Ex Libris C. K. OGDEN S FOE STUDENTS. The NICOMACHEAN ETHICS of ARISTOTLE. A New Translation, maiuly from the Text of Bekker ; with an Introduc- tion, a Marginal Analysis, and Explanatory Notes. Designed for the Use of Students in the Universities, By the Eev. D. P. Chase, M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, and Principal of St. Mary Hall, Oxford. Fourth Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. cloth, 7s. 6d. REMARKS on the USE and ABUSE of SOME POLITICAL TERMS. By the late Eight Hon. Sir Georgb CoenewjUll Lewis, Bart., sometime Student of Christ Church, Oxford. A New Edition, with Notes and Appendix by Sir Roland Knyvet Wilson, Bart., M.A., Barrister-at-Law ; late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge ; Author of ' History of Modern English Law.' Crown 8vo. cloth, 6s. A SYNOPSIS and SUMMARY of the REPUBLIC of PLATO. With a Prefatory Excursus upon the Platonic Philosophy, and Short Notes. By George William Gent, B.A. [Preparing. A SYNOPSIS and SUMMARY of the ANNALS of TACITUS. Boolvs I. -VI. With Introduction, Notes, and Indexes. By GEOEciE William Gent, B.A., late Scholar of University College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. cloth, 3s. 6d. SYNOPSIS and SUMMARY of the HISTORY of TACITUS. By George William Gent, B.A. [^Preparing. A SYNOPSIS of LIVY'S HISTORY of the SECOND PUNIC WAR. Books XXI.-XXIV. With Appendices, Notesj Maps and Plans. By J. B. Worcester, M. A. Second Edition. Fcp. Ba^o. cloth, 3s. Qd. A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY of the CHIEF REAL PROPERTY STATUTES, with their more important Provisions. For the Use of Law Students. By P. F. Aldred, B.A. \_In the press. An ANALYSIS of ADAM SMITH'S WEALTH of NA- TIONS. Books I. II. [Preparing/. ARS SCRIBENDI LATINE ; or, Aids to Latin Prose Com- position. In the Form of an Analysis of Latin Idioms. By BiCKERTON A. Edwards, B.A. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d. JAMES TUOBNTON, HIGH STREET, OXFORD. Tiools for Students. PAL/ESTRA OXONIENSIS. QUESTIONS and EXERCISES for MATRICULATION and EESPON.SIONS. CoNTKNTS : (1.) Grainmatical Questions in G-reek and Latin. (2.) Materials for Latin Prose. (3.) Questions on Authors. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. cloth 3«. Gd. QUESTIONS and EXERCISES for the SCHOOL CERTI- FICATE, and FIK8T PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS. Contents: — (1.) Critical Grammar Questions in Greek and Latin. (2.) Unseen Passages for Translation. Crown 8vo. [Freparmg. QUESTIONS and EXERCISES for MATRICULATION and KESPONSIONS. Contents: (1.) Arithmetic\ (2.) Algebra. (3.) Euclid. Second Edition, lievised and Adapted to the Certificate Examinations of the Oxford and Cambridge Schools Examination Board. Crown 8vo. [/m the press. The Answers will be published; and may be had separately. Crown 8vo. ELEMENTARY QUESTIONS on the LAW of PROPERTY, REAL and PERSONAL ; Supplemented by Advanced Questions on the Law of Contracts. With Copious References throughout, and an Index of Legal Terms. By Philip Foster Aldbed, B.A., Hertford College, Oxford. Crown Svo, cloth, 5s. OPINIONS of the FBESS. ' Tlio value of such a compendium of questions will bo btst appreciated by the student himself, who has probably found himself utterly at a loss to obtain what he wants from the wide range of an ordinary Examination Paper. The references annexed to each question, and which are intended to indicate where full information on the subject may be found, are most complete, as may perhaps be inferred when we state that they fall very little sliortof 0000 in number.' The OxFOKD AND Cambhiuge Undergraduate's JournaIj, Nov. 2, 187G. ' The Author has compiled a very useful handbook for the legal student.' The Sheffield and Rotheuham Independent, Nov. 2, 1876. ' Contains a great deal that is very suggestive, and will be found useful by the student in directing his reading. There are copious references to authorities where the ansv^ere to the questions will be- found.' The Law Times, Oct. 28, 187G. ' The Author has conferred a great boon, not OTily on the University law students, for whom it is evidently intended, but also on that much larger community of young men who are preparing for practical branches of tbe legal profession. We are speaking now more particularly of those who are training to become solicitors, and who have to pass the examination of the Incorporated Law Society before being admitted to practice.' The SiiEFEiELD Post, Nov. 4, 187(!. ' Candidates for the intermediate and final examinations of the Incorporated Law Society may refer with advantage to a collection of questions on the " Law of Real and " Personal Property," edited by Mr. Philip Foster Aldred, B.A The book contains a digest of questions.' The Law JounNAL, Nov. 11, 1870. QUESTIONS and EXERCISES in ELEMENTARY LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE and INDUCTIVl':; with Index of Logical Terms. Crown Svo. paper covers, Zs.; cloth, 3s. dd. QUESTIONS on the OLD and NEW TESTAMENT, with PASSAGES for TRANSLATION from the GREEK TESTA- MENT. {Vreparing. JAMES THORNTON, HIGH STREET, OXFORD. THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES POLITICAIj tebms. PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AXD CO., LOXDOX, FOR JAMES THOENTON, OXFOED. Camirilfgr : J. HALL AND SON, Tuumpixgtox Sti;eet. SBufiltli: HODGES, FOSTER, AND CO., Gkafton Steeict. eofixljurslj : MACLACHLAN AND STEWART, South Ehidge. iL0litl0ll : SIxMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO., Stationebs'-Hall Court. REMARKS 0^7 / THE USE AND ABUSE OF SOME POLITICAL TEEMS. BY THE LATE RIGHT HON. Sill GEORGE CORNEWALL LEWIS, BART. SOMETIME STUDENT OP CHRIST CHUIICH, OXFOIiD. A .SEW EDlTloS. WITH XvTES AXD A/'/'EMJlX SIR ROLAND KNYVET WILSON, BART., M.A. BARRISTER- AT -LAW : LATE FELLOW OP KIVG'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE : . AUTHOR OF ' HISTORY OK MODEli>' ENGLISH LAW.' THE LIBRARY UNWEPRTTYjflF CALIFORNU ' Seal up tlic mouth of outrage for awhile, ' ' ' Till we can clear these ambiguities, And know their spring, tlicir head, their true rlescont.' Romeo ami Julift, Act v. .Scene ;). JAMES THORNTON, HIGH STKKKT 1877. PEEFACE. By tele Editor. This book was the first, or nearly the first, literary attempt of its distinguished author, having been published by him in 1832, at a time when he was only 26 years old. He lived till 1863, combining eminent services to the State with most remarkable literary activity, in the coiuse of which, however, he never thought fit to revise and republish this production of his early manhood, nor does it appear to have reached a second edition. No mention of it occurs in his published letters ; but as the same may be said of all but one or two of his numerous writings, no inference could be drawn from this alone as to his mature judgment respecting it. It is a more significant fact that, in his much later and more elaborate work on the "^Methods of Observation and Eeasoning in Politics,' he not only never refers to the earlier treatise in places where it would have been natural for him to do so, but incorporates a consider- able portion of its matter, in a condensed form and stripped of the illustrations, in a single chapter, entitled ' The Technical Language of Politics' ; a proceeding which certainly conveys the impression that he either wished or expected the ' Use and Abuse ' to be speedily forgotten. Under these circumstances, it may seem a somewhat rash undertaking to reprint the book fom'teen years after the author's death and forty-five years after its ILSLSIO VI EniTOR S PREFACE. original publication. The reasons which encourage me nevertheless to hope for a favourable reception are, first, the increased attention now bestowed in many quarters, and especially at the Universities, on the scien- tific study of law and politics ; secondly, the more specific fact that, as I am informed, this particular work, having been some time out of print, has been frequently inquired for of late, and that Oxford teachers have recommended their pupils to consult it if possible. It is not difficult to imderstand why this should be so. The value of the book for educational purposes consists not so much in its positive results, which have naturally been embodied by this time, so far as they have been generally accepted, in other standard treatises, as in the fact that it opens a vein of thought which the student may usefully follow out to any extent for himself, and that it affords an instructive example of a thoughtful, scientific, and in the best sense academical style of treating political questions. Our Universities have sometimes been hotbeds of premature excitement and partisansliip about the immediate ques- tions of the hour, political or religious, while at other times they have fallen into the worse fault of a sleepy or cowardly shirking of responsibility, diverting the minds of their scholars from the studies which should chiefly concern them as men and citizens either to mere abstrac- tions or to ornamental or antiquarian trifling. Such treatises as the present may at least serve to remind a young man of the true use of the precious interval which precedes his immersion in the actual work of a public or professional career ; namely, to familiarise himself with the theory of the subjects which he will afterwards have to deal with in practice, and to reason coolly while he can on (questions with which his personal interests and passions are only too likely hereafter to become involved. The temper of mind which will refuse to use or accept a bad argument EDITOR S PREFACE. Vll in support of a right conclusion must be acquired at the undergraduate age, if at all, and, even when acquired, is difficult enough to retain. Lastly, it is a commonplace remark that authors are not always the best judges of the comjDarative excellence of their own works, and in this case there seem, to be reasons which may well justify the preference which the public has certainly shown for the earlier and slighter treatise over the more mature and elaborate one. It is not unlikely to have been felt by many readers of the ' Methods of Observation ' that it is calculated to set public men on a false scent by encouraging premature and exaggerated expectations from inquiries into the laws of causation in politics; the fact being that in our present state of knowledge, and in any state that we are likely to attain for a long time to come, the difference between a good and a bad statesman depends far more upon the power and determination to get at what we call the rights of a case, to see how the elementary axioms of morality apply to a complicated state of facts, and to act and induce others to act accordingly, than upon their respective degrees of success, very slight at the best, in predicting specific consequences. The treatise now under considera- tion, professing as it does to be a contribution only to one subordinate but indispensable object, namely, the forma- tion of a convenient and consistent political terminology, is at least open to no objection on this score ; its utility is quite independent of the truth or falsehood of any poli- tical theory, and is undeniable so far as it goes. On this head I have nothing to add to the author's own intro- ductory observations. With regard to my own annotations, the object wliich I have chiefly kept in view has been to direct the attention of the reader to such later writings as have expressly undertaken to fix the scientific meaning of the political Vlll EDITORS PREFACE. terms here discussed, and, above all, to ' Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence,' to which the present work may be con- sidered as a kind of companion volume. The connection is indeed very close between the two authors. They were personal friends, associated at one time in an important and successful undertaking, as the joint commissioners who framed a code of laws for Malta. Sir Gr. C. Lewis had been a member of the class to which Austin's lectures were addressed — lectures which had been delivered, though not yet published, when he wrote his ' Use and Abuse,' which accoimts for each work containing a reference to the other. (See below, Tntrod. p. 11, and 'Student's Austin,' p. 427.) Points which are here tentatively discussed and copiously illustrated are often curtly determined by Austin with an authority which seems to be generally accepted as final. Hence the reader who finds Austin dry for want of detailed applications may be glad to supplement him with Lewis, and the critical reader of Lewis will be interested to find his conclusions occasionally set aside, but more often confirmed by Austin. So far as Sir Gr. C. Lewis's illustrations are drawn from ancient sources, they fit in excellently with the ordinary course of University reading, and more especially with that of Oxford ; tlie modern illustrations are, as was to be expected, taken to a consi- derable extent from treatises which were attracting notice at the time, but are not much read at the present day. Systematically to supply parallel passages from more recent publications in all these cases was a task which would have required a range of reading as extensive as that of the author hiniself, and which I felt no inclination or capacity to undertake ; it would indeed have been to re-write the book rather than to edit it. I have, however, referred here and there to such passages as occurred to me, and it is to be hoped that many readers will carry on the process for themselves. EDITORS PEEFACE. IX By way of further promoting the use of the book as a stimulus to inquiry rather than as a compendium of infor- mation, I have called attention in the Appendix to some other political terms which appeared to be frequently handled in modern controversies, and to be deserving of investigation. And, inasmuch as misunderstandings not unfrequently arise from the use of different words to describe the same thing, as well as from the application of the same word to different things, I have appended a short list of such phrases of this kind as occurred to me : not exactly as an Index Expurgatorius, since the words are mostly very good in themselves, but in order to assist those who use the corresponding eulogistic and dyslogistic synonyms to realise that they are agreed as to the facts themselves, and only differ as to their feelings about them. I ought not to conclude without acknowledging my obligations to Mr. T. Case, M.A., Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for several valuable suggestions and cor- rections, which I have thankfully adopted. E. K. W. 3 ilECKLENBURGH StREET, LoNDON, W.C. : ■Janimry, 1877. ADVERTISEMENT. The Author's footnotes are indicated by numerals ; those of tlie Editor by letters ; or, where they are continuations of the Author's, by being eiiflosed in brackets thus — f 1 ; and in either case are initialled ' W.' CONTENTS. PAG r. IKTEODUCTION I. GoVEKIvMEXT 17 II. CoifSTITTJTIOX-^CoXSTITlTTIONAL 18 III. Eight — Dutt — "Wrong — EiGHiFrL — WEoxGFrL — Justice 1\. Law — Lawful — Unlawful .... v. sotekeign — sotebeigxtt Division of Forms of Governtncnt VI. Monarchy — Eoxalty — King .... VII. CoMjroNWEALTH — Eepublic — Eepublican VIII. Aeistoceact — Oligarchy — Nobility IX. Democracy X. Mixed Government — Balance of Powers XI. People — Community XII. Eepresentation — Eepeesentative — Pepresentati^ Government '-K'l XIII. EiCH — Middle Class — Poor KK! XIV. Nature— Natural — Unnatural — State of Natuiie V2~y XV. Liberty — Freedom — Free 140 XVI. Free Government — Arbitrary Government — Tyranny — Despotism— Anarchy . XVII, Power— Authority — Force K"' 1 20 41 > OS Xll CONTENTS. PAGE XVIII. Public — Private — Political — Civil — Municipal . 163 XIX. Property — Possession — Estate— Estates of Par- liament 169 XX. Community of Goods 172 Tabular Division of Governments 177 Note on Sovereignty 179 APPENDIX. I. Nation — Nationality — National . . . .183 II. Party — Liberal — Conservative .... 185 III. Autonomy — Local Self-Government — Home Rule 189 IV. Permissive Legislation • 190 V, Eulogistic and Dyslogistic Synonyms . . . 190 Index 193 POLITICAL TEEMS. IXTEODUCTION. The object of the following work is to illustrate the various uses of the principal terms belonging to political science. It is the duty of every science to perform this office for itself ; and those equivocal words which belong to no par- ticular subject might conveniently be assigned to the pro- vince of logic. An inquiry of this description may be con- sidered as occupying a middle place between a technical dictionary, and a scientific treatise on the same subject ; as being more copious and connected than the one, more meagre and desultory than the other. With the view, then, of affording to political speculation the assistance to be derived from a technical vocabulary, I have attempted ■ to collect from different writers examples of the principal meanings attached to those terms of political science which seemed of the greatest importance and most frequent occurrence. As it was obviously desirable to ascertain such usages, not only in the set phrase of scientific inquirers, ))ut also in the living language of party discussion, I have purposely selected examples from writers of all opinions, often from modern anonymous publications, having no other care than to represent their statements with fidelity. For the most part, however, I have limited myself to works of extensive circulation and established character, and especially to those employed in this countiy as elementary treatises in various departments of political knowledge ; as their authority has the widest influence, and their errors and confusions are the most mischievous. Hence I have. 2 POLITICAL TERMS. wherever it was possible, selected instances from the Com- mentaries of Blackstone, the speculative parts of which work may be considered as an epitome of popular fallacies and misconceptions on most of the fimdamental doctrines of jurisprudence and government. The explanations and distinctions which accompany and connect the various passages examined in the follow- ing inquiries, are intended to assist in assuring the results or detecting the fiillacies of political reasoning, by putting the reader on his guard against unconsciously passing from one signitication of a word to another. Of the liability even of the most skilful and experienced reasoners to this fatal error, the instances cited in the ensuing pages fur- nish examples, which may perhaps surprise sonae persons who have not considered and observed the powerful influ- ence of equivocal language in deceiving the mind. Per- haps there is no moral or political treatise of any length, certainly no considerable argumentative work, of which the conclusions are not in some degree affected by an incautious employment, or an unperceived ambiguity, of language. The following work is therefore strictly adapted to the pm'poses of political arguraent ; and even if the defini- tions which I have either borrowed or suggested should be thought incorrect, yet the investigation of the various .senses of each word, as occurring in popular language, must, if properly employed, furnish to others the means of detect- ing fallacy in political discussion. The ' Book of Fallacies,' published by Mr. Bentham,'^ was not properly a guide for the detection of sophisms in political argument : it was a treatise on the truth of certain propositions commonly assumed in political reasoning. The arguments which he attacked were not fallacious : like the arguments of a madman, they were correct and conclusive, if certain pre- nnises or principles were granted. Some of these principles he disproved with great force and ingenuity : but the utility of his book is limited to arguments in which those particular propositions are either stated or implied, and it furnishes no clue for the solution of questions in which those principles are not involved. * Vol. ii. p. 375, of Bentham's Complete Works, edited by Bowrinff. — W. INTRODUCTION. 3 The following researches, however, relate, not to the truth of any particular propositions, but to the meaning of certain terms used in political reasoning ; which, being often employed with different senses in the premises and ■conclusion, have given rise to countless inconclusive argu- ments, and have thus caused fallacies of argument in the proper meaning of the word. The soundness of an infer- ence cannot depend on the use of a term. Hence an inquiry into the meaning of words may fm'nish an instru- mental art for the purposes of argument, applicaVjle to an indefinite extent, which an inquiry into the truth of cer- tain propositions never can. There are two ways in which an argument may be re- futed : viz. 1 . By shewing that one of the premises is false ; and 2. by shewing that though the premises may be true, the conclusion does not follow from them. In most cases the opponent has his option which of these two courses he shall adopt ; for, on account of the mutilated form in which arguments are commonly stated, the entire .syllogism may be restored, either by supplying a false pre- mise — in which case the inference would be good — or by supplying a true pi'emise — in which case the inference would be bad. Thus the argument of the ancient Eg}^^- tians mentioned by Herodotus, that fire is a living animal because it devours, may be either restored thus — Fire is an animal, because all things that devour are animals, and fire devours ; where one premise is fiilse, although the inference is correct; — or thus : Fire is an animal, because animals •devour, and fire devours ; where both premises are true, but the conclusion does not follow from them. So the argu- ment of Mr. Canning, examined below (under Tyranny), in its present form, is an unsound inference founded on true premises : it might be converted into a sound argument by assuming one fiilse premise. In most cases, it is advis- able to adopt the former course, because the generality of people are better able to comprehend the Msity of a pro- position, than the unsoundness of an inference. But out of the whole number of invalid arguments, a very small portion are so palpal)ly inconclusive as those just noticed. In the great majority of instances, the error springs from B 2 4 POLITICAL TERMS. the hidden and unsuspected source of verbal ambig'uity ; the effects of which, imperceptibly mingling with the dis- cussion, poison the whole current of the reasoning, and vitiate every part which they touch. The influence of this cause upon reasoning is the more powerful and extensive, because not even those who know the ambiguity of a term are always proof against the con- fusion which it tends to generate. ' It is not the same thing (as has been truly observed ) to be merely acquainted with the ambiguity of a term, and to be practically aware of it, and watchful of the consequences connected with it.'^ For this reason it may be usefid, even to the practised political reasoner, to illustrate the various usages of the words with which he is conversant, and to point out the mistakes and confusions to which they have given rise ; in order that the impression of their ambiguities, and the con- viction of the necessity of attending to them, may be more deeply fixed in his mind. It is for want of attending to points which, if ever thought of, would not require half the labour and iiigenuity often wasted by disputants in eloquent declamation or personal invective, that (as Lord Bacon has observed) * Magnte et soleunes disputationes hominum doctorum ssepe in controversias circa verba et nomina desinunt : a quibus (ex more et prudentia mathematicorum) incipere consultius foret, easque per definitiones in ordinem redi- gere.'"^ As the experiment lias never yet been tried, how far, by a close attention to the definitions and meanings of words, controversies in the moral and political sciences may be rendered useful in the discovery of truth, and be relieved from the curse of barrenness which has hitherto almost constantly been upon them, it is uncertain how much of the blame is to be attributed to the insufficiency of the weapons, and how much to the imfairness and un- skilfulness with which they are used. So deep a sense of ' Whately"s liumptou Zertiire.i, p. 413.* 2 Novum Orgaiioii, lib. 1. aph. .51>. * The U.ift nnd Ahuxe of Partij Fi'i'linrj in matters of lieligioii, considered in eight sermons preached before the University of Oxford, l\v Richard Whately, M.A. (after- terwards Archbishop of Dublin). I liave not been able to find the words here quoted. Tiiere are not so many as 413 paijes, cither in the first edition (1822), which is the one- elsewhere referred to by our author, or in the fourth and last edition, entitled Bampton /^ectures and other Sermons. — W. INTRODUCTION. 5 the imperfections of language had Locke, that, he even goes so far as to affirm that if any one ' shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, he will find some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge among mankind.'* Although it is impossible to agree with this opinion in its whole extent, as language, whatever may be its defects, is the only means by which knowledge can be preserved and communiqated ; yet it is difficult to overrate its influence on reasoning, especially when we remember that language is not only the sign by which we express our thoughts and reasonings, but also the instrument by which we think and reason. The mis- take arises not in the expression or communication, but in the conception of the argument. It is an error to suppose that a man cannot be misled by a verbal fallacy, without seeing it formally dra^vn out in words. WTiether or not the following attempt to unravel some of the chief ambiguities of political language may be found satisfactory, it is obviously desirable that persons about to engage in controversy should be agreed as to the use of certain common signs ; otherwise, if they disagree both as to their opinions, and the manner of establishing and ex- pressing thein, there is no prospect of any other result from the debate than mutual misunderstanding and misrepresen- tation. ' Quum enim (as Lord Bacon says) nee de principiis consentiamus,necde demonstrationibus,tollitur omnis argu- mentatio.' ^ Disputants in this condition are familiarly said to be at cross pwrposes. Each one is eagerly combating a shadow, which he mistakes for the substance of his adversary's argument. If men are not agreed about their weapons, they cannot engage in controversy. If two duellists go out into the field, the one armed with a sword, the other with a pistol, they cannot settle their dispute. Unluckily, however, as the difference of weapons is not so obvious in intellectual as in physical conflicts, the dis- putants proceed to the encounter without further explana- ' Essaif ou. the Understandimj, b. iii, ch. 11. § 4. * Novum Organon, lib. i. aph. 61. 6 POLITICAL TEMIS. tion : and as their minds are often too eagerly bent on victory to take a calm survey of the subject, and its real difficulties and obscurities, each one falls upon those state- ments of his adversary which appear most objectionable, prol)ably because a sense is attributed to them which was never intended ; and the controversy commonly ends in the most frivolous verbal questions. ' Nothing (says Hume) is more usual than for philosophers to encroach on the province of grammarians, and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern.'' As in legal con- troversy, when all the facts are admitted by both parties, the point in dispute must be a question of law ; so in political controversy, when all the facts are given, and the question does not relate to some futiu-e event,^ the dispute must turn on the meaning of words. Thus, for example, when it is debated whether an hereditary upper chamber is better than one for life, whether a king is better than a president, &c., the question is real. When it is debated whether the English constitution is a monarchy or an aristocracy, whether it is a piu-e or a mixed government ; whether the King of England is sovereign ; whether monarchy can be combined with aristocracy or democracy, or both; these are merely verbal questions. A verbal discussion may be important or unimiDortant, but it is at least desirable to know that it is verbal. For want of attending to this distinction, nearly all controversialists, blinded by the heat and fury of the discussion, treat the merest verbal disputes as questions of vast moment and difficulty, and draw out their arguments to an immeasur- able length, until, having fairly bewildered their readers, irritated each other by fruitless wrangling, and embroiled the subject which both imdertook to explain, they at last retire from the field for very weariness. But that verbal questions, if treated as verbal questions, and not mistaken for what they are not, may lead to the most useful residts, I need not express my conviction, who have compiled the following observations for the sake of explaining the signification of political words. In pointing ' Essays, Appendix 4. Worlis, vol. iv. p. 396. INTRODUCTION. 7 out their various senses, however, it is not intended to imply, that it is possible, either in scientific or popular discourse, constantly to attribute to each word only one meaning. Many of the ambiguities remarked upon, depend on causes not connected with our own language ; and may be traced to historical associations and other circumstances, which have equally influenced the languages of other nations, both in ancient and modern times. Hence many parts of the following pages might be literally translated into French or German, without losing their application or truth. The links which bind together these various shades of meaning, are connected too closely with the general course of our thoughts to be broken at the com- mand of any individual. It is impossible to legislate in matters of language ; " the evils arising from its imperfec- tions may be eluded, but can never be removed. No mischief, however, arises from the variable meaning of a word (except sometimes a partial obscurity), unless the argument turns on the double sense. Thus there is no harm in calling the republican government of England and France a monarchy ; there is no harm in calling the aristocratic government of the United States a democracy ; only let it be remembered that they are not what they are called. There is no objection to a misnomer, so that it does not lead us astray. But if it were argued, that justice^ not laiu, ought to be administered in courts of justice ; that no man can have a right to do that which is wrong; that in a kingdom tlie institutions ought to be monarchical, &c. ; then the ambiguity is mischievous, because it serves as an inducement to error, and confounds things as well as words. Such verbal ambiguities generate confusion of thought » This is only partially true, cenlurios in a foreign laiii^uage, The adoption of a fixed nomencla- and for several more in a verbose tare and orthography in all laws jargon almost equally remote from and legal instruments cannot fail literary English. A still more di- to exercise a powerful intiuencc reel influence is exercised by a sys- o\er popular usage; an influence tem of State education, such as which would have been much more that which we have now, but which strongly felt in England, had not liad not begun to exist when this our laws been expressed for many book was written.— W. 8 POLITICAL TERMS. in those who sincerely seek after truth, and afford an opportunity for delusion to those whose only object is to support a party measure, or a preconceived opinion ; who seek an end without caring for the honesty of the means. Still, notwithstanding the vast number of unsound argu- ments advanced on all great political questions, there are probably few politicians who constantly follow the rules suggested by the author of the work on Parliamentary Logic : they generally share in some degree in the delusions which they propagate, and feel some part of the enthusiasm which they kindle. It is impossible to say how much of the evils of party contention has arisen solely from interes- ted persons making use of certain phrases as a pretext, and how much from honest mischievousness caused by the delusion of language ; for it is to be remembered that political terms do not always occur singly in reasoning, and that when several are crowded together in the same propo- sition or argument, the chances of delusion are infinitely multiplied.' The following researches, however, are chiefly designed for the use of persons engaged in political studies, espe- cially of those beginning such pursuits, who often require some manual, some book of reference, beyond a mere dictionary, which should furnish an explanation of the terms belonging to political science. For want of this assistance, persons not acquainted with the vocabulary of a science, are sometimes unable to detect the flaws in reasoning by which they are not convinced. It often happens that an argument seems inconclusive, without our being able to comprehend lohy it is so : we may be able to disprove the conclusion, but not to refute the argument. It serves, however, greatly to confirm and strengthen our • ' The best verbal fallacies are those which consist not in the am- biguity of a single word, but in the ambiguous syntaxis of many put together,' says Mr. Hamilton, in his very acute, though not very honest, Maximji of Parliamentary Lvc/ie, p. 29.* By beitt is here meant most- ealculated to deceive. This remark, which refers to ambiguities of construction (as, Aio te, ^acida, Romanes vincere posse), applies with at least equal force to such collections of equivocal words, as ' Man has a natural right to his liberty.' * On this author see Bentham's Boak of Falliiries, section 7. — W. INTRODUCTION. 9 conviction if we can perceive, not only why we are ri^ht, bnt why those who ditier from lis are wrong. ^ Now for this purpose there is no instrument so powerful as an accurate knowledge, and a watchfid observance of the different uses of words. This often affords the master-key which discloses the whole mystery, and at once resolves all difficulties by showing that they have no existence. . Nor is it only in the detection of the fallacies of others that an attention to the different meanings of words is to be recommended : this test of correctness may be applied \vith at least as much benefit to our own reasonings as to those of our neighbours. And above all is this attention requisite in coiioiiunicating our thoughts ; for it some- times (though perhaps not often) happens that a man may clearly imderstand a subject which, nevertheless, for the want of appropriate language, he may fail to make intel- ligil)le to others. To the acute and profound Butler it might, indeed, seem that ' confusion and perplexity in writing is indeed without excuse, because anyone may, if he pleases, know whether he understands and sees through what he is about ;"^ but, unhappily, there are few qualities so rare as a clear perception of the boundaries of a man's ip-norance and knowledgfe. The nuiltitude of treatises which discuss a subject without explaining or proving any- thing with distinctness, * darkening coimsel by words without knowledge,' owe a great part of their obscurity and inconclusiveness to a neglect of definitions, and to an inaccurate use of language. ' They who are accustomed to reflect on ideas, know well how much ideas depend on words. Improper terais are the chains which bind men to unrea- sonable practices. Error is never so difficult to be de- stroyed, as when it has its root in language. Every improper tei'ui contains the germ of fallacious proposi- tions ; it forms a cloud, which conceals the nature of the thing, and presents a frequently invincible obstacle to the ' Oi) fjiuvov Be7 raXjiOfS fiTrelv, aWa Koi rb alriov rod »|/f i<5ous • tovto yap '€Tat ■a.\7]8(s ovK ov dA7)6t5, TTiar^viiv Troiilrcf aK-qQil ixaKKov. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. h. vii. cli. 14 § li. * Preface to Sernaunt in the Ilollx (Impel. 10 POLITICAL TERMS. clisco\ery of truth.' ^ Such errors cloud the minds both of the author and his readers, of the teacher and his disciples, of the speaker and his audience ; and from their very minuteness, and seeming insionificance, are only the more difficult to discover, and the less willingly acknowledged : as people are indignant f^t being supposed liable to be duped by a trick apparently so inartificial, or to be eagerly searching at a distance for that which lies at their feet. The number of political arguments now sent forth into the world by means of newspapers, magazines, reviews, and other periodical publications is so great, that errors arising* from the indistinctness of words are embodied in a thou- sand forms, and multiplied in a constantly increasing progression. For this reason it is the more desirable that, where all people talk on the same subject, they should be agreed about the vocabulary with which they discuss it : or, at any rate, that they should be aware that they are not agreed. There are, indeed, too many political dis- com'ses, besides Sir E. Filmer's, of which we may say with Locke, that ' if anyone will be at the pains to strip it of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce the words to direct positive intelligi])le proposi- tions, and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied that there was never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English.'^ On the application of the tests suggested in the following in- quiries, pages of flowery declamation, or serious mysticism, shrink into nothing, or fall to pieces, deprived of their apparent coherency. Possibly too, the same weapons may sometimes avail against those shameless impostors, who seek only to produce an immediate effect without caring for subsequent detection : like the passers of bad money, to whom it is indifferent how soon the fraud is discovered, so that they escape with their dishonest gains. But let me not be imderstood to affirm that it is possible, by any system of rules, however well framed, to afford an infallible ' Bentham on Evidence, by Dumont, b. iii. ch. 1. [This is most readily accessible in French, under the title, Preuvbs Judiciaires, 2 vols. There is an English translation in the Lincoln's Inn Library, but it is out of print. — W. ] * Preface to 2'reatise on (iorerui/in/t. INTRODUCTION. 11 guide for the perception of fallacious reasoning derived from the imperfection of language : still less to undeceive those whose minds are under the influence of arguments, artfully adapted to party feelings, and urged with confi- dence and effrontery, by a practised and ingenious sophist.* When we think of the difhculty of finding the way when we are most desirous to go right, how easy to mislead those whom we wish to go wrong ! In selecting the words to be included in an explanatory catalogue of the terms of political science, a doubt some- times arose : as, on account of the imperfect separation between the provinces of government and law, many words of which it seemed desirable to treat, lie on a debatable ground, and owe a divided allegiance to politics and juris- prudence. In these, such as right, sovereignty, &c., I have generally followed the definitions laid dovra. by Mr. Austin in the ' Outline of his Lectures on General Jurisprudence' ; ^ but although much of what I have said ' ' Natura cavillationis, quam Grajci (T6(pi(r/xa appellant, hfec est, ut ab evidenter veris j)er hreriasimas miifafio/ii's disputatio ad ea qiite evi- denter falsa sunt perducatvir.' — Dif/. lib. 50. t. 16. c. 177. The method of deceit by a slight variation in the use of a word, is practised in the same manner by the modern, as by the ancient sophist : only instead of displaying his ingenuity by appearing to prove that which his hearers know to 1)0 false, he displays it by appearing to prove that which they wish to be true. - The statements alluded to (which I had, moreover, the ad- vantage of liearing tilled up by J\Ir. Austin, in his oral lectures) are chiefly contained in the following passage: — 'Neither a sovereign one (or a monarch, properly so called) nor a sovereign number (in its collegiate and sovereign capacit}') bears a status or condition (in the proper acceptation of the term). Conditions are composed of Irf/al rights and duties, and of capacities and incapacities to take and incur them. But, since such rights and duties are products of positive law, and since positive law is merely the creature of the sovereign, we cannot ascribe a condition, (which is composed of such rights and duties) to a monarch or sovereign body. We may say that the sovereign has y;^)/rCT".'<. We may say that the soverciign lias rights, conferred by the law of God : tliat the sovereign lias rights (impro- perly so called) conferred by the law (improperly so called) which I style positive morality: that tlie sovereign is subject to duties set by the law of (iod : tliat the sovereign is subject to duties (impro- perly so called) whicli jiositive moi-ality enjoins. lUit to say that the sovereign has legal riglits, or lies under legal duties, is to say that the sovereign is subject to a sovereign, by whom those rights are conferred, and by whom those duties are imposed. In other words. 12 POLITICAL TERMS. under these heads is either stated or implied in the short but comprehensive work referred to, yet the mere state- ment of the truth, though it implies the correction of error, was not sufficient for the purpose which I had in view. jNIy object was to show that, although the truth is one, error is manifold ; and to point out the inconsist- encies, as well as the inaccuracy, of popular views : for it commonly happens that scientific explanations are rejected by a lai'ge majority, who agree only in that negative opinion ; and entertain on the point in dispute notions just as irreconcilable with one another, as with the truth which they unanimously condemn. When the definition of sovereignty is once determined, the principle of division for the different forms of govern- ment, and their respective definitions, (as laid down by most political writers,) flow from it as necessary conse- quences. On this important point there appears to be a ■difference of phraseology rather than opinion ; for although the established legal language of this country gives the title of ' sovereign ' to the King alone, yet many eminent writers, well acquainted with the English Constitution both in its ancient and modern form, and little inclined to derogate from the authority and amplitude of the Cro^vn, have considered the legislative sovereignty as belonging jointly to the King and the two Houses of Parliament : nor am I aware that objections have ever been made to this language. Whether or not the name of ' sovereignty' is to be given to a power indispensable to the making of a law, and subject to no responsibility, is of course a mere question of convenience. But, by whatever name this particular kind of power may be distinguished, its character is essentially different from power whii h, though indis- pensable to the exercise of government, is subject to responsibility. In this respect, however, I have followed the course which seemed to possess the most obvious con- venience, and to be sanctioned by the highest authority. the proposition amounts to this : that the sovereign is not sovereign.' — Outline of a course of Lectures on General Jurisjjrudence. to be •delivered in the University of London, p. 50. [See now the Student's Austin, by Campbell, pp. 105, 116, 118, 193.— W.] INTRODUCTION. 13 The simple and orii^inal metliod of dividing governments by the number of the governors, employed and illustrated in the following pages, may to some persons seem barren and inconvenient ; inasmuch as, since the extinction of city communities, such as those of ancient Grreece, or of ancient and modern Italy, and the general introduction of the system of political i-epresentation, there exists no longer such a government as a democracy. Nor can it be denied that, according to that phraseology, to say that a state is an aristocracy, conveys very little information as to the character of its institutions, as this name would include governments as different as those of Venice, England, and the United States of America. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that the division into monarchies and republics, or into governments where one rules, and where several rule, always marks a mighty distinction in the real character of the respective consti- tutions ; nor can any thing more tend to confusion, both of words and thought, than an attempt to make the names of governments imply more than they rightly denote, by attributing to them subsidiary meanings besides their proper and direct signification. It is thus that the term republic^ having been distorted from its right sense, and understood to imply particular accidents of some govern- ments designated by that name, has clouded many poli- tical discourses, and raised many unfounded prejudices; and the term monarchy, l)y being applied to kingdoms, and confounded with royalty, has induced many persons to transfer to kings the evil impressions justly entertained against arbitrary princes, or monarcJis properly so called."