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 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
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 mi\
 
 THE 
 ART OF FIGHTING
 
 THE 
 ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 ITS EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS 
 WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM 
 CAMPAIGNS OF GREAT COMMANDERS 
 
 BY 
 REAR-ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE 
 
 U. S, NAVY 
 
 Former Aid for Operations of the Fleet, President of the U. S. Naval Institute, Gold 
 
 Medalist of U. S. Naval Institute, the Franklin Institute and the 
 
 Aero Club of America 
 
 Author of "'Electricity in Theory and Practice,'" "War Time in Manila," "The 
 
 Navy as a Fighting Machine," "From Midshipman to 
 
 Reat-Admiral," etc. 
 
 Inventor of the Gun Director System, the Naval Telescope Sight, the Stadimeter, 
 
 the Turret Range Finder, the Horizometer, the 
 
 Torpedoplane, etc., etc., etc. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 THE CENTURY CO. 
 
 1920
 
 Copyright, 1920, by 
 The Century Co.
 
 \ 
 
 
 (Xj 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The evils of war are so heart-rending that every friend of 
 the human race would greet with joy the coming of perma- 
 nent peace, and would aid every movement tending to en- 
 sure it. 
 
 Nevertheless until it is certain that war has actually been 
 banished from the earth, armies and navies must be main- 
 tained. In order to give their country the protection needed, 
 each army and navy must be correctly designed, prepared, and 
 operated. 
 
 To know whether this is being done, the people need a gen- 
 eral knowledge of the principles of the art of fighting, espe- 
 cially of strategy. 
 
 To impart this knowledge in simple language is the object 
 of this book, 
 
 Bradley A. Fiske.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 FIGHTING AND WAR IN GENERAL 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I Fighting Between Individuals 3 
 
 II Fighting Between Tribes 15 
 
 III Gradual Development of the Art of Fighting . . 37 
 
 IV Principles of the Art of Fighting 50 
 
 PART II 
 
 HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
 V Thutmose III and Ramses II 67 
 
 VI MiLTIADES AND ThEMISTOCLES 79 
 
 VII Philip of Macedon and Alexander His Son . . .96 
 
 VIII C^SAR 124 
 
 IX C^sAR (Continued) 141 
 
 X Charlemagne, William, and Marlborough . . . 164 
 
 XI Frederick 177 
 
 XII Washington* 191 
 
 XIII Nelson 208 
 
 XIV Napoleon 220 
 
 XV From Napoleon to Moltke 251 
 
 XVI Moltke 256 
 
 XVII From Moltke to Togo 272 
 
 XVIII Ante Bellum 289 
 
 XIX The World War .312 
 
 PART III 
 
 STRATEGY 
 
 XX Strategy in Peace 321 
 
 XXI Strategy in War 345 
 
 XXII Strategy as Related to Statesmanship .... 365
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Besieging- a City in Ancient Times Frontispiece 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Vicinity of Kadesh 70 
 
 Plain of Marathon 80 
 
 Ancient Greece and Asia Minor 84 
 
 Artemisium and Thermopylae 86 
 
 Battle of Salamis 88 
 
 The Persian Empire . 101 
 
 The Battle of Issus 106 
 
 Tyre 109 
 
 Battle of the Hydaspes 119 
 
 The Roman Empire 127 
 
 Central Europe, 1789 179 
 
 Washington's Movements in 1776 196 
 
 Battle of Cape St. Vincent 209 
 
 Central Europe, 1810 221 
 
 Vicinity of Waterloo 248 
 
 Japan, Korea, and Part of Manchuria 291
 
 PAET I 
 FIGHTING AND WAR, IN GENERAL
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS 
 
 MAN'S earliest method of fighting was with his fists. 
 The use he made of his fists was to strike blows upon 
 the body of his antagonist, with the intention of in- 
 juring him, and especially of decreasing his ability to inflict 
 blows in return. In practically all cases, a fight was waged to 
 accomplish some purpose; and this purpose was either offensive 
 or defensive. This means that the intention was either to 
 further some purpose, or to prevent an antagonist from carry- 
 ing out some purpose of his own. Fighting with the fists is in 
 vogue even at the present day, not only among savage tribes, 
 but in the most civilized communities ; and it is the prototype 
 of the most complicated and extensive wars ever waged, even 
 among nations the most highly civilized and numerous. 
 
 Looked at from the standpoint of a war between two na- 
 tions, a fist fight between two men seems a very simple matter. 
 But it does not seem a simple matter if one considers all the 
 elements involved. Superficially regarded, such a fight seems 
 simple, for the reason that we take no account whatever of the 
 wonderfully complicated activities going on inside the skin 
 of each contestant. If we knew all that was going on inside 
 of each skin, we would realize that in no army and no navy 
 has there ever been such a perfect adaptation of means to ends, 
 such a thorough system of coordination among all the various 
 parts, such an ability to concentrate them all on one object.
 
 4 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 such a speedy supply of reinforcements to threatened points, 
 such an admirable system of reconnoitering, and such a com- 
 plete power to move as a unit in the desired direction, and to 
 the indicated spot. 
 
 If two untrained men fight each other with their fists, we 
 do not see the same quickness of attack and parry as in the 
 ease of two men who are highly trained ; but even in the case 
 of two untrained men, or even of two small boys, we see such 
 wonderful efficiency of the body for the purpose of fighting as 
 almost to suggest the idea that the primary intention of the 
 Almighty in designing the body of a man was that he should 
 fight. This would be a very extreme position to assume ; but, 
 at the same time, it may be pointed out that in no other 
 activity in which a man engages is he called upon to exert 
 his powers so strenuously; in nothing else that a man does is 
 there a demand for such a wide range of effort ; by no other 
 activity is a man's strength — physical, mental, and moral — 
 taxed so heavily ; after no other exercise is a man so exhausted. 
 These things need not surprise us : why should it surprise us 
 that the utmost of a man's possible endeavor should be called 
 upon to save his life? On the issue of many a fight has de- 
 pended the life of each man who is fighting ; and, in many cases 
 where life itself has not depended on the issue, something has 
 depended on it of such importance that, because of it, the 
 risking of life has been undergone. 
 
 If we watch two men, even unskilful men, when fighting, 
 we see that each one keeps his eye eagerly on the other, look- 
 ing first for an opportunity to strike, and second for a blow 
 that must be parried. In some eases we see this condition re- 
 versed, and note that at least one of the men is more intent 
 on parrying than on striking. If we see one man intent on 
 striking and the other man intent on parrying, we realize that 
 one man is acting offensively and the other defensively; and 
 we realize also that, unless there is a marked disproportion in 
 strength or skill, the man who is acting offensively will prob- 
 ably be the victor.
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS 5 
 
 But we realize also that he may not necessarily be the victor. 
 We realize that the one who is acting defensively may be 
 merely waiting for an opportunity to strike effectively; and 
 that the man who is acting offensively may be merely using 
 strength and effort, with but little guidance from reason, and 
 may exhaust himself in ill-directed effort. We realize that the 
 man who is acting defensively may finally see an opportunity 
 to break through the guard of his adversary and inflict a 
 decisive blow. We realize all these things because from boy- 
 hood we have been accustomed to this kind of fighting, and 
 because a knowledge of its fundamental principles is so much 
 a part of our heredity as to be almost an instinct. 
 
 We realize also that, unless the defendant does at some time 
 act offensively, he vdll surely be vanquished. No fighting in 
 the history of the world, no matter how defensively conducted, 
 has ever obtained a victory without offensive action of some 
 sort, as by delivering a blow. In the simple case of two men 
 in a fist fight, we cannot imagine either of the men becoming 
 the victor without a blow, or a successful grapple, or a throw- 
 down, or the inflicting of an injury of some kind. We shall 
 see hereafter that these facts are the fundamental principles 
 underlying all wars ; and that it has been by forgetting them 
 that much misunderstanding as to the nature of war and the 
 purposes of strategy has been created. 
 
 While the two contestants are watching each other for 
 chances to strike, and for the necessities for parrying, there 
 are going on inside of each man things that we cannot see. 
 We cannot see that system of independent and yet dependent 
 parts by which all the members of the body act independently 
 of each other, and yet cooperatively, and in obedience to the 
 will that directs all toward a common object. The mind is 
 informed by its reconnoitering agency, the eye, of the rapid 
 movements of the adversary, not only of his body as a unit, 
 but of his arms and his legs and his eyes: that is, the mind 
 takes note of the direction and speed of movement of the 
 enemy main body and of its supports and reconnoitering
 
 6 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 parties. Apprehending these, the mind telegraphs orders by 
 the nerves to the muscles, and thus immediately disposes of its 
 own main body and its supports and reconnoitering parties — 
 sometimes to parry, sometimes to retreat, sometimes to ad- 
 vance, and sometimes to launch a blow. 
 
 Each contestant by means of his reconnoitering parties (his 
 eyes) watches for any uncovering of the enemy main body, 
 in order that he may strike it, and also for any opportunity 
 of reaching some weak spot. Each contestant realizes that 
 the most effective blow would be one delivered with the full 
 power of the arm on the front, but that such a blow entails 
 a risk, because it uncovers one's self to attack; and therefore 
 he delivers many comparatively ineffective blows without 
 uncovering himself, in the hope of gradually wearing down 
 the fighting power of his adversary to a point at which he 
 may launch a blow with his full power, without undue risk. 
 
 This, of course, presupposes that the two contestants are 
 fairly matched. If they are not fairly matched, one of the 
 contestants may be able to deal a series of heavy blows without 
 serious risk to himself and bring the fight to a speedy end. 
 Where such a disproportion of power exists, however, the 
 matter is not interesting to the student of the art of fighting, 
 for the reason that it is impracticable to learn the possibilities 
 of that art from occasions in which the disproportion of mate- 
 rial forces is so great as to give strategy no opportunity to 
 exert its powers. 
 
 While the case of two unskilled men in fighting with their 
 fists reveals to the student a marvelous display of the powers 
 of the human body, it is only in the contest between highly 
 trained pugilists that this is shown in its perfection. And 
 when one considers how few men have been highly trained 
 pugilists, and when he realizes the marvelous physical strength, 
 the quickness of perception, the rapidity of inter-action be- 
 tween the nerves and the muscles, and the amount of training 
 required, he must conclude that, although he may consider 
 such things very brutal and demoralizing, and though they
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS 7 
 
 may decrease the refinement of the community, yet neverthe- 
 less they do develop more highly than does anything else the 
 powers of the human body. We see in the trained pianist a 
 superb coordination between the eyes and the fingers. This 
 coordination is as great as that between the eye and the fists 
 of the pugilist; but it is no greater. The pianist produces 
 beautiful chords and successions of chords to delight an audi- 
 ence, while the pugilist inflicts blows that cause physical pain 
 and harm. Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that, from 
 the standpoint of the mechanics of the human body, the pianist 
 or even the acrobat, is in a class inferior to that occupied by 
 the pugilist. That the pugilist should devote his truly mar- 
 velous powers to a purpose that may be unworthy, or even bad, 
 does not nuUif}^ the fact that he brings the physical activities 
 of the human organism to a higher point than does anybody 
 else. 
 
 The reason that the pugilist is able to accomplish so much, 
 or the reason that any man is able to walk or talk or do any- 
 thing else, is because the body of a man is an organism : that 
 is, an organization composed of parts that are independent 
 of each other, and yet interdependent, and that can all be 
 made to act together for a definite purpose. What is ordi- 
 narily called a machine is man's imitation of the organism 
 created by the Almighty. In a machine, a printing-press for 
 instance, we see an enonnous number of parts, each working 
 apparentl}'- independentl}- of every other; and yet we see all 
 working together to print a paper. When one watches a 
 printing-press, or when he watches any other of the great ma- 
 chines invented by man, he is filled with wonder at the genius 
 of the inventor and the skill of the mechanics who embodied 
 the inventor's invention in steel and brass; but no machine 
 that man ever invented is other than an imitation of the 
 mechanism of the human body. So far as men know, man is 
 the most perfect machine that even the Almighty has invented. 
 
 There are three main elements that determine the effective- 
 ness of a pugilist, and they are the same elements that deter-
 
 8 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 mine the effectiveness of an army or a fleet: strength, skill, 
 and courage. These qualities are natural in a man originally, 
 but can be developed to a surprising degree. 
 
 The strength is of two kinds, defensive and offensive, and is 
 evidenced by ability to endure injury and to inflict injury. 
 In a man the size of his frame is a rough indication of his 
 strength ; and so in a fleet or an army is its size a rough indi- 
 cation. The indication is quite rough, however; for many a 
 large man is not strong either defensively or offensively, and 
 the same has always been true of an army or a fleet. The 
 physical strength of a man depends not only on his size, but 
 on the way in which his various elements are put together, 
 on the strength of his individual muscles, and on the effective- 
 ness with which they are combined. If a pugilist should have 
 weak legs or a weak heart, even if he had exceedingly strong 
 arms, he would not be a strong pugilist. Similarly, if an 
 army or a fleet that is large is composed of men and weapons 
 that are weak, or if it has weak parts, that army or fleet can- 
 not be strong. Roughly speaking, the strength of a man, or 
 of an army or a fleet, is the strength of its weakest part ; be- 
 cause in a serious flght the weak part is liable to be detected, 
 and so vigorously assaulted as to be broken down, and the 
 integrity of the entire structure thereby destroyed. 
 
 The skill of a pugilist is both natural and acquired ; and so 
 is that of a fleet or an army. If a man has a quick mind, in 
 the sense that he apprehends things quickly, every move of 
 his adversary is quickly apprehended ; w^hereas, if a man has a 
 sluggish mind, the adversary's moves may not be seen quickly 
 enough to permit of taking effective counter-measures. Simi- 
 larly, in a fleet or an army, if the reconnoitering parties are 
 not efficient the fleet or army may find itself attacked before 
 it has had time to take proper measures of defense. And even 
 if a man's faculties of apprehension are good, it may be that 
 the coordination between his mind and his muscles is slug- 
 gish; so that, even if he sees an adversary's threat quickly, his 
 muscles reply too slowly. This is more apt to be the case
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS 9 
 
 with heavy men than with light men, because the mass to be 
 moved is greater ; but, as a rule, a man who is quick to appre- 
 hend is quick to act. Similarly, in a fleet or army, the gather- 
 ing of information concerning the enemy may be effective, but 
 the means for getting the information to the main body and 
 of taking effective counter-measures may not be effective, 
 especially if the fleet or army be very large. As a general 
 rule, however, the same foresight that provides a good means 
 of information provides also a good means for taking action 
 in accordance with it. 
 
 Skill is more susceptible of development in a pugilist than is 
 his physical strength; though, of course, strength is suscep- 
 tible of great development also. The skill is developed by 
 training; and it is an important fact that this training is 
 gained mainly by actual contests with an adversary. The 
 development of strength alone may be gained by mere physi- 
 cal exercises ; but the eye cannot be trained by such means to 
 see an enemy's moves quickly, nor can the arm be trained to 
 make the parry or give the counter-blow. Similarly, in fleets 
 and armies, mere strength (that is, the power to withstand 
 blows and to deliver blows) can be developed in the laboratory 
 and machine-shop, and in target practice and tactical drills; 
 but it is only in contests more or less realistic that real train- 
 ing can be secured in apprehending the intentions of the 
 enemy and in replying effectively. 
 
 It is not only for taking counter-measures, however, that skill 
 is needed : it is needed even more for initiating offensive meas- 
 ures. The whole aim of the pugilist, or of the fleet or the 
 army, is to inflict a crushing blow. In order to do this, the 
 first requisite is to discern the opportunity ; and the second is 
 to act instantly with all the force possessed. The opportunity 
 must be apprehended instantly; but there is little use in ap- 
 prehending it, unless the appropriate action follows. A sim- 
 ple illustration is the sharpshooter with his musket. He 
 eagerly watches his sights as they sway up and down and to 
 the right and left across the target ; and his skill consists, not
 
 10 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 in keeping his sio-hls invariably on the tar^ret, for no man 
 can do that, but in seeing instantly when they are on and 
 instantly pulling the trigger. Many a marksman has failed 
 to hit the target because he Wius too slow in pulling the trigger. 
 
 Closely associated with skill is courage; because without 
 courage the nervous, mental, and moral systems of a man are 
 not at the correct degree of tension. Courage does not mean 
 merely absence of fear; for absence of fear may be due to 
 absence of a complete understanding of the situation, owing to 
 sluggishness of mind. Courage is that intense and yet con- 
 trolled will to win which seeks the objective so intently that 
 all the powers of the body and mind are devoted to attaining 
 it, in spite of danger, discomfort, and fatigue. Without 
 courage, no pugilist could ever fight effectively, and neither 
 could an army or a fleet. That it is a useful quality when 
 devoted to the purposes of pugilism may be doubted ; but the 
 natural fighting of a man is seldom for the sake of mere pugil- 
 ism, but for some purpose that may be very fine, such as the 
 defense of his wife and children. I have used the example of 
 pugilism merely because it affords the best illustration of the 
 development of the power of fighting in a man. 
 
 But, whether we consider that the use of courage in mere 
 fighting is laudable or not, we must admit that, for the pur- 
 poses of fighting it is the highest personal quality, because 
 without it strength vanishes and skill fails. Many a fight, 
 especially against untrained men, has been won, not because 
 the loser was dead or exhausted physically, but because his 
 courage or morale had been reduced to such a point that he 
 would not or could not fight any longer. He has said to him- 
 self, in effect : ' ' I am already beaten ; what is the use of 
 fighting any longer? The longer I fight the worse condition 
 I shall be in. ' ' For this reason, in the training of all fighters, 
 both individual fighters and army and navy men, much of the 
 training is devoted to developing the courage ; and much of the 
 art of the trainer in the one ease, and of the high commanders 
 in the other case, is devoted to encotiraging the men.
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS 11 
 
 In fighting with unaided fists and arms, it has seldom been 
 possible, in the case of a fight that was carried on to attain 
 some object, or to prevent an antagonist from attaining an 
 object, to get a decisive result with arms and fists only. As 
 long as this means only was employed, the antagonist retained 
 his freedom of movement, and could always retreat, or move 
 to the right or left, in such a way as to lessen the force of a 
 blow or to evade it altogether. For this reason, one man or 
 the other has endeavored to grapple his opponent and reduce 
 his freedom of movement, so that blows could be neither soft- 
 ened nor evaded. At some stage of the fight, one man has 
 usually grappled his opponent and endeavored to throw him to 
 the ground and make him helpless to deliver further blows 
 or to evade blows. An antagonist lying helpless on the 
 ground, the victor has been able to administer blows of the 
 utmost violence, until his victim was subdued ; and in some 
 cases to throttle him and kill him by choking him. We see 
 the counterpart of this in many operations of fleets and armies, 
 in which one side has been enabled to envelop or surround the 
 other, or to force it into a position where its freedom of move- 
 ment was so restricted that it became practically helpless. 
 
 In some cases, in a fight between two men, one seeks safety 
 in flight, and the other pursues him. If the fugitive is fleeter 
 than his pursuer he may escape ; but if he is not so fleet he is 
 doomed to destruction, because he will surely be attacked from 
 behind, from a direction in which he cannot reply, and thus 
 forced to receive blows without the power of inflicting appre- 
 ciable damage in return. Similarly, in fights between armies 
 or fleets, one party usually retreats. If it is able to retreat 
 with a speed greater than that at which the enemy can ad- 
 vance, it will get away in safety ; but if it is not able to retreat 
 at such a speed, it is doomed to disaster, because the pursuing 
 enemy can inflict great damage upon it with little danger to 
 itself. 
 
 Another reason for the danger in retreating, which applies 
 both to individual men and to fleets and armies, is that the
 
 12 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 courage, or morale, which is so essential to effective fighting, 
 is reduced enormously by the mere fact of retreating, and by a 
 realization of the comparative helplessness engendered. For 
 this reason, retreat must not be undertaken except for impera- 
 tive reasons; and yet, if it is undertaken, it must be under- 
 taken so promptly after the desirability of retreating is recog- 
 nized that it can be carried out in an orderly and deliberate 
 fashion. 
 
 Weapons. — As far back as history goes, we know that men 
 supplemented their fists and arms with sticks and clubs ; and 
 it is inconceivable that, almost from the first, men should not 
 have made crude clubs from branches wrenched from trees. 
 The usefulness of the club was simply that it enabled a man 
 to reach his antagonist from a greater distance than his arm 
 could stretch, and also to administer a heavier blow. The 
 reason that he could administer a heavier blow was twofold: 
 first, the club was harder than his fist; and, second, it could 
 be given a much greater velocity than could be given to his 
 fist, by swinging it through a considerable arc. 
 
 Another means for supplementing the arm and the fist was 
 the stone. The stone was either held in the hand and utilized 
 to give a blow, the effectiveness of which was due to the hard- 
 ness and sharpness of the stone, or it was used as a projectile. 
 In the latter case, its effectiveness was due to four things : its 
 hardness, its sharpness, the velocity that could be imparted to 
 it, and the distance over which it could be thrown. 
 
 The development of the club and the stone has gone on for 
 many centuries since men first used them ; and, as civilization 
 has advanced, these crude appliances have been developed into 
 weapons much more powerful. But every weapon that the 
 most scientific fleet or army uses now owes its effectiveness 
 to the same four qualities that made the club and the stone 
 effective : its hardness, its sharpness, the velocity that can be 
 given to it, and the distance over which it can be used.^ It 
 will be noted, however, that the more highly these qualities 
 
 1 Possible exceptions are poison gas and submarine torpedoes.
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS 13 
 
 have been developed, the greater the difficulties and complexi- 
 ties that have arisen in the endeavor to make use of them. 
 The complexity has become so great that to study them and 
 applj^ them in practice two separate professions have been 
 required — ^the military profession and the naval profession. 
 
 The fighting of primeval man, done with his fists and arms, 
 and supplemented with sticks and stones, was followed by the 
 use of implements less crude than sticks and stones, fashioned 
 into definite shapes and used for definite purposes. These im- 
 plements were first of stone, later of copper, and later still of 
 other metals. In what is now called the paleolithic age (old 
 stone age) some implements were made, however, from bones 
 and horns and tusks. All were distinguished by the feature 
 of a sharp point or a sharp edge, evidently for the purpose of 
 effecting penetration, and were devoted to the main object of 
 all men ; that is, they were devoted mainly to procuring food 
 and guarding what had been procured. We see here that, if 
 used to guard or attack, an implement became a weapon — 
 that a weapon is merely a tool for a warlike purpose. 
 
 In the old stone age the implements were rough and evi- 
 dently made by hammering or chipping with a hard sub- 
 stance ; but in the neolithic or new stone age, the implements 
 were ground or polished, an evidence of an increase in men- 
 tality that we cannot measure correctly now. The smooth 
 instruments were, of course, capable of greater penetration 
 than were the rough instruments of the preceding age; and 
 they were, therefore, more efficient for the purposes of both 
 war and peace. In fact, in those days the interv^als between 
 war and peace were so brief that no very great distinction 
 could have been made between them. This does not mean that 
 there was more war in those times than now, but merely that 
 conditions were such that war and peace succeeded each other 
 more rapidly. It did not require ten years of strenuous 
 preparation then to prepare for a war, or even one year to 
 wage it. 
 
 It is noteworthy that the effect of a blow from a fist or a
 
 14 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 club was to bruise or crush the external surface of the body, 
 or to upset. the equilibrium, or to give such a shock to the 
 internal mechanism as to make it less capable of hostile action ; 
 while the effect of a blow from a sharp instrument was to 
 penetrate the protective covering of the skin. We shall see 
 later that the effects produced on fleets and armies by the most 
 modem weapons are essentially the same. 
 
 Weapons and Civilization. — As one of the important ac- 
 companiments of the advance of early civilization was an im- 
 provement in the effectiveness of weapons, it would be inter- 
 esting to determine how much the improvement in weapons 
 was a cause of the advance, and how much it was an effect. 
 It is impossible to determine this absolutely ; but, inasmuch as 
 the struggle to attain civilization has always been extremely 
 bitter, and necessitated bloody fights against barbarians and 
 also against wild beasts, the probability seems to be that the 
 development of improved weapons was a cause of the advance 
 of civilization to a greater degree than it was an effect of it, 
 and that civilization could not have been achieved without it.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 
 
 THE fact that weapons were gradually improved indi- 
 cates that a considerable degree of cooperation de- 
 veloped among men, for the reason that several dif- 
 ferent kinds of skill were needed to improve the weapons ; and 
 if several different kinds of skill were devoted to that one 
 purpose, several men must have worked in cooperation. The 
 cooperation must have been caused by a community of interest 
 among bands of men ; and as the most urgent need then was 
 to secure self-protection, it can hardly be doubted that this 
 community of interest was in securing it. In order that a 
 band of men should secure self-protection, the first necessary 
 step was to form an organization. 
 
 The earliest organization was, of course, the family, at 
 the head of which was the man, who was charged by nature 
 with providing food and shelter for his wife and children, and 
 with protecting the food and shelter afterward from the at- 
 tacks of beasts and men. It seems probable that the first 
 fights originated in the necessity for providing the food and 
 shelter, and guarding them after they had been provided. A 
 man 's only ways of getting food were to kill animals, to climb 
 trees for fruits and nuts, to till the ground, and to fish in the 
 waters — or to steal from other people. That stealing was 
 sometimes resorted to, the records of history show ; and so do 
 the doings of savages now. In fact, the doings of people in 
 the most highly civilized Christian nations now indicate a 
 similar tendency, if at any time, or in any place, the law can 
 be evaded or defied. 
 
 This point is more important than it might at first sight 
 
 15
 
 16 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 seem to be ; because the only way in which we can study the 
 tendencies of man per se, and therefore of tribes and nations, 
 is to study man free from the influences of civilization and the 
 restraints of law. Men have gradually come to realize that 
 it is better for men to be governed by certain laws : even the 
 most sinful man realizes that it is best for him that other men 
 should be good ; even a thief wants other men to be honest ; 
 and even a conscienceless debtor wants other men to pay him 
 what they owe him. Municipal laws have resulted that re- 
 strain individuals by force; but there have never been inter- 
 national laws that could restrain nations and tribes by force. 
 
 If the earliest cause of fighting was to obtain and retain the 
 means wherewith to support the women and children, it prob- 
 ably has been the fundamental cause ever since, even though 
 this fundamental cause has been overgrown with others more 
 apparent. Certain it is that the man has always done the 
 fighting ; certain it is that he has never needed much food and 
 shelter for himself; certain it is that he has always been 
 charged with getting the food and shelter for the women and 
 children; certain it is that this charge has demanded all the 
 industry and labor and ability that men could be induced and 
 forced to employ. The wants of women and children have 
 increased from age to age, and the labors of men have in- 
 creased proportionately. 
 
 This does not mean that the wants of the men have not in- 
 creased as well ; but it does mean that they have not increased 
 in so great a ratio as have those of the women and children. 
 It also means that the wants of the men, if carefully ana- 
 lyzed, will be found to be so closely bound up with those of 
 the women and children dependent on them that we cannot 
 truthfully declare that what a man wants is wanted for him- 
 self alone. The wants of most men, in so far as the men alone 
 are concerned, a-re exceedingly simple and easily provided for. 
 
 Every man being charged with the feeding and protection 
 of his family, it is easy to see how two m-en agreed together
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 17 
 
 to cooperate in providing food and protection, how three men 
 so agreed, and how tribes came to be formed. These tribes 
 must first have been made up of families related to each other, 
 and therefore bound together by the powerful tie of hereditary- 
 hates and fears of hereditary foes. Even at the present day 
 and in highly civilized countries, one hears at times of an 
 hereditary^ family feud. A tribe having been formed for the 
 advancement of the common interests, both in providing food 
 and shelter and in guarding the food and shelter after they 
 had been provided, it is easy to see that the methods by which 
 the men of the tribe could act together the most effectively, 
 both in attack and defense, should be eagerly discussed and 
 tried. It is easy to see, also, how the desirability of securing 
 some valuable fishing waters possessed by another tribe, or 
 some desirable site for a village in a fertile valley, or some 
 fine cattle, or some other possession, should lead to a determi- 
 nation to take them by force. In even a very primitive civ- 
 ilization, however, such as existed many centuries ago, and 
 such as exists over a large surface of the earth to-day, an at- 
 tack would not be made until certain plans of organization and 
 operation had been settled, under some one man as leader. In 
 other words, a campaign would first be laid out and strategic 
 plans be made. 
 
 Similarly, as every tribe would realize that whatever pos- 
 sessions it had were always subject to attack by a neighboring 
 tribe, it would make strategic plans as to what it would do 
 in case it were attacked. Some tribes have done this far- 
 sightedly, and some short-sightedly ; and, for this reason, some 
 tribes have prospered and retained their independence, while 
 other tribes have not. Such differences in condition prevail 
 in uncivilized countries now : in every savage land we see some 
 dominant tribe, like the Tagalos in the Philippines, who have 
 been more far-sighted and energetic than their neighbors. 
 We see the same thing in the most civilized parts of the world 
 as well, at the highest pitch of civilization that the world has
 
 18 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 reached: we see a few dominant nations that owe their domi- 
 nance to exactly the same personal attributes as those which, 
 in a lesser degree, characterize the Tagalos. 
 
 Now, imagine j^ourself the chief of a tribe that has decided 
 to seize that village which lies so snugly at the foot of that 
 mountain, at the bend of that river ten miles away, and to 
 steal the cattle that look so fat and numerous. What would 
 you decide to do? You would decide to attack the village at 
 the point where it could be attacked with the greatest proba- 
 bility of success, at the point where it would be the most diffi- 
 cult to defend : that is, at its weakest point. You would also 
 decide to attack it at a time when the men of the tribe would 
 be the least able to defend it — if possible, when they were 
 absent, or when they were asleep. That is, you would en- 
 deavor to attack the weakest point at the most favorable mo- 
 ment. So does the strategist of the greatest army or the great- 
 est fleet, when planning an attack at the present day. 
 
 In order to ascertain the weakest point and the most favor- 
 able moment, you would send out spies who would keep you 
 informed, as far as possible, of the movements of your victims, 
 and you would not launch the attack until you felt assured 
 on all the vital points. Meanwhile, you would drill your men 
 secretly, taking precautions to prevent the enemy from get- 
 ting knowledge of your intentions and your preparations ; and 
 when you were completely ready, you would advance to the 
 attack, keeping your men concealed as long as possible, and 
 maintaining spies and scouts, who would keep you continually 
 informed of the doings and positions of the other tribe, and 
 prevent them from getting information, through spies and 
 scouts of their own, as to your doings and position. At the 
 instant decided on, you would project an attack of the utmost 
 violence of which your men were capable against the spot 
 decided on. 
 
 If your plans had been made in the light of accurate in- 
 formation, and if they were cai*ried out to the moment of 
 attack without the knowledge of the enemy, the attack would
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 19 
 
 probably be successful. In this case, the enemy would sud- 
 denly be thrown into the utmost confusion, panic would result, 
 and then a disorderly retreat. As you had planned the attack 
 for the purpose of securing certain material possessions, you 
 would take advantage of the helpless condition of your victims 
 to do the utmost injury possible to the men of the tribe, and 
 thereby prevent their re-securing their possessions. 
 
 Such has been the history of countless expeditions through- 
 out the countless ages of the past. Sometimes an expedition 
 has been undertaken on a small scale by a small tribe ; some- 
 times on a grand scale by a grand nation ; but usually on some 
 intermediate scale by a tribe or nation neither very small nor 
 very grand. In all cases, the method has been fundamentally 
 the same. 
 
 Now, look at the other side of the picture, and imagine that 
 you are the chief of a tribe possessing fine cattle and occupy- 
 ing a village in a fertile plain near water full of fish, and that 
 you suddenly receive information that a neighboring tribe is 
 making preparations to attack you, that the men of the tribe 
 are dancing. What will you do? 
 
 If you are a chief of the kind that has always been the most 
 common, you will fail to look the situation in the face: you 
 will persuade yourself that what was told you is not true, or 
 that the other tribe is not very strong, or that you are well 
 prepared to receive their attack, or that there is no use in 
 worrying. You will consequently take such dilatory meas- 
 ures that the enemy will strike a sudden blow at your weakest 
 spot, break it in, put your whole tribe to rout, and destroy the 
 fruits of their ind.ustr3% accumulated by the work of many 
 years. 
 
 But, if you are a chief worthy to occupy your responsible 
 and honorable post, you will bestir yourself at once to take 
 measures to defend the members of your tribe, their families 
 and possessions. You will first endeavor to estimate the situ- 
 ation as a whole, and to divine the probable form the attack 
 will take and the place at which the blow will fall. You will
 
 20 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 call into consultation those leading men of the tribe whose 
 advice is most worth having, and make up your mind as to 
 what form your defense had best assume. You will, of course, 
 look at once into the organization of the tribe, and their war- 
 like equipments, and begin a series of drills of the most 
 strenuous kind. In doing all this, you will take means to pre- 
 vent the hostile tribe from getting any information as to what 
 you are doing, and have a careful inspection made to discover 
 whether there are any spies within your own village or lurk- 
 ing in its vicinity. 
 
 Having come to a decision as to the probable intentions of 
 the enemy, your measures naturally will be such as will op- 
 pose them. Having come to an opinion that a certain part of 
 your village or its defenses is the weakest, you will take meas- 
 ures to protect that part. Having come to an opinion that 
 the enemy will probably launch his attack upon you from a 
 certain direction, you will take measures of protection against 
 an attack from that direction. You will probably find evi- 
 dences of spies ; and you will naturally direct your effort 
 against these spies, employing spies of your own, of course. 
 You will station some of these spies within your own bound- 
 aries, and direct them to meet any efforts of hostile spies 
 within those boundaries ; but you will also send out other spies 
 through the territory between your tribe and the hostile tribe, 
 and if practicable send some to carry on spy operations within 
 their boundaries. 
 
 These efforts will be of the kind that we call strategical, but 
 they will include measures for the actual handling of the men 
 of the tribe in the impending battle ; that is, they will include 
 the ' ' tactical ' ' handling of those men. One of the first things 
 you will realize will be that you must turn the front of your 
 force toward the probable direction of the attack: that is, if 
 you conclude that the attack will probably come from north- 
 east, and you have a thousand men, you will prepare to ar- 
 range those thousand men on a line extending from northwest 
 to southeast, so that the mea will face northeast. One reason
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 21 
 
 for this would be that every man can fight best in the direction 
 in which he faces, that he is weaker on the sides for both 
 offense and defense, and that he is weakest in the rear. An- 
 other reason would be that a similar statement applies to a 
 number of men more than it does to one man, because one 
 man can change the direction in which he faces very quickly, 
 whereas a line of men must change the direction in which it 
 faces comparatively slowly, and to a degree that varies with 
 the length of the line. While a man, however, is weakest 
 from behind, a line of men is weakest on its side or flank. 
 This is because a line of men can be faced to the rear by mak- 
 ing each man face to the rear; whereas it can be faced to the 
 right or to the left only by the long and comparatively difficult 
 process of wheeling the whole line on a pivot. 
 
 Your first dispositions will naturally be purely defensive, 
 and devoted to the purpose of preventing the success of the 
 attack. Realizing, however, that a defeat is possible, you 
 will take measures to lessen the dangers which retreat always 
 entails, by deciding on the line of retreat you will adopt, and 
 on what measures you will take to protect that line after re- 
 treat shall have been begun. You will also arrange that cer- 
 tain persons, such as women and children, and certain articles 
 of value, such as cattle, shall be ready to start on the retreat 
 in good season, so as to be out of the way of the fighting men, 
 and in order not only to assure their safety, but also to sim- 
 plify the operation after retreat shall have begun. You will 
 also arrange that a rear guard shall follow the non-combatants 
 and the main body in the retreat, in order to keep off the 
 assaults of the enemy; and you will also provide guards for 
 each side or flank, in order to prevent the enemy from pur- 
 suits on lines parallel to your retreat, from which lines they 
 could attack your retreating forces from either side. That is, 
 you will do exactly what every competent general of every 
 army, large or small, has done, when threatened with an at- 
 tack from an enemy that he knew to be dangerous. 
 
 If you receive your information in time, and make your dis-
 
 22 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 positions with due energy and foresight, and are successful in 
 keeping the fact of your preparations a secret from the enemy, 
 the chances will be that when he finally makes his attack, it 
 will be unsuccessful — for the reason that he will make his 
 attack with an inaccurate estimate of the situation and on the 
 assumption that you are unprepared. 
 
 This discussion assumes that the two tribes are fairly equal 
 in power. Of course, if your tribe is greatly inferior in num- 
 bers, or in the position it holds, or in the skill and courage of 
 the warriors, or if, while the tribes are equal in these factors, 
 the enemy has better weapons, you cannot prevail in any 
 case. Your only chance for safety will lie in undertaking a 
 retreat in due time, or else in giving such concessions to the 
 enemy that you will stay his hand. Instances of situations 
 like these are frequent in history. 
 
 In case the tribes are fairly equal in power, the issue cannot 
 be predicted in advance, but will have to be decided as such 
 issues always have been decided — by actual fighting. When 
 the time arrives, certain fast scouts of the enemy, armed with 
 light weapons, will probably precede his main body, in order 
 to ascertain the locality where your warriors are, and what 
 they are doing; and in between these scouts and the main 
 body will be other men, who will run back to the main body 
 with whatever news the scouts may get, and take orders back 
 to the scouts. The scouts will not need their weapons for 
 scouting; in fact, the weight of those weapons would be a 
 hindrance to their speed of movement, and therefore to their 
 effectiveness as scouts ; but the weapons will be needed in case 
 the scouts meet some of your scouts, because without them 
 your scouts might prevent their advance and even drive them 
 back. 
 
 The scouts of the enemy will probably be thrown out, not 
 only directly in front of his advance, but also laterally, and 
 in a fan-shaped screen ; because he will know that you might 
 otherwise appear suddenly on his flank and attack him from 
 a direction in which he would be almost helpless. Probably
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 23 
 
 the scouts of both sides will come into contact with each other, 
 and a fight between the scouts result, in which case the side 
 whose scouts are the strongest will be able to drive back the 
 others and secure a distinct advantage. The main bodies con- 
 tinuing, however, will eventually come together, and a battle 
 will ensue. 
 
 The result of this battle cannot be predicted in advance by 
 either side, for the reason that neither side will have full 
 knowledge of all the factors in the case. The result, however, 
 could be predicted by any one who knew all the various 
 values of all the various factors, and knew how to sum them 
 up. In other words, the issue of the battle will really have 
 been decided before the battle begins, although what the de- 
 cision will be no mortal can foretell. 
 
 This declaration may seem vague and academic, but really 
 it is definite and practical. As illustrating it, suppose two 
 horses that seem to be evenly matched were to race ; but sup- 
 pose also that one of the horses had had administered to him 
 before the race a depressing medicine, which would render 
 him incapable of doing his best. This has often been done, 
 and the fact of it having been done has decided the result of 
 the race beforehand; although no one knew what the result 
 would be except those people who had administered the medi- 
 cine. 
 
 Similarly, in the supposititious fight between your tribe and 
 another, the main factors that will decide the fight are the 
 strength, skill, and courage of the opposing sides. Neither 
 side can evaluate these factors; but nevertheless each of the 
 factors has an actual and definite value, though no one knows 
 what it is; and their combination, which will decide victory 
 for one side or the other, has also an actual value, though that 
 actual value is never ascertained, and though even the rela- 
 tive values of the strength, skill, and courage of the two sides 
 are not known until the issue of the fight declares them in 
 trumpet tones. 
 
 Our usual idea of a battle or a fight is that one side ad-
 
 2i THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 vances against the other until the two actually collide, and 
 that then they begin to fight. Such an attack on the front 
 is called a frontal attack ; and if one side or the other believes 
 that it has such an overwhelming advantage in strength that 
 it can overpower the other, this is the quickest way in which 
 to gain a decision. But frontal attacks are not usually at- 
 tempted, unless one side has supreme confidence in its 
 strength ; because, unless that confidence is found to be justi- 
 fied, an enormous loss of men is apt to occur without achiev- 
 ing a decision. The attacker usually tries to get some advan- 
 tage, either by striking on the side or by getting around the 
 side and striking in the rear, or by concentrating on a given 
 point of the enemy's line and trying to break through it. 
 
 One side or the other usually takes the offensive; that is, 
 one side makes the attack, while the other assumes the de- 
 fensive and awaits the attack. In the case that we are con- 
 sidering, your enemy will probably make the attack, because 
 it is the role that he must play in order to attain his ends, 
 and to defeat which you have prepared your plans. How 
 far you will maintain the defensive is a matter that you must 
 decide. The offensive and the defensive have each their pe- 
 culiar advantages. The defensive has the advantages that the 
 men, being comparatively stationary, can use their weapons 
 with the greater accuracy, and can be the more protected by 
 obstructions or defenses, natural or artificial; that is, the de- 
 fenders can usually kill more of their opponents during an 
 attack than the attackers can, who must of necessity expose 
 themselves the more, and be unable to use their weapons with 
 as great exactness. 
 
 On the other hand, the offensive has the tremendous advan- 
 tages that it knows what it is going to do, that it has decided 
 where it is going to strike, and that the mere act of initiating 
 the movement gives a feeling of confidence and courage. The 
 defender, on the other hand, not knowing where the enemy 
 is going to strike, or when, must await the actions of the enemy, 
 remain in a state of continual doubt, and be unable to decide
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 25 
 
 what to do until the last moment. Such conditions are un- 
 favorable to the maintenance of a high morale. 
 
 In case the enemy has been kept in ignorance in regard to 
 the adequacy of your preparations, you will probably defeat 
 him; and, as in this case he will probably not have made ade- 
 quate preparations for retreat, any victory over him that you 
 may achieve you will probably be able to turn into a tri- 
 umphant pursuit. In such a pursuit you will be able to inflict 
 upon him a disastrous series of injuries, first, by killing the 
 fighting men, and, second, by destroying certain of his pos- 
 sessions and capturing others. If, on the other hand, you are 
 defeated, you, by reason of your preparations, will probably 
 be able to retreat in good order ; so that, though you will suffer 
 a defeat, you will not suffer a disaster. Illustrations of all 
 these cases, both with small forces and with large ones, are 
 frequent throughout history. 
 
 During the battle waged between your tribe and the other, 
 you will realize that by merely defending yourself you will 
 onlj^ postpone disaster; because you know that it is only by 
 diminishing the power of the enemy to injure you that you 
 will secure safety from further injury. Therefore, whenever 
 opportunity presents itself, you will strike back at him, even 
 while your ultimate object is merely defensive. In other 
 words, you will carry out what is now called an offensive 
 defensive. No other defensive has ever had any success. An 
 exception to this statement must be made in cases where pe- 
 culiar conditions have existed, such as inability of the enemy 
 to procure supplies. 
 
 But it may be that, after you receive the news of the im- 
 pending attack, your studies of the situation will lead you to 
 realize that the best thing for you to do is to make a vigorous 
 attack on the enemy, that is, to "launch an offensive," while 
 he is making his preparations to attack you. This has often 
 proved to be not only the wisest course, but the only safe 
 course. We see its analogue continually in the records of 
 murder trials, in which the person accused of murder declares
 
 26 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 that the man actually killed was about to attack him, and that 
 he realized the necessity of forestalling him. So clearly is this 
 situation recognized that the expressive slang phrase has come 
 into use, "getting the drop" on a man. One man has ''the 
 drop" on another when he can bring his weapon to bear the 
 more quickl3\ 
 
 So you have to decide whether or not the other tribe has 
 the drop on you. If you conclude that the other tribe has the 
 drop on you, your only good plan is to adopt defensive meas- 
 ures, such as have already been outlined ; but if you conclude 
 that he does not have the drop on you, and that you may be 
 able to get the drop on him, your best plan is to assume the 
 offensive. To do this you must do exactly what a man in 
 daily life must do continually, in carrying out his undertak- 
 ings; that is, you must make your preparations with the ut- 
 most celerity and secrecy, and launch your undertaking before 
 your rival can prevent it. If the other tribe is confident of 
 its superiority, and if you can keep it in a state of ignorance 
 as to the actual fact of your preparations, and if your tribe 
 is equal to the other in strength and skill and courage, you 
 will probably be able to attack him suddenly at his weakest 
 point, before he expects it or before he is able to defend him- 
 self. If you can do this, you will throw him into a state of 
 confusion, the degree of which will be proportional to the 
 shortness of time that intervenes between the instant when he 
 finally becomes aware of your intentions and the actual instant 
 of attack. If you should be able to attack him before he has 
 received any information as to your intentions, you will prob- 
 ably score a victory. 
 
 One of the greatest factors contributing to success is sur- 
 prise ; and this is due in a great measure to the mental effect 
 produced on the individuals of the enemy; not only those in 
 high command, but those even in the lowest ranks. The sud- 
 den transition from a state of confident tranquillity to a 
 realization of suffering a dangerous attack tends to confusion, 
 panic, and ;retreat.
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 27 
 
 In ease you receive information in due time of the prepara- 
 tions of the enemy, but decide not to assume the offensive, 
 you will undoubtedly take measures to protect your village, 
 or home base, by fortifications of some kind, such as the trunks 
 of trees and other obstructions; but you will not plan that 
 your fighting men shall remain behind those obstructions, un- 
 less you are relatively extremely weak. You will realise that 
 such an arrangement, while it might delay the advance of the 
 enemy, will not end in his defeat ; because you know that the 
 only way in which to beat him is to inflict upon him positive 
 injuries of some kind. You will not even draw up your men 
 close outside of those obstructions; because you will realize 
 that such an arrangement would enable the enemy to come 
 close up to your home without having suft'ered any losses, and 
 to inflict upon 3'ou a sudden blow from any quarter that he 
 may select. You will also realize that such an arrangement 
 would leave him free to work whatever havoc he wished 
 against your fields and outlying possessions, without any cost 
 whatever to himself. For these reasons, you will advance 
 considerably toward his probable direction of approach, and 
 endeavor to get into touch with him, as soon as practicable, by 
 means of scouts sent out in advance. 
 
 Since your enemy will adopt similar tactics, there will soon 
 be two forces operating in each other's presence, under condi- 
 tions similar in essentials to those under which the greatest 
 armies have operated in all the centuries of history. 
 
 You realize from your hereditary instincts that the severity 
 of any blow that you can inflict will be proportional to the 
 force with which you deliver it; and that this force will be 
 somewhat like the force with which a fist or a club strikes its 
 object. You know that the severity of a blow varies with the 
 size of the fist or the club, or with the number of the warriors, 
 and the velocity which the fist or the club or the warriors 
 strike. 
 
 For these reasons, you will realize that, when the time comes 
 for delivering the final blow, it would be best for you to hurl
 
 28 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 your main body (which should be as many men as you can 
 muster) against some predetermined point of the enemy's line, 
 and that this main body should be given as much speed as 
 practicable. In other words, you will realize that your final 
 blow must take the form of a charge, in which your main body 
 will advance with the utmost speed practicable against a pre- 
 determined point of the enemy's line. 
 
 You will also realize, however, that (just as in a fight with 
 fists or clubs) not only must the blow be powerful, and not 
 only must it be swiftly delivered in order to attain the greatest 
 power, but it must be promptly delivered, in order not to give 
 the enemy time to parry or evade the blow. In other words, 
 you will realize that the two essential elements in the actual 
 operations of forces are weight and speed. You will also 
 realize that both the power of the blow and the speed with 
 which it is delivered are dependent on the force of the will- 
 power and courage behind the blow. 
 
 The value of speed is somewhat more obvious in the oper- 
 ations preliminary to an actual battle — that is, before the 
 actual delivery of the blow — than in the absolute battle itself ; 
 because in the preliminaiy operations speed is the most im- 
 portant single factor. When one is making a feint at an 
 enemy's communications, or threatening his flank, or when he 
 is replying to a threat or a feint, one is much in the position 
 of a boxer who is making feints, or who is repljdng to feints 
 or threats of his antagonist. In such operations, while it is 
 necessary that the boxer should have enough strength to parry, 
 he does not need strength so much as he needs quickness. 
 This quickness is indicated to the observer by the quickness of 
 the muscular movements of the boxer; but, long before the 
 arm or the body of the boxer moves in making a parry, his eye 
 must see the preliminary movements of his antagonist, and 
 telegraph the fact to the brain ; then the brain must send out 
 orders to the muscles, and then the muscles must obey. 
 
 Similarly, in the movement of two opposing forces, either of
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 29 
 
 little tribes or of enormous armies, the operations of each 
 actual battle must be preceded by many operations of ma- 
 ncBuver, for which great speed is necessary, not only in the 
 movements of the bodies that execute the manoeuvers, but 
 previously in the apprehending of the movements of the 
 enemy, and in taking proper measures to frustrate them. His 
 movements may be offensive or defensive; but, in either case, 
 you must realize the necessity of apprehending them as quickly 
 as possible, and adopt swift measures of frustration. 
 
 We see this similarity of action on two opposing sides 
 throughout all the operations of war. Generally speaking, 
 each side is endeavoring to do the same thing as the other, 
 modified only by practical conditions; because each side real- 
 izes that it is only by making attacks of some kind that suc- 
 cess can be secured, and that the only advantage of the de- 
 fensive is the negative one of preventing the enemy from 
 making some success. Some writers seem to have carried this 
 idea, however, to an undue extreme, and to have adopted the 
 notion that one's tactics should be wholly offensive. One has 
 simply to imagine what would happen to a boxer if he did not 
 attempt to parry or evade the blows of his antagonist, to see 
 how untenable this theory is. It may be pointed out, also, 
 that in all combats, large and small, most of the time is occu- 
 pied in what may be called defensive measures, which are car- 
 ried on with the double object of preventing a decisive blow 
 by one's antagonist, and of making the way clear for a de- 
 cisive blow by one's self. 
 
 In making your plans of operation, you will doubtless take 
 into account all the various parts of your little army, and 
 realize that it would operate at a great disadvantage if its 
 various parts, even when they were acting separately, were not 
 linked together by a system of communications analogous to 
 the nervous system of the human body. You will realize the 
 necessity of a system whereby you will be able to send out 
 orders to any part, and receive information from it, and not
 
 30 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 only direct each part as to what that particular part is to do 
 individually, but also to direct all the parts so that they can 
 be made to act together toward a common object ; and so that 
 any part can render assistance to another part that may be 
 placed in a dangerous position. You will instinctively realize, 
 though you may not formulate the idea in words, that all your 
 fighting force should be capable of being managed as a boxer 
 manages his own body, all of its parts directable by a supreme 
 intelligence, and mutually cooperating and assisting. 
 
 Reserves. — If the conditions of the situation are such as to 
 make it difficult for you to apprehend exactly where the enemy 
 will strike, you may keep a considerable force in reserve, a 
 short distance to the rear, so placed that when your advance 
 guard, or even the main body, receives an attack at any point, 
 this reserve can be rushed to that point if necessary. De- 
 pending on the circumstances of the case, the reserve will bear 
 a large or a small proportion to your total force. Whether it 
 be large or small, however, it will have to have a great fighting 
 value; because on it may depend the issue of the battle. 
 
 Of course, this does not mean that the reserve should be 
 used for defensive purposes only, and in case that a part of 
 your line is attacked; because it is obvious that, even in ad- 
 vancing to the attack, you might find your line too weak at 
 one point with reference to the enemy to take advantage of 
 an opportunity, in which case you would send j^our reserves 
 to that point. Whether one attacks or is being attacked, re- 
 inforcements are occasionally needed at one point or another, 
 to strengthen that point; in either case, more force is needed 
 at a certain point than is immediately available, and reinforce- 
 ments are therefore called for. 
 
 In the operations of the boxer, the capacity of the human 
 body for sending reinforcements from one point to another is 
 clearly evident. If strength is needed in the left arm for a 
 parry, the left arm suddenly acquires a strength utterly lack- 
 ing there only a second before : if the quick parry of the left 
 arm throws off the antagonist 's guard, the right arm suddenly
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 31 
 
 becomes endowed with tenfold strength, and automatically 
 launches a blow in which seems to be momentarily concen- 
 trated the entire strength of the body. 
 
 Discipline. — But, no matter how perfect your apprehension 
 of what ought to be done, and the means of communication 
 you possess between yourself and the parts of your little army, 
 you will be powerless to handle it effectively unless correct 
 reports are sent to you, and unless your orders are obeyed. 
 These two things are effected by what we call discipline, which 
 ties all the various parts together somewhat as trusses tie the 
 parts of an engineering structure, and transforms a number 
 of separate parts into a strong and coherent body. Some peo- 
 ple suppose that discipline is a harsh and cruel agency for 
 meting out punishment to offenders. That meting out pun- 
 ishment is one of the functions of discipline is true, but it is 
 not the only function. If this were the only function of disci- 
 pline, discipline would be ineffective for the purpose that it 
 actually serves — the purpose of rendering possible the han- 
 dling of a large number of units ; because, instead of drawing 
 tht)se units together, it would drive them apart. No man and 
 no body of men could be made to endure that kind of disci- 
 pline very long. What an organization requires primarily is 
 not this kind of discipline, but the opposite kind — the kind 
 that attracts men to each other and to the cause they fight for. 
 
 This kind of discipline endeavors to imbue all the men with 
 a feeling of comradeship, with devotion to the cause, with 
 loyalty to the organization that fights to gain the cause', and, 
 therefore, not only with obedience to those superior in author- 
 ity, but also with devotion, and with consequent unselfishness. 
 Without this kind of discipline, no effective work of any kind 
 can be done ; but with it the most amazing deeds are possible. 
 One of the best illustrations was given b}^ the ragged, un- 
 trained, and half-fed forces that the young Republic of France 
 hastily sent out to fight against the organized armies of Aus- 
 tria and Prussia in 1792. By sheer force of patriotic enthusi- 
 asm, those raw levies overcame the most forbidding obstacles
 
 32 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 of weather, bad roads, and even hunger and lack of ammuni- 
 tion, and actually became the victors in two battles. 
 
 The same statement may be truly made concerning the 
 French armies in all their wars in the Napoleonic times. 
 True, they had a sublime genius to inspire and guide them 
 and keep alive their courage ; but before Napoleon took any 
 part whatever in the struggle the French army had already 
 shown its amazing spirit. It is true also that Napoleon was 
 superbly powerful in appealing to that spirit ; but he could 
 not have been powerful if he himself had not been inspired 
 by the same spirit as had the armies under him, and if he had 
 not remained under its stimulating spell. 
 
 Looked at from this point of view, which history shows to 
 be the true one, discipline, courage, and morale are seen to be 
 much alike, and mutually to cooperate. In the difficult and 
 dangerous times of war, the morale and discipline cannot be 
 high unless the courage is high ; the discipline and courage 
 cannot be fine unless the morale is also ; and the morale and 
 courage must inevitably sink if the discipline be poor. But 
 when all three are good, as they were in the armies of Na- 
 poleon, an army will fight gloriously and effectively, even 
 though the conditions may not permit them to fight success- 
 fully. This is not only because of their direct effect in giving 
 impetus to the army, but because it permits the higher officers 
 to devote their time and efforts to the main object that they 
 have in view, without being perpetually hampered by having 
 to overcome the indifference and inertia of the people under 
 them. An example of a great commander who had to struggle 
 against these difficulties is that of George Washington in our 
 Revolutionary War. 
 
 But if you were the chief of a savage tribe, that is, of one 
 of the savage tribes of Europe from which the present great 
 nations of the world are descended, and from which we get 
 most of our ideas of strategy to-day, you would not have great 
 difficulty in maintaining discipline. In savage tribes of the 
 kind with whom questions of strategy are concerned, war has
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 33 
 
 ever been the main business of life, and the warlike qualities 
 have been those most cultivated. The two principal warlike 
 qualities are courage and loyalty. In savage nations of the 
 softer type, which are not represented in questions where 
 strategy is concerned, the qualities of courage and loyalty are 
 not so important, and are not, therefore, so assiduously culti- 
 vated. In a savage tribe also, even of the sterner kind, these 
 qualities are apt to diminish if the tribe advances in civiliza- 
 tion, because other qualities have to be cultivated ; and, while 
 it might be an extreme statement to say that the cultivation 
 of other qualities tends to the diminishment of courage and 
 loyalty, it can be truthfully declared that they tend so to over- 
 grow them that those qualities assert their existence in great 
 emergencies only. In civilized peoples, where the rights and 
 the privileges of the individual are matters of great concern, 
 individual selfishness and the promotion of individual ease and 
 comfort ait'ect unfavorably the development of courage and 
 loyalty; and, although it is true that in any one man who 
 originally possessed them they will assert themselves in crises, 
 nevertheless they are apt to assert themselves a little tardily, 
 and somtimes too late. 
 
 The softening effect of civilization on most nations is evi- 
 den.t all through history. "Whether this effect, while injurious 
 to the fighting qualities themselves, may not be beneficial to the 
 individual as a human being, made in the image of the Al- 
 mighty, it is not within the province of strategy to discuss. 
 It is within its province, however, to point out that it does 
 exist, and that it is very powerful; so powerful that it has 
 brought about the destruction of many a nation at the hands 
 of some other nation whose spirit had not been dulled by the 
 effeminizing influence of wealth and ease. 
 
 Doctrine. — You should have reason to expect not only that 
 your men would obey your instructions, but that, even should 
 they become separated from you, they would endeavor to obey 
 such instructions in the spirit in which you gave them; that 
 is, the men separated from you should be capable of a consid-
 
 34 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 erable latitude of action, and not dependent upon specific and 
 detailed orders. The trouble about detailed orders is, of 
 course, that when the time to obey them has arrived, the cir- 
 cumstances may be different from what it was expected they 
 would be, and the obeying of them might be most unfortunate. 
 To overcome this difficulty, discipline endeavors to bring about 
 a community of understanding, sometimes called "doctrine," 
 so that each person will know in a measure what he is to do 
 without being told specifically in each case. When a number 
 of men are thoroughly permeated with this doctrine, discipline 
 is at its highest point of effectiveness ; and it is possible for a 
 commander-in-chief to give the commanders of separate de- 
 tachments mere instructions as to what they are to do ; that is, 
 to assign them tasks and leave to them the execution of those 
 tasks. 
 
 Subordinate commanders, however, no matter how free you 
 may leave them as to their interpretation of orders, are never- 
 theless not free agents, except in the means they use to inter- 
 pret and execute them. It is exceedingly difficult sometimes 
 for a subordinate commander to know what to do, when con- 
 fronted with a situation which he knows to be different from 
 that expected by his chief. In such cases, the highest degree 
 of clearness of instructions is required on the part of the com- 
 mander, and the utmost of loyalty on the part of the subordi- 
 nates. The commander-in-chief must be able to impress upon 
 his subordinates a very clear idea of what his ultimate pur- 
 pose is, and of how much latitude the subordinate is allowed : 
 and the subordinate, on the other hand, must exert his mental 
 powers to the utmost to apprehend what his chief would wish 
 him to do under the actual circumstances — inclining toward 
 strict obedience, however, rather than to the opposite extreme. 
 
 If the discipline in your tribe is good, as it probably would 
 be, the result will be merely that your machine will be in good 
 working order. You vdll not be assisted by this factor in 
 making your plans of operation, nor will your personal bur- 
 den of responsibility be lightened. On the contrary, the bet-
 
 FIGHTING BETWEEN TRIBES 35 
 
 ter the discipline of your force, and the more loyally and 
 intelligently your orders are carried out, the more the re- 
 sponsibility for the planning of the campaign will be thrown 
 upon yourself. 
 
 Retreat. — If you have made your preparations so fully and 
 carried on your operations so successfully as to force your 
 enemy to retreat, and if he has shown a similar skill, j^ou will 
 force him back, but only gradually. In no military work can 
 skill be better shown than in conducting a retreat. It is some- 
 what more difficult to conduct a successful retreat than a suc- 
 cessful pursuit, largely on account of the effect of the act of 
 retreating on the morale of the men : and the difficulties will, 
 of course, be aggravated if the retreat is begun too tardily. 
 
 In na department of life is foresight so much needed as in 
 conducting military operations, for the reason that in no other 
 department of life is there an enemy waiting, with all his 
 nerves in tension, night and day, to take advantage of any 
 error that you may commit, or of any opportunity that you 
 may lose. If your enemy has been living off the country, his 
 retreat may be a comparatively simple matter; but if he has 
 to be followed by a train of supplies, it may become extremely 
 complicated, from the necessity under which he finds himself 
 of sending those supplies ahead of him, lest they fall into your 
 hands. In the operations of modern armies, which have to 
 be followed by enormous trains of supplies and also of muni- 
 tions, the problem sometimes becomes impossible of solution, 
 and large quantities of supplies and munitions have to be 
 abandoned, under the stern necessity that the fighting men 
 escape from being captured. The capture of an army is, of 
 course, the worst disaster it can suffer. 
 
 Objective. — As you are conducting operations that are es- 
 sentially defensive, although you carry on offensive measures, 
 you will realize that your objective is the fighting force of the 
 enemy ; and your subordinate commanders will realize that 
 their objectives are those parts of the enemy's fighting force 
 against which you direct their efforts. In the conditions here
 
 36 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 considered, however, the chief of the enemy tribe will not re- 
 gard your fighting force as his main objective; because his 
 main objective is your village and other material possessions, 
 and your fighting force merely an obstruction placed in his 
 path. To him your fighting force is merely the immediate 
 objective, which he must dispose of before he can turn his at- 
 tention to his ultimate objective. The various commanders 
 of his fighting force, however, regard your fighting force as 
 their main objective. The difference between the points of 
 view of the chief of the enemy tribe and of his subordinate 
 officers is that their point of view is purely military, while his 
 is essentially political. 
 
 The State and the Army. — This distinction in the case of 
 two small tribes would not be important; but it is often ex- 
 tremely important in the case of large nations. In the case 
 of small tribes, the head of the state is usually the head of 
 the army, and the political and military commands are united 
 in one man. In the case of great nations, however, this is 
 usually not the case at the present day ; because the duties of 
 the political head are so great, and the knowledge required so 
 extensive, that only a sublime genius, like Caesar or Napoleon, 
 could discharge the duties of the head of the state and of the 
 head of the army also. The result has always been a consider- 
 able lack of coordination between the two. Since the time of 
 Napoleon, no man has successfully discharged both duties. 
 The closest approximation to it is in the case of William I of 
 Prussia ; but he was assisted by Bismarck as Chancellor and by 
 Moltke as chief of staff. Such a combination as that of Wil- 
 liam, Bismarck, and Moltke has appeared but once in history.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 THE first wars of which we have any connected ac- 
 counts were those which the pharaoh, Thutmose III, 
 waged against rebellious states in northern Pales- 
 tine and Syria. Of all the wars and battles fought in the 
 countless ages that preceded them we have but the vaguest 
 records, though the monuments of Egypt, Chaldea, Assyria, 
 and Persia show that many wars were waged. They also show 
 that weapons and armor were in existence before the thir- 
 teenth century B.C. ; while excavations made in numerous and 
 widely separated regions of the world show weapons that were 
 probably used some thousands of years before. 
 
 The invention and use of weapons have always proceeded 
 on paths parallel with those of tools, because a weapon is a 
 tool used for the purposes of war. The main reason why man 
 was able to overcome the brute, and why men of intelligence 
 and civilization have been able to overcome barbarians and 
 men of lesser intelligence, is to be found in the use of weapons. 
 Weapons were, of course, a product of their intelligence: so 
 that it is true to say that it has been due to weapons, and to 
 the wars in which they were used, that an intelligent civiliza- 
 tion has been made possible against the resistance, first, of wild 
 beasts and, second, of barbarians. 
 
 It may be pointed out here that, while many people have 
 suffered in war, yet they have been only a very small fraction 
 of the human race, while the entire human race has benefited. 
 A comparatively few people have been sacrificed in war for 
 the benefit of the race. 
 
 The earliest weapons and tools were of stone and wood and 
 bone, principally of stone. In the old stone age, these were 
 
 37
 
 38 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 rough and evidently chipped and hammered into shape ; but in 
 the new stone age they were smooth and polished. There is 
 no fixed dividing line between the old and the new stone age, 
 however, and for this reason we see a gradual transition from 
 the rough weapons to the smooth. Tools and weapons later 
 were made of copper, and later still of bronze, an alloy of 
 copper with tin or some similar metal. Iron seems to have 
 come into use before bronze among some nations and after 
 bronze in others. It was more difficult at first to make weap- 
 ons of iron; but, after the art of working it had been mas- 
 tered, iron supplanted bronze for both weapons and armor, 
 because it was harder and could take a keener edge or point. 
 The people who seem to have been the foremost in develop- 
 ing effective weapons were the Assyrians, who used military 
 equipments, both offensive and defensive, as early as the thir- 
 teenth century B.C. An infantry soldier of the regular army 
 wore for defensive armor a helmet with a chin-strap, a round 
 buckler, and sometimes a corselet made of plates of metal 
 sewed on skins or woven stuffs. Some also had real coats of 
 mail made of steel, while their legs were protected in front 
 as high as the knee-joint by leggings. Their offensive weapons 
 were the lance, sword, bow, and sling. The militia soldier 
 wore a helmet, but without a chin-strap. Bas-reliefs show that 
 the heads of Persian archers also were protected with helmets. 
 The Assyrians employed cavalry, who carried lances and 
 swords and were protected by armor not unlike that worn by 
 the foot-soldiers, sometimes consisting of entire coats of mail, 
 which protected them both in front and rear. The archers 
 were sometimes mounted, and were protected in part by 
 armor ; and, in addition to carrying bows, arrows, and quivers, 
 they carried swords. The Assyrians seem to have been the 
 inventors of the war chariot, which carried cutting-scythes 
 on the wheels; of the catapult, which threw heavy projectiles, 
 such as stones and pieces of lead; and of the ballista, which 
 hurled arrows. Besides these, they used the battering-ram 
 for making breeches in the walls of forts and cities.
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 39 
 
 Thus we see that before the thirteenth century b.c. the 
 gradually increasing eivilization of the principal countries had 
 advanced the fabrication and use of weapons to a degree not 
 far behind that at which they were in Europe in the middle of 
 the fourteenth century xV.d., when guns using gunpowder were 
 introduced into European warfare. Before inventing these 
 weapons, the ancients must have realized the desirability of 
 having such weapons to use; that is, they must have realized 
 the value of such appliances for carrying out their plans of 
 war. The act of inventing and fabricating them was not a 
 warlike act, but an act in the practice of an art that in itself 
 was peaceful. In other words, the production of those weap- 
 ons was due, first, to a strategic conception, and, second, to a 
 resulting mechanical invention and development. Since most 
 of the appliances of the earlier civilization were such imple- 
 ments as knives and hammers and axes, and since the first ne- 
 cessity of man was to protect his life, the inference seems un- 
 avoidable that the first impetus to civilization was given by 
 war. Demmin says: ''Hence weapons, originally invented 
 for destructive purposes, have become the most powerful 
 means of civilization." 
 
 When we consider the difficulties in fabricating the weapons, 
 whether in the old stone age in hammering and chipping hard 
 pieces of flint into shape, or in the new stone age in smoothing 
 and polishing them, or in the bronze age, or the iron age, in 
 producing tools and weapons that were as well made as we now 
 know them to have been, we can realize that an enormous 
 amount of mental and physical work must have been done, 
 and that back of this there must have been a stem necessity. 
 
 An important and interesting fact in the matter of arms and 
 armor is that arms were invented first and armor afterward. 
 A contrary situation could hardly be imagined, because armor 
 would not have been invented except as a protection against 
 arms. The first effort of war ever since has been offensive, 
 and the second effort has been defensive, both in the making of 
 weapons and armor and in the adoption of plans. For this
 
 40 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 reason, tlie defense has always lagged behind the offense, even 
 though eventually it may have overcome it : and this explains 
 the enormous value of a new weapon, or a new method, when 
 suddenly introduced into a war and used before the enemy has 
 been able to devise and to develop into practical form a means 
 or methods of defense against it. In innumerable cases where 
 victorj^ has gone to one side quickly and decisively, when the 
 two sides were numerically and materially equal, it has been 
 because the victorious side surprised the other with some imex- 
 pected weapon or operation. It is perplexing to note how 
 little this historical fact has been taken into account by writ- 
 ers on strategy. That it was recognized originally, however, 
 is suggested by the similarity of the two words — strategy and 
 stratagem — which grew from the same Greek root. 
 
 It is interesting to note that after any new weapon had 
 been introduced, or any new armor to protect against it, the 
 strategic plans of the commanders did not have to be modified, 
 except in detail ; because the results that they were trying to 
 achieve were absolutely unchanged. Whether two tribes were 
 armed with clubs or with spears, the effort was the same, and 
 the means of carrying it into effect identical. Whether the 
 weapons were clubs or spears, the plan was always to strike 
 the enemy in the most advantageous place as quickly as pos- 
 sible; and the desirability of attacking him on the flank, of 
 shutting off his source of supplies, or of preventing his re- 
 treat, was the same in one case as in the other. The same is 
 true if the weapons were bows and arrows, if the archers were 
 mounted or unmounted, if cutting-scythe chariots were used, 
 or if ballistas, battering-rams, and catapults were employed. 
 The strategy of the operations was unchanged. 
 
 But the tactics and logistics of the operations were changed 
 enormously. All the actual marching, all the actual arrang- 
 ing of supplies, all the actual computations of time and dis- 
 tance, had to be carried out to meet the new conditions that 
 the new weapons and armor had imposed. Furthermore, 
 the technical knowledge required by all the participants, from
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 41 
 
 the commanders down to the lowest privates, increased con- 
 tinuously with the increase in the number, size, and com- 
 plexity of the weapons and the defensive armor. A chief of 
 a savage tribe who was worthy to hold his position had all the 
 knowledge necessary to plan and conduct operations, when the 
 only weapons were clubs, when no armor was used, and when 
 the men lived off the countr3^ But a savage chief would be 
 utterly incompetent to plan and carry on operations in which 
 ballistas and battering-rams and scythe chariots had to be 
 supplied, and food had to be provided for an army of 300,000 
 men. Such was the army of King Darius, that marched from 
 Asia Minor into Greece, and battled on the plains of Marathon. 
 
 During the thousands of years that preceded the wars of 
 Thutmose III, there must have been great progress made in 
 devising and making new weapons and armor, and learning 
 how to use them effectively. New weapons and new kinds of 
 armor necessitated new methods of tactics and logistics; and 
 as these had to be devised by strategy, it necessitated new 
 methods of strategy, new methods by which the principles of 
 strategy could be made applicable in succession to each new 
 set of conditions brought about by the new appliances. 
 
 For instance, the mere addition of shields for defense 
 against sharp-pointed weapons necessitated first the design- 
 ing, then the construction, and then the providing of the 
 shields, and then the drilling of the men in using the shields 
 effectively. In other words, the use of shields necessitated the 
 expansion of the arts of strategy, logistics, and tactics; for it 
 brought about a condition in which, if two tribes were other- 
 wise equal, but if one had shields and the other had not, the 
 tribe with the shields would defeat the tribe without them. 
 The same statement may be made concerning the introduction 
 of bows and arrows. After any one tribe had begun to use 
 them effectively, all the tribes in the vicinity would have to 
 provide and use them, on pain of being brought into subjec- 
 tion. 
 
 Now, it must be apparent that the introduction of bows and
 
 42 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 arrows brought about a change in warfare as great as any 
 brought about since by any other invention, even gunpowder, 
 and possibly a greater change. Previouslj^-, tribes had to fight 
 close together, and with weapons that could be provided with 
 comparative ease. Imagine yourself chief of a savage tribe, 
 and suddenly confronted with the fact that a rival tribe was 
 using new and unheard-of weapons, by which they could 
 wound and kill men a hundred yards away. Under some cir- 
 cumstances you might have a considerable time in which to 
 learn how to make those weapons, then actually to make them 
 and provide your warriors with them, and then to drill your 
 warriors so that they could use the weapons effectively. But 
 if the rival tribe had kept the existence of those weapons a 
 closely guarded secret until ready to attack you, you might 
 not be able to get ready in time. Such a condition, it can 
 hardly be doubted, confronted many tribes when bows and 
 arrows were first introduced ; for we know that not only savage 
 tribes but highly civilized nations in recent years have been 
 confronted with similar conditions, and suddenly attacked with 
 weapons that they did not know existed. 
 
 The introduction of bows and arrows must have brought 
 about conditions very difficult for some savage tribes to meet, 
 not only in designing, making, and providing them, but in 
 teaching individual men how to use them ; even more in de- 
 vising the best tactical methods for employing them; and still 
 more in drilling large bodies of men in the methods decided 
 on. And when we realize how much opposition every new 
 weapon has had to overcome, even in modern times, and with 
 men accustomed to new inventions and to changes of all kinds, 
 we can hardly avoid the conviction that the coming of bows 
 and arrows must have been strenuously resisted by many 
 "conservative" savages. In fact, it was not until the battle 
 of Cressy in 1346 a.d. that bows and arrows were realized by 
 Europe to be as effective as they actually were; it was not 
 until the trained knights of feudal France, clad in their heavy 
 armor, were shot down helpless by the skilled archers of Eng-
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 43 
 
 land, from distances over which the long lances of the knights 
 were powerless to reach. 
 
 Because of the introduction of bows and arrows, the tech- 
 nical knowledge of the savage chief had to be increased; for 
 how could he plan to handle them well in battle, and how 
 could he make good plans before battle for bringing them into 
 battle in such a way that he could use them successfully, until 
 he had learned the most important points connected with their 
 weight, the length of flight of the arrows, and the ways in 
 which the arrows were affected by the wind; and until he had 
 also acquired a skill in measuring distances and in estimating 
 the strength of the wind that he had not needed before? 
 Clearly, the introduction of bows and arrows demanded of the 
 strategist, not a clearer conception of the principles of strategy, 
 but an increased technical knowledge and a more exact appre- 
 ciation of quantitative matters ; in order that he might apply 
 the principles of strategy to practice. 
 
 The introduction of cavalry into warfare must have caused 
 an increase in complexity and difficulty even greater than did 
 that of bows and arrows; because horses were living animals 
 whose food and water had to be provided as carefully as did 
 those of men and in greater quantity, and whose training 
 required almost as much thoroughness and care. Further- 
 more, although the actual handling of cavalry was, in some 
 respects, like that of foot-soldiers, nevertheless it presented 
 many points of difference, and was of greater variety and 
 scope. For, besides being used, as foot-soldiers were, to make 
 direct attack and direct defense, the speed of cavaliy had to 
 be utilized in operations independent of the infantry, and 
 beyond the immediate presence of the infantry and that of the 
 commander-in-chief. 
 
 The introduction of cavalry brought about the use of oper- 
 ations additional and auxiliary to the operations hitherto in 
 vogue, and it therefore brought into existence a system of 
 tactics (cavalry tactics) and a system of logistics (cavalry 
 logistics) hitherto unthought of. In order to plan the sue-
 
 44 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 cessful use of cavalry, the strategist had first to come to a 
 clear understanding of the main characteristics and require- 
 ments of horses and of horsemen, in order that he might be 
 able to get all the useful work out of them that was possible, 
 and yet not place crushing tasks upon them. The strategist 
 had to become in some measure a cavalryman himself, in order 
 to do this correctly from logistical, tactical, and strategical 
 points of view. Afterward, he had to devise his plans for war 
 in such a way as to include cavalry manceuvers in them ; and 
 he had to plan to use those cavalry manceuvers, not as iso- 
 lated performances, but as parts of a campaign, and so that 
 they should bear the best relation practicable to all the oper- 
 ations as a whole, and do the utmost possible toward attaining 
 the end in view. 
 
 The same declarations are true with respect to war chariots, 
 battering-rams, ballistas, catapults, and other engines of war. 
 That great difficulties had to be overcome to bring them into 
 use cannot be doubted by anyone who realizes how grievously 
 those engines taxed the engineering resources of those days, 
 and how vague was the knowledge of mechanics in the minds 
 of the men who lived when they were introduced. The exact 
 date when this happened is not known; but it is known that 
 the Assyrians used war chariots with scythes on the wheels, 
 and that ballistas and catapults were invented and employed 
 by the Assyrians, all before the thirteenth century B.C., and 
 that battering-rams were used by the Babylonians to batter 
 down the walls of Jerusalem in the sixth century b.c. 
 
 It is impossible for us, living in the days when the sciences 
 of mathematics and mechanics are taught in public schools, 
 and when we are surrounded with mechanisms of a thousand 
 kinds, to realize how difficult it must have been to invent those 
 ancient appliances of war, and afterward to get them into use. 
 To us, a wheel seems almost a work of nature; and yet, it is 
 not a work of nature, but one of man's devising, and one of 
 the most brilliant inventions ever conceived by the human 
 mind. The strategist was not concerned as a strategist in in-
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 45 
 
 venting the engines of war, but he was deeply concerned in 
 utilizing them to the best advantage; and, while it must be 
 admitted that it did not require so high an order of intellect 
 to do this as to invent them, it required greater industry and 
 a longer time. Not only did all the technical difficulties at- 
 tending their use have to be understood and taken into ac- 
 count, in order that the war engines might be used success- 
 fully in the actual tactical operations of battle; not only did 
 the plans have to arrange that the war engines should be sup- 
 plied in the proper proportions relatively to the other appli- 
 ances of war; but methods had to be devised whereby they 
 should be so used in cooperation with the other appliances and 
 agencies that all the appliances and agencies should work to- 
 gether with the maximum effectiveness to the attainment of 
 the end in view. In other words, each new appliance and 
 each new method had to be added to the war machine, and 
 made to work for it and in it and with it. It had to be made 
 an actual part of the war machine that already existed, and 
 to be incorporated with it in such a way that, though the war 
 machine became larger and more complex, it remained equally 
 smooth working, efficient, and effective. 
 
 A still greater addition to warfare was that of boats. When 
 boats were first introduced, history does not tell us ; and it was 
 not until the battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. that we have any 
 connected account of their use in actual battle. As we know, 
 however, that the earliest settlements of men were on the banks 
 of rivers, bays, gulfs, and seas, and as we know that primitive 
 man used boats for fishing and for going from one shore to 
 another, it is inconceivable that boats were not used for war 
 far back in the ages of the past. We know that in the cam- 
 paigns of Thutmose III in Syria vessels were employed in 
 cooperation with his armies; though we have no clear record 
 that they were actually used in battle. 
 
 The use of mere boats propelled by paddles or oars did not 
 introduce as great a complexity, possibly, as did the use of 
 horses and of such engines of war as the catapult and the
 
 46 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 ballista; because the boats were very simple in construction 
 and easy to manage, and because they were probably not used 
 in great numbers or in important operations. But as the 
 boats increased in size, and as they ventured farther and far- 
 ther from the land, and as various appliances were introduced, 
 such as sails, the compass, and other navigational instruments, 
 the attendant complexity increased, a training more special 
 than that in any other branch of warfare was required, and 
 a new profession — the naval profession — was created. 
 
 All warlike watercraft have one peculiarity that differenti- 
 ates them in fighting from organizations of men that war on 
 land. This peculiarity is that, as the resistance due to their 
 passage through water is less in proportion as the vessels are 
 long, the vessels are made longer than they are wide, more 
 weapons can be utilized along their sides than elsewhere, and 
 the greatest offensive power can be exerted in directions ap- 
 proximately perpendicular to the directions in which they 
 move; whereas men exert their greatest offensive power di- 
 rectly to the front. The line of battle for troops, therefore, 
 is a line perpendicular to that in which they move; whereas 
 the line of battle for watercraft is in the direction in which 
 they move. In both cases, of course, the line of battle is the 
 direction in which the lines are weakest ; that is, a line of men 
 drawn up for battle is weakest on the side or flank, whereas 
 a line of warships drawn up for battle is weakest from ahead 
 or astern. 
 
 An exception to this statement must be made in the case in 
 which watercraft are used for ramming; and this was one of 
 the principal ways of using them in the early days of Greece 
 and Rome, when galleys pulled by rowers charged on the 
 enemy. In this case, the tactics of a fleet of galleys was not 
 very different from that of an army; and for this reason we 
 find that generals commanded fleets in battles on the sea. 
 Furthermore, the fighting men of the galleys were soldiers, 
 armed with spears and other weapons, provided with shields, 
 and often covered with armor.
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 47 
 
 When sailing vessels came to be used for the purpose of 
 war, the amount of maritime knowledge and skill required 
 made it impossible for generals and soldiers to be the fighting 
 factors on the sea; and the fact that the wind compelled the 
 vessels to head on courses that bore a rigid relation to the 
 direction of the wind, added to the fact that the wind varied 
 greatly, and sometimes suddenly, both in direction and in 
 strength, made the tactics of ships bear little relation to the 
 tactics of armies, and introduced such uncertainties, especially 
 in regard to the times at which certain fleet operations might 
 be expected, that armies and fleets could not act together, ex- 
 cept loosely. This condition was most obvious and important 
 during the period from the fourteenth century to the nine- 
 teenth, beginning, generally speaking, with the attempted in- 
 vasion of England by the Spanish Invincible Armada in 1588. 
 Fleets were used in this period to support the policies of their 
 respective governments, but mostly in auxiliary and secondary 
 ways. The only nation that can be said to have utilized them 
 successfully was Great Britain. Partly by accident, partly by 
 foresight, and partly by a wise opportunism, Great Britain 
 developed both her merchant service and her navy, not only 
 in size but in skill, to such a degree that she gradually secured 
 possession of islands and seacoasts and barbarian countries 
 that cover one quarter of the surface of the earth. 
 
