E Li i ORNIA SAN DIEGO x/ CROWN PRINCE HIROHITO He has recently been named Regent of Japan with the approval of the Council of the Imperial Family and the Privy Councilors. His marriage to a princess of Satsuma will take place this spring. ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS JAPAN : KOREA : CHINA : PHILIPPINE ISLANDS BY E. ALEXANDER POWELL AUTHOR OF "THE LAST FRONTIER," "FIGHTING IN FLANDERS," "WHERE THE STRANGE TRAILS GO DOWN," ETC. ILLUSTRATED NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1922 Copyright, 1922, by THE CENTURY Co. Printed in U. S. A. To THE HONORABLE WARREN G. HARDING President of the United States who, by his vision and statesmanship in calling the Washington Conference, has done more than any man of our time to preserve the peace of the Pacific and to further the friendship and mutual understanding of the peo- ples dwelling upon its shores FOREWORD Most writers on Far Eastern politics make the mis- take of crediting their readers with a profounder knowledge of the subject than they in fact possess. They take too much for granted. They talk in terms of algebra instead of arithmetic. On the assumption that those who read their books already understand the meaning of such phrases as "spheres of influence," "extraterritoriality," the Shogunate, the Genro, the tucTiuns, the Anfu Club, the Consortium, the Gentle- men's Agreement, the Twenty-one Demands, they make repeated use of them without pausing long enough to explain precisely what they mean. As a result, the casual reader, who usually has only a vague idea of the subject to start with, either becomes bewildered and gives up in despair, frankly admitting that he does not understand what it is all about, or he forms conclusions which, being based on miscon- ceptions, do not agree with the facts. So, though the shelves of the public libraries sag beneath the volumes that have been written on various phases of Oriental politics, it seems to me that there is still a place for a clear, concise, simply written, un- prejudiced explanation of the various problems, po- litical, economic, and financial, which, taken together, vu viii FOREWORD form what is commonly referred to as the Far Eastern Question. Therefore, even at the risk of covering ground with which some of my readers are doubtless already familiar, I have endeavored to sketch in outline, using simple, every-day language, the condi- tions and events which have combined to produce the present complex situation. Those who have the patience to follow me to the end will have gained, I hope, a sound, if rudimentary, understanding of one of the most perplexing subjects in the whole field of international politics. I am perfectly aware that, so far as the chapters dealing with Japan and China are concerned, this book does not cover much new ground historically, nor is it marked by any special originality of presen- tation. I am also aware that much of the material has been used repeatedly in recent years by other writers on Japanese and Chinese questions. But, in spite of this, the book has, I believe, the merits of being clear, comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-the- minute. It was written, in the main, while the Wash- ington Conference was still in session an advantage in that it enabled me to discuss the mooted questions with the very men best qualified to discuss them; a disadvantage, perhaps, in that certain of the condi- tions which I have described, particularly in China, will necessarily be modified by the conferees' deci- sions. FOREWORD ix A certain number of errors inevitably creep into the pages of any book of this nature, no matter how carefully it may be written and edited, but, in order to keep the errors to a minimum, the proof-sheets of the various chapters were submitted for correction to gentlemen who are universally recognized as among the highest authorities on the subjects treated in them. The proofs of the chapters on Japan and Korea were read and corrected by His Highness Prince Toku- gawa, President of the Japanese House of Peers, and by His Excellency Baron Shidehara, Japanese Am- bassador to the United States, both members of the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference, and by the Honorable Roland S. Morris, formerly American Ambassador to Japan. The chapters on China were revised by Dr. J. C. Ferguson, Adviser to the President of the Chinese Republic, a distin- guished educator and probably the leading foreign authority on Chinese affairs. The chapters on the Philippines were corrected by the Honorable Wil- liam H. Taft, Chief Justice of the United States and formerly Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; by the Honorable Cameron Forbes, also a former governor-general and a member of the Wood-Forbes Mission, and by Major-General Frank Mclntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. It should be clearly understood, however, that the opinions ex- pressed in the following pages do not necessarily x FOREWORD reflect the views, nor in all cases meet with the ap- proval, of the gentlemen in question. The opinions expressed in this book are my own. Some of the things which I have written will prob- ably give offense to those governments and individuals from whom I received many courtesies. Those who are privileged to speak for governments are fond of asserting that their governments have nothing to conceal and that they welcome honest criticism, but long experience has taught me that when they are told unpalatable truths governments are usually as sensitive and resentful as friends. Yet, were I to attempt to retain the good-will of the governments and officials of the countries under discussion by re- fraining from unfavorable comment, this book would be little more than propaganda. Perhaps it is too much to expect, but I would like those who showed me so many kindnesses in Japan, China, Korea, and the Philippines to believe that I have leaned back- ward in an effort to keep these pages free from bias and injustice, that I have tried to tell the truth as I understand it and because I believe that it is to the best interests of all the peoples concerned that the unvarnished truth should be told. If those of my country people who honor me by reading this book obtain from it a clearer understanding of the problems and perplexities which confront our trans-Pacific neighbors, if it teaches them to regard the short- XI comings of the peoples of Eastern Asia a little more leniently and their national aspirations a little more sympathetically, then I shall feel that my purpose in writing it has been accomplished. E. ALEXANDER POWELL. Washington, January, 1922. AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT I welcome this opportunity of expressing my ap- preciation of the innumerable courtesies extended to me by the governments of Japan, Korea, China, and the Philippine Islands, and of the many personal kindnesses shown me by individuals in those countries. My studies in the Japanese Empire were greatly facilitated by the hearty cooperation of the late Premier Hara, whose tragic death at the hands of an assassin in November, 1921, was a profound shock to all who knew him. For the assistance and hospitality which I received everywhere in Japan and Korea I am also grateful to His Excellency Baron Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador to the United States; to His Highness Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers; to His Excellency Masanao Hanihara, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; to Major-General G. Tanaka, formerly Minister of War ; to His Excel- lency Admiral Baron Saito, Governor-General of Korea, and to Dr. Kentaro Midzuno, the Vice-Gov- ernor-General; to Viscount Kaneko; to Dallas McGrew, Esq., and Frederick Moore, Esq., of the Japanese Foreign Office ; to Dr. T. lyenaga, of New York City; to the Hon. Ransford Miller, American Consul-General at Seoul; and in particular to the xiii xiv AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT Hon. Roland S. Morris, formerly American Ambas- sador to Japan. Of the many persons who assisted me in China my thanks are due to Dr. J. C. Ferguson, Adviser to the President of the Chinese Republic ; to the Hon. Paul R. Reinsch, formerly American Minister to China; to Ray Atherton, Esq., Secretary of the American Legation at Peking; to I. Tokugawa, Esq., Secretary of the Japanese Legation at Peking ; to P. Loureiro, Esq., Assistant Financial Secretary of the Salt Rev- enue Administration; and to Bertram Lennox-Simp- son, Esq. ("Putnam Weale"). For the great trouble to which they put themselves in rendering my visit to the Philippines instructive and enjoyable I am very grateful to the Hon. Francis Burton Harrison, formerly Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; to the Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; to the Hon. Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the House ; to the Hon. Frank C. Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu; to the Hon. P. W. Rogers, formerly Governor of Jolo; to Colonel Ralph W. Jones of the Philippine Constabulary; to Major Ed- win C. Bopp, Chief of Police of Manila, and to army, scout, and constabulary officers all the way from northern Luzon to Zamboanga. This also affords me an opportunity to acknowl- edge my indebtedness for many suggestions and much AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT xv valuable material which I have derived from the fol- lowing sources : "Modern Japan," by A. S. Hershey ; "What Shall I Think of Japan?" by George Gleason; "The Japanese Empire," by Philip Terry; "The Far East Unveiled," by Frederick Coleman; "The New Far East," by T. J. Millard; "The Mastery of the Far East," by Arthur Judson Brown; "China, Japan and Korea," by J. O. P. Bland; "These from the Land of Sinim," by Sir Robert Hart; "China in Transformation," by A. B. Colquhoun; "Peking Dust," by Ellen La Motte; "Modern China," by S. G. Cheng; "Korea," by Angus Hamilton; "In Korea with the Marquis Ito," by George T. Ladd; "Korea's Fight for Freedom," by F. A. McKenzie; "The Pass- ing of Korea," by H. B. Hurlbert; "The Truth About Korea," by C. W. Kendall; "The Rebirth of Korea," by Hugh H. Cynn; "The Case for the Filipinos," by Maximo M. Kalaw; "The Philippine Islands and Their People" and "The Philippines, Past and Pres- ent," by Dean C. Worcester, and particularly the extremely able despatches of the New York Tribute's Far Eastern correspondent, Mr. Nathaniel Peffer. E. ALEXANDER POWELL. CONTENTS PART PAOB I JAPAN 8 II KOREA 101 1. The Peninsula and Its People 101 2. The Japanese in Korea 127 III CHINA 181 IV THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS 273 APPENDIX A 345 APPENDIX B . 3-18 ILLUSTRATIONS Crown Prince Hirohito Frontispiece FACING PAGE Map of the Japanese Empire 32 Fujiyama, the Sacred Mountain, and Fuji River ... 48 Sunset in Shiba Park, Tokyo 48 A Religious Procession in Kioto 49 Map of Chosen (Korea) 112 Korean Peasant Taking Farm-Products to Market . . 128 Korean Peasant Woman and Child 128 Funeral of the Ex-Emperor of Korea 129 Devil-Posts Outside Korean Village to Keep Away Evil Spirits 160 Transporting Fodder on the Backs of Bulls in Korea . . 160 Ancient Korean Temple in Seoul 161 Palanquin of Prince Li 161 Map of China 181 The Great Wall of China 188 Another View of the Great Wall 188 Camels under the Walls of Peking 189 The Tartar Wall and a Portion of the Tartar City in Peking 189 The Jade Pagoda near Peking 196 A Pagoda of the Summer Palace 197 xx ILLUSTRATIONS FACING PAGE The Temple of Heaven, Peking 197 Hsu Shih-Chang 204 Dr. Sun Yat-Sen 204 In the Forbidden City 205 Canal Scene in Canton 228 The Pawnshops of Canton 228 View from the Terrace of the Summer Palace .... 229 Bridge in the Gardens of the Summer Palace, Peking . . 229 A Funeral Procession in Peking 240 Funeral Procession of a High Official 240 An Itinerant Mendicant of the Northern Hill . . .241 Tibetan Priests at the Entrance to the Lama Temple, Peking 241 Chinese Railway Guards 272 Japanese Railway Guard 272 A Feast Given by a Boy of 13 Years and His 12-Year-Old Wife on the Anniversary of the Death of Their Son 273 The 1911 Eruption of Taal Volcano 276 The Little River that Flows Through the Town ... 277 A Bit of Zamboanga 277 A Kalinga Man and Woman 284 A Kalinga Dancing-Girl 285 A Kalinga Family 285 Map of the Philippine Islands 288 Rice Terraces Built by the Ifugaoes; in the Mountain Prov- ince, Luzon 292 Filipinos Threshing Rice with Their Feet 293 ILLUSTRATIONS xxi FACING PAGE Plowing and Harrowing the Zacate Fields 293 Roasting a Dog at an Igorot Caniau in the Mountains of Luzon 300 An Igorot Burial Cave 300 Fruit-Bats in Flight, Lagangilang 301 Boobies on Tubbataja Reef 301 Moros of Zamboanga 304 A Negrito 304 A Monobo-Manguangan from the Upper Agusan, Mindanao 805 A Bagobo Youth 305 A Moro Enlisted Man 320 A Moro Dato 320 An Ifugao Soldier 320 The Famous "Zigzag" on the Benguet Road . . . .321 The Pasig River, Manila 321 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS PART I JAPAN IT is too early by many years to assess at their true value the achievements and failures of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Arma- ments. We are standing too near the picture to esti- mate with accuracy its merits and its faults. But, when history has lent it the justice of perspective, the assembly of nations which convened on the banks of the Potomac in November, 1921, will assuredly be recognized as one of the most remarkable episodes of our time. No matter what else it accomplished, or failed to accomplish, it provided the world with a striking object-lesson in the efficacy, as applied to international relations, of the policy of let's-sit-down- and-talk-it-over. It would be idle to deny that, when the Confer- ence was called by President Harding, Japan was regarded as a potential enemy by a majority of Americans. I, for one, am convinced that, had the 3 4 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS mutual suspicions and misunderstandings of the two peoples been permitted to continue, had their respec- tive governments clung to the policies which they were then pursuing, the situation would have ended in war. Yet their mutual suspicions were so largely allayed, their misunderstandings so successfully com- posed by the frank discussions which characterized the Conference, that, when it ended, the sentiment of most thoughtful persons, Americans and Japanese, was expressed by Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers, when he said upon his departure from our shores: "The United States has learned that Japan entertains no aggressive designs in the Pacific and Japan has learned that she has nothing to expect from this side of the Pacific except friendly cooperation." The near-hostility which until recently embittered the relations of the United States and Japan, and which threatened at one time to break into an open sore, was due, I am convinced, not to any inherent ill-will on the part of either people for the other, but to a mutual lack of knowledge and sympathetic un- derstanding. In other words, both Americans and Japanese had shown themselves unable, or unwilling, to think the other's mind. It was not enough for groups of more or less representative Americans and Japanese to gather about banquet tables and indulge in sonorous protestations of mutual friendship and in- ternational good-will, or to cable each other hands- JAPAN 5 across-the-sea greetings couched in terms of fulsome praise. The possibilities of a cordial relationship and a harmonious cooperation between the two nations are so tremendous, the interests at stake are so vast and far-reaching, the consequences of an armed con- flict would be so catastrophic and overwhelming, that it is unthinkable that the two peoples should ever again permit themselves to drift into the frame of mind which existed in both countries prior to the Con- ference at Washington. Yet, if such a perilous situation is not again to arise, each people must make an earnest endeavor to gain a better understanding of the temperament, tra- ditions, ambitions, limitations, and problems of the other, and to make corresponding allowances for them in short, to cultivate a more tolerant and sym- pathetic state of mind. Japan is, and probably al- ways will be, one of the most important countries, if not the most important, on our political horizon. Summoned from obscurity by an American commo- dore, adopting with avidity the devices of Western civilization, advancing as in seven-league boots to her present position as one of the five greatest mili- tary and naval powers in the world, our closest com- petitor in the race for the trade of Eastern Asia, one of our most profitable customers, the key that can lock the Open Door it is imperative for every Amer- ican to learn more about this great Ocean Empire on the other side of the Pacific and to obtain a clearer 6 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS understanding of what has taken place in those nine- and-sixty amazing years less than the span of life which the Scriptures allot to man since the anchors of Perry's frigates rumbled down in the Bay of Yedo. The Japanese Question is an extremely compli- cated one. Its ramifications extend into the realms of politics, industry, commerce, and finance. It stretches across one hundred and fifty degrees of longitude. It affects the lives and destinies of six hundred millions of people. Its roots are to be found as far apart as a Japanese military outpost in Siberia and the headquarters of a labor union in, Sacramento, as a Korean village and a Californian farm, as an obscure harbor on the coast of Mexico and a cable- station on a lonely rock in the Pacific, as the offices of a firm of international bankers in Wall Street and the palace of the President of China in the Forbidden City. To understand algebra, you must have a knowl- edge of arithmetic. To understand the Japanese Question, you must have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the various factors which have combined to produce it. It grew to its present dimensions so silently, so stealthily, that the average well-informed American has only a vague and frequently erroneous idea of what it is all about. He has read in the newspapers of the anti-Japanese agitation in Califor- nia, of the Gentlemen's Agreement, of picture-brides, JAPAN 7 of mysterious Japanese troop-movements in Siberia, of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, of Japa- nese oppression in Korea, of the Shantung contro- versy, of the dispute over Yap ; but to him these iso- lated episodes usually had about as much significance as so many fragments of a complicated jig-saw puz- zle. Moreover, the avalanche of information, near- information, and misinformation about Japan which filled the columns of the daily papers prior to and during the Washington Conference bewildered rather than enlightened him. Therefore, even at the risk of repeating some facts with which you are doubtless already familiar, I will endeavor to piece the puzzle together, so that you may view the picture in its entirety and in the light of the Conference's decisions. But, before I proceed, let me make it amply clear that I hold no brief for Japan. I am an American and, because I wish to see my country morally in the right, I deplore the unjust, intolerant, and provoca- tive attitude toward the Japanese adopted by certain elements of our population. I believe that the poli- tician or publicist who deliberately inflames public opinion against a nation with which we are at peace, and with which we wish to remain at peace, is an enemy to the best interests of his country and should be treated as such by all decent citizens. It is to the great mass of reasoning and fair-minded people in both countries, who, I am convinced, wish to learn the unvarnished truth, no matter how unflattering 8 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS it may be to their national pride, how disillusionizing, that I address myself. In order that they may have the clearest possible understanding of a situation which vitally concerns the future well-being of both the United States and Japan, I propose, in the fol- lowing pages, to discard all euphemism and diplo- matic subterfuge and to tell as much as possible of "nothing but the truth." n Some truths, more half-truths, many untruths have been said and written in each country about the other. The clear waters of our old-time friendship have been roiled by prejudice and propaganda. Much of our appalling ignorance of Japanese character, aims, and ideals is traceable to our national propensity for generalization always an inexact and dangerous method of estimating another people, and doubly dangerous in the case of a people as complex as the Japanese. Let us not forget that we were accus- tomed to think of the French as a volatile, excitable, easy-going, pleasure-obsessed, decadent people until the Marne and Verdun taught us the truth. Such a misconception was deplorable in the case of a people from whom we had nothing to fear ; it is inexcusable, and might well prove disastrous, in the case of the Japanese. I have heard Americans who pride them- selves on being well-informed, men whose opinions are listened to with respect, betray ignorance of Japan JAPAN 9 and of Japanese institutions which would be ludicrous under other conditions. And the ignorance of many intelligent Japanese in regard to ourselves is no less disheartening. Their way of thinking is not our way of thinking; many of their institutions and ideas and ideals are diametric- ally different from ours. Believe it or not, as you choose, the great majority of intelligent Japanese are unable to understand our thinly veiled distrust and dislike of them. That many of our people do dis- trust and dislike the Japanese there can be no gainsay- ing. Yet the average American usually finds some difficulty in giving for his attitude toward the Jap- anese a definite and cogent reason. This unreasoning antipathy was illustrated by an educated and charm- ing American woman, who had been traveling in Japan, whom I met on a homeward bound liner. "How did you like the Japanese?" I asked her. "I did n't like them," she replied. "Were you ill-treated in Japan? Did you meet with any discourtesy or injustice?" "No," she admitted, with some embarrassment. "I have no complaints whatever to make of the treat- ment I received. I found them universally courte- ous." "Then why did n't you like them?" I persisted. "Well," she explained, "I just made up my mind before I went to Japan that I was n't going to like the Japanese, and I did n't." 10 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS That is an extreme case, I admit, but if you will take the trouble to go into the matter you will find that that is about as cogent a reason as many Amer- icans can offer for their dislike of the people of Nippon. Underlying all the misunderstandings between the two nations is race prejudice. Our racial antipathy for the Japanese is instinctive. It has its source in the white race's attitude of arrogant superiority toward all non-white peoples. We inherited it, along with our Caucasian blood, from our Aryan ancestors. It is as old as the breed. The Japanese do not realize that they are meeting in this an old, old prob- lem; that the American attitude is not dictated by a wish to place a stigma of inferiority on them, but is merely the application to them of the Caucasian's his- toric attitude toward all peoples with tinted skins. If the Japanese question this, let them observe the atti- tude of the Americans resident in the Philippines toward the Filipinos, that of the English toward the natives of India and Egypt, that of the French toward their brown-skinned subjects in Indo-China. But this racial prejudice is by no means one-sided. The Japanese consider themselves as superior to us as we consider ourselves superior to them. Make no mistake about that. The Japanese are by no means free from that racial dislike for Occidentals which lies near to the hearts of all Orientals ; but they have JAPAN 11 the good sense, good manners, and tact to repress their feelings. That is where they differ from Amer- icans. Another reason for American dislike of the Jap- anese is the latter's assertion of equality. We don't call it that, of course. We call it conceit cockiness. The reason that we get along with another yellow race, the Chinese, is because they, by their abject abasement and submissiveness, flatter our sense of racial superiority. Our pride thus catered to, we give them a condescending pat of approval, such as we would give a negro who always "knows his place," holds his hat in his hand when he addresses a white person, says "sir" and "ma'am," and shows no sign of resenting ill- justice or mistreatment. The Japanese, on the contrary, stands up for his rights; he is not at all humble or submissive or in the least awed by threats, and if an irate American attempts to "put him in his place," as he is accustomed to do with a Chinese or a Filipino or a negro, he is more likely than not to find himself on the way to jail in the grasp of a small but extremely efficient and unsym- pathetic policeman. I asked an American whom I met in Yokohama if he had enjoyed his stay in Japan. "Not particularly," he answered. "I don't care for the Japs ; give me the Chinese every time." "Why?" I queried. He pondered my question for a moment. 