* In general, I have intentionally avoided all remarks on the meanings of the words examined, which do not fall within the scope of political science. Thus under Liheuty I have said nothing of freewill and necessity ; nor under Power, have I made any allusion to mechanical powers, powers of the mind, &c. But in the word Nature, on account of the difficulty of tracing its numerous and discordant significations, it was necessary to take a wider * Tlic Editor's comments on this view will ])C found further on. — W. 14 roLiTicAL tehms. range than its political applications would include. An attempt was indeed made, many years ago, by Boyle, to lay down the various uses of this word;* but, as his researches are confined to its physical meanings, and although drawn out to a considerable lengtli, they have not exhausted, nor indeed greatly elucidated the subject, it appeared necessary to occupy an independent ground. In the words Nature and Liberty I have distinguislied two senses — one positive, tlie other negative ; both of which respectively may doul)tless be traced to a common head, although it was sufficient for my purpose to indicate without accounting for them. Liberty, in its original sense, appears to signify a power of doing what we desire : but as this power may be considered in a double light, the word liberty has obtained a double sense, and we some- times use it in reference to the capacity which enables us to act, and sometimes to the absence of that which disables lis from acting. In like manner. Nature seems to have originally expressed a notion of that which any thing is : whence it sometimes means the essence, disposition, &c., of any thing ; sometimes that which it was before it was altered. In a work which contains an examination of so many elementary doctrines, and which incidentally touches on so many debated and debatable questions of political science, it must of course be expected that some persons will find passages which will seem to them obvious truths, not worthy of statement; while others may find assertions whicli they may think not only false in themselves, but likely to lead to dangerous conclusions : — in short, that many parts may seem to be made up of useless truisms and mischievous paradoxes. To the former I can only say that truths, familiar to them, may possibly not be familiar to all others ; that things familiarly known are not always practically observed ; and that, moreover, it sometimes happens that people are satisfied of the truth of doctrines to which they were led by steps which they have forgotten ; — that they believe the conclusion without remembering ' Pi-e.e Iiiquirij i/do the received Notion of Nature, WorliS, vol. v. pp. 158—254. 4to. INTRODUCTION. 15 the premises. Now to such persons it may, perhaps, be useful if their attention is recalled to the connexion between their opinions and the assumptions wliich these involve ; and if they are reminded that the positions wliich they now at once condemn were tlie parents of many doctrines to wliich they still steadfastly adhere. To the latter class I would submit that the following- remarks are not intended to establish a theory of govern- ment, but to investigate and explain the use of political words ; and that definitions, laid down for the sake of con- venience, and sanctioned by the authority of usage, are not to be treated as positions intended to serve as the basis of a system, and established only for the sake of their results. But above all, I would suggest, that, in drawing conclusions from the statements of otliers, the reader may fancy that there is a real, because there is a verbal con- nexion ; and may think, without reason, tliat others neces- sarily draw from certain premises the same inference as himself. There is no objection to a fair use of indirect reasoning; nor can any writer have just cause of complaint, if it be shown that the doctrines which he establishes necessarily and legitimately lead him to an absurdity. But no man can so far trace tlie consequences which the greater ingenuity and wider combinations of others may deduce from his statements, as to be justly held responsible for tlie errors which he may thus be made to seem indirectly to countenance. * There is (says a distinguished writer) :among the worst arts of controversy no fallacy more repre- hensible than this, though, vuihappily, scarcely any is more frequent. In some miinds, the temptation to this unworthy sophistry seems to increase always in proportion to the importance of the subject on which it is employed, and to the extent of public or of private evil which the misre- presentation is likely to produce. It has, in every case, a direct tendency to discourage all freedom of thought and sincerity of speech.' ' But while I guard myself against the cavils of others, it may perhaps be thought that I have myself laboured to ' O.rfovd and Lochr, by Lord (iicn\illc, p. 75, 16 rOIJTICAL TERMS. disparage the fair fame of many great writers, by minute criticism on insulated passages, without adverting to the general merit of their works, or exhibiting the entire course of their reasonings. To this charge tlie nature of my inquiries miist afford an answer ; which did not embrace a view of large treatises or political systems, but were confined to an examination of tlie usage of certain words by political writers : in which examination it was necessary to be precise ; to be precise, it was necessary to be minute. When, therefore, I may adduce examples of verbal fallacies from the works of celebrated writers, it will not be supposed that they were chosen from a love of detraction, but rather as ' exempli docinuenta in illustri posita monument o,' and as being blemishes, rendered more apparent by the excel- lence of the material by which they are surrounded ; still less that I entertained the faintest imagination of imputing any thing that coidd savour of intentional or deliberate deceit. If, in the course of these remarks, I have canvassed with freedom many statements made by writers of deserved reputation and acknowledged usefulness, and if I have not enlisted under the banners of any political party or philosophical sect, let it be remembered that I have only exercised a privilege without which no inquiry can possess an independent' value, or ])ring any sensible contribution to the cause of science. But I would willingly bear the blame of needless precision or over-curious criticism, if the following pages should be found to afford any, the smallest, assistance to the progress of political knowledge : or if they might sometimes help to soften the anger and direct the efforts of political disputants, by suggesting an explanation of their differences, and calling their attention, to the question really at issue. GOVERNMENT. When ^ a body of persons, yielding obedience to no supe- rior, issue their commands to certain other persons to do -or forbear from certain acts, and threaten to pimish the disobedience of their commands by the infliction of pain,'^ they are said to establish or exercise political or civil government.'^ The persons who issue and enforce these commands, or the sovereign body, are said to possess tlie governing power, and their acts are called the acts of government. ' Government,' in this sense, is a certain exercise of the highest power over a whole community. 'Government' is likewise used as synonymous with /orm of government, or constitidioji, to signify the arrange- ment or disposition of the ruling power in the members of the community ; thus we speak of a free government, a monarchical government, a republican government. It is moreover used to express the persons in whom the ruling power, or some part of the ruling power, resides. Thus we say that the people rose against the government ; that the government was overthrown by rebels ; that it ' 'The annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment before- hand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of govern- ment.' — Butler's Analuriy, part 1. ch. 2. » This substantiallyagrees with also constitute a tolerably nume- Austin's definition of sovereignty, rous society, larger at all events ■i^Studenfs AuMin, p. 82,) except tlian a single family.— W. that, according to the latter, the '' Observe that in our author's bulk of the persons to whom the definition there is nothing about commands are addressed must be jjleaxin-e. On this see Student's in a state of habitual obedience to Austin, p. 13. — W. the sovereign body, and they must 18 POLITICAL TERMS. maintained its ground against them, &c. In such expres- sions as these we mean the whole body in whom the sovereignty is vested : sometimes, however, the word has a narrower sense, being applied only to those wlio have the administrative power, or (as they are commonly called)' the ministers ; as, a Tory government, a Whig government, a strong government. The primary and derived meanings of the word govern- ment are marked with sufficient clearness, and do not seem likely to afford occasion for fallacy or confusion. Some- times, however, this word and its conjugates are employed to denote neither the exercise of the sovereign power, nor the members of the sovereign body, nor persons deriving their authority from the sovereign ; but persons having only a vote for the election of members of the sovereign body, who themselves can never, in that capacity, possess any portion of the ruling power. It is by attributing this double sense to the terms government, governing power, governing body, &c., that those constitutions are repre- sented as democratical, in which the right of suffrage is widely extended, although the governing power resides in a small minority of the whole nation. On this subject more will be said in another place.^ 11. CONSTITUTION.- — CONSTITUTIONAL. Constitution signifies tlie arrangement and distribution of the sovereign power in the community, or the form of the government. This is the meaning of such expressions as a free constitution, a democratic constitution, the British constitution,^ &c. ' See in Democracy, People, and KErRESENTAxioN. * Sir J. Mackintosh, in his Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations, defines the constitution of a state to be 'the body of those written and unwritten fundamental laws whicli regulate the most im- portant rights of the higher magistrates, and the most essential privi- leges of the subjects ' (p. 65) ; but this explanation does not agree with the common usage, ihQJns et norma loqucndi. CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL. 19 Constitution therefore, properly, expresses something which either has, or has had, a real existence. It is, how- ever, frequently used to signify something ideal, an imagi- nary model of excellence which the government has never, in fact, attained, though in the writer's or speaker's opinion it has constantly been tending to it. Hence people speak of the maxims of the constitution, the theory of the constitution, the spirit of the constitution, meaning some supposed rules to which, in their judgment, the constitu- tion ought to conform, though, in fact, they have never been observed. Constitution, in this sense, is little more than a vague term of praise, though it is calculated to de- ceive ignorant persons into a belief that a measure or law recommended to them is only a recurrence to ancient institutions, and that the cliange is restoration, and not innovation. Hence is derived the common use of constitutional^ and its opposite, unconstitutional. When certain prac- tices or usages, though not legally binding on any part of the community, have been constantly observed both by the governors and governed, they are properly styled con- stitutional ; and any measure or practice contrary to them, is styled unconstitutional. But more usually these terms are used with a very indefinite meaning, and convey little more than a general sentiment of approbation or dislike. If persons are agreed as to the history of any country, there can be no doubt whether a measure is to be charac- terised as constitutional or unconstitutional ; but often, in controversy or debate,tliese epithets are applied to a measure without any regard to reality, and merely denote agreement or disagreement with some imaginary standard of propriety which each man sets up for liimself. Generally, therefore, wlien discussions arise, whether any thing is or is not con- stitutional, the dispute is merely verbal, and can only be terminated by mutual explanation ; yet, unfortunately, men ' regard it as so high an affront to be suspected of being unconsciously engaged in a logomachy, tliat he who proposes to terminate a contest by proving that it turns on the ambiguity of words, must prepare himself to incur, c 2 20 POLITICAL TERMS. from the eager controversialists of both parties, even more ill-will than they feel towards their opponents.' ^ III. EIGHT. DUTY. — WRONG. RIGHTFUL. WRONGFUL. JUSTICE. When the sovereign power commands its subjects to do or forbear from certain acts, the claim ^ for such performances or forbearances which one person thereby has upon another, is called a right ; ^ the liability to such performances or forbearances is called a duty ; and the omission of an act commanded to be done, or the doing of an act commanded to be forborne, is called a ivrong. All rights, therefore, must be subsequent to the estab- lishment of government, and are the creatures of the sovereign power ; no claim upon another, which may not be enforced by process of law, i.e. by calling in the as- sistance of the sovereign, however recommended by moral justice, can, without an abuse of language, be termed a right.^ The existence of a moral claim may often be a matter of doubt wlien the facts are ascertained, and one party may demand what the other may not think himself bound in conscience to yield ; but, the facts being given, ' \\niately"s BamjHo/i Lectures, p. 196 [p. 118 ; ed. 1859.— W.]. ^ There does not appear to be any reason why claim, or requisition ■should not be considered as the genus of right; * though Mr, Bentham (Pri/icij}les of Morals and Legislation, vol. 2. p. 94 n. [224 n, in the Clarendon Press edition ; chap. IG, § 21. — W.]) says, that right has no :superior genus. " ' A party has a right, when and only proper one, seems rather anotlier or others are boiand or arbitrary ; though the importance obliged by the law to do or for- of always making it clear in argu- bear towards, or in regard to him.' ment whether legal or moral rights Student's Austin, p. 193. — W. are intended can hardly be over- *> The assumption that the legal stated. — W. meaning of ' right ' is the primary * la that case duim must mean the jwicer of claiming, which is not quite its ordinary meaning. — W. EIGHT AND WEONG. 21 the existence of a rigid, or a legal claim, can never admit of dispute, as it is defined and conferred by a third party, who will, if required, step in to enforce it. Properly, therefore, rigid signifies a claim conferred or sanctioned by the sovereign power, i.e. a legal right. Sometimes, however, it is used to mean a claim recom- mended by the practice, analogy, or doctrines of the con- stitution, i.e. a coyistitutional right; and, sometimes, a claim recommended by views of justice or public policy, i.e. a onoral right. By the first and proper sense is meant a claim which may be enforced in a court of law, or by the proper autho- rities, and which actually exists : by the two last a claim which cannot be enforced by any public authority, and which does not exist. Thus, in the first sense, it is said that a man has a right to his own property, reputation, &c., meaning that he has an available claim which can be enforced by process of law. It is also said that, constitu- tionally, every British subject who pays taxes has a right to vote for a member of the House of Commons, meaning that such a claim is supported by tlie practice or doctrines of our constitution. It is also said that all the people have a right to be represented ; that they have a right to choose their own governors, to cashier their governors for misconduct, and to frame a government for them- selves ; that tlie poor have a right to be maintained by the rich ; that the poor liave a right to spoil the land- owners, and divide their lands ; that the poor have a right to spoil the rich, and divide their property, &c. In the latter cases, the persons who use these expressions mean that, in their opinion, there is a claim founded in justice and expediency, which they call a right; thougl],in truth, what they mean to express is, that it ought, by the sanc- tion of the legislature, to be made a right. Burke's explanation of rights, in fact, amounts to no more than that last stated, though he appears to have in- tended something very different ; as his definition is per- fectly consistent with the doctrines which he is professedly combating, and which h(; lield in utter abhorrence. The following passage from liis work on tlie Frencli Revolution, 22 POLITICAL TERMS. is in answer to those who maintained the doctrine of the natural rights of men. ' The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes ; and, in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be discerned. The rights of men in government are their advantages ; and these are often in balances between differences of good, in com- promises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil.' If this doctrine were admitted, a man would have a riglit to every thing which might appear advantageous to him, and private opinion would be the only rule of law.^ * No objection, even on the score of inconvenience, can be made to the use of an equivocal word when its different senses are plain and palpable ; as, for example, the word light, which sometimes means the contrary of heavy, — sometimes the contrary of dark ; or the word duty, which sometimes means a legal or moral obligation, — sometimes a tax on a commodity. By such ambiguous terms as these, 1 ' When I went into the house first, (says one of the witnesses ex- amined on the trial of Watson for high treason), I went in company with a nobleman's servant who wore a liverj^ ; they seemed discoursing among themselves for a little while, and then turned round and ob- served that the crest i;pon his button was the crest of a lord, and they asked him who made his master a lord. He could make no answer, not readily, to this question that was put to him. After a little while they turned to me, upon which I explained it as well as I knew how : and after my explanation, theyasked me how this nobleman came to be possessed of so much landed property as he was possessed of ; and they turned round to the servant, and told him he had a rir/Jit to as much land as his master, and that the time was now fast apijroaching- when he would be as good a man as his master, and possess as much property ; and also asked b// n-ltat rujlit he held this projoerty.' — 2 Watmn'ii Trial, 6.5.* This passage ati'ords a striking example of the effect which may be produced on ignorant persons by the ambiguity of imposing terms, and the emploAinent of (what Mr. Bentham has termed) qncxtion-heggiiif/ appiilkit'ivcA. t " Burke's real meaning appears right to such a form of government to be this; all men have avim'al as is for the (/eweraZad vantage. — W. * Trial of James Watson for High Treffibn, at the bar of the Court of King's Bench, in 1817. London. Butter-worth & Son : in the Lincohi's Inn Library. — W. t In all probability the word ' right' was here understood by all parties in the sense of moral right ; these ])eople were not misled by any verbal ambiguity, but by their ignorance of the substantial reasons which justify the maintenance of social inequalities. — W. KIGIIT AND WROXG. 23 no one could be misled. But when the two significations lie on each other's confines, the one being perhaps a meta- phorical or derivative use of the same word, there is great difficidty in marking the boundaries which the ambiguity always tends to confound ; though the distinction is the more important, because, even if the names were different, such near neighbours would be likely to encroach on each ■other's territories. In the present case, the confusion of legal and moral rules, to which, at all times, mankind are sufficiently prone, is heightened by an additional meaning of the word in question. Right is sometimes a substantive, sometimes an adjec- tive. When used as a substantive, it properly signifies a legal claim, and answers to duty. Where the law confers a right on one person, it creates a corresponding duty in another. Wrong, the substantive, signifies the violation of a right. But, when used as an adjective, rigid expresses agreement with the standard of morality (whatever that may be), and is opposed to ivrong, the adjective, that which disagrees with tins standard. Thus a right may be right or turong, {i.e. a claim given by law may be just or unjust, politic or impolitic,) in the judgment of different persons. The necessity of a legislative sovereignty, or of a power of altering old and enacting new laws, is entirely founded on the supposition that rights may be lurong, — a truism which has sometimes been treated as a paradox and an antithesis. If the different senses of right, just pointed out, really coincided ; that is, if all claims founded •on justice and sound policy were legal rights, and all legal rights were founded on justice and sound policy, there would be no necessity for deliberative assemblies or legis- lative enactments, and the whole business of govern- ment might be confined to the administration of existing laws. This ambiguity, so manifest when pointed out, and so -easily detected by a translation into Latin (which has dif- ferent terms for the substantive and adjective)' has yet mis- ' Jus means a rif/Jit, the substantive; honestits or 7-e(.'tvx, v\y^hi, ihe adjective. On the other hand, the Latin language has an ambiguity of jus, from which the English is free, viz, that it means both law and 24 POLITICAL TEEMS. led many unreflecting' persons, and even some writers of high authority, who might have been expected to keep clear of so obvious a fallacy. Thus Palsy, in his ' Moral and Political Philosophy,' b. 1 , chap. 9, says that ' right is a quality of per- sons, or of actions ; — of persons, as when we say, Such a one has a rigid to this estate, &c. ;- -of actions, as in such ex- pressions as the following : It is right to punish murder with death, &c.' The argument by which Blackstone proves the latter part of his definition of municipal law, that it is ' a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, comonanding wJtat is right, and 'prohibiting what is ivrong,'' ' proceeds entirely on this uncertainty of meaning. 'In order to do this completely (he says), it is first of all necessary that the boundaries of right and turong be established and ascertained by law. And when this is once done, it will folloiv of course that it is likewise the business of the law, considered as a rule of civil conduct,, to enforce these rights, and to restrain or redress these ivrongs.''" If, in defence of Blackstone, it should be said that by right and wrong he only means that which the law enjoins or forbids, then the latter part of his definition is superfluous, and to say that a laiu is right would be an identical proposition.^ Hence also Crabb, in his ' Dic- right, an ambiguity which has led Blackstone into the most fearful errors. — See MilVs British India, vol. i. p. 195 ; and Austin's admirable Outline of a Course of Lectures on Jurisprudence in the London L'ni- rersitj/, p. 48. (London, 1831.) [See now Studenfs Austin,]). 118, note. — W.] The French droit, and the German recht, have the ambiguities both of the Latin and English words, for thej' signify lex, jus, and rectus. Ambigi^ities of words are often brought out in translation ; for instance, linr/na in Latin and Italian, in English is sometimes rendered by toni/iie, sometimes by lant/uage. The most perplexing ambiguities, however, n;n through all the commonly known languages of civilised nations. It may be remarked as a singular circumstance, that the Greek language sho\;ld possess no term for right, or jus. The treatise- of Aristotle entitled SiKaiwfxaTa Tr6Keooi/ appears to have been upon the rights, or privileges of different states (see Keunuinn, Ari.Htotelis ■noXireiwv fragmenta, p. 43) : but the word SiKalufxa never came into general use in the sense of jus. Sir J. Mackintosh, misled by a false reading iroXifjiQiv for irdKioiv, represents this as a treatise on the laws of war. — On the Ijuw of JVature and Nations, p. 16. ' 1 Com. 44. Iiitrod. § 2. ^ 1 Com. 53. ^ It is however obvious, that he uses right and wrong in the former sense, as he quotes the words of Cicero, repeated by Bracton, that a RIGHT AND TVPiONa. 25 tionary of English Synonyms,' says, that ' Tigid (the sub- stantive) signifies what it is right for one to possess.' The same confusion of the two very different senses of right i& well shown in the following passage, where the argument turns upon the double sense. ' If it be right that the- propej-ty of men should be protected, and if this can only be done by means of government, then it must be right that some person or persons should possess political power. That is to say, some person or persons must have a right to political power.' ^ The apparent force of this argument rests on a mere verbal fallacy. 80 the author of the 'Dictionary of English Synonyms,' just cited, states, that a certain conclusion cannot be received, ' unless we admit the contradiction that men have a right to do what is wrong.'' ^ This instance is perhaps the more worthy of notice, because it occurs in the work of a writer whose- professed object was to point out and illustrate the dif- ferent meanings of words.'' In the celebrated verse which would represent as a paradox ' Tlie right divine of kings to govern wrong,' the antithesis is only in sound and not in sense : if a sovereign has not the power to enforce his commands, whether right or wrong, that is, whether the- subject thinks them right or wrong, he is not sovereign. ' When governors shall be so perfect, as never to propose a measure that is not faultless, and when subjects shall be so infallible in their judgments, and so candid in their dispositions, as universally to perceive and acknowledge la-w is ' saiictio justa, jn])en^ Iio/iestii, et proliibens coidraria.' — 1 Com. 122. ' Ed'uiljunjli Eevicn-, vol. lii. p. 364. [If he liad .said 'miast have a moral right' (whicli most readers would probably landerstand him to mean) it would have been a perfectly sound argument williout any fallacy. -W.] * Crabb's Eiii/liglt Siinoiu/iiis, in Right. -■* Mr. Bentham, in his Priiicij)l(;!< of Morah and Lcghlation, vol. ii.. p. 257, n. [p. :}2:i in the Clarendon Tress edition, ch. 17, § 22.— W.] points out an ambiguity of the English word laic, which signifies Ijoth a single law, and the whole body of laws, or (as we say) the law ; and appears to lament that we have not, like the Germans, appropriated the word ru/ht to the entire corpiat juriH, i.e. to law in its collective sense. Doubtless it would be desirable to have two different words to express the two ideas distinguished by Mr. Bcntham ; but it cannot be wished that any additional burden should be laid on the term riffJif, which has alreadj^ a sufficient weight of meanings to sustain. •26 POLITICAL TERMS. this perfection, — then, and not till tlien, may a peaceable and permanent government be established on such prin- ciples.' ^ It may moreover be observed, that if all rights are the creatures of the sovereign power, and can only be enforced by calling in the assistance of a superior authority ; no absolute monarchs or sovereign governors can be said to possess oughts, or to be subject to chcties, except in a moral sense. A claim which a man gives himself, of which he is alone judge, and which he can alone enforce, may un- doubtedly be called a rirjJd, though it seems much more precise and simple, in such cases, merely to speak of power ; but a sovereign, whether one or many, can never be liable to any legal duties, because a legal duty implies the legal means of enforcing it ; and if a sovereign power could be legally forced to any act, it would not be sovereign. That governors have not, as governors, any legal duties, is distinctly stated by Dr. Wliately, in a sermon preached before the University of Oxford, although he too speaks of the rights of a governor.^ ' The governor,' he says, ' is bound to make a good use of his power, no less than his subjects are to obey him ; and he is accountable to Grod for so doing ; but not to them ; for if this merely condi- tional right to obedience be once admitted, it must destroy all government whatever.'^ The attributing of rights to governors appears to have arisen from a confusion of the effects ^DToduced by the exercise of the power of a sovereign, and of the right of a subject. A man by hiring a servant acquires a right to his services and obedience ; a sovereign issues its commands, and thereby has a claim on the sub- mission of its subjects : whence it is inferred that the claim of the sovereign is of the same nature as the claim of the master; i.e. that they both have a right to the performance of the respective duties. But in the one case, the claim is given by a third party ; in the other, it is ' Wliatehj'fs Sermon oti Ohcdiotci' to Itulcrs, p. 202 [173] *. 2 Bampton LccturcH, p. 292 [173]. 3 lUd. p. 296 [175]. And see p. 297 [177]. * I have been unable to find the edition here referred to ; the references in brackets are to the 4th edition (1850) of Bumplon Lectures and other Sermons. — W. KIGHT AND WRONG. 27 obtained by an exercise of individual volition : three par- ties are necessary to the existence of a legal rights as tivo parties are necessary to the existence of moral justice.^ A man cannot be just towards himself, nor can that be a right which A gives himself against B, and A alone can enforce. In this country a mistaken notion as to the rights of subjects has arisen, from confounding the powers of the King and those of the Parliament. The people have rights as against the King ; and hence it is correct to say that Charles tlie First and James the Second violated the rights of their subjects : without having the legislative sovereignty, they commanded acts to be done which were •contrary to law. But the people have no rights as against the Parliament, or the whole sovereign body ; and hence such expressions as the Parliament withholding or refusing the riglits of the people, are not only unmeaning and absurd, but also mischievous, as they tend to encourage the idea that members of that body are legally, as well as morally, answerable for their acts. In a like manner, the rule of the English constitution tliat the King can do no ivrong, appears to be an ab- surdity, and startles some who hear it, only because a breach of legal riglit is confounded with a breach of moral duty. Neither the whole sovereign body, nor any part of the sovereign body, so far as it is sovereign, can do a wrong, that is, infringe a right ; as that implies a superior power to redress the wrong or enforce the right, which, l)y the supposition, does not exist. All orders issued by a com- petent authority are necessarily dispimishable ; but this im- munity does not extend to those who execute them, if con- trary to law. For example, the King may ordcn* his ministers to do an illegal act, but they will obey at their peril. Tlie House of Commons may order their serjeant-at-nnns to arrest a man for an act not falling within their juris- diction, but their officer will obey at his peril. If the House of Lords, or House of Commons, were to go in a body and kill a man, they would be guilty of murder, laecause this would not be an act done in virtue of the » Tlic Italics are the Editor's, — W, 28 POLITICAL TERMS. sovereign power which in their collective capacity they severally possess for certain purposes.^ This is stated in substance by Blackstone,^ though his expressions are not strictly accurate. 'The supposition of law is,' he says, ' that neither the King nor either house of Parliament (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong ; since, in such cases, the law feels itself incapable of furnishing any adequate remedy ; for which reason, all oppressions which may happen to spring from any branch of the sovereign power, must necessarily be out of the reach of any stated rule or express legal provision.' He afterwards states, that the maxim that ' the King can do no wrong,' means two things : 1. 'That whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs, is not to be imputed to the King, nor is he answerable for it, personally, to his people ; ' and, 2. ' That the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injiuy."- As to the first of these- rules, it is clear that the King cannot be answerable for any act done by him in his capacity of sovereign ; as this immunity is implied in the idea of supreme power : while ' 1 Com. 214. Boswell, in his Life of Johnson, vol. i. p. 388, reports a conversation on this point, between Goldsmith and Johnson. Gold- smith argued, that ' as the King might, in the exercise of his regal power, command and cause the doing of what was wrong, it certainly might be said, in sense and reason, that he could do wrong.' (This is what the logicians call an if/norat'w eleiichi ; the question was, whether the King could do a wrong.) Johnson in answer, among other things, said, ' We hold tlie King can do no u-romj, that whatever may happen to he wrong in government may not be abo\'e our reach by being ascribed to majesty, lledress is always to be had against opi^ression by punishing the immediate agents. The King, though he should com- mand, cannot force a judge to condemn a man unjustly ; therefore it is the judge whom we prosecute and punish.' Johnson's sentiments are quite accurate ; though he too falls into the common error of confound- ing wrong, an. injur//, with wrong, inij)?-oj>cr. - 1 Coin. 246. * And see 3 Com. 2.54, 25.5. " Why, then, should it not be 4 Com. 3:5, both of wliicli passages- the same if the King were to kill a are retained in Stejj/ien's Commen- man with his own hand ? Yet all taricn.) Therefore the maxim authorities agree that it is not. means more than our author ap- (Blackstone, 1 Com. 246 n. and pears to suppose. — W. * In the note Blackstone suggests a third meaning, viz. that ' although the King is- subject to the passions and infinnities of other men, the law has provided no mode by which he can be made personally amenable for any wrong that he may actually commit.. The law will therefore presume no wrong where it has provided no remedy." — W. RIGHT AND "WRONG. 29 the second is merely a statement, in different terms, of the proposition that 'The King can do no wrong ;' for King, putting prerogative of the croiun ; and for ' wrong,'' injury. By ' injury,'' a breach of law can only be meant ; as all political parties think that the King does that which is hurtful to the nation, when he chooses his ministers from their opponents.^ The statement of this rule by Hume, in his ' Essay on Passive Obedience,' is very precise, and seems framed for the express purpose of cautioning per- sons against the superficial error, so often committed, of confounding a legal injury with a moral impropriety. The King of England, he says, ' though limited by the laws, is, in a manner, so far as regards his own person, above the laws, and can neither be questioned nor 'punished for any injury or wrong luhich may be committed by him."^ Before the word ' right ' is dismissed, it may be useful to notice some of the epithets applied to it ; the number, variety, and discordancy of which are almost past belief: though, when they come to be examined, most of them will be found to be either unmeaning or inapplicable. The following passage occurs, as spoken by Dr. Jolmson, in a conversation preserved by Boswell:^ ' Ever}' man has ■a right to liberty of conscience, and with that the magis- trate cannot interfere. People confound liberty of thinking with liberty of talking ; nay, with lilierty of preacliing. Every man has a physical right to think as he pleases; ' The Attorney-General, in his speech in Hardy "s trial, cites a pas- sage from an American work communicated to an English j)olitical society, where it is said, that 'in government, the maxim being that -a King can do no ivrunf/, the maxim ought to be that he can do no r/ood.'' — See Ersliinc'x Speeches, vol. iii. p. 191). If the author of this passage had understood the maxim which lie objects to, so far from tliinking that his remark was pointed and antithetical, he would have seen that it is absolutely unmeaning. Jlr. Hallam, in his JIii/ of the Middle Ar/es, vol. 2. p. 243, 4to ed., says, that 'In the prudent fiction of the English law, no wrong is supposed to proceed from the source of right.' 'This statement is not correct ; it is not a legal fiction, but a plain truth, that the King can do no wrong. It is another maxim of English law, that there is no wrong without its remedy : and against the acts of the King, no remedy is, or can be, provided by law. - Part ii. Essay 13. * I/ife of Johnson, vol. ii. p. 111. 30 rOLITICAL TERMS. for it cannot be discovered how he thinks : he has not a moral rigid, for he ought to inform himself, and think justly.' Here ^'physical rigid ' must mean poiver ; ' moral right ' appears to mean '•legal right,'' for Johnson never could have intended to say that a man is, in conscience, bound to conceal opinions which he thinks true : ^ the doubt would rather be the other way, whether a man is justified in concealing- what he thinks true. On another occasion he said that ' there seems to be in authors a strono-er rig-ht of property than that by occupancy ; a metaphysical right, a right, as it were, of creation, which should, from its nature, be perpetual.' ' This expression is manifestly founded on the erroneous supposition that a right to a tangible is more corporeal than a right to an intangible object ; but elsewhere he uses a more common epithet, when, speaking of government, he says that ' if the abuse be enormous. Nature will rise up, and, claiming her original rights, overturn a corrupt political system.' ^ It is, however, a contradiction to speak of original rights, if by original is meant anterior to government ; for, as has been shown above, the notion that ' right is altogether an abstract thing, which is independent of human laws and institutions,' ^ is not only not true, but is the direct con- trary of the truth. The ^-erse of Dryden, in the Wife of Bath's Tale, that * Sovereign monarchs are the source of right,' expresses the truth, but not the whole truth ; as not only sovereign monarchs, but all sovereign legislatures, whether of one or many, are, and are alone, the sources from which all rights flow. Yet we hear of original rights, natural rights, indefeasible rights, inalienable rights, imprescrip- tible rights, hereditary rights, indestructible rights, inhe- rent rights, &c., where there is no pretence of legislative ' Vol. ii. p. 122, Burke, in his Thoughts on the French Revolution, also speaks of metaphysical rights ; where, by metaphysical, he appears to mean imaginary, or luireal. - Vol. i. p. 889. ^ Crabb's English Synonyms, in Eight. » Evidently Johnson meant a says nothing about expressing or moral right (in the ordinary signi- concealing his opinions. — W. fication) to think as he pleases ; lie RIGHT AND WRONG. 31 sanction : indeed the only object of using these names is to induce the legislature to convert these supposed rights into real rights, by giving them the sanction of law. The phrase, natural rigid, takes its origin from the doctrine of a state of natm-e, which will be more fully explained below. ^ It appears to signify a claim recommended by natural law, or by those rules which were recognised by common consent, when mankind were in a state of nature. An indefeasible right is a right which man enjoyed in a state of nature, and which he only surrendered condition- ally at the making of the social compact ; so that nothing has since been able to defeat or destroy it, and it is ready to be revived at any time. An imprescriptible right is a right which was prior to the social compact, and whicli continues to exist without being subject to prescription or failure by lapse of time. An inalienable right is a right which cannot be alienated from a man. Indestructible rights, inherent rights, hereditary rights, birthrights of liberty, &e., appear to have nearly the same meaning : viz. that they are dormant rights, never exercised by the possessors, and not extinguishable by any law. In fact, however, these imprescriptible, inalienable, indefeasible rights, in most cases never have been rights, or, if they have, long since were alienated and defeated by the sove- reign power. These various expressions have all taken their origin from the theory of the state of nature and the social compact ; but they are frequently used by persons who have never heard of this absurd and mischievous doctrine, and would perhaps reject it if they knew it. All that those persons mean is, that, in their opinion, the claims which they call rights ought, in sound policy, to be sanctioned by law. It is the duty of such persons to show that sound policy requires wliat thei/ require ; but as this would require a process of reasoning, and as reasoning- is often both hard to invent and to understand, tliey prefer begging the question at issue by employing some of the high-sotmding phrases just mentioned. Eights are, moreover, divided into political or civil ' Tn the word NATURE. 32 rOLITICAL TERMS. rights, and fn'lvate riglits : the meaning of which division will be explained elsewhere.^ ' Vested rigJds' ^ is another expression which lias been much used of late years. In its legal sense, ' vested ' is opposed to ' contingent,^ and expresses a right of which the next possessor is ascertained, whenever tlie prior right to the same object may determine ; as opposed to a right of which the next possessor is not so ascertained. But its 'political sense (with which alone we are now concerned) is widely different from its legal acceptation, and appears to have no connexion with it whatever.^ When a legislature passes a law, not for any temporary purposes, nor limited as to the time of its operation, and which therefore may be reasonably expected to be permanent, — and persons, confiding in its permanency, embark their capital, bestow their labour, or shape the course of their life, so that their only hope of success is founded on the existence of the law, — the rights which they have acquired in the reliance upon its continuance are termed ' vested rights ; ' and per- sons in this situation are considered as having a moral •claim on the legislatiue for tlie maintenance of the law, or at least for the allowance of a sufficient time to with- draw their investments, and to take the measiures necessary for guarding against the loss consequent on so large a •change. When duties are imposed for the purpose of excluding a cheap foreign commodity, in order to enable it to be produced at a higher price at home, the persons who carry into effect the intentions of the legislature, by engaging in the favoured manufacture, are considered as having a vested right in their undertakings, and possess- ing a claim to notice of a reasonable length, before the duties are removed ; for although their profit is not larger than it would have been in any other unprotected branch of trade, and although the public lose the difference be- tween the prices of the foreign and native commodity ; yet ' In the word Political. * This passage is noticed and commented upon by \nstin, in his fifty-third lecture (p. 887, third edition ; Student's Austin, p. 427). » This can hardly be admitted. See next note. — W. EIGHT AND WRONG. 33 having, in consequence of the encouragement of the legis- lature, once engaged in the protected trade, they cannot, at a moment's warning, withdraw their capital and invest it elsewhere, without incurring a certain loss. In con- sequence of the high duties on French, Portuguese, and Spanish wines, many persons were induced to invest their capital in the making of wine at the Cape of Grood Hope. They produced an inferior commodity at a higher price : but when it was proposed to equalise the import duties on wines, it was allowed that the vested rights of these per- sons ought to be respected, and that they were fairly entitled to have a sufficient time to engage in new specu- lations. All preferences given to particular classes of traders create vested rights of this description ; and it is for this reason that, although the existence of such pre- ferences is an unmixed evil, their abolition is very far from being an im mixed good. A vested right may therefore be described as a right of investment ; * giving to its possessor a moral claim upon the legislature, for the permanency or tardy abolition of a law, which he has gained by employing his capital or ^ i.e. not a right to invest, but a right based on investment. The histd^ical origin of the phrase in its legal sense is clearly shown in the chajster on 'Vesting,' in Hmv- Mns on Wills, referred to in the St.i(denfs Austin, p. 423, where Mr. Hawkins's view is thus summa- rised : — ' It originates in the all- pervading feudal tenures. In the language of feudal lawyers the no- torious and conspicuous fact of the person entitled beingplaced in pos- session, was called the inrestitnrc. Thereby, as by the putting on of a palpable and substantial garment, were imagined to be clothed one or other of the following objects (for the metaphor is somewhat loosely conceived and applied) ; viz. the naked intention of tlie con- ceding sovereign or private gran- tor ; the bare right of the person entitled ; or, that person himself. Originally, therefore, ' vesting ' meant the completing of the owner's right by actual possession. By analogy the meaning has been' extended to rights other than that of the owner seised in actiial pos- session ; and the fact or event which either alone, or as the last and crowning event with others, com- pletes the predicament to which the law annexes the right, is said to ' vest ' the right. Thus ' vested ' as applied to a right is nearly synonymous with ' completed.' The fact which vests the right is called 'the investitive fact.' It is far more probable that the political was derived from the legal sense, the intention being to in- sinuate that mere expectations of profit encouraged by the law ought to be equally sacred with positive legal rights, than that it had any- thing to do with the investment of capital. — W. D 34 POLITICAL TERMS. labour in adventures only compatible with the existence of the law. Being founded on the principle of not dis- appointing expectations, it is founded on a principle of the wisest and most enlarged policy ; but the doctrine of vested rights must not be stretched too far, as there is scarcely a right on which some expectations are not founded, and which does not, in some degree, serve as a guide of con- duct: it can only be admitted where the loss would be great, and the probability of the law being repealed or modified was inconsiderable. Of vested rights, that on which the greatest number of calculations and expectations is founded, and which, in most states, offers the fairest hope of permanency, is the right of 'property. There is scarcely a step in a man's life, if it has any prospective view, which is not taken in reference to his property. His bodily and mental habits, his connexions, whether of friendship or marriage, are all formed with reference to the rank of society in which his property places him. A man is brought up by his parents, and insensibly adapts himself, to the situation which he is likely to fill. A poor man suddenly made rich is not more likely to be happy, and is much less likely to do good to others, than a rich man suddenly made poor.