iiiiil
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 EUSSIA'S M^iECH TOWAEDS INDIA 
 
 VOL. I
 
 riiiNTRr) KT 
 
 SFOTTISWOODE AM) CO., XEW-STREET SQUARE 
 LONDON
 
 RUSSIA'S MARCH 
 
 TOWAEDS 
 
 INDIA 
 
 BY 'AN INDIAN OFFICER 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 WITH A MAP 
 
 LONDON 
 
 SAMI'SON LOW, MAKSTON & COMPANY 
 
 IL/JUTEfi) 
 
 St. Snnsian V IFjousc 
 FETTER LANK, FLEET STREET, E.G. 
 
 1894
 
 
 ; PEEFACB 
 
 ^^ ^^ 
 
 '^ . . 
 
 , The following page? contain an account of Russia's 
 
 T advance towards India from the earliest times up 
 
 to the present day. During the past thirty years 
 
 \ a very large number of books has been written 
 
 on this subject; but while each of the various 
 
 , episodes of this great movement have been 
 
 ■;: separately described, and although the political 
 
 and strategical aspects of the question have been 
 
 frequently discussed, no recent work has, to my 
 
 ^ knowledge, been published which gives a clear 
 
 historical account of Eussia's March throui^h 
 
 ^ Central Asia in all its stages. 
 
 This want I have endeavoured to supply ; but 
 it is with many misgivings that I place before my 
 countrymen the result of several years' close study 
 of a (question which is of the greatest importance
 
 vi Russia's March towards India 
 
 to all who are concerned in the safety and welfare 
 of our great Eastern dependency. 
 
 In former years it used frequently to be said 
 that a Russian attack on India was, if not impos- 
 sible, at all events, highly improbable, and some 
 politicians even went so far as to scoff at the 
 danger and declare that it was nothing but the 
 phantasy of a disordered mind. I know not if any 
 Englishmen still adhere to these optimistic opinions ; 
 but, if there be any, I trust that the following un- 
 varnished statement of Eussian aggression will go 
 far to convince them that a real danger does exist, 
 and that the time has come when England can no 
 longer place any reliance on Muscovite assurances, 
 but must be prepared to resolutely oppose any 
 further encroachments on the part of Russia, 
 
 I have no desire to pose as an alarmist, for I 
 confidently believe that Russia will never success- 
 fully invade India if the English people make up 
 their minds to keep the Cossacks behind the limitary 
 line agreed upon in 1873. But if they fail to do this, 
 and permit the Russians to consolidate themselves 
 at Herat or in Afghan-Turkestan, then England's 
 real troubles will commence. I believe that a war 
 fought under existing conditions would undoubtedly
 
 Preface vii 
 
 result in a triumph for Great Britain ; but if tlie 
 Muscovites be allowed to establish themselves on 
 the frontiers of India, our political and financial 
 difficulties would be increased a hundredfold, and 
 the result would be by no means so well assured. 
 
 The existing military situation has not been 
 dealt with, and all questions of strategy have been 
 carefully avoided, for I consider it to be highly 
 injudicious — even for irresponsible writers — to 
 discuss these matters. The War Office and Army 
 Headquarters at Simla are fully competent to 
 determine what action should be taken in certain 
 eventualities, and the discussion of the strategical 
 situation can only tend to draw attention to the 
 weak points which may exist in our armour with- 
 out affijrding any assistance to those who are 
 responsible for the defence of India. But one 
 thing I will say, and that is, that, in spite of the 
 recent attempts which have been made to revive 
 the antiquated theory that the Indus is the true 
 (irst line of defence for India, I believe" that it 
 would be nothing less than an act of political 
 suicide to permit the tide of invasion to reach the 
 Indus Valley without enq)loying all the resources of 
 the Empire to avert such a catastrophe, and that
 
 viit Russia's March towards India 
 
 no British commander will ever be found who 
 would be willing to stake all on the result of a 
 great battle fought on Indian soil. 
 
 The most important publications which have 
 been consulted by me in the preparation of this 
 work are given in the following list of references. 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
 London; October 1, 189B.
 
 LIST OF REFEEENCES 
 
 Tlie History of Russia from the Earliest Times to 1882. By 
 
 Alfred Rambaud. Translated by L. B. Lang, and edited and 
 
 enlarged by N. H. Dole. 
 Russia. By Sir D. M. Wallace. 
 
 The History of Russia. By H. Tyrrell and Henry A. Haukeil. 
 The Eastern Question., from the Treaty of Paris, 1856, to the 
 
 Treaty of Berlin, 1^1^, and to the Second Afghan War. By 
 
 the Duke of A.rgyll. 
 History _of_ Bolihara. By A. Vambery. 
 Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds relating to 
 
 India and the Neighbouring Countries. By Sir C. U. Aitchison. 
 History of Afghanistan, from the Earliest Period to the Outbreak 
 
 of the War of 1873. By Colonel G. B. Malleson. 
 History of the War in Afghanistan. 6y Sir J. W. Kaye. 
 The Afghan War of 1879-80. By H. Hensman. 
 The Afghan Campaigns of 1878-80. By S. H. Shadbolt. 
 Kanda Jiar in 1879 ^ By Major A. Le Messurier. 
 ^exxiL^ the G^rjMtMrywnd' (jro/rden of Central Asia. By Colonel 
 
 G. B. Malleson. 
 The History of Persia. By Sir J. Malcolm. 
 A History of Persia, from the beginning of the 19f7i Century to 
 
 the. Year 1858. By R. G. Watson. 
 The Annual Register (1758 to 1892). 
 ^JI%e ^Russians jin Central Asia. By M. Veniukoff and Captain 
 
 Valikhanoff. Translated by J. and R. Michell. 
 Various other translations from the Russian by J. and R. Michell. 
 Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara. By Joseph Wolff. 
 Journey from Heraut to Khiva, Moscow, and St. Petersburgh. 
 
 By Colonel James Abbott. 
 Progress and Present Position of Russia i'l the East. By Sir 
 
 J. McNeill.
 
 Russia's March towards India 
 
 ^Englaaid, and Russia in the East. By Sir H. C. Rawlinson. 
 Englaaid-and Russia in Central Asia. By M. F. Martens. 
 Travels into Bokhara. By Sir A. Burnes. 
 The Life of Peter the Great. By Eugene Schuyler. 
 TurMsiatJu^ By Eugene Schuyler. 
 The Russians in Central Asia. By F. von Hellwald. 
 Memoires du Chevalier d'Eon. Par Frederic Gaillardet. 
 Dcs Progres de la Puissance Russe. Par M. L . . . . (Lesvu*). 
 Journey to the Source of the River Oxus. By J. Wood. With 
 
 an Essay on the Geography of the Valley of the Oxus by Colonel 
 
 Henry Yule. 
 Cathay and the Way thither. By Colonel Henry Yule. 
 The Travels of Marco Polo. Translated and edited, with notes, 
 
 by Colonel Henry Yule. 
 Eeport of a Mission to Yarkand in 1873, under command of 
 
 Sir T. D. Forsyth. 
 The Roof of the World. By Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Gordon. 
 ThQ_ Shores, of Lake Aral. By Major Herbert Wood. 
 Russian Projects against India. By H. S. Edwards. 
 Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, 
 
 Turkestan, and Beluchistan ; ivith Historical Notices of the 
 
 Countries lying between Russia and India. By J. P. Ferrier. 
 Russia and England in the Struggle for Markets in Central 
 
 Asia. By Captain M. A. Terentieff. (English translation.) 
 From Kulja, across the Thian-Shan, to Lob-Nor. By N. M. 
 
 Prjevalsky. Translated by E. 1). Morgan. With Notices of 
 
 the Lakes of Central Asia. 
 Russia's Advance Eastward. By C. E. H. Vincent. 
 Russia i7i Central Asia. By H. Stumm. 
 A Ride to Khiva. By Colonel F, Burnaby. 
 ^yCampaigning on the Oxus. By J. A. MacGahan. 
 The Merv Oasis. By E. O'Donovan. 
 Narrative of a Journey through the Province of Khorassan, and 
 
 on the North-tvest Frontier of Afghanistan. By Sir C. M. 
 
 MacGrcgor. 
 Wanderings in Baloochistan. By Sir C. M. MacGregor. 
 Travels in Central Asia. By A. Vanibery. 
 Clouds in the East. By Colonel Valentine Baker. 
 4 Short History of China. By D. C. Boulger. 
 /jQSJiiXiliAsianJ^mstions. By D. C. Boulger. 
 England and Russia in Central Asia. By D. C. Boulger. 
 Central Asian Portraits. By D. C. Boulger. 
 Life of Yakooh Beg. By 1). C. Boulger. 
 Russian Central Atia. By liov. II. Lansdtll, D.D.
 
 List of References xi 
 
 //i 
 
 ^7ie Eye-witnesses^ Account of the disastrotcs Russian Camiiaign 
 
 against the A:;hal TelJce Turcomans. ByXL—Matviu. 
 MerVj Ike Queen of the W orld. By C. Marvin. 
 Th£jBai&dans.<xLM.erJM.a3Jd Hevui. By C. Marvin. 
 The Russian Advance towards India. By C. Marvin. 
 G-rodehoff's Eide from Samarlcand to Herat. By C. Marvin. 
 The Russian Railway to Herat. By C. Marvin. 
 Tli&Jiuss ian A nnexation of ^lexv. ^y C. Marvin. 
 Reconnoitring Central Asia. By C. Marvin. 
 The Russians at the Gates of Herat. By C. Marvin. 
 Russia's Poiver of aH aching India. By C. Marvin. 
 England and Russia face to face in Asia; Travels tvith the 
 
 Afghan Botmdary Co7n7nission. By LibUGenant A. C. Yate. 
 Northern Afghanistan, or Letters from the Afghan Boundary 
 
 Commission. By Major C. E. Yate. 
 'La Cainpagne des Busses dans le Khanat de Khol\and (1875-76).' 
 
 Published in Le Journal des Sciences Miiitaires. 
 \ £)fficial Re port on the Siege a7ul Assault of Ueiigldl Tejpe. By 
 
 General Skobeleff. (Eiii^lish translation.) 
 Throtigh tiie Heart of Asia : Over the Pamirs to India. By 
 
 G. Bonvalot. 
 Russia in Central Asia. By Hon. G. N. Curzon. 
 ^ Pe rsia,, an d the Pers ian Qii.p.sti.inn. By Hon. G. N. Curzon. 
 Hansard' s Parliamentary Debates. 
 Haydn s Dictionary of Dates. 
 Markham's Geographical Magazine. 
 
 Proceedifigs and Journals of the Royal GeograjJiical Society. 
 Parliamentary Eeports regarding Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia, 
 
 and Beluchistan.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE FIEST VOLUME 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 1220-1689 
 EARLY HISTORY OF RUSSIA 
 
 Mongol devastations in Asia and Europe— Russia freed from 
 the Mongols by Ivan III. — Russia's first advance into Asia 
 — Conquests of Ivan the Terrible — The British-Miiseovy 
 Company — First Russian Embassj' to England — Reign of 
 Michael Feodorovitch, the first of the Romanoffs — Riissia's 
 Siberian conquests — Cossack invasions of Khiva — English 
 intervention between Sweden and Russia — England seeks 
 a Siberian route to Hindustan — Russian mission to the 
 Khan of Bokhara — Advance of Russia towards the Pacific 
 checked by the Chinese — Persia refuses Russia's com- 
 mercial proposals — Expeditions to the Crimea . 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 1689-1800 
 ' THE KEY AND GATE ' 
 
 Peter the Great conquers Azof — Pultawa — Peter's loss of Azof 
 and his desire to open a trade with the East — Stories of the 
 wealth of Asia — Submibsion of the Khan of Khiva to Peter
 
 xiv Russia's March towards India 
 
 PAGE 
 
 — Gold-mines of Irket — Omsk and Semipalatinsk — ' New 
 Siberian Line ' — Failure of Peter's expeditions to Little 
 Bokhara and Khiva — Russian conquests in Persia — Pro- 
 posed route to India via Astrabad — Peter's ' will ' — Persia 
 regains her lost provinces — Submission of the Kirghiz - 
 Kazaks to Russia — The ' key and gate to all the countries 
 in Central Asia' — Orenburg — The Pe^'sians defeat the 
 Khan of Khiva — Empress Anne and British trade with 
 Persia — The blind Governor of Khiva — Russia again 
 obtains Azof — Russian acquisition of the Crimea — 
 Russian designs on Turkey, and Treaty of Jassy — Russians 
 in Georgia, and their failure in Persia — The struggle for 
 the Caucasian provinces ....... 25 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 1800-1828 
 COLLAPSE OF PROJECTED INVASIONS OF INDIA 
 
 Scheme for a French and Russian invasion of India — The 
 Emperor Paul's manifesto — The Sovereignty of Georgia — 
 Russian advance against Persia — French alliance with 
 Persia — India threatened by an Afghan invasion — Treaty 
 of Tilsit — Revival of project for a Franco-Russian invasion 
 of India — Mission of Sir Harford Jones to Persia — Russo- 
 Turkish War — Franco- Russian War — Persian reverses and 
 Treaty of Gulistan — Submission of Turkoman tribes to 
 Russia — The Gokcheh difficulty and renewal of hostilities 
 between Russia and Persia — Treaty of Turkomanchai — M. 
 Griboiedoff's Mission ....... 50 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 1829-1840 
 ATTACKS ON HERAT AND KIIIVA 
 
 Growth of Russian influence in Persia — Russo-Turkish War, 
 and Treaty of Adrianople — Russia incites Persia to attack 
 Herat — Russian intrigue in Afghanistan — Mission of 
 Burnes to Kabul — Persia's withdrawal from Herat — Lord 
 Auckland's expedition to Afghanistan, the Simla Manifesto, 
 and the restoration of Sbuja-ul-Mulk — Russian expedition 
 for conquering Khiva — Russia and the Kirghiz —Failure 
 of Russian adviinco upon Khiva . . . . ,89
 
 Contents of the First Volume xv 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 1840-1845 
 TROUBLES IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Dost Mahommed's attempt to regain his throne — Oiatbreak in 
 Kabul, and murder of Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir 
 William Macnaghten — Fate of General Elphinstone's army 
 — The only survivor of the army — Disaster to Colonel 
 Palmer and his troops — Critical situation in Afghanistan 
 — Stoddart's and ConoUy's missions to Khiva and Bokhara 
 — Failiu-e of Eussian mission to Khiva — Russian mission 
 to Bokhara— Eussian occupation of Ashnrada . . . 12G 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 1846-1858 
 
 RUSSIAN ADVANCE ACROSS THE KIRGHIZ STEPPES 
 
 Eussian frontier-line at the beginning of the nineteenth 
 century — Operations in the Sea of Aral and construction 
 of Fort Eaim — Subjection of the Southern Kirghiz to 
 Eussia — Founding of Kopal — Collisions between Eussians 
 and Khivans — The Aral Sea flotilla — Khokandian attacks 
 on the Eussians — Siege of Ak-Mechet and its capture by 
 the Eussians — Khokandian expeditions for retaking Ak- 
 Mechet — Further Russian aggression across the Hi — The 
 Crimean War — Two Eussian plans for the invasion of 
 India — Herat again besieged by Persia — British force de- 
 spatched against the Shah — Intrigues and insurrection of 
 Izzet Kutebar — Ignatieff's Missions to Khiva and Bokhara 
 — Further Russian explorations of Central Asia — Khani- 
 kofl's Mission 144 
 
 CHAPTER Vn 
 
 1859-1868 
 
 ATTACKS ON KHOKAND AND BOKHARA 
 
 Civil war in Khokand — Russian forward movement in 
 Khokand — Capture of Anlio-ata and Hazret-i-Turkestan — 
 Tchernaieff captures Chiiukcnt — British policy of ' masterly 
 inactivity ' in India — Prince Gortchakoff's circular — Fall 
 of Tashkent — Russian declarations regarding Tashkent — 
 Russian invasion of Bokharan territory — Capture of Khojent 
 — Capture of Ura-Tepe, and occupation of Jizakh — The 
 ' Steppe Conunission ' — Formation of the Province of
 
 xvi Russia's March towards India 
 
 PAG K 
 
 Turkestan — Occupation of Samarkand — Treatj' of Peace 
 with Bokhara ......... 183 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGBEEMENT OF 1873 
 
 Conferences between Lord Clarendon and Baron Briinnow on 
 Russia's advance towards Afghanistan and India— Prince 
 Gortchakoff's map — Gortchakoff' assurances — Contro- 
 versy on the limitary line — Bussia takes time to consider 
 the Indian Government's proposals — Final settlement of 
 the northern frontier of Afghanistan, and Prince Gort- 
 chakoff's letter — Russian pledges to respect the integrity 
 of Afghanistan — An incomplete settlement — Present con- 
 dition of the boundary question ..... 221 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 1868-1883 
 KULJA AND KASHGAR 
 
 ' Bokharan independence ' — Petty native disturbances in 
 Bokhara — The Iskander Kul Expedition — Kulja and its 
 history — Affairs of Kashgar, and the rule of Yakoob Beg 
 — Russian occupation and annexation of Kulja ' in per- 
 petuity ' — Yakoob Beg defies Russia — British relations 
 with Kashgar — Russian proposals to Y''akoob Beg — Kashgar 
 and the Porte — Treaty of commerce between the Indian 
 Government and Kashgar — Projected Russian invasion of 
 Kashgar — Subjugation of Kashgar by tJie Chinese — Ren- 
 dition of Kulja to China ....... 235 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 1869-1873 
 CONQUEST OF KHIVA 
 
 Occiipation of Krasnovodsk and its object — Gortchakoff's 
 explanations to Great Britain — Protestations from the 
 Khan of Khiva and the Persian Government — Kirghiz 
 insurrection — Skokeleff and Markozofi's reconnaissances — 
 Council at St. Petersburg— Advance to Khiva and march 
 of the Russian columns — Disasters of Markozoff 's column 
 — Bombardment of Khiva — Siu-render of Khiva and 
 Kaufmann's triumphal entry— Treaty of peace— Reaction 
 in England against Russia ...... 27."
 
 RUSSIA'S MARCH TOWARDS INDIA 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 1220 1G89 
 
 EARLY IIISTOKY OF EUSSIA 
 
 Mongol devastations in Asia and Europe — Russia freed from the 
 Mongols by Ivan III. — Russia's first advance into Asia — Con- 
 quests of Ivan the Terrible — The British-Muscovy Company — 
 First Russian Embassy to England — Reign of Michael Feodoro- 
 vitch, the first of the Romanoffs — -Russia's Siberian conquests — 
 Cossack invasions of Khiva — English intervention between 
 Sweden and Russia — England seeks a Siberian route to Hin- 
 dustan — Russian mission to the Khan of Bokhara — xVdvance of 
 Russia towards the Pacific checked by the Chinese — Persia 
 refuses Russia's commercial proposals — Expeditions to the 
 Crimea. 
 
 <i. 
 
 j^ the early years of the thirteenth century, at the 
 time when HenryL-IIL— was- king- of- England, the 
 wild inhabitants of the regions on the extreme 
 eastern borders of Europe were startled by dis- 
 quieting rumours of the movements of vast hordeS/> 
 of barbarians who were at that time devastating 
 the unknown countries in the heart of Asia. Nor 
 was it long before these reports assumed a more 
 definite shape, for it soon became known that a 
 mighty chieftain had made himself master of the 
 
 VOL. L B
 
 2 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 north-eastern portion of Asia, and was then march- 
 ing with his armies against the kingdoms of Turan 
 and Iran. 
 
 This great conqueror was Geng hiz Khan, the 
 son of Yissugei, the ' Emperor of the Great Mon- 
 gols.' In the course of one campaign he had 
 conquered the whole of the vast region which 
 stretches from the Sea of Japan to the inhospitable 
 Pamir Plateau ; shortly afterwards Khiva, Samar- 
 kand, Balkh, and Bokhara were captured by his 
 warriors ; and by the year 1220 the frontiers of his 
 mighty empire had been extended to the southern 
 slopes of the Caucasus and to the eastern shores of 
 the Caspian Sea. 
 
 In the following year a considerable Moni:^ol 
 army marched into Europe ; but after ravaging the 
 rich valley of the Ural it quickly retired, leaving 
 the startled Eussians astonished at the seemingly 
 supernatural visitation. Again, in 1223, one of 
 Genghiz Khan's generals crossed the Caucasus, 
 and, carrying everything before him, speedily 
 subjugated the whole country between the mouths 
 of the Eivers Volga and Dnieper. 
 
 <^At this period the country which is now known 
 by the name of 'Eussia' was in a condition of 
 complete anarchy, and was split up into a number 
 of petty principalities/>The rulers of these states 
 were perpetually at war with each other, their 
 subjects were devoid of the elements of civilisation, 
 and throughout the country there was no state, or 
 group of states, which was in a position to offer 
 any effective resistance to the onward march of the
 
 -1689 Mongol Supremacy in Eastern Europe 3 
 
 barbarian invaders. <iAt this time the most power- 
 ful of the Eussian princes was MiUslaiof__G:allicia.r^ 
 and he speedily gathered round him some of the 
 minor chiefs and proclaimed a holy war against 
 the savage unbelievers who appeared to be bent 
 on the extermination of all who attempted to 
 oppose their career of war and bloodshed. But 
 ;the Eussian armies were defeated with great 
 slaughter on the banks of the Eiver Kalka/'and 
 after the barbarians had again indulged their 
 appetite for destruction and massacre, they once 
 more retired, leaving behind them a desert to mark 
 their path. 
 
 Thirteen years elapsed before these scourges of 
 humanity again appeared in Europe. In the mean- 
 while .^nghiz Khan had died, and was succeeded 
 by his son Ogatai^dio, during the first years of 
 his reign, was occupied with the continuation of 
 the war against the Kin emperors of China, which 
 his father had commenced with such remarkable 
 success. In May 1234 the last of the Kin em- 
 perors was overthrown, and while Ogatai was 
 employed in a great struggle with the S;zng rulers 
 of the southern provinces of China, Mie sent an 
 army under his nephew Batu Khan to re-establish 
 Mongol supremacy in Eastern Europe. 
 
 It is needless here to describe the various 
 campaigns which followed ; it is sufficient merely 
 to state that by the year 1241 Batu Khan liad com- 
 pletely overthrown the armies of the Eussian 
 princes,^heir chief cities had been captured, and 
 the irresistible hordes of Asiatic barbarians had 
 
 b2
 
 / 
 
 4 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 conquered Poland and Hungary,<and had gained 
 complete possession of the whole of Eastern 
 Europe. But at this juncture, when Batu was 
 on the point of commencing a new campaign 
 against Austria and the Teutonic knights, he 
 received news of the death of his sovereign Ogatai, 
 and at once made preparations for a retreat. 
 Europe was thus delivered from any further ' car- 
 nivals of death,' and the terrible Mongol invasions 
 cam^ to an end. 
 
 <C(3n his return from Poland and Hungar}'-, Batu 
 settled on the banks of the Eiver Volga, built the 
 'city of Sarai, and there established the kingdom of 
 the Khans of the Golden Horde — a name which 
 is said to have been derived from the gorgeous 
 tapestry and sumptuous appointments of the tent 
 of the Mongol prince. For more than two cen- 
 turies after this the princes of the petty Eussian 
 principalities were forced to pay homage to the 
 Khans of the Golden Horde. They were obliged 
 to attend at Sarai to obtain the Khan's decision 
 regarding their various disputes, and could not 
 ascend their thrones without first receiving the 
 ' larlikh,' or letters-patent, from the Khan^^nd they 
 were speedily punished if they made any attempt 
 to throw off the Mongol yoke. 
 
 But towards the close of this period the Mon- 
 gol empire itself had, for many reasons, begun to 
 show signs of decay ; anddhe victory which the 
 Graiid- J?rinae-_of_Mo^cpw^-I)iiiiitri Domikoi — 
 gained OYe^he Mongol army of Mamai at Kouli- 
 kovo in^380)was a sure presage of the approaching
 
 -1689 Ivan III. defies the Mongols 5 
 
 overthrow of the supremacy of the Golden Horde. 
 Moscow, at that time, was gradually assuming a 
 leading position among the Eussian principalities, 
 and when Ivan Ill^surjiamed-ihejClreat, succeeded 
 his father Vassih the Blind in 1463 , as Gm.nd 
 iVince^ of 3Ioscow, the Russians obtained in him 
 a leader who was able to free them from the 
 oppression of the Mongols, and one who laid the 
 foundation of that unity of the Eussian people^^ 
 which enabled them to take their place among 
 the nations of Europe. 
 
 It would be out of place here to refer to Ivan's 
 actions except in so far as they affect the question 
 of Eussian conquests towards the East, and these 
 therefore only will be considered. After subduing 
 Novgorod the Great, which had been hesitating 
 between the rival Grand Princes of Moscow and 
 Lithuania, Ivan conquered the whole of Northern 
 Eussia as far as Finland, the White Sea, and the 
 Ural Mountains, and then turned his attention to 
 the Khanates or Czarates of Sarai and Kazan — two 
 of the states ■which had grown out of the OTadual 
 decay of the Golden Horde. He, in 1478, refused 
 to pay tribute to Aclimet Khan of Sarai, trampled 
 on the Khan's image, and put all the Khan's envoys 
 to death, excepting one who escaped and conveyed 
 the news to the Horde. Achmet, of course, took 
 the field for the purpose of punishing his rebellious 
 vassal, and, on marching towards Moscow, found 
 that Ivan, with a numerous and well-equipped 
 army, had taken up a strong position on the banks 
 of the Eiver Oka. The Khan seems to have been
 
 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 disinclined to risk everything on a battle, and did 
 not attack ; while the Grand Prince, who, in spite 
 of his repeated successes, does not appear to have 
 been possessed of much valour, neglected the 
 advice of his hoyars, and declined to cross the 
 river to attack the Mongols. The two armies 
 remained thus confronting each other for many 
 weeks, confinin<j' themselves to an occasional dis- 
 charge of arrows and abuse ; and it was not until 
 the river became frozen that this extraordinary 
 situation was brought to a close. Then, how- 
 ever, when a bloody battle appeared imminent, 
 an inexplicable panic seized both armies, and 
 ^ they fled in confusion. Such was the final en- 
 ' counter between the Eussians and their former 
 oppressors of Sarai — a disgraceful flight of both 
 forces. But the power of the Golden Horde was 
 broken. Achniet on reaching his country was put 
 to death by one of his followers, and the Horde, 
 attacked by Ivan's firm ally, the Khan of the 
 Crimea,^ oi^ly existed as a separate nation for a 
 short time longer."-' 
 
 Ivan then marched against Kazan, captured the 
 city in 1487, and carried the Khan Alegam as a 
 prisoner to Moscow. The people were forced to 
 swear allegiance to the Grand Princes of Moscow ; 
 but, as the city was not yet ripe for annexation, it 
 
 ' The Khanate of the Crimea was one of the three chief Tartar 
 States which rose out of the ruins of the Golden Horde. Kazan 
 and Sarai were the headquarters of the other two. 
 
 '^ Sarai, the great capital of the Golden Horde, where Eussian 
 prisoners had fjrovelled before the Khans, was destroyed in 1502, 
 when the power of the Horde was completely broken.
 
 -1689 Russia's First Advance into Asia 
 
 was placed under the sovereignty of a nephew of 
 Ivan's ally, the Klian of the Crimea. 
 
 Two years later Viatka, which had for a short 
 time fallen into the hands of the Khan of Kazan, 
 was reconquered; and in 1499 the governors of 
 Oustiougue, of the Dwina, and of Viatka, advanced 
 as far as the Eiver Petchora, and built a fort on 
 its banks. Then, crossing the Ural Mountains in 
 sledges drawn by dogs, in the depth of winter, 
 they slew fifty Samoyedes and captured 200 rein- 
 deer. They then invaded the country of the 
 Vogouls and Ougrians, took forty palisaded en- 
 closures, and finally returned to Moscow with fifty 
 captive chiefs. 
 
 This raid had no permanent results, and is only 
 interesting from the fact of its having been the 
 first Eussian advance into Asia. This advance 
 across the Urals was made at a time when England 
 was just recovering from the effects of the Wars 
 of the Eoses, when India was only known to 
 Europe through vague travellers' tales, and a 
 hundred years before the formation of the first 
 East India Company. 
 
 It will be seen that this first advance into 
 Asia was merely a sudden and irregular foray 
 across the border. It had been made without 
 orders from the central Government, and without 
 any idea of permanent advantages being derived 
 from it. It was a natural result of the disordered 
 state of the country, and was merely an episode in 
 the general expansion of a people who had been 
 downtrodden for centuries bv a race of barbarous
 
 8 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 nomads, but wlio, taking advantage of the gradual 
 deca}^ of their oppressors, and feeling the growth 
 of their own forces, began, under Ivan the Great, 
 that expansion and course of territorial acquisition 
 which has steadily continued ever since, and has 
 brought Eussia to the position she now occupies, 
 as one of the most powerful nations in the world, 
 with an empire extending from the Pacific Ocean 
 to the very heart of Europe. 
 
 Ivan's conquests towards the east have only 
 been here referred to ; but he succeeded also in 
 greatly extending and consolidating Eussian power 
 towards the west and north ; and Eussia day by 
 day took a more important share in European 
 concerns, while eastern potentates also sought the 
 Grand Prince's friendship. Among these was 
 Baber the Great, Mogul Emperor o£ Dehli, jwho 
 entered~ihto negotiatiohs"\vith Ivan's son and suc- 
 cessor, Vassili Ivanovitch. 
 
 Yassili's rule, however, was merely a prepara- 
 tion for the more important reign of his son, 
 Ivan IV., who, on account of his violent acts, 
 earned the surname of ' The Terrible.' Vassili lost 
 the friendship of the Khan of the Crimea, and 
 found that Kazan had fallen away from its alle- 
 giance to Moscow. He twice sent expeditions 
 against the city, but both were complete failures ; 
 and he therefore devised other means for ruining 
 his enemies. He established a fair at Makarief,^ 
 
 ' The fair of IMakariof was afterwards transferred to Nijni 
 Novgorod, where it still flourishes and attracts hundreds of thou- 
 sands of merchants from all parts of Europe and Asia.
 
 -1689 Conquests of Ivan the Terrible 9 
 
 on the Volga, by means of which the trade of 
 Kazan was much injured. 
 
 But the final subjugation of Kazan, and the 
 annexation of the Khanates of Kazan and Sarai 
 (or Astrakhan) was not accomj)lished till some 
 years later by the terrible Ivan IV. 
 
 Throughout the first years of the reign of 
 Ivan IV. the Czar^ found that Kazan was still 
 greatly under the influence of the Khan of the 
 Crimea, and although the Muscovite party at one 
 time obtained the ascendency, a revolution shortly 
 afterwards broke out, when the city gates were 
 shut on the Muscovites, and the people proclaimed 
 a Tartar Khan. Ivan then determined to subdue 
 the Mussulman city once and for ever, and he 
 therefore marched against it with a large arm}- in 
 1552, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, 
 gained complete possession of the town, and then 
 massacred the inhabitants. The fall of Kazan was 
 soon followed by the annexation of Astrakhan. 
 The Nogais, who wandered in the adjoinino- 
 steppes, then submitted to the Czar of Moscow, 
 and their example was followed by the Cossacks 
 of the Don, while the Bashkirs and other tribes 
 on the Volga and Kama, who formerly had been 
 subject to the Khan of Kazan, after a short time 
 paid homage to Ivan the Terrible. 
 
 Russia — or, more correctly speaking, Moscow 
 — thus obtained possession of the entire course of 
 the Volga from its source to the Caspian Sea, and 
 
 ' Ivan the Terrible was the first Grand Prince of Moscow wlio 
 assumed the title of ' Czar.'
 
 lo Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 thus secured one of the main trade routes with the 
 far East. By oaining a footing on the shores of 
 the Caspian, she was able to exert some shght 
 influence over Persia, and her fame began to 
 penetrate far into the unknown hinds in the heart 
 of Asia. In 1557, ambassadors from the Khan of 
 Khiva arrived at the court of the Czar to seek 
 permission to trade with Eussia; and similar 
 missions visited Moscow in 1563, 1566, and 1583. 
 Nor were these the only successes towards the 
 East which Ivan the Terrible could boast of. In 
 1558 he granted to one, Gregory Strogonoff, a 
 strip of land on the banks of the Eiver Kama, 
 where the Strogonoffs settled, and from whence 
 they started on explorations of the mineral re- 
 sources of the Urals. These colonists, in their raids 
 across the mountains, came into contact with the 
 Siberian hordes of the Irtish, Tobol, and Baratin- 
 ski Tartars, who were ruled by Kuchum Khan, a 
 lineal descendant of the great Genghiz Khan. The 
 Strogonoffs applied to Ivan for permission and 
 assistance to fight the Tartars. Ivan was at the 
 time fully occupied elsewhere, but he saw a way 
 of furthering the schemes of the Strogonoffs. At 
 that time a band of brigands named ' The Good 
 Companions of the Don ' maintained a regular 
 system of blackmail and pillage on the Volga, and 
 had on more than one occasion roused the ire of 
 the Czar. These men he now proposed to utilise, 
 and pardoning one of their chiefs, named Irmak 
 (or Yermak) Timofeevitch, permitted him to take 
 service with the Strogonoffs, with several hundred
 
 -1689 Irmak's Exploits in Siberia ii 
 
 of his followers— outcasts of every nationality and 
 description. Irmak, with this motley army, crossed 
 the Ural Mountains in 1579, traversed the vast 
 untrodden forests of Tobol, defeated Kuclium in 
 a series of battles in 1581, captured his capital, 
 Sibir, and made the Khan's cousin, Mahmet Kul, 
 a prisoner. Many of the neighbouring chiefs sub- 
 mitted, and the Eussians then sailed down the 
 Eiver Irtish, capturing several forts on their way. 
 Thus, before Ivan's death, which occurred in 1584, 
 the Czar received news that a vast tract of hitherto 
 unknown country had been conquered for him 
 by the wild brigand chief and his adventurous 
 followers. 
 
 Leaving Irmak's exploits for the present, it is 
 necessary now to refer to the doings of the English 
 in Eussia at that time, in order that it may be 
 clearly understood what were then the relative 
 positions and commercial aspirations of the two 
 nations which now are rivals for empire in Asia. 
 
 In the reign of King Edward YI. a compau}^ of 
 merchants was formed for the discovery of ' king- 
 doms, islands, and places unknown and unvisited 
 by the highway of the sea.' The great navigator, 
 Sebastian Cabot, was nominated governor for life; 
 and shortly afterwards three vessels, under Sir 
 Hugh Willoughby and Chancellor, were sent 
 towards the Xorth to explore the unknown sea 
 which was believed by some to offer a road to 
 China and the far East. These three ships en- 
 countered a violent storm off the Scandinavian 
 coast, and became separated from each other.
 
 12 Earlv History of Russia 1220- 
 
 Willougliby, with the ' Buona Speranza ' and 
 ' Buona Confidenza,' was lost ; but Chancellor, in 
 the ' Edward Bonaventura,' succeeded in rounding 
 the North Cape, and found himself first in a 
 strange sea, and then at the mouth of a river, near 
 to which stood two monasteries.^ Here he landed, 
 and found that he was on the territory of the Czar 
 of Moscow, although, at that time, no Czar had 
 visited this portion of his dominions.^ He had 
 unwittingly reached the White Sea and mouth of 
 the Eiver Dwina, close to where the town of 
 Archansjel now stands. Chancellor went to Mos- 
 cow and delivered to Ivan the letters which he 
 had received from King Edward VI. This hap- 
 pened in 1553. 
 
 On the accession of Queen Mary, she confirmed 
 the privileges of the company, and in 1556 
 Chancellor again sailed for the Dwina, and after 
 revisiting Moscow, was accompanied to England 
 by the first Eussian ambassador, Osip Nepei. 
 Nepei, on his return to Eussia, was accompanied 
 by Anthony Jenkinson, who, by his straightforward 
 behaviour and wide knowledge, succeeded in 
 gaining Ivan's favour, and obtained from the Czar 
 a letter of recommendation to the neighbouring 
 Asiatic princes. Jenkinson, thus armed, descended 
 the Volga, and flew the first British flag on the 
 Caspian Sea. Crossing from Astrakhan to the 
 
 ' These were the monasteries of Saint Nicholas and Saint 
 Michael, near to the latter of which the town of St. Michael the 
 Archangel — or, shortly. Archangel — was afterwards built. 
 
 ^ Peter the Great was the first Czar who visited Archangel and 
 the White Sea.
 
 -1689 The British-Muscovy Company 13 
 
 Mangishlak peninsula, lie thence made liis way to 
 Bokhara. There he was obliged to sell his wares 
 at a price which brought him little or no profit, 
 and he thus returned to Eussia, having gained but 
 small remuneration for his difficult and dangerous 
 undertaking. In another journey which Jenkinson 
 made in 1562, he again sailed down the Caspian 
 Sea from Astrakhan to Derbent, and from thence 
 proceeded to Kasvin, which was at that time the 
 capital of Persia. He, however, received but scant 
 courtesy from the Shah, and returned to Eussia, 
 taking with him the princes of Georgia and 
 Shirwan, and other chiefs who wished to gain the 
 friendship of the Czar of Moscow. 
 
 These ventures of Jenkinson's were repeated 
 by other factors of the British-Muscovy Compai.iy 
 during the next nineteen years ; but none of them 
 had any tangible result, and they merely demon- 
 strated, that the time had not yet arrived when a 
 profitable trade could be carried on with the 
 countries of Central Asia, and the English were 
 therefore oblio;ed to content themselves with tradinsf 
 in the territories of the Czar. Ivan, however, 
 in acknowledgment of Jenkinson's services, had 
 authorised the English Merchant Company to trade 
 on all rivers in the north of Eussia, from the 
 Dwina to the Obi, and permitted them to esta- 
 blish themselves in the principal Eussian towns. 
 
 Thus it will be seen that while Eussia was 
 engaged in forming an united empire out of the 
 various elements which had been scattered and 
 suppressed by the Mongol invasions, and one
 
 14 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 which could take its place among the nations of 
 Europe, England and other Western nations (which 
 had escaped from the disastrous results of the 
 barbarian invasion, and were in a more advanced 
 state of civilisation), began to turn their attention 
 to commertdal enterprises, and became desirous of 
 obtaining some share in the riches of the East. 
 But none knew how these riches were to be 
 acquired, or by what road the countries which 
 possessed such fabulous wealth could be reached. 
 It was only known that those states through which 
 the commerce of India and the East passed in- 
 variably became in their turn wealthy ; and this 
 knowledge merely increased the desire to obtain 
 some share in the traffic. Since Vasco de Gama 
 had discovered the Cape route in 1497, Portugal 
 had obtained complete command over the Eastern 
 seas, and had monopolised the Eastern trade. 
 None of the other nations in Europe for many 
 years attempted to contest the naval supremacy 
 of the Portuguese in the East, and they were 
 therefore obliged to seek some other route in their 
 endeavours to obtain a share in the trade. Thus 
 England, through a want of geographical know- 
 ledge, first endeavoured to obtain a trade route to 
 India and Central Asia through liussia — a fact 
 which it is strange to contemplate, when Great 
 Britain, through her maritime supremacy and the 
 hardihood of her sons, has succeeded in building 
 up for herself a great empire in the East to find 
 herself there confronted and even threatened by 
 the State which first was believed to offer the best
 
 -1689 'The Times of Troubles' 15 
 
 means of communication with India, but which 
 now appears as a dangerous and powerful rival. 
 
 It is impossible here to review the effects which 
 * the times of troubles ' had on Eussian expan- 
 sion ; and it is sufficient merely to state that when 
 Ivan the Terrible, in a fit of uncontrolled rasfe, 
 slew his favourite son, Ivan, in 1581, he com- 
 mitted an act which had the most disastrous 
 results for Eussia, and threatened to overthrow 
 the empire which he and his immediate prede- 
 cessors had built up. The country became the 
 theatre of war for two rival Powers who deter- 
 mined to profit by the internal disorder and 
 weakness of the Eussian State. Eussia, which 
 had just become united, and which was just 
 appearing before Europe as a powerful nation, 
 appeared doomed to destruction, when help came 
 from an unexpected quarter. Tartar Kazan, which 
 had been for so long a thorn in the side of Eussia, 
 had gradually been transformed, and now stepped 
 forward as the champion of the empire of Moscow. 
 Joining in, if not actually leading, the national 
 rising for the deliverance of Eussia, the citizens 
 of Kazan stepped into the breach, and briUiantly 
 assisted in the popular movement for the salvation 
 of the Muscovite empire, and in defence of the 
 orthodox religion. The foreign invaders were 
 repulsed, and Michael Feodorovitch, the first of 
 the EomanofT dynasty, was proclaimed Czar. 
 
 But although, after the death of Ivan the 
 Terrible, Eussia lost in Europe much of the power 
 which she had previously gained, she was carving
 
 i6 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 out for herself a new and extensive empire in 
 Asia. Irmak's exploits have already been referred 
 to, and the story of Eussian conquests in Siberia 
 must now be resumed. 
 
 In the spring of 1584 (the year in which 
 Ivan IV. died), Irmak and his followers were 
 besieged in Sibir by the Tartars ; but the Russian 
 leader soon defeated his enemies and then 
 sailed up the Irtish, conquering many strong 
 places during his advance. His brilliant career, 
 however, was fast drawing to a close, for it was 
 destined that he should not lonsf survive the 
 master whom he had latterly served so well. 
 Hearing that a caravan from Bokhara was crossing 
 the Ishim steppe on its way to Kuchum lOian, he 
 halted near the Eiver Bagatai with the intention 
 of surprising the traders. There the Russians lay 
 down to rest, unconscious that their enemy was 
 near. The sleepers were suddenly attacked by 
 Kuchum's followers, and the gallant Irmak was 
 drowned, after having bravely cut his way to the 
 river bank. His followers then recrossed the 
 Urals, and left Kuchum, for a time, master of the 
 situation. But not for long ; for news of Irmak's 
 brilliant successes had reached Moscow, and a 
 second expedition was fitted out and despatched 
 to Siberia in 1586. The territory which Irmak 
 had conquered for Ivan was gradually won back 
 for Russia, and by the end of the sixteenth century 
 the Russians had regained possession of Siberia 
 from the Ural Mountains to the River Irtish. The 
 town of Tinmen was built on the site of one of
 
 -1G89 Russia checked in the Caucasus 17 
 
 Irmak's first conquests, and was thus the first 
 permanent Russian settlement east of the Ural 
 Mountains. Tobolsk was also founded, and be- 
 came the residence of the first Russian governor of 
 Siberia. And Kuchum Khan, bereft of his wives 
 and children, was driven into the wild steppes of 
 Ishira, where he died, or was put to death by the 
 Nogai Tartars. 
 
 But, though Russia gained vast additions to 
 her dominions in Siberia, she was less fortunate in 
 her dealings at this time in the Caucasus. A 
 force which was sent by Boris Goudonoff to oc- 
 cupy Daghestan was annihilated ; while Alexander, 
 Prince of Kachetia, who had acknowledged himself 
 to be a vassal of Goudonoff, had been assassinated, 
 and was succeeded by his son, who was a staunch 
 defender of Islam, and ally of Shah Abbass of 
 Persia. 
 
 During this period Russia had but few deal- 
 ings with the states of Central Asia ; but, never- 
 theless, the fame of her conquests in Siberia 
 caused the great Abdulla, the Khan of Bokhara, 
 to send an embassy to Moscow in 1589 with 
 the object of obtaining the friendship of the 
 Czar Feodor Ivanovitch. The Khan, however, 
 omitted to address the C^ar with his full 
 titles, and his letter was therefore not received. 
 The Boyar, Boris Goudonoff (who subsequently 
 was proclaimed Czar), informed the Khan that ' all 
 sovereigns write to his Czarish Majesty with due 
 respect, and to him, the Boyar, with love and 
 compliments,' and said that it was only due to his 
 
 VOL. I. c
 
 1 8 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 intercession that the ambassador had not been 
 refused an audience. 
 
 The commencement of the seventeenth century 
 was marked by a series of Cossack invasions of 
 Khiva. In 1602 the Ural Cossacks heard of the 
 riches of Khiva from some Persian merchants 
 whom they had captured in one of their forays. 
 They accordingly resolved to make a raid on the 
 Khanate, and, crossing the Kirghiz Steppes, ac- 
 tually captured the town of Urgenj during the 
 temporary absence of the Khan. They then 
 started to return with large quantities of spoil 
 and about a thousand women, but were overtaken 
 and surrounded by the Khivans. Cut off from 
 water, they still fought for' several days, quenching 
 their thirst with the blood of the slain ; but finally, 
 after being compelled to abandon their booty, they 
 were almost all massacred, 
 
 A second expedition shared the same fate, 
 while a third fared still worse. Caught in severe 
 snowstorms, the invading Cossacks lost their way, 
 and, instead of reaching Khiva, found themselves 
 on the shores of the Sea of Aral. Their provisions 
 became exhausted, and, driven to madness by the 
 pangs of hunger, they killed and ate each other, 
 while the survivors were captured and carried into 
 slavery by the Khivans. 
 
 Michael Feodorovitch had no easy task before 
 him when in 1613 he found himself raised to the 
 throne of the Czars of Moscow. His dominions 
 were threatened by Sweden in the north, while the 
 Poles still ravaged the country to the south-west ;
 
 -1689 John Merrick in Russia 19 
 
 and the traces of ' the troublous times ' were every- 
 where apparent. Foreign help was necessary ; 
 and after Holland had been first fruitlessly asked 
 for assistance, Michael sent an ambassador to 
 England to entreat for money with which to con- 
 tinue the struggle. In the following year (1614) 
 John Merrick, who had for some years previously 
 traded in Moscow, appeared before the Czar as an 
 ambassador from the English kino^, James I, Mer- 
 rick demanded that the English merchants should 
 be permitted to trade with India by the Eiver 
 Obi, and with Persia through Astrakhan and the 
 Caspian Sea. He also applied for concessions of 
 iron and jet mines on the Soukhona, and grants 
 of land near Vologda. These were the English 
 terms for mediation between Gustavus Adolphus 
 of Sweden and the Czar, and are curious in that 
 they show that, fourteen years after the formation 
 of the first East India Company, England was still 
 desirous of obtaining a trade route with Hindustan 
 through Siberia. But the difiiculties and dangers 
 of the route were pointed out to the English envoy, 
 and he finally consented to negotiate wdth the 
 Swedes ; and through his good offices the Peace of 
 Stolbovo was concluded between Gustavus Adol- 
 phus and the Eomanoff Czar. As a reward for 
 his successful mediation, Merrick ao-ain urfjed 
 that the English demands should be conceded ; 
 but the merchants of Moscow so unanimously 
 represented to the Czar that such a concession 
 would mean their ruin, that the negotiations fell 
 through. 
 
 02
 
 20 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 Inl620 the Czar Michael made a fresh attempt 
 to open up a trade route with Central Asia, and 
 sent an embassy, under Ivan Khokhloff, to the 
 Khan of Bokhara. This mission, however, failed 
 to obtain any concessions from the Khan, and is 
 chiefly remarkable on account of the instructions 
 which were issued to the Eussian ambassador 
 in order that the dignity of the Czar might be 
 fully maintained. Khokhloff was ordered to give 
 no presents if such should be demanded in order 
 to admit him to the Khan's presence ; and, if 
 he were to be invited to dine with the Khan, he 
 was not to accept the invitation unless it was 
 stipulated that he should be given a higher place 
 than any other foreign envoys who might be 
 present. This ambassador reached Samarkand in 
 safety, and obtained an audience of the Khan ; 
 but, on presenting the Czar's compliments, he 
 noticed that the Bokharan ruler did not stand 
 up when the Czar's name was mentioned, and 
 he therefore remarked that all foreign potentates 
 were in the habit of rising on such occasions as 
 a mark of respect towards the Czar. The Khan 
 immediately stood up, and apologised for the un- 
 intentional slight which had been offered. This 
 incident, and the earlier treatment of Abdulla 
 Khan's ambassador, show that, although the 
 Eussians were unable to obtain a footing in 
 Central Asia at that time, yet they had no 
 intention of permitting their nation to be in an}^ 
 way despised or treated with disrespect — an excel- 
 lent principle in dealing with Asiatics, and one
 
 -1689 Russia checked by the Chinese 21 
 
 which has been of much use to Eussia in her 
 advances into the heart of Asia. 
 
 Two years after the despatch of this embassy 
 to Bokhara diplomatic relations were also entered 
 into with Afghan, the Khan of Khiva, who, havinsr 
 been driven from his kingdom, sought the pro- 
 tection of the Czar, and even offered, if restored 
 to his throne, to become the vassal of Eussia. 
 
 At the beginning of the seventeenth century 
 the Eussians did little more than hold their own 
 in Siberia, and many attacks were made by the 
 native tribes on their posts and settlements. But, 
 profiting by the quarrels of opposing factions, 
 and by opening up trade with the Central Asian 
 khanates, the Eussian power in Siberia gradually 
 became consolidated, and communications were 
 entered into with the Chinese and with the 
 Dzungarian Kalmuks which have resulted in 
 the gradual extension of Eussian influence, first 
 to Lake Baikal, and then still further eastwards 
 to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 Their advance through Eastern Siberia, how- 
 ever, was by no means unopposed. The Chinese 
 were naturally alarmed at their .movements, and 
 when the first Eussian embass}^ visited Pekin, in 
 165G, it met with a very cold reception. Some 
 years afterwards the Chinese Emperor Kanghi 
 sent a force to subdue Galdan, the Dzung-arian 
 prince, whose pretensions were beginning to im- 
 peril the very existence of the Manchu dynasty ; 
 and while he was so engaged the Eussians, taking 
 advantage of the dispute between the Chinese
 
 22 Early History of Russia 1220- 
 
 and Dzungarians, built some forts on the upper 
 waters of the Eiver Amour, the chief of which 
 were Albazin and Astrog, and thus brought about 
 the first conflict between Eussian and Chinese 
 troops. The Emperor Kanghi viewed the exist- 
 ence of these forts as a standing menace and 
 insult to his authority ; and as soon, therefore, 
 as Galdan had been defeated, he ordered his troops 
 to attack and demolish the objectionable Eussian 
 outposts. Albazin was captured and destroyed, 
 the other forts in the neighbourhood shared the 
 same fate, and thus all traces of the first Muscovite 
 settlements on the Amour were completely obli- 
 terated. 
 
 But a fresh war soon broke out between 
 Galdan and the Chinese, and the Eussians were 
 thus for a while left undisturbed in their efforts to 
 retrieve their shattered fortunes in Eastern Siberia. 
 Albazin was rebuilt, and rose from its ruins 
 stronger and more capable of resisting a siege. 
 As soon as the Chinese had once again settled 
 their differences with the Dzungarians, an army 
 marched against the Eussians. The first attack 
 was repulsed ; but Kanghi sent large reinforce- 
 ments, when the Eussians, finding themselves to 
 be completely overmatched, signed the Treaty 
 of Nipchu in 1689, whereby the fertile regions 
 of the Amour were restored to the Chinese ; and 
 thus the Eussians were seriously checked in their, 
 advance towards the Pacific, and for the next 
 century and a half they were shut out from all 
 communication with the eastern shores of Asia.
 
 -1689 Russians in Ashurada 23 
 
 Nor was it only in Eastern Siberia that the 
 Eussians failed in their endeavours to extend their 
 territories at the expense of their Asiatic neigh- 
 bours. In 1664 the Czar Alexis Mikhailovitch 
 sent an embassy to the court of Shah Abbass II. 
 of Persia. The filthy habits of the Muscovites, 
 however, utterly disgusted the Persian monarch, 
 who called them the ' Usbegs of the Franks ' ; 
 and when it was discovered that the object of 
 the mission was solely for the purpose of trade, 
 and that the Eussians had adopted the guise of 
 ambassadors to evade the payment of dues, the 
 Shah became incensed, and summarily expelled 
 them from the country. In revenge for this 
 affront the Czar incited the Cossacks of South 
 Eussia to attack the Persian province of Mazan- 
 deran. The Cossacks promptly took the hint, 
 overran the province, sacked the city of Ferabad, 
 and finally entrenched themselves on the Mian- 
 kaleli peninsula, north of the Gulf of Astrabad, 
 where they intended to remain for the winter. 
 Here, however, they were attacked by the Per- 
 sians, and, being defeated, took refuge on the 
 island of Ashurada, where they remained for 
 some time.^ 
 
 Two expeditions were also sent against the 
 Crimea, in 1687 and 1689, but both proved 
 
 ' This account of the first Russian occupation of the Island of 
 Ashurada has been taken from the recent excellent work on Persia 
 by the Hon. G. N. Curzon, where the fact is noticed for the 
 first time by an English writer on Central Asian affairs. It is 
 interesting in that it shows that this island was occi;pied by the 
 Eussians 170 years before they permanently settled down thei'e.
 
 24 Early History of Russia 1220-1689 
 
 complete failures ; and thus, when Peter the Great 
 freed hnnself from the regency of his sister Sophia, 
 and assumed entire control over the affairs of the 
 state, he found that Eussia's dealings with her 
 barbarian neighbours were marked by failure and 
 retreat.
 
 25 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 1689-1800 
 
 'THE KEY AND GATE ' 
 
 Peter the Great conquers Azof — Pultawa — Peter's loss of Azof and 
 his desire to open a trade with the East— Stories of the wealth 
 of Asia — Submission of the Khan of Khiva to Peter — Gold- 
 mines of Irket — Omsk and Semipalatinsk — ' New Siberian 
 Line ' — Failure of Peter's expeditions to Little Bokhara and 
 Khiva — Russian conquests in Persia — Proposed route to India 
 via Astrabad — -Peter's ' will ' — Persia regains her lost provinces 
 — Submission of the Kirghiz-Kazaks to Russia — The ' key and 
 gate to all the countries in Central Asia '• — Orenburg — The 
 Persians defeat the Khan of Khiva — Empress Anne and British 
 trade with Persia — The blind Governor of Khiva — Russia again 
 obtains Azof — Russian acquisition of the Crimea — Russian 
 designs on Turkey, and Treaty of Jassy — Russians in Georgia, 
 and their failure in Persia — The struggle for the Caucasian 
 provinces. 
 
 Peter the Great had much to occupy his attention 
 in Europe before he was able to turn his thoughts 
 to Asiatic affairs. He discerned that, as air and 
 freedom are essential for the growth and deve- 
 lopment of mankind, so, for the expansion and 
 progress of a nation, it is equally necessary that 
 external trade and international intercourse should 
 be fostered and extended. Eussia had effected 
 her unity, but was still surrounded by a cordon of 
 states which checked her further development and
 
 26 'The Key and Gate' iosq- 
 
 cut her off from commercial intercourse with tlie 
 Western nations of Europe. Peter saw that before 
 Eussia could cease to be merely an Oriental state, 
 and before she could take a befitting place among 
 the European powers, it was necessary that she 
 should obtain a footing on the sea coast, in order 
 that she might be able to trade freely and directly 
 with Western Europe. This was one of the first 
 tasks to which he applied his great powers, and 
 how well he succeeded in his endeavours is gene- 
 rally known. 
 
 Shortly after he had assumed supreme authority, 
 
 he succeeded in conquering Azof, whereby he 
 
 gained a footing on the sea at the mouth of the 
 
 Eiver Don, and at the same time took up a position 
 
 from which he could keep the Tartars of the 
 
 Crimea in check. But the results of this conquest 
 
 did not fulfil his expectations. Before his vessels 
 
 could freely navigate the Black Sea and pass from 
 
 thence into the Mediterranean, it was necessary 
 
 that the Sultan of Turkey should give his assent ; 
 
 and as this was not forthcoming, and Peter was 
 
 not strong enough to cope with the Turks, he had 
 
 to turn his attention elsewhere to obtain that 
 
 ' window towards the West ' upon which he had 
 
 set his heart. How he at first met with reverses, 
 
 but eventually triumphed over his enemies, and 
 
 effaced the memories of Narva by the great victory 
 
 at Pultawa, are matters of European history, and 
 
 require no notice here, except for the purpose of 
 
 showing that Peter had many matters of vital 
 
 importance to settle in Europe, which fully occu-
 
 -1800 Stories of the Wealth of Asia 27 
 
 pied all his attention until the commencement of 
 the eighteenth century, and prevented him from 
 interfering to any great extent in Asiatic concerns. 
 
 Even after Pultawa had been fought and won 
 in 1709, the Czar found himself confronted by 
 a new enemy who gave him ample occupation. 
 This new foe was the Sultan of Turkey, who, at 
 the instigation of France and Sweden, declared 
 war asfainst Eussia, and succeeded in reoainino- 
 possession of Azof. Peter thus found himself 
 again completely cut off from the Black Sea, and 
 was not in a position to attempt any further 
 struo-ofle with the Turks : and it was after this 
 disaster that he chiefly devoted his energies to the 
 maintenance and extension of his acquisitions on 
 the Baltic, and to the development of commercial 
 dealings with the East. He had gained a firm 
 footing on the Neva, but had lost Azof; and he 
 now desired to obtain some equivalent for the 
 latter by exploiting Asia, and making Eussia the 
 great centre of trade between Asia and Europe. 
 
 Some time previously, in 1694, he had sent a 
 merchant named Simon Malinki to India provided 
 with government stores and money for the purpose 
 of opening up a trade with the Great Mogul. But 
 his mission appears to have borne no fruit, for no 
 records of his doings have been kept. 
 
 In 1713, however, marvellous stories of the 
 mineral wealth of Asia began to reach Peter's ears. 
 The Governor of Siberia reported that gold sand 
 was to be found in abundance near the town of 
 Irket, i.e. Yarkand ; and at the same time a
 
 28 'The Key and Gate' i689- 
 
 ^ 
 
 Turkoman chief named Hodja Nefes arrived in 
 Astrakhan, where he related many stories of the 
 gold which was said to be found on the banks 
 of the Amu Daria — Eiver Oxus. This Turkoman 
 also stated that the Oxus used formerly to flow 
 into the Caspian Sea, and professed to explain how 
 its course had been diverted towards the Sea of 
 Aral by the Usbegs, who had constructed dams 
 across its former channel. From Astrakhan he 
 went to Moscow, to propose to the Czar that he 
 should take possession of the countries bordering 
 on the Oxus, and restore the river to its ancient 
 bed. 
 
 Some years previously — in 1700 — the Khan of 
 Khiva had tendered his submission to the Czar; and 
 Peter had accepted the proffered allegiance. When 
 Hodja Nefes arrived in Moscow, his wonderful 
 reports were confirmed by a Khivan envoy who 
 was there at the Eussian Court, and Peter at once 
 decided to despatch a military expedition to take 
 possession of Khiva, and to establish his authority 
 over the districts on the banks of the Oxus which 
 were said to contain such fabulous stores of wealth. 
 
 He also issued orders for the despatch of an 
 expedition to Little Bokhara, for the purpose of 
 obtaining possession of the gold-mines of Irket. 
 This undertaking was entrusted to Colonel Buch- 
 lioltz, who was directed to proceed thither, build- 
 ing forts along the line by which he advanced. 
 But the expedition was a disastrous failure, and its 
 only permanent result was the erection of a fort on 
 the site of the present city of Omsk.
 
 1800 The New Siberian Line 29 
 
 Two years later another fortified post was built 
 at Semipalatinsk ; and in 1720 General Likhareff 
 was sent to establish a fort on Lake Zaisan, and to 
 explore the country lying between that point and 
 Irket. Likhareff reached Zaisan Nor, and was 
 continuing his advance up the Irtish when he 
 unexpectedly came across Galdan Tchirin, the 
 Khan of Dz angaria, who, with a large army, was 
 watching his frontier against the Chinese. He 
 managed, however, to deceive the Khan as to the 
 object of his mission and retreated, building a fort 
 at Ust-Kamenogorsk on his way back. 
 
 Thus Peter's search for gold in Little Bokhara Jv 
 resulted in complete failure. But although lie did 
 not succeed in the immediate object which he had 
 in view, the movements of Eussian troops towards 
 the head waters of the Eiver Irtish had a very im- 
 portant influence on the Russian position in Siberia, 
 for in this way the line of forts on the Irtish was 
 commenced, which line, by 1752, was connected 
 with the Orenburg posts by a continuous series of 
 forts which extended across the Ishim Steppe and 
 became known as the ' New Siberian Line.' ^ 
 
 Nor did Peter's expedition to Khiva meet with 
 any greater measure of success. The Czar en- 
 trusted the command to a Circassian prince named 
 Bekovitch Tcherkasski, who spent three years in 
 surveying the eastern shores of the Caspian, and 
 established forts at Cape Karagan (on the Man- 
 gishlak peninsula) and on the Krasnovodsk spit. 
 
 ^ No further mention will be made of Russian advances in 
 Siberia except those towards Khokand, via Yerno^yc.
 
 30 'The Key and Gate' i689- 
 
 Ile was ordered to approach the Khan in the 
 character of a friendly envoy, and, before resorting 
 to force, to congratulate him on his accession to 
 power, and to explain that the strength of his 
 escort was merely due to a polite desire on the 
 part of the Czar to give due importance to his 
 mission. When the Khan had been persuaded, or 
 forced, to acknowledge Eussian supremacy, two 
 j^ trade caravans were to be despatched — one to the 
 Khan of Bokhara and the other to the Great Mogul 
 of India. 
 
 The envoy for India received special instruc- 
 tions from Peter to go ' by water as far up the Amu 
 Daria as possible (or by other rivers which may 
 fall into it) to India, in the guise of a merchant, 
 the real business being the discover}^ of a water- 
 way to India ; to inquire secretly about the river 
 in case progress by water be forbidden ; to return, 
 if possible, by the same route, unless it be 
 ascertained that there is another and more con- 
 venient way by water ; the water-way as well as 
 the land route to be carefully observed and de- 
 scribed in writing and to be mapped ; to notice 
 the merchandise, particularly aromatic herbs and 
 other articles that are exported from India ; to 
 examine into, and write an account of, all other 
 matters which, though not mentioned here, may 
 concern the interests of the empire.' Such were 
 the precise orders given by Peter himself to 
 Lieutenant Kojin, of the Russian Navy, who had 
 been selected as envoy for India. But Kojin 
 appears to have been ill-disposed towards Bekovitch,
 
 -1800 Failure of the Expedition to Khiva 31 
 
 and even accused the Prince of a treacherous 
 design ' to deliver the Russian troops into the 
 hands of the barbarians.' He was then recalled, 
 and, after being subjected to a court-martial, was 
 imprisoned at St. Petersburg, when Bekovitch, in 
 accordance with orders from the Czar, sent^Murza 
 Tevkelef with instructions to proceed to India 
 througli Persia, returning to Eussia by way of 
 China and Bokhara.^ But this mission came to 
 nothing, owing to the tragic fate which over- 
 took the over-confident Circassian Prince and his 
 army. 
 
 Bekovitch left Astrakhan in June 1717 w^itli 
 a force consisting of o,500 men, six guns, and a 
 train of 200 camels and 300 horses. Pie reached 
 the Kliivan oasis in the following August, but, 
 falling into a trap cunningly laid by the Khan, 
 he and his officers were killed and mutilated, 
 while his troops were either massacred or reduced 
 to slavery. 
 
 While Peter was acting with such vigour in 
 Siberia and against Khiva, he was not neglectful 
 of Eussian commercial interests in Persia. He 
 saw that the trade of that state, especially in silk, 
 was by no means inconsiderable, but that Eussian 
 merchants had little or no share in it ; and he - 
 moreover knew that througli Persia there was an 
 excellent road to India. He at first resorted to 
 diplomacy, and sent an agent to Ispahan to per- 
 
 ^ See Notes on the Intercourse of Russia with Khiva, by 
 G. Kuhlewein, Secretary to Colonel Ignatieff's mission to Central 
 Asia, translated from the Kussian by John and Robert Michell.
 
 32 'The Key and Gate' i689- 
 
 suade the Shah to turn the Armenian trade in raw- 
 silk through Eussia. But, although the Shah 
 signed a treaty permitting Eussian merchants to 
 trade freely and to purchase raw silk whenever 
 they wished, the agent reported that force would 
 be far more advantageous than diplomacy. A 
 good excuse for such interference was soon 
 obtained. The Lesghians attacked the Persian 
 town of Shemakha and plundered the Eussian 
 merchants in common with the other residents. 
 Orders were given for the Eussian troops on the 
 Volga to march to winter quarters, from whence 
 they were to advance, via Astrakhan, in the 
 following spring. But, before the expedition 
 started, Persia had been invaded b}^ the Afghans ; 
 and then the Czar, instead of advancing against 
 Persia to punish the attack on his subjects, 
 announced that he was going to assist the Shah 
 against his enemies. This was in 1722. A large 
 Eussian army having been collected at Astrakhan 
 under Peter's personal command, advanced against 
 Derbent, and obtained possession of the city with- 
 out difficulty. Peter then returned to Astrakhan for 
 the winter; but his lieutenant, continuing the 
 operations, captured Baku in the following July ; 
 and two months later the representative of the 
 unfortunate Shah Tamasp was compelled to sign a 
 treaty at St. Petersburg by which Mazanderan, 
 Ghilan, and Astrabad were ceded to Eussia — very 
 important concessions, which clearly show^ed that 
 Peter had fully realised the great advantage of 
 olMaining complete control over the sliores of the
 
 -1800 The Astrabad Route to India 33 
 
 Caspian, and that lie understood the great vahie 
 of Astrabad. 
 