 Our earliest records of war come from Egypt, Chaldea, 
 Assyria, Media, and Babylon, and show that wars were car- 
 ried on on a scale greater than that of many modem wars, 
 as far back as the thirteenth century B.C. From that time 
 until the introduction into Europe of the gun, the weapons 
 of war did not increase greatly either in the number of kinds 
 or in effectiveness; and for this reason the methods of war 
 did not vary greatly. But the introduction of the gun 
 brought this condition to a close, and inaugurated a new con- 
 dition — that of perpetual change, first in weapons and after- 
 ward in methods. After the introduction of the gun, and 
 the changes in tactics and logistics that were required, with
 
 48 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the consequent changes in the methods of strategy that were 
 needed in order that the new methods might be taken into 
 account in the original plans of war, no very great change 
 occurred until the introduction of the railroad and the tele- 
 graph, which were first utilized in warfare in the American 
 Civil War ; but both parties to this war, especially the North- 
 ern, went into the war so suddenly, and were so unprepared, 
 that the use of the railroad and telegraph simply grew in a 
 haphazard fashion with the progress of the war. In 1870, 
 however, when Prussia went to war with France, her original 
 plans of campaign took careful account of the railroad and 
 the telegraph, as well as of all other new methods and means 
 of warfare; and it was largely for this reason that she was 
 able to overwhelm France so quickly and completely. 
 
 A number of wars of great importance have occurred since 
 then, and each war has shown an increased and increasing use 
 of new weapons, and therefore of new methods ; but it was not 
 until Germany went to war in August, 1914, that the world 
 had an illustration of a nation going to war seriously prepared 
 to use successfully all the appliances that a rapidly increasing 
 mechanical and scientific knowledge, and a rapidly growing 
 industrial world, had made it possible to employ. 
 
 During the half century between the American Civil War 
 and the recent great European war, the addition of scientific 
 instruments, the invention of electrical and mechanical appli- 
 ances, and the development of these into actual weapons of 
 war, went on at such a rate as to perplex and almost over- 
 whelm the logistician, the tactician, and the strategist. The 
 logistician realized that the principles of his art were in no 
 way changed, but that the necessity of applying those ancient 
 principles to the new conditions was imperative and the diffi- 
 culty great ; while the difficulties of successfully adapting the 
 instruments and weapons to the uses of logistics were possibly 
 even greater. The tactician realized that the principles of 
 his art were in no way changed, but that the necessity of ap- 
 plying those principles to the new conditions was imperative
 
 DEVELfOPMENT OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 49 
 
 and the difficulty great; while the difficulties in arranging 
 that the weapons and other instruments should be made as 
 perfectly adaptable to his art as possible were enormous. The 
 strategist also realized that the principles of his art were in 
 no way changed, but that the necessity of applying those prin- 
 ciples to the new conditions was imperative and the difficulties 
 great; while the difficulties in the way of utilizing the new 
 conditions with the maximum effectiveness for the furtherance 
 of his strategic purposes were almost overwhelming. 
 
 How great all the difficulties were may be realized from the 
 fact that none of the nations that went into the last great 
 war had really overcome them. Of all the nations, the nation 
 that had come the nearest to overcoming them was Germany ; 
 but it seems to be the fact that she had failed to take due ad- 
 vantage of the possibilities of aeronautics, and that if she had 
 done so she would easily have won the war. 
 
 If either side had taken advantage at the start of the possi- 
 bilities of aeronautics, it would easily have won the war.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OP FIGHTING 
 
 IT may be thought that we have assumed more intelligence 
 and a clearer perception of the end and the means of 
 warfare to exist in the mind of a savage chief than would 
 be justified by the facts. The facts are, however, that the 
 wars of savage tribes indicate as clear a perception of the prin- 
 ciples of strategy, in many cases, as do wars between highly 
 civilized nations. In point of courage, energy, and appreci- 
 ation of the important things to do, savages have often shown 
 an instinct surprisingly correct. No better illustration of 
 this can be found than in the wars that went on for so many 
 years between the Indians and the white men in North Amer- 
 ica. In many cases — such, for instance, as in the fight be- 
 tween General Braddock and the Indians in 1755 — the In- 
 dians showed a better perception of strategy under the condi- 
 tions existing than did the British general. The reason why 
 the savage has gone down before the white man is that the 
 white man has had better weapons, and has in the end been 
 able to bring a greater number of fighters to the field of battle. 
 Furthermore, the white man has been capable of longer pe- 
 riods of mental work, and therefore has been capable of pre- 
 paring more elaborate plans and of working them out with 
 greater care. The savage is not capable of long-continued 
 mental effort. This fact explains his non-success in war, and 
 in a great degree his failure to advance in civilization. 
 
 On the other hand, the savage's almost continual contact 
 with warfare, and the necessity of concentrating most of his 
 attention on thoughts connected with war, has kept alive a 
 certain warlike spirit, and a certain instinct in regard to the 
 
 50
 
 PEINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 51 
 
 main principles of war, that the civilized man has partly lost. 
 Very few men have ever been capable of attaining excellence 
 in more than one line of endeavor; and the result has been 
 that, in highly civilized countries, the greater part of the 
 population have become so out of touch with warlike matters, 
 and their mental muscles have become so unaccustomed to 
 exercise on warlike problems, that the jar of a sudden threat 
 of war is needed to arouse the warlike instinct that exists in 
 every living thing. This instinct being aroused, however, a 
 nation suddenly finds itself as closely bound together, and as 
 permeated by the instinct of war, as the most primitive tribe. 
 The important difference exists, however, that the individuals 
 of the savage tribe are ready to fight immediately, whereas the 
 individuals of a civilized nation are not ready in the least. 
 After being roused, the civilized man becomes ready very 
 quickly in point of determination to fight, but not in point 
 of decision as to how to fight. 
 
 This indecision as to how to fight is because of his having 
 forgotten or never having learned the elementary principles 
 of fighting, and it results commonly in the formation of some 
 kind of public opinion as to what ought to be done that is 
 usually erroneous. That it should be erroneous is, of course, 
 to be expected : because there is usually only one line of work, 
 or at best a very few lines, that ought to be followed, while 
 there are a very great nimiber of lines that ought not to be 
 followed. A person ignorant of any situation is almost sure 
 not to adopt the proper course of conduct, for the same reason 
 that an inexpert marksman is almost sure not to hit the target. 
 
 This matter of public opinion, in the case of a national 
 war, is a matter of the utmost possible importance, because 
 public opinion guides in a great measure the officials of the 
 government, and handicaps the operations of the fleets and 
 armies. An important instance was the effect of public opin- 
 ion in the Union States in the early part of the Civil War. 
 This public opinion, acting through the government, had a 
 most harmful influence on the operations of the generals, espe-
 
 52 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 cially of McClellan. Whether McClellan was a great general 
 or not we cannot ascertain, because he was not given a fair 
 opportunity of showing. Certain it is that Julius Caesar or 
 Napoleon Bonaparte could not have been successful if re- 
 stricted as McClellan was. 
 
 If, before our Civil "War, the people of the country had 
 learned as much about the elementary principles of strategy 
 as they had about arithmetic or geography, this load of errone- 
 ous public opinion would not have had to be borne, and the 
 war would have ended much sooner than it did. Now, a suf- 
 ficient knowledge of the elements of strategy could have been 
 gained in very much less time and with very much less effort 
 than were expended on arithmetic and geography. In fact, 
 the principles are so simple that a mere authoritative state- 
 ment of thein would have been sufficient ; because a perception 
 of them really exists within every human being, overgrown 
 though it is with the knowledge and the ambitions of a com- 
 mercial and industrial civilization. 
 
 The first difficulties caused by the unreadiness of the people 
 in 1861 were in organizing the warlike forces needed, getting 
 the necessary munitions and supplies, and drilling the various 
 officers in their various posts. Naturally, it was more difficult 
 to give efficient drill and training to the higher officers than 
 to the lower, while at the same time it was more important. 
 Even the regular army and navy found themselves pitifully 
 unprepared — not only by reason of the necessity for hastily 
 expanding the organizations, and thereby producing new 
 organizations that must be inefficient for a while simply be- 
 cause they were new, but also because the immense complexity 
 of the machinery of modem warfare, even at that time, forced 
 the minds of all to concentrate so strenuously on learning the 
 necessary details of weapons and methods as to blunt their 
 perception as to what was the purpose of those weapons and 
 methods. Now, the savage has no such difficulty: nothing 
 stands in the way of his applying the full force of his heredi- 
 tary instinct directly to the actual problem in hand. The
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OP FIGHTING 53 
 
 object that he wishes to attain stands out brightly before him, 
 unconfused by any details, except of the simplest kind. 
 
 The operations between two tribes that we have discussed in 
 outline illustrate the simplest case of operations between con- 
 tending forces, because they leave out all the difficult and com- 
 plicated questions that are connected with the supply of food 
 and ammunition, and all other questions of a comparatively 
 minor character, such as the care of the sick and wounded and 
 the maintenance of communication between the fighting force 
 and the base it started from. Campaigns of this simple char- 
 acter, however, illustrate many of the important points of 
 strategy; and some of them have been conducted by even mod- 
 em armies. In Napoleon's first campaign in Italy, for in- 
 stance, his armies lived on the country they passed through; 
 and as the country was fertile, filled with numerous towns, 
 and traversed with many roads, his problems of supply were 
 comparatively simple. At the present day, however, when 
 enormous armies are manoeuvering, it is impossible for them to 
 subsist upon the country, and the supply of food and ammu- 
 nition is one of the utmost difficulty of attainment ; while the 
 maintenance of inter-communication and of inter-support 
 among all the numerous organizations and sub-organizations 
 presents problems almost as difficult to master. 
 
 In the case of two hostile tribes in the situation just dis- 
 cussed, difficulties would present themselves, however, if the 
 homes of the hostile tribes were far apart and the intervening 
 land offered little in the way of food. Such situations have 
 been frequent, especially in northern climates, and in sterile 
 sections even in the tropics. Now, imagine yourself under 
 the same conditions as those discussed, except that a long 
 stretch of unfertile coiuitry, with few towns or roads, lies be- 
 tween your base or village and that of your enemy. In this 
 case, his problem as the aggressor will be difficult in propor- 
 tion to the distance and the unfavorable nature of the country ; 
 and your problem, therefore, will be rendered easier to solve. 
 You will be no safer, however, unless you take prompt and.
 
 54 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 intelligent advantage of the difficulties that your enemy has 
 to surmount, and are able to render them more troublesome. 
 If you simply realize his difficulties, but not your own advan- 
 tages, you will permit him to advance unhindered to the 
 attack ; with the result that he will attack you as successfully 
 as in the previous case, though his attack will come more tar- 
 dily. If you do not take advantage of the danger to which he 
 is exposed of having his food supply cut off, he will have a 
 string of supplies coming to him continually from his home 
 base and will operate just as successfully^ as before. 
 
 If you are worthy of holding your position, however, you 
 will employ such a system of scouts that they will keep you 
 informed of the nature and localities of his lines of supply; 
 and you will realize that he will be so conscious of his de- 
 pendence on these lines of supply, that a mere threat against 
 them will force him to detach part of his force to protect 
 them, and perhaps even to halt his main body. For every army, 
 large or small, is dependent on food; and every commander 
 knows that if his food supply is shut off his men will starve, 
 unless they can succeed in retreating to some spot where they 
 can obtain supplies, or unless, indeed, they actually surren- 
 der. It has happened in history that armies have had to sur- 
 render simply because their lines of supplies had been cut. 
 A notable instance of this is the surrender of Lee at Appo- 
 mattox Court House, that ended our Civil War. 
 
 While manoeuvering against the main body in the endeavor 
 to prevent its advance, or to defeat it altogether, you will 
 doubtless arrange a system of attacks or feints against your 
 enemy 's lines of supply. Such feints and attacks form a large 
 part of the operations of strategy. They may or may not en- 
 tail much actual fighting, but their successful prosecution is 
 a matter of paramount importance. When one reads of the 
 operations of armies against each other, he finds himself fre- 
 quently noting with surprise how little of the time is con- 
 sumed in actual and decisive engagements, and how much is 
 consumed in making attacks or feints at the lines of supply.
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 55 
 
 This is somewhat analogous to the conditions of a fight be- 
 tween two pugilists in which most of the time is taken up with 
 ''sparring," in trying to disconcert the adversary, meanwhile 
 watching for an opportunity to launch the decisive blow. The 
 decisive blow itself may not consume a quarter of a second. 
 
 Since your enemy wishes to advance against you, it is obvi- 
 ously your duty to do everji:hing you can to prevent him 
 from advancing ; unless, indeed, there is some spot into which 
 you wish to have him advance, knowing that you would have 
 him there at a great disadvantage. For instance, if there is 
 between him and you a defile in the mountains, your best plan 
 might be to put no obstructions whatever in the way of his 
 getting there, but rather to lure him on; knowing that if he 
 takes his men into that defile, especially if he takes them there 
 without a knowledge of your presence, you may be able to 
 station your men on both sides of the defile and attack him 
 on both flanks, under circumstances of the utmost possible 
 advantage to yourself. Or, even if it would not be practicable 
 for you to attack him within the defile itself, you would realize 
 the advantage of attacking him just as he was endeavoring 
 to emerge from the defile; that is, if the defile were narrow 
 enough to prevent him from deploying his men in line, facing 
 you. You would realize that, by attacking a column of men 
 trying to emerge from a narrow defile, you could bring your 
 whole force to bear upon the men at the head of his column, 
 and that most of his men would be unable to join in the fight. 
 You would realize this if you were a man fit for your post; 
 because you would know that, if two bodies of men equal 
 in fighting power array themselves against each other, the 
 most advantageous position is one in which all the forces can 
 be used together, while the most disadvantageous is one in 
 which only a few can be used. 
 
 This is because of the principle of concentration, which can 
 best be explained by reference to the following tables. A 
 chief of a savage tribe would not understand these tables ; but 
 a life-long contact with fighting would make him act in ac-
 
 56 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 cordairce with the principle they illustrate. Similarly, a pugi- 
 list does not understand the physiological principles in ac- 
 cordance with which his arm strikes as soon as he sees his an- 
 tagonist expose an unguarded spot — in fact, before he can 
 mentally formulate the situation. He strikes automatically. 
 
 It is one of the old stories that, once upon a time, a man 
 was attacked by three men, and, realizing that he could not 
 overcame them all, he fled. The pursuers did not keep to- 
 gether, and one man outstripped the others. Noting this, the 
 fleeing man permitted him to get near, and then suddenly 
 turned and overwhelmed him, being the stronger. He then 
 resumed his flight, and allowed himself to be overtaken by the 
 second man, whom he overwhelmed in turn. He then turned 
 upon the third man and overwhelmed him. Whether this par- 
 ticular incident ever happened may reasonably be questioned ; 
 but it cannot be questioned that the incident was entirely pos- 
 sible. And, whether the story be true or not, it illustrates one 
 of the fundamental principles of strategy, usually spoken of as 
 the ''principle of concentration," though it seems to me 
 that it should be called the ' ' principle of isolation. ' ' It seems 
 to me that the fundamental reason for the defeat of the three 
 men was not so much that the final victor concentrated on one 
 man and then on another as that he isolated each of the three 
 men, so that the others could not assist him. If the three men 
 had not been isolated, but together, it would not have advan- 
 taged their one antagonist to concentrate on one man, because 
 the other two would have concentrated equally on him. 
 
 The fundamental reason why it is better to do as the final 
 victor in the old story did is that, if one man is more powerful 
 than another, he can do him more injury in a given length 
 of time than the other man can do him ; so that at the end of 
 that period of time their original inequality will be increased. 
 Suppose, for instance, that one man can exert a blow of a 
 force that we will call 1,000, and that his antagonist can exert 
 a blow of a force that we will call 500. In this case their rel- 
 ative powers would be as 1,000 to 500. Now, the man who
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 57 
 
 can exert a blow of the force of 1,000 can evidently do an in- 
 jury to his opponent greater than that which his opponent can 
 do to him, in the proportion of 1,000 to 500. For the sake of 
 simplicity, let us suppose that each can, in a given length of 
 time can inflict an amount of injury equal to 1/10 of his total 
 strength; that is, that one man can inflict an injury denoted 
 by 100 and the other an injury denoted by 50. At the end 
 of some length of time, the first man will have had his 
 strength reduced from 1,000 to 950 ; while the other man will 
 have had his strength reduced from 500 to 400. Therefore, 
 at the end of this time the disproportion of strength, instead 
 of being 2 to 1, will be 950 to 400— that is, nearly IV2 to 1. 
 
 In the following table, the results between two forces fight- 
 ing are indicated in the various columns. In the first column 
 the forces are supposed to be equal, and each represented at 
 first by a strength of 1,000. In column 2 the forces are 
 1,000 to 900; in column 3 they are 1,000 and 800, etc. In 
 each case, it is assumed that a force can inflict an injury equal 
 to 1/10 of its total force; that 1,000 men, for instance, can 
 inflict in a given time an injury equal to 100, while 900 men in 
 the same time can inflict an injury of only 90. It is evident 
 that at the end of the first period the first force will have 910 
 units left, while the other force will have only 800 left (col- 
 umn 2). 
 
 It will be noted that in column 1 the values of the two oppos- 
 ing forces continue equal throughout ; that in column 2 they 
 become reduced unequally, so that at the end of the twelfth 
 period the disproportion, instead of being as 10 to 9, is about 
 4 to 1 ; that in column 3 the larger force has a value of 569 
 when the smaller force has become reduced to zero ; and that 
 the other columns show that the greater the disproportion 
 of force is originally, the more rapidly the disproportion in- 
 creases. Column 10 shows that, if the original disproportion 
 is as 1,000 to 100, the smaller force is reduced to zero in the 
 first period, while the larger force loses only one per cent, of 
 its strength.
 
 58 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 TABLE I 
 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 Col. 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 Value of offensive power, 
 
 A 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 ICOO 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 1000 
 
 at beginning i 
 
 B 
 
 A 
 
 1000 
 100 
 
 900 
 100 
 
 800 
 100 
 
 700 
 100 
 
 600 
 100 
 
 500 
 100 
 
 400 
 100 
 
 300 
 100 
 
 200 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 Damage done in first pe- 
 
 100 
 
 riod bv 
 
 B 
 
 A 
 
 100 
 900 
 
 90 
 910 
 
 80 
 920 
 
 70 
 930 
 
 60 
 940 
 
 50 
 950 
 
 40 
 960 
 
 30 
 
 970 
 
 20 
 980 
 
 10 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 990 
 
 at end first period 
 
 B 
 
 900 
 
 800 
 
 700 
 
 600 
 
 500 
 
 400 
 
 300 
 
 200 
 
 100 
 
 
 
 Damaere doae in second 
 
 A 
 
 90 
 
 91 
 
 92 
 
 93 
 
 94 
 
 95 
 
 96 
 
 97 
 
 98 
 
 
 period by ' 
 
 B 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 A 
 
 810 
 
 830 
 
 850 
 
 870 
 
 890 
 
 910 
 
 930 
 
 950 
 
 970 
 
 
 at end second period. . 
 
 B 
 
 810 
 
 709 
 
 608 
 
 507 
 
 406 
 
 305 
 
 204 
 
 103 
 
 2 
 
 
 Damage done in third pe- 
 
 A 
 
 81 
 
 83 
 
 85 
 
 87 
 
 89 
 
 91 
 
 93 
 
 95 
 
 
 
 riod by 
 
 B 
 
 81 
 
 71 
 
 61 
 
 51 
 
 41 
 
 31 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 A 
 
 729 
 
 759 
 
 789 
 
 819 
 
 849 
 
 879 
 
 910 
 
 940 
 
 
 
 at end third period.... 
 
 B 
 
 729 
 
 626 
 
 523 
 
 420 
 
 317 
 
 214 
 
 111 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 Damage done in fourth 
 
 A 
 
 73 
 
 76 
 
 79 
 
 82 
 
 85 
 
 88 
 
 91 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 B 
 
 73 
 
 63 
 
 52 
 
 42 
 
 32 
 
 21 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 A 
 
 656 
 
 696 
 
 737 
 
 777 
 
 817 
 
 858 
 
 899 
 
 
 
 
 at end fourth period... 
 
 B 
 
 656 
 
 550 
 
 444 
 
 338 
 
 232 
 
 126 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in fifth pe- 
 
 A 
 
 65 
 
 70 
 
 74 
 
 78 
 
 82 
 
 86 
 
 
 
 
 
 riod by 
 
 B 
 
 fA 
 
 65 
 
 591 
 
 55 
 641 
 
 44 
 693 
 
 34 
 743 
 
 23 
 794 
 
 13 
 845 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 at end fifth period 
 
 B 
 
 591 
 
 480 
 
 370 
 
 260 
 
 150 
 
 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in sixth 
 
 A 
 
 59 
 
 64 
 
 69 
 
 74 
 
 79 
 
 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 B 
 
 59 
 
 48 
 
 37 
 
 26 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 fA 
 
 532 
 
 593 
 
 656 
 
 717 
 
 779 
 
 841 
 
 
 
 
 
 at end sixth period 
 
 B 
 
 532 
 
 416 
 
 301 
 
 186 
 
 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in seventh 
 
 A 
 
 53 
 
 59 
 
 66 
 
 72 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 B 
 
 53 
 
 42 
 
 30 
 
 19 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 479 
 
 551 
 
 626 
 
 698 
 
 772 
 
 
 .... 
 
 
 
 
 at end seventh period.. 
 
 B 
 
 fA 
 
 479 
 
 357 
 
 235 
 
 114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in eighth 
 
 48 
 
 55 
 
 63 
 
 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 B 
 
 48 
 
 36 
 
 24 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 [A 
 
 431 
 
 515 
 
 602 
 
 687 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 at end eighth period... 
 
 B 
 
 431 
 
 302 
 
 172 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 .... 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in ninth 
 
 fA 
 
 43 
 
 52 
 
 60 
 
 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 period bv 
 
 B 
 
 43 
 
 30 
 
 17 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 fA 
 
 388 
 
 485 
 
 585 
 
 683 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 at end ninth period 
 
 B 
 
 388 
 
 250 
 
 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in tenth 
 
 A 
 
 39 
 
 49 
 
 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 B 
 
 39 
 
 25 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 A 
 
 349 
 
 460 
 
 574 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 at end tenth period 
 
 B 
 
 349 
 
 201 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in eleventh 
 
 fA 
 
 35 
 
 46 
 
 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 B 
 
 35 
 
 20 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 fA 
 
 314 
 
 440 
 
 569 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 at end eleventh period 
 
 B 
 
 314 
 
 155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Damage done in twelfth 
 
 fA 
 
 31 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 period by 
 
 ,B 
 
 81 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Value of offensive power 
 
 A 
 
 283 
 
 426 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 at end twelfth period. . 
 
 IB 
 
 283 
 
 111 
 etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total damage done f A 
 
 717 
 
 789 
 
 800 
 
 700 
 
 600 
 
 500 
 
 400 
 
 300 
 
 200 
 
 100 
 
 by 1 
 
 B 
 
 717 
 
 574 
 
 431 
 
 317 
 
 228 
 
 159 
 
 
 
 
 .... 
 
 Table I shows merely the conditions of a fight between two 
 forces, A and B. It is supplemented, however, by Table II, 
 which shows what would happen if a large force engaged two
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 59 
 
 smaller forces in succession. In column 1 a force that origi- 
 nally was 1,000 is supposed to have fought a force of 200, and 
 therefore to have been reduced to a strength of 970, and then 
 to engage a force of 800. (See Table I, column 9.) In column 
 2 the large force is supposed to have engaged 800 first, thereby- 
 becoming reduced to 569 (see Table I, column 3), and then to 
 engage the force of 200. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that it 
 makes no difference whether A engages the stronger or the 
 weaker force first; that it makes no practical difference 
 whether it engages 200 and then 800, or 800 and then 200. 
 
 Column 3 shows that a force of 841 (the part remaining 
 after a force of 1,000 had annihilated a force of 500 — see 
 Table I) would have 653 left after annihilating a second force 
 of 500. Taken in connection with columns 1 and 2, this in- 
 dicates that it is easier to defeat two separated equal forces 
 than two separated unequal forces of the same aggregate 
 value. It shows that the weakest way in which to divide a 
 force is into equal parts. 
 
 A savage chief would not understand all these arithmetical 
 complexities; but if you were a savage chief worthy to hold 
 your position, you would know the lesson that they teach 
 by instinct. That is, you would know that your force would be 
 the strongest when concentrated in one group, in which the 
 units could help each other; and that if it were divided into 
 two parts, the weakest arrangement would be that in which 
 the parts would be equal. You would also know that the 
 greater number of parts into which you divided your force, 
 the weaker it would be. 
 
 That is, it would be weaker for fighting against a concen- 
 trated body that could attack its various separated parts in 
 detail. This might lead to the notion that a force should 
 never be divided. Such a notion, however, would be entirely 
 erroneous ; for there are other elements of weakness in a mil- 
 itary force than those due to division into parts. One of the 
 elements of weakness of a force is its flanks. If a force should
 
 60 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 TABLE II 
 
 ol. 1 C( 
 
 )1. 2 
 
 Col. 3 
 
 970 
 
 569 
 
 841 
 
 800 
 
 200 
 
 500 
 
 97 
 
 57 
 
 84 
 
 80 
 
 20 
 
 50 
 
 890 
 
 549 
 
 791 
 
 703 
 
 143 
 
 416 
 
 89 
 
 55 
 
 79 
 
 70 
 
 14 
 
 42 
 
 820 
 
 535 
 
 749 
 
 614 
 
 88 
 
 337 
 
 82 
 
 54 
 
 75 
 
 61 
 
 9 
 
 34 
 
 759 
 
 526 
 
 715 
 
 532 
 
 32 
 
 262 
 
 76 
 
 53 
 
 72 
 
 53 
 
 3 
 
 26 
 
 706 
 
 523 
 
 689 
 
 456 
 
 
 
 190 
 
 71 
 
 
 69 
 
 46 
 
 
 19 
 
 660 
 
 
 670 
 
 385 
 
 
 121 
 
 66 
 
 
 67 
 
 39 
 
 
 12 
 
 621 
 
 
 658 
 
 319 
 
 
 54 
 
 62 
 
 
 66 
 
 32 
 
 
 5 
 
 589 
 
 
 653 
 
 257 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 563 
 
 
 
 198 
 
 
 .... 
 
 56 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 543 
 
 
 
 142 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 529 
 
 
 
 88 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 520 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
 .... 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 516 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f ^ 
 
 Value of oflfensive power at beginning j g 
 
 ( A 
 Damage done in first period by < g 
 
 Value of offensive power at end first period j -g 
 
 Damage done in second period by | g 
 
 Value of offensive power at end second period |g 
 
 Damage done in third period by ,' g 
 
 Value of offensive power at end third period jg 
 
 Damage done in fourth period by jg 
 
 Value of offensive power at end fourth period jg 
 
 Damage done in fifth period by jg 
 
 Value of offensive power at end fifth period |g 
 
 Damage done in sixth period by j u 
 
 Value of offensive power at end sixth period jg 
 
 Damage done in seventh period by jg 
 
 Value of offensive power at end seventh period < g 
 
 Damage done in eighth period by jg 
 
 Value of offensive power at end eighth period j g 
 
 Damage done in ninth period by j g 
 
 Value of offensive power at end ninth period jg 
 
 Damage done in tenth period by jg 
 
 Value of offensive power at end tenth period jg 
 
 Damage done in eleventh period by j g 
 
 Value of offensive power at end eleventh period jg 
 
 Damage done in twelfth period by j g 
 
 Value of offensive power at end twelfth period jg 
 
 march in lines, one behind the other, it would present the 
 strongest arrangement to an attack from the front; and if a 
 chief knew that he would not have to fight except directly in 
 front, he should march all his men in lines. But if, under nor- 
 mal conditions, he should march his whole force in lines, his 
 enemy would undoubtedly detach a comparatively small part 
 of his own force to strike one or both of the flanks. The whole 
 force being in line, it would have no advance guard, no scouts,
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 61 
 
 no flank guards, and no rear guard, and be practically help- 
 less, therefore, against any attack except one from directly in 
 front. For this reason, as well as others, the actual fighting 
 strength of a force must be reduced by the necessity of send- 
 ing out detachments to get information concerning the enemy, 
 and to guard against surprise of all kinds. 
 
 Besides, except in the case of very small bodies in a fertile 
 country, an army cannot live on the country, and must detail 
 a considerable number of men to carry supplies and ammu- 
 nition and guard the lines of supply. Furthermore, it is the 
 duty of the commander of every force in war to utilize his 
 force as economically as possible in actual fighting; and this 
 means to avoid frontal attacks with the main body except 
 when confident of getting a favorable decision, and to devote 
 a great deal of effort to securing advantages at small cost of 
 men and effort, by striking at the communications of the 
 enemy, or by threatening them, or by making flank attacks and 
 feints. 
 
 For these reasons and others, it is impracticable and unwise 
 to keep a force continuously concentrated ; and the result is 
 that the various parts of a large force become like the various 
 pieces on a chessboard, or like the various players in a base- 
 ball game ; and the operations between the forces take on some 
 of the features of a game. They suggest, in fact, that warfare 
 is the greatest game in the world, the oldest game and the most 
 important. It is a serious mistake, however, to regard war as 
 a game, though many people have spoken of it and written of 
 it as such. To do this is to ignore the most important feature 
 of war — the fact that warfare is fighting, and sometimes fight- 
 ing to death, and always fighting to the death of some of the 
 individuals. Another reason why warfare is not a game is 
 that a real game is played for the sake of the game, and with 
 the sole aim of winning the game. But warfare is not carried 
 on for the sake of warfare, or even for the sake of winning. 
 It is carried on to accomplish some purpose. Sometimes the 
 purpose is good, sometimes it is bad. The purpose is usually
 
 62 THE ART OP FIGHTING 
 
 political, using the word political in its broad sense; that is, 
 the purpose concerns some result which the tribes or nations 
 waging war wish to accomplish or prevent. 
 
 Strategy and Tactics. — In making plans, you will find your- 
 self constantly confronted with the necessity of looking ahead 
 into the future ; but in conducting actual operations in sight 
 of your enemy, you will have merely to take prompt action, 
 either to seize some opportunity or to ward off some threat- 
 ened blow. In the one case, foresight and careful preparation 
 are needed ; in the other case, quick apprehension and prompt 
 action. The two phases of war thus indicated are called the 
 strategical and the tactical phases; in one, strategy directs 
 operations; in the other tactics. There is no sharp dividing 
 line between them, and they merge one into the other ; never- 
 theless their provinces are distinct. The elementary prin- 
 ciples governing them are the same ; the main difference being 
 that the strategist sees with the eye of the mind, while the 
 tactician sees with the actual eye of the body. Whether con- 
 ducting a strategical or a tactical operation, your endeavor 
 will be to bring destructive force to some point before the 
 enemy can do so, and to select the most advantageous point. 
 In conducting strategical operations, your work will be mostly 
 in making plans; while in directing tactical operations your 
 work will be in conducting the troops or the ships to the point 
 decided on, and manoeuvering them afterward in the face of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Logistics. — No matter how simple may be your strategical 
 plan of campaign, and the tactics, marches, and manoeuvers, 
 you will have to arrange that your men shall be fed. No mat- 
 ter how simple may be the weapons of your warriors, you must 
 see that the weapons shall be provided. This may or may not 
 be an easy task. If the distances are short and the country 
 fertile, and if the weapons are easy to obtain, it will be simple ; 
 but if the distances are long, the country sterile, and the 
 weapons difficult to obtain, you may find it extremely hard. 
 In the enormous armies of modem nations, which cannot live
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF FIGHTING 63 
 
 off the country, which expend enormous amounts of ammuni- 
 tion, and which require millions of delicate and complicated 
 weapons and warlike appliances of all kinds, the problems of 
 logistics are of the highest order of difficulty. 
 
 We must not fall into the error of supposing that strategy, 
 logistics, and tactics are three separate agencies that merely 
 assist each other. If they were, the difficulties of conducting 
 a military or naval campaign would be far greater than they 
 are ; they would be so great, in fact, that no consistent plan of 
 operations could be devised. We can easily avoid falling into 
 the error by reminding ourselves that the whole object of both 
 tactics and logistics is to carry out the plans of strategy, and 
 that they must, therefore, be subordinate to strategy. The 
 dominant agency of war is strategy; tactics and logistics are 
 its subordinates. Strategy points the way to battle, and ar- 
 ranges the conditions under which it shall begin, under which 
 it shall be fought, and under which subsequent operations 
 shall be carried on. Logistics arranges that the men and ships 
 shall be supplied, and afterward that they shall be properly 
 fed and armed ; and tactics moves them to the battlefield and 
 manceuvers them on the battlefield afterward. Before the 
 battle, logistics is more important than tactics ; but during the 
 battle tactics is more important than logistics. As to which 
 may be said to be the more important in the main, it would be 
 merely wasting time to speculate. It must be borne in mind, 
 however, that the ultimate actual result can be achieved by 
 tactics only. To gain tactical victories should be the only aim 
 in war.
 
 PART II 
 HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II 
 
 THE first great strategist about whom history tells 
 us was Thutmose III, King of Egypt, who reigned 
 from about 1501 to 1447 B.C. Though a younger 
 son of the king he became a priest in the temple of Karnak. 
 He married Hatshepsut, a princess of the old line of kings; 
 and these two together became co-regents later. Until the 
 time of her death, covering a period of more than twenty 
 years, the queen's influence seems to have been greater than 
 her husband 's, because of a superior claim to the throne ; and 
 it was not until after her death that Thutmose III was able 
 to display his energy and genius. This he did throughout 
 thirty-two years thereafter, during which he carried on seven- 
 teen campaigns, and as the result of which he established his 
 kingdom on such a firm basis and extended his boundaries so 
 far, and increased its wealth so greatly, that he is worthy of 
 the title "First Empire-Builder." 
 
 At the time when Thutmose III came into absolute power, 
 the strength of Egj^pt had materially declined, mainly because 
 the efforts of the queen had been devoted for the most part to 
 erecting beautiful monuments and temples; with the result 
 that the military spirit and skill of the people had danger- 
 ously decreased. 
 
 In a direction approximating northeast of Egypt, on the 
 eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, were Palestine and 
 Syria, which contained many cities, like Tyre and Sidon, that 
 had accumulated great wealth of many kinds, mostly manu- 
 factured products such as silks, glassware, jewelry, etc. The 
 little nations of Palestine and Syria were supposed to be under 
 the dominion of Egypt, but they had taken advantage of the 
 
 67
 
 68 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 weakness of the kingdom, and many of them were more or less 
 openly in revolt. At the head was the King of Kadesh, 
 
 Late in the twenty-second year of his reign, in 1479 B.C. 
 Thutmose marched from Egypt through southern Palestine, 
 which was still loyal, toward the army of the King of Kadesh, 
 which advanced to meet him, and occupied the strong fortress 
 of Megiddo. Not only was this place a powerful stronghold, 
 but it occupied an important strategic position, commanding 
 the road from Egypt, that lay between two mountain ranges. 
 The fact that a fortress had been placed at that point proves 
 that a clear conception of at least one principle of strategy 
 existed among the semi-savage tribes of Syria in 1479 b.c. 
 
 Learning of the enemy's occupation of Megiddo, Thutmose 
 found himself called upon to decide the important strategic 
 question of whether he should march against it by a direct 
 route that led him through a narrow pass, or march by a longer 
 route that would not require him to go through the pass. 
 Against the advice of his officers, who pointed out the dangers 
 of being surprised on both sides in the pass, or of being met 
 by the enemy while emerging from the pass, Thutmose deter- 
 mined to take the most direct route. To encourage his men, 
 he led them personally. It seems probable that he would not 
 have made this decision if he had not judged that the enemy 
 was incompetent to take advantage of the danger to which he 
 exposed himself. That he judged correctly is shown by the 
 fact that he was not molested in going through the pass, and 
 was able to bring his forces out into the plain of Megiddo 
 without meeting any opposition. 
 
 This incident illustrates the difference between good strat- 
 egy and bad strategy, between good judgment and bad judg- 
 ment, between action and inertness. 
 
 Early the next morning Thutmose, in a glittering chariot 
 of electrum, led his forces forward to a position in which his 
 right rested on a hill southwest of Megiddo, while his left was 
 northwest of Megiddo. The Asiatics, drawn up in a north-and- 
 ioutli line, confronted, him. He immeLdiately attacked them, ^
 
 THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II 69 
 
 and with such vigor that the enemy gave way at the first 
 charge and fled inside of the city. Thutmose at once instituted 
 a siege, his army living in great comfort on the fertile fields 
 of the plain until the city surrendered ; an act caused mainly 
 by the fact that the Syrians were so unprepared that there was 
 not food enough for the defending soldiers. An indication of 
 conditions in those days may be gathered from the fact that 
 Thutmose captured in the city 924 chariots, 2,238 horses, 200 
 suits of armor, the gorgeous tent of the king of Kadesh, and 
 prodigious quantities of gold and silver and precious stones. 
 
 Being a good strategist, Thutmose lost no time in carrying 
 on further operations, until the close of the dry season forced 
 him to return to Egypt. During these operations he captured 
 three cities. Afterward, he reorganized the territory con- 
 quered. 
 
 Because of the military decadence of Egypt, Thutmose was 
 not able to resume his task of subduing the revolt in Syria 
 until two years later. Finally he marched through northern 
 Palestine and Syria, establishing his power firmly in those 
 regions. In the following year he carried on a campaign of 
 the same nature, as he did also in the year ensuing. 
 
 But it had now become evident to Thutmose that he could 
 not effectively subdue the revolt until he had captured the city 
 of Kadesh and the regions to the north and east of it; and 
 that he could not accomplish this while leaving his flank ex- 
 posed to the unsubdued Phoenician cities on the coast of the 
 Mediterranean. He, therefore, planned a series of campaigns, 
 and laid the basis of them by organizing a fleet. Employing 
 the new fleet, he transported his army by sea on his fifth cam- 
 paign, and moved directly against the northern coast cities. 
 Thence he moved his army southward and captured the pow- 
 erful city of Arvad. He thus gained a secure footing on the 
 coast, easily accessible by water from Egypt, and forming an 
 admirable base for further operations. The strategic concep- 
 tion involved here is respectfully pointed out. 
 
 After making suitable preparations in the ensuing winter,
 
 70 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Camp of 
 Division ^^1 ^ 
 ofAmon Ay^ 
 
 Thutmose started out on his sixth campaign in the following 
 spring-, disembarked his army from the fleet at Simyra and 
 immediately marched upon Kadesh. The city lay on the west 
 side of the Orontes River, surrounded by its waters and those 
 
 of a tributary, at the north end of 
 a high valley between the two 
 ridges of the Lebanon mountains, 
 and protected b}^ an inner moat 
 that reinforced the natural water 
 defenses. It was the most formida- 
 ble fortress in Syria, and command- 
 ed the valley of the Orontes River, 
 the only route northw^ard in that 
 part of Syria. The locality and 
 the character of the natural and 
 artificial defenses show the exist- 
 ence of a clear conception of one 
 of the first principles of strat- 
 egy. 
 
 Thutmose captured Kadesh after 
 a long and difficult siege, and spent 
 tlie rest of the season and all of the 
 following season in subduing the 
 cities in the neighborhood, not only 
 in the interior, but along the coast. 
 In particular Thutmose exacted 
 that the people of the interior 
 should keep the coast towns liber- 
 ally supplied with provisions for his next campaign. 
 
 The preparations for his next campaign occupied nearly two 
 years; so that it was not until the thirty-third year of his 
 reign, in 1469 B.C., that he was able to begin it. In that 
 campaign Thutmose carried his armies to the northward and 
 eastward of S^-ria to the Euphrates River. There he captured 
 the city of Carchemish, which enabled him to do what he had 
 
 Asiatics 
 — £<g"yp-tians 
 
 5Kin. 
 
 
 
 5M. 
 
 From Breasted's "History of 
 
 Egypt." 
 By pel-mission of Charles Scrib- 
 
 ner's Sons.
 
 THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II 71 
 
 been fighting ten years to do — cross the Euphrates River and 
 set his boundary tablet on its eastern side. 
 
 Thvitmose had now achieved the great object of his life. 
 He had extended the boundaries of his kingdom farther than 
 any preceding king had done, and, as a natural consequence, 
 he had established his power more firmly at home, brought 
 about more efficient government, and placed his kingdom in all 
 respects, both military and economic, on a firmer basis. It is 
 a fact which one constantly meets in history, that a really 
 competent ruler strengthens his country both externally and 
 internally. 
 
 Thutmose carried out seventeen campaigns in all, starting 
 in the spring, and returning to his capital about October. Im- 
 mediately on his return, after each campaign, he made a tour 
 of inspection throughout Egypt, mainly for the purpose of 
 suppressing corruption and bringing about efficiency in local 
 administration ; but also for observing progress on temples and 
 other works that he was either erecting, restoring, or adorning. 
 His campaigning became regularly organized as part of a 
 routine of his reign ; and as soon as the spring rains in Syria 
 and Palestine had ceased, he would embark his troops and 
 sail for their coast. 
 
 The last of his campaigns, the seventeenth, was carried on 
 in the year 1459 B.C., in which he chastised certain princes of 
 Syria who had been incited by the King of Kadesh. Although 
 Thutmose was now more than seventy years of age, he prompt- 
 ly started with his fleet on his seventeenth and last campaign, 
 landed his army, and advanced against the city of Kadesh, 
 which he first isolated and then recaptured. He lived twelve 
 years after this ; but so thoroughly had he subdued all parts 
 of his kingdom that he had to make no more campaigns. He 
 died in the year 1117 B.C., leaving a record as a strategist 
 which stands the first upon the page of history, and which, tak- 
 ing into account the differences in conditions, has not greatly 
 been surpassed by that of any strategist since. He seems to
 
 72 TPIE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 have been the first strategist to recognize and utilize the ad- 
 vantages of sea power. 
 
 It is worthy of remark that the operations which Thutmose 
 carried out were similar in their essentials to those which we 
 have supposed, in previous chapters, that one aggressive chief 
 of a savage tribe might carry out against another tribe, whose 
 village or cattle or other material possessions he was deter- 
 mined to acquire. In both cases we see the same aggressive ad- 
 vance, the same endeavor to attack the weak point of the 
 enemy, the same ardor in attacking, the same energy in fol- 
 lowing up the victory, the same endeavor to render the enemy 
 incapable of further resistance, the same endeavor to make 
 secure any positions or possessions which had been attained. 
 In fact, if Thutmose had been acting as one man only, and if 
 his enemy had been one man only, who possessed a hut or 
 other thing that Thutmose wanted, he would have proceeded 
 in a similar manner, though his operations would have cov- 
 ered shorter distances. We can even imagine that if his enemy 
 had lived on the shores of some water common to both, Thut- 
 mose would have gone over the intervening distance in a 
 canoe as he actually went over the intervening distance with a 
 fleet. If we can imagine a series of moving pictures that 
 showed the campaigns of Thutmose, or of any other strategist 
 or leader, it is not hard to realize that, if the scale of the dis- 
 tances were changed, and if the number of men engaged were 
 changed in a similar proportion, the series of moving pictures 
 might represent in its essential features almost any campaign, 
 no matter how large or how small. 
 
 Thutmose was succeeded by Amenhotep II, who seems to 
 have been a worthy son of his father, though made on a smaller 
 scale. He was succeeded by Thutmose IV, and he by Amen- 
 hotep III, sometimes called the Magnificent. Amenhotep re- 
 minds us in some ways of Solomon, son of David, and of many 
 sons of men who had amassed great wealth ; because his career 
 consisted mainly in using the powers in his possession for 
 ostentatious display and the construction of objects of art and
 
 THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II 73 
 
 beauty. During his reign the empire of Egypt reached its 
 greatest height in the refinements and superficial splendors of 
 civilization; so great a height, indeed as to suggest that the 
 civilization of Greece, which followed about one thousand 
 years later, was more indebted to Egypt than is often realized. 
 
 Like the high civilization of Egypt, that of Greece imme- 
 diately followed a series of successful wars. The high civiliza- 
 tion, therefore, was based on successful war; and as the fun- 
 damental basis of the successful war was successful strategy, 
 we see that the high civilization was based fundamentally on 
 successful strategy. We shall see that this was true of Rome 
 and of all the other countries that thus far have achieved a 
 high civilization of their own making. That this was expect- 
 able is clear; because it has only been by successful strategy 
 that large nations have been formed, large reservoirs of wealth 
 created, large numbers of people enabled to live together 
 in safety, and conditions favorable to the greatest good of the 
 greatest number established and maintained. 
 
 The result of Amenhotep's rule was like that of Solomon 
 and many sons of rich men in that, to use an old but very apt 
 phrase, ''It killed the goose that laid the golden egg"; and, 
 unfortunately for Egypt's material greatness, he was suc- 
 ceeded by a king who, although one of the greatest men of 
 history was far from a great statesman or a warrior. He be- 
 gan his reign as Amenhotep IV ; but, as he had conceived of a 
 religion more highly spiritual than the worship of Amon, and 
 was determined to supplant the old religion with the new, 
 which may be described as the worship of the god of the Sun, 
 he changed his name to Ikhnaton, or spirit of the Sun. He 
 reigned for seventeen years, during which he almost succeeded 
 in his purpose ; and he left a record showing a greater individ- 
 uality than that of any other man in history up to that time. 
 But he almost ruined Egypt, and was known afterwards as 
 "the criminal of Akhetaton." 
 
 He was followed by three weak kings in succession, under 
 whom Egypt descended farther and farther in the scale of
 
 74 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 strength and order. Then Harmhab came to the throne in 
 1350 B.C. He was an able ruler and, like all able rulers, 
 devoted his attention to both the internal and external 
 strength and prosperity of the country. Under the conditions 
 he was not able to accomplish much externally, except in the 
 way of preparing the way for some able successor. His imme- 
 diate successor was Ramses I, an old man who was soon suc- 
 ceeded by his son Seti I. Seti's career was somewhat like that 
 of Thutmose III, though in a much smaller degree; for he 
 made war in Palestine and Libya, and brought the little tribes 
 and kingdoms there back to their allegiance. Like Thutmose 
 also, he devoted his latter daj's to improving the internal con- 
 dition of Eg3^pt, and to the development of the various peace- 
 ful arts, especially architecture. He was succeeded about 
 1292 B.C. by Ramses II, who reigned sixty-seven years and 
 was the last great king of Egypt. 
 
 "When Ramses came to the throne the internal condition of 
 the kingdom was good; but the warlike Hittites, under their 
 king, Metella, had taken possession of some provinces in Syria 
 that had belonged to Egypt, and these Ramses determined to 
 get back. It is probable that Metella heard of this, for he set 
 to work to collect a large army ; so that when Ramses, with his 
 army, entered Syria in 1288, the Hittites were ready to oppose 
 him. Ramses, like Thutmose III, utilized a coast city of Pal- 
 estine as a base, and from it marched toward the city of Ka- 
 desh, on the west side of the Orontes River.^ His army was 
 divided into four divisions, led by the division of Amon, which 
 Ramses himself commanded. In May, Ramses found himself 
 on the east side of the Orontes River about a day's march 
 from Kadesh, which was on the west side. It seems probable 
 that he had not taken the precaution to send an advance 
 guard very far ahead, or else that Metella had taken unusual 
 precautions to prevent any of his own forces from being seen, 
 because when Ramses arrived at this point he had been unable 
 to find any traces of the enemy. 
 
 1 See sketch on p. 70.
 
 THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II 75 
 
 At this juncture two Bedouins appeared, and declared that 
 they had deserted from the Hittites, and that the Hittites had 
 retreated far northward of Kadesh. Acting on this story as if 
 he knew it to be true, which a more experienced strategist 
 would not have done, Ramses crossed the river to the west 
 side with the division of Amon, and marched on with that di- 
 vision only to the vicinity of Kadesh, leaving the other divi- 
 sions to straggle on after him. ^Metella, being apprised doubt- 
 less of the success of his stratagem, crossed to the east side of 
 the river and kept out of sight, while Ramses passed to the 
 north on the opposite side. Metella thus secured a position on 
 the flank of Ramses, so that when a favorable moment arrived 
 he could cross the river and divide the Egyptian army in two. 
 Ramses arrived in an apparently favorable position northwest 
 of Kadesh in the afternoon, and camped there, in fancied se- 
 curity. Suddenly he learned that a number of Hittite char- 
 iots had issued from the south side of Kadesh and struck the 
 division that was following his own division of Amon. This 
 second division was quickly put to flight ; some fleeing pre- 
 cipitately into the camp of Ramses, where they produced a 
 consternation that can easily be imagined when it is realized 
 that the chariots of the Hittites followed close behind them. 
 
 That Ramses had been guilty of great negligence in strat- 
 egy cannot be denied; but he instantly realized the situation 
 tactically, and, with the greatest possible decision and bold- 
 ness, charged into the advancing Hittites as they poured into 
 the west side of his camp. His first charge was repelled ; but 
 he instantly made another charge on the eastern side, and 
 carried it out with such impetuosity th'at he drove his enemies 
 before him. Fortunately for him, the discipline among the 
 Hittites was very bad, so that the Hittites, instead of follow- 
 ing up their advantage, had dismounted from their chariots 
 and betaken themselves to plundering the camp. While in 
 this helpless situation they were suddenly set upon by a body 
 of Egyptian recruits, who probably had marched from the 
 coast to join the army of Ramses. The successful charge of
 
 76 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Ramses and the sudden appearance of the recruits, together 
 with the tactical skill and courage displayed by Ramses and 
 his followers, carried the day, finall^^ to the extent of driving 
 the Hittites behind the walls of Kadesh. Ramses immediately 
 returned to Egypt, and made it appear to his people that he 
 had accomplished a tremendous victory. The Hittites, how- 
 ever, were not deceived, nor were the small tribes and king- 
 doms of Syria ; for revolts against Egypt soon began to spread. 
 
 The battle of Kadesh is the first battle of which there is any 
 clear account in history. From the incomplete knowledge of 
 it that we have, it would seem that the Hittites had the better 
 understanding of strategy, but that the Egyptians were supe- 
 rior to them in tactics. They seem to have been so much su- 
 perior that, although they began the battle in a very bad 
 strategic situation, they were able to secure the final victory — 
 the tactical victory, which was, of course, their ultimate end 
 in view. 
 
 Ramses was never able to subdue the Hittites, but he was 
 able finally to bring about a situation enabling him to make a 
 treaty with them whereby each acknowledged the other vir- 
 tually his equal. From that day, Ramses never went to war 
 again ; and though Egypt, under his reign, became very pros- 
 perous and very highly advanced in all the arts of civiliza- 
 tion, she gradually but surely declined. 
 
 The Egyptians were never really a martial people, and it 
 was only because of the energy and ability of a few of their 
 kings that Egypt was able to maintain enough national 
 strength to resist the encroachments of the barbarians who 
 surrounded her on all sides. "We cannot justly point the finger 
 of scorn at Egypt, however; for she continued longer as a 
 great nation than any other nation that has ever lived. Fi- 
 nally in 525 B.C., she was conquered by Cambyses, King of 
 Persia. Besides Egypt, the other great empires of antiquity 
 were Babylonia, Assyria, Chaldea, Media, and Persia. 
 
 About the early Babylonian empire little is known that 
 bears upon our subject, except that the Babylonians built
 
 THUTMOSE III AND RAMSES II 77 
 
 great cities and formed a powerful nation by the same means 
 that Egypt employed and that all great nations have em- 
 ployed since ; that is, by developing the useful arts and 
 sciences, including the art and science of government, and by 
 giving strength to the national structure by developing the 
 military arts and sciences as well. About 728 B.C. Babylonia 
 was conquered by the King of Assyria, which had been a 
 tributary, but which now wrested from Babylon the suprem- 
 acy of the world. The Assyrians were a warlike people, and 
 originally hardy; but they succumbed rapidly under the 
 enervating influences of wealth and were conquered about 
 606 B.C. by the Chaldeans in alliance with the Medes. Nin- 
 evah, their capital, was then literally wiped ofi" of the surface 
 of the earth. The new Babylonian or Chaldean kingdom now 
 took the place of the Assyrian, as the mistress of the world. 
 
 The career of the new Babylonian empire was splendid in 
 all that pertained to the luxuries of life, and probably for that 
 reason it rapidly deteriorated in military strength. In the 
 year 538 b.c. Cyrus, the head of a new kingdom formed of 
 the Medes and Persians, fought a battle with the King of 
 Babylon in the plains outside the city, and defeated him. 
 Strange as it may seem, the gates of Babylon, though it was a 
 strongly fortified city, were then thrown open without further 
 resistance to the Persians ! An interesting fact resulted from 
 this, in that the scepter of world power passed from the 
 Semitic nations, which had always held it hitherto, to the 
 Aryan nations. Since the capture of Babylon, the great na- 
 tions of the world have always been Aryan. An exception 
 must be made to this statement in favor of Japan ; because in 
 the past few years Japan, though not even of the Caucasian 
 race but of the Turanian race, has fought her way to the front 
 and become one of the great nations of the earth. 
 
 Until the year 553, fifteen years before the conquest of 
 Babylon, the Medes had held supremacy over the Persians. 
 After they had overthrown the Assyrian empire, acting in con- 
 junction with the Babylonians, they extended their dominions
 
 78 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 rapidly; but about 553 B.C. Cyrus, King of Anshan, east of 
 Persia, overthrew their power, and united all the Medes and 
 Persians under himself as king. 
 
 Cyrus was one of the great conquerors of history. After 
 conquering Media, he conquered Lydia and Babylonia, Lydia 
 being a rich and fertile country in the western part of Asia 
 Minor, bordering on the Mediterranean. The King of Lydia 
 at this time was Croesus, supposed to be the richest man in the 
 world. Alarmed at the growth of Persia, Crcesus had thrown 
 down the gage of battle to Cyrus, who defeated him in the 
 open field (in 546 b.c.) and captured Sardis, the greatest 
 city. 
 
 Cyrus was succeeded by his son, Cambyses, who invaded 
 Egypt with results unparalleled in one way. Having cap- 
 tured Memphis and ascended the Nile as far as Thebes, he 
 sent from there an army of 50,000 men to take possession of 
 the oasis of Amon. But of this host not a man ever returned, 
 and history does not tell us why ! By some it has been sup- 
 posed that the army was overwhelmed in a tremendous sand- 
 storm. Shortly afterwards Cambyses committed suicide. 
 
 He was succeeded by Darius I, who first devoted himself to 
 bringing about prosperity in the interior of the country, and 
 afterward to extending its boundaries. After bringing all the 
 Punjab in northwestern India under his power, he turned his 
 thoughts and ambitions to the westward, and resolved on the 
 invasion of Europe.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 
 
 DARIUS, King of Persia, made three expeditions to 
 Europe, of which the second and third were di- 
 rected ultimately at Athens. Great preparations 
 were made for each expedition, and all precautions were taken 
 that the provinces left behind in Asia Minor should be reduced 
 to order and compelled to take their due part in the prepara- 
 tions. The King's son-in-law, Mardonius, had charge of the 
 first. He was sent to re-assert Persian supremacy in Thrace 
 and Macedonia, and then to march through Macedonia into 
 Greece, while a fleet sailed along the coast in cooperation. 
 Thrace and Macedonia were subdued, but the expedition had 
 to be abandoned because the fleet was partially wrecked in a 
 storm near the promontory of Mount Athos. Mardonius was 
 compelled to return to Persia, after he had fulfilled an im- 
 portant preliminary part of the undertaking (492 b.c). 
 
 Two years later, when the second expedition started out, it 
 went straight across the ^gean Sea, instead of going by land 
 through Thrace and Macedonia. The cities of the Asian sea- 
 board were compelled to equip warships and transports for 
 cavalry, and the command of the army was given to Datis. 
 How great were the forces that he headed it is impossible to 
 know ; but there can be little question that both the land part 
 and the naval part were much larger than anything that 
 Greece could oppose. The expedition sailed across the ^gean 
 Sea between Asia Minor and Greece, subduing the various 
 islands, and then went up the channel between Euboea and 
 Attica, in which Athens was, and captured certain towns in 
 the province of Euboea. The army then crossed the narrow 
 channel to Attica, landed on the shores of the Bay of Mara- 
 
 79
 
 80 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 From Creasy's "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World." 
 By permission of Harper & Brothers. 
 
 thon, about twenty-two miles northeast of Athens, and drew 
 up their galleys on the beach. 
 
 The Athenians had had plenty of time in which to prepare 
 for the attack. They had also had considerable experience in 
 war, and the fruits of this experience showed in the strategical 
 and tactical excellence of their operations. Their army num- 
 bered about 10,000 men, under the war-ruler Callimachus, 
 and it was reinforced before the battle by about 1000 Plateaus. 
 The first decision the generals had to make was the very im- 
 portant one as to whether he should await the attack in Athens 
 or advance to meet the enemy. It seems that there was con- 
 siderable discussion, and that the final decision was to follow 
 the campaign plan of Miltiades and meet the enemy in the 
 plain of Marathon. This plain lay between two marshes at 
 its northern and southern ends, and between the sea on its 
 east side and a mountainous country on its west side. There 
 were two roads by which the army could march, one of
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 81 
 
 which led to the field of Marathon along a narrow stretch of 
 beach, while the other led through the mountains, and entered 
 the plain somewhere near its middle. If the army had 
 marched by the coast road, the Persians would have been able 
 to attack the head of the column as it reached the plain. 
 Naturally, the Athenians took the other road, and established 
 themselves in a good position in the hills, where they could not 
 be assaulted successfully from the plain. There they awaited 
 the first move of the Persians. 
 
 The Athenians had so much the advantage of position that 
 it was clearly to their interest to delay the engagement; and 
 equally clearly was it to the advantage of the Persians that it 
 should not be delayed too long. After waiting several days 
 in the hope that the Greeks would make some false move, the 
 Persians made ready to advance toward Athens, the land force 
 to follow the narrow main road along the water-front and the 
 naval force to go by sea. The Persians, who at first had occu- 
 pied the northern part of the plain, crossed the river that 
 separated them from the southern part, detaching a consider- 
 able portion to guard their right flank from any assault by 
 the Greeks. Exactly what happened immediately afterward 
 is not known ; but it seems that the Greek and Persian forces 
 soon found themselves drawn up in two opposing lines, the 
 Persians with their backs to the sea, and the Greeks with their 
 backs to the mountains. The Greek force was numerically in- 
 ferior in number to the Persian, and composed mostly of 
 hoplites, heavily armed infantry soldiers, clad in armor, and 
 carrying spears, swords and shields. 
 
 The Greeks advanced at a run toward the enemy, in order 
 to come to close quarters, where their heavy arms and armor 
 would have a great advantage over the lighter equipment of 
 the Persians, and also to escape the arrows that the Persians 
 shot at them. The story is that Miltiades purposely made 
 his center weak and his flanks strong, with the idea of permit- 
 ting the Persians to break through the center and then of 
 enveloping them with his flanks. This is exactly what hap-
 
 82 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 pened, and the Athenian wings, closing in on the enemy's 
 flanks as they rushed forward, threw them into confusion, and 
 then drove them back upon the shore with slaughter. It seems 
 probable that only a portion of the Persian army was engaged, 
 and that those unengaged retreated to their ships in disorder 
 as soon as the fact became evident that the Greeks were suc- 
 ceeding. 
 
 The Persian fleet then sailed for Athens; but, arriving 
 within sight of the place and seeing that it was not unde- 
 fended (for the victors of Marathon had immediately marched 
 to Athens to defend it), they sailed away, and Datis aban- 
 doned the enterprise. 
 
 The battle of Marathon, like a few others in history in which 
 great forces were not engaged, was nevertheless a super-im- 
 portant battle; because, if the issue had been decided in the 
 contrary way, Greece would have come under the heel of 
 Persia, and the world would now not have the benefits of the 
 civilization that Greece afterward created. The battle is one 
 illustration, among countless others in history, that the tri- 
 umph of civilization over barbarism and semi-civilization has 
 been brought about by force — that is, by force of war. This 
 does not mean that the people on the side of civilization have 
 been more warlike than those on the side of barbarism or of 
 the less advanced civilization. It does mean, however, that 
 the forces on the side of civilization have been directed with 
 a greater intelligence and skill — that is, by better strategy. 
 This means also that a great factor, and possibly the greatest 
 single factor, in the triumph of civilization over barbarism 
 and semi-civilization has been strategy. 
 
 The failure of the expedition roused the Persian king to a 
 determination to repeat the attempt, and on a scale that 
 should not only insure punishment, which had been the main 
 intention of the second expedition, but accomplish conquest. 
 As we shall see, the third expedition was also a failure, be- 
 cause of the defeat of the Persian fleet at the battle of Salamis. 
 
 The great victory at Salamis must, of course, be credited to
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 83 
 
 all the Greeks that took part in it directly or indirectly. One 
 figure stands out, however, so clearly as to outshine all the 
 others. This is the figure of Themistocles. If Thutmose III 
 was the first great strategist of history, Themistocles was the 
 second. Themistocles was gifted with the greatest attribute 
 of the strategist, foresight; and in Themistocles this gift of 
 foresight was reinforced (as it must be in every great strate- 
 gist) with sufficient force and courage to impress his convic- 
 tions on others, and with energy to carry the consequent 
 policy into practice afterward. 
 
 Three years before the battle of Marathon, Themistocles had 
 stood up alone before the admirals and generals (strategoi) 
 and other public men of Athens, and declared that the great- 
 ness of Athens could be best assured, not by a great army, but 
 by a great na\'y. He pointed out the long coastline of Greece, 
 the fact that the fleet alwaj's cooperated with the Persian army 
 in distant expeditions, that the Persian army was dependent 
 on the fleet for assuring its supplies, that an Athenian fleet 
 based on the shores of Greece near by would have a great ad- 
 vantage over a fleet coming from a distant place, that there- 
 fore the weak point in any attack on Greece by Persia was the 
 Persian fleet, and that, as a consequence of all these facts, 
 the main effort of Greek strategy' should be naval. 
 
 Themistocles was able to con\'ince the people of Athens and 
 to commit them to a great increase of their na^'y. A rich 
 bed of silver had recently been discovered and had brought a 
 large sum into the treasury. It was proposed to distribute 
 this among the people; but Themistocles persuaded the As- 
 sembly to apply it to the building of new ships, and even 
 roused so much interest that special contributions were made 
 afterward, and many ships were built. The result was that, 
 before the battle of Salamis, Athens had nearly two hundred 
 triremes in her navy. 
 
 After the return of his ill-fated expedition, King Darius 
 began almost immediately to make preparations for a third ; 
 but a revolt in Egypt delayed them, and shortty afterward his
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 85 
 
 death occurred, in the year 485 b.c. He was succeeded by 
 Xerxes, who debated with his councilors for a long while as 
 to whether or not he should carry out the project of Darius. 
 He was finally persuaded to do so, and definite preparations 
 were undertaken in the year 483. The first act was the foolish 
 one of digging a canal across the Isthmus of Mount Athos, in 
 order that the fleet should not be compelled to go round the 
 promontory where so large a part of the fleet of Mardonius 
 had been wrecked. Another part of the preparations was lay- 
 ing bridges over the Strymon River, which the army would 
 have to cross, and making preparations all along the line of 
 route for the feeding of the soldiers. Another part was the 
 building of two bridges across the Hellespont, which divided 
 Asia Minor in Asia from Thrace in Europe, in order that the 
 army might march across, instead of going by ship ! The ac- 
 counts show that the construction of these two unnecessary 
 bridges was a work that taxed the energies and resources of 
 the engineers and workmen to the utmost ; and that the army 
 did not cross them until April, 480 B.C. It is said that they 
 crossed in two days ; and that Xerxes watched their passage 
 from a marble throne erected on the shore. What the number 
 of the army was is not exactly known. The statements vary 
 from 5,000,000 to 300,000. The latter figure is probably the 
 more nearly correct. 
 
 The Persian army was joined by the fleet near the shores of 
 Thrace, and both acted together thenceforward. They met 
 with little resistance until the army reached the narrow pass 
 of Thermopylffi, sometime in July ; though a short time before 
 the Persian fleet encountered three Greek vessels sent forward 
 to reconnoiter, and destroyed two of them. 
 
 In the meantime, Greece had also been busy making prepara- 
 tions, to which she had been stimulated greatly by the cutting 
 of the canal near Mount Athos. It was realized, of course, 
 that the defense w^ould have to be both militarj^ and naval. 
 At that time Sparta was the strongest power in Greece, for 
 Athens had not yet established herself even as a naval power.
 
 86 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 The result was that the command of the army and navy were 
 both given to Spartans, the command of the army to King 
 Leonidas, and the command of the navy to Eurybiadas. 
 
 When Xerxes reached the Hellespont, the Thessalians real- 
 
 Longitude East 2^° of Crceiivi 1 
 
 From Burg's "History of Greece." 
 By permission of the Macmillan Co. 
 
 IValterO'BoulalIsc 
 
 ized with alarm the defenseless condition of northern Greece, 
 and endeavored to have measures taken for its defense. In 
 this they were unsuccessful, inasmuch as the final decision was 
 made not to attempt any resistance until the Persians should 
 reach the narrow pass of Thermopylae, which was the only 
 direct road through the mountains toward the south. Leo- 
 nidas went there, therefore, with his army, which comprised 
 about 7000 men. In the month of July the Persian army 
 arrived at Thermopylge and the Persian fleet at the southern 
 extremity of the promontory of Magnesium, about fifty miles 
 away. A great storm then arose and destroyed some hundreds 
 of the Persian ships. Naturally, this heartened the Greeks ex- 
 ceedingly, for they believed that it proved that the gods were
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 87 
 
 fighting on their side. The Persians then secretly sent two 
 hundred vessels to sail around Euboea, to get between the 
 mainland and the Greek fleet, then stationed near Artemisium, 
 at the northern end of this island; but the gods again inter- 
 fered, with the result that these two hundred ships, after hav- 
 ing rounded the southern end of the island, were wrecked in 
 a storm on the coast. Meanwhile Leonidas had taken up his 
 post at Thermopylse. The strategic and tactical situation 
 would have been excellent for the Greeks, had there not been 
 a by-road over the mountains, which, though longer than the 
 length of the pass, afforded very few natural facilities for re- 
 sistance. It was hoped that the Persians might not know of 
 this road, but a force of Phocians was nevertheless sent to 
 guard it. 
 
 Xerxes realized the danger of attempting to force the pass, 
 and waited four days in the hope that the Greeks would be 
 overawed by the sight of his great army, and retreat. Since 
 they did not do so, he attacked on the fifth day and on the 
 sixth, but with no result. He then decided to send a force 
 of his best men by the mountain road into the plain beyond, 
 under the guidance of a Greek named Ephialtes, and from 
 there to attack the Greeks in the rear. The manoeuver was 
 successful; and, though the Greeks fought with the greatest 
 gallantry, they could not, of course, prevail against a force 
 so much greater, that attacked them from both sides. 
 
 The forcing of the pass of Thermopylae left free the road to 
 Greece. The Persians advanced rapidly and entered Athens 
 without resistance. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet had re- 
 turned to Athens, and there they found the Peloponnesians 
 building a wall from sea to sea across the isthmus, in the selfish 
 endeavor to protect Peloponnesus only, leaving Attica, includ- 
 ing Athens, undefended. Themistocles and his colleagues 
 made a proclamation that all Athenian citizens should embark 
 in the triremes, and that all who could should convey their 
 families and property across the water to places of safety. 
 This was done; and therefore it was that when the Persians
 
 88 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 reached Athens they found the city almost deserted, except for 
 a small band of defenders who had intrenched themselves on 
 the Acropolis. A conflict ensued which lasted two weeks, at 
 the end of which time the Persians had secured possession of 
 that; natural fortress. 
 
 After the fall of the Acropolis, the danger of the situation 
 
 £leu^ 
 
 ^^c^f2?i^iis 
 
 ^is\ 
 
 T r c, 
 
 MEGARIS /r ' Qf E leu SIS >'^*2S^ 
 
 
 I, oS — 
 
 7 ^I s i a^ n d 3 (.,^., , o^^rf^ 
 
 
 
 
 i«^«rn 1 G y^^ ) 
 
 irv 
 
 S a , o^if I c -^ G a I f 
 
 Battle of 
 
 SALAMIS 
 B.C. 480. 
 
 Sea Miles 
 ; ? j 4 
 
 From Burg's "History of Greece." 
 By permission of the Macmillan Co. 
 
 IValAerii-eoulalisc, 
 
 was intensely realized, and the Greek strategoi held a council 
 of war, at which it was decided that the Greeks would retreat 
 to the isthmus south of Attica, and that the Greek fleet should 
 there await the attack of the Persian fleet. Themistocles had 
 been exerting his influence to have the decisive fight in the 
 Bay of Salamis; but his colleagues, being men of inferior 
 strategic genius and daring, were overimpressed by the fact 
 that there would be greater safety from disaster near the 
 isthmus, because they would be in close touch with their land 
 forces, and also have the Peloponnesus to retreat to in case of 
 defeat.
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 89 
 
 At this juncture, with patriotic intent, Themistocles se- 
 cretly thwarted the execution of the decision of the strategoi 
 by going privately to Eurybiadas and convincing him that ii 
 would be more advantageous to fight in the restricted waters 
 of the Bay of Salamis than in the open bay; because in the 
 narrow waters of Salamis the great number and speed of the 
 Persian ships could not be utilized. A new council was then 
 called, in which Themistocles was able to impress his views, 
 though with great difficulty. 
 
 Meanwhile the Persians were not idle. They had placed 
 their fleet across the entire southern exit from the Bay of 
 Salamis, and had also landed troops on the island of Psyttalea, 
 to rescue any Persians and to kill any Greeks who might swim 
 ashore in the expected battle. These movements alarmed the 
 Greeks to such extent that another council was called, at 
 which so timorous a feeling was exhibited that Themistocles 
 saw that all his work was about to be nullified. He then de- 
 termined on a course of action that has no counterpart in re- 
 corded history; and if he had been detected in carrying it out 
 he would probably have been declared a traitor, and his name 
 would have gone do\\Ti in history in infamy. What he did 
 was to send a slave to the Persian camp, bearing a message 
 from himself as a friend, to the effect that the Greeks purposed 
 to sail away in the night ; and saying that if they were pre- 
 vented from doing this, a Persian victor}^ was certain, owing 
 to the disaffection among the Greeks; and, furthermore, that 
 if the Persians should attack the Greek ships where they then 
 were, the Athenians would revolt against their allies. Strange 
 as it may seem, this message was believed, and Xerxes took 
 measures to hinder the Greek fleet from escaping by the west- 
 ern straits, between the island of Salamis and Megaris, by 
 placing two hundred ships south of the straits. 
 
 Meanwhile, the council of Greek strategoi was going on. 
 Suddenly word was brought that the Greek fleet had thus been 
 made prisoner. Themistocles had gained his point : the battle 
 had to be fought at Salamis.
 
 90 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 At daybreak on the following morning the Persians began 
 their advance, passing on both sides of the island of Psyttalea 
 into the Bay of Salamis. This, of course, put them at a great 
 tactical disadvantage, because the Greek ships could attack 
 the heads of the column as they came successively into the 
 bay. The Greeks set upon them furiously; and so crowded 
 were the waters that the great numbers of the Persian ships, 
 instead of being an advantage to them, was an actual dis- 
 advantage, because it prevented their freedom of movement. 
 The result was a perfect victory for the Greeks. 
 
 The battle of Salamis is one of the most instructive battles in 
 the history of the world, in that it proves the overwhelming 
 possibilities of the genius of the strategist ; for by nothing else 
 than the genius of Themistocles was the expedition of the 
 Persians brought to naught and Greece saved from ruin. 
 
 The battle of Marathon has sometimes been declared to be 
 the most important battle in the history of the world up to 
 that time. Perhaps it was, but certainly it was not so im- 
 portant as the later battle of Salamis ; for the battle of Mara- 
 thon repelled what was comparatively a minor expedition, 
 while the battle of Salamis repelled the most determined at- 
 tack that Persia was capable of making. 
 
 The battle of Salamis is also a better illustration of the 
 operations of strategy than is the battle of Marathon, though 
 there was considerable strategic preparation before both bat- 
 tles ; for the planning of the battle of Marathon was of a more 
 commonplace order, made to meet a more usual situation, and 
 more obviously suggested by the conditions than was the plan- 
 ning of the battle of Salamis by Themistocles. Though many 
 of the campaigns that have followed Salamis in the succeeding 
 centuries have employed the services of many more men, have 
 extended over larger areas and required a longer time, there 
 is no campaign that illustrates more brilliantly the victory- 
 gaining power of good strategy. 
 
 The word strategy, it may be remarked, comes from the 
 Greek word strategeia, which meant the art of the strategos.
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 91 
 
 Now, Themistocles was a strategos. It is true that he occupied 
 other positions at different times; but it was his ability as a 
 strategos that enabled him to see that Greece needed a 
 navy more than an army; to realize the strate^e advantage 
 of the Bay of Salamis as the locality for the coming battle ; to 
 bring the Athenians to his point of view; and finally, when 
 they failed him because of sheer lack of strategic genius them- 
 selves, it was the ability of Themistocles as a strategos that 
 enabled him to have the battle fought at Salamis, in spite of 
 them. All these things might have happened, of course, and 
 the battle have been lost by the Greeks. In that case, Themis- 
 tocles would have been like many another man who was just 
 about to put his foot on the pinnacle of greatness, and then 
 slipped off. But Themistocles did not slip off. The issue of 
 the battle was exactly what Themistocles had foreseen; and 
 the name of Themistocles is therefore enrolled among the 
 names of the very few strategists who stand on the high pla- 
 teau of greatness. 
 
 Many centuries later, after the weapons and methods of 
 warfare in Europe had assumed, for the time being, a fairly 
 definite type in all armies, before navies had yet emerged from 
 their relative inferiority to armies because of the uncertainties 
 of sail power and because of the difficulty of cooperation be- 
 tween armies and navies, the word strategy came gradually to 
 be applied to military strategy only, and even to the mere 
 operating of armies in the field, after war had begun. That 
 this was a very narrow view of strategy can hardly be denied ; 
 and that it left out of consideration all strategic preparations 
 preceding war is clear. Possibly this might not have been 
 disadvantageous if another word had existed, or had been 
 created, to bring before the minds of people the fact that the 
 most important single factor in gaining victory in any war 
 is the strategic preparation made before the war begins. But, 
 as there is no such word, we must either recognize strategy as 
 a continuing factor, existing before a war and extending 
 through it, or else ignore all that strategists like Themistocles,
 
 92 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Philip of Macedon, Frederick the Great, and Moltke did before 
 their wars, and imagine wars to start from a strategic zero! 
 The Romans tell us, ^'Ex nihilo, nihil fit." 
 
 The Persians retreated north after the battle of Salamis, 
 the army by land and the fleet by sea. The army wintered 
 in Thessaly, and advanced south in the fallowing spring, 
 whereupon the Athenians again abandoned their city. Under 
 the conditions, one would presume that all the Greeks would 
 rally zealously to repel their Asiatic foe ; and yet, it was only 
 by dint of the greatest exertions that the Athenians were able 
 to induce the Spartans to come tardily to the assistance of 
 Central Greece. The Persians and Greeks finally came to 
 battle on rough ground near the town of Platea, though the 
 Persians tried to bring on the battle on a level plain near by, 
 which they selected because it would give them room for the 
 movements of their cavalry. In the battle that ensued, the 
 Greeks won, largely because of their heavier armor and weap- 
 ons, and the greater skill and strength of the Spartan hoplites. 
 About the same time the crews of Greek vessels landed at 
 Mycale, and gained a victory over a superior force of Persians. 
 
 The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were due in a 
 measure, of course, to the fact that they had the strategic ad- 
 vantage of position, in being near to their home base of sup- 
 plies, while the Persians were dependent on a long line of 
 communications ; but they were due in at least equal measure 
 to the fact that the Greeks were superior to the Persians men- 
 tally, spiritually, and physically. A contributory reason was 
 that the battlefields of Greece, both on the water and on the 
 land, were so small, owing to the numerous ranges of hills and 
 mountains and the shape of the coastline, that the numerical 
 superiority of the Persians could not be fully utilized. An 
 army or a fleet is at a great disadvantage when it finds itself 
 so placed that its freedom of movement is restricted. We can 
 draw another analogy from the prize-ring, in which we see that 
 one pugilist acquires a great advantage over the other if he 
 can drive him into a comer against the ropes.
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 93 
 
 In the same year with the battle of Salamis, the Greeks won 
 a decisive victory at Himera over the Carthaginians, who, 
 doubtless instigated by Xerxes, attempted an invasion of 
 Sicily. These great victories over two different peoples, fol- 
 lowed by the victories of Platea and Mycale, filled the Greeks 
 with extraordinary enthusiasm, and instilled in them what 
 they had never had before, a national spirit. In a short time, 
 however, the long-standing rivalry between Athens and 
 Sparta, the great dissimilarity in the characters of their peo- 
 ples, and the inherently jealous character of all, brought about 
 a gradually increasing enmity. The main cause of this was 
 the fact that Athens devoted herself to the beautifying of the 
 city and the production of works of art, and assumed an atti- 
 tude of superiority over Sparta and all other parts of Greece. 
 Under Pericles, a sort of Athenian empire was established, 
 wliich, though small, was more beautiful and elegant than any 
 that has existed since. 
 
 War between Athens and Sparta finally broke out in 431 B.C. 
 The resources of Athens and her allies were greater than those 
 of Sparta and her allies; but the result was the same as in 
 many similar wars, the side that possessed the greater mate- 
 rial sources going down before the side that possessed the 
 greater strategic skill and military strength. The war was 
 not fought at all well by the Athenian side, and ended in 
 405 B.C. with what has been called the battle of ^gospotami, 
 but which was not a battle at all, but a disgraceful incident. 
 For the Athenians, not seeing the enemy near on one occasion, 
 left their ships near the shore while they landed to gather 
 food, and the enemy, coming up at this time with their fleet, 
 simply attacked the vacated triremes. This scandalous event 
 ended the war, and caused the imposition of degrading terms 
 of peace on Athens. In only seventy-six years after the glori- 
 ous battle of Salamis, the Athenians had degenerated so 
 greatly that they were forced to demolish their long walls, give 
 up all their warships except twelve, and follow Sparta in peace 
 and in war. The Peloponnesians entered the Pireeus with
 
 94 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 their fleet, and began the destruction of the walls of Athens to 
 the music of flutes. 
 
 Sparta had now become preeminent, wholly because of her 
 warlike spirit; but she soon had to maintain her supremacy 
 against the rising power of Thebes under her king, Epaminon- 
 das. A battle between them was fought at Leuctra in 371 
 B.C., which was won by Epaminondas by the exercise of an 
 unexpected mode of attack now called the ''attack en echelon," 
 by which one wing' (in this case the left) was advanced ahead 
 of the center, and the center ahead of the right. As the left 
 wing would be the first to strike the enemy, Epaminondas 
 made it especially strong — made it, in fact, a column fifty 
 men deep. The Spartans being drawn up in line, twelve men 
 deep as usual, their right wing could not withstand the impact 
 of the first charge, and was hurled back in confusion, which a 
 prompt attack by the Theban cavalry increased. The Spartan 
 center and left threw themselves on the right flank of the 
 Theban column, but were held off by the reserves, the ' ' Sacred 
 Band" of three hundred hoplites, which Epaminondas had 
 stationed in the rear for that purpose. 
 
 This attack, if it were new, showed a great deal of inventive, 
 strategical, and tactical ability on the part of Epaminondas. 
 And it probably was new to the Spartans ; for otherwise they 
 would not have been surprised, and would either have strength- 
 ened their right wing, and had reserves at hand there, or 
 would have been prepared to take effective counter-measures, 
 and attack more strongly the head of the Theban column and 
 the Theban center and rear with their center and left wings. 
 It will be noted that Epaminondas did not really isolate any 
 part of the Spartan force from the rest of the force, and that 
 all the parts of the Spartan force could have acted together. 
 That they did not do so must be ascribed to defective tactical 
 skill in the Spartan chief. 
 
 The battle of Leuctra enhanced the prestige of Thebes and 
 prompted her to achieve the supremacy in Greece : but in the 
 battle of Mantinea, in 362 b.c, though Epaminondas repeated
 
 MILTIADES AND THEMISTOCLES 95 
 
 his tactics of Leuctra with distinct success, and cut through 
 the opposing ranks of the enemy, he himself was mortally- 
 wounded, and there was no one able to take his place. The 
 result was a victory for neither side, and a truce that practi- 
 cally restored the status quo. 
 
 From the dawn of history until the time we now have 
 reached in this discussion, Greece had never become a nation, 
 and had never, therefore, been able to exercise the influence 
 in the world that might have been expected from the high in- 
 telligence and strong character of her various peoples; be- 
 cause no single state and no single man had been great enough 
 to draw all together under one leadership and direct their 
 energies to one purpose. Greece was never able to unite her- 
 self. She was finally united by Philip, king of a semi-bar- 
 barous state called Macedon.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER HIS SON 
 
 PHILIP was a son of a strategist, Amyntas II, who was 
 king of the lowlanders in Macedon, and who by adopt- 
 ing the military system and the arms and armor of the 
 civilized Greeks was able to bring the barbarian highlanders 
 into subjection and unite all of Macedon in one monarchy, 
 under himself as king. 
 
 Amyntas died in 369 B.C. In 367 the Thebans interfered in 
 Macedon, and carried away Philip as a hostage, Philip being 
 then fifteen years old. Thebes was at the height of her glory. 
 Her army was the best in the world, and her civilization, while 
 not so cultured as that of Athens, was more virile. Philip 
 was tremendously impressed, with all he saw; and when, at 
 the end of a three years' stay in Thebes, he returned to Mace- 
 don, he was filled with designs for glorifying himself and her. 
 In 358 he deposed his nephew, had himself proclaimed king, 
 and started on a career which evidenced a combination of far- 
 sightedness, determination, courage, diplomatic skill, and 
 strategic wisdom that has no superior in history. At this time 
 Macedon was looked upon by the Greeks as almost barbarous ; 
 but Philip realized that Greece was a hopelessly and helplessly 
 divided collection of little states, incapable of concerted action. 
 For twenty-two years Philip carried on a program of diplo- 
 matic intrigue, statesmanship, and bullying that gradually 
 brought Macedon to the front, and made it evident that if the 
 Greek states did not combine against her, Philip would con- 
 quer them all and unite them under his crown, as his father 
 had united the tribes of Macedon. 
 