^ There is no change in the condition of human life, except the change from freedom to slavery or imprisonment, — no deprivation of rank, honours, dignity, political power, military power, or sovereign dominion, — which blights so many prospects, which chills so many hopes, which brings such bitter dis- appointments, and such painful humiliations,' which offers • It is to this that Juvenal probably refers, when he so feelingly says that, — Nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se Quam quod ridicules homines facit. — III. 152. Men are not ridiculous simply by being poor ; it is when they become poor, that the shifts and expedients to which they are driven, in order to conceal their poverty and keeia up a semblance of their former wealth too frequently make them ridiculous.* * We should rather have ex- a rich man who has been such from pected the antithesis to be, 'than his youth.' — W. * This is ingenious but rather far-fetched, and the context seems rather to relate to needy men who are trying to rise, than to rich men who have fallen. See especially v. I{i4. It is more likely that the term infelix is used here as a kind of expletive of execration. — W. KIGHT AND WRONG. 35 «uch violence to a man's familiar liabits and thoughts, and forces him into courses for which he is so little fitted, as the change from affluence to beggary. The interrup- tion of this right takes a man from a station where he is contented, and which he is fitted to fill, to put him in a .station where he will be discontented and dangerous, and which he is not fitted to fill. The effect on the person who is supposed to be benefited by his loss, need not be ■considered ; as, at times when this right is interrupted, the resistance is usually so great, that although the plun- dered are impoverished, the jslunderers are seldom en- riched. It is for these, among many other reasons, that the right of property is one of those vested rights which should be most sparingly and tenderly interfered with by a wise legislature ; but, like all other rights, it is the mere creature of the sovereign power, which can at any moment destroy what it created : and to deny the power of the legislature to dispose of it at pleasure, is to confound ex- pediency and justice with fact, and to conclude that what ought not to be done, cannot be done. Wrongful and rightful are the adjectives of wrong and right the substantives ; and differ from wrong and right the adjectives, inasmucli as the former signify that which agrees or disagrees with the rule of laiu, the latter that which agrees or disagrees with the rule of morality. Justice is commonly used by political writers in the sense of moral justice. In this sense alone it is applicable to acts of the legislature. Sometimes, however, it is used as identical with law, as when we speak of the administra- tion of justice, oi courts of justice, &c.' ' ' The legal criminal intention necessary in criminal law is not identical in strictness with the evil intention imputal^le in moi'als. It is enough, that there exists an intention to do the act. It is not neces- sary tliat tlie party sliould know tljat tlie act is morally wrong. It makes no difference even if the party Ijclieve that the act. is morally virtuous. ..... A case like that of Martin the incendiary will illus- trate the distinctions. Tliere could be no pretence for his acquittal, supposing tlie jury of opinion that he believed that it was morally or religiously right to burn York Minster, but knew, at Die same lime, tliat it was legally wrong. If they meant by their verdict to express that his understanding was too disturbed to be capable of knowing that it was legally wrong, the acquittal was correct.' — Ediiihimjh Kecieiv, No. 107, pp. 221, 222. There could be no doubt that Martin was aware u 2 36 POLITICAL TERMS. IV. LAW. LAWFUL. — UNLAWFUL. A FULL investigation of the different meanings of the word laiu would of itself furnish matter for a long treatise ; but as it is a subject which belongs properly to the j)rovince of jurisprudence, and could not be satisfactorily explained without diverging into questions unconnected with politi- cal science, I shall limit myself to one remark on an am- biguity which has a very extensive influence on political reasoning. Law properly signifies a general command of the sove- reign, whether conveyed by the way of direct legislation, as in the case of statutes, or of pertnissive legislation, as in the case of legal rules established by courts of justice.. The only proper mode of determining a dispute as to the existence or construction of a law, is by application to a competent tribunal, which alone has authority to decide it.. Laiv, however, is often used to denote, not the com- that the bixrning of York Minster was a criminal act, as his contri- vances for escaping observation in committing the deed evinced con- siderable foretliought ; and the same remark a^Dplies to nearly all cases of crimes committed b}' madmen. If madmen were acquitted only when proved to be ignorant of the law, they would he acquitted, not on the ground of their madness, but on quite a different plea, of which others, besides madmen, might avail themselves. The true state of the question seems rather to be, whether, when a man's mind is so diseased tliat he believes himself to be driven by an overwhelming duty, whether moral or religious, to the commission of an act which he knows to be illegal, he is to be considered as a person whose punish- ment can be usefid to societj', and whom society can hold as responsible for his acts. A merely depraved man may think murder or robbery^ indiiferent acts ; he may deny the existence of riglit and wrong, or of all moral rules whatever ; but if he commits murder or roblaery, he is properly amenable to punishment. But a madman is not indijf event to- a moral duty ; he is hurried on to a violation of law by the suggestions of a deranged understanding and a heated imagination, which seem tO' him far to outweigh all other considerations. A man in this state of mind is no more an accountable political agent, and a tit subject for the animadversion of the law, than he is an accountable moral agent, and a subject for moral disapprobation : as a moral agent, his errors can only be pitied ; as a political agent he must only be prevented from doing further mischief. SOVEREIGN — SOVEREIGNTY. 37 mands of a sovereign, but certain moral rules, the existence of which can only be determined by the arguments of pri- vate individuals, and not by the authority of public officers. It is in this sense that we speak of the law of Grod, the law ■of nature, the laws of honour, &c. Tlie same confusion of legal and moral rules is likewise transferred to the adjectives derived from this term : for, •as Archbishop Whately has observed, ' The words lawful and unlawful are sometimes employed with reference to the law of the land, and sometimes to the law of God and the dictates of a sound conscience : so that the same thing may be lawful in one sense, which is unlawful in an- other.' 1 V. SOVEREIGN. — SOVEREIGNTY. ■* For a state to be entirely sovereign ' (says Martens, in his *• Treatise on the Law of Nations,' '^) 'it must govern itself, and acknowledge no legislative superior but G-od.' That is to say, some person or persons in a state are said to be sovereign, or to possess the sovereign power, when they yield no obedience to any person on earth, and when they receive obedience from the community wliich they govern. The independence of a state, or the non-obedience of its sovereign to any foreign power, — and the existence of a government, or the obedience of a community to a sove- reign power, — are both questions of degree, to be decided by the length of time during which obedience has been yielded or withheld, as well as by other circumstances ; and thus can only be determined according to the facts of each particular case. As long as a government exists, the power of the person or persons in whom sovereignty resides, over the wliole community, is absolute and unlimited. The sovereign has the complete disposal of the life, rights, and duties of every member of the community. It has also power to modify ' Bampton. Lccturc.% p. 337 [lt>7]. 2 P. 23, Engl, trantil. 38 POLITICAL TERMS. or change the existing form of government. There is no- law wliich it has not power to alter, repeal, or enact. When the sovereign acts as sovereign in a legislative capacity, it cannot be said to possess rights, or to be sub- ject to duties. By legislating, it confers rights and im- poses duties ; but its legislative power is not founded on any right, or restrained by any duty. Not only cannot a sovereign be limited by any power residing in the community which it governs ; but it cannot limit itself, so far as its own subjects are concerned. It can limit itself, i.e. bind itself and its successors, by agree- ments with foreign powers, as then it is a party to a contract^ which it is not when it makes laws. A law excludes the idea of a compact ; for ' a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The language of a compact is, " I will, or will not, do this ; " that of a law is, " Thou shalt, or shalt not, do it." ' ^ No agree- ment can exist, except in a moral sense, between a sove- reign and its subjects, — between a government and people, — as there is no legitimate means of enforcing it. A sovereign can only be liable to duties towards another sovereign, in which relation it becomes, as it were, an in- dividual in the great community of nations.'* The sovereign power may be exercised in two ways ; viz. in making laws, and in administering them or carry- ing them into execution. Of these two functions, the latter must, for the suppression of crime, and the maintenance of civil rights, be kept in constant activity.'^ A day's in- terregnum of lawlessness — dm-ing which tlie sovereign slept, no protection was allowed to persons and property, and there was a complete impunity of crime — would be sufficient to overturn the most flourishing society. The existence of th& > Blackstone, 1 Cum. 45. Introd. § 2. 2 In this country, the prosecution of a civil suit, or of a criminal, cannot at all times be carried to its last stage : but the preliminaiy steps, such as arresting a debtor, or committing an offender for trials may be always taken. » Even here the word ' diity ' is They may of course be reciproc- not strictly appropriate, since two ally liable to moral duties, but sovereigns have no common su- the context shows clearly that the perior by whom a duty could be aiithor is not speaking of these. — - imposed on one towards the other. W. SOVEREIGNTY. 39 executive sovereignty is therefore uninterrupted. But when a state has once been founded, and laws established, the legislative sovereignty is often in abeyance for long periods of time ; nor, in modern times, is it ever kept in constant existence, except in absolute monarchies. Thus, in Great Britain, the legislative sovereignty is only alive during the session of Parliament : during a prorogation, or after a dissolution, it is in abeyance, and does not revive until it vests in the whole Parliament at its next meeting. Tt has been sometimes imagined that, during such intervals, the legislative sovereignty resides in the community at large, or in those who have votes for the election of members of the House of Commons : but this opinion, if taken in its plain and direct sense, has evidently no foundation in truth ; and it is difficult to understand what benefit can be derived from giving metaphorical or figurative meanings to expres- sions of such importance as that now in question. Such is essentially the nature of sovereign power, whether it be possessed by one person or by several ; and if by several, whether by a minority or majority of the state. There is no difference in the nature, of the power belong- ing to an arbitrary monarch, to a supreme council of nobles, or to a democratic assembly ; the difference lies in the manner of exercising it. Nevertheless there may not unfrequently be traced, in the speculations of political writers, a vague notion that the sovereign power is less absolute in free governments than in despotisms ; that is, in governments where the sove- reignty resides in many, than where it resides in one ; and that a limitation of the Kinffs power is also a limitation of tlie soverei.f/n power. Whereas, in fact, a King's power is limited, not by destroying it, but either by taking it from him and giving it to others, or by compelling him to share it with others. On the other hand, some writers, thinking that the discretion of the sovereign body is, in limited monarchies, subject to a regidar check and control, liave mistaken the exercise of sovereign power in republics for arbitrary or tyrannical power ; confounding the use of sovereign power with tlie abuse of it ; an error wliich may be observed in the following passage in Mr. Hallam's ' Con- 40 POLITICAL TERMS. stitutional History of England.' ' Numerous bodies ' (lie says) ' are always prone to excess, both from the reciprocal influences of their passions, and the consciousness of irre- sponsibility ; for which reasons a democracy, that is, the absolute government of the tnajority^ is the most tyran- nical of any' (ch. 16).* In a democracy, the government of the majority is absolute, for the same reason that the government of one is absolute in a monarchy, and the government of a minority absolute in an aristocracy ; viz. that the majority are sovereign. The same confusion is discernible in the following extract from one of Mr. Can- ning's speeches, who appears, at the moment, not to have adverted to the fact, that the royal, not the sovereign power, is limited in a limited monarchy : ' Now to this view of the matter I have no other objection than this — that the British constitution is a limited monarchy ; that a limited mo- narchy is, in the nature of things, a mixed government ; but that such a House of Commons as the radical reformer requires would, in effect, constitute a pure democracy — a power, as it appears to me, inconsistent with every mo- narchy, and unsusceptible of any limitation.^ '^ Mr. Mitford, also, in his ' History of Greece,' frequently confounds the tyrannical acts of the Athenian democracy with the sove- reign power possessed by the body of citizens ; which, he seems to think, ought to have been legally checked or balanced, in order to prevent misgovernment. Thus in one place he says, that ' despotic governments, whether the power be in the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near resemblance of character.' ^ Again, he remarks, that ' the balances of Solon's constitution were no sooner over- thrown, and sovereign poiver became absolute in the hands of those without property, &c., than the interest of all who had property placed them necessarily in the situation of conspirators against the existing government.' ^ In another place, professing to translate Aristotle, he says, that ' ab- solute democracy is tyranny ; ' '' meaning, as it appears, that ' Speeches, vol. vi. p. 388. '■' History of Greece, vol. iv. p. 19. ^ IMd. p. .SI. * Ibid. p. i53. The words of Aristotle are t) Br^fioKparia f) reXevrata Tvpavvis i 1 Cum. 50. ^ 1 Covi. 2G2. Tlic well-known and often-quoted passage of Claudian (3 Co/is. ntUic/i, 114)— Nunquam libertas gratior extat (Jnam sub rege pio— (BO POLITICAL TEEMS. One of the chief mischiefs of this confusion both of words and thought, has been that, in comparing the ad- vantages of a limited monarchy and a republic (to use the common expressions), it has not been perceived that the principal question is, whether it is more advantageous that the headship of tlie state should be determined by election or succession, and whetlier it should last for life, or for a term of years ? All the other advantages actually possessed by limited monarchies seem communicable to republics, and vice versa. The real diffeience by which their respective merits should be tried, is the mode of determining the first person in the state. The objections to an hereditary succession are (as Gribbon ' and Paley have remarked) obvious to all the world. To confer on a man the largest political powers in a state, not because he is the wisest or the best, but because he is the son of a particular person, seems at first sight the very height of absurdity. It would appear more reasonable to imitate the ancient ^^ilthiopians, and make the tallest or the fairest man King. But the real, and not less obvious benefits, of hereditary succession, are that it puts an end to all questions of supremacy ; that it prevents the constant existence of intrigues, cabals, factions, and party measures, for the sake of attaining to the first place in tlie state ; and saves the community from ever being disturbed by a contest for the possession of its highest honours. It is not because a King is wiser or better, or more versed in political affairs, or more skilled in the art of governing, than any of his subjects, that he is King. He is King that no one else may be King : to make it certain that, as long as the established government lasts, all attempts to obtain the chief rank in the state will be fruitless. In the republics of Athens and Syracuse, if a man by his political talents, or from any other cause, obtained great influence over his fellow-citizens, he might be banished by ostracism or pe- talism, lest he should make himself prince over his fellow- ' the sentence,' according to Gibbon, (ch. xxix. note 54,) 'so familiar to the friends of despotism,' — is not more applicable to absolute than to limited Kings, although it is always applied to the former. ' Decline and Fall, ch. vii. at the beginning. MONARCHY. 61 citizens. Under a King, such a person could never be first in the state, and must always acknowledge a superior. Whatever his ambition, or wealth, or station, or eloquence, — whether he be a victorious general, a noble formidable from his opulence and connexions, or a statesman backed bj a large and powerful party, — he must still be content constantly to show at least an outward respect to the royal name and person ; and gratefully himself receive, and see all others receive from the King, the highest marks of honour, and the chief places of power. The station and the hereditary succession of the King render his possession of great political ability and influence both improbable and hurtful ; while the impossibility that a subject can become king, prevents his political talents being wholly perverted by ambition.' In this manner, the greatest and most usefid talents are safely brought into the service of the public, and the good of the individual is reconciled with the good of the community. We may reverse the maxims of Ji^schj'lus,^ and say, that it is both desirable to breed a lion in the state, and easy to curb it when grown into vigour. Even if the evils caused by a perpetual competition for the chief magistracy, and the danger of uniting the greatest legal authority with the possession of the greatest personal influence, are left out of the question, it is to be ' ' The advantages which seem to us to be peculiar to this arrange- ment are, lirst, to disarm the ambition of dangei-ous and turbulent individuals, by removing the great prize of supreme authority, at all times and entirely, from competition ; and secondly, to render this authority more manageable and less hazardous, by delivering it over, peaceably, and upon understood conditions, to an hereditary prince, instead of letting it be seized upon by a fortunate conqueror, who would think himself entitled to use it, as conquerors commonly use their booty, for his own exclusive gratification.' — Edinhuryh licview, vol. XX. p. 3153. ' The chief advantage of monarcliy consists in its taking away the occasions of contention for tlie lirst place in tlie state, and, in a manner, neutralising tliat place by separating it entirely from any notion of merit or popularity in the jjossessor.' — IJnd. j). 324. The force of the argument with regard to conquerors, in llie lirst of tliese passages, is not very apparent. * Ov xpv A.e'ofTOS iTKVfxvuv iv t 6K(i rpe To these arguments, it may wise republican will not think of be added, that even supposing that grudging these, if at so moderate it is not desirable to institvite he- a price he can secure the peaceful reditary royalty where it does not development of popular govern- already exist, it may happen that ment. — W. a royal family has in the course EEPUBLIC. 63 VIL COMMONWEALTH. — EErUBLIC. — REPUBLICAN. Commonwealth, or republic, is a general name for all governments in which tlie sovereign power resides in several persons, whether they be few or many. Thus we speak of the commonwealths or republics of Kome in early times, Venice, &c., which were aristocracies ; of Athens, of Eome in later times, &c., which were democracies. A few in- stances of this usage will be sufficient to exemplify it. Thus Machiavelli, at the beginning of his 'Principe,' says, 'Tutti li stati, tutti i dominii che hanno havuto e hanno imperio sopra gli uomini sono stati e sono o republiche o principati.' Dryden, in the following couplet, opposes commonwealths generally to kingly governments {i.e. monarchies) : Plots, true or false, are necessary things To raise up commonwealths and ruin kings.' Hume, in his Essay on the ' Populousness of Ancient Nations,' remarks, that ' at present there is not one republio in Europe, from one extremity of it to the other, that is not remarkable for justice, lenity, and stability, equal to, or even beyond Marseilles, Rhodes, or the most celebrated in antiquity. Almost all of them are well-tempered aris- tocracies.""^ In this passage Hume makes aristocracy a species of republic ; on the other hand, so many writers have included democracy under it, that some have been led to confine the term republic to democracies. Thus Crabb, in his ' Dictionary of Synonyms,' says, that ' govern- ments are divided by political writers into three classes, — monarchical, aristocratic, and republican.' Here he makes a republic equivalent to a democracy.'' He does not, how- ever, adhere to this usage ; for afterwards he says, that ' most of the constitutions of Europe, whether republican ' Ahxalojii and Achitophcl. • Works, vol. iii. p. 4(Jl. ' This use of republic appears to be of very frequent occurrence, though it is diliicult to discover what is commonly signified by tliis word. 64 POLITICAL TERMS. or monarchical, are indeLted to time and the natm-al com'se of events for their establishment :' ' where his re- public includes all governments not monarchies. According to the custom already noticed of identifying royalty with monarchy, or of calling all states in which a King rules, monarchical, it is usual to class England and France with monarchies, and not with commonwealths or republics, to which, in strictness, they belong.^ The in- terval in English history, between the death of Charles the First and the Eestoration, is commonly known by the name of the Commonwealth : although, during part of that time, the state was more absolutely under the rule of one individual than it has ever been since the Restoration, or, at any rate, since the Eevolution. By the writers, in- deed, of the age which preceded the Civil War, the English government (as Mr. Mitford has remarked ^) is often called a commonwealth : but they appear to use this term as nearly synonymous with state, or res publica. This is the sense in which Locke uses the word in his treatise., on govern- ment: and such he considers to be its genuine signification.* Unquestionably, however, since the end of Charles the First's reign, it has received the narrower meaning of a republic ; (thus, at the end of the seventeenth century, a ' In Government, Constitution. 2 Thus Hume notices 'the common opinion that no large state, such as France or Great Britain, could ever be modelled into a common- wealth ; but that such a form of government can only take place in a city or small territory.' — Essays, part ii. Essay 16. ' History of Greece, vol. ix. p. 53. However, in the following passage from Lord Bacon's Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates, ' commonwealth ' apjDears to be opposed to ' kingdom ' : — ' In the great game of kingdoms and commonwealths, it is in the power of princes or estates to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms.' * * By commonwealth I must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent com- munity, which the Latins signified bj' the word civitas ; to which the word which best answers in our language is "commonwealth," and most properly expresses such a society of men, which " community " or " city " in English does not : for there maybe subordinate communities in a government ; and " city," amongst us, has a quite different notion from commonwealth : and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word " commonwealth " in that sense in which I find it used by King James the First ; and I take it to be its genuine signification ; which, if anybody dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.' — On Government, b. ii. § 134. EEPUBLIC. 65 coininomuealtli s-inan signified what a republican does now;) although, even now, it occasionally obtains its wider acceptation. And hence, in such passages as that where Mr. Hallam calls the Kings of England, ' the chiefs of the English commonwealth,' ' it is uncertain in what way the term should be understood. Probably, however, no one would call an absolute monarchy by this name ; would speak, for example, of the Turkish commonwealth, or the French commonwealth under Louis the Fourteenth. ^ Commonwealth and commonweal are synonymous, and mean a society formed for the common good ; vjealth and iveal being originally the same word, and signifying wel- fare or happiness. Res publica is used by the Romans in rather a wider acceptation, as it included all governments except a violent despotism : thus Cicero, in his dialogue De re publica, says, ' When all are subject to the rule of one tyrant, the state cannot be called a res publica.'' ^ A republican is defined by Johnson to be 'one who thinks a commonwealth without monarchy the best government.' More precisely, ' one who thinks a commonwealth witliout royalty the best government.' A commonwealth with royalty is usually called a monarchy. Republican, how- ever, seems to have obtained a narrower sense than republic. For repjublic is applied to all aristocracies and democracies of which a King is not the head ; whereas a republican generally signifies a democrat, as opposed either to an aristocrat, or to a favourer of kingly government.* ' Constitutional Iliato?-!/ of Ungland, c. 14. - ' " Commonwealth," altliough not appropriately (query not i/;appro- priately) applied to any nation, is most fitted for republics. '^Crabb's English Sijnomjms, in State. ' ' Ergo illam rem populi, id est rem publicam, quis diceret turn cum crudelitate unius oppressi essent universi ; netjue esset vinculum juris, nee consensus ac societas coetus, quod est populus ? . . . Ergo ubi tyrannus est, ibi non \itiosam, ut heri dicebam, sed ut ratio cogit, dicendum est plane nullam esse rem pul;licam.' — Dc Itep. .3. .31, 48. » Yet modern historians of against Julius Cicsar, the fa- Rome (such as Merivale for in- vourite of the democracy, as re- stance), speak of Cato and his publicans. — W. fellow oligarclis, who fought 66 POLITICAL TERMS. VIII. ARISTOCIIACY. OLIGARCHY. — NOBILITY. Aristocracy signifies a government in which the sove- reignty is shared by several persons, being less in number than half the community.* Such are the governments of England, France, Bavaria, the United States of America, &c. It also signifies a certain class in a state, whatever may be the form of its government. Thus we speak of the French aristocracy, when the government was a monarchy ; of the aristocracy of Eome, when the government was democratic : and many writers have called the English government an aristocracy ; and a class of persons in England, the aristocracy. Aristocracy, as the name of an order or class of per- sons, is applied variously to the following classes : 1. To the class of nobles: as when we speak of the French aristocracy before 1789, meaning the clergy and the noblesse ; and the English aristocracy, meaning the members of the House of Lords and their families. 2. To the class of wealthy land-oivners. In this sense the members of the House of Lords, together with most members of the House of Commons, and a considerable portion of the rest of the community, would, in England, form the aristocracy. Thus, in a recent pamphlet, it is said, that ' For all England there are eighty-two county members. These, if any are supposed to be chosen by the landed interest, — the aristocracy.' ' ' Friendly Advice to the Lords (London, 1831), p. 12. * Austin defines ' aristocracy ' number to the whole is extremely in its widest sense as a constitution small, aristocracy (in a more speci- in which the sovereignty is shared fie sense), where the proportion is by any number more than one and small, but not extremely small, and less than all, including tlierefore democracy, where the proportion is all existing constitutions which are what would generally be considered not pure monarchies, since govern- large. Any one of these three forms ment by all is unknown. But he may hecaWeAtilimited monarchy, if distinguishes three forms of this a large and peculiar share of power aristocracy, viz. oligarchy, where is accorded to a single individual, the proportion of the sovereign (^Student's Austin, p. yS.) — W. AEISTOCRACT. 67 3. To the class of rich men generally, from whatever source their wealth is derived, or that class which, in England, is known by the name of gentleonea.^ Thus, Mr. Mill says, in his ' Essay on Gfovernment,' that ' the class whicli is universally described as both the most wise and the most virtuous part of the community, the middle rank, are wholly included in that part of the community which is not the aristocratical : '^ plainly identifying tlie aristocracy with the rich. The ambiguity of this word has been turned to great account by modern writers and speakers, who shift from one sense of it to another, as it suits their purpose, and having succeeded in raising a prejudice against one class, transfer and direct it against another, by merely con- founding them under one name. Substantially, liowever, ' aristocracy,' as the name of a class in England, is synony- mous with ' the rich ' in the widest sense : and any measure tending to increase the power of the rich is considered aristocratic ; and any measure tending to increase the power of the poor is considered anti-aristocratic. Oligarchy., as well as aristocracy, signifies both a form of government, and a class of persons in a state. It is generally used as an opprobrious term by those who think ' In England, whenever gentlemen are spoken of as a class, the rich are signified as opposed to the middle ranks and the poor. In a nar- rower sense, and as applied to individuals, the word gentleman is used to denote persons remarkable for the qualities and attainments which ought to distinguish those who have had the advantage of a liberal education, and, from their birth ujjwards, have associated with persons of refined and cultivated minds. It is likewise employed, in a re- stricted sense, to mean those who, by their wealth, are enabled, and by their disposition are induced, to live in entire idleness, engaged onlj-in the pursuit of pleasure. In this latter sense. Lord Chesterfield (if I am not mistaken) remarked, that it was unbecoming for a gentleman to walk (juickly in the streets, because it seemed as if he had some busi- ness or occupation. So Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, defining the popular acceptations of words, says, that 'things useful are those which bring a profit ; gentlemanlike, (fXevdepia,) those which are for the sake oi enjoyment.' {llliet. b. i. ch. 5. § 7). Nevertheless, this latter meaning is commonly given to the word in question by those wlio scarcely be- long to thecla-ss which they describe — the vulgar in mind — who seek to obtain admiration by insisting on the casual eccentricities of a few, or at least to the unimportant accidents of the class, without adverting to its genuine characteristics, which they are unable to ap])reciate. - yupp. to Encycl. Brit. vol. iv. p. .'iOS. See below in KicH and Poou. F 2 68 POLITICAL TERMS. either that the government is in the hands of too few, or that in an aristocracy tlie rulers govern oppressively. Nobility is a narrower term than either aristocracy or oligarchy : and signifies only those who have titles of honour or dignity, accompanied with political privileges.' ^ In the republics of ancient Greece, where there were no titled orders, or hereditary marks of distinction conferred by the state,^ the nobles were not distinguished from the rest of the community by any precise line ; but nobility was a moral rather than a legal distinction, and consisted in the ancient wealth and respectability of a man's family.^ It appears that the distinction between persons of high and low birth {cvfyevsh, ^vaysvus) existed down to the latest times of the Grreek states, even when it received not the slightest countenance from the lavv.^ IX. DEMOCRACT. 1)emocracy properly signifies a government in which a majority of the whole nation or community partake of the ' See Lord Bacon's Essay on KobiUty. - See Welcker's Prolegomena to Theugnis, p. 58. ^ The iiniversally prevailing opinion in favour of noble or gentle descent, i.e. of a descent from a wealthy and respectable family, is founded on truth, so far as one generation is concerned ; for a person brought up by parents in the same rank of life to which he himself be- longs, is more likely to have early formed the habits and imbibed the notions suitable to his station, than one who has been the cause either of his own rise or fall in society. Beyond this point, the feeling of pride in an illustrious ancestry is akin to that which makes us glory in the renown and great deeds of our countrymen : the national pride which an Englishman feels in being the countryman of Bacon and Shakspeare, is exactly analogous to the family pride of an individual in the ancient exploits of his forefathers. • Accompanied with political ^ We hear, however, of special privileges. This is not strictly cor- immi;nities (areXeiat) conferred at rect, as regards this country. Peers' Athens on the descendants of Har- sons, and some other j^ersons are modius and Aristogeiton, and a f ew universally classed among the no- other persons. See the speech of bility, though they have no politi- Demosthenes against ■Leptiucs. — cal privileges whatever. — W. W. DEMOCRACfr. 69 sovereign power. Such were, at one time, the govern- ments of Athens, Kome, and many other Grecian and Italian states, as well as some of the Italian and German cities in the middle ages, in which all the male adult citizens had a voice in the supreme legislative assembly. It is also used to signify a government in which either a majority or a large portion of the people have, by means of the right of election, an influence on the appointment of members of the supreme power. In this sense the federal government of the United States, as well as the governments of the several states, are called democracies ; although, both in the one and in the others, the sovereign power resides in a very small minority of the whole people. Even during the rule of the multitude in the French revolution, at the worst periods of the reign of terror, tlie sovereignty was never shared by a large part of the popu- lation of France. The government was really in the hands of the lower orders of Paris, and hence it was termed a democracy. This ^ agrees with the definition of Aristotle, who says that democracy is not, according to the common opinion, a government in which the many govern, but a government in which the poor govern. It so happens (he adds) that the rich are always the minority, the poor the majority of the people ; and hence accidentally a de- mocracy is a government where the many rule.^ In the following passage, Mr. Millar extends the term 'democracy' to those governments where the right of voting for the election of members of the sovereign body belongs to a majority of the nation. ' Many politicians (he says) have asserted that a republican constitution is peculiarly adapted to a small state, and cannot be maintained in a large community. This doctrine seems to have arisen from a view of the ancient republics, in which the whole people composed the legislative assembly ; and is evidently ' PolUicst, b. iii. ch. 8 § 3 ; b. iv. ch. 4 § 2 ; b. v. ch. 1 § 12 ; b. vi. ch. 2 § 2, See below in Rich and Poor. ' Not the representative demo- scribed in the sentence immedi- cracy which he was speaking of at ately preceding. The transition is t ho beginning of the paragrapli, but somewhat al)riij)t . — W. tlic oligarchy of proletarians de- 70 POLITICAL TEEMS. inapplicable to tliose modern systems of democracy, in which the legislative power is committed to national representatives. Nothing is more common than for phi- losophers to be imposed ujDon by the different acceptation of words.' ' It is, however, very questionable whether Mr. Millar and other philosophers, who have given the name of democracy to governments in which the sove- reignty ])elongs to a small minority, have not themselves been imposed upon by the doubtful acceptation of words ; or, even if they have advisedly employed this phraseology, whether it is not likely to impose upon others less wary and keen-sighted than themselves, less familiar with political reasoning, and less aware of the fallacies likely to arise from tlie use of equivocal terms. In states where there is a slave population, the form of government is commonly decided by the arrangement of the so.ereign power among the freemen or citizens: thus it has been above remarked that the government of Athens was, and is always called, a democracy, although the whole number of the freemen, men, women, and children, was not, in the times of which we have any accounts, above a fifth part of the number of slaves. In like manner, some of the southern states of the American Union are said to possess a democratic government, notwithstanding the large slave population which they contain.'^ This phra- seology has been objected to by Mr. Bentham, who in his ' Fragment on Grovernment,' has the following remarks : 'What is curious (he says) is, that the same persons who tell you that democracy is a form of government under which the supreme power is vested in all the members of a state, will-also tell you that the Athenian commonwealth ' His^t. Vicn- of English Government, vol. iii. p. .325. » By a Constitutional Amend- sequent amendment, passed March ment, passed December 18, 1865, it 30, 1870, 'no discrimination shall was enacted that, ' neither slavery be made in the United States, nor involuntary servitude, except among the citizens of the United as a punishment for crime whereof States, in the exercise of the elec- the party shall have been duly con- tive franchise, or in the right to victed, shall exist within the Uni- hold office in any state, on account ted States or any place subject to of race, colour, nativity, property, their jurisdiction ; ' and by a sub- education, or creed.' — W. DEMOCRACY. 71 was a democracy. Now the truth is, that in the Athenian commonwealth, upon the most moderate computation, it is not one tenth part of the inhabitants of the Athenian state that ever at a time partook of the supreme power ; women, children, and slaves being taken into the account.' ^ If, in computing" the numbers of a commimity in respect of its government, women and children are not taken into account, not only has there never been, but probably tliere never will be a democracy, in whatever sense that word is taken. As to slaves, the constant usage has un- questionably been to exclude their numbers in determining the question of aristocracy or democracy ; and to attend solely to the distribution of the sovereign power among the citizens, freemen, or body politic {iroKlrsvixa). Never- theless, Mr. Bentham's remark should never be neglected ; and in comparing two governments, it should always be l)orne in mind, that although they may be the same in name, their true characters may be widely different, if in the one state all manual labour, whether in manufactures or husbandry, was performed by slaves, in the other by free men. Mr. Mill, in his * Essay on Government,' appears to follow the common use of this word, not assenting to Mr. Bentham's remark ; for he says that ' in Grreece, notwith- standing the defects of democracy, human nature ran a more brilliant career than it has ever done in any other age or country.' ^ Now if we take from the rolls of democracy the illustrious name of Athens, and give to the cause of aristocracy the splendid achievements of her sons in every department of literature, science, and art, there will be little ground for extolling the renown of Grecian democracy. Indeed there was no republic in Greece which, according to this phraseology, would not have had an aristocratic government. ' P. 68, note. 2 Suppl. to Eiicyclopnedia Brit. p. 494. 72 POLITICAL TEEMS. X. MIXED GOVERNMENT. — BALANCE OF POWEHS. A MIXED government is opposed to a pure or simple government, and belongs to a classification of governments upon a different principle from any hitherto examined ; though what that principle may be, or in what manner it is connected with the theory of the balance of powers in a state, to which it is always linked, cannot be very readily or satisfactorily determined. The common notion appears to be, that there are three pure forms of government, viz. monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, in which there is no balance of powers : but that by combining any two of these forms of government, or all three together, a mixed government is formed in which a balance of powers exists ; that is to say, in which the elementary parts of tlie com- pounded constitution mutually check and counterpoise one another. This notion is subject to the obvious difficulty, that as the triple division of governments is strictly accu- rate and logical, it must be exhaustive, and its members must be opposed to one another ; whence it follows, that there can be no form of government which is not one of these three, and that a combination of any two of them, much more of all three, is as inconceivable as that a number should be odd and even at the same time ; inas- much as the notion of one excludes that of any other. For example : monarchy is the government of one, aristo- cracy of more than one : therefore, as a state cannot be governed both by one person and by several persons, it cannot, at the same time, be both a monarchy and an aristocracy. Aristocracy is a government of less than half, democracy of more than half the community : therefore, as a state cannot, at the same time, be governed by more and less than half its members, it cannot be, at the same time, a democracy and an aristocracy. Still less can it be governed by one, by a minority, and a majority of its members, all at once. On whatever principle the division of governments into monarchies, aristocracies, and demo- MIXED GOVERNMENT. 73 cracies is taken, — whether on the numbers of the sovereign body, on the presence of a King in the state, on the inheritance of the chief magistracy, on the wealth or poverty of the governors, or any other circumstance, — the difficulty still remains the same : for by whatever test monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are distinguished from one another, by the very h37pothesis there is a dis- tinction between them, and, therefore, no two can be united in the same state.