REESE LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 , IQO 
 Accession No^ o5522 . Class No. 
 

HISTORICAL SKETCH 
 
 ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION, MATERIEL AND TACTICS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY, 
 
 WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, 
 
 FIRST LIEUTENANT, THIRD REGIMENT, U. S. ARTILLERY. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. : 
 
 JAMES J. CHAPMAN, 
 
 AGENT. 
 1884. 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1884, by 
 
 WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
 PRESS OP THOMAS McGiu. & Co., 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
TO 
 BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL 
 
 HENRY J. H UNT, 
 COLONEL (RETIRED) UNITED STATES ARMY, 
 
 WHOSE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE IN PEACE AND CONDUCT IN WAR, DURING 
 
 FORTY-POUR YEARS OF ACTIVE MILITARY LIFE, 
 
 EVER CONTRIBUTED TO THE HONOR OF THE ARTILLERY ARM, 
 
 THIS WORK IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED. 
 
 85522 
 

 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 7, thirtieth line, for 1776 read 
 
 Page 135, seventeenth line, for (U) read (M). 
 
 Page 180, twenty-sixth line, omit l a.' 
 
 Page 231, seventh line, insert 'had' after 'also.' 
 
 Page 269, eighth line, for k representative ' read 'representatives.' 
 
 Page 273, the note belongs to paragraph above. 
 
 Page 322, second line from bottom, insert the words "'battery' to the" 
 
 before ' front.' 
 
 Page 328, in both fifteenth and nineteenth lines, insert (3) before ' guide.' 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 WHEN the writer of this work joined the army as a commissioned officer, 
 in 1870, he cast about with a view to learning something of the career in this 
 country of the arm to which he had been assigned the artillery. The 
 result was unsatisfactory. Of record there was almost nothing, and that 
 little was sometimes glaringly erroneous. Experienced officers who were 
 consulted could give little information regarding matters of a date anterior 
 to their entry into service, and when they wished to speak positively con- 
 cerning those things of which they were personally cognizant their memories 
 were frequently so defective as to surprise even themselves. 
 
 All this was a subject for wonder to the writer. It seemed strange that 
 with our admiration for and knowledge of foreign services our own had not 
 received more attention ; but, on the contrary, the study of its organization 
 and administration had been neglected. Since the Civil war much has 
 been said and written concerning our military establishment. The matter 
 has received no little attention in the deliberations of the National Legisla- 
 ture ; but it has always seemed that such legislation would be none the less 
 certain of being wise and permanent if more were known of the history of 
 our army, especially of its combatant branches. 
 
 Of late years there has been a seemingly increasing disposition with us to 
 inculcate the precepts, if we could not attain to the practice, of European 
 Services. There are undoubtedly many admirable features in the organiza- 
 tion of some foreign armies ; but instead of blindly following them, it would 
 be wiser to first thoroughly familiarize ourselves with our own service and 
 its relations to our civil institutions, to see whether principles which lead to 
 such happy results elsewhere would be equally applicable here; indeed, 
 whether they would not be positively injurious. As to the artillery, how- 
 ever, there is left no room for doubt. The technical and the combatant 
 branches are everywhere else united under a single superior direction, and 
 so they must be with us before either can attain to highest efficiency. 
 
 It would have been interesting to have touched upon the subject of projec- 
 tiles and powder, in the manufacture of which there has been vast im- 
 provement. Indeed, powder has largely revolutionized methods of gun 
 construction. But these advances in the refinements of modern warfare 
 are of so recent date as to remove them from the domain of history accord- 
 ing to the plan of this work. On the other hand, questions involving the 
 construction of carriages, the metals of which cannon should be made, and 
 the character of the 'artillery system' which would best meet the necessities 
 of Government have been of constant recurrence since the beginning of the 
 Kevolutionary war. For this reason the latter alone have been considered 
 in treating of MATERIEL. 
 
 With us the employment of guns in masses was not practiced, and^was 
 almost unknown even in theory, before the Civil war. In earlier days, 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 nothing beyond the manoauvres of a single battery was attempted. Hence, 
 but a passing notice has been taken of the use of artillery, in conjunction 
 with the other arms, as an important factor on the battle-field. Yet, broadly 
 speaking, this is the true province of ARTILLERY TACTICS. To have entered 
 it would, however, have transcended the limits within which it was deter- 
 mined to restrict the consideration of tactical questions, and which did not 
 extend beyond a brief review of the main points of difference between 
 successive systems of instruction which have been adopted. Until quite 
 recently there is discernible, running through the latter, evidence of an 
 effort being made to maintain the tactics abreast with improvements affecting 
 artillery organization and materiel. When pieces were hauled around by 
 drag-ropes, field exercises were very limited. The prolonge greatly added 
 to the mobility of the system. This was again enhanced many fold by the 
 introduction of the stock-trail carriage. Kequisite mobility being secured, 
 the next feature appearing in our works of instruction related to administra- 
 tion, and embraced a comprehensive article on the interior economy of the 
 battery, in so far as related to strictly artillery affairs. Lastly, there was 
 formulated the 'assimilation ' idea, in which the dominating principle seems 
 to be to convert as nearly as possible both artillery and cavalry into infantry : 
 to consider the questionable advantage of mere similarity in commands as 
 of more consequence than the preservation of the natural elements into 
 which experience has divided the different arms of service : and to leave 
 the light artilleryman and the cavalryman in doubt whether, after all, the 
 most important part of their service is not performed on foot, where they 
 are at every disadvantage when compared with their more fortunate coad- 
 jutor the infantryman. 
 
 Researches, the results of which are given in the following pages, were 
 begun in 1872-73, when the writer was at the artillery school of practice. 
 It was not with the intention of publishing a book that they were com- 
 menced, but simply to increase knowledge of a subject of great personal 
 interest. The scope of his labors has been enlarged since that time, due in 
 great degree to the suggestions of friends and others interested, and to a 
 hope he was led to entertain that in this way the army, particularly the 
 artillery, would acquire information which would be acceptable to it. The 
 work has been prosecuted with as much assiduity as circumstances would 
 permit. Facilities afforded at the ordinary military post for the collection 
 of facts which could be utilized are not worth considering. But the writer 
 was fortunate in being stationed for some time in the vicinity of New York, 
 and afterwards in Washington city, where he availed himself of opportu- 
 nities to gather together data other than is found in ordinary histories. He 
 was also generously assisted by friends, who placed their collections of papers 
 at his disposal. Press of official duties for several years precluded attempts 
 to arrange in a connected manner any portion of what he had accumulated ; 
 but, so far as affects the artillery, the first available moments have been 
 made use of for this purpose. 
 
 Others may possess knowledge which would have enabled them to per- 
 form the task here essayed in a more thorough or acceptable manner. If 
 so, it is to be regretted that they have not published and made it available 
 to those who are interested. 
 
 The writer is under obligations to the Honorable Robert T. Lincoln, Sec- 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 retary of War, to Adjutant-General Drum, and to General Bene"t, chief of 
 ordnance, for facilities extended to him in the prosecution of his work, in 
 the course of which the wisdom of the existing relation between the ord- 
 nance department and the artillery regiments is brought in question. To 
 be known, however, it needs not to be pointed out here, that the chief of 
 ordnance is not responsible for a state of affairs which he did not create. 
 It is only regretted that the gentleman at the head of that department 
 is not now, what it is hoped he may yet be chief of a reorganized and 
 reunited artillery. 
 
 To General Henry J. Hunt and Lieutenant-Colonel Kobert N. Scott the 
 writer is under particular obligations for suggestions, the use of documents 
 and books of reference. To Mr. David Fitzgerald, the efficient librarian of 
 the War Department, he desires to make acknowledgments for courtesies 
 so willingly extended on every occasion ; while to General E. P. Alexander, 
 late 0. S. army, to Major J. P. Sanger and Lieutenant E. S. Dudley, of 
 the artillery, and to Captain James Kockwell, Jr., of the ordnance, who 
 kindly read over and corrected different portions of the manuscript, he now 
 returns sincere thanks for their valuable assistance. 
 
 LITTLE KOCK BARRACKS, 
 
 ARKANSAS, November 1st, 1884. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1821. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 ADMINISTRATION INSTRUCTION. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION DUTIES : TECHNICAL. 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION DUTIES : As AN ARM OF SERVICE. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION DUTIES : CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE 
 
 FIELD. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MATERIEL CARRIAGES. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 MATERIEL METAL. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 MATERIEL SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 TACTICS GENERALLY. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 TACTICS FIELD ARTILLERY. 
 
 APPENDICES. 
 
 [A], ORGANIZATION ; [B], ADMINISTRATION ; [C], MATERIEL. 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCB 
 
 THE ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY. 
 
 ORGANIZATION-GENERALLY. 
 
 THE ARTILLERY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY dates from 
 the beginning of the American Revolution, when, as part of the 
 continental forces, it became a recognized arm of the military 
 establishment. Prior to that time, however, some of the colonies 
 had limited experience in the organization and management of 
 this branch of service. Companies had been formed and trained 
 at Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, S. C., and other cities, 
 some of which saw active service in the wars with the French 
 North American possessions, wherein were associated with them 
 companies of the English Royal Artillery Regiment. When 
 Louisburg was captured in 1745, three companies of the latter, 
 with some Massachusetts militia, manned the artillery of the 
 besiegers. Braddock, ten years later, was accompanied by a 
 company of the Royal artillery in his disastrous expedition. 
 
 At the epoch of the American Revolution the British artillery, 
 after a protracted but triumphant struggle -with prejudice, had 
 vindicated its right to be, and was, considered an important com- 
 batant arm. Its laws, customs, and traditions were ingrafted into 
 the new-formed artillery of the Colonial army. This naturally 
 resulted from that association of Colonial with the Royal artillery 
 to which allusion has been made. The organization of the first 
 artillery regiment arrayed against the forces of the Crown, at 
 Boston, in June, 1775, gave proof of this. Raised by the Colony 
 of Massachusetts and adopted by the continental Congress, the 
 regiment was commanded by Colonel Richard Gridley, a half- 
 pay British officer, who had rendered distinguished service as an 
 engineer and artillerist. The number and designations of the 
 
2 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 officers, and of the rank and file, were very similar to those of a 
 battalion (at the time four in number) of the Royal Artillery 
 Regiment, the most marked difference being that a greater num- 
 ber of field officers was given the American regiment than be- 
 longed to a battalion of the English artillery. The difference 
 was not accidental, but well considered, and was to the advantage 
 of the colonists. It showed that Gridley, under whose advice 
 the regiment was raised, had profited by his experience with the 
 Royal Regiment, in which, because of the few field officers, it 
 had been found necessary to organize a new battalion every few 
 years, in order that those who remained in service should have 
 a reasonable chance of promotion. (Organization of Gridley's 
 regiment, Appendix A [i]; Organization of Fourth Battalion, 
 Royal artillery, 1771, Appendix A [2].) 
 
 There was associated with Gridley at the siege of Boston a 
 company of Rhode Island artillery, commanded by Major John 
 Crane. The personnel consisted of one major and commandant, 
 one captain, three lieutenants, (no distinction as to grade,) two 
 sergeants, four corporals, two bombardiers, four gunners, four 
 musicians, (drums and fifes,) seventy-four matrosses, and one 
 conductor who was the company ordnance officer. This was a 
 large number of men to manage the four field guns which consti- 
 tuted their armament; but in those days, and for many years 
 afterwards, field artillery in this country was manoeuvred by drag- 
 ropes, manned by matrosses, who occupied the grade now corre- 
 sponding to that of private soldier. 
 
 The field officers of Gridley's regiment, under the colonel, 
 were : William Burbeck, lieutenant-colonel ; David Mason, first, 
 and Scarborough Gridley, second major. The latter was dis- 
 missed the service in September, 1775, for misconduct at the 
 battle of Bunker Hill, where the artillery did not cover itself 
 with glory, as five of its six pieces present remained in possession 
 of the enemy. The influence of the colonel on the discipline of 
 the regiment does not seem to have been good, as in the report 
 of a committee sent by the continental Congress to visit the army 
 at Boston in the fall of 1775, it is stated that he had become very 
 obnoxious to that corps (the artillery regiment), and would prove 
 its destruction if continued in command. It was recommended 
 that he be superseded in some honorable way, Congress making 
 good the half-pay he had renounced on entering the service of 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 3 
 
 the colonies. Mr. Henry Knox, a young man of twenty-five, and 
 who had been serving as a volunteer in the army under General 
 Washington, was recommended as his successor an appointment 
 duly conferred by Congress on the iyth of November following.* 
 He was announced as colonel of the artillery in general orders 
 dated December i2th, 1775. At that time Knox had been sent 
 on special duty to New York, Albany, and Ticonderoga to pro- 
 cure siege material for the army before Boston. Gridley contin- 
 ued to command the regiment until January ist, 1776, on which 
 date the term of service for which the latter had enlisted expired. 
 
 Meanwhile Congress, at the instance of the commander-in-chief, 
 had resolved to reorganize the regiment, with one colonel, two 
 lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and twelve companies. It was 
 recruited immediately upon the old regiment being mustered out, 
 and to a great extent by re-enlisting for one year the discharged 
 artillerymen of Gridley's regiment, together with Crane's com- 
 pany of Rhode Island artillery. (Organization of Knox's reg- 
 iment, Appendix A [3].) The field officers were : Henry Knox, 
 colonel ; William Burbeck, first, and David Mason, second lieu- 
 tenant-colonel ; John Crane, first, and later in the year John 
 Lamb, of the New York artillery, second major. These offi- 
 cers had rendered service before the enemy, all except Lamb 
 at the siege of Boston, and he, with Montgomery, at the assault 
 on Quebec, where he fell, severely wounded, into the hands of the 
 enemy. The appointment to Knox's regiment was given him 
 by General Washington as a reward for his conduct on that 
 occasion. 
 
 It was fortunate for the artillery that there was placed thus early 
 at its head an officer of acknowledged ability, experience in busi- 
 ness affairs, and an aptitude for the duties of that arm. Under 
 Knox's command it took and maintained a position second to none 
 during seven years of an eventful war. When compared with the 
 best appointed of the present day, it is true that the artillery of 
 our Revolutionary army seems a crude affair; but when tested 
 
 * General Henry Burbeck, in a letter of April 30th, 1847, stated that the 
 colonelcy of this regiment was offered his father, at that time lieutenant- 
 colonel, but he declined, and recommended Knox, whom he knew, and who 
 was a soldier in every way ; that his father, though well informed as an artil- 
 lerist and in laboratory duties, was by habit nothing of a soldier, and was 
 about sixty years of age. 
 
4 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 by the true standard the character of its officers and its efficiency 
 in the field it appears favorably when placed side by side with 
 other artilleries of that time. 
 
 The straightened condition of the force invading Canada, after 
 Montgomery's death and the failure of the attack on Quebec, de- 
 termined General Washington, after the enemy had left Boston, 
 to detach two companies of the artillery regiment to the assistance 
 of the commander (Arnold) in that quarter. With them were 
 dragged through the wilderness two thirteen-inch mortars. 
 Nine companies moved with Knox to New York city in April, 
 1776, while one remained in the defenses of Boston. To replace 
 the three absent companies, there joined and did duty with the 
 regiment, two New York artillery companies, one under Captain 
 Sebastian Beauman, afterwards major in the Second Regular Ar- 
 tillery, and the other under a youth destined to act a distinguished 
 part in the history of his adopted country Alexander Hamilton. 
 Of the field officers before mentioned, Lieutenant- Colonel Mason 
 and Major Crane were present ; Lieutenant-Colonel Burbeck, 
 having refused to leave Boston when the army marched, was in 
 May summarily dismissed the service ; Major Lamb was still a 
 prisoner. 
 
 After the defeat of the Americans on Long Island, August 27th, 
 1776, and their retreat from New York city, Congress resolved 
 upon an entire reorganization of the army. The number of in- 
 fantry battalions was, September i6th, fixed at eighty-eight. As 
 to the artillery, nothing was immediately determined on ; but the 
 congressional committee appointed to investigate the subject of 
 army reform called upon Knox for suggestions concerning that 
 arm. These he communicated as follows : 
 
 "I.I recommend that there be one or more capital laboratories erected at a 
 distance from the seat of war, in which shall be prepared large quantities of 
 ordnance stores of every species and denomination. 
 
 " 2. That there be at the same place a number of able artificers employed to 
 make carriages for the cannon of all sorts and sizes, ammunition wagons, tum- 
 brels, harness, &c. 
 
 "3. That, as contiguous as possible to this place, a foundry for casting brass 
 cannon, mortars, and howitzers be established upon a large scale. 
 
 " 4. And, as officers can never act with confidence until they are masters of their 
 profession, an academy established upon a liberal plan would be of the utmost 
 service to the continent, where the whole theory and practice of fortification 
 and gunnery should be taught, to be nearly on the same plan as that at Wool- 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. $ 
 
 w i c h making allowances for differences of circumstances a place to which 
 our enemies are indebted for the superiority of their artillery to all who have 
 opposed them. 
 
 " 5. That these and all other matters respecting the artillery and artillery stores 
 be under the direction of a board of ordnance, whose business shall be the 
 regulation and management of the affairs of this department, and to wbrrm - 
 returns shall be made. 
 
 " 6. The corps of artillery now in the service of the United States is exceedingly 
 insufficient for the operations of an extensive service. It consists of a little 
 more than 600, officers included ; of these, 100 are in the northern army, where 
 their numbers are very unequal to the service. His excellency General Wash- 
 ington has, to supply the deficiency of this corps, drafted from the different 
 regiments 600 men, and General Gates a proportionate number. This is a tem- 
 porary remedy, attended with a variety of inconveniences. 
 
 " 7. There ought to be a respectable body of artillery established which shall 
 be equal to all the services of the war. In proportion to every 1000 men of the 
 marching regiments, there ought to be one company of 60 men, including offi- 
 cers. This number will be found to be small when the various contingencies 
 of the artillery shall be considered. Supposing, then, the army to consist of 
 80 battalions of 726 men each, making nearly 60,000 men, the number of artil- 
 lery requisite will be 3360. These may be thrown into two or three battalions, 
 as may be thought best. 
 
 " 8. If any circumstances shall happen to render the movement of this army 
 necessary, one hundred covered wagons will be wanting to transport the stores ; 
 three hundred strong horses to draw the travelling artillery ; (the heavy artil- 
 lery on garrison carriages and the heaviest stores are not included in the above 
 estimate ;) wagons and drivers for the above ; a wagonmaster to be established 
 for the artillery ; also a quartermaster for the horses and wagons, whose busi- 
 ness it shall be to purchase hay, horses, &c., as may be needed. 
 
 " 9. Exclusively of the artificers at the fixed laboratories, there must be 100 
 of different branches attached to the artillery, to repair carriages when broken, 
 make platforms, and a thousand other matters belonging to the artillery. 
 
 " 10. Besides the commissary of stores, it will be necessary to have a deputy 
 commissary, who shall be a capable, active man ; the number of conductors 
 and clerks to be twelve ; if the service should require more, they to be added 
 during the pleasure of the commander-in-chief ; the commanding officer of 
 artillery to have a clerk attached to him, for the purpose of arranging and 
 disposing the various returns of cannon and stores. 
 
 " 11. The following brass field pieces are wanting, (and as there is a consider- 
 able quantity of copper collected, it is to be wished that the founder might be 
 employed to cast some immediately,) viz., eighteen six-pounders and eighteen 
 three-pounder cannon." 
 
 These recommendations evince that the commander of artillery 
 was cognizant of the requirements of that arm, and of the proper 
 means to secure them; and, though not always in the manner con- 
 
6 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 templated, most of the measures here proposed were favorably 
 acted upon by Congress. The prominence given to the supposed 
 excellence of the English artillery system is worthy of notice. It 
 was upon this as a model that Knox sought to build up the United 
 States service, and not upon the French, as has been erroneously 
 supposed. It is true that several officers of the latter service 
 sought and obtained positions in the continental army ; that in 
 their own country the new and improved system of Gribeauval 
 was at last, spite of every opposition, firmly established ; but in 
 the American army English ideas of organization and materiel 
 had taken too deep root to be shaken ; as to organization, this 
 has already been illustrated. And though much artillery ma- 
 teriel was purchased in France, it was almost entirely confined 
 to the one item of cannon without carriages. It was the not un- 
 natural expectation of French officers to give shape to, and com - 
 mand, the American artillery ; but they found already on the 
 ground those capable of conducting its management, in every 
 detail, with distinguished success. 
 
 The elaboration of a plan for establishing the artillery upon a 
 scale commensurate with the requirements of the contemplated 
 regular army, of possibly more than one hundred regiments, em- 
 bracing troops of all arms, was a task devolved upon Colonel 
 Knox. He recommended to the commander-in-chief that the 
 number of artillery battalions be fixed at five, each to consist of 
 one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, and twelve com- 
 panies ; each company one captain, one captain-lieutenant, four 
 lieutenants, six sergeants, six corporals, six gunners, six bombar- 
 diers, and twenty-eight matrosses. From this it appears that 
 each company was to manoeuvre two pieces, with their ammu- 
 nition wagons. The "battalion" was in fact a regiment; the for- 
 mer designation was given in conformity with the English system 
 that Knox so much admired, and which, he remarked, " we will 
 have no reason to blush for imitating." 
 
 Alarmed at the retreat of the army through New Jersey and 
 the proximity of the enemy to the seat of government, Congress 
 adjourned from Philadelphia to Baltimore, first delegating to 
 General Washington, December i2th, 1776, power to "order and 
 direct all things relative to the department and operations of 
 war." By virtue of this authority steps were at once taken for 
 raising three of the five battalions proposed by Colonel Knox. 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 7 
 
 (Appendix A [6].) This action was confirmed by Congress, De- 
 cember 27th, when Knox was chosen brigadier-general of artillery 
 a grade which, in the regular army, has been held to this day 
 by that officer alone. 
 
 The five battalions proposed by Colonel Knox were intended 
 to supply artillery to all the armies of the United States. That 
 number was organized in a few months, but one of them was con- 
 verted into an artificer-regiment, and ingrafted into the " Depart- 
 ment of the Commissary- General of Military Stores." (Appen- 
 dix A [n].) 
 
 Of the four remaining, one was recruited in Virginia, pursuant 
 to resolution of Congress, November 26th, 1776, and embraced two 
 companies raised in that State by General Charles Lee. The 
 field officers of the regiment were : Charles Harrison, colonel ; Ed- 
 ward Carrington, lieutenant-colonel ; Christian Holman, major. 
 Two regiments were raised pursuant to the orders of the com- 
 mander-in-chief, issued under the extraordinary powers conferred 
 by Congress, December i2th, 1776. The other artillery regiment 
 raised pursuant to this authority was that converted into artifi- 
 cers. The commanders of the latter regiments were Colonels 
 Crane and Lamb for the artillery and Flower for the artificers. 
 The other artillery regiment necessary to complete the number 
 came from Pennsylvania. This was raised, pursuant to resolution 
 of the State authorities, in February, 1777, and on the 2oth of 
 June following was taken by Congress into the continental estab- 
 lishment. Its field officers were : Thomas Proctor, colonel ; John 
 Martin Strobagh, lieutenant-colonel; Thomas Forrest, major. 
 
 The regiments of Colonels Harrison, Crane, Lamb, Proctor, 
 and Flower constituted, therefore, the artillery of the regular 
 army after June, 1776. Of these, Flower's was never arranged 
 properly as a regiment; it was never anything but an assem- 
 blage of mechanics, with some degree of military organization. 
 It will, therefore, not hereafter be considered as belonging to the 
 artillery, which, omitting this, was made up of the four other regi- 
 ments mentioned. It may remove misapprehension to mention 
 that the terms "regiment" and "battalion" were synonymous as 
 they appear in the resolutions of Congress and in the army orders 
 of the time. 
 
 No sooner were the four regiments, or, for that matter, any two 
 of them, brought together than disputes arose as to their order 
 
8 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 of precedence and the relative rank of their officers. The diffi- 
 culty was enhanced by the fact that some officers of service under 
 previous engagements had now commissions of a more recent 
 date than others who had originally entered the service long after 
 them. To put an end to daily bitter controversies, a board of 
 officers was assembled at general headquarters in August, 1779. 
 The board decided that the colonels ranked in the following 
 order: Crane, Lamb, Harrison, and Proctor; but that their regi- 
 ments should be designated and take precedence as follows : First, 
 Harrison's; Second, Lamb's; Third, Crane's; Fourth, Proctor's. 
 This decision was never afterwards modified. Those are the 
 designations which will hereafter be given the four regular regi- 
 ments. 
 
 By reference to Appendices A [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], and [10] it 
 will be seen that the organizations of these regiments or battal- 
 ions were dissimilar. This was to be expected from the various 
 sources whence they came. When originally organized, both 
 Harrison's and Proctor's were State troops ; but Lamb's and 
 Crane's were recruited from the States at large. It was not until 
 May of 1778 that all were given, on paper at least, the same 
 organization. 
 
 There was difficulty in obtaining the complement of field offi- 
 cers for Crane's and Lamb's regiments. John Popkins was lieu- 
 tenant-colonel of the former and Eleazer Oswald of the latter ; 
 but in neither was the office of major filled until September, 1778, 
 when William Perkins was appointed major of Crane's and Se- 
 bastian Beauman major of Lamb's regiment. At the same time 
 that the latter appointments were made, Oswald's resignation 
 caused the assignment to the Second Artillery of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Ebenezer Stevens, commander of artillery in the northern 
 department. The position of the latter officer was anomalous. 
 In the fall of 1776, when the terms of service of the two com- 
 panies of Knox's regiment, in command of which Captain Ste- 
 vens had marched to join the northern army, had expired, Gen- 
 eral Schuyler, commanding that department, had authorized him 
 to recruit a corps of one artificer and three artillery companies. 
 This he did, principally in Massachusetts, where, at the same 
 time, Colonel Crane was enlisting for his (3d) regiment. The 
 latter officer claimed Stevens' corps as part of his regiment, 
 in which he had the support of the authorities of Massachu- 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 9 
 
 setts, as well as the favorable indorsement of General Knox. 
 Stevens, however, maintained that he was independent; and 
 as he served altogether in the northern department until the 
 fall of 1778, removed from all other artillery, he succeeded in 
 practically sustaining his claim. His companies formed wTiaT 
 was known as "Stevens' Corps of Artillery," which never ac- 
 knowledged any connection with Crane's regiment, although 
 the latter, without these, had but nine of the twelve compa- 
 nies authorized by Congress. (Organization of Stevens' Corps, 
 Appendix A [7].) In the movements of the army towards 
 Canada at various times under Generals Schuyler, Gates, and 
 St. Clair, the services of Stevens' corps and the ability of 
 its commander were conspicuous, particularly in the campaign 
 terminating in the surrender of Burgoyne. Congress conferred 
 upon its commander the brevet of major, May 22d, 1777 ; the bre- 
 vet of lieutenant-colonel, April 3d, 1778; November 24th, 1778, 
 passed a resolution conferring the full rank of lieutenant-colonel 
 of artillery, to date from the preceding 3d of April, he to be 
 assigned to the first vacancy in that grade happening in the four 
 regular artillery regiments. When, therefore, in the fall of 1778 
 Oswald resigned, on a point of rank, Stevens was assigned to the 
 Second Artillery. The companies of his corps were incorporated 
 into Crane's regiment ; his artificers were at the same time at- 
 tached for general service to the artillery of the main army. 
 
 While the four regiments before mentioned formed what was 
 considered the regular artillery, there were other companies and 
 battalions of that arm organized by the colonies, some of which 
 were in continental pay, and in a limited sense might be consid- 
 ered as belonging to the continental establishment. New Jersey 
 raised two companies one for the eastern, the other for the west- 
 ern division of the colony ; each of one captain, one captain- 
 lieutenant, one first and one second lieutenant, one fire-worker, four 
 sergeants, four corporals, one bombardier, and fifty matrosses. 
 Rhode Island raised more than three hundred artillerymen to 
 guard her coast. In Massachusetts there was an artillery regi- 
 ment, intended for local defense alone, with a personnel of one 
 colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quar- 
 termaster, and ten companies. The provincial Congress of South 
 Carolina, in November, 1775, put on foot an artillery battalion of 
 three companies, one hundred men each. (Appendix A [12].) 
 2 
 
10 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 This organization, in which the men were enlisted for two years, 
 was taken by Congress into continental pay. Owen Roberts was 
 lieutenant-colonel commandant and Barnard Elliott major. The 
 former was mortally wounded in the affair of June 2oth, 1779, at 
 Stono River, and the regiment, with the volunteer companies of 
 Charleston artillery, was captured at the surrender of that city 
 to the British, May i2th, 1780. Georgia contributed her artillery 
 quota, concerning which the continental Congress, February 6th, 
 1777, resolved : "That as soon as the artillery companies already 
 ordered to be raised in Georgia are completed, one other be 
 raised, to consist of one captain, two lieutenants, and fifty pri- 
 vates. ' ' What the organization of these was, except the last, is not 
 known ; but Captain Defatt was appointed inspector of the whole, 
 and a French officer Major Roman de Lisle commander. 
 
 Although the expenses, including the pay of the foregoing- 
 State organizations, were borne by the United States, their status 
 was different from that of the four regular artillery regiments. 
 The companies of South Carolina and Georgia w r ere not expected 
 to, nor did they, move beyond the immediate boundaries of those 
 States; the continental Congress bore their expenses with this 
 understanding, and for the reason that the States themselves were 
 not able to do it. Knox, as head of the artillery, never exercised 
 any control over these organizations. 
 
 While the army lay at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-' 78 
 many measures, some of which affected the artillery, were adopted 
 by Congress. It was then that a junto in that body, aided by the 
 Conway cabal in the army, was endeavoring to undermine the 
 influence and prestige of the commander-in-chief. To under- 
 stand the course of legislation at this time it is necessary to ap- 
 preciate the character of this short-lived intrigue. 
 
 With the exception of the surprise at Trenton, the forces under 
 the immediate orders of General Washington had been defeated 
 wherever they met the enemy in the open field. Gates, on the 
 contrary, had compelled a splendidly-equipped British army to 
 lay down their arms. The opponents of the former were not 
 slow to institute comparisons which were to the disadvantage of 
 the commander-in-chief. This movement was strengthened by 
 the caustic pen of General Charles Lee, who hinted at General 
 Washington's indecision of character. The first act in the pro- 
 gramme to supersede the latter was the remodeling of the Board 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. II 
 
 of War and Ordnance. This board, organized in June, 1776, was 
 at first composed of Members of Congress. Its duties, in brief, 
 were to see that military affairs were conducted properly, that 
 supplies were furnished, and proper care taken of those not in 
 use. It was the direct military organ of Congress. The duties 
 of the Secretary of War to-day, in his relations to the President, 
 are analogous to those of the Board of War at that time. It was 
 proposed, after eighteen months' trial, to relieve Congress of this 
 duty, so extensive, important, and demanding, for proper per- 
 formance, both technical knowledge and unremitting attention. 
 To do this, gentlemen were to be selected who were in no way 
 connected with that body, yet who would, as a board, be subject 
 to its orders and direct supervision. Quartermaster-General Mif- 
 flin, Adjutant-General Pickering, and Colonel Harrison General 
 Washington's secretary were the first members appointed, the 
 latter declining. A few days later Gates was chosen by Congress 
 president of the board, with Joseph Trumbull and Richard Peters 
 as additional members. There can be little doubt but that Gen- 
 eral Mifflin was mainly instrumental in bringing about this read- 
 justment of the board. He was clever enough to discern that if he 
 could control the Board of War, with Gates as its nominal head, 
 he would virtually command the army. Arrangements were now 
 complete for General Washington's opponents to assume direc- 
 tion of military affairs. The first act was to bring to the front an 
 officer General Conway more obnoxious to the commander-in- 
 chief than perhaps any other in the army, and make him in- 
 spector, with the increased rank of major-general. It is to be 
 understood that Congress alone had the authority to originate 
 this or any other measure affecting the organization of the army ; 
 but at this time it was very willing to adopt any suggestions ema- 
 nating from the Board of War ; so that, in effect, the latter con- 
 trolled military measures. The Quartermaster's Department was 
 remodeled under the auspices of the new board, which rightly 
 judged that the building up of the administrative bureaus was a 
 long step in the direction of that consolidation of powers in their 
 own hands for which they planned, and for the consummation of 
 which nothing was left undone. A blow was struck at the effi- 
 ciency of the artillery by the organization of the ' ' Department of 
 the Commissary-General of Military Stores." (See Technical 
 Artillery.) This temporarily rendered the commander of that 
 
12 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 arm one of General Washington's trusted lieutenants power- 
 less to effect reforms or improve his service. But this attempt 
 to concentrate authority in the hands of those who knew not 
 how to use it failed of any useful purpose, and was but ephem- 
 eral in its effects. Concerning the board itself, little more need 
 be said. Its efforts to render the commander-in-chief impotent at 
 the head of his army failed signally. Its influence faded away in 
 that majestic presence as dew before the sun. No effort was made 
 to enforce the new inspectorship, to put in operation the machin- 
 ery of the new Quartermaster's Department, or to carry into exe- 
 cution many other resolutions of Congress based on the recom- 
 mendations of this new Board of War. Those members who had 
 been moved more by ambition than by patriotism naturally be- 
 came disgusted. Gates sought, and was given, a command. Mif- 
 flin requested a similar favor, but, finding himself unpopular, re- 
 signed from the army. The prestige of the commander-in-chief, 
 and the confidence reposed in him by his countrymen, had but 
 gathered strength under factious opposition. 
 
 Congress resolved, January 6th, 1778, to send a committee to 
 the camp at Valley Forge to concert measures for the reduction of 
 the number of regiments, and placing those retained upon a more 
 efficient footing. One of the results was the reorganization of the 
 army the 27th of May following, by which, in each branch or arm 
 of service, the regiments (called battalions) were arranged uni- 
 formly. For the first time the artillery was now placed on the 
 same basis in all the regiments ; the same personnel given each. 
 (Appendix A [8].) This was simply bringing Harrison's and 
 Proctor's regiments to the same standard fixed for both Crane's 
 and Lamb's when (January ist, 1777) they were first authorized. 
 
 Harrison's was brought up to twelve companies by attaching to 
 it two companies from Maryland, commanded, respectively, by 
 Captains Brown and Dorsey. Lamb had twelve companies ; but 
 Crane, due to the fact that Stevens would not join him, had but 
 nine companies, until, as before narrated, Stevens' corps was 
 absorbed in the Third Regiment in the fall of 1 778. The First, Sec- 
 ond, and Third regiments had, therefore, their complement of com- 
 panies, and were organized, as contemplated by Congress, before 
 the end of the year ; but Proctor's retained the eight companies with 
 which it was organized the year before, and gained none. The 
 Fourth Artillery never had the organization provided by the resolu- 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 13 
 
 tion of May 27th, 1778, nor was it given ten companies even, until 
 1780, when the other regiments were razeed from twelve to ten 
 companies each, and two of the surplus companies attached to the 
 Fourth. The resolution of May 27th provided further that in all 
 the regiments the adjutants and quartermasters should be chosen 
 by the field officers, subject to the approval of the commander- 
 in-chief or the commander of a separate department ; and that the 
 regimental paymasters, who also had charge of the clothing, 
 should be selected by the officers of their own regiment from 
 among the captains and subalterns. 
 
 The new regiments had but three field officers. Gridley's regi- 
 ment in 1775 had four, and Knox's five in 1776. The change had 
 not been for the better. The lessons which in the British service 
 were at that time being taken to heart, causing the organization 
 of new battalions in the Royal Artillery Regiment, in order that 
 more field officers might be appointed, thus giving promotion to 
 the lower grades, were unheeded. The battalion organization of 
 the enemy the weakness of which the enemy himself acknowl- 
 edged was blindly followed. The result was a foregone conclu- 
 sion : promotion in the artillery was so slow as to deter many from 
 entering that arm, and caused others of its best officers to leave it 
 in despair. After the four regular regiments were established in 
 1777, and until the end of the war, not more than a half-dozen or 
 so captains were promoted, or at a rate but little greater than one 
 captain a year for the Artillery Brigade. This state of affairs, 
 which should not exist, was partially due to the mistake, made 
 after the year 1776, of reducing the number of field officers, as 
 before indicated. Gridley, who knew from a long experience the 
 inconvenience of this arrangement, understood the proper organi- 
 zation for this arm, and the regiment he commanded gave proof 
 of it. It had been better had his precepts and example in this 
 particular been followed by his successors in service.* 
 
 * Incidents trivial in themselves often, from their associations, indicate a 
 great deal. As illustrating the manner in which the British idea had taken 
 possession of their rebellious subjects, it will not be uninteresting to note 
 that in some of the official returns Knox's command is designated the 
 "American Regiment of Artillery," of which the four regular regiments 
 were style 1 "battalions." To those acquainted with the. organization of 
 the Royal Artillery Regiment at that time it need not be pointed out that 
 a more complete case of military and official plagiarism, with slight foun- 
 dation to base it upon, can scarcely be conceived of. 
 
14 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 In common with the rest of the army, the artillery was next re- 
 organized, pursuant to resolves of Congress of October 3d and 2ist, 
 1780. On the farmer date a proposition was carried through that 
 body to retain as the artillery of the ' ' regular army of the United 
 States" the four existing regiments, but with the number of com- 
 panies cut down to nine, each of sixty-five enlisted men, the com- 
 missioned officers remaining as before. Upon consultation with 
 General Washington this was modified, on the second date men- 
 tioned, so as to fix the number of companies at ten per regiment. 
 (Appendix A [13].) ' The change here contemplated was effected 
 by transferring two Pennsylvania companies from the Second to 
 the Fourth Artillery. In the First, natural causes so reduced the 
 number of companies that neither consolidation nor muster-out 
 was necessary. It went south with Gates, and suffered severely 
 at Camden ; never rejoined the main army, but the fragments 
 remained in the Carolinas and in Georgia until the end of the war. 
 In the Third, two companies were absorbed, the men transferred, 
 and the surplus officers, as provided by Congress, placed on the 
 list of supernumeraries. The organizations here given were re- 
 tained unchanged until the end of the war. 
 
 When the regular army was being prepared for the field in 
 1776-' 77 it was given out that the artillery was to be recruited at 
 large, and without regard to State limits, as is customary now 
 for all branches of service; but those regiments soon found, to 
 their cost, that it was far better to be assigned to the quota of 
 some particular State, each of which, to some extent, furnished its 
 own troops with food and clothes. . Accordingly, under the re- 
 solves of October 3d and 2ist, 1780, the First Artillery was as- 
 signed to Virginia, the Second to New York, the Third to Mas- 
 sachusetts, the Fourth to Pennsylvania. To the latter State was 
 also accredited a regiment of artificers; but as it afterwards became 
 a matter of doubt whether Congress intended to retain Flower's 
 artillery artificers or Colonel Baldwin's quartermaster artificer- 
 regiment, both were mustered out of service, and the artificers, as 
 a distinct organization, entirely disappeared. 
 
 The Fourth Artillery served a short time in the southern de- 
 partment with the First Regiment. The former moved to join 
 Greene after the siege of Yorktown, with the commands of St. 
 Clair and Wayne. The Second, with the Fourth, composed the 
 artillery in the trenches at that memorable siege. Except this 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 15 
 
 Service of the Second, and the detachment with Lafayette into 
 Virginia of part of the same regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Stevens, early in 1781, the Second and Third regiments served 
 wholly in the northern section of the United States, and mostly 
 with the main army. 
 
 The rule of promotion in the artillery during the Revolution 
 underwent several changes. In the first period of that war, and 
 before the regiments were organized into a brigade, promotions 
 were regimental. This is stated in a letter from General Wash- 
 ington to Major Forrest, of the Pennsylvania artillery (Proctor's), 
 in 1777. Replying to a complaint that Major Popkins had been, 
 July 1 5th, 1777, promoted to lieutenant-colonel of Crane's regi- 
 ment, when Forrest antedated him in the former grade, the com- 
 mander-in-chief remarked: "Each regiment of artillery is as dis- 
 tinct as are the regiments of foot belonging to the various States, 
 and promotion in Crane's regiment does not affect you." When, 
 however, the brigade had been formed, there was established a 
 closer bond of union than was here indicated. This will appear 
 in the following letter of Knox to General Washington, dated 
 New Windsor, March 27th, 1781: 
 
 "There is now no established rule for filling vacancies that occur in the 
 artillery. Some doubts have arisen since the last regulation of the army (Octo- 
 ber, 1780) whether the right of appointment is in Congress, as usual, or in the 
 States to which the artillery regiments were then assigned. New appointments, 
 made since the regiments were originally organized and placed on the conti- 
 nental establishment, have been made by Congress on requests and certificates 
 of regimental commanders, countersigned by the general commanding the 
 corps. All line officers have been promoted regimentally, field officers in line 
 of the corps at large ; this principle connects the artillery regiments ; without 
 it they would be four separate and distinct organizations. If States interfere 
 with the appointments, this connection between the regiments will be destroyed. 
 The principles of appointments and promotions should be fixed in the most ex- 
 plicit terms. * * * I propose that appointments originate with the colonels, 
 as before indicated, with certificate of qualifications. Unless something of this 
 kind be done, the best officers, seeing how uncertain promotion is, will leave 
 the service. The present state of the artillery, the work of years, may be 
 ruined in an hour unless this matter be settled." 
 
 It will not escape notice that the principle of promotion here 
 announced as that which cemented together the various parts of the 
 artillery is precisely that which governs in the premises at this time 
 one hundred years later. The only instance during the Revolu- 
 tion in which it was practically illustrated was the case of Captain 
 
16 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Benjamin Eustis, of the Third Artillery, who, December 2d, 1778, 
 was promoted to major of the Fourth Artillery. On that date 
 Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Strobagh, of the latter, died, and Major 
 Forrest, of the same regiment, succeeded him. Eustis was the 
 ranking captain of artillery, and for this reason was promoted 
 major, vice Forrest. (Appendix A [10].) The principle on which 
 this was done, however well it might have been understood in the 
 army, was little understood outside of that institution. The officers 
 of the Fourth Regiment remonstrated against Eustis' transfer, 
 nor was President Reed, of Pennsylvania, inclined to look with 
 favor on this injection of a Massachusetts officer into what was 
 looked on as the artillery of the State of Pennsylvania. Mr. Reed 
 was satisfied when the commander-in-chief explained the rule to 
 him, but the officers of the Fourth Regiment were slower to acqui- 
 esce in what they considered an infringement on their rights ; and 
 it required all the authority of the commander-in-chief to sustain 
 Major Eustis in his position, which he filled until his death, Octo- 
 ber 6th, 1781.* 
 
 The assignment in the reorganization, October, 1780, of the 
 artillery to certain States for recruitment was followed by a reso- 
 lution of Congress, May 25th, 1781, making promotion regimental. 
 But the power to appoint officers of the line up to and including 
 colonels was, by the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, 
 March ist, 1781, given the States, each for its quota. This, whe- 
 ther intended or not, wrought new and diverse rules of promotion. 
 The power to appoint was found to carry with it that of prescrib- 
 ing how the officers should advance from one grade to another. 
 Hence each State both appointed and promoted officers as it saw 
 fit. These frequent changes where there should be, and in every 
 
 * Writing to President Reed concerning the remonstrance of the Fourth 
 Artillery officers, General "Washington remarked: "From 1777, when it was 
 taken on the continental establishment, until October, 1780, Proctor's regi- 
 ment was not credited to the quota of, nor did it belong to, any State. 
 In consequence, the various resolutions of Congress regulating promotions 
 in State quotas did not apply to this regiment. When Forrest was pro- 
 moted, vice Strobagh, Eustis was the ranking captain of artillery. Up to 
 that time there had arisen no occasion for promoting field officers of artil- 
 lery, or it would have been done on the principles here used." In the latter 
 statement, however, the commander-in-chief was not strictly correct, as the 
 case of Forrest, who sought the lieutenant-colonelcy of Crane's regiment, 
 evinces. (See p. 15.) 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 17 
 
 well-regulated system is, stability, caused misunderstandings, bit- 
 ter controversies, and consequent disappointment. This was 
 particularly the case when Proctor resigned, April gth, 1781. 
 Carrington, as ranking lieutenant- colonel of artillery, claimed the 
 vacancy. He at the time was deputy quartermaster-general of 
 the southern department, but Greene permitted him to leave that 
 station and assume command of his (supposed) regiment. His 
 claims were supported by General Washington ; but the matter 
 being referred to Congress, that body decided that, under the 
 Articles of Confederation, it was not legal to appoint a Virginia 
 lieutenant-colonel to the command of a Pennsylvania regiment. 
 Carrington' s pretensions were therefore disallowed. He resumed 
 his duties of deputy quartermaster-general, which he performed 
 with distinguished ability until the end of the war. The vacant 
 colonelcy was never filled. Forrest remained lieutenant-colonel 
 of the regiment until October 7th, 1781. The ranking major 
 Andrew Porter commanded until January ist, 1782, when he 
 was promoted to lieutenant-colonel commandant. The vacancy in 
 the rank of major thus created was filled December 24th, 1782, by 
 the promotion of Captain Francis Proctor, Jr. , to date back to Jan- 
 uary ist, 1782, when Porter was promoted. The vacancy caused 
 by Eustis' death, was filled by the promotion of Captain Isaac 
 Craig. All these officers belonged to the Fourth Artillery. Under 
 the provisions of resolution of Congress of August 7th, 1782, con- 
 solidating and reducing the number of regiments and retiring 
 supernumerary officers, Major Proctor retired from active service 
 January ist, 1783. 
 
 As the time for disbanding the Revolutionary army approached, 
 the serious consideration of Congress was directed to providing a- 
 proper peace establishment. A committee composed of Messrs. 
 Hamilton, Madison, Ellsworth, Wilson, and Holten was appointed 
 to examine into and submit a report on the subject. They solicited 
 the views of numerous officers of rank in the army ; and as some 
 of the views elicited, as well as those contained in the committee's 
 report, are interesting and pertinent, they will be inserted here. 
 Du Portail, the chief of engineers, in a letter to General Washing- 
 ton, September 3Oth, 1783, gave as his opinion that, for the fol- 
 lowing among other reasons, it would be best to unite the artillery 
 and engineers : 
 
 ' ' The preliminary knowledge of each is the same. There is a 
 
 3 
 
l8 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 very great relation between the professions themselves. The 
 most important use of cannon is in attack and defense of forti- 
 fied places. In some European countries they are united, and 
 where they are not, it is in contemplation. In France they were 
 united at a time of active hostilities, and the scheme for uniting 
 was bad ; besides, the private interests of some of the first officers 
 were injured by the union ; add to this the injury to their corps 
 pride, one of long standing, and the opposition to the union, upon 
 the wisest basis, can be accounted for. However, almost all officers 
 of engineers are persuaded of the advantage of it. 
 
 ' ' In making my calculations of force, I suppose, agreeably to his 
 excellency's letter, that it is to be used solely to protect ourselves 
 against the British ; for if the United States are to have fortified 
 harbors, what I am proposing will be insufficient. I propose 
 two regiments, each five companies of gunners, one of bombar- 
 diers, one of sappers and miners, one of artificers ; each company 
 in peace to have three sergeants, six corporals, twenty-four pri- 
 vates, commanded by one first and one second captain, one first 
 and one second lieutenant ; in time of war the number of privates 
 to be doubled ; each regiment to have one colonel, one lieutenant- 
 colonel, one major, one adjutant, one paymaster, one quarter- 
 master, two surgeons, one sergeant-major, one drum-major, six 
 drums and fifes ; total to each regiment, 327. 
 
 ' ' The four officers to each company provides for detached serv- 
 ice on fortifications, &c. 
 
 "The British frontier should be divided into three parts ; at the 
 head of each a brigadier-general or colonel will control what con- 
 cerns artillery and fortifications in that part. Above and com- 
 manding all these must be a director-general of the United States 
 artillery and fortification. All officials of the department are 
 accountable to the director ; he is the head of the administration 
 of the corps. Through him the orders of Congress and of their 
 Board of War will be transmitted to the corps. Such an officer 
 as director seems absolutely necessary to have that important 
 branch of the administration governed upon the same plan and 
 constant principles. If there be at the head of the department of 
 artillery and fortification many officers, independent one of an- 
 other, great inconvenience will result. 
 
 ' ' The necessity of an academy to be a nursery for the corps is 
 too obvious to be insisted upon. It must be commanded, under 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 1 9 
 
 the director, by a field officer, assisted by a captain. The students 
 should spend three years at least at the academy. Ten or twelve 
 students would be sufficient to keep the corps complete. To 
 secure places in the corps as soon as possible for men of theory 
 and knowledge, keep vacant the second lieutenancies for the first 
 graduates. At the academy there should be one master of math- 
 ematics, one of natural philosophy and of chemistry, and one of 
 drawing. As for military matters, it belongs to the officers of the 
 head of the academy to give that kind of instruction." 
 
 Colonel Hamilton penned the committee report submitted to 
 Congress, when all suggestions had been received and considered. 
 In this it was recommended "that the military peace establish- 
 ment of the United States shall consist of four regiments of in- 
 fantry, one of artillery, into which regiment the engineers will be 
 incorporated, the consolidated body to be called the Corps of 
 Engineers. ' ' 
 
 Each regiment of infantry "to contain two battalions of four 
 companies each ; the companies to have each sixty-four rank 
 and file, to be recruited to one hundred and twenty-five rank and 
 file in time of war, preserving proportion of corporals to privates. 
 The entire personnel of the infantry regiment to be : one colonel, 
 two majors, eight captains, eight first lieutenants, thirteen second 
 lieutenants, (to furnish paymaster, quartermaster, and adjutant, 
 and also two ensigns, one to each battalion,) one chaplain, one 
 surgeon, one mate, two sergeant-majors, two quartermaster- 
 sergeants, two drum and fife majors, thirty-two sergeants, sixty- 
 four corporals, (included in rank and file, ) four hundred and forty- 
 eight privates, sixteen drums and fifes. The corps of engineers to 
 consist of one regiment, or two battalions of artillery; each battalion 
 four companies; each company, sixty-four rank and file; and a corps 
 of artificers. The personnel of the corps of engineers to consist of 
 one major-general commandant, one colonel, two lieutenant-col- 
 onels, four majors, eight captains, sixteen first lieutenants, nineteen 
 second lieutenants, (to provide corps paymaster, quartermaster, and 
 adjutant,) one professor of mathematics, one professor of chemistry, 
 one professor of natural philosophy, one professor of civil archi- 
 tecture, one drawing master, one chaplain, one surgeon, one mate, 
 one sergeant-major, two quartermaster-sergeants, one drum and 
 fife major, thirty-two sergeants, (four to a company,) thirty-two 
 bombardiers, (included in rank and file,) three hundred and 
 
20 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 eighty-four cannoneers, ninety-six sappers and miners, sixteen 
 drums and fifes." The artificers forming part of the engineer 
 corps were to be workers in brass and iron, armorers, engravers, 
 cutters, blacksmiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, masons, saddlers, 
 cartridge-box makers of the first, second, and third classes. The 
 committee thought, also, that ' ' there would be necessary one com- 
 missary of military stores, five deputy commissaries, and a cer- 
 tain number of conductors, all of whom should be taken from 
 among the non-commissioned officers." 
 
 Of the general staff in time of peace there would be necessary, 
 in the opinion of the committee, one general commanding the 
 troops, one general commanding the artillery and engineers, and 
 one inspector-general. 
 
 As to a military academy, that would not be advisable ; active 
 service, in the opinion of the committee, was the school of the 
 soldier. To disseminate throughout the military establishment 
 the necessary scientific knowledge, the professors in the corps of 
 engineers were provided, and would be sufficient. 
 
 Touching the subject of appointment to office in the peace army, 
 as well as promotion therein, the report proceeds : ' ' The idea of 
 the Confederation being adhered to, the number of troops to be 
 raised must be distributed to the several States according to the 
 proportion of their respective populations, and each must appoint 
 regimental officers in proportion to the number of men furnished ; 
 but as no State will have to furnish a complete regiment, this 
 apportionment of the officers will become extremely difficult, if 
 not impracticable, on any satisfactory footing, and the filling up 
 vacancies as they arise will create endless perplexity. It would 
 be much to be preferred that the States could be induced to trans- 
 fer this right to Congress ; and indeed without it there can never 
 be regularity in the military system. It would also be much for 
 the best that the men should be enlisted under continental direc- 
 tion, which will be a more certain and frugal mode. ' ' 
 
 The rule of promotion suggested by the committee was that of 
 seniority in each regiment, to include the advancement of captain 
 to major, and after that in the arm at large ; and if dragoons 
 should be introduced into the army by subsequent resolution of 
 Congress, then the officers of infantry and dragoons to be placed 
 on one roster for promotion to lieutenant-colonel and colonel. 
 In the engineer corps, advancement to follow strictly the rule of 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 21 
 
 seniority. It was provided, however, that in no part of the army 
 could an officer claim exemption from being overslaughed by 
 another for brilliant services or peculiar talents ; but this exception 
 to the ordinary rule was never to be made but on recommenda- 
 tion of the general commanding the army, accompanied by facts 
 and reasons, and with the approval of the Secretary of War. 
 
 General Washington, to whom this report was referred, strong- 
 ly indorsed the views therein set forth respecting the appointment 
 and promotion of officers ; but with reference to those relating 
 to the necessity for a military academy, he stated that he would 
 pass them by without remark. He favored the establishment of 
 that institution, as did also Colonel Hamilton when he had more 
 maturely considered the importance of the measure. 
 
 But not even Colonel Hamilton's array of facts, nor his forcible 
 method of presenting them, could remove the insurmountable 
 obstacles that arose to the formation of a peace establishment. 
 The opinion very generally prevailed that it was a violation of the 
 fundamental principles of the Confederation to maintain a standing 
 army in time of peace ; that each State should maintain order 
 within her own borders, and .without others helping to bear the 
 expense. Militia only, according to this theory, could be lawfully 
 brought into service, except when a national danger called the 
 whole country to arms ; when that time arrived, the Confedera- 
 tion involved in war, a regular army was admissible. It need not 
 be mentioned that these views were not those entertained by 
 Colonel Hamilton, who struck at the root of these dangerous here- 
 sies when he urged that the States should surrender to Congress 
 the power of appointing and promoting officers in the proposed 
 national army. The States would surrender nothing ; and when 
 afterwards General Knox, as Secretary of War, attempted to lay 
 down rules governing the relative rank of officers in the army, he 
 found they could not be enforced ; the States accepted them, or 
 not, as they chose. As a consequence, diversity prevailed in these 
 matters; and when, in 1789, President Washington nominated 
 the officers of the Confederation army for appointment in the 
 army of the United States, he remarked : "It is to be observed 
 that the order in which the captains and subalterns are named is 
 not to affect their relative rank, which has hitherto been imper- 
 fectly settled, owing to the perplexity of promotions in the State 
 quotas conformably to the late Confederation." 
 
22 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Various causes operated to prevent the Revolutionary army 
 being entirely disbanded November 3d, 1783, as directed in the 
 proclamation of Congress the preceding i8th of October, and the 
 remnant designated which was to remain in service. The portion 
 of the army thus retained formed in no sense a peace establish- 
 ment. When the time came to disband the troops there were 
 large quantities of public stores scattered at numerous places all 
 over the country ; these had to be guarded ; it was expected the 
 British \vould vacate the posts they occupied within the northwest 
 boundaries of the United States, and it was necessary that troops 
 should occupy them. For these and other necessary purposes 
 one infantry regiment five hundred strong, and one battalion of 
 artillery composed of one hundred and thirty-eight officers and 
 men, with a few from the invalid regiment, were kept in service. 
 They were all selected from the army on the Hudson River, which 
 was under the immediate orders of General Washington. (For 
 statement of force retained, see Appendix A [14].) Except the 
 small battalion here mentioned, the four regular artillery regiments 
 had disappeared, the First and Fourth under Greene to the south- 
 ward, the Second and Third in the north. Of the battalion, 
 four officers and fifty-five men were from the Third Artillery ; the 
 rest from the Second. Those were retained who, by the terms of 
 their enlistments, had longest to serve. 
 
 The maintenance of any military establishment was beset by so 
 many difficulties the principal of which seemed to be the ex- 
 pense attending the measure that many expedients were proposed 
 in Congress whereby the absolutely necessary military service of 
 the Government could be performed. Colonel Hamilton's plan 
 for an army dropped apparently out of sight. Another commit- 
 tee, to which had been intrusted the duty of devising measures for 
 taking possession of the forts held by the British, submitted May 
 1 2th, 1784, a scheme for this purpose which embraced the forma- 
 tion of three battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery, and 
 a few engineer officers. (Appendix A [15].) It was understood 
 that these troops \vere for the purpose specified, and not to form a 
 permanent force ; the term of enlistment three years, each State 
 furnishing a contingent. This report, like its predecessor, was 
 rejected ; and as the terms of service of the few men of the old 
 army were about expiring, it was resolved, as a preliminary step 
 to the raising a proper peace establishment, to discharge all 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 23 
 
 those who had been retained. This was accordingly done by 
 resolution of Congress June 2d, 1784, but eighty men fifty-five 
 at West Point and twenty-five at Fort Pitt being kept to guard 
 stores, with a proportionate number of officers, none above the 
 rank of captain. (Appendix A [16].) The next day it was re- 
 solved that, "as it appeared absolutely necessary to have seven 
 hundred non-commissioned officers and men properly officered, 
 it was recommended to the following States, as most conven- 
 ient to the posts shortly to be vacated by the British, to furnish 
 from their militia : Connecticut, 165 ; New York, 165 ; New 
 Jersey, no ; Pennsylvania, 260 to serve twelve months, unless 
 sooner discharged. ' ' 
 
 The Secretary at War was directed to form these troops into 
 one regiment of ten companies eight of infantry, two of artil- 
 lery ; the officers to be one lieutenant-colonel commandant, from 
 Pennsylvania ; two majors, one from Connecticut, the other from 
 New York, each major to command a company ; eight captains, 
 to be taken from the States in proportion to their quotas ; ten 
 lieutenants, one to act as adjutant ; ten ensigns, one chaplain, 
 one surgeon, and four mates. As there was no Secretary at 
 War until March, 1785, the duty of arranging the organization, 
 further than here given, devolved on the States furnishing the 
 troops and upon the regimental commander. 
 
 Among those kept to guard stores, under resolution of June 2d, 
 1784, was the artillery company of Brevet Major John Doughty, 
 Alexander Hamilton's successor* in the New York artillery. 
 Doughty' s, with one from Pennsylvania under Captain Thomas 
 Douglass, late of the Fourth Continental Artillery, were assigned 
 as the two artillery companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Harmar's 
 regiment. 
 
 Thus, in the fall of 1784, the only force in the service of the 
 United States aside from a few of the old Maryland line at Fort 
 Pitt was a regiment of detached militia enlisted to serve one 
 year, and styled by the War Department the ' ' First American 
 Regiment." Upon this as a basis was gradually built up the reg- 
 ular army, into which passed by absorption several companies of 
 the First American ; among others, the artillery company of Cap- 
 tain and Brevet Major Doughty. 
 
 By resolution of March 3ist, 1785, it was determined to dis- 
 charge that part of the regiment not actually in service on the 
 
24 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 frontier. It was soon evident that the term of engagement was 
 too short for any useful purpose ; and in April, (ist, yth, i2th,) 
 1785, it was resolved to replace the one-year militia by others to 
 serve three years. The quotas of States remained unchanged, 
 and in fact the personnel of the new regiment was little else than 
 the old re-enlisted. The former officers were generally retained, 
 among others Captain Doughty ; but Pennsylvania replaced Cap- 
 tain Douglass by Captain William Ferguson, also late of the 
 Fourth Continental Artillery. At this time a change was made 
 in the designations of enlisted men of artillery. In Douglass' 
 company they had been divided into sergeants, corporals, bom- 
 bardiers, gunners, drummers, fifers, and matrosses ; whereas in 
 Ferguson's the terms bombardier and gunner did not appear, 
 and matross was supplanted by the term private. The person- 
 nel of Douglass', company, on December ist, 1784, as shown by 
 his return, was : one captain, one lieutenant, four sergeants, three 
 corporals, three bombardiers, three gunners, two drums and fifes, 
 and thirty-five matrosses. That of Ferguson's, August 7th, 1787, 
 was : one captain, one lieutenant, three sergeants, three corporals, 
 two drums and fifes, and forty-two privates. 
 
 Resemblance to Colonel Hamilton's plan, or that reported by 
 the committee May I2th, 1784, will be looked for in vain in the or- 
 ganization of the army actually adopted. A regiment composed 
 partly of infantry and partly of artillery companies was not appar- 
 ently thought of by those to whom had been intrusted the devis- 
 ing a plan for a military establishment. The regiment served on 
 the northwest frontier, where its duties were principally to keep 
 'the Indians in good order ; but small as was the force, insignificant 
 as were its operations, the uniting artillery and infantry in the 
 same regiment was found to be as inconvenient as it was incon- 
 gruous. When, therefore, the military establishment was, Oc- 
 tober 2Oth, 1786, increased to 2040 enlisted men, including those 
 in service, and Secretary Knox given authority to organize the 
 whole, he formed them into a legion, the artillery, under a major, 
 making a separate battalion. (Appendix A [17].) From that day 
 January 3Oth, 1787 to this the artillery has been organized as 
 an arm distinct from the infantry, though generally in peace, and 
 sometimes in war, performing the duties of the latter. The major 
 and commandant of the new artillery battalion was John Doughty. 
 The captains were William Ferguson, of the Pennsylvania com- 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 25 
 
 pany ; James Bradford, late first lieutenant Second Artillery, and 
 who, remaining in service with him, was now promoted, vice 
 Doughty ; Henry Burbeck, (son of Lieutenant-Colonel Burbeck, 
 of Gridley's regiment,) late captain of the Third Artillery ; and 
 Joseph Savage, late captain in the Second Artillery. 
 
 Excepting the companies of Burbeck and Savage, the troops 
 enlisted pursuant to resolution of October 2oth, 1786, were, by 
 resolution of April Qth, 1787, ordered to be discharged. This vacil- 
 lation was due to the deranged state of the public finances. It was 
 felt that the protection of the frontier and the vindication of the 
 national honor required these troops, but economy was more im- 
 portant. This left in service Harmar's eight companies of infantry 
 and Doughty' s four companies of artillery. 
 
 The re-enlistment of the seven hundred men engaged under reso- 
 lution of April 1 2th, 1785, and their rearrangement with Burbec.k's 
 and Savage's companies into an infantry regiment of eight and an 
 artillery battalion of four companies, was authorized by Congress 
 'October 3d, 1787. All companies were given the same organization. 
 (Appendix A [ 1 8]. ) The staffremained unchanged. This regiment 
 and this battalion, commanded, respectively, by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 and Brevet Brigadier-General Harmar and Major Doughty, were 
 adopted, September 29th, 1789, as the regular army of the United 
 States under the constitutional Government. The former had re- 
 ceived the brevet of brigadier-general, with the emoluments of 
 the office but without the pay proper. He remained lieutenant- 
 colonel of the regiment of infantry, and performed the duties of 
 the latter office as well as those of commander of the forces in 
 the northwest. (Appendix A [19].) 
 
 Affairs on the frontier had, under the Confederation, gradually 
 grown worse, the Indians more haughty ; and there was reason to 
 believe they were urged on by the British, who still, seven years 
 after the Revolutionary war had ended, held to the posts they were 
 expected to deliver up on the ratification of peace. Under these cir- 
 cumstances the infantry regiment, by act of April 3Oth, 1790, 
 received an addition of four companies, and the twelve of which it 
 was now composed, were arranged to three battalions. Except a 
 slight increase in the rank and file, this act left the artillery un- 
 changed. (Appendix A [20].) It was with these troops that 
 Harmar marched against the Miami Indians, by whom he was 
 defeated October 2oth, 1790. This disaster caused a further in- 
 4 
 
26 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 crease of the army by one regiment of infantry similar to that in 
 service, the appointment of St. Clair to the position of major- 
 general and Samuel Hodgdon to the office of quartermaster- 
 general. 
 
 Major Commandant John Doughty, of the artillery, was nom- 
 inated and confirmed lieutenant-colonel commandant of the new 
 regiment of infantry. The ranking artillery captain Ferguson 
 was confirmed, vice Doughty, as commandant of the artillery. 
 Doughty, however, declined the appointment thus tendered ; but 
 as Ferguson had been confirmed major of artillery in his stead, he 
 was considered as ousted from the service. The battalion, under 
 its new commander, accompanied St. Clair on his expedition 
 against the Miami Indians, when, on the 4th of November, 1791, 
 Ferguson, with other officers and many men, fell by the side of 
 the 4 guns they could not take off the field. Bradford, the rank- 
 ing captain, having been killed, Ferguson Was succeeded as major 
 commandant by Captain Henry Burbeck. 
 
 The defeats in succession of Harmar and St. Clair caused the 
 army, by act of March 5th, 1792, to be still further increased to 5120 
 men ; and, under the authority given him in the act, President 
 Washington arranged this force to one legion and four sub-legions. 
 This plan had been advocated by Baron Steuben, who often during 
 the Revolution pressed the principles and advantages of the legion- 
 ary formation upon the attention of the commander-in-chief. A few 
 months after Steuben' s arrival in this country and his appointment 
 as inspector-general, an attempt was made in Congress (May, 
 1778) to have the army organized in this manner, but it failed of 
 adoption. Replying in 1783 to General Washington's request for 
 suggestions upon the subject of a peace establishment, Steuben 
 had again urged the legionary as the best organization. It was 
 doubtless under his influence that Knox became imbued with the 
 same views, as is evinced in his arrangement of the army in Jan- 
 uary, 1787, and his celebrated, but Utopian and impracticable, 
 plan of 1790 for the organization of the militia of the United 
 States. 
 
 As the army was arranged in 1792, the major commandant was 
 of the legionary staff, and one company of artillery was assign- 
 ed to each sub-legion. (Appendix A [21].) Under St. Clair' s 
 successor, Major-General Anthony Wayne, the Americans at last 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 27 
 
 defeated and dispersed the Indians at the Miami Rapids, August 
 20th, 1794. 
 
 Meanwhile, on the gth of the preceding May, (1794,) the ar- 
 tillery had been (for those times) largely increased in numbers, 
 and had received an important change of organization. Since-the 
 disbanding of the artillery of the Revolution, that arm had been 
 maintained in but insignificant numbers, with an eye single to 
 economy, at whatever sacrifice of efficiency. The infantry and 
 artillery had been organized and used together on the frontier, 
 and the only difference between them was that the artillery, in 
 addition to duty as infantry, managed their guns, repaired and 
 kept in order every species of armament, small-arm or otherwise, 
 with which the troops were equipped. For this extra' service 
 they received neither pecuniary nor other reward. The pay of 
 the same grade of officers in different branches of service was the 
 same. In one word, the artillery, except in name, had been only 
 infantry, with the additional duties imposed of acting as artificers 
 for the army, and managing the pieces of ordnance with which 
 the western forts and the Indian expeditions were supplied. 
 
 The act of May gth, 1794, by combining the artillery with the 
 engineers, contemplated a very different status for the arm from 
 that to which it had been relegated since the Revolution. For 
 furnishing merely a combined infantryman, gunner, and artificer, 
 without regard to efficiency, former practices had been sufficient. 
 When, however, the scene of operations was transferred from the 
 wilderness to the sea-coast, the objects to be defended, instead 
 of log forts became populous cities, the repositories of the nation's 
 wealth ; the enemy, instead of the wild Indian became a military 
 nation supported by the most powerful navy in the world, the 
 necessity for reorganizing and increasing the artillery to meet the 
 new order of things became apparent. That this was the matur- 
 ed judgment of the country, proof was given in the prompt pas- 
 sage by Congress of the act of May 9th, 1794. The Executive 
 evinced his appreciation of the situation by appointing to the first 
 positions in the new corps gentlemen of approved scientific attain- 
 ments. The field officers were : Stephen Rochefontaine, lieuten- 
 ant-colonel commandant ; to the original vacancies, Lewis de 
 Tousard, John Jacob Ulrick Rivardi, Constant Freeman, majors ; 
 and, as the artillerists and engineers absorbed the old artillery 
 battalion, Burbeck, by virtue of his former rank, entered as major. 
 
28 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Rochefontaine and Rivardi were at the time civil engineers in 
 the employ of the Government, constructing fortifications ; Tou- 
 sard was an accomplished artillerist ; Constant Freeman, late 
 captain-lieutenant Crane's regiment, was an officer of great ex- 
 perience, and had a thorough knowledge of his duties as an ar- 
 tillery officer. 
 
 The plan of organization for the artillerists and engineers (Ap- 
 pendix A [22]) had some of the features proposed by both Gen- 
 eral Du Portail and Colonel Hamilton's committee, before men- 
 tioned. But, like many other attempts at army legislation, there 
 was more form than substance in it. Both Du Portail and the 
 committee, while proposing to unite the artillery and engineers in 
 one corps, contemplated the organization of that corps into one com- 
 pact and well proportioned body, with a regular chain of surbor- 
 dination extending from top to bottom, so that unity of purpose 
 and action might characterize every movement. Both recognized 
 the necessity that existed in such a corps for the subalterns re- 
 ceiving special instruction to teach them the fundamental princi- 
 ples of their profession. The act of May gth, 1794, was drafted 
 apparently with the same general principles for a groundwork. 
 But, while the form was there, the practical facilities to secure 
 efficiency were lacking. The section of the law authorizing 
 cadets to be instructed, and the procurement of the necessary 
 apparatus for the purpose, while well meaning, was never, except 
 to demonstrate the inadequacy of educating officers in this man- 
 ner, of any utility whatever. Then the absorption of the old bat- 
 talion of artillery was a mistake; it had never, in fact, been any- 
 thing but infantry, except in name, and the personnel was not 
 possessed of the theoretical knowledge and scientific attainments 
 which it was intended should distinguish the officers of artillerists 
 and engineers. The scattered condition of the corps on the 
 western frontier, in the east and on the sea-board, was prejudicial 
 to its interests; the parts did not serve together; were unknown 
 to each other, and the colonel, serving constantly as an engineer, 
 was given no opportunity to attend to the interior arrangements 
 of his command. Moreover,, though Rochefontaine and his asso- 
 ciates were capable officers, there was an element of weakness in 
 having a corps French at the head and American at the foot. 
 Opportunity was not given for the cultivation of that sympathy 
 between these parts which grows out of a community of interests; 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 29 
 
 thus the naturally delicate and difficult task of uniting heterogen- 
 eous elements into one harmonious whole, with the cultivation of 
 a proper esprit de corps, was practically impossible. The disad- 
 vantage of this situation was something for which no one was re- 
 sponsible; the attempt had been made to build up the corps with 
 the best material obtainable, and it was but an incident of the 
 imperfectly developed resources of the country that features which 
 it was expected would, and which actually did, give strength to 
 the system, were at the same time sources of weakness. Under, 
 all the circumstances, however, it was not a matter to excite 
 wonder that the artillerists and engineers failed to accomplish 
 what was expected, or that in eight years the corps passed away 
 leaving scarcely a trace to show that it had existed. 
 
 This was but facilitated by the organization of a regiment of 
 artillerists and engineers, in addition to the corps, by act of April 
 27, 1798. (Appendix A [23].) The two organizations were 
 separate and distinct, and the sequel verified the prediction of Du 
 Portail years before that: " If there be at the head of the depart- 
 ment of the artillery and fortifications many officers, independent 
 one of another, great inconvenience will result. ' ' 
 
 The field officers of the regiment were : John Doughty, lieuten- 
 ant-colonel commandant; Benjamin Brooks, Adam Hoops, and 
 Daniel Jackson, majors. Of these, Doughty was the old major 
 commandant of artillery, and Jackson had been a first lieutenant 
 in Crane's Revolutionary artillery. 
 
 It will be noticed that, whereas a preponderance of rank and 
 influence had been given foreign officers when the corps was or- 
 ganized in 1794, in the regiment of artillerists and engineers all 
 the field officers were native Americans. The presence of the 
 former at this juncture was a source of solicitude to the President, 
 which, from the friends of government in his confidence, he did 
 not attempt to conceal. He summarily dismissed Rochefontaine 
 in May, 1798, although for what reason is not known. When 
 Inspector- General Hamilton urged the appointment of Major 
 Tousard to the position of inspector of artillery an office created 
 by act of July i6th, 1798 the President replied that there was so 
 much uneasiness felt because of the French officers of artillery, 
 he expected much trouble ; and although Tousard, in April, 1801, 
 received this appointment to date back to May, 1800, there was 
 no denying the fact that President Adams was right ; at that early 
 
30 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 day, when the machinery of government was not yet in working 
 order, it was dangerous to intrust the inspection and proof of ar- 
 tillery to any officer with whose native country the United States 
 was preparing to go to war. 
 
 By the same act which created the office of inspector of artillery, 
 the President was authorized to appoint not exceeding four 
 teachers of the arts and sciences, for the instruction of the cadets 
 of artillerists and engineers. They were to do the duties contem- 
 plated for the professors in Colonel Hamilton's plan for an army 
 before given, and it is reasonable to suppose their employment now 
 was suggested by that gentleman, whose influence with Secretary 
 McHenrywas unbounded. Concerning these teachers the Secre- 
 tary remarked : ' ' Their employment would give the intended 
 effect to the provision of the law of May gth, 1794, authorizing the 
 appointment of two cadets to each company of artillerists and en- 
 gineers, who would, it was supposed, form a nursery from which 
 qualified officers might be drawn to fill vacancies." It is not 
 known that these teachers were appointed. It is probable that 
 they were not, as, when the cadets were drawn together in 1801 at 
 West Point, they gave little evidence of having been the subjects of 
 Scientific instruction. ' ' The school as started at this time was 
 under the direction of a private citizen, and was nothing more than 
 a mathematical school for the few cadets then in service. It was 
 found that the government of young men was incompatible with the 
 ordinary system of schools, and consequently the institution ran 
 into disorder and the teacher into contempt. ' ' 
 
 The act of March 3d, 1799, reorganized the army upon a plan 
 drafted by Lieutenant-General Washington. It provided for 
 placing the corps and the regiment of artillerists and engineers 
 upon the same footing, giving the latter, like the former, four bat- 
 talions. (Appendix A [24].) Thereafter the two organizations 
 were called, respectively, the first and second regiments of artil- 
 lerists and engineers. 
 
 The United States had but few more scientific officers in 1798 
 than the colonies had in 1775. In both instances the Government 
 turned abroad to Europe for the desired knowledge and experi- 
 ence not found at home. To the corps of artillerists and engineers 
 the country had looked for the requisite talents and knowledge, 
 and the personnel in 1795 gave promise that this confidence was 
 not misplaced ; but events had unexpectedly changed. Those for- 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 3! 
 
 merly relied upon were now mistrusted ; and, through neglect to 
 cultivate native talent, the attainments essential to an army scien- 
 tific corps had now, in face of the enemy, to be picked up wher- 
 ever found. These facts made a profound impression on thoughtful 
 men of the day. The revival soon after of the attempt to re-establish 
 the military school, which for years had languished from inatten- 
 tion, gave proof that the lesson had been taken to heart. Ad- 
 verting to this subject in a letter of December 24th, 1798, Mr. 
 McHenry said : 
 
 "It is deeply to be regretted that a precious period of leisure 
 was not improved toward forming among ourselves engineers 
 and artillerists, and that, owing to this neglect, we are in danger 
 of being overtaken by war without a competent number of charac- 
 ters of these descriptions. To form them suddenly is impracticable ; 
 much previous study and experiment are essential. If possible to 
 avoid it, war ought not to find us unprovided. * * * j n the 
 meanwhile it is considered to be advisable to endeavor to intro- 
 duce from abroad at least one distinguished engineer and one 
 distinguished officer of artillery. They may be sought for pref- 
 erably in the Austrian, and next in the Prussian armies. It is also 
 suggested that an inspector of fortifications is much wanted. 
 # * * The officer may be drawn from the corps of artillerists 
 and engineers, or it may be left discretionary with the President 
 to choose him where he pleases." 
 
 These suggestions had been made to Mr. McHenry by Lieu- 
 tenant-General Washington in his letter submitting the plan for 
 the reorganization of the army. In conformity therewith, the 
 President was authorized, by act of March 3d, 1799, to engage and 
 appoint two engineers with rank of lieutenant-colonel, distinct 
 from the corps, and also an inspector of fortifications, who, if not 
 taken from the corps, should have the rank of major. 
 
 There at this time entered the artillerists and engineers as major 
 of the Fourth Battalion, Second Regiment, Jonathan Williams, a 
 gentleman of ability and attainments, the result of combined talent, 
 travel, study and reflection. He at once took- a prominent posi- 
 tion among those who- were to re-establish confidence in the native 
 American officers of the army. He was, December i4th, 1801, 
 made inspector of fortifications, and at the same time superintend- 
 ent of the military school for cadets at West Point, into which it 
 was proposed to instill new life. His appointment in 1802 to the 
 
32 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 corps of engineers separated Major Williams from the artillery ; 
 but, as superintendent of the military academy, he laid the foun- 
 dation of an institution which, for its special purposes, is second 
 to none. 
 
 President Adams contemplated the appointment of a civilian to 
 be commander of the corps of artillerists and engineers in place 
 of the dismissed Rochefontaine ; but the nomination of the Hon. 
 Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey to the office was not confirmed, as 
 it should not have been, being a most dangerous innovation upon 
 the well-understood rule for making appointments and promo- 
 tions in the army. No successor to Rochefontaine was appointed 
 until February 2Oth, 1799, when Henry Burbeck, ranking major, 
 was promoted to the vacancy, to date from May yth, 1798, the day 
 of Rochefontaine.' s dismissal. The office of lieutenant-colonel 
 commandant of the Second Regiment of artillerists and engineers, 
 vacated by the resignation of Doughty, May 26th, 1800, was filled 
 by the promotion of Tousard, the ranking major in that arm of 
 service. But fate had decreed that neither Tousard' s nor his 
 compatriot Rivardi's connection with the American artillery was 
 to be prolonged. They were not in favor with Secretary Dear- 
 born, a rough, practical soldier, who had imbibed military ideas 
 in the field during the Revolution, and who then conceived what 
 he never overcame a prejudice against foreigners and their ways 
 of doing things. The correspondence betweeen the Secretary 
 and these officers was often of such nature that no one familiar 
 with it was surprised when, in Mr. Jefferson's political reorganiza- 
 tion of the army in 1802, both were mustered out of service. 
 
 In this reorganization the artillerists and engineers as a com- 
 bined arm disappeared. Out of a part of the old material a regi- 
 ment of artillerists was formed, while a corps of engineers was 
 created as a distinct part of the military system. The colonel of 
 the former was Ikirbeck, ranking lieutenant-colonel commandant 
 of artillerist and engineers ; the lieutenant-colonel, Constant Free- 
 man ; the majors, Daniel Jackson, Decius Wadsworth, Moses 
 Porter, and William MacRea. This absorbed all the field officers 
 of the late artillerists and engineers save four. Of these, Will- 
 iams was appointed major of the engineer corps ; Tousard and 
 Rivardi, with Mahlon Ford, were discharged. The arm was here 
 deprived of some of its best educated and most capable officers. 
 
 Before the reduction the artillerists and engineers embraced 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 33 
 
 one hundred and eighty-two officers, surgeons, mates and cadets. 
 In the regiment of artillerists there were one hundred and seven 
 of these grades. The enlisted force was at the same time cut 
 clown from 2152 to 1520. But though forty per cent, of the 
 first mentioned left service, it will be noticed that both Bur- 
 beck and Freeman were promoted by the change, thus going up 
 in the scale, while many others went not only down but out of 
 service. As illustrating the mutability of military fortune in those 
 days of frequent changes, it may be mentioned that both these 
 officers Burbeck in 1815 and Freeman in 1821 were placed to 
 one side to make room in their turn for others. 
 
 If we compare the organization of the artillery under the act of 
 March i6th, 1802, (Appendix A [25],) with that of the artillerists 
 and engineers before that time, it will be found in some respects 
 to have gained by the change.. True, the staff of the regiment 
 and the battalions were either wanting or entirely inadequate ; but 
 this disadvantage was far more than offset by the fact that the 
 arm was again given a single head. The complete failure of the 
 artillerists to rise to a plane of scientific excellence commensurate 
 with the needs of service a fact which led directly to the separa- 
 tion in 1812 of the technical from the combatant artillery and the 
 formation of the technical branch into an ordnance department 
 was due not to faults of organization but to incompetent personnel. 
 
 The large number of musicians given each company, (four out 
 of seventy-six enlisted,) was for the purpose, as the Secretary of 
 War explained, of providing the colonel with a fine regimental 
 band, a luxury "in which Crane, Proctor, and perhaps other 
 artillery commanders were indulged during the Revolution. 
 
 There was little in the history of the artillery between 1802 and 
 1812 to call for remark except that important event, the organi- 
 zation of the light artillery regiment. On the 26th of February, 
 1808, Mr. Jefferson recommended to Congress that, in view of 
 complications growing out of the Napoleonic wars, an addition 
 should be made to the regular army. Accompanying the com- 
 munication of the President was one from Secretary Dearborn, 
 suggesting that this increase should be fixed at six thousand men, 
 arranged to five regiments of infantry, one of riflemen, one of 
 light artillery, and one of light cavalry. This was authorized 
 by act of April" 1 2th, 1808. (Organization of Light Artillery, 
 Appendix A [26].) Profiting by experience, the introduction of 
 5 
 
34 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 unnaturalized foreigners as officers was prevented by a clause 
 restricting such appointments to citizens of the United States. 
 
 Examination of all correspondence bearing on the subject leads 
 to the belief that, when the light artillery was recommended by 
 the Secretary and authorized by Congress, the question as to its 
 equipment had not been decided. No provision, based on the 
 hypothesis that it would be mounted, was made for any part of the 
 establishment ; in fact, as provided for in the law, the light differ- 
 ed from the other artillery only in name. The expense that neces- 
 sarily attended fitting out a regiment of this character was more 
 than the administration was willing to authorize, and no sooner 
 were the light companies recruited than they were, with a single 
 exception, marched off with muskets. To such lengths was this 
 spirit of economy carried, that the lieutenant-colonel was not 
 appointed until December, 1811, and the colonel for some months 
 later. Captain John Saunders of the artillerists was, January, 
 1809, appointed major of the new regiment, but this was after the 
 companies were nearly, if not quite all, fully recruited. The cap- 
 tains and subalterns were active young men, who eagerly sought 
 opportunity to distinguish themselves in an arm of service ren- 
 dered famous in the contemporaneous wars of Europe. George 
 Peter, who had the honor of commanding the first properly 
 equipped light artillery company in the American army, headed 
 the list of captains ; Winfield Scott, afterwards general-in-chief, 
 stood second on the list; Abraham Eustis, who rose, zyth No- 
 vember, 1834, to be colonel of the present First Artillery, was third. 
 These and many others who started with them rendered distin- 
 guished service. The regiment was full of life, the officers young 
 enough to be ambitious, and had opportunity offered under any- 
 thing like favorable conditions, the light artillery would have 
 made a record honorable alike to itself and to the service of which 
 it formed a part. 
 
 Secretary Dearborn lost no time in organizing the first company 
 as field artillery proper. The following is his letter of instructions 
 to Captain Peter, then stationed at Fort McHenry, Baltimore, 
 
 Maryland : 
 
 "WAR DEPARTMENT, Gth May, 1808. 
 
 GEO. PETER Sir: As soon as you can have two six-pounders properly 
 mounted, with one ammunition wagon and one light horse wagon, for convey- 
 ing four men besides the wagoner, prepared for service, I will order the pur- 
 chase of a sufficient number of horses for making an experiment with one field 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 35 
 
 piece, with its ammunition wagon containing, say, fifty cartridges, ten of which- 
 ought to have round shot, and ten of grape or cannister. The officers, with one 
 sergeant and three men on horseback, and four men in the light wagon, are to 
 proceed, at the rate of five or six miles an hour, from Baltimore to this city, 
 and to make some experiments at this place by manoeuvring the cannon in 
 different directions. * * * For one six-pourider, one ammunition and one 
 light wagon, and for the officers and others on liorseback, it will, I presume, 
 require from thirteen to sixteen horses. I wish you to endeavor to have a 
 sufficient number of suitable men well trained to the business before the gen- 
 eral experiment is made." 
 
 On the 1 6th of the same month, ten days after the Secretary's 
 letter was written, Peter replied that he had the requisite number 
 of horses in training, and that the carriages, harness, saddles, 
 bridles, &c. , would be ready in a few days. Upon this letter the 
 Secretary indorsed an order to the surveyor of supplies directing 
 that he send twenty-six suits of light artillery uniform to Captain 
 Peter as soon as possible. Everything having been put in order 
 for the purpose of making a display with the new arm, the novel 
 feature of the succeeding 4th of July parade in Washington city 
 was Captain Peter's field artillery company. 
 
 This was properly looked upon as an important event, and one 
 of great interest both to the Secretary and the President. Artil- 
 lery moving at the rate of five or six miles an hour was a great 
 advance on anything that had been seen before in this country. 
 The equipment was unique, and must have originated with Secre- 
 tary Dearborn. Different from anything then practiced elsewhere, 
 it was, both in simplicity and mobility, certainly not second to 
 the system at the time in vogue in some parts of Europe, and of 
 which the Wurst caisson formed a prominent feature. The gun 
 carriages and limbers, of nearly the Gribeauval pattern, were made 
 by the artillery artificers stationed at Fort McHenry. 
 
 Orders having been issued directing that the light artillery com- 
 panies raised south of New Jersey should be concentrated at New 
 Orleans, Peter, augmented in men and guns, left Baltimore De- 
 cember 24th, 1808, and marched to Pittsburg en roiite to that city. 
 Writing to Secretary Dearborn from Pittsburg, January gth, 1809, 
 Captain Peter said : ' ' The performance of the light artillery in the 
 late march has exceeded my most sanguine expectations. The 
 gun carriages, ammunition wagons, fixed ammunition, &c., have 
 arrived without the smallest injury, and I really believe that the 
 march could have been performed in ten days could the baggage 
 
36 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 'wagons have kept pace with us." In conjunction with other 
 forces destined for New Orleans, the company, with men, guns, 
 and horses, were embarked on the Ohio in the latter part of Jan- 
 uary. After many delays, due to inclement weather and other 
 causes, the command reached its destination in the latter part of 
 March, 1809. Soon after, the army moved to Terre au Bceuf, below 
 the city, and Peter resigned his commission. The company, left in 
 command of Lieutenant James Gibson, was in 1812 absorbed in 
 the companies of the artillerist regiment in that vicinity ; while 
 Gibson, returning north, raised and marched to the field one of 
 the first horse artillery companies, which joined the army on the 
 Niagara frontier. 
 
 Ere this, Secretary Dearborn had been succeeded, under the 
 new administration of Mr. Madison, by Doctor William Eustis. 
 This gentleman had been surgeon of Gridley's regiment in 1775. 
 He had seen something of military affairs, but wholly from the 
 standpoint of a non-combatant. In this he was a marked contrast 
 to his predecessor, and, unlike him, failed to appreciate the impor- 
 tance of maintaining some portion of the field artillery, equipped as 
 such, in a state of efficiency. On the 2d of June, 1809, he wrote 
 to General Wilkinson : "I am informed by the accountant that the 
 amount of expenditures at New Orleans is great ; the charges for 
 house rent, forage, and other articles are such as, if admitted and 
 continued, will soon devour our appropriations. The inclosed 
 memorandum will give you an idea of them. I beg of you to 
 interpose your authority to put an end to them. Horses for the 
 artillery cannot be maintained at such an expense ; they must 
 either be sent to some part of the country where they can be main- 
 tained at one-fourth of the present expense, or they may be sold. 
 On those waters I should suppose they might be dispensed with. 
 The drivers should be taken from the line ; there is no lawful 
 authority for the employment of other persons. Imagine for a 
 moment the whole regiment of light artillery on this scale of ex- 
 pense. Consider the prejudices against the army in general 
 which an inspection of such charges by members of the Govern- 
 ment is calculated to impress on their minds." Replying to this, 
 August 27th, 1809, Wilkinson said : "Finding that it is impossible 
 to maintain the light artillery horses on anything like the terms 
 you stipulate, I have ordered them to be sold at vendue." Thus, 
 after a service of little more than one year, the first light artillery 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 37 
 
 company of the United States army, serving as such, was dis- 
 mounted. 
 
 From the date of this event until war with Great Britain became 
 inevitable, nothing was done to further the interests of the light 
 artillery arm beyond preparing the materiel necessary for its 
 equipment, which was to be on the Gribeauval system.* In this 
 Secretary Dearborn had resolved on uniformity, and his successor 
 followed in his footsteps. Meanwhile a bold front was put on 
 when the subject of adding to the efficiency of the practically- 
 discarded arm was suggested as a measure worthy the attention 
 of Government. To a French gentleman who had presented a 
 memoir on the advantages of horse artillery organized as in 
 Europe, pointing out the deficiencies of the United States in 
 this particular, Secretary Eustis, January loth, 1810, replied: 
 ' ' The use of horse artillery has been suspended in practice for rea- 
 sons which cannot at this time be entered upon. The importance of 
 this limb of an army has never been uncontemplated or under- 
 valued. The measures of availing ourselves of it are not so remote 
 as may be imagined. ' ' But in fact there was little upon which to 
 base this air of confidence. The means at hand to form an effi- 
 cient horse artillery were too meagre to be relied upon for this 
 purpose. They consisted of a so-called light artillery but really 
 an infantry regiment, possessing neither a horse nor a gun, and 
 
 * In the spring of 1810, the death of Major John Saunders gave rise 
 to a controversy regarding the right to promotion of an officer under 
 suspension which, because of the important precedent established by the 
 decision, as well the subsequent prominence of the person at the time prin- 
 cipally affected, is of interest. Captain Winfield Scott, the ranking officer 
 of light artillery after Saunders, claimed the majority, under the regular rules 
 for promotion. But he was at the time under suspension by sentence of a 
 court-martial, and the Secretary of War, not being acquainted with the pre- 
 cedents in the case in our army, referred the matter to a board, of which 
 Colonel Burbeck was president, for advice ; the report was adverse to Cap- 
 tain Scott's pretension, and was to the effect that officers forfeited their right 
 to promotion while under suspension, and the next on the list eligible in 
 other respects acquired them. Under this ruling Eustis overslaughed Scott, 
 and was made major of the light artillery. Although this was not in ac- 
 cordance with precedents, had the Secretary but known what they were, it 
 is an eminently just decision, and has governed similar cases in the army 
 since. 
 
38 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 of some materiel for its equipment, when mounted, scattered at 
 the arsenals and artillery posts. 
 
 It was not until February, 1812, that the officers, even when 
 mounted, were authorized by law to draw forage for their horses, 
 having previously been required to feed them at their own expense. 
 At the same time the President was empowered to mount the entire 
 regiment, while to each company thus mounted there was allowed 
 one saddler and one farrier. This was four years after the organiza- 
 tion was put on foot, and shows what erroneous ideas prevailed as 
 to the requisites for a proper light artillery. In the following 
 May, when preparing to take the field, each company was, by 
 law, allowed twelve drivers, who, when the companies were not 
 mounted, were at all times liable to do duty in the ranks. This 
 was a wise measure. Enlisting drivers in the company with which 
 they served was far more conducive to efficiency and discipline 
 than the practice then in vogue in some European armies of hav- 
 ing them drawn from corps attached to the artillery, yet inde- 
 pendent of it. 
 
 The condition of the light artillery at the commencement of 
 the year 1812 demonstrated the impossibility of combining the 
 duties of that arm with those of the infantry. The attempt failed ; 
 it was seeking to obtain something for nothing to have the 
 moral effect and prestige of this powerful auxiliary arm without 
 paying for it. That there was not an efficient horse artillery dur- 
 ing the war of 1812, resulted from the fact that the Government 
 was not willing to complete the work it had begun. The person- 
 nel was of the best; the materiel was practically equal to that of the 
 enemy, (owing to the relatively slight use made of field artillery;) 
 but from first to last the policy was pursued of dismounting the 
 companies almost as fast as equipped, to the discouragement of the 
 men and the disgust of the officers, who could not reasonably be 
 expected to take pride in a light artillery regiment which existed 
 as such in name only. 
 
 Under the pressure of impending war, larger additions were 
 made to the army by act of January nth, 1812. The combatant 
 force thereby authorized embraced two regiments of artillery, 
 one of dragoons, and ten of infantry. (Organization of Artillery, 
 Appendix A [27].) The two artillery regiments were desig- 
 nated the Second and Third, the old artillerists being, for con- 
 venience, known as the First Regiment of regular artillery. But, 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 39 
 
 as regards promotion of officers, these regiments were always 
 distinct. The First belonged to what was officially known as 
 the " peace establishment;" the Second and Third to the <( addi- 
 tional military force; " and if during the lifetime of the latter two 
 regiments January nth, 1812, to March 3Oth, 1814 there had 
 happened, in either, a vacancy in the grade of major, for instance, 
 the ranking captain of the artillery line could not claim it. After 
 the original vacancies in the Second and Third regiments were 
 filled, advancement in each was distinct ; it was not until the 
 reorganization of March 3Oth, 1814, when the regiments were 
 broken up and formed into a corps, that promotion, under exist- 
 ing rules, became general throughout the foot artillery arm. 
 
 Captain George Izard, formerly of the artillerists, was appointed 
 colonel; Captain Winfield Scott, of the light artillery, lieutenant- 
 colonel; William Lindsay and Daniel M. Forney, majors of the 
 Second Regiment; the other lieutenant-colonel, Francis K. Huger, 
 was not appointed until 1813. Concerning the colonel of the Sec- 
 ond, it is proper to remark that there was not in the United 
 States his superior in military knowledge. Educated in the mili- 
 tary schools of France, he had, by several years' experience in 
 the army, supplemented by study and reflection, methodically 
 digested in his mind the whole subject of army organization and 
 supply. This fact made his counsel particularly valuable at the 
 beginning of the war, upon which, with little preparation, the 
 Government had now embarked. Both the colonel and lieuten- 
 ant-colonel of this regiment rose to the grade of general officer. 
 
 The Third was not completed in organization so rapidly as the 
 Second Artillery. Of the field officers, only the colonel, Alexan- 
 der Macomb, late of the engineer corps, and Major George E. 
 Mitchell from civil life, were appointed in 1812. Early in 1813 
 the complement of field officers was completed by raising Mitchell 
 to the grade of lieutenant-colonel, transferring into the like grade 
 Captain James House, of the First Artillery, and appointing a 
 civilian, Mr. Samuel Nye, with Captain George Armistead, of the 
 First Artillery, majors. 
 
 When Izard waspromoted, March i2th, 1813, he was succeeded 
 by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott; the latter by Major Lindsay, and he 
 by Captain Hindman all agreeably to the regimental plan of 
 promotion. 
 
 Macomb was appointed brigadier-general January 24th, 1814, 
 
40 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 and Scott on March Qth following. The vacancies thus created 
 were not filled; in the corps of artillery organized from the three 
 regiments March 3Oth, same year, the grade of lieutenant-colonel 
 was the highest for which provision was made by law. 
 
 The artillery was generally well officered during the war of 181 2, 
 but it suffered then, as it has since, from not having a single head to 
 direct its affairs. Prior to the year mentioned, Burbeck was theo- 
 retically serving as such; but by July, 1812, three other officers of 
 equal rank were appointed in that arm, viz., Porter of the light 
 artillery, Izard and Macomb. These officers were independent 
 the one of the other, and neither was appointed to the com- 
 mand of the artillery of the whole army, as might easily have 
 been done. While Secretary Eustis expressed himself as deeply 
 impressed with the importance of training all troops at the ser- 
 vice of artillery, and sought to render the arm itself efficient, he 
 failed to appreciate the fact that, to do this, unity in purpose and 
 action, which alone can exist under the supervision of one direct- 
 ing mind, was the first thing to be secured. The Secretary was a 
 man of peace, not of war, and seems to have lost his head amidst 
 the multiplicity of affairs that pressed upon him, and which soon 
 drove him from his office in despair. Not only was no one ap- 
 pointed to command the whole, but the principal officers were 
 scattered everywhere except with their own arm. Izard did not 
 serve a day with the artillery, although from taste, education, 
 and experience he was well qualified for it. Burbeck was not act- 
 ing as an artillery officer proper, although, first in New York Har- 
 bor and afterwards at New London, he had troops under him of that 
 arm, but always in conjunction with infantry, in a general com- 
 mand. Porter was commander of artillery on the Niagara fron- 
 tier from the fall of 1812 until he retired through sickness, one 
 year later. Macomb was commander of the artillery brigade at 
 Sackett's Harbor in the summer of 1813, and at other times was 
 chief of artillery in Wilkinson's army, but it was, except for a 
 very short time, merely as an adjunct to his duties as an infantry 
 commander. His own regiment, the Third, served almost wholly 
 as infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick commanded the light 
 artillery under various generals whose armies operated on the 
 Canadian frontier, but he was transferred to a staff department. 
 
 Thus it was with the most prominent and efficient officers ; that 
 they were efficient was considered a reason for assigning them to 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 41 
 
 duty elsewhere. As a result, commanders were embarrassed in 
 the management of their artillery, and, to secure its even tolerable 
 service, it was often necessary to assign to duty therewith officers 
 from other branches of the army. Writing, August 29th, 1812, 
 from his grand camp at Greenbush, near Albany, N. Y., General 
 Dearborn said : " I am in want of experienced artillerists. We have 
 none here of any kind, excepting light artillery unprepared for 
 actual service. Whatever relates to our artillery and ammunition 
 remains in a chaotic state for want of suitable officers." In the 
 summer of 1813 General Hampton complained that he was left 
 with only raw captains just entering the artillery service, and asked 
 authority to appoint Lieutenant Lomax an assistant adjutant- 
 general, that he might be assigned to the command of that arm 
 over the heads of those officers. Soon after Major McRee, of the 
 engineer corps, was appointed chief of artillery in Hampton's 
 army. The instances cited sufficiently illustrate the difficulties 
 experienced in securing the services of competent artillery officers, 
 who, instead of being with their commands, were performing what 
 was considered indispensable duty elsewhere ; but it was at a sac- 
 rifice of the efficiency and credit of their own arm. It all resulted 
 from one cause, viz. , the want of a chief -of artillery for the whole 
 army, as Knox was in the Revolution, who could assign duties to 
 his own officers, each in the sphere for which he was best fitted. 
 Colonel Izard well understood this fact. He urged on the Secre- 
 tary of War, early in 1812, a reorganization of the artillery to 
 secure its efficiency, stating at the same time that he was willing 
 to serve in a subordinate capacity ; but his suggestions came too 
 late to work a practical reformation. War was at hand ; all were 
 preparing for the field ; the time for wisely carrying out the pro- 
 posed work, which must always be the result of deliberate reflec- 
 tion, had passed, and, though Mr. Eustis was favorably disposed, 
 he resigned before congressional action could be taken ; the artillery 
 was left to drift without a directing hand ; and finally, March 3Oth, 
 1814, a distorted plan, miscalled a reorganization, entirely devoid of 
 the substance, while having in some degree the form of a scheme 
 proposed by Colonel Izard, was enacted into law ; but by this, 
 the regiments, instead of being drawn more closely together, were 
 broken into still smaller fragments, each independent of the other. 
 (Izard's Plan of Organization, Appendix A [29].) 
 
 In common with each regiment of dragoons, infantry, and rifles, 
 6 
 
42 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 the light artillery was, by act of January 2oth, 1813, given another 
 major. This was more particularly to facilitate recruiting, as it 
 was intended that the extra major should supervise that service 
 for his regiment. In addition there were, as to every other in 
 the army, added to each company of light artillery a third lieu- 
 tenant and a fifth sergeant. 
 
 Thomas Pitts, senior captain of the light artillery, was appointed 
 to the original majority thus created in his regiment. He resigned 
 August 3ist, 1814. The President appointed Captain McPherson 
 to be Pitts' successor, overslaughing Captain William Campbell. 
 This was during the recess of the Senate, which body did not con- 
 sent to the appointment. Captain Campbell's name was then sent 
 in, and he was confirmed major in the light artillery, to date back 
 to the day of Pitts' resignation. The circumstance receives sig- 
 nificance from the fact that it was an attempt, on the part of the 
 Executive, to ignore, in the interests of favorites, the rules of pro- 
 motion established by law. It is one of the many instances in 
 which the Senate stood firm in defense of right. To that body, and 
 to it alone, the army owes it that promotions are made otherwise 
 than at the will, perhaps the caprice, of the President. 
 
 By the law of March ^oth, 1814, the First, Second, and Third 
 regiments of artillery, as has been mentioned, were arranged to a 
 Corps of twelve battalions. (Appendix A [28].) The light artil- 
 lery remained unchanged. The pay of all was, for the first time, 
 fixed at that of dragoons. The President was authorized to 
 assign one of the second lieutenants, of which each company of 
 the Corps was given two, to duty as conductor of artillery, i. e. 
 company ordnance officer, for which he received ten dollars per 
 month extra compensation. The artificers introduced into the 
 artillery in 1802 were not provided for in the corps organization ; 
 they were generally superior workmen, and since their introduc- 
 tion in 1802 had made much of the materiel, such as carriages, 
 caissons, <&c. Their loss now deprived the artillery of some of 
 its most useful members, whose duties under the law of 1812 were 
 devolved on the ordnance department. 
 
 It is to be regretted that no authentic information has been ob- 
 tained concerning the reasons which led to the formation of the 
 Corps of Artillery. Before this law was enacted promotion was 
 regimental, and afterwards it followed the general rule, only the 
 Corps was considered a single body. This undeniably tended to 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 43 
 
 unity throughout the system, and thus far the change was for the 
 better ; but this advantage was dearly purchased at the price of a 
 still further dispersion of the arm into twelve instead of, as for- 
 merly, four independent units. Though the law contemplated 
 the consolidation of many organizations and the mustering out of 
 supernumerary officers, more of the latter were provided for in the 
 Corps than in the three old artillery regiments. This increase 
 was, however, in the lower and at the expense of the upper grades. 
 Macomb and Scott had recently been promoted. Burbeck was a 
 brevet brigadier, assigned to duty as such. At the date of the 
 passage of the act of March 3Oth, 1814, there was not a colonel 
 serving with these three regiments. The fact might have been 
 used as an argument for abolishing the grade ; but, if so, it was 
 illusory, illogical, and struck a fatal blow at soldierly ambition. 
 Because, forsooth, colonels of artillery proved themselves worthy 
 of promotion, the vacancies thus created were not to be filled! 
 The men upon whose conduct they had to a great extent built up 
 their fame were not worthy to succeed them ! If this is to be 
 their reward, what incentive to honorable action can subordinates 
 have ? 
 
 But whatever may have been the motives which actuated the 
 legislature, the practical effect of the reorganization upon the ar- 
 tillery was prejudicial to its interests. Denominated a Corps, it 
 was such in no sense indicating unity either in mind or body. It 
 had no head. It was only small, separate fragments thrown to- 
 gether. The many distinguished subordinate officers of artillery 
 who had won brevets on brevets in battle were now given to un- 
 derstand they need expect no more substantial rewards. The 
 battalions of the so-called "Corps" were composed of four com- 
 panies each, half commanded by lieutenant-colonels and half by 
 majors an incongruity at variance with the simplest rules ol 
 correct military organization. The radical defect, however, lay 
 in the fact that no officer commanded the different parts of the 
 Corps. 
 
 By Colonel Izard's scheme for the reorganization of the ar- 
 tillery, it was proposed to replace the regiment by a battalion, 
 to unite the engineers with the artillery, and to impose on 
 the new corps all the duties devolving by law upon the artil- 
 lery, the engineer corps, and the ordnance department. This 
 was in substance what Du Portail and Hamilton had advocated in 
 
44 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 1783. Izard favored an artillery corps composed of battalions ; 
 the act of March 3Oth, 1814, provided such a Corps. So far as 
 names words were concerned, the act supplied what Izard had 
 advocated ; but here similarity ceased. Words are not things. 
 The organization actually given was but a soulless form, devoid 
 of life, or that which could impart animation to the system. 
 
 Brevet Brigadier-General Burbeck ceased now to be colonel of 
 artillery, but he continued in service until the reduction and dis- 
 banding of the army the following year, when, after having served 
 almost continuously for forty years, he was relegated to civil life. 
 
 The act of reorganization, March 3Oth, 1814, increased by one 
 the number of lieutenant-colonels in the artillery, to which orig- 
 inal vacancy Major MacRea, of the First Regiment, was ap- 
 pointed ; and as there existed a vacancy in the grade of major 
 in one of the regiments, but one other field officer besides Bur- 
 beck was retired from the service. This was Major A. Y. Nicoll, 
 late adjutant and inspector-general of the army, who resigned June 
 ist, 1814. 
 
 The act fixing the military establishment, approved March 3d, 
 1815, authorized the President to determine what proportion of 
 the ten thousand men forming the peace army should be artillery, 
 infantry, and riflemen. Regarding the former, the law provided that 
 the Corps should retain its existing organization, and that the light 
 artillery should be maintained as organized in 1808, thus muster- 
 ing out of the latter the second major, the third lieutenant and 
 fifth sergeant for each company, the drivers, saddlers, and far- 
 riers. (Appendix A [30].) 
 
 There were mustered to form the Corps of Artillery the old corps, 
 the regiment of dragoons, the 4ist, 42d, and 43d regiments of in- 
 fantry. Seven of the eight field officers retained were from the 
 old corps ; the eighth and junior was Major W. H. Overton, of the 
 3d rifles, who resigned a few months later, and was succeeded by 
 Major James Bankhead, late of the yth infantry. 
 
 To form the new light artillery there were mustered the existing 
 regiment, the i5th, 26th, 3oth, 3ist, 33d, 34th, and 45th regiments 
 of infantry. All the field officers of the old light artillery regi- 
 ment and four of the ten captains were retained. Among those 
 transferred to the light artillery at this time was Captain Nathan 
 Towson, of the Corps of Artillery, afterwards paymaster-general, 
 whose good fortune it had been to be present with his company 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 45 
 
 in almost every affair of importance on the northern frontier during 
 the years 1812-' 14. 
 
 By the War Department order which reduced and reorganized 
 the army, (iyth May, 1815,) the territory of the United States 
 was divided into nine military departments, five of which made up 
 the northern and four the southern division. The dividing line be- 
 tween the divisions may be roughly stated to have been the parallel 
 of Washington city. In assigning the artillery, the light regi- 
 ment, with four battalions of the Corps, were apportioned to 
 the northern ; the, other four battalions to the -southern division. 
 The battalions were officially known as the first, second, third, 
 and fourth of the divisions to which they belonged. In each di- 
 vision the companies of the battalions were designated by the let- 
 ters of the alphabet from A to Q, both inclusive, excluding the 
 letter). (Appendix A [32].) To point out a particular company 
 it was necessary to specify, for instance, ' ' Company (Q) Fourth 
 Battalion, southern division," and they are so designated in the 
 official records. If Company (Q) of the southern were ordered 
 into the northern division, a company must leave the latter to 
 take its place ; whereupon these two changed their official desig- 
 nations, which were, consequently, never permanent. This at- 
 tempt to maintain an artillery equipoise in the two great military 
 divisions was as inconvenient as the organization of the Corps 
 itself was impotent. The awkwardness of the arrangement was 
 clearly demonstrated before the reorganization of March 2d, 1821, 
 when the army was reduced from ten thousand to six thousand 
 men, and the Corps of Artillery put an end to. 
 
 By act of April 2Oth, 1818, slight changes were made in the 
 personnel by giving each company of the Corps one captain, two 
 first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, and to each company of 
 light artillery one captain, one first and two second lieutenants ; 
 while to each battalion of the Corps and to the light regiment 
 there was allowed one armorer. It was further provided that in 
 each artillery company one of the second lieutenants should be 
 conductor, for which $10 per month extra pay was allowed. 
 The act affected the commissioned officers to the extent that in 
 the Corps of Artillery each company was given another first lieu- 
 tenant and its third promoted to second lieutenant ; while in the 
 light artillery an additional second lieutenant was given each 
 company. 
 
46 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 The ist, 2cl, 3d, and 4th regiments of artillery of the present 
 regular army date from the act of March 2d, 1821. Although 
 the number of companies in each regiment has been increased, 
 and other modifications have been introduced as circumstances 
 have made them proper, the organization then given these regi- 
 ments has remained essentially unchanged. (Organization, Ap- 
 pendix A [31].) In Appendix A [32] will be found a state- 
 ment showing which companies of the Corps and of the regiment 
 of light artillery were retained, and their designations, in the new 
 regiments. Under the terms of the reorganizing act the light 
 artillery regiment ceased to exist ; but provision was made for this 
 species of troops by a mandatory clause in the law directing that 
 one of the nine companies in each regiment should be designated 
 and equipped as light artillery. (See Field Artillery.) 
 
 The field officers of the artillery regiments retained were : Moses 
 Porter, Nathan Towson, Walker K. Armistead, John R. Fen- 
 wick, colonels ; George Bomford, James House, G. E. Mitchell, 
 William MacRea, lieutenant-colonels ; John B. Walbach, J. Hind- 
 man, James Bankhead, Abraham Eustis, majors. Of these, 
 Armistead was transferred from the head of the engineer corps ; 
 Bomford from the ordnance department ; while Towson was taken 
 from the head of a civil department, the pay corps. When the 
 name of the latter officer came before the Senate, that body re- 
 fused to give its consent to the appointment. Then commenced 
 a struggle between the Executive and the Senate which it is 
 believed is without a parallel in the history of the Government. 
 Three successive administrations became involved in the contro- 
 versy, and finally, after eleven years, during which time the 
 Second Artillery remained without a colonel, the matter was set- 
 tled by a compromise. * 
 
 * The President maintained in the 1821 reduction that he had a perfect light 
 to make the new corps of the army out of the old, in any manner he saw lit. 
 That no officers could claim legal exemption from being deranged, nor could 
 any have legal claim to being retained. The selection of officers for the new 
 army, from those belonging to the former, was a matter entirely at the discre- 
 tion of the President. 
 
 From these broad propositions, all and singular, t'he Senate dissented. Many 
 interesting points were raised. in the ensuing discussions that must be consid- 
 ered as corollaries to the main proposition stated above. 
 
 The President maintained that the pay department was one of the " corps " of 
 the army ; the Senate denied it and rejected the nomination of the paymaster-gen- 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 47 
 
 The law of April 5th, 1832, introduced into the army a class of 
 under officers (ordnance sergeants) who, while belonging- neither 
 to the ordnance department nor to the artillery, are intimately 
 connected with both. During the Revolutionary war the office 
 of conductor of artillery was one of the subordinate positions 
 assigned to artillery officers. It disappeared with that war, and 
 was revived again by section 17 of the act of March 28th, 1812, 
 which directed the President to appoint four conductors, to be 
 entitled to the pay and emoluments of a lieutenant of artillery. 
 As has been noticed, the acts of March 3Oth, 1814, and April 2Oth, 
 1818, had imposed the duties of conductor on one of the two sec- 
 ond lieutenants given each artillery company, and for the perform- 
 ance of which $10 per month extra pay was allowed. These duties 
 had been to receive, account for, issue, and keep in repair the 
 artillery and other material of the company, garrison, brigade, or 
 other organization to which the conductor was attached. It was 
 a position in war of great property responsibility, and, though 
 sometimes intrusted to warrant officers and at others to those 
 holding commissions, it had been the practice to allow additional 
 compensation to the incumbent. The reorganizing and reducing 
 act of March 2d, 1821, neither made mention of nor provision for 
 
 end for the colonelcy of one of the regiments. The President held that no particu- 
 lar officers were entitled to the colonelcies of the eleven new regiments. The Sen- 
 atc held that, by directing the Executive to arrange the officers of the old army 
 to the new, he was bound to put the eleven old colonels in these new places. 
 Therefore, according to the Senate's views, the colonels dropped out were still 
 legally in service. 
 
 The President mentioned that he was prepared to take the ground that Con- 
 gress could not, constitutionally, limit by law his choice of individuals to fill 
 original vacancies from the whole body of his fellow citizens. The Senate re- 
 marked, incidentally, that they were prepared to combat that proposition ; 
 basing their argument on the clause of the constitution giving Congress power 
 to prescribe rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval 
 forces. 
 
 The Senate held that the offices that Towson and Gadsden were nominated 
 for were created during a session of the Senate, and therefore the President had 
 no right to fill them during a recess of that body. Here again the President 
 was at issue with them. 
 
 The House also became involved in the controversy. So far as the views of 
 thai body ran be gathered, they at that time sustained the Senate in all points 
 upon which they (the House) expressed an opinion. 
 
 The Senate and House maintained that, in the new army, officers should be 
 
48 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 conductors of artillery, and their duties devolved upon command- 
 ing officers, who thus, instead of being able, if so disposed, to 
 devote their time and attention to other and relatively more im- 
 portant matters, were compelled to give a large part of it to petty 
 details connected with the keeping in order of ordnance and other 
 property. It was with the double object of relieving commanding 
 officers of the duties of receiving and preserving ' ' the ordnance, 
 arms, ammunition, and other military stores," and transferring 
 them to meritorious non-commissioned officers of long service, 
 with an increase of pay and a permanency of station, that the 
 grade of ordnance sergeant was created. 
 
 The Seminole war having drawn all the troops into the field 
 and strained to the utmost the resources at his command, the 
 Secretary of War, in his report of 1837, recommended, among 
 other measures looking to the perfection of the military system, 
 the increase of the number of companies in each regiment of artil- 
 lery. This was done by act of July 5th, 1838. One company 
 was added to each regiment, and the number of privates in each 
 
 kept, when possible, in same corps as before the reduction ; and rejected Gads- 
 den for adjutant-general on that ground, he having formerly been an inspector. 
 
 The House became interested in this controversy from the fact that, through 
 a transfer of Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay back to the artillery from the infantry, 
 Major Eustis was kept out of his lieutenant-colonelcy. Major Eustis had an 
 uncle, the Hon. William Eustis, formerly Secretary of War, who was chairman 
 of the House Military Committee, and who was looking after the major's in- 
 terests. 
 