 Among the many statesmanlike things that Philip aceom- 
 
 96
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 97 
 
 plished, the most important single thing was the improvement 
 he effected in the Macedonian army. In order fully to appre- 
 ciate the importance of this, we must realize that Greece had 
 been on the downward road ever since her great victories over 
 Persia in 480 b.c. ; that Persia, though effete, was still the most 
 powerful empire in the world, and that she still threatened to 
 smother the only civilization in the world — the civilization of 
 Greece. 
 
 Philip combined those traits which we see in all men who 
 have pushed their countries forward. If he had not, he would 
 not have been able to achieve even his first success — that of 
 making the Macedonian army the best in the world. But, by 
 sheer force of character and ability, he was able, not to force 
 the Macedonian people to build up their army, but to fire them 
 with enthusiasm and to enlist all classes of people to take part 
 gladly in the work. He was himself an incessant worker, a 
 fighter, a drinker, and a man of the people in his sympathies 
 and tastes. Demosthenes said of Philip : "In his struggle 
 for power and empire he had an eye cut out, his collar-bone 
 fractured, and a hand and leg mutilated, and was willing to 
 sacrifice any part of his body which fortune might choose to 
 take, provided he could live with the remainder in honor and 
 glory." This being understood, we can readily see how he 
 organized the rough highland huntsmen and the peasants of 
 the lowlands in local regiments, and built up the Macedonia 
 phalanx. 
 
 This phalanx was like the Greek phalanx, except that the 
 spears were much longer and the armor lighter, and that the 
 men were not massed so closely together, and had therefore 
 greater freedom of movement. The nobles served in the cav- 
 alry as ''companions" of the king; for a part of Philip's sys- 
 tem was to give greater prominence to the cavalry. Gradually 
 stirred by the example and enthusiasm of the king, and by the 
 efficiency that the army was evidently gaining, the army be- 
 came the pride of the people; and military distinction and 
 military rank became the great prizes in the eyes of everyone.
 
 98 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 The effect on the people was admirable in every way; for it 
 instilled the virtues of courage, loyalty, patriotism, and health- 
 ful living, and gave to Macedon that quality which is more 
 effective than any other in making a nation strong — sol- 
 idarity. 
 
 Naturally, the states of Greece became alarmed at the prog- 
 ress of Philip, and several wars resulted ; but the Greeks were 
 too selfish and pleasure-loving to make much effective resist- 
 ance. The most important single factor in arousing the 
 Greeks against Philip was the Athenian orator Demosthenes. 
 Gradually Demosthenes brought about an Hellenic League. 
 A battle between the Hellenic League and Philip finally took 
 place at Charonea in the year 338 b.c. On each side were 
 about 30,000 men. The battle reminds us curiously of the 
 battle of Leuctra, though reversed ; that is, Philip used tactics 
 against the Thebans and the Athenians like those which the 
 Thebans had used against the Spartans. On the League side, 
 the Thebans held the right wing, some of the smaller states the 
 middle, and the Athenians the left; while on the Macedonian 
 side, the left flank was made the strongest, and was supported 
 by the cavalry, as had been the case with the Theban side at 
 the battle of Leuctra. The subsequent tactics also were simi- 
 lar, for Philip directed the right wing to give way for a while 
 before the Athenians, while his left wing forced back the 
 Thebans and threw them into confusion; whereupon the cav- 
 alry under the king's son, Alexander, then eighteen years old, 
 threw themselves upon the helpless mass. The issue was the 
 same, also, in that the side pursuing these tactics gained a de- 
 cisive victory. 
 
 Though Demosthenes had been able to bring about the Hel- 
 lenic League, and though his motives doubtless were patriotic 
 and not merely narrow, it is evident that it was well for the 
 world that Philip triumphed and united Greece. Few Greeks 
 held this point of view, however; and those who did were 
 under the leadership of Isocrates, a man ninety years of age, 
 a student and a statesman. But Isocrates, like most of the
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 99 
 
 sound statesmen and students of history, was not an orator; 
 and his knowledge and wisdom could not contend successfully 
 before a crowd against the picturesque and emotional ha- 
 rangues of Demosthenes. So it happened that, instead of 
 joining with Philip and making common cause against the 
 noxious influences of Persia, the Greeks were compelled to 
 serve under him by force. 
 
 The battle of Chaeronea was one of the most important bat- 
 tles of the world ; not only because it united Greece and paved 
 the way for the overthrow of Persia by Alexander, but be- 
 cause it shows better than any other battle in history, up to 
 that time, the climax of a long-continued and persistent stra- 
 tegical effort, and because it also shows strategy in the role 
 of the promoter of civilization against barbarism. Strategy 
 has not always played this role ; sometimes it has been em- 
 ployed by barbarians against civilization. But, inasmuch as 
 strategy requires for its successful use a very considerable 
 mentality, good strategy has more often been found on the 
 side of civilization than on the side of barbarism. In fact, 
 while there are many things that account for the gradual tri- 
 umph of civilization over barbarism and semi-civilization, it 
 can hardly be denied that, inasmuch as the triumph has been 
 accomplished by actual force in the majority of cases, the 
 main factor in effecting the triumph of civilization has been 
 strategy. 
 
 Might does not make right, and right does not make might ; 
 but the history of the world seems to show that it is right for 
 the human race to progress in civilization, and that civiliza- 
 tion (up to the present time) has triumphed by means of force 
 skilfully directed by strategy. 
 
 Philip was a great strategist, but his morals were not wholly 
 above reproach; so, when he desired to marry a certain Cleo- 
 patra, he divorced his wife, the mother of Alexander, and ar- 
 ranged a wedding with Cleopatra. But the offended queen 
 induced a man to murder him; with the result that Philip 
 fell with a dagger in his breast on his wedding day.
 
 100 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Alexander succeeded to the throne, and found himself in a 
 situation fraught with urgent difficulties and dangers of many- 
 kinds ; but it is in meeting such situations that men like Alex- 
 ander find the opportunities to exert their powers, and to 
 show the difference between themselves and other men. The 
 fact that Philip had died brought about a natural movement 
 on the part of the states he had subdued to rise instantly in 
 revolt. The most threatening revolt was that of Thessaly, just 
 south of Macedon. Marching thither, Alexander soon found 
 himself confronted at the entrance of a narrow defile by a 
 lorce of Thessalians. These he succeeded in circumventing by 
 adopting the ingenious scheme of cutting a new path up the 
 steep side of a mountain, and thus making a road for his army. 
 By this road he got behind the enemy, and threatened them 
 from sucn a position of advantage in the rear that the Thes- 
 salians abandoned their hostile attitude at once. Alexander 
 was shortly afterward made supreme general of the Greeks, 
 and an invasion of Persia under his command was decided on. 
 
 But Llacedon was threatened on the northeast by Thrace 
 and on the northwest by Illyria. Passing into Thrace with 
 great swiftness, Alexander reached a defile in the mountains 
 which he had to pass, and found it defended by mountaineers 
 who had hauled up a number of war chariots to the top, in 
 order to roll them down upon the Macedonians. Alexander 
 showed himself at once to be not only a man of daring, but an 
 inventor ; for he immediately ordered the infantry to advance 
 up the path, opening the ranks when possible to let the chariots 
 go through ; but, when that was impossible, to fall on their 
 knees and hold their shields together as a sort of roof on which 
 the chariots would slide and from which they would roll off. 
 This amazing story is supposed to be true ; and the most amaz- 
 ing part of it is that the device succeeded perfectly. When 
 the barbarians had expended all their chariots, they were 
 easily forced back by the heavily armed and athletic Mace- 
 donians. 
 
 Shortly afterward Alexander had to cross the Danube with
 
 102 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 all his equipments and attack the barbarians on the other 
 bank. This he saw he could not do except by some stratagem. 
 Here his inventive faculty was called into play again, with the 
 result that all the fishing-boats in the neighborhood were col- 
 lected, and tent-skins filled with hay were tied firmly together 
 and strung across the stream in the night-time; and, by the 
 means of these as floats, he got his entire force and their equip- 
 ments across before daybreak. The work after that was 
 easy. 
 
 Alexander then marched toward lUyria, but found that the 
 Illyrians were already at the frontier of Macedon and had 
 captured Pelion, a fortress commanding a mountain pass. 
 He marched rapidly to the vicinity of Pelion, and found the 
 heights covered with Illyrians. Alexander intended to block- 
 ade them in their fastness; but, reinforcements reaching the 
 enemy, he saw that it was necessary to retreat. This task was 
 excessively difficult and dangerous, the route lying through 
 mountainous defiles and across a river; but the skilful move- 
 ments of the highly trained Macedonians enabled them to ac- 
 complish it, and to reach the opposite side of the river without 
 losing a man. In this position his communications were safe, 
 and Alexander therefore waited there, watching for an oppor- 
 tunity to strike. This soon came. For the enemy, being evi- 
 dently exceedingly stupid in strategy, assumed that Alexander 
 had retreated in fear, and so far neglected all precautions as 
 to form a camp near Alexander's forces without taking due 
 precautions to guard against surprise. Alexander promptly 
 surprised them; and the subjugation of lUyria followed 
 promptly in consequence. 
 
 But Alexander was not yet secure in Greece; for the The- 
 bans and others had revolted and blockaded the citadel of 
 Thebes called Cadmea, in which was a Macedonian garrison. 
 Alexander, operating with incredible swiftness, appeared sud- 
 denly and unexpectedly before the walls of Thebes, and 
 quickly captured it. Then, in accordance with a decision of 
 the Confederacy of Corinth, the city was leveled, her land
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 103 
 
 divided among the Confederates, and the inhabitants sold into 
 bondage. 
 
 With the fall of Thebes, Alexander's campaigns in Europe 
 ended. He then took up with great carefulness the expedition 
 into Asia which his father had projected. His greatest weak- 
 ness lay in the lack of a good navy, for the Persians had an 
 excellent navy. The Confederacy of Corinth should have 
 helped him, but it did not do so on any adequate scale ; nor did 
 the Greeks at any time show any but the most languid inter- 
 est in Alexander's expedition into Asia. Yet that expedition 
 spread Greek civilization and prestige and extended Greek 
 commerce to the utmost confines of the then known world. 
 
 Alexander finally collected an army of about 30,000 foot- 
 soldiers and 5000 cavalry. Of the foot-soldiers there were six 
 regiments of the phalanx which formed the center of his army 
 in all engagements, and who were supported by Greek hoplites, 
 some belonging to the Confederacy and some mercenary. 
 There were, besides, the light infantry, who were stationed on 
 the right of the phalanx, the heavy Macedonian cavalry on 
 the extreme right, and the ThesS'alian cavalry on the extreme 
 left. The fleet transported the army across the Hellespont to 
 Abydos, and Alexander landed in Asia, never to return. 
 
 At this time the Persian empire had degenerated miserably 
 in strength and spirit, though it covered substantially the same 
 territory as when Cyrus, its founder, died. The great acces- 
 sion of wealth and the long-continued peace had wrought the 
 same result which that combination of conditions has always 
 wrought, and the whole structure of the rotten empire needed 
 but a few strong blows to disintegrate for the benefit of man- 
 kind. Alexander had become informed, through a system of 
 spies, of all the conditions before he determined to embark 
 on the expedition ; so that he was not starting on any rash or 
 ill-considered project, but on a carefully calculated strategic 
 enterprise. 
 
 Throughout the accounts of Alexander's invasion of Persia, 
 we see on his side an amazing series of performances, charae-
 
 104 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 terized by the highest order of energy, courage, and good 
 judgment ; while we see on the other side exactly the reverse. 
 The Great King had formed an army of 40,000 men to defend 
 Asia Minor, and he showed his bad strategic judgment at the 
 very start by consigning the army, as a joint command, to 
 several generals. These several generals showed equally bad 
 judgment when they drew up their forces against Alexander 
 on the banks of the little river Granicus ; first by opposing a 
 purely passive resistance, and second by making an incredibly 
 bad disposition of their troops in placing the cavalry in a 
 long line in front along the river-bank, with the Greek hoplites 
 (mercenaries) on the slopes behind them! Alexander at- 
 tacked with his usual force and good judgment, and routed the 
 Persian cavalry, whom, it would seem, the rest of the Persian 
 army did not assist at all. Alexander's phalanx then at- 
 tacked the Greek hoplites, who seem to have been resting in the 
 background, waiting to be attacked; and then his light and 
 heavy cavalry attacked them on the flanks. The Persians 
 fought with great courage, but the natural result of bad 
 strategy was not thereby prevented. 
 
 Alexander then marched south along the west coast of Asia 
 Minor, and met with no appreciable resistance until he 
 reached Miletus, which consisted of two parts, an outer city 
 and an inner city, the latter strongly fortified and surrounded 
 with a wall and a fosse, or moat. Alexander occupied the 
 outer city, and then stormed the inner city successfully with 
 his siege engines. The Persian fleet was in the vicinity; but 
 the Macedonian fleet had reached the harbor first, and pre- 
 vented the Persian squadron from bringing help. 
 
 Alexander showed his good strategic judgment at this time 
 by refusing to follow the advice of one of his generals to send 
 his fleet against the Persians, which was greater in size; for 
 Alexander realized that, while the superior individual excel- 
 lence of his soldiers enabled him to encounter a greater force 
 of Persian soldiers with success, he could not count on any 
 such individual superiority with his ships. He even went
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 105 
 
 further, and took what undoubtedly was a most risky step — 
 that of disbanding his fleet after the fall of Miletus. This 
 action entailed the double disadvantage of giving up all the 
 aid the fleet might give to him, and of abandoning any line of 
 retreat from Asia into Europe, in case his operations in Asia 
 should be unsuccessful. In a great majority of circumstances, 
 an action like that of Alexander's would be strategically most 
 unwise. But, like all the other vocations of men, strategy is 
 not an exact science, but an art ; and, like all arts, its practice 
 in any set of conditions must depend on those conditions. In 
 order to adapt the practice of any art successfully to condi- 
 tions, one must be skilful in that art ; and Alexander was skil- 
 ful in his art, the art of strategy. He estimated the situation 
 of Persia according to the information at his disposal, and 
 came to the conclusion that he would be victorious on the 
 land; that, therefore, he did not need a navy; and that, there- 
 fore, he should not waste any of his resources in maintaining 
 one. Whether Alexander was right or not was to be shown by 
 the result. The result showed that he was right. 
 
 Alexander continued his march down the west coast of Asia 
 Minor, and met the next resistance at Halicarnassus, which 
 was surrounded with a wall and encompassed with a moat. 
 Alexander filled up the moat, and attacked the walls with his 
 war towers and engines. In pursuance of his far-sighted pol- 
 icy of doing as little destruction as possible, Alexander per- 
 mitted the garrison to withdraw, and then took possession of 
 the city. As the cold season was now approaching, he per- 
 mitted part of his army to go into winter quarters, while he 
 advanced with the remainder into Lycia and Phrygia, where 
 his operations w^ere largely diplomatic, and were bent toward 
 winning the satrapies to his side. 
 
 IMeanwhile the Great King was advancing against him with 
 a large army. This army and the Macedonian came together 
 in October, 333 B.C., on the banks of the river Pinarus in the 
 plain of Issus. The Persians, with amazingly bad strategy, 
 had deliberately taken up a position there, though there was
 
 106 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 not space enough for a large force to manoeuver ! They made 
 better tactical dispositions than they had made at the Grani- 
 cus, but thej^ again made the strategic error of adopting a 
 purely defensive plan. Alexander had to advance toward the 
 
 From Burg's "History of Greece." 
 By permission of the Macmillaii Co. 
 
 Walker GrBoulallsc, 
 
 Persians across an open plain, and to cross the river and at- 
 tack the Persians, who were drawn up on the high banks of 
 the opposite side. The forces were arranged as in the accom- 
 panying diagram; and when one looks at this diagram, and 
 realizes that the Persians had not only the advantage of great 
 numerical superiority but of strategic position, one can hardly 
 imagine the state of mind of Alexander when he determined 
 to attack. But strategy includes many more factors than
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 107 
 
 numbers and positions, important as these are. If aU the 
 force of Darius had been Persian, the situation would have 
 been better for Alexander than it actually was; for Darius 
 had 30,000 highly trained Greek hoplite mercenaries. 
 
 Alexander charged at the head of this cavalry across the 
 river, and at the part of the Persian force where the Great 
 King stood in his war chariot. The Persians there opposed 
 a furious resistance, in the course of which Alexander was 
 wounded in the leg. Alexander's phalanx followed, assisted 
 by the lighter infantry, the hypaspists, and were able to push 
 back the enemy hoplites, who were practically their own coun- 
 trymen. The contest there was for a while indecisive: but 
 suddenly the Great King himself, in his war chariot, turned 
 and fled ! 
 
 This precipitated a general rout on the whole left of his 
 line. On his right, the Persian cavalry had crossed the river 
 and were carrying all before them, when suddenly they heard 
 the news of their king's flight. Almost instantly they turned 
 and fled also ; so that in a short time the whole army was in a 
 wild retreat, being cut down from behind and on the flanks 
 by the pursuing Macedons. For their flight the Persians 
 were hardly to be blamed ; for were they not imitating as best 
 they could the example of the commander-in-chief? The 
 Great King was so desirous of vacating the premises that he 
 left his own mother and wife in the hands of the conqueror. 
 Alexander treated them with scrupulous courtesy. 
 
 It has often been said that Darius showed very bad strategic 
 judgment in placing his forces in the narrow plain of Issus, 
 where they could not be manoeuvered to advantage. This, of 
 course, is true ; and yet, it may be pointed out that the very 
 narrowness of the plain, and the very fact that this necessi- 
 tated that a great part of the Persian forces should be kept out 
 of the fight at the beginning and had to act as reserves, made 
 it impossible for the Macedonians to be victorious if the Per- 
 sians held their ground with even a small measure of per- 
 sistency. It may also be pointed out that the very depth of
 
 108 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the Persian formation gave support to the men in front ; that 
 the very fact that a large number of men were in the rear, and 
 comparatively secure, tended to make those in the rear hold 
 their ground ; and that the men at the front could not possibly 
 have retreated if the men in the rear had stood fast. But why 
 should they stand fast, if the king fled ? It is seldom that any 
 man in command of a great military force has given such per- 
 fect examples of bad strategy as King Darius did. 
 
 It has sometimes been stated as one of the "principles" of 
 strategy that when the enemy begins to retreat, he should be 
 pursued with the utmost ardor, Alexander did pursue Darius 
 until nightfall, but then he forbore ; and then, letting Darius 
 go where he willed in peace, Alexander turned his footsteps 
 toward the south. 
 
 For Alexander was no academic strategist. He had been 
 bom and bred in the midst of war; and the first man whom 
 he had known was the greatest strategist of his time. Alex- 
 ander had determined on a perfectly definite objective before 
 he left Macedon, and this objective was the conquest of Persia. 
 To accomplish this, Alexander knew that he must proceed step 
 by step, and that at every step he should leave no powerful 
 enemy to harass him from behind. If he had started east 
 from Issus in pursuit of Darius, he would have left behind him 
 not only Syria and Egypt, but the great Phoenician fleet, which 
 was the backbone of the Persian navy. He therefore per- 
 sisted in his original intention, and advanced against the sea- 
 coast towns of Syria. 
 
 The three principal cities were Aradus, Sidon, and Tyre, 
 great commercial centers of Phoenicia, and bound together as 
 a federation. They would have been a strong trio if they had 
 been sufficiently unselfish to act together ; but, like most com- 
 mercial bodies, their aims were selfish, and as a result they 
 accomplished less, even materially, than otherwise they would 
 have done. As an illustration, it may be stated that some 
 years before Sidon had revolted from Persia, and her two sis- 
 ter cities had promised to support her; but that Tyre and
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 109 
 
 Aradus had then agreed together to abandon Sidon and let 
 her be crushed, so that they could profit by the trade that she 
 would lose. In the present juncture, Aradus and Byblus, 
 
 TYRE. 
 
 From Burg's "History of Greece." 
 By permission of the Macmillan Co. 
 
 lyaiker &-Boutall sc. 
 
 which had in a measure taken Sidon 's place, submitted to 
 Alexander. 
 
 When Alexander reached the vicinity of Tyre, he expressed 
 his desire to visit the city ; but the Tyrians, not knowing what 
 would be the result of his war with Persia, feared to compro- 
 mise themselves, and refused permission. Alexander realized
 
 110 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 that to conquer Tyre was a necessity, because Tyre was the 
 naval base not only of Phoenicia but of Persia; and that the 
 only way in which he could nullify the power of the Persian 
 fleet was to destroy its base. But to capture Tyre was no 
 trivial undertaking for a general who had only hoplites and 
 cavalry to work with ; for Tyre was surrounded with an enor- 
 mous wall, very thick and very high, and stood on an island 
 separated from the shore by more than half a mile of deep 
 water. 
 
 What would you have done if you had been Alexander? 
 
 Alexander built a causeway. The first part of the work was 
 easy; but the farther out the causeway reached the more diffi- 
 cult the work became, because the water became deeper, the 
 workmen came within the range of projectiles from the island, 
 and Tyrian vessels issued from the two harbors of the island 
 and threw projectiles also. To protect the men, Alexander 
 erected two towers on the causeway, on which he mounted war 
 engines for throwing projectiles, and to which he attached cur- 
 tains of leather to act as shields. Then the Tyrians con- 
 structed a fire-ship and let it drift down on the causeway. 
 The result was that they set fire to the towers and the engines, 
 while the Tyrians in the vicinity discharged darts at the 
 Macedonians who tried to put out the fire. 
 
 Alexander, being Alexander, was undismayed, and pro- 
 ceeded at once to widen the causeway, so that it could ac- 
 commodate more towers and engines. He also went up to 
 Sidon and got together some galleys with which to assist his 
 operations. Then suddenly the squadrons of the Phoenician 
 cities, Aradus and Byblus, which had been in the ^gean Sea, 
 and had learned that their cities had submitted to Alexander, 
 came to Sidon and submitted also. As these ships numbered 
 eighty, and as various other ships came in soon after from 
 other cities similarly placed, as well as from Cyprus, whose 
 king submitted also, Alexander found himself ultimately in 
 possession of about two hundred and fifty triremes, and there- 
 fore stronger on the water than, the Tyrians themselves.
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 111 
 
 When ready, Alexander bore down upon Tyre with his 
 whole fleet, of which he, like a good general of those days, 
 commanded the right wing. The Tyrians would not accept 
 the gage of battle ; but they drew up their triremes across the 
 mouths of their harbors and blocked any entrance to them. 
 The causeway by this time had been carried up to the island, 
 and the best engineers that Cyprus and Phoenicia could pro- 
 duce had constructed the necessary war engines. Some of 
 these engines were placed on the causeway, while others were 
 placed on old galleys and transport ships. But they could 
 make little impression on the wall at the east side, which was 
 one hundred and fifty feet high and enormously thick, and 
 from behind which the besieged replied with fiery missiles 
 hurled from war engines. Furthermore, Alexander's engine- 
 carrying vessels could not get close enough to the wall, be- 
 cause of large boulders under the water. 
 
 Alexander placed galleys carrying windlasses near the boul- 
 ders to try to drag them away ; but the Tyrians sent out boats 
 and cut the anchoring ropes of the galleys, so that they drifted 
 away. Alexander answered by stationing boats close to the 
 anchors; and then Tyrian divers came out and cut the cables 
 under water. Finally chains were brought, by the use of 
 which the galleys could be kept in position while the boulders 
 were hauled away. The engine-bearing vessels then got close 
 to the wall. Then the Tyrians made a large curtain of canvas, 
 behind which they manned a number of triremes and smaller 
 vessels with picked men, and from which they suddenly 
 launched an attack on Alexander's vessels. Alexander imme- 
 diately started a counter-movement of small vessels, which he 
 led himself, against the Tyrian vessels, and with such perfect 
 success that henceforth the Tyrians made no further attempts 
 at offensive measures, but restricted themselves to a purely 
 passive defense. 
 
 This passive defense ended as all purely passive defenses 
 have ended — with an inglorious surrender — but after the 
 walls had been breeched, and several thousands had been slain.
 
 112 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 The fall of Tyre gave Alexander, with his new fleet, the 
 command of the sea, and removed the last obstacle in Syria to 
 his journey south. But at the lower end of Palestine, just 
 before the shore turns toward the westward, towered the great 
 stronghold of the Philistines, Gaza. It stood on high ground ; 
 and, since more than two miles of sand lay between it and the 
 seashore, Alexander's fleet could not assist him. Alexander's 
 engineers declared that the walls could never be stormed, on 
 account of the great height of the hill on which they stood. 
 Alexander replied by ordering that ramparts be thrown up 
 around the city so high that war engines mounted on them 
 would be on a level with the walls. Since the best chance 
 seemed to be on the south side, the work there was pushed 
 on rapidly. The engines that had been used at Tyre soon ar- 
 rived, underground mines were placed beneath the walls, and 
 finally, the walls being breeched in places, the Macedonians 
 entered Gaza. 
 
 Egypt was now cut off from Persia; so that the Egyptians, 
 having lost all their ancient spirit, yielded at once when Alex- 
 ander marched within her boundaries and sent his fleet up the 
 Nile to Memphis. In Egypt, Alexander showed his customary 
 attitude toward the people of the countries that he conquered, 
 treating with respect the native religion and customs, but 
 making it clear that he intended to impress Greek civilization 
 upon them, and to advance in every way the interests of Greek 
 commerce. His principal act in this direction was in found- 
 ing a new city where the Nile empties into the Mediterranean, 
 to be called after himself, Alexandria. It is said that Alex- 
 ander himself traced out the ground-plan of the new city. 
 Alexandria became not only the seat of the greatest learning 
 in the world, but the principal port in the eastern Mediter- 
 ranean, diverting commerce from the Phoenician cities, as had 
 been the intention of Alexander. 
 
 In order to make his position secure politically as well as 
 strategically, Alexander undertook an expedition to the sanc- 
 tuary of Ammon ; and he succeeded in making it believed that
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 113 
 
 he was recognized there by the priests of Ammon, after com- 
 munication with their god, as a descendant of Ammon and the 
 rightful King of Egypt. After reorganizing its government 
 he returned to Tyre. After establishing an efficient system of 
 administration there, he started east toward Babylon. 
 
 Alexander left the sea far behind him and struck out into 
 the midst of a hostile empire. But there was nothing reck- 
 less or thoughtless about his expedition. Every detail of logis- 
 tics seems to' have been attended to, the service of the trans- 
 ports and supplies well organized, and the intelligence depart- 
 ment for securing and transmitting information concerning 
 the movements of the enemy fairly comparable in essentials 
 with that which any modem army has brought forth. 
 
 From this intelligence department Alexander learned that 
 Darius, with a much larger army than that which fought at 
 Issus, was waiting for him just beyond the Tigris River, in a 
 plain near Gaugamela, about fifty miles northwest of Arbela. 
 The number was reported to be 1,000,000 foot-soldiers and 
 40,000 horses, a formidable array to be attacked by a force 
 that numbered in all only 47,000. Alexander approached, 
 however, by night, and attained the crest of the hill, whence he 
 could look down and see the enemy drawn up for battle. As 
 a precaution, Alexander had the intervening ground searched 
 for pits and concealed dangers. He himself rode over the 
 plain, and found that the Persians had cleared it of bushes 
 and other obstacles; and he rightly surmised that this meant 
 that the enemy intended to make important use of their war 
 chariots. 
 
 Alexander was advised to make a night attack, in view of 
 the disproportion of forces ; but he decided against this advice, 
 believing that the greater skill, strength, and courage of his 
 men and his own superior ability would compensate for his 
 numerical inferiority. The result proved him to be right, as 
 it usually did. The Persians probablj'- expected a night attack 
 the first night ; for they remained under arms the entire time 
 and were, therefore, comparatively weak and jaded when the
 
 114 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 troops of Alexander, fresh after a good night 's rest, advanced 
 to the attack. 
 
 The Persians were drawn up in two lines, with war chariots 
 and some elephants in front ; and the Great King, with a large 
 body-guard, was in the center, as he had been at Issus. Alex- 
 ander's force was disposed in the usual mannei', with the six 
 regiments of the phalanx in the center, the light infantry and 
 the heavy cavalry on the right, and the Thessalian cavalry on 
 the left. His line was so short, however, compared with the 
 Persian, and the consequent danger of having his wings envel- 
 oped by the Persian wings was so great, that he put behind 
 each wing a second line, which by facing to the right or left 
 could meet a flank attack. As he advanced, leading with the 
 cavalry as usual, he was nearly .opposite the center of the 
 enemy's line. He, therefore, directed his attack obliquely 
 toward the right. Darius noted that this movement was tak- 
 ing the Greek force away from the plain in front of his char- 
 iots, which he had smoothed for their operation; and there- 
 fore he directed the cavalry from his left flank to deliver a 
 flank charge on the Macedonian right, to prevent a further 
 movement in that direction. A brisk battle naturally fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 Meanwhile the Persian scythe chariots charged forward. 
 But the athletic Macedonian archers and spear-throwers at- 
 tacked the chariot drivers, seizing the reins of the horses and 
 pulling the drivers from their seats ; while the light infantry, 
 opening out quickly, let the chariots pass harmlessly through 
 their ranks. The whole Persian line now advanced. It was 
 a critical moment for Alexander, for he saw no weak point in 
 their line on which he could deliver a blow with any reasonable 
 hope of breaking through. But at this moment a number of 
 Persian cavalry were despatched to the assistance of the Per- 
 sian left flank, thereby leaving a gap. Into this gap Alexan- 
 der charged at the head of his cavalry, and then turned to the 
 left and charged the enemy's center near the post of the king 
 and his body-guard. At the same time, the Greek phalanx
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 115 
 
 came into contact with the front of the Persian center, and — 
 the Great King turned his chariot and fled ! 
 
 The series of events that closed the battle of Issus were 
 repeated in their essentials now, except that between the two 
 reg:iments on the left of the Greek phalanx a gap was opened, 
 through which the Persian and Indian cavalry rushed. This 
 would have created a dangerous situation if the cavalry had 
 done as it should have done, and attacked the rear of the 
 Greek phalanx; but, instead of doing this, they galloped 
 straight to the Macedonian camp and began to plunder. 
 While engaged in this occupation they were attacked from 
 the rear by the Greeks, and readily overcome. A desperate 
 conflict was going on, meanwhile, on the left of Alexander's 
 line ; but the superior strength and skill of the Macedonians, 
 and the destruction of the Persian morale caused by the cow- 
 ardly flight of the Persian king, soon brought this conflict to 
 a result that was favorable to the Greeks, Thus one of the 
 critical battles of the world, usually called the battle of Arbela, 
 came to the rescue of civilization. 
 
 Darius fled. Alexander did not pursue, but pressed for- 
 ward to his objective, Babylon. To his surprise, when he ap- 
 proached the city prepared for battle, the gates opened, and 
 the satrap surrendered the city and the citadel. Here Alex- 
 ander followed the same policy as he had in Egypt, and as he 
 did later in all the conquered provinces of Asia: he concil- 
 iated the people, posed as the protector of their customs and 
 religion, and endeavored to win the people to his support. At 
 Babylon he rebuilt the temples that had been destroyed by the 
 Persians, and commanded especially the restoration of the 
 magnificent temple of Bel, which the fire-worshiper Xerxes 
 had partially demolished. 
 
 After resting his army in the most luxurious city of the 
 world, Alexander advanced to Susa, and thence toward Persia. 
 He soon encountered a tribe of hillsmen in the Uxian Pass, 
 who effectually blocked his way through the defile, but whom 
 he easily circumvented by a march night over a difficult
 
 116 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 mountain pass, which enabled him to surprise them in the 
 rear. 
 
 Alexander now entered a region unknown to the outside 
 world, and began an expedition of discovery as well as a 
 march of conquest. He had not gone far when he came to a 
 narrow defile, called the Persian Gates, where he found 
 opposed to him an army of 40,000 foot and 700 horse, guard- 
 ing this pass, which was fortified with a wall. A slight tenta- 
 tive attack 'showed Alexander that thcp^s^was impregnable. 
 He learned from his intelligence department, however, that 
 there were some paths leading through the forests that cov- 
 ered the mountains, but that these paths were very dangerous 
 at any time, especially to men in armor, and still more so at 
 this time, when snow was on the ground. Nothing daunted, 
 Alexander started over the paths at nightfall, leaving part of 
 his troops in front of the pass, with orders to attack as soon 
 as they heard his trumpets sounding from the other side. 
 "With the rest of his force, including the cavalry, he succeeded 
 in traversing the devious and perilous paths and reaching the 
 point decided upon. Sounding the trumpets, he attacked the 
 foe so ardently in their rear, while his troops in front attacked 
 them at the same time there, that he put them to flight after 
 little effective resistance, and with great slaughter. 
 
 This account and most of the other accounts of Alexander's 
 amazing victories in Asia disclose an almost incredible differ- 
 ence between the forces engaged ; and this difference is not in 
 courage, is not to any great degree in strength, but is almost 
 wholly in strategy. In fact, it is almost as easy for an ordi- 
 nary man to gaze undazzled at the brilliant performances of 
 Alexander as to gaze good-temperedly at the stupid perform- 
 ances of his enemies. Can anyone understand how a general 
 in command of 40,000 men could have guarded the Persian 
 Gates against an assailant, and yet failed to guard the by- 
 roads over the mountains? 
 
 Alexander continued his path of conquest, unprecedented 
 then and unequalled to this day, through Persia, and thence
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 117 
 
 north to Media and the city of Ectabana, in pursuit of Darius. 
 Traveling at great speed, both day and night, he finally 
 learned that Darius had been taken prisoner by Bessus, the 
 satrap of Bactria. He finally overtook Darius just as he was 
 breathing his last, having been stabbed by his captors. Alex- 
 ander sent the corpse with all honor to the queen mother, and 
 then started to capture and punish Bessus for the murder of 
 his king. 
 
 Alexander was now carrying out, and in an increasing de- 
 gree, his project, not of destroying or of merely conquering 
 the nations and provinces of the East, but of forming a grand 
 empire which should embrace the whole known world, and 
 which should be divided into states, under efficient administra- 
 tors, and directed by the spirit of the highest Greek civiliza- 
 tion; each state, however, living under its own religion and 
 adhering to its own national customs and institutions. In 
 order to effect this, he deemed it wise to take on himself, in 
 some measure, the characteristics of the Egyptians when in 
 Egj-pt, of the Babylonians when in Babylon, and of the Per- 
 sians when in Persia. This procedure succeeded admir- 
 ably with the conquered peoples, but it aroused an increasing 
 discontent and jealousy among his followers. Naturally, they 
 did not take so comprehensive a view as he did, and it filled 
 them with anger to see their king show so much respect to 
 people whom they despised as low barbarians; and it espe- 
 cially angered them when the king put on an oriental dress 
 and conferred with Persian lords and satraps, showing them 
 marks of confidence and favor. 
 
 Alexander continued his progress through Persia, subduing 
 provinces, founding cities, and establishing an empire. The 
 court he took with him might be called a small moving city, 
 so large was it, so filled with men of many callings, and so well 
 organized for the purpose that Alexander had in mind and 
 was accomplishing. One becomes dizzy in reading of how this 
 young man not only carried all before him in a military way, 
 but accomplished much more in the way of construction than
 
 118 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 destruction ; how he gave the people more efficient and honest 
 government than they had had before ; and how he performed 
 the seemingly impossible task of super-imposing Greek civiliza- 
 tion on Persian civilization to the advantage of both. And 
 one becomes lost in admiration in noting that, although he 
 continually increased his distance from his home base, he kept 
 his communications secure, using both political and strategic 
 methods, and playing skilfully on the jealousies of rival of- 
 ficials, both military and civil. 
 
 Although required to fight his way almost continually from 
 one place to another, Alexander met no very serious check 
 until he arrived in northwestern India, and crossed the Indus 
 River. Shortly after doing this, he learned that King Porus 
 had gathered an army from 30,000 or 40,000 strong, and was 
 encamped on the eastern bank of the Hydaspes River to pre- 
 vent his crossing. After a slow and toilsome march, Alexander 
 arrived on the western bank of this river, and saw the army 
 of Porus on the opposite shore, protected by a multitude of 
 elephants. Alexander realized that it would be foolish to 
 attempt to cross at that place, and that some stratagem had 
 to be devised. He adopted various measures, one of which 
 was to seem to make preparations to cross in the early night 
 and thus rouse the enemy to prevent it. He made feints of 
 this kind a number of times, each time with success, until he 
 noted that the enemy were getting weary of the useless night 
 watches and becoming consequently negligent. Then one 
 night he moved up the west bank of the river about sixteen 
 miles, to a place where the river made a sharp bend, and 
 where there was a thickly wooded island in midstream and 
 dense woods on the opposite shore. Here he determined to 
 cross. He caused to be brought there the parts of the boats 
 that had been used in crossing the Oxus River, and had those 
 boats remade ; and he also had skins prepared, such as he had 
 often used before as floats, stuffed with straw. He left a suf- 
 ficient force in the camp to prevent the suspicions of the enemy 
 from being roused; and, when all was ready, began his
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 119 
 
 adventurous crossing, leading the way himself. (326 b.c.) 
 As usual in enterprises where preparations have been care- 
 fully made and all the conditions studied, Alexander was suc- 
 cessful. Hardly had he landed on the eastern side, however, 
 when his forces were discovered by scouts of Poms, who gal- 
 
 
 Battle of the 
 
 HYDASPES. 
 
 (J.B.B.yedi.) 
 
 K 
 
 I H 
 
 .^5] I I I! I ll 
 
 ISIL • 
 
 B 
 
 B' 
 
 AAA 
 
 AAA. Infantry \ 
 
 BBf Caualnj }- INDIAN 
 
 CCC. Elephants) 
 
 H. Hypaspists 
 
 I. Heavy cavalry led by Alexander 
 K. ,, ,, ,, „ Coenifs 
 
 L. Mounted Archers j 
 
 [MACEDONIAN 
 
 From Burg's "History of Greece." 
 By permission of the Macmillan Co. 
 
 l^al/ierijrBoulatl so 
 
 loped away to warn him. Alexander at once prepared to 
 advance to the last great battle of his life. He had no heavy 
 infantry with him, only light infantry, cavalry, and archers. 
 Following his wont, Alexander advanced toward the camp of 
 Porus at the head of his cavalr^^ Soon he met a troop advanc- 
 ing against him. It was merely a heavy reconnoitering party 
 under the son of Porus ; and it turned and retreated at the 
 first charge of the Macedonians. 
 
 Porus himself was soon seen advancing with his army. As 
 soon as he reached ground suitable for the movements of his
 
 120 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 cavalry and war chariots, he drew up his line of battle (indi- 
 cated in the accompanying diagram). Alexander realized at 
 once that it would be impossible to make a frontal attack suc- 
 cessfully, because of the elephants. But he rarely made a 
 frontal attack when he could make a flank attack; and so 
 he promptly proceeded to make a flank attack with his 
 cavalry (see the diagram), while the archers attacked the 
 Indian cavalry on the left and the infantry maintained a 
 position facing the left flank of the elephants and the main 
 body. Against such an attack, delivered with all the force 
 and speed that Alexander could give to it, the enemy were 
 almost helpless. In a short time the utmost confusion reigned. 
 The elephants got bej^ond control, and the army of Porus 
 became little but a mob. Then Alexander ordered the infan- 
 try to advance shield to shield, while he, reforming his cavalry, 
 dashed in again on the left flank. About this time, the forces 
 that Alexander had left on the other side of the river crossed 
 without resistance, and consummated the victory. 
 
 In this battle, as in so many of the battles of Alexander, — 
 in fact, in so many of the battles of which we read in his- 
 tory, — we see on the defeated side such an utter absence of 
 all strategic apprehension as to amaze us. If Porus, instead 
 of having an army, had had a club, or a sword, or a spear, he 
 would not calmly have stood in one place and let his opponent 
 come on his left side and deliberately attack him there. He 
 would have wheeled around toward the left, so that he could 
 protect himself with his weapon. Yet, having ah army, which 
 was simply a weapon placed in his hands, he took no meas- 
 ures whatever to protect his left side ! Porus failed to realize, 
 what many commanders have failed to realize, that an army 
 or a fleet is a weapon, like a club but bigger ; and that a man's 
 success depends upon the skill with which he strikes blows 
 upon the enemy and parries the blows they deliver. The rea- 
 son for the failure to realize this truth seems to lie in the fact 
 that it has been necessary to concentrate so attentively on the 
 details of constructing the weapon, keeping it in good order,
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 121 
 
 and wielding it that the object at which it should be directed 
 has been overlooked ! It is not only in strategy, but in every 
 vocation and profession, and even in the daily lives of indi- 
 viduals, that we see people so engrossed with details, and so 
 enmeshed in circumstances, as to forget the end in view. 
 
 Alexander restored to Porus his kingdom, but as a protected 
 state under the suzerainty of Macedon ; and near the site of 
 the battle, on each side of the river, he founded a city, one 
 named after his horse, Bucephala. Then Alexander took up 
 his march to the eastward, his mind filled with no one knows 
 what dreams and projects, when suddenly the long-restrained 
 discontent and the utter weariness of his soldiers resulted in 
 their refusal to go any farther. Alexander brought into play 
 all the batteries of his elotiuence and authority, but without 
 avail. For twelve long and terrible years his army had 
 toiled and fought, in cold and heat, and now they would not 
 and could not go any farther. So Alexander was forced to 
 yield and retrace his steps, although almost within arm 's reach 
 of the end of the world, as he thought. 
 
 It was a toilsome journey that he had to make, especially 
 across the desert of Gedrosia. At its end he was joined by his 
 fleet under Nearchus, whom now he sent to complete his voy- 
 age up the Persian Gulf. For by this time Alexander had proj- 
 ects of world dominion, to achieve which the conquest of the 
 sea was necessary, and which undoubtedly he would have 
 achieved if he had lived. But not long after reaching Baby- 
 lon, and while building a fleet and cutting wood in the 
 forests for it, he was taken ill of a fever and shortly after- 
 ward died. He was not at that time quite thirty-three years 
 old. (June 13, 323 b.c.) 
 
 Thus passed from the stage of history the most picturesque 
 figure that has ever appeared upon it. Doubtless one must 
 make considerable allowance for enthusiasm and exaggeration 
 in the accounts that one reads about him. But after all rea- 
 sonable subtractions have been made, one is confronted with
 
 122 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the fact that Alexander, of his own initiative, under his own 
 sole direction, and by his own force of character, led a small 
 army through the greatest empire of the world, conquered it' 
 all, and created an empire larger and better than any that had 
 ever before existed. It is true that this empire broke up almost 
 immediately when he died ; but it simply became divided into 
 parts, and those parts did not die. 
 
 The two larger parts, the kingdom of the Seleucidae, which 
 occupied the same territory approximately as Persia, and the 
 kingdom of the Ptolomies, or Egypt, continued for three bril- 
 liant centuries afterward. Of the two, the former was prob- 
 ably the better administered, as it certainly was the larger: 
 but Egypt represented the higher civilization ; for Alexandria, 
 with its wonderful museum and library, became the seat of 
 learning and civilization of the world. And after the fall of 
 Rome at the latter end of the fifth century a.d,, when civiliza- 
 tion in Europe, even in Italy, was almost wholly blotted out, 
 it was in the lands that were conquered by Alexander, and on 
 which he had impressed Greek civilization, that civilization 
 continued. And when the minds of men began again to turn 
 in search of a better life than that which Europe in the Middle 
 Ages gave them, it was to those lands that they had to go for 
 the materials of literature and science and learning with which 
 to start again on the upward path. If Alexander had not con- 
 quered Persia, where would Europe have obtained the start 
 with which she began the Renaissance? 
 
 Had not Alexander conquered Persia and the East, we have 
 reason for supposing that both Greece and Persia would have 
 continued on the downward path on which thej^ had already 
 started, and that the lamp of civilization would gradually have 
 flickered out. It was the impetus that Alexander gave to the 
 sluggish spirits of the Greeks, and the opportunities he offered 
 to them for enhancing their prestige and expanding their com- 
 merce, that carried Greek civilization into Asia and planted 
 it there. Alexander's conquests not only give the best single
 
 PHILIP OF MACEDON AND ALEXANDER 123 
 
 illustration of the overwhelming influence of strategy on mili- 
 tary operations, but they were the greatest single factor in 
 preserving ancient civilization, and thus supplying a basis 
 for the civilization of to-day.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 C^SAR 
 
 IN order to appreciate Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, and 
 their effect in supporting civilization, we must remind 
 ourselves that at the time when C«sar went into Gaul the 
 Roman Republic controlled not only Italy, but practically all 
 the coast of the Mediterranean Sea; and that, within the ter- 
 ritory that she controlled, law, order, and material prosperity 
 reigned in greater degree than in any other part of the world. 
 
 Before the time of Cassar, Rome's progress had been threat- 
 ened seriously only once — when the great Carthaginian gen- 
 eral Hannibal invaded Italy in the Second Punic War. Han- 
 nibal was the son of a great general named Hamilcar, and a 
 brother of another great general named Hasdrubal ; and it is 
 one of the most curious facts of history that a people so wholly 
 pacifistic and commercial as the Semitic Carthaginians should 
 have brought forth such strategists. Of the three, Hannibal 
 was the greatest. 
 
 Because of the events of the First Punic War, Hamilcar 
 determined on revenge against Rome ; and, in order to secure 
 it, formed a Carthaginian province in Spain, intending to use 
 it as a base of operations. After Hannibal became commander 
 of the Carthaginian army, he captured Saguntum, a city of 
 Spain allied with Rome. (218 b.c.) He then crossed the Pyre- 
 nees and invaded Gaul and then Italy. In an important battle 
 on the Trebia River, he defeated a Roman army ; and in a sub- 
 sequent battle near Lake Trasimene he almost annihilated an- 
 other. Later, at Cannge (216 b.c), he disastrously defeated 
 another army and threatened Rome itself. Then the Roman 
 general Fabius made a distinct contribution to strategy by in- 
 stituting what are now called "Fabian tactics." These con- 
 
 124
 
 C^SAR 125 
 
 sisted in continually avoiding actual battle, but perpetually 
 harassing the enemy, and especially interfering with his get- 
 ting supplies. These tactics were the best possible under the 
 circumstances, and prevented Hannibal from achieving any 
 more tactical victories. The crisis came when Hannibal's 
 brother, Hasdrubal, marching from Spain, endeavored to form 
 a junction with Hannibal, but was brought to battle and de- 
 feated on the Metaurus River, in Italy, shortly before he could 
 accomplish it. Hannibal quitted Italy soon afterward and 
 returned to Carthage. Near Carthage he suffered the only 
 defeat of his life, in a decisive battle at Zama. 
 
 When Cifisar marched into Gaul, the lands of Asia and 
 Africa to the east and southeast of Rome, on which Alexander 
 had impressed the civilization of Greece, had a considerable 
 degree of good government and prosperity; but outside of 
 these territories only primitive civilization existed and barbar- 
 ous customs prevailed. The territories that lay to the north 
 and northwest of Italy were inhabited by tribes of a very war- 
 like cast, and wars among them were continual. Of these 
 tribes, the bravest and least civilized were the German tribes 
 on the east bank of the Rhine, the Belgians in the northern 
 part of Gaul, and the Aquitanians in the southwestern part. 
 In the middle of Gaul the various tribes had been considerably 
 influenced by Roman traders who had gone there with the 
 products of the Roman civilization; with the result that, 
 though those tribes were no less prone to war than before, 
 they had become less hardy, and therefoi-e less efficient. 
 
 It is easy for the people of to-day to decry the civilization of 
 Rome, and to point out many particulars in which the Romans 
 were cruel atid militaristic; but let us remember that the 
 Romans were no more cruel or militaristic than the savage 
 tribes that comprised most of the rest of the world. It is abso- 
 lutely essential to anyone who wishes to come to a just opinion 
 about any nation, at any time, to realize that man was orig- 
 inally a savage, living a life little different from that of the 
 beasts of the field ; and that it has been only by means of what
 
 126 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 we call civilization that man has been raised above that state. 
 Furthermore, it is necessary to realize that the advance of civ- 
 ilization has been forced by a comparatively few men, that it 
 has been steadily resisted by barbarians, and that the only way 
 by which civilization overcame barbarism was by the use of 
 military force. Finally, it is necessary to realize that military 
 force alone could not have overcome the opposing military 
 force of barbarism, if it had not been directed by superior in- 
 telligence. Now, the directing of force by intelligence is the 
 province of strategy. 
 
 Caesar marched from Italy into Gaul in the year 58 B.C. He 
 had been Consul; and during his consulate the general condi- 
 tion of unrest in Gaul had been such as to arouse alarm in 
 Italy. The proximity of the Gauls was so intimate, and the 
 difference between them and the Romans was so great, as to 
 incite and maintain the aggressive hatred of the barbarians, 
 and the need for defensive measures against them by the 
 Romans. Now, the Romans, being a military people, knew that 
 purely defensive measures would, in the end, be broken down, 
 and that the only way in which they could preserve security 
 inside their borders was to take offensive measures on the out- 
 side against the Gauls. This was the procedure they had been 
 carrying on for some centuries, first within the peninsula of 
 Italy, and afterward outside, as the Roman state gradually 
 expanded. This procedure the Roman Senate now commis- 
 sioned Julius Cffisar to institute in Gaul. They, therefore, 
 gave him command, not only in Cisalpine Gaul on the southern 
 side of the Alps, but in Transalpine Gaul beyond the Alps ; his 
 commission to last five years. 
 
 At this time Cassar was forty-three years old. * His health, 
 originally good, had been conserved by an abstemious and 
 active life, and he was in the fullest vigor of mind and body. 
 He had had little experience as a soldier ; but he had been bom 
 and bred in a military atmosphere, and his habits of life and 
 traits of character were of the military cast. He had the 
 quickness of mind, the strength of nerve, and the natural cour-
 
 128 THE ART OP FIGHTING 
 
 age that enable a man to scent danger quickly but with equa- 
 nimity, to separate important from unimportant facts, and to 
 decide what course it is best to follow, unconfused by details. 
 Finally, he had what is the most valuable single attribute in 
 a great commander — that of foresight. This does not mean 
 that Cffisar was a prophet, or that a strategist must be a 
 prophet ; but it does mean that Caesar had the patience and the 
 moral courage to study an actual situation with thoroughness, 
 to look it in the face without quailing, and to arrive at an 
 intelligent estimate of the course of events that the situation 
 would bring forth. In addition, he had the persistency and 
 industry to make preparations with the utmost care and 
 thoroughness for doing whatever he decided to do; the self- 
 control to refrain from overt action until he was quite ready ; 
 and the energy and ardor to strike with the utmost possible 
 celerity and force when he was ready and the opportunity had 
 arrived. 
 
 There were two events in particular that had aroused the 
 Romans. These were disturbances produced in Gaul by the 
 westward crossing of the Rhine by a German tribe, and a 
 threatened westward exit from Switzerland into Gaul of the 
 Swiss. The Germans had attacked and beaten a tribe called 
 the ^duans, who were more or less under the protection of 
 Rome. The Swiss had as yet committed no overt act ; but for 
 two years they had been making preparations showing that 
 they contemplated a complete exodus from Switzerland and a 
 long march to the westward. The danger of this action on the 
 part of the Swiss was not only that they would drive before 
 them the Gauls, who would overflow into Italy, but that they 
 would leave Switzerland open to occupation by the Germans 
 and a road for the Germans into the Roman province. The 
 Germans then, as now, were the disturbing force in Central 
 Europe. The Swiss, in fact were practically being driven out 
 of Switzerland by pressure from the Germans. 
 
 Since the seven million barbarians of Gaul and Germany, 
 regardless of how much they might fight among themselves,
 
 C^SAR 129 
 
 were all hostile to the Romans, Caesar realized that he faced a 
 gigantic task. No mortal ever faced a greater. 
 
 In the midst of his preparations, Cassar learned that the 
 Swiss were about to set fire to their towns and villages, to burn 
 up all the corn except what they were to carry with them, 
 and to start on their expedition, taking a route that lay 
 through the Roman Province in southern Gaul. He left Rome 
 at once, and hastened through Gaul to the vicinity of Geneva, 
 where there was a bridge across the Rhone River, over which 
 the Swiss had to pass. He took with him the only legion in 
 Gaul, though he made requisition on the Roman Province for 
 as many troops as it could muster. When he arrived at 
 Geneva he immediately destroyed the bridge. The Swiss evi- 
 dently had not expected such rapid movements; and, being 
 taken by surprise, had neglected to secure the bridge. They 
 thereupon pleaded with CjEsar to permit them to cross. Ca?sar 
 replied that he would take a space of time for consideration, 
 and told them to return in two weeks, on the 13th of April. 
 He utilized the interval by taking obstructive measures of the 
 most energetic and effective kind ; so that, when the two weeks 
 had elapsed, he had constructed walls and trenches and posted 
 separate garrisons in newly constructed intrenched forts. 
 The Swiss attempted by various operations to get across the 
 river, but finally abandoned the attempt. 
 
 We see in this first operation of Ccesar, and throughout his 
 campaigns in Gaul, a marked skill in the utilization of mechan- 
 ical and engineering appliances. In some cases we see also a 
 high order of invention. Froude says of him: "He was 
 never greater than in unlooked-for difficulties. He never 
 rested. He was always inventing some new contrivance." 
 
 The Swiss then started to the westward by another pass, 
 though they had to secure the consent of the Sequani to do so. 
 This having been secured, the whole multitude set out, in num- 
 ber about 368,000, of whom 92,000 were fighting men. And 
 these fighting men were not like the Persians whom Alexander 
 encountered, but hardy mountaineers, brave, determined, and
 
 130 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 accustomed to war. Caesar estimated the situation as so men- 
 acing that forthwith he hurried back to Italy, enrolled two 
 legions, and brought out of winter quarters three more : then, 
 with these five legions, he marched back with the greatest 
 speed and by the shortest route, though it lay over the Alps. 
 
 At this time a Roman legion at its full strength seems to 
 have been about 5000 men in number ; but it was rarely at its 
 full strength in Caesar's campaigns. In a legion there were 
 only about 300 cavalry, and their use was mainly for recon- 
 noitering, scouting, and pursuit. The legion was made up of 
 ten cohorts, each cohort being made up of three maniples, and 
 each maniple being made up of two centuries. If a century 
 had really been composed of 100 men, as its name would indi- 
 cate, this would have made a legion 6000 strong. In battle 
 formation a legion was drawn up in three lines. The infantry 
 were trained to attack with javelins at short range, and to fol- 
 low immediately with a charge and a hand-to-hand encountcK 
 with swords. A shield was carried on the left arm, and this, 
 of course, protected the left side rather than the right. 
 
 The commander-in-chief (imperator) of an army that con- 
 sisted of two or more legions had a staff that varied in num- 
 bers, according to the size of the army and the requirements of 
 the situation ; and at the head of this staff was a quaestor, who 
 combined the duties of what we now call the chief of staff and 
 the quartermaster general. He was also second in command 
 and had his quarters next to those of the commander-in-chief. 
 The commander-in-chief had a special body-guard (or prato- 
 rian guard), who were picked men; Ceesar's guard was the 
 tenth legion. The prsetorian guard, under the empire, ac- 
 quired an enormous influence, in some cases making and un- 
 making emperors. Besides the fighting men strictly consid- 
 ered, Csesar had a considerable number of engineers, expert 
 workmen who built bridges, looked after siege material, and 
 did mechanical work of all kinds. The skilful and frequent 
 use that Caesar made of these men was the most powerful sin- 
 gle factor in contributing to his success. Csesar 's men were no
 
 C^SAR 131 
 
 braver than the men of the Gallic tribes, the fighting instinct 
 was no better developed, and even in discipline there was no 
 overwhelming superiority; but the barbarians of Gaul had 
 nothing with which to compete with the mechanical appli- 
 ances that Csesar provided in advance for his campaigns 
 against them. In no other way did Csesar show more clearly 
 his genius as a strategist than in his careful and skilful prep- 
 aration of mechanical appliances. 
 
 By the time that Caesar reached their vicinity in the early 
 summer, the Swiss had emerged from the defiles, gone through 
 the territory of the Sequani, reached the borders of the ^dui, 
 and begun to lay waste their lauds, following the destructive 
 instinct of barbarians. They had now reached the bani:s of 
 the Saone River and were engaged in crossing it. Seeing his 
 opportunity, Csesar waited until his scouts informed him that 
 three-quarters of the enemy had crossed, and then attacked the 
 remaining quarter with the utmost suddenness and force, took 
 them completel}^ by surprise, and routed them utterly. This 
 done, he built a bridge over the river and sent his army 
 across. The Swiss were tremendously alarmed; for not only 
 had Ceesar destroyed a large part of their force, but he had 
 crossed the river in one day, whereas it had taken them twenty 
 days. They thereupon sent a deputation to him, which made 
 both pleas and threats, but without avail. 
 
 The Swiss thereupon moved their camp, and Caesar followed, 
 sending forward his cavalry to keep in touch with them and 
 inform him of their doings. This cavalry was a very irregular 
 force, which he had raised, and which he soon found to be 
 entirely unreliable. In a short time Caesar began to be in 
 straits for corn ; for he could not get any from the land, he 
 had left his provision boats on the Saone River, and the 
 -'Eduans (whom he was defending against the Swiss), though 
 they continually promised to give him com, failed to do so. 
 He was finally compelled to cease following the Swiss and to 
 march toward Bibracte, where the ^duans had stored a large 
 supply. The Swiss construed this change of course as a re-
 
 132 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 treat and turned on him in pursuit and annoyed his rear 
 guard. 
 
 The situation came to a crisis with a battle, in which four 
 veteran Roman legions drawn up in three lines, with the two 
 new legions and the wagons and tent equipage behind them on 
 a hill were attacked from directly in front by a close pha- 
 lanx of the Swiss, who much exceeded them in numbers. The 
 first few volleys of the long Roman javelins had great effect, 
 piercing the ineffective shields of the barbarians, and some- 
 times binding two of them together. The Swiss were grad- 
 ually forced back ; but suddenly about 15,000 men of two other 
 tribes attacked the Romans on their right flank. The situation 
 was serious, but it was to meet serious situations that the 
 Roman legions trained. The rear line of the Romans wheeled 
 and advanced toward the new attack, while the first two lines 
 again pressed back the enemy, who had advanced when their 
 allies made the flank attack. A double conflict of the utmost 
 fury followed, which continued far into the night; the Swiss 
 finally fighting from behind a rampart of carts, that they had 
 constructed, while some of them from underneath the carts 
 hurled lances and javelins. Superior equipment and training 
 prevailed in the end, however, and a wholesale retreat ensued. 
 
 It is said that for three days 130,000 marched away from the 
 scene of battle. Ceesar did not pursue them, but he ordered 
 the other tribes not to give them food. The result was that the 
 Swiss were soon compelled by lack of provisions to ask for 
 terms. These being arranged, the Swiss went back into their 
 own province. Of those who reached home there were only 
 110,000, though 368,000 had left. 
 
 After the Swiss campaign, certain tribes of Gaul besought 
 Cagsar to save them from the Germans, who had come across 
 the Rhine to the number of about 120,000, and were gradually 
 taking possession of their territory by sheer force of military 
 strength, under their king, Ariovistus. Csesar concluded 
 finally to endeavor to treat with the German king; but, not 
 being able to accomplish this, he decided to advance against
 
 C^SAR 133 
 
 him. He had received word in time that the Germans were 
 marching to seize the town of Vesontio, a place well fortified, 
 well situated strategically, and well provisioned. With the 
 celerity that characterized all his operations, Caesar advanced 
 to Vesontio, reached it before the Germans did, and cap- 
 tured it. 
 
 But the Roman soldiers, even their officers, were soon 
 thrown into a virtual panic by the accounts they received of the 
 enormous strength and courage of the Germans. It re(iuired 
 all Caesar's ability as an orator (and he stood second only to 
 Cicero) to infuse heart into them ; but this he did. He immedi- 
 ately set out on the march. On the seventh day his scouts 
 informed him that the Germans were only twenty-four miles 
 away ; and he soon received emissaries from the German king 
 suggesting a parley. At this parley Ctesar found himself con- 
 fronted by a man whom he could neither threaten nor per- 
 suade into a peaceful line of conduct, with the result that the 
 two forces soon found themselves in opposing camps, two miles 
 apart. 
 
 For several days in succession Csesar brought his forces out 
 in front of his camp, to give the Germans opportunity for 
 battle ; but, ascertaining from prisoners that the reason why 
 the Germans abstained from battle was that the German 
 matrons had declared, after certain occult observances, that 
 Heaven forbade that they should win a victory if they fought 
 before the new moon, Cassar realized his opportunity at once, 
 and advanced his forces in triple line right up to the German 
 camp, thereby forcing the Germans as valiant soldiers to come 
 out and fight. This they did, and with the utmost valor and 
 energy. In fact, they charged so quickly that a hand-to-hand 
 conflict ensued at once, in which by sheer weight of numbers 
 the Germans almost forced the Romans back. A tactical man- 
 CBuver, however, by which the Romans brought their third line 
 in to the support of their left flank, saved the day, and the 
 Germans were soon in full retreat. 
 
 One notes in this battle, and in others between the Romans
 
 134 THE ART OP FIGHTING 
 
 and the barbarians, that, although the first onslaught of the 
 barbarians was splendid, they seemed to be at a loss if any- 
 thing unexpected occurred, or after any reverse had been sus- 
 tained. In this case, after the German retreat began, it was 
 conducted without even an attempt at preserving order. Now, 
 one of the distinctive features of a well disciplined army is 
 that, unless the circumstances are excessively unfavorable, it 
 withdraws in good order instead of plunging into a headlong 
 rout. 
 
 The defeat of the Swiss and the Germans removed the two 
 menaces that Caesar had been sent into Gaul to remove. He 
 accomplished this in the first summer, and with that combina- 
 tion of deliberation, celerity, and force that distinguished 
 everything he did. He then sent his army into winter quar- 
 ters among the Sequani, north of the Roman Province. 
 
 In the early summer following, he learned that the Bel- 
 gians were forming a conspiracy with the tribes of northern 
 Gaul, and inciting them to unite against the Roman power. 
 He, therefore, enrolled two more legions, sent them into Gaul, 
 and followed them soon himself. Having arranged for 
 his corn supply, he then marched north with his army, 
 and, as usual, with the greatest possible speed. Arriving near 
 the borders of the Belgians, he ascertained that the various 
 tribes had got together about 300,000 men, and that they 
 were already advancing against him. He thereupon marched 
 his army across the Aisne River and pitched his camp ; going 
 over a bridge to the farther side, setting a guard on both ends 
 of the bridge, and placing his lieutenant, Sabinus, on the 
 nearer side of the river. He gave orders to Sabinus to con- 
 struct and intrench a camp there with a rampart twelve feet 
 high and a trench eighteen feet wide. 
 
 When the Belgians reached a point about eight miles dis- 
 tant from Caesar, they stopped and attacked a town named 
 Bribax with great violence. In accordance with their method, 
 a host of men surrounded the ramparts, and formed a "tor- 
 toise, ' ' which was a formation in which the men in front and
 
 C^SAR 135 
 
 on the sides held their shields in a sloping position, while the 
 other men held their shields horizontally; so that all men 
 were completely protected from missiles from behind the ram- 
 parts. At the same time, a storm of missiles was kept up 
 against the defenders. When these were driven from the 
 walls (as soon happened in this case), they undercut the 
 walls and advanced to the gates. Receiving news of this, 
 Cffisar sent archers and slingers, and these succeeded in driv- 
 ing otf the Belgians. 
 
 The whole barbarian host then advanced toward Cassar, and 
 soon the two forces stood in front of each other. CaBsar had 
 secured a very advantageous position, and protected his flanks 
 by artificial means also. There being a swamp between the 
 two forces, and neither venturing to put itself to a disad- 
 vantage while crossing the swamp, no action occurred except 
 a minor cavalry engagement. Cassar then withdrew his army 
 toward the camp ; whereupon the barbarians rushed past him 
 and crossed the river by fords, evidently intending to capture 
 the fort of Sabinus and get between the Romans and their 
 base. Cffisar at once crossed the bridge which his guards still 
 held and engaged the enemy while many of them were in the 
 river and while the whole force was disorganized. The bar- 
 barians fought gallantly but unavailingly, and with tremen- 
 dous loss. That night they decamped without order, each 
 seeking for himself the shortest route home. Cgesar was cau- 
 tious about pursuing, realizing the danger of ambush ; but on 
 the following morning his cavalry pursued the Belgians furi- 
 ously, attacking the rear guard, and producing a confusion 
 that spread increasingly through the horde. 
 
 Caesar now proceeded to assault a town called Noviodunum. 
 Though there were few there to defend it, because most of the 
 men were absent in the war, he could not take it by storm. 
 He, therefore, made ready his siege appliances and prepared 
 to use them against the walls. But the mere sight of his ap- 
 pliances so impressed the barbarians that they at once sent 
 deputies to make terms of surrender.
 
 136 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Cassar soon received information that the water-drinking 
 Nervii, the most hardy tribe in Gaul, were organized to oppose 
 him, and that they were already in position on the farther 
 side of the Sambre River. He at once sent scouts ahead to 
 select a place for a camp, and moved his army north. It was 
 his custom on ordinary marches to have each legion followed 
 by its baggage train ; but on this occasion, and usually when 
 near the enemy, he directed that six legions should march at 
 the head, with the army baggage behind them, followed by two 
 legions as a rear guard. Not knowing of this later arrange- 
 ment, certain Gauls informed the Nervii how Cgesar's army 
 usually marched, and pointed out the ease with which the head 
 of the column could be attacked. The result was that when 
 the six legions reached the site of the camp and began to form 
 it, and just as the first baggage detachment came in sight, the 
 Nervii dashed out from the woods with full force upon the 
 cavalrj^ which were ahead. The cavalry were quickly thrown 
 back ; and then with amazing swiftness the enemy attacked the 
 camp itself before the legions could arm themselves. The sur- 
 prise was complete and the crisis was one of the utmost urg- 
 ency. It was impossible for Csesar, or even for the subordi- 
 nate commanders, to give all the directions that were neces- 
 sary ; and it was impossible even for the line to form in order. 
 It was here that the admirable discipline of Caesar's force 
 showed itself; for almost automatically every ofiScer and man 
 seemed to realize what ought to be done, and to do it at once. 
 
 At one time the situation became extremely critical ; but the 
 personal magnetism of Caesar, his calmness and courage, 
 enabled him to rally his forces at the most dangerous point, 
 and even to advance against the enemy. The barbarians, on 
 the other hand, after their original plan had been put into 
 operation, had no methods by which to adapt their operations 
 to changed conditions ; and the result was that, after fighting 
 with the utmost possible courage and determination, their 
 fighting was reduced to mere desperate struggles, and then 
 to dying bravely. And, as has so often happened with sav-
 
 C^SAR 137 
 
 ages, when disaster came it was complete. The name and the 
 nation of the Nervii were almost annihilated. 
 
 A neighboring tribe had been advancing to the assistance 
 of the Nervii. On hearing of their defeat, however, they re- 
 turned home, abandoned all of their towns and forts, and 
 gathered themselves with their belongings into one strong- 
 hold, which was admirably fortified by nature. On all sides 
 save one it looked down on steep rocks, and on that one side 
 the approach was very narrow. This approach they had for- 
 tified with a double wall of great height. Upon the arrival 
 of the Romans, they made frequent sallies against them. 
 But Caesar made a fortified rampart around the town, pushed 
 his mantlets (large shields on wheels, protected on the sides 
 and on top) up toward the wall, and built a tower. The 
 barbarians laughed at the tower, seeing it so far away, and 
 judging that no darts could reach them from that distance. 
 But when they saw the tower moving toward them, they were 
 filled with terror, and sent deputies at once to treat for 
 peace. Caesar granted peace, but exacted that they give up 
 their arms. The barbarians threw over a great quantity from 
 the walls ; but they did not throw them all, and in the middle 
 of the night they made a sudden sally. Anticipating such a 
 movement, Caesar instantly gave the signal prepared before- 
 hand, and a battle ensued, in which the superior equipment 
 and discipline of the Romans had the usual effect. 
 
 These achievements brought peace in Gaul, and Csesar de- 
 parted to Italy, purposing to return in the following summer. 
 During his absence the Veneti, a large tribe on the north- 
 western coast, the most skilful seamen and navigators of 
 Gaul, stirred up a revolt that quickly spread. This revolt 
 was especially dangerous because, in case of a conflict, the 
 superiority of skill and equipment would rest with the bar- 
 barians and not with the Romans; for the reason that the 
 Veneti could not be subdued except upon the sea, and neither 
 the Roman sailors nor the Roman vessels were as good for
 
 138 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 navigating in the boisterous seas on the Vencti coast as were 
 the Veneti themselves. 
 
 Nothing daunted, Caesar ordered men-of-war to be built on 
 the river Loire, and rowers and seamen to be drafted from 
 the Roman Province. The Veneti, hearing these prepara- 
 tions, and having the barbarians' fear of the Roman power, 
 made all possible preparations for defense. But with good 
 reason they looked forward to victory: for what could the 
 Romans, with their comparatively small vessels built for navi- 
 gation on the Mediterranean, and navigated by men ignorant 
 of the waters near their coast — what could they do against 
 the very much stronger and larger Veneti ships, with their 
 heavy sails of hides and skins, manned and officered by ex- 
 perienced seamen? The two fleets finally came together — the 
 Veneti fleet being not only made up of the stronger vessels 
 and manned by the more skilful seamen and navigators, but 
 even superior in numbers. The Roman vessels could have no 
 success in ramming them, and were at a great disadvantage 
 in the matter of throwing missiles, because the decks of the 
 Veneti ships were higher. 
 
 What happened? The Roman galleys were rowed rapidly 
 against the Veneti ships, and Roman sailors raised long poles, 
 on which were sharp hooks, which they put over the halyards 
 that held up the sails. Then the Roman galleys rowed rap- 
 idly away. The halyards were cut or broken, and down come 
 the sails. The Veneti ships at once became helpless, and were 
 immediately boarded, with the result that, of all the number, 
 very few made their escape. This engagement ended the cam- 
 paign against the Veneti and the whole coast; for nearly 
 every ship and every fighting man available had been in the 
 battle. 
 
 The following winter, which ushered in the year 55 B.C., 
 brought an invasion from a savage German tribe that was 
 forced out of Germany by a tribe more powerful. This inva- 
 sion seriously threatened the stability of Gaul, and Caesar at
 
 C^SAR 139 
 
 once advanced to drive it back. He was soon met by envoys, 
 who said that the tribe had been driven from its own country, 
 and had come to Gaul to seek a home. Caesar replied that 
 there were no unoccupied lands that could receive so great a 
 multitude, and that they must go back across the Rhine at 
 once. The envoys departed, begging Caesar to advance no 
 farther until he heard from them. Csesar was too experi- 
 enced a strategist to grant this request, knowing the Germans 
 would utilize the time by concentrating their forces. 
 
 The two armies soon came in sight of each other, and Caesar 
 gave orders to his men not to meddle with the Germans. A 
 body of the Germans, however, attacked the Roman advance 
 guard during a period of truce, and killed and wounded sev- 
 eral. CtEsar thereupon committed an act for which he has 
 been more blamed than for any other of his life. On the fol- 
 lowing morning, when some German chiefs appeared to apolo- 
 gize, he detained them, and then flung his army upon the 
 German tribe, which was entirely unprepared — ^the members 
 of which were lying about, in fact, with women and children 
 dispersed among them. The Roman legions, furious at the 
 German treachery of the previous day, made wholesale 
 slaughter of men, women, and children. The original num- 
 ber was stated by Caesar as 430,000. Of these it is not known 
 how many survived; but it is said that no clear record re- 
 mains of any survivors except certain detachments which 
 were absent from the battle, and the chiefs whom Ceesar had 
 detained. For his act no justification can be urged accord- 
 ing to modem standards. The nearest approximation to jus- 
 tification that one can make is to say that the Germans would 
 probably have treated the Romans in a similar manner, had 
 they been offered a similar opportunity. 
 
 The effect of his action was tremendous in impressing the 
 Gauls and the Germans with fear of the Roman power, and 
 thereby in pacifying the Gallic tribes. But, across the Rhine, 
 the Suevi, the most savage of the German tribes, were threat- 
 ening weaker tribes in the vicinity; and these begged Caesar
 
 140 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 to come and save them. Caesar decided to cross the Rhine, 
 not for conquest, but for the psychological effect; and, in 
 order to make this effect as great as possible, to construct a 
 bridge and send his army over it. This was done with the 
 celerity, thoroughness, and success that distinguished Caesar's 
 acts ; for in ten days after he had decided to make the bridge, 
 at which time the material was still standing in the forest, a 
 bridge forty feet wide had been constructed. Caesar marched 
 across with his legions, and remained in Germany eighteen 
 days. His visit had an enormous effect, mainly by reason of 
 the bridge; for the construction of such a bridge in ten days 
 made the barbarians realize with awe and fear that the 
 Romans were of a superior race.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 c^SAR (Continued) 
 
 IT was now early August of the year 55 B.C. Gaul had 
 been reduced to submission; but across a narrow strait 
 was an island whose white cliffs could be seen sometimes, 
 but of which the Romans knew little, save that on it the ene- 
 mies of Rome had sometimes found shelter. Csesar deter- 
 mined to visit it. He directed an officer to take a galley and 
 make a survey of the island coast, sent the ships he had used 
 in the- Veneti war into the English Channel, and finally gath- 
 ered about eighty ships at the point where Boulogne now is. 
 After the surveying officer had returned, he started across, 
 carrying two legions in the ships. 
 
 He found the white cliffs lined with warriors, and saw that 
 the cliffs were so close to the water that landing there would 
 be impossible, in face of the threatened resistance. He there- 
 fore moved up the coast until he found an open beach. The 
 Britons followed him, some in chariots and some on horses, 
 evidently intending fight. The Roman soldiers hesitated (for 
 which we can scarcely blame them), but Caesar did not. He 
 at once sent his armed galleys ahead with archers and cross- 
 bowmen to clear the approach, and then ordered the legion- 
 aries to spring overboard and advance toward the beach. 
 The Britons rode their horses into the water to meet the 
 Romans. A hand-to-hand struggle then ensued, which ended 
 in the usual way. 
 
 Cassar then formed a camp. All went well till the fourth 
 day, when a storm arose that drove some of the ships ashore 
 and some of them into the Channel. With his customary 
 energy and resourcefulness, Ceesar collected all of his vessels 
 
 141
 
 142 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 save twelve, and repaired such as were injured. Meanwhile 
 the Britons, much heartened by the accident, made two sud- 
 den attacks on the Romans in their camp. They were de- 
 feated, however, and made to beg for peace, despite their skil- 
 ful use of chariots, to which the Romans were not accustomed. 
 Caesar then returned to Gaul and put his army in winter 
 quarters among the Belgians. He himself departed to Illyria. 
 
 In the following April of the year 54 b.c. CfEsar returned to 
 Boulogne, where he found nearly ready 28 armed galleys, as 
 well as 600 transports, constructed in accordance with his own 
 design. On the 20th of July he set sail with five legions and 
 considerable cavalry, embarked in 800 vessels; and at noon 
 landed on the same beach as in the previous year, but without 
 opposition, made his camp, and intrenched it. Caesar then 
 advanced inland, at the cost of overcoming considerable re- 
 sistance; but suddenly he heard that his fleet had again been 
 broken up by storm. He returned immediately to the coast, 
 and set about the work of salvage and repair. His measures 
 were so well directed and so efficiently executed that in ten 
 days he was able to resume his march. He again met with 
 considerable resistance from the Britons. They were as 
 brave and warlike as any he had ever met ; but, like all bar- 
 barian tribes, they had no plan of action after their first as- 
 sault had been made, and quickly lapsed into a state of con- 
 fusion, in which the highly disciplined Roman legions, under 
 the resourceful Caesar, were able to inflict tremendous dam- 
 age, which increased their confusion and finally produced a 
 rout. 
 
 Of all the men in history, the man who seems to have been 
 the most resourceful, to have been the best able to adapt meas- 
 ures to changed conditions and devise new methods and appli- 
 ances in emergencies, was Julius CcBsar. 
 
 The summer passed successfully for the Romans, and Caesar 
 led them back to Gaul about the middle of September. The 
 harvest in northern Gaul that year was bad ; and Caesar was 
 forced, for this reason, to disperse his troops over a wider area
 
 C^SAR 143 
 
 than he otherwise would have done. The Gauls, noting this, 
 saw an opportunity for attacking the garrisons in detail. 
 The leader of the movement possessed the engaging name of 
 Indutiomarus ; and he persuaded a chief named Ambiorix to 
 achieve the capture of the garrison at Tongres by treachery, 
 as being easier than by force. Ambiorix, being personally 
 known to Sabinus, the Roman general in command, told him, 
 under the guise of friendship, that vast bodies of Germans 
 had crossed the Rhine and were about to attack Tongres, 
 while all over Gaul the other Roman garrisons would be at- 
 tacked at the same time. He advised Sabinus to escape to 
 another garrison while there was time. Against the advice 
 of his second in command, against the orders of Caesar, and 
 with a stupidity that is surprising in a Roman general, Sabi- 
 nus broke camp and marched to join Labienus, another Roman 
 general. Ambiorix waited for him in a large valley two miles 
 distant from camp, and at the appropriate time and place 
 attacked him on all sides. The Romans fought with the ut- 
 most possible valor, the last of them dying like Romans on 
 each other's swords. Only a few stragglers escaped. These 
 took the news to Labienus. 
 
 Not far away from Tongres was Charleroi, in command 
 of which was Quintus Cicero, a brother of the orator. As 
 soon as it was known that Sabinus and his command had 
 been destroyed, the tribes in the vicinity attacked Cicero, and 
 with their usual violence and courage. Failing in their at- 
 tack, they tried on Cicero the methods that had been success- 
 ful with Sabinus, but without avail. The barbarians then, 
 having learned many things from the Romans, made a high 
 rampart and a deep ditch around the camp and constructed 
 a tower, though they possessed no tools but their swords, and 
 then threw red-hot clay balls, and darts carrying lighted 
 straw, over the ramparts upon the thatched roofs of the sol- 
 diers' huts. The houses and stores took fire; whereupon the 
 enemy redoubled their efforts with javelins and stones and 
 arrows, but again unavailingly. Csesar was one hundred and
 
 144 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 twenty miles away; but no word could be got to him, until 
 finally a slave was found willing to brave torture and death, 
 and to carry a letter to Cgesar in the shaft of his javelin. 
 
 With that swiftness of decision and movement that distin- 
 guished him, CjBsar set out at once to the relief of Cicero, 
 gathering such reinforcements as he could from the various 
 garrisons. He was well served by spies, being a good strate- 
 gist ; but he had only 7000 men with which to oppose 60,000. 
 Receiving information that Cicero was out of immediate dan- 
 ger, and that there was no reason for risking a battle at a 
 disadvantage to relieve him, he formed a camp, making it as 
 small as he could in order to lead the Gauls to underestimate 
 the force he really did have. In various ways he affected 
 weakness; then, seizing a favorable moment, when the enemy 
 had evidently acquired an over-confidence and consequent 
 carelessness, he suddenly flung open the gates of his camp and 
 rushed upon the barbarians with his whole force, nearly cut- 
 ting them to pieces. 
 
 It is evident from this incident and others, that the bar- 
 barians, like most untrained people, were unable to persist 
 long in any state of watchfulness. Not long before, Caesar 
 had remarked that wise men anticipate possible difficulties 
 and decide beforehand what they will do if certain possible 
 occasions arise. Clearly, this was what the barbarians did 
 not do, and what Cffisar did do habitually. 
 
 Cassar at once relieved Tongres, entering Cicero's camp 
 about nine o'clock in the evening. He then returned to 
 Amiens, realizing that the whole country was in turmoil, and 
 that imminent danger threatened the Roman power. Labi- 
 enus was still intrenched in his camp, besieged, in fact, by In- 
 dutiomarus. Following the tactics of Ca?sar, he affected timid- 
 ity, permitting the barbarians to ride around the intreneh- 
 ments, to call the Romans cowards, and to fling javelins over 
 the wall, while he was apparently afraid to reply. Then, one 
 afternoon, just as the Gauls had scattered after one of these
 
 C^SAR 145 
 
 expeditions, he sent his cavalry out suddenly with special or- 
 ders that, after they had put the enemy to flight, they should 
 kill Indutiomarus, the chief. The sally was successful, and 
 the result of it quieted in part the exultation of the Gauls 
 over the destruction of the legions of Sabinus. 
 
 Cgesar did not go to Italj^ as was his custom in the winter; 
 and before spring arrived he advanced with four legions 
 against the Nervii who had attacked Cicero. Without the 
 slightest warning, he fell upon them, seized their cattle, and 
 wasted their country. Returning to Amiens, he marched 
 thence to Paris with his usual rapidity, and brought two other 
 tribes to pray for pardon. He then turned on the tribes that 
 had destroyed Sabinus, throwing bridges over the dykes and 
 creeks in search for Ambiorix, who was hiding in Flanders. 
 At the same time, Labienus, under orders from Caesar, 
 tempted the Treveri to engagement by feigned flight, and 
 then turned on his pursuers with great success. Their Ger- 
 man allies retreated again across the Rhine, and Ceesar again 
 threw a bridge over that river and pursued them. But his 
 pursuit was in vain ; for his savage enemies simply fled to the 
 forest, and they had no towns or fields or other property that 
 could be destroyed. Ccesar therefore recrossed the Rhine to 
 Gaul. 
 