* This irreconcilable hostility between the three forms of government, may be illustrated by the three numbers in the Greek language, the singular, dual, and plural ; each of which represents something- distinct from the others, and incompatible with either or both of them. A noun can no more be at once of the singular, dual, and plural numbers, than a state can be at the same time a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a demo- cracy. ^ ' D'Alembert, in his Anahjsia of Montesquieu'' s Esjmt des Lois, dis- poses of this difficulty in the following easy manner ; that is, he states the inconsistency, and thinks that hy the statement he accounts for it. ' Three sorts of government (he says) may be distinguished, — the re- publican, the monarchical, and the despotic. In the republican, the people in a body has the sovereign power. In the monarchical, one person governs by the fundamental laws. In the despotic, no other law is known than the will of the master, or rather of the tyrant. This does not mean that there are not in the world any iut these three kinds of states; it does not even mean that there are states which belong wholly and strictly to some one of these forms : most states are, as it were, mixed or shaded with one another. In one, the monarchy inclines to despotism ; in another monarchical is combined with republican gorern- * It might perhaps be said that, is an hereditary chief magistracy ; if there are three different prin- and a democracy in the sense that ciples on which governments are poor men occasionally become popularly divided into monarchies, members of the sovereign body, or aristocracies, and democracies, a in the sense that the elective fran- government which on one princi- chise is very widely extended. To pie is a monarchy, on another an this our author would iirobably aristocracj', on a third a demo- reply, that to give tliis meaning cracy, may properly be called a to ' mixed government ' would mixed government. Our own go- amount to the recognition of vernment, for instance, is an aris- three different popular usages as tocracy as regards the number of equally legitimate in scientific the sovereign body, according to discussion, which could only lead our author's mode of reckoning ; to hopeless confusion. — W. a monarchy in the sense that there 74 POLITICAL TERMS. As the use of the term in question is quite familiar and established in language, and yet there appears no way of escaping from the perplexity to which it gives occasion, it will be desirable to examine the principal passages in the works of political writers, where the doctrine of mixed governments is laid down. Plato, in his ' Treatise on Laws,' introduces the Lace- daemonian interlocutor in the dialogue, speaking thus : ' When I consider the constitution of Laced^mon, I cannot readily say by what name it should be called. In the first place, it appears to resemble a despotism, for the power of the Ephors has a marvellously despotic character: and yet it sometimes seems to be more democ7'atic than the government of any other state. On the other hand, not to call it an aristocracy appears altogether absurd. Moreover, it has Kings who hold their dignity for life, belonging to a lineage confessedly more ancient than any other in Greece. So that being thus suddenly called on for my opinion, I must acknowledge myself unable to define the constitution of my native country.' The Cretan then adds, ' It appears that I am in the same difficulty myself : for I cannot say positively that the constitution of Cnosus (in Crete) can be distinguished by any one of these names.' Upon which the Athenian remarks, ' The truth is, my friends, that the governments of your two countries are severally made up of all these different forms.' ' Aristotle, after speaking of the mode of establishing a government between an oligarchy and a democracy, by taking some of the peculiarities of each, and combining them in the same state, proceeds as follows : — ' The test by which to try whether democracy and oligarchy have been well mixed, is that the same government may be called ment ; in a third, not the whole, but only a part of the people, have the power of making laws. But the preceding division is not less accurate or less just. T/ie three kinds of government which it includes are so dis- tinguished that jjroperhj tlicij have nothing in common ; and, moreover, all the states which we know partake of one or the other of them.' D'Alembert here proposes to remove the difficulty by the very consider- ations which give rise to it. ' Leg. b. iv. p. 712, ed. Staph. The final remark of the Athenian stands thus in the original : aTiKa. -noWa iiju rd^tv tx^"'- - I'uliticx, ]). iv. cli. It. Compare what is said on the mixed nature of the Lacedaimonian government, in b. ii. ch. C. 76 POLITICAL TEEMS. After exemplifying the manner in which the different powers in the Lacedaemonian government mutually checked one another, and making some further remarks, he pro- ceeds to say that ' the three kinds of government of which we have been speaking were all found united in the commonwealth of Eome, and so even was the balance between them all, and so regular the administration that resulted from their union, that it was no easy thing, even for the Eomans themselves, to determine with assurance whether the entire state was to be esteemed an aristocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy. For if they turned their view upon the power of the consuls, the government appeared to be purely monarchical and regal. If, again, the authority of the seriate was considered, it then seemed to wear the form of aristocracy. And, lastly, if regard was had to the share which the people possessed in the administration of affairs, it then appeared plainly to be a democracy.^ ' Hence Cicero, doubtless adopting ^the opinions of Polybius, laid it down in his Dialogue De Repuhlica, that ' the best form of government is a mode- rate mixture of royalty, nobility, and democracy.' ^ In the same treatise he says that ' he does not know whether royalty {i.e. monarchy) is not far preferable to any other simple form of government, — if indeed he could approve of any simple form.' ^ Some years afterwards, Tacitus, following only the course of his own vigorous and original mind, remarked that ' all states are governed either by the people, the nobles, or a single person ; but a form of government, selected and combined from all these kinds, is more easily ' Polj/biiis, h. vi. ch. 10, 11. Hampton's translation has been followed, except in some placeiS, where he seemed to depart unneces- sarily from the original. - ' Statu esse optimo constitutairj rem publicam qute ex tribus generibus illis, regali et optimati et populari, confusa modice, nee puniendo irritet animum immanem ac ferum . . ." (De Rep. b. ii. ch. 23). In this passage, which is jareserved by a grammarian, and does not form part of the fragments discovered by Mai, the last words are either cor- rupt or mutilated. ' Ibid. In another place, he says, that a simple form is ' non per- fectum Deque optimum, sed tolerabile tajmen,' b, i. ch. 20. MIXED G0VEEN51ENT. 77 praised tlian put in practice, or, if put in practice, is not likely to prove lastino-.' ^ Having extracted these detailed passages from the ancient political writers, I will now subjoin some of the doctrines of modern philosophers on this subject, with whom tlie theory of mixed governments is sometimes sup- posed to have originated:"^ although the foregoing extracts prove, that not only the notion of combining the simple forms of government was cui'rent in antiquity, but that the doctrine of the balance of powers was likewise known. Indeed, this very expression is employed by Polybius to signify the reciprocal action of the different parts of the sovereign body. Blackstone's account of the mixture of the three forms of government in the British constitution, is so strongly marked with the vagueness and obscurity which characterise his method of treating political subjects, that his opinions on this point cannot be very satisfactorily ascertained. His doctrine on this question is, however, chiefly contained in the following passage. After having described the partition of the sovereign power among the King, the Lords, and the Commons, he proceeds to say that ' in no other shape could we be so certain of finding the three great qualities of government so well and so happily imited. If the supreme power were lodged in any one of the three branches separately, we must be exposed to the incon- veniences of either absolute monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy ; and so want two of tlie three principal in- gredients of good policy, — either virtue, wisdom, or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches, — for instance, ' AjinaU, b. iv. ch. 33. Tacitus was probably led to this remark, by considering the political changes of his own country, in which a despotism had been submitted to, as a less evil than the anarch}^ which it had superseded. Otherwise it is not easy to understand by what course of thought he arrived at this opinion : for the Spartan constitu- tion, which had a longer duration than that of any other Greek or Italian state with which we are acquainted, was, by all the ancient politicians, considered to be a mixed government. '^ ' The political writers of anticjuity will not allow more than three regular forms of government (viz. democracy, aristocracy, and mo- narchy). All other species of government, they say, are either corrup- tions of, or reducible to, these three.' — Blackstone, 1 Com, 49. 78 POLITICAL TERMS. in the King and House of Lords, — our laws might be pro- videntially made, and well executed : but they might not always have the good of the people in view : if lodged in the King and Commons, we should want that circumspec- tion and mediatory caution which the wisdom of the peers is to afford : if the supreme rights of legislature were lodged in the two Houses only, and the King had no nega- tive upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to encroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps abolish the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally destroy) the strength of the executive power.' ^ Eousseau says, that ' properly speaking, there is not such a thing as a simple form of government. A single prince must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government must have a head.' ^ The same extraordinary doctrine is likewise maintained by Paley, though not on the same grounds : — 'Political writers (he observes) enumerate three principal forms of government, which, however, are to be rega^'ded rather as the simple forms, by some combination and in- termixture of which all actual governments are composed, than as anywhere existing in a pure and elementary state.' Then, after treating of monarchy, aristocracy, and demo- cracy, he adds, that ' A mixed government is composed by the combination of two or more of the simple forms of government above described.'^ It may be observed that, in all these passages, either one or each of the kinds of republic, i.e. aristocracy or democracy, is supposed to enter into the composition of a mixed government ; but in the following extract from Mandeville's ' Fable of the Bees,' it is assumed that a combination may be formed of a monar- chy and a republic generally. — ' These are the arts which tend to worldly greatness : what sovereign power soever makes a good use of them, that has any considerable na- tion to govern, — whether it be a monarchy, a common- wealth, or a mixture of both,^ — can never fail of making it flourish.''* ' 1 Com. 51; and compare Bentham's Fragment on Government, ch. 3. * Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 7. ' Moral and Political PhiloMphy, b. vi. ch. 6. ^ Faile of the Bees, vol. i. p. IKi. MIXED GOVERNMENT. 79 Although there are some prevailing ideas which seem to run through all the above passages, yet there are no less obvious differences in the sentiments of the various writers. For instance, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Tacitus, and Black- stone, conceive that there may be both simple and mixed governments, — and such is probably the common opinion. Rousseau and Paley, however, maintain that no govern- ment can be simple ; while, on the other hand, Mr. Mill has proved, by a long and laboured argument, that no government can be mixed.' -These contradictions and in- consistencies may, however, as it appears, be explained by the aid of the following considerations, although they cannot be reconciled either with reason or with one an- other. 1. When a government is called ' mixed,' on account of certain institutions established in it by the sovereign power, the origin of the appellation may be explained on the Allowing principles. In a monarchy, where one rules, — in an aristocracy or oligarchy, where the few rule, — or in a democracy, where the many rule, — certain practices and institutions are generally found to prevail, and to be in harmony with (what is termed) the spirit of the constitu- tion. Such, for example, in an aristocracy, is any measure tending to lessen the number and increase the power of the ruling few ; in a democracy, to increase both the number and the power of the ruling many. These several usages and institutions thus acquire the name of monarchi- cal, aristocratic, and democratic. If, then, there is a state in which several of the institutions thought chai'acteristic of either government co-exist ; the original principle of division, viz. the number of the governing body, is lost sight of, and the government is said to be mixed of mo- narchy, aristocracy, and democracy. It is on this principle that Plato represents the Lacedsemonian as a mixed go- vernment. It has certain institutions which resemble those of the simple states. Thus tlie Epliors liave a power resembling that exercised by an arl)itrary monarcli ; the people have likewise a power resembling that which they ' On Government, p. 4KG. 80 POLITICAL TERMS. enjoy in a democracy ; the nobles have a power resembling that which they possess in an aristocracy : and hence, neg- lecting the principle on which these governments are called monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, Plato doubts whetlier a state, containing institutions similar to those caused by these various arrangements of the sove- reign power, is to be named by one appellation or the other ; and ends by determining that it has an equal right to all. So, again, Polybius, because the Roman consuls had, on certain occasions, a power which a monarch possesses at all times, — because the senate enjoyed some of the powers belonging to a council of nobles in an aris- tocracy, — and because the people had much of the power belonging to the people in a democracy, — decides that the Roman government was mixed of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. In a nearly similar manner Aristotle prescribes the manner in which a constitution is to be compounded of oligarchical and democratical institutions ; adding, that the mixture is then most perfect, when it is doubtful whether the government should be called an oligarchy or democracy, and may with propriety be said to be either. Aristotle has, in the passage in question, ex- pressed his doctrines with his usual perspicuity and pre- cision ; so that the purport of his reasoning, and the origin of his phraseology, may both be plainly discerned : but if he had adhered to his own definition of the three forms of government, formed on the numbers of the ruling body,^ he never could have conceived the existence of a doubt as to the name by which a government should be distin- guished. It is evident that this theory of mixed governments, proceeding on the character of the institutions of a state, abandons the division of governments by the numbers of the governors, which it nevertheless presupposes ; for the institutions which form the test of the mixture are them- selves characterised by the names of tlie simple forms of government, defined by the numbers of the sovereign body, in which they commonly prevail. All, therefore, that ' Politics, b. iii. ch. 7. avayKr) flvai Kvpiov ^ eVa ^ oK'iyovs ^ tovs ito\- \ovs. ' One, or a few, or the majority, must of necessity be sovereign.' MIXED GOVERNMENT. 81 need be further reraarked on this part of the subject is, that the division of governments into monarchies, aris- tocracies, and democracies, and the division into simple and mixed governments, are cross-divisions, founded on distinct principles ; the principle of classification for the latter division being the presence or absence, in a com- bined form, of certain practices, laws, and institutions, which are assumed to be characteristic of monarchy, aris- tocracy, or democracy, as determined by the distribution of the sovereign power. Consequently, these two divisions are perfectly consistent with each other ; and a constitu- tion may be, at the same time, an aristocracy, for example, in respect of the number of the governors, and a mixed government in respect of its laws and institutions. 2. A government is sometimes called mixed, when, by a change in the relations of the persons composing the sovereign body, or by lodging the entire sovereignty in a part of that body instead of the whole, the government would become monarchical, aristocratical or democratical. Tlie train of thought by which some persons are led to take this view of mixed governments, appears to proceed as follows. When people see, in any state, a power which, if all other powers were abolished, would make a state either monarchical, aristocratical or democratical (in the proper sense of those terms), they call that power the monarchy, the aristocracy, or the democracy ; and if there are two or three such powers in a state, then they say that it has a mixed government. Thus, in England, if the King was alone sovereign, and the Houses of Lords and Com- mons were abolislied, the government would be a monar- chy ; if the King and Commons were abolished, and only the Lords remained, the government would be an aris- tocracy ; if only the House of Commons remained, then, according to the common acceptation of democracy, the government would be democratical. But as all these powers co-exist at one and the same time, the government is said to be mixed. This is tlie manner in wliicli Elack- stone treats the Englisli constitution in the passage cited above : he considers what would be the effect if the whole sovereign power were lodged in each one of the three G 82 POLITICAL TERMS. branches, to the exclusion of the others ; and he then pro- nounces that the government is mixed. Persons who try a mixed government by this touchstone are, equally with those who use the criterion of institutions, debarred from using the classification of governments by the numbers of the rulers, as opposed to mixed governments : for even they must admit tliat these two divisions are quite consistent with each other, and that a government may be, at the same time, an aristocracy, for example, in respect of the numbers of its governors, and a mixed government in respect of the construction of its sovereign body. On the principle adopted by Blackstone, all governments of more than one, or republics, must be mixed governments ; for, in every republic, if the chief magistrate was sovereign, it would be a monarchy : and therefore, whether it be an aristocratic or democratic republic, its government must equally be mixed. Thus if the first Archon or General at Athens, the Doge of Venice, or the Stadtholder of the United Provinces, had been sovereign, Athens, Venice, and the United Provinces, would have been monarchies. So the government of the United States of America is mixed, because, if the President was sovereign, it would be a monarchy ; if the Senate, an aristocracy ; if the House of Eepresentatives, a democracy.^ This mode of con- sidering mixed governments proceeds, in great measure, from an unperceived ambiguity of the words ' aristocracy ' and ' democracy,' which mean either a form of government, or a class of persons in a state ; and of the word ' monarchy,' which, properly signifying the sovereignty of one, is some- times synonymous with royalty, the form of government, or the royal power in a state. Hence it is thought, that because there is in a state, monarchy (meaning the King), * There are four points in which instead of two ; the minimum age the Senate may be considered a is thirty instead of twenty-five more aristocratic body than tlie years; and they must have been House of Representatives; they are citizens of the United States nine electedbytlie Legislatures of their instead of seven years. None of respective states (tliemselvesrepre- these points, liowever, seem quite sentative bodies) instead of being sufHciently important to make all elected by the citizens directly; the difference between aristocracy their tenure of office is six years and democracy. — W. MIXED GOVERNMENT. 83 and an aristocracy and a democracy (meaning- classes of persons), therefore the constitution is compounded of the three forms of government so called. Tliis transition from the one signification to the other may be conveniently illustrated by the following extract from Mr. Mill's ' Essay on Gfovernment.' Speaking of the union of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy,' in the same state, he says : ' As a part of this doctrine of the mixture of the simple forms of government, it may be proper to inquire, whether an union may not be possible of two of them ? Three varieties of this union may be conceived ; the union of the monarchy with aristocracy, or the union of either witli democracy. Let us first suppose that monarchy is united with aristocracy (i.e. the forms of government). Their power {i.e. the power of the King and the aristocratic class, not of the forms of government called monarchy and aristocracy,) is equal or not equal. If it is not equal,'- &c. And he proceeds to examine a question wholly different from that proposed, viz. whether two powers in a state can be equal : and moreover equal, not in legal power, but in moral influence. A trace of the same mode of reasoning may likewise be plainly discerned in the following passage from a recent article in the ' Edinburgh Review,' on the subject of Mr. Mill's ' Essay on Government.' ' Mr. Mill ' (it is there said) ' tells us that it is a mistake to imagine that the English Government is mixed. He holds, we believe. . . . . that it is purely aristocratical. There certainly is mi aristocracy in England, and we are afraid that theiripovfeT is greater than it ought to be,' &c. The, Reviewer pro- ceeds to shew that the aristocratic class are restrained from abusing their power by certain moral motives ; whence he infers that the English government is mixed. ^ But even if the class of persons in England, called the aris- tocracy, had greater powers than they really possess, it ' See Mr. Mill's definition of these three forms of government, above, p. 36. 2 This confusion of the different senses of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is well illustrated by Bcntham's exposition of Black- stone's sophisms, Fragment on Government, p. 88. ' Edinburgh Itevien; vol. 1. p. 108. Q 2 84 POLITICAL TERMS. would not follow that the English g-overnment is an aris- tocracy. The French aristocracy were a powerful class under the old French regime, but the government was not the less a monarchy. So likewise there was usually a powerful aristocracy of nobles or rich men in the Greek and Italian democracies, if it had not been exterminated or expelled in the fierce dissensions and massacres which so often took place in those ill-constructed and ill-ad- ministered commonwealths. In like manner, Mr. Mill's elaborate argument that monarchy cannot be mixed with aristocracy, is founded on the merest verbal confusion. If monarchy means the government of one, of course it cannot be mixed with a government of more than one ; if it means royalty, it can plainly be combined with aristo- cracy : indeed, in most kingly governments, both of an- cient and modern times, the King has only been the head of the governing body. 3. A third manner of viewing mixed governments, is to make them consist, not in the arrangement or relations of the sovereign body, nor in the political institutions of the state, but in the moral influence exercised by different individuals and classes in the community. This notion of a mixed government is contained in the sentiments which Dionysius puts in the mouth of Manius Valerius, when addressing the Senate on an extension of the political rights of the plebeians : whence \ve may infer that, in the age of Augustus, the praise of a mixed government was one of the commonplaces of the Gfreek rhetoricians. ' That the Roman state (he says) will not be either an unmixed oligarchy or an unmixed democracy, but a con- stitution compounded of both these forms, is to us senators a signal advantage. Either of these governments, when existing singly, is most prone to run into violence and lawlessness. But when they are mixed in even proportion, any party in the state which may aim at change, and seek to unsettle the existing order of things, is restrained by tlie party of more moderate disposition, and less inclined to deviate from their accustomed habits.' ^ It is in this • Ant. Earn, b. vii. ch. 55, MIXED GOVERNMENT. 85 light also that Cicero considers the subject in his Treatise De Republica. ' All (he says) who liave the power of life and death over the people are despots : although they prefer being called Kings in imit.ition of the title of Jupiter. Again, when certain persons either from their wealth, their family, or other means, obtain the command of public affairs, they are in truth a mere faction, though they are called by the name of nobles. And if the people have the chief power, and all things are governed by their will, this state is called liberty, but is in fact licentious- ness. When, however, there is a mutual fear of one man for another man, and of one class for another class, then, as no one relies on his own strength, a sort of compact is formed between the people and the nobles ; whence arises that excellent form of polity, a mixed constitution.' ' A similar view of mixed governments is taken by Sir J. Mackintosh, in his ' Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations ' ; who considers the mixture of a government to consist in the mutual influence exercised by different bodies and persons in the state : his objections to the goodness of the simple forms of government are, however, partly founded on an assumption that the sovereign power can limit itself, and partly on a confusion of supreme, with despotic, or rather tyrannical, authority. His opinions on this subject are contained in the following passage: 'The privileges of a powerful nobility, of opvdent mercantile communities, of great judicial corporations, have in some monarchies approached more near to a control on the sovereign. Means have been devised, with more or less wisdom, to temper the despotism of an aristocracy over their subjects, and in democracies to protect the minority against the majority, and the whole people against the tyranny of demagogues. Eut in these unmixed forms of government, as the right of legislation is vested in one individual or in one order, it is obvious that the legislative power may shake off all the restraints tvhich the laivs ' * Sed qiium alius alium timet, et homo liomincm, et ordo ordinem, turn quia nemo sibi confidit, quasi pactio fit inter jxtpulum et potentes : ex quo exsistit id, quod Scipio laudabat, coiijunctum civilalis genus.' — De Re}), lib. iii. c. 14. 86 POLITICAL TERMS. have imposed on it. All such governments, therefore^ tend towards despotism ; and the securities which they admit ag'ainst misgovernmeut are extremely feeble and pre- carious.'' And, after some further remarks, he adds, ' that no institution so detestable as an absolutely un- balanced government perhaps ever existed ; that the simple governments are mere creatures of the imagination of theorists, who have transformed names used for the con- venience of arrangement into real polities ; that, as con- stitutions of government approach more nearly to tliat unmixed and uncontrolled simplicity, they become despotic; and as they recede further from that simplicity, they become free.'^ The substance of these opinions, viz. that the mixture of a government depends on the reciprocal influence of different classes and individuals in the com- munity, and that tlie simple forms of government are component parts of real constitutions, which the mind may consider apart from the rest, but which never occur in an elementary shape, is repeated, though with greater detail, in an article in the ' Edinburgh Eeview ' already mentioned. ' Wherever a King or an oligarchy refrains from the last extremity of rapacity and tyranny, through fear of the resistance of the people, there the constitution, • ivhatever it may be called, is in some measure democra- ' tical .... Wherever a numerical minority, by means of 'superior wealth or intelligence, of political concert, or of military discipline, exercises a greater influence on the society than any other equal number of persons ; there, wJtatever the form of governmefit may he called, a mixture of aristocracy does in fact exist. And wherever a single man, from whatever cause, is so necessary to the com- munity, or to any portion of it, that he possesses more power than any other man, there is a mixture of monarchy. This (the Eeviewer proceeds to say) is the philosophical classification of governments ; and if we use this classifica- tion we sliall find, not only that there are mixed govern- ments, but that all governments are, and must always be, mixed.'' ^ ' P. 61. "- P. 65. ^ Udinhurjh Itei-ien', vol. 1. p. lOt). MIXED GOVERNMENT. 87 According to the doctrine contained in tlie two passages last quoted, a mixed government is not determined either by the formation of the governing body, or by the nature of the laws and institutions ; but by the reciiDrocal moral influence of different persons and orders in the society. The doctrine of Cicero appears, indeed, to differ from that of the ' Edinburgh Eeview,' inasmuch as he admits the existence of simple forms of government ; but he admits it only in words, for his conclusion is incompa- tible with their existence ; it not being conceivable that til ere should be any state, in which a moral influence of individuals and classes of men upon each other, or upon the governing power, does not exist. On this principle, therefore, all governments must be mixed. According to the doctrine of the ' Edinburgh Eeview,' the French govern- ment under Napoleon was a monarchy, not because Napoleon was emperor and alone possessed the sovereign power, but because he had more power than any other man in the state ; it was likewise an aristocracy, because a numerical minority, viz. the army, exercised a greater influence on society than any other equal number of persons ; it was a democracy, because neither the emperor nor the army could venture to the last extremity of rapacity and tyranny ; on the contrary. Napoleon thought it prudent to render his dominion popular with his subjects, and indeed by various arts actually succeeded in so doing. The Reviewer, therefore, very justly adds that, according to these definitions, every government must be miixed ; and, he might have added, mixed not of any two, but of all the three forms. It follows necessarily, from his explana- tion, that there are no simple governments, that all governments are mixed, and that all governments are at the same time monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies ; which of course implies that they are at the same time monarchies and republics. To call this a classification of governments is therefore not less an abuse of language, than to call the offence of one man a conspiracy ; it is, in effect, a denial of all classification, an abolition of all distinction between different classes of governments, which 88 POLITICAL TERMS. are thus joined together in one undistinguished heap. No government can differ from another in being a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, inasmuch as those names are common to all governments. There is no doubt that this system effectually removes the ambiguity and explains the distinctions of the terms in question, by destroying both their signification and their difference ; but whether the political vocabulary would be benefited by discarding as senseless those much used and much abused words without an attempt to turn them to some purpose, whether science would be advanced by this summary method of cutting, rather than of unloosing the knot, is very ques- tionable. The weapons of political reasoning may be blunt and shapeless, and of uncertain employment ; but is it not more advisable to sharpen and repair them, and to ascertain their uses, than to reject them, in the lump as worthless lumber ? No classification of governments can be serviceable which turns on moral influences, and not on the construc- tion of the sovereign body, or some permanent attribute of the established constitution. The one principle affords a precise and definite ground of distinction, about which no two persons can disagree. The other depends on an uncertain opinion as to the comparative moral and politi- cal influence of certain persons and parties in the state, an influence which may be exercised in the most various ways, and is liable to fluctuate from year to year, and almost from day to day. And, after all, the system of the Edinburgh Reviewer assumes the very doctrine which it denies : for why does he say that a state is monarchical when one person in it has great influence ? Simply be- cause a state governed by one person, who thus necessarily has great influence in it, is properly called a monarchy. Why is a state aristocratical when a minority have great influence ? For no other reason than that in a state where the few govern, or* an aristocracy, the few possess great influence. Why is a state democratical where the • Here or =i.e. — W. MIXED GOVERNMENT. 89 people liave sufficient moral interest to save themselves from being cruelly oppressed ? Because a state where the many govern, and thus enjoy a power similar to this in- fluence, only greater in degree, is properly called a demo- cracy. Before the subject of mixed governments is dismissed,, it will be necessary to advert to a topic usually connected with it ; the existence of mutual checks and counterpoises in a constitution supposed to be compounded of the three simple forms of government, or (as it is termed) the balance of poivers.^ This question, which has been often discussed with much eagerness and little advantage, turns entirely on a confusion of moral influence and legal power. Legally, there can be no competition between different powers in the same state, as the sovereign power is supreme and un- divided ; nor can any other power, according to law, enter into competition with it. But the acts of the persons composing the sovereign body may be influenced by the wishes, interests, and proceedings, as well of each other as of other persons and classes in the community. So that, although a legal balance of powers is impossible, a moral balance must always exist. Besides the division of governments into monarchies and republics, or into monarchies, aristocracies, and de- mocracies, and into pure and mixed, there need only be noticed that into national and federal governments, which proceeds on a principle different from any otlier classification. A federal government is when an union is formed between several states,* by the terms of which some part of the sovereignty is lodged in persons wliose powers extend over all the states, and the remainder is lodged separately in persons whose powers are confined to each particular state. A national government is when the sovereign power, by whomsoever exercised, extends ' See Paley, Mural and Political Philosophy, b. vi. cli. 7. * Or, communities so fully or- separate states with but little in- ganised that they might constitute ternal change. — W. 90 POLITICAL TERMS. over the whole country, without any territorial distinc- tions.^ * XI. PEOPLE. — COMMUNITY. The word People sometimes signifies the whole nation, or society, the populus,^ including all persons in the state from the highest to the lowest, whether governors or sub- jects, noble or ignoble, rich or poor, young or old, male or female. In this sense Blackstone divides the people into aliens and natural-born subjects, and into the clergy and laity. Sometimes it signifies the whole nation with the excep- tion of the persons composing the government ; or the governed as opposed to governors. Thus we say that the government is supported by the people, is hated by the people, &c. In this sense it is used by Blackstone, when he makes the people of England include the whole society ' Theocracy is defined by Johnson to be a 'government immediately- superintended by God.' In this sense, it is applied by many writers to the Jewish state. Thus Blackstone speaks of ' the theocratic establish- ments of the children of Israel in Palestine ' (1 Com. 191). Sometimes, however, it is used to signify a government of priests, a sacerdotal aristocracy. Hence the governments of Ancient Egy^Jt, Modern Rome, &c., have been termed theocracies.* See Heeren, Idecn, vol. ii. part ii. p. 430— .5. ed. 4. 2 That is, as jwjndus was used in the later ages of the Roman com- monwealth ; for in early times, as Niebuhr has shewn, it denoted only the patrician order as opposed to the plebeian. See his History of Home, vol. i. p. 365. Engl, transl. » The distinction between a very fully considered in Austin's federal and a national govern- Sixth Lectiire. See also Wheaton's ment, and also that between a su- International Lan-, 2nded.byLaw- preme federal government and a ranee, p. 75. See also J. S. Mill's system of confederated slates, ar iRej). Government, ch.xvii. — W. * Plato, in his Latcs, book iv. p. 713, recommends in terms a theocracy :—a)! oa-oiv av noKeuiv fx.'i) 6eo<; aKKa. T19 , who may be regarded as the natural ^ representatives of the whole popu- lation.' By the community governing itself, therefore, Mr. ]\Iill means the adult males voting for the election of representatives, or members of the supreme body ; that is to say, he considers the sovereign body and the electoral body as together forming the governing body : unless indeed he intends to exclude those who share in the sove- reign power from the governing body ; but on this point his language is somewhat perplexed. If it is not assumed that the electors, being a majority of adult males, compose the governing body, then he proves that the only good ' Wliat is liere meant by natural, does not very clearly appear : pro- nably it is used as nearly the contrary of aHiJicial, that which is inde- pendent of human institution or contrivance. See below in Nature. » Few readers will need to be view from his father on this point, reminded that the younger Mill 9:ee\ns Rejjresentative Government, (John 8tuari) took a very different ch. viii. p. 175. — W. 94 POLITICAL TERMS. form of government is an aristocracy, after having said that ' the unfitness of an aristocracy ' (i.e. the class) to be intrusted with the powers of government rests on demon- stration: ' for the representative assembly, and the persons possessing the sovereign executive power must necessarily be a very insignificant minority of the whole population. It is however an unquestionable, though perhaps not un- common, abuse of language, to describe the electoral body as possessed of the governing power, which properly be- longs only to the sovereign body ; as the constituent is thus confounded with the representative, and incorrect notions of the nature of representation and sovereign power are suggested by the obscurity and vagueness of the lan- guage. On this confusion more will be said under the word Eepresentation. It will be observed that, in the preceding extract, Mr. Mill, in order to strike off the women and children, assumes, and does not prove, that their interest is identical with that of the adult males. Commonly, however, this deduc- tion is made, not only without proof, but even without mention, and is tacitly assumed as a matter of universal agreement. On this exception of women and children from the whole community, when considered with reference to its government — an assumption made by all writers on political science — the true theory of government may (as it appears) be founded : inasmuch as they are thus unanimously set aside from the question, not on account of their poverty, not on accovmt of their depravity, not on account of the smallness of their numbers (for they always form the ' This again causes some perplexity : for he defines an aristocratical government to be when ' the powers of government are held by any number of persons intermediate between a single person and the majority.' By majority, therefore, we must understand not a majority of the whole society, but a majority of the adult males ; and hy j^overs of government, not sovereign power (as is commonly understood by that expression), but the power of electing persons who are to wield the sovereign power. Thus, if a nation consisted of 2,000,000 persons, out of whom 500,000 were adult males, and the sovereign body consisted of 500 persons : then, if 250,001 adult males voted for the election of members of the sovereign body, the government would be a democracy ; if 249,999, it would be an aristocracy. PEOPLE. 95 largest portion of the society), not on account of their interest being hostile to that of the smaller number of adult males (for it is asserted that their interests are identical) ; but on account of their incapacity for ruling, the inferiority of their intellects, and their general igno- rance of political questions and political science.' All classes of the community are more fitted for governing in proportion as they differ from women and children, and the less fitted as they resemble them, in these respects.^ If interest alone was to be regarded as a qualification for rulers, women and children would have the strongest claim to an enjoyment of political rights : as being the weakest, and therefore most exposed to violence, as being the most simple, and therefore most subject to fraud, they have the greatest interest in good government. If, on the other hand, knowledge alone were regarded, without the desire to promote the interests of the com- munity, rulers might unintentionally, through indifference, or intentionally, through ill-will or selfishness, omit to adopt the measures which they thought best fitted to- benefit the state. The problem of government is to reconcile these two elements, and to combine the advantages derivable from knowledge with the motive afforded by interest. This subject is of too great importance to be pursued further in this place ; but I may be allowed to remark, ' It must be observed, that when Mr. Mill excludes from his body of electors all women, on the ground that their interests are involved in the interests either of their husbands or fathers, he does not account for this exception ; for his statement might be exactly reversed, and the electoral body might be made to consist only of adult women, on the ground that the interests of their husbands and fatliers were involved in their interest. His argument goes no further than this : interest is the only thing to be considered in the formation of an electoral body : the interest of husbands and wives, fathers and daughters is identical ; therefore it is superfluous to give a vote to women, when tliey would be, as it were, the duplicates of their husbands and fathers. But, by parity of reasoning, if the electoral body consisted only of adult females, then the interest of the males would be equally secured, because it would be involved in that of their wives, daughters, and mothers. - In this sense Cicero says : ' In disscnsione civili, quum boni plus quam mali valent, expendendos elves, non numerandos [)ut() " (Be licp. lib. vi.): a remark as applicable to times of domestic concord, as of civil war. 96 POLITICAL TERMS. that, on examination, it will probably be found that in the early periods of a nation's history, when the mass of the population was immersed in darkness and ignorance, greater weight was attached to the knowledge and wis- dom of the governoi's, and their moral character, than to any other qualification; whence the expressions wltena- geniot, prudhomTnes, boni homines, probi hovii7ies, buon- uomini, &c., in the middle ages ; nor was it till experience had shown that good education is no guarantee against the abuse of political power, and it was perceived how the most grievous oppressions had arisen from the interests of the rulers being opposed to the interests of their subjects, that the theory was imagined, that if the interests — that is, the wishes — of the majority of any nation could be ascertained and carried into effect, such nation would in- fallibly be well governed. As, in the former theory, it was forgotten that knowledge without interest is not sufficient ; so in this, it was not perceived that interest without knowledge is not sufficient ; and that, though a man always wishes well to himself, yet in his actions, from ignorance or passion, he frequently pursues that very course which is the least fitted to insure his own happiness. Each theory embraces, and each omits, an essential condition of the problem. XII. REPRESENTATION. REPRESENTATIVE. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. Of the several definitions of the word repTesentation given by Johnson in his Dictionary, that which most nearly approaches its political meanings, is ' the act of supporting a vicarious character,' To represent, he likewise lays it down, is ' to fill the place of another by a vicarious character; to personate, as the parliamerit represents the people.' Vicarious he defines to be ' deputed ; delegated ; acting in the place of another.' Eepresentation, as is expressed by these definitions, in REPRESENTATION. 97 its primary political sense, means the standing in another's place ; holding another's proxy ; being the organ of his sentiments, and the instrument of conveying his wishes and determination. Thus an ambassador instructed to treat with a foreign power represents the king his master, or whatever power presides over the intercourse with foreign states. Thus, likewise, a person signing another's name under a power of attorney is his representative. Representatives of this description were the deputies anciently chosen in England by the counties and boroughs to treat with the king concerning the amount of money required for the service of the state and the wants of the crown, which the several bodies, of whom they were the several organs, would agree to grant to the King. So completely was this transaction considered in the light of a bargain between two parties, that in early times the grant was made in the form of an indenture, each estate granting separately ; and the King's assent (as in the case of a common grantee) was presumed without being formally given.' This proceeding less resembled the making of a law, than a contract between an individual on the one part, and the committee of a company or a body corporate on the other part.