 That the Czar did fully realise the great 
 strategical advantages which would be gained by 
 a Eussian occupation of Astrabad is conclusively 
 proved by the words he made use of when at 
 Derbent in 1722. During a conversation he there 
 had with one of his officers regarding the relative 
 advantages of the Cape route and the way to India 
 through Central Asia, Peter remarked : ' Have you 
 ever been in the Gulf of Astrabad ? You must 
 know, then, that those mountains ' (pointing to the 
 heights on the shore of the Caspian) ' extend to 
 Astrabad, and that from there to Balkh and 
 Badakshan with pack camels is only a twelve 
 days' journey, and on that road to India no one 
 can interfere with us.' 
 
 These expeditions of Peter's against Khiva and 
 Persia were the first organised attempts made by 
 the Eussians to obtain a permanent footing in 
 Central and Southern Asia. 
 
 Having, by the conquest of the Baltic pro- 
 vinces, obtained a footing on the sea, Peter turned 
 his attention to the countries with which the most 
 lucrative trade appeared probable, hoping thus to 
 gain some of the wealth which Eussia so sorely 
 needed. He saw that the Portuguese had greatly 
 enriched themselves during the time of Albu- 
 querque, and that at a later period his friends the 
 Dutch, as also the English and French, were ob- 
 taining considerable stores of wealth from the 
 East. If such riches could be gained 1)}' nations 
 
 VOL. I. D
 
 34 * The Key and Gate ' i689- 
 
 wliidi were separated from India by imperfectly 
 explored and dangerous seas, Peter might reason- 
 ably have expected to be able to gain an equal 
 share by means of the shorter and more direct 
 land route through Khiva and Persia. That such 
 was his belief appears to be incontestable, and he 
 was the first Czar to organise and despatch expe- 
 ditions for this purpose. That any idea of the 
 conquest of India ever entered his mind is, how- 
 ever, highly improbable, and all he wished to 
 obtain for Eussia was wealth, which he thought 
 ■ ^ could be more easily gained through the trade 
 with Asia which he hoped to organise. 
 
 Mention is frequently made of the apocr3q)lial 
 document called the ' will of Peter the Great,' and 
 many, assuming that document to be genuine, en- 
 deavour to prove that ever since Peter's death 
 Eussian Czars and diplomatists have steadily pur- 
 sued a course of policy strictly in keeping with the 
 principles set forth in the so-called will, and which 
 virtually amount to the conquest of the world. 
 But the very existence of such a will is disputed, 
 and its fictitious character, if not actually esta- 
 blished, is highly probable. The first mention of 
 this will is contained in a book published by M. 
 Lesur in 1812, entitled, ' Of the Progress of the Eus- 
 sian Power from its Commencement to the Bei>in- 
 ning of the Nineteenth Century.' ^ This famous 
 book was apparently written by order of Napo- 
 leon I., who at the time ordered the publication 
 in the French newspapers of a series of articles 
 
 ^ A translation of ilio will as it appears in M. Lcsnr'.s boolc is 
 given in Appendix I.
 
 -1800 The Will of Peter the Great 35 
 
 wherein he endeavoured to prove ' that Europe 
 found herself in train to become the prey of 
 Russia.' War between France and Eussia then 
 appeared inevitable, and Napoleon was anxious to 
 prove that Eussia was the enemy of Europe. The 
 will reappeared on several other occasions when it 
 seemed desirable to revive the idea that Eussia was 
 bent on obtaining the Empire of the World. But 
 although it is extremely doubtful if Peter left such 
 a will, yet he unquestionably had a very keen sense 
 of the advantages which Eussia could obtain b}^ 
 commercial dealings with the Central Asian states, 
 and through them with India ; and he undoubtedly 
 initiated a policy which had for its aim the mono- 
 poly of — or at all events a share in — the trade 
 with these countries. 7^ 
 
 For several years after Peter's death, in 1725, 
 Eussian affairs in Asia were not conducted with 
 any marked degree of success. There were several 
 reasons for this. The Eussians had become im- 
 bued with a desire for still further intercourse 
 with European nations, and neglected Oriental 
 concerns ; large numbers of foreigners from the 
 West had obtained service in Eussia, and were 
 indiscriminately employed in European and Asiatic 
 affairs, to the detriment of the latter ; and the fate 
 of Bekovitch had created so great an impression in 
 Eussia that ' to perish like Bekovitch ' became a 
 synonymous phrase for complete annihilation. It 
 was not long, therefore, before reverses were sus- 
 tained, which completely neutralised Peter's suc- 
 cesses in the Caucasus. When the wretched Shah 
 
 D 2
 
 36 'The Key and Gate' i689- 
 
 Tamasp heard of the disastrous peace which his 
 envoy had signed, he refused to ratify it ; and as 
 Turkey at the same time compelled Peter, under a 
 threat of war, to abandon his aggressive schemes 
 south of the Caucasus, the Czar finally came to an 
 arrangement with the Sultan, by which all the 
 Persian provinces which were not in the hands of 
 the Afghans should be divided between the two 
 states. But, after Peter's death, Persia, having 
 under Nadir Shah succeeded in expelling the 
 Afghans, set both Russia and Turkey at defiance, 
 and, after a protracted struggle, regained her lost 
 provinces, which, together with Derbent, were 
 restored to her by the Treaty of Eesht, which was 
 signed by the Empress Anne in 1732. 
 
 But this defeat was in some measure counter- 
 balanced by the submission of the Kirghiz-Kazaks 
 of the Middle and Lesser Hordes, who inhabited the 
 inhospitable Steppes to the east of the River Ural. 
 Peter the Great appears to have had some 
 dealings with these people, for in 1722, when in 
 Astrakhan, he said : ' Although these Kirghiz are 
 a roaming and fickle people, their Steppe is the 
 key and gate to all the countries of Central Asia.' 
 Five years after his death (i.e. in 1730) Abdul- 
 Khair, the Khan of the Lesser Horde, being 
 oppressed by the Dzungarians, and harassed by 
 the Bashkirs and Kalmuks, sought the protection 
 of Russia. This act of submission was at the time 
 repudiated by the Kirghiz ; but in 1734 both the 
 Middle and Lesser Hordes tendered their submission, 
 and Abdul- Kliair bound himself by an agreement
 
 '-isoo Submission of the Kirgiiiz-Kazaks 37 
 
 to protect EiLSsian caravans, and to secure the 
 Eussian borders from molestation. 
 
 This event was the cause of much rejoicing in 
 the Eussian capitaL Peter's words were called to 
 mind, and the Eussians thought that by this sub- 
 mission of the Kirghiz they had actually obtained 
 possession of ' the key and gate to all the countries 
 in Central Asia,' and that the wealth of India and 
 the East was within their grasp. They, however, 
 had yet to learn the truth of the axiom set forth 
 by Hyacinth Bitchurin, who said that 'Nomads 
 consider allegiance a bargain with their conscience, 
 in which they expect to win at least four to one ; 
 and for that reason, when a favourable case arises, 
 they rival each other in their readiness to declare 
 themselves subjects ; but if they be deceived in 
 their hope of winning four to one, they are shrewd 
 enough to repay themselves by pillage, rapine, and 
 murder.' As the Eussians found to their cost, 
 this submission of the Kirghiz was due to no anxiety 
 on the part of the nomads to come under the rule 
 of the White Czar, but was merely for the purpose 
 of obtaining protection from their numerous 
 enemies ; and by it Eussia no more obtained any 
 actual control over the country than she did over 
 Khiva when Peter the Great accepted the allegi- 
 ance of the Khivans in 1703.^ 
 
 • The traffic fate of Bekovitch, fourteen years after Peter 
 accepted the submission of Khan Shahmaz of Khiva, shows how 
 little meaning the Khivans attached to their offers of allegiance. 
 
 In 1731, also, Colonel Erdberg was sent to Khiva as an envoy 
 from the Empress Anne, but he was attacked on the road and 
 ompelled to return. 
 
 i^<^^ 2li< j»
 
 38 'The Key and Gate' leso-- 
 
 ^' For the better protection of their new subjects 
 — or, probably, for protection from them — the 
 Eussians considered it advisable to advance their 
 frontier line, and the fortified town of Orenburg 
 was built in 1735, while at the same time a fortified 
 line of Cossack settlements was established on the 
 banks of the Eiver Ural. These measures, how- 
 ever, failed to keep the Kirghiz in check, although 
 they had a salutary effect on the turbulent 
 Bashkirs, who were cut off from the Steppe, and 
 were thus forced to submit in some measure to 
 Eussian control, and to curb their turbulent pro- 
 pensities. 
 
 Shortly after this, the Kirghiz chief, Abdul- 
 Kliair, was elected Khan of Khiva, but his reign 
 did not last for lonQ-. The o'reat Nadir Shah of 
 Persia, then in the zenith of his victorious career, 
 was advancing to subdue the Khanate. In this 
 emergency Abdul-Khair declared the Khanate 
 to be subject to Eussia, hoping that by this 
 subterfuge he would arrest Nadir's march. A 
 Eussian officer, who was then at Khiva, was even 
 sent by the Khan to meet the Shah and ask for 
 mercy ; but his intercession was of no avail, for 
 Nadir continued his advance and captured the 
 Khanate, driving the Kirghiz Khan back into the 
 Steppes. 
 
 About this time several attempts were made to 
 establish a Eussian post or town at the mouth of 
 the Syr Daria (Jaxartes), and a llolilhi on the Sea 
 of Aral; hwi this could not then be accomplished, 
 OMancf to tlic iiusetlled state of the countrv ; and
 
 -1800 British Traders in Persia 39 
 
 Eussia was compelled to wait for more than a 
 century before this object was attained. 
 
 Though the Empress Anne by the Treaty of 
 Eesht lost the provinces which Peter the Great 
 had acquired from Persia, she nevertheless was 
 not blind to the advantao^es which Eussia miijht 
 obtain through commercial dealings with that 
 state. She therefore, in^ 1734, granted a con- 
 cession to British subjects to trade with Persia 
 through Eussia on payment of a duty of three per 
 centrad valorem. Five years later an employe of/ 
 the British-Muscovy Company, named John Elton, 
 left Astrakhan, and, proceeding to Persia, obtained 
 a decree whereby he was permitted to trade freely j 
 throughout the Persian dominions, between tliej 
 Caspian Sea and Eiver Indus. Elton then returned 
 to Eussia, and wrote a letter to the British Minister 
 at St. Petersl)urg, pointing out the great advan- 
 tages which British merchants would ol)tain by 
 means of the trade through Meshed to Bokhara ; 
 and in spite of the opposition of the East India 
 Company, an Act of Parliament was passed sanction- ^ 
 ing this trade. Permission was received to build 
 two ships for the purpose at Kazan, and an expedi-/ 
 lion set out from the Volira in 1742. Dissensions, 
 however, arose among the factors, and in the next 
 year Elton took service under the^reat Kadir Sliali 
 as naval constructor on the Caspian. H^surveyed \ 
 the^east coast of that sea from the Bay of Astrabad 
 to the ancient mouth of the Oxus, and set to work 
 to build a fleet on the Caspian for the Persian 
 monarch. Tlie Eussian Empress, who had no
 
 40 'The Key and Gate' i689- 
 
 desire to see a Persian fleet established in the 
 Caspian, was greatly incensed at Elton's proceed- 
 ings, while the English directors of the new 
 Company became alarmed at his neglect of their 
 interests. They ordered him to return, but he 
 found his position too advantageous, and therefore 
 ignored the message ; and as matters thus con- 
 tinued in a most unsatisfactory state, the Empress 
 Elizabeth Petrovna issued an ukase forbidding the 
 British to trade on the Caspian. Thus ended the 
 last attempt of the British to obtain a trade route 
 by the Caspian and Khorassan to India and Central 
 Asia. 
 
 During the latter half of the eighteenth century 
 Eussia made little progress in Central Asia, although 
 some slight intercourse was maintained with Khiva, 
 while Eussian officials were also sent from Siberia 
 to Bokhara and Tashkent, for the purpose of exa- 
 mining the countries in the basins of the Oxus 
 and Syr Daria. 
 
 In 1750 the Khivans sent an envoy to the 
 Empress Elizabeth with a request that more in- 
 timate relations might be entered into between the 
 two states ; but this friendly overture was com- 
 pletely neutralised by the pillage of a Eussian 
 caravan in the following year. 
 
 Again, in 1792, in the reign of AbdulghazillL, 
 the brother of the Inak ^ Ivaz became blind, and 
 
 ^ An Inak or Inekh was an hereditary governor of Khiva 
 elected from the Kirghiz or Karakalpak chiefs after the death of the 
 Kirghiz Khan Kaip. Kliiva at the end of the eighteenth century 
 was ruled by Khans and Inalis, the Khans being tlie nominal 
 sovereigns, while the actufil power was in the hands of the Inaks,
 
 -1800 * Doctor ' OR * Major ' 41 
 
 the Empress Catherine II. was asked to send an 
 oculist to cure the disease. Catherine at once 
 compUed with this request, and sent ' Doctor or 
 Major ' Blankenagel ^ to treat the sick man. On 
 arrival at Khiva, Blankenagel declared the eyes of 
 the patient to be incurable, and this so annoyed 
 the Inak that he called a council to decide how 
 the Eussian should be dealt with. It was decided 
 that Blankenagel should be allowed to start for 
 Eussia and be put to death on the way. The 
 doctor, however, heard of this plot, and managed 
 to escape to Eussia through the assistance of the 
 Turkomans. 
 
 The closing years of the reign of Catherine II. 
 were marked by some important events in connec- 
 fion^jnthrTTussia's dealings with her barbarian 
 neighbours, and were also remarkable for the 
 preparation of the first known scheme for a 
 Eussian invasion of India through the Klianates 
 of Central Asia.^ 
 
 This strange form of dual government came to an end on the death 
 of the Inak Ivaz in 1804, when his son drove out the Kirghiz Khan 
 and proclaimed himself sole ruler of the State. 
 
 ^ Blankenagel is thus referred to in the Notes on Russian 
 Intercourse with Khiva, written by G. Kiihlwein, the Secretary to 
 Colonel Ignatieffs mission to Central Asia, and given as Appendix 
 IV. of The Eussiayis in Central Asia by John and Eobert Michell. 
 It is curious that such a well-informed Russian writer as Ktihlwein 
 sliould throw doubts on Blaukenagel's real profession. If Blan- 
 kenagel was, as Ktihlwein almost hints, a military oflfioer and not 
 a doctor, his inability to cure ophthalmia and subsequent rough 
 treatment are easily accounted for. 
 
 ^ This scheme is thus referred to by Sir John M'Neill in his 
 pamphlet entitled The Progress and Present Position of Biissia in 
 the East : — 
 
 ' It was on this occasion ' (i.e. when England, by her league
 
 42 'The Key and Gate' igso- 
 
 Iii July 1774, by the Peace of Kairnadji, which 
 was concluded after one of the many wars between 
 Eussia and Turkey, Eussia finally obtained pos- 
 session of Azof and some places on the Euxine, 
 and the Crimea was declared to be independent of 
 the Porte. From this time the Crimean peninsula 
 was in a constant state of anarchy. The Sultan, 
 deprived of his temporal sovereignty, still claimed, 
 as the successor of the Khalifs, to be supreme in 
 religious matters ; while the people, abandoned to 
 themselves, were divided into two factions — the 
 Turkish and the Eussian. In 1775 the reigning 
 Khan, who was devoted to Eussian interests, was 
 deposed and replaced by a Turkish adherent, who 
 in turn was dethroned by Catherine, when another 
 Eussian puppet, named Schagin Gliirei, was placed 
 on the throne. 
 
 What followed is thus described by Sir John 
 M'Neill :— 
 
 ' But it was the possession, not the tranquillity, 
 
 with Prussia and Holland for the preservation of the Txirkish 
 Empire, forced the Empress Catherine to make peace with the 
 Porte) ' that the idea of disturbing the British Empire in India 
 was first suggested to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, as a check on 
 the aggressive power, which the maritime superiority of England 
 enabled her to exert against Russia. The Prince Nassau Siegen 
 presented to Catherine a project for marching an army through 
 Bokhara and Cashmere to Bengal to drive the English out of 
 India. The plan had been drawn up by a Frenchman, and the 
 first step was to be a manifesto declaring the intention of the 
 Empress to re-establish the Great Mogul on the throne of India. 
 This, it was supposed, would secure the concurrence of the inter- 
 mediate states, and attract to the standard of Russia all the 
 discontented spirits in Hindustan. The scheme, though derided by 
 Polemkin, was favouralily received by Catherine, and has never 
 been fori/otten in liussia.'
 
 -1800 Annexation of the Crimea 43 
 
 of the Krimea that Eussia desired ; and, fearing 
 the resistance of the people, she sought and found 
 a pretext for marching an army into the country 
 without opposition. A Turkish pasha had occu- 
 pied the island of Taman, on the opposite shore 
 of the Cinnnerian Bosphorus, and the Eussians 
 succeeded in persuading Schagin Geray to demand 
 its evacuation. The fierce Turk put the ambas- 
 sador to death, and Eussia called loudly for 
 vengeance. The Khan, irritated by this barbarous 
 insult, acceded to the proposal of his friends to 
 entrust to them the punishment of the Pasha, and 
 a Eussian army entered the Krimea for the pur- 
 pose of driving the Ottomans from the opposite 
 island ; but when it had penetrated to the coast 
 it suddenly fell back, occupied the whole penin- 
 sula, seized by stratagem or force all the strong- 
 holds, and, at the point of the bayonet, forced the 
 Imams and the people to take the oath of alle- 
 giance to the Empress, Specious promises of 
 advantage were held out to all, but the Tartars 
 nevertheless prepared to resist ; and Field-marshal 
 Potemkin, informed of their intentions, ordered 
 the principal persons concerned to be put to 
 death. The officer. Prince ProborofFski, to whom 
 his command was first addressed, indio-nantlv 
 refused to execute it ; but General Paul Potem- 
 kin, a relation of the Field-marshal, and General 
 Suvaroff, were obsequious instruments, and thirty 
 thousand Tartars, of either sex and every age, 
 were slaughtered in cold blood.' 
 
 Thus, in a time of profound peace, did the
 
 44 ' The Key and Gate ' leso- 
 
 Empress Catlierine gain possession of the Crimea, 
 and so completed the work of Ivan the Terrible 
 by finally subdning and annexing to Eussia the 
 last kinixdom which recalled the memories of the 
 Mongol yoke and the supremacy of the Golden 
 Horde. 
 
 The Sultan at first protested, and threatened 
 a rupture ; but he eventually signed the Treaty 
 of Constantinople in 1784, whereby he acknow- 
 ledged the cession of the Crimea, the island of 
 Taman, and a large portion of the Kuban. 
 
 Not content with these important acquisitions, 
 Catherine secretly prepared for nothing less than 
 the partition of the Turkish Empire. The Emperor 
 Joseph II. acceded to her views, and the year 
 1788 saw Turkey in imminent peril. But England, 
 who had during the previous Eusso-Turkish war 
 been fettered by the troubles in America, was 
 now free to resist Eussian desicfns on the Bos- 
 phorus, and fitted out a great naval armament 
 for the Baltic. Sweden declared war, and Prussia, 
 after some hesitation, concluded a treaty with 
 the Turks, marched an army into Poland, and, 
 by a convention with Austria, withdrew the 
 Emperor Joseph from his Eussian alliance. Europe 
 was in arms against the aggressions of the Mus- 
 covites ; Catlierine was forced to abandon her 
 designs against the Ottoman Empire ; and in 1792 
 a treaty of peace was concluded at Jassy, by which, 
 however, Eussia advanced to the Dniester, and 
 obtained the acknowledgment of Turkey to lier 
 sovereignty over Georgia.
 
 -1800 Russian Intrigues in Georgia 45 
 
 During the reign of the great Nadir Shah, and 
 for several years after his death, the Eussians had 
 abstained from any warhke ventures in Persia ; 
 but after the assassination of Nadir, in 1747, 
 troubles ensued which destroyed the integrity 
 of the empire which the Khorassan warrior had 
 built up, left Persia weak and divided, and 
 afforded an opportunity for the outlying provinces 
 to throw off the Persian yoke. Afghanistan and 
 Khorassan became independent, and in 1752 the 
 princes of Georgia (Tamaras and his son Heraclius), 
 being unable to protect themselves against the at- 
 tacks of the neighbouring mountain tribes, appealed 
 to Eussia for assistance. Eight years afterwards 
 Heraclius drove his father from the throne, and 
 the whole of Georgia thus again became united 
 under the rule of one prince, who was completely 
 under Muscovite influence, and who even assisted 
 the Eussians in their war with Turkey. In order 
 to protect himself from possible retribution in the 
 event of Persia becomini? re-united under a strono- 
 ruler, Heraclius, in July 1783, entered into an 
 offensive and defensive alliance with Eussia, and 
 signed a treaty whereby he renounced all connec- 
 tion with Persia, and declared himself to be the 
 vassal of the Empress Catherine 11. , who in turn 
 bound herself and her successors to protect him, \ 
 and to guarantee the possession of his dominions 
 and such territories as might be acquired by him 
 in future. 
 
 Nor was it only in Georgia that Eussian in- 
 trigue was at work. Persia was distracted by a
 
 46 • The Key and Gate ' icso- 
 
 civil war in wliicli several rival pretenders asserted 
 their claims to the throne. Russian agents seized 
 the opportunity ; a Eussian protege was supported 
 in his attempt to overthrow Aga Mahommed ; and, 
 taking advantage of Persia's helpless condition, the 
 Russians again made an attemjjt to obtain a per- 
 manent footing on the shores of the Gulf of 
 Astrabad, 
 
 In July 1781 Count Voinovitch sailed from 
 Astrakhan with four frigates and two armed 
 sloops, having on l)oard the necessary troops and 
 ammunition for a descent on the Persian coast. A 
 landing was made in the Gulf of Astrabad, and 
 the Russians commenced the construction of a 
 fortification about twenty -five miles to the west 
 of Gez, which was to be armed with eighteen 
 guns. 
 
 Aga Mahommed Shah, on hearing this, visited 
 the place, congratulated the Russian commander 
 on the result of his labours, dined on board one of 
 the frigates, and, on leaving, invited Voinovitch 
 and the other Russian officers in return to dine 
 with him at his residence in the neighbouring 
 mountains. When they, in response to this in- 
 vitation, reached the Shah's house on the next day, 
 they discovered that the wily Persian had been 
 merely feigning satisfaction for the purpose of 
 more surely getting the Russians into his power ; 
 for no sooner had they arrived than they were 
 })laced in irons, and Voinovitch was forced to sign 
 an order directing the commandant of the fort to 
 re-ship the guns and demolish the ol)j('Ctionable
 
 -1800 Struggle for the Caucasian Provinces 47 
 
 buildings. Then, loaded with abuse and exposed 
 to every kind of indignit}', tlie Eussians were 
 whipped down to their sliij^s, and thus the se- 
 cond Eussian attempt to establish themselves on 
 Persian territory near Astrabad ignominiously 
 failed. 
 
 For twelve years after the conclusion of the 
 treaty between Heraclius and the Empress 
 Catherine, the Georgian Prince remained un- 
 punished for his disloyalty to his suzerain, as Aga 
 Mahommed was fully occupied in opposing the 
 rival claimants to the throne of Persia. But in 
 1795 the Shah, having got rid of his rivals and 
 having received the submission of the soutJiern 
 provinces of Persia, was able to turn his attention 
 to his rebellious subject. He first summoned 
 Heraclius to return to his duty, and to attend 
 at the capital to take the oath of allegiance ; 
 but the Georgian Prince replied that he acknow- "f^ 
 ledged no suzerain but the Empress Catherine of 
 Eussia. Then Aga Mahommed collected a large 
 army of about 60,000 men ; Heraclius was soon 
 afterwards defeated in a pitched battle ; Tiflis, 
 the capital, was occupied by the Persian army ; 
 and Erivan opened its gates to the victorious 
 Shah.^ 
 
 By this campaign Aga Mahommed regained 
 
 ^ The fortress of Sheeshah still held out, but was captured bj- 
 Af;;a Mahommed in the spring of 1797. This was his last success, 
 for a few days afterwards he was assassinated by two of liis ser- 
 vants whom he had condemned to death, but who were allowed to 
 perform their duties while under sentence of death.
 
 48 'The Key and Gate' less- 
 
 coraplete possession of the Persian provinces in 
 the Caucasus, and he then turned his attention to 
 tlie subjugation of Khorassan, which district had 
 fallen away from Persia during the troubles which 
 followed Nadir Shah's death; but while so em- 
 ploj^ed the armies of the Empress Catherine were 
 advancing to re-assert Eussian prestige, which had 
 been so roughly shaken by the Shah's triumphant 
 campaign in Georgia. 
 
 When Catherine 11. received news of the attack 
 on her new vassal she at once took steps to recover 
 the territory which had been lost, and to punish 
 the Persian monarch for his temerity in having re- 
 asserted his sovereign rights over a feudatory who 
 had, for a long series of years, paid tribute to the 
 Shahs of Persia, but who, through Eussian intrigue, 
 had fallen away from his allegiance. In the spring 
 of 1796 a Eussian army, under Count Valerian 
 ZoubofF, advanced against Derbent. The outworks 
 were captured, and the town then surrendered ; 
 and soon afterwards Baku was also taken, while 
 the island of Sari, near Lenkoran, was occupied, 
 and an unsuccessful attempt was made to capture 
 Enzeli, the port of Eesht. In the month of October 
 the Eussians took possession of Shemakha, and 
 before the close of the winter two columns had 
 been pushed forward to the frontiers of Azerbijan. 
 But before any decisive results could be obtained, 
 news reached the army of the death of Catherine II., 
 and ZoubofT received orders from the Emperor Paul 
 to retire. The Eussian general accordingly with- 
 drew his forces, and aljandoned the territory which
 
 -1800 Persia reconquers Georgia 49 
 
 had been occupied, witli tlie exception of the 
 towns of Derbent and Baku, which were retained 
 by Eussi a. On the death of Herachus his son 
 Groorgeen, or George, tendered his submission to 
 Futteh AU Shah, and thus Georojia once afjain 
 returned to its allei;jiance to Persia. 
 
 VOL. T.
 
 so 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 1800—1828 
 
 COLLA.PSE OP PEOJECTED INVASIOxVS OF INDIA 
 
 Scheme for a French and Eussian invasion of India — The Emperor 
 Paul's manifesto — The Sovereignty of Georgia — Eussian advance 
 against Persia — French alliance with Persia — India threatened 
 by an Afghan invasion — Treaty of Tilsit — Eevival of project for 
 a Franco- Eussian invasion of India — Mission of Sir Harford 
 Jones to Persia — Eusso-Turkish War — Franco-Eussian War — 
 Persian reverses and Treaty of Gulistan — Submission of Turko- 
 man tribes to Eussia — The Gokcheh difficulty and renewal of 
 hostilities between Eussia and Persia — Treaty of Turkomanchai 
 — M. GriboiedofT's Mission. 
 
 The dawn of the present century found Great 
 Britain engaged in a desperate struggle against 
 the power of the First Consul of France. In the 
 previous year (1799), Pitt, finding that England 
 was freed from all dano-ers in Ireland, and seeins^ 
 that she had quite regained her naval su23reniacy 
 by the glorious victories of St. Vincent, Camper- 
 down, and the Nile, revived the coalition with 
 Eussia and Austria, lavished enormous subsidies 
 on England's two allies, and made strenuous elForts 
 to overthrow Napoleon. 
 
 But the disasters suffered by the Eussian troops 
 in Central Europe, and the failure of the Anglo- 
 Eussian expedition to Holland brought an angry 
 remonstrance from the Emperor Paul, which
 
 1800-1828 Emperor Paul and Napoleon 51 
 
 appeared in the ' St. Petersburg Gazette,' and he 
 sullenly abstamed from any further attack on the 
 French. 
 
 This was Bonaparte's opportunity. By dexter- 
 ous diplomacy he gradually persuaded Paul that 
 England was the common enemy of Europe. By 
 the Treaty of Luneville, France was secured from 
 attacks on the continent, and England stood alone 
 opposed to the increasing power of Napoleon. 
 The Eussian Czar saw in the streno-th of Great 
 Britain the chief obstacle to his designs on Turkey. 
 He claimed Malta, on the ground of his alleged 
 election as Grand Master of the Knio-hts of St. 
 John, and was greatly incensed when the English, 
 who had just captured the island, refused to re- 
 linquish it. He daily became more and more im- 
 bued with a passion for Bonaparte, surrounded 
 himself with his portraits, and drank his health 
 publicly. The First Consul carefully fostered these 
 sentiments. He offered to hand Malta over to 
 Eussia, and, to endorse his friendly feelings towards 
 the Czar, liberated without exchange all the Eus- 
 sian prisoners who had been taken in the war. 
 
 Thus the commencement of the year 1801 
 found the Emperor imbued with strong feelings of 
 friendship, amounthig to infatuation, for Napoleon, 
 and preparing to join with Sweden, Denmark, and 
 France in an attack against Great Britain, in the 
 hope of being able to wrest from her the command 
 of the sea. 
 
 It was at this time that a second great scheme 
 was prepared for a joint French and Eussian inva-
 
 52 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 sion of Hindustan for the purpose of driving the 
 English out of their settlements in that country. 
 The French troops still occupied Egypt, and Napo- 
 leon still cherished the idea of being able to force 
 the English to abandon India. The Eussians also 
 had obtained an advantageous base from which 
 operations against the East Indian settlements 
 might, it was thought, be successfully launched. 
 Since Paul had recalled his troops from the Cauca- 
 sus, Eussian agents had been busily employed in 
 intrigues for the purpose of preparing the way for 
 a final annexation of Georgia. Their efforts were 
 completely successful, for, on September 28, 1800, 
 Prince George XIII. of Georgia renounced his 
 crown in favour of the Emperor of Eussia, and 
 thus Paul, without striking a blow, gained posses- 
 sion of a considerable increase of territory, and 
 obtained a more advanced base for the great 
 Indian expedition he was about to undertake. 
 
 This Franco-Eussian invasion of India was to 
 have been carried out by means of two distinct 
 columns. One of these armies was to be composed 
 of 35,000 French and an equal number of Eussians. 
 The French were to descend the Danube, and then 
 to be transported across the Black Sea, in Eussian 
 ships, to Taganrog. From thence they were to go 
 up the Don as far as Piati-Isbaiiskaia, cross to the 
 Volga at Tzaritsin, descend that river to Astrakhan, 
 re-embark on the Caspian in Eussian vessels, and 
 on reaching Astrabad would there be joined by 
 the Eussian army of 35,000 men — 25,000 regular 
 troops of all arms, and 10,000 Cossacks. The
 
 -1828 Projected Franco-Russian Invasion 53 
 
 combined force, under the command of Massena, 
 was then to advance through Khorassan, Herat, 
 Farah, and Kandahar fo the Indus, ' chase the 
 Enghsh from India, Hberate that rich and beautiful 
 country from the Enghsh yoke, and open new roads 
 to England's commercial rivals, and especially to 
 France.' The project entered into the most minute 
 details, and on the margin were scribbled the 
 criticisms of Napoleon with the Czar's replies. 
 
 It was calculated by Paul that ' from the 
 Danube to the borders of India the advance will 
 occupy the French army four months, or, avoiding 
 forced marches, five months.' 
 
 The armies were to be preceded by commis- 
 saries who were to establish stations and halting- 
 places where necessary, and to visit the Khans and 
 great landowners to explain that the expedition 
 was for the purpose ' of driving away the Eng- 
 lish from the beautiful country which they have 
 subjected — a country formerly so remarkable for 
 its industry and wealth, and which it is now pro- 
 posed to open to all the world, that the inhabitants 
 may profit by the riches and other advantages 
 given to them by heaven.' The Eussian note then 
 proceeded to state : — 
 
 ' The sufferings under which the population of 
 this country groans have inspired France and 
 Eussia with the liveliest interest ; and the two 
 Governments have resolved to unite their forces in 
 order to liberate India from the tyrannical and 
 barbarous yoke of the English. Accordingly, the 
 princes and populations of all countries through
 
 54 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 wliicli the combined armies will pass need fear 
 nothing. On the contrary, it behoves them to 
 help with all their strength and means so bene- 
 volent and glorious an undertaking, the object of 
 this campaign being in all respects as just as was 
 unjust the campaign of Alexander the Great, who 
 wished to conquer the whole world. The commis- 
 saries are further to set forth that the combined 
 armies will not levy contributions, and will pay in 
 ready money, on terms freely agreed to, for all 
 things necessary to their sustenance ; that on this 
 point the strictest rules will be enforced. More- 
 over, that religion, laws, manners, and customs, 
 property and women, will everywhere be respected 
 and protected. With such announcements, with 
 such honest, straightforward statements, it is not 
 to be doubted that the Khans and other small 
 princes will allow the combined armies to pass 
 without hindrance through their territories. In 
 any case, they are too weak and too much divided 
 by dissensions among themselves to make any 
 opposition. The commissaries w^ill hold negotia- 
 tions with the Khans, princes, and private land- 
 owners about furnishing provisions, carts, and 
 kibitkas. They will subscribe conditions, and 
 according to circumstances will require, or them- 
 selves deposit, caution-mone3^' 
 
 Learned and scientific societies were to take 
 part in the ' glorious expedition.' Aeronauts and 
 pyrotechnists were also to accompany the troops, 
 and it was arranged by Paul, ' before the army 
 starts from Astrabad, to hold <zraiid fetes and
 
 -1828 The Astrabad Route to India 55 
 
 perform striking evolutions, in the style of those 
 with which great events and memorable epochs 
 are celebrated in Paris.' The French Government 
 was to send rare objects and produce of national 
 industries, which gifts, ' distributed with tact 
 among the princes of those countries, and offered 
 with the grace and courtesy natural to the French, 
 will enable those races to form the highest idea of 
 the magnificence of French industry and power, 
 and will in consequence open an important branch 
 of commerce.' 
 
 Napoleon appears to have doubted the success 
 of the proposed undertaking, and asked, ' Sup- 
 posing the combined army be united at Astrabad, 
 how do you propose that it should get to India, 
 through countries almost barbarous, and without 
 any resources ; having to march a distance of 300 
 leagues from Astrabad to the frontiers of Hindu- 
 stan ? ' Paul, in reply, said, ' The country is not 
 savage; it is not barren. It has long been tra- 
 versed by open and spacious roads ; the soil is 
 like that of Arabia and Libya — not covered witli 
 dry sand, rivers water it at almost every step. 
 There is no want of grass for fodder. Eice grows 
 in alnindance, and forms the principal food of the 
 inhabitants.' And, aftex referring to Nadir S^hah's 
 march through the same country from Dehli to 
 
 the Caspian, the Czar ended by saying: 'The 
 
 French and Russiaii armies are eager for glory ; 
 they are brave, patient, and unwearied ; their 
 courage, their perseverance, and the wisdom of 
 their leaders will know how to surmount all
 
 56 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 obstacles. . . . What a really Asiatic army did in 
 1739 and 1740, we cannot doubt that an army of 
 French and Kussians can do to-day.' 
 
 The other army of invasion was composed of 
 35,000 Eussian troops, and was to move by way 
 of Khiva and Bokhara to the upper Indus. That 
 the Eussian Emperor was fully determined to 
 carry out this great scheme is shown by the fact 
 that the advanced troops of this northern army 
 had actually proceeded for a considerable distance 
 before the whole scheme collapsed on receipt of 
 the news of Paul's death. 
 
 On January 24, 1801, he issued the following 
 orders to OrlofF-DenisofF, the Ataman of the Don 
 Cossacks : ' The English are preparing for an 
 attack by land and sea against me and my allies, 
 the Swedes and Danes ; I am ready to receive 
 them. But it is necessary to be beforehand with 
 them, and to attack them on their most vulnerable 
 point, and on the side where they least expect it. 
 It is three months' march from Orenburg to Hin- 
 dustan, and it takes another month to get from 
 the encampments of the Don to Orenburg, making 
 in all four months. To you and your arms I con- 
 fide this expedition. Assemble, therefore, your 
 men, and begin your march to Orenburg. Thence, 
 by whichever of the three routes you prefer, or by 
 all, you will go straight with your artillery to 
 Bokhara, Khiva, the Eiver Indus, and the English 
 settlements in India. The troops of the country 
 are light troops like yours ; you will therefore 
 have over them all the advantage of your artillery.
 
 -1828 Paul's Orders to Orloff-Denisoff 57 
 
 Prepare everything for this campaign ; send your 
 scouts to reconnoitre and repair the roads. All 
 the wealth of the Indies shall be your recompense. 
 . . . Such an enterprise will cover you with im- 
 mortal glory, will secure you my goodwill in 
 proportion to your services, will load you with 
 riches, give an opening to our commerce, and 
 strike the enemy a mortal blow. I send you 
 maps, as many as I have, and remain your well- 
 wisher, Paul. 
 
 ' P.S. — My maps only go as far as Khiva and 
 the Eiver Amu (Oxus). Beyond these points it is 
 your affair to gain information about the posses- 
 sions of the Enoflish and the condition of the 
 Indian population subject to their rule.' 
 
 On the same day the following additional in- 
 structions were sent : ' India, to which I send 
 you, is governed by a supreme head and a number 
 of small sovereigns. The English possess com- 
 mercial establishments there, which they have 
 acquired by means of money or conquered by 
 force of arms. The object of this campaign is to 
 ruin these establishments, to free the oppressed 
 sovereigns, to put them with regard to Eussia in 
 the same state of dependence in which they now 
 are with regard to the English, and finally to 
 secure for ourselves the commerce of those 
 regions.' 
 
 Again, on the next day Orloff is told : ' Be sure 
 to remember that you are only at war with the 
 English, and the friend of all who do not give 
 them help ; on your march you will assure men of
 
 58 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 the friendship of Russia. From the Iiidu8__you 
 will go to the Ganges ; on the way you will occupy 
 Bokhara, to prevent her going over to China. At 
 Khiva you will deliver some thousands of my 
 subjects who are kept prisoners there. If you 
 need infantry, I will send it to follow in your 
 footsteps. There is no other way, but it will be 
 best if you can be sufficient for yourselves.' And 
 then again, on February 19, comes the pressing- 
 note, ' The expedition is urgent ; the earlier the 
 better.' 
 
 Such were the instructions sent to Orloff- 
 Denisoff, who marched from Orenburg, in the 
 depth of winter, with 22,000 Cossacks and two 
 companies of horse -artillery. The Volga was 
 crossed on the ice, amid great difficulties, and the 
 force had proceeded upwards of 450 miles, when 
 the Ataman received news of the sudden death of 
 the Emperor Paul, which occurred on the night of 
 March 23. On the next day Alexander I. was 
 proclaimed Czar, and peremptory orders were 
 issued for the return of the expedition. Bona- 
 parte's friend and ally was dead ; ten days later 
 the Danish lieet was seized at Copenhagen, the 
 League of Armed'Weutrality collapsed, and with it 
 the fantastic scheme for the invasion of India fell 
 t^ the ground. 
 
 Although the Emperor Alexander I. put a stop 
 to the expedition against the English settlements in 
 India, he showed no desire to abstain from extend- 
 ing Eussian influence in the Caucasus at the ex- 
 pense of Persia. It has been mentioned that in
 
 -1828 Tii£ Sovereignty of Georgia 59 
 
 September 1800 the Prince of Georgia abdicated 
 in favour of the Czar — an act which drew down 
 upon him the hatred and curses of the nobles of 
 liis country. The Queen of Georgia, who was 
 ashamed of her husband's weakness, did her best 
 to stir up the people to resistance, and when an 
 attempt was made to seize her in order that she 
 might be deported to Moscow, stabbed the Eussiaii 
 officer who was sent to arrest her. George's 
 younger brother, Alexander, also did his best to 
 raise a general rebellion for the purpose of throw- 
 ing off the Eussian yoke, and sought the aid of the 
 Khan of Karabagh. 
 
 But the Czar Alexander had no intention of 
 renouncing his claims to sovereignty over Georgia 
 as the successor of George XIII., and on Sept- 
 ember 12, 1801, he issued a proclamation to the 
 people of the principality, in which he formally 
 announced his acceptation of the Georgian crown. 
 The following is an extract from this proclama- 
 tion : — 
 
 ' It is not for the sake of increasing our power, 
 from no interested motives, nor for the extension 
 of an empire already so vast, that we accept the 
 cares of the Georgian throne ; it is only the senti- 
 ment of our dignity, honour, and humanity that 
 has imposed on us the sacred duty, not to resist 
 your heart-rending cries, but to relieve you from the 
 evils which afflict you, and to introduce in Georgia 
 a strong Government, capable of administering 
 justice with equity, protecting life and property, 
 and extending" to all the ccs^is of the law.'
 
 6o Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 / General ZizianofF (a Georgian by extraction) 
 was sent as Governor-General of the province, and 
 this officer at once marched into Mingrelia and 
 occupied that province with Eussian troops. In 
 the following year the town of Genja was taken by 
 assault, when the garrison ^s^as slaughtered amid 
 scenes of the grossest barbarity and ferocity ; and 
 from thence ZizianofF advanced to Erivan, being 
 led on by a promise of the governor of the city 
 (Mahommed Khan Kajar) that he would yield it to 
 the Eussian general. These proceedings caused 
 the greatest alarm in the Court of Persia. The 
 defection of Mahommed Khan necessitated prompt 
 measures, unless the Shah wished to see Erivan also 
 in the power of the Eussian Czar ; and a Persian 
 army under the Crown Prince Abbass Mirza there- 
 fore took the field early in 1804, and advanced to 
 punish the traitorous governor and to prevent the 
 Eussian troops obtaining possession of the city. 
 
 After several engagements the city of Erivan 
 was occupied by the Shah's forces, and thus the 
 close of the year 1804 found the Persians once 
 again masters of the surrounding province. 
 
 In the following spring the campaign was re- 
 newed. ZizianofF gained possession of the province 
 of Shekee, and in July marched into Karabagh, 
 where the fortress of Sheeshah was traitorously 
 handed over to him by the governor ; but an 
 attempted descent on the coast of Ghilan at Enzeli 
 was repulsed, and the governors of Kuba, Derbent, 
 and Baku, and the chief of the Lesghians appealed 
 to the Shah for assistance to enable them to throw
 
 -1828 Russo-Persian War 6i 
 
 off the Eussian yoke. The Eussian general, there- 
 fore, marched to reduce Baku, while the Eussian 
 squadron from Enzeli steered for the same place. 
 
 While conducting the siege, ZizianofFwas foully 
 murdered. Threatened with an attack in rear by 
 the Persian forces who were advancing under the 
 Crown Prince from the direction of Ardabil, the 
 Eussian general entered into negotiations with the 
 governor of Baku for the surrender of the place. 
 He was invited by the Khan to a conference for 
 the purpose of arranging the terms of the capitu- 
 lation, and while conversing with the chief under 
 the walls of the fort, was suddenly assailed by a 
 gang of assassins who had been stationed there for 
 the purpose. It was a cruel and treacherous deed, 
 but one which, however rej)rehensible, can hardly 
 be wondered at, for ZizianofF had throughout his 
 career in the Caucasus rarely shown clemency to 
 those whom he conquered, and was perpetually 
 intriguing w^ith the Persian 'governors for the sur- 
 render of their charges. He thus was in constant 
 communication with traitors of the worst class — 
 men who did not hesitate to commit acts of the 
 blackest treason towards their sovereisfn and coun- 
 try — and it is not surprising that the men who were 
 thus capable of betraying the charges committed 
 to their trust should sooner or later turn ao-ainst 
 the instigator of their treachery, and be found 
 ready and willing to commit a cold-blooded murder 
 such as was perpetrated under the walls of Baku. 
 
 The death of ZizianofF was a severe blow to 
 the Eussians. The news was received in Persia
 
 62 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 witli every sign of satisfaction. The Shah was 
 exultant, and issued a proclamation announcing 
 that a glorious victory had been won, in which 
 the renowned Eussian commander had been slain. 
 It was indeed a disaster for the Eussiaiis, but re- 
 flected little credit on the Persians. Baku was for 
 the time saved from Eussian occupation ; but the 
 Shah and his ministers fully expected that steps 
 would be taken by their adversaries to avenge the 
 deed, and to prosecute the war with redoubled 
 energy. 
 
 But while the campaign in Persia had been 
 dragging on without any decided success having 
 been gained by either of the belligerents, events 
 were taking place in Europe which compelled 
 Eussia to turn her attention towards the west, and 
 the war in Georgia became a matter of very minor 
 importance to the Czar Alexander I. 
 
 After the death of the Emperor Paul, and the 
 collapse of the League of Armed Neutrality, the 
 war between Great Britain and France continued. 
 On March 21, 1801, General Abercrombie defeated 
 the French army at Alexandria, and, in the follow- 
 ing June, French rule in Egypt was terminated by 
 the capitulation of General Hoclie. 
 
 Both parties now desired peace, and in March 
 1802 the war was brought to a close by the Peace 
 of Amiens. But Napoleon was resolved to become 
 master of Europe, and it was not long before the 
 pledges given at Amiens were set aside. Piedmont 
 and Parma were annexed to France, and a French 
 army occupied Switzerland. Enghsli protests were
 
 -1828 A French Ambassador in Persia 63 
 
 ignored, and war became inevitable. In May 
 1803 the British Government declared war against 
 France, and Bonaparte, in the determination to 
 humble his most persistent adversary, formed a 
 gigantic camp at Boulogne and made preparations 
 for the invasion of England. Pitt was recalled to 
 power in this national emergency ; by the offer of 
 large subsidies he gained the alliance of Eussia, 
 Austria, and Sweden ; and thus the terrible struggle 
 on the continent was resumed. The danger which 
 threatened Napoleon from the East compelled him 
 to abandon his dream of crossing the Channel, and 
 all fear of an invasion of England was finally dis- 
 pelled by the glorious victory off Cape Trafalgar 
 on October 21, 1805. 
 
 But two days before this great naval battle the 
 Austrian army had capitulated under Mack at 
 Ulm, and, rapidly following up this success, Bona- 
 parte had inflicted a crushing defeat on the com- 
 bined armies of Austria and Eussia on the field of 
 Austerlitz. It then appeared as if nothing could 
 save Europe from the ambitious designs of the 
 French Emperor ; and it was then that Napoleon 
 resolved to lose no opportunity of injuring his 
 opponents, sent Colonel Eomieu as an ambassador 
 to the Court of Persia, with promises that if the 
 Shah would repudiate his connection with the 
 English, and enter into an alliance with the 
 French nation, the Persian troops would be sub- 
 sidised, and a French army would be sent to 
 assist in driving the Eussians out of Gcoro-ia. 
 Such an alliance would have been to the advan-
 
 64 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 tage of both nations, for thereby France could 
 have struck a blow at Eussia in a direction far 
 removed from the European theatre of war on 
 which the Czar's whole attention was directed, 
 while the Persians would be freed from the op- 
 pression and increasing aggression of their great 
 northern neighbour. But still the Shah hesitated ; 
 for had he not already concluded a treaty with 
 the British authorities, and did it not appear most 
 probable that in accordance with that treaty the 
 English would help him in his hour of need ? 
 ^ Seven years before the Government of India 
 ,4iad been in a state of the wildest alarm and 
 excitement owing to the invasion of the Punjaub 
 by the Afghans under Zemaun Shah. At that 
 time the people of India had not yet forgotten the 
 great invasion by Afghan hordes under the illus- 
 trious Ahmed Shah which culminated in the com- 
 plete overthrow of the Mahratta Confederacy on 
 the plains of Panipat in January 1761. 
 
 It was believed that such another invasion 
 was imminent ; and when it became known that 
 several Indian princes had sent invitations to the 
 Afghan ruler, and had promised to aid him in the 
 effort to free Hindustan from the British yoke, 
 Lord Wellesley determined to des})atcli a mission 
 to Persia, to secure the friendship of the Shah, and 
 thus to obtain an ally who could, by a diversion 
 against Herat, prevent Zemaun Shah from molest- 
 in(T the territory of the East India Company. 
 The presence of the French in Egypt, and French 
 intrijrues in India, rendered such a course still
 
 -1828 Malcolm's First Mlssiox to Persl\ 65 
 
 more imperative ; and in 1800 Captain Malcolm 
 left India as envoy to the Court of Persia. But, 
 even before Malcolm readied the Persian capital, 
 the Shah for his own purposes, and without any 
 inducement from the Indian Government, had 
 carried out the very movement which was to 
 ensure the security of the English in India. 
 Khorassan had been invaded by Persian armies, 
 and Zemaun Shah had been obliged to abandon 
 his ambitious designs on India to save the western 
 province of his kingdom.^ 
 
 ' Two years before Malcolm went to Persia a Persian nobleman 
 naturalised in India, named Mahdi Ali Khan, had been sent to 
 Teheran by the Governor of Bombaj', with instnictions ' to take 
 measm-es for indncing the Court of Persia to keep Shah Zemaim in 
 perpetual check (so as to preclude him from retiu-ning to India), but 
 without any decided act of hostility.' This envoy found, on his 
 arrival, that the Shah was disposed to assist the two refugee Afghan 
 Princes, Mahmoud and Firoz-ud-din, without the additional induce- 
 ment of an English subsidy, which he had been authorised to offer. 
 He therefore took upon himself a considerable amount of responsi- 
 bility, and by suppressing his credentials, and by leaving well alone, 
 had the satisfaction of seeing the Afghan princes marching towards 
 Herat, supported by Persian troops. This expedition failed, and 
 shortly afterwards Zemaun Shah sent an imperious message to the 
 Shah of Persia, demanding the cession of Khorassan. Futteh Ali 
 Shah replied that it was his intention to restore to Persia the terri- 
 tories which it had possessed in the time of the Sefavean kings ; 
 and following up the threat by action, he in 1799 took the field in 
 person, and marched into Khorassan. By this movement Zemaun 
 Hliah, threatened with the loss of his western provinces, was forced 
 to withdraw from Lahore. This expedition, however, lasted but a 
 short time, and when Futteh Ali Shah returned to his capital in the 
 autumn of 1799, the Afghan ruler once more turned his attention 
 towards the East. In the following spring, however, the Shah of 
 Persia again marched into Khorassan, and Zemaun Shah was agam 
 obliged to move westwards to watch Herat. Thus, when Malcolm 
 reached Teheran, he found that Persian ambition had done all that 
 was reijuircd to save India from the danger of an Afghan invasion. 
 
 VOL. L F
 
 66 Projected Invasions of India i8oo- 
 
 In the following year Malcolm concluded two 
 treaties with the Shah — one political and the 
 other commercial. The Shah engaged to over- 
 run Afghanistan with a great army, in the event 
 of any attempt being made b}" the Afghans to 
 invade India, and to conclude no peace with 
 that state unless it was accompanied by a solemn 
 promise to abstain from attacking the English. 
 A remarkable clause was also inserted wliereby 
 it was provided that, ' should an army of the 
 French nation, actuated by design or deceit, 
 attempt to settle, with a view of establishing 
 themselves on any of the islands or shores of 
 Persia, a conjoint force shall be appointed by the 
 two high contracting parties, to act in co-opera- 
 tion, for their expulsion and extirpation, and to 
 destroy and put an end to the foundation of their 
 treason ; and if any of the great men of the 
 French nation express a wish or desire to obtain 
 a place of residence, or dwelling, in any of 
 the islands or shores of the kingdom of Persia, 
 that they may raise the standard of abode, or 
 settlement, leave for their residing in such a place 
 shall not be granted.' The Shah believed this 
 treaty to constitute a complete offensive and de- 
 fensive alliance l)etween Great Britain and Persia, 
 and, therefore, when the French envoy appeared 
 in Teheran, he was coldly received. Persia already 
 possessed a powerful ally, who, she loelieved, wonld 
 defend her interests, and who liad taught her to 
 consider the French a dangerous and deceitful 
 people ; and Colonel Pomieii llierefore found, in
 
 -1828 Malcolm's Treaty 67 
 
 spite of his large suite, handsome presents, and 
 still more tempting promises, that Futteh Ali 
 Shah still looked to the English for aid. 
 
 But the British Government viewed Malcolm's 
 treaty in a different light. It is true an offensive 
 and defensive alliance had been concluded against 
 France, but the Shah wanted assistance against the 
 Eussians who were not referred to in the compact, 
 and who were then allies of the British Govern- 
 ment. Thus, when Futteh Ali in his distress sent 
 Mirza Nubbi Khan as an envoy to ask for assist- 
 ance from the Governor-General of India, help 
 was denied to him ; and then, when the Shah 
 throug:h English inaction was forced to realise 
 that he could expect no support from Great 
 Britain, he threw himself into the arms of the 
 ver)^ people whom he had been taught by England 
 to shun. In the summer of 1806 Mirza Eeeza 
 was despatched post haste with instructions to 
 proceed to the camp of the French Emperor, and 
 there to enter into negotiations for tlie purpose of 
 obtaining French aid against the Russians, who 
 were referred to as being ' equally an enemy of 
 the kings of Persia and France, and whose destruc- 
 tion accordingly became the duty of the two 
 kings.' The Persian envoy was also instructed to 
 inform the Emperor that ' if the French have an 
 intention of invading Khorassan, the king will 
 appoint an army to go down by the road of Kabul 
 and Kandahar.' 
 
 What fairer terms could Napoleon desire? 
 Persia was thus spontaneously offering to him
 
 68 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 an alliance whereby an opportune diversion could 
 be made against the Eussians, while at the same 
 time assistance would be provided in furthering 
 his ambitious designs on India. A treaty was 
 drawn up and ratified by Napoleon at Fenken- 
 stein in May 1807, and Monsieur Jaubert was at 
 once sent to Teheran to announce to the Shah the 
 terms of the agreement, and to confirm the friendly 
 relations which had been entered upon. This 
 envoy was soon afterwards followed by a more 
 brilliant embassy under General Gardanne, The 
 Persian troops were drilled by French officers, 
 French counsels were predominant in the Shah's 
 council chamber, and the hopes of the Per- 
 sian Government were centered in the French 
 alliance. 
 
 But while Futteh Ali Shah was congratulatiug 
 himself on thus having gained a new and powerful 
 ally, by whose aid he could beat back the tide of 
 Eussian invasion, a great change was occurring in 
 the relations between the European courts which 
 were most interested in Persian affairs. The 
 bloody and indecisive battle of Eylau had been 
 followed by the great French victory at Friedland, 
 which broke down the resistance of Eussia and 
 forced the Czar Alexander to seek peace. On 
 July 7 the two sovereigns met on the famous raft 
 at Tilsit, and there arranged the terms of a peace 
 which put an end to the war between France and 
 Eussia. 
 
 At the conference then held, the two Emperors 
 fully discussed the Eastern question. Bonaparte
 
 -1828 Malcolm again vlsits Persia 69 
 
 revived the project for an invasion of India by a 
 Franco-Eussian army ; Sebastiani urged the Porte 
 to grant permission for the passage of French 
 troops through Constantinoj^le and Asia Minor ; 
 and Lucien Bonaparte, the most capable of Napo- 
 leon's brothers, was destined for the Teheran 
 mission, to continue the negotiations which Gar- 
 danne had so successfully inaugurated, to organise 
 the Persian forces and to persuade the Persian 
 Government to take an active part in the projected 
 invasion. 
 
 When these facts became known the British 
 and Indian Governments were filled with consterna- 
 tion, and became possessed with a sense of un- 
 reasoning and exaggerated alarm. Simultaneously 
 they both decided to take steps to avert the new 
 danger which threatened India ; and each, un- 
 known to the other, determined to send an embassy 
 to the Court of Teheran. Brigadier-General Mal- 
 colm, the envoy from India, sailed from Bombay 
 in April 1808, a few days before the British am- 
 l)assador. Sir Harford Jones, reached that port. 
 The latter, in accordance with the instructions he 
 had received, remained at Bombay awaiting the 
 result of Malcolm's proceedings, while the Indian 
 diplomatist, continuing his journey, reached Bu- 
 shire on May 10. 
 
 But at that time French influence in Teheran 
 was supreme ; Gardanne, though debarred by the 
 Treaty of Tilsit from opposing Russiau advances 
 in Georgia by force of arms, nevertheless was 
 using his influence to prevent further encroach-
 
 70 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 ments ; and thus, when Malcolm for the second 
 time set foot on Persian territory, he found that 
 he was coldly and even discourteously received. 
 The mission was a complete failure, and in July 
 the ambassador from the Governor-General of 
 India was forced to re-embark without having 
 even received an audience. 
 
 As soon as Lord Minto heard that Malcolm 
 had withdrawn from Persia, he requested Sir 
 Harford Jones to proceed there with the utmost 
 despatch, and on October 14 the ambassador from 
 the Court of St. James reached Bushire. At first 
 he encountered the same irritating opposition and 
 insolence that had caused Malcolm to quit Persian 
 territory ; but he steadfastly continued his onward 
 progress, and succeeded in reaching Teheran, where 
 he was w^ell received. Gardanne withdrew on his 
 approach, the British ambassador having stipulated 
 that he would only advance to the capital on the 
 condition that the French envoy received his pass- 
 ports. A remarkable change had indeed taken 
 place in the sentiments of the Persian ruler and 
 his advisers. The French had completely over- 
 reached themselves, and were now discredited. 
 When the Shah first heard of the Peace of Tilsit, 
 and realised that lie could expect no armed re- 
 sistance from the French against Eussian aggres- 
 sion, his faith in his new allies was sorely shaken. 
 Nevertheless, Gardanne still promised much, and 
 Futteh Ali Shah still believed that through French 
 mediation he would recover Georgia and Kara- 
 bagh. But after tlie lapse of many months spent
 
 -1828 Sir Harford Jones's Treaty 71 
 
 in anxiety and fruitless negotiations, it was seen 
 that the inexorable Muscovites retained their 
 position in spite of French promises, and even 
 threatened further encroachments ; and then all 
 faith in the French alliance vanished. Sir Har- 
 ford Jones reached Bushire when this reaction was 
 setting in, and he skilfully took advantage of it. 
 Gardanne had, in the early days of his mission, 
 impressed on the Persian ministers that the true 
 friend of Persia was the nation which was Eussia's 
 enemy. At that time France was at war against 
 England and Eussia, and the argument was all in 
 favour of the French. But the Treaty of Tilsit 
 altered the conditions. England now was the 
 enemy of France and Eussia,^ and Gardanne's 
 doctrine therefore afforded a good reason for 
 an alliance with Great Britain. The British en- 
 voy with consummate skill took up the French 
 line of argument, and, by utilising Gardanne's 
 own precepts, drove him off the field. On March 
 12 a preliminary treaty was signed wherein it 
 was stipulated that ' in case any European force 
 had invaded or should invade the territories of the 
 King of Persia, his Britannic Majesty should afford 
 to the Shah a force, or in lieu of it a subsidy, 
 with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, 
 &c., to the amount that might be to the advantage 
 of both parties, for the expulsion of the force so 
 invading ' ; while the Shah on his part agreed 
 that ' every treaty or agreement which the 
 
 ' For in the prcvioiTs November (1807) the Emperor Alexander I. 
 had declared war against Great Britain.
 
 72 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 King of Persia miglit have made with any one 
 of the Powers of Europe became null and void, 
 and that he woukl not permit any European 
 force wliatever to pass through Persia either 
 towards India or towards the ports of that 
 country.' ""<. 
 
 Sir Harford Jones's conduct has by many writers 
 been severely criticised, but he unquestionably 
 was very successful in his negotiations, and by his 
 skilful diplomacy restored British credit in Persia, 
 and put an end to foreign intrigue. He appears 
 to have been one of the first English diplomatists 
 who recoE^nised that the OTeatest external damper 
 which threatened British India was to be found, 
 not in French intrigues at Teheran, nor in the 
 possibility of an invasion by the wild hordes of 
 Afghanistan, but in the steady but insidious en- 
 croachments of Piussia beyond her European 
 frontiers. English statesmen at that time only 
 perceived one danger, which sprang from the in- 
 ordinate ambition of the French Emperor, and 
 which threatened to overwhelm the whole of 
 Europe. What cared England for Persia and its 
 troubles, while the very existence of the British 
 nation was at stake ? With their scanty knowledge 
 of the history and geography of Asiatic states, 
 how could they realise that the subtle movements 
 of liussia were infinitely more dangerous to India 
 than the stratagems of tlie French? So long as 
 the French occupied Egypt, and while their fleet 
 in the Mediterranean remained undefeated, the 
 safety of the British settlements in the East was
 
 -1828 Malcolm's Third Mission to Persia yi 
 
 undoubtedly seriously endangered ; but at no time 
 did the danger lie through Persia ; and when the 
 French had been driven out of Egypt and the 
 English fleet had regained undisputed supremacy 
 in the Mediterranean, then all dangers to India 
 from the French disappeared. 
 
 To Sir Harford Jones must be given the credit 
 of having first recognised that another great Euro- 
 pean power was stealthily advancing towards Hin- 
 dustan ; advancing, it is true, at that time slowly 
 and with uncertain steps, but nevertheless gradu- 
 ally moving forward, at one time by force of arms, 
 and again by means of intrigues and cunning ; 
 rarely receding from a position once taken up, 
 and ready to seize every opportunity for further 
 territorial acquisitions. 
 
 The preliminary treaty was conveyed to Eng- 
 land by Mr. Morris and Hadji Mirza Abul Hassan 
 Ivlian, was then duly ratified, and Sir Harford 
 Jones was confirmed in his appointment as Minister 
 at the Persian Court. 
 
 In 1810 the Indian Government again de- 
 spatched General Malcolm to Persia, and with him 
 were sent several officers who were employed in 
 drilling the Persian troops and in exploring the 
 countr3^ 
 
 Meanwhile the war between Eussia and Persia 
 had been continued, the Persians being organised 
 and led by British officers. Baku, Shirwan, Shekee, 
 Genja, Talish, and Mugan were occupied by the 
 Russians, and an unsuccessful advance was made 
 against Erivan.
 
 74 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 But Eussia was still occupied in the war witli 
 Turkey, and was eagerly watching the movements 
 in Western Europe. Alexander I. had, it is true, 
 made peace with Napoleon, but he nevertheless 
 watched with growing anxiety the gradual exten- 
 sion of the French Empire. In 1810 Hanover, 
 Westphalia, and Holland had been annexed by 
 France, and in the following year Hamburg shared 
 the same fate. It was necessary for the Eussians 
 to be prepared to face any sudden change in the 
 political situation, and their troops could not be 
 spared to strike a crushing blow in Persia. In 
 1812 matters reached a crisis. The suspension of 
 all trade with England proved irksome to Eussia, 
 and even threatened the Eussian landowners with 
 ruin. Napoleon insisted that England should be 
 completely isolated, and became irritated when the 
 Czar refused to entirely suspend all commercial 
 relations with Great Britain. Both nations now 
 began to prepare for the struggle which appeared 
 imminent ; a great movement of the French troops 
 began, wdiereby the armies of the First Empire 
 were drawn from the West and concentrated on 
 the frontiers of Eussia, while Eussian columns 
 were hurried westward. On May 28 the Czar 
 made peace with Turkey, and concluded the 
 Treaty of Bucharest, whereby the Porte regained 
 possession of Wallachia and Anapa, Eussia merely 
 gaining Bessarabia as the fruits of a long and 
 arduous campaign. 
 
 But the safety of the Eussian Empire depended 
 on the results of the war which was about to
 
 -1828 Close of the Russo-Persian War 75 
 
 commence, and it was necessary that the entire 
 mihtary resources of the state should be utiHsed 
 to beat back the tide of French invasion. On 
 June 22 Napoleon declared war, and two days 
 later crossed the Eiver Memen, In September the 
 hosts of France and Eussia met on the bloody field 
 of Borodino, where, though terribly shaken, the 
 French troops once again forced their brave 
 enemies to fall back ; and the ancient capital of 
 Eussia was shortly afterwards occupied by 
 jSTajDoleon. 
 
 The outbreak of hostilities between France and 
 Eussia naturally brought about a reconciliation 
 between the latter power and England. Under 
 these circumstances British officers could no longer 
 1)e permitted to lead the Eersian armies, and Sir 
 Gore Ouseley, who relieved Sir Harford Jones in 
 the summer of 1811, therefore ordered them to 
 take no further part in the military operations 
 against Eussia ; though at the earnest entreaty 
 of the Crown Frince and his ministers, Captain 
 C*hristie ^ and Lieutenant Lindsay with thirteen 
 sergeants were permitted to remain with the 
 Eersian army. 
 
 But the war now was drawins; to a close. The 
 Eersian army had marched to the Araxes, and re- 
 mained for ten days at Aslandooz without taking 
 the most ordinary precautions to guard against 
 surprise. On the morning of October 31a Eussian 
 force consisting of 2,300 men and six guns suddenly 
 
 * The gallant Christie lost his life during the surprise of the 
 Persian camp at Aslandooz, at daybreak on November 1, 1812.
 
 ^6 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 attacked the camp and caused the Persians to fall 
 back to a position about half a mile distant. There 
 the Crown Prince's army was again surprised on 
 the following morning and completely destroyed 
 by a Eussian force of comparatively insignificant 
 strength ; all his guns were lost ; and his camp, 
 with everything it contained, fell into the hands of 
 the victors. 
 