 Shortly after, he came again to Tongres, which Sabinus 
 had deserted. The intrenchments were still standing; and 
 CaBsar, finding himself encumbered by his heavy baggage, left 
 it there with Cicero and one legion; promising to return in 
 seven days, and giving Cicero strict orders to keep his men 
 within the lines. It happened on the seventh day of Cgesar's 
 absence that 2000 German horsemen, coming into the vicinity, 
 and hearing that Cgesar was away, attacked the place. Un- 
 fortunately, Cicero had not obeyed his orders, and had per- 
 mitted Ms men to go foraging and leave some gates un- 
 guarded. Into the gates the enemy galloped. Here again 
 they showed the inherent weakness of the barbarian, lack of
 
 146 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 foresight; for they betook themselves merely to plundering, 
 and then galloped away, after a brief engagement with the 
 returning foragers. 
 
 The impression left on the Romans may easily be imagined. 
 To make things worse for their own feelings, they inferred 
 from the attack that the Germans must be in great force in 
 the vicinity, and that Ceesar and his small force must have 
 been destroyed. Cgesar, however, returned with his usual 
 precision at the time that he had fixed. It is said that Caesar 
 was not pleased with what he heard. 
 
 Gaul was now seemingly quiet, but Rome was not. Politi- 
 cal intrigues of great violence and complexity were going on 
 there, of which one element was jealousy of Csesar. Csesar 
 went to Rome. News of this arrived in Gaul, and encouraged 
 the tribes to the belief that Caesar's standing in Gaul was so 
 uncertain that a sudden and simultaneous revolt would be 
 successful, especially as he himself was now on the other side 
 of the Alps. A day was fixed for a general rising; and on 
 that day the revolt was ushered in by the massacre of a party 
 of Roman civilians in the town of Gien on the river Loire. 
 The massacre became known in a few hours to the tribes in 
 the south; with the result that the Auvergne country, which 
 had hitherto been peaceful, immediately revolted under their 
 young chief, Vercingetorix. This chief soon developed an 
 extraordinary ability and energy, raised an army of consider- 
 able size, and imbued it with his spirit. 
 
 Caesar started at once toward Gaul, though to do so left his 
 own interests in Rome in jeopardy. He realized that the task 
 of joining his legions was one of enormous difficulty, the 
 Roman garrisons in Gaul being scattered over a large area 
 filled with the enemies of Rome. Caesar overcame the diffi- 
 culties confronting him largely by the method of moving more 
 rapidlj^ than his enemies expected, and surmounting obstacles 
 that they thought he could not surmount. With a few levies 
 added to some troops that he had left beyond the Alps, he 
 marched through the passes of the Cevennes Mountains,
 
 C^SAR 147 
 
 though the snow was six feet deep, and the roads were sup- 
 posed to be impassable for even single travelers. By this 
 means he was able to fall upon the rebels of Auvergne, and 
 lay the country waste, before they had imagined that he could 
 be anywhere in the vicinity. Caesar made a strong intrenched 
 camp there, and left Decimus Brutus in charge ; while he, un- 
 known to any one, dashed across the country with a handful 
 of attendants. Riding day and night, he finally reached two 
 legions that were quartered near Auxerre, and sent word for 
 the other legions to join him there. 
 
 Meanwhile the Gauls were concentrating, and Caesar's 
 forces were confronted with an increasing shortage of sup- 
 plies. He ordered the ^duans to furnish supplies, and then 
 suddenly advanced on Gien, where the Romans had been 
 murdered. There was a bridge over the river, and by this 
 the barbarians tried to escape in the night; but Caesar was 
 quicker than they, and took all of them prisoners. Ver- 
 cingetorix, who had not known that Caesar was not still in the 
 camp where he had left Decimus Brutus, now hastened to en- 
 gage him in battle. This battle had the usual result; but it 
 had another result — that of opening the eyes of Vercingetorix 
 to the fact that the best way to destroy Caesar was not to meet 
 him in battle, but to prevent his soldiers from getting food. 
 This he forthwith set out to accomplish, burning the fields in 
 the vicinity, harassing Caesar's communications, and resort- 
 ing to many ingenious expedients like those of the Roman gen- 
 eral Fabius. 
 
 Part of the young chief's plan was not to defend even the 
 towns; but he was prevailed upon to permit the defense of 
 Avaricum, a rich and strongly fortified city, protected by 
 rivers on three sides, while on the fourth there were swamps 
 and marshes that could be passed only along a single ridge. 
 Caesar found that the place could not be taken except by a 
 regular siege ; and it seemed doubtful whether the corn sup- 
 ply of the Romans would last as long as the necessary siege 
 would. The situation culminated in an almost actual famine ;
 
 148 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 but, under the inspiration of Caesar, the soldiers determined 
 to persevere. The siege work was made peculiarly difficult 
 by the fact that the inhabitants of that part of the country 
 were skilled artisans, and had surrounded the town with walls 
 forty feet thick, made of alternate layers of stone and timber. 
 The weather was cold and wet ; but in twenty-five da^^s the 
 Romans had built against the wall a bank of turf and fagots 
 one hundred yards wide and eighty feet high, as high as the 
 walls of the town. Then the ingenious Gauls managed to 
 undermine it and set it on fire, while they threw torches and 
 burning fagots from the walls. Finally, however, the fires 
 were subdued. On the following morning the Romans dashed 
 over the walls from the top of the bank, and killed every 
 human being in the town. 
 
 The effect of this disaster was to heighten the prestige of 
 Vercingetorix, who had opposed any attempt to defend the 
 town; and it consequently caused his followers to redouble 
 their exertions to shut off the food supply. 
 
 There was another town, called Gergovia, which Ver- 
 cingetorix was persuaded to defend also. It was believed to 
 be impregnable; and Cgesar himself realized that it could not 
 be taken except by siege. He began an intrenched camp near 
 it ; but before he could proceed further with the work, he 
 heard that ^duans, on whom he relied largely for his food, 
 had become very unreliable; in fact, that 10,000 men, whom 
 they had raised according to his orders, had murdered the 
 Roman officers in charge of them, and were preparing to join 
 Vercingetorix. Leaving two legions to guard his camp, 
 Caesar intercepted the ^duan revolters and took them pris- 
 oners. 
 
 In his absence, Vercingetorix attacked liis camp. Csesar 
 returned in time to save the camp; but the urgency of his 
 food supply had now become so great that he was forced to 
 give up the siege and accept the single military failure of his 
 entire Gallic campaign. His position was indeed critical. 
 To feed the army in his present position was no longer pos-
 
 C^SAR 149 
 
 sible; to retreat into the Roman Province would be a confes- 
 sion of defeat, and rouse the barbarians to still greater efforts. 
 He set out immediately for the territory of the ^duans, 
 where he knew there would be an abundance of food ; and by 
 swift movements, which included crossing a ford over which 
 the troops had to wade in water up to their armpits, he suc- 
 ceeded in getting his entire army to its destination. 
 
 At this time Labienus, with a separate command, was near 
 a town that now is Paris. Hearing of Cesar's retreat, and 
 realizing the necessity of joining him, but being confronted 
 by a large force of Gauls on the opposite side of the river, he 
 saw the necessity of some stratagem. He thereupon sent a 
 fleet of small barges to a bend in the river four miles below 
 Paris, and directed them to wait for him. At nightfall he 
 sent a small force up the river in boats, with orders to make 
 a great noise as though they were retreating, while he with 
 the major part of his force marched silently to the barges 
 and crossed the river in them without being detected. The 
 Gauls, judging by the noise made by the smaller force, con- 
 cluded that the whole army was in flight, and started to fol- 
 low them, but in disorder. Labienus fell upon them witli 
 the usual result, and then joined Ca?sar. 
 
 Meanwhile Cgesar's failure at Gergovia inspired all Gaul 
 with the hope of expelling the Roman invaders. They there- 
 upon elected Vercingetorix their commander, and proceeded 
 with redoubled vigor to cut off Cagsar from supplies of 
 food. But Ceesar, by reason of Ms conquests across the Rhine 
 and his wise treatment of the people there afterward, was 
 enabled to get large supplies of food, and besides that a great 
 number of German horsemen. These horsemen, however, he 
 was compelled to mount on Roman horses, because of the in- 
 feriority of the German horses. When ready, Ceesar started 
 out to punish the treacherous ^duans. On his way, he was 
 attacked by a large force under Vercingetorix, who had the 
 bad strategic judgment to attack him in the open field. The 
 men under Vercingetorix were defeated with great loss, and
 
 150 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 driven toward the fortress of Alesia. They were, in fact, 
 driven within the fortress, and one of the most remarkable 
 sieges in history — in many respects the most remarkable — 
 resulted. 
 
 The fortress of Alesia stood on a hill that sloped steeply in 
 all directions, and lay between two rivers that flowed virtually 
 parallel to each other and emptied into the Brenne River, 
 about two miles distant. In it 80,000 men had now taken 
 refuge. The place was impregnable except to famine, and 
 Caesar knew enough of barbarians to feel sure that they had 
 not had the foresight to supply a great amount of food. He 
 soon learned from horsemen sent out by Vercingetorix that 
 they had enough for thirty days, and that Vercingetorix was 
 calling on all Gaul to come to his assistance before that time 
 elapsed. 
 
 Csesar realized (and so did the Gauls) that the final crisis 
 in the conflict between the Gauls and the Romans was close 
 at hand. Ctesar began at once the construction of intrench- 
 ments and appliances of various kinds, and so did the be- 
 sieged; for by this time they had learned a good deal from 
 the Romans. He cast up around the town siege works that 
 had a length of eleven miles, placed camps at convenient 
 spots, and constructed twenty-three forts. Scarcely had 
 the work begun when a cavalry battle took place on the plain, 
 which was fought with the utmost vigor, and which was lost 
 by the barbarians chiefly because they managed affairs so 
 badly that their great numbers caused interference of one 
 man with another. The usual result occurred. 
 
 Cgesar dug around the fortress a trench twenty feet deep 
 with vertical sides; and four hundred yards back of this he 
 began his other siege works, the unoccupied space of four 
 hundred yards acting to prevent a surprise by the enemy. 
 Behind it he dug two trenches parallel to each other, fifteen 
 feet broad and fifteen feet deep. Behind these he built a ram- 
 part with a palisade twelve feet high, and to this he added a 
 breastwork of pointed stakes projecting horizontally. At in-
 
 C^SAR , 151 
 
 tervals of eighty feet he constructed turrets. In addition, he 
 had branches cut from trees, and sharpened on the ends ; and 
 these he fastened at the bottom of trenches five feet deep, so 
 that the points projected just above the ground. In front of 
 these he dug shallower pits, into which tapering stakes as 
 thick as a man's thigh, sharpened at the top and fire-hard- 
 ened, were driven, so as to project about four inches above 
 the ground; and at the same time the earth was trodden 
 down strongly and firmly for a distance of a foot from the 
 bottom. The pits were covered with twigs and brushwood to 
 conceal them. Eight rows of these pits were dug, three feet 
 apart ; and in front of all, stakes with iron hooks were buried 
 in the ground and scattered at brief intervals over the field. 
 When all these things had been done, Csesar constructed par- 
 allel intrenchments of the same kind, but facing in the other 
 direction, for the reception of the enemy, whom he knew 
 would come from the outside to the assistance of the town. 
 
 The expected reinforcements did not come within the thirty 
 days; but a few days later they arrived, in number about 
 250,000, and filled the entire plain to the east of the town to 
 a depth of three miles. CjEsar disposed of his whole army on 
 both faces of the intrenchments, and then gave orders for 
 the cavalry to go out and engage the enemy. The Gauls had 
 placed archers and light-armed skirmishers among their horse- 
 men, and these at first had some effect. Seeing this, Caesar's 
 German cavalry formed in mass and charged the enemy, and 
 speedily put them to flight. 
 
 On the following day the enemy made a great number of 
 hurdles, ladders, and grappling-hooks ; and that night they 
 left their camp silently, approached the intrenchments, and 
 then raised a shout as a signal to the besieged inside. A 
 combined assault then began against the Roman lines from 
 two opposite directions, in the darkness. By dint of contin- 
 ual drill in their new posts, each Roman had learned what 
 to do under every probable contingency; and in this respect 
 they had their customary advantage over their foes. The
 
 152 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 battle continued during most of the night, but ended without 
 decisive result. After a council of war, and after having re- 
 connoitered the locality by means of scouts, the barbarians 
 decided upon an excellent plan, which was to send a picked 
 force by a circuitous route to a hill north of the town, where 
 the Roman line was weak, and from there to attack from be- 
 hind a camp that the Romans had been obliged to lay out on 
 the side of the hill that sloped toward the fortress. 
 
 About midday, when all was ready, this attack was made; 
 and simultaneously Vercingetorix from the inside and the 
 other barbarians from the outside precipitated a general as- 
 sault. As the Roman force numbered only about 50,000, 
 while the besieged inside numbered 80,000 and the Gauls 
 outside numbered 250,000, the situation was critical for the 
 Romans. The critical point was the hill north of the fortress. 
 The battle was fought, of course, with the greatest cour- 
 age by both sides. Csesar sent a part of the cavalry 
 around the outer intrenchments to the back of the hill 
 with orders to attack the enemy in the rear. He himself then 
 hurried to this critical part of the battlefield, attired in his 
 scarlet cloak, and filled his troops with that ardor which he 
 was always successful in inspiring. His coming being well 
 timed, his cavalry was now seen advancing toward the rear 
 of the enemy. The barbarians were seized with panic and 
 turned to flee. The panic spread as panics always have 
 among barbarians; and after that the battle became a merci- 
 less slaughter. 
 
 The faU of Alesia virtually completed the conquest of 
 Gaul. Much had to be done to bring the various tribes into 
 submission; but this was done without great difficulty, 
 Caesar by his sudden movements appearing in one district 
 and then in another, and crushing each in turn, before any 
 formidable resistance could be organized. The last part of 
 Gaul to yield was the extreme southwest, where a single 
 tribe, reljdng on the strength of a fortress, persisted in re- 
 sistance. Cassar realized that the last spark must be put out,
 
 C^SAR 153 
 
 lest it spread. The fortress was taken by the stratagem of 
 cutting a tunnel, by which the Roman engineers tapped the 
 spring that gave the garrison water. 
 
 Before leaving Gaul, Ccesar reconciled the tribes to the 
 new conditions, convincing them that they would be happier 
 united as a province under the orderly government of Rome 
 than divided up into little bands, perpetually fighting each 
 other. He gave the chiefs magnificent presents, laid no im- 
 positions on either the leaders or the people, and left them 
 resolved to maintain the peace that was now established. 
 
 In the spring of 50 B.C. he went to Italy, and met an atmos- 
 phere of animosity, especially in the Senate. The people re- 
 ceived him with demonstrations of affection, but the politi- 
 cians hated him. After a brief stay he went back to the 
 army; for he had yet one more year of command in Gaul. 
 But the politicians did not want him to remain in command. 
 At this time the government was exceedingly corrupt, and 
 the politicians were alarmed by the fact that Caesar had 
 been promised the Consulship at the end of his second five 
 years in Gaul. They foresaw an end of their peculations if 
 Cffisar should become Consul. They knew that he would 
 carry out the same program of honest and efficient govern- 
 ment that he had pursued when he had been Consul before, 
 and had invented and put into operation the epochal "Leges 
 Juliae." 
 
 After much debate and indecision, the Senate finally or- 
 dered him to give up his command in the following March. 
 To carry out this order would force Caesar to go to Rome as 
 a private citizen, and expose himself helpless to all possible 
 dangers, including murder. He therefore addressed the one 
 legion he had with him with a statement of the case. In re- 
 ply, the legion promised him their enthusiastic support for 
 whatever he might do. Thereupon he sent orders over the 
 Alps for two more legions to follow him, and then crossed 
 the river Rubicon with his legion, thus leaving his province 
 and going into Italy with an armed force. The Senate took
 
 154 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 instant flight — a flight so precipitous that they left their 
 wives, property, and children behind, even the money in the 
 Treasury — and sought refuge with Pompey's army near 
 Capua. 
 
 The greatest confusion reigned in their councils. The only 
 man who took decisive action was Domitius, who had been 
 appointed Caesar's successor, and his action was very foolish, 
 for he took a hostile position in Corfinium and defied Caesar. 
 Cassar took Corfinium by his Gallic methods. Then, with his 
 usual clemency, he gave Domitius and all his followers their 
 liberty, and even their money, without even exacting a prom- 
 ise to refrain from further hostilities. 
 
 The fall of Corfinium so alarmed Pompey and the Senate 
 that most of them fled from Italy into northern Greece. 
 Pompey had a very considerable fleet, and with this he could 
 almost bring starvation to Italy. Cgesar could not follow, be- 
 cause he could not get the necessary ships; but he utilized 
 the time by sending expeditions to Sicily and Sardinia, on 
 which Rome depended for its corn, and clearing them of 
 enemies. Gaul remained true to Cfesar; except that Mar- 
 seilles, a purely commercial city, revolted to Pompey, as a 
 result largely of a visit from a squadron of Pompey's fleet 
 under the command of Domitius. This was the same Domi- 
 tius whom Caesar had recently spared at Corfinium. 
 
 Caesar could not afl'ord to leave Marseilles hostile and ef- 
 fective, because he was about to dash into Spain to attack 
 Pompey's legion there, and she would threaten his communi- 
 cations. How could Caesar shut in Marseilles when he had 
 no fleet? Caesar made a fleet. He cut down trees in the 
 forests, and in thirty days built, launched, and manned 
 twelve strong ships. Leaving these ships to blockade Mar- 
 seilles by sea, and three legions to blockade it by land, Caesar 
 hurried through the passes in the Pyrenees Mountains, which 
 the enemy had not had the foresight to guard. In forty days 
 all the enemy in northern Spain were his prisoners, while 
 those in the south were begging for peace.
 
 C^SAR 155 
 
 But the melting snow on the mountains in northern Spain 
 carried away bridges, made the fords of the rivers impassable, 
 and brought Caesar's army to the point of starvation. What 
 did he do? Remembering that in Britain the fishermen used 
 boats made of frames of wicker covered with skins, Caesar 
 collected wicker from willows on the river-bank, secured hides 
 from the carcasses of animals in the camp, constructed a num- 
 ber of light, buoyant vessels, and crossed the Segre River in 
 them. Soon afterward he returned to Marseilles, just in time 
 to receive its surrender. The siege had been a difficult one, 
 and several engagements had been fought on the water, in 
 which the extemporized vessels of Ciesar had gained the 
 mastery. 
 
 Cffisar left two legions in Marseilles, and sent others back 
 into Gaul, not thinking it wise to give the Gauls too much 
 temptation to revolt. With the rest of his army he returned 
 to Rome at the beginning of the winter, and was at once 
 named Dictator. Civil affairs were in the wildest confusion; 
 public credit was shaken ; debts were long in arrears ; and the 
 whole nation was in terror of Pompey's fleet. Under these 
 circumstances, Caesar gave eleven days of work to Rome, and 
 then (just a year after he had crossed the Rubicon) marched 
 into southern Italy with an army not greater than 30,000 
 men. Pompey and his force, with the Senate, were now on 
 the opposite shore of the Adriatic in western Greece, with 
 nine legions and an abundance of money, stores, and auxili- 
 aries of all kinds. Besides these, two more legions were com- 
 ing from Syria, and great numbers of slingers and archers 
 from the islands. In addition, Pompey had a fleet of one 
 hundred and thirty ships, the principal purpose of which was 
 to prevent Caesar from crossing. 
 
 By great exertions Caesar collected twelve fighting triremes 
 and enough transports to carry half his army. To attempt to 
 cross under such circumstances would seem a wild project; 
 and for this reason Csesar attempted it, and in bad weather, 
 knowing that he would not be expected. As a result he got
 
 156 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 across with 15,000 men and 500 horses, and landed on the 
 eastern shore of the Strait of Otranto, which lies between 
 Italy and Greece. As soon as he disembarked, Csesar ordered 
 the transports to start back in the darkness. But even Caesar 
 could not inspire the men with intelligence and energy while 
 he was absent; and the result was that the transports lin- 
 gered until daylight and were promptly overtaken. 
 
 Not knowing this and expecting that Mark Antony would 
 follow shortly, Csesar occupied Apollonia and intrenched 
 himself on the left bank of the Apsus River. He had depre- 
 cated the civil war, though in a sense he had caused it ; and 
 he hoped still to persuade Pompey to come to terms with him, 
 Pompey had been absent in Macedonia; but he hurried back 
 to Durazzo, near Apollonia, and for some time the oppos- 
 ing forces confronted each other, divided only by a narrow 
 river. Deputations from both sides were chosen to consult, 
 with Cesar's approval; but their consultations were ended 
 when one of Cesar's officers was assaulted with a shower of 
 darts. 
 
 ]\Ionths passed by, while Csesar watched in vain for Mark 
 Antony and the other legions : but Antony was blockaded in 
 Brindisi by Pompey 's ships. Antony drove these off, but did 
 not start. Finally Caesar wrote to Antony that the legions 
 were true as steel, and ready to take any risks, rather than 
 leave their commander in danger. 
 
 Spurred by this, Antony took advantage of a favoring 
 wind, and sailed, though closely followed. In the darkness 
 his ships were swept from their intended course; but finally 
 they ran into a harbor which they were fortunate enough to 
 enter safely, though hotly pursued. 
 
 In the position that Antony's army now took up, Pompey 's 
 army lay between his and Caesar's. Casar surmounted this 
 difficulty by swiftly marching around Pompey 's army and 
 joining Antony before Pompey knew t-hat he had moved. 
 Cgesar was still greatly outnumbered by Pompey, but Pom- 
 pey would not fight. Csesar then drew a line of fortified posts
 
 CiESAR 157 
 
 around him and shut off many of the streams on which Pom- 
 pey depended for water, so that horses and cattle died and 
 fever set in. Csesar's lines were several miles long; so one 
 wonders why Pompey did not attack him, as Caesar undoubt- 
 edly would have done, if the cases had been reversed. 
 Caesar's army had plenty of meat, but practically no wheat; 
 but, having been used to hardships, and having an ingenious 
 commander, they made cakes out of roots, which they ground 
 into paste and mixed with milk. 
 
 In June, 48 B.C., the two legions from Syria approaching 
 Pompey through Asia Minor and Macedonia, Ctesar sent a 
 force eastward to get into touch with them and report their 
 movements to him. While his force in the camp was thus 
 reduced, two young Gauls, turning traitor to Cgesar, gave 
 Pompey information of a certain weak point in Caesar's line, 
 and Pompey promptly attacked it. Cgesar 's forces being sur- 
 prised and distributed over great distances, nearly a thou- 
 sand were killed, and the situation at once became so desper- 
 ate that even Casar failed to restore confidence. If Pompey 
 had possessed Cesar's quick apprehension of situations, he 
 would have seized the opportunity, and perhaps destroyed all 
 of Caesar's force. Some hundred of Caesar's legionaries were 
 taken prisoners; and these, despite Ceesar's clemency shown 
 on so many occasions, were led into the midst of Pompey 's 
 camp and killed. 
 
 Caesar realized the situation at once, and immediately fell 
 back on Apollonia. Leaving his sick and wounded there, he 
 endeavored to rejoin the force that he had sent to the east- 
 ward to watch the coming legions from Sj^ria; a thing which 
 he succeeded in accomplishing. He then marched into Thes- 
 saly, which was a fertile country, capable of feeding his army, 
 and soon reached the vicinity of Pharsalia. Pompey was now 
 following him to bring him to battle, not being guided by his 
 own judgment, but bullied by the Senators who accompanied 
 his army, and who by this time had almost taken his author- 
 ity out of his hands. Not understanding the relative impor-
 
 158 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 tance of the various factors of war, which can be learned only 
 by experience, they were perfectly confident that Pompey's 
 forces could defeat Caesar's because they were superior in 
 numbers. So confident of this were they that they arranged 
 what was to be done with Caesar and his followers, and even 
 with those who remained neutral. 
 
 The long-expected battle finally was fought on the banks of 
 the Enipeus River. It occurred at a place and a time not 
 determined by Pompey, but forced on him by his Senators 
 and politicians. Caesar had only 22,000 men besides 1000 
 cavalry. Pompey had 47,000 Roman infantry and 7000 cav- 
 alry, besides his allies. Pompey's right was covered by the 
 river, and his left spread out into the open plain, reaching, of 
 course, beyond Ctesar's right flank. Pompey intended to send 
 his cavalry outside, with archers and slingers, to attack 
 Cfesar's cavalry on his right flank. Caesar expected this, and 
 trained about 1000 picked men to assist his own cavalry; 
 and besides that he added a fourth line of cohorts of specially 
 selected men, to engage the enemy's cavalry. He told these 
 men that the result of the action would depend on them. 
 
 Pompey commanded on his own left flank. Caesar, with his 
 favorite Tenth Legion, commanded his own right flank. 
 Mark Antony commanded the left flank, and Loginus the 
 center. Caesar made the attack, as usual, his front rank ad- 
 vancing on the run. Seeing that Pompey's men did not move, 
 they halted until they had recovered breath, and then rushed 
 on, flung their darts and closed with the sword. Then Pom- 
 pey's cavalry charged on Ctesar's right flank, reinforced with 
 their archers. Caesar's cavalry gave way; whereupon Pom- 
 pey's squadrons of cavalry came wheeling round, to attack 
 from the rear. To their astonishment, Caesar's fourth line 
 suddenly wheeled into line against them. Surprised and 
 bewildered by the firmness of the resistance of the infan- 
 try, which cavalry always fear, Pompey's cavalry broke 
 in confusion and galloped away. As an explanation, it 
 must be stated that these were not trained cavalrymen,
 
 C^SAR 159 
 
 but "carpet knights" from home. Caesar's fourth line 
 now threw themselves on Pompey's exposed left wing, and 
 were at once reinforced by Caesar's third line. Suddenly 
 Pompey's left flank yielded, and then the entire army turned 
 and fled. 
 
 Only 200 of Cesar's men were lost; of the opposite side 
 15,000 lay dead upon the ground. A tremendous victory had 
 been gained. Nevertheless, Caesar allowed his men no rest; 
 but taking the freshest of them he set out by a rapid march 
 to cut off the line of retreat of the defeated enemy. As a 
 result, he succeeded in capturing 24,000, who came to him 
 sobbing for mercy. With his usual clemency, Caesar par- 
 doned them all. 
 
 The battle of Pharsalia has been described as a battle be- 
 tween aristocracy and democracy. So it was, in effect. Cer- 
 tainly the result was a defeat for the corrupt aristocracy of 
 Rome, and a triumph for the democracy of Italy, and for a 
 cause which shortly made Rome the greatest nation that had 
 ever lived, and the exemplar of efficient government for all 
 the nations that were to follow. 
 
 Pompey fled to Egypt, but was murdered treacherously 
 while he was attempting to land. Csesar followed him; and 
 on reaching Alexandria was presented, much to his disgust, 
 with Pompey's head. The Alexandrians endeavored to pro- 
 pitiate Caesar, and expected that they would have little diffi- 
 culty, and that he would shortly return to Italy and give them 
 their independence. But Caesar soon dispelled all such expec- 
 tations; and thereupon a revolt was started which soon as- 
 sumed great proportions. Cgesar found himself blockaded in 
 the palace, while the Egj-ptian fleet, which had come back 
 from Greece, was in the inner basin, outnumbered his, and 
 threatened his communications with Italy. Without hesita- 
 tion, Caesar set fire to the docks, burned and disabled most of 
 the Egyptian ships at the docks, seized the Pharos and the 
 mole that connected it with the town, and fortified the palace. 
 
 The Alexandrians pumped sea water into the conduits that
 
 160 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 supplied the palace with drinking water; then Caesar sank 
 wells and got fresh water. The Alexandrians constructed a 
 new fleet, and brought down others from the canals, and made 
 oars and spars, even out of benches and tables. At one 
 time they made a sudden attack on a ship on board which 
 Caesar happened to be, and from which he had to swim for his 
 life. Finding at length that they seemed to be making no" 
 impression, the Alexandrians pretended to desire peace; but 
 this move made no impression on the sapient Caesar. 
 Finally, reinforcements for Caesar arrived, imder the com- 
 mand of Mithridates; but a division of the Egyptian army 
 lay between them and Csesar. By his customary method of 
 extraordinarily rapid movement, Cassar joined Mithridates, 
 despite the Alexandrians. Alexandria at once surrendered. 
 
 Caesar now went to Syria, leaving two legions in Egypt. 
 Pharnaees, son of King Mithridates the Great, hearing that 
 Caesar was shut up in Alexandria, had lain claim to his fa- 
 ther 's kingdom and was killing or otherwise maltreating every 
 Roman there. Caesar saw that he must punish Pharnaees 
 before he returned to Rome, and set out at once to meet him. 
 Pharnaees promised submission, and sent Caesar- a golden 
 crown; but Caesar took the ground that his submission must 
 be made to the empire and not to himself, and that the prov- 
 inces he had invaded must be evacuated at once. Pharnaees 
 adopted dilatory tactics, knoM'ing that Caesar's presence was 
 required in Rome; but Caesar cut short negotiations, and, 
 seizing a position at night on the brow of a hill near the Ar- 
 menian camp, began to intrench. Pharnaees, seeing this, de- 
 cided to attack at once, and was able to throw some confusion 
 into the Roman legions before they could exchange their dig- 
 ging tools for their arms and armor. But, as soon as the ex- 
 change had taken place, the Armenians were hurled back with 
 tremendous slaughter, and the insurrection brought to a sud- 
 den end. 
 
 When Ccesar returned to Italy, Spain was in confusion. 
 Italy was disorganized, and a general lack of leadership per-
 
 C^SAR 161 
 
 vaded the whole republic. The issue between the Senate and 
 the people had not yet been decided finally; and, though 
 Cffisar was consul now, the situation was most difficult, even 
 for Csesar. He soon restored quiet in the city and the coun- 
 try, but was then confronted with a difficulty he had not 
 expected — one with his own legionaries. The trouble was that 
 they had been led by foolish or ill-intentioned officers to expect 
 extravagant rewards ; and, these not having been received, 
 they were on the point of mutiny. Even the favorite Tenth 
 Legion demanded speech with Caesar, and then asked for their 
 discharge. Caesar met them coldly, but granted them their 
 discharge and certain lands that he had arranged to have 
 allotted to them. He gave them money also, and told them 
 to go. 
 
 But they M'ould not go. Ca3sar had shamed them by speak- 
 ing to them as he had never spoken before, not as comrades, 
 but as plain citizens, and had offered them land and money, 
 but evidently with contempt. Not one soldier left him. 
 
 Csesar now had to go into Africa, where a large force of 
 Pompeiians under Scipio were assembled with 60,000 Italians 
 in addition, 120 elephants, and a multitude of African cav- 
 alry. He left with only a verj^ small force, ordering the rest 
 to follow as soon as they could; and on arriving fortified a 
 suitable spot at Ruspinum on the coast. The other legions 
 followed slowl}^ Finally, when all had arrived, an evident 
 lack of suitable equipment showed how their officers had dete- 
 riorated. 
 
 Cffisar, noticing that his men feared elephants, delayed 
 active operations until he got some elephants from Italy, so 
 that his men might learn to handle them. He then tried to 
 get into battle, but the enemy held aloof. In order to pre- 
 cipitate it, Caesar blockaded the peninsula of Thapsus by sea 
 and land, reasoning that this would force Scipio to come to 
 its assistance. The issue showed him to be right, as usual. 
 The enemy advanced toward Ca?sar; whereupon Caesar's 
 legionaries showed such eagerness for battle that even Csesar
 
 162 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 was forced to advance sooner than he otherwise would have 
 done. Then he sprang upon his horse and led the charge in 
 person. The first thing that happened was that the elephants 
 that had been placed in front of the enemy wheeled around 
 and crashed, trumpeting and roaring, through the lines of 
 their own men, precipitating a rout. 
 
 Cffisar then returned to Rome, to meet triumphal proces- 
 sions, rejoicings, and honors of all possible kinds. He was 
 made Dictator for ten years, and received powers equal to 
 those of a king. He used these powers more wisely and more 
 energetically, and more in opposition to the efforts and de- 
 sires of the ruling classes, than any other man in history. It 
 would be out of place in a book of this kind to describe what 
 they were, nor would it be necessary. We should remember, 
 however, that the great reforms which Caesar instituted were 
 made by the greatest strategist the world has ever seen, that 
 he could not have made them unless he had attained the posi- 
 tion which he then held, and that he could not have attained 
 that position except by means of strategy. We must realize, 
 therefore, that the greatest single agency in producing that 
 government of Rome, which has been the pattern of all good 
 governments since, was strategy. 
 
 But Csesar had yet one more campaign to carry through, 
 though he was now fifty-five years old, and his splendid health 
 had begun to fail, under the terrific strain of the preceding 
 fourteen years. His presence was required in Spain, where 
 the officers whom he had sent there had brought about a bad 
 state of affairs — as the subordinate officers of great strategists 
 have usually done when left to the guidance of their own intel- 
 ligence and character only. Caesar took with him his grand- 
 nephew, Octavius, then a lad of seventeen, who was to follow 
 him in power, and to bring to a climax of unsurpassed effi- 
 ciency and glory the government he had founded. 
 
 Caesar met his enemies on the 17th of March, 45 B.C., on the 
 plain of Munda on the Guadalquivir River, not far from Cor- 
 dova. The two armies were both composed mainly of highly
 
 C^SAR 163 
 
 trained Roman soldiers. The enemy had the advantage in 
 position, Caesar's army in morale. The battle was a mere 
 stand-up brutal fight ; and for a long while the struggle was 
 so equal that Csesar himself saw the necessity of some signal 
 act to strengthen his men. So he seized a standard, and, by 
 the exercise of his rare powers of persuasion and command, 
 rallied a legion that was beginning to waver. At that moment, 
 Labienus, a traitor from Caesar's Gallic army, and one of the 
 important generals on the enemy's side, was seen to gallop 
 across the field. A shout arose that he was fleeing. A panic 
 thereon ensued, which Csesar's legions took advantage of to 
 break through the enemy's lines. The enemy then broke into 
 two masses, one running to shelter at Munda, and the other to 
 shelter at Cordova. 
 
 Caesar returned shortly to Rome, and resumed the work of 
 reforming the abuses of the government that is historical. 
 The work was not favored by the Senate, for reasons that also 
 are historical ; and it was ended on the 15th of March, 44 B.C. 
 
 On that day, that man was murdered by Roman Senators 
 who pretended to be his friend, who had done more than any 
 other mortal who has ever lived for the establishment of good 
 government and the reign of law.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM AND MARLBOROUGH 
 
 THE death of Cffisar had an effect contrary to the one 
 intended, for it established in the hearts and con- 
 victions of the people a belief in the sincerity of his 
 character and the wisdom of his policies. He was followed 
 in power by his grand-nephew Octavius, one of the most for- 
 tunate facts in history, because Octavius possessed the char- 
 acter and the ability to build still higher the structure that 
 Julius Csesar had founded. Under succeeding emperors the 
 Roman empire became greater and stronger, until the reign 
 of Trajan in the early part of the second century, when it 
 acquired its greatest territorial extent. After this the empire 
 slowly but surely declined; and, if one analyzes the causes, 
 he sees that the immediate cause was a decrease first in strate- 
 gic ability and afterward in purely military ability; and that 
 this decrease was due to the increase in wealth. 
 
 While the empire became weaker inside, the barbarians 
 became stronger outside; and finally the city of Rome itself 
 was sacked by Alaric, Chief of the Visigoths. Britain was 
 then abandoned by the Romans ; and not long after, Genseric, 
 King of the Vandals, conquered the Roman Province in North 
 Africa, and then captured and sacked the city of Rome itself. 
 The Huns under Atilla, a natural military genius, after de- 
 feating the Goths and the armies of the Eastern Empire and 
 receiving tribute from Constantinople, moved westward into 
 Gaul, and finally were met in battle in the year 451 by the 
 Roman legion under Aetius near Chalons. One of the critical 
 battles of the world then followed, in which Atilla was de- 
 feated by the same agency as that which has usually defeated 
 
 164
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM, MARLBOROUGH 165 
 
 barbarians in their world-old war against civilization, that is, 
 by superior strategy. But Rome was now too decadent to 
 stand up long against the virile barbarians; and the Roman 
 Empire of the West fell in 476. 
 
 The Eastern Empire continued, however, with Constanti- 
 nople as its capital; and for almost a thousand years the em- 
 pire kept at bay the barbarians and Mohammedans by the sheer 
 power of superior strategy. Meanwhile, about 486 b.c, the 
 Kingdoms of the Franks, a collection of the Teutonic tribes, 
 was established in Gaul; and later Mohammedanism was 
 spread in the Orient and Africa by the sword. By the year 
 732, just one hundred years after the death of Mohammed, 
 it had been forced on the natives all along the shores of the 
 southern Mediterranean, through Spain, and thence into 
 France. In that year another critical battle was fought, 
 usually called the battle of Tours, between the Saracen Mo- 
 hammedans on one side and the Christian Franks under Duke 
 Pippin, usually called Charles Martel, on the other side. The 
 battle was fought with the utmost courage and energy on both 
 sides, but with distinct lack of strategic ability on the Saracen 
 side ; with the result that the Christians forced the Mohamme- 
 dans out of Gaul and back into Spain, and thereby stopped the 
 advance of Mohammedanism into western Europe. 
 
 Charles Martel was succeeded by his son, also Duke Pippin, 
 who was made King of the Franks with the approval of the 
 Pope, and therefore with his assistance. This favor he later 
 repaid by marching into Italy and expelling the Lombards 
 and donating certain lands regained from them to the Pope. 
 This laid the foundation of the Pope's temporal power. 
 
 Pippin was succeeded by his son, Charles, who became 
 known later as Charlemagne, or Charles the Great. ^ He 
 reigned for forty-seven years. During his reign he made 
 more than fifty campaigns, which resulted in his extending 
 the boundaries of his kingdom beyond the Rhine, beyond 
 Rome in Italy, and from the Mediterranean on the south to 
 the North Sea on the North, His principal campaigns were
 
 166 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 against the Lombards, the Mohammedan Moors in Spain, and 
 (especially) the so-called Saxons, a collection of barbarous 
 Teuton tribes, who seem to have come originally from the 
 neighborhood of the Rhine, but who had spread to the west- 
 ward. 
 
 Like Alexander and Caesar, Charlemagne was a great 
 statesman as well as a great strategist, and did not wage war 
 for mere conquest, but in order to establish good government 
 over a large area. In Charlemagne 's time the civilization that 
 Egypt, Greece, and Rome had produced had almost been 
 extinguished, except in western Asia; and Gaul was in a con- 
 dition not far above barbarism. While Charlemagne did not 
 extend his boundaries over such large areas as did Alexander 
 and Caesar, he probably was nearly as great personally as 
 either of them, both as a strategist and as a statesman ; for he 
 did not have the advantage that they had of commanding 
 armies far superior in skill and discipline to the armies of the 
 enemy. In one way he achieved a greater personal success 
 than either; for he was crowned Emperor of the West (800 
 A..D.), and for fourteen years was the ruler of an empire he had 
 himself created. His empire was divided after his death into 
 three parts, which were made afterward into two; but it did 
 not disappear, like the empire of Alexander. One-half of 
 his empire became approximately the France of to-day, and 
 the other half the late German Empire. 
 
 It was the stable government that Charlemagne established 
 in his empire that made possible the civilization of the Europe 
 of to-day; and it must not be overlooked that the uniting of 
 so many mutually hostile barbarian tribes under one good 
 government was due initially to Charlemagne's superior strat- 
 egy, and would not have been possible without it. 
 
 After Charlemagne's death, civil wars of all kinds took 
 place in his dominions, with the result that the government 
 became so weak that the Norsemen did much as they pleased 
 in the northern part of Gaul, and finally, in 912, forced the 
 French king to cede the province of Neustria to their chief,
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM, MARLBOROUGH 167 
 
 Hrolf, who later changed his name to Rollo. Later the name 
 of the province was changed to Normandy. The Normans 
 came to be the best combination of civilization, intelligence and 
 character that Gaul contained. 
 
 In 1065 the name of the Duke of Normandy was William. 
 He was a man of great ability, energy and ambition; and he 
 took advantage of the wreck on the coast of Harold, who was 
 the probable heir to the throne of England, to make Harold 
 swear allegiance to himself and promise to assist him to attain 
 the crown of England, after the death of Edward, the actual 
 king. Harold was then permitted to return to England. 
 King Edward dying soon afterward, Harold was declared to 
 be the king, the late king ha\dng nominated him as his suc- 
 cessor. Harold thereupon declared his oath to William to 
 be void, because given under compulsion and had himself 
 appointed king. 
 
 William at once organized an expedition of invasion, and in 
 September, 1066, set out for England with 60,000 men. For- 
 tunately for him, Harold was attacked in the same month by 
 a Norwegian army, and compelled to fight a bloody battle at 
 Stamford Bridge, in which he lost many men; for it was dur- 
 ing Harold 's absence with his army and fleet on this campaign 
 that William appeared off the coast of England. He landed 
 at once, on the 29th of September, 1066, without meeting any 
 opposition whatever. 
 
 Harold came south to meet him; and, though his army was 
 far inferior in number to William's, and though his fleet 
 would be able seriously to threaten William's communication 
 with Normandy, he committed the strategic blunder of pre- 
 cipitating a battle, when it would have been much better strat- 
 egy to lay waste the country", keep out of William's way, and 
 let his army starve. The two forces finally met near Has- 
 tings. Harold selected a very good position on a small 
 eminence, in which both his flanks and rear were well pro- 
 tected, and threw up a barricade in front of his force, con-
 
 168 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 structed of shields and wooden stakes so joined together as 
 to make a sort of wall. 
 
 The Normans hurled themselves against the Saxons, but for 
 several hours had no success. The Normans then resorted to 
 the stratagem of pretending to flee in order to tempt the Sax- 
 ons from the shelter of their little fortress. The Saxons fell 
 into the trap, and followed the Normans, and finally broke 
 into disorder in the eagerness of their pursuit. Seizing a 
 favorable opportunity, the Normans turned around and re- 
 newed their attack. The Saxons, being inferior in numbers 
 and deprived of the protection that the wall had given them, 
 were finally defeated. On Christmas Day, William, Duke of 
 Normandy, known in history as William the Conqueror, was 
 crowned King of England. 
 
 It is the verdict of historians that the conquest of England 
 by the Normans was one of the most fortunate events of his- 
 tory. Not only were the Nonnans superior in ability and 
 character to the Saxons, but the combination that was eventu- 
 ally produced of Saxons and Normans made the splendid 
 British race. If the invasion had not occurred, no reason war- 
 rants us to suppose that the interminable little strifes between 
 tribes and provinces would have ceased until some other great 
 occurrence had brought pressure against England from the 
 outside, and compressed the English together into a single 
 nation. 
 
 When William invaded England, the light of a renewal of 
 civilization was dimly visible in Europe, and nations were 
 beginning to form approximately along present lines, by the 
 union in various sections of many tribes and clans. Especially 
 clear were the nations of England, France, Germany and 
 Spain. The crusades that were waged against the Turks, 
 mainly in the twelfth century, assisted in this movement; 
 while the institution of Chivalry, which sprang from the Cru- 
 sades, operated in all countries, especially in France, to soften 
 the manners of the people and alleviate the horrors of war,
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM, MARLBOROUGH 169 
 
 The principal single epoch was that comprised in what is 
 usually called the Hundred Years ' War, which was a series of 
 wars between 1338 and 1453, waged between France and Eng- 
 land for the possession of the crown of France. The ultimate 
 decision of this war, by which the English were finally forced 
 out of France in 1453, had less influence on history than did 
 the fact that the war united each nation by making it fight 
 against an outside enemy. The war produced strong feelings 
 of nationality in each country. 
 
 That this was a beneficent influence cannot reasonably be 
 doubted; for history tells us in unmistakable language, and 
 tells us many times, that every advance in civilization has 
 been contributed by some country whose people were natu- 
 rally cooperative because bound together by a strong feeling of 
 nationality. 
 
 Patriotic nations have always been the most useful to the 
 world. 
 
 In the same year that marked the expulsion of the English 
 from France, 1453, Constantinople was finally taken by the 
 Ottoman Turks, under Mohammed II, surnamed the Great. 
 He must have been a remarkable strategist, for the difficulties 
 he had to overcome were numerous and important. He be- 
 came possessed of a gun, enormous for those days, that threw 
 balls weighing one hundred pounds, made of hard black stone. 
 He was not only energetic, brave, and determined, but very 
 resourceful and inventive. One of his ingenious and success- 
 ful accomplishments was to transport eighty galleys for a 
 distance of eightj'^ miles across the land and into the harbor, 
 because he was unable to reach the harbor through the regular 
 channels. He then captured or sank all the ships in the har- 
 bor, and built a bridge over it, by which the city was laid 
 open to assault. The Ottoman Turks at this time were great 
 warriors, and included among their number an organization 
 called Janizaries, a special corps who were selected at first 
 from Christian captives when they were boys, and trained to 
 the profession of arms.
 
 170 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 An extraordinary occurrence was the expedition of Jen- 
 ghis Khan, which began in 1206 and lasted twenty-one years. 
 Jenghis Khan was only the chief of some Mongolian tribe in 
 the eastern part of Asia; but he collected an enormous horde 
 of barbarians, and marched through Asia at their head, lay- 
 ing waste everything in his path. He conquered the northern 
 part of China, overran Turkestan and Persia, and established 
 a savage empire. He was succeeded by his son, Oktai, who 
 continued his father's course, and during the interval between 
 1238 and 1241 ravaged nearly half of Europe. One of his suc- 
 cessors was Kublai Khan, who made the present Peking his 
 capital. Upon his death this curious empire fell apart. It 
 was partially restored by Tamerlane. After his death his 
 descendant Baber invaded India, and established the kingdom 
 Great Moguls, which lasted two hundred years. These men 
 cannot strictly be called strategists; yet one must admit that 
 they possessed many of the qualities of great strategists, and 
 achieved some of their successes. The first two seem to have 
 been destroyers only, and to have carried their rage for de- 
 struction further than anybody else known. It is said that in 
 some cities that they destroyed they killed every living thing, 
 human and brute ! 
 
 The reason for mentioning them in this book is to point out 
 that their success was due almost entirely to the absence of 
 real resistance. The lands over which they swept were inhab- 
 ited for the most part by peaceful people, who had exactly 
 the amount of skill and resourcefulness to defend themselves 
 that might have been expected. The barbarians had that 
 hatred of civilization which all barbarians have, and always 
 will have; and they gained the success which barbarians al- 
 ways have gained and always will gain, against people who 
 have become so persuaded of the permanence of peace, and 
 so averse to war, as to have lost the power of self-protection. 
 Self-protection is the first law of nature; and any man and 
 any nation that becomes so ultra-civilized as to lose that in- 
 stinct will inevitably go down, if seriously attacked.
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM, MARLBOROUGH 171 
 
 The fate meted out by Jenghiz Khan to the pacifists of his 
 day is respectfully called to the attention of the pacifists of 
 the present day : for barbarism is not dead, but only held in 
 incomplete subjection. 
 
 After the fall of Constantinople, the Mohammedans became 
 increasingly aggressive, and threatened to spread to the west- 
 ward over Europe. They were stopped by Don John of Aus- 
 tria in 1571, who, at the head of the Spanish fleet, aided by 
 Venetian and Papal squadrons, defeated the Turkish fleet at 
 the battle of Lepanto. Again civilization was saved from the 
 wrath of barbarians by fighting. 
 
 The next incident of strategic importance was the expedi- 
 tion of the Spanish Invincible Armada, sent by Philip II of 
 Spain in 1588 to invade England. The expedition was fitted 
 out and organized with the most extraordinary energy and 
 completeness ; and the original plan was good. It was simply 
 that the Armada was to sail into the English Channel in over- 
 powering force and secure command of the sea there, in order 
 to permit the Prince of Parma to sail across from Calais in 
 France with a large force of infantry soldiers and cavalry, be- 
 sides gun-carriages, siege machinery, and all requisites for 
 building bridges and forming camps. The king made the stra- 
 tegic mistake at the start, however, of rejecting the advice of 
 the admiral, Santa Cruz, to make sure of some harbor on the 
 coast of Holland to be used as a base and harbor of refuge; 
 and, after the death of this admiral, he made a mistake possi- 
 bly greater, by appointing a man to the command of the fleet 
 who, though a duke and a grandee of Spain, was wholly un- 
 qualified. After a number of mishaps, the Spanish fleet 
 engaged the British fleet, and in overpowering force — not 
 numerically, but in aggregate tonnage and in number and 
 weight of guns. The result of the fight was such as might 
 have been expected by anyone who knew of the superior skill 
 of the British. The Armada was disastrously defeated, 
 Parma 's army could not get across the Channel, and the whole 
 expedition was a failure.
 
 172 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 This fight decided that England, and not Spain, should rule 
 the seas ; that free institutions, and not despotic governments, 
 should prevail; that civilization was to advance and not re- 
 cede. It was decided, not by superior courage, but by supe- 
 rior strategy. As in all the long battle between civilization 
 and barbarism, or between a higher and a lower civilization, 
 superior intelligence, as embodied in superior strategy, in 
 superior leadership in fighting, decided the result. 
 
 Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. The throne then passed to 
 the Stuart family, from whom it was wrested by the strategic 
 genius of Cromwell in 1649, to whom it reverted in 1660, and 
 from whom it was again wrested in 1688, There followed the 
 accession of the Protestant William, Prince of Orange. Mean- 
 while, Henry IV of France had made the French into a strong 
 nation; Philip II of Spain had died, leaving a ruined coun- 
 try; the Thirty Years' War had been fought in Germany, and 
 ended by the establishment of Protestantism there ; Richelieu 
 had continued the advancement of the military and civil 
 power of France ; and Louis XIV had come to its throne. 
 
 Louis XIV is not usually classed among the great strate- 
 gists of history; and yet it cannot truthfully be denied that 
 in foresight, courage, initiative, knowledge of military mat- 
 ters, and ability to select and support subordinates, it would 
 be absurd to deny him strategic and statesmanlike ability. 
 Certain it is that during all his youth and middle life he ad- 
 vanced the prosperity of France by that policy of military 
 and economic progressiveness which permanently prosperous 
 countries have always followed. Skilful generals led his 
 armies; wise statesmen administered his departments; and 
 the greatest military engineer of history, Vauban, fortified his 
 frontiers and directed the sieges of the fortresses of his ene- 
 mies. In the latter part of the seventeenth century and until 
 ]\Iarlborough defeated his armies and destroyed his prestige, 
 France was the best governed country the world had seen 
 since the days of Rome and Octavius Caesar. 
 
 The death of the childless King of Spain in 1700, and the 
 
 1
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM, MARLBOROUGH 173 
 
 fact that he bequeathed his kingdom, as if it were a piece of 
 personal property, to the grandson of Louis XIV, menaced 
 Europe with the danger that the Bourbon family would again 
 dominate Europe, as Charles V had dominated it, but more 
 arbitrarily and less wisely. A coalition was quickly formed, 
 of which the main members were England, Holland, Prussia, 
 and Austria. Their forces outnumbered those of Louis; but 
 they were merely allies, unaccustomed to act together, sepa- 
 rated by considerable distances, and with no leader of recog- 
 nized ability; whereas the forces of Louis occupied a central 
 position, were united under one government, and spoke one 
 language. They were, besides, intimately allied with those of 
 Spain. The death of William III, the natural leader of the 
 coalition, was hailed with joy in France; but it would not 
 have been hailed with joy if the French had known that it 
 would result in placing in command of the allied troops the 
 greatest strategist of the day, the Duke of Marlborough. 
 
 The Allies declared war against France in 1702. Marl- 
 borough was made commander-in-chief of the allied troops. In 
 the first two years of the war he took some towns in Flanders, 
 but accomplished nothing decisive. Louis XIV, however, ob- 
 tained the alliance of Bavaria ; and this gave him a powerful 
 strategic advantage by virtue of the geographical position of 
 Bavaria relatively to Austria, which was the most powerful 
 member of the coalition against him. Louis then planned a 
 campaign of the greatest strategic boldness and reasonable- 
 ness. It was simply to assemble a grand army and march on 
 Vienna. The army was to be made up from a large force 
 under Marshal Villeroy taken from Flanders, the army under 
 Marshal Tallard then near Strasbourg, the French troops 
 under Marshal Marsin, then with the elector of Bavaria, and 
 the French army of Italy, which was to advance through 
 Tyrol into Austria. This plan had excellent prospects of suc- 
 cess. Had it succeeded, the Bourbon family and the Roman 
 Catholic Church would probably have dominated Europe for 
 a long while thereafter.
 
 174 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 As we know, it did not succeed. 
 
 What prevented it ? The strategic genius of Marlborough. 
 
 Louis had not been accustomed to be opposed by any strate- 
 gic genius. Marlborough immediately frustrated his plan by 
 the simple and daring act of marching rapidly to the vicinity 
 of the French main forces, near Strasbourg and operating 
 against Bavaria. This extraordinary move not having heen 
 expected, the plans of Louis were at once thrown out of the 
 orderly procedure he and the generals had arranged, and had 
 to be modified at once. Villeroy, in the north, seems to have 
 been utterly disconcerted and to have done nothing whatever. 
 If he had followed close on the heels of Marlborough, the 
 results that ultimately were obtained by Marlborough would 
 probably not have been obtained; and this is one illustration 
 out of many, that the triumphs of good strategy have often 
 been gained because of being opposed by bad strategy. Mar- 
 shal Tallard, fearing that Marlborough was about to attack 
 Alsace, did not advance himself, but remained where he was. 
 Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria forbore to press 
 upon the Austrians opposed to them, fearing to divert their 
 own attention from Marlborough. This left the Austrians free 
 to oppose the inroad of the French from Italy into Austria, 
 which, therefore, did not take place. 
 
 In this condition of affairs Marlborough was able to catch 
 the Bavarians while they were unsupported, and to defeat 
 them in the battle of Donauwert. This battle roused Marshal 
 Tallard at last to the real state of affairs, and caused him to 
 march at once to the eastward and unite his force with those 
 of Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria. Their com- 
 bined forces took up a position facing to the eastward, with 
 their right under the command of Tallard, resting on the 
 village of Blenheim on the Danube, while the left, under Mar- 
 sin and the Elector, rested on the village of Lutzingen. Marl- 
 borough took up a position facing them, commanding the left 
 wing in person, while Prince Eugene commanded the right 
 wing, which consisted mostly of cavalry. Marlborough had
 
 CHARLEMAGNE, WILLIAM, MARLBOROUGH 175 
 
 about 56,000 men and fifty-two guns, while Tallard had about 
 60,000 men and sixty-one guns. 
 
 The battle began at early morning on the 13th of August, 
 1704. As a result the French army was almost entirely de- 
 stroyed. Yet they had not only been superior numerically 
 to the allies, but had the advantage of position; their flanks 
 being protected by the Danube on the right and high ground 
 on the left, while the little river Nebel made a barrier that 
 Marlborough's forces had to cross. Furthermore, the French 
 were supposed to be as well commanded and to be as brave 
 and skilful soldiers. 
 
 When one reads the accounts of the battle, he realizes that 
 after it had begun it was purely a tactical fight ; and he finds 
 himself wondering why it resulted as successfully for Marl- 
 borough as it did. One reason undoubtedly was that Marl- 
 borough possessed in an extreme degree the ability to decide 
 wisely and quickly under circumstances of the most extreme 
 peril and urgency. This was evidenced by his brilliant man- 
 oeuver of reforming his troops under fire, and changing the 
 brunt of his attack from the village of Blenheim, where the 
 French line was strong, to a point where he suddenly realized 
 that their line was weak, breaking through the line, and di- 
 viding the French force. The absence of this kind of ability 
 in savages, when opposed to white men, is notable in many 
 battles in history. In an actual battle, this tactical ability 
 in a commander-in-chief is the most important that a com- 
 mander-in-chief can have. 
 
 Marlborough was assisted, of course, by a genius almost 
 equal to his own, that of Prince Eugene; and it must have 
 been the mutual and cooperating action of these two geniuses 
 that brought about the actual result. No other cause seems 
 assignable. What other cause can we assign, when a numeri- 
 cally inferior force beats a superior force that has great ad- 
 vantage of position? One may say that there was a better 
 morale on the side of Marlborough than on the other side. 
 There probably was, and it is indicated by the fact that Marl-
 
 176 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 borough took tlie oft'cnsivo. But, even if we grant this, must 
 we not credit Marlborough and Eugene with having inspired 
 this morale 1 
 
 The war eoulinued until 1713, when it was concluded by 
 the Peace of Utrecht. It resulted to the advantage of the 
 allies almost wholly; because of the military operations of 
 Marlborough, and especially his victories at Blenheim, Ramil- 
 ies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet. 
 
 There is only one reasonably assignable cause for the vic- 
 tories of Marlborough, and the consequent liberation of 
 Europe from the stilling conditions of Bourbon rule — supe- 
 rior strategy.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 FREDERICK 
 
 IN the year 1640 the Margravate of Brandenburg had lit- 
 tle importance in the world; but a man who was to in- 
 fluence all future history came then to its throne, and 
 started it on a career that no historian since has neglected to 
 describe. His title was Margrave; but, as he was one of the 
 men who elected the German Emperor, he had the title also 
 of Elector. In history he is called the Great Elector. He 
 ruled from 1640 to 1688. He found Brandenburg poor, unim- 
 portant, and disordered ; he left it comparatively rich, with a 
 recognized standing as an independent state, a good army, an 
 excellent corps of administrators, and a very efficient govern- 
 ment. He accomplished this by that combination of good 
 statesmanship and good generalship by which all good govern- 
 ments have been established. 
 
 He was followed by his son, who was a painful contrast to 
 his father, but who mainly because of the excellent condition 
 in which his father had left Brandenburg and its sister Prus- 
 sia, succeeded in being made the King of Prussia. He was 
 followed in turn by his son, Frederick William I, who was in 
 essentials like his grandfather, the Great Elector. He also 
 was a great statesman, a great strategist, and a great patriot, 
 though coarse and brutal, as many of the Prussians were — in 
 fact, as the German peoples have ever been since the time of 
 Cgesar and before. He continued the work of securing pros- 
 perity at home and security abroad, fighting against the 
 opposition of nearly all of his own people, including his own 
 family, including even his own son, who was later to reap such 
 advantage from his father's work, and to do so much in addi- 
 tion, as to secure the name in history of Frederick the Great, 
 
 177
 
 178 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 It must be said, however, in exculpation of Frederick, that 
 his attitude toward his father was caused largely by the evil 
 influence of his mother ; and that he came later to realize that, 
 while his father had done many coarse and brutal things, the 
 number and the magnitude of the good things that he did, and 
 the results they achieved, were such that in the end he accom- 
 plished much more good than harm. 
 
 Frederick II came to the throne of Prussia in 1740, at the 
 age of twenty-eight. During most of his youth he was a dilet- 
 tante and a dreamer, playing the flute, writing poetry, and 
 amusing himself in literature. Suddenly he became an auto- 
 cratic king, and the commanding general of an army. One 
 of his first acts was to abolish the tall grenadiers, who had 
 been his father's only extravagance. He addressed himself 
 especially to the improvement of the army, which had already 
 been made the most efficient army in Europe ; for he realized 
 that the Emperor of Germany's death was not far distant, 
 and that the opportunity would come then, if ever, to press 
 those claims to Silesia that his father and grandfather had 
 urged but had not been able to have recognized. 
 
 A few weeks after Frederick's accession, the Emperor died. 
 Frederick resolved at once to invade Silesia. In fact, he took 
 immediate steps actually to invade it ; but he kept the fact a 
 secret. On the very evening before his departure for the 
 army, he gave a double entertainment that lasted far into the 
 night; and then, on the following morning, he mounted his 
 coach and drove off to carry out a project that has been un- 
 sparingly condemned by historians and others ever since, but 
 has also been vigorously defended. 
 
 "Whether or not Frederick was justified in invading Silesia, 
 it is not within the province of strategy to discuss, any more 
 than it is within the province of engineering to discuss ques- 
 tions of religion. It is within the province of strategy, how- 
 ever, to discuss the skill and energy with which Frederick 
 carried out his invasion; and strategy has always declared 
 that his conduct of the invasion was admirable. One of the
 
 180 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 first requisites in a strategist is the capacity for making plans 
 in advance, starting promptly to carry out the plans when the 
 proper moment comes, and continuing thereafter to do every- 
 thing vi^ith timeliness and force. That Frederick made certain 
 claims concerning Silesia was well known; but no suspicion 
 that he intended to press them seems to have been entertained ; 
 for, before Austria had taken any defensive measures of any 
 kind, Frederick was in Silesia and had captured Breslau, its 
 capital. 
 
 The Austrians having committed the capital strategic crime 
 of being caught unprepared, were consequently slow in get- 
 ting an army into Silesia, to oust Frederick; but, when they 
 did start, they did it with so much secrecy and swiftness that 
 Frederick himself was almost caught unprepared, for he had 
 his troops scattered in many dii¥erent camps. The Austrians, 
 however, probably through lack of a good intelligence depart- 
 ment, were unable to bring him to battle. They finally took 
 up a defensive position near Mollwitz, and there Frederick 
 determined to attack them, though there was two feet of snow 
 on the ground. His infantry was greater in numbers than 
 that of the Austrians, but the Austrian cavalry was the 
 stronger. 
 
 The battle was bitterly contested on both sides. At one 
 time, owing largely to the fact that Frederick's soldiers were 
 unused to actual war, the second battle line fired into the rear 
 of their own first line. Frederick was so overwhelmed with 
 despair that he was induced to leave the field of battle by 
 his general, Schwerin, who possibly wished to get rid of him. 
 Schwerin then rallied his forces and advanced to the attack 
 with his right wing upon the Austrian infantry. The Prus- 
 sians had an enormous advantage in the fact that their mus- 
 kets were better than those of the Austrians, and also that by 
 the use of a novel iron ramrod they could be loaded and fired 
 more quickly — Carlisle says in the ratio of five to two. This 
 enormous advantage was not the result of accident, but of
 
 FREDERICK 181 
 
 superior strategic foresight, combined with prompt action in 
 accordance with it. The Austrians were soon in retreat, and 
 then Sehwerin tlirew forward his whole left wing at double 
 time, and struck the Austrians, not with an irregular, waver- 
 ing line, but with a line that was moving with the absolute 
 rigidity which the father of Frederick had had in view, and 
 to attain which he had drilled the army so stubbornly and so 
 long. As a result, the Austrian army was soon in full retreat. 
 
 Frederick shortly afterward made a treaty with France, 
 whereby France guaranteed Lower Silesia to him and agreed 
 to prosecute the war vigorously on her own account, but in 
 cooperation with him. In accordance, an allied French and 
 Bavarian army soon captured Linz, the capital of Upper Aus- 
 tria. 
 
 Frederick then showed a true conception of strategy by in- 
 sisting that the allied forces should at once attack Vienna, 
 which probably could have been easily taken then. He said: 
 "This Austria must be struck to earth; incurable wounds 
 must be inflicted upon her before she is in a condition to 
 parry the blows. ' ' But this the French would not consent to. 
 They gave various reasons; but the real reason was that a 
 successful attack on Vienna would have been too greatly to 
 the advantage of Charles Albert of Bavaria, who was their 
 Emperor Elect of Germany, but whom they did not wish to 
 encourage too much. A French diplomat is said to have re- 
 marked: "If we make the Elector master of Vienna, we shall 
 no longer be the master of the Elector." 
 
 This incident is important because it illustrates the conflicts 
 between strategy and statesmanship that often have taken 
 place, especially when allies were cooperating, but which have 
 also taken place in the service of one country when the states- 
 man and the strategist were two different persons. Alexan- 
 der suffered from no such difficulty ; neither did Caesar ; 
 neither did Louis XIV; and neither did Frederick as long as 
 his operations concerned his own army only. In fact, in
 
 182 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 some of his later wars the strongest single factor in his favor 
 was that both the statesman and the strategist wore the uni- 
 form of the King of Prussia. 
 
 Disgusted with the inefficient support of France, and with- 
 held himself by no scruples of ethics or morality, Frederick 
 now made a secret agreement with Austria, providing that 
 there should be a sham siege of Neisse, which should surrender 
 to him at the end of fifteen days, after which a truce would 
 follow. This, he saw later, was not even wise, because it 
 enabled the Austriaus to use their entire army against the 
 French. He therefore promptly repudiated his agreement 
 with Austria and took possession of the Province of Glatz. 
 The Austrians then advanced to attack him, but wit"h such 
 strategic unskilfulness that they allowed him to unite two 
 separated forces. A battle ensued at Chotusitz, which, like 
 most battles, was fought bravely by both sides. The Aus- 
 trians were finally defeated, largely because of the poor dis- 
 cipline of the Austrian cavalry, who took advantage of a 
 favorable opportunity to stop and do some plundering for 
 their personal benefit. 
 
 By the Treaty of Breslau, signed soon after in July, 1742, 
 Frederick secured the greater part of Silesia, a territory equal 
 to one third of the entire former Prussian state. 
 
 The war continued between France and Austria, and was 
 carried on by the French with the same lack of skill as char- 
 acterized most of the French operations during the reign of 
 Louis XV, conducted as they were by generals selected, not 
 because they were brave and skilful, but because they were 
 favorites of the king or of his mistresses. In 1743 a treaty 
 between Austria and Sardinia, which was followed by a treaty 
 between Austria and Saxony in January, 1744, decided Fred- 
 erick to reenter the war in order to preserve what he had 
 gained in Silesia, and to endeavor to get more. To this end 
 he made a treaty with France, and then advanced at once 
 and captured Prague. 
 
 At this time Maria Theresa's army, under command of
 
 FREDERICK 183 
 
 Prince Charles of Lorraine, was making a victorious advance 
 into Alsace. On hearing of Frederick's advance, Charles 
 immediately recrossed the Rhine. Of course, the French 
 should have pursued him, and Frederick naturally expected 
 that they would. They did not, however, and soon Frederick 
 found himself not taking Vienna, as he had hoped, but re- 
 treating to Silesia. He was opposed by greatly superior 
 numbers, and he could not bring them to battle, as the Aus- 
 trian general followed the Fabian policy of letting Freder- 
 ick's army wear itself away under the influence of hunger 
 and discouragement, which it soon began to do. Then Fred- 
 erick adopted the stratagem of leaving the passes in the Giant 
 Mountains unguarded, hoping that the enemy would take his 
 apparent failure as a sign of weakness and rush forward to 
 attack him. This they did, but so quickly that Frederick 
 himself was almost caught unprepared for their onslaught, 
 and got his forces together in time only by dint of the utmost 
 energy. Prince Charles of Lorraine was so confident of his 
 own tactical ability, and so sure that he had Frederick in his 
 grasp, that he took the actual command away from General 
 Traun and assumed it himself, and then lay down to sleep 
 without taking adequate measures for watching Frederick. 
 As a result, Frederick moved out of his camp in the night- 
 time, leaving his fires burning and tents standing, and took up 
 a more favorable position near Hohenfriedberg. From this 
 position, at early dawn, he attacked the enemy so violently 
 and so unexpectedly as to put them to ruinous flight. 
 
 Shortly afterward he himself was attacked at the village of 
 Sohr by an Austrian army nearly twice as large as his own, 
 which tried the same manceuver against him. Curiously 
 enough, Frederick himself was caught ; but he was able to re- 
 ply with an attack on the enemy, and to conduct it with such 
 courage and coolness as to win the day. Shortly afterward 
 he sent an army into Saxony, in order to prevent the union of 
 the Saxon and Austrian armies, and with peremptory orders 
 to attack the Saxons before the union could be effected. The
 
 184 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 expedition was successful, but by a very narrow margiuj be- 
 cause when the old Prussian Field Marshal, with 22,000 men, 
 finally stormed the heights at Kesseldorf, on which were 
 34,000 Saxons, the Austrian army of 46,000 men was only five 
 miles away. Since Frederick was now ready to unite with 
 his victorious general, the Austrians sued for peace. As a 
 result, the Peace of Dresden, which confirmed the Peace of 
 Breslau, was signed on Christmas, 1745. 
 
 The War of the Austrian Succession continued, mainly be- 
 tween Austria and France, for a little more than two years, 
 and was ended in 1748 by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. One 
 clause in this treaty guaranteed to Frederick the possession 
 of Silesia. 
 
 In 1756 the long-presaged Seven Years' War broke out. In 
 the complicated situation that had gradually been forming, 
 the various countries that took part in the war found them- 
 selves lined up in a way very difl^erent from the way in which 
 they had been lined up in the previous war, England and 
 Prussia being allied against France, Austria, and Russia. 
 
 Frederick, having a good intelligence department, soon 
 learned that Austria and Russia were both secretly preparing 
 enormous forces to take the field against him. He tried to 
 get a declaration of intentions from Maria Theresa, but with- 
 out success; whereupon he at once invaded Saxony, marched 
 into Dresden, forced open the door of the room in the palace 
 where the archives were kept, selected three bags full of 
 compromising documents, and sent them to Berlin to be pub- 
 lished. He then ordered the commanding general of the 
 Saxon army to make his whole army take oath of allegiance to 
 him. At this time an Austrian army was advancing to the 
 relief of Saxony. A battle took place between them and Fred- 
 erick at Lobositz, which ended to the advantage of the Prus- 
 sians. Little was accomplished, however, except that Saxony 
 was placed under Prussian administration, and the taxes of 
 her subjects were diverted to the use of Prussia. 
 
 Louis XV of France was now induced to take the offensive
 
 FEEDERICK 185 
 
 energetically, and to furnish an army of 115,000 men ; where- 
 upon he, Maria Theresa, and the Empress of Russia started 
 a very effective plan of operations, even drawing Sweden into 
 their alliance, with an agreement to furnish 20,000 men. In 
 addition, Austria succeeded in drawing to her side sixty out 
 of eighty-six of the estates of the German empire; the Diet 
 voting "imperial execution" against Frederick for invading 
 Saxony. 
 
 Frederick was now in a perilous situation. England was 
 his only friend, and her hands were full, waging wars of her 
 own with both America and India. Numerically, he was at a 
 crushing disadvantage ; but he had two enormous military ad- 
 vantages which ultimately made him victorious — that of supe- 
 rior stategic ability, and the fact that the statesman and the 
 strategist were united in one person. These were of incalcul- 
 able value to him in many ways, but especially in endowing 
 him with that prime requisite in strategy — speed of action. 
 
 In those days in Europe, armies went into winter quarters 
 in the winter-time. In the following winter of 1756-57, Fred- 
 erick spent his time studying and pondering the campaigns of 
 the great strategists, especially those who had fought in the 
 vicinity in which he expected to fight when fighting weather 
 came. As a result he made an early dash at the enemy's camp 
 at Koniggratz. He took the enemy so wholly by surprise that 
 they retreated at once to the hills near Prague, and left be- 
 hind them stores that were of great value to Frederick. They 
 took up a strong position, but the Prussians followed them, 
 though under great difficulties because of the nature of the 
 ground, and finally put them to flight. Leaving the bulk of 
 his army to coop up the Ausfrians in Prague, Frederick 
 started to cut off General Daun, who was advancing to 
 Prague's relief. At this time he made the strategic blunder 
 of giving them battle at once, refusing to believe the reports 
 given him of the strength of Daun's army. The result was a 
 disaster that decided the whole campaign adversely to him, 
 and for which nobody was to blame but Frederick, His situ-
 
 186 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 ation was now almost desperate. To make it worse, an army 
 of Hanoverians and Hessians, under the command of the 
 Duke of Cumberland, was conducted with such strategic un- 
 skilfulness that it was forced to surrender to the French, 
 
 Frederick's next move was to march into Thuringia and try 
 to get battle with the French army there. He failed to ac- 
 complish this, however, and meanwhile a small Austrian force 
 entered Berlin and laid it under contribution. Frederick en- 
 deavored to intercept this force after it withdrew; and his 
 movement appeared to the French and Austrian commanders 
 as a retreat. They therefore advanced, and Frederick then 
 took up a strong position at Rossbach. So confident were the 
 French and Austrians that they, having 43,000 men, could 
 capture Frederick and his army of 20,000 men, that they 
 tried the dangerous manoeuver of marching around Freder- 
 ick's flank. Seizing a favorable moment, Frederick dashed 
 down upon the enemy from the crest of the hill, and in the 
 course of an hour routed them completely. 
 
 The victory was splendid and important, but not enough so 
 to redeem the dangerous situation in which Frederick still 
 was. To make the situation worse, an important new for- 
 tress in Silesia fell after a siege of seventeen days, and 5800 
 Prussians were made prisoners of war. When finally a battle 
 did take place near Breslau, the capital of Silesia, the Prus- 
 sians were defeated, and obliged to take refuge in the town. 
 Soon afterward Breslau was captured, and Silesia seemed to 
 be lost to Frederick. So confident were the Austrians now 
 that Charles of Lorraine, commander of the Austrian army, 
 was ordered to hasten and give the finishing blow to Fred- 
 erick's disordered forces. 
 
 But Charles was a poor strategist, while Frederick was a 
 great one; and the result was that Frederick got his army 
 together and inspired in a very short time, and then hurled 
 it like a living weapon against the inert and unskilful line of 
 Charles. In this battle (Leuthen), Frederick is said to have
 
 FREDERICK 187 
 
 shown his genius as both a strategist and a tactician in a 
 higher degree than at any other time, and to have handled 
 his army as a skilful fencer handles his rapier. The result 
 was that, though his forces were vastly inferior in numbers, 
 he inflicted upon his enemy a defeat that was also a disaster. 
 
 This victory put nearly all of Silesia once more back into 
 Frederick's hands. At the same time, a piece of great good 
 fortune came to him when William Pitt was made Prime Min- 
 ister of England, and induced Parliament to vote £4,000,000 to 
 him, after having declared in Parliament : "I feel the most 
 grateful sentiments of veneration and zeal for a prince who 
 stands, the unshaken bulwark of Europe, against the most 
 powerful and malignant confederac.y that ever yet has threat- 
 ened the independence of mankind. ' ' 
 
 But Frederick was nevertheless in a very dangerous posi- 
 tion, and it was rapidly made worse by Russian operations in 
 East Prussia. Frederick replied by marching against the 
 fortress of Olmutz; but his engineers made some mistakes in 
 calculations that occasioned considerable delay, during which 
 4000 transport wagons fell into the hands of the AUstrians, 
 and reduced dangerously Frederick's supply of ammunition. 
 As usual with great strategists, the emergency stimulated 
 Frederick; and, as usual also with great strategists, Fred- 
 erick stimulated his army. 
 
 As a result, Frederick marched one hundred and fifty miles 
 in ten hot days, joined forces with one of his generals, and 
 forced the Russians to give up the siege of Kustrin. Immedi- 
 ately afterward he brought the Russians to battle at Zorndorf, 
 and defeated them disastrously and completely. Then, with- 
 out any rest whatever, he started off for Saxony, which the 
 Austrians had invaded. At Hochkirch he committed the 
 strategic blunder of despising his enemy and encamping in a 
 position where he was virtually surrounded by a superior 
 force that held the hills, despite the warning of some of his 
 officers. He paid for it by being surprised at night and
 
 188 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 driven back. The enemy then committed the strategic mis- 
 take of not following up the victory, but intrenching them- 
 selves. As a result, Frederick slipped away. 
 
 In the following summer the Russians again advanced. 
 This time they took the important town of Frankfort on the 
 Oder, while simultaneously a corps of Austrians was sent 
 into Prussia. The armies were able to combine and to make 
 a force twice as great as Frederick's. Nevertheless, he at- 
 tacked them at Kunersdorf, routing the enemy's left wing and 
 taking several thousand prisoners. Following this, he com- 
 mitted the strategic mistake of overworking his men in an en- 
 deavor to cut off the retreat of the Russians, and as a result 
 he suffered one of the most disastrous reverses of his career. 
 During the same month Ferdinand of Brunswick won the 
 battle of Minden against the French; but shortly afterward 
 one of Frederick's generals surrendered a garrison of 4000 
 men and a great accumulation of supplies in Dresden. Then 
 came the surrender at Maxen of 12,000 Prussian soldiers un- 
 der General Fink. 
 
 Frederick again seemed on the verge of ruin. In the fol- 
 lowing spring, that of 1760, he could oppose only 90,000 Prus- 
 sians to 200,000 Austrians; and, for the first time, the cam- 
 paign opened on Prussian territory. Frederick attempted to 
 capture Dresden, but without success, and then marched to 
 Silesia, where he found himself surrounded by three Austrian 
 armies, while a Russian force also was advancing toward him. 
 Day after day the enemy forces would make their dispositions 
 for an attack the following morning; but night after night 
 Frederick would change his camp. At last they felt sure of 
 securing him ; two of the forces got ready to fall upon him 
 simultaneously, while the third prepared to cut off his retreat. 
 But that night, Frederick caught the latter force while on the 
 march to take up its appointed position, and defeated it with 
 a loss of 11,000 men, while he himself only lost 3500. 
 
 Frederick then evaded the Russians, but they captured
 
 FREDERICK 189 
 
 Berlin. The Austrian General Lacy then took Potsdam and 
 Charlottenburg ; but on Frederick's approach the Russians 
 withdrew to the Oder River, and Lacy to Torgau, where he 
 joined another Austrian force under Daun. A battle soon 
 was fought near Torgau, in which Frederick, with 44,000 men, 
 was confronted with 60,000 Austrians, who furthermore had 
 almost twice as many large guns as he had. When night came 
 on, the battle had not been decided; but in the night-time a 
 violent cavalry charge from the Prussians forced the Aus- 
 trians to retreat. This victory was a Pyrrhic victory to Fred- 
 erick, for it cost him more than it really was worth. 
 
 In the following spring he had only 96,000 men, while the 
 Austrians and Russians had three times as many. For this 
 reason, Frederick had to abandon the offensive during that 
 year, 1761, and defend himself with intrenchments. During 
 the year two important towns were lost and Frederick's forces 
 shrank to 60,000. At this time, as if to put the final touch to 
 Frederick's agony, Pitt fell, and Frederick's supplies from 
 England consequently were shut off. Bute, who took Pitt's 
 place, even went so far as to urge Russia to continued action, 
 in order that Frederick might not have free play against Aus- 
 tria. Frederick was urged to make peace even at the price 
 of some of his territory, but this advice he refused to follow. 
 
 Shortly afterward, in January, 1762, the Czarina of Russia 
 died, and her successor, Peter III, who w^as an ardent admirer 
 of Frederick, sent 18,000 men to fight for Frederick instead 
 of against him! The Russian general commanding these 
 forces joined Frederick just as he was preparing to fight a 
 battle for the rescue of one of his towns that had been cap- 
 tured; but, before the attack was actually made, news came 
 that Peter had been replaced by Catherine II, who refused to 
 have her soldiers fight for Frederick. This news was kept 
 secret, however, until after the battle — a fact that helped to 
 decide it in his favor. 
 
 In 1762 a treaty of peace was signed between England and
 
 190 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 France that left Austria and Prussia the only remaining 
 belligerents. After various diplomatic manoeuvers between 
 the two, peace was signed in February, 1763. 
 
 Frederick had now reigned for twenty-three years, during 
 which he had been engaged in continual war or preparation 
 for war, and had made a reputation as a strategist that few 
 have excelled. He reigned almost exactly the same length of 
 time afterward in peace ; and during that time he made a 
 reputation as a statesman virtually equal to that which he 
 had made as a strategist. Like Csesar before him, and Wash- 
 ington after him, he devoted the same energy, foresight, pa- 
 triotism, and wise management to the affairs of peace that he 
 had devoted to the affairs of war. 
 
 It may not be inappropriate to point out here that, while 
 many men without military training have been good states- 
 men, and while many strategists have also been good states- 
 men, no statesman without military training has ever been a 
 good strategist; though many have thought that they were, 
 and have consequently done great harm. It might further be 
 pointed out that the greatest statesmen have been the greatest 
 strategists, and the greatest strategists have been the greatest 
 statesmen. It might be a little bold to suggest, though I my- 
 self believe it to be true, that the men who have done the most 
 to insure good government in the world have been men who 
 were both strategists and statesmen, like those whose names 
 head certain chapters in this book.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, who had been a skilful and 
 daring fighter in the seven years' French and Indian 
 War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army 
 of the United Colonies on June 15, 1775, At this time the 
 British forces occupied Boston and the skirmishes at Concord 
 and Lexington had taken place. On June 17 the bloody bat- 
 tle of Bunker Hill was fought. 
 
 Washington arrived at Cambridge, just outside Boston, on 
 July 3, and took command. He had about 17,200 men pres- 
 ent for duty, whose only military training had been in shoot- 
 ing and whose terms of enlistment would expire within six 
 months. Washington organized this motley group, expecting 
 attack at almost any moment by the British under General 
 Howe, who ought to have attacked him but did not. Finally, 
 on March 4, after he had organized a new army, and brought 
 heavy cannon through the snow from Ticonderoga, and some 
 privateers had captured a considerable amount of gunpowder, 
 and his fortifications were sufficiently complete to furnish 
 rallying points in case of defeat, he took the offensive. He 
 did this by seizing and fortifying Dorchester Heights, on the 
 mainland of Massachusetts about two miles south of Boston, 
 from which he could command by guns the whole of Boston 
 and the channel south of it. General Howe, who was then in 
 command of the British forces, should have prevented this, 
 but he did not; but after the Heights had been fortified he 
 endeavored to capture them. Being unsuccessful in this, he 
 evacuated Boston, taking his army of about 11,000 soldiers 
 and seamen to Halifax. He left behind a great amount of 
 
 191
 
 192 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 supplies and military stores, without even endeavoring to de- 
 stroy them. Washington occupied Boston at once, but in 
 three v^eeks set out for New York, to which he had already 
 sent a considerable part of his army. 
 