^ Frequently the representatives of the estate of the Commons, together with the other estates, required from the King a consideration in the shape of some concession of his prerogative or sovereign power, for the subsidies which they granted to him ; and thus these persons appear as negociators treating with an independent power, from whom they require some sacrifice for their benefit, corresponding to the sacrifice which they make for his benefit. They granted subsidies for his immediate use and advantage, and not for the advantage of the whole commimity, of which they were members. In like manner, tlie deputies sent to the States-general of the United Provinces represented the provinces to which tliev re- ' Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 212, 4to. Cunstitidional Histoi-y of Eufjland, vol. ii. p. 369. 4to. •^ See a case in 13 Ed. 3. mentioned hy Mr. Hallam, Middle Ages, vol. ii. p. 218, where the Commons could not grant a subsidy without first consulting tlicir constituents. II 98 POLITICAL TERMS. spectively belonged, and acted upon the instructions which they received, without forming any independent opinion as to the tendency of a measure to promote the common good.^ They, like the deputies of the Commons' estate in England, and many Gferman principalities,'^ were specially appointed to act in the interest of a particular class or part of the whole community. Whether the name of a representative government, as applied to governments such as those of modern England, France, Bavaria, Holland, the United States, &c., was derived from an historical recollection of the times when, as in England, the deputies of the estates of the Clergy and the Commons were representatives in the original sense of the word, or from its analogy to strict and proper representation, seems to be uncertain ; although the latter supposition is perhaps the more probable. A representative government is when a certain portion of the community, generally consisting either of all the adult males, or of a part of them, determined according to some qualification of property, residence, or other accident, have the right of voting at certain intervals of time for the election of particular members of the sovereign legis- lative body. This right of voting is properly a political right ; nor does it bear any resemblance to the exercise of sovereignty. The possession of this right enables a voter to influence the formation of the sovereign body ; but a voter never has any part of the governing power, nor does he wield a power which in any way resembles the authority of government, except that the decision of those who really wield that authority may be influenced by his vote. The moral duty incumbent on an elector is to vote for that candidate whose services as a member of the legislature are, in his judgment, most likely to prove beneficial to the state. His power, conferred by this right, is strictly ' See Sir William Temple's Oh)t) : ' In so large a state as ours, it is very wisely contrived, that the jjeople should do that by their repre- sentatives, which it is impracticable to perform in person.' 102 POLITICAL TERMS. legislative question. ' The proposition ' (says a writer in the ' Edinburgh Eeview,') 'which we would lay down as the corner-stone of the representative system, [is] that the people ought not to decide directly and finally on any public measures except the choice of their representatives.' ' Whatever ought to be the case or not, it is certain that in this, or any other representative government, so long as those governments endure, the people, i.e. the electors, cannot by their votes decide directly and finally on any public measure : their power is confined to the choice of those who are to decide. The certainty of this fact is not at all impugned by such passages as the following : — ' Sovereignty (says Rousseau) cannot be alienated : it consists essentially in the general will ; and will cannot be represented : — it is the same, or it is different ; there is no medium. The deputies of the people, therefore, neither are, nor can be its representatives ; they are only its dele- gates iconimissaires); they cannot conclude any thing definitively. Every law that the people in person has not ratified, is null ; it is not a law. The English people imagines that it is free, but it is much mistaken ; it is free only during the election of members of Parliament : as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing.' ^ These remarks, though mixed up with erroneous notions on the subject of liberty, chiefly proceed on the supposition that the electors of England are, between the sessions of Parliament, possessed of the sovereign power, which they surrender to their representatives : whereas, by the election of representatives, they enable the King at any moment to summon his Parliament, and so call the legislative sovereignty into existence. Rousseau boldly rejects the doctrine that a member of the English House of Commons is permitted in any case to exercise an independent j udgment ; ^ while others maintain ' Vol. XX. p. 408. 2 Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 1.5. ^ 'A knifflit, citizen, or burgess of the House of Commons, cannot bj' any means make any proxy, hecausc he is elected and trusted by multitudes of people,' says Lord Coke, 4 Inst. 12. This reason is adopted by Blackstone, who, however, states it in a rather more objec- tionable form, 'as he is himself but a proxy for a multitude of other REPRESENTATION. 1 03 that he should be guided only by his views of the public interest, and not by the requisitions of his constituents. Between these two doctrines the following remarks are intended to steer a middle course : which, however, as they had not the advantage of studied composition and calm consideration, must not be scrutinised with critical mi- nuteness. ' The fundamental principle of our constitution — the great political discovery of modern times — that, indeed, which enables a state to combine extent with liberty — (is that j the system of representation consists altogether in the perfect delegation by the people of their rights, and the care of their interests, to those who are to deliberate and to act for them. It is not a delegation which shall make the representative a mere organ of the passing will, or momentary opinion, of his constituents . . . According to the soundest views of representative legislation, there ought to be a general coincidence between the conduct of the delegate and the sentiments of the electors.' ' However laudable the endeavour to mediate between extreme opinions, yet, in this case, it appears that there is no middle term, and that one or the other must be true. Either a representative is a mere delegate, empowered only to act according to the instructions of his constituents, and not concerned about the general expediency or in- expediency (as it may seem to him) of the course which he is pursuing ; or he is morally bound, no less than he is legally able, to follow that line of conduct which he con- siders most conducive to the public welfare. Besides these two alternatives, there is no third : a representative must be either a delegate or a free agent ; he must either follow the opinions of others, or his own : nor is it possible to dis- tinguish between cases in which he should be his own j)eople.' 1 Com. 168. Such reasoning, however, is not, only contra- dicted by tlie fact, but is directly at variance v/ith BLackst one's own account of the powers of a member of the House of Commons, 1 Cum. i.V.i. ' Tlie Lord Chaiwidlor's* Speech on Pari. lUform, Oct. 7, ISHl, p. 71. See likewise, on this subject, some remarks of Hume. inanoteapi)endc(l, in the early editions of his Essays, to Part i. Essay 4. Works, vol. iii. p. 30. * The Lord Chancellor reterrod to was the late Lord Brougha-n. 104 POLITICAL TERMS. master, and in which he should be the servant of his con- stituents. There is no doubt that, in all representative governments, the sentiments of the representative will generally coincide with those of his constituents, because they will choose a person who holds their opinions, and he will frequently be influenced by the desire of insuring a subsequent return. Nevertheless, according to the un- questionable theory of representation, a representative is neither an advocate to plead the cause of his constituents, nor is he merely their organ, obeying their instructions with just so much discretion as a lawyer exercises on behalf of his client : but he is a member of the sovereign legisla- tive body, acting by no delegated authority, entitled to form an independent judgment, legally answerable to none for his conduct, but bound by a moral obligation to consult and vote for the good of the whole community. In all cases of delegation, one party puts another in his place ; transferring to the delegate an authority which he is either unwilling or unable to exercise for himself. Thus a man delegates to his steward the management of his estate, to a tutor the education of his children ; arming them with certain powers, which for specific purposes, he possesses in his capacities of proprietor and father. But no one can delegate a power which he does not possess. If an elector does not himself, under any circumstances, possess the power of making laws, he cannot properly be said to delegate to another the power of making laws. A representative exercises this power by virtue of the votes of his constituents, but not by a delegation from them.'' The distinction between real and virtual representa- tion appears to be founded on the same erroneous notion, " The error, if it be an error, is king and the peers, with the elec- shared, not only by the writers toral body of the Commons.' The above referred to, but also by Aus- whole passage relating to the exer- tin, who says (Student's Austin, p. cise of sovereign power through 97), ' Speaking accurately, the delegates should be carefully com- merabers of the Commons' house pared with this cliapter. On the are merely trustees for the body by same side is Mr. J. S. Mill, who which they are elected and ap- says {liepresentative Government, pointed; and consequently, the ch. v. p. 86), ' The meaning of re- sovereignty always resides in the presentative government is, that REPRESENTATION. 105 that a representative is merely the delegate of his con- stituents : for a town or district is said to be really repre- sented, when it returns a member to Parliament ; to be virtually represented, when it does not return a member, but its interests are protected by those who really repre- sent other places.' Those who propose to remedy the evil of virtual representation by changing it into real represen- tation, frequently support the change on false grounds : for it is not more expedient that a large town should be represented rather than a small town, because its interests will be watched by its own delegate ; but because it is more likely to send a good representative to the national councils. Lastly, it may be remarked that those who found the expediency of a representative government on the impossi- bility or inconvenience of assembling the whole community, acknowledgfing at the same time that a nation must be well governed if all public measures coincide with the sup- posed interest, or the wishes of a majority of the com- munity, should remember that there would be no difficulty in putting all important questions to the vote in primary assemblies, and polling the whole nation, without having recourse to the circuitous and uncertain process of repre- sentation. If representatives are to be considered as merely having the proxies of their constituents, and if they are returned merely to avoid the difficulty occasioned by ' The idea of virtual representation appears to be expressed in the followino' passage : ' The principle of rei^resentation, in its widest sense, can hardly be unknown to any government not purely democrat ical. In almost every country, the sense of the whole is understood to be spoken by a part, and the decisions of a part are binding upon the whole." — Hallam's Middle Ayes, vol. ii. p. 210. the whole people, or some numer- electors, seems to have been dofini- ous portion of them, exercise, lively rejected by that general tlirough deputies periodically elec- usage which constitutes the ulti- led by tliemselv(;s, the ultimate mate court of appeal in sucli mat- controlling power which in every- ters. Though there is a good deal constitution must reside some- to T»e said for it on grounds of pure where.' See also the concluding logic, it is liable to the fatal ob- paragraph of chapter iii. In short, jeclion that it would render such Sir G. C. Lewis's view of sovereign long-establislied terms as monar- power, as residing only in the chij^ arintocracy, and democractj al- persons who actually legislate or most wholly unmeaning with re- command, and not at all in the fcrence to modern politics. — W. 106 POLITICAL TERMS. numbers, surely it would be little less expeditious, and far more secure to take the votes of the constituents in detail ? ^ XIII. RICH. MIDDLS CLASS. — POOR. There are two different ways in which classes of things can be opposed to each other : viz., as contraries^ and as extremes.^ They are opposed as contraries, when a class is logically divided in such a manner that every individual of it, not contained in the one member of the division, is contained in tlie other ; when the two species are together equivalent to the whole genus to which they belong. Thus true is contrary to false, straight is contrary to crooked, odd is contrary to even, knowledge is contrary to igno- rance ; because all propositions which are not true must be false, all lines which are not straight must be crooked, all numbers which are not odd must be even, and a person must be ignorant of all things about which he has no knowledge. On the other hand, things are opposed as extreniies, when they do not together make up, or exhaust, the class or genus to which they belong, but there is between them a middle state, from which they are not precisely divided, and into which they insensibly graduate at both its extremities. Instances of this class of opposites are old and young, tall and short, belief and disbelief, love ' The policy of the late Em- virtually equivalent to a ^^Zf&(.ict. of Biajraphv, p. 332 &.— W. 120 POLITICAL TERMS. poverished by any accidental cause, for example by a loss of territory, to demand a new division of all the land, and an equal partition of it among the citizens. To this practice (not to be confounded with the agrarian laws of the Romans, which were partitions of unappropi'lated public land) Aristotle alludes in many passages of his 'Politics' ; ' and such divisions were made or proposed in different states on several occasions.^ Of the same nature was the abolition of all claims of debt, and sometimes even a forced repayment of the interest already received by the lenders f which measures, indeed, could only be proposed after an open conflict between the rich and poor. It is in the Grreek states that the most striking examples of the col- lision of the poor and rich, and the confliction of their supposed interests, are to be found, on account of the insignificance of the middle class in those communities, and the direct share which the poor had in the enact- ment and administration of the laws, by means of their admission to the legislative and judicial assemblies of the citizens, and the appointment of public officers by lot. Thus it was not only at times of popular commotions, but during the regular course of the government, that the rich were unfairly and harshly dealt with. So, at Athens, the practice of multiplying occasions for the con- fiscation of property, and of willingly entertaining accu- sations which, if supported, would entail that punishment, was very prevalent : "* in the same manner, and for the same motives, that grounds for accusations of treason were, in more recent times, diligently sought after })y the Euro- pean princes. So Aristophanes describes the poor of Attica as being anxious for war — the rich and the farmers as ' B. V. ch. 8. § 20 ; b. vi. ch. 3, § 3, and ch. 5, § 3 * 2 Miiller's Dorians, vol. ii. pp. 165, 169, 190. 3 Plutarch, QiK^-sf. Grceo. IS.f * Boeckh's Economy of Athens, vol. li. p. 127. * Of the passages here referred to, only the first relates to divisions of land, the other two to judicial confiscation ; nor does the first imply that the practice was a common one. — W. + See on this subject Grote's History of Greece, vol. iii. ch. 11, pp. 143-157 ; and note especially his remark (p. 1.5G) that, 'While there occuiTed at Rome several political changes which brought about new tables or at least a partial depreciation of contracts, no phenomenon of the same kind ever happened at Athens, during the three centuries between Solon and the end of the free working of the democracy.' — W. RICH AND POOR. 121 adverse to it ; * because the poor would receive a share of the spoil, if there was any (and the Greeks always con- sidered war in the light of an extensive plundering expedi- tion), while the rich would sustain the loss, if the war was unsuccessful, and the cultivators were liable to have their lands ravaged by the victorious enemy. At JNIegara, too, the leaders of the popular party {i.e. the poor) on one occasion banished so many of the rich, for the sake of con- fiscating their property, that the numbers of the exiles became sufficiently large to enable them to return and engage with the people, whom they overcame, and then established an oligarchy ; ^ making (as Aristotle has re- marked) their preponderance in tlie government the prize of their victory. Isocrates describes the Argives, during the short intervals of war, as destroying the most opulent citizens, and rejoicing at their ruin more than others would rejoice at the death of an enemy. ^ These instances (which are only a few out of a large number) may serve to put in a clear view the hostile spirit which often exists between the poor and the rich, and which has not hitherto been powerfully developed, or been attended with impor- tant eftects in most modern states, for reasons which can- not here be investigated. But that the class of poor have almost constantly acted in opposition to the interests of the rich, and that the class of rich have frequently acted in opposition to the interests of the poor, is not more certain than that their real, and permanent, and general interests, are in perfect unison with each other. Now the assertion of the ' Westminster ' Ee viewer, that the interest of those who are not rich is always coincident with the interest of the whole community, is true, if we take interest in its largest sense, to signify that which is ultimately l)eneficial to the community : but in that sense, neither is the essential interest of the rich or poor, sepa- ' vavs 5ri Ka6(\KfLV Tu irii/riTi fxlv 5oKe7, Tots TrAoutn'ois 5e koI yfup-yols ov SoKi7.* Aristopli. Eccl. 297. 2 Aristot. Pol. b. v. cli. 5. ' PMlij>jj. p. 5)2. D. * It is well known that at Rome, thronghout almost the whole history of the republic, the opposite was the case ; the poorer citizens feeling chiefly the burdens of war, wliilo the rich monopolised the glory and spoil. — W. 122 POLITICAL TERMS. rately, distinct from the interest of the community. But if, in a proper democracy, i.e. a government in which a majority of the adult male population partake of the sove- reign power, the poor (who in every coimtry are, and always must be, more numerous than the rich and the middle rank taken together) were to propose, and by their numbers carry, that the property of the rich shoidd be divided in equal shares among all the members of the com- munity, then the interest of the rich would not coincide with the supposed interest of the whole community ; for they are members of the community, and would conceive themselves injured. If the interest of the community means the I'eal interest of all and every of the members composing it ; the interest not only of any two classes together, but of every class by itself, must coincide with the interest of the community. If the interest of the commimity means not the real, but the supposed interest of all and every of its members, then the supposed interest of any number of persons less than the whole, is not coin- cident with the interest of the whole commimity. This difference in the significations of the word interest may be illustrated by a verse of an ancient poet, which occurs in a collection of maxims made by Lord Bacon : Cum vitia prosint, peccat qui recte facit. Of which the following translation is given : — ' If vices were upon the whole matter profitable, the virtuous man wovdd be the sinner.' ^ In other words, ' if it were for the general and permanent interest of mankind to commit vice, the virtuous man would be the sinner.' In this sense, all vice is contrary to a man's interest ; that is, his true interest is to act virtuously. But it is often said that a man preferred his duty*to his interest — that his right moral judgment was perverted by his interest, &c.; in which cases '• interest ' means, not that which is, on the whole, beneficial to mankind ; but that which the indi- vidual desires, or what, to the majority, would be an immediate gratification. Even if the subject could be properly discussed at ' Bacon's Works, vol. i. p. 418. ed. Montagu. RICH AND POOR. 123 length in this place, it would be needless to attempt, after the excellent dissertation of Dr. Arnold,^ to trace the manner in which the division of political interests, in the early periods of national development being commonly into the nobles and the rich, when the ricli are the 'popular party, — is changed at a later epoch into that of the rich and poor, when the rich become the anti-popular party. Thus much, however, it may be proper to observe, that at no time do the poor consider their interest as identical with the interest of the rich ; but that, when the rich are excluded from political power and privileges, on the ground of their not belonging to certain families, this is the pro- minent grievance of the day : and while this lasts, the other division of interests, though it equally exists, is not brought into light, nor does it become the point of sepa- ration between the contending parties. So long as the rich are the excluded party, claiming to be admitted to equal rights, the discontents of the poor remain unheeded, or are enlisted in the cause of the rich. This tirst contest, therefore, is of a purely political character, and is chiefly carried on between persons of property and education, who may thus on both sides be expected neither to rejoice in massacre and bloodshed for their own sake, nor to be indif- ferent about the destruction of property which takes place in all violent civil wars. But when the struggle comes on between the rich and poor, or (as Dr. Arnold has expressed it^) between property and numbers, the contest is not so much for political j^rivileges, as for the equalisation of wealth ; not so much for setting up the low, as for putting down the high ; no hopes of accommodation can be enter- tained, because the claims of the attacking party are as unreasonable as their end is unattainable. Add to this, that when the rich are the discontented party, being, even in a state of political disability, somewhat accustomed to rule, they are less likely to make a grievous abuse of power than those who come into possession of it for the first time, full of hatred and envy against their opponents who have lived in luxury while tliey perhaps liave been ' See his edition of 'rhiicj/didea. Appendix 1. * See his edition of I'kuci/dides, pp. G33, 634. ] 24 POLITICAL TERMS. pinched by want, and determined to retaliate on them for their former superiority of condition. To this inferior moral state of the poor when contending against the rich, as compared with that of the rich when contending against the nobles, the greater bloodiness and atrocity of the former contest is to be attributed ; it is, in its nature, a war of extermination, directed to an inaccessible object; nor is it to be expected that the flame of such a conflict will be extinguished till it has consumed all the materials which feed it. Hence, it is no matter for surprise that Dr. Arnold should remark, that he knows no instance in which the struggle between property and numbers has, after having come to a crisis, terminated favourably. Indeed it is difficult to understand how a contest could have a favourable issue, of which the object is to abolish a distinc- tion not factitious or arbitrary, but necessarily existing in all communities in which a right of property exists, and of which all the members are not on the same level of barbarism. In the ancient states, this political crisis was followed by every form of evil — native despotism, foreign despotism, invasion, unprincipled oligarchies, unprincipled democracies, national poverty and decline. Whether the same crisis, which seems impending in some modern states, will be averted by the prudence of the rich, the numbers, wealth, and respectability of the middle class, the diffusion of knowledge among the poor, and, above all, by the extension of the rights of citizenship to the whole popu- lation, is a problem which time alone can resolve.'' » During the forty-four years unions on which the poorer side which have elapsed since these re- relies for success are potent in- flections were lirst published, Eng- struments for familiarising their land at least has passed success- members with the feelings and fully through the crisis which the habits of corporate proprietors, author then viewed with such and impressing upon them their natural apprehension, and chiefly need for legal protection. And by the means which he indicated, eventhisstruggle, though far from The struggle between property and being ended, and indeed attrac: ing numbers has assumed the much more attention than at anyprevious milder form of a struggle for the period, seems to be carried on every higher remuneration of manual la- year with greater moderation and bour, in which the institution of with more deflnite and practicable property itself is so far from being aims. — W. endangered, that the very trades- 125 XIV. NATURE. NATURAL. — UNNATURAL. — STATE OF NATURE. On account of the gi-eat number and diversity of signi- fications belonging to the word Nature, and the difficulty of fixing them with clearness and precision, it will be desirable to examine all its principal meanings, without regard to their political bearing, as they mutually serve to explain and throw light on one another. Nature is sometimes used as identical with God, or the Being which made the universe : as when we speak of the works of Nature ; or when it is said that Nature makes nothing in vain. It is also employed by atheistical writers, in an indistinct sense, to denote some supposed power or motion which has affected existing matter, and presides over the world. This meaning may be discerned in the two following passages, which, though taken from Latin authors, may serve to exemplify the English usage, as they admit of literal translation into our language : — Horace, speaking of the gods of Epicurus, says — • Namque deos didici securum agere ajvum, Nee si quid miri faciat Natura, deos id Tristes ex alto coeli demittere tecto. Sat. I. v. 103. Juvenal also has these verses : — Sunt in fortiinfe qui casibus omnia ponunt, Et nullo credunt mundum rectore moveri, Natura volvente vices et lucis et anni. xiii. 8G. ' In both these passages Nature expresses an active supreme power, distinct from God. Akin to this sense,^ is the use of Nature, not as a real being, but as a personification of the active powers of the universe, of the various causes always in operation around us. This usage of the word, which suits only with • So closely akin, that it may thors referred to would have re- well be doubted whether the au- cognised any distinction at all, — W. 126 POLITICAL TERMS. a figurative and poetical style, is sufficiently illustrated by the following passage from Shakspeare : — Thou, Nature, art my goddess ; to thy law My services are bound.' Nature is also used to signify the material things created by God, the outward objects which strike the senses. Thus we speak of the order of Nature, the laws of Nature, the beauties of Nature, an observer of Nature. In this sense is to be understood Lord Bacon's work on the ' Interpreta- tion of Nature.' In this sense, too, it occurs in the following passages of Pope, who makes great use of this word : — All are but parts of one stupendous whole, Whose body Nature is, and God the soul.^ Let ruling angels from their spheres be hurled, Being on being wrecked, and world on world ; Heaven's whole foundations to the centre nod, And Nature tremble to the throne of God.' So likewise Sir Walter Scott : Call it not vain : they do not err Who say that, when the poet dies, Mute Nature is his worshipper. And celebrates his obsequies. Hence is derived the phrase natural philosophy, as opposed to mathematical and moral philosophy ; natural philosophy being that philosophy which is concerned about objects that strike the senses, and do not refer to the qualities or conceptions of the human mind. The expression exact sciences as opposed to moral sciences, comprehends both natural and mathematical philosophy, and is a division founded, not on the quality of the sub- ject matter, but on the greater or less certainty of the results. Nature is likewise used to signify the qualities or attributes of anything; that which anything is, or the system, order, arrangement, or mutual relations, of dif- ferent things. Thus we speak of the nature of God, the ' Lear, act 1. sc. 1. " Essay on Man, ep. i, v. 267. » Ibid. V. 254. NATURE. 127 nature of the human mind, the nature of the human body, the nature of society, the nature of government, the nature of an army, the natiu-e of the air, the nature of the sun, &c. So Lucretius wrote a poem * On the Nature of Things.' From this acceptation of the word are derived the expressions good-nature and ill-nature^ as applied to mankind, in the sense of benevolent and malevolent dis- position. Hence also the phrase human nature, which appears to signify the sum total of the faculties, dispositions, and propensities of mankind ; or the condition of the human race. Thus Dryden, paraphrasing Juvenal, speaks of A soul, that can securely death defy, And count it Nature's privilege to die. And Milton, O why did God, Creator wise, that peopled highest heaven With spirits masculine, create at last This novelty on earth, this fair defect Of Nature, and not fill the world at once With men, as angels, without feminine ? In this general sense, Nature includes all the constituent parts of the human mind and disposition, whether bad or good, all which are comprehended in the following passages of Shakspeare : His nature is too noble for the world. ' How quickly nature breaks into revolt, When gold becomes her object.'^ If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would con- duct us to most preposterous conclusions.* So likewise, in the ' Paradise Lost,' the Angel Michael addresses Adam in the following words : Judge not what is best By pleasure, though to nature seeming meet, Created, as thou art, to nobler end Holy and pure, conformity divine, ' Coriolanus, act. iii. sc. 1. ^2 Hen, IV, act iv. sc. 4. ' Othello, act i. sc. 3. 128 POLITICAL TERMS. Hence Nature is used to signify the disposition which a man would have if he did not regulate his passions and appetites, and educate his mind by moral discipline. In this sense Lord Bacon uses the word in his Essay on ' Nature in Men ' : thus, ' Nature is often hidden, some- times overcome, seldom extinguished.' ' A man's nature runs either to herbs or weeds ; therefore let him season- ably water the one, and destroy the other.' Horace applies the same term to the original good taste and feeling which a mistaken system has been unable wholly to stifle : Naturam expellas furca : tamen usque recurret, Et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.' Sometimes, however, nature is taken in a narrower sense, to express only the prevailing part of the human disposi- tion, those moral principles which are found to actuate the majority of mankind in a civilised state of existence. In this sense we say, that parricide, incest, and other crimes, are contrary to our natm-e, are revolting to human nature, e^c. So the author of the poem of ' New Morality ' speaks of Crimes by God and Nature loath'd. The ordinary sense of natural has the same origin, signifying that which is agreeable to the nature of any- thing. Thus a natural death, as opposed to a violent death, is a death which happens in the regular course of nature, and does not arise from any extraneous cause. In this sense, it is opposed to miraculous or supernatural, as, * a miracle is a disturbance of the natural order of things.' As applied to mankind, it sometimes follows the general sense of nature just described ; as, ' it is natural to men to be kind, to be cruel, to better their condition, to love their children,' &c. ; so Johnson said, that 'all men will naturally steal : '^ sometimes, in the narrower sense, (when it becomes a laudatory term,) as when it is said that a man is wanting in natural love, that he violates natural decency, &c. ' The word natural ' (says Hume) ' is commonly taken * Epist. 1. 1. ep. X. V. 24. - BosiveWs Life, vol. ii. NATURE. 129 in so many senses, and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence, be natm-al to man ; if reason and forethought be also natural ; then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's inclination, their necessities, lead them to combine ; their understanding and experience tell them that this combination is impossible, where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others. And from these passions and reflections con- joined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual of the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exer- tion of his intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural.'^ In these remarks, Hume properly understands natural to mean that which is agreeable to man's nature, in the general sense above pointed out. Unnatural is sometimes used to signify that which is inconsistent with the nature of anything, and could not have happened without some extraordinary deviation from the usual course of things. Thus we call an incident in a tale of fiction unnatural ; and we speak of an unnatural birth, meaning a monstrous birth. Unnatural is likewise used to signify that which is contrary to the good principles of human nature : as, an imnatural offence, an unnatural child ; so in ' Hamlet ' the murder of the king is called an act ' foul, strange, and unnatural.' ' The Irish ' (said Johnson) ' are in a most unnatiu'al state ; for we see there the minority prevailing over the majority.'^ Here by unnatural state Johnson must have meant a state which he considered as luifavour- a])le to good government ; for there is nothing moust rcjus or unusual in the smaller governing the larger number. The same person is reported to have ' wondered that the phrase of unnatural rebellion should be so much used, for ' See Hume's Esmys, A{)penciix 3. Works, vol. iv. p. 31)1. ^ Bosn-cWs Life, vul. ii. p. 118. K 130 POLITICAL TERMS. that all rebellion was natural to man.'' If nature means only the good part of man's disposition, then rebellion (without sufficient cause) is unnatm-al ; if nature means the whole of man's disposition, then rebellion is natural. Nature, again, is opposed to art, or human institutions. In this sense, nature is a negative te^m, and means that which is not made or fashioned by man. These usages, which are of frequent occurrence, will be sufficiently exemplified by the following passages : All nature is but art unknown to thee ; All chance, direction which thou canst not see.^ As nature's ties decay, As duty, love, and honour fail to sway, Fictitious ^ bonds, the bonds of wealth and law, Still gather strength, and force unwilling awe/ 'Agriculture' (says Gibbon) 'is the foundation of manufactures : since the productions of nature are the materials of art.'^ In like manner the proverb says, that 'habit is a second nature ;' and Shakspeare, that ' use almost can change the stamp of nature.' So likewise we say that 'artificial flowers, or fruit, look as if they were natural;' by the latter word meaning that which is not the work of man's hands. In a nearly similar sense, we speak of a natm-al manner, and an artificial manner ; a natural voice, and an artificial voice ; by natural understanding that which would be if man did not make it otherwise. It appears that the use of natural, as opposed to revealed, is formed by an analogical application of this sense of natm'e : natural religion meaning a religion which may be derived from the exercise of our unaided reason, without a revelation from Grod.^ ' Bosn-elVx Tour in the Hebrides, p. 403. "^ Pope's E)nifying a child born out of wedlock, as distin- guished from one born after marriage, which is an institu- tion of men. In some of the writings of Mr. Bentham,*^ the method of natural procedure in courts of justice is strongly re- commended, and opposed to that of technical procedure. It is impossible to suppose that any mode of judicial procedure should be left to the discretion of the judge, guided by no rules. Mr. Bentham must evidently, by natural procedure, have meant procedure governed by certain rules, but by rules different from those commonly established. In this case, natural seems to be a vague teim of praise signifying that system which, to the writer, seems most expedient. When, however, we use such expressions as ' trade should be left to take its natural course,' &c., we mean that trade should be left to take that course into which it would fall if subjected to no regulations or restrictions whatever.^ ])resent state of man as opposed to his state after death, appears to be derived from nature in the sense of humati condition; so likewise in ' Hamlet,' the ghost describes himself as, Confined to fast in fires, Till the foul crimes, done in my daya of nature, Are burnt and purged away. And Hamlet himself afterwards speaks of Passing through nature to eternity. ' ' Natural may be opposed, either to what is Hnusiml, miraculous, or artAp'cial. In the two former senses, justice and property are un- doubtedly natural. But, as they suppose reason, forethought, design, and a social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that epithet cannot strictly, in the last sense, be applied to them. Had men lived witliout society, pro])erty had never been known, and neither justice nor injustice had ever existed. But society among human creatures liad been impossible witliout reason and forethought. Inferior animals tliat unite are guided l)y instinct, wliich supplies tlie place of reason. But all tliese disputes are merely verbal." — Hume's Etiisai/s, App. 3. Works, vol. iv. p. 392. " Natural there = domestic, like present editor's remarks thereon in 1 he procedure of a father in house- his Histovji of Modern English Law, hold disputes. See Bowring's edi- p. 153. — W. lion, i. 558, and vii. 197, and the K 2 132 POLITICAL TERMS. From a general view of the above examples, it follows that the various significations of nature fall into two classes: 1. It expresses a positive idea, as when it means essence, quality, disposition, &c. 2. It expresses a nega- tive idea, as when it merely excludes art, or human regu- lation and contrivance.' It is from the latter sense of nature, when it denotes the absence of human skill and institutions, connected with a mistaken belief as to the progress of society, that the famous political theory of the state of nature has been derived.^ It has been imagined that a cultivation of the moral and intellectual faculties, and an advance in the arts and comforts of social life, have corrupted and debased mankind ; ^ and that the ignorance and barbarism, prevalent at some early period of the world, were attended with an amount of virtue and happiness unknown in succeeding times. Hence the term, a state of nature, has been employed to designate a sup- ' '-The idea of a natural society is a negative one. Tlie idea of a political society is a positive one.' — Bentham, Fragment on Government, p.. 13. ^ The negative sense of this expression is well marked in the ex- planation of the corresponding French phrase, in the Biotionnuire de VAcademie. ' On appelle Hat de jmre nature, Tetat des hommes sauvages, sans societe, et sans lois.' ^ It is singular that the doctrine of the possession of wealth being hostile to virtue, should occur in the writings of a person who has com- posed a treatise on Political Economy. 'Prudence' (says Mr. Mill, in his Essay on Government, p. 505, comjjaring the aristocratic body with the rest of the community, i.e. the rich with the middle class and the poor) ' is a more general characteristic of the people who are without the advantages of fortune, than of the people wlio have lieen thoroughly subject to their eorriijjtire operation.'' A sentiment of this kind might naturally be expected in Goldsmith's Deserted Village, or in Mande- ville's Fahle of the Bees : but how is it consistent with a work, of which the object is to point out those circumstances which most favour the productiveness of industry, and the production, distribution, and accu- mulation of wealth 1 It may, however, be said, that, in his work on Political Economy, Mr. Mill described the circumstances which are most favourable to the increase of wealth, in order that they might be avoided : that he showed how industry may be encouraged, in order that the most effectual mode of repressing it might be perceived : that the knowledge of the best means of increasing wealth implies the knowledge of the best means of diminishing it. Thus his work on Political Economy would be like a treatise on poisons ; the object of which is not to recommend the use of the poisons, but to ascertain their antidotes.* * Mr. Mill perhaps derived this notion from Bentham, in whose mouth it seems equally strange. fiec3 his Constitutional Code, Book I., chaps. IX. and XUI. — W. STATE OF NATURE. 133 posed state of primitive simplicity, before the introduction of the arts of civilisation, ' and the establishment of government and laws. The phrase itself and the theory connected with it have, in this country, been diffused chiefly by the writings and authority of Locke ; though neither he nor anyone else has ventured to fix on any time or country which furnishes an example of this form of society, if society it is to be called ; and his state of nature is as pm-e an offspring of the imagination, as Plato's perfect republic, or Sir Thomas More's Utopia. As, however, Locke's account is somewhat diffuse and indistinct, I shall prefer giving Pope's description, in his ' Essay on Man,' of the state of nature, and the change from that state to civilisation and government, as being shorter and more explicit. If any one objects to taking an account of a political theory from a poet, let him produce one from a prose writer, which, when it is examined, will be found to be more prosaic or less inconsistent with reason and reality : Nor think in nature's state they blindly trod ; The state of nature was the reign of God : Self-love and social at her birth began, Union the bond of all things, and of man. Pride then was not ; nor arts, that pride to aid ; Man walk'd with man, joint tenant of the shade : The same his taV>le, and the same his bed ; No murder cloth'd him, and no murder fed, :^ :^ :(e :^ :(: :fc ;(c Ah, how unlike the man of times to come. Of half that live the butcher and the tomb ; Who, foe to nature, hears the general groan, Murders their species, and betra3's his own.- The poet then describes man From Natiire rising slow to Art, as addressed by the voice of Nature, which enjoins him to take instruction from the lower animals ; for example, to learn the art of building from the bee ; the art of plough- ing from the mole ; of sailing from the nautilus, &c. ' Hence, in familiar language, a date of nature is employed to mean a state of nuditj/ ; clothes being the work of men's hands. ~ 071 Man, epist, iii. v. 140. 134 POLITICAL TERMS. Moreover, to imitate forms of government from the same original : — a republic from the ants ; a monarchy from the bees. Great Nature spoke : observant man obey'd, Cities were built, societies were made. The result of this account seems to be, that in the state of nature God ruled the world ; that is, G-od alone ruled it, — there being no human rulers. Benevolence and self-love existed ; but, notwithstanding the existence of self-love, all men lived in concord, and the feeling of pride was unknown. There were no arts or government ; men lived with the beasts,^ and subsisted exclusively on vege- table food. In the state of nature men killed neither beasts nor men. After some time, mankind learnt, by observing some of the lower animals, to imitate their ways ; and having thus invented the arts of social life, upon the same model they formed societies under an established government. Such is an outline of this puerile theory of the progress of society ; untenable from its self-contradictions, even as a hypothesis, and distinctly refuted by facts : a theory which could only have arisen from the distempered imagi- nation of some day-dreamer, and could only have been tolerated by a blind ignorance or wilful neglect of all history. Pictures of this description may delight the mind when presented to it in an avowedly poetical and fabulous shape, as in the Greek legends of the golden age ; but when introduced into a didactic poem, or a philosophi- cal system of government, they shock the reason without amusing the fancy. To refute it in detail would be superfluous ; nor indeed need anything more be said, than that there is no record of such a state of existence, at any time, in any country. No one can doubt, that if a history is shown to be utterly destitute of historical evidence, it must fall to the ground : yet Locke treats this objection as devoid of weight, and proposes to answer it, by observing that ' all princes and ' This supposition implies a change in the nature of beasts, as well as of man : for beasts avoid man, and prey upon him, which have never been subject to his attacks. STATE OF NATURE. 