 This disaster was followed by the loss of 
 Lenkoran, which was captured by the Eussian 
 General KotlarefTsky in the following January ; and 
 although the Persians were able to check the 
 Eussian advance on the Araxes, and even made 
 preparations for assuming the defensive, a rising 
 among the Turkomans caused the Shah to lend an 
 ear to the counsels of Sir Gore Ouseley, who had 
 been strenuously endeavouring to re-establish 
 friendly relations between the two powers. The 
 British Ambassador's efforts had, up to that time, 
 proved unsuccessful, as the Eussians would make 
 no concessions, while the Persian Government re- 
 fused to accept any settlement which was based on 
 the actual state of possession of territory. But 
 new dangers having arisen, the Shah was per- 
 suaded to accept the Eussian conditions, which, 
 though hard, were the best that could be obtained 
 through the good offices of Sir Gore Ouseley. 
 
 On October 12, 1813, a treaty of peace was 
 signed at the Eussian camp near Gulistan, whereby 
 the Shah acknowledged ' the sovereignty of the 
 Emperor of Eussia over the provinces of Karabagh 
 and Georgia, now called Elizabeth I'aul, the dis-
 
 -1828 The Treaty of Gulistan 'jy 
 
 tricts of Shekee, Shirwan, Kuba, Derbent, Bakoo- 
 beh ' (Baku), ' and such part of Talish as is now 
 possessed by Eussia, the whole of Daghestan, the 
 tract of Shoorgil, Achook, Bash, Gooreea, Min- 
 greUa, Abtichar, the whole country between the 
 boundary at present estabhshed' (by article 2) 
 ' and the line of the Caucasus, and all the territory 
 between the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea.' It 
 was also agreed that the ' Eussian flag shall fly in 
 the Eussian ships of war, which are permitted to 
 sail on the Caspian as formerly ; no other nation 
 vjJiatever shall be allowed ships of war on the 
 Casimm ' ; and thus, by the Treaty of Gulistan, 
 Eussia wained possessionof a large slice of some of 
 thFmost fertile districts of Persia, and converted 
 tlfe Caspian into a Eussian lake. 
 
 The conclusion of this treaty necessitated cer- 
 tain modifications in the understanding between 
 Great Britain and Persia. On March 14, 1812, 
 Sir Gore Ouseley had signed a treaty based upon 
 Sir Harford Jones's preliminary one ; but before it 
 was finally ratified still further changes in its con- 
 ditions were made by the British Government. 
 After Sir Gore Ouseley's departure from Teheran, 
 Mr. Morier, his Secretary, was left in charge of 
 the Mission, and in 1814 Mr. Henry Ellis was sent 
 out from England for the purpose of obtaining the 
 Shah's assent to the alterations which were required 
 by England. On November 25, 1814, the treaty, 
 modified to meet the wishes of the British Govern- 
 ment, was concluded at Teheran by Messrs. Morier 
 and Ellis. It was very similar to the one which
 
 78 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 had been signed by Sir Gore Ouseley, and its most 
 noticeable features were : 
 
 (1) The suppression of a clause whereby 
 England had engaged to supply naval officers, 
 sailors, and artificers, if the Shah should at any 
 time desire to establish a naval force on the 
 Caspian.^ 
 
 (2) The Persian Government bound itself not 
 to permit an European army to enter Persia for 
 the purpose of invading India, and even agreed 
 that ' should any European Powers wish to invade 
 India by the road of Kharezm ' (Khiva), ' Tartari- 
 stan' (Kashgar), 'Bokhara, Samarkand, or other 
 routes, his Persian Majesty engages to induce the 
 kings and governors of those countries to oppose 
 such invasion, as much as is in his power, either 
 by fear of his arms or by conciliatory measures.' 
 
 (3) If the Afghans were at war with the 
 British, the Persian Government undertook to 
 send an army against them ; but if war should 
 be declared between the Afghans and Persians, 
 the English Government agreed not to interfere 
 with either party, unless their mediation to effect 
 a peace were solicited by both parties, 
 
 (4) In the event of Persia being invaded by an 
 European nation, the British Government engaged 
 either to supply a force to assist in repelling the 
 invasion, or, in lieu thereof, to pay an annual 
 
 ' The Treaty of Gulistan had rendered such an ap:recnient 
 between England and Persia devoid of meaning, as by that treaty 
 the Shah had abrogated his right to maintain vessels of war on the 
 Caspian.
 
 -1828 Anglo-Persian Alliance 79 
 
 subsidy of 200,000 tomans on the understanding 
 that such subsidy would be withheld, if the war 
 with the European nation was brought about by 
 any act of Persian aggression. 
 
 Thus the close of the year 1814 found Persia, 
 though deprived of some of her fairest provinces, 
 at peace with Eussia and in close alliance with 
 Great Britain : an alliance carefully described in 
 the treaty as being of a strictly defensive cha- 
 racter, but, nevertheless, one which bound England 
 to protect her from any further Eussian attacks so 
 long as Persia was not the aggressor. But the 
 Government of the AVhite Czar has never wanted 
 astute politicians who were able to gain their ends 
 by means of statecraft and intrigue without risking 
 open hostilities with powerful nations ; and it will 
 be seen how Persia was invaded by an European 
 Power, and was obliged to undertake a disastrous 
 campaign without the support of England, because 
 Eussia, through unwarranted acts of encroach- 
 ment, forced the Persians to strike the first blow. 
 
 During the long peace which followed the 
 final overthrow of Napoleon Bonaparte, Eussia dis- 
 pla3^ed increased activity in Asia, and was able to 
 carry out a policy of aggression and conquest, 
 which is remarkable for the undeviating perseve- 
 rance with which it has been pursued, for the 
 skilful manner in which each new advance has 
 been planned and carried out, and for the vast 
 additions of territory which have thus been incor- 
 porated into the Eussian Empire. 
 
 The Treaty of Paris had not long been signed
 
 8o Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 wlien orders were issued for the despatch of Eussian 
 officers to the eastern shores of the Caspian, for 
 the purpose of selecting a suitable site for a fort, 
 to enter into negotiations with the Turkomans, and 
 if possible to penetrate to Khiva itself. 
 
 Some years previously, certain of the Turko- 
 man tribes are said to have made overtures to the 
 Eussian authorities, asking for protection ; and in 
 1803 the Abdal tribe were granted a document 
 which declared that they were the vassals of the 
 White Czar. It is also said that, in 1811, two 
 deputations repaired to Astrakhan, asking for 
 similar protection, and that these overtures were 
 repeated two years later. From the subsequent 
 attitude of the Turkomans it is highly probable 
 that if such deputations actually did reach Astra- 
 khan, they cannot have represented any consider- 
 able section of the people, and that they merely 
 claimed Eussian protection to escape attacks from 
 Persia and Khiva. Nevertheless, the opportunity 
 thus presented was a favourable one for renewed 
 explorations in the direction of Khiva ; and Captain 
 Mouravieff accordingly set out with Major Pono- 
 mareff in 1819, carefully reconnoitred the south- 
 eastern shores of the Caspian, selected two suit- 
 able sites on which forts could advantageously 
 be erected, and entered into friendly negotiations 
 with the Yomud tribe of Turkomans, who are said 
 to have again applied for Eussian protection. 
 Mouravieff then, escorted by a few Yomuds, crossed 
 the desert and succeeded in reaching Khiva, where, 
 however, he was thrown into prison ; and though
 
 -1828 Disorders in the Kirghiz Steppes 8i 
 
 subsequently released, was forced to hastily quit 
 the Khanate. 
 
 Attempts were also made to introduce order 
 into the Kirghiz Steppes. The greatest disorder 
 and unrest prevailed throughout that region, and 
 it became absolutely necessary that some steps 
 should be taken to induce the wild nomads to 
 abstain from their reckless acts of outlawry and 
 violence. Since their submission, the Kirghiz had 
 been nominally under the rule of Khans who were 
 the descendants of Abul-Khair, the Russians having, 
 in 1734, agreed to recognise the sovereignty of 
 Abul-Khair's descendants, in return for their sub- 
 mission and the protection of Eussian boundaries 
 and trading caravans. But, although this system 
 of government lasted for nearly a hundred years, 
 it was a most pernicious one ; for the people 
 ignored the titular Khans thus placed over them, 
 and became more violent and unruly under the 
 nominal rule of Eussia than they had been pre- 
 viously. In 1824, therefore, the Khanate was 
 abolished, and the Steppe was divided into three 
 rayons, each of which was to be governed by a 
 Sultan-Eegent, nominated by the Eussian authori- 
 ties. This change, however, did little good, for 
 raiding and disorder still continued ; and, as will 
 be seen, gave Eussia a pretext for sending a large 
 expeditionary force, not against her Kirghiz vassals, 
 but against the ruler of one of the Central Asian 
 Khanates, who was made a scapegoat for the offence 
 of the Czar's own subjects, thus demonstrating the 
 truth of Peter's saying : ' Although the Kirghiz are 
 
 VOL. I. Q
 
 82 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 a roaming and fickle people, their Steppe is the 
 key and gate to all the countries in Central 
 Asia.' 
 
 Although by the Treaty of Gulistan Eussia 
 had gained very material concessions from Persia, 
 it was not long before fresh difficulties arose, which 
 were due to certain portions of the new frontier 
 having been inaccurately defined. For several 
 years after the ratification of the treaty no steps 
 were taken to remove this obvious source of 
 danger, and when eventually commissioners were 
 appointed to settle the disj^uted points, no agree- 
 ment could be arrived at. 
 
 The district of Gokcheh, which unquestionably 
 belonged to Persia, was the chief cause of the 
 quarrel, while further disputes arose over the 
 possession of Guni, Balakloo and Kapan. Since 
 the conclusion of the previous war, Eussia had 
 gradually strengthened her position in her Cauca- 
 sian provinces, and she was able, if necessar}^ to 
 force the Shah to accept her reading of the treaty. 
 All attempts to arrive at an understanding were 
 therefore met by a persistent refusal on the part of 
 the Eussian agents to reduce any of their demands, 
 while the Persian Government, feeling that they 
 had right on their side, stoutly contested the 
 Eussian claims. 
 
 Twice a satisfactoiy settle ivient appeared to 
 have been arrived at, but on both occasions the 
 negotiations fell through at the last moment ; and 
 finally, in 1825, when a third effort proved unsuc- 
 cessful, a Eussian force occupied the district of
 
 -1828 The Gokcheii Difficulty 83 
 
 Gokclieh. This step, which was an unwarranted 
 act of aggression, and one which clearly showed 
 that Eussia M'as determined to provoke war, 
 occurred at a time when the Shah's subjects were 
 in a highly excitable state. The Persians had not 
 yet forgotten the previous war by which they had 
 lost so man}^ rich provinces, and their anger against 
 the Eussians was greatly increased by the accounts 
 that reached them of the manner in which their 
 co-religionists in the ceded districts were treated 
 by their new masters. The popular excitement 
 was fostered by the priests, who preached a religious 
 war from the pulpits of the mosques, and thus, 
 when the Eussian forces occupied Gokcheh, the 
 Shah found it almost impossible to avoid hosti- 
 lities. 
 
 One hope, however, still remained. In 1826 
 the Persian Court received news of the death of 
 the Czar Alexander and accession of his brother 
 Nicholas, and it was also known that Prince Menchi- 
 kofF was on his way to Teheran as ambassador 
 from the Eussian Emperor. Futteh Ali still be- 
 lieved that peace could be maintained, and nego- 
 tiations were re-opened as soon as the Prince 
 reached the Shah's summer camp. But MenchikofT ^^ 
 had been sent to Teheran for a very different ^ 
 
 purpose. His mission was to endeavour to divert 
 the attention of the Shah and his people from the 
 north-west towards the east, and, by encouraoingf an 
 attack on Herat, to simultaneously destroy the 
 Anglo-Persian alliance, to enable Eussia to quietly 
 gain possession of the disputed provinces, and still 
 
 6 2
 
 84 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 further to advance her interests in the direction of 
 India. 
 
 The fanatical frenzy of the people, however, 
 had become far too great for any such schemes to 
 succeed. The populace, excited by the appeals of 
 the mullahs, demanded the evacuation of Gokcheh ; 
 the Shah, threatened with the forfeiture of the joys 
 of Paradise, pledged himself to vindicate the claims 
 of his subjects; and nothing else would satisfy the 
 nation. 
 
 When, therefore, Menchikoff declined to con- 
 sent to the withdrawal of the Eussian troops, the 
 negotiations were broken off, and hostilities com- 
 menced. 
 
 From all parts of the kingdom thousands of 
 armed men flocked to the standard of the Crown 
 Prince, and the entire Persian nation united in the 
 effort to avenge the long course of insult and in- 
 dignities to which they had been subjected. 
 
 The Eussian authorities on the frontier were 
 completely taken by surprise at the suddenness 
 of the Persian attack. Although by their action 
 they had been steadily provoking war, they did 
 not believe the Persians to be capable of any 
 prompt and united action. When, therefore, the 
 people, carried away by religious fervour, invaded 
 the Eussian frontier provinces, they carried every- 
 thing before them, and forced the Eussians to 
 evacuate nearly all the territory which had been 
 acquired by the Treaty of Gulistan. 
 
 But, as was inevitable, the tide of Persian 
 successes soon slackened, and then followed a
 
 -1828 England deserts her Ally 85 
 
 series of disasters which speedily swept the Shah's 
 armies out of Eussian territory, and forced Futteh 
 Ah to conclude another humiliating treaty of 
 peace. 
 
 As soon as the war commenced, the Persian 
 Government applied to Great Britain for the assist- 
 ance which had been promised in the last treaty 
 which had been signed by Mr. Ellis. The Shah 
 fully expected that such assistance would be forth- 
 coming, either in troops or money ; for, although 
 the Persians had fired the first shot, and struck 
 the first blow, such action had been forced on 
 them through the unprovoked invasion of their 
 territory by the Russians. JSTevertheless, England, 
 as represented by her ministers, did not intend to 
 enter into a war with a great European Power to 
 save Persia, and therefore preferred to adopt an 
 interpretation of the treaty which would enable 
 her to escape from the engagements which had 
 been contracted ; and thus when a reply was sent 
 to the Persian Court, it was to the effect that ' the 
 occupation by Eussian troops of a portion of un- 
 inhabited ground, which by right belonged to 
 Persia, even if admitted to have been the proxi- 
 mate cause of hostilities, did not constitute the 
 case of aggression contemplated in the Treaty of 
 Teheran.' 
 
 It is needless now to criticise this action on 
 the part of the British Government,^ but there is 
 
 ' For an impartial discussion of this question, see pages 40 and 
 41 of England and Russia in the East, by the late Sir Henry 
 Rawlinson.
 
 86 Projected Invasions of India isoo- 
 
 no doubt that before the next ten years had 
 elapsed, they had good cause to question the pru- 
 dence of so having deserted their ally. 
 
 Left thus to her own resources, it was inevit- 
 able that the war should end in the discomfiture 
 of Persia, and a further advance on the part of 
 Eussia. 
 
 The conflict, which continued until the spring 
 of 1828, was an unvaried Eussian triumph ; and 
 at last, when the Persian disasters had culminated 
 in the loss of Erivan and Tabriz, the Crown Prince 
 Abbass Mirza once again appealed to the British 
 Ambassador, through whose good offices peace 
 was restored by the signature of the Treaty of 
 Turkomanchai on February 21, 1828. By this 
 treaty the Shah lost possession of the provinces 
 of Erivan and Nakhtchivan, and agreed to pay a 
 war indemnity of ten crores of tomans, or thirty 
 millions of silver roubles. 
 
 After this treaty had been concluded, it became 
 again necessary to modify the terms of the under- 
 standing between England and Persia. The Shah's 
 appeal for assistance had placed the British 
 Government in an awkward position, and they 
 then realised the dangers contained in the subsidy 
 articles of the Treaty of Teheran. Taking advan- 
 tage, therefore, of the Shah's necessities, the British 
 Ambassador offered to pay 250,000 tomans towards 
 the liquidation of the w^ar indemnity, if the subsidy 
 engagements w'ere cancelled ; and subsequently, 
 after a bond to this effect had been passed, the 
 necessary erasures were oblaiued by payment of
 
 -1828 GRIBOIEDOFF'S MISSION TO TEHERAN 8/ 
 
 four-fifths of the amount ; a transaction which has 
 been sufficiently condemned by the able author of 
 ' England and Eussia in the East.' ^ 
 
 The reconciliation of Eussia and Persia had 
 scarcely been effected when an event occurred 
 which would undoubtedly have led to a renewal 
 of hostilities had the Emperor not then been en- 
 gaged in a war against Turkey. In October 1828, 
 M. Griboiedoff*, the poet diplomatist, arrived at 
 Tabriz as envoy extraordinary and minister pleni- 
 potentiary from the Czar to the Court of Persia. 
 Continuing his progress, the Eussian Ambassador 
 proceeded to Teheran, and was there received with 
 every mark of respect and consideration. But 
 the Persians had not yet recovered from their 
 fanatical outburst against the Muscovites ; and 
 irritated by the blustering conduct of the Ambas- 
 sador's Cossack escort, they became still more 
 incensed when M. Griboiedoff* haughtily refused 
 to grant redress for the wrongs committed bv 
 his toUowers. Error followed error, and instead 
 of conciliating the people, the Ambassador imperi- 
 ously put forward demands which tended still 
 further to widen the breach. A eunuch of the 
 royal seraglio was granted protection in the 
 Eussian Embassy on the plea of his being a native 
 of the district of Erivan, now a Eussian province, 
 and finally a demand was made for the surrender 
 of two Armenian women, who had been drafted 
 from the ceded provinces to the harem of the 
 Asef-Ed-Dowleh. After some hesitation the 
 
 ' See pages 41 to 43 oi England and Russia in the East.
 
 88 Projected Invasions of India 1800-1828 
 
 women were given up and conveyed to the Em- 
 bassy. The infuriated Persians could stand no 
 more ; the people rose, and after obtaining the 
 sanction of their priests, Hocked to the Eussian 
 Embassy to deliver the women from the hands of 
 the infidels. The offer then made to restore the 
 ladies to their master came too late ; the Embassy 
 was sacked, and the ill-advised Ambassador with 
 all his staff and escort slain. The Shah was filled 
 with dismay, and an envoy was sent in haste to 
 St. Petersburg to offer reparation. The Czar, 
 however, had no desire to resume hostilities 
 against Persia ; for Eussia was then engaged in a 
 war against the Ottoman Empire, and it was 
 necessary that Persia should take no part in the 
 contest. When therefore Khosroo Mirza, the 
 Persian Envoy, obtained an audience of the Czar, 
 and, presenting the handle of his sword to the 
 Emperor, declared himself willing to give his life 
 for that of the Eussian Ambassador, he was in- 
 formed that it would be sufficient if the plundered 
 property were restored, and the persons concerned 
 in the tumult were punished.
 
 89 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 1829—1840. 
 
 ATTACKS ON HERAT AND KHIVA 
 
 Growth of Kussian influence in Persia — Eusso-Turkish war, and 
 Treaty of Adrianople — Eussia incites Persia to attack Herat — - 
 Eussian intrigTie in Afghanistan — Mission of Biirnes to Kabid — 
 Persia's withdrawal from Herat — Lord Auckland's expedition to 
 Afghanistan, the Simla Manifesto, and the restoration of Shuja- 
 al-Mulk — Eussian expedition for conquering Khiva — Eussia and 
 the Kirghiz — Failure of Eussian advance upon Khiva. 
 
 The Treaty of Turkoraanchai marks a turning point 
 in Persia's relations with Great Britain and Eussia. 
 On the one hand the Shah had on more than one 
 occasion feU the weight of Russia's power, and was 
 aware that his great northern neighbour was in a 
 position to inflict still greater humiliation on Persia 
 whenever coercion might be considered desirable ; 
 while, on the other hand, he, rightly or wrongly, 
 considered that he had been deserted by England, 
 and his bitter resentment was not appeased by the 
 method adopted in obtaining the cancelment of 
 the subsidy engagements. Moreover, the Persians 
 be^an to believe that England was unable or un- 
 willing to defend them from their enemies, and 
 this impression vspeedily gained ground when the 
 English Government, with remarkable capricious- 
 ness, abandoned their previous forward policy, and
 
 90 Attacks on Herat Ax\d Khiva 1829- 
 
 entered upon a course of studied indifference to 
 Persian concerns. Thus Russia, tiiumphant after 
 her successful campaigns, became emboldened, 
 and took up a position of commanding and almost 
 offensive superiority ; while England, hastily arriv- 
 ing at the conclusion that Persia v/as useless as a 
 barrier against Eussian advance towards India, 
 took but little interest in Persian affairs, and per- 
 mitted Muscovite influence to gain complete as- 
 cendency at the Court of Teheran. 
 
 But some years elapsed before the full effect of 
 these changed conditions became apparent. Russia 
 had gained much by her recent wars with Persia, 
 and her interests could best be served, not by open 
 hostihties, but by taking advantage of her newly 
 acquired ascendency in exerting moral pressure on 
 the feeble ministers of the Shah, thus causing them 
 to become the tools whereby her aggressive schemes 
 could be carried out. The war with Turkey also, 
 for a short time, caused Persian affidrs to assume 
 but a secondary place in Russia's Eastern policy. 
 Six years before the Treaty of Turkomanchai had 
 been siojned, the Greeks had revolted a^^ainst the 
 Porte, and declared their independence. A Vjitter 
 struggle ensued, and after it had lasted for some 
 years, the despatch of an Egyptian expedition to 
 the Morea, with orders to devastate the country 
 and carry off the people into slavery, forced 
 England, France and Russia to interfere. On Octo- 
 ber 20, 1827, the combined squadron of the allies, 
 under Codrington, destroyed the Turko-Egyptian 
 fleet at Navarino, and the Greeks were saved from
 
 -1840 RUSSO-TURKISH WaR 9I 
 
 their oppressors. But Eussia remained unsatisfied. 
 Canning, who had skilfully arranged the joint 
 action of the Powers against the Porte to keep 
 Eussia in check, died without seeing the Greek 
 question settled, and his successors were unable to 
 prevent Eussia from using the troubles of the 
 Greeks as a pretext for attacking the Porte. 
 
 As soon as peace was restored between Eussia 
 and Persia, the Czar, joining his personal grievances 
 to the claims of Europe, declared war against 
 Turkey. Paskievitch, the first Count of Erivan, 
 wheeled his army and entered Asia Minor, while 
 Witgenstein crossed the Pruth. The Eussian 
 troops crossed the Danube under the eyes of their 
 Czar, and captured Brailof and Varna ; while in 
 Asia the Turks were defeated in a bloody battle 
 near Akhaltsykh, and that town and the fortress 
 of Kars fell into the hands of the renowned Paskie- 
 vitch. England and Austria became alarmed, but 
 Eussia had the encouragement of France, and so 
 the war continued. Diebitch, the successor of 
 Field-Marshal Witgenstein, defeated the Grand 
 Vizier near Pravady, and forced him back on 
 Schumla ; Silistria capitulated, the Balkans were 
 crossed, and Adrianople occupied by a Eussian 
 army ; while in Asia, Paskievitch, continuing his 
 victorious career, twice defeated the Turkish ar- 
 mies in the field and captured Erzeroum, At last 
 Turkey, defeated in Europe and Asia, and with- 
 out allies, was forced to j'ield, trusting to the 
 good offices of England and France to obtain for 
 her the best terms possible after her humiliating
 
 92 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 overthrow. On September 14, 1829, a treaty of 
 peace was signed at Adrianople, whereby Eussia, 
 in addition to a large war indemnity and cer- 
 tain concessions in Europe, gained in Asia the 
 districts of Anapa, Poti, Akhaltsykh, and Akhal- 
 kalaki, thus rounding off her possessions south of 
 the Caucasus. 
 
 After the conckision of this war with Turkey, 
 the Russians once more turned their attention to 
 Persia, and began to urge the Shah's Government 
 to undertake agijressive movements towards the 
 East. The disorders which prevailed in Afghan- 
 istan at this period gave the Eussian Ambassador 
 an excellent opportunity for exciting the ambition 
 of the Persian monarch ; and after the Crown 
 Prince Abbass Mirza had concluded a successful 
 campaign in Khorassan,^ it was decided that an 
 attack should be made on the city of Herat, which 
 was then under the independent rule of the Suddozai 
 Prince Kamran. 
 
 For a brief space, however, the project remained 
 in abeyance. Abbass was summoned to Teheran, 
 his son Mahommed Mirza being appointed governor 
 of Khorassan in his stead, and Persian reinforce- 
 ments were marching eastwards to take a part in 
 the war which was to be conducted by the young 
 
 ' During this campaign, Abbass Mirza destroyed the Ralor 
 Turkoman fort of Old Sarakhs, which stood on the right bank of the 
 Hcri-Rud, within a few miles of the Persian town of the same name 
 on the opposite side of the river. The place was razed to the ground 
 by the Persians, the garrison was massacred, and 5,000 slaves were 
 captured, but were afterwards ransomed by the Khan of Khiva for 
 60,000 tomans.
 
 -1840 Success of Russian Intrigue 93 
 
 grandson of the Shall, when Mr. M'Neill, in 
 defence of British interests, threw the whole of 
 his energies into the task of averting the projected 
 invasion. His efforts were in a measure successful, 
 for the attack was delayed. But, though post- 
 poned, the idea had not been abandoned. The 
 Czar's agents, by their intrigues, which had been 
 too long unopposed, succeeded in thoroughly rous- 
 ing the ambition of the Persians, and in the autumn 
 of 1833 Prince Mahommed Mirza crossed the 
 eastern frontier of Persia, and advanced upon 
 Ghurian, a strongly fortified place, about forty 
 miles west of Herat. The inhabitants of that 
 place, however, obstinately refused to surrender, 
 so the Prince left it in his rear, and marched 
 forward to the attack of the capital of Prince 
 Kamran. Here also he encountered a stubborn 
 resistance. The Vizier of the Suddozai prince was 
 a man named Yar Mahommed, who had no desire 
 to see Herat turned into a Persian province, as he 
 W'Ould thereby lose much of his power and dignity. 
 The Heratis, under the guidance of this chief, 
 prepared for a vigorous defence, and there was 
 every prospect of a long struggle, when Mahommed 
 received the news of his father's death. Abbass 
 Mirza, anxious to take command of the Persian 
 army, had, contrar}^ to the advice of his physicians, 
 returned to Meshed ; but after his arrival there, 
 the disease from which he suffered rapidly grew 
 worse, and he died in the Holy City of Khorassan. 
 This event caused his son to abandon the siege of 
 Herat, and return to Persian territor}^ ; and thus
 
 94 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 the aggressive designs of Persia and the deeply 
 laid plots of Eussia were for a time defeated. 
 
 On the death of Abbass, the Shah nominated 
 Mahommed Mirza as his heir, and appointed him 
 to the governorship of Azerbijan — the province 
 which had for many years been ruled by his father. 
 But the young prince, who was at this time twenty- 
 eight years of age, did not long remain at Tabriz, 
 for his aged grandfather, the Shah, died on 
 October 23, 1834, and the British and Eussian 
 representatives each hastened to be the first to 
 cono-ratulate the new sovereicjn on his accession to 
 the throne. Eival claimants, however, soon ap- 
 peared in the field, and while the Eussian Ambas- 
 sador was offering armed resistance, the English 
 Minister took prompt action to overthrow the 
 pretenders. Sir Lindsay Bethune — who had for- 
 merly served in Persia as an artillery subaltern — 
 had once again been sent out from England for the 
 purpose of drilling the Persian troops, and a large 
 number of officers and sergeants were at the same 
 time sent from India with the same object, while 
 arms and ammunition were also transmitted for 
 the use of the Shah's army. The presence of these 
 officers enabled the British Ambassador to adopt 
 very effective measures to ensure the succession of 
 Mahommed Mirza, and thus rendered it unnecessary 
 for Eussia to supply the military force which had 
 been offered for the purpose. Colonel Bethune had 
 under his command a force far superior, both in 
 arms and organisation, to any which the pretenders 
 could bring against him, and by his prompt march
 
 -1840 Aggressive Designs of the Shah 95 
 
 from Tabriz to Teheran, and from thence to Shiraz, 
 he speedily silenced all opposition and secured the 
 throne to Mahommed. 
 
 It was a service which should have secured the 
 gratitude of the new Persian ' Kino- of Kinos • ' 
 but, unfortunately, Mahommed had for man}' years 
 lived under the shadow of Eussian influence, and 
 merely looked upon the action of Sir Lindsay 
 Bethune as an effort made by the English to prevent 
 his being placed on the throne by the aid of the 
 Eussians. The abandonment of the siege of Herat, 
 which had been caused by his father's death at 
 a time when his ambition had been thoroughly 
 aroused, had continually rankled in his mind ; he 
 had sworn a solemn oath to return to the attack 
 on the first opportunity, and he brooded sullenlv 
 over his disappointment. Thus after Mahommed 
 Shah was crowned King of Persia, on January 31, 
 1835, his first thoughts were turned towards Herat, 
 and his first utterances in public durbar were fall 
 of references to the great campaign which he was 
 about to undertake, to humble the pride of the 
 Afghans and the Usbegs, and by means of which 
 Persia was once more to regain possession of the 
 territories which had been subject to the princes of 
 the Sefavean dynasty. 
 
 The year 1835, however, passed without any 
 advance being made, and the best part of the next 
 year was also spent in unsuccessful operations 
 against the Turkoman settlements on the Gurgen 
 Eiver ; but in the autumn of 1837, as Shah Kam- 
 ran steadfastly resisted the Persian pretensions to
 
 g6 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 sovereignty over his State, Mahommed once more 
 set out towards the east, fully determined to break 
 down the independence of Herat. 
 
 Mr. M'Neill, who by this time had returned to 
 Persia as British Ambassador, found that British 
 credit had sunk to the very lowest ebb, and that 
 there was then no chance of preserving the peace. 
 Nothing short of the armed intervention of Great 
 Britain would suffice to turn Mahommed Sliah from 
 his purpose ; and how could England possibly in- 
 terfere without violating her treaty engagements ? 
 For had she not, in the ninth article of the Treaty 
 of Teheran, agreed that, ' if war shall be declared 
 between the Afghans and Persians, the English 
 Government shall not interfere with either party, 
 unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be 
 solicited by both parties.' Persia, in pursuit of her 
 ambitious schemes, did not desire British mediation, 
 and when such counsel was voluntarily tendered, 
 it was rejected. And thus the English, who had 
 formerly urged the Persians to invade Afghanistan 
 for the purpose of shielding India from an Afghan 
 invasion, now had the mortification of seeing a 
 Persian army repeating the invasion, not in defence 
 of British interests, but in furtherance of the ag- 
 gressive designs of a Power whose advances in Asia 
 were — and still are — made for the })urpose of 
 threatening the very stability of British rule in 
 Hindustan. 
 
 Early in November 1837, the Persian troops 
 crossed the Herat frontier ; by the middle of that 
 month the strontr fortress of Ghurian had sur-
 
 -1840 SiE(iE OF Herat 97 
 
 rendered, and a week later the advanced guard of 
 the invading army took up a position before the 
 capital of Shah Kamran. It is not the intention 
 here to enter into a description of the long siege 
 which followed, as every Englishman who takes an 
 interest in the gallant doings of his countrymen 
 has, or should have, read of the stubborn defence 
 made by the Afghans, encouraged thereto by the 
 unfailing constancy and unflinching courage of the 
 young artillery subaltern, Eldred Pottinger. Nor 
 is it necessary to describe at length how the Per- 
 sians durino' their ten months' investment of the 
 fortress were aided by a Eussian regiment of so- 
 called deserters : how their operations were directed 
 by Eussian officers ; and how the crowning assault 
 of June 24, 1838, which, it was confidently believed, 
 would result in the capture of the place, was 
 planned by Count Simonitch, the Eussian Ambas- 
 sador himself, who, ' while Mr. M'Neill was ap- 
 pealing to the prudence and the reason of the Shah, 
 was exciting the ambition and inflaming the pas- 
 sions of that sovereign.' 
 
 Mr. M'Neill, leaving Teheran on March 10, 
 1838, reached the Shah's camp on the 6th of the 
 following month, and from that moment did every- 
 thing that was possible to induce the Shah to raise 
 the siege. But the Eussian Ambassador arrived a 
 fortnight later, and systematically set to work to 
 thwart all the efforts of the British Envoy to bring 
 about a settlement of the differences between the 
 contending parties. ' Whilst the one was preach- 
 ing moderation and peace, the other was inciting 
 
 VOL. I. 11
 
 98 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 to war and conquest ; and whilst the one pointed 
 out the difficulties and expense of the enterprise, 
 the other inspired hopes of money and assistance.' 
 
 Such was the state of affairs in Persia during 
 the summer of 1838. The British Mission had 
 fallen into contempt, and the British Ambassador 
 was treated with marked discourtesy, while the 
 Czar's agents were triumphantly witnessing the 
 successful results of their long course of intrigue. 
 
 The Eussian Government, however, did not 
 confine their attention only to Persia ; it was in- 
 tended that Eussian influence should be extended 
 far beyond Herat, and right up to the borders of 
 the British settlements in Hindustan. Persia, it 
 is true, was to be the principal agent for the 
 furtherance of Eussia's designs, and the chief 
 interest in Eussia's doings at that time centred in 
 the siege of Herat, because in that event the result 
 of Eussian machinations was most clearly dis- 
 cernible. But the siege of Herat was only the 
 first move in the great game which was to end in 
 the establishment of Eussian influence on the 
 threshold of India. The next move was an 
 attempt to gain the alliance of the Barakzai rulers 
 at Kabul and Kandahar. This was necessary for 
 the complete success of the Eussian project ; and for 
 this purpose a Eussian captain named Vitkievitch 
 was sent on a mission to Afghanistan. When it 
 became evident that Mahommed Shah had defi- 
 nitely determined to attack Herat, Vitkievitch was 
 despatched from Orenburg to Teheran; there, in 
 September 1887, he received from Count Simonitch
 
 -1840 VITKIEVITCH'S MISSION TO KABUL 99 
 
 his final instructions, and set out for Kabul as 
 envoy from the Emperor Nicholas to the Amir 
 Dost Mahommed, bearing with him letters from 
 the Eussian Ambassador and from the Czar 
 himself. 
 
 The following is a translation of the Emperor's 
 letter : — 
 
 ' In a happy moment the messenger of your 
 Highness, Mirza Hosan, reached my Court with 
 your friendly letter. I was very much delighted to 
 receive it, and highly gratified by its perusal. The 
 contents of the letter prove that you are my well- 
 wisher and have friendly opinions towards me. It 
 ilattered me very much, and I was satisfied of your 
 friendship to my everlasting Government, In con- 
 sequence of this, and preserving the terms of 
 friendship which are now commenced between you 
 and myself in my heart, I will feel always happy 
 to assist the people of Kabul who may come to 
 trade into my kingdom. On the arrival of your 
 messenger, I have ordered him to make prepara- 
 tions f(n' his long journey back to you, and also 
 appointed a man of dignity to accompany him on 
 the part of my Government. If it please God, and 
 he reaches safe, he will present to you the rarities 
 of my country which I have sent through him. 
 By the grace of God, may your days be prolonged. 
 Sent from St. Petersbourg the Capital of Eussia, 
 on April 27, 1837, a.d. and in the twelfth year of 
 my reign.' 
 
 Vitkievitch first visited Kandaliar and suc- 
 ceeded in winning over the Barakzai brothers to
 
 loo Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 the Eusso-Persian alliance/ and having thus satis- 
 factorily carried out the first part of his mission, 
 he proceeded to Kabul, and arrived there on 
 December 19, 1837. But Captain (afterwards Sir 
 Alexander) Burnes v^^as then in the Afghan capital, 
 and Dost Mahommed fully realised that a complete 
 understanding with his near neighbours the British 
 would be far more advantageous to him than an 
 alliance with the Eussians, and he cherished the 
 hope that the English, in order to secure his 
 friendship, would induce — or compel — the Sikhs 
 to restore Peshawar to the Afghans. The Amir 
 considered the Sikhs to be his greatest enemies, 
 and his policy at that time was to secure an 
 alliance with any State which would help him to 
 overthrow Eunjeet Singh, and recover the pro- 
 vinces which had been lost to Afghanistan. 
 
 Burnes arrived at Kabul on September 20, 
 1837, in charge of a so-called ' commercial mis- 
 sion ' which had been sent by Lord Auckland ' to 
 work out the policy of opening the Elver Indus to 
 commerce,' and to establish commercial relations 
 with the Afghans. But he had not been many 
 days in the Afghan capital before the real object 
 of his mission bec'ame apparent. His duty was to 
 
 ^ a treaty was prepared and sent to Persia for the Shah's sig- 
 nature, and when signed, it was returned to Kandahar through the 
 Russian Ambassador, who, in forwarding it to the Sirdars, wrote : — 
 ' Mahommed Shah has promised to give you the possession of 
 Herat ; I sincerely tell you that yoii will also get Ghurian on my 
 account, from the Shah. . . . When Mahommed Omar Khan arrives 
 here, I will ask the Sluih to quit Herat, and I will remain here with 
 12,000 troops, and when you join we will take Plerat, which will 
 afterwards be dclivrrod to vou.'
 
 -1840 BURNES'S MISSION TO KABUL 10 1 
 
 ascertain the exact power which the Persian party 
 in Kabul possessed over the pohtics of Afghanistan, 
 in order that the Indian Government might know 
 what steps to take to effectually prevent the Amir 
 from becoming a party to the Eusso-Persian 
 Alliance. 
 
 Dost Mahommed saw in the arrival of this 
 Embassy a possible opportunity of regaining 
 possession of Peshawar, and he received Burnes 
 w^ith great pomp and splendour. Every possible 
 honour was paid to the British Envoy, and the 
 Amir displayed the greatest anxiety to enter into 
 an alliance with the Indian Government. Thus, 
 when Vitkievitch reached Cabul, he found that he 
 had been forestalled ; his reception was of a most 
 discouraging nature ; and, for many w^eks after 
 his arrival in the Afghan capital, he experienced 
 great difficidty in even obtaining an audience of 
 the Amir. 
 
 But after many months spent in negotiations, 
 the only promise which Dost Mahommed could 
 obtain as the price of his complete abstention from 
 intercourse with Eussia and Persia, was that the 
 English would restrain Eunjeet Singh from attack- 
 ing the Amir's dominions. Such a promise com- 
 pletely failed to satisfy the ruler of Kabul. He 
 feared no aggression from the direction of Lahore, 
 but on the contrary desired to attack the Sikhs 
 himself. He was promised protection from a 
 danger which only existed in the minds of Lord 
 Auckland and his advisers ; while no guarantee 
 was given that his dominions should be defended
 
 I02 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 against the Eussians and Persians, altliougli lie was 
 to risk incurring the enmity of these Powers by 
 abstaining from all intercourse with them. He, 
 however, made one further attempt to secure the 
 friendship of the Indian Government, and his 
 brother, Jubbar Khan, who was notorious for his 
 friendly feelings towards the English, strove hard 
 to obtain from Burnes some hope that more 
 advantageous terms would eventually be conceded. 
 But the Envoy had received j)recise instructions, 
 and could make no concessions, and although he 
 remained at Kabul for a short time longer, and 
 had many friendly interviews with the Amir, it 
 became daily more apparent that there was no 
 hope of bringing matters to a favourable issue. 
 
 Vitkievitch, who in the meanwhile had been 
 quietly watching the course of the negotiations 
 between Burnes and the Amir, and had also 
 commenced a correspondence with the Sikh 
 Maharaja Eunjeet Singh, was then sent for, and 
 was accorded a reception which fully compensated 
 for the previous neglect with which he had been 
 treated. Dost Mahommed, abandoning all hope 
 of concluding an advantageous treaty with the 
 English, threw himself into the Eusso-Persian 
 Alliance. Vitkievitch promised everything that 
 was asked of him, and when Ikirnes turned his 
 back on the Afghan capital on April 28, 1838, 
 the Barakzai ruler of Kabul had become an 
 avowed ally of the Persian Shah, and therefore the 
 enemy of Great Britain, 
 
 Eussian diplomacy had thus gained a remark-
 
 -1840 Persians insult British Embassy 103 
 
 able series of triumphs. The Shah of Persia, 
 apparently in pursuit of his own ambition, but 
 actually for the furtherance of Eussia's aofgressive 
 designs, was besieging Herat ; the Kandahar 
 Sirdars, at the instigation of a Eussian agent, had 
 flung themselves into the Eusso-Persian alliance ; 
 and finally the Amir of Kabul, by promise of 
 Eussian money and assistance, had been drawn into 
 the same net. A Eussian army was also being 
 prepared for an advance against Khiva, whenever 
 such a movement might be necessary to give a 
 finishing touch to the great design which had been 
 planned with so much care and craftiness. 
 
 It was, however, but a short-lived triumph. 
 The Persian army before Herat was unable to break 
 down the resistance of the gallant defenders, and 
 the Shah's ministers, sheltered under the win<»' of 
 the Eussian eagle, at last overreached themselves, 
 when England intervened, and the attack on Herat 
 collapsed. 
 
 The influence of the British Minister in Persia 
 had long been steadily declining, and at last it 
 reached such a low ebb that the Persians beaan 
 to show their contempt for the Mission in petty 
 aimoyances and insults. A courier of the Mission 
 had been stopped, seized and ill-treated in Octo- 
 ber I808, when the Persian army was advancing 
 towards Herat, ^ and although Mr. M'Neill had 
 
 ' This messenger was on his way from Herat to Teheran with 
 letters from Yar Mahommed and I'ottingcr to Mr. M'Neill, and 
 having passed through tlae Persian camp, had arrived near to Meshed, 
 when he was seized by horsemen who had been sent after him, and 
 was forced to return to the camp, where he was placed in custody.
 
 I04 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 repeatedly demanded reparation for this grievous 
 insult, no redress was offered, and the Persian 
 Government declared that they had the right to 
 punish, or even put to death, any Persian employes 
 of the British Mission, without reference to the 
 Ambassador. The Governor of Bushire also had 
 used offensive language and threats towards the 
 British Resident at that port, and in this case also 
 Mr. M'Neill's demands for redress were studiously 
 ignored ; while, in addition to these direct affronts, 
 the Shah, though pledged to the conclusion of a 
 commercial treaty with England, put forward many 
 frivolous excuses, whereby the long promised set- 
 tlement was indefinitely postponed. 
 
 Any one of these offences was sufficient in itself 
 to have caused a rupture with the Persian Court ; 
 but Mr. M'Neill had still remained at his post, in 
 the hope of inducing the Shah to abandon the 
 attack on Herat, and believing that the Persian 
 Government would eventually accede to the British 
 demands. As time passed, however, it became 
 
 ' He succeeded, however, in making his way to the tent of Colonel 
 Stoddart, and was by that otficer conducted to the Prime Minister, 
 who, after he had been informed by Colonel Stoddart that the man 
 was in the service of the Mission, again placed him in custody, while 
 Iladji Khan, an officer of the rank of brigadier in the service of tlie 
 Shah, not only used offensive language in addressing Colonel Stod- 
 dart in presence of the Prime Minister, but after the messenger had 
 been i-eleased by order of His Excellency, seized him again in the 
 midst of the camp, stripped him to search for any letters he might 
 have concealed about his person ; took from him Lieutenant Pot- 
 tinger's letter, which was sent to tlie Prime Minister ; used to the 
 }nosscnger the most violent threats and the most disgusting and 
 opprobrious language ; and took from him a portion of his accoutre- 
 ments.'
 
 -1840 M'Neill's Ultimatum 105 
 
 daily more obvious that nothing less than a 
 complete cessation of diplomatic intercourse would 
 turn Mahommed Shah from his wild scheme of 
 aggression, and show the Persian Court that, even 
 though they were aided by Eussia, Great Britain 
 had the power to enforce compliance with her just 
 demands, and was resolved to uphold her dignity 
 and defend her interests. Mr. M'Neill therefore 
 wrote a letter to the Persian Government, in which 
 all the British demands were clearly set forth. The 
 Shah then began to shuffle and prevaricate. He 
 did not desire that matters should be brought to a 
 crisis, and he therefore first offered to comply with 
 all the demands excepting the abandonment of the 
 siege, if the question of Herat was treated sepa- 
 rately ; but shortly afterwards he changed his mind, 
 and said that he would only adopt that course if 
 Lieut. Pottinger was ordered to quit the city, and 
 if no further reference was made to Herat affairs. 
 
 It thus became clear that Mahommed had no 
 intention of withdrawing from before Herat, unless 
 compelled to do so by a display of force, or unless 
 the English purchased the safety of the place by 
 the payment of a large sum of money. Mr, 
 M'Neill, however, objected to any half measures, 
 and declared that, unless the whole of the British 
 demands were acceded, he would quit Persia. As 
 the Shah still refused to raise the siesje, he, on 
 June 3, announced his intention of leaving the 
 camp on the following day, and demanded per- 
 mission to proceed to the frontier. The Shah then 
 pretended not to understand what was required of
 
 io6 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 liim, and stated that no insults had been offered 
 to the members of the British Embassy. M'Neill 
 however, reiterated his demands, and insisted on 
 their comphance — excepting the conclusion of the 
 commercial treaty — within three days ; and, as 
 this was not done, he left the Persian camp on 
 June 7. 
 
 In the meantime the Indian Government had 
 tardily resolved to make a demonstration in the 
 Persian Gulf. For this purpose some war vessels 
 were sent with the steamers ' Semiramis ' and 
 ' Hugh Lindsay ' conveying detachments of the 
 15th, 23rd, and 24th Eegiments and Marine 
 }3attalions with a couple of field guns. This in- 
 significant expeditionary force reached the island 
 of Karrack on June 19, when the troops 
 were at once landed and took possession of the 
 island. Orders were at the same time sent to Mr. 
 M'Neill, instructing him to inform the Shah that 
 the British Government would view the occupation 
 by Persia of Herat, or any portion of Afghanistan, 
 in the lisjlit of a hostile demonstration as^ainst 
 England. He was also directed to refer to the 
 despatch of the expedition to the Gulf, and state 
 that, if Mahommed Shah desired the suspension of 
 hostilities, he must at once withdraw from Herat. 
 M'Neill received these instructions when he was 
 at Shahrud, on his way to Teheran, and he at once 
 ordered Colonel Stoddart to return to the royal 
 camp and deliver the message. 
 
 Stoddart reached the camp on August 11, and 
 on the followiiiir dux had an interview with the
 
 -1840 The Shah gives way 107 
 
 Shall, when he found the Persian King more dis- 
 posed to listen to reason. The great assault which 
 had been planned by Count Simonitch had already 
 failed, and the Shah had begun to grow weary of 
 the long siege. Moreover the news of the occu- 
 pation of the island of Karrack had already 
 reached the Court, where it was believed that an 
 English army had landed at Bushire, and was 
 advancing through Shiraz to the Persian capital. 
 While the British officer was delivering his mes- 
 sage, the Shah interrupted him with the remark : 
 ' The fact is, if I do not leave Herat there will be 
 war. Is not that so ? ' Stoddart replied, ' It is 
 war ; all depends on your Majesty's answer, and 
 may God preserve your Majesty.' Whereupon 
 Mahommed Shah, taking the English message into 
 his hand, said, ' It is all I washed for.' Two days 
 later Stoddart was called before the King, and was 
 then informed by the Shah that he would comply 
 with all the demands of the British Government. 
 
 But before the Persian army could retire, it 
 was necessary that baggage animals should be 
 collected for the transport of the Shah's camp and 
 the large force which been assembled before the 
 city. Thus some delay occurred ; and Count 
 Simonitch seized this opportunity to try and bring 
 about an arrangement which would enable the 
 Persians to withdraw with some appearance of 
 success. He sent a letter into Herat offering to 
 mediate between Shah Kamran and Mahommed 
 Shah, and an attempt was made to persuade Shah 
 Kamran to visit the Persian camp and pay homage
 
 io8 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 to the Persian army. But the wary Vizier, Yar 
 Mahommed, supported by the advice of Eldred 
 Pottinger, dechned to be drawn into the trap, and 
 thus the Eussian diplomatists failed to secure for 
 their ally even the faintest semblance of victory. 
 
 British interference had compelled the Persians 
 to withdraw from before Herat ; this fact was well 
 known throughout the length and breadth of 
 Persia ; and the Shah's proclamation that he had 
 raised the siege ' in sole consideration of the inte- 
 rest of our faith and country, and from a due 
 regard to the welfare of our troops and subjects,' 
 did not lessen the humiliation. By September 9, 
 1838, the Persian army was in full retreat, and on 
 the morning of that day Colonel Stoddart reported 
 to Mr. M'Neill that ' the Shah has mounted his 
 horse " Ameerij," and is gone.' 
 
 Some time before Mahommed Shah advanced 
 against Herat, the British ambassador in Persia 
 had earnestly exhorted the British Government to 
 make some movement in Afghanistan which would 
 counteract the ambitious projects of the Persian 
 King, and thwart the designs of his Eussian con- 
 federates. The Indian Government had long mis- 
 trusted the Barakzai Sirdars, and when the Persian 
 army invested Herat, and it became known that 
 the Kandahar chiefs were intriguing with Persia, 
 Lord Auckland began seriously to consider the 
 expediency of reinstating Shuja-ul-Mulk on the 
 Afjihan throne. As the danoers in the West beii^an 
 to tliicken, this idea gained a stronger hold on tlie 
 mind of the Governor-General, and he eventually
 
 -1840 The Tripartite Treat v 109 
 
 decided to send a mission to the Court of tlie Sikh 
 Maharaja Eunjeet Singh for the purpose of ascer- 
 taining on what conditions a Sikh army would 
 advance to Kabul in support of the exiled Sud- 
 dozai. In accordance with this resolution Mr. 
 Macnaghten was sent from Simla to the Court of 
 Lahore, accompanied by Captains Osborne and 
 Macgregor and Dr. Drummond. The Mission 
 reached Adeena-imggur on May 31 1838, and 
 there received a cordial and gracious reception 
 from Eunjeet Singh, 
 
 It is unnecessary to enter into details of the 
 subsequent negotiations, which resulted in the sig- 
 nature of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between 
 Maharaja Eunjeet Singh and Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk 
 — a treaty executed with the approbation of, and 
 in concert with, the British Government, and by 
 which it was agreed that a Sikh army should 
 march on Kabul from Peshawar, while Shuja-ul- 
 Mulk advanced through Shikarpur and Kandahar, 
 the Indian Government aiding the movements with 
 their moral support and pecuniary assistance. 
 Nor is it necessary to describe how the ideas of the 
 Indian Government gradually expanded until in 
 August 1838 it was decided that a laro-e English 
 force should be employed to depose Dost Ma- 
 hommed and reinstate Shuja-ul-Mulk on the Afghan 
 throne ; how Lord Auckland met Eunjeet Singh at 
 Ferozepore amidst the roar of artillery and braying 
 of military bands, while the British and Sikh 
 armies were reviewed and fought mimic battles to 
 display their prowess and to add importance to
 
 no Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 the occasion ; how the famous ' Simla Manifesto ' 
 was published, setting forth the reasons which had 
 led the Government to despatch a British army 
 across the Indus ; and how Lord Auckland still 
 persisted in his fatuous design of invading Afghan- 
 istan with British troops, even after he had re- 
 ceived news that the Persian army had retired 
 from before Herat, and when it thus became 
 known in India that there was no longer any imme- 
 diate danger to be expected from Persian aggression 
 or Eussian intrigue. Herat was safe ; but still the 
 Barakzai Amir of Kabul had to be deposed and 
 the feeble Suddozai puppet placed on the Afghan 
 throne, and for this purpose the British army, 
 though somewhat reduced in numbers, moved for- 
 ward across the Indus. 
 
 The combined columns from Beno-al and Bom- 
 bay, with Shah Shuja's contingent, reached Quetta 
 on April 4, 1839, and three weeks later appeared 
 before the walls of Kandahar, when Kohundil 
 Khan and his brothers fled towards Persia, and the 
 city was occupied without resistance. On May 8, 
 a grand review of the entire force was held on the 
 plains outside the city, and Shah Shuja was there 
 installed as King of the Durani Empire. On 
 June 27 the march was resumed towards Kabul ; 
 Ghuzni was captured at daybreak on July 23 ; and 
 Dost Mohammed moved out of Kabul towards 
 Maidan — about twenty-seven miles to the south- 
 west of Kabul — where he intended to dispute the 
 British advance. But the news of the fall of Ghuzni 
 paralysed the Afghan defence, and one by one the
 
 -1840 First Afghan War , in 
 
 Amir's adherents went over to the enemy; the 
 Kizilbashes traitorously deserted, their example 
 being quickly followed l)y the greater part of the 
 Afghan troops ; and, finally, Dost Mahommed was 
 forced to take refuge in flight, without being able 
 to strike one blow in defence of his crown. The 
 news of his flight soon reached the British camp, 
 and Captain Outram, with 500 horsemen, eagerly 
 started off in pursuit. But the fugitive had a day's 
 start of his pursuers, and, aided by the treachery 
 of an Afghan Sirdar named Hadji Khan Kliakur, 
 who accompanied Outram, succeeded in escaping 
 across the Plindu Kush into the dominions of the 
 Usbeg ruler of Kunduz. On August 7 the British 
 army entered Kabul, and the Suddozai king was 
 again seated on the throne from which he had been 
 driven twenty-nine years before. 
 
 Thus was the restoration of Shuja-ul-Mulk 
 accomplished. The chief cities of Eastern Afghan- 
 istan were occupied by British garrisons ; the 
 Barakzais had been overthrown, and forced to fly 
 from the country ; and in the first flush of success 
 it appeared as if a great triumph had been achieved. 
 It was believed that a friendly Government had 
 been permanently established in Afghanistan, and 
 it was confidently expected that in a short time the 
 J British troops might be safely withdrawn, and 
 the Suddozai ruler left in firm possession of the 
 country. 
 
 But shortly afterwards vague rumours began 
 to circulate that a Eussian army was advancing 
 southwards, across the wild unknown Steppes of
 
 112 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 Central Asia. These indefinite reports gradually 
 began to assume a fixed shape, and at last it was 
 known for certain that the Czar had despatched an 
 army to conquer Khiva. 
 
 This expedition had been planned some years 
 previously, at the time when the Czar's agents 
 were striving to induce the Persian Government to 
 attack Herat. The Eussian Government had pre- 
 pared a gigantic scheme of attack, which was to 
 make Eussian influence supreme throughout the 
 whole of Western Asia. Persia was to conquer 
 Herat ; by means of the alliance with the Barakzai 
 Sirdars, Eussian influence was to be pushed for- 
 ward to the Indus ; and while this portion of the 
 programme was being carried out, a Eussian army 
 was being prepared at Orenburg, from whence it 
 was to be pushed forward to Khiva, whenever a 
 demonstration against that Khanate could be made 
 with the most telling effect. Such was the scheme 
 prepared by the Eussians — amazing in its audacity, 
 and preposterous because of the enormous diflicul- 
 ties in the way of its realisation. In the early 
 years of the nineteenth century the Czar Nicholas 
 and his advisers tried, by one great stroke, to 
 secure a position on the borders of India which 
 their successors have not yet gained after an interval 
 of threescore years spent in constant warfare, and 
 unceasing interference and aggression. The time 
 for such a move was not yet ripe ; the intervening 
 countries were unknown and unexplored ; the 
 characteristics of their inhabitants had not been 
 studied ; and, alcove all, it was not realised that
 
 -1840 The Kirghiz-Kazaks 113 
 
 Russia, with her frontiers at Orenburg and on the 
 Eiver Araxes, was quite unable to estabUsh any 
 permanent influence in the countries bordering 
 India, or to destroy the stabiUty of British rule in 
 Hindustan. The Czar's government, however, felt 
 that somethincr had to be done to neutralise the 
 effects of the retreat from Herat, and as a counter- 
 stroke to the British occupation of Afghanistan, 
 and it was therefore decided that the invasion of 
 Khiva should be carried out as speedily as possible. 
 A plausible pretext for this readily obtained. 
 Eussian subjects were languishing in horrible dun- 
 geons on the banks of the Oxus, and the Kirghiz 
 Steppes were the scenes of constant disturbances, 
 which were said to have been due to Khivan insti- 
 gation. 
 
 It has already been related how the Kirghiz- 
 Kazaks were gradually driven westwards by the 
 Dzungarians, until in 17 2d the tribes of the Middle 
 and Lesser Hordes, settled in the Steppes to the east 
 of the Eiver Ural. In 1734 these tribes tendered 
 their submission to the Czar, in order to obtain 
 Eussian protection from their numerous enemies, but 
 with little intention of bowing to Eussian authority. 
 The Eussians then advanced their frontier line, and 
 built the town of Orenburg, while at the same time 
 a fortified line of Cossack settlements was esta- 
 blished on the banks of the Eiver Ural. These 
 measures, however, failed to keep the Kirghiz in 
 check, and from that time they continued to carry 
 on a system of raids, in which no respect was paid 
 to Eussian caravans. 
 
 VOL. I. I
 
 114 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 The methods which the Eussian authorities 
 adopted for govermng these people were ill- 
 advised, gave rise to the greatest discontent, and 
 tended to create opposition rather than to pacify 
 the district. This misgovernment was due to the 
 complete ignorance of the Eussians concerning the 
 customs, ideas, passions, and even language of the 
 Kirghiz. At first, although these nomads were in 
 name the subjects of the White Czar, they displayed 
 but little respect for their masters ; and the Eussian 
 settlers on the banks of the Eiver Ural considered 
 it a matter of some good fortune if the Kirghiz did 
 not break through the line of fortified posts, ravage 
 their villages, and carry off" the people into slavery. 
 But when the Eussian position on the Ural became 
 strengthened, and their settlements behind the 
 fortified frontier line were no longer exposed to 
 attacks, they then began to devise measures for 
 tlie purpose of turning the Kirghiz from nominal 
 into actual subjects ; and then their ignorance in 
 all matters concerning these nomad people became 
 abundantly evident. For many years all corre- 
 spondence was carried on in the Tartar language, 
 because it was believed that the Kirghiz were of 
 the same race as the Volga Tartars — a method of 
 communication which was about as useful and 
 intelligible to the Khans as a letter written in 
 Spanish would be to an Italian. Tlien, again, it 
 was believed that the Kirghiz were Mahommedans, 
 and they were treated as such ; when, as a matter 
 of fact, they were really Shamanists, and have oidy 
 become Mahommedans through the Mussulman
 
 -1840 Russia and the Kirghiz 115 
 
 religion having been forced on them by Russia. 
 But their cliief mi.stake was in considering that, so 
 long as the Khans were friendly, the people also 
 would be obedient ; and this error was the cause 
 of most of the troubles which followed. These 
 mistakes, combined with others, tended to increase 
 the already wide-spread discontent which was still 
 displayed in constant pillage and disorder. Cara- 
 vans were plundered; Russian subjects were carried 
 into slavery ; and, whenever an opportunity arose ^ 
 the people gathered round some trusted leader and 
 openly rebelled against Russian authority. 
 
 Such beino- the condition of the Kirghiz who 
 were under Russian protection, it can readily be 
 imagined that the independent tribes of the adjoin- 
 ing states were not loth to take advantage of these 
 continual disturbances in order to enrich them- 
 selves. Thus the Khivans and Khokandians were 
 at one time accused by the Russians of inciting 
 the Kirghiz to make forays, while at another time 
 they were charged with attacking these same 
 Kirghiz and preventing them from living quiet, 
 peaceable lives. Both charges had, no doubt, a 
 considerable substratum of truth ; but had the 
 Russian authorities adopted a more popular sys- 
 tem of government among their Kirghiz subjects, 
 and endeavoured to make them take to a more 
 settled mode of life, one great reason for the 
 frontier troubles would have been removed ; and, 
 although the Russians could not have entirely 
 prevented the traffic in slaves at Khiva without 
 invading that Khanate, it is pro])a])le that the
 
 ii6 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 Khivans would have, to a great extent if not alto- 
 gether, been obliged to obtain their chief supplies 
 of slaves through the Turkomans from Persia. 
 
 Instead of doing this, however, ' the authorities 
 at Orenburg,' according to a Eussian writer,^ 
 ' tried formerly, by every possible means, to pre- 
 vent the wandering Kirghizes from adopting a 
 settled mode of life and pursuing agriculture, 
 beinof afraid that cattle-rearing would be neglected.' 
 And thus, rather than risk any neglect of cattle- 
 rearing, the Eussian authorities prevented the 
 Kirghiz from settling down, and so indirectly 
 caused that very condition of disorder throughout 
 the Steppes which resulted in incessant raids, and 
 the capture of Eussian subjects who were sold as 
 slaves in the markets of Central Asia. 
 
 During the course of about fifteen years (from 
 1820 to 1835) Eussia despatched several small 
 expeditions against the Kirghiz tribes ; but her 
 wars with Persia and Turke}^ the revolution in 
 France, which drove Charles X. from the throne, 
 and the insurrection in Poland, compelled her to 
 abandon for a time the idea of conquering Khiva. 
 
 In 1834 the Eussians constructed the fort of 
 Novo Alexandrovsk at the head of the Mertvii- 
 Kultuk bay on the east coast of the Caspian, for 
 the protection of the Emba fisheries against the 
 Turkoman pirates ; ^ and they also commenced the 
 
 ' The Russians in Central Asia, by Captain Valiklianoff, M. 
 Veniiikoff, and other Russian travellers ; translated by John and 
 Robert MitcheU, p. 482. 
 
 '^ This fort was abandoned in 1840, when anew one, bearing the 
 same name, was erected on the Mangisblak Peninsula.
 
 -1840 The Khivans as Scapegoats 117^ 
 
 erection of a continuous ramjDart, somewhat like 
 the Chinese Wall but on a smaller scale, which 
 was to connect Orsk on the Eiver Ural with Omsk 
 on the Irtish. This bulwark was actually com- 
 menced and about twelve miles were completed in 
 1836, when it was abandoned. 
 
 But matters remained in an unsettled condition. 
 The Kirghiz continued to carry on their ' barantas,' 
 or forays, and displayed on every possible occa- 
 sion their discontent with the Eussian administra- 
 tion. They received support from the Khivans, who 
 found the traffic in slaves to be most advantage- 
 ous ; while the Eussian authorities, instead of en- 
 deavouring to find a remedy by means of a more 
 satisfactory government of the Kirghiz tribes, and 
 by encouraging, or if necessary forcing, them to 
 adopt a more settled mode of life, continued to 
 misgovern them, whereby their discontent and 
 predatory instincts were fostered ; and then the 
 whole blame was thrown on Khiva. The acquisi- 
 tion of Khiva had long been coveted by the 
 Eussians, and the Khan was therefore made the 
 scapegoat for all the offences of the Kirghiz. 
 
 When Mouravieff returned to Eussia in 1822 
 from his mission to Khiva, he wrote an account of 
 his journey in which there is the following para- 
 graph : — ' Khiva is at this moment an advanced 
 post which impedes our commerce with Bokhara 
 and Northern India. Under our dependence Khiva 
 would have become a safeguj^rd for this commerce 
 against the attacks of populations dispersed in the 
 Steppes of Central Asia. This oasis, situated in
 
 ii8 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 tlie midst of an ocean of sand, would have become 
 a point of assembly for all the commerce of Asia, 
 and would have shaken to the centre of India the 
 enormous superiority enjoyed by the rulers of the 
 sea.' Mouravieff's words expressed the opinions of 
 all Eussian politicians and soldiers from the reign 
 of Peter the Great downwards, and until Khiva 
 became a Eussian possession in 1873. 
 
 Ever since the time of Peter the Great the 
 Eussians endeavoured to obtain a footing on the 
 Oxus, as the}^ believed that river to afford the 
 easiest route to the heart of Central Asia. But in 
 order to obtain control over this water-way, it was 
 necessary to subjugate Khiva, and the acquisition 
 of that State has therefore been steadily kept in 
 view. The importance to Eussia of a successful 
 campaign against Khiva had, in 1839, become 
 doubly great. It was necessary that the Eussians 
 should take immediate steps to minimise the effects 
 of the failure of their intrigues in Persia, and the 
 advance of the British troops into Afghanistan, 
 and this could be best done by an advance on 
 Khiva. What better reason for the movement 
 could be desired than the suppression of the hor- 
 rible and decfradin"' traffic in slaves ? England 
 herself had been for years engaged in the suppres- 
 sion of the slave trade, and it surely was part of 
 the duty of Iloly Eussia to take her share in the 
 crusade ! No one could deny that Khiva was one 
 of the centres in which this abominable trade was 
 carried on, but how many persons were aware 
 that among the most prominent offenders in this
 
 -1840 Attack on Khiva ordered 119 
 
 respect were Russia's own subjects the Kirghiz, who 
 should first have been brought into subjection and 
 encouraged to lead peaceable and settled lives 
 before the crusade was carried further afield. 
 
 On March 24, 1839, when the British troops 
 were toiling through the Bolan Pass, the Czar 
 approved of the following recommendations of a 
 special committee : — 
 
 I. To commence at once the organisation of an 
 expedition against Khiva, and to establish the 
 necessary depots and stations on the route without 
 delay. 
 