 The British Parliament now realized the necessity of send- 
 ing a greater force to America, and provided for an addi- 
 tional 12,000 seamen and an army of 55,000 men. Many of 
 these were mercenaries, of whom about sixty per cent, were 
 hired from Hesse: from this circumstanjce the mercenaries 
 were called Hessrans. 
 
 The British realized the strategic value of New York, due 
 mainly to the fact that the broad Hudson River separated 
 New England from New York and the rest of the country, 
 and they decided, therefore, to capture that city and seize 
 and hold the Hudson. They did not follow this plan as 
 closely as they should have done, however, but allowed them- 
 selves to be diverted to side issues, especially in South Caro- 
 lina, which had the usual effect of accomplishing nothing 
 important, and handicapping the m-ain operations. Washing- 
 ton also realized the strategic importance of New York, and 
 endeavored to defend it. He built a number of small bat- 
 teries at salient points on the North and East rivers ; but, be- 
 cause of the small number of his total force, he concentrated 
 his main defense in an intrenched camp on Brooklyn Heights. 
 
 The first squadron of the British fleet, coming from Halifax 
 and comprising about 32,000 troops, landed on Staten Island 
 in July and early August. The menace was great, since the 
 British commanded all the water and could land wherever 
 they pleased; while Washington's force was too small, the dis- 
 tances too great, and his means of getting information too 
 poor to enable him to oppose any effective resistance at any 
 landing point. On August 22 Howe landed 20,000 men and 
 forty pieces of artillery on the beach of Gravesend Bay, near 
 the present Coney Island, about eight miles south of the 
 American camp. 
 
 Washington reinforced the Americans as best he could.
 
 WASHINGTON 193 
 
 Unwisely, the Americans, instead of remaining within the 
 protection of their intrenchments or of retreating promptly, 
 advanced into the open. Howe made a feint by advancing 
 along the west shore line of Long Island, but sent a large 
 flanking force by night to the eastward as far as Jamaica 
 Pass, which then turned to westward on the morning of 
 August 27, and advanced so rapidly that it got behind the 
 American lines outside of their camp. Considerable fighting 
 followed, which resulted in the retreat of the Americans. The 
 British do not seem to have followed them very energetically, 
 with the result that most of the Americans got back into their 
 camp. Why Howe did not attack them at once is a matter 
 for surprise; for it is difficult to see how a determined attack 
 with the forces he had available could have failed to bring 
 about disaster to the Americans. Instead, Howe prepared for 
 a siege; with the result that Washington made a retreat, in 
 the night of August 29 and 30, which for skill and daring and 
 success has sJdom been surpassed. 
 
 He landed his troops on the east side of Manhattan Island, 
 near what is now Fulton Street, and disposed them as best he 
 could, expecting that the British would attack, landing some- 
 where on the long water-front. They landed on September 
 15, near what is now East 34th Street, and rapidly drove the 
 Americans back to the westward and thence to the northward, 
 despite the passionate endeavors of Washington to make them 
 stand. By dark that night, his forces had fled to positions on 
 Harlem Heights north of the ' ' Hollow Way, ' ' near the 129th 
 Street of to-day, while the British confronted them on lines 
 facing north in the neighborhood of what is now 100th Street. 
 Washington wrote to Congress the next morning of the ** dis- 
 graceful and dastardly retreat" of his men. 
 
 He occupied a position that was very strong against assault, 
 but that could easily be surrounded by a large force. Howe 
 endeavored to surround it. He did not succeed; but, in order 
 to prevent it, Washington had to move to the northward. 
 Because, however, of a foolish resolution of Congress, he did
 
 194 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 not withdraw the garrison from Fort Washington. Howe 
 then succeeded, on November 16, in surrounding and captur- 
 ing the fort and its garrison — a terrible calamity to the 
 Americans. Meanwhile Washington had gone to White 
 Plains, and there received an assault from Howe, which was 
 only partially successful on the first day, but which would 
 undoubtedly have been successful the following day, after 
 Howe had received a reinforcement that brought his strength 
 up to 20,000 men, had not a storm delayed the attack. Under 
 cover of the storm Washington withdrew five miles to a 
 strong position at North Castle. Howe did not follow. 
 
 Washington joined General Greene at Fort Lee, which was 
 on the west side of the Hudson, opposite Fort Washington, at 
 the time when Fort Washington was attacked, and with him 
 retreated to Newark. Thence he retreated to Brunswick, 
 thence to Trenton on the Delaware River, and thence to a 
 position on the opposite shore. He had ordered General Lee, 
 then at White Plains, to cross the Hudson and join him ; but 
 Lee was excessively dilatory in doing this, and was finally 
 taken prisoner. Washington's force was now reduced to 
 3000 men, whose enlistments would expire during that month 
 (December), and Howe had 30,000 regular troops with which 
 to capture and destroy him. Instead of attempting this at 
 once, as any competent strategist would have done, he went 
 into winter quarters in New York, and sent 6000 troops and 
 a large part of the navy to Newport, to carry on eccentric 
 operations in New England ! 
 
 But Washington's day of ruin did not seem far away. It 
 was averted by the same agency that contributed to the vic- 
 tories of Csesar and Alexander, the personal genius of the 
 man in command. Washington, with a discouraged, half 
 ragged, underfed, and untrained handful of men, crossed the 
 Delaware on Christmas night, forced his way through floating 
 ice, fell on the camp of the Hessians at Trenton with a vio- 
 lence, a suddenness, and a success that are unsurpassed in 
 history, and changed the aspect of the situation almost in a
 
 WASHINGTON 195 
 
 moment. Comwallis advanced at once against Washington; 
 but again Washington displayed that amazing celerity and 
 force which in supreme emergency marks the great com- 
 mander. By dint of personal courage, ability to inspire, tre- 
 mendous exertion, and wise direction, he succeeded in eluding 
 the greatly superior force in the night-time, and, reaching the 
 vicinity of Princeton in safety, defeating in a skirmish on the 
 wa}' a British force that intercepted him. He then went into 
 winter quarters at Morristown. 
 
 Washington expected throughout the winter that Howe 
 would attack him then or in the spring, which he certainly 
 should have done, but did not do. In the month of July, 1777, 
 Howe embarked his men in transports and sailed from New 
 York for Delaware Bay. But, after remaining there a day, he 
 sailed for the Chesapeake. On August 25 he landed at the 
 northern end of the bay, and then moved northeast with the 
 evident intention of attacking Philadelphia. Washington 
 was at hand, and a battle took place on September 11, near 
 the Brandywine, on Howe's line of march to Philadelphia, 
 which seems to have been fought against Washington's better 
 judgment as a militar}^ man, but which he feared to evade on 
 account of the effect of such an act upon the people. The 
 British had the superior force and defeated the Americans. 
 After a few unsuccessful manoeuvers, made with the intention 
 of catching Washington at a disadvantage, Howe took posses- 
 sion of Philadelphia. 
 
 There have been several reasons given why Howe took such 
 a roundabout method of getting to Philadelphia. One of 
 them is that he had received' information from General 
 Charles Lee, whom he had taken prisoner and who had there- 
 upon turned traitor, that there was such a strong Tory senti- 
 ment in Pennsylvania and IMaryland that his best line of at- 
 tack on Philadelphia would be by way of the Chesapeake. 
 This reason does not seem verj^ good, if one considers all the 
 circumstances; but many of the reasons given for many of 
 General Howe's actions do not seem very good from the point
 
 196 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 of view of strategy. The fact probably is that General Howe 
 was ail excoodingly poor strategist, and that Washington was 
 an exceedingly good one. No other reason seems sufficient to 
 
 Washington's movements in 1776. 
 
 explain 'how the successes of Washington could possibly have 
 been achieved, against troops so much supej*ior in number, so 
 much better equipped and so much more highly trained. 
 
 General Howe, after reducing some of the forts in the vicin- 
 ity with the aid of his brother, Lord Howe, who was in com- 
 mand of the British fleet, went into comfortable winter quar- 
 ters at Philadelphia. Washington and his soldiers went into 
 winter quarters at Valley Forge, twenty-one miles away. 
 There conditions were so bad that the army could not have sur~
 
 WASHINGTON 197 
 
 vived as an army, unless led and inspired by a man like 
 Waiihinglon. 
 
 Meanwhile, a campaign marked by amazing mismanagement 
 by the British had been carried on in the middle of New York 
 State. The British government, apparently without consult- 
 ing with General Howe, and on the advice of one of his sub- 
 ordinates. General Burgoyne, then on leave in England, had 
 directed a double expedition, one to go from Oswego down 
 the Mohawk Valley, and the other from Montreal down Lake 
 Champlain and the Hudson, the two forces to meet at Albany. 
 General Howe was to join them, marching from New York; 
 but no instructions were sent him to that effect. Few better 
 illustrations are given in history of the folly of endeavoring 
 to manage military campaigns from an office in a ministry. 
 
 Howe did not go up the Hudson to Albany. The force that 
 went to Oswego, and thence started for Albany, was brought 
 to battle and defeated, and never reached Albany. Bur- 
 goyne 's force, which came down Lake Champlain and the 
 Hudson, soon found itself in great difficulties for lack of 
 supplies. Sir Henrj^ Clinton, whom Howe had left in com- 
 mand at New York, went up the Hudson in October with 
 about 3000 men, convoyed by several ships of war, in con- 
 formity with some rather vague instructions he had received 
 from Howe. Instead of going at once to Burgoyne 's assist- 
 ance, however, he accomplished a few minor successes, and 
 then returned to New York, although he knew that Burgoyne 
 was in desperate straits. Burgoyne, after being defeated at 
 Bennington and Saratoga, finally surrendered on October 17, 
 1777. 
 
 Burgoyne 's expedition was strategically unwise. It was 
 decided on by the king, in preference to another plan, which 
 was the one that Washington naturally expected to be carried 
 out — that of concentrating most of the British forces in New 
 York and with them crushing Washington's forces. This 
 campaign furnishes one illustration, out of many in history, 
 of the tendency of poor strategists to devise complicated plans
 
 198 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 instead of simple ones; of a forgetfulness of one of the ele- 
 mentary principles of strategy, which anyone can see being 
 carried into practice in the next fist fight he witnesses, and 
 colloquially expressed in the phrase "hit liim first and 
 hardest." 
 
 Washington's winter quarters at Valley Forge, which he 
 occupied from December, 1777, till June, 1778, were only six- 
 teen miles by road from Howe's outposts at Germantown. 
 Washington had about 15,000 men, of whom about 12,000 
 were at Valley Forge, and Howe had 19,500 at Philadelphia 
 and 10,400 at New York — about 30,000 available troops; and 
 yet, Howe did not molest Washington during the entire six 
 months! Washington improved the opportunity strenuously, 
 devotedly, passionately. In spite of the almost criminal neg- 
 ligence of Congress, and the actually treasonable conduct of 
 some Congressmen and others, despite difficulties of all pos- 
 sible kinds, which we need not enumerate here, Washington 
 succeeded in putting into the field in June a well disciplined 
 and efficient force. Possibly not even Washington could have 
 accomplished this if he had not been assisted by the German 
 General Steuben, who joined him as a volunteer and was later 
 made Inspector General. Steuben was a thoroughly compe- 
 tent accountant, tactician, and drill-master, having learned 
 those arts on the personal staff of Frederick the Great. 
 
 The surrender of Burgoyne and Washington's masterly 
 battles near Philadelphia gave the French such confidence in 
 the cause of the Americans that they made an alliance with 
 them in the spring of 1778. This alliance proved to be of 
 such value as to warrant the statement that without it the 
 Americans would have failed. 
 
 Another important factor that contributed no less to their 
 success was the very bad strategy of the British, who, after 
 Burgoyne 's surrender, abandoned the offensive in America, 
 divided their forces, and even sent part of it out of the United 
 States to the West Indies. To initiate the change in plan, 
 Philadelphia was to be evacuated and the troops there sent to
 
 WASHINGTON 199 
 
 New York. In pursuance of this plan, Clinton, who had re- 
 lieved Howe, began to make preparations for evacuating Phil- 
 adelphia at the beginning of June. Washington had organ- 
 ized an excellent intelligence department, and was thereby in- 
 formed continually of the doings of the enemy. He therefore 
 took measures to march out of Valley Forge when the appro- 
 priate moment should come, keep in touch with the enemy, 
 and precipitate a battle as soon as a favorable opportunity 
 could be found. 
 
 Clinton left Philadelphia on June 18, crossed the Delaware, 
 and marched to the eastward about five miles. Early that 
 afternoon, six American brigades marched out of Valley 
 Forge, followed at five o'clock the following morning by 
 Washington with the rest of his army. The weather was in- 
 tensely hot. The two armies advanced in a direction approxi- 
 mately northeast. Clinton at the end of the sixth day had 
 marched only thirty-four miles, while Washington had 
 marched forty-seven miles and was almost directly ahead of 
 him. So Clinton moved off to the right, putting all of his 
 baggage train ahead. At this time and afterward he was 
 forced to move his army on one road only, so that his total 
 column was more than twelve miles long. His force arrived 
 at Monmouth on June 26, and took up a strong position there 
 and rested for a day. At the close of June 27, Lee and 
 Lafayette (Lee in command), with the advance guard of 5000 
 men, were five miles westward, and Washington with 6000 was 
 about five miles west of Lee. 
 
 Since Clinton was approaching broken eountrj^, where it 
 would be easy for him to get defensible positions, AVashington 
 told Lee that evening to be ready to attack early the following 
 morning. Clinton started early, whereupon Washington or- 
 dered Lee to attack. Lee moved forward toward Clinton's 
 rear, but in a leisurely fashion, delivered a half-hearted at- 
 tack, and then ordered a retreat. This had such a bad effect 
 on his men that a disorderly rout ensued. At this time Wash- 
 ington was advancing with the main body behind Lee. Gal-
 
 200 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 loping ahead, he met the fugitives, whose morale was utterly- 
 broken down. Then the "Washington of history seized those 
 terrified and wildly fleeing men, wheeled them about, and 
 formed them in a line that stubbornly defied and successfully 
 held back their late pursuers. No finer example of the power 
 of a passionate and impetuous leader of men can be found in 
 history. He established his line quickly, but with calm 
 strategic judgment, between two swamps that protected both 
 his flanks. 
 
 Clinton, meanwhile, had turned back with his main force. 
 The so-called battle of Monmouth then ensued. This battle 
 was fought in a terrible heat until nightfall; and then both 
 sides took up positions confronting each other. At daybreak 
 the British had disappeared in retreat, although they were 
 superior in number. They retreated quickly to Sandy Hook, 
 where Admiral Lord Howe embarked them, and whence he 
 transported them to New York. 
 
 On July 8 (1778) Rear Admiral Comte d'Estaing arrived 
 in command of a French fleet with 4000 soldiers at Delaware 
 Bay; but he sailed almost immediately to the northward, and 
 anchored in the ocean just outside of Sandy Hook. The 
 British Admiral Lord Howe was behind the bar and inside 
 the hook, with nine ships of the line to d'Estaing 's twelve, 
 and 534 guns to his 834. D'Estaing remained there eleven 
 days, but could not pluck up courage to brave the perils of 
 the bar and attack Lord Howe besides. As it had been ar- 
 ranged between Washington and d'Estaing that at a juncture 
 like this a combined land and naval attack should be made 
 against Newport, d'Estaing went there. Shortly afterward, 
 the energetic Lord Howe appeared outside the bay. D'Es- 
 taing went out to give him battle; but a tremendous gale 
 came up, which did such serious damage that Howe returned 
 to New York and d'Estaing went to Boston for repairs. 
 
 For the next four years the military operations in the north 
 were carried on in an excessively half-hearted manner by the
 
 WASHINGTON 201 
 
 British, and so nothing occurred that influenced materially 
 the outcome of the war. This was most fortunate for the 
 Americans, because Washington could only with difficulty 
 keep the army paid and fed, and was hardly able, therefore, 
 to maintain it in any discipline whatever, even under the 
 comparatively easy conditions that the inaction of the British 
 permitted to exist. 
 
 The British abandoned Newport in October, 1779, and 
 Cornwallis arrived later at New York with reinforcements; 
 so that in December the British garrison numbered nearly 
 29,000. Washington had between 10,000 and 11,000, and yet 
 Clinton did not attack him ! Instead he sent a large part of 
 his force away, to carry on operations that were strategically 
 unimportant in Georgia and the Carolinas. 
 
 For a long while the French alliance seemed to be of little 
 assistance, D'Estaing, after completing repairs on his ships 
 at Boston, went to the West Indies; and then, instead of re- 
 turning north, as Washington implored him, he became in- 
 volved in a siege of Savannah in which he was repulsed, and 
 after which (October, 1779) he sailed away to France. Dur- 
 ing the entire year 1779 Washington had been exerting him- 
 self to concentrate a large force at New York, insisting that if 
 the French would secure the command of the sea there, and 
 land a few troops, he could bring 25,000 effective men, cap- 
 ture New York, and end the war. Washington was right, of 
 course ; but during the entire war he, and next to him General 
 Greene, seem to have been almost the only men who could be 
 depended on to be right in strategic matters. 
 
 In July, 1780, another French fleet, consisting of seven 
 ships of the line, arrived, bringing 6000 troops commanded 
 by Rochambeau. This fleet anchored at Newport. Washing- 
 ton now thought he saw an opportunity for an attack on New 
 York, and he pushed his preparations rapidly. But his 
 hopes were killed almost immediately by the arrival of six 
 British ships under Admiral Graves, which made the com-
 
 202 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 bined British fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot superior to the 
 Frencli. The British fleet now blockaded the French forces 
 in Newport. 
 
 At this time the Revolution almost came to a full stop from 
 lack of money and supplies. A determined mutiny soon fol- 
 lowed, caused mainly by the fact that the soldiers had not 
 been paid for a year and were insufficiently fed and clothed. 
 It was finally repressed, but only by dint of all the force and 
 persuasion that Washington could exert. Colonel Laurens 
 was now sent to France, under instructions from Washington 
 to try to get some money. He succeeded not only in getting 
 money, but in having the French fleet sent from the West 
 Indies to Yorktown. It was this French fleet that finally 
 enabled Washington to end the war with victory. 
 
 Meanwhile the British had been frittering away irretriev- 
 able time in operations in the South, under the mistaken 
 strategic notion that their mission was to secure territory, 
 whereas it really was to destroy Washington's armed force. 
 These operations were in the main successful, though not im- 
 portant for victory in the war. The most important of the 
 earlier expeditions resulted in the capture of Savannah in 
 December, 1778, and the ensuing conquest of the State of 
 Georgia. 
 
 A year later Clinton himself headed a large expedition to 
 complete the conquest of the South. He arrived off Charles- 
 ton in February, 1780, and received the surrender of the city 
 on May 12. After some further operations, designed to se- 
 cure the conquest of all South Carolina, Clinton returned to 
 New York, leaving Comwallis in command in the South with 
 about 8400 men. 
 
 Cornwallis soon started on a march to the Northwest. On 
 August 16 he fought at Camden, South Carolina, an Ameri- 
 can force under General Gates, and almost destroyed it. The 
 main reason for the disaster was that Gates, while an adroit 
 and unscrupulous politician, was a bad strategist. 
 
 Congress now allowed Washington to appoint a commander
 
 WASHINGTON 203 
 
 in Gates's place. Washington showed his good judgment by 
 appointing Greene. A long series of operations now ensued 
 between Greene on one side and Cornwallis on the other, which 
 were conducted by Greene with great skill and tremendous 
 energy, and by Cornwallis with little skill and almost no 
 energy whatever. Affairs came to a climax in a battle at 
 Guilford, North Carolina, on March 15, 1781, in which 
 Greene suffered a tactical defeat but won a strategic victory ; 
 because he forced Cornwallis to abandon the offensive and 
 resort to the defensive. This Cornwallis did by retreating to 
 Wilmington, North Carolina. 
 
 Cornwallis now found himself in an extremely embarrass- 
 ing position, far from his base of supplies, and unable to get 
 definite instructions from either Clinton or the Colonial Sec- 
 retary in England, both of whom were writing to him letters 
 that only embarrassed him. Finally, Cornwallis decided to 
 march north into Virginia, to carry on operations there, where 
 he thought he saw an opportunity to destroy Lafayette, who 
 commanded a force much inferior to his own. This was 
 probably a good plan ; but he carried it out with such lack of 
 celerity, while Lafayette carried on his own operations with 
 such extreme celerity, that Cornwallis failed altogether to 
 accomplish his intention. At last, in July, he received an 
 order from Clinton, revoking a previous order and directing 
 him to keep all his troops with him, and occupy Old Point 
 Comfort, as a support for the fleet that was to be sent to 
 Hampton Roads. Instead of occupying Old Point Comfort, 
 Cornwallis occupied Yorktown, which was probably a more 
 suitable locality. 
 
 Meanwhile Washington was bending every energy, with the 
 small force he had after sending the necessary forces to 
 Greene, to secure the cooperation of the French in the attack 
 on New York on which he had set his heart. When he re- 
 ceived the information that a French fleet was to be sent from 
 the West Indies to the American coast, he went at once to 
 Wethersfield, Connecticut, met Rochambeau, and perfected
 
 204 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 with him the details of the attack. At the same time he sent 
 most urgent requests to the New England Governors to fill 
 up their regiments, if only for one season. He also wrote to 
 de Grasse, urgently requesting him to bring troops as well as 
 ships from the West Indies, and to come to New York, stop- 
 ping on his way at the Chesapeake. 
 
 In accordance with his plan, the French army left Newport, 
 and Washington met them with his army near Dobbs Ferry. 
 He then made a careful reconnaissance of the fortifications of 
 Manhattan Island, and came to the conclusion that they were 
 too strong to be successfully attacked with the force he then 
 commanded, being held as they were by about 14,000 effective 
 troops. Like all good strategists, however, Washington had 
 an alternative plan; and he held both plans in reserve until 
 he got more definite information from de Grasse. In the 
 middle of August he received word from de Grasse that he 
 would sail north on August 13 with twenty-nine vessels of 
 war, three regiments of 1000 men each, 100 dragoons, lOO 
 artillerymen, ten field pieces, and several siege cannon and 
 mortars; that he would go directly to the Chesapeake; and 
 that he would sail from there for the West Indies on Octo- 
 ber 15. 
 
 There was no time to be lost. Washington did not lose a 
 second. He resolved instantly to march to the Chesapeake 
 and meet de Grasse with all of his available force, and crush 
 Cornwallis. He gave orders to Lafayette to prevent Corn- 
 wallis from getting away; he directed General Heath to take 
 command of a certain force that he would leave in the North ; 
 and he sent despatches to de Grasse, telling him what he 
 wished to do, and requesting him to send suitable vessels to 
 the northern end of Chesapeake Bay, to transport American 
 troops to the vicinity of Yorktown. On August 21 he crossed 
 the Hudson River, and began a march behind the Palisades 
 to Newark and New Brunswick, and thence to the northern 
 end of Chesapeake Bay. He carried out his movements so 
 skilfully and rapidly that most of his troops had reached Phil-
 
 WASHINGTON 205 
 
 adelphia before Clinton knew that he had left the vicinity of 
 New York. Evidently Clinton had a very poor intelligence 
 department. 
 
 Washington was taking a tremendous risk; but he knew 
 Clinton, and knew that the risk was justified. Clinton had 
 more than 16,000 men, and yet he let Washington get away. 
 The fact that Clinton was so inactive does not in the least de- 
 tract from the merit of Washington's brilliant and daring 
 move ; for every strategist makes his plans according to the 
 situation as he estimates it, and the character of Clinton was 
 the most important single factor in the situation of which 
 Washington made his estimate. Washington estimated the 
 situation correctly, as he usually did. He then made the cor- 
 rect decision, as he usually did. He then acted on his decision 
 with energy, daring, and skill, as he usually did. 
 
 It was an essential part of Washington's plan, of course, 
 that the French should have command of the sea for a time 
 long enough to enable him to concentrate all his forces on 
 Cornwallis. By this time he knew that de Grasse was a com- 
 petent strategist instead of an incompetent one, like d'Estaing; 
 and he included this factor in his estimate of the situation, 
 his consequent decision, and his consequent action. He con- 
 cluded that he could rely upon de Grasse, and, as usual, his 
 conclusion was correct. De Grasse arrived at Chesapeake Bay 
 on August 30, and at once sent the troops up the James River, 
 where they joined Lafayette. On the same day that they 
 landed, a British fleet came within sight of Cape Henry, and 
 de Grasse went out to meet it. A battle was then fought 
 which, while not decisive tactically, was decisive strategically ; 
 because the French fleet inflicted so much damage on the Brit- 
 ish as to force it to go to New York for repairs, and leave the 
 French in command of the sea. The first result of this was 
 that the French admiral, de Barras, with a small squadron, 
 was able to bring into the Chesapeake some reinforcements 
 from Newport and a large train of siege artillery'. 
 
 Clinton realized, as soon as he heard that de Grasse was in
 
 206 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the Chesapeake, that Washington had outgeneraled him and 
 would capture Cornwallis unless he, Clinton, could reinforce 
 Cornwallis sufficiently and in time. He therefore embarked 
 4000 men on transports. But he could not send these safely, 
 because the British fleet were under repairs and could not 
 furnish a convoy. When this convoy was ready, on October 
 19, Clinton sailed With 7000 men; but, as often happened to 
 Clinton, he was too late. The allied army, under Washington 
 as commander-in-chief and Rochambeau under his orders, had 
 arrived in the vicinity of Yorktown in the middle of Septem- 
 ber. They numbered in all about 16,600 men, while Corn- 
 wallis had less than 8000, and besides this, the allies were 
 much superior in siege artillery. The natural result fol- 
 lowed. Cornwallis surrendered on October 19, 1781. This 
 act virtually ended the war, though the definitive treaty of 
 peace was not signed until September 3, 1783. 
 
 This war, like most wars in which a force inferior in num- 
 bers and resources triumphs over a superior force, was marked 
 with great energy and skill on one side, and great lack of 
 energy and skill on the other side. It seemed almost impos- 
 sible that the Colonies could triumph under the conditions, 
 and yet they did. The fact that England was so threatened 
 by war in Europe that she could not send to America as large 
 a force as she otherwise would have done does not furnish an 
 adequate explanation, because the force that she did send was 
 enormously superior in numbers, training, and equipment to 
 the American force. If one analyzes the reasons for the Brit- 
 ish failure, and traces events to their causes, he will see that 
 the main cause was that the British operations in America 
 were directed by the Colonial Secretary, who was in turn di- 
 rected by the king, — both the Colonial Secretary and the king 
 being exceedingly poor strategists, — while opposed to them 
 was Washington, one of the greatest strategists of history. 
 
 Like Csesar and Frederick, Washington devoted his declin- 
 ing years to the tasks of statesmanship. Like Csesar and 
 Frederick, he was as fine in statesmanship as he was in strat-
 
 WASHINGTON 207 
 
 egy. It has been the fashion in America, in speaking of 
 Washington, to concentrate the attention of the people on 
 President Washington and to ignore General Washington. 
 That this has been intentional there can be no doubt; and 
 that it has been a part of the general pacifist movement there 
 can also be no doubt. It and the whole pacifist movement 
 seem to be because of a curious trait in human nature which 
 leads successful people and successful nations to ignore the 
 causes of their success; which leads rich families, for in- 
 stance, to keep persistently in the background the means by 
 which the family money was acquired. 
 
 The independence of the United States was gained by mili- 
 tary force, guided by the strategy of George Washington. 
 That the subsequent statesmanship of Washington was fine 
 there can be no doubt. But there can also be no doubt that 
 the task of Washington as President was immeasurably easier 
 than his task as general. As President, he lived at ease in 
 the absolute security and the comparative luxury of the presi- 
 dential mansion, with assured rest at night, regular and suf- 
 ficient meals, assisted by the organization of an established 
 government and the resources of a prosperous nation. As 
 general, he had to oppose treachery, negligence, and disaffec- 
 tion in Congress, and among great numbers of the people ; and 
 amid the continual dangers of war to direct and force to 
 action a ragged, half fed, and half trained army, by day and 
 by night, in heat and in cold, in mud and rain and storm and 
 snow, for five destiny-deciding years. In comparison with 
 this, Washington's career as President was like a vacation.
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 NELSON 
 
 ON February 14, 1797, a British fleet of fifteen ships 
 of the line, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jervis, 
 was sailing on a course a little west of south in col- 
 umn of battle (that is, one ship behind the other) on the 
 starboard tack (that is, with the wind on the starboard side). 
 Ahead and a little on their starboard side was a Spanish fleet 
 of eighteen sail, heading toward the east with the wind astern, 
 their destination being Cadiz, about one hundred and fifty 
 miles away ; while ahead and a little on the port side were nine 
 Spanish ships that had become separated from the eighteen. 
 The distance between the two parts of the Spanish fleet was 
 about six miles. 
 
 Jervis headed his column between the two parts in order to 
 keep them from assisting each other, and with the purpose of 
 tacking and heading to the northward after he had passed be- 
 tween, and then of attacking the eighteen ships. These 
 eighteen ships then headed to the north. Jervis headed his 
 column to the north as soon as the head of his column had 
 passed between the two separated parts of the Spanish fleet. 
 The third ship from the end of his column was the Captain, 
 which flew the broad pennant of Commodore Horatio Nelson. 
 When Nelson's ship came abreast of the last Spanish ships 
 in the main body of eighteen ships, Nelson noticed that the 
 leading ships of that body, which had previously headed to the 
 northward, now suddenly headed again to the eastward, with 
 the evident intention of crossing behind the British column 
 and effecting a junction with the other nine ships. Without 
 any orders (and therefore almost contrary to orders), Nelson 
 
 208
 
 BATTLE OF CAPE 5T. VINCENT 
 
 FEBRUARY 14.1797. 
 
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 From Mahan's " Life of Nelson." 
 
 By permission of Little, Brown & Company. 
 209
 
 210 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 directed the Captain to "wear," and thus get into position 
 ahead of those Spanish ships and prevent them from making 
 the junction. 
 
 By this time the head of the British column, which was 
 now heading to the northward, was nearly abreast of Nelson ; 
 and so it came down before the wind at once, and joined him 
 in the terribly unequal but successful combat that he was 
 waging. About the same time, the rear ship of the British 
 column, the Excellent, commanded by Collingwood (the great 
 Collingwood that was to be), obeyed a signal to do the same. 
 The other ships of the British column followed, and a general 
 action ensued in which the eighteen Spanish ships were badly 
 worsted. The other nine ships ultimately joined, however, 
 raising the Spanish force to twenty-seven ships, nine of which 
 were uninjured. Jervis thereupon withdrew. The victory- 
 was not decisive; but, considering the enormous inequality in 
 force, and the fact that immeasurably more harm was done 
 to the Spaniards than to the English, it was not only glorious 
 but important. For it was absolutely essential to Great Brit- 
 ain then that she maintain her supremacy at sea. 
 
 The action of Nelson was one of those unexpectable and 
 unique actions that stand out in history like a bright spark 
 in the dark. Judged by some of his later deeds, and by many 
 other deeds in history, it was not of commanding importance ; 
 but judged from the standpoint of strategy and tactics, or 
 from the standpoint of individual merit, it was as great as 
 any other single act we know of. For a British commodore 
 to leave the column of battle was an act that could be justi- 
 fied by one thing only — success. For a captain to realize 
 what Nelson realized, in the hurry and excitement of the 
 coming battle, required extraordinary strategic insight. To 
 possess this extraordinary insight, a clear and accurate mind 
 was needed, and also an intense training of that mind by in- 
 cessant thought for a long period on strategic and tactical 
 questions. To act upon it required physical courage of a 
 high order — to brave the physical dangers that Nelson real-
 
 NELSON 211 
 
 ized he was rushing into ; and in an immeasurably higher de- 
 gree it required moral courage to face the professional ruin 
 it invited. 
 
 His justification was his success. His success was because 
 of the fact that he estimated the situation correctly, decided 
 correctl}^ and acted correctly. Similarly, the trained gym- 
 nast makes some daring leap. His justification depends on 
 his success. His success depends on whether he estimates the 
 situation correctly, decides correctly, and acts correctly. 
 
 In the early part of 1798 the French Directory decided to 
 send an expedition to Egypt under Bonaparte; and, al- 
 though they succeeded in keeping its destination a secret, they 
 could not keep secret the fact that a large expedition was 
 being prepared in Toulon and neighboring places on the south- 
 em coast of France. The commander-in-chief of the British 
 fleet received orders to endeavor to thwart the expedition. 
 With this end in view, he formed a squadron of thirteen ships 
 and put Rear-Admiral Nelson in command. 
 
 Bonaparte sailed from Toulon on May 19. Nelson, after a 
 variety of disappointments of many kinds, one of which was 
 an inability to get scouts in the shape of fast sailing frigates 
 to search the sea for Bonaparte's expedition, was finally able 
 to start in search, but not until June 7. His estimate of the 
 situation brought him to the conclusion that Bonaparte's ex- 
 pedition was bound for Egypt. He came to this conclusion 
 by the same kind of mental process as that which a chess- 
 player employs in divining the intentions of his opponent; 
 but, in order to arrive at it, he ha.d to take into consideration 
 an immeasurably greater number of factors, and to evaluate 
 each of these factors by the exercise of his professional judg- 
 ment. It is in this process of evaluation that the knowledge 
 and experience of the professional man is valuable, in com- 
 parison ivith the knowledge and experience of the a^mateur. 
 
 Nelson reached Alexandria in Egypt on June 28, and ascer- 
 tained that the French had not appeared there, and that no 
 knowledge of their whereabouts or destination could be ob-
 
 212 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 tained. He at once started back to the westward. Bona- 
 parte's expedition arrived at Alexandria three days after 
 Nelson left, having purposely gone by an indirect route. For 
 several days, while the two expeditions were proceeding to 
 the eastward, they were not more than one hundred miles 
 apart — a fact that Nelson's lack of frigates prevented him 
 from ascertaining. 
 
 Nelson proceeded to Syracuse in Sicily, and arrived there 
 on July 19. The only news he could get was that the French 
 fleet was not west of Sicily or at Corfu. He therefore started 
 again to the eastward, convinced that his first estimate of 
 Napoleon's destination was correct, a conviction that was 
 strengthened by further information received on July 28, that 
 four weeks before the French expedition had been seen near 
 Candia, steering southeast. In the afternoon of August 1 the 
 masthead lookout of one of Nelson's ships discerned and re- 
 ported thirteen French line-of-battle ships in Aboukir Bay, 
 fifteen miles east of Alexandria. The French fleet was found 
 later to be at anchor, in a single column, with both flanks 
 exposed. 
 
 Throughout the voyage Nelson had occupied his mind con- 
 tinually with plans as to what he should do under all prob- 
 able contingencies, and with laboriously instructing his cap- 
 tains in his plans; so that, as he gradually approached the 
 enemy, and as their formation and position became gradually 
 clear, he was prepared, and so were his captains, for the 
 steps they should take. When the battle began, the task of 
 strategy was ended and the task of tactics began; but they 
 shaded one into the other without jar or hitch : the tactical 
 execution was as good as the strategic preparation, both fitted 
 into each other, and together they formed a perfect whole. 
 The analogy may be here suggested among all performances 
 that are first well planned and then well carried out. 
 
 Thus it happened that the British fleet went unhesitatingly 
 around one exposed flank of the French fleet in the gathering 
 darkness, and six British ships almost immediately concen-
 
 NELSON 213 
 
 trated on four French ships and destroyed them. Four other 
 British ships impetuously attacked four other French ships 
 anchored at the same end of the French line, where they could 
 not get assistance from other French ships anchored near: 
 and the battle was actually decided in favor of the British, 
 before three British ships arrived on the scene, largel}^ be- 
 cause five French ships did not and could not become engaged 
 or render any service whatever. The result was that the 
 French fleet was destroyed at once as a fighting force, though 
 two line-of-battle ships out of thirteen succeeded in escaping. 
 
 This victory cut Napoleon's communications with France, 
 prevented his carrying out his ultimate intention, and ruined 
 his entire campaign. A few months later Napoleon was able 
 to traverse the Mediterranean to France — ^but as a furtive 
 passenger in a single ship, and not as the head of a grand 
 naval force. 
 
 In 1780 the Baltic states, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, 
 combined in a League of Armed Neutrality, to assert by arms 
 their rights as neutrals against certain practices of the Brit- 
 ish navy, especially in searching neutral ships at sea. The 
 matter was smoothed over, but in 1799 it again assumed im- 
 portance ; and this importance increased in the following year, 
 when Czar Paul seized three hundred British vessels then lying 
 in Russian ports, in sudden hostility toward England, because 
 of her refusal to surrender Malta after it had been captured 
 from the French. On the 16th of December a treaty was 
 signed by Russia and Sweden, to which Denmark and Prussia 
 soon adhered, renewing the Armed Neutrality. This renewal 
 was largely the work of Napoleon, who was using all means 
 available to ruin the sea commerce of Great Britain. 
 
 The menace to Great Britain's supremacy on the sea, and 
 especially in the Baltic, was so strong and clear, and the need 
 to Great Britain for maintaining that supremacy in her war 
 with Napoleon was so absolute, that she took immediate meas- 
 ures in her own defense. The first step was against Denmark, 
 her nearest adversary in the coalition..
 
 214 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 In the early days of March, 1801, Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde 
 Parker received orders to proceed with his fleet to the vicinity 
 of Copenhagen, and send an envoy to Copenhagen, to attempt 
 to induce Denmark to withdraw from the coalition. His in- 
 structions, in case the envoy was not successful, were to bring 
 force to bear. Nelson was made second in command of the 
 fleet. The envoy was not successful, but Sir Hyde Parker 
 adopted measures that seemed dilatory to Nelson. Nelson 
 estimated the situation as one requiring the utmost prompt- 
 ness of action to prevent the Danes from strengthening their 
 defenses at Copenhagen. He finally persuaded (almost bul- 
 lied) his superior officer to allow him. Nelson, to take a part 
 of the fleet into the actual harbor of Copenhagen and attack 
 the floating defenses and land batteries that the Danes had 
 got into position there. The attempt was most hazardous; 
 because to the dangers from the fire of the vessels and the forts 
 had to be added the dangers of navigation, which were great. 
 
 The main fleet anchored on March 30 about five miles from 
 Copenhagen. Nelson's division, thirty-three vessels in all, of 
 which the main part was twelve ships-of-the-line, advanced to 
 the south on the afternoon of April 1 through a channel to 
 the east of Copenhagen, and anchored at nightfall south of a 
 large shoal called the Middle Ground, about two miles from 
 the southern end of the Danish line of block-ships and float- 
 ing batteries that ran nearly north and south. His plans hav- 
 ing already been laid, the evening and night were spent in 
 arranging the final details and sending out the final orders. 
 His division was to start in the morning ; but not a pilot could 
 be found who would take charge of a ship ! At length one of 
 the officers of the fleet undertook the piloting of the column, 
 and the signal to get under way was made. Of the twelve 
 ships-of-the-line, two grounded on the west side of the Middle 
 Ground shoal, and another did not succeed in getting around 
 it. The other nine proceeded boldly, and anchored as nearly 
 as they could in their designated stations, parallel to the line 
 of Danish hulks that shielded Copenhagen.
 
 NELSON 215 
 
 A hotly contested battle followed, in which there were great 
 losses on both sides, but which in the end resulted in the 
 virtual destruction of all the Danish defenses, both fixed and 
 floating. In the middle of the action Sir Hyde Parker sig- 
 naled to Nelson to withdraw his ships. This order Nelson 
 very properly disobeyed. It was on this occasion that Nelson 
 put his telescope to his blind eye and said jokingly that he 
 could not read the signal. 
 
 The result was a complete victory for the British. Its im- 
 portance was increased and the results were hastened by the 
 murder of the Czar of Russia, which had occurred on March 
 24, but news of which did not reach Copenhagen until several 
 days after the battle. Not long afterward, in early May, 
 Nelson relieved Parker as commander-in-chief, and thereupon 
 promptly started for the Eussian port of Revel, hoping to 
 find the Russian fleet there and prevent its forming a junction 
 with the Swedish. When he arrived in the outer bay, how- 
 ever, he found that the Russian fleet had gone. Receiving 
 an intimation from the Czar that his coming with so large a 
 fleet did not look like a friendly act. Nelson at once moved 
 away, and wrote a diplomatic and conciliatory note to the 
 Russian Minister. Shortly afterward he received an answer 
 from the Minister, announcing that because of Nelson's 
 prompt withdrawal, and the friendly character of his note, 
 the Czar had ordered the immediate raising of the embargo 
 that his predecessor had placed upon English merchant-ships 
 in Russian ports. 
 
 Like most great warriors. Nelson was a statesman and a 
 diplomat as well. 
 
 The League of the Armed Neutrality soon broke up, and 
 what had been at the start a great menace to Great Britain 
 disappeared. The main cause of its disappearance was the 
 strateg.y of Nelson. 
 
 It was not until the year 1805 that Nelson was again able, 
 in any preeminent degree, to contribute his unrivaled skill as 
 a naval strategist to the service of his country. In the early
 
 216 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 part of that year it was known that Napoleon had been collect- 
 ing and drilling in Boulogne an army of 150,000 men, and 
 that many flotillas suitable as transports had been constructed. 
 It was suspected that his object was to invade England and 
 Ireland; but it was realized that Napoleon could not accom- 
 plish this unless he could secure control of the English Chan- 
 nel by a French fleet during a period long enough to enable 
 an expedition to get across. It was also realized that, by rea- 
 son of the known superiority of the British fleet, Napoleon, 
 would not attempt an invasion unless by some means he could 
 get the British fleet out of the way. It was also realized that 
 a very natural thing for him to attempt would be to lure it 
 to the West Indies, by sending a French fleet thither to 
 threaten British possessions, which were of great importance 
 to British commerce. At this time Napoleon had twenty 
 ships-of-the-line in the naval port at Brest on the northwest 
 coast of France, five at Rochefort on the west coast, and ten 
 at Toulon on the south coast. For the full success of his ex- 
 pedition, it would be necessary that these ships should unite 
 somewhere at sea and then return and enter the Channel. 
 For this reason, a British fleet was kept on watch at each port. 
 
 The ten ships at Brest were successfully kept in by Admiral 
 Comwallis; the five ships at Rochefort got away and went to 
 the West Indies, but came back without effecting anything. 
 The ships at Toulon, under command of Vice- Admiral Vil- • 
 leneuve, got out on the 17th of January. 
 
 The officer in command of the British fleet watching Toulon 
 was Nelson. He was informed by a frigate on January 19 of 
 Villeneuve's departure. Not knowing Villeneuve's destina- 
 tion, and being in command in the Mediterranean, Nelson 
 deemed it his first duty to prevent any descent on Egypt or 
 on any place in the Mediterranean under the British flag or 
 under British protection; and he therefore bestirred himself 
 — a prey to the most agonizing doubts and conjectures — ^to 
 patrol the sea, even to Alexandria in Egypt, in search of 
 Villeneuve. On the 19th of February he received inf orma-
 
 NELSON 217 
 
 tion that Villeneuve's ships had been so badly disabled in a 
 gale that he had had to go back to Toulon. On April 4 he 
 learned from a frigate that Villeneuve had again sailed on 
 March 30; but he heard nothing more until April 18, when 
 he received chance information that Villeneuve had been seen 
 on the 7th off the southern coast of Spain, steering toward the 
 Strait of Gibraltar and the Atlantic Ocean. On April 19 
 he received certain information that the enemy fleet, consist- 
 ing of twelve French ships-of-the-line, had passed out of the 
 Straits into the Atlantic. 
 
 Nelson at once concluded that Villeneuve had gone to the 
 "West Indies. He had determined several months before that, 
 in case he got information at any time that Villeneuve was 
 going to the West Indies, he would pursue him. Therefore 
 he now took immediate steps to follow; but, because of un- 
 favorable winds and other causes that hampered so much the 
 movements of vessels in those days, he did not start for the 
 West Indies until the evening of May 11. He had only 
 eleven ships-of-the-liue. Villeneuve had eighteen, six Spanish 
 ships having joined him at Cadiz. 
 
 Nelson arrived at Barbados on June 4, and received infor- 
 mation, subsequently found to be erroneous, from the general 
 commanding the British troops at Santa Lucia, that the 
 enemy fleet had passed there, steering south, during the 
 night of May 28 and 29. Nelson was amazed at this report, 
 being unable to see what strategic plan could possibly justify 
 Villeneuve in going south. As the information was authori- 
 tative, however, he started the next morning toward the south, 
 only to find on June 7, by information from Trinidad, that 
 no hostile fleet had appeared. He steered north at once, and 
 reached Antigua, the northernmost of the Windward Islands 
 save one, on June 12. There he received information that 
 Villeneuve had reached Martinique on May 14, had left on 
 June 4, and that he had then sailed northward. Nelson at 
 once divined that for some reason, probably hearing of his 
 (Nelson's) presence, he had abandoned all hostile operations
 
 218 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 in the West Indies and was returning to Europe. Nelson 
 immediately decided to go after Villeneuve, and to send a 
 fast-sailing frigate to inform the British Admiralty of the 
 entire situation. This frigate, the Curieux, fulfilled her mis- 
 sion perfectly, and was a vital factor in bringing about the 
 success of the campaign. 
 
 On June 13 Nelson got away from Antigua, and on July 18 
 he sighted Cape Spartel on the northwest coast of Africa, just 
 outside the Strait of Gibraltar, There he ascertained that no 
 information had been received of Villeneuve. However, the 
 Curieux had sighted Villeneuve 's fleet on June 19, and had 
 reached England on July 7 ; and on July 9 the First Lord of 
 the Admiralty, a trained naval officer and strategist, issued 
 orders for the British blockading squadrons off the ports of 
 Rochefort and Ferrol to unite and take post one hundred miles 
 otf Cape Finisterre on the northwest coast of Spain. On July 
 19 the combined force was in this position, under command of 
 Admiral Calder, and on the 22d Villeneuve rushed into his 
 arms. Calder had fifteen ships and Villeneuve had twenty. 
 The ensuing battle went to the advantage of the British ; but 
 Calder did not press his advantage and Villeneuve got away, 
 for which Calder was bitterly blamed by the British public. 
 Villeneuve sent three ships into Vigo, and sailed himself to 
 the Spanish port of Ferrol, a few miles south of Cape Finis- 
 terre, which he reached on August 1 with fifteen ships. 
 Calder, after sending five of his ships to resume the blockade 
 of Rochefort on the west coast of France, joined Comwallis's 
 blockading force off Brest on August 14. The next day Nelson 
 joined with his eleven ships, thus raising the force under 
 Comwallis's command to thirty-seven, and effectually pre- 
 venting all possibility of Villeneuve 's force uniting with the 
 one in Brest. 
 
 By reason of poor health, Nelson now received leave to go 
 home. On the 19th of August he hauled down his flag, ex- 
 pecting the rest that he much required. But news soon came
 
 NELSON 219 
 
 that Villeneuve had got away from Ferrol, and that on August 
 20 he had arrived at Cadiz with his fleet. 
 
 The Admiralty at once decided to force that fleet to come 
 out and fight, and realized that Nelson was the best man to 
 be charged with the undertaking. Accordingly, Nelson re- 
 ceived orders to this effect. At half past eleven in the morn- 
 ing of September 14 he hoisted his flag on board the Victory, 
 and on the following morning sailed. 
 
 Nelson arrived off the port of Cadiz with twenty-seven 
 ships-of-the-line. Villeneuve was inside with thirty-three 
 ships-of-the-line, of which eighteen were French and fifteen 
 Spanish. Villeneuve came out on the 19th of October, pos- 
 sibly forced out by the difficulty of subsisting so large a force 
 for a long time in a small l)lockaded port. In view of the 
 known character of Nelson, both sides realized that a fight to 
 a finish was in prospect. 
 
 Nelson's plans had now been carefully made, and all his 
 captains had been not only fully informed as to those plans, 
 but fully imbued with the spirit that inspired them. The re- 
 sult was that when the battle took place, on October 21, it 
 was carried out with that combination of decision and flexi- 
 bility, of deliberation and celerity, of caution and ardor, that 
 characterized all of Nelson's operations. 
 
 The allied fleet was destroyed as a fighting force, and Great 
 Britain vsas established even more firmly than before in her 
 supremacy of the seas. This made it impossible for Napoleon 
 to gain the world dominion, to obtain which he was bending all 
 his powers. 
 
 It is interesting to note that, while the destruction of re- 
 publicanism in Europe was prevented by the strategy of 
 Napoleon, the undue aggrandizement of Napoleon was pre- 
 vented by the strategy of Nelson.
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 NAPOLEON 
 
 ON October 15, 1793, a youthful and ill-clad captain of 
 artillery vehemently opposed a plan for driving the 
 British out of the French city and harbor of Toulon, 
 which had been drawn up by a celebrated engineer and ap- 
 proved by the Committee on Fortifications. He proposed in 
 place of it a plan which was much simpler. His plan was to 
 mount some guns at -a point which he specified on the shores of 
 the harbor, and to drive out the British fleet. He pointed out 
 that after the fleet had left the British army would have to 
 leave also, and that the result could be secured without doing 
 any harm to the town. His plan was eventually adopted and 
 carried out. It was carried out largely by the captain of 
 artillery who had originated and proposed it ; for it was he 
 who put the guns into place and afterward directed them. 
 His name was Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 
 In none of his later campaigns did Napoleon show any 
 clearer insight into the problem presented to him, or any 
 greater energy and daring in carrying it out, than in his first 
 essay at Toulon, when he was only twenty-four years old, 
 poor, friendless, and inexperienced. 
 
 At Toulon he showed the same rare combination as he did 
 later, of great imagination and intense ardor with mathe- 
 matical correctness. He was a dreamer at Toulon and he was 
 a dreamer ever afterward; but his dreams were not vague 
 dreams, or about vague projects, or proceeding from vague 
 knowledge. His dreams were sharply defined and based on 
 accurate knowledge; and they were pointed as definitely to- 
 ward the end in view as the calculations of an engineer or the 
 diagrams of a draftsman. 
 
 220
 
 222 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 His services at Toulon were so evident and so important 
 that he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general ; and 
 in the spring of 1794 he was sent to the army of Italy, to 
 command the artillery. The army there was under the com- 
 mand of a general who was old and incapable ; but Bonaparte 
 was able to have some suggestions of his own adopted which 
 brought about some successes of an important kind. During 
 his stay in Italy he con*ceived a plan for a campaign there to 
 drive out the Austrians, and submitted it to the Committee of 
 Public Safety in Paris. It was rejected by them then, but 
 adopted in its main features later. 
 
 About September of that year, 1794, Bonaparte went to 
 Paris, At this time the government of the Republic was in a 
 precarious position. In the early part of October it was 
 threatened with actual ruin by the National Guard, 30,000 
 strong, which suddenly rose in revolt. In the emergency, 
 Bonaparte was given command of all the troops, only 5000 in 
 number, that the government had there under its control, 
 with which to subdue 30,000. AVith these 5000 troops, and 
 forty pieces of artillery which Bonaparte knew how to use so 
 well, he dispersed the insurgents after a brief but violent at- 
 tack with grape, and at the cost of only four hundred lives. 
 
 This was a small campaign compared with his later ones; 
 but it was won in the same way that those campaigns were ' 
 won — by a rapid but correct estimate of the situation, a 
 prompt and correct decision, and an extraordinary celerity 
 of action. It was won, also, by complete thoroughness — to 
 use a colloquialism of the present day, ' ' by making a complete 
 job of it." Napoleon realized, as every great strategist has 
 realized, that mere operations, mere fighting, mere working, 
 may be absolutely fruitless; that what must be done in order 
 to get decisive results is to do a definite injury at a definite 
 place at a definite time and for a definite purpose. He real- 
 ized further, as every great strategist has realized, that his 
 work was not finished until everything had been done that was 
 necessary to be done and that could be done. By the time
 
 NAPOLEON 223 
 
 Napoleon had finished with the mutinous National Guard, 
 there was nothing further to be done, and the mutiny had 
 been quelled thoroughly and completely. It has often been 
 stated that Napoleon ruined France. It must not be forgotten 
 that on this occasion Napoleon saved France, and also that 
 he did so several times aftei^ward. 
 
 As affairs in northern Italy were in very unsatisfactory 
 condition because of the presence there of the allied forces of 
 Austria and Piedmont, and the ineffective operations against 
 them of the general commanding the French forces. Napoleon 
 was sent to take his place, and to carry out the plan of opera- 
 tions that he had originally submitted to the government. 
 By this plan, Jourdan and Moreau were to operate separately 
 and yet cooperatively in Germany, while Napoleon was to 
 separate the Austrians and Piedmontese in Italy, then drive 
 the Austrians out of Italy, then advance through the Austrian 
 Tyrol into Germany, and join Moreau and Jourdan in an at- 
 tack on Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon reached Nice on March 27, 1796, and found the 
 French army widely dispersed, thoroughly discouraged, al- 
 most destitute, and with their communications to France run- 
 ning along the coast of the Mediterranean, parallel to those of 
 the enemy and therefore everywhere exposed. He at once 
 made an eloquent appeal to his men, promising to lead them 
 to victory immediately and to provide for all their wants. 
 The soldiers of France at this time were ardent and patriotic, 
 and willing to undergo all privations and to brave all dangers* 
 — provided they were competently led. They responded to 
 Napoleon's appeal immediately and sincerely. 
 
 To meet this enthusiastic band, led and inspired by the 
 ardent but exact genius of Napoleon, a half-hearted Austrian 
 army under an old, inefficient, and lethargic general, ad- 
 vanced. The natural result followed. On April 12, two 
 days after the Austrians descended from the Apennines, Napo- 
 leon defeated them in battle ; and on the following day he de- 
 feated the Piedmontese. A few more decisive victories oc-
 
 224 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 curred, after which the King of Sardinia withdrew altogether 
 from the coalition against France, and left the Austrians alone 
 to fight against Napoleon. 
 
 Napoleon instantly advanced against the Austrians. On 
 May 10 he arrived before the town of Lodi, which was held by 
 10,000 Austrians. To reach the town, he had to cross a 
 bridge that was defended by twenty pieces of artillery, and 
 that could have been cut by the Austrians if they had been 
 prompt enough. Napoleon was more prompt than the Aus- 
 trian general, and advanced across the bridge before it had 
 been cut, he himself at the head, animating his men by his 
 example. As a result the column dashed along the bridge in 
 the face of a terrible fire, overcame all opposition, and car- 
 ried the enemies batteries at the point of the bayonet. The 
 enemy retreated at once to the eastward, and Napoleon en- 
 tered Milan at the head of his victorious army. 
 
 At Milan, Napoleon at once took upon himself the task of 
 statesmanship, and sought to secure the fruits of the con- 
 quests he had made. But the news of his success excited the 
 jealousy of the French government, and caused it to send him 
 orders to divide his army into two parts : to give up the com- 
 mand of half of it to Kellerman, who was to remain in the 
 north of Italy and observe the Austrians, and to advance him- 
 self with the remaining half upon Rome and then upon 
 Naples. Napoleon, seeing the suicidal nature of this division 
 of forces and diffusion of effort, resigned his command. 
 Pending the receipt, however, of the reply of the government, 
 he resolved to drive the Austrians out of Ital}'; and to that 
 end he immediately advanced against them, after addressing 
 to his soldiers one of the most eloquent military appeals in 
 history. But on the day he quitted Milan, a revolt occurred 
 in his rear, Pavia being seized and the garrison put to death. 
 Without an instant's hesitation, and without stopping the 
 march of his army. Napoleon hastened to Pavia with a small 
 but sufficient force. At the head of this force he broke open 
 the gates, advanced within the city, delivered it up to the
 
 NAPOLEON 225 
 
 pillage of his troops, ordered the municipal officers to be shot, 
 and immediately extinguished the insurrection. At two other 
 places he carried out a similar policy, and secured similar 
 results. 
 
 The Austrians, under Beaulieu, were now drawn up beyond 
 the IMincio River in a line approximately north and south and 
 facing west, flanked on the right by Lake Garda and on the 
 left by the fortress of Mantua, The enemy's wings being thus 
 protected, Napoleon attacked his center, but while making 
 demonstrations against his line of retreat. The Austrians, 
 remembering the terrible charge at Lodi, gave way very soon; 
 and the Austrian general, fearful of the movement against 
 his communications, retired beyond the Adige River. Part 
 of his left wing, however, became dispersed, and the remainder 
 took refuge in Mantua. Napoleon decided at once to besiege 
 Mantua. So long as this city was held by the strong force of 
 13,000 men that now held it, Napoleon could not advance 
 beyond it, to carry out his campaign against Vienna, because 
 he would leave a military enemy in his rear. Furthermore, 
 he could not rely on the support of any large number of Ital- 
 ians in the vicinity, because they realized the danger of taking 
 the part of the side that might ultimately be defeated. 
 
 In July the Austrians sent to the relief of Mantua an army 
 60,000 strong and commanded by Wunnser. Against it Napo- 
 leon had only 30,000, 10,000 of whom were besieging 13,000 
 in Mantua. He instantly abandoned the siege and advanced 
 against the Austrians. They were advancing in two columns. 
 Napoleon attacked the weaker and repulsed it, and then at- 
 tacked the stronger and threw it back with a loss of fifty guns 
 and 12,000 men. He thus defeated completely the army of 
 relief. 
 
 In the following month a second relieving army, under 
 Wurmser, advanced again, this time also in two columns. 
 Napoleon again (in September) defeated one column and 
 then the other; but in this campaign the defeated column 
 under Wurmser himself had to take refuge in Mantua, and
 
 226 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 thus add to the garrison about 10,000 additional mouths to 
 feed. 
 
 Napoleon now earnestly besought more troops and guns, 
 for he saw that Austria realized the necessity of relieving 
 Mantua. Six weeks later Austria's third and most deter- 
 mined attempt was made. In the six weeks' interval Napoleon 
 exercised all his genius as a statesman in spreading a propa- 
 ganda of liberty in Italy. He opposed the French government 
 in its foolish project of embarking on a war with Rome and 
 Naples, and forced it (though without convincing it) to con- 
 tinue a war of the utmost vigor against Austria, in which the 
 first accomplishment must be the capture of Mantua. 
 
 The third army of relief also advanced in two columns ; but 
 it was under the command of a general, Alvinzi, who was far 
 more wise and quick than Wurmser, and opposed to Napoleon 
 a resistance so able and so stubborn that the powers of Napo- 
 leon and his ragged but enthusiastic army were taxed to the 
 utmost. In the final battles near Arcole, however, he de- 
 feated Alvinzi and drove him back. 
 
 In January, 1797, the fourth and last army of relief was 
 sent, again under Alvinzi. He made a determined attack on 
 the plateau of Rivoli with a superior force, but under the dis- 
 advantage that in order to reach the plateau he had to dis- 
 pense with both cavalry and artillery. In the battle that 
 followed, the French infantry, though greatly outnumbered, 
 were supported by artillery and cavalry, an advantage that 
 outweighed the mere numerical inferiority, and in conse- 
 quence were able to throw back the Austrians quickly and 
 decisively. On February 2, the flag of the Republic was fly- 
 ing over Mantua, the north of Italy was clear of Austrians, 
 and Napoleon was free to leave Italy and carry out his cam- 
 paign against Vienna. 
 
 Napoleon then advanced to the northeastward, and won a 
 succession of victories against easily defeated and demoralized 
 enemies, and finally signed preliminaries of peace with Aus- 
 tria at Leoben, less than one hundred miles from Vienna. At
 
 NAPOLEON 227 
 
 this time Napoleon knew when to exercise moderation, though 
 later in life he did not. He showed it in the preliminaries of 
 peace signed at Leoben, on April 18 and by his moderation 
 brought about a condition in which Austria withdrew from 
 the coalition against France and left Great Britain as her 
 only enemy. The defeat of Austria, and the consequent 
 abandonment of her hostile attitude toward France, saved the 
 Republic, and therefore the cause of liberty in Europe. For 
 this France was indebted wholly to the strategy of Napoleon. 
 
 The final treaty of peace was signed at Campo Formio on 
 October 3, 1797. Of the original six enemies of the Republic 
 only one now remained — Great Britain, the most powerful of 
 all. Napoleon realized that there would be a fight to the 
 death between her and France, and conceived the plan of 
 attacking her by attacking Egypt, thus threatening the com- 
 munications between England and India and menacing India 
 herself. He presented his plan to the Directory and secured 
 its approval, which suggests that neither Napoleon nor the 
 Directory estimated correctly the importance of the fact that 
 the British M^ere superior at sea. Except for brief periods, 
 the British navy had been superior to the French for several 
 centuries, and it was overwhelmingly superior at this time. 
 The effect of the Revolution had been subversive of that or- 
 derly discipline and that patient carefulness and skill that are 
 needed to manage naval instruments and equipments, and in 
 addition most of the competent officers, belonging as they did 
 to well-born families, had been forced out of the service, while 
 some had been beheaded. On the other hand, the British navy 
 as a whole was in a condition of completeness and efficiency 
 that had never been surpassed. Its Mediterranean fleet was 
 under the command of Nelson. 
 
 Napoleon set sail from Toulon on May 19, 1798, with about 
 38,000 veteran troops, a large corps of mathematicians, geolo- 
 gists, antiquarians, chemists, etc., embarked in a fleet of 
 transports, and guarded by thirteen ships-of-the-line. It is 
 interesting to note that this expedition had a double pur-
 
 228 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 pose, — conquest and exploration, — and that Napoleon, there- 
 fore, departed from his usual straight line of conduct and 
 tried to do two things at one time. By good fortune, he suc- 
 ceeded in reaching Egypt without being caught by Nelson, 
 and arrived at Alexandria on July 1. He immediately 
 marched on Cairo, and soon met the Mamelukes, who charged 
 on him with their customary impetuosity, but met the same 
 fate as cavalry usually have when charging on infantry and 
 artillery properly commanded and trained. Napoleon got to 
 work at once on his project of seducing the Egyptians to the 
 French Republican cause by false promises of many kinds, 
 when he suddenly received information — which should not 
 have surprised him — that the fleet he had left at Aboukir Bay 
 had been attacked by Rear- Admiral Nelson and destroyed on 
 August 1, 1798. 
 
 Napoleon was now in a position that was not only humil- 
 iating and dangerous, but ridiculous. He would not have 
 pardoned any general for getting into such a position in land 
 operations. His communications had been cut, and because 
 of circumstances that were almost inevitable. This shows 
 that, while Napoleon was one of the greatest military strate- 
 gists that ever lived, he was an exceedingly poor naval strate- 
 gist. It also shows something immeasurably more important, 
 which is that no man can be a strategist in any department 
 of strategy unless he understands thoroughly all the factors 
 in the problem which one encounters in that department. 
 Napoleon could apply to naval strategy as much mentality, 
 energy, and ardor as he could to military strategy; but he 
 understood accurately, clearly, and thoroughly every factor 
 involved in military strategy, while he understood almost none 
 of the factors employed in naval strategy. Napoleon doubt- 
 less took the advice of naval officers in naval matters; but, 
 as he himself decided what was to be done, he was not very 
 much more competent to act than a layman would be who 
 tried to perform a surgical operation under the advice of a 
 surgeon-. This throws light on the attempts of civilians, to.
 
 NAPOLEON 229 
 
 direct na'ixil and military operations, and explains the use- 
 less loss of life they have occasioned. 
 
 Napoleon then conducted a campaign in Syria, which was 
 made disastrous by the British fleet acting in conjunction with 
 the Turks when Napoleon besieged Acre. After his failure at 
 Acre he retreated precipitately into Egypt, and there suc- 
 ceeded in destroj^ing a Turkish force that had landed at Abou- 
 kir. 
 
 Some time before this he had received word that war had 
 broken out again on the Continent, and that Russia, Austria, 
 Sardinia, and Naples had joined a coalition with Great Brit- 
 ain against the French Republic. Realizing the failure of his 
 Egj-ptian campaign, and seeking an opportunity to retrieve his 
 fortunes, he sailed for France on August 24, 1799, with a few 
 of his best officers ; deserting the soldiers to whom he had prom- 
 ised so much, and who, for his sake, had faced hunger and 
 thirst and pestilence and wounds and death. 
 
 At this time the affairs of France were in a precarious con- 
 dition. Military operations had not been successful ; there 
 was tremendous discontent throughout the country; and Na- 
 poleon was the only man who stood high in public favor. He 
 was received with great enthusiasm and was shortly able to 
 bring about a coup d'etat whereby the Directory was abol- 
 ished and a consular government established in its stead, with 
 himself as First Consul. In discharging the duties of that 
 office, which was practically that of Dictator, Napoleon 
 showed the same grasp of the situation, the same talent for 
 detail, the same energj^ ardor, industry, and endurance, that 
 he had shown in discharging the duties of general. He showed 
 also the same arbitrarj^ spirit and the same tremendous con- 
 fidence in himself ; and he achieved a success and accomplished 
 a good for France of as high an order of importance. 
 
 He soon made overtures for peace to both Great Britain and 
 Germany, but by both his overtures were repelled. Similar 
 overtures to Russia, which was at that time irritated against 
 Great Britain and Austria, were followed by Russia's aban-
 
 230 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 donment of the coalition. This left Great Britain and Aus- 
 tria as France's only important enemies. There was a large 
 French force now in Germany under Moreau, and another 
 besieged at Genoa under Massena. The appearance of a Brit- 
 ish fleet in April, 1800, was a preconcerted signal for the Aus- 
 trians to attack Genoa and thus cut off all communications 
 with France. 
 
 Meanwhile, the campaign in Germany proceeded somewhat 
 to the advantage of the French, largely because of a lack of 
 cooperation among the Austrian forces ; but no decisive results 
 occurred. In this condition of affairs. Napoleon decided to 
 take the field himself. To this end he concentrated a force 
 of about 40,000 men near Dijon, from which position he could 
 advance into either Austria or Italy. On the 6th of May he 
 left Paris. On the 14th he began the passage of the Great 
 St. Bernard at the head of this force, dragging cannon in hol- 
 lowed trunks of trees through the snow. He forced his way 
 by dint of courage and energy and ingenuity, and suddenlj^ 
 he emerged into northern Italy, bringing artillery — to the 
 great astonishment of the Austrian general there. Napoleon 
 arrived at Milan on the 2d of June, and on the 14th fought 
 the battle of Marengo. 
 
 Napoleon took many risks with the disposition of his forces 
 in the interval which might have proved fatal if the Austrian 
 general had been as active as Napoleon was. But Napoleon 
 would not have taken those risks had he not realized the inef- 
 ficiency of the Austrian general. The Austrians fought the 
 battle, of course, with all the bravery and determination that 
 could be expected ; and they did not break until they received 
 a sudden and unexpected assault from cavalry supported by 
 artillery. They then broke into a rout, and disaster and car- 
 nage followed. This battle compelled the Austrians again to 
 retire to the eastward of the Mincio Eiver. 
 
 Meanwhile, the naval domination of Great Britain, which 
 ultimately was to prove the backbone of the resistance of 
 Europe to Napoleon, had excited great jealousy among the
 
 NAPOLEON 231 
 
 maritime powers of Europe, who had formed a League of 
 Armed Neutrality to oppose her. The issue between Great 
 Britain and these powers was finally decided by a naval battle 
 off Copenhagen, in which Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, on April 
 2, 1801, destroyed virtually all the defenses of the town, both 
 fixed and floating. This victory caused an almost immediate 
 dissolution of the League. 
 
 Affairs did not come to a crisis between the French and 
 Austrian armies in Germany until the battle of Hohen- 
 linden on December 3, 1800. An interesting feature of the 
 campaign was the fact that Napoleon sent orders to the French 
 General Moreau to follow a certain plan of operations; that 
 Moreau protested, submitted another plan, and asked permis- 
 sion to take a lower rank if Napoleon insisted on his own plan ; 
 and that Napoleon, with true strategic judgment, yielded to 
 Moreau. The battle of Hohenlinden was ended in disaster to 
 the Austrians, mainly because of the extremely bad strategy 
 of the Austrian commander. The battle was followed by the 
 Treaty of Luneville on February 9, 1801. This left Great 
 Britain the only surviving member of the coalition. Bona- 
 parte now realized that the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen, 
 and the consequent dissolution of the Confederacy of Neutrals, 
 made it impossible for him then to ruin British commerce. 
 In consequence of all the conditions then prevailing. Great 
 Britain and France signed the Treaty of Amiens in March, 
 1802. 
 
 By the treaties of Luneville and Amiens the French Repub- 
 lic was acknowledged by all Europe. It is worthy of note that 
 a feeble directory had been replaced by a strong Republic, and 
 that France had been saved against the combined assaidt of 
 the greatest monarchies in Europe by one agency ordy — the 
 strategy of Napoleon. 
 
 The Treaty of Amiens contained the provision that Eng- 
 land should surrender Malta. The British did not surrender 
 Malta, and Napoleon made tremendous accusations against 
 her for this reason. But the British can hardly be blamed
 
 232 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 with reason; because it soon became apparent that Napoleon 
 was still actively at work on his projects against Egypt and 
 India, that he was not himself keeping faith in many matters, 
 and that his enormous success in upbuilding French maritime 
 and naval power threatened the naval supremacy of England. 
 He even sent an expedition that captured San Domingo ; and 
 by securing from Spain a large tract, called Louisiana, and 
 then selling it to the United States, he gave good grounds 
 for the suspicion that he was projecting an aggressive mari- 
 time policy. When, finally. Napoleon sent an expedition 
 to India, though apparently for mere exploration, when 
 French papers spoke of the ease with which Egypt could be 
 reconquered, and when the advance of French prestige 
 through all of continental Europe had become apparent, the 
 British Cabinet decided not to give up Malta, War was de- 
 clared in May, 1803, between Great Britain and France. 
 Then began a struggle which lasted until the battle of Water- 
 loo, in which virtually all the powers of Europe, though not 
 always at the same time, made war against Napoleon. 
 
 After the declaration of war, the invasion of England be- 
 came the .intense preoccupation of Napoleon ; and to accom- 
 plish it he embarked on the greatest strategic enterprise that 
 had ever been undertaken. He realized, of course, that he 
 could not send an invading force across the Channel, unless 
 it were supported by a French fleet superior to any British 
 fleet that might be in the Channel at that time. He realized 
 that he should have to create a great addition to the French 
 fleet, therefore, and a large flotilla of transports. Of the two, 
 the enlargement of the fleet was the more difficult. He finally 
 collected near Boulogne about fifteen hundred transports and 
 about 150,000 men. The British naturally got information 
 of his preparations, and many of them were much alarmed; 
 but the government itself, while it appreciated the danger, 
 took such measures to counteract it that it never regarded the 
 situation as really perilous. Napoleon finally adopted the 
 plan of endeavoring to lure the principal part of the British
 
 NAPOLEON 233 
 
 fleet away from the Channel by sending a large fleet westward 
 to threaten British possessions in the West Indies. This was 
 a plan similar to that of many strategic operations on land; 
 but Napoleon understood all the factors in land campaigns, 
 while he did not understand those in naval campaigns. For 
 this reason, he hampered the operations of Admiral Ville- 
 neuve considerably by ill-advised instructions. Whether they 
 hampered the admiral to such a degree as to be the main cause 
 of the final failure, however, it is difficult to decide. 
 
 Villeneuve started for the West Indies, and Nelson started 
 in pursuit. Meanwhile Napoleon was pressing his prepara- 
 tions near Boulogne, in order to be able to dash across the 
 Channel as soon as the French fleet should return, having left 
 Nelson in the West Indies. Villeneuve returned, but allowed 
 himself to be brought to battle on July 22, 1805, with the 
 result that he went for repairs to Cadiz, where he arrived on 
 August 20. Napoleon realized at once that his scheme to 
 invade England had been ruined. He realized also that it 
 had been ruined by the same man Nelson, who had ruined his 
 Egyptian campaign and had broken up the Confederacy of 
 Neutrals, and that these three occurrences showed a British 
 supremacy upon the sea that precluded any reasonable antici- 
 pation of conquering England. There is no reason to suppose, 
 however, that he realized that this supremacy of Great 
 Britain on the seas was to threaten seriously his success upon 
 the Continent; and it is quite certain that he did not appre- 
 ciate fully the importance of the predominant sea power of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 Napoleon has been criticized by many for ever harboring 
 seriously the idea of invading England. It has often been 
 contended also that he did not really intend to do so, and that 
 the collecting of large forces near Boulogne, and the man- 
 oeuvering of his fleet, were simply parts of a feint to hide his 
 real intentions — a march into Germany. But it must not be 
 forgotten that, even if the project failed, he suffered no great 
 harm ; because his army could be used, and was used, for the
 
 234 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 other purpose. In other words, Napoleon had two alternative 
 plans, as he often had. 
 
 As soon as Napoleon heard that Villeneuve had gone to 
 Cadiz, he started with the utmost possible promptness, and 
 marched with the utmost possible speed against the Austrians, 
 under General Mack, who was about to advance through the 
 Black Forest toward the French frontier. So rapid was Na- 
 poleon's movement, so unsuspecting was Mack, and so little 
 information did he get from his intelligence department, that 
 he was taken by surprise near Ulm and his army enveloped. 
 As a result he was forced to surrender his entire force on 
 October 20. 
 
 The battle of Trafalgar, in which the British under Nelson 
 defeated the French and Spanish fleets, occurred the following 
 day, and, though it was not then realized, sounded the death- 
 knell of the empire of Napoleon. 
 
 While marching to Ulm, Napoleon violated the neutrality 
 of Prussia by marching over Prussian ground. This insolent 
 act, combined with many other causes, one of which was the 
 gradually rising wrath of the Prussians against the feeble 
 neutrality of their king, forced the king to assert the rights 
 of Prussia, to make an alliance with the Czar of Russia, 
 and then to declare war against Napoleon. But the king's 
 previous inaction had put the Prussian army and the country 
 in such a condition that he was wholly unprepared; so that 
 he now added to his crime of unpreparedness the crime of 
 going to war before his unpreparedness had been overcome. 
 
 Russia and Austria now joined their forces, and soon col- 
 lected an allied army of about 100,000 men near Austerlitz, 
 while the French numbered about 80,000. The actions of the 
 Allies at this time seem to have been marked by vague precip- 
 itancy rather than exact celerity; for a little waiting would 
 have enabled their forces to be increased by those of the Arch- 
 duke Charles, who was hurrying up from Italy, and by a 
 certain Russian corps then marching to join them; and 
 their forces would have been augmented vastly if the Allies
 
 NAPOLEON 235 
 
 had avoided battle until such time as the Prussian army 
 could have been got ready and sent to join them. The precip- 
 itancy seems to have been caused mainly by the Czar, who was 
 determined to force a general engagement. This engagement 
 took place on December 2, 1805, at Austerlitz. 
 
 The French had about 80,000 men and the Allies 100,000 ; 
 but the French were commanded by Napoleon, and Napoleon 
 had under him Lannes and Soult and Bernadotte and iMurat. 
 The battle was fought with the utmost courage on both sides, 
 but with strategic and tactical skill by only one side. The 
 result was that the Russian center was pushed off the plateau 
 on which it had taken a stand ; and the Russian left, which 
 had charged down on the French right, was attacked on the 
 flank and rear. 
 
 The Russians now retreated to the north. Austria signed 
 an ignominious peace, and Napoleon became supreme in 
 southern Germany and Italy. His prestige had now increased 
 to such a point that he was able to marry several of his rela- 
 tives to persons of royal or noble blood, to make his brother 
 Louis, King of Holland and his brother Joseph, King of 
 Naples, to form the Confederation of the Rhine, and to abolish 
 the Holy Roman Empire. Against one nation, however, he 
 was helpless, and that nation was the British ; for Nelson had 
 defeated Villeneuve disastrously at the battle of Trafalgar on 
 October 21, and thus dispelled forever all hope of overcoming 
 Great Britain's mastery of the sea, and consequent control of 
 all its trade routes. Napoleon then resorted to various meas- 
 ures of declared blockade, which had little ultimate effect 
 other than of inflicting great hardships on the people of Eng- 
 land, and equal and in some cases greater hardships on the 
 maritime countries of the Continent. 
 
 Finally the Prussian king started his ill-trained and ill-com- 
 manded army against the highly trained and superbly com- 
 manded army of Napoleon. 
 
 The result was that the Prussian king suddenly discovered, 
 about October 12, that a French army corps was between him
 
 236 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 and his base of supplies. He attempted to drive them from 
 his line of communications, but Napoleon fell with overpow- 
 ering numbers upon a large detachment of his force at Jena, 
 while Davoust fell upon the main force at Auerstadt near by. 
 Both battles took place on October 14, were decisive victories 
 for the French, and forced the Prussians to sign terms of 
 peace that were not only ignominious but almost ruinous. One 
 of the most humiliating features of the situation, which soon 
 developed, was that Napoleon entered Berlin, and that it was 
 from Berlin that he issued on November 21, 1806, his first 
 famous decree, the "Berlin Decree," proclaiming the British 
 Isles in a state of blockade and prohibiting all commerce and 
 correspondence with them. 
 
 The treaty of peace was not signed, however, until after the 
 Russians had been brought to battle. The Russian army could 
 not be brought to a decisive battle at once, but it was finally 
 met and defeated, though not decisively, on February 8, at 
 Eylau. This battle left Napoleon with an army demoralized 
 by privation, surrounded by hostile forces in a hostile coun- 
 try in the winter, and under conditions that every day of sus- 
 pended operations made more difficult. Fortunately for 
 Napoleon, the Russian general committed a strategic blunder 
 by which Napoleon was enabled to engage him at Friedland 
 on June 14 with a greatly superior force. The victory was so 
 complete as to discourage the Russian emperor completely, 
 and to induce him to join with the King of Prussia in a treaty, 
 which was signed with Napoleon on July 8, at Tilsit, on a raft 
 in the Niemen River. By this treaty the Czar became practi- 
 cally an ally of Napoleon, and the King of Prussia lost nearly 
 half of his dominions. 
 
 Preliminary to this treaty and other treaties, and during 
 the discussions of all treaties, Napoleon showed that quickness 
 of decision, that ability to cajole and threaten and persuade 
 at the proper time, which mark the great diplomatist; and 
 without that ability he could not, of course, have made the 
 advantageous treaties that he did make. Napoleon's entire
 
 NAPOLEON 237 
 
 success was due to the combination of all these qualities ; and 
 Napoleon Bonaparte would never have been the Napoleon of 
 history had he not been a diplomatist and a statesman as well 
 as a strategist. This fact must not blind us, however, to the 
 more important fact that his greatness did not rest at bottom 
 upon his diplomacy/ or his statesmanship, hut on his strategy. 
 In other words, the most important element in Napoleon's 
 career — as in the career of Thutmose III, Alexander, Caesar, 
 and the others whose names head certain chapters in this 
 book — was strategy. Now, these men contributed more than 
 any equal number of other men to the establishment of stable 
 government in the world. 
 
 Perhaps it would not be logical to deduce from this that the 
 most important factor in the establishment of stable govern- 
 ment has been strategy. But it would be logical to deduce 
 that strategy has been an agency as important as to be im- 
 measurable, and that there is no good ground for declaring 
 that any other agency has been more important. The govern- 
 ment of every civilized country was established originally by 
 military force directed by strategy, and was maintained after- 
 ward by statesmanship and diplomacy supported by strategy. 
 Which of the three has been the most important it would be 
 useless to discuss; but it cannot be gainsaid with reason that 
 of the three strategy was the first to act, and that the others 
 followed. 
 
 Napoleon had now reached the culmination of his rapid and 
 tremendous rise, and was about to start gradually upon that 
 fall which ended with such abruptness at Waterloo. After 
 the peace at Tilsit, France and Russia seemed the most im- 
 portant countries in the world, and England seemed to be 
 threatened with disaster, because her assertiveness on the sea 
 had roused against her the opposition of all the powers of 
 continental Europe. Napoleon's first act in the long series 
 that brought about his final downfall was his invasion of 
 Spain and Portugal. 
 
 To complete his continental blockade of England, Napoleon
 
 238 THE ART OF FIGHTINa 
 
 deemed it necessary thiat Portugal, on account of her large 
 sea-front and her geographical position, should be brought 
 under French control. He therefore took steps to invade Por- 
 tugal; and in order to accomplish this he formed a plot 
 whereby he obtained the actual cooperation of Spain, and 
 with it, of course, her permission to march his invading army 
 through her territory. At this time the government of Spain 
 was excessively corrupt; the queen's favorite was the real 
 ruler of the kingdom, and the queen's son, whom she declared 
 on one occasion to be not the king's son, had acquired a popu- 
 larity in Spain that was entirely undeserved. Napoleon sent 
 an army under Junot that captured Lisbon on November 30, 
 1807, but too late to secure the royal family, for it had already 
 embarked upon the British fleet. 
 
 Nominally as a support to this expedition, Napoleon had 
 sent five armies into Spain; and it was not imtil they had 
 seized the principal fortress in northern Spain, and Murat was 
 found to be advancing toward Madrid, that the Spanish gov- 
 ernment realized the situation. Then the king and queen and 
 Godoy, the actual ruler of Spain, resolved on flight ; but they 
 were stopped by an insurrection, and the king was compelled 
 to abdicate in favor of his reputed son. Now, this son was not 
 only a scoundrel, but a coward ; and so, instead of rallying the 
 nation to its own defense, which he could have done, he tried 
 to make terms with Napoleon. The result of all this was that 
 Napoleon in June put his own brother, Joseph, on the throne 
 of Spain. The Spanish nation rose in revolt, and for some 
 time with considerable success. Meanwhile, Austria, noting 
 the menace to the Catholic religion and the Bourbon family 
 in Napoleon's invasion of Spain and Portugal, and taking 
 advantage of the large army that Napoleon was required to 
 keep there, declared war against him in the spring of 1809. 
 