135 rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in a state of nature,' and that members of different communities are, as towards each other, in a state of nature.' These statements are, in a certain sense, strictly true ; but they afford no answer to the fatal objection which Locke treats so lightly. The question is, whether there ever was a number of men living together, not forming a society, or recognising a common sovereign, or an estab- lished law of the state; but following a certain law of natm-e as plain or even plainer to be understood than the positive laws of commonwealths, of which each man is judge in his own cause, and which each has the power to execute for himself; yet never abusing this power, but using it always as calm reason and conscience dictate.- To this inquiry it is answered, that there is no account of such a state of existence, and therefore it is to be rejected as a chimera. On the other hand, Locke replies that sovereigns are subject to no law, and members of different states acknowledge no common law ; and therefore there are persons living in a state of nature. But this reply does not touch the objection which it professes to remove : it is objected that there never was a collection of men living together peaceably before the establishment of a govern- ment, all acknowledging a certain law, which each man makes and executes for himself. This olijection is not answered by saying that after the formation of societies, and the establishment of governments and laws, there are some persons in those societies not subject to the law, and persons in different states who acknowledge no common law. The doctrine of the state of nature may be readilj admitted, if it is confined to persons living in civilised communities, and to a jjeriod posterior to the estal.)lish- ment of government.'* The ancient errors respecting the innocence and virtue of savages, and their superiority over civilised man, have in late times been so generally exploded by the advance- • Locke on Government, b. ii. § 14. 2 IhUl. § 13, 8. ^^ " And even now it, is only to a dent states can be said to live very limited extent that indepen- peaceably together. — W. 136 POLITICAL TERMS. ment of historical knowledge, more especially since the researches of modern travellers have disclosed the real habits and character of barbarous nations, that scarcely a person could, perhaps, be now found to defend such a theory of the progress of society as is advanced by Locke and Pope ; nevertheless, it is sometimes important that such groundless speculations should be set forth, so that their absurdity may appear, and the doctrines deduced from them be shown to want a foundation. Many a person might be startled by imperfections dragged into the broad daylight, which would pass unobserved if suffered to remain hidden in their former obscurity. It might indeed have been expected that when a theory was abandoned by common consent, and never mentioned but to be rejected, the practical deductions from it would have shared a like fate : that 'when the brains are out, the man would die.' Still we find traces of the belief in a state of nature lingering in many expressions of frequent occurrence, which had their origin in that delusion ; and which only owe their currency to an ignorance of the impure source from whence they are derived. It is thus that a theory which, in its day, had a sufficient vogue to transfer its peculiar and technical expressions into common language, may continue, by that means, to influence our reasonings after it has fallen into deserved oblivion ; and that its very obscurity may favour the circulation of the errors to which it gave birth. No one has furnished a more efficacious antidote to the erroneous and mischievous notions respecting the virtues of savages, and the tendency of civilisation to corrupt mankind, than Archbishop Whately, in his lately published ' Lectures on Political Economy ; ' whose discussion of this subject must afford delight and instruction, even to those who already are most firmly convinced of the principles which it establishes. It is on account of the excellence of this discussion, and the authority which it deservedly carries, that it becomes the more necessary for me to advert to the explanation there given of the expression — 'a state of nature,'' as it disagrees with that suggested in the pre- ceding pages. ' There is no good reason (he says) for calling the con- STATE OF NATURE. 137 dition of the rudest savages a state of nature : on the contrary, such language is as much at variance with sound philosophy, as the dreams of those who imagine this state to resemble the golden age of the poets are with well- ascertained facts. The peaceful life and gentle disposition, — the freedom from oppression, — the exemption from selfishness and from evil passions, — and the simplicity of character of savages, — have no existence but in the fictions of poets and the fancies of vain speculators : nor can their mode of life be called, with any propriety, the natural state of man. A plant would not be said to be in its natural state, which was growing in a soil or climate that precluded it from putting forth the flowers and the fruit tor which its organisation was destined. No one who saw the pine grow near the boundary of perpetual snow on the Alps, stunted to the height of two or three feet, and struggling to exist amidst rocks and glaciers, would describe that as the natural state of a tree, which, in a more genial soil and climate a little lower dovm was found capable of rising to the height of fifty or sixty yards. In like manner, the natural state of man must, according to all fair analogy, be reckoned not that in which his intellectual and moral growth are, as it were, stunted and permanently repressed ; but one in which his original endowments are, I do not say brought to perfection, but enabled to exercise them- selves and to expand, like the flowers of a plant; and especially, in which that characteristic of our species, the tendency towards progressive improvement, is permitted to come into play.' ^ " If nature is taken to mean the whole compound of the moral and intellectual faculties and disposition of man, and if natural signifies that which is agreeable to the nature of any thing, then it is natural to man to improve his external condition, to regulate his passions, and to ' Whately's Iiitroductiiri/ Lectvre^ on Political Economy , pp.137, i;?8. The sentiments expressed in tlie latter i^art of this passaere coincide exactly with the definition of nature p:iven by Aristotle : oiov yap eKa. — W. 138 POLITICAL TERMS. cultivate his mental powers ; in other words, to advance in civilisation : and to this course of things he has a natural tendency, in the same way that wealth has a natural ten- dency to increase at a faster rate than population. But although his tendency is to move in this direction, it is not the less natural,, i.e. consonant with his nature, for him to recede instead ofadvancing in the career of improvement, in the same way that population sometimes increases faster than wealth : as is witnessed by the mighty revolutions that have reduced to misery, ignorance, and barbarism, countries once the seat of gigantic empires, and the home of every art and science ; which have converted the palaces of kings, the sites of vast cities, and the territories of powerful and active commonwealths, into wastes scarcely tilled by a few slaves, or occasionally visited by a roving tribe of barbarians : such instances of national decline and degradation are unhappily too frequent to be called un- natural, or to be considered as monstrous deviations from the ordinary course of hiunau affairs. Although the opinions of those philosophers who conceived that all human affairs revolve in a cycle, and must after a regular succession of changes, end where they began, are not less mistaken than that doctrine which compares the life of a state with the life of an individual, and teaches that its forces will be impaired by long existence, as a man is enfeebled by old age ; yet it is impossible, with some modern historians, to consider the state of mankind as one of perpetual progres- sion or to flatter ourselves that every retrograde movement will only l)e a voluntary retreat, by which society collects all its powers in order to enable it to take a more vigorous spring in advance.'' In this general sense, therefore, it is natural to man to recede, as well as to advance, in civilisation ; though his tendency is towards improvement. He might, therefore, be in a natural state,, whether in his original barbarism, or having made some progress in the ascent of civilisation, » Adequatel}' to examine this grade as compared with the pro- view would require a volume gressive movements of mankind is rather than a foot-note ; but it is here considerably exaggerated. — allowable to intimate an opinion W. that the importance of the retro- STATE OF NATURE. 139 or having- again relapsed into his former rudeness. But being in a natural state appears to be by no means syno- nymous with being in a state of nature, as Dr. Whately's argument assumes. In the one phrase nature signifies that which anything is, the essence or constitution of any thing ; in the other, it expresses the absence of art or human regulation. A state of nature is (if I may for once make use of such a word) a state of inartlficialness. Men are supposed to be in a state of nature when there are no arts, luxuries, or refinements whatever ; nor any established government and laws. From this state of original simplicity and separateness they emerged into a state of civilisation, by learning the useful arts from some of the lower animals, according to Pope ; and by forming a government on the basis of the social compact, according to Locke and many other writers. This expression, how- ever, does not imply that it is more natural to man (or more consonant to his nature) to be savage than to be educated ; more than the expression a natural child implies that it is more natural to mankind to permit a community of women than to establish the institution of marriage : it is a mere negative term to express the non- existence of certain contrivances and ordinances of men. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that the very mistaken notion of a state of nature being more natiu-al to man than a state of arts and government, may be suggested or confirmed by the doubtful form of the expression in question. The law of nature has not been so favourite an expression with modern political writers as natural riffhts; but has been chiefly used by writers on ethics and juris- prudence. It is a phrase of great antiquity, being used both by the Grreek philosophers and the Roman lawyers, and is of a date long anterior to the theory of the state of nature, witli which it had ori<^inally no connexion. By the moderns, however, the law of nature has often been made an integral part of that tlieory ; in whose writings (for instance, in tliose of Locke) it usually signifies, not laws enacted by a legislature, l)ut moral rules, wliich are Innding on men independently of law ; and, according to the above 140 POLITICAL TERMS. hypothesis, were the only rules by which the conduct of men was guided in the state of nature : and which, though unwritten and unascertained, either by common agreement or by the command of a governor, were yet more intelli- gible and fixed than the established laws of a civilised state.'' XV. LIBERTY. — FREEDOM. — FREE. Liberty and Freedom,^ as well as Nature, have both a positive and a negative sense ; and these senses require to be accurately distinguished, in order to avoid the confusions and mistakes which they have so often occasioned. 1. Liberty, in the positive sense, signifies rights, the enjoyment of which is beneficial to the possessor of them. Thus we speak of the liberty of a British subject, meaning certain rights which a British subject may exercise, such as the right of suing out a writ of habeas corpus if he is imprisoned without reason.^ So it is said, that ' a man has a liberty to use his own property as he wills, so that he injures not others ;' for example, that he may ride his own horse, till his own land, fell his own trees, &c. ; that is to say, the law annexes these rights to the right of property, and guarantees the proprietor against the disturbance of ' Crabb {Diet, of Siinonymx), in Freedom, says that ' freedom is personal and private; liberty is public' There is no ground for this distinction: and in the remarks in the text, both words are intended, where only either the Saxon or the Norman form is expressed. - According to Blackstone, the 'spirit of liberty is so deeply im- planted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the pro- tection of the laws, and so far becomes a free man.' 1 Com. 127. Upon which passage, Mr. Christian remarks, that ' it is not to the soil or to the air of England that negroes are indebted for their liberty, but to the ethcacy of the writ of haheas corpus, which can only be ex- ecuted bj- the sherifE in an English county.'* " On the law of nature, as con- the last century, see Maine's A)i- ceived respectively by the Koman cient Law, ch. iv. — W. lawyers and bj' the philosophers of * Blackstone's learned but unimaginative editor seems rather hard here upon a very haimless figure of speech. — W. LIBERTY. I4l them. In like manner, we speak of giving one the freedom of a borough or corporation, i.e. conferring on him the rights and privileges which belong to the members of such a body. Lihertiea, in the plural number, when employed with a political reference, is always equivalent with v'Kjhts.^ A second positive sense of liberty, is when it is used to signify the possession of certain rights by one part over * another part of the community. In this sense it is opposed to slavery or servitude. A freeman is he who is not a slave. In communities where there is a class of slaves, liberty is a distinction, and the freemen compose a privi- leged order in the state. In a nearly similar sense. Sir James Mackintosh, in his ' Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations,' defines liberty as consisting in security against wrong : ^ i.e. in the enjoyment of the protection of the sovereign against a breach of law ; in other words, in the possession of legal rights. Hence he properly infers, that 'liberty is the object of all government :' for all government must have for its end the investing of all the members of the community with certain legal rights. But there is like- wise an ulterior end, or a standard whereby these rights are to be judged ; viz., their tendency to produce the well- being of the society. It is sometimes imagined that all laws are a restraint on liberty ; and that liberties, such as that of moving a man's body, or tilling his own field, are fragments of original natural liberty, which have been left untouched by the encroachments of the legislature, and which man would enjoy without the existence of a government. 'Political or civil liberty (says Blackstone), which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty, so for restrained by human laws (and no further) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public.'^ In this view, liberty is made to seem inde- ' 'The rights, or, as they are frecjuently termed, the liberties of Englishmen.' — Blackstone, 1 Com. 140. And see Hales Analysis of tfte Law, § 13. ^ P. 5y. » 1 Com. 125, i.e. in contradistinction to. — W. 142 POLITICAL TERMS. pendent of law, "and all law as an abridgment of liberty. There is, indeed, no doubt that a wandering savage, who has occupied a plot of ground, possesses the power of using his limbs, and cultivating his land : but to suppose that these liberties are, under a settled government, only spared by the legislature, and not created and secured by it, betrays a complete misapprehension of the nature of legal rights, and the acts of a sovereign body. Under an estab- lished government, no absence of law can be beneficial; because every act which may be done by man must be either permitted or prohibited by the legislatiu-e. "What the law does not forbid, it sanctions ; ^ and will protect those who do it from obstruction. If a legal prohibition to do an act were removed, without a legal permission to do the same act being granted, the repeal of the prohi- bition would be nugatory; for although the law would not prevent any one from doing the act hitherto prohibited, it would not secure him against the interruption of others. The absence of a disabling law, without the presence of an enabling law, would be of no avail, as the act of the subject would be neither legal nor illegal : it would lie without the pale of the civil jurisdiction ; and might would be the only right, as in an unsocial state. All acts of persons living under an established government must be either lawful or unlawful ; if they are unlawful, the law prohibits them from being done ; if lawful, the law authorises them to be done, and guarantees the enjoyment of the right or liberty which it confers.^ Therefore, in a state of society, all liberty arises from the existence, and is secured by the protection, of law. The liberty of speaking, or of moving, is as much a right conferred hj law, as the right of suing on a bill of exchange, or of arresting a debtor; for without law there would be no security for its enjoyment.^ ' 'What the law does not enjoin, it forbids,' & fj-i] KeXevet aira- optvei, says Aristotle, Ethics, b. v. ch. 11, but not quite correctly, for the law 2)errmts many things which it does not prohibit, [qu. command ? — W.] ^ ' Men (says Sir J. Mackintosh) are more free under every govern- » This is true even of acts which though such a gambling contract the law endeavours to discourage will not be enforced, the gambler without actually prohibiting, such will be protected against forcible as most kinds of private gambling ; interruption. — W. LIBERTY. 143 2. In its negative sense, liberty or freedom signifies not the enjoyment of a beneficial right, but the exemption from a painful duty, or the absence of unnecessary or hurt- ful restraint ; as the freedom of trade — liberty of the press — free discussion. In this sense, liberty is opposed to oppression or tyranny; of which more will be said when we come to the subject of Free Governments. Persons who speak of liberty in general, of the bless- ings of liberty, of the cause of liberty, may be understood to use this word to denote an immunity or exemption fromi certain restrictions which they consider as pernicious to society.' Liberty is likewise used to signify independence of a foreign power ; i.e. an absence of foreign dominion. In its first negative sense, it refers to the relations of the members of a state, as towards each other : in the second, to the relation of the whole state to another state. In the first, the exemption is from oppressive power ; in the second, from all power, whether oppressive or inoppressive. Thus, according to Sir William Temple, ' a free nation is that which has never been conquered, or thereby entered into any conditions of subjection.'^ So likewise Gibbon, in speaking of the first deliverance of Britain from the Roman yoke, says, that ' the restoration of British freedom was not exempt from tumult and fection.' ^ In like manner we speak of the free towns of Germany and Italy, mean- ment, even the most imperfect, than they would be if it were possible for them to exist without any government at all : they are more secure from wrong, more undisturbed in the exercise of their natural powers, and therefore more free . . . than if they were altogether unprotected atrainst injury from each other.' — Discourse on. the Law of Natvrv and Nations, p. 59. If liberty consists in security against wrong, not only are men living under a government more free, nwre secure, and more undisturbed, than men living without a government, but without a government there is al)solutcly no security, and therefore no liljerty. Security is derived from tlie protection of a tliird party besides the in- jured person and the wrong-doer, which in a savage state, by the hypo- thesis, does not exist. ' ' Every one (says Montesquieu, treating of the different significa- tions of this word) has given the name of lihcrt]i to the government which agrees with his habits, or inclinations.'— ^Kw^-iiJ des Lois, b. xi. eh. 2. 2 On the Original and Nature of Government, WorJfs, vol. ii. p. 87. » Decline and Fall, ch. 31. [p. 132, Milman's ed.— W.] 144 POLITICAL TERMS. ing those towns which were independent of external control, and administered their own government. It is true that these cities enjoyed what is termed a free government ; but the exemption from external dominion, and not from domestic tyranny, appears to have been the origin of their name. This too is very frequently the sense of iXsvdspos and iXsvOspla in the Grreek writers ; ' and with good reason, as the evils of foreign dictation and dominion were more severely felt in the states of Greece than the evils of native tyranny. A state may be free in the second sense, without being free in the first sense ; i.e. it may be independent, without having a free government : nor is the converse by any means impossible, as we know from the example of the kingdom of Poland, as regulated at the Congress of Vienna, which was an attempt to reconcile freedom with independ- ence,^ i.e. to establish a commonwealth with a foreign prince at the head of it ; ^ and from the government of Hungary, which still exists.^ ■ Another negative signification of liberty is when it de- notes the absence of imprisonment, in the sense of being at large. Thus we say that a captive has regained his liberty, when he escapes from the place of his confine- ment. Liberty, therefore, may mean both the possession of rights and immunity from duties ;^ in both of which senses ' See Wachsmuth, JTelleniscke AUerthumslut tide, \o\. i. part 2. p. 447. IThncyd. iv. 86. 2 ; viii. 64. 3.— W.] 2 See Malchus, Stafistik, § 99. ^ Blackstone divides rights into absolute and negative ; and absolute rights he defines to be ' such as would belong to persons merely in a state of nature and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it.' — 1 Com. 123. He then says, that 'the absolute rights of man are usuall.y summed in one general appellation, and de- nominated the natural Uherty of mankind. This natural liberty con- sists properly in a power of acting as one thinks lit, n-itJiout any re- * See Wheaton's International incorporated with that of Russia. Law, by Lawrance, p. 74, and the — W. State.WMii's Year Booh for 1 874, *" The separate constitution was p. 3.58. The separate constitution abolished in 1848, but restored in of Poland was abolished in 1832, 1867, at which date Hungary was and after several intermediate declared to form a double monar- changes, the government of Poland chy with Austria, on a footing of was in 1868 finally and absolutely complete equality. — W. LIBERTY. 145 it appears to be taken by those who make liberty the end of government ; i.e. they make it consist in the enjoyment of all beneficial rights, and the absence of all pernicious duties. From this explanation, however, it is at once seen that liberty cannot be the ultimate end of government, as there must be some measure by which the expediency and inexpediency of these several rights and duties is to be estimated. Persons who employ this phraseology are per- liaps liable to be misled, by considering only the negative side of liberty, into an opinion that the removal of all restrictions is desirable, and that the goodness of a govern- ment is to be estimated by the absence of regulation. This opinion is supported by the often-quoted sentence of Tacitus, ' that the most degenerate states have the greatest number of laws ; ' ' In corruptissima republica plurimse leges ; ' — a position not only not true, but the very reverse of the truth, as the progress of civilisation is to multiply enact- ments, in order to suit the extended relations and the more refined and diversified forms of property introduced by the improvement of society. It is such an absence of restric- tions, abolished merely for the sake of promoting liberty, witliout any regard to the public good, that is termed licen- f/ousness (when that word has a political sense), and some- times improperly, anarchy, which word, though properly xfraint or control, unless by the law of nature." — Ibid. 125. Thus far it appears, that absolute rights are not positive rights conferred by a legislature, but a mere absence of legal restraint, or natural liberty. Afterwards, he lays it down, that ' the absolute rights of every English- man, taken in a political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties : ' and proceeds to explain how these ' rights and liberties ' exist by virtue of certain acts of Parliament. — Ibid. 127. Here, then, libei-ties are positive rights conferred by the legislature, having no con- nexion with natural Ixlicrtij. Finally he says that 'the rights them- selves, thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a number of l)ri\ate immunities ; which will appear, from what has been premised, to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to pu1)lic convenience, OT' eZse those civil privileges which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals.' — Ibid. 12!). At length, we find that these 'absolute rights ' may be either the immunity from certain legal duties, or the possession of cer- tain legal rights, or perhaps both at the same time. It is, perhaps, difhcult to conceive greater confusion and obscurity of thought, than is displayed in this laboured discussion. L 146 POLITICAL TEEMS. it means an absence or privation of government, is often (as will be shown below) used figm'atively to express an in- sufficiency of restraint. The theory of natural liberty is an endeavour to reconcile the advantages of a social with the immunities of a savage life. According to this doctrine, man, in a civil state, is supposed to possess some of the freedom from legal restraint which exists in a state of nature, yet, at the same time, to be entitled to the protection of the govern- ment.' This theory, therefore, involves a self-contradic- tion. A man cannot claim an exemption '" in right of his civilised condition, while he refuses a burden in right of his savage condition. He cannot deny the existence of legal duties, while he asserts the existence of legal rights. He cannot call for the assistance of the sovereign power, given only upon a condition which he repudiates. If a man objects to being imprisoned for debt, on the ground that it is an infringement of his natural liberty, in the same breath he demands the aid of the law against a person wrongfully imprisoning him. If he will not obey the law which orders him to prison, how can he appeal to the law for protection against those who force him to it ? ' How can any man claim (as Burke has justly inquired), under the conventions of civil society, rights which do not so much as suppose its existence — rights which are absolutely repugnant to it?' 2 Grenerally, however, the phrase in question, on account of the vagueness and uncertainty of both the words which compose it, conveys no precise notion ; and Locke's posi- tion—that men are naturally free — may be considered no less unmeaning and insignificant than the opposite posi- tion of his adversary Filmer, that men are not naturally free. The argument by which the latter writer establishes his assertion, viz. that men are born in subjection to their parents, and, being under their authority, are not by nature free/ is founded on the customary confusion of law and morality ; for though a child, in a savage state, owes a 1 See Blackstone, 1 Com. 125. 2 On the French Revolution, p. 88. ' Locke on Government, b. ii. § 6. • Exemption seems here to mean protection. — W. LIBERTY. 147 moral dtity to his parents, he is bound to them by no legal obligation. The idea of natural liberty in a savage state is an ex- emption from the duties imposed by government, and an entire command of a man's actions, so far as he is not hin- dered by superior force. The idea of natural liberty in a social state, as already explained, is derived from the doc- trine of the social compact, as delivered by Locke, Rousseau, and others.* This theory teaches that mankind, when in the state of nature, made a compact by which the whole surrendered to a part of the community their natural rights and natural liberty, on condition of being well governed ; and if this condition is not fulfilled (of the fulfilment of which they themselves are the only judges), they may at once resume their natural rights and natural liberty.' After the conclusive objections of Hume,^ Paley,^ and Whately,* to this theory, and after the remarks already made on Rousseau's explanation of sovereignty, on the meaning of legal rights, and on the state of nature, it would be unnecessary to examine this subject in detail ; nor indeed does this historical account of the origin of all governments require any other answer than that 'it is a mere fiction — the supposition of a thing which never had any existence.'^ It may perhaps seem extraordinary that so acute and sagacious a writer as Locke shoidd, in laying the founda- tions of his theory of government, have preferred to reality and truth his own ' exsufflicate and blown surmises ' about a state of things which he must liave known to be purely imaginary.^ But he had doubtless made up his mind as ' Hobbes's state is formed by a compact, but made between su])jcct and subject, and not between suV)ject and sovereign : the condition being that, if you will surrender your right of self-government, I will surrender mine. — Leviathan, p. ii. ch. 17. - J'Jamy on the (Jryiinal Contract, part ii. essay 12, ' Moral and I'olitiral Plnhmiphij, b. vi. ch. 3. ■• Hampton Lccturv><, pi). 2H8-21)7. * EiUnhnnjli llevien; vol. xvii. p. 424. See also Sir J. Mackintosh on the Law of Nature and JVationx, p. 57. * ' Were one (says Hume) to choose a period of time when the * On the theory of a social ture {Student's Austin, p. 127). — compact, see Austin's Sixth Lee- W. L 2 148 POLITICAL TERMS. to the conclusion to be proved ; and people are accustomed to be satisfied with very slight evidence for the assertions which they make in accounting for a position which they consider as unquestionable. ' This is not the first instance in the world (as ]Mr. Bentham has remarked in relation to another subject), where the conclusion has supported the premises instead of the premises the conclusion.' ^ The same easy faith in accepting a doctrine, which, if true, would account for the subject to be explained, may be discerned in Aristotle's definition of a law — that it is determined by the common agreement of the state ; ^ and Cicero's definition of a state — that it rests on a consensus juris ; ^ or that the law is established by general consent : for although it is true that legal duties, imposed by the sovereign, are binding in the same way as duties to which a party becomes liable by entering into a contract, and that many of the attributes of law are explicable on the hypothesis of a covenant ; yet it is certain that no such covenant ever exists ; nor if it had existed, could a contract be of any value which there is no third party to enforce. According to the historical theory of the social com- pact, the existing government of a state was settled by agreement of the whole community at an original conven- tion ; and that agreement having once been actually made, its reciprocal obligations are transmitted through all the succeeding generations of rulers and subjects, every new person becoming (as it were ) the member of an old partner- ship upon ascertained conditions. Now as this account is liable to the fatal objection that no such agreement ever people's consent was the least regarded in public transactions, it would be precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a settled constitution, tlieir inclinations are often consulted ; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, militarj' force or political craft usually decides the controversy/* — Ensai/ on the Onginal Contract. ' Principles of 3Iorals and Legislation, vol. ii. p. 278. ■■^ Rliet. ad Alex. c. 1. Koyos uKTifftxivos Kad' o/xoKoyiav koivtjv iroKeus, fxt]vva>v -kZs Se: ■Kpamiv eKaara. Compare Atkenrcus, lib. xi. p. 508. A. ' De liej). lib. i. c. 2."). * This remark of Hume's must be qualified by the consideration, that the revolutions or conquests are ft-equently tlie result of popular discontent, and that the military force employed is generally either supplied directly by the popular enthusiasm, or owes its success to the absence of popular feeling on the other side. — W. LIEERTY. 149 was made, and therefore could not he perpetuated, another theory has been devised, which may he termed the fictitious theory of the social compact ; which declares that, although no compact that obedience to governors is conditional on their governing well was in fact ever made, yet it is implied, and may be assumed to exist, though it never did exist.' This doctrine will require a closer examination, on account of the proneness of mankind to acquiesce in any explanation of a position which they wish to see estab- lished ; and to be satisfied with iiction where truth is not to be had. In common language, a thing is said to be implied, when it follows from another by a certain inference. Thus, the making of a bargain implies two parties to it ; a ser- vant implies a master ; a husband implies a wife ; the power of writing implies the power of reading, &c. In all these instances the existence of the thing implied is a necessary condition for the existence of the thing which affords the implication, and, therefore, the one cannot happen without the other having preceded it. In the language of the English law, ' implication ' has a different meaning, and is nearly equivalent with fiction. Where a thing is presumed to exist under circumstances in which it might probably exist, though it has not existed, or (what comes to the same) is not proved to have existed, there is said to be an implication of law as to its existence. Thus, in many cases, a contract is implied where no contract was made ; a promise to pay is implied where no promise to pay was made ; the meaning being that the legal conse- quences are the same as if such contract and promise had been really made, and their existence may be assumed in argument without proof. It is thus evident that neither on the common nor on the legal explanation of implication can the assumption of the social contract be supported. It cannot be inferred from the existence of government, as all must admit that governments may exist without a ' ' The original contract of society, which Ihougli perhajjs in no in- stance it has ever been formally expressed at the first institution of a state, i/et in nature and reason must always he vnderxtood and. imj/licd in the very act of associating together.' — Blackstone, 1 Com. 47. 150 POLITICAL TERMS. previous convention. Nor can it be considered as a legal fiction ; for a legal fiction is a supposition avov^edly false, but treated as if it were true, for the imagined convenience of administering the law. A legal fiction without the sanction of law is a mere absurdity : and, therefore, it can- not be pretended that the social compact, which serves as the foundation of all law, derives its own force from the existence of law. How far a belief in the doctrine of the social compact still exists may be uncertain ; but it is not uncertain that the popular notions as to the natural liberty and equality of mankind have their origin in this political system, and that they are frequently entertained by those who are ignorant of the polluted source to which these expressions may be traced. The confusion of the exercise of sovereign power with tyranny, or of the coercion of government with oppressive restraint, has further contributed to foster these erroneous conceptions ; for thus, not only does it appear that man in a civilised state may, if he pleases, consider himself as a savage in respect of his legal obligations, but the very act of governing is represented as tyranny and misrule. Hence it is that Rousseau can describe the English people as only being free during the election of members of parliament ; and as soon as these are elected, relapsing again into a state of slavery. Reasoners of this description should at least be consistent, and, as they can- not serve two masters, should cleave alone to the mammon of barbarism ; never lifting up their eyes to the arts of civilisation and the institutions of government ; but imi- tating those, who Led their wild desires to woods and caves, And tliought that all but savages were slaves. If, therefore, the statement of the doctrine of the social contract enables us to deduce the pedigree of these vulgar errors, and not only to show that such opinions are false, but also to track them to their fountain-head, it may point out to some persons the startling character of the assump- tions on which their belief must be founded ; who may thus, when the connectiori of the theory and its results is LIBERTY. 151 made evident to their minds, cease to resemble those weak- minded enthusiasts, who continue to practise the super- stitious observances enjoined by a creed which they have abandoned, and to worship the idols which they acknow- ledo-e to be mere wood and stone.* * The variety of senses in which the word ' free ' may be used in connection with politics is strik- ingly illustrated by a political programme put forward two or three years ago on behalf of cer- tain advanced Liberals. I am quoting from memory from, I believe, a speech by Mr. Chamber- lain, M.P. for Birmingham, but I think I am not very incorrect in stating that it contained some such sentence as 'free land, free labour, free religion, and free schools.' Whether it did or not, it is certain that all the four phi'ases are to he found somewhere in the political speeches and writings of the day. Here Free land means apparently land which is not to be tied up, as the phrase is, in strict settlement ; in other words, of which the owner is to be less controlled than at present by the wishes of deceased predecessors ; it is proposed, in short, to give greater freedom of action to sons by restricting that of fathers. Free laboitr seems to mean sometimes a shortening of the hours of labour by means of legal restrictions on the freedom of con- tract, sometimes the repeal, now nearly accomplished, of all laws for punishing manual labourers as criminals for mere breaches of contract. Free relirjion cannot mean free- dom for every man to worship (iod after liis own fashion, for that has been alreadyattained ; nor freedom to publish opinions adverse to the jDopular theology, for though laws of considerable severity in re- straint of this kind of freedom are still to be found in our statute- books, they are too completely a dead letter, and too little known, to constitute a popular grievance ; but it means primarily the dis- establishment of the National Churcli; or, to use the motto of the association which devotes itself to this special object, 'the libera- tion of religion from State patron- age and control.' In point of fact the existence of a State Church no more involves a control of re- ligion than the existence of a royal navy involves a control of naviga- tion, and to speak of liberatic n from patronage is like speaking of libe- ration from the receipt of benefits. The kind of freedom which would really result from the proposed change is the freedom from a cer- tain amount of taxation which would be obtained if certain pro- perty, which according to one party is purely national, and according to another party is administered by the State as a mere trustee for tlie special jiurpose of promoting a particular form of religion, were made available for the more proper and necessary functions of govern- ment. Thus, in the phrases ' free re- ligion ' and 'free schools,' the word ' free ' is used in diametri- cally opposite senses. In the one case it means that certain instruc- tion is, in tlie otlier case that it is not, provided gratuitously at the public expense. — W. 152 POLITICAL TERMS. XVI. FREE GOVERNME^'T. — ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT. — TYRANNY. DESPOTISM. ANARCHY. A FREE government is not a government in which liberty prevails, or in which there is an absence of inconvenient restraints and oppression on the part of the sovereign power ; but a government in which there is a plurality of rulers, and fixed laws respected by the administrative authority.'' A free government is thus opposed to an arbitrary or despotic government, such as the Eoman, French, or Austrian empires. In this sense, Hume ' op- poses free states to absolute monarchies, and Rousseau speaks of ' the difference between free and monarchical states ;'^ i.e. between states where the sovereignty belongs ' * The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states.' Part i. Essay 3. '■^ Contrat Social, liv. iii. ch. 8 According to Sir James Mackintosh, ' as general security is enjoyed in very different degrees under different governments, those which guard it most perfectly, are by way of emi- nence called /ree. Such governments attain most comialetely the end which is common to all governments. A free constitution of govern- ment, and a good constitution of government, are therefore different expressions for the same idea.' On the Law of Nature and Nations, jj. 60. However, one who thought with Hobbes that absolute monarchy is the best form of government, would probably not call that a free constitution. On the difference between free and despotic govern- ments, see likewise Bentham's Fragment on Government, p. 113.* » Fixed laws respected hij the C. Lewis on other grounds. An administrative aiithuriti/. This con- absolute despot will naturallj^ put dition is not recognised by Aus- down whatever displeases him ; a tin. Sir James FitzJames Stephen more numerous body are pretty {Liheriy, Equality/, and Fraternittj, sure to jwesent variety in their p. 171), goes so far as to declare likes and dislikes, so that the that ' democracy has, as such, no practices which they will agree to definite or assignable relation to suppress or enforce, will, ceteris liberty ; ' but this can hardly be paribus, be comparatively few. It admitted, for the reason given by is true on the other side that the Mr. James Mill in the passage despot may be indifferent to prac- quoted above (p. 100), which is tices very hateful to the majority, almost conclusive for this purpose, but which do not touch him per- though justly criticised by Sir. G. sonally. — W. And Austin's 6th Lecture (Student's Austin, p. 112). He says: ' They who distin- TYRANNY. 153 to one, and where it belongs to several. Substantially, there- fore, the division of states into free and arbitrary govern- ments coincides with the division into republics and monarchies, in the strict use of those terms. It may be observed, that a state is not the less a free government because it contains a class of slaves ; in the same way that a constitution is called democratic, in respect of the free- men or citizens alone, without any consideration being had of the number of the slave pojoulation. It is a common mistake to suppose that liberty can only be enjoyed under a free government; and that in despotisms the people are subject to the absolute rule of a master, from which in free countries they are exempt : whereas in all governments the sovereign power must reside somewhere ; and wherever it resides, must be abso- lute. Thus, even Cicero says, that ' in a monarchy the people do not enjoy liberty ; which consists not in having a just master, but in having no master at all ;'^ a con- dition altogether incompatible with the existence of a government, and the exercise of sovereign authority. Arbitrary or absolute monarchy is opposed to limited monarchy;- and this is properly a division, not of monar- chies, but of kingdoms or governments of which a King is chief, founded on the numbers of a sovereign body. In a ' ' Desunt omnino ei populo multa, qi;i siib rege est, in primisqne libertas ; quae non in eo est, ut justo utamur domino, sed ut nuUc' — iJe liep. lib. ii. c. 23. The kingdom of which Cicero here speaks is governed ' uninit perpetua potestate,' that is to say, it is a pure monarchy. - Sometimes a free monarrhy is used as equivalent to a limifrd monarcliij : in the following passage, however, from one of Lord Bacon's Tracts, it occurs in a directly opposite sense. ' It is impossible an elective monarchy should be so free and absolute as an hereditary, no more than it is possible for a father to have so full power and interest in an adoptive son as in a natural.' — Of a war with Spain, vol. v. p. 289. Here /?'6'e means unchcclied, vnlimited, as Tacilus says, 'Nee regibus libera aut infinita potestas.' (Germ. 7), and natural son means 07vn child. puish governments into free ancl despotic, probably mean by a ' free government ' a trovcrnmcnt of a ])opiilar or demoeratic form, and by their diptinction wish to inip'y ithat such a eovemment, beiiip likily to rofjaril the weal of the whole and not only of a nHrrow section of the community, is apt to leave or grant to its subjects, not perh.aps more political liberty tluin is left or granted to them by a government of one or a few, but more of lh(U politicil Ul:erty wliich conduces to the common wi'al.' This, however, is clearly not the meaning of Burke, in the passage quoted by our author on the next page. — W. 154 POLITICAL TERMS. state where the prince is alone sovereign, it is said that the monarchy is absolute or arbitrary ; in a state where he is only part of the sovereign body, it is said that the monarchy is limited. Tyranny is properly opposed to mild inoppressive rule, and has no relation to the numbers of the governing power. Thus Burke says, that ' free governments have committed more flagrant acts of tyranny than the most perfect despotic governments which we have ever known.' So likewise Sir Walter Ealeigh, in his ' History of the World,' remarks, that ' that which we properly call tyranny is a violent form of government, not respecting the good of the subject, but only the pleasure of the commander. I purposely forbear to say ' (he continues) ' that it is the un- just rule of one over many; for very truly doth Cleon, in Thucydides, tell the Athenians, that their dominion over their subjects was none other than a miere tyranny; though it were so that they themselves were a great city, and a popular estate.' ' The following passages from the same author, will also serve to show that tyranny is opposed to lenient or moderate rule, and may be exercised by many no less than one : ' Now concerning the tyranny wherewith a city or state oppresseth her subjects, it may appear some ways to be more moderate than that of one man ; but in many things it is more intolerable.'