 II. To conceal the real object of the expedition, 
 which was to be given out as a scientific expedition to 
 the Aral Sea. 
 
 III. To postpone the departure of the expedi- 
 tion until the settlement of English matters in 
 Afghanistan, in order that the influence and im- 
 pression of the Eussian proceedings in Central 
 Asia might have more weight, and that England, 
 in consequence of her own conquests, might no 
 longer have any right to trouble the Russian 
 Government for explanations ; on no account, 
 however, to delay the expedition later than the 
 spring of 1840. 
 
 IV. In the event of the expedition terminating 
 successfully, to replace the Khan of Khiva by a 
 trustworthy Kazak Sultan ; to establish order and 
 security as far as possible, and to give full freedom 
 to the Russian trade. 
 
 V. To assign 425,000 silver roubles and 12,000 
 gold ducats for the estimated cost of the expe-
 
 120 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 dition, and to supply the detachment with arms 
 and the indispensable material, and to allow the 
 Governor-General of Orenburo- to avail himself of 
 the assistance of the local artillery and engineer 
 force. 
 
 On October 10, 1839, final orders were issued 
 regarding the Eussian operations which were to be 
 carried out after the capture of Khiva, and a 
 document was prepared for the guidance of the 
 new Khan, in which his relations towards Eussia 
 were clearly set forth ; and finally, on November 
 26, a manifesto was published at Orenburg, stating 
 the causes and objects of the proposed expedition, 
 wherein it was said that 'just and reasonable 
 considerations have induced His Majesty the 
 Emperor to send a military force against Khiva, 
 in order to secure by force of arms the rights and 
 interests of Eussian subjects, to put an end to 
 pillage and rapine, to liberate prisoners then in 
 Khiva, to inspire the respect due to Eussia, and 
 to establish the influence indisputably belonging 
 to her, and which is the only guarantee for the 
 maintenance of peace in that portion of Asia. 
 Such is the object of the intended expedition 
 against Khiva.' 
 
 Meanwhile preparations for the advance had 
 been pushed forward. Large stores of provisions 
 and forage were purchased and collected at 
 Orenburg, and every possible want was anticipated 
 and provided for. As the expedition would have 
 to march tlirougli an almost waterless Steppe, the 
 great difficulty whicli was to be expected was the
 
 -1840 Perovski's Expedition starts 121 
 
 absence of sufficient water for the large force 
 which it was proposed to send. It was known 
 from Kirghiz reports that wells existed on the Ust- 
 Yurt plateau, but these only gave a sufficient supply 
 for small caravans, and were totally insufficient for 
 the requirements of large parties. It was there- 
 fore considered advisable that the advance should 
 be made in the winter ; and this decision was the 
 cause of the disasters which followed. The troops 
 were saved from the distress and dangers of march- 
 ing through the desert in the burning heat of 
 summer, but they had to face an exceptionally 
 severe winter, which paralysed their movements 
 and eventually necessitated a retreat. 
 
 As the stores were received at Orenburg they 
 were sent forward to the intermediate depots 
 which it was intended to establish at various 
 points along the line of march, and for this 
 purpose 7,750 carts were obtained from the 
 liashkirs. 
 
 On June 30, 1839, the first detachment, con- 
 sisting of a small force of infantry with 400 
 mounted Bashkirs and 2 howitzers, marched out 
 of Orenburg, under Colonel Heke, for the purpose 
 of establishing advanced posts. The last portion 
 of his march was attended with the greatest hard- 
 ships, owing to the great heat and scarcity of 
 water ; but on July 27 he arrived at Ak-Bulak, 
 and there commenced the construction of a fortified 
 post, Convoys of stores were then sent forward, 
 and by the end of October the preparations for the 
 general advance had been completed. Early in
 
 122 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 November a detachment was sent forward under 
 Colonel Danilevski, who was ordered to await the 
 main army at a post which had been constructed 
 on tlie Eiver Emba. 
 
 At the end of November 1839, the main body 
 commenced its advance under General Perovski, 
 who had been entrusted with the command of 
 the expedition. The total strength of the army 
 (including the detachments which had been sent 
 forward in advance) amounted to 5,325 men, with 
 22 guns and 4 rocket stands. It was divided into 
 five columns, four of which were to advance from 
 Orenburg, while the fifth marched from the 
 Kalmykovski Fort on the lower Orenburg line 
 direct to the Eiver Emba, where it was to effect a 
 junction with the remainder of the army. 
 
 But intense cold, frequent snowstorms, and 
 terrible hardships decided the result of the expedi- 
 tion, and by the time the columns reached Ak- 
 Bulak, during the first week in February, it w^as 
 evident they could go no further. 
 
 General Perovski, who had remained at Fort 
 Emba till the whole of the troops had left, and who 
 passed the columns on their march to Ak-Bulak, 
 and thus saw the enormous difficulties and hard- 
 ships they had to contend against, then began to 
 realise that a continuance of the advance would 
 probably lead to the total loss of the force. He 
 therefore consulted liis commanding officers, who 
 unanimously decided that it would be madness to 
 go on. 
 
 On mustering liis force the General also foand
 
 -1840 Collapse of the Expedition 123 
 
 that it had been sadly thinned through sickness and 
 death, and that the loss in camels had been so 
 great that even if the weather had been more 
 favourable it would have been impossible to reach 
 Khiva. 
 
 The effective force of men available only- 
 amounted to 1,856. 
 
 No alternative now remained but to retreat, and 
 Perovski was therefore reluctantly compelled to 
 issue a general order, thanking the troops for the 
 unflagging devotion and energy they had displayed, 
 and ordering the return of the expedition. 
 
 Thus the second organised Eussian invasion of 
 Khiva was a miserable failure, and little short of 
 disaster. Snow and pestilence had done their work, 
 and Khiva was delivered, not by the valour of its 
 people, but through its peculiarly isolated situation, 
 surrounded as it is on all sides by hundreds of miles 
 of barren, pathless, and waterless deserts. 
 
 Wlien it became known that Perovski's force 
 would not be able to reach Khiva, and had been 
 compelled to retreat, steps were at once taken 
 to repair the catastrophe, and great preparations 
 were made for the despatch of a new expedition : 
 orders were issued for strenfftheninfij the OrenburjT 
 Corps by six more battalions ; and Admiral 
 Korsakoff was sent to report on the number of 
 vessels on the Volga and Caspian available for 
 transporting troops to the eastern shores of the 
 Caspian, in order that the new expedition might 
 follow the route taken by Prince Bekovitch 
 Tcherkasski.
 
 124 Attacks on Herat and Khiva 1829- 
 
 But it was found that there were not sufficient 
 vessels for the purpose, and arrangements were 
 therefore made for the new expedition to again use 
 the Orenburg-Ak-Bulak line, the advance being, 
 however, so timed that the whole force might be 
 concentrated at Ak-Bulak during the autumn, and 
 thus have only to cross the Ust-Yurt plateau in 
 the early winter. But fifty years ago there were 
 no railways in Kussia, by means of which troops 
 and stores could be rapidly pushed forward to 
 Orenburg, and before the preparations for a 
 renewed attack on Khiva were completed, the 
 English, by obtaining the liberation of the Eussian 
 captives, deprived Eussia of all excuse for making 
 war against the Khan. 
 
 In June 1830, Major d'Arcy Todd, an artillery 
 officer, was despatched on a special mission to 
 Herat, and on his arrival there he sent a Mahom- 
 medan priest, named Mullah Hussan, to Khiva Math 
 a letter of friendship to the Khan. This messenger 
 arrived in the Khanate at the time when the people 
 were in a wild state of alarm on account of the 
 Eussian advance, and he was therefore cordially 
 received, as England was the only nation which 
 could save Khiva from falling into the hands of 
 Russia. Mullah Hussan on his return reported the 
 successful results of his mission, and was ac- 
 companied by a Khivan ambassador bearing letters 
 from the Klian full of declarations of friendship. 
 Major Todd therefore despatched Captain Abbott to 
 Khiva in order to improve the friendly relations 
 which had been entered upon, and he was also
 
 -1810 Shakespeare's Mission to Khiva 125 
 
 instructed to persuade the Khan to Hberate the 
 Eussian prisoners, in order that Eussia might have 
 no further excuse for invading tlie Khanate. 
 Abbott obtained permission for a Eussian official 
 to visit Kliiva and take away any Eussian captives 
 who wished to return ; and he then set out for 
 the Caspian, but was robbed and cruelly treated 
 on the way, and only reached Astrakhan with 
 difficulty. Meanwhile Major Todd heard that 
 Abbott was dead, and he therefore sent Lieutenant 
 Shakespeare to complete the work which Abbott 
 had been sent to perform. Shakespeare obtained 
 the release of all the Eussian prisoners, to the 
 number of 416, and in the summer of 1840 ac- 
 companied them across the Steppe to the Caspian, 
 and handed them over to the Commandant of the 
 Eussian fort of Novo Alexandrovsk, when the 
 Eussians, in their turn, released many Khivan 
 subjects whom they had previously captured and 
 detained as hostages.
 
 126 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 1840—1845 
 TROUBLES IX AFGHANISTAN 
 
 Dost Mahommed's attempt to regain his throne — Outbreak in Ka- 
 bul, and murder of Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Mac- 
 naghten — Fate of General Elphinstone's army — The only sur- 
 vivor of the army — Disaster to Colonel Palmer and his troops — 
 Critical situation in Afghanistan— Stoddart's and ConoUy's mis- 
 sions to Khiva and Bokhara — Failure of Russian mission to Khiva 
 — Russian mission to Bokhara — Russian occupation of Ashurada. 
 
 If events in Afghanistan had turned out differently, 
 there is no doubt that the Russian Government 
 would have found some fresh pretext for pushing 
 forward. But even while Shakespeare was march- 
 ing across the desert toward the Caspian with his 
 little band of liberated slaves, events were occurring 
 in Shah Shuja's dominions which were shortly to 
 culminate in an appalling disaster to the British 
 arms, which completely dwarfed the failure of 
 Perovski, and rendered it quite unnecessary for 
 Russia to think of invading Khiva for the purpose 
 of resisting British advances into Central Asia. 
 From the very moment that Shuja-ul-Mulk, sup- 
 ported by a British army, had been reseated on 
 the Afghan throne, it was evident that he had no 
 hold over his subjects, and that he would be un- 
 able to maintain liis position once the Britisli troops
 
 1849-1845 A Beautiful Game 127 
 
 were withdrawn. His installation on the plains of 
 Kandahar, when only about a hundred Afghans 
 assembled to do honour to their sovereign, should 
 have plainly warned the British authorities that 
 their policy was inherently weak and ill-advised. 
 But Mr. Macnaghten, the British envoy, shut his 
 eyes to facts which were patent throughout the 
 army, and continued in his firm faith in the popu- 
 larity of the Suddozai Shah. He believed that 
 there would be no further trouble in Afghanistan, 
 and fixed his attention on affairs far beyond the 
 frontiers of the kingdom of Kabul. He urged that 
 Herat should be attacked and annexed to the 
 dominions of Shuja-ul-Mulk, and even considered 
 the advisability of despatching a force to Balkh and 
 far distant Bokhara. He had a firm belief in the 
 success of the British policy, and believed that ' a 
 beautiful game ' could be played by pushing the 
 British armies far beyond the position they then 
 occupied. But while he was thus engaged in the 
 contemplation of grand operations wdiich were to 
 place ' the safety of British interests on a firm and 
 solid basis,' and ' effectually frustrate the designs 
 of Eussia,' everything was going wrong in the 
 dominions of the effete Suddozai king. The British 
 were standing on a mine which was shortly to 
 explode with terrible results. 
 
 When Dost Mahommed fled from Argandeh in 
 August 1839, he took refuge in Bokhara, but was 
 there ill-treated by the Amir Nasrullah Khan. 
 He therefore fled to Shahr-i-Sebz, and from thence 
 went to Khulm, where he was well received by
 
 128 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o- 
 
 tlie Wall, who assisted liim to raise an army for 
 the purpose of recovering his throne. By the 
 autumn of 1840 he was in a position to take the 
 field, and advanced to Heibak, a fort about 150 
 miles north of Bamian, which latter place was 
 then occupied by a small British detachment. In 
 September he forced the British to evacuate the 
 advanced posts of Saighan and Bajgah, but rein- 
 forcements under Brigadier-General Dennie were 
 hurried forward from Kabul to Bamian, and on 
 September 18 he, with his small force of about 
 1,500 men and two guns, inflicted a severe defeat 
 on the Amir's army, which was said to be 40,000 
 strong. Dennie then advanced to Saighan, de- 
 stroyed that place, and forced the Wali of Khulm 
 to make terms. Dost Mahommed meanwhile fled 
 to the Nijrao valley, in the Kohistan north of 
 Kabul, where Brigadier-General Sale had been 
 sent with a column, to chastise some chiefs who 
 refused to acknowledge Shah Shuja. 
 
 After several skirmishes, Sale on November 2 
 approached Parwan, a small village on the southern 
 slopes of the Hindu Kush. He there saw the 
 enemy evacuating the village and neighbouring 
 forts, and flying to the hills ; and the British cavalry 
 was pushed forward in pursuit. But when they 
 had advanced about a mile in advance of the 
 column, Dost Mahommed, at the head of 200 
 Afghan horsemen, rode forward and prepared to 
 meet his assailants. Uncovering his head, he 
 called upon his adherents to follow him in the 
 name of God and the Prophet, or he would be a
 
 -184-5 The Fight at Parwan 129 
 
 lost man ; and then, placing himself at the head of 
 his small band of followers, he rode forward to 
 drive the infidels from the field, or perish in the 
 attempt. Captain Fraser formed the Light Cavalry 
 into line and sounded the charge ; the British 
 officers rode steadily forward, believing that their 
 men were following ; but the native sowars held 
 back, and then fled in confusion before the Afghan 
 horsemen. Of the five British officers who rode 
 in the charge, three — Lieutenants Broadfoot and 
 Crispin, and Dr. Lord — were cut to pieces, while 
 the other two, Fraser and Ponsonby, were severely 
 wounded. 
 
 But Dost Mahommed's triumph did not last long. 
 The British infantry, coming up, quickly recovered 
 the lost ground and, driving the Afghans away 
 from the hills overlooking the Parwan Pass, forced 
 them to retreat towards thePanjshir Valley. Dost 
 Mahommed had made one last gallant attempt to 
 save his cause, and had failed. He now clearly saw 
 that it was hopeless to continue the struggle against 
 the British, and on the next day he rode into 
 Kabul, there surrendered to Sir William Macnaixh- 
 ten, and within ten days was on his way to India 
 under a strong- escort. 
 
 During the next twelve months tliere were 
 many signs that the affairs in Afghanistan were b}^ 
 no means satisfactorily settled. Early in 1841 a 
 serious rising of the Duranis took place in the 
 Zemindewar to the north-west of Kandahar ; Yar 
 Mahommed, the Vizier of Herat, was doing his 
 utmost to destroy British influence, and to slu- up 
 
 VOL. 1. Iv
 
 130 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o- 
 
 the Duranis against the unbelievers ; British troops 
 were twice repulsed by the Khakars of Sibi in an 
 attack on the village of Kojak ; and a British 
 column was busily employed in coercing refractory 
 tribes in the neis^libourhood of Jalalabad. Durini:r 
 the summer troubles arose at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, fresh 
 disturbances broke out in the Zemindewar, and a 
 trifling outbreak in the Kohistan had also to be 
 suppressed. In October Brigadier-General Sale 
 started for India with his brigade, and had some 
 sharp fighting in the passes. Before the end of 
 that month the Kohistanis were again in open 
 revolt, and news was received that Dost Mahom- 
 med's son, Mahommed Akbar Khan, had left his 
 asylum at Bokhara and reached Bamian. 
 
 At last the storm broke. On November 2 a 
 tumult arose in the city of Kabul. The mob, acting 
 in accordance with a preconcerted plan, attacked 
 the house of Sir Alexander Burnes, murdered him, 
 his brother, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot of 
 the Engineers, and then looted the Treasury. It 
 is needless to repeat the oft-told tale of the follies 
 which were then committed ; of the hesitation and 
 vacillation of the infirm General in chief command, 
 and of the impracticable temper and perversity of 
 his second in command. Mistake followed mistake, 
 and the army rapidly l)ecame so demoralised, tliat 
 when Sir William Macnaghten was traitorously 
 murdered on December 23, 1841, by Mahommed 
 Akbar Khan, during a conference held within 400 
 yards of the British cantonments, no attempt was 
 made to rescue him or to avenge the deed ; liis
 
 -1845 The Retreat from Kabul 131 
 
 body was permitted to remain on the plain in full 
 view of the force, and to be carried thence by the 
 Afghans, and paraded about the streets and bazaars 
 of the city. 
 
 After Macnaghten's death, political matters 
 were entrusted to Major Eldred Pottinger, the 
 gallant defender of Herat, and he appealed to the 
 military chiefs to continue the struggle and to 
 occupy the Bala Hissar, which, with a determined 
 garrison under competent leaders, might have been 
 defended until reinforcements arrived from India. 
 But his exhortations were unheeded, and on 
 January 6, 1842, the British army, commanded by 
 General Elphinstone, commenced its retreat from 
 Kabul in accordance with the terms of a treaty of 
 capitulation, which had been ratified five days pre- 
 viously. What followed is well known. Out of an 
 army which numbered 4,500 figliting men and 
 12,000 camp followers, one solitary Englishman 
 alone succeeded in reaching Jalalabad, where Sale 
 had entrenched himself on hearing of the disasters 
 in Kabul. 
 
 ' On January 13, when the garrison were busy 
 on the works, toiling with axe and shovel, with 
 their arms piled and their accoutrements laid out 
 close at hand, a sentry on the ramparts, looking 
 out towards the Kabul road, saw a solitary white- 
 faced horseman struggling on towards the fort. 
 The word was passed, the tidings spread. Pre- 
 sently the ramparts were lined with officers, look- 
 ing out with throbbing hearts through unsteady 
 telescopes, or with straining eyes tracing the road.
 
 132 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o- 
 
 Slowly and painfully, as though horse and rider 
 both were in an extremity of mortal weakness, the 
 solitary mounted man came reeling, tottering on. 
 They saw that he was an Englishman, on a 
 wretched, weary pony ; clinging as one sick or 
 wounded to its neck, he sat, or rather leant for- 
 ward ; and there were those who, as they watched 
 his progress, thought that he could never reach 
 unaided the walls of Jalalabad. A shudder ran 
 through the garrison. That solitary horseman 
 looked like the messenger of death. Few doubted 
 that he was the bearer of intelligence that would 
 fill their souls with horror and dismay. Their 
 worst forebodings seemed confirmed. There was 
 the one man who was to tell the story of the 
 massacre of a great army. A party of cavalry 
 were sent out to succour him ; they brought him 
 in, wounded, exhausted, half-dead. The mes- 
 senger was Dr. Brydon, and he now reported his 
 belief that he was the sole survivor of an army of 
 some sixteen thousand men.' ^ 
 
 After this fearful disaster to the Kabul force, 
 only Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kalat-i-Gliilzai, and Kan- 
 dahar remained in the hands of the British. Ghazni 
 was, however, lost shortly afterwards. Towards 
 the end of November, 1841, the enemy appeared in 
 force before the place, but withdrew on hearing 
 of the advance of a brigade under Maclaren from 
 Kandahar en route for Kabul. But Maclaren only 
 went two marches north of Kalat-i-Ghilzai and 
 
 ' History of the War in Afgltanistan, by Jolin William Kaye, 
 F.R.S. Vol. ii., pp. 358 and S.TO.
 
 -1845 Critical Situation in Afghanistan 133 
 
 then retraced his steps, when the Afghans col- 
 lected again round Ghazni and completely invested 
 the place. Colonel Palmer, the commandant, had 
 omitted to expel the inhabitants from the city, and 
 they made a passage under the walls by which 
 the besiegers entered the town on December 16. 
 The garrison then retreated to the citadel, and 
 there held out for several weeks. But, on March 6, 
 Palmer and his troops opened the gates and 
 marched out of the citadel, trusting to the Afghan 
 promise of safe conduct to Peshawar. It is need- 
 less to state that this promise was not kept. On 
 the following day the troops were suddenly at- 
 tacked while they were cooking their dinners, and 
 after three days of hard fighting those wlio sur- 
 vived the slaughter were carried off into an 
 apparently hopeless captivity. 
 
 Thus, in the spring of 1842, the British position 
 in Afghanistan appeared to be well-nigh hopeless. 
 Incompetence and vacillation on the part of the 
 military commanders had brought about a condi- 
 tion of affairs such as a British army had never 
 before experienced. Kandahar, Kalat-i-Ghilzai, 
 and Jalalabad alone remained in British hands, 
 and the defence of the two latter places were the 
 only bright spots during this terrible crisis. 
 
 While fresh armies were beinsj collected and 
 hurried forward to avenge the disasters which had 
 occurred in Afghanistan, a dark tragedy was being 
 enacted far north of the Hindu Kush. Shortly 
 after the close of the siege of Herat, Mr. M'Neill 
 sent Colonel Stoddart on a mission to Bokhara to
 
 134 Troubles in Afghanistan i840- 
 
 counteract the macliinations of the Eussians, who 
 were known to be intriguing in that state ; and to 
 remove a possible excuse for Eussian interference 
 by obtaining the hberation of such Eussian subjects 
 as were in slavery there. In 1820 a Eussian em- 
 bassy had been sent to Bokhara under M. Negri. 
 In 1834 another mission was sent under M. De- 
 maison, who adopted the disguise of a Tartar 
 Mullah. In 1835 Lieutenant Vitkievitch — who 
 afterwards appeared in Kabul — visited the Khanate 
 disguised as a Kirghiz-Kazak ; and since that time 
 several Bokharan envoys were sent to Eussia, their 
 visits being returned by the despatch of Eussian 
 agents. It was, therefore, time that England took 
 steps to prevent the Amir Nasrullah from falling 
 completely under Eussian influence. Stoddart 
 arrived in Bokhara at the close of the year 1838, 
 but on his arrival there he foolishly refused to 
 conform to the customs and etiquette of the Bok- 
 haran Court, and within three days of his arrival 
 he found himself a prisoner. He was suddenly 
 seized in the minister's house, thrown to the 
 ground, bound with cords, and shortly afterwards 
 cast into a filthy and noisome pit, where he re- 
 mained with criminals for his companions, ' covered 
 with vermin and surrounded by reptiles, in killing 
 which they were constantly occupied.' At the 
 end of two months he was released from this fear- 
 ful dungeon and removed to the house of the chief 
 of the Bokharan police, but two days later he was 
 informed that he would be put to death unless he 
 consented to become a Mahommedan. Exhausted
 
 -1845 STODDART and CONOLLY IN 50KIIARA 1 35 
 
 in body and mind by the terrible ordeal lie had 
 passed through, he reluctantly consented to con- 
 form to the rites of the Mahommedan faith — an 
 act which he bitterly repented of throughout the 
 remainder of his miserable existence. From that 
 time he was treated with less brutality, as the 
 Amir had heard of the British successes in Af- 
 ghanistan, knew that British troops had advanced 
 across the Hindu Kush to Bamian and Saighan, 
 and feared that a force would be sent across the 
 Oxus to avenoe his cruel treatment of the British 
 ambassador. 
 
 In September, 1840, Captain Arthur ConoUy 
 was sent on a similar mission to Khiva and Khokand. 
 He first went to Khiva, where he was well received, 
 and thence to Khokand, which state was then at 
 war with Bokhara, Madali Khan, the ruler of 
 Khokand, having invaded Bokharan territory and 
 captured the strong fortress of Ura Tepe, NasruUah 
 believed that Conolly had advised this movement, 
 and he therefore determined to get the British 
 officer into his power. He accordingly invited 
 him to visit his Court, and prevailed upon Stoddart 
 to use his influence to persuade him to do so. 
 Conolly, in spite of the advice of the Khan of 
 Khokand, accepted the invitation and arrived in 
 Bokhara in November, 1841. 
 
 For a short space all went well ; but soon after 
 his arrival news reached Bokhara that the Afghans 
 were in revolt against Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, that 
 Burnes had been murdered, and that the British 
 army had Ijeeii defeated, and were closely besieged
 
 136 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o- 
 
 in their cantonments outside Kabul. This was 
 Nasrullah's opportunity. The British envoy who, 
 according to his behef, had incited the Khokandians 
 to invade his dominions, and the other Feringhi 
 who had defied him and insulted his minister, 
 were both in his hands, and he could now punish 
 them as he willed without fear of consequences. 
 Stoddart and ConoUy were both seized and im- 
 prisoned in the house of the Topshi-Bashi, or chief 
 of the artillery, in Bokhara, where they remained 
 for more than six months in a condition of the 
 most abject and heart-rending misery. The rain 
 leaked freely through the mud-roof of the miserable 
 hut in which they were confined ; the very clothes 
 they wore rotted from off their bodies, and they 
 suffered indescribable torments from the attacks of 
 vermin, while ague and fever sapped their strength 
 and reduced them to the condition of mere living 
 skeletons. 
 
 But the end came at last. The Bokharan Amir, 
 after some delay, had collected an army for the in- 
 vasion of Khokand, and after a short but success- 
 ful campaign, returned to his capital in triumph. 
 Intoxicated with his success, the cruel tyrant re- 
 membered his Feringhi captives, and gave orders 
 for them to be put to death. On June 24, 1842, 
 the two Englishmen were taken out of their prison 
 and conducted to a small courtyard close at hand, 
 where Stoddart was first put to death in the pre- 
 sence of an asseml)led crowd of natives. Conolly 
 was then offered his life on the condition that he 
 adopted the Mahommedan faith ; but he scornfully
 
 --1845 Murder of the British Envoys 137 
 
 rejected the proposal, saying : — ' Stoddart and 
 Yusuf, my servant, turned Maliommedans, and yet 
 you have killed them ; I have no confidence in your 
 promises ; I will not turn from my faith ; I am 
 prepared to die ; finish your work.' The tragedy 
 was finished. Arthur Conolly was speedily put to 
 death ; and thus died two brave British officers 
 who, taking their lives in their hands, went cheer- 
 fully into unknown lands and there laid down their 
 lives in their endeavours to add to the glory of 
 their dearly-loved country, and to thwart the 
 designs of England's enemies. 
 
 While Stoddart and Conolly were in Central 
 Asia, Eussia was not idle. As the Khan of Khiva 
 had released the Eussian prisoners and issued a 
 jDroclamation abolishing the trade in Eussian slaves, 
 the Czar's Government decided to reopen negotia- 
 tions with him, and Captain Nikiforof was therefore 
 sent on a mission to Khiva in 1841, accompanied 
 by an escort of twelve Cossacks. On his arrival 
 he behaved in much the same way as Stoddart had 
 done at Bokhara, refused to yield to the demands 
 of Khivan etiquette, treated the Khan's officials in 
 a contemptuous manner, and generally assumed a 
 bold and defiant demeanour. Fortunately for the 
 Eussian envoy, Allah Kul was not an inhuman 
 monster of the type of Nasrullah of Bokhara ; the 
 Khivan Khan, moreover, had not forgotten the 
 alarm occasioned by Perovski's advance ; and the 
 British officers, Abbott and Shakespeare, had been 
 advising him to abstain from any act which might 
 give Eussia an excuse for a fresh attack on the
 
 138 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o- 
 
 Khanate. Nikiforof, therefore, experienced no nn- 
 pleasant results from his overhearing conduct. His 
 mission, however, was completely unsuccessful, for 
 he was unable to secure any trade concessions, and 
 the Khan declined to enter into an}^ treaty. 
 
 In the following year another Eussian agent, 
 named Colonel Danilefsky, was sent to Khiva. 
 During his stay in the Khanate, Allah Kul Khan 
 died, and Danilefsky succeeded in persuading his 
 son and successor, Eahim Kul, to sign a treaty 
 engaging not to undertake liostile acts against 
 Eussia or to permit robbery or piracy. 
 
 An important embassy was also sent to the 
 Court of Nasrullali Khan of Bokhara. In 1840 
 the Amir began to fear that his dominions would 
 be invaded by a British column from Kabul, and 
 he therefore sent an influential envoy named Mukiii- 
 Beg to St. Petersburg, with letters and presents 
 for the Czar, besides gifts for various other Eus- 
 sian authorities. The Eussian Government seized 
 this opportunity, and despatched a mission under 
 Colonel ButenefF, diarized with, the collection of 
 ' positive and reliable information concerning the 
 Khanate of Bokhara and neighbouring countries, 
 and with the arrangement of terms for regulating 
 the mutual relations between Bokhara and Eussia.' 
 In the instructions which he received from the 
 Eussian Minister of Foreign Aflliirs, lie was also 
 directed to observe the effect produced on Bokhara 
 l)y the recent events in Afghanistan, as the acqui- 
 sition of this information would enable him ' to 
 suggest the best means for strengthening the
 
 -1845 Russian Mission to Bokhara 139 
 
 political influence of Eussia and for developing 
 Eussian trade in this part of Asia.' 
 
 Buteneff, accompanied by Captain Bogoslovski, 
 M. Lehmann, M. KlianikofF, and a small staff of 
 miners and topographers, left Orenburg in May, 
 1841, and reached Bokhara on August 17, having 
 been escorted as far as the Syr Daria by a detach- 
 ment of 400 Ural Cossacks. Shortly before he 
 crossed the Eussian frontier, Lord Palmerston had 
 directed the British ambassadors at St. Petersburg 
 and Constantinople to enlist the sympathy of the 
 Eussian and Turkish Governments in the cause of 
 the captives in Bokhara, and both the Sultan and 
 Czar did what they could to obtain the release of 
 Stoddart and Conolly. 
 
 When the officers of the Eussian mission reached 
 Bokhara, they received a very favourable recep- 
 tion, and Buteneff lost no time in exerting his 
 influence for the purpose of obtaining Stoddart's 
 release.^ As a result of his friendly efforts, Stod- 
 dart was permitted to live in the house occupied 
 by the Eussian mission, where he received great 
 kindness from the Eussian officers ; and the Amir 
 even promised to permit him to leave the country. 
 But Stoddart had been sent on his mission to Bok- 
 hara by the British Government, and he considered 
 it to be his duty to remain until recalled, and thus 
 the opportunity of escape was lost. Conolly soon 
 afterwards arrived ; news of the British disasters 
 reached Bokhara, and the two British officers were 
 closely confined until their death. 
 
 -■ Conolly hiul not then arri\ed in Bokhara.
 
 140 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o- 
 
 The British defeat in Afghanistan had also a 
 very marked effect on the Amir's behaviour towards 
 the Eussian embassy. So long as the British armies 
 remained at Kabul and Bamian, he was afraid that 
 an advance would be made against his dominions, 
 and he therefore was anxious to be on friendly 
 terms with the Eussians ; and thus for the first few 
 months of their stay in the country the Eussian 
 mission was treated well, and the members of the 
 embassy were permitted to visit the eastern and 
 less known portion of the Khanate. But as soon 
 as the British evacuated Kabul, and all danger of 
 invasion from the south was removed, Nasrullah 
 began to show his disinclination to have any deal- 
 ings with the infidel — whether Eussian or English 
 — and from this time the position of the Eussians 
 became daily more and more difficult. ButenefT, 
 hewever, remained in hopes of being able to effect 
 the release of Stoddart and Conolly, and of the 
 many Eussians who were detained in slavery ; and 
 he also tried hard to obtain the Amir's simature 
 to a treaty with Eussia. But Nasrullah clearly 
 showed that he no longer wished to come to any 
 arrangement ; the Envoy's requests were ignored ; 
 and the members of the mission were in danger of 
 sharing the fate which had overtaken the British 
 ambassadors. Nothing remained but to quit the 
 inhospitable and treacherous Court. On the night 
 of April 19, 1842, ButenefT and his companions 
 started on their way back to Eussia, the negotia- 
 tions having been completely unsuccessful. But 
 great acquisitions to science were made during
 
 -1845 Occupation of Ashurada 141 
 
 their eight months' sojourn in the country, and — 
 what was of more advantage to Russia — extensive 
 surveys of the Khanate had been made by Khani- 
 koff and the topographers, which proved of much 
 assistance when the Eussians made their great 
 advance a quarter of a century later. 
 
 While these events were occurrinj? in Afghan- 
 istan and the Khanates of Central Asia, Eussia 
 did not remain inactive in Persia. By the Treaty 
 of Gulistan, and again by the Treaty of Turko- 
 manchai, Persia had renounced her right of main- 
 taining war vessels on the Caspian, and thus was 
 unable to check the piracy of the Turkomans, 
 who infested the shores of the sea between Kras- 
 novodsk and the Gulf of Astrabad, and carried off 
 hundreds of Persian subjects into slavery. As the 
 Shah was thus unable to repress the piratical 
 Turkomans, he in 1836 pointed out to the Eussian 
 Government the difficulties of the situation, and 
 foolishly applied for their assistance. The Czar's 
 Government were not slow to comply with the 
 request, and in 1837 and 1838, vessels were sent 
 from the Eussian naval station at the island of 
 Sari, to cruise off the south-eastern shores of the 
 Caspian Sea, while at the same time the island of 
 Ashurada (at the mouth of the Gulf of Astrabad) 
 was quietly occupied. This step alarmed the 
 Persians, and a request was made that the Eussian 
 naval commander should either be placed under 
 the orders of the Governor of Astrabad, or failino- 
 this, that naval aid might be withheld. The Eus- 
 sians, however, had no intention of withdrawino-.
 
 142 Troubles in Afghanistan i84o^ 
 
 as they had managed to get hold of an excellent 
 and long-coveted point d'appid, from which they 
 could threaten Astrabad and Khorassan. 
 
 This first landing on the island attracted but 
 little attention, and was apparently merely a tem- 
 porary occupation ; but in 1841 Ashurada was 
 permanently taken possession of, for the ostensible 
 purpose of protecting Persian trade against the 
 Turkoman pirates. Sir John M'Neill reported the 
 matter to the British Grovernment in 1842 ; and in 
 1849, as Persia was unable to induce the Eussians 
 to evacuate the island and had petitioned England 
 for aid, Lord Aberdeen applied to Eussia to with- 
 draw. But they had meanwhile been strengthen- 
 ing their position ; extensive buildings had been 
 erected ; and negotiations were opened from thence 
 with the Turkomans. The English representation, 
 therefore, had no effect, and Ashurada has since 
 remained in Eussian hands. 
 
 This seizure was an act for which no possible 
 excuse can be found. Ashurada was as much a 
 portion of Persia as Hajding Island is of England ; 
 its permanent occupation by Eussia was therefore 
 an unprovoked violation of the Shah's dominions, 
 which admitted of no justification. But the Czar's 
 Government knew that the thoughts of everyone in 
 England were then turned towards Afghanistan, 
 where the avenging armies were moving forward 
 to Kabul to wipe out the disgrace which had 
 sullied the British reputation ; and that it was not 
 likely that much attention would be given to the 
 occupation l)y Eussia of a small sandy islet in the
 
 -1845 Strategical Value of Astrabad 143 
 
 Caspian. Persia, unaided, could do nothing more 
 than expostulate, and thus Eussia was able to 
 (j^uietly take up a position from whence she can, 
 when desirable, move forward to the mainland, and 
 gain possession of the narrow neck of fertile 
 country which connects the province of Khorassan 
 with the remainder of Northern Persia, and which 
 thus forms one of the most valuable strategical 
 positions in Southern Asia.
 
 144 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 184G-1858 
 EUSSIAN ADVANCE ACROSS THE KIRGHIZ STEPPES 
 
 Russian Frontier-line at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century — 
 Operations in the Sea of Aral and Construction of Fort Raim — 
 Subjection of the Southern Kirghiz to Russia — Founding of Kopal 
 — Collisions between Russians and Khivans — The Aral Sea Flotilla 
 — Khokandian attacks on the Russians — Siege of Ak-Mechet 
 and its capture by the Russians^ — Khokandian Expeditions for 
 retaking Ak-Mechet —Further Russian Aggression across the 
 Hi — The Crimean War — ^Two Russian Plans for the Invasion of 
 India — Herat again besieged by Persia — British Force des- 
 patched against the Shah — Intrigues and Insurrection of Izzet 
 Kutebar — Ignatieff's Missions to Khiva and Bokhara — Further 
 Russian Explorations of Central Asia — Khanikoff's Mission. 
 
 At the commencement of the present century, 
 the Russian frontier from tlie Caspian to Eastern 
 Siberia was defended by a continuous line of forti- 
 fied posts, which protected the Russian settlements 
 from the attacks of the wild tribes which inhabited 
 the Steppes of Central Asia. This frontier line 
 commenced at Guriev, at the mouth of the River 
 Ural, and followed the left bank of that river as 
 far as the town of Orsk ; from thence it ran to 
 Troitska, and then across the Ishim Steppe, past 
 Petro-Paulovsk to Omsk on the Irtish ; the line 
 then followed the left bank of that river to Semi- 
 palatinsk and Puktarminsk on the l)orders of
 
 1846-18.58 The Syr Daria 145 
 
 China. But, although this frontier was a good one 
 for defensive purposes, being on the northern 
 extremity of vast, barren, and sparsely populated 
 Steppes, the Eussians had no intention of treatins^ 
 it as a permanent line beyond which they should 
 not advance. 
 
 It has already been shown how they en- 
 deavoured on more than one occasion to sret a 
 footing on the great Eiver Oxus, the main water- 
 way into the heart of Central Asia, and how their 
 attempts had failed. The disastrous failure of 
 Perovski's expedition, together with the lessons 
 which had been derived from the previous attacks 
 on Khiva, taught the Eussians that the time was 
 not yet ripe for the conquest of that Khanate, and 
 that they could not yet acquire control over the 
 navigation of the Oxus. 
 
 But some distance to the north of that river 
 there is another great stream, the Syr Daria, or 
 Jaxartes, which rising in the Thian Shan Eange, 
 appeared to offer a line of advance almost as 
 favourable for their purpose ; and the Eussians 
 therefore began to turn their attention in that 
 direction. 
 
 Even before the failure of Perovski's expedition 
 they had determined to examine this line of ad- 
 vance, and in 1837 the Asiatic Committee decided 
 to despatch a so-called scientific mission to the 
 north-eastern shores of the Sea of Aral, and up 
 the Syr Daria. But this mission was indefinitelv 
 postponed on account of the serious events which 
 were occurring in Persia and Afghanistan, followed 
 
 VOL. I. L
 
 146 Russian Advance : Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 by Perovski's abortive attempt to reach Khiva. 
 Then troubles broke out among the still discon- 
 tented Kirghiz, and a serious rebellion of these 
 turbulent subjects had to be suppressed ; so that 
 it was not till 184G that steps could be taken to 
 carry out the recommendation of the Committee. 
 In that year, however, General ObruchefF, who was 
 Governor-General of Orenburg, obtained permis- 
 sion to occupy a point on the shores of the Sea of 
 Aral ; and for this purpose Captain Leo von Schultz 
 was despatched to survey the mouth of the Sj^r 
 Daria, and to select a suitable site for a fort. As 
 a result of his investigations a fort, which became 
 known as Fort Eaim or Fort Aralsk, was con- 
 structed in 1847 at the mouth of the river, while 
 at the same time three other forts were built, as 
 links in the chain connecting the old Orenburg 
 line with the Syr Daria. These intermediate posts 
 w^ere Kurabutakski and Uralski on the Eiver Irghiz, 
 and Orenburgskoi on the Eiver Turgai. 
 
 While the Eussians were gradually pushing 
 forward from Orenburg, in order to gain a footing 
 on the Syr Daria, they were also throwing forward 
 their left flank in the direction of Little Bokhara 
 or Kashgar. Thus, after the lapse of more than a 
 century, they commenced a series of movements 
 precisely similar to those which had been initiated 
 by Peter the Great. Peter, at the commencement 
 of the eighteenth century, had invaded Persia, 
 attacked Khiva, and sent an expedition to gain 
 possession of the gold mines of Little Bokhara; 
 while his successors in the present century also
 
 -1858 Kirghiz of the Middle Horde 147 
 
 invaded Persia on two occasions, tried to conquer 
 Khiva, and pushed forward towards Kashgar. 
 
 As has already been mentioned, the town of 
 Omsk was founded in 1716 by BuckhoUz on his 
 retreat from Lake Yamyshef. Two years later the 
 first fortress was built at Semipalatinsk, and in 
 1720 Ust-Kamenogorsk was founded by LikharefF 
 on his retirement from Zaisan Nor. The Orenburg 
 and Irtish forts were connected in 1752 by the 
 New Siberian line of posts across the Ishim Steppe, 
 and in 1760 the Buktarminsk Fort was erected as 
 an advanced post against possible attacks from the 
 Chinese. At this time the country round the head- 
 waters of the Irtish was populated by the Kalmuks, 
 but in 1758, the Chinese having conquered Dzun- 
 garia, set to work, and indiscriminately massacred 
 the Kalmuk inhabitants of the province. The 
 Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde then hastened 
 to occupy the vacant pastures, and thus became 
 the neighbours of the Eussians. These people, 
 however, coquetted with both the Chinese and the 
 Eussians, and at first gave some trouble, but in 
 1760 their Khan, Sultan Abdul Faiz, sent an am- 
 bassador to St. Petersburg asking the Czar to take 
 him under his protection, and promising to protect 
 Eussian caravans trading with the states of Central 
 Asia. This request was granted, and thus all the 
 Kirghiz-Kazaks between the Irtish and Orenburg 
 became the nominal subjects of the Wliite Czar. 
 Those to the south of the Irtish, however, behaved 
 in exactly the same way as their kinsmen to the 
 west had done. Caravans were plundered and the
 
 148 Russian Advance : Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 Steppes were the scenes of continual disorder and 
 violence. At the commencement of the present 
 century the Eussian autlio];ities began to adopt 
 measures for enforcing order among these unruly 
 subjects. Each caravan proceeding southwards 
 was escorted by a small detachment of Cossacks, 
 and between 1808 and 1819 a considerable force 
 was employed under General Glasenap, for the pur- 
 pose of completely subduing the marauders. These 
 operations were crowned with success, and the 
 Kirghiz on the Irtish Steppes were so reduced to 
 subjection that solitary travellers could traverse 
 the country in complete safety. 
 
 But the Russians were determined to advance 
 southwards, towards the unknown lands from 
 whence continual reports were received of the 
 great stores of mineral wealth which lay hidden in 
 the mysterious regions to which but few Europeans 
 had yet penetrated. The Kirghiz were again to be 
 made the excuse for aggression, and once again 
 were Peter's words to be verified : — ' The Kirghiz 
 are a roaming and fickle people, yet their Steppe is 
 the key and gate of all the lands and countries of 
 Asia.' In 1827 Cossacks were stationed at Kok- 
 chetaf and Karkaraly ; in 1831 the town of Ser- 
 giopol was founded ; and in the following year 
 Akmolinsk and Baian-Aul were made the head- 
 quarters of sub-districts. At this time, a portion 
 of the Great Horde of Kirghiz tendered their sub- 
 mission, and the relations of the Eussians with 
 their Kirghiz subjects became much more satis- 
 factory. But still the advance was continued.
 
 -1858 Advance from both Flanks 149 
 
 Scientific officers and topographers were sent 
 forward to make surveys and to report on the 
 mineral resources of the countries visited ; and in 
 1846, the town of Kopal was founded by Prince 
 GortchakofF, tlie Governor-General of Western 
 Siberia, on a fertile plateau at the base of the Ala- 
 Tau range. 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs at the eastern 
 end of the Orenburg-Siberian line when Fort Eaim 
 was built at the mouth of the Syr Daria. The 
 Eussians, advancing beyond their line of fortified 
 posts, had thrown forward their right and left 
 flanks — ostensibly for the subjugation of the 
 Kirghiz, but really in the deliberate pursuit of a 
 well-matured scheme of aggression. The extremi- 
 ties of these two arms which were thus thrown 
 forward were far in advance of the old fortified 
 line, and were separated from each other by many 
 hundreds of miles of barren Steppes and unexplored 
 mountain ranges. The position for a time was a 
 weak one ; but the Eussians soon began to consider 
 the best means of closing the long undefended gap 
 between Fort Eaim and Kopal. With this object 
 it was considered necessary that the whole of the 
 Steppes between the two advanced flanks should 
 be annexed, and that a new line of fortified posts 
 should be constructed along the southern limits of 
 the territory so appropriated. 
 
 The Eussian Government professed to believe 
 that by doing this their Kirghiz subjects would be 
 brought under proper control, and protected from 
 the attacks of the Khivans and Khokandians ; but
 
 ISO Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 they ignored the fact that by abandoning their 
 old defensive hne, and taking up a new position 
 at the southern edge of the Steppe, they ran the 
 risk of colhsions with the Khivansand Khokandians, 
 which would necessarily prove far more trouble- 
 some than the worst raids of the Kirghiz, and 
 inevitably involve Eussia in constant warfare with 
 the Central Asian Khanates. 
 
 The Khokandians and Khivans naturally con- 
 sidered the Eussian occupation of the mouth of the 
 Syr Daria to be an unwarranted act of aggression. 
 The former had, early in the century (about 1817), 
 constructed the forts of Yani-Kurgan, Julek, Ak- 
 Mechet, Kumysh-Kurgan, Chim-Kurgan, Kosh- 
 Kurgan, and others, and had since that time 
 regularly levied taxes on the Kirghiz who settled 
 on the banks of the river ; and in 1830, the 
 Khivans, who considered that their authority ex- 
 tended throughout the Kizil Kum desert to the 
 south of the Syr Daria, had also erected several 
 forts on the left bank of the Kuvan Daria (a branch 
 of the Syr). 
 
 But the Khokandians were at this time ensfaged 
 in a bitter civil war, and could therefore offer 
 but slight opposition to the Eussians ; while the 
 Khivans could do little or nothino- at such a dis- 
 tance from their capital. During 1847 and 1848, 
 however, the Khivans made repeated inroads into 
 the country round Fort Eaim, and there were 
 frequent collisions between them and the Eussian 
 detachments which were sent against them. The 
 Eussians were almost invariably successful in these
 
 -1858 Aral Sea Flotilla 151 
 
 encounters, and eventually the Kliivans Trere 
 obliged to give up the struggle, and contented 
 themselves with merely demanding the evacua- 
 tion of the fort. 
 
 When the Eussians built the Raim fort, they 
 at the same time commenced the formation of the 
 Aral Sea flotilla. In 1847 two sailing vessels were 
 built at Orenburg. One of these, the Nikolai, was 
 a war vessel intended for surveying purposes ; 
 while the other, the Mikhail, was a merchant ship 
 for establishing fisheries. These vessels were 
 transported in pieces to Fort Eaim and were there 
 put together and launched. The Nikolai at once 
 put to sea, but owing to the lateness of the season 
 could do little in the way of surveying. However, 
 in the spring of 1848 the whole of the northern 
 coast of the Aral Sea was survej^ed, and another 
 and larger war-vessel, the Constantine, having 
 meanwhile been sent from Orenburg, Lieutenant 
 Butakoff commenced in the following autumn to 
 make a thorough survey of the whole of the Sea of 
 Aral — a work which was satisfactorily completed 
 in two years. 
 
 In 1850 two steamers were ordered from the 
 Motala Ironworks in Sweden, for the navigation of 
 the Syr Daria. These steamers, the ' Perovski ' and 
 the ' ObruchelT,' reached Fort Aralsk in November, 
 1852, and were there put together, being ready for 
 work by the end of the following May. 
 
 At this time the Governor of Ak-Mechet was 
 a man named Yakoob Beg, who had gradually been 
 making a name for himself in the troubled Khanate
 
 152 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 of Khokand, and who some years later, as the 
 Atalyk Ghazi of Kashgar, occupied a prominent 
 position in Eastern pohtics, and became known as 
 the most powerful sovereign in Central Asia. In 
 1845 he was Chamberlain to the newly-appointed 
 Khan Khudayar ; shortly after he was made a 
 ' Pansad Bashi,' or commander of 500 men ; in 
 1847 he married a Kipchak lady of Julek — a 
 Khokandian post some miles east of Ak-Mechet — 
 and towards the close of that year he was raised 
 to the rank of ' Kush-Begi,' and entrusted with the 
 command of Ak-Mechet and the surrounding Kho- 
 kandian district on the banks of the Lower Syr 
 Daria. 
 
 Yakoob Beg appears to have been imbued with 
 strong feelings of hatred towards the Eussians, 
 and as soon as he arrived at Ak-Mechet he began 
 to adopt measures for the defence of his district. 
 The establishment of the Eussians at Fort Eaim 
 constituted a standing menace to the Khokandian 
 posts higher up the river ; and Yakoob anxiously 
 watched the preparations which were being made 
 for a fresh advance. The Khokandians did not 
 realise that their best policy was to abstain from 
 attacking the Eussians, and thus to have given 
 them no excuse for further encroachments. They 
 had no idea of the strength of the great Power 
 which had now become their neighbour. They 
 only knew that the troops of the White Czar had 
 advanced across the wild Kirghiz Steppes, and had 
 without provocation seized upon a portion of 
 Khokandian territory, where they had established
 
 -1858 First Move up the Syr Daria 153 
 
 themselves, and were making preparations for a 
 further advance against the other Khokandian 
 forts along the banks of the river. Yakoob be- 
 lieved that unless the Eussians were driven out of 
 Fort Eaim his district would inevitably be lost to 
 Khokand, and he therefore organised a series of 
 raids against the fort and the adjoining Eussian 
 settlements. These attacks, however, gave the 
 Eussians an excellent excuse for a further advance ; 
 and in 1851, Major Engmann, the Commandant of 
 Fort Aralsk, attacked a party of Khokandians who 
 had advanced to the neighbourhood of the fort, 
 and pursuing them along the banks of the river, 
 captured their fort Kosh-Kurgan. 
 
 But the Eussian preparations for a general 
 advance were not then complete, and until the fol- 
 lowing year no decisive measures could be taken 
 to drive the Khokandians from their strongholds 
 higher up the river. 
 
 In April, 1852, however, a surveying party 
 was despatched up the Syr Daria, but on reaching 
 Ak-Mechet was very naturally stopped and turned 
 back. This act was denounced as a piece of in- 
 tolerable interference, and General Perovski, the 
 Governor-General of the Orenburg district, re- 
 solved to despatch a strong force to curb the 
 insolence of the Khokandians, and to reduce their 
 chief stronghold, Ak-Mechet. Accordingly, on 
 July 3, 1852, a detachment left Fort Aralsk, con- 
 sisting of 12 officers and 420 men, with 2 guns, and 
 accompanied by 36 irregulars. 
 
 This small column was placed under the com-
 
 154 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 mand of Colonel Blaramberg, who received the 
 following orders : — 
 
 (1) To survey the right bank of the Syr Daria 
 as far as Ak-Mechet. 
 
 (2) In the event of an encounter with the 
 Khokandians, or in case they should make any 
 uncalled-for demands, to attack them immediately. 
 
 (3) Without touching at any fortifications 
 lying nearer to Aralsk, to proceed direct to 
 Ak-Mechet, and there act as circumstances might 
 require. If Ak-Mechet lies within Eussian limits, 
 to endeavour to raze it ; but, under all circumstances, 
 to notify to the Khokandians that the fort must not 
 remain on its actucd site. 
 
 Warned of the enemy's approach, the Khokand- 
 ians destroyed the dam which diverted the waters 
 of the Syr into Lake Ber Kazan, and thus flooded 
 the adjacent country. But the Eussians, in spite 
 of this obstacle, managed to safely cross five 
 branches of the river, and eventually arrived be- 
 fore the fortress on July 19. Here Blaramberg 
 found that the capture of the place was not such 
 an easy task as had been expected. He found 
 that the defences consisted of an outer wall, within 
 which there was a strong citadel, the ramparts of 
 which were composed of hard clay, about 25 feet 
 high and 10 feet thick. His force was unprovided 
 with scaling ladders, the whole country was in- 
 undated, and a considerable rise in the water was 
 by no means improbable. Moreover, he heard 
 that a strong Khokandian reinforcement was daily 
 expected. Under these circumstances he decided
 
 -1858 Unsuccessful Attack ON Ak-Meciiet 155 
 
 to attack the outer portion of the fortress, and to 
 destroy all that lay between the exterior walls and 
 the citadel ; and he therefore commenced a pre- 
 liminary bombardment of the place on the night 
 of July 19. The Khokandians at once returned 
 the fire, but by daylight on the 20th their guns 
 had been dismounted, and the outer gate of the 
 fortress had been destroyed. 
 
 Blaramberg then formed his small force into 
 two columns, and assaulted the place ; while one 
 party forced an entrance through the broken gate- 
 way, the other scaled the wall by the aid of pick- 
 axes and hatchets. In less than ten minutes the 
 Eussians obtained complete possession of the whole 
 space between the outer walls and citadel, and ad- 
 vanced to the foot of the ramparts of the keep. 
 But here their progress was stopped ; it was im- 
 possible to make any impression on the massive 
 walls, and without scaling ladders the place could 
 not be stormed. The Eussian Commander therefore 
 decided to abandon the attempt, and to retire to 
 Fort Aralsk. Before retiring he, however, set fire 
 to all the buildings outside the citadel, and com- 
 pletely destroyed everything of value. The con- 
 flagration lasted the whole night, during which 
 many of the garrison who endeavoured to save 
 their property were killed. 
 
 On July 21 the retreat commenced, and on the 
 way back to Fort Aralsk, Colonel Blaramberg de- 
 stroyed the small forts of Kumysh-Kurgan, Chim- 
 Kurgan, and Kosh-Kurgan. 
 
 Thus the first serious advance which the
 
 156 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 Eussians made along the Syr Daria was repulsed ; 
 but Perovski determined to renew the attack on 
 Ak-Mechet as soon as possible, and to employ 
 such a formidable force as would render success 
 certain. Preparations were accordingly pushed 
 forward, every possible precaution being taken to 
 insure the success of the undertaking ; and in the 
 spring of 1853 a force of 2,168 men, with 12 
 o'uns, left Orenburor under the command of the 
 Governor-General of the district in person. The 
 force marched in two columns and concentrated at 
 Aralsk. 
 
 Although one of the reasons for the Eussian 
 advance along the Syr is stated to have been for 
 the purpose of protecting the Kirghiz from the 
 oppressions of the Khokandians, yet Perovski 
 appears to have been afraid that these Eussian 
 proteges would, instead of affording assistance to 
 their deliverers, attack the convoy's ; and he there- 
 fore gave orders to the Sultan rulers to remove 
 their followers into the Steppe, and prohibited 
 them from encamping during the summer near to 
 the road leadin*? from Orenburfy to Aralsk. This 
 order was carried out ; but the Kirghiz openly 
 displayed their unfriendliness by refusing to supply 
 camels for the expedition. 
 
 Towards the end of June the force detailed for 
 the attack on Ak-Mechet marched out of Aralsk. 
 It consisted of 1,500 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 10 
 guns, and was accompanied by 780 waggons and 
 1,150 camels, besides numerous baggage-horses 
 and oxen.
 
 "1858 Renewed Attack on Ak-Mechet 157 
 
 Meanwhile the Khokandians had not been idle. 
 As they fully expected that the Eussians would 
 renew the attack on their stronghold, they had set 
 to work to improve its defences. The debris of 
 the old outer fortification and buildings was re- 
 moved, and the citadel was greatly strengthened. 
 The plan of the place had been improved, the 
 walls made thicker, and the gates carefully 
 screened by outworks. Three guns were mounted 
 on the ramparts, and lumps of sun-dried clay, 
 called ' kisiak,' were prepared in readiness to hurl 
 down at the assailants. 
 
 As soon as Perovski arrived before the fort he 
 sent a messenger under a flag of truce demand- 
 ing its immediate surrender ; but when this man 
 arrived within gun-shot, the Khokandians opened 
 fire on him, and he was obliged to return. 
 
 On July 21 the bombardment commenced, but 
 its effect was found to be very unsatisfactory, and 
 Perovski therefore determined to advance by 
 means of common saps, and to form a breach by 
 mining. Systematic approaches were accordingly 
 started on July 22 and were steadily pushed for- 
 ward ; but the slowness of this form of attack 
 caused considerable discontent among the troops, 
 who had expected that the fort would be taken by 
 storm immediately after their arrival. 
 
 On July 25 a Khokandian prisoner was sent to 
 the fort with the followim? summons to surrender : — 
 
 ' From the Governor-General of Orenburg to 
 the Commander of the Fortress of Ak-Mechet. 
 
 ' By order of my Sovereign, the Emperor of All
 
 158 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 tlie Eussias, I have come to take Ak-Mechet, 
 erected by the Khokandians on Eussian territory 
 for tlie purpose of oppressing the Kirghiz subjects 
 of His Imperial Majesty. 
 
 ' Ak-Mechet is already taken, although you are 
 inside it, and you cannot fail to perceive that 
 without losing any of my men, I am in a position 
 to destroy every one of you. 
 
 'The Eussians have come hither, not for a day, 
 nor yet for a year, but for ever ; they will not 
 retire. 
 
 ' If you wish to live, ask for mercy ; should 
 you prefer to die in Ak-Mechet you can do so ; I 
 am not pressed for time, and do not intend to 
 hurry you. I here repeat that I do not come to 
 offer you combat, but to thrash you until you open 
 your gate. 
 
 ' All this I would have told you on the first day 
 of my arrival, when I approached the walls of your 
 fort unarmed, had you not traitorously opened fire 
 on me, which is not customary among honourable 
 soldiers.' 
 
 In the evening the messenger returned with a 
 reply that while the Khokandian Government de- 
 clined to be answerable for the acts of oppression 
 committed by the Kipchaks, the Commandant was 
 willing to evacuate the fort if he were allowed fifteen 
 days for the purpose, during which time the Eus- 
 sians were to retire from under the walls ; otherwise 
 the garrison would resist ' so long as the gun- 
 barrels remained in their stocks, or their sword- 
 blades and spear-handles were unbroken, and the
 
 -1858 Capture of Ak-Mechet 159 
 
 supply of " kisiak " was unexhausted.' At the same 
 time the Commandant explained that the first 
 Eussian messenger had been fired upon because 
 the Eussians had invaded Khokandian territory and 
 approached the fort without any declaration of war, 
 or explanation of their reasons for so acting. The 
 attack was therefore continued, and on July 27 
 the approaches had reached the ditch, which was 
 shortly afterwards crossed by a covered sap, and a 
 mined gallery was driven under one of the bastions. 
 At three o'clock in the grey dawn of August 9, 
 three rockets were discharged in rapid succession ; 
 a few moments later the earth trembled, and with a 
 dull roar a great black mass of earth was seen to 
 rise in the air and then settle down into two con- 
 fused heaps on the ground. The mine had been 
 sprung, and a great opening was formed in the 
 walls more than thirty feet wide. Ak-Mechet was 
 enveloped in dense clouds of smoke and dust, 
 which for a time concealed the breach from the 
 Eussians ; but the piercing shrieks and cries which 
 rose from behind the walls proved to the besiegers 
 that their work had been well done. The Eussian 
 batteries at once opened a heavy fire of grape on 
 the spot where the breach was known to have been 
 made, and the storming parties rushed forward to 
 the attack. But the Khokandians were not taken 
 by surprise, for before the smoke and debris from 
 the explosion had cleared away they had lined the 
 breach, and, although exposed to a heavy fire from 
 the Eussian guns, poured a continuous fire of 
 musketiy into the advancing troops. The Eussians
 
 i6o Russian Advance : Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 were twice driven back, and it was only after they 
 had received reinforcements that their third as- 
 sault proved successful. At half-past four all 
 resistance had ceased, and the Eussians became 
 masters of Ak-Mechet, which had been the chief 
 barrier against • their advance towards the Kara- 
 Tau Mountains. 
 
 Yakoob Beg appears to have left the fort 
 during^ the siesfe, and his successor, Mahommed 
 Wali, was killed, while out of a garrison of 300 
 men, 230 were found dead in the ditch or inside 
 the fort, which proves the desperate bravery with 
 which the Khokandians defended their stronghold. 
 The Eussian loss consisted of 13 men killed, and 8 
 officers and 52 men wounded. 
 
 The loss of Ak-Mechet was a severe blow to 
 the power of Khokand, as it was the chief bulwark 
 of that State on the Lower Syr Daria, and it was 
 not long before the Khokandians began to make 
 efforts to recapture it. But Perovski had taken 
 steps to render his position as strong as possible. 
 During his advance up the river he had given 
 orders for the construction of two forts, which 
 were to connect Ak-Mechet with Fort Aralsk. 
 One of these forts was built on the Kazala branch 
 of the river, and became known as the Kazala Fort, 
 or Fort No. 1, while the second was built higher up 
 the Syr at the Karmakchi settlement, and became 
 known as Fort No. 2. The Khokandian fort of 
 Kumysh-Kurgan, which had been abandoned by 
 its garrison during the siege of Ak-Mechet, was 
 also occupied by the Eussians, and named Fort
 
 -1858 The Svr Daria Line i6r 
 
 No. 3. These three forts, together with forts 
 Aralsk and Ak-Mechet (which was re-named Fort 
 Perovski), formed the new line of the Syr Daria. ^ 
 
 At the end of 1853, Fort Perovski contained a 
 garrison of 1,055 men, with 14 guns and 5 mor- 
 tars, and was supplied with provisions for eighteen 
 months. 
 
 Early in September, 1853, the commandant of 
 Fort Perovski received intelligence that a force of 
 about 7,000 Khokandians had arrived at Julek, 
 and were advancing against him. But they were 
 speedily routed by the troops despatched by the 
 Commandant. 
 
 Undaunted by this failure, a fresh Khokandian 
 force of about 13,000 men with 17 guns left Tash- 
 kent in November, 1853, under Yakoob Beg, for 
 the purpose of driving the Eussians out of their 
 posts on the Syr, and messages were sent to the 
 Kirghiz, inciting them to join in the attack. But 
 this expedition also entii-el}^ failed. More than 
 2,000 Khokandians were killed, whilst the Eussian 
 loss only amounted to 18 killed and 49 wounded. 
 
 This affair completel}^ put an end to the Kho- 
 kandian attempts to recover possession of Ak- 
 Mechet, for although there were several rumours 
 of further attacks being meditated, the Eussian 
 posts on the Syr Daria were not interfered with. 
 
 While these events were occurring on the Syr 
 Daria a similar advance was being made far away 
 in the East. The town of Kopal was originally 
 
 ' Fort Kumysh- Kurgan was abandoned by the Russians in 1855, 
 and in the same year Fort Aralsk was removed to Fort No. 1. 
 VOL. I. M
 
 1 62 Russian Advance : Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 supposed to have been built for the protection 
 of the Great Horde of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, the 
 majority of whom had become Eussian subjects 
 some few years previously. But this town was 
 situated on the northern confines of the tract which 
 was inhabited by the Horde, and a new advance 
 was soon said to be necessary for the purpose of 
 protecting these people from the Kara-Kirghiz, or 
 Dikokamenni-Kirghiz, who frequented the moun- 
 tainous districts further to the south. It was 
 merely a repetition of the old story. The Kirghiz 
 were once more to be put forward as an excuse for 
 further aggression. It is doubtful whether any 
 Government has displayed such an amount of 
 solicitude and thoughtful consideration for any 
 section of its subjects as the Eussians have mani- 
 fested with regard to these unruly Kirghiz. But 
 this anxious solicitude for the welfare of these 
 people was unfortunately only displayed when an 
 excuse could thereby be obtained for fresh aggres- 
 sion. For many decades after these nomads 
 tendered their submission to Eussia, no steps 
 were taken to improve their mode of living, or 
 to introduce among them any of the blessings of 
 civilisation. They have always been wild, reck- 
 less barbarians, living in the most primitive man- 
 ner, and but little has ever been done to better 
 their condition. But whenever the Eussians have 
 established themselves in an advanced position, 
 and have completed their preparations for a 
 further forward movement, it has invariably been 
 found that some tribe or state has been molest-
 
 -1858 Russians cross the River Ili 163 
 
 ing the Kirghiz, and must therefore be punished. 
 And so the game has continued ; the Eussian 
 frontiers meanwhile having been pushed forward 
 many hundreds of miles, until the extreme limits of 
 the country occupied by the Kirghiz-Kazaks have 
 been reached, and the excuse no longer needed. 
 
 Thus, a few years after the building of Kopal, 
 it was decided that a new advance should be made 
 across the Eiver Ili, and that the whole country 
 between that river and Lake Issik Kul should be 
 occupied, in order that the Great Horde might 
 be defended from its enemies, and that permanent 
 peace might be obtained by making the Eussian 
 frontier conterminous with the borders of the 
 Chinese Empire. Such were the motives which are 
 said to have induced the Eussians to push south- 
 wards across the Eiver Ili ; and it will be seen in 
 the sequel how utterly erroneous it was for them 
 to imagine that by advancing far into the wilds of 
 Central Asia, they would be able to secure peace. 
 