 Noting the gathering of the storm before it broke, foresee- 
 ing that he would have to go to war with Austria, and realiz- 
 ing the desirability of crushing all armed hostility in his rear. 
 Napoleon himself went into Spain, and, by a series of masterly
 
 NAPOLEON 231) 
 
 and rapid movements of the Napoleonic kind, crushed out all 
 rebellion, at least temporarily. He then hastened to Paris and 
 prepared to turn his arms on Austria. 
 
 He was informed of Austria's declaration of war while in 
 Paris in April, 1809, and left the following day to join his 
 forces in Germany. At this time, Berthier, who had been an 
 excellent chief of staff, but did not prove himself an excellent 
 commander-in-chief, was in command of the French forces 
 near Augsburg, and Davoust was at Ratisbon, about seventy- 
 six miles distant. On April 16 the Austrian Archduke Charles, 
 at the head of an army 126,000 strong, forced the passage of 
 the Isar River. Had he possessed the strategic ability of Na- 
 poleon, he would instantly have crushed Davoust, who had 
 only 60,000 men, before Berthier could have come to his assist- 
 ance, and then he would have crushed Berthier. Instead of 
 this, he did nothing decisive. Napoleon arrived on the scene 
 at four o'clock on the following morning, the 17th of April. 
 He instantly united the scattered forces of his army. In 
 three victorious battles on three successive days, April 20, 21, 
 and 22, he divided the Austrian forces, and then drove them 
 back on the Danube. On the day following, April 23, at the 
 end of an extraordinary five daj'^s' campaign, the Austrians 
 withdrew across the Danube, having lost 50,000 prisoners. 
 Three weeks later Napoleon slept in the palace of the Austrian 
 emperor in Vienna. 
 
 But on IMay 21 and 22 he fought a battle with the Austrians 
 near the villages of Aspem and Essling that gave him no vic- 
 tory, in which he sustained grave losses, and that not only 
 weakened his material forces but greatly impaired his repu- 
 tation and prestige. On the night of May 21, in the face of 
 a strong force, he crossed the Danube River on temporary 
 bridges where it is divided by the island of Lobau. For a 
 whole day the French fought desperately against superior 
 numbers, cut off from the possibility of retreat by the de- 
 struction of their bridges. In the night reinforcements were 
 sent across, but not in adequate force; so that after another
 
 240 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 day of fighting Napoleon had to withdraw from the left or 
 northern side of the Danuhe to the island of Lobau. He re- 
 tired defeated and with a knowledge in his own mind and in 
 that of his officers that he had not planned the operation with 
 his customary foresight, and that he personally had left the 
 field of battle under circumstances that suggested flight. 
 
 The French and Austrian forces confronted each other for 
 six weeks, separated only by the branch of the Danube, sixty 
 yards wide, that runs north of the island of Lobau. The Aus- 
 trians fortified their position and made preparations to oppose 
 the French, supposing that they would cross by the original 
 bridge opposite Essling, which Napoleon had ordered to be 
 repaired. But Napoleon had the bridge repaired in order 
 to deceive the Austrians, for he intended to cross lower down 
 by temporary bridges that he had constructed. He crossed 
 in the night of the 4th and 5th of July, took the Austrians 
 at a disadvantage, and compelled them to change their plans 
 and dispositions. The 5th was spent in manceuvering, but at 
 daybreak of the 6th was begun a pitched battle that is known 
 as the battle of Wagram. The Austrians succeeded in throw- 
 ing back the French left wing, and almost in throwing back 
 the right; but Napoleon realized that in order to accomplish 
 this they must have weakened their center. So he attacked 
 their center with artillery, then with infantry, and then with 
 cavalry, and succeeded in breaking through their line. The 
 Austrians then withdrew from the field; but the French had 
 lost 35,000 in killed and wounded and were unable to pursue. 
 
 Though this battle, as well as the previous one, had been 
 really indecisive. Napoleon and Austria determined to con- 
 clude the war. A treaty was signed on October 14, 1809, by 
 which Austria agreed to discontinue all commercial relations 
 with England, and to recognize all the changes that had taken 
 place or might take place in Spain and Portugal. On March 
 10, 1810, a daughter of the Emperor of Austria became the 
 wife of the Emperor of the French. 
 
 Meanwhile, the continental blockade of England was caus-
 
 NAPOLEON 241 
 
 ing serious embarrassment not only in England but to certain 
 continental powers, especially Russia. This fact, and certain 
 others growing out of the treaty of Tilsit, brought about a 
 gradual but distinct change for the worse in the feeling be- 
 tween Alexander and Napoleon. After two years of prepa- 
 ration a rupture occurred, preceded on March 24, 1812, by a 
 treaty of alliance between Russia and Sweden. On the 9th of 
 May Napoleon left Paris for Dresden, the rendezvous of the 
 allies (France, Austria and Prussia), and opened negotiations 
 with the Czar. These bearing no fruit, he declared war on 
 the 22d of June and joined his army. 
 
 This army was the finest and largest that France had ever 
 sent bej^ond her borders, and amounted to nearly half a mil- 
 lion combatants and 1200 pieces of artillery'. On the 24th the 
 French army crossed the Niemen River without opposition. 
 On the 28th it entered Wilna, the ancient capital of Lithuania. 
 It continued to advance, still without meeting opposition, 
 until the 28th of July, when it entered Witepsk. Most of Na- 
 poleon's generals now advised him to go no farther; but Na- 
 poleon could not be dissuaded. He spent the first two weeks 
 of August here ; and during this time the two Russian armies, 
 which Napoleon had been able to disunite, had reunited at 
 Smolensk, a large town on the Dnieper River surrounded with 
 fortifications. In this strong position the Russian commander- 
 in-chief resolved to make a stand. Napoleon had endeavored 
 to get Smolensk before the enemy did, but for some reason 
 (possibly because Napoleon himself had lost some of his 
 youthful celerity) he had failed to do it, and it now became 
 necessary to capture the place against a strong resistance. 
 The Russians did resist for one day; but they retreated dur- 
 ing the night-time, after setting fire to the city and to some 
 immense magazines. Napoleon took possession of the town, 
 his troops much disappointed at finding only a heap of ruins 
 where they had expected to find good quarters. 
 
 It was now the middle of August, and nearly all of Napo- 
 leon 's generals advised him to stop at Smolensk, reorganize his
 
 242 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 army, bring up provisions and reinforcements, and wait until 
 the spring before renewing the campaign. Knowing the Na- 
 poleon of previous campaigns, it seems incredible that Napo- 
 leon should have failed to estimate the situation correctly and 
 to realize that the strategy of the Russians was Fabian, and 
 that their intention was to lure him on farther and farther, in 
 the hope that his army would eventually be reduced by sick- 
 ness and discouragement and starvation. But it seems clear 
 that by this time the originally almost perfect judgment of 
 Napoleon had been spoiled by an excessive confidence in him- 
 self, and that the essential faculty of self-correction had been 
 seriously impaired. Therefore he advanced toward Moscow. 
 On the 7th of September he came to battle with the Russians 
 who were posted on a series of hills near the village of Boro- 
 dino, on the Moskwa River, a position covered by intreneh- 
 ments and redoubts. The opposing forces were nearly evenly 
 matched numerically, being perhaps 130,000 each; while the 
 Russians had the advantage of position and the French had 
 the advantage of superior leadership and experience. The 
 battle was bitterly contested, but at the end the Russians were 
 forced to abandon the field, beaten at all points. 
 
 On the 14th of September the French entered Moscow, and 
 Napoleon took up his abode in the Kremlin, anciently the res- 
 idence of the Czar. Suddenly fires appeared in different parts 
 of the city. Great importance was not at first attached to 
 them; and it was not until the following day that serious 
 measures were taken to repress them. These were without 
 avail, and by the 16th the fire had increased. On succeeding 
 days it continued to increase, and by the evening of the 20th 
 nine tenths of Moscow was in ashes. 
 
 It seems that Napoleon now realized the magnitude of his 
 danger. His decision was Napoleonic — to advance at once on 
 St. Petersburg. But his generals would not agree to this : on 
 the contrary, they advised retreat. As a result, neither plan 
 was adopted, and the French remained in Moscow for forty 
 days, until the 19th of October ! On that day Napoleon evac-
 
 NAPOLEON 243 
 
 uated Moscow and started on his retreat, the horrors of which 
 it is not necessary to detail. For the purpose of this book it is 
 simply necessary^ for us to realize that only a small portion of 
 Napoleon's army ever recrossed the Niemen River, that the 
 whole expedition was a disastrous failure, and that the main 
 cause was Napoleon's refusal (or possibly his inability) to 
 estimate the situation with an unbiased mind. Even after he 
 had been caught in Moscow, and almost up until the day he 
 left it, he was continually expecting favorable replies to pro- 
 posals of peace that he had forwarded to the Czar. 
 
 Napoleon arrived at Paris on December 18. He found that 
 the war in Spain was still going on, not altogether unfavorably 
 to the French, and that the Senate, the court and the capital, 
 though dismayed by the disaster of the Russian campaign, 
 seemed still loyal and obsequious. The conscription of 1813 
 had been called out, and a formidable army would soon be at 
 his disposal to check any advance of the Russians. 
 
 But the disaster in Russia had awakened the hopes and 
 stimulated the courage of all the cowed but resentful govern- 
 ments of the continent. The Emperor Alexander, in a proc- 
 lamation of February 10, 1813, invited the members of the 
 Confederation of the Rhine to throw off the yoke of France ; 
 and twelve days later, in another proclamation, he called on 
 the people of Germany to rise en masse against Napoleon. 
 Prussia responded almost at once, and Sweden followed. 
 France immediately raised a large army for the coming cam- 
 paign, and put forth the utmost energy of all kinds. The sol- 
 diers of the new army, however, were youthful and untrained. 
 
 Napoleon at once assumed the offensive, and on "Slay 2 
 engaged the allies near Lutzen. In this battle, as in nearly 
 all his previous ones. Napoleon's genius as a tactician, and his 
 ability to perceive with absolute clearness and correctness, 
 even in the excitement of the crisis of a battle, what the actual 
 situation was, and what ought to be done, brought victory to 
 his standards. The battle was trained principally by artillery, 
 which was always Napoleon's favorite arm; but the victory
 
 244 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 could not be pushed as far as would otherwise have been the 
 case, because of lack of sufficient cavalry. Some military writ- 
 ers consider the victory of Lutzen as one of Napoleon's great- 
 est achievements, because he gained it with an army most of 
 whom were raw and half-disciplined conscripts, and many of 
 whom were boys. 
 
 Napoleon then occupied Dresden, threw a bridge over the 
 Elbe River, and marched across it to attack the Russians and 
 Prussians at Bautzen, where they were drawn up on a range 
 of hills. The whole of the 20th of May was spent in manoeu- 
 vers and partial combats, and on the 21st the actual battle 
 was fought. Napoleon began it by simultaneous attacks 
 against both flanks of the enemy; but, owing to the great 
 length of the line and the many intervening hills, he could not 
 watch the movements, or order the troops under his own imme- 
 diate command to advance, until he knew that the movements 
 on the flanks were successful. While waiting, and being over- 
 come by fatigue, he fell asleep. At length, hearing fresh 
 sounds of artillery, his attendants woke him; whereupon Na- 
 poleon, noting the direction of movement of the sounds, real- 
 ized that the attack was successful, and instantly ordered his 
 center forw^ard. This attack decided the fate of the battle; 
 but the enemy retreated in order, leaving neither cannon nor 
 prisoners in the hands of the French, an accomplishment 
 they were able to effect partly because with their superiority 
 in cavalry, and partly because of their position. 
 
 Napoleon had won two successes ; but his army, even his gen- 
 erals were tired of war ; all of Europe was at war against him, 
 and it was apparent that he would have to get some important 
 reinforcements or be defeated. Under these conditions, he 
 agreed to an armistice on June 4, which was later extended 
 until August 10. He received reinforcements, and reorgan- 
 ized his army ; but so did his enemies, and to a greater degree. 
 On August 12 Austria declared war, and announced her adhe- 
 sion to the alliance of Russia and Prussia. Napoleon took his 
 station at Dresden, and prepared to meet attacks which he
 
 NAPOLEON 245 
 
 divined were to come from three directions, the south, the east, 
 and the north: the main army of the allies, under Schwartz- 
 enburg, from the south; the Prussians, under Blucher, from 
 the east ; and the Swedes, under Bemadotte, from the north. 
 The allies had about half a million men, and Napoleon about 
 half of that number. 
 
 The allies by this time had learned much about Napoleon's 
 tactics, and their generals had become veterans in war. One 
 thing they had learned was that it was much better to fight 
 against Napoleon's lieutenants than against Napoleon. They 
 could fight against his lieutenants on equal terms; but no one 
 of their generals could equal Napoleon in that extraordinary 
 rapidity and correctness of decision and action which enabled 
 him to move large forces more rapidly than they, and concen- 
 trate them more quickly at given points. 
 
 Napoleon sent Oudinot and then Ney to meet the army of 
 the north, but they were successively defeated. Napoleon 
 himself advanced to the east against Blucher. The main army 
 of the allies at once advanced from the south, expecting to get 
 to Dresden before Napoleon could return; but Napoleon de- 
 feated Blucher, returned with incredible swiftness to Dres- 
 den, and on August 26 and 27 hurled them back. Unfortu- 
 nately for Napoleon, he was taken suddenly ill at the end of 
 August 28, and had to delegate the pursuit of the allies to 
 Vandamme. Thereupon Vandamme was himself enveloped 
 and destroyed, and the fugitives escaped. 
 
 Napoleon's army was now worn down to a dangerous 
 degree, and he was threatened by three powerful enemies. 
 Against these enemies he exercised all his marvelous tactical 
 abilit}' in a succession of endeavors to catch one force alone, 
 but without success. Finally he ascertained that Schwartz- 
 enburg was circling around from the south to get between him 
 and Paris ; and that Blucher was marching to join Bernadotte 
 north of Napoleon, and with Bemadotte to join with 
 Schwartzenburg. Realizing his danger, Napoleon first sent 
 Murat to Leipzig to hold Schwartzenburg while he advanced
 
 246 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 upon Blucher. But he could not catch Blucher. Therefore, 
 on October 12, after some days of perplexity, he reversed his 
 plan, and marched to Leipzig, hoping to catch Schwartzen- 
 burg before he was joined by Bernadotte and Blucher. On 
 October 15 he entered Leipzig, and on October 16 engaged 
 Schwartzenburg in battle. But he was too late, for during 
 the battle Bernadotte and Blucher came up and made their 
 junction, and Napoleon had to fight with all. He was not 
 tactically defeated in the terrible battle of Leipzig that fol- 
 lowed on the 18th ; but, since he was not tactically successful, 
 he was strategically defeated, because he needed a tactical 
 victory to save him from a future defeat, surrounded as he 
 was b}^ enemies superior in^force. On the 17th, instead of 
 retreating, which he then might have done in safety, he sent a 
 letter to the Austrian emperor, hinting at concessions. But 
 it was too late : his enemies realized that they had him in their 
 power. His overtures were spurned, and the allies, now re- 
 inforced, defeated him strategically on the 18th, and forced 
 him to retreat toward Paris. 
 
 At this time all France except Napoleon was bent on peace. 
 Had Napoleon not lost his ability to estimate a military situ- 
 ation with correctness, had he not become poisoned with suc- 
 cess, and had he been really a patriot he could have saved his 
 throne then by agreeing to the offers of the allies made in 
 December, 1813, and February, 1814. In fact, when in Paris 
 on February 4 he did give Caulaincourt carte hlanche to treat 
 with the allies; but unfortunately, he soon afterward heard 
 that the allies had divided their forces, and he seized what he 
 thought was an opportunity to destroy the force under 
 Blucher, then marching on Paris. At first he was successful, 
 for with incredible swiftness and force he gained three victo- 
 ries in three battles fought on February 10, 11, and 14, and 
 stopped Blucher 's advance. But the conditions were too un- 
 favorable for even the genius of Napoleon to triumph over; 
 and after seven weeks of wonderfully swift and skilful move- 
 ments, directed with the strategic intention of cutting the
 
 NAPOLEON 247 
 
 allies' communications behind them, he learned that the in- 
 vaders were nearing Paris, and turned to fight a decisive bat- 
 tle before its walls. But the enemy had three days' start, and 
 before Napoleon could reach Paris, Paris had surrendered. 
 This she did on March 31. 
 
 Even then, this immeasurably strong and resolute man re- 
 fused to admit that he was beaten, and tried to continue the 
 struggle. But his marshals would no longer support him, and 
 they induced him to accept terms of unconditional surrender 
 which they had tried in vain to have made more gentle. On 
 April 6 Napoleon renounced the thrones of France and Italy 
 and five days later the treaty was signed awarding him the 
 sovereignty of the little island of Elba, a body-guard, and an 
 income. Napoleon drove south through France, through a 
 bitterly resentful population and took up his residence in Elba. 
 
 The government of Louis XVIII started in with a policy 
 that was so flavored with the surroundings and atmosphere of 
 the old regime as to offend most of the people almost from the 
 beginning, and to force on them the suspicion that all the evils 
 which they had fought against in the Revolution were about to 
 return, and that all the sacrifices of the nation had been made 
 in vain. So great a spirit of antagonism to the government 
 did this bring about that in less than a year Napoleon was 
 able to leave Elba and make a triumphal journey through 
 France, not only unopposed, but acclaimed, and to take up his 
 residence in the Tuileries. This he did on the evening oJ 
 March 20, 1815, borne in on the shoulders of the populace, the 
 king and his court having that morning fled. 
 
 Napoleon proceeded with his customary energy, skill, and 
 success, to establish himself anew upon the imperial throne. 
 To make himself the more secure he assumed the role of lover 
 of peace and liberty, caused a new constitution to be framed, 
 secured an overwhelming vote in favor of its adoption, and on 
 June 1 took the oath to obey it, in the presence of a great 
 assembly. 
 
 But Europe rose in arms. Great Britain, Austria, Russia,
 
 248 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 and Prussia bound themselves each to put 150,000 men in the 
 field. Their forces soon began to gather. The first gathering 
 was in Belgium, where in June the Duke of Wellington, com- 
 manding a mixed force of English, Dutch, Belgians, and Han- 
 overians, and Blucher, commanding a homogeneous Prussian 
 
 
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 From Creasy's "Fifteen Decisive Battles of 
 
 the World." 
 By permission of Harper & Brothers. 
 
 army, held a long and straggling line. Napoleon by this time 
 had gathered an army of about 125,000 men, which was infe- 
 rior to the combined forces of Wellington and Blucher, but 
 which he nevertheless decided to attack. True to his strategic 
 principles, he acted with the greatest promptness, realizing the 
 necessity of beating Wellington and Blucher before the Rus- 
 sians and Austrians should get into the field, and also of de- 
 feating either Wellington or Blucher before they could unite. 
 With this end in view, he took his station near Charleroi 
 on the northern side of the Sambre River, but on June 15, 
 though he had hoped to be there on the 14th. He was ready 
 to give battle on the 16th ; but by this time, his approach had
 
 NAPOLEON 249 
 
 become known, the English and Prussian armies were draw- 
 ing together, and by noon Blucher had concentrated 90,000 
 men at Ligny, about fifteen miles northeast of Charleroi, while 
 Wellington was hurrying troops to Quatre Bras, about fifteen 
 miles northwest of Ligny and perhaps twenty miles north of 
 Charleroi. 
 
 Brussels was about thirty miles north of Quatre Bras. 
 Napoleon did not know that Blucher was so near and in such 
 force, and supposed that the Prussians were widely dispersed. 
 Accordingly, he split his army into two divisions, giving the 
 left wing to Ney, with orders lo push on toward Quatre Bras, 
 and the right wing to Grouchy, with orders to advance toward 
 Ligny ; while he kept command of a large reserve, with which 
 he could reinforce either Ney or Blucher, as circumstances 
 might direct. His reckoning was upset when Grouchy found 
 Blucher present in such force ; but Napoleon immediately 
 made up his mind to destroy Blucher, assisting his force and 
 Grouchy 's with additional troops, which he ordered Ney to 
 send. Napoleon was successful in his battle with Blucher at 
 Ligny on June 16, but not sufficiently so — largely because a 
 detachment which he had ordered Ney to send, Ney called 
 back before it had joined in the battle. Napoleon then over- 
 estimated the disaster to Blucher which he had inflicted, and 
 so failed to exert as much promptness as otherwise he would 
 have exerted in advancing toward Wellington, who had fallen 
 back to a position at Waterloo about half way between Brus- 
 sels and Quatre Bras, and about twelve miles west of Wavre, 
 to which Blucher had retired. This was unfortunate for him 
 under the circumstances ; for Blucher had not retreated east- 
 ward in disorder, as Napoleon imagined, but northward and 
 toward Wellington rather than away from him. The result 
 was that during the battle of Waterloo, on June 18, Blucher 
 reinforced Wellington, and turned the scale decisively and 
 forever against Napoleon. 
 
 Napoleon saved republicanism in France, and therefore in 
 Europe; and, though he left France smaller than he had
 
 250 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 found her, and impoverished in every way, he left the French 
 a great nation, and not a conquered nation, as they would 
 have been if Napoleon had not lived. Many people blame 
 Napoleon for all the Napoleonic wars. Those people forget 
 that, although Napoleon was responsible for the later wars, 
 the original wars were caused by the French Revolution, and 
 that the Revolution was caused by the misgovernment of 
 France and the intelligence and spirit of the French people, 
 who rose in revolt against it. 
 
 The career of Napoleon furnishes perplexing illustrations 
 of the facts that a m-an who is primarily a great strategist 
 may leave no permanent monument to his strategy, but many 
 imperishable monuments to his statecraft; that a man may 
 practise strategy (or any art) with surpassing skill, and yet 
 contribute nothing novel or useful to the art itself ; that a man 
 may gain all that the world can give, and yet close his life in 
 prison, an exile from the world ; that a man 's life as a whole 
 may be an ignominious failure regarded from a personal 
 standpoint, and yet be successful in a high degree, regarded 
 from the impersonal standpoint of achievement and the ad- 
 vancement of the human race ; that a man may be almost des- 
 titute of morality of any kind, and yet do more good to the 
 world than harm ! 
 
 The ultimate influence of a man of genius does not depend 
 so much on the personal character of the man himself as on 
 the cause in which his genius is enlisted. 
 
 Fortunately for the world, the efforts of men of genius have 
 generally been enlisted on the side of the establishment of 
 good government and the attainment of the greatest good for 
 the greatest number.
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 FROM NAPOLEON TO MOLTKE 
 
 AFTER Napoleon, no great strategist appeared until 
 the conflict between Prussia and Austria in 1866 
 showed that another genius had stepped upon the 
 stage of war. The greatest writer on strategy, however, 
 Clausewitz, lived in this interval of time. 
 
 During the years between there were several wars, but only 
 two that, from the standpoint of strategy, can be called im- 
 portant. These were the Crimean "War, between Russia on 
 ^ne side and Turkey, France, and England on the other, in 
 1854-55, and the Civil War in the United States, which was 
 waged in 1861-65. Neither war was fruitful of great devel- 
 opment in strategy, though both were marked with those in- 
 stances of valor and endurance, and that persistence of efl^ort 
 of large bodies of men acting together in a common cause, that 
 have marked most wars. Of the two, the Civil War was the 
 more important historically, both in political results and 
 strategical illustrations. 
 
 The Civil War broke out in the early part of 1861. From 
 the dawn of history to the end of the Napoleonic wars, there 
 had been a gradual and progressive change in the methods of 
 warfare, due to the gradual increase in the number and the 
 power of weapons of offense and the material adjuncts of 
 defense. The spears and bows of the savage had been devel- 
 oped gradually, but only as bows and spears; for the cross- 
 bow was only a bow, and the catapult and ballista did not 
 differ greatly from it. The rude skins and hides used on 
 shields and in protecting covering for the body had been 
 gradually developed into armor and shields of steel; the use 
 
 251
 
 252 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 of stone and bone and then of bronze in weapons had ^own 
 into the use of steel; battering-rams for occasional use had 
 been devised and used, and horses had come into employment 
 in the form that we call cavalry. The greatest single change 
 that had taken place in warfare had been caused by the in- 
 vention and employment of the gun. 
 
 That this had made a considerable change in warfare cannot 
 be denied; nevertheless the change that it made in strategy 
 or tactics was not so great as some imagine, because it merely 
 increased the velocity and penetrative power of projectiles 
 and the range over which they could be fired. The armies of 
 Napoleon, like the armies of Thutmose, moved by means of the 
 legs of men and horses ; the men and horses in Napoleon 's day 
 could march no faster than those in the days of Thutmose, 
 and both the men and horses were subject to identical limita- 
 tions as to distances that could be traversed, and had identical 
 requirements in the way of food. Almost the only radical 
 difference in Napoleon 's time lay in the use of the gun and the 
 necessity for making and providing powder. There was far 
 less difference between the conditions of warfare on land in 
 the days of Thutmose and those in the days of Napoleon, than 
 between the conditions in the days of Napoleon and the condi- 
 tions now. 
 
 On the sea far greater changes had come about. There was 
 greater difference between the vessels of war in Napoleon's 
 day and the vessels of war in Thutmose 's day than there was 
 between the armies of those epochs. In Egypt's palmy days, 
 though occasional trips were made from Egypt or Phoenicia 
 even into the Atlantic, such trips were rare indeed; but in 
 Napoleon's time large fleets of men-of-war cruised over all 
 the world, showed the flags of their countries in the great 
 naval and commercial harbors, and transported large armies 
 over great ocean spaces. 
 
 Between the time of Napoleon and the breaking out of our 
 Civil War in 1861, the use of the steamship, and of mechanism 
 generally, had become established in all civilized countries
 
 FROM NAPOLEON TO MOLTKE 253 
 
 and incorporated in the daily life. The electric telegraph 
 had also come into employment; iron and steel of excellent 
 quality were produced in quantities ; steamships traversed the 
 ocean and railroad trains traversed the land. Muskets and 
 cannon had increased in size and power, but otherwise had not 
 changed materially. 
 
 Because of the progress occasioned by the development of 
 mechanism, the Civil War was fought under conditions that 
 were more different from the conditions in the days of Napo- 
 leon than were the conditions of Napoleon from those of 
 Thutmose. In the days of Napoleon, and before, the speed 
 of movement, and in almost an equal degree the speed of con- 
 veying information and giving instructions, were governed 
 by the speed of movement of a man or a horse; but in the 
 Civil War large masses of troops were transported by railroad 
 trains, and information and instructions were transmitted in- 
 stantaneously by the electric telegraph. These new condi- 
 tions profoundly influenced the tactical movements of troops, 
 and the conditions under which the strategical plans of each 
 side were made and carried out. Nevertheless, we see the same 
 strategical efforts to outflank the enemy; to threaten his com- 
 munications, his supplies, and his way of retreat; to confuse 
 him by feints; to ascertain his weak point, and to launch a 
 powerful blow against that weak point, that we see in the 
 operations of Napoleon and Thutmose, and in those of the 
 other strategists who waged war in the intervening centuries. 
 
 The weakest point in the situation at the beginning of the 
 Civil War was on the Southern side. It was in the line of 
 communication between the Confederacy and Europe, by 
 which the Confederacy could send cotton to Europe, and re- 
 ceive in return from Europe arms, munitions, and supplies. 
 This point was made weaker by the fact that the Confederate 
 Navy was inferior to the Union Navy. The Confederates en- 
 deavored to overcome this inferiority by rebuilding and ar- 
 moring the large steam frigate Merrimac, realizing that if 
 they could produce a warship that could easily whip any
 
 254 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 other, she and similar vessels could overcome the wooden ves- 
 sels of the Union navy and prevent any blockade of the South- 
 em coast. They realized also that the Mcrrimac might even 
 shell such cities as New York and Boston, and even go up the 
 Potomac River to Washington. 
 
 On the very day of her departure from the Norfolk Navy 
 Yard, March 8, 1862, the Merrimac destroyed almost immedi- 
 ately two large Union men-of-war, the Cumherland and the 
 Congress. This created a profound and justifiable alarm on 
 the Union side, and a corresponding' elation on the Confederate 
 side; but on the following day the Monitor defeated the Mer- 
 rimac and ruined the whole Confederate scheme. It did even 
 more, because it made it possible for the North to do to the 
 South just what the South had intended to do to the North. 
 It did even more still ; because it showed to the world that the 
 United States had produced a warship that was superior to 
 any other then existing in the world, and that could be re- 
 produced in large numbers in a short time, and therefore pre- 
 vent any foreign power from enforcing any inimical policy 
 on our coast. The result was that Great Britain did not 
 recognize the Confederacy, a fairly close blockade of the 
 Southern coast was maintained, and the Confederate army 
 was so enfeebled from lack of munitions and supplies, and the 
 Confederate government was so embarrassed from lack of 
 money, that the South had to give up the struggle. 
 
 The profound effect of the battle between the Monitor and 
 the Merrimac was not realized at the time; with the result 
 that the main effort on the Union side was devoted, not to 
 breaking down the weakest part, the Confederate line of 
 communication to Europe, but to breaking down the strongest 
 part — the Confederate army. Both sides fought the war with 
 splendid courage, energy, and devotion, and in the latter part 
 of the war with great tactical and strategical skill. During 
 the major part of the war, however, most of the participants, 
 even among the higher officers, were so inexperienced and un- 
 trained (especially on the Northern side), and the generals
 
 FROM NAPOLEON TO MOLTKE 255 
 
 were so interfered with (especially on the Northern side) by 
 the President and by an ignorant and impulsive public opin- 
 ion, that they were somewhat in the position that a pugilist 
 would be in, if some bystander or bystanders were continually 
 interfering with the movements of his ainns and legs. 
 
 The result was that a war which under proper strategical 
 direction would have been decided in a very short time, and 
 with a comparatively slight loss of blood and money, dragged 
 along for four heart-rending years.
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 MOLTKE 
 
 MOLTKE was made chief of staff of the Prussian 
 army in January, 1858. He was then nearly fifty- 
 eight years old, but he was just beginning his career. 
 
 We have confined our attention thus far in this book to the 
 great geniuses in strategy. It has been noticeable that the 
 subordinate commanders under those great geniuses fre- 
 quently sufi'ered reverses when they acted on their own re- 
 sponsibility, and not under the immediate direction of their 
 superiors. Napoleon said, in speaking of his generals: 
 ' ' They do not understand my system. ' ' 
 
 The reason doubtless was that those great geniuses saw 
 something in war that their subordinates did not see: they 
 saw something that they had not been trained to see, that no- 
 body told them to see, and that they were able to see solely 
 with that peculiar mental eye which is part of the make-up of 
 — a genius. 
 
 The sole training of soldiers and sailors of aU grades, up to 
 the time of Moltke, had been in wielding the weapons, and in 
 manceuvering the organizations of men who wielded the 
 weapons that existed at the time they lived. A soldier, for 
 instance, had been taught and trained to handle his spear or 
 bow or sword or musket; a colonel had been taught and 
 trained (mostly by experience) to manoeuver his regiment of 
 soldiers ; a captain in the navy to manceuver his ship ; a gen- 
 eral to manoeuver his division, corps, or army ; and an admiral 
 to manoeuver his squadron or fleet. 
 
 The training in armies and navies has always been better 
 than the training in any other walks of life, for the reason 
 
 256
 
 MOLTKE 257 
 
 that they have been the only vocations for which a nation has 
 selected boys and youths, and given them a system of training 
 that began in the impressionable period of youth and lasted 
 throughout their lives ; and the result has been that when Alex- 
 ander or Caesar or Nelson or Napoleon has told a subordinate 
 commander to take his command to a certain place, and to ma- 
 nceuver it in such and such a way against such and such an 
 enemy, the duty has been skilfully performed. 
 
 Yet, if one of those subordinate commanders found himself 
 in a situation in which he himself had to decide alone where to 
 take his force, and when, and what to do with it when he got 
 there, he found himself confronted with a situation that he 
 had not been trained to meet. He was in a situation some- 
 what like that in which a soldier would be who had been 
 trained to be merely a skilful and accurate marksman, and 
 who could be relied upon to hit a target, provided that lie A^as 
 told what target to fire at and its distance, if he found him- 
 self on a battlefield and compelled to rely on himself to select 
 the best target and ascertain its distance. 
 
 Moltke seems to have conceived the idea that this difficulty 
 could be obviated by giving officers careful training in tactics 
 and strategy as well as in drills, manoeuvers, transportation, 
 etc. ; and that, though it was ordinarily supposed that the only 
 means by which an officer could receive training in tactics and 
 strategy was in actual war, that nevertheless a great deal could 
 be accomplished by giving officers theoretical instruction, and 
 imparting to them what Mahan so well calls "preparedness of 
 mind." 
 
 To this end, he instituted schools of instruction in which 
 officers were exercised at solving hypothetical problems. For 
 instance, you are at such and such a place, commanding a 
 force composed of so and so; the instructions you have re- 
 ceived have been to accomplish so and so; you receive unex- 
 pected information that a force of the enemy, consisting of 
 so and so, was seen at a certain place at a certain time, march- 
 ing in such and such a direction. What do you do ? Moltke
 
 258 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 devoted himself, as Colonel Maude expresses it, to the "adap- 
 tation of strategical and tactical methods to changes in arma- 
 ment and the methods of communication, to the training of 
 staff officers in accordance with the methods worked out, to 
 the perfection of the arrangements for the mobilization of the 
 army, and to the study of European politics in connection 
 with the plans for campaign that might become necessary. ' ' 
 
 Moltke evidently realized in 1858 that the tremendous im- 
 provements produced in the civilized world by the progress 
 of the phj'sical and mechanical arts and sciences, especially 
 in the matters of transportation, communication, and im- 
 proved weapons, would have so enormous an influence in the 
 next war that the nation that entered the war better prepared 
 to utilize those improvements than her enemy would have a 
 great advantage. He also realized that, though a savage 
 tribe could get ready for war in a very short time, and though 
 even Napoleon did not need a long time to get an army ready, 
 yet that in order to prepare the more highly specialized 
 weapons of 1858, in order to adapt railroad sj'stems to the 
 transportation of armies, in order to organize a military tele- 
 graph service, in order to do all the things necessary in so 
 thorough a way that, when war should be declared, he would 
 have an actual machine actually ready for his purpose, a long 
 and laborious period of preparation in advance would be re- 
 quired. 
 
 It has often been said that Moltke cannot be compared 
 favorably with strategists like Napoleon, for the reason that 
 in the three wars in which he was the dominant figure he 
 never found himself in situations such as Napoleon often 
 found himself in, and from which Napoleon extricated him- 
 self by means of those brilliant and rapid combinations and 
 manoeuvers that made Napoleon Bonaparte the Napoleon of 
 history. This doubtless is true ; and, in fact, it can hardly be 
 imagined that a man seventy years old, as IMoltke was in the 
 war between France and Prussia, would be capable of those 
 feats of rapidity and endurance that characterized the youth-
 
 MOLTKE 259 
 
 ful Alexander and Napoleon. But it may be pointed out that 
 the reason why Moltke never found himself in such situations 
 was that Moltke had prevented them from existing. Moltke 
 introduced into the art of war an element almost entirely new 
 — the element of peace strategy, the element of utilizing in 
 peace the strategic, tactical, and logistical skill of officers, in 
 preparing plans of campaign for all probable situations or 
 combinations of situations; so that, when war broke out, in- 
 stant action was possible — and not only instant action, but 
 orderly action; no part interfering with any other part, but 
 all the parts working together, as in any other machine, to 
 the attainment of one purpose. 
 
 The result was that, when war broke out with France in 
 1870, we do not see on Prussia's part any of that confused 
 and disordered excitement, any of that hysterical enthusiasm, 
 any of that wild rush, that had characterized all wars before, 
 except possibly the wars of Julius Casar. On the contrary, 
 we see a tremendous engine start smoothly when the button 
 is pressed, and operate smoothly until all is over. Then we 
 see it quietly come to rest again. There was a neatness, an 
 artistic finish, in Prussia's wars with Austria and France that 
 had never been seen before. There was also a promptness in 
 finishing the wars that had never been seen before. Many 
 wars of immeasurably less importance, and immeasurably in- 
 ferior in the number and power of the forces engaged, have 
 dragged along for years ; like our Civil War, and in a greater 
 degree the Thirty Years' War that made Germany almost a 
 wilderness. But, in the war with Austria, the Prussian army 
 defeated the Austrian decisively in seventeen days after war 
 began; and, in the war with France, the Prussians defeated 
 the French at Sedan and received the surrender of Napoleon 
 III in forty-five days. 
 
 It must not be supposed that in either war Prussia was 
 fighting a foe supposed to be inferior. Austria was a nation 
 with a larger population, spread over a larger area, and with a 
 greater historic past. France was governed by a nephew of
 
 260 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Napoleon the Great, and was esteemed by the world at large 
 to be the greatest military country on the earth. Both coun- 
 tries had large armies, and these armies were supposed to be 
 highly trained. But they had been trained under old meth- 
 ods, and Moltke's army had been trained under new methods. 
 The soldiers of Austria and France were as brave and endur- 
 ing as Moltke's, and the officers were as skilful in manoeuver- 
 ing the various units. The real difference lay where the real 
 difference has always lain, when decisive victories have been 
 gained over equal or superior forces : it lay at the top. The 
 difference lay in the mind that prepared Moltke's army and 
 the minds that prepared the Austrian and French armies. 
 
 The condition of the Austrian and French armies was like 
 the condition in which most men get in middle life, a condi- 
 tion of approximate automaticity. By middle life most men 
 have "learned their jobs," and proceed thereafter to act al- 
 most automatically. Most men leave school with a feeling of 
 relief because they will not have to study any more. The 
 greatest single difficulty that the Torpedo Station at Newport 
 had to meet, and later the War College, was the reluctance of 
 officers to "go to school." This reluctance is easily under- 
 stood, for the reason that studying a new thing always re- 
 quires a degree of mental effort that is very considerable; 
 while the degree of mental effort required later in utilizing 
 the knowledge gained is much less, because it is of an inferior 
 order. The mental effort required of a learner at the piano is 
 greater than the mental effort exercised afterward by even 
 the most expert pianist. The difference between the two is 
 related to the difference between the scientist and the artist. 
 For, while it is true that the work of the artist is the only 
 work that bears fruit that is apparent, — while it is true that 
 it is the finished product, the beautiful painting, the perfected 
 invention, the decisive battle, that appeals to men, — yet never- 
 theless the mental effort that originated each is the greatest 
 mental effort involved in the entire performance, and under- 
 lies each one as its foundation.
 
 MOLTKE 261 
 
 Like most foundations, also, it is hidden from view and 
 usually forgotten. 
 
 Moltke seems to have realized this; but, whether he did or 
 not, he actually saved the minds of the officers of the Prussian 
 army, or rather those of a certain selected group, from auto- 
 maticity. He kept their minds in good working order, and 
 along a line that he himself prescribed; with the result that 
 all of these officers became strategists and tacticians (though, 
 of course, in vary-ing degrees), and could be relied upon to 
 carry out a task, if simply told what the task was, and without 
 the need of receiving detailed orders or of remaining under 
 supervision. This permitted decentralization to a degree un- 
 known before, and enabled each officer in high command to 
 trust each subordinate to carry out the details of his indi- 
 vidual task, and to devote his own time and attention to the 
 great problem before him as an entirety. 
 
 The first war in which Moltke became engaged after assum- 
 ing the duties of chief of staff was the one with Denmark, 
 about the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Into the merits 
 and demerits of the Schleswig-Holstein controversy, out of 
 which no country emerged with any honor, and only Prussia 
 emerged with any material gain, it is not within the province 
 of this book to enter. As a result of the controversy, Prussia 
 and Austria combined against Denmark, and sent an army of 
 45,000 men into Holstein, which is south of Schleswig, as 
 Schleswig is of Denmark. Moltke was a firm believer in the 
 efficacy of enveloping operations, and an advocate of using 
 them whenever a preponderance of force or of skill rendered 
 them safe. He therefore recommended a plan that entailed 
 a movement to cut off the retreat of the Danes, pointing out 
 that a mere victory over them would enable them to retreat to 
 the islands of Alsen and Funen, where they would be better 
 fitted to resist, because they could receive the assistance of 
 their fleet. He was not sent with the invading army, however, 
 and his plan was mismanaged in execution, with the result 
 that the Danes did retreat to the islands. Moltke was sent to
 
 262 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the front on April 30, as chief of staff to the commander-in- 
 chief; and, on his advice, a system of operations was at once 
 instituted, whereby the island of Alsen was attacked and cap- 
 tured. As a consequence, a treaty of peace was soon after- 
 ward signed, by which the King of Denmark ceded all his 
 claims on Schleswig and Holstein, as well as Lauenberg, to the 
 Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia. 
 
 But the resulting situation was obviously only a temporary 
 one, because it aggravated the already disturbed condition 
 among the German states, and brought about additional causes 
 of friction between Austria and Prussia. Austria had long 
 regarded Pinissia as a too aggressive minor state, and had re- 
 sented her rapidly rising importance, with its threat against 
 Austria as the dominant power of Germany; while Prussia 
 regarded Austria as an enemy of the movement to unite Ger- 
 many. During the two years that followed the peace with 
 Denmark, actual enmity rapidly developed between Prussia 
 and certain North German states on one side, and Austria and 
 the South German states on the other side. 
 
 Even in Prussia, however, and even in Berlin, and even in 
 the army, there was no enthusiasm for war with Austria, and 
 little approval of the aggressive policy of the government. 
 But the government, inspired by Bismarck, persisted even to 
 the point of increasing the army and ordering supplies and 
 munitions without authority from Parliament. On the Aus- 
 trian side, on the contrary, while perhaps there was no en- 
 thusiasm, there was perfect unity of purpose: for both Aus- 
 tria and the people of South Gennany were highly embittered 
 against the Prussians. The fact, therefore, that Prussia tri- 
 umphed in the war, while the forces on the two sides were 
 virtually equal, was not because of national unity on the one 
 side and lack of it on the other, but because of superior 
 strategy — Moltke 's strategy. 
 
 On June 15, 1866, Prussia demanded of Hanover, Hesse, 
 and Saxony that they should restore their armies to a peace 
 standard and remain neutral, under penalty of losing their
 
 MOLTKE , 263 
 
 independence. These countries rejected this demand, and the 
 next day Prussia invaded all of them. This act began the 
 war. Moltke had acquired considerable prestige in the war 
 with Denmark, with the result that his plan of operations 
 against Austria was accepted. Like most great plans, it was 
 simple in principle, but worked out carefully in detail; the 
 details conforming to the general plan, and the general plan 
 being of such a nature that practical details could be worked 
 out successfully, and yet conform to the general plan. 
 
 By this general plan, the Prussians were to advance at once 
 toward the south into Bohemia, on the northern edge of Aus- 
 tria, with the major part of their force, leaving only a com- 
 paratively small force of about 48,000 men to deal with the 
 states of North and South Germany. To carry it out would 
 be to violate what has been deemed by some to be a cardinal 
 principle of strategy — that one must not leave an enemy in 
 his rear. But Moltke 's intimate knowledge of all the military 
 and political conditions enabled him to perceive that, in the 
 situation as it actually existed at the time, taking into ac- 
 count the inferior training, equipment, and unreadiness of 
 the Austrian army, he could probably inflict a fatal blow on 
 Austria in a very short time, and that then the hostile Ger- 
 man states would be very glad to yield. 
 
 One feature of the campaign against Austria that strate- 
 gists and writers on strategy are apt to ignore is the fact that 
 the Prussians had had the foresight to adopt, some time be- 
 fore, a new invention — a breech-loading "needle-gun"; and 
 that the Austrians had not had that foresight. Strategists 
 and writers on strategy have, in most cases, shown a tendency 
 to belittle the effect of mechanical and scientific improvements 
 in weapons and appliances, and to give all the credit for vic- 
 tories to the manoeuvering of the forces engaged, both in the 
 strategical operations preceding battle and in the tactical 
 operations during battle. This is natural, of course; but, at 
 the same time, it may be pointed out that, inasmuch as the 
 only effect of a gun in the hands of a soldier is to hit an
 
 .264 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 enemy with its bullet, a ^n in the hands of a soldier which 
 is twice as good as the gun in the hands of his opponent makes 
 him almost as effective as two against that other soldier; and 
 that, since to get a virtual preponderance in ability to hurt 
 an enemy is the ultimate aim of strategy, the adoption of an 
 improved weapon is just as much an effort of strategy as is 
 the adoption of any line of march, or combination of marches, 
 or other movements in actual operations. The adoption of a 
 new weapon in time of peace is, of course, an operation of 
 preparation strategy, rather than of war strategy; but the 
 fruit of Moltke's life was to make preparation strategy more 
 important than war strategy. 
 
 The Prussians invaded Saxony at once, occupying Dresden 
 and Leipzig on June 18 and 19. They then advanced in five 
 principal columns, which later combined in three, to form the 
 Army of the Elbe on the west, the First Army under Prince 
 Frederick Charles in the center, and the Second Army under 
 the Crown Prince on the east. The armies advanced over 
 difficult mountain paths, but were not molested until they 
 emerged from them into the plains of Bohemia. The forces 
 on both sides were about 250,000, the Prussian being some- 
 what more numerous, and much better armed, supplied, or- 
 ganized, and trained. A number of minor battles occurred 
 in the latter part of June, caused by unsuccessful attempts 
 of the Austrians to prevent the Army of the Elbe from unit- 
 ing with the First Army, and to prevent the junction with 
 them of the Second Army. But on June 30 the Army of the 
 Elbe and the First Army, with the King of Prussia person- 
 ally in command, appeared before the enemy, who were con- 
 centrated near the fortress of Koniggratz and the village of 
 Sadowa; while the Second Army, under the Crown Prince, 
 was close at hand to the eastward. 
 
 The Austrian army was drawn up with its back to the 
 Elbe. Their position had been carefully strengthened, but 
 its selection seems somewhat unwise, from the fact that the 
 river was directly behind them and made retreat more diffi-
 
 MOLTKE 265 
 
 cult for the Austrians if they should be defeated. About 
 midnight of July 2, the Prussian king resolved to attack 
 early on the following day, and sent an order to the Crown 
 Prince to assault the enemy's right flank as soon as prac- 
 ticable — about two o'clock in the afternoon, as estimated. In 
 the early forenoon the Prussian main force, commanded by 
 the king himself, consisting of the Army of the Elbe and the 
 First Army, made a determined frontal attack, which con- 
 tinued without intermission until noon, by which time the 
 supply of artillery ammunition was running low; and yet no 
 ground had been gained. The situation of the Prussians was 
 much like that of the English under Wellington at Waterloo, 
 when Wellington exclaimed: "Oh, for night or Blucher!" 
 And, as at Waterloo, the looked-for reinforcements did come 
 in on the enemy's right flank, and turned a doubtful and ter- 
 rible contest into a decisive victory. 
 
 The victory was so decisive that Austria, the acknowledged 
 dominant power of Germany for many centuries, signed an 
 armistice only nineteen days afterward, confirmed it on August 
 23 by the Treaty of Pragaie, consented to the dissolution of 
 the South German Confederation and virtually accepted all the 
 changes proposed by Prussia. Prussia forthwith formed the 
 North German Confederation, which made all the North Ger- 
 man states virtually her subject states, with their foreign af- 
 fairs under her control and their military forces under her 
 command. 
 
 The next war in which Moltke was concerned was one with 
 France. Napoleon III was emperor, and maintained himself 
 in power by his skilful and unscrupulous catering to the 
 vanity and love of pleasure of the French people, especially 
 the mob. The brilliant success of the French armies in the 
 Crimean and Italian wars, the beauty of the empress, and the 
 splendor of the Exposition held in Paris in 1867, at which the 
 emperor entertained the Emperor of Russia and the King of 
 Prussia as his guests, convinced the French (and almost the
 
 266 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 whole civilized world) that France was the greatest nation in 
 Europe and Napoleon III the greatest sovereign. 
 
 Outwardly France was a very great and highly civilized 
 nation, and the French army the equal of the armies of Napo- 
 leon the Great. But the government was corrupt, the people 
 kept in good humor by false pretenses, and the whole struc- 
 ture ready to fall at the first determined blow. The French 
 people, believing the government strong and the army the best 
 in the world, thirsted for glory and looked with jealousy on 
 the rising power of Prussia. The emperor felt the same jeal- 
 ousy; but it is hardly conceivable that he did not know that 
 the German army was superior to the French, both in num- 
 bers and training. It is certain that Moltke knew it. 
 
 Into the details of the quarrel that brought about the rup- 
 ture it is not necessary to enter here. The only fact that need 
 be stated is that on July 19, 1870, France, the entire nation 
 enthusiastically concurring, declared war against Prussia. 
 
 Moltke had been making plans for a war with France ever 
 since 1857, and had perfected arrangements for the mobiliza- 
 tion and transport of the army to the frontier between France 
 and Germany, which were revised annually to meet all the 
 changing conditions that were continually taking place; with 
 the result that when, on July 15, he received the secret order 
 to mobilize the army, his plans were fully ready. They were 
 followed afterward, with only such changes, from time to 
 time, as the situations that arose demanded. But so well had 
 Moltke been able to divine what the French opening move- 
 ments would be, by reason of his intense study of the problem 
 in all its phases, that the changes necessitated were few and 
 easily made. 
 
 On the other hand, France, despite the military ardor of 
 her people, their intense desire for glory, their hatred of Prus- 
 sia, and their knowledge that a war must come some day, was 
 wholly unprepared. The French Minister of War reported to 
 the emperor that the army was ready "to the last button of
 
 MOLTKE 267 
 
 the gaiters." Subsequent events proved that the army was 
 not ready, and that he did not even know that it was not 
 ready ; while the phrase he used showed that his thoughts had 
 been more engaged by the material requirements of the army 
 than by its strategic plans of operations. 
 
 The emperor assembled 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at 
 Strasburg, and 50,000 at Chalons, the three places constituting 
 points of a triangle on the frontier east of Paris ; Metz being 
 the northern point, Strasburg the southern or southeastern 
 point, and Chalons the western point. Moltke concentrated 
 nearly the entire German army in one locality south of 
 Mayence. Napoleon's general plan was to go in person with 
 the 150,000 from Metz to Strasburg, combine with the 100,000 
 there, and then, with the combined force of about 250,000, to 
 invade Germany in the vicinity of Strasburg. The plan of 
 IMoltke was to resist the invasion that he expected would most 
 probably be in that vicinity; and, in case he was ready to 
 strike sooner, to advance into France, and then to wheel his 
 entire force to the right and north, so as to drive the French 
 north and break their communications with Paris. The Prus- 
 sian army consisted of three armies, aggregating considerably 
 more than 400,000 men, besides which were about 100,000 that 
 were left behind in Prussia, in case Austria should seize the 
 opportunity to attack. 
 
 The Prussian plans were so much the more complete, and 
 the arrangements for carrying them into effect were so much 
 the more thorough, that the result became apparent before a 
 battle had been fought ; for the Prussians advanced actually 
 into France before the French had got their forces together. 
 The first important battle was on August 6 at Worth, a few 
 miles inside the frontier on the French side, in which the 
 crown prince, in command of the Third Army, attacked the 
 forces of Marshal MacIMahon before MacMahon had collected 
 them all in readiness, and defeated him so thoroughly that 
 the retreat became a rout, and many French fled into Stras- 
 burg. This battle was brought on prematurely, and not ex-
 
 268 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 actly according to Moltke's plans; for he had desired that 
 MacMahon's retreat should be cut off, and MacMahon forced 
 to surrender. On the same day, a battle was fought at 
 Spicheren, farther to the north and west, which also resulted 
 favorably to the Prussians, and which, with the battle of 
 Worth, effectually prevented any junction between MacMahon 
 and Bazaine. The emperor was then with Bazaine at Metz; 
 but he left Metz on August 14, and joined MacMahon. 
 
 The Germans now made a general advance of all three 
 armies into France. Bazaine endeavored to retire from Metz 
 toward Paris; but the First Army overtook his rear guard, 
 and brought on a battle which, though minor, destroyed Ba- 
 zaine 's last opportunity to retreat, without exposing his flank 
 to attack. Meanwhile the Second Army had crossed the 
 Moselle River, on which Metz was situated, and moved oppo- 
 site Metz. A series of operations now took place, which cul- 
 minated near Gravelotte, on August 18, in one of the most 
 important battles of history. In this battle the armies had 
 changed the directions in which they faced, the French facing 
 westward and the Germ'ans facing eastward; a change that 
 made the prospect for the defeated party more difficult than 
 it would otherwise have been. The French fought the battle 
 with their accustomed and hereditary ardor and courage ; but 
 they were utterly routed nevertheless; their army being 
 broken and defeated, and Bazaine forced to withdraw his 
 army of nearly 200,000 men within the walls of Metz. It is 
 to be noted that Moltke had manceuvered his armies in such a 
 way as to force Bazaine into Metz, in order that he might 
 hold him securely there, and have the rest of his army free 
 to march to Paris. 
 
 Moltke (or more exactly the king on Moltke's recommenda- 
 tion) detailed about 160,000 men to detain Bazaine in Metz, 
 and, with the rest of the army, prepared to advance toward 
 Paris. But the amazing news then came that MacMahon was 
 marching by a northerly route to the relief of Metz, thus leav- 
 ing the way to Paris entirely open : a plan devised by the
 
 MOLTKE 269 
 
 Prime Minister Palikao, indorsed by the Empress Eugenie, 
 and opposed strongly by MaciMahou! As soon as Moltke be- 
 came convinced that the information, though incredible, was 
 nevertheless correct, he determined to move to the north in- 
 stead of on Paris, and attack MacMahon before he could unite 
 with Bazaine. In this he was successful, with the result that 
 MacMahon was brought to battle near Sedan on September 1, 
 while virtually surrounded, and forced to surrender his entire 
 command. The French, repulsed wherever they attempted to 
 break through the ring around them, were driven into the 
 little fortress of Sedan, the emperor among them. He sur- 
 rendered with the rest on September 2. 
 
 On August 31 and September 1 Bazaine made a desperate 
 effort to break the German line round Metz, in order to join 
 MacMahon ; but the sortie was unsuccessful, and he was com- 
 pelled to withdraw again into what had become the prison of 
 his army. 
 
 The war had now been decided, but the French people were 
 not sufficient!}^ versed in strategy to realize it; and an awful 
 amount of useless loss of life resulted. The Germans marched 
 on Paris and besieged it, meanwhile maintaining the siege of 
 Metz, realizing that the fall of both cities was merely a ques- 
 tion of time. The French showed an amount and a degree of 
 skill and courage and devotion that would have been of the 
 highest possible value, if exercised during the years preceding 
 the war, but which now were worse than useless, and resulted 
 merely in a series of disastrous minor battles, and in humilia- 
 tion and suffering of all kinds. 
 
 Metz surrendered on October 27, the surrender including 
 173,000 men and three marshals. The people of Paris de- 
 fended their city, and the other people of France harassed 
 the besiegers until January 26, 1871, when hostilities were 
 suspended. On January 28 an armistice was signed, and on 
 February 26 a preliminary treaty of peace. 
 
 The extraordinary quickness and completeness of the Ger- 
 man victory was due almost wholly to the superior training
 
 270 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 in strategy of the German officers. Henderson says : * ' Even 
 the French generals of divisions and brigades had had more 
 actual experience [in war] than those who led the German 
 army corps. Compared with the German rank and file, a 
 great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were 
 veterans, and veterans who had seen much service. Their 
 chief officers were practically familiar with the methods of 
 moving, supplying, and manoeuvering large masses of troops; 
 their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers. And yet, 
 the history of modern warfare records no defeats so swift and 
 complete as those of Koniggratz and Sedan. The great host 
 of Austria was shattered in seven weeks ; the French imperial 
 army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days ; and to all 
 intents and purposes the resistance they had offered was not 
 much more effective than that of a respectable militia. But 
 both the Austrian and the French armies were organized and 
 trained under the old system. Courage, experience, and pro- 
 fessional pride they possessed in abundance. Man for man in 
 all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to 
 their foes. But one thing their generals lacked, and that was 
 education for war. Strategy was almost a sealed book to 
 them." Also: "Moltke committed no mistake. Long be- 
 fore war had been declared, every possible precaution had 
 been made. And these included much more than arrange- 
 ments for rapid mobilization, the assembly of superior num- 
 bers completely organized, and the establishment of maga- 
 zines. The enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, and effi- 
 ciency had been submitted to a most searching examination. 
 Every possible movement that might be made, however un- 
 likely, had been foreseen; every possible danger that might 
 arise, however remote, discussed and guarded against." Also : 
 "That the Prussian system should be imitated, and her army 
 deprived of its monopoly of high efficiency, was naturally 
 inevitable. Every European state has to-day its college, its 
 intelligence department, its schools of instruction, and its 
 course of field manoeuvers and field firing. ' '
 
 MOLTKE 271 
 
 The unprecedented despatch with which this war and the 
 war with Austria were settled, the long period of time during 
 which the causes operated that brought on the wars, the facts 
 that the armies had had nothing to do with bringing on the 
 wars, and that the wars had been brought on by the people 
 themselves, bring to our minds the analogy so often pointed 
 out between the usefulness of surgery and the usefulness of 
 war. In both cases, causes that are harmful to healthful liv- 
 ing bring about an unhealthful condition, and in both cases 
 this unhealthful condition is removed (or the attempt is made 
 to remove it) by means that are very painful and very bloody, 
 and that leave the patient in a weakened condition for a con- 
 siderable time thereafter. If this analogy be at all correct, 
 we are forced to admit that any means that can quicken the 
 surgical operation in one case, or the progress of war in the 
 other case, must be beneficial. 
 
 There seems no reasonable doubt that Moltke did more to 
 shorten wars than did any other man in history. It is true 
 that the shortening of the wars has been paid for by long and 
 laborious and expensive periods of preparation. Whether the 
 shortening of w^ars is worth the cost or not, we have no exact 
 means of determining; but those people who inveigh against 
 the "burden of militarism" should, in all fairness, realize 
 that, without that burden, the world would be in the position 
 that it was in when protracted wars like the Hundred Years' 
 War and the Thirty Years' War cursed the human race.
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 PROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 
 
 SINCE Moltke, no genius in the art of strategy seems to 
 have arisen, and no great contributor to its science has 
 been recognized, though several wars have occurred. 
 It is possible, however, that, after the records of the present 
 war shall have been gone over carefully, it may be found that 
 a strategist really great was on one side or the other. 
 
 The first important war, from the standpoint of strategy, 
 was that between China and Japan, which was waged in the 
 years 1894 and 1895. It is important mainly because it illus- 
 trates the fact that, if a nation has the military instinct and 
 character, it can in a short while attain proficiency in the 
 technical arts of modem war and become a great fighting 
 force. Only forty years before, China and Japan had been 
 on about the same plane in the elements of material civiliza- 
 tion, but the Chinese nation was much the more numerous. 
 The Japanese, however, not having gone through protracted 
 periods of peace, had not lost their mental alertness, and had 
 long realized the danger to their national existence that was 
 indicated by the powerful men-of-war from Europe and Amer- 
 ica that visited the Orient. 
 
 The result was that immediately after Commodore Perry's 
 visit and virtual ultimatum in July, 1853, the Japanese be- 
 stirred themselves to acquire education and training, espe- 
 cially in the mechanic arts. They bestirred themselves with 
 an energy, a foresight, and a clearness of purpose that have 
 no parallel in history ; so that, when they finally came to war 
 with China in 1894, they had an army and a navy that was 
 much better in equipment and training than China's. The 
 Chinese fought as bravely as the Japanese, but they suffered 
 
 272
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 273 
 
 a humiliating defeat, nevertheless. The most important bat- 
 tle was a naval battle off the Yalu River on September 17, 
 1894. This battle showed what several modern naval battles 
 have shown — that, because of the superior concentration of 
 power in ships as compared with armies, decisions are won 
 more quickly, and with much smaller loss of life. Some 
 Chinese vessels, escaping to the naval base at Wei-Hai-Wei, 
 were followed by the Japanese. The forts there being taken 
 soon by the Japanese troops, the Chinese vessels were all cap- 
 tured, and the issue of the war decided. The treaty of peace 
 was signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. 
 
 The next important war was that between the United States 
 and Spain, which broke out in 1898. The cause was the bad 
 condition of affairs in Cuba, and the cause of this was the 
 tyrannical misrule of Spain. Not only was the condition bad 
 to such a degree as to make Cuba an international nuisance, 
 especially to the United States, but it continued year after 
 year, and without any reasonable hope of betterment. The 
 reason why the conditions continued so long was the bad 
 strategical handling of the Spanish troops on the island; for 
 there were more than enough troops to keep the insurgents in 
 subjection. But a good strategical handling of the troops 
 could not be expected under a government so inefficient as that 
 of Spain, for inefficient government and inefficient strategy 
 usually go together. The war was precipitated by the explo- 
 sion of the U. S. S. Maine in Havana harbor : another illustra- 
 tion of the fact that, while the causes of yiiost wars are power- 
 ful and profound, they often lie passive until some exciting 
 occurrence acts like a spark to gunpowder. 
 
 Few wars more unwise than this war, on the part of Spain, 
 have ever occurred. Not only was Spain inferior to the 
 United States in naval power, but she was at a great strategi- 
 cal disadvantage, because Cuba was nearer to the United 
 States than to herself. It is inconceivable that the govern- 
 ment of Spain had so little strategical knowledge and insight 
 as not to know that a war with the United States would be
 
 274 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 disastrous to Spain ; but it is certain that the people of Spain 
 were so ignorant of strategy that they did not know it. It 
 VMS fundamentally because of lack of strategical knowledge 
 among the Spa7iish people that the nation went to war. 
 
 The Spanish government itself endeavored to keep at peace ; 
 but, like many other governments, they were unable to do 
 this because of the attitude of the pe'ople. The position of 
 the Spanish government was somewhat like that of Napoleon 
 III in 1870. These two illustrations and many others show 
 the great danger to a country of ignorance of strategy among 
 its people. A grasp of the elements of strategy by the people 
 of a country is just as important to the safety of the country, 
 ■as a whole, as is a knowledge of the elements of hygiene to 
 the health of its individuals. 
 
 The first battle was a naval battle in Manila Bay on May 1. 
 This battle, from the standpoint of strategy, was one of the 
 most interesting in history; not because it illustrated good 
 strategy, but because it illustrated bad strategy. I was pres- 
 ent at the battle as navigator of the Petrel; and, as I had 
 taken up my station aloft, I had a perfect view of all that 
 happened. We had expected that the Spanish fleet would be 
 found in such a position in the bay that it would be supported 
 by the guns on the shores of the bay. We knew th-at there 
 were four large guns, much more powerful than any in our 
 fleet, mounted in elevated positions, supported by many other 
 guns, and possessed of ideal facilities for quick and accurate 
 aiming; and we knew also that the combined power of the 
 shore batteries and the ship batteries was far in excess of the 
 power of all we had. But, to our amazement and delight, we 
 found that the Spanish fleet, which of itself was inferior to 
 ours, had anchored in a part of the bay where the guns of the 
 city could not help them in the slightest ! The result was the 
 destruction of the Spanish fleet and the consequent helpless- 
 ness of Manila. This does not mean helplessness against our 
 artillery fire, but helplessness against an effective blockade, 
 which Dewey immediately instituted.
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 275 
 
 The ardent and methodical attack of Dewey was strategi- 
 cally and tactically correct. This, combined with our better 
 gunner)^ and our superiority in force, was the cause of the re- 
 sult. That all the Spanish ships should have been sunk, while 
 almost no damage was received by the American ships, has 
 excited great astonishment; but it is not a matter for aston- 
 ishment at all. As the tables in Chapter IV show, a force 
 originally superior becomes increasingly superior, and to a 
 degree depending on the degree of original superiority. At 
 the battle of Manila, the principal part of our superiority in 
 force was superiority in gunnery. Astonishment has often 
 been expressed that we hit the Spanish ships so many times, 
 while they hit us so seldom : astonishment has been expressed 
 that it should have been possible to make so many misses as 
 the Spanish did. But it should be remembered that a ship 
 occupies but a small part of the field of view, and that the 
 chance of hitting it is extremely small, unless a gun is pointed 
 at it correctly; and also that there are thousands of ways in 
 which to point a gun incorrectly, but only one way of point- 
 ing it correctly. This may seem a digression from the subject 
 of strategy, but really it is giving an illustration; for the 
 study of strategy, like the study of gunnery, is simply a 
 study of how to find the only right path to pursue out of 
 countless wrong pa,ths. 
 
 Spain sent a fleet across the ocean to Cuba in response (it 
 must be) to the feeling that "someone must do something"; 
 for what that fleet could do effectively on the coast of the 
 United States against a superior fleet is not clear now, and it 
 could not have seemed clear even then to the Spanish govern- 
 ment. On May 19 the Spanish fleet went into Santiago har- 
 bor, where it was blockaded for several weeks by an American 
 fleet of superior power under Admiral Sampson. Finally it 
 was ordered out by the Spanish government, though its only 
 possible fate was complete destruction. Complete destruction 
 it received — about an hour being sufficient to accomplish it. 
 This was on July 3.
 
 276 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 These two battles virtually decided the war, though subse- 
 quent small land operations in both the Philippines and Cuba 
 were undertaken afterward, to give the coup de grace. 
 
 The main results of the war, brief and comparatively 
 bloodless as it was, were as important as those of any war in 
 history, and much more important than the results of many 
 wars that were long and bloody ; and they supply an illustra- 
 tion of the important fact that, as a rule, the ultimate conse- 
 quences of short and decisive wars have been the most impor- 
 tant. The main single result of the Spanish war was that the 
 United States emerged from the position of a second-rate 
 power into the first rank among the nations of the earth. By 
 reason of the facts that the United States was the richest 
 country in the world (except Great Britain), that it had long 
 stood in the first rank in the matter of individual intelligence 
 of the people, and that its form of government was ideally 
 higher than any other, it cannot truthfully be denied that the 
 rise of the United States was an advantage, and a very great 
 advantage, to mankind. Though there were several factors 
 that led to our success in the war, it is obvious that the great- 
 est single one was strategy. 
 
 An interesting fable was bom shortly after the battle of 
 Manila, to the effect that at the subsequent bombardment of 
 the city, on August 13, the British fleet placed itself between 
 the German and the American fleets in the harbor. The in- 
 teresting part of the fable is not the fable itself, but the fact 
 that belief in it exists broadcast to-day. No such occurrence 
 happened; and yet, I am credibly informed that the story 
 has been accepted by historians in general and incorporated 
 permanently in history ! 
 
 The war with Spain was followed, on the part of the 
 United States, by a war with the Filipinos, who had been 
 grievously oppressed by the Spaniards, and now s'eized the op- 
 portunity, as they thought, to get their independence. Be- 
 cause the United States government did not decide quickly 
 whether or not to take the Philippines, the insurrection as-
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 277 
 
 sumed large proportions, and was consequently quelled with 
 difficulty and considerable loss of life. The main argument 
 against taking them was that mere conquest did not give us 
 the right. Of course, we realized finally that, if we did not 
 assume the governnment of the islands, the various savage 
 tribes would fight against each other for it, and establish a 
 condition of barbarism in place of the comparative civiliza- 
 tion of the Spanish rule; whereas we would give them a gov- 
 ernment much more civilized than that of the Spaniards. 
 
 The next war (October, 1899, to May, 1902) was between 
 Great Britain and the Boer Republic in South Africa — 
 caused, as many wars have been, by a difference in opinion as 
 to what was right and what was wrong. In this case, the 
 difference was in regard to certain matters in dispute be- 
 tween the government of the Boer Republic and certain sub- 
 jects of Great Britain who resided in the Boer Republic and 
 owned property there. Since there was no other way to de- 
 cide the question except the oldest way, that of resorting to 
 force, force was resorted to. 
 
 It may be pointed out, in passing, that when any individual, 
 in even the most enlightened nation, is compelled to do a thing 
 that he thinks he ought not to be compelled to do, or to refrain 
 from doing a thing that he thinks he has a right to do, force 
 is resorted to just as much as when two nations go to war. 
 
 Great Britain had the advantage, of course, of immeasur- 
 ably greater strength ; but the Boer Republic had the strategic 
 advantage in the fact that Great Britain had to send troops 
 and supplies over the great ocean distance between her and 
 South Africa. It was inevitable that Great Britain should 
 triumph in the end; but the war lasted for more than two 
 years and a half. The war is interesting from the fact that, 
 in the early part of the war, the strategy of the Boers was 
 better than that of the British, although the British forces 
 were* mostly those of the regular army and navy. The trouble 
 with the British forces seems to have been that the officers in 
 the higher commands were suffering from what I beg le^ve to
 
 278 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 call automaticity ; that is, they acted automatically along the 
 line in which they had been trained, and used methods suitable 
 to war with armies like themselves and in the close!}' popu- 
 lated districts of continental Europe, instead of devising 
 methods suitable for fighting the rapidly moving and fre- 
 quently dispersed guerrilla bands of the Boers. They man- 
 oeuvered in somewhat the same way as General Braddock did, 
 in fighting the Indians in North America, during the Seven 
 Years' War. The Boers, on the contrary, adopted methods 
 that were efficacious under the conditions that actually 
 existed. 
 
 This war is interesting strategically, therefore, as exempli- 
 fying a truth which is often overlooked — that each contestant 
 in a war always has, or ought to have, a definite mission to 
 accomplish, and that fighting is merely a means of accomplish- 
 ing it. It is the task of strategy to ascertain definitely what 
 is the actual mission ; then to estimate the actual difficulties in 
 the way of accomplishing it, and the actual facilities at hand 
 for accomplishing it ; then to make the decision as to what to 
 do; and then (and not until then) to inaugurate operations. 
 
 The next war was the so-called Boxer War, one of the most 
 peculiar wars of history. It began and ended in 1900, and 
 was caused by a number of acts on the part of certain Euro- 
 pean powers, and the consequent revolt of a comparatively 
 small number of Chinese against it. Russia had taken Port 
 Arthur and much adjacent territory; Germany had leased 
 Kiaochau, virtually by compulsion, and gained great conces- 
 sions in the Province of Shantung ; France was seeking in- 
 creased privileges in parts of China near Tonquin ; and Great 
 Britain had obtained a lease from China of Wei-Hai-Wei on 
 the south shore of the gulf of Pechili, and thus gained com- 
 mand of the water approach to Pekin. Prince Tuan, an 
 athlete, and the head of a large following in China who had 
 taken up athletic exercises and called themselves Boxers, 
 headed a revolt. Following customs of great antiquity, the 
 Boxers committed a number of atrocities. Finally they made
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 279 
 
 an attack on the foreign legations at Pekin, in which even the 
 Chinese imperial troops eventually took part. 
 
 The civilized world rose in alarm, and fortunately took 
 prompt action. Very considerable forces were sent to the 
 vicinity of Pekin ; and in August the allied troops, consisting 
 of Americans, British, Germans, French, Austrians, Italians, 
 and Japanese, under the command of the German Field Mar- 
 shal von Waldersee, marched on Pekin. Pekin was cap- 
 tured on the 14th, and a note agreeing to the demands of the 
 powers was signed by the Chinese authorities in December. 
 
 From the standpoint of strategy, the most interesting single 
 fact this war brought out was the admirable condition, train- 
 ing, and general eifectiveness of the Japanese army. Before 
 this war it had been known, in a general way, that the Japa- 
 nese were bestirring themselves to acquire military and naval 
 skill; but it was not at all realized that they had achieved 
 success. It seemed to be the consensus of opinion that, of all 
 the forces of the great civilized countries that marched to- 
 gether on Pekin, the Japanese were better than any other 
 except the German. This fact has peculiar interest when 
 viewed in confiection with the extraordinary lack of strategi- 
 cal foresight of the Russians when they engaged in their war 
 with Japan, onl}' four years later. 
 
 A very important provision of the treaty between China 
 and Japan, which closed the war in 1895, was that the Liao- 
 tung peninsula, including Port Arthur, should go into the 
 possession of the Japanese. Russia, France, and Germany 
 prevented this from being accomplished; and finally Russia 
 herself secured possession of the Liao-tung peninsula, and es- 
 tablished at Port Arthur, at its southern end, the most power- 
 ful fortress in the Orient^ and one of the most powerful in the 
 world. At the same time, the Russians gradually spread 
 themselves through Manchuria, strengthened their naval base 
 at Vladivostok, and completed a line of railway from St. 
 Petersburg through Siberia and Manchuria to Vladivostok,
 
 280 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 with a branch line running southwest from Harbin to Port 
 Arthur. 
 
 Meanwhile, on January 30, 1902, an agreement was made 
 between Great Britain and Japan, whereby it was mutually 
 agreed that if either party became involved in a war in safe- 
 guarding the interests that both parties recognized in main- 
 taining the independence and territorial integrity of China 
 and Corea, the other party should remain neutral, and en- 
 deavor to prevent any third part 3^ from joining in hostilities 
 against its ally; but that, should a third party join in such 
 hostilities, the other party would come to its ally's aid. This 
 treaty evidently strengthened Japan's position in case of a 
 war with Russia ; and, as such a war was obviously coming, it 
 possibly had that intention. 
 
 Negotiations were begun by Japan with Russia, in 1903, 
 with a view to inducing Russia to cease her continuing en- 
 croachments in Corea; Corea being so close to Japan that 
 Japan very properly considered that Russia's increasing in- 
 fluence there was a menace to her national security. Russia 
 adopting the policy of polite evasion and delay, Japan in-, 
 structed her ambassador at St. Petersburg, on February 6, 
 1904, to ask for his passports. This was not a declaration of 
 war, but it was an announcement that friendly diplomatic 
 relations had been broken, and it ought to have roused Russia 
 to instant warlike preparation. It did not. 
 
 As the empire of Japan was contained within the Japanese 
 islands, it is obvious that if the Russian government had cor- 
 rectly estimated the strategic situation, it would have realized, 
 long before matters had come to this crisis, that the most ef- 
 fective attack against Japan would be a naval attack ; because 
 the Russian navy was much larger than the Japanese, and if 
 it brought the Japanese navy to battle and defeated it, Russia 
 would gain complete command of the sea between Japan and 
 the mainland of Asia, and render Japan helpless against Rus- 
 sian aggressions in Manchuria and Corea, for the reason that
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 281 
 
 she would be unable to send any troops across the water. At 
 this time th-e Russian naval force in Asia was approximately 
 equal to that of the Japanese, consisting principally of seven 
 battleships, seven protected cruisers and twenty-five destroyers 
 in Port Arthur, three large armored cruisers and a smaller 
 cruiser at Vladivostok, and one large protected cruiser, the 
 Variag, with the gunboat Korietz at Chemulpo. Thus Russia 
 had her main force divided into three parts, a highly inefficient 
 arrangement, when war broke out. Japan had six battleships, 
 eight armored cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers and nine- 
 teen destroyers, besides smaller craft, all grouped together. 
 
 The Japanese immediately took advantage of the situation, 
 with correct strategic insight and promptness, for they de- 
 spatched three expeditions almost immediately : a naval ex- 
 pedition against the Russian fleet anchored outside of Port 
 Arthur; a naval expedition against the Russian ships at 
 Chemulpo, and an accompanying convoy of troops, for landing 
 there and initiating military operations. All three expedi- 
 tions were successful. 
 
 On the night of February 8-9 ten Japanese destroyers 
 made a determined torpedo attack on the unsuspecting Rus- 
 sian squadron at Port Arthur, with the result that the battle- 
 ships Retvisan and Csarevitch and the cruiser Pallada were 
 torpedoed and so seriously injured that a long time in port 
 was needed to repair them. These battleships were the most 
 powerful in the squadron, and the Pallada was a vessel of 
 6630 tons displacement. On the following day Admiral Togo 
 engaged the other vessels of the Russian squadron at long 
 range, and succeeded in inflicting considerable damage; but 
 he wisely refrained from getting under fire of the Russian 
 guns on shore. Meanwhile, a squadron of Japanese vessels, 
 under Vice-Admiral Uriu, arrived at Chemulpo and sank the 
 Russian protected cruiser Variag and the gunboat Korietz in 
 a battle in the offing, while the transports landed their troops. 
 These troops at once marched to Seoul, the capital of Corea, 
 and captured it. 
 
 The war between Russia and Japan is one of the most in-
 
 989 
 
 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 struetive wars of histor}': because of the great distance sep- 
 arating one of the belligerent countries from its fighting 
 forces, the large forces engaged on both sides, and the fact 
 that land and naval forces cooperated to a degree and with an 
 effectiveness never known before. It is one of the most im- 
 portant wars because it established on a firm basis, and for 
 the first time in many thousands of years, the people of a 
 non-Aryan race in the first rank of the nations of the world. 
 From the standpoint of strategy, it is interesting for two rea- 
 sons: the fact that the conditions, occasioned by the use of 
 new weapons, methods, and appliances, were more different 
 from the conditions of previous wars than had ever hap- 
 pened before ; and because it is one of the best illustrations in 
 history of the defeat of a superior force by the use of good 
 strategy against bad strategy. 
 
 The fundamental strategic error of the Russian government 
 was in underestimating, first, the military and naval power of 
 the Japanese, and, second, the probability of war. These two 
 errors even the most loyal friend of Russia must admit were 
 wholly inexcusable, and caused wholly inexcusable loss of 
 life, money, and prestige. It is impossible also to justify the 
 continued aggressiveness of the Russians in Manchuria and 
 Corea, especially when these aggressions were followed by a 
 failure properly to support them after they had been chal- 
 lenged. Both the aggressions and the failure to support 
 them show the same kind of overbearing and yet fundamen- 
 tally weak character that Spain showed after the days of 
 Charles V. A nation that is really strong, like a man who is 
 really strong, is rarely brutal and aggressive. Where strong 
 countries have been aggressive, they have always supported 
 their aggressions with adequate force, as Rome did; and in 
 virtually all cases they have established governments over the 
 victims of their aggressions that were better in every way 
 than the governments thej^ had had before. Nations and men 
 that are both brutal and weak are not only despicable but 
 harmful.
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 283 
 
 Both Russia and Japan now began to rush troops to eastern 
 Manchuria: Russia by way of the trans-Siberian railroad, 
 Japan by way of the Sea of Japan and Corea. Having com- 
 mand of the sea, Japan landed troops on the western coast of 
 Corea to the number of about 45,000, under General Kuroki, 
 and marched them north unresisted to the Yalu River, which 
 forms the northwestern boundary of Corea between it and 
 Manchuria. This was the First Army. Across the Yalu 
 River was a comparatively small force of Russians. Instead 
 of withdrawing this small force. General Kuropatkin, the 
 Russian commander-in-chief, ordered it to hold the line of the 
 Yalu. The result was a bloody battle, in which the Japanese 
 attacked the Russians both in front and on the left flank, in- 
 flicting a decisive defeat. This was the first land battle of 
 the war. It did not have a great effect physically, but it did 
 morally; because it proved to the world, and especially to the 
 Russians, that it was possible for the Japanese pagans ("mon- 
 keys," the Russians called them) to defeat European Chris- 
 tians in a modern war. The battle occurred on the first of 
 May, 1904. 
 
 Japan now went ahead with preparations for sending its 
 Second Army to Manchuria, and meanwhile endeavored by 
 naval operations to secure the immobility of the Russian fleet 
 in the harbor of Port Arthur, and prevent any interference 
 by it with Japanese transports carrying supplies and troops. 
 To this end, three attempts were made to block the narrow 
 exit from the harbor. These attempts were made under cir- 
 cumstances of the greatest difficulty and danger ; and the first 
 two were so disastrously unsuccessful that men other than 
 men of great determination would have been deterred. On 
 the night of Ma}^ 2, however, the harbor was partially blocked 
 by sinking five steamers in the channel. 
 
 During the following night the Second Japanese Army, 
 under General Oku, began to land at Pitszewo, on the eastern 
 side of the peninsula of Liao-tung. After landing, on May 5, 
 the Second Army pushed westward, driving the Russians be-
 
 284 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 fore them. Finally, on the 26th of May, a great battle was 
 fought at Kinchou, and the town was captured. Just south 
 of Kinchou is a narrow neck of land, a mile and three quarters 
 broad, that connects the promontory with the mainland. It is 
 low on each side; but near the center a high ridge rises that 
 culminates in a point about 350 feet high, called Nanshan, 
 An army holding this point blocks passage either way. The 
 position was strongly fortified with all the most modem means 
 to protect it against attack both night and day. It was fi- 
 nally taken by the Japanese, who then pressed forward and, 
 on May 30, took possession of Dalny, a base of great value for 
 prosecuting attack on Port Arthur, which lay southwest. 
 
 It being evident now to the Russians that the Japanese 
 plan was to take Port Arthur, they sent a Russian army of 
 about 35,000 men to recover Kinchou and Nanshan, and then 
 go to its assistance. In consequence a battle took place at 
 Telissu, on June 14, in which the Japanese, under Oku, out- 
 flanked the Russians and drove them northward with great 
 loss in personnel and material. 
 
 Meanwhile, the two Japanese battleships Hatsuse and 
 Yashima struck mines off Port Arthur, and sank. Since the 
 Japanese had only six first-class battleships, this was a terrible 
 loss; and the strategic effect on both sides of knowledge that 
 it had happened would have been so considerable that the 
 Japanese determined to prevent that knowledge from spread- 
 ing. This they succeeded in doing, though they could not 
 prevent rumors from getting abroad. It was not known defi- 
 nitely until the end of the war that this disaster had occurred. 
 