^ Again: ' Many tyrants have been changed into worthy Kings, and many have ill used their ill-gotten dominion, which, be- coming hereditary to their posterity, hath grown into the most excellent form of government, even a lawful monar- chy. But they that live under a tyrannical city have no such hope : their mistress is immortal, and will not slacken the reins, until they be pulled out of her hands, and her own mouth receive the bridle of a more mightier chario- teer.'^ And afterwards: 'The moderate use of sovereign power being so effectual in assuring the people unto their lords, and consequently in the establisliment or enlarge- ment of dominion ; it may seem strange that the practice of tyranny, whose effects are contrary, hath been so com- ' r.. V. ch. 2. p. 812. [Thuc. iii. 37, 3.— W.] - Ibid. p. 813. 3 XMd. p. 813. TYRANNY. 155 mon in all ages.' ' The following passage of Locke, though less precise in its language, clearly points out that tyranny is common both to monarchies and republics : ' It is a mistake' (he says) 'to think this fault (viz. tyranny) is proper only to monarchies ; other forms of government are liable to it as well as that : for wherever the power that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it ; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many.'^ Tyranny, however, Ijeing the abuse of sovereign power- is sometimes confounded with the ifnere exercise of it, and sometimes with the exercise of it by one person, or des- potism. Thus, according to a writer in the ' Edinburgh Review,' the difference between a free government and a tyrannical one, consists entirely in the different propor- tions of the people that are influenced by their opinion, or subjugated by force.' ^ ' Solon ' (says Mr. Mitford, in his ' Histoiy of Greece,") ' carefully providing for the respon- sibility of ministers, committed absolute sovereignity im- mediately to the multitude, who could be responsible to none He intended, indeed, that the councils of the Areopagus and of the Four Hundred should balance the authority of the popular assembly ; . . . . but against sovereign power committed immediately to the people at large, no balance could avail. Interested demagogues inciting, restraint was soon overborne, and so the Athenian government became .... a tyranny in the hands of the people.'^ '^ Of the numerous errors contained in this ' B. V. cli. 2. p. 817. * On Gmrernmcnf, h. ii. § 201. ' Vol. vi. p. 1 ■!;■). A division of govcrnment.s into froo and iirbitrary, stated in another volume of tlie same review, coincides with lliat into monarchies and republics, tttricto nr/hiii. ' All civilised fi:overnments may be divided into free and arhitrnrj/ ; or, more accurately for our present purpose, into the government of England and other European governments ' (written in 1807). vol. x. j). 11. * Vol. V. p. 11. " Perhaps Mr. Mitford is here l>ut tliat in this instance it led to using the word in its Greek sense ; tyranny; wliich is rather a mis- if not, he must mean, not tliat representation of facts than a absolute sovereignty is tyranny, misuae of language. — W. 156 POLITICAL TERMS. passage, our present purpose only requires us to notice the confusion of sovereign with ti/raanieal power ; which may be likewise discerned in the following extract from one of Mr, Canning's speeches : ' All power is, or ought to be, accompanied with responsibility. Tyranny is irrespon- sible power. The definition is equally true, whether the power be lodged in one or many ; whether in a despot exempted by the form of government from the control of law, or a mob whose numbers put them beyond the reach of law. Idle, therefore, and absurd to talk of freedom where a mob domineers ! '' If by power, at the outset of this passage, sovereign power is meant, sovereign power not only ought not, but cannot, be subject to responsibi- lity. The succeeding argument appears to stand thus : because tyranny is irresponsible power, and because the dominion of the mob is irresponsible power, the dominion of the mob is tyranny. Such reasoning, however, is ob- viously unsound. If, instead of saying that tyranny is irresponsible power, jNIr. Canning had said that irrespon- sible power is tyranny, he would have saved his argument, but at the cost of one of his premises ; for all sovereign power, whether tyrannically used or not, is irresponsible. Nor (as has been already stated) is tyranny merely irre- sponsible j)ower, but irresponsible power exercised in an oppressive and hurtful mariner. Thus the power of the English Parliament is irresponsible, but not tyrannical. The power of Trajan, or Louis the Sixteenth, was irrespon- sible, but not tyrannical. The power of the republics of Athens and Carthage over their allies, of the Emperor Napoleon over his subjects, was irresponsible, and also tyrannical. Tyranny having no reference to the number of the governors, sovereign power may be wielded as tyrannically by ten thousand as by ten, and by ten as one. It thus differs essentially from despotism, which is the sovereign rule of one person. Despotism, however, is sometimes used incorrectly in the modern sense of tyranny, (for with the ancient sense of tyranny its proper meaning nearly coincides,) to signify the oppressive government of ' Canning's Sjjecches, vol. vi. p. 379. TYUANNT. 157 any number. Thns ]Mr. ^Nlitford says, that an ' irregnilar tax, not unknown where single despots have ruled, with the improper name of free gift, was frequently exacted by the despotic democracy of Athens.'^ And ag-ain : 'De- spotic governments, whether the power be in the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near resemblance of character We find, indeed, many marks of resem- l)lance between the Turkish despotism and the Athenian democracy.'^ A 'despotic democracy,' and 'a despotic government of a multitude,' are, properly, contradictions in terms : but this abuse of language enables jMr. jNIitford 1o insinuate (without proving) that, because the Athenian democracy has some points in common with the despotism of Turkey, it is therefore a tyyxinnical government. According to Montesquieu, there are three kinds of governments ; the repuljlican, the monarchical, and the despotic. Eepublican government is when the whole or a part of the people has the sovereign power ; monarchical, when a single person governs, but by fixed and established laws ; while despotic government is when one person, without laws and rules, decides every thing by his will and his caprices.^ Montesquieu here makes two kinds of monarchical government ; one in which the prince rides according to fixed law ; the other in which he rules according to the fancy of the moment. The same quality had been before pointed out by Aristotle, as characteristic of the government called by the Greeks rvpavvb, which woid is most accurately rendered by despotisoii; but he extends the distinction furtlier by applying it to some oligarchies where a small number govern without estab- lished laws; and to some democracies where the people ' History of Greece, vol. v. p. 19. 2 7Wy^. p. 21. ' Esprit des Lois, liv. ii. ch. 1. See above, p. 51. Malchus, in liis Statistik unci Staatenliundc, § 9G, divides the governments of the European states into — 1. Autocracies ; 2. Limited monarcliies ; 3. Re- ])ublics, which are subdivided into aristocracies and democracies. This division does not agree with that of Montesquieu, whose class of republics properly comprehends limited monarchies : but it coincides exactly with that of Hume, wlio discusses the question, ' Whetlicr the British government inclines more to absolute monarcliy or to a re- public,' being itself a limited monarchy. — Essays, part 1. Essay 7. 158 POLITICAL TERMS. do not suffer fixed laws to be administered by the regular authorities, but carry on the government by means of decrees in each particular case.' The difficulty under which this principle of division labom's is, that in all governments, wliatever seems good to the sovereign is law, whether it be a general rule enacted for the guidance of the executive power in all cases arising after its enactment, or a special decision passed on the occasion, when the necessity occiu's. There is no doubt that tlie difference between these two classes of governments is immense ; inasmuch as one of the chief benefits of law is that it furnishes all persons in the community with a fixed rule whereby to guide their conduct. Perfect justice (if such a thing were possible), administered by a tribunal without reference to previous decisions or statute law, would be far less advantageous than an imperfect system adminis- tered according to known rules.^ But that the distinction between a legal monarchy and a despotism is, that in the latter all things are decided at the moment by the will of the prince, cannot be admitted ; because the will of the prince, whether exercised in the form of a permanent statute or of a temporary ordinance, is equally law." The same may be said of oligarchies and democracies, in which the executive is merged in the legislative power. Montes- qmeu's object doubtless was, to make a distinction between the French monarchy of his own time, and the violent and tyrannical monarchies of which there have been too many examples; but the point of distinction which he has chosen depends rather on the character and disposition of ' ' Another kind of oligarchy (he says) is when the son succeeds the father, and not the law but the rulers govern. This, among oligarchies, corresponds to despotism (rvpavils) among monarchies, and the worst kind of democracy among democracies." — Politics, b. iv. ch. 5. The democracy in which no tixed laws exist, is described in the preceding chapter. " To this, however, it might be the people, and at all events would replied, that if all the decisions soon become known. — W. were perfectly just, they would ^ According to Austin, an iso- necessarilj' conform to fixed prin- lated command, though proceeding ciples, which would generally be from the sovereign, is not a law. anticipated by the moral sense of {Student's Austin, p. 13.) — W. TYRANNY. 159 the reigning prince, and the mode of his administration, than on any essential attribute of the form of government. Anarchy properly expresses an absence of all govern- ment ; an entire cessation of the exercise of sovereign power. Improperly, it is used to signify a feebleness or supineness of the sovereign, in consequence of which the subjects are not sufficiently restrained or coerced. The following passage from the ' Edinburgh Review ' ably describes the manner in which unfair arguments are founded on this ambiguity, — a description which applies with equal force to the use made of the ambiguity of other political terms. After saying that the cpiestion of poli- tical change had been stated as if despotism or anarchy were the only alternatives, the writer thus proceeds — ' The instrument with which a great part of the delu- sion is wrought is — the grand instrument of delusion — ambiguity of language. Despotism is a pretty definite term ; it is, where the sovereign is subject to little or no regular control of his po\ser, and has scarcely anything to dread but from the chance of resistance in the body of the people. A narchy is one of the most vague and ambiguous words in the language. It means, in the way in which it is used by the friends of despotism, the utter dissolution of all government, and also every intermediate stage of govern- ment between that and absolute power. They paint as strongly as possible, and it is impossible they can paint too strongly, the evils to which the dissolution of govern- ment gives birth. This they call anarchy ; and this term, with all the terrors which it brings, they endeavour to associate with every form of government but the baleful one to which it is the tendency of their endeavours to chain or to reduce mankind.'' ' Udinhtirgh BccieK, vol. xvii. p. 427. IGO rOI.ITICAL TERMS. XVII. POWER. — AUTHORITY. — FORCE. The word 'pfnver, when used in a political sense, appears to signify the possession of the means of influencing the will of another, either by persuasion or threats ; or of con- straining his person by the application of physical force. Thus ministers or party-leaders possess power, because they may influence the conduct of many persons by the promise of favours or the threat-of injury : so it has been remarked, that knowledge and wealth confer power. Sovereign rulers and parents may forcibly constrain their subjects and chil- dren, when the motive arising from the fear of pain does not suffice to determine the will. In civilised societies, power, whicli, in default of the desired influence on the will, is supported by the sovereign, and by the application of the physical strength at his com- mand, is called authority. In other words, authority is power sanctioned and supported by the law. Thus we speak of the authority of government ; the authority of an officer over his soldiers ; of a father over his children, &c.' Sometimes, how^ever, jooiver is used as synonymous with authority. For example, every person who takes the oath of supremacy declares his belief ' that no foreign prince, prelate, person, state, or potentate, hath any jurisdiction, 'power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm.' ^ Now, it is clear, that the Pope, in his character of head of the Eoman Catholic Church, exercises power, in the ordinary sense of that ' ' By authority (saj's Hobbes, part ii. ch. 16) is always understood a right of doing any act : ' that is, if we assume that sovereigns have rights. 2 See also in 10 Geo. 4. c. vii. s. 2, the oath administered to Eoman Catholics ; where the terms are slightly varied, and (what is singular) the word poiver is retained, while the word authority has been rejected. For, according to the common acceptation of these terms, the Pope has power, but not autliurity, in this kingdom. FORCE. 161 word, within these realms, although it is not a power pro- tected * by the law, or authority. When it is said that the power of rulers differs from the power of a band of conspirators only in degree,' the proposition is true as to the compulsive sanction, which in both cases is brute force ; but the moral effect of the ex- ercise of sovereignty, the means of influencing the wills of subjects without resorting to extremities, although these are fully as important as its physical force, are not taken into the account. It is true that all governments have been founded by force, and are maintained by force, but its influence in states where it is least used is commonly over- looked for the following reasons, which may be applied to many subjects besides that in question. The effects or consequences of any law, institution, or system, may be of two kinds, positive or negative : positive, when they cause a certain event to occur ; negative, when they prevent it from occurring. Thus the positive effect of education is to make a man know many things of which he would otherwise be ignorant ; its negative effect is to prevent him from committing many crimes, and falling into many errors, of which he would otherwise be guilty.^ Now it is a very common error, in judging of political measm-es, especially of institutions in actual existence, to overlook this latter kind of negative effects, and not to give them sufficient weight. For this reason, institutions meant only to have a negative effect are sometimes thought ' ' The power of rulers is not, as superficial observers sometimes seem to think, a thing mi generic. It is exactly similar in kind, though generally superior in amount, to that of any set of conspirators who plot to overthrow it.' —Ediiihnryh lleview, vol. 1. p. 111. 2 This latter kind of effect is quaintly expressed by Polonius in the well-known lines : — Now remains That we find mit the cause of this effect ; .Or, rather say, the cause of this defect ; For this effect defective comes by cause. » That is, not aided, not pro- like all other acts not expressly tected against disobedience ; for forbidden, sanctioned and pro- of course the acts through which tected against obstruction (p. the Pope exercises his power are, 142). — W. M 162 POLITICAL TERMS. unnecessary or hurtful, when in fact they are completely successful. For example, it is settled that in all questions litigated in courts of law (with some exceptions which need not here be specified), the presumption is in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff or claimant. This pre- sumption is established in order to prevent unfounded claims being brought forward, or innocent persons being harassed with vexatious actions ; and because it has this negative effect, and plaintiffs, therefore, are generally on the right side, Mr. Bentham concludes that the rule is in- expedient, and that the presumption ought to be in favour of the plaintiff.^ If a penal system was completely effica- cious, there would be no crime ; when, probably, some one would discover that punishments are superfluous, and would propose to abolish them. The same oversight is not un- frequently committed as to the operation of force on govern- ment. We are told that government must be founded on the national will, and can only exist with the consent of the people. No one doubts that it is desirable that the government should be beloved by the people ; and that the people will, in general, know how to appreciate a good government ; but that all governments subsist by force, and that force ultimately is the sole check on wrong-doers, is equally certain. The existence and administration of a criminal law are necessary to the existence of a state ; and no criminal law can be carried into effect without the means of applying physical constraint to those who infi-inge it. Nevertheless, the knowledge that force may, if necessary, be applied, induces offenders to submit without resistance. The fear of coercion renders the use of coercion unneces- sary. The criminal walks willingly to the gaol and the scaffold, well knowing that if he does not go with his will he will be forced to go against it. The cases, therefore, in which force is actually applied are not many ; and as the effect of the law autliorisingtheuse of force- is to render its use unnecessary, it has been thought that force is of little benefit in civilised societies, and might be banished from the resources of government, although it is in fact the * See Bentham on Eciderice, by Dumont, b. vi. ch. 2. FORCE. 163 keystone on which all government must ultimately rest.' ' In the community of nations (it has been remarked), the first appeal is to physical force. In communities of men, forms of government serve to put off the appeal, and often render it unnecessary. But it is still open to the oppressed or the ambitious.'^ Not only, however, is it open to the oppressed or ambitious against the government, but it is indispensable to the government against the oppressed or ambitious. Superior force is as necessary in order to punish a criminal as it is to repel an invading army or quell domestic sedition.^ XVIII. PUBLIC. — PRIVATE. — POLITICAL. — CIVIL. MUNICIPAL. Public, as opposed to private, is that which has no imme- diate relation to any specified person or persons, but may ' ' The power of the sovereign is nothing else than the jjower — the actual force of muscle or of mind — which a certain part of his subjects choose to lend for carrying his orders into ett'ect.' — Edinhuryh Review, vol. XX. p. 326. ^ Edinlurgh Mevieiv, vol. 1. p. 111. » The use and abuse of the term be damned" [by a divine power ' Force ' are scarcely touched in this over which I have no control],* he chapter, perhaps because the au- emjjloys force just as much as if he thor did not happen to have any held a pistol to his pai'ishioner's conspicuous misuse of it before his head.' [He ought to have said, in eyes. He appears to confine his order to make the analogy hold own application of the term to good, 'Vote as I tell you, or /wrZZ actual physical constraint ; but caui^e you to be damned.'] The there is no reason to suppose that whole passage, which is too long he would have strongly objected for quotation, and indeed a consi- to the common usage, which in- derable portion of the book, should eludes under it the constraint of be read, in order to appreciate the the will by threats of pain, either extent to which the misuse of this phj'sical or mental, to be inflicted in term, and the confusion between case of non-compliance. He could warning a person of the probable hardly have foreseen such a confu- consequences of his actions, and sion between persuasion and force tlireatening to bring about those as occurs in Sir James Fit z James consetjnences, affect the general Stephen's Liberty, Ktjuality, and course of the ai'gument. See espe- Fraternity,\). 11.5: — 'Whenapriest cially pp. 9, 10. — W. says " Vote as I tell you, or you will » The words in brackets are of course those of the present editor. — W. H 2 164 POLITICAL TERMS. directly concern any member or members of the commu- nity, without distinction. Thus the acts of a magistrate, or a member of a legislative assembly, done by them in those capacities, are called public ; the acts done by the same persons towards their family or friends, or in their dealings with strangers for their own peculiar purposes, are called private. So a theatre, or a place of amusement, is said to be public, not because it is actually visited by every member of the community, but because it is open to all indifferently ; and any person may, if he desires, enter it. The same remark applies to public-houses, public inns, public meetings, &c. The publication of a book is the exposing of it to sale in such a manner that it may be procured by any person who desires to purchase it ; it would be equally published, if not a single copy was sold. In the language of our law, public appear to be distin- guished from private acts of parliament, on the ground that the one class directly affects the whole community, the other some definite person or persons.'' Political signifies that which relates to a state, or a society of persons comprising several families, and united for the purpose of government. Hence man is called a political animal, as having a tendency to form a commu- nion more extensive than a family ; tliat is, an union of parents and children, together with their slaves or ser- vants. Social has a wider signification than political ; for man would be a social animal, if he merely lived in families; but, in order to be a political animal, he must form collec- tions of families, or states.^ In like manner, jjolitical science is that science which treats of the government of sovereign communities ; political questions are those ques- tions which relate to this matter ; a politician is a person who occupies himself about such questions, &c. Hence, ' See Locke on Government, b. ii. § 77. To the 'public relations of magistrates and people ' Blackstone opposes ' the private economical (i.e. family) relations ' of master and servant, husband and wife, parent, and child, guardian and ward. — 1 Com. 422. On the distinction between families and states, see Niebuhr, Histm'y of Rome, vol. i. p. 264. Eng. Trans. \_Studenfs Avstin, p. 88.— W.] • On the different senses of Public Law, see Austin's 44th Lecture. — W. PUBLIC— POLITICAL. 165 political economy is that science which is concerned about the economy of a state, whicli examines the same subject matter in respect of a political community, wliich domestic economy examines in respect of a family. Originally, the words economy and economical were employed exclusively (according to their etymology) to signify the management of a family ; and in this sense they are constantly used by Xenophon, whose ' Q^conomics ' have no connection with political, and are confined alone to private management. The same remark applies to the first book of the ' (Econo- mics ' attributed to Aristotle ; and it is one of the many marks by which we are enabled to discover that the second book of those ' GEconomics' is the work of a later writer than the first ; for in this treatise the word economy has reached its modern acceptation, and is applied to national, as well as domestic finance. The ' Q^conomics ' of Cicero, though written at a more recent period, retained the ancient use of the word, and were confined within the original limits of the science, as being chiefly derived from those of Xeno- phon.' The analogy by which the word economy has been transferred from the affairs of a family to those of a state, to signify the regulation of its income and expenditure, and the general arrangement of public finance, seems per- fectl}' unobjectionable ; nor can I perceive why the term Political Economy should not be considered as an appro- priate and convenient name for this important department of political science. The term Catallactics, which has been proposed as a substitute for it,^ even if its derivation were correct,^ would not be sufficiently comprehensive, if we ' O'lKouofxia was rightly explained by Cicero to mean not the manage- ment of a house, but of a man's entire property : ' non gubernationem vilUe, sed dis])cnsationem univers;c domus.' (Vol. iv. pai't 2. p. 472. ed. Orelli) : oIkos, in the language of the Athenians, being different from oki'o, and signifying not Jiouse, but estate and effects generally. Cicero's treatise contained three books; the first, on the domestic duties of the mother ; the second, on the duties of the father abroad ; the third, on agriculture (Ibid. p. 476). ^ Whately's Lectures on Political Economy, p. 5. ' The word KaraWaKTiKhs never has any reference to exchanges, but means reconciliny or forgiving. In Ai'istot. Rhct. b. i. ch. 9. § 31, it has the sense ol jjvacticahlc.* * In the passage referred to it certainly must mean either reconciliiirj or rcillimj to be reconciled, and it is so taken in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, Perhaps tlie anther had 166 POLITICAL TERMS. understand an exchange to bear its common meaning of a volmitary or unconstrained dealing between two parties. For although the payment of taxes may be ultimately re- solved into an exchange, yet taxes are levied from a man without his consent, and by virtue of the sovereign autho- rity. The science of exchanges would not, therefore, pro- perly include the doctrine of taxation, whicli has always been correctly considered as belonging to the province of Political Economy. Much importance has been attached by many political writers to the distribution of rights and wrongs into certain classes, determined by their public or private character. Thus Blackstone says, that ' wrongs are divisible into, first, private turoiigs, whicii, being an infringement merely of particular rights, concern individuals only, and are called civil injuries ; and secondly, jpuhllc ivrongs, which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the whole com- munity, and are called crimes and misdemeanours.'' This division is correct, though the reasons here given for it are untenable. A crime is called a public wrong, and a civil injury is called a private wrong, not because one respects the community, the other an individual ; but because one offence is prosecuted by a public magistrate, and the offend- ing party is punislied for the benefit of the community ; the other is prosecuted by the party wronged, and the offending party is compelled to make him compensation for the harm which he has sustained.^ The same act maybe a crime in one country and a civil wrong in another, although its effects on individuals or the whole community are necessarily iden- tical. Thus, according to the Mosaic law, adultery was piuiished by the death of both offenders, and was a crime ; in England it is only a civil injury, for which the husband has a remedy against the adulterer by suing him for a > 1 Com. 122. ' Austin's way of stating the condonation of the civil injury is distinction is substantially the left to the dixc7-eti on oi the injured same, but he lays greater stress on paiiy. — Student's Austin, p. 196. — the fact tliat tlie prosecution or W. some other i)assage in his niiiid and gave this reference by mistake. Wliately himself refers to the Nicom. EDiics, book iii. c. \i, protesting at the same time that he is not conrerned to give classical authority for a use of the term which he finds convenitnt. — W. PUBLIC. — POLITICAL. 167 pecuniary compensation, and against the adulteress by- suing' her for a divorce.^ If adultery was made a crime in this coiTutry, its effects, as towards individuals or the whole community, would of course be unaltered, although its legal complexion would be changed. In like manner, political rights are not distinguished from private rights by their tendency — for all rights either tend, or are supposed to tend, to the public good — but by the purpose for tuhich they are exercised. A private right is a right exercised for the immediate and peculiar benefit of the individual who possesses it ; a political right is a right exercised not for the immediate or peculiar benefit of any individual, but for the good of the whole community. Thus the right of property may tend equally to the public good with the right of voting for the election of members of a representative body ; but the one is exercised for the direct and separate benefit of the proprietor, though indi- rectly it tends to the benefit of the community ; the other is not exercised for the direct and immediate benefit of tlie %oter, though ultimately it may tend to his good. From a comparison of the remarks made in a former place on the subject of vested rights,' it results that no ' Above, p. 32. Since the remarks here referred to were printed, it has been suggested to me that the phrase vi'ftted rights is in fact devoid of meaning ; that it is never applied generally to any class of rights ; l)ut that, when certain rights are attacked, it is used as a specious and delusive phrase, by persons who think that those rights ought to be preserved, vented having merely an intensive force, and being equiva- lent to mc7'ed or inrinlaMe. According to this interpretation, the use of the particular word vented would be explained by supposing, tliat those who invented or employ this expression, have wislied to repre- sent, that a right so vested or lodged cannot be divested or taken away by the legislature. If this explanation is correct, the phrase vested o'ights would be a mere al)surdity, and would belong to the same class of expressions as natural, indefeasible, inalienable, indestructible, &c., rights, examined above, p. 31. Now tliere is no doubt that the phrase vested Tights is often used in a dishonest manner, merely for t lie sake of raising prejudice, and creating a vague and unfounded alarm, by per- sons who attach to it no definite meaning. But, if it were laid down that all political exjjressions, which are sometimes, or even frecjuently ■* This is not quite correct, as Act of Parliament. The action a description of the state of the against the adulterer is now super- law at t lie time when it was writ- seded by a petition for damages ten. Down to 18.57 a divorce in the Divorce Court. — W. could only be obtained bj' private 168 POLITICAL TERMS. political rights, can belong to the class of vested rights, which must necessarily be rights of property, for the peculiar advantage of their possessors. Civil is sometimes used in nearly the same sense as joolitical, as when we speak of civil society, civil liberty ; and, in fact, these two are the corresponding words of the Latin and Greek languages, civilis standing in the same relation to civitas as ttoXltlkos to 7r6\i9. Civil, however, has, in our language, obtained two additional meanings : 1. When, as a division of laymen, it is opposed to military and naval ; civil service, for example, being any service, not ecclesiastical, which is not concerned with the army or navy ; ^ and, 2. When it is opposed to criminal, i.e. civil and criminal law — a distinction which has just been ex- plained. Municipal is commonly used in reference to a corpo- rate town, or some body politic subordinate to the sove- reign : in which sense we speak of municipal institutions, used in a senseless manner, are therefore in their origin unmeaning and absurd, the political vocabulary would be contracted within very nar- row limits. I am very far from feeling confident that the explanation which I have just mentioned may not be correct, and that the explana- tion which I have proposed may not be wrong ; but, on considering the peculiar kind of rights to which, when they are called in question, the term vested is vsvally applied, it seems to me probable, that the notion and epithet of rested, as applied to rights, have been derived from the investment of capital; * that, when a man has invested his capital in a certain manner, with a reasonable assurance of the permanencj' of a law, the right of property which by this investment he has acquired is called a vested right ; and it is considered as conferring on him a moral claim upon the legislature for such a delay or compensation, as will enable him either to withdraw his capital, or to reimburse himself for his loss. If this view of the subject is correct, vested r'u/hts would be an admissible phrase, signifying a limited and definite class of rights ; if the other view is correct, vested rights would be a dishonest and deceitful expression, improperly applicable to all rights, but properly applicable to none. ' Blackstone first divides the people into the clergy and laity (1 Com. 376); and the laity 'into three distinct states, the civil, the military, and the maritime \Ibid. .396). He then proceeds to say, that 'the civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty.' Now, as a nobleman or a commoner ma}^ be either a clerk, a soldier, or a sailor, it is quite clear that either the division is incorrect, or the last state- ment is false. Blackstone, indeed, admits this inaccuracy ; but he should have avoided his error, as well as confessed it. » See the editor's note at p. 33. MUNICIPAL. 169 regulations, &c. The miinicipia of the Romans were pro- vincial^ cities, which retained certain privileges and ex- emptions, and possessed an independent subordinate juris- diction and authority. Blackstone, however, has perverted this term and made it synonymous with 'civil' or 'national'; for wliich perversion he assigns a most singular reason, viz. that he calls the law of a state municipal law . in com- pliance with common speech, and then proceeds to say, that in common speech it has 7iot that meaning. ' I call it municipal law (he says) in compliance with common speech ; for though, strictly, that expression denotes the particular customs of one single municipiuvi, or free town, yet it may, with sufficient propriety, be applied to any one state or nation which is governed by the same laws and customs.''^ XIX. PROPERTY. — POSSESSION. ESTATE. — ESTATES OF PARLIAMENT. It does not fall within the scope of tlie present enquiries to investigate the legal meaning and incidents of property and possession ; " but, for the sake of many political questions, it is desirable to give a general outline of the notions con- veyed by these two terms, and of the distinction between them. Without, then, attending to the peculiarities of any one legal system, possession may be described as the actual use or occupation of anything for a man's own convenience, pleasiure, or profit. Thus a man is possessed of the clothes ' Com. 44. See Bentham on Murals and Legislation, vol. ii. p. 263, n. ; [Clarendon Press Edition, p. 328, n. — W.] * Properly speaking they were diction. — W. Italian, not provincial. See Smith, ■= See, as to Property, Austin's Dirt. Antiqii. p. 318 b. ; and 47th Lecture {Student's Austin, I^Iommsen's Hist, of Runic, vol. iii. p. 383), and Bentham's Theorij of p. 370, (Eng. Trans.) — W. ici7?.'!/«f!tfw(by Dumont,Hildreth's *> Probably Blackstone intended translation), p. Ill, ch. 8, of the the words 'with suflficient pro- Principles of the Civil Code; as jtriety ' to mean 'without violating to Possession, Poste's Gai'us,\^^. t lie common usage of sjjeech.' He 500-516, taken mainly from Sa- would thus be guilty only of a vigny's treatise.— W. misstatement, not of a self -contra- 170 POLITICAL TERMS. which he wears, of the house which he inhabits, of the g^oods on his premises, of tlie horses which he rides or drives, of the farm which he cultivates, &c. Property, or the right of property, is the right of ownership of any object, without regard to the actual use of it ; and it implies the right of obtaining possession at some time or otlier. Thus a man lias a property in a field or house which he lets, in a book which he lends, &c. Property and possession may of course coincide ; but there may be possession without property, and property without possession.' Each of the words, property and possession, (which it may be observed, are often used as synonymous,) bears a doultle meaning ; inasmuch as both signify the right itself, and the object of the right.'' Thus, in such ex- pressions as the security of property, infringement of property, the right itself is meant ; but when we speak of trespassing on another man's property, division of property, &c., it is the object of the right which we mean. The word ' estate ' is liable to a similar ambiguity. Thus a freehold estate, an estate tail, an estate for life, &c., mean certain rights ; but when we speak of a large estate, the boundaries of an estate, the map of an estate, we mean a portion of land, the object of the right. It may be here useful to remark that the word ' estate ' is often used by English writers, in reference to the con- stitution of their own country, with a meaning which better deserves the name of a blunder arising from igno- rance, than an ambiguity caused by the imperfection of language. 'The Court of Parliament (says Lord Coke) consisteth of the King's Majesty, sitting there in his royal politic capacity, and of the three estates of the realm.' ^ 'The constituent parts of a Parliament (says Blackstone) are the King's Majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity, and the three estates of the realm ; — the Lords ' See Blackstone, 8 Com. 17fi, 177. - 4 I/ist. 1. » So our authorised version of sions,' translating- thus the Greek the Bible (Matt. xix. 22), speaks word KTrjjuaTa, which means things of the young man who ' went away acquired, the sul)jects of owner- sorrowful, for he had great jfossea- ship or property. — W. ESTATES OF PARLIAMENT. 171 spiritual, the Lords temporal (who sit together with the King in one house), and the Commons, who sit l)y them- selves in another. And the King and these three estates together form the great corporation or body politic, of the kingdom.' ' Those persons who are acquainted with the history either of this or any European kingdom, both during and after the middle ages, might reasonaljly think it superfluous to quote jaassages from well-known authors to estaV)lish a well-known fact. Nevertheless, many writers of high reputation have confounded the three estates of the English realm with the three powers or branches of the constitution or sovereign legislature, and have thought that the King is an estate. For example, we find even in Paley, such a passage as the following : ' By the balance of interest, which accompanies and gives efficacy to the balance of power, is meant this ; that the respective interests of the three estates of the empire are so disposed and adjusted, that whichever of the three shall attempt any encroachment the others will unite in resisting it. If the King should endeavour to extend his authority by contracting the power and pjivileges of the Comonons, the House of Lords would see their own dignity endangered,' &c.^ So it is said in the Preface to Lord Clarendon's History, that ' the true interest of this kingdom is supported 7ion tarn fama, quam sua vi ; its own weight still keeps it steady against all the storms that can be brought to beat upon it, either from the ignorance of strangers to our constitution, or the violence of any that project to themselves wild notions of appealing to the people out of Parliament, as it were to a fourth estate of therealm.^ : ^ where it is evidently*^ meant that the people out of Parliament are a fourth power in addition to the King, Lords, and Commons. Two of the propositions condemned in the celebrated Oxford decree, passed in 1683, are that ' the sovereignty of England is in the three estates, viz. King, Lords, and Commons ' ; and ' 1 Com. 153. * Moral a)) d Political Philosophy, b. vi. ch. 7. s P. 11. ed. 182tJ. » The evidence that this was tution of Kinp:, Lords, and Corn- really Lord Clarendon \s meaning is mons is the happiest composition of to be found in the preceding pages, government in the world." — W where it is said that 'the cousti- 172 rOLTTICAL TERMS. that ' the King has but a co-ordinate power, and may be overruled by the other two ' ; ' doctrines manifestly false, as the King, Lords, and Commons, are not the three estates of the realm ; nor, if they were, could the King be over- ruled, either in an executive or legislative capacity, by the Lords and Commons. Yet several wi-iters appear to have thought that these positions were improperly condemned ; imagining, probably, that the language of this decree implied that the sovereignty did not reside in the three branches of Parliament, but in the Kino- alone. ^ XX. COMMUNITY OF GOODS. Community of Goods ^ may mean that no right of possession or property whatever is sanctioned by the legislatm-e or protected by the executive ; in which case, not only all land and all products of agricultural and manufacturing industry would be the prey of the first taker, but even things in possession could not be retained, and a man might be stripped of the clothes on his body, or turned out of the house which he inhabited, by any stronger man. If goods were common to this extent, possession could only be maintained, and would frequently be acquired, by supe- rior force. When men live after this manner, their state is so miserable, insecure, comfortless, and degraded, that, perhaps, its adoption has never been seriously recommended by any political guide. It may likewise mean, that the legislature recogmises no right of property, but recognises the right of possession. In this case a man's clothes, food, implements, and money, the house in which he resides, his beasts of burden, &c., would be protected by the law, as well as land in his occu- ' See Wilkifrs Concilia, vol. iv. p. 611. - See, for example, Lingard's History of England, vol. xiii. p. 341. Edinburgh Bevien; vol. xli. p. 27. ^ By the word goods, I here mean all things which may become the objects of property, whether movable or immovable. COMMUNITY OF GOODS. 173 pation ; but no property in land or other things could exist ; nor could any one let lands or houses, lend money on interest, deliver goods on credit or to be conveyed by a carrier from place to place ; or, in short, part with any- thing out of the immediate occupation or possession of himself, his servants, or his agents, if, indeed, a man would be permitted by law to occupy or possess any thing by means of another person. The inconveniences of such a state of things to the rich are obvious, but it does not appear that they would in any degree be balanced by countervailing advantages to the poor. A perfect com- munity of goods would effectually put an end to inequality of wealth by making all equally poor ; but a limited com- munity of goods, admitting possession and excluding pro- perty, would not prevent inequality of wealth, and would press with greater hardship on the poor than on the rich, inasmuch as it would prevent the existence of credit, by which those who are occasionally exposed to want, profit more than those who perpetually have the enjoyment of superfluities. Under such a law, theft would be a crime, and punishable as such, as all goods would necessarily be in the possession of soine person ; and there might be large capitalists employing large numbers of workmen. There would be profits of stock and wages of labour, but no interest of money, or rent of land. The reason why the inequality of wealth presses se- verely on the poor, and gives the rich and the middle classes an advantage at every turn of the market, is, that, in disagreements about the rate of wages, the latter can refuse to continue their workmen, and, being able, with- out material inconvenience, to live for a short time on their capital, can hold out against the demands for an increased payment ; whereas the poor, having little or no capital to fall back upon, are soon compelled to come into the terms of their employers. The same is the case with persons who live, not on the profits of stock, but on the wages of labour, if their wealth, derived from other sources, is sufficient to maintain them for a considerable time without employment. Thus, although tlie legal pro- fession has always of late years been greatly overstocked, 174 POLITICAL TERMS. the rate of payment has never varied. The numerous lawyers who, though they are perfectly competent to per- form their duties, have never any legal business, prefer living on their own fortunes to offering to practise at a I'ate lower than that sanctioned by the opinion and usage of their profession. So, likewise, the fees of physicians (if we except a reduction for the sake of convenience caused by a change in the value of the gold coin) have not, like the wages of poor labourers, varied continually from time to time, but have remained the same for many years. But the wages of agricultural labourers are constantly . varying, and are, by the working of competition, driven down to the lowest point. In this manner the competition of the poor is more powerful, and operates more to their disadvantage, than the competition of the rich and middle ranks, whether capitalists or labourers. It does not, however, very clearly appear, in what way it is proposed to remedy the evils attributed to the inequality of wealth, by taking away the right of property, and retaining the right of possession. With regard to land, such a law would compel all persons to cultivate the whole of their own estates ; and thus, by preventing their divi- sion into forms and holdings of a manageable size, would increase the difficulties of agriculture, and raise the price of provisions. In manufactures, as the whole concern is in the immediate occupation of the capitalist, no change would be produced, except the impossibility of giving or receiving credit, of the manufacturer selling goods without instant payment, or of borrowing money in any pressure of mercantile distress or alarm. All that branch of internal and external commerce which consists in carrying the goods of the manufacturer to the market of the consumer, would be at once destroyed, if possession conferred entire dominion over commodities, and the merchant would, as in ancient times, be compelled to sail in the same ship with his own merchandises.