 In 1853 a Eussian detachment crossed the 
 Eiver Ili, but instead of being welcomed as the 
 saviours of a down-trodden and oppressed race, 
 they were violently attacked l:)y strong bodies of 
 the very people whom they had come to deliver. 
 A considerable section of the Great Horde had 
 not submitted to the Eussians, and now stoutly 
 opposed their advance. Their chief stronghold 
 was the Fort of Tuchubek on the Kaskalan Eiver, 
 from whence they boldly attacked the Eussian 
 troops, and clearly showed that they had no 
 desire to become subjects of the White Czar.
 
 i64 Russian Advance : Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 But in tlie following year a larger force was 
 sent across the Hi, Tuclmbek was destroyed, and 
 the Kirghiz were compelled either to submit to 
 Eussian authority, or to take refuge in Khokan- 
 dian territory. Many preferred the latter alter- 
 native, and either fled to the Naryn Valley or 
 settled down on the banks of the Talas Eiver. 
 The Eussians wintered on the banks of the Tolgar 
 (a small tributary of the Hi), and in the follow- 
 ing year, 1855, advanced to the northern slopes 
 of the Ala-Tau Mountains, and there founded the 
 town of Vernoye or Almaty, on the banks of the 
 little Almatinky stream. Thus, while the Eussians 
 were extendino- their rio'ht from Orenbur^y towards 
 the Syr Daria, the left flank was also pushed for- 
 ward to the borders of Eastern Turkestan, then a 
 province of the Chinese Empire ; and preparations 
 were made for a simultaneous movement from 
 both flanks towards the centre, which would round 
 off the Eussian possessions to the south of Siberia, 
 and extend Eussian authority to the very borders 
 of the Khanate of Khokand. 
 
 But in the meanwhile events had occurred in 
 Europe which forced the Czar Nicholas to aban- 
 don further military operations on the frontiers of 
 his vast Asiatic dominions. The peace which had 
 been maintained in Europe for so mau}^ years was 
 now drawing to its close. On Dec. 2, 1851. Louis 
 Napoleon, taking advantage of certain unpopular 
 acts of the Eepublican deputies, overthrew the 
 Eepublic which he had sworn to defend, and a 
 year later assumed the title of Emperor of the
 
 -1858 The Crimean War 165 
 
 French. The Europeati Governments viewed this 
 change with considerable apprehension, as it was 
 generally expected that the new Emperor would 
 endeavour to strengthen his position by aggressive 
 enterprises against his neighbours. The Eussians 
 also had been, as usual, intriguing in Turkey, 
 and finally demanded that the Sultan should ac- 
 knowledge the Czar's right to protect the Chris- 
 tian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan 
 refused to agree, and England and France sup- 
 ported the Porte. Napoleon was desirous of going 
 to war to divert the thoughts of his people from 
 home affairs, and the English Ministry failed to 
 make the Czar understand that a Eussian attack 
 on the Porte would mean war with England. In 
 July, 1853, Eussian troops occupied the Danubian 
 Principalities ; the Sultan declared war in the fol- 
 lowing October ; and by the end of March, 1854, 
 Great Britain and France had formed an alliance, 
 and the Crimean war began. 
 
 While this great war was in progress, two 
 schemes for the invasion of India were laid before 
 the Emperor Nicholas. After the failure of the 
 siege of Herat, and the British invasion of Afghan- 
 istan, the Eussian Government did their utmost 
 to allay the commotion which had been caused 
 through their intrioues on the borders of India. 
 Vitkievitch was therefore disowned ; and Count 
 Simonitch was recalled from Persia, as he was 
 said to have exceeded his instructions. Simonitch 
 was succeeded at Teheran by General Duhamel ; 
 and when the Crimean war began, this officer
 
 1 66 Russian Advance : Kirghiz Steppes i84g- 
 
 presented a memorandum to tlie Czar, wherein he 
 recommended that a Eussian force should be sent 
 against India, in order that the Enghsh might be 
 alarmed for the safety of their East Indian posses- 
 sions, and thus be unable to concentrate the whole 
 of their attention on the struggle which was being 
 fought out in Europe. 
 
 In this project General Duhamel stated : — 
 ' When, towards the close of the last century, 
 an army corps w^as quartered on the Eastern 
 borders, by order of the Czar Paul, for the pur- 
 pose of attacking India, the English people, 
 although not certain of the fact, were greatly 
 startled when they received reports of the concen- 
 tration. Since then British writers have never 
 ceased to point out, in various ways, the dangers 
 of a possible Eussian invasion of India, and their 
 Parliament has often discussed the question. 
 
 ' The present war, which is to be fought out to 
 the bitter end, imposes on Eussia the duty of 
 showing how she can attack England in her only 
 vulnerable point, in India, and thus force her to 
 assemble so great a force in Asia as to weaken her 
 action in Europe. History teaches us that nearly 
 all the Powers wdiich conquered India found their 
 w^ay to it through Central Asia and Persia, and that 
 the roads by which Alexander the Great, Genghiz 
 Khan, Tamerlane, Baber, and, finally, Nadir Shah 
 broke into India are still open. They traverse 
 Khorassan and Afghanistan, wdiether they lead from 
 Persia or from the river Oxus. The cities of 
 Kandahar and Kabul are the gates of India.
 
 -1858 New Schemes for Invasion of India 167 
 
 ' The first route leads from Orenburg over the 
 Ust-Yurt plateau to Khiva, and thence through 
 Merv and Herat to Kandahar and KabuL 
 
 'The second iroes from Orsk or Orenburir to 
 Fort Aralsk, and thence to Bokhara, Balkh, 
 Khuhn, and Kabul. 
 
 ' The third leads from Orsk or Troitska, 
 through Fort Aralsk and Ak-Mechet to Tashkent ; 
 or goes direct to Petro-paulovsk, and thence on to 
 Khokand, Khuhn, Bamian, and Kabul. 
 
 'The fourth is by water from Astrakhan to 
 Astrabad, and thence, through Kabushan (Kushan^ 
 or Shahrud, to Meshed, Herat, Kandahar, and 
 Kabul. 
 
 ' The fifth and last route leads from the frontier 
 on the Eiver Araxes to Tabriz, Teheran, Meshed, 
 Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul. 
 
 ' The first three roads lead through the desert 
 where it is widest, and by these, even if the oases 
 of Khiva and Bokhara were made use of, many 
 thousands of camels would be required for trans- 
 port purposes. The last two routes lead through 
 a country where there are no deserts, and which 
 in some places is very fertile, and inhabited by a 
 sturdy race of people. These two lines of advance 
 do not traverse any such inaccessible points as are 
 met with in the Hindu-Kush Mountains, nor are 
 there any impassable rivers, such as the Oxus, 
 between Bokhara and Balkh. When once the 
 necessary transport vessels are collected on the 
 Caspian Sea, then the Astrakhan-Astrabad line is 
 to be preferred to all the others, for it is the
 
 i68 Russian Advance: Kirghiz SxErrES i846- 
 
 sliortest. Once in Astrabad, a footing in Klior- 
 assan can easily be obtained, and the remaining 
 distance to Kabul is only 1,870 versts. The in- 
 fantry, guns, and ammunition would be carried 
 across the Caspian Sea, while the cavalry and 
 train marched from Circassia through Persia. 
 
 ' A march through Turkestan would be a dan- 
 gerous operation, for the Khans and their tribes 
 would have to be fought, and, even when defeated, 
 they would attack our rear, and thus cut our com- 
 munications. The march through half-civilised 
 Persia would, however, be comparatively easy, for 
 that State is so bound by treaties as to be in- 
 capable of offering any serious opposition, and is 
 moreover threatened from all sides (especially from 
 Circassia), and thus rendered powerless. What 
 more, then, can be wanted ? Active co-operation 
 on the part of Persia involves active co-operation 
 on the part of Afghanistan, on account of the 
 deadly hatred which exists between the two 
 peoples ; and this is the conditio sine qua non of an 
 attack against Hindustan. . . . Naturally England 
 would take steps to prevent all this ; but even if 
 she had time and means for despatching an expe- 
 dition to the Persian Gulf, and occupied the island 
 of Karrack and Bunder Bushire, or raised up a 
 rebellion among the tribes of Southern Persia, it 
 would be of little avail if Eussia guaranteed to the 
 Shah the secure possession of his throne and 
 dominions, and still less should she promise the 
 restoration of the Turkish provinces of Baghdad, 
 Kerseldi, and a part of Kurdistan, thereby kindling
 
 -1858 The Khorassan Route recommended 169 
 
 a war between Persia and Turkey. The route 
 through Persia is therefore for many reasons to be 
 preferred to those through Turkestan. 
 
 ' There are three roads from Afghanistan to 
 India: — (1) from Kabul, through Jalalabad and 
 Peshawar to Attock ; (2) from Ghazni to Dehra 
 Ismail Khan ; (3) from Kandahar, through Quetta 
 and Dadur to Shikarpur. 
 
 ' These three roads lead through defiles which 
 are easily defended, but which are all more ex- 
 posed to a successful attack from the west than 
 from the east. The best, shortest, and most 
 healtliy, is the first ; although in 1839 the English 
 adopted the third. From Attock it is easier to 
 reach Lahore and Delhi, which are the principal 
 objectives. The selection of this route would give 
 rise to a rebellion in the very heart of the English 
 possessions, and cause all the Mahommedan races 
 to rise against them. This line also offers to the 
 Afghans the most tempting prospects of plunder 
 and extension of territory. If the Sikhs were also 
 won over so much the better, but the friendship 
 of the Afghans is of the most vital importance. 
 Once this is gained all is won ; for we invade 
 India not to make conquests, but to overthrow 
 the English, or at all events to weaken England's 
 power. To effect this but a small force is re- 
 quired to form the nucleus of the attacking force, 
 round which all the conquered races would gather, 
 and which might even be gradually reduced as a 
 general rebellion brought fresh recruits to the 
 invading army.'
 
 lyo Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i84g- 
 
 Such was the scheme submitted by General 
 Duhamel in 1854, and in the following year 
 General Khruleff prepared another project for a 
 Eussian invasion of India. This was very similar 
 to the one which had been drawn up by the 
 Eussian Minister in Persia. It was proposed that 
 an army of 30,000 men should advance from Ak- 
 Kala, near Astrabad, to Kandahar, via Bujnurd, 
 Kushan, Meshed, and Herat ; that when Kandahar 
 had been occupied an embass}^ should be sent 
 from thence to Kabul, to gain the alliance of the 
 Afghans ; and that then India should be invaded, 
 the people incited to rebel, and the English driven 
 out of the country or so weakened that they would 
 be forced to abandon the war in Europe. Khruleff 
 considered that for such a scheme to succeed 
 it was indispensable that Persia should observe 
 perfect neutrality, and that tlie Afghans should 
 co-operate in the invasion. He explained how the 
 friendship of Persia could be obtained, stated that 
 the Afii'lians would welcome the advent of a 
 Eussian army, and ' be gratified at our endeavour 
 to overthrow the English ' ; and then proceeded to 
 discuss the precautions whicdi woidd be necessary 
 to guard against possible attacks from the Khivans 
 and Turkouians. Then, after exphiining the pro- 
 posed method of invasion, tlie Eussian General 
 continued : — ' I am deepl}^ imbued with a con- 
 viction of the possibility of carrying it into exe- 
 cution, and of this the English are more assured 
 than we are. A large army would be embarrass- 
 ing ; we should irx to raise a native force ; our own
 
 -18.58 Russia humiliated 171 
 
 should merely form the reserve. We should in- 
 struct the people m our methods of opposing the 
 oppression of the English, whose army in India 
 consists of only 25,000 European soldiers. The 
 Indian army, according to Major Everest, consist- 
 ing of some 300,000 men, is dispersed over an area 
 of 1,076,590 square miles, and is called upon to 
 defend a frontier 707 miles in length, being at the 
 same time commanded by only 7,343 European 
 officers, which was the establishment in 1847. 
 There have been many instances in which these 
 troops have retreated before compact masses of 
 England's native enemies when the officers have 
 been killed. The advent of a long desired army 
 of 30,000 men would rouse the natural hatred of 
 the Afo^hans towards the Enolish, and will shake 
 the power of the British in India. We may make 
 compromises with our other enemies, but Eng- 
 land's bearing towards us, which tends to weaken 
 our power, does not justify us in leaving her in 
 peace. We must liberate the people who are the 
 sources of her wealth, and prove to the whole 
 world the might of the Eussian Czar.' 
 
 But these schemes were never carried out, and 
 the Eussians were unable to prove the might of 
 their Czar before the whole world. Their forces 
 had been defeated in the field, and their most 
 powerful stronghold in the south, though bravely 
 defended, was closely besieged by the armies of 
 the Allies ; the Baltic ports were bombarded, and 
 their commerce destroyed ; whole divisions while 
 marching to the front perished on the frost-bound
 
 172 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 Steppes, and defeat and ruin stared them, in the 
 face. They had no time to devote to wild ventures 
 ill the inhospitable countries of Central Asia, and 
 were forced to concentrate the whole of their 
 energies on the struggle in Europe. 
 
 It may be asked why, when Eussia was con- 
 templating an attack on India at the time of the 
 Crimean war, did not England take advantage of 
 her enemy's crippled condition, and commence 
 operations in Asia which would have driven the 
 Eussians back to the northern extremities of the 
 Kirghiz Steppes, and forced them to abandon their 
 conquests south of the Caucasus ? An English 
 corps operating in Georgia, with the aid of Turkey 
 and Persia, and backed by Schamyl and his hardy 
 mountaineers, would certainly have driven the 
 Eussians beyond the Caucasus ; while a little 
 assistance to the Khivans atid Khokandians would 
 have raised such a convulsion in Central Asia that 
 the Eussians could not possibly have maintained 
 their isolated posts in the Steppes, and would have 
 been forced back to the frontiers they occupied 
 at the commencement of the century. 
 
 Such schemes were laid before the British 
 Government, but found no favour for several 
 reasons. Just as the English people suspected 
 that they had been dragged into the war in order 
 lliat the popularity of the new French Emperor 
 might be enhanced, so the French believed that 
 they had been drawn into the quarrel to advance 
 English interests in the East. Any attempt on the 
 part of England to carry the war into Asia would,
 
 -1858 English Dread of Central Asia 173 
 
 therefore, have been viewed with the greatest sus- 
 picion in France, and might even have caused a 
 rupture between the AUies. Then, again, England 
 had not forgotten the last movement beyond the 
 Indus : and although the aveuQ-inc^ armies success- 
 fully performed their task, and in a great measure 
 re-established British credit, still the entire nation 
 had become possessed with an intense dread of any 
 interference with the States of Central Asia, and 
 shrank from the very idea of despatching troops 
 beyond the Indus. It was not understood that the 
 Kabul massacre had been due to the utter incom- 
 petence of the military commanders, and would 
 never have occurred if even an average amount of 
 decision and military capacity had been displayed. 
 The disaster had been of such an appalling nature 
 that the very judgment of the English people 
 appeared to have been affected. Instead of appre- 
 ciating the true causes which led up to the cata- 
 strophe, it was erroneously imagined that the 
 country was so inaccessible, and its inhabitants of 
 such a formidable and even terrible character, that 
 any new movement beyond the Indus would in- 
 evitably result in renewed defeat and disaster. No 
 British Ministry would therefore undertake the 
 responsibility of waging war with Eussia in Central 
 Asia ; and thus no attempts were made to shake 
 her position on the Syr Daria, while even a hostile 
 demonstration in the Caucasus was abandoned, in 
 order that French susceptibilities might not be 
 wounded. 
 
 During^ the Crimean war the relations l^etween
 
 174 Russian Advance : Kirghiz SxErrES i846- 
 
 Eiigland and Persia were most unsatisfactory. 
 Maliommed Shah died in 1848 and was succeeded 
 by his son, Nasr Eddin, the present Shah of 
 Persia, who had not long been seated on the 
 throne before he began to meddle with Herat 
 aflliirs. Yar Maliommed Khan, who had formerly 
 been Shah Kamran's Vizier, but who murdered his 
 master in 1842, and had since been the indepen- 
 dent ruler of Herat, died in the autumn of 1851, 
 and was succeeded by his son. Said Mahommed, 
 This prince, on his accession, met with considerable 
 opposition from the chiefs of the city, and appealed 
 to the Shah for support ; and Herat would then 
 have become a province of Persia if the British 
 Government had not interfered and insisted on its 
 independence. On January 25, 1853, a treaty was 
 concluded, whereby the Persian Government en- 
 ecao-ed to abstain from all interference in Plerat 
 affairs, and renounced all claims to sovereignty 
 over the State. It was also agreed that no Persian 
 troops should on any account be sent to Herat, 
 ludess the place were attacked by troops from 
 Kabul or Kandahar, or from other foreign terri- 
 tor}^ ; and the Persian Government also relinquished 
 all claims to the coinage of money, or other sign 
 of subjection on the part of the people of Herat to 
 Persia. This convention was a source of con- 
 siderable irritation to the Shah, and predisposed 
 him to be influenced by counsels which were hostile 
 to England. Wlien, therefore, late in the autumn 
 of 1853, a Eussian army was concentrated south 
 of the Caucasus, for the invasion of the Turkish
 
 -1858 A Violent Ambassador 175 
 
 provinces in Asia Minor, and the Eussian Minister 
 (Prince Dolgorouky) suggested that Persia should 
 co-operate with Eussia in an attack on Turkey, 
 the Shah was not unwilling to enter into the pro- 
 posed alliance, and even issued orders for the 
 concentration of 40,000 troops in Azerbijan and 
 15,000 men in Kermanshah. But the Persian 
 Prime Minister suggested that it would be more 
 advantageous to Persia if the Shah were to throw 
 in his lot with the English and French, as thereby 
 Persia might recover the provinces which she had 
 lost in the previous wars with Eussia. Acting on 
 this advice, Nasr Eddin decided to watch the 
 course of events before he committed himself ; and 
 the Eussian Ambassador shortly afterwards de- 
 stroyed all chance of a Eusso-Persian alliance 
 through an act of unseemly violence. At an inter- 
 view with the Vizier, Prince Dolgorouky reproached 
 him with the evil counsel which he had cfiven to 
 his master, and warned him of the disastrous con- 
 sequences that would assuredly follow ; and then 
 completely losing control over his temper, he 
 assaulted the Minister with a cane which he held 
 in his hand. Such an act naturally put an end to 
 the projected alliance, and Persia remained neutral 
 throughout the war. 
 
 But although the Shah took no part in the 
 great struggle which was being fought out between 
 Eussia and the Western Powers of Europe, it was 
 not long before he displayed his enmity towards 
 the English by direct acts of hostility. He first 
 tried to form an offensive and defensive alliance
 
 176 Russian Advance : Kirghiz SxEPrES isie- 
 
 wirh the rulers of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat ; 
 and when this scheme was frustrated by the oppo- 
 sition of Dost Mahommed — who had been restored 
 to the Afghan throne after the first Afghan war — 
 Nasr Eddin tried to bring about a collision between 
 Kandahar and Herat, in order that he mio-ht have 
 a pretext for interference. In March, 1855, Dost 
 Mahommed, alarmed by the threatening ' attitude 
 of the Persian Court, concluded at Peshawar a 
 treaty of perpetual peace and friendship with 
 England ; but, at about the same time. Said 
 Mahommed of Herat was deposed by Mahommed 
 Yusuf, a grandson of the Suddozai Prince Firoz- 
 ud-din. This prince had been for many years a 
 refugee in Meshed, and it was believed that he had 
 taken possession of Herat through the instru- 
 mentality of Persia. That such was actually the 
 case was soon proved beyond any doubt. In March, 
 1856, Nasr Eddin threw off the mask, and marched 
 an army across the frontier. The gates of Herat 
 were thrown open, and Mahommed Yusuf openly 
 declared his allegiance to the Shah. But shortly 
 afterwards the people, led by Isa Khan, broke into 
 rebellion, deposed the Suddozai Prince, expelled 
 the Shah's troops from Herat, and jDrepared to 
 defend the city against the Persians. Herat was 
 once again besieged by a Persian army. But Isa 
 Khan had not the energy and capacity with which 
 Yar Mahommed was endowed, nor was there an 
 Eldred Pottiuger within the walls ; and after a 
 desultory contest, which lasted for four months, Isa 
 Khan, despairing of receiving any assistance from
 
 -18.58 The Anglo-Persian War 177 
 
 the Afghans, surrendered the fortress to the 
 Persians on October 25, 1856. 
 
 Meanwhile the relations between Enoland and 
 Persia had ])een daily becoming more strained, and 
 after a lon^i' course of studied provocation, Mr. 
 Murray, the British Minister, was forced to sus- 
 pend relations with the Court of Teheran, and left 
 for Baghdad on December 6, 1855. When, there- 
 fore, it was known that in addition to previous 
 insults the Shah had deliberately attacked Herat 
 in spite of the Convention of 1853, the British 
 Government decided to despatch an expedition to 
 the Persian Gulf. On Novemlier 1, 1856, a procla- 
 mation was issued in Calcutta, declaring war with 
 Persia, on account of the hostile expedition against 
 Herat ; on December 4 the Island of Karrack was 
 once more occupied by British troops ; five days 
 later the Persians were dislodged from the old 
 Dutch Fort of Reshire, after a short but fierce 
 encounter ; and on the next day Busliire was oc- 
 cupied by the invading army. After the arrival 
 of Sir James Outram, on January 27, 1857, pre- 
 parations were made for striking decisive blows 
 which would speedily force the Shah to sue for 
 peace. On February 8 a Persian force was de- 
 feated at Kushab ; on March 26 Mohamreh (at the 
 mouth of the Karun Eiver) was bombarded, and 
 the enemy's batteries captured ; and by April 1 
 the British troops had advanced far up the Karun 
 Pi-iver, and driven the Persians from Ahwaz. But 
 even before Mohamreh had been attacked, the 
 Persian Ambassador at the C'ourt of France had 
 
 VOL. I. N
 
 178 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i84g- 
 
 concluded a peace, which was signed in Paris on 
 March 4, 1857. Intimation of this event reached 
 Outram at Mohamreh on April 4, and the treaty 
 was ratified at Baijiidad in the following month. 
 
 In the meanwhile the Eussians were occupied 
 in the suppression of a serious revolt of the 
 Kirghiz, which compelled them to remain inactive 
 on the Syr Daria for some years after the conclu- 
 sion of the Crimean war. 
 
 After several fruitless expeditions, and when 
 the rebellion had lasted for five years, General 
 Katenin, who had succeeded Perovski as Governor- 
 General of the Orenburg district, determined in 
 1858 to resort to conciliatory measures. Izzet 
 Kutebar, the chief leader in the revolt, was pro- 
 mised complete forgiveness in the event of his sub- 
 mission, and, at the same time, a general amnesty 
 to all the rebel Kirghiz was proclaimed. . At first 
 Izzet declined to enter into negotiations with the 
 Eussian authorities, but having heard of the 
 arrival of General IgnatiefT's mission at the Emba, 
 en route for Khiva and Bokhara, he changed his 
 mind, and on June 4 surrendered himself to the 
 Eussian Envoy. He begged Ignatieff to inform 
 the Czar of his firm desire to atone for former mis- 
 deeds by future loyalty and zealous service, and in 
 order to emphasise his devotion to the Eussian 
 Government he sent his son with the mission as 
 far as Kliiva. 
 
 This mission of IgnatiefT's to Khiva and 
 Bokhara was despatched in response to an invita- 
 tion which had been received from the Amir of
 
 -1858 IgNATIEFF'S MISSION 
 
 1/9 
 
 Bokhara. In July, 1857, an envo}^ from Khiva 
 arrived from Orenburg with a suite of sixteen men, 
 and requested permission to proceed to St. Peters- 
 burg for the purpose of deUvering letters from 
 the Khan and his Ministers, congratulating the 
 Emperor Alexander II. on his accession to the 
 throne. This Khivan Embassy was followed by 
 the arrival of a similar mission from the Amir of 
 Bokhara, which reached Fort Orsk on August 22. 
 The Bokharan Envoy was the bearer of several 
 presents for the Czar, and a letter from the Amir, in 
 which NasruUah, after having congratulated the 
 Czar on his accession to the throne, and announced 
 his victories in Shahr-i-Sebz, asked that ' the pre- 
 cious and bright intelligences of the Sovereign 
 might be directed towards the sending of an 
 Embass}'- from himself.' 
 
 These ambassadors went on to the Eussian 
 capital in September and October, 1857, and after 
 a short stay there returned to Orenburg in January, 
 1858, and soon afterwards returned to their re- 
 spective countries. 
 
 The Eussian Government determined to accept 
 the invitation which had been given by the Amir 
 of Bokhara, and gave orders for the equipment of 
 a mission which was to proceed to that State under 
 Colonel IgnatiefT, who was afterwards Eussian Am- 
 bassador at Constantinople. IgnatiefT was directed 
 to proceed through Khiva, for the purpose of con- 
 cluding a treaty with the Khan, Said Mahommed,^ 
 
 ^ Said Mahoramed, the son of Khan Mahommed Eahini and 
 brother of Khan Allah-Kul, succeeded to tlie Khivan throne in 1850.
 
 i8o Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846- 
 
 one of the chief clauses of which was that Eussian 
 vessels should be permitted to navip^ate the Amu- 
 Daria. He received special instructions to collect 
 information regarding the ancient bed of the Oxus, 
 and to carefully survey the course of that river 
 from its mouths as far as Balkh if possible, and 
 for this purpose the Aral flotilla under Captain 
 ButakofF was to co-operate with the mission. On 
 May 15, 1858, Ignatieff started from Orenburg 
 with an escort of 57 men and 1 gun. But his 
 mission to Khiva was a complete failure ; for the 
 Khan, after much hesitation and delay, eventually 
 decided that no Eussian vessels should be permitted 
 to remain on the Oxus. The negotiations were 
 then broken off, and Ignatieff was obliged to leave 
 Khiva without having gained permission for Eussian 
 vessels to navigate the Oxus, which was the main 
 object of his mission. But, after leaving Khiva, 
 he went on to Bokhara and obtained this privilege 
 from the Amir of that State, although the con- 
 cession so obtained was of but little use so long as 
 the entrance to the river from the Sea of Aral was 
 barred by the Khivans. 
 
 Wliile Ignatieff was thus employed, other Eus- 
 sian agents were busily engaged in exploring the 
 countries of Central Asia. In 1857 and 1858 M. 
 Borshchoff andM. Syevertsoff examined the country 
 lying between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian 
 Sea, and thoroughly explored the Mogadjar Moun- 
 tains and the Ust-Yurt plateau ; hi 1859 Captahi 
 Golubeir, accompanied by M. Matkof, went forth 
 into the count rv bevond Lake Balkash and the
 
 -18.58 Kiianikoff's Mission i8i 
 
 River Hi, and surveyed Lake Issik Kul ; in the 
 same year Captain Valiklianoff, tlie son of a Kir- 
 ghiz Sultan, crossed the Tliian-Shan range with a 
 company of traders, spent the winter in Kashgar 
 and its neighbourhood, and collected much valu- 
 able information regarding the geography, eth- 
 nology, and history of Eastern Turkestan ; and at 
 the same time other parties of surveyors mapped 
 some 38,000 square versts on the eastern shores of 
 the Caspian, and gained accurate information re- 
 garding the shores of that sea in the neighbour- 
 hood of the Kara-Bugaz Gulf and Balkan liay. 
 
 But the most important mission was one under 
 M. Nicholas Khanikoff, which was despatched for 
 the exploration of Khorassan. This expedition 
 started in March, 1858, and travelled through As- 
 trabad, Nishapur, and Meshed to Herat, and then 
 returned by the Lake of Hamun, Kerman, Yezd, 
 and Ispahan to Teheran. When it reached Herat, 
 India was still in the throes of the terrible Indian 
 Mutiny, and Khanikoff therefore turned his atten- 
 tion from scientific pursuits to political intrigues. 
 When Mahommed Yusuf, the ruler of Herat, had 
 been deposed by Isa Khan, he had been sent as a 
 prisoner to Teheran ; and after peace was con- 
 cluded between England and Persia, the Persian 
 Government, knowing that if the Suddozai Prince 
 was restored to his throne, he would feel that he 
 owed its possession to the Britisli, and thus Ije 
 hostile to Persia, determined to get rid of him and 
 place a ruler on the throne of Herat who would 
 owe his advancement to the goodwill of the Shah'si
 
 1 82 Russian Advance: Kirghiz Steppes i846-i858 
 
 Government. They accordingly permitted Ma- 
 liommed Yusuf to be put to death by the relatives 
 ol Said Mahommed, and then Sultan Ahmed Khan 
 — Dost Mahommed's nephew and son-in-law — was 
 placed on the throne. This man, Avho had pre- 
 viously quarrelled with his uncle, Dost Mahommed, 
 and had sought the protection of Persia, was the 
 ruler of Herat when Khanikoff arrived, and the 
 Eussian Envoy succeeded in confirming the Barak- 
 zai Prince in his dependency on Persia. Nor was 
 he content with this, for he intrigued in Afghanis- 
 tan, and even proposed that Eussian officers should 
 be sent to Kabul and Kandahar, to revive the 
 alliances which Vitkievitch had concluded. But 
 fortunately Dost Mahommed remained true to his 
 friendship with England, and thus the Eussian 
 plot failed.
 
 i83 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 1859 1868 
 
 ATTACKS ON KlIOKAND AND BOKHARA 
 
 Civil war in Khokand — Russian forward movement in Khokand — ■ 
 Capture of Aulie-ata and Hazret-i-Turkestan — Tchcrnaieff 
 captures Chimkent — British policy of ' masterly inactivity ' in 
 India — Prince Gortchakoff's circular — Fall of Tashkent — 
 Kussian declarations regarding Tashkent — Kussian invasion of 
 Bokharan territory — Capture of Khojent— Capture of Ura- 
 Tepe, and occupation of Jizakh — The ' Steppe Commission ' — - 
 Formation of the Province of Turkestan — Occupation of 
 Samarkand — Treaty of Peace with Bokhara. 
 
 As soon as Eiissia had recovered from the exhaus- 
 tion caused by the Crimean war, and had quelled 
 the insurrection of the Kirghiz under Izzet Kute- 
 bar, she once more found herself in a position to 
 resume her aggressive movements on the Syr Daria 
 and in the country between Ak-Mechet and Ver- 
 noye, and preparations were therefore made for a 
 campaign in Central Asia, which was to be con- 
 ducted on a far greater scale than any of the 
 previous Russian efforts in that direction. 
 
 Khokand had for many years been in a con- 
 stant state of civil war, and had been subjected to 
 repeated invasions from Bokhara — a state of 
 ailliirs which sapped the strength of the State, and
 
 1 84 Attacks on Khokand and Bokitara i8o9- 
 
 prevented the people from opposing a solid front 
 to the Eussian advance. When the Eussians were 
 making their first advance up the Syr Daria, the 
 Khokandian regent, Mussulman Kuli, was fully 
 occupied in his endeavours to subdue the rebellion 
 of the Sarts in Tashkent ; and then followed the 
 split between Khudayar Khan and his ' Ming 
 Bashi,' which ended in the execution of the latter 
 and the merciless slaughter of the Kipchaks. 
 Thus, when Perovski attacked Ak-Mechet, the 
 Khokandians were fully occupied with the bitter 
 struggle between the rival factions of the State, and 
 were unable to pay any attention to the advances 
 of their powerful northern neighbour. Ak-Mechet 
 and the other Khokandian forts were thus easily 
 captured, and the Eussians were able to consoli- 
 date their position on the Syr Daria without en- 
 countering any serious opposition from the main 
 Khokandian armies. Even after this, when Eussia 
 was fruitlessly struggling against the great Western 
 Powers of Europe, and was subsequently obliged 
 to devote her attention to the restoration of order 
 in the Kirghiz Steppes, the miserable dissensions 
 in Khokand still continued, and the Khokandians 
 thus threw away their last chance of regaining 
 possession of their strongholds on the Jaxartes. 
 The opportunity so lost was gone for ever, for as 
 soon as the Eussians had recovered from the 
 exhausting effects of the Crimean war, and had 
 su])dued the Kirghiz, they recommenced their 
 career of aggression, speedily captured the chief 
 towns of Khokand, and by rapidly penetrating into
 
 -1868 New Scheme of Aggression 185 
 
 the heart of the country, obtained a position from 
 which it was impossible to dislodge them. 
 
 It has akeady been mentioned that the Eus- 
 sian authorities considered it necessary to close 
 the undefended gajD between the Orenburg and 
 Siberian lines by a series of forts between the 
 Syr Daria and Yernoye. Just before the Crimean 
 war it had been decided that this new frontier line 
 should run from Fort Perovski (the new name for 
 Ak-Mechet) along the northern slopes of the Kara- 
 Tau Mountains to the Chu Eiver, and then alono- 
 the course of that river to Vernoye. But the local 
 commanders now strongly urged a reconsideration 
 of the matter, and it was finally determined that 
 the new frontier should start from a point higher 
 up the Syr Daria, and, after including the Kho- 
 kandian towns of Hazret-i-Turkestan and Aulie- 
 ata, should follow the line of the Talas Eiver and 
 AlexandrofFski Eange. This decision meant that 
 the Eussian Government deliberately determined 
 to seize two important Khokandian towns and to 
 occupy a large portion of Khokandian territory 
 w^ithout provocation, and solely because it suited 
 their policy to do so. 
 
 The first forward movement in pursuance of 
 this Eussian scheme was made in 1859, when the 
 Khokandian fort of Julek was captured and 
 destro3'ed.^ In 1861 a Eussian fort was built on 
 the site of the old Khokandian post, and in the 
 
 * This post, which was on the Syr Daria, some seventy or eighty 
 miles above Fort Perovski, was destroyed by General Padm-off in 
 July, 1853, when Perovski was besieging Ak-Mechet ; but when the
 
 1 86 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara 18.59- 
 
 same year a detachment advanced some fifty miles 
 further up the river and seized Yani Kurgan. In 
 the meanwhile another column, under Colonel 
 Zimmermann, was moving forward from the Irtish, 
 and in 1860 the two Khokandian forts of Pishpek 
 and Tokmak were captured. The Eussian force 
 available for operations west of Vernoye was at 
 this time inconsiderable, and after -these first 
 successes it was spht up into several small detach- 
 ments for the purpose of watching the extensive 
 frontier. One party was left in a fort on the Eiver 
 Hi to cover the communications with Semipalatinsk ; 
 another detachment occupied Vernoye ; while the 
 main body w^as posted in a small fort at the 
 mouth of the Kastek Pass, with a small party at 
 Uzun-Agatch, for the purpose of maintaining com- 
 munication between Vernoye and the Kastek fort. 
 It was expected that in the event of the Kho- 
 kandians retaliating, their first attack would be 
 through the Kastek Pass, which offered the easiest 
 line of advance from Khokand to Verno3^e, and it 
 was for the purpose of resisting such a movement 
 that Lieutenant-Colonel Kolpakoflsky placed him- 
 self at Kastek with the main body of the Eussian 
 troops. 
 
 It was not long before the Khokandians col- 
 lected an army of some 30,000 men, and advanced 
 under Khanayat Shah, one of their best generals, 
 to rebuild Pishpek and Tokmak, and if possible to 
 
 Knasians retired, the Khokandians rebuilt the fort, and held 
 possession of it until 1850, when it was finally destroyed by the 
 Bussians.
 
 -1868 Battle of Uzun-Agatch 187 
 
 expel the Eussians from their posts south of the 
 Hi. The Khokandian commander knew that it 
 would be useless to attack the Eussian force at 
 Fort Kastek ; and he, therefore, crossed the 
 mountains by another pass in October, 1860, and 
 with the greater portion of his force fell on the 
 detachment at Uzun-Agatch, hoping thus to cut 
 off Kolpakoifsky from his supports, and to be able 
 then to reduce Kastek and Vernoye at his leisure. 
 The attacking force consisted of some 10,000 men, 
 and as the Eussian party at Uzun-Agatch was 
 very small, it appeared almost impossible for them 
 to escape annihilation. They, however, defended 
 themselves with the greatest fortitude, and managed 
 to communicate with KolpakofFsky, who at once 
 sallied out from Kastek, and attacking the Khokan- 
 dians in rear, drove them in confusion from the 
 field. It was a brilliant victory, and reflected the 
 greatest credit on KolpakofFsky and his troops, 
 for with a strength of only 800 men and 6 
 guns they completely routed a force of vastly 
 superior strength, and demoralised the Khokandian 
 defence. 
 
 In 1803 preparations were made for important 
 combined operations from both flanks, by which 
 the long wished-for junction between the Orenburg 
 and Siberian lines was to be effected. But the out- 
 break of the Polish Eebellion and the threatening 
 aspect of affairs in Western Europe, forced the 
 Czar to defer the attack till the following year, 
 when all danger of a general conflagration in 
 Europe had disappeared. In the summer of 1864
 
 1 88 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara i8^9- 
 
 tlie advance bes^an. Colonel TchernaiefF moved 
 forward from Siberia with a force of 2,500 men, 
 and assaulted the town of Aulie-ata on June 16. 
 The attack was completely successful, and the 
 place was soon occupied by the Eussians, who 
 only lost five men wounded, while over 300 
 Khokandians are said to have been killed in the 
 fight. This town, which stands on the banks of 
 the Eiver Talas, is of insignificant dimensions, and 
 its capture was important only because it is situ- 
 ated in a fertile district about half-way between 
 Fort Perovski and Vernoye, and is at the junction 
 of two important routes which lead to Chimkent 
 in the west and to Namangan in the south. 
 
 While TchernaiefF was advancino' agfainst 
 Aulie-ata, another column, 1,200 strong, was 
 moving eastwards from Fort Perovski, under 
 Colonel Verefkin, to effect a junction with the 
 Siberian troops. A glance at the map will show 
 that unless Verefkin kept to the north of the Kara- 
 Tau Mountains, he would necessarily pass close to 
 the town of Hazret-i-Turkestan (the most sacred 
 city in that part of Asia), and a collision with the 
 Khokandians would inevitably follow. But it has 
 already been shown that the Kussian Government 
 had deliberately rejected the frontier line of the 
 Kara-Tan mountains, and had determined to seize 
 Hazret-i-Turkestan and to absorl) the neighbouring 
 Khokandian district ; and in accordance with this 
 decision, Verefkin attacked the city in June, 18G4. 
 The Khokandian garrison manfully defended the 
 2)lace ; but, in order to hasten its fall, the Russian
 
 -1868 Capture of Hazret-i-Turkestan 189 
 
 artillery were directed to ojDen fire on the great 
 mosque over the tomb of the Saint Hazret Hodja 
 Achmet Yasavi, a substantial building constructed 
 of well-burnt bricks, which rises to a height of 
 over 100 feet, and is flanked by two massive towers 
 or bastions. The Eussian fire did considerable 
 damage to the mosque and had the desired effect. 
 A flag of truce was soon hoisted by the Sheikh-ul- 
 Islam, and shortly afterwards the city surrendered. 
 
 By the capture of Hazret-i-Turkestan and of 
 Aulie-ata, the Eussian design for closing the gap 
 between the Orenburg and Siberian lines was 
 successfully accomplished ; for the two Eussian 
 columns shortly afterwards joined hands, the two 
 towns were held by Eussian garrisons, and the 
 surrounding country was taken possession of in 
 the name of the White Czar. Yeref kin was then 
 recalled, and Tchernaieff assumed command of the 
 united columns. 
 
 Tchernaieff, however, was by no means content 
 with the success which had been achieved. Chim- 
 kent, which was now the most advanced Khokan- 
 dian fortress, commanding the main road between 
 Hazret-i-Turkestan and Aulie-ata, was occupied 
 by a garrison of some 10,000 Khokandians who 
 were fairly well provided with artillery ; the forti- 
 fications were being strengthened, and preparations 
 were made to stoutly oppose any further advance 
 on the part of the Eussians. He saw the im- 
 portance of the place, and determined to attack it 
 before its defences could be completed. It was 
 said to be intolerable that a Khokandian army
 
 I90 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara isoo- 
 
 should be permitted to assemble so close to the 
 Eassiaii frontiers. The stronger Power, Eussia, 
 had unprovokedly invaded the territories of a 
 weaker neighbour, occupied its towns, and shot 
 down its inhabitants ; but when the outraged 
 people assembled a force to defend the residue of 
 their possessions, it was declared that such 
 defensive measures could not be permitted, and 
 necessitated further punishment. Undoubtedly, 
 where Eussian interests are concerned, there is 
 one law for the strong and another for the weak. 
 Chimkent was required by the Eussians to cover 
 their communications between Hazret-i-Turkestan 
 and Aulie-ata ; and Tchernaieff, therefore, with 
 between 4,000 and 5,000 men, rapidly pushed 
 forward and captured the place on October 3, 
 1864, with the trifling loss of five men. It 
 was a brilliant affair, well conceived and boldly 
 carried out, and one which stamped TchernaiefT as 
 a leader of great daring and enterprise. By it the 
 safety of the Eussian line from Fort Perovski to 
 Vernoye was secured, and a wedge was driven 
 into Khokand by which Tashkent, Khojent, and 
 the capital itself were brought within easy striking 
 distance of the Eussian frontier. 
 
 When the news of these operations reached 
 England, but little interest was manifested in the 
 Eussian movements. Far more momentous occur- 
 rences were taking place elsewhere ; Denmark had 
 been attacked by Prussia and Austria, and the 
 whole sympathies •of the English were extended 
 towards the nation which had just given their
 
 -1808 Prince Gortciiakoff's Circular 191 
 
 fairest Princess to be the bride of the future King 
 of England ; a desperate struggle also was being- 
 carried on in North America, -which caused much 
 distress in Lancashire by its interference with the 
 supply of cotton ; while the fitting out of piratical 
 cruisers in British ports in the name of the 
 Southern Confederation gave great annoyance to 
 the Northern States, and threatened to cause a 
 war between England and America. In India 
 also the policy of ' masterly inactivity ' was in 
 full swing ; and Lord Lawrence, the new Viceroy, 
 was inculcating the doctrine that ' Eussia might 
 prove a safer ally, a better neighbour, than the 
 Mahommedan races of Central Asia and Kabul.' ^ 
 
 But though the British public displayed but 
 little interest or concern in the annexation by 
 Eussia of the northern districts of the Khanate of 
 Khokand, Prince Gortchakoff, the Eussian Chan- 
 cellor, considered it necessary to publicly announce 
 the causes which had induced the Czar to sanction 
 the invasion of Khokand. This explanation was 
 given in the now famous circular of November 21, 
 1864, to all the Eussian embassies and lesfationsin 
 foreign countries,- which professed to place the 
 Asiatic policy of Eussia in its true light. After 
 explaining the causes of the invasion. Prince 
 Gortchakoff stated that there was no intention on 
 the part of Eussia to make any further advances, 
 
 ^ See p. 41 of Papers relating to Central Asia and Quetta, 
 printed by order of the House of Commons, February 25, 1879. 
 
 - A translation of this interesting document is given in 
 Appendix II.
 
 192 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara i8;39- 
 
 as they found themselves ' in presence of a more 
 solid, compact, less unsettled, and better organised 
 state ; fixing for us with geographical precision 
 the limit up to which we are bound to advance, 
 and at which we must halt, because, while on the 
 one hand any further extension of our rule, meet- 
 ing (as it would) no longer with unstable com- 
 munities, such as the nomad tribes, but with more 
 regularly constituted states, would entail con- 
 siderable exertions, and would draw us on from 
 annexation to annexation with unforeseen compli- 
 cations.' 
 
 The specious phrases and plausible arguments 
 contained in this remarkable circular were con- 
 sidered to be fairly satisfactory ; for it was now 
 for the first time clearly stated that Eussia had 
 been forced to advance in spite of all its efforts 
 to the contrary and in opposition to the wishes 
 of the Czar ; that no further aggressive move- 
 ments were contemplated ; and that it was hoped 
 that the day might come when regular relations 
 might, to the advantage of both parties, take 
 the place of the permanent troubles which had, 
 up to that time, paralysed all progress in those 
 countries. 
 
 At that time the English had yet to learn that 
 Eussian promises are liable to be broken, and that 
 Eussian agreements are not always worth the 
 paper on which they are written. The Black Sea 
 clauses of the Treaty of Paris had not been then 
 repudiated ; Khiva and Merv had not been annexed, 
 in spite of repeated promises tliat no such steps
 
 -1868 Unsuccessful Attack on Tashkent 193 
 
 would be taken ; and Eussian agents had not been 
 intriguing in Afghanistan after positive assurances 
 had been given, and reiterated, that Eussia con- 
 sidered Afghanistan to be outside her sphere of 
 influence, and that no such envoys would be sent 
 into that country. 
 
 But even before this circular was written, 
 hostilities had been resumed on the Syr Daria, 
 and the Eussians had begun a new advance which 
 marked the commencement of a series of cam- 
 paigns which ended in the conquest of Tashkent 
 and Samarkand, and was the stepping-stone to 
 the establishment of Eussian influence throughout 
 
 o 
 
 Central Asia up to the borders of Afghanistan 
 and Eastern Turkestan. 
 
 As soon as Chimkent had been captured, 
 Tchernaieff' rapidly advanced against Tashkent in 
 hopes of being able to gain possession of that 
 important city by a coup de main. On October 
 15, 18G4, he suddenly appeared before the town, 
 placed a battery in position, made a breach in the 
 walls, and then delivered an assault. The attempt, 
 however, failed ; and tlie Eussians were forced to 
 retreat to Chimkent. The Khokandians quickly 
 followed up this success, and a considerable force 
 soon marched northwards for the purpose of re- 
 gaining possession of Hazret-i-Turkestan. On their 
 approach a small force of Cossacks was sent out 
 to the villaf^e of Ikan, which lies some eisfhteen 
 miles to the south-east of Hazret, on the Chimkent 
 road. This party, whicli was under the command 
 of Captain Serof, only consisted of one sotnia of 
 
 VOL. L
 
 194 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara isoo- 
 
 Cossacks — 120 men — with one field-piece; and when 
 they arrived near Ikan on the evening of Decem- 
 ber 16, they found the place swarming with 
 Khokandians, who speedily surrounded the small 
 detachment. Serof thus found himself in a position 
 of extreme danger ; but the gallant little band of 
 Russians defended themselves with the utmost 
 valour, and absolutely refused to surrender, al- 
 though they were offered a safe retreat to Hazret. 
 Tlirouohout the evenino- and nio-ht of the 16th, the 
 whole of the next day and night, and until the 
 evenincf of the 18th, these brave Cossacks held 
 their own, and eventually, after having lost 57 
 of their party killed and 43 wounded, the few 
 survivors spiked their gun and forced their way 
 back to Hazret. By this splendid piece of bra- 
 very the Khokandian attack was broken, Hazret- 
 i-Turkestan was saved, and the Eussians were de- 
 livered from a very serious danger to their newly 
 acquired position on the Syr Daria, 
 
 Tchernaieff's sudden attack on Tashkent in 
 October 1864 greatly alarmed the Amir of 
 Bokhara, who looked upon Khokand as his legiti- 
 mate prey, and resented the Russian invasion of 
 that State. It has been mentioned that Khokand 
 was constantly invaded by the Amirs of Bokhara ; 
 and one such invasion took place when the Rus- 
 sians were advancing against Hazret-i-Turkestan 
 and Aulie-ata, on which occasion MozufTer-Eddin 
 was supporting Kliudayar Khan against the Regent 
 Alim Kuli. After AHm Kuli was defeated, the 
 Amir returned to Bokhara, wlien the Regent once
 
 -1868 BOKHARANS INVADE KliOKAND 1 95 
 
 more took the field, and drove Khudayar out 
 of Kliokand. The exiled Khan took up his 
 abode in Jizak, there secretly made preparations 
 for a fresh campaign, and finally persuaded the 
 Amir to again support him in his attempt to regain 
 the throne. It appears that Mozuffer-Eddin's object 
 in marching into Khokand was not merely to re- 
 instate Khudayar, but at the same time to pre- 
 vent Tashkent from falling into the hands of the 
 Eussians. At all events, Tchernaieff viewed the 
 Amir's attitude at this time with the greatest 
 suspicion, and when he heard that a Bokharan 
 army was being assembled at Ura-tepe, he de- 
 termined once more to advance against Tashkent. 
 
 At this time the city — which contained a popu- 
 lation of over 100,000 souls and was defended hy 
 a garrison of about 30,000 men — was encircled by 
 a hard clay rampart from twelve to fifteen feet 
 high, sixteen miles in circumference, of consider- 
 able thickness, well provided with loop-holes and 
 embrasures, and pierced by twelve gateways. The 
 chief water-supply was obtained from the Eiver 
 Chirchik, from whence it was brought by means 
 of a large canal, called the ' Bos-su,' which left 
 the river at a place named Niazbek, some sixteen 
 miles to the north-east of the cit}^ where there 
 was a small fort. This canal had four branches, 
 which conducted the water to all parts of tlie 
 town. 
 
 On account of the great size of the city, 
 Tchernaieff was unable to invest it, and as he 
 did not feel inclined to risk anotlier assault, he
 
 196 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara isoo- 
 
 first attacked Niazbek in April 1865, and, by 
 the capture of the fort, obtained command over 
 the water-supply. Then he took up a position 
 within six miles of Tashkent, and entered into 
 correspondence with some of the inhabitants 
 of the city, who, being discontented with Alim 
 Kuli's government, were inclined to favour a 
 Russian occupation ; and he arranged with them 
 that on May 20, while he made a demonstra- 
 tion against the north-east front of the town, they 
 should attack the garrison and open the gates. 
 This plot was, however, frustrated by the Eegent 
 Alim Kuli himself, who on that day entered the 
 city with some 6,000 fresh troops and forty guns. 
 On the following day (May 21) the Khokan- 
 dians made a determined attack on the Eussian 
 position. For a short time the Eussians were hard- 
 pressed, and it seemed as if they were about to 
 experience a second reverse before Tashkent ; but 
 during the battle Alim Kuli was killed, and the 
 Khokandians were eventually repulsed at all points 
 and forced to take shelter under the walls of the 
 town. 
 
 After the Eegent's death the inhabitants of 
 Tashkent sent an embassy to the Amir of Bokhara, 
 offering their submission and begging of him to 
 send assistance. To prevent Bokharan interference 
 Tchernaieff occupied the fort of Chinaz on the Syr 
 Daria for the purpose of guarding the ferry at that 
 place, and then, hearing that the Amir's troops 
 had retreated across the river, he returned and 
 took up a position alx)ut three miles from Tashkent.
 
 -1868 The Storming of Tashkent 197 
 
 In tlie meanwhile, Mozuffer-Eddin had informed the 
 Tashkendians that Khudayar's nephew, Said SnUan 
 Khan, who was then in the city, must be surrendered 
 to him as the price of his assistance. Said Sultan, 
 on hearing this, fled on the night of June 21, and a 
 party of Bokharans then marched into the city, 
 while the Amir's troops began to show themselves 
 at various points along the Syr Daria. 
 
 TchernaiefF M\as thus placed in a critical 
 })08ition ; but he determined to make a bold bid 
 for success by assaulting the city before the Amir's 
 army could render such a course impracticable. 
 Accordingl}", at three o'clock in the morning of 
 June 27, a storming party, under Captain AbramofT, 
 scaled the walls near the Kamelan gate, surprised 
 the guard, and after silencing the guns which were 
 turned on them from the adjoining bastions, opened 
 the gate to the Eussian troops. AbramofT then 
 advanced for about six miles along the ramparts, 
 as far as the Kara-Serai gate, while a second colunm, 
 under Major de la Croix, entered by the Khokand 
 gate and captured that portion of the fortress. 
 Throughout the whole of that day the Eussian 
 troops were engaged in incessant street-figliting, 
 and although during the ensuing night there was 
 a pause in the conflict, at daybreak on the next 
 day they found that numerous barricades had been 
 erected in the principal streets and alleys. The 
 whole of the 28th was spent in destroying these 
 obstacles and in subduim? the resistance of the 
 garrison ; but on the morning of the 29th a 
 deputation of the leading inhabitants waited on
 
 198 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara 18.59- 
 
 Tchernaieif, and unconditionally surrendered the 
 c^it}^ to the Eussians. 
 
 Thus was Tashkent captured and the fate of 
 Khokand sealed. But while these movements 
 were being carried out, and three months after 
 TchernaiefF had cut off the water-supply at Niazbek, 
 and had commenced systematic operations for the 
 reduction of the city, the Eussian Government 
 declared that they had no intention of occupying 
 the place. On July 21, 1865 (a month after the 
 city had been taken), the director of the Eussian 
 Asiatic Department (M. Stremoouchoff) informed 
 the British Charge d' Affaires at St. Petersburg that 
 ' the Eussian Government hoped, at no distant date, 
 without occupying Tashkent, to make that place the 
 great entrepot for Eussian connnerce with Central 
 Asia.' And again, on September 11 (two and a 
 half months after the city had fallen). Prince 
 Gortchakoff informed the British Ambassador that 
 * it was the intention of the Imperial Government 
 to insist on the Bokharan troops being withdrawn 
 from Khokandian territory, and 07i Tashkent being 
 declared an independent toivn.' Such declarations 
 can only have been made for the purpose of mis- 
 leading the British authorities, for the Eussian 
 Government must have been aware of Tchernaieff 's 
 movements, which had been commenced in the 
 previous spring ; and a month before it was stated 
 that Tashkent would be declared to be an inde- 
 pendent town— the Governor-General of Orenburg 
 had actually visited the place and promised the 
 inhabitants that thev would be 'admitted to the
 
 -1868 Value of Russian Declarations 199 
 
 privilege of becoming subjects of the " White 
 Czar." ' General Krijhanoffsky, the Governor of 
 the Orenburg district, visited Tashkent in August 
 1865 ; convoked an assembly of the elders of the 
 city, and then accepted their submission ; declared 
 Tashkent to be a province of the Eussian Empire ; 
 and promised to protect the people m^ ith his troops, 
 and to respect their manners and customs. This is 
 a fair example of the value of Eussian declarations. 
 The capture of Tashkent greatly incensed the 
 Amir of Bokhara, who wrote to Tchernaieff, calling 
 on him to evacuate Khokandian territory, and 
 threatenino- in the event of refusal to kindle a 
 religious war against the Eussians. In order to 
 emphasise his demands, he also confiscated the 
 property of such Eussian merchants as happened 
 to be in Bokhara. Tchernaieff scornfully rejected 
 the Amir's demands, and made reprisals by detain- 
 ing the Bokharan merchants who were found in 
 Eussian territory. Mozuffer-Eddin was at this 
 time engaged in the suppression of a rebellion at 
 Shahr-i-Sebz ; and as he had no desire to be drawn 
 into a war with Eussia, he despatched a man, 
 named Hodja Nedjm-Eddin, on a mission to St. 
 Petersburg to complain to the Czar of the un- 
 provoked invasion of Khokand. This envoy was, 
 however, arrested on the road and detained at 
 Kazala ; and shortly afterwards Tchernaieff sent 
 an embassy to Bokhara, under M. Struve, to de- 
 mand the release of Eussian subjects. As might 
 have been foreseen, the Amir was not likely, after 
 what had occurred, to treat the Eussian embassy
 
 200 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara i859- 
 
 witli any consideration ; and as soon as Struve's 
 party reached Bokhara they were detained, two 
 of the members of the mission being cast into 
 prison. 
 
 When Tchernaieff heard of this he collected 
 a force of 2,000 men and fourteen guns, and, 
 crossing the Syr Daria on February 11, 1866, 
 marched ai>'ainst Bokhara to force the Amir to 
 release the captives. Crossing the ' Golodnaia,' or 
 ' famished steppe ' — a barren, waterless desert 
 between the Syr Daria and the Bokharan fortress 
 of Jizakh — the Eussian column arrived before 
 Jizakh on February 16, 1866, when it was found 
 that the place was too strongly fortified to permit 
 of its being carried by storm, while regular siege 
 operations were out of the question, on account 
 of the considerable Bokharan army which was 
 close at hand. Tchernaieff was thus unable to 
 capture Jizakh, and was obliged to fall back, his 
 force being surrounded during the retreat by 
 swarms of Bokharan irregulars, who managed to 
 inflict some slight loss on the column. On nearing 
 Tashkent the Khokandians also joined in the attack 
 on the infidels. A large force marched out of the 
 city and attacked the Eussian troops, while at the 
 same time the Khokandian garrison of Niazbek 
 opened fire on a Eussian detachment as it was 
 marching towards the Chirchik. Although these 
 attacks were quite unexpected, the Khokandians 
 were speedily beaten off and dispersed, and 
 Tchernaieff regained possession of Tashkent witli- 
 out dilTiculty, when the garrison of Niazbek
 
 -1868 Recall of TcherNx^ieff 201 
 
 marched out, leaving 370 prisoners, six guns, and 
 a considerable quantity of small arms and ammu- 
 nition in the hands of the Eussians. 
 
 After this failure General TchernaiefF was 
 recalled, and was succeeded by Major-General 
 Dimitri Ilyitch Eomanoffsky. The Eussian Govern- 
 ment stated that TchernaiefF had been recalled 
 because he had exceeded his orders, and had 
 advanced in direct opposition to the wishes of 
 the Czar. The Emperor was, no doubt, annoyed 
 that the promises and explanations contained in 
 Prince GortchakofF's circular should have been so 
 speedily proved to be nothing more than hollow 
 diplomatic phrases published for the purpose of 
 throwing dust in the eyes of the British public ; 
 but it has never been satisfactorily explained why 
 — if TchernaiefF had really advanced in defiance 
 of the Czar's orders— he was not recalled when 
 his first attack on Tashkent became known to 
 the Imperial Government. He assaulted Tash- 
 kent in October 18G4, but was not recalled ; then, 
 again, in April 1865, he advanced against the place 
 and captured it after a three months' campaign, 
 but still he was not recalled, nor were any orders 
 issued for the purpose of moderating his aggressive 
 designs ; and it was not till the spring of 186G, 
 
 when he had failed to canture Jizakh and was 
 
 J. 
 
 forced to retreat before the Bokharan forces, that 
 the Czar's Government thought fit to remove him 
 from his command. When these points have been 
 satisfactorily explained — if such explanation is 
 possible — the English people may be asked to
 
 202 Attacks on Kiiokaxd and Bokhara 18-59- 
 
 believe that TcliernaiefF was deprived of his com- 
 mand because he exceeded his instructions ; other- 
 wise they may rest assured that he was recalled, 
 not because he did too much, but because he failed 
 in his attempt to seize Jizakh, and was forced to 
 i-etreat on the first occasion that Russian troops 
 Avere broucfht face to face with the Bokharan 
 forces. 
 
 If Tchernaieff had really been superseded on 
 account of his unauthorised advances, it might 
 reasonably be assumed that his successor would 
 have been warned to avoid similar excesses. But, 
 nevertheless, no sooner did EomanofFsky take 
 command than he proceeded to make preparations 
 for a still more serious and unprovoked attack 
 againfet Bokhara. Large quantities of stores were 
 sent up from Kazala to Ohinaz, and in May 1866 
 a Eussian force marched southwards for the in- 
 vasion of Bokharan territory. 
 
 Mozuffer-Eddin had in the meanwhile collected 
 an army of 5,000 regular troops and 85,000 Kir- 
 ghiz, with twenty-one guns ; and numerous petty 
 encounters took place on the banks of the Syr 
 Daria. On May 18 Eomanoffsky heard that the 
 Bokharan army was moving in the direction of 
 Tashkent, led by the Amir in person ; and although 
 he could only muster fourteen companies of in- 
 fantr}^ and five sotnias of Cossacks, with twenty 
 guns and eight rocket-stands, he determined, 
 nevertheless, to march against the enemy. Two 
 days later the Eussians reached the plain of Irjar, 
 where the Bokharans had taken up a position
 
 -18C8 Battle of Irjar 203 
 
 about two and a half miles in extent, their whole 
 front being covered by swarms of irregular horse- 
 men. After a considerable amount of skirmish- 
 ing between the Cossacks and Bokharan cavalry, 
 Eomanoffsky, towards noon, commenced a heavy 
 artillery fire on the enemy's intrenchments, and 
 shortly afterwards the infantry advanced to the 
 attack. The battle ended in the complete rout 
 of the Bokharans. The Amir fled with a small 
 escort to Jizakli ; and the Bokharan troops were 
 scattered in all directions, leaving the whole of 
 their artillery, treasure, and large quantities of 
 stores in the hands of the Eussians. 
 
 In this battle the Bokharans are said to have 
 lost over 1,000 men, while the Eussians' had only 
 between 20 and 30 men killed and wounded — a 
 very trifling loss, considering the great importance 
 of the victory and its far-reaching efiects. 
 
 After this defeat Mozuffer-Eddin released 
 M. Struve and his companions, and sent them 
 back to Tashkent loaded with presents. Eoman- 
 offsky, however, rapidly pushed forward, and, 
 after capturing Nau, advanced against the city of 
 Khojent. The Eussians appeared before the place 
 on May 29, and while part of the force occupied 
 a position about four miles from the city on the 
 Bokhara road, another column took possession of 
 the right bank of the Syr Daria to the north of 
 the town. After two days spent in careful recon- 
 naissances, Eomanoffsky commenced the bombard- 
 ment on June 1. For four days a heavy fire was 
 maintained from eighteen guns and two mortars.
 
 204 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara isso- 
 
 aud at daybreak on June 5 the assault was deli- 
 vered. The Eussians, taking advantage of the 
 ruggedness of the ground, managed to approach 
 unobserved to within a short distance from the 
 walls, and there planted a battery, which soon 
 silenced the enemy's guns. Then a company 
 under Captain Baranoff rushed forward with 
 scaling ladders, and quickly forced an entrance 
 into the city. T3ut the garrison still held out, 
 and defended themselves from house to house 
 wirh remarkable vigour, and it was not until 
 the following day that all resistance ceased, 
 and the city of Khojent surrendered at discretion 
 to the victorious troops of the powerful ' White 
 Czar.' In this afiliir the Eussians sustained a loss 
 of 11 men killed or missing, and 122 wounded, 
 while more than 2,500 Khokandians were placed 
 hurs de combat. 
 
 By the capture of Khojent Eussia had gained 
 possession of the last important town in the 
 western portion of the khanate of Khokand. 
 Khudayar Khan, panic-stricken and helpless, now 
 found that half his kingdom had been seized, 
 and his chief cities occupied, by the insatiable 
 infidels, who would undoubtedly rob him of his 
 remaining possessions unless foreign help could 
 be obtained. In his distress he appealed to the 
 Khaii of Khiva, to Bokhara, and to the rulers 
 of the Usbeg States on the banks of the Upper 
 Oxus, and tried to kindle a hol}^ war against 
 the luibelievers. None of these States, however, 
 cared to incur the wrath of the powerful Musco-
 
 -18G8 KlIOKANDIAN DIPLOMACY 205 
 
 vites ; and when Khudayar found himself left 
 alone opposed to the Eussians, he strove to save 
 the remnants of his kingdom by propitiating 
 his enemies. Eomanoffsky urged that the whole 
 khanate should l^e annexed to Eussia, and that 
 the capital should be occupied by a Eussian 
 garrison. The Government, also, though objecting 
 to such wholesale conquest, desired to occupy 
 the province of Namangan, and thus to limit 
 Khokandian rule to the country south of the 
 Syr Daria. One false step or one aggressive 
 movement on the part of the Khokandians would 
 assuredl}^ have been followed by a Eussian occupa- 
 tion of Namangan, and possible annexation of the 
 entire khanate. At this time, however, Khudayar 
 Khan was fortunate in having a shrewd adviser 
 in the person of his Atalyk, or commander-in- 
 chief, Ata Bek ; and when he found that he 
 would have to light the Eussians single-handed, 
 he acted on this chief's sound advice, and sent 
 envoys to Eomanoffsky to congratulate him on 
 his successful campaign against the Bokharans, 
 and to declare his friendly feelings towards the 
 Eussian Government. Thus there was no pos- 
 sible excuse for any Eussian movement against 
 Khokand, and the conquest of that khanate had 
 to be postponed. 
 
 Eomanoffsky, moreover, had not yet suffi- 
 ciently humbled Bokhara, and further operations 
 towards the south were considered necessary. 
 It was well known that Khokand could be con- 
 quered whenever such a step might be considered
 
 2o6 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara isoq- 
 
 to be advisable ; but the attitude of the Bokharan 
 Amir constituted a standing menace to the Eus- 
 sian position on the Syr Daria. MozufFer-Eddin, 
 though defeated, was by no means subdued ; 
 and aUhough he entered into negotiations with 
 a view to the restoration of peace, it was evident 
 that he had no intention of submitting to the 
 Eussian demands. The truce lasted for some 
 months ; but eventually, in October 1866, a Eus- 
 sian detachment marched against Ura-tepe, which 
 was defended by one of the strongest citadels in 
 Central Asia. Batteries were established before 
 the place on October 6, and after a close siege 
 for eight days, the fortress was assaulted and 
 captured, after a severe fight, which lasted for 
 about an hour and a half. Abdul Gaffar, the 
 Bek of the place, with most of its defenders, 
 managed to escape to the mountains ; but many 
 of the garrison were overtaken in their flight, 
 and hundreds of corpses testified to the severe 
 punishment which had been inflicted. The 
 Eussians lost 3 oflacers and 200 men, but made 
 many prisoners, and among their trophies were 
 16 guns and 4 standards. 
 
 While Ura-tepe was being attacked, another 
 force, under the command of General Krijhanoffsky, 
 moved against Jizakh, which had been greatly 
 increased in strength since Tchernaiefl^'s unsuc- 
 cessful attempt to reduce it. 
 