 The Senate having rejected the paymaster-general's nomination for colonel 
 of the 2d artillery, the regiment was without a colonel. Of the four colonels 
 discharged, viz., Wads worth, Smith, King, and Bissell, the first and third died 
 soon afterwards. Smith was appointed a U. S. judge, leaving Bissell alone to 
 be provided for. The President maintained he was out of service ; the Senate 
 that he was in service ; he took the latter view, and reported regularly to the 
 War Department, but was not assigned to duty. When Mr. J. Q. Adams be- 
 came President, Bissell reported for duty as usual. He was not assigned, but 
 Mr. Adams nominated him as from citizen life for the colonelcy that the Senate 
 had contended all along of right belonged to him. The Senate did not act 
 directly on the nomination, but expressed the opinion that Bissell was entitled 
 to the place, and, as he had never been out of service, the President might ar- 
 range him to the 2d artillery. To this proposition Mr. Adams would not agree. 
 He renominated Bissell, but nothing came of it. In his annual message, De- 
 cember, 1826, he recommended such legislation as the case might require, as 
 there was no hope of the President and Senate agreeing. A bill was reported 
 by the Senate Military Committee looking to the legislating of Bissell into office, 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 4$ 
 
 company was increased from forty-two to fifty-eight. At the 
 same time the number of second lieutenants allowed each artillery 
 company was reduced from two to one, but the filling original 
 vacancies created by the new companies, together with the en- 
 largement of several staff corps, obviated the necessity for muster- 
 ing any officer out of service. (Appendix A [31].) 
 
 The vacancies in the grade of captain created in the four regi- 
 ments were filled by appointing in each, except the First, the 
 ranking first lieutenant. For particular reasons, that officer in 
 the First Artillery stood still and was overslaughed. This was 
 the first instance in the history of the artillery that offices newly 
 created (original vacancies) in that arm had been filled, prefer- 
 ably, by selections made from those already in service. The 
 practice in the early years of the Government was the reverse. 
 When the corps of artillerists and engineers was raised in 1794, 
 the regiment of the same arm in 1798, the 2d and 3d regiments 
 of 1812, officers of the army received very few of the appointments 
 thus made available to them ; they were, with rare exceptions, 
 
 but it failed to become law. The House Military Committee also reported a 
 bill looking to the same end, but its fate was like the other. In presenting this 
 bill the House Military Committee was called on to express an opinion on the 
 construction of the reducing act of 1821. They sustained the Senate so far as 
 Towson was concerned, but maintained, with the late President, that the old 
 colonels had no legal right to the new colonelcies ; in which view they were 
 opposed by the Senate. The House Military Committee, therefore, in 1827, 
 concurred in President Monroe's view expressed in 1822, that the only limita- 
 tion placed on him was that he should take the officers of the new army from 
 those of the existing army ; but they disagreed from his views as to who were 
 officers of the army before the reduction. The House Committee intimated 
 very strongly, but did not say, that in their opinion Bissell was entitled to the 
 colonelcy. 
 
 President Jackson suggested that an explanatory act be passed, designating 
 the class of officers from which the colonelcy of the 2d regiment of artillery 
 should be filled. This called forth a report from the House Military Committee, 
 January 18th, 1830. In this it was held that Bissell was not entitled to it, but 
 the vacancy belonged to the ranking lieutenant-colonel of artillery, Lindsay. 
 The Senate Military Committee was now under the leadership of Mr. Benton. 
 It can readily be surmised that it would not assent to these views of the House 
 Committee. The bill did not become a law. But the same end was attained, 
 as the ranking lieutenant-colonel was promoted in accordance with this idea, 
 April 26th, 1832 ; and thus, after being eleven years without one, the 2d regi- 
 ment of artillery was given a colonel. ^ (See Niles' Register, vol. 22, p. 400, et seq. 
 Mil. Affairs, vol. 2, p. 395; Vol. 3, Ibid., pp. 259, 290; Vol. 4, Ibid., p. 248.) 
 
 7 
 
50 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 conferred upon civilians. The experience of the war of 1812 had 
 demonstrated the superiority, as a rule, of officers versed in their 
 profession over those newly selected from civil life. One of the 
 results has been, and the general augmentation of 1838 initiated 
 the system, that since then, in the matter of new appointments, 
 those already in the army have received consideration in some 
 degree commensurate with their professional services and attain- 
 ments.* 
 
 There was begun a movement this year which, in its effects on 
 the artillery, has been, to a degree, unsurpassed by any measure 
 of reform, permanent and salutary. Reference is made to the 
 mounting, as horse artillery, in the fall of 1838, of Captain Ring- 
 gold's company C, of the 3d regiment. Followed the succeeding 
 year by the equipping one company in each of the other regiments 
 as field artillery, it resulted, as did many other improvements of 
 that arm, from the intelligent, earnest efforts of the gentleman at 
 the head of the War Department. Of the many measures set on 
 foot for building up the department over which he presided with 
 singular, conspicuous, and universally acknowledged ability, none 
 contributed more to that end, or to the glory of his country's 
 arms in the field, than did the re-establishment, as contemplated 
 in the act of March 2d, 1821, of this arm of service. The subject 
 will be treated of elsewhere ; for the present it suffices to remark 
 that the field batteries of the regular army, with their honorable 
 records, owe their existence to the military sagacity of Secretary 
 Joel R. Poinsett. 
 
 The Mexican war brought an augmentation and a slight change 
 of organization to the artillery. In his annual report, December 
 5th, 1846, Secretary Marcy pointed out that the efficiency of the 
 regular troops in the field was greatly impaired by the absence of 
 the field officers. This, he stated, was in great degree due to their 
 
 *"To the House of Representatives of the United States, whose votef of the 
 10th of April, 1846, in the Twenty-ninth Congress, gives hope of a recognition 
 of military service as a necessary qualification for command, this work, of four 
 years' labor, is humbly inscribed, by C. K. Gardner." (Dictionary of the Army 
 of the United States.) 
 
 f The vote was for this : 
 
 " Provided, That all the officers of the aforesaid regiment of riflemen shall be 
 selected from the regular line of the United States army." (Intending to em- 
 brace, for the selection, the Avhole annyjthen in service. Being defective, the 
 proviso was stricken out by the Senate.) 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 51 
 
 physical incapacity. As there was no retired list on which they 
 could be placed, the Secretary urged, as a means of infusing 
 younger blood into the system, the appointment in the artillery of 
 an additional major for each regiment. An increase also in the 
 number of artillery troops seemed to be a proper measure from 
 the fact that the old organizations were absent at the seat of war, 
 leaving public property inadequately guarded and the forts on the 
 maritime frontiers almost without garrisons. Ships of the most 
 insignificant nation can insult with impunity the strongest coast 
 devoid of defenders. These considerations moved Congress to 
 augment the artillery and to add slightly to the staff; to make the 
 whole more complete, by acts of February nth and March 3d, 
 1847. Two additional companies, a major, quartermaster, two 
 principal musicians, and a principal teamster, were given each 
 regiment ; two teamsters to each company ; while the President 
 was authorized to designate four additional companies to be equip- 
 ped as light artillery. For the first time since '1821 the officers 
 and men of the light artillery, when serving as such, were given 
 dragoon pay and allowances. This resulted from the brilliant 
 actions of the field companies on the battle-fields of the Rio 
 Grande valley, where they astonished the army and the country 
 by their manoeuvres, efficiency, and power. (Appendix A [33].) 
 
 The artillery was given the benefit of the original vacancies 
 created by the acts cited, in filling which, as well as in the result- 
 ing promotions flowing therefrom, due regard was paid to the 
 actual rank of officers concerned, who were advanced to newly- 
 created offices upon the principle of regular promotion established 
 by law for all branches of the army. 
 
 From the Mexican war until the breaking out of the Civil war 
 in 1 86 1, the artillery retained its organization unchanged, al- 
 though attempts to modify it in various ways were made during 
 that time. Mr. Shields, chairman of the Senate Military Com- 
 mittee, made a report, March 23d, 1852, advocating the appoint- 
 ment of a head to the artillery, and accompanied by a bill to 
 secure this desired amelioration. (Appendix B [2].) During 
 the session of 1854-' 55 a bill favored by Secretary Davis was in- 
 troduced, which provided for reducing the arm to two regiments, 
 to be thereafter equipped and trained strictly as artillery proper. 
 At the same time it was proposed to cut off all below the grade 
 of field officer in the ordnance, and detail the captains and sub- 
 
52 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 alterns of that department from the line of the army. In the 
 latter particular the measure was similar to that proposed in 1878 
 by the congressional committee on army organization. These 
 measures received the approval of many of the first officers, in 
 point of intelligence, in the army. 
 
 It was expected that officers for service in the ordnance 
 would be drawn from the artillery ; they would ultimately be- 
 come the field officers of that department; these two branches of 
 service would thereby be drawn more closely together, and, while 
 one would not interfere with the other, the interests of both and 
 of the service in general would be enhanced. As to the effect on 
 the artillery, one of the advocates of the measure an ordnance 
 officer* second to none for faithful, intelligent, and successful 
 labors for the improvement of artillery materiel remarked that, 
 ' f Being thus reduced to the part of the military force of the na- 
 tion that can be spared from the Indian frontiers, it will be restricted 
 to duty appropriate to artillery, either with field, garrison, siege 
 or sea-coast guns a service requiring much greater and much 
 more difficult instruction than that of foot troops" 
 
 None of these attempts had the effect to change the status of 
 the arm. The general-in-chief strenuously opposed the reduction 
 contemplated in the last-named measure, and carried the point 
 with Congress. What could not be effected by legislation, viz., 
 placing the artillery in a more advantageous position profession- 
 ally, was next sought through the re-establishment of the artillery 
 School of Practice at Fort Monroe, the organization of field artil- 
 lery schools, and providing a systematic course of instruction for 
 artillery troops at permanent fortifications. (See Instruction.) 
 
 The scattered condition of the regular army in 1861 rendered 
 it impracticable for the Government at the beginning of the Civil 
 war to avail itself of the services of the troops in that prompt man- 
 ner which the emergency demanded. This, so far as the artillery 
 was concerned, resulted, at least ostensibly, from the attempt to 
 carry out an elaborate scheme of instruction for that arm. To 
 meet the necessities of the case the President, by proclamation of 
 May 3d, that year, increased the regular establishment by one 
 regiment of artillery, one of cavalry, and eight three-battalion 
 regiments of infantry. The Constitution provides that ' ' Congress 
 
 Major Mordecai. 
 
ORGANIZATION GENERALLY. 53 
 
 shall have power to raise and support armies;" but this was an 
 instance where delay was not to be tolerated, and the Executive, 
 conceiving that it was always constitutional to save the Govern- 
 ment from overthrow, raised these troops on his own responsibility. 
 The day following the President's proclamation a general order - 
 was issued, fixing the organization and pay of the additional reg- 
 iments. On June i8th (G. O. 33, A. G. O., 1861) a roster of 
 the commissioned officers was promulgated. In the artillery, the 
 higher positions in the original vacancies thus created were filled 
 by selections from the old artillery regiments. The colonel was 
 taken from the line of majors; the lieutenant-colonel and majors 
 from the captains. In every instance they overslaughed sev- 
 eral in their own arm of service. The commissions of all were 
 dated May I4th, 1861. Nearly three months after this addition 
 to the regular army had been organized, .the act of July 29th, 
 1 86 1, was passed, giving legislative sanction to the increase. As 
 was the case with the two companies added to each regiment of 
 artillery by the act of March 3d, 1847, it was stipulated that the 
 additional troops should serve only during the existing war; but 
 when the rebellion w r as put down circumstances had changed, 
 and the Fifth Artillery became a part, as it has remained, of the 
 permanent military establishment. (Appendix A [34].) It fol- 
 lowed that during the Civil war the artillery regiments had differ- 
 ent organizations. This was changed by act of July 28th, 1866, 
 which, except as to the commissioned staff, (made uniform for 
 all, ) placed the four old regiments on the same footing with the 
 Fifth. This, with some slight changes in the non-commissioned 
 staff, affecting all regiments alike, is the status of the artillery at 
 the present .day. (Appendix A [35].) 
 
54 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1 82 1. 
 
 The part of section 2 of the act of March 2cl, 1821, which direct- 
 ed that one company of each artillery regiment should be desig- 
 nated and equipped as light artillery,* remained for seventeen 
 years practically inoperative. Aside from announcing the com- 
 panies, a matter of form merely, and giving their uniform some 
 slightly distinctive feature, nothing was done during that time to 
 carry the law into effect. 
 
 Mention has been made incidentally of the equipping by Mr. 
 Poinsett of the light 'companies in 1838-' 39. When finally the 
 time came to execute the law in earnest, no attention was paid to 
 the previously existing light artillery designations, which had 
 been made on the authority of regimental commanders ; com- 
 panies were selected regardless of either service or associations, 
 and more particularly with a view to obtaining efficient captains. 
 
 The first to be mounted, (C) of the Third Artillery, retained 
 its light battery organization until 1849, and, except during one 
 interval of eighteen months, has been equipped as a field battery 
 since then. The captain of (C) company at that time was Brevet 
 
 * Light artillery is horse artillery, but the practice in our service has been so 
 opposed to the correct military usage of the former term that with us it signifies 
 both horse artillery, i. e., wherein each man serves on horseback, and mounted 
 artillery, in which the cannoneers mount on the carriages for rajiid movements 
 only. The person to initiate this was Mr. Poinsett, who, as mentioned in the 
 text, in 1838 and 1839 fitted out one company as horse and three as mounted 
 artillery, when he essayed to execute the law of 1821, directing that, in each 
 regiment, one company should be "designated and equipped as light artillery." 
 
 Economical considerations caused indirectly that to be called light artillery 
 which was not such in fact, and the confusion has continued since. The term 
 "light" is now made to do duty for "field" artillery. At the present time 
 there are, under the authority of the law allowing ten light batteries, that num- 
 ber of mounted (field) batteries in service. Correctly speaking, there is not in 
 our army to-day a single battery equipped as light artillery. 
 
 The difficulty has not been in the law, where proper terms have always been 
 used ; it has arisen from the erroneous practice under the law. 
 
 The Artillery Tactics have until quite recently made correct use of military 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1821. 55 
 
 Major Samuel Ringgold. It was engaged in the Florida (Semi- 
 nole) war, whence its commander had returned north on sick 
 leave. The intention of the Secretary of War to give vitality to 
 the almost obsolete law was conveyed officially to Major Ringgold ' 
 in the following communication : 
 
 "ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 "WASHINGTON, September 18th, 1838. 
 
 "Sm: Having been selected by the Secretary of War to organize, equip, and 
 command the first company of light artillery authorized by act of 1821, you will 
 repair to Carlisle barracks and lose no time in proceeding to execute the views 
 of the department. The number of horses necessary for the purpose being now 
 in depot, will require your immediate attention. As the convenience of the 
 general service will not, at this time, justify the ordering of your company to 
 Carlisle, you will see by my requisitions on the colonels of the First and Second 
 regiments of artillery of this date the measures which are, for the present, to be 
 adopted for the formation of the proposed company. The ordnance, equip- 
 ments, and all other supplies will be furnished in due time by the proper depart- 
 ments. You will forward to this office your requisitions for the approval of 
 the Secretary of War." 
 
 The horses referred to in this letter were those used by the 
 Government in removing Indians from their lands east of the 
 Mississippi River to the Cherokee country. Upon these horses, 
 now no longer needed, the Secretary relied for a proper mount, 
 and they alone were used for this purpose. Mr. Poinsett was not 
 one to be deterred by lack of means ; having- the will, he found 
 the way to the building up of this important but neglected branch 
 of the artillery service. 
 
 The following is the letter to the colonels of the First and 
 Second artillery regiments, referred to in Major Ringgold' s in- 
 structions : 
 
 "The Secretary of War being desirous to equip one company to act as light 
 artillery with as little delay as practicable, deems it most expedient, for the 
 present, to organize the proposed company as a detachment to be formed by 
 
 terms. In the assimilated edition, now in use, the term "light artillery" has, 
 however, been introduced with the erroneous signification above indicated. 
 
 During the Civil war many regular batteries were equipped as horse artillery, 
 as was Ringgold's, (C) of the Third, from 1838 to 1849. So far as the author is 
 aware, no other regular batteries have in time of peace been so equipped since 
 1821. 
 
 In the text, the term "light artillery" is used with its customary significa- 
 tion ; the work of reform in the use of technical language in our army is too 
 onerous to be undertaken here. 
 
56 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 detail or selection from the First and Second regiments of artillery. Accord- 
 ingly he desires that you select three good men, such as you may suppose best 
 calculated for the object in view, from each of the companies of your regiment, 
 which, on being mustered and inspected as a detachment, you will order to 
 Carlisle barracks with as little delay as practicable. You will also please to 
 assign two sergeants and two corporals to the detachment, who will be reported 
 on the same service." 
 
 A first lieutenant was ordered from the First and a second 
 lieutenant from the Second Artillery to act as subalterns in the 
 new company for the time being. Lieutenants Aisquith and 
 Barry were selected for this duty. The latter here laid the founda- 
 tion for that knowledge of light artillery service which, twenty- 
 three years afterwards, he turned to good account as chief of artil- 
 lery when the Army of the Potomac was being organized in 1861. 
 
 November 5th, 1838, by orders from the War Department, 
 the men thus detached were formed into a new (C) company, 
 Third Artillery ; Ringgold' s old company in Florida was broken 
 up, the subalterns ordered to join the light company, and the 
 detached lieutenants just mentioned of the First and Second 
 ordered to join their regiments. Lieutenant Barry was, however, 
 at his own request, allow r ed temporarily to remain ; and at Major 
 Ring-gold's request, the books of his old company, with one ser- 
 geant and one private soldier of his own selection therefrom, were 
 sent to his new command. 
 
 How the light artillery should be mounted whether the can- 
 noneers should ride on the limbers and caissons, or each man on 
 horseback as light artillery proper was a question yet to be set- 
 tled. There was at the time sitting in Washington city a board 
 composed of Fenwick and Ewing of the artillery, Talcott, Baker, 
 and Mordecai of the ordnance, and which had been assembled to 
 fix upon a system of artillery for field service, as well as to deter- 
 mine other questions of a proper artillery materiel. (See Materiel.) 
 The question of light artillery equipment was a peculiarly appro- 
 priate one to be decided by the board, to which it was referred 
 by the following letter : 
 
 "ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 "WASHINGTON, October 24th, 1838. 
 "Brevet Brigadier- General JOHN R. FENWICK, Fourth Artillery, 
 
 u President of Board of Ordnance, Washington. 
 
 u GENERAL : I am desired by the Secretary of War to inform you that he wishes 
 the board to communicate its views as to the preferable mode of mounting the 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1821. 57 
 
 company of light artillery now being organized at Carlisle ; that is, whether it 
 be preferable that every man be mounted, as is usual in what is generally known 
 as horse artillery, or that as great a number be accommodated on the guns and 
 caissons, as is generally practiced in the equipment of field artillery. The 
 Secretary himself would prefer the latter mode, inasmuch as the expenses of 
 the outfit would be less, and he being desirous in making his estimates for tin-; 
 branch of service, in fulfillment of the provisions of the act of 1821, not to swell 
 the amount beyond what may be absolutely indispensable. The opinion of the 
 Secretary as to this point is not communicated with any view to control that 
 of the board, but only to show the expediency of the lesser expenditure, in 
 order to insure the chances of better success in obtaining the necessary appro- 
 priation by Congress." 
 
 The gentlemen addressed seem to have had little difficulty in 
 determining the point, and adversely to the predilection of the 
 Secretary, as the next day an answer, signed by the president of 
 the board, was transmitted to the adjutant-general, as follows : 
 
 "Sin: In reply to your letter relative to the preferable mode to mount the 
 light artillery company at Carlisle, I have to state that the views of the ord- 
 nance board relative to light artillery are that it should be organized as horse 
 artillery, and consequently that the men should not be carried on the guns and 
 caissons, but that each man should be mounted separately, as is usual in the 
 service of that arm; otherwise the exercise and manoeuvres of the company 
 must be conducted as for foot artillery, instead of light horse artillery." 
 
 Notwithstanding the prompt action of the board, the question 
 was not finally decided for a month afterwards. The matter of 
 relative expense was one of grave moment, as the Secretary well 
 understood, and as subsequent experience has fully demonstrated. 
 October 25th, 1838, the adjutant-general wrote Major Ringgold : 
 
 " SIR : I am instructed to inform you that your company will be mounted as 
 horse artillery, and consequently the men should not be carried on the guns 
 and carriages, but that each man be mounted separately, as is usual in the 
 field service of that arm." 
 
 The company was equipped as directed, and continued to serve 
 as horse artillery until dismounted at Santa Fe, New Mexico, 
 whither it had been marched after the Mexican war. 
 
 Particular attention is here given to the mounting of Ringgold' s 
 company for the reason that doubts are sometimes expressed as 
 to its having been horse artillery. The letters quoted will dis- 
 pel those doubts, which have arisen perhaps from the fact that 
 the light artillery companies of the other three regiments, equip- 
 ped the following year, were organized into what was technically 
 
58 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 known as mounted artillery, i. e., the cannoneers habitually walk- 
 ed, and mounted the limbers and caissons for rapid movements 
 only. 
 
 It seemed a peculiarly appropriate circumstance that General 
 Fenwick should be the officer to announce the decision as to what 
 should be the equipment of the rehabilitated arm; for, although 
 he was not the first to organize a company of that description in 
 the United States army, he was the first to lead one into the pres- 
 ence of the enemy. This was in September and October, 1812, 
 when, as lieutenant-colonel of the light artillery regiment, he 
 marched a section of Captain Gibson's company, fully equipped 
 as horse artillery, together with a train of heavier ordnance, to 
 the relief of General Van Rensselaer, just before the battle of 
 Queenstown Heights. 
 
 Having embarked in the scheme of restoring the light artillery 
 to the service, Mr. Poinsett followed it up with his usual vigor. 
 In his report of December, 1838, he pointedly called the attention 
 of Congress to the importance of the measure, remarking: " We 
 are without light artillery entirely, and have yet to learn its man- 
 agement. There is not at present a complete train of artillery for 
 a single one of the four regiments in service. I beg leave to sug- 
 gest the necessity of an appropriation for the purpose of furnish- 
 ing the number of pieces required to arm the existing regiments 
 properly, as well as to furnish batteries for two battalions of light 
 artillery." 
 
 The opportunity to still further put into execution his views on 
 this subject was given the succeeding year, when, following up his 
 efforts to improve the condition of the troops, not of one but of 
 all branches of service, sadly impaired during a protracted war in 
 the pestilential swamps of Florida, Mr. Poinsett, by General 
 Orders No. 28, Adjutant-General's Office, May 2Oth, 1839, estab- 
 lished a camp of instruction for the practice and discipline of 
 detachments from all the fighting arms. The order was as 
 follows: 
 
 " With a view to the better instruction of the troops and improvement of the 
 discipline of the army, such portions of the regiments of dragoons, artillery, 
 and infantry as may be withdrawn from their stations without detriment to 
 other interests of the service, will be concentrated during the summer months 
 at some convenient point best calculated for a camp of instruction. 
 
 " The arduous and desultory service in which the troops have been so long 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1 82 1. 59 
 
 engaged, the unavoidable dismemberment of the regiments, and separation of 
 so many officers from duty in the line while employed on other service, could 
 hardly fail greatly to impair the esprit de corpt of the army, as well as its dis- 
 cipline and efficiency. These must be restored, and every proper effort speedily 
 made to place the service on a foundation which will insure its steady and 
 uniform advancement. 
 
 " The occasional concentration of companies of the same regiment, and the 
 bringing together troops of different arms where all the duties of the officer 
 and soldier of the several corps of the army may be strictly and systematically 
 performed, from the school of the company to the evolutions of the line, are 
 necessary steps to be taken to effect this desirable amelioration. 
 
 " .Major-General Scott is charged with the formation and direction of the pro- 
 posed camp of instruction, the immediate command of which will be assigned 
 to such officer as he may designate. In choosing a position for the camp, 
 regard Avill be had to health, cheapness, and facility of transportation, both of 
 troops and supplies. 
 
 " The rules and regulations and established systems for each arm of service 
 will be punctually observed and strictly practiced, and no other than the pre- 
 scribed military dress will be worn. 
 
 "All necessary supplies and transportation will be promptly furnished by the 
 respective departments of the staff, and two officers of each brach of that ser- 
 vice will be ordered without delay to report to Major-General Scott for duty at 
 the camp of instruction." 
 
 The camp, named ''Camp Washington," was established near 
 Trenton, New Jersey, and Brevet Brigadier- General Abraham 
 Eustis, major of the light artillery regiment of 1808, and at this 
 time colonel of the First Artillery, was appointed commandant. 
 To this camp Ringgold marched his company of horse artillery, 
 fitted out with an entirely new armament, prepared by the ord- 
 nance department. Here were found also (K) of the First 
 Artillery, a new company, added to the regiment by act of July 
 5th, 1838; (A) of the Second, and (B) of the Fourth Artillery, 
 all destined to become the field companies of their respective 
 regiments. (A) received its battery at the camp of instruction; 
 (K) at Plattsburg, New York, immediately after the camp was 
 discontinued; while the order dated September 27th, 1839, Head- 
 quarters Eastern Division, breaking up the camp, directed the 
 dragoon- horses to be turned over to (B), Fourth Artillery, which 
 was then equipped as a field company. 
 
 Simultaneously with the equipping of the last three companies, 
 there appeared a tactics adapted to the service of this species of 
 troops. This was the ' ' Instruction for Field Artillery, Horse 
 and Foot," translated from the French and arranged for the service 
 
60 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 of the United States, by First Lieutenant Robert Anderson, Third 
 Artillery. This work, the appearance of which was most oppor- 
 tune, was, by orders from the War Department, April 2oth, 1840, 
 adopted as the authorized field artillery tactics, except that por- 
 tion relating to horse artillery, which it was directed was not to 
 be put in practice until further orders a suspension which was 
 terminated by General Order No. 46, Adjutant- General's Office, 
 August i gth, 1841. From this date until 1845 Anderson's trans- 
 lation was the prescribed field artillery tactics for the army. 
 
 The opposition to that part of the tactics relating- to horse artil- 
 lery has been stated by good authority to have been due to the 
 influence of Major Ring-gold. Previous to his company being 
 mounted he had studied the exercises of the British light artillery, 
 upon which he had modeled his own, and his wish was to adhere 
 to their system. The adoption in 1845 of a course of field artil- 
 lery instruction supplanting Anderson's work, in a measure ac- 
 complished his wishes in this respect. (See Tactics.) 
 
 It has been mentioned that, by act of July 5th, 1838, the 
 number of enlisted men in the companies of artillery had been 
 increased to seventy-one. This sufficed to enable the captains 
 of the light companies to man (in a most imperfect way to be 
 sure) six pieces ; but the return of a general peace, after the Sem- 
 inole war, having caused a reduction to be made in each company 
 of one artificer and sixteen privates, the number of pieces in each 
 was restricted by Special Orders No. 96, Adjutant-General's Of- 
 fice, 1842, to four; the other two in each company being stored 
 for use when required. 
 
 To still further reduce expenses, and in total disregard of those 
 considerations for public interests which had but recently led to 
 their proper equipment, the question began to be agitated whether 
 or not it would be expedient to dismount the field companies, 
 either wholly or in part. As had been the case in 1809, the suc- 
 cessor to the Secretary of War, who had attempted to place this 
 branch of the artillery upon an eligible footing* did not appreciate 
 as did that officer the value to the combatant arms of this species 
 of troops. Change of policy followed change of administration in 
 the War Department. Fortunately for the artillery, at this juncture 
 there was a staunch old soldier in the office of adjutant-general 
 who knew something of war and its necessities from experience, 
 and who had the courage to avow and defend his convictions. 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE l82I. 6l 
 
 In a communication addressed to the Secretary of War, Mr. J. 
 M. Porter, and commenting upon the proposition mentioned, he 
 remarked : 
 
 " The arming and equipping of the light companies of artillery with their 
 appropriate arms has been attended with the best results. Considering tke 
 character of our maritime frontier, rendering field and horse artillery pecu- 
 liarly efficient as a means of national defense, and the little knoAvledge of their 
 management possessed in the country even among the educated classes, this 
 powerful arm is, in my opinion, vitally important and ought to be encouraged; 
 and therefore it would be inexpedient to dismount any of the companies now 
 mounted as light artillery." 
 
 On this letter General Scott indorsed the brief but expressive 
 sentence, "I fully concur in the above." 
 
 The companies in question were in the meantime being brought 
 in an unobtrusive manner to a high state of excellence as regards 
 discipline, drill, and generally whatever would enhance their effi- 
 ciency. The selection of their commanders Captains Ringgold 
 of the Third, Taylor of the First, Washington of the Fourth, and 
 Lieutenant Duncan of the Second Regiment had been well calcu- 
 lated to bring about that result. They were men well fitted by 
 nature, taste, and training for the work here given them in hand. 
 The duty was attended by positive pecuniary disadvantages. 
 Although subjected to all expenses attending mounted service, they 
 did not receive mounted pay. This circumstance, which was in 
 effect a discrimination against the field artillery, made the duty 
 undesirable to many officers, captains as well as subalterns. Few 
 men have the virtue, esprit de corps, or whatever it may be called, 
 to sacrifice themselves and their material interests for sentiment's 
 sake and without compensation ; few can afford to do it even if so 
 disposed ; nor does sound policy require it at the hands of public 
 servants. Yet this was demanded of the commanders in question. 
 Undeterred, these officers pursued the even tenor of their ways, 
 faithfully attending to whatever would enhance the professional 
 standing of their companies. The battle-fields of the Mexican 
 war, on which the latter soon after acted so conspicuous a part, 
 bore testimony before the army and the 'country to the thorough 
 manner in which they had been prepared for their as yet untried 
 and arduous duties in the field. 
 
 It is not intended here to do more than mention the field artil- 
 lery companies that did service in Mexico. What that service 
 
62 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 was is a matter of history, written more eloquently than elsewhere 
 in the brief but spirited and business-like official reports of the 
 various commanders under whom they won their way to the first 
 rank in the fighting arms of service. Company (E), Third Regi- 
 ment, Lieutenant Bragg commanding, was, under War Depart- 
 ment instructions, furnished with a battery consisting of two guns 
 and two howitzers in the summer of 1845. It joined General 
 Taylor's army, and immediately after the first battles, in May, 
 1846, was fully equipped as field artillery. Captain T. W. Sher- 
 man; subsequently one of the most distinguished officers of that 
 arm, succeeded to the command of this company, by regular pro- 
 motion, May 28th, 1846. The companies organized by Mr. Pom- 
 sett were also with General Taylor in his advance into the enemy's 
 territory ; Ringgold's equipped as horse artillery ; the others con- 
 tinuing, as they had started in 1839, to be what is now technic- 
 ally known as mounted artillery. Major Ringgold was mortally 
 wounded at Palo Alto, May 8th, 1846, and died three days later. 
 His successor, Morris S. Miller, assistant quartermaster, relin- 
 quished the captaincy June i8th, to be followed by Braxton Bragg, 
 who proved himself to be a worthy successor to the first com- 
 mander of the horse artillery company. 
 
 By the act of May i3th, 1846, the number of privates in com- 
 panies of the regular army was authorized, at the discretion of 
 the President, to be increased to one hundred. This enabled the 
 field artillery companies, if filled, to man six guns each. Of 
 Ringgold's old company, an officer who joined it at Monterey 
 says : 
 
 11 It was then commanded by Bragg*, and Avas in the highest state of efficien- 
 cy, discipline, and drill of any organization, of any arm, that 1 have ever seen. 
 It had six guns, six caissons, two battery wagons, and two forges, each having 
 six horses as teams, and each gun served by a detachment of twelve men 
 mounted, not on the boxes, but on high-mettled and well-trained horses, which 
 followed the guns as they moved at a gallop, and swept over the plain of exer- 
 cise like a whirlwind." 
 
 That its action on the field of battle was as conspicuous as were 
 its manoeuvres on the drill-ground, it gave ample proof, particu- 
 larly at Buena Vista, where its service is best described in the lan- 
 guage of the commanding general : 
 
 "Captain Bragg, who had just arrived from the left, was ordered at once 
 into battery. Without any infantry to support him, and at the imminent risk 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SIXTH IvS2I. 63 
 
 of losing his guns, this officer came rapidly into action, the Mexican lines being 
 but a few yards from the muzzles of his pieces. The first discharge of cannis- 
 ter caused the enemy to hesitate; the second and third drove him back in dis- 
 order, 'and saved the day.'' 
 
 The services of the field artillery companies proving so valua- 
 ble, Congress, by act of March 3d, 1847, provided that, "in 
 addition to the four companies authorized by the act of March 2C\, 
 1821, to be equipped as light artillery, the President is hereby 
 empowered, when he shall deem it necessary, to designate four 
 other companies, one in each regiment, to be organized and 
 equipped as light artillery. * * * That the officers and men 
 of the light artillery, when serving as such and mounted, shall 
 receive the same pay and allowances as provided by law for the 
 dragoons." By War Department General Orders No. 16, April 
 1 5th, 1847, the duty of designating the four additional field com- 
 panies was imposed on the general-in-chief, then in the field. 
 Accordingly j in General Orders No. 218, Headquarters of the 
 Army, Pueblo, Mexico, July i6th, 1847, the following companies 
 were so announced: Captain J. B. Magruder's, (I) of the First; 
 J. F. Roland's, (M) of the Second; T. W. Sherman's, (E) of the 
 Third, and Captain S. H. Drum's, (G) of the Fourth Artillery. 
 So far as (E) of the Third Regiment was concerned, the order 
 simply legalized a state of affairs that had existed for a year. All 
 the companies, except (M) of the Second, had participated in the 
 battles either in the Rio Grande valley, or in General Scott's 
 campaign on the southern line of operations. (M) was one of 
 the companies added to the Second Regiment by the same act 
 which increased the number of light artillery companies, but it 
 was not organized in time to render services in the field during 
 that war. 
 
 After the close of hostilities with Mexico all the field compa- 
 nies of artillery, with the exception of (C) and (E) Third, and 
 (B) Fourth, turned their horses over to the quartermaster's de- 
 partment at New Orleans, in compliance with orders from Head- 
 quarters First Military Department. They were legally, however, 
 field companies, and all hoped to be remounted ; but a circular 
 from the Adjutant-General's Office, September 3Oth, 1848, directed 
 that but one in each regiment should be equipped as a company 
 of field artillery. In compliance therewith the original four field 
 companies were retained as such, and (E) of the Third turned 
 
64 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 in its horses accordingly. (K) of the First and (A) of the Sec- 
 ond were provided with horses in November, 1848, and, with 
 (C) of the Third and (B) of the Fourth, formed the mounted 
 field companies of the regular army. This was but a temporary 
 arrangement. It was soon resolved to equip four other compa- 
 nies, as contemplated by the law of March 3d, 1847 ; and as the 
 assignment of these companies by the general-in-chief while in 
 the field was considered to be but provisional in its nature, it was 
 deemed proper to announce them anew. This was accordingly 
 done in General Orders No. 22, War Department, Adjutant- 
 General's Office, April 2ist, 1849, as follows : 
 
 "1. Under the provisions of the act of March 3d, 1847, authorizing four 
 additional companies ' to be organized and equipped as light artillery/ the 
 President directs the following designated companies to be so organized and 
 equipped : 
 
 "First Regiment of Artillery, Company (I), Captain Magruder. 
 
 "Second do do do (M), Captain Roland. 
 
 " Third do do do (B), Captain Shover. 
 
 " Fourth do do do (G), Captain Freeman. 
 
 " Four pieces and forty-four horses will be allowed each company, and all 
 the necessary supplies will be furnished, on requisitions duly forwarded to the 
 proper departments of the staff, agreeably to regulations. 
 
 "Company (B), Third Artillery, will proceed, without unnecessary delay, to 
 take post at West Point, for the purpose of aiding in the practical instruction 
 of the cadets in this important branch of the military service, under its cap- 
 tain, Brevet Major Shover, the present instructor of artillery at the academy. 
 The lieutenants on extra duty will join the company." 
 
 The only change made by this order was that affecting (E) of 
 the Third, for which (B) of the same regiment was substituted. 
 This was a discrimination against the former company which its 
 commander, Captain T. W. Sherman, energetically and success- 
 fully combated. The company had earned in the field honorable 
 distinction as field artillery even before the law authorizing its 
 equipment was passed. The proposed substitution for it of -(B) 
 Company was not carried into execution, as in General Orders 
 No. 29, Adjutant- General's Office, May i2th, 1849, it was an- 
 nounced that ' ' the execution of paragraph 2 of General Orders 
 No. 22, dated April 2ist, 1849, having been suspended, and Com- 
 pany (B), Third Artillery, ordered to rejoin its station at Fort 
 Adams, considerations of the public service no longer require 
 a deviation from the rule observed in designating the companies 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE l82I. 65 
 
 of the other regiments of artillery to be remounted. Accordingly 
 Company (E), Third Artillery, Captain T. W. Sherman, will be 
 organized and equipped as light artillery, instead of Company 
 
 (By 
 
 The selection of field artillery commanders was about the same 
 time regulated by General Orders No. 12, War Department, 1849, 
 which were dictated by Secretary Marcy, and to the following 
 effect : 
 
 " If a vacancy happen in the grade of captain of a company designated as a 
 light artillery company, it will be filled by the order of the Secretary of War 
 on the recommendation of the colonel, who will name the captain best quali- 
 fied for the service." 
 
 This has been the rule by which the assignment of captains to 
 this duty has been supposed to be regulated down to the year 
 1882, when captains, equally with lieutenants, were made detail- 
 able according to seniority, and the former for a tour of three 
 years.* 
 
 Under the provisions of the orders of April 2ist and May I2th, 
 quoted, (I) of the First, (E) of the Third, and (G) of the Fourth 
 Artillery were equipped as directed. Company (M), Second 
 Regiment, was not so equipped up to 1851. 
 
 The supposition, based in error, that, the war being over, the 
 field companies had fulfilled their appointed purpose, and were 
 no longer useful, led (March 3ist, 1851, by General Orders 
 No. 1 8, War Department) to the dismounting of six companies 
 of the field artillery, leaving only (K) of the First and (C) of the 
 Third equipped with the proper arm. Referring to this in his 
 annual report of that year, Secretary Conrad remarked : 
 
 " Prior to the late war there were only four light artillery companies. After 
 the war broke out four more of the artillery companies were converted into 
 light artillery, making in all eight companies. This description of troops, 
 although extremely effective in regular war, are utterly useless in the kind of 
 service in which the army is now employed. The department did not hesitate, 
 therefore, to direct that six of those companies should be dismounted. Of this 
 number four will continue dismounted, unless Congress should otherwise 
 direct. But as it is deemed important to preserve a portion of this description 
 of force, two others will be mounted as soon as the department is provided 
 with the means of doing so. This will make in all four companies, or one to 
 each regiment of artillery, which seems to have been contemplated by the act 
 of 1821." 
 
 * Changed by G. 0. 86, H. Q. A., series of 1884, to four years for captains. 
 9 
 
66 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 The "means of doing so" were forthcoming the next fiscal 
 year; and accordingly Sedgwick's (A) of the Second and Hunt's 
 (G) of the Fourth Artillery were remounted by General Orders 
 No. 36, Adjutant- General's Office, September 25th, 1852. 
 
 The statement of the Secretary of War that four of the field 
 companies would "continue dismounted unless Congress should 
 otherwise direct, ' ' was a direct appeal to the sense of the legisla- 
 ture upon the propriety of dismounting the artillery, a measure 
 the wisdom of which was doubtful even to himself, and. which had 
 been entered upon in opposition to the advice of the most expe- 
 rienced and distinguished officers in service, including the gen- 
 eral-in-chief. The response was of such a character as, to some 
 minds at least, would have carried conviction as to the wishes of 
 Congress in the premises; it was announced by that body appro- 
 priating, during the session of 1852-' 53, the sum of eighteen 
 thousand five hundred dollars, to be expended under the direc- 
 tion of the President of the United States, for the specific purpose 
 of mounting the four remaining field artillery companies. This 
 expression of congressional will was sufficiently emphatic to im- 
 press even Secretary Davis, no friend to the artillery, who, in 
 War Department General Orders No. 15, May 26th, 1853, di- 
 rected that (M) of the Second, (E) of the Third, and (B) of the 
 Fourth Artillery should be remounted. Of the field companies, 
 (I) of the First alone remained now without horses and proper 
 artillery equipments. 
 
 Commenting upon the fact that Congress had in the most 
 explicit manner expressed a desire to have all the field companies 
 mounted ; that Secretary Davis, while partially carrying it into 
 effect, had acted with apparent desire to defeat the spirit of the 
 law, General Scott, in a communication of May 220!, 1857,10 Sec- 
 retary Floyd, said : 
 
 "The Congress, during the winter of 1852-7>3, made an ample, spec i lie- 
 appropriation for the purpose of mounting the four dismounted light companies. 
 The next Secretary (Mr. Davis) gave horses, &c., to only three of these, and 
 sent them to the Indian frontier, where, according to Mr. Secretary Conrad and 
 all military men, they were utterly useless, and in fact soon fell into decay, 
 after an enormous cost in forage. To correct this blunder (by another), Mr. 
 Secretary Davis (General Orders No. 9, Headquarters of the Army, October 
 30th, 1856) dismounted three companies and ordered them to Fort Monroe, with 
 Magruders company, (I) of the First Artillery, (which had not been mounted in 
 many years,) to constitute a school of practice, as sea-coast, garrison, and 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE l82I. 67 
 
 siege artillery. Of that school of practice I think well, but consider it a blun- 
 der to have dismounted those companies. In conclusion, I hope that they, 
 together with Magruder's, may soon be remounted." 
 
 It was at this time that General Scott expressed the urgent 
 desire to assemble the field companies in pairs, at the posts best 
 adapted to that end, for purposes of instruction; forming, in fact, 
 field artillery schools. 
 
 The companies dismounted, as mentioned, by General Orders No. 
 9, of 1856, were (M) of the Second, (C) of the Third, and (G) of 
 the Fourth Artillery ; (C) had not before been dismounted, except 
 temporarily and for change of station, since it was organized as a 
 horse artillery company, in 1838. Having marched to Santa Fe, 
 New Mexico, after the Mexican war, it was there for a time con- 
 verted into a company of cavalry, the materiel, guns, caissons, 
 &c., being stored. In 1850 the remaining personnel, without the 
 guns, &c., returned to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, where Cap- 
 tain Bragg joined it, and rehabilitated the company as field artil- 
 lery ; but this time as mounted, not as horse artillery. 
 
 Acting .on General Scott's suggestion, Secretary Davis' suc- 
 cessor had scarcely assumed the duties of his office before he 
 began seriously to consider the advisability of remounting the 
 companies of field artillery dismounted but six months previously. 
 One week after General Scott's communication was written, Ma- 
 gruder's company, (I) of the First, was, by General Orders No. 6, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, May 29th, 1857, ordered to be equipped 
 as field artillery. This was followed by the equipment of (M) of 
 the Second, pursuant to " Special Orders No. 70, Headquarters 
 Troops Serving in Kansas," dated September i8th, 1857, issued 
 under instructions from the War Department of the 7th of that 
 month. It was fitted out completely as a four-gun battery. 
 
 By Special Orders No. 52, Headquarters of the Army, April loth, 
 1858, Captain and Brevet Major J. F. Reynolds' company, (C) of 
 the Third; was directed to proceed to Leavenworth, Kansas, for 
 horses, and thence to Utah to receive the guns, caissons, and other 
 materiel from a detachment of the ordnance, in whose charge 
 they had been placed by the commanding general of the army in 
 Utah. 
 
 Touching the subject of this transfer, the remarks of Colonel 
 H. K. Craig, head of the ordnance department, are worthy of 
 record as illustrating the spirit of fairness regarding the proper 
 
68 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 service of artillery which had succeeded to the intriguing of the 
 disgraced late head of that bureau. In a letter to the Secretary 
 of War, Colonel Craig observed : 
 
 "The efficient performance of his ordnance duties will occupy Brevet Cap- 
 tain Reno's time and that of his ordnance detachment. It was not supposed 
 that he would be diverted from these legitimate and proper duties to be assign- 
 ed to those which pertain properly and exclusively to the artillery. Every 
 consideration of justice and propriety demands that all batteries of artillery, 
 and especially those in active service, should be manned and served by artillery 
 troops, under the direction of officers of that arm; and the assignment of such 
 duties to ordnance officers and soldiers, or to any other, is wrong. It is also 
 adverse to the interests of public service, inasmuch as it tends to lessen the 
 artillery esprit de corps, and assigns very important military service to troops 
 who cannot be supposed to take much interest in it, or to be as efficient for its 
 performance as those to whom it legitimately pertains." 
 
 It is all the more pleasurable to note the views here expressed 
 upon the relative proper functions of the artillery and the ord- 
 nance, under the existing organization, from the fact that it has 
 been found necessary elsewhere in this work to expose and ani- 
 madvert upon the manner in which the latter usurped, in large 
 degree, the functions of the former during the Mexican war. 
 
 The resuscitation of (C) of the Third restored to their proper 
 status seven of the eight field artillery companies, leaving (G) of 
 the Fourth Regiment alone dismounted. The pieces of this com- 
 pany were inspected and condemned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan- 
 sas, May 1 8th, 1855. The following month it was mounted as cav- 
 alry, and acted as such during the Sioux expedition, returning to 
 Fort Leavenworth in November, 1856. It was not again equipped 
 as field artillery until June, 1861. 
 
 Six of the seven mounted field artillery companies were either 
 in Utah, or marching to join the army there, when the adjustment, 
 in a measure, of the difficulties that had caused the Government 
 to concentrate its troops in that quarter left the "batteries," as 
 they were now often officially designated, free for duty elsewhere. 
 
 It was at this time that War Department Order No. 10, of 1859, 
 was issued, elaborating a plan for "the better instruction of the 
 artillery in its appropriate duties, and at the same time to secure 
 an efficient disposition of it for actual service." (See Instruc- 
 tion.) Notwithstanding the expressed views, already quoted, of 
 the general-in-chief, that "according to Secretary Conrad and all 
 military men" they would thereby be rendered "utterly useless," 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1 82 1. 69 
 
 the batteries were distributed at various points on the Indian fron- 
 tier, where, as it proved, they were not available, but utterly 
 useless when most needed, in 1861, and those in Texas only 
 escaped the enemy by sacrificing their horses and materiel. 
 
 It was this dispersed condition of the companies, resulting nal 
 from Secretary Floyd's treachery, as is sometimes asserted, but 
 from a desire in certain quarters (not, so far as known, on the part 
 of the Secretary) to experiment with an impracticable system of 
 instruction, which brought the Government face to face, in 1861, 
 with the necessity for providing itself with more field artillery, 
 and was the immediate cause of the Fifth Regiment being organ- 
 ized ; for although, when the Civil war broke out, the companies 
 were called in as quickly as possible, in many cases it could not 
 be done soon, and in some instances it was not known that it 
 could be done at all. 
 
 The law designated as "batteries" the tactical units of this 
 regiment. This was the first time this designation was legalized, 
 although for several years the terms "light company" and "bat- 
 tery" had been treated as synonymous in orders from army 
 headquarters. The Fifth was equipped throughout as field ar- 
 tillery ; but the law did not, as was the case with the eight old 
 companies, direct that this should be done ; it followed from the 
 necessity that existed for fitting out many more batteries, com- 
 manded by regular officers, for service with the armies then being 
 organized. 
 
 The importance of placing on a field artillery footing every 
 company of the old regiments that could by any means be made 
 available was quickly appreciated ; and, for the reason that the 
 enemy was not a maritime power, it became the easier and more 
 reasonable thing to do, to take for this work the companies from 
 the sea-coast as well as those from the interior. August 23d, 
 1 86 1, General Barry, chief of artillery, Army of the Potomac, 
 addressed General McClellan on the subject as follows : 
 
 " To insure success, it is of vital importance that the army should have an 
 overwhelming force of field artillery. To render this the more effective, the 
 field batteries should, as far as possible, consist of regular troops." 
 
 A few days after, the commanding general urgently appealed 
 to the Secretary of War to send in the Third Artillery from 
 the Pacific coast, to give him half the companies forming the 
 late artillery school at Fortress Monroe, and followed it up 
 
JO HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 later with the recommendation " that the whole of the regular 
 artillery, old and new, be ordered to report here [Washington], 
 excepting the mounted batteries actually serving in other depart- 
 ments, and the minimum number of companies actually necessary 
 to form the nucleus of the garrisons of our most important per- 
 manent works." These earnest representations had the effect to 
 bring into the Army of the Potomac, as field batteries, half the 
 regular artillery of the United States. 
 
 As usual with that arm, the service was by detachment, the 
 regular batteries forming the nuclei around which gathered the 
 volunteers. This important principle of organization, conform- 
 able to the sound and settled policy on which the regular army has 
 been maintained in time of peace, was observed in every phase 
 of organization that the artillery experienced, and whether as- 
 signed to brigades, divisions, corps, or armies, and with or without 
 reserves. That portion of the regular artillery which was not 
 with the Army of the Potomac served elsewhere in the field, save 
 four companies which remained in permanent works, but from 
 necessity it was scattered very sparsely over the various theatres 
 of operations ; nevertheless, all except those mentioned were, at 
 one time or another during the Civil, war, organized and equip- 
 ped as either mounted or horse artillery.* In view of the fact 
 here stated, it is a rather curious circumstance that the official 
 army registers issued during the years of the Civil war set forth 
 that " two companies in each of the ist, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments 
 of artillery being equipped as light artillery, are allowed sixty-four 
 instead of forty-two privates per company." 
 
 Horse artillery was early recognized as the associate of prop- 
 erly organized cavalry. Accordingly, some time in the fall of 
 1861, TidbalFs company, (A) of the Second, was equipped for that 
 service at Washington, D. C., forming the first company of horse 
 artillery in the army since Bragg' s company was dismounted at 
 Santa F6 after the Mexican war. This was soon followed by the 
 similar equipment of (M), Second, and, March, 1862, by (B-L), 
 Second, (consolidated for want of men,) and (C), Third Artillery. 
 These companies were formed into a horse artillery brigade ; and 
 so efficient did they prove that by the date of the battle of Chan- 
 
 * Companies (H) and (K) of the Second, and (B) and (D) of the Third, were 
 not at any time equipped as field artillery. 
 
ORGANISATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE l82I. yf 
 
 cellorsville (May 2d~4th, 1863) their number had been 'doubled. 
 After this battle the horse batteries of that army were organized 
 into two brigades, that they might alternate campaigning and 
 recuperating, in their arduous service with the cavalry. The 
 strength of these brigades gradually increased in personnel and 
 fighting power as their utility became manifest and their manage- 
 ment understood, until, under Meade, May 4th, 1864, on the eve 
 of the Wilderness, the First Brigade embraced the Sixth Battery 
 of New York light artillery, (B-L), (D), and (M) of the Second, 
 (A) and (C-E) of the Fourth Artillery ; the Second Brigade, (E- 
 G), (H-I), and (K) of the First, (A) and (G) of the Second, and 
 (C), (F), and (K) of the Third Artillery. Of the twelve batteries 
 composing the two brigades, seven were six-gun and five were 
 four-gun batteries. 
 
 Associated with the cavalry of other armies than that of the 
 Potomac were horse batteries, the armaments being generally 
 3-inch rifle guns, which were served with an enterprise, 61an, and 
 effectiveness unsurpassed up to that time by the first artilleries 
 of the world. (See Organization of Artillery for an Active 
 Army.) Of the companies equipped for longer or shorter periods 
 as field batteries from the regular army during the Civil war, 
 about one-third served as horse artillery. 
 
 A general dismounting of both regular and volunteer batteries 
 commenced within a few days of the surrender, May 26th, of the 
 last Confederate army in the trans-Mississippi. By General 
 Orders No. 105, Adjutant-General's Office, June 2d, 1865, com- 
 manders of military geographical departments were directed to 
 reduce at once their batteries of volunteers to the lowest number 
 absolutely required. General Orders No. 126, same office, July 
 2Oth, following, directed that two companies of each of the regu- 
 lar regiments, to be selected by the colonels, should be, as 
 previous to the war, retained as mounted batteries, while the 
 remaining companies, except those serving west of the Mississippi, 
 were dismounted. Pursuant to the provisions of this order, the 
 following were- designated by General Orders No. 139, Adjutant- 
 General's Office, September 28th, 1865, as the field batteries of 
 the regular regiments, viz.: (I) and (K) of the First; (A) and 
 (M) of the Second; (C) and (E) of the Third; (B) and (G) of 
 the Fourth; (F) and (G) of the Fifth. It will be noticed that 
 the original field artillery companies were retained in the four old 
 
72 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 regiments. Of the two batteries retained in each regiment, one 
 had for armament 3-inch rifles, the other i2-pounder Napoleons. 
 The personal armament of the men were revolvers and sabres for 
 chiefs of pieces and of caissons, sabres for cannoneers, while the 
 drivers were unarmed. 
 
 Though the term "field artillery" does not appear in the act of 
 July 29th, 1861, legalizing the organization of the Fifth Artillery, 
 the personnel of the battery therein prescribed was, with slight 
 modification, that which had been fixed upon for field artillery in 
 the authorized tactics of that arm. This, together with the other 
 fact of the mounting, equipping, and sending out as field artil- 
 lery all the batteries of the regiment, does not leave in doubt that 
 Congress intended the Fifth to be a field artillery regiment. 
 
 Prior to the organization of the Fifth there were authorized 
 by law but eight field artillery companies. The equipment of 
 that regiment added twelve batteries to the number; and as the 
 act of July 28th, 1866, directed that thereafter the organizations 
 of the four old regiments should be similar to that of the Fifth, 
 the designations of their tactical units "companies"- were 
 thereby changed to "batteries," each of which, like the batter- 
 ies of the Fifth, was eligible for equipment as light artillery. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs when, in 1874, the enactment of sec- 
 tion noi of the Revised Statutes re-established to a degree the 
 laws of 1821 and 1847 relative to the selection of batteries for light 
 artillery service by providing that ' ' one battery in each regiment 
 of artillery, to be designated by the President, shall be equipped 
 as light artillery, and one other battery may be so designated and 
 equipped when the President may deem it necessary." Under 
 the law as it exists to-day, therefore, but five of the batteries are 
 required to be equipped as light artillery, while five others may 
 or may not be, at the option of the President, who, by General 
 Orders No. 96, of 1882, Adjutant-General's Office, in the exercise 
 of the discretion here given, increased the field batteries to 
 the full number authorized. As previously mentioned, however, 
 they are equipped not as light artillery proper, but as mounted 
 batteries. 
 
 It is not known that the President, acting under the require- 
 ments of the law, formally announced the five batteries which 
 "shall be equipped as light artillery." It was probably thought 
 to be unnecessary. The organizations designated under the act 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE l82I. 73 
 
 of 1821, with CF) of the Fifth, were, at the date of the enactment 
 of the statutes, so equipped, and have so continued. But had 
 the President, pro forma, selected certain batteries for this duty, 
 instead of recognizing the continuation of the existing state of 
 affairs as a full compliance with the statute, there was every rea- 
 son which sound military policy and public spirit could dictaTe 
 why he should have chosen the four original companies. They 
 were the pioneers in the field of light artillery under the present 
 regimental organizations. The blaze of their guns had shed un- 
 fading lustre over every battle-field, from Palo Alto to the crush- 
 ing of the last army of the Rebellion. Nothing could be more 
 conducive to a proper esprit de corps than a recognition of this 
 fact, for both officers and men must see with peculiar satisfaction 
 these honored organizations allowed permanently to retain the 
 armaments with which they had become veterans, and which 
 they had ever served to the credit of the artillery arm and to 
 their country's glory. This pleasure seems vouchsafed to them, 
 .for there is no reasonable doubt but that the continuation as field 
 artillery of the batteries indicated, subsequent to the enactment 
 of the Revised Statutes, fixed on them the character of permanent 
 field artillery organizations, as contemplated by the law. 
 
 Of the ten batteries equipped pursuant to General Orders No. 
 139, of 1865, (I) of the First, (M) of the Second, (E) of the 
 Third, (G) of the Fourth, and (G) of the Fifth were, in accord- 
 ance with provisions of General Orders No. 6, of 1869, Adjutant- 
 General's Office, dismounted; and at the same time four of the 
 five batteries remaining were ordered to Fort Riley, Kansas, to 
 form a school for field artillery practice and instruction. (See 
 Instruction.) 
 
 The five batteries retained by the order of 1869, quoted, re- 
 mained the field artillery organizations of the regular army until 
 the number was increased by five additional batteries, agreeably to 
 the requirements of General Orders No. 96, of August i5th, 1882, 
 Adjutant- General's Office. In the meantime, however, (L) of 
 the Second, in Texas, was, by Special Orders No. 25, of February 
 4th, 1878, Adjutant- General's Office, directed by the President to 
 be temporarily equipped as field artillery, and so remained until 
 it was transferred from that military department pursuant to in- 
 structions from army headquarters and Special Orders No. 208, of 
 October i3th, 1880, Department of Texas. The captain of (F) of 
 10 
 
74 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMtf. 
 
 the Second, which remained in Texas, having applied to have his 
 battery equipped as field artillery, the request, was favorably con- 
 sidered, and in Special Orders No. 246, of November iyth, 1880, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, the President, in conformity with sec- 
 tion noi of the Revised Statutes, directed that battery to be tem- 
 porarily so equipped. As (F) of the Second was one of those 
 designated by General Orders No. 96, of 1882, before mentioned, 
 to be mounted and equipped as an additional field battery, its 
 temporary service has been exchanged for one more permanent 
 in character. (For G. O. 96, A. G. O., 1882, see Appendix.) 
 
 It will not escape notice that, of the batteries designated in 
 General Orders No. 96, of .1882, not one was of the additional 
 companies equipped as field artillery in i846-'47. While the 
 competency of the President to select for this service from all 
 dismounted batteries is not here denied,* it must be conceded 
 that it would have been a particularly appropriate thing had 
 the four old batteries been allowed to once more buckle on the 
 harness in which, on the hotly-contested fields of two wars, at 
 least three of them (I) of the First, (E) of the Third, and 
 (G) of the Fourth had been greatly distinguished. The regi- 
 ments had learned to regard their field artillery companies 
 with affectionate pride ; and it will be remembered that, in 
 1865, when the selection of companies to remain mounted was 
 left to colonels of the artillery regiments, and their expressed 
 wishes respected, the original light companies of 1821 and 1847 
 were, without exception, retained. The traditions of an hon- 
 orable arm of service are worthy of respect a fact recognized 
 by every nation in which the profession of arms has been 
 cherished, and forgetfulness of which has in every instance been 
 the surest evidence of military and political decadence ; those 
 who disregard them stifle the noblest sentiment that can actuate 
 the soldier's breast, while evincing an ignorance of human nat- 
 ure well calculated in its effects to freeze up the fountains of 
 
 * Whether or not recent laws and the enactment of the Revised Statutes have 
 abrogated the llgal rights of the eight batteries designated as light artillery 
 under the acts of March 2d, 1821, and March 3d, 1847, is an open question. It 
 is not intended here to enter upon its legal aspects. Suffice it to say, there are 
 the strongest reasons upon which to base an argument in support of the nega- 
 tive view, though the logic of orders since the Civil war tends to the affirmative 
 of the proposition. 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD ARTILLERY SINCE 1 82 1. 75 
 
 true military spirit by the chilling blasts of official indifference or 
 neglect. 
 
 To be known, it need not be repeated here ; but it will not be 
 amiss to recall that (I) under Magruder, (E) under Sherman, 
 and (G) under Drum all won in Mexico the plaudits of the army 
 and the country, and, with (M) of the Second, did faithful service 
 during that interval of vacillation and perpetual change interven- 
 ing between the Mexican war and the Civil war; all this when not 
 a single battery designated in General Orders No. 96, of 1882, 
 had as yet been equipped as field artillery. As a result, the old 
 field batteries were looked upon with affectionate regard by their 
 respective regiments, each of which doubtless would have been glad 
 to see ancient and honorable associations perpetuated by having 
 these, preferably to any others, equipped for a service with which 
 their careers had been so intimately connected. It would have 
 tended, therefore, to the development and maintenance of proper 
 professional spirit had the field batteries of 1847 been selected as 
 those to be rehabilitated in 1882 ; and it is to be hoped, should 
 changes be hereafter made, that their claims based on services, 
 merit, their own pride and that of the artillery arm may not be 
 denied the recognition to which they are justly entitled. 
 
76 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF .THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 
 
 At the epoch of the Revolution (1775-' 83) it was customary to 
 attach two field guns to each infantry battalion, the rest being kept 
 in a general reserve. General Washington early and urgently 
 recommended to Congress the procurement of sufficient field 
 guns from Europe to supply two to each regiment of infantry of 
 the continental army. This, however, was not a matter easily 
 accomplished in the crippled state of the finances and trade of 
 the colonies, and the plan was adopted of attaching a company 
 of artillery with two or three guns to each infantry brigade. The 
 remainder of the pieces with the army were held in reserve. Bat- 
 talion guns, i. e., those attached to battalions alone, have never 
 had any place in the armament of our regular army. 
 
 The first assignment thus made was by General Orders No. 9, 
 Headquarters of the Army, New York city, August" gth, 1776, 
 which directed that two pieces should be attached to, and ma- 
 noeuvre with, each brigade, the horses and ammunition carts being 
 kept at some convenient place and for this special service. 
 
 The following are the instructions given the officers command- 
 ing the brigade artillery companies, or detachments, by General 
 Knox : 
 
 " Much is required from an officer of artillery when on detachment, as he 
 hath then the whole weight of duty on* his mind. He must be careful in disci- 
 plining and exercising his men at least three times a day. He must see that 
 they keep themselves clean, and will himself set the example. He will partic- 
 ularly attend to the manner of the men cooking their provisions, which ought 
 always to be boiled or roasted, never fried, baked, or broiled, which modes are 
 very unhealthy ; they must be taught to use vinegar freely. The officer must 
 frequently examine his ammunition and air it, view his pieces, apparatus, the 
 horses and harness, and be sure that everything is in the most perfect order to 
 move at the shortest notice after he shall receive orders. The reputation and 
 promotion of the officers, and that of the corps, will depend on the most punc- 
 tual performance of their duty in every point; no excuse will be admitted for 
 any omission. The orders of the day must be constantly taken by every officer 
 commanding a detachment, and when the brigade manoeuvres the artillery 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 77 
 
 must be out and exercise with them. The limbers belonging to the guns must 
 not, on any pretense whatever, be taken for any other use, but always kept with 
 them." 
 
 These instructions give sufficient proof of the intimate rela- 
 tions existing between the commander of the artillery and the - 
 various portions of that arm, even when the latter were detached 
 from the main park and serving with other troops. 
 
 Afterwards, and doubtless for the reason that divisions became 
 reduced until they were no larger than brigades had formerly 
 been, artillery, as we learn from the orders of the day, was some- 
 times attached to divisions; but these were exceptional cases, the 
 rule remaining as before. 
 
 There was at that time no uniform system of artillery tactics 
 for the whole army, nor any system of evolutions for the guns 
 with their brigade. This is told us by Captain Stevens, who, in 
 1797, wrote the first artillery tactics published in this country, 
 and who was an officer of Lamb's regiment during the Revolu- 
 tionary war. To supply the deficiency indicated, this author 
 informs us that General Knox appointed boards to determine the 
 simpler manoeuvres of the pieces -with the troops. Tousard, 
 also, reproduces in the Artillerist's Companion some of the evolu- 
 tions performed by the artillery when paraded and drilled with 
 the infantry. We are led to believe, therefore, that, though uni- 
 formity of practice was wanting, the manoeuvres of the artillery 
 were characterized by sufficient mobility to meet every demaad 
 of service. 
 
 The principle of organization for the artillery was this : The 
 general of artillery commanded the whole ; that with the main 
 army, in person ; that with other armies, through their respective 
 artillery commanders. During the inactive season all the guns 
 and materiel of each army were drawn together into one park. 
 When the campaign opened the various detachments were attach- 
 ed to the brigades, and, for fighting purposes, were exclusively 
 under the orders of the brigade commander. In disciplinary 
 matters the authority of the commander of the artillery extended 
 over these detachments, he alone having power to grant furloughs 
 to either officers or men. 
 
 During the war of 1812 the only attempt known to have been 
 made to systematically apportion the artillery was that of General 
 Izard, made at the beginning of the campaign of 1814, and was 
 
78 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 after the Revolutionary method. This solitary effort was short- 
 lived, and passed away without having been of any practical bene- 
 fit. During that war the artillery was, as a rule, scattered with- 
 out semblance of system. 
 
 For administrative purposes, Izard adopted a plan similar to 
 McClellan's in 1862. In this respect he placed the artillery and 
 cavalry on the same footing. McClellan's orders will be found 
 further on ; Izard' s were promulgated in General Orders of July 
 25th, 1814, which, after designating the several regiments of 
 infantry to be assigned to the brigades of the army, directed : 
 
 " The detachments of artillery and of light dragoons will join the several 
 brigades as occasion may render the measure advisable. When not so detach- 
 ed these corps will be under the immediate orders of their respective command- 
 ing officers, and report directly to the headquarters of the army." 
 
 We thus see that in 1814, as during the Revolution, artillery 
 attached to brigades was on the footing of troops attached for 
 service merely, returning to the main body at general headquarters, 
 and passing again under the orders of the officer commanding 
 that arm, when their services with the troops were no longer 
 necessary. 
 
 With the. rise of the Military Academy, and the increased 
 interest in military affairs manifesting itself when officers com- 
 menced to look to the army as a permanent profession, the proper 
 adjustment of its parts became a subject for study and reflection. 
 From this followed the elaborate and in some instances very able 
 discussions which grew out of the reductions of 1815 and 1821, in 
 the latter of which Mr. Secretary Calhoun, with that earnestness 
 and energy of style, plainness of proposition, and closeness of 
 logic for which his public papers stand unrivalled, reviewed the 
 field of controversy, and for the first time formulated those prin- 
 ciples on which should rest the organization and maintenance of 
 our regular army. 
 
 The Mexican war enabled, in a limited degree, application to be 
 made of theoretical knowledge acquired by officers. But although 
 the services of the arm in Mexico were brilliant, and brought the 
 field artillery especially to the front rank in the combatant arms 
 of service, the operations of that war were conducted on too 
 small a scale to enable practical knowledge to be acquired as to 
 the best organization to be given artillery to accompany a large 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 79 
 
 army. Not only this, but what was there learned, being acquired 
 by experience with small forces, contracted the field of vision, 
 and to many officers was a detriment, by leading them to sup- 
 pose the same principles should govern in the distribution of the 
 artillery in large armies like those of the Civil war. On the_ 
 northern line of operations General Taylor's the field batteries 
 were attached one to each brigade of infantry ; on the southern 
 line General Scott's the artillery w r as attached to divisions. 
 The strength of the brigades was about 1200 men present; of 
 the divisions, 2400 men present. The brigades which took the 
 field in 1861, North and South, were much stronger than these 
 divisions of the preceding war ; and this circumstance led to 
 the faulty system of attaching artillery to brigades in the first 
 months of the contest; but, with the large armies which then took 
 the field, the system was found wretchedly inadequate for either 
 administrative or fighting purposes, and was speedily abandoned. 
 
 Many of the regiments taking the field at the commencement 
 of the Civil- war had batteries attached to them, but they were 
 found to be practically useless, and the first regiments bringing 
 them out were also the last. 
 
 When the Union army marched to the first Bull Run the bat- 
 teries not belonging to regiments, and most of which were regu- 
 lars, were attached to brigades. The average strength of the 
 latter was 3000 men present. No attempt was made to provide 
 an artillery reserve. No organization looking to the efficient 
 tactical use of the arm had yet been effected. One of the bat- 
 teries, borrowed from the navy, was hauled by drag-ropes, as 
 were the guns at Bunker Hill in 1775. 
 
 Elsewhere than on the Potomac the Federal forces distributed 
 their artillery in a similar manner. In August, 1861, General 
 Lyon's army in Missouri was organized into brigades, each of 
 which had its battery ; so likewise with General Grant's troops 
 in the vicinity of Cairo, Illinois, in October of that year ; and, 
 without particularizing farther, it can be stated that the same 
 remarks are true with reference to the numerous other armies 
 which took or prepared to take the field in the first campaign of 
 that war. To those who were capable of learning, a brief experi- 
 ence was sufficient to demonstrate the disadvantages of the sys- 
 tem. In an army exceeding 10,000 men it sacrificed that con- 
 centration which alone renders artillery-fire formidable. It was 
 
80 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 soon found that brigade commanders either could not or would 
 not give both their regiments and their battery proper supervision ; 
 neither did they better understand the question of artillery sup- 
 plies, through what channels they came, or who was responsi- 
 ble that they came at all ; in one word, the brigade system, in 
 both the Army of the Potomac and that of Northern Virginia, 
 broke down ; nor was it more efficient in other armies of any 
 magnitude. 
 
 General McClellan assumed command of the army at Wash- 
 ington July 27th, 1861. It embraced about 50,000 infantry, less 
 than 1000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, manning nine incom- 
 plete batteries aggregating but thirty guns. In the reorganiza- 
 tion at once set on foot the following principles formed the basis 
 for the organization of the artillery : 
 
 " 1st. The proportion of artillery should be in the ratio of at least two and 
 one-half pieces to 1000 men, to be expanded, if possible, to three pieces. 
 
 U 2d. The field guns should be restricted to the systems of the U. S. ordnance 
 department and of Parrott, the smooth-bores (with the exception of a few how- 
 itzers for special service) to be exclusively the 12-pounder guns, model of l.SfH, 
 variously called the gun howitzer, light 12-pounder, or the Napoleon. 
 
 '3d. Each field battery to be composed, if practicable, of six, and none to 
 have less than four guns, those of each battery to be of uniform calibre. 
 
 " 4th. The field batteries to be assigned to divisions and not to brigades, in 
 the proportion of four to each division, one of which should be a regular battery, 
 the rest volunteers; the captain of the regulars to command the artillery of the 
 division. In the event of several divisions being united into an army corps, 
 at least one-half of the divisional artillery to be withdrawn from the divisions 
 and formed into a corps reserve. [Note. The contingency provided for having 
 arisen, the corps reserves were formed as contemplated, when the army was on 
 the Peninsula.] (See Appendix.) 
 
 " 5th. The reserve artillery of the whole army to consist of one hundred 
 guns, comprising, besides a sufficient number of light mounted batteries, all 
 the guns of position, and, until the cavalry be massed, all the horse artillery. 
 
 "Oth. The amount of ammunition to accompany the field batteries to be not 
 less than four hundred rounds per gun. 
 
 " 7th. A siege train of fifty pieces to be provided [subsequently expanded to 
 one hundred pieces at Yorktown, including 13-inch sea-coast mortars and 100- 
 pounder and 200-pounder Parrotts]. 
 
 " 8th. Instruction in theory and practice of gunnery, as well as in the tactics 
 of that arm, to be given to the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 
 volunteer batteries, by the study of suitable text-books and by actual recita- 
 tions in each division, under the direction of the regular officer commanding 
 the divisional artillery. 
 
 "9th. Personal inspections, as frequent as circumstances will permit, to 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 81 
 
 be made by the chief of artillery of the army, to see to a strict observance of 
 the establishel organization and drill, of the special regulations and orders 
 issued from time to time under authority of the commanding general, to note 
 the improvement of officers and men of the volunteer batteries, 'and the actual 
 fitness for field service of the whole, both regulars and volunteers." 
 
 These principles for the organization of artillery were proposed 
 by the chief of that arm, and are worthy of special notice. At 
 other and various times in this country commanders and writers 
 had essayed in the same direction. Still, from force of circum- 
 stances, the artillery before this had been either small in amount 
 or imperfect in appointments, often both. And although books 
 on the subject were not wanting, it is believed that the plan here 
 proposed by General Barry was the first comprehensive scheme 
 for organizing artillery to accompany a large force into the field 
 ever promulgated to the United States army, with the expectation 
 that it would be brought to the test of practical experience. It 
 may be remarked, however, that the assignment as here contem- 
 plated, of batteries to divisions and of artillery reserves to corps 
 and armies, was then practiced in the principal States of Europe, 
 though the army reserves have been since abandoned. Although 
 in some respects the preceding principles were departed from in 
 actual practice, they formed the groundwork on which was built 
 the artillery service of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 McClellan says in his report: "The creation of an adequate 
 artillery establishment was a formidable undertaking, and had it 
 not been that the country possessed in the regular service a body 
 of accomplished and energetic artillery officers, the task would 
 almost have been hopeless." He drew together all the regular 
 batteries he could lay his hands on ; and when the three corps 
 eight divisions embarked for the Peninsula campaign they were 
 accompanied by forty-nine batteries aggregating two hundred 
 and ninety-nine guns, of which one hundred were in the artillery 
 reserve. Of the forty-nine batteries, twenty were regulars ; the 
 latter represented twenty-six batteries, some being consolidated 
 for service. Of the eighteen batteries of the reserve, fourteen were 
 regulars, of which five were formed by two batteries being consoli- 
 dated into one. The First Corps (McDowell's), which did not 
 accompany McClellan, is not included in the preceding. 
 
 It will not be uninteresting to note the changes which the or- 
 ganization of the artillery of the Army of the Potomac underwent 
 ii 
 
82 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 at different periods subsequent to its establishment upon a proper, 
 scientific basis changes which resulted partly from experience 
 acquired in campaign and battle, and partly from the caprices of 
 the numerous generals who at various times commanded that 
 army. 
 
 First of all, an increase in the number of army corps caused a 
 draught from the reserve artillery which almost annihilated it. 
 
 On the Peninsula, McClellan had three corps; and two divis- 
 ions joining subsequently, made ten divisions altogether. Four 
 months later, at Antietam, the army embraced six corps and one 
 cavalry division; total, nineteen divisions. There accompanied 
 the army at Antietam sixty-two batteries; seven were in reserve; 
 fifty-five were distributed to divisions and to the Twelfth Corps, 
 the latter having its seven batteries organized as corps artillery, 
 and not distributed to divisions. There were attached to the 
 cavalry division four batteries of horse artillery. Except in three 
 divisions, one regular was associated with the volunteer batteries, 
 in accordance with the original plan. Of the sixty-two batteries, 
 twenty-two were regulars, five of the latter being formed by unit- 
 ing two distinct batteries, thus making twenty-seven the number 
 of regular organizations represented at Antietam. It will thus 
 be seen that the creation of new divisions had in a few months 
 well-nigh absorbed the whole of that superb artillery reserve 
 which took the field under McClellan at the beginning of 1862. 
 
 At the close of the Peninsula campaign General Barry, under 
 whose immediate supervision the artillery of the Army of the 
 Potomac had been organized, was appointed inspector of artil- 
 lery, and commander of that arm in the defenses of Washington, 
 being succeeded, September 5th, 1862, as chief of artillery, by 
 Colonel Henry J. Hunt, late commander of the artillery reserve. 
 McClellan remarks, in his report dated August 4th, 1863, con- 
 cerning this officer, that he ' ' had commanded the artillery reserve 
 with marked skill, and brought to his duties as chief of artillery 
 the highest qualifications. The services of this distinguished offi- 
 cer in reorganizing and refitting the batteries prior to and after 
 the battle of Antietam, and his gallant and skillful conduct on that 
 field, merit the highest encomiums in my power to bestow." 
 General Hunt continued in this position during the rest of the 
 war, stamping on the service of which he was the head the im- 
 press of a cultivated mind stored with knowledge of the uses and 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 83 
 
 capabilities of the artillery arm, the result of extensive experience, 
 profound study, and reflection. 
 
 At the battle of Fredericksburg General Burnside's army con- 
 sisted of six corps, each of three divisions, and of two cavalry 
 divisions. He had sixty-seven batteries, nine of which were-iri- 
 reserve. Of the sixty-seven, twenty-six were regulars, four of 
 them being composed of two batteries each, thus representing 
 thirty regular organizations. All the horse artillery belonged to 
 that branch of service. The fifty-eight batteries attached to 
 troops were with the divisions, a number varying from one to 
 four being with each, depending on the arm of service and the 
 strength of the division. In the cavalry service each division 
 had one horse battery; drawing on the reserves for a greater 
 number when needed. Of the infantry divisions, seven had two, 
 three had three, and eight had four batteries. The strength of 
 the divisions (effective) was about 5000 men; of the corps, 15,000 
 men. The batteries were two-thirds six-gun, the rest having 
 four guns each. 
 
 At Chancellorsville General Hooker had eight corps, includ- 
 ing one of cavalry, a total of twenty-three divisions. Of the 
 seventy-one batteries with the army, twelve were in the reserve; 
 the rest, except two attached to the provost guard, were arranged 
 to the divisions. Of the seventy-one batteries, twenty-one were 
 regulars, representing twenty-three distinct organizations; in the 
 Eleventh and the Cavalry Corps, half the artillery was formed into 
 a corps reserve. Of the twenty-three divisions, fourteen had two, 
 five had three, and four had four batteries attached. The effect- 
 ive strength of the divisions averaged about 5000 men; of the 
 corps, about 15,000 men; the average number of guns, including 
 the general reserve, was three per 1000 men. 
 
 Down. to this time the principles originally adopted as those 
 upon which the artillery should be organized had been adhered 
 to, and even the Twelfth Corps, which at Antietam had its guns 
 massed under one commander as corps artillery, at Chancellors- 
 ville had its batteries distributed to divisions, in accordance with 
 the original plan. 
 
 As, however, regiments had been compelled to surrender up 
 their artillery to brigades, these in their turn to divisions, so, as 
 experience in manoeuvring and fighting large armies was gained, 
 did it become manifest that, to most effectively organize the arm 
 
84 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 for administrative and fighting purposes, divisions must give up 
 their artillery to army corps. Accordingly, after Chancellorsville 
 this change was effected, the batteries of each corps being organ- 
 ized into what was designated an "artillery brigade," the com- 
 mander of which had, or was supposed to have, his own staff, 
 adjutant, quartermaster, commissary, medical officer, &c. 
 
 As illustrating the disadvantages under which artillery officers 
 often labor in the matter of rank, it may be noted that while 
 these artillery brigades were considered equal in importance and 
 fighting power to divisions of infantry, the latter were commanded 
 by generals, the former, as a rule, were commanded by captains 
 or lieutenants. 
 
 The number of batteries in a brigade varied according to the 
 strength of the corps to which it was attached. Of the eight 
 corps at Gettysburg, the first battle after this reorganization was 
 effected, four had five and two had four batteries to a brigade; 
 the Sixth Corps brigade had eight batteries; the Cavalry Corps 
 had nine of horse artillery, the latter in two brigades of four and 
 five batteries respectively. Four-fifths of all the batteries of the 
 army had six guns, the rest four guns each. Each brigade in- 
 cluded at least one regular battery. 
 
 The advantages to be derived from assigning the artillery to 
 larger commands were that the batteries were better cared for 
 and capable of more efficient employment on the field of battle. 
 As a result, fewer guns were required to perform the same 
 amount of work. Consequently, in 1864 the number of pieces 
 was reduced to two and one-half per 1000 men of other arms, 
 having previously been in the ratio of three guns per 1000 men. 
 
 The Confederates had anticipated us in this style of organi- 
 zation for artillery. Immediately after the Peninsula campaign, 
 in 1862, they commenced to draw their batteries together into 
 battalions, which embraced from three to five batteries, and had 
 a complete battalion organization, perfect in all its parts, i. <?., 
 each battalion had a proper number of field officers, with a 
 regular staff, the quartermasters and commissaries being officers 
 of those departments. 
 
 There is an error made by those who sometimes affect to 
 understand the use and management of artillery, i. e., to con- 
 sider the battery as necessarily the unit of the artillery arm. 
 This must mean that it is either the fighting or the adminis- 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 85 
 
 trative unit for the artillery, as the battalion is for the infantry. 
 So far from this being the fact, the reverse is true in every 
 well-organized army. As for fighting purposes, it is well known 
 that allowing batteries to go into battle alone is avoided when 
 it can be done, and every effort made to bring all the batteries 
 of the brigade into action at the same time, that concentration 
 of fire and weight of metal thrown may produce decisive results. 
 The battery is not, therefore, the only fighting unit. No more 
 is it the sole administrative. In Germany batteries are assem- 
 bled together in divisions, each commanded by a field officer, 
 with a proper staff; and, though the designations are different 
 in some, the same is true in every other army in Europe. 
 These divisions are made up of three or four batteries, and are 
 similar in purpose, essentially so in organization, with the 
 brigades of the Union . and the battalions of the Confederate 
 artillery. In each and every case the battery ceased to be the 
 only administrative unit, and those functions were conjointly 
 assumed by the brigade, the battalion, or the division. (Appen- 
 dix A, No. 52.) 
 
 The erroneous ideas to which attention has been drawn led 
 to others, and to an invidious discrimination against the artil- 
 lery in our own army. Accepting as an established fact that 
 the battery was the artillery unit, the conclusion was drawn 
 that there was nothing about the service of that arm higher 
 than a battery which could be legitimately the subject of com- 
 mand. This doctrine, at variance alike with our experience 
 and the facts as they exist in every active army of respectable 
 proportions in recent times, was announced in General Orders 
 No. 126, of 1862, from the War Department, which provided 
 that, " as a general rule, artillery will be called for and received 
 by batteries, thus rendering the field and staff unnecessary." 
 As a result, when these batteries were assembled into brigades, 
 the field and staff, here pronounced unnecessary, had to be 
 drawn from captains and subalterns, thus increasing the duties 
 of these officers, and turning over the artillery brigades to those 
 whose rank was in nowise commensurate with their commands. 
 The arrangement was most unjust, and drove many of the first 
 officers of the artillery, in point of merit, into the staff or into 
 other branches of service, where they received the promotion 
 they deserved. 
 
86 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 The laws of the Confederacy allowed general and field officers at 
 the rate of a brigadier-general to every eighty guns, a colonel to 
 every forty, a lieutenant-colonel to every twenty-five, a major to 
 every twelve; and although the complement under this rule may 
 never have been appointed, still it appears from the records that 
 their battalions, made up of independent batteries, were always 
 commanded by a field officer, while many of them had more than 
 one officer of that rank. 
 
 Neither the brigades of the Union nor the battalions of the Con- 
 federate artillery were creations authorized by the legislature; 
 they sprang out of the necessities of war, supplanting the battery 
 as the artillery fighting and, to a great extent, as the administra- 
 tive unit, the progress of the war only demonstrating more clearly 
 their efficiency. 
 
 When the Army of the Potomac took the field in 1864, the 
 number of corps had been reduced from eight, with 277 regiments, 
 to four, with 226 regiments; the artillery from sixty-seven to fifty 
 batteries of field artillery, with which were serving two regiments 
 and three battalions of foot artillery, the latter armed as infantry 
 for guards and escort duty. The regular batteries which were 
 with the army the year before remained with it, though from the 
 reduced number of men it was in several instances found neces- 
 sary to unite two or three organizations in a single battery, which, 
 even then, in no instance had the maximum strength authorized 
 by law. To each corps' artillery brigade there was attached a 
 battalion of foot artillery for the various duties, artillery and 
 other, required of foot troops. The two heayy artillery regi- 
 ments formed part of the Artillery Reserve, which, May 4th, 1864, 
 embraced twenty-four of the fifty field battery organizations of 
 the army. 
 
 Soon after the first movements of troops in the Wilderness 
 campaign (1864), General Grant resolved to dispense with this 
 artillery reserve. It was accordingly ordered back to Washing- 
 ton. The reason for this step was that the theatre of operations, 
 as well as the plan of campaign determined on, did not permit 
 the use of artillery to advantage, or with decisive effect. The at- 
 tack was generally against breastworks of greater or less strength, 
 in a swampy or wooded country, where artillery could only ma- 
 noeuvre with difficulty. Instead, however, of ordering the guns 
 to Washington, the reduction of impedimenta was, upon the rep- 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 87 
 
 resentations of the chief of artillery of the army, effected in the 
 following manner: 
 
 ' HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF. THE POTOMAC, May IGth, 1864. 
 11 [Special Orders No. 130.] 
 
 ********* 
 " 2d. Each six-gun battery in this army, except the horse artillery and Taft's 
 New York independent battery, will at once be reduced to four guns, retaining 
 all its caissons. The surplus ordnance stores and horses will be sent to Belle 
 Plain to-morrow, and turned in to the proper departments at that place. The 
 batteries of the Artillery Reserve will be distributed as follows, after sending back 
 the surplus guns: To the Second Corps, Major Hazard, with Clarke's (B) First 
 New Jersey, McKiiight's Twelfth New York independent, and Burton's Eleventh 
 New York independent. To the Fifth Corps, Major Fitzhughi, with Bigelow's 
 Ninth Massachusetts, Hart's Fifteenth New York, Sheldon's (B) First New 
 York, Barnes' (C) First New York. To the Sixth Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Monroe, Brinkle's (E) Fifth United States, Stevens' Fifth Maine, Hexamer's (A) 
 First New Jersey, Ewing's (H) First Ohio. Taft's Fifth New York battery will 
 report to-morrow to Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth Corps. The 
 batteries transferred from the Reserve will join their corps to-morrow. Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel McGilvray will remain in charge of the general ammunition 
 column, with staff officers attached to it. 
 
 **** * * *** 
 
 " By command of General Meade. 
 
 S. WILLIAMS, 
 "Assistant Adjutant- General.' 1 
 
 By this arrangement the organizations of all the batteries were 
 retained, together with the field officers belonging to the reserve; 
 a matter of importance in an army where, as we have seen, 
 that class of officers was proscribed; only the surplus guns were 
 sent away. The retention of all the caissons with the reduced 
 batteries enabled the ammunition wagon-trains to be correspond- 
 ingly reduced, besides furnishing a better means of transport, as 
 caissons are acknowledged to be superior for this purpose to 
 wagons. 
 
 Prior to the issuing of the special order just quoted, the artil- 
 lery brigade of the Second Corps had nine, of the Fifth Corps 
 had eight, and of the Sixth Corps had eight six-gun batteries. 
 The Artillery Reserve had six six-gun batteries, besides Taft's 
 six-gun 2o-pounder battery. Under the terms of the order, there- 
 fore, thirty-one field batteries were changed from six to four guns, 
 and each of the three corps mentioned was -given a brigade of 
 twelve batteries forty-eight guns. 
 
88 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 At the date of breaking up the Artillery Reserve the Horse 
 Artillery was composed of twelve batteries, with sixty-four guns, 
 organized into two brigades. On the 3ist of May, 1864, these 
 were reduced to eight batteries, four guns each, the whole arranged 
 to one brigade for the Cavalry Corps. This reduced the number 
 of guns in the Horse Artillery by thirty-two, or to one-half the 
 original number, thus making a total reduction in the field artil- 
 lery of ninety-four guns in that army before the campaign had 
 gotten well under way. In each horse battery one section two 
 guns was i2-pounder Napoleons, one 3-inch rifles. 
 
 Most of the pieces ordered away when the Reserve was broken 
 up were returned when the army arrived before Petersburg, to be 
 used as guns of position in the siege operations. Besides these, 
 there was a siege train, which embraced twelve 8-inch siege how- 
 itzers, sixty-seven siege mortars, seven sea-coast mortars, thirty- 
 six Coehorn mortars, ten loo-pounders, thirty-eight 3o-pounder 
 Parrotts, fourteen 4^ -inch rifles, and one 3O-pounder Brooke rifle. 
 The artillery operations before Petersburg, from the arrival of the 
 army, June, 1864, until March, 1865, when the final campaign 
 was vigorously opened, were almost wholly in the nature of the 
 siege, and, by Special Orders 42, of 1864, Headquarters Armies 
 of the United States, were carried on under the supervision of 
 the chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 On taking the field in 1865 the artillery was distributed as fol- 
 lows : The Second Corps artillery brigade had twelve batteries; 
 that of the Sixth Corps nine, and of the Ninth Corps six batteries. 
 Four batteries were in the Artillery Reserve. The horse batteries 
 were attached to the cavalry. The Second, Sixth, and the Re- 
 serve had each six Coehorn mortars, this species of cannon prov- 
 ing so efficient in the previous campaign as to recommend them 
 to more general service. 
 
 On the 2Qth of March the batteries for field service were or- 
 dered to be reduced to six for the Second and Sixth Corps, 
 and five for the Fifth and Ninth Corps. The surplus batteries 
 were either left temporarily in position on the lines, or sent to 
 the Artillery Reserve, which had, by sheer force of circumstances 
 and in absence of specific instructions, re-established itself with 
 nineteen batteries, the supply (artillery) and ammunition trains 
 of the army. 
 
 This reduction in the 1 number of guns with the troops resulted 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 89 
 
 from a desire to strip the army of all impedimenta not neces- 
 sary for the campaign then opening, and of which the pursuit 
 of the enemy was rightly expected to be one of the main features. 
 Besides, it had been shown that the large artillery brigades of 
 twelve batteries organized when the Reserve was broken up 
 were unwieldy; moreover, the Corps, accustomed as they had 
 been from the beginning to send broken-down or surplus batter- 
 ies to the general artillery reserve, were now at a loss for means 
 to take care of or recuperate them. Then followed a reaction 
 in favor of returning to the former practices; the brigades were 
 reduced to a less number of batteries than they had before the 
 order of May i6th, 1864, was issued, while the Artillery Reserve 
 was re-established with a larger number of batteries than it had 
 before that time. 
 
 Thus the organization of the artillery of this army changed 
 frequently during the four years of the war. An understanding 
 of the causes for these changes and their results will prove 
 neither uninstructive nor uninteresting. 
 
 We have seen that when the war began it was not unusual 
 for regiments to bring their guns into the field, after the prac- 
 tice of the last century in Europe; while the generally accepted 
 plan was to attach a battery to each brigade of infantry, then 
 four batteries to each division, and finally from five to twelve 
 batteries, organized as a brigade and with a distinct adminis- 
 trative staff, were attached to each army corps. 
 
 Experience has everywhere demonstrated that in a large 
 army the smallest tactical unit which should be made complete 
 in all fighting arms of service is one numbering 10,000 men at 
 the minimum. When large forces are involved a less number 
 than this cannot be expected, if detached for any purpose, to 
 effect important results. When the Army of the Potomac was 
 organized, and prior to its embarkation for the Peninsula, the 
 divisions numbered about 10,000 men each, as will be seen from 
 the following official list selected at random from the returns: 
 Present for duty Sedgwick's, 9296; Hooker's, 10,751; Porter's, 
 IX >335; Couch's, 11,013; Casey's, 10,998. The batteries were 
 accordingly assigned to divisions; but the necessity for a distinct 
 administrative staff for the divisional artillery was not under- 
 stood, and during the three campaigns of the ensuing twelve 
 12 
 
90 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 months those duties were imposed upon the corps chiefs of 
 artillery. 
 
 Casualties of service soon reduced the strength of the divisions, 
 which at Antietam averaged but 6190 men. This is too small 
 a force to be made an independent unit in a large army, but 
 the divisional plan having once been adopted, it was not easy 
 to effect a change, even though the necessity for it became 
 clearly manifest. This difficulty was enhanced by the frequent 
 changes of army commanders. 
 
 At Chancellorsville the average strength of army corps was 
 15,000 men; of the divisions, 5000 men. It was resolved after this 
 battle to withdraw the batteries from the latter and assign them 
 to the former, giving to the corps artillery what the divisional 
 never had, viz., a distinct organization with an administrative 
 staff. These organizations were designated ' ' artillery brigades. ' ' 
 Experience served only to multiply proofs of the efficiency of 
 the new system. Each corps of 15,000 men was now a complete, 
 compact fighting body, capable of making its power felt with 
 effect, whether acting in concert with other corps or detached 
 and acting independently. In Europe to-day the same principles 
 govern in this matter. There the divisions, which as a rule 
 number 15,000 men, are the smallest commands to which distinct 
 artillery organizations are assigned. In artillery, as in other 
 arms, concentration is favorable to instruction, to discipline, and 
 to efficiency, and in active service is absolutely necessary to secure 
 that weight of metal which renders its fire formidable. From the 
 time that artillery was attached to battalions of infantry to this 
 day the tendency has been in that direction, and it is always ac- 
 companied by marked improvement and economy. In all active 
 armies it has resulted in substituting the artillery brigade attached 
 to a fighting unit of 15,000 men for a single piece attached to a 
 battalion 500 strong, with very great advantages both of command 
 and administration, as well as increased efficiency on the field, 
 which has enhanced the importance, relatively to others, of the 
 artillery arm of service. 
 
 In the consolidation of corps effected by General Orders No. 
 115, of March 23d, 1864, Adjutant- General's Office, no change 
 was made in the principles of artillery organization. Thereafter 
 the corps, numbering about 23,000 effectives* each, were com- 
 
 *The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps aggregated 69,884; Cavalry Corps, 
 11,839; Ninth Corps, 18,995 effectives. 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 91 
 
 * posed of three or four divisions of the same strength as formerly 
 five to six thousand men. The same reasons which rendered ar- 
 tillery brigades advisable existed still, and continued until the end 
 of the war. The only changes were in the number of batteries 
 assigned to these brigades, these varying from five at Gettysburg- 
 to nine and twelve in the campaign of 1864, and returning as the 
 war progressed to their original numbers. 
 
 The artillery of this army was never in better condition than at 
 the beginning of the Wilderness campaign. The batteries were 
 well equipped both in personnel and materiel. The brigades were 
 commanded by experienced officers, and associated with each was 
 a battalion of foot artillery for guard, escort, and other infantry 
 duty, besides furnishing drafts, if needed, to keep the batteries 
 full. The Reserve embraced about one-third of the batteries with 
 the army, organized into brigades of a size convenient for manoeu- 
 vre or detached service with other troops, and it was accompanied 
 by two regiments of foot artillery armed as infantry. These regi- 
 ments furnished parties for the construction of works on the field 
 or elsewhere, the fabrication of gabions and fascines, the building 
 of magazines, the preparation and laying of platforms, and other 
 duties of similar nature requiring special instruction and practice 
 to insure rapidity and perfection, and generally all those duties 
 connected with artillery service that men of the batteries can- 
 not well be taken to do, and which uninstructed infantry had pre- 
 viously been detailed to perform, at great sacrifice of time, labor, 
 and economy. Its principal defects were, first, a want of general 
 and field officers, a subject to which attention had been called by 
 the chief of artillery in all his reports of battles; and, second, of a 
 code of regulations for its government which should be binding 
 on all branches of the service. These defects injured its efficiency 
 and usefulness to the prejudice of its reputation, caused a misap- 
 plication of its powers, and added to its cost; but they were defects 
 for which the artillery itself was in no way responsible. 
 
 It was at this time that the Artillery Reserve was broken up, the 
 artillery brigades given a larger number of batteries ; and al- 
 though circumstances rendered a return to former practices nec- 
 essary before the campaign closed, thus demonstrating- the neces- 
 sity that existed for that Reserve, the excellence in both a military 
 and economic point of view of the artillery brigades was never 
 brought in question, but, on the contrary, made more clearly 
 
92 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 manifest as the war progressed, \yith us, evolved out of the 
 necessities of actual service, this organization was that adopted by 
 our enemies under precisely similar circumstances; it is that put 
 in practice by the armies of Europe during both peace and war. 
 .It may therefore be considered as that which, at this stage of the 
 military art and science, is best for the artillery accompanying a 
 large army into the field. 
 
 It does not follow from this that the distribution of single bat- 
 teries to brigades may not, under certain circumstances, be proper, 
 and indeed necessary. With a small force like that which fought 
 under General Taylor in the Mexican war, for instance, it may be 
 the only thing to do; and what in an army like that of the Poto- 
 mac would cause the power of the artillery to be frittered away 
 in inefficient driblets, the cost of its maintenance to be greatly 
 increased, might, under the circumstances supposed, have been 
 highly advantageous. It was by overlooking the fact here brought 
 to view, viz. , that the proper organization of artillery will vary 
 with, among other things, the numerical strength of the army, 
 which caused much of the delay in putting it on a proper footing 
 when the Civil war broke out; and fortunate will it be for us if 
 the results of practical knowledge then acquired do not pass be- 
 yond recall forever with the lives of those who then learned the 
 proper use and management of the artillery arm in campaign 
 and in battle. 
 
 Particular attention has been paid to the principles on which 
 the artillery of the Army of the Potomac was organized, and the 
 changes made in that organization, for the reason that it was the 
 most important army of the Nation. Its opponent was the grand 
 army of the Confederacy, in which was concentrated the bone 
 and sinew of the rebellious States, their warlike resources, or- 
 ganized and guided by the highest order of military talent at their 
 command. 
 
 In other armies than that of the Potomac, in their diverse fields 
 of action, the artillery was variously organized, depending greatly 
 upon the character of the country, the magnitude of the oper- 
 ations, including that of the forces engaged, and the views of com- 
 manding generals; but, except in some of the western armies, 
 it will be found, as a rule, that as the war continued, as the 
 resources of the combatants became compressed essentially into 
 two or three well-organized masses, the tendency was to with- 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 93 
 
 draw the artillery from control of subordinate commanders, and 
 place that arm under orders only of generals commanding the 
 larger tactical unit divisions and army corps. 
 
 Although reference has been made to changes of artillery or- 
 ganization in the Army of Northern Virginia, a more particular 
 yet general review of these may not prove uninteresting. 
 
 August 23d, 1 86 1, the chief of artillery of McClellan's army 
 wrote to that general : 
 
 "To insure success it x is of vital importance that the Army of the Potomac 
 should have an overwhelming force of field artillery. To render this the most 
 effective, the batteries should, as far as practicable, consist of regular troops. 
 With every disposition to do their best, the volunteer artillery do not possess 
 the knowledge or experience requisite for thoroughly efficient service. I would 
 therefore recommend that companies of regular artillery may be withdrawn 
 from many of the forts on the Atlantic and Pacific sea-boards and ordered to this 
 point [Washington] at as early a date as practicable, to be mounted as field 
 artillery." 
 
 This, seconded by the influence of the commanding general, 
 had the effect, before the army took the field in the spring of 1862, 
 of increasing the number of regular batteries in McClellan's army 
 from thirteen when this written, to twenty-nine when the cam- 
 paign commenced. The expectation, however, of creating a field 
 artillery overwhelmingly stronger than that of the e^nemy was 
 not realized. The enemy were equally alive to the importance of 
 the measure, meeting gun for gun the artillery of the Union army. 
 Shortly before that battle the Confederate army which met Mc- 
 Clellan at Antietam had seventy-three batteries, to oppose which 
 that general had but sixty-seven; and, although the data is not at 
 hand by which an accurate comparison can be made of the 
 metal-throwing powers of the two artilleries, there is reason to 
 believe that the total number of pieces with each army was about 
 the same. At Gettysburg, General Meade's sixty-seven batteries 
 were met by sixty-eight of the Confederates. Afterwards the 
 number went on increasing until, when preparing for the final 
 struggle in the campaign of 1865, the Army of Northern Virginia 
 embraced eighty-one batteries in its various army corps. 
 
 In the arrangement of this artillery the same principles con- 
 trolled as in the Army of the Potomac, in so far as to lead to 
 forming battalions analogous to our brigades; but in other respects 
 the practice of the two armies was very different. Just prior 
 to the second Bull Run, August 29th~3Oth, 1862, forty-seven 
 
94 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 batteries of General Lee's army were attached to brigades and 
 divisions, while twenty-six were held in reserve. This was long 
 after brigade artillery had become a thing of the past in the Army 
 of the Potomac; but, as to the reserve, the same organization was 
 given it in each of the opposing forces at this time, that is, it 
 embraced about one-third of all the field artillery. 
 
 One year after, when the Army of the Potomac met that of 
 Northern Virginia at Gettysburg, the artillery reserve, having in 
 the interval nearly vanished, (at Antietam it embraced but seven, 
 at Fredericksburg but nine batteries,) was as large in the former 
 as when first organized, while in the latter it had entirely disap- 
 peared. At this time, and afterwards, the Confederate artillery 
 in this army was attached to divisions, each army corps having 
 its own reserve. Here again there was a marked contrast, as 
 divisional artillery was unknown in the Army of the Potomac 
 after Chancellorsville. 
 
 It is proper to place on record the fact that the Confederates 
 were the pioneers in the plan of artillery organization and admin- 
 istration at this time universal in Europe. They were the first to 
 break up and do away with grand army reserves, distributing the 
 artillery to divisions and retaining corps reserves only. Prussia 
 and Austria followed after 1866 and France after 1870; and al- 
 though the* details of both organization and supply are more 
 perfect in those armies than was possible in that of the Confed- 
 eracy, still the prominent and more important features are. those 
 put into practical execution in the Army of Northern Virginia, 
 under General Lee, early in 1863. 
 
 In the west we find that General Albert S. Johnson organized 
 his army October 28th, 1861, in the same manner as McClellan 
 on the Potomac; but afterwards the Confederates in that section 
 had their artillery almost wholly distributed to brigades a faulty 
 system in a large army, delivering as it does piecemeal what 
 should be a powerfully concentrated fire and one which had been 
 abandoned by the most important and best equipped armies on 
 both sides. After General Johnson had given a proper direction 
 to this matter, it is to be wondered at that this objectionable plan 
 should have been resorted to, thus carrying the army backward 
 instead of forward in organization. Whether or not General 
 Beauregard's influence effected this change is not known; yet 
 certain it is that his recommendations of March 4th, 1862, after 
 
ORGANIZATION FIELD SERVICE. 95 
 
 he joined the western army, would, if acted upon favorably, have 
 brought about that result. His proposition, in brief, was to as- 
 sign to "each brigade of 2500 men one battery of six guns, either 
 four smooth-bores and two howitzers, four rifles and two how- 
 itzers, or six rifle guns; to give to each grand division [corre- 
 sponding to corps of Union army] as large an artillery reserve as 
 practicable, and to attach to the staff of the general-in-chief a 
 chief of artillery. ' ' 
 
 In Lieutenant-General J. C. Pemberton's command Depart- 
 ment of Mississippi and East Louisiana as organized in April, 
 1863, there is not discernible any systematic distribution of the 
 artillery, although most, but not all, of the brigades had one 
 battery attached; some of the so-called divisions had artillery 
 reserves, while others had not. The dispersed condition of this 
 army may account for the want of system here manifest. 
 
 When General J. E. Johnston assumed command, after Pem- 
 berton's surrender, he distributed the batteries to brigades in all 
 the infantry divisions, retaining one battalion of three batteries 
 in reserve. The cavalry, numbering three small divisions, had 
 but one battery, as shown by the returns; but it is inferred the 
 reserve was to supply that or any other deficiency. 
 
 At Chickamauga, Bragg' s artillery was distributed one battery 
 to each brigade, except in Long-street's corps from the Army of 
 Northern Virginia, organized as already indicated. Of the forty- 
 three batteries with the army, excluding the battalion of six bat- 
 teries with Longstreet's corps not yet arrived, six were in reserve. 
 
 After Chickamauga, and previous to the battle of Chattanooga, 
 November 23d to 25th, 1863, Bragg' s army was organized into 
 corps, and the artillery then distributed, in battalions of three 
 batteries each, to divisions; seven batteries of the thirty-two with 
 the army constituting a general reserve. 
 
 It will be seen that South as well as North, when necessity for 
 and the great advantage of thorough organization became more 
 apparent, the artillery was assigned in the principal armies to the 
 larger commands, the batteries being arranged in battalions. 
 This was an outgrowth of experience acquired in war, which sifts 
 from crude and ill-digested notions the germs of good they con- 
 tain. If proof were wanting that the true military idea had been 
 seized upon, it will be found in the armies of Europe to-day, 
 where briefer experience has rendered the adoption of the same 
 principles of artillery organization for an active army universal. 
 
96 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. 
 
 General Artillery Reserves have formed a feature of our active 
 army organization at various times, commencing with the Revolu- 
 tion; but the opinions of military men have differed regarding 
 their formation, management, and utility. The reason seems 
 to be that this, as the light artillery brigade, being a creature of 
 active campaign, is not, with us, thought of or provided for in 
 peace, and its existence depends upon the particular views of each 
 army commander, the magnitude of the operations, and the topo- 
 graphical features of the theatre of war. 
 
 We find the artillery of the Revolution was provided, in a 
 limited degree, with this as with most other essentials to a re- 
 spectable field service. As early as August Qth, 1776, General 
 Washington apportioned, in orders, the artillery of the army to 
 infantry brigades, giving each two pieces, while the remainder 
 were directed to be kept parked near headquarters, under the 
 eye of the colonel commanding that arm. In an estimate dated 
 January 3d, 1777, this latter officer, now promoted to brigadier, 
 submitted the following list of the ordnance necessary for the main 
 army to take into the field the ensuing campaign: For seventeen 
 infantry brigades, four pieces to each, total 68; to be 3-pounders, 
 4-pounders, and 6-pounders, brass; and for a reserve, two 24- 
 pounders, four 12-pounders, four 8-inch and eight 5^/2 -inch how- 
 itzers, and twenty 3-pounders, 4-pounders, and 6-pounders, all of 
 brass; or, more than one-third of all the guns were kept direct- 
 ly under the control of the general. That these pieces could be 
 brought up and put into action with effect, the battle at Monmouth 
 gave proof, as did other contests in which the arm acted an honor- 
 able part. In general orders congratulating the army on the 
 affair at Monmouth, the commander-in-chief remarked that he 
 could "with pleasure inform General Knox and his 'officers that 
 the enemy has done them the justice to acknowledge that no 
 artillery could have been better served." Without doubt, how- 
 ever, it was not so much to act a part by throwing its weight at 
 
ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. 97 
 
 vital moments into the scale of battle that the reserve was expected 
 to prove its utility in those days, as by becoming a base of supply 
 for brigade artillery, or a depot where could be sent broken-down 
 guns and materiel to be either repaired, or their places supplied 
 with new. The master mind destined to teach men the true use 
 of an artillery reserve, launched on the foe at the right point 
 with the force of the thunderbolt, had not, at that time, received 
 the impress of a first lesson in the military art. 
 
 Neither the second war with Great Britain nor the operations 
 in Mexico furnish any examples of the use of artillery in the man- 
 ner indicated. During the former, throughout two of its three 
 campaigns the vital powers of the army seem to have been para- 
 lyzed by the want of military knowledge at the War Department, 
 the incompetency of most of the officers who one after another 
 were assigned to command, and the factious, unpatriotic opposi- 
 tion to the war on the part of one of the great political parties. 
 In the Mexican war the forces engaged were too small to render 
 necessary any artillery reserve for fighting purposes; and, be- 
 sides, the efficiency of the horse and modern field batteries was 
 first taught our commanders, the army and the country, in the 
 Rio Grande valley. It is true that under General Taylor were 
 several heavy pieces, i8-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers, 
 which had not the mobility demanded of field artillery; pieces of 
 position they might be called, but they in no sense formed, either 
 in fact or design, an artillery reserve. Under General Scott, on 
 the southern line, the siege train, equipped by the Ordnance 
 Department and manned by its artificers, would, under ordinary 
 circumstances, have formed part of the reserve; but in this 
 instance, as in the other mentioned, there was nothing with the 
 army which could properly be designated by that name. 
 
 Accompanying the Army of the Potomac when it took the field 
 in 1862, there appeared, for the first time in this country, an artil- 
 lery reserve placed upon a proper footing, to be used both for 
 purposes of fighting and of supply, commanded by officers con- 
 versant with its functions, and capable of developing, organizing, 
 and directing its powers. 
 
 Of the two hundred and ninety-nine guns which accompanied 
 McClellan's army, one hundred were in this reserve, with calibres 
 ranging from the 3-inch to the 2o-pounder rifle. The first bri- 
 gade of horse artillery (four batteries) formed part of the reserve, 
 13 
 
98 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 which embraced eighteen of the fifty-two batteries with the army. 
 Its commander was a colonel, and aid-de-camp to the command- 
 ing general, appointed under the act of August 5th, 1861. To 
 assist him there was a regular staff, though it was incomplete. 
 
 The operations attending the withdrawal of the troops from the 
 Peninsula, reforming them for the Virginia arid Maryland cam- 
 paigns, well-nigh swept the reserve from existence. The first 
 troops landed from the Peninsula were hurried forward to the 
 Army of Virginia, and no attention paid to whether they had or 
 had not their regularly assigned artillery; in this way many 
 of its batteries were attached to and remained with divisions. 
 New divisions absorbed many more. When preparing for the 
 Antietam campaign it was found that some batteries had lost 
 more or less guns, others were greatly deficient in men and 
 horses, and a number were unserviceable from these causes 
 combined. Batteries were supplied from the reserve to the 
 corps and divisions deficient in guns, horses were taken from the 
 baggage trains, and men transferred from the infantry ; and by 
 the time the army reached Antietam its artillery was in very fair 
 condition, having been reorganized on the march and in the in- 
 tervals of conflict. On this field the reserve embraced but seven 
 of the sixty-two batteries with the army, the rest having disap- 
 peared as just indicated. The number of divisions had increased 
 from the eight which accompanied McClellan to the Peninsula, to 
 eighteen at Antietam, including the cavalry. These had all to be 
 supplied, and it could only be done by reducing the number of 
 batteries attached to the old divisions and to the artillery reserve. 
 
 Thus matters stood at the battle of Fredericksburg, where but 
 nine of the sixty-nine batteries (two with siege guns being unat- 
 tached) with the army constituted the reserve. The enemy was 
 on the opposite side of the river; and, in order to control his 
 movements, command the town of Fredericksburg, cover the 
 throwing of the bridges and the crossing of the troops, a power- 
 ful and well-sustained artillery fire was necessary. To this end 
 it was determined to temporarily attach to the artillery reserve 
 some of the batteries of the divisions. This being done, they 
 were grouped into four artillery divisions for the work before 
 them, two being made up of seven, one of eight, and one of nine, 
 batteries. It may be remarked that many of these were 20- 
 pounders and 4^ -inch rifles, thus demonstrating, as was done on 
 
ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. 99 
 
 many other occasions, the advisability of carrying heavy guns of 
 position with every army in the field. 
 
 Prior to this battle General Burnside contemplated breaking up 
 the artillery reserve, distributing its batteries to divisions of in- 
 fantry and cavalry, half of which had but two batteries each; but 
 the experience there acquired not only put an end to this, but 
 brought out in stronger light than ever before the necessity of 
 the commanding general retaining a respectable mass of artillery 
 in his own hand to meet the possible exigencies of the conflict. 
 
 One of the specious arguments in favor of breaking up the 
 reserve was, that if artillery en masse were needed, it could be 
 obtained when the occasion arose by withdrawing batteries from 
 troops. This theory was put to a practical test when, as men- 
 tioned, it became necessary to temporarily increase the reserve, 
 while covering the army during its passage of the river in face of 
 the enemy. The theory signally failed; many division command- 
 ers, although the guns were to be restored as the troops crossed, 
 protested against their being taken for this short time, and de- 
 clared they would not be responsible for the consequences. The 
 batteries were, however, restored to the divisions, as had been 
 stipulated they should be, and, as a result, eleven of the nine- 
 teen which debouched into the town were jammed together in the 
 streets, idle spectators of the fight, obstructing the movements of 
 other troops, and in many instances returning to the north bank 
 without having fired a shot. The logic of this circumstance was 
 to negative propositions for placing more artillery at the disposal 
 of subordinate commanders when they could not use what they 
 already had, yet were willing to make its temporary withdrawal 
 a cause of embarrassment to the commanding general. 
 
 At Chancellorsville twelve of the seventy-one batteries were 
 in the reserve, and among- them were several siege batteries, 
 which proved very efficient. The mismanagement here of the 
 artillery, a fact for which the arm itself was not responsible, led to 
 a return to first principles, and an augmentation of the reserve, 
 which at Gettysburg, two months later, embraced twenty-two of 
 the sixty-seven batteries present on the field the proportion to 
 the whole artillery that it bore when McClellan started for the 
 Peninsula. But things did not stop here ; the consolidation of 
 March 23d, 1864, threw still other batteries into the reserve, and 
 when the army moved May 4th, 1864 on the Wilderness cam- 
 
100 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 paign, that organization embraced twenty-four of the fifty light 
 batteries with the army, together with two regiments of foot artil- 
 lery armed as infantry. This was by far the most complete organ- 
 ization the general artillery reserve ever had, and it was that to 
 immediately precede its dissolution. The twenty-four batteries 
 were arranged to brigades of six batteries each, fully appointed 
 and well commanded, while the foot artillery served as escorts, 
 guards, skilled workmen for the various duties devolving on that 
 species of troops, and supplied on requisition details to keep the 
 batteries full. But the campaign just opening was in a country 
 with few and bad roads; it was therefore desirable to reduce to 
 the utmost practicable limit the impedimenta; the fighting was in 
 places where artillery could only with difficulty be manoeuvred, 
 or, rather, could not be manoeuvred at all, and it was resolved to 
 send all surplus guns back to Washington. The details of this 
 reduction are given elsewhere. It suffices here to remark that 
 its disappearance was short-lived, as, during the summer, it was 
 partially resuscitated with as many as eleven batteries at one time; 
 that the morning report of the Army of the Potomac, March 3ist, 
 1865, shows the artillery reserve contained 35 officers, 1127 en- 
 listed men, 47 guns, and some mortars; that on the 6th of April 
 a brigadier-general was assigned to its command, and that before 
 the brief campaign ended it embraced nineteen of the forty-two 
 batteries actually with that army. 
 
 As with other parts of the combatant arms, the most important 
 service of the reserve was by hard blows to help beat the enemy, 
 and this, early in its history, it did at Malvern Hill, where 
 every gun was employed, and with such effect that it confessedly 
 saved the army from serious disaster. At Antietam, Fredericks- 
 burg, and Gettysburg every battery present with the army was 
 sent into action, and always at critical moments. The belief 
 which, with many other erroneous ideas, prevailed at the be- 
 ginning of the war, that a reserve was to be kept out of the battle, 
 was, not figuratively speaking but in fact, effectually exploded by 
 its shells at Malvern Hill, and its subsequent services in action 
 sustained the reputation it there earned. If a particular point was 
 to be defended as the key to the position, its guns were placed 
 there; when, as we have seen was the case at Fredericksburg, 
 bridges were to be thrown and the army crossed in presence of 
 the enemy, it was the reserve artillery, augmented by batteries 
 
ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. IOI 
 
 withdrawn if necessary from the troops, which covered the peril- 
 ous undertaking. These facts set at rest the suspicion that this 
 mass of artillery was, merely because of its designation, to play 
 a secondary part on the field of battle a suspicion founded on 
 ignorance of the functions of the various parts of every army- 
 organized upon sound military principles, and of which the first 
 in our service was the Army of the Potomac under McClellan. 
 
 Batteries attached to divisions and corps losing their efficiency, 
 either from the want of men or materiel, the incompetency of their 
 officers, or other casualties of service, were at once 1 replaced from 
 the reserve, thus keeping the army corps fully effective, and giv- 
 ing the broken-down batteries the necessary opportunity and 
 supervision to restore them. In this way was maintained the 
 efficiency of the artillery of the whole army; but its utility as a 
 centre of supply for this purpose was apparently never appreciated 
 by the army itself until after May i6th, 1864, when its batteries, 
 with a diminished number of guns, were distributed to army 
 corps. When, from the natural accidents of service, after this, 
 batteries became run down in men or materiel, there was no sat- 
 isfactory way for the corps to take care of them; they were 
 accordingly sent to the army ammunition train, which was all that 
 was left of the old reserve, to recuperate and be refitted. Thus 
 this train became the nucleus around which a new reserve grew 
 up, without special orders, and merely from the force of circum- 
 stances; it lacked, however, the well established administrative 
 machinery of its predecessor, which led to delays in the perform- 
 ance of duties assigned it; but for this it was not responsible. 
 
 From its earliest organization the reserve was accompanied by 
 an ammunition train, which was conspicuously useful on numerous 
 occasions. At Malvern Hill its one hundred wagons supplied 
 the guns engaged after (as was the case in many instances) their 
 ammunition chests were emptied. The division trains had been 
 mixed up with the baggage wagons, and sent away with them. 
 Had it not been for this ammunition column many of the batteries 
 would have been idle during a great part of the battle. 
 
 Though not to such a degree, the same trouble existed at An- 
 tietam, there being a great deficiency in the divisions of certain 
 kinds of ammunition, which this column supplied. At Gettysburg 
 the Third Corps left all its artillery ammunition behind, the Sec- 
 
102 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 ond Corps half its trains, and many others were, from similar or 
 other causes, deficient in this essential item. 
 
 There had been formed while preparing for this campaign, and 
 attached to the reserve, a special ammunition column containing 
 twenty rounds per gun for every gun in the army over and above 
 the number (two hundred and fifty rounds per gun) fixed by 
 orders as the campaign supply. From this source was mainly 
 drawn ammunition to meet the deficiencies mentioned, the disas- 
 trous consequences of which were in this manner luckily provided 
 against.* 
 
 There were expended in the three days of this battle 32,781 
 rounds, averaging over 100 rounds per gun. Of this number 
 many were lost by explosions or other accidents to limbers and 
 caissons. The supply, as just seen, was 270 rounds per gun; 
 hence there was sufficient left to fill 'the chests and enable the 
 army to fight another battle. There was for a short time, during 
 the progress of the fight, a fear that the ammunition would give 
 out, caused by the large demands made by commanders who had 
 left their trains, or part of them, behind. It was in this emer- 
 gency that the special ammunition column supplied every requi- 
 sition made upon it. 
 
 When the general reserve was broken up, in May, 1864, it was 
 this column which was ordered to be retained, with a battalion of 
 foot artillery, armed as infantry, for escort. Several Coehorn mor- 
 tars a species of cannon proving so useful during the progress 
 of the campaign as to cause the number to be afterwards increas- 
 ed were also retained with it. These formed the groundwork 
 on which, as has been mentioned, a new artillery reserve grew up 
 to vindicate the principle of this organization in a large army. 
 
 The establishment, fitting out, and maintenance of ammunition 
 columns was a part of the duties of the reserve to which no glory 
 attached. In time of peace, particularly, very little attention is 
 
 * This special ammunition train was organized by Brigadier-General Henry 
 J. Hunt, chief of artillery of the army, upon his own motion, and without spe- 
 cial orders to that effect. Upon his requesting it, the quartermaster of the 
 Army of the Potomac furnished the wagons. General Meade knew nothing 
 about it until some time afterwards. The intelligent foresight evinced in the 
 formation of this train becomes apparent when we contemplate the situation 
 at Gettysburg, where, owing to the fact that much ammunition with some of 
 the commands was left behind in the hurry to arrive on the field, its absence 
 might have led to serious embarrassment, not to say disastrous results. 
 
ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. 103 
 
 given to these matters in our army; in war the machinery for their 
 adjustment is complicated; yet they are of the first importance. 
 In Europe this is not only well understood, but the practice is in 
 accordance therewith, the arrangements for supplying ammunition 
 to a battery being as clearly defined as is the organization of tin* 
 battery itself. Under control of the artillery arm, through the 
 ammunition columns and depots, there extends an unbroken chain 
 of supply connecting the batteries in line of battle with the arse- 
 nals in their rear. With us, requisitions for ammunition have first 
 to be submitted to one department, and, when obtained, turned 
 over to another for transportation to the front. All ammunition 
 should be transported in caissons, in charge of properly organized 
 companies, and not, as with us, in ordinary army wagons. It 
 was to attain this desirable end, at least partially, that all caissons 
 were retained in May, 1864, when many of the reserve guns 
 were sent to the rear. The chief of artillery with the army should 
 have charge of these columns, the immediate commanders of 
 which should be officers selected from that arm. In this way 
 only can supplies under all circumstances, on the field of battle as 
 elsewhere, be certainly provided when wanted. 
 
 In the Union armies other than that of the Potomac there was 
 not the completeness of organization inaugurated by McClellan; 
 hence in few of them % is there found any trace of an artillery re- 
 serve. In the Army of the Ohio such an organization was not 
 deemed necessary by either Buell or Rosecrans; but General 
 Thomas, who relieved the latter October igth, 1863, distributed 
 eighteen of his batteries to divisions, while a general reserve 
 embraced twelve more, including the six regular batteries with 
 that army. 
 
 In the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia there was, as 
 early as the Peninsula campaign, a large artillery reserve. It 
 does not seem, however, to have well answered its purpose, as 
 we are informed by one of the first artillery authorities of their 
 service that this body, ' ' not being in intimate relation with the 
 infantry, which always develops the situation, and being invari- 
 ably put on the march either behind the infantry commands or on 
 some road to itself, was never promptly available on an emer- 
 gency. Indeed, if the history of the general reserve artillery 
 during its entire existence be investigated, it will be found that, 
 although excellent in material and comparatively so in equip- 
 
104 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 ment, the service that it rendered was greatly disproportionate to 
 its strength." It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that in 
 February, 1863, all the reserve, except two battalions aggregating 
 six batteries, were assigned to corps, and that when a new corps 
 was formed in June of that year these two battalions were taken 
 away and the general reserve broken up, never to reappear. Each 
 army corps had its own train to which disabled guns were sent, 
 from which spare parts were supplied, and which thus acted for 
 the corps the part that- the general reserve train is supposed to 
 perform for all the corps of the army. 
 
 The similarity of artillery organization adopted by the Confed- 
 erates at this time to that now practiced in Europe maybe judged 
 of by the following: At Gettysburg, each division of General Lee's 
 army had attached to it an artillery battalion of three or four bat- 
 teries, while two battalions formed the corps reserve; in the Ger- 
 man army, each division of infantry has a division of artillery 
 of three or four batteries, and the corps artillery (called corps 
 reserve with us) embraces two divisions of three batteries each; 
 in the English army, each infantry division has attached three 
 batteries, and the corps artillery embraces five batteries; the same 
 principles govern in Austria and Italy; and in all these armies, as 
 in that of Northern Virginia, there is no general artillery reserve. 
 
 It must not be accepted from what precedes that the artillery 
 organization of the Army of Northern Virginia was more in con- 
 sonance with advanced military ideas than was that of the Army 
 of the Potomac. Judged only by the present organization of 
 European armies, this might be conceded; but, on the other hand, 
 there are reasons disassociated from any army, and based on gen- 
 eral principles, for maintaining a general artillery reserve. 
 
 The extended fronts of modern lines of battle render rapid con- 
 centration at a decisive point, when the enemy has shown his hand, 
 the natural method of attack. "After a defensive army has de- 
 veloped its strength, and the weak parts of its line have been as- 
 certained, a powerful reserve artillery will have little difficulty in 
 bringing about a preponderating cross or enfilade fire upon an 
 exposed flank already engaged in front, or upon one or more 
 points of a defensive line, that will inevitably cause disaster. ' ' The 
 only certain way to have artillery ready when wanted, as here 
 described, is to have it massed under the direct control of the 
 commanding general. Division and corps commanders view with 
 
ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. 165 
 
 alarm any attempts to take from them their batteries in time of 
 action witness Fredericksburg ! while to the practical impos- 
 sibility of withdrawing artillery from the corps, and bringing it to 
 bear upon the decisive point of attack, was attributed by some of 
 the ablest generals of the Confederacy the failure of PickeU's" 
 charge at Gettysburg. 
 
 From the success attending the employment of the German 
 artillery in the war of 1870-' 71, it seems to be a widely accepted 
 principle that the entire artillery of the main body ought to be 
 kept at the head of the columns and brought up at the very com- 
 mencement of an attack, when all the guns should go at once into 
 action the objects to be attained being to prevent the enemy de- 
 stroying the artillery in detail as it forms, and also by numbers 
 and concentration of fire to obtain ascendency of the latter as 
 quickly as possible. 
 
 It is very desirable that these objects be attained; but it is not 
 admitted that this is the only proper method, nor must we lose 
 sight of other important duties of the artillery arm. Nothing is 
 more fallacious than to suppose that, a certain tactical principle 
 having been practiced successfully, it must needs prove equally so 
 under all other circumstances; and the brilliant movements of the 
 artillery in that war are not likely to prove an exception when 
 attempted against a formidable and enterprising foe.* 
 
 Bringing from column into line to the front the large mass of 
 artillery takes time, and the mass extends over considerable 
 ground, where it is but very inadequately protected until the 
 infantry in rear arrives; thus a fearless and energetic enemy is 
 given an opportunity of which he would not be slow to avail 
 himself. When the other troops arrive the very length of line oc- 
 cupied by the artillery may seriously impede their deployment, 
 and cause them to mask the guns while doing so. It offers from the 
 first a conspicuous object for the concentrated fire of the enemy; 
 essays what must always be considered the hazardous experiment 
 of leaving the general empty-handed to meet the critical phases 
 of battle; and even though it be possible, when an emergency 
 
 * What might not the French have accomplished had they, at 10 o'clock A. 
 M., September 1st, 1870, energetically attacked the poorly supported mass of 
 guns, with the defile 'of St. Albert at its back, on the fatal field of Sedan 1 
 The desperate valor of Ducrot's last effort with the cavalry came four hours 
 too late ! 
 
 H 
 
106 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 arises, to take from corps and divisions to supply new demands 
 elsewhere in action, it would at best be using troops partially 
 exhausted, while those from a general reserve would be fresher 
 for their work. It is one of the first tactical principles in the 
 use of the arm that artillery should avail itself of accidents of the 
 ground, adding by the position taken up to the effectiveness of 
 its fire. If it be massed regardless of this principle, much of its 
 power will be sacrificed. 
 
 In every carefully selected line of battle there will be positions 
 of importance key points the successful defense of, or attack on, 
 which will decide the conflict. These should be both attacked 
 and defended by heavier guns, which in every well-appointed re- 
 serve forms part of its armament. When bridges have to be 
 thrown or rivers otherwise crossed in face of the enemy, these 
 guns, even if they cannot properly be attached to troops, will be 
 found, if not indispensable, at least greatly to facilitate the difficult 
 operation. 
 
 Let, then, corps and division artillery come into action with 
 their respective commands, and a reserve, under the direct control 
 of the commanding general, be kept free to act at his bidding at 
 the supreme moment of the battle.* 
 
 Napoleon first taught the tactical use and power of this organ- 
 ization. Having developed the strength and position of his ad- 
 versary, he brought up at the right time and place the artillery 
 reserve .to sweep everything before it, preparatory to advancing 
 a strong column to penetrate and roll up the enemy's line. These 
 tactics were little practiced during the Civil war, the nearest ap- 
 proach to it being the Confederate attack of July 3d at Gettys- 
 burg; but this was lacking in the elements which made Napoleon's 
 tactics formidable, viz., a sweeping of the ground at which the 
 assault was to be made by a powerful and sustained fire from 
 fresh masses of -artillery held in reserve for this very purpose. 
 
 Rapidity and precision of modern fire render future success- 
 ful attacks in column improbable; but the extended line in which 
 the column is now deployed will offer opportunities for decisive 
 results if promptly taken advantage of, and artillery must be at 
 
 * At the battle of Gravelotte, Prince Frederic Charles, commanding the Sec- 
 ond Army, held the corps artillery of the Third Army Corps directly under his 
 orders as an artillery reserve. 
 
ORGANIZATION ARTILLERY RESERVES. icy 
 
 hand to do the work. This can certainly be depended upon only 
 when held at the commander's disposal. 
 
 In the United States there is another than the purely tactical 
 reason here given for the organization of an artillery reserve in a 
 large army like that of the Potomac. It arises from considerations 
 affecting the composition of such armies. From necessity they 
 are composed of volunteers, with a little leaven from the regular 
 army to set an example in discipline and in methods of adminis- 
 tration. A reserve in such an army, under an efficient officer, will 
 be an absolutely necessary source whence supplies may be drawn, 
 including replenished and properly-equipped batteries, to take the 
 places of those that have been run down and knocked to pieces. 
 It is also necessary in such an army that the commanding general 
 should have at his bidding and immediately under his control a 
 powerful weapon, such as this is, to throw upon the vital point 
 when the latter is developed, either to pave the way for piercing 
 the enemy's line, or to repel his onslaught. 
 
 If we are to abandon well-established principles and adopt the 
 practices, at present in high repute, of certain military nations, 
 without considering the different circumstances under which our 
 armies are raised and take the field, it is difficult to indicate at 
 what point in the model system we should commence to copy. 
 If it be not at the fountain-head the plan for recruitment, by 
 which each man is compelled to take his turn with the colors the 
 result may not be the same with us as with those who lay the foun- 
 dation for success in that true principle of democracy universal 
 service in the ranks of the army. 
 
IO8 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 From the organization of the colonial forces, in 1775, the ar- 
 tillery took and maintained an advanced position. Numerous 
 artillery companies, formed in the principal cities, and invariably 
 composed of the first young men of the community, gave re- 
 spectability to the arm, prestige to its service, and a personnel 
 far above the average in character, intelligence, and professional 
 attainments. The question of the relative rank of its officers with 
 those of the infantry and cavalry had been fought over in England, 
 and decided, in 1751, in favor of the artillery. Since then the 
 superior scientific knowledge of its commissioned personnel in 
 the mother country had raised that arm still higher in its own 
 and in the estimation of others; while in the colonies, due to 
 causes just mentioned, it was regarded as a more elevated branch 
 of service than any except the engineers. There was no aristoc- 
 racy. The high-born commissioned gentlemen of the English 
 infantry and cavalry, whose deeds of bravery lent honor to the 
 troops they led, and gave eclat to those services, were not to be 
 found among the forces assembled to oppose them, where, as 
 regards birth, all, in theory at least, stood on the same plane, and 
 where, therefore, other things being equal, the better education of 
 the artillery officers not unnaturally raised that branch of service 
 in public esteem. Colonel Gridley, commander of the first artil- 
 lery regiment, was the most accomplished and experienced artil- 
 lerist and engineer in the colonies, and, though too old for the 
 duty, his selection in the first instance evinces the belief which 
 prevailed that to be a competent artillery officer required both 
 attainments and acknowledged ability. 
 
 The provisions of Articles XLVIII and XLIX of War, adopted 
 by the continental Congress June 3oth, 1775, strengthens this 
 general view of the subject. It was declared by the former that 
 "all officers, conductors, gunners, matrosses, drivers, or any other 
 persons whatsoever receiving pay or hire in the service of the 
 continental artillery, shall be governed by the aforesaid rules and 
 
ADMINISTRATION. lOQ 
 
 articles, and shall be subject to be tried by courts-martial, in like 
 manner with the officers and soldiers of the continental troops;" 
 and by the latter, that "for differences arising amongst them- 
 selves, or in matters relating solely to their own corps, the courts- 
 martial may be composed of their own officers; but where~a 
 sufficient number of such officers cannot be assembled, or in mat- 
 ters wherein other corps are interested, the officers of artillery 
 shall sit in courts-martial with the officers of the other corps." 
 This language might leave in doubt whether officers of artillery 
 were considered too good, or not quite good enough, to sit on 
 courts-martial with those of other corps. When made part of 
 the English code, whence they were transcribed bodily into our 
 own, they were intended to establish that officers of artillery were 
 as good as those of other arms a fact which the infantry and 
 cavalry had strenuously denied. The origin and significance of 
 the law was, however, when adopted by the continental Congress, 
 either misunderstood or lost sight of, and an interpretation given 
 it the reverse of what was originally intended the artillery was 
 placed a little above the others. The air of superiority thereby 
 engendered was no doubt disagreeable. To curb their pride and 
 let them know their true position, Congress, in the revised Arti- 
 cles of War adopted September 3Oth, 1776, provided that, when 
 sitting on courts-martial with those of other corps, officers of the 
 artillery should take "rank according to the dates of their re- 
 spective commissions, and no otherwise" 
 
 That the artillery was not unconscious of its position there 
 is abundant evidence. The fact crops out in the correspondence 
 of the times, particularly of its own members, and was encouraged 
 in various ways by the Revolutionary Government. When the 
 provincial Congress of New York authorized Captain (afterwards 
 Colonel) Lamb to raise a company of artillery, and then resolved 
 to attach the company to McDougall's regiment, the sturdy cap- 
 tain objected "that it placed the artillery on a level with the in- 
 fantry a practice unprecedented in any service," and thereupon 
 tendered his resignation. This was not accepted, but, instead, 
 the obnoxious resolution was repealed. In his estimates Colonel 
 Pickering, when quartermaster-general, inserted the items forage 
 and horses for captains of artillery, who, at least until 1782, were 
 mounted at Government expense a consideration shown these 
 officers, the quartermaster-general remarked, based not on law, 
 
110 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 but on unbroken custom, which he was not at liberty to disre- 
 gard. 
 
 The pay of the artillery, established by Congress, was better 
 than that of either the infantry or cavalry. The first adjustment 
 of the pay of the army provided, among other things: Per month, 
 captain of infantry, $20; of artillery, $26^ ; lieutenant of infantry, 
 $13^5; of artillery, $18^; sergeant of infantry, $8; of artillery, 
 $8^; private of infantry, $6^i; of artillery (matross), $6f. When, 
 May 2yth, 1778, the different arms of service were first uniformly 
 organized,, the pay of certain officers was established as follows: 
 Per month, colonel of artillery, $100; of cavalry, $93^; of infan- 
 try, $75; major of artillery, $62^; of cavalry, $60; of infantry, 
 $50; a surgeon of artillery, $75; of cavalry and infantry, each 
 $60. 
 
 A superiority claimed by the members of a particular branch of 
 service, and recognized by Congress, could not have been main- 
 tained without something of solid merit to rest upon. The foun- 
 dation consisted in (i) a department controlled by a single direct- 
 ing mind, intelligent, fertile in resources, imbued with a love of 
 the special duties of the arm; (2) excellent subordinate officers, 
 any one of whom was known to be equal to the performance of 
 any duty the exigencies of service might require. There was, 
 besides, even among the best informed people, a very general 
 ignorance of the art and science of artillery, which no doubt added 
 to the seeming importance of those versed in what was generally 
 considered occult. Referring to the arrival of a captain of artil- 
 lery with his company en route to join in Montgomery's invasion 
 of Canada, Schuyler wrote to the commander-in-chief : ' ' I am glad 
 he has arrived, as there was not in this whole department a single 
 person who understood the business. ' ' 
 
 Regarding the qualifications of the personnel, Knox wrote : 
 ' ' No officer should be appointed to the artillery who does not 
 possess a proper knowledge of the mathematics and other nec- 
 essary abilities for the nature of the service." Not only were 
 they able to point and fire guns, but down at least to captains, 
 inclusive they were conversant with the laboratory arts, knew 
 enough of engineering to build a work adapted to the site, and 
 place the guns therein advantageously for defense. 
 
 Early in the war the necessity of procuring, fpr the service of 
 the colonies, scientific engineers was made manifest, and many 
 
ADMINISTRATION. Ill 
 
 there were who, ignorant of the capacity of our own artillery 
 officers, imagined it would be necessary to secure, as well, officers 
 of experience in that department. To this end, Mr. Silas Deane, 
 the agent of the colonies at Paris, entered into negotiations with 
 several artillerists of the French army. Benjamin Franklin, before" 
 leaving this country as one of the commissioners at that capital, 
 had also entered into correspondence on the subject. On June 
 loth, 1776, Barbue Dubourg wrote the distinguished patriot: 
 
 " Many military men agree in thinking that the colonies have more need of 
 artillerymen than of engineers. This is particularly so with the most capable 
 judge in Europe, the Count De St. Germain. Mr. De Gribeauval, lieutenant-gen- 
 eral of the King's armies and director-general of artillery, thinks you ought to 
 have three officers of that arm : one to be chief, and set the whole going, one 
 to direct in the northern and one in the southern colonies. For chief he has 
 fixed his eye, with St. Germain, upon Mr. Du Coudray, whose talents in Corsica 
 raised him over one hundred and eighty seniors." 
 
 Upon these flattering recommendations Du Coudray was ac- 
 cordingly employed to collect the cannon, ammunition, arms, and 
 clothing purchased by the colonies pending the settlement of the 
 terms on which he could enter their service. (See Appendix B 
 [i].) The arrival of this gentleman with a retinue of officers on 
 the 2Oth of April, 1777, produced an explosion in the army which 
 threatened serious consequences, several of the first officers, in- 
 cluding Knox, Sullivan, and Greene, protesting to the President 
 against the confirmation of the Deane- Coudray compact in such 
 vigorous language that Congress voted their letters to be an in- 
 fringement on the liberties of the people, as tending to influence 
 the decisions of that body, and called upon the offenders to 
 apologize for so "singular an impropriety." This was not done, 
 however; the pressure brought to bear was too strong for Con- 
 gress to resist, and the compact was disapproved, on the ground 
 that Mr. Deane had exceeded his authority. It was at this time 
 that General Washington, writing to the President of Congress, 
 spoke of Knox as " one of the most valuable officers in the service, 
 a man of great military reading, sound judgment, and clear con- 
 ceptions, and who, combating almost innumerable difficulties in 
 the department he fills, has placed the artillery upon a footing 
 that does him the greatest honor. ' ' From this time on there was 
 no attempt made to supplant the commander of the artillery in 
 the position which, according to the highest authority in the land, 
 
112 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, tJ. S. ARMY. 
 
 he was so eminently qualified to fill, or to disturb by foreign in- 
 fluences the working's of a department which, at that time and 
 afterwards, met every demand of service promptly and efficiently. 
 The administration of artillery affairs will, for convenience of 
 arrangement and clearness of thought, be considered under the fol- 
 lowing heads: (i) Instruction. (2) Duties: (A) technical; (B) as an 
 arm of service. (3) Duties of the chief of artillery in the field. 
 
 INSTRUCTION. 
 
 Aside from the experience acquired in war, this may be con- 
 sidered under three heads: First, Instruction at Posts; second, 
 Instruction at Schools; and third, Practice- Firing. The first is 
 both (A) practical, and (B) theoretical. The second embraces (c) 
 schools for foot artillery, and (D) the field batteries. 
 
 INSTRUCTION AT POSTS: (A) PRACTICAL. 
 
 During the Revolutionary war the experience of the field 
 supplied that practical instruction which enabled the artillery to 
 come to the front rank in the army. Aside, however, from the 
 mere duties of the gunner pointing and firing the piece the 
 commander of that arm and many of his officers improved every 
 opportunity to elevate their branch of service by both experiment 
 and research, all conducted with a view to rendering themselves 
 and those under their command more efficient in the field. Until 
 February, 1778, the commander of the artillery had charge of the 
 procuring all arms and stores, i. e. , warlike materiel. In this ser- 
 vice he employed many civilians, some companies of artificers, and 
 such artillery officers as were available and whose services could 
 be thus utilized to advantage. Although nothing elaborate was 
 attempted in those primitive times, the experience of all kinds 
 gained by artillery officers was such as to make them thoroughly 
 efficient in their specialty. 
 
 Although the establishment (1778) of the department of com- 
 missary-general of military stores took from the artillery the man- 
 ufacture of materiel and the charge of the arsenals, the necessity 
 for schooling of this kind for officers of that arm was fully ap- 
 preciated; and accordingly, the next year, February i3th, 1779, it 
 was resolved by Congress ' ' that, when it shall be thought neces- 
 sary, the commanding officer of artillery shall send officers of ar- 
 
INSTRUCTION AT POSTS: PRACTICAL. 11^ 
 
 tillery to visit the laboratories, foundries, and manufactories, to 
 the intent that they may thereby gain an insight into the mechanical 
 branches of their profession. And such number of artillery officers 
 as, in the opinion of the commanding officer of artillery, with the 
 concurrence of the commander-in-chief, can be spared from their 
 duties in the field, shall, at every convenient season, be stationed at 
 all or any of the principal laboratories, to be instructed in the labora- 
 tory art, that a knowledge thereof may be disseminated through 
 the corps." The same resolution of Congress provided for a sur- 
 veyor of ordnance, to be taken from the colonels of artillery. This 
 officer was really an inspector of artillery manufactories and ma- 
 teriel, and the creation of this office again brought these matters 
 under the surveillance of the commander of that arm, who was 
 thus in fact, though not in name, made chief of artillery technical 
 affairs. 
 
 From this time on, the manufacture, inspection, and acceptance 
 of artillery materiel were duties performed by artillery and ord- 
 nance officers acting jointly; the manufacture, however, being 
 almost exclusively intrusted to the latter, under instructions pre- 
 scribed by General Knox. It is deserving of notice and remem- 
 brance that, in the midst of campaigns, many artillery officers of 
 the Revolution not only practiced their profession in the field, 
 but in the inclement seasons supplemented the knowledge there 
 acquired by researches in the laboratory and workshop. In this 
 way practice and theory went hand in hand. The result was that 
 no branch of the army stood so high, professionally, at the end of 
 that war as did the artillery. 
 
 From the close of the Revolution until the end of the eighteenth 
 century the artillery did little else than infantry duty. It was 
 armed as infantry even when manning the small field pieces which 
 were taken into the Indian country. What technical duties it 
 was called upon to perform in this interval, the writer has not 
 been able to determine. It is presumed, however, that they were 
 limited to making or repairing carriages. Certainly the require- 
 ments of the service were very meagre, and all artillery supplies 
 were obtained, by contract, under the direct orders either of the 
 Secretary of War, or of the Treasury Department. If artillery 
 officers had anything to do with the matter, it was doubtless to 
 act as inspectors, the necessity for which, in order that uniformity 
 might be introduced, was so generally recognized, that, when the 
 15 
 
114 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 army was augmented in anticipation of war with France, in 1798, 
 an inspector of artillery for the army was authorized to be taken 
 from the artillery arm. He was the legitimate successor to the 
 surveyor of ordnance of 1779, although Congress had defined the 
 duties of the latter but not those of the inspector, which were left 
 to be regulated by the War Department. Colonel Louis Tousard, 
 commanding the Second Regiment of artillerists and engineers, was, 
 April i4th, 1801, appointed inspector of artillery, his commission 
 dating back to May 26th, 1800, when, it is presumed, he formally 
 assumed the function of the office, although prior even to this 
 date he had acted as inspector, as appears from his work, The 
 Artillerist's Companion. His duties were: (i) to take an inven- 
 tory of all ordnance and ordnance stores, note where kept, and see 
 that they were properly cared for; (2) inspect all artillery materiel 
 after manufacture; (3) devise models for all such materiel, and 
 allow no deviation therefrom in construction. Scarcely had Col- 
 onel Tousard assumed the direction of affairs when the reduction 
 of the army, March i6th, 1802, retired him from active service. 
 Although it was questioned by some of the best authorities whether 
 that act abolished the office of inspector of artillery, it was held by 
 the War Department that it did. 
 
 The law reducing and reorganizing the army provided eight 
 artificers to each artillery company, whereas there were only four 
 each of sergeants and corporals; moreover, the pay of each artificer 
 was $10 per month, the same as that of a cadet and more than a 
 sergeant-major. The object of this apparently singular provision 
 was to convert each artillery post into a small arsenal, where 
 would be manufactured all the gun carriages and other artillery 
 materiel required in service, except the guns and projectiles; hence 
 the proportionately great number of mechanics and their com- 
 paratively very high pay. These mechanics continued in service 
 until the reorganization of March 3Oth, 1814, although in the 
 meantime the ordnance department had assumed their functions 
 as constructors of artillery mat6riel. 
 
 It must not be presumed for a moment that the services per- 
 formed by these artificers were merely nominal. This was far from 
 being the case. The records of the War Department covering 
 this period are, to a great extent, preserved; and they evince that 
 at all the posts garrisoned by artillery, either in the interior or 
 on the sea-board, the manufacture of materiel of all kinds, except 
 
INSTRUCTION AT POSTS: PRACTICAL. 115 
 
 that of the foundry, was very generally carried on, particularly 
 under the business-like administration of Secretary Dearborn. 
 Although this enabled officers to acquire valuable practical ex- 
 perience, it of necessity led to great diversity in constructing the 
 same articles, as Colonel Burbeck had never, like Tousard, been 
 authorized and directed to prepare working models and then to 
 see that they were adhered to. 
 
 With the organization of the ordnance department the labor 
 devolving on the artillerists, and for performing which the artifi- 
 cers had been provided, was transferred to that department, one 
 of the duties of the commissary-general of ordnance being ' ' to 
 direct the construction of all carriages, and every apparatus for 
 ordnance, for garrison and field service, and all ammunition 
 wagons, pontons, and travelling forges." The artificers were 
 indeed retained until the reducing act of March 3oth, 1814, but 
 their occupation was gone, and the officers were deprived of the 
 practical experience secured them by the law of 1802. 
 
 From 1802 until May i4th, 1812, when the ordnance depart- 
 ment was organized, artillery officers had in charge, as part of 
 their practical duties, the manufacture of whatsoever materiel the 
 service required at their various stations. The colonel of the 
 regiment of artillerists was the principal, though by no means the 
 only, inspector of artillery, having in that capacity succeeded to the 
 duties formerly devolving on Colonel Tousard. 
 
 From the date of the establishment of this department until 
 1821, when it was merged in the artillery, the practical duties of the 
 latter were confined, as at present, to taking care of and manoeu- 
 vring their guns on the field or elsewhere, and to drills at their 
 posts. It was made the business of the inspectors-general of the 
 army, among other things, to report half-yearly the progress 
 made by each regiment or corps in military discipline in general, 
 and particularly in knowledge of the evolutions prescribed for the 
 practice of the troops whether the officers knew their duties, and 
 were able and willing to perform them. There was during this 
 time no uniform system of artillery materiel. The text-books 
 authorized were meagre in detail; so it is fair to infer that the 
 course of practical instruction for the artillery, from the end of the 
 war of 1812 until the reorganization of 1821, was very limited. 
 
 It was the wish of Secretary Calhoun to place the artillery in 
 this country on something like the same plane it occupied in 
 
Il6 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Europe. To this end, under his supervision, the ordnance de- 
 partment was merged in the artillery at the reorganization men- 
 tioned. This was maintained until the partial re-establishment 
 of that department in 1832, and its final resuscitation as a staff 
 corps of the army in 1838; for, although under the provisions of 
 the act of 1832 lieutenants of artillery alone were eligible for 
 detached service with the ordnance, it was not the practice after 
 1838 to detail them on that service. In the meantime other in- 
 fluences had been brought to bear in the matter of artillery instruc- 
 tion. The school of practice at Fortress Monroe, to which refer- 
 ence will hereafter be made, was one. Lieutenant Daniel Tyler 
 of the artillery had, in 1829, secured complete drawings of the 
 French stock-trail system of gun carriage, limber, caisson, &c. 
 In 1830 several were constructed, and that series of experiments 
 begun which resulted in the adoption of the system of artillery 
 substantially as it exists to-day. 
 
 From the date of breaking up the artillery school of practice, 
 in 1836, at the beginning of the Seminole war, down to the Mexi- 
 can war, practical instruction was confined, of necessity, to drills 
 with various kinds of old-fashioned artillery with which, in limited 
 quantities, the army was supplied. But there was inaugurated 
 during this period a system of instruction which, for practical 
 benefits, were it properly carried out, could not be surpassed. 
 Reference is here made to artillery target practice, first in our 
 service enjoined and regulated by General Orders No. 21, series 
 of 1842, Adjutant-General's Office. The provisions of this order 
 will be found embraced in paragraphs 72 to 85, inclusive, Regula- 
 tions of 1847, and, with slight modifications, paragraphs 57 to 70, 
 Regulations of 1863. Article XXXVII, of Regulations of 1881, 
 contains the rules of artillery practice originally adopted in 1842, 
 with all subsequent modifications. However slight may have 
 been the facilities for this practice, it cannot be doubted that 
 the institution of the system of firing at targets was most impor- 
 tant. The practical value of the experience thus acquired, if the 
 firing be conducted properly, can scarcely be overestimated; and 
 it may be looked upon as second to no other means of acquiring 
 valuable knowledge now open to the artillery arm. 
 
 At the date of the Mexican war the new system of field ar- 
 tillery, based upon the researches of Lieutenant Tyler, before 
 mentioned, supplemented by those of numerous artillery and ord- 
 
INSTRUCTION AT POSTS: PRACTICAL. Iiy 
 
 nance boards, had become familiar to the army. The labors of 
 that officer, of these boards, and of the distinguished head of the 
 ordnance department, Colonel Bomford, resulted in supplying, 
 also, about the same time, new siege and sea-coast armaments. 
 In 1851 tactics for mountain and heavy artillery were also supplied 
 the service, so that the ten years from 1850 to 1860 were more 
 favorable for practical instruction of artillery at posts than any 
 previous equal interval had been. More attention was directed 
 to the subject by the authorities than before, and the re-establish- 
 ment of the artillery school of practice in 1857 was an encour- 
 aging step. This was followed May Qth, 1859, by the promul- 
 gation of General Orders No. 10, Adjutant-General's Office, 
 directing the establishment of a more complete and systematic 
 course of practical and theoretical instruction. It failed of any 
 useful purpose, for the reason that thereby the artillery was scat- 
 tered over the interior of the continent, and, as a result, experience 
 obtained under the newly- inaugurated system was of little value. 
 The scattering of the arm, the field batteries especially, was par- 
 ticularly unfortunate; nor did more practical good result to those 
 companies serving as infantry at posts which, by the order, were 
 organized as artillery schools of instruction. One provision of this 
 order, however, deserves particular notice; and if ever any system 
 of instruction is to be made of value, it will be by enforcing its re- 
 quirements. The feature here referred to was the appointment of 
 inspectors of artillery, whose duties were, under the direction of 
 the general-in-chief, to inspect periodically (at least once a year,) 
 the artillery within the geographical limits assigned them. The 
 inspection embraced a thorough examination into the proficiency 
 of every company officer in the practice as well as theory of the 
 arm, and the result was reported through regular channels to the 
 adjutant-general of the army. Another feature of the system of 
 instruction provided for an annual change between the companies 
 on the sea- coast and those stationed at the field artillery schools, 
 one-third of the whole changing yearly. Whether or not this 
 could have been carried into practical execution is not known, but 
 it is doubtful; the Civil war, however, put an end to the scheme. 
 
 After the war, in 1866, one of the first duties performed by the 
 permanent artillery board convened by General Orders No. 16, 
 Adjutant- General's Office, March i2th of that year, was to submit 
 one project for the re-establishment for the second time of the ar- 
 
Il8 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 tillery school of practice at Fortress Monroe, and another for in- 
 struction at the various posts occupied by the artillery. The 
 result will be considered when treating- of theoretical instruction. 
 For the present it suffices to state that General Orders No. 10, 
 of 1859, was > so f ar as field artillery was concerned, partially 
 revived, not, however, upon the recommendation of the perma- 
 nent artillery board. It is, for all practical purposes, that which 
 governs in the artillery to-day. It has been shown to be wanting 
 in nearly every feature which would render it efficient as a course 
 of practical instruction for that arm of service. 
 
 INSTRUCTION AT POSTS: (B) THEORETICAL. 
 
 If we except the study of tactics required of all arms, there 
 does not appear to have been any course of theoretical instruction 
 prescribed for the artillery previous to that promulgated in Gen- 
 eral Orders No. 10, of 1859. Efforts, though feeble in their nat- 
 ure, had before been made to keep up an appearance of instruc- 
 tion ; but in this order, for the first time, was there a course of 
 studies prescribed. A consideration of those paragraphs affecting 
 the field artillery will for the present be deferred, and only those 
 referring to the foot artillery will now be noticed. 
 
 For this branch the order provided : ' ' At each artillery station 
 there will be established a thorough system of instruction, theo- 
 retical and practical, in the more essential elements of the artil- 
 lery service. At the fortifications it will necessarily be confined, 
 for most part, to heavy artillery; but in every case it will be car- 
 ried to all the duties of the arm which the means at hand will 
 permit, including those of the laboratory. ' ' 
 
 The following named text-books were designated: (i) Instruction 
 for Field Artillery; (2) Instruction for Heavy Artillery; (3) Ord- 
 nance Manual; (4) Aide Me"moire d'Artillerie. 
 
 Recitations were to be had twice a week, work in laboratory 
 one day per week, the whole under supervision of the command- 
 ing officer, either directly or through some officer designated by 
 him. No account was rendered by commanding officers of the 
 nature and extent of recitations. The only reports called for were 
 those of the artillery inspectors. 
 
 It is not to be expected that any project for instruction in any 
 part of the army will be perfect at first; the aim of those having 
 these matters in charge is to have them grow in excellence. It is 
 
INST RUCTION AT POSTS: THEORETICAL. 1 1C) 
 
 presumed that the present system would have been no exception 
 to this rule, but, as previously mentioned, the breaking out of the 
 Civil war suspended its operation during several years. When it 
 reappeared, in 1866, there were some modifications in the original 
 plan. Instead of the commanding officer of each post being the" 
 instructor, this duty was transferred to the commanders of batter- 
 ies, supervised in each regiment by the colonel, who was directed 
 to require quarterly reports to be made by battery commanders 
 of (i) means of instruction at posts; (2) progress and kind of in- 
 struction given; (3) numbers and dates of drills, exercises, and 
 recitations the colonels to forward abstracts of these reports di- 
 rect to the headquarters of the army. The text-books prescribed 
 were: (i) Parts I and II, Instruction Field Artillery; (2) Heavy 
 Artillery Tactics ; (3) Gibbon's Artillerist's Manual; (4) Roberts' 
 Hand-book of Artillery; (5) The Ordnance Manual. The hand- 
 book was intended for the use of non-commissioned officers and 
 enlisted men; and it is worthy of remark that the order in question 
 (General Orders No. 67, of 1866) was the first to provide a 
 theoretical course for the rank and file of the regular artillery, 
 their instruction, in all preceding orders covering the subject- 
 matter, having only in general terms been enjoined upon their 
 officers. It was intended by the board which submitted projects 
 for the artillery school at Fortress Monroe, and for instruction at 
 posts, that the former should be supplementary to the latter, and 
 that the two should be so arranged as to insure the progress of 
 officers at posts equally as at the artillery school. It was not con- 
 templated that the prescribed course of instruction at the former 
 would remain in force longer than two years, when it was expected 
 that a revised course would be adopted, thus maintaining the 
 studies of artillery officers at posts abreast with the progress of 
 the age. No attempt has been made to carry this plan into exe- 
 cution. The course of study has been changed very little since 
 1866. 
 
 In 1876 the new field artillery tactics were substituted for Parts 
 I and II of the old, and in 1880 Tidball's Manual of Heavy Artil- 
 lery was prescribed as a text-book for artillery troops garrisoning 
 the sea-coast forts. It may be objected to these books our field 
 artillery tactics Tidball's, Gibbon's, the Ordnance Manuals, and 
 Roberts' Hand-book that they treat in great measure of anti- 
 quated materiel; and while this is true as regards some of them, 
 
120 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 it is also true that a thorough study of these books would give 
 the best artillerist many practical hints ; but, with any text-books 
 that could be devised, it is doubtful if the present system of in- 
 struction is capable of accomplishing anything of great value. 
 The method contemplated in 1859, to insure an execution of the 
 orders of the War Department, was to have inspectors, officers 
 of rank in the artillery, visit the posts and personally examine 
 into the proficiency of every company officer. The plan adopted 
 in 1866 to secure the same object, and which still governs, was 
 a system of paper inspections , i. e., quarterly reports of instruc- 
 tion and progress. The former of these two plans, if intrusted 
 to competent inspectors, sustained as they should be, was capable 
 of accomplishing something creditable. The latter has not been, 
 nor will it ever be, of great practical utility. What is needed to 
 give vitality to the subject of instruction at posts is, first, a course 
 of study which keeps the officers up with the improvements of 
 the times; second, that artillery inspectors visit and examine, find 
 out and report upon the practical and theoretical knowledge of 
 every officer. One active and capable inspector would have done 
 the artillery more good, and have given the authorities a juster 
 insight into the condition of the materiel and the acquirements of 
 the personnel, than all the quarterly reports that have ever been 
 written. 
 
 INSTRUCTION : (c) SCHOOLS FOR FOOT ARTILLERY. 
 
 The establishment of artillery schools was first suggested, in 
 our service, in a letter written by Colonel Henry Knox, Septem- 
 ber 27th, 1776, to a congressional committee at the time visiting 
 army headquarters. Among other recommendations having in" 
 view the efficiency of the arm of which he was the head, was the 
 following: "As officers can never act with confidence until they are 
 masters of their profession, an academy established upon a liberal 
 plan would be of the utmost service to the continent, where the 
 whole theory and practice of fortification and gunnery should be 
 taught; to be nearly the same as that at Woolwich, making- 
 allowance for the difference of circumstances a place to which 
 our enemies are indebted for the superiority of their artillery to all 
 who have opposed them." Although the academy was not estab- 
 lished during that war, proof is here given that early in the life- 
 time of the artillery in this country the necessity for study by an 
 officer of that arm was recognized, and, in providing that officers 
 
INSTRUCTION: FOOT ARTILLERY SCHOOLS. 121 
 
 should visit laboratories, workshops, and arsenals, when they 
 could be spared from other duties, an important movement was 
 made in the interests of efficiency. In the midst of campaigns, 
 when experience was every year impressing deeply on the mind 
 those invaluable lessons which unaided theory in vain essays to 
 teach, officers of artillery were never allowed to forget that the 
 profoundest knowledge is acquired by learning first the theory 
 and then practicing the details of their profession. 
 
 Attaching cadets to the regiment of artillerists and engineers 
 in 1794 was doubtless the first attempt to establish anything 
 like a course of instruction for that arm ; but it is generally ad- 
 mitted to have been a very imperfect scheme, and productive of 
 no practical benefit, except to demonstrate the inherent weakness 
 of a travelling military academy, or one without a thoroughly com- 
 plete organization. Referring to this subject, the Secretary of 
 War, in letter dated June 28th, 1798, said : ' ' It was supposed that 
 these cadets would form a nursery from which qualified officers 
 might be drawn to fill vacancies; but it must occur that, without 
 proper masters to teach them the sciences necessary to the 
 engineers and artillerists, this nursery can produce no valuable 
 plants." It is not intended here to trace the origin of our military 
 academy. That has been done by others. It suffices to say that 
 the provisions of law authorizing the appointment of cadets con- 
 tinued to be practically as unsatisfactory in results as at the time 
 mentioned by Secretary McHenry, until the corps of engineers, 
 constituting a military academy, was organized in 1802, and had 
 placed at its head that accomplished scholar and soldier, Colonel 
 Jonathan Williams. Not even the talents and address of Colonel 
 Williams could, however, speedily put the school on a respect- 
 able and satisfactory footing, and it was not until after the war of 
 1812, when cadets were appointed, not in the artillery and engi- 
 neers alone, but in all branches of service, and attached to the 
 academy for instruction, that the latter was started on its distin- 
 guished career as a preliminary military and scientific institution. 
 
 It was soon discovered that it did not suffice that cadets pass 
 through the course at West Point; it was found that they were 
 then only prepared to begin in earnest the practical duties of their 
 profession. The advantages of concentration, to insure uniformity 
 of instruction and a higher degree of discipline among the troops, 
 were also speedily recognized. These two considerations were 
 16 
 
122 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 mainly instrumental in causing to be established at Fortress Mon- 
 roe a practical school for artillery. This was effected by Orders 
 No. 1 8, dated Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, April 5th, 
 1824, which directed that eleven companies of artillery should be 
 stationed at that fortress, the whole to constitute a " corps for 
 instruction," the companies to be detached from the several regi- 
 ments. A colonel was placed in command. He was assisted by 
 a lieutenant-colonel and a major, one director and one assistant 
 director of artillery, one instructor and one assistant instructor of 
 mathematics. These officers formed the staff of the school. Con- 
 cerning this institution, the general-in-chief remarked, in 1825, 
 one year after its establishment: 
 
 "As a remedy for the evil resulting from its dispersed condition, the artillery 
 arm has, in the school of practice at Fortress Monroe, a most favorable earnest 
 of the advantages that may be expected from concentration. Among the nu- 
 merous benefits to be derived from the institution, there appears to me none more 
 important than those to be reaped by the graduates of the military academy, in the 
 incipient formation of their ideas and character with reference to the practical 
 duties of their profession. Our commissioned ranks are periodically recruited 
 from this source young men of high moral worth and scientific attainment ; and 
 sanguine hopes have been entertained that on this fundamental source of ex- 
 cellence a military establishment would be formed for the Nation to which it 
 might look with confidence and pride for those attributes on which, in a future 
 exigency, its glory and perhaps its safety might depend. It seems to be, how- 
 ever, almost in vain that military education should be fostered, if it terminate 
 with the course of studies at West Point; and a school of practice has been 
 anxiously looked for as a supplemental institution, in which the theoretic in- 
 struction of the academic graduate might be applied with good effect to the 
 practical duties and relations of the military service." 
 
 In accordance with these views, the cadets assigned to the 
 artillery were, after the organization of the school, sent to that 
 institution for a practical course before joining their regiments. 
 In this view of the subject the West Point education was consid- 
 ered in its true light, viz. , as a preparatory course of training , 
 fitting those who had enjoyed its benejits for beginning, under 
 favorable auspices, the practical life they would be called upon to 
 pursue in the army. To educate a man in four years is an im- 
 possibility. To give him in that time \^^ foundation for an educa- 
 tion is entirely feasible. That is what West Point then did and 
 continues to do. Hence the necessity that existed and always 
 will exist for supplemental courses of instruction, both practical 
 
INSTRUCTION: FOOT ARTILLERY SCHOOLS. 123 
 
 and theoretical ; for the science and art of war are progressive, 
 essentially practical, and he who is content to stand still will fall 
 rapidly to the rear out of sight. Special schools are as necessary 
 for our officers, 61eves of West Point, as is sea service to the 
 graduate of the naval academy, or law and medical practice to 
 the graduates of our colleges who adopt those professions. None 
 of these schools give young men, however great their aptitude or 
 talents, a practical knowledge of professions evolved from centu- 
 ries of experience and study of details. There is no royal road 
 to learning for the practical artillerist. He must have instruction 
 in his specialty; and, for foot artillery, this can, perhaps, best be 
 given in our service at a single school, where the necessary mate'- 
 riel can be collected, expenditures economized, and the course 
 made complete, and thorough. If, when thus established and 
 made efficient, the studies and practice at this school be brought 
 into harmony with the instruction which officers receive at posts, 
 the whole being supervised by an adequate inspectorship, the 
 hope can be rationally indulged that the artillery arm may, in so 
 far as its disjointed organization will permit, enter upon a career 
 of professional efficiency honorable to itself and reflecting credit 
 upon the country. 
 
 These seem to have been the views of Mr. Calhoun and his 
 successors in the War Department, under whose fostering care 
 the school of practice, amidst many difficulties, continued in 
 some, although not full, degree to meet the expectations of its 
 friends. In his report of December ist, 1825, Secretary Barbour 
 said : ' ' The good effects resulting from the establishment of the 
 school of practice at Fortress Monroe are daily developed in the 
 increasing improvement of the artillery corps, that important arm 
 of the public force." 
 
 It was the custom to change the companies annually a prac- 
 tice to-day happily abandoned, as the attendant expense very 
 greatly prejudiced the interests of the school, which, as soon as 
 established, in 1824, became the favorite experimental ground 
 upon which were tested the guns, carriages, and other artillery 
 materiel before they were either discarded or issued to troops. 
 Boards for the purpose of advising the Secretary of War on artil- 
 lery matters were assembled at the school, which was intended to 
 be a headquarters whence would emanate well-digested opinions, 
 based on actual experience, concerning artillery matters. 
 
124 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 It would seem, however, that eleven companies were more than 
 could be accommodated at the fortress. Mr. Calhoun's desire to 
 form a ' ' perfect regiment ' ' thereat was never realized. Although 
 there were plenty of troops, the amount of materiel available for 
 practice was small, and, contrary to the hopes of its founders, no 
 horse artillery was organized there, though the grounds for ma- 
 noeuvring that arm were provided. 
 
 The death of General Brown, commanding the army, an event 
 which took place February 24th, 1828, deprived the school of its 
 steadfast friend and advocate. His successor, Major- General 
 Alexander Macomb, though an old artillery officer, was of opin- 
 ion that the institution could best accomplish its purpose by 
 giving up some of its companies for duty at ordinary artillery 
 posts. Accordingly, by Order No. 58, Adjutant-General's Office, 
 1828, the number of companies was reduced to six, all from one 
 regiment (the First), and a stop was put to the plan of rotating 
 the various companies as set on foot by Mr. Calhoun. The new 
 arrangement was not intended to interfere with the school of 
 practice, and graduates of the military academy, when assigned 
 to the artillery arm, were directed to repair there as usual. It 
 was also provided that either companies or officers found deficient, 
 when inspected, should be sent to the school of practice, with 
 a view to their instruction and improvement. Referring to this 
 change, the general-in-chief remarked: "It may be proper to 
 state, in regard to this institution, that the want of means has pre- 
 vented its establishment to a full extent upon the plan originally 
 contemplated. It is believed, however, that, as at present ar- 
 ranged, it may be made instrumental in diffusing throughout the 
 artillery the practical knowledge necessary to the efficiency of 
 that arm." We were at this time on the eve of an important 
 revolution in artillery materiel; knowledge of the stock-trail sys- 
 tem of carriages was being put in possession of the Government, 
 but many years passed before its adoption, and, in the meantime, 
 circumstances had operated to break up the school of practice. 
 In 1831 eleven companies were stationed at the school; in 1832, 
 six companies, Indian and other troubles having removed the 
 rest; in 1833, nine; in 1834, nine; in 1835, four companies, at 
 which time the Seminole disturbances in Florida caused all the 
 troops to be transferred to that theatre of hostilities. Fortress 
 Monroe then became an experimental ground for the ordnance 
 
INSTRUCTION: FOOT ARTILLERY SCHOOLS. 125 
 
 department, and so remained until the reorganization of the 
 school of practice, which was brought about in the following 
 manner : 
 
 In 1855 Mr. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, writing to the 
 chairman of the Senate Military Committee, said: "Much may 
 be effected for the improvement of the artillery by the estab- 
 lishment of schools of instruction, causing all the companies to 
 pass periodically through the course, remaining for a term of, 
 say, two years." This was followed by General Orders No. 9, 
 Headquarters of the Army, October 3Oth, 1856, directing that 
 (M) of the Second, (C) of the Third, (G) of the Fourth, and (I) of 
 the First Regiment should be thereafter designated as garrison, 
 sea-coast, and siege artillery; that they should be concentrated 
 at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, and form a school of practice for 
 service with heavy guns. These companies, which had previously 
 been equipped as field artillery, and were legally light artillery 
 companies, were accordingly brought together, and by General 
 Orders No. 15, Headquarters of the Army, December 29th, 1857, 
 Brevet Lieutenant- Colonel Harvey Brown, Second Artillery, was 
 instructed to proceed to organize the school, submitting to the 
 general-in-chief a code of regulations and plan of instruction. 
 
 The code of regulations and the plan of instruction ordered to 
 be submitted, as just indicated, were published in General Orders 
 No. 5, Adjutant-General's Office, May i8th, 1858. The school 
 was very much on the plan adopted in -1824, except the number of 
 companies was fixed at eight two from each regiment. The 
 course extended over two years, one company from each regi- 
 ment being relieved annually. The companies were given their 
 complement of officers. Graduates of the military academy as- 
 signed to the artillery were, as in 1824, to serve one year at this 
 school before joining their companies. The instruction was quite 
 complete, embracing, so far as practicable, the whole range of 
 studies and practice which go to make up the education of an 
 artillery officer. Provision was also made for the examination in 
 their duties of the non-commissioned officers. The official des- 
 ignation was " The Artillery School." There is every reason to 
 suppose that the institution, started under circumstances so much 
 more favorable than those surrounding it in 1824, would have 
 been productive of much good to the artillery arm, had not the 
 breaking out of the Civil war put an end to its existence before 
 
126 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 the first companies selected had completed the prescribed two 
 years' course of instruction. 
 
 That feature of the code of regulations which required graduates 
 of the military academy to serve at Fortress Monroe before join- 
 ing their companies is considered to have been a mistake, though 
 sanctioned by previous practices. 
 
 Young graduates of West Point need practice more than any- 
 thing else. They possess already the groundwork of a thorough 
 professional education, but it is nearly all theoretical. Let them, 
 after completing their academic course, first join their respective 
 commands, where they will mingle with the army such as it 
 is in every-day life, and not such as is found at schools of any 
 kind. Here the observant young officer will have leisure to think 
 over what he has learned, to compare the theory of the school- 
 room with the practice he sees around him, and draw therefrom 
 many useful conclusions. He will soon find that there are many 
 things of first importance in the management of military affairs 
 which he learned nothing of in his four years' course, yet a 
 knowledge of them is indispensable to the officer who is to com- 
 mand troops. Instead, therefore, of crowding the heads of young 
 graduates with more theories, when they have not been able to 
 digest those already learned, let them go first to their stations, 
 and mingle with the arm with which they are to be thenceforth 
 identified, and acquire some practical knowledge of army life as 
 it really is. Having done this they will be much better prepared 
 to appreciate the true value and importance of what is taught at 
 any well-organized school of practice. 
 
 One of the first things to be attended to after the Civil war was 
 to reorganize the school upon the old site. There then arose a 
 practical difficulty in devising any course of study to be pursued 
 by all artillery lieutenants, resulting from the diverse attainments 
 of these officers, some of whom were from civil life, some from the 
 military academy, and others promoted during the war from the 
 ranks of the army. 
 
 In order that all lieutenants should have opportunity to prepare 
 themselves, it was proposed that there should be established at 
 the various posts instruction batteries for the foot artillery, similar 
 to those already existing in each regiment for field artillery; the 
 captains and the non-commissioned officers of the foot instruction 
 
INSTRUCTION: FOOT ARTILLERY SCHOOLS. 127 
 
 batteries to be permanent, the lieutenants and privates to be as- 
 signed temporarily. 
 
 At the school of practice it was proposed to adopt different 
 courses of study to meet the acquirements of the various classes 
 of officers. For those requiring it, there was to be a course in 
 the common branches of an English education, embracing so much 
 mathematics and natural philosophy as would enable those pur- 
 suing it to comprehend in a very general way the principles on 
 which their ordinary practical duties depended. It was not 
 thought just to require more than this of officers promoted for . 
 field service in inferior grades. For all graduates of the military 
 academy a higher standard was prescribed. The distinction here 
 made was based on* the principle that in peace the only claims to 
 commissions should be knowledge and education; in war, courage 
 and conduct. Each and every one was made to render an ac- 
 count of his stewardship, depending upon his opportunities and 
 previous educational facilities. 
 
 The correctness of the foregoing principles, which were formu- 
 lated by the permanent artillery board; the advantages arising from 
 the establishment of foot-battery schools of instruction; the fairness 
 of the proposition that each should be held to a standard high in 
 proportion to the advantages he has enjoyed, the benefits, in an 
 educational point of view, he has been the recipient of from the 
 Government, all seem manifest; and they were partially adopted 
 in the scheme for instruction at posts and that for the school of 
 practice, soon after promulgated. The salient points of the former 
 have been given when treating of that subject, (p. 119, ante;) the 
 latter was provided in General Orders No. 99, Adjutant- General's 
 Office, November i3th, 1867, and, with slight modifications, con- 
 tinues in force. The number of batteries stationed at the school 
 for purposes of instruction was five one from each artillery regi- 
 ment. It was provided, also, that brevet second lieutenants 
 assigned to the artillery arm should serve one year before being 
 sent to their proper batteries, (an objectionable feature, already 
 remarked upon,) and such number of young and intelligent re- 
 cruits, for the foot batteries, as would keep the five instruction 
 batteries full. The course was similar in scope to that adopted 
 in 1858. 
 
 There was this marked difference between the former and pres- 
 ent schemes, so far as the instruction batteries were concerned, 
 viz. : formerly their stay was temporary, now it is permanent. 
 
128 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Both Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Davis favored passing all artillery 
 companies in rotation through the school. Which is the better 
 plan may be an open question; permanent instruction batteries 
 are at present in favor, and there is no doubt but that the expense 
 attending constant removals was a serious difficulty which has 
 been overcome by keeping the batteries permanently at the 
 school. 
 
 Sending intelligent recruits to the school of practice for an ad- 
 vanced course of instruction has proved scarcely more than a 
 visionary scheme, of little practical benefit except to the permanent 
 school batteries, whose ranks the recruits have served to keep 
 full; to the service at large it has been of no real benefit. For 
 commissioned officers, however, the school has proved to be of 
 the greatest service. Facilities for study and practice combined are 
 here offered, to be found nowhere else in this country. The course 
 in artillery is kept up with the progress of the age the practical as 
 nearly so as the materiel now provided by the proper department 
 will permit; and, although opinions differ as to the wisdom of cer- 
 tain branches pursued and the methods of instruction, no unpreju- 
 diced person acquainted with the work it has done and is doing 
 will fail to acknowledge that the school has been, and now gives 
 promise of being, highly beneficial to the artillery arm. It is the 
 only institution maintained by the Government which serves in 
 any manner to unite the artillery. Scattered as the latter is in 
 this country, without a head to direct its affairs, with no bond 
 of union connecting the batteries with the headquarters even of 
 their respective regiments, it is a fortunate circumstance that For- 
 tress Monroe brings the latter together at one point, where an 
 effort is made to impress on the minds of all subalterns of artillery 
 the fact, that only by moving forward can they tread the path- 
 way leading to professional honor. 
 
 Circumstances, however, are such as to prevent this school 
 attaining fully the purposes for which it was instituted and is 
 maintained. As recently announced by the authorities, its ob- 
 jects are to secure (i) professional advancement, and (2) unity of 
 method in the artillery arm of service. 
 
 Nothing could bring out in bolder relief the inadequate system 
 of instruction, either throughout the artillery arm or at this 
 school, than the fact that, although the first object of the latter 
 is advancement, still there have been found here in the same class, 
 
INSTRUCTION: FOOT ARTILLERY SCHOOLS. 129 
 
 pursuing the same studies, the eleve of West Point, fresh from the 
 academy, and the graduate of twenty years' experience, including 
 that of a four years' war. Certainly no such spectacle as this, 
 where men of middle age and striplings are placed and main- 
 tained on the same footing, can be found at any other military" 
 school in any land. If such an union be proper, it requires no 
 professional eye to discern either that there has not been much 
 progress as a result of those twenty years' experience, or that 
 the course at the school is illy adapted to its pupils. 
 
 It is one of the cardinal principles of our military system that, 
 though our army be very small, its officers are trained and effi- 
 cient, the small force thus forming a perfectly- appointed nucleus, 
 capable of ready expansion into a large and effective army in time 
 of national danger. If this premise, upon which are based all 
 arguments in favor of our present army organization, be not 
 false, then the joining together of youth and age in the same 
 course of study is unwise. Nor does the incongruity stop here: 
 the graduate of the artillery school returns to the institution years 
 hence, and again finds his classmate to be a youth fresh from col- 
 lege or the military academy. 
 
 It is very true that, were the course of study and practice at 
 posts of the artillery what it should be, but what it is not and 
 never will be without a progressive system, enforced by an effi- 
 cient inspectorship, there would be no excuse for this state of 
 affairs. But this would not wholly mend the difficulty. 
 
 To insure the attainment of what is said to be the first object 
 of the school of practice advancement in professional knowledge 
 the course should be^ differently arranged. Provision should 
 be made for an advanced class of pupils officers who are com- 
 petent to pass a prescribed examination, which should be a pre- 
 requisite to entering the class. This is the common practice in 
 other countries. Ambitious officers would keep up their studies, 
 with the hope and reasonable expectation of having their ac- 
 quirements recognized. The examinations should be rigid, both 
 preliminary and those subsequent to admission. 
 
 This is done in the department of artillery studies at Woolwich, 
 England, which, it is said, has accomplished more than all other 
 influences combined to raise the intellectual standard of the artil- 
 lery of that country. The same remarks are true with regard to 
 the higher artillery and engineer course in Austria and Germany, 
 
130 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 the Michael artillery academy of Russia, and similar schools in 
 other States of Europe. 
 
 Another step in the same direction would be the introduction 
 of the study of modern languages ; if possible, both French and 
 German ; certainly the former. No one who compares the cur- 
 riculum of this school with that of similar institutions in Europe 
 but will remark upon the absence of all attention to languages in 
 the former, and contrast it with the reverse practice in the latter. 
 Education can in no way be made a more powerful agent to 
 efficiency with the average artillery officer than by giving him a 
 ready translating knowledge of the French language. It is not 
 meant that he be merely able to stumble through his sentences, 
 guessing at half of them ; on the contrary, that he be able to 
 convert French into English, and vice versa, with accuracy and 
 facility. It gives him command, either directly or indirectly, of 
 the best military literature of the world. The sooner this fact is 
 recognized, and a practice inaugurated in accordance therewith, 
 the better will it be for the school, the officers who go there, and 
 the artillery arm. Let room be made for this most important 
 and practically useful addition to the course. It may interfere 
 with the convenience of individuals ; it is not, however for the 
 personal interest of any one, but for the benefit of an honorable 
 arm of the public service, that this school exists, and the practice 
 should be in accordance with this idea. 
 
 Too much importance is not here attached to the mere fact that 
 in other countries advanced courses of study are given officers 
 possessing certain qualifications, without at the same time con- 
 sidering the appropriateness and feasibility of inaugurating the 
 same thing in our own school. No greater mistake can be made 
 than to blindly follow the example of others without considering 
 whether it is or is not suitable or proper in our case. It is grasp- 
 ing form without considering the more important matter sub- 
 stance. Remembering and giving due weight to this, it yet 
 appears plain that. providing such a course as has been indicated, 
 for selected pupils at the artillery school, is not only in keeping 
 with the practice of other nations, but, under existing circum- 
 stances, is advisable here. Indeed it seems the only means by 
 which that school can be made to meet the first object for which 
 it was instituted. 
 
 The second object is also imperfectly attained; but this is no 
 
INSTRUCTION: FOOT ARTILLERY SCHOOLS. 13! 
 
 reproach to, or fault of, the school. Unity of method throughout 
 the artillery cannot be secured when, in the case of at least two- 
 thirds of the officers, instruction in that particular method begins 
 and ends with the school of practice. There are at Fortress 
 Monroe appliances for mechanical manoeuvres and experiment 
 to be found on a plan equally elaborate at no other one place 
 garrisoned by artillery troops. This fact, of itself, would make 
 it difficult to extend and make uniform the methods of instruction 
 there pursued. But even in those matters wherein there might 
 exist the desired uniformity there is no efficient outside effort 
 made to secure it. Were there a well-digested plan of instruc- 
 tion, progressing at equal pace with science and the mechanic 
 arts, or, if this be impracticable, then a scheme adopted which 
 would at least insure the use, to the utmost practicable extent, 
 of all mechanical appliances pertaining to artillery materiel act- 
 ually supplied to each post, then not only would it appear 
 proper, but it would be entirely feasible to make the methods 
 of the school uniform in all parts of the artillery service. 
 
 The objects of the school are theoretically correct, and in any 
 other of the great nations of the earth would be practically so. 
 That it does not insure the progress of artillery subalterns to a 
 degree that is possible, is partially due, as has been pointed out, 
 to a course of studies which, in some important particulars, does 
 not rise to the plane of mediocrity; but that it fails so generally 
 to make itself practically what it is theoretically, is due to the 
 fact that the rest of the foot artillery is not organized and oper- 
 ated in unison with, but far below, the artillery school standard; 
 therefore the results of its workings are to a great extent dissi- 
 pated. 
 
 Practically speaking, it is an institution where, unless prevented 
 by political influence or official favoritism, young officers entering 
 the artillery receive a combined theoretical and practical knowl- 
 edge of their branch of service, and to which they periodically 
 return to brush away from their intellectual horizon the gathering 
 shadows which threaten to obscure the vision when they pass 
 beyond its threshold into a world of professional twilight or 
 darkness. 
 
 Let not these remarks be interpreted as an attempt to dispar- 
 age the school, but the reverse. Aside from the field batteries, it 
 is the one great and good feature of the artillery in the important 
 
132 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 matter of instruction, theoretical and practical. It is properly 
 regarded as the conservator of professional knowledge and tradi- 
 tions ; the good it does extends with impaired yet strongly felt, 
 invigorating, and genial influence to the extremities of the dis- 
 jointed body of the artillery arm, separated as the latter is into sixty 
 batteries, with scarcely any bond of union between them. Such 
 an institution deserves to be nurtured and sustained by the strong 
 arm of authority and of law. It must be cherished for the good 
 that is in it, while its faults, if any appear, should be corrected 
 as they become manifest. Situated as the artillery is in this coun- 
 try, it is of the first importance that its one common school of 
 practical instruction be built up by the united efforts of the artil- 
 lery itself and of the Government, for the credit of each of which 
 it is maintained, and whose interests it subserves. 
 
 INSTRUCTION AT SCHOOLS: (D) FIELD BATTERIES. 
 
 Soon after the mounting of a company as field artillery in each 
 regiment, in pursuance of the general plan of instruction formu- 
 lated by Mr. Calhoun in 1821, it was decided to make those 
 companies schools for artillery subalterns. The system was in- 
 itiated by General Orders No. 46, of 1841, Adjutant- General's 
 Office, which' provided that the lieutenants of the four artillery 
 regiments should be passed through the schools of horse artillery 
 in such manner that no lieutenant should serve therein for a 
 longer period than one year. From this rule could be excepted 
 lieutenants who were actually in command of companies, staff 
 lieutenants, and such others as, from accidental causes, might 
 be unable to ride. At this time there were ten companies in each 
 regiment of artillery; consequently it took ten years at least for 
 all eligible officers to pass through this course, which, being found 
 too short to impart the information desired, was shortly after- 
 wards lengthened to two years. 
 
 When lieutenants were first thus assigned to the field artillery 
 companies, the armament of each embraced six guns. This num- 
 ber, however, was cut down to four by Special Orders No. 96, of 
 1842, Adjutant- General's Office, the other two pieces being stored 
 for use when required. To make the instruction company re- 
 spectably large in personnel, General Orders No. 42, of 1842, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, directed that, in each regiment, another 
 should be associated with the field artillery company. The four 
 
INSTRUCTION: FIELD BATTERIES. 133 
 
 selected were (I) of the First, (F) of the Second, (F) of the Third, 
 and (K) of the Fourth. Each of the selected companies remained 
 in charge of its own officers. In respect, however, to exercises 
 and manoeuvres as field artillery, the care of batteries, horses, 
 harness and stables, the duties of the two companies were blend- 
 ed, and equalized, under the orders of the senior officer. This 
 plan failed; as, to use the language of one who was at that time 
 an active field artillery officer, "it was a question of constant 
 annoyance to every one concerned where were to begin, where 
 to end, and what really were the appropriate duties of the foot 
 companies which were thus made yoke-fellows to the field artil- 
 lery." 
 
 The practice of having the lieutenants remain only one year 
 with the field companies was found inconvenient, besides being 
 detrimental to service by keeping the officers constantly changing 
 stations. The evil was attempted to be ameliorated by General 
 Orders No. 33, of 1844, Adjutant- General's Office, which made 
 the first lieutenants permanent, as they were in the foot artillery; 
 only the second and brevet second lieutenants, of whom together 
 there were two with each field company, being relieved annually. 
 The first lieutenants thus assigned were selected by the colonels 
 of the respective regiments. Although this order broke up the 
 field artillery schools to a great extent, it furnished these compa- 
 nies when they went to Mexico, in 1846, trained and specially 
 competent first lieutenants; which fact without doubt had its 
 influence in enabling the field companies to make their distin- 
 guished records in that war. 
 
 Following the cessation of hostilities with Mexico, numerous 
 changes were made in the equipment of the field artillery com- 
 panies; but, early in 1849, (April 2ist and May I2th,) all were 
 ordered to be supplied with their proper arm. Then came (Gen- 
 eral Orders No. 14, August 24, 1849, Headquarters of the Army,) 
 those rules for the detail of subalterns for field artillery service 
 which are embodied, in substance, in the 'Army Regulations 
 of the present day. The tour of duty was fixed at two years. 
 Those who could be excepted from the rule were lieutenants in 
 command of companies whose captains were indefinitely absent, 
 adjutants, quartermasters, and those physically unable to ride. 
 The number of subalterns was established at two first and one 
 second lieutenant with each company, the first lieutenants being 
 
134 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 relieved in alternate years; this to secure constantly with each 
 company at least one instructed subaltern. The rute here estab- 
 lished, reaffirmed by Special Orders No. 141, of 1870, Adjutant- 
 General's Office, continues essentially that by which lieutenants 
 are at present detailed for this duty. 
 
 The caprices of those in authority, particularly of the various 
 Secretaries of War, during the following years rendered the field 
 artillery companies extremely uncertain schools of practice. This 
 will appear when we examine the records between the close 
 of the Mexican and the beginning of the Civil war. During 
 that period (K) of the First Regiment was the only company 
 which was not dismounted; it was given a field artillery equipment 
 after its return from Mexico, and has kept it unmolested. Of 
 the others, (A) of the Second, (C) of the Third, and (B) of the 
 Fourth were, in the interval mentioned, each dismounted and re- 
 mounted once; (I) of the First and (E) of the Third were dismount- 
 ed twice and remounted twice; (G) of the Fourth was dismounted 
 three times and remounted twice; while (M) of the Second was dis- 
 mounted three times and remounted as often in the same interval. 
 In fact, although from 1849 to 1851 eight companies were author- 
 ized, but seven were actually equipped as field artillery ; and on 
 March 3ist, 1851, in a paroxysm of economy, the number, in 
 violation of the law of March 2d, 1821, was cut down to two 
 (K) of the First and (C) of the Third Regiment; but the Secre- 
 tary, having apparently awakened to the illegality of his action, 
 remounted, September, 1852, one company in each of the other 
 two regiments. Three companies were remounted in May, 1853, 
 but the Secretary of War stationed them on the Indian frontier, 
 and, as a result, in three years the number of mounted companies 
 w.as again reduced to four. 
 
 Immediately upon the assumption of the duties of his office by 
 Secretary Floyd, the question of remounting the field companies 
 came up for consideration. General Scott approved the measure, 
 and, to secure the carrying out of a more elaborate system of in- 
 struction, he suggested they be stationed in pairs at posts particu- 
 larly well adapted to the purpose. This was the attempted be- 
 ginning of the plan of field artillery posts for batteries of that 
 arm exclusively a plan upon which the school at Fort Riley, 
 Kansas, was organized in 1869, and of which more will be said 
 hereafter. 
 
INSTRUCTION: FIELD BATTERIES. 135 
 
 But General Scott was not able to carry out his views. It is 
 true that by April, 1858, when Mr. Floyd had been Secretary of 
 War one year, three of the dismounted field artillery companies 
 were again properly equipped; but the Mormon disturbances in 
 Utah had scattered them at different points en route to that 
 territory. After their services were no longer needed there, far 
 Irom concentrating them, they were, as has been mentioned, by 
 General Orders No. 10, of 1859, Adjutant-General's Office, dis- 
 tributed over the western country, with the object of putting into 
 execution an elaborate but, as it proved, a visionary scheme of 
 artillery instruction which embraced both foot and field artillery, 
 and, for the latter, it was substantially as follows: The companies 
 were stationed, (C) of the Third at Vancouver, Washington Terri- 
 tory; (E) of the Third at Fort Ridgely, Minnesota; (K) of the 
 First at Fort Clark, Texas; (I) of the First and (A) of the Second 
 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; (B) of the Fourth at Camp Floyd, 
 Utah; and (U) of the Second at Fort Brown, Texas. (G) of the 
 Fourth was not then mounted. In every instance from three to 
 five companies of foot artillery were stationed at the same post 
 with a field company, and all the officers at the post, each in his 
 proper sphere, either commanded or exercised with the field ar- 
 tillery in accordance with the following rule: On Fridays, Satur- 
 days, and Sundays the officers of the field company exclusively 
 served with it. During the remaining days of the week lieutenants 
 for that company were furnished by a roster which embraced every 
 subaltern at the post. During four days out of every twenty- 
 eight, namely, on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thurs- 
 day, the company was commanded by a captain of one of the 
 foot artillery companies. If the field artillery captain was senior 
 to the foot captain, he superintended the field artillery drill of the 
 latter. 
 
 The time during which it was attempted to put in practice the 
 provisions of this order was not long, it is true, but sufficiently 
 so to demonstrate its impracticability. The primary defect was 
 of the same general nature as that which rendered abortive the 
 attempt to combine companies in 1844 for the performance of field 
 artillery duties, viz., the mixing up of commands, placing the field 
 artillery company under command of another captain than its 
 own, and, finally, the impossibility of so adjusting the complex 
 machine as to determine what were the precise functions of its 
 
136 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 parts. It was attempted to obviate the difficulties by supple- 
 mentary orders from the War Department, but to no purpose; 
 the whole plan, after a few attempts to make it a working real- 
 ity, was in a fair way to pass by common consent into contempt 
 and oblivion. Such was the state of affairs when the precipitation 
 of the Civil war swept the artillery officers into a more improving 
 and attractive school of instruction. 
 
 While the field artillery companies had, from their first organ- 
 ization in our army, been looked upon as schools of instruction 
 for the subalterns, their captains were always considered as per- 
 manent until very recent times. By General Orders No. 96, of 
 1882, Adjutant-General's Office, the tour of service of captains 
 with light or mounted batteries was fixed at three years,* that of 
 lieutenants remaining as before two years. To avoid complaints 
 of injustice and to insure uniformity of instruction, the captains 
 are detailed by roster, the senior eligible for detail being desig- 
 nated first. 
 
 This practice can only be regarded as an experiment. Whether 
 it will be for the best interests of the service, time must determine. 
 The traditions and experience of the arm lead to contrary antici- 
 pations. The old field artillery companies were organized and for 
 years nurtured under the eyes of selected officers captains and 
 lieutenants who brought them, spite of many discouraging cir- 
 cumstances, to a high state of excellence. The proud records of 
 these companies in the first war succeeding their organization was 
 then attributed to the fact that they fought under their veteran 
 commanders, even the first lieutenants being then permanently 
 attached. 'The loss of prestige of these batteries during the 
 Civil war is to be attributed, in large degree, to the fact that 
 their old officers were absent ; the batteries were often command- 
 ed by inexperienced lieutenants who changed frequently. If the 
 principle of having captains rotate be for the good of the artillery, 
 it will prove itself so ; and this is the standard by which it will be 
 judged. 
 
 * Changed by recent orders to FOUR years for captains, (General Orders No. 
 86, of 1884, Headquarters of the Army.) This is a long step in the right 
 direction. It only remains now to complete the good work by selecting the 
 most capable captains, and either give them command of the field batteries 
 permanently, or for a lengthened period, say six years. 
 
INSTRUCTION: FIELD ARTILLERY POSTS. 137 
 
 If, indeed, it be true that this is the only means by which favor- 
 itism can be prevented, it may be conceded to be a wise measure; 
 but if there be not in the military system sufficient virtue to pre- 
 vent such a state of affairs being brought about, it may well be 
 questioned if the distinguished career of the field artillery be not 
 a thing of the past. 
 
 In most European armies the field artillery mounted and 
 horse is entirely separate from the foot or fortress artillery, 
 promotion being distinct in the two services. In the English 
 army there is an exception, all the artillery belonging, theoretic- 
 ally at least, to one regiment ; but it is in fact a corps, as that 
 term is used in the United States service not a regiment. Offi- 
 cers for the horse batteries are selected for their special qualifica- 
 tions a principle which has brought that arm to the first rank* 
 in European artilleries. When our field artillery companies were 
 first mounted the same rule was followed here; and as a result, al- 
 though laboring under disadvantages, (infantry pay, the lukewarm 
 aid of doubting friends, and the hostility of enemies,) the field artil- 
 lery demonstrated during the Mexican war the superiority of the 
 system of selection by which its officers were appointed. It cannot 
 be denied, however, that it opens the door to favoritism, than 
 which nothing more quickly breaks down* military spirit, and that 
 in some instances this operates to the detriment of the service 
 both at home and abroad; but whether 'the detail of captains for 
 a brief tour is destined to improve matters, may well be questioned. 
 It cannot be claimed, nor will it be conceded, until an experience 
 yet to be acquired has demonstrated its wisdom. 
 
 FIELD ARTILLERY POSTS AS SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION. 
 
 By General Orders No. 6, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant- 
 General' s Office, February i8th, 1869, four of the field artillery 
 batteries were, in pursuance of a projet of the Secretary of War, 
 assembled at Fort Leavenworth for the purpose of establishing a 
 field artillery school something similar to that recommended by 
 General Scott in 1857. The post fixed upon was Fort Riley, 
 Kansas, whither the batteries were accordingly sent, to remain, 
 however, as it proved, for two years only, being by General Or- 
 ders No. 17, of 1871, Adjutant- General's Office, returned to their 
 respective regiments. 
 18 
 
138 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Judged alone by the brief term of its existence, the school was 
 a failure. Yet the objects to be attained and which led to its 
 organization were excellent. Much good must accrue to the 
 artillery arm and to the service generally by such a school as this 
 was intended to be, placed and maintained upon a proper footing. 
 
 Its failure resulted not from any defect in the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of the establishment, but from other causes. Some of the 
 objects for which the school was organized were: (i) To introduce 
 into the field artillery uniformity of practice in all that pertained 
 to instruction and manoeuvre. (2) By a well-established system 
 of competitive drills and firings to weed out everything which 
 was not of practical utility, and at the same time develop and 
 suggest improvements in the guns and projectiles, that by timely 
 advances they should keep pace with improvements in small-arms. 
 (3) To study the horse and to determine the best classes and 
 breeds for the light artillery service. (4) To serve as a school of 
 practical instruction for officers, where would be taught not only 
 the duties of the battery as an artillery unit, but also those of 
 the artillery brigade, that administrative and fighting body which 
 has superseded the battery for war purposes, not only in our 
 own experience, but in the practice of every nation of continental 
 Europe. (5) To enable officers to acquire a knowledge of the 
 mounted service required for siege and mountain artillery, parks 
 and convoys; the course at Fortress Monroe not admitting of 
 this instruction being given. 
 
 The utility of a school of this character, and its importance to 
 the artillery, can scarcely be overestimated. If it be desirable to 
 maintain the field batteries, it should be on the footing of highest 
 attainable efficiency consistent with a proper economy. This the 
 field artillery school would have rendered possible had it been 
 supported as it deserved, and as would have been the case had it 
 remained under the management of its projector, Major-General 
 Schofield. Before systematic organization could be effected, 
 however, the troops were diverted from their proper duties to 
 serve as cavalry on the frontier; the men were taken as teamsters; 
 the horses (draught), not intended for this kind of service, were 
 broken down; finally, the commandant was kept away indefinitely 
 at a time when his presence with the command was indispensable 
 to insure a proper beginning for the institution. In a word, the 
 
INSTRUCTION: FIELD ARTILLERY POSTS. 139 
 
 field artillery school was strangled in its infancy. That which, 
 if properly nurtured, gave promise of fair proportions, bringing 
 strength, symmetry, and a high order of excellence to the field 
 artillery, was cast to one side, to be even now almost forgotten, 
 without an intelligent effort being made to develop what there 
 was good in it. 
 
 If the improvement of this branch of service be an object 
 worthy the solicitude of the Government, it is eminently proper 
 and desirable that the batteries be assembled at schools of instruc- 
 tion similar to that contemplated at Fort Riley, Kansas. Aside 
 from the salutary results following honorable emulation when 
 troops serve in large, well-organized commands under the eye of 
 a capable and impartial commander, there are other reasons which 
 make such schools desirable for the field artillery. It is, as com- 
 pared with other troops, expensive to organize and maintain. In 
 all armies, therefore, no more is kept equipped during peace than 
 proper economy justifies; but what portion soever of the military 
 establishment this may be, sound reason, justice to the Govern- 
 ment which bears the expense, and true military policy all demand 
 that it be kept in a high state of efficiency. With competent 
 commanders, a step towards the attainment of this desirable end 
 will be the arranging of the batteries into artillery brigades. 
 This is the organization in which they will fight in a great war; 
 it was adopted by both belligerents during the Rebellion, and 
 has the sanction and practice of all civilized nations. In Janu- 
 ary, 1 86 1, the field batteries, under a false idea of instruction, 
 were scattered as they are now. By the end of that year, when 
 war had wrought its practical changes, they were grouped to- 
 gether in brigades of four batteries each. 
 
 The desirability of assimilating our peace organization to that 
 of actual war, as nearly as practicable, seems self-evident. More 
 particularly is this true when increased efficiency of administra- 
 tion and economy of both money and materiel are thereby insur- 
 ed. Remember the favorite article of our military creed, that, 
 though our army be small, it is commanded from top to bottom 
 by well-trained officers. If it be intended to make this a reality 
 rather than an empty boast, it will, for the light artillery, be most 
 surely attained through the instrumentality of the schools in 
 question. The assignment by recent orders of captains to the 
 command of batteries for a limited period of years has but added 
 
140 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 cogency to the reasons before existing for assembling them into 
 brigades under energetic field officers.* 
 
 In other armies, the objects here sought to be attained by the 
 proposed field artillery schools are in various ways secured to 
 that branch of service. So far as is known, however, there is not 
 in Europe a single school of practice equal in scope to that pro- 
 jected at Fort Riley. In Germany the artillery brigade is the 
 administrative unit in peace as well as in war, having in this 
 respect supplanted the battery. There is at Berlin a gunnery 
 school, to which officers and men are sent by detail annually from 
 the field batteries, horse and foot. The course has for its object 
 to teach the use of different kinds of guns, wagons, ammunition, 
 fuses, and the tactics of artillery under all the circumstances of 
 actual war. 
 
 England has her gunnery school at Shoeburyness, the object 
 being essentially the same as in Germany. Batteries attend this 
 school in rotation, as was the case with us formerly at Fortress 
 Monroe. 
 
 Austria has similar institutions, and at Vienna there is the cen- 
 tral artillery riding school, the object being to secure uniformity 
 in riding, in stable management, the government of unruly horses, 
 and the training of riding-masters for the artillery. 
 
 The same remarks are true with reference to the other countries 
 of Europe ; each puts forth, in one way or another, every energy 
 to improve this branch of the service. Their annual practice 
 firing is in every way worthy of imitation ; at known and un- 
 known distances ; with good, bad, and indifferent ammunition ; 
 
 * Since the foregoing was written, it is observed that the correctness of the 
 views here expressed on the general subject of field artillery schools are con- 
 firmed by Major-General Hancock in his annual report of 1883. 
 
 After observing that the four field batteries of his geographical division 
 were stationed, one at Washington Barracks, District of Columbia, one at Little 
 Rock Barracks, Arkansas, another at Fort Adams, Rhode Island, and the fourth 
 at Fort Hamilton, New York Harbor, the general proceeds : "I take occasion to 
 reiterate what I have heretofore said, that I do not think the light batteries are 
 fulfilling a useful purpose as at present located. A light artillery school under 
 one of our best artillery field officers, where all, or at least four or five, of the 
 light batteries could be concentrated, would, in my judgment, best fulfill the 
 object of their organization. Scattered as they are at present, and associated 
 with foot troops, and required often to perform kindred duties, the specialty of 
 their arm is apt to be lost sight of." 
 
PRACTICE FIRING. 14! 
 
 battle and all other firing likely to be of use is practiced, competi- 
 tion between the batteries engaged being the soul of the exercise. 
 Afterwards, careful notes, covering every important fact elicited, 
 are worked up and given to the army for the information and 
 benefit of all concerned. 
 
 Much has recently been said and written in this country on 
 the subject of target practice with small-arms. It is of the first 
 importance ; and no one who has labored honestly in this field, 
 has seen the gradual improvement of the men, has remarked the 
 feeling of conscious power manifesting itself as they learned the 
 capabilities in their own hands of the weapons they carry, can for 
 one moment doubt that this practice vastly increases the effective- 
 ness of our infantry. 
 
 Every argument that can be advanced in favor of small-arm 
 target practice and battle firing (skirmish infantry target practice 
 is that,) proves still more strongly the necessity that exists for 
 artillery target and battle practice. In Europe artillery firing 
 receives much more careful and conscientious attention than does 
 small-arm firing in this country ; there is more system about it ; 
 the actual results, \hefacts, are more guardedly determined on the 
 spot; and nothing is left undone to turn them to the greatest pos- 
 sible advantage of the artillery arm. In the United States the 
 reverse of this is true ; but it should not and need not be ; and 
 the proposed field artillery schools, similar to that organized at 
 Fort Riley, would afford, among other things, the means of 
 supplying our deficiencies in this particular. 
 
 PRACTICE FIRING FOR ARTILLERY. 
 
 Rules and regulations governing this useful branch of artillery 
 instruction were first promulgated in War Department Orders No. 
 21, April ist, 1842. They provided in brief for fixed batteries: 
 (i) That a post record-book be kept, wherein for each mounted 
 gun there should be placed all data as to calibre, weight, material 
 of gun, the carriage, and the field of fire. (2) That all the 
 surrounding country and waterways be reconnoitred and thor- 
 oughly studied. (3) That every material fact as to the charac- 
 ter of shot thrown, and its flight, be noted in the record-book. 
 (4) Each company with a fixed battery was annually allowed one 
 hundred cartridges, with seventy-five shot or shell. (5) Com- 
 panies equipped as field artillery were allowed annually two 
 
142 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 hundred blank cartridges and one-third that number of shot or 
 shell. (6) All commanders were directed to keep registers of 
 their practice, so that not a shot should be thrown for instruc- 
 tion without distinct objects; such as range, accuracy of fire, 
 number of ricochets, bursting time for shells, &c. (7) Full re- 
 ports of results were to be sent to the adjutant-general for the 
 information of the War Department and of the general-in-chief. 
 The general objects to be attained by this practice were to impart 
 to officers and men knowledge of the ready and effective use of 
 batteries, to preserve on record for their benefit the more impor- 
 tant results, and to ascertain the condition of both guns and car- 
 riages. These rules first appeared as part of the Army Regula- 
 tions in 1847. I n the edition of the Regulations promulgated in 
 1857 they remained almost unchanged, except that the general- 
 in-chief was not given the results of the practice, th,ey being 
 worked up for the information of the War Department only; and 
 the allowance of ammunition for a field artillery company was 
 changed to five hundred blank cartridges and one-third that 
 number of shot or shell annually. These allowances were cut 
 down in the Regulations of i86i-'63, the field batteries being 
 deprived altogether of either shot or shell for target practice, and 
 blank cartridges given in such quantities as were necessary for 
 instruction and drill. There was not allowed, therefore, by Army 
 Regulations, during the Civil war, a single shot for experimen- 
 tal or target practice, to the fifty-six batteries of regular field 
 artillery which during that contest were equipped and served 
 with the various armies. 
 
 Paragraph III, General Orders No. 67, of 1866, changed the 
 annual allowance, for each artillery company serving by itself at a 
 post with a fixed battery, to fifty cartridges and twelve projectiles 
 for sea-coast guns, with twenty projectiles for calibres below 100- 
 pounders; while, for each additional artillery company, there was 
 given one-half this number; all the cartridges and projectiles 
 being equally divided among the companies firing. This was 
 reducing the practice firing to about one-third what it was in 
 1842, when the system was inaugurated. 
 
 At no time subsequent to 1861, until the promulgation of Gen- 
 eral Orders No. 83, of 1867, Adjutant-General's Office, were the 
 field batteries authorized to expend projectiles for practice; but 
 by that order each was allowed twenty-five rounds, which, for 
 
PRACTICE FIRING. 143 
 
 smooth-bores, were one-half shell or case shot, one-quarter solid 
 shot, and one-quarter canister; for rifle guns, (with which half the 
 field batteries were equipped,) three-quarters were shell or case 
 shot and one-quarter canister; while for instruction and drill pur- 
 poses as many blank cartridges and friction primers were author- 
 ized as the battery and post commanders deemed necessary. The 
 allowance to a battery at permanent works was also changed 
 again by this order, each being given twenty-five blank cartridges, 
 with twelve projectiles for calibres above and twenty for those 
 below 8-inch, and the necessary blank cartridges; for each addi- 
 tional battery serving at a post, one-half this number, the whole 
 number being equally divided among the batteries firing; besides, 
 there were allowed annually not exceeding two hundred friction 
 primers to each battery for drill purposes. The condition was 
 added, that the ammunition should be taken from the serviceable 
 yet longest on hand at the post. 
 
 General Orders No. 14, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 
 1876, promulgated existing orders relating to artillery target prac- 
 tice, with the following additional instruction: 
 
 " Commanding officers of forts and light batteries will transmit direct to the 
 adjutant-general, for the chief of ordnance, on forms to be supplied by the 
 ordnance department, reports of each and every shot fired from field, siege, or 
 sea-coast guns and mortars. Each gun should have its recorded history. Every 
 shot fired should be recorded and reported, with all the circumstances and 
 incidents attending it. It is of the greatest importance that the whole number 
 and character of rounds to which a gun has been subjected in practice be at 
 all times known." 
 
 The official who comes prominently into view here is the chief 
 of ordnance, placed thus in the position of chief of artillery of the 
 army, a role never before openly assumed. The next year (1877), 
 upon his recommendation, the above order was modified, omit- 
 ting an enumeration of the character of ammunition to be used by 
 field batteries, and providing that reports of each and every shot 
 fired, not only in target practice, but in actual service against the 
 enemy, should be tabulated for the information of the chief of 
 ordnance; thus adding strength to the functions he had assumed 
 as head of the artillery arm of service chief of the artillery staff. 
 
 When the practice firing of artillery was begun, in 1842, 
 reports were made for the information of the general-in-chief ; 
 
144 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 but in 1857 ne dropped out of sight, and his place has at last 
 been assumed by the head of a non-combatant bureau. 
 
 It may not be uninteresting, in this connection, to recall the 
 position in which the new head of the artillery and his department 
 posed at this time before Congress and the public outside of the 
 army. 
 
 In a printed argument to demonstrate the impolicy of reuniting 
 the artillery and ordnance, the new chief of artillery remarked : 
 
 "It [ordnance department] is not the staff of the artillery in any sense; its 
 duties are defined by law, and consist in providing, preserving, distributing, and 
 accounting for every description of artillery, small-arras, and all the munitions 
 of war which may be required by the fortresses of the country, the armies in 
 the field, and for the whole body of the militia of the Union. The functions of 
 the ordnance department will thus be seen to be entirely distinct from those 
 of the line of the army in any of its branches ; its duties would remain the same 
 whether the peace establishment be large or small, or be entirely abolished." 
 
 Where, may we ask, in the organic or any subsequent act, 
 defining the duties of this department, is there any warrant for 
 this assumption, by its chief, of the supervision of the artillery in a 
 matter which belongs essentially to that arm alone? If, indeed, 
 it be found that these duties defined by law circumscribe its proper 
 sphere of action, and the nature of things requires that the chief 
 of ordnance should assume charge of one of the most important 
 duties of the artillery arm collating the results of its target prac- 
 tice it is time to consider seriously the question thus forced upon 
 us, viz. : Is not, after all, the uniting of the present ordnance and 
 artillery under one head the natural and proper plan of organi- 
 zation ? Here is a department which, when the question of merg- 
 ing is raised, loudly proclaims that it is in no sense artillery staff, 
 and yet it seeks to assume those duties and is now actually per- 
 forming them. Not only has this been done in the matter of 
 target practice and other firing, even to the extent of every shot 
 used in actual service against the enemy, but, upon the recom- 
 mendation of the new chief of artillery staff, artillery officers have 
 been excluded from councils which decided upon the armament 
 of the forts they were to defend, and their proper duties in this 
 respect assumed by the officers of that new staff. The absurdity 
 of depriving artillery officers of a voice (which should be a pre- 
 ponderating one) in determining what proportions of guns of the 
 various calibres should be used in defending our forts, is appar- 
 
PRACTICE FIRING. 145 
 
 ent.* Yet this is what the new chief of artillery staff recommended 
 and had the address to secure being done. The regulations of the 
 army require that commanders of fortified places shall consult 
 their senior officers of artillery, who keep journals, in which, in 
 case of investment, every circumstance of importance is entered. 
 In this, and in the duties of the siege, the artillery is intimately 
 associated with the engineers. The commandant of the former 
 submits to the commanding general his views as to everything 
 affecting the artillery, and advises the general throughout as to 
 the employment of his arm. Still this is the officer who, under 
 the dispensation of the new artillery staff, is to be ignored when 
 the armaments of the forts are being determined upon, and his 
 place at the council filled by a non-combatant, ' ' whose services 
 have no immediate connection with the line of the army, who is 
 separated from that body, and given up to a study of the exact 
 sciences and mechanical philosophy" ! 
 
 The records show that in 1879, after the ordnance department 
 had thus assumed the duties of artillery staff, there were fired at 
 targets by the troops of that arm, exclusive of those at Fortress 
 Monroe, ten lo-inch Rodman, eighteen lo-inch siege mortar, one 
 hundred and fifty-five 8-inch siege mortar, seventeen 8 -inch how- 
 itzer, seventy 4^ -inch siege rifle, fourteen 12-pounder smooth- 
 bore, three hundred and eighty-three 3-inch rifle, and three thou- 
 
 * The recent attempt, through the provisions of a fortification bill, to 
 organize a board, advisory to the Secretary of War, for the determination of 
 all questions relating to the fortification and armament of our most important 
 sea-boards, without having an artillery officer thereon, is another of those efforts 
 to push bureauocracy to the front at the expense of the fighting arms of service 
 and of the public weal, and one to which Members of Congress unwittingly, it 
 is believed, lent themselves. 
 
 Why any should be selected for this duty who, during the four years' war 
 for national existence, never heard a hostile shot fired, while artillery officers 
 who faced the enemy on every battle-field, and will do it again if the coast be 
 attacked, are ignored, is one of those questions that cannot be answered. 
 
 Why those who will command the sea-coast works in case of invasion, upon 
 whom will devolve the duty of upholding the honor of the flag and the country, 
 should not have a voice in this advisory board, is not apparent; but the short- 
 sightedness of that policy which would exclude from its councils the very offi- 
 cers who ultimately have more responsibility in the premises than any others, 
 or all others combined, is apparent enough. 
 
 Fortunately for the security and honor of the United States, Congress prompt- 
 ly relegated to the oblivion it deserved this endeavor to hold up to contempt the 
 
146 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 sand Catling projectiles. No attempt is made by the artillery staff 
 to turn the results of target practice to the advantage of that arm, 
 or of the army at large. The tabulated statements are filed away 
 for the information of the chief of ordnance and nobody else. The 
 general-in-chief knows nothing of them, or at least he has disap- 
 peared from view in this connection. No opportunity is given 
 different commands to compare results; and, except in the low- 
 est grades of duties, those of the gunner, it would be difficult 
 to point out in what manner the artillery is benefited by this 
 annual expenditure of ammunition. While large sums are being 
 expended in target practice with the infantry weapon, prizes and 
 honors being showered upon the successful contestants, the artil- 
 lery is left to languish under the withering influence of official 
 neglect. 
 
 It is not so in any of the other first-class nations, for in every other 
 the efficiency of the infantry and artillery, in fighting power, ad- 
 vances with equal pace. There is no feature of their army organi- 
 zation more complete than the firing schools, for the practical 
 benefit of officers and men; and in the artillery, in addition, to test 
 
 capacity, intelligence, and professional attainments of the officers of that par- 
 ticular arm of service, upon which has heretofore, and will hereafter, devolve 
 the defense of the maritime frontier, while favoring those who are "invincible 
 in peace, invisible in war." [Tortification Bill, section 2, Majority Report, 
 House of Representatives, first session, Forty-eighth Congress.] 
 
 Paragraph 1023, Revised Regulations of 1881, (No. 490, of 1863,) directs that 
 the senior officer of engineers, of ordnance, and the departments of the general 
 staff serving at the chief headquarters in the field, shall transmit to the bureau 
 of his department at Washington, at the close of the campaign, and .at such 
 other times as the commander in the field may approve, a full report of the 
 operations of his department, and whatever information to improve its service 
 he may be able to furnish. 
 
 The artillery is excluded here. Hence, neither during the Civil war, before 
 that, nor since, have commanders of artillery had any means of placing needed 
 information before any authority whatever, let alone the War Department. 
 This being ignored, has proved a heavy and grievous load for the artillery to 
 bear. Thus this most complicated of all arms has been left, in the field, to its 
 own devices. As artillery it has never had any standing at the War Depart- 
 ment. The head of a bureau non-combatant in war, in peace fiercely combat- 
 ant, acts as chief of the artillery arm, but without, of course, knowing any- 
 thing of its needs in campaign. This is but another reason why the ordnance 
 and artillery should be either united under a single head, or the arm given a 
 chief of its own to represent it at the War Department councils. 
 
PRACTICE FIRING. 147 
 
 the guns, carriages, caissons, and ammunition, in order that the 
 theoretical knowledge acquired from books may be made com- 
 plete by practice, skill acquired, without which the lessons of the 
 school-room are of secondary importance, and to some officers 
 a positive detriment. The annual allowance, for each battery is 
 from three to five hundred rounds of ammunition, good, bad, and 
 indifferent in quality, depending upon the particular lessons to be 
 taught. Every effort is made by competition and otherwise to 
 excite the deepest interest in the practice, and when completed to 
 turn its results, carefully noted, to the greatest advantage of the 
 artillery arm. 
 
 With us the practice is the reverse of this. The allowance 
 of ammunition is insufficient, and, being selected from ' ' service- 
 able yet longest on hand," is generally wretchedly inferior in 
 quality. As illustrating what can be done with this kind of ammu- 
 nition, the firing does, perhaps, very well; but to show the actual 
 power of our artillery, under favorable circumstances, it is of no 
 value whatever. The truth of these statements, their exact accord 
 with the facts as regards quality of ammunition, is abundantly 
 borne out by the marginal remarks on the tabulated records from 
 the various posts. Neither have the officers of the new artillery 
 staff, separated as they are from the line of the army, absorbed in 
 study of the exact sciences, given up to philosophical reflections, 
 time nor inclination to withdraw themselves from these congenial 
 pursuits to work out practical deductions from the results of our 
 annual artillery practice. The artillery officers with troops have 
 not the records, hence they cannot do it; and, as a result, no at- 
 tempt is made to follow up to its logical consequences the informa- 
 tion acquired, thus defeating, in great measure, the objects for 
 which the target practice of the artillery arm is authorized. 
 
148 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION DUTIES : TECHNICAL. 
 
 The Artillery Branch of Service has to a degree, at some times 
 more than others, been intrusted with those technical duties of 
 the laboratory, the workshop, and the arsenal which in other 
 countries are considered as appertaining to the peculiar functions 
 of that arm, but at present, with us, are assigned to the ordnance 
 department. 
 
 Knox was the active agent, under the orders of the commander- 
 in-chief, for devising ways and means for manufacturing or other- 
 wise securing, within the colonies, munitions of war, particularly 
 cannon and small-arms, with powder and projectiles. He wished, 
 in regard to technical matters at least, to establish our own upon 
 the plan of the Royal Artillery of England, himself occupying 
 the position of master-general of ordnance. He was never able, 
 however, to fully carry that point, although himself practically 
 performing the duties, not only of the master-general but of his 
 board of ordnance as well, in addition to those appertaining to 
 commander of the artillery arm. This state of affairs was inter- 
 rupted for one year only, while the plan on which the department 
 of commissary-general of military stores was being tested. The 
 commander of artillery, except during- that year, determined upon 
 the models for guns and carriages, and the kinds and quantities of 
 warlike stores to be supplied. Although many cannon of various 
 sizes and kinds of metal were procured abroad, no carriages, tum- 
 brils, ammunition wagons, or other wheeled artillery vehicles 
 were purchased; all were manufactured in the colonies. 
 
 In general terms it may be stated that the commander of the 
 artillery controlled everybody and everything connected with that 
 branch of service, both personnel and materiel. He did not 
 make contracts for supplies; that, Congress reserved the right to 
 do, and generally through its cannon committee, the board of 
 war and ordnance, or the finance department. To the board 
 of war and ordnance, appointed June I2th, 1776, was given by 
 Congress the duty of keeping account of all artillery, arms, and 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 149 
 
 warlike stores, and preserving such portion as might not be in use. 
 The next year these duties were extended to embrace the build- 
 ing and management of laboratories, arsenals, foundries, and mag- 
 azines, thus relieving Knox of a burden which force of circum^ 
 stances had placed upon him in the earlier stages of the war. 
 
 The facts attending the establishment of the department of the 
 commissary-general of military stores, from their direct bearing 
 upon the technical affairs of the artillery at this time, should be 
 understood, and will be narrated. 
 
 Soon after assuming command at Boston, in 1775, General 
 Washington recommended to Congress the appointment of a 
 commissary of artillery. This appointment he was authorized to 
 make, at a salary of $30 per month more than a captain of that 
 arm. The office, purely civil, was first filled by Mr. Ezekiel 
 Cheever; and, in the orders assigning him to duty, the com- 
 mander of artillery was instructed to place all ordnance stores, 
 not in the hands of troops, in charge of the commissary, who was 
 to see them properly taken care of, and who was in fact made 
 storekeeper for artillery materiel. The number of persons thus 
 employed increased as the war progressed; and one of the rec- 
 ommendations of the commander of the artillery for the improve- 
 ment of that arm, made to a congressional committee September 
 27th, 1776, was that, besides the commissaries, there should be 
 appointed deputies capable, active men conductors, and clerks, 
 at the discretion of the commander-in-chief. 
 
 - To meet still further that officer's views, General Washington 
 diverted from its original purpose one of the battalions of artillery 
 the organization of which was set on foot pursuant to authority 
 vested in him December i2th, 1776, and formed it into an artificer- 
 regiment (so called), for labor in the same field of non-combatant 
 duties with the commissaries, clerks, and conductors. (Organi- 
 zation, p. 7.) This was the germ of the department of commis- 
 sary-general of military stores, or the ordnance department of the 
 Revolution. January i6th, 1777, Benjamin Flower, of Philadel- 
 phia, was appointed lieutenant-colonel commandant of this artil- 
 lery artificer-regiment, with the additional office of commissary- 
 general of military stores. The regiment was recruited from 
 mechanics alone wheelwrights, blacksmiths, and laboratory men 
 who never, as soldiers, took the field or fired a gun. The 
 colonel was a capable business man; his subordinate officers were 
 
150 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 supposed to be master-workmen. The organization, though styled 
 regiment, was never so in fact; it had no staff; its major was a 
 carpenter; the officers of five companies of the regiment were 
 commissioned, while those of five other companies were not. 
 One company was engaged to serve as mechanics for the artil- 
 lery in the field; all the rest were employed at the laboratories 
 and arsenals. 
 
 When the Conway cabal was at its height, in the winter of 
 1777 '78, several of its members were placed on the new board of 
 war and ordnance, ostensibly presided over by Gates, but really 
 by Mifflin. The faction opposed to General Washington con- 
 trolled its councils, and, that the commander-in-chief might be 
 struck a blow which at the same time would cement and add to 
 the power of the board of war, it was determined to reorganize 
 the staff departments, place them under orders of that body almost 
 exclusively, and withdraw them to a corresponding degree from 
 control of the commander of the army. The quartermaster's 
 department was overhauled; the inspector's department created, 
 and Conway, against Washington's well-known, publicly express- 
 ed wishes, and with the increased rank of major-general, placed 
 at its head; but so ill-timed were these and many other measures 
 undertaken professedly to reform the public service, that they 
 scarcely excited notice, and soon passed into oblivion. It was 
 at this time that, having received the recommendation of the 
 board of war, the department in question really the department 
 of technical artillery was placed upon a more elaborate footing, 
 and the control of its officers regulated in accordance with the 
 principle before indicated. In pursuance of this plan Congress, 
 February, 1778 
 
 " Resolved, That there shall be one commissary-general of military stores, 
 whose business it shall be to receive and deliver all arms, ammunition, and 
 accoutrements of every species and denomination ; to provide and contract for 
 all such articles as may be wanted in this department, according to the direction 
 he shall receive from the board of war and ordnance ; to receive and collect 
 returns from all the different States where there are any continental arms and 
 stores, draw them into one general return, and, on the first day of every month, 
 deliver one to the board of war and ordnance. * * * 
 
 "All continental armorers shall be under the direction of the board of war 
 and ordnance and of the commissary-general of military stores ; the armorers 
 to receive from the said commissary all arms to be repaired, make returns of the 
 state of repairs when demanded, and deliver the arms, when repaired, into his 
 store. * * * 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 151 
 
 "That there be as many deputies, assistants, commissaries, deputy commis- 
 saries, conductors, and clerks as the exigency of the service shall require, to 
 be appointed by the board of war and ordnance. * * * 
 
 " That for the future no rank be annexed to the officers of this department 
 except they belong to the regiment of artillery-artificers, and then their rat^k 
 only to take place as officers of that corps ; the pay also which they receive as 
 officers of that regiment to be included in the pay herein settled for the officers 
 of the commissary-general's department. * * * 
 
 "All the artillery-artificers that are or may be employed at any armories, labo- 
 ratories, foundries, or military magazines, (those employed with the army in the 
 field excepted,) shall be under the immediate direction and subject to the orders 
 and command of the commissary-general, or the officer directed by him to take 
 charge of the same. * * * 
 
 "The board of war and ordnance shall transmit from time to time, as the 
 service shall render necessary, transcripts from all returns received from the 
 commissary-general of military stores; also accounts of all ordnance and stores 
 under their care, or belonging to the United States, and the places where the 
 same are deposited, to the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, 
 in order that he shall make such requisitions for supplies for the army under 
 his immediate command, or for the separate departments, as he shall think 
 proper. * * * 
 
 "The commanding officer of artillery for the time being, in the grand army, 
 with the chief engineer, commissary of artillery, and eldest colonel of artillery 
 in camp, or such of them as are present with the army, shall be a subordinate 
 board of ordnance, under the direction of the commander-in-chief or the board 
 of war and ordnance, for transacting all business of the ordnance department 
 necessary to be done in the field, and to have the care of all ordnance and stores 
 in camp ; and in case of sudden exigency the commissary-general of military 
 stores shall be obliged to obey their directions as to any supplies wanted by the 
 army out of the stores not in camp ; and the said board shall correspond with 
 and report their proceedings to the board of war and ordnance, from whom they 
 are to receive any necessary assistance." 
 
 Colonel Flower was confirmed in the position of commissary- 
 general of military stores, with rations and pay dating back to 
 July i6th, 1776, when he had been appointed commissary of the 
 Flying Camp in New Jersey. He was authorized to augment 
 the number and strength of the companies of the regiment of 
 artificers, the enlisted force of which received every bounty and 
 more pay than the artillery, while the officers received equal pay 
 with those of the same grade in that arm. 
 
 The establishment of this department was important in its bear- 
 ing upon the administrative affairs of the artillery, inasmuch as it 
 materially curtailed the powers of the commander of that arm in 
 the management of technical matters. For the artillery-artificers 
 
152 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 it proved important also ; the clause confining the scope of their 
 military rank to the narrow limits of their own corps placed them 
 in a mortifying position when brought into contact with the rest 
 of the army. They fought hard against this interpretation being 
 given the resolution, but to no purpose; a no less authority than 
 Colonel Pickering, at the time a member of the board of war and 
 ordnance, declaring that it was the intention to confine the opera- 
 tion of the rank of these artificer officers to the limits of their regi- 
 ment ; and as this decision was concurred in by the Secretary at 
 War and the agent for army accounts, the commutation of half- 
 pay for life, given after the war to other continental officers, was 
 denied those of the artillery-artificers. The commissary of mili- 
 tary stores department, including that regiment, was considered 
 to be a civil branch of the Government, and the only reason for 
 allowing the officers of the latter organization military rank at all 
 was to enable them to sit on courts-martial to try members of 
 their own corps, and for general purposes of interior discipline. 
 
 The career of the new department was neither long nor pros- 
 perous. This was due, first, to the fact that the power of the 
 particular board of war and ordnance which brought it into 
 existence was but transitory; second, it withdrew from the com- 
 mander of the artillery authority which he had previously exer- 
 cised, and which experience was every day demonstrating he 
 should retain, viz., a deciding voice in determining all questions 
 that arose concerning artillery materiel ; third, by far the larger, 
 more intelligent and (excepting the head of the department) influen- 
 tial members among its officials and employe's were civilians, the 
 military rank of the artificers, though limited, being still sufficient 
 to beget rivalries, jealousies, and disputes which brought to a 
 stand-still the government workshops. 
 
 In so far as the new order of things affected the armies in the 
 field, we may best judge of their workings by the following ex- 
 tract from a letter written to the commander-in-chief by General 
 Knox, and dated artillery park, Valley Forge, June i5th, 1778: 
 
 " I feel myself so embarrassed in the duties of my department by the regula- 
 tions of the llth February that I send changes for consideration of Congress. 
 I am in the awkward situation of having none of the powers appertaining to 
 the rank of commanding officer of artillery ; I am expected to do things, and 
 have no means of doing them. In all considerable armies in Europe a general 
 officer has command and direction of the artillery and the preparation of every- 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 153 
 
 thing relating to the ordnance department in all its details. He is allowed as 
 assistants commissaries, clerks, conductors, founders, and artificers, all under 
 his immediate control. In the British service the muster-master-general of 
 ordnance or the cbmmander-in-chief of the artillery has a board of ordnance ; 
 he presides ; and this regulates everything pertaining to the artillery. This_ 
 board consists of the surveyor-general of the artillery, clerk of the ordnance, 
 storekeeper, and clerk of the deliveries. There cannot be pointed out one in- 
 stance where the commissaries or clerks are independent of the commanding 
 officer of the artillery, as provided in these regulations. It is necessary that 
 the head of a department should have the direction of all its parts. By these 
 regulations .the commanding officer of artillery has no power to give the dimen- 
 sions or construction of any carriages or cannon, however erroneous they may 
 be ; nor directions for making port-fires, fuses, or other matters in which the 
 reputation of his corps is intimately concerned." 
 
 The difficulties pointed out led to great inconvenience in the 
 campaign of 1778, and a committee of Congress examined into 
 the subject, heard all parties interested, and then recommended 
 such modifications as amounted in effect to abolishing the depart- 
 ment of commissary-general of military stores, in so far as the duties 
 of its head were inimical to the rights, privileges, and powers of the 
 commander of the artillery, as pointed out by Knox. The changes 
 made had the sanction and recommendation of that officer, as well 
 as of the commander-in-chief. They went into effect just one year 
 after the department was 'organized, when Congress, February 
 1 8th, 1779 
 
 " Resolved, That the commanding officer of artillery of the United States for 
 the time being shall, under the general orders and concurrence of the com- 
 mander-in-chief, arrange and direct all business of the ordnance department 
 necessary to be done in the field. The ordnance, arms, and military stores in 
 the fixed magazines to be drawn out only by the orders of the board of war 
 and ordnance, unless, in the course of the service, circumstances should occur 
 in which the procuring such orders from the board would, in the opinion of the 
 commander-in-chief and commanding officer of artillery, occasion improper 
 delays; and in such cases the commanding officer of artillery shall have "power 
 to draw from the nearest magazines the supplies wanted for the army ; and the 
 different commissaries and directors of the magazines and laboratories shall, in 
 such cases, immediately obey the orders of the commanding officer of artillery, 
 informing the board of war and ordnance of the same. And, that the comman- 
 der-in-chief and commanding officer of artillery may know, in such cases, where 
 to send for necessary supplies, the board of war and ordnance shall cause 
 monthly returns of all ordnance, arms, and military stores at the magazines in 
 the United States to be made to the commander-in-chief, who will communi- 
 cate to the commanding officer of artillery the whole or any part of them, as he 
 shall judge the good of the service requires. And as it may frequently happen 
 20 
 
154 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 that parts of the army may be detached to such distances as to render their 
 obtaining supplies, in the circumstances above mentioned, by the immediate 
 orders of the commander-in-chief and commanding officer of artillery, incon- 
 venient, in such cases the commander-in-chief and commanding officer of artil- 
 lery shall give to the commanding officers of the detachment, and of the artillery 
 annexed to it, proper directions for furnishing the detachment with the neces- 
 sary supplies of ordnance, arms, and military stores; and the orders of the said 
 commanding officers of the detachment, and of the artillery annexed to it, 
 given pursuant to the said directions, shall be obeyed by the commissaries 
 and directors at the magazines and laboratories as if given immediately by 
 the commander-in-chief and commanding officer of artillery of the United 
 States. * * * " 
 
 This was the first point gained under the new regulations, and 
 greatly increased the mobility of the army by placing the ord- 
 nance, arms, and military supplies at the command of the general 
 of artillery or his subordinates. But this was not sufficient ; a 
 competent machinery was necessary to conduct the commissary 
 duties with the army itself, and to meet this requirement Congress 
 created a new department for this special service by providing 
 
 "That there shall be a field commissary of military stores, to be appointed 
 by the board of war and ordnance, who shall receive and issue all ordnance, 
 arms, and military stores in the field, pursuant to the orders of the commander- 
 in-chief and commanding officer of artillery ; all orders for this purpose from 
 the commander-in-chief to be directed to the commanding officer of artillery. 
 The field commissary shall have so many conductors, deputies and clerks, to be 
 likewise appointed by the board of war and ordnance, as, in the opinion of the 
 board, the commander-in-chief, and the commanding officer of artillery, the 
 service shall from time to time require." 
 