^ ' Mr. Millar, in the following passage, considers the existence of the right of possession without the right of property as a mark of a barbarous state of society. 'Among barbarians in all parts of the world (he saj^s) persons who belong to the same family are understood to enjoy a community of goods, and to be all jointly subjected to the COMMUNITY OF GOODS. 175 Aristotle, in combating Plato's arguments in fiivour of a community of goods, says that, at first sight, people are captivated by the plausible and benevolent appearance of that scheme, especially when it is urged that such a com- munity would put an end to litigation, perjury, and dis- putes concerning property ; which latter argument Aris- totle answers by saying, that these evils arise, not from the institution of property, but from the depravity of mankind.* Doubtless they do ; but it is not the less true, that, if there was no property there would be no disputes about property. The true answer is, that litigation, or the power of calling in the assistance of the law to relieve a party harmed, has been invented as a remedy for the evils caused by the forcible or fraudulent abstraction of that which is in the possession of others, and has been produced by their labour. The lawsuit is not the cause but the remedy of an evil which would otherwise be remediless. A lawsuit may be an evil, but the administration of justice has been established on the express ground that it is an evil far less than those which it redresses or prevents. In like manner, it might with perfect truth be said, that a community of goods would extinguish the crimes of stealing, forging, defrauding, &c., in the same manner that a commimity of women, as proposed by Plato, would put an end to adultery and illicit concubinage. Nevertheless, although the world would be relieved of the names of these vices, it would equally suffer from the mischiefs which they produce. Society would not the less be injured by the rights of universal plunder of goods and promiscuous intercourse with women, because those acts were not called by certain names which signify the breaches of the rules meant to repress them. If a revenue system was wisely organised, the name of smuggling would be unknown, but the evil itself, as well as its name, would be banislied. Not so same obligations. In Ihose early ages, when men are in a great measure strangers to commerce, or the alienation of commodities, the right of i)ropcH]i is hardly distinguished from the privilege of w.s-iwc/ or j)()ss-eKfii/if/; and those persons who liave acfjuired the joint possession of any subject, are apt to be regarded as the joint proprietors of it.' — Historical Viov of tlm EiujUxh. G«ri;rnment, vol. i. p. I'JO. ' Politics, b. ii. ch. 5. p. 317, D. 176 POLITICAL TERMS. under a system of community of goods and women : there would be the insecurity of property, and debasement of female character, with the consequent evils of indolence, ig-norance, improvidence, and neglect of children : only those who caused these evils would not be called thieves and adulterers. The modern advocates of a community of goods have, so far as I am acquainted with their writings, dealt much in vague and general assertions of the benefits to be derived from the equality of wealth, and the evils arising from its inequality, and have given florid descriptions of a state of universal harmony and concord, which they would repre- sent as the natural result of their system. But they have altogether omitted to make any detailed statement of the extent to which they would carry their community ; nor have they shown, either that the existence of government and civilisation is compatible with an absence of the right of possession, or that an abolition of the right of property, while the right of possession remained, would produce an equality of wealth : unless, indeed, by an equality of wealth they mean an equality of poverty. Instead of aiming at the conviction of competent judges by solid reasoning, they have often indulged in passionate declamation, or dogmatic assertion ; faithfully copying the wildness, the absurdity, and the fanciful reveries of their great leader, though without a particle of the varied and beautifid imagery and captivating rhetoric, which, in spite of all its incoherence and all its folly, will, to the end of time, make even the most sober-minded recur with delight to the Eepublic of Plato.'' ^ The community of goods pro- |)lication to the benefit of each in- posed by Plato does not correspond dividual according to his deserts with either of the significations or necessities. The same is the discussed by our author. It is not case with all the varieties of com- the mere refusal of legal protec- munism which are discussed in J. tion to separate rights, whether of 8. Mill's Princijyles of Political property or of possession, but the Uconomt/, b. ii. ch. 1. The editor assumption by the state of the has been unable to discover what complete control of whatever is ac- are the writings alluded to and quired bj- the exertions of any criticised in this chapter. — W. member of the society, and its ap- H Iz; K o c o I— I m I— I > I— I - ci o S S - -=! o B s -C-:: ; cr. c- ^ ^J a u ci 'S .2 (P a> >^ -M ■Jl k 8S 2 ^ til ■£ iQ c ^', \A •^ a V3 0) .:; J3 NOTE ON THE AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM 'SOVEREIGN: {See paije 40.) The confusion of ideas which is sometimes caused even among statesmen by the ambiguity of the term ' Sovereign ' is strikingly illustrated by the following extract from a debate which took place in the House of Commons on Feb. 16, 1871, on the proposal to grant a marriage portion to the Princess Louise. Mr. p. a. Taylor : ' Then it was said that the income of some Continental sovereigns was larger than that of our own sovereign. He should decline to draw any such comparisons ; but if the Queen's income must be compared with that of any other sovereign, it should be compared with the income of the mler of the great nation across the Atlantic, sprung from the same race as ourselves, and then the difference between 600,000Z. and 5,000Z. a year was rather striking.' Mr. Disraeli : ' I cannot help noticing one remark the hon. gentleman made. He said it was not with kings or emperors that he wished to compare the position of Her Majesty, but that he would rather cross the Atlantic, and make a comparison of Her Majesty's position with that of the sove- reign of the United States. I do not think that we ouglit really on this question to go into a policy of pounds, shillings, and pence ; but if these matters are brought under our consi- deration, it is hardly possible to leave them qviite unnoticed. If we cross the Atlantic we should find that the sovereign of the United States — the sovereign people — is paid through its representatives in both Houses of Parliament an annual salarv +ar exceeding that of the solitary sovereign of this country. 1 think the hon. gentleman will find, if he goes into the question uTore deeply than probably this discussion is an opportunity ibr, that the expense of govermnent in the United States — taking the word " government " in its large and real sense — is one of a very different character from that which he con- veyed to the House just now.' N 2 180 NOTE ON THE The language of the first of these two speakers is open to no other criticism than that he uses the word ' sovereign ' in its popular and conventional sense, to describe the chief magis- trate in a free commonwealth, instead of the one or number in whom the absolute power of the state really resides. He does not suffer himself to be misled by this conventionality, and very properly refuses to compare the nominal sovereign of Great Britain with the sovereigns, properly so-called, of despotically governed countries, or with the sovereigns of the various states of Europe in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to that condition. Exception might possibly be taken to his comparison of the Queen to the President of the United States, on account of the superior dignity attaching to the former by her life-tenure of office, her independence of popular election, and her personal irresponsibility ; but against these advantages must be set the far greater real power enjoyed by the American President so long as he is in office, so that on the whole it would be difficult to say that the title ' Sovereign ' was more misplaced in the one case than in the other. At least, this is so if we accept Sir G. C. Lewis's view that the sovereign power resides in the elected, not in the electors ; for, according to Austin and most other writers,^ the Queen is a member, thoixgh not the only or principal member, of the Bovereign body of Great Britain, while the American President is not a raember of the sovereign body at all, having only a delegated authority from the electors. As Austin puts it,'' * the common government, or the government consisting of the Congress and President of the United States, is merely a sub- ject minister of the United States' governments, . . . meaning by a States' government, not its ordinary legislature, but the body of its citizens which appoints its ordinary legislature.' But what are we to say of the other speaker ? He adopts Austin's view so far as to consider the people^ — that is, the electors — as the real sovereign body in the United States, but instead of comparing them with the real sovereign body of Great Britain, viz., the electors ^Zhs the members of the House of Lords and the Queen,^ he compares them Avith the Queen alone, the nominal sovereign. Nor is this all ; he pi^oceeds to use language which must mean, if it means anything, that the entire ' expense of government' in the United States is to be set against the income of the Queen. It is most probable, • See note (-1) under Represextatiox. •> Sfudenfs Austin, p. lOJJ. • Ibid., p. 97. AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM ' SOYEREIGN.' 181 however, that the last sentence does in fact mean nothing, for he had previously spoken only of the salaries of the members of Congress. Had he chosen to do so, he might here have made a point out of the fact that the members of both Houses of Parliament receive no salaries ; but the argument would then have stood thus: because two branches of our sovereign body receive nothing, either directly or through their repre- sentatives, therefore it is fair that the remaining branch should receive 120 times as much as the corresponding branch of the sovereign body in a neighbouring state, in which the other branches do receive moderate salaries ; — which would hardly have answered his purpose. The reader is requested to take notice that the above remarks relate merely to the verbal question as to the use or abuse of the political term Sovereign. As regards the merits of the proposal then before the House of Commons, the whole dispute was really irrelevant. The propriety of portioning the Queen's children on their marriage depends not on the amount of power exercised by her, but, as regards the gross income of the royal family, on the expenses necessarily incurred by her for the benefit of the nation, and as regards their net income, on the market value of their services. This, again, depends not merely on the ability and industry required for their per- formance, but on the rarity of one special qualification, that of birth. The reasons given at the end of the chapter on Monar- chy in favour of the institution of hereditaiy royalty may be urged to some extent in favour of a liberal scale of payment. W. APPENDIX. (By the Editor.) ^OME OTHER POLITICAL TERMS LIABLE TO AMBIGUITY OR MISUSE. I. NATION. NATIONALITY. — NATIONAL. See Mill's ' Representative Government,' chap. 1 6 ; Wheat- on's ' International Law,' by Lawrance, p. 33, and especially the words of Count Cavonr with I'Cgard to Italy which are quoted in the footnote; 'Student's Austin,' p. 9.5, note; Stephen's ' Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,' p. 167. Consider the propriety of the following definitions : — Nation has three recognised meanings : 1. Synonymous with ' State,' or 'independent political com- munity,' as defined by Austin. This is the usage from which we derive the expressions ' international law,' or the ' law of nations.' 2. A number of persons connected by real or supposed com- munity of descent, who are sufficiently numei'ous to form a state by themselves, whether they actually do so or not, or whether they form several independent states. This is the strict etymo- logical sense. 3. A number of persons who, whether or not actually forming an independent ])olitical society, are, in the opinion of the speaker, either generally desirous or specially fitted to do so, whether on account of community of descent, of language or religion, of social habits or of historical antecedents, or foi- any other reason. Nationality has two recognised meanings : 1. Synonymous Avith the third sense of ' nation.' °- " In this sense the Italians was a prominent feature in the formed a nationality before ]85i), policy of Najjolcon III. and Uie 'jirinciple of nationalities' 184 ArrENDix. 2. The fact of belonging to a particulai* nation in any of tlie above senses, but more commonly in the first. In this sense it forms the svibject of a chapter in Westlake's ' Private Interna- tional Law,' Tbe Jews are not a nation in the first sense, ai'e a nation in the second sense, and, to persons who sbare the sentiments of Mordecai in ' Daniel Deronda,' also in the third sense, that which is equivalent to ' nationality.' The Greeks who are subjects of King George are a nation in the first sense ; the Greeks scattered all over the Levant are a nation in both the other two senses. The subjects of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires form a nation only in the first sense, though we recognise a distinct Turkish nation in the second sense, which ought jjerhaps to include the inlial^itants of Tvu'kestan and some other regions beyond the borders of the Empire. The same Empii-e includes several distinct nationalities. France, Spain, and Italy may be said, subject to very slight qualifications, to be nations in all three senses. National. — Taking this woixl as the adjective corresponding to the substantive ' nation ' in the fii'st of the above-mentioned senses, we observe that it may either mean, that which relates to all or most of the members of a given nation (i.e. independent political community), or, that which relates to the sovereign body of the nation. In the fii-st sense we may speak of drimkenness or thriftlessness as national vices, in the second sense we speak of our national schools, or our national army. This ambiguity may sometimes lead to serious misiuiderstanding. It is not very uncommon to meet with arguments which, when stripped of ornament, would run somewhat in this way : (1) A nation which is imbued with a love of art becomes thereby happier and better. [Here ' nation ' means the aggregate of individuals com- posing the community.] (2) Therefore the encouragement of ai't is a matter of national interest. [Here ' national ' may mean, that which concerns all oi- many of the individuals com- posing the community, in which case the inference is correct ; or it may mean, that which is connected with the duties of the national government, in which case the conclusion does not follow from the premises.] (3) Therefore the government ought to employ national money in establishing national galleries and giving pensions to native artists. [Here ' national ' undoubtedly means, belonging to the government, and the connection between the conclusion and the premises is purely verbal.] So, again, it is good for all to be i-eligious ; therefore religion is a matter of APPENDIX. 185 Bational concern ; therefore let us maintain a national Chvirch. Thei'B is no end to the schemes for fostering particular branches of industry, curing or preventing particular diseases or relieving particular kinds of distress, which might be supported by simi- lar ai-guments. It is, of course, open to any one to maintain the theoiy, that whenever it is believed that a large number of individuals would be benefited by having something done for them, all the members of the community should be compelled to contribute towards the expense of doing it ; but it is incumbent on those who maintain the theory to prove it, and not, as is too often done, to beg the question under cover of a verbal am- biguity. II. PARTY. LIBERAL. CONSERVATIVE. The term Party, as applied to politics, may seem one of the simplest and least susceptible of misuse. The definition in Webster's Dictionary — ' a number of persons united in opinion or design, in opposition to others in the community ' — may seem quite explicit and satisfactory. Closer observation, however, enables us to distinguish two uses of the term, the interchanging of which without due notice may possibly breed confusion. It sometimes means, a body of persons united by the common object of asserting some political principle, or of pi-omoting or resisting some particular measiu-e or set of measm-es. Thus we speak of the Home Rule Party, the High Church Party, the Peace Party, etc. In this sense there may be any number of parties in the countiy, and the same pei-son may belong to several parties at once. But in another sense there cannot be at any given time more than two political parties in the country, and no person can belong to both of them at once, though of course it is pos- sible to be absolutely neutral, or to pass and repass from one to the other. These are, the ■ Government party and the party of Opposition. A politician may feel that his aims and sympathies are radically different from those of botli lenders, or that he is in agreement with one leader on one point and with the other on another point ; he may be resolved to deal with each question as it arises purely on its own merits ; but he must at any given moment either desire or not desire a change of Ministry ; and according to modern constitutional practice there is always sonu^ ])articular statesman who on the resignation of the present 186 APPENDIX. Ministry will necessarily be called npon to form a new one, and a limited number of other statesmen out of Avliom he must neces- sarily choose his Cabinet. The test of party in this sense is, if you were a member of Parliament, and the leader of the Oppo- sition were to propose to-morrow a vote of want of confidence, would you vote for or against it 1 Hence we say of any pai-ticu- lar question that it is, or is not, a party question, according to the gi-eater or less tendency of an adverse vote to produce a change of Government. In some cases the existence of the Ministry is avowedly staked on a particular division, though there is no actual vote of want of confidence ; but in other cases the ques- tion is one of degree, and each man must judge for himself as to the relative importance of, on the one hand, a just decision of the immediate point at issue, and on the other hand of the amount of injury which this particular defeat will probably in- flict on the stability of the Government. Hence, it is easy to understand the readiness of politicians to charge each other with dismgenuousness in representing that a pai'ticidar division is or is not a party one. Again, when we find a politician pridiaig himself on not being a party man, he may mean that he sees so little reason for pi-eferring either of the two leading statesmen to the other, that he is prepared to deal with nearly eveiy question simply on its merits, taking liis chance as to the effect of his action on the fortunes of the Ministiy, or it may mean that he is so intensely devoted to ' party ' in the other sense — is, for instance, so vehement a Home Ruler, sanitary re- former, or what not, that he will vote for any one whom he thinks likely to promote his favoiirite object, regardless of the efiect of his action on the general policy of the country. The ambiguity of the word ' party ' natui'ally leads to an ambiguity as to the sigiiification of party designations. The Government party and the party of Opposition are never content with those simple appellations, liut natm-ally endeavour to keep up a sense of continuity by means of a name which will stick by them in or out of ofiice, and will l)e independent of the gradual changes in the personal composition of the knot of leaders. The primary purpose of such a name being to denote an association of individuals having a sort of pei'petual succession, it may or may not be such as also to connote particular piincijiles which are supposed to form the bond of union. Names of either kind must inevitably in course of time aflfbrd an opportunity for mis- miderstanding to those Avho are that way inclined. If they are originally mere marks, without any special connotation, such as ArrENDix. 187 Whig and Toiy, Roundhead and Cavalier, they acquire a conno- tation if the pai-ty continues for a generation or so to stake its reputation mainly on a particular set of measures or principles. Men become accustomed to speak of these as Whig and Tory pi-inciples, and when at last the controvei'sy between the rival ])rinciples comes to an end, either by the definitive triumph of one OA^er the other, or by a generally acce2)ted compromise be- tween them, or by such a change of circumstances as causes the difference to lose its importance, the statesmen who can trace, as it were, their jjolitical pedigree in an unbroken line from the original Russells and Danbys, and who retain the old names to mark that continuity, are liable to be charged with sailing under false colours if the Tory disclaims the doctrine of passive obedience, and the Whig discourages the fervour of Orangemen. Then we have attempts to define anew the principles supposed to be indicated by the names, by tracing at least a certain habit of mind as characteristic of each party through all the stages of its career. Of these we have a masterly specimen in chap. 16 of Hallam's ' Constitutional History,' the existence of which (for it was pul^lished in 1827) was possibly the reason why Sir i}. C. Lewis did not include Whig and Tory in his list of terms requii-ing examination. Even Hallam, however, is obliged to admit that his task is not an easy one, because, as he says, ' Those denominations being sometimes applied to factions in the state, intent on their own aggrandisement, sometimes to the prin- ciples they entertained or professed, have become equivocal, and do by no means, at all periods and on all occasions, present the same sense ; an aml)iguity which has been increased by the lax and incorrect use of familiar language.' He then pi-occeds to consider the words as expressive of political theories, and con- cludes with the remark that, though he cannot reckon these old ap})ellations by any means characteristic of our political factions in the nineteeiith century, the names Whig and Tory ar(i often well applied to individuals. If, on the other hand, the names origiaially selected have some s]iecial connotation, as is the case with Lil)eral and Conservative, the confusion between party and })rinciple commences imme- diately, and goes on continually increasing so long as the names are in use. It seems as though they ouglit to imply certain definite and antagonistic theories of government, but in fact they would never, even on their first application, have been adapted to describe the two rival camps of English politicians, had they not been too vague and elastic to afford any ])ra,ctical guidance. The present editor once attempted a definition of Ijil)oralism 188 APPENDIX. considered as a set of principles, wliich was quite satisfactory to himself at the time : but, unfortunately, it would not in any degree correspond to the present line of demarcation between the Government and the Opposition.^ He is now convinced that there is nothing to be gained l)y attempting anything of the kind, and that the best way of avoiding misunderstandings is to con- fine the terms Liberal and Conservative, or their equivalents Whig and Tory, as strictly as possible to their purely personal signification, using other tei-ms to describe differences of piin- ciple. On this view, a Liberal is one who would prefer at the present moment such a Government as would be likely to be formed under the Marquis of Hartington to the existing Govern- ment under the Earl of Beaconsfield, whatever may be his reason for the preference, and a Conservative is the opposite. It follows from this that it is perfectly possible for an advanced Radical, a Democrat, or a Republican to be a Conservative, and for an Ultramontane or an admirer of absolutism to be a Liberal ; but it is not possible for a Liberal to be at the same time and in the same sense a Conservative ; however easy it may be, according to the stereotyj^ed foi-mula, to profess a desu-e ' to preserve all that is good in existing institutions, while freely adapting them to the changed necessities of the time.' It is imfortunate that the term ' Liberal ' is also wanted for other pur- poses, social a.nd theological, and it is perhaps to be regretted that we cannot go back to ' Whig ' as the piu-ely party designation ; but so long as the party chiefs insist on using the former as their party designation, nothing but confusion can result from at- tempting, in political discussion, to employ it as descriptive of a theoretical creed. " Tlie definition, or description, bidden to one shall be forbidden to was as follows : — 'A true Liberal, all who come within the reason of whatever view he may take as to the prohibition; that all who are particular applications of the prin- equally guilty shall be equally ciple, must necessarily be in favour punished, of course with due al- of themaximi^mof Z/^f?"^y, inother lowance for ditferences of sensi- words, of the minimum of legal bility ; that public burdens shall commands and prohibitions which be borne in fair proportion to means is compatiVjle with the protection by those, atad those only, who come of the members of the community within the reason of the prohibi- from mutual injuries and from tion ; and that the feelings and foreign hostility. He must also be interests of every individual in the in favour of equal Uhei'tij, which community, rich or poor, male or is only another word for justice ; female, old or j'oung, shall, in all and must therefore be prepared to legislation which is to aifect them, insist: That an act which is for- be fully and equally considered.' ArrENDix. 189 III. AUTOXOMY. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. HOME RULE. The fii-st of these phrases has been borrowed of late from the ]iolitical vocabulary of ancient Greece, in which it implies, at least, that the power of making laws, inclnding constitutional laws, and not merely the administration of tbem or the election of officers, is vested in the inliabitants of the city or territory in question or some portion of them. Sometimes it seems to be equivalent to eXevdepia, as meaning absolute independence (Thuc. viii., 91-3), and occasionally it is even applied to the internal government of a state and opposed to monarchy {Aris- totle, 'Politics,' Y. xi. 26). ' Local self government,' on the other hand, as used in English politics at all events, is understood to mean simply that the ad- ministration of the general laws is left to the inhabitants of each locality within the same national territory, or to officers freely elected by them, the laws themselves being made, and ])erhaps even the administration being to some extent superin- tended, by a central authority, instead of officers being sent down for the purpose by such central authoiity. No one would speak of Canada or New Zealand as enjoying local self-government, though we might, with only a slight modification of the Greek usage, speak of tliem as autonomous. Recently, however, some confusion has been introduced in connection with the latter term by the use of the phrase, local or administrative autonomy, which has been explained by a Cabinet minister to mean neither more nor less than local self- (joverninent. This has necessitated the addition of the adjec- tive ' political ' where it is intended to denote autonomy in its original Greek sense. Home Rule, as is usual with a phrase invented as a popular watchword, to describe something wished for but not yet obtained, has not accpiired so definite a signification as words which have been oflicially used to describe actually existing in- stitutions. Probably no member of Parliament who has declared himself a Home Euler would consent to limit the term to what we in England unckn'stand by 'local self-government,' while on the other hand it is a])parently not intended to be; quite so wide as autonomy, or, in the new style, ' political autonomy,' since we see another party in Ireland, calling itself the Nationalist party, whose aims appear to agree pretty well with the original sense 1 90 APPENDIX. of autonomy, and which seems to be strongly opposed to the Home Rulers. The Nationalists, indeed, ought, according to the proper signification of the term, if nation is used in either the first or the thiixl of the senses above noticed, to aim at the absolute independence of Ireland. The second signification can scarcely be intended, since Ireland is notoriously inhabited by a mixture of races. IV. PERMISSIVE LEGISLATION. This is a phrase which has been much used of late, and in a sense which is veiy much calculated to mislead, luiless accom- panied by full explanations. The typical instance is the measure periodically brought forward by Sir Wilfrid Lawson, and gene- rally known as the Permissive Bill. Its object is to enable a majority of two- thirds of the ratepayers in any district to close all or any of the public-houses in that district. In other words, the so-called permission consists in the delegation by the State to certain persons of very stringent powers of coercion. An equally startling paradox, in fact the exact converse of this, occurs in Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's ' Liberty, Eqiiality and Fraternity,' whei'e he tells us, that to ' deprive Brahminism of its coercive sanction ' is a measure of coercion (p. 56, com- pared with the sentence at the top of the preceding page). EULOGISTIC AND DYSLOGISTIC SYNONYMS. The phi'ases here set opposite each other in parallel columns are used to describe facts which would present the same appearance to every observer, though the moral judgment, which by the selection of one phrase or the other is incorporated with the description, is different. It may be said that there ought to be a third column for neuti'al terms, imjilying neither praise nor blame ; but in truth we almost always find that there ai'e only two terms in use, one of which has to be shared between the neutral and one or other of the partisans. In the following table those phrases which are used in a neutral, as well as in an eulogistic, or dyslogistic sense, are followed by the letter N. APPENDIX. 191 Dyslogistic. Faction. N. Agitation. N. Agitator. Demagogue. Mob-orator. Hireling agitator. Wire-pulling ""I Factitious >Agitations.' Got -up J Despotism. Arbitrary power. Class interest. Godless. 1 Tj. 1 . • T T • > Education. Irreligious. J Sect. " It is difficult to see why a po- litical movement should be thought less worthy of respect for being ' got up,' unless by those ultra- democrats, if there are any such, who consider that the unprompted instinctive sentiment of the masses is more likely to be right than an opinion to which their adhesion has been laboriously obtained by the combined force of reasoning, ex- hortation, and example on the part of better-informed persons. The machinery of agitation by public meetings, demonstrations, peti- tions, deputations to ministers, kc, carried on under the superin- tendence of great leagues or asso- ciations with a regular staff of officers, paid and unpaid, is not yet a century old, and as a part of the normal working of the constitution is much more recent. It was viewed at first with a prejudice, closely Eulogistic. Party. Movement. ("Popular leader. < Apostle. (^Missionary. Agent of an association. Well-organised. Paternal government. Wide discretion. N. Esprit de corps. r Unsectarian. ■'. Undenominational. I Secular. N. f Church. \^Eeligious denomination. N. resembling, and about as rational as, that which induced the last generation of artisans to resent the introduction of spinning- jennies and steam ploughs ; and traces of the same feeling even now crop up occasionally in quarters where greater intelligence might have been expected. The notion that political strife loses in dignity by being carried on in a more scien- tific manner and with more elabo- rate aiDpliances, seems like a relic of the llousseauism which our au- thor has so ably exposed in his chapter on Nature ; and it is to be hoiicd that we shall soon see the last of the puerile state of mind which despises the professional ' wire-puller ' or 'agitator,' while it admires the professional soldier, the professional diplomatist, and the professional ad\ocatc. INDEX. ABS A BSOLUTE monarchy, 154 ■^ Agitation, Agitator, 191 Anarchy, 159 Aristocracy, 66 Aristophanes, distinguishes be- tween poverty and beggary in his Plutus, 111 Aristotle, on democracy and tyranny, 40 — on sovereignty, 47 — on Plato's theory of a cycle of governments, 50, note — on democracy, 69, 72, 115 — on mixed governments, 74, 80 — sense in wliich he uses the term 'poor,' 116 — on forced re-divisions of lands, 1 20 and note — • on the Megarian revolutions, 121 — his definition of a law, 1 48 — distinguishes legal and absolute governments, 158 — combats Plato's arguments in favour of a communitj' of goods, 175 Arnold (Dr.), on the division of political interests at different stages of national development, 1 2;} Athens, constitution of ,70, 92,101 — judicial confiscations at, 120 Austin, his connection with Sir G. C. Lewis, viii. — his detinitions of Sovereignty, Rights, &c. 11, note, 17, nolo — of Aristocracy, 66, note BEN Austin, on the social compact, 147, note — on free and despotic govern- ments, 152 — on the distinction between crimes and civil injuries, 166, note Authority, 160 Autonomy, 189 "DACON (Lord), on the propriety ^ of beginning a discussion by defining the terms used, 4 — on disjDutants at cross purposes, 5 — on virtue and interest, 122 — on the Literpretation of Na^ ture, 126 — on Nature in Men, 128 — his use of the phrase ' free monarchy,' 154, note Balance of Powers, theory of, 77, 89 Bentham, his Book of Fallacies, 2, 8, note — says that llight has no superior genus, 20, note — would use the word Right to denote the entire corjnis Juris, 25, note — on government, 41 — denies that the Athenian com- monwealth was a democracy, 70 — on natural j)rocedure, 131 — on the legal ])resumption in favour of the defendant, 162 194 INDEX. B L ACKSTONE, the speculative parts of his Commentaries and epi- tome of popular fallacies, 2 — misled by the ambiguity of Right, 24 — explains the maxim that ' the King can do no wrong,' 28 — on the nature of sovereign power, 45 — on the seat of sovereignty in the British Constitution, 49 — on monarchy, 54, 59 — on the British Constitution as a mixed government, 77 — his division of the English people, 90, 91, 168 — considers tlie elective franchise in England an exercise of sove- reignty, 101 — on liberty, 140, 141, 144 — on the social compact, 149, note — opposes public to family rela- tions, 1G4, note — divides wrongs into public and private, 166 — his misuse of the term Mmii- cipal, 169 Brougham (Lord), his speech as Lord Chancellor on Parlia- mentary Reform, referred to, 107, 110 Burke on ' rights,' 21, 30, 7iote ■ — on natural liberty, 146 Butler (Bishop), on confui^ion and perplexity in language, 9 — his definition of government, 17 PANNING, fallacious argument ^ of, noticed, 3 — confuses royal with sovereign power, 40 — confuses absolute sovereignty with tyranny, 156 Catallactics, a suggested sub- stitute for Political Economy, 165 Cicero, on the triple division of governments, 51 — on royalty, 57 — on the term res ^^wi^ica, 65 Cicero, prefers a mixed govern- ment, 76, 85 — says that citizens should be weighed, not counted, 95 — thinks that liberty consists in having no master, 153 Civil, its different meanings, 168 Claim, suggested as the genus of Right, 20, note Clarendon (Lord), misunder- stands the phrase ' Three Estates,' 171 Class interest, 191 Cdaudian, on freedom under a monarch, 59, note Commonwealth, 63 Community, 92 Community of Goods, 172 Constitution, 18 Constitutional, 19 Crabb, his Dictionary of English Synonyms referred to, 24, 54, 63, 140 Crimes and civil injuries, 1G6 "n'ALEMBERT, on mixed govern- ments, 73, note Democracy, 68 Despotism distinguished from tyranny, 157 Dionysius the historian, his praise of a mixed government, 85 Division of forms of Govern- ment, 49 — should not turn on merely moral influences, 88 — popular and scientific, in a tabular form, 177 Dryden quoted, 62, 63 "PGYPTLVNS, fallacious argu- -^ ment of the, mentioned by Herodotus, 3 Estate, Estates of Parlia- ment, 170 Eulogistic and Dyslogistic Synonyms, 190 INDEX. 195 FAC l^'^ACTION, 191 Federal distingiiished from national governments, 8!) Fielding, defines and classifies the 'poor,' 113 Free towns of Italy and Germany, 143 — land, labour, religion, and schools, called free in different senses, 151, note — government, meaning of the term, 152 — monarches sometimes means a limited, sometimes an absolute one, 154 Freedom synonymous with Li- berty, 140, note FiLMER (8ir Robert), contempt- uous criticism of, by Locke, 10 Force, 1(50, 163, note Forms of Government, the me- thod of dividing according to the number of the governors, 13 GENTLEMEN, various uses of ^ the term, 67, mrte (tIBBON, his definition of mo- narchy, 55 — his use of the term nature, 130 ; — of ' freedom ' in the sense of national independence, 143 Goldsmith's Traveller, 130 Government defined, 17 Grenville (Lord), quoted, 15 Grote 's H istory ofGreece,120, note ITALLAM, (juoted and criticised, ^ 29, 40 — on the effects of the Revolution of 1688, 43 — his use of the term ' Common- wealth,' 65 Hamilton, on Parliamentary Lo- gic, 8 Heeren, his defective definition of sovereignty, 44 Hereditary Nobility, none in aiicit^nt (Jreece, 68 Hereditary Royalty, objections to it considered, 60 KIN Herodotus, earliest notice of triple division of governments. 50 Herschel (Mr.), on solid, liquid, and aeriform bodies, 107 HOBBES, on the triple division of governments, 51 — his notion of the social com- pact, 147 — on authority, 160 HoLiNSHED, condition of the poor, as described by, 110 HOxME Rule, 189 Horace, on Nature, 128 Horton (Mr. Wilmot), defines and classifies the ' poor,' 112 Hume, on philosophers uncon- sciously disputing about words, 6 — on the maxim that ' the King can do no wrong,' 29 — on the middle station of life, 118, note — on the word 'natural,' 128, 131 — on the original contract, 148 — on the provinces of free states, 153 Hungary, 144 and note IMPLICATION, contract by. 140 ■^ Interest and knowledge, bot li necessary qualifications for rulers, 95 — the word lias two distinct senses, 118 Ireland, Home Rule and Nation- alist parties in, 190 TOHNSON (Dr.). quoted, 28, 29. " 90, 96, 128, 129 Jus (Lat.), ambiguitv of the term. 23, mrte Justice, in what sense applicable to the acts of the Legislature, 35 Juvenal, on poverty, 34 T/ING of England, real mean- ing of the maxim that he can do no wrong, 27 — is not properly sovereign. 48, 55 — of France, 54. 56 196 INDEX. T ANGUAGE, whether possible to •*-' legislate for, 7 Law, Lawful, defined, 36 Law of Nature, 13i) Liberal and Conservative, as party designations, 187 Liberty, 140 — depends upon law, 1-12 — cannot be the ultimate end of government, 145 Local Self-government, 189 Locke, his extreme view of the evil effects of a misuse of words, 5 — his criticism of Sir R. Filmer, 10 — on a state of nature, 133 — on the social compact, 147 — on tjrranny, 155 Lucretius, on the nature of things, 127 XfACKINTOSH (Sir James), de- -^ lines the constitution of a state, 18, note — misled by a false reading of Aristotle, 24 — his remarks on mixed govern- ments, 85 — on liberty, 141, 142, note Mandeville's ' Fable of the Bees,' 78 Martens, on monarchy, 54 Martin, the incendiary, his case illustrates the distinction be- tween legal and moral crimi- nality, 35 Middle Class, 117 Mill (James), his Treatise on Government quoted and criti- cised, 52, 53, note, 67, 71, 83, 92, 99 — denies the possibility of a mixed form of government, 79 ; thinks wealth adverse to virtue, 132 — (John Stuart), 90, note, 93, note, 176, note Millar (Mr.), his division of go- vernments, 56 — his use of tlie term ' Democracy,' 69 PAL Millar (Mr.), considers the exis- tence of the right of possession without the right of property as a mark of barbarism, 174, note Mitford's History of Greece, quoted and criticised, 40, 155, 157 Mixed Government, 72 — in what sense the British Con- stitution is, 81 Monarchy, 53 — applied to a government under a double race of kings, 58 Montesquieu, on the division of governments, 52 — distinguishes two kinds of mo- narchical governments, 158 Municipal, 168 T^APOLEON I., in what sense tl.e government under him was a mixed one, 87 Nation, Nationality, 183 National, dangerous ambiguity of, 184 — opposed to federal, 89 Nationalist Party in Ireland, 190 Nature, Natural, different senses of, 125 Natural Philosophy, 126 — procedure, 131 — rights, 189 — liberty, 146 New Morality, poem entitled, 128 NiEBUHR, on the 2Mj)ulus of Rome, 90, note — on the Greek wordSTj/^or, 91, note Nobility, 68 n7C0N0MICS,the, of Xenophon, \^ Aristotle, and Cicero, 165 Oligarchy, 67, 115 Omnipotence of Parliament, 41 )ALEY, misled by the ambiguity of the term right, 24 INDEX. 197 Paley, on the absoluteness of go- vernment, -il — says that all actual govern- ments are mixed, 78 — misunderstands the phrase, 'Three Estates,' 171 Palgrave, on Teutonic royalty, 54 Paradise Lost referred to, 127 Party, 185 Paupers or beggars, how distin- guished from poor, 111 — defined, 113 People. !)0 — in political sense usually in- cludes only adult males, 92 Periodical Publications, their effect in multiplying errors, 10 Permissive Legislation, 190 Phocylides, on the happiness of a middle station, 118, nuto Pindar, on forms of government, 50, note Plato, his division of govern- ments, 50, note — on mixed governments, 71, 80 — on theocracy, 90, note — on a community of goods, 175 Plutarch, his division of govern- ments, 51 Poland, kingdom of, 144 Political, meaning of the term, 164 POLYBIUS, his division of govern- ments, 51 — on mixed governments, 75, 80 I'ope's Kssay on Man, 12(5, 130, 133 I'OPULUS, its meaning at Rome, 90, nuie Possession, 169 — riglit of, witliout property, 172 Power, KSO Property, 35, 109 I'UHLic, different applications of the term, 163 "DALinOH (Sir Walter), on ty- ^^ ranny, 154, 155 Reprksentation, 90 Rei'rksentative Government defined, 98 SOV Representatives were in Eng- land anciently mere deputies, biit are not now, 97 — so were those sent to the States- General of the United (Dutch) Provinces, 97 — are now members of the sove- reign body and not delegates, 104 (but see note) Republic, Republican, 68, 65 Rich and poor are terms which belong to the class of extremes, 107 — are relative to a particular so- cial condition, 108 — under what circumstances iden- tified with i)opular and anti- popular, 123 Right and Wrong, difference of meaning between the adjectives and substantives, 23 — rights and wrongs are public or private, 166, 167 Rights, legal, physical, metaphy- sical, original, indefeasible, &c., 30, 31 — political or private, vested or contingent, 32 Rousseau, in error as to tlie na- ture of sovereignty, 46 — on the division of governmenis, 53 — applies the term Republic to pure monarchies, 57, note. — on simple and mixed govern- ments, 78 Royalty, unfortunately identified with monarchy, 58 CCOTT (Sir W.), on Natur(>, ^ 126 Sharspeare, on Nature, 126, 127. 131 Social, a wider term than I'oli- tical, 164 Social Compact, theory of tlie, 147 Sovereign, Sovereignty, 2i;, 37 — not less absolute in free govern- ments than in despotisms, 3U 198 INDEX. 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