12 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS "I'll sum it up for you like this," he replied. "The Chinese treat you as a superior; the Japanese treat you as an equal." Until Commodore Perry opened Japan to western civilization and commerce, we held all Mongolians in contempt, being pleased to consider them as inferior peoples. But in the case of the Japanese this con- tempt changed in a few years to a patronizing con- descension, such as a grown person might have for a precocious and amusing child. We congratulated ourselves on having discovered in the Japanese a sort of infant prodigy ; we took in them a proprietary interest. We watched their rapid rise in the world with almost paternal gratification. And the Japanese flattered our self-esteem by their open admiration and imitation of our methods. I think that our national antipathy for the Japanese had its beginnings in their victory over the Russians. Up to that time we had looked on the Japanese as a brilliant and ambitious little people whom we had brought to the notice of the world and for whose amazing progress we were largely responsible. But when Japan administered a trouncing to the Russians, who are, after all, fellow-Caucasians, American sen- timent performed a volte-face almost overnight. We were as pro-Russian at Portsmouth as we had been pro-Japanese at Port Arthur. This sudden change in our attitude toward them has always mystified the JAPAN 13 Japanese. Yet there is really nothing mystifying about it. We were merely answering the call of the blood. As long as we believed Japan to be the under dog, we were for her; but when she became the upper dog, the old racial prejudice flamed up anew. A yellow people had humbled and humiliated a Cau- casian people, and we, as Caucasians, resented it. It was a blow to our pride of race. (A somewhat similar manifestation of racial prejudice was observ- able throughout the United States when the negro pugilist, Jack Johnson, defeated Jim Jeffries. ) That a yellow race could defeat a white race had never occurred to us, and we were correspondingly startled and alarmed. We abruptly ceased to think of the Japanese as a third-rate nation of polite, well-mean- ing, and harmless little men, drinkers of tea and wearers of kimonos. They became the Yellow Peril. Though the Japanese are of Asia, they cannot be treated as we are accustomed to treat other Asiatics. To attempt to belittle or patronize a nation that can put into the field three million fighting men and send to sea a battle fleet not greatly inferior to our own, would be as ridiculous as it would be short-sighted. Japan is a striking example to other Oriental races of the power of the Big Stick. She has never been subjugated by the foreigner. In spite of, rather than by the aid of, the white man, she has become one of the Great Powers, and at Versailles helped to shape the destinies of millions of Europeans. Yet when she 14 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS claims racial equality we deny and resent it. Our refusal to treat the Japanese as equals, while at the same time showing a wholesome respect for the armed might that is behind them, reminds me of an Amer- ican reserve lieutenant, a Southerner, on duty at a cantonment where there was a division of colored troops, who refused to salute a negro captain. He was called before the commanding officer, who gave him his choice between saluting the negro or being tried by court-martial. "I suppose I '11 have to salute the uniform," he muttered rebelliously, "but damned if I '11 salute the nigger inside it." in I have already said that racial prejudice is at the bottom, the very bottom, of the friction between the two countries. Immediately overlying it is our fear of Japanese economic competition. For, if you will look into it, you will find that there has hardly ever been a conflict between nations into which some economic question has not entered as the final and essential factor. Never was this truer than in the American-Japanese situation. In considering the question of Japanese economic competition, it would seem that Americans fail to realize the extent to which Japanese business is aided* controlled, and directed by the Japanese Government. The Japanese business man does not have to fight JAPAN 15 unaided for foreign trade, as does the American. He has his government solidly behind him. Govern- ment-subsidized steamship lines and government- owned railways give him every possible advantage. The government's ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and commercial agents lend him encouragement and assistance. Allied industries support him. Virtu- ally all of the industries of the empire belong to trade guilds, which, like their European prototypes of the Middle Ages, are licensed by the government and are granted special privileges and immunities. In short, the Japanese business man is really a part of a gigantic trust, which differs from our American trusts only in that it is a government instead of a corporation. The Japanese long since realized that their ma- terial resources were greatly inferior to those of other first-class powers, and that the realization of their national ambitions required great wealth as much as a great military establishment. They could not obtain this wealth by agriculture, for not only is Japan a comparatively small country territorially, but not more than fifteen per cent, of its area is capable of profitable cultivation. Moreover, there are already three hundred and fifty inhabitants to the square mile, and the birth-rate, like the cost of living, is steadily rising. In Japan, as in the United States, to quote the words of a popular song: "The rich get richer and 16 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS the poor get children." Now the Japanese were fully conscious of the handicap under which they were struggling in their race for wealth and power. So they set about overcoming it by embarking upon a carefully planned campaign of industrial develop- ment and commercial expansion which, in its inten- sity and thoroughness, has no parallel save that which was waged by Germany prior to August, 1914. Per- ceiving that they could never hope to overtake their Western rivals by wading cautiously into the sea of commercial competition, they resolved to risk every- thing by plunging boldly into deep water. They risked everything and they won. By utilizing to the utmost what they already possessed, by taxing themselves until they staggered under the burden, by borrowing from the Occidental nations until their credit was stretched to the breaking-point, by speed- ing up the industrial machine until it was running twenty-four hours a day and three hundred and sixty- five days a year, by hard work, rigid economy, and self-denial, they succeeded in raising the huge sums which they required for mills, factories, and power- plants, for railway and steamship lines, for docking and terminal facilities, for postal and telegraph sys- tems. To-day, as a result of their courage and amaz- ing energy, the Japanese are running neck-and-neck with the United States and England in the race for the commerce of the world. They are making matches at a price that has virtually closed the Asiatic markets JAPAN 17 to their Western competitors. They can deliver sashes, doors, Winds, and woodenware in North and South America at so low a rate that our manufac- turers would be driven out of business were it not for the protection afforded by our tariff wall. Though the Japanese do not themselves grow large quantities of cotton, they purchase the poorer and cheaper grades of the raw material in India and Egypt, trans- port it by their government-subsidized steamers and government-owned railways to their government- assisted factories, where, as the result of low wages and long hours, it is spun into piece goods which are sold to the cotton-clad millions of the East at prices with which American and British manufacturers are finding profitable competition almost out of the ques- tion. In competing with Western nations for the trade of the Orient, Japan possesses several important advan- tages. Government control of transportation lines by land and sea, government subsidies and bounties, and, in the trade with Asia, short hauls, are vital factors. The Japanese are so near to the great, rich markets of the Asian mainland that they can fill orders from Eastern Siberia, Korea, Manchuria, and Eastern China before the American manufacturer could get his shipment aboard a vessel at San Fran- cisco or Seattle. Furthermore, it is a cardinal prin- ciple of Japanese commercial policy to constantly keep in touch with the changing tastes and fashions 18 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS of their Asiatic customers and to give them exactly what they want, which American manufacturers, all too frequently, do not. It must also be kept in mind that the Japanese Government and the Japanese man- ufacturers work hand in hand in furthering their commercial ambitions. Several of the greatest indus- trial enterprises in Japan, as I shall show further on, are controlled directly or indirectly by the govern- ment, large blocks of stock being held by members of the imperial family and by high officials. Strug- gling enterprises are frequently assisted by govern- ment bounties, and money at low rates of interest is often loaned for the same purpose. The principal Japanese steamship lines are so liberally subsidized by the government, and pay their seamen such low wages, that it is impossible for American-owned ves- sels, with highly-paid white crews and no govern- ment subsidies, to compete with them. As a result, the carrying trade of the Pacific is in Japanese hands. Thus it will be seen that, in their struggle for the trade of the Orient, American firms are not merely competing against Japanese firms. In effect, they are competing against the Japanese Government. And here is another point which should be empha- sized. American business men bear no such relation to their government as Japanese business men bear to theirs. Unlike Japan and Germany, in both of which countries foreign politics and foreign com- merce are closely interrelated, the United States does JAPAN 19 not utilize the commercial ventures of its citizens to advance its foreign policies. Indeed, beyond giving half-hearted and usually inefficient protection in case of menace to their lives and property, the government at Washington does not concern itself at all with the business interests of its citizens oversea. When an American firm makes a foreign loan, or establishes a bank, or leases harbor or shore rights, or secures a contract, or obtains a concession, every one knows that the venture is without political significance, present or prospective. On the other hand, every move made by Japanese commercial interests abroad has some degree of political significance. If a Japanese firm leases harbor or shore rights in a foreign country, that lease is to all intents and purposes a government one, and may be controlled as such whenever the government chooses. Hence the alarm which was felt by well-informed Americans when it was reported that a Japanese business house was negotiating with the Mexican Government for the lease of a harbor on Magdalena Bay for they recognized how simple a matter it would be for the Japanese Government to take over that lease and transform an innocent com- mercial harbor into a coaling station or naval base. Again, the Japanese Government has not hesitated to utilize the concessions held by its subjects in China to coerce the government at Peking. In short, every Japanese merchant who establishes himself abroad automatically becomes a listening-post for the Tokio 20 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS Foreign Office, a point d'appui for Japanese aggres- sion, a picket eternally on the alert to serve the polit- ical interests of Nippon. 1 No one can travel in the Far East without being struck by the bitterness and unanimity with which foreign business men, American and European alike, condemn Japanese business methods. Whether jus- tified or not, this feeling of disapproval and distrust has done more than anything else, save only the racial prejudice to which I have already referred, to em- bitter the relations between the United States and Japan. Therefore, delicate as the question is, I pur- pose to discuss it with the utmost frankness. To ignore it in order to avoid offending Japanese suscep- tibilities would be tantamount to permitting a wound to fester because opening it would cause the patient pain. I will give the foreigner's side first. Here is the way an American importer, whom I met in Yoko- hama, expressed himself: "The Japanese business man has two great faults conceit and deceit. In his business relations he is overbearing and underdeveloped. In order to make an immediate profit, he will lose a life-long and valu- able customer. Though it frequently happens that *A high Japanese official, to whom I submitted the proofs of this chapter for correction, professes to see a parallel t this situation in the Siems-Carey and American International Corporation railway contracts in China. In this I do not agree with him. E. A. P. JAPAN 21 he does not understand what the foreign buyer is talking about, his vanity will not permit him to admit his ignorance; instead, he will accept the order and then fill it unsatisfactorily. He will accept an order for anything, whether he can deliver it or not. He would accept an order for the Brooklyn Bridge, f.o.b. next Thursday, Kioto hoping that something might turn up in the meantime that would enable him to fill it." An Englishman doing business in Japan said to me: "The Japanese has his nerve only on a rising market. As soon as the market shows signs of falling, he hesitates at nothing to get from under. When the silk market rose, hundreds of Japanese firms de- faulted on orders which they had already accepted from foreign importers, as they would have lost money at the old prices. When, on the other hand, there was a slump in the money market in the spring of 1920, the customs warehouses at Yokohama and Kobe were piled high with goods ordered from abroad for which the consignees refused to accept delivery." Another American importer, who has made semi- annual buying trips to Japan for more than a quarter of a century and who has a genuine liking for the Japanese, told me, with regret in his tone, that, of all the firms with whom he did business, those upon 22 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS whom he could rely implicitly to send him goods of the same quality as their samples could be numbered on the ringers of one hand. I cite these complaints because they are typical of many I heard while I was in the Far East. That does not mean, however, that I consider them entirely justified, for I do not. Their very bitterness reveals the prejudice which gave birth to some of them and added exaggeration to others. But I concluded that where there was so much smoke there must be some flame, so I made it my business to question as many foreign business men as I could, as well as commer- cial attaches and consuls, both European and Amer- ican. From their replies I gathered that a trademark, copyright, or patent does not, as a rule, prevent a Jap- anese manufacturer from appropriating any idea of which he can make use; though I am glad to say that recent legislation, combined with an awakening national conscience, has done much to protect the foreigner from such abuses. For example, "Bentley's Code," which sells in the United States for thirty dollars and which is fully protected by copyright, has been copied by a Japanese publishing house, which sells it for ten dollars. A famous brand of safety razor, which sells in the United States for five dollars, is copied by the Japanese in everything save quality, and is marketed by them, under the originator's name and in a facsimile of the original package, for one- fifth of the price charged for the genuine article. JAPAN 23 The same is true of widely advertised brands of soap, tooth paste, talcum powder, perfume, and other toilet preparations. An imitation of Pond's Extract, for instance, is sold in a bottle exactly like that contain- ing the American-made article except that a faint line, scarcely discernible, turns the P into an R. This infringement was fought in the Japanese courts, how- ever, which decided in favor of the plaintiff. A par- ticularly flagrant example of these questionable com- mercial methods came to light in the spring of 1920 at Tientsin, when the American consul-general made an official protest against the action of the Jap- anese chamber of commerce of that city, which had sent broadcast thousands of hand-bills intimating that a certain American trading company, which had be- come a dangerous competitor of Japanese firms, was on the verge of insolvency a statement which was en- tirely without foundation in fact. The Japanese chamber of commerce refused to retract its allega- tions and the American house was nearly ruined. These are only a few examples of those Japanese business practises to which foreigners object. I heard similar stories from almost every American business man whom I met in the East. Indeed, I cannot recall having talked with a single foreigner (with a solitary exception ) doing business with the Japanese, who did not have some complaint to make of their practise of imitating patented or copyrighted articles, of substituting inferior goods, of giving short weight, 24 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS and of not keeping their engagements when it suited them to break them. That the Japanese Government recognizes and deplores the methods of certain Jap- anese business men is shown by the following quota- tion from the report of the Japanese consul-general at Bombay, as quoted in the Japan Weekly Chron- icle: Although I am confident that the credit of Japanese mer- chants in general is not so low as is represented by a small section of the foreign merchants, yet it is to be deplored as an indisputable fact that there is one sort of short- sighted dishonest Japanese merchants who are always eager to obtain a temporary profit just before their eyes, who resort to extremely detestable and crafty expedients. They will send samples of goods far superior in quality in com- parison with the price quoted, and when they receive orders according to these samples, they never manufacture goods equal to the samples in quality, but manufacture and ship inferior goods suitable to the price. This commercial unscrupulousness has worked great injury to the friendly relations of Japan and the United States. It has engendered in American business men a distrust and a dislike which it will take years to eradicate. This was strikingly illustrated one evening in the smoking-room of a trans-Pacific liner. While chatting with a group of returning American business men I casually mentioned the case of a fel- low-countryman who had recently brought American commercial methods into disrepute by giving "exclu- sive" agencies for certain widely advertised articles to several firms in the same city. Instead of deploring JAPAN 25 such trickery, my auditors applauded it almost to a man. "Fine!" they exclaimed. "Good work! Glad to hear of a Yankee who can beat the Japs at their own game!" They were as jubilant over that dis- honest American's success in turning the tables on the Japanese as was the American public when it learned that we had perfected a poison gas more hor- rible in its effects than any in use by the Germans. I heard other criticisms, too, which, if they are jus- tified, would indicate that the Japanese Government itself sometimes aids Japanese business by methods which are not generally considered fair. These in- cluded charges that the government-owned railways give rebates to Japanese shippers; that Japanese freight is expedited by railway and steamship lines while that shipped by foreign firms is subjected to ruinous delay; that, owing to the South Manchuria Railway being under Japanese control, Japanese mer- chants shipping their goods into Manchuria have fre- quently been able to evade the customs, whereas goods of foreign origin are subject to full duties; that im- portant commercial messages sent over Japanese cables have been revealed to the senders' Japanese competitors, the messages in some cases not having been delivered to the addressees at all. 1 Foreign business men in the East often assert that 'I am informed by an official of the Japanese Foreign Office that Japanese business men in the United States are making precisely the same complaints in regard to the handling of messages by American cable companies. E. A. P. 26 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS the amazing commercial success of the Japanese is mainly due to such methods. On the contrary, it has been achieved in spite of them. Japan's com- mercial rise is due, as I have already shown, to the courage, energy, industry, and self-denial of the Jap- anese nation. It should be added, however, that the tremendous commercial boom which reached its zenith in 1919-20 was largely the result of artificial and tem- porary conditions. At a period when the rest of the world was engaged in a life-and-death struggle, Japan, far from the battlefields, was free to engage in commerce, and she possessed, moreover, certain articles which other nations must have and for which they had to pay any price she demanded. Nor could the Japanese merchant, any more than the American, realize that this was a purely temporary condition and could not continue indefinitely. Now, mind you, I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that commercial trickery is character- istic of Japanese business men as a class. There are business houses in Japan many of them which meet their obligations as punctiliously, which fill their com- mitments as scrupulously, which maintain as high a standard of business honor, as the most reputable firms in the United States. But, unfortunately, there are many altogether too many which do not. It seems a thousand pities that the honest and far- sighted business men of Japan and the Japanese trade guilds and chambers of commerce do not take ener- JAPAN 27 getic steps to stamp out commercial trickery, if for no other reason than the effect it would have on for- eign opinion. The series of conferences held in Tokio in 1920 between a self-appointed delegation of Amer- ican bankers and business men and a number of rep- resentative Japanese offered a splendid opportunity for a candid discussion of this delicate and irritating question. If the Americans, instead of confining themselves to hands-across-the-sea sentiments and platitudinous expressions of friendship, had had the courage to tell the high-minded Japanese who were their hosts how objectionable such methods are to Americans and what incalculable harm they are caus- ing to Japanese- American relations, it would have worked wonders in promoting a better understanding between the two peoples. Despite what I have felt compelled to say about the methods of a section of the Japanese commercial class, I am convinced that the Japanese people, as a race, are honest. Though pocket-picking is said to be on the increase in Japan, burglary and highway rob- bery are extremely rare, while the murders, shooting affrays, daylight robberies, and hold-ups which have become commonplaces in American cities are virtually unknown. I should feel as safe at midnight in the meanest street of a Japanese city as I should on Com- monwealth Avenue in Boston considerably safer, indeed, than I should on certain New York thorough- fares after nightfall. I asked an American woman 28 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS who has lived for many years in Japan if she consid- ered the Japanese honest. "I never think of locking the doors or windows of my house in Yokohama," she replied, "yet I have never had anything stolen. But when I was staying last winter at a fashionable hotel in New York, I was robbed of money, jewels, and clothing the very night of my arrival." Nor could I discover any substantiation of the oft-repeated assertion that fiduciary positions in Jap- anese banks are held by Chinese. Certainly this is not true of Japanese-controlled institutions, such as the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Dai Ichi Ginko, as I can attest from personal observation. It is true that Chinese are employed