 On August 10 Admiral Vitgeft left Port Arthur with his 
 squadron, with the intention of forcing his way to a junction 
 with the armored cruiser squadron at Vladivostok. A battle 
 between him and Togo ensued that afternoon, which was 
 brought to a crisis by the bursting of a Japanese shell against 
 the conning-tower of the flagship Csarevitch. This killed the 
 Russian admiral, jammed the steering-gear of the ship, and 
 created such confusion in the squadron that it promptly re-
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 285 
 
 treated back to Port Arthur, leaving the Japanese in full 
 command of the sea. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian squadron at Vladivostok, consisting 
 of three large armored cruisers, made a number of excursions 
 unto the Sea of Japan, sinking and capturing Japanese mer- 
 chantmen and successfully eluding Kamimura's squadron. 
 Finally Admiral Kamimura caught them, on the 14th of 
 August. A running fight ensued, in which the Russian ship 
 Rurik was sunk, and the other two were so seriously injured 
 that they were unable to take any part afterward in the war. 
 
 Immediately after the capture of Dalny, the Japanese had 
 begun to pour troops into it, with the result that they soon 
 had three divisions there, under the command of Nogi, and 
 constituting the Third Army. They then landed the Fourth 
 Army, under Nozu, at Takushan on the south coast of Man- 
 churia, between the Liao-tung peninsula and the mouth of the 
 Yalu River, and between the first and second armies. By the 
 close of June the First, Second, and Fourth Armies, under 
 Field Marshal Oyama, were fully deployed and ready to ad- 
 vance to the north, to clear the Russians from the littoral and 
 force them into the mountains of Manchuria. Five heavy 
 engagements soon resulted, fought between the 26th of June 
 and the last day of July, in which the Japanese acted uni- 
 formly on the offensive and were uniformly victorious. 
 
 Then followed the great battle of Liao-yang, which lasted 
 from August 25 to September 3, in which the Russians had 
 about 220,000 engaged and the Japanese 200,000. The Rus- 
 sians being strongly intrenched, the Japanese made little im- 
 pression on their front, and finally attempted to turn their 
 left flank. Kuropatkin sent a strong counter-flanking force; 
 but (mainly on account of incompetence on the part of the 
 Russians) the operation was unsuccessful. The Japanese, in 
 planning this campaign, had expected, it seems, that Nogi's 
 army would have finished its task at Port Arthur before the 
 campaign developed thus far, and would have been able to 
 contribute a strong effort on the Japanese left flank, and pre-
 
 286 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 vent any such counter-flanking operation as Kuropatkin had 
 attempted. This shows the strategic importance of hokling 
 on to a position like that of Port Arthur, even though it may 
 eventually fall, provided that the maintenance of the siege 
 necessitates the employment of a sufficient force of the enemy. 
 
 After his unsuccessful counter-flanking attempt, Kuropat- 
 kin withdrew north to Mukden. On the 9th of October he 
 started an offensive with about 250,000 men, attempting a 
 flanking operation with his right flank in order to get posses- 
 sion of Liao-yang; but, after a week's fighting, he was driven 
 back with enormous losses of all kinds. He set forth again 
 on January 25, 1905, but was defeated at the battle of Hei- 
 kautai and driven back. 
 
 Meanwhile the siege of Port Arthur was continued; but it 
 was not until July 31, 1904, that the Japanese captured the 
 positions commanding the fortress and advanced close enough 
 to make a direct assault. Bombardment began on August 7; 
 but the defense had now so strengthened their positions that 
 the Japanese accomplished little, and were compelled to resort 
 to stereotyped siege operations. Finally, on November 30, 203 
 Meter Hill was taken, and a post of observ^ation thus secured 
 from which the Japanese heavy artillery could be accurately 
 directed against the Russian warships in the harbor. The 
 Russians, in consequence, had to sink those warships. The 
 surrender of Port Arthur followed, on January 2, 1905. 
 
 After the battle of Heikautai, Kuropatkin received con- 
 tinuous and enormous reinforcements from Russia, thanks to 
 the skill and energy of the only Russian who emerged from 
 the Russian war with great renown, Prince Khilkoff, the 
 Minister of Ways and Communications. The Japanese real- 
 ized, in consequence, the necessity of defeating Kuropatkin 
 as decisively as possible and as quickly as possible; with 
 the result that they finally brought him to battle at Mukden. 
 Kuropatkin 's force was probably in excess of 300,000, and 
 protected by defenses of the most complete and effective 
 character. The Japanese army probably numbered nearly
 
 FROM MOLTKE TO TOGO 287 
 
 400,000; a new army, the Fifth, having been added, and 
 Nogi 's army having come up from Port Arthur. Nogi 's army 
 was put by Marshal Oyama, the commander-in-chief, into 
 a position on the left flank, but well to the rear, in the de- 
 sire to prevent knowledge of its presence coming to the Rus- 
 sians. The armies now advanced, the Fifth Army on the Jap- 
 anese right attacking the Russian left flank, and the Third 
 Army under Nogi awaiting the order to sweep around the 
 Russian right flank. Wlien the center and flank attacks had 
 fully developed, Nogi swept around, and descended on Muk- 
 den from the northwest, seriously threatening the enemy 's line 
 of retreat. IMeanwhile, Kuropatkin, not knowing of Nogi's 
 presence, had sent a large force against the Japanese Fifth 
 Army, and could not recall them to oppose Nogi until too late. 
 The result was that Kuropatkin, after extricating his forces 
 with great difficulty, retreated north of Mukden (March, 
 1905). 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian fleet, under Admiral Rozhdest- 
 vensky, was coming out to contest the command of the sea 
 with the Japanese fleet under Togo. The Russian fleet con- 
 sisted of about forty vessels, counting supply vessels, etc., and 
 it seems doubtful whether the fleet could ever have got out to 
 the Orient if the governments of all the countries in whose 
 harbors the fleet anchored had strictly observed their obliga- 
 tions as neutrals. Togo took up a position of waiting near the 
 island of Tsushima, at the southwestern entrance to the Jap- 
 anese Sea, realizing that the Russian fleet must go by that 
 position or else go through the straits of Tsuguru, which 
 easily could be mined. Sending out his scouts, he received 
 information of the enemy's fleet at 5 a.m. on the 27th of 
 ]\Iay. In the battle that resulted the Russians had eight bat- 
 tleships, the Japanese five, one of which was almost useless; 
 the Russians had three coast-defense ships, the Japanese one ; 
 the Russians had nine destroyers, the Japanese twenty; the 
 Russians nine cruisers and the Japanese eight armored cruis- 
 ers and ten protected cruisers, etc. There is no recognized
 
 288 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 standard by which to compare the two forces; but I person- 
 ally am inclined to the opinion that the Japanese superiority 
 in small vessels did not compensate for their inferiority in 
 the matter of battleships. 
 
 The result of the battle was one of the most disastrous and 
 speedy defeats in history, only two of the Russian vessels 
 escaping. The fate of the battle was decided in not more than 
 an hour, though the battle as a whole was not concluded until 
 the following day. The obvious cause of the speedy defeat 
 was the fact that the Japanese, by reason of superior gunnery, 
 hit the Russians more often than the Russians hit them. 
 While there are many reasons for the Japanese superiority 
 in gunnery, the principal single reason was that the Japanese 
 had had the foresight and energy to equip their guns with the 
 new naval telescope sight, the invention of the author of this 
 book, and to train the men in its use ; while up to that time 
 the Russians had not done so. 
 
 This is only one illustration among millions of the para- 
 mount advantage of always being prepared for every probable 
 emergency.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 ANTE BELLUM 
 
 AFTER the war between Russia and Japan had ended, 
 army and navy officers the world over began to spec- 
 ulate as to the nations between which the next war 
 would be. As Germany had not been at war since 1871, 
 while each of the other great nations had been at war since 
 then, and as (very roughly speaking) nations have usually 
 gone to war about once each generation, we felt quite sure 
 that Germany would be one of the contestants. This convic- 
 tion was increased by Germany's evident preparedness, and 
 the fact that Great Britain, France and Russia were evidently 
 trying, though not successfully, to keep pace with her. The 
 armaments of all the great countries, including the United 
 States and Japan, increased rapidly in magnitude, and still 
 more rapidly in cost. 
 
 The reasons why they increased in cost even more than in 
 magnitude were mainly that the use of highlj^ scientific in- 
 struments and specialized weapons had become a requirement, 
 largely because of the increase in the use of them by Germany ; 
 that both armies and navies needed many grades of enlisted 
 men of higher technical education than they needed before, 
 and these men demanded higher pay; and that the require- 
 ments in the way of efficient but complicated organizations 
 necessary for handling fleets and armies with the speed and 
 precision necessary to utilize them fully, brought into being 
 much larger and more highly paid staffs, not only in the war 
 offices and admiralties, but in the field and in the fleets. The 
 press of all the great countries groaned with complaints about 
 the increasing financial burden, and were filled with interrog- 
 
 289
 
 290 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 atories as to what was the cause of the increasing rage for 
 armament. The cause was perfectly plain : the evident prep- 
 arations of Germany for war, the war lust of her population, 
 which had not been to war for more than a generation, and 
 the historically proved policy of aggression of the German 
 people. 
 
 It became increasingly evident to army and navy officers 
 that the next war in which Germany would become engaged 
 would be one of a scope and a rate of destruction of life and 
 property, per unit of time, such as had never been seen before. 
 As the years went by it became increavsingly evident also that, 
 when the time came, Germany would be much better prepared 
 than any other country, and that there was grave danger of 
 Germany's playing the part of imperial Rome after the 
 war, the rest of the world playing the part of vassal states. 
 The principal single reason why the rest of the world remained 
 so inert, in plain sight of Germany's preparations, was the 
 spread of the pacifist movement. This movement was only a 
 repetition of many in the past that had taken place in wealthy 
 countries ; but, by reason of the increased facilities for print- 
 ing and mailing, it spread much more rapidly than any like 
 movement had ever spread before. It constituted almost an 
 invitation to Germany to take what she wanted; because it 
 dangled Opportunity before her eyes and said to her in effect : 
 ' ' Though we are rich and you are poor, we will not even pre- 
 pare to resist an aggression on your part, except in the wholly 
 improbable case that you should forcibly attack us. If you 
 actually do that, then we will defend ourselves bravely." 
 
 Germany's preparations increased at a speed and with a 
 precision and effectiveness unprecedented in history. Of 
 course, preparations for the kind of war that Germany in- 
 tended could not proceed unless accompanied with govern- 
 mental, commercial, industrial, and scientific developments of 
 all sorts. In fact, the period from 1871 to 1914 was an era of 
 tremendous progress in Germany in all fields of activity. 
 "William I remained Emperor until 1888, when he died and
 
 292 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 was succeeded by his son, Frederick III, who reigned for 
 three months only, and was succeeded by his son, William II. 
 Bismarck was made the first Imperial Chancellor by William 
 I; and he remained in that position until 1890, when he was 
 dismissed by William II. 
 
 The developments that took place in Germany have been 
 the marvel of the world ; and well they may be, for even Rome 
 never introduced so many and so important reforms in so 
 short a time. These reforms covered all departments of the 
 national life, but most of them may be classed under the head- 
 ing, utilitarian. This does not mean that there was not a great 
 advance in Germany in music and science; but it does mean 
 that even the advance in those activities had a utilitarian 
 tinge. 
 
 We must remember that the Germans, and especially the 
 Prussians, were virtually on the eastern edge of the civiliza- 
 tion of Europe, and in closer contact with the Slavs and 
 Turanians of eastern Europe than were the western nations; 
 that they were of almost the pure Germanic stock, and were 
 not a combination, like the French, who were a mixture of 
 Gauls, Celts, and Italians; and we must remember especially 
 that the original Germanic tribes, even in the time of Caesar, 
 were of a coarser fiber than even the Gauls of France. We 
 must also remind ourselves that, from 1640 till 1871, the Ger- 
 mans and the Prussians had gone through a distinct career 
 of increasing prosperity, which was built on the ideas and 
 methods of the Great Elector, and continued without inter- 
 mission, except possibly during the reigns of Frederick Wil- 
 liam III and Frederick William IV; and that, even in the 
 reign of Frederick William III, the Prussians had achieved 
 great glory by the conduct of Blucher and his troops at the 
 battle of Waterloo. We must also remember that, while the 
 immediate cause of the prosperity that each individual German 
 enjoyed was the improvements made in the economic, indus- 
 trial, and transportational systems, yet these were all madte 
 possible by the unification first of Prussia and then of Ger-
 
 ANTE BELLUM 293 
 
 many; and that these unifications were due dflrectly to suc- 
 cessful war. 
 
 Books have been written about the many measures that the 
 government of Germany adopted and carried through for the 
 welfare of the people. If we read of these measures, we are 
 apt to become confused by their multiplicity and complexity. 
 There are two possible explanations, however, which suggest 
 that the matter may not be so complicated as it seems. 
 
 One explanation is that the government adopted for solving 
 its civil problems the ''estimate of the situation" method, 
 which the German general staff invented many years ago, fo>r 
 solving military problems. By this method each problem is 
 divided into four parts : 
 
 1. The mission — that is, the distinct end that it is desired 
 to attain. 
 
 2. The difficulties in the way. 
 
 3. The facilities on hand, or attainable, for accomplishing 
 the mission. 
 
 4. The decision. 
 
 Looked at from a scientific standpoint, it will be seen that 
 this method is divisible into two parts; the first part (the first 
 three steps) being analytical and the second part synthetic, 
 or constructive. It can be seen also that it is somewhat anal- 
 ogous to the feat of Professor Helmholtz, who analyzed a 
 sound into its fundamental tone and its over-tones, and then, 
 by means of appropriate apparatus, synthesized a number of 
 different tones into that sound and into other sounds. 
 
 Another and more obvious explanation is suggested by the 
 organization of an army or a battleship. For an army or a 
 battleship is an integral part of a nation, composed of human 
 beings, subjected to the same necessities and animated by the 
 same desires as the human beings in the nation itself. Now, 
 an army or a battleship in order to carry out its purposes, 
 must be divided into various branches ; each of these branches 
 must be divided into divisions, and each of these divisions 
 must be divided into sub-divisions ; and eyery branch, division,
 
 294 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 and sub-division must be placed under a responsible head or 
 chief. Furthermore, all the branches and divisions and sub- 
 divisions must be so coordinated that they can be combined 
 together and made to form one coherent organization, under 
 one man at its head. With these ideas in mind, it is easy to 
 see how the analj'^tical German mind analyzed the multitudi- 
 nous problems into their component parts, and then synthe- 
 sized or constructed the means whereby the problem would be 
 solved. And we can see also that, being permeated, as the 
 Germans hereditarily were, with the military instinct, it was 
 not hard for them to make what might almost be called an 
 army out of the whole German nation. 
 
 It may seem that the explanations just attempted are some- 
 what labored and far-fetched. Possibly they are ; but we can- 
 not deny that the whole structure of the German gevemment, 
 and the whole structure of the German nation, show the evi- 
 dence of careful analysis and able synthesis, and that the struc- 
 ture of the German nation is essentially military. Possibly the 
 most obvious sign of its military character is the training 
 through which everyone is put for whatever vocation he is to 
 fill, and the insistence that every man at the head of every or- 
 ganization, large or small, must be fitted by training to per- 
 form its duties well, and must have given evidence of his abil- 
 ity by previous work of the same character. 
 
 Possibly it may seem foolish to suggest that Germany is 
 alone in having experts at the head of the departments of 
 the government ; and yet, the naked fact stands out, clear and 
 plain, that Germany is the only great country that has ever 
 accomplished or very seriously attempted it. Possibly ancient 
 Rome and modem Japan have come the nearest to Germany 
 in this particular. In the other great countries of the world, 
 the army and the navy are the only organizations in which it 
 is seriously attempted to restrict the leadership of the various 
 branches and divisions of the government to men skilled in 
 their duties; and in many countries political influences pre- 
 vent this in even the army and navy.
 
 ANTE BELLUM 295 
 
 The Germans came to pride themselves excessively on their 
 "efficiency," and to believe themselves superior to all other 
 people in the world. Feeling in this way, it did not take them 
 long to proclaim their superiority, and their desire to prove 
 it. In their own estimation, they did prove it by the records 
 they made in increasing the productiveness of their soil, and 
 improving nearly all their activities, especially their manu- 
 factures, exports, steamship lines, foreign trade, and in gen- 
 eral all enterprises in which cooperation among many people 
 was required. It was not a long step from this to feeling that, 
 if they could surpass the other nations in these particulars, 
 and if they could within a few years build up a navy from 
 almost nothing to the position of the second navy in the 
 world, they could literally beat all the world militarily; be- 
 cause their army was more superior to any other army than 
 was any other activity in Germany to its. corresponding activ- 
 ity in any other country. 
 
 With such a history as Germany had, and with the essen- 
 tially barbarous characteristics of the German people, it is 
 easy to see why Germany, during all the years between 1871 
 and 1914, should have prepared for war. Wonder has been 
 expressed that she kept out of war so long. The explanation 
 is that the favorable combination of events did not occur si- 
 multaneously with a plausible excuse until the Archduke Fer- 
 dinand was shot in Servia on June 28, 1914. 
 
 War was declared on the 1st of August, and Germany was 
 ready; not only in "the last button of the gaiters," but in 
 everything; especially in the things most difficult to be ready 
 in — that is, strategic plans, both general and detailed. 
 
 But the world was unprepared, except one organization — 
 the British navy. Wliy the world was unprepared may be 
 explained on the same grounds as can be explained the unpre- 
 paredness of many nations that in the past were forced to rush 
 into war unprepared. The explanation is simply that the 
 nations had not had the strategic insight necessary to discern 
 the danger, and therefore lacked the wisdom to prepare. They
 
 296 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 were like the five foolish virgins in the Bible. And yet Ger- 
 many's preparations were perfectly plain; in fact, Germany 
 made little effort to conceal them, though she was able, by 
 means of paid agents in all the countries to do as the barbaric 
 German tribes had done centuries before — to make her future 
 antagonists believe in her peaceful intentions, or at least to 
 close their eyes. Such methods had succeeded with possible 
 antagonists in the time of Csesar; and they succeeded with 
 Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States nineteen 
 centuries later. 
 
 Meanwhile, in Great Britain much progress in all ways had 
 been made. Perhaps the most important single steps were 
 taken in 1900, when the Australian Federation was formed, 
 and in 1909, when the South African Union was formed. In 
 1910 Great Britain had five self-governing colonies, Canada, 
 New Zealand, Newfoundland, the Commonwealth of Austra- 
 lia, and the South African Union. Besides these self-govern- 
 ing colonies, Great Britain had many dependent colonies scat- 
 tered over the world. In addition, she possessed India, the 
 most important of all, inhabited by a population of three hun- 
 dred millions. 
 
 It is noteworthy that this empire had been established by 
 naval and military power, directed by strategy. 
 
 Queen Victoria died in 1901, and left Great Britain in a 
 condition of prosperity that was considered then to be very 
 secure, but that we now know was insecure. 
 
 Many causes contributed to the prosperity : the main causes 
 being the character of the people, the climate, and (most im- 
 portant of all) the enormous improvements effected in the con- 
 ditions of living by inventions in engineering and mechanics, 
 notably those that increased the certainty and speed of trans- 
 portation and communication. 
 
 It is a remarkable fact that most writers, except technical 
 writers, show little appreciation of the tremendous assistance 
 to the progress of civilization that very simple mechanical 
 and electrical inventions have imparted, and seem to fail to
 
 ANTE BELLUM 297 
 
 realize tliat the principal difference between modem civiliza- 
 tion and ancient civilization is not any difference in the people 
 but merely in the use of mechanical and electrical appliances. 
 There is no evidence that the human machine is any better 
 than it was in the days when the pyramids were built, or when 
 the Greeks held their Olympian games. There is no evidence 
 now of any brain better than that of Caesar ; we have no poet 
 greater than Homer, no orator greater than Demosthenes, no 
 sculptor greater than Praxiteles. But the ancient Egyptians 
 had no electric railways; the Assyrians did not possess the 
 wireless telegraph; Homer did not have the advantage of a 
 typewriter; and Charles V lived a life of squalor compared 
 with that of a moderately prosperous resident of any modern 
 city. 
 
 Victoria was succeeded by Edward VII. He had always 
 been popular with the people, though his private life had not 
 been strictly puritanical, and he was supposed to have trod 
 the primrose path of dalliance for some years. But when he 
 came to the throne he was sixty years of age, and the fresh 
 exuberance of early youth had passed. He had always been 
 supposed to be a trifler ; but as a king he showed that he was 
 a trifler only in trifles. His career as king surprised both 
 friends and enemies: because he proved to be the man that 
 was required, the man needed to remedy, as far as he could, 
 the feminine mistakes of his mother's reign — an excessive 
 shrinking from war, a fatuous trust in the notion that war had 
 passed away. 
 
 Edward received the unofficial title of Peacemaker from the 
 people; and yet, he really was not a peacemaker in the sense 
 in which they used the word. While not a man of exceptional 
 ability, he was, like some other indolent and pleasure-loving 
 men, able to see things from a distance, unconfused by details. 
 Of course, he had had the advantage of long training in antici- 
 pation of his task, and had had all possible opportunities for 
 getting correct information from all sources. But, after all 
 allowances have been made, it can hardly be denied that Ed-
 
 298 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 ward made a more correct estimate of the situation than did 
 the professional statesman of his kingdom, who did little 
 things well, but who failed so utterly on important things as 
 almost to ruin the empire. His principal achievement was the 
 establishment of the Triple Entente, which included Great 
 Britain, France, and Russia. It cannot justly be claimed that 
 he originated the idea, or was the only man concerned in it; 
 and yet, there can be no question that the Triple Entente was 
 largely brought about by him. Certain it is that he has always 
 received the principal credit for it. 
 
 Unfortunately, he died before many things had been done 
 that should have been done. Whether, if he had lived, he 
 would have succeeded in rousing the country to a realization 
 of her peril, we do not know. Two important occurrences in 
 his reign were the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and the 
 resulting Declaration of London. 
 
 The First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 had drawn up a 
 comprehensive ' ' International Convention with Respect to the 
 Laws and Customs of War on Land," designed to check the 
 severity of military^ belligerents, and it had been ratified by 
 the great powers. One of the chief objects of the Second Con- 
 ference, in 1907, was the preparation of a similar code, to 
 apply to war on the sea. The first attempt to do this had been 
 made in 1856 by the signers of the Treaty of Paris. In this 
 treaty four important rules had been agreed to ; but the vast 
 increase in size, power, and complexity of both maritime com- 
 merce and of navies made more definite agreements necessary ; 
 and these the Second Hague Peace conference attempted to 
 efi'ect. The conference was unable to do this wholly ; but it did 
 provide for an international prize court to which were to be 
 referred certain classes of questions. 
 
 It soon became apparent, however, that this prize court 
 would have no basis of law or agreement to start from. To 
 provide this Great Britain invited the representatives of 
 seven other great powers to meet in conference, "in order to 
 arrive at an agreement as to what are the generally recog-
 
 ANTE BELLUM 299 
 
 nized practices of International Law, within the meaning of 
 The Hague Convention." 
 
 The representatives deliberated in London between Decem- 
 ber, 1908, and February, 1909. The result was the Declara- 
 tion of London. This declaration was divided into seventy-one 
 articles, arranged in nine chapters, headed ' ' Blockade in Time 
 of "War," "Contraband of War," "Unneutral Service," 
 "Destruction of Neutral Prizes," "Transfer to a Neutral 
 Flag," "Enemy Character," "Convoy," "Resistance to 
 Search," "Compensation" and "Final Provisions." 
 
 Most of the Conventions of the Second Peace Conference 
 concerning war contain a clause to the effect that they "are 
 only applicable between the Contracting Powers, and only if 
 all the belligerents are parties to the Convention, ' ' and the first 
 sentence of Article 66 of the Final Provisions of the Declara- 
 tion of London reads : ' ' The signatory powers undertake to 
 insure the mutual observance of the rules contained in the pres- 
 ent Declaration in any war in which all the belligerents are 
 parties thereto. ' ' This is noteworthy : for many people, not 
 knowing it, not knowing that the declaration of London had 
 not been ratified even by Great Britain, that some of the con- 
 ventions of the Second Peace Conference had not been ratified 
 by several countries, and that Convention XII, creating an 
 international prize court, had not been ratified by any coun- 
 try when the World War broke out, have criticized certain 
 acts as being contrary to the Declaration and the conventions 
 of the Second Peace Conference. 
 
 The Declaration aroused great opposition in England, both 
 from the Chambers of Commerce, which thought that the Dec- 
 laration would operate unfavorably to British commerce in 
 any war in which Great Britain would be a neutral, and also 
 from the navy, which thought that the Declaration would 
 operate unfavorably to the navy in any war in which Great 
 Britain would be a belligerent. Since Great Britain had the 
 greatest maritime commerce and the greatest nav^^; since it 
 was apparent to army and navy men that the coming war with
 
 800 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Germany could not be delayed much longer ; since the nation 
 next to Great Britain in both naval power and maritime com- 
 merce was Germany; since Germany and Great Britain nat- 
 urally viewed the subject from directly opposite points of 
 view; and since the subject was absolutely vital to both 
 nations, the interest aroused was intense. 
 
 The Declaration of London was not ratified, however, and 
 therefore it accomplished nothing of a definite character; but 
 the failure to ratify it brought into startling relief the fact 
 that the governments of the eight great maritime and naval 
 nations had found it impossible to agree on the most important 
 and most controversial questions regarding maritime warfare, 
 and that the whole international law situation in regard to 
 war on the sea was therefore indefinite and va^e! This 
 meant that in case of any war between great maritime coun- 
 tries, questions of the utmost importance and involving pos- 
 sible war would almost certainly arise between belligerents 
 and neutrals, and international law could provide no adequate 
 basis of mutual understanding or of law, for reaching an 
 agreement. This condition makes the inertness of the great 
 maritime nations just before 1914, and even in the early part 
 of that year, the more difficult to understand. 
 
 King George and Queen Mary were crowned on June 22, 
 1911, and six months later they went to India, where they were 
 crowned Emperor and Empress of India at Delhi, amid 
 pageants of great splendor. This circumstance, and the gen- 
 eral state of affairs throughout the country, betokened a pow- 
 erful empire and prophesied great longevity. It was rein- 
 forced in the following year, by an Imperial Conference at 
 London, where the representatives of the five self-governing 
 dominions, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Canada, 
 and South Africa, met in consultation on imperial questions 
 and the consideration of the military and naval defense of the 
 empire. Nothing else on earth seemed so stable as the British 
 Empire. 
 
 Yet the British Empire was on the brink of a crisis in which
 
 ANTE BELLUM 301 
 
 it almost went down to ruin, and from wliich it was barely 
 saved by an occurrence that nobody expected — the sudden 
 interposition of the United States. 
 
 Throughout the reign of Victoria and afterward, the people 
 of Great Britain, including their politicians, who competed 
 with each other in trying to win popularity by prophesying 
 smooth and pleasant things, had been concentrating their 
 attention on internal matters, and neglecting the safety of 
 national life ; just as many a man has devoted himself to the 
 making of money, or the pursuit of pleasure, until a physician 
 has warned him that he was putting his life in danger. There 
 were a few men, like Field Marshal Lord Roberts, Field Mar- 
 shal Lord Kitchener, many army and navy officers, and a 
 handful of thinkers and writers who pointed out that the na- 
 tional life was in grave peril. These men were not gifted with 
 any special knowledge or with any special insight : they were 
 merely men who were not so engrossed in their own private 
 affairs as to be unable to think of other things, and who were 
 not so lacking in courage as to be afraid to tell the people 
 unpleasant facts. 
 
 These men, of whom Lord Roberts was the principal, told 
 the people of England repeatedly, insistently, and emphati- 
 cally that Germany was arming to attack Great Britain. They 
 called the attention of the people of England to things printed, 
 not only in German newspapers and magazines, but in care- 
 fully written books, which showed that the Germans had come 
 to believe themselves a people far superior in ability, charac- 
 ter, and courage to any other people in the world, and to feel 
 that it was bad for the world that they should be kept in a 
 position that they thought one of inferiority in comparison 
 with that held by Great Britain. These men gave proofs that 
 the Germans considered that the people of Russia, France, 
 and England were decadent, mentally and morally, and yet 
 held a standing in the world far higher than Germany 's, and 
 possessed much more in land and wealth. These men proved 
 that Germany, having easily conquered France, and knowing
 
 302 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 tlie corrupt condition of affairs in Russia, regarded France 
 and Russia as almost negligible, except in so far as they might 
 give assistance to Great Britain. They showed that Germany 
 felt aggrieved that Great Britain held the sovereignty of one 
 quarter of all the land in the world, and was mistress of the 
 sea, while Germany (a much more noble country, according to 
 their views) was hemmed in on all sides, and lacked "a place 
 in the sun." 
 
 These men proved that Germany realized that all the 
 national success she had ever got had been got by the sword; 
 and that many Germans declared that if, at certain critical 
 times, the Germans had devoted themselves to practical affairs, 
 as Great Britain, France, and Holland had done, instead of to 
 dreams in philosophy, poetry and religion, Germany would 
 then occupy a place like England's. They showed that these 
 ideas, under the inspiration of men like Treitschke, were not 
 held as academic principles, but were becoming living realities, 
 and spurring the people to revolt. They showed that the Ger- 
 man army was very much better than any other army in the 
 world, not only because it was larger, but also because it was 
 more efficient ; and that the German navy, which only twenty- 
 five years before had been almost negligible, was now second 
 in size to the British, and at least as efficient and possibly more 
 so. They pointed out the unparalleled expansion of German 
 commerce all over the world, and the superior efficiency of the 
 German government, and expressed their opinion that if Ger- 
 many should go to war with Russia, France, and Great Brit- 
 ain combined, she would have an excellent chance of victory. 
 They also showed that victory would mean the ruin of the 
 British Empire and the world dominance of the German. 
 
 The man who exerted himself the most to convince England 
 of her danger was Lord Roberts. His arguments and appeals 
 were received by the mob with jeers and insults, and by even 
 the better classes with ill-disguised impatience. Many harsh 
 remarks were made about him, the average of which might be 
 expressed in the words, ' ' He is an old fool. ' ' Yet Roberts was
 
 ANTE BELLUM 303 
 
 right and the rest were wrong ! The treatment of Lord Rob- 
 erts by the British people, whom he had served so well, is one 
 of the most deplorable facts in history. That Great Britain 
 has made expiation for it is also one of the clearest facts of his- 
 tory. She has expiated it by the death of the best of her 
 young manhood; by the impoverishment of the kingdom; by 
 the untold suffering, physical, mental, and spiritual, of every 
 man, woman, and child; by everything that is deplorable in 
 national life, except national ruin itself. 
 
 That Great Britain should have gone on as she did, even to 
 the day when she declared war on Germany, is a thing that 
 cannot be explained. We know that Assyria fell before the 
 barbarian Persian; that Persia fell before the barbarian 
 Greek ; and that Rome fell before the barbarian Alaric : but all 
 those countries were decadent countries, and we accept the 
 fact of their decadence as the explanation of their fall. But 
 was Great Britain decadent f Germany said she was; and the 
 fact that Great Britain so nearly fell, and was saved only by 
 the unexpected interposition of the United States, gives im- 
 portance to the question. 
 
 Yet Great Britain was not decadent in the sense that 
 Assyria and Persia and Egypt were ; for Great Britain was in 
 the very flower of a civilization supposed to be the most beau- 
 tiful the world had ever seen. 
 
 The answer to the question is dependent, of course, on the 
 definition of the word decadent. In default of an agreement 
 as to that definition, we cannot decide whether Great Britain 
 was decadent or not ; but we can easily decide whether, during 
 the first fourteen years of the twentieth century, the British 
 acted as worthy descendants of Harold and Alfred and the 
 Black Prince, and Marlborough and Nelson and William Pitt. 
 
 Of all the departments of the British government, the only 
 department ready was the navy. The army was not ready; 
 and no one in England who had paid any attention to national 
 matters expected that she would be ready, in case the thing 
 happened that did happen. That the army did well after the
 
 304 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 emergency had arisen, the applause of the whole world testi- 
 fies. But the glory it achieved was at the cost of sacrifices that 
 should not have been necessary, and that have made England 
 endure unutterable remorse. 
 
 The navy was wonderfully ready, though not so ready as the 
 German; and the officers and men of the navy covered them- 
 selves and the navy and the country with the greatest measure 
 of glory that the country as a whole has a right to claim; for 
 before the war the country had shown the foresight and the 
 patriotic spirit necessary to build and maintain a navy ade- 
 quate to her defense. As to her navy, Great Britain did not 
 have to be driven into a corner before she made ready to pro- 
 tect her national life and the lives of her women and children. 
 
 Yet the navy itself was not all it should have been ; not from 
 any fault of the navy, but from the same fault as that mainly 
 responsible for the unprepared condition of Great Britain in 
 other departments. 
 
 The unreadiness of the British nav;^^, as compared with the 
 German, seems to have no other explanation than the fact that, 
 somewhat less than a hundred years before the war, the politi- 
 cians had become so strong in Great Britain, and had been able 
 to impress the people so thoroughly with the idea that "the 
 military should be subordinate to the civil authority," that 
 they adopted the practice of putting untrained civilians at the 
 head of the army and the navy. They made the people believe 
 (and possibly made themselves believe) that it was not neces- 
 sary to have men at the head of the army and the navy who 
 were thoroughly acquainted with the army and the navy ; giv- 
 ing out the idea that untrained ministers could direct the army 
 and navy successfully, provided they were men of superior 
 intelligence; and that whatever professional knowledge they 
 might lack they could easily get from professional advisers. 
 
 They neglected to point out that the "professional advis- 
 ers" could be ignored, that a minister untrained in technical 
 matters would not be competent to make the best selection of 
 professional advisers, and that the scheme actually promoted
 
 ANTE BELLUM 305 
 
 irresponsibility. For the minister could always shift the 
 blame for any miscarriage to his professional advisers; and 
 these professional advisers would be perfectly safe, because 
 they were responsible only to the minister himself ! They also 
 failed to point out that ministers, untrained in the profession 
 of arms, might appoint assistants whose qualifications were the 
 tact and suavity of the courtier, rather than the force and 
 austerity of the warrior. 
 
 No evidence that it'ould he accepted in a court of law has 
 ever been given which would establish the reasonableness of 
 the proposition that untrained men can manage great profes- 
 sional organizations with real success. Certain it is that man- 
 aging an army or a navy is a business, in the sense as that in 
 which managing a factory can be said to be a business, or 
 keeping a shop or conducting a hotel, or administering a rail- 
 road; and virtually all of these businesses are conducted by 
 men who knew them intimately. Certain it is, also, that in 
 this war the head of the Admiralty made two bloody mistakes 
 that a man knowing the naval business intimately would not 
 have made. 
 
 Certain it is, also, that the mere fact of army and navy 
 officers knowing that they would never be allowed to decide 
 important strategic questions took away from them not only 
 that interest in the higher part of their profession which they 
 should have had, but also the strategic training they would 
 otherwise have gained. Certain it is, also, that strategic 
 training and the resulting strategic ability were lost to Great 
 Britain; because nobody but army and navy officers could 
 possibly attain it, and no other people did. Certain it is, 
 therefore, that the government of Great Britain for nearly one 
 hundred years lacked the kind of council it should have had. 
 Almost certain it is that, if the government had not lacked 
 that counsel, Great Britain would not have lapsed into unpre- 
 paredness, and would not have gone through the agony she has 
 gone through. 
 
 It is noteworthy that this was the first great war in which
 
 306 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the British navy was not headed by a naval officer; that in 
 each war in which it was headed by a naval officer it showed 
 more dash, resourcefulness, and strategic ability than did any 
 of its adversaries; that in this war it showed less dash and 
 resourcefulness and strategic ability than the German navy; 
 and that the German navy was headed by a naval officer. 
 
 It is a principle fundamental to the efficient handling of 
 every organization that the man at its head should have been 
 specially trained for his task. 
 
 Even more than Great Britain, in proportion to her danger 
 from Germany, France became increasingly unprepared for 
 war as war drew near. In 1889 the requirement for compul- 
 sory military service had been reduced from five to three years. 
 In 1905 the period of service was reduced to two years. This 
 fact, taken in connection with the increase in socialistic agita- 
 tion, the absence of any commanding personality that could 
 direct the energies of the people for more than a very short 
 time, the lack of continuous interest in public affairs, the in- 
 tense factionalism, and the ardent pursuit of pleasure by all 
 classes, was of sinister importance ; because Germany was 
 meanwhile straining every faculty to acquire the military- 
 power wherewith to crush France. Finally, however, it was 
 realized that, in view of the menace of Germany, it was im- 
 portant that France and England should come to a friendly 
 understanding. In 1903 visits were interchanged between the 
 rulers ; then an Anglo-French Convention was signed in 1904. 
 By this convention many long-standing disputes were ami- 
 cably adjusted, and some new arrangements were agreed to. 
 
 In June, 1905, M. Delcasse retired from the Foreign Office, 
 a post he had held for seven years. A few days before, the 
 dismaying news had been received of the sudden and total 
 destruction of the fleet of France 's ally, Russia, by a Japanese 
 fleet of equal size. Since Delcasse 's retirement was supposed 
 to be caused by German influence, because of his opposition to 
 German interference in Morocco, the two incidents had a 
 depressing effect on the people. For the fact was known
 
 ANTE BELLUM 307 
 
 (though the people shut their eyes to realizing its importance) 
 that Germany was exercising an enormous influence on France 
 and in France; that she was utilizing all the resources of an 
 astute, far-seeing, and ruthless diplomacy to weaken the na- 
 tion; and that the people were too much occupied with small 
 factional disputes and personal pleasures to take proper 
 measures to avert the national danger that intelligent persons 
 knew to be impending. 
 
 As both a cause and an effect of all the conditions, the politi- 
 cian in France had come into power which, though usually 
 brief in the case of each individual, was tremendous and tre- 
 mendously injurious. Ministries succeeded one another with 
 bewildering rapidity ; there being, for instance, fourteen Min- 
 isters of Foreign Affairs in the fifteen years between 1879 and 
 1894, and six in the following fifteen years. Furthermore, the 
 ministers and their subordinates acquired and maintained 
 their offices, not because they were capable experts, but be- 
 cause crowds of excitable people voted for them. The only 
 agencies of the government that were even partially free from 
 political influences were the army and the navy ; the War and 
 Navy Departments themselves being far from free. The navy 
 suffered more than the army, mainly because of the pernicious 
 activities of Camille Pelletan, Minister of Marine, who nul- 
 lified the navy's work of many years and the expenditure of 
 hundreds of millions of francs, and brought about a condition 
 of inefficiency, disorganization, and discouragement which the 
 succeeding years of extra effort have not yet been able to over- 
 come. That one man should have been able to accomplish so 
 much harm showed a deplorable national condition ; because 
 the fact that the mischief was being done was a matter of 
 common knowledge. 
 
 The French people saw more clearly the necessity of keep- 
 ing their army effective than their navy ; for it was the French 
 army to which France was indebted for her national security 
 and the place she held in the forefront of the nations. Never- 
 theless they allowed even the army to fall far below the
 
 308 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 standard of efficiency set by their only military rival, Ger- 
 many. Nevertheless, they carelessly observed the Germans 
 increase their army in size, and exercise it in war manoeuvers 
 of unprecedented magnitude, well knowing that that army 
 was being increased in size and effectiveness for the sole pur- 
 pose of fighting France and Russia and any allies they might 
 secure. Nevertheless, they concentrated whatever of attention 
 they gave to public matters on little factional disputes. 
 Nevertheless, the individual Frenchman concerned himself 
 almost wholly with his private affairs and his private pleas- 
 ures. Nevertheless, the individual man and woman continued 
 to dance on the very edge of the abyss of national disaster. 
 
 On August 1, 1914, Prussia repeated her performances of 
 1864, 1866, and 1870, by precipitating a war against nations 
 whom she knew to be unprepared, at a time when she felt that 
 she herself had become sufficiently prepared to overcome the 
 disproportion against her in material resources. 
 
 That she did this was unjustifiable. But was it justifiable 
 for the other nations to permit her to do it 1 It is unjustifiable 
 for burglars to rob houses; but does this fact make it justi- 
 fiable for municipal authorities to permit 'burglary? The 
 record of Germany was perfectly well known, and so was her 
 policy. Many writers, like Treitschke, had described it 
 clearly; many declarations of Bismarck and the Kaiser had 
 emphasized it ; and many incidents like that of Agadir had 
 shown that the policy was alive, and ready to be put into active 
 operation as soon as a favorable opportunity should arrive. 
 
 But the Thomas Jeffersons and William J. Bryans of France 
 had been doing their work successfully. The orators of 
 France had told sweet stories to people who wished to have 
 such stories told them. Suddenly the storm broke, and France 
 plunged into the valley of the shadow of death. The story of 
 France being led to war like a lamb to the slaughter would 
 be incredible, had it not so often been told before ; had it not 
 been told so short a time before by Denmark and by Austria 
 and by France herself; had it not been told many centuries
 
 ANTE BELLUM 309 
 
 before by Egypt and Assyria and Babylon and Greece and 
 Rome; by every great country which became decadent and 
 then fell ; by every tribe and town and nation, great or small, 
 that failed to obey the law of self -protection. 
 
 The flash of a pistol in Serbia on June 28, 1914, started an 
 explosion that statesmen and military and naval men all over 
 the world recognized instantly as an explosion that must be 
 followed by others; so intimately connected were the piles of 
 national explosives, and so sensitive to shock was the explosive 
 in each pile. The explosives first affected were those in Serbia 
 and Austria; next, those in Germany and Russia; next, those 
 in France; next, those in England. By August 5 all had ex- 
 ploded, and Germany and Austria were at war with Russia, 
 France and England. Germany being fully prepared, Aus- 
 tria fairly prepared, and the others unprepared, the tremen- 
 dous advantage of the initiative and the offensive went to Ger- 
 many and Austria. Germany violated the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium and took the easiest road to France. This was a crime, 
 but it was not unexpected (or it should not have been) ; for 
 violations of neutrality and of treaties were as old as history, 
 and as much to be expected as burglaries and murders. 
 
 In the United States, during the period between 1870 and 
 1914, the progress in the development of commerce, industry, 
 and invention had been greater than in any other country, 
 and the spread of pacifism had also been greater. The great 
 spread of pacifism was due mainly to two causes — the influence 
 of the doctrines of Thomas Jefferson, and the absorption of 
 the people in the pursuit of wealth, which the enormous devel- 
 opment of the country facilitated and encouraged. The result 
 was a condition of unpreparedness far in excess of that in 
 any European country. 
 
 Many inventions of instruments and methods pertaining to 
 war were made in the United States, of which the greatest was 
 the airplane made by Professor Samuel Langley and the 
 Wright Brothers. The next most important, probably, was 
 an invention for using airplanes for discharging torpedoes,
 
 310 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 which the author patented in July, 1912. The fact that every 
 warlike operation is an endeavor to bring destructive forces 
 to a certain point before the enemy bring their destructive 
 forces there, combined with the fact that the airplane could 
 carry destructive forces more quickly than any other means, 
 showed strategists, when the first successful flight was made 
 by the Wright Brothers in 1903, that a new instrument of 
 war had been born. It also showed that it behooved each na- 
 tion to develop the warlike capabilities of that instrument at 
 once, in order to be ready for the next war. 
 
 When the Great War broke out on August 1, 1914, the 
 degree of the unpreparedness of the United States was amaz- 
 ing, as I know from personal and intimate knowledge. For I 
 was Aid for Operations, a position analogous to that of chief 
 of staff in the army, and the principal adviser of the Secretary 
 of the Navy. Naturally, I did all I could to get the navy 
 ready. The fact that the two greatest naval and maritime 
 countries in the world were at war, that the United States was 
 the greatest neutral countrj^ and that the manufacturers and 
 merchants of the United States would endeavor to sell to both 
 sides, combined with the chaotic condition of international 
 law as applied to neutrals and belligerents at sea (as evi- 
 denced by the failure of the Declaration of Loudon), made it 
 plain that it would be impossible for the United States to keep 
 out of the war. I had a meeting of the General Board called 
 at half past nine in the forenoon of the first of August, 1914; 
 and we drew up a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, urging 
 certain measures. Accompanying the letter of the General 
 Board, I sent a letter urging its careful consideration, signed 
 by myself as Aid for Operations. This was the first measure 
 for preparedness, I believe, that was taken in the United 
 States. 
 
 On November 9, 1914, I wrote an official letter to the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy, reporting that the navy was "unprepared 
 for war, ' ' and showing that, in the actual condition of affairs, 
 "if this country avoids war during the next five years,
 
 ANTE BELLUM 311 
 
 it will be accomplished only by a happy combination of high 
 diplomatic skill and rare good fortune. ' ' About the same time 
 Representative Gardner introduced a resolution in Congress 
 to investigate the condition of the army and navy ; but, as the 
 Congress was Democratic, his resolution failed. On December 
 17, 1914, I testified officially before the Naval Committee of 
 the House of Representatives that it would take ' ' at least five 
 years" to get our navy ready to fight effectively against any 
 great naval power. 
 
 The only immediate effect of my efforts was to bring about 
 such a feeling against me, on the part of the Secretary of the 
 Navy, that I had to resign my position and turn my duties 
 over to an officer whose ideas and personality were more ac- 
 ceptable to him. But the report of my testimony to Congress, 
 and the fact that I was forced to resign, caused considerable 
 excitement throughout the countrj^; because the position that 
 I occupied made me the official expert in such matters. The 
 appropriations that Congress made immediately afterward for 
 the navy were larger than any ever made before in this 
 country. 
 
 A condition of great restlessness ensued in certain sections 
 of the country, in an endeavor to initiate measures for pre- 
 paredness. The Navy League had been started many years be- 
 fore, and had done much to secure appropriations for the navy 
 from Congress. The National Security League was formed in 
 December, 1914, and the American Defense Society in August, 
 1915, by persons in private life, in order to rouse the country 
 to the dangers that impended. These patriotic organizations 
 and a few civilians, at the head of whom were Theodore Roose- 
 velt, Eliliu Root, Senator Lodge, and Representative Gardner, 
 instituted a vigorous propag:anda. This propaganda took on 
 new energy when the Lusitania was sunk by a German sub- 
 marine on May 7, 1915. On April 6, 1917, the United States 
 declared war against Germany.
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE WORLD WAR 
 
 IT may seem absurd to omit from a book on strate^ a 
 detailed account of the operations of the World War that 
 has just ended; but would it not be more absurd at the 
 present time, when all the facts of the war are not yet known, 
 to attempt to do this, or to draw any but the most general 
 strategic deductions from it? 
 
 As the general trend of operations during the War is famil- 
 iar to most people, it is not absurd to point out, however, that, 
 while this war involved greater numbers of men on both sides 
 than any previous war, weapons of greater destructive power 
 and more rapid and sure means of transportation and com- 
 munication, yet the general methods followed were like those 
 of Thutmose III, Alexander, and the rest. We see the same 
 endeavor to bring destructive forces to positions of strategic 
 importance ; the same endeavor to find the weak point, to make 
 flank attacks, to feint at the line of communication or attack 
 it, to feint at the line of retreat or attack it; the same en- 
 deavor to hold a force of the enemy with a part of one 's own 
 force while dealing an important blow with another part; the 
 same endeavor to envelop and capture the enemy. 
 
 The distinctive peculiarity of this war was that it brought 
 to a climax the use of new weapons and the resulting use of 
 new methods for handling the organizations that used those 
 weapons. It was a climax of the progress that had been going 
 on since the days when primeval men fought with fists and 
 clubs and stones. The World War was no more intense, for 
 each individual employed in it, than were countless fights 
 between individuals and small tribes in primeval days; and 
 
 312
 
 THE WORLD WAR 313 
 
 the pain and fear and danger and anger were no greater. The 
 Great War differed from a fight between two primeval sav- 
 ages, not in nature, but in degree; and, although the armies 
 on each side were the outcome of five thousand years of devel- 
 opment, those armies as fighting machines were not so efficient 
 as were the two primeval savages. Great effort had been made 
 to devise weapons and methods by which greater numbers of 
 men and weapons could be handled as units, in the same way 
 that the primeval savage handled himself as a unit, but, of 
 course, no such result had been even approximately secured; 
 and the greater the number of men whose handling as a unit 
 was attempted in any case, the greater the difficulty, and the 
 smaller the degree of success achieved. 
 
 Leaving aside the moral aspects of the question, there can be 
 little doubt that the strategy of the Germans was better than 
 that of the Allies, This was, of course, an inevitable result of 
 the fact that the Germans had devoted more time and mental 
 effort to the work of preparing for the war than the Allies 
 had. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that what is some- 
 times called the miMtary machine, or the naval machine, is in 
 fact a real machine ; and that in any war the most powerful 
 machine must win. The Germans had designed and prepared 
 the better machine, in the sense that it was the more efficient ; 
 but it was not the more powerful, because it was the smaller. 
 
 The clearest indication of a superior strategy on the part of 
 the Germans is the fact that the Germans acted on the offensive 
 for almost the whole war; and that, therefore, on the land the 
 war was carried on in the territories of her enemies and not in 
 her own ; and that on the sea the territorial waters of Germany 
 were not invaded, except for brief periods. 
 
 On the land the Germans had the advantage of what are 
 sometimes called interior lines, while their enemies worked on 
 exterior lines, and therefore had longer distances to traverse. 
 In addition the Germans had unity of command throughout 
 the war ; whereas the Allies did not have unity of command for 
 the forces of the different nations until its closing months.
 
 314 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 In the matter of brave fighting, persistent effort, and heroic 
 endurance, no good reason can be found for adjudging the 
 men on either side to be superior to the men on the other side. 
 As has often been noted in this book, it has been the history 
 of most wars that in mere fighting, courage, and endurance, 
 little difference among great bodies of men has been recorded. 
 
 On the sea the Germans showed their strategic insight by 
 attacking the British navy in its most vulnerable part, that is, 
 below the water line of the ships. They did this by means of 
 torpedoes fired from submarines; and the skill displayed by 
 the commanders of the submarines, together with the ex- 
 cellence of the submarines themselves, show that the scheme 
 had been worked out most carefully in advance. Had 
 the Germans confined the efforts of their submarines to sink- 
 ing vessels of war, we have no means of knowing what would 
 have been the outcome of the struggle ; but we do know that 
 the fact of their using submarines for sinking merchant-ves- 
 sels without warning brought the United States into the war 
 on the Allies' side, and produced a preponderance of mate- 
 rial resources on their side, which resulted in defeating Ger- 
 many. 
 
 Looking at the question from the standpoint of what has 
 been called hindsight, it seems that the attack of submarines 
 against unwarned merchant-vessels was a blunder. It does 
 not seem, however, to have been a blunder of strategy so 
 much as a blunder of statesmanship. From the standpoint of 
 strategy alone, the use of the submarines against merchant- 
 ships seems to have been not only justifiable but advantageous. 
 Strategy, however, is not concerned with any questions except 
 those connected intimately with fighting itself; and the mere 
 fact that. such use of the submarines was strategically advan- 
 tageous does not relieve the statesman from the charge of 
 blundering in employing it. Strategy is the servant of states- 
 manship, and its task is to do well what statesmanship de- 
 mands that it do. The tasks of statesmanship and strategy, 
 though they should be mutually assisting, are nevertheless
 
 THE WORLD WAR 315 
 
 distinct, as will be pointed out more fully in another chapter. 
 In order that they may assist each other with the maximum 
 efficiency, the statesman and the strategist should work to- 
 gether in harmony ; and in order that they may work together 
 in harmony, each should thorouglily understand his own do- 
 main of effort, the domain of the other, and the borderland 
 between them. To accomplish this, the statesman and the 
 strategist should continually and intimately confer. 
 
 Possibly, in Germany, the statesmen and the naval strate- 
 gists did not confer with a sufficient degree of intimacy and 
 mutual understanding: in fact, the memoirs of von Tirpitz 
 indicate that they did not. About this question we have little 
 trustworthy information now ; but one fact seems clear, and 
 that is that the German statesmen underestimated the proba- 
 bility that the United States would enter into the war. The 
 German statesmen seem to have been convinced that the people 
 of the United States were so wholly engrossed in money-mak- 
 ing, and so thoroughly under the influence of the doctrines of 
 Jefferson, that they would endure any insults, and continue 
 blind to any national danger from Germany. The German 
 statesmen seem to have deceived themselves into the belief 
 that the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, was a representative 
 American, and that the inspiring teachings of George Wash- 
 ington and Theodore Roosevelt no longer had power to rouse 
 the people. 
 
 The fact that the German strategy seems to have been ex- 
 ceedingly good, and the German statesmanship faulty, indi- 
 cates that the strategists of Germany knew their task better 
 than the statesmen knew their task. This has been the case 
 in nearly all countries, and is explainable by the fact that in 
 those countries naval and military men have been educated 
 from childhood under careful government supervision for 
 their tasks, while statesmen have not been similarly educated 
 for their tasks. 
 
 Before the war the Germans had very cleverly designed 
 their sea defense and offense, and the mutual cooperation of
 
 316 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 their submarine mines, submarine vessels, and surface vessels 
 of war. The submarine mines prevented the access of enemy- 
 vessels to the coast, and powerful surface vessels prevented 
 counter-mining of the submarine mines by enemy small ves- 
 sels of light enough draft to enter the mined waters ; with the 
 result that German submarines were able to pass unhindered 
 through thickly sown mine areas from their bases out into 
 deep water, and then return. The British navy found itself 
 virtually helpless against this interlocking system, and was 
 compelled to resort to operations on an enormous scale to off- 
 set the depredations of a small number of German subma- 
 rines. 
 
 The author of this book pointed out publicly two months 
 after the United States entered the war — that is, in June, 
 
 1917, and repeatedly afterwards until he was stopped by of- 
 ficial orders — that the interlocking system could be beaten by 
 flying over it with airplanes ; that airplanes were not hampered 
 by submarine mines or by submarine vessels; and that air- 
 planes could attack the German naval bases with bombs and 
 sink the German ships with torpedoes. The author is, of 
 course, a biased witness in this case ; but it seems to him that 
 this plan was perfectly feasible, and that if it had been carried 
 out promptly (as it could have been), the entire naval force 
 of Germany (including her submarines) could have been de- 
 stroyed, Germany crippled utterly, and the war brought to a 
 sudden close. In fact, preparations to carry out this plan 
 were under way when the armistice was signed in November, 
 
 1918. Too late. 
 
 Doubtless many lessons of strategic importance will be gath- 
 ered when all the records of the war have been carefully gone 
 over. But it is doubtful whether there will be much value in 
 making the elaborate and detailed investigations that have 
 been made after previous wars, for the reason that the next 
 great war will probably be so different from the last one that 
 it may be unwise to concentrate much attention on its de- 
 tailed operations. It will probably be wiser to try to discern
 
 THE WORLD WAR 317 
 
 the character of the next war than the details of the last war. 
 
 The most important factor in making a change between the 
 two will probably be the airplane. In the last war it was 
 used in a subordinate capacity only; but the probability seems 
 to be that in the next war the airplane (including the tor- 
 pedoplane), by reason of its enormous speed over great dis- 
 tances and the large amount of liigh explosives it can carrj', 
 will be one of the most important factors (if not the most im- 
 portant factor) in the war. 
 
 If so, the next war will be more different from the last war 
 than any other war has ever been from the war preceding it.
 
 PART III 
 STRATEGY
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 
 
 IN what we have read thus far in these pages, nearly all 
 of the interest and importance have lain in the actual 
 movements of land and naval forces, and especially in 
 the battles in which they were engaged. Little has been in 
 evidence of preparations before the wars of which the battles 
 formed the critical parts; but it is obvious that preparations 
 must have been made. It is obvious also that those prepara- 
 tions had great influence on the results of the battles, and 
 therefore of the wars. Even primeval savage tribes made 
 preparations not only of a material kind in laying in supplies, 
 securing weapons, and assuring the safety of the women and 
 children, but also in stirring up the martial ardor of the war- 
 riors. When the Swiss in Csesar's time decided to move west 
 through Gaul, they instituted preparations that lasted a year, 
 mainly in the matter of sowing large crops and in laying in 
 supplies from them ; and when Genghis Khan started west on 
 his benevolent expedition, he also made preparations, part of 
 which was leaving all the women and children behind. 
 
 Nevertheless, until the time of Moltke, the preparations of 
 even the largest armies were of a simple kind. The greatest 
 care and foresight that we see were in the preparations of 
 Julius Cae.sar for invading Gaul, and the outfitting of the 
 Invincible Armada. Wlien Moltke became chief of staff, the 
 complexity of civilization had become so great, and the capa- 
 bilities of modem mechanism for assisting the warrior had 
 become so evident, that the value of making long and careful 
 preparation was discerned by his intelligence. The awful 
 magnitude of the task entailed w^ould have appalled most men, 
 
 321
 
 322 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 and Moltke seems to have been the only man, save one, who 
 realized the occasion and rose to it. The exception was Roon, 
 who was Minister of War and the immediate superior of 
 Moltke. 
 
 But, great as were the complexity and difficulty of prepar- 
 ing for war in 1870, they rapidly became greater after Moltke 
 died and the years went by. Railroads increased in number, 
 speed, and carrying power; steamships did the same, but to a 
 much greater degree; the wireless telegraph came into prac- 
 tical use ; guns became not only more powerful and of greater 
 range, but of greater difficulty to handle ; the naval telescope 
 sight gave a precision to naval gunnery, with consequent in- 
 crease of destructive power to ships-of-war, that resulted in 
 increasing their size and therefore their cost and complexity ; 
 the submarine torpedo became a weapon of such practical use- 
 fulness that destroyers had to be built in increasing numbers 
 to carry them ; the submarine vessel became practically use- 
 ful, so that many submarines had to be built, and officers and 
 men trained to handle them both singly and in flotillas; the 
 musket of the soldier increased in range, penetrating power, 
 and speed of fire, and so in a greater degree did machine-guns 
 of various kinds ; and large guns became so improved in rapid- 
 ity of fire as to increase enormously the amount of ammuni- 
 tion needed for them, an increase that was even more pro- 
 nounced with small arms and machine-guns. All this increase 
 in the number and power of mechanisms was accompanied 
 with an enormous increase in their complexity, and therefore 
 in the skill required to operate them, and therefore in the 
 number and the trained skill of the operators. Inasmuch as 
 all the battleships, eruisers, destroyers, submarines, infantry 
 regiments, artillery batteries, cavalry squadrons, scouts, en- 
 gineers, etc., could not be handled effectively without drill, 
 systems of drills had to be devised and afterward put into 
 effect, whereby in every vessel, in every company, and in every 
 organization of whatever kind, each individual, high or low, 
 was continually exercised in the performance of his duties;
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 323 
 
 and whereby also, after all the various units and various 
 groups of units had been trained and drilled, whole fleets and 
 whole armies were trained and drilled in exercising as en- 
 tireties. 
 
 Of course, all the exercises had to be carried on with the 
 utmost possible seriousness, and after the most careful prep- 
 aration in every case; in order not only that they should be 
 carried on skilfully as matters of tactics, but that they should 
 be of such a kind, and carried on in such a way, as to get the 
 most beneficial results as matters of strategy. 
 
 It is obvious that, in order to exercise a ship, one must first 
 procure the ship ; that, in order to exercise a soldier with his 
 rifle, one must first procure the soldier and his rifle. After 
 the ship in the one case, and the soldier with his rifle in the 
 other case, have been procured, they must then be drilled ; that 
 is, logistics having secured the material, tactics must handle 
 it. But what agency is going to arrange that logistics shall 
 get the material and that tactics shall handle it ? Strategy. 
 
 It is apparent that, in order to arrange that logistics shall 
 provide the material, and especially to arrange what material 
 logistics shall provide, the task of strategy is difficult. And 
 it is also apparent that, in order to arrange that tactics shall 
 handle the material, and to direct the ways in which tactics 
 shall handle the material, the task of strategy is difficult. It 
 is apparent also that the first task of strategy is to decide 
 what material logistics shall supply; second, to see that logis- 
 tics does supply it ; third, to decide in what ways tactics shall 
 handle the various kinds of material ; and, fourth, to see that 
 tactics does so handle them. In dealing with both logistics 
 and tactics, therefore, the first thing for strategy to do is to 
 plan, and the second is to execute. Of these two tasks, only 
 the first is distinctively the task of strategy; for the second, 
 that of executing, is mainly left to the logistical officers in one 
 case, and to the tactical officers in the other case. 
 
 This means that the planning of strategy is mainly the 
 planning of the work that logistics and tactics are to do.
 
 324 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Strategy says, for instance, that it wants a battleship of a 
 certain power, speed, and steaming distance, and tells logistics 
 to provide it. Logistics tells the constructors to design and 
 build the hull, the ordnance officers to design and construct the 
 battery and armor, and the engineers to design and make the 
 engines. Similar principles govern the relations between 
 strategy and tactics, and they apply to all the preparations, 
 great and small, whereby in time of peace strategy prepares 
 for war. 
 
 It will be noted that, although we use the technical terms 
 strateg3^, logistics, and tactics here, they are merely technical 
 terms as applied to a special art, and indicate the same suc- 
 cessive steps as follow each other in every undertaking in life : 
 planning to do, securing the means wherewith to do, and doing. 
 
 We have seen how the progress of warfare, beginning with 
 the warfare between two men who used their fists alone, has 
 been gradually developed and complicated by the invention 
 and use of means to assist and supplement the fists during 
 more than five thousand years. The use of the human arms 
 being not only to inflict blows with the fists, but also to parry 
 blows from the antagonist's fists, they have always been em- 
 ployed, not only for striking, but also for parrying. To sup- 
 plement the use of the arm in parrying, the shield was invented 
 before the time when recorded history began; the shield dif- 
 fering from the arm in the sense that it was used to oppose 
 resistance only, and not to inflict blows. So, in the develop- 
 ment of armies and navies, the employment of troops and ves- 
 sels to parry an attack by interposing themselves in the line 
 of the attack, was supplemented by various kinds of shields; 
 such as armor of hide and steel on the bodies of men and 
 horses, defensive edifices, walls and ramparts, and heavy 
 plates of specialized steel, secured on the outside of the struc- 
 tures of ships and forts. 
 
 It is plain, therefore, that the highly complicated armies 
 and navies that fought the last Great War were merely the 
 developments of primeval fighters, and differed from them
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 325 
 
 not in kind but in degree. In the same way, the modern city 
 of New York differs from a savage village ; for in both we see 
 human beings essentially alike, living together in houses, di- 
 vided into families, subsisting on food and water, and gov- 
 erned by such rules as are necessary, in order that those bodies 
 of people may live together in comparative tranquillity. To 
 render this possible, a highly complex condition of society has 
 had to be developed. For some reason of which we are not 
 apprised, certain tribes (only a few) achieved civilization and 
 built cities, and a very few have developed into great nations. 
 Those great nations have, both as a cause and an effect, devel- 
 oped highl}' complicated armies and highly complicated navies. 
 We do not know why it should be, but it seems to be a fact 
 that no nation has ever been able to attain a high degree of 
 civilization, or to maintain it afterward, without developing a 
 highly complicated army and navy. A nation seems to have 
 natural enemies, as a man does, these enemies being both ex- 
 ternal and internal. In the case of a nation, the enemies are 
 foreign nations and barbarians outside, and unruly elements, 
 now comprised under the general name of " bolsheviki, " inside. 
 In the case of a man, his enemies are other men outside and 
 noxious bacilli inside. In all cases, strength is needed to over- 
 come the external and internal enemies, and live in health. 
 
 The simple club gave way to weapons that consisted of more 
 than one part, and gradually to weapons and appliances con- 
 sisting of many parts; that is, to what we call machines. 
 Now, a fundamental characteristic of a machine is that the 
 various parts are not mere aggregations of like parts, as are 
 the straws bundled together in a broom, but complicated ar- 
 rangement of dissimilar parts, having different functions, but 
 acting together under a common directing head, for the ac- 
 complishment of a common purpose. Such a machine is the 
 arm of a man, and such a machine is his entire body. The 
 body of a man, however, is of so much higher an order of ex- 
 cellence than any machine ever devised by man that it is not to 
 be described hj the word machine so accurately as by the word
 
 326 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 organism. No man has ever yet created an organism, but he 
 has invented and developed many machines. 
 
 The ordinary conception of the word machine is of an ap- 
 paratus, such as a steam engine, made mostly of iron and 
 brass ; but this is only one kind of machine. One of the defi- 
 nitions of machine in the Standard Dictionary is: "The 
 organization of the powers of any complex body : as, the ma- 
 chine of government"; so that an organization of human be- 
 ings is as much a machine as a steam engine is. And if this 
 organization includes men who handle machines of iron and 
 brass, and if those machines of iron and brass are essential to 
 the attainment of the end in view of the organization, those 
 men and those machines of iron and brass are parts of the 
 complete machine, just as the engine of an automobile is part 
 of the automobile, which itself is a machine. From this 
 point of view, a navy is a machine; and so is an army. 
 
 We now see that the work of peace strategy is to prepare 
 war machines: that the work of peace strategy in any nation 
 is to prepare a naval machine and a military machine. And 
 it is a little more than that: it is to prepare one great ma- 
 chine, of which the principal parts are a naval machine and 
 a military machine, which will work together for the common 
 purpose of the nation ; just as the separate parts of the naval 
 machine work together for the attainment of the task allotted 
 to the navy, and as the separate parts of the military machine 
 work together for the attainment of the task allotted to the 
 army. 
 
 It is an obvious fact that there is in no country any other 
 machine comparable in cost, complexity, and importance with 
 its national defense machine. Therefore it is evident that in 
 no other single work of the nation is there so much need for 
 accurate and energetic work, and therefore for trained char- 
 acter and skill. For it may be pointed out that, if two cou7i- 
 tries go to war, the result of the war will depend on the rela- 
 tive effectiveness of the two machines that they put forth, 
 and upon nothing else whatever; because the effectiveness of
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 327 
 
 each machine is a product of all the factors of strength and 
 skill, of material and personnel, that go to make them up. 
 When two pugilists meet in the arena, or when two great 
 armies meet on the field of battle, or two great fleets meet on 
 the ocean, the battle has already been decided. Mortals do 
 not know how it has been decided; but this is because they 
 do not know what are the relative degrees of efficiency and 
 strength of the two machines. 
 
 We see, therefore, that the work of strategy in peace is to 
 produce a national defense machine, and that the first stage 
 in the production is to design it. As the machine consists 
 primarily of two cooperating machines, a navy and an army, 
 and as in every country the amount of money to be spent on 
 national defense varies with the wealth and strategic position 
 of the country, the first thing to decide in each country is 
 whether the navy or the army shall be the major machine, and 
 have the major part of the money expended on it. In Great 
 Britain, the United States, Japan, Australia, and Argentine, 
 it seems obvious that the navy should be the major part of the 
 machine ; and that in France and other European continental 
 countries the army should be the major part. Because of 
 the facts that three quarters of the earth is covered with 
 water, and that the greatest countries will in the future be 
 countries that border on the ocean, it seems probable that in 
 every great country the navy will, in the future, be the major 
 part of the machine. The coming of aeronautics will tend to 
 make this probability the greater, because aeronautics will 
 extend the power of navies much more than it will extend the 
 power of armies. It is not improbable, however, that aero- 
 nautics may become such a powerful factor in war that it will 
 become a separate branch and not an accessory to an army or 
 a navy. If this should come to pass, the national defense ma- 
 chine will consist of three parts instead of two. 
 
 In designing the machine or any of its parts, the strategist 
 will naturally follow a course such as any man follows in de-
 
 328 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 signing an engine, planning a house, or embarking on any- 
 undertaking whatever ; that is, he will consider carefully what 
 the machine is intended to accomplish, what are the difficul- 
 ties in the way, such as cost, etc., and what are the means that 
 he has available, such as money, material on hand, etc. After 
 considering these three factors, he will design the machine. 
 
 In naval and military affairs, this process, as has been fre- 
 quently stated in this book, is gone through by following a 
 method that was devised by the German general staff, called 
 the estimate of the situation method. By it every military 
 or naval problem — in fact, many problems in daily life — may 
 be solved. It is perhaps the greatest single contribution to 
 strategy ever made; and it is, furthermore, a great contribu- 
 tion to civilization in general, and one of which people might 
 profitably avail themselves more often than they do. It is 
 applicable strategically not only to any great problem, such as 
 the designing of the military or naval machine, but also to 
 each one of the great divisions and subdivisions into which 
 every great problem becomes ultimately divided as we proceed 
 with its solution. An essential beauty of it is that it enables 
 one to solve any problem unconfused by details, leaving the 
 details to be solved later as separate though similar problems. 
 It enables one, for instance, to plan a navy as a whole, uncon- 
 fused by the details of each kind of ship, or kind of base, 
 or kind of organization; and then to make for each of these 
 problems a separate estimate of the situation. 
 
 Of course, the United States navy was not designed in this 
 way; but that is a misfortune, and it accounts for the hap- 
 hazard way in which it grew, and the enormous amount of 
 money that it cost. If an engineer should build an engine with- 
 out making any plans for it beforehand, but by simply making 
 a number of parts and then putting them together afterward, 
 he would produce a result somewhat like that actually pro- 
 duced in our navy. In the last few years this state of affairs 
 has been improved upon, largely through the teachings of our 
 Naval War College. A better machine is the result.
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 329 
 
 As an aid to designing an army, and to a greater degree a 
 navy, abundant use has been made in later years of war 
 games. Moltke realized that in time of peace officers got no 
 training for war except in manoeuvering their companies, regi- 
 ments, divisions, and corps, in what may be called "parade- 
 ground tactics"; and that it was possible for an officer to 
 handle his men with excellent skilly and yet have no clear idea 
 in his mind as to why he was moving them about, or as to what 
 he would do with them against an actual enemy. He realized 
 that such an officer would be skilful in the way in which a 
 swordsman would be skilful, who could brandish his sword 
 with strength and quickness, but who had never met an actual 
 opponent, even in the fencing-room. He therefore devised 
 problems in which tactical situations and strategical situations 
 were stated ; and officers were required to solve them : that is, 
 each officer was required to state in writing what he would do 
 in each situation. 
 
 In this way, Moltke gave each officer a training comparable 
 to the training that a fencer gets by being pitted against an 
 antagonist in the fencing-room : for the mind of each officer 
 was confronted with the necessity of overcoming an active 
 enemy, and therefore of having to take into account his prob- 
 able and possible moves, and his own facilities for meeting 
 them. He was also compelled to come to a prompt decision as 
 to what he would do. To aid in solving some of the problems, 
 or parts of the problems, the Kriegspiel, or war-game, was in- 
 vented, in which the actual forces engaged were represented 
 in miniature, and made to fight against each other in mimic 
 battles, under certain carefully prescribed rules that tried to 
 take into account all the varying conditions and sequence of 
 incidents that were probable. 
 
 The usefulness of the war-game in designing the naval or 
 military machine, or parts of it, lies mainly in the fact that in 
 any given game, different kinds of ships, or different kinds of 
 military organizations, or weapons, can be introduced, and 
 mimic battles fought out, or mimic operations conducted, with
 
 330 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the idea of ascertaining which kind of ship or organization or 
 weapon is the best. The analogy is evident, of course, be- 
 tween this way of using the war-game and the experimental 
 department of every large manufacturing institution ; for it is 
 the intention of most experiments, at least in their earliest 
 stages, to try out large schemes, and parts of large schemes, 
 with models that represent them in miniature. 
 
 In designing the national defense machine, or any of its 
 parts, it is obvious that the persons who make the experi- 
 ments, and afterward the design, should be experts; that is, 
 they should be experts if the best results are to be obtained 
 for the money allotted. That the designing has often been 
 made by people with almost no knowledge of the subject, 
 however, has been the history of all navies, except perhaps the 
 German and Japanese. In designing our navy, for instance, 
 the people who designed the navy as a whole have usually 
 been members of Congress; though the people who have de- 
 signed the individual ships, guns, etc., have been experts. 
 For this reason, the individual ships and guns have been bet- 
 ter than the navy as a whole. The Congressmen have de- 
 signed the machine as a whole, and the experts the little parts. 
 
 The naval or military machine having been designed as a 
 whole by Congressmen (that is, it having been decided, for 
 instance, that the navy should consist of so many ships of such 
 and such classes, and of so many officers and men of such and 
 such classes), the actual building of the machine has been 
 carried on by experts in the various departments. That is, 
 ordnance officers have built the guns and gun-carriages; con- 
 structors have built the ships; engineer officers have con- 
 structed the forts in the army and the engines in the navy; 
 electrical officers have made the electrical apparatus, etc. This 
 part of the task, the actual mechanical work, and even the de- 
 signing of the mechanisms, does not, of course, fall within the 
 province of strategy, but of logistics. 
 
 But, while the purely logistical details of vessels, forts, 
 guns, etc., may be decided by men skilled in designing such
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 331 
 
 details, we cannot too clearly hold it in our minds that the 
 design of the machine as a whole must be made by experts 
 who comprehend the mission of the machine as a whole, the 
 difficulties in the way of accomplishing the mission, and the 
 means available for accomplishing it — ^that is, by strategists. 
 After the macliine as a whole has been produced, there is a 
 work that this machine as a whole can accomplish, and this 
 work is, in its ultimate effect, strategic. The barbarians in 
 all history have been defeated because civilized men brought 
 against them machines that wrought ultimately their strategic 
 defeat. It is true that these machines (for instance, batter- 
 ing-rams, ballista, and muskets) were not of themselves 
 strategic machines, but rather mechanical machines. Never- 
 theless, they were brought into use to accomplish strategic 
 purposes, and were designed in their basic features by men 
 who understood their strategic usefulness. Had they been 
 designed by men who did not have this understanding, they 
 would have been ineffective strategically, no matter how ex- 
 cellent they were mechanically. 
 
 The climax of the development of war appliances occurred 
 in the last Great War, when the Germans brought to bear 
 against the Allies, on both the land and the sea, weapons and 
 scientific mechanisms that were better than the Allies had. 
 While this statement is true of both the armies and the navies, 
 it is more strikingly true in regard to the navies, especially 
 in regard to the German navy and the British navy. The 
 British navy was the most powerful navy in the world, and it 
 held the longest continuous record of success of any military 
 or naval organization in the world ; whereas the German navy 
 was comparatively new — had, in fact, been considered a first- 
 class navy for hardly ten years, and held no record of achieve- 
 ment whatever. Yet at the battle of Jutland, as shown con- 
 clusively by Admiral Jellicoe's book, "The Grand Fleet," the 
 German naval machine proved itself to be better than the 
 British, although it was not so large. 
 
 Even the German machine was defective, however, in that
 
 332 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 there had not been incorporated in it (in any adequate de- 
 gree) the greatest new agency in warfare invented since the 
 gun — the flying-macliine. In Germany this first appeared in 
 the form of the Zeppelin dirigible balloon, and in the United 
 States in the form of the airplane. Both had been developed 
 to the point of practicability before August, 1914, the Zep- 
 pelin in the higher degree. The first serious development of 
 the airplane by a government was in Italy, the next in Ger- 
 many, and the next in England ; so that when the war opened 
 both types were available, but the Zeppelin the more so. The 
 exigencies of the war developed the airplane more rapidly than 
 they did the dirigible balloon, so that by the end of the war 
 there was a tremendous aviation corps in each army and navy, 
 and important results were gained by them. In fact, the re- 
 sults were so great that one is inclined to marvel that Germany 
 had not used a greater degree of foresight in developing the 
 airplane before the war began, for she had shown a foresight 
 unprecedented since the time of Moltke in her preparations 
 for the war. 
 
 With regard to countries other than Germany, one does not 
 incline to marvel, because they showed little war foresight of 
 any kind. As to Germany, the simplest explanation seems to 
 be that her attention had been so wholly engrossed with the 
 preparations she had already made, culminating in the pro- 
 duction of a really practical submarine, her preparations had 
 been so complete before the advent of the airplane, and the 
 material at her disposal was so wholly obligated by the re- 
 quirements of existing weapons and appliances, that she had 
 hardly the time or the means for adequately developing the 
 airplane in addition. Before the war had finished, however, 
 it was clear that if the countries of either the Teuton or the 
 Allied side had estimated correctly the possibilities of the air- 
 plane, and had developed it as energetically as they could 
 have done, that side would have won the victory, and quickly ; 
 with great saving in lives and suffering and money. 
 
 Before the war there had been considerable discussion in
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 333 
 
 Great Britain as to the advisability of reorganizing the Ad- 
 miralty, and making it more like the German Admiralty ; but 
 this was not done, except in a small degree. Judged by the 
 results as shown in the battle of Jutland, by the success of 
 the submarine, and by the fact that the British Admiralty 
 later did adopt a system that is virtually a general staff sys- 
 tem, the German system was the better. Now, by the German 
 system the planning of the navy was done entirely by the gen- 
 eral staff, that is, by strategists. 
 
 The result of the competitive test of the two systems in war 
 was exactly what could have been expected, as Admiral Jelli- 
 coe's book and certain public statements of Admiral Beatty 
 abundantly set forth. If the British navy had been as well de- 
 signed strategically as the German navy, there would not have 
 been that deficiency in destroyers, submarines, and aircraft, 
 and that comparative inefficiency of armor-piercing shell, pro- 
 tective decks, and searchlights, that Jellicoe points out. It 
 may be answered that strategy has nothing whatever to do 
 with the kind of armor on the side of a ship or the kind of 
 steel of which a shell is made. To this the answer may be 
 that if, in any navy, strategy has no voice in these matters, 
 the results will be such as were with the British na\y at the 
 battle of Jutland; but that if strategic experts do control in 
 these matters, they will see to it that the logistical officers 
 supply the strategically best material that can be supplied; 
 and a Grand Fleet will not be handicapped by inadequacy in 
 small craft and defective material, and made unable to achieve 
 victory over a much smaller fleet. 
 
 It may be pointed out here that a logistical officer is not so 
 immediately concerned with victory or defeat, does not so 
 clearly apprehend the factors that secure it, and is not so 
 much on edge as a strategical officer, whose whole life is spent 
 in the endeavor to attain actual victory under the strategical 
 conditions that the next war will bring forth. 
 
 It is important for us to see clearly that, no matter how well 
 designed the various parts of any machine may be (such as a
 
 334 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 navy or an army, or a national defense machine comprising 
 both), the ultimate value of the machine is what the machine 
 as a whole can do. "The strength of a chain is the strength 
 of the weakest link." This is an old saying, and it may be 
 applied without much qualification to any machine, and even 
 to any man when subjected to great strain. No matter how 
 fine armor a ship may have, or how powerful her guns, or 
 how magnificent her engines, she is very weak below the water- 
 line, and will be disabled and perhaps sunk if penetrated 
 there : no matter how perfect she is in other ways, a compara- 
 tively small disablement to her engines, boilers, pumps, or 
 condensers will restrict and perhaps destroy her mobility : no 
 matter how strong a man otherwise may be, a weak heart 
 will reduce his strength, sometimes to zero, if ever his strength 
 is sorely taxed. Therefore it is essential that a navy or an 
 army shall be designed as a whole, and its parts designed 
 afterward ; as is the procedure in the case of a ship or a house, 
 or any thing constructed in the usual line of business. For 
 the same reason that nobody but an expert architect can de- 
 sign a house, that nobody but an expert constructor can de- 
 sign a ship, and that nobody but an expert engineer can design 
 an engine, so nobody but an expert strategist can design that 
 great strategic machine, an army or a navy. 
 
 In thinking of the designing of the military or naval ma- 
 chine, we must not forget that the men are the most important 
 part of each machine ; and that, therefore, the numerous ques- 
 tions that come up in regard to the men, not only the details 
 of the organizations but the total numbers needed, should be 
 decided by the requirements of strategy, as interpreted by ex- 
 perts in that art. 
 
 Apologies are hereby tendered for dilating at such length 
 on what may seem an obvious proposition. The excuse is the 
 paramount importance of the subject, the fact that the prin- 
 ciple involved has never been recognized in this country, and 
 the further fact that in consequence enormous sums of money 
 have been wasted.
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 335 
 
 While the most important part of the work of desiring 
 the machine must be along the regular lines of planning, 
 much attention (that will probably have to increase as time 
 goes on) must be devoted to the production of new appliances, 
 especially of new offensive weapons. It is obvious that if 
 one side can bring into a war, ready for use and with men 
 trained to use it, an absolutely new weapon, a tremendous ad- 
 vantage will be gained; because the other side will not know 
 how to protect themselves against it. Examples of this 
 dimly apprehended truth are numerous in history; but the 
 most startling examples are the M&rrimac and the Monitor. 
 It is true that before the Merrimac appeared at Hampton 
 Roads the Northerners knew that she was being prepared; 
 but they did not know it long enough in advance to enable 
 them to oppose any resistance worthy of the name; with the 
 result that the Merrimac destroyed the Cumberland and the 
 Congress on the very day that she left the Norfolk Navy 
 Yard, and threatened to destroy the ships of the Union navy 
 in succession, bombard our coast cities, and prevent any block- 
 ade of the Confederate coast. If she had accomplished this, 
 victory in the war would have gone to the Southern side. 
 But, fortunately, John Ericsson, many years before, had de- 
 signed a type of vessel that he called a Monitor; and, not long 
 after the war began, he had persuaded the Union government 
 to make a contract vnth. him for its construction, and to detail 
 a crew to man her. The victory of the Monitor over the Mer- 
 rimac on the day following the destruction of the Cumberland 
 and Congress turned the scales the other way, and assured 
 victory for the Union in the war. 
 