 After carefully examining the place, and 
 spending some days in constructing siege batteries, 
 Krijhanoflsky commenced the bombardment on
 
 -1868 Capture of Jizakh 207 
 
 October 28, and at noon on the oOtli an assault 
 was ordered. In spite of the natural strength 
 of the place and its strong defences, and notwith- 
 standing the determined resistance of the garrison, 
 the Eussians gained a footing within the walls 
 after an hour's fighting. But the enemy for some 
 time refused to surrender, and were slaughtered 
 by hundreds, while some, finding further resist- 
 ance to be useless, blew themselves up in the 
 powder-magazine. Out of the eighteen Beks 
 who were in the place, only two escaped with 
 their lives, Allayar Bek, the brave commandant, 
 being among the slain. Nearly 6,000 Bokharans 
 were killed, and 2,000 were taken prisoners ; 
 while the Eussians only lost 6 men killed and 
 92 wounded. Although the important fortresses 
 of Khojent, Nau, Ura-tepe, and Jizakh had been 
 thus occupied, there still remained one important 
 point which the Eussians wished to possess, be- 
 cause it commanded the water-supply of Jizakh, 
 and thus, if held by the Bokharans, would have 
 enabled them to place the Eussian garrison of that 
 place in a very critical situation. This was the 
 fort of Yani-kurgan, in the Kara-Tau branch of 
 the Nurata Mountains ; and in the spring of 1867 
 it was seized and occupied by a Eussian detach- 
 ment. 
 
 The result of these fresh triumphs was that the 
 Amir, MozufTer-Eddin, recognising the futility of 
 continuing the struggle alone, was compelled to 
 sue for peace. He first vainly endeavoured to 
 form an alliance with the Amir of Afo-hanistan.
 
 2o8 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara is59- 
 
 But tlie country to the south of the Oxus was then 
 in a very troubled condition on account of the 
 bitter struggle between Dost Mahommed's sons : 
 and although he succeeded in establishing friendly 
 relations with Eaiz Mahomnied Khan, the Governor 
 of Balkh and half-brother of Shere Ali, he found it 
 impossible to procure Afghan assistance against 
 his vigorous and triumphant enemies. After this 
 lie tried to enlist the sympathies of the Indian 
 Government, and sent an envoy to Calcutta to 
 seek the assistance of the British ; but England 
 had not yet forgotten the cruel murder of her 
 Ambassadors — Stoddart and Conoll}^ — nor had she 
 yet recovered from her unreasoning dread of inter- 
 ference in Central Asian affairs which had been 
 induced by the Kabul disaster. The Amir's Am- 
 bassador was therefore politely snubbed, and 
 MozufFer-Eddin was left to make the best terms he 
 ccuild with his insatiable foes. 
 
 Up to this time the administration of the newly 
 acquired Russian territory had been carried on 
 chiefly through the agency of native officials, and 
 no serious attempt had been made to improve the 
 former methods of government which had been in 
 force under the Khokandian Khans and Beks. 
 But at about the time when EomanofTsky was 
 appointed Governor in supersession of T(;hernaieff, 
 a special commission was appointed by the Czar 
 to report on the best means of governing the 
 country. This commission, which is known as 
 ' The Steppe Commission,' consisted of M. Giers, 
 and Colonels Giens, Protsenko, and ])andeville ;
 
 -1868 The Steppe Commission 209 
 
 and these officers, after careful inquiries, sub- 
 mitted an elaborate report in the spring of 1867, 
 which was submitted for the consideration of a 
 superior committee, under the presidency of the 
 Eussian Minister of War, who was assisted by 
 delegates from the Ministries of the Interior, of 
 War, and of Foreign Affairs. As the result of 
 these deliberations, an ukase was published on 
 July 23, 1867, announcing the formation of the 
 Province of Turkestan, which was to be ruled by 
 a Governor-General, who would be appointed by 
 the Emperor, and placed under the orders of the 
 Eussian War Office. This new province was to 
 include the whole of the newly acquired territory, 
 together with that portion of the Siberian Province 
 of Semipalatinsk which lies to the south of the 
 Tarbagatai Mountains. Tashkent was fixed as the 
 headquarters of the province, which was divided 
 into the two districts of the Syr Daria and Semi- 
 retchinsk, each of which was to be controlled by a 
 military governor nominated by the Ministry of 
 War. The district of Syr Daria included the 
 'uyezds,' or sub-districts, of Kazala, Perovski, 
 Turkestan, Chimkent, Aulie-Ata, Kurama, Khojent, 
 and the city of Tashkent (which formed a sepa- 
 rate sub-district of its own) ; while the district oi 
 Semiretchinsk was divided into the ' uyezds ' of 
 Sergiopol, Kopal, Vernoye, Issik Kul, and Tok- 
 mak. These orders were not promulgated without 
 a certain amount of opposition. General Krijlian- 
 offsky, the Governor-General of Orenburg, whose 
 authority liad liitherto extended over tlie wli(»le of 
 VOL. 1. P
 
 2IO Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara isoo- 
 
 the newly acquired tracts on the Syr Daria, and 
 under whose orders the mihtary operations had 
 been carried out, was loth to have his power cur- 
 tailed, and he protested against the proposals of 
 the Steppe Commission, basing his objections on 
 the disadvantages which would result if the 
 Kirghiz were placed under two separate adminis- 
 trations. The correctness of this argument was to 
 a great extent proved by the disturbances which 
 arose among the Kirghiz in 1869 and 1870, when 
 they again revolted, destroyed stations on the 
 postal route, and captured travellers, who were 
 either killed or sold as slaves in Khiva. ]3ut 
 Krijhanoflsky was unsupported. The Kirghiz had 
 played their part in the game of Eussian aggres- 
 sion, and when no longer useful as an excuse for 
 fresh conquests, were to be permitted to lapse into 
 their former neglected and despised condition. 
 Two of the members of the Commission — viz., 
 M. Giers and Colonel Protsenko — also objected to 
 the inclusion of Semiretchinsk in the new province, 
 on the grounds that the frontier affairs of Siberia 
 and Turkestan required different methods of treat- 
 ment, and could therefore be best controlled by 
 two distinct sources of authority. These and other 
 minor objections were, however, overruled by the 
 War Ministry, and the new Province of Turkes- 
 tan was formed on the lines already described. 
 Komanoffsky continued to hold couuoand till the 
 arrival of tlie first Grovernor-General in the person 
 of Adjutant-General von Kaufmann, who reached 
 Tashkent on November 17, 1867.
 
 -18G8 BOKHARAN RAIDS 211 
 
 At this time negotiations for peace were still 
 proceeding between the Eussians and the Amir of 
 Bokhara. General Krijhanoffsky had drafted a 
 treaty of peace, which had been sent for Mozuffer- 
 Eddin's signai^ure in the previous September — that 
 is, some ten months after the capture of Jizakh 
 and the suspension of hostilities. In this treaty it 
 was stipulated that a part of the frontier line 
 between the new province of Turkestan and Bok- 
 hara should follow the crest of the Nurata 
 Eange, the Eussians being under the impression 
 that there was only one such range, while in 
 reality there are two branches — the Kara-Tan on 
 the north and the Ak-Tau on the south — between 
 which lies the fertile Bekship of Nurata. Before 
 signing the treaty the Amir wished to know which 
 branch of the range was referred to ; and thus the 
 negotiations dragged on, the Eussians declaring that 
 the point had been raised for the sake of procras- 
 tination, and through a desire on Mozuffer-Eddin's 
 part to avoid coming to terms. 
 
 In the meanwhile irresponsible bands of Bok- 
 harans made raids on the Eussian frontier, and 
 a Eussian officer (Second-Lieutenant Slushenko) 
 and three soldiers were captured by robbers on 
 the road between Chinaz and Bokhara. A small 
 column, under Baron von Stempel, was sent against 
 the village which was believed to be mixed up in 
 this affair ; but although the place was burnt, the 
 villagers fled to the mountains, and so escaped 
 punishment. Kaufmann, however, arrived shortly 
 afterwards, and lie at once demanded the release
 
 212 Attacks on Kiiokand and IJokhara isjq- 
 
 of the captives and insisted upon the immediate 
 signature of the treaty. This action resuhed in 
 the release of Slushenko and his companions, but 
 the treaty remained unsigned ; and in March 18G8 
 tlie Eussian Governor-General determined to adopt 
 strong measures for the purpose of enforcing 
 compliance with the Eussian demands. A force 
 of some 500 Cossacks was accordincrly sent to 
 establish a permanent camp close to the city of 
 Samarkand, and to there commence the erection of 
 a fortress. This step naturally roused the anger 
 of the Bokharans, who had not yet forgotten their 
 previous defeats, and were burning to avenge 
 themselves. The progress of the Eussians was 
 opposed, and a fight ensued at a place called 
 Uchum, which, of course, resulted in the flight of 
 the native troops. Then, during the absence of 
 the Amir from his capital, the Kazis and Mullahs 
 proclaimed the necessity for a holy war, and 
 roused the people to resist the unwarranted ad- 
 vances of the infidels. MozufFer-Eddin, knowing 
 that his array was powerless to oppose the troops 
 of the White Czar, tried to pacify the people ; but 
 riots took place in Samarkand, and when he re- 
 turned to his capital he was there ill-treated by 
 the enraged populace. 
 
 At this time there were two distinct parties in 
 opposition to the Amir. His eldest sou, the Katti- 
 Tiura, was intrigning against his authority, and 
 his nephew. Said Khan, supported by the Beks of 
 Shahr-i-Sebz, Chilek, and Ilra-tepe. was also trying 
 to gain possession of liie tliioiie. Being aware of
 
 -1868 Second Campaign against Bokhara 213 
 
 the differences between Moznffer-Eddin and the 
 Enssian.s, vSaid Khan's party ordered Omar Bek of 
 Ghilek to attack the Eussian forces near Jizakh, in 
 order that the Enssians might be provoked to in- 
 vade Bokhara, and that Said Khan might thus 
 obtain a chance of seizing the throne during the 
 disturbances which would follow a foreign inva- 
 sion. This attack was made, but Omar Bek was 
 easily repulsed and fled to Shahr-i-Sebz, lest he 
 might be punished by the Amir for having thus 
 afforded the Eussians an excuse for attackinir 
 Bokhara. 
 
 A few days before this affair, Iskander Khan, 
 an Afghan prince, deserted to the Eussians wntli 
 some 2,000 followers. This prince had been 
 driven out of Afghanistan by Shere Ali during 
 the intestine troubles in that State, and had 
 placed his services at the Amir's disposal ; but, 
 becoming discontented with the treatment he 
 received, he, with true Oriental treachery, de- 
 serted Mozuffer-Eddin and went over to the enemies 
 of the State which had helped him in his distress. 
 The Eussians believed that Omar Bek's attack had 
 been made in retaliation for Iskander Khan's 
 desertion, and Kaufmann therefore decided to 
 strike a blow which should finally break the power 
 of Bokhara and reduce the Amir to a condition of 
 complete vassalage. Hastily collecting a force, he 
 marched to Jizakh, and from thence moved for- 
 ward towards Samarkand, driving before him the 
 small parties of Bokharan irregular troops which 
 attempted to bar his progress. When he reached
 
 214 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara i839~ 
 
 Yani-Kurgan he received messengers from Jura 
 Bek and Baba Bek of Shalir-i-Sebz, two of the 
 rebellious leaders of Said Khan's faction, promising 
 either to afford active assistance against the Amir, 
 or to remain neutral, on the condition that their 
 presence should not be required in Samarkand 
 when the city had been captured by the Kussians. 
 Kaufmann expressed his great pleasure at the 
 friendly spirit which had been displayed by the 
 Shahr-i-Sebz chiefs, and assured the envoys that 
 although he stood in no need of any assistance 
 from the Beks, he would respect their wishes in 
 the event of strict neutralit}' being observed. The 
 Amir also made several attempts to avert hos- 
 tilities, and sent several messengers to state that 
 the treaty would be signed if further delay was 
 granted. Matters, however, had gone too far, and 
 as the Amir was believed to be desirous of Q-ainincf 
 time for the purpose of completing his warlike 
 preparations, the advance was continued. 
 
 On Ma^^ 13 the Eussians reached the banks of 
 the Zarafsnin Eiver, and found the enemy drawn 
 up on the hill of Chupan-ata. Here another 
 ambassa^tji* arrived, with a treaty signed by 
 Mozuffe iddin, which purported to be the same 
 that had Oeen prepared by Kaufmann. On exami- 
 nation, nowever, it was found to differ in many 
 important respects from the Eussian original, and 
 Kaufmann therefore demanded that the Bokharans 
 should evacuate their position within two hours. 
 But, instead of retiring, the Amir's troops kept up 
 a desultory fire on the Eussians, who were drawn
 
 -1868 Occupation of Samarkand 215 
 
 lip in order of Ijattle ; and, therefore, when the 
 stipulated time had expired, Kaufmann ordered 
 the attack. The fight was short and decisive, and 
 the Bokharans soon fled in the wildest confusion, 
 leaving their camp and twenty-one guns as trophies 
 in the hands of Kaufmann's victorious troops. 
 
 As soon as the inhabitants of Samarkand heard 
 of this Eussian success, they closed the gates of 
 the city against the Bokharan array, and on 
 May 14 sent a deputation to Kaufmann offering 
 their submission, and requesting that the place 
 might be occupied by Muscovite troops. At the 
 same time the other chief towns in the neiofhbour- 
 hood sent delegations to declare their allegiance 
 to the ' White Czar,' the only exceptions to the 
 general surrender being Omar Bek of Chilek, and 
 Hus«ein Bek of Urgut, who declined to treat with 
 the infidels. Samarkand was at once occupied 
 by the Eussians, and thus the ancient capital of 
 the Timurids became an appanage of the Eussian 
 Crown. 
 
 But although the great Bokharan city had 
 been thus easily captured, the war was by no 
 means at an end. While the main body of troops 
 under Golovatcheff was pushed forward in pursuit 
 of the Amir's army, two detachments were sent 
 against the recalcitrant chiefs of Urgut and 
 Chilek, and another party under AbramofT was 
 sent southwards to watch the movements of the 
 Shahr-i-Sebz troops. At first all went well. 
 Golovatcheff captured the town of Katti-Kurgan ; 
 Urgut was taken, although the Bek, Hussein, and
 
 2i6 Attacks on Khokand and Bokhara isso- 
 
 his followers escaped ; Cliilek was forced to sub- 
 mit ; and Abramoff, after a slight encounter Avith 
 the troops from Slialir-i-Sebz, forced them to retire 
 to the hills south of Samarkand. But in spite of 
 the satisfactory commencement of the campaign 
 the position of the Eussians became daily more 
 critical. Wlien Kaufmann entered Samarkand he 
 sent Kamal-Eddin, the Kazi Kalian of the city, to 
 summon Jura Bek and Baba Bek to attend at the 
 Eussian headquarters — a demand which was in 
 violation of the assurances which had been given 
 to their envoy at Yani-Kurgan. The chiefs at 
 first disbelieved the Kazi's stor}^ and cast him into 
 prison ; but when they found that Kaufmann had 
 deliberately broken ftiith with them, they began 
 to suspect treachery, and wrote to the Amir 
 offering to make peace with him, and to help him 
 to continue the struggle against the Eussians. 
 Thus these powerful chiefs were, through Kauf- 
 mann's ill-advised and unscrupulous action, turned 
 into active enemies, and the Eussians narrowly 
 escaped a crushing disaster which might have 
 caused the loss of all their recently acquired terri- 
 tory in Central Asia. 
 
 Mozuffer-Eddin, encouraged by the assistance 
 of the Shahr-i-Sebz troops, regained confidence, 
 and collected a fresh army to the west of Katti- 
 Kurgan, while his cavalry cut Kaufmann's com- 
 munications with Jizakli ; some 15,000 horsemen 
 were assembled at Chilek under a nephew of 
 Abdul Gaffar, the late Bek of Ura-tepe ; and the 
 whole country round Samarkand was swarming
 
 -1868 Battle of Zara-bulak 217 
 
 with armed irregulars. But Kaufmaun, though in 
 great peril, and cut off from his base at Tashkent, 
 was equal to the emergency. He decided to effect 
 a junction with Golovatcheff at Katti-Kurgan, and 
 then force the Amir to a decisive engagement, 
 which, if successful, would break up the combina- 
 tion against the Russians. He therefore left his 
 sick and wounded in Samarkand, with a small 
 garrison of 7G2 men, all told, and marched with 
 the remainder of his force towards Katti-Kurgan. 
 But he had only gone a few miles when he re- 
 ceived an alarming report from Golovatcheff, who 
 stated that he was completely surrounded by the 
 enemy, who were in great strength. Making a 
 forced march, Kaufmann relieved the garrison of 
 Katti-Kurgan, and then, on June 14, totally 
 defeated the Bokharan army on the heights of 
 Zara-bulak, some few miles to the west of Katti- 
 Kurgan, on the Samarkand-Bokhara road. 
 
 But during Kaufmann's absence from Samar- 
 kand, the little garrison which had been left to 
 defend the city were having a very anxious time. 
 The main Russian force had scarcely left the place 
 when parties of the Shahr-i-Sebz troops began to 
 appear on the outskirts of the city, and Jura Bek 
 and Baba Bek, with many other minor chieftains, 
 advanced to try and recapture it. Major Stempel, 
 who had been left in command of the garrison, 
 found that it was impossible to defend the great 
 length of wall surrounding the city, and he there- 
 fore concentrated his force in the citadel. 
 
 A determined attack commenced soon after-
 
 2i8 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara i859- 
 
 wards, and on June 15 the enemy succeeded in 
 setting fire to the gates, their total destruction 
 being only prevented by piles of sand-bags which 
 were placed against them. The garrison was by 
 this time reduced to great straits, and although 
 Stempel sent seven messengers to inform Kaufmann 
 of what w^as occurring, there were no signs of his 
 return. 
 
 At this juncture, when it appeared impossible 
 to save the place. Jura Bek received news of 
 the Amir's defeat on the heights of Zara-bulak, 
 and being misled by a false report that Kaufmann 
 was marching against Shahr-i-Sebz, withdrew his 
 forces, and left the other Beks to their own 
 resources. They, however, still kept up a constant 
 series of attacks until the evening of June 19, and 
 it was not until the arrival of Kaufmann on the 
 20th with the main Eussian army that the re- 
 maining irregulars were finally driven from their 
 positions and forced to raise the siege. The relief 
 came just in time. The brave garrison had lost 
 .3 officers and 46 men killed, and 5 officers and 
 167 men wounded; and although the withdrawal 
 of Jura Bek greatly weakened the attacking force, 
 the defenders had been reduced to the very last 
 extremity, and Stempel had decided to concentrate 
 the survivors of his small force in the Amir's 
 palace — a large building in the centre of the 
 citadel — there to sell their lives as dearly as 
 possible. Had Jura Bek continued to assist in 
 the attack, or if Kaufmann's return had been 
 longer delayed, nothing could have saved the
 
 -18G8 The Treaty of Peace 219 
 
 Eussians, and Samarkand must have fallen into 
 the hands of the Bokharans. Such a disaster 
 to the Eussian arms would have been the signal 
 for a general combination to expel the troops of 
 the ' White Czar ' from Turkestan. Kaufmann 
 would have found himself hopelessly cut off 
 from all assistance, and the small garrisons in 
 Tashkent and the other towns in Eussian occupa- 
 tion, would have been attacked by the combined 
 armies of Khokand and Bokhara, aided, most 
 probably, by the Kirghiz and Khivans. 
 
 After Kaufmann's return to Samarkand all 
 resistance ceased, and on July 5, 1868, a treaty 
 of peace was signed, whereby the Zarafshan 
 Valley, including Samarkand and Katti-Kurgan, 
 was surrendered to Eussia,^ who also obtained 
 the right of establishing cantonments at Kermineh, 
 
 ^ In order to allay the excitement which had been produced in 
 lEngland by the rapid advances of Eussia to the borders of 
 Afghanistan, Prince Gortchakoff informed the Earl of Clarendon 
 on September 2, 1869, that the Czar did not intend to retain 
 Samarkand, and stated that ' he could give no better proof of his 
 Majesty's determination not to proceed southwards.' This promise 
 was frequently repeated, and on February 20, 1870, the Eussian 
 Chancellor informed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 
 the city was not restored to Bokhara only ' because the Emir will 
 not pay us the war indemnity which he is engaged by treaty to 
 do.' The payment of this indemnity had been delayed on account 
 of the continued rebellion of the Katti-Tiura ; but although the 
 final instalment of the contribution was paid in ]870, Samarkand 
 was not restored to the Amir, and in April 1875 Prince Gortchalioff 
 finally announced in the following words that all idea of its 
 rendition had been abandoned : — 
 
 ' The necessity of holding the Amir in check, and the wishes of 
 the population, have been the principal reasons which have com- 
 pelled us to retain Samarkand.'
 
 220 Attacks on Kiiokand and Bokhara i859-g8 
 
 Charjui, and Karshi. By this treaty it was also 
 aa'reed : — 
 
 '■& 
 
 (1) That all Russian subjects, without distinc- 
 
 tion of creed, should be permitted to 
 trade freely throughout the khanate of 
 Bokhara, the Amir being responsible for 
 the security of all such merchants, their 
 property and caravans. 
 
 (2) That all Eussian merchants should have 
 
 the right to appoint agents in all towns 
 throughout the Amir's dominions. 
 
 (3) That a maximum ad valorem duty of 
 
 2^ per cent, should be levied on all 
 Russian goods imported into the khanate. 
 
 (4) That Russian merchants trading with 
 
 neio-hbourinof States should be granted 
 free passes through the khanate. 
 
 (5) That the Amir was to pay a war indemnity 
 
 of 125,000 tillas, of which amount 
 10,000 tillas were to be deposited im- 
 mediately, the balance being paid within 
 one year. 
 
 By the occupation of the Zarafshan Valley the 
 Russians obtained control over the water-supply 
 of the city of Bokhara, and they were thus in 
 a position to enforce complete compliance with 
 any demands they might subsequently desire to 
 make.
 
 221 
 
 CHAPTER YIII 
 
 THE AXGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1878 
 
 Conferences between Lord Clarendon and Baron Brunnow on 
 Russia's advance towards Afghanistan and India — Prince Ciovt- 
 chakoffs map — Gortchakoff's assurances — Controversy on tlie 
 liniitarj' line — Russia takes time to consider the Indian Govern- 
 ment's proposals — Final settlement of the northern frontier of 
 Afghanistan, and Prince Gortchakoff's letter — Russian pledges to 
 respect the integrity of Afghanistan — An incomplete settlement 
 — Present condition of the boundary question. 
 
 As the Eussian annexation of Samarkand and the 
 Zarafslian Valley created considerable excitement 
 in England, Lord Clarendon, the British Minister 
 for Foreign Afiliirs, in the following spring had 
 several conferences with Baron Brunnow, the 
 Russian Ambassador, regarding the rapid ad- 
 vances of Russian troops towards Afghanistan and 
 India; and he then said, that while her Majesty's 
 Government felt neither suspicion nor alarm at 
 these movements, yet something had to be done 
 to allay the uneasiness of the British and Indian 
 public. With this object, therefore, he recom- 
 mended ' the recognition of some territory as 
 neutral l:)etween the possessions of England and 
 Russia, which should he the limit of lliose pos- 
 sessions, and be scru])ulously respected l»v l)(»th
 
 222 The Anclo-Russian Agreement of 1873 
 
 Powers.' Baron Brunnow communicated this pro- 
 posal to his Government ; but, before replying, 
 Prince Gortchakoff wished to obtain some clear 
 knowledge of the political geography of the coun- 
 tries between the Eussian frontiers and India, 
 and to this end he obtained from Sir Eoderick 
 Murchison — then President of the Eoyal Geo- 
 graphical Society — a map of Persia, Afghanistan, 
 and Beluchistan, which had been prepared by 
 Mr. Weller, a well-known cartographer. In com- 
 piling this map, Mr. Weller had been guided more 
 by the ethnographical than by the political divi- 
 sions of the country ; and, therefore, instead of 
 colouring the whole of Afghanistan with one dis- 
 tinctive colour, he showed Afghanistan proper 
 as being bounded to the north by the Hindu 
 Kush Eange, while Afghan-Turkestan — i.e., the 
 country between the Hindu Kush and Oxus, and 
 extending from Badakshan to Maimana — was 
 painted a different colour, as if it constituted an 
 independent State. 
 
 Armed with this map. Prince Gortchakoff sent 
 an answer to the proposals of the British Foreign 
 Minister, in which, after expressing his satisfaction 
 at the friendly sentiments of the English Govern- 
 ment, and after referring with true diplomatic 
 insincerity to the ' profound wisdom ' of Lord 
 Lawrence's policy of ' masterly inactivity,' he 
 gave ' the positive assurance ' that ' His Imperial 
 Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely 
 outside the sphere within which Eussia may be 
 called upon lo exercise her inniicnce.' Lord
 
 Neutral Zone abandoned 223 
 
 Clarendon consulted the India Office before any 
 further steps were taken for the establishment of 
 a ' neutral zone ' between India and the Eussian 
 frontiers in Central Asia ; and in accordance with 
 the opinions of the Secretary of State, he, on 
 April 17, 1869, informed Baron Brunnow that 
 her Majesty's Government ' had arrived at the 
 decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil 
 those conditions of a neutral territory that it was 
 the object of the two Governments to establish, 
 as the frontiers were ill-defined ; ' and he then 
 suggested ' that the Upper Oxus, which was south 
 of Bokhara, should be the boundary line which 
 neither Power should permit their forces to cross.' 
 From this time the idea of a 'neutral zone' 
 was definitely abandoned by the British Govern- 
 ment, although Ptussia for obvious reasons en- 
 deavoured on more than one occasion to revive 
 the idea. It would, of course, have been to her 
 advantage that Afghanistan — as shown in Mr. 
 Weller's map — should have been placed outside 
 British influence, while she was to be permitted 
 to absorb the whole of the States lying between 
 her frontiers and the Hindu Kush ; but fortunatelv 
 the Indian authorities clearly recognised the ex- 
 travagance and one-sidedness of the Eussian pro- 
 posals, and the idea of a neutral zone was absolutely 
 dropped so far as England was concerned in April 
 18G9 ; the subsequent negotiations being based on 
 the assumption that it was desirable to fix some 
 limitary line bej'-ond whicli neither Power sliould 
 advance.
 
 224 The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1S73 
 
 The idea of Lord Ma3^o's Government was that 
 a girdle of semi-independent States should be 
 formed on the frontier of each country — Afghani- 
 stan, Beluchistan, and Kashgar l)eing subject to 
 British influence ; while Khiva, Bokhara, and 
 Khokand remained under liussian control. But 
 Eussia did not relish this idea. Although the 
 English thereby clearly displayed their desire for 
 peace, Eussia had no intention of putting a limit 
 to her advance until she had arrived in close 
 proximity to the frontiers of British India ; and, 
 therefore, after some further interchange of com- 
 munications, this idea also was abandoned, and 
 all that resulted was a repetition of the Eussian 
 promise that Afghanistan should be completely 
 outside the sphere within which Eussia should 
 be called upon to exercise her authority. This 
 guarantee, however, was of great value, and steps 
 were then taken to arrive at a clear definition of 
 the actual boundaries of the Amir's territories. 
 The Indian Government insisted that the true 
 northern boundary of Afghanistan was marked by 
 the course of the Eiver Oxus ' from the district of 
 Balkh on the west to the extreme east of Badak- 
 slian ; ' and they based their arguments on the fact 
 that the various khanates between the Oxus and 
 Hindu Kush had acknowledged the sovereignty of 
 Dost Mahommed, and had since recognised the 
 Sfovernment of Sliere Ali. After reviewinf:^ the 
 con({uests and rule of Dost Mahommed, the Indian 
 Government said : ' The north-western l)oundary of 
 wlial, ill oiir <>])ini(>ii. ought to Ijc considered Sliere
 
 Controversy on the Limitary Line 225 
 
 All's dominions, runs in a soiith-westerl}- direction 
 from a point on the Oxus between Khoja-Sale and 
 Karki, skirting and including the provinces of 
 Balkh, Maimana (with its dependencies of Andkhui, 
 &c.), and Herat (with its dependencies between 
 the Murghab and Heri Eud). The northern 
 boundary is the Oxus, from the same point between 
 Karki and Khoja-Sale eastwards to Punjab^ and 
 Wakhan, and thereafter the stream which passes 
 Wakhan up to the point where the range of the 
 Hindu Kush meets the southern angle of the Pamir 
 Steppe.' When a copy of the letter containing 
 these remarks was forwarded to the Eussian 
 Government, M. Stremooukoff, the Director of the 
 Asiatic Department of the Eussian Foreign Office, 
 stated that Khoja-Sale itself should be the point on 
 the Oxus from which the western boundarv should 
 commence ; and after a brief discussion this was 
 practically agreed to, on the understanding that 
 the district of Khoja-Sale should be considered as 
 constituting a portion of the territories of the Amir 
 of Kabul. From Khoja-Sale the frontier line was 
 to be drawn towards Persia so as to include 
 Andkhui and Maimana in Afghan territory ; but 
 M. StremooukofF added the significant remark 
 that ' great care would be required in tracing a 
 line from thence (i.e., Khoja-Sale) to the south, as 
 Merv and the country of the Turkomans were 
 
 * The meaning here is somewhat obscure. The word ' Pnniab ' 
 is evidently a misprint for Panjah, and the Indian Government 
 evidently referred either to the River Ab-i-Panjah or to one of the 
 towns on its banks — viz., Bar Panjah or Kila Panjah. 
 
 VOL. 1. g
 
 226 The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 
 
 becoming commercially important ; ' a remark of 
 which the full meaning was only realised some 
 fourteen or fifteen years later when Merv was seized 
 by Eussia, and Eussian troops had established 
 themselves within easy striking distance of Herat. 
 
 Before the Eussian Government gave any 
 decision regarding the remainder of the proj)osed 
 frontier line, they referred the matter to General 
 Kaufmann, as being a person on the sj^ot who 
 could form the best opinion as to the correctness 
 of the arguments put forward by Lord Mayo's 
 Government. Bat months passed, and even years, 
 without an}^ definite reply having been vouchsafed, 
 and therefore on October 17, 1872, Lord Granville 
 addressed a communication to Lord Au2:ustus 
 Loftus, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 in which the northern boundaries of Afghanistan 
 were defined in the following words : — 
 
 ' For your Excellency's more complete infor- 
 mation I state the territories and boundaries 
 which Her Majesty's Government consider as fully 
 belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, viz : 
 
 '(1) Badakshan, with its dependent district of 
 Wakhan, from the Sir-i-kul (Woods Lake) on the 
 east to the junction of the Kokcha Eiver, with the 
 Oxus (or Panjah) forming the northern boundary 
 of this Afghan province throughout its entire 
 extent. 
 
 ' (2) Afghan Turkestan, comprising the districts 
 of Kunduz, Kliulm and Balkh, the northern 
 boundary of which would l)e the line of the Oxus, 
 from the junction of the Kokcha Eiver to the post
 
 The Czar accepts British Proposals 227 
 
 of the Khoja-Sale inclusive, on the high road from 
 Bokhara to Balkh — nothing to be claimed by the 
 Afghan Ameer on the l6ft bank of the Oxus below 
 Khoja-Sale. 
 
 '(3) The internal districts of Akcha, Siripul, 
 Maimana, Shiberghan, and Andkui, the latter of 
 which would be the extreme Afghan frontier 
 possession to the north-west, the desert be3^ond 
 belonging to independent tribes of Turcomans. 
 
 ' (4) The western Afghan frontier between the 
 dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian 
 province of Khorassan is well known, and need not 
 here be defined.' 
 
 In reply, Prince GortchakofF, on Deceml)er 7, 
 1872, forwarded a copy of a report which he had 
 received from General Kaufmann, wherein the 
 Governor-General of Turkestan disputed the Amir's 
 authority over Badakshan and its dependent district 
 of Waklian, and also threw doubts on Shere Ali's 
 claims to the districts of Akcha, Siripul, Maimana, 
 Shiberghan, and Andkhui. But in the meantime 
 Eussia had completed her preparations for the 
 invasion of Khiva, and it was necessary that she 
 should do something to conciliate the English, in 
 order that her military operations against that 
 khanate might not be interfered with. Tlierefore, 
 on January 31,1873, Prince Gortchakoff definitely 
 announced the Czar's acceptance of the northern 
 frontier of Afghanistan, as defined by the British 
 Cabinet, and therel)y formally agreed to a limitary 
 line which neither England nor Kussia should cross. 
 As this final settlement — so arrived at — coustitutes
 
 228 The Anglo-Russian ACxReement of 1873 
 
 one of the most important agreements between the 
 two Powers concerning Central Asian affairs, and 
 as it is the key-stone of the present pohtical situa- 
 tion, the Eussian Chancellor's letter is given in 
 extenso. It was addressed to Baron Brunnow, by 
 whom it was communicated to Earl Granville on 
 February 5, 1873, and was as follows : — 
 
 ' St. Petersburgh, Janiiary H, 1873. 
 
 'M. le Comte, — Lord Augustus Loftus has 
 communicated to me the reply of Her Britannic 
 Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to our 
 despatch on Central Asia of the 19th of December. 
 
 ' I inclose a copy of this document. 
 
 'We see with satisfaction that the English 
 Cabinet continues to pursue in those parts the 
 same object as ourselves, that of ensuring to them 
 peace, and, as far as possible, tranquillity. 
 
 ' The divergence which existed in our views 
 was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the 
 dominions of Shere Ali. 
 
 ' The Enolish Cabinet includes within them 
 Badakshan and Wakhan, which, according to our 
 views, enjoyed a certain independence. Con- 
 sidering the difficulty experienced in establishing 
 the facts in all their details in those distant parts, 
 considering tlie greater facilities which the British 
 Government possesses for collecting precise data, 
 and, above all, considering our wish not to give 
 to this question of detail greater importance than 
 is due to it, we do not refuse to accept the line of 
 boundary laid down by England.
 
 Terms of the Agreement 229 
 
 ' We are the more inclined to this act of 
 courtesy as the English Government engages to 
 use all her influence with Sliere Ali, in order to 
 induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as 
 well as to insist on his giving up all measures of 
 aggression or further conquest. This influence 
 is indisputable. It is based not only on the 
 material and moral ascendency of England, but 
 also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is 
 indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in 
 this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance 
 of peace. 
 
 ' Your Excellency will have the goodness to 
 make this declaration to Her Britannic Majesty's 
 Principal Secretary of State, and to give him a 
 copy of this despatch. 
 
 ' We are convinced that Lord Granville will 
 perceive in it a fresh proof of the value which 
 our auf]^ust master attaches to the maintenance 
 and consolidation of the most friendly relations 
 with the Government of Her Majesty Queen 
 Victoria. 
 
 ' Eeceive, &c. 
 
 ' (Signed) Gortciiakoav.' 
 
 Such was the famous Agreement of 1873 — 
 sometimes erroneously referred to as the Agree- 
 ment of 1872 — and although Eussian writers have 
 frequently endeavoured to revive the question of 
 a neutral zone, and have tried to explain that this 
 agreement merely defined the northern limits of 
 the Amir's dominions, and in no way interfered
 
 230 The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 
 
 with Eussia's freedom of action with regard to 
 Afghanistan, the Czar's Government have repeat- 
 edly pledged themselves to respect the integrity 
 of Afghanistan, and have frequently recognised 
 that by this agreement they had bound themselves 
 to abstain from all interference in the affairs of 
 that State. They have stated that while they saw 
 no objection whatever to English officers visiting 
 Kabul, they agreed that Eussian agents should 
 not do so ; and they have even gone so far as to 
 declare that ' Happen what might, in the internal 
 state of that country, the Imperial Government 
 would not interfere ' ; and further, that ' If Eng- 
 land found it to her interests to annex Afghanistan 
 to the Indian Government, the Eussian Govern- 
 ment would not regard it as a menace to them, 
 nor would they endeavour to prevent it.' 
 
 But although this agreement was satisfactory, 
 so far as it went, the frontiers of the kingdom of 
 Kabul were defined in such an ambiguous manner 
 as to render it very probable that disputes would 
 arise in the future ; for while the centi'al portion 
 of the frontier — from the mouth of the Kokclia 
 Eiver to Khoja-Sale — was clearly marked by the 
 course of the Eiver Oxus, the eastern and western 
 portions of the bouiudary were merely defined in a 
 general way, without any attempt being made to 
 fix the precise boundary in those parts. Thus, 
 the north-western ' territories and boundaries ' of 
 Afghanistan — i.e., between Khoja-Sale and Persia — 
 were said to include the internal districts of Akcha, 
 Sij-i})ul, Mainuuia, Shiberghan, and Andkhui ; but
 
 An Incomplete Settlement 231 
 
 the limits of those provinces were not specified, 
 and thus the frontier of Afo-hanistan in this direc- 
 tion remained undefined except in so far that it 
 was recognised that tliose districts formed a portion 
 of the Amir's dominions. Then, again, in the first 
 clause of the Schedule, certain words were omitted 
 by a careless copyist, and thus the clause was 
 rendered obscure and almost without meaning. 
 
 The late Sir Henry Eawlinson, who first pointed 
 out this error, stated that this first clause should 
 read as follows (the omitted words being shown in 
 italics) : — 
 
 ' (1) Badakshan, with its dependent district of 
 Wakhan from Sir-i-kul on the east to the junction 
 of the Kokclia Eiver with the Oxus (or Penjali) on 
 the west ; the stream of the Oxus thus forming the 
 northern boundary of this Afghan province through- 
 out its entire extent.' 
 
 He then claimed that, such being the case, the 
 frontier line between Afghanistan and the Central 
 Asian States under Eussian influence should fol- 
 low the course of the main stream of the Oxus, 
 which rises in the Chak-Mak Kul, or Little Pamir 
 Lake, and, after running for some distance in an 
 easterly direction, then turns to the north-west, 
 and under the name Ak-su, circles round the 
 elevated plateau of the Great Pamir, where it is 
 joined by the Ak-Baital stream, from whence — 
 under the name of the Murghab — it flows down 
 the great Shignan Valley, and unites with the 
 southern iH-anch of tlie Oxus at Kila-Wamar, on 
 the confines of lioshan ; and, in su})port of this
 
 232 The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 
 
 contention, lie stated that this Murghab branch of 
 the Oxus was well known to form the northern 
 boundary of the district of Wakhan. 
 
 The ambiguity with which the north-eastern 
 and north-western portions of the Afghan frontier 
 were defined in the Agreement of 1873 have, as 
 might have been expected, given rise to serious 
 misunderstandinos between the British and Eussian 
 Governments. In 1884, after the Eussians occu- 
 pied Merv, they took advantage of the incomplete- 
 ness of the settlement, seized several important 
 })ositions which had long been recognised as 
 forming part of Afghanistan, and eventually 
 gained possession of a large slice of territory 
 which undoubtedly belonged by right to the Amir 
 of Kabul ; while at the present time, also, negotia- 
 tions are being carried on between London and 
 St. Petersburg regarding the north-eastern portion 
 of the frontier. 
 
 The Pamir region is divided among the petty 
 States of Wakhan, Shignan, Eoshan, Darwaz, and 
 Sir-i-kul, Of these, Wakhan, Shignan, and Eoshan, 
 with a portion of Darwaz, have long formed a part 
 of Afghanistan ; the district of Sir-i-kul belongs to 
 the Chinese ; and that portion of Darwaz which 
 lies to the north of the Oxus is dependent on Bok- 
 liara. During the great Mahommedan rebellion in 
 the western provinces of China, and while Yakoob 
 Bog was an independent sovereign in Kashgaria, 
 the Chinese naturally lost their hold over the Sir-i- 
 kul district ; and similarly, after Shere All's death, 
 and during the British occupation of Afghanistan,
 
 Complications 
 
 Sliignan, Roslian, and Waklian were left to look 
 after themselves. But after the Chinese had re- 
 conquered the western provinces, their troops were 
 once again sent into the Pamirs, and in 1883 
 Chinese posts were re-established throughout the 
 Sir-i-kul district ; and in the same year also the 
 Amir Abdur Eahman re-occupied the districts of 
 Shignan, Eoslian, and Wakhan. The Eussians at 
 once protested against this movement on the part 
 of the Afghans ; they denied that Shignan and 
 Eoslian had ever belom^ed to Afohanistan, and after 
 pointing out that those districts were not men- 
 tioned in the Agreement of 1873, they called upon 
 the British Government to use their influence with 
 the Amir to induce him to cause the withdrawal of 
 the Afghan force. After some delay the British 
 Foreign Office replied that ' the Amir considers 
 Shignan and Eoslian are part of Badakshan, which 
 was formally declared in 1872-73 to belong to 
 Afghanistan' — and the Afolian oarrisons have since 
 remained in possession. 
 
 It will be thus seen that the boundary ques- 
 tion which the British and Eussian Governments 
 are now endeavouring to settle is a very com- 
 plicated one ; and its settlement has been rendered 
 all the more difficult on account of the careless 
 omission of the line in the first clause of the 
 Schedule of the Agreement of 1873, and also 
 because the English Foreign Office and India 
 Office, by an extraordinary oversight, neglected 
 to include Shignan and Eoshan in the list of 
 districts under Afghan control, although they
 
 234 The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 
 
 must have known that such was the case. The 
 comphcation, moreover, has been still further 
 increased by the Bokharan occupation of a portion 
 of Darwaz, which lies on the left bank of the 
 Oxus, and which the Eussian Government evi- 
 dently intend to adhere to as a set-off against the 
 Afghan occupation of Shignan and Eoslian. 
 
 But although the question is undoubtedly 
 beset with difficulties, four facts remain perfectly 
 clear, and these are: (1) Eussia cannot, by any pos- 
 sible interpretation of the clause in question, lay 
 claim to any influence over the territories to the 
 south of the Sir-i-kul branch of the Oxus, and Eus- 
 sian incursions into the countries to the south of 
 that branch of the river can, therefore, only be made 
 in direct violation of the Anglo-Eussian Agree- 
 ment ; (2) the Bokharan occupation of territory 
 to the south of the main stream of the Oxus is 
 totally inadmissible and unjustifiable ; (3) the 
 Sir-i-kul district to the east of Burzila-Jai, and 
 to the north of Lake Victoria, belongs to China ; 
 (4) it would not be difficult to prove historically 
 that Shignan and Darwaz have long formed a 
 portion of the Badakshan province of Afghanistan, 
 and the Amir's claim to those districts cannot 
 therefore be lightly set aside.
 
 235 
 
 CIIArTEE IX 
 
 1868—1883 
 KULJA AND KASHGAE 
 
 'Bokharan independence '—Petty native disturbances in Bokhara 
 — The Iskander Kill Expedition — Kulja and its history — Affairs 
 of Kashgar, and tlie rule of Yakoob Beg — Eussian occupation 
 and amiexation of Kulja ' in perpetuity ' — Yakoob Beg defies 
 Russia — British relations with Kashgar — Eussian proposals to 
 Y^'akoob Beg — Kashgar and the Porte — Treaty of commerce be- 
 ween the Indian Government and Kashgar — Projected Russian 
 invasion of Kashgar — Subjugation of Kashgar by the Chmese — 
 Rendition of Kulja to China. 
 
 After tlie capture of Samarkand there was a brief 
 pause in Eussia's career of conquest and annexa 
 tion in Central Asia. By Kaufmami's rapid and 
 successful campaign, Bokhara had been reduced 
 to a condition of complete subjection ; for although 
 the Amir nominally retained his position as the 
 ruler of an independent State, he, in reality, be- 
 came nothing more nor less than a feudatory chief 
 of the Russian Empire. Had it been necessary for 
 the improvement of Eussia's strategical position in 
 regard to her designs against India, the Czar 
 could have annexed the whole of Mozuffer-Eddiu's 
 dominions without striking another blow, for the 
 victories of Chupan-ata and Zara-Bulak, togetlier 
 with the brilliant defence of Samarkand, had com-
 
 236 KULJA AND KaSHGAR 1868- 
 
 pletely cowed tlie Bokliarans, and made them feel 
 the utter uselessness of continuing the struggle 
 against the m-eat Muscovite nation. But it was 
 well known in Eussia that no such annexation was 
 necessary, nor would such a step have been politi- 
 cally sound. By permitting the Amir to retain 
 some semblance of independent authority, the 
 Czar's Government avoided the expenses of a 
 military occupation of the country, with its atten- 
 dant dangers ; while they at the same time were 
 able somewhat to allay the irritation in England 
 which had been caused l)y their recent advances, 
 by pointing to their moderation with respect to 
 Bokhara as a proof of their desire to abstain from 
 fresh conquests. The Eussians well knew that so 
 far as the military situation was concerned, an- 
 nexation would offer no advantages ; for from 
 tlieir position in the Zarafshan Valley, command- 
 ing the water-supply of the city of Bokhara, they 
 could enforce compliance with all their demands, 
 and could move their troops through any portion 
 of the country without difficulty or opposition ; 
 and their strategical position was therefore just 
 the same as though they liad advanced their 
 frontiers to the banks of the Oxus. 
 
 Tliey therefore decided — and decided wisely — 
 tliat Bokliara sliould not be annexed ; and they 
 thereby, without losing any strategical advan- 
 tages, avoided the dangers and expense of an 
 occupation of the country ; wliile tlie English 
 people — who would liave been reduced to a frantic 
 state of alarm if the Eussian frontiers had been
 
 -1883 BOKHARAN INDEPENDENCE 237 
 
 actually advanced to the borders of Afghanistan — 
 in their ignorance still cherished the belief that 
 ' independent ' Bokhara lay between Eiissia and 
 the kingdom of Kabul, little dreaming that for all 
 practical purposes 'Bokharan independence' is 
 but an idle phrase. 
 
 But although the Eussians made no further 
 advances towards the middle course of the Oxus, 
 they did not remain idle, but found ample employ- 
 ment in the consolidation of their position in their 
 newly acquired territories, and in making prepara- 
 tions for fresh campaigns. Mozuffer-Eddin had 
 rendered himself obnoxious to his subjects because 
 he had concluded the disastrous peace whereby 
 Samarkand and the Zarafshan Valley had been 
 lost to Bokhara ; and Eussian troops had to be 
 employed for the suppression of rebellion against 
 the Amir's authority, and for the subjugation of 
 certain malcontent chiefs who, having established 
 themselves in the mountainous district to the 
 south-east of Samarkand, kept the country in a 
 constant state of disorder. Then, again, the rapid 
 extension of Yakoob Beg's power throughout East- 
 ern Turkestan was viewed by Kaufmann with the 
 greatest anxiety ; the relations between Eussia and 
 the Atalyk Ghazi thus became daily more strained; 
 and eventually the Kulja Valley was annexed, in 
 order that it might not fall into the hands of the 
 remarkable ruler who had formed a new and 
 powerful State on the western borders of the 
 Chinese Empire. Nor were these the only im- 
 portant matters which occupied the attention of
 
 238 KULJA AND KASHGAR 18G8- 
 
 the Russian Government after Samarkand had 
 been captured and Bokhara subdued. They clearly 
 ■saw that the whole military position in Central 
 Asia was a very weak one, and that until Tur- 
 kestan was placed in communication with European 
 Eussia by means of some shorter and more direct 
 line than the old Orenburg-Kazala route, the 
 new districts would never, by their trade, repay 
 the great military expenditure which had been — 
 and was still being — incurred, nor would Turkestan 
 make a satisfactory base of operations against 
 India. Several alternative schemes for the esta- 
 blishment of direct communication between Tur- 
 kestan and the Caucasus were therefore carefully 
 considered, and it was not long before a Eussian 
 force landed at Krasnovodsk, on the east coast of 
 the Caspian, to prepare the way for the conquest 
 of Khiva, and for the final absorption of the whole 
 of the Turkoman country from the Gulf of Astrabad 
 to Merv and the Oxus. 
 
 It has already been mentioned that the greatest 
 discontent and restlessness prevailed among the 
 people of Bokhara for some time before Kaufmann 
 invaded the State and seized Samarkand. Two 
 parties had been in a state of open rebellion 
 against the Amir's authority, and disturbances 
 liad broken out in Samarkand and in the city of 
 Bokhara itself, Mozuffer-Eddin having been pul)- 
 licly insulted and ill-treated in his capital. The 
 loss of Sauiarkaiid, and the disastrous peace wliirli 
 had been concluded wifh the Eussians, did not 
 tend to improve the situation, and it was not loi'g
 
 -1883 Disturbances in Bokhara 239 
 
 before the general dissatisfaction manifested itself 
 in a fresh outbreak of popular feeling against 
 the Amir, who was considered to have betrayed 
 his country . Tlie Katti-Tiura — who was then at 
 Shahr-i-Sebz, and to whom the Beks of tliat place 
 had transferred their allegiance — seized the oppor- 
 tunity, and issued a proclamation declaring his 
 father to be an infidel, and therefore quite unfit to 
 rule the State. 
 
 The rebel prince then entered into negotiations 
 with the Turkomans, Khivans, and Kirghiz ; and as 
 the revolt soon began to assume serious propor- 
 tions, Kaufmann determined to take steps to show 
 the malcontents that the Eussians intended to 
 uphold the Amir's authority. General Abramoff 
 was therefore ordered to take the field ; Jam, 
 Kara-tepe, Urgut, and Karslii were speedily occu- 
 pied by Eussian troops ; and when the Beks of 
 Shahr-i-Sebz found that the Eussian forces were 
 closing round them, they sent in their submission 
 and the rebellion collapsed. 
 
 As soon as this insurrection had been suppressed, 
 Kaufmann was able to turn his attention to the 
 restoration of order in the mountainous district to 
 the east of Samarkand. During the disturbances 
 which followed the conclusion of peace between 
 MozufTer-Eddin and the Eussians, the Amir had 
 marched a force into Hissar and Kulab — the two 
 most eastern districts of the khanate of Bokhara — 
 for the purpose of subduing the local Beks, who 
 had endeavoured to assert their independence. 
 While so employed, a portion of the Bokharan
 
 240 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 army had been detached towards tlie north to 
 operate against Karategin, which was then a de- 
 pendency of Khokand. Shere AH, the Bek of the 
 district, was driven out of the place, and forced to 
 take refuge in Khokand ; and Khudayar Khan 
 thereupon complained to Kaufmann of the un- 
 provoked invasion of his dominions by the Bok- 
 haran troops. MozufFer-Eddin, on being expostu- 
 lated with, tried to prove that Shere Ali had been 
 secretly assisting the rebellious Bek of Hissar ; but 
 this charge could not be substantiated, and Kauf- 
 mann therefore ordered the Bokharan forces to be 
 withdrawn, and suggested to Khudayar that he 
 should restore Karategin to its former ruler, Mozuffar 
 Shah, who had been some time previously deposed 
 and kept as a prisoner in Khokand. This was 
 done, and Karategin was thus formed into a semi- 
 independent State between Khokand and Bokhara, 
 while the Eussians acquired some considerable 
 influence over the affairs of the district. 
 
 But Mozuffar Shah had not long been reinstated 
 when he in his turn invaded Bokharan territory. 
 But, while marching to attack Hissar, his troops 
 mutinied, and proclaimed a man named Patcha 
 Hodja as Bek of Karategin ; and thus in the course 
 of a few months the Russian nominee was driven, 
 from his throne, and the whole of the Kohistan 
 east of Samai'kand was thrown into a state of 
 disorder. 
 
 Under these circumstances Kaufmann deter- 
 mined to send an expeditionary force into the 
 country to put an end to tlie constant petty war-
 
 -1883 ISKANDER KUL EXPEDITION 24I 
 
 fare wliicli was there being carried on, while at the 
 same time the opportunity was taken of exploring 
 the head waters of the Zarafshan, and t]»e passes 
 to the south of Lake Iskander Kul. 
 
 General Abramoff, to whom the charge of the 
 expedition was entrusted, occupied Urmitan and 
 Varsaminor, and destroyed the forts at Paldorak. 
 He explored the Glacier of the Zarafshan, and, 
 after two severe encounters with the enemy, re- 
 turned to Samarkand. 
 
 During Abramoff's absence on this expedition, 
 difficulties again arose between the Eussians and 
 the Beks of Shahr-i-Sebz. Prince Urusof, with a 
 detachment of Cossacks, had been sent out into 
 the country round Samarkand to collect taxes, 
 and while so employed he was attacked Ijy a band 
 of robbers, who succeeded in killing some of his 
 escort. In consequence of Jura Bek, of Shahr-i- 
 Sebz, refusing the Eussian demand for the sur- 
 render of the leader of the band, an expedition 
 was promptly sent against him. Kitab ^ was carried 
 by assault on August 26, 1870. Shahr immedi- 
 ately surrendered without offering any resistance ; 
 and Jura Bek and Baba Bek — the two leading chief- 
 tains of the district — fled for safety to Khokand. 
 
 The twin cities were then handed over to the 
 Amir, in order to emphasise the great desire on 
 the part of the Eussians to abstain from further 
 
 * The name Shahr-i-Sebz, or Green City, is applied to the twin 
 cities of Shahr and Kitab, which are about Ibnr miles apart. These 
 two towns, with a few of the adjacent villages and cultivated fields, 
 were formerly surrounded by a massive mud wall, some fifty-three 
 miles in length, and were tlien known by the name of Kesli. 
 
 VOL. I. a
 
 242 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 advances ; and Abramoff's force returned to Samar- 
 kand, a small detachment being, however, sent 
 once more into the Kohistan to punish the Beks 
 of Farab and Maghian, who were believed to have 
 been implicated in the attack on the Eussians on 
 the heights of Kuli Kalan during the Iskander 
 Kul expedition. The two places were soon oc- 
 cupied, and were at once annexed to the Eussian 
 district of Urgut ; and in the following year — 1871 
 — the remaining mountainous districts were incor- 
 porated into the Eussian Empire as a portion of 
 the province of Zarafshan. 
 
 Having thus briefly reviewed the Eussian 
 operations in Bokhara subsequent to the conclu- 
 sion of peace between the Amir and his Muscovite 
 neighbours, it is now necessary to return once 
 more to the consideration of Eussia's movements 
 on the extreme eastern frontier of Kaufmann's 
 great province. 
 
 Far away in the very heart of Central Asia 
 there lies a broad fertile valley, watered by a 
 swiftly-running river and its numerous affluents, 
 and encompassed on the north, east, and south 
 by an apparently endless succession of gigantic 
 mountain peaks which are clothed in a mantle of 
 everlasting snow. This is the district of Kulja, 
 which once formed a portion of the ancient king- 
 dcmi of Dzungaria ; and the name of the river is 
 the Hi. For many centuries this well-favoured 
 district had been the theatre of bitter intertribal 
 warfare ; and it had been occupied in succession 
 by many of the wild races which inhabited the
 
 -1883 KULJA 243 
 
 countries of Central Asia. In the second century 
 before the Christian Era, the Usun — who are sup- 
 posed by some to be the ancestors of the Suiones 
 — were driven out of Mongolia by the Huns, and 
 forced to migrate to the Hi Valley, where they 
 settled down and became a powerful people. 
 There, however, they found that they were much 
 harassed by the neighbouring nomads, and in the 
 fourth century of the Christian Era they again 
 migrated, and left Kulja to be occupied by the 
 Uishurs — a Turkish tribe that descended from 
 the north and occupied the slopes of the Eastern 
 Thian-Slian range. After the Uighurs came the 
 Kara-Khitai, and these again were conquered at 
 the commencement of the thirteenth century by 
 the Mongols. When the great Genghiz Khan died, 
 Dzungaria, with other regions, fell to the share of 
 his son Jagatai, and his successors held the country 
 until Timur made it a portion of his vast empire. 
 
 During the supremacy of the Mongols, Dzun- 
 garia was occupied by the three powerful Mongol 
 tribes of Tchoros, Hosliot, and Torgot, who, to- 
 wards the close of the fourteenth century, formed 
 an alliance for the purpose of obtaining supreme 
 power ; and after having overthrown the opposing 
 factions, they became predominant throughout 
 Dzungaria. In the following century the Tchoros 
 tribe became separated into two branches — the 
 Tchoros and Durbot — and then the confederates 
 became known by the name of ' Durben Oirat,' 
 or ' four allies,' and extended their influence 
 throughout Mono-olia. 
 
 K 2
 
 244 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 Tlius matters remained till the commencement 
 of the seventeenth century, when dissensions arose 
 which led to the secession of certain petty chiefs, 
 who, with their supporters, migrated to Siberia, 
 where they received from the Tartars and Kirghiz 
 the name of ' Kalmuks ' — i.e., the remnant. For 
 the next hundred years Dzungaria, under the so- 
 vereignty of successive Oirat princes,^ was the scene 
 of almost incessant warfare ; and early in the eight- 
 eenth century the Torgot tribe was defeated by 
 Tsevan-Kabdan, and forced to migrate to European 
 Eussia, where it settled along the banks of the 
 Vola'a. In 1745 Galdan Tchirin, the son of 
 Tsevan-Eabdan, died, and was succeeded by one 
 of his sons ; but this prince was soon afterwards 
 murdered by his brother ; the murderer in his 
 tarn was then killed by another brother, who was 
 fnially overthrown by two tribal leaders named 
 Amursana and Davatsi. These two conspirators, 
 however, quarrelled, when the former invoked the 
 aid of the Emperor of China, and with the assist- 
 ance of a Chinese army overthrew his opponent. 
 
 China having thus acquired an influence in the 
 country, had no intention of abandoning it, and 
 Amursana thus found himself to be merely in the 
 position of a Chinese governor instead of being an 
 independent sovereign as he had expected to be. 
 He therefore instigated his followers to rise and 
 expel the Chinese forces ; but was defeated, and 
 tied to Siberia, wliei'c he died in 1757. 
 
 ^ These were Klu)-no-kho-tsin (or Batnr Kun-taitsi). Zenga, 
 Galdan, Tsevan-Kabdan, and Galdan Tcliiriu.
 
 -1883 The Chinese conquer Kulja 245 
 
 The Chinese, after having gained this victoiy, 
 determined to prevent a repetition of the rebellion, 
 and they therefore at once proceeded to indis- 
 crimhiately massacre the remaining Dzungarian 
 population. This was done so completely that 
 about 600,000 persons were either killed or forced 
 to save their lives by fleeing from the country. 
 
 By these drastic measures the Emperor of China 
 found himself to be the happy possessor of a fer- 
 tile province, but one which was entirely without 
 inhabitants, with the exception of the few soldiers 
 who had effected its subjugation. This difficulty 
 was, however, speedily surmounted by enforced 
 colonisation. Agriculturists were sent from East- 
 ern Turkestan, who became known as Tarantchis 
 (fromtaran — i.e., millet); criminals, called Tcham- 
 ])ans, were deported from the prisons of Southern 
 China ; while military colonies were drafted whole- 
 sale from Manchuria ; and thus in a short time 
 Dzungaria was re-inhabited by a new population 
 entirely under Chinese subjection. 
 
 Some years after this (in 1771) the Kalmuks — 
 i.e., the Torgot tribe — who had settled on the banks 
 of the Volga, having heard of the depoindation of 
 Dzungaria by the Chinese, returned there, expecting 
 to find themselves masters of the province on their 
 arrival. Finding, however, that the Chinese were 
 in fidl possession of the country, they had no 
 alternative but to tender their submission, when 
 they were granted lands on the banks of the Tekes 
 and Kunges Eivers. 
 
 The population of the district thus consisted
 
 246 KULJA AND KaSIIGAR 1868- 
 
 of a number of different tribes ; and, in addition to 
 these, another new race gradually became settled 
 in the Hi Valley during the Chinese regime. These 
 were the Dungans, a hardy, temperate tribe of 
 Mahommedans from the Chinese provinces of Shensi 
 and Hansu, who, on account of their being more 
 robust than the Chinese, were chiefly employed as 
 carriers. These people monopolised the carrying 
 trade between China and Kulja, and gradually 
 settled in considerable numbers in the latter 
 province. 
 
 The Chinese appear to have relied to a great 
 extent on the race-hatred between these various 
 nationalities for the safe government of the province, 
 as only a small number of regular troops appear to 
 have been kept there. They, however, succeeded 
 in carrjdng on the government for more than a 
 century, and it was not until the end of that 
 period that general discontent began to manifest 
 itself on account of the oppression of the Chinese 
 officials. In 1836 troubles began. In that year 
 there was an attempt at rebellion, which, however, 
 was easily put down, when the leaders w^ere executed 
 or banished from the country; and again, in 18G0 
 and 1863, other rebellions occurred, but these also 
 were similarly suppressed. 
 
 But the general insurrection of the Maliom- 
 medan populations against Chinese authority was 
 rapidly gaining ground throughout the empire. 
 
 The Chinese garrison of Urumchi was attacked 
 and the city captured by the rel^els, who are 
 stated to have massacred 130,000 of the loyal
 
 -1883 Revolt against Chinese Authority 247 
 
 inhabitants and garrison. The Dungans, by the 
 possession of Urumchi, isolated Kulja from China 
 proper, as the direct roads ran through that city. 
 But they were not satisfied with this success, and 
 advanced to Kucha (Kut-che), and also towards 
 Kashgar, while at the same time a force moved to 
 Manas, thus threatening the Hi province. 
 
 On receiving intelligence of their compatriots' 
 successes, the Dungans of Kulja again broke out 
 into rebellion in March 1864, but were aaain 
 suppressed, and the Chinese Governor-General 
 then despatched a strong force to attack the 
 insurgents who had advanced from Urumchi to- 
 wards Manas. The Chinese troops were defeated 
 and driven back to Kulja, and this was the signal 
 for a renewed rising on the part of the local 
 Dungans, who were shortly after joined by the 
 Tarantchis. Hi (Mantchu-Kulja) and Bayandai 
 were besieged by the Dungans, and disturbances 
 broke out in Old Kulja. 
 
 The Kirghiz now joined in the revolt, and com- 
 menced plundering the Chinese settlements ; and 
 eventually the Dungans, finding that the Chinese 
 were incapable of decided action, grew bolder, and 
 stormed the fort of Bayandai in the spring of 1865, 
 and, having captured it, massacred the garrison and 
 inhabitants. Suidun, Losigun, and Khorgos were 
 in turn besieged, and the insurrection spread to 
 Tarbagatai, while the siege of Hi dragged on. 
 
 Matters now appeared to be in as hopeless a 
 condition for the Chinese as can well be imagined ; 
 but they seemed determined, by mismanagement.
 
 248 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 to throw away every possible chance of success. 
 The Kahiiuks, who had hitherto held aloof, be- 
 coming incensed at a Dungan attack on their great 
 temple, took up arms, and inflicted a severe defeat 
 on the rebels near Hi ; and if the Chinese had then, 
 by diplomatic measures, taken advantage of this 
 movement in their favour, it might have still 
 been possible for them to regain their ascendency. 
 They, however, by their ill-advised actions, suc- 
 ceeded in completely alienating the Kalmuks, 
 who interfered no more in the conflict, and on 
 their departure from Hi, the rebels resumed 
 the siege with redoubled energy, and completely 
 surrounded the place, which w^as reduced to a 
 state of starvation. Finally, in January, 1866, 
 when the provisions had become entirely exhausted, 
 and hundreds of the garrison and inhabitants had 
 died from disease, the city was assaulted. The 
 rebels forced their way into the town, where a 
 horrible butchery took place, in which no consi- 
 deration was paid to sex or age, and the entire city 
 was converted into a disgusting slaughter-house. 
 
 The capture of Hi was a deathblow to Chinese 
 domination in the province, for it was shortly 
 followed by the fall of their remaining strongholds 
 in the north of the district, where the Dungans and 
 Tarantchis became masters of the situation. The}-, 
 however, could not long agree, and early in 1867 
 commenced fighting among themselves, to the 
 ultimate advantage of the Tarantchis. 
 
 At the time when these disturbances were 
 taking place hi Kulja, the Kussian district of Semi-
 
 -18S3 Eastern Turkestan 249 
 
 retchinsk formed a portion of the Siberian province 
 of Semipalatinsk. Eussia at that time was fully 
 eno-aofed in her advance towards the frontiers of 
 Khokand, and was therefore not in a position to 
 undertake a forward policy in Kulja, with the risk 
 of being draw^n into a quarrel with China, and the 
 Eussian frontier officials thus maintained an atti- 
 tude of strict neutrality, and abstained from all in- 
 terference in the Hi Valley. In July, 1867, however, 
 Semiretchinsk was removed from Siberian control, 
 and incorporated in the newly-formed province of 
 Turkestan. This change resulted in the adoption 
 of a new line of policy towards Kulja — a policy 
 which was dependent in a large measure on Kauf- 
 mann's dealings with the States on his south-eastern 
 frontier. 
 
 In the early ages, the territor}^ known by the 
 names of Kashgaria, Alty Sliahr, Little Bokhara, 
 or Eastern Turkestan (tliat is, the country extend- 
 ing from the Alai Eange on the west to Lob-Xor 
 on the east, and between the Kuen-Luen and Thian ■ 
 Shan Mountains), appears to have been subject 
 either to the Chinese or to some of the wander- 
 ing tribes which inhabited Mongolia. During the 
 eighth century the doctrines of Mahomet began to 
 take root in the country ; but owing to the pre- 
 dominance of Buddhism the religion of the Propht t 
 at first made but little headway, and it was not till 
 five centuries later that Mohammedanism began to 
 obtain the ascendency. 
 
 Durinoj the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
 several teachers, or Seids, who were said to be the
 
 250 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 descendants of tlie Prophet, and who had the 
 reputation of saints and workers of miracles, ap- 
 peared in Eastern Turkestan, wliere tliey were 
 received with great res|)ect and even enthusiasm ; 
 and one of these men, named Hodja-Makhturmi- 
 Aziam, gained considerable renown as a theologian. 
 After this man's death, his two sons, Imam-Kalian 
 and Hodja-Isaac-Vali, were treated with a similar 
 amount of veneration, and from this time the 
 Hodjas (or Khojas) began to obtain a position of 
 great authority through Kashgaria, which has been 
 maintained to the present day. The followers of 
 Imam-Kalian were called Ishkias, and the disciples 
 of Isaac-Vali called themselves Isakias ; and sub- 
 sequently these branches became known as ' White 
 Mountaineers ' and ' Black Mountaineers ' respect- 
 tively. These two parties soon became hostile to 
 one another ; and although at first their rivalry 
 was confined to religious matters, as each became 
 stronger and gained adherents, their dissensions 
 soon developed a secular turn, and ended in a 
 struggle for political supremacy. 
 
 During the following centuries Kashgaria was 
 the scene of almost continual strife, until, in 1865, 
 it fell into the hands of Yakool) Bt\o-, the Khokan- 
 dian, who had been one of the most prominent 
 opponents of the Eussian advance on the Syr Daria, 
 and Chinese supremacy was entirely broken for 
 several years. 
 
 Yakoob Beg first entered the country as the 
 ' Batyr Baslii,' or commander-in-chief, of a Hodja 
 claimant to the throne, named Buzurg Khan. But
 
 -1883 Rule of Yakoob Beg 251 
 
 when the Chinese troops had been defeated, he 
 struck out a hue for himself, and after defeating 
 his former master in a pitched battle outside Kash- 
 gar, was proclaimed ruler of the State. He then 
 entered upon a course of conquest, which, in a few 
 3^ears, extended his rule as far eastwards as Turfan, 
 and to Khotan in the south, thus becoming in 
 a short space of time one of the most powerful 
 sovereigns in Central Asia. He, however, never 
 lost his inveterate hatred towards the Eussians, 
 and declined to permit their traders to enter his 
 dominions. 
 
 There is no doubt that the rapid successes of 
 Yakoob Beg caused the greatest alarm to the 
 Eussian authorities, who could not watch the 
 growth of a strong, independent State so close to 
 their frontier without serious misgivings, especially 
 as the ruler of this State took no pains to conceal 
 his strong anti-Eussian proclivities. At first, how- 
 ever, they were far too much occupied with their 
 own operations against Khokand and Bokhara to 
 attempt any interference in Kashgarian affairs, and 
 when Yakoob Beg was proclaimed supreme ruler 
 of Eastern Turkestan, they contented themselves 
 with merely refusing to recognise his position as 
 an independent sovereign. 
 
 But in 18G7 matters beijan to assume a differ- 
 ent aspect ; for the Eussians began to display 
 unwonted activity in the Naryn Valley to the 
 north of the Thian-Shan Mountains, and, although 
 they still refused to recognise his status as an 
 independent prince, they nevertheless a^jplied for
 
 252 KULJA AND KaSHGAR 1868- 
 
 permission to construct a bridge across the Naryii, 
 and make a military road across the Thian-Shan 
 range. Yakoob Beg, however, emphatically refused 
 to grant this request ; he clearl}^ saw that the 
 construction of such a road would place Kashgar 
 at the mercy of the Eussians whenever they might 
 wish to seize it; and the Eussians, being much 
 irritated at the rebuff which they had received, 
 hastily commenced the construction of a fort in 
 the Naryn Valley, and began to make preparations 
 for an invasion of Kashgar. 
 
 This fort was completed in 1868, and in the 
 spring of that year an enterprising Eussian trader, 
 named KhludofT, set out from Yernoye with the 
 intention of proceeding to the city of Kashgar by 
 way of Uch-Turfan. He, however, had scarcely 
 crossed the frontier when he was attacked and 
 driven back ; but the Eussian authorities speedily 
 assisted him to collect another caravan, and, having 
 obtained a certificate from General Kolpakoffsky 
 (the Governor of the district of Semiretchinsk) 
 to the effect that his enterprise was a purely com- 
 mercial one, he once more crossed the frontier, and 
 on this occasion succeeded in reaching Yakoob 
 Beg's capital. There he combined diplomacy with 
 trade, and by his shrewd conduct managed to per- 
 suade the Atalyk Ghazi to enter into negotiations 
 with the Eussians. 
 
 Khludoff returned to Yernoye in August 1868, 
 accompanied by Yakoob Beg's nephew, Shadi 
 Mirza, who brought with him a letter addressed 
 to General Kaufmann. Kaufmann, however, had
 
 -1883 ReINTIIAL'S MISSION TO KaSIIGAR 253 
 
 just gone to St. Petersburg, after the conclusion of 
 peace with Bokhara, and IvolpakofFsky, therefore, 
 did not permit the Kashgarian envo}' to continue 
 his journey to Tashkent. He repHed to Yakoob 
 Beg's letter, and sent the answer by Captain Eein- 
 tlial, who was also instructed to try to conclude a 
 commercial treaty with the Atalyk Ghazi, and at 
 the same time to demand the surrender of cer- 
 tain Kirghiz marauders, and the return of some 
 prisoners whom these men had captured. 
 
 Eeinthal was received in Kashgar with due 
 consideration, and he was treated during his stay 
 in a hospitable manner. But his movements were 
 closely watched, and he was not allowed to visit 
 other parts of the country ; and, on his return, he 
 was forced to confess that he had been able to do 
 little or nothing to remove the misunderstandings 
 between the Atalyk Ghazi and the Eussian autho- 
 rities. Shortly afterwards Kaufmann, while in St. 
 Petersburg, received a rej^ort of Shadi Mirza's 
 mission, and gave orders for the envoy to be sent 
 to the Eussian capital. On his arrival there, how- 
 ever, Yakoob Beg's ambassador failed to obtain an 
 audience of the Czar, and he therefore returned to 
 Kashgar in January 1869 without having been able 
 to arrive at any satisfactory settlement. Thus the 
 relations between Eussia and Kashgar continued 
 on their former unsatisfactory footing. 
 
 During this period Y^akoob Beg had been 
 consolidating his power over Western Kashgaria, 
 and had steadily extended his authority over the 
 country towards the east. He at first endeavoured
 
 2 54 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 to enter into friendly relations with the Dungans 
 and Tarantchis, but failing in this, he soon changed 
 his tactics and picked a quarrel with them. At 
 first they succeeded in holding their own, but after 
 occupying Karashar, Kucha, and Sairam, he, in 
 the spring of 1870, besieged Turfan, which place 
 also surrendered to him, after a defence of four 
 months, in July 1870. 
 
 As these movements appeared to be directed 
 against Kulja, the Eussians at last determined to 
 occupy that province, so that it might not fall into 
 Yakoob Beg's possession. They therefore occupied 
 the Muzart Pass as a preliminary step to hold the 
 Kashgarians in check while they carried out the 
 annexation of the district. The Eussian authori- 
 ties, however, considered it necessary to bring 
 forward some grievance against the Tarantchis to 
 justify their action, and this was easily obtained. 
 During the revolt of the Dungans and Tarantchis 
 against the Chinese, the Kirghiz had (as has already 
 been mentioned) joined in the insurrection, and 
 from that time they carried on a system of raids 
 both in Eussian and Kulja territor3^ This gave 
 rise to mutual complaints between the Eussians 
 and Tarantchis, which were never satisfactorily 
 settled. The Tarantchis repeatedly sent envoys 
 to Vernoye to assure the Eussians of their friend- 
 ship and desire to retain friendly relations ; but a 
 ready cause fur Eussian interference existed, al- 
 though it is probable that the chief delinquents 
 were Eussian Kirghiz, who took advantage of the 
 unsettled state of the border to conunit their
 
 -1883 Russian Occupation of Kulja 255 
 
 depredations, and who then took refuge in the 
 mountains outside the Eussian territory. Yakoob 
 Beg's advance to Kucha and Turfan having brought 
 matters to a chmax, the Kirghiz raids were put 
 forward as the immediate reason for the Eussian 
 advance. 
 
 At the end of 1870 Baron Kaulbars was sent 
 to Kulja, ostensibly for the purpose of coming to 
 terms with Sultan Abil Ogla (the ruler of the 
 Tarantchis) ; but there is reason to believe that it 
 was not intended that a satisfactory solution 
 should be arrived at, and the negotiations fell 
 through. 
 
 On his return preparations for an advance 
 were begun. On June 24, 1871, General Kolpa- 
 koffsky left the town of Borokhudzir with about 
 1,800 men, and commenced a rapid advance on 
 Kulja. On June 28 he defeated about 4,000 
 Tarantchis at Alim-tu ; and two days afterwards 
 gained another victory in front of Chin-cha-ko-tsi, 
 which town fell into his hands on the same day. 
 On July 1 he occupied Suidun, and two days later, 
 wdiile near Bayandai, received an embassy from 
 Sultan Abil Ogla, who formally tendered his sub- 
 mission. In the evening of the same day the 
 Sultan arrived in the Eussian camp and delivered 
 himself up, and on the next day (July 4) Kolpa- 
 koffsky occupied Kulja just too late to prevent the 
 massacre of over 2,000 Dungans and Chinese, who 
 had been mercilessly slaughtered by the Tarantchis 
 as soon as they heard of the surrender of their 
 chief.
 
 256 KULJA AND KaSIIGAR 1868- 
 
 Kulja — or ' Dzungaria,' as it was called in the 
 proclamation — was shortly afterwards annexed to 
 Eussia ' in perpetuity,' and received the name of 
 the ' Priilinskaya Gubernaya,' or the Government 
 of Priilinsk. The Eussian Foreign Office, however, 
 immediately informed the Chinese Government 
 that the province would be restored to China as 
 soon as the Emperor could send a sufficient force 
 for the permanent occupation of the country, so as 
 to preserve it from external attacks and to main- 
 tain order among its turbulent inhabitants. 
 
 It is now necessary to return for a moment to 
 Kashixar to follow the fortunes of its remarkable 
 ruler. As direct relations between Eussia and the 
 Atalyk Ghazi had been suspended, General Kauf- 
 mann turned to Khudayar Khan of Khokand, in 
 hopes that that chief might be persuaded to attack 
 Kashgar, and thus save Eussia the trouble and ex- 
 pense of military operations beyond the Thian-Shan 
 range. He tried to work on the Khan's vanity, and 
 explained how Yakoob Beg and his best lieutenants 
 had been his former subjects, and that, therefore, 
 Kashgar should form, not an independent and rival 
 administration, but a province subject to Kho- 
 kand. Khudayar was therefore urged to invade 
 Eastern Turkestan, and to add the country to 
 his dominions. 
 
 The Khan, however, had no desire to be drawn 
 into a quarrel with his powerful neighbour. He 
 declared that Yakoob Beg had given him no 
 offence ; and then with bitter irony he pointed to 
 the map and showed how Khokand should extend
 
 -1883 Yakoob Beg defies Russia 257 
 
 further towards the west, and ended the matter by 
 saying that the conquest of the plains of Kashgaria 
 would be but a poor equivalent for the loss of 
 Tashkent and Khojent, He, however, promised to 
 use his influence to persuade Yakoob Beg to come 
 to terms with the Eussians, and he therefore sent 
 Sarymsak Udaitchi with a letter to the Atalyk 
 Ghazi, counselling him to make peace with Eussia. 
 Yakoob, however, while receiving the envoy with 
 respect, declined to enter into negotiations with 
 the Eussians, as they had refused to acknowledge 
 his position as the ruler of an independent State ; 
 and in reply to the suggestion that he should enter 
 into commercial relations with Eussia, he said, 
 ' The Eussians that have come here, into my State 
 of Kashgar, look at these localities and become 
 acquainted with the state of the country ; and 
 therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for 
 they are a treacherous and crooked-minded people.' 
 This defiant reply clearly demonstrated to Kauf- 
 mann that the Atalyk Ghazi was determined to 
 insist on being treated as an equal, and that he 
 had no intention of being frightened into granting 
 any political or commercial concessions. 
 
 But just before the receipt of this bold letter, 
 Kaufmann had himself written a letter to Yakoob 
 Beg threatening war if he did not mend his ways 
 and enter into friendly intercourse with the Eus- 
 sians, in the same manner as had been done by 
 the Khokandians and Bokharans ; in other words, 
 Kashgar was to become subservient to Eussia, 
 or otherwise the country would be attacked and 
 
 VOL. 1. fcj
 
 258 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 probably annexed. Nor was tliis an idle threat. 
 Kussia had fully determined to go to war if nothing 
 else would bring Yakoob Beg to reason. But, 
 before taking this final step, Kaufmann tried still 
 once ao'ain to bring about the re-establishment of 
 diplomatic relations with Kashgar through the 
 good offices of the Khokandians. He therefore in- 
 duced Mirza Hakim to write a letter to a certain 
 Ivhokandian named Akhrar Khan, who had 
 formerly held high office under Khudayar Khan, 
 but had since migrated to Kashgar, informing 
 him of the Eussian preparations for the invasion 
 of Eastern Turkestan, and advising him to induce 
 the Atalyk Ghazi to adopt a more conciliatory line 
 of conduct. To this letter Akhrar Khan replied 
 that his master Yakoob Beg considered it was 
 useless for the Governor-General to attemjDt to 
 establish diplomatic relations through the agency 
 of the Khan of Khokand ; and that if the Eussians 
 really desired to form an alliance with him, they 
 could send an embassy, when the envoys would 
 be well received and the matter favourably con- 
 sidered. ' The Badaulet ' — it was said — ' does not 
 den}^ either the power or resources of Eussia, but 
 as a brave man he places his trust in God, and will 
 never refuse to fight, for he does not fear death, 
 and all he aspires to is to die for the faith.' 
 
 Thus, for the first time in the history of 
 Eussia's dealings with the States of Central Asia, 
 an Asiatic ruler, by his dignified independence, 
 completely nonplussed the Czar's officials ; and in 
 this way Yakoob Beu;- forced Kaufmann to make the
 
 -1883 Kaulbars' Mission to Kulja 259 
 
 first move to effect a reconciliation. The Governor- 
 General of Turkestan began to realise that he was 
 confronted by a determined chieftain whose power 
 was daily increasing, and who might, unless pro- 
 pitiated, set himself up as the champion of Islam, 
 and incite the Mahommedan States of Central Asia 
 to undertake a holy war against the Eussians. 
 He therefore decided to send a mission to Kashofar, 
 and in May 1872 Baron Kaulbars set out from 
 Kulja for Yakoob Beg's capital, accompanied 
 by an engineer, a to^^ographer, and a merchant. 
 Meanwhile, however, the warlike preparations 
 were continued, troops were massed along the 
 Eussian frontier to the south of Lake Issik Kul, a 
 military road was made across the mountains, and 
 stores were collected at the Naryn Fort. 
 
 The objects of Kaulbars' mission were threefold. 
 He, firstly, was to acquire information regarding 
 the country, and to ascertain if Yakoob Beg really 
 was the powerful ruler he was generally supposed 
 to be. Then he was to endeavour to obtain a 
 monopoly of the trade in order that the British 
 might be shut out from commercial relations with 
 the country. And, finally, he was to find out 
 what the Atalyk Ghazi's intentions were regarding 
 Kulja and Khokand. 
 
 Eussia at this time was very jealous of Enolisli 
 interference in Kashgarian concerns. Some few 
 years previously — in 1868 — after Yakoob Beg had 
 established his position in the country, he had 
 sent a man named Mahommed Nazar to the Pun- 
 jaul) to take notes of the strengtli and resources
 
 26o KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 of the Indian Empire. Mr. Shaw, who was then 
 in Ladakh, then told this envoy that he greatly 
 desired to visit Kashgar, and after some little de- 
 lay the Atalyk Ghazi's consent was obtained, and 
 Shaw entered Eastern Turkestan in December 
 1868, being the first Englishman who had ever set 
 foot in that country. He remained there for three 
 months as the guest of the Atalyk Ghazi, who 
 treated him most hospitably and had several 
 friendly interviews with him. While there, Mr. 
 Hayward — Mdio afterwards was murdered in the 
 wild country north of Gilgit — also reached Kashgar, 
 and although this fresh arrival for a short time 
 rendered Yakoob Beg suspicious and caused him 
 to detain the two Encflishmen in a kind of honour- 
 
 o 
 
 able captivity, the matter ended happily, and the 
 first two English explorers of Eastern Turkestan 
 returned to India in safety. 
 
 While in Kashgar, Mr. Shaw had strongly 
 urged Yakoob Beg to maintain a representative 
 in the Punjaub, and some months after the Eng- 
 lishmen's return to Ladakh, the Atalyk Ghazi de 
 spatched Akhrar Khan on an embassy to India, to 
 urge the British Government to enter into com- 
 mercial relations with Kashgaria, and to send a 
 British officer to his dominions as an official repre- 
 sentative of the Indian Government. In response 
 to this invitation, Mr. — afterwards Sir Douglas — 
 Forsyth was sent as the first British envoy to 
 Eastern Turkestan. Accompanied by Mr. Shaw 
 and Dr. Henderson, he reached Yarkand in 1870, 
 but there heard that Yakoob Beg was away on the
 
 -1883 Russian Treaty with Yakoob Beg 261 
 
 far eastern frontiers of his dominions, engaged in 
 suppressing the Dungans of Turfan and Urumchi ; 
 and, as nothing coukl be effected, the mission was 
 obhged to retrace its steps in September 1870. In 
 the following year, however, Yakoob Beg once 
 more sent Akhrar Khan to India to renew his 
 protestations of friendship, entrusting him with 
 letters to the Queen and Viceroy of India. 
 
 Thus while the Atalyk Ghazi was persistently 
 refusing to negotiate with the Eussians through 
 the mediation of the Khokandians, he was openly 
 displaying his friendship towards the English, and 
 this fact, no doubt, greatly influenced Kaufmann in 
 his decision to send Baron Kaulbars to Kashgar. 
 
 When the Eussian ambassador first reached 
 Yakoob Beg's capital, he was received in the most 
 cordial manner. At the first audience the Atalyk 
 Ghazi said : * Y^'e are guests sent to me from heaven ; 
 sit upon my knees, on my bosom, or where ye 
 like ; ' and then a short time later, after the 
 Eussians had been shown all the objects of interest 
 in the neighbourhood, and had attended reviews 
 of the Kashgarian troops, he again said : ' I look 
 upon the Eussians as my best friends ; if I did not, 
 should I have shown 3'ou my military })ower ? 
 Surely it is not usual, even with you Eussians, to 
 make known one's actual condition to a possilile 
 enemy.' But when he found that the Eussians 
 were still continuing to mass troops on his north- 
 ern frontiers, his manner soon changed, and he 
 declined to sign the proposed commercial treaty 
 until the warlike preparations had been stopped.
 
 262 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 Eveiitually, however, the treaty was signed on 
 June 22, 1S72 ; but Baron Kaulbars, in order to 
 prove the complete success of his negotiations, had 
 it dated June 2 (okl style, May 21) or St. Con- 
 stantine's da}^, and then wrote to Kaufmann saying 
 that, as a mark of especial goodwill, Yakoob Beg 
 had insisted on signing the treaty on that day in 
 honour of Kaufniann's patron saint This, how- 
 ever, was a little too much even for Kaufniann's 
 vanity, and he therefore, in forwarding the despatch 
 to St. Petersburg, substituted the name of the 
 Grand Duke Constantine (the Emperor's brother) 
 for his own. This treaty, however, remained> a 
 dead letter, and no good feeling sprang up between 
 the two countries ; the mutual distrust continued, 
 and trade languished. 
 
 Soon after Baron Kaulbars had left Kashgar, 
 Yakoob Beg sent his nephew Seid Yakoob Khan 
 — commonly called the Hadji Torah — on a return 
 mission to St. Petersburg, where the envoy was 
 treated in the most princely fashion. After con- 
 cluding his business in the Eussian capital, Hadji 
 Torah turned southwards, and after visiting Moscow 
 and Odessa, he arrived in Constantinople, from 
 whence he returned to Kasha;ar via the Suez Canal 
 and India. While at Constantinople this ambas- 
 sador concluded certain secret negotiations with 
 the Sultan, and it shortly afterwards became 
 generally known that the Sultan had conferred the 
 title of ' Annr-ul-Muminin ' on Yakoob Beg, who 
 in his turn acknowledged the suzerainty of the 
 Porte, and even began to issue a new coinai?e
 
 -1883 Commercial Difficulties 263 
 
 bearing on one side tlie head of Sultan Abdul Aziz. 
 When this became known in Eussia, the mili- 
 tary party at once declared that such an alliance 
 between the two Mahommedan States constituted 
 a great danger to the Eussian position in Central 
 Asia, and they clamoured for an expedition to be 
 sent to finallj^ subdue the haughty ruler of Kashgar. 
 But at that time the Czar's Government had decided 
 to invade Khiva, and peremptory orders were issued 
 that operations beyond the Thian-Shan range were 
 on no account to be undertaken ; and thus the 
 projected invasion of Kashgar was once more 
 postponed. 
 
 The troubles about trade meanwhile continued, 
 and in 1873 a Eussian caravan was sent to Kash- 
 gar under a man named Somof, the clerk of a 
 Mr. PupyshefF, who had large bushiess connections 
 with most parts of Central Asia. On arriving at 
 Kashgar, however, Yakoob Beg himself bought 
 up the greater part of the goods, and prohibited 
 Somof from making any commercial expeditions to 
 Yarkand and Kliotan. This wholesale purchase 
 of stores was a very astute move on the Atalyk 
 Ghazi's part, as thereby he gave the Eussians no 
 excuse for lingering at Kashgar ; but when pay- 
 ment was made the merchant found that he re- 
 ceived his pay in Chinese coins at a value fixed 
 by the Atalyk Ghazi himself, which w^as con- 
 siderably above their real connnercial value, and 
 ill this way the trader lost some 15,000 roubles. 
 The Eussian authorities took up the matter, and, 
 after considerable delay, Yakoob agreed to pay
 
 264 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 12,000 roubles, which was the final amount claimed 
 after the matter had been investigated by a com- 
 mission at Tashkent, 
 
 In the meantime the English Government de- 
 cided to send another mission to Kashgar in re- 
 sponse to Yakoob Beg'rS second invitation ; and in 
 the autumn of 1873 Mr. Forsyth once more set 
 out for Eastern Turkestan, accompanied by Colonel 
 T. E. Gordon, Dr. Bellew, and Captains Chapman, 
 Trotter, and Biddulph. The learned Dr. Sto- 
 liczka^ also joined the party, and there was an 
 escort of ten sowars, and one naick and ten sepoys 
 of the Corps of Guides. On reaching the frontier 
 district of Sanju, the embassy was joined by the 
 Hadji Torah, who had pushed on by forced marches 
 as soon as he reached India, and from this time 
 he, by his tact and good-will, did much to assist 
 Forsyth in the execution of his delicate task. On 
 December 4 the mission reached Yakoob Beg's 
 capital, and seven days later Forsyth had his first 
 formal interview with the stranss'e chieftain who had 
 become so famous throughout the wild countries 
 of Central Asia, and who, by his bold and clever 
 policy, had made both England and Eussia anxious 
 to cultivate his friendship. Forsyth and his com- 
 panions were received with the utmost distinction 
 and cordiality ; they were permitted to move freely 
 about the country, and the Kashgarian officials, 
 and even the common people, vied with each other 
 in their efforts to display their friendly feelings 
 
 ^ This gentleman unfortunately died in the Passes from the effects 
 of the rarefied atmosphere.
 
 -1883 British Treaty with Yakoob I^eg 265 
 
 towards the British Elchi and his staff. Through- 
 out their stay they travelled free of all expense, 
 and Yakoob Beg insisted on paying his subjects for 
 whatever service they rendered to the members of 
 the Embassy. 
 
 On February 2, 1874, Yakoob Beg signed a 
 treaty of commerce with the Indian Government, 
 whereby the subjects of either State were to be per- 
 mitted to trade freely and without restriction in 
 the dominions of the other contracting party ; and 
 on March 16 Forsyth took leave of the Atalyk 
 Ghazi, and commenced his return march to India ; 
 Colonel Gordon, with a portion of the escort, turn- 
 ing westward to explore the little known regions of 
 the Pamir Plateau, which had previously been 
 visited by only one Englishman. — the intrepid Cap- 
 tain John Wood of the Indian Xavy. 
 
 The Eussians were by no means pleased at the 
 conclusion of this commercial treaty between 
 England and Kashgar, as they had no wish to 
 see British traders competing with theirs in the 
 markets of Eastern Turkestan. They therefore 
 considered it necessary that immediate steps should 
 be taken to increase their influence in Y'akoob Bea's 
 dominions, and for this purpose Colonel Eeinthal 
 (the same officer who visited Kashgar in 1868) was 
 sent to demand that Eussian consular agents should 
 be permitted to reside in the chief cities in Kasli- 
 garia. But Yakoob Beg too clearly realised the 
 dangers which would follow the establishment of 
 such Eussian agents in his dominions, and he reso- 
 lutelv set his face aaainst riw such concessions. In
 
 266 KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 Article III. of the Commercial Treaty of 1872 it 
 had been stipuhited that ' Eussian merchants shall, 
 if they desire it, have the right to have commercial 
 agents (caravan-bashis) in all the towns of Djety- 
 Shahr (i.e. Kashgaria), whose business it is to watch 
 over the regular courts of trade, and over the legal 
 imposition of customs dues,' and Eeinthal contended 
 that this clause was intended to mean that Eussia 
 could appoint consular agents in the chief towns 
 of Yakoob Beg's kingdom. The Atalyk Ghazi 
 would, however, permit no such construction to 
 be placed on the article in cpiestion. A caravan- 
 baslii — as both he and the Eussians knew full well 
 — means the leader of a caravan, who is gene- 
 rally an uneducated and unimportant personage, 
 who merely looks after the personal affairs of the 
 traders. He had no intention of permitting this 
 personage to be supplanted by a prying Aksakal 
 or Mirza, who would foster intrigues and foment 
 rebellion against his authority for the advancement 
 of Eussia's aggressive designs ; and he therefore 
 rejected Eeinthal's proposals, and the Eussian am- 
 bassador was forced to return without a vestige 
 of success. 
 
 On his return the Turkestan authorities decided 
 that for(;e should be used to remove the objection- 
 able ruler who had so often thwarted their designs, 
 and had even rendered them ridiculous in the eyes 
 of the other chiefs in Central Asia. Preparations 
 were, therefore, once more made for connnencing 
 a campaign against Kashgar ; stores were pushed 
 forward to Kulja and the Naryn Valley, and a
 
 -1883 Projected Russian Invasion 267 
 
 Eussian mission was sent to Khokand to obtain 
 Khudayar Khan's consent to the passage of a sub- 
 sidiary column through his dominions, in order 
 that Kashgaria might be simultaneously invaded 
 from the north and from the west. But, as will be 
 subsequently described, a serious rebellion broke 
 out in Khokand, when Kliudayar was driven out of 
 his dominions, and bands of Khokandians crossed 
 the Eussian frontiers and even threatened Tash- 
 kent and Khojent. Thus the projected invasion of 
 Eastern Turkestan was turned into an attack on 
 Khokand, which resulted in the annexation of that 
 province to Eussia. But even after the conquest 
 of Khokand the relations between Yakoob Beg and 
 the Eussians still continued to be most unsatis- 
 factory ; and Kaufmann was seriously meditating 
 an invasion of Eastern Turkestan, when events 
 occurred which rendered such a step unnecessary. 
 The days of the remarkable Atalyk Ghazi, or 
 Amir of Kashgaria, were fast drawing to a close, 
 and China, by once more establishing her authority 
 throughout the countries to the south of the Tliian- 
 Shan range, deprived Eussia of any further excuse 
 for interference in Kashgarian affairs. 
 
 In the autumn of 1876 messengers arrived in 
 Kasho-ar, brino-ino- to Yakoob Be<? stran^-e and ter- 
 rible news from the north-eastern frontier of his 
 dominions — strange on account of its very unex- 
 pectedness, and terrible to the Atalyk Ghazi, be- 
 cause the message thus brought clearly proved 
 tliat the Emperor of China had, after many years 
 of apparent forgetfulness, once more turned his
 
 268 KULJA AND KaSHGAR 1868- 
 
 attention towards the West, and determined to fem- 
 ploy the whole strength of his Empire to overthrow 
 the usurper, and to re-estabUsh Chinese supremacy 
 throujThout Eastern Turkestan. The inteUiorence 
 thus suddenl}^ brought to Kashgar was to the effect 
 that a Large Chinese army, under Tso Tsung Tang, 
 had appeared in the country to the north of the 
 Thian-Shan range, and, after capturing Urumchi, 
 was closely besieging the town of Manas, while a 
 subsidiary force, under another Chinese general, 
 Chang Yao, was in possession of Hamil, to the 
 south of the mountains. 
 
 The Atalyk Ghazi at once nerved himself for 
 the conflict, and hastily collected an army of some 
 17,000 men, he marched eastwards to do battle in 
 defence of his kingdom. 
 
 He occupied the towns of Turfan and Toksoun, 
 on the extreme eastern frontier of Kashgaria, and 
 there halted, after detaching a small force of 900 
 men and two guns to the village of Devanchi, at 
 the southern entrance to the Devan Pass. But 
 here he was fairly caught in a trap. Chang Yao, 
 in the middle of April 1874, seized the towns of 
 Chightam and Pidjam, to the east of Turfan ; and 
 then a simultaneous advance was made by the 
 Chinese armies from the north and east, which 
 soon resulted in the complete overthr-ow of the 
 Atalyk Ghazi's army and his lieadlong flight 
 towards Kurla, wliere — on May 1, 1877 — he was 
 assassinated by Hakim Khan Torah, the chief of 
 Kucha and son of his old master and subsequent 
 enemy, Buzurg Khan Ilodja. Thus ended the
 
 -1883 The Chinese reconquer Kashgaria 269 
 
 career of this remarkable soldier of fortune, ' who, 
 without birth, power, or even any great amount of 
 genius, constructed an independent rule in Central 
 Asia, and maintained it against many adversaries 
 during the space of twelve years/ 
 
 After some months' halt in the neighbourhood 
 of Turfan, the Chinese armies again began to move 
 forward in August 1877 for the complete subjuga- 
 tion of Kashgar. 
 
 All hope of resisting the invaders vanished, 
 and after an absence of fourteen years, the Chinese 
 regained complete ascendency over the whole of 
 Eastern Turkestan. By this remarkable campaign 
 China thoroughly vindicated her right to take her 
 place as one of the three Great Powers of Asia, 
 and clearly demonstrated to the startled politicians 
 of Europe that she is a potent factor in the Central 
 Asian Question. 
 
 As soon as the Chinese had thus firmly re- 
 established themselves in Eastern Turkestan, the 
 Emperor determined to remind Eussia of her pro- 
 mise to restore Kulja to China as soon as the 
 Pekin authorities could send a force sufficiently 
 strong to maintain order in that province. Such 
 a force had undoubtedly established itself in 
 Kashgaria, and China now was perfectly capable 
 of fulfilling the Russians conditions with respect to 
 Kulja ; and TsoTsung Tang therefore preferred a 
 formal demand that the Hi Valley should be handed 
 over to him. This request, though by no means 
 unexpected, was nevertheless most annoying to the 
 Eussians, and they plainly showed that tliey liad
 
 27P KULJA AND KASHGAR 1868- 
 
 no intention of quietly abandoning one of their 
 richest provinces in Central Asia. Eventually, 
 after some months' delay, a high Chinese official 
 named Chung Hao was sent to St. Petersburg for 
 the purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement 
 of the difficulty ; and in September 1879 this 
 ambassador concluded a treaty at Livadia, wherein 
 it was stipulated that a portion of the Kulja 
 province was to be restored to China, Eussia how- 
 ever retaining the Tekes Valley and the passes of 
 the Thian-Shan leading into Eastern Turkestan. 
 China was further to pay five million roubles to 
 defray the expenses incurred in the temporary 
 occupation of the country, and as indemnity to 
 the Eussian traders for losses incurred through 
 Mahommedan revolts and the oppression of the 
 Chinese officials. The treaty also contained clauses 
 granting to Eussia some important trade privi- 
 leges, and some important references were also 
 made to the boundary line between Khokand and 
 Kashgaria. 
 
 Chung Hao returned to Pekin early in January 
 1880, but on his arrival there he was greeted with 
 a perfect storm of popular indignation. He was 
 declared to have betrayed his country, was de- 
 prived of his State offices, and was handed over to 
 a competent tribunal for trial and punishment. 
 On January 28 the commission recommended that 
 he should be dismissed from the public service ; 
 and he was tlien cast into prison, an order being 
 sliortly afterwards issued for his decapitation. 
 Marcpiis Tseng, tlie Chinese ambassador to Eng-
 
 -1883 Rendition of Kuija 271 
 
 land, was then appointed special ambassador to 
 the Eussian Court for the negotiation of a fresh 
 treaty, as the Chinese Emperor absolutely refused 
 to ratify the Livadia Convention. Eussia, how- 
 ever, declined to resume negotiations unless Chunix 
 Hao was first pardoned and set at liberty ; and for 
 many months the relations between the two coun- 
 tries were very strained. Both parties made ener- 
 getic preparations for war ; Chinese armies were 
 massed along the Amour and on the frontiers of 
 Kulja, while the Eussians in turn pushed forward 
 reinforcements to the Hi Valley ; and for a time it 
 seemed as if nothing could prevent the outbreak 
 of a tremendous struggle between the Chinese and 
 ' the Barbarians of the West.' All the foreign 
 ambassadors at Pekin, however, supported the 
 Eussian demand for Chung Hao's acquittal, and 
 finally — on August 12 — an order for his release 
 appeared in the Pekin Gazette. The negotiations 
 between Eussia and China were then resumed ; 
 and after a lapse of what, under the circumstances, 
 may well be considered a very short period, Tseno- 
 succeeded in inducing the Czar's Government to 
 agree to the rendition of the whole of the Kulja 
 province, except a small and unimportant portion 
 which was to be used as a refuge for such Dun- 
 gans as might desire to remain under Eussian pro- 
 tection. In other respects tliis treaty differed but 
 little from the previous one which had been neoo- 
 tiated by Chung Hao ; but the Chinese had made 
 up their minds that Kulja should be recovered, 
 and, once that point had been iiained, the national
 
 2/2 KULJA AND KaSIIGAR 1868-1883 
 
 sentiment was satisfied, and they paid but little 
 heed to the other points. 
 
 Tseng's treaty was concluded at St, Petersburg 
 on February 12, 1881, and was ratified within six 
 months, but it was not until the spring of 1883 
 that the Eussians finally evacuated the Hi province. 
 Early in March of that year the garrisons were 
 marched across the newly-defined frontier into 
 Eussian territory, leaving a small detachment of 
 Cossacks in the town of Kulja for the protection 
 of the Eussian Consul and traders in that place. 
 They, however, had scarcely left when troubles 
 broke out among the tribes, who were by no means 
 friendly to the Chinese, and serious disputes also 
 occurred between the Chinese and Eussian frontier 
 officials, owinof to the Eussians havinsr advanced 
 some five miles beyond the boundary line as fixed 
 by the treaty. The matter was, however, soon 
 arranged, the delimitation of the new frontier was 
 speedily concluded, and a protocol was signed at 
 Chuguchak on October 19, 1883, by the plenipo- 
 tentiaries of the two Empires.
 
 2/3 
 
 CIIAPTEK X 
 
 1SG9— 1873 
 
 CONQUEST OF KHIVA 
 
 Occupation of Krasnovodsk and its object — Gortchakoffs explana- 
 tions to Great Britain — Protestations from tlie Klian of Khiva 
 and the Persian Government — Kirghiz insurrection — Skobeleff 
 and Markozoff s reconnaissances — Council at St. Petersburg — - 
 Advance to Khiva and marcli of the Russian columns — Disasters 
 of MarkozotT's column — Bombardment of Khiva — Surrender of 
 Khiva and Kaufmann's triumphal entry— Treaty of peace — 
 Reaction in England against Russia. 
 
 Shortly after the capture of Samarkand, and while 
 the Eussians were engaged in restoring order in 
 the Khanate of Bokhara, and in subduing the petty 
 Bekships in the mountainous districts round the 
 head-waters of the Zarafshan, another important 
 movement was being made far away to the west. 
 In November 1869 a small Eussian detachment 
 quietly left the port of Petrovsk, and shortly after- 
 wards landed at Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shores 
 of the Caspian Sea. The force which thus estab- 
 lished itself at the mouth of the ancient bed of the 
 Oxus was under the command of General Eadetsky, 
 the officer who afterwards distinguished himself by 
 his successful operations in the Sliipka Pass during 
 the last Eusso-Turkish war. A site was at once 
 
 VOh. I. T
 
 274 Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 selected for the construction of a fort, and as soon 
 as the garrison had been properly established, 
 Eadetsky returned to the Caucasus, when the com- 
 raand devolved on Colonel StolietofF, who after- 
 wards led the Eussian mission to Kabul in 1878. 
 
 This occupation of Krasnovodsk, though appa- 
 rently insignificant in itself, was nevertheless an 
 act of the very greatest importance, for thereb}^ 
 Eussia initiated the most important movement in the 
 whole of her great scheme for empire in Central 
 Asia — a movement which has not only resulted 
 in the connection of Turkestan with the Caucasus 
 and the consolidation of Eussian power in Central 
 Asia, but which has brought the Czar's troops 
 within close striking distance of the most vulner- 
 able portion of Afghanistan. It is well, therefore, 
 to clearly understand why this move was made, 
 and to consider the reasons which induced the 
 Eussians to deliberately occupy a position on the 
 eastern shores of the Caspian, where they would 
 assuredly come into collision with the warlike 
 Turkoman tribes who inhabit the countries be- 
 tween Persia and the Eiver Oxus. 
 
 While the Eussians were advancing along the 
 Syr Daria from Fort Aralsk towards Tashkent and 
 Samarkand, their position in Central Asia was one 
 of considerable strategical weakness. Eeinforce- 
 ments could only reach Turkestan from Orenburg 
 after great delay and toilsome marches across the 
 Steppes, and had ariy serious disaster occurred 
 to the Eussian arms, it would have inevitably 
 been followed by a complete collapse of Muscovite
 
 -1873 Weakness of Russian Position 275 
 
 supremacy in the countries to the south of the 
 Kirghiz Steppes. Thus it was clear that, for 
 mihtary reasons alone, it was most necessary that 
 Turkestan should be linked to European Russia by 
 means of some shorter route than the old Orenburg- 
 Kazala line. Then, again, there were financial and 
 administrative reasons for such a step. Hitherto 
 the Czar's Asiatic provinces had been a constant 
 drain on the resources of the Empire. Vast sums 
 had been expended in fitting out the expeditionary 
 forces which were necessary for the conquest of 
 the countr}^, and constant military expenditure 
 was needed for the maintenance of garrisons at 
 the main strategical points in the newly-acquired 
 territories. All this time but little or no revenue 
 was received, and it was clear that until a short 
 and safe trade route could be established between 
 Europe and Central Asia, the Czar's Government 
 could expect to gain no profit from the occupation 
 of their new provinces. And, finally, there was 
 the question of offence to be considered as well 
 as defence. The Turkestan army could never be 
 of any use for an attack on India until it could 
 readily receive reinforcements and supplies from 
 European Russia ; and as the possibility of an 
 attack on India has never been lost sight of in 
 Russia, this point was no doubt carefully considered 
 when the question of better communication with 
 Turkestan came to be discussed. 
 
 A glance at the map will show that the shortest 
 line of communication between European Russia 
 and the Russian provinces in Central Asia would 
 
 T 2
 
 2/6 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 start from some point on the east coast of the 
 Caspian Sea, and must pass either through the 
 Khanate of Khiva or through some portion of the 
 adjoining territory which is inhabited by the 
 Turkomans, some of whom were subjects of the 
 Khan of Khiva. But the greater portion of this 
 tract of country is nothing better than a barren 
 sandy desert which appeared to offer an ahnost 
 insurmountable obstacle to any advance in tliat 
 direction, and it can well be understood why the 
 Eussians for some time hesitated before they 
 seriously set to work to open up communication 
 with Turkestan by a direct line from the east 
 coast of the Caspian. In 1868, however. General 
 Eomanoffsky brought out a pamphlet on Central 
 Asian affairs, which attracted a considerable 
 amount of attention in Eussia at the time, in which 
 he pointed out the urgent necessity of at once 
 establishinf^f direct communication between the 
 Caucasus and Turkestan, in order that the military 
 resources of the southern province might be utilised 
 in Central Asia. In this brochure Eomanoffsky 
 suggested three alternative routes which might be 
 adopted, viz. : — 
 
 1. From Krasnovodsk along the ancient bed of 
 the Oxus to Khiva. 
 
 2. From the mouth of the Eiver Emba round 
 the north of the Sea of Aral, to Kazala on the Syr 
 Daria. And 
 
 3. Across the Ust-Yurt plateau, tlirough Kliiva 
 to the Oxus.^ 
 
 ' This third altornative line had been previously recommended
 
 -1873 Occupation of Krasnovodsk 277 
 
 He himself recommended the adoption of the 
 third hne ; and there is no doubt tliat the first and 
 last were the onl}^ two routes which were ever 
 seriously considered by the Eussian authorities ; 
 for the line from the Emba round the northern 
 shores of the Aral Sea was a long and circuitous 
 one, and considerable outlay would have been 
 required to provide water in the portions on the 
 skirts of the Kara-Kum sands near the mouth of 
 the Emba. After some consideration the Eussian 
 Government decided to make Krasnovodsk the 
 starting-point for the new route to Central Asia, 
 and thus, as has been mentioned, a force sailed 
 across the Caspian in November 1869, and occu- 
 pied that place. 
 
 Now it will be well to pause and inquire why 
 the Czar's advisers selected Krasnovodsk as the 
 western terminus of the proposed route to Turke- 
 stan, instead of adopting the more northerly line 
 across the Ust-Yurt plateau, which would have 
 been shorter and would also have been safe from 
 flank attacks from the direction of Persia. It must 
 be borne in mind that in the year of grace 1869 
 but little was known concerning the regions to 
 the north of Persia, and the general geography 
 of Central Asia was but little understood. The 
 English, however, knew of the existence of Khiva, 
 and they believed that Eussia's object in landing 
 
 by Prince Bariatinsky, who suggested that a railway should be 
 constructed across the Ust-Yurt plateau between the Mertvii- 
 Kultuk Bay on the Caspian and Chernishef Bay on the Aral Sea. 
 The execution of this project had for some years been seriously 
 contemplated by the Kussian Government.
 
 278 Conquest of Khiva isgd- 
 
 on the eastern coast of the Caspian was in order 
 that she might obtain a more convenient base of 
 operations from which Khiva could be successfully- 
 attacked. Such, no doubt, was partly the object 
 of the occupation of Krasnovodsk ; but, although 
 the English people did not know it, Eussia had 
 another and more important object in view which 
 could not have been attained if the Ust-Yurt line 
 had been adopted, and if a point on the Mertvii- 
 Kultuk Bay had been occupied, instead of Kras- 
 novodsk. Eussia knew full well that between the 
 Caspian and Turkestan there were only two 
 possible lines of communication, viz. : one through 
 Kliiva, and the other along the northern frontiers 
 of Persia, and thence through Merv to Bokhara. 
 By occupying Krasnovodsk she gained a position 
 from which she could push forward on either or 
 both of these lines as the opportunity might occur, 
 while, from the Mertvii-Kultuk Bay, she could 
 have only dealt with the route through Khiva. 
 Thus it will be seen that the occupation of Kras- 
 novodsk marks the commencement of a most 
 important design, not merely for the conquest of 
 Khiva, but it was also part and parcel of a more 
 elaborate scheme for the connection of Turkestan 
 with Europe by means of a direct route from the 
 eastern shores of the Caspian, and for the subjuga- 
 tion of the Turkoman tribes between the northern 
 frontiers of Persia and the Eiver Oxus. 
 
 For some years it was not realised in England 
 that the chief danger from this new development 
 of Muscovite activity lay in the possibility of a
 
 -1873 Russian Explanations 279 
 
 Eussian advance along the northern borders of 
 Persia towards Merv and Herat. Sir Henry Eaw- 
 linson and a few other experts did indeed clearly 
 explain how Eussia would assuredly obtain a for- 
 midable and threatening position on the borders 
 of the Herat province as the natural result of this 
 preliminary occupation of Krasnovodsk ; but their 
 warnings were unheeded, they themselves were 
 believed to be alarmists and Eussophobes, and the 
 English people, after some slight show of interest, 
 once more relapsed into their usual condition of 
 calm indifference to Central Asian affairs, happy in 
 their belief that the Turkomans would, by their 
 resistance, offer a barrier to the Eussian advance 
 which would at least last for many years, and that, 
 even if that obstacle were overcome, Herat would 
 still be safe behind the mythical range of snow- 
 clad mountains with which cartographers delighted 
 to embellish their maps. 
 
 But, although the danger of a Eussian advance 
 towards Merv and Herat was at this time imper- 
 fectly understood, such was not the case with the 
 Khiva question. The British Ambassador at St. 
 Petersburg at once demanded explanations regard- 
 ing the occupation of Krasnovodsk, and Prince 
 Gortchakoff then stated that the proposed estab- 
 lishment at that place ' would be merely a factory, 
 which would, however, of course, require to be 
 protected by a small armed force.' He further 
 observed that ' its object would be entirely com- 
 mercial, as it would open a shorter caravan route 
 to Central Asia, and also give increased security to
 
 28o Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 trade by restraining the predatory practices of the 
 Turkomans, and by warning the Khan of Khiva 
 that hostihty on his part would not be tolerated 
 hereafter.' But, as persistent rumours began to 
 obtain circulation to the effect that an expedition 
 on a large scale was being prepared for the con- 
 quest of Khiva, Sir A. Buchanan again, on Decem- 
 ber 1, 1869, asked Prince Gortchakoff whether 
 there was any truth in Hlie reports ; and the 
 Eussian Chancellor then repeated what he had 
 previously said as to the commercial objects of the 
 occupation of Krasnovodsk, and went on to deny 
 in the most positive manner that the Czar had any 
 intention of attacking Khiva. His Excellency said 
 that, unless the Khan gave provocation by the 
 renewal of intrigues among the Kirghiz,^ there 
 
 ^ As the Khivans were accused of instigating the Kirghiz to 
 revolt in 1869 and 1870, and as the final conquest of the Khanate 
 was undertaken on the pretext that the Khan was always interfer- 
 ing with the Kirghiz and inciting them to rebellion, it will be 
 interesting to see what General Tchernaieff says on the subject. 
 This distinguished officer, who thoroughly understood what he was 
 writing about, made the following statements in the Btisski Mir of 
 February 14, 1875 : — 
 
 ' The Khivans did not incite the Kirghiz to rebellion, but, on the 
 contrary, they were made to rebel by the introduction of the new 
 regulations lorepared by the Ministry of War, the liberal and 
 hiuuane aims of which, for some reason, alwaj'S meet a strange 
 fate. So it was in the present instance. Instead of the expected 
 gratitude of the population for the introduction of the humane and 
 liberal regulations, the only reply was rebellion. 
 
 ' When Cossack detachments were sent out to put down these 
 distiu-bances, the Kirghiz threw the blame on the distant Khivans, 
 and the officials accepted these excuses to cover their own mistakes. 
 In this way the idea grew up at St. Petersburg of the instigation of 
 the Kirghiz by the Khivans, who had no thought for foreign imder- 
 takings when they could scarcely maintain themselves at home
 
 -1873 Attack on Khiva Postponed 281 
 
 was ' no idea of going to war with him, much less 
 of occupying his country, the possession of which 
 would only be an embarrassment to the Govern- 
 ment.' 
 
 In sjjite of these declarations of the Russian 
 Chancellor, there is, however, no doubt that at 
 this time the subjugation of Khiva was seriously 
 contemplated by the Russian Government ; for im- 
 mediately after Krasnovodsk had been occupied 
 General Kaufmann reported to the Ministry of War 
 the necessity of adopting harsh measures with 
 Khiva, and proposed that the Khanate should be 
 attacked by two forces, one acting from the 
 Krasnovodsk base, while the other advanced from 
 Tashkent ; and it is now well known that this sug- 
 gestion was approved of in a letter dated March 
 *25, 1870, wherein the Minister of War informed 
 General Kaufmann that his views had met with the 
 Emperor's approval. The projected attack was, 
 however, postponed, not out of respect for the 
 pacific assurances which had been given to the 
 British Government, but because the Russian 
 troops in Central Asia were occupied in the 
 Iskander Kul and Kulja campaigns, and it was 
 also necessary that the country through which the 
 columns would have to move should be thoroughly 
 reconnoitred. 
 
 The seizure of Krasnovodsk created a profound 
 
 against the Turkomans. We must remember, too, this fact, that 
 tvhen ive are quiet, otir neighbours are quiet, but as soon as rve 
 excite the discontent of our own Kirghiz, some of our neighbours 
 are imviediatcly found to be to blame.''
 
 282 Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 impression in Khiva, where it was generally be- 
 lieved that the Eussian landing was but a pre- 
 liminary step to an immediate invasion of the 
 Khanate. The Khan indignantly protested against 
 the occupation as being an unwarranted seizure of a 
 portion of his dominions, and a direct menace to 
 the safety of his kingdom, and he quickly de- 
 spatched an envoy to the Caspian, to complain of 
 the encroachment. StolietofF, however, was in- 
 structed to abstain from entering into negotiations 
 with this ambassador, and the man was thus 
 obliged to return without having even obtained an 
 audience. The Persian Government also displayed 
 considerable concern at the establishment of the 
 Russians at the mouth of the Balkan Bay, and 
 they at once asked for explanations as to the 
 Eussian intentions in that direction. They clearly 
 recognised that the chief danger to be expected 
 from this new movement lay in the probability 
 that other points further to the south would be 
 similarly seized, and that Eussia, after establishing 
 herself on the shores of the Gulf of Astrabad and 
 along the banks of the Atrek and Gurgen rivers, 
 would gradually push forward either through 
 Khorassan itself or along the skirts of the hills to 
 the north of Bujnurd and Kushan, in the direction 
 of Merv and Herat. After somewhat prolonged 
 negotiations on the subject, however, the Eussians 
 gave a clear promise that the Persian frontier line 
 of the Atrek would be carefully respected by 
 Eussia, and the Shah's Government were obliged 
 to be content with this assurance.
 
 -1873 Kirghiz Insurrection 283 
 
 In the meanwhile the Kirghiz subjects of 
 Eussia had been engaged in one of their periodical 
 rebellions, on account of the mismanagement of 
 the Eussian officials. Amongst these nomads 
 there is a tribe known as the AdaiefFs, who for 
 years had been subject to the Khans of Khiva, and 
 had been in the habit of paying tribute to the 
 rulers of that State. But when the Eussians • 
 built the Fort of Novo-Alexandrovsk, on the 
 north-eastern shores of the Caspian, they also 
 began to tax this tribe, and thus much discon- 
 tent was caused. The wretched nomads, how- 
 ever, were forced to submit to the arbitrary 
 exactions of their two stronger neighbours, and 
 no serious trouble occurred until 1869, when the 
 Eussians increased the taxes by as much as 150 
 per cent. This naturally created the very greatest 
 dissatisfaction, and in the spring of 1870 the 
 AdaiefFs displayed their resentment by making a 
 determined attack on the Eussian position in the 
 Mangishlak Peninsula. A party of Eussians, 
 under Colonel Eukin, was surprised by the nomads 
 near the Kochak Bay, on which occasion four- 
 teen Cossacks were killed and the remainder car- 
 ried into slavery, Eukin himself committing 
 suicide to avoid capture. The Kirghiz then 
 closely besieged Fort Alexandrovsk, and in spite 
 of the fact that the fort was armed with fourteen 
 guns, the garrison were reduced to the greatest 
 straits, and were on the point of surrendering, 
 when reinforcements arrived from the Caucasus, 
 and the AdaielTs were completely overcome. The
 
 284 Conquest of Khiva iseg- 
 
 Eussians at once accused the Khivans of having 
 mstigated this serious attack, and this supposed 
 act of hostihty on the part of the Khivan Khan 
 was added to the Ust of offences which was to 
 be put forward as the reason for invading the 
 Khanate, as soon as the preparations for a com- 
 bined attack had been completed. It is imposs- 
 ible to say whether the Khivans did support the 
 Adaieffs or not ; and it is not impossible that 
 they did incite the nomads to make this attack ; 
 but it is far more likely that they were driven 
 to rebellion by the long series of errors which 
 General Tchernaieff has so forcibly referred to, 
 and which culminated in the arbitrary and extor- 
 tionate increase of taxation in 1869. 
 
 As soon as Stolietoff had established his posi- 
 tion at Krasnovodsk he began to send out recon- 
 noitring parties into the neighbouring countr}^ ; 
 and proceeding eastwards along the northern shores 
 of the Balkan Bay, he built a small fort at a place 
 called Tash-Arvat, at the foot of the western 
 slopes of the Great Balkan range, where there was 
 a fair supply of water. By the occupation of this 
 point, the Russian commander expected to be able 
 to get a firm hold over the Yomud tribe of Turko- 
 mans, who were in the habit of migrating every year 
 from the south to the Ust-Yurt plateau ; but in 
 this he was disappointed, for the nomads in their 
 annual migrations used a route far to the east of 
 the fort, and thus kept well out of striking dis- 
 tance. Shortly afterwards the Eussians built a 
 second post at Michaelovsk ; but as at this place
 
 -1873 StOLIETOFF DESTROYS KiZIL-ARVAT 285 
 
 there ^vas little or no drinking water, and all tlie 
 water for the garrison of 100 men had to be 
 brouo'ht from Krasnovodsk, at a cost of about 
 three roubles per bucket, another fortification 
 was built, some fourteen miles to the east of 
 Michaelovsk, at a place called Mulla Kari, where 
 good springs were found. 
 
 In the spring of 1870 the Eussian Government 
 determined to develop their position on the east- 
 ern shores of the Caspian ; and, in accordance 
 with the orders issued from St. Petersburg, Prince 
 Mirsk}^, who was then entrusted with the direction 
 of affiiirs in the Caucasus, sent instructions to 
 Stolietoff to form Krasnovodsk into an extensive 
 fortified base of operations, from which he was to 
 commence energetic offensive movements against 
 the Yomud and Tekke tribes of Turkomans. A 
 good excuse for such an attack on the Turkoman 
 settlements was soon afforded by the Turkomans 
 themselves, who in the spring of 1870 assaulted 
 the Michaelovsk post. This attack was easily re- 
 pulsed ; and in the following November Stolietoff, 
 acting on the instructions received from Tifiis, 
 marched round the head of the Balkan Bay, and, 
 crossing the barren Steppe to the east of Mulla 
 Kari, reached the Turkoman fort of Kizil-Arvat 
 on the skirts of the Kuren Dagh Eange. Tlie 
 Tekkes had however abandoned the place and dis- 
 appeared with their families and possessions into 
 the Akhal Oasis, further towards the east ; and as 
 Stolietoff was not prepared for a prolonged campaign, 
 he destroved the Tekke fort, and returned to
 
 286 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 Krasnovodsk, his first considerable venture into the 
 Turkoman country having tlius been of very doubt- 
 ful utility. 
 
 But while Stolietoff was marching against the 
 Tekkes a far more important reconnaissance was 
 being made in the direction of Khiva. Captain 
 Skobeleff, the future hero of Plevna and idol of 
 the Eussian army, set out from Krasnovodsk with 
 a small party of Cossacks, and after a trying and 
 adventurous march in a north-easterly direction, 
 reached the Sari-Kamish Lake in safety. But this 
 brilliant officer was by no means satisfied with this 
 achievement, and he therefore pushed on, accom- 
 panied by only three Cossacks, all disguised as 
 Usbeg merchants, as far as Dekclie, on the borders 
 of the Khivan Oasis. Havino- thus reconnoitred 
 the route from Krasnovodsk to Kliiva, Skobeleff 
 returned with an excellent sketch of the country 
 traversed, and by the following summer was in 
 Titiis, when he was able to add very considerably 
 to the meagre stock of knowledge respecting these 
 regions which was then possessed by the Caucasus 
 authorities. 
 
 In the spring of 1871 StolietofT was recalled, 
 and Colonel MarkozofF was then appointed to the 
 chief command at Krasnovodsk. This officer re- 
 ceived orders to carefully examine the country to 
 the north-east of the Balkan Bay, as far as Tuar, 
 a spring some few miles from the eastern shores 
 of the Kara-Bugaz Gulf; and, in accordance with 
 these instructions, he assembled a column at Mulla 
 Kari, and set out on the proposed reconnaissance.
 
 -1873 MaRKOZOFF'S FIRST RECONNAISSANCE 28/ 
 
 Proceeding northwards, he reached tlie Gezli-Ata 
 Wells without difficulty, and after he had there 
 constructed a small fort for a garrison of forty 
 or fifty men, he continued his march towards 
 the north-east. At the Chagil Wells another small 
 fort was built, and on October 3 the force reached 
 Tuar, which is situated in a trough-like depression 
 at the foot of a precipitous range of hills. Here 
 a third fortification was constructed, and with 
 it the actual instructions of the Tiflis authorities 
 had been successfully carried out. But MarkozofT, 
 taking advantage of the excellent condition of his 
 troops, determined to extend the reconnaissance 
 on his own responsibility ; and he therefore, on 
 October 5, set out from the Tuar post, and reached 
 the Kum-Sabshan Wells on October 9. There a 
 halt was made for some days to permit of the con- 
 struction of a fort for a garrison of fifty infantry, 
 twenty Cossacks, and one gun ; and while this was 
 being built, the commander of the force started ofi' 
 to examine the wells at Dapmi and Dirin, which 
 are situated at a distance of some twenty miles 
 to the north-west of Kum-Sabshan. On his re- 
 turn he resumed his march towards Kazakhli, 
 and on reaching that point he let the column con- 
 tinue its march towards Uzun-Kuyu, while he, 
 accompanied by a few Cossacks, rode to the spring 
 of Dakhli, some miles to the south of Kazakhli. 
 He then hastened back and overtook the main 
 body while still on the march to Uzun-Kuyu, 
 which point was reached after terrible sufferings 
 from want of water ; and another fort was there
 
 288 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 built for the reception of all the Cossacks and 
 their horses and fifty infantrymen. From thence 
 the remainder of the force pushed on towards 
 the Sari-Kamish Lake, reached Haji-Kuyusi on 
 October 29, and two days later struck SkobelefF's 
 route at the Sari-Kamish Wells. There he left 
 the bulk of his force, and with fifty men and all 
 his camels he pushed on to Dekche, which he 
 reached on the same day, and found the banks of 
 the ancient channel of the Oxus clothed with 
 verdure, saxaul bushes, and even trees twenty 
 feet in height and some eight inches in diameter. 
 Here the Eussian advance was checked by the 
 Turkomans, who attacked the party, and although 
 they were easily driven off, MarkozofT felt that it 
 would be a highly injudicious proceeding to ven- 
 ture any closer to Khiva. He therefore com- 
 menced his return march towards the Caspian, 
 and although the Turkomans followed the column 
 as far as Chagil, they kept at a respectful distance 
 and never ventured to make any serious attack. 
 From this point MarkozofT sent a portion back to 
 Krasnovodsk by a new route through Portoku}) 
 and Yangi-Su, while he himself with the rest of 
 the column marched to Kulmughir, on the eastern 
 shores of the Kara-Bugaz Gulf. On his return 
 from thence to Gezli-Ata, another detachment was 
 sent back to Krasnovodsk, and the Colonel with 
 the remainder of the troops marched eastwards, 
 via Kimal and Alti-Kuyurukh to the Topatan 
 Wells and Lakes in the Uzboi, or ancient channel 
 of the Oxus. There some more Turkomans were
 
 -1873 CHIKISHLIAR 289 
 
 encountered and several slight skirmishes ensued, 
 but the nomads were easily repulsed, and on 
 November 25 Markozoff returned to MuUa Kari. 
 
 This expedition, though but little known, had 
 very important results, for during the two months 
 it lasted all the routes to the north-east of Kras- 
 novodsk, and between that place and the borders 
 of Khiva, had been thoroughly examined, and the 
 Russians thus acquired valuable information as to 
 the difficulties which might be expected in an 
 advance af?ainst Khiva from this direction. But 
 the indefatigable Eussian commander had no in- 
 tention of resting content with his achievements ; 
 the winter was yet young, and he had many other 
 important matters still to attend to. It had been 
 found that camels could not be procured at Kras- 
 novodsk in sufficient numbers for the projected 
 invasion of Khiva, while it was known that they 
 could be more easily obtained from the Goklan 
 tribe of Turkomans which inhabit the country 
 near the Atrek and Gurgen Elvers, and for this 
 purpose, and also to emphasise the Eussian claims 
 to the country north of the Atrek, it was decided 
 that a fort should be erected at the mouth of that 
 river. Therefore, after a brief halt of four days, 
 he once more set out from Mulla Kari, but on this 
 occasion he moved in a southerly direction to- 
 wards the Atrek Eiver and the settlements of the 
 Goklans. He reached Ghikishliar, about twenty 
 miles to the north of the mouth of the Atrek 
 Eiver, on December 13. Here he was attacked 
 by the Turkomans, but they were easily driven 
 
 VOL. 1. u
 
 290 Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 off, and the construction of the fort was com- 
 menced. On the following night a more serious 
 attack was made, when Markozoff narrowly 
 escaped assassination, A small band of nomads 
 suddenly burst into the Eussian camp, cut down 
 the guards, and made their way into the Colonel's 
 tent with the evident intention of killing the com- 
 mander, who had proved to be such a relentless 
 and energetic foe to the Turkoman tribes. He, 
 however, was at the time fortunately absent on a 
 visit to the picquets, and thus escaped, and the 
 marauders were soon forced to retire with some 
 slight loss. After the fort had been built, Marko- 
 zoff proceeded a short distance up the river, with 
 the intention of crossing it ; but the stream was 
 much swollen by the recent heavy rains, and it 
 was found that even horses could not live in the 
 current. The idea was therefore abandoned, and 
 after leaving two companies and two guns as a 
 Cfarrison for the new fort, Markozoff returned to 
 Krasnovodsk, and from thence proceeded to Tehe- 
 ran, where he concluded a definite treaty with 
 Persia respecting the Atrek frontier line. After 
 this he went to Tiflis to report the result of his 
 recent operations, and to receive orders as to what 
 was to be done durinf? the foUowinc^ winter. 
 
 In the meanwhile the Eussians in the Mang- 
 ishlak Peninsula had not been idle. After the 
 death of Eukin that officer had been succeeded 
 first by Major-General Komaroff, and then by 
 Colonel Lomakin, and both of these officers made 
 several reconnaissances between the years 1870
 
 -1873 Russian Preparation for War 291 
 
 and 1872, in order to introduce the new system 
 of administration among the Kirghiz which it was 
 hoped would insure the speedy settlement of the 
 country. For this purpose small Eussian detach- 
 ments constantly visited the ' Auls ' of the nomads, 
 who were thus soon convinced that they were 
 completely under the power of the Eussians, and 
 that the best thing they could do was to submit 
 quietly to the new order of government. 
 
 In Turkestan also Kaufmann had been enersfeti- 
 cally exploring the country between his frontier 
 posts and the Oxus, and was quietly preparing for 
 the projected invasion of Khiva. As soon as he 
 arrived in Tashkent he wrote a letter to the 
 Kliivan Khan, Mahommed Eahim, in which he 
 informed him of his appointment and arrival. He 
 at the same time sent small columns from Kazala 
 and Fort Perovski as far as Irkibai, for the purpose 
 of examining the northern portion of the Kizil 
 Kum Desert, and for the protection of Eussian 
 caravans ; and in his letter to Mahommed Eahim 
 he mentioned the despatch of these columns, and 
 stated that they had been sent out to punish the 
 marauders who had pillaged certain caravans. In 
 the following February a reply was received from 
 the Khivan Kush-Begi, claiming for Khiva all 
 territory to the south of the Syr Daria, protest- 
 ing against the violation of the Khan's dominions, 
 and promising to punish all persons who molested 
 traders crossing the Steppes to the south of the 
 Jaxartes. 
 
 For some time following this Kaufmann was
 
 292 Conquest OF Khiva isgq- 
 
 engaged in the war with Bokhara, and in the sub- 
 sequent pacification of that Khanate, and Khivan 
 affairs therefore for a time became of secondary 
 importance ; but in 1869 the outbreak of the 
 Kirghiz rebellion gave the Governor-General of 
 Turkestan an opportunity for renewing his inter- 
 ference with Khiva, and on August 24 of that 
 year he wrote a letter in which the Khan was told 
 that inflammatory proclamations had been sent to 
 the Kirghiz and Turkomans, that his officials ac- 
 companied by troops had crossed the Russian 
 frontiers for the purpose of fomenting rebellion 
 amongst the suljjects of the Czar, that Russians 
 had been carried off to Khiva with the full know- 
 ledge of the Khan, and that rebels and marauders 
 had evaded punishment by taking refuge in Khiva, 
 where they had been hospitably received.^ At 
 about this time also a detachment was sent from 
 Kazala to the Yani-Daria, while another force was 
 sent from Jizakh to the Bukan-Tau Mountains. 
 