in considerable numbers in minor positions of trust in the Japanese branches of foreign banks, such as the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Bank of India, Australia & New Zealand, but these have generally come over from China with the banks' European officials, their employment denoting no lack of faith in Japanese integrity. Yet such stories, spread broadcast by superficial and usually prejudiced observers, have helped to give Americans a totally erroneous impression of the Japanese. My personal opinion is that the commercial trickery practised in Japan is not due to any inherent dis- honesty in the Japanese character, but rather to the contempt in which merchants were held in that JAPAN 29 country for centuries. Until recent years the position of the merchant in Japan was analogous to that of the Jew in the Europe of the Middle Ages. He was at the bottom of the social scale. At the top was the noble ; then came the samurai, or professional fighting man ; followed in turn by the farmer and the artisan ; and last of all came the merchant. The farmer and the artisan have always held a higher place than the merchant because they are producers, whereas the merchant was looked upon as a huckster, a haggler, a bargainer, who made his living by his wits. As a result, business was in the hands of a low class of Japanese. Trading was regarded as beneath the dig- nity of a gentleman. Furthermore, the Japanese merchant has had less than seventy years in which to learn the rules of the business game as it is played in the West. Coming from a despised and down- trodden class, is it any wonder that in that brief span he has not wholly eradicated his ancient methods, that he has not yet acquired all our Western virtues and ideals? The Jew has been under the influence of the West for two thousand years, yet his business ethics are not always beyond reproach. Let us, then, be charitable in judging the Japanese. Nor should we forget that barely a score of years have passed since American business houses com- monly practised the very methods of which we com- plain so bitterly when they are practised by the Jap- anese. It is within the memory of most of us when 30 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS rebates, discriminatory freight rates, infringements of copyrights and patents, substitution, adulteration, evasion of customs, and the ruthless crushing of com- petition by unfair methods were so common in the United States as scarcely to provoke comment. If you question this, read the early history of the Stand- ard Oil Company, of the sugar, beef, and steel trusts, or of certain of our great railway systems. The truth of the matter is that the Japanese to-day are about where we were two decades ago. Not having entered the commercial contest until long after we did, it is not surprising that their commercial ethics are still several laps behind our own. Business ethics in the island empire are at present undergoing the same rehabilitation and purification that were forced upon American business by an outraged public opinion. And, according to most unprejudiced observers, that transformation is being effected with remarkable rapidity. So why not stop throwing stones and give the Japanese a chance? Rome was not built in a day. There is yet another explanation of the question- able business usages practised by certain Japanese merchants. And that explanation, curiously enough, points straight at ourselves. It remained for the late Premier Hara himself a business man and the first commoner to hold the position of prime minister to bring that embarrassing fact to my attention. "You should not forget that my people learned what they know of modern business methods from JAPAN 31 your own countrymen," he reminded me. "It was your Commodore Perry who, in the face of Japanese opposition, opened Japan to American commerce. It was from the American traders who followed him that the Japanese received their first lessons in the business ethics of the West. The early American traders, in the methods they practised, provided the Japanese with anything but a laudable example. If they could cheat a Japanese, they considered it highly creditable; they took advantage of his ignorance by selling him inferior goods and by driving sharp bar- gains; they constantly bamboozled him. Is it any wonder, then, that the Japanese merchant, patterning his methods on those pursued by the Americans, adopted American commercial trickery along with other things? But mind you," he added, "I am not condoning commercial trickery among my people. I am only explaining it." IV In the preceding pages I have endeavored to show how important are the racial and economic elements in their effect on American-Japanese relations. We now come to a consideration of the political factor. In order to estimate this factor at its true importance, it is necessary to envisage the trying political situation in which Japan finds herself. Since their victory over the Russians in 1904 the Japanese have seen themselves gradually encircled 32 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS by a ring of unsympathetic and suspicious, if not openly hostile peoples. Overshadowing the island empire on the north is the great bulk of Bolshevist Russia, still smarting from the memories of the Yalu River and Port Arthur, and bitterly resentful of Japan's military occupation of Eastern Siberia and Northern Sakhalin. Every patriotic Russian feels that Japan, in occupying these territories, has taken unfair advantage of Russia's temporary helplessness ; he listens cynically to the protestations of the Jap- anese Government that it has occupied them merely in order to keep at arm's length the menace of Bol- shevism and that it will withdraw its troops as soon as this menace disappears. To the west, the Koreans, though now officially Japanese subjects, are in a state of incipient revolt, to which they have been driven by the excesses of the Japanese military and the harshness of Japanese rule. To the southeast, China, huge and inert, loathes and fears her island neighbor, their common hatred of Japan being the one tie which binds the diverse elements of the republic together. As a protest against Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Shan- tung the Chinese have instituted a boycott of Japanese goods, which is gravely affecting Japanese commerce throughout the Farther East. In regions as remote from the seat of the controversy as the Celebes and Borneo, as Siam, the Straits Settlements, and Java, I found Japanese merchants being forced out of busi- JAPAN 33 ness because the Chinese living in those countries re- fused to trade with them or to purchase goods of any one else who traded with them. In Formosa, taken from China as spoils of war in 1895, the head-hunting savages who inhabit the mountains of the interior remain unsubjugated, only the Guard Line, a series of armed blockhouses connected by electrically charged entanglements, standing between the Jap- anese settlers and massacre. In the Philippines there is always present the bogey of Japanese imperialism, both the Filipinos and the American residents being convinced that Japan is looking forward to the day when she can add those rich and tempting islands to her possessions. In far- distant Australia and New Zealand the Japanese are distrusted and disliked, stringent legislative measures having recently been adopted to prevent further Jap- anese immigration into those commonwealths. On the Pacific coast of the United States and Canada a violent anti-Japanese agitation is in full swing, new and severer legislation being constantly directed against them. In Hawaii, where the Japanese out- number all the other elements of the population put together, the Americans and Kanakas view the situa- tion with acute apprehension. 1 Influenced by the frankly hostile attitude of her great overseas dominions, and fearful of its effect on her relations with the United States, England eagerly There were 109,274 Japanese in Hawaii in 1920. 34 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS seized the opportunity, afforded by America's offer at the Washington Conference, of substituting the Four-Power Treaty for the Anglo-Japanese Al- liance. Holland, having ever in the front of her mind her great, rich colonies in the East Indies, looks with a suspicious eye on Japan's steady territorial expansion and on the suggestive augmentation of her naval and military establishments. France, con- stantly seeking new markets, views with thinly veiled apprehension Japan's attempts to attain political and commercial domination in China. Nor is Germany likely either to forget or forgive the conquest of Tsingtau and her former insular possessions in the Pacific. Not only has Japan aroused the suspicions of the white races, but she has antagonized and alienated the yellow races who are her nearest neighbors. As a result she found herself, at the open- ing of the Washington Conference, as completely isolated, as universally distrusted, as was Germany at the beginning of 1914. The Japanese have been hurt and bewildered by this world-wide suspicion. Yet, instead of attempting to win back the good-will of the West, which was theirs until little more than a decade ago, by giving convincing proofs of their peaceable intentions; in- stead of making an effort to regain the confidence of half a billion Chinese and Russians by a prompt with- drawal from their soil and abstention from further interference in their affairs, the Japanese made JAPAN 35 the psychological blunder of adopting an attitude of stubbornness and defiance. They replied to criticisms by embarking on a military program which, had it been adhered to, would have made them the greatest military power on earth. Their naval plans called for a neck-and-neck shipbuilding race with the United States; they had steadily strengthened their occupa- tional forces on the mainland of Asia, instead of show- ing a disposition to withdraw them. They seemed utterly incapable of realizing that the world has, in its millions of soldier dead and its billions of war debt, the very best of reasons for being suspicious of imperialistic nations ; that it is in no mood to tolerate anything savoring of militarism. The peoples of the world had hoped that those dread specters, militarism and imperialism, had passed with the Hohenzollerns, never to return. Is it any wonder, then, that they viewed with distrust a nation which, judged by its actions, seemed bent on recalling them? This distrust of Japanese intentions was largely dispelled, however, by Japan's concurrence in the Hughes program for the limitation of naval armaments. The key to Japanese militarism and imperialism is to be found in the dual government that exists in Japan. It is another case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, but the victim of this dual personality, instead 36 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS of being an individual, is a nation. There is the con- stitutional government, functioning in the open, normal, aboveboard, conciliatory, presumably sincere. But behind it, in the shadows, lurks a cloaked and mysterious government, furtive, untrustworthy, pre- dacious, wholly evil. Unfortunately for Japan and for the world, this invisible government is the more powerful of the two. Times without number the Dr. Jekyll government has adopted some altruistic course of action only to have the Mr. Hyde government step in and, by an exertion of its mysterious power, set it all at naught. It is a most curious and complicated situation, without parallel in any other country in the world. Let me see if I can explain it, for its clear and complete comprehension is absolutely essential to an intelligent understanding of those tortuous and seemingly contradictory policies pursued by Japan in her relations with foreign nations, which have so per- plexed and alarmed the world. To begin with, you must understand that Japan is nominally governed by a constitutional government, consisting of a cabinet, a legislative assembly known as the Diet, and a civil bureaucracy composed of the chiefs of the various administrative departments and their subordinates. This is the government with which the world is familiar. But there is also an invisible government, an unseen empire, composed of a clique of officers holding high rank in the army and navy, certain statesmen with military sympathies and JAPAN 87 affiliations, and a few representatives of big business and finance. The constitutional government functions through the cabinet, and, in its relations with foreign nations, through the foreign office, being represented abroad by regularly accredited ambassadors, ministers, and consuls. The invisible government functions through the general staff, its activities abroad being carried on by a great number of secret agents, whose identities can only be guessed at, and by the military attaches attached to the various embassies and lega- tions, who, though ostensibly under the orders of their respective ambassadors and ministers are, in reality, answerable only to the general staff. Japanese policy, particularly in foreign affairs, is invariably shaped by this unseen government, whose wishes are generally translated into action by the constitutional government, on which it is able to exert powerful pres- sure. The two governments, whose interests are by no means always opposed, are of necessity more or less closely correlated, like interlocking directorates. For example, many of the permanent civil officials of the constitutional government, such as bureau chiefs and the members of their staffs, are drawn from the mili- taristic clique, which is identical with the unseen gov- ernment, with which, as might be expected, they work in harmony. Thus it will be seen that, whereas the militarists who compose the invisible government form a bloc bound together by their mutual interests and ambitions and working always in unison, the constitu- 38 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS tional government is weakened by the militarists who have insinuated themselves into its organization and who, in the event of a conflict between the constitu- tional government and the unseen government, in- variably lend their power and influence to the latter. At the head of the Japanese State stands the em- peror, generally spoken of by foreigners as the Mikado ("Honorable Gate," a title comparable with Sublime Porte) , and by his own subjects as Tenno, or Heavenly King. According to Japanese history, which reckons from 660 B.C., when Jimmu ascended the throne, the present Emperor, Yoshihito, is the one hundred and twenty-second ruler of his line. 1 But as written records do not carry us back further than 712 A.D., the reigns and periods of the early monarchs are more or less apocryphal. Still the fact remains that Japan has been ruled by an unbroken dynasty ever since the dawn of her history, in which respect she is unique among the nations of the world. The whole scheme of government in Japan is based on the recognition of the divine origin of the emperor. According to popular belief, he is directly descended from the Deity. By the terms of the constitution he combines in himself the rights of sovereignty and exercises the whole of the executive powers, with the advice and assistance of the ten ministers who compose 1 In December, 1921, owing to the mental condition of the emperor, Crown Prince Hirohito was proclaimed Regent of Japan. JAPAN 39 his cabinet. Supplementing the cabinet is the Privy Council, a purely advisory body of thirty-nine mem- bers (including the ten cabinet ministers), which is only consulted upon important matters and policies. The emperor is the supreme commander of the army and the navy. He alone can declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties. He convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives. Should a national crisis or an urgent necessity arise when the Diet is not in session, the emperor may issue imperial edicts which take the place of laws, though such edicts must be submitted to the Diet at its next session, when, if not approved, they become invalid. Thus it will be seen that, though Japan is, in theory, a constitutional monarchy, the emperor is vested with virtually abso- lute power. But it should be added that his abso- lutism has never degenerated into despotism or tyranny. In fact, he is more or less a figurehead so far as the administration of the government is con- cerned, dwelling in Olympian aloofness and ruling by proxy. He is regarded by his people not as a temporal ruler, but rather as a patriarch, a demigod, a direct representative of Heaven. In order to strengthen their own position, the militarists who sur- round the emperor have assiduously encouraged the people in this delusion. They have fostered among the masses the belief that the emperor can do no wrong, that no sacrifice is too great for a son or 40 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS daughter of Nippon to make for him, that to so much as question his Heaven-bestowed authority is the apotheosis of sacrilege. From the blind obedience to the sovereign thus created, which involves a curious mixture of religion and patriotism difficult for the Western mind to comprehend, the militarists derive their power. I have said that, according to the terms of the con- stitution, the emperor is supposed to exercise the ex- ecutive power with the advice and assistance of his cabinet. But between the cabinet and the crown stand a rapidly diminishing body of men who are known as the Genro, or Elder Statesmen. This sacred and secret inner circle, as at present consti- tuted, has only two members: Marquis Saionji and Marquis Matsukata. This duumvirate of old men is the mentor and mouthpiece of divinity itself; they, with Field Marshal Uyehara, the chief of the general staff, constitute the occult power which hedges the imperial throne ; they are the real rulers of Japan. Now let me make it clear that the Elder Statesmen are neither appointed nor elected. They have no legal status. They are not recognized by the Japanese con- stitution or in the laws of Japan. You will find no mention of them in the Japan "Year Book" or other official publications. Indeed, there is no such office as that of Elder Statesman per se. Though they control the government, form cabinets, and shape the national policy, they are not officials, save as they are JAPAN 41 members of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. They are merely a little group of veteran counselors, representatives of the great clans, who have grown by mere survival and the confidence reposed in them by the emperor to be the most powerful influence in Japan. Imagine, if you can, a pair of American statesmen Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, let us say attaining such unlimited political power that the President of the United States was their mouth- piece and the heads of the executive departments of the government their obedient instruments, and re- taining such power, irrespective of which political party was in the saddle, through administration after administration. That is by no means an exact parallel, but it is the best that I can offer of a situation that is without parallel in any other coun- try. When the shogunate was abolished in 1868 and the unification of the country under the youthful Em- peror Mutsuhito begun, the task of reconstruction was undertaken by the dcdmyos, or feudal nobles. They became the officials of the new government and directed the transformation of Japan into a modern state. The present Genro, then young men, played minor parts in the restoration. But, as the years passed, they gradually ascended the political ladder and, as the older men died or retired from office, they automatically succeeded them, themselves eventually 42 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS becoming ministers of the crown. More years slipped by, and they, now old themselves, in turn gave way to younger men. But, in relinquishing office, they did not relinquish their power. Autocrats by training, brought up in an atmosphere of mili- tarism, contemptuously believing with Hegel that "the people is that portion of the state which does not know what it wills," they viewed with deep misgivings the democratic tendencies which were gradually manifesting themselves in the new Japan. They were sincere in their convictions that the safety of the empire was being jeopardized by the growing spirit of democracy among certain elements of the population. They felt that they alone stood between the nation and ruin. Conservatives and reactionaries to the very marrow, they might have said with the French king, "Apres moi le deluge" So, instead of retiring from public affairs and contenting them- selves with an existence of innocuous desuetude, like superannuated European statesmen, they merely shifted their position, withdrawing from the fierce glare that beats upon the front of the throne to the shadows at its rear. From there, themselves unseen, they can see all that happens ; they are always at the elbow of the sovereign, who, because he trusts them implicitly, willingly issues as commands the sugges- tions which they whisper in his ear. The prerogatives of the crown, as I have already shown, are very great, and they are exercised as the JAPAN 43 Elder Statesmen "advise." Ministers rise and fall, but the Genro abide, independent of cabinet and diet alike and beyond the reach of either. There you find the explanation of why the Japanese cabinet does not wield the power of European ministries and why changes of cabinet seldom result in changes of national policy. For, though parties come and go, the Genro remain forever and the emperor does as they tell him to do. No further explanation is needed, surely, of why Japan, whose government is under the control of a little group of self-appointed and reactionary dictators, is, though greatly advanced for an Asiatic power, still far behind those Western nations whose governments are in the hands of individuals and bodies chosen by the people. So closely associated with the Elder Statesmen that he might almost be considered one of them is the chief of the general staff, who, everything con- sidered, is probably the most powerful single indi- vidual in the empire to-day. His title is really a misnomer, for, whereas in other countries the chief of the general staff is the executive head of the army alone, in Japan the chief of the general staff exercises as much influence in naval, colonial, and foreign affairs as he does in those of the army. He is the actual head of all the armed forces of the empire on land and sea. He occupies much the same position in the invisible government that the premier does in the constitutional government. The only superior authority recognized 44 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS by the premier is the emperor; the only superior authority recognized by the chief of the general staff is the Genro. And, as the emperor accepts without question the decisions of the Genro, it follows that the chief of the general staff occupies a position of altogether extraordinary power. I have heard it asserted, indeed, that he can override the decisions of the premier and even force him and his cabinet to resign, but this is probably an exaggeration. That the chief of staff might be able, with the concurrence of the Elder Statesmen, to wreck a min- istry is due to the curious constitution of the Japanese cabinet. Of the ten members of the cabinet, two the minister of war, who must always be an army officer of a grade not lower than major-general, and the min- ister of marine, who must always be a naval officer of a grade not lower than rear-admiral are not answer- able for their actions to the premier and frequently act independently of him, being responsible only to the emperor, which, translated, means the Elder Statesmen and the chief of the general staff. As a re- sult of this anomalous situation, these ministers, tak- ing their orders from the chief of the general staff, who has the support of the Genro, who in turn have the support of the emperor, can, and frequently do, defy the premier and block legislation. Due to the constitutional provision that these posts can be held only by military and naval men of high rank, their incumbents always represent the military party and JAPAN 45 can be depended upon to consistently oppose any pol- icy of an anti-militaristic nature. As the members of the cabinet are appointed by the emperor, instead of, as in most European countries, by the premier, it is self-evident that the ministers of war and marine are always persona gratissima to the Elder Statesmen and the chief of the general staff. The remaining members of the cabinet, including the premier, though they may not always be persona grata, or even entirely acceptable, to that august and all-powerful quartet, are rarely openly hostile