 Similar cases, which are next in order of importance, oc- 
 curred during the war just ended, in which the Germans 
 brought into use weapons that their antagonists did not know 
 existed — such as the long-range mortars that dropped high 
 explosives on top of the Belgian forts, and appliances for 
 using noxious gasas. In addition, they had improved the 
 submarine and the art of mine-laying to a degree far beyond
 
 336 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 that which they had permitted to be known; with the result 
 that the magnificent British navy, almost in sight of its own 
 coast, was comparatively helpless against them. The Ger- 
 mans had also developed their spy system to a degree unheard 
 of before, and therefore new ; so that during the early stages 
 of the war the Allies, and especially the British, found them- 
 selves fighting against secret enemies within their own borders. 
 
 The fact that the Germans went down, finally, in disastrous 
 defeat must not beguile us into making the illogical inference 
 that w'e have nothing to learn in strategy from them. We 
 must in honesty admit that the Germans have been preceptors 
 in strategy to all the world since the time of Moltke, and that 
 the fact that the German nation directed the strategy of the 
 German anny and navy to evil ends does not impugn the ex- 
 cellence of the strategy. Many bad men have had great 
 talents and devoted those talents to evil ends; but this fact 
 does not blind logical men to the fact that those bad men 
 had talents. It is an axiom in strategy that one must learn 
 all he can from his enemies, and that it is the height of folly 
 to underestimate an enemy in any way. Exactly how many 
 new things we shall be able to learn from the Germans in mat- 
 ters of strategy we shall not know until all the history of the 
 war has been written and the campaigns analyzed; but we 
 know now, and we have known for more than four years, that 
 the Germans showed the world how enormous is the value of 
 bringing new weapons and appliances suddenly and unexpect- 
 edly into use at the beginning of a war. 
 
 The Germans could not have done this except under the 
 guidance and inspiration of strategists, whose vision took into 
 account not only the operations of fleets and armies, but the 
 scientific and the mechanical appliances which it was the effort 
 of those operations to bring to bear against an enemy. This 
 shows that at the present day the strategist who completely 
 fulfils his mission must he to a considerable degree an engineer, 
 and must have enough of the inventor in his composition to 
 he possessed of an imagination that will enable him to visual-
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 337 
 
 ize the possibilities of new methods and appliances that may he 
 proposed. If, like CoBsar, he can invent instruments and 
 methods and original plans himself, let his country^ 's enemies 
 beware. 
 
 The machine having been designed and built, the next step 
 is to prepare it for use. As far as the activities of strategy 
 are concerned, this preparation is almost wholly of the per- 
 sonnel ; because the preparing of the material engines and ap- 
 pliances is the task of logistics, though it must be performed 
 to the satisfaction of strategy. 
 
 The task of preparation divides itself naturally into two 
 parts — tactical preparation and strategical preparation. 
 
 The tactical preparation is that needed to insure that, in the 
 day of battle, each gun's crew, each engine-room force, each 
 signal force, each destroyer, each submarine, each vessel of 
 every kind, each division of vessels, each squadron of vessels, 
 and the fleet itself shall be manoeuvered skilfully; and that 
 similarly each squad, each company, each regiment, each divi- 
 sion, each corps, each army shall be manoeuvered skilfuUy; 
 and that in the aeronautical branch each unit and each force, 
 of whatever kind or whatever size, shall be manoeuvered as a 
 unit skilfully. The principal single reason for the victories 
 of Alexander, in fighting against enemies greatly superior in 
 numbers, and possessed of similar weapons, was the splendid 
 precision with which the Grecian phalanx could be manoeu- 
 vered. As an army is merely a machine, Alexander had a 
 better machine than Darius; a machine that was better bal- 
 anced, less clumsy to direct, and less easily broken to pieces. 
 
 The larger the forces that one handles, the greater the ne- 
 cessity for drill, because the greater difficulty is in the way. 
 A man can be trained in a short time to handle a club or 
 sword or spear : it takes a longer time to train him to handle 
 a group of, say, ten men, armed with clubs and swords and 
 spears. It takes him a longer time to learn to handle a hun- 
 dred men so armed, or to handle ten men armed with more
 
 338 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 complicated weapons, sucli as muskets. That is, it takes him 
 a longer time to learn to handle them with the same degree of 
 skill and consequent effectiveness. In fact, he can never 
 learn to handle a large complex organization quite as effi- 
 ciently, in proportion to its size, as a small and simple one, 
 for the reason that his capacity as a man remains the same, 
 whereas the difficulties of the task increase. Let anybody 
 watch the lightning-like movements of the point of a skilled 
 fencer's foil, and then observe the sluggish manoeuvers of 
 even the best drilled fleet, or army corps, and the truth of this 
 remark will become apparent to him. 
 
 The distinctive difference between a club or sword and a 
 fleet or army is that the club or sword is a rigid unit, whose 
 parts cooperate with absolute perfection; whereas a fleet or 
 army is a machine whose parts are held together loosely in- 
 stead of rigidly, and with the handicap of great complexity 
 and consequent liability to fail in some part at almost any 
 moment. The whole endeavor of tactical drills, on land or sea 
 or in the air, is to make all the various parts cooperate as 
 well as possible. The father of Frederick the Great was hated 
 because of his harsh persistency in the drill of his soldiers; 
 but when his son hurled one of his divisions against one of the 
 loosely tied divisions of his enemy, the blow was like the blow 
 of a club against a bundle of fagots. Similarly, the dashing 
 Mamelukes of the Egyptian desert threw themselves in vain 
 against the sides of Napoleon's squares of thoroughly drilled 
 though half-ragged troops. 
 
 The tactical drills of armed forces are within the domain of 
 tactics rather than of strategy ; nevertheless their nature must 
 be prescribed by strategy, or they will serve no useful pur- 
 pose. It is a well known fact in naval and military history 
 that many tactical drills and many tactical formations and 
 manoeuvers were not devised under competent strategical di- 
 rection, and that in consequence they were not strategically 
 effective, and had to be discarded in the next war, and often 
 after some great disaster. An analogous case is that of ad-
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 339 
 
 hering to methods that were tactically good at one time or 
 under one set of conditions, but not good at a later time, after 
 new weapons had been introduced, or when the conditions 
 under which war was waged had considerably altered. Strat- 
 egy must see to it that tactics keeps its methods adapted to all 
 the changing conditions of the times. 
 
 After the various organizations have attained some degree 
 of proficiency in manceuvering, tactical exercises are held, 
 which differ from tactical drills in the sense that they have an 
 object in view beyond mere successful manceuvering. These 
 tactical exercises are usually so conducted that parts of a fleet 
 or army are pitted against other parts, and manoeuver for 
 tactical advantage, and sometimes fire blank charges at each 
 other. By this means, they not only simulate actual battles, 
 but gain practice in handling the various weapons, ascertain- 
 ing the range of the enemy under varying conditions, moving 
 large masses of men or vessels, etc., and test out systems of 
 fire-control, transmission of orders and information, etc., un- 
 der circumstances as close to those of battle as can be got with- 
 out using actual projectiles and killing men and injuring 
 ships. These tactical exercises are sometimes very exciting 
 indeed; and they are always interesting and always contain a 
 very considerable element of danger. No fleet and no army 
 can be prepared for war without such exercises, any more than 
 a pugilist can be prepared for a prize fight without engaging 
 in boxing bouts. 
 
 In order that tactical exercises may be of such a character 
 as to convey the most valuable lessons and impart the best 
 training to meet the probable circumstances of the next war, 
 they have to be carefully planned beforehand, both in their 
 general character and in the details; and this planning, of 
 course, is the task of strategy. The planning is usually done 
 by the general stafiP at the Admiralty or War Office, or by the 
 staffs of the commanders of the forces that are exercising. In 
 either case, the staff frequently assist themselves with the 
 game-board, and play games beforehand that represent in
 
 340 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 miniature the exercises they are planning. Occasionally an 
 exercise as actually carried out is a selection made from many 
 games that have been played on game-boards, or is a combina- 
 tion of several. The tactical exercises are sometimes at the 
 end of strategical exercises, in which forces that have been 
 separated from each other by great distances are brought to- 
 gether after a series of strategical operations more or less pro- 
 longed, and are then made to manoeuver against each other; 
 just as forces do after being brought together from a dis- 
 tance in real war. 
 
 Strategical exercises for both armies and fleets are the larg- 
 est operations carried on on the surface of the earth, except 
 strategic operations in actual war. Armies, consisting some- 
 times of hundreds of thousands of men, with mortars and 
 cannon and supplies and munitions and engineering imple- 
 ments and hospital appliances, are moved over hundreds of 
 miles, partly on railroad trains and partly on foot, and sud- 
 denly brought within sight of each other on a mimic field of 
 battle. In the Continental armies, and in those of Japan and 
 Argentine, the utmost possible importance is attached to these 
 operations by the nation; great expense is incurred; and the 
 undivided attention of all the forces engaged is concentrated 
 on the operations, not only during their actual continuance, 
 but during many weeks and sometimes months before. In 
 fact, the whole period of time between one series of grand 
 manceuvers and the next is one of preparation for the next. 
 By this sj^stem, the training of an army and of its various 
 parts becomes definite and forward-looking; it ceases to be 
 perfunctory and becomes objective; automaticity is pre- 
 vented; and the minds of all are kept in a continual state of 
 activity and expectancy. 
 
 The strategic exercises of navies are, of course, on a much 
 larger scale, because of the greater power of the units em- 
 ployed, the greater speed at which they move, and the greater 
 distances that they traverse. A strategic exercise that would 
 involve, for instance, an attack by the United States fleet on
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 341 
 
 the coast of Portugal would extend over the entire Atlantic 
 Ocean; and a strategic exercise involving an attack on the 
 coast of China would cover a great part of the Atlantic, the 
 Isthmus of Panama, and most of the North Pacific Ocean. 
 Over these large areas, dreadnoughts, costing more than $20,- 
 000,000 each, would move, accompanied by hosts of cruisers, 
 destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries of all kinds. 
 As a matter of fact, however, such large strategic exercises as 
 these have never been carried out, except in chart manceuvers, 
 as distinguished from strategic exercises. Many strategic ex- 
 ercises have been held, however, in which fleets manceuvered 
 over the spaces between England and Gibraltar, and between 
 Boston and the West Indies. 
 
 Strategic exercises, ending in tactical contacts, are the cul- 
 mination of the work of strategy, in peace. They bring to a 
 climax all the work of the strategist, the logistician, and the 
 tactician, in designing the naval or the military machine, and 
 in preparing it for war. In order that the exercises may be 
 of the maximum value in simulating the conditions of war, 
 and therefore in gaining the most valuable strategic, logisti- 
 cal, and tactical experience possible, the reserves must be 
 called out, and the navy or army put on a war footing; for 
 otherwise a condition quite untiTie as a picture of war will be 
 made, difficulties that would appear in war will not appear, 
 and the whole performance will lack adequacy and complete- 
 ness, and therefore truthfulness. 
 
 For this reason, the grand manceuvers in the Continental 
 armies, and in the most important European navies, have been 
 preceded by a mobilization of the entire military or naval 
 forces, and all arrangements have been made to simulate war 
 as accurately as possible. The strategists of the principal Eu- 
 ropean armies and navies, ever since the day of Moltke, have 
 realized that when a nation enters into war the preparations 
 she has made before the war in designing, building, and pre- 
 paring her national defense machine are the determining fac- 
 tors, and the only determining factors, as to the way in which
 
 342 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 that machine will operate during the war. After a war has 
 begun, the two contesting machines are like two pugilists who 
 have started to fight. It is too late then to rectify any mis- 
 takes or supply any omissions. 
 
 This being the case, does it not seem a matter of the com- 
 monest kind of common sense to have the designing and pre- 
 paring of an army and a navy made under the guidance of 
 strategy, interpreted and carried out by experts? When 
 hundreds of millions are spent on national defense, why not 
 try to get the greatest amount of defense in return ? 
 
 The prime necessity in any naval or military machine is, of 
 course, that it shall be ready to start on war operations as 
 soon as a war breaks out ; for otherwise it may be defeated im- 
 mediately by a machine that is ready, as the French army was 
 in 1870 by the Prussian. In the days not long gone by, before 
 the great industrial movement had filled navies and armies 
 with almost an infinity of complicated apparatus of all kinds, 
 a navy or an army could quickly and easily pass from a 
 peace footing to a war footing. Moltke was the first man to 
 realize adequately the additional requirements in the way of 
 preparation entailed by the progress of civilization; and he 
 met them by organizing and training a body of officers who 
 should have charge of making the numerous and complicated 
 preparations needed. To this body of men, which now exist 
 in every considerable navy and army, the name general staff 
 has been given in our language. The United States army 
 had no such body of men until about the year 1902, when 
 Elihu Root as Secretary of War succeeded in having a gen- 
 eral staff established for the army, against strenuous opposi- 
 tion from politicians. Politicians naturally saw in a general 
 staff a curb to their activities in managing such matters as 
 the composition of the army, the selection of officers for high 
 positions, the distribution of army posts throughout the coun- 
 try, etc. 
 
 But the navy was unable to secure a general staff because 
 of political opposition; so that, when the probability of our
 
 STRATEGY IN PEACE 343 
 
 becoming involved in the World War became manifest, a situ- 
 ation highly dangerous arose. As Aid for Operations, I 
 was responsible, under the Secretary, for the strategy of the 
 navy. After the war broke out in August, 1914, the danger 
 of our navy being dragged into war while unprepared became 
 so alarming that I secretly induced Representative Ilobson to 
 introduce a provision into the Naval Appropriation Bill for 
 a general staff. To avoid opposition, we agreed not to use the 
 word general staff, and to use instead tlie words "Office of 
 Naval Operations." The provision was eventually adopted 
 and incorporated in the Naval Appropriation Bill and ap- 
 proved by the President, though in a somewhat emasculated 
 form. In March, 1916, in the course of official testimony be- 
 fore the House Naval Committee, I made an argument in 
 favor of putting into the pending appropriation bill those 
 provisions pertaining to the Office of Naval Operations that 
 had been left out of the previous bill, and at the same time 
 informed the committee that I was the author of the provi- 
 sion which Mr. Hobson had introduced. My plea was heeded ; 
 and the bill, as eventually passed and approved by the Presi- 
 dent in August, 1916, contained virtually all the provisions 
 originally suggested. This gave the navy a general staff, 
 though it was not called by that name. The Navy Depart- 
 ment, of course, obeyed the law ; and the result was that when 
 the United States navy entered the Great War in April, 1917, 
 it entered fairly well prepared, and with an organization that 
 could handle the navy effectively. 
 
 It may seem out of place in a book of this kind to recount 
 a personal experience; it may seem an exhibition of mere 
 vanity. Perhaps it is ; but I have decided to narrate it for the 
 following reasons : 
 
 (1) Personal experiences, when narrated in connection with 
 an important matter, have great efficacy in bringing the main 
 points of what might otherwise seem an academic question 
 into clear relief. 
 
 (2) One of the objects of this book is to impress upon the
 
 344 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 people of the country the importance of strategy, and the ne- 
 cessity of a comprehension of its elementary principles by the 
 voters of the nation. Now, this personal experience is irre- 
 futable proof that no such knowledge existed before the war; 
 for, if it had existed, it would not have been necessary, in 
 order to insure the national safety, for the officer who occu- 
 pied the highest position in the navy to risk his commission 
 and jeopardize his entire professional career by secretly in- 
 fluencing Congress, and thereby deliberately disobeying the 
 United States navy regulations.
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 
 
 WE have seen that the effort of strategy in peace is 
 to design, build, and prepare a national defense 
 machine. When two nations go to war, therefore, 
 they put forward two machines to operate against each other ; 
 in practice, two naval machines operate against each other, 
 and two military machines operate against each other. 
 
 The simplest conception of two fleets or two armies operat- 
 ing against each other is that the two fleets range opposite 
 each other in parallel columns, and shoot at each other across 
 the space between; or that two armies line up against each 
 other, face to face, and shoot across the space between. Ac- 
 tual battles of this kind have been fought; but, as a rule, 
 fleets and armies have been brought into battles as a result of 
 an attempt by one side or the other to begin the battle with 
 a tactical advantage of some kind. 
 
 The tactical advantage desired has usually been of the na- 
 ture of concentration upon an inferior force or part of the 
 enemy, so placed that it could receive but little assistance from 
 other parts of the force. If the enemy force has been divided 
 into separated parts, the endeavor has usually taken the form 
 of an attack on one of the separated parts by a force stronger 
 than itself; if the enemy force has been concentrated, the 
 endeavor has usually taken the form of an attack on one of 
 his flanks or his line of communications, or an attempt to pene- 
 trate his line. In case the enemy is concentrated, but is infe- 
 rior in numbers, skill, or otherwise, the endeavor has sometimes 
 been to envelop or surround him. Obviously, if envelopment 
 or surrounding can be effected, greater results can be obtained 
 
 345
 
 346 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 than by any other form of attack, because the enemy is thereby 
 immobilized. Obviously also, it is more difficult to achieve. 
 
 Attention may be here invited to Tables I and II (pages 
 58 and 60), which show why it is desirable to attack two 
 separated parts of any enemy rather than both together ; and 
 why success may be achieved, even if the aggregate of those 
 two forces is greater than the attacking force. 
 
 We can see this clearly if we consult Table I, and note that, 
 if two forces each aggregating 1000 were in each other's vicin- 
 ity, and if the entire force A was able to engage half of B, 
 or 500, it would whip half of B, and have 841 remaining with 
 which to engage the other half (500) of B. Reference to 
 the end of the third period in this table shows also that if a 
 force of 789 engages a force of 523, it will have 569 left after 
 the other has been reduced to zero. Therefore, a force of 
 1000 that engages two forces of 500 separately will have more 
 than 500 left, after those two forces have been reduced to zero ; 
 whereas, if it engages both when they are united, both sides 
 will be gradually reduced to zero, remaining equal all the 
 time. 
 
 It is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to 
 most of the operations of strategy and tactics; how (the me- 
 chanical tools in the way of men, ships, guns, torpedoes, and 
 equipment having been supplied) the key to their successful 
 use is simply to take advantage of all opportunities of isolat- 
 ing one part of the enemy's force from the rest, and then at- 
 tacking one of the parts with a force superior to it. Oppor- 
 tunities lacking, one must, of course, try to create opportuni- 
 ties by inducing the enemy to detach some part of his force, 
 under circumstances in which you ean attack it, or the weak- 
 ened main body, with a superior force. Naturally, ane must 
 try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy. 
 
 This does not mean that the sole effort of operations is 
 finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort 
 is t3 force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and 
 to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. Be-
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 347 
 
 fore the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, 
 however, the strategy of each commander is to bring about a 
 situation in which his force shall have the advantage. The 
 advantage having been gained and recognized (or an advan- 
 tage existing and being recognized), strategy insists on forc- 
 ing a battle, for the reason that every contest weakens the 
 loser more than it does the winner. 
 
 This does not mean that it is alwaj^s wise to engage a 
 weaker force that is temporarily separated from its main 
 body. It is readily understandable, for instance, that it 
 would be unwise in two cases : 
 
 (1) A case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, 
 and were part of a force so much larger than the total of the 
 smaller force, that the gain as between the two forces ac- 
 tually engaged would not be great enough to compensate for 
 the loss entailed. For instance, a reference to Table I shows 
 that an A force of 1000 engaging a B force of 800 would have 
 569 left when B was reduced to zero. This is impressive; 
 but if the B force of 800 were a part of a total B force of 
 2000 — in other words, if there were another B force of 1200 
 near at hand — A would have 569 left with which to oppose 
 1200, a proportion little less advantageous than the propor- 
 tion he started with— 1000 to 2000. 
 
 (2) A case in which the B force may have divided with the 
 express purpose of luring A to attack ; arrangements having 
 been made whereby an inferior B force would simply hold 
 the A force until the rest of the B force could come to its 
 assistance; arrangements having been also made that this 
 should be accomplished before the detached part of B should 
 get very badly damaged. 
 
 Attention is invited to Table II, which is a continuation of 
 Table I. It represents what would happen if a force of 1000 
 should fight separately two forces, one of 800 and the other 
 of 200. In column 1, A is supposed to have engaged the 
 force of 200 first, and so to have become reduced to 970 (see 
 Table I) and to engage 800 afterward. In column 2, A is sup-
 
 348 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 posed to have engaged 800 first, thereby becoming reduced to 
 569 (see Table I), and then to engage the force of 200. The 
 table indicates that it makes no practical difference whether 
 A engages the stronger or the weaker force first. 
 
 Column 3 shows that a force of 841 (the part remaining 
 after the force of 1000 had annihilated a force of 500) would 
 have 653 left after annihilating a second force of 500. 
 
 ,B' 
 
 
 Fi^.l 
 
 A 
 
 ..^B 
 
 M. 
 
 ^^^* 
 
 A 
 
 FJg.Z 
 ...B 
 
 A'...--'" ,£' 
 
 Taken in connection with columns 1 and 2, this indicates that 
 it is easier to defeat two separated equal forces than two sep- 
 arated unequal forces of the same aggregate value; that the 
 weakest way in which to divide a force is into equal parts. 
 This fact is mathematically demonstrated by Mr. F. W. Lan- 
 chester in a recent book called "Air craft in Warfare." 
 
 The act of engaging the separate parts of a force is 
 usually spoken of as "concentration"; but the word "isola- 
 tion" seems better, for the reason that the advantage results 
 from the fact that the part attacked is isolated from and 
 unsupported by the other parts. This case is represented by 
 Fig. 1, in which A and A' fire on B, which is unsupported by 
 B'. The case in which B is supported by B' is indicated in 
 Fig. 2, That there is no advantage in merely "concentrat- 
 ing" on B is shown by Table III; for, while B is rapidly re- 
 duced in power by the concentrated fire of A and A', and A
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 
 
 349 
 
 and A' are more slowly reduced by the fire of B, B' is not re- 
 duced at all, and continues to fire at A and A', and therefore 
 to reduce their power. 
 
 TABLE III 
 
 fiiisJJI aggregate.... 1000 
 
 Value of offensive at beginning ■< g — 500 5 
 
 i gi — 500 I aggregate — 1000 
 
 I Ai- In 1 aggregate.... 50 
 
 Damage done in first period by A -^ ~ Vnl 
 
 Ibi= 50 J aggregate.... 50 
 
 I 4i = !^2J aggregate.... 900 '] 
 
 Valued offensive power at end of first period ■< „ ~ Ann \ >■ 
 
 [|i = 500 I aggregate.... 900 | 
 
 I fi= 4^ (aggregate.... 90 ] 
 
 Damage done in second period by .s ij — aji ! > 
 
 Lii= |^( aggregate.... 90 | 
 
 In reading accounts of strategical and tactical operations 
 we see three words used continually : force, quickness, and 
 direction. The word force as here used is not force in the 
 engineering or mathematical sense, but denotes material 
 masses in the sense of numbers of soldiers and numbers and 
 sizes of ships and guns. It is comparable to the weight of a 
 club; while quickness means, of course, speed of movement. 
 Therefore, the three words that we see used so constantly in 
 military annals mean the same things as do the factors in 
 any blows that are struck: mass, velocity, and direction. 
 
 The effect of anj- blow is overcoming resistance. It is meas- 
 ured in mechanics by the mass that delivers the blow and 
 the square of the velocity with which it strikes. The mathe- 
 matical formula is E = V2M V^. In this formula, M is the 
 mass of the weapon that delivers the blow, and is proportional 
 
 to the weight. Mathematically speaking, m = -^, where w is 
 the weight and g is the acceleration of gravity. Whenever 
 a blow overcomes the resistance of a body, it does it by virtue 
 of the energy, or work, stored up in it, which is expended in 
 doing work in overcoming the resistance of the resisting body. 
 If a club breaks in the skull of a man, or an arrow pierces his 
 flesh, or a rifle projectile penetrates the armor of a battle-
 
 350 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 ship, the energy is expended in overcoming the resistance of 
 the skull, the flesh, or the armor through a given distance. 
 The office of the skull, flesh, or armor is to protect vital 
 parts from such blows, and its duty is well performed in pro- 
 portion to its strength; and this strength consists largely in 
 such an arrangement of its molecules that parts contiguous 
 to that which receives the blow can come to its assistance. If 
 the strength is small, little resistance is offered; but if the 
 resisting strength is great, as in the armor of a battleship, the 
 parts adjacent to the part that receives the blow come quickly 
 to its assistance, and resist the attempt of the projectile to 
 break the part struck away from the contiguous parts, and 
 force it to the rear. 
 
 We see here one phase of the so-called "contest between 
 guns and armor" that began with the making of pointed 
 weapons and the answering making of shie'lds. The reason for 
 making weapons pointed was a realization of the fact that the 
 smaller the area attacked the less resistance could be opposed. 
 It was realized that by concentrating the blow on a small area, 
 the total resistance to penetration would be less than if a 
 larger area were allowed to oppose resistance. The idea was 
 exactly the same as that of concentrating attack upon a sep- 
 arated portion of the enemy before the other parts could come 
 to its assistance. It was realized, at the same time, that by 
 giving great speed to the weapon, say a spear, the parts sur- 
 rounding the place attacked would have less time to come to its 
 assistance, and penetration would be more surely effected. In 
 other words, the* effect of sharpening the point of a spear and 
 giving the spear great speed were identical : to effect penetra- 
 tion by isolating the part struck from other parts that might 
 assist it. If you will look at a pane of glass that has been hit 
 by a stone, and another that has been hit by a rifle-ball which 
 went through it at a great speed, you will see in the first case 
 a number of cracks, as evidence of a partially successful en- 
 deavor on the part of the glass near to the part struck to come 
 to the assistance of that part ; and you will see a smooth hole
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 351 
 
 in the second case, as evidence of a less successful attempt at 
 resistance, due to lack of time. And if you will examine the 
 hole punched in armor by a rifle projectile, you will see con- 
 vincing evidence of the tenacity with which the metal all 
 around the hole tried to come to the assistance of the part 
 struck. 
 
 These considerations show that, in making any attack, as in 
 striking any blow, speed is necessary, to prevent neighboring 
 parts from coming to the assistance of the part attacked ; and 
 equally that, in resisting any attack or blow, speed is necessary 
 in order to bring up quickly all neighboring parts to the 
 assistance of the part attacked. 
 
 In the operations between two hostile forces, the greater 
 the concentration of any force, the greater its cohesive 
 strength, and therefore the greater its ability both to give 
 and to resist blows : on the other hand, the greater the disper- 
 sion of any force, the less its strength and therefore the less its 
 striking and resisting power, because of the difficulty of attain- 
 ing mutual assistance among the various parts. For this rea- 
 son, strategists endeavor that military and naval forces shall 
 enter battles in concentrated form; that is, with the various 
 parts in supporting distance of each other. If two armies or 
 two fleets could be concentrated in two points, they could be 
 brought into collision with each other, with the result that the 
 army or the fleet possessing the greater energy would instemtly 
 overcome the other. It is, of course, impracticable at the pres- 
 ent day to concentrate them so perfectl}^; but it is the office 
 of strategy, assisted by tactics, to approach this condition as 
 closely as the practical limitations of logistics and tactics will 
 permit. 
 
 The ideal concentration can be more readily approached in 
 fleets than in armies; because greater destinictive powers can 
 be carried in individual units, and therefore (under the prac- 
 tical limitations of money expended) fewer units used; and 
 for the further reason that these units, being made of steel, 
 are much more rigid and coherent units than are the compar-
 
 352 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 atively loosely tied organizations that compose armies. This 
 enormous concentration gives enormous strength ; but the very 
 concentration, the very fact of putting so much into so few 
 highly specialized units, makes injuries the more difficult to 
 repair in time, and increases the importance of victory or 
 defeat. 
 
 If there is so much value in concentration for both offense 
 and defense, it may be asked why fleets and armies cannot be 
 kept concentrated during war. The answer is that fleets and 
 armies cannot be kept concentrated during time of peace, so 
 that when the war starts they are already separated, and 
 must remain so, until their commanders are able to concen- 
 trate them ; and that, even after that, the various minor opera- 
 tions that have to be carried on, the necessity for sending out 
 scouting expeditions, supported by fighting forces, to ascertain 
 the position and movements of the enemy, and the logistical 
 and tactical difficulties in the way of moving large forces, 
 especially on land, necessitate a large force being divided a 
 very great part of the time. The period immediately after the 
 breaking out of a war is apt to be the most critical period of 
 the war, because the force that concentrates the more quickly 
 can gain great advantages by attacking portions of the enemy 
 before they can be joined together. Important instances of 
 this were the activities of the British fleet in Nelson's time in 
 watching outside of the great French naval ports of Brest, 
 Rochefort and Toulon, and preventing those forces from 
 emerging and forming a great fleet, which might later get into 
 the English Channel and convoy an invading army across. 
 Another important instance occurred at the outbreak of the 
 war in 1870, in which the Prussians, by concentrating more 
 quickly than the French, were able to prevent MacMahon and 
 Bazaine from uniting, and then to defeat each one while iso- 
 lated from the other. 
 
 On the sea, after a fleet has once been concentrated, there 
 is less difficult}^ in keeping it together while moving from one 
 place to another than with an army, because the sea is not cut
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 353 
 
 up into roads, as the land is, and fleets are therefore not re- 
 ctrieted to certain narrow lanes, as armies usually are. Fur- 
 thermore, a fleet can carrj'- its supplies with it, and mostly 
 inside of the fighting ships themselves; whereas an army's sup- 
 plies and munitions have to accompany it in separate wagons, 
 which take up a great deal of space and need guards to pro- 
 tect them. Additional difficulties with armies are the fact that 
 an army fights in the direction in which the men face and 
 march, the accompanying fact that the lines in which they fight 
 are now very long by reason of the numbers engaged, and the 
 further fact that the columns in which they march are so very 
 long that an army does not march in one long column but in 
 several. If these columns can maech on roads so close that the 
 columns are within supporting distance of each other, and yet 
 so far apart that, if need be, the columns may be deployed 
 (that is, formed in line of battle), the danger from separation 
 is not great. But if, as often happens, the positions and direc- 
 tions of the roads and the character of the land in between 
 them are such as to occasion wide separation of the columns, 
 then danger exists that one column may be attacked when the 
 others cannot come to its assistance. 
 
 This same difference between the surface of the sea and 
 the surface of the land concerns the line of retreat, which is 
 always one of the many sources of anxiety of a commander. 
 On the sea or in the air, a defeated fleet may retreat in almost 
 any direction; but on the land a defeated army can retreat 
 with order along certain definite roads only. Furthermore, 
 the line of communication of an army with its base, and by 
 which it receives its supplies, may run in an unfavorable di- 
 rection from the center of the army, in which case the army 
 may not be able to retreat along its lines of communications, if 
 defeated. The line of communications may even run approx- 
 imately parallel with the line in which the army faces to fight, 
 and therefore approximately perpendicular to the line along 
 which it may be forced to retreat. Unfavorable conditions 
 may possibly occur on the sea during the day-time: for the
 
 354 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 hostile and victorious fleet may even get between the defeated 
 fleet and its base, as the British fleet seems almost to have done 
 at the end of the battle of Jutland. But with the coming of 
 night even a defeated fleet, if not too much injured, as Rojes- 
 vensky 's was, may steam around the hostile ships and get back 
 to its base, as the Germans did from Jutland. 
 
 One of the curious and interesting facts connected with 
 warfare is the way in which the defensive and the offensive 
 have been alternately favored by successive improvements in 
 appliances and methods. There seems to have been a contest 
 between the offensive and defensive in warfare, analogous to 
 the contest between guns and armor. As a rule, improvements 
 for defense followed improvements for offense, as the inven- 
 tion of the shield followed the invention of the club and the 
 spear, and as the invention of armor for ships followed the 
 production of guns that could pierce unarmored ships. That 
 this should have been so is not surprising, and is merely one 
 instance among thousands of the tendency of men not to take 
 precautions until taught by harsh experience to do so. 
 
 We can hardly conceive of a war, or even of a fight between 
 two men, in which during most of the time, one party is not 
 taking the offensive and the other the defensive, even though 
 the two parties alternate in their activities. When any im- 
 provement has been made in weapons, it has naturally first 
 favored the offensive; and similarly, when any improvement 
 has been made in such appliances as shields, armor or subma- 
 rine mines, it has first favored the defensive. Nevertheless, 
 every improvement in weapons, say in muskets, has given 
 great advantage to the defense, because it has enabled the 
 defensive to use a more powerful fire against an offensive 
 attack; and every improvement in m.eans and methods of 
 defense has been utilized by the attacker. For instance, sav- 
 ages use shields while making attacks, and battleships, in even 
 the most aggressive assault, wear thick armor on their sides. 
 
 The discussion as to which is the more powerful activity in 
 war, the defensive or the offensive, is more than 5,000 years
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 355 
 
 old. Of course, there is much to say in favor of each. The 
 most important considerations are that the defensive can 
 select its own position, can protect itself by such things as 
 ramparts and submarine mines, and (being in a state of com- 
 parative rest and protection) can use its weapons with more 
 precision than can an attacking force, which must be most of 
 the time advancing and exposed; while the offensive has the 
 advantage that it can select its own time, method, and locality 
 of attack, and can therefore make its plans beforehand and 
 get ready to execute them. Added to this, the mere fact of 
 movement, of pressing forward to attack, imparts a great 
 moral and nerve stimulant to the men. One of the curious 
 facts in the last war is that although both forces, especially 
 the Germans, endeavored continually to take the offensive, the 
 war had in one way a more defensive character on both sides 
 than any war in recent history, because the greater part of 
 both sides found themselves during the greater part of the war 
 in trenches. A curious fact in connection with this is that in 
 his book ' ' On War To-day, ' ' Bemhardi had declared that in a 
 Central European war such conditions would be "hardly 
 likely" to prevail. 
 
 Another curious phase of the development of warfare is that, 
 while new weapons have been produced, almost no weapons 
 ever used before have ever wholly been discarded. In the 
 World War, for instance, men fought against each other with 
 not only the most highly specialized and scientific instruments 
 that the intellects of all the world could devise, but with their 
 fi^ts and feet and clubs and bayonets ; while many of the 
 highly specialized means were merely revivals in improved 
 forms of old contrivances : for instance, the highly specialized 
 submarine was a development of submarine vessels moved by 
 hand power in our Civil War; the mortars that attacked the 
 tops of the Belgian forts were developments of the old bal- 
 lista ; and poison gas was an improvement on the ancient Chi- 
 nese stink-pot. 
 
 While fleets and armies operate. with the same end in view —
 
 356 THE, ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the destruction of the enemy 's machine — and while the strate- 
 gic principles under which both operate are identical, their 
 methods of tactical operation and logistical preparation and 
 supply, are of course, quite diii'erent. The main difference in 
 the tactical handling lies in. the fact that armies fire their guns 
 in the direction in which they advance, whereas fleets fire 
 theirs in a direction approximately perpendicular to it. The 
 first important consequences of this difference is that hostile 
 armies cannot both advance far after they begin to fire at each 
 other, whereas fleets continue to advance. In fact, fleets con- 
 tinue to advance with as much speed as is practicable and 
 safe; for the reason that, if one fleet can get a position in 
 advance of the other, it will secure an advantage in using tor- 
 pedoes; because the fleet that is to the rear will run into tor- 
 pedoes, whereas the fleet that is ahead will run away from 
 them. 
 
 Another important difference between the conduct of an 
 army and that of a fleet, in actual operations, is that an army, 
 being extended in a long line and liable to attacks at any 
 points which the enemy may select, it is usually necessary to 
 have behind the line large reserve forces that can be sent to any 
 threatened points. In some operations, the reserve has been 
 the main striking part, and in that sense the most important 
 part of the whole force ; as in prosecuting an offensive when 
 the weak points of an enemy's force have been sought out by 
 forces ahead, and the reserve held in readiness to be hurled 
 against a selected spot when found. On the sea, however, the 
 fact that a fleet must be kept in motion, and very rapid motion, 
 added to the fact that no circumstances, such as mountains or 
 rivers, prevent the extension of the column, makes it difficult 
 and undesirable to station any reserve on the side opposite 
 from the enemy. For this reason, and for the reason that a 
 fleet is a much more highly organized machine than an army, 
 a naval battle is usually much more decisive than a battle on 
 land, and therefore a more important factor in deciding the 
 ultimate defeat or victory of a nation. This has always been
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 357 
 
 the case ; and it is becoming increasingly more so, as ships be- 
 come more and more powerful, more and more complicated, 
 and more and more difficult to repair when injured. This is 
 analogous to the condition of affairs in the animal kingdom, 
 in which the more highly organized the animal, the more easily 
 it is killed or seriously injured. 
 
 When Csesar was operating in Gaul, when Napoleon was 
 operating in Egypt, and even when Dewey was operating in 
 the Philippines, the actual operations of war were almost 
 wholly under the control of the commander on the spot ; but 
 the advent of the wireless telegraph has made possible such 
 rapidity and certainty of communication, even between mov- 
 ing vehicles on sea and land and in the air, that the general 
 staff at home can keep in fairly constant touch with fleets and 
 armies; and since hy these means they can become informed 
 of many important movements nearly as soon as the com- 
 mander-in-chief himself, and may have more sources of infor- 
 mation than he on some questions, the general staff at home 
 can exercise much greater control than formerly. 
 
 This condition has its advantages, of course ; but it has the 
 extremely dangerous disadvantage, that superior authority at 
 home is under the constant temptation of interfering unduly 
 with the commander on the spot ; with the consequent danger 
 of giving him orders based on information that he may know 
 to be erroneous or too old, and putting him in the dilemma of 
 either disobeying orders or playing into the hands of the 
 enemy. The danger exists not only between the authorities at 
 home and the forces in the field or on the sea and in the air, 
 but also between separate parts of the same force. 
 
 As the complexity and size of fighting forces has increased, 
 and the difficulty of unity of action and purpose has in conse- 
 quence increased, and as improved facility of communication 
 has not sufficed wholly to overcome the difficulties, a method 
 called indoctrination has come into use, whereby it is at- 
 tempted to imbue all the members of a fighting force with 
 such an understanding of the end in view, and such loyalty
 
 358 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 to the cause, that the men will do what they ought to do in 
 emergencies without receiving specific orders. Good examples 
 of the working of indoctrination can be read of in Admiral 
 Jellicoe's account of the battle of Jutland. In this battle it 
 was impossible for him to direct all the various parts of his 
 force, or even to know exactly what was happening. Never- 
 theless the cruiser squadrons and the destroyer and submarine 
 flotillas, and even individual vessels took the initiative in 
 many important emergencies, and did what their indoctrina- 
 tion led them to see that Admiral Jellicoe would want them 
 to do. 
 
 A formal acceptance of the idea of indoctrination — in fact, 
 the proposition itself — is fairly new; nevertheless we see ad- 
 mirable illustrations of its being carried out in practice under 
 the inspiration of Nelson at the battles of Trafalgar and the 
 Nile, Nelson spoke of his officers and himself as a "band of 
 brothers." They were; and because of this, and because of 
 Nelson's continuous and intimate communion with them, the 
 increasing interest that naturally arose in the great events in 
 which they were engaged, and the exact information of all as 
 to Nelson's plans and aims, that "band of brothers" was 
 actually indoctrinated, though none of them had ever heard 
 of indoctrination. 
 
 A navy or army that is thoroughly prepared goes into war 
 and starts on a war in accordance with certain general plans 
 that have been prepared by the general staff long before. But 
 a general plan is not a fixed thing made of steel, like a railroad 
 track, but a flexible thing, capable of being adapted to emer- 
 gencies as they arise ; and it usually exists in connection with 
 many alternate plans, devised in advance to meet different 
 contingencies that have been foreseen. Nevertheless, the num- 
 ber of things that may happen in a campaign is, humanly 
 speaking, infinite; so that new situations continually arise, 
 that must be dealt vidth by means that must be mentally de- 
 vised and cannot be automatically produced. In other words, 
 situations arise that have to be dealt with strategically as new.
 
 STRATEGY IN WAR 359 
 
 situations; and problems are therefore presented which have 
 to be solved as new problems. How are they solved ? 
 
 By the estimate of the situation method, already explained. 
 In each new situation, large or small, a clear mental concep- 
 tion of the mission must first be achieved ; then a clear concep- 
 tion of the difficulties in the way of attaining the mission, and 
 a clear conception of the facilities or means available for over- 
 coming the difficulties. After these three steps have been 
 taken, the fourth step is taken : the decision is made. 
 
 Warfare of Positions. — It has often happened, especially 
 during long interv^als of peace, that ideas about warfare have 
 become crystallized, and strategy has come to be regarded like 
 a game of chess, in that the numerical power and positions of 
 forces have been considered to be the decisive factors in gain- 
 ing a result. Foch, in his book ''The Principles of War," 
 quotes Marshal Saxe as saying of war: "I am sure that a 
 clever general can wage it as long as he lives without being 
 compelled to battle ; ' ' and Foch devotes most of a chapter to 
 proving the erroneous nature of this declaration, and of like 
 declarations, as well as of operations in accordance with them. 
 
 It is a fact, of course, that in such a theory, as in most 
 theories, there is a considerable element of truth. It is a fact 
 that a large force has an advantage over a small force, that a 
 force on the top of a hill has an advantage over a force at the 
 bottom of the hill, that a force on a flank of an enemy has an 
 advantage, that a force well armed and equipped has an ad- 
 vantage over a force poorly armed and equipped, etc. In the 
 latter part of the eighteenth century, in the interval between 
 the wars of Frederick the Great and those of Napoleon, the 
 warfare-of-positions theory secured great vogue, and this is 
 one of the reasons for the early successes of Napoleon. For 
 Napoleon demonstrated, as Thutmose III and Alexander and 
 others had done before him, that strategy differs from chess 
 in the fact that, while the factors on the chess-board are dead, 
 the factors on the war-board are alive. On the chess-board, 
 one king is as good as another, and so is any other piece as
 
 360 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 good as a similar piece on the board, except in so far as posi- 
 tion may favor it or the reverse. Napoleon showed that on the 
 war-board the human "pieces" differed, though the chess 
 I)ieccs did not; and that, while positions were valuable, the 
 ability to think correctly and act vigorously was also val- 
 uable. 
 
 It is true that many a force has compelled another force to 
 retreat, and sometimes to surrender, by simply taking up 
 positions with reference to the enemy that made the posi- 
 tions of the enemy untenable. It is true also that a com- 
 mander, being caught in an untenable position, may very 
 properly retreat without fighting, knowing that fighting would 
 injure his force more than it would the enemy. It is true also 
 that manoeuvering to get good positions is a very important 
 feature in strategical and tactical operations, and that ability 
 to take up such positions quickly and with good judgment is a 
 great quality in a commander. Nevertheless, the taking up 
 of such positions, unless fighting is afterward done from these 
 positions, is only a threat, and a threat that would have no 
 value if military force were not available to back it up. It is 
 a little like getting the judgment of a court against a man. 
 In ordinary life we are apt to regard the judgment of a court 
 as the real act that compels a man to do anything that the 
 court directs; for instance, to pay a bill. But, in fact, the 
 judgment of the court does not compel him to pay the bill or 
 do an^lhing else : it is the executive power of the government 
 to put a man by force into jail, or to do other violence to him, 
 that compels him to pay the bill. 
 
 Thus the introduction of the human element into warfare, 
 as illustrated by the operations of Napoleon and others, has 
 prevented strategy from becoming like a game of chess. 
 Another thing that has prevented it in as great a degree, and 
 probably in a greater degree, has been the continual change 
 of weapons, especially the increase in their number and efifec- 
 tiveness; for some of the most disastrous defeats have been
 
 STRATEGY IN WAE 361 
 
 caused by inactivity in not continually devising new methods 
 to meet new weapons. 
 
 Until within the last few years, the most important single 
 change in the circumstances and methods of warfare in re- 
 corded history was made by the invention of the gun ; but now 
 we see that even greater changes will certainly be caused by 
 the invention of the airplane. For the gun was merely an 
 improvement over the cross-bow, in propelling a projectile 
 with greater velocity, and therefore over a greater range and 
 with a greater penetrating power. Its principal effect was to 
 increase the distances at which troops engaged. But the air- 
 plane introduces the third dimension into warfare, and com- 
 pels forces to move not only backward and forward and to the 
 right and left, but also up and down. It revolutionizes scout- 
 ing by giving a means of observation and a speed of movement 
 immeasurably greater than those of cavalrj^; a means of cor- 
 recting gun-fire, especially distant gun-fire, very much better 
 than any known before ; and a means of sending instructions 
 and information incomparably superior to the horse or even 
 to motor-cars. But all these changes fade into insignificance 
 beside the fact that the airplane, if armed, is of itself an offen- 
 sive weapon in the first rank of power and excellence, though 
 few people have yet realized it. 
 
 Let us not forget that the whole object of sending a division 
 of troops, or a vessel, to a certain point is that when the divi- 
 sion or vessel gets to that point, it may destroy something, or 
 threaten to destroy it. Now, airplanes can do this very much 
 more quickly than can a division, or even a ship. Further- 
 more, a division or a ship operates on the surface of the land 
 or water, and its projectiles are practically restricted to a 
 horizontal direction and an attack on vertical structures, such 
 as walls and the bodies of men, for which very ancient methods 
 of protection are in use. But the airplane attacks from above, 
 from a direction against which little protection has been yet 
 devised; or, in the case of the torpedoplane, from below and
 
 362 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 on the iinder-water bodies of ships, their most vulnerable part. 
 Furthermore, the cheapness of airplanes, in comparison with 
 their speed and bomb-carrying power, and their extreme mo- 
 bility, permit of their being constructed and manoeuvered in 
 large numbers and with a facility and speed that the older 
 agencies of warfare cannot even approximate. 
 
 It would be foolish, of course, at the present moment to pre- 
 dict what will be the future of aeronautics in warfare, and 
 therefore its influence on strategy ; but it is obvious that it will 
 be so great as to compel the modification of all existing strate- 
 gical and tactical methods on both land and sea. A peculiar 
 element is that an airplane or airship can be converted almost 
 instantly from a peaceful carrier of commercial commodities 
 into a powerful instrument of war, by merely attaching a 
 bomb for use on shore, or a torpedo for use on sea. It may be 
 that this ease of conversion is due to the fact that special- 
 ized types of aircraft for naval and military use have not yet 
 appeared, and that it will vanish later, when special types are 
 developed, as ships-of-war were developed from ordinary ships 
 on which guns had been placed. It is probable that specialized 
 types will be developed; in fact, a specialized type was devel- 
 oped during the war, in the sense that light armor was built 
 in certain airplanes to protect certain parts. The future use- 
 fulness of aircraft in warfare, however, is not dependent neces- 
 sarily on specialization; for airplanes that exist to-day, and 
 others that are being built, are of a power and speed and 
 radius of action that compel the anxious attention of the strat- 
 egist. 
 
 At the present moment it seems probable that the tactics of 
 aircraft will be more like those of armies than of navies, for 
 the reason that the greatest dimension of an airplane is per- 
 pendicular to its direction of movement, as in an army's ; while 
 a ship 's greatest dimension is in the direction of its movement. 
 
 There are those who prophesy that warfare in the air will 
 in time become more important than warfare on either land 
 or sea or both together ; by reason mainly of the great speed
 
 STRATEGY IN WAK 363 
 
 that can be attained, the freedom of aircraft from hindrance 
 by shoals or rivers or unfavorable elements of the ground, and 
 the great vulnerability of cities and harbors and troops and 
 ships to airplane and torpedoplane attack. This is an inter- 
 esting prophecy; but whether it will be fulfilled or not, it is 
 probably better to leave to prophets for decision. It does not 
 need a prophet, however, to predict with confidence that, in- 
 asmuch as airplanes and other aircraft are merely weapons, 
 their utilization in war will be directed by the same agency as 
 directs and always has directed the utilization of weapons — 
 strategy. 
 
 Speed of Thought. — In speaking of speed, one naturally 
 thinks of the speed of the material units; that is, of the ships 
 or the troops. But there is another kind of speed — the speed 
 of thought. The victories of Caesar, Frederick, and Napo- 
 leon are instances of the value of speed. This speed is mainly 
 evidenced by the quickness with which their troops arrived 
 at certain points. The reason usually given for the quickness 
 of their arrival is the speed at which they marched ; but let us 
 not overlook the super-important fact that antedating the 
 speed of their marching was the quickness of their starting, 
 and that this was due wholly to the speed of thought of their 
 great commanders. 
 
 Strategy and Imagination. — In the mutual cooperation of 
 strategy with logistics and tactics, and although they merge 
 one into another, with no precise dividing lines, it is apparent 
 that if we visualize the functions of the three we will see that 
 strategy differs from the other two mainly in the fact that it 
 uses and requires imagination. Strategy looks ahead into the 
 dim beyond, and pictures to itself, in everj' situation, what the 
 situation can be made to bring forth. To do this requires, of 
 course, a sufficient knowledge of the details, nature and scope 
 of logistical factors and tactical factors, to get a true picture 
 of the situation as it really exists, and a correct estimate of 
 what must be done, logistically and tactically, to turn the sit- 
 uation to the best account. If guided properly by strategy,
 
 364 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the logistical or tactical officer does not require special fore- 
 sight, and therefore does not need much imagination. A logis- 
 tical officer needs mainly clear common sense, good judgment, 
 exact knowledge, and great energy; a tactical officer needs 
 these and besides great rapidity of decision, strong nerves, and 
 high courage. A strategical officer needs all of these, but pos- 
 sibly in not so great a degree ; but what he does require pre- 
 eminently is foresight, and a clear and accurate imagination. 
 The French have a proverb: ''No imagination, no great 
 general. ' ' 
 
 By the words "great general" the saying probably means 
 great strategist; for it is not clear that much imagination is 
 needed to make a great tactician ; while it is inconceivable that 
 a man could be a great strategist without having a great imag- 
 ination. Certain it is that Alexander, Caesar, Frederick the 
 Great, and Napoleon had imaginations as great and as fine as 
 can be found in history, even among the poets, in which class 
 Frederick the Great and Napoleon certainly were, and even 
 among the inventors, of whom one in the highest rank was 
 Julius Caesar. 
 
 The sine qua non of the strategist is imagination. He must 
 foresee the circumstances under which the next great conflict 
 will be fought, and prepare plans and appliances of the high- 
 est order of completeness and novelty to meet them with suc- 
 cess. It is well to study the campaigns of the great command- 
 ers of the past, but not exclusively. 
 
 The war that the strategist must win is not the last war, but 
 the next war.
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 STRATEGY AS RELuVTED TO STATESMANSHIP 
 
 STRATEGY is the servant of statesmanship. The great 
 strategists, whose work has been briefly outlined in 
 these pages, were statesmen also, and their ultimate 
 aim seems to have been to accomplish achievements in the line 
 of statesmanship rather than in the line of strategy, and to 
 use strategy merely as a means to an end. Clearly, unless 
 strategy does serve some end of statesmanship, it cannot serve 
 any definite purpose. If this be true, it must also be true that 
 some aim of policy or statesmanship must precede the aim of 
 strategy in each case ; in other words, the end to be fought for 
 must precede the idea of fighting for it. 
 
 It is obvious of course, that man was originally a savage, 
 that a great part of the population of the world have always 
 been savages, or at the best barbarians or semi-barbarians, and 
 that they are so to-day. A fraction of the population of the 
 world have now advanced to a degree of civilization which we 
 consider very high, and which may or may not be actually 
 better than savagery. Whether it is or not we do not know ; 
 but we do know that there is some force that has impelled us 
 to struggle out of a condition of savagery, and that it is the 
 general opinion of the civilized world that a condition of civi- 
 lization is better than one of savagery. The following remarks 
 are based on the supposition that this opinion is correct. 
 
 The history of peoples whose doings are recorded shows a 
 gradiTal rise in every case from a lower order of civilization 
 that, in its turn, had risen from savagery. History is largely 
 a record of conflicts between the forces that tended to civiliza- 
 tion and the forces that resisted it. Before these conflicts be- 
 gan, however, another conflict had been waged: a conflict 
 
 365
 
 366 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 between men and beasts. The men triumphed ; not because of 
 superior strength or courage, but because of a certain mental 
 capacity that enabled them to make and use weapons. 
 
 The wild beasts having been subdued, the race was free to 
 start on its upward course. But some men were antagonistic 
 to this course. Only a small fraction desired civilization, or 
 had the mental capacity to see its benefits and work for it. 
 Savages, and later barbarians, resisted the progress of civiliza- 
 tion with force. They had to be answered with force. The 
 result was many wars. 
 
 If we look at history analytically, we see that, while there 
 were many wars that seem to have been waged for no special 
 reason and to have had no special result, yet many of the wars, 
 especially the great wars, were a part, directly or indirectly, 
 of the conflict between civilization and barbarism. This does 
 not mean that, in each one of these cases, there was a civilized 
 nation on one side and a savage or barbarian tribe on the other 
 side, such as there were in the conflict between Rome and 
 Alaric; but it does mean that on one side was a cause whose 
 triumph would benefit the progress of civilization, while on the 
 other side was a cause whose triumph would hinder or impair 
 it. Such was the war between the North and the South in 
 1861-1865; such was the war between the United States and 
 Spain ; such was the World "War just finished. 
 
 Civilization does not mean, of course, a condition in which 
 there are merely great wealth and great material comfort ; for 
 it means also a condition in which the physical, moral, and 
 spiritual well-being of the individual is intelligently cared for. 
 History shows that all these things can be accomplished only 
 when large communities live together under laws that not only 
 are wise but are strictly observed. The instinct of the savage 
 and the barbarian revolts at this. Bearing this in mind, we see 
 a distinct connection between the barbarian outside of a nation 
 and the anarchist inside; one is a barbarian outside, and the 
 other is a barbarian inside. As both have the same feeling 
 regarding civilization, they both resist it in the same man-
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 367 
 
 ner — with force ; and it is only with force that the barbarian 
 and the anarchist can be subdued. 
 
 We thus see that, up to the present time, the influence of 
 war on history has been not only favorable to civilization, but 
 essential to it. Of itself, war has not directly contributed to 
 civilization, though it has done so indirectly in some ways. 
 Its main accomplishments have been first to assist a healthy 
 civilization to triumph over barbarism, and, second, to cause 
 the destruction by healthy peoples of every nation that had 
 become over-civilized and effete. 
 
 It may be argued that the world has at last reached such a 
 height of civilization that war is no longer needed. But, as 
 war has always existed, there are no data on which to base such 
 an argument. If wars were to cease, the human race would 
 find itself embarked on an unknown sea, for which the records 
 of the past would furnish no chart or compass. Exactly what 
 would happen to the race, we do not know. We have records, 
 however, that extend over a period of more than five thousand 
 years ; and these records show that the combination of wealth 
 and long-continued peace has been not only harmful but dis- 
 tinctly ruinous to every nation that has been subjected to its 
 influence. 
 
 In judging whether or not civilization has now reached a 
 stage in which the past may be ignored, let us remind our- 
 selves that the number of individual human beings that are 
 really civilized by education and character is, even now, only 
 a small fraction of the people of the earth. The majority are 
 held in subjection by the minority. But the barbarians were 
 long held in subjection by Rome, and much more firmly 
 than barbarians are held now. The barbarians ultimately 
 triumphed over Rome ; and as the antagonism between barbar- 
 ism and civilization is as great as it ever was, and is increased 
 by the ostentatious luxuriousness of the rich, the barbarians 
 (or anarchists or bolshevists) may triumph again. The reason 
 that the barbarians were able to triumph over Rome was that 
 Rome became luxurious and neglected the military arts. If we
 
 368 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 neglect the military arts, the barbarians (or anarchists or 
 bolshevists) may triumph over us — and probably will. 
 
 If one takes a general view of the progress of development 
 of the human race, he can hardly fail to come to the opinion 
 that, although human beings seem to us to be the best things 
 that the Almighty has created, and although the human mind 
 seems to be the best part of the human being, nevertheless the 
 human mind is an exceedingly imperfect contrivance. One 
 becomes amazed in noting that the great body of mankind have 
 been almost inert in the march of progress, that a very great 
 number have forcibly resisted it, and that the progress of the 
 world has really been initiated and forced through by a com- 
 paratively few. The benefactors who seem to have been the 
 most powerful in this work have been those individual geni- 
 uses who have made the inventions, and written the poems, and 
 painted the pictures, and carved the statues, and sung the 
 songs, and said the things that stimulated men's intelligence 
 and enabled them to triumph in a practical way over the harsh 
 difficulties of their natural surroundings. The men who in- 
 vented the wheel and the screw are unknown to history, and 
 so are the men who sang the songs that inspired primeval tribes 
 to rise. But it was those men and men like them that started 
 and maintained the race on its upward march. 
 
 The men next in importance seem to have been the statesmen 
 and the strategists. If all the men and women in the world 
 could be made into one vast organism, like the human body, 
 then all the parts would work together solely for the good of 
 the organism. But this is not the actual condition. The 
 actual condition is that each man and woman in the world is 
 himself an organism, covered with a skin that isolates him 
 from all the rest of the universe. It is only by sympathy, and 
 by an intelligent appreciation of the good results of coopera- 
 tion that any human organism comes into any touch, except 
 hostile touch with other human organisms. But by means of 
 sympathy, which the various religions, especially the Chris- 
 tian religions, have inculcated, a great deal of fellow feeling
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 369 
 
 has been engendered among people who come in contact with 
 one another. Naturally, this fellow feeling is at its greatest 
 among people whose interests are in common, especially when 
 they are bound together by ties of affection, particularly fam- 
 ily affection. Heredity has a curious and powerful effect; 
 and so have natural surroundings. 
 
 From these causes it has resulted that tribal organizations 
 came into existence even in the earliest times; and that in 
 countries like Greece, in which small localities were separated 
 from others by chains of mountains, or rivers, or other natural 
 divisions, intense tribal feeling has been brought about. In 
 most cases, and in most places, tribal organizations have con- 
 tinued without much change for long periods; but in some 
 cases, such as those well known in Greece, Rome, France, etc., 
 tribes possessing greater energy and ability than others have 
 subdued them, and nations large and small have resulted. 
 In virtually all nations that have lived long, the hereditary tie 
 has been strong: empires that have consisted of many kinds 
 of people, not having strong hereditary ties, have usually not 
 lived long. The best example is the short-lived empire of Alex- 
 ander. 
 
 Now, in the relations of all these tribes and nations to the 
 rest of the world we see evidence of cooperation among the 
 individuals of the tribe or nation, and of competition between 
 each tribe or nation and the other tribes and nations with 
 which it came into contact. The action and interaction of 
 competition and cooperation seem to have been almost a neces- 
 sity of progress, and even of efficiency. 
 
 Numberless illustrations may be cited, even in the affairs of 
 every-day life. A simple one is that of baseball teams. We 
 cannot even imagine an efficient baseball condition unless 
 there be excellent cooperation among the individuals of a team, 
 and intense competition among the teams. So, in the larger 
 affairs of nations, and all through history, the progress of 
 civilization has been accompanied with cooperation among the 
 individuals of each nation, and competition among the nations
 
 370 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 themselves. These two factors are not antagonistic tj3 each 
 other, but rether mutually stimulating. That is, the more in- 
 tense the esprit de corps in any organization, the greater the 
 cooperation of its members, the higher the efficiency of the or- 
 ganization and the greater its spirit of competition as regards 
 other organizations; and, equally, the greater the spirit of 
 competition among organizations, the greater the esprit de 
 corps, and the consequent efficiency, of each organization. 
 
 It seems to be a fact, therefore, that, were it not for the 
 existence of competing tribes and nations, the world would not 
 have progressed as it has. It is true, of course, that this com- 
 petition has often brought on wars that caused great misery 
 and bloodshed. But it must he plain that the misery and 
 bloodshed have caused suffering to a comparatively small 
 number of individuals, and that the whole human race has 
 benefited. 
 
 Now, in order that in the various tribes and nations the 
 elements of cooperation and competition should be wisely 
 directed, certain policies have had to be followed, and these 
 have been under the direction of statesmanship. The wars 
 that have resulted have (in wisely governed nations) been 
 waged under the direction of strategy, not only in the actual 
 fighting, but in the preparations beforehand. During the 
 actual fighting strategy has been practically in full control, 
 with statesmanship awaiting the issue ; while in times of peace 
 statesmanship has been in full control. Yet, if the statesman- 
 ship has been wise, it has always worked in cooperation with 
 strategy, even in times of peace, in order to maintain a con- 
 dition of national strength, sufficient to repel attack from out- 
 side or from inside. 
 
 The aims of statesmanship have sometimes been distinctly 
 good and sometimes distinctly bad, sometimes wise and some- 
 times foolish ; though, like all the other activities of men, they 
 have usually been in the great middle ground between. But, 
 whatever the goodness or badness or wisdom or folly of those 
 aims, it has been the endeavor to carry out those aims that has
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 371 
 
 been the cause of virtually all the wars. The responsibility 
 for wars, therefore, rests on statesmen and not on strategists ; 
 and this remark is true even in cases in which the statesman 
 and the strategist have been the same man. In other words, 
 it was Alexander the statesman who was responsible for Alex- 
 ander's wars, and not Alexander the strategist. 
 
 Inasmuch as a most powerful factor in bringing the 
 nations of the world into their present condition of civiliza- 
 tion has been war, and inasmuch as the consensus of civilized 
 opinion seems to be that this condition is better than our orig- 
 inal condition of savagery, one is led to question the correct- 
 ness of the assumption so generally held that war is an evil. 
 The question involved is too profound to be reasonably en- 
 tered into in a book of this .kind ; but in the interest of truth 
 the fact must not be overlooked that, while peace is a much 
 pleasanter phase of life than war is, yet the record of history 
 for more than five thousand years shows, with no exception 
 whatever, that long-continued periods of peace and prosperity 
 have always brought about the physical, mental, and moral 
 deterioration of the individual. It may also be pointed out 
 that, while the Savior's teachings inculcated kindness and 
 good will as among individuals, they never condemned war 
 among nations or disparaged warriors. They seem to show a 
 recognition of the fact, that, in a good cause, one ought to fight 
 if necessary. In other words, they seem to preach that neither 
 right nor vjronq exists in fighting itself; the right or the wrong 
 is concerned in the cause fought for. The Savior himself com- 
 mitted an act of violence when he overturned the tables of the 
 money-changers in the temple. 
 
 As both statesmanship and strategy have been necessary to 
 the advance of civilization, it would be as idle to discuss which 
 is the more important as it would be to discuss which are the 
 two most important links of a chain, or which is the more 
 important of any two things that are absolutely essential. 
 The curious fact may be pointed out, however, that in virtu- 
 ally every tribe and nation, from the earliest times to the
 
 372 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 present day, men have been educated and trained from boy- 
 hood for the military and naval professions; but not in any 
 tribe or nation in history' do we see any record of men being 
 trained in any equal degree for statesmanship. During the 
 last half century, this condition of what may be called neg- 
 ligence has been aggravated in nations where representative 
 governments exist, and especially in the United States. Why 
 this should be so, it might be indelicate for a naval officer to 
 discuss. The fact seems to be, however, that, while for the 
 army and navy young men are selected in boyhood, after pa.ss- 
 ing rigid phj^sical examinations, are trained all their lives 
 thereafter along a very strict system, and are not promoted 
 from any grade to another until after passing rigid physical, 
 moral, and mental examinations, yet for the most important 
 civil positions under the government, including even those of 
 ambassador and cabinet officer, no training whatever is under- 
 taken, and men are appointed without examinations of any 
 kind. 
 
 In the last few hundred years a number of nations, notably 
 France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, Italy and 
 Japan, have reached a very great height in civilization, intel- 
 ligence and wealth. Accompanying the advance in these mat- 
 ters, there has been an increase among the individuals of the 
 nations of a desire for the individual to express himself as an 
 individual, and a consequent diminution of the autocratic pow- 
 ers of the governments. In most of the nations, constitutions 
 have been adopted that define the mutual rights and privileges 
 of the government on one side and of the individual on the 
 other. In time of peace the provisions of the various constitu- 
 tions have been observed with considerable closeness; but in 
 every war it has been found necessary to increase, at least tem- 
 porarily, the powers of the governments, and to decrease cor- 
 respondingly the right and privileges of the individual. 
 
 The movement toward constitutional government, which in 
 most of the great nations carries with it the right of the people 
 to be represented in the government, especially in the legisla- 
 
 I
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 373 
 
 tive part, is unquestionably a movement that is for the well-be- 
 ing of the people as a whole ; for it cannot be questioned that 
 all through history there can be plainly seen the tendency of 
 men in power to oppress the people below them, often to the 
 point of harshness and even cruelty. As the principal means 
 of oppression by rulers has been military force, there has nat- 
 urally come about an intense distrust of military force, and a 
 desire in every nation to cut down the military force to as low 
 a point as is consistent with the safety of the country from 
 attack by foes outside and by lawless elements inside. 
 
 In other words, in every country there has been a con- 
 test around the question of how much military force the coun- 
 try should support, and how much importance should be 
 given to the military element. In Great Britain, France, and 
 the United States, the military and naval activities have been 
 subordinated to the more peaceful activities of the nation; 
 whereas in Germany and Japan the military has been in the 
 ascendant, and the most vital factor in the national life has 
 been held to be its ability to sustain itself against outside 
 attack. 
 
 Previous to the World War, the greatest nations of the 
 world were Great Britain, France, and the United States as 
 exponents of representative government, and Germany as the 
 exponent of hereditary' autocratic government. In Germany 
 the general system of government, especially the military part, 
 was highly efficient ; and the safety, health, and general well- 
 being of the individual were more carefully guarded than in 
 any other country, though his personal liberty was much re- 
 stricted. In Great Britain, France, and the United States, 
 on the other hand, the governments were not so efficient (es- 
 pecially the military part) and the personal health, safety, 
 and well-being of the individual were not carefully looked out 
 for; but, on the other hand, the personal liberty of the indi- 
 vidual was great. 
 
 It has been said that in the World War the two systems 
 were tried in competition; and that, as Germany was beaten
 
 374 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 in tlie war, the systems of government of Great Britain, 
 Franco, and the United States were proved to be better than 
 the German. 
 
 Does the fact that Germany was beaten prove that her sys- 
 tem was not so good as that of her opponents? Before we 
 answer this, let ns realize that the wealth, and population of 
 Great Britain, France, and the United States were greater 
 than those of Gefrmany, and that Germany seems to have lost 
 mainly because of her comparative inferiority in material re- 
 sources (logistics). 
 
 It is not, of course, the purpose of this book to try to prove 
 the inferiority of the system of government of his own coun- 
 try to that of Germany ; for it is his intense conviction that 
 the system of govenunent of the United States, and in a less 
 degree the systems of Great Britain and France, are much bet- 
 ter than that of Germany. It is his conviction, however, that 
 in these three countries something occurred that ought not to 
 have occurred, and that almost brought about their ruin at 
 the hands of Germany. 
 
 The thing that occurred, according to his conviction, is that 
 the idea of personal liberty, with its consequent fear of the 
 military, was carried to an undue extreme ; and that, like 
 every other idea that has been carried to an undue extreme, 
 it jeopardized the continuance of the idea itself. The distrust 
 of the military was carried to such an extreme in Great Brit- 
 ain, France, and the United States, largely through the influ- 
 ence of the pacifists and German propagandists, that those 
 countries got into a condition that a man is in when he has not 
 enough iron in his blood. Those countries seem to have lost 
 their national physical strength, by lapsing into a condition 
 of comparative effeminacy. This was due probably to being 
 beguiled into forgetfulness of the fact that no nation has 
 ever yet maintained itself except by military force, and that 
 the culminating disaster in every nation that has ever fallen 
 has been a defeat in battle. 
 
 The distrust of the military in each of these three nations
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 375 
 
 has been shown most clearly by the fact that men without any 
 military or naval trainin<^- whatever have been placed at the 
 head of the arm}^ and the navy, intermediate between the army 
 and the navy and the ruler of the nation. In every nation, of 
 course, the ruler (be he emperor, king, or president) is the 
 commander-in-chief of the army and the navy. As command- 
 er-in-chief of the army and the navj'-, he is in a position toward 
 them not different from his position toward all the other de- 
 partments of the government; for, though he is the head of 
 the army and the navy, he is equally the head of every other 
 department of the government. He is the head, for instance, 
 of the Finance Department, the Post Office Department, and 
 the Department of Foreign Relations. The fact of being 
 ruler makes him automatically the head of each department of 
 the executive branch of the government, and makes the imme- 
 diate heads of those departments merely his ministers; or, as 
 they are called in the United States, secretaries. 
 
 Considerable confusion exists in the public mind on this 
 matter, largely because of the expression "the military must 
 be subordinate to the civil authority." Of course it must be; 
 every hranch of the government must he subordinate to the 
 civil authority. The civil authority is the authority of the 
 government, and all the branches of the government must 
 necessarily be subordinate to the government as a whole. In 
 this particular, the men who belong to the army and the navy 
 are in a category no different from that in which are the offi- 
 cials of the Treasury Department, the State Department, or 
 any other department of the government. The only difference 
 between the men in the army and navy and the men in the 
 other branches of the government is that those in the army and 
 navy wear uniforms ; and, in the case of commissioned officers, 
 hold their positions during good behavior. They form no 
 special class, are drawn from no special class, and have no spe- 
 cial privileges. 
 
 Because, however, of a cautious distrust of the military 
 (which is perfectly proper provided it be kept within reason-
 
 376 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 able bounds), the people in Great Britain and the United 
 States have insisted that civilians only be put in immediate 
 charge of the army and navy, intermediate between them and 
 the ruler. In France there has been no such absolute insist- 
 ence, with the result that the head of the army or the navy 
 has sometimes been a civilian and sometimes an army or a 
 navy officer. That the civilian system can result in as great 
 an efficiency in those services as in nations that exact that 
 those services be managed solely by trained men, it would 
 be idle to discuss; for the plain fact is that in every other 
 branch of the government, and in virtually every other great 
 organization of every kind in every country, the men at the 
 head of those organizations are men trained to perfect famil- 
 iarity with the work they have to do. Certain it is that the 
 World War has proved beyond any possibility of doubt that 
 the German army and navy, managed hy men trained in army 
 and navy iwrk, were more efficient than the armies and navies 
 of Great Britain, France, and the United States, managed hy 
 men untrained in such work. 
 
 The question seems to be, therefore, whether or not we 
 should accept the necessary inefficiency resulting from un- 
 trained men guiding the affairs of the army and the navy, in 
 exchange for the supposed immunity given us against undue 
 encroachments by the military. Before we answer this, let 
 us realize that the real head of the army or navy in any coun- 
 try is not the Minister of War or of Marine, the Secretary 
 of War or the Secretary of the Navy, but the ruler of the 
 country — the king or president. Let us also realize that 
 the cause of the distrust of the army and navy is really 
 based on the use that rulers have sometimes made of the army 
 and navy for the purpose of oppressing the people, or of ag- 
 grandizing or perpetuating their own power: so that the dis- 
 trust should not be directed toward the army or the navy, but 
 toward the ruler. History is full of the deeds of oppression 
 of rulers, exercised through the medium of the military; 
 though there are a very few cases in very effete countries:
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 377 
 
 such as in the Roman Empire in its days of degeneracy, when 
 the prffitorian guard couki influence and sometimes dictate the 
 choice of emperors, and even kill an emperor. The fact that 
 praetorian guards have acquired and abused such power is a 
 reason for not allowing praetorian guards to exist again, and 
 an argument against excessive militarism in general. Never- 
 theless, let us guard ourselves against confusion of thought, 
 and realize that the real trouble w^as not the power of the 
 praetorian guard, or even of the military element, but the 
 abominable corruption, profligacy, and effeminacy of the peo- 
 ple themselves. In the bad condition in which the Roman 
 Empire was when the praetorian guard was in full bloom, the 
 great power of the military was not, in fact, an evil, but 
 a benefit ; because without it the government could not have 
 h^ld together at all, and Rome would have fallen before the 
 sword and torch of the barbarian. In fact, it was the weak- 
 ening of the military power of Rome that later caused the fall 
 of Rome and the sacking of the city. 
 
 The intention of every nation in maintaining an army or a 
 na\'y is that it shall protect the country ; and the man who is 
 charged with this responsibility is the emperor, king, or presi- 
 dent. In Germany and Japan he controls the army and the 
 navy no more absolutely than does the ruler of Great Britain, 
 France, or the United States; but he deals directly with the 
 trained experts at their heads, and handles the army and navy 
 through the medium of those experts ; whereas in Great Brit- 
 ain, France, and the United States he deals with non-experts, 
 and handles the army and navy through the medium of those 
 non-experts. 
 
 The result has been that in Germany and Japan the army 
 and navy have been well handled, and a very great degree of 
 effectiveness has been obtained in exchange for the money ex- 
 pended by the people ; whereas in Great Britain, France, and 
 the United States the army and navy have not been well 
 handled, and great effectiveness has not been obtained in ex- 
 change for the monc}' expended by the people.
 
 378 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Any man can manage an army or a navy ; but, in the same 
 sense, any man can manage a railroad company, or paint a 
 picture, or sing a song, or fill a tooth. No man, however, can 
 do any of these things well unless he is an expert in the art. 
 The competition in all classes of endeavor in daily life as- 
 sures that the men who manage the railroad companies, and 
 paint the pictures, and sing the songs, and fill the teeth, are 
 experts. But, during the long periods of peace that fortu- 
 nately now prevail, there is no observable competition among 
 the armies and navies of the various nations, and there is no 
 means, therefore, of knowing their relative conditions of effi- 
 ciency. It is possible, therefore, in Great Britain, France, 
 and the United States (as has been proved) for the armies 
 and navies to go on for many years without any real knowl- 
 edge on the part of anybody, except the officers of each army 
 or navy, as to what is its condition of efficiency or ineffi- 
 ciency. True, this is found out when war takes place; hut 
 then it is too late. 
 
 The British Army, for instance, continued for many years 
 in a state of inefficiency that was thoroughly realized by the 
 officers themselves, but by no one else, until the Boer War 
 broke out in 1899 ; and then the awful slaughter of the Brit- 
 ish soldiers, and the terrible expenditures of money that fol- 
 lowed, brought the real condition of affairs before the public. 
 It is true that Great Britain finally whipped the Boers ; but it 
 is also true that it cost her an amount in lives and suffering 
 and money that was wholly unnecessary, and that cannot be 
 balanced by an}^ advantage that is discernible. It ivas caused 
 hy inefficiency solely; and the inefficiency was due fundamen- 
 tally to the fact that the British army was inefficient in the 
 place where most inefficient organizations are inefficient — at 
 the head. 
 
 But a condition that is more serious, if possible, than the in- 
 efficiency of an army and navy because of unskilled control is 
 that the ruler and his ministers, and the public itself, cannot 
 have the knowledge of its conditions and its needs that it ought
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 379 
 
 to have. It has been pointed out several times in these pages 
 that, in order to secure good results, the statesmen and the 
 strategist should frequently and intimately confer. But how 
 can they do this, when the strategist is put off by himself, and 
 the statesmen manage the affairs of the country without pay- 
 ing any attention to him ? One of the main reasons, if not the 
 main reason, why Germany forged ahead so rapidly from 
 1864 to 1870 was that King William, Bismarck, and Moltke 
 were in continual conference with one another. Bismarck 
 embodied the statesuianship of Germany, Moltke embodied the 
 strategy, and the king, because he was the ruler, embodied 
 both. 
 
 In Great Britain, France, and the United States, for many 
 years previous to the World War, the strategist, while not 
 exactly discredited, was, to use an expressive colloquialism, 
 told to "go 'way back and sit down and keep quiet." In 
 those countries the strategists — in fact, all navy and army of- 
 ficers — knew the dangerous condition of affairs, and did all 
 they could to rouse their governments to a realization of the 
 danger; but their own governments, instead of listening to 
 them, ignored them in effect, and, when they tried to inform 
 the people directly, ordered them to keep quiet. 
 
 If, now, at the head of each a.rmy and navy in those three 
 countries there had been a trained man, immediately respon- 
 sible to the king or president, and holding the same position 
 relatively to the army or navy as the head of the Treasury or 
 Post Office Department holds relatively to that Department, 
 the king or president and his ministers, because of the fre- 
 quent and intimate relationship that then would have existed, 
 would have been fully informed of the whole military and 
 naval situation, not only at home but in other nations; the 
 public would have learned of it also, and the deplorable con- 
 dition of unpreparedness in which Germany caught those 
 three countries would have been entirely prevented. The 
 reason why Germanj^ went to war in 1914 was the same reason 
 as that for which she went to war in 1864, 1866, and 1870 —
 
 ) 
 
 380 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 the reason that she was thoroughly prepared and her enemies 
 were unprepared. If the people of Great Britain, France, 
 and the United States had been informed of the actual situa- 
 tion, and had prepared to a degree even approximating that in 
 which every sensible man maintains himself in regard to the 
 dangers of ordinary life, Germany would no more have at- 
 tacked France than a thug would attack a man whom he saw 
 to be adequately armed and ready. 
 
 There seems to he no escape from the conviction that Great 
 Britain, France, and the United States had allowed them- 
 selves to drift into a condition of unpreparedness to which 
 the word "disgraceful" can he applied with perfect reason- 
 ahleness and propriety, rememhering how unnecessary it was, 
 and what frightful suffering it caused. 
 
 It is instructive to note in this connection that, of the 
 twenty-eight presidents of the United States, nine have been 
 men who had seen active service at the front in actual war. 
 Of these, Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, and Grant 
 were distinctly military men; Hayes and Garfield had served 
 during nearly the entire Civil War of four years, and had 
 risen to the rank of Brigadier-General ; IMcKinley had reached 
 the rank of Major in the Civil War, and Roosevelt had served 
 with distinction as colonel in the Spanish War. It has been 
 said on occasions that some of the purely military men did 
 not make as good presidents as others whose training had not 
 been mainly military; but, on the other hand, it has never 
 been said that any of them ever made as inefficient presidents 
 as some of the others did. 
 
 As the duties of President of the United States (or of ruler 
 of any country) require expert direction of all the multi- 
 tudinous affairs of the government, it is obvious that there 
 are many and very reasonable objections against making a 
 purely military man the President ; but, inasmuch as nine of 
 our presidents out of twenty-eight have been military men, 
 and as the man who seems at the present moment to be ap- 
 proved of the most widely for our next President is Major-
 
 STRATEGY AS RELATED TO STATESMANSHIP 381 
 
 General Leonard Wood, it is evident that no overwhelming 
 popular sentiment condemns it. It is pertinent, therefore, 
 to point out the unreasonableness of putting a military man 
 in actual command of the army and the navy, as well as of all 
 the other agencies of the government, and then balking at 
 putting a military man as merely the assistant to the President 
 in managing the army and the War Department, and a naval 
 man as merely the assistant to the President in managing the 
 navy and the Navy Department. It is an excellent illustra- 
 tion of "straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel." 
 
 Much confusion of thought has arisen from the fact that the 
 people of the country fancy that the main task of the man at 
 the head of im army or a navy is to provide the necessary 
 material for it to use, in the way of munitions, supplies, etc. 
 This confusion of thought is easily explainable by the fact 
 that, in nearly all the daily life of an individual, and in nearly 
 all the daily life of any nation, the question of material sup- 
 plies, of the wherewithal to support life, of food and clothing 
 and shelter, is the paramount consideration; and in every na- 
 tion the duty of the government is so to administer affairs, 
 by means of the various administrative departments, in obedi- 
 ence to financial and economic laws, that the individuals of the 
 country shall have abundance of all material necessities. To 
 employ a word used ordinarily only in armies and navies, one 
 may say that the main factors in the life of every individual 
 and every nation are "logistical." Nevertheless, it is obvi- 
 ous that when a national defense machine is to be designed, 
 built, and operated as a machine to protect a nation, it must 
 be designed, built, and operated to do a certain strategical 
 work; and that therefore strategy, and not logistics, must 
 control its design, building, and operation — if the best results 
 are to be secured. 
 
 This means that, although in the conduct of ordinary busi- 
 ness, even the business of government, logistics is the prime 
 factor, yet in the conduct of an army or navy strategy is the 
 prime factor and logistics the subordinate. If a War or a
 
 382 THE ART OF FIGHTING 
 
 Navy Department were merely an agency for handling money 
 and securing supplies and materials of all sorts, then a man 
 trained in the handling of large business interests would be 
 the ideal man to put in charge of it. But a War Department 
 or a Navy Department is not anything like that. It is an 
 agency for designing and preparing an army machine or a 
 navy machine in time of peace, and for operating it in time 
 of war. 
 
 It is sometimes urged that even a man wholly untrained in 
 naval and military matters, if he would follow the advice of 
 the best professional experts, could design, prepare, and handle 
 an army or a navy with perfect efficiency. Whether this 
 could be done or not (supposing an indefinite amount of 
 time to be available) it would be idle to conjecture. It may 
 be declared with confidence, however, that no such achieve- 
 ment has ever yet been accomplished, or even approximated. 
 
 The reason is that a military machine, or a naval machine, 
 is more complicated, powerful and rapidly moving than any 
 other machine the world contains; that even a small and 
 slowly moving machine requires knowledge and skill in its 
 director; and that the more powerful and rapidly moving a 
 machine is, the more urgently it needs knowledge and skill 
 in its director. 
 
 The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, in 
 peace as well as in war, must continually make decisions upon 
 matters involving ultimately the lives of thousands of men, 
 the expenditure of millions of dollars and the safety of the 
 nation. It is my mature and profound conviction that no 
 man untrained in the principles and the technique of strategy 
 would dare to accept either position, if he really understood 
 the responsibilities he was assuming and the dangers he was 
 courting. 
 
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