 These movements, and the occupation of Kras- 
 novodsk, caused the greatest alarm in the Khivan 
 capital, and the Khan began to take measures for 
 the defence of his kingdom. A small fort was 
 constructed at Cape Urga ; the chief branch of 
 the Oxus was diverted, and canals were cut to 
 render it shallow and impassable for any of the 
 ships of the Aral Sea flotilla ; a new citadel was 
 built for the protection of the capital, and it was 
 
 ^ This is Kaufmann's version of the causes of the Kirghiz re- 
 belHon. Tchernaicff, however, as has already been seen, attributed 
 the rising to liussian maladministration. (See footnote to page 280.)
 
 -1873 Alarm of the Khivans 293 
 
 armed with twenty guns ; and a force of cavalry 
 was sent out to poison the wells on the road to 
 Krasnovodsk by throwing dead dogs into them. 
 The Khan also insisted on the recooiiition of his 
 undoubted right to the country in the vicinity of 
 the Bukan-Tau Mountains ; asserted with a con- 
 siderable show of reason that the disturbances in 
 that region had been caused by the dissatisfied 
 Kirghiz subjects of the Czar, and had in no way 
 been encouraged by the Khivan officials ; and, 
 finally, after once more bitterly complaining of the 
 violation of his territories, he concluded one of his 
 letters by saying : ' If, relying on the strength of 
 his armies, the White Czar wishes to make war 
 against us, then before the Creator of heaven and 
 earth, before the Great Judge of all earthl}^ judges, 
 all are equal, both the strong and the weak. He 
 gives the victory to whomsoever He wishes, and 
 nothing can be accomplished against the desires 
 and predestination of the Most High.' This letter 
 was written in April 1870, after much previous 
 correspondence which clearly proved to Mahommed 
 Rahim that the Russians were fully determined to 
 find some excuse for invading his dominions. He 
 plainly saw that his enemies were gradually en- 
 compassing him on all sides, and that he was 
 marked down as the next victim to the insati- 
 able lust after territorial aggrandisement which is 
 the leading characteristic of the Russian rule in 
 Central Asia. His alarm gradually increased as 
 the Russian reconnoitring parties pushed forward 
 closer and closer to his capital, and at the close of
 
 294 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 tlie year 1871, when Markozoff was advancing to 
 Dekclie on the west, and when another detach- 
 ment under Colonel Golovatcheff had been sent 
 from Jizakh through the Bukan-Tau Mountains to 
 the Oxus, he decided once again to try to come 
 to terms with his formidaljle enemies. He there- 
 fore, early in 1872, sent two embassies, one to 
 Tiflis and the other to Orenburg, bearing letters 
 addressed to the Czar, in which he declared that 
 he had always been actuated by feelings of friend- 
 ship towards Russia. After reviewing the nume- 
 rous threatening expeditions which had advanced 
 into his dominions, both from the direction of 
 Turkestan and from the Caspian, he asked that a 
 treaty might be concluded whereby each of the 
 two Powers should agree to be content with its 
 existing frontiers, and he then offered to return all 
 the Eussian subjects who remained captive in the 
 Khanate. ' But,' continued the Klian, ' if these 
 prisoners serve you only as a pretext for war 
 against us with the aim of extending your do- 
 minions, then a decree will descend from Providence 
 whose purposes we cannot alter.' 
 
 Of the two embassies sent to Russia, one pro- 
 ceeded via Fort Novo-Alexandrovsk and Petrovsk 
 to Tiflis, while the other went to Orenburg. But 
 they were not allowed to continue their journey to 
 St. Petersburg, and were informed that negotia- 
 tions with Khiva would not be entered into until 
 every Russian captive in the Khanate had been 
 released. The Klian tlien sent an envoy to the 
 Indian Government asking for assistance, but this
 
 -1873 England refuses to help Khiva 295 
 
 messenger was informed that he could expect no 
 help from England, and the Khan was advised to 
 restore the Eussian captives and to come to a 
 reconciliation with the Eussian authorities ; a reply 
 which must have greatly pleased the Muscovites, 
 who now clearly learnt for the first time that 
 England had no intention of waging war in defence 
 of Khiva, 
 
 During the autumn of the year 1872 important 
 reconnaissances were made, both from Fort Alex- 
 androvsk and Krasnovodsk. On September 20 
 Colonel Lomakin left the former place, success- 
 fully explored a considerable tract of the adjacent 
 country, and marched G70 miles in thirty-two days 
 without loss of either men or horses. 
 
 In the meanwhile MarkozofF had returned to 
 Krasnovodsk, and was busily engaged in preparing 
 for more extensive operations in the Turkoman 
 country. In June 1872 he left Krasnovodsk and 
 made a careful examination of the Caspian coast 
 between that point and Chikishliar. Landing at a 
 small bay about half way between the two Eussian 
 forts, he captured some three hundred camels, and 
 after exploring the neighbouring country returned 
 to his headquarters. But the great summer heat 
 of those regions and the scarcity of water rendered 
 it necessary that no extensive military movements 
 should be carried out until the winter had fairly 
 set in, and thus nothing of much importance was 
 done until September. Then, however, troops were 
 concentrated at Krasnovodsk, Belek, and Chikish- 
 liar, and on the lOth of the month the Krasnovodsk
 
 296 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 and Belek troops left the latter place and marched 
 through Tash-Arvat and Burudji to Topatan, where 
 they were to join hands with the Chikishliar de- 
 tachment, which started on September 23 under 
 the command of Markozoff himself. The two 
 columns united at Topatan on October 7, and the 
 combined force then consisted of about 1,450 men 
 and fourteen guns. 
 
 It was at first intended that this force should 
 rapidly advance on Khiva and try to gain pos- 
 session of the capital of the Khanate by a sudden 
 attack. But this idea was eventually abandoned, 
 for just as Markozoff was on the point of com- 
 mencing his advance from Topatan, and before 
 any encounter with the Turkomans took place, an 
 officer arrived from Tiflis, bringing strict orders 
 from the Grand Duke that the attack on Khiva 
 was on no account to be attempted, and Markozoff 
 therefore had to rest content with a less exciting 
 campaign against the Akhal Tekkes. Leaving 
 Topatan on October 16, the column reached Jamala 
 on the following day, when they at once began the 
 construction of a small fort. While thus employed 
 they were suddenly assailed on all sides by some 
 two thousand Turkomans, but after a sharp fight 
 the enemy were driven off, and the Eussians shortly 
 afterwards continued their march eastwards along 
 the Uzboi. Igdi was reached on October 28, and 
 after a three days' halt at that place the column 
 marched southwards towards the Tekke settle- 
 ments in the Aklial Oasis. Kizil-Arvat, Bami, and 
 J^eurma were in turn visited, and after some slight
 
 -1873 MaRKOZOFF'S SECOND RECONNAISSANCE 297 
 
 skirmishes with the Tekkes MarkozofF turned west- 
 ward, and marched down the Sumbar and Atrek 
 valleys to Chikishliar, where he arrived on Decem- 
 ber 30. There he heard that it had been definitely 
 decided that Khiva should be invaded in the fol- 
 lowing spring, and he started at once for Tiflis to 
 confer with the military authorities in the Caucasus 
 regarding the part which was to be played by the 
 Krasnovodsk troops in the coming campaign. 
 
 Colonel Markozoff's operations on the eastern 
 shores of the Cas23ian have received little or no 
 notice from English writers on Central Asian 
 affairs, and have generally been dismissed in a few 
 words as though they were absolutely insignificant 
 and devoid of important results. As a matter of 
 fact, this indefatigable officer, who is but little 
 known in England, except as having been the 
 unfortunate commander of the one Eussian column 
 which failed to reach Khiva in 1873, laid the 
 foundation of Eussia's present position at Merv, 
 and on the frontier of the Herat province of Af- 
 ghanistan. His operations in the winter of 1871 were 
 completely successful, and by them all the routes 
 between Krasnovodsk and Khiva were thorou£yhlv 
 examined and surveyed ; but the subsequent expe- 
 dition of 1872 was even more important in its 
 results, for thereby he gained complete information 
 regarding the various routes from Krasnovodsk to 
 the Tekke country north of the Kuren Dagh Eange, 
 the alternative line of advance from Chikishliar 
 along the Atrek and Sumbar Eivers was also ex- 
 plored, and, above all, by his successful advance to
 
 298 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 Beurma, he took the first important step in that great 
 movement towards Herat, which, after man}^ inter- 
 vening checks and disasters, has been so successfully 
 completed, through the military skill of Skobeleff, 
 and the subsequent intrigues and unscrupulous 
 actions of Komaroff and Alikhanoff. In England 
 the full significance of the Eussian operations on 
 the borders of the Akhal Tekke country was com- 
 pletely lost sight of, owing to the great importance 
 which was attached to the independence of Khiva, 
 and on account of the ever-increasing belief that 
 Eussia was steadily preparing for the annexation 
 of that Khanate ; and it was only several years 
 later, when Skobeleff broke the power of the 
 Turkomans at Denghil Tepe, that the people of 
 England fully realised that the Eussians had ac- 
 quired a position which, as a base for offensive 
 operations against India, was of infinitely greater 
 value than the whole of Eussia's other conquests 
 in Central Asia put together. 
 
 But the Eussians in all their movements in 
 Central Asia have displayed remarkable patience 
 and caution, and they have never undertaken any 
 fresh advance until they have thoroughly secured 
 their existing position. In this instance they knew 
 full well that it would be useless to attempt the 
 conquest of the Tekkes or to try to gain a footing 
 at Merv and at the gates of Herat until Khiva had 
 been first subdued, and therefore in December 
 1872 the Czar finally issued orders for the imme- 
 diate preparation of a large expedition for the in- 
 vasion of that Khanate. In the previous August,
 
 -1873 Scheme for Invasion of Khiva 299 
 
 General Kaufmann left Tashkent for St. Petersburg 
 in order to strengthen his position in the eyes of 
 the Czar against the numerous and frequent attacks 
 which were being made against his administration 
 of the Turkestan province, and also to gain the 
 Czar's assent to the despatch of an army against 
 Khiva, in order that by a successful campaign he 
 might be able to divert public attention from the 
 maladministration of Turkestan, and gain the sym- 
 pathies of the powerftd military party in the 
 country. On his arrival at the Eussian capital, 
 the Grand Duke Michael (Governor-General of the 
 Caucasus) and General Krijhanoffsky (Governor of 
 the Orenburg district) were summoned to St. 
 Petersburg to give their opinions regarding his 
 proposed scheme for the invasion of Khiva. He 
 suggested that, while one column advanced under 
 his command from Turkestan, another force should 
 operate from Krasnovodsk or Chikishliar. A small 
 subsidiary detachment was at the same time to 
 start from Fort No. 1 on tlie Syr Daria, and join 
 the Tashkent troops at some point on the Oxus, 
 and wdien the eastern and western armies had 
 united at some point in the Khivan Oasis, they 
 were then to carry out combined operations under 
 the supreme command of General Kaufmann him- 
 self. On the recommendation of General Krijhan- 
 offsky, it was afterwards decided that a strong 
 detachment should advance from Orenburg in ad- 
 dition to those proposed by Kaufmann ; and minor 
 changes were also subsequently introduced into 
 the plan of campaign on account of the difficultv
 
 300 Conquest of Khiva iseg- 
 
 experienced in procuring a sufficient number of 
 camels. The Caspian column was divided into 
 two distinct and independent forces, one of which 
 under MarkozofF was to start from Chikishliar, 
 while the other under Lomakin was to operate 
 from Fort Alexandrovsk ; and thus, by the final 
 orders for the expedition, it was arranged that five 
 different detachments should converge on the oasis, 
 viz. two from the Caspian, one from Orenburg, 
 and two from the Russian provinces east of the 
 Sea of Aral. These orders were sanctioned by the 
 Emperor in December 1872 at a council at which, 
 it is said, that thirty-five of the members voted for 
 the annexation of the Khanate, while the small 
 minority of nine (among whom was Prince Gor- 
 tchakofF) voted against such a step, believing that 
 it would be better rather to punish the Khan and 
 retire than to retain possession of the country. 
 
 Having thus definitely decided that Khiva 
 should be invaded in the following spring, the 
 Eussian Government at once determined to break 
 the news as gently as possible to the British 
 Government ; for it was well known that public 
 opinion in England was strongly averse to any 
 Eussian interference with Khiva, and as the Czar's 
 Government had so frequently disavowed any 
 intention of attacking the Khanate, it was clearly 
 incumloent on them to at least explain the reasons 
 which had caused such a change in their declared 
 policy. For this purpose, therefore, Count Scliou- 
 valofF, a statesman enjoying the full confidence of 
 the Czar, left St. Petersburg for London, by the
 
 -1873 Russian Declarations 301 
 
 express command of the Eussian Emperor, and on 
 January 8, 1873, had an mterview with Lord Gran- 
 ville, when he made an important statement regard- 
 ing Eussia's intentions concerning Khiva, and of 
 the Czar's general policy in Central Asia. After 
 expressing surprise at the amount of excitement 
 and susceptibility displayed by the English regard- 
 ing Central Asian affairs, and after he had then 
 asserted that an agreement regarding the Afghan 
 frontier might be expected at an early date,^ this 
 trusted adviser of the Eussian Czar then went on 
 to say that : ' With regard to the expedition to 
 Khiva, it was true that it was decided upon for 
 next spring. To give an idea of its character, it 
 icas sufficient to say that it would consist of four and, 
 a half battalions. Its object was to punish acts of 
 brigandage, to recover fifty Eussian prisoners, and 
 to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part 
 could not be continued with the impunity which 
 the moderation of Eussia had led him to believe. 
 Not only was it far from the intention of the Emjieror 
 to tahe possession of Khiva, hut positive orders had 
 been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that 
 the conditions imp)osed should be such as could not in 
 any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva.' 
 Schouvaloff then went on to say that this positive 
 assurance might be given to the British Parliament 
 as a proof of the friendly and pacific intentions of 
 his master the Czar. 
 
 ^ As has already been seen, this matter was settled on January 31, 
 1873, by the formal recognition by Russia of the northern frontier 
 of Afghanistan as defined by the British Government.
 
 302: Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 Wlien this emphatic denial of any intention on 
 the part of the Kussian Government to retain pos- 
 session of Khiva became known, the English public 
 readily accepted the Czar's promises, and it was 
 generally believed that, as soon as the Khan had 
 been punished for the barbarous acts which he was 
 said to have committed, the Eussian troops would 
 once more be withdrawn to their former positions, 
 and that Khiva would still remain an independent 
 State between Afghanistan and the Eussian frontiers 
 in Central Asia. 
 
 It is but natural that Schouvaloff's voluntary 
 declarations should have had a tranquillising 
 effect, for his position as the confidential am- 
 bassador from the Eussian Emperor was well 
 known, and it was implicitly believed that, al- 
 though Eussian diplomatists might be found who 
 would tear up treaties and repudiate their engage- 
 ments, still the pledged word of the Russian Czar 
 could never be broken. It was indeed a natural 
 belief, but one which was destined to be rudely 
 shaken ; and it will be seen how Eussia did retain 
 possession of a large slice of Khivan territory, and 
 how, to use the words of the late Sir Henry Raw- 
 linson, ' an Emperor's word had been weighed in 
 the balance and found wanting.' 
 
 In spite of Count SchouvalofTs declaration 
 that the force would be limited to four and a half 
 battalions, the total strength actually amounted to 
 sixty-one companies of infantry, twenty- six sotnias 
 of Cossacks, and several sappers, with fifty-four 
 iiuns, four mortars, and five rocket detachments.
 
 -1873 The Invading Columns 303 
 
 The four and a half battahons had in a few weeks 
 expanded into a formidable army. 
 
 The Turkestan column, under the supreme 
 command of General Kaufmann, comprised two 
 detachments, which started from Kazala and 
 Jizakh, and were commanded respectively by 
 Colonel Goloff and Colonel GolovatchefT. The 
 Orenburg column was commanded by Lieutenant- 
 General Veref kin ; the Kinderly column by Colonel 
 Lomakin ; and the Krasnovodsk column by Colonel 
 Markozoff. 
 
 In the orders which were issued for the con- 
 duct of the operations, it was stated that the 
 Jizakh column was to proceed by the road 
 running along the Bokharan frontier to Min 
 Bulak, in the Bukan-Tau Mountains, where it 
 would be joined by the Kazala detachment, and 
 the united forces were then to march iji a south- 
 westerly direction towards the village of Shura- 
 Khana, on the right bank of the Oxus In 
 })ursuance of this design, the Kazala force began 
 its advance on March 11, 1873, and on the 2oth 
 of the same month the head of the main Turkestan 
 army marched out of Jizakh. But when Kauf- 
 mann, on April 13, reached the Wells of Aristan- 
 bel-Kuduk, about 100 miles from the appointed 
 rendezvous, he suddenly issued fresh orders, 
 changing the routes by which the two detach- 
 ments were to advance to the Amu-Daria. By 
 these fresh instructions the Jizakh force was to 
 turn off towards the west, and proceed, via Kliala- 
 ata and Adam-Krilgan, to Uch-Uchak, on the river
 
 304 Conquest of Khiva 1869- 
 
 Oxus ; while the Kazala detachment was directed 
 to continue its march in a southerly direction 
 and effect a junction with the main column at 
 Khala-ata. 
 
 This change of route was most ill advised, and 
 very nearly resulted in the complete loss of the 
 whole Turkestan army of invasion. It is not clear 
 what possible advantage Kaufmann expected to 
 gain by it, for tlie route originally selected had 
 been previously reconnoitred and was well known, 
 whereas the new line was quite unexplored. 
 
 The two columns successfully joined hands at 
 Khala-ata on May 6, and a halt was then made for 
 some days, in order that the troops might be 
 rested before they began their march to the Oxus, 
 and for the purpose of building a fort to guard the 
 line of communications. It was also necessary 
 that the country between Khala-ata and the Oxus 
 should be examined, and for this purpose a small 
 detachment was sent forward, under Colonel 
 Ivanoff. This party arrived near the Adam- 
 Krilgan Wells, where they encountered a band of 
 Turkomans. A smart fight followed, and the 
 Turkomans retired, after wounding the Colonel in 
 two places and killing two of his escort. 
 
 The Eussians then proceeded to improve the 
 wells by digging, so that in a short time a suffi- 
 cient supply of water Avas obtained for the whole 
 column; and on May 12 Kaufmann moved for- 
 ward, leaving a small garrison in the fort at 
 Khala-ata. 
 
 Up to this time the Eussian troops from Jizakh
 
 -1873 KaUFMANN'S DIFFICULTIES 305 
 
 and Kazala had experienced but little hardship, 
 but the weather now became excessively hot, and 
 the most trying portion of the march began. No 
 one knew how far the Oxus really was, but, 
 altliough it was believed that no wells existed in 
 the intervening desert, it was confidently expected 
 that the column could reach the river in three 
 days. On the morning of May 17 the advance 
 was resumed, a supply of water for three days 
 ]:)eing carried with the troops. It was intended 
 that the force should start ever}^ day at dawn and 
 march until about 10 a.m., rest till the afternoon, 
 and then continue the march in the evening, when 
 the great heat had somewhat abated, by which 
 means it was expected that the columns could 
 cover thirty miles a day. But this calculation 
 was completely upset by the great heat which was 
 experienced, by the heavy shifting sand through 
 which the advance was made, and chiefly on 
 account of the extreme weakness and miserable 
 condition of the camels. 
 
 During the ver}^ first day's march from Adam- 
 Krilgan the troops consumed the greater portion 
 of the precious supply of water which was to have 
 lasted till they reached the Oxus ; and the posi- 
 tion of the force at last became so critical, that 
 Ivaufmann gave himself up for lost, and even no- 
 minated the officer who should take command in 
 the event of his death. Advance through an un- 
 known desert without water was, of course, quite 
 impossible, while a retreat would have had a 
 most demoralising efiect, not only on the troops 
 
 VOL. 1. X
 
 3o6 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 composing the force, but on all the tribes and 
 nationalities of Central Asia. Eussia's position in 
 Central Asia depended largely on the prestige 
 which the troops of the White Czar had gained 
 by their wonderful successes in the wars against 
 Khokand and Bokhara, and any reverse at this 
 time would have destroyed that belief in Eus- 
 sian invincibility on which the foundations of 
 the Czar's empire in Asia rested. The Amir of 
 Bokhara was known to be watching for a favour- 
 able opportunity for attacking his old enemies, 
 and the Khan of Khokand was no less hostile. A 
 retreat would, therefore, have been the signal for a 
 general attack on the Eussian garrisons in Central 
 Asia ; and, instead of conquering Khiva, it is 
 probable that the Eussians would have had to 
 fight for the retention of their existing possessions 
 on the S3^r Daria. 
 
 But at this juncture, when defeat and disgrace 
 were staring him in the face, Kaufmann was saved 
 by an insignificant and hitherto despised member 
 of his force. While the Kazala detachment was 
 advancing from Irkibai, a ragged Kirghiz offered 
 his services to Colonel Dreschern, and begged that 
 he might be employed as a guide without any pay, 
 in order that he might witness the punishment of 
 the Turkomans who had killed or enslaved most 
 of his relations. This man now came forward, and 
 said he could find water in the immediate vicinity 
 of the camp. Kaufmann took out his flask, and 
 promised to give the guide a hundred roubles if 
 he would bring it back full of water; and, after
 
 -1873 Skirmish with Turkomans 307 
 
 tlie Kirghiz had been absent for a short time, he 
 returned with the flask full of water — filthy and 
 nauseous, it is true, but, nevertheless, water which 
 would save life. On being questioned, he stated 
 that this foul liquid had been obtained from three 
 wells which existed some four miles to the north 
 of the Eussian camp, and that a sufficient supply 
 could be obtained for the whole army. Orders 
 were immediately given for the force to move to 
 the spot referred to, and on arrival there it was 
 found that the guide's stoiy was correct. Kauf- 
 mann had three more w^ells dug,^ but even then 
 the supply was very unsatisfactory, and the troops 
 were limited to a daily allowance of one pint per 
 man, which merely supported life, but did not 
 relieve them from intense suffering. 
 
 As there was not sufficient water for the camels 
 at this place, they were sent back, under an escort 
 of 600 men, to Adam-Krilgan, in order that they 
 might have a good drink and get a fresh supply 
 for the force before the final attempt was made to 
 reach the Oxus. While this convoy was at Adam- 
 Krilgan it was attacked by some 500 Turkomans, 
 under their renowned leader Sadyk, who had 
 taken service under the Kliivan Khan, and who 
 now tried to cripple the Eussians by capturing 
 their transport animals. The attack was made in 
 the early dawn, and the Turkomans, led by their 
 brave chief, advanced to the attack with con- 
 siderable determination ; but they were unable to 
 
 ' The place thus became known as 'Alty Kuduk,' or 'six 
 wells.' 
 
 X 2
 
 3o8 Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 stand for long before the fire of the Eu.ssian breech- 
 loaders, and were soon obliged to retreat. 
 
 A week elapsed before the camels returned to 
 Alty-Kuduk with a fresh supply of water for the 
 force, and during this time the troops had been 
 reduced to a deplorable and apparently hopeless 
 condition. To add to Kaufmann's difficulties it 
 was found, when the convoy did return, that the 
 camels were so reduced in numbers through sick- 
 ness and death that it would be impossible to con- 
 vey all the baggage to the Oxus. The greater 
 part of the stores had therefore to be left behind 
 at Alty-Kuduk under a guard of two companies, 
 and out of six iron boats which had been specially 
 constructed for the passage of the Amu Daria, only 
 two could be carried forward with the advancing 
 army. Taking with them only absolute necessaries, 
 the troops continued their advance ; and after hard 
 marching, and exposed throughout the whole of 
 the last day to incessant attacks from the enemy, 
 the force arrived on the banks of the Oxus at the 
 foot of the Uch-Uchak hills on May 23. 
 
 As soon as the safety of the column was assured 
 by its arrival on the banks of the river, Kaufmann, 
 who had hitherto remained strictly on the defen- 
 sive, proceeded to attack the enemy, who were 
 collected in masses at the foot of the neio'libourincf 
 mountains. Tlie Turkomans were quickly dispersed, 
 and pursued for several miles along the banks of 
 the river, and eleven ' Kayuks,' or Khivan boats, 
 were captured, which proved most invaliial)le when 
 the Russians crossed the Oxus a few days later.
 
 -1873 Battle of Sheikh Arik 309 
 
 Continuino; its march down the riofht bank of 
 the river, the cohimn reached Shura-Khana on 
 May 28 ; but the boats, without which the passage 
 of the river could not be effected, had not then 
 arrived, and Kaufmann, in his anxiety for their 
 safety, rode some three or four miles up the bank 
 to see if there were any signs of their coming. 
 While thus riding along, a Khivan battery on the 
 opposite side of the stream suddenly opened fire 
 on the group of officers, and, by their excellent 
 practice, made it exceedingly unpleasant for the 
 Eussian staff for a short time. As this battery 
 would have endangered the safe passage of the 
 boats, the Eussian commander determined to 
 silence it, and therefore, on the next morning, a 
 portion of his force, under General Golovatcheff, 
 moved up from Shura Khana and commenced to 
 bombard the Khivan position. The Eussians 
 opened fire from two six-pounder guns, and after a 
 short eno'ao'ement, in which the enemv were com- 
 pletely overmatched, the battery was silenced, and 
 the Khivans were seen to be withdrawing their 
 guns out of range. This engagement has received 
 the name of the ' Battle of Sheikh Arik,' from the 
 fact that the Khivan fort (which was a miserable 
 structure some thirty feet in diameter) stood on 
 one of the embankments of the Sheikh Arik canal, 
 which conducts water durino- flood-time to the 
 
 o 
 
 interior of tlie Khivan oasis. 
 
 In the meanwhile the boats had arrived from 
 Uch-Uchak, and preparations were then made for 
 crossing the Amu Daria. It had originally been
 
 3IO Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 iiitended that the river should be crossed at Shura 
 Khana, but after the affair at Sheikh-Arik, Kauf- 
 mann decided that it would be better to cross over 
 at the latter place ; and at daybreak on May 30 
 the Eussian troops were put in motion and concen- 
 trated at the spot where Golovatcheff's detach- 
 ment had stood the day before. The river at this 
 point was about 1,200 yards wide, and it took 
 each boat an hour to make the trip to the left 
 bank and back again, for the current being strong, 
 the boats were carried some distance down stream, 
 and had then to be hauled back to their original 
 starting place ; and it was not until June 3 that 
 the whole of the troops had been transferred to the 
 left bank. The safety of the operation was, how- 
 ever, quickly ensured, for early on the first day 
 two companies of infantry and four light guns 
 were landed on the left bank, and taking posses- 
 sion of the deserted fort and adjacent canal em- 
 bankments, they completely covered the crossing 
 of the remainder of the army. 
 
 On June 4 the town of Hazarasp was occupied 
 without resistance, and Kaufmann, who was thus 
 within forty-five miles of the caj^ital, there received 
 a letter from the Khan stating that all Eussian 
 prisoners had been liberated, and declaring his 
 w^illingness to comply with the Eussian demands, 
 but requesting that the further advance of the 
 column might be stopped. 
 
 One of the other columns was felted to expe- 
 rience even greater difficulties and hardships than 
 Kaufmann's force had gone through ; and in spite
 
 -1873 The CiiiKisiiLiAR Column 311 
 
 of desperate endeavours to push forward and thus 
 to share in the uhimate triumph, it was compelled 
 to abandon the attempt and retreat in disorder to 
 the Caspian. This unfortunate column was the 
 one which advanced from Chikishliar under Colonel 
 MarkozofF. It started from that place on March 31, 
 and reached lodi on the 29th of the foUowinn- 
 month. There the advanced guard had a sharj) 
 fight with some Turkomans, who were easily de- 
 feated with considerable loss, and the force soon 
 afterwards set out for the Ortakuya wells, which 
 were believed to be about fifty miles distant. But 
 the column had not proceeded far before the 
 terrible heat began to tell on the troops. The 
 water-supply soon became exhausted, and although 
 the ijuides susfofested that the store should be re- 
 plenished from the wells of Bala Ishem, which 
 were at no considerable distance from the line of 
 march, Markozoff decided to continue the advance 
 in the lioj^e of being able to capture Khiva before 
 the other columns could reach the khanate. ]^ut 
 the attempt failed. The whole force rapidly fell 
 into a state of disorder, and was at last forced to 
 retreat to the Caspian. 
 
 On May 2G — while Kaufmann was marching 
 down, the right bank of the Oxus, and two days 
 after Verefkin and Lomakin had joined hands near 
 Kuno^rad — the last straii'Mers of this ill-fated de- 
 tachment reached Krasnovodsk, utterly broken 
 down in health, half-starved on account of the 
 scarcity and bad quality of the provisions which 
 had been supplied, and displaying unmistakable
 
 312 Conquest of Khiva isco- 
 
 traces of the utter defeat and demoralisation wliicli 
 had been caused through the rascahty of tlie army 
 contractors and the reckless indiscretion of the 
 commander, who, in his ambitious desire to cap- 
 ture Khiva before the other columns could assist 
 in the undertaking, pushed blindly on into the 
 waterless desert, when a halt and rest at the Bala 
 Ishem wells would have refreshed his jaded troops 
 and enabled them to make a fresh start with some 
 hope of ultimate success. 
 
 Early in January 1873, when the troops for the 
 Orenbur<T column were beim? assembled at Oren- 
 burg, Orsk, and Uralsk, news was received that a 
 Mangishlak chieftain, named Kaphar-KarajigetolT, 
 was urging the AdaiefF Kirghiz to migrate into the 
 desolate regions in the centre of the Ust-Yurt 
 plateau, in order that they might not be compelled 
 to give up their camels to the Eussians for use 
 in the Khivan campaign. This man was so suc- 
 cessful in his agitation that the Adaieffs actually 
 began to move eastwards with the whole of their 
 camels and household goods ; and Colonel Lomakin 
 was therefore ordered to march into the Buzachi 
 peninsula to restore order. On arriving near the 
 Kara-Kitshu-Tuz lake, he came across a consider- 
 able number of nomads, who were making their 
 way towards the Ust-Yurt with some 10,000 
 camels. The Kirghiz at once attacked the Cos- 
 sacks, and a hard fight ensued, which ended in the 
 defeat of the nomads, who, however, managed to 
 drive oil" their camels. This defiant attitude of 
 the Adaieffs was one of the reasons why the lUis-
 
 -1873 The Kinderly Column 313 
 
 siaii Government decided that the Caspian cohimn 
 should be spHt up into two detachments, one being- 
 sent from the Mangishlak peninsula to keep the 
 Kirghiz in check during the campaign ; and at the 
 same time Cossack detachments were sent to Sam, 
 Djebisk, and to the Mogadjarsk Mountains to pre- 
 vent inroads of the nomads into Eussian territory, 
 and to keep up communication between the Oren- 
 burg and Kinderly columns. 
 
 Colonel Lomakin, who commanded the Kin- 
 derly column, experienced much difficulty in get- 
 ting a sufficient number of camels, and the de- 
 tachment was obliged to start with an insufficient 
 number ; but at length 380 camels and 110 horses 
 were captured from the Adaieffs, in addition to 
 some 3,000 sheep and goats. 
 
 On April 26 the column set out from the Kin- 
 derlinsk Gulf and commenced their march to 
 Kungrad by way of Kaundi, Senek, Bishekti, 
 Iltegi, and Kizil-Aghir. It was not long before 
 the troops began to experience all the trials and 
 sufferino's of a desert march. The heat was exces- 
 
 o 
 
 sive, and the wells were far apart, while such water 
 as was obtainable was brackish, muddy, and full of 
 insects. The camels soon began to die off, and 
 within the first few days the force found that it 
 was opposed by an enemy far worse and more 
 powerful than any possible combination of nomad 
 tribes. During the march from Kaundi to Senek — ■ 
 a distance of about sixty miles — sickness broke out 
 among the soldiers, and it was found necessary to 
 utilise the cavalry horses for the conveyance of the
 
 314 Conquest of Khiva isgo- 
 
 men who were stricken with fever, dysentery, or 
 sunstroke. But Lomakin steadily pushed forward, 
 and passing Senek, reached Bishekti on May 2, 
 when a small fort was built enclosing the six wells. 
 
 The sufferings which had been experienced 
 during the march from the Kinderlinsk Gulf to 
 Bishekti were but a foretaste of what was in store 
 for the Eussians during the whole of their march 
 to the borders of the Khivan Oasis. Intense heat, 
 aggravated by the blinding glare from the sand, 
 accompanied by a most serious scarcity of water 
 and with a steady and rapid increase in the death- 
 rate among the camels, marked the progress of the 
 column. 
 
 Durimx the march from Bishekti to Kilzil-Aixhir 
 there were many anxious moments, when it almost 
 appeared as if the force was doomed to destruction. 
 On May 9, when the headquarter staff and its 
 escort reached Kol-Kinir, the well was found to be 
 so deep that no means could be devised for bring- 
 ing the water to the surface, and although the next 
 known well was thirty-four miles further on, there 
 was no alternative but to make an attempt to 
 reach it. The party, therefore, pushed on ; but 
 by mid-day on the 10 th they had still some 
 thirteen miles to march before they could get a 
 drop of water ; the men could go no further ; ' and 
 everybody, even the officers, with their horses, sank 
 down helplessly into the burning sand. Not a 
 drop of water was left in the column ; round 
 about as far as the eye could reach there was 
 nothing but the white sand.'
 
 -1873 Sufferings of the Column 315 
 
 But while the troops were in this hopeless con- 
 dition, Lomakin, in his search for water, came 
 across a dried-up channel, and sent two Kirghiz to 
 explore it, when they found a small well about one 
 and a half mile to the north of the place where 
 the troops had halted. By this fortunate discovery 
 the headquarter staff and its escort were saved, and, 
 after a rest, they once more pushed on and reached 
 the wells of Iltegi on the following day. 
 
 While there, a messenger arrived with the news 
 that the main body of troops under Colonel Gro- 
 dekoff had come to a complete standstill at a point 
 some three miles short of the wells, and were 
 unable to proceed any further as their water-supply 
 had been completely exhausted, and the men were 
 dying from thirst. Lomakin at once sent back every 
 available animal with vessels containing water, and 
 after the troops had been thus refreshed, they con- 
 tinued their march to Iltegi. There a square re- 
 doubt was built to enclose the two wells, and on 
 the afternoon of May 14 the force once more 
 resumed its journey eastwards. 
 
 Kizil-Aghir was reached at 1 a.m. on the loth, 
 and as it was known that Khiva was not far dis- 
 tant, a council of war was held to decide what 
 steps should be taken to ensure complete co-oper- 
 ation with the Orenburg column. It had been 
 originally intended that the Orenburg and Kin- 
 derly columns should meet at some point on the 
 dried-up inlet of the Aral Sea called Lake Aibugir, 
 and orders were therefore issued that the main 
 body of troops should move to Bai-chagir, and
 
 3i6 Conquest of Khiva isgo- 
 
 tlience turn nortliwards through Itibai, while a 
 force was detached under Colonel Skobeleff to 
 reconnoitre the country in the direction of Kone 
 Urgenj. But on the 16tli, when the column was a 
 short distance beyond Bai-chagir, Lomakin received 
 a messaoie from General Verefkin, in which he said 
 that he hoped to reach Urga on the Sea of Aral 
 by May 18, and directed the Kinderly column to 
 march northwards and join him at that place, so 
 that the two columns could make a combined 
 attack on the town of Kungrad. Messengers were 
 therefore sent to recall Skobeleff; but this was no 
 easy matter, for Skobeleff never let the grass grow 
 under his feet, and before the order reached him 
 he had on the 17 th had an encounter with a large 
 body of Turkomans who were escorting a caravan 
 to Khiva. In this fight the gallant colonel was 
 wounded, but he quickly defeated the enemy, and 
 captured 15 prisoners, 150 camels, and a large 
 store of provisions. 
 
 On receivino- a second messacfe from Verefkin, 
 Lomakin determined to push forward by forced 
 marches with his staff and cavalry, leaving Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Paduroff to follow on with the 
 infantry. Throughout the three days' march which 
 followed, only one well was found, and this had 
 been poisoned by the Khivans, who had cast dead 
 animals into it. But, although Lomakin's party 
 suffered considerably from want of water, they, on 
 May 23, crossed the dried-up bed of the Aibugir 
 Lake, which was thickly covered with reeds from 
 15 to 20 feet high, and on the following day the
 
 -1873 LOMAKIN REACHES KUNGRAD 317 
 
 flying column arrived in the Kliivan oasis, where, 
 after two months of incessant privations and 
 suffering, they again saw green fields and flowing 
 water, and knew that their troubles were over, 
 and that they were within reach of the goal 
 towards which they had struggled so bravely. 
 Lomakin reached Kungrad at about one o'clock in 
 the afternoon of May 24 ; but found that the 
 Orenburg column had left the place a few hours 
 previously in its rapid advance on the capital — a 
 strong detachment having been left in possession 
 of the town. He, therefore, pushed on after an 
 hour's halt, and succeeded in joining Verefkin at 
 nine o'clock in the evening. He was, however, 
 ordered to wait for his infantry, and on Padurofl^'s 
 arrival to push on as rapidly as possible with the 
 whole force. 
 
 In the meanwhile the infantry under Padu- 
 roff' had been advancing along the regular route 
 through Irbasan and Kara-Kuduk. The force was 
 divided into two detachments — the main party 
 being under the command of Padurofl" himself, 
 while the other was under Major Avarsky. The 
 march from Uk-Alan commenced at 2 a.m. on May 
 20, and during the first day some water was ob- 
 tained en route, but it was brackish and almost un- 
 drinkable ; on the second day's march the troops 
 had to rely on the scanty su})ply of water which 
 was carried with tliem, for the wells which were 
 passed were found to have been poisoned; while 
 on the third day they were absolutely without any 
 water at all. In fact, throuiijhout the whole march
 
 3i8 Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 to the outskirts of the Khivan oasis the force was 
 almost entirely without water, and the infantry of 
 the Kinderly column cannot be too highly praised 
 for their splendid endurance under most trying 
 circumstances. However, at three o'clock in the 
 afternoon of May 23, they reached Irali-Kotchkan, on 
 the borders of the oasis, and a couple of days later 
 were met by Lomakin, who, after a short rest, 
 advanced with the whole column towards Khojaili. 
 
 Before describing the advance of the combined 
 Orenburg and Kinderly columns towards the cap- 
 ital, it is necessary now to give a brief account 
 of the march of Verefkin's force from Orenburof 
 to Kungrad. Although General Krijhanoffsky 
 only received definite orders regarding the de- 
 sj)atch of a column from Orenburg at the beginning 
 of 'January, yet by the end of the following month 
 all the preparations had been completed, and the 
 troops began their march towards the Emba Eiver 
 from Orenburg, Orsk, and Uralsk on February 25, 
 26, and 27. In spite of tremendous snowstorms 
 and severe frost, and the terrible condition of the 
 roads, the Emba post was reached on March 15, 
 16, and 17, and after a three weeks' halt the force 
 resumed its advance towards Khiva on April 7. 
 By this time the weather had become much 
 milder, and the Eussians experienced but little 
 difficulty in their march to the western shores of 
 the Aral Sea, and then along the coast to Yani 
 Kala on the borders of the Khivan Oasis, where the 
 column arrived on May 14, 
 
 Up to this time no resistance had been en-
 
 -1873 The Orenburg Column 319 
 
 countered, the Kliivans having merely contented 
 themselves with sending messages demanding the 
 withdrawal of the Eussian forces. On the ]9th, 
 when Verefkin ^was a short distance from Kun 
 grad, he received an amusing letter from the 
 Kliivan governor of that town, requesting that the 
 march of the force might be dela3'ed for three 
 days until the garrison had been reinforced by 
 some artillery which was daily expected, on re- 
 ceipt of which he would be ready to oppose the 
 Muscovite advance; but it was stated that, if the 
 Eussians blindly persisted in moving forward be- 
 fore the guns arrived, the Khivans would abso- 
 lutely decline to fight. Verefkin, however, did 
 * blindly persist ' in continuing his advance, and 
 when he reached Kungrad on the following day he 
 found that the Khivan commander had kept his 
 jDromise. The place was deserted, and the Eussians 
 took possession of it without firing a shot. 
 
 On May 23 the advanced guard of the Orenburg 
 column marched out of Kungrad under Colonel 
 LeontschefF, and at about four o'clock in the after- 
 noon it was violently attacked by a large number 
 of Khivans, who succeeded in forcing their way to 
 the very centre of the Eussian camp, but were 
 eventually driven off with the loss of several killed. 
 Verefkin, as has been already mentioned, left 
 Kungrad with the main body of the Orenburg 
 troops on the morning of the 24th, and steadily 
 pushed forward to the capital without seeing any 
 further signs of the enemy, either on that day or 
 on the 25tli. But at 5 a.m. on the 2Gth the advance
 
 320 Conquest of Khiva isgo- 
 
 was continued toward Kara-Baili, and at noon, 
 while the column was resting; on the banks of a 
 stream, the sound of firing was heard towards the 
 front, and a Cossack arrived with a report that while 
 an officer of the Topographical Department was 
 making a reconnaissance of the country ahead of 
 the column, he had been attacked by a numerous 
 body of Khivans, who had succeeded in killing one 
 of the escort and wounding two others, besides 
 capturing several horses. 
 
 Colonel LeontschefF at once galloped forward 
 with two sotnias of cavalry, but on reaching the 
 scene of attack, he found that the enemy had dis- 
 appeared, and although he advanced some miles 
 further he failed to see any signs of them, and he 
 was obliged to abandon the pursuit. He had, 
 however, scarcely returned to the main body, when 
 shots were again heard on the flank of the column, 
 and on this occasion he overtook the Khivans and 
 inflicted considerable loss on them. From one of 
 the prisoners taken during this fight it was learnt 
 that these two attacks had been made by some 400 
 or 500 Turkomans who had been detached from a 
 large Khivan army which had been sent under the 
 command of the Khan's brother to defend the town 
 of Khojaili, 
 
 On the same evening Lomakin rejoined with 
 the whole of the Kinderly column, and from this 
 time the combined columns came under the com- 
 mand of General Verefkin, wlio at once issued 
 orders reijfarding the formation of the column dur- 
 ing its advance on the capital.
 
 -1873 Capture of Khojaili 321 
 
 The force left Kara-Baili at dayljreak on May 27, 
 and, after a slight skirmish, reached the gardens 
 and enclosures on the outskirts of Khojaili at 
 about four o'clock in the afternoon. Skirmishers 
 were then sent forward, and the force steadily 
 pushed on till it arrived within about 500 yards 
 from the walls of the town. Here a deputation 
 of the leading inhabitants presented themselves 
 before Verefkin, informing him that the Khivan 
 troops had evacuated the place, and begging that 
 they might not be punished. At 5 p.m. the Eus- 
 sians marched through the town and took up a 
 position three-quarters of a mile to the south, where 
 the force remained for two da3's. 
 
 On May 30 the advance was continued, and 
 early the following morning the outposts were 
 attacked by large bodies of Turkomans, who, how- 
 ever, as usual, fell back as soon as a few shells had 
 been fired. Leontscheff pursued them for several 
 miles, and on his return he reported that the Laudan 
 Canal on the way to Manghit was impassable for 
 infantry, as there was no bridge over it. A detach- 
 ment of sappers and two sotnias of cavalry were 
 therefore sent forward with the cask-bridge equip- 
 ment, but on reaching the canal they were received 
 by a heavy fire from the Khivans, who were hidden 
 in the undergrowth on the opposite bank. The 
 Cossacks, however, swam across and drove the 
 enemy away, and the bridge was then so rapidly 
 constructed that by 8.30 a.m. the whole force had 
 crossed, and after a short march camped on the 
 banks of the Oxus at a place called Djelan- 
 
 VOL. I. Y
 
 322 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 Cheganak, where the river was about three-quarters 
 of a mile wide. 
 
 The remainder of the day passed quietly, and 
 although a night-attack was expected, no further 
 signs of the enemy were seen until the following 
 morning (June 1), when, just as the Eussians 
 were striking their camp, a couple of shots were 
 fired from some Khivan guns on the opposite bank 
 of the Amu Daria. These, however, fell short, 
 and the column shortly afterwards set out towards 
 Manghit, where the enemy was known to have 
 taken up a strong position barring the Eussian 
 line of advance. 
 
 At 7 A.M. Verefkin came into touch with the 
 Khivan army, which was drawn up on a plain 
 covered with reeds and hi^h g-rass — the villai^e of 
 Mancfhit and several neio^hbourinsj sandhills beimr 
 also strongly occupied. As soon as the Eussians 
 arrived within about three-quarters of a mile from 
 the position, the Khivan horsemen, uttering fiend- 
 ish yells, galloped forward with the apparent 
 intention of charging the Eussian centre ; but they 
 soon changed their course, and in a few minutes 
 spread themselves out into a long line some seven 
 or eight miles in extent, which encircled tlie 
 column on the south, east, and north-east. The 
 four guns in the Eussian centre then opened a 
 heavy fire, and Verefkin sent three other pieces 
 to reinforce the left flank which was seriously 
 threatened. The Khivans, however, made a series 
 of determined charges, and at one time they suc- 
 ceeded in pushing forward to within a couple of
 
 -1873 Fight at Manghit 323 
 
 hundred yards of the general and his staff, while 
 Leontscheff's cavalry on the right flank was so 
 hardly pressed that they were obliged to dismount 
 and fight like infantrymen before they could beat 
 off the assailants. As soon as this front attack 
 was repulsed, the Khivans made a furious onslaught 
 on the rearguard, which they apparently expected 
 to find weak and unprovided with artiller3^ But 
 they were soon undeceived, for they were received 
 with a heavy infantry and artillery fire, whicJi 
 caused them to recoil in confusion, when they 
 joined their companions in flight towards Manghit. 
 A short time afterwards the attack.was renewed, 
 but on this occasion the Khivans did not attempt 
 to come to close quarters, and soon retired once 
 aG^ain towards the south. Verefkin then ordered 
 a general advance, and Manghit was occupied at 
 three o'clock in the afternoon. Here the Eussians 
 were fired upon by some of the enemy who were 
 lurking in the village, and in retaliation the troops 
 set fire to the place and commenced an indis- 
 criminate massacre of the inhabitants, in which no 
 respect w^as paid to either sex or age. The force 
 then continued its march and took up a position 
 on the banks of the Arna Canal, about a mile to 
 the south of the smouldering ruins of Manghit, 
 from whence Skobeleff was sent with two sotnias 
 of Cossacks to destroy the village of Kubetan, the 
 inhabitants of which had taken a leading part in 
 the hostile operations. This affair was the most 
 serious engagement of the w^hole campaign. The 
 Russians lost one ofiicer and eight men killed, and
 
 324 Conquest of Khiva isgo- 
 
 ten men severely wounded, whilst many others 
 received slight wounds. The Khivan loss is un- 
 known, but it must have been very heavy. 
 
 On June 2 the force continued its advance, 
 and after repeated encounters with parties of 
 Turkomans, reached the Attualick Canal. On the 
 following day the eneni}^ still continued to harass 
 the column, but they were unable to delay its pro- 
 gress, and it was not till June 4 that any further 
 serious fighting took place. At 6.45 a.m. on that 
 day, however, just as the Eussians had struck 
 their camp, they were assailed on all sides by 
 dense masses of the enemy. Their position for a 
 time was most critical, for they were in a closely 
 built Usbeg village which was surrounded by a 
 network of gardens and irrigation channels, and 
 they were unable to get a clear field for their fire. 
 The Khivans were most determined in their attacks, 
 and returned again and again to the charge ; and 
 it was not until 11 a.m., when the Eussians had 
 broken down some of the surrounding walls and 
 brought their guns into action, that the assailants 
 were finally forced to retire. Tlie staflf then halted 
 at the village of Udott, and in the afternoon went 
 into a camp some miles to the south. 
 
 In this fight, in spite of its serious character, 
 the Eussians only lost five men wounded, which 
 is due to the fact that the Khivans were only 
 armed with swords and spears, and had but few 
 Cfuns of a verv primitive make. Thus, while tliev 
 invariably lost heavily from the fire of the Eussian 
 breech-loaders, they themselves, like all savage
 
 -1873 The Combined Columns reach Khiva 325 
 
 races, were unable to inflict any serious loss on 
 their opponents, because they were always defeated 
 before they could come to close quarters. This 
 defeat near Udott, together with tlie previous 
 lesson they had received at Manghit, appears to 
 have completely disheartened them, and they 
 made no more serious attempts to resist the ad- 
 vance of Verefkin's troops towards the capital, 
 and the Eussians from this time encountered no 
 greater difficulties than were caused by the de 
 struction of brido-es over the numerous canals 
 which crossed their line of march. ^ 
 
 The Khan, however, made one further attempt 
 to persuade Verefkin to grant a truce. On June 4 
 a messenger arrived in the Eussian camp bearing 
 a letter from Mahommed Ealiim, in which he de- 
 clared his friendship towards Eussia, and stated 
 that nothing would please him better than to be 
 able to entertain such distinguished visitors in a 
 befittinof manner. He therefore beojred that an 
 armistice mij^ht be granted for three or four davs 
 to enable him to make the necessary arrangements 
 for their reception ; but he urged the general not 
 to abstain from attacking the Turkomans,' who, 
 he declared, had opposed the Eussian advance in 
 opposition to his wishes. Verefkin, ho^vever, was 
 not to be deceived by such a palpable attempt to 
 gain time, and he therefore i)ushed on ; and pass- 
 ing through Kyat-Kungrad on June 0, and Kush- 
 Kupir on the following evening, the combined 
 
 ' At Kl\tcl\ Nia/ Bai a bridge 189 feet long had to be built over 
 tlie canal before the Eusiiians could coutinuc their march.
 
 326 Conquest of Khiva i8G9- 
 
 Orenburg and Kinderly columns on June 7 en- 
 camped in the Clianakchik, or pleasure-gardens of 
 the Khan, which are situated some three miles 
 from the northern gate of the Khivan capital. 
 Here the troops remained for two days, during 
 which time the advanced guard under Skobeleff 
 was incessantly attacked by the enemy, who in- 
 variably delivered their assaults in the mornings, 
 and daily lost 400 or 500 men besides many guns 
 and horses. 
 
 Veref kin at this time was in complete ignorance 
 of Kaufmann's movements ; for, although on June 5 
 he had received a letter from the Commander-in- 
 Chief which had been written three days previously, 
 and which contained news of the engagement with 
 the Khivan forces at Sheikh Arik and successful 
 passage of the river, no further intelligence had 
 been received regarding the position or move- 
 ments of the Turkestan column. It was, moreover, 
 rumoured that Kaufmann, after advancing to Haz- 
 arasp, had been compelled to return to the Oxus, 
 and that he was then about sixty miles away from 
 Khiva. 
 
 Verefkin, therefore, decided to attack the city 
 without waiting for the arrival of the Turkestan 
 troops, and at about eleven o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of June 9 the troops advanced from Clianak- 
 chik for the purpose of making a reconnaissance 
 in force so that the breaching batteries could be 
 placed and the bombardment commenced. At 
 noon the column reached SkobelelF's advanced 
 posts, which had just had their usual morning's
 
 -1873 An Awkward Position 327 
 
 fight with tlie Khivans, and shortly afterwards the 
 reconnoitring party found the enemy strongly 
 posted in the gardens and suburbs in front of the 
 north gate. A few rounds from the guns, how- 
 ever, soon caused them to disappear, and a quarter 
 of a mile further on the column got into a narrow 
 road, scarcely four yards wide, with an almost 
 impassable network of canals, gardens, and build- 
 incjs on each side. 
 
 While in this confined position, and buried in 
 clouds of dust which rendered it impossible to see 
 even a few yards ahead, the Eussians suddenly 
 found themselves exposed to a heavy fire. With- 
 out knowing it they had arrived in close formation 
 within a couple of hundred yards of the city walls, 
 which were lined with Khivans, who opened a 
 tremendous fusillade on the astonished Eussians. 
 Fortunately, however, for Verefkin's men the fire 
 was badly directed, and most of the bullets passed 
 high over the heads of the troops. For ten minutes 
 the Eussians were in this unpleasant position be- 
 fore they could get out of the defile ; but they at 
 length got under cover, the guns were brought to 
 the front and opened a well-directed fire against 
 the north gate of the city, and the infantry moved 
 forward on the right and left of the road, pre- 
 ceded by a line of skirmishers, who kept up a 
 heavy fire on the walls. In a short time several 
 of the Kliivaii guns were put out of action, and 
 the Eussians pushed on to a brick building just in 
 front of the canal bridge outside the north gate. 
 
 Here their fiu'ther advance was delayed by a
 
 328 Conquest of Khiva isgo- 
 
 well-built barricade which had been erected across 
 the road about 100 yards in front of the gate, 
 and which contained four pieces of artillery. In 
 front of this there was a deep, wide canal, over 
 which there was a narrow bridge, which the 
 Khivans had stupidly neglected to destroy. The 
 fire from this barricade proved most galling to 
 the Eussians, and Major BourovzofF charged across 
 the bridge at the head of four companies of in- 
 fantry, and in a few moments forced his way 
 into the work, where the Kliivan gunners were 
 bayoneted beside their guns. 
 
 This storming party, which was exposed to a 
 heavy fire from the city walls, then took shelter 
 behind the canal embankment, and as an assault 
 on the town would have probably been less 
 dangerous than retirement. Lieutenant- Colonel 
 PadurofF, who commanded the attack at this point, 
 sent back and asked Verefkin for scaling-ladders. 
 The general, however, did not intend to risk an 
 assault, and decided to confine himself to a bom- 
 bardment till Kaufmann arrived, and he therefore 
 ordered the troops to retire. BourovzofT's party 
 then fell back, and in spite of the heavy fire to 
 which they were exposed, they succeeded in 
 dragging off three of the Kliivan guns. This 
 advanced party suffered a loss of four men killed 
 and twenty-two wounded, including their gallant 
 leader, who was wounded in three places. 
 
 Durinoj the en^ao-ement Verefkin was also 
 
 o Co 
 
 severely wounded in the right eye, and after 
 giving directions regarding the breaching batteries
 
 -1873 Bombardment of Khiva 329 
 
 which were to be employed against the defences, 
 he was obhged to hand over the command to 
 Colonel Sarantschoff. The cavalry and staff then 
 retired, and were shortly afterwards followed by 
 the main body of infantry, Skobeleff remaining in 
 his usual post at the front to continue the bom- 
 bardment and watch the movements of the enemy. 
 
 The guns kept up a steady fire on the city 
 until about 4 p.m., when an envoy arrived from 
 the Khan asking for a suspension of hostilities, and 
 saying that within an hour an ambassador would 
 be sent to arrange the terms of capitulation. 
 Colonels Sarantschoff and Lomakin informed this 
 messenger that the Eussians would cease fire and 
 grant an armistice only on the understanding that 
 not another shot was fired from the walls, but that 
 the conditions of peace could only be arranged by 
 General Kaufmann. The Eussian batteries, in ac- 
 cordance with this arrangement, ceased firing at 
 4.30 P.M. ; but soon afterwards the fire from the 
 ramparts recommenced, and although a second 
 messenger then appeared declaring that the Khan 
 was not responsible for this hostile demonstra- 
 tion, as the culprits were Yomud Turkomans, 
 over whom the Khan had no control, the 
 Eussians very naturally ignored the excuse and 
 resumed the bomljardment, which was maintained 
 till 10 P.M., when the city was on fire in several 
 places. 
 
 An hour later a letter was received from 
 General Kaufmann, stating that the Turkestan 
 column, which had left Hazarasp on June 8, was
 
 330 Conquest of Khiva iseo- 
 
 about seven miles from Khiva, and directing Yeref- 
 kin to stop the bombardment and to meet him at 
 eight o'clock on the following morning at a bridge 
 some three miles from the eastern gate of the city, 
 when the Khan's uncle, Seid Emir-ul-Umar, would 
 be present to arrange the terms of surrender. 
 Veref kin was unable to go to the rendezvous on 
 account of his wound, and he therefore sent 
 Sarantsclioff and Lomakin. At the appointed 
 place they met Kaufmann at the head of the 
 Turkestan column, and there Seid-ul-Umar, Ata 
 Jan (the Khan's younger brother), and other influ- 
 ential persons offered their complete submission 
 and formally surrendered the city to the Eussians. 
 While Kaufmann was thus peacefully obtaining 
 the capitulation of Khiva, certain fiery spirits on 
 the opposite side of the city appeared determined 
 to keep up the contest as long as possible ; for 
 while the Russian and Khivan leaders were pro- 
 ceeding to the rendezvous to settle the terms of 
 surrender, the Turkomans at the north gate re- 
 opened fire on the advanced party under Skobeleff, 
 who at once recommenced the bombardment. By 
 a few well-directed shots the gate was destroyed, 
 and then a storming column of about 1,000 men, 
 led by Skobeleff and Count Schouvaloff, rushed to 
 the assault and speedily gained possession of the 
 gate and adjoining ramparts. Ihit the Turkomans 
 still maintained a running Are from the houses 
 and alleys of the city, and Skobelefl', pushing on, 
 cleared the streets with rockets, and finally, with 
 a loss of only fifteen men, penetrated as far as the
 
 -1873 Kaufmann's Entry into Khiva 331 
 
 Khan's palace, where he heard that Kaufmann, at 
 the head of the Turkestan column, was entering 
 the town by the Hazarasp gate with all ' the 
 honours of war.' SkobelefF therefore discreetly 
 fell back, and marching his force out of the city 
 by the gate at which he had entered, left the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief to continue his triumphal progress 
 undisturbed. 
 
 After remaining at the Khan's palace for a few 
 hours to make arrangements for the protection 
 of property and disarmament of the inhabitants, 
 Kaufmann visited Yerefkin's camp and inspected 
 the wounded in the hospitals ; on the following 
 day a ' Te Deum ' was sung and Mass said for the 
 repose of the souls of Peter the Great (whose 
 birthday it was) and of those soldiers who had 
 perished in the previous wars against Khiva ; and 
 on June 13 the troops evacuated the city and 
 marched into camps in the adjacent gardens, small 
 detachments being, however, left to guard the 
 gates of the town. 
 
 In the meanwhile, as Mahommed Eahim, being 
 alarmed at the bombardment by Yerefkin's force, 
 had fled to Imukchir, near lliali, and there taken 
 refuge among the Yomuds, his younger brother, 
 At a Jan, was temporarily appointed to the khan- 
 ship ; but, on the loth, Kaufmann wrote to 
 Mahommed Eahim advising him to return, and on 
 the evening of the next day he presented himself 
 at the general's camp, where he was reinstated, 
 a special council or ' divan,' partly composed 
 of Russian officers and partly of Khivans, being
 
 332 Conquest of Khiva i869- 
 
 appointed to assist in the government of the 
 khanate. 
 
 On June 24, the Khan, by Kaufmann's direction, 
 issued a decree abohshing slavery, and command- 
 ing all his subjects to set their slaves at liberty. 
 The captives were permitted, if they so desired, to 
 remain in Khiva, or to return to Persia if they 
 preferred to do so. Those wishing to return to 
 their homes were directed to assemble at certain 
 bazaars, where they were to be registered, and 
 thence sent to Persia, via Krasnovodsk. In spite 
 of this order, however, it appears that not more 
 than one-sixth of the whole number of slaves were 
 released by the time the Kussian forces left the 
 oasis. 
 
 Shortly afterwards the Eussian troops were 
 employed in a campaign against the Yomud Tur- 
 komans, which lasted till late in the month of 
 August ; and, on his return from this expedi- 
 tion, Kaufmann, on August 24, 1873, concluded 
 a treaty of peace with the Khan, the draft of 
 which had been previously sent by a courier to St. 
 Petersljurg for the Emperor's sanction, and which 
 had been returned duly approved by the Czar. 
 By this treaty the Khan renounced his right to 
 maintain direct relations with any of the neigli- 
 ]jouring rulers or Khans, or to undertake any 
 military operations without the knowledge and 
 ])ermission of the Eussian autliorilies in Central 
 Asia; the whole of the right bank of the Amu 
 Daria aiid the lands adjoiidug thereunto^ which 
 
 ' Oil the lULli ol' the following October Kaufiiuinn conchiJeJ a
 
 -1873 The Treaty of Peace 333 
 
 had formerly been considered as belonging to 
 Khiva were annexed to Eussia, and the ancient 
 bed of the Oxus was fixed as the boundary between 
 the Eussian and Kliivan dominions to the west of 
 the oasis ; the navigation of the Oxus was exclu- 
 sively reserved for Eussian vessels, Khivan or 
 Bokharan boats being only permitted to sail on the 
 river by special permission from the Eussian au- 
 thorities ; the Eussians were to have the right to 
 construct wharves and factories at such points on 
 the left bank of the Amu Daria as might be con- 
 sidered necessary or convenient ; Eussian mer- 
 chants were to have the free right to travel 
 throughout the khanate without payment of any 
 taxes, and to be permitted to establish agents in 
 Khiva or in any of the other towns of the khanate ; 
 and, in addition to many other clauses, it was 
 finally agreed that the Khan should pay a war 
 
 treaty with the Amir of Bokhara, whereby the strip of territory on 
 the right bank of the Oxus, from Kukertli to Meshekh, and thence 
 to the Russian frontier, was handed over to Bokhara as a reward 
 for the Amir's neutrality during the war. By this treaty it was 
 also agreed that tlie Russians might establish wharves and fac- 
 tories at any places on the Bokharan bank of the Ainu Daria ; that 
 all towns and villages in the khanate should be open to Russian 
 trade ; that all goods belonging to Russian traders — whether im- 
 ported or exported — should be subject to a tax of 2^ per cent, ad 
 valorem ; that Russian merchants should have a right to transport 
 their goods through the khanate free of all duties ; that Russian 
 traders might establish caravanserais and appoint commercial 
 agents wherever they pleased ; that Russian subjects should be 
 permitted to piu-chase real property' and to engage in any trade or 
 craft permitted by the Shariat ; that no persons should be permitted 
 to enter the khanate from Russian territory without passes from 
 the Russian authorities; and that a Bokharan envoy should reside 
 in Tashkent, a Russian resident agent being also appointed to 
 remain in Bokhara.
 
 334 Conquest of Kiiiva i869- 
 
 indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles, payable in certain 
 instalments, the last of wliicli was to be paid on or 
 before November 13, 1893. 
 
 Such were the conditions imposed on tlie 
 Khivans as the result of their disastrous overthrow. 
 The Khan was turned into a mere puppet who was 
 to be entirely under Eussian guidance ; the great 
 Eiver Oxus was to be thenceforward completely 
 under Eussian control, from its mouths to the 
 borders of Afghanistan ; and in spite of the 
 Eussian Emperor's solemn declaration that he had 
 no intention of occupying the khanate, and had 
 even given positive orders to prevent it, and that 
 the final conditions to be imposed should be such 
 as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occu- 
 pation of Khiva — in spite of this voluntary and 
 emphatic promise, a large slice of Khivan territory 
 was annexed to Eussia, Khivan independence was 
 completely destroyed, and instead of abstaining 
 from a prolonged occupation of the khanate, a 
 considerable Eussian force was permanently estab- 
 lished in a fort on the Oxus within two marches 
 of the Khan's capital. 
 
 It is not to be wondered at that when this 
 treaty was published the British public felt that 
 they had been completely duped. It is true that 
 three years previously they had been taught how 
 little value Eussia attaches to her treaty obliga- 
 tions ; ^ but in spite of the cancelment of the Black 
 
 ^ On October 31, 1870, dnrin;^ the Fr.inco-German War, Prince 
 Gnrtchakoi'f wrote a circular note to the Eussian Ambassadors at 
 l^'oicign Coiu'ts, wherein he dcchired the intention of Russia to be
 
 -1873 Reaction in England 335 
 
 Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, they could not 
 bring themselves to believe that the assurances 
 voluntarily given at the instance of the Eussian 
 Czar himself would not be scrupulously observed ; 
 and, therefore, when they found that their confi- 
 dence had been misplaced the reaction was com- 
 plete. 
 
 no longer bound by the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. 
 The time was well chosen : Finance was then vainly endeavouring 
 to stem the tide of invasion, and was powerless to take action 
 against Russia. England was thus left alone, and as she did not 
 feel inclined to go to war in support of the treaty, a conference 
 was assembled, at which, after uaiich delay, it was agreed that the 
 Black Sea clauses were to be cancelled ; and although it was de- 
 clared that no Power had a right to liberate itself from treaty 
 engagements, this was very little to set against the tangible advan- 
 tages which had been gained by Russia. In this way, by a stroke 
 of the pen, the fruits of the Crimean War were practically destroyed, 
 and yet some Englishmen were still to be found who believed in 
 the good faith of Russia. 
 
 END OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
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