to it, for the very good reason, as the Jiji Shimpo, the Times of Japan, puts it, that "In this country the work of cabinet-making is at present in the hands of the Elder Statesmen." It is scarcely probable, then, that the Genro, whose advice the sovereign invariably accepts in such matters, would give their approval to the appointment of a minister who was likely to antagonize them. This is not say- ing, however, that all of the present members of the cabinet meet with the unqualified approval of the Genro, or that they represent the latter's views. Cer- tain of them, indeed, are supposed to be in opposition to the principles for which the Genro stand. But the Genro are fully awake to the growing power of pub- lic opinion and are far too shrewd to alienate it by refusing to sanction the appointment as minister of a man possessed of a powerful popular backing, even if his views do not concur with their own. But this 46 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS much can be said: If a cabinet minister dared to defy the Elder Statesmen or the chief of the general staff on some really vital question, if he consistently ob- structed their policies, he would almost certainly be forced to resign. For, in a contest between the cab- inet and the militarists, the latter always win. The procedure followed by the military party in wrecking a cabinet is as simple as it is effective. If it does not approve of the cabinet's policy, the Genro and the chief of the general staff send for the min- ister of war and tell him to resign. The premier, who, as I have already explained, is limited by law in his selection of a successor to the retiring minister, offers the portfolio in turn to one after another of the small group of army officers who, by virtue of their rank, are eligible to accept it under the provisions of the constitution. Having been coached in advance by the chief of the general staff, each of them politely de- clines. Thereupon the prime minister is compelled to admit his inability to complete his cabinet. In Japan such an admission is tantamount to withdrawal from public life, whereupon the emperor offers the vacant premiership to some statesman more willing to accept the dictation of the militarists. The correspondent of the New York Herald, Mr. Louis Seibold, has quoted "one of the most progres- sive of Japanese leaders" as saying, in this connec- tion: JAPAN 47 The general staff of Japan is quite as powerful as was the general staff that induced the German kaiser to make war upon the rest of the world. The Japanese General Staff controls the mental processes of the emperor to an even greater extent than was true in Germany in 1914. It, in turn, controls the cabinet. The minister of war, instead of being the master of the general staff, is its servant. It says to him, "You provide us with the recruits, war material, and supplies, and we will decide what to do with all these things. It is not for you to say." That is precisely what the general staff, with the consent of the emperor, told Premier Hara's cabinet a few weeks ago, when the wisdom of deferring to universal sentiment regarding the military activities of the government in Shantung and Siberia was broached. In other words, the general staff told the gov- ernment to mind its own business, which it did not consider to be of a military character. It might be supposed that, when the militarists thus attempt to dictate to the constitutional government, the Diet would promptly bring them to terms by re- fusing to vote the appropriations necessary for the maintenance of the military establishment. And that is exactly what would happen in most Western countries. But not so in Japan. For the militarists long since foresaw and guarded against just such a contingency by inserting in the constitution an article providing that budgets can be automatically reenacted from year to year. Article 71 of the Jap- anese Constitution reads as follows: "When the Im- perial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget for the preceding year." 48 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS Moreover, as the militarists have direct access to the emperor and to the funds of the imperial household, which is the richest in the world, they never lack for money. Indeed, when all is said and done, it is they who hold the national purse-strings. It will be seen, therefore, that the late progressive premier, Mr. Hara, was in a trying and none too strong position. The military party and the forces of reaction, as typi- fied by the Genro and the chief of the general staff, had too much power for him. Nothing is more indica- tive of the increasing strength of democracy in Japan i:han the fact that Premier Hara, himself a progres- sive and a man of the people, remained in office as long as he did. The effect on foreign opinion of the constant usurpation of power by the invisible government is clearly recognized by the liberal element in Japan, as witness a recent editorial in the Yomi-Yuri Shimbim: It is regrettable that the declarations of the Japanese Government are often not taken seriously. The Powers regard Japan as a country that does n't mean what it says. The most important reasons for this will be found in the actions of the militarists, whose utterances are the cause of the Government's attitude being misunderstood abroad. Unless the militarist evil is stamped out, a hundred declara- tions disavowing territorial ambitions will not be able to convince the Powers. The repeated failures to keep her agreements, which have cost Japan the confidence of other nations, FUJIYAMA, THE SACRED MOUNTAIN, AND FUJI RIVER SUNSET IN SHIBA PARK, TOKYO A RELIGIOUS PROCESSION IN KIOTO JAPAN 49 are not due to hypocrisy or insincerity on the part of the Japanese Government. They are due to the fact that the government is constantly flouted and overridden by the military party. Japan's failure to abide by her promise to evacuate Siberia upon the withdrawal of the American and European troops provides a case in point. This commitment was made to the United States and her European associates by the constitutional government of Japan as repre- sented by Premier Hara. But the militarists wished Japan to remain in Siberia for reasons of their own, so, at the very time the premier was notifying the Western Powers of Japan's intention to withdraw her Siberian garrisons, the general staff, unknown to the premier, was rushing troops north to reenforce them. The militarists placed the constitutional govern- ment in an almost equally embarrassing situation in Korea. Premier Hara, stirred to action by the ex- cesses of the Japanese soldiery, issued orders that the military forces in Korea should be subordinated to the civil authorities, but the military men, secure in a knowledge of their power, virtually refused to obey these orders, doing everything that they dared to obstruct the newly appointed governor-general, Baron Saito, in carrying out the promised reforms. It is the military party, again, that applies the screws to the distracted government of China, com- 50 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS pelling it to grant to Japanese firms concessions of one kind and another which give Japan virtually com- plete control in the regions where the concessions are operative. It is the military party that buys up the Chinese generals and politicians, hatches the plots, and directs the propaganda that produce the sporadic revolutions which are tearing China to pieces. This continued exercise of irresponsible authority by the military party is the most important and the most dangerous factor in the whole Japanese Ques- tion. Until the invisible government is suppressed in favor of the constitutional government, there can be no real hope of a satisfactory understanding be- tween the United States and Japan. A democracy like ours cannot do business with a government that is masked ; we must know with whom we are dealing. The high-minded and progressive statesmen who com- posed the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference were unquestionably sincere when they disavowed for their country any militaristic ambi- tions. But it remains to be seen whether the mili- tarists will support them. For we can no more trust the militarists of Tokio than we could trust the mili- tarists of Potsdam. We do not speak the same lan- guage. Our standards of honor are not the same. If Japan sincerely desires the friendship of the United States, then she must give valid assurances that the promises of her government will henceforward be binding on her military, as well as her civil agents. JAPAN 51 Let me resume, now, my explanation of the struc- ture and mechanism of the Japanese Government. The Diet, like the American Congress, consists of two branches the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. The House of Peers, which, ac- cording to the late Marquis Ito, is intended to "repre- sent the higher grades of society," is composed of the members of the imperial family, the nobility, and one hundred and twenty-four imperial nominees, the lat- ter including forty-five representatives of the largest taxpayers. These last, who are mostly rich merchants and wealthy landowners, are elected for seven years, one from each prefecture, by the fifteen male inhabit- ants thereof who pay the greatest amount of taxes. The balance of the imperial nominees are for the most part government officials appointed by the emperor for life upon the recommendation of the cabinet. As might be expected, they are strongly bureaucratic in their sympathies. Notwithstanding the fact that the moneyed element of the empire is well represented, the House of Peers is not a plutocratic body. Neither is it a stronghold of the landed interests, like the British House of Lords. Essentially aristocratic, it represents the interests of the clans, the nobles, the bureaucrats, and the military classes. The members of the House of Representatives, which is the lower branch of the Diet, are elected by the people. By the provisions of the election law, as revised in March, 1919, every male Japanese who is 52 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS not less than twenty-five years of age and who pays a direct annual tax of not less than three yen ($1.50) instead of fifteen yen ($7.50), as formerly can vote for the members of the lower house, who are known as deputies. This law increased the number of possible voters from about half a million to nearly three million ; that is, about one out of every nineteen Japanese now possesses voting privileges, instead of one in every eighty-seven, as was the case under the old statute. The astonishing increase in the number of qualified voters effected by a reduction of six dol- lars in the tax franchise provides a striking illustra- tion of the dire poverty of the Japanese masses. Even more astonishing, from a Western viewpoint, is the utter indifference to the franchise displayed by both the voting and the non-voting population. The truth of the matter is that the great mass of the people are too heavily burdened with taxation, too busily en- gaged in the struggle for the bare necessities of life, to concern themselves with politics. This explains why there is almost no public opinion, as we under- stand the term, in Japan. Though, under the pro- visions of the constitution, the Japanese taxpayer has a voice in the government of the country, he is seldom able to raise it above a whisper. Again, those of the masses who do take some in- terest in politics are, generally speaking, quite sat- isfied with the present situation. Looking back, they compare the Japan of feudal days with the present JAPAN 53 powerful empire, and, marking the progress that has been made, they are quite content to let it continue. As a result of this indifference on the part of the masses, there is no check on the ruling classes, which, believing with von Rochow in "the limited intel- ligence of subjects," find no difficulty in keeping the reins of power in their own hands. It must be ad- mitted, however, that in the main they have ruled in the national interest. Everything considered, the present organization of the state is a great advance from the feudalism which it supplanted, and it gives Japan a remarkably efficient and flexible administra- tion. But, without taking an unpardonable liberty with the truth, present-day Japan cannot be called democratic. It is a government for rather than by or of the people. VI I have now sketched in outline the double-barreled administration which rules Japan, where two distinct governments one constitutional and aboveboard, the other unconstitutional and unseen exist and func- tion side by side. I have also made it reasonably clear, I hope, that the constitutional government, were it free from outside influences, would be demo- cratic in its tendencies and pacific in its policies, whereas the invisible government is autocratic, mili- taristic, aggressive, and reactionary. Broadly speak- 54 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS ing, one stands for the ballot, the other for the bullet. It might be supposed that the former, having the constitution behind it, would be in the strongest posi- tion. But such is not the case. For the unseen gov- ernment has behind it the Elder Statesmen, who, through their influence with the emperor, are able to override the constitution. Furthermore, as its moving spirits include the highest officers of the army and the navy, it has complete control of the armed forces of the empire ; it has the allegiance of the great cap- tains of industry and finance; and it represents the clans. The position of the unseen government is still further buttressed by the attitude of the proletariate, in whose eyes it stands for military glory and natural expansion a bulwark against foreign aggression. This invisible government is not a modern develop- ment ; it goes back into Japanese history for centuries. It dates from the days of the shogunate, when the emperor was the titular ruler and the shogun the actual ruler of Japan. The power of the shogun was made possible by the support of the great military clans, which were the forerunners of the military party of to-day. When it is remembered that the Elder Statesmen, all the officers of the army and navy, and most of the higher officials of the govern- ment are members of these clans, it is not difficult to understand the ascendancy of the militarists in Japa- nese politics. For example, nearly all the members of the military clique belong to the Chosu clan, while JAPAN 55 the navy clique is recruited from the Satsuma clan. Thus it comes about that the policy of the govern- ment in fundamental matters is dictated and con- trolled by men who represent the warrior clans, abetted by a few men who, though not themselves clansmen, are in sympathy with the policies for which they stand. Though close observers have detected of late a noticeable change in the attitude of the younger gen- eration of Japanese toward the emperor, who is no longer venerated as he was by past generations ; and though, with the spread of education and the conse- quent growth of democratic ideas, the anti-militarist party is steadily though slowly gaining ground, to talk glibly, as certain American visitors to Japan have done, of Japanese militarism being on its last legs is to betray profound ignorance of actual conditions. Were the system of unseen government merely transi- tory, it might easily yield before the pressure of edu- cation and enlightened public opinion. But it is not transitory. Its tentacles sink deep into the traditions of the nation. It would be strange, indeed, if the mili- tarists were not dominant in Japan, for the whole history of the country is punctuated by wars, feuds, and rebellions; 1 it climbed to its present position as one of the great powers on the guns of its battleships 1 It should be noted, however, that for two hundred and fifty years, under the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan had no wars, civil or foreign. Perhaps no other nation of virile character can boast a period of such length entirely free from strife. E. A. P. 56 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS and the bayonets of its soldiers; it has always been ruled by military men. Though in the last fifty years the Japanese have reared an imposing governmental structure, apparently built on constitutional lines, you will find upon examination that it is founded on the bed-rock of stern and uncompromising militarism. 1 In order that you may have a clear comprehension of how this came about, let us take a hasty survey of the events leading up to the Restoration of 1868. Until that time, you will understand, the politico-so- cial conditions prevailing in Japan approximated those which characterized the Europe of the Middle Ages. The emperor was a spiritual rather than a tem- poral ruler, a sort of high priest, an object of awe and veneration, dwelling in his great moated castle in Kioto in magnificent seclusion. In certain respects his position might be likened to that now occupied by the Pope at Rome. So far as the practical work of government was concerned, he was only an abstrac- tion. The real power was in the hands of a military dictator, known as the shogun. This title originated in 1192, when the Emperor Takahira made one of his generals, Yorimoto, a S ei-i-tcd-shogun (literally, "barbarian-subjugating generalissimo"), or comman- der-in-chief , and this office became stereotyped in the persons of successive great military leaders until, in 1603, lyeyasu Tokugawa became shogun and estab- 1 A high Japanese official to whom I submitted the proofs of this chapter writes, "Instead, we think it was Western militarism that made us militaristic." E. A. P. JAPAN 57 lished the dynasty which bore his name. For more than two centuries and a half the shogunate remained in the Tokugawa family, the shoguns, though ,in theory subordinate to the emperor, exercising the de facto sovereignty in Japan. Ruling under and with the permission of the sho- gun, who held them in subjection with an iron hand, * were the daimyos, the chieftains of the various clans. In the course of centuries these great feudal chief- tains had become as powerful as the Norman barons who crossed with William the Conqueror into Eng- land. They lived in fortress-like castles in medieval arrogance and splendor; they maintained miniature armies; they made and executed their own laws; they exercised the rights of high justice, the middle, and the low ; they grew rich from the labors of an op- pressed and exploited peasantry; in their own terri- tories their will was supreme. Each of these feudal lords collected the revenues of his fief and used them as he saw fit, subject to the sole condition that he maintain a body of troops proportionate to his hold- ings and income. The daimyos recruited these mili- tary contingents from the samurai, or fighting men, of their respective clans. These retainers occupied a position in the social scale somewhat below that of the knights of the Middle Ages but considerably above that of the men-at-arms. Armed, armored, and highly trained for war, each of them was entitled to wear two swords as a symbol of his station, very 58 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS much as the European knights were distinguished by their golden spurs. Enjoying innumerable preroga- tives, they formed a class by themselves, shaping their conduct in strict accordance with the rules laid down in the celebrated code of Bushido the Ways of the Fighting Man. But for the common people there was no Bushido. They had no rights, save the right to work. They were looked upon merely as machines for grinding out wealth for the support of the daimyos and the pay of the samurai. Japan has made such amazing progress along mod- ern lines in the last fifty years that it is difficult for us to realize that these medieval conditions persisted until well past the middle of the last century. Gen- eral William Verbeck, the son of that Dr. Guido Verbeck who was the most celebrated of the early American missionaries sent to Japan, has told me that one of the clearest recollections of his boyhood is of a force of samurai^ clad in full armor, encamp- ing on his father's grounds. At about the time that the revolver and the repeating rifle were making their appearance in the West, the arms and armor of the Middle Ages were still in use by the fighting men of Nippon. When the nineteenth century reached the halfway mark, therefore, the actual government of the coun- try was still in the hands of a Tokugawa shogun. Satsuma and Chosu were the two most powerful clans. But the arrival in 1853 of Commodore Perry's JAPAN 59 squadron with the demand that Japan open her gates to foreign commerce; followed in 1861 by the bom- bardment of the Satsuma capital, Kagoshima, by British men-o'war; and by the destruction in 1864 of the Chosu ships and fortifications at Shimonoseki by a fleet of British, French, Dutch, and American war- ships, brought the great feudal chieftains to an abrupt realization of the nation's weakness and of the sho- gunate's inability to successfully resist foreign aggres- sion. This unwelcome discovery was accompanied by a recognition of the fact that Japan's only hope of preserving her independence lay in the immediate abolition of the shogunate and the reorganization of the government under the emperor along modern lines. The hopelessness of the situation, if the dual form of government was persisted in, was made clear in a memorial addressed to Yoshinobu, the last of the shoguns, who, on October 14, 1867, gave con- vincing proof of his patriotism by placing his resigna- tion in the hands of his sovereign, the fifteen-year-old Mutsuhito. The young emperor was brought from Kioto, the old capital, to Tokio, the new capital, where the daimyos laid their privileges and possessions at his feet. This act of self-renunciation has been de- servedly applauded by the historians, yet, as a matter of fact, it was a sacrifice of form rather than of sub- stance. For the youthful sovereign, thus suddenly restored to power, must have ministers, so, in the very nature of things, the higher offices of the new govern- 60 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS ment were allotted to the former daimyos now be- come, under the new order of things, princes, mar- quises, counts, and barons while the less important posts went to their samurai retainers. It could hardly have been otherwise, for at that period the daimyos and samurai that is, the nobles and the fighting men were the only classes possessed of the necessary education and training. Thus the leaders of the great clans stepped almost automatically into posi- tions of leadership and power in the reorganized state, while their retainers, now become subordinate officials in the new government, continued to give allegiance to their former chieftains and to obey their commands, just as they did in the old feudal days. But, though the ex-daimyos and the former samurai laid aside their armor with the dawning of the new era, though they exchanged the pike for the pen, they remained at heart military men. For a leopard cannot change its spots. Thus was born the military autocracy which rules Japan to-day, and the no less military bureau- cracy which supports it. With such training and traditions, it was not sur- prising that the Japanese of the ruling classes early became convinced that the development of a powerful nation depended upon the development and main- tenance of a powerful army and navy. It would have been more surprising had they thought otherwise. Now the militarists realized that they would have no difficulty in carrying out their policies as long as they JAPAN 61 could keep the reins of power in their hands, but they also realized that, should the people ever get control of the government, their schemes for building up a great military machine were certain to meet with serious opposition. For the people could be counted on to grudge the vast sums which the militarists deemed necessary for an adequate system of national defense. Let it be clear, however, that in working for the upbuilding of a huge military machine, the militarists were working for what they firmly believed to be the highest interests of the nation. For, what- ever else may be said of them, it must be admitted that they are genuinely patriotic men, even if their ideas of what constitutes patriotism are not the same as ours. They are perfectly sincere in their conviction that Japan's safety from foreign aggression requires the maintenance of military and naval establishments second to none. Compared with this question, all other questions, to their way of thinking, are of negligible importance. In order to make certain, therefore, that, in the event of the people gaining control of the government, the nation should always have adequate means of defense, they devised a scheme which has proved as effective as it is ingenious. At the direction of the Elder Statesmen (whose doyen, Prince Yamagata, was regarded as the head of the military party) the emperor issued a decree pro- viding that laws relating to certain phases of the na- tional defense need not be submitted to the Diet, but 62 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS could become operative upon receiving the approval of the crown. It was likewise provided that regard- ing such matters the members of the Diet did not even have the right to ask questions. This freed the min- ister of war and the minister of marine from the neces- sity of consulting the premier on military and naval matters. Instead, they can carry such matters straight to the emperor, who, guided by the Elder Statesmen, is certain to do as the militarists advise. In other words, the militarists in some degree enjoy a law-making power of their own. Not only that, but they are able to carry out their plans in absolute secrecy, for under such a system not even the premier himself knows what is going on within the inner circle. The militarists guard their secrets from those mem- bers of their own government who are not in sympathy with them as zealously as they guard them from the agents of foreign nations. So fearful are they, in- deed, lest their plans should become known to the constitutional government that, when the military leaders are received in audience by the emperor, the precaution is taken of substituting a military aide-de- camp for the civilian court chamberlain who is cus- tomarily in attendance on the sovereign. Thus the premier, the cabinet, the Diet, and the people are kept in profound ignorance of many important de- cisions. For example, it is asserted that the Chinese Government has frequently made representations to the foreign office in Tokio relative to the actions of JAPAN 63 Japanese officials in China, only to find that the foreign office was totally ignorant of the whole mat- ter. "The result," as Professor Yoshino, one of the fore- most political students and publicists in Japan, has said, "is that the cabinet and people of Japan are held responsible for things done in China, Korea, and other places of which the government and the people have not the slightest knowledge. Because of this dual government, Japan has been greatly misunder- stood by America and other foreign nations, as the military, being the most powerful, is the Japan known to the outside world." Let me see, now, if I can give you a concrete illus- tration of how this system of dual government works in practice. Let us suppose that the American Gov- ernment favors the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia, leaving the Russians to work out their own salvation. A note to this effect is despatched by the secretary of state to the American Ambassador at Tokio, who in turn transmits it to the premier, as the responsible head of the Japanese Government. The premier calls a meeting of his cabinet and submits the note for consideration. If the cabinet agrees to the American suggestion the premier directs the minister of war to issue the necessary orders to the chief of the general staff for the withdrawal of the troops in Siberia, at the same time instructing the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to inform the secretary of 64 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS state that the suggestion of the American Government has been approved and that the troops will be with- drawn forthwith. Had Japan a normal system of government, like that of England or France or Italy, that would end the matter. But Japan has not a normal system of government. For the invisible gov- ernment now steps in. The minister of war, who, as I have already explained, is always a general, loses no time in informing the Elder Statesmen and the chief of the general staff of the cabinet's action. They disapprove of what the cabinet has done. Being militarists, they believe that the best interests of Japan will be served by strengthening, rather than relaxing, her grip on Siberia. So the emperor, acting on the advice of the Elder Statesmen, summons the minister of war and directs him to despatch an additional di- vision of troops to Siberia forthwith. The minister of war so directs the chief of the general staff, who promptly issues the necessary orders, and the deed is done. All this is done, mind you, without consulting the premier and without his knowledge. The first intimation that he has that his policy has been reversed by the militarists, and his promise to the American Government broken, is when he reads the news de- spatches from Washington announcing that the Japa- nese Government has gone back on its word and that, instead of withdrawing its garrisons in Siberia, as it had solemnly agreed to do, it is secretly pouring more troops into that region. It is obvious that the con- JAPAN 65 stitutional government of Japan cannot justly be blamed for this sort of thing. The men who make the promises are not those who break them. It is not Dr. Jekyll who is insincere ; it is Mr. Hyde. To again quote Professor Yoshino: "Of course this scheme of a double government is not constitutional. It ought to be easily broken up. As a matter of fact, in the government itself, cer- tainly in the present cabinet and among the people, the opposition to this scheme is very strong and very pronounced. But it is very difficult to be undertaken. The stronger the opposition among the people be- comes, the stronger the opposition of the militarists. Their whole attitude is that whatever is best for Japan is the thing that is to be done, no matter who or what is sacrificed. Their aim is to make Japan powerful and to insure her influence as a nation. If that means that China or Korea is to be sacrificed, it is unavoid- able." VII Though the Japanese are gradually becoming more democratic in their tendencies; though the number of young men, mostly students, who realize where the militarists are leading the nation, is steadily increasing; let us not delude ourselves into thinking that the disappearance of militarism is a probability of the near future. That it will eventually dis- 66 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS appear is as certain as that dawn follows the dark. But it may take a generation or even longer. At present the militarists are too strongly intrenched for a public opinion as feeble as that of Japan to dis- turb, much less dislodge them. Certainly there seems to me little justification for the prediction recently made by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, American Min- ister to China, that Japan will be a democracy in twenty years. That the militarists will remain in the ascendant during the lifetime of the Elder States- men there can be but little doubt. Not until the grip of those aged dictators has been relaxed by death is the power of the militarists likely to wane. Nor is there any certainty that it will wane then; for in re- cent years their power has been immensely strength- ened by a force far mightier and more sinister than that of the Genro. I refer to the force of organized capital, of big business. As Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, one of the shrewdest and best-informed students of Far Eastern politics has pointed out, it is big business which has reinforced and is keeping in power the un- seen government the military party. Only recently has modern industrial Japan awak- ened to a realization of its own strength. But it is now fully alive to the almost unlimited power, the endless possibilities, to be realized by the great business inter- ests of the country joining hands with the militarists and working with them for a common purpose. One who could trace through the political structure of the JAPAN 67 empire the ramifications of the great industrial and trading companies would be in a position to analyze Japanese politics, domestic and foreign. Those ac- tions of the Japanese Government which are usually attributed by foreigners to the ambitions of the mili- tarists are in reality quite as frequently due to the predacity of the capitalists. Here you have the key to the annexation of Korea, to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Siberia, to the unreasonable demands made on China, to the opposition to the restoration of Shantung. All of those regions are immensely rich in natural resources, they offer unlimited opportuni- ties for profitable exploitation. And it is Japanese big business which proposes to do the exploiting. So, in order that it may obtain control of the territories which it proposes to exploit, it has joined forces with the land-hungry militarists. It is the most sinister combination of high politics and big business that the world has ever seen. Consider for a moment what similar but far less powerful combinations have achieved in other parts of the world. It was the influence of the Rhodes-Beit- Barnato interests, remember, that was chiefly instru- mental in inducing England to embark on her con- quest of the Transvaal, thereby bringing under the unchallenged control of British capitalists the dia- mond mines of Kimberley and the gold-diggings of the Rand. It was the interests of the great West- phalian firm of Mannesmann Brothers in the mines 68 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS of Morocco which led to Germany's naval demonstra- tion off Agadir. It was the greed of Muscovite cap- italists for further concessions in Manchuria and Korea which precipitated the war between Russia and Japan. It was the avarice of French capitalists, far more than the persecutions of French missionaries, which led to the tricolor being raised over Indo-China. It was American sugar interests which brought about the annexation of Hawaii and American oil interests which have helped to shape our policy toward Mexico. And in the ambition of Japanese big business to con- trol and exploit the mines, forests, grain-fields, rail- ways, and markets of Eastern Asia is found the ex- planation of Japan's policy of expansion by military force. The expansion may be commercial or terri- torial, and the force may be used or merely threat- ened, but the policy, and the influences which shape the policy, are the same. Dominating Japanese business and finance are a few great corporations Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Okura, Sumimoto, Kuhara, Takata, Furukawa. So much larger than the others that they are in a class by themselves are the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies, owned respectively by the Mitsui and Iwasaki families. Indeed, it is a common saying in Japan that no one knows where Mitsui ends and the government begins. Their tentacles sink deep into every phase of national life commercial, industrial, financial, political. They own banks, railways, steamship lines, mills, factories, JAPAN 69 dockyards, mines, forests, fisheries, plantations, insur- ance companies, trading corporations. They and the leaders of the unseen government the military party are as closely bound together by political, financial, and family ties as were the Chicago packers before the dissolution of their monopoly. They are as inter- twined by marriage, mutual interests, and interlock- ing directorates as President Wilson boasted that the Treaty of Versailles was intertwined with the Cove- nant of the League of Nations. Each of these great companies, according to Mr. Peffer, has its political, financial, or family alliance with the leaders of the unseen government. For ex- ample, the late Marquis Okuma, one of the Elder Statesmen, was related by marriage to the Iwasakis, who, as I have said, own the great house of Mutsu- bishi. Another of the Elder Statesmen, Marquis Matsukata, is adviser to one of these industrial dy- nasties, while his third son, Kojiro Matsukata, is the head of the great Kawasaki shipbuilding plant at Kobe, where more than one dreadnought has been built for the government. The late Marquis Inoue, who held in turn the portfolios of agriculture and commerce, home affairs, finance, and foreign affairs, was closely connected with the house of Mitsui. The late Field-Marshal Terauchi, at one time Prime Min- ister of Japan and one of the .foremost leaders of the military party, was equally close to Okura, a relation- ship which explains that house's success in obtaining 70 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS highly profitable army contracts as well as important concessions in the Japanese spheres of influence on the mainland. Baron Shibusawa, whom they call "the Rockefeller of Japan," has long been on the most in- timate terms with Prince Tokugawa, the President of the House of Peers, having gone to Europe as the companion of the prince and his brother as long ago as 1868. And so with the highest military men of the empire and the leading statesmen. Each has his rela- tionship to some great financial house, to some captain of industiy. Big business uses these affiliations with the militarists to obtain for their schemes the support and cooperation of the unseen government. And by the same token the unseen government is enormously strengthened by the support of big business. It is like a crossruff at bridge. Tin "Japan's future lies oversea." In those four words is found the policy of the military-finan- cial combination which rules the empire. The an- nexation of Formosa and Korea and Sakhalin, the occupation of Manchuria and Siberia and Shantung, are not, as the world supposes, examples of hap- hazard land-grabbing. They are phases of a vast and carefully-laid scheme which has as its ultimate object the control of all Eastern Asia. Ostensibly to solve the problems with which she has been confronted JAPAN 71 by her amazing increase in population and produc- tion, but in reality to gratify the greed of big business and the restless ambitions of the military party, Japan has embarked on a campaign of world-expansion and exploitation. Convinced that she requires a colonial empire in her business, she has set out to build one up as she would build a dry-dock or a bridge. The fact that she had nothing, or next to nothing, to start with did not discourage her at all. Having once made up her mind that the realization of her political, economic, and territorial ambitions necessitated the acquirement of overseas dominions, she has permitted nothing to stand in the way of her getting them. Land and trade-hunger and the lust for power have whipped her on. So, wherever a pretext can be provided for raising a flag-staff, whether on an ice-floe in the Arctic or on an atoll in the Pacific, there the Rising Sun flag'shall flutter ; wherever trade is to be found, there Yokohama cargo-boats shall drop their anchors, there Osaka engines shall thunder over Kobe rails, there Kioto silks and Nagoya cottons shall be sold by mer- chants speaking the language of Dai Nippon. It is a scheme astounding in its very vastness, as methodi- cally planned and as systematically executed as an American presidential campaign ; and already, thanks to Japanese audacity, aggressiveness, and persever- ance, backed by Japanese banks, battleships, and bay- onets, it is much nearer realization than the world dreams. 72 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS In China, Siberia, and the Philippines, in Cali- fornia, Canada, and Mexico, in the East Indies, Aus- tralia, and New Zealand, on three continents and on all the islands of the Eastern seas, Japanese mer- chants and money are working twenty-four hours a day to build up that overseas empire of which the financiers and the militarists dream. The activities of these outposts of trade are as varied as trade itself. Their voices are heard in every Eastern market-place ; their footsteps resound in every avenue of Oriental endeavor. Their mines, in Siberia and Manchuria and China rival the cave of Al-ed-Din. The railways that converge on Peking from the north and east, the great' trunk-line across Manchuria, and the eastern section of the trans-Siberian system are already in their hands. They work tea plantations in China, coffee plantations in Java, rubber plantations in Malaya, cocoanut plantations in Borneo, hemp plantations in the Philippines, spice plantations in the Celebes, sugar plantations in Hawaii, prune orchards in California, apple orchards in Oregon, dairy-farms in British Co- lumbia, coal-mines in Manchuria, gold-mines in Korea, forests in Siberia, fisheries in Kamchatka. Their argosies, flying the house-flags of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, and a score of other lines, bear Japa- nese goods to Japanese traders on every seaboard of the world, while Japanese warships are constantly aprowl up and down the Eastern seas, ready to pro* JAPAN 73 tect the interests thus created by the menace of their guns. In regions where Japanese banks have been estab- lished and Japanese traders have settled, it is seldom difficult for Japan to find an excuse for aggression. It may be that a Japanese settler is mistreated or a Japanese consul insulted, or that a Japanese bank has difficulty in collecting its loans. So the slim cables flash the complaint to Tokyo ; there are secret consul- tations between the leaders of the military party and the chieftains of big business ; a spokesman of the un- seen government rises in the Diet to announce that in Siberia or China Japanese interests have been imper- illed or Japanese dignity affronted; the newspapers controlled by big business inflame the national resent- ment ; the aged trio behind the throne, speaking in the name of the emperor, issue the necessary orders to the ministers of war and marine and to the chief of the general staff ; and before the offending country awak- ens to a realization of what is happening, Japanese transports are at anchor in her harbors and Japanese troops are disembarking on her shores. Before they are withdrawn, if they are withdrawn, Japan usually succeeds in extorting a concession to build a railway, or to work a coal-mine, or to contract a loan, or a ninety-nine year lease of a harbor which can be converted into a naval base, or the cession of a more or less valuable strip of territory and so the work of building up an overseas empire goes steadily on. 74 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS This territorial expansion (or rather, the spirit of aggression which has inspired it and the readiness to advance it by the employment of military force) has naturally aroused foreign suspicion of Japan's inten- tions. In less than a quarter of a century we have seen the area of the empire increased by nearly eighty per cent. and every foot of this new territory was won by the sword. We have seen Formosa and the Pescadores filched, as spoils of war, from a helpless China. We have witnessed the annexation of Korea against the wishes of its people. We have seen Man- churia become Japanese in fact, if not in name. We have watched first Southern and then Northern Sak- halin brought under the rule of Tokyo. We have seen Japan, not content with the seizure of the German possessions on the Shantung Peninsula, push her gar- risons two hundred and fifty miles into the interior of China. We have noted Japan's reluctance to per- mit the neutralization of Yap. We have even heard of Japanese agents at work in Outer Mongolia, at the court of the Living Buddha. To-day Japan has a chain of forts, garrisons, naval bases and coaling sta- tions stretching from the mid-Pacific to mid-Asia, from the ice of the Arctic to the fierce heat of the Line. Her guns watch the whole eastern seaboard of the continent. The strategic railways converg- ing on Peking, the Manchurian trunk-line, and the eastern section of the trans-Siberian system are in her hands. Sakhalin and Hokkaido on the north guard JAPAN 75 the approaches to Kamchatka and the rich basin of the Amur. Port Arthur, Chemulpo, and Tsing-tau are Japanese watchdogs at the gateways to the vast un- developed wealth of Northern China. Kyushu and Formosa look out on the populous and fertile littoral which stretches from Shanghai to Canton. Her naval bases in the Pescadores are within easy striking dis- tance of the Philippines. And, a thousand miles out in the Pacific, the Marshall, the Caroline, and the Bonin groups form her eastern skirmish line. Is it a matter for surprise, then, that our suspicions and ap- prehensions have been aroused by this steady and implacable Japanese advance? The Japanese resent these suspicions and apprehensions as unjustified. My answer to that is : Let them look at the map. IX Japan finds herself to-day in a most difficult and perplexing situation. With her population increasing at the rate of nearly three quarters of a million an- nually, and with less than fifteen per cent, of her soil capable of cultivation, her government finds itself faced by three grave and pressing problems : the first, that of finding sources from which to obtain the raw materials with which to keep her factory-wheels turn- ing; the second, that of finding markets for her manu- factured products ; the third, that of finding room for 76 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS the expansion of her surplus population. Barred by legislation from North America and Australia, she has found on the mainland of Asia in China proper, in Manchuria, and to a lesser degree in Mongolia and Siberia suitable fields for colonial, industrial, and commercial expansion. But the energetic, aggressive, and at times unscrupulous methods which she has pur- sued in these regions have brought her into sharp con- flict with American interests, with American moral sentiment, and particularly with the American policy of the Open Door. American opinion appears to be fairly evenly divided as to the attitude which should be adopted by the United States in regard to Japan's claims of preponderant rights and "special interests" on the Asian mainland, one section (which is strongly pro-Chinese) insisting that she must be forced to withdraw unconditionally from Chinese and Russian territory ; the other holding that, so long as she makes no attempt to shut us out from the markets of those regions which she considers within her sphere of in- fluence, it would be impractical and impolitic for the United States to interfere with her activities on the mainland. These diametrically opposed views are admirably summed up in the following extracts, the first being taken from an editorial in a well-known periodical :* As long ago as the time of the Paris Conference we urged the necessity of giving the Japanese a reasonable outlet in 1 Town and Country, January 1, 1922. JAPAN 77 Northern China and Eastern Siberia. We held that it was manifestly impossible to bar the Japanese from the western coast of the twin American continents and all of Australia and New Zealand and the larger islands of the Pacific which are controlled by the English-speaking peoples, and also to prevent her from overflowing onto the mainland of Asia. At least, it was impossible to do this without eventually going to war. We also disagreed entirely with the outcry against the assigning at Paris of the German leases in Shantung to Japan. Japan had exactly the same right to those German assets, which she seized by process of war, as we had to the German ships which we seized in the North River. When, therefore, the Washington Conference takes a course which gives Japan a fairly clean bill of health in the Far East, tacitly allows her a wide field for expansion there, and, in addition, does away with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which, in our view, was a real stumbling block in the way of peace, we need hardly say that our sympathy is all with the action of the Conference. ... It is entirely reasonable, to our view, that we should give the Japanese a fairly free hand in Northern China and Siberia ; at least, it is the business of China, with her four hundred million popu- lation, to stop Japan, and not our business. This is manifestly the expression of a narrow and selfish point of view, being in striking contrast to the following extract from a letter written me, shortly before the opening of the Washington Conference, by a former American diplomatist, a gentleman of dis- tinguished attainments, and, by reason of his long residence in Japan, a recognized authority on Fas Eastern affairs: For us to acknowledge unreservedly Japan's preponderant rights on the Asian mainland and to recognize that Eastern Asia is her political sphere of influence would mean not only a general recognition by us of the validity of spheres of in- 78 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS fluence which would be fatal to our foreign policy, but might involve us in a practical approval of what would amount to a partition of China. Such an approval would mean a re- versal of our whole attitude toward China, which would be a tragedy to the people of China and would furthermore be a serious political blunder, as we would thus acquiesce in the practical elimination of all our trade with the Orient. Our choice has always seemed to me reasonably simple. We must either maintain our disapproval of spheres of influ- ence or we must surrender our ideals of an open market and play the game with the other Powers, demanding our par- ticular spheres as they demand theirs. This latter position I am confident our people would never support. I realize that Japanese propaganda has endeavored to find an an- alogy between the Monroe Doctrine and their claim of a paramount interest on the mainland of Asia, but in my judgment there is no such analogy. There is one final rea- son why I think that this method of averting a conflict between the United States and Japan is not only impractical and impolitic, but also what I venture to term immoral. In effect, it would be appropriating the rights and property of China and Russia and then using them to complete a bargain in the interest of our own exclusion policy! What right have we to bargain away China's sovereignty in Manchuria in order to solve our own controversy with Japan ? It strikes me as a form of international embezzlement. And then, worst of all, it simply wouldn't work. It would not leave peace in Asia. It would create problems in the future in which we would be viewed by the Russian and Chinese peoples as co-conspirators in Japan's aggression. ... Of course, you realize that such a solution is the one that the Japanese ruling class most earnestly desire. Now it seems to me that, speaking in the language of practical politics, the only feasible solution lies somewhere between these views. For I do not believe that the majority of Americans are selfish enough to endorse the first view any more than I believe that JAPAN 79 they are altruistic enough to insist on the latter. Moreover, we must recognize the existence of certain conditions and be prepared to accept them, whether we approve of them or not. For example, we might as well realize first as last that there is not the slight- est probability of Japan evacuating the Kwantung peninsula that is, the leased territories of Dalny and Port Arthur. She is there to stay make no mistake about that at least until the expiration of the ninety- nine-year lease which she took over from Russia. This great stronghold at the entrance to the Gulf of Chihli forms a vital link in Japan's scheme of national defense, it has cost her thousands of lives and millions of yen, and there is no more likelihood of her restoring it to China than there is of Great Britain restoring Gibraltar to Spain. As regards Shantung, the situation is entirely dif- ferent. The possession of Kiauchau is not vital to the Japanese scheme of national defense nor are the Japa- nese people particularly attached to it by sentiment. Ever since the Peace Conference at Paris, Japan has realized that, in remaining on the peninsula, she was defying world opinion. Moreover, her statesmen have proclaimed over and over again, in the most un- equivocal of terms, that it was Japan's intention to restore the German leasehold to China, and it is hardly conceivable that the nation intends to break the pledge thus given. The truth of the matter is that the delay in the withdrawal of the Japanese has 80 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS been largely due to the obstinacy and excessive pride shown by both parties and to petty bickering over the form and details of the transaction. Prophecy in in- ternational affairs is always unwise, but I think it safe to predict that the Japanese evacuation of Shantung will have begun before this book is published. The greatest obstacle in the path of a friendly un- derstanding between Japan and China is provided by Manchuria, where Japan has extensive, varied, and valuable interests railways, mines, timber, and other concessions some of which she took over from Rus- sia by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth and others which she has acquired since. She has ex- pended millions of yen on the development of these concessions and there have settled in Manchuria, moreover, a very considerable number of Japanese subjects. And finally, the borders of Manchuria are conterminous with the borders of Korea for nearly a thousand miles. Now, in view of the notorious weak- ness and instability of the Peking government, which has shown itself powerless to make its authority felt throughout the Eighteen Provinces of the Chinese homeland, much less in the outlying territories, it seems to me too much to expect Japan to renounce her enormously valuable interests in Manchuria, with- draw the guards from her railways, and abandon her nationals and their properties to Chang Tso-lin and his fellow-bandits, who, once the firm hand of Japa- nese control was removed, would have the land at JAPAN 81 their mercy. No one who has a first-hand knowledge of the conditions which prevail in Manchuria can truthfully assert that the substitution of Chinese for Japanese control in that region at this time would be for the best interests of the inhabitants themselves. But this should not be interpreted as meaning that I believe in perpetuating Japan's claims to "special in- terests" in Manchuria, for I do not. Let the Chinese give convincing proof of their ability to establish a strong and efficient central government, let them put an end to the civil war which is disrupting the repub- lic, let them suppress the misrule, corruption, and brigandage which prevail throughout the Eighteen Provinces, and then they will have substantial grounds for demanding that Japan's privileged posi- tion in Manchuria shall be terminated. Manchuria is indubitably Chinese territory, and its complete con- trol should be restored to her as soon as she is in a position to exercise it. But Japan has not the same justification for her conduct in the Eighteen Provinces that she has had for her policy in Manchuria. Her behavior in the Chinese homeland has been characterized by inexcus- able selfishness, arrogance, discrimination, and greed. If she wishes to convince the world that she is sincere in her protestations that she has no designs on Chinese sovereignty, no desire to shut the Open Door, then she should lose no time in withdrawing her troops (she has a garrison as far inland as Hankow) and 82 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS her police, in abandoning her post-offices, and in ter- minating certain offensive agreements which she has coerced the Chinese into accepting. In short, she must conduct herself henceforward like a guest in a friend's house, rather than like a burglar. On the other hand, so long as Japan confines her- self to strictly legitimate methods I fail to see how exception can be taken by the Chinese, or by any one else, to Japanese commercial expansion in China. By commercial expansion I mean the establishment of banks, the flotation of loans, the construction of rail- ways, the operation of mines, and similar industrial activities, provided always that they meet with the approval of the Chinese Government and are con- ducted in a fashion which in no way imperils the sov- ereignty of China or infringes on the rights of other nations. Japan must obtain raw materials for her home industries, and I can see no more objection to her obtaining them from China than I can to the United States obtaining oil from Mexico. Japan must find markets for her products, and I can see no more objection to her seeking those markets in China than I can to the United States seeking markets in Latin- America. Japan must provide for her surplus population, and I can see no more objection to Japa- nese emigrants settling in China provided they are willing to abide by Chinese laws than I can to Euro- pean emigrants settling in the United States. But Japan must abandon for good and all her old policy JAPAN 8 of monopolization and coercion. There must be no further alienation of Chinese territory on any pretext whatsoever. There must be no further attempts to intimidate the Chinese Government into granting con- cessions, accepting Japanese "advice," or signing ob- noxious treaties. If Japan will give convincing proof of her sincerity by putting an immediate end to these abuses, then there is no reason why the two great Oriental nations should not become friends and allies, thereby dispelling for all time the ominous cloud that has so long overshadowed the Farther East. I am of the opinion that the Japanese policies in China which have caused so much uneasiness abroad are dictated by imperative economic necessity rather than by a spirit of wanton aggression. If you will take the trouble to look into the matter you will find that Japan's territorial expansion on the Asian mainland is not due, as her enemies would have you believe, to greed for military glory, to an insatiable lust for power. It is due, as I have already pointed out, to the necessity of providing food for a popula- tion which is already greater than the soil of the homeland can support, and which is de- barred by exclusion acts or racial hostility from seeking its livelihood on the American or Australian continents. Consider the facts. With a birth-rate of 32 per 1000, the population of Japan is increasing at the rate of approximately 750,000 a year. Though 84 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS much of its surface is so mountainous as to be unin- habitable, or at least unsusceptible to cultivation, Japan already has nearly four hundred inhabitants to the square mile, and this number is steadily rising. Though, during the last decade, the area of land under cultivation has been increased by five per cent, and the production of rice by four per cent., the number of mouths that must be fed have increased by twelve per cent. In the same period the cost of living in Japan has increased nearly four hundred per cent. With emigration to America and Aus- tralia out of the question, the nation is faced, then, by three alternatives : ( 1 ) a reduction of the birth-rate ; (2) an increase in food production; (3) territorial expansion into the thinly populated regions of East- ern Asia. As a reduction of the birth-rate is not to be expected, and as food production in Japan itself has already reached the maximum, Japanese states- men have been compelled by sheer economic necessity to adopt the third alternative expansion on the Asian mainland. There you have in tabloid form the true expansion of Japan's political and military activ- ities in Shantung, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia and her claims to "special interests" in all those regions. In short, Japan has reached the point where she must overflow or perish, just as the congested countries of Europe overflowed into the Americas and Africa. But in her case there is no New World, no Dark Continent, in which her surplus millions can JAPAN 85 find homes and livelihoods. The waste lands were long ago parceled out among the Western nations. Japan came into the world a century too late. De- barred from expanding to the eastward or the south- ward, she is expanding westward into the loosely held, thinly peopled, undeveloped fringes of China and Siberia. That her expansion should be at the ex- pense of other and weaker nations is unfortunate but, under the circumstances, unavoidable. As a Japanese writer in "The World's Work" has put it: "The Japanese people must either die a saintly death in righteous starvation, or expand into the neighbor's backyard and Japan is not that much of a saint." We now come to the most delicate, the most difficult, and the most dangerous of all the ques- tions in dispute between America and Japan that of Japanese immigration into the United States. Now I have no intention of embarking on a discussion of the pros and cons of this question. But because I have found that most Americans have only an inexact and fragmentary knowledge of it, and because a rudi- mentary understanding of it is essential to a clear comprehension of the larger question, our relations with Japan, I trust that you will bear with me while I sketch in outline the events which led up to the 86 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS present immigration situation. I will compress them into tabloid form. Under the administrative interpretation of our naturalization laws, Japanese aliens are ineligible to American citizenship. But down to the summer of 1908 there was no restriction on Japanese immigra- tion. Up to that time, in other words, a Japanese could enter and settle in the United States, but he could not become an American citizen. In that year, however, the much-discussed "Gentlemen's Agree- ment," whereby Japanese laborers are excluded from the United States, went into effect. That agreement is not in the shape of a formal treaty or undertaking. The term applies simply to the substance of a num- ber of informal notes exchanged between the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and Mr. K. Takahira, at that time the Japanese Ambassador in Washing- ton. The terms of this agreement provided that no Japanese could enter our ports from Japan or from Hawaii without a proper passport from his own gov- ernment, and Japan promised to give no passports to prospective emigrants of the coolie, or laboring class. There has been no charge that Japan has failed to keep both letter and spirit of this agreement with absolute integrity. In fact, the Japanese Foreign Office has at times leaned backward in its endeavor to keep faith. But the labor elements in California, unable to meet Japanese industrial competition and jealous of Japanese success, continued their anti- JAPAN 87 Japanese agitation, being aided by politicians seeking the labor vote, and in 1913 laws prohibiting the pur- chase of land by Japanese in that state were placed on the statute books of California. But there were certain loopholes left by this law. These loopholes permitted of agricultural land being leased by Japanese for three years ; of land being pur- chased by corporations in which Japanese were inter- ested ; and of land being purchased by American-born children of Japanese parents. To block up these loopholes the Oriental Exclusion League circulated a petition to place an initiative act known as the Alien Land Act on the ballot in 1920. To bolster up its arguments in favor of this act, the League called at- tention to the rapid increase in the Japanese birth- rate in California. This increase in the birth-rate was due, it was claimed, to the custom followed by many of the poorer Japanese settlers in California of having sent to them from Japan pictures of eligible girls. In this manner the Japanese in America selected their wives, to whom they were married in absentia. These so-called "picture brides," being thus legally married, had the right under our laws to join their husbands in the United States, which they did in considerable numbers. And the more picture brides, the more chil- dren. And the more children, the more land passing under Japanese control; for the Japanese circum- vented the prohibition against their holding land by purchasing land in the name of their American-born 88 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS children, who were automatically American citizens and of whom the parents were the legal guardians. This method of circumventing the law created such an uproar among the anti-Japanese elements in Cali- fornia that in February, 1920, Japan, in order to re- move another source of controversy, ceased to issue passports to picture brides. But this did not satisfy the Calif ornian agitators, who succeeded in having the adoption of the Alien Land Act put to a popular vote. This act perhaps the most stringent measure ever directed against the civil rights of residents in the United States provides: 1. Prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese. . Prohibition of leasing of agricultural lands by Japa- nese. 3. Prohibition of land-ownership by companies or cor- porations in which Japanese are interested. 4. Prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese children born in the United States, by removing them from the guardianship of their parents in such cases. At the elections in November, 1920, this measure was carried by a majority of the registered voters and by a three-to-one vote of those who expressed an opin- ion on the subject. The vote stood 668,483 in favor and 222,086 opposed. There you have the Japanese immigration situation up to date. Right here let me interject the remark that, in re- senting the American attitude of racial superiority, the restrictions imposed by the United States on JAPAN 89 Japanese immigration, and the prohibition of land- ownership by Japanese in California, the people of Nippon are not consistent. They refuse to see that the American attitude toward the Japanese is almost identical with the Japanese attitude toward the Chinese but with this difference: we do not hold the Japanese in contempt, as the Japanese hold the Chinese. The Japanese regard the Chinese as an in- ferior race, considering themselves immeasurably su- perior to them intellectually in culture and in effi- ciency. His supreme contempt for the Chinese ex- plains why the Japanese so bitterly resents being placed in the same category with them by our immi- gration laws. The Japanese see nothing anomalous in the fact that their own laws prohibiting Chinese from settling in Japanese territory are fully as rigid as the restrictions placed on Japanese immigration into the United States. Indeed, they have carried their exclusion policy to far greater lengths than we have ours, for unskilled foreign laborers are not per- mitted to settle in those regions on the Asian main- land which, though they do not belong to Japan, are under Japanese control. In other words, a Chinese coolie cannot settle in the Chinese province of Shan- tung, because, forsooth, Japan regards it as within her own sphere of influence. The subjects of the em- peror admit of no inconsistency in the fact that, though approximately 27,000 acres are owned by Japanese settlers in California, not a single foot 90 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS of Japanese soil can be owned by a foreigner. They fail to recognize anything anomalous in the fact that, though nearly 48,000 acres in California are owned by American corporations controlled by Japanese capi- tal, very few, if any, foreigners are represented in corporations holding land in Japan. There are, it is true, a few foreigners in Japan who hold land under perpetual leases, but these holdings, insignificant in number and extent, have come down from the days when the Western nations exacted extraterritorial privileges. As a people, the Japanese are not blessed with a sense of humor. If they were, they would see the humor of their insistence on being accorded the same rights which they deny to another Oriental race, the Chinese. But the point I wish to emphasize is this: the Japanese Government is not clamoring for the re- moval of any of the present restrictions on the immi- gration of its nationals into the United States. The Japanese consider these restrictions offensive and humiliating, that goes without saying, but they concede our right to decide who shall enter our doors and who shall stay out. Not for a moment, however, have the Japanese been blinded by our assertions that our exclusion of them is based purely on economic grounds. They are far too shrewd not to recognize that this explanation was advanced to soothe their wounded vanity, as a sop to their pride. They know, and we know, that the real cause of their exclusion is JAPAN 91 racial. No one realizes more clearly than the Japanese themselves that, in excluding them from the United States, we have in effect stigmatized them as an in- ferior race. I repeat, however, that they concede our right to exclude whom we please. But what they do not concede, what they will not agree to, is the right of the United States, or of any state in the United States, to discriminate against those Japanese who are lawfully resident in this country. To attempt to deprive those Japanese legally dwelling within our borders of those personal and property rights which we grant to all other aliens is so obviously unjust that it scarcely merits discussion. The Japanese have ex- cellent grounds for believing that such discriminatory legislation is unconstitutional ; they know that it con- stitutes an open defiance of equity and justice. They feel and their feeling is apparently shared by the 222,000 Californians who voted against it that such legislation makes ridiculous and hypocritical our oft- repeated boast that we stand for the square deal. The bitterness of Japanese resentment over the immigration question is not entirely due, however, to wounded racial pride, but quite as much, I think, to the rudeness and lack of tact which have characterized the anti-Japanese agitation in California. For it should be remembered that in no country is the code of social courtesy or consideration for foreigners so rigidly observed as in Japan. In dealing with the Japanese, nothing is ever gained by insults or bully- 92 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS ing. Politeness is the shibboleth of all classes, and the lowest coolie usually responds to it instantly. Is it to be wondered at, then, that the Japanese are irri- tated and resentful at the lack of courtesy and ordi- nary good manners which we have displayed in our handling of so peculiarly delicate a matter as the im- migration question? It may be that local conditions justify the wave of anti-Japanese hysteria which is sweeping the Pacific Coast. It may be that the people of the Western states can offer valid reasons for their constant pin- pricking and irritation of Japan. But I doubt it. I am no stranger to California I have lived there off and on for years nor am I ignorant of the relations between labor and politics in that state. That is why I refuse to become excited over the threatened "con- quest" of California by a little group of aliens which comprises only two per cent, of the population of the state and which owns or leases only one and six tenths per cent, of its cultivated lands. The last census shows that there are 111,010 Japanese men, women, and children in the United States. And no more are coming in. Surely this is not a very serious menace to a nation of 110 millions of people! The Californians assert that their anti-Japanese legislation is a matter for them to decide and does not concern the rest of the country. Therein they are wrong. For in the unwished-for event of war with Japan, it would not be a war between California and JAPAN 93 Japan, but between the United States and Japan. Therefore, in its treatment of the Japanese, it be- hooves California to take the rights and interests of the rest of the country into careful consideration. So, because we must all share in the responsibility for California's treatment of the Japanese problem, let us make certain beyond doubt or question that that treatment is based on equity and justice. Under no conditions must racial prejudice, economic jealousy, or political expediency be permitted to serve as an excuse for giving the Japanese anything save a square deal. XI Just and permanent solutions of the various ques- tions at issue between the United States and Japan have been greatly retarded by trouble-making and dangerous elements in both countries: in Japan, by the arrogant, avaricious, unscrupulous militarists who shape the policies of the government; in America by jingoes with selfish aims to serve, irresponsible gossip- mongers, professional alarmists, and yellow journal- ists. For example, not a little of the American dis- trust of Japan is directly traceable to the highly circumstantial stories told by returning tourists, whose opportunities for observation have usually been limited and whose opinions are generally super- ficial, of Japan's secret designs against the Philip- 94 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS pines. In substantiation of these stories they point to Japan's imperative need for an outlet for her ex- cess population, to the temptation offered by the Phil- ippines, which form a prolongation of the Japanese archipelago (Formosa, the southernmost island under the Japanese flag, can be seen from the highlands of Luzon on a clear day), and to the alleged alarming increase in the number of Japanese settlers in the Philippines, most of whom, so the gossips will assure you earnestly, are military reservists disguised as laborers. Before proceeding, let me dispose of the latter assertion by saying that investigations con- ducted by American intelligence officers have proved conclusively that there are less than ten thousand Japanese in the entire archipelago, and that, though the men have doubtless had military training, they are simple farmers, traders, and artisans, who are in the Philippines for the purpose of making a living. That the Philippines would be the first objective of Japanese attack in the event of war between the United States and Japan is a foregone conclusion. That the Japanese General Staff is in possession of accurate and detailed information as to our scheme of defense and the strength and disposition of our forces in the islands, goes without saying. Our own general staff is presumably equally well informed about Mexico. That, in the event of war, the Japanese could seize the islands with little difficulty, and hold them indefinitely, is conceded by most military men. JAPAN 95 But I am convinced that, as things stand to-day, Japan is as innocent of designs against the Philippines as we are of designs against Mexico. (What her attitude might be were we to withdraw from the islands, leaving the natives to manage their own af- fairs, is quite another question. ) It is true that Japan objects to the fortification of the Philippines, regard- ing it as an implied threat against herself, but I imagine that we would object to, and probably would prohibit, the establishment of a fortified Japanese naval base on the coast of Mexico. Those persons who talk so loosely of Japan's determination to seize the Philippines at the first opportunity that offers are doubtless unaware that she once had an opportunity to purchase them at a bargain price and declined it. Viscount Kaneko told me that, some years prior to the Spanish- American War, representatives of the Spanish Government inquired whether Japan would care to purchase the Philippines for the equivalent of eight million dollars gold, and that Japan refused to consider the proposal on the ground that the Philip- pines were too far away for her to administer easily and that Japanese do not thrive in tropical climates. It has long been a popular pastime among certain of our people to prophesy an eventual war between the two countries. Let us look at this question from the viewpoint of common sense. Neither the Jap- anese Government nor the Japanese people want war with the United States. It is possible that some of 96 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS the younger and more hot-headed military men might welcome such a conflict because of the opportunities it would afford them for winning promotion, decora- tions, and glory. But you may be quite certain that the older and wiser men who direct the military policies of the empire have no desire to embark on such an adventure. Confident as they are of Japan's prowess, they do not blind themselves to the fact that such a conflict could have only one conclusion. The lessons taught by America's achievements in the World War have not been lost on them. When the United States in less than eighteen months raised an army of five million men and equipped them, and put nearly half of them down on a battle-line three thousand miles away, it gave the Japanese mili- tarists much food for thought. They were as astounded by this revelation of the republic's military might as were the Germans. Though it is entirely possible that the Japanese might be victorious in the earlier stages of a conflict with the United States, the Japanese strategists know perfectly well that, in view of America's immensely superior man-power, wealth, and natural resources, such a struggle would be hopeless for Japan from the beginning. They have not forgotten how desperate was their plight when President Roosevelt's intervention brought the war with Russia to a close, nor do they shut their eyes to the certainty that, in a war with the United States, the nations of the world, including those of JAPAN 97 the Orient, would infallibly give their moral support to America. Even were the militarists mad enough to embark on such an enterprise, which they are not, they could never obtain the support of Japan's cap- tains of finance and industry. These shrewd, far- seeing business men do not forget that America is Japan's largest customer ; that more than one third of all the products of the empire go to the United States. Practically all of Japan's exported tea, seventy per cent, of her raw and manufactured silk and large quantities of her other products are sold in American markets. I have heard it declared, indeed, that were the United States to double her import duties on tea and silks it would bring Japan to the verge of ruin. Nor do the Japanese overlook the fact that the United States is now the greatest reservoir of capital in the world. Japan needs money. Europe, impoverished by the war, cannot supply it. America can. I repeat, Japan does not want war with the United States. And it is equally certain that the United States does not want war with Japan. We want, and expect to get, our fair share of the trade of the Far East, but we have not the remotest desire for territorial ex- pansion in those regions. We shall continue to insist on the Open Door in China remaining open, but we freely concede that the Japanese have as much right to use that door as ourselves. We shall continue to insist that our rights in the Pacific be recognized, but this implies no hostility toward Japan. A suggestion 98 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS that any considerable section of the American people cherishes sentiments hostile to the Japanese would be greeted with derision anywhere in the United States, save perhaps in a few local communities on the Pacific Coast, whose sentiments are in no wise indicative of the attitude of the country as a whole. I do not believe that the majority of fair-minded Americans object to Japanese commercial expansion on the Asian mainland so long as that expansion is legitimately conducted. But we do object to ex- pansion by intrigue or force. We can sympathize with Japan's undeniable need for more elbow-room, but we cannot countenance the plans of the Tokio militarists for extending Japanese dominion by the sword. Though we conceded, through the Lan- sing-Ishii Agreement, that Japan possesses "special interests" on the Asian mainland, we cannot see those interests multiplied until they block the Open Door. 1 For sentimental, political, and economic rea- sons we are averse to the expansion of Japan at the expense of China and Russia, but we have no thought of actively opposing such expansion so long as it takes the form of peaceful penetration of thinly peo- pled, undeveloped, and misgoverned regions, partic- ularly as we believe that those regions will be im- proved by scientific development and their peoples benefited by decent government. I am myself of ^ *One of the first acts of Mr. Hughes, upon becoming Secretary of State, was to make it amply clear to the Japanese Government that the United States no longer recognizes these "special interests." JAPAN 99 the opinion that the future policy of Japan will tend rather in the direction of economic penetration than of territorial expansion. Several recent events have contributed to bring about this change in policy. To begin with, the sudden collapse of Prussian militarism was a staggering blow to the Japanese militarists. It brought them to an abrupt realization of the fact that the world was heartily sick of militarism and im- perialism, and that their dreams of building up a Pan- Asian empire by conquest could never be fulfilled. They realized that America, now the greatest mili- tary-naval-financial power on earth, would never consent to the Japanese making themselves masters of the Pacific or overlords of Asia. Again, they recognized the growing strength of public opinion in Japan itself a public opinion which is beginning to make itself heard and which demands peace and friendship with the rest of the world. And lastly, but by far the most important, came the Washington Conference, with its full, frank, and friendly discus- sions of all pending questions, its clarification of Japan's and America's position, and the correspond- ing enlightenment of public opinion in both countries. From talks that I have recently had with many of the leading men of Japan, including the premier, several members of his cabinet, and the president of the House of Peers, I am convinced that there is not a single question pending between the two countries on which an understanding cannot be reached, pro- 100 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS vided we go about it in a courteous manner and a sympathetic frame of mind. My conversations with the Japanese leaders showed me that they have a much clearer understanding of our difficulties and perplexities than I had supposed. It might be well for us to remember that the Japanese Government is itself in an extremely trying position, and that its leaders are extremely apprehensive of the effect on public opinion of any settlement of the questions at issue which might be interpreted as an affront to Japanese national dignity or racial pride. But of this I can assure you: Japan is genuinely, almost pathetically, anxious for American confidence and good-will, and, in order to obtain them, her responsible statesmen are prepared to make almost every con- cession that self-respect will permit and that a fair- minded American can demand. PART II KOREA 1. THE PENINSULA AND ITS PEOPLE KOREA is the Ireland of the East. The more I consider the comparison the better I like it, for between the two countries, one on the eastern edge of the Old World, the other on the western, there is a most singular and striking analogy. Ireland is separated from the nation which is its suzerain by a narrow, landlocked sea. So is Korea. Ireland is a land of surpassing beauty. So is Korea. The Irish are an agricultural people, as are the Koreans, the national industries of both being connected with the tilling of the soil. The peasantry of both coun- tries are ignorant, simple, patient, industrious, good- natured. Both are prone to use intoxicants to excess on occasion. Both are extremely superstitious, with a terrified belief in the existence of spirits, goblins, and demons. Both are desperately poor, dwelling in wretched hovels amid filth and squalor. The Irish are turbulent and fond of intrigue. The same character- istics are found in the Koreans. The histories of both 101 102 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS nations are punctuated by invasions, rebellions, and internecine wars. Both have been the victims of cruelty, injustice, and oppression. Cromwell's inva- sion of Ireland in 1649, with its accompanying mas- sacres and systematic devastation, had its counterpart in the shocking scenes which marked Hideyoshi's in- vasion of Korea in the preceding century. The Irish have been held in subjection by a people of alien race and religion. The Koreans still are. Irish distrust and detestation of England is equalled only by Ko- rean distrust and detestation of Japan. Heretofore the Irish have failed to give convincing proof of their ability to maintain a just and stable government. This is likewise true of the Koreans. Most English- men are convinced that an independent Ireland would prove a menace to the safety of the British Empire. Most Japanese are equally convinced that an inde- pendent Korea would threaten the safety of the Empire of Japan. Korea, or, to give it its official Japanese name, Chosen, "Land of the Morning Calm," though scarcely larger than the state of Kansas, has a popula- tion equal to that of Spain. Its immense importance to Japan will be better realized when I add that it comprises one third of the total land area of the empire and that its seventeen millions of inhabitants form one fourth of the empire's total population. One of the oldest nations in the world, its early history KOREA 103 is lost in the mists of antiquity. But this much we know: it maintained its independence for three thou- sand years and for nine centuries its frontiers never changed. The ignorance, insularity and intolerance of its peasantry, the degeneracy and corruption of its ruling classes, and its misfortune in lying between two powerful and predatory empires, proved its undoing. Korea is essentially a mountain land. Rising abruptly from its northern boundary, like a great buttressed wall striving to hold back the flowing Si- berian steppes, is a sinuous range of towering peaks. Running south from this chain is a lofty central range which forms the backbone of the country, its lateral spurs corrugating the entire surface of the peninsula. Ancient lava streams and craters of long-extinct vol- canoes are constantly met with, the appearance of the country being strongly suggestive of the Rand, with all its mineralogical possibilities. Like the Transvaal, Korea is extremely rich in minerals. There are numerous coal deposits, both anthracite and bituminous, and the natives claim that gold is found in every one of the three hundred and sixty-five prefectures. This is an exaggeration, but it is near enough to the truth to explain why for centuries Korea has aroused the cupidity of her powerful and avaricious neighbors. Indeed, I have been as- sured by American mining engineers that the penin- sula is as highly mineralized as Mexico. 104 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS Sandwiched between the rugged range which forms the spine of the country and the eastern coast is a narrow strip, fertile but comparatively inaccessible, which slopes sharply to the Japan Sea. But by far the greater part of the arable land of Korea lies on the western side of this watershed; all the long and navigable rivers are there or in the south; almost all the harbors are on the Yellow Sea. Thus it may be said that Korea has her back to Japan and her face turned toward China, a topographical circumstance which has had no inconsiderable effect on the history of the country. Though the moun- tains along the northern border are densely wooded the timber concessions along the Yalu, it will be remembered, were one of the contributing causes of the Russo-Japanese War, those to the south are so bare and desolate that the Japanese often refer to the peninsula as "the land of treeless mountains." One of the causes of this lack of timber may be found in the history of Korea, which records that during the terrible days of the Hideyoshi invasion the peas- ants, fleeing to the mountains for their lives, were forced to burn the trees to keep from freezing. As a result of this widespread deforestation, great areas are to-day as bare as a bald man's head or clothed only with low, straggling, discouraged-looking vegetation. But the Japanese Bureau of Forestry has displayed commendable foresight and energy in systematically reforesting the country, and every year sees more KOREA 105 and more of the bare brown slopes covered with young trees. Though Korea possesses an extensive river sys- tem, the country consequently being well watered, the streams are, with but few exceptions, too shal- low to permit of navigation. The largest of the rivers, the Yalu, called by Koreans, Am Nok, "Green Duck," from the bluish-green tinge it assumes after the melting of the snow and ice near its mountain birthplace, forms part of the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. It is navigable for sixty miles above its mouth and is much used for rafting the timber cut on its upper reaches down to the Yellow Sea. The cold Tumen, which rises in the Ever White Moun- tains and empties into the Japan Sea, is likewise a frontier river, being bordered on the south by Korea and on the north by Siberia and Manchuria. But, though upwards of two hundred miles in length, it is of little benefit to the Koreans, for it is frozen solid throughout the fierce Siberian winter, and in the spring, when the snows melt, it becomes a raging and almost unnavigable torrent. By far the finest of the Korean rivers is the stately Han, sometimes referred to, because of the auriferous deposits in its bed, as the River of Golden Sand. It has its nativity in the mile-high fastness of Diamond Mountain, near the eastern coast, swings south and west across the peninsula to Seoul, where it is nearly a thousand feet in width, and forty-five miles farther on joins the 106 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS Yellow Sea. It is navigable for small, flat-bottomed craft for nearly nine score miles above its mouth, and up and down its sinuous course, through gorges as wild and imposing as those of the Upper Yangtze, go lumbering junks with towering sterns and huge lug-sails and great goggle eyes painted on their bows. The Han flows through the most fertile portion of Korea, the rich alluvial soil, sometimes ten feet deep, being capable of bearing two bumper crops a year with little or no enriching. Considering the remarkable fertility of the soil, the Korean agri- culturist has not obtained the results that might be expected, though this is due not to any lack of indus- try but rather to his antiquated methods and imple- ments, which are as crude as those used in the Egypt of the Pharaohs. The backward condition of agri- culture in the peninsula is being remedied, however, by the Japanese themselves the most intensive and successful farmers in the world who are establishing experiment stations, introducing modern methods and machinery, and displaying the same energy and abil- ity which have made them such formidable competi- tors in California. Mark my words: Korea, under Japanese tutelage, will be one of the most prosperous agricultural countries in the world some day. Korea is a land where poverty should be unknown, for nature has lavishly endowed it with resources and blessed it with a superb climate. During nine months of the year the climate is delightful most KOREA 107 nearly comparable, perhaps, to that of northern Cali- fornia. Though the three summer months are char- acterized by heat, humidity, and heavy rains, they are quite supportable, even for foreigners. Particu- larly delightful are the bright, beautiful, strangely calm and perfect mornings clear as crystal and ex- hilarating as dry champagne which give Chosen its name. With such a climate, a productive soil, an abundant rainfall, with mountains rich in minerals and coastal waters teeming with every variety of fish, Korea needs only the security and encouragement of a decent and unselfish government to make it one of the most opulent countries in the East. The condition of any people may be gaged with considerable accuracy by their facilities for intercom- munication. Judged by this standard, the Koreans must be set down as an extremely unprogressive peo- ple, for by far the greater part of the roads in the peninsula are merely trails, so rough that even the ubiquitous bicyclist sometimes has to pick up his ma- chine and carry it on his back over the worst stretches, often so narrow that laden bulls cannot pass. The constant shuffling of feet through untold centuries has worn these narrow paths down below the level of the ground, so that during the rains they become miniature canals. Indeed, during the rainy season, when the streams have become brawling torrents and the flimsy bridges have been swept away, all traffic save that by junk along the rivers is perforce sus- 108 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS pended. Towns of considerable size are sometimes connected only by narrow foot-paths running along the tops of the embankments between the rice-fields. Though the Japanese are steadily expanding and improving the peninsular highway system, it will be some years before motoring in Korea will be practi- cable outside the immediate vicinity of the larger cities and still longer before it will be enjoyable. The government-owned Chosen Railway, which now has close to fifteen hundred miles of line in op- eration, is one of the best built, best equipped, and best run systems in the Farther East. The main line, which makes connections at Antung with the South Manchuria Railway, traverses the entire length of the peninsula to Fusan, whence extremely comfort- able steamers maintain a rapid service across the Korea Strait to Shimonoseki, where the Japanese system begins. It is approximately six hundred miles from Fusan to Antung, and the express trains make the journey in about nineteen hours. A first-class ticket costs in the neighborhood of $15.00; the fare for second-class, which is scarcely distinguishable from first, is $10.00; while $5.50 will pay for a third- class ticket from one end of Korea to the other. Branches connect the main line with Mok-po, Kun- san, Jinsen (Chemulpo), and Chinnampo, the four chief ports on the Yellow Sea, and with Gensan, on the east coast of the peninsula, it being only a matter of time before this latter line is pushed north to KOREA 109 Vladivostok. Most of the equipment is American, though the sleeping and dining-cars were built at Dairen or in Japan and mounted on American-made trucks. The aisles in the day-coaches, instead of running down the center, as in the United States, run down the side of the car, thus making the seats almost twice as wide as those in American trains. The sleeping-cars are divided into compartments, after the European fashion, thereby affording for- eign travelers a privacy which is highly desirable in an Oriental country. The meals on the dining-cars are well cooked and well served, Korea being one of the few countries where the old "dollar dinner" is still to be had. At every station is a large sign-board in English and Japanese, giving a brief description of the places of historic and scenic interest in the neigh- borhood, their distance from the station, and how to reach them an idea which might well be adopted in Western lands. When the Japanese adopted the standard four-foot eight-inch gage for the Korean system they assimil- ated it with the Chinese railways, though at the same time rendering it altogether different from their own system in Japan, which is still upon the now inade- quate meter gage. In adopting the standard gage they had in mind something far more important, how- ever, than providing Korea with an up-to-date rail- way system. In shaping her Korean railway policy Japan had three distinct objectives: first, to facilitate 110 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS the rapid movement of troops and supplies into Si- beria, Manchuria, and China; second, to place the empire in direct railway communication with Europe via Mukden, Harbin, Manchouli, and the Trans- Siberian ; third, to bring the South China market for Japanese piece goods and the mid-China ore supply, which is required for the Japanese steel works, into connection with Fusan, whence it is but a short half- day's steam to the great Japanese port of Shimono- seki. As a result of the linking of the Korean and Manchurian systems, Japan is now enabled to send her manufactured goods by rail from Fusan to Peking and Hankow, while the impending comple- tion of the Hankow-Canton Railway will give her vast new markets for her merchandise among the teeming millions of southern China. The Shantung Railway, which connects the seaport of Tsingtau with the Peking-Shanghai system, provides Japan with still another means of access to the Chinese markets a fact which explains her reluctance to surrender con- trol of that much discussed and highly important line. Thus it will be seen that these railways are something more than twin lines of steel laid down for the convenience of travelers and shippers. They are the instruments which Japan is using to effect her political and commercial penetration of eastern Asia. Barring the busy port of Chemulpo, where the first shot of the Russo-Japanese War was fired on February 8, 1904, when the Japanese fleet attacked KOREA 111 the Russian cruisers Variag and Korietz; and Ping- Yang, the ancient and highly picturesque town which was for centuries the capital of Korea, the only city in the peninsula of more than passing interest to the foreigner is the present capital, Seoul (pronounced sowl., if you please), or, as the Japanese have re- named it, Keijo. Encircled by a crumbling, crene- lated wall, obviously modeled after the Great Wall of China and built a century before Columbus set foot on the beach of San Salvador, it stands on the eastern bank of the broad, swift-flowing Han, nest- ling in a bowl-shaped valley formed by two semi-cir- cular mountain ranges whose bare brown peaks tower above it in somber grandeur. Arid and forbidding as these mountains look in winter, summer finds them clothed in vivid green relieved here and there by great splashes of heliotrope, honeysuckle and azalea. In springtime the budding orchards of cherry, peach and plum transform the valley into a sea of snowy blos- soms. Seoul, with not far from half a million inhabitants, is the political, commercial and intellectual center of Korea. For upward of eight centuries it was the home of the Korean sovereigns, and few cities have witnessed more cruelty, bloodshed, licentiousness and corruption. It has several picturesque palaces, now falling into decay, a small but exceptionally fine art museum, mediocre botanical and zoological gardens, a number of government buildings, erected by the 112 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS Japanese, which, though substantial, have small architectural merit, street-c:.. , electric-light and tele- phone systems, and a hotel that has only one superior in Eastern Asia. The Chosen Hotel, which is op- erated by the Korean Railways, stands in the walled compound of an ancient temple amid a garden heavy with the fragrance of many roses. At night, when the paper lanterns on the terrace are reflected in the lotos pools, and the incense from the Temple of Heaven mingles with the perfume of the flowers, it is a place to be marked with a white mile-stone on the road of memory. Seoul is a city of magnificent distances and of re- markably wide streets several of them are wider than the Avenue du Bois in Paris which are in curious contrast to the mean and garish shops of tin- der-box construction with which they are lined. One great thoroughfare, the Chon-no, or Big Bell Street, bisects the entire city, running from the East Gate to the West Gate and far into the country in both directions. It is not only the principal artery of the capital but the "Main Street" of all Korea, for along its dusty length flow placid, slow-moving townsmen, dignified despite their absurd topknots and strag- gling goatees, their enormous, horn-rimmed goggles and transparent fly-trap hats; short, squat women with olive skins and coarse black hair and figures which look like meal sacks with a string tied around the middle, their shapeless garments of white cotton CHOSEN (KOREA) SCALE OF MILES 50 100 150 200 250 Principal Railroads.. Wonsan JAPAN SEA C.S.Ha-nmoncI & Co.,N.Y. KOREA 113 concealing everything save their breasts, which are brazenly exposed; Yang-bans, as the native officials are known, lolling somnolently in palanquins borne by sweating coolies; peasants, fresh from the coun- try districts, leading strings of squealing, kicking ponies laden with farm produce or bulls piled high with the twigs which the Koreans use for fuel ; Japa- nese officials in ill-fitting European clothes and Japa- nese officers in red-banded caps and smart khaki uniforms ; school-boys with knapsacks on their backs, speeding by on bicycles, their baggy garments flap- ping in the breeze; rickshaws, drawn by half -naked coolies, skimming along on silent wheels; creaking carts hauled by lumbering bullocks; clanging street-cars ; motors of all makes and sizes, from lordly Rolls-Royces to bustling members of the well known Ford family of Detroit all these combine to im- part to the great thoroughfare a strange blend of the medieval and the modern, of the backward and the progressive, of the Orient and the Occident. But of all the things I saw in this most picturesque and curious city, there were two which struck me as being of peculiar significance. One is a deserted gar- den, overgrown by shrubbery and rank with weeds. It is at the back of the North Palace, surrounded by a crumbling and discolored wall. Here, in the cold gray dawn of an autumn morning in 1895, the clever and ambitious queen, the most brilliant and the most cruel Korean woman of her time, was brutally mur- 114 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS dered by a band of Japanese and Korean assassins. 1 The other place to which I refer is a long, low, unpre- tentious cottage in the gardens of the East Palace, screened from observation by shrubbery and high hedges. Here, guarded by Japanese sentries and watched by Japanese spies, dwells in enforced seclu- sion a pasty-faced, unhealthy-looking youth, who, ac- cording to popular report at least, is little better than an imbecile. He is the dethroned emperor, now known as His Imperial Highness Prince Yi Kon, the title which the Japanese have bestowed upon him, the last of that long line of sovereigns who ruled in Korea for upward of two thousand years. In the palace, not a stone's throw distant, is a vast and lofty room, its walls hung with the richest of brocades, its carven woodwork embellished in all the colors of the chromatic scale. On a dais in the center of this mag- nificent apartment, flanked by the gorgeous trappings of royalty and cushioned in the imperial yellow, is an empty throne. II The first impressions of most visitors in Korea are generally unfavorable to the Koreans. This is due, in the first place, to the disgusting filth and squalor amid which the great mass of the people live, which 1 Though the Japanese Minister, Viscount Miura, appears to have instigated this shocking crime, there is every reason to believe that he acted without the knowledge of his government. KOREA 115 has led some one to describe the country as "a going piggery"; secondly, to the cowed manner and abject servility of the average Korean, which reminds one of a dog that has been beaten and which is probably due to the same cause; and lastly, to the grotesque and unbecoming national costume. Every adult male in Korea wears on the top of his otherwise shaven head what looks for all the world like a twist of navy plug. This is the topknot, which is as distinguish- ing a mark of the Korean as the queue formerly was of the Chinese. But, whereas the queue was a sym- bol of subjugation, the topknot is the Korean's badge of legal manhood, and, until he reaches the age when he is permitted to wear it, he is known as "a half- man." It is protected by a transparent hat of woven horsehair, many sizes too small, held in place by broad black ribbons tied beneath the chin, which lend to the wearer's chubby face, with its drooping and at- tenuated mustaches or straggling chin-whisker, an infantile and comical expression. Should the horse- hair hat get wet, it is ruined, so, to prevent this, it is covered in inclement weather with a conical affair of oiled paper, producing an effect as ludicrous as it is bizarre. The rest of the costume consists of a short, shapeless jacket and enormously baggy trousers which are confined at the ankles by means of strings. The garments of the poorer classes are made of a coarse white grasscloth, woven by the peas- ants themselves, but the upper classes, when they can 116 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS afford it, wear thin silks that vie with Joseph's coat in their diversity of colors. In the case of the Yang- bans officials and men of leisure this curious en- semble is completed by the addition of an enormous pair of horn-rimmed spectacles and a pipe with a yard-long stem and a bowl the size of a thimble. Thus arrayed, the Greek gods would have looked like circus clowns. The garb of the Korean women, though less ludi- crous than that of the men, is equally unattractive: an apology for a zouave jacket and exaggerated Turkish trousers, the latter all but concealed, how- ever, by a petticoat as shapeless as a sheet. Between the petticoat and the jacket there is a hiatus of bare skin, the breasts being displayed as fully and un- blushingly as the damsels of Mr. Ziegfeld's chorus display their legs. Were the Korean women less faded and of more youthful mold this daring decol- letage might be more alluring. To form a just appreciation of the mental and moral characteristics of an alien race, particularly an Oriental race, is a delicate and difficult matter, even for those who have spent years among the people in question, while a casual observer like myself is in constant danger of indulging in hasty and inaccurate observations based on inadequate knowledge and lim- ited opportunities for observation. In order, there- fore, that I may not lay myself open to charges of KOREA 117 superficiality or prejudice, I have drawn the mate- rials for the following sketch of Korean character and characteristics from the statements of Mr. Homer B. Hurlbert, 1 one of the foremost authorities on Korean history, life and customs, and an avowed friend of the Koreans. Let it be emphasized, in the first place, that the Korean is a man of high intellectual possibilities, his present state of moral and mental stagnation being directly traceable to his unhappy history, his wretched condition, and his discouraging surroundings. Lift him out of this slough of despondency, set him on his feet, give him a chance to develop independently and naturally, and you would have as good a brain as the Far East can produce. It is the experience of those who have had to do with the various peoples of the extreme Orient that it is easier to understand the Korean and to get close to him than it is to under- stand either the Japanese or the Chinese. While the Japanese inclines toward the idealistic, and the Chi- nese leans toward the materialistic, the temperament of the Korean lies midway between the two, even as his country lies between Japan and China. In other words, he is the most rational, judged by Western standards, of all the Far Eastern races. I am per- fectly aware that those who possess only a superficial acquaintance with the Korean, and those others who, actuated by political motives or racial prejudices, ^ee Mr. Hurlbert's "The Passing of Korea." 118 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS make it their business to belittle and discredit him, will jeer at this appreciation; but those who have had the opportunity and patience to go to the bot- tom of the Korean character, and are able to dis- tinguish the true Korean from some of the caricatures which have been drawn of him, will confirm the asser- tion that he possesses certain qualities which, were they developed, would make him a reputable member of the community of nations. The Korean always looks toward yesterday instead of toward to-morrow. He has a proverb, "If you try to shorten the road by cutting 'cross lots you will fall in with robbers." In other words, he believes in staying in the old ruts instead of making new ones. What was good enough for his great-great-grand- father, he argues, is good enough for him. Yet he can be induced to abandon his conservatism by convinc- ing him that a change would be to his own advantage, as is shown by his enthusiastic adoption of bicycles, phonographs, sewing-machines, and other Western innovations. Foreigners are unfavorably impressed by the read- iness of the impecunious Korean to live on his rela- tives or friends, but to a large extent this is offset by his willingness, when his finances are in a flourishing condition, to let his relatives and friends live on him. The moment a man attains prosperity he automati- cally becomes the social head of his clan, and his rela- tives, no matter how far removed, descend upon him KOREA 119 in droves to live indefinitely upon his bounty. It amounts to a sort of nepotistic communism in which every successful man has to divide his profits with the less prosperous members of his family, many a Korean having been impoverished by the heavy de- mands thus made upon him. It should be added, however, that this custom is by no means peculiar to the Koreans, for precisely the same practice pre- vails among the Filipinos and, to a certain extent, among the Malays. Mr. Hurlbert seems to be of the opinion, however, that the average Korean rather welcomes the burden thus imposed upon him, for it caters to his over- whelming egotism and pride and gives him an excuse for lording it over his less fortunate relatives and friends. For the Korean is a born social climber, and, like social climbers in every country, any acces- sion of importance goes to his head like champagne. Give a Korean a position of even minor responsibility and he will swell up like a toy balloon. The slightest social or business promotion is prone to make him very offensive, his overbearing manners and pro- nounced self-esteem rendering him quite unfitted for employment in positions where tact and courtesy are required. The medal has another and more pleasing side, however, for there is the best of evidence that a large number of Koreans die annually from starva- tion because they are too proud to beg or borrow or to sorn upon their friends. In Seoul there is one 120 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS whole quarter almost wholly populated by those on whom Fortune has turned a cold shoulder. It lies under the slopes of South Mountain, and you have only to say of a man that he is a "South Ward gentle- man" to tell the whole story. In the matter of veracity the Korean measures well up to the best standards of the Orient, which are none too high at best. Some people lie out of pure maliciousness; others for the fun of the thing. The Korean does not belong in either of these categories; but if he gets into trouble or is faced by a sudden emergency, or if the success of some plan necessitates a lie, he does not hesitate to take a few liberties with the truth. The difference between the Korean and the European is illustrated by their reactions if given the lie direct. Before calling a European a liar it is the part of wisdom to prepare for sudden emer- gencies, whereas it is as common for Koreans to use the expression "You're a liar!" as it is for an Ameri- can to remark "What, really?" or "Is it possible?" or "You don't say so!" As Mr. Hurlbert succinctly puts it, a Korean sees about as much moral turpitude in a lie as we see in a split infinitive. Though nothing in my own experience in Korea led me to believe that the Korean is any more dishonest than his Japanese or Chinese neighbors, I was told that he does not hesitate to appropriate anything which excites his cupidity when he can do so with safety to himself. The Korean costume struck KOREA 121 me as affording a standing inducement to pocket- picking, the capacious sleeves and balloon-like trous- ers providing ideal places of concealment for pur- loined articles. Like all Orientals, the Korean is an inveterate gambler, making his appeals to Lady Luck through the medium of dominoes or cards, the latter being made of stiff oiled paper, half an inch wide and eight inches long. There are few harder or more constant drinkers than the Korean. He is as fond of "fire water" as the red man of the West and periodically embarks on drunken and disorderly sprees. On these occasions he is prone to display unusual assertiveness, which he manifests by forcibly abducting some neighboring beauty or emphasizing his opinions by beating in the head of a friend. As for morality in its narrower sense, the Koreans are as easy as an old shoe. And it would be surpris- ing if they were otherwise, for from the dawn of Korea's history her ruling classes have set an ex- ample of depravity and debauchery without parallel save in ancient Greece and Rome. Indeed, the Greek hetsera has her nearest modern equivalent in the Korean Jdsang, or dancing-girl. These "leaves of sunlight," a feature of Korean life, stand apart in a class of their own. In the days of Korea's inde- pendence they were attached to a department of the government, were controlled by a special bureau of the court, and were supported from the national treas- ury. They are trained from earliest childhood with 122 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS a view to making them brilliant and entertaining com- panions, the one sign of their profession, indeed, be- ing their culture, intellectual development, and charm. Korean parents, upon meeting with financial reverses, frequently dedicate their daughters to the career of a kisang, just as, in the days of the empire, they ap- prenticed their sons to that of a eunuch. Besides these privileged and pampered playthings of the rich, Korea has another and far larger class of women of easy virtue of a lower and less attractive grade. But this much must be said for the Koreans: until the Japanese came prostitutes were not recognized by law or advertised by segregation. The Korean, as both Mr. Hurlbert and Mr. Philip Terry 1 have noted, is devoid of humane instincts where animals are concerned. If a lame dog or a sick cat is seen upon the street, old and young enthusiasti- cally join in the sport of stoning it to death. They take particular delight in catching insects and pulling off their legs and wings, going into gales of laughter at the contortions of the tortured creatures. Their callousness to suffering is exemplified in their meth- ods of slaughtering animals for food. In killing a beef the butcher first cuts the throat of the animal and inserts a peg in the opening, after which he proceeds to beat the frenzied creature on the rump with a heavy mallet until it is dead. The process takes about an 1 See Terry's "The Japanese Empire." KOREA 128 hour and the poor animal suffers agonies before death intervenes, but, as the Korean will point out, very little blood is lost by this method, the meat is full of it, and its greater weight consequently means more profit for the butcher. Goats are killed by pulling them to and fro in a stream, thus destroying the rank taste of the meat and enabling it to be sold for mutton. Dogs are despatched by twirling them in a noose until they are dead, after which they are bled, dog- meat being a common article of food among the poorer classes. It would be easier to overlook the Korean's other weaknesses were it not for his incurable aversion to cleanliness. Water he never uses except with his meals, and then only when there is nothing stronger to be had; with soap he does not possess so much as a nodding acquaintance. As might be expected, there- fore, his voluminous, dirt-caked clothing is usually alive with vermin. His villages are but one degree removed from pig-sties mere clusters of hovels open- ing on narrow, refuse-littered streets from whose open drains assorted stenches rise to high heaven. You do not have to see a Korean village to be made aware of its existence, for when the wind is in the right di- rection it is as manifest as a fertilizer plant. If the filth and squalor amid which he lives are distasteful to the Korean, he never shows it; he is always com- placent. One might say of Korea, as Artemas Ward 124 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS once remarked of Spain, that there would be more arable land in the country if the people did not carry so much of it around on their persons. Though the upper class Koreans are, with few ex- ceptions, slothful, purposeless, and born dawdlers, the peasants, when well trained and competently su- pervised, make excellent workmen, the success of those who have emigrated to Hawaii testifying to their willingness to work. American and British mine managers have told me that the Korean miner, if tactfully handled, has no superior in the world. Taking him by and large, however, the countryman and the town dweller, the upper class and the lower, the Korean can hardly be characterized as a hard worker. The trouble is that he is without ambition. The thing he does best is nothing; his clothes always wear out first in the seat. Indeed, he might appro- priately adopt that favorite doggerel of the American negro, whom, in his distaste for physical exertion, he so greatly resembles: Dat's de reason why I's as happy as a bee, Fur I don't trouble work An' work don't trouble me. Yet there are a fair number of items to be listed on the credit side of the ledger. First of all is the Korean's good nature, for when even passably well treated he is docile and easy to control. Secondly comes his unfailing hospitality, both to utter strangers KOREA 125 and, as I have already shown, to impecunious rela- tives and friends. Another redeeming trait is a cer- tain sturdiness of character perhaps stubbornness would be a better word which has enabled him to preserve his nationality under the sorest trials. The want of courage and self-reliance so frequently com- mented on by foreigners are not, I am convinced, the result of constitutional cowardice, but are prob- ably due to centuries of servitude and oppression. Koreans have fought well on occasion, the irregular bands who have been conducting a guerilla warfare along the Manchurian border having time and again proved themselves the equals of the best troops that Japan could send against them, while during the sup- pression of the independence movement many of the Korean prisoners displayed a very high order of moral courage in the face of death. I doubt, indeed, if braver men are to be found anywhere than the tiger-hunters of the hills, who, armed with antiquated, long-barreled, percussion muskets, follow the great Korean tiger into its den, approach to within a few paces, and kill it with a single shot. As there is no time to reload, the man who misses dies; the tiger attends to that. Now it should be remembered that in my estimate of the Korean character I have been speaking of the average Korean, which means the peasant, for the peasantry form the great mass of the population. But, though the Korean of the old school admittedly 126 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS presents a discouraging problem, the country is grad- ually gaining a considerable class of young men who have been educated abroad and who are intelligent, cultured, progressive, and genuinely patriotic. An- other encouraging sign is the growing demand among all classes for education, the number of students reg- istered last year being unprecedented in the history of the country. The Koreans make excellent stu- dents, displaying particular aptness for mathematics. They are quick of comprehension, and those who know them well assure me that there is no doubt that they are the intellectual equals of the Japanese. All they need is the opportunity and the incentive. I, for one, can perfectly well understand how the alert, energetic, industrious, progressive, aggressive Japanese have been exasperated to the limit of their patience by the ignorance, slothfulness, irresolution and squalor of this people whom they have under- taken to reform. I can understand why the Japanese consider them and treat them as inferiors. Yet there are traits of mind and heart in the Korean which, if developed, would prove an enormous asset to the em- pire. Make no mistake about that. Japan cannot afford to permit the Koreans, who form one quarter of her total population, to be overrun and crushed beneath the wheels of a selfish and short-sighted policy directed by a little group of military men. Were she to do so she would be guilty, in the words of Talleyrand, of something worse than a crime a mistake. KOREA 127 2. THE JAPANESE IN KOREA On a sultry August afternoon in 1905, four men two burly, bearded Russians and two slight, suave Japanese bending over a table in an unim- pressive red brick building within the walls of the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, scrawled their signatures at the bottom of a closely written parchment, thereby bringing to an end the stupendous struggle between their respective coun- tries for the mastery of the Farther East. But, in thus concluding a peace between their own great em- pires, the plenipotentiaries were signing the death warrant of a third nation, a nation which had kept its independence for upward of two thousand years, for, by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Rus- sia recognized Japan's "paramount political, military, and economical interests" in Korea. Thus guaran- teed complete freedom of action in the peninsula, Japan proclaimed a protectorate over the ancient little kingdom before the ink on the treaty was fairly dry, and Korea passed into the limbo of subject nations. The Koreans and their champions have never ceased to denounce the methods employed by Japan in the establishment of the protectorate, asserting, and probably with some degree of truth, that the 128 ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS Emperor of Korea and his ministers were intimi- dated into signing away the independence of their country. But, though the methods which Japan em- ployed in effecting this step may be open to criticism, that the step was imperative and inevitable cannot seriously be questioned. Korea's loss of independ- ence was primarily due to her unfortunate geograph- ical position. Her internal condition, bad as it was, was only contributory in bringing about her down- fall. Glance at the map and you will see that the peninsula of Korea is a pistol pointed straight at the heart of Japan. As long as that weapon remained, unloaded, on the table, Japan felt tolerably secure. But when she saw an unfriendly hand moving stealth- ily to grasp it, she was forced to take decisive action in order to insure her own safety. For with nations, as with individuals, self-preservation is the first law of nature. In 1894 China, which had long claimed a shadowy suzerainty over Korea a suzerainty not recognized by Japan despatched a military force to the penin- sula for the ostensible purpose of stabilizing the gov- ernment of the little kingdom and effecting internal reforms. In reality it was a move to bring Korea under the rule of Peking. China's curt refusal to withdraw her troops forced Japan to choose between a permanent Chinese occupation of the peninsula and war. She chose the latter and, by a series of continuous and easy victories, quickly won an over- o w fc W V &