 And, to show what relation this new department should bear 
 to the rest of the army and the established commissary depart- 
 ment, paragraph 5 (ibid.) proceeded : "The field commissary of 
 military stores, his deputies, conductors and clerks, shall be inde- 
 pendent of the commissary-general of military stores;" and they 
 were instructed to make monthly returns of stores received, is- 
 sued and remaining on hand, from which a consolidated return 
 was to be made, and a copy sent by the field commissary to the 
 board of war and ordnance, one to the commander-in-chief, one 
 to the commander of artillery, and a fourth to the commissary- 
 general of military stores. 
 
 The duty of submitting estimates for ordnance, arms, and 
 military stores necessary for the use of the army was imposed 
 upon the commanding officer of artillery. That the materiel 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 155 
 
 should have that intelligent supervision which the good of the 
 service required, and that the experience of the war might not 
 be lost, it was further provided 
 
 "That, whenever the said commanding officer of artillery shall judge any 
 particular directions necessary for, or alterations and improvements to be 
 made in, the construction or preparation of ordnance, arms, and military 
 stores of any kind, he shall communicate the same to the board of war and 
 ordnance for their consideration, who shall thereupon give such orders to the 
 artificers and laboratory men as they shall judge the good of the service re- 
 quires." 
 
 While the provisions quoted gave the commander of artillery 
 control of all ordnance, arms, and military stores already manu- 
 factured, made the field commissary his subordinate, and gave 
 the suggesting of improvements into his hands as his peculiar 
 prerogative, it yet remained to bring the whole field of technical 
 artillery under his supervision. To accomplish this, and thus 
 make the commander of artillery what the name implies in all its 
 plenitude, paragraph 10 provided 
 
 "That there shall be one surveyor of ordnance, to be appointed annually 
 from the colonels, the appointment to be made by the board of war and ord- 
 nance, until Congress shall direct otherwise. The officer thus appointed shall 
 retain his rank in the artillery and all the benefits arising from it ; but during 
 the time of his surveyorship he shall not, except in extraordinary cases or when 
 called tor by the commander-in-chief, perform any duty in the line. His duty 
 as surveyor shall be to examine into the construction, qualities, and condition 
 of all cannon, carriages, arms, and materials for and preparation of every spe- 
 cies of warlike stores, and to visit all the different arsenals, foundries, laborato- 
 ries, and workshops belonging to the ordnance department of the United States, 
 carefully noting every error and defect he shall discover, which, with a general 
 state of the department, he shall report immediately to the board of war and 
 ordnance, as well as the commanding officer of artillery, with his ideas of any 
 alterations or improvements proper to be made thereon. He shall also examine 
 all ordnance and military stores in the field, and report the state of them to 
 the commanding officer of artillery and the board of war and ordnance; and, 
 for the purposes aforesaid, the commissaries of military stores, as well in the 
 field as elsewhere, shall make returns to the said surveyor, and shall expose to 
 his view all the ordnance, arms, stores, and materials for the ordnance depart- 
 ment in their custody." 
 
 In one word, everything and everybody connected with the 
 department of ordnance, in the field, at the laboratories, foundries, 
 arsenals, or wherever they might be, were brought through this 
 inspectorship, inquisitorial in its powers, to the attention, whether 
 
156 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 with good or bad report, of the commander of artillery of the 
 United States. The practical effect of this was what Congress 
 intended it should be, and that officer was restored to his position, 
 in fact as well as in name, of commander of the artillery arm. The 
 pay of the commander of artillery was increased $75, that of the 
 surveyor $70 per month, as compensation for the duties imposed, 
 and subordinate officers of the new department received an in- 
 crease in proportion to their pay in the line. 
 
 Colonel John Lamb was, March 6th, 1779, appointed to the 
 office of surveyor. He had from early in life devoted much time 
 and study to obtaining a knowledge of the technical features of 
 the artillery, while a wide experience in the field, in the several 
 grades of captain, major and colonel, had thoroughly informed 
 him of the details of actual service, its needs and defects, and sug- 
 gested means for overcoming them. 
 
 The office of field commissary was conferred upon Mr. Samuel 
 Hodgdon, a civilian commissary of the ordnance department. 
 This gentleman, whose superior as a man of business the Revolu- 
 tionary war did not produce, had first been appointed commissary 
 by General Knox, February ist, 1777, and had served in that ca- 
 pacity, principally in the northern department, with Major Stevens' 
 artillery battalion, under Schuyler and Gates. The establishment 
 of his department, the personnel of which were devoid of military 
 rank, was a most difficult matter; but he grappled with the task 
 and was successful. His character was known and appreciated. 
 When Colonel Flower died (April 28th, 1781,) he was appointed 
 commissary-general of military stores, the duties of which office, 
 together with those of field commissary, he performed until the 
 end of the war.* 
 
 With such assistants as Lamb and Hodgdon it may be supposed 
 that Knox found his labors greatly facilitated. The appointment 
 
 *Mr. Hodgdon also performed the duties of assistant quartermaster for the 
 State of Pennsylvania, under Pickering. During President Washington's ad- 
 ministration he was quartermaster-general of the army. He filled these positions 
 with conspicuous ability; and notwithstanding a congressional committee held 
 him partially responsible for St. Glair's defeat, December 4th, 1791, public con- 
 fidence in his great business capacity was not in the least impaired. When 
 General Washington was called to the head of the army in 1*798, Mr. Hodgdon 
 was again drawn into the service as superintendent of military supplies and 
 confidential adviser to the Secretary of War. 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 157 
 
 of the surveyor, however, led directly and rather abruptly to the 
 disintegration of the ordnance department proper. The attention 
 of that functionary was first directed to the extensive laboratory at 
 Springfield, Massachusetts, where, due to misunderstandings be- 
 tween the civil and the military branches of the service, the costly 
 plant was turning out few products, and they inferior in quality. 
 At the same time Governor Reed, of Pennsylvania, reported prac- 
 tically the same state of affairs existing at the Carlisle arsenal. 
 Concerning this the governor remarked: "The iron-work of the 
 carriages was most villainously done. I could run my hands 
 into the joints and cracks in the wood-work, and one i8-pounder 
 carriage that I saw broke down under the first fire." 
 
 The reports of the surveyor having been adverse to the man- 
 agement at these and other places, Congress, on August I2th, 
 1780, razeed the department, retaining only Colonel Flower, one 
 deputy, and one commissary each at Springfield, Carlisle, and 
 the Virginia laboratory, and two or three at places of minor 
 importance. Except the chief, all the principal officers were now 
 civilians. Each company of artillery-artificers was reduced to 
 one officer and forty enlisted men. Lieutenant-Colonel David 
 Mason, of Knox's original regiment, detached for ordnance duty 
 as early as 1776; Mr. Ezekiel Cheever, the first commissary of mil- 
 itary stores in the army; Major Eayres, of the artillery artificer- 
 regiment, with the subalterns, almost to a man, were discharged; 
 and although several captains of that regiment were retained as 
 superintendents of harness-makers, carpenters, wheelwrights, ar- 
 morers, smiths, &c., they were, with scarcely an exception, placed 
 under the orders of civilian commissaries. The next blow was 
 struck by the resolve of Congress of March 29th, 1781, which 
 discharged all the artillery-artificers except two companies. The 
 death of Colonel Flower, and his succession by Mr. Hodgdon, 
 placed now, as had formerly been done by the resolution of Con- 
 gress of February, 1778, the affairs of the ordnance department, 
 both in the field and elsewhere, under the immediate supervision 
 of a single head; but circumstances were changed, and the whole 
 was entirely under the superior control of the commander of 
 artillery, by virtue either of original powers conferred by Con- 
 gress, or powers assumed with the acquiescence of the com- 
 mander-in-chief and the board of war and ordnance. This ap- 
 
158 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 pears from Mr. Hodgdon's correspondence, covering the minute 
 details of artillery technical affairs at this period. 
 
 It only remained to take from it what little of permanency was 
 left, even in appearance, that the ordnance department, as such, 
 should cease to exist. This was accomplished by resolution of 
 Congress of July 24th, 1782, which removed every semblance of 
 stability, by authorizing the Secretary at War to appoint from 
 time to time a commissary of military stores, and, if agreeable to 
 them, to select as many officers of the army to act in that 
 department as the exigencies of service required. Mr. Hodgdon, 
 in a letter to Captain Irish, of the artillery-artificers, concerning 
 this resolution, said: "The department is annihilated. I am 
 retained as commissary of military stores. The Secretary retains 
 you as deputy, with one assistant, one conductor, and one director 
 in the laboratory. ' ' 
 
 Thus terminated the department of commissary -general of 
 military stores, or the ordnance department of the Revolution. 
 Springing from the inevitable necessities of active service, it was 
 so unfortunate as to receive a distinct organization under the 
 blighting influence of a faction in the army and in Congress, 
 which, seeking to render the department independent of the 
 commander-in-chief and the general of artillery, rendered its 
 successful operation impossible; for the wheels of its machinery, 
 when the army took the field, either dragged heavily or stood 
 still. The rapidly-developed defects caused the organization of 
 a field commissary department, independent of the first. There- 
 after it was practically nothing more than a supply corps made 
 up of mechanics, mostly civilians, whose work was supervised 
 by the general of artillery. When the army was disbanded, in 
 1783, Mr. Hodgdon, with several assistants, was temporarily 
 retained in service. He acted as agent for the Secretary at War, 
 whose duty it was to preserve all military supplies, and was finally 
 discharged July 20th, 1785. 
 
 Under resolve of Congress, September, 1782, the field com- 
 missary department was readjusted to meet the needs of an army 
 upon the eve of peace. The appointment of the personnel there- 
 after devolved upon the commanders of artillery in the main and 
 southern armies, acting with the approval of their respective 
 commanding generals. Its existence officially terminated when, 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 159 
 
 pursuant to the proclamation of October i8th, the army was dis- 
 solved November 3d, 1783. 
 
 The arrangement of a peace establishment was a matter of no 
 little difficulty, although one to which Congress early addressed 
 itself, by appointing a committee, of which Colonel Hamilton 
 was the active member, to consult with the commander-in-chief. 
 Among all the responses to General Washington's request to be 
 furnished with the views of officers, that of General Du Portail, 
 of the engineers, was perhaps most pertinent to the subject now 
 being considered. His counsels derived additional weight from 
 the fact that he was acquainted not only with the experience 
 and practice of European armies, but also of our own. He ad- 
 vised uniting the artillery and engineers, dividing the frontier 
 into sections, placing artillery and engineer affairs in each section 
 under an officer of rank, while over all would be placed a com- 
 mandant and director-general of artillery and fortification for the 
 United States. To the director-general subordinate officers of 
 the department of artillery and engineers were to be accountable, 
 he to be their commander and the head of administrative affairs, 
 through whom would be transmitted all orders of Congress or 
 the Secretary at War affecting the corps. It was absolutely nec- 
 essary, Du Portail significantly remarked, to have such an officer, 
 in order that the important branch the administrative should 
 be governed by constant principles; for inconvenience, prejudi- 
 cial to the public interests alone, would follow from having several 
 heads to the department, each independent of the others. 
 
 This argument was conclusive with Mr. Hamilton's committee, 
 which recommended the adoption, in the proposed military peace 
 establishment, of the principles here announced ; but the unsettled 
 and imbecile Government was incapable of doing anything calcu- 
 lated to secure its perpetuity, and the report of the committee was 
 never heard from after being submitted to Congress. 
 
 In the meantime General Knox, retained in service temporarily 
 when the army was disbanded to take care of the interests of the 
 Government in the resulting disorder, wrote the following letter to 
 General Washington, in which was first suggested the advisability 
 of making the Secretary at War commander of the peace army, 
 whatever that might prove to be, and adding to his duties those 
 of master-general of ordnance. He said: 
 
160 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 "I have had it in contemplation for a long time past to mention to your 
 excellency the idea of a master-general of ordnance. I beg leave at the 
 same time to rejmark that, although my expectations and wishes are for 
 private life, yet if any office should be formed upon the broad scale of 
 national policy, I might, if thought worthy, find it convenient to give it 
 my zealous assistance." 
 
 General Washington replied: 
 
 " I have conversed with several Members of Congress upon the propriety, 
 in time of peace, of uniting the offices of Secretary at War and master- 
 general of ordnance in one person, and letting him have command of the 
 troops on the peace establishment, not as an appendage of right for that, 
 I think, would be wrong but by separate appointment at the discretion of 
 Congress. If done, it will make a handsome appointment. My wishes to 
 serve you in it you need not doubt." 
 
 Congressional action was such as to meet these views favorably, 
 and was probably the result of General Washington's recommen- 
 dations, made pursuant to the arrangement here entered into; for 
 although, when Secretary at War Lincoln resigned, it was not 
 expected that his place would be filled, this idea was abandoned, 
 and, by resolution of May 2Qth, 1784, the proper committee was 
 directed to revise the institution of the War Office, while on the 
 2yth of January following an ordinance was passed to ascertain 
 the powers and duties of the incumbent. Knox was, March 8th, 
 1785, chosen Secretary at War; his functions were substantially 
 those of the old Secretary, but in addition he was directed to deter- 
 mine ' ' the arrangement, destination, and operation of such troops 
 as are or may be in service, subject to the orders of Congress, or 
 the Committee of the States in the recess of Congress." This 
 made him commander of the forces, and, subject to the limita- 
 tions indicated, he exercised that authority until the installation 
 of the first President under the Constitution. 
 
 In technical artillery matters the powers of the new Secretary 
 were to a degree more limited than those of his predecessor, who 
 had been intrusted with the building and management of laborato- 
 ries, arsenals, foundries, and magazines; but this resulted from the 
 circumstance that for several years after the war no attempts were 
 made at manufacturing new materiel, the old stock alone being 
 drawn upon for the limited demands of service. It was made the 
 duty of the Secretary at War to see the materiel properly stored 
 and taken care of, to insure which being done the law provided 
 that he should, at least once a year, visit all the magazines and 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 161 
 
 deposits of public stores, reporting to Congress their condition, 
 with the measures taken for their preservation. But the expecta- 
 tion that he would personally inspect these, widely- separated 
 depositories proved to be an absurd impossibility, incompatible 
 with a proper performance of his functions at the seat of Govern- 
 ment, and by force of circumstances the inspector's duties were 
 devolved on subordinates. 
 
 The inauguration of the first President transferred the com- 
 mand of the army from the Secretary of War. In the adminis- 
 tration of artillery affairs, however, the functions of the Secretary 
 remained practically as before. He was responsible for materiel, 
 and, at the option of the President, gave orders to the artillery, 
 with other troops. 
 
 This was possible in the quiet immediately succeeding the 
 Revolution; but the first symptoms of serious national trouble 
 called for increased administrative facilities. Accordingly, when, 
 in 1794, our relations with England assumed a threatening as- 
 pect, leading to the initiating of a plan for the fortification of the 
 sea-board, the raising of a corps of artillerists and engineers, and 
 the providing what was deemed a large amount of cannon and 
 warlike stores, the Secretary of War was given, by act of April 
 2d, 1794, an assistant in the person of the superintendent of mili- 
 tary stores. 
 
 This officer's duty was to keep account of warlike materiel, 
 quartermaster and other stores appertaining to the War Depart- 
 ment. Practically, however, accountability for public property 
 was but very imperfectly insured. It was not at first considered 
 possible to devise any system by which company commanders 
 could be held responsible for property in their possession, and 
 as late .as March, 1800, the superintendent of military stores 
 reported that there was no one whose business it was to make 
 returns for the ordnance in the hands of the regiments. This 
 difficulty was attempted to be met by General Orders issued from 
 the Adjutant-General's Office, War Department, March i7th, 
 1800, wherein were promulgated regulations for making returns 
 of ordnance and other property. By subsequent orders the 
 military and assistant military agents provided for in the peace 
 organization of March i6th, 1802, were directed, together with 
 all post commanders to whom were issued military and quarter- 
 21 
 
l62 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 master stores, to render an account of them to the superintendent 
 of military stores, the agents quarterly and the post commanders 
 semi-annually. Although, no doubt, the surveillance of the super- 
 intendent prevented waste and loss, the inadequacy of the system 
 of responsibility may be judged from the circumstance that, in 
 1809, in response to a direct inquiry of the Secretary of War, 
 the superintendent replied that there was no system in force which 
 enabled him to know where the Government property was located, 
 or what stores were in existence, as military agents and post 
 commanders exercised their volition about making returns for 
 property in their possession. 
 
 To those acquainted with military affairs, no statement other 
 than this is necessary to prove the utter and entire absence of any 
 proper system of administration. It was a fitting prelude to the 
 enormous losses and misdirection of supplies which marked the 
 movements of the small armies of the war of 1812, and caused 
 commanders to cast a hundred anxious glances to the rear where 
 they cast one towards the enemy. 
 
 The office of purveyor of public supplies, created by act of 
 February 23d, 1795, was another of those attempts to improve 
 army administrative affairs which followed when the people, rudely 
 awakened from the dream of universal and everlasting peace which 
 followed the Revolution, were preparing by force of arms, under 
 the vivifying influence of the constitutional Government, to assume 
 and maintain an honorable position among the nations of the 
 world. The duty of the office was to procure all arms, military 
 and naval stores, or other articles of supply requisite for the serv- 
 ice of the United States. At first the purveyor was an officer 
 of the Treasury Department only; but by act of July i6th, 1798, 
 when preparations were making for war with France, the con- 
 tracting for and purchase of supplies for the army was placed in 
 the hands of the Secretary of War, and the purveyor made subject 
 to his orders, thus becoming, at least to this extent, an officer of 
 the War Department. 
 
 But it did not suffice that the purveyor should purchase, and 
 the superintendent of military supplies should take care of, artil- 
 lery materiel ; it was found necessary to have an officer act in an 
 intermediate capacity, to examine into the quality of purchases 
 before acceptance by the Government. In a letter dated June 
 28th, 1798, Secretary McHenry remarked: 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 163 
 
 "It is with infinite regret the Secretary is obliged to mention that the 
 ordnance of our country is by no means in a position to command respect. 
 Part of it was collected during a season of difficulty and necessity, from 
 different countries, and consequently many of the guns are essentially de- 
 fective, and those of the same class differ in weight, length, and calibre. The 
 variance in these particulars occasions much trouble and inconvenience, in 
 providing appropriate ammunition, stores, apparatus, carriages, besides sub- 
 jecting the military service to injurious delays, and the fatal consequences 
 which might result from ammunition and implements being supplied which, 
 in time of need, will be found not adapted to the piece. As there is no 
 established standard, it has also happened, from a defect of knowledge in 
 our founders, or some other cause, that most of the cannon that have been 
 cast within or on account of the United States are defective in very essen- 
 tial points, and exhibit varieties in those cast at the same furnace, and of 
 the same class, with those procured from abroad. 
 
 "It is important that some arrangement should be immediately adopted, 
 calculated to give efficacy to a proper system and correct these evils. It is 
 not enough that the President determine upon the size, weight, dimensions, 
 and calibres of the different kinds of cannon, either to be made or imported 
 into the United States, for their use, unless an inspector of artillery can be 
 appointed to see that all regulations appertaining to the ordnance department 
 be executed and observed with exactitude." 
 
 Moved by these just considerations, Congress, in the bill then 
 pending for the augmentation of the army, and which became law 
 July i6th, 1798, made the appointment of an inspector of artillery 
 obligatory; and, to insure technical knowledge on the part of the 
 person so designated, provided that he should be taken from the 
 line of artillerists and engineers. 
 
 Concerning a fit character for this office, PresidentAdams wrote 
 to Inspector-General Hamilton, who had urged the appointment 
 of Major Louis de Tousard, that, while recognizing the profes- 
 sional qualifications of this gentleman, he hesitated to make 
 him inspector of artillery, as there was such a deep-seated dis- 
 trust of French officers on the part of the people that he expect- 
 ed much trouble. . It must be confessed that the President, 
 by promptly dismissing La Rochefontaine, colonel of the corps 
 of artillerists and engineers, and placing the other obnoxious 
 officers under a ban, adopted rather energetic measures to quiet 
 popular apprehension; but, as to Tousard, suspicion was speed- 
 ily and very justly allayed. He was soon after informally put 
 upon this duty, and May 26th, 1800, appointed lieutenant- 
 colonel commandant of the Second Regiment of artillerists and 
 
164 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 engineers, with the additional formal appointment of inspector of 
 artillery for the United States. The duties of the office were 
 defined by the Secretary of War in general terms to be 
 
 " First, to take an inventory of ordnance and ordnance stores now on 
 hand, and see that all are placed where they will be properly taken care of; 
 .second, to inspect all ordnance and articles of artillery materiel, making 
 report to the superintendent of military stores: third, to prepare and fur- 
 nish contractors and others proper models for gun carriages and other 
 articles of artillery whenever necessary, and to see that no subaltern officer 
 makes any artillery machine which is not of the model adopted ; fourth, 
 to provide lists and models of all necessary utensils and apparatus for 
 artillery at the several laboratories, &c." 
 
 The administration of artillery affairs from this time down to 
 1812 may be summed up as follows: The technical; the Secretary 
 of War contracted for supplies ; the purveyor purchased those not 
 procured by contract through the Secretary; the inspector fur- 
 nished models, and saw that they were strictly complied with, 
 while the superintendent of military supplies received and stored, 
 for distribution on requisitions, what was accepted by the inspec- 
 tor; and as no rigid system of returns was observed, or indeed 
 deemed practicable, an attempt was made to protect the interests 
 of the Government by making it the duty of the superintendent to 
 cut down all estimates for supplies to the lowest limits compatible 
 with public requirements, and of these requirements he was made 
 the judge. Regarding military subordination, the regiment of 
 artillerists, in common with the rest of the army, was, in a general 
 way, under the orders of the Secretary of War, who therefore 
 could be said to administer affairs affecting the artillery, both 
 technical and personnel. 
 
 The reorganizing act of March i6th, 1802, was construed to 
 abolish the office of inspector of artillery. Subsequent to the 
 passage of this act, and prior to the organization of the ordnance 
 department in 1812, the colonel of the regiment of artillerists gen- 
 erally performed the duties of inspector, and was the principal 
 assistant to the Secretary on technical artillery matters ; in his cus- 
 tody were preserved models for guns, carriages, and machines. 
 Those seeking information on which could be based estimates 
 for the manufacture or supply of materiel were invariably referred 
 by the Secretary to the colonel of the artillerists for details; and 
 in June, 1812, after the department had been authorized by law, 
 Secretary Eustis wrote that officer, then in command of the artil- 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 165 
 
 lery in New York Harbor: "Until the ordnance department shall 
 be in operation, you will, as far as your other duties may permit, 
 continue to superintend the preparations making therein." Of 
 these duties he was finally relieved by the commissary-general of 
 ordnance a few weeks later. Thus passed from the control of the 
 senior officer of artillery the functions of inspector or supervisor 
 of the technical affairs of that arm. 
 
 It thus appears that, from the termination of the Revolutionary 
 war down to the appointment of the commissary-general of ord- 
 nance, in 1812, the Secretary of War exercised a very close per- 
 sonal control of technical artillery matters, and there is no reason 
 to suppose that his course would have changed had not the war 
 of 1812 given him other things to think about, and demonstrated 
 the necessity for intrusting minor affairs to subordinates. The 
 fact cited may have been due to the imposition upon the Secre- 
 tary, under the Confederation, of the duties of master-general of 
 ordnance; and although, prior to 1800, the President himself was 
 supposed to prescribe models for cannon and other materiel, while 
 at that date this authority was transferred to the inspector of artil- 
 lery, still, the official correspondence covering the period from 
 1785 to 1812 shows, apparently, that not a carriage was made, 
 not a gun cast, not a single new feature affecting artillery men 
 or materiel carried into.execution, but that the Secretary of War 
 discussed the measure, raised objections, suggested improvements, 
 and in fine gave as much attention to the matter as though he 
 were chief of the artillery alone. 
 
 This was particularly so under Secretaries Knox and Dearborn, 
 both of whom were, from experience, competent judges; and al- 
 though under the former little new materiel was manufactured, 
 and that of old style, this was not the case with the latter, under 
 whose administration the Gribeauval carriage was brought to the 
 point of being first introduced into our service, a new and excel- 
 lent system of iron field giuis successfully manufactured, thereby 
 greatly increasing the mobility of the field artillery. These, with 
 the equipping of the first horse battery, in 1808, mark what 
 should have been an important epoch in the history of the United 
 States artillery. That no adequate results followed these intelli- 
 gent exertions was no fault of Secretary Dearborn, and but par- 
 tially so of the arm itself, many of whose officers were among the 
 ablest and most cultured in service. It followed from lack of a 
 
l66 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 competent head to the artillery a man who could recognize an 
 improvement when demonstrated to be such capable of using 
 the good material of the personnel to raise it to its true position 
 as a scientific arm ; from changes in the head of the War Depart- 
 ment, one tearing down what the other built up; from the deplet- 
 ed state of the treasury and what proved to be false notions of 
 economy; lastly, from the fatal sense of immunity from war into 
 which the Government had lapsed while the reverberation of the 
 Leopard^ s guns yet echoed along the shores of the Atlantic ; and 
 although the new system of field artillery proved its superiority 
 over its predecessor in a second struggle with Great Britain, 
 neither it nor the light artillery fully met, owing to the causes 
 mentioned, the anticipations of their projector. 
 
 As to the aclual professional acquirements of the artillery at 
 this time, (1802-1812,) it may be safely asserted that the mass 
 of its officers knew little or nothing of the higher duties of the pro- 
 fession. Combining, in 1794, the artillerists and engineers had 
 not been productive of the happy consequences hoped for by 
 Mr. Hamilton's committee and General Du Portail. Both La 
 Rochefontaine and Tousard, of that arm, were capable scientific 
 officers, but attention was then turned to the engineering rather 
 than to the artillery duties of the corps; while the former occupied 
 the time of the best educated officers, the latter were turned over 
 to contractors and foundrymen. Artillery officers did not, there 
 is reason to believe, come in contact with practical technical 
 duties, from 1794 to 1800, to a degree that would in the least 
 benefit them. 
 
 The embarrassment caused by the Frenchmen when war 
 with France was imminent was a sufficient reason for gradual- 
 ly eliminating them, which process, commenced in 1798, was 
 rendered complete by the reorganizing act of 1802. But, while 
 the country was thus reassured, the artillery was injured in 
 having withdrawn from its ranks its most accomplished mem- 
 bers. Nor was this all : that reorganizing acl: took from the arm 
 its only American officer, above the rank of captain, who was 
 known to be possessed of great abilities and scientific attain- 
 ments, and placed him at the head of the new engineer corps ; 
 while, as colonel of the regiment of artillerists, was retained a 
 respectably practical soldier, with some knowledge of simpler 
 technical affairs, but disqualified by habit and education for the 
 
DUTIES I TECHNICAL. 167 
 
 position of chief of a scientific corps. Here was made a mistake 
 from which the arm has never recovered. That was the time at 
 which a right direction might have been given affairs ; but, being 
 allowed to pass unimproved, through incapacity, the organization _ 
 of a technical artillery, under capable management if possible, was 
 a logical and inevitable consequence so soon as either efficient re- 
 adjustment of the army was determined on, or the accumulating 
 responsibilities of war rendered it impracticable for the Secretary 
 to devote a large part of his time to personal supervision of artil- 
 lery affairs. 
 
 Intelligent soldiers, who knew what the deficiencies of service 
 were, had pointed out the necessity for reform of some kind. In 
 the fall of 1811 a board of officers, embracing General Ganse- 
 voort, Colonel Williams, and others first in merit in the army, 
 submitted to the Secretary of War, among other recommenda- 
 tions for the improvement of the military establishment, the fol- 
 lowing for the artillery : First, the adoption of a uniform system 
 of tactics ; second, reviving the office and powers of inspector of 
 artillery; third, the appointment of an artillery board, upon which 
 should rest responsibility for determining models, proportions, and 
 metal of cannon of all kinds, in order that system should be 
 established in that department, where, at the time, nothing was 
 definitely determined in regard to these important matters. 
 
 Colonel Izard, of the Second Regiment of artillery, (being 
 raised,) likewise addressed the Secretary upon the same subject, 
 urging that active measures be taken for the amelioration of the 
 condition of that arm, the same in substance but more elaborate 
 in detail than that of Du Portail thirty years before. Concerning 
 the professional status of the artillery at the time (1812), this 
 officer, who was perhaps the best informed in that branch of 
 service, remarked: 
 
 "The various corps denominated artillery have been such for many years in 
 the United kStates only in name. The pecuniary advantages which accompany 
 the exertions of American youth in other liberal professions have necessarily 
 deviated their attention from the studies which are indispensable for the exer- 
 cise of the scientific branches of the military duty, and which require long 
 and serious instruction. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the officers 
 of the United States artillery, with but few exceptions, are only acquainted 
 with details of service which are common to every description of soldiers. 
 With us, contrary to the practice in Europe, it sometimes happens that officers attain 
 to the highest ranks in the army, of corps that are entirely scientific, without being 
 
1 68 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 acquainted with the elements which are necessary for the execution of the duties of a 
 subaltern. How all-important for the public it is to have a remedy for the evil, 
 is proved by the difficulties in procuring those qualified to take the higher 
 commands in the artillery and engineer corps at the present crisis." 
 
 The crisis mentioned precipitated what events had predeter- 
 mined; the technical artillery was given into the hands of those 
 competent to perform its duties; the ordnance department was 
 organized under an able, accomplished scholar and officer; while 
 to the regiments were left the glorious to be sure, yet restricted, 
 duties of the field, to perform which, however, most efficiently 
 and economically, required the technical knowledge of the new 
 department, supplemented by the practical experience of the old. 
 Thus, as a result of the selection of improper personnel in 1802, 
 was the artillery, contrary to the practice of all other armies, 
 separated ten years later into two parts, each in itself imperfect, 
 yet which, properly united, make up a complete and symmetrical 
 whole. 
 
 This continued until March 2d, 1821, when, in the reduction 
 and rearrangement of the army, the ordnance department was 
 merged in the artillery and technical duties restored to that arm. 
 The reorganizing act provided that to each of the four artillery 
 regiments should be appointed one supernumerary captain, while 
 the President was given authority to select from the artillery the 
 other necessary officers for ordnance duty. 
 
 These were subject, in the execution of their special duties, to 
 the orders of the War Department only; but when companies or 
 detachments of artillery were stationed at arsenals, the comman- 
 dants of the latter were responsible to regimental and department 
 commanders for the regular returns and reports. In so far as 
 discipline was concerned, officers on ordnance duty were on the 
 same footing as others; and being, in technical matters, exclu- 
 sively under the orders of the War Department, questions of 
 responsibility to seniors were happily adjusted. On the one 
 hand, they had constantly before their eyes the fact that they 
 were part of the army and amenable to military law; on the 
 other, that, in the performance of the duties to which they were 
 assigned, they were not subject to interference except by order 
 of the Secretary of War. 
 
 To insure perfect working of the new department, a special 
 inspectorship was deemed advisable. With this end in view, one 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 169 
 
 of the regular inspectors-general was at first assigned to the artil- 
 lery arm alone. As to the personnel, his duties, besides those 
 defined by general regulations, embraced reports upon the char- 
 acter, capability, and usefulness of the several officers and agents 
 connected with the artillery, as well as the condition of the posts 
 and troops under their command. Regarding technical affairs, he 
 was instructed to direct his attention to the various depots of 
 stores, arsenals, foundries, and manufactories of arms; the mode 
 of fabrication of the materiel of the army, its quantity and quality. 
 When, afterwards, the order assigning this officer to duty in the 
 artillery was revoked, and the inspectors-general directed to 
 alternate in their inspections without regard *to arm of service, it 
 was deemed necessary to have a special inspector for the techni- 
 cal branch at least. Accordingly, a field officer of artillery, 
 assisted by a subaltern, was appointed to subject to proof and 
 critical examination all cannon, shot, shells, &c., at the several 
 foundries, and which were intended for the army and the militia 
 of the United States. 
 
 The school of practice at Fortress Monroe was intended by 
 Secretary Calhoun to add to the general efficiency, and, with a 
 proper organization of the artillery, would no doubt have proved 
 to be a powerful auxiliary to that desirable end; but it is not 
 questioned that this school, like all else appertaining to the arm, 
 suffered from want of a central administrative bureau, and, in con- 
 sequence, but imperfectly attained the object for which it was 
 instituted. 
 
 Merging the ordnance in the artillery was done upon the rec- 
 ommendation of Secretary Calhoun, whose clear and logical mind 
 grasped the whole subject of the military establishment in all its 
 details, and, in the duties to be performed, assigned to each its 
 proper part. In a report communicated to the House of Repre- 
 sentatives, dated December 2oth, 1820, there appeared as his 
 reason for the measure the opinion that, ' ' by uniting the three 
 corps of the ordnance, light artillery, and artillery in one, ap- 
 pointing one general staff at the head of it, and making its officers 
 pass in rotation through the three services, the organization of 
 the army would be rendered more simple and the instruction of 
 the officers much more complete." 
 
 As the most important step towards putting these views into 
 practice, the Secretary proposed, first of all, that there be ap- 
 
 22 
 
170 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 pointed for the new corps a lieutenant-colonel commandant, with 
 a staff and administrative machinery competent to give efficiency 
 to the system. But it was a time of reduction as well as of reor- 
 ganization; officers who had devoted their best years to the 
 service of their country were being razeed in rank or turned out 
 to begin life anew ; the struggle for place that ensued was natural. 
 Nor was the legislature insensible to the claims of worthy vet- 
 erans; personal considerations not unfrequently took precedence 
 of public interests; the artillery arm, under the color of reform, 
 was again, as in 1802, sacrificed to make place for individuals. 
 Instead of being united in one compact whole, as proposed, it was 
 arranged to four distinct regiments, without a bond of union 
 between them. Amidst the disordered body stood the technical 
 artillery in it, but not of it. 
 
 The scheme as attempted was a failure; it lacked every ele- 
 ment of strength, while its weaknesses were conspicuous and 
 fundamental. First of all was the omission to place a capable, en- 
 ergetic commandant, with a competent staff, at the head of affairs. 
 This was a vital defect. Nothing in our experience since the 
 foundation of the Government is more clearly established than 
 the fact that, unless there be a single directing mind to set and 
 maintain in harmonious working its delicate and complex parts, 
 no department of the public service can long survive the strains 
 incident to practical and successful operation. The artillery of 
 1821 proved no exception to this rule. 
 
 But this was not all. The regulations established by the War 
 Department restricted, with three or four exceptions, the tours 
 of artillery officers on ordnance duty to one year, a time entirely 
 inadequate to render their services of any substantial benefit to 
 either themselves or the department. Nothing could have struck 
 a deadlier blow at efficiency than this rule of short details. It is 
 very generally believed that four years is the least time that offi- 
 cers detached should serve on this or any other scientific duty. The 
 first year is devoted to obtaining knowledge elementary in char- 
 acter, while, with faithful public servants, every additional year 
 adds, in greater or less degree, to the value of a good officer in 
 his specialty. Under the rule adopted, no sooner had an officer 
 become somewhat at home in his new avocation than he was 
 taken away, and his place filled by a new-comer, who must, like 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 171 
 
 his predecessor, spend all his time becoming familiar with mere 
 rudiments. 
 
 To the foregoing there must be added, as one of the main 
 elements of weakness, the seeds of dissatisfaction, germinating in 
 intrigue, sown when the ordnance department was merged, with- 
 out being absorbed, in the artillery. The principal officers of that 
 department who were retained under the new regime were placed 
 permanently at the head of artillery technical affairs; but the 
 merging process had cut off their individual prospects of promo- 
 tion. It were better for them that the newly-organized artillery 
 fail in its mission ; return to former practices would be to their 
 advantage; and however much they may have labored, if at all, 
 to build up and sustain the honor of the corps into which they 
 were transferred, their efforts in this direction are not of record; 
 while their schemes for its dismemberment commenced so soon 
 as Mr. Calhoun, the reputed although not the real author of the 
 merging plan, (as actually carried out,) had left his seat in the 
 War Office. No effort of theirs was spared to demonstrate the 
 defects of the existing system; every argument that ingenuity 
 could devise to compass the cherished object in view was pressed 
 upon Congress with a persistency which, had the same abilities, 
 zeal, and industry been directed to making the ordnance depart- 
 ment inside the artillery a success, might, spite of adverse sur- 
 roundings, have partially redeemed the name of the arm to which 
 they belonged and which name they trailed in the dust. Unfor- 
 tunately, the condition of the artillery, the result of errors of organ- 
 ization and administration which have been pointed out, reinforced 
 and made more apparent by professional apathy on the part of its 
 own disaffected members, furnished a basis for the arguments of 
 the latter; it fell a prey to the weaknesses, inherent or acquired, 
 of the system, and to the parasitic attacks of those who, residing 
 at the seat of Government, had the advantage of personal contact 
 with Congress, while the body of the arm, scattered in regiments 
 to the four winds, without a head to champion its cause or pre- 
 sent the true reasons for the existing state of affairs, was compelled 
 to submit to dismemberment, through inability to act in its own 
 defense. 
 
 That the promotion to higher grades of those interested was a 
 consideration of the first moment with them, without which the 
 much-sought-for separation was neither acceptable to nor deemed 
 
172 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 advisable by them, the voluminous papers on the subject with 
 which for six years Congress was deluged give abundant proof. 
 Each was accompanied by a carefully-prepared plan to increase 
 the rank of those who, by virtue of their positions, might expect 
 to be benefited. 
 
 Protestations of virtue and disinterestedness in the public' serv- 
 ice are legitimate objects for suspicion when invariably coupled 
 with conditions for securing personal advancement. 
 
 Let not injustice be done the memory of Mr. Calhoun by sup- 
 posing that a department such as the reorganized artillery of 1821 
 was his work; far from it. His propositions contemplated re- 
 uniting, in a well-proportioned, efficient corps, under the control 
 of one mind, the two parts of what ought to be, and in other 
 armies is, a single service. The organization actually given pos- 
 sessed, with many of its own, every weakness, without a single 
 element of strength, appertaining to the well-considered, admirable 
 plan of the distinguished Secretary.* 
 
 * Notwithstanding our melancholy experience from 1821 to 1832, the Con- 
 federate authorities, to whom the history of those times was familiar, evidently 
 did not, in 1861, deem the union of the artillery and ordnance incompatible 
 with a proper efficiency, but the reverse. They adopted the merging plan of 
 1821, in form at least. 
 
 The Confederate army regulations prescribed that " the senior officer of artil- 
 lery on ordnance duty is, under the direction of the Secretary of War, charged 
 with the superintendence and administration of the ordnance bureau ; " while 
 for field service it was provided that the senior officer of artillery on ordnance 
 duty attached to an army should have charge and direction of the depots of 
 ordnance for the supply of such army. He was to correspond with the chief 
 of artillery through the adjutant-general of that army. 
 
 The ordnance officers of the Confederacy, from Brigadier-General Gorgas, 
 chief of the bureau, down, were artillery officers on ordnance duty. The de- 
 partment embraced an ordnance bureau proper, with its officers in the field, 
 at the arsenals and depots, of a nitre and mining bureau ; and a bureau of for- 
 eign supplies. 
 
 It is stated by those familiar with the facts that the workings of this depart- 
 ment were eminently successful ; that its history, while illustrating the diffi- 
 culties which lay in the way of supplying large armies under adverse circum- 
 stances, demonstrates at the same time that energy and skill, intelligently 
 directed, can surmount every obstacle. 
 
 Had the same earnest zeal in the public service characterized the efforts of 
 those who had immediate charge of the department from 1821 to 1832, the 
 result of the merging experiment, which failed so disastrously of beneficial 
 effects, might and probably would have been different. 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 173 
 
 Since the reorganization of 1832 technical artillery affairs have, 
 under the law, been confided to the ordnance department, then 
 rehabilitated. The act of February 8th, 1815, which the resus- 
 citating act of April 5th, 1832, revived, had been enacted under_ 
 the auspices of the first and, perhaps, the greatest of its chiefs, 
 Colonel Decius Wadsworth ; and it is a model for the concise and 
 clear manner in which the duties of a department may be defined. 
 
 Those who labored for the severance of the technical from the 
 combatant artillery, so nearly as political favoritism would permit, 
 now had their reward in the promotion they had sought. Fortu- 
 nately for the stability of their plans there was placed at the head 
 of the department an officer of ability, education, and long expe- 
 rience in the duties which now chiefly were intrusted to his 
 supervision. The principal assistants were gentlemen of attain- 
 ments, while among the junior ranks were some of the most 
 approved officers whose names have adorned the rolls of the 
 army men whose untiring efforts to place upon a firm footing, 
 elevate to and maintain at a high standard their branch of service, 
 challenge the admiration of all who are familiar therewith, or the 
 circumstances under which they were rendered. Their devotion 
 to duty has not been surpassed in the history of the military pro- 
 fession in this country ; nor do the members of that profession 
 themselves generally know either the character of their unobtru- 
 sive labors, or the full value of the results flowing therefrom. 
 
 The personnel of the department has continued to be of a high 
 order of merit. Sweeping at first from other departments and 
 from the line of the army some of the brightest intellects, it has * 
 since that time attempted, as a rule, to recruit the commissioned 
 ranks from among those graduates of the military academy stand- 
 ing first in scientific and scholastic attainments; while in these and 
 other respects those appointees from other sources, which a broad 
 and wise policy has admitted, stand second to none. 
 
 From the beginning, the department possessed elements of 
 strength which the artillery, except" during the Revolution, has 
 lacked, viz. , an organization compact and homogeneous from top 
 to bottom, under the direction of a chief, aided by a central sys- 
 tem of administration, thus rendering unity of purpose and action 
 easy and practicable. Moreover, it offered opportunity to place 
 and maintain the best, ablest, and most valued officers in posi- 
 tions where their powers and services could be fully utilized, 
 
174 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 while the indifferent and incapable were allowed to sink out of 
 sight. 
 
 The department inherited much of solid worth from the artillery, 
 and was further fortunate in having early extended to its members, 
 by intelligent and energetic Secretaries of War, unusual facilities 
 for obtaining valuable professional information abroad. 
 
 The technical artillery had, in 1830, been placed in possession 
 of all data pertaining to, and had commenced the manufacture of, 
 the new French English-modified style of carriages; that which 
 soon became and has remained the one feature common to all field 
 and siege artilleries of civilized armies. This was of the first im- 
 portance to any scheme for a reorganized artillery materiel. 
 There were also available and ready, to the hand of him who 
 would use them, the results of deliberations of boards of artillery 
 and ordnance officers convened to investigate the condition of the 
 armaments of the country and report plans for their improvement, 
 at various times from 1818 to 1838. A commission was sent to 
 Europe by Mr. Poinsett, who, with a true genius for military 
 affairs, which took in at a glance, as it were, the requirements of 
 his department, and pointed out what was the one thing necessary 
 to give breadth of thought and exact information to those officers 
 particularly and directly intrusted with the delicate, responsible 
 task of devising and elaborating a comprehensive scheme for a 
 national armament. The knowledge acquired by the commission 
 was of great value, not only in a limited technical sense within 
 the department, but to the rest of the army and to the public, 
 which were thus informed as to what was transpiring elsewhere 
 in these important matters. 
 
 Such were the materials from which, under the management 
 and inventive genius of Colonel Bomford, aided by the indus- 
 try and intelligent perseverance of Major Baker, Captains Mor- 
 decai, Huger and others, his assistants, there was evolved the first 
 complete system of artillery materiel adopted in the service of the 
 United States. 
 
 How well the department, in its entire work, has met the views 
 and fulfilled the prophecies of those who advocated its establish- 
 ment, the army and the country will judge ; it is foreign to the 
 purpose to here enter that field of controversy. It suffices to re- 
 mark that at the epoch of the breaking out of the Civil war the 
 United States smooth-bore system of ordnance was not surpassed 
 
DUTIES : TECHNICAL. 175 
 
 in excellence by any other. That its rifle system is far behind 
 others is not due to lack either of ability or knowledge of details 
 on the part of the personnel, but to inadequate appropriations, 
 without which improvements cannot be either worked out or prac- 
 tically tested ; to the fact that, while adding to its strength politic- 
 ally by making it a compact unit both in offense and defense, the 
 exclusiveness of the organization has a tendency to narrow the 
 minds of its members, to lead them to follow unduly their own 
 fancies to the exclusion of other and better things originating 
 elsewhere, to render them mere theorists after all, through the 
 impossibility of their knowing from experience either the strong 
 points or the weaknesses of their own handiwork, and to cause 
 them to look with suspicion and misgivings upon the suggestions 
 of those who, from knowledge acquired in the field of practical 
 service, are alone capable of judging of the real merits and demer- 
 its of artillery or other warlike materiel. 
 
 The duties of the department ' ' are defined by law> and con- 
 sist in providing, preserving, distributing, and accounting for every 
 description of artillery, small-arms, and all the munitions of war 
 which may be required by the fortresses of the country, the armies 
 in the field, and for the whole body of the militia of the Union, 
 including the general principles of construction, the details of 
 models and forms of all military weapons." It was expected and 
 intended, when its duties were assigned, that the construction and 
 inspection of all cannon, carriages, implements, apparatus for ord- 
 nance, wagons and forges, the inspection and proving of powder, 
 and the preparation of all kinds of ammunition and ordnance 
 stores, would be carried on by that department. The anticipa- 
 tion has in large degree, though not entirely, been realized. The 
 department points to its Wadsworth, Bomford, Mordecai, Rod- 
 man, and others since their day, who have stood and now stand 
 in the front rank of scientific investigators ; but isolation, self- 
 imposed withdrawal from contact with mankind, must have to no 
 small extent a benumbing effect on the intellectual vigor of any 
 department if its members give way to this habit, while inventive 
 minds elsewhere will not remain idle. Of recent years Congress 
 has taken from the department much that was originally its pre- 
 rogative, by providing that mixed boards of officers, and some- 
 times its own committees, should examine into the merits of all 
 improvements and inventions presented touching the particular 
 
176 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 part of the armament under consideration, whether coming from 
 the small world inside or the large world outside the ordnance 
 department. In the list of improvements and inventions accepted 
 by those boards and committees which have been known to pos- 
 sess most knowledge of the subject-matter of their deliberations, 
 those emanating from the ordnance bureau are conspicuous by 
 their absence. 
 
 Why these boards and committees are deemed necessary when 
 they so seriously affect the prestige of the department by taking 
 from it the most important of those ' * duties defined by law, ' ' is 
 known, perhaps, only to the legislature. 
 
 It is worthy of remark that, although organized for purely tech- 
 nical duties, the department accepts with reluctance the role of 
 artisans, overseers, and manufacturers, which their predecessors, 
 the artillery -artificers of the Revolution, were, and which the 
 ' ' duties defined by law ' ' make them. Efforts to escape from this 
 position have been strenuous, long sustained, and have become 
 of interest to the combatant artillery for the reason that they have 
 invariably resulted in trenching upon its rights, privileges, and 
 duties. Seeking the privilege of manning the siege train, the 
 howitzer and rocket battery, by ordnance mechanics during the 
 Mexican war, while regular artillery marched as infantry; organ- 
 izing an ordnance department in the field during the Civil war, 
 although the laws of April 5th, 1832, and July lyth, 1862, con- 
 fided that duty to artillery officers; recommending that boards to 
 determine the nature of fortress armaments be organized to exclude 
 artillery officers, while the proper functions of the latter in the 
 premises are assumed by themselves; recommending that the 
 results of all artillery firing, both in peace and war, be tabulated 
 and sent to the chief of ordnance, who thereby becomes, to this 
 extent, chief of artillery, all these things the department has 
 done, thus usurping the functions of the regimental artillery, and 
 making itself what it insists that it is not, yet which at the same 
 time its assumed and eagerly grasped-after duties make it artil- 
 lery staff. 
 
 The disposition here manifested to encroach upon the long 
 established rights of the regiments is not, perhaps, to be wondered 
 at; but it cannot be indulged without the utter annihilation of the 
 latter and sweeping away the last pretext for opposing the reunit- 
 ing, under a proper organization, of the technical and combatant 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. tjj 
 
 branches of the artillery arm. To gentlemen reared in a school 
 where to seek and fight the enemy is instilled into youth as the 
 highest honor to which the soldier can aspire, this being cut off 
 from all hope of appearing on the field is not agreeable in practice, 
 however it may appear in theory, even though accompanied by 
 increased rank and pay. They cannot indulge the pleasing re- 
 flection of having alleviated the sufferings of their fellow-men 
 cherished by the medical, nor that spiritual self-approbation for 
 duty done which buoys up their chaplain non-combatant associ- 
 ates. As a consequence they yearn apparently to escape from a 
 disagreeable situation, supplementing their duties defined by law 
 by others not defined, yet more soldierly in their nature; and as 
 the functions of artillery as a special arm of service naturally and 
 properly appertain to artillery staff, they are selected. The de- 
 partment thereby gains an eclat which under the law it cannot 
 have. In the absence of a chief of artillery at the seat of Govern- 
 ment to protect the interests of the arm, this usurpation is all the 
 more easily effected. 
 
 When the proposition is made to unite under efficient manage- 
 ment the two parts of the artillery, it is earnestly protested by 
 some with what candor can now be judged that the ordnance 
 department is wholly absorbed in duties defined by law, the proper 
 execution of which requires the combined talent, industry, and 
 business capacity of all its members. No sooner is the danger 
 passed than new inroads are made on the regimental artillery. 
 How long the latter can sustain this undermining process, if con- 
 tinued, it is impossible to determine; its extinction as a separate 
 arm, however, will be the inevitable result, while its prescriptive 
 rights and duties pass to the artillery staff. 
 
 That the two corps should be separate is unnatural; and if con- 
 vincing proof of this were wanting, it is furnished in the continued 
 assumption by the ordnance of the duties pertaining to the other 
 branch of service. 
 
 This state of affairs will continue, the interests of individuals 
 rather than those of the Government be served, until Congress, with 
 an eye single to the public good, builds up a reorganized artillery 
 service, line and staff together, with a chief and a central adminis- 
 trative bureau similar to that of the ordnance department to-day, 
 and in which the most meritorious of that department and of the 
 artillery regiments will be absorbed. 
 23 
 
178 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 The re-establishment of the ordnance left as before the four reg- 
 iments of line artillery without aught to unite them. The want 
 of a head to the corps was felt now even more than ever, and the 
 absence of regulations denning its duties, rights and privileges, 
 particularly in active service, binding upon all branches, has 
 operated to the prejudice of its reputation, the misdirection of its 
 powers, the usurpation of its special functions by non-combatants, 
 and has resulted in an increased expense attending its management 
 both in peace and war. There has not been wholly wanting, on 
 the part of the artillery, either appreciation of, or disposition to 
 remedy, the difficulties indicated; but the method whereby relief 
 could best be obtained has not always been clear, or, when known, 
 has not been practicable. Efforts in the right direction have been 
 in the nature rather of isolated attempts than of systematic labors, 
 upon a well-considered plan, looking to the amelioration of the 
 public service. 
 
 The superior administrative control of the two branches of the 
 artillery remained the same, after their re-separation, that it was 
 previous to that event, i. e. , the technical under the War Depart- 
 ment only, while the combatant was under the immediate orders 
 of the general-in-chief, in regard not only to personnel, but the 
 management of its interior affairs. The regiments have always 
 been the military branch of the artillery department, forming part 
 of the army proper, under the military commander. It was so dur- 
 ing the Revolution; the periods, intermittent in character, during 
 which General Wilkinson commanded the army; under General 
 Brown and his successors after 1821. The only apparent excep- 
 tion to this was placing, when it was first organized, the command 
 and administrative affairs of the artillery school of practice in 1824 
 under the control of the War Department. The reason doubtless 
 was that Mr. Calhoun wished personally to supervise measures 
 adopted for carrying into successful operation this experimental 
 school, from which, under proper management, results highly 
 beneficial to the service were anticipated; but whatever may have 
 been the cause of the deviation in this instance from the general 
 rule, it continued in operation but a short time, as by orders of 
 January 26th, 1826, the troops composing that school were placed 
 under the command of the general-in-chief of the army. Order 
 No. 58, Adjutant- General's Office, that year, authorized the com- 
 manding officer of the .eastern department to exercise the same 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 179 
 
 military control over these troops as over others within the geo- 
 graphical limits of his command; while to the general-in-chief was 
 reserved the exclusive right, under the War Department, to make 
 regulations for the post as a school of instruction and practice. 
 Stated reports and returns were, therefore, made to the depart- 
 ment commander. Upon this basis the school was re-established 
 in 1857, while the reorganization of 1867 placed all pertaining to 
 the institution under the orders of the general of the army, subject 
 of course to that general supervision exercised by the Secretary of 
 War over all branches of the service. This is the status, as it 
 should be, of the administrative affairs of the school at present. 
 
 In the regular artillery, the prerogatives of colonels in their 
 own regiments, either of administration or command, are very 
 limited. They do not control a battery beyond the particular 
 posts at which they are serving, and it not unfrequently happens 
 that captains command a larger portion of the regiment than the 
 colonels themselves. Information as to the personnel is obtained 
 from monthly returns of the batteries sent to regimental head- 
 quarters, which set forth the strength of each, with the changes 
 since the last return; while quarterly reports make known the 
 instruction received by officers, commissioned and non-commis- 
 sioned, and the state of the battery funds. The authority of the 
 colonel is exhausted when he has required these returns and 
 reports to be made out as prescribed by orders; he cannot, even 
 in the important (if properly attended to) matter of instruction, 
 take one step with a view to making personal inspection beyond 
 the limits of his own post. The regiment of twelve batteries, two 
 of which at this time are equipped and serving as field artillery, is 
 scattered over one or more military geographical departments, 
 embracing several States, the field officers frequently at garrisons 
 of a single battery, while their juniors have commands larger than 
 this. The colonel may, and often does, know but little of the 
 mental, moral, or physical qualifications of his officers through per- 
 sonal contact, nor they anything of him a circumstance which 
 operates to the detriment of all, who are thus deprived of those 
 advantages ever flowing from an interchange of ideas between 
 intelligent professional gentlemen, and that confidence resulting 
 from a thorough knowledge of those upon whom, as coadjutors, 
 reliance must be placed in times of danger. 
 
 The unfavorable conditions here mentioned are not of recent 
 
180 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 growth, but are those under which, in all its mutations of organi- 
 zation, the artillery has labored from the beginning. Regiments 
 have never been kept together. In Revolutionary times, aside 
 from the companies attached to brigades and those making up 
 the reserve at general headquarters, many were scattered at 
 various posts and forts, particularly along the Hudson River; but 
 in those times, unlike the present, artillery officers of rank, except 
 those with the army in the field, exercised command over large 
 districts, embracing numerous detached portions of their own 
 arm of service. 
 
 With the artillery, as with other portions of the army, concen- 
 tration in peace is conducive to discipline, economy, and general 
 efficiency. The evils of dissemination, often a necessary incident 
 of service, have been recognized, and measures have been taken, 
 in a degree at least, to counteract them; as, witness the artillery 
 school of practice of 1824; the camp of instruction at Trenton in 
 1839; the re-establishment of the former in 1857, an d again, after 
 the Civil war, ten years later; the elaborate scheme for practical 
 and theoretical instruction combined, promulgated in General 
 Orders No. 10, of 1859; and, finally, the Fort Riley light battery 
 school of 1869. Of these, the school of practice at Fortress 
 Monroe alone remains. The field batteries are isolated from one 
 another, and, as schools of practical instruction, their utility re- 
 duced to a minimum; the war battalion formation, in which alone 
 that arm now manoeuvres with a large army, being entirely 
 ignored, and officers but partially, and that in a an indifferent 
 manner, taught the duties they will be called upon to perform 
 during the first week of active campaign. 
 
 The tendency of late has been towards an abandonment of small 
 posts and a concentration of batteries, and is in the right direc- 
 tion; but, if artillery is to be such except in name, these points of 
 concentration must be supplied with the guns and other materiel 
 to enable the troops to practice their specialty. To do otherwise 
 is to neglect the obvious import of one of the most important 
 lessons that recent wars* have taught the arm, viz., that untrained 
 artillerymen are incapable of rendering formidable in attack or 
 defense the refined and complicated machinery they are required 
 to use, and knowledge of which cannot be acquired by even long 
 practice at the manual unless accompanied by study of the powers 
 and capabilities of modern armaments, and of their proper use 
 
DUTIES : TECHNICAL. l8l 
 
 in active service. It is true that but few of our artillery troops 
 have an opportunity to exercise with modern guns; but practice 
 with those at hand, if accompanied by a wise course of instruc- 
 tion, could not but prove of great utility in preventing professional 
 stagnation and decay. If a system of inspection were established, 
 each colonel for his regiment, a degree of knowledge, theoretical 
 and practical, commensurate with the facilities offered at each 
 post, could be required of officers, and which to some degree would 
 keep them abreast with the progress of the age. To station them 
 where there is no artillery, or by an indifferent system of admin- 
 istration make the use of what they have a matter of accident, 
 depending upon the caprice of garrison commanders, is, particu- 
 larly if our sea-coast forts are to be defended, a fitting prelude to 
 the necessary embarrassment, confusion, and possible defeat, with 
 its attending disasters, that must inevitably follow. 
 
 The service of heavy artillery, under modern conditions, is 
 eminently the field of practical scientific labor for that arm; but 
 here labor alone will lead to excellence or skill, either of which 
 can only be acquired through devotion to duty and long-sustained, 
 intelligent use of every means at the command of its members. 
 The truth of this will be demonstrated should this country be 
 brought face to face with an enemy deserving to be called 
 formidable. 
 
 Except for conduct in war, let appointments to the artillery in 
 time of peace be made only from those graduates of the military 
 academy recommended by the academic board; in case of other 
 graduates and appointees from the ranks and from civil life, only 
 after having passed an examination pronounced satisfactory, and 
 before a board drawn from the staff of the artillery school. Let 
 captains and lieutenants be divided into two classes: first, those 
 who have been commissioned for conduct in the field in war; sec- 
 ond, all other appointees; and, as in the ordnance, the medical 
 department, and the engineers, make examination a condition 
 precedent to promotion up to the grade of field officer; the char- 
 acter of examination to vary for the classes, but to be the same 
 for members of each class; that every individual, no matter 
 whence he conies, may be justly, equitably, yet firmly called to 
 account, the fact kept ever present to his mind that to hold a com- 
 mission sufficeth not; to retain, he must be prepared to prove 
 
l82 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 that he is worthy of it; if he cannot do this, he must, as he de- 
 serves, cease to be an officer. 
 
 In addition to these measures, taken to insure a solid foundation 
 in excellence for the commissioned personnel, let the batteries be 
 grouped together at posts, three, four, or a greater number at 
 each, under their field officers, where the best armaments fur- 
 nished by the Government are now or may be made available for 
 their use; make the colonels responsible for the discipline and 
 efficiency as artillerists of their regiments; subject the colonels 
 themselves to a surveillance which regards not persons, but keeps 
 in view the good of the public service only, and the artillery will 
 enter upon a career marked by a higher tone and an increased 
 professional knowledge on the part of its officers, who will better 
 be prepared to vindicate a claim to being capable defenders of 
 their country's honor. 
 
 To render this or any other plan for the amelioration of the 
 artillery permanently effective ; to make it a living reality instead 
 of an inert theory; to cause to flow therefrom advantages lasting in 
 nature and beneficial to a degree proportioned to the time, trouble, 
 and expense involved, will require that the arm be given what it 
 has not now, and yet the want of which is admitted by all familiar 
 with its history to be its principal organic defect a chief. 
 
 There is every reason for this ; and if proof irrefragable were 
 needed it is found in the fact that, while the artillery struggles 
 along without one in time of peace, no sooner does war arise, re- 
 quiring the resources of the Nation to be put forth with power and 
 organized with intelligence, than each division, corps, and army 
 in the field is given an officer acting in that capacity. 
 
 The artillery of the Revolution was organized to more success- 
 fully meet the special requirements of its service in war than it 
 has been since. Disregarding the first year of that struggle, in 
 which experience was teaching the novices from commander-in- 
 chief down the rudiments of a newly-practiced art, it is to be 
 remarked that the defeat of Long Island and the retreat through 
 New Jersey placed before the eyes of all, in no uncertain light, the 
 unwelcome truth that the only hope of successful revolution rested 
 on the ability of Congress to raise and maintain what, in contra- 
 distinction to militia and short-service men, was styled a regular 
 army. The efforts put forth to accomplish this are familiar mat- 
 ters of history. Before the end of the year 1776 one hundred and 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 183 
 
 four infantry regiments, three thousand light horse, a corps of 
 engineers, and four regiments of artillery were authorized by Con- 
 gress, to form the regular establishment. 
 
 Artillery affairs were then fortunately given a proper direction 
 by appointing a young and active colonel, Henry Knox, to be 
 brigadier-general and commander of that arm. He was assigned 
 a staff proper to his rank, and gradually gathered around him an 
 adjutant-general, inspector, aids-de-camp and clerks, wherewith 
 to keep the administrative machinery in order. The companies 
 were scattered, it is true, (for only in the most highly-wrought 
 organizations of modern times are artillery regiments kept to- 
 gether;) but there was one head to supervise them all, attend to 
 their wants, supply deficiencies, keep up the character of materiel, 
 and cultivate a proper esprit de corps, thus making the artillery 
 service one its members were proud of, and which challenged the 
 approbation of General Washington, the army, and the Congress. 
 It would seem, too, that whether the subject-matter for delibera- 
 tion were to determine a plan of campaign, the supplying the 
 army either from home or from abroad, or its reorganization, the 
 commander of the artillery was ever present at the council board. 
 It needs no detailed statement of services rendered to evince that 
 a proper commander, so circumstanced, must from necessity have 
 exerted a potent influence for the well-being and honor of his 
 corps. Of the opinion entertained of it at headquarters we may 
 judge by the following observations of the commander-in-chief to 
 a Member of Congress in 1777: "The department of artillery, 
 presided over by General Knox, has been placed, notwithstanding 
 innumerable difficulties, upon a footing that does its commander 
 the greatest honor. ' ' While the Marquis de Lafayette, adverting 
 to the same subject, remarked that "the progress of the artillery 
 during the Revolution was regarded by all conversant with the 
 facts as one of the wonders of that interesting period. ' ' And from 
 among testimonials to the efficiency of the personnel in action, 
 covering the whole period of the war, may be here recorded that 
 of Charles Lee at Monmouth : "The behavior of the whole army, 
 both men and officers, was so equally good, it would be unjust to 
 make discriminations ; but I can with difficulty refrain from pay- 
 ing compliments to the artillery, from General Knox and Colonel 
 Oswald* down to the very drivers." And of Chastellux at York- 
 
 * Lieutenant-colonel Second Regiment of artillery. 
 
184 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 town : ' ' The'guns were always well served, and while the enemy 
 marvelled at the exact fire of the French, we marvelled no less at 
 the extraordinary progress of the American artillery, at the capac- 
 ity and instruction of its officers." 
 
 It cannot be supposed, however, that the abilities, professional 
 attainments, or knowledge of affairs of any one man could have 
 brought about such results in those times of revolution. The 
 general of artillery was fortunate in not being left alone to essay 
 the task of placing and maintaining upon a sound basis the arm 
 he had the honor to command. In the field officers, the captains, 
 and to a great extent the lieutenants, he possessed assistants 
 whose efforts alone made that possible; they understood the science 
 and practice of their profession sufficiently well to meet every 
 demand of service; and without their intelligent aid the chief 
 could never have raised the corps, or the services it rendered, 
 above the level of mediocrity. 
 
 From the date (February 26th, 1795) of the appointment of La 
 Rochefontaine to be lieutenant-colonel commandant of the corps 
 of artillerists and engineers, until 1798, was a period in which, 
 jointly with the engineers, the artillery had a chief; but it was not 
 a time when, for the latter, anything of practical value was being 
 done. The lieutenant-colonel commandant, a professional engi- 
 neer, was busily occupied personally on the sea-coast fortifications 
 then being built, after a crude fashion, along the Atlantic. The 
 execution of a design to garrison the new works on the coast 
 with this corps had passed no farther than its incipient stages; a 
 large part was on the frontier against the Indians, and neither 
 time nor circumstances had permitted anything of importance to 
 be done before La Rochefontaine was dismissed the service. As 
 previously mentioned, a regiment of artillerists and engineers was 
 organized in 1798 as the Second, and the corps of 1794 was styled 
 the First Regiment. Both remained a part of the military estab- 
 lishment until 1802; but the lieutenant-colonel commandant of 
 neither regiment commanded the whole, so that, as chief of artil- 
 lerists and engineers, La Rochefontaine had no successor. 
 
 At this time (1798) the late commander-in-chief, General Wash- 
 ington, with the title of lieutenant-general, was again placed at the 
 head of the army. Except the French, who were not, under the 
 circumstances, to be trusted, there were, as at the beginning of the 
 Revolution, no active, well-qualified officers of artillery or engi- 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 185 
 
 neers in service. General Washington, however, appreciated the 
 necessity for having at least a capable head to each of these de- 
 partments, and, as there was no one at home available, he looked 
 to Europe, as before, for educated and scientific officers to fill the- 
 positions. Of the advisability of the measure, and of the circum- 
 stances rendering it necessary, the Secretary of War made the fol- 
 lowing statement in a communication to Congress dated December 
 24th, 1798: 
 
 "It is deeply to be lamented that a very precious period of leisure was not 
 improved towards forming among ourselves engineers and artillerists ; and that, 
 owing to this neglect, we are in danger of being overtaken by war without a 
 competent number of characters of these descriptions. To form them suddenly 
 is impracticable ; much previous study and experiment are essential. If possi- 
 ble to avoid it, war ought not to find us unprovided. It is considered advisable 
 to introduce, from abroad, at least one distinguished officer of engineers and 
 one of artillery." 
 
 Clearing away the war-cloud that had threatened made unnec- 
 essary a completion of the measure; the foreign officers were not 
 engaged; but that a head to each of these branches of service 
 was deemed absolutely necessary by General Washington and 
 his contemporaries, there is here abundant proof; as usual, when 
 earnest work was to be done, principles asserted themselves. 
 
 The reorganizations of 1802 and 1821, with their influence on 
 the artillery arm, have been adverted to. Notice of them here is 
 unnecessary, further than to remark that the former failed princi- 
 pally, not through want of a chief, but from the inability of the 
 person who vL Dually occupied that position to rise to the necessi- 
 ties of the occasion; the latter was a melancholy instance of the 
 impotency of any organization springing from considerations of 
 expediency rather than those affecting the public service, and 
 based on makeshifts instead of on sound military principles. 
 
 Of the intermediate arrangement of March 3oth, 1814, nothing 
 need be said, except that it was imbecile to a degree unrivalled 
 a grasping after form, while ignoring, through incompetency to 
 comprehend it, the soul of a certain proposed plan of organiza- 
 tion. The artillery corps of 1814, made up of fragmental battal- 
 ions, with nothing to unite them, passed away after a painful ex- 
 istence of seven years, sinking, even in memory, out of sight into 
 deserved oblivion. 
 
 That there should be at the seat of Government a centre of 
 administration for the artillery is a fact that has not passed unno- 
 24 
 
186 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 ticed. Among other measures proposed by friends of the service, 
 Mr. Shields, in March, 1852, from the Senate Military Commit- 
 tee, introduced a bill for supplying the deficiency. (For report 
 accompanying bill, see Appendix B [2].) 
 
 The effort then failed. As a result, the batteries, scattered soon 
 after over the western territories in futherance of an utterly chi- 
 merical idea, were not at hand when needed at the beginning 
 of the Civil war. No sooner was this war precipitated than the 
 practices of peace were instantly abandoned. Every army was 
 given a chief of artillery, and for the armies covering the national 
 capital an inspector was appointed, with the rank of brigadier- 
 general.* In war even more than in peace the absence of a chief 
 at Washington was deplored as a misfortune operating in every 
 way to the prejudice of that arm and of the service. 
 
 With the hope that the experience of this eventful period, to 
 acquire which had cost so much, might not be lost, but turned to 
 advantage in after years, the permanent artillery board (Appen- 
 dix B [3]) was in 1866 organized by the lieutenant-general com- 
 manding the army. The subject of instruction received, among 
 other things, the serious and earnest consideration of the board 
 during its brief, active life; but, in the absence of the general ol 
 the army, in the fall of 1866, it was adjourned, never to be reas- 
 sembled. This was the last attempt to give the artillery a perma- 
 
 *" Special Orders No. 210. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, August 
 28th, 1862. ***!!. Brigadier-General William F. Barry, U. S. volun- 
 teers, is assigned to duty as acting inspector of artillery, and will report to the 
 chief of ordnance." * * * 
 
 "Special Orders No. 242. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, Septem- 
 ber 15th, 1862. * * * III. Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, U. S. volun- 
 teers, inspector of artillery, his assistant and staff, are assigned to duty in the 
 city of Washington, D. C., to date from the 1st instant.' ; * * * 
 
 This officer occupied an anomalous position. He belonged neither to the 
 artillery nor the ordnance, but in a degree to both. The necessity for such a 
 functionary was one of many evidences, ever recurring both in peace and war, 
 of the inadequacy of either the ordnance department or the artillery arm as 
 now organized to fully act a part as an important branch of the military serv- 
 ice. Proof here exists that the former called to its assistance one of the most 
 experienced and capable artillery officers for the performance of those duties of 
 inspector connected with artillery materiel equipping for the field, which " the 
 functions of its own officers, entirely distinct from those of the line of the 
 army in any of its branches, involving a familiar acquaintance with the exact 
 
DUTIES: TECHNICAL. 187 
 
 ttent representative at the War Department competent to advise 
 on its affairs. 
 
 The remedy for this evil will be applied when the efficiency of 
 that branch of the public service becomes a subject for earnest- 
 remedial action in either the councils of the War Department or 
 the halls of Congress, and may be applied, with various degrees 
 of efficacy, in the following ways : 
 
 (A) Consolidating into a new corps of artillery, and under such 
 restrictions in personnel as will insure efficiency, the present regi- 
 ments and the ordnance department. 
 
 (B) Giving the present regiments a chief, with a competent staff, 
 as contemplated by Mr. Shields. (Appendix B [2].) 
 
 (c) Detailing an officer to act as chief, at the War Department, 
 from among the present personnel of the artillery arm. 
 
 If placing the service on an enduring basis, rather than the con- 
 venience of individuals, be an object worthy the solicitude and 
 corrective power of Government, the relative merits of these 
 plans is that of the order in which they are enumerated. To 
 strike at the root of existing evils and effect an adjustment as 
 permanent as the present methods of organizing armies, (A) should 
 be chosen; but it must be as indicated heretofore, for otherwise 
 would only be repeated the disastrous experiences that have 
 always attended such attempts. While not so thorough in its 
 
 sciences and with mechanical philosophy," and not extending to any of the 
 practical duties of armies in campaign, had rendered them incompetent to per- 
 form. On the other hand, here was the spectacle presented of an artillery arm 
 impotent to discharge its obvious and legitimate duties except under the sur- 
 veillance of a department made up of manufacturers and theorists, scientific 
 and philosophical students, who, if they kept their places assigned by law, could 
 by no possibility ever hear a hostile shot fired. 
 
 The inspector of artillery had charge of all the artillery connected with the 
 defenses of Washington and all the field batteries at Camp Barry, which were 
 constantly being changed, dismounted, remounted, &c., as they came from and 
 went forward to the armies. 
 
 He was responsible for the condition of these transient artillery commands, 
 regular and volunteer, while at Camp Barry and when starting for the front. 
 They were inspected under his supervision, and all questions relating to the 
 fitting out of artillery for the lines were supposed to be referred to him for 
 decision. 
 
 He had a regular post system. Morning reports were daily submitted and 
 consolidated at his office. 
 
l88 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 operations as (A), the second (B) will give that desideratum first 
 of all in importance unity of purpose and method in the conduct 
 of artillery affairs and is preferable to (c) in that the chief would 
 be permanent. 
 
 Though least desirable, and having within itself fewer facilities 
 for improving the condition of the artillery, (c) could not but 
 redound to the great advantage of that arm, and has the recom- 
 mendation, if facility of execution be counted a merit, that a War 
 Department order is all that is needed to put it into operation, 
 while both (A) and (B) will require an act of Congress. 
 
 Without enumerating the duties of chief of artillery under (A), 
 it suffices to state that they would extend the authority of the 
 chief of ordnance and make him as well commander of the artillery. 
 The following are some duties the chief of artillery would very 
 properly be called upon to perform under (B) and (c): 
 
 (1) Principal adviser to the Secretary of War and the general 
 of the army on all artillery matters. 
 
 (2) President ex officio of the permanent artillery board consti- 
 tuted by General Order No. 6, of 1866, before mentioned, and 
 which has never been dissolved ; also of such boards as that as- 
 sembled by General Order No. 39, of 1881, " to consider the recent 
 changes in guns, harness, and equipments for light batteries." 
 
 (3) To see that the armaments of the forts are properly re- 
 paired and kept in good order, causing for this purpose careful 
 inspections to be made of all ordnance, stores, carriages, and 
 ammunition in the forts once a year, or oftener if necessary. 
 
 (4) Ascertain the degree to which instruction has been carried 
 on in every battery or artillery command; whether it has been 
 given in accordance with the prescribed text-books or existing 
 orders. 
 
 (5) To ascertain what appliances for practical instruction are at 
 the artillery posts, to have these appliances distributed, and to see 
 that every use is made of them for imparting practical knowledge' 
 to the commands. 
 
 (6) To visit the artillery school at Fortress Monroe and the 
 field battery schools which should be established for the general 
 purposes indicated in (4), and to see further that they are fully 
 meeting the end for which they are organized. 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION DUTIES : AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 
 
 The artillery of the Revolutionary army was early in its history 
 officially assigned a place (which the arm has retained) in what 
 was technically known as ' ' the line,' ' * /. e. , that portion of the 
 armed force destined to take position in line of battle, and the func- 
 tions of which were strictly military. The resolution of Congress 
 (February, 1779) readjusting artillery and ordnance affairs, for 
 instance, provided that the commanding officer of artillery of the 
 United States should be allowed $75 per month extra for his serv- 
 ices as head of the ordnance department in the field, while the 
 commanding officer of artillery in any detachment should have a 
 proportional allowance in addition to his pay in the line. In the 
 resolution of September 25th, 1780, establishing the inspector's 
 department, it was provided: "There shall be one inspector to 
 the corps of artillery, to be taken, when the service will admit, 
 from the colonels or lieutenant-colonels, who shall be allowed, in 
 addition to his pay, $7^4 per month and forage for three horses, 
 including what he is entitled to in the line of the army;" while 
 in the reorganization of the following month was the provision 
 that the four artillery regiments, among others, should be retain- 
 
 *It is not overlooked that military men may criticise the arrangement of the 
 artillery to the line of the army. It properly belongs to the special arms of 
 service. In well-organized armies, where the artillery is assigned its natural 
 function the combined duties of our ordnance department and artillery regi- 
 ments there would be no difficulty in classifying it as a special arm of service 
 only. It suffices to state the fact that in this country, from 1775 to this time, 
 the artillery has always, by the laws, been assigned to the line. It is not in- 
 tended here to enter into a discussion of the propriety, or the reverse, of the 
 arrangement; nor attempt to revise our military nomenclature, the unsatisfac- 
 tory condition of which is pointed out in various other places in this work. 
 The artillery will, therefore, be here considered as of the line, as it conforms to 
 facts, however repugnant it may be to the rules of a strict technical language. 
 It will also be necessary in some instances to refer to it as a special arm of 
 service. To belong to the line, and at the same time be a special arm, is a 
 contradiction in terms; but this contradiction exists, unfortunately, in the 
 position of the artillery in our military establishment. 
 
1QO HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 ed, the States selecting from the line of the army a proper num- 
 ber of officers. The artillery officers arranged to these regiments 
 were all selected from among those commissioned in that arm. 
 
 In the mother country this was not so. There the artillery was 
 regarded, not as part of the line, but, with the engineers, as a spe- 
 cial arm. In fact, however, the sphere of duty of artillery officers 
 in our own was as circumscribed as in the British service. Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Carrington was indeed made quartermaster of 
 Greene's army in the south, and Knox, after his promotion to 
 major-general, was given command of the post and environs of 
 West Point, then regarded as the key to the country; but these 
 were the most conspicuous, if not the only, assignments of artillery 
 officers to important duties disconnected from their immediate 
 profession. The rule was to confine them to those duties, either 
 as commanders of artillery in the field, or in the various military 
 geographical departments. 
 
 The nature of the duty it was called upon to perform rendered 
 it necessary that the artillery should serve in detachments, only 
 the rarest occurrences bringing all the companies of any regiment 
 together, even in winter quarters. The armies in the field, the 
 various posts and forts to be garrisoned, required the active serv- 
 ices of every trained artilleryman, and as a result the arm was al- 
 most exclusively confined to its special duties. As to personal 
 arms, the officers carried swords, while, theoretically at least, the 
 rank and file carried fusees or muskets, after the prevailing fash- 
 ion in Europe at the time. When Captain Lamb, advancing 
 against the gates of Quebec, found it impracticable to drag his 
 guns, they were left by the road, and the company moved on to 
 the assault with fusees alone. When Procter's artillery regiment 
 (the Fourth regulars) was organized it was supplied with small- 
 arms, belts, and cartridge-boxes. The resolution of Congress 
 authorizing Harrison's regiment (First regular artillery) explic- 
 itly directed that it should be armed with muskets and bayonets. 
 
 In actual service small-arms proved to be an incumbrance, be- 
 ing always in the way; and Captain Stevens, in his pioneer work 
 on artillery tactics, published in 1797, asserts with a confidence 
 based on long experience that small-arms were found to answer 
 no useful purpose whatever, except to mount guard. It would 
 seem that this or some other cogent reason led to their partial 
 disuse with the artillery, if we may judge from the following ex- 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 191 
 
 hibit, taken from General Knox's returns : "Harrison's regiment, 
 72 muskets, 44 bayonets ; Lamb's regiment, 90 muskets, 36 bay- 
 onets ; Crane's regiment, 84 muskets, 31 bayonets ; Proctor's reg- 
 iment, 77 muskets, 72 bayonets." These doubtless represent the 
 number of small-arms retained for guard duty, the remainder of 
 the original quantity received having been turned in for issue to 
 other troops. The artillerymen had apparently determined to 
 make their guns defend themselves. 
 
 In the period immediately following the disbanding of the Rev- 
 olutionary army the whole of the small force kept in service was 
 employed against the Indians in the Northwest Territory. All, 
 both infantry and artillery, were armed in the same manner, and 
 performed substantially, if not identically, the same kind of serv- 
 ice, with the sole difference that there was imposed on the latter 
 the additional duty of serving the guns in the forts and those 
 taken against the hostiles. 
 
 The threatened war with Great Britain growing out of unsettled 
 boundaries, and the attacks of that power on American commerce, 
 opened up in 1794 a new field for the service of artillery, viz., the 
 defense of the sea-coast. The possibility that such use might 
 have to be made of some portion of the national forces seems to 
 have received but little attention ; and it is a singular fact that, in 
 all the various plans for the organization of a peace establishment 
 submitted to Congress by prominent officers at the close of the 
 war, not one had seriously considered the subject of the defense 
 of the maritime frontier ; nor was the elaborate report of the con- 
 gressional committee on the same subject, written by Colonel Ham- 
 ilton, less open to criticism. This apparent obliviousness to the 
 existence of a very vulnerable point in the national armor resulted 
 doubtless from the circumstance that the whole attention of the 
 Government had been directed, during the Revolution, to defeat- 
 ing the enemy's forces in the field, thus leaving the coast to be 
 defended by the States whose territory was threatened. From 
 necessity it followed that they were scarcely defended at all. 
 
 The prospect, however, of war with our old and powerful naval 
 foe, and the growing commercial importance of the harbors on the 
 Atlantic, determined Congress to take measures for the safety 
 of the coast. Accordingly, in March, 1794, the act was passed 
 providing for fortifying twenty of what were considered the 
 most important points between Portland, Maine, and St. Mary's, 
 
IQ2 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Georgia; and, to serve as at least a partial armament, the purchase 
 was authorized of one hundred each of 32-pounder and 24-pounder 
 cannon, their carriages, implements, and other necessary materiel. 
 To construct these fortifications and to defend them required both 
 engineers and artillerists, of which, at that time, we had neither; 
 for the battalion of artillery, equipped as infantry and in the In- 
 dian country, could scarcely be considered as artillerists in any 
 proper sense, and of engineers there had been none since the 
 Revolution. Such were the considerations which led to the 
 passage of the act of May gth, 1794, authorizing the raising of a 
 corps of artillerists and engineers, into which the then existing 
 battalion of artillery should be incorporated. The President was 
 authorized to have such portions of the corps serve in the field, on 
 the frontiers, or in the fortifications on the sea-coast, as he deemed 
 consistent with public interests. The reorganization of 1802 
 permanently severed the engineers from their yoke-fellows, the 
 artillerists. 
 
 Meantime the gathering war-clouds had been dissipated. Jay's 
 treaty and Wayne's victory over the Miamis had deferred the 
 conflict with Great Britain, while the ascendency of Napoleon had 
 restored amicable relations with France. The artillerists and 
 engineers were not called upon to measure strength with the 
 enemy; but attention had been pointedly drawn to the necessity 
 that existed for troops skilled in the practice of sea-coast arma- 
 ments and capable of defending permanent works. The principle, 
 which has not since been entirely lost sight of or undervalued, 
 had been initiated of assigning this as the legitimate, proper, and 
 important duty of a portion of the regular military establishment. 
 
 The splendor which attached to the service of horse artillery in 
 Europe was not without its effect in this country. Tousard, who 
 was personally familiar with the circumstances attending its 
 adoption by Frederick the Second, its subsequent brilliant career 
 under that great master of the art of war and the greater Napo- 
 leon, prevailed on Secretary McHenry to warmly advocate its 
 introduction into our army. This the Secretary did in a com- 
 munication to the President bearing date January 5th, 1800, and 
 by the latter transmitted to Congress. Together with a statement 
 of the military necessities of the country generally, a scheme for 
 the reorganization of the army and the establishment of military 
 academies, the letter contained a brief and spirited review of the 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM oP SERVICE. 193 
 
 services of horse artillery abroad, while the advisability of its adop- 
 tion as a part of our military force was urged with that earnest 
 eloquence and felicity of expression which characterized Mr. Mc- 
 Henry ' s writings. Nothing was done at that time. It was reservecL 
 for the rival (politically) administration of Mr. Jefferson, eight 
 years later, under the advice of the veteran soldier, Secretary 
 Dearborn, to prevail on Congress to lend legislative sanction to 
 the raising of the first light artillery regiment of the United States 
 army. It was, indeed, a crude attempt at legislation. No horses 
 were provided, neither increased pay nor allowances to officers 
 or men. To belong to this regiment was an expensive luxury; 
 yet the service was in high favor with the first young men of the 
 country, and the personnel, when the companies were first raised, 
 was superior to that of any other regiment. Active measures 
 were at once taken to practically test the new style of troops, in 
 which both the Secretary and Mr. Jefferson took great interest. 
 Although the act authorizing the light artillery was passed in 
 April, the celebration of the thirty-second anniversary of our 
 National Independence, three months later, was signalized by the 
 parade though the streets of the Capital of the first completely 
 equipped so-called horse-artillery company. 
 
 Though it was intended to mount the whole regiment, this was 
 the only company so equipped prior to the war of 1812; the others 
 were armed as infantry. The experience of this company was as 
 brief as its position was unique; the succeeding administration, 
 as before mentioned, for economical reasons, sold the horses, stored 
 the guns, and reduced the horse artillery to the same footing with 
 the other companies. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs at the beginning of the war of 1812, 
 which precipitated the inevitable second war with Great Britain. 
 The light artillery, raised amidst a flourish of trumpets, was car- 
 rying muskets; some of its companies had disappeared even, 
 through consolidation or other natural causes. The old artiller- 
 ists of the 1802 regiment, scattered in small detachments along 
 the frontier from Maine to New Orleans and Mackinac, were 
 never during the war concentrated ; its members, as had been 
 the usual practice with the artillery since the Revolution, served 
 the pieces of ordnance wherever they might be stationed, and in 
 addition, when occasion required, fought as infantry; most of its 
 25 
 
IQ4 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 field and many of its line officers were detached as district com- 
 manders, adjutants-general, or staff officers of other departments. 
 
 As artillery proper, the services of the Second and Third regi- 
 ments, organized pursuant to act of January nth, 1812, were 
 very unsatisfactory. At first Colonel Izard, of the Second, fully 
 expected that his regiment would be equipped as field artillery. 
 Writing to the War Department in October, 1812, he remarked : 
 "The work I have on hand at Philadelphia, besides my duties 
 as recruiting officer for this district, is important ; a small train 
 of artillery, consisting of 6-pounders and howitzers, has been 
 preparing under my direction, and will be complete in a few 
 weeks;" while one month later he informed the department 
 that "a train of sixteen pieces of field artillery, with Wurst caissons, 
 [used in some parts of Europe with horse artillery,] implements, 
 and harness complete, will be ready very soon. I hope the whole 
 will be in a state to march in a fortnight. Of the two parts of 
 companies here, a detachment might be formed to escort them to 
 the north. The officers are all anxious to proceed; the pieces 
 might be distributed to the companies on the frontier, and the 
 whole compose the germ of a battalion of artillery." Izard' s 
 ambition, however, to have his regiment properly equipped was 
 but partially realized. Two companies, under Captains Towson 
 and Baker, left Philadelphia in September, 1812, for Dearborn's 
 army ; these and several other captains of the regiment, Archer, 
 Hindman, Biddle, and others, were wholly identified with the field 
 artillery in that quarter during the war. But the companies of 
 the regiment were never concentrated ; and, while most were em- 
 ployed in their special duties in the field, some of them served in 
 garrison on the South Atlantic coast, particularly in the forts of 
 Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. 
 
 The Third Regiment, under Colonel Alexander Macomb, served 
 wholly on the New- York frontier, and principally as infantry; al- 
 though the following, selected from many orders bearing on the 
 subject, show that in some instances it performed the duties of 
 artillery: 
 
 "SACKETT'S HARBOR, N. Y., February 20th, 1813. 
 
 " Captain Crane, Third Regiment, is placed in charge of the ordnance de- 
 partment of this command. He and his company will do nothing but exercise 
 their pieces, take charge of the elaboratory, and mount guard over the guns at 
 the magazines and the batteries." 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 195 
 
 While in April following it was announced from the same head- 
 quarters : 
 
 " To enable the commanding officer of the artillery brigade (Colonel Macomb) 
 to practice his men in the art of gunnery, and give him an opportunity to in- 
 struct them in the other parts of their duty, that brigade will be exempt from" 
 detail until further orders, except guards necessary for the brigade and forts. 
 The pieces will be properly manned, and worked until the men are perfect." 
 
 The intention of the War Department, when the war became a 
 foregone conclusion, was to equip the light artillery regiment as 
 horse artillery. Although companies were serving with muskets, 
 orders were given in May, 1812, to provide swords and pistols for 
 the whole regiment. In February, 1812, instructions were issued 
 from the War Department to incorporate the two light companies 
 at New Orleans, and the detachment en route to join them, with 
 the companies of the First Regiment of artillery at that city. 
 General Hampton was directed to send the light artillery offi- 
 cers of the incorporated companies to report to the adjutant and 
 inspector-general at Washington. It will not be amiss to note 
 that some of the companies of the First artillery, thus recruited, 
 were themselves equipped and served as field artillery. General 
 Wilkinson, who succeeded Hampton, reported to the Secretary 
 of War, in March, 1813: "I have here [New Orleans] a charming 
 light train of thirty brass pieces, with harness and implements. 
 Our field artillery, to be useful, must be horsed for rapid move- 
 ments, and will require at least one hundred and twenty horses 
 broken, trained and disciplined, which I have ordered to be pur- 
 chased. ' ' To this Captain Woolstonecraft, of the First artillery, 
 adds his testimony in a report to the inspector at New Orleans, in 
 May, 1814, that his company had helped take care of these horses, 
 which, with the field pieces, he had exercised during fine weather 
 as light artillery. 
 
 Colonel Porter being temporarily engaged on artillery duties 
 elsewhere, the task of preparing the light artillery regiment for 
 the field devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, who was at 
 the seat of Government. In June, 1812, Captains Gibson and 
 Mclntosh, under Fenwick, marched from their rendezvous at Lan- 
 caster, Pennsylvania, for Albany, New York. Each company was 
 full ; each was completely equipped as horse artillery, with four 
 guns, their caissons, and the necessary baggage wagons. These 
 officers went to the front with all the ardor of men proud of the 
 
196 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 arm to which they belonged The appointments, in every 
 respect, of their companies were such as to inspire them and the 
 authorities with confidence. 
 
 That no results commensurate with this elaborate preparation 
 followed, cannot be laid at the door of the light artillery compa- 
 nies themselves, as they were, by superior authority, disintegrated 
 before they reached the enemy; but rather must responsibility 
 rest upon those generals who had no knowledge of the proper 
 use of the arm, who had no chiefs of artillery to assign a proper 
 place to that branch of the combatant forces, husband its resources, 
 direct its energies, and develop its fighting powers. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Fenwick was, it is true, sent forward at once from Albany 
 to General Van Rensselaer with part of Gibson's company and a 
 supply of ordnance, but only in time to be wounded and taken 
 prisoner at Queenstown. Colonel Porter, of the same regiment, 
 was dispatched to take Fenwick' s place as commander of all the 
 artillery on the New York frontier, and an effort was made 
 to place an efficient light artillery at his command; but, from 
 the first, the embarrassments attending the procurement of the 
 essential article of forage even were such as to neutralize every 
 exertion put forth to make the horse artillery formidable. The 
 inadequacy of the staff supply department was nowhere else felt 
 more than by this species of troops, who no sooner reached the 
 vicinity of the enemy than they had to scatter to keep from 
 starving. 
 
 Writing, October 2ist, 1812, to General Van Rensselaer' s suc- 
 cessor, Dearborn said: "A fine company of light artillery, all 
 mounted, will follow , Colonel Porter to the front as rapidly as 
 possible to replace those lost at Queenstown. On their arrival 
 it will, I presume, be expedient to send the greatest number of 
 the horses back to some place where forage may be conveniently 
 obtained." One week later he continued : "Colonel Porter left 
 this place [Greenbush, opposite Albany] on the 24th instant with 
 one hundred light artillerists, all mounted, and well appointed in 
 every respect." 
 
 Meanwhile, every company of Porter's regiment that could be 
 spared from their old stations were concentrated at Greenbush. 
 Major Eustis, of that regiment, equipped three of these as horse 
 artillery, and took two of them to Plattsburg with him. It will 
 thus be seen that within six months of the time war was declared 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 197 
 
 June 1 8th, 1812 at least half of the light artillery had been 
 equipped with their appropriate armament. These companies 
 were speedily followed by the others, either as field or horse 
 artillery. 
 
 No service is of record commensurate with these preparations. 
 The light artillery seldom manoeuvred as such, and then in drib- 
 lets, in face of the enemy. No action like that which signalized 
 Ringgold's horse battery in its first battle at Palo Alto distin- 
 guished the career of that arm during the war of 1812. 
 
 If it be asked why this was so, the answer can be easily given. 
 Disregarding the miserable fiascos on the northern frontier in 
 1812, disgraceful to the American arms, humiliating to every 
 patriot, filling with shame and indignation the breast of every 
 soldier, and involving in dishonor alike all branches of the mili- 
 tary service, there were particular and sufficient reasons why 
 the light artillery disappointed the expectations of its own offi- 
 cers, its friends in the service, and the Government. First of all 
 came Mr. McHenry's erroneous theory of having the light artil- 
 lery horsed in time of war only, and which, since Peter's com- 
 pany had been dismounted in 1809, had been strictly put in 
 practice. Its effect could not but prove disastrous, and especially 
 so at that time, when light artillery was a new institution, an 
 experiment, in this country. None of the officers of the regiment 
 knew from experience in war anything about it. Except Gibson, 
 who had been Peter's subaltern, every captain, when his own 
 was fitted out in 1812, saw, for the first time in his life, perhaps, 
 a properly equipped company of light artillery. Several of the 
 companies were also composed of raw recruits. 
 
 These were unquestionably drawbacks, but they were neither 
 all nor the greatest. Before he reached the frontier, Captain Gib- 
 son wrote to the Secretary of War that his company had been 
 broken up, many of his horses taken from him, and his command 
 well nigh annihilated. He adds: "It is very discouraging to 
 me to raise a company, have the labor and expense of mounting 
 it, and then have it treated in this manner.' ' No sooner were 
 they in the presence of the enemy, where they felt they could be 
 of some service, than the distinctive feature of the arm the 
 horses was taken from all the light artillery. It was said to be 
 a case of necessity. Van Rensselaer, as early as September, 
 1812, complained of the difficulties attending the feeding of the 
 
198 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 flying artillery horses. The quartermaster was directed in gen- 
 eral orders to furnish forage regularly, but it was in vain; and 
 against the earnest protests of Colonel Fenwick his light artillery 
 was not only unhorsed, but disarmed. The wretched straits to 
 which the army was reduced for means of subsistence paralyzed 
 every effort to render the corps efficient. 
 
 When General Wilkinson, in 1813, assumed command in the 
 north, he wished very much to rehabilitate the light artillery 
 regiment, and with this end in view he, while in Washington en 
 route to the Niagara frontier, requested of the Secretary of War 
 " authority to equip the whole of the horse artillery, as contem- 
 plated by law, because the arm will be found all-important in 
 every combat which may ensue." The Secretary (Armstrong) 
 replied : "The* dragoons and light artillery corps shall be made 
 efficient ; horses may be bought for both ; average price not to 
 exceed $120 each." The records fail to show that the project here 
 authorized was put into execution. The general, like his prede- 
 cessors, found that to properly organize his army on the eve of 
 a campaign was impossible. To meet the popular demand and 
 the expectations of the administration, he must win victories with 
 the material in hand, and that, too, without delay. Some horses 
 were purchased, but they were of no service practically; as, in the 
 attempted descent on Montreal, the troops, the guns and artillery 
 materiel moved in boats, separated from the horses, which were 
 driven across the country; thus rendering it necessary, when light 
 artillery was needed on several occasions, to dismount dragoons, 
 that the necessary teams could be procured to drag the pieces. 
 
 Nor were the fortunes of the regiment more propitious in other 
 fields of action. When Izard assumed command at Plattsburg, 
 in May, 1814, he wrote to the Secretary of War that the three 
 companies of light artillery at that post had but one officer each, 
 and altogether had but forty horses, scarcely enough to haul their 
 guns and ammunition. The Secretary replied : ' ' The light artil- 
 lery with you will do the duty of heavy artillery, and need not be 
 mounted. I need not tell you the reason for mounting light artil- 
 lery. With us this reason does not and will not exist until we 
 have masses of cavalry with whom they can co-operate, and until 
 our champ de bataille is an open and level plain." In pursuance 
 of these views General Izard, July ist, 1814, issued the following 
 general order: "It is the pleasure of the President that the regi- 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 199 
 
 ment of light artillery shall serve as field artillery on this frontier. 
 The commanding officer of that corps will, in consequence, make 
 returns for their equipment with small-arms and accoutrements, 
 and cause them to be duly instructed in the manual exercise anxL 
 infantry manoeuvres, which are indispensable for their service in 
 the field." 
 
 In some instances, however, the shifting fortunes of the war 
 were more favorable ; for instance, at Sackett's Harbor, in June, 
 1814, the commanding general directed "that all horses hereto- 
 fore attached to the artillery of this command will, until further 
 orders, remain under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell, 
 who will cause such numbers as he may deem proper to be placed 
 under Captain Melvin, of the light artillery, the whole to be kept 
 and trained for light artillery purposes ; and all the artillery will 
 be exercised at their guns every day, either in their batteries or 
 in the field, from reveille until an hour after sunrise." 
 
 Although some of the companies, acting in detachments, still 
 occasionally performed the duties of horse artillery in small ex- 
 peditions and other light duty, this service was but temporary 
 and unimportant; its prestige as a strong auxiliary arm had grad- 
 ually disappeared; yet, spite of every discouraging circumstance, 
 the excellent material of which the regiment was composed asserted 
 itself on all occasions. The inspector-general of the northern army 
 remarked in his report dated December 31 st, 1814: "The light 
 artillery regiment had just got together when General Izard left. 
 Colonel Fenwick and Major Eustis are with it. It surpasses any 
 regiment in this army in discipline and evolutions." But every 
 distinctive feature appertaining to the light artillery service faded 
 away with the campaign of 1814, at the end of which nearly if 
 not all the companies were equipped as infantry. 
 
 Thus terminated the service in its proper sphere of the light 
 artillery regiment of 1808, of which much was expected, yet which, 
 in its special functions as horse artillery, accomplished little. Its 
 successor, the field artillery of the present regiments, has been 
 more fortunate; this, because circumstances, adverse though they 
 have been, are more favorable with the latter; for in intelligence, 
 professional pride, and zeal in their calling, the pioneer light 
 artillery has not been surpassed by any corps of the United States 
 army. 
 
 If we scrutinize the instructions of the Secretaries of War 
 
200 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, u. s. ARMY. 
 
 Eustis, Armstrong, and Monroe who at various times controlled 
 affairs during the war of 1812, examine their orders and those 
 of the general officers, we find among the mass but a single 
 systematic, properly-founded plan proposed for the organiza- 
 tion of the artillery during either peace or war. Turning to 
 what existed, it is seen that this arm, which, to be efficient in the 
 field of active service, at least, requires careful organization, had 
 none save that given by accident. The proposed system referred 
 to originated with General Izard, and embraced a thorough reor- 
 ganization, which would have united the present duties of the 
 engineers, the artillery, and the ordnance in a single department, 
 with an efficient personnel, and would have resulted, had it been 
 adopted, in a vast saving of money to the Government, together 
 with a more complete and efficient service. (Appendix A, [29].) 
 
 In active service Izard seems to have been the only general 
 officer who understood the functions and proper distribution of 
 the arm; his order assigning one company to each brigade, while 
 the rest of the artillery, properly equipped, was placed as a reserve 
 under command of the ranking officer of artillery present, is the 
 only instance of which record has been found of any proper and 
 intelligent effort having been made during the war of 1812 to 
 organize that arm in the field. 
 
 The active service of the artillery subsequent to the war of 1812, 
 and prior to that with Mexico, was performed almost wholly as 
 infantry, and embraced participation in the Indian hostilities of 
 that period, particularly the remarkable struggle with the Florida 
 Seminoles, which, with varying fortune, covered the period begin- 
 ning 1835 and ending 1842. Owing to the fact that the companies 
 directed (by the act of March 2d, 1821,) to be equipped as light 
 artillery had never been placed upon a proper footing, they were 
 not prepared to act efficiently in that capacity; and though a few 
 guns and ammunition wagons were taken into the Indian country,* 
 
 * Paragraph 12, General Orders No. 68. Headquarters 2d Division, Army of 
 the South, Camp on Jupiter River, January 27th, 1838. " Captain Washington's 
 Company, [(B), Fourth Artillery,] serving as artillery, with its pieces, caissons, 
 ammunition wagons, and travelling forge, will move with the column, carrying 
 the necessary supplies of ammunition in addition to that in the hands of troops." 
 
 Companies (B) and (H) of the First, united, served some light artillery in the 
 Seminole war ; and doubtless other artillery companies did the same; but it was 
 of little consequence. 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 2O1 
 
 the service they rendered was of little importance either against 
 the enemy or in giving the officers practical experience as light 
 artillerymen. It was during the progress of the Seminole war 
 (1838) that the number of companies in a regiment of artillery w_a$_ 
 increased from nine to ten. This number was, owing to the de- 
 fenceless condition in which during the Mexican war the sea-coast 
 fortresses were left, temporarily increased to twelve companies in 
 each regiment. The two additional companies were afterwards 
 made, as they have continued, part of the regular military estab- 
 lishment. 
 
 At the date of the campaign in the valley of Mexico there were, 
 therefore, forty-eight companies of regular artillery. Eight of 
 these, under the acts of March 2d, 1821, and March 3d, 1847, were 
 authorized to be equipped as field artillery. Other companies, 
 as Captain Steptoe's of the Third, served temporarily as field 
 batteries. Company (G) of the Fourth served both as field and 
 heavy artillery, its captain (Drum), with his lieutenant (Ben- 
 jamin), falling by the side of their guns before the gates of the 
 Mexican capital. Other companies and detachments were, upon 
 occasion, equipped as field artillery, only to be again relegated to 
 the position of infantry, in which latter capacity three-fourths of 
 the artillery companies served during the whole war. 
 
 While this was the case, there were equipped and serving 
 against the enemy a siege-train and a howitzer and rocket bat- 
 tery, officered and manned by the ordnance department. 
 
 This the artillery arm felt to be a deep wrong. It seemed 
 strangely inconsistent then, and no less so now, that a branch of 
 service which had maintained that its exclusive function was to 
 manufacture materiel, whose enlisted men were designated in the 
 laws as mechanics, should seek to exclude from its duties in the 
 field a combatant arm of service, and to appropriate those duties 
 to itself. To understand this unique affair, wherein the ordnance 
 department appears as the first and foremost exemplar of the 
 maxim "the makers should be the users," which on some occa- 
 sions it affects to deprecate, it will be necessary to take a retro- 
 spective glance at the position in the army of the suddenly bellig- 
 erent department. 
 
 It was formally established under our present form of government 
 by the act of May i4th, 1812, for the better regulation of the ord- 
 nance. It followed in the footsteps of the revolutionary "depart- 
 26 
 
202 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 
 
 ment of the commissary-general of military stores," resolved upon 
 by Congress February i ith, 1778. The duties were essentially the 
 same. In the parent organization the chief, styled "commissary- 
 general of military stores," had the rank of colonel; most of his 
 assistants and employe's were civilians, the only branch, and it the 
 least important one, of the department having a semblance of 
 military organization being the so-called regiment of artillery- 
 artificers. In the newly-created department (of 1812) the head 
 had also the rank of colonel, and was styled commissary-general 
 of ordnance. His assistants had military rank, but the rest of the 
 personnel the wheelwrights, carriage-makers, blacksmiths, and 
 laborers were civilians. In military features, therefore, the Rev- 
 olutionary department had the advantage, as the presence in its 
 ranks of enlisted artificers made it at least military in appearance. 
 
 That the artillery-artificers were not, however, military except 
 in appearance there is abundant proof. When the few officers of 
 this corps who remained in service until the end of the Revolu- 
 tionary war applied for commutation of the half-pay for life which 
 Congress promised those honorably discharged from its service, 
 they were refused, for the reason that the artillery-artificers had 
 not been a military organization, and because Congress "intended 
 to restrict that grant to officers of the army who could be consid- 
 ered military, whereas commissions were given the artificers for 
 the sole purpose of rank in their own corps, and to hold courts- 
 martial ; they belonged to nothing more than a civil branch of 
 the ordnance department." This was equally true of the depart- 
 ment organized in 1812. The general duties of each were, first, 
 to manufacture warlike materiel; second, to enforce a system of 
 accountability therefor. These duties, in themselves, are wholly 
 civil in their nature a fact not in the least affected by the circum- 
 stance that since the reorganization of 1815 the rank and file have 
 been in part, as during the Revolution, enlisted men ; they re- 
 mained, as formerly, armorers, carriage-makers, blacksmiths, or 
 other skilled laborers, and were, in contemplation of law, as 
 strictly non-combatants as their associates, the civilian employe's. 
 
 Colonel Decius Wadsworth, the first chief of ordnance, and in 
 ability second to none, strongly advocated restricting the depart- 
 ment to objects defined by law. Upon this subject he remarked : 
 " The duties of the ordnance department should be limited to pro- 
 viding for and supplying the different armies, forts, posts, maga- 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 203 
 
 zines, and arsenals of the United States. It is incompatible with 
 the other duties of the department to take charge of ordnance and 
 ordnance stores in the field. The responsibility of the depart- 
 ment should cease with the act of delivery from the arsenal or 
 magazine." 
 
 Regarding the true status of the enlisted men, Colonel Bomford, 
 the worthy successor to Wadsworth, remarked to one of his subor- 
 dinates : ' ' Enlisted men of the ordnance department are to be con- 
 sidered as mechanics and laborers, and not, of course, to be em- 
 ployed as soldiers, except in case of emergency, when you are 
 justified in equipping any portion of them as a guard." And 
 again : "A guard of ordnance men has never been contemplated 
 by the laws or regulations, which have all been formed on the 
 presumption that these men are always to be employed as laborers 
 and mechanics, saving only on certain occasions of emergency 
 requiring a guard for a short time." 
 
 The appearance of these non-combatants in the field, to the 
 exclusion of the artillery, whose functions they performed, was a 
 spectacle which, in view of the foregoing facts, was well calculated 
 to excite criticism. 
 
 The immediate steps by which this was brought about are now 
 well known, and can be told in a few words. It is necessary to 
 premise, by observing that Colonel Bomford was absent from the 
 seat of Government at this time, absorbed in those experiments 
 which resulted in the development of a new and improved system 
 of guns the Columbiad. He had nothing to do with the trans- 
 formation scene in question, whereby non-combatants were tem- 
 porarily converted into artillerymen. 
 
 In a communication to the Secretary of War early in 1845, the 
 acting chief of ordnance used the following language : ' ' An in- 
 crease of the enlisted men [of the department], by the addition 
 of one hundred and fifty to the present number, is earnestly urged. 
 This may be done without additional expense to the Government, 
 as it will save the employment of that number of hired rhen. It 
 will also have the advantage of giving the control of a description 
 of labor not always readily found when wanted, but indispensable 
 to the proper care and preservation of munitions, and cheaper, as 
 well as better, than the hired labor now devoted to such pur- 
 poses." When hostilities had commenced on the Rio Grande, 
 the acting chief of ordnance renewed his recommendations in yet 
 
204 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 more urgent language, remarking that ''the law now provides 
 two hundred and fifty men to be enlisted in the corps. These 
 are not sufficient. To increase the number to meet the needs of 
 service will involve no expense whatever. On the contrary, it 
 will be a measure of economy. The enlisted men would merely 
 take the place of men who are now hired at these ordnance posts, 
 and their pay would be less than that paid to hired men." In- 
 fluenced by these specious representations, and believing that an 
 increase in the number of enlisted men was directly in the line of 
 economy, and would reduce the number of higher-priced civilians, 
 Congress, by act of June i8th, 1846, authorized the senior officer 
 of the ordnance department to enlist as many armorers, carriage- 
 makers, blacksmiths, and laborers as the public service, in his 
 opinion, under the direction of the Secretary of War, might 
 require. 
 
 The time for throwing off the non-combatant mask had now 
 arrived. A large number of men were enlisted under authority 
 of this act. No sooner had this been cleverly effected than the 
 acting chief of ordnance submitted a proposition to the Secretary 
 ' ' of War ' ' to gather at Fort Monroe Arsenal, partly by drafts 
 from other arsenals and by enlistment of laborers of ordnance, a 
 sufficient number of men to man a battery of mountain howitzers 
 now at that post, and also form a brigade of rocketers. Under 
 the law, any number deemed necessary may be provided. They 
 will of course be commanded by ordnance officers. ' ' This was 
 followed by flaming posters calling for recruits, and stating that 
 ' ' in pay, provisions, and clothing this corps will be superior to 
 any yet raised, and, from the kind of arms, will be constantly in 
 the advance when the hardest fighting may be expected. ' ' Ord- 
 nance officers in command of posts were directed to send to 
 Fortress Monroe any suitable and spare men to man the before- 
 mentioned batteries, and, in addition, a siege-train there fitting 
 out by the ordnance department. The places of the enlisted men 
 so detached were authorized to be filled by hired men. 
 
 Here, then, was the act of duplicity complete! Congress is 
 assured that, in the interests of economy, hired men should be 
 replaced by enlisted mechanics. No sooner are these carriage- 
 makers and blacksmiths secured than they are armed and sent to 
 the field equipped as artillery, while at the ordnance posts their 
 places are supplied by that higher-priced labor to avoid the em- 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 205 
 
 ployment of which was the chief and oft-repeated argument urged 
 for increasing the enlisted force of the department. 
 
 Candid men will draw their own conclusions. The character 
 of the transaction is easily understood. Comment is unnecessary, 
 further than to observe that no such systematic deception for the 
 purpose of aggrandizing a non-combatant department at the 
 expense of a fighting arm of service can be found elsewhere in 
 the history of the army. 
 
 The reason given by the acting chief of ordnance for usurping 
 the functions of the artillery, viz. , that the latter were unacquainted 
 with the duties of their own arm, was as wanting foundation in 
 fact as the methods to build up his department were questionable. 
 The part acled by the artillery in Mexico does not demand de- 
 fense here or elsewhere; it is written in the history of every siege 
 and battle of that war. It was given no opportunity to use the 
 rocket battery, that duty being entirely usurped by the ordnance 
 department, in violation not only of the law, but in disregard of the 
 decision of the Secretary of War (Mr. Poinsett) in 1838 that this 
 service in the field should be intrusted to the artillery. 
 
 In his annual report dated November 3Oth, 1847, the adjutant- 
 general of the army, adverting to this subject, made the following 
 pertinent remarks: 
 
 " It may not be irrelevant to state in this place that, while probably not more 
 than ten companies of the four regular artillery regiments are serving with their 
 appropriate arm the other thirty-eight companies are armed and equipped as 
 infantry there are two batteries with the main army in Mexico served by ord- 
 nance men (with several officers) and one by the Maryland and District of Colum- 
 bia volunteers. The men of the ordnance department are enlisted as artisans and 
 laborers, and receive a higher rate of pay than is allowed by law to soldiers of the 
 light artillery. At the last session of Congress an incre'ase of the ordnance 
 corps was authorized, because the number of officers was deemed inadequate 
 to the wants of that branch of service. It would seem, therefore, peculiarly 
 proper to confine officers of the ordnance to the defined objects of that depart- 
 ment. Economy as well as military propriety requires that all the 
 harnessed batteries be transferred to the artillery ; and it is respectfully recom- 
 mended that the transfer be directed accordingly. No corps in service has been 
 more distinguished in the present war than the artillery, and they are justly 
 entitled to be equipped with the arm which they have proved themselves 
 capable of using so efficiently against the enemy." 
 
 It is not an uninteresting fact, but one over which artillery offi- 
 cers may do well to ponder, that there is nothing in the relative 
 position of their arm and that of the ordnance department to- 
 
206 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 day to prevent a repetition of this experience, when they may 
 find themselves marching as infantry supports to batteries com- 
 manded by ordnance officers. There is now just as much reason 
 for this as there was thirty-seven years ago. 
 
 Following the Mexican war, although the artillery was still, as 
 before, taken equipped as infantry into the field against the In- 
 dians, the practice was somewhat abated. This was perhaps due 
 to the service therein of the light companies, which turned the 
 attention of the artillery to the necessity and advantage of being 
 properly equipped and trained in its special duties; but the policy 
 affecting it was as variable as were the Administrations, one tear- 
 ing down what the other built up. It was during this period 
 that the artillery school was re-established, through^which, every 
 ten years, all the companies, except those mounted, were ex- 
 peeled to pass, thus receiving, each in its turn, a good practical 
 course of instruction in foot artillery duties, while the field com- 
 panies were scattered over the western country, each associated 
 with several foot companies (aggregating more than half the 
 whole number in the army), and forming for the latter at each 
 post the nucleus of a field artillery school. 
 
 As in the Seminole war it had been found necessary to increase 
 the number of companies in each artillery regiment by one, and 
 in the Mexican war by two, so, when the Civil war broke out, 
 an additional regiment of field artillery was rendered necessary, 
 owing to the scattered condition of the field companies, as just 
 mentioned, and the impossibility of concentrating them where 
 they were needed. This increased the number of artillery com- 
 panies and batteries in service to sixty. During that war fifty- 
 six of the sixty served for longer or shorter terms as field bat- 
 teries, and of these about twenty-two were horse batteries. In 
 some instances two and even three distinct organizations were 
 united to form a complete battery. The other four regular com- 
 panies were, by accidents of service, assigned to duty in the per- 
 manent defenses of the country, from which it was not found 
 advisable to move them. The attention given to the subject of 
 field artillery subsequent to the Mexican war, and the strenuous 
 efforts, under adverse circumstances, of the general-in-chief and 
 of the field company commanders to keep these organizations 
 mounted, now bore fruit in the number of officers the regular 
 artillery could turn out acquainted with the rudiments, at least, 
 
DUTIES: AS AN ARM OF SERVICE. 207 
 
 of field artillery duty, and who were invaluable in the emergency 
 that had arisen. 
 
 The large increase, at the close of the Civil war, of the number 
 of infantry and cavalry regiments has obviated the necessity 
 almost entirely of using the artillery, equipped as infantry, on 
 the interior frontier against the Indians. Its employment in 
 this manner has been rare, and for a pressing emergency, when 
 the batteries have returned to their appropriate stations and duties. 
 
 The principle of National defense, first recognized in 1794, by 
 authorizing the raising a corps of artillerists and engineers 
 viz., that for garrisoning the sea-coast fortifications certain troops 
 should be set apart has ever since been acknowledged as an 
 important feature of the military policy of the Government. 
 The wisdom of this cannot be questioned. It is admitted by 
 all thinking men that there is no branch of the military service 
 requiring more careful preparation to render it efficient than 
 modern foot artillery. The duties of the sea-coast garrison are 
 undeniably the field of scientific research pre-eminent above 
 others. The refined armaments of modern times are useless in 
 the hands of novices. The importance, therefore, of maintaining 
 this species of troops at the highest state of efficiency that can 
 be attained with the means at hand or within reach of the Gov- 
 ernment can scarcely be overestimated. So far as is consistent 
 with other public interests, they should be kept in this condition. 
 True economy and a proper administration alike forbid their 
 diversion to other purposes, or their being deprived of facilities 
 for both theoretical and practical instruction in their special, and 
 now more than ever scientific, duties. 
 
208 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 - 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 
 
 A question of importance in the proper administration of artillery 
 affairs in the field is that of the true status of the chief of artillery, 
 i. e. , whether he be commander of the artillery in the army, corps, 
 or division in which he is chief, or whether he be a staff officer 
 simply, with authority to issue orders only in the name of the 
 commanding general. The subject gave rise to much discussion 
 and to diverse practices during the Civil war. It, was not gener- 
 ally understood, and confusion of ideas operated to the disad- 
 vantage of the arm. There is no law defining the duties, rights, 
 and privileges of a chief of artillery ; the very designation is of 
 comparatively recent introduction into our service ; but it is neces- 
 sary that it be determined whether he be a commander or not, 
 and, in the absence of positive law, this can only be done from- 
 custom (common law) and the regulations. 
 
 If we recur to the revolutionary period, we find that General 
 Knox was commander of all the artillery of what was designated 
 by Congress as the regular 4 army the war organizations. This is 
 manifest from the orders and correspondence of the times seems 
 never to have been questioned, but, on the contrary, to have been 
 fully recognized by both the army and the Congress. The orders 
 issued by him to artillery officers in armies other than the main 
 army, with which the general served in person, establish beyond 
 question that he occupied towards them the position of commander. 
 These officers were also subject to the orders of the general with 
 whom they served; and just how conflict of authority was avoided 
 in every case it is not possible here to state. From what has been 
 gathered on the subject, the inference is that the orders of the 
 general of artillery were sufficient to cause his views to be every- 
 where executed in his department of service. The instructions 
 given to officers of artillery commanding during campaign the 
 companies attached .to divisions and brigades evince the perfect 
 control exercised over them by the general of artillery ; the pre- 
 servation of both personnel and materiel, the exercise of both, 
 
DUTIES! CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 2O$ 
 
 were carefully provided for, and regulations therefor were deliv- 
 ered direct to the officers concerned by the general of artillery. 
 The authority of division and brigade commanders over these 
 artillerymen would naturally soon become a question to be deter- 
 mined ; and to pointedly set the matter right, in some respects at 
 least, General Washington issued the following order, dated 
 Orangetown, August i5th, 1780: 
 
 " The officers and men of the artillery corps attached to the divisions and 
 brigades are not to be furloughed by division and brigade commanders, as it is 
 irregular, and interferes with the internal arrangement of the corps." 
 
 This order makes manifest that at the date of its being issued 
 the artillery serving with divisions and brigades was on the footing 
 of troops attached for service, but belonging permanently to a 
 central and distinct command, which in the order is called the 
 corps. 
 
 The trial of General McDougall, in 1782, resulted partially from 
 misunderstandings which arose from this dual responsibility of 
 artillery officers. In January, 1782, General Heath, commanding 
 the Department of the Highlands, with headquarters at Newburgh, 
 assigned Colonel Crane, of the Third Regiment, to the command 
 of all artillery in the department. He was enjoined to pay par- 
 ticular attention to the ordnance and ordnance stores at the 
 posts, and at all of them to place the artillery in position as he 
 deemed best. Major Perkins, of Crane's regiment, was placed 
 by the same order in charge of the artillery at West Point, under 
 the orders of both Colonel Crane and of General McDougall, 
 commanding at that important post. This position of Major 
 Perkins, it is important to remark, is, in the matter of responsibility 
 to superiors, that prescribed by paragraph 1022 of the existing 
 army regulations for artillery commanders at all headquarters. 
 
 It so happened that Crane, for the time being stationed at 
 West Point, although commander of the department artillery, was 
 ordered by McDougall to make certain dispositions of artillery 
 materiel at the post. This Crane refused to do, justifying him- 
 self by orders received from General Heath, department com- 
 mander. McDougall insisted upon being obeyed, and was court- 
 martialed for his actions in the premises. 
 
 There are two facts clearly established by the correspondence 
 growing out of this court-martial, and which are pertinent to an 
 elucidation of the subject now under consideration: (i) that Major 
 27 
 
2IO HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Perkins, McDougall's artillery officer, was in technical affairs 
 under the orders of the commander of artillery of the department; 
 (2) that the latter officer was answerable only to the commanding 
 general of the department. It would seem there should have been 
 no trouble about the latter point, but it required the court-martial 
 of a major-general to set the matter right. In the positions occu- 
 pied by Major Perkins and Colonel Crane, as before indicated, 
 we see put into practice the principle of a direct chain of subordi- 
 nation connecting the commanders of artillery at general with , 
 those at subordinate headquarters, afterwards embodied in Scott's, 
 and at this time recognized (ostensibly) in paragraph 1022, regu- 
 lations of the army, edition of 1881.* 
 
 Following the Revolution was what may be called the dark age 
 of our army; and, as tending to throw light upon the subject of 
 artillery command, nothing appears until the regulations spring- 
 ing out of our experience in 1812. We may except General 
 Wilkinson's order, dated Sackett's Harbor, N. Y., October, 1813, 
 when preparing for the descent on Montreal, and which assigned 
 the command of all- artillery troops, the care and custody of all 
 artillery materiel, without exception, to Brevet Brigadier-General 
 Porter. This officer at that time, and afterwards Major Eustis, 
 his successor, exercised command as much as any. brigadier with 
 the army; neither thought of using the name of the general of the 
 forces in matters affecting the artillery, any more than did the 
 brigade commanders in giving orders to their regiments. 
 
 The regulations of September, 1816, promulgated pursuant to 
 act of April 24th, same year, provided for the stationing a com- 
 mander of artillery at the headquarters of an army, and of course 
 wherever at subordinate headquarters the presence of an artillery 
 officer might be necessary; and further, that "the conductors of 
 stores will keep the senior officer of the corps of artillery in com- 
 mand acquainted with the state of the ordnance of their respective 
 divisions. Besides the ordnance, ammunition, and stores appro- 
 
 *The modification of paragraph 489, regulations of 1863, which appears in 
 paragraph 1022, regulations of 1881, is a plain violation of the law of June 23d, 
 1879, authorizing the codification of the " regulations of the army and general 
 orders " then in force. The unauthorized change consists in substituting the 
 word officers for commanders where the latter was used with particular 
 significance. 
 
DUTIES: CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 211 
 
 priated to each division of artillery, the senior officer of that 
 corps in command with the army will apportion to the respective 
 divisions, according to his judgment, the spare arms, ammunition, 
 gun-carriages, equipments." [The divisions here referred" to 
 were those of artillery, viz., a company having six pieces of 
 ordnance, with the requisite stores.] (Appendix C, [i].) "The 
 conductors of stores will, from time to time, as opportunities may 
 offer, and under direction of the senior officer of artillery in com- 
 mand, disincumber the division of the empty ammunition wagons 
 and carriages needing repairs." 
 
 In the first complete code of regulations supplied the army, and 
 drawn up by Brevet Major- General Scott, were laid down with 
 great care, and, considering the times, with great precision, the 
 functions of artillery commanders. These regulations were written 
 after much experience, research, and reflection on the part of the 
 compiler. There is a singleness of purpose manifest throughout 
 the work, desirable in any system of regulations, resulting from 
 the fact that the compilation was the product of one man's 
 judgment. 
 
 As bearing on the subject now under consideration, we quote 
 from paragraph 14, article 44, Scott's Regulations: " The number 
 and description of staff officers, as adjutants-general, inspectors- 
 general, &c., at the disposal of the War Department, for any 
 particular army, will depend on creations made by Congress; 
 but, of the staff officers who may be assigned to an army in the 
 field, the commandants-in- chief of the * * * artillery * * * 
 will be attached to general headquarters, for the direction or 
 administration of their particular departments of service." This 
 plainly contemplated that the chief of artillery was to be also 
 commandant of his corps with the army; and, to clearly set at rest 
 the possible vexed question of double responsibility of subordinate' 
 chiefs of artillery, paragraph 15, ibid, provided that "the superior 
 officer of artillery serving with one of the army corps, a detached 
 division, or a brigade will receive the orders of the commandant 
 thereof, to whom the said superior officer of artillery will commu- 
 nicate any orders he may receive from his own particular com- 
 mandant-in-chief attached to general headquarters. ' ' And to show 
 the chain of subordination connecting these various artillery offi- 
 cers, it was provided in paragraph 3, article 45: "A colonel, who 
 occupies that position in a division, will have a direct authority over 
 
212 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 a major, chief of one of the brigade staffs, in the same division, 
 independent of the commander of the division; but in this example, 
 should the colonel give an order to the major incompatible with 
 the duties of the latter towards his brigade, such order would not 
 be obeyed until communicated to the brigadier-general for his 
 approbation." It will thus be seen that the position of these com- 
 mandants-in-chief of artillery was in a measure that of staff officer, 
 but with this distinction that they commanded in their own 
 branch of service. 
 
 Paragraph 14, article 44, Scott's Regulations, appears in the 
 edition of 1841; the others quoted had by that time disappeared. 
 The term "chief of the artillery" now (1841) for the first time 
 made its appearance, although that of commandant-in-chief was 
 also retained, thus by the context showing that these designations 
 were synonymous. It was enjoined in these regulations, also, that 
 all communications relating to ordnance supplies, when in the 
 field, should be transmitted to the ordnance officer in charge of 
 the depots, through the adjutant-general or the chief of the artil- 
 lery with the army. 
 
 The war with Mexico elicited apparently neither interest in nor 
 information on the subject of the proper functions of chiefs of the 
 artillery. They were charged with duties relating wholly to 
 supply; the batteries were considered as exclusively under the 
 control of division or brigade commanders; in battle the chief of 
 artillery of an army had nothing more to do with the manage- 
 ment of the batteries than other officers on the staff of the gen- 
 eral, i. e, , he acted only on the orders of the general. 
 
 In the edition of 1857 there first appeared paragraphs 1021 and 
 1022 of the present regulations of the army. They represent 
 what is left of that portion of Scott's Regulations of 1821 before 
 quoted, after they had been pruned in the interests of a certain 
 staff bureau. Such was the status of the question under' con- 
 sideration when the Civil war broke out. 
 
 When the Army of the Potomac was being organized, in 1861, 
 the question early arose whether the chief of artillery should have 
 command of that arm, or whether his functions should be purely 
 administrative. A board of officers was assembled to take the 
 subject into consideration, and reported as a result of its labors 
 that the practice varied in different armies. Owing to the peculiar 
 situation of the artillery arm, General McClellan determined to 
 
DUTIES: CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 213 
 
 make the functions of his chief of artillery administrative only; 
 and, as the cavalry was similarly situated, the following order 
 was issued, applying equally to both these arms of service : 
 
 "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 26th, 1862. 
 " [General Orders No. 110.] 
 
 " I. The duties of the chief of artillery and cavalry are exclusively adminis- 
 trative, and these officers will be attached to the headquarters of the Army of 
 the Potomac. They will be required to inspect the artillery and cavalry when- 
 ever it may be necessary, and will be responsible that they are properly equipped 
 and supplied. They will not exercise command of the troops of their arms, 
 unless specially ordered by the commanding general, but they will, when prac- 
 ticable, be selected to communicate the orders of the general to their respective 
 corps. All requisitions for officers and men, and for supplies for artillery and 
 cavalry other than the regular supplies furnished by the staff departments on 
 ordinary returns, will be sent to the chiefs of artillery and cavalry, to whom 
 will also be rendered, in addition to those rendered to general headquarters and 
 division commanders, such reports of artillery and cavalry practice, marches, 
 actions, and other operations pertaining to these arms as may be necessary to 
 enable them to judge of the efficiency both of men and material." * * * 
 
 General William F. Barry, at the time chief of artillery of the 
 army, pointed out the disadvantages under which he and his arm 
 labored in consequence of the provisions of this order, but to no 
 purpose. It has been said that the peculiar situation of the arm 
 as regards field officers was held to render it necessary that, in 
 the first instance, their duties should be supervisory rather than 
 of command. That situation was as follows : Comparatively 
 few artillery officers, and those mostly of the lower grades, had 
 been instructed in field battery duties; not half a dozen of them 
 had commanded artillery in battle. In the volunteer regiments 
 field officers were wholly inexperienced, and it was deemed proper, 
 in the first months of active operations, to give to the officers 
 who had been instructed the command of the batteries in the 
 field. The duties of the field officers, or chiefs of artillery, were 
 made purely administrative, they being all, except the chief of 
 artillery of the army, from the volunteers. The batteries were 
 assigned to divisions, then about 10,000 strong, giving four bat- 
 teries one regular and three volunteer to each division, the 
 captain of the regular battery, an experienced officer, commanding 
 the four. The object was to so organize the artillery as best to 
 develop its fighting powers, and this was attained by allowing 
 field officers of volunteer regiments first to learn something about 
 
214 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 handling artillery before taking command according to their rank. 
 Under authority granted by the act of August 5th, 1861, several 
 artillery officers fr,om the lower grades were appointed additional 
 aids-de-camp, and assigned according to their .staff-rank to com- 
 mand in the artillery,* to meet the practical difficulty existing of 
 having with the army uninstructed volunteers who would com- 
 mand them. As time passed, battles were fought, the regular 
 captains were, in great measure, promoted and removed from 
 the artillery, the volunteer officers became conversant with their 
 duties, the divisions were reduced in strength, half their batteries 
 were withdrawn and formed, agreeably to the original plan of 
 organization, into corps reserves, some of which were under the 
 command of the volunteer field officers, the chief of artillery of 
 the army commanding the whole. (Appendix A, [51].) This 
 was during the Peninsula campaign, after the termination of which 
 General Barry was removed to other duties, and was succeeded, 
 as chief of artillery, by the late commander of the general artillery 
 reserve. 
 
 The position of the chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac 
 under the various generals who, in rapid succession, were appoint- 
 ed to its command during the following months, cannot better be 
 described than is done by the former in the official report of the 
 operations of his arm at Chancellorsville. He says : 
 
 " Command of the. artillery, which I held under Generals McClellan and 
 Burnside, and exercised at the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg, was 
 withdrawn from me when you assumed command of the army, and my duties 
 made purely administrative, under circumstances very unfavorable to their effi- 
 cient performance. I heard after the movement [preliminary to the battle] 
 commenced that when the corps were put in motion to cross the river they 
 left part of their artillery in their camps. No notice of this was given to me, 
 and it was by accident that I learned that the batteries so left behind were 
 afterwards ordered to join their corps. As soon as the battle commenced, I 
 began to receive demands from corps commanders for more artillery, which I 
 was unable to comply with, except partially, and at the risk of deranging the 
 plans of other corps commanders. Being ordered to proceed to Bank's ford, 
 I was recalled by telegraphic instructions on the night of the 3d [Sunday, 
 May, 1863], when I was ordered by the commanding general at Chancellorsville 
 to take charge of all the artillery of the army." 
 
 As a result, although there was sufficient artillery during the 
 first periods of the battle, it was not at the places where needed, 
 
 *A similar device was resorted to by General Hampton in 1813. 
 
DUTIES: CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 21$ 
 
 and no one had authority or knowledge of affairs sufficient to 
 supply the demands of corps commanders for guns and ammuni- 
 tion, as, in the language of an eye-witness, the "woods seemed 
 alive with artillery" in a state of utter confusion. This was in 
 marked contrast with the artillery of the Confederates, which, ac- 
 cording to one of their first authorities, ' ' in spite of the difficulties 
 of the Wilderness, here co-operated with the infantry in a manner^ 
 never excelled in promptness and vigor." 
 
 When, from want of a directing hand, the artillery was in the 
 condition above described, the general commanding reinstated his 
 chief of artillery in the position of which he had deprived him, 
 that order might be brought out of this chaos which the com- 
 manding general had himself created. We thus see a general, 
 when the battle was bearing hard against him, when it was a 
 question whether or not anything could save his army from dis- 
 aster, abandoning his speculative ideas, and placing his chief of 
 artillery in command, in order that the batteries might be assem- 
 bled and directed against the enemy. No circumstance of the 
 Civil war more forcibly illustrates the necessity that exists for 
 understanding the functions of, and placing in his true position, 
 the chief of artillery of an army, than does this of Chancellorsville. 
 Whatever may or may not have been the views of the command- 
 ing general regarding the distribution and command of the artil- 
 lery, the fact remains that on the field, when pressed by the enemy 
 and disaster seemed impending, he was constrained to forego 
 them, and recall the officer whom he had deprived of that com- 
 mand. Further remark is unnecessary. Armies are organized 
 and maintained to beat the enemy; and that system which, over- 
 riding every prejudice, is resorted to when armies meet, is the 
 true one. 
 
 It may be said that General Hooker was only returning to the 
 system instituted by General McClellan in General Orders No. 
 no, Army of the Potomac, 1862, before quoted. While this 
 may be true, the reasons for the order having been issued origi- 
 nally seem either not to have been understood or to have been 
 ignored; and while the letter of the order, so far as it affected 
 the chief of artillery, may have been observed, the spirit of it was 
 entirely lost sight of. 
 
 After the battle of Chancellorsville, when the occasion which 
 rendered it necessary had passed, the command with which he 
 
2l6 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 had been temporarily intrusted was again taken from the chief of 
 artillery. This was the state of affairs when, oft the 28th of the 
 following month June the army once more changed command- 
 ers, on the eve of the great battle at Gettysburg. The chief of 
 artillery, during the preliminary movements leading to that event, 
 was directed by the new commanding general ' ' to see to the 
 position of the artillery, and make such arrangements respecting 
 it as were necessary," which order was interpreted by the officer 
 receiving it as vesting in him all the powers of commander of that 
 arm for the particular occasion. 
 
 To every reflecting mind it must appear strange that the duties, 
 powers, and rights of command of so important a personage as 
 the chief of artillery of an army having 364 field-guns, served by 
 8000 men and 7000 horses, should have been changed from day 
 to day, and, above all, that his status in his own arm, when battles 
 were being fought, was one thing, while in the intervals between 
 it was altogether different. 
 
 The necessity for organizing the artillery as a special arm of 
 service is recognized by every nation. It is, as a rule, auxiliary 
 to the cavalry and infantry, though by no means always so ; for in 
 siege operations and the forced passage of rivers it becomes the 
 principal, the others the auxiliary arms. But artillery is expensive 
 to organize and maintain in a state of efficiency ; therefore only so 
 much is provided as is necessary for the actual wants of the army, 
 and such special rules adopted for the service as will make it avail- 
 able, whether directed in mass by its own superior officer with the 
 army, commonly called the chief of artillery, or whether it be 
 attached to the smaller tactical units corps and divisions for 
 fighting purposes. In all armies, therefore, it has been found 
 necessary to regulate the management of this arm, to define the 
 functions of its principal officers in their own corps, and their 
 relations to the other arms of service. 
 
 General Meade, the new commander of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, appreciating this fact, together with the anomalous and 
 unsatisfactory basis on which the matter at that time stood, pro- 
 ceeded, in the following order, to clearly define the position of the 
 chief of artillery : 
 
 " HEADQUAETERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August list, 1863. 
 " [General Orders No. 82.] 
 
 "The duties of the chief of artillery of this army are both administrative and 
 executive. He is responsible for the condition of the artillery wherever serving, 
 
DUTIES: CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 2iy 
 
 respecting which he will keep the commanding general fully informed. Through 
 him the commanding general of the army will take the proper steps to insure 
 the efficiency of the artillery for movement and action and its proper employ- 
 ment in battle. All artillery not attached to other troops will be commanded 
 by the chief of artillery. He will, both personally and through his staff, main- 
 tain a. constant supervision and inspection over the personnel and material of 
 the artillery to insure the instruction of the former and completeness of the 
 latter, as well as the discipline of the artillery not attached to other troops: Ift 
 battle he will, under the instructions of the major-general commanding, dis- 
 tribute and place in position the reserve artillery, and, when so directed, select 
 positions for the batteries attached to troops, conveying to the commander of 
 the troops the directions of the commanding general. He will give such direc- 
 tions as may be necessary to secure the proper supply of ammunition and to 
 furnish it promptly to the batteries when in action. He will give no orders 
 that will interfere with the military control exercised by the commanders of a 
 corps or division over the batteries attached to their troops, nor will he with- 
 draw batteries from a corps, or transfer them from one corps to another, unless 
 directed to do so by the general commanding the army. Commandants of the 
 artillery attached to troops will be responsible to the chief of artillery for the 
 condition and efficiency of their batteries so far as relates to equipments, sup- 
 plies, and instruction, and will be governed with respect to orders received 
 from him by paragraph 489, Revised Army Regulations of 1861." 
 
 This order sets forth the powers of the chief of artillery of an 
 army in a manner clear and precise, and not equalled in these 
 particulars by any other orders and regulations of our service. 
 Analysis will evince that this officer commanded the artillery 
 reserve and such unattached batteries as were awaiting assignment; 
 that, for purposes of equipment and supply of materiel, and the 
 instruction of the personnel, he commanded every artilleryman 
 and every gun in the army; but, for disciplinary and fighting pur- 
 poses, the artillery attached to corps or divisions was exclusively 
 under the orders of the immediate military commanders ; with 
 these matters the chief of artillery had nothing to do, except 
 when directed by "the general commanding the army." The 
 order very nicely balances the various parts of a delicate machin- 
 ery, the disjointing of which had caused serious inconvenience. 
 It continued in force until the close of the Civil war, and deserves 
 to be preserved among the valuable contributions to our code of 
 regulations resulting from experience then acquired. 
 
 Although little precise information has been obtained touching 
 
 the subject under consideration, enough has been gathered to 
 
 indicate that the provisions of the general order just quoted 
 
 embody the fundamental ideas which in the main, if not exactly, 
 
 28 
 
218 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 govern in European armies. (Appendix B, [4] and [5].) And 
 although army reserves, made up of a large proportion of the 
 artillery, and under the immediate command of the chief of ar- 
 tillery, are nowhere at this time maintained as in the Army of 
 the Potomac when this order was issued, its provisions are of 
 almost universal application, the absence of the Reserve only less- 
 ening the immediate command of the chief of artillery, without 
 in the least affecting the principles governing the employment 
 of the arm or the duties and rights of its officers, either in their 
 own corps or as affecting the army at large. 
 
 In this connection, the experience .of the Confederate army will 
 be found to be interesting ; and although it may be stated that their 
 orders on the subject never so completely covered the ground as 
 did our own, still the practical results at which both armies ar- 
 rived were almost identical. Prior to the Peninsula, and even 
 during that campaign, their artillery had no organization worthy 
 of the name ; there was, however, a large and well-appointed artil- 
 lery reserve, commanded by the chief of artillery of the army, the 
 batteries of which were afterwards, in 1863, distributed to the army 
 corps. Before the second Manassas a great improvement had 
 been effected in the artillery organization by arranging the bat- 
 teries in battalions, under iield officers, and attaching them to 
 divisions ; at that battle the efficiency of the artillery battalion 
 organization was fully demonstrated. When army corps were 
 organized artillery was attached to each corps, under its own chief. 
 Following this came General Orders No. 7, Richmond, January, 
 1863, providing that 
 
 "Hereafter all field artillery belonging to any separate army will be parked 
 together under the direction of the general, or other chief officer of artil- 
 lery having control of the same, to be distributed, when required, accord- 
 ing to the judgment of the commanding general .of such army." 
 
 This order may be considered as another step in the plan of 
 concentration which had been commenced as soon as the mistakes 
 of organization were made manifest by experience, and by which 
 plan of concentration the artillery was gradually withdrawn from 
 control of the subordinate (brigade and regimental) commanders 
 and placed under generals of divisions, corps, and armies ; but it 
 is believed that the order just quoted went farther in this direction 
 than has been done in any other modern army, and it may be 
 doubted if it was ever given practical effect in the Army of North- 
 
DUTIES: CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 2IQ 
 
 ern Virginia ; this will become manifest when we examine General 
 Lee's order issued pursuant to the provisions of that under re- 
 view. General Lee directed that 
 
 " All the battalions of each corps will be under the command of and will 
 report to the chief of artillery for the corps. The whole, in both corps, will 
 be superintended by and report to the general chief of artillery." 
 
 A question would immediately arise as to the meaning of the 
 word superintend in this order. Is it synonymous with com- 
 mand ? If it were so considered, then why not use the latter in the 
 order? It would have removed ambiguity by terms, the signifi- 
 cance of which is well known to every military man. The inference 
 is that if it had been intended to give the chief of artillery com- 
 mand of that arm the order would have said so. He was not, 
 therefore, a commander, but a superintendent, the functions of 
 whose office must have been confined to matters of administration. 
 It may, indeed, have been, and doubtless was, true that the chief 
 of artillery of the army commanded the few batteries unattached 
 to corps, which either by accident or design accompanied the 
 army at various times after the general reserve was broken up 
 in 1863. These unattached batteries, however, formed no proper 
 command for a general officer; and hence the chief of artillery was 
 confined from necessity to a general superintendency of the equip- 
 ment, supply, and instruction of his arm, the command of the 
 artillery attached to troops being expressly vested in the chiefs of 
 artillery of the various army corps.* 
 
 It will be conceded without argument that the position and 
 authority of the chief of artillery of an army, i. e., whether he 
 act the part of an administrative officer simply, or whether he be 
 commander of the artillery, is a matter the correct determination 
 of which is of the first consequence to the proper service of that 
 arm. 
 
 In approaching the consideration of the subject, the importance 
 of which, as affecting the efficiency and credit of the artillery, 
 cannot be overestimated, it is to be remarked that this is a case 
 wherein a great mistake might be made by attempting to apply 
 an inflexible rule, without taking into account the varied circum- 
 
 * For information concerning the organization of the Confederate artillery, 
 Army of Northern Virginia, I am indebted principally to General E. P. Alex- 
 ander, late 0. S. A., and at one time' chief of artillery of Longstreet's corps. 
 
220 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 stances under which the armies of different nations are organized 
 and maintained. 
 
 Of this we may be reasonably certain: Unless the question of 
 the true position of the chief of artillery be happily determined, 
 much cannot be expected from that arm. If the duties of those 
 at the head of affairs be not defined, how is it possible for them 
 to direct those lower in the scale? The hand which should control 
 being palsied, the machinery either works heavily, wastes its 
 power in a useless friction of its parts, or stops altogether. 
 
 In the carefully-organized and highly-trained armies of conti- 
 nental Europe each piece in the machine has a well-ascertained 
 function. Its appointed sphere of action in the complete working 
 of the whole is determined beforehand and known to all concerned. 
 The result is this : As each knows perfectly what he is to do, there 
 is less need for supervision by those in chief authority. Each 
 commander of both divisional and corps artillery, (Appendix A, 
 [52],) from study, reflection, and the annual and other exercises in 
 time of peace, knows his duty under any and all circumstances. 
 To him the management of his batteries in war is different from 
 that in peace in this only: that the former gives opportunity for 
 putting in practice those principles with which peace has made 
 him familiar. In these thoroughly disciplined and equipped 
 armies there may be no objection to the distribution of the entire 
 artillery to army corps. The functions of the chief of artillery of 
 the army would in this case be administrative. As the artillery 
 of each corps has its commander, and as all the artillery is dis- 
 tributed to corps, there is no direct artillery command i. e., of 
 troops left for the chief of artillery of the army. It is understood 
 that, under the orders of the commanding general, he can at any 
 time assume those functions, and whenever the various corps 
 artilleries are massed for any purpose he would assume com- 
 mand of the mass. Except on these rare occasions, his duties 
 would be purely advisory and administrative. This, it will be 
 found, is the role assigned in the field to the chief of artillery of 
 the principal armies of continental Europe. As to the special 
 arm artillery its tactical units form permanent parts of the 
 divisions and army corps, and for fighting and disciplinary pur- 
 poses they are wholly under the orders of the division and corps 
 generals. The establishment of an imperium in imperio is in this 
 manner rendered impossible. 
 
DUTIES: CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. 221 
 
 Is this system best suited to our service? 
 
 If our artillery took the field under similar circumstances as to 
 practice and discipline; if the armies which the Government would 
 send forth in case of war were veterans, well organized; if the duties 
 of each, from the highest to the lowest, were well understood and 
 executed with facility, there would be left no room to doiibt_ 
 about it; we could not in that case do a wiser thing than adopt a 
 system which, amidst the surroundings indicated, has led' to splen- 
 did results elsewhere. It may be assumed, however, that the large 
 armies which the United States will send out will not be of this de- 
 scription. They certainly have not been. Veterans are not re- 
 cruited directly from the walks of civil life. With present practices 
 the artillery which will accompany these armies cannot be expected 
 to be well versed in their special duties, for during peace the 
 regulars received no instruction, administrative or tactical, in the 
 management of that organization the artillery brigade into 
 which, when war calls them to action, they will at once be formed; 
 and as for the volunteers, they will have everything to learn. 
 
 In armies such as ours would be it is doubtful if the existing 
 methods of European armies are the best, even if they be practi- 
 cable. There should be a closer bond connecting the detached 
 portions of the artillery scattered throughout the army than the 
 European system recognizes. This will be secured by a code of 
 regulations having for its foundation-stone the two following 
 principles: First, a chief of artillery is commander of that arm; 
 second, batteries or other artillery organizations assigned to 
 divisions and corps are on the footing of troops attached for service. 
 It is to be understood that artillery will be neither attached to, nor 
 taken from, these commands without the authority of the com- 
 manding general of the army; and, when so attached, it is for dis- 
 ciplinary and fighting purposes, exclusively under the orders of the 
 division and corps commanders. Batteries and other artillery 
 organizations not attached to military commands will be under 
 the direct orders of the chief of artillery; this to include the artil- 
 lery reserve, if there be one; also the ammunition columns, For 
 purposes of supply, instruction, and inspection, all artillery, 
 wherever serving, should be under the orders of the chief of 
 artillery of the army. 
 
 In the cantonments of winter season, when hostilities are sus- 
 pended, it would, when compatible with safety, add to the effi- 
 
222 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 * 
 
 ciency of the artillery to withdraw it temporarily from divisions 
 and corps into one body, for more thorough and uniform instruc- 
 tion and equipment, and with a view to the batteries being return- 
 ed in a replenished condition at the opening of a new cam- 
 paign. This was the plan pursued with the artillery of the main 
 army during the Revolutionary war; and, not because of its ancient 
 origin, but rather of its excellent features, it deserves careful 
 consideration. 
 
 If the management of our artillery in campaign be based upon 
 the principles before announced, it would insure all being done that 
 a correct administrative system could accomplish to render the 
 service of that arm efficient, to impart unity of purpose and action 
 to its dispersed members, without in the least impairing military 
 discipline, and open a certain pathway to its honorable career 
 in the field. This done, the prestige and glorious traditions of 
 the arm would be intrusted to the guardianship of the personnel, 
 in which, more than ever before, character, professional attain- 
 ments, and abilities will be found to be absolutely necessary. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 223 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MATERIEL. 
 
 The term ''system of artillery," as used generally, is synony- 
 mous with "system of guns;" but this is not always so, as illus- 
 trated in the Gribeauval, the most complete in all its parts of 
 any system of artillery ever devised, embracing not only guns, 
 carriages, and their appliances, but the organization of the per- 
 sonnel as well, the last being as important a feature as any other. 
 The division of Gribeauval formed the first distinct artillery tactical 
 unit y whence sprang the present battery, with the men, their pieces 
 and the horses inseparably connected. 
 
 Vallier's system related only to the calibres of guns to be 
 used; the stock-trail system to the carriages alone, the calibres 
 of the pieces and the organization of the personnel remaining 
 unchanged. 
 
 As the organization of the United States artillery is elsewhere 
 treated of, the -materiel of the system will here exclusively receive 
 attention. 
 
 CARRIAGES. 
 
 It has been naturally but erroneously supposed that the Gri- 
 beauval carriage was introduced into the American service during 
 the Revolution; instead, the English was then used, and it re- 
 mained during the eighteenth century the only style known 
 practically to the American artillery service. Many cannon and 
 other military stores were procured in France, and the con- 
 clusion was drawn that the carriages accompanied them, and 
 that in effect the whole Gribeauval system was transplanted to 
 American soil. There is no proof, however, that this was the 
 case. On the contrary, the existence of the system seems scarcely 
 to have been known, and only during the later periods of the 
 war. No reference to the system by American officers while 
 the war was in progress has been found; and even those Amer- 
 icans who served with Rochambeau's army seem to have been 
 entirely ignorant of the fact that the French set up claims to 
 special merit for their artillery, if indeed at that time they did. 
 
224 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF TPIE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 In Captain Stevens' "System for the Discipline of the Artil- 
 lery" (1797) there is no reference to the Gribeauval system, ex- 
 cept in a foot-note, the purport of which confirms the view here 
 taken. Following the exercise of the field-piece by the American 
 (English) plan, he remarks that "students, as a matter of curi- 
 osity, may like to contrast this with a practice the manuscript for 
 which was given General Knox at Yorktown by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Nadal, director of the French artillery park." This 
 proved to be the manual for the Gribeauval field artillery a fact 
 of which, farther than supposing it was the system adopted by 
 the French army, Stevens, in 1797, was apparently profoundly 
 ignorant; as he was also of the further fact that such a person as 
 Gribeauval had ever lived. We are justified in drawing this infer- 
 ence, for, had he been aware of the existence of the great artil- 
 lery reformer, nothing would have been more natural than for 
 him to have mentioned his name when he was dealing with his 
 system of artillery. General Knox did not take the trouble to 
 have Nadal' s manuscript translated a task which, several years 
 afterwards, the American author found great difficulty in having 1 
 accomplished; not, he remarked, that there was any trouble in 
 having ordinary French converted into English, but because the 
 technical artillery terms were almost unknown. So far was Ste- 
 vens from conceding special merit to the unknown system that 
 he, in true English style, took just the opposite view, remarking 
 triumphantly, and without thought of having the assertion brought 
 in question, that ' ' to clearly establish the superiority of the 
 American (English) method over the French, one had only to 
 study their respective manoeuvres as they were here contrasted. ' ' 
 
 Beaumarchais, who furnished large quantities of stores to the 
 Americans during the Revolution, including cannon and other 
 materiel, did not, so far as can now be ascertained, send over a 
 single carriage. 
 
 It is easily understood why the American artillery adhered to 
 the English system as nearly as possible in everything. First, 
 they were familiar with it, both through inheritance and the fact 
 that Muller's Treatise, with its plans and tables for artillery con- 
 structions, was in every workshop and foundry which turned out 
 this species of materiel ; second, they deemed it superior to every 
 other; and the reason they supplemented home products by im- 
 portations from France was, that the brass-foundry art being in its 
 
.TERIEL: CARRIAGES. 
 
 225 
 
 infancy in America, the ordnance yielded was not, particularly 
 during the first year of the war, entirely satisfactory, nor was it 
 easy to procure the copper and tin necessary for brass castings. 
 
 There was every reason why they should not look with favor 
 on the Gribeauval or French system. The Du Coudray affair had 
 disgusted them with anything that had the semblance of it. They 
 felt that they had been compelled to show that they could teke- 
 care of themselves, not with the assistance, but in spite of French 
 artillery officers ; and it was impossible for them to separate the 
 personnel from the system of materiel it represented. 
 
 General Knox, commanding the artillery, stamped on all apper- 
 taining to that arm the impress of an active, well-balanced mind, 
 stored with both theoretical and practical knowledge. That he 
 considered the English artillery the best in the world there is 
 abundant evidence ; when, in 1776, urging upon a committee 
 of Congress the advisability of establishing for our artillery an 
 academy similar to that at Woolwich, he observed that it was 
 confessedly to this institution that the enemy owed the superiority 
 of their artillery to all that had opposed it ; and in recommend- 
 ing to the commander-in-chief the organization of additional regi- 
 ments, about the same time, he remarked that we were safe so 
 long as we followed the example of the English in this and all 
 other particulars touching the management of the artillery arm, 
 either the personnel or the materiel. The standard set up by the 
 Royal Artillery Regiment was good enough for him ; he used the 
 French guns just as though they had come from Turkey, or else- 
 where, in happy ignorance of the fact that they belonged to and 
 were the exponents of a system destined soon to become famous, 
 and, except by the English, to be adopted with but slight changes 
 into every artillery of the world, including the American. There 
 is no reason to doubt that, had Du Coudray succeeded Knox as 
 general of artillery, the Gribeauval system, in its entirety, would 
 have followed him to our shores. General Gribeauval himself 
 was perhaps the staunchest of Du Coudray's friends; but the utter 
 and humiliating failure of that scheme proved the American artil- 
 lery to be strong enough in every way to bid defiance to outside 
 interference. It was intellectually, and in all that goes to make 
 up an efficient arm, the peer of any other in the Revolutionary 
 army. 
 
 So far as is known, Professor Muller's work on gunnery was 
 29 
 
226 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 the only text-book for artillery constructions extant in this country 
 prior to 1797. That it was extensively used by those having 
 charge of artillery technical affairs is well known. With this 
 book in the hands of a superintendent, there was no reason why 
 skilled artisans should not produce English guns and carriages 
 of the most approved patterns. The carriages that Stevens 
 describes as having been used during the Revolution and down 
 to the time at which he wrote were Muller's. The American 
 edition of Muller's treatise, published in Philadelphia in 1779, was 
 dedicated (doubtless without the author's consent*) "to Gen- 
 erals Washington and Knox, to Colonel Proctor, and the officers 
 of the continental army." The typographical and artistic execu- 
 tion of the work was rough, yet sufficiently exact for practical 
 purposes. Contemporaneous testimony establishes the fact that 
 the tables of construction and the drawings therein contained 
 were extensively made use of, while there is no evidence to show 
 that any other than this style of carriage was known. It was 
 called the "bracket," as the Gribeauval was called the "flask," 
 and its successor, the present style, the ' ' stock-trail ' ' system. 
 
 The ' ' travelling carriages ' ' were used to transport the heavier 
 pieces which accompanied troops; "field carriages," to carry the 
 lighter pieces. In both cases the material used was wood, except 
 for bolts and bands required to hold the wooden parts together. 
 The cheeks of the traveling carriage flared outwards towards the 
 trail, and were joined together by three transonis trail, centre, 
 and breast. Firmly mortised into the cheeks was a piece of wood, 
 upon which rested a wedge for elevating or depressing the gun. 
 The inside of the cheeks between the trail and centre transoms 
 was cut away considerably to lighten the trail, while immediately 
 in rear of the centre transom was placed a locker for carrying tools. 
 The field-carriage did not differ materially in design from the 
 other; wooden axles were used for all; but in the field-carriage 
 the wedge was suppressed and the elevation given by means of a 
 screw. The traveling gun-carriage wheels for all calibres 3, 
 6, 12, and 24-pounders were of the diameter of field artillery 
 carriage-wheels of the present day fifty-eight inches; but the 
 
 *It could not be expected that the preceptor to H. R. H., the Duke of 
 Gloucester, would view with entire approbation this wholesale purloining by 
 unrepentant rebels of the fruits of his brain-work. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES: 227 
 
 field gun-carriage wheels were only fifty inches in diameter. Ex- 
 cept for the 3-pounder gun, where they were but forty-five inches, 
 the limber-wheels for all gun-carriages were forty-eight inches in 
 diameter. From this it appears that there was not that disparity 
 in the size of limber and carriage wheels twelve inches which 
 characterized the Gribeauval system. 
 
 The horses were attached to the carriages of the pieces in single- 
 file. There was no ammunition chest on the limber. That a few 
 rounds might be at hand when the pieces came into action, two 
 side boxes, placed one above the other, the upper for cartridges, 
 the lower for projectiles, were attached to either side of the 
 bracket-trail stock in rear of the axles. When the piece was "in 
 battery ' ' the side boxes were placed on the ground three paces 
 in rear of the end of the trail handspike. The ammunition in the 
 side boxes made the piece in a measure independent of the ammu- 
 nition wagons. When the British started out on the expedition 
 which terminated in the affair at Lexington, in 1775, they carried 
 with them none other than twenty-four rounds per gun in these 
 side boxes, which therefore served the same purpose as the small- 
 trail ammunition-box of the Gribeauval, and the limber chest of 
 the stock-trail carriage; and it is worthy of remark that, after 
 having been universally suppressed about the beginning of the 
 nineteenth century, when the Gribeauval and block-trail had sup- 
 planted all other systems of carriages, the side box is again com- 
 ing into use, not only with some of the mitrailleurs, but also in 
 the most recent patterns of improved metallic field gun-carriages. 
 
 Aside from that carried in side boxes, ammunition was trans- 
 ported in tumbrels, carts, and ammunition wagons. The wagon 
 had four, the tumbrel and cart each two wheels, which were all of 
 different sizes, and unlike either the limber orguri-carriage wheels. 
 The inconvenience resulting from this multiplicity in the sizes of 
 artillery wheels must have been very great, and it is hard to 
 understand why it was tolerated. To the British artillery belongs 
 the credit of having first corrected this evil, by making inter- 
 changeable the wheels of limbers and gun-carriages, an important 
 step in the simplification of artillery materiel, which their off- 
 spring, the American artillery, did not imitate for many years, nor 
 until, with many doubts and misgivings, the Gribeauval system 
 had first been adopted, and then discarded. 
 
 Secretary McHenry was the first to move against the ancient 
 
228 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 and honored system of the fathers. He had drawings purchased 
 of carriages of the German horse-artillery system, concerning the 
 power of which he had an exalted opinion, and with a view to 
 having it introduced into the United States army. An elaborate 
 report on the subject was made to Congress, which body did not, 
 however, partake of the Secretary's enthusiasm ; and so during 
 the latter part of Mr. Adams' administration the matter dropped 
 out of sight. 
 
 Modifications of the old system were begun by Secretary Dear- 
 born almost as soon as he was installed in office, March 5th, 1801, 
 but not in the manner contemplated by his predecessor. The 
 introduction of horse artillery was held in abeyance, even as a 
 measure to be advocated before Congress, and improvements in 
 
 NOTE The enlisted men of the artillery did not drive the teams ; that was 
 done by civilians, employed sometimes by contract for a certain time, as a year, 
 and at others hired for temporary service. The artillery soldier served his guns 
 and prepared his ammunition. To make a driver of him was considered a 
 degradation. Horses for the artillery were sometimes purchased for that arm 
 alone, but generally the demands of service required the transfer of horses from 
 that to other branches, and the reverse. During the latter years of the war the 
 impressment of horses became quite a common practice, those belonging to 
 Tories being levied upon when possible. The following warrant given Colonel 
 Pickering, quartermaster-general, when Lafayette's detachment was about to 
 march for Virginia, illustrates the manner of procuring means of transport in 
 an emergency : " HEADQUARTERS, NEW WINDSOR, February 16^, 1781. Whereas 
 I have ordered a detachment to march from Peekskill on the 19th instant, on a 
 service that may not admit of delay resulting from an observance of the usual 
 forms of procuring teams and forage on the route, you are hereby authorized 
 by yourself or deputy (whenever it may be necessary) to procure those articles 
 by military impress in the country through which the detachment marches, for 
 which this shall be your warrant." This was signed by the commander-in- 
 chief. The "usual forms of procuring forage and teams" here alluded to was 
 by making requisitions for them on the civil magistrates. There was often no 
 money with which to purchase ; levies on Tories were not always practicable ; 
 and as owners refused to hire their teams when pay therefor was so uncertain, 
 there was nothing to do except to invoke the aid of authority; either civil or 
 military. The former was appealed to preferably, but when prompt action was 
 necessary, as in the instance cited, the vigor of military impress alone sufficed. 
 
 Benedict Arnold introduced the use of oxen for transporting heavy artillery, 
 and in this Colonel Pickering followed his example. He has left on record the 
 statement that without oxen there could not have been assembled at Yorktown 
 the necessary siege artillery, and that to their extensive employment might be 
 attributed the success of American arms in that decisive campaign. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 22Q 
 
 the existing but ancient system of materiel became the order of 
 the day. 
 
 The translation in 1800 of'De Scheel's Treatise on the Gribeau- 
 val Artillery paved the way for these innovations. This work, 
 which consisted of a text accompanied by a volume of plates, 
 contained all the information necessary to the proper construction 
 of the Gribeauval carriages. It gave the first information to trie" 
 army and the public in an available form concerning the particu- 
 lars of the (to them) new system of artillery; for, though there 
 were many officers of artillery who were cognizant of its existence 
 and its merits, they were those versed not only in the French 
 language, but also in French military literature. This number 
 was very small, and, as they never imparted their knowledge to 
 the community, it availed the latter nothing. 
 
 De Scheel's treatise dealt wholly with materiel ; hence it for 
 some time longer escaped the attention of the authorities that 
 Gribeauval' s completed system extended to the organization of 
 the personnel. 
 
 Secretary Dearborn retained in some degree the prejudice 
 against foreign importations which he had imbibed during the 
 first years of the Revolution, when many incompetent officers 
 who sought service in the forces of the colonies were given posi- 
 tions, because of their supposed knowledge, over more deserv- 
 ing Americans. So great had been this abuse that a reaction set 
 in naturally enough, yet as unreasonable as the practice it was 
 intended to correct, and which for some time left even the gallant 
 De Kalb knocking in vain at the doors of Congress for admission 
 into its army. 
 
 But although Dearborn deprecated the practice of servilely 
 copying that which was European, he had the practical sense 
 which enabled him to recognize a good thing when he saw it; 
 nor were his prejudices so great as to deter him, through mere 
 sentiment, from adopting, if not the exact form, at least the sub- 
 stance of the Gribeauval carriage improvements. This will ex- 
 plain how it was that, while* he did not hesitate to appropriate 
 the new system piece-meal, he could not make up his mind to 
 adopt it bodily. He desired to secure a lighter and more mobile 
 carriage for his new system of cast-iron field-guns, and for this 
 purpose was anxious to secure whatever there was of merit in the 
 Gribeauval; but he determined to make no change until the 
 
230 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 wisdom of the measure was established to his satisfaction. He 
 relied on his own judgment, instead of being guided by the 
 counsels of other men. By failing to appreciate the importance 
 of having the same parts of all carriages precisely alike and inter- 
 changeable, the soul of the Gribeauval system was passed by 
 without recognition; but by taking up one after the other its most 
 striking features, the manoeuvring power of the field artillery was 
 greatly increased. Thus by degrees the American carriage was 
 brought to the point where but one step was necessary to make 
 it the Gribeauval in its entirety; and this step was taken by 
 Dearborn's successor within a month of the time he was estab- 
 lished in the war office. 
 
 It will be interesting to trace, as they were successively made, 
 these changes from the old bracket-trail carriage. First of all, the 
 weight was cut down in 1801 about thirty per cent., taken pretty 
 evenly from every part except the axler The wooden axle 
 next gave way to one of wrought-iron, incased in wood, with 
 composition boxes. Driving teams tandem was discontinued, the 
 shafts of former days being replaced by the pole. These alterations 
 had all been made before 1807, and the year following both 
 traveling as well as firing trunnions were adopted for the heavier 
 field-gun carriages. Thus, during Dearborn's incumbency, and 
 under his directions, four of the most prominent features of tile 
 Gribeauval carriage were adopted: First, the carriages reduced 
 thirty per cent, in weight; second, wrought-iron axles with 
 composition boxes replaced those of wood; third, the pole sup- 
 planted the shafts; fourth, firing and traveling trunnions were 
 used for the heavier calibres. Except the last, which was a very 
 inconvenient arrangement, these changes have stood their ground 
 for three-quarters of a century, attesting the sterling worth of 
 him who, in that dark age of our army's history, discerned their 
 advantages, and was not deterred by a sense of his exalted position 
 from seeing to it that their merits should be tested, and, when 
 demonstrated to be such, that the improvements themselves should 
 be adopted in service. 
 
 The pent-house ammunition box of the Gribeauval system was 
 not made part of the new carriages. Its advantages over the old- 
 fashioned English side boxes were not clearly established; it 
 carried no more ammunition than they, and its manipulation was 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 23! 
 
 equally difficult. But it will be seen that the new system had 
 been pushed to the verge of the French without having, however, 
 become identical with it. 
 
 It was the intention of the Secretary of War to equip all the 
 companies of the light artillery regiment raised pursuant to the 
 act of April i2th, 1808, with the new carriages and the new 
 system of cast-iron field guns, which also been perfected during^ 
 his administration of the War Department. Every effort was 
 made to supply the requisite materiel, but, as has been mentioned, 
 the expense that would attend the measure caused its abandon- 
 ment, except for a single company. 
 
 During the Revolution, Americans had accepted the English 
 artillery as the standard of perfection. Time had, however, 
 wrought changes in the artilleries of both countries. Both had 
 abandoned their old and honored system for a new one. Though 
 in many places their lines of research and improvement had been 
 parallel, they had on the whole diverged, until, in 1809, their 
 respective systems were diametrically opposed to each other. 
 The Americans had partially copied, and were now about to 
 adopt, what was considered by all,, except the British, the finest 
 system in the world. The English artillery had wrought out a new 
 system for itself one as much superior to the Gribeauval as the 
 latter was superior to any that had preceded it, and which was 
 destined in a few years to sweep all rivals from the field. 
 
 Secretary Eustis was appointed March yth, 1809. On the i8th 
 of the following April he ordered the military agent at Boston to 
 construct for the light artillery regiment some gun-carriages of 
 the Gribeauval style, without modifications, adding the injunction 
 that, "as these are the first of the kind on this plan , it is particu- 
 larly desirable that they should be made in a proper manner and 
 of the best materials and workmanship. ' ' This is the date at which 
 the Gribeauval system of carriages, pure and simple, was intro- 
 duced into the American service. 
 
 Other carriages of this pattern had, however, been manufactured, 
 and others still had been turned over to the United States author- 
 ities at New Orleans in 1803, after the Louisiana purchase; hence 
 those which Eustis ordered to be constructed were not the first 
 seen in this country. In his letter of instruction to the agent, 
 before mentioned, the latter was directed to accept as a model in 
 
232 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 his constructions a carriage that had already been made by a 
 mechanic of Boston and approved of by competent judges. 
 
 The New Orleans artillery received from the French con- 
 sisted of four 12-pounder, four 8-pounder, eight 4-pounder guns, 
 and eight 6-inch howitzers, with the most approved Gribeauval 
 carriages, caissons, and equipments complete. In the fall of 1809 
 two of these carriages were by the Secretary's order sent to Wash- 
 ington city for examination, and to serve as patterns for others. 
 
 The Wurst wagon, which at that time was the French light 
 (horse) artillery caisson, was not introduced, or even manufac- 
 tured, until 1812, after the declaration of war against Great Britain. 
 Colonel Izard, of the Second Artillery, was the first to construct a 
 few of them for the equipment of part of his regiment fitting out 
 for the Canadian frontier ; but, so far as can be ascertained, they 
 were not issued to any part of the army. That portion of the 
 light (horse) regiment which, in the first months of the war, took 
 the field, was equipped as horse artillery proper, with the ordinary 
 caisson. 
 
 As the war progressed and the construction of many new car- 
 riages became necessary the Gribeauval system was gradually 
 extended to embrace all calibres 3, 6, 12, 18, and 24-pounders 
 the most noticeable improvement being that the tire, instead of 
 being put on the wheels in sections, as in the Gribeauval, was made 
 into a hoop. 
 
 Although the Americans met in the field the new English sys- 
 tem of artillery during the war of 1812, the events of the war were 
 not of sufficient magnitude to demonstrate its superiority, which 
 seems to have escaped the attention of all except one man 
 
 NOTE. It has been stated that the complete Gribeauval system embraced two 
 parts: (1) materiel; (2) personnel. The former included (a) guns ; (b) car- 
 riages. Of these, (a) was never adopted into the United States service. The 
 manner in which (b) was adopted has been narrated. This left (2) to be ac- 
 counted for, to take in the completed Gribeauval system. 
 
 The laws had organized the personnel of the United States artillery into 
 companies and regiments. The division of Gribeauval found -no place in the 
 strictly legal organization. It was given one by regulations. After Secretary 
 Armstrong assumed control at the War Department (January 13, 1813), the 
 artillery, on paper at least, was distributed for field service, under the regula- 
 tions of May 1st, 1813, into divisions or half divisions. This was simply copying 
 the Gribeauval system. It left the adoption of the guns (a) to make that sys- 
 tem complete; but this step was never taken. [See Appendix C, (1).] 
 
MATERIEL ! CARRIAGES. 233 
 
 Colonel Decius Wadsworth, of the ordnance department.* This 
 officer was attracted by the peculiarities of the English field-car- 
 riages, and, having given careful attention to their construction, 
 became convinced of their many advantages, particularly as to the 
 increased mobility thereby insured. He was at the time engaged, 
 under the authority and requirements of the act of February Sth^ 
 1815, in devising a complete system of artillery mat6riel, which he 
 hoped to have adopted by the War Department. Among other 
 things, he proposed a field-carriage in principles of construction 
 very much like the English block-trail. But the idea was novel; it 
 was departing, almost as soon as adopted, from the system of Gri- 
 beauval, with its glorious associations, and which, save by the 
 British artillery, had been everywhere accepted as superior to all 
 others. It was natural, therefore, that Secretary Calhoun should 
 hesitate to approve this new and unique field-carriage ; and, as 
 the safest course, he proposed that a board of officers should 
 examine and report upon the merits of the Wadsworth system of 
 materiel. The personnel of the board was selected by Colonel 
 
 * Writing, in 1869, concerning the attempts of Colonel Wadsworth to 
 improve the style of gun-carriage after the war of 1812, Mr. William Wade, 
 who was at the time (1812-1821) an ordnance officer and a co-laborer with 
 Wadsworth, remarked: "In 181*7, Colonel Decius Wadsworth, who had been 
 chief of the ordnance department since its first establishment, in 1812, de- 
 vised a field-carriage of a model entirely different from any hitherto known 
 to our service. Its leading features were similar to the carriages used by 
 the British army in our war of 1812. One of the British carriages captured 
 at the battle of Plattsburg in September, 1814, was sent to the Washington 
 arsenal. It was of the stock-trail kind, which coupled with its limber by 
 means of a pintle-hook fastened upon the rear of the limber-axle body.. The 
 limber had, instead of a single pole, three thills or shafts, designed for the 
 use of three horses abreast. One of the. shafts was movable, to be displaced 
 or attached at pleasure. A large ammunition chest was placed upon the 
 limber-axle body, upon which six men could ride, and seats for two men 
 were placed on the carriage, thus carrying eight men in all upon the carriage. 
 This was the first field-gun carriage of the stock-trail model that I ever saw 
 or heard of, and was doubtless the first ever known in the United States. 
 
 "Colonel Wadsworth, in constructing his carriage, modified this English 
 model by substituting the single pole for the three shafts, and by using two 
 bent cheeks instead of the stock-trail, and also by supporting the limber ammu- 
 nition chest on springs, instead of fixing it upon the axle, as in the English 
 carriage. By bending the two cheeks so that they came nearly together at 
 the trail ends, he retained all the advantages of the stock-trail for wheeling 
 
 30 
 
234 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Wadsworth, and embraced Colonel Porter and Captain Towson 
 of the light artillery, Captain Archer of the corps of artillery, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Bomford and Captain Wade of the ordnance 
 department. Convened by general order from the adjutant and in- 
 spector-general' s office, July 28th, 1818, the board was directed 
 to meet on the ist of the following September "to examine the 
 patterns and models of cannon, howitzers, and mortars; of field 
 and fixed carriages ; of caissons and other appendages of the artil- 
 lery, and such other subjects as may be referred to it, with a view 
 to the establishing of a permanent system of uniformity in relation 
 to that branch of the service. The board will report its opinion 
 on all subjects referred to its consideration." Porter was excused, 
 because of ill-health, from attending. Towson was made paymas- 
 ter-general in 1819, so the board was soon reduced to its three 
 junior members. It was the pioneer in the field of artillery boards, 
 of which more recent years have been so prolific. 
 
 In the acrimonious correspondence that ensued when the board 
 reported adversely to his system the colonel of ordnance showed 
 
 the carriage on a curve of short radius. I constructed several of these carriages, 
 the first one under the personal supervision of Colonel Wadsworth, in 1817. 
 I made several trials at Pittsburg with one of these carriages in 1818, with 
 as many men mounted upon it as were needed to serve the piece, driving 
 over rough roads, the horses at full gallop, then suddenly halting and firing 
 the gun. I rode myself on the limber with the men that I might observe 
 any defects. This test was as complete as could well be made with untrained 
 horses and men, and was quite satisfactory, and I am now of opioion that if 
 Colonel Wadsworth had continued in authority, with health and other favoring 
 circumstances, he would have effected an entire revolution in the old [Gribeau- 
 val] system, and have made important improvements." 
 
 There was another particular, not noticed by Mr. Wade, in which Wadsworth 
 deviated from the British system, viz., he proposed that while the limber wheels 
 for all field-carriages should be of the same height, they should be different 
 from the gun-carriage wheels ; and the latter differed among themselves, those 
 for the 6-pounder being 4 feet 6 inches in height, those for the 12-pounder, 
 4 feet 9 inches. During the Peninsular war all limber wheels of the British 
 artillery were of the same height as the gun-carriage wheels an improvement 
 that Wadsworth had done well to copy, as likewise the block-trail, instead of 
 the two bent flasks. It is evident that, by placing the ammunition box on the 
 limber, carrying on them a number of men sufficient to serve the piece, making 
 practically a stock-trail of the two flasks, Wadsworth had struck the key-note 
 to the modern British artillery system, which he recognized, contrary to the 
 opinion of his contemporaries, as being superior to any other. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 235 
 
 himself a master in the polemic art as well as an artillerist of true 
 genius. Referring to the field-carriage before mentioned, and 
 the reception it had received, he remarked : 
 
 "The board have thought proper to criticise the carriage constructed under 
 my direction. Whether or not I have succeeded in improving our field carriage, 
 let unprejudiced, intelligent men decide. They say in one place that mine_are_ 
 the only carriages which have not been altered for the worse from the French ; 
 in another, that mine are in every way inferior to the latter. 
 
 " My carriage has some improvements that will stand their ground. The 
 arrangement of the elevating screw is superior to anything of the kind that has 
 yet appeared. I stake my reputation upon that. The 6-pounder carriage pro- 
 posed by the board carries fifteen rounds ; mine twenty-nine rounds. The lim- 
 bers of my carriage admit of being employed in time of action as tumbrels to 
 convey ammunition from the caissons to the pieces, thereby permitting the 
 former to remain out of range of the fire. The explosion of a British caisson at 
 Chippewa by a shell from Towson's battery, if it did not decide the fate of that 
 action, at least contributed greatly to its success. If a better plan than mine 
 can be devised, let it be proposed. 
 
 "The 6-pounder carriage of my construction permits a number of men suffi- 
 cient to serve the gun to ride upon the limber and carriage ; and, as it is lim- 
 bered and unlimbered with the greatest facility, which is even partially 
 acknowledged by the board, changes of position may be effected with it in 
 inconceivably less time than with carriages of the French construction." 
 
 He appreciated the fact that the Gribeauval was inferior to the 
 English system, the latter of which he proposed essentially to 
 adopt. In that opinion he stood without support ; but events 
 have vindicated the keenness of his perception and the soundness 
 of his judgment. Remarking upon the disposition to blindly 
 adhere to the French system, without examining its value, when 
 compared with others, he continued : 
 
 " The making of wheel carriages is well understood in this country, and we 
 should lose a great deal and expose ourselves to derision in the minds of 
 those who know how carriages ought to be built to servilely copy French patterns 
 invented fifty or sixty years ago. It. is a mistake to suppose the French system 
 of artillery is the most perfect in existence. The British artillery has been 
 greatly improved within the last twenty years. In the construction of carriages, 
 in the celerity of their movements, in the facility of their manoeuvres, in the 
 excellent quality of their ammunition, and the convenience with which their 
 pieces are supplied in time of action, the British artillery is now superior to 
 what the French ever was. It is in vain for us to try to underrate it. We 
 shall be obliged sooner or later to contend with it, and a knowledge of its 
 perfections and power ought to stimulate us to greater exertions to bring our 
 own to a point of excellence to equal, at least, if we cannot surpass it. The 
 
236 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 British artillery has been brought to its present state by gradual improvements, 
 made under the direction of men of intelligence and experience, equally versed 
 in the theory and the practice of their profession. The Government has spared 
 no expense to attain the object in view." 
 
 This statement of the relative merits of the two opposing sys- 
 tems, considering the time at which it was made, is remarkable. 
 The colonel of ordnance only, of the artillerists in this country, 
 took in at a glance, as it were, though he had carefully studied it, 
 the great superiority of the English system something that the 
 French Government, with every proof before it, did not acknowl- 
 edge until ten years later. Wadsworth did not live to see the 
 justness of his views established, the English sweep the Gribeauval 
 and all other systems before it, to become, as it has remained, 
 without change in principle and but few in minor details, master 
 of the battle field. He discerned what others, bound by that 
 strange spell a name could not see. It is due the memory of 
 this truly great man to place on record this narrative of his 
 labors. The opposition he encountered, and principally from 
 within his own department, was like that which for a time bafHed 
 Congreve, Gribeauval, and other artillery reformers. He com- 
 bined the learning and sense of Muller with a power of analysis 
 equal to Gribeauval Jhimself. Ill health impaired his usefulness 
 and frustrated his plans, though it did not for one moment 
 cloud his clear intellectual horizon. He lived before his time. 
 Twenty years afterwards his associates and opponents acknowl- 
 edged that he had been right. He retired from the service in that 
 struggle illustrating the survival of the physically fittest the 
 reduction of 1821. Had he remained at the head of the technical 
 artillery, there is no doubt that he would, with proper support, 
 have overturned the system finally (in 1819) determined upon, 
 and which, almost as soon as established, went down before that 
 other, the advantages of which Wadsworth alone of his cotem- 
 poraries had pointed out to the army. 
 
 The contest between the Gribeauval and the Wadsworth 
 systems was an unequal one. The former was backed by the 
 memories of a brilliant career; the latter, unknown and without 
 honor even in its own country, was considered as merely an ex- 
 periment, which, however successful it might be, could produce 
 nothing having merit equal to that of its world-renowned rival. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 237 
 
 The board reported adversely to the proposed system, and, 
 acting under instructions from the War Department, it then pro- 
 ceeded to digest another, complete in all its parts, embracing every 
 branch of the artillery service, and which would strictly conform 
 except as to the calibres of the ordnance and the metals used in the 
 construction thereof to the latest and most improved patterns-ol 
 the Gribeauval. After much labor, prolonged experiment, and 
 patient investigation, the board submitted a system for the approval 
 of the Secretary of War, embracing three general features: First, 
 cast-iron as the gun-metal for all calibres; second, cast-iron as the 
 materiel for gun-carriages of all fixed batteries; third, the most 
 recent patterns of the Gribeauval for field, siege, and garrison 
 artillery carriages. The proceedings of the board were approved 
 by Secretary Calhoun, and the system of artillery recommended 
 by it was adopted for the service of the United States. 
 
 The French system, now definitely determined upon, after a 
 vigorous effort to obtain a better one had failed, retained undis- 
 puted sway until, in 1829, there were deposited with the technical 
 artillery department complete and accurate drawings of carriages 
 field, siege, garrison, and sea-coast, all, except the last, based on 
 the English plan, which Colonel Wadsworth had championed 
 ten years before. The construction of modol stock-trail carriages 
 was at once begun. The first stroke of the hammer sounded 
 the death-knell of the Gribeauval regime. 
 
 We will briefly notice the career of the system English block- 
 trail which, after twelve years of rigorous experiment, had, 
 despite national prejudice, and at the sacrifice of the cherished 
 idol of a half century, forced itself upon the French artillery, and 
 was now to be retransplanted into our own.* 
 
 Captain Congreve broke ground against the bracket-trail system 
 as early as 1776, and the following year experimental carriages, 
 having the ammunition-boxes on the limber-axle, were made at 
 his suggestion. He pointed out the advantage of having the lim- 
 ber and the gun-carriage wheels of the same size, and interchange- 
 
 * The facts here given concerning the gradual introduction of the salient 
 features of the English stock-trail system of carriages were furnished the author 
 by the late General Tyler, who, through the courteous assistance of Major 
 Hime, Eoyal artillery, and perhaps others of that service, was enabled to 
 establish their correctness from the official records at Woolwich. 
 
238 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 able. The associate of Congreve in these improvements was De 
 Sagulier, who, in 1778, constructed carriages with interchange- 
 able limber and piece wheels, and in 1779 introduced wrought- 
 iron axles for 3-pounder and i -pounder gun-carriages. The 
 substitution of a block of wood for the bracket-trail seems first to 
 have occurred to De Sagulier, who, in 1778, proposed block- 
 trails for heavy 3-pounder carriages. By 1794, due to the joint 
 labors of these officers and of others, perhaps, wrought-iron axles 
 with composition-boxes, the block-trail, the pintle-hook, wheels 
 for limber and gun-carriage interchangeable, with ammunition- 
 chest placed on the limber-axle, were generally recognized im- 
 provements which, one after another, had become leading features 
 of the English field artillery materiel. Having taken these steps, 
 it was but making another in the same direction to convert the 
 clumsy caisson into a carriage built upon the same general prin- 
 ciples, thus enabling it to turn upon the same ground as the piece. 
 The forge and battery wagon were similarly affected by this spirit 
 of change, which had so thoroughly accomplished its work that 
 when Wellington began his Peninsular campaigns the artillery 
 materiel of his army was the same in principle, and almost the 
 same in detail of construction, with that adopted by the French in 
 1827, and concerning which, in 1829, the United States War 
 Department received its first information. 
 
 The superiority of the new English system could not but have 
 attracted the attention of the veteran artillerists who had to contend 
 against it. They saw that its mobility far exceeded what it was 
 possible to attain with their own. After the fall of Napoleon, 
 when the allies were encamped in the environs of Paris, the sim- 
 plicity of this unique system and the facilities of its manoeuvres 
 attracted the attention, awakened the interest, and challenged the 
 admiration of not only the artillery, but of all the principal officers 
 in that vast assembly of the armies of Europe. Following the 
 Restoration, when the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had freed 
 France of the allies, the question whether or not the English sys- 
 tem should be chosen to supersede the time-honored Gribeauval 
 attracted the serious consideration of the French military authori- 
 ties. Boards of experienced officers were appointed to examine 
 into the subject in all its bearings. After years of careful investi- 
 gation, aided by the severest and most elaborate series of experi- 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 239 
 
 ments, and including many futile attempts to modify the Gribeauval, 
 reports were made in favor of the proposed change. To accept 
 the system of a victorious, exultant, and insolent enemy drove 
 the iron to the soul of the French artillery. Many, blinded by 
 national predjudice, held out against it, but, to the honor of those 
 upon whom the responsibility rested, be.it remembered that thy_ 
 had the courage of their convictions ; and placing behind them 
 as unworthy of consideration whatever of professional pride they 
 felt which might bias their judgment in a matter affecting the 
 well-being, of the State, they united in recommending, regardless 
 of its origin, the adoption of a system of artillery which in every 
 point of view added strength to the military power of the Nation. 
 
 Several copies of the able and dispassionate report of the com- 
 mittee which finally determined the matter, and upon which report 
 the French Government ordered, July, 1827, that the stock-trail 
 system of artillery should be adopted, were among the valuable 
 papers furnished the United States authorities through the un- 
 tiring labors of Lieutenant Tyler during a few months' stay in 
 Europe. 
 
 The principal changes made in the English system by the 
 French were as follows : (i) The iron axle, encased in wood, was 
 replaced by a single piece of iron without any support. (2) A 
 pole replaced the shafts of the limber. (3) The height of the 
 wheels was diminished a little more than an inch, to better adapt 
 them to the draft of the French horses. (4) The elevating screw, 
 which in the English system was bolted to the knob of the cascable 
 and worked in a movable bed, was given a fixed seat, with the 
 breech of the piece resting on the head of the screw. (5) The 
 limber was given a movable splinter-bar. (6) In place of the 
 two small ammunition-boxes, side by side on the limber and the 
 caissons, and secured by cords, a single ammunition-box was sub- 
 stituted, retained in place by iron fastenings. (7) In the English 
 ammunition-boxes the apartments were made to carry the ball 
 and cartridge separately; in the modified chest the apartments 
 were for fixed ammunition. 
 
 The drawings which the lieutenant placed at the disposition of 
 the Department were of the latest models. By July, 1830, the 
 preliminary work was begun looking to the construction of some 
 of the field carriages based on these drawings, from which was 
 
240 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 derived the only information possessed concerning the new sys- 
 tem.* 
 
 The young officer, to whose intelligent and almost unaided exer- 
 tions the artillery arm was indebted for this important acquisition, 
 deserves to be remembered among those who have contributed 
 
 *The following letter, written by Major Alfred Mordecai, late of the United 
 States ordnance department, dated September 27th, 1872, confirms in the most 
 positive manner the claim here put forward, that to this officer, and to him 
 alone, is due the credit of having introduced into our service a full knowl- 
 edge of the stock-trail system of artillery. Major Mordecai was a' lieutenant of 
 engineers in 1832, and was appointed a captain in the ordnance department 
 organized that year. * * * " My actual service in the ordnance depart- 
 ment began on the 1st of January, 1833, when I joined Captain Symington at 
 Washington arsenal, and soon after succeeded him in the charge of that post. 
 He had then constructed the first of the field gun-carriages and caissons of the 
 pregent system, adopted from the French, and in doing so he used as models the 
 drawings of the French system which Lieutenant Daniel Tyler had obtained 
 in France and deposited in the ordnance office. I made at that time from the 
 same drawings the first drawings, and translated the tables of construction for 
 the field forge, which was afterwards modified, I think at Watervliet arsenal, 
 by a slight change, perhaps, in the bellows, and covering it with a roof. At the 
 same time Symington was just finishing the first of the barbette carriages, 
 which were also copied from the French system, knowledge of which in detail 
 was obtained also from drawings deposited by Lieutenant Tyler in the ord- 
 nance office. The first of these barbette carriages was sent in the winter or 
 spring of 1833 for the armament of Fort Moultrie on account of the political 
 disturbances in South Carolina. I can have, therefore, no hesitation in saying 
 that the first full knowledge of the French system, which we copied in the 
 field, siege, and barbette carriages, was derived from the complete drawings 
 and tables of construction which were furnished by Lieutenant Tyler to the 
 ordnance office." The writer of the above (Major Mordecai) was one of the 
 officers who labored most intelligently and with greatest effect to secure 
 to the artillery a complete sys-tem of materiel. From 1835 to 1860 his name 
 was intimately associated with every effort to build up an efficient national 
 armament. From 1835 to 1840, to his exertions more than to those of any 
 other, and, so far as can be seen, from 1840 to 1850, to his industry and perse- 
 verance more than to those of all others united, the vast mass of data on artil- 
 lery subjects which had been collected was systematically arranged, published, 
 and placed in the hands of the army in the " Artillery of the United States 
 Land Service," text and plates, 1849, and in the " Revised Ordnance Manual " 
 of 1850. No other testimonial to the work that Lieutenant Tyler performed 
 could be wished than is here given by this accomplished scholar, profound 
 thinker, and scientific artillerist. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 241 
 
 most to its advancement. With no wish to make invidious com- 
 parisons, it can be claimed, without risk of being successfully con- 
 troverted, that none others of the many who have been dispatched 
 by this Government to Europe have secured, either in so short a 
 time or at so great pecuniary sacrifice, such a variety of useful 
 information, or made it so directly available to his associates -&f - 
 the military profession. After a few months' sojourn in France, 
 there appeared, as the result of his labors : (i) 300 lithographed 
 copies of a translation, accompanied by plates, of the whole sys- 
 tem field, seige, garrison, and sea-coast of the Gribeauval artil- 
 lery tactics. (2) Many lithographic copies of the report (trans- 
 lated) of the French committee, which discussed the relative merits 
 of the ancient and the modern systems of artillery materiel, and 
 finally decided the question between them. (3) Most important and 
 useful of all, complete copies of the working drawings and tables 
 of construction, perfect in every particular, of the latter system, as 
 modified and adopted by the French Government. All this was 
 done at the expense of the young military enthusiast. In addi- 
 tion, he obtained and rendered promptly available to the Gov- 
 ernment (4) valuable information concerning the most improved 
 patterns of small arms used abroad. For the pecuniary outlay 
 incurred he received but a tardy and most inadequate return. 
 
 Disappointed at the lack of a just appreciation of his services in 
 building up the technical artillery, in which field he was at that 
 time the most prominent and advanced laborer, disgusted that 
 merit should remain unrewarded, while in some instances mere 
 political favorites were promoted into this branch of the artillery, 
 now organized as the ordnance department, he resigned his 
 commission to seek and receive in the open competition of civil 
 life that recognition of great talents and business capacity, and 
 the rewards of indefatigable industry, for which in the army he 
 had hoped and struggled in vain. Death, in 1882, terminated 
 a life of activity and usefulness that may well serve as a model for 
 the emulation of the youth of his native land. Full of years and 
 honors, he has been gathered to rest, but the work he did lives 
 after him. In the light artillery system of the present day, with 
 its distinguished career in peace and war, in the bivouac and on 
 the battle-field, there stands an enduring monument to the memory 
 
242 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 of Lieutenant Daniel Tyler, of the First regiment of United 
 States artillery.* 
 
 The system of artillery prepared by the board of 1818, although 
 it had been adopted after what were deemed sufficient tests, was 
 not found to be adapted to actual service. A half battery, com- 
 posed of Wadsworth carriages and the long 6-pounders of the 
 adopted pattern, was sent to the artillery school of practice at 
 Fortress Monroe in 1827 for trial, f The guns burst under cir- 
 
 * The author experiences great pleasure at being authorized to insert the 
 following tribute to the memory and later services of this distinguished officer, 
 written by Senator Joseph R. Hawley, of Connecticut, late major-general U. S. 
 volunteers, who received his first lessons in the military art under General 
 Tyler's instructions in 1861, when, although sixty-four years of age, the gallant 
 patriot and soldier, abandoning lucrative civil pursuits, buckled on the armor 
 and went forth to do battle for the maintenance of the Union with all the fervor 
 of a youth of twenty-five : 
 
 " General Tyler's name is remembered with the warmest gratitude in Con- 
 necticut. Of the best blood of the Revolutionary era, he was every inch a sol- 
 dier. His residence and business connections in the South as well as the 
 North gave him a very thorough comprehension of the temper and purposes of 
 the conspirators against the Union. Like General Sherman, he was misunder- 
 stood, and believed to be magnifying the coming war. The moment Sumter 
 was fired upon he placed himself at the service of the good war governor, 
 Buckingham. The first regiment of three-months volunteers was raised in a 
 very few days, and Captain Tyler, as he was then called, was made colonel 
 thereof. The other two three-months regiments followed quickly, and Colonel 
 Tyler was made a brigadier. These three regiments he took into camp at New 
 Haven, thoroughly equipped in every respect, and put them under the severest 
 drill for two or three weeks before they started for Washington. Several hun- 
 dred of the officers and privates of these three regiments became officers of the 
 three-years regiments raised immediately after. General Tyler infused into 
 all under his command a spirit of severe, exact discipline, a determination to 
 master speedily the details of a soldier's duty, and a blazing patriotism that 
 made no measure of its devotion. Without doubt his influence was most 
 beneficially felt during the four years of, and among the 54,000 troops Con- 
 necticut sent to, the war. Some people, doubtless, thought him unduly im- 
 petuous, but he was physically, morally, and mentally to those under him 
 the model of a chivalrous, fearless gentleman and thorough soldier." 
 
 f Why Wadsworth's rejected carriages should have been selected for these 
 important experiments with the new field-gun is not known. The fact that 
 they were so used is established. After that officer had left the army, it is 
 possible, and altogether probable, that his note of warning concerning the 
 superiority of the English carriage, on which his was modeled, began more 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 243 
 
 cumstances which destroyed all confidence in them and their sys- 
 tem, and the attention of the department was at once drawn to 
 the fac~l that a new one, for the field artillery at least, was abso- 
 lutely necessary. 
 
 Without any accepted pattern of field-piece, and with the at- 
 tention of the department divided- between the Gribeauval going 
 out and the stock-trail system coming in, it is not to be wondered 
 at that Secretary Cass should have reported, in 1831, that the ma- 
 te"riel of the artillery was in an unsettled state. He also an- 
 nounced that a board would be appointed to examine into the 
 matter and definitely settle upon some permanent system. Ac- 
 cordingly, by Order No. 74, Headquarters of the Army, Decem- 
 ber 24th, 1831, instructions from the War Department, dated De- 
 cember 8th, 1831, were promulgated, instituting a board, consisting 
 of Generals Macomb commanding the army, and Scott commanding 
 the eastern department, Inspector-General Wool, Colonel Eustis 
 commandant of the artillery school of practice, and Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Bomford on ordnance duty, "to take into consideration 
 the establishing of a uniform system of operations in the ord- 
 nance department, both as regards the models and patterns of 
 arms, carriages, and equipments of every species, as well as 
 all kinds of supplies furnished by that department." It was 
 further directed to report, for the examination and decision 
 of the War Department, such a system for the government of 
 the ordnance department as should appear proper and neces- 
 sary. This board first met March 28th, 1832, when Colonel 
 
 and more to attract the attention of those who had been his colaborers, and 
 who had remained in the artillery service. The desire would naturally arise 
 to give the carriage a fair trial, that its merits, if any it had, might be found 
 out. Had this been the reasoning of those having such matters in charge, the 
 result would have been just what happened the occasion for more severely 
 testing the new guns was seized on as a proper one for similar experiments 
 with the carriage. As, however, the guns failed so signally, (being only 
 rivaled in this respect by the "conversion system" of 1881,) the carriage, 
 with the pieces, seems to have been permanently relegated to the obscurity 
 whence it had, for a temporary purpose, emerged. There was no further 
 opportunity given to test the Wadsworth, as, before another pattern of field- 
 gun was decided on, the Government was actively engaged in constructing the 
 latest model of stock-trail carriage, of which Wadsworth's was at best but an 
 inferior copy, made before the original of the system had been brought to its 
 present state of perfection. 
 
244 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Gratiot, of the engineers, relieved Scott, and the labors, which, 
 after many mutations of the personnel caused by changes in the 
 boards which one after another took up the work, here given the 
 original in charge were finally to result in giving a definite 
 system of artillery to the United States army. The Macomb, 
 officially designated the ' ' ordnance board, ' ' continued in exist- 
 ence until June 22d, 1837, when the duties of its members, con- 
 sequent upon the Florida war, being such as to prevent their 
 giving that attention to the subjects intrusted to it which their 
 importance demanded, another board was convened to take up 
 the duties of the former. The relieving board was assembled 
 pursuant to General Orders No. 41, Headquarters of the Army, 
 agreeably to instructions from the War Department of June 2ist, 
 1837, and was composed of Brevet Brigadier-General Eustis, 
 president ; Colonel Cutler of the infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Crane of the artillery, Major Craig and Captain Baker of the 
 ordnance, members ; Captain A. Mordecai, ordnance, secretary. 
 By Special Orders No. 45, June 26th, 1837, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Talcott, ordnance, relieved Major Craig; and on July 4th follow- 
 ing, the board met at West Point, and proceeded to take up the 
 thread of the armament investigation where it had been left off by 
 its predecessor. The same causes, however, which had rendered 
 a dissolution of the original board advisable now operated to pre- 
 vent the reassembling of its successor, thus seemingly, but not in 
 fact, retaining matters relating to the procurement of an efficient 
 artillery materiel in statu quo. But this was not true. On the 
 contrary, some of the most important measures looking to the 
 solution of the armament problem, and which had been inaugu- 
 rated by the Macomb board, were being successfully prosecuted, 
 and had led to the procurement of a large amount of materiel, with 
 more in process of manufacture. ' The results of this labor were 
 placed at the disposition of a board convened by General Orders 
 No. 20, Adjutant-General's Office, July 2d, 1838, and used by it 
 to definitely settle upon a system of field, seige and garrison, and 
 sea-coast artillery, which was approved by the Secretary of War, 
 as announced officially to the army in 1839. The board of 1838 
 was composed originally of Colonel Fenwick and Captain Erving, 
 of the artillery ; Lieutenant-Colonel Talcott and Captains Baker 
 and Mordecai, of the ordnance. The unique spectacle was pre- 
 sented of a civilian Paymaster-General Towson sitting, at the 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 245 
 
 special request of the Secretary of War, as an honorary member 
 of this military board, and partaking of its deliberations. When 
 the question of the sea-coast armament was being determined on, 
 Colonel Totten, the chief of engineers, was, by Special Orders 
 No. 93, Adjutant- General's Office, December 24th, 1838, also 
 added to the board. 
 
 In the meantime the board appointed by Order No. 50, Adjutant- 
 General's Office, August 24th, 1835, which was practically, though 
 not altogether in personnel, a branch of the Macomb board 
 and acted the part of a committee of the latter, had, in pursuance 
 of the general plan, made its important contribution to the stock 
 of information being acquired in the line of field artillery. The 
 members were Inspector- General Wool, Colonels Gratiot and 
 Eustis, all of the "ordnance board," with Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Talcott, Major Worth, and Captain Mordecai, of the ordnance. 
 By Special Orders No. 63, Adjutant-General's Office, September 
 1 2th, 1835, Captain Huger, ordnance, was appointed an addi- 
 tional member of the board, with the proceedings of which, be- 
 cause of some difficulty regarding relative rank, Major Worth 
 refused to have anything to do. The board was instructed to 
 examine into, prove, and report upon the merits of new field-guns, 
 carriages, harness, and equipments which had been manufactured 
 in pursuance of the resolutions of the ordnance board, of which 
 General Macomb was president. Its proceedings, therefore, were 
 in strict conformity with the general plan of operations mapped 
 out by the latter at its first session, and they form a most important 
 link in that unbroken chain which connects the labors of the ord- 
 nance board of 1831 with those of its successors of 1837 and 
 1838, and which, the succeeding year, resulted in the adoption 
 of those calibres of ordnance, the models of their carriage and 
 equipments, which constituted the main features of a new and 
 improved system of artillery. 
 
 Much had been done, but the work was not complete ; a mass 
 of valuable data was collected in these years of research and ex- 
 periment, which had either to be systematically arranged and 
 published, or lost to the public service ; besides, the question of a 
 proper metal for field-guns was still undecided ; in a word, the 
 task of naturally and methodically putting in order the accumu- 
 lated materials brought together through the intelligent labors of 
 so many boards, all directed to the same end, had yet to be per- 
 
246 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 formed. The particulars as to metals, models, and dimensions 
 of the adopted ordnance, to a considerable extent, remained to be 
 determined. 
 
 It was now that Secretary Poinsett, placing before it all informa- 
 tion thus far acquired, devolved on a committee of ordnance 
 officers the onerous duty of putting the last hand to the work 
 begun by the ordnance board of 1831. This committee, consist- 
 ing of Lieutenant-Colonel Talcott, Major Baker, Captains Mor- 
 decai and Huger, was appointed, April i6th, 1839, for the pur- 
 pose, as announced ~ by the Secretary of War in his letter of 
 instruction, ' ' of devising and arranging a uniform system of 
 artillery and other supplies of every kind furnished for the mili- 
 tary service by the ordnance department." The result, as im- 
 mediately affecting the artillery, was the gradual perfecting, and 
 ten years afterwards the adoption, of a uniform system of materiel, 
 the most minute particulars of which were carefully worked out, 
 and which in its leading features has remained to this day essen- 
 tially unchanged. 
 
 The labors of this committee were but a continuation of those 
 of its immediate predecessors, the ordnance boards of 1831, 1835, 
 1837, and 1838. Each acted its part for the attainment of the 
 grand object kept steadily in view. Without the contribution of 
 each, the result would have stopped short of success ; the con- 
 nected efforts of all produced the perfect system. 
 
 Upon the ordnance department was placed the responsible duty 
 of digesting, reducing to method, and publishing to the world 
 the outcome of the ten years' investigations of the mixed boards, 
 supplemented by much valuable information acquired through a 
 commission of its own officers sent to Europe, and the original 
 researches of the ordnance committee. This committee per- 
 formed well the part allotted it by the Secretary of War ; but, 
 while conferring this, its just meed of praise, it will not be lost 
 sight of that it had, as a foundation on which to base its inquiries, 
 the accumulated knowledge resulting from the efforts of many 
 hard-working, conscientious, and intelligent boards of officers, 
 without which the triumph which crowned its protracted labors 
 would have been much more difficult of accomplishment and 
 much less complete. 
 
 The calibres and natures of the standard ordnance, the system 
 of carriages and their equipments, the nomenclature of every part, 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 247 
 
 with the principles to be observed in preparing the whole for 
 active service, were definitively settled upon before the appoint- 
 ment of the ordnance committee of 1839, nor were they afterwards 
 modified in any essential particular. The efforts of that com- 
 mittee were directed, not to tearing down what others with so 
 much laborious care had built up, but rather, by rounding ojfif 
 angles and filling in vacant places, adding not so much strength 
 as beauty and symmetry to the structure, the frame-work of which 
 had been placed, already joined together, in its hands. 
 
 Notwithstanding the very generally-conceded superiority of the 
 stock-trail, it did not formally and entirely supersede the Gri- 
 beauval for several years after its first introduction into the service. 
 It was no doubt deemed unprofessional to discard an old, faithful, 
 and valued servant for one comparatively unknown, and of the 
 merits of which, from personal experience, we knew nothing. 
 Such seemed to be the view of the ordnance board of 1831; and 
 one of the first questions to the determinate settlement of which 
 it addressed itself was that of the relative merits of these two 
 systems of carriages. Among other resolutions adopted by the 
 board at its first meeting, were the following : " * * * 
 3. That the chief of ordnance be required to procure from Europe 
 the best models of French and English * * * artillery, * * * 
 including guns and carriages of field-artillery, and models of sea- 
 coast and garrison guns and mortars, with their carriages, for the 
 use of the board. * * * 5. That a committee of the board 
 be appointed to consider the proper calibres and models for guns 
 and carriages of field artillery, the materials of which they should 
 be made, to report its opinion on the subject, and prepare a plan 
 for carrying its views into effect. ' ' 
 
 The next day it resolved : " i. That the Secretary of War be 
 requested to send to Europe one or more officers of the army for 
 the purpose of carrying into execution the third resolution of yester- 
 day." This being approved by Secretary Cass, Inspector-.General 
 Wool, a member of the board, and of course conversant with its 
 views, was dispatched to Europe with the necessary funds and 
 instructions to purchase one English 6-pounderand one 4-pounder, 
 one i2-pounder, and one 5^ -inch howitzer of the French system, 
 with their carriages, caissons, and equipments complete ; also 
 models of the French siege and sea-coast mortars, with their beds, 
 and drawings of the rest of both the English and French systems of 
 
248 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 artillery. The inspector-general started on his mission with alac- 
 rity, and no doubt, as a matter of personal gratification, it was 
 eminently successful ; but, so far as the objects of the ordnance 
 board and the interests of the Government were concerned, it was 
 devoid of any useful results. He brought back eight swords and 
 belts ! 
 
 The committee appointed under the fifth resolution of the board 
 before mentioned was composed of Colonel Eustis and Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Bomford. They were met at the threshold of their in- 
 vestigations by an absence of proper facilities for conducting the 
 experiments which that resolution necessitated being made. This 
 fact was reported to the board by the committee in February, 
 1834, accompanied by a request to be furnished with the neces- 
 sary ordnance, mounted in equal proportions on the Gribeauval 
 and on the stock-trail style of carriages, to enable the committee 
 to execute the duty devolving upon it. The request received the 
 approval of the Secretary of War, and measures were taken to 
 have the iron guns and the stock-trail carriages procured, but it 
 was not given to the committee to pursue the investigations; this 
 duty was devolved on the ordnance board of 1835, before men- 
 tioned, and which met for the first time September, 1835, at 
 Watervliet arsenal. The Gribeauval carriage was not experi- 
 mented with, as it was doubtless considered that nothing which 
 was not well known could be developed concerning it ; but the 
 stock-trail carriages were day after day put to the severest tests 
 possible with the ample facilities placed at the disposition of the 
 board, which, September 22d following 
 
 "Resolved, That the system of carriages for field artillery, recently adopted 
 after much trial and minute investigation by the Government of France, is the 
 best hitherto devised for the service of the United States, and that it ought to 
 be received, with no further alterations than may be found necessary for the 
 adoption of the respective carriages to our guns and roads." 
 
 Before the board adjourned, September 26th, following, similar 
 resolutions were passed concerning all carriages appertaining to the 
 field-train of the French system. After the usual number of refer- 
 ences from one department to another, this report was approved 
 by Secretary Cass July 8th, 1836, who directed that the money 
 appropriated for the purpose by Congress at its last session should 
 be expended in carrying into execution the measures proposed in 
 the resolutions of the board. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 249 
 
 We are not, therefore, left in doubt as to the date at which, or 
 the circumstances under which, the stock-trail system of car- 
 riages was adopted into our service. Its position has never been 
 questioned since. Time has served to only more fully develop 
 its merits, and while alterations in a few of the details of construc- 
 tion have been made, the underlying principles have remained 
 unchanged ; the system itself, taken as a whole, seems incapable 
 of improvement. The harness and all equipments making up the 
 complete French materiel were adopted at the same time, with 
 but slight and generally unimportant modifications. 
 
 Recent attempts at improvement have been directed, not at the 
 system on which they are constructed, but towards the securing a 
 better material for the carriages, limbers, caissons, and wagons, 
 replacing the wooden frame by combinations of wood, steel, and 
 iron, each placed so as most advantageously to perform the work 
 thrown upon it. 
 
 Attention began to be directed to the subject of metallic car- 
 riages soon after the Civil war. At that time wrought-iron was 
 the only metal thought of. The advantages which it was sup- 
 posed would result from the change were I. Lightness and 
 cheapness. 2. By placing the pintle two feet in rear of the limber 
 axle-tree the trail of the gun-carriage would act as a counterpoise, 
 relieving the wheel horses of the weight of the pole. 3. By 
 bringing the trunnion-beds nearer the axle-tree the liability of the 
 carriage to overturn while traveling would be diminished. 4. By 
 allowing no part of the limbered carriage to project below the 
 plane of the axle-trees the breaking of implements in passing 
 over stumps, stones, and other obstacles would be prevented. 
 5. A more convenient method of carrying rammers and the trail 
 handspike would be secured. 6. By placing thimbles in the trun- 
 nion holes for the larger, when the smaller calibred guns were 
 being used, one carriage would be made to suffice for all calibres 
 of field guns. 
 
 A few wrought-iron carriages were made and issued to the 
 artillery for trial, but they were heavier than was necessary, of 
 rough construction, and were pronounced unsatisfactory. It 
 would seem, however, that they were not intended to exhibit what 
 the department could do, but were made for preliminary tests 
 merely, and to indicate in what line of investigation the carriage 
 of the future would be found. Strong and not very clumsy can- 
 32 
 
25O HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 noneer seats were placed between the wheel and the gun ; but its 
 excessive weight, and an awkward angle to the trail, which caused 
 undue labor in limbering and unlimbering, with other defects, 
 caused the carriage to be rejected as inferior to that already in 
 use ; and, as there was a large stock of wooden carriages on 
 hand, the subject of metallic ones dropped out of sight, while the 
 inventive and mechanical ingenuity of the country was taxed to 
 the limit in endeavors to devise a heavy armament equal to the 
 necessities of the nation, and has but recently come up again for 
 serious consideration. 
 
 Steel has invaded this as it has all other fields of improvement in 
 modern ordnance. In the more recent constructions the prominent 
 features consist of (i) a trail formed of steel flasks, strengthened 
 by flanges and bolted together; (2) steel axle-tree, so strengthened 
 by steel plates as to resist shock of discharge ; (3) wheel with 
 wooden spokes and fellies, steel tire, and brass boxes ; (4) a 
 brake for changing the wheels from rolling to sliding friction ; 
 (5) a tool-box placed in rear of the elevating screw between the 
 trail flasks. The last was one of the devices which characterized 
 the Wadsworth carriage of 1818. The flasks are assembled very 
 much as in the old bracket-trail, but the principles on which the 
 carriage is constructed are strictly those of the stock-trail system. 
 
 A new departure has been taken recently in regard to the 
 method of eliciting information on artillery subjects, which bids 
 fair to lead to the better construction of carriages as well as of 
 other field artillery materiel. Pursuant to General Orders No. 39, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1881, a board of artillery 
 officers was convened to consider recent changes in guns, harness, 
 and equipments for field batteries, and to recommend any devi- 
 ations from existing methods which to their experience and judg- 
 ment seemed fit. The recommendations of the board were in the 
 direction which has been marked out as that taken with reference to 
 gun-carriages, but they embraced, besides, changes in the caissons, 
 battery-wagons, and forges, for not only field but magazine guns, 
 and were, for the former, in substance as follows : i. All wheels 
 to have eight fellies, sixteen spokes, and to be interchangeable 
 throughout the field-gun system. 2. Gun-carriages (a) to be of 
 steel in two parts; that on which the gun rests to have a small 
 movement, independent of the other, cheeked by an elastic buffer, 
 and by which means the shock received by the trunnions may be 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 251 
 
 progressively and with diminished force transmitted to the second 
 part ; () two axle-seats between the gun and wheels, so can- 
 noneers face towards the muzzle ; (V) brake to be operated if on 
 the march by cannoneers on axle-seats ; (d) cheeks and elevating 
 apparatus to admit of curved fire with reduced charges; the angle 
 of depression to be six degrees; (<?) single elevating screw, with 
 slot and side-screw, to prevent its running down when gun is fired; 
 (/) trail handspike of hollow metal to fold back securely on stock ; 
 (g) trail-box for implements between cheeks. 3. Limber: (a) 
 pole of wood; (<5) frame-work, steel or iron; (c] limber-chest of 
 steel, projectiles placed horizontally therein, cartridges in water- 
 proof apartments above projectiles; two drawers, one exclusively 
 for implements, the other for friction primers; the back to let 
 down to horizontal position by means of hinges at the bottom, 
 exposing rear of chest ; (d} canvas boot in front of limber-chest 
 for men's knapsacks; (e) pintle to project in rear of chest, securing 
 longer lever-arm for the weight acling as counterpoise to pole, 
 which, unless rendered absolutely necessary by other details of con- 
 struction, should not bring more than eight pounds pressure on the 
 neck of each wheel horse. 4. Caisson : (a) limber similar to and 
 interchangeable with that of piece; ($) frame of caisson body to be 
 of iron or steel; (c) one steel chest, lid movable, projectiles placed 
 therein on end, cartridges in trays above projectiles, the chest so 
 placed as to serve as counterpoise to pole; (d) common lever 
 brake. 5. Battery wagon: (a) framework, iron x)r steel; () box, 
 iron or steel, rectangular in shape, longitudinal strip along roof, to 
 which two sloping lids can be hinged. 6. Forge: (a) frame -work 
 and box-like battery wagon, with drawers for the safe and con- 
 venient transport of stores and tools. 7. Wagon for ammunition 
 columns: (a] this to be of easy draught, good capacity, for trans- 
 portation of spare ammunition; ($) have a wooden instead of a 
 canvas cover; (V) carry two spare wheels for field-artillery car- 
 riages. 8. Carriages for machine guns: (a) to be of steel, similar 
 in construction to field gun-carriage ; (&) axle-tree ammunition- 
 boxes' to 'hinge so as to fold to front if necessary ; (c) no style of 
 caisson, properly so called, recommended, there being probably 
 better arrangements for meeting the same end; (af) forge and bat- 
 tery wagon similar to those for field-artillery train; (e) steel two- 
 wheeled cart for ammunition of 45-calibre Catling gun, short. 
 Field-gun carriages must fulfill two conditions, which are incom- 
 
252 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 patible, and their construction in the most approved form will be 
 a compromise: First, they must be light; second, their recoil must 
 not be excessive. As the shock producing recoil is expended 
 principally in communicating motion to the carriage, it is evident, 
 if condition second is to be insisted upon, that condition first cannot 
 be, and vice versa. With the large charges and heavy projectiles 
 of the present field artillery, the problem of how best to adjust 
 the opposing conditions becomes the more difficult.* The result 
 has been that, contrary to what at the first blush might seem 
 possible, and what was expected, the field gun-carriage has not 
 been diminished in weight to any extent, whatever other advan- 
 tages may be claimed for the metallic construction. 
 
 The appointment of the light artillery board of 1881 was a move 
 in the right direction. Under the present imperfect system offi- 
 cers of the ordnance department cannot acquire experience with 
 their own handicraft; that, so far as artillery materiel is concerned, 
 is reserved for artillery officers alone. In the United States two 
 separate departments are the custodians of a knowledge which, 
 in the first armies of the world, is entrusted to a single, and, 
 therefore, a much more perfectly equipped artillery service than 
 our double one is or may hope to be. 
 
 The deliberations of the board covered as completely as it was 
 practicable for them to do the matters referred to it, and in its 
 recommendations it traversed the whole subject of light artillery 
 materiel. But,, because of our dual artillery organization one 
 part for constructing things, the other part for using them it is 
 impossible for the board to see its recommendations followed out 
 to their legitimate consequences, except through the agency, and 
 perhaps the interference, of a distinct bureau. It is understood, 
 however, that in the matter of carriages and caissons its recom- 
 mendations are being favorably acted upon ; their manufacture has 
 been begun. Referring to this board and its work, in his annual 
 report of 1882, the chief of ordnance remarks: 
 
 " The action of such a board I deemed of the first importance, as little had 
 been done in that direction for some years. The board made a preliminary re- 
 port to enable this department to manufacture samples of carriages, harness, 
 
 * Recent experiments with the spring recoil check indicate that, as at present 
 applied, it will be impracticable elsewhere than on the proving ground and 
 with guns of position. A lock which requires the gun-carriage to be halted 
 and backed at the foot of a declivity is worthless for service purposes. 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 253 
 
 &c., embodying its views, so as to present to a subsequent board the articles or 
 improvements recommended, that action might be taken on practical results. 
 The preparation of a metal field-carriage, limber, and caisson has been greatly 
 delayed by the difficulty of procuring suitable material in proper shapes, but 
 it is confidently believed that we will be ready for the action of an artillery 
 board at an early day." 
 
 We may hope, therefore, that the labors of this board will yet 
 be productive of good, by stamping on the field artillery materiel 
 the impress of a certain knowledge only to be derived from offi- 
 cers of practical experience. If so, this may be the precursor of 
 an era marked by a closer relationship between two departments 
 which, when a proper organization becomes the order of the day, 
 will become one; but until that time arrives, and while an un- 
 natural divorce renders them independent of, yet dependent on, 
 each other, it is of the utmost importance, though working sepa- 
 rately, that they should be directed, not only in their aims, but in 
 their methods, towards a common purpose an increased efficiency 
 of the public service. 
 
 SIEGE, GARRISON, AND SEA-COAST CARRIAGES. 
 
 The same general principles which have governed with the 
 field have been observed in the construction of siege and garrison 
 carriages. In early days the heavier were denominated "trav- 
 eling," in contradistinction to the "light field" carriages which 
 were to manoeuvre with troops on the field of battle. The former 
 term was not, however, applied to the carriages of any particular 
 calibres, as there were both light and heavy guns for every cali- 
 bre in the service, the latter being used in siege or garrison, or 
 forming, on the line of battle, guns of position. Traveling car- 
 riages were used to transport every species of heavy gun, and 
 therefore were as necessary with the heavy 6-pounder as with the 
 heavy 24-pounder. 
 
 The systems of siege and garrison carriages have conformed 
 to those of the field service. First came the bracket-trail; then 
 the Gribeauval; finally the stock-trail; but the fact that equal 
 mobility cannot be attained with siege and garrison as with the 
 field-carriage has modified the construction of the former. For 
 instance, ammunition-boxes have never formed a feature of the 
 heavier carriages ammunition, as well as implements and tools, 
 being transported in wagons, and when taking the road, the 
 
254 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 pieces are now shifted from their firing to what in effect is the 
 Gribeauval traveling trunnion-beds. Nor have they, until 
 quite recently, been made of any other material than wood; 
 but, following as usual the lead of the field, a few of the siege 
 gun-carriages have of late been made of various kinds of metal; 
 and it has been announced that metallic constructions will in the 
 near future replace entirely those heretofore in vogue. 
 
 It was not until after 1800 that a gun heavier than the 32- 
 pounder was mounted in the sea-coast defenses. The carriages 
 for these guns were, as a rule, wooden frames, mounted on four 
 heavy wheels, although there were also in vogue those made up 
 of two parts a chassis and an upper carriage; the former, fastened 
 to a front pintle, and supported in rear on wheels, was capable of 
 being traversed, as in the barbette carriage of the present, through 
 an angle approximating 180 degrees. 
 
 Except slight attempts at improvements, there was no change 
 made in these carriages the only iron work in which appeared to 
 be bolts and traverse- wheels until Wads worth, in 1818, projected 
 his system of artillery. In this, cast-iron was contemplated for 
 all carriages to be used in the sea-coast defenses; and in this one 
 respect, as the views of his antagonist, the ordnance board, coin- 
 cided with his own, the measure was adopted. Cast-iron sea- 
 coast carriages, to replace those of wood, began to be extensively 
 made. The former were at the time in favor abroad, and the ex- 
 periments of the ordnance board were considered to have demon- 
 strated their general superiority. They cost less and lasted longer 
 than the wooden carriages; in fact were as indestructible as the 
 guns themselves. From 1819 to 1839 they continued to be man- 
 ufactured, the appropriations for the armament of fortifications 
 at times being almost entirely used in their purchase. 
 
 With more extended experience, however, their superiority 
 was brought in question; and among other matters referred to 
 the Macomb board, was the determination of the relative merits 
 of these two rival systems of heavy gun-carriages. That board 
 did not make a report on the subject, which was then referred to 
 its successor the board of 1838. In its final report of January, 
 1839, the latter embodied a resolution condemning cast-iron for 
 gun-carriages a.s being for this purpose inferior to wood, neither 
 was it suited for general use. It recommended that no more be 
 purchased, but that the cast-iron carriages on hand be distributed 
 
MATERIEL: CARRIAGES. 255 
 
 for service, and that transoms of this metal be no longer pro- 
 cured for casemate or barbette carriages, until by proper trials the 
 relative cost and efficiency of the iron and wooden transoms be 
 certainly known. These recommendations having been approved 
 by the Secretary of War, cast-iron carriages, except to use up the 
 stock on hand, may from that time be said to have become a thing 
 of the past. After a trial of twenty years, resort was had again to 
 wood, which remained for fifteen years longer the favorite material 
 for all classes of fixed carriages. 
 
 Meanwhile in Europe wrought-iron was forcing its way to the 
 front. Officers who had inspected foreign armaments reported 
 that for sea-coast carriages this metal was superior to any other. 
 The matter was brought formally before the ordnance board by let- 
 ter of September I2th, 1856. Drawings of some of the European 
 patterns had been procured by the commission of 1855, an d the 
 board recommended that wrought iron be tried for carriages, both 
 barbette and casemate. Finally, in April, 1859, it recommended 
 their definitive adoption one style each for the lo-inch and 8-inch 
 Columbiads, en barbette; one for 42-pounder and 32-pounder, en 
 barbette; one for the 24-pounder and smaller calibres, en barbette; 
 one for 8-inch Columbiad and 42-pounder casemate; one for 32- 
 pounder and 24-pounder casemate, altogether six different kinds. 
 When guns of different calibres were used on the same carriage, 
 trunnion-plates to fit the smaller were to be adjusted to the perma- 
 nent trunnion-beds of the larger calibres. 
 
 The wisdom of changing to wrought-iron has been vindicated. 
 In the United States it is to-day the sole material used for sea-coast 
 carriages. Its superiority over all others and its adaptability to 
 the object in view has been more completely demonstrated by 
 time and experience; and though in some styles of German coast- 
 carriages the upper part, which works on the chassis, is made of 
 cast-iron, it is exceptional the use of wrought-iron for this pur- 
 pose being almost universal, not only at home, but abroad. 
 
 The material for construction having been definitively settled, 
 the remaining problems connected with the securing a suitable 
 heavy gun-carriage were first, to take up the recoil; second, to 
 depress the gun en barbette behind the parapet after being fired, 
 and while being loaded; third, to manoeuvre the carriages by 
 mechanical means alone, thereby economizing the labor of 
 cannoneers. 
 
256 HISTORICAL SKETCH Of THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 The first has been very happily solved by the use either of the 
 English hydraulic or the American pneumatic buffers, which not 
 only take up recoil, but relieve both carriages and platforms from 
 danger of being broken to pieces by the shocks to which they 
 are subjected. 
 
 The solution of the other problems has not been so satis- 
 factory. Several models of depressing carriages have been pro- 
 posed, and Major King's has been experimented with. The results 
 were favorable, but the carriage is apparently complicated, and 
 for twelve years it has not been heard of among the measures 
 brought forth to improve the sea-coast armament. For sim- 
 plicity, an elegant adjustment of parts, and an exact compliance 
 with mechanical principles, Lieutenant-Colonel Buffington's model 
 leads the others ; but, so far as is known, no carriage of his design 
 has been constructed and practically tested. Until that be done, 
 the question of its merits will remain a matter of speculation. 
 
 The manoeuvring of carnages by mechanical appliances is a 
 problem as far from solution as the other. While abroad the aid 
 of the steam-engine has been successfully brought to bear, the 
 sole attempt in that direction in this country is Benton's apparatus, 
 consisting of ropes and a windlass, by which means the piece is 
 run from and into the battery, traversed to the right or left, the 
 muzzle raised or depressed. To a limited extent, and under favor- 
 able circumstances, it has been tried, and found to work well. 
 
 The buffers serve their important office without in any degree 
 complicating the machinery to be manoeuvred. This is not true 
 of either the depressing or the manoeuvring apparatus. Each of 
 the latter, as experimented with in the land service, is complex, 
 making the result of accidents a more serious matter than with 
 the simpler machine it is intended to supersede. Moreover, 
 the advantages to be derived from either depressing carriages or 
 manoeuvring appliances are, it is believed, generally overestimated. 
 The increased immunity from danger is questionable. The whole 
 matter seems for the present to be held in abeyance. Questions 
 concerning the carriage are overshadowed and lost sight of in 
 presence of more important problems affecting the gun it is 
 intended to carry. 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 257 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 MATERIEL: METAL. 
 
 From 1775 down to the close of the eighteenth century brass 
 was, in the American service, the metal almost exclusively used 
 for ordnance, the largest calibre (the 32-pounder) alone being 
 always made of cast-iron. Though more expensive than iron, 
 there was not the same danger from the guns bursting ; besides, 
 brass guns were at that time more generally used abroad, which 
 naturally caused them to be looked on with favor in the colonies. 
 This is evinced in the resolutions of Congress instructing its can- 
 non committee to procure certain calibres of guns; as, for instance, 
 August 2ist, 1776, that committee was ordered to purchase six 
 6-pounders, six i2-pounders, four 8-inch and four 6-inch how- 
 itzers, and six Coehorn mortars, preferably of brass; but if that 
 were impracticable, then of iron. The igth of the following No- 
 vember, on General Washington-' s recommendation, Congress 
 directed that there should be procured for the field service of the 
 United States one hundred 3-pounders, fifty 6-pounders, thirteen 
 i8-pounders, and thirteen 24-pounders, all of brass. These 
 instances, from among many that might be cited, are mentioned 
 to show that brass was the favorite metal, iron being resorted to 
 only when the other was not to be obtained. 
 
 Some of this ordnance was manufactured in the United States, 
 some in France. Castings of this nature began to be made in 
 the colonies before the war; and, from evidence elicited by the 
 Duke of Richmond, November loth, 1775, it appears that large 
 quantities of both brass and iron cannon were at that time being 
 turned out by the foundries of Philadelphia. 
 
 The brass was substantially what was afterwards, and is now, 
 known as bronze. Muller called the alloy gun metal, also brass, 
 and stated that its constituents were copper and tin. In Martil- 
 lier's " Observations on Casting," published in 1790, and quoted 
 by Tousard, the mixing of a little zinc with the copper and tin 
 was recommended, in proportions depending upon the nature of 
 the gun, and with the object of increasing the endurance of the 
 33 
 
25& HISTORICAL SKfifCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 resulting alloy. The brass gun metal of Woolwich at that time 
 was made of sixty-eight parts copper, fifty-two parts brass, and 
 twelve parts tin. Stevens gave as the mixture of different metals : 
 for 4,200 pounds, 3,68yff copper, 204!! brass, and 307!! tin. 
 
 Some of the bids for supplying ordnance that have been pre- 
 served prove that at this time copper and tin alone were the con- 
 stituents of the gun metal, the founders covenanting that none 
 others should enter into the products of their manufactories.* It 
 appears, also, from various sources, that this continued until after 
 1800, when Secretary Dearborn began to have extensive experi- 
 ments made to test the suitableness of cast-iron for the construc- 
 tion of field guns, as for some time it had been exclusively used in 
 the construction of heavy ordnance. 
 
 In the United States, as in Europe, the cheapness of cast-iron 
 ordnance, as compared with brass, had caused the former to be 
 looked on with favor, which was only counter-balanced by the 
 supposed superiority of the latter. During the Revolution there 
 was neither time nor opportunity to test the question here raised; 
 but when peace was restored, the attention of founders began to be 
 directed to cast-iron as the metal from which the heavier natures 
 could be not only more cheaply but more serviceably made. We 
 find, therefore, that the commissioner of revenue, in all contracts 
 
 *In a bill rendered to the Government by Daniel Foy, superintendent of 
 ordnance, Philadelphia, 1*778, are the following items and memorandum : "For 
 making alterations, improvements, and proving cannon, as per orders of cannon 
 committee of Congress, f> , viz.: (1) Boring and proving new brass 3, 6, 
 
 and 12-pounderedguns, 5j-inch and 8-inch howitzers, $ . (2) Boring out 
 
 Hessian 3-pounders to 6-pounders, $ . (3) Drawing draughts and alter- 
 
 ing plan of brass ordnance, which were much approved of, $ . (4) To 
 
 drawing draughts and calculating proportions of wrought-iron cannon, from 
 3 to 12-pounders, $ 
 
 a N. B. Not one of Mr. Bird's cannon that were made before I got the plan 
 altered stood the proof, nor was any of the brass ordnance sound until my 
 advice was taken." 
 
 The field commissary issued this new ordnance to the artillery at White 
 Plains in the fall of the same year. It may be interesting to know what was 
 considered a full equipment for a brass 6-pounder, on this occasion : Ready 
 shot, 80 ; grape, 70 ; case-shot, 35 ; tubes, 35 ; tube-boxes, 3 ; sponges and 
 rammers, 2 ; coils, slow-match, 6 ; portfires, 24 ; portfire stocks, 2 ; lint stocks, 
 2 ; hammers, 4 ; pairs pincers, 4 ; priming wires, 6 ; gimlets, 2 ; sets drag 
 ropes, 4 ; gunners' belts, 2 ; sheepskins, 2 ; sponge tacks, 20 ; powder-horns, 3 ; 
 budge barrel, 1 ; wagon with gears, 1. 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 259 
 
 for supplying the first heavy ordnance, which under the consti- 
 tutional government Congress authorized for a sea-coast arma- 
 ment, stipulated cast-iron as the metal of which these 32-pounder 
 and 24-pounder guns should be constructed; 12-pounders and 18- 
 pounders were also included in the list, and from this time on a 
 bold effort was made to push cast-iron to the front. But the little 
 encouragement given to founders by the Government, as well as" 
 lack of skill on the part of the artisans, for some time delayed 
 the success of the scheme, and brass held its own in public favor 
 against the constantly increasing strength of its rival until about 
 the year 1800.* 
 
 The career of the coming metal was not without reverses. In 
 a report to Congress, December i2th, 1795, on the measures 
 which had been taken to replenish the magazines with military 
 stores, Secretary of War Pickering remarked : 
 
 " The casting of cannon has not been attended hitherto with the expected 
 success. The foundries, which formerly succeeded very well in the casting of 
 small guns, were not well adapted to the casting of 24 and 32-pounders. A 
 French gentleman, of some knowledge and experience in cannon foundries, has 
 
 *In 1793 Secretary Knox reported that at Springfield, Massachusetts, there 
 were being cast thirty brass guns and twenty howitzers. This was the Gov- 
 ernment foundry; and however trustworthy the products of private establish- 
 ments were, it would seem from the following extract from the New York State 
 "arms commissioner's" report (1795) that those cast at Springfield were not to 
 be depended on implicitly : " The field pieces to be cast by Mr. Byers were to 
 be proved as were those made for the United States. On September 3d, 1794, 
 the deputy commissary of military stores at Springfield certified that he had 
 proved twelve 3-pounders, and October 22d, 1794, eight 3-pounders and four 
 6-pounders, all of brass. Nevertheless, certain persons deemed it expedient to 
 further prove the pieces before mounting them on carriages. Of twenty-three 
 thus proved thirteen burst. Another 6-pounder, proved in presence of the 
 maker, the commissioner, General Lamb, Colonel Stevens, and Colonel Beau- 
 man, burst also. The pieces were then recast into fourteen guns, (the number 
 burst,) all of which, except one, stood the test at Springfield." 
 
 Some attempts were made to make wrought-iron guns during the Revolution, 
 the principal manufacturer being Mr. Samuel Wheeler, of Philadelphia. The 
 congressional cannon committee ordered several to be purchased, and Tousard 
 says that one of them, with the artillery at Brandywine, gave very satisfactory 
 practice, but it was captured by the enemy. Due to difficulties of welding, 
 perhaps, but certainly to some cause, this metal was not used to any extent, 
 though Tousard favored giving it an exhaustive trial. From the Revolution 
 down to the time when the Macomb board commenced to experiment with 
 various gun metals, wrought-iron dropped completely out of sight. 
 
260 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 lately been employed to amend the process of casting and to improve the ma- 
 chinery for boring ; but in an undertaking so important, and at the same time 
 so expensive, it was desirable to obtain a complete cannon founder. Measures 
 have accordingly been taken to procure one from the first foundries of Europe." 
 
 We may infer, however, that the evil was not at once remedied, 
 for Secretary McHenry, in 1798, when war with France seemed 
 to be a foregone conclusion, expressed himself on the same sub- 
 ject in a clear and forcible manner. (See page 163, ante.) 
 
 The reasoning of the Secretary appealed so favorably to the 
 sense of the Legislature that an inspector of artillery was at once 
 authorized, whom Mr. McHenry immediately set to work super- 
 intending the construction and proof of cast-iron field-guns. The 
 results were encouraging; and upon Secretary Dearborn entering 
 the war office, he proceeded to follow up energetically the path thus 
 marked out, and which gave so much hope of leading to important 
 practical results. He at once stopped the casting of brass guns, 
 and directed that no more should be manufactured until either the 
 practicability or the reverse of the successful casting of iron field- 
 guns was demonstrated. It was at this time (1801) that cast-iron 
 for field artillery supplanted brass. Great deliberation was used 
 in every step. The best advice the country afforded was sought 
 in determining the proportions of the guns and all details of con- 
 struction. The pieces were cut down to fourteen calibres in 
 length, and the weight reduced to that of brass guns of the same 
 calibre. 
 
 The new departure was considered by many of the best-inform- 
 ed artillerists as a doubtful experiment. The example of the 
 world was against it. But Dearborn was a man who depended 
 more on his own judgment, deliberately formed,, than upon the 
 opinions of others. Having made up his mind to the advisability 
 of the measure, he never faltered in its execution. The price of 
 brass was five or six times that of iron. The country produced 
 the best iron-ore, but as yet only a small quantity of copper, and 
 no tin. There were two important reasons why cast-iron should 
 be experimented with until a definite conclusion could be arrived 
 at as to its adaptability for field-guns: First, economic considera- 
 tions; second, that we might depend on our own resources. Suc- 
 cess the most complete crowned the Secretary's efforts. The 
 excellent character of the 6-pounder field-guns then introduced 
 was proved in the war of 1812. They were referred to in terms of 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 26l 
 
 highest praise by Colonel Wadsworth, and by every board assem- 
 bled for the amelioration of the artillery down to that of 1838, 
 And, as will be seen hereafter, it was to these guns that Secretary 
 Poinsett, in his controversy with the committee of ordnance officers 
 in 1840, referred as establishing, in the manner most convincing 
 of all in actual field service that efficient, trustworthy cannon^ 
 could be made of cast-iron. 
 
 The change from brass to iron was not effected without 
 opposition. No sooner was Dearborn gone than an effort was 
 made to bring the department back to former practices. A few 
 orders were given by his successor for brass guns, one of March, 
 1812, being for twenty-four 6-pounders and twelve i2-pounders. 
 But so complete was the triumph of the other that an officer of 
 the ordnance department, who, in the year 1813, fitted out the 
 field artillery sent to the armies operating against Canada, has 
 left on record the statement that during that time he did not see 
 a single piece of brass ordnance. 
 
 Practically speaking, the use of brass ceased in 1801, and was 
 not resumed until 1836, upon a recommendation of the ordnance 
 board of 1835. That brass guns, &c., in limited quantities were 
 manufactured during this period of thirty-five years, which may 
 properly be called the "iron age" of our ordnance, is true; but it 
 was apparently in deference to the wishes of individual States or 
 private corporations; the policy of the Government was against it. 
 
 In the first system of land ordnance formally adopted by the 
 War Department that promulgated in the regulations of 1816 
 cast-iron alone appears as a gun metal. While in the style 
 of carriages and the disposition of the personnel for field service 
 we followed the Gribeauval system, this was not true of the guns. 
 Except the Napoleon gun, the French ordnance has had no foot- 
 ing in the United States artillery since the Revolutionary war. 
 While the French used brass, we used iron; while they adhered 
 to 4 and 8-pounders, we clung to 6 and i2-pounders. Neither 
 in Colonel Wadsworth' s system nor in that of the ordnance board 
 of 1818 was the use of any other metal than cast-iron contem- 
 plated. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, however, and the fact that cast-iron, 
 after great deliberation, had been definitively adopted and used 
 for several years, one of the first acts of the Macomb board was to 
 throw wide open the door for investigation and experiment, with 
 
262 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 a view to returning to the employment of brass for all kinds of 
 field ordnance. 
 
 This action of the board was due to one cause a lack of confi- 
 dence in cast-iron. The want of confidence in its turn was due 
 to the complete breaking down, in 1827, of the field-gun system 
 of the board of 1818, which, after enduring what were deemed 
 satisfactory tests prior to adoption, went to pieces in a most 
 unaccountable manner. Besides, in Europe, whence we have 
 drawn most of our ideas concerning military supplies, brass had 
 remained the generally accepted material for field service. 
 
 It may be asked, Where were the Dearborn guns now ? They 
 had been pushed to one side in that desire for change which 
 characterized the proceedings of the ordnance board of 1818 to 
 have their places filled by an inferior system. When the Ma- 
 comb board began its labors, this inferior system attracted very 
 little attention. On the other hand, reference was constantly made 
 in the most eulogistic terms, by those '"ho were cognizant of the 
 facts, to the great endurance and the excellent record in action 
 of the cast-iron guns of 1812. After brass returned to the field 
 as a competitor with cast-iron, it had a long, precarious, and 
 uncertain struggle for supremacy, during which its opponent 
 based its claim to favor upon the Dearborn system, tried by 
 the ordeal of battle, and not upon the ' ' walking-stick ' ' system 
 of 1818. 
 
 The old brass guns on hand not being considered reliable, and 
 it not being practicable to purchase any abroad, as contemplated 
 by the board of 1831 (Macomb), the comparative tests directed 
 by this board to be made could not be at once instituted; and 
 when the board of 1835 met at Watervliet, it found awaiting trial 
 none other than cast-iron ordnance, which it proceeded to dispose 
 of in what was no doubt meant for a very deliberate, but in fact was 
 a very summary, manner. After subjecting the 6-pounder and 
 i2-pounder pieces to what they considered a proper trial, the 
 board resolved unanimously that none of them were such as 
 should be received as models for the field service of the United 
 States ; that the howitzers were not worthy the labor and expense 
 of proving them ; and finally, that iron was not a proper material 
 for field ordnance, which should be made wholly of bronze* It 
 
 *This is the first instance in our records in which the alloy commonly called 
 brass is officially designated bronze. 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 263 
 
 then proceeded to enumerate the natures, weights, and dimensions 
 of the bronze ordnance which should form the field armament 
 of the United States; and, continuing, observed: " If, however, the 
 Government, rejecting the experience of the warlike nations of 
 Europe and the opinions above expressed by this board, determines 
 to adhere to the system of iron guns for field service, the board is 
 of opinion that neither the 6 nor the i2-pounder should be less 
 than fifteen calibres long, the former weigh not less than 850, the 
 latter 1 800 pounds. ' ' This report was approved by the Secretary 
 of War (Mr. Cass) July 8th, 1836, which is therefore an important 
 date in the history of our artillery materiel, marking as it does the 
 formal introduction of the stock-trail system of carriages and the 
 authorization of brass as a material for field-guns. 
 
 The contest between brass (bronze) and iron now began in 
 earnest. The struggle was not unlike that at present going on 
 in this country the iron-founders on one side, the most respect- 
 able professional artillerists on the other. 
 
 July 1 3th, 1836, a contract was entered into with the Ames 
 Manufacturing Company, and in October, 1837, ten bronze guns 
 were turned over by that company to the ordnance department. 
 The competitive trials which the Macomb board had resolved to 
 make were now commenced. Malleable cast-iron, as well as cast- 
 iron, entered the lists as a disturbing factor, and for a time threat- 
 ened to sweep all else before it, eliciting from the colonel of ord- 
 nance the remark, that by this process guns could be made lighter 
 and stronger than brass, and that the trials then being prose- 
 cuted promised to establish the great superiority of this species 
 of ordnance. In this, however, he and the other adherents to iron 
 were disappointed. The malleable burst like all the other cast- 
 iron guns, and, though they tested well, their good qualities was 
 not conspicuous. 
 
 The diversity of opinion entertained by artillerists in this 
 country concerning the proper material for field-guns was no- 
 where more manifest than in the proceedings of the ordnance 
 board of 1838. At first the cast-iron element seemed to pre- 
 dominate, and a resolution was adopted to the effect that, while 
 this metal, as ordinarily manufactured, was unreliable, still, as had 
 been shown in the field-guns of the late war (1812), it was possi- 
 ble to make iron guns of such patterns as would endure success- 
 fully every strain incident to service. 
 
264 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF f HE ARtlLLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 For horse artillery the board recommended both malleable 
 cast-iron and bronze; but under instructions from the Secretary 
 of War to choose between these two metals, they took the 
 latter. At this time Ringgold's horse-artillery battery was being 
 mounted and equipped with its proper arm. 
 
 The bursting of both the cast-iron and the malleable cast-iron 
 guns and howitzers which were being tested but increased the 
 uncertainty of the board regarding the merits of the several 
 metallic contestants. The result was to leave undisturbed the 
 bronze field-gun system of 1835, except the suppression of the 
 9-pounder. Regarding the seige, garrison, and sea-coast arma- 
 ments, they were wholly of cast-iron, except the bronze Coehorn 
 and the i6-inch Stone mortars. 
 
 Thus the matter of gun metal stood when was assembled the 
 committee of ordnance officers appointed by Mr. Poinsett April, 
 
 1839. Experiments with bronze, cast-iron, and malleable cast- 
 iron had been industriously carried .on, but without any definite 
 result. The best metal for a field armament was as far from set- 
 tlement as ever; each had its partisans. 
 
 This was one of the first questions to the determination of 
 which the committee addressed itself. The interesting cor- 
 respondence which ensued between the committee and the Secre- 
 tary of War the former advocating bronze, the latter inclining to 
 cast-iron led directly to the sending of the first ' ' armament 
 commission ' ' to Europe to study on the ground and from the 
 masters in the art the practical details of gun-casting, to which 
 we were in a measure strangers. (Appendix C, [2].) This cor- 
 respondence makes clear the fact that to Mr. Secretary Poinsett 
 more than to any other of the many who contributed to that end 
 is the artillery indebted for the elegant and complete system of 
 1849. It will be readily admitted that he had a much clearer per- 
 ception of what was needed, and the proper methods to attain it, 
 than the ordnance committee. He rejected all temporary expe- 
 dients. What he wanted, and determined to have, was a system 
 of artillery based on correct principles. The first step was 'for 
 those into whose hands the working out of details was intrusted 
 to acquire knowledge of their business. These considerations 
 led to sending the commission of ordnance officers to Europe in 
 
 1840. This strengthened and fitted the department for its work. 
 The information acquired abroad by the members of this commis- 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 265 
 
 sion gave dignity and importance to the deliberation of the com- 
 mittee, now become the "ordnance board." From the return 
 of the commission the work of arranging details of the proposed 
 system went straight on without break or hindrance, other than 
 those properly incident to the service. There was no halting, 
 no thought of meeting by temporary devices an assumed present^ 
 demand which did not exist. The foundation of the new system 
 was deep laid in experience, knowledge of the practices of the old 
 nations, and professional lore, and it was permanent. 
 
 The commission, consisting of Major Baker, Captains Mordecai 
 and Huger of the ordnance department, with Mr. Wade, a prac- 
 tical founder, (formerly captain of ordnance,) spent about nine 
 months in Europe, visiting the principal arsenals, cannon foun- 
 dries, and armories. It had seen enough to have its views con- 
 cerning field-gun metal confirmed, and, January 2d, 1841, the 
 ordnance board again unanimously recommended bronze. This 
 was approved by Mr. Pouisett. From this time, therefore, we 
 may date the undisputed ascendency of bronze over cast-iron of 
 all kinds. 
 
 Nor were wrought-iron guns more successful. They had been 
 urged as a last resort by the friends of iron, but neither those 
 experimented with in 1832, nor those of improved manufacture 
 tested in 1839 and 1840, gave results that inspired confidence 
 in this method of gun making. The first difficulty was to 
 weld the parts; the next and greater was to determine whether 
 the welds were perfect. Wrought, with all kinds of cast-iron, not- 
 withstanding the persistent efforts of the founders, at last for twenty 
 years gave way to bronze. It may be stated, therefore, that in 
 1835 bronze became the favorite. The next year its use was 
 authorized. In 1841 it was officially and permanently recognized 
 as the metal for field ordnance a position which it retained, with 
 none to dispute its title, until 1861. Except the Stone and Coehorn 
 mortars, the former of which was abandoned in 1861, the heavy 
 ordnance siege, garrison, and sea-coast continued to be made 
 of cast-iron, the quality of which, in all that went to make up first- 
 class gun metal, was second to none in the world. 
 
 The Civil war inaugurated a revolution in this as in every other 
 feature of gun construction. Although the French rifled field- 
 pieces used in 1859 were of bronze, experience showed that this 
 metal was not adapted to the strains and wear of guns constructed 
 34 
 
266 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 on the rifle principle. In 1860 a board of officers had recom- 
 mended that the bronze guns then in service, or at least fifty per 
 cent, of them, be rifled. The latter recommendation was ordered 
 to be put in execution ; but scarcely had the work of conversion 
 begun, when it was found the altered bronze pieces were too 
 weak, and the scheme was abandoned ; thus forming a fitting 
 prelude to the fate of the conversion heavy-gun system of 1881. 
 
 As, however, it was necessary to have rifled guns, the Secretary 
 of War (Mr. Cameron), June 22d, 1861, ordered three hundred 
 wrought-iron field-guns to be purchased. Two-hundred of these 
 were rifles. But the use of wrought-iron was not looked upon 
 with favor. The ordnance board passed a resolution giving their 
 sanction to its employment as a temporary expedient only and 
 to supply the pressing demands for rifled ordnance of the armies 
 in the field. Notwithstanding this, wrought-iron has not only 
 held its ground, but at this time has driven bronze before it, and 
 it will surrender only to steel. During the Civil war it had as 
 competitors in the field armaments bronze, cast-iron hooped with 
 wrought, and steel ; but as a representative of the Government 
 department, wrought-iron for rifled guns stood alone. The 3- 
 inch wrought-iron rifle, called the "ordnance gun," although 
 made upon a plan devised at a private foundry, was recognized 
 from the date of its first appearance, in 1861, as the Government 
 gun. After a quarter of a century it maintains that position. 
 
 In larger natures of ordnance the use of wrought-iron first 
 began in 1861, when the plan of hooping large cast-iron rifles at 
 the breech, which had been suggested to the ordnance board in 
 1858, and rejected by it, was successfully put in practice by Cap- 
 tain Parrott. This was known as the "Parrott system," and 
 it furnished the only large rifled ordnance which appeared during 
 the war. Thus, after having been uniformly rejected whenever 
 it knocked at the door for admission into the list of gun metals, 
 from 1777 down, wrought-iron, in 1861, forced itself to the front, 
 where it has, for field artillery, retained the position then acquired. 
 The want of confidence expressed by the ordnance board in 1861 
 has not been justified by events. 
 
 Since the close of the Civil war, and down to this time, the 
 problem which has engrossed attention, to the exclusion of every 
 other connected with a public armament, has been the building 
 up of an efficient system of heavy ordnance. The most perplex- 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 267 
 
 ing element entering into the determinate solution of this problem 
 has been the selection of a proper gun metal. So long as the 
 smooth-bore held its own against the rifle, the racking stood up 
 in the presence of the punching system of fighting, cast-iron 
 alone was used. That contest was short. It ended, even in the 
 opinion of the most enthusiastic supporters of the old system, 
 about 1871. The struggle between cast-iron and other metals 
 for purposes of rifled-gun construction had been going on for 
 some time prior to this. The former was that of which, excepting 
 the Parrott guns, American heavy artillery had alone been made. 
 Cast-iron was part and parcel of the smooth-bore system; but it 
 did not follow that the two elements were inseparable. Large 
 smooth-bore guns had elsewhere been made of other metals than 
 cast-iron. On the other hand, it was hoped that this metal could 
 be manufactured into efficient heavy rifles. Although, intimately 
 associated, the smooth-bore system and the metal of which it had 
 been built were to be considered separately, each to stand by its 
 own merits or fall from its own weakness. The fate of the smooth- 
 bore will be considered elsewhere. Attention will for the present 
 be directed to cast-iron (i) as a gun metal, pure and simple; (2) 
 in combination with other metals. 
 
 i. The excellent character of the cast-iron of the United States 
 ordnance, which was second to none in the world, even if it did 
 not lead all others, together with Rodman's method of cooling 
 the molten mass from the interior, gave rise to the hope, which 
 in some influential though not official quarters has not yet died 
 out, that this metal might prove equal to all the demands of 
 heavy rifled ordnance. In 1861 a oast-iron 1 2-inch rifle experi- 
 mental gun and in 1862 an 8-inch, both on Rodman's plan, were 
 constructed. This number was increased in 1868 by another 12- 
 inch rifle. The result of the experiments instituted with these 
 guns was not favorable. The chief of ordnance, who was the 
 firm friend and champion of cast-iron, in his report of 1870, re- 
 marked on this subject: 
 
 " The principal nations of Europe, fully aware of the necessity of having 
 heavy rifled guns for their coast defense, have spent millions in search of a 
 reliable rifle gun. We have confined our experiments to one or two cast-iron 
 rifled guns. The results obtained do not warrant me in recommending that 
 any cast-iron rifled guns be procured for arming the forts. We must try some 
 other material for heavy rifle guns." 
 
268 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Nothing could be plainer than this: cast-iron had been weighed 
 in the balance by its own zealous advocates, and found wanting. 
 Just at this juncture, however, hope was revived by two experi- 
 mental facts: First, the expanding metallic sabot, which replaced 
 the buttons of rifle projectiles, had made it possible to secure 
 uniform results (action in the bore) with the latter ; second, the 
 increase in size of powder-grain, and the successful manipulation 
 of the ingredients, had rendered it possible to greatly increase 
 the initial velocity of the projectile, with a diminished pressure on 
 the walls of the gun. So favorable were these to the metal just 
 discarded, that, in 1873, the chief of ordnance recommended that 
 an appropriation of $75,000 be asked of Congress for the manu- 
 facture and trial of 1 2-inch cast-iron rifles. The money was not 
 appropriated. The test of heavy rifled cast-iron guns under the new 
 conditions of projectile and powder has not been made. Neverthe- 
 less, in the opinion of the most experienced military authorities of 
 the world, the views of the chief of ordnance, as expressed in 1870, 
 relative to the fitness of cast-iron, are as sound to-day as they 
 were then; nor have the new and supposed favorable conditions 
 raised it in the scale of relative merit. Neither the board of 
 officers assembled pursuant to act of June 6th, 1872, to designate 
 models of heavy ordnance, nor that assembled pursuant to the 
 act of March 3d, 1881, for the same purpose, nor has any other 
 board of officers since 1870, recommended that cast-iron, except 
 when combined with other metals, be used for heavy-rifled guns ; 
 but, on the contrary, it has been uniformly proscribed. It, how- 
 ever, is not dead. Private founders having failed to secure recog- 
 nition from the military profession, have appealed their case to a 
 non-military but more powerful tribunal the Congress of the 
 United States and with better success. The result is that while 
 others, after the most exhaustive trials, have given up cast-iron, 
 we are to-day making experimental guns with this metal. The 
 outcome will be looked for with great interest. Fortunately, the 
 experiments by which these souvenirs of a past age in gun con- 
 struction are to be put on their trial will be conducted under the 
 surveillance of officers actuated by the sole desire to arrive at truth, 
 regardless of the interests of individuals or corporations.* 
 
 * The cast-iron guns now being made, one of which is tubed with steel 
 from the breech to a point just in front of the trunnions, are " in lieu of" the 
 new Americanized Krupp 12-inch rifles, which, although contracted for, were, 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. . 269 
 
 Happily for the safety of the country in great degree depend- 
 ent on its sea-coast armament, standing sentinel, grim-visaged, 
 at the portals of the Nation the character, professional and 
 scientific attainments of those who control in the councils of the 
 present ordnance board, the consciencipus attention to duty 
 evinced in the modest, yet thorough, painstaking, and able re- 
 ports which have of late emanated therefrom, leave no room 
 for doubt but that these representative of an elsewhere-discarded 
 heavy gun metal will be tested without ''fear, favor, or affection," 
 and with an eye single to the good of the public service. 
 
 2. Cast-iron in combination with other metals. The first con- 
 structions on this principle \vere Parrott's guns, which, in 1862, 
 formed the most powerful rifled system in existence. The ex- 
 perience of the Civil war was not favorable to this type of built-up 
 gun, which, after its close, seems to have passed out of notice, 
 while attention* was being directed to other systems. 
 
 In the next attempt to combine wrought with cast-iron, the order 
 of metals was reversed, the wrought-iron being placed as a tube 
 inside the cast-iron body of the gun a plan which, in the conver- 
 sion of old smooth-bore guns into low-power rifles, is still 
 practiced. 
 
 The armament board of 1867 having decided that the rifled 
 heavy-gun system of the United States should consist of lo-inch 
 and 12-inch rifles, it became a question for the ordnance board to 
 decide what should be the construction of these guns and the 
 metal used therein. Among other types, this board recommended 
 the building up of cast-iron guns with steel tubes. There was not, 
 however, spite of all these resolutions as to calibres, metals, and 
 modes of construction, a single built-up rifle gun in the United 
 States, except Parrott's, until after the board appointed pursuant 
 to act of June 6th, 1872, made its report. Congress had appro- 
 priated $270,000 for experiments and tests with the models of 
 heavy ordnance to be selected by this board, half of which, as it 
 proved, viz., the converted smooth-bores, the Thompson and the 
 Sutcliff types, were combinations of a cast-iron body, with either 
 a steel or a wrought-iron tube. 
 
 after the failure of the " system " in 1881, not constructed. They may be con- 
 sidered as in some degree compensating the cast-iron founders for the expense 
 and trouble they were put to in taking the preliminary steps looking to the 
 manufacture of the subsequently abandoned guns. 
 
270 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Of these, the Thompson and the Sutcliff have never been tested 
 beyond a few preliminary shots. Every attention was given, 
 every nerve bent, to the development of the conversion system, 
 and with such success that the manufacture of new constructions 
 on the same general plan was determined on, and carried into 
 execution in 1877 by the building of a 12. 25-inch cast-iron gun 
 with wrought-iron tube. 
 
 In the system of standard ordnance promulgated by the ord- 
 nance department in 1880, the only built-up heavy guns are com- 
 binations of cast and wrought-iron. The friends of the conversion 
 system were, however, doomed to disappointment; the system 
 itself, brought up with so much care, and to the exclusion of 
 everything else, " burst to pieces," not figuratively, but literally 
 a fact to which, in the Fall of 1881, testimony was amply borne by 
 the fragments of its guns scattered everywhere over the Sandy 
 Hook proving ground. 
 
 Meantime the board of officers convened pursuant to act of 
 March 3d, 1881, had been at work. As a result of its exhaustive 
 researches, and in the guns recommended by it, wrought-iron, in 
 combination with cast, was replaced by steel. Ten varieties of 
 heavy ordnance were deemed by this board to be worthy of trial. 
 Five of these were built-up guns embracing two metals in their 
 constructions and in all of them the metals were steel and cast- 
 iron. 
 
 The recommendations of this board, whether they be carried 
 into execution or not, will stand their ground against adverse 
 criticism. Private interests may, through political influence, 
 frustrate the legitimate results that should flow from the labors of 
 the board ; the spectacle be presented of the United States going 
 backward while other nations go forward in the grand march 
 towards the securing an efficient national armament ; but what- 
 ever deviations may be made from the course marked out by it, 
 those who are familiar with the subject will not expect them to 
 make easier of attainment that great desideratum the object of 
 years of patient labor and experiment a heavy gun system which 
 will guarantee security to our shores and consideration before the 
 nations of the world. 
 
 Wrought- iron . 
 
 Except when used in combination with cast-iron, either as bands 
 or as tubing, this metal has received but little consideration during 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 271 
 
 the last fifteen years. For independent heavy-gun constructions, 
 while not ignored, it has been pushed completely out of sight by 
 its more popular and powerful rivals. 
 
 As with steel, the practical difficulty that lay in the way was 
 the inadequacy of foundry facilities to forge or otherwise prepare 
 large and homogeneous masses, and the other alternative which 
 has been seized on with steel, viz., to build up a wire gun, was 
 not practicable with wrought-iron. 
 
 In 1868 the chief of ordnance recommended that a wrought-iron 
 12-inch gun be constructed to be tested, in a series of comparative 
 trials, with a cast-iron rifle of the same calibre. The proposition 
 met with the approval of the Secretary of War, but neither of 
 these proposed rifles has been manufactured. Notwithstanding 
 that armament boards met and decided on the calibres of the 
 ordnance that should be used, and ordnance boards followed with 
 plans and specifications, embracing the metals, their combination, 
 and their distribution in the completed gun, nothing was done 
 until the board of officers appointed pursuant to act of June 6th, 
 1872, had completed its work. Among other designs approved 
 of by the board was that of Mr. Hitchcock for a wrought-iron 
 12-inch rifle, built up by welding rings end to end ; and although 
 the inventor was given every facility he asked, and personally 
 superintended the preliminary arrangements, the difficulties were 
 so great and the promised results so unsatisfactory that he aban- 
 doned the project in despair. 
 
 The result of these failures has been, taken in conjunction with 
 the successful manipulation of other metals, to remove wrought- 
 iron from the list of even possible materials for efficient heavy- 
 gun constructions. 
 
 Steel. 
 
 The career of steel has been, in the long run, diametrically 
 opposite that of wrought-iron; as the latter disappeared, the former 
 came more boldly into view first as an auxiliary in the shape of 
 tubing to cast-iron, then for both wrapping and tubing, and 
 finally for the building up independently of the heaviest calibres. 
 Down to the time that conversions became the rage, the two 
 metals wrought-iron and steel were about equally favored as a 
 tubing material, in which form alone, practically speaking, either 
 had entered as a factor into the gun problem. In the muzzle- 
 
 
272 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 loading conversions, wrought-iron linings were supposed to have 
 quickly established their superiority. The tubing metal of the 
 standard gun system, as appears in the report of the chief of 
 ordnance of 1880, was wrought-iron alone. Indeed, steel does 
 not appear in any manner in the heavy-gun armament there pre- 
 sented. 
 
 From this state of utter exclusion, steel quickly recovered, not 
 only regaining from wrought-iron the ground thus lost, but 
 driving out the latter, and springing by a single bound into the 
 first rank of gun metals. Nor is this a temporary victory. Steel 
 in some form, either in masses or wire, or both combined, is 
 conceded by all artillerists to be the metal of the future as well 
 as of the present. 
 
 This reaction, which from the first impulse has gone on gaining 
 strength, until to-day all competitors have been passed, began in 
 this country when breech-loading conversions won their way to 
 favor. The board of 1872 had recommended, among other things, 
 that a Krupp 1 2-inch be procured as a representative, (i) of a 
 breech-loading system, (2) of a system of gun construction. 
 The gun was not purchased ; instead, the attempt was made to 
 graft the Krupp breech-loading mechanism upon the conversion 
 system of rifled guns. The jacket, breech-block, and breech-band 
 for the members of this new departure in the scheme of conver- 
 sion were of imported steel. The pioneer gun was manufactured 
 and on the proving ground by July, 1878, and by 1880 the record 
 was such as to justify the ordnance board in the following 
 conclusions: 
 
 "The endurance of this system of gun construction, and the endurance as 
 well as the successful manipulation of the breech mechanism, in the opinion of 
 the board, have been satisfactorily established, and, in its judgment, the depart- 
 ment is warranted in their adoption for future new constructions as well as in 
 future conversions of smooth-bore into rifled guns." 
 
 At the same time that the breech mechanism was being thus 
 successfully tested, another important element was added to the 
 system by the introduction of the chamber, which, without any 
 bad effects, had increased the power of the 8-inch muzzle-loading 
 converted rifle thirty per cent. , and led the board to the following 
 conclusions and recommendations: 
 
 " This experiment shows that, with pressures entirely within the limits of 
 safety, the increased velocity due to chambering has increased the power of the 
 
MATERIEL: METAL. 273 
 
 8-inch rifle about one-third, and that the increased power has been accompanied 
 by an increased accuracy of fire. The area of bore incident to the higher 
 charge with the one hundred and eleven rounds fired seems no greater than 
 that in the unchambered gun with the 35-pound charge. The board, there- 
 fore, recommends the adoption of the system of chambering in all future con- 
 versions or new constructions of this and of 11 -inch calibres. In higher calt-~ 
 bres the system has already received the approval of the department." 
 
 The conversion system had now reached the summit of its pros- 
 perity, whence, through the untoward events which followed, it 
 rapidly descended. The successful application separately of the 
 breech-loading and the chamber principles to the conversions led, 
 very naturally, and under the preceding resolutions of the board, 
 to the next step, which was to combine the two in the same gun ; 
 but the overstrained system broke down completely, the pieces 
 bursting one after the other as they were subjected to trial. The 
 system, passing its limit of safety, fell at once into disfavor, and 
 work on the 1 2-inch rifles of the new Americanized Krupp 
 models, contracts for which had been let, was immediately 
 stopped. 
 
 Without waiting to inquire into the causes of this hopeless 
 collapse, it is a fact that the prestige of steel as a metal for gun 
 constructions was not thereby impaired, but the reverse. When 
 the Americanized Krupp system went to wreck amidst the debris 
 from its own exploded members, the board appointed pursuant 
 to the act of March 3d, 1881, was pursuing its investigations. It 
 recommended that nine different models of guns and a rifled mor- 
 tar be constructed, all on the built-up plan. Five of the guns 
 were to be constructed wholly of steel, the remaining four, 
 as has been previously mentioned, of steel and cast-iron com- 
 bined; the latter being mere make-shifts, as "they can be 
 readily and rapidly produced in this country without the 
 delay of sending abroad for large masses of forged steel."* 
 With us, therefore, as abroad, steel, either by itself or combined 
 with other metals, has supplanted wrought-iron in the construc- 
 tion of heavy armaments ; and although quacks may still advocate 
 others, the masters turn to steel as that material which alone gives 
 promise of meeting successfully the crucial tests of modern gun- 
 nery. 
 
 * One of these 12-inch guns, concerning the endurance of which there was 
 not even "the suggestion of a doubt," went to pieces, with the rest of its type, 
 on the Sandy Hook proving grounds. 
 
 35 
 
274 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Investigations and experiments having in view the selection 
 of proper materials for siege and field ordnance, under the 
 modern conditions of increased weight of metal thrown and larger 
 charges of powder, have of recent years attracted comparatively 
 little attention pending the solution of that infinitely more difficult 
 problem the construction of an efficient sea-coast armament. 
 
 Fqf siege guns cast-iron retains its place, although in the pro- 
 posed 4^ -inch rifle a body of this material is both hooped and 
 lined with steel ; and, like all others of the recent models for the 
 land service, the breech-loading mechanism is a prominent feature. 
 Both steel and wrought-iron 4^2 -inch guns were recommended 
 by the ordnance board of 1868 to be tested for power and endur- 
 ance with those of cast-iron, and which during the Civil war did 
 excellent service, but they have not been constructed. 
 
 In the line of field artillery there has been greater activity ; 
 more experiments have been made, and a greater variety of metals 
 have been tested. The Moffatt steel breech-loader, the Dean 
 bronze muzzle loader, (with metal around bore hardened by com- 
 pression,) and several 3 -inch wrought-iron rifles converted to 
 3. 20-inch breech-loaders by screwing on a breech block of steel, 
 have all received attention. The latter is apparently a most ex- 
 cellent field piece, forming by far the most successful attempt that 
 has been made at converting old into new and more powerful 
 guns. 
 
 In siege and field equally with sea-coast artillery the tendency 
 has been towards the use of steel, and it seems to be simply a 
 question of time when this metal will supersede all others. 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 275 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 
 
 The great variety of calibres presented by the artillery during 
 the Revolution may be judged from the array set forth in a gen- 
 eral return of the commissary of military stores at the end of that 
 war. In this there were enumerated as being on hand, mounted 
 and ready for service: Of guns, 1,3, 4, 6, 9, 12, and 24-pounders; 
 of mortars, 4^, 5^, 8, 10, 13, and i6-inch; of howitzers, 5^ 
 and 8-inch, all of brass; and of iron, i, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 
 and 32-pounder guns, i8-pounder carronades, and 3^ -inch how- 
 itzers. 
 
 It must not be supposed, however, that all these guns, howit- 
 zers, and mortars accompanied each army to incumber it; or even 
 that, in all the ordnance, both field and garrison, used actively 
 against the enemy, this great variety of calibres could be found. 
 It would be just as reasonable to assume, because an ordnance 
 return of the present day took account of many varieties of an- 
 cient and antiquated models, that these formed part of the present 
 artillery system. Fortunately, the records do not leave us in 
 doubt on this point; they reduce the calibres and the natures of 
 ordnance which were habitually used to narrow and well-defined 
 limits, making it for practical purposes as easy a matter to fix 
 upon what was the Revolutionary system as though it had been 
 formally announced in orders. 
 
 In an official report submitted January, 1778, General Knox 
 mentioned the following as the artillery which it would be neces- 
 sary for the main army to have during the ensuing campaign: 
 
 " Brigade artillery, seventeen brigades, with four guns each, sixty-eight 
 pieces, to be 3 , 4, or 6-pounders ; with the park, two 24-pounders, four 12- 
 pounders, four 8-inch howitzers, eight 5^-inch howitzers, ten 3 or 4-pounders, 
 ten 6-pounders ; for the reserve, to be kept at a proper distance from camp, 
 thirty 3, 4, and 6-pounders, two 12-pounders, one 24-pounder; all the forego- 
 ing brigade, park, and reserve guns and howitzers to be of brass. In addition, 
 twelve 18-pounders, twelve 12-pounders, battering pieces, on traveling car- 
 riages, together with two 5^-inch and twelve 8, 9, and 10-inch mortars ; the 
 battering pieces and mortars to be of cast-iron." 
 
276 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 When preparing for the eventful and decisive campaign of 
 1781, the general of artillery estimated that, to accompany the 
 main army into the field, there would be necessary, three 24- 
 pounders, seven i2-pounders, twenty each of 3 and 4-pounders, 
 thirty 6-pounders, five 8-inch howitzers, and six 5^ -inch howit- 
 zers. From which it will be seen that he had concluded, for active 
 field duty, to dispense with the heavy 32-pounder gun and discard 
 mortars entirely. When, however, soon after, preparations were 
 making to lay siege to New York, the train collected for this pur- 
 pose embraced 12, 18, 24, and 32-pounder guns; 5^, 8, 10, and 
 1 3- inch mortars; 5^ and 8-inch howitzers. Finally, there were 
 taken on the march to the southward when the siege was aban- 
 doned, and were present with the army before Yorktown, of field 
 artillery, two 12-pounders, four 3-pounders, six 6-pounders, three 
 5^-inch howitzers; of siege artillery, two 8-inch mortars, ten 10- 
 inch and six 5^ -inch mortars, and three 8-inch howitzers, all of 
 brass; and of iron, three 24 and twenty i8-pounders. 
 
 The ordnance which accompanied others than the main army 
 was of the same character as that which made up the armament 
 of the latter. It were useless to particularize concerning it. 
 
 It is seen from what precedes that the field artillery embraced 
 of guns, 3, 4, 6, 12, and 24-pounders; of howitzers, 5^ and 8-inch, 
 all of brass. Of these, the 3, 4, and 6-pounder guns habitually, 
 and the howitzers occasionally, were attached to the infantry 
 brigades; while the 12 and 24-pounders were held for guns of 
 position. The siege artillery embraced (in addition to the field) 
 iron 1 8, 24, and 32-pounder guns, with the 1 3-inch mortar; of 
 brass, the 5^, 8, and lo-inch mortars. 
 
 The field system included five different calibres of guns and two 
 of howitzers; for the siege there were added two distinct calibres 
 of guns and four of mortars, or seven calibres of guns, two of 
 howitzers, and four of mortars total, thirteen. Thus, instead of 
 the Revolutionary army being loaded down, as were those of 
 Europe a few years before this time, by an almost endless variety of 
 guns, mortars, and howitzers, it was not incumbered at all. 
 Thirteen different calibres will not appear a large number when 
 we recall that the field and siege train of the Army of the Potomac 
 before Petersburg in 1864 numbered seventeen different calibres 
 of guns, mortars, and howitzers, and that the complete system of 
 ordnance of 1850 embraced eighteen different calibres. 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 277 
 
 Subsequent to the Revolution, and prior to 1800, there was no 
 change worthy of note made in the calibres of artillery constructed 
 for either field, siege, or sea-coast armaments. The 32-pounder 
 continued the heaviest gun. The act of March 2oth, 1794, pro- 
 viding for the manufacture of sea-coast guns, directed that they 
 should be 24 and 32-pounders. Men longed for and dreamed of 
 peace. Though brought to the verge of war in 1794, and again 
 in 1798, we had escaped it. The danger passed, retrenchment 
 brought to a stand-still every measure looking to the building up 
 of the artillery system. 
 
 The new century ushered in a new era in gun making. The 
 42-pounder was added in 1801, the 5O-pounder Columbiad in 181 1, 
 while in 1819 these, as well as loo-pounder guns, formed part of the 
 sea-coast armament. But we are forced to the conclusion that 
 the utility of each and all of these larger natures was not apparent 
 at the time, as, in the systems for the land service as announced 
 by the War Department both in 1816 and 1821, the 24-pounder 
 was the largest calibre prescribed, the contingency which would 
 require heavier guns being so remote that it was not considered 
 necessary to provide against it. 
 
 If we examine the calibres of the artillery in use at the close of 
 the War of 1812 we will find that, except the addition of the 42- 
 pounder and the Columbiad, and replacing the field 8- inch how- 
 itzer by the 24-pounder howitzer, there had been no change since 
 the Revolution. No inconvenience was experienced from the 
 multiplicity of calibres; but there were very many varieties of 
 each calibre, due to the fact that the guns were not cast upon 
 any exact plan, and this led to interminable confusion in the 
 construction of carriages. 
 
 Colonel Wadsworth's service in the artillery, the engineers, 
 and finally in his position as head of the ordnance department, 
 gave him opportunity to observe the evils resulting from this state 
 of affairs. From the time of his -appointment as colonel of ord- 
 nance until his muster out of service in the reduction of 1821 he 
 labored faithfully and intelligently to correct them, and to secure 
 for the artillery a uniform, practical, and permanent system of 
 materiel. Dearborn had done much for the artillery, particularly 
 the field artillery, by making it lighter, and otherwise increasing its 
 mobility; but his improvements seem rather like disjointed efforts, 
 all tending towards the desired end, it is true, yet lacking that 
 
278 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 important characteristic method without which no extensive, 
 consistent, and lasting amelioration could be effected. With 
 Wadsworth the case was different. He had the benefit of the 
 labors of those who had gone before. He carefully surveyed the 
 ground, saw what the difficulties were, proceeded promptly, yet 
 deliberately, and upon a matured plan, to the work of reformation. 
 Whatever may be claimed for others, to Colonel Wadsworth is 
 due the credit of having first worked out upon proper principles 
 the details of a complete system of artillery materiel. Commenc- 
 ing his administration of the ordnance department when the 
 armies were taking the field, in 1812, he found time amidst the 
 turmoil that involved his own as well as every other branch of the 
 public service to develop a plan for placing the artillery upon a 
 sound basis. (Appendix C, [3.]) As a result, the system of 
 artillery for the land service of the United States was first formally 
 announced by authority of the War Department, in the regu- 
 lations of 1816, as follows: 
 
 "To insure greater simplicity and uniformity in future in the calibres and 
 patterns of cannon, &c., the cannon, howitzers, and mortars to be provided 
 hereafter for the land service will be as follows: 
 
 " For the field: Cannon light 6-pounder, light 12-pounder, and medium 
 18-pounder; howitzers, 24-pounder, 8-inch. 
 
 "For sieges (including also field pieces of the foregoing descriptions): Can- 
 non heavy 24-pounders ; mortars 8-inch, 10-inch, and 13-inch. 
 
 "For fixed batteries on the seaboard and forts in the interior (including also 
 field pieces of the foregoing descriptions): Cannon heavy 24-pounders ; mor- 
 tars 10-inch and 13-inch. 
 
 "All ordnance to be provided hereafter of any of the natures and calibres 
 above expressed are to be invariably of the same pattern ; and it will be the 
 duty of the ordnance department to adopt proper measures for insuring uni- 
 formity in the ordnance hereafter by gradually abolishing and replacing the 
 guns of other calibres than the foregoing which have been introduced into the 
 service, as well as guns of patterns different from those which have or may be 
 established, so as eventually to bring all the guns of any one calibre to a 
 uniform pattern." 
 
 A comparison of this list of ordnance with that proposed by 
 Colonel Wadsworth in May, 1813, (Appendix C, [3]) the lan- 
 guage of the regulations, together with the views of the colonel of 
 ordnance as there expressed, will at once evince that the system 
 adopted was on the recommendation of that officer. 
 
 The 3-pounder which in 1813 had been proposed as part of 
 the field train, was suppressed in 1816, as Wadsworth had inti- 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 279 
 
 mated that it might be, thus reducing the total number of calibres 
 to eight instead of nine. Following Napoleon, (Appendix C, [i],) 
 the 6-pounder had supplanted the 4 and 8-pounders of Gribeauval. 
 
 Having thus secured the limiting to eight the number of cali- 
 bres that should constitute the land armament the next step was . 
 to devise patterns therefor, together with models for the carriages 
 on which they should be mounted. This work was completed 
 and submitted to the Secretary of War in 1818, and constituted 
 our first complete system of artillery for the service of the United 
 States, the details of which had been worked out in the minutest 
 particulars. The main features of the gun system proposed were: 
 First, the retention of all calibres then prescribed by regulations; 
 second, increasing the power of the guns by diminishing the 
 windage. For carriages, the main features were : First, the adop- 
 tion of a modified English block-trail in place of the Gribeauval 
 for field service ; second, a reduction in the number of carriages 
 by mounting different pieces on the same carriage; third, the 
 replacing wooden by cast-iron carriages in all fixed batteries. It 
 was the patterns and models of this system which were referred 
 by the Secretary of War to the ordnance board of 1818 for ex- 
 amination, and upon which that board reported adversely. 
 
 Having rejected Wadsworth's, the board proceeded, under the 
 instructions of the Secretary of War, to devise another. Its 
 action regarding carriages has been mentioned. For the guns it 
 proposed a new system, built upon a plan of its own. For field 
 artillery the weight was cut down to the proportion of 100 pounds 
 of metal to one pound of shot. This, together with the length of 
 the 6-pounders (18 calibres of bore), gave the 6-pounder field- 
 guns recommended the popular name of ' ' walking-sticks. ' ' The 
 medium i8-pounder was abolished, thus reducing the field artil- 
 lery to 6 and i2-pounder guns and the 24-pounder howitzer. 
 The 8-inch and 1 3-inch mortars were abolished; a 1 5-inch Stone 
 mortar introduced, as were also battering 12 and i8-pounder 
 guns. The siege artillery embraced, therefore, heavy 12, 18, and 
 24-pounder guns, the 8-inch howitzer, the lo-inch mortar (light), 
 and the 1 5-inch stone mortar. The sea-coast armament embraced 
 the heavy 24-pounder and the lo-inch mortar (heavy). Thus 
 the entire system as proposed embraced four calibres of guns, 
 two of howitzers and two of mortars, the same as Colonel Wads- 
 worth's. 
 
20 HISTORICAL SKETCH OE THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 While the 6-pounder had the same length as the French, it 
 weighed only two-thirds as much. The 12-pounder did not weigh 
 two-thirds as much as the French, and was but fifteen and one- 
 half calibres, while the French i2-pounder was eighteen calibres 
 long. The howitzers proposed by the board were both longer 
 and heavier than the French, and intended for larger charges. 
 The 24-pounder battering-gun weighed 5,500, the 1 8 pounder, 
 3, 700 pounds not differing from the English guns of correspond- 
 ing calibres. In one word, so far as can be discovered, the 
 board followed no rule in devising its system, which, excepting 
 the 15-inch mortar, was, however, in 1819, adopted for the land 
 service of the United States. 
 
 It will be noticed that the heaviest calibre was a 24-pounder. 
 In 1829 a 32-pounder was added and in 1831 a 42-pounder. With 
 these two exceptions, and that of the 1 5-inch Stone mortar men- 
 tioned, the system of the 1818 board remained without change 
 until replaced by that devised by the Macomb board of 1831 
 a list of the calibres of which appeared in the army regulations 
 of 1835. This was as follows: 
 
 For field service : 6, 9, and 12-pounder cannon (light) and 12 and 24-pounder 
 howitzers (long). 
 
 Siege and garrison: 12, 18, and 24-pounder cannon, 8-inch howitzer (light), 
 and 8 and 10-inch mortars (light). 
 
 Sea-coast: 24, 32, and 42-pounder cannon, 18, 24, 32, and 42-pounder car- 
 ronades, and 10-inch mortars (heavy). 
 
 The changes from the system of the 1818 board, besides those 
 already mentioned, consisted in the addition to the field system 
 of the 9-pounder gun and the 12-pounder light howitzer; to the 
 siege, the 8-inch mortar, which the 1818 board had discarded, 
 while the sea-coast was increased by the carronades. In fact, 
 however, the carronades never, except on paper, became part of 
 the land armament. None were manufactured. The colonel of 
 ordnance reported, in 1837, that the only knowledge he possessed 
 regarding them was derived from the British regulations; and 
 the following year they were dropped out altogether. 
 
 This ordnance was iron throughout. But the whole subject of 
 a land armament being then in a state of transition, the preceding 
 list of calibres could only be considered as temporarily indicating 
 what, in the opinion of the board, the artillery system should be. 
 
 From 1835 until 1839, when the ordnance board of 1838 made 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 281 
 
 its final report, which was approved by the Secretary of War, 
 there w,as constant change either being attempted or being made 
 in the field artillery; the siege and the sea-coast remained com- 
 paratively undisturbed. This change was inaugurated by the 
 board of 1835, which, rejecting in toto the iron field-artillery sys^ 
 tern presented to it for trial, recommended the following as a 
 substitute therefor, and to be made wholly of bronze. 
 
 Nature of Piece. Length in Calibres. .Weight. (Ibs.) 
 
 6-pounder gun. 15.669 67'2 
 
 9-pounder gun. 16 1,350 
 
 12-pounder gun. 16 1,800 
 
 12-pounder howitzer. 10 (not exceed.) 700 (fit 6-pounder carriage.) 
 
 24-pounder howitzer. 11 (not exceed.) 1,260 (fit 9-pounder carriage.) 
 the 9-pounder and 12-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers to have square 
 handles, like the French patterns. 
 
 As the recommendation was approved, the manufacture of 
 bronze guns and howitzers was immediately begun. The brass 
 ordnance enumerated became an authorized field system of the 
 United States, and, excepting the 9-pounder, which fell into 
 disfavor from the first, these calibres were only retired from that 
 system, by order of the Secretary of War> in 1868. 
 
 But it seemed impossible to settle permanently anything con- 
 nected with the artillery. Nothing ought to have changed the 
 field system after it had been definitely fixed upon by competent 
 authority. Yet this was exactly what was done. When the ord- 
 nance board of 1838 met, the instructions given it plainly indicated 
 that nothing appertaining to the national armament was considered 
 as determined. This state of affairs was probably due to two 
 causes: First, a change of administration; second, the persistent 
 efforts of the iron founders to gain back for their metal the ground 
 it had lost. The result was that the field system of 1835, (except- 
 ing the 9-pounder,) while it eventually triumphed, had to fight 
 its way at every step, and victory was not assured until after the 
 return of the ordnance commission from Europe, and its recom- 
 mendation that bronze be adopted definitely as the metal for field 
 artillery. 
 
 The board of 1838 retired the neglected 9-pounder from service, 
 recommended the substitution, in lieu of the 9-pounder and 12- 
 pounder bronze guns, of a malleable cast-iron 12-pounder, and the 
 replacing for horse artillery of the 6-pounder of 1835 by one four- 
 36 
 
2$2 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 teen calibres in length. This action did not make any impression 
 further than to rid the service of the 9-pounder. So far as is known, 
 the i2-pounder malleable cast-iron gun was not made, or, if made, 
 not issued to troops; and though a few short 6-pounders were 
 cast, they seem to have been looked upon as parasites, clinging 
 to without having a place in the system, and they soon disap- 
 peared. 
 
 To siege artillery the board added an iron 24-pounder howitzer, 
 the Cj>ehorn and the 1 6-inch Stone mortars, both of bronze; to 
 the sea-coast armament, iron 8-inch and 24-pound howitzers and 
 a 13-inch mortar; while the carronades were abolished. 
 
 Secretary Cass had, in 1836, added the French mountain how- 
 itzer to the field system through a belief, which events confirmed, 
 that this gun would be of practical utility against the Indians, with 
 whom at that time we were commencing the tedious and not very 
 glorious Seminole war. The various calibres composing the land 
 artillery, as determined by the joint labors of the ordnance boards 
 of 1831, 1835, and 1838, and as announced by the War Depart- 
 ment in 1839, were as follows:* 
 
 For the field: 6 and 12-pounder guns (light), 12 and 24-pounder howitzers, 
 and the 12-pounder mountain howitzer. 
 
 Siege and garrison: 12, 18, and 24-pounder guns, 8-inch and 24-pounder 
 howitzers, 8 and 10-inch mortars (light), and Coehorn and 16-inch stone 
 mortars. 
 
 Sea-coast : 24, 32, and 42-pounder guns, 8-inch and 24-pounder howitzers, 
 and 10 and 13-inch mortars (heavy). 
 
 This was the condition of affairs when the ordnance committee 
 of April 1 6th, 1839, was appointed. In commencing its labors 
 this committee laid down as a principle not to change any piece 
 of ordnance so that the carriage already made for it could not be 
 
 * In October, 1838, Mr. Poinsett informed the board that it was advisable to 
 introduce rocket service into the army, and it was directed to report whether, 
 in its opinion, the service of rocket batteries should be given to the artillery 
 arm, or whether a separate brigade should be organized for that purpose. The 
 board gave as its opinion that this service should be committed to the artillery 
 troops. This view was concurred in by the Secretary of War. This was the 
 origin of the "rocket battery" which was taken to Mexico in 1847, manned, 
 not by the artillery, but by the mechanics of the ordnance department. From 
 1838 to 1847 information concerning rockets had been carefully guarded by 
 that close corporation. What the artillery learned was picked up in spite of 
 this secrecy. 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 283 
 
 utilized. After the return of the commission from Europe the 
 committee suggested slight changes in the models of the 32 and 
 42-pounders, the 6-pounder gun and the 24-pounder howitzer; but 
 the field pieces were not altered as recommended. The remain- 
 der of the system, as received from the board of 1838, was~4eft 
 untouched. 
 
 In 1843 a 32-pound howitzer was added to the field service as 
 a shell-gun, to be used in conjunction with the heavy i2-pounders. 
 
 At this time Colonel Bomford was making experiments with 
 heavy ordnance, which resulted in the development of the 
 Columbiad, only to make way for the stronger Rodman sys- 
 tem. The lo-inch sea-coast howitzer and the 8 and ro-inch Co- 
 lumbiads recommended by him were added to the land system, 
 the former in 1841, the latter in 1844. This model of Colum- 
 biad was, in 1858, pronounced too weak for the work expected 
 of it, and these guns were then degraded to the position of shell- 
 guns using reduced charges. 
 
 In 1850 the system embraced the following calibres: 
 
 Field service: 6 and 12-pounder guns, 12, 24, and 32-pounder howitzers, and 
 12-pounder mountain howitzer, all of bronze. 
 
 Siege and garrison: 12, 18, and 24-pounder guns, 8-inch and 24-pounder 
 howitzers, and 8 inch (light) and 10-inch (light) mortars, of iron ; Coehorn 
 24-pounder mortar, and 16-inch stone mortar, bronze. 
 
 Sea-coast: 32 and 42-pounder guns, 8 and 10-inch Columbiads, 8 and 10-inch 
 howitzers, and 10 and 13-inch (heavy) mortars, of iron. 
 
 Six different calibres of guns, two of Columbiads, five of 
 howitzers, five of mortars, or eighteen altogether an increase of 
 four over the system of 1839, and principally in the larger 
 natures the precursor of that ceaseless struggle for an efficient 
 heavy armament which from that day to this has gone ever for- 
 ward, guided by the inventive genius of the Nation, inspiring 
 hope that the grand object kept steadily in view is at last to be 
 realized. 
 
 Rodman's plan of casting by cooling from the interior was a 
 conception of true genius. It raised the American artillery, in 
 1 86 1, to a leading position among the heavy-gun systems of the 
 world. 
 
 Lieutenant Rodman began the investigations which led to the 
 development of his theory, about 1845, when superintending the 
 construction of the Columbiads. In 1849 two guns an 8-inch and 
 a lo-inch were cast upon this principle, and in the tests to which 
 
284 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 they were subjected vindicated completely its correctness. Other 
 experiments were carried on at various times, in all with six pairs 
 of guns, the results only confirming the conclusions first arrived 
 at regarding the great practical advantages of this method of 
 casting. The six solid-cast guns endured 772 rounds altogether, 
 while the hollow-cast fired 5,515 rounds, and remained unbroken. 
 Upon the evidence here afforded of its superiority the War De- 
 partment, in 1859, directed that thereafter all the larger natures 
 of ordnance should be cast on Captain Rodman's plan. 
 
 So early as 1855 experiments were made at Fortress Monroe 
 with a grooved gun the forerunner of the rifled cannon that was 
 speedily to follow, and the development of which has given in- 
 creased interest to every question appertaining to field, siege, and 
 sea-coast armaments, of armor and of land defense. But, though 
 bearing evidence of intrinsic merit, the rifle principle, the workings 
 of which as illustrated in the performances of the Lancaster guns 
 w r ere not altogether satisfactory, could only be considered as 
 foreshadowing great possibilities. Experiments were, however, 
 pursued in a small way to develop the new principle, and with 
 encouraging results. By Special Orders No. 144, Adjutant- 
 General's Office, 1860, a board of artillery and ordnance officers 
 was appointed to make more elaborate trials of the rifled cannon 
 and projectiles. The report of this board was submitted Novem- 
 ber ist, 1860. Regarding the method of rifling and of construct- 
 ing projectiles to be used therewith presented to it for trial, the 
 board remarked: 
 
 " It is admirably adapted to the various calibres of guns now in use, requiring 
 only that they be rifled (which can be done at the forts and arsenals where 
 they now are) and supplied with proper proportions of rifled projectiles. 
 -Another advantage is that these same guns, and without increase of charge, 
 will be enabled to throw a weight of metal about double what they have here- 
 tofore fired, with more accuracy, effectiveness, and greater range. The board, 
 therefore, recommends the rifling of all, or at least fifty percent., of the guns at 
 forts and arsenals." 
 
 Thereupon fifty per cent, of the guns, as here recommended, 
 were ordered by the War Department to be rifled on the James 
 plan. But this attempt to secure an efficient artillery by con- 
 verting old guns on hand, like its antitype, the conversion 
 system of 1881, was a total failure. After a brief yet more 
 extended experience than that of the board the project was aban- 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 285 
 
 doned, as the increased weight of projectile, when fired with a 
 proper charge of powder, strained the conversions of 1860, 
 as it did afterwards those of 1881, beyond endurance. / 
 
 The War Department had been put in possession of drawings 
 of the i2-pounder Napoleon or gun howitzer, designed by Na- 
 poleon III, and intended to increase the power of the light, reduce 
 the weight of the heavy, and render but one field-gun necessary. 
 As in the Dearborn gun and those recommended by the board 
 of 1818, the weight of metal per pound of shot was fixed at 
 100. This gun was adopted in 1857, an< ^ st ill forms part of the 
 field system. It was a most efficacious weapon proved to be 
 such on many battle-fields of the Civil war, where the heavily- 
 wooded and broken surface of the country together with the 
 inferior small arms of the enemy caused the severest fighting to 
 be done at short ranges, where the gun howitzer, with its heavier 
 shell and case-shot, was often found to be more destructive than 
 the light lo-pounder rifle gun. 
 
 The Civil war gave an impetus to the manufacture of all 
 kinds of artillery materiel. The talent and mechanical skill of 
 the country at large were given remunerative employment in 
 this branch of the public service. The result was that private 
 manufactories alone, unaided by the military authorities, gave to 
 the armies operating in the field their first systems of rifled ord- 
 nance. As the sources from whence the guns came were numerous, 
 the varieties of calibres and types were very great. Some idea 
 may be formed of the complexity of the resulting armaments from 
 the fact, cited at random from among many similar instances that 
 could be mentioned, that the field artillery with Rosecrans' 
 army, February 8th, 1863, was made up of thirty-two 6-pounder 
 smooth-bores, twenty-four i2-pounder howitzers, eight 12-pounder 
 light Napoleons, twenty-one James rifles, thirty-four lo-pounder 
 Parrotts, two i2-pounder Wiard steel guns, two 6-pounder Wiard 
 steel guns, two 1 6-pounder Parrotts, and four 3-inch rifle ordnance 
 guns. 
 
 Of all private corporations to which the Government was in- 
 debted for prompt and efficient aid at this time, without which 
 the Union armies would have been equipped with a field arma- 
 ment worthy at that time only the semi-barbarous nations of Asia, 
 the Cold Spring foundry may perhaps lay claim to pre-eminence. 
 The specialty of this foundry was the Parrott gun, upwards of 
 
286 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 seventeen hundred of which, with three million projectiles, were 
 procured by the War Department alone during the war. From a 
 report made November, 1861, of a board of officers upon the rifled 
 guns of the Army of the Potomac, this system appears to have 
 embraced, among others, 10, 20, and 3O-pounder Parrotts, all of 
 which had been tested with satisfactory results before the 3-inch 
 (lo-pounder) ordnance gun made its appearance among the field 
 batteries of that army. 
 
 The decade from 1850 to 1860 had been signalized by experi- 
 ments which laid the foundation for changes that now followed 
 each other in quick succession. The original 8-inch and lo-inch 
 Columbiads having been previously turned into shell-guns, were 
 finally suppressed in 1861, their places supplied by others of the 
 same calibre, but strengthened at the breech to withstand the shock 
 of heavy charges. The 42-pounder gun and the 1 6-inch stone 
 mortar were suppressed. In February, 1861, a 1 5-inch Columbiad, 
 of the type afterwards known as the Rodman gun, was adopted. 
 In the same year new modeled 8 and lo-inch siege mortars, 10 
 and 13-inch mortars and an 8-inch howitzer for sea-coast service, 
 were adopted. These were all distinguished, as were the Rod- 
 man guns, by an absence of ornamental mouldings. In the line 
 of rifled ordnance, the 4^ -inch siege and the 3-inch field were 
 adopted in 1861. The changes which have been noted estab- 
 lished the artillery system in the Fall of 1861, when the Civil war 
 had been fairly inaugurated, so as to embrace the following: 
 
 Field: Wrought-iron 3-inch rifle, bronze 6 and 12-pounder guns; 
 i2-pounder Napoleon, 12-pounder mountain, and 12, 24, and 32- 
 pounder howitzers. 
 
 Siege and garrison: Cast-iron 4^ -inch rifle, 12, 18, and 24- 
 pounder guns, 24-pounder and 8-inch howitzers, and 8-inch and 
 io-inch mortars; Coehorn mortars (bronze). 
 
 Sea-coast: 32-pounder gun, 8, 10, and 15-inch Columbiads, 10 
 and 13-inch mortars. The total embraced seven different calibres 
 of guns, three of Columbiads, four of howitzers, and four of 
 mortars, or eighteen altogether the same as in 1850. 
 
 In 1861 the smooth-bore system of the United States was cer- 
 tainly excellent. In quality of cast-iron used and its manipula- 
 tion during manufacture it has been claimed, and with reason, 
 that our ordnance department led all others. If not the first upon 
 the ground, the department was among the pioneers in heavy 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 287 
 
 modern armaments, as was shown by the casting successfully 
 in that year what at the time was the most powerful weapon 
 known a 1 5-inch Rodman gun followed, in 1864, by a similar 
 but 2O-inch smooth-bore, throwing a shot weighing 1,080 pounds. 
 This was a grand stride, and placed the American artillery in no 
 secondary position in the array of national armaments at that 
 time developing. 
 
 The power of these smooth-bore guns developed the ' rack- 
 ing ' as distinguished from the rifle-gun ' punching system ' of 
 attack on iron-clads, and enabled the former for several years to 
 hold its own against the latter. To bring about this result was a 
 task of no mean magnitude. Its accomplishment redounds 
 immeasurably to the credit of those to whose labors success was 
 due. It was a new thing for a system of artillery, distinctly 
 American, to command the serious attention and respect of the 
 military nations. The disabling of numerous iron-clads, how- 
 ever, by shots from exemplars of the ' racking system ' placed 
 beyond question its efficiency when brought to bear on the armor- 
 plated vessels of that day. 
 
 But the contest which sprang up between the two systems 
 proved to be an unequal one. The ' rackihg, ' after a gallant 
 fight, went down before its opponent. This followed naturally 
 the successful application abroad of the principle of rifling to heavy- 
 gun constructions. In the United States men's minds were too 
 busily occupied with the paramount duties of the hour, growing 
 out of the Civil war, to fully take cognizance of as they had not 
 time to investigate the great advantages of the rifled cannon. 
 Seasons of active hostilities are not favorable to well-considered 
 changes of armament. The study the deliberate experiment 
 which must precede alterations based on correct scientific princi- 
 ples can only be secured in time of peace. Napoleon, at St. 
 Helena, while complaining that the Gribeauval system was too 
 heavy, and otherwise objectionable, took care to observe that, 
 though he had appreciated these facts, yet he had been too busily 
 engaged to apply, except imperfectly, the remedies, as this could 
 only be done when quiet and opportunity for experiment enabled 
 intelligent investigation to work out its methods of reform. 
 
 This was eminently true in the United States during the Civil 
 war. The development of the smooth-bore system went on 
 naturally and as a matter of course; it involved no principle not 
 
288 HISTORICAL SKETCH OP THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 already understood; it was but unfolding one after another the 
 principles of a system the foundations of which were laid by the 
 labors of Bomford and Rodman years before. Under the circum- 
 stances it was to be expected that the smooth-bore would, and 
 it was right that it should, receive more attention than the rifle. 
 Nor was this due to a disposition to ignore the importance 
 of the latter. In the report of the armament board appointed 
 December, 1861, it was remarked that "at present it is not 
 deemed expedient to recommend placing any large rifled guns in 
 our forts, but at an early day it is anticipated that guns of this 
 nature may take the place of an equal number of those in the 
 tables of armaments prepared by the board. In the meantime, 
 we recommend that unremitting experiments be made to settle 
 this point." 
 
 But, as Napoleon had found, due attention to the enemy in 
 front left little time for experiments in the rear. Only one 8-inch 
 and one 12 inch cast-iron Rodman rifle were placed on the 
 proving ground down to 1865. The result was that at the end 
 of the Civil war the only rifled guns of large calibre that had 
 been tested in service were the sole products of private foundries, 
 where plans for thefr construction had been matured prior to the 
 commencement of hostilities. 
 
 From 1 86 1 to 1867, therefore, the heavy armament of the 
 United States was made up of smooth-bores, except in so far as 
 the purchased products of private foundries were put in requi- 
 sition to add a rifle element of secondary importance. 
 
 Meanwhile the punching system rapidly abroad, at home 
 slowly had advanced in favor. It had begun to be doubtful 
 as to how long the racking could hold its own against the punch- 
 ing system. That the rifle should longer be excluded from 
 the sea-coast armament seemed suicidal. Accordingly the arma- 
 ment board of 1867* was instructed to determine, not only the 
 calibres of the ordnance for the forts, but also the proportion 
 of rifled guns which should be procured. This was a recognition 
 officially of the necessity that existed for supplementing (as in 
 that light it seemed to be viewed) the power of the smooth-bore 
 by that of the rifle. The board recommended the purchase of 
 
 * Convened per Special Orders No. 29, Adjutant-General's Office, January 
 18th, 1867. 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 289 
 
 equal numbers of smooth-bores and of rifles; but it seemed to dis- 
 cern the handwriting on the wall which foretold that the days of 
 the smooth-bore were numbered; for, after having made the recom- 
 mendation indicated, it adopted a resolution practically stultifying 
 itself, but no doubt expressing its views truthfully as to the rifle-_ 
 gun problem, to the following effect: " From the fact we are now 
 dealing with a new and greatly more powerful gun, and as the 
 emplacements, traverses, and platforms in fortifications will all 
 undergo change from the use of rifled artillery, we can express 
 no determinate opinion as to the relative number of rifled and 
 smooth-bore guns which should go to make up our armaments." 
 From this time on, however much the gospel of the ' racking 
 system ' might be preached by its disciples, its glory had de- 
 parted. Thenceforth the most that could be hoped for was that 
 the smooth-bore might share honors equally with its more prom- 
 ising competitor. The postponement of the inevitable the rele- 
 gation of the smooth-bore to the position of a mere auxiliary was 
 due to the fact that it was not practicable to procure a proper 
 metal for the rifle gun. Our cast-iron, indeed, was unsurpassed, 
 but such had been the experience with it that the chief of ordnance 
 reported in 1870 that the results obtained did not warrant him in 
 recommending that any cast-iron rifle guns be procured for arm- 
 ing the forts, and followed it the next year by the remark that, 
 with our knowledge of their construction and the metals of 
 which they should be made, he was dot willing to recommend 
 the purchase of any rifled cannon, but adding, ' ' as our smooth- 
 bore Rodmans are regarded as reliable and perfectly fit for service, 
 I shall continue to recommend their purchase." 
 
 From 1867 down to 1871, therefore, the smooth-bore, due partly 
 to the fact that efficient rifles seemed beyond our manufacturing 
 facilities, and partly to the reluctance of its devotees to acknowledge 
 that it had a superior, was in assumed relative importance kept side 
 by side with the rifle. The year 1871 saw it fall to the rear in 
 spite of the efforts of its friends and admirers. That which had 
 happened in every other artillery happened here the smooth- 
 bore took its proper and secondary place. This event, which had 
 been foreseen by the armament board of 1867, was officially an- 
 nounced by the chief of ordnance in his report of 1872. After 
 recommending the purchase of more smooth-bore cast-iron guns, 
 he remarked of their accuracy that " within a mile distance it is 
 37 
 
290 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 fully equal to that of rifled guns, and in many of our exposed 
 positions within easy range of hostile ships would be entirely 
 effective. To solve the problem completely, rifled guns with great 
 accuracy and long ranges and great penetrating power must be 
 provided." Although the smooth-bore was still clung to, the 
 insignificant part it was considered competent to act may be 
 judged when we reflect that, standing outside the range at which 
 it was claimed to be efficient, a modern iron-clad with even third- 
 rate rifles could crumble to pieces the foundation on which rested 
 its helpless and impotent adversary. 
 
 But even reduction to this unimportant role could not long save 
 the once formidable smooth-bore system, which was to receive no 
 rest until retired permanently from respectable modern armaments. 
 The chief of ordnance, it is true, continued as late as 1873 to urge 
 the purchase of more smooth-bores; but the only result was to add 
 to the already generous array of antiquities that garnished the de- 
 fences of our extended sea-board. The reign of the smooth-bore 
 was ended. Congress, by act of June 6th, 1872, had appropriated 
 $270,000 for experiments and tests with heavy-rifled ordnance. 
 This was the last nail in the coffin of the racking system, con- 
 fessedly worthless as it was for purposes of defense against even 
 second-rate armor-plated vessels of modern construction. The 
 lid which shut out forever the remains from view was firmly yet 
 decently closed by the hand of that faithful advocate and friend, 
 the chief of ordnance himself, who, December i4th, 1874, in an 
 official letter or report calling the attention of the authorities to 
 the importance of building up the sea-coast armament, remarked: 
 
 "Rifle guns ranging from eight inches to twelve inches in calibre, with power 
 sufficient to penetrate at considerable distances the armor of iron-clad vessels, 
 must be provided. The heaviest rifles are the guns of the present, as they will be of the 
 future; and while smooth-bores may for some time to come play a secondary part, 
 for want of a more powerful weapon, they must inevitably yield to the rifle in every 
 important juncture as the old smooth-bore musket has given place to the breech- 
 loading rifle in the hands of the soldier." 
 
 In the United States, therefore, the final and overwhelming 
 triumph of the heavy-rifle gun dates from 1874. While the 
 smooth-bore remains in our list of standard ordnance, it is simply 
 for the utilization of material on hand; the system is as obsolete 
 as anything can be; and, amidst the interesting questions that now 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 291 
 
 absorb the attention of the artillery world, it is, except as a 
 relic of the past, almost forgotten.* 
 
 At the same time that the question of smooth-bore against rifle 
 was being decided, that of breech against muzzle-loading was re- 
 ceiving attention. 
 
 The proposition to construct heavy-rifle guns on the breech- 
 loading principle received little serious consideration until, in 
 1872, the importance of the measure was so convincingly presented 
 to Congress that special appropriation was made to enable breech 
 mechanisms to be tested experimentally. Previously, however, 
 the subject had been discussed and reported on favorably by 
 boards of officers; but, except to fire a few shots on the proving 
 ground with the Mann cast-iron rifle, nothing in the line of testing 
 the breech-loader was done until about 1879. The ordnance 
 board of 1868 and the mixed board of 1870 recommended the 
 construction of 12- inch breech-loading cast-iron rifles, but the 
 chief of ordnance announced that he disapproved of and would 
 oppose the measure, until it was determined whether or not a 
 successful muzzle-loading rifle of large calibre could be manu- 
 factured. 
 
 The act of June 6th, 1872, providing funds for experiments and 
 tests with heavy-rifled ordnance, stipulated that the money should 
 be used to procure at least three models, to be designated by 
 a board of officers appointed by the Secretary of War, and to 
 include both classes breech and muzzle-loading cannon. Of 
 the seven different models selected by the board as worthy of 
 
 *The truth of what precedes is in nowise impaired by recent apparent at- 
 tempts to galvanize into life the corpse of the obsolete system and the report of 
 the ordnance board, as a result of experiments, that : " With our improved pow- 
 ders and projectiles the projectile energy of this gun [15-inch smooth-bore] has 
 been increased to an extent which renders it not only an efficient weapon for sec- 
 ondary defense, but even formidable as a primary gun for racking in many of 
 our harbors." 
 
 We have three hundred 15-inch smooth-bore guns distributed to the sea-coast 
 forts. The effort (a most laudable one) seems to be to prevent their being a total 
 loss on our hands without having fired a shot. The best we can hope from them 
 is to prevent a contemptible enemy approaching our shores with impunity. But 
 no amount of experiment, nor yet the profoundest reverence for the racking sys- 
 tem, will save the fort defended by these guns from being knocked to pieces by 
 even low-power rifles held beyond the range at which the smooth-bore is claimed 
 to be efficient. 
 
 
2Q2 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 trial, four were breech-loaders, viz.: (i) Krupp's, (2) Sutcliff's, 
 (3) Thompson's, and (4) French and Swedish; and, contingent 
 upon the appropriation proving sufficient, the Mann and the 
 Lyman multi-charge guns were recommended for trial. 
 
 Of these systems Krupp's alone had a well-established reputa- 
 tion; and the board was led to recommend the purchase of a 12- 
 inch gun of this pattern. No purchase, however, was made 
 of the i2-inch or any other Krupp. Instead, as is 'elsewhere 
 mentioned, an attempt was made to build up an American-Krupp 
 system, by attaching the Krupp breech-loading mechanism to 
 the converted 8-inch and the cast-iron 1 2-inch rifles of new 
 construction. As a final result, the intentions of the board of 
 1872 have been entirely frustrated. Neither the conversions nor 
 the new constructions could in any proper sense be said to test 
 either the Krupp breech mechanism or that system of gun- 
 making. In the attempt to build up a breech-loading Amer- 
 ican system the principle of the breech mechanism was held en- 
 tirely subordinate to the absorbing desire to develop successfully 
 the conversion idea, which for years monopolized the time and 
 attention of the authorities to the exclusion of all else. Yet 
 experiments made in pursuance of this plan were so satisfactory 
 as to lead the ordnance board in 1880 to conclude that "breech- 
 loading systems must supersede muzzle-loading;" and immedi- 
 ately contracts were entered into for the construction of four new 
 12-inch breech-loading rifled guns, appropriation for the manu- 
 facture of which had been specially made by Congress. Fortu- 
 nately, before work had far progressed, the breaking down of 
 the American-Krupp system, upon which they had been pro- 
 jected, enabled their construction to be arrested before the Gov- 
 ernment had been put to the expense of adding four more to the 
 number of pieces in its weak and inefficient heavy-rifle armament. 
 
 The other breech-loaders recommended by the board of 1872 
 were duly manufactured ; but, except the Lyman multi-charge, 
 they had not, save to fire a few rounds each, been experimentally 
 tested. Until the conversion mania had subsided, "by the blowing 
 up of the system in 1881, there was neither time nor money avail- 
 able for other purposes. Other systems were placed to one side, 
 while the favorite went boldly on to its natural and legitimate 
 end complete failure. But ere this time had arrived the idle 
 guns in the presence of that new and powerful element of gun 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 293 
 
 construction, steel had joined the ranks of systems past and gone; 
 nor had their peculiar breech mechanisms any advantages over 
 that of Krupp, already thoroughly tested, not only on the proving 
 ground, but in the more trying practice of active service. 
 
 To summarize, we see that, until 1868, the muzzle-loader alone - 
 was thought of. The few shots fired from the Mann before this 
 had led to no practical result whatever. From 1868 to 1872, the 
 breech-loader, while it had entered the lists, was kept subordinate 
 to the other ; but it gradually gained ground, until, in the latter 
 year, the two systems about equally divided the attention and 
 favor of our authorities. The breech-loader kept straight on in its 
 course, passing its competitor, which, under the announcement 
 of the ordnance board that breech-loading systems must supersede 
 muzzle-loading, finally, in 1880, retired from the field. The ap- 
 propriateness of this act was confirmed by the unanimous voice of 
 the board appointed pursuant to act of March 3d, 1881, not one of 
 the constructions recommended by it being a muzzle-loader. The 
 venerable and venerated associates the smooth-bore and the 
 muzzle-loader, full of years and honors were together laid quietly 
 away to rest. The latter has, however, been dragged temporarily 
 forth to fill the obscure niche cut out for it in the system of 8-inch 
 rifles converted from lo-inch smooth-bores. But all new construc- 
 tions are breech-loaders, which system is therefore, for all prac- 
 tical purposes, master of the situation, without a rival worthy of 
 the name. 
 
 Among improvements in modern gun construction, each of 
 which acts an important part in the perfect machine, is the 
 chamber. Although experimented with abroad before that time, 
 the first test of the principle in this country, so far as known, was 
 made with a muzzle-loading 3. 1 7-inch wrought-iron gun at Sandy 
 Hook in 1879. In reporting on the results, the ordnance board 
 remarked : 
 
 "It will be seen that the advantage of chambering is fully established, as the 
 results attained are most excellent, and fully equal to any developed abroad. 
 It is, therefore, of* the highest importance, in the opinion of the board, that 
 further experiments be made by applying this principle to higher calibres, and 
 practically establishing the extent to which it can be used in our sea-coast 
 armament/' 
 
 The results of the experiments here recommended have been 
 
294 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 elsewhere mentioned. They, in 1880, established that the cham- 
 ber was an indispensable feature of all gun constructions field, 
 siege, and sea-coast. 
 
 Regarding siege artillery, there is little to say. No gun, except 
 the 4^ -inch rifle, adopted in 1861, has been added to that arma- 
 ment. The same general principles of construction which affect 
 the heavier calibres must have their influence on the siege and 
 field-guns. The 12, 18, and 24-pounder smooth-bores have dis- 
 appeared from the list of siege pieces; and in proposed construc- 
 tions, steel as the metal, and the breech-loading and chambering 
 principles, appear as prominent, absolutely necessary, features. 
 
 There has been greater activity in the province of field artillery. 
 The 3-inch wrought-iron rifle of 1861 was pronounced too light, 
 in weight of metal thrown, by those who used it extensively 
 during the Civil war. Since then the effort has been to secure a 
 gun which will correct this evil. This caused the adoption, in 
 1868, of a model for a 3.5-inch rifle of wrought-iron firing a shot 
 weighing 16.75 pounds with three pounds of powder. While the 
 weight of the projectile would be an important point in its favor, 
 it is not likely this gun will ever appear in the field. With all 
 other wrought-iron muzzle-loaders it must give way before the 
 breech-loading steel guns, which alone at this time and prospect- 
 ively will make up first-power field armaments. 
 
 Experiments have been made with Moffatt's 3.o7-inch breech- 
 loading steel rifle, Sutcliff's breech-loading mechanism applied 
 to an ordinary 3-inch rifle, Dean's 3.5-inch muzzle-loading rifle, 
 made of bronze with hardened metal around the bore, and with 
 several 3-inch rifles converted into both muzzle and breech- 
 loaders of various models. The result has been that all interested 
 have settled down tq the belief that a breech-loading steel gun 
 is the field-piece, not of the future only, but of the present. Of 
 the conversions, the 3.2O-inch, consisting of the original 3-inch 
 wrought-iron gun reamed out and a steel breech-receiver attached, 
 seems to solve very efficiently the problem as to what disposition 
 shall be made of the present stock of 3-inch rifle muzzle-loaders. 
 
 In the United States, as in most countries, much attention has 
 been given, since 1870, to machine guns. In 1874 the .45-cal- 
 ibre Catling was adopted as an auxiliary for flank defense and for 
 all other parts of the national armament. By 1880 the i-inch and 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 295 
 
 5-inch Gatlings, the i. 45-inch Hotchkiss revolving cannon, with 
 the i. 65-inch Hotchkiss breech-loading rifle, the latter for moun- 
 tain service, had been added to the field system. The part that 
 these guns are to act in war remains to be determined. Their 
 chances, if brought against the longer range and more powerful^ 
 field-gun of the present day, would appear to be slight, and 
 their employment has been rejected by some of the first artilleries 
 of the world. Still, for flanking purposes, and in positions where 
 they can be protected from the projectiles of the rifle-gun, they 
 are very formidable, and in their effects on human life terribly 
 destructive. 
 
 The latest views on the subject of field artillery are contained 
 in the report of the board convened by General Orders No. 39, 
 Adjutant-General's Office, April 28th, 1881, which, in treating of 
 the field armament, proceeded as follows: 
 
 "After a careful examination of the various field-guns tested by the ordnance 
 board, we recommend for immediate adoption the converted 3.20 inch calibre 
 breech-loading gun with the round-back wedge fermeture, and that a sufficient 
 number to equip the five field batteries, for purposes of instruction and for 
 service generally, be prepared and issued as soon as practicable. Although 
 not in all respects such a gun as the board would suggest in a new construction 
 of the same calibre, the gun we have recommended satisfies nearly, if not quite, 
 all the conditions sought for in a light gun. Additional reasons render this 
 gun suitable for adoption, and they may be briefly stated as follows : 
 
 "1st. From the trial reports of the ordnance board it appears that this gun 
 compares favorably with any other field-gun of the same calibre in velocity, 
 accuracy, range, and weight of metal in the shell. In the simplicity of the 
 breech mechanism, and the facility with which it can be worked and handled, 
 it possesses undoubted advantages over any other gun presented or known to 
 the board; in this respect it is not inferior to any other field gun now manu- 
 factured. 
 
 " 2d. It is a tested and approved construction of the ordnance department 
 far superior to any field-gun now in our service. 
 
 "3d. As it is a converted gun, it is comparatively inexpensive, and, if 
 adopted, will enable the Government to advantageously and speedily dispose 
 of the old 3-inch muzzle-loading guns. 
 
 "4th. The only change recommended by the board in this gun is that the 
 position and direction of the vent and action of the fermeture shall be such 
 that the gun cannot be fired until the breech is closed and locked. 
 
 " The board is of opinion that for a permanent field system there should be 
 steel guns of two calibres, having weight and length of bore sufficient to give 
 a muzzle velocity of not less than 1,600 feet the lighter gun to throw a shell 
 of about thirteen pounds weight, and the heavier a shell of about twenty-two 
 
296 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 pounds weight; both guns to be modeled on the 3. 20-inch gun recommended 
 by the board. ******** 
 
 " In determining the most suitable gun for field service, the board has not 
 lost sight of the value of vertical fire in all field operations, and the likelihood 
 of its greater development in consequence of the influence of intrenchments, 
 rifle-pits, forts, and other temporary covers to which troops resort when con- 
 fronting each other. To provide for this kind of fire, the board recommends a 
 short rifle steel howitzer or mortar of not less than 5j-inch calibre, and of a 
 weight not to exceed 1,000 pounds, the same to be mounted on an iron or steel 
 carriage, so arranged that it can be attached to a limber, and when unlimbered 
 be ready for firing. Such a piece would find its use in reaching an enemy 
 sheltered by intrenchments, rifle-pits, or other cover, and in such temporary 
 siege operations as might take place. 
 
 "In fact, the usefulness of such batteries would be very great ; and while 
 the board is in doubt whether the service of such a piece does not more prop- 
 erly belong to the heavy than the field-artillery branch, its importance in 
 future field operations may be given as the reason for alluding to it." 
 
 The board commended the i. 65-inch calibre Hotchkiss moun- 
 tain rifle as an excellent gun for mountain and Indian service. 
 
 Concerning machine guns, the board made the following recom- 
 mendations : 
 
 " 1. That the Hotchkiss revolving cannon, calibre 1.5 inch, be adopted for 
 field service. 
 
 " 2. That the Gatling gun be retained, and that the calibre .45 gun have the 
 side-action crank and the improved rear adjustment. 
 
 " 3. That the improved Gardner gun be adopted for service. 
 
 " 4. That all guns, calibre .45, intended for field service be made to take the 
 cartridge of *70 grains powder and 500 grains bullet." 
 
 In conclusion, it will not be uninteresting to notice in detail the 
 measures which, since 1860, have been taken to secure a proper 
 system of artillery. First, there was the armament board of 
 1 86 1,* and which was instructed " to regulate and fix the number 
 and calibre of the cannon to be mounted en barbette and in case- 
 mates in each of the permanent fortifications of the United States, 
 and also the number and descriptions of guns to comprise field 
 batteries." This board recommended the adoption of a 1 3-inch 
 smooth-bore as an intermediate calibre between the lo-inch and 
 the 15-inch then in service, and that both 2o-inch and 3o-inch 
 smooth-bores, on the same plan as the 15-inch (Rodman's), should 
 be constructed. Except for the 3O-inch gun, these recommenda- 
 
 * Appointed pursuant to Special Orders No. 314, Headquarters of the Army, 
 November 26th, 1861. 
 
MATERIEL: SYSTEMS OF ARTILLERY. 297 
 
 tions were carried into execution, the first 2O-inch being cast in 
 1864.* The armament board of 1867 added a 15-inch mortar and 
 10 and 12-inch rifle-guns to the list of calibres, and expressed the 
 opinion that the Catling gun, or one of similar character, might 
 be advantageously used in flank defense in place of the 24- 
 pounder howitzer of 1839. 
 
 The calibres of guns, mortars, and howitzers having been 
 determined upon by the armament board, a board of ordnance 
 officers was assembled to determine the best mode and metal for 
 their construction. The latter was the first board to recommend 
 the construction of lined cast-iron rifle-guns. Among others, this 
 board also made the recommendation that the 8-inch howitzer, 
 without preponderance, supplant the 24-pounder flank defense, 
 the latter to be abolished. Further, it presented the following 
 as a list of the standard ordnance; and as this part of the pro- 
 ceedings was approved by the Secretary of War, it exhibits the 
 authorized artillery system of 1868: 
 
 Field service : 3 and 3.5 inch rifles, wrought- iron ; 4.62-inch smooth-bore 
 (bronze) Napoleon; 4.62-inch smooth-bore mountain howitzer; and 1-inch and 
 .5-inch Gatling guns (on trial). 
 
 Siege and sea-coast: 4.5-inch rifle, cast-iron; 8-inch smooth-bore howitzer, 
 cast-iron; 8-inch smooth-bore mortar, cast-iron; and 10-inch smooth-bore mor- 
 tar, cast-iron. 
 
 Sea-coast: 10-inch rifle, cast-iron ; 12-inch rifle, cast-iron ; 13-inch smooth- 
 bore, cast-iron ; 15-inch smooth-bore, cast-iron ; 20-inch smooth-bore, cast-iron ; 
 13-inch smooth-bore mortar, cast-iron; and 15-inch smooth bore mortar, cast- 
 iron. 
 
 * The committee of the armament board of 1861, upon which was devolved 
 the duty of determining the number and kinds of guns for field batteries, was 
 composed of General Barry, Colonel Hunt, and Captain Rodman. The report 
 of this committee, which was adopted by the board and approved by the Sec- 
 retary of War, was in substance as follows. In the light of subsequent events 
 it will not be uninteresting. They recommended (1) that mounted batteries be 
 composed of eight pieces ; horse-artillery batteries of six pieces ; (2) that but one 
 calibre, smooth-bore or rifled, be used in any battery ; that for the time being 
 those calibres be 12-pounder Napoleons and 3-inch rifles, and that horse-artil- 
 lery batteries be equipped exclusively with 3-inch rifles. 
 
 " However, as to mounted batteries, we have not yet sufficient experience with 
 the rifled field-gun to fix their composition definitely, but, so far as practicable, 
 but one kind of gun should be used in any battery. 
 
 " The description of guns for each battery and the proportion of each in mixed 
 batteries must be determined by the nature of the service to be performed and 
 by other circumstances." 
 
 38 
 
298 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 This list embraced no model of a date previous to 1861, except 
 the i2-pounder Napoleon.* 
 
 The lo-inch Rodmans, since become famous through the efforts 
 to build up thereon a system of 8 and g-inch rifles, are omitted 
 from this table. In so far as the heavy-rifled guns were concerned 
 ( 10 and 12-inch), it would appear that they were standard ord- 
 nance in name and on paper only, as, in 1873, the chief of 
 ordnance, in his report, remarked that " no rifle of large calibre 
 has yet been adopted for our service. ' ' 
 
 As a result of the recommendations of the board convened 
 pursuant to act of June 6th, 1872, and the exertions of the ord- 
 nance department in the same line of action, the converted system 
 of rifles was added to the list of heavy ordnance. Between 1874 
 and 1880 the machine guns and the i. 65-inch breech-loading 
 Hotchkiss rifle, as previously mentioned, were added to the field 
 system. 
 
 The modifications here mentioned changed the list of 1868 to 
 that of 1880 the last published system of United States artillery 
 which is: 
 
 Field service : 4.62-inch (12-pounder) smooth-bore, bronze; 3.5-inch rifle, 
 wrought-iron ; 3-inch rifle, wrought-iron ; J .65-inch rifle (breech-loader), steel ; 
 1.45-inch revolving cannon, steel ; .45-inch Gatling (both long and short), and 
 4.62-inch smooth-bore howitzer, (mountain service.) 
 
 Siege and garrison : 4.5-inch rifle-gun, cast-iron ; 8-inch smooth-bore how- 
 itzer, cast-iron; 8-inch smooth-bore mortar, cast-iron; 10-inch smooth-bore 
 mortar, cast-iron ; and 5.82-inch Coehorn mortar, bronze. 
 
 Sea-coast: 12-inch rifle, cast-iron; 12-inch rifle, cast-iron, with wrought-iron 
 tube; 10-inch rifle (converted), cast-iron, with wrought-iron tube; 8-inch 
 rifle (converted), cast-iron, with wrought-iron tube ; 20-inch rifle (smooth-bore), 
 cast-iron; 15-inch rifle (smooth-bore), cast-iron; 13-inch rifle (smooth-bore), 
 cast-iron; and 13-inch and 15-inch mortars, (smooth-bore), cast-iron. 
 
 * The 24-pounder Coehorn was, perhaps inadvertently, omitted from the list. 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 299 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 TACTICS: GENERALLY. 
 
 Introductory to a few remarks on the tactics of artillery, it will 
 be interesting, and tend as well to an understanding of the subject, 
 to mention in their order the various works in this field that have 
 been published for the use of the army. 
 
 Only meagre information has been gathered concerning instruc- 
 tion for and manoeuvres of artillery during the Revolutionary 
 war. Tousard's Artillerists' Companion, printed in 1809, gives 
 the manual as then practiced, and the simplest exercises of bat- 
 talion pieces, with their ammunition wagons or tumbrels. But from 
 Stevens' ' ' System of Discipline for the Artillery, ' ' we are led to 
 believe that each artillery officer exercised his detachment or 
 company as suited his fancy, according to traditional ideas, as 
 there was nothing written and stamped with the seal of authority 
 for his guidance. 
 
 The first treatise on the tactics and discipline of the artillery 
 arm emanating from an American source that has descended to 
 these times was that of Captain Stevens referred to. Prepared 
 for the press as early as 1792, its publication was delayed until 
 1797. The author had been a captain in Lamb's regiment 
 of Revolutionary artillery. The manuscript was prepared for 
 three volumes, duodecimo. Volume one treated of the formation 
 of a corps of artillery and the duties and practice of light field ar- 
 tillery; volume two, of the theory and practice of heavy artillery 
 in garrison and on board the navy, and furnished an extract on 
 the origin and principles of courts-martial. Volume three treated 
 of laboratory duty, gave a great variety of directions for making 
 compositions, the method of preparing fire-works, and the various 
 kinds of ammunition necessary for different species of ordnance. 
 Thus the plan 'of the work covered the ground of both theoretical 
 and practical artillery, except fortification, very thoroughly; but 
 in fact only volume one was published. 
 
 It is not known whether this system was or was not adopted 
 by the War Department for the regular artillery. There is no 
 
3OO HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 doubt as to its adaptability, although the context shows that 
 Stevens had directly in view supplying the wants of the militia 
 artillery, in which he was an officer. In those early days, 
 when the hopeless failure of Knox's Utopian plan of militia or- 
 ganization had not become an established fact, it was believed 
 that this branch of the national force could be equipped, prepared 
 for, and placed in the field, as provided by law, which illusion 
 has since been rudely dispelled. 
 
 That the System of Discipline was not, however, considered all 
 that was needed by the regular artillery, even if adopted therefor, 
 maybe inferred from the fact that Inspector -General Hamilton 
 and Major -General Pinckney had made considerable progress in 
 digesting a system of exercises and discipline for the artillery 
 arm, when, in 1800, the additional army raised in anticipation 
 of war with France was disbanded, and those officers mustered 
 out of service. Their manuscript was left at the War Office, where 
 it was doubtless, in the same year, destroyed by the fire which 
 consumed the Department records. 
 
 In September, 1808, General James Wilkinson, then command- 
 ing the army, had prepared a complete "modern system of 
 movements and manoeuvres for infantry, artillery, and cavalry," 
 translated principally from the French, and was arranging, under 
 the direction of Secretary Dearborn, for its publication; but, so 
 far as is known, the work was never prosecuted to completion, 
 although the Secretary urged that it be given to the army with 
 all possible celerity. The manuscript, like its predecessor pre- 
 pared by Hamilton and Pinckney, has disappeared, and left be- 
 hind but the faintest trace of having existed. It is possible that 
 the change of administration, March 4th, 1809, put an end to this 
 measure, as it did to others of great practical utility which Secre- 
 tary Dearborn had set on foot for the benefit of the army. The 
 result was that a second war with Great Britain found the United 
 States without any recognized system of instruction save Baron 
 Steuben's infantry regulations and a system of horse -artillery 
 manoeuvres written at Paris in 1800 by General Kosciusko. The 
 latter had been prepared at the request of an American citizen, 
 who presented it to the Philosophical Society of West Point, New 
 York. Although Kosciusko' s manoeuvres were written on the 
 supposition that the battery was organized as in France, they 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 301 
 
 could be, with obvious modifications, equally adapted to the 
 light artillery of the United States. 
 
 The paucity of materials on the subject of regulations, tactics, 
 and military administration impaired alike the discipline and effi- 
 ciency of the army, and formed an almost insurmountable barrier- 
 to the progress of an officer ambitious to excel in, or even attain 
 a fair knowledge of, the theoretical part of his profession. This 
 fact was forcibly presented to the War Department by Captain 
 Winfield Scott, of the .new light artillery regiment, in a letter 
 dated July I4th, 1809, in which he requested to be sent to Europe 
 to collect and compile materials for supplying the army with 
 treatises on military police, discipline, and tactics. Referring to 
 the limited knowledge of officers regarding the proper manage- 
 ment and uses of horse artillery, the writer remarked: "The 
 recent introduction of this important corps into the American 
 service, and its peculiar duties and organization, leave it certain 
 that it can be but imperfectly practiced or understood in this 
 country. France is the best school for obtaining a knowledge 
 of it." Captain Scott's proposition was not accepted. It was 
 left for him, six years later, when, as a general officer of the reg- 
 ular army, he visited Europe, to collect the necessary data for 
 the first comprehensive system of regulations given to the regu- 
 lar army, and which, to use General Scott's words, after being 
 "obscured, mutilated, and pirated from 1836 down to 1861, 
 inclusive, ' ' forms the foundation on which rest the army regula- 
 tions of the present day. 
 
 War was declared without the Government having at its dis- 
 posal any system of manoeuvres for the artillery except that of 
 Kosciusko. Major Amos Stoddard compiled and hurried through 
 the press a small work on the manual of cannon and the ma- 
 noeuvres of field and horse artillery. It was incomplete in de- 
 tails. The emergency did not permit elaboration; yet it proved 
 sufficient for practical purposes. And as the order formally 
 adopting Stoddard' s work furnishes the first instance of the artil- 
 lery being authoritatively supplied with a general system of in- 
 struction, it merits preservation. It is as follows: 
 
 "WAR DEPARTMENT, August 1st, 1812. 
 
 "The 'exercises for cannon and field ordnance,' and 'manoeuvres for horse 
 artillery, as altered from the manual of General Kosciusko and adapted to the 
 service of the United States/ are hereby ordered for the government of the 
 
302 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 several corps of artillery in the said service. Such alterations and improve- 
 ments as experience may suggest will be reported to the several commanding 
 officers of regiments, and by them to the Department of War." 
 
 The Government gave the West Point Philosophical Society 
 $200 for the copyright of Kosciusko's manoeuvres thus appropri- 
 ated. No alterations or improvements in Stoddard's work were 
 announced during the war of 1812. It remained the standard 
 authority until the adoption of Lallemand's system in 1821. 
 
 Tousard's Artillerists' Companion, before mentioned, which 
 appeared in 1809, although an exhaustive, scientific, and excel- 
 lent treatise, was neither a system of tactics nor of instruction. 
 In the language of Colonel Tousard, it was intended to demon- 
 strate, ' ' first, the necessity for both theoretical and practical 
 instruction to officers of artillery; second, that the artillery one 
 of the most necessary branches of the military profession re- 
 quires at the hands of its devotees early, constant, and attentive 
 study; third, the present advantages of improvements, founded 
 on theory and practice; fourth, the advantage of uniformity and 
 regularity in the construction of materiel." We are informed in 
 the preface that the work ' ' was composed in obedience to the 
 wishes of the great George Washington. It was begun as early 
 as 1795. This great man often lamented the absolute want of an 
 elementary treatise on artillery and the scarcity of English books 
 on this branch of military science. He considered such a defi- 
 ciency as an obstacle to the progress of instruction, which he was 
 very desirous to remove, by rendering the works of authors and 
 officers who had written upon artillery in other languages familiar 
 to the officers of the corps of artillerists and engineers." While 
 well serving the purposes for which it was written, the Com- 
 panion was too voluminous and expensive for general distribu- 
 tion to the army, though it was long justly considered an author- 
 ity on the subjects of which it treated. 
 
 The only other American work which has covered, equally 
 with the Companion, the whole ground of the artillerists' profes- 
 sional studies, is a "Treatise on Artillery" by H. Lallemand. 
 The author had been general of artillery of the Imperial Guard 
 under Napoleon; and being proscribed by Louis XVIII, July 
 24th, 1815, sought refuge in the United States, where he died 
 September i5th, 1823. His manuscript treatise was in three 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 303 
 
 volumes. Volume one treated of the organization of artillery, its 
 service in campaign, and tactics ; volume two, of the art of forti- 
 fication, principally in connection with artillery, and of castra- 
 mentation; volume three, of the principles of construction to be 
 used in all kinds of artillery materiel, and the relations of trie- 
 artillery to the other arms of service. Volumes one and two 
 were translated and published in 1820. By orders from the War 
 Department the President directed that, having approved the 
 treatise, so much of the work as was embraced in the exercise of 
 field artillery, school of the battle piece, evolutions of field bat- 
 teries, school of the mountain pieces, exercise and management 
 of siege, garrison, and sea-coast guns, and mechanical manoeuvres, 
 should be adopted for the service of the United States. Volume 
 three, so far as is known, was never printed. It was ready for 
 publication at the time of Lallemand's death, and Mr. Calhoun 
 authorized its purchase, with a view to adoption as a text-book 
 at the artillery school; but as no copy has been found, it is inferred 
 that volume three was not published. 
 
 Lallemand's were not so bulky as Tousard's volumes, but were 
 in other respects little better suited for text-books. They formed, 
 as the name indicated, a treatise on artillery covering 'the whole 
 range of professional subjects, with their bearings upon other 
 branches of service, and from necessity were written in a style 
 entirely too general to serve for a system of tactical instruction 
 adapted to the needs of service. 
 
 By act of May i2th, 1820, Congress prescribed that the tactics 
 of the regular army should be used by the militia also, but Lalle- 
 mand's treatise was too elaborate for either. To supply the 
 deficiency for the militia, a mixed board of regular and militia offi- 
 cers was convened in October, 1826, of which General Scott was 
 president, to prepare, among other things, a system of instruction 
 for field artillery. The board made a report in December of the 
 same year, recommending the " Manual for Artillery of 'the Garde 
 Roy ale" translated by Lieutenant Daniel Tyler, First Artillery. 
 It was subsequently published, and, pursuant to act of Congress, 
 5,000 copies purchased for the use of the militia, the title being : 
 "A System of Exercise and Instruction of Field Artillery, in- 
 cluding Manoeuvres of Light or Horse Artillery." 
 
 The proceedings of this board early drew attention to the fact 
 that if this work were approved the militia would be furnished 
 
304 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 with a system of manoeuvres for field and horse artillery far more 
 complete than was that of the regular army. It was felt that this 
 was a state of affairs neither creditable to the latter nor to be perpet- 
 uated. To meet the difficulty, a board was at first resolved upon to 
 digest a complete course of instruction based on the Gribeauval 
 system of artillery. There was not a single harnessed battery in 
 service. It was conceded that the facilities at hand were not such 
 as would enable the board to take up and push to a successful 
 issue, and in a manner satisfactory to the Government, the work 
 in contemplation. Even at the artillery school of practice, though 
 the materiel was forthcoming, the pieces, when manoeuvred, 
 were hauled by men using bricoles. Under these circumstances 
 the plan that gave promise of being most successful was not to 
 convene a board, as had been proposed, but to send an officer 
 to study the adopted (Gribeauval) system on its native soil and 
 at the French camps of instruction. This course was determined 
 on by the Department after more maturely considering the situa- 
 tion. The proposed board was therefore unnecessary, its labors 
 being performed by more satisfactory methods. Lieutenant Tyler 
 was selected for this delicate and responsible duty. His orders, 
 dated War Department, January 3d, 1828, directed him to exam- 
 ine into and report upon the most recent system of French 
 artillery, to translate their tactics and manoeuvres with a view to 
 adopting all into the regular service of the United States; and so 
 far as compatible with this, the main object of his mission, he was 
 to take advantage of every opportunity to acquire information 
 on other military matters of interest and- importance. 
 
 Proud of the honor thus conferred upon him, and anxious to 
 prove himself worthy of it, Tyler, with abundant opportunities 
 for observation, soon translated the whole Gribeauval system of 
 exercises and manoeuvres, a lithographic edition of three hundred 
 copies being struck off at Metz, in 1828, under his supervision 
 and at his expense. These were sent to the United States and 
 distributed to the army, supplying a long-felt want, when circum- 
 stances to be mentioned, and which had not been anticipated, 
 rendered them valueless. The translation was in three volumes. 
 Volume one embraced the school of the cannoneer, field artillery; 
 volume two, the service of siege, garrison, and sea-coast artillery; 
 volume three, manoeuvres of field batteries. 
 
 Although Lieutenant Tyler had, in obedience to instructions, 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 305 
 
 made the translations in question by far the most complete that 
 the army had seen he soon became convinced that the course 
 of the Gribeauval artillery system was run. The French Gov- 
 ernment had already, after the most exhaustive trials to prove 
 its efficiency, adopted a modification of the English block-trail 
 system of gun-carriage. Notwithstanding the efforts of that 
 Government to keep everything pertaining to it a profound 
 secret, the young American obtained minutely exact drawings 
 of the new system of materiel. These, upon his return to the 
 United States, were turned over to the technical branch of the 
 artillery, and were at once utilized to manufacture the first of the 
 present style of artillery carriages for field, siege, and garrison 
 guns. (See Materiel, p. 239, ante.) 
 
 It was at once seen that labor on the old system, if not lost, 
 would be of questionable utility. The new system met triumph- 
 antly every objection urged against the Gribeauval, while intro- 
 ducing scarcely any of its own. 
 
 Artillery materiel being in this state of transition, it followed 
 that questions of tactics and instruction also remained in abey- 
 ance. As a result, Lallemand's Treatise, with its recognized 
 imperfections, remained for some years longer the only authority 
 on these subjects issued to the army. 
 
 As was the case in France, whence we had directly received 
 our ideas, it took nearly ten years of discussion and experiment 
 to bring out the stock-trail system, which drove all competitors 
 from the field and relegated that of Gribeauval to the back-ground. 
 Simultaneously with this event came the mounting of Ringgold's 
 horse battery and the equipping as field artillery of one company 
 in each of the other artillery regiments. Provisions for instruc- 
 tion moved on with equal pace, and in 1839 appeared Captain 
 Anderson's translation of the French ''Instruction for Field 
 Artillery, Horse and Foot," arranged for and adapted to the 
 service of the United States. These instructions were for the 
 stock-trail system what the manual of the Garde Royale and the 
 work of Lallemand were for the Gribeauval, but more complete 
 than either; and so far as field artillery was concerned, it super- 
 seded both. The principles upon which this arm of the public 
 service is based were unfolded in a manner at once entertaining 
 and instructive; the arrangement of the subject-matter was sys- 
 tematic, the definitions clear and explicit. 
 39 
 
306 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 There was, however, one officer who was dissatisfied with the 
 new instructions. This was Brevet-Major Ringgold, of the horse 
 artillery, who had, previous to the appearance of the new, ma- 
 noeuvred his battery in accordance with the English system. For 
 a time the practice of that portion of Anderson's work relating to 
 horse artillery was, by War Department orders, suspended; but 
 this injunction proving only temporary, Ringgold, in 1843, had 
 the address to secure the ordering a board, of which he was a 
 member, for its revision. The result of the labors of this board 
 appeared in the form of a system of "Instruction for Field Artil- 
 lery, Horse and Foot," which was adopted by the War Depart- 
 ment March 6th, 1845. The changes from Anderson's Instruction, 
 which characterized its successor, were adopted at Major Ring- 
 gold's suggestion, and resulted in an English- Americanized re- 
 vision of the French system. The new work appeared just in 
 time for the Mexican war, in which the field artillery sprang at 
 once into the front rank of the combatant arms. 
 
 The siege and mountain materiel of the stock-trail pattern hav- 
 ing been closely guarded by the ordnance department until taken to 
 the field by its employe's, in 1 846-^7, and the character of the sea- 
 coast armament not having been determined upon, no change 
 from Lallemand's system of instruction for these was necessary, 
 nor was any made, until after the return of the army from Mexico, 
 when, by General Orders No. 12, Headquarters of the Army, 
 July 27th, 1849, a board of officers was instituted to prepare a com- 
 plete course of instruction for siege, garrison, sea- coast, and 
 mountain service. That for the mountain service was approved by 
 the War Department December 5th, 1850, and that for the heavy 
 artillery May loth, 1851, which therefore marks the date when, 
 for the first time, all branches of the arm were provided with 
 tactics adapted to the stock-trail system of carriages. 
 
 The instructions of 1845, although excellent so far as they went, 
 embraced little more than the manual of the piece and the ma- 
 noeuvres of a battery. The proper organization of artillery for and 
 its management in the field were merely touched upon. Much of 
 Anderson's instruction germane to these important features of any 
 complete system were omitted, thus securing brevity at the ex- 
 pense of clearness and a knowledge of the principles on which the 
 field artillery rested, which made the work very unsatisfactory as 
 a text-book. 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 307 
 
 The board of officers appointed to supply this deficiency by 
 Special Orders No. 229, Adjutant-General's Office, 1855, for 
 some cause, never met; but its work was taken up and pushed to 
 completion by another board, assembled in 1858, which prepared 
 the "Instruction for Field Artillery," approved by the War- 
 Department March 6th, 1860. 
 
 This, while embodying the instruction of 1845, went much 
 further, far exceeding in breadth of design and completeness of 
 execution anything of a similar nature that had been given the 
 artillery arm. Its appearance on the eve of the Civil war was a 
 most felicitous event, enabling the volunteer batteries to system- 
 atically and thoroughly prepare for the field in the least possible 
 time and most efficient manner. 
 
 At the same time with the new instructions there was adopted in 
 service what was a fitting supplement thereto, viz. , ' ' Evolutions 
 of Field Batteries," translated from the French by Major Robert 
 Anderson, and embracing essentially the same manoeuvres as are 
 comprehended in the "School of the Battalion," present light- 
 artillery tactics. Together, they supplied the theoretical knowl- 
 edge necessary to organize the regular and volunteer batteries, both 
 singly and in masses, for the great events calling them to action. 
 
 The features wherein the instruction of 1860 was superior to its 
 predecessors consisted in articles on organization, materiel, and 
 the service of artillery in campaign, presenting a philosophical 
 and instructive expos of the general principles underlying the 
 formation, discipline, and service, both in peace and war, of an 
 efficient field artillery. To this rationale of the subject-matter of 
 instruction there was added the school of the soldier, mounted 
 and dismounted, beginning at squad drill and extending to the 
 exercises of detachments, together with a system of battery ma- 
 noeuvres more complete than any that had preceded it. The first 
 was an important feature, rendering the instruction independent 
 of others, and making unnecessary constant reference to the tactics 
 of infantry and cavalry, as had been the case before; the latter 
 only added to the finished character of the work as a course of 
 instruction. And while the assimilated tactics now in use seek 
 to render the information and experience acquired in one arm of 
 service directly available in others in a greater degree than was 
 formerly attempted, it is equally true that the clear, incisive style 
 of the instructions of 1860 has been obscured in the assimilated 
 
308 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 edition by transposition, attempts at brevity, and a passion for 
 change, which could only be indulged at the sacrifice of a dis- 
 tinctive, well-defined individuality. 
 
 The result of the labors of the board appointed to assimilate 
 the tactics of the other arms to those of infantry were given to the 
 army in 1873. The success with which the work of assimilation 
 has been met in these tactics a principle the value of which, if 
 properly put in execution and restricted to its proper limits, is not 
 underestimated will be considered hereafter; but protest is here 
 entered against some of the principles laid down for the guidance 
 of artillery in the crucial test of battle. 
 
 In the assimilated infantry tactics, it is enjoined upon officers 
 to ' ' cultivate among the men the feeling that they cannot be 
 beaten, ' ' while with artillery the aim seems to be to create the 
 impression that they can be beaten, and that easily; hence they 
 must take care of themselves, even at a sacrifice of bold and decis- 
 ive movements. It is taught that the safety of the pieces depends 
 upon the advantage that is taken of accidents of the ground; that 
 the increased range and effect of infantry fire has impaired the 
 utility of guns at short ranges, and made cover more necessary 
 than ever for the protection of batteries; that the latter can no 
 longer move up within short range of troops and open fire with 
 cannister the use offensively of which is entirely ended; that 
 artillery fire is apt to become inefficient at a greater range than 
 2,500 yards; that if a battery remains within 900 yards of the 
 enemy' s infantry the chances are, particularly if there be no cover, 
 that it will be disabled. 
 
 So far from these principles being calculated to inspire the 
 artilleryman with the ' ' feeling that he cannot be beaten, ' ' which 
 feeling alone can and does render the soldier individually, or 
 soldiers collectively, formidable, they must have the opposite 
 tendency, engendering timidity and pusilanimity; as his only 
 hope to escape annihilation at the hands of his murderous adver- 
 sary, the infantryman, inspired with the true spirit of the soldier, 
 through the "feeling that he cannot be beaten," is to either seek 
 cover or leave the field. The sole relief from this impression of 
 decadence in the importance of his arm, when compared with that 
 of his more fortunate rival, vouchsafed to the artilleryman, is in 
 the reflection that the value of his rifle-gun fire has been enhanced 
 at long range. 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 309 
 
 This attempt at depreciation is hardly to be looked for, par- 
 ticularly in artillery works of instruction, and must, if followed to 
 its legitimate consequences undue cautiousness and loss of mili- 
 tary spirit strike at the foundation of honor; is a fitting prelude 
 to disaster, is repugnant to every instinct that animates the soldier, _ 
 and is at variance with experience, which shows that improvements 
 in artillery .and infantry arms have gone on part pas 'su, as have 
 likewise the importance of these branches of service; and, in truth, 
 in Europe to-day more attention is directed to bringing out the 
 powers of artillery than is the case with any other arm, through 
 a well-founded belief, based on the experience of recent wars, that 
 the way is open for the development therein of an increased rela- 
 tive importance. 
 
 In the field of heavy artillery tactics,* the edition of 1862, pub- 
 lished when the Civil war was in progress, formed the only con- 
 necting link between the tactics of 1851 and Tidball's Manual, 
 approved in 1880, for use in sea-coast garrisons. 
 
 The heavy artillery tactics of 1851 embraced only the manual, 
 mechanical manoeuvres, and the nomenclature of siege, sea-coast, 
 and garrison artillery, with just so much instruction for dismounted 
 detachments as would enable the cannoneers to be marched to 
 and from their pieces. The edition of 1862 differed from that of 
 1851 in the parading of detachments, which was done as in field 
 artillery, and the addition of a few hints on the service of rifled 
 guns. 
 
 * Artillery troops are divided into light and foot or heavy. Pieces of artil- 
 lery are sometimes designated as light and heavy. The latter term, applied to 
 personnel as distinguished from materiel, is of recent origin in the United States 
 service ; but confounding the piece with the man who handles it is not of recent 
 date, nor has it been confined to the heavy artillery branch. 
 
 Captain Stevens applied the terms light, field, and heavy to pieces equipped 
 for service, i. <?., materiel. Light artillery, as used in the act of April 12th, 1808, 
 referred to personnel, being by contemporaneous authorities synonymous with 
 horse artillery ; and the latter, as used by both Kosciusko and Stoddard, meant 
 personnel, or its organization, and had no reference to the materiel used. 
 
 Stoddard applied the term field artillery to both personnel and materiel, 
 while he used the term cannon to designate larger calibres of guns. 
 
 Lallemand divided the personnel of artillery into field, horse (or light), and 
 foot. The latter manned mountain, siege, garrison, and sea-coast artillery. 
 
 In Anderson's translation (1839) and the instruction of 1845, the designations 
 horse and foot referred to personnel. 
 
310 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 Tidball's Manual of Heavy Artillery is a much more compre- 
 hensive work. During the Civil war the whole subject of the 
 proper handling of heavy artillery was in an unsettled state. It 
 was necessary to use such means for the management of the new 
 materiel as circumstances allowed; but from necessity there was 
 diversity of practice, and there was neither time nor opportunity 
 to reduce the whole to system. 
 
 The re-establishment of the artillery school at Fortress Monroe 
 in 1867 laid the foundation for this deferred work. Notes on 
 the results of practice at the school in the manual and in the 
 mechanical manoeuvres of the most recent siege, garrison, and 
 sea-coast guns in the hands of artillery troops were carefully 
 made, revised, and preserved, to appear in the new Manual, re- 
 placing what was old and obsolete. But this was npt its only 
 important feature. Breaking from the fetters which, under the 
 specious plea of assimilation, would bind all arms to the infantry ', 
 no matter how incongruous their natural elements may make the 
 union, Major Tidball has given the troops of heavy artillery a 
 system of manoeuvres of their own. It is worthy of note that this 
 system, founded on the ' exercise of detachments, ' Field Artillery 
 Instructions of 1860, demonstrates conclusively that the present 
 assimilated tactics of all arms rest, through the infantry tactics, 
 upon the same basis, the only difference being that in the In- 
 struction mentioned and in Tidball's Manual the block of eight 
 men is styled a 'detachment,' while in the infantry tactics it 
 is called a ' set of fours. ' Aside from the advantages that must 
 
 As used in the tactics of 1851, the term heavy artillery referred to materiel 
 only. 
 
 In the Instruction for Field Artillery of 1860, where the analysis of principles 
 on which the artillery service. is founded is presented in a clear manner, the 
 personnel of that arm is divided into field and foot the former serving mounted 
 and horse batteries; the latter, mountain, rocket, siege, garrison, and sea-coast 
 batteries. 
 
 Up to this time the term " heavy," in the artillery nomenclature, referred to 
 materiel only, and there was no confusion of ideas as to what it meant ; but 
 during the Civil war, the designation "heavy" was given several regiments of 
 volunteers raised to serve siege and sea-coast guns. Right here, and under 
 the sanction of the highest military authority of the Government, the practice 
 began of using the same term heavy to designate both personnel and mate- 
 riel. However objectionable this may be, tending to confusion and being 
 unnecessary, it has, for the present at least, fixed itself upon the service. 
 
TACTICS: GENERALLY. 311 
 
 result from a system of manoeuvres adapted to this (heavy) 
 branch of the artillery, the recognition of the fact that this is 
 a distinct part of the military service, subject to rules peculiar 
 to itself, is not only conducive to discipline, but creates and 
 strengthens a pride in their own arm, by reminding soldie_rs 
 that they are not simply infantry in artillery garb, but that they 
 are in fact artillerymen. 
 
 The remaining articles of the Manual (i) Artillery against 
 Armored Vessels and in Harbor Defense, (2) Attack and Defense of 
 Intrenched Positions, (3) Field Intrenchments, (4) Submarine 
 Mines, (5) Salutes and Ceremonies are important and practically 
 useful, and add to the completeness of the work as a valuable 
 course of instruction. 
 
 To the credit of the artillery school let it be remembered that 
 principally through its instrumentality is due the fact that the 
 scope and value of Tidball's Manual, when compared with its 
 predecessors the various heavy artillery tactics may be taken to 
 measure quite accurately the interest in and knowledge of their 
 profession, which characterized officers of the artillery at the 
 epochs, respectively, at which they were written and issued for 
 the use of the army. 
 
312 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 
 
 Except for a few pieces mentioned in Tousard's Artillerists' 
 Companion, no trace has been preserved of the field-artillery 
 exercise of the Revolutionary war. There is the best authority 
 for the statement that there was in this matter no uniformity, 
 either prescribed or practiced. In the introduction to Stevens' 
 System of Discipline, it is remarked: 
 
 " Several authors have written on the theoretical part of artillery, but the 
 manual exercise of field-artillery has been transmitted by tradition, which ac- 
 counts in some measure for the variety in this part of their duty among artil- 
 lerists. It is therefore absolutely necessary to have a uniformity in the 
 exercise of artillery, there not being any in particular adopted, but every offi- 
 cer teaching the men he exercises according to the traditional idea he forms of 
 this part of his duty." 
 
 As Stevens was a captain in the regular artillery during the 
 Revolution, his word on the subject must be accepted as con- 
 clusive; but he states that, in 1779, General Knox had the field 
 officers of artillery draw up a plan for manoeuvring a regiment 
 of infantry with field-pieces attached, whereby the whole moved 
 and the firings took place by beat of drum. Stevens does not 
 state what these manoeuvres were, but Tousard gives those of 
 two pieces attached to and parading with a battalion; from which 
 it appears that in both line and column the guns with their tum- 
 brels were held on either flank. From necessity the exercise was 
 simple in nature; the pieces were hauled by drag-ropes manned 
 by artillerymen, for which purpose there was supplied the requisite 
 number to each piece in excess of those needed for the manual. 
 
 For the service of the light brass 6-pounder in action there 
 were required one commissioned officer, one sergeant, one cor- 
 poral, two gunners, and twelve matrosses. This does not include 
 the drivers, who as a rule were hired with their teams. For the 
 service of the 5)^ -inch howitzer there were necessary one com- 
 missioned officer, one sergeant, one corporal, two bombardiers, 
 and ten matrosses. In the manual of the 6-pounders, numbers 
 i and 2 stood in front of and close to the axle, between the 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 313 
 
 wheel and the piece ; numbers 3 and 4 supplied number 2 with 
 ammunition from the two side-boxes which, when the pieces 
 were unlimbered, were taken from their axle-seats on either 
 side of the piece and placed three yards in rear of the end of 
 the trail handspike; numbers 5 to 12, both inclusive, maimed- 
 the drag-ropes; number i sponged and rammed; number 2 
 placed ammunition in the bore; the first gunner (on the right) 
 tended vent and primed; the second gunner (on the left) fired 
 the piece with port-fire and lintstock; the corporal pointed; 
 the sergeant was chief, and took charge of the piece; the com- 
 missioned officer supervised the whole, including the supply 
 of ammunition. The commands of the instructor in the man- 
 ual of the piece were : (i) Attention. (2) Unlimber piece. 
 (3) Secure side-boxes. (4) Man out the piece. (5) From right 
 to left, dress. (6) Advance sponge. (7) Tend vent. (8) Sponge 
 piece. (9) Handle cartridge. (10) Charge piece, (u) Ram 
 down cartridge. (12) Prime. (13) Take aim. (14) Fire. To 
 limber from this position the commands were: (i) Unhook drag- 
 ropes. (2) Mount side-boxes. (3) Limber piece. (4) Shoulder 
 rammer. (5) Carry lintstock. In the manoeuvres, unlimbered, 
 three men carried the side-boxes, always keeping in rear of the 
 trail. When prepared for action, the drag-ropes were ' manned 
 out' in prolongation of the axle-tree of the gun-carriage; when 
 moving in advance they were fastened to the washer-hooks of 
 the wheels; when in retreat, to the trail-hooks. 
 
 The field artillery of the Revolution could in no sense be termed 
 light. It had little mobility; nor was that prime consideration of 
 the present day deemed necessary. Artillery tactics embraced 
 the manual of the piece, with a few of the simplest manoeuvres. 
 The first system that divorced the field-gun from the drag-rope 
 was the horse artillery manoeuvres of General Kosciusko. It 
 was in 1808 translated from the French by Colonel Jonathan 
 Williams, superintendent of the Military Academy, and, so far as 
 is known, was the first artillery tactics recognized as authority by 
 the War Department, two hundred copies being distributed to 
 troops and fifty copies being purchased for the use of cadets 
 at West Point. As, owing to this circumstance, the work 
 occupies an interesting place in artillery literature, a brief yet 
 more extended notice of it here will not be out of place. 
 
 Written in 1800, but a few years after the introduction of horse 
 40 
 
314 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 artillery into the French army, and before its organization in our 
 own, this system of manoeuvres was not properly a treatise on the 
 functions and uses of that species of troops, but rather a short me- 
 moir, such as a distinguished soldier could find time in leisure 
 moments to write for a friend, being in some places so obscure that 
 translator's notes were necessary to render it coherent and intelli- 
 gible. The movements were thirty in number; were crudely, often 
 erroneously, illustrated; yet furnished in a manner clear enough 
 for practical purposes all that was necessary to enable a battery to 
 manoeuvre in face of the enemy. The habitual formations were not 
 arranged to their three natural orders line, column, and in bat- 
 tery as has been the case in all subsequent tactics; but these 
 orders evolved themselves without effort from the manoeuvres, 
 which covered what at the time was considered to be the whole 
 science of field-artillery tactics, illustrating as they did how, with 
 the utmost facility and precision, to advance and retreat in column 
 and in line of battle ; to fire both while advancing and retreating 
 in line; to form front in any direction, both from line and column; 
 and to change front from line to fire either to the right or left. 
 
 The prolonge had now superseded the drag-rope; the Gribeau- 
 val had supplanted the obsolete system of the Revolution; mo- 
 bility had been thereby increased, and yet, when compared with 
 those of the present day, Kosciusko's horse batteries were but 
 little deserving the name of light artillery. Arriving at the field of 
 exercise or in presence of the enemy, the prolonge was fixed and 
 used in all manoeuvres. The habitual column of manoeuvre was 
 that of a front of two pieces, or double column, formed from line 
 by advancing the centre, though it might be formed by throwing 
 forward either the right or left; but although the double 
 column was preferred, manoeuvring in single column was like- 
 wise provided for equally with the other. Instead of each gun 
 being, in all formations, immediately followed or preceded by its 
 caisson a practice introduced by Lallemand the pieces were 
 grouped together, while the caissons formed another and distinct 
 group. Advancing in column and in line, the group of pieces 
 preceded that of the caissons; in retreat, the caissons preceded. 
 . The principle of inversions was rigidly adhered to Anderson, in 
 1839, being the first to disregard it. The original right and left 
 of the battery retained, therefore, these designations, no matter 
 what the formations might be. In column, the mounted gun 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 315 
 
 detachment marched in single-file on either side of the teams of 
 the pieces; in line of battle they moved in the same order in the 
 tracks of the gun-carriage wheels. There were no horse-holders. 
 When the men dismounted to serve the pieces they gave the reins 
 of their horses to the drivers of the gun-carriage teams or tied_ 
 them to the limbers. Kosciusko favored the double column on 
 the centre as that of manoeuvre, for the reason that it was more 
 quickly formed than any other; and while this is true, the objec- 
 tion that thereby some of the lieutenants have their commands 
 oroken up, has, in the minds of other tacticians, outweighed this 
 advantage. Lallemand did not use it; and though restored by 
 Anderson, and since retained, it has been considered rather in the 
 light of an exceptional movement, to be resorted to only under 
 particular circumstances. 
 
 The horse-artillery manoeuvres of Major Stoddard were those 
 of Kosciusko, only slightly modified, so as the more readily to 
 adapt them to the American light artillery, and therefore need 
 not be further noticed. 
 
 In forming the men dismounted for service at the pieces, 
 Stoddard, as is the case to-day, divided both field and horse 
 artillerymen into sections, but the sections were only gun detach- 
 ments in fact, each being composed of one non-commissioned 
 officer and eight matrosses. The non-commissioned officer, 
 styled section officer, was a functionary similar to his successor 
 the chief of piece, or the present chief of section. The matrosses 
 were numbered in substantially the same way as practiced since, 
 viz., numbers i and 3, gunner of the right, and number 5, in the 
 rear rank; numbers 2 and 4, gunner of the left, and number 6, 
 in the front rank. Although in field as in horse artillery, manoeu- 
 vring with the prolonge was recommended, supernumeraries, 
 numbered from 9 to 14, inclusive, were, in the former, added for 
 the service of each piece, for dragging which, when the prolonge 
 was not at hand, every man of the section carried a bricole. The 
 manual was an adaptation of American drill to the Gribeauval 
 system of carriage, then but recently introduced into the service. 
 The duties of the different numbers were nearly the same as 
 during the Revolution, the only difference being that the small 
 ammunition-box, carried between the flanks of the trail in the 
 Gribeauval system, had taken the place of the side boxes formerly 
 in vogue. Eighteen rounds were carried in the movable ammu- 
 
316 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 nition-box, while in the ammunition wagon, which, " in battery," 
 was placed fifty yards behind the piece, there were eighty-eight 
 rounds for the 6-pounder, and one hundred and fifty for the 
 4-pounder. 
 
 Comparing the exercises of 1812, as presented in Stoddard, 
 with those of the Revolution, set forth in a fragmentary manner 
 by Tousard and Stevens, it is evident that the mobility of field 
 artillery had been increased. Tin's was rendered possible by two 
 circumstances: First, the gradual introduction, under Secreta- 
 ries Dearborn and Eustis, of the Gribeauval system of artillery; 
 second, placing in the hands of troops a system of manoeuvres 
 for its proper and efficient management. The drag-rope had 
 given way to the prolonge; the burden had been removed from 
 the backs of men and placed on the backs of horses. 
 
 As was natural at a time when knowledge of professional sub- 
 jects could scarcely be obtained in this country for love or money, 
 the organization and management of horse artillery was, in the 
 early days of the century, clouded in an atmosphere of mystery. 
 One of the services rendered by Stoddard was to clear this away, 
 by showing that the only difference between what were known as 
 field and horse artillery lay in the circumstance that in the latter 
 the cannoneers, to facilitate rapid movements, rode on horses, 
 while in the former they walked by the sides of their pieces. 
 Plain as this now appears, it was then an important point to have 
 established and clearly understood, and it greatly simplified to 
 the artillerymen of that day the whole subject of light artillery 
 manoeuvres. 
 
 Following this idea, Lallemand made the manoeuvres applica- 
 ble directly to dismounted detachments (field artillery), indi- 
 cating, in the few instances requiring it, the special movements 
 necessary for the horse artillerymen. This plan has been fol- 
 lowed by subsequent authors, and it has greatly facilitated a 
 comprehension of the whole matter, for all the horse-artillery 
 detachment has to do, as a rule, is to follow directly in rear of its 
 piece, while the latter moves in the field-artillery evolutions. 
 
 Understanding from experience the value of correct principles 
 of organization, Lallemand paid great attention to this part of his 
 treatise. The company, dismounted, was formed into detach- 
 ments, each containing a number depending on the service re- 
 quired, but generally consisting of eight men, told off as 1,2, 3, 4, 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 317 
 
 gunner of the right, gunner of the left, 7, 8. In addition, there 
 were attached to each detachment one non-commissioned officer 
 or artificer, who had charge of the caisson, and another non- 
 commissioned officer who was chief of piece. 
 
 The general principles on which the battery was organized for 
 manoeuvre were carefully and clearly presented. The duties of 
 each person holding a position of responsibility were minutely set 
 forth. The term 'section,' to indicate two pieces with their cais-. 
 sons, was first introduced. The important post of chief of caissons, 
 intrusted by Stoddard to a sergeant or a cadet, was conferred by 
 Lallemand upon a commissioned officer. Two non-commissioned 
 officers were used as special guides or markers. Upon them, 
 when forming line, the wheel horses of the leading carriages were 
 dressed. In double column, they moved four feet in advance of 
 the leading team of each column of carriages. These special 
 guides disappeared from our tactics with Lallemand's treatise. 
 
 When formed in line the pieces, sections, and half-batteries had 
 permanent numerical designations, commencing on the right, 
 which they retained under all circumstances. The principle of 
 inversions, with all its inconveniences, was therefore fully recog- 
 nized. This converted the battery into what, compared with the 
 battery of these days, might be called a rigid system. Advancing 
 in column and in line, the piece preceded the caisson; in retreat, 
 the caisson preceded the piece. Any formation which inverted 
 the original order of the carriages was considered an inconvenience, 
 to be escaped from as soon as possible. 
 
 The formations of the battery in the three natural orders for 
 manoeuvre column, line, in battery were here first fully elabor- 
 ated. The processes by which passage was made from one to 
 the other were unfolded in an easy, natural manner, thus enabling 
 the essential features of battery exercise to be taken in at a glance. 
 The single column of pieces was never used for manoeuvre; and 
 though column of half batteries was permitted, that of sections, 
 formed by breaking line forward from either the right or left, but 
 never from the centre, was habitually used. Like Stoddard, 
 Lallemand presupposed that the system of artillery employed 
 would be the Gribeauval ; but he went a step further, and intro- 
 duced the French manual of the piece, which was practiced until 
 supplanted by the instructions of 1845. By this, numbers i and 
 2, acting together, handled the sponge and rammer; and while 
 
318 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 advantageous for large guns or small men, it was not necessary, 
 and, for ordinary field-guns, could by no means be considered an 
 improvement on the old method. Numbers 4, 7, and 8 supplied 
 ammunition; the gunner of the right commanded during the 
 manual exercise; number 3 served vent and primed, while the 
 gunner of the left fired the piece. 
 
 Whether the guns should be grouped together, distinct from 
 the caissons, as practiced by Kosciusko, or whether each should 
 be either followed or preceded by its caisson, were questions upon 
 which artillerists at that time were divided. Lallemand adopted 
 the latter plan, which has been followed since. The horse artil- 
 lery detachment was moved from the place assigned it by Stod- 
 dard, placed two paces in rear of the muzzle of the piece, when 
 limbered, and horse-holders were introduced. 
 
 Lallemand added to the battery manoeuvres 'on right into 
 battery, ' closing intervals in line, exercises with closed intervals, 
 the passage of obstacles and defiles. His style of commands was 
 vastly superior to Kosciusko' s; but, with the exceptions just 
 noted, his battery exercise was essentially the same as that of 
 the latter. 
 
 Considering the reputation and great experience of General 
 Lallemand, it might appear from a casual examination of his work 
 that he paid but little attention to the exercise and evolutions of 
 artillery; but it must not be lost sight of that his was a treatise 
 on the art, science, as well as the practice of artillery in all its 
 branches, rather than a tactics in any proper sense of the term: 
 the geometrical problem of the movements of a battery being 
 but an incident, and no doubt in the author's mind a compara- 
 tively unimportant one, in the main plan of his work. It was 
 adopted as a text-book, for the reason that, notwithstanding its 
 recognized imperfections, it was the best that could be had. No 
 sooner, however, as has been mentioned, was it apparent to the 
 War Department that the militia, through the translation of the 
 manual of the Garde Royale, were about to be supplied with a 
 plan of instruction superior to that of the regular artillery, than 
 efforts were energetically begun to secure for the latter the per- 
 fect system of Gribeauval materiel, tactics, and all a task, so 
 far as tactics were concerned, intrusted to Lieutenant Tyler, 
 executed by him, and the results given to the army just as that 
 celebrated system had been pronounced obsolete. 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 319 
 
 Between 1830, when the Government was furnished with draw- 
 ings of the newly-adopted French system of artillery, and 1839, 
 when Anderson's translation of the field manoeuvres appeared, 
 the new had gradually supplanted the old style of materiel. 
 This translation was for the stock-trail what Lieutenant Tylerls _ 
 translation of the whole French tactics had been for the Gri- 
 beauval system, viz., a plain presentation of the principles of 
 organization and manoeuvre, by which it was to be prepared for 
 and made available on the field of battle. It embraced the school 
 of the piece, including the manual and the mechanical manoeu- 
 vres; school of the cannoneer, mounted; school of the driver; 
 school of the battery. As with Lallemand's Treatise, the text 
 was directly applicable to foot (field artillery), the variations 
 necessary for horse artillery being noted as they occurred. No 
 instruction was given in squad drill or that of the soldier dis- 
 mounted, reference being made for what was needed to the 
 infantry tactics. The school of the cannoneer, mounted, embraced 
 but the simplest elements of cavalry exercise. The system, in 
 the matter of rudimentary instruction, was therefore defective a 
 remark equally true of all others prior to that given the service 
 in 1860. 
 
 The school of the driver embraced (i) exercises of couples un- 
 hitched and (2) exercise of several pieces horsed. It was an ex- 
 tension of Lallemand's school of the battle piece, and formed 
 altogether a very admirable preparatory instruction for the 
 school of the battery. 
 
 The cannoneers for the service of one piece and its caisson were 
 styled a platoon. They were paraded in two ranks, as at present 
 numbers i, 3, gunner of the right, and 5 in rear, and served on 
 the right of the piece unlimbered; numbers 2, 4, gunner of the 
 left, and 6 in front, and served on the left. In the school of the 
 piece, as in Lallemand, numbers i and 2, working together, 
 handled the sponge ; 3 fired, using port-fire and lintstock ; gun- 
 ner of the right pointed; gunner of the left tended vent; 4, 5, 6 
 supplied number 2 with ammunition. The practice of dividing 
 the loading exercise into motions, separated by pauses, together 
 with moving the piece, unlimbered, by hand to the front and rear, 
 were here introduced. Changing wheel and carrying piece on its 
 limber were added to the mechanical manoeuvres; and, as con- 
 templated in the new style of carriage, provision was made for 
 
32O HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 mounting the cannoneers on the ammunition chests, and for dis- 
 mounting them. In the school of the battery the double column 
 was, as usual, the habitual column of manoeuvre, and under cer- 
 tain circumstances column of half batteries was used, but never 
 the single column of pieces.* Combining the practice of Kosci- 
 usko and Lallemand, Anderson (as have his successors) formed 
 the double column from line by moving forward either the centre 
 or either flank. 
 
 Anderson's translation introduced several new and important 
 principles of manoeuvre. They were (i) disregarding inversions, 
 thereby causing the designation of pieces to depend, not upon 
 their original, but upon their actual positions in line or column ; 
 (2) the passage of carriages; (3) the countermarch; (4) using the 
 movable pivot only, with the guide towards the pivot; (5) dis- 
 pensing with general or special guides. These principles, which 
 were mostly rendered practicable through the discarding of the 
 prolonge (except for firing in retreat,) greatly added to the flexi- 
 bility of the mass; and now it could be said with truth that mo- 
 bility in a correct sense for field artillery was first secured. 
 
 The habitual formations column, line, in battery were in 
 detail of execution somewhat different from Lallemand. ' In 
 battery ' the horses, except when firing in retreat, faced as they 
 do now towards the enemy. In Lallemand they faced from the 
 enemy. As in other arms of service, both the column and the 
 line were used as a basis of manoeuvre. The reciprocal move- 
 ments of passing from qolumn into line, and conversely, were first 
 explained. This was followed by the formations 'in battery '- 
 first from line and then from column. The passage of carriages, 
 the countermarch, and the disregarding inversions permitted an 
 almost unlimited variation of former manoeuvres, while ' right (or 
 left) front into line, faced to the rear,' was added to those already 
 authorized. The intricate changes of front were carefully ex- 
 
 * Since Kosciusko's time the single column for manoeuvring has been either 
 wholly or partially discarded. Lallemand, Anderson, and the 'assimilation' 
 proscribe it. The instructions of 1845 and of 1860 recognize the fact that it 
 might be necessary to manoeuvre from single column, and stated how, when 
 necessary, it should be done. Kosciusko was in this matter wiser than those 
 who have succeeded him. 
 
 In the United States the single file of carriages is the natural column of 
 march, as the roads and topography, in nineteen cases out of twenty, do not, 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 321 
 
 plained and illustrated an example followed by others, until the 
 assimilated tactics, where they are impotently left to be executed 
 according to the whim of each battery commander. The terms 
 'interval' and 'distance' were introduced, and so calculated 
 that the various changes of formation occupied the least possible 
 space. Another noticeable feature of Anderson was the character 
 of the illustrations, which were numerous, exact, and, compared 
 with any that had preceded them, elegant. 
 
 For the field artillery the year 1839 was an important epoch. 
 One company in each of the four regular regiments had been at 
 last equipped as contemplated by the reorganizing act of 1821. 
 The completion and issue to troops of carriages upon the new 
 system had not only increased immensely the mobility of both 
 foot and horse artillery, but the mounting of cannoneers on 
 limbers and caissons, as provided for the former, had practically 
 well-nigh annihilated the difference between them, so far as 
 facility of movement was concerned. Simultaneously with the 
 providing a properly-equipped personnel, there was furnished in 
 Anderson's work a very complete course of instruction, giving 
 the details of field artillery organization for purposes of manoeu- 
 vre, as well as the manoeuvres themselves, thus adding, so far as 
 a course of instruction could do, all that was needed to place this 
 arm upon a proper footing for service. 
 
 The circumstances leading to the revision of Anderson's in- 
 structions, which appeared in 1845, have been detailed. And 
 notwithstanding the excellence of Anderson's work, if proof were 
 needed of the wisdom of the changes then (1845) made, it is 
 found in the fact that now, after being continuously in use for 
 forty years, they are found embodied almost literally in the light 
 artillery tactics of the present day. 
 
 The new instructions (1845) embraced the three schools of the 
 
 for any distance, admit of two carriages moving abreast. Hence it almost 
 always happens that the single column is that in which the battery will ap- 
 proach its position on the battle-field. In view of this fact, it is remarkable 
 that the present light artillery tactics, being a revision after the Civil war of 
 the instructions of I860, and purporting to contain the practical suggestions 
 gathered in that eventful struggle, does not explain the manner of forming 
 directly 'in battery' from single column, although, should a battery take the 
 field, the chances are that, if marching at the head of the column, this is the 
 first manoeuvre it would be required to perform in presence of the enemy. 
 
 41 
 
322 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 piece, the driver, and the battery. The school of the cannoneer 
 mounted of Anderson was suppressed, and, for the preliminary 
 instruction needed in those branches of service, reference was 
 made to the cavalry and infantry tactics. 
 
 In the school of the piece, the French manual, introduced by 
 Lallemand and followed by Anderson, was discarded, and that 
 at present in use adopted. Previous to* this two gunners had 
 always been told off to each gun detachment. This was so not 
 only in the French, but the old American service. Now one 
 sufficed. Instead of numbers i and 2 working together, number 
 i alone handled the sponge and rammer. In the manual the 
 movement of detachments to the front, rear, right, and left of the 
 piece limbered were introduced, while dismounting and mounting 
 carriages appeared as a new feature of the mechanical manoeuvres. 
 
 Aside from the changes indicated, the most important difference 
 between the old and the new systems of instruction consisted in 
 the introduction of the 'actions' (right, left, and front) and the 
 manoeuvres depending on them, thus perfecting that mobility 
 which, since the practice of Anderson's new principles of ma- 
 noeuvre, had characterized the movements of field artillery bat- 
 teries. Pieces could now be brought ' in battery ' to the front, 
 right or left, when on the line they were to occupy in action, by 
 the gun detachments simply turning the carriages on their own 
 ground, thus, if desired, effecting an important saving of time at 
 a critical moment. The ' reverse ' was for the first time employed, 
 and to facilitate the execution of the manoeuvre of coming into 
 'action' (right, left, and front). Throwing the caissons on the 
 flank of the pieces while in column, with the formations ' in battery ' 
 from this position, was now for the first time also authorized. 
 
 The style of commands was a great improvement on Anderson, 
 being briefer, yet clearer. As adding to the value of the work 
 as a course of instruction, the careful drawings of the new style 
 of carriage, with proper explanations thereof, deserve notice. 
 Anderson's translation had not given these, which are neces- 
 sary to any finished work of this nature. The most important 
 improvements, however, wrought by the Instruction of 1845 
 consisted in the changes in the manual exercise and in the intro- 
 duction of the manoeuvres ' action ' (right, left, and for coming 
 into front). 
 
 Reference has been made to the circumstances which caused 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 323 
 
 the preparation of the Instruction of 1860 and to the scope of 
 that work. In the various schools of the piece, the section, and 
 the battery the preliminary principles were stated with a clearness 
 and fullness that left nothing to be desired. For exercise without 
 the guns the company in double rank was formed into detach- 
 ments, of which those, charged with the particular duties of the 
 service of the pieces were designated gun detachments. On the 
 left of each gun detachment, when paraded, were the drivers 
 and others appertaining to the piece with its caisson, the whole 
 divided into sets of eight men each, and constituting with that 
 detachment the platoon. Two platoons formed a section. Ma- 
 noeuvring by detachment was, therefore, in all respects similar to 
 the movements by sets of fours, which form the basis of the 
 present infantry and cavalry tactics. This is all the more apparent 
 in Tidball's Manual, where the principles of the artillery instruc- 
 tions of 1860 and the form of the present infantry tactics are 
 blended, the commands ' detachment right, ' ' right forward, de- 
 tachment right,' &c., replacing the movements by fours of the 
 infantry. 
 
 In the mere battery manoeuvres there was very little difference 
 between the Instruction of 1 860 and its predecessor. Bricoles were 
 entirely dispensed with, no provision being made, as had always 
 been the case before, for their use under any circumstances. For 
 short distances the movements by hand, both unlimbered and 
 limbered the former introduced by Anderson and the latter in 
 1860 had rendered bricoles unnecessary, while for long distances 
 horses were put in requisition. In Anderson and the Instruction of 
 1845 the guide, in obliquing, had always been on the side opposite 
 to that towards which the movement was made. For instance, if 
 obliquing towards the right, the guide was left; and vice versa. 
 This was now changed, the guide, as it has remained since, being 
 placed on the side towards which the oblique was made. In the 
 school of the battery the guidon was introduced, and his func- 
 tions made somewhat similar to those of the general guides of 
 Lallemand. Contrary to the practice of Anderson and the In- 
 struction of 1845, the chief of caissons was, in column, placed on 
 the side opposite the captain. 
 
 It was more particularly in a clear exposition of the principles 
 on which field artillery rested, both as regards organization and 
 service, both in war and in peace, in campaign as well as on the 
 
324 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 field of exercise, and in its entire independence of other tactics, 
 that the Instruction of 1860 surpassed all that had preceded it. 
 The equipment of a battery, both in personnel and materiel; and 
 its management, both as a school for subalterns and under all cir- 
 cumstances of war, marches, transportation, encampment, and 
 conduct in action, were fully and clearly laid down with many 
 practical suggestions the result of experience in the field. 
 
 There was, however, in the Instruction of 1860 a defect which 
 has been corrected in its successor, the present assimilated artil- 
 lery tactics. It was an attempt to generalize too much in the 
 arrangement of details. While generalizations, properly pre- 
 sented, facilitate the understanding of a complex subject, by 
 placing the salient points in bold relief before the mind, they 
 cannot be carried too far without defeating their object, which 
 is, to make easy the ready comprehension of important features, 
 around which naturally, and with little mental effort, details 
 may be left to arrange themselves. There should, therefore, 
 be a direct and obvious connection between the main head 
 and the subordinate heads grouped under it; but this in the 
 instructions in question was sometimes wanting. 
 
 Leaving out of consideration the articles on organization, 
 materiel, and service, the subject-matter of instruction was ar- 
 ranged under (i) the 'school of the piece,' (2) 'school of the 
 section, ' and (3) ' school of the battery ' ; but except the last, 
 it was not possible, without examination, to divine what subjects 
 were classified under each. The 'school of the piece,' for 
 instance, embraced (i) cannoneers dismounted, (2) manual and 
 exercise of the sabre, (3) exercise of gun detachment, dismounted, 
 (4) manual of the piece, (5) mechanical manoeuvres, (6) school 
 of the soldier, mounted, (7) riding house drill, (8) gun detach- 
 ment mounted (horse artillery), and (9) school of the driver. 
 With the ' school of the piece ' properly speaking, most of these 
 subjects of instruction had nothing directly to do. There was not 
 the relation between them of antecedent and consequent. The im- 
 propriety of the arrangement seems sufficiently manifest, and led 
 to a curious error in the contemporaneous heavy artillery tactics, 
 where it is stated that ' the cannoneer, previous to receiving instruc- 
 tion in heavy artillery, should be thoroughly instructed in the school 
 ' of the piece, field artillery. ' By ' school of the piece ' is here 
 meant, of course, manual of the piece, for nothing could be more 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 325 
 
 absurd or unnecessary than to require foot artillerymen, as a pre- 
 liminary to heavy artillery exercise, to learn all that appertained 
 to the ' school of the piece, ' field artillery instruction, before 
 enumerated. 
 
 The arrangement of the ' school of the section ' was almost as 
 objectionable as the other. It embraced the drill of several de- 
 tachments (i) dismounted, (2) mounted; (3) exercise (mounted) 
 of several pieces; (4) school of the section, i. e. y the school of 
 the section was a sub-head under the more general one, ' school 
 of the section' than which a more confusing and incongruous 
 classification cannot easily be imagined. 
 
 While it is theoretically very well to have the schools of the 
 platoon and the battery distinct, in order that the former may serve 
 as a preliminary to the latter, it is practically objectionable. First, 
 it is unnecessary, the school of the battery embracing that of the 
 platoon; second, because, with beginners, of the constant and an- 
 noying references that have to be made to the latter school, that 
 a proper understanding may be had of battery manoeuvres. In 
 the assimilated tactics these schools are combined into that of 
 the battery a change which seems to be conducive to simplicity 
 and convenience. 
 
 The assimilated tactics which appeared in 1873 but more 
 fully carried out attempts in that general direction which had 
 marked the labors of military writers for many years. Stevens in 
 his system of discipline based the dismounted manoeuvres of 
 artillery troops on the infantry instructions of Baron Steuben a 
 facl noticed in the introduction, in the following words: 
 
 " I must acknowledge myself greatly indebted to Baron Steuben's Regulations 
 for the Discipline of the Army, from which I have received abundant assistance in 
 blending the duty of the artillery with that of the infantry. Where they are 
 connected in the following work I have adopted its principles, and have 
 extracted from it whatever I deemed necessary or useful to my plan." 
 
 In pursuance of this idea, Anderson and his successors remarked 
 that "the same general principles regulate the manoeuvres of 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery. As the former, however, makes 
 up the main body of an army, its movements must control those 
 of other arms of service. Hence the infantry forms of command 
 have been adopted for the artillery where the difference between 
 the two services would permit. A battery executes nearly the 
 same manoeuvres as a battalion (of infantry), but with less pre- 
 
326 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 cision, its elements not being susceptible of manoeuvring with the 
 same geometrical accuracy as platoons of well -instructed infantry." 
 
 The experience of the Civil war showed that an officer might 
 be rapidly transferred from one arm of service to another. The 
 arms themselves were sometimes called upon to interchange their 
 normal duties; the infantry to serve mounted, the cavalry dis- 
 mounted; the artillery to act sometimes on foot and again on 
 horseback. 
 
 Although each arm had an appropriate code of its own, which 
 could not be subordinated to the manoeuvres of other troops, it 
 was a recognized fact that the same general principles lay at the 
 foundation of all. Hence, so far as was practicable, the experience 
 acquired in any one should be made available in the others. 
 That this might the more easily and satisfactorily be done, it was 
 peculiarly proper to assimilate the instruction for the three arms, 
 in so far as the tactical elements of each and the character of each 
 service would permit. 
 
 In executing this task it was necessary, on the one hand, to 
 make the good of the whole service paramount, and, disregarding 
 mere prejudices or fancies, to render the assimilation as complete 
 as possible; on the other, to avoid indulging a passion for change, 
 which, confounding words with the things they represent, would, 
 under the guise of assimilation, apply general, inflexible rules to 
 elements peculiar to each arm, and which cannot properly be 
 subjected to the same laws. While the blending process went 
 on it was necessary to remember that each arm had a distinct per- 
 sonal identity that could not be sacrificed without injury to not 
 only the arm itself but to the general service. 
 
 The evolutions of a brigade, some forms of inspection and re- 
 view, an article on horses and stable duty similar to that of the 
 cavalry tactics, with others on honors to be paid by troops, and 
 on the service of the mitrailleur, embodied in the assimilated 
 tactics, were either wholly or partially new to light artillery in- 
 struction; that on horses and stables being an elaboration of the 
 same subject, as presented in the Instruction of 1860. The re- 
 maining portion of the work was a recast of materials, culled 
 mostly from the latter system of artillery instruction and from the 
 established infantry tactics. 
 
 First is the school of the soldier (squad drill) dismounted. This 
 is identical, or nearly so, for the three arms, and there is no reason 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 327 
 
 why it should not be. The manual and exercise of the sabre, the 
 manual of the piece, and mechanical manoeuvres are essentially 
 as in the Instruction of 1860. In the manual of the piece the only 
 change of consequence was the introduction of ' action rear' for 
 forming ' in battery ' in the direction indicated. 
 
 The school of the battery dismounted was the counterpart of 
 ' exercises of several detachments dismounted, ' instructions of 
 1860; but it introduced some new and important features of organi- 
 zation which deserve notice. That which before was known as 
 platoon was now called section; that formerly designated section 
 now became platoon. The section embraced the personnel for 
 the service of a piece with its caisson; two sections formed a 
 platoon. In the school of the battery these definitions were given 
 a slightly different significance; there a piece with its caisson, 
 manned, horsed, and equipped, being designated a section, two 
 sections forming, as before, a platoon. 
 
 The school of the soldier mounted, with that of horse-artillery 
 detachments, was but slightly changed from the work of 1860, 
 whence were also gathered most of the materials for the school of 
 the driver, the only exceptions being in the latter, and embraced 
 the introduction of Lalle*mand's school of the battle piece, and 
 the exercise of a single unhitched team. In this school (driver) 
 the 'reverse' of former tactics becomes 'left about'; the former 
 ' left about ' changes to ' reverse. ' Differing also from previous 
 practices in the passage of carriages, that which is passed takes 
 up the gait of the passing carriage; formerly the converse of this 
 was true. 
 
 The manoeuvres ' school of the battery ' are so nearly identi- 
 cal with those of 1845 and 1860 as not to require further notice. 
 The . difference between them resulted not from the invention 
 of new manoeuvres, but in applying the principles of assimilation. 
 The movements as taken from former tactics are supposed to 
 be performed by commands drawn from the infantry. This, ap- 
 parently, was the great end to be attained. To a degree the labor 
 was successful. The similarity of commands perhaps enables 
 one versed in the tactics of either infantry or cavalry to more 
 readily acquire those of the artillery. It will not escape notice, 
 either, that rules for the guides, for the movements of the guidon, 
 changes of gait, together with the duties in all formations of each 
 of the battery personnel, are more carefully prescribed than ever 
 
328 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 before. This gives a more finished school than others had done, 
 for these details are not embellishments they are essentials in 
 any perfect system of instruction. 
 
 It would be useless to recite the various points of difference 
 between the assimilated tactics and those which preceded them. 
 But one principle for giving commands may be mentioned, as its 
 tendency is manifestly in the direction of simplicity. It is this: 
 In other tactics an entirely different command was given when a 
 movement was executed from a halt from that used when the 
 same movement was executed from the march. In the assimi- 
 lation, the commands are the same, except the addition of 'trot' 
 or 'gallop' in the second case. For instance, being in line at 
 a halt, to break column of sections to the front by the old system 
 the commands were (i) by section from the right (or left) front 
 into column; (2) march; guide left (or right). Or if the line were 
 advancing (i) by the right (or left), break sections; (2) march; 
 (3) guide left (or right). In the new system, whether at a halt 
 or marching, the commands are (i) right (or left), by platoons; 
 (2) march; guide (right or left): if marching, and the movement 
 is to be performed at an increased gait, the command ' trot ' or 
 'gallop' precedes the command 'march.' The principle here 
 illustrated is of general application, and is in accord with the 
 infantry rule. Not so, however, with the commands (i) forward, 
 (2) march, which, in the light artillery tactics, are not given ex- 
 cept to move forward from a halt or from an oblique; never after 
 a change of direction an innovation not in the line of assimila- 
 tion to the infantry, but the contrary. 
 
 The interchange of the designations 'section' and 'platoon,' 
 the movements ' left about ' and ' reverse, ' was apparently inspired 
 by a consuming desire for varying what had gone before. There 
 is no reason based on true principles of assimilation why the term 
 ' section, ' to designate two pieces of artillery with their caissons, 
 should not have been retained. And as with that meaning it was 
 well established in the military vocabulary, while 'platoon' is 
 not, the technical language has been garbled without correspond- 
 ing benefit. 
 
 In the United States service the designation 'platoon' had 
 been applied to a variable number of men in ranks; it had been 
 used in the tactics of artillery, infantry and cavalry, both mounted 
 and dismounted, but the idea of a definite number of units of 
 
TACTICS: FIELD ARTILLERY. 329 
 
 any kind was never associated with it. On the other hand, 
 from Lallemand down, when a battery was equipped, the term 
 ' section ' had been used to designate two pieces and their cais- 
 sons a fixed number. In infantry, cavalry, and dismounted 
 artillery, 'platoon' retains its primitive signification; not so, how- 
 ever, when applied to field batteries; there it has come to signify 
 a certain unalterable number. This is a violation of one of the 
 first principles in military organization, which is never, if possible 
 to avoid it, to have the same term applied to things essentially 
 different in their natures, it being of the greatest importance that 
 perfectly distinct names should be used in all armies. 
 
 If this change had led towards the goal for which the field 
 artillery tactics were revised assimilation it would have been 
 more reasonable; but in truth nothing of the kind resulted. The 
 artillery platoon column is that for manoeuvre ; in infantry the 
 habitual column of manoeuvre is that of fours or of companies; 
 assimilation is not gained here. Moreover, the section of artillery, 
 like the platoon, is a unit which may be used for manoeuvre. We 
 have, for instance, ' right by platoon, ' and also ' right by section ; ' 
 and as both are thus retained, why interchange their long-estab- 
 lished meaning? 
 
 It may be answered that it was necessary to apply a definite 
 term to the piece, taken in conjunction with its caisson, instead of, 
 as formerly, considering them a unit, covered by the term piece. 
 While attaching no importance to this, as the old nomenclature 
 had not led to any confusion, it is remarked that, granting this 
 to be true, it had been far better in the assimilated tactics to 
 have given the designation ' platoon ' to a piece with its caisson, 
 as the Instruction of 1860 had already given to their personnel, 
 and retained ' section ' to mean two platoons ; it would have been 
 equally as conducive to assimilation, and would have retained in 
 the artillery vocabulary terms with their proper and well-known 
 signification. 
 
 So in regard to 'reverse' and 'left about'; nothing was 
 gained by their interchange. There is no 'reverse' in infantry 
 or cavalry, and the ' left about ' with these arms is executed on 
 a fixed pivot, while in field-battery drill it is always executed on 
 a movable pivot. Assimilation was not gained in this instance; 
 therefore the only result was the mixing up of terms before well 
 understood. 
 42 
 
330 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY. 
 
 The great object kept in view in the work of assimilation seems 
 to have been to render the commands similar to those of infantry. 
 While the new signification given the term platoon lends a color 
 of success to this questionable improvement, it is plain that in 
 other respects, notably the rules for guides, the changes have led 
 in the reverse direction. Mere similarity of commands is of itself 
 of little value, which cannot justify the sacrifice of a single prin- 
 ciple in the organization or manoeuvres of any arm; yet if this 
 similarity in commands be conceded the crowning triumph of the 
 new dispensation, it is about all that can be claimed for it. This 
 has been attained at the expense of technical language, a forced 
 and unnatural parallelism in the treatment of the dissimilar 
 elements of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and a surrender of 
 artillery (perhaps cavalry) independence, which cannot lead, if 
 allowed to work out its natural results, to other than a conscious 
 self-abasement of that arm, which is made to feel from first to 
 last that its identity as artillery is being impaired, and, so far as 
 possible, destroyed. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A [i]. 
 
 List of Field and Staff Officers and Captains of Colonel Richard 
 Gridley' s Regiment of American Artillery, 
 
 Colonel, Richard Gridley; lieutenant-colonel, William Bur- 
 beck; first major, David Mason; second major, Scarborough 
 Gridley;* surgeon, William Eustis ; surgeon's mates, Samuel 
 Tenny and Elijah Hewins ; adjutant, Jeremiah Niles; quarter- 
 master, Thomas Edes; captains, Edward Crafts, Joseph Chad- 
 wick, Edward Burbeck, Thomas Waite Foster, Thomas Pierce, 
 Samuel Gridley, John Popkins, Samuel R. Trevett, John Wiley, f 
 and John Callender. 
 
 Organization of Colonel Richard Gridley s Regiment. 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, i surgeon, 2 sur- 
 geon's mates, i adjutant, and i quartermaster. (2 cadets, 4 con- 
 ductors, i store-keeper, and 2 clerks attached to regimental 
 staff.) 
 
 Ten companies, each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, i first 
 lieutenant, 2 second lieutenants (who were also fire-workers), 
 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 6 gunners, 6 bombardiers, and 32 
 matrosses. 
 
 * Dismissed by sentence of court-martial September 24th, 1775, for miscon- 
 duct at Bunker Hill. Vacant majority offered December llth, 1775, to Mr. 
 Thomas Crafts, Jr. (declined.) 
 
 f Superseded June 25th, 1775, by Ezra Badlam. 
 
 J Dismissed July 7th, 1775, for cowardice at Bunker Hill. 
 
 NOTE. The title ' captain-lieutenant ' was taken from the British, where it had 
 been introduced in 1720, and where, by Royal warrant, June 22d, 1772, captain- 
 lieutenants of artillery and of engineers were given the rank of captains in the 
 army at large. The title was abolished in the Royal artillery in 1802, and that 
 of 'second captain' substituted for it; and as in 1872 the first captains in that 
 service were designated majors, the second captains dropped the ' second,' and 
 became captains (though not commanders) of the batteries of the Royal 
 artillery. In the American service the title captain-lieutenant did not sur- 
 vive the Revolution, and nothing took its place. So long as it continued, how- 
 ever, the position, although not equal to that of captain, was markedly above 
 that of first lieutenant, the grade next below, and which finally crowded it out. 
 The distinction is well shown in the rate of pay given by Congress pursuant 
 
332 APPENDIX. 
 
 A [2]. 
 
 Organization of Fourth Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, 
 
 1771. 
 
 One colonel commandant, i lieutenant-colonel, i major, i adju- 
 tant, i quartermaster, and i chaplain. 
 
 Ten companies, each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, 2 first lieu- 
 tenants, 2 second lieutenants, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 4 bom- 
 bardiers, 8 gunners, 2 drummers, and 52 matrosses. 
 
 A [3]. 
 
 List of Commissioned Officers of Colonel Henry Knox's Regiment 
 of Continental Artillery, as Organized Pursuant to Resolve of 
 Congress, December 2d, 1775, and Subsequent Resolves. 
 
 Colonel, Henry Knox; first lieutenant-colonel, William Bur- 
 beck; second lieutenant-colonel, David Mason; first major, John 
 Crane; second major, John Lamb (appointed chief of artillery, 
 northern department, pursuant to a resolve of Congress, January 
 9th, 1776, with rank of major; assigned by the commander-in- 
 chief to Knox's regiment); chaplain, Rev. Abiel Leonard; adju- 
 tant, Jeremiah Niles; .quartermaster, David Bradley; surgeon, 
 William Eustis. 
 
 Captains Edward Crafts, Thomas Pierce, Thomas Waite 
 Foster, John Popkins, Edward Burbeck, William Perkins, Di- 
 mond Morton, Stephen Badlam, Eliphalet Newall, William Dana, 
 Ebenezer Stevens, and Jotham Drury. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants Benjamin Eustis, William Treadwell, 
 Benjamin Frothingham, Timothy Stow, Jotham Horton, Edward 
 
 to resolve of July 29th, 1775. While a captain of artillery received one-third 
 more pay, a captain-lieutenant of artillery received the same pay as a captain 
 of infantry, and the artillery first lieutenant received one-tenth less pay than 
 the latter. 
 
 The title ' fire-worker ' was also inherited from the British, where it was the 
 name given the lowest lieutenant of the company, who was generally, though 
 not always, promoted from cadet gunners. The rank fire-worker was abolished 
 in the British service in 1771, nor did it long survive in the American. No 
 mention of it is made in any organization after 1777. 
 
 NOTE. The Royal artillery was reorganized in such manner in 1782 as to in- 
 crease the number of field oificers from the ratio one field to twenty-one com- 
 pany officers, to the ratio one field to eight and one- half company officers. The 
 change was for the avowed purpose of removing the stagnation in promotion 
 that had weighed down that arm of service. 
 
APPENDIX. 333 
 
 Rumney, David Allen, Winthrop Sergeant, John Johnson, 
 Thomas Seward, Asa Rawson, and Benajah Carpenter. 
 
 First lieutenants Thomas Randall, David Briant, Henry Bur- 
 beck, William Stevens, John Welch Edes, Samuel Treat, John 
 Bryant, Isaac Coren, Isaac Packard, Jonas Simmons, David Cook, 
 and John Sluman. 
 
 Second lieutenants Henry Wells, John Lillie, Joseph Loring, 
 Thomas Vose, Thomas Deane, David Preston, Thomas Jackson, 
 James Furnivol, Peter King, Joseph Savage, Joseph Thomas, 
 Sarhuel Shaw, Daniel Parker, Hardy Peirce, Isaiah Simmons, 
 Oliver Brown, John Chandler, Thomas Machin, Joseph Blake, 
 John Bull, James Steele, Thomas Carnes, Samuel Daggatt, and 
 Jeremiah Freeman. 
 
 Organization of Knox's Regiment, 1776. 
 
 One colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, i chaplain, i adju- 
 tant, i quartermaster, i surgeon, i surgeon's mate, i drum- 
 major, and i fife-major. 
 
 Twelve companies, each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, i first 
 lieutenant, 2 second lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 6 bom- 
 bardiers, 6 gunners, i drum, i fife, and 32 matrosses. 
 
 AW. 
 
 List of Commissioned Officers, Battalion of Artillery, Composed 
 of two Companies of Knox^ s Regiment, Detached March 28th, 
 1776, for Service with Army Operating in Canada, and given 
 a Battalion Organization by the Commanding Generals, North- 
 ern Department. 
 
 Stephen Badlam, captain, commander, with rank of major; 
 Thomas Kendell, chaplain, appointed by General Gates; Alex- 
 ander Stewart, surgeon, appointed by General Thompson; James 
 Gardner, quartermaster, appointed by General Thomas; Ebenezer 
 Stevens, captain; Benjamin Eustis, captain-lieutenant; Asa Raw- 
 son, captain-lieutenant; Henry Wells, first lieutenant; David 
 Cook, first lieutenant; Thomas Vose, second lieutenant; Isaiah 
 Simmons, second lieutenant; John Bull, second lieutenant; Sam- 
 uel Daggatt, second lieutenant; James Gardner, conductor. 
 
 NOTE. These companies were commanded by Captain Stevens while en route 
 from Boston to Canada, where Badlam joined them. Although provisionally 
 arranged as a battalion, they remained part of Knox's regiment. 
 
334 APPENDIX. 
 
 A [5]. 
 
 Names, Rank, and Dates of Commissions of the Officers of Col- 
 onel Charles Harrison s Regiment of Continental Artillery, 
 Organized Pursuant to Resolve of Congress, November 26th, 
 1776. 
 
 N. B. The data which follows is gathered from proceedings of the Conti- 
 nental Congress, from Saffell's records of the Revolutionary war, and those of 
 the State Department, Washington. As affecting this regiment, the State De- 
 partment records are only fragmentary, but, so far as they go, they confirm 
 generally the correctness of Saffell's compilation. 
 
 Colonel, Charles Harrison, commissioned November 3Oth, 1776; 
 lieutenant-colonel, Edward Carrington, commissioned November 
 3Oth, 1776; major, Christian Holmer, commissioned November 
 3Oth, 1776; adjutant, William Camp, commissioned as adjutant 
 June ist, 1778; adjutant, Richard Waters, commissioned as ad- 
 jutant September 2ist, 1778; paymaster, Ambrose Bohannon, 
 commissioned as paymaster June ist, 1778; quartermaster, Jervis 
 Adams, commissioned November 2 ist, 1777; quartermaster, 
 Clement Skerrett, commissioned December 6th, 1779; surgeon, 
 Thomas Chrystie, appointed April ist, 1778; surgeon's mate, 
 Jonathan Calvert, appointed November 3oth, 1776; surgeon's 
 mate, Alexander Lajournade, appointed March i5th, 1778; ser- 
 geant-major, John Coale, appointed November 3oth, 1776; quar- 
 termaster-sergeant, Grifntt Evans, appointed November 3oth, 
 1776; drum-major, Robert Hart, appointed November 3Oth, 1776; 
 fife-major, Thomas Parr, appointed November 3Oth, 1776. Cap- 
 tains (commissioned by Congress November 3oth, 1776) Samuel 
 Denny, Nathaniel Burwell, William Pierce, Buller C. Claiborne, 
 Joseph Scott, William Murray, Spotswood Dandridge, Matthew 
 Smith, Sir John Pettus, and William Waters. 
 
 The Assembly of Virginia was authorized to appoint the sub- 
 alterns. Of the captains, Claiborne, Scott, and Dandridge de- 
 clined, and Congress, February 7th, 1777, appointed Anthony 
 Singleton, John Winter, and Jacob Walker in their stead. 
 
 The commissioned officers attached to the various companies 
 on the dates and at the places [specified are given by Saffell as 
 follows : 
 
 Company No. i. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, Will- 
 iam Pierce, commissioned November 3Oth, 1776; captain-lieu- 
 tenant, William Frazier, commissioned November 3Oth, 1776 ; 
 first lieutenant, Thomas Dix, commissioned January i5th, 1778; 
 first lieutenant, Samuel Coleman, commissioned June I5th, 1778. 
 
 Company No. 2. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, Na- 
 thaniel Burwell, A. D. C. to Brigadier-General Howe, commis- 
 sioned November 3oth, 1776; captain-lieutenant, John Blair, 
 
APPENDIX. 335 
 
 commissioned November 3Oth, 1776; first lieutenant, William 
 Camp (adjutant), commissioned November 3Oth, 1776; first 
 lieutenant, William Stevenson, commissioned June i5th, 1778. 
 
 Company No. 3. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, 
 Anthony Singleton, commissioned February ist, 1777; captain- 
 lieutenant, Ambrose Bohannon (paymaster), commissioned Jan- 
 uary 1 3th, 1777; first lieutenant, William Miller, commissioned 
 January i3th, 1777 ; second lieutenant, Henry Wallace, commis- 
 sioned March ist, 1778. 
 
 Company No. 4. Pluckemin, July i6th, 1779. Captain, Drury 
 Ragsdale, commissioned February 7th, 1777 ; captain-lieutenant, 
 William Godman, commissioned January ist, 1778; first lieuten- 
 ant, Richard Waters (adjutant), commissioned January i3th, 
 1777 ; second lieutenant, William Darvil, commissioned February 
 7th, 1777. 
 
 Company No. 5. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, 
 James Pendleton, commissioned February 7th, 1777; captain-lieu- 
 tenant, John Prior, commissioned February i3th, 1777. 
 
 Company No. 6. Valley Forge, June 4th, 1778. Captain, 
 John Dandridge, commissioned February 7th, 1777; captain-lieu- 
 tenant, William Meredith, commissioned January I3th, 1777 ; first 
 lieutenant, Michael McNamera, commissioned January ist, 1778; 
 second lieutenant, Walter Richardson, commissioned March 4th, 
 1778. 
 
 Company No. 7. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, John 
 Champe Carter, commissioned October 3oth, 1777 ; first lieuten- 
 ant, William Poythress, commissioned November 2Oth, 1777 ; 
 second lieutenant, Robert Dandridge, commissioned October 
 30th, 1777. 
 
 Company No. 8. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, Sam- 
 uel Eddens, commissioned January ist, 1778; captain-lieutenant, 
 Lewis Booker, commissioned January i3th, 1777; first lieutenant, 
 Richard Hill, commissioned October 2oth, 1777 ; second lieu- 
 tenant, Abraham Cole, commissioned November 3Oth, 1777. 
 
 Company No. 9. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, 
 Thomas Bay top, commissioned February 5th, 1778; captain-lieu- 
 tenant, William Flemming Gaines, commissioned October 2oth, 
 1777 ; first lieutenant, Holland Haynie, commissioned November 
 30th, 1777 ; second lieutenant, William Stevenson, commissioned 
 September 30th, 1777 ; second lieutenant, James Tyrie, commis- 
 sioned April 23d, 1778. 
 
 Company No. 10. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, 
 John Henry, commissioned February 7th, 1777; captain-lieu- 
 tenant, William Meredith, commissioned January I3th, 1777; 
 first lieutenant, Thomas Fenn, commissioned January 1 3th, 1777. 
 
 By orders of General Washington, May 3Oth, 1778, the two 
 Maryland companies of Captains Brown and Dorsey were an- 
 nexed to Harrison's regiment, thus bringing it, in pursuance of 
 
336 APPENDIX. 
 
 the resolve of Congress, May 27th, 1778, up to twelve com- 
 panies. 
 
 Captain, William Brown, commissioned November 22d, 1777; 
 captain-lieutenant, James Smith, commissioned November 220!, 
 1777; first lieutenant, James McFadden, commissioned Novem- 
 ber 22d, 1777; second lieutenant, Clement Skerritt (quarter- 
 master), commissioned February 5th, 1778. 
 
 Dorsey's Company. Valley Forge, June 3d, 1778. Captain, 
 Richard Dorsey, commissioned May 4th, 1777; captain-lieuten- 
 ant, Ebenezer Finley, commissioned July 4th, 1777; first lieuten- 
 ant, Robert Wilmott, commissioned November 24th, 1777 ; 
 second lieutenant, Nicholas Ricketts, commissioned December 
 ist, 1777; second lieutenant, Young Wilkinson, commissioned 
 February 25th, 1778. 
 
 Organization of Colonel Harrisoris Regiment, Under Resolve 
 of Congress, November 26th, 1776, and Other Resolves. 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, i major, i surgeon, i surgeon's 
 mate, i adjutant, i quartermaster, i paymaster, i sergeant-major, 
 i quartermaster-sergeant, i fife-major, and i drum -major. 
 
 Ten companies, each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, i first lieu- 
 tenant, i second lieutenant, i sergeant, 4 corporals, 4 bombar- 
 diers, 8 gunners, and 48 matrosses. 
 
 A [6]. 
 
 Writing to the President of Congress from camp above Trenton 
 Falls, December 2Oth, 1776, General Washington remarked: 
 "Under the resolution of Congress of the i2th instant, at the 
 instance of Colonel Knox and the pressing advice of all general 
 officers now here, I have ventured to order three battalions of 
 artillery to be immediately raised." These battalions, command- 
 ed by Colonels Lamb, Crane, and Flower, subsequently formed 
 the Second and Third regiments of regular artillery and the so- 
 called artillery-artificer regiment of the Revolutionary army. 
 
 List of Officers of Colonel John Crane's Regiment (or Battalion] 
 of Continental Artillery as First Organized. 
 
 Colonel, John Crane, commissioned January ist, 1777; lieu- 
 tenant-colonel, ; major, ; adjutant, James Gardner, 
 
 commissioned January ist, 1777; quartermaster, Thomas Baker 
 (April 1 2th, 1777, to November ist, 1778); paymaster, Charles 
 Knowles, commissioned January ist, 1777; surgeon, Isaac Spof- 
 ford, commissioned January ist, 1777; surgeon's mate, Benjamin 
 Upham, commissioned January ist, 1777. 
 
APPENDIX. 337 
 
 Captains (commissioned January ist, 1777) William Perkins, 
 Jotham Drury, Benjamin Eustis, William Treadwell, Jotham 
 Horton, David Allen, Thomas Seward, Winthrop Sergeant; and 
 David Bryant, commissioned May loth, 1777. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants (commissioned January ist, 1777) Henry 
 Burbeck, Thomas Wells, David Cook, John Sluman, Thomas 
 Jackson, Daniel Parker, Oliver Brown, Isaiah Bussey; and John 
 Gridley, commissioned June ist, 1777. 
 
 Supernumeraries (commissioned January ist, 1777) John 
 Callender, Thomas Deane, Joseph Loring, Joseph Blake, and 
 Jeremiah Niles. 
 
 First lieutenants (commissioned February ist, 1777) John 
 Compston, John George, John Peirce, Eli Parsons, Edward 
 Proctor, Noyes Arnold, Jacob Goldthwaite, Joseph Andrews, and 
 Benjamin Allen. 
 
 Second lieutenants (commissioned February ist, 1777) James 
 Hall, William Price, Zacheus Dunnell, John Harris, William 
 Andrews, Artemus Knight, Daniel Jackson, Samuel Jefferds, 
 Florence Crowley, Samuel Bass, Abijah Hammond, Joseph Bliss, 
 David Mason, Thomas Bailey, Samuel Cooper, John Cooper, 
 John Hiwell, Benjamin Eaton, Abraham Eustis, Jonathan Clark, 
 
 David Putnam, John Crosier, Le Brum, and George 
 
 Hutton. 
 
 List of Officers of Crane's Regiment, September, 1778, after the 
 Absorption of Lieutenant- Colonel Ebenezer Stevens' Battalion. 
 
 Colonel, John Crane; lieutenant-colonel, John Popkin, com- 
 missioned July i5th, 1777; major, William Perkins, commissioned 
 September i2th, 1778; adjutant, James Gardner; paymaster, 
 Charles Knowles; quartermaster, Thomas Baker; surgeon, Sam- 
 uel Adams, commissioned May i2th, 1778; surgeon's mate, Ben- 
 jamin Upham. 
 
 Captains Benjamin Eustis, William Treadwell, Benjamin 
 Frothingham, Winthrop Sergeant, Thomas Seward, Stephen 
 Bucfcland, Nathaniel Donnell; John Winslow, commissioned June 
 8th, 1777; Henry Burbeck, commissioned September i2th, 1777; 
 Thomas Wells, commissioned May I4th, 1778; David Cook, com- 
 missioned May i4th, 1778; John Sluman, commissioned Sep- 
 tember 1 2th, 1778. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants John Lillie, William Johnson, Thomas 
 Vose, Thomas Jackson, Samuel Shaw, Daniel Parker, Oliver 
 Brown, Joseph Blake, John Callender, Isaiah Bussey, John Grid- 
 ley; John Cumpston, commissioned September i2th, 1777. 
 
 First lieutenants Joseph Perry, John Pierce, John George, 
 Constant Freeman, James Gardner, Jacob Goldthwaite, Edward 
 Proctor, Jacob Kemper, Eli Parsons; James Hall, commissioned 
 September i2th, 1777; Jacob Welsh, commissioned September 
 
 43 
 
33^ APPENDIX. 
 
 1 2th, 1778; Charles Knowles, commissioned September i2th, 
 1778. 
 
 Second lieutenants Daniel McLane, Zacheus Dunnell, William 
 Price, Artemus Knight, Daniel Jackson, John Harris, Isaac Bar- 
 ber, Joseph Driskill, Richard Hunnewell, Thomas Bailey, William 
 Andrews, David Mason, Samuel Jefferds, Florence Crowley, 
 Abijah Hammond, John Crosier, John Hiwell, George Ingersoll, 
 Joseph Bliss, Samuel Cooper, John Cooper, Samuel Bass, Ben- 
 jamin Eaton, David Putnam, John Liswell, David Deming; Elias 
 Parker, September i2th, 1777; Isaac Morey, January ist, 1778; 
 William Downe, May, 1778. 
 
 A [7]. 
 
 Stevens' corps or battalion of artillery, absorbed in Crane's 
 regiment in the fall of 1778, was organized in the following man- 
 ner: As the terms of service of Knox's two companies, detached 
 as already mentioned to the northern department, were about to 
 expire, the Congressional committee which was sent to investigate 
 the cause of disasters and set matters to rights in that quarter 
 authorized the raising a small battalion of artillery, as appears in 
 the following letter from Stevens to General Schuyler, then in 
 command at Albany: 
 
 " TICONDEROGA, November 25?A, 1776. 
 
 !i The honorable the committee of Congress have been pleased to determine 
 that a corps of artillery be raised in this department, consisting of four com- 
 panies, three of artillery and one of artificers ; and have been likewise pleased 
 to give me command thereof, with the rank of major." 
 
 The next month Stevens was dispatched by Schuyler to Boston 
 for the necessary materiel for the new corps, and also for recruits, 
 neither of which could be obtained at Ticonderoga. From the 
 circumstances under which this battalion was raised, Stevens 
 looked upon his command as an independent organization. At 
 the same time, however, that he was recruiting, Colonel Crane 
 was likewise in Massachusetts raising his regiment, under the au- 
 thority of the commander-in-chief. The authorities of the State, 
 General Knox, and Colonel Crane all decided that Stevens' corps 
 formed part of Crane's regiment, which, in consequence, was 
 raised with but nine companies, the three of Stevens making up 
 the complement. The controversy led to a bitter personal quar- 
 rel between Crane and Stevens, the latter declaring that he would 
 resign rather than yield. This alternative would probably have 
 been forced upon him had it not been for the fact that his bat- 
 talion served in the northern department, without contact with 
 the artillery regiments, until the fall of 1778, when, a vacancy 
 happening in the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Second regiment, 
 
APPENDIX. 339 
 
 Stevens was transferred to it, and his three artillery companies 
 formally incorporated into Crane's regiment. That Stevens had 
 practically carried his point, and that his corps was in fact a com- 
 plete and independent organization, the following roster and data 
 will abundantly prove: 
 
 Return of Stevens' Corps, June 2oth, 1777. 
 
 Major, Ebenezer Stevens, commissioned November gth, 1776; 
 adjutant, Hezekiah Whetmore, commissioned February ist, 1777; 
 surgeon, John Stevenson, commissioned April ist, 1777; commis- 
 sary of military stores, Samuel Hodgdon, commissioned February 
 ist, 1777; first conductor, Benjamin Bartlett, commissioned January 
 9th, 1777; second conductor, Jasper ManduitGidley, commissioned 
 June ist, 1777; director of laboratory, John Bull, commissioned 
 June 1 5th, 1777; captain of artificers, Noah Nichols, commissioned 
 November gth, 1776; lieutenant of artificers, Nathaniel Call. 
 
 COMPANY OFFICERS. 
 
 Captains (commissioned November 9th, 1776) Stephen Buck- 
 land, Nathaniel Donnell; John Winslow, commissioned June 8th, 
 1777 (paymaster, June ist, 1778). 
 
 Captain-lieutenants (commissioned November gth, 1776) 
 William Johnson, Thomas Vose, Thomas Barr. 
 
 First lieutenants (commissioned November 9th, 1776) Joseph 
 Perry, Constant Freeman, Jacob Kemper. 
 
 Second lieutenants (commissioned November gth, 1776) Ja- 
 cob Welsh, Daniel McLane, George Ingersoll, Joseph Driskill, 
 Isaac Barber ; Richard Hunnewell, commissioned February ist, 
 1777; John Liswell, commissioned February ist, 1777; David 
 Deming, commissioned February ist, 1777; Andrew H. Tracy, 
 commissioned June ist, 1777. 
 
 The dating of commissions, November 9th, 1776, seems to have 
 been a local arrangement, and perhaps was part of the ' inde- 
 pendent corps ' idea. Certain it is that the records of the State 
 of Massachusetts do not credit any of these officers with service 
 under these commissions anterior to Janury ist, 1777, when Crane's 
 regiment was organized; and those dated November gth, 1776, 
 when transferred to that regiment formally, were cut down to date 
 January ist, 1777; and this determined their position in the Third 
 artillery. 
 
 The anomalous position of this corps seems to have been due 
 to the fact, in the first instance, that its organization was in effect 
 a private arrangement between a Congressional committee and 
 Captain Stevens, of which no one else knew anything, but 
 which was, nevertheless, acquiesced in by the commanding gen- 
 erals of the northern department. The corps was an independent 
 body, so long as it remained in that department, and was a law 
 unto itself regarding dates of commissions and details of organi- 
 
340 APPENDIX. 
 
 zation. Its isolated position, and the acknowledged ability, high 
 character, and distinguished services of its commander made this 
 fiction of independence a practical reality until the corps joined 
 the main army in the fall of 1778; then a readjustment had to be 
 effected and matters placed on a sound basis. This was done by 
 assigning Stevens to a vacancy elsewhere, and placing his com- 
 panies in the Massachusetts artillery regiment upon the same 
 footing that would have been conceded them had they served 
 with it from the date of its organization. 
 
 Of Stevens it is too much to assert that in ability he was 
 the peer of any officer of the Revolutionary artillery. He 
 only of all started low down, and was carried near the top on 
 merit alone. . He was picked out by Congress and given rank 
 step after step over the heads of others, in disregard of rules of 
 promotion, which were generally treated as sacred. The justness 
 of this statement is in nowise affected by the position of General 
 Knox at the head of the artillery; nor is it intended to disparage 
 either his talents, business capacity, or attainments in his special 
 arm of service. He was selected from civil life, and given com- 
 mand of the artillery because of his youth, great energy, intelli- 
 gence, and zeal in the service displayed as a volunteer under the 
 eye of the commander-in-chief at a time when youth and energy 
 were in demand. Having gained the first step, his subsequent 
 advancement was both natural and proper; but there were no 
 competitors in the field. With Stevens the case was different. 
 Starting after the general reorganization of January, 1777, with 
 several captains above him, he was breveted major by the Con- 
 tinental Congress May 27th, 1777; was breveted lieutenant- 
 colonel of foot April 30th, 1778, and made full lieutenant-colonel 
 of artillery November 24th, 1778, to date from his brevet of 
 April 3oth, Congress at the same time directing that he should 
 be assigned to the first vacancy happening in that grade and arm. 
 General Washington inclosed his commission December i7th 
 following, assigning him, vice Oswald, to Lamb's regiment, which 
 he joined on the 22d of that month. 
 
 The three artillery companies of which Stevens' corps was 
 composed had each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, i first and 
 3 second lieutenants, 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 bombardiers, 
 6 gunners, i drummer, i fifer, and 28 matrosses. The company 
 of artificers had, when full, i captain (Noah Nicholls), i captain 
 of cartridge-makers (Nathaniel Call), i foreman of smiths (Thomas 
 Patton), i quartermaster (Bela Nicholls), i lieutenant (Joseph 
 Olmstead), and about 40 enlisted men, all mechanics. This com- 
 pany was attached to the artillery park of the main army when 
 Stevens' corps was broken up. 
 
APPENDIX. 341 
 
 A [8]. 
 Roster of Crane's Battalion {Regimenf), April i6th, 1780. 
 
 Colonel, John Crane, January ist, 1777; lieutenant-colonel, 
 John Popkin, July I5th, 1777; major, William Perkins, Septem- 
 ber i2th, 1778; adjutant, James Gardner, January ist, 1777; 
 paymaster, Charles Knowles, January ist, 1777; quartermaster, 
 Samuel Cooper, May gth, 1779; surgeon, Samuel Adams, May 
 i4th, 1778; surgeon's mate, Benjamin Upham, January ist, 
 1777. 
 
 Captains William Treadwell, January ist, 1777; Benjamin 
 Frothingham, January ist, 1777; Winthrop Sergeant, January ist, 
 1777; Thomas Seward, January ist, 1777; Nathaniel Donnell, 
 January ist, 1777; Henry Burbeck, September i2th, 1777; David 
 Cook, March i4th, 1778; John Sluman, September i2th, 1778; 
 John Lillie, November ist, 1778; Thomas Vose, December 2d, 
 1778; Thomas Jackson, February 22d, 1780; Samuel Shaw, April 
 1 2th, 1780. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants William Johnson, January ist, 1777; 
 Thomas Barr, January ist, 1777; John Callender, January ist, 
 1777; Isaiah Bussey, January ist, 1777; John Gridley, January 
 ist, 1777; John Pierce, September i2th, 1778; John George, 
 October ist, 1778; Constant Freeman, October ist, 1778; Jacob 
 Kemper, December 2d, 1778; James Gardner, February 220!, 1780; 
 Jacob Goldthwaite, March 6th, 1780; James Hall, April i2th, 1780. 
 
 First lieutenants Charles Knowles, August ist, 1778; Daniel 
 McLane, September I2th, 1778; William Price, September i2th, 
 1778; Daniel Jackson, September i2th, 1778; Samuel Jefferds, 
 October ist, 1778; Florence Crowley, October ist, 1778; Abijah 
 Hammond, December 2d, 1778; Joseph Driskill, May 7th, 1779; 
 George Ingersoll, June loth, 1779; John Hiwell, February 220!, 
 1780; Isaac Barber, March 6th, 1780: Thomas Bayley, April i2th, 
 1780. 
 
 Second lieutenants William Andrews, February ist, 1777; 
 David Mason, February ist, 1777; John Liswell, February ist, 
 1777; Joseph Bliss, February ist, 1777; Samuel Cooper, February 
 ist, 1777; Samuel Boss, February ist, 1777; Benjamin Eaton, 
 February ist, 1777; Elias Parker, September I2th, 1777; Moses 
 Porter, January ist, 1778; William Moore, September 9th, 1778; 
 Edward Blake, September loth, 1778. 
 
 The organization of Crane's regiment, when raised, was the 
 same as that of Lamb's regiment, authorized at the same time; 
 
 NOTE. Samuel Shaw was brigadier-major (assistant adjutant-general) of the 
 artillery brigade from May llth, 1777. 
 
342 APPENDIX. 
 
 but in the former, as has been mentioned, Stevens' corps was con- 
 sidered as furnishing three companies to complete the organization 
 to that authorized by the commander- in-chief. It was as follows: 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, i major, i adjutant, i quarter- 
 master, i paymaster, i surgeon, i surgeon's mate, i sergeant- 
 major, i quartermaster-sergeant, i drum-major, and i fife-major. 
 
 Twelve companies, each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, i first 
 lieutenant, 3 second lieutenants, 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 
 bombardiers, 6 gunners, i drum, i fife, and 28 matrosses. 
 
 It is probable that this organization for artillery regiments was 
 adopted at the instance of General Knox, as it is almost identical 
 with that proposed by him to the commander-in-chief, and men- 
 tioned by the latter in his letter of December 2Oth, 1776, to the 
 President of Congress. [6, ante. ] This supposition is strengthened 
 by the facl that when, May 27th, 1778, a general reorganization 
 was given the army, including the artillery, Crane's, Lamb's, 
 Harrison's, and Proctor's regiments were all given the organi- 
 zation just mentioned as that of Crane's and Lamb's regiments, 
 January ist, 1777, with the single exception that while in the 
 latter the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster were extra 
 lieutenants, in the organization of May 27th, 1778, these staff 
 officers were made detailable from the captains and subalterns of 
 each regiment. 
 
 A [9]. 
 
 List of Commissioned Officers of Lamb 's Regiment as First 
 
 Organized. 
 
 Colonel, John Lamb, commissioned January ist, 1777; lieuten- 
 ant-colonel, Eleazer Oswald, commissioned January ist, 1777; 
 
 major, ; adjutant, Isaac Hubbell, commissioned January ist, 
 
 1777; quartermaster, William Fenno, commissioned March 5th, 
 1777; paymaster, John Dutton Crimshire, commissioned July ist, 
 1777; surgeon, Hosmer; surgeon's mate, Caleb Austin, com- 
 missioned January ist, 1777; captain of artificers, Anthony Post, 
 commissioned January ist, 1777; lieutenant of artificers, Garret 
 Brower, commissioned January ist, 1777; foreman, Samuel John- 
 son, commissioned January ist, 1777. 
 
 Captains (commissioned January ist, 1777) Sebastian Beau- 
 man, James Lee, Isaiah Wool, Samuel Mansfield, Samuel Lock- 
 wood, Andrew Moodie, Robert Walker, Gresham Mott, John 
 Doughty, and Thomas Theodore Bliss. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants (commissioned January ist, 1777) Samuel 
 Treat, William Stevens, James Simonds, George Flamming, Joseph 
 Thomas, Joseph Savage, Thomas Machin, Thomas Thompson, 
 William Powers, James McClure, Daniel Ganno, and Jonathan 
 Pearsia. 
 
APPENDIX. 343 
 
 Supernumeraries (commissioned January ist, 1777) Edward 
 Archibald, Jacob Reed, Cornelius Swartwout, and Ephraim 
 Fenno. 
 
 First lieutenants (commissioned February ist, 1777) Thomas 
 Sutton, Baxter Howe, Sheppard Kollock, John Miles, Isaac Hub- 
 bell, Henry Warring, Clarkson Edgar, James McNair, Samuel" 
 Webb, Caleb Brewster, and James Mackinson. 
 
 Second lieutenants (commissioned February ist, 1777) Elisha 
 Harvey, Peter Nestill, Joseph Ashton, Isaiah Thompson, James 
 Brewster, Stephen Ailing, Isaac Guion, Francis Shaw, Peter 
 Woodward, Cornelius Cunningham, John Troop, George Lay- 
 craft, Henry Bogart, Oliver Lawrence, William Cebra, James 
 Hughes, William Hubbell, John Waldron, Chilion Ford, Robert 
 Parker, Ezra Patterson, Ezekiel Howell, Samuel Whiting, Sam- 
 uel Doughty, Alexander Guy, and George Whipple. 
 
 List of Commissioned Officers of Colonel Lamb' s Battalion (or 
 Regiment) of Artillery ', September i2th, 
 
 Colonel, John Lamb, January ist, 1777; lieutenant-colonel, 
 Eleazer Oswald, January ist, 1777 (left regiment in July, 1778; 
 place filled December, 1778); major, Sebastian Beauman, Sep- 
 tember 1 2th, 1778; adjutant, Joseph Ashton; quartermaster, 
 William Fenno, March 5th, 1777; paymaster, John Dutton Crim- 
 shire, July ist, 1777; surgeon, - ; surgeon's mate, Caleb 
 Austin, January ist, 1777; captain of artificers, Anthony Post, 
 January ist, 1777; lieutenant of artificers, Garret Bower, January 
 ist, 1777; foreman, Samuel Johnson, January ist, 1777. 
 
 Captains (commissioned January ist, 1777) James Lee, Isaiah 
 Wool, John Doughty, Andrew Moodie, Gresham Mott, Thomas 
 T. Bliss, Robert Walker, Samuel Lockwood, Andrew Porter, 
 Samuel Mansfield, Jonathan Brown; and William Stevens, Sep- 
 tember 1 2th, 1778. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants (commissioned January ist, 1777) James 
 Simonds, George Flemming, Joseph Savage, Joseph Thomas, 
 Thomas Machin, Jacob Reed, Cornelius Swartwout, Thomas 
 Thompson, Daniel Gano, Edward Archibald, Ephriam Fenno, 
 James McClure, and William Power. 
 
 First lieutenants (commissioned January ist, 1777) Isaac 
 Hubbell, Baxter Howe, Henry Warring, Sheppard Kollock, John 
 Miles, Caleb Brewster; and (commissioned September I2th, 1778) 
 Isaac Guion, John Waldron, William Hubbell, Francis Shaw^ 
 Isaiah Thompson, and Joseph Ashton. 
 
 Second lieutenants (commissioned February ist, 1777) Elisha 
 
 NOTE. Swartwout and Fenno were considered supernumeraries, being pris- 
 oners with the enemy. 
 
344 APPENDIX. 
 
 Harvey, Peter Nestill, Samuel Doty, James Brewster, Stephen 
 Ailing, John Throop, Samuel Whiting (prisoner), George LeCraft, 
 George Hutton, Oliver Lawrence, Chilion Ford, William Cebra, 
 Robert Parker, Ezra Patterson, Ezekiel Howell, Peter Wood- 
 ward; and William Strachan, commissioned September 23d, 1777. 
 (For authorized organization of Lamb's regiment, under the 
 orders of the commander-in-chief, to date from January ist, 1777, 
 and also under the resolve of Congress, May 27th, 1778, see Crane's 
 Battalion, Appendix [8, ante].} 
 
 List of the Officers of Lamb 's Regiment at the end of the Revo- 
 lutionary War. 
 
 Colonel, John Lamb; lieutenant-colonel, Ebenezer Stevens; 
 major, Sebastian Beauman ; surgeon, Garret Tunison. 
 
 Captains John Doughty (brigade major of artillery), Andrew 
 Moodie, Gresham Mott, Thomas T. Bliss, William Stevens, George 
 Flemming, Joseph Savage, Joseph Thomas, Thomas Machin, and 
 Jacob Reed. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants Cornelius Swartwout, Ephriam Fenno, 
 Isaac Hubbell, John Miles, Caleb Brewster, Isaac Guion, Isaiah 
 Thompson, Elisha Harvey, Peter Nestle, and James Brewster. 
 
 Lieutenants Stephen Ailing, John R. Throop, George LeCraft, 
 Chilion Ford, Robert H. Livingston, Hiel Peck, John Campbell, 
 Michael Wetzell, Peter Woodward, William Strachan, James 
 Bradford, Henry A. Williams, Henry Cunningham, Timothy 
 Mix, William Pennington, Alexander Thompson, John Smith, 
 Alexander Clinton, John Reed, Robert Burnet, William LeCraft, 
 William Morris, Isaac Smith, Peter Tappen, Jonas Addoms, 
 Henry Demlar, and John Shaw. 
 
 A [10]. 
 
 List of Field Officers and Captains of Proctor s Regiment (or 
 Battalion) Fourth of Continental Artillery. 
 
 Colonel, Thomas Proctor, commissioned February 6th, 1771, 
 resigned April gth, 1781 ; lieutenant-colonel, John Martin Stro- 
 bagh, promoted from captain March 3d, 1777, died December 2d, 
 1778 ; Thomas Forrest, promoted, vice Strobagh, resigned, Octo- 
 ber 7th, 1781 ; lieutenant-colonel commandant, Andrew Porter, 
 promoted from major December 24th, 1.782, to rank from January 
 ist, 1782 ; served to end of war. 
 
 NOTE. In the list of officers (Lamb's regiment) given above, and which is 
 certified to by Colonel Lamb as being correct, there is no distinction in the 
 grade of lieutenants; i. e., they are not distinguished as first and second. 
 
APPENDIX. 345 
 
 Majors Thomas Forrest, from captain, February 5th, 1777 
 (promoted) ; Benjamin Eustis, commissioned December 2d, 1778, 
 died October 6th, 1781. [This promotion was made in pursuance 
 of the rule established, that captains and officers of higher rank 
 should be advanced in the artillery line at large. Eustis came 
 from Crane's regiment.] Andrew Porter, from captain, April 
 1 9th, 1781 (promoted) ; Isaac Craig, first major, from captain, 
 vice Eustis, to rank from October 7th, 1781 ; Francis Proctor, Jr., 
 second major, December 24th, 1782, ranking from January ist, 
 1782, retired January ist, 1783. 
 
 Captains Gerard Jacob Dircks, March 3d, 1777, to July 6th, 
 1777 (resigned) ; Isaac Craig, March 3d, 1777, to October 7th, 
 1781 (promoted) ; Hercules Courtenay, March 3d, 1777, to March 
 30!, 1778 (dismissed); Joseph Rice, March 3d, 1777, to August 
 ist, 1780 (resigned); Francis Proctor, Sr. , March 3d, 1777,10 
 April i4th, 1778, (dimissed) ; Bartholomew Van Heer (captain of 
 provost), March 3d, 1777, to June ist, 1778 (resigned) ; Amos 
 Wilkinson, March i4th, 1777, to - -; Francis Proctor, 
 
 Jr., July i6th, 1777 (promoted); Charles Turnbull, July i6th, 
 
 1777, to - , served to end of war; Patrick Duffy, Feb- 
 ruary 29th, 1778, to October I2th, 1781 (dismissed) ; William 
 Ferguson, April i4th, 1778, to end of war ; John Brice, June ist, 
 
 1778, to end of war; Robert Coultman, June ist, 1778, retired 
 January ist, 1783; Worsley Ernes, September 26th, 1780, retired 
 January ist, 1783; Andrew Porter, transferred from Lamb's regi- 
 ment, January ist, 1787 (promoted) ; James Simonds, transferred 
 from Lamb's, January ist, 1787, served to end of war ; James Mc- 
 Clure (vice Porter), April igth, 1781, retired January ist, 1783; 
 William Power (vice Craig), October 7th, 1787, retired January 
 ist, 1783 ; Thomas Douglass, October i2th, 1787, retired January 
 ist, 1783 ; and William Martin (vice Proctor), January ist, 1782, 
 retired January ist, 1783. 
 
 The following is the organization of the regiment as authorized 
 by the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, February 6th, 1777: 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, i major, i adjutant, i quar- 
 termaster, i paymaster, i surgeon, i surgeon's mate, i sergeant- 
 major, i quartermaster-sergeant, i drum-major, i fife-major, and 
 12 musicians for a band. 
 
 Eight companies, each i captain, i first lieutenant, i second 
 
 NOTE. Although the record of the field officers and captains of this regiment 
 is satisfactorily given, it is regretted that no list of the subalterns has been 
 procured. 
 
 The grade of fireworker was unknown in any of the regular artillery 
 organizations at this time, and it seems soon to have been discarded in this, 
 and the grade of captain-lieutenant introduced here as elsewhere in that arm. 
 The date of this change is not known, but it must have been immediately after 
 the date of organization, as Courtenay, on March 3d, and Francis Proctor, Jr., 
 and Turnbull. on July 10th. 1777. were promoted to be captains from captain- 
 lieutenants. 
 
 44 
 
346 APPENDIX. 
 
 lieutenant, i lieutenant-fireworker, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, i 
 drummer, i fifer, and 60 privates. 
 
 Proctor's regiment, with the others, partook of the general 
 change of organization wrought by the resolve of Congress, May 
 27th, 1778. (See Crane's Regiment, ante, Appendix [8].) In fact, 
 however, it was not found practicable to assign Proctor twelve 
 companies, as contemplated by that organization. There were 
 with the army when this change was proposed two companies of 
 New Jersey artillery, the officers of one being Thomas Randall, 
 captain; John Lillie, captain-lieutenant; Eli Elmore, first lieu- 
 tenant; Seth Bowenand David More, second lieutenants. Of the 
 other, Thomas Clark, captain; Thomas Jenner Carnes, captain- 
 lieutenant; John Vandyke, first lieutenant. It was intended to 
 place these in Lamb's regiment, and take therefrom the companies 
 of Captains Porter and Lee. These latter, with another com- 
 manded by Captain Gibbs Jones, then unattached, were raised by 
 no particular State, but chiefly recruited in Philadelphia, Delaware, 
 and New Jersey. It was proposed to attach them to Proctor's regi- 
 ment. This was not done; and Proctor remained with but eight 
 companies until after the reorganization of October 3d and 2ist, 
 1780, when Porter's and Lee's companies, the latter now com- 
 manded by Captain James Simonds, were transferred from Col- 
 onel Lamb's to Proctor's regiment, where Porter rose to the 
 rank of lieutenant-colonel commandant. 
 
 Under the resolve of Congress, August 7th, 1782, the Fourth 
 artillery was reduced, January ist, 1783, to a battalion of four com- 
 panies, still retaining, however, the regimental band. The com- 
 missioned roster was as follows : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel commandant, Andrew Porter; major, Charles 
 Craig. 
 
 Captains Charles Turnbull, William Ferguson, John Brice, 
 and James Simonds. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants James Lloyd, James Smith, Robert Mc- 
 Connell, and Jesse Crosley. 
 
 First lieutenants John Strieker, Samuel Doty, Joseph Ashton 
 (paymaster), and John B. Webster (quartermaster). 
 
 Second lieutenants Robert Parker (adjutant), Henry Greer, 
 Ezekiel Howell, Robert Porter, James Gamble (from 4th Pennsyl- 
 vania), John Humphrey (from 6th Pennsylvania), and John Van 
 Court (from 6th Pennsylvania). 
 
 A [ii]. 
 
 The records show that the artillery-artificer regiment of Colonel 
 Flower was a regiment in name only. Its officers, May 24th, 1780, 
 were: 
 
 Colonel, Benjamin Flower; major, Joseph Eayres. 
 
APPENDIX. 347 
 
 Captains Coren, Jordan, Irish, Wylie, and Chapman. 
 
 Captain-lieutenants William E. Godfrey and A. Dow. 
 
 Lieutenants H. Stroop, George Norris, John Sproules, James 
 Gibson, and Alexander Power. 
 
 There was no regimental staff. Flower was commissary-general 
 of military stores. Major Eayres, who was borne on the rolls as- 
 a master mechanic, was at the Springfield (Massachusetts) armory. 
 The captains and subalterns before mentioned were all employed 
 in Pennsylvania, either at the armory at Philadelphia or the 
 arsenal and laboratory at Carlisle. The artillery-artificers formed 
 in fact, while an important, yet, when compared with the civil 
 branch, an altogether secondary feature of the ordnance depart- 
 ment. 
 
 A [12]. 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA ARTILLERY REGIMENT. 
 
 November I3th, 1775, the Provincial Congress of South Caro- 
 lina resolved to raise a regiment (more properly a battalion) of 
 artillery to serve not less than six months nor more than two 
 years, and to consist of 
 
 One lieutenant-colonel commandant, i major, i adjutant, i 
 quartermaster, i surgeon, i surgeon's mate, i paymaster, i 
 armorer, i assistant armorer, and i sergeant workman, to attend 
 laboratory. 
 
 Three companies, each i captain, i first and i second lieutenant, 
 2 lieutenant fire-workers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 10 gunners, i 
 drum, i fife, and 86 matrosses. 
 
 The officers chosen by the Provincial Congress were: Lieuten- 
 ant-colonel commandant, Owen Roberts; major, Barnard Elliott; 
 captains, Barnard Beckman, Charles Drayton, and Sims White; 
 paymaster, Paul Townshend; surgeon, John Budd. 
 
 The subalterns were to be selected by the captains with the ap- 
 probation of the commandant. 
 
 June 1 8th, 1776, this battalion, although not expected to serve 
 beyond the limits of South Carolina, was taken by the Continental 
 Congress into the pay and service of the Revolutionary Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 A [13]. 
 
 Organization of the Regiments of Artillery, Regular Army of 
 the United States, under the Resolves of Congress of October $d 
 and 2ist, 1780. 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, i major, i adjutant, i pay- 
 master, i quartermaster, i surgeon, i surgeon's mate, i sergeant- 
 
348 APPENDIX. 
 
 major, i quartermaster-sergeant, i drum-major, i fife-major, and 
 i chaplain (to a brigade only). 
 
 Ten companies, each i captain, i captain-lieutenant, i first and 
 3 second lieutenants, 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 bombardiers, 6 
 gunners, i drum, i fife, and 39 matrosses. 
 
 This remained the established organization until the end of the 
 war. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 349 
 
 Troops Provisionally Retained in Service when the Revolutionary Army was Disbanded. 
 
 y 3d, 1784, Major-General Knox transmitted to the president of Congress a list of the officers retained, 
 lied by a return showing the organization of the troops. As this paper is certified to by Knox as correct, 
 Drove of general interest, it is inserted here entire: 
 
 ARTILLERY. INFANTRY. 
 
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350 APPENDIX. 
 
 List of Officers. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 Major, Sebastian Beauman, commissioned September i2th, 
 1778; captain, John Doughty, commissioned January ist, 1777; 
 captain-lieutenants, William Johnson, commissioned January ist, 
 1777, and Ephraim Fenno, commissioned January ist, 1777; first 
 lieutenants, William Price, commissioned September i2th, 1778, 
 and Samuel Jefferds, commissioned October ist, 1778; second 
 lieutenant, Joseph Bliss, commissioned February ist, 1777; 
 lieutenant and adjutant, James Bradford, commissioned Septem- 
 ber 1 2th, 1778; lieutenants, Alexander Thompson, commissioned 
 May 3ist, 1779, and John Reed, commissioned June 29th, 1781. 
 
 Of the artillery, seventy non-commissioned officers and ma- 
 trosses belonged to the New York line; fifty-five to the Massa- 
 chusetts line. One subaltern and twenty-one men were en route 
 to Fort Schuyler (Rome, N. Y.) to guard stores there and to take 
 possession of the forts on the western lakes when surrendered by 
 the British. One subaltern and twenty-three men were in New 
 York city to assist in restoring civil government. The rest were 
 at West Point or dependencies. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 Colonel, Henry Jackson, January i2th, 1777; lieutenant-colonel, 
 William Hull, August i2th, 1779; major, Caleb Gibbs, July 29th, 
 1778; adjutant, Lieutenant Charles Seldon, March, 1778; quarter- 
 master, Lieutenant Henry Nelson, March ist, 1782; paymaster, 
 Lieutenant Thomas H. Condy, March ist 1779; surgeon, John 
 Hart, ; surgeon's mate, Nathaniel Leavenworth . 
 
 Captains Joseph Williams, January ist, 1777; Isaac Frye, 
 January ist, 1777; Job Sumner, January ist, 1777; William Mills, 
 May nth, 1781; John Hobby, July 24th, 1781; Joseph Potter, 
 October i6th, 1781; Elnathan Haskell, April ist, 1778; Thomas 
 Hunt, March ist, 1779; Simon Jackson, April ist, 1782. 
 
 Lieutenants Patrick Phelon, June 2oth, 1777; Thomas Cush- 
 ing, January i4th, 1778; Charles Seldon, (adjutant), Jonathan 
 Haskell, February 5th, 1779; Thomas H. Condy (paymaster); 
 Ralph H. Bowles, March 2Oth, 1779; Nathaniel Stone, March 
 2oth, 1780; Joshua Merrow, July I2th, 1780; Gamaliel Bradford, 
 September 3d, 1780; John Adams, October 6th, 1781; Henry 
 Nelson (quartermaster); William Pickard, April I4th, 1782. 
 
 Ensigns Caleb Swan, November 26th, 1779; James Sever, 
 February ist, 1781; James Sawyer, February 22d, 1781; Elisha 
 Horton, April 2d, 1781; Jeremiah Lord, June i5th, 1781; John 
 Rowe, June i5th, 1781; John Graton, July i6th, 1782; Amasa 
 Jackson, October i3th, 1782; Charles Jackson, February 4th, 
 1783- 
 
APPENDIX. 35! 
 
 Of the infantry, 461 belonged to Massachusetts and 103 to New 
 Hampshire. 
 
 Invalids Captains, John McGovern, William Williams, Philip 
 Seibert, and Leonard Cooper; captain-lieutenant, William Mc- 
 Elhothen; lieutenants, Jonathan Pugh and James McLane. 
 
 One hospital mate ( Dr. Coggswell) and one steward were, be- 
 sides those enumerated, retained for hospital service at West Point. 
 
 A [15]. 
 
 Provisional Force Recommended by a Congressional Committee 
 in a Report of May i2th, 1784, to be Enlisted for Three 
 Years, each State furnishing its Quota. 
 
 One adjutant-general, i inspector-general (both with rank and 
 pay of major of infantry), i colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, and i 
 major of engineers. 
 
 Three battalions of infantry, the staff for the whole being i 
 colonel, i captain quartermaster, i captain paymaster and cloth- 
 ier, i surgeon, and 5 mates. 
 
 Each infantry battalion to embrace i lieutenant-colonel, i major, 
 4 captains, 5 lieutenants (including i adjutant), 4 ensigns, 16 ser- 
 geants, i quartermaster-sergeant, i music-sergeant, 4 drummers, 
 4 fifers, and 200 privates. 
 
 In addition to the three infantry battalions, i battalion of artil- 
 lery was recommended, embracing i lieutenant-colonel, i major, 4 
 captains, 4 captain-lieutenants, 4 first lieutenants, 4 second lieuten- 
 ants, i adjutant lieutenant, i captain quartermaster, i captain 
 paymaster and clothier, i surgeon, i surgeon's mate, i quarter- 
 master sergeant, i sergeant major, i music sergeant, 24 ser- 
 geants, 4 drums, 4 fifes, 100 artificers, and 100 matrosses. 
 
 A [16]. 
 
 Officers of Artillery Retained in Service Pursuant to Resolution 
 of Congress > June 2d, 1784. 
 
 Captain, John Doughty; captain-lieutenant, William Johnson; 
 lieutenants, Samuel Jefferds and James Bradford. 
 
 NOTE. The author is indebted for this list to the researches of Professor A. 
 B. Gardner, judge-advocate, United States army. 
 
 Commissioned Officers of the Detachment of Artillery, Composed 
 of Fifty Men, Raised in Pennsylvania Pursuant to Resolve of 
 Continental Congress, June jd, 1784. 
 
 Captain, Thomas Douglass; lieutenant, Joseph Ashton. 
 
352 APPENDIX. 
 
 Officers of the Pennsylvania Artillery Detachment, as Reorgan- 
 ized under Resolve of Continental Congress, April i2th, 1785. 
 
 Captain, William Ferguson; lieutenant, Joseph Ashton. 
 
 A [17]. 
 
 Organization of the Artillery of the Legionary Corps into which 
 the Troops Raised Pursuant to Resolves of April i2th, 1785, 
 and October 2oth, 1786, were Arranged under War Department 
 Order of January jot/i, 1787. 
 
 One battalion i major, i adjutant, i quartermaster, i pay- 
 master and clothier, i sergeant-major, i quartermaster-sergeant. 
 
 Four companies, each i captain, 2 lieutenants (no distinction 
 as to grades), 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 4 artificers, i drum, i fife, 
 and 45 matrosses. 
 
 List of Officers of the Artillery Battalion, Legionary Corps. 
 
 Major, John Doughty. 
 
 Captains William Ferguson, James Bradford, Henry Burbeck, 
 and Joseph Savage. 
 
 Lieutenants Joseph Ashton, Mahlon Ford, Dirck Schuyler, 
 John Pierce, Moses Porter, William Moore, Ebenezer Smith 
 Fowle, and Matthew Ernest. 
 
 A [18]. 
 
 October 3d, 1787, the battalion organization for the artillery 
 was retained by resolve of Congress, but the personnel of the ar- 
 tillery company, like that of infantry, was 4 sergeants, 4 cor- 
 porals, 2 musicians, and 60 privates. 
 
 As thus modified, the battalion passed, two years later, into 
 the regular army under the Constitutional Government. 
 
 A [19]- 
 
 The President nominated the officers for reappointment in the 
 following message: 
 
 "UNITED STATES, September 13th, 1789. 
 
 " GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE : Agreeably to the act of Congress for adopting 
 the establishment of troops in the public service to the Constitution of the 
 United States, I nominate the persons specified in the inclosed list to be the 
 commissioned officers thereof. This nomination differs from the existing ar- 
 rangement only in the following cases, to wit: * * * * Ensign E. Spear, pro- 
 
APPENDIX. 353 
 
 moted to vacant lieutenancy of artillery ****. It is to be observed that 
 the order in which the captains and subalterns are named is not to affect their 
 relative rank, which has hitherto been imperfectly settled, owing to the per- 
 plexity of promotions in the State quotas, conformably to the late Confedera- 
 tion." * * * * * * * 
 
 Officers of the Battalion of Artillery. 
 
 Major commandant, John Doughty. 
 
 Captains [3]* Henry Burbeck, Massachusetts; [i] William 
 Ferguson, Pennsylvania; [4] Joseph Savage, Massachusetts; and 
 [2] James Bradford, New York. 
 
 Lieutenants [3] John Pierce, Massachusetts ; [4] Moses Por- 
 ter, Massachusetts; [5] William Moore, Massachusetts; [2] Dirck 
 Schuyler, New York; [i] Mahlon Ford, New Jersey; [6] Mat- 
 thew Ernest, New York; [8] Edward Spear, Pennsylvania; and 
 [7] Ebenezer Smith Fowle, Massachusetts. 
 
 Surgeon's mate, Nathaniel Hey ward, Massachusetts. 
 
 A [20], 
 
 The act of April 3Oth, 1790, for regulating the military estab- 
 lishment, gave to the artillery battalion an organization which in 
 no essential particular differed from that prescribed by Secretary 
 Knox, January, 1787, as modified by the resolve of October 3d, 
 same year. That provided by the act in question was ; 
 
 One major commandant, i adjutant, i quartermaster and pay- 
 master (each from the subalterns of the line), and i surgeon's mate. 
 
 Four companies, each i captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 
 corporals, 2 musicians, and 66 privates. 
 
 A [21]. 
 
 Legion of the United States, Organized December, 1792, by the 
 President, Pursuant to Authority Vested in Him by Act of 
 March ^th, 1792. 
 
 One major-general (or legionary general), with 2 aids-de-camp, 
 i adjutant and inspector, i quartermaster, i deputy quartermaster, 
 
 *The figures inclosed in [ ] indicate the relative rank of the officers as 
 fixed upon in the President's message of June 2d, 1790. The date of their 
 new commissions was, in every instance, fixed at September 29th, 1789. (See 
 letter of Secretary of War, March 14th, 1*792, "Executive Journal, Senate.") 
 No attempt has been made to present the names of artillery officers at any 
 period subsequent to the adoption of the military establishment by Congress, 
 September 29th, 1789, under the provisions of the Constitution. These will be 
 found in the "Dictionary of the Army" and in Registers. 
 
 45 
 
354 APPENDIX. 
 
 i surgeon, i chaplain, i major commandant of cavalry, and i 
 major commandant of artillery. 
 
 Four sub-legions, each of 1280 rank and file, arranged as follows: 
 
 One brigadier (or sub-legionary) general, with i aid-de-camp, 
 i brigade (or sub-legionary) major and inspector, i quartermaster, 
 and i surgeon. 
 
 One troop of dragoons, to consist of i captain, i lieutenant, i 
 cornet, 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, i farrier, i saddler, i trumpeter, 
 and 65 dragoons. 
 
 One company of artillery, to consist of i captain, 2 lieutenants, 
 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 50 privates, to include 
 10 artificers. 
 
 Two battalions of infantry and i battalion of riflemen, each i 
 major, i adjutant, i quartermaster, i surgeon's mate, i sergeant- 
 major, i quartermaster-sergeant, i senior musician ; and 
 
 Four companies, each i captain, i lieutenant, i ensign, 6 ser- 
 geants, 6 corporals, 2 musicians, and 81 privates; to the rifle 
 companies, i bugler and 81 privates. 
 
 A [22]. 
 
 Act of May 9th, 1794, to organize a corps of artillerists and 
 engineers, to be incorporated with the corps of artillery already 
 in service (entire rank and file 992), to consist of 
 
 One lieutenant-colonel commandant, i adjutant, and i surgeon. 
 
 Four battalions, each i major, i adjutant and paymaster, i 
 surgeon's mate; and 
 
 Four companies, each i captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 cadets (pay, 
 clothing, and rations of sergeants), 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 42 pri- 
 vates, sappers, and miners, 10 artificers, and 2 musicians. 
 
 It was made the duty of the Secretary of War to provide, at 
 the public expense, under regulations prescribed by the President, 
 the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus for the use and 
 benefit of the corps, which was to serve in the field, on the 
 frontiers, or in the fortifications on the sea-coast, as the President 
 should deem consistent with the public service. 
 
 A [23]. 
 
 Organization of a Regiment of Artillerists and Engineers ', 
 Authorized by Act of April 2jth, 1798. 
 
 One lieutenant-colonel commandant, i adjutant, and i surgeon. 
 
 Three battalions, eagh i major, i adjutant and paymaster, i 
 surgeon's mate; and 
 
 Four companies, each i captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 cadets, 4 ser- 
 geants, 4 corporals, 42 privates, sappers, and miners, 10 artificers, 
 and 2 musicians. 
 
APPENDIX. 355 
 
 The act of July i6th, 1798, to augment the army, authorized 
 i inspector of artillery (froni line of artillerists and engineers), 4 
 teachers of the arts and sciences, or a less number, as might be 
 necessary for . the instruction of the artillerists and engineers (the 
 teachers each fifty dollars per month and double rations). 
 
 A [24]. 
 
 By act of March 2d, 1799, the President was authorized, in case 
 war should break out between the United States and a European 
 power, or in case there was in his opinion imminent danger of 
 invasion of their territory by any such power, to increase the 
 military establishment by * * * one battalion of artillerists 
 and engineers, * * * the authority to cease at the expiration 
 of the next ensuing session of Congress, unless by future law con- 
 tinued in force. The continuation was rendered unnecessary by 
 the general law of March 2d, 1799 (same date), reorganizing the 
 army, and which for the artillerists and engineers gave the corps 
 and the regiment the same organization, viz. : 
 
 One lieutenant-colonel commandant; i adjutant, i quarter- 
 master, i paymaster, (extra lieutenants); i surgeon, 2 surgeon's 
 mates, and i chief and 10 other musicians. 
 
 Four battalions, each i major, i sergeant-major, i quarter- 
 master-sergeant ; and 
 
 Four companies, each i captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 cadets, 4 ser- 
 geants, 4 corporals, and 56 privates, including 8 artificers. 
 
 The increase here authorized for the regiment of artillerists and 
 engineers was held to supplant the necessity that might exist for 
 raising the battalion of that arm authorized by the preceding act 
 of the same date. The reorganizing act prescribed that a " regi- 
 ment of artillery ' ' should consist of, &c. ; but this was construed 
 to mean ' ' regiment of artillerists and engineers, ' ' which branch 
 of service thereafter, and until 1802, was arranged to two regi- 
 ments, styled the First and Second. The First regiment sup- 
 planted the old corps of artillerists and engineers of 1794. 
 
 Two engineers were authorized, distinct from the officers of 
 artillerists and engineers, with the rank and pay of lieutenant- 
 colonels; also an inspector of fortifications, to be taken either from 
 the army or civil life, and to have the rank of major. 
 
 A [25]. 
 
 Organization of the Regiment of Artillerists, Act of March i6th, 
 
 1802. 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, 4 majors i adjutant. 
 
 Five battalions, 20 companies; each company i captain, i first 
 
356 APPENDIX. 
 
 lieutenant,, i -second lieutenant, 2 cadets, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 
 4 musicians, 8 artificers, and 56 privates. 
 
 This act formally separated the artillerists from the engineers. In 
 the former the grade of second lieutenant was introduced for the first time since 
 the army was disbanded in 1783. [The musicians were intended in great 
 part for a regimental band. The act of February 28th, 1803, provided for two 
 teachers of music for the regiment of artillerists.] 
 
 A [26], 
 
 Organization of a Regiment of Light Artillery, Acts of April 
 1 2th, 1808, and March jd, 1815. 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant colonel, i major; i adjutant, i 
 quartermaster, i paymaster, each taken from subalterns; i sur- 
 geon, i surgeon's mate, i sergeant-major, i quartermaster-ser- 
 geant, and 2 principal musicians. 
 
 Ten companies, each i captain, i first lieutenant, i second 
 lieutenant, 2 cadets, 4 sergeants 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 8 artifi- 
 cers, and 58 matrosses. 
 
 [Act of February 24th, 1812, provided that this regiment should 
 be mounted, in whole or in part, when deemed expedient; and 
 when so mounted, the officers were entitled to forage, or money 
 value thereof, on same terms as the light dragoons; and that one 
 farrier and one saddler should be added to each company. Act of 
 May i6th, 1812, gave a regimental paymaster, (pay and emolu- 
 ments of captain of his regiment,) and added twelve drivers to 
 each company of light artillery. Act of January 2oth, 1813, 
 gave the regiment a second major; to each company a third lieuten- 
 ant and a fifth sergeant. The act of March 3d, 1815, restored 
 the light artillery to its original organization, i. e. , that of April 
 1 2th, 1808.] 
 
 A [27]. 
 
 Organization of the Second and Third Regiments of Artillery, 
 Authorized by Act of January nth, 1812. 
 
 One colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 2 adjutants, i 
 quartermaster, i paymaster, i surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates, 2 ser- 
 geant-majors, 2 quartermaster sergeants, and 2 senior musicians. 
 
 Two battalions, each 10 companies; each company i captain, i 
 first lieutenant, i second lieutenant, 2 cadets, 4 sergeants, 4 corpo- 
 rals, 8 artificers, 2 musicians, and 72 privates. [Act of March 28th, 
 1812, authorized four conductors of artillery, pay and emoluments 
 of a lieutenant.] 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A [28]. 
 
 Act of March 30, 1814, arranged the First, Second, and Third 
 artillery regiments into a corps of 12 battalions, with 6 lieutenant- 
 colonels, 6 majors, 12 adjutants, 12 quartermasters, and 48 com- 
 panies; each i captain, i first lieutenant, 2 second lieutenants 
 (one to be conductor of artillery for his company, with ten dollars 
 additional per month), i third lieutenant, 5 sergeants, i quarter- 
 master-sergeant, 8 corporals, 4 musicians, and 100 privates. 
 
 The officers of artillery, whether of the corps or of the light 
 regiment, were given dragoon pay. 
 
 A [29]. 
 
 Plan for the Organization of the Artillery of the United States, 
 proposed to the Secretary of War July igth, 1812, with Remarks 
 thereon by Colonel George Izard. 
 
 " It is proposed to substitute for the four regiments, making ten battalions, a 
 regular force, of which all the component parts shall be assimilated to each 
 other ; to connect the engineer department with that of the artillery, and thus 
 to place at the disposal of the Government a body of officers and men who, 
 from the nature of the institution, will progressively become more and more 
 useful. 
 
 ' ; The establishment will embrace 1 colonel-in-chief, 4 colonels, 1 lieutenant- 
 colonel (adjutant-general of the corps), 8 lieutenant-colonels (commanding 
 battalions), 1 major and assistant adjutant-general of the corps, 8 majors, 10 
 captains (assistant inspectors), 64 captains (commanding companies), 74 first 
 lieutenants, 148 second lieutenants, 74 cadets, 8 sergeant-majors, 8 quarter- 
 master-sergeants, 8 senior musicians, 320 sergeants, 320 corporals, 128 musi- 
 cians, 256 fire-workers, 456 artificers. 100 sappers and miners, 1,792 privates 
 of the first class, and 2,560 privates of the second class. The whole arranged 
 to eight battalions, eight companies each, except the colonel-in-chief, 4 colonels, 
 
 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 10 captains, 10 first lieutenants, 20 second lieu- 
 tenants, 10 cadets, four companies of artificers, 50 each, and two companies of 
 sappers and miners, 50 each. Each company of the battalion to consist of 1 
 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 cadet, 5 sergeants, 5 corporals, 
 
 2 musicians, 4 fire- workers, 4 artificers, 28 privates of the first and 40 privates 
 of the second class. 
 
 " The proportion between the number of officers and men depends upon the 
 nature of the duties to be performed. In the field service of artillery it is as- 
 certained by experience that the superintendence of more than two pieces in 
 action cannot be executed by one officer well. In the French system a division 
 or company embraces 4 officers and 88 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, 
 including artificers and musicians. Each company is subdivided into four 
 squads, one of which is supernumerary, to supply loss of men in action ; each 
 remaining squad has two pieces, commanded by a subaltern. The captain com- 
 mands the division or company ; eight companies are in one battalion ; eight 
 battalions make up a corps of artillery. 
 
 " It will be asked, Where is the flying or horse artillery in this arrangement? 
 Let me in turn inquire what are the peculiarities in the service of horse artil- 
 lery which distinguish it from artillery on foot? Is there one circumstance in 
 their manoeuvres or in the construction of their gun-carriages and caissons 
 
358 APPENDIX. 
 
 which need vary from those adopted in the latter? Wherefore is the soldier 
 of horse artillery mounted on horseback? Not to do cavalry duty in any 
 shape whatever, but simply to expedite his transportation from one distant 
 point to another. All that it is essential for him to know, which his comrade 
 on foot may dispense with, is to sit upon his horse in moving for an hour or 
 so at a rapid pace." 
 
 A [30]. 
 
 The act of March 3d, 1815, fixed the military peace establish- 
 ment at not to exceed 10,000 men, of artillery, infantry, and 
 riflemen, in such proportions as the President should deem proper; 
 the regiment of light artillery to be retained as organized April 
 i2th, 1808 ; the corps of artillery as organized March 3oth, 1814. 
 
 Under the discretionary authority given him, the President 
 retained in service eight of the twelve battalions into which the 
 corps of artillery was organized by the act last mentioned. 
 
 [By act of April 24th, 1816, one paymaster was allowed each 
 battalion of artillery, who was also to be a district paymaster, to 
 be appointed from subalterns or citizens, with pay and emolu- 
 ments of major. Act of April 2Oth, 1818, fixed the commission- 
 ed officers of a light artillery company at I captain, I first lieu- 
 tenant, 2 second lieutenants (one to act as conductor of artillery); 
 of a company of the corps of artillery, at i captain, 2 first lieuten- 
 ants and 2 second lieutenants (one to act as conductor of artillery) ; 
 while to each battalion of artillery, and to the regiment of light 
 artillery, i armorer was attached (with same pay as in ordnance 
 department).] 
 
 A [31]- 
 
 Organization of the Artillery under the Act of March 2d, 1821, 
 to Reduce and Fix the Military Establishment. 
 
 Four regiments, each i colonel, i lieutenant colonel, i major, 
 
 1 captain, supernumerary for ordnance duty, (repealed by acl 
 April 5th, 1832,) i adjutant, from the line of subalterns, i sergeant- 
 major, and i quartermaster sergeant; and 
 
 Nine companies, one of which it was directed should be desig- 
 nated and equipped as light artillery; each company i captain, 
 
 2 first lieutenants, 2 second lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 
 
 3 artificers, 2 musicians, and 42 privates. Ordnance department 
 merged in the artillery; officers of artillery to be selected for ord- 
 nance duties, and, when so serving, to be under orders of War 
 Department only; the number of enlisted men in the ordnance 
 department to be reduced to fifty-six. 
 
 [Acl: of April 5th, 1832, reorganized the ordnance department 
 with no officer under rank of captain. It authorized the President 
 
APPENDIX. 359 
 
 to sele6l from the artillery such number of lieutenants as might be 
 necessary for ordnance duties. Act of July 5th, 1838, added i 
 company to each regiment of artillery, organized as those already 
 in service; reduced the number of second lieutenants for each 
 company to one, and added 16 privates to each. A6t of August 
 23d, 1842, took away these 16 privates, and also i artificer from 
 each company of artillery, leaving the enlisted strength of each 
 at 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 artificers, 2 musicians, and 42 pri- 
 vates.] 
 
360 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A [32]. 
 
 Table Showing the Reorganization of the Artillery, June, 1821, 
 Under the Act of Congress to Reduce and Fix the Military 
 Peace Establishment of the United States, Approved March 2d, 
 1821. 
 
 Organization prior to 
 1821. 
 
 Captains. 
 
 Became in Reorganization. 
 
 A Light Artillery 
 
 McDowell 
 
 A, 1st Artillery. 
 G, 
 C, 
 H, 
 G, 4th Artillery. 
 H, 3d " 
 D, 1st " 
 n April, 1821. 
 E, 3d Artillery. 
 A, 4th 
 
 itary Division. 
 
 I, 1st Artillery. 
 F, 1st ' 
 C, 2d ' 
 B, 1st ' 
 A, 3d ' 
 C, 3d 
 Broken up. 
 H, 2d Artillery. 
 B, 
 G. " 
 D| 
 A, 
 E, 1st Artillery. 
 I, 2d " 
 Broken up. 
 F, 2d Artillery. 
 
 vision. 
 
 F, 4th Artillery. 
 B, 3d " 
 B, 4th " 
 C, 4th " 
 F, 3d " 
 Broken up. 
 D, 4th Artillery. 
 Broken up. 
 H, 4th Artillery. 
 D, 3d " 
 See C, 4th Artillery (list below). 
 I, 4th Artillery. 
 E, 4th 
 I, 3d 
 G, 3d " 
 See E, 3d Artillery (list below). 
 
 B 
 
 Leonard 
 
 n 
 
 Brooks .... 
 
 D 
 
 Wilkins 
 
 E 
 
 Hobart 
 
 F, 
 a 
 
 
 Eastman 
 
 H, 
 
 Was broken up 
 
 I 
 
 K, 
 Corps Artille 
 A 2d Battalion 
 
 Bell 
 ry, Northern Mil 
 Erving 
 
 B 4th " 
 
 Read 
 
 C 3d " 
 
 Mountfort 
 Crane 
 
 D 2d " 
 
 E 3d " 
 
 
 F 3d 
 
 
 G 4th 
 
 Dearborn 
 
 H 4th 
 
 
 I 1st 
 
 Gates 
 
 K 4th 
 
 
 L 1st 
 
 Heilman . 
 
 M 2d 
 
 Beall 
 
 N 2d 
 
 Churchhill 
 Pierce 
 
 1st 
 
 P 1st 
 
 Farley 
 
 O 3d 
 
 Zantzinger 
 
 South 
 A 3d Battalion 
 
 ern Military D\ 
 Sands 
 
 B9d " 
 
 Wilson . .. 
 
 C 3d " . ... 
 
 Humphrey 
 Fanning 
 Burd 
 
 D 4th " 
 
 El af U 
 
 F 3d " 
 
 Whiting 
 Root 
 
 G3d " 
 
 H 4th " 
 
 Archer 
 
 I 1st " 
 
 Mason 
 
 K 2d " 
 
 Jones 
 
 L 4th* " 
 
 T,nnmis . 
 
 M 4th " Ridrllp 
 
 N 1st " 
 
 
 9 d " . .. 
 
 Allen 
 
 P 2d " 
 
 Lomax 
 
 Q 1st 
 
 O'Conner 
 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 3 6i 
 
 New Organization. 
 
 Regiment. 
 
 Co. 
 
 Captains. 
 
 Organized From 
 
 1st Artillery... 
 
 
 A... 
 B 
 
 McDowell 
 Crane 
 
 A, Light Artillery. 
 D 2d Battalion Northern Division 
 
 
 
 c 
 
 Brooks 
 
 C Light Artillery 
 
 
 
 D... 
 
 Eastman 
 
 G, " " 
 
 u 
 
 E 
 
 Churchill 
 
 N 2d Battalion Northern Division 
 
 u ' 
 
 F 
 
 Worth 
 
 B 4th " u 
 
 u 
 
 G... 
 
 Mason. 
 
 B, Light Artillery. 
 
 14 
 
 U 
 
 2d Artillery.... 
 
 H... 
 I 
 A... 
 
 H. Whiting ... 
 F. Whiting.... 
 Fanning 
 
 D, 
 A, 2d Battalion, Northern Division. 
 M, 2d Battalion, Northern Division and 
 
 a 
 
 B 
 
 Gates 
 
 detachment at West Point, N. Y. 
 I 1st Battalion Northern Division 
 
 u 
 
 c 
 
 Roach 
 
 C 3d " " " 
 
 u 
 
 D... 
 
 Heilman 
 
 L, 1st " " " 
 
 u 
 
 E 
 
 Nourse 
 
 6th Infantry Recruits 
 
 u 
 
 F... 
 
 Beltoii 
 
 Q, 3d Battalion, Northern Division 
 
 u 
 u 
 u 
 
 G... 
 H... 
 I 
 
 Zantzinger 
 Mountfort 
 Legate 
 
 K, 4th " . " 
 H, 4th " " " 
 1st " " " 
 
 3d Artillery.... 
 
 A 
 
 Ansart 
 
 E, 3d " " " 
 
 
 R 
 
 Wilson 
 
 B, 2d " Southern " 
 
 a 
 
 C... 
 
 Jones 
 
 F, 3d " Northern " 
 
 a 
 
 D... 
 E... 
 
 Stockton 
 Craig 
 
 K, 2d " Southern " 
 I, Light Artillery and Q 1st Battalion 
 
 a 
 
 F. 
 
 Laval 
 
 Southern Division. 
 E 1st Battalion Southern Division 
 
 u 
 
 G 
 
 Lomax 
 
 P, 2d " " u 
 
 u 
 
 H... 
 
 Morris 
 
 F Light Artillery 
 
 a 
 
 I 
 
 Baker 
 
 2d Battalion Southern Division 
 
 4th Artillery 
 
 A... 
 
 Bell 
 
 K, Light Artillery 
 
 u 
 
 
 B.... 
 C.... 
 
 Humphrey 
 Burd 
 
 C, 3d Battalion, Southern Division. 
 D and part of L 4th Battalion Southern 
 
 M 
 
 D... 
 
 Pierce 
 
 Division. 
 G, 3d Battalion Southern Division 
 
 (. 
 
 E 
 
 Payne 
 
 N, 1st " " " 
 
 U 
 
 F... 
 
 Hayden 
 
 A, 3d " " " 
 
 a 
 
 G... 
 
 Hobart 
 
 E, Light Artillery. 
 
 a 
 
 H... 
 
 Erving 
 
 I, and part of E, 1st Battalion Southern 
 
 
 
 I . 
 
 Sands 
 
 Division. 
 M 4th Battalion Southern Division 
 
 
 
 
 
 NOTE. The author is indebted for the preceding interesting and valuable 
 table to the researches of Mr. Heitman, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, 
 who, with the kind permission of Adjutant-General Drum, devoted much time 
 to its preparation. It is with great pleasure that this acknowledgment is made. 
 
 46 
 
362 APPENDIX. 
 
 A [33]. 
 
 The legislation affecting the artillery and growing out of the 
 Mexican war was initiated by the act of May I3th, 1846, which 
 authorized the President to increase the number of privates 
 in each company to one hundred [reduced, act August i4th, 
 1848]. This was followed by the act of February nth, 1847, 
 giving to each regiment an additional major, to be taken from the 
 captains of the army; and a regimental quartermaster, to be se- 
 lected from the subalterns. 
 
 The act of March 3d, 1847, added to each regiment of artillery 
 two companies, two principal musicians, one principal teamster, 
 and to each company two teamsters. The President was em- 
 powered, when he should deem it necessary, to designate four 
 other companies, one in each regiment, to be organized and 
 equipped as light artillery, the officers and men of the light 
 artillery, when serving as such and mounted, to receive the same 
 pay and allowance as dragoons. 
 
 The various additions made to the artillery, except the two 
 companies to each regiment, were intended to be but temporary 
 in nature, and to terminate with the war. As to the regimental 
 quartermaster, the principal teamster to each regiment, and the 
 teamsters for the companies, the original purpose was carried 
 out. The majors were, by a6l of July iQth, 1848, made part of 
 the permanent organization of the artillery regiments, while the 
 principal musicians were allowed to disappear by casualties of 
 service, their places not being filled. 
 
 [By acl of June i7th, 1850, the enlisted strength of light artil- 
 lery companies was fixed at 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 artificers, 
 2 musicians, and 64 privates. By the same acl: the President 
 was authorized to properly mount and equip such portions of the 
 army as served habitually on foot whenever, in his opinion, the 
 exigencies of the public service might require it. This, of course, 
 empowered the President to temporarily equip as field artillery, 
 or as cavalry, any of the foot artillery companies. Under the 
 provisions of the acl; of July i7th, 1862, officers when so mounted 
 were authorized to receive cavalry pay.] 
 
 A [34]- 
 
 Organization of the Fifth Regiment, United States Artillery, 
 Raised Pursuant to the President's Proclamation, May jd, 
 1861, and Act of July 2yth, 1861. 
 
 One colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, i major (to every four bat- 
 teries) ; i adjutant, i quartermaster and commissary, (to be taken 
 from the lieutenants of the regiment); i sergeant-major, i quar- 
 termaster-sergeant, i commissary sergeant, 2 principal musicians, 
 i hospital steward, and i band of not more than 24 musicians. 
 
APPENDIX. 363 
 
 Not more than 12 batteries, each i captain, i first lieutenant, i 
 second lieutenant, i first sergeant, i quartermaster-sergeant, 4 
 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 musicians, 2 artificers, i wagoner, and 
 not exceeding 122 privates, at the option of the President, who 
 was authorized to add to each battery i first lieutenant, i second 
 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, and 4 corporals. 
 
 This was the organization, save in the matter of artificers, of a 
 6-gun battery on a war establishment, as prescribed in the author- 
 ized light-artillery tactics of the time. The Fifth was raised as a 
 regiment of artillery simply. The term ' light artillery ' nowhere 
 appears in the a6l of July 29th, 1861 ; nevertheless, the personnel 
 of each battery was that, as has been seen, appertaining to field 
 artillery only. This fact has given rise to the general but erro- 
 neous impression that the Fifth was organized as a regiment of 
 field artillery. 
 
 A [35]. 
 
 By the act of July 28th, 1866, the four old regiments of artil- 
 lery were each given the same organization as the Fifth regiment, 
 except that the regimental adjutants, the quartermasters and 
 commissaries were made extra lieutenants. The acl; of March 
 3d, 1869, allowed each artillery regiment i chief musician, in- 
 sructor of music. The acl of July i5th, 1870, abolished the 
 grades of regimental commissary-sergeant and hospital steward, 
 and the number of corporals in each battery was reduced by it to 4. 
 
 Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes the organization 
 of each regiment of artillery is i colonel, i lieutenant-colonel, i 
 major for every four batteries, i adjutant, i quartermaster and com- 
 missary, i sergeant-major, i quartermaster-sergeant, i chief mu- 
 sician, 2 principal musicians, and 12 batteries; each i captain, i 
 first lieutenant, -i second lieutenant, i first sergeant, i quarter- 
 master-sergeant, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 2 artificers, 
 i wagoner, and privates, as many, not exceeding 122, as the Presi- 
 dent may direct. 
 
 NOTE. The President may add at his discretion 1 first and 1 second lieu 
 tenant, 1 sergeants, and 4 corporals to each battery. 
 
 The actual personnel of artillery organizations under existing 
 orders at this time (1883) is as follows : 
 
 Field battery 
 
 Captains. 
 I 
 
 . First 
 Lieutenants. 
 
 ') 
 
 Second 
 Lieutenants. 
 
 2* 
 
 First 
 Sergeants. 
 1 
 
 Sergeants. 
 
 (j 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 4 
 
 Field battery 
 
 Corporals. 
 4 
 
 Musicians. 
 ') 
 
 Artificers. 
 2 
 
 Wagoners. 
 1 
 
 Privates. 
 
 49 v 
 
 Foot battery 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 * At present half the field batteries have 2, the others 1 second lieutenant. 
 
364 APPENDIX. 
 
 A [36]. 
 
 [General Orders No. 49. Extract.] 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, November 6th, 1838. 
 
 ******* 
 IV. Captain Ringgold having been instructed to organize and equip a com- 
 pany of light artillery, in conformity with the act of 1821, at Carlisle Barracks, 
 the men detailed from the First and Second regiments of artillery for this service 
 will now be dropped from the rolls of their respective companies and be mus- 
 tered -as C company of the Third regiment. Captain Ringgold's former com- 
 pany, now in the field, will 4ae broken up, the men transferred to the other 
 companies of the regiment, and the subalterns will join their company at Car- 
 lisle, when the lieutenants of the First and Second Artillery now on duty there 
 will proceed to join their respective regiments. 
 
 A [37]. 
 
 [General Orders No. 46. Extract.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 WASHINGTON, August 19th, 1841. 
 
 ******* 
 II. The following order has also been received from the Department of War : 
 
 "1. In the order of the Department of War, April 29th, 1840, adopting the 'Instruction 
 for Field Artillery, Horse and foot,' it is said that so much thereof 'as relates to the 
 manoeuvres of horse artillery is for the present suspended, and will not be adopted in prac- 
 tice until otherwise ordered by the Department.' 
 
 " 2. -The President of the United States, through the Department of War, now directs 
 that all parts of the said system be followed in future both by the horse and foot artillery, 
 and to the exclusion of all other systems." 
 
 The foregoing addenda and order are announced to the army by the major- 
 general commanding. 
 
 For the purpose of diffusing instruction, the lieutenants of the four artillery 
 regiments will be passed through the school of horse artileryin their respective, 
 regiments, so that no lieutenant be in that school more than one year at any 
 one tour. From this rule may be excepted lieutenants who are actually in 
 command of companies, staff lieutenants, and such others who from accidental 
 causes may be unable to ride ; and the colonel will make all the other changes 
 herein indicated. 
 
 A [38]. 
 
 By Special Orders No. 96 of 1842 it was announced that, as the 
 number of enlisted men allowed each company had been reduced 
 by act of Congress, only four pieces would be manned by each 
 company of light artillery; the other pieces would be stored for 
 future use. 
 
 The detail of lieutenants for service with these companies was 
 regulated by the following order: 
 
APPENDIX. 365 
 
 [General Orders No. 33. Extract.] 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, July Sth, 1844. 
 * * * * * * * * * 
 
 AFTER ORDER. 
 
 1. So much of General Orders No. 46 of 1841 having reference to the detail 
 of subalterns for the four companies of light artillery as requires the first lieu- 
 tenants to be annually relieved is hereby rescinded; and they will in future 
 be attached to those companies in the same manner as the first lieutenants of 
 the other artillery companies. 
 
 2. The respective colonels will accordingly select the first lieutenants who 
 are to be permanently assigned to the light companies, so that the arrange- 
 ment may take effect after the 30th of September next. 
 
 3. The brevet second lieutenants now attached to the light artillery com- 
 panies will be transferred to other companies after the 1st of October, when 
 they will be relieved by other brevet second lieutenants, so that the comple- 
 ment, including the graduates of this year, will be two for each light company. 
 
 A [39]- 
 
 [General Orders No. 42.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, October IfaA, 1844. 
 
 In order to extend the peculiar instructions now imparted to light companies 
 of artillery by periodical changes in their regiments, and to have the number of 
 officers and men necessary at each school to manoeuvre with a full battery, in- 
 stead of four pieces as at present, in the First regiment of artillery, company 1 
 will [be] exercised with K; in the Second, F with A ; in the Third, F with C ; 
 in the Fourth, K with JB. 
 
 Accordingly K company. Fourth artillery, will repair to Carlisle Barracks as 
 soon as relieved by F company of the Third artillery, which will be put in mo- 
 tion for Fort McIIenry the moment'that transportation for it can be obtained. 
 
 Each of the additional four companies designated above for joint instruction 
 in light artillery will remain as before, under the charge of its own officers, ex- 
 cept in respect to the exercise and mano3uvres, as field artillery, and in the care 
 of batteries, horses, harness, and stables. In these particulars only the duties 
 of the two companies will be blended and equalized under the orders of the 
 senior officer on duty with the companies. 
 
 On the arrival of the additional company of the Fourth artillery at Carlisle 
 Barracks the lieutenant-colonel of that regiment will become the commander 
 of the post, and a field officer of the Third artillery will, as soon as practicable, 
 be assigned to the command of the two companies of his regiment to be at Fort 
 McHenry. 
 
 A [40]. 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, June 18th, 1845. 
 Lieut.-Col. WM. GATES, or 
 
 Com'd'g Officer Fort Moultrie, Charleston, S. C. 
 
 SIR : On the receipt of this you will immediately dispatch by sea company 
 E, Third artillery, to New Orleans barracks to await further orders. I am, sir, 
 (Signed) R. JONES, Adft- General. 
 
366 APPENDIX. 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, June 18th, 1845. 
 First Lieut. B. BRAGG, 3d Art'y, or 
 
 Comd'g Officer Co. E, Third Art'y, care U. S. Q'rm'r, New Orleans. 
 SIR : A battery of two pieces and two howitzers, fully equipped for service 
 (with horses), and supplied with the necessary ammunition, has been ordered to 
 New Orleans barracks for your company. You will take charge of it imme- 
 diately on your arrival at the barracks, and then proceed as expeditiously as 
 possible to join the brigade ordered to the Gulf of Mexico, near the mouth of 
 the Sabine, under the command of Brig.-Gen'l Taylor, to whom you will re- 
 port. I am, sir, &c., 
 
 (Signed) R. JONES, Adft-Gen'l. 
 
 ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 Brig. -General Z. TAYLOR, WASHINGTON, June 18A, 1845. 
 
 Com'd'g First Dep't, Fort Jesup, La. 
 
 SIR : The colonel of ordnance has been this day instructed to send without 
 delay to New Orleans barracks a field battery of two pieces and two howitzers, 
 equipped for service with horses, with a full supply of ammunition. A com- 
 pany of the Third artillery has been ordered from Fort Moultrie to New Orleans, 
 there to receive the battery, and will proceed thence to join you on the gulf. To 
 avoid the delay attending the purchase and shipment of horses, it is deemed 
 best to leave you the procuring of such number as may be required for the com- 
 pany, and you will therefore please give the necessary orders on the subject, 
 &c. I am, sir, &c., 
 
 (Signed) R. JONES, Adft-Gen'l. 
 
 A [41]. 
 
 [Special Orders No. 74.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, August loth, 1845. 
 
 Light companies A, Second artillery, and C. Third artillery, having been 
 ordered to Texas, companies F of the Second and F of the Third artillery, 
 united with them for the purpose of instruction, by General Orders No. 42, of 
 1844, will turn over to the ordnance department their sabres, &c., and resume 
 their former equipments. 
 
 A [42]. 
 
 [General Orders No. 218.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, 
 
 PUEBLA, July 16th, 1847 
 
 In compliance with General Orders No. 16, dated April 15th, 1847, from the 
 War Department, the general-in-chief designates the following companies of 
 the four regiments of artillery as those to be equipped as light artillery under 
 the act of March 3d, 1847 : 
 
 Captain J. B. Magruder's company I, First artillery. 
 Captain J. F. Roland's company M, Second artillery. 
 Captain T. W. Sherman's company E, Third artillery. 
 Captain S. H. Drum's company G, Fourth artillery. 
 By command of Major-General Scott: 
 
 (Signed) H. L. SCOTT, A. A. A. G. 
 
APPENDIX. 367 
 
 A [43]- 
 
 [General Orders No. 14.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., August 11th, 1849 
 
 For the purpose of diffusing instruction, the lieutenants of the four artillery 
 regiments will be passed through the school of light artillery in their respect- 
 ive regiments, so that no lieutenant be in that school more than two years at 
 any one tour. 
 
 From this rule may be excepted lieutenants in command of companies the 
 captains of which are indefinitely absent, adjutants, regimental quartermasters, 
 together with such others as from accidental causes may be unable to ride. 
 
 Two first lieutenants and a second lieutenant will be attached to each light 
 company. No brevet second lieutenant will be allowed to a battery except 
 where the captain is indefinitely absent. 
 
 To secure constantly with each battery at least one instructed subaltern, 
 only a portion of the officers will be changed at the same time. Accordingly, 
 one of the first lieutenants and the second lieutenant will be relieved the 1st of 
 October next, the other first lieutenant October 1st, 1850, and so on in suc- 
 cessive years. 
 
 Commanding officers of regiments will make the change herein indicated. 
 
 A [44]- 
 
 [Special Orders No. 70.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS TROOPS SERVING IN KANSAS, 
 FORT LEAVENWORTH, September 18th, 1857. 
 
 I. In obedience to instructions from the War Department, company M of the 
 Second artillery will be furnished with the field battery of four guns (com- 
 plete), now at this post. . 
 
 II. The quartermaster's department will procure without delay the neces- 
 sary number of horses to equip this battery, including six horses to each piece 
 and caisson. 
 
 III. The commanding officer of this battery will use every exertion to pre- 
 pare it for the field as soon as practicable. 
 
 By order of General Harney : 
 
 (Signed) A. PLEASANTON, 
 
 Captain Second Dragoons, Acfg Ass't Adft- General. 
 
 A [45]. 
 
 [Special Orders No. 52.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, 
 NEW YORK, April 10th, 1858. 
 
 I. Captain and Brevet Major John F. Reynolds' company C, Third artillery, 
 is announced as one of the light companies of that regiment. 
 
 II. Light company C, Third artillery, now at Fort Monroe, will proceed with- 
 out unnecessary delay to Fort Leavenworth, where its horses will be furnished. 
 The company will thence join the Army of Utah with the reinforcements al- 
 ready designated for that command, and upon its arrival in Utah will be 
 
368 APPENDIX. 
 
 equipped with the battery at present under the charge of Brevet Captain Jesse 
 S. Reno, ordnance department. 
 
 By command of Bv't Lieutenant General Scott: 
 
 (Signed) IRWIN MCDOWELL, 
 
 Ass't Adjutant- General. 
 
 A [46]. 
 
 [Special Orders No. 141. Extract.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, June 18th, 18*70. 
 
 1. For the purpose of diffusing instruction, the lieutenants of the five artillery 
 regiments are expected to serve in turn with the light battery of their respective 
 regiments, not exceeding two years at any one tour, as directed in General Or- 
 ders No. 14, Headquarters of the Army, August 24th, 1849. From this rule 
 may be excepted lieutenants in command of companies the captains of which 
 are indefinitely absent, regimental staff officers, and such officers as from acci- 
 dental causes are unable to ride. Commanding officers of regiments will, in due 
 season to carry out this arrangement, report to the adjutant-general of the 
 army the names of officers who should be transferred under this order. 
 
 A [47]- 
 
 [Special Orders No. 25.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, February 4th, 1878. 
 
 ******* 
 5. In conformity with section 1101, Revised Statutes, the President directs that 
 company L, Second artillery, Captain John I. Rogers commanding, be tempora- 
 rily equipped as a battery of light artillery. The commanding general, Depart- 
 ment of Texas, will give the necessary instructions for the proper execution of 
 this order. * * * 
 
 A [48]. 
 
 [Special Orders No. 208.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS, 
 
 SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, October 13th, 1880. 
 
 **#***#*# 
 III. To meet the requirements of General Orders No. 11, current series, and 
 subsequent instructions from the headquarters military division of the Missouri, 
 directing the movements of batteries E, G, and L, Second Artillery, the fol- 
 lowing will govern : 
 
 1. Batteries E (Fort Brown) and L (Fort Clark) will proceed to Little Rock 
 Barracks, Arkansas ; Battery G, to Jackson Barracks, Louisiana. Light battery 
 L will move (mounted) to San Antonio, Texas, where the guns, horses, etc., 
 will be duly transferred, under special instructions from these headquarters ; 
 thereafter the battery will proceed dismounted. 
 By command of Brigadier-General Ord. 
 
 THOMAS M. VINCENT, 
 Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 
APPENDIX. 369 
 
 A [49]. 
 
 [Special Orders No. 246.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OP THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, November 1th, 188Q._ 
 
 1. In conformity with section 1101, Revised Statutes, the President directs 
 that Battery F, Second Artillery, Captain E. B. Williston commanding, be 
 temporarily equipped as a battery of light artillery. The commanding general, 
 Department of Texas, will give the necessary instructions for the proper execu- 
 tion of this order. 
 
 A [50]. 
 [General Orders No. 96.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, August 15th, 1882. 
 
 I. The following order has been received from the War Department : 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 WASHINGTON CITY, August Hth, 1882. 
 
 The President, under the authority conferred by section 1101 of the Revised Statutes, 
 providing that an additional battery in each regiment of artillery may be mounted and 
 equipped as a battery of light artillery, designates the following as the additional light 
 batteries : 
 
 1st Artillery, Battery E Captain Franck E, Taylor. 
 
 2d Artillery, Battery F Captain E. B. Williaton (now temporarily equipped as a bat- 
 tery of light artillery). 
 
 3d Artillery, Battery F Captain James M. Lancaster. 
 4th Artillery, Battery F Captain Frank G. Smith. 
 5th Artillery, Battery D Captain Jacob D. Rawles. 
 
 ROBERT T. LINCOLN, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 II. The batteries named above will take station as follows : 
 
 Battery E, 1st Artillery, at Vancouver Barracks, Washington Territory. 
 
 Battery F, 3d Artillery, at San Antonio, Texas. 
 
 Battery F, 4th Artillery, at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. 
 
 Battery D, 5th Artillery, at Fort Omaha, Nebraska. 
 
 Battery F, 2d Artillery, will remain at Fort Leavenworth. 
 
 The batteries of the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 5th Artillery herein designated will 
 proceed to the posts named, where they will be filled to a minimum strength 
 of sixty-five enlisted men, and equipped as batteries of light artillery under the 
 direction of the respective department commanders. 
 
 III. By direction of the Secretary of War, on the recommendation of the 
 General of the Army, the tour of service of captains with light or mounted 
 batteries of artillery shall hereafter be three years, commencing with January 
 1st, 1883, and of lieutenants as at present detailed two years. 
 
 IV. Such of the captains as shall have commanded light batteries three or 
 more years on the date named in the last preceding paragraph of this order 
 will be relieved by others, to be designated in orders from this office. 
 
 V. Regimental commanders of artillery will, respectively, as occasion re- 
 quires, nominate to the Adjutant-General, as is now done in the detail of lieu- 
 tenants, the captains to replace those whose tours of duty with the light bat- 
 teries are about to expire. 
 
 VI. To avoid complaints of injustice having been done in the selection, and 
 that the instruction in regiments may be as uniform as practicable, the regi- 
 mental roster for the detail of captains shall commence with the senior captain 
 
 47 
 
370 APPENDIX. 
 
 eligible for detail, and continue downwards, until all the captains shall have 
 had instruction as such in the command of light batteries, when it will again 
 commence with the senior captain. 
 
 Those captains relieved on the first operation of this order, or who have re- 
 cently been in command of light batteries for three years or longer, will not be 
 regarded as eligible for detail until all the other captains of the regiment have 
 had a tour of duty in command of the light batteries. 
 
 VII. To insure that none but those possessing the more soldierly qualities 
 and regimental esprit should be attached to so favorite and distinguished an 
 arm of the service, an officer who has not served with his regiment continu- 
 ously (including cumulative leaves) for at least the previous two years will 
 not be considered eligible for detail to the light batteries. Exception will only 
 be made by the special order of the Secretary of War, and where the circum- 
 stances attending the absence of an officer do not indicate a desire to avoid 
 the performance of ordinary regimental and company duty. 
 
 A [51]. 
 
 [Special Order No. 168.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 
 CAMP NEAR NEW BRIDGE, VA., June 2d, 1862. 
 
 ********* 
 
 V. Commanders of army corps will, with the least practicable delay, organize 
 from the field batteries attached to the divisions composing their respective 
 corps an artillery reserve, to consist of about one-half the whole field artillery 
 force attached to the corps, and to be placed under the command of a suitable 
 light-artillery officer. This reserve will be subject only to the orders of the 
 corps commander. 
 
 ********** 
 By command of Major-General McClellan. 
 
 S. WILLIAMS, 
 Ass't Adjutant- General. 
 
 A [52]. 
 
 It will not be uninteresting to notice the organization of the 
 artillery-brigades of the Union, the artillery-battalion of the Con- 
 federate, and the artillery-divisions of the German and Austrian 
 armies. 
 
 ist. UNION ARMY, ARTILLERY-BRIGADE. (Robertson's, in 
 1863, is taken for illustration.) 
 
 One commander, senior captain of brigade, ex-qfficio chief of 
 artillery of the army corps. Staff i assistant adjutant-general, 
 from lieutenants of brigade ; i acting inspector-general, from lieu- 
 tenants of brigade ; i acting ordnance officer, from lieutenants of 
 brigade; i quartermaster (assigned from that department of U. S. 
 volunteers) ; i commissary officer (from that department of U. S. 
 volunteers) ; i or 2 medical officers (from that department of U. S. 
 
APPENDIX. 371 
 
 volunteers.) Non-commissioned staff i sergeant-major, from 
 sergeants of the batteries ; i ordnance-sergeant, from sergeants 
 of the batteries ; i commissary-sergeant, from sergeants of the 
 batteries ; i hospital steward, from regular medical department. 
 Troops 6 batteries, four of them each with six 3-inch rifles, and 
 two each with four i2-pounder Napoleons. 
 
 In addition to the ammunition wagons forming part of the reg- 
 ular war organization of the batteries, there were for its exclusive 
 use attached to the brigade 75 wagons for transportation of ord- 
 nance and other stores ; or the total number of supply wagons 
 accompanying and forming part of the brigade was about 3^i per 
 gun. 
 
 2d. CONFEDERATE ARMY, ARTILLERY-BATTALION. (Alex- 
 ander's, of Longstreet's corps, in fall of 1863.) 
 
 One colonel commanding, and i major. Staff i adjutant, i 
 acting ordnance officer, (with sergeant and train of reserve ammu- 
 nition-wagons, forges, and battery wagons); i quartermaster, from 
 that department, with sergeant and wagons; i commissary, from 
 that department, with sergeant and wagons; i or 2 medical offi- 
 cers. Troops 6 batteries, five of them each with four and one 
 battery with six pieces. 
 
 Enlisted strength of batteries: to every 4 guns, 100 enlisted 
 men; to 6 guns, 150 enlisted men, /. <?., these numbers were 
 allowed by regulations. There was no regular non-commis- 
 sioned staff. 
 
 3d. ARTILLERY-DIVISION, GERMAN ARMY. 
 
 One major or lieutenant colonel. Staff i adjutant, i pay- 
 master (from regimental staff), i medical officer (is part of regi- 
 mental staff, but may be attached to the division staff). Non- 
 commissioned staff i sergeant-clerk, 5 corporals and privates, 
 to assist in various ways. Troops 4 batteries, each 6 guns and 
 8 caissons. 
 
 4th. ARTILLERY-DIVISION, AUSTRIAN ARMY. 
 
 One field officer. Staff i lieutenant-adjutant, i lieutenant- 
 paymaster, i quartermaster and commissary (from the supply 
 department), i officer charged with money accounts (from the sup- 
 ply department), i medical officer. Non-commissioned staff, etc. 
 i veterinary (with horse artillery), 3 non-commissioned officers, 
 5 drivers and cannoneers, 5 orderlies. Troops 2, 3, or 4 bat- 
 teries, each 8 guns ; generally 3 or 4 batteries. 
 
 Superficial examination might lead to the conclusion that the 
 administrative machinery of the Union artillery-brigade or the 
 Confederate artillery-battalion was more complete than were those 
 of the artillery-divisions of the German and Austrian armies. If 
 
372 APPENDIX. 
 
 we more fully consider the organizations of the latter, it will be 
 evident that this is not the case. 
 
 1. The artillery-brigade of the Union army embraced all the 
 batteries assigned to the army corps. Every principle of organ- 
 ization demanded that its staff should be perfect. There was in 
 the corps no artillery authority above that of the artillery-brigade 
 commander, who by law was chief of artillery and ordnance of 
 the corps. Under these circumstances, it was absolutely necessary 
 that the brigade should have within itself facilities for securing sup- 
 plies and administering its affairs equal to the demands and exingen- 
 cies of service. Had it been otherwise, the artillery would have 
 been left helpless, dependent perhaps, at the supreme moment 
 upon others who did not understand its wants. 
 
 The commander of artillery at army headquarters was often far 
 removed from the batteries attached to troops. The supervision 
 he exercised over them was general in character. It was not of 
 that direct and energetic character which alone in an emergency 
 could procure either sustenance for the personnel, materiel for 
 necessary equipment, or munitions for the batteries in action. To 
 attend to these indispensable matters, it was -necessary that the 
 staff of the artillery-brigade should be complete, embracing every 
 branch both of administration and supply. 
 
 2. Few of the Confederate artillery-battalions were so completely 
 organized as was Alexander's, previously mentioned. Some of 
 them had neither ordnance, commissary, or quartermaster trains. 
 The staff was limited to an adjutant detailed from the subalterns of 
 the battalion, an ordnance officer (i. e., artillery officer on ordnance 
 duty) also a lieutenant, and a regular quartermaster and com- 
 missary. There was no non-commissioned staff. Each army corps 
 had a reserve ammunition train of about twenty wagons, and the 
 general ammunition train of the Army numbered about sixty 
 wagons. This was the practice in the army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, the most thoroughly organized army of the Confederacy. 
 As this army was organized, August 3ist, 1864, the first corps 
 had eighteen batteries, arranged to five battalions ; the second 
 corps had nineteen batteries, in five battalions ; so, likewise, had 
 the third corps ; two chiefs of corps-artillery were brigadiers ; 
 the other was a colonel; the chief of artillery of this army was a 
 brigadier-general . 
 
 3. In the German army, although the arrangement is not uni- 
 form, the principle is the same throughout, i. <?., the artillery is 
 distributed to army corps, each of which as a rule has an artil- 
 lery brigade consisting of two regiments. One of these regi- 
 ments, styled 'divisional artillery,' has eight batteries, grouped 
 into two divisions of four batteries each; each division is part and 
 parcel of one of the two infantry divisions which make up the 
 army corps. The other regiment of the artillery brigade is styled 
 ' corps artillery. ' It has nine batteries, equally arranged to three 
 divisions, which are held in a corps reserve. 
 
APPENDIX. 373 
 
 The complete staffs of both the divisional and the corps-artillery 
 regiments accompany the army corps. The artillery-brigade staff 
 is also present with corps headquarters. 
 
 With each army corps there are six artillery ammunition col- 
 umns. The personnel of each column is i captain, i medical 
 officer, i paymaster, i veterinary (non-commissioned officer), and 
 169 men; the wagons of each are 19 caissons, i store wagon, i 
 forge, i baggage wagon, and 4 park wagons. 
 
 These ammunition columns are under the orders of the chief of 
 artillery of the corps; hence there is no danger of the artillery- 
 divisions being left without a full supply of ammunition. 
 
 4. The same principles of organization govern in the Austrian 
 service. One artillery regiment is permanently attached to each 
 army corps. But this regiment on a war footing has fifteen bat- 
 teries, while the German artillery brigade has but seventeen. The 
 fifteen batteries are arranged to six divisions. Three of the divi- 
 sions, embracing each three batteries, are attached to the infantry 
 divisions of the corps. The six remaining batteries, grouped in 
 divisions of two batteries each, form together the corps or reserve 
 artillery. 
 
 The colonel of the regiment is chief of artillery of the corps. 
 He has a staff sufficiently numerous to enable him, with the assist- 
 ance of the small staffs of the artillery-divisions, to administer all 
 the affairs of the regiment. 
 
 Four ammunition columns, embracing a total of ninety wagons, 
 and all under the orders of the colonel, supply the six divisions 
 with ammunition. The personnel of the four columns embraces 
 6 officers and 448 men. 
 
 From the foregoing, it is evident that, as the arm is at present 
 organized, it is not necessary that the administrative arrangements 
 of the German and Austrian artillery-divisions be so complete as 
 was required with the brigades of the Union artillery, for this 
 administrative machinery is supplied in their respective regimental 
 and brigade staffs, which invariably accompany the army corps to 
 which the regiments are permanently attached. As with these, 
 so with the other armies of Continental Europe. 
 
 Questions of administration and organization have not, how- 
 ever, primarily determined that in all large armies of recent times 
 artillery should be handled by grouping the batteries together. 
 This has been decided from purely tactical considerations, which, 
 in battle, should and do dominate all others. It is seen that, to use 
 artillery effectively, massing to a greater or less degree is neces- 
 sary. Correct tactical principles require that this arm must be 
 used not a gun or even a battery here and there, but that, 
 when practicable, several batteries should come into action to- 
 gether, and, by weight of metal thrown, endeavor to beat down 
 all opposition. And as tactics render it necessary that they must 
 fight together, it is natural and proper that in the organization of 
 
374 APPENDIX. 
 
 the arm the batteries should be united in sufficiently large, yet 
 not unwieldy masses, which, when necessary, may be moved 
 from point to point with facility and effect. The question of 
 administration in turn follows that of organization, and is only this: 
 How shall the batteries thus brought together be commanded and 
 supplied to insure the highest attainable degree of efficiency when 
 they come on the field? 
 
 B [i]. 
 
 PARIS, FRANCE, September 16th, 1776. Articles of Agreement between S. Deane 
 Agent for the United Colonies of North America, and Sieur Phillipus Charles 
 John Baptist Trouson du Coudray, Adjutant General of Artillery, in the 
 service of France. 
 
 I. Sieur du Coudray, under title of general of artillery and ordnance and 
 rank of major general in the forces of the United Colonies, shall have direction 
 of whatever relates to the artillery and corps of engineers, under orders and 
 control only of Congress, their board of war, and the commander-in-chief, for 
 the time being. 
 
 II. The corps of artillery and engineers, the officers and soldiers of the same, 
 shall be under his immediate command, with all the privileges and authority 
 annexed to such command respecting either rewards and punishments ; and in 
 case of vacancies in said corps by death, removal, or new creations it shall be 
 for him to recommend to the Congress, or their committee of war, the persons 
 proper for filling the same. 
 
 Ill/ Whatever relates to the supplying the said corps with provision, to the 
 construction of artillery and fortification, to any plan or scheme relative to 
 these objects, will be consulted on with him, and the execution of whatever 
 
 may be agreed on committed to him, as within his department. 
 
 ********* 
 
 V. Mons. du Coudray shall be furnished with an adjutant, two aids-de-camp, 
 or one aide and a secretary, and designer, at the expense and in the pay of 
 
 the United States. 
 
 ********* 
 
 X. Mons. du Coudray will exert himself in the dispatch of artillery and stores 
 agreed on ; also will embark himself as early in the season as is consistent with 
 such dispatch. 
 
 His title and emoluments were to date from August ist, 1776, 
 and he was given the privilege of choosing for assistants 2 engi- 
 neers, 4 captains, 4 lieutenants, and i adjutant-general. But his 
 preparations were still more elaborate, as there arrived in the 
 Amphitrite with him i doctor, i adjutant-general, 3 captains and 
 4 lieutenants of engineers, i captain and 2 lieutenants of mines, 2 
 captains, 3 captain-lieutenants and 6 lieutenants of artillery, i 
 captain and i lieutenant of bombardiers, i lieutenant of workmen, 
 and 12 sergeants of artillery. Among these captains of artillery 
 was Louis de Tousard, who, in consequence of the loss of an arm 
 while gallantly fighting his guns in an action against the enemy 
 in Rhode Island, in 1778, was brevetted lieutenant-colonel, and 
 given a pension of thirty dollars per month during life. This was 
 
I APPENDIX. 375 
 
 the officer subsequently appointed major in the corps of artillerists 
 and engineers, promoted lieutenant-colonel commandant, Second 
 artillerists and engineers, and appointed inspector of artillery for 
 the army of the United States. Being disbanded in the reorganiza- 
 tion of 1802, he devoted himself to the completion of a task which 
 he had undertaken at the special request of President Washington, 
 and in 1809 published the Artillerist's Companion, the first elab- 
 orate and comprehensive work on the practical and scientific duties 
 of the arm produced in this country. Considering the paucity of 
 literary facilities at the time, the difficulty in procuring materials, 
 the little interest in military affairs taken by a government still 
 struggling to vindicate the principle that an army was not neces- 
 sary to its existence, the publication of these volumes must ever 
 be regarded as a remarkable achievement. They remain a noble, 
 enduring monument to the patriotic zeal, high professional attain- 
 ments, and indefatigable industry of the distinguished author. 
 The artillery has reason to remember the advent of Du Coudray 
 to American shores, if only for the felicitous circumstance that 
 thereby the honorable list of its officers was embellished with the 
 name of Louis de Tousard. 
 
 It may not be uninteresting to briefly note the fate of Du Cou- 
 dray and his followers. It will be noticed that by the terms of his 
 agreement he was to be chief of both engineers and artillery. 
 But it transpired that provision for the former had already been 
 made under authority of Congress, whose committee of secret 
 correspondence had been instructed so early as December 2d, 
 1775, to procure four good European engineers. A contract was 
 entered into February i3th, 1777, by Benjamin Franklin and 
 others, at Paris, with certain officers, who received leaves of 
 absence for the purpose. 
 
 On July 22d, 1777, Chevalier Du Portail, colonel of engineers, 
 the officer highest in rank of these Frenchmen, was placed in 
 command of all engineers in United States service a position he 
 retained until the end of the war. With Knox as cnief of artil- 
 lery and Du Portail as chief of engineers there was nothing left for 
 Du Coudray except the ordnance feature of the Deane contract. 
 He was accordingly, August nth, 1777, chosen, with rank of 
 major-general, to perform the duties of inspector-general of ord- 
 nance and military manufactories an office created for him. He 
 was not a man to be flattered with the shadow, while the sub- 
 stance of his agreement was being enjoyed by others. He de- 
 clined the office, and informed the President that all he wanted 
 was an opportunity to fight for America, with whatever rank 
 Congress chose to give him. Upon this he 'Was chosen captain, 
 his officers lieutenants, and his non-commissioned officers en- 
 signs, and commissions were ordered to be made out accordingly. 
 Soon after, while hastening to join the army retreating from 
 Brandywine, he was drowned in the Schuylkill river. Congress 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 ordered his remains to be buried with the honors of war. The 
 result of that battle was to bring foreigners once more into favor ; 
 the distrust and disappointment caused by the importunities, pre- 
 sumption, and incompetence of most of those already taken into 
 the service of the States was again temporarily forgotten; and, 
 October nth, 1777, Du Coudray's friends, both commissioned 
 and enlisted, were given the offices and pay stipulated for them 
 by Mr. Deane. Had Du Coudray lived, he would probably, 
 like De Kalb, have been appointed a major-general in the line. 
 
 B M. 
 
 MARCH 23d, 1852. Ordered to be printed. 
 Mr. Shields made the following report, to accompany Bill S. 
 No. 304: 
 
 The Committee on Military Affairs respectfully reporteth 
 
 That since the termination of the Mexican war, the artillery has been so 
 much neglected that discontent and discouragement begin to prevail at the 
 present time in that important branch of military service. 
 
 The exigencies of our extended frontier service, and the imperative necessity 
 which compelled the department to make the whole military force as available 
 as possible to act against the Indians and protect the frontier settlements, and 
 the additional circumstance that the artillery consists nominally of four regi- 
 ments, under four colonels, making four distinct and separate commands, sub- 
 ject to no common and recognized head, will sufficiently account for the present 
 neglected and almost disorganized state of that important corps. 
 
 To avoid all misconception on this head, we wish to state distinctly that for 
 the present condition of the artillery no blame or censure can justly attach to 
 the department, to the general-in-chief who made every possible effort, under 
 the circumstances, to preserve it in a state of efficiency, or to the officers of the 
 corps who, as a body, are as intelligent and energetic as any other body of offi- 
 cers of equal number in any service ; but to causes already alluded to, and to 
 others, which it is unnecessary at this time to particularize. 
 
 There never was a time in the military history of the world when so much 
 attention was bestowed upon the instruction and improvement of artillery as 
 at present. The extraordinary progress of the present age in the arts and 
 sciences is felt to the full extent in this branch of the military service. 
 
 The whole efforts of the nation should be directed, not to increase the quan- 
 tity of this force, but to improve its quality, and to make it, both in its personnel 
 and materiel, -the most perfect of its kind in the world. It should be in every 
 particular a model army a nucleus around which the nation should rally in 
 any great national emergency. Artillery is the work of time. Its efficiency 
 depends upon a high order of intelligence and careful instruction, and its 
 perfection can only be obtained by the zealous application to its service of 
 time, intelligence, and practice. 
 
 Two companies of the forty-eight in service are equipped as light artillery ; 
 the remainder are, far the greater part, armed, equipped, and disciplined as 
 infantry. They are thus deprived of any opportunity of acquiring that knowl- 
 edge which is absolutely necessary for the defense of our coast in time of war 
 which includes the, use of heavy artillery in all its forms. Great care and 
 skill are now required in the preparation of the different species of munitions, 
 in the arrangement of shell for efficient use, in the repair of carriages and the 
 
APPENDIX. 377 
 
 re-establishment of guns dismounted by accident or the enemy's fire, which 
 can only be acquired by application and practice, and which are more neces- 
 sary and essential now than ever, owing to the celerity with which steamers, 
 or vessels towed by them, can pass, independent of wind and tide, to the object 
 of their attack. 
 
 In addition to all this, there is the use of artillery in field and siege service, 
 in which our troops will soon become lamentably deficient without competent- 
 instruction and practice. It is only within a few months that even a system 
 of instruction in the manual exercise of the heavy artillery has been given to 
 the army ; for which the service is indebted to the general-in-chief, under 
 whose orders it was compiled by a board of officers. 
 
 There are still other important duties belonging to the artillery, of which 
 ours, under the present system of arrangement, can acquire no practical knowl- 
 edge such as the construction of their own batteries in field works, of siege 
 works, including the parapets, embrasures, platforms, magazines, &c. 
 
 The condition and efficiency of the artillery as an arm of the military service 
 may be taken as the best test at any time, and as a certain test at the present 
 time, of the military efficiency of the nation to which that service belongs. 
 
 If the present condition of our artillery be taken as a test, ours might be 
 considered as the most inefficient and worst managed military service in the 
 world. But as this nation is anomalous in many respects, so it is in this. The 
 personnel of our artillery, so far as it consists of the corps of artillery officers, 
 is, in point of intelligence, scientific knowledge, and preparatory instruction, 
 equal as a body to the officers of any other service ; and with equal oppor- 
 tunities for practice and improvement, owing to the practical energy and in- 
 ventive energy of our people, they would surpass in general efficiency any 
 other equal number of artillery officers in any service. It must be gratifying 
 to the American people to see the officers of the army, instead of concealing 
 the defects Df the service from the public, the first to point them out, and to 
 call aloud for assistance and reform. 
 
 This is the spirit which should animate Americans in every branch of the 
 public service, whether civil or military, and without which the public service 
 is liable to become almost as much neglected and badly managed in a republic 
 as under any other form of government. 
 
 The first essential to improve the condition of the artillery and render it effi- 
 cient is unity. This is the first essential in every kind of military service, and 
 is indispensable to the artillery. The committee propose, therefore, to give it a 
 directing head, and to make the head, who ought to be one of the most effi- 
 cient officers of the army, responsible for the condition and efficiency of this 
 branch of the service. It is now a body without any head, or rather it has as 
 many heads as it has regiments ; but there is no one whose duty it is to super- 
 intend its management, supervise its instruction, and diffuse life and energy 
 into the whole as a distinct corps of the army. The next measure is to author- 
 ize the chief of artillery, under the direction of the President, to eliminate from 
 the present artillery force a sufficient number of officers and companies to con- 
 stitute a competent corps for instruction, practice, and improvement in every 
 species of artillery service, and employ the residue as cavalry or as infantry 
 companies for the defense of the frontier. This new arrangement will not 
 diminish the general efficiency of our little army for frontier service, and will 
 not increase its expense ; and yet, simple as it is, it will render our artillery 
 disciplined and efficient, and keep it in a state of readiness, by which it can be 
 expanded, in any emergency, to any extent commensurate with the wants and 
 wishes of the nation. 
 4 8 
 
378 APPENDIX. 
 
 B [3]- 
 
 [General Orders No. 6.] 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 WASHINGTON, January 30^, 1866. 
 
 A permanent artillery board is hereby organized, to which questions pertain- 
 ing to the artillery arm of service may be referred by the Secretary of War or 
 the general-in-chief for discussion and recommendation. 
 
 The board shall also have the power to make original recommendations to 
 the general-in-chief in reference to the interests and efficiency of the artillery 
 arm. 
 
 The members shall sit on the board in accordance with their rank in the 
 artillery, and the senior member shall be president. He shall have power to 
 call meetings at such times and places as shall be approved by the general-in- 
 chief, in addition to those called by the Secretary of War or general-in-chief. 
 
 A complete record of the proceedings of the board will be kept by the secre- 
 tary, who, on being relieved, shall turn it over to his successor or the adjutant- 
 general of the army. 
 
 * * 1 * * * * 
 
 By command of Lieutenant-General Grant. 
 
 E. S. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 
 Position and Functions of Brigadier- Generals and Lieutenant- 
 Colonels ', Royal Artillery, in the Field, British Regulations* 
 
 The brigadier-generals and commanders of corps and divisional artillery in 
 the field form an integral part of the army corps staff and divisional staff, 
 respectively. They will encamp with the staff and receive orders from their 
 respective generals. 
 
 The commanding officer of corps artillery will encamp with his artillery and 
 receive his orders from the brigadier-general. When divisional artillery is 
 withdrawn from its division for the purpose of being massed with the corps ar- 
 tillery, it will be under the immediate orders of the brigadier-general ; but on 
 other occasions the lieutenant-colonel in command of the divisional artillery 
 will have the entire responsibility for the use of his batteries, under the orders 
 of the divisional general. 
 
 In the field, brigadier-generals and lieutenant-colonels of artillery will be 
 made acquainted with the general plan of operations and the part which the 
 artillery under their command is expected to play. They will communicate as 
 much of this information as may be necessary to the officers commanding bat- 
 teries. The brigadier-general will, as a rule, accompany the general officer of 
 the army corps, and only leave him when the artillery is massed. Similarly, 
 the commanding officer of divisional artillery will accompany the generals of 
 division, but will take personal command when the divisional artillery is massed. 
 
 *When the British army takes the field, there is, according to the published accounts 
 of its organization, with each army corps a brigadier-general, chief of artillery. Each 
 corps has three divisions ; each division has three batteries (18 guns), commanded by a 
 lieutenant-colonel. Each corps has an artillery reserve, called corps artillery, of three 
 horse and two field batteries, commanded by a colonel. 
 
APPENDIX. 379 
 
 Responsibility of Different Ranks of Officers. 
 
 In order that no question may arise as to the responsibility of officers of dif- 
 ferent ranks in action, the following general rules will be observed : 
 
 The brigadier -general will be responsible that the lieutenant-colonels or other 
 officers in command of more than one battery in the field are acquainted with the 
 position of the corps ammunition columns, the probable position of the corplf 
 staff, and every other necessary information which does not come strictly under 
 the government of general officers commanding divisions. He will also be re- 
 sponsible, under the orders of the general officer in command of the corps, for 
 the tactical use of the whole of the artillery not at the time under the command 
 of general officers commanding divisions. 
 
 Whenever corps and divisional artillery are massed, he will take immediate 
 command of the mass, assigning to each section the portion of the objective at 
 which it is to fire, and the commanding officer of each section will divide the 
 portion so assigned amongst the batteries under his command. 
 
 Any order given by him to the artillery is to be considered as coming from 
 the general commanding the corps. 
 
 Lieutenant-colonels, or other officers of less rank, being in command of a sec- 
 tion of artillery, will be responsible for the tactical handling of the batteries 
 under their command, including the general choice of positions and the part of 
 the objective to be fired at. When their batteries are massed, they will assign 
 the position to be taken up by the wagons and spare horses, and direct the re- 
 placement of casualties. 
 
 Officers commanding batteries will be responsible for the range and nature of 
 projectiles used, as well as for the actual movements of their batteries. In ac- 
 tion, they should separate themselves from the smoke of the guns and watch 
 carefully the result of the fire, correcting errors from time to time. They will 
 note down the object, the apparent effect of the fire, and the changes made in 
 projectiles, range and direction, the movements of their batteries, the hour at 
 which movements and opening or ceasing fire occur, together with any useful 
 remarks. The books in which these notes are made should be preserved for 
 future reference. They will also be responsible, when acting singly, that the 
 caisson-wagons are within reach, and that the guns in action are kept duly sup- 
 plied with everything needful for their efficient working. 
 
 B[ 5 ]- 
 
 The organization of the German artillery, for administrative 
 purposes, in peace, is as follows : 
 
 1. A general or lieutenant-general as inspector of artillery. 
 
 2. Four artillery inspections, each supervised by a lieutenant- 
 general or a major-general. 
 
 3. Fourteen or more artillery brigades, each commanded by a 
 major-general or colonel, and each composed of two or three 
 regiments. 
 
 4. Corps and divisional artillery ; the former is in reality the 
 reserve for the army corps, while the latter embraces the batteries 
 attached to army divisions, two or three of which make up each 
 army corps. 
 
 When the army takes the field in war, the inspector-general 
 [i] joins the headquarters of the commander-in-chief ; the sub- 
 inspectors [2] join the headquarters of the operating armies, 
 
380 APPENDIX. 
 
 where they act as chiefs of artillery. The artillery brigade com- 
 manders accompany their corps headquarters, where they act as 
 chiefs of artillery for their respective army corps. 
 
 The corps artillery (i. e., corps reserve) is a regiment com- 
 manded by its colonel. 
 
 The divisional artillery embraces three or four batteries organ- 
 ized into an artillery division and commanded by a field officer. 
 
 Regarding the duties of the inspector-general, the following 
 very general information has been secured through the American 
 minister at Berlin : 
 
 "The inspector-general is both an executive and administrative officer. His 
 duties consist in inspecting all the artillery in his district, in attending their 
 shooting practice, &c. Questions of discipline, however, are settled by the army 
 corps commander. On the declaration of war, his peace duties cease altogether, 
 and he becomes the chief artillery officer at the headquarters of an army com- 
 mander. In battle, it is his duty to secure good positions for the artillery of the 
 different corps, but always in consultation with his commanding general. 
 
 "He is supposed to know the intentions of the general, and do all in his 
 power to forward them in directing the artillery. He may form no independ- 
 ent plans, and consequently is not supposed ' to give any orders originating with 
 himself,' except so far as, after knowing confidentially the general's plans, he 
 believes they will be thus most successfully executed. There are no rules laid 
 down to prevent conflict of authority between inspectors-general and com- 
 manding-generals of army corps. In time of peace the latter seldom interfere 
 with the artillery of their district, but may, if they like, inspect it at any time. 
 In time of war, the artillery-general of an army has to regulate the proper supply 
 and disposition of ammunition as well as its reserves." 
 
 C [i]. 
 
 Regulations United States Army of May 6th, 1813. 
 
 The artillery will be distributed for field service into divisions or half divi- 
 sions. A division of artillery will consist of six pieces of ordnance, viz., four 
 cannon of the same calibre and two howitzers or six cannon of not more than 
 two calibres. A half division of artillery will consist of two pieces of cannon 
 of the same calibre and of one howitzer, or of three pieces of cannon of the 
 same calibre. To each pair of three-pounders will be allotted one ammunition- 
 wagon or caisson ; to each sixr-pounder the same ; to each howitzer, double 
 this allowance; to each gun of larger calibre than a six-pounder, two, or at 
 most three, ammunition-wagons or caissons. 
 
 To each division of artillery will be allotted three wagons, provided with 
 assorted and spare articles of equipment, ammunition, harness, entrenching and 
 artificers' tools, &c. ; to each half division, one wagon, with assorted spare 
 articles and tools as above ; to each division of flying artillery and every two 
 divisions of foot artillery will be allotted one traveling forge. * * * Wagons 
 will be provided with mining and laboratory tools and utensils, together with 
 additional quantities of entrenching and artificers' tools, whenever necessary. 
 
 By the Regulations of 1820 each company of artillery, with 
 six pieces of ordnance and their proper stores, constituted a divi- 
 sion of artillery. The *divisipn was divided into subdivisions, 
 each consisting of two pieces of ordnance of the same kind. 
 
 By the Regulations of 1835 the term division was changed to 
 
APPENDIX. 381 
 
 battery, and the artillery for field service was distributed into bat- 
 teries, half-batteries, and sections, corresponding in composition 
 to the former divisions, half-divisions, and subdivisions. We 
 thus see that the Gribeauval system, not only as regards materiel, 
 but as regards the organization of the personnel, disappeared^ in 
 all its parts immediately after the introduction of the stock-trail 
 system of carriages. 
 
 The inconvenience that results from having the legal designa- 
 tion of the artillery tactical unit company different from that 
 prescribed by regulations division or battery is manifest. The 
 incongruity remained, however, as part of the military system 
 until the Fifth artillery was organized in 1861, when it was par- 
 tially, and in the reorganization of 1866 it was wholly, abated by 
 the introduction of the term battery to designate the smallest legal 
 artillery unit. 
 
 As germane to the subject-matter of this note, the following 
 extract from the fourth note of Napoleon's Dictations at St. 
 Helena, made upon General Rogniat's " Considerations sue L' Art 
 de la Guerre," published in 1861, will be interesting: 
 
 " The artillery division has been fixed by General Gribeauval at eight pieces 
 4, 8, and 12-pounders, or 6-inch howitzers because it is necessary, first, that 
 a division of artillery may be able to divide itself into two or four batteries ; 
 second, because eight pieces can be followed by a company of 120 men, having 
 a reserve detachment in the park ; third, because the wagons and carriages 
 necessary for the service of these eight pieces can be harnessed by a company 
 of the equipage of the train ; fourth, because a good captain can look after that 
 number of pieces ; fifth, the number of carriages and wagons which composed 
 a battery of eight pieces provide sufficient work for one forge and one ammu- 
 nition-wagon, and because two spare gun-carriages are sufficient for the 
 division. 
 
 " If the division were composed of a less number of pieces, so many more 
 forges, ammunition-wagons, and spare gun-carriages would be needed. 
 
 "Napoleon suppressed the 4 and 8-pounders, and for them substituted the 
 6-pounder. Experience had shown him that the infantry generals made use 
 indiscriminately of the 4 and 8-pounders, without regard to the effect they 
 desired to produce. He suppressed the 6-inch howitzer, substituting for it the 
 o.]-inch howitzer, because two cartridges of the first weigh as much as three 
 of the second (5-inch), and, besides, the 5^-inch howitzer is found to have the 
 same calibre as the 24-pounder, used so much in siege-trains and forts. He 
 formed his foot artillery divisions of two 5j-inch howitzers and six 6-pounders. 
 or of two long-range 5^-inch howitzers and six 12-pounders ; the horse artillery 
 divisions, of four 6-pounders and two howitzers ; but it would be preferable, 
 if they [the horse artillery divisions] had the same compositions as the foot 
 artillery, that is to say, two 5j-inch howitzers and six 6-pounders. ' The pro- 
 portions of the various calibres were twelve-twentieths 6-pounders, three- 
 twentieths 12-pouhders, and five-twentieths howitzers. 
 
 " These changes modified M. de Gribeauval's system. They were mad'e in 
 his spirit, and he would not have disowned them. He reformed a great deal ; 
 he simplified a great deal. The artillery is yet too heavy, too complicated; it must 
 again be simplified, rendered uniform, and reduced to its simplest form. 
 
 " The equipage of sixty pieces, formed on Napoleon's principles, was thirty- 
 six 6-pounders, nine 12-pounders, fifteen howitzers, forming seven divisions and 
 a half, and required thirty-two forges, ammunition-wagons, and spare gun-car- 
 riages for the divisions ; eighty-one caissons for 6-pounders, forty and a half 
 
382 APPENDIX. 
 
 for 12-pounders, sixty-seven and a half for howitzers, twenty-nine wagons and 
 carriages of the park, thirty wagons for infantry, twenty of bridge equipage 
 in all, three hundred and sixty carriages, or six carriages for each piece. By 
 this means the supply was three hundred and six shot per piece, without count- 
 ing what was in the small ammunition-chest. 
 
 "M. de Gribeauval, who had fought through the seven years' war in the 
 Austrian army, and had a genius for artillery, made the rule that the extent of 
 the equipage should be at the rate of four pieces to 1,000 men, or thirty-six 
 pieces for a division of 9,000, or one hundred and sixty pieces for an army of 
 40,000 men. The imperial arrangement was 120 pieces for a corps d'arme' of 
 40,000 men, composed of 4 infantry, 1 light cavalry, 1 dragoon, and 1 cuiras- 
 sier division. Of the fifteen artillery divisions, two were attached to each in- 
 fantry division, three were in reserve. Of the remainder the horse artillery 
 divisions one was with the light cavalry, one with the dragoons, and two with 
 the cuirassiers. The whole embraced seventy-two 6-pounders, eighteen 12- 
 pounders, thirty howitzers, and nearly six hundred wagons, including the pieces, 
 the double supply of stores, and the infantry ammunition-wagons. 
 
 "It is necessary that an army have infantry, cavalry, and artillery in just 
 proportions. These different arms cannot supply each other's places. "We 
 have seen some occasions where the enemy had almost won the battle. He 
 occupied a fine position with a battery of fifty or sixty pieces. It would have 
 been in vain to attack him with 4,000 horse and 8,000 infantry. A battery of 
 equal power was necessary, under the protection of which the colums of attack 
 advanced and deployed. 
 
 " The proportions of the three arms have always been the object of the medi- 
 tations of the great generals. 
 
 "They have agreed that it must be first, four pieces for 1,000 men, giving 
 one-eighth of the army for the artillery personnel ; second, a cavalry equal to 
 one-fourth of the infantry. 
 
 "A good infantry is without doubt the nerve of the army ; but if it had to 
 fight a long time against a very superior artillery, it would be demoralized and 
 destroyed. In the first campaigns of the war of the Revolution, France had 
 always the best artillery. I don't know a single instance in this war where 
 twenty pieces of cannon advantageously posted have been taken by the 
 bayonet." 
 
 C [2]. 
 
 February 3d, 1840, the ordnance committee, when it had been 
 in session nearly a year, addressed a letter to the Secretary of 
 War on the subject of the proper metal for field ordnance, calling 
 attention to the following facts: i. The board of 1835 had recom- 
 mended bronze. 2. The board of 1838, four to one, did the 
 same, and also recommended that experiments be made to test 
 the durability of cast-iron and malleable cast-iron. 3. The results 
 showed that no dependence could be placed on iron guns of 
 either description. 4. This was the opinion among artillerists 
 abroad. 5. The committee therefore found no difficulty in unani- 
 mously recommending the adoption of bronze. 
 
 The Secretary replied in the following rather caustic letter, 
 dated War Department, February i8th, 1840: 
 
 "The report of the board of ordnance in relation to the best material for field 
 artillery has been carefully examined ; and notwithstanding the concurrent 
 
APPENDIX. 383 
 
 opinions of so many boards of ordnance that have considered this matter, and 
 that of the existing board, in favor of the exclusive use of bronze for field can- 
 non, the Department of War does not deem it expedient to renounce altogether 
 the use of iron for this purpose. Judging from the experiments quoted by the 
 board, it appears certain that iron is abundantly strong, and that if guns some- 
 times fail, it is not because the gun is of iron, but because the founder is not per- 
 fect in his art. At present, he makes a good gun by accident, whereas it is~by- 
 accident only he should make a bad one. 
 
 " The iron 6, 12, and 18-pounders in use during the last war prove that we 
 formerly possessed the art of making strong, light, and serviceable guns. The 
 uncertainty which attends the proof of the new iron guns arises from some irreg- 
 ularity in the selection, mixing, or the management of the metal ; but the pre- 
 cise nature of the difference in this respect between a good and a bad gun is not 
 fully known, and ought to be ascertained with all possible accuracy. This 
 must be regarded as the first and most important thing to be learned, being more 
 necessary even than to decide upon the pattern and other details. In fixing on 
 the latter, however, it will be necessary to bear in mind that the uncertainty 
 complained of is due in some measure to the frequent changes made by the ord- 
 nance office in the length and weight of the guns. No sacrifice of safety and 
 solidity ought to be made to lighten the weight of the metal. * * * It would 
 seem that it would be no less difficult to introduce the art of casting bronze 
 than iron guns. We possess the best quality of iron ; but copper is not found 
 or not wrought in sufficient quantities, and tin not at all ; and it is important 
 that the armament of our navy, fortifications, and troops should be drawn from 
 an independent source. 
 
 " The partial use of bronze field artillery is not objected to ; but the board of 
 ordnance must apply itself to acquire sufficient knowledge of the subject to cast 
 the guns within our own arsenals, as this Department is not satisfied with those 
 that have been hitherto made at private foundries. For this purpose an intel- 
 ligent officer should be sent to visit the foundries of bronze cannon in Europe. 
 A few pieces of field artillery may be purchased there, on condition of the privi- 
 lege being granted of assisting at all the operations of mixing the metals and 
 fusing and casting the guns. Two officers of industry and capacity ought to 
 be immediately stationed at two of the principal foundries (in this country), in 
 order to make themselves familiar with all the usual processes of iron work, so 
 that when they enter the foreign establishments they may be able to discern 
 what is new and peculiar, and lose no time in learning abroad things equally 
 well understood and practiced at home. 
 
 " The Department will take measures to ascertain the method pursued by the 
 Prussian Government in the reception of iron guns for its artillery, and pursue 
 the same course in procuring a few light pieces from Sweden ; and it is proposed 
 that the officers spoken of above should, when sufficiently acquainted with the 
 subject, proceed to that country, superintend the casting of our own guns, and 
 acquire accurate information in relation to the selection of metals, their mixing, 
 fusing, and casting, and the method of proving cannon, as practiced by the 
 Swedish and foreign officers at those foundries. Connected with this subject is 
 an inquiry into the effect produced by the increased strength of the powder 
 now in use, both with regard to its application to common service and to prove 
 guns." * * * 
 
 The rejoinder of the committee, dated February 2Oth, was as 
 follows : 
 
 The board of ordnance officers has attentively examined the decision of the 
 Secretary of War of February 18th, upon the proposition submitted to him of the 
 best materiel for field artillery ; and while it admits the correctness of his views 
 and the propriety of the means to be adopted for accomplishing the objects to 
 be attained, the subject is of so grave a nature, involving interests of such im- 
 
3^4 APPENDIX. 
 
 portance to the country as well as the reputation of the ordnance corps, that 
 the board begs leave to submit the following remarks and propositions for his 
 consideration : 
 
 1. The board is of opinion, as before stated, that iron field guns can be made. 
 It also fully concurs with the Secretary that the means pointed out should be 
 put in practice with as little delay as practicable, to insure castings of good 
 quality ; but it is evident some time must elapse before we can get the benefit 
 of their results. 
 
 2. In addition to the field guns required for our own service, several of the 
 States require iron field guns for arming their militia, and others require field 
 guns of bronze. More than one hundred guns of this material have been issued 
 to the States within the last two years ; and in relation to this matter, the 
 board is of opinion that the skill acquired in this branch of manufacture has 
 been underrated. We have the principal French publications on the subject 
 Mouge and Dartein. They have been closely followed, except in moulding. 
 We make use of a first-rate furnace, better moulding materials, and the same 
 mode of mixing the materials as the French. We have succeeded in making 
 castings perfectly sound and homogeneous, of the same specific gravity as 
 foreign bronze, the actual weights of the guns corresponding with their com- 
 puted weights. The durability of some of our bronze guns exceeds that of 
 many foreign guns. 
 
 ********* 
 4. The board considers the ordnance department capable to furnish immedi- 
 ately bronze field guns fit for service, and they propose to make patterns of these 
 guns the dimensions of which will be such that their carriages will be able to 
 receive iron guns when prepared. Should the Secretary of War agree to this 
 proposition, they will arrange all the details, so that our artillery could be 
 supplied with field batteries complete immediately ; and they could at the 
 same time proceed to put in practice the measures proposed to perfect the 
 manufacture of iron guns, which, when perfected, could be introduced without 
 delay and without altering the system, as the same carriages, &c., Avould suit 
 for both. The necessity of adopting a system at once is evident; and by pur- 
 suing the course here recommended, we would be able now to put our resources 
 in operation to furnish what is absolutely necessary a system for the immediate 
 use of our artillery. 
 
 The subject of chambered guns will also receive the prompt attention of the 
 board ; but this, even supposing the principle established, would require some 
 time and experiments to arrange the details. 
 
 FEBRUARY 29th, 1840. The drawings of pattern field guns, 
 brass and iron, were completed and sent to the Secretary of War, 
 with the following statement for his consideration: 
 
 The board of ordnance officers, in conformity with the instructions of the 
 Secretary of War, has the honor to submit drawings for bronze and iron field 
 cannon, the latter of such dimensions as they confidently believe will impart 
 to them sufficient strength, provided the material is of good quality, without 
 which the board would have no faith in iron of any pattern. The patterns for 
 the bronze guns are reduced somewhat in length from those established in 1835, 
 so as to conform in length to the iron guns, for the purpose of allowing the 
 latter to be mounted upon the carriages established for the brass guns, simply 
 by a small increase in the width of the rondels and the length of the assem- 
 bling bolts. 
 
 The 12-pounder bronze gun of 1835, being sixteen calibres long and weighing 
 1,800 pounds, is of too great weight for field service generally, though particu- 
 larly adapted to field works and batteries of position. The pattern now pro- 
 posed is for a light 12-pounder ; and as it is not expedient to alter the diameters 
 (which would affect the strength of the piece), they are obliged to reduce its 
 
APPENDIX. 385 
 
 length to thirteen calibres, which is nearly the same as the English light 12- 
 pounder. This gun takes the place of the 9-pounder of 1835, which has been 
 abolished. 
 
 The G-pounders have been fixed at fourteen calibres length of bore, for the same 
 reasons, viz., that the strength of the guns should be augmented without add- 
 ing too much to their weight; and notwithstanding a majority of the board 
 would prefer guns of an increased length, if made exclusively of bronze, they_ 
 have yielded such preference to the necessity of preserving a uniformity between 
 the length of the guns of the two metals and in the carriages for them, it being 
 very important to avoid a multiplication of models for field carriages. 
 
 The board having considered the subject of chambered guns, is of opinion 
 that a few field guns should be bored with chambers, and that their force and 
 durability should be compared with the ordinary guns. 
 
 The reply of the Secretary of War to the above was dated 
 War Department, March 5th, 1840: 
 
 The Secretary of War has attentively considered the remarks and proposals 
 of the board of ordnance, made in reply to his communication of the 18th 
 ultimo, on the subject of field artillery, and cannot concur in the one or the 
 other. However important it may be that our artillery should be supplied at 
 once with field batteries complete, it is more so that the guns which compose 
 those batteries should be perfect, and the patterns to be adopted unobjection- 
 able and permanent. The frequent attempts to adopt a system at once for the im- 
 mediate use of our artillery, without an adequate acquaintance with the subject, 
 have led to the protracted delay we have already experienced in this matter. 
 The Secretary is therefore opposed to all temporary expedients. The patterns 
 presented for approval, in conformity with the proposals, are confessedly defective, 
 and have been devised because the material is supposed not to be good or the 
 knowledge of the foundries imperfect. The weight is not considered material, 
 but the length is very objectionable. It is not such as the board would have 
 recommended if it had believed that the metal now in use would have borne 
 such an increased number of calibres as would place our light artillery on an 
 equality with that of Europe and suffice to fight the guns advantageously be- 
 hind field-Avorks. From a desire to use the same carriages, the bronze gun is 
 likewise reduced, extending these serious objections to all the light artillery, 
 whether iron or brass. 
 
 The board is satisfied "that such additions to the knowledge of founding 
 bronze guns as could be made by visiting European establishments would un- 
 doubtedly enable them to perform the work at any one of the arsenals, in case 
 a national foundry should not be authorized by Congress." The Secretary 
 thinks this remark equally applicable to iron guns. And in the absence of au- 
 thority to establish a foundry, the board ought to possess such additional 
 knowledge of the subject as to enable its members to regulate the founding of 
 bronze and iron guns by contract with the proprietors of private foundries, in 
 such manner as to secure the strict application of scientific principles to the 
 founding of cannon ; and he is not satisfied that the corps, collectively or individu- 
 ally, possess that practical knowledge which the importance of the subject, both to the 
 country and the reputation of the corps, ivould seem to require. He repeats, there- 
 fore, his wish that this desirable knowledge should be acquired with as little 
 delay as practicable, and for that purpose proposes that the three junior mem- 
 bers of the board should proceed to Europe, accompanied by a practical founder. 
 
 Although the subject of light artillery alone is now under consideration, it 
 may be well to advert to our defective system of heavy ordnance as a further 
 motive for the course recommended. During the absence of the members of 
 the board who are designated to proceed to Europe, it will be advisable to sus- 
 pend the casting of light artillery, and to make no contracts for heavy ord- 
 nance. 
 
 49 
 
386 APPENDIX. 
 
 c[ 3 ]. 
 
 The following letter from Colonel Wadsworth to a prominent 
 officer of the army, whose aid he solicited in the furtherance of 
 the important work marked out in the letter itself, sufficiently 
 indicates the prompt manner in which he proceeded to the task 
 of introducing symmetry and simplicity into the artillery service. 
 It is dated Washington, D. C., May 2yth, 1813 : 
 
 "Although it has been near a twelve-month since I came into this office, but 
 little could be accomplished before General Armstrong became Secretary of War. 
 At the commencement of hostilities we were destitute of seasoned timber for 
 gun-carriages, as well as establishments and sufficient workmen for their con- 
 struction. Heretofore they have been procured partly by contracts and partly 
 constructed by the artificers of the artillery. Every superintendent selected 
 whatever pattern and introduced whatever alteration his fancy suggested. The 
 American artillery, including that belonging to the individual States, comprises, 
 I believe, every calibre made use of either in the English or French service, by 
 sea or land, with endless variations in the proportions of each calibre. The 
 necessity of some regulation to secure simplicity and uniformity must be obvious 
 to all ; yet men of reflection and experience alone can duly estimate the im- 
 portance of these two qualities. Every variation in the proportions of pieces of 
 the same calibre exacts a corresponding change in the carriage, and for every 
 distinct calibre will be required not only a suitable carriage but its appropriate 
 equipments and ammunition. In a word, unless the number of our calibres and 
 their variations be reasonably reduced, and the whole be settled by some per- 
 manent regulation, no possible exertion can give to our artillery that perfec- 
 tion its importance merits and which the public service requires. 
 
 " In France, by the Regulations of 1732, calibres for land service were reduced 
 to five 24, 16, 12, 8 and 4-pounders. The military writers of that country 
 date from that period the improvement of their artillery. Experience had 
 taught the celebrated Vauban the necessity for such a reformation, which was 
 solicited, however, in vain during his life. 
 
 " I feel anxious to get the following system established relative to the calibres 
 of cannon in the United States : 
 
 " For field service, let there be : light 3, 6, and 12-pounder guns on traveling 
 carriages, and 5^ inch howitzers, i. e, the diameter of the 24-pounder hoAvitzer. 
 
 " For siege : heavy 18 and 24-pounders on traveling carriages, 8 and 5 T 8 ^-inch 
 howitzers on traveling carriages, and 8, 10, and 13-inch mortars. 
 
 " For fixed batteries on seaboard : heavy 18 and 24-pounders on fixed car- 
 riages, and 10-inch mortars. 
 
 "For movable batteries on seaboard : light 12-pounders and 8-inch howit- 
 zers on traveling carriages. 
 
 " Thus the whole reduced to five calibres of cannon, two of howitzers, and 
 three of mortars. 
 
 " Were any alterations allowed, it might be in the entire suppression of the 
 heavy 18-pounders, whose place should be supplied by the 24-pounders, on the 
 supposition that a light 18-pounder might be annexed to the field train. 
 
 " The proportion of 3-pounders and 12-pounders in a field train should be 
 small, letting' the division consist principally of 6-pounders and 5 T ? j-inch 
 howitzers. 
 
 " The difference between 3-pounder and 4-pounder shot or case is immaterial ; 
 but the former are preferable, used in conjunction with the 6-pounder, as they 
 are not so nearly like each other danger of mistakes avoided. 
 
 " The range of an 8-inch shell from howitzers exceeds that of random can- 
 non shot, for this reason that piece is superior to all others for attacking a 
 ship at anchor on our coast or in our bays and rivers. In attacking a ship with 
 
APPENDIX. 387 
 
 two or three 18-pounders or 24-pounders on traveling carriages commonly se- 
 lected for the purpose, unless the ground should particularly favor the assail- 
 ant, the chance is the fire of the ship, from the superior number of her guns, 
 would compel him to give over the attack ; whereas a single 8-inch howitzer 
 placed out of the reach of a ship's guns would annoy her so as to compel a 
 change of station, much more than which ought not to be expected. 
 
 "The light 12-pounder is perfectly adapted to impede and prevent the land- 
 ing of boats. 
 
 " The 9-pounder is indeed a very good piece, yet need not be retained. 
 
 " If you require a gun heavier than the 6-pounder, let the 12-pounder be used ; 
 if lighter than a 12-pounder, use the 6-pounder. 
 
 "The 3-pounder will be particularly useful for the defense of distant posts 
 on the frontier and interior, where the difficulties of transportation render 
 economy of ammunition an important object. 
 
 " I give the preference to the 6-pounder rather than to either the 4-pounder 
 or 8-pounder of the French, and, joined to the 5 T 8 ^ inch or 24-pound howitzer, 
 consider it capable almost of superseding all other kinds of field artillery. 
 
 " The influence of a single individual cannot reach far enough to attain the ob- 
 ject I have in view of bringing our artillery to a system of simplicity and uniformity. 
 The public mind must be fully impressed with the idea of its necessity before a 
 change can be wrought." 
 
INDEX 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 ADMINISTRATION : 
 
 General considerations affecting early artillery 108-112 
 
 Of artillery affairs from 1802 to 1812 164 
 
 Existing system of, in the United States artillery 178-188 
 
 AMMUNITION : 
 
 Train, accompanying Army of Potomac 101 
 
 Special, organized to accompany army 102 
 
 Retained when army reserve (artillery) was broken up 102 
 
 ANDERSON, CAPTAIN ROBERT : 
 
 Translates instruction for field artillery 305 
 
 evolutions of field batteries 307 
 
 ARMISTEAD, CAPTAIN GEORGE, appointed major 3d artillery 39 
 
 ARMISTEAD, WALKER K., colonel 3d artillery 46 
 
 ARMY : 
 
 Plans for peace establishment of the 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 
 
 Detachment of, retained provisionally at the peace 22 
 
 Measures adopted to secure small regular 22, 23, 24 
 
 Of April 9th, 1787, composed of 1 infantry regiment and 1 artillery 
 
 battalion 25 
 
 Of confederation adopted under Constitution 25 
 
 Reorganized into a legion 26 
 
 upon Lieutenant-General Washington's plan 30 
 
 Increase of, by 10 infantry, 2 artillery, and 1 dragoon regiment 38 
 
 Of Potomac: Strength of Divisions and corps of. 83 
 
 Organization of artillery in (1864) 86 
 
 Of Northern Virginia: Artillery organization of. 93 
 
 ARTICLES or WAR, provisions of, affecting the artillery 108, 109 
 
 ARTIFICERS : 
 
 Recommended by Knox 4 
 
 100 to be attached to artillery in the field 5 
 
 Regiment of, formed of one of the proposed artillery battalions..... 7 
 
 Regiment of, mustered out of service 14 
 
 Large number provided for (act of March 16th, 1802) 114 
 
 ARTILLERISTS AND ENGINEERS : 
 
 Corps of, prganized 27 
 
 Regiment of, organized '. 29 
 
 Teachers authorized for cadets of 30 
 
 Reorganization of corps and regiment of 30 
 
 Failure of plan to make military school of 31 
 
 Circumstances attending raising of corps of. 191 
 
 ARTILLERY : 
 
 Organization of, United States (Appendix A [1] ) 1 
 
 Volunteer companies of, before Revolution 1 
 
 Colonial, associated with English Royal regiment 1 
 
 One company Royal, accompanies Braddock's expedition 1 
 
 Laws, customs, traditions of Royal regiment ingrafted into Colonial... 1 
 
 Major John Crane's company of Rhode Island 2 
 
 Gridley's regiment of, reorganized, Knox in command 3 
 
 Standing of the arm in service secured by Knox 3, 4 
 
 Two companies of Knox's regiment dispatched to Canada 4 
 
 (389) 
 
3QO INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 ARTILLERY Continued. 
 
 Nine companies move to New York; one remains at Boston... 4 
 
 Companies of Captains Beauman and Hamilton join Knox 4 
 
 Project for improvement of, submitted by Knox to Congressional Com- 
 mittee 4, 5, 6 
 
 Claim set up for superiority of British 5 
 
 Inadequacy of the, for needs of service 5 
 
 Proportion of, to other arms of service 5 
 
 The English taken as model for building up Colonial 6 
 
 Erroneous ideas regarding supposed influence of the French 6 
 
 General Washington authorizes raising three battalions 6, 7 
 
 Origin of the several regiments (or battalions) of regulars 7, 8 
 
 The regiments of regular Continental 8 
 
 Relative order of precedence established for regiments of. 8 
 
 Colonel Ebenezer Stevens' corps of. 9 
 
 Incorporation of companies of Stevens' corps into Crane's artillery 9 
 
 Companies and battalions of, belonging to Colonies, distinct from reg- 
 ular establishment 9 
 
 Colonial, status of, as compared to regular 10 
 
 Reorganization of regular 12, 14 
 
 Assignment, regular regiments of, to State quotas 14 
 
 At siege of Yorktown 14 
 
 First and Fourth regiments of, move South 14 
 
 Second and Third regiments of, remain North 15 
 
 Rule for promotion in .- 15, 16, 17 
 
 Views as to proper peace establishment for 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 
 
 Of peace establishment, organized into battalion 24 
 
 Position of, in the legion 26, 27 
 
 Reorganization of, as corps of artillerists and engineers 27 
 
 Organization of regiment of artillerists and engineers 29 
 
 Light, recommended ; one regiment organized 33 
 
 Its equipment 34 
 
 Equipment first company as such 34, 35 
 
 Regiment of, concentrated at New Orleans 35 
 
 March of light company, Baltimore to Pittsburg 35 
 
 Company of light, dismounted 36 
 
 Condition of regiment of light, before war of 1812 38 
 
 Two additional regiments organized 38 
 
 Principal officers of, detached from their commands 40 
 
 Slight changes in personnel of 42 
 
 Corps of, formed by consolidation of First, Second, and Third regiments 42 
 
 Remarks on organization of corps of. 42, 43 
 
 Reorganization of, act of March 3d, 1815 44 
 
 Designation of companies by letters of alphabet 45 
 
 Slight changes in organization of. 45 
 
 Reorganization of. 46 
 
 Light, one company of each regiment to be equipped as 46 
 
 (C), Third Artillery, equipped as 50 
 
 Four additional companies of, authorized 51 
 
 Career of, in Rio Grande valley 51 
 
 Report introduced by Senate Military Committee favoring chief of 
 
 artillery 51 
 
 Bill introduced in Congress for reorganization of. 51, 52 
 
 School of Practice for, at Fortress Monroe 52 
 
 Fifth regiment of regular, organized 53 
 
 Light, note regarding use of term 54, 55 
 
 Question of a proper mount for 56, 57 
 
 One company in each regiment of, equipped as field artillery 59 
 
INDEX. 391 
 
 PAGE. 
 ARTILLERY Continued. 
 
 Light, letter of Adjutant-General concerning utility of. 61 
 
 Excellence of captains, &c., commanding companies of. 61 
 
 Additional companies equipped as 62, 63 
 
 Companies dismounted and remounted after Mexican war.... 63, 64 
 
 Remarks of Secretary Conrad concerning U5 
 
 Money specifically appropriated for mounting 66 
 
 Companies re-equipped as 66, 67 
 
 Companies of, stationed on Indian frontier 68 
 
 Companies of, dispersed ; condition at beginning of Civil war... 69 
 Fifth regiment of, organized with tactical units designated l bat- 
 teries ' 69 
 
 Field, effort to organize powerful, in Army of the Potomac 69, 70 
 
 Horse batteries reorganized 70 
 
 Formed into brigades 70, 71 
 
 Field, general dismounting of, after Civil war 71 
 
 Batteries retained as 71 
 
 Effect of section 1101, Rev. Stats., regarding 72, 73 
 
 Companies equipped as (1884) ; 73, 74 
 
 Claims to recognition, of old light companies 74, 75 
 
 Brigades of, formed after Chancellorsville 83, 84 
 
 Advantages of assignment to large tactical units 84 
 
 Erroneous ideas concerning proper organization of. 84 
 
 General reserve, Army of Potomac, broken up ,- 86, 87, 88 
 
 Results flowing from breaking up reserve 88, 89, 91 
 
 Siege before Petersburg, Va 88 
 
 Recapitulation of changes in Army of Potomac 89-92 
 
 Of Army of Northern Virginia 93 
 
 Changes in 93-95 
 
 The organization of, into brigades an outgrowth of war 95 
 
 Reserves 96-107 
 
 Confederate Army of Northern Virginia organized on plan now uni- 
 versal in Europe 94 
 
 Advantageous position of American, at beginning of Revolution.. 108-112 
 
 Better pay of officers of the 110 
 
 Field batteries of, made schools of instruction 132-137 
 
 Posts of field batteries 137-141 
 
 Target record of, in 1879, and results 145-147 
 
 Technical duties of, performed by artillery officers 148 
 
 Commissaries for, appointed 149 
 
 Attainments of the personnel from 1802 to 1812 166 
 
 Recommendations made in 1811 for improvement of artillery arm 167 
 
 Views of Colonel Izard 167 
 
 United with the ordnance department 168 
 
 Propositions looking to the securing a chief of. 186-188 
 
 Horse (or light), the organization of, advocated by the Secretary of 
 
 War , 192 
 
 Steps taken to fit the artillery for the field 193, 194 
 
 The results flowing from efforts to organize artillery for active service 
 
 in war of 1812 196-200 
 
 Character of the service rendered by, from 1815 to 1846 200 
 
 Companies of, equipped as light artillery in Mexican war 201 
 
 Functions of, usurped by ordnance 201-206 
 
 Chief of, question as to'his proper function 208-222 
 
 Status of, during Revolution 208-210 
 
 War of 1812 210 
 
 As fixed by regulations of 1816 210 
 
 By Scott's regulations 211, 212 
 
392 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 ARTILLERY Continued. 
 
 Chief of, regulations of 1841 and of 185*7 212 
 
 McClellan's orders 213 
 
 Hooker's position regarding 214, 215 
 
 Meade's orders 216, 217 
 
 Confederate orders concerning 218, 219 
 
 General remarks regarding position of. 220, 221, 222 
 
 Materiel of. 223, 298 
 
 Personnel of the combatant always under command of the general-in- 
 
 chief 178,179 
 
 Authority of colonels of 179 
 
 Remarks on present condition of the combatant 180-182 
 
 Proposed measures for improvement 187, 188 
 
 Colonel Wadsworth's proposed system of materiel 233-237 
 
 English block-trail system of. 237-239 
 
 Materiel of Adoption of English system of, by France 239 
 
 Americanized Krupp system 272, 273 
 
 Revolutionary system of. 275, 276 
 
 System of, 1816 278 
 
 Proposed by ordnance board of 1818 279, 280 
 
 1835 280 
 
 Calibres of, proposed in 1835 281 
 
 1839 282 
 
 1850 283 
 
 1861 286 
 
 Contest between the smooth-bore and the rifle 289, 290 
 
 Muzzle and breech-loader 291-293 
 
 Chamber introduced in construction of 293 
 
 Recent improvements in siege and field 294-295 
 
 Report of board on light 295, 296 
 
 Systems of 1868 and 1880 297, 298 
 
 Mobility of the, at epoch of war of 1812 315 
 
 BRIGADES OF UNION ARMY : Battalions of Confederate ; divisions of German 
 and Austrian Artillery 370-374 
 
 BANKHEAD, MAJOR JAMES, assigned to corps of artillery 44 
 
 Retained in 1821 ". 46 
 
 BARBOUR, SECRETARY OF WAR, remarks of, concerning school of practice.. 123 
 
 BARRY, GENERAL WILLIAM F. : 
 
 Addresses General McClellan regarding field artillery 69 
 
 Principles formulated by, for organization of artillery 80 
 
 Chief of artillery, Army of Potomac 82 
 
 Relieved as chief of artillery, Army of Potomac 82 
 
 Appointed inspector of artillery 82 
 
 Orders assigning to duty as inspector of artillery 186, 187 
 
 BEAUMAN, SEBASTIAN : 
 
 Captain New York artillery 4 
 
 Retained in service 350 
 
 BEAUMARCHAIS : contractor for artillery supplies 224 
 
 BOARD 
 
 Of ordnance, recommended by Knox 5 
 
 Of war and ordnance, remodeled 10, 11 
 
 Personnel of the, when remodeled 11 
 
 Attempts of, to supplant commander-in chief... 11 
 
 Frustrated 12 
 
 Of ordnance: Fenwick, Ewing, Talcott, Baker, and Mordecai 56 
 
 Of officers, recommends measures affecting artillery 167 
 
 Appointed to improve condition of artillery. ..234, 243, 244, 245 
 
INDEX. 393 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 BOMFORD, GEORGE : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel of artillery 46 
 
 Labors of, as head of the ordnance department 117 
 
 BRAGG, BRAXTON : 
 
 Lieutenant, commanding company equipped as light artillery 62 
 
 Captain, succeeds to command of horse artillery company tm _ 62 
 
 Conduct at battle of Buena Vista 62, 63 
 
 BROOKS, MAJOR: regiment of artillerists and engineers 29 
 
 BRASS : 
 
 Foundry, recommended by Knox 4 
 
 Ordnance, in which army stood in need 5 
 
 The favorite metal for cannon during Revolution 257 
 
 Composition of early gun-metal 257, 258 
 
 Supplanted by cast-iron for field-guns 260 
 
 Investigations begun looking to a return to brass 261, 262 
 
 Manufacture of first ten bronze guns by Ames Manufacturing Co 263 
 
 Definitely adopted for field ordnance 265 
 
 Plan for converting field-guns into rifled ordnance 266 
 
 BROWN : captain of artillery company attached to Harrison's regiment 12 
 
 BROWN, GENERAL : 
 
 Gives reasons for establishment of artillery school of practice 122 
 
 Death of. 124 
 
 BROWN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HARVEY, commandant school of practice.... 125 
 
 BUFFINGTON, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, design of depressing gun-carriage 256 
 
 BURBECK, WILLIAM : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel Gridley's regiment 2 
 
 Knox's regiment '. 3 
 
 Note concerning his declining colonelcy 3 
 
 Dismissed 4 
 
 BURBECK, HENRY: 
 
 Captain of artillery 25 
 
 Colonel commandant corps artillerists and engineers 32 
 
 Colonel of artillerists 32 
 
 Retired from service 33 
 
 CALHOUN, SECRETARY OF WAR : 
 
 Plan to improve condition of the artillery 1 15, 116 
 
 for merging artillery and ordnance 169 
 
 Not the originator of merging plan put in execution 172 
 
 CALIBRES OF ARTILLERY : 
 
 List of, during Revolution 275-276 
 
 At the epoch of the war of 1812 277 
 
 CAMP OF INSTRUCTION at Trenton, N. J 58 
 
 CARRIAGES, ARTILLERY : 
 
 English patterns used by Americans during Revolution 223, 225 
 
 Features of the Gribeauval introduced 229,230 
 
 The Gribeauval system of. 231 
 
 Purchases from France 231, 232 
 
 Wheels for, in British service, of same size 227 
 
 Colonel Wadsworth's pattern of. 233 
 
 Efforts of board of 1831 to secure proper 247 
 
 Recommendations of board of 1835 regarding 248 
 
 French stock-trail, adopted into United States service 248 
 
 Metallic, advantages of early patterns 249 
 
 Recent improvements in construction of. 250 
 
 Recommendations of light artillery board 250, 251 
 
 Difficulties in constructing proper 251, 252 
 
 50 
 
394 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 CARRIAGES, ARTILLERY Continued. 
 
 Systems of siege, garrison, and sea-coast 25;i 
 
 Introduction of cast-iron in construction of. 254 
 
 wrought-iron 255 
 
 Depressing 256 
 
 CARRINGTON, EDWARD : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel Virginia artillery regiment 7 
 
 Claims colonelcy Fourth artillery 17 
 
 Quartermaster of Southern army 190 
 
 CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT, introduction of title into American service 331 
 
 CASS, SECRETARY OF WAR : 
 
 Reports on unsettled condition of the ordnance 243 
 
 Appoints board for improvement of 243 
 
 Sanctions return to brass for field ordnance 263 
 
 Introduces mountain howitzer into United States service 282 
 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE, composition of Union Army at 83 
 
 CHIEF OF ARTILLERY, the question of the status or functions of 208-222 
 
 COMMANDER OF ARTILLERY : 
 
 Recommendations of, favorably acted on by Congress 5, 6 
 
 Authority curtailed by department of commissary-general of military 
 
 stores 11, 12 
 
 New powers given by resolves of Congress 154, 155 
 
 All artillery affairs placed practically under his control 155 
 
 COMMISSARY-GENERAL OF MILITARY STORES : 
 
 Department of 11 
 
 Resolutions of Congress concerning 150, 151 
 
 Its career short-lived 152 
 
 Experiences of department 152-158 
 
 Field department of, or field ordnance department organized 153, 154 
 
 Readjustment of. 158 
 
 COMMITTEE : 
 
 Of Congress, reports adversely to Gridley 2, 3 
 
 to investigate army affairs 4 
 
 suggestions of Colonel Knox to 4, 5 
 
 to consider subject of peace establishment 17 
 
 Of ordnance officers, appointed by Secretary Poinsett.... 264 
 
 commission from, sent to Europe 264 
 
 Deliberation of, results in adoption of brass for field ordnance 264, 265 
 
 CONFEDERATE ARMY: 
 
 Organization of artillery in 84, 86,93, 94, 95 
 
 The pioneer in present plan of artillery organization 94 
 
 Rule for assignment of artillery officers in 86 
 
 Command and administration of artillery affairs in 218, 219, 370, 374 
 
 CONGREVE, CAPTAIN, improvements of, English artillery 237 
 
 CONRAD, SECRETARY OF WAR, report of, regarding light artillery companies.. 65 
 
 CONWAY, GENERAL : 
 
 Made inspector-general 11 
 
 Cabal, result of 12 
 
 CRANE : 
 
 Major John's company Rhode Island artillery 2 
 
 Major in Knox's artillery regiment 3 
 
 Colonel of one of the artillery regiments raised by order of General 
 
 Washington 7 
 
 The ranking colonel of artillery 8 
 
 Regiment of Colonel, third in order of precedence 8 
 
 Chief of artillery, Department of the Highlands 209 
 
 List of officers in regiment of, as first organized 336, 337 
 
 in 1780.... .. 341 
 
INDEX. 395 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 CEAIG, CAPTAIN ISAAC, promoted major Fourth artillery 1 7 
 
 CRAIG, COLONEL H. K., remarks of, relative to the performance of artillery 
 duties by officers and men of the ordnance department 6*7, 68 
 
 DAVIS, SECRETARY OF WAR : 
 
 Remounts three of the field artillery companies 66 
 
 Proposes to re-establish artillery school of practice 125 
 
 DEARBORN, HENRY: 
 
 Secretary of War 34 
 
 Authorizes equipment of light artillery company 34 
 
 Interest and labors in field of technical artillery 165 
 
 Introduces many features of the Gribeauval carriage 230 
 
 DEARBORN, GENERAL HENRY : 
 
 Complains of scarcity of artillery officers 41 
 
 DE FATT, CAPTAIN, inspector of Georgia artillery 10 
 
 DE LISLE, MAJOR ROMAN, commander Georgia artillery 10 
 
 DE SAGULIER, improvements of, English artillery 238 
 
 DORSE Y, CAPTAIN, artillery company of, attached to Harrison's artillery 12 
 
 DOUGHTY, BREVET MAJOR JOHN : 
 
 Company of, provisionally retained at the peace (1T83) 23 
 
 Promoted to major artillery battalion 24 
 
 Declines appointment of lieutenant colonel commandant of infantry... 26 
 
 Retires from the artillery 26 
 
 Returns to it 29 
 
 Retires from service 32 
 
 DOUGLASS, CAPTAIN THOMAS : 
 
 Commands artillery company on peace establishment 351 
 
 Du COUDRAY : 
 
 Compact with American agent at Paris Ill 
 
 Results flowing therefrom 3*75 
 
 DUCROT: Attack of, with cavalry at Sedan (note) 105 
 
 Du PORTAIL, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS : 
 
 Views of, regarding peace establishment 17 
 
 ELLIOTT, BARNARD: Major of South Carolina artillery battalion 10 
 
 ENGLISH : 
 
 Artillery of, taken as a model by Knox 6 
 
 System of. 237 
 
 ENGINEERS : 
 
 Two, distinct from corps of artillerists and engineers, authorized 31 
 
 EUSTIS, CAPTAIN BENJAMIN: Promoted to fourth artillery 16 
 
 EUSTIS, DOCTOR WILLIAM, Secretary of War : 
 
 Dismounts light artillery company 36 
 
 Remarks of, regarding use of horse artiller} 7 " 37 
 
 Favorably inclined towards proposed plan of reorganization of artil- 
 lery 41 
 
 Introduces Gribeauval carriage 231 
 
 EUSTIS, ABRAHAM: Captain in light artillery, promoted to major 37 
 
 Retained in 1811 46 
 
 Equips three companies of horse artillery 196 
 
 FENWICK, JOHN R. : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel of light artillery 40 
 
 Commands artillery on Canadian border 40, 196 
 
 Colonel Fourth artillery 46 
 
 President of board of ordnance % 56 
 
 FIRE-WORKER, title of, introduced into American service 332 
 
396 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 FLOWER : 
 
 Colonel of so-called artillery-artificer regiment "7 
 
 Commissary-general of military stores 149, 151 
 
 Death of Colonel , 156 
 
 List of officers in so-called regiment of Colonel 346 
 
 FORD, MAHLON, major of artillerists, discharged 32 
 
 FORNEY, DANIEL M., major Second artillery 39 
 
 FORREST, THOMAS : 
 
 Major of Pennsylvania artillery regiment 7 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel Pennsylvania artillery regiment 16 
 
 FOUNDRY for casting brass ordnance recommended 4 
 
 FORT RILEY, KANSAS: School for light batteries there established 137 
 
 FRANCE : 
 
 Army officers of that nation in service of colonies 6 
 
 Erroneous ideas concerning their influence 6 
 
 Embarrassments caused by officers of that nationality 166 
 
 FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN : correspondence of, with regard to artillery officers... Ill 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG : composition of the Union army at 83 
 
 FREEMAN, CONSTANT : 
 
 Major of artillerists and engineers 28 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel of artillerists 32 
 
 Retired from service in 1821 33 
 
 GATES, GENERAL HORATIO : 
 
 President board of war and ordnance 11 
 
 Is given a command 12 
 
 GERMAN ARTILLERY : 
 
 Successful employment of, war 1870 and 1871 105 
 
 Organization of artillery in the field 371, 374 
 
 Function of artillery commanders in war 380 
 
 GIBSON, CAPTAIN : 
 
 Marches company horse artillery to Albany, N. Y 195 
 
 Letter of, to Secretary of War 197 
 
 GRIBEAUVAL : 
 
 Artillery system of, unknown to Americans at time of Revolu- 
 tion 223, 224, 225 
 
 Features of carriage adopted by Secretary Dearborn 230 
 
 Carriage introduced into U. S. service 231 
 
 GRIDLEY, RICHARD : 
 
 Colonel First regiment Continental artillery 1 
 
 Discontent in regiment of. 2 
 
 Superseded in command of artillery 3 
 
 List of officers, regiment of. 331 
 
 GEIDLEY, SCARBOROUGH : 
 
 Second major artillery regiment 2 
 
 Dismissed the service for misconduct 2 
 
 HAMILTON, ALEXANDER : 
 
 Captain New York artillery 4 
 
 Makes report on peace establishment 19 
 
 Inspector-general, work on system of discipline for the artillery 300 
 
 HAMPTON, MAJOR-GENERAL WADE : 
 
 Complains of the inexperience of artillery officers with him 41 
 
 HANCOCK, MAJOR-GENERAL : 
 
 Remarks of, relative to field-artillery schools, &c 140 
 
 HARMAR: Lieutenant-colonel " First American regiment" 23 
 
INDEX. 397 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 HARRISON. CHARLES : 
 
 Colonel of the Virginia artillery regiment - 7 
 
 Third in order of rank regular artillery 8 
 
 Regiment of colonel, first in order of precedence 8 
 
 List of officers in regiment of. 334-336 
 
 HINDMAN, CAPTAIN : 
 
 Appointed major Second artillery ::;> 
 
 Retained in 1821 46 
 
 HODGDON, SAMUEL : 
 
 Quartermaster-general 26 
 
 Field commissary of military stores 156 
 
 Retained in service after Revolutionary war 158 
 
 HOLMAN, CHRISTIAN, major Virginia artillery regiment 7 
 
 HOOKER, MAJOR-GENERAL, policy of regarding functions of chief of artillery. 215 
 
 HOOPS, ADAM, major of artillerists and engineers 29 
 
 HOUSE, CAPTAIN JAMES : 
 
 Appointed lieutenant-colonel 39 
 
 Retained as lieutenant-colonel 46 
 
 HUNT, GENERAL HENRY J. : 
 
 Commander of artillery reserve Army of the Potomac 82 
 
 Succeeds to position chief of artillery Army of the Potomac 82, 83 
 
 Organizes special ammunition column 102 
 
 One of the committee on field artillery armament (note) 297 
 
 INSPECTOR OP ARTILLERY : 
 
 Appointed 114 
 
 Duties of. 114 
 
 Colonel of artillerists performs the duties of. 115 
 
 Necessity for the office represented by Secretary of War 163 
 
 INSTRUCTION : 
 
 Artillery schools for, established 68 
 
 Consideration of general subject of, for the artillery 112-147 
 
 Plan of Mr. Calhoun for artillery 115, 116 
 
 Plan of, inaugurated by G. 0. A. G. 0., 1859 117, 118 
 
 Of artillery personnel, plan proposed by permanent artillery board.. 117, 118 
 
 Text-books for theoretical 118, 119 
 
 Importance of inspectors to supervise 120 
 
 Knox the first to recommend schools for artillery 120 
 
 Inadequacy of scheme for, inaugurated in 1794 121 
 
 Field batteries, made schools for 132-137 
 
 General remarks upon the importance of field artillery posts 138-141 
 
 IRON, CAST : 
 
 Metal adopted for sea-coast carriages 254 
 
 Gradual introduction of, in constructing ordnance 258. 259 
 
 Supplants brass as a metal for field-guns 260 
 
 Dearborn's system of field-guns 260, 261, 262 
 
 Recommended to be superseded by bronze for field-guns 262 
 
 Circumstances attending readoption of bronze 263-265 
 
 Pure and simple, for heavy ordnance 267-269 
 
 Combined with other metals for heavy ordnance 269. 270 
 
 Malleable : 
 
 Experiments with, for field ordnance 263 
 
 IRON, WROUGHT : 
 
 Metal adopted for siege and sea-coast carriages 255 
 
 Field-guns (note) 259 
 
 Failure of guns for field ordnance 265 
 
 51 
 
398 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 IRON, WROUGHT Continued. 
 
 General use of, for field artillery 266 
 
 Unsuitableness of, for heavy ordnance 271 
 
 Conversion of 3-inch field-guns into breech-loaders 274 
 
 IZARD, GEORGE : 
 
 Colonel Second artillery 39 
 
 Brigadier-general 39 
 
 Plan for reorganization of artillery 41 
 
 Organization of artillery for field service, 1814 77, 78 
 
 Efforts to equip his regiment as field artillery 194 
 
 Constructs some Wurst caissons , 232 
 
 Correspondence of, concerning equipping light artillery 198 
 
 JACKSON, DANIEL : 
 
 Major of artillerists and engineers 29 
 
 Major of artillerists 32 
 
 KING, MAJOR : design of depressing gun carriage 256 
 
 KNOX, HENRY : 
 
 Volunteer in army under General-Washington. 3 
 
 Appointed colonel of artillery regiment, vice Gridley 3 
 
 On special duty at New York, Albany, and Ticonderoga 3 
 
 Moves to New York city with nine companies 4 
 
 Suggestions of, for improvement of artillery 4 
 
 Recommends five battalions of artillery 6 
 
 Chosen brigadier-general of artillery 7 
 
 Secretary at War, reorganizes peace establishment into a legion 24 
 
 Instructions of, to artillery officers on detachment 76, 77 
 
 Supervises department of technical artillery 113 
 
 Recommends schools for artillery officers 120 
 
 Remarks of, concerning the ordnance department 152, 153 
 
 Proposes to unite the duties of Secretary at War and of master-general 
 
 of ordnance 160 
 
 Appointed Secretary at War 160 
 
 Duties of, as such 160, 161 
 
 As Secretary at War, commands the army 160 
 
 surrenders command of the army to the first Pres- 
 ident under the Constitution 161 
 
 Promoted to major-general, assigned to West Point 190 
 
 Receives manual of Gribeauval artillery from Lieutenant-colonel Nadal.. 224 
 
 Views of, concerning qualifications of artillery officers 110 
 
 Submits list of artillery to be taken in campaign of 1779 275 
 
 Failure of plan for organization of militia 300 
 
 List of commissioned officers, the regiment of. 332 
 
 KOSCIUSKO : System of horse artillery manoeuvres written by 300 
 
 KRUPP: 
 
 Twelve-inch, gun, recommended to be purchased by board convened 
 
 in 1872 272 
 
 Attempt to graft breech mechanism of, on American conversions and 
 
 new constructions 272, 273 
 
 Failure of this attempt 272 
 
 LABORATORIES recommended by Knox 4 
 
 LALLEMAND, GENERAL HENRY: Treatise of, on artillery 302 
 
 LAMB, JOHN : 
 
 Major of Knox's regiment 3 
 
 Prisoner with the enemy 4 
 
INDEX. 399 
 
 PAGE. 
 LAMB, JOHN Continued. 
 
 Colonel of artillery regiment 8 
 
 Colonel, second in order of rank.. 8 
 
 Regiment of Colonel, second in order of precedence 8 
 
 Appointed surveyor of ordnance 150 
 
 List of officers in regiment of Colonel 342, 344 
 
 LEE, GENERAL CHARLES, strictures of, regarding commander-in- chief -.... 10 
 
 LINDSAY, WILLIAM : 
 
 Major and lieutenant-colonel Second artillery 39 
 
 MACOMB : 
 
 Colonel of Third artillery 39 
 
 Appointed brigadier-general 39 
 
 Chief of artillery for General Wilkinson 40 
 
 General-in-chief, views of, concerning school of practice 124 
 
 MACREA, WILLIAM : 
 
 Major of artillerists 32 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel corps of artillery 44 
 
 Retained 46 
 
 MASON, DAVID : 
 
 Major of Gridley's regiment 2 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel of Knox's regiment 3 
 
 Mustered out of service . 157 
 
 MARCY, SECRETARY : Promulgates rule by which captains of field batteries 
 
 are to be selected 65 
 
 MATERIEL OP ARTILLERY : 
 
 Gribeauval system 223 
 
 Carriages. 223, 256 
 
 Sources whence America was supplied 223, 224, 225 
 
 Secretary McHenry moves against the Revolutionary system 227 
 
 Modifications in, wrought by Secretary Dearborn 228, 231 
 
 Secretary McHenry 231, 232 
 
 Colonel of the ordnance department 233 
 
 And results 234-237 
 
 Appointment of boards of 1831, 1835, 1837, 1838, and of the ordnance 
 
 committee, to ameliorate condition of 243, 246 
 
 Result of their labors 246, 249 
 
 Recommendations of light artillery board concerning 250 
 
 The question of suitable metals for ordnance brass, cast-iron, 
 
 wrought-iroTi, steel 257-274 
 
 Calibres and natures of ordnance in 'the various systems of, that have 
 been adopted t 275-298 
 
 McDouGALL, MAJOR-GENERAL : Court-martialed 209, 210 
 
 MCHENRY, SECRETARY : 
 
 Advocates introduction of horse artillery 192 
 
 Remarks on necessity for educated officers 31 
 
 Remarks concerning the failure of plan to educate cadets 121 
 
 Observations on the unsatisfactory condition of the ordnance 163 
 
 MclNTosH, CAPTAIN : Marches company light artillery en route to Canada.. 195 
 
 McCLELLAN, GENERAL GEORGE B. : 
 
 Assumes command of Army of Potomac "80 
 
 Remarks of, on organization of artillery 81 
 
 Army commanded by, on Peninsula 82 
 
 Order of, defining position of the chief of artillery 213 
 
 MF.ADE, MAJOR-GENERAL : Order of, defining status of chief of artillery 216 
 
 MIFFLIN: 
 
 Quartermaster-General 11 
 
400 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 MIFPLIN Continued. 
 
 Member board of war and ordnance 11 
 
 Resigns his commission 12 
 
 MILITARY ACADEMY : 
 
 Influence of 78 
 
 At West Point, placed on sound basis 121 
 
 Character of education there acquired 121-123 
 
 MITCHELL, GEORGE E. : 
 
 Major and lieutenant-colonel Third artillery 39 
 
 Retained at reorganization of 1821 46 
 
 MORTARS : 
 
 Two thirteen-inch (13-in.), dragged through wilderness to Canada by 
 
 companies of Knox's regiment 4 
 
 Foundries for casting brass, recommended 4 
 
 Rifle recommended 273 
 
 MULLER'S TREATISE ON ARTILLERY the standard for constructions 224 v 
 
 MUSICIANS: Object of, in organization (1802) 33 
 
 NICOLL, A. T., MAJOR: Adjutant and Inspector-General, resigned 44 
 
 NYE, SAMUEL : Major Third artillery 39 
 
 OFFICERS: 
 
 Field; paucity of, in Royal artillery 2 
 
 Increased number of, in Gridley's regiment 2 
 
 Disputes among, concerning rank and precedence 7 
 
 Difficulty in obtaining, for Crane's and Lamb's regiments 8 
 
 Number of, in reorganized artillery 13 
 
 Academy for instruction of, recommended .". 4 
 
 Of American artillery equal to demands of service 6 
 
 Relative rank of colonels 8 
 
 Of artillery battalion, Legion of United States 24, 25 
 
 Ranking, of artillerists and engineers 27, 28 
 
 Educated, efforts to secure from Europe 30, 31 
 
 Of light artillery, allowed forage for horses 38 
 
 Of artillery, habitually detached 40 
 
 Of old army, selected for vacancies in the increase given artillery 49 
 
 Field, selected for Fifth regular artillery 53 
 
 Of artillery, unjustly discriminated against 85 
 
 Provisions made for technical instruction of. 112 
 
 Protest of American, against Du Coudray's compact Ill 
 
 List of, retained in-service, when Revolutionary army was disbanded.. 350 
 
 retained in service after June 2d, 1784 351 
 
 in Pennsylvania detachment (1784) 351 
 
 (1785) 352 
 
 Artillery battalion, Legionary corps, in 1787 352 
 
 under constitutional government 353 
 
 OR GANIZATION : 
 
 Of First Colonial regiment of artillery based on that of a battalion 
 
 Royal artillery 2 
 
 Gridley's regiment 331 
 
 Battalion Royal artillery 332 
 
 Major John Crane's Rhode Island company 2 
 
 Knox's artillery regiment 333 
 
 Five battalions recommended by Knox 7 
 
 The regular artillery and artificer regiments 334346 
 
 Stephens' corps 338 
 
INDEX. 401 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 ORGANIZATION Continued. 
 
 Oi Colonial companies and battalions, other than those of regular 
 
 establishment 9 
 
 Regular artillery (1778) 12, 14 
 
 Corps of artillerists and engineers 27 
 
 Regiment of artillerists 29 
 
 Second and Third artillery 38 
 
 Corps of artillery 42 
 
 March 3d, 1815, corps retained 44 
 
 Four artillery regiments 46 
 
 Slight changes in personnel of artillery regiments 48 
 
 Artillery for field service in Revolution 76 
 
 in War of 1812 77, 78 
 
 under McClellan (1862) 78, 80, 81 
 
 Artillery of army in Mexico 78, 79 
 
 in western armies during Civil war 79 
 
 Change in artillery, immediately after battle of Chancellorsville. 83, 84 
 
 Elements of weakness in the artillery after 1821 170-173 
 
 Propositions to modify that of the artillery 186 
 
 Measures proposed, looking to same end 187, 188 
 
 South Carolina artillery regiment 347 
 
 Artillery regiments, resolves of October 3d and 21st, 1780 347 
 
 Troops retained when army disbanded in 1783 349 
 
 Proposed temporary force, in 1784 351 
 
 Artillery, Legionary corps of 1787 352 
 
 under resolve of Congress October 3d, 1787 352 
 
 Legion of the United States under act of March 5th, 1792 353 
 
 Corps of artillerists and engineers 354 
 
 Regiment 354 
 
 Regiment of light artillery 356 
 
 Second and Third regiments of artillery 356 
 
 Plan of, proposed by Colonel Izard to Secretary of War 357 
 
 Of military establishment under act March 3d, 1815 358 
 
 Reorganization of artillerists and engineers, ] 799 355 
 
 Reorganization of artillerists pursuant to act March 16th, 1802 355 
 
 Reorganization of artillery, March 2d, 1821 358 
 
 Table showing reorganization of 1821 360, 361 
 
 ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT : 
 
 Proposed reorganization of. 52 
 
 Organized by act of May 14th, 1812 115 
 
 Technical artillery duties confided to 115 
 
 'Assumes role of artillery staff. 143-147 
 
 Of the Revolution 149 
 
 Resolutions of Congress establishing 150, 151 
 
 Remarks of Knox concerning 152, 153 
 
 Merged in the artillery 168 
 
 Result of the merging scheme 168-172 
 
 Of Confederate States (1861-'65) 172 
 
 Resuscitation of, in 1832 173 
 
 Career of the, United States, since 1832 173-177 
 
 Usurpation of artillery duties 201-205 
 
 Ordnance Committee appointed by Secretary Poinsett 246 
 
 OSWALD, ELEAZER : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel Second regular artillery 8 
 
 Resigns September, 1778 '. 9 
 
 OVERTON, MAJOR W. H. : 
 
 Assigned to corps artillery 44 
 
402 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 PARROTT : System of| rifled guns 285,286 
 
 PERKINS, WILLIAM : 
 
 Major Third regular artillery 8 
 
 Commander of artillery at West Point 209 
 
 PETERS, RICHARD : Member board of war and ordnance 11 
 
 PETER, GEORGE : 
 
 Captain light artillery 34 
 
 Company of, equipped as light artillery 34, 35 
 
 Marches to New Orleans, Louisiana ; resigns 36 
 
 PICKERING : 
 
 Adjutant-general 11 
 
 Member board of war and ordnance 11 
 
 Quartermaster-general 109 
 
 Secretary of War 259 
 
 PINCKNEY, MAJOR-GENERAL : -Work on a system of discipline for the artillery. 300 
 
 PITTS, CAPTAIN THOMAS : 
 
 Promoted major light artillery ; resigns 42 
 
 POINSETT, JOEL R., SECRETARY OF WAR : 
 
 Services of, for benefit of the artillery 50-54, 55 
 
 Calls attention to our lack of light artillery 58 
 
 Sends ordnance commission to Europe 174 
 
 Results of its visit 264, 265 
 
 Introduces rocket service into United States 282 
 
 Controversy with ordnance committee as to construction of field 
 guns 382-385 
 
 PORTER, MAJOR ANDREW : Lieutenant-colonel commandant Fourth artillery. 17 
 
 PORTER, MOSES : 
 
 Major of artillerists 32 
 
 Colonel of light artillery ; retained as colonel of First regiment 46 
 
 Brevet brigadier-general commander of artillery, Northern Army 210 
 
 POPKINS, JOHN : Lieutenant-colonel Third regular artillery 9 
 
 PRACTICE-FIRING, ARTILLERY: 
 
 Plan for, instituted 116 
 
 Successive changes wrought in plan 141-143 
 
 Position of chief of ordnance in this feature of artillery instruction 143 
 
 PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES at battle of Gravelotte (note) 106 
 
 PROCTOR, THOMAS : 
 
 Colonel of Pennsylvania artillery 7 
 
 Fourth in rank in artillery service 8 
 
 Regiment of, Colonel, fourth in order of precedence 8 
 
 Resigned his commission 17 
 
 PROCTOR, FRANCIS, JR. : 
 
 Major Fourth artillery; retires 17 
 
 List of officers in regiment of Colonel 344, 346 
 
 PROMOTION : 
 
 Rule of, in regular artillery 15, 16, 17 
 
 Variable in peace establishment... 21 
 
 Disregarded by President Adams 32 
 
 Failure of this attempt 32 
 
 For the three artillery regiments 39 
 
 Executive attempts to set at defiance is defeated by Senate.... 42 
 
 Followed in filling certain vacancies 49 
 
 created by act March 3d, 1847 51 
 
 PROPERTY, GOVERNMENT : No system of accountability therefor for many 
 
 years after Revolution 162 
 
 PURVEYOR OP PUBLIC SUPPLIES: Office created; duties of. 162 
 
INDEX. 403 
 
 PAGE. 
 QUARTERMASTER : 
 
 For artillery, recommended by Knox 5 
 
 Department remodeled 11 
 
 Failure of plan 12 
 
 REED, GOVERNOR: Criticizes the construction of gun-carriages 157 
 
 RESERVE ARTILLERY : 
 
 Organized during Revolution 96 
 
 Not used during War of 1812 or Mexican War 97 
 
 Organization of, Army of Potomac 97,98,99,100 
 
 Of Army of Potomac broken up 100 
 
 Services rendered by, Army of Potomac 100, 101 
 
 Of Armv of Potomac re-establishes itself. 102 
 
 Of Army of Northern Virginia 103 
 
 General considerations affecting % 104, 105 
 
 Inexpediency of dispensing with 105-107 
 
 REYNOLDS, MAJOR J. F. : Proceeds to Utah with light battery (C) Third 
 
 artillery 67 
 
 RIFLED GUNS : 
 
 Early experiments to test principle 284 
 
 Give rise to so-called "punching system" of attack on iron-clads 287 
 
 Development of heavy-rifle system retarded by Civil war 287, 288 
 
 Experimental cast-iron 288 
 
 Private foundries supply heavy during the Civil war 288 
 
 RINGGOLD, SAMUEL, CAPTAIN AND BREVET MAJOR : 
 
 Commanding company horse artillery 55 
 
 Secures modification of field-artillery instruction 306 
 
 Killed at battle of Palo Alto ..: 62 
 
 RIVARDI, J. J. U. : 
 
 Major of artillerists and engineers ; 27 
 
 Disbanded at reorganization of the army 32 
 
 ROBERTS, OWEN : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel commandant South Carolina artillery battalion 10 
 
 Mortally wounded at Stono River 10 
 
 ROCHEPONTAINE, STEPHEN : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel commandant artillerists and engineers 27 
 
 Dismissed the service 29 
 
 RODMAN, LIEUTENANT : 
 
 Develops system of cooling cast guns from the interior 283, 284 
 
 Develops a system of heavy ordnance 283, 284 
 
 Member of committee to select field armament 297 
 
 SANDERS, CAPTAIN JOHN : 
 
 Appointed major of light artillery 34 
 
 Note concerning successor to 37 
 
 SCOTT, WINFIELD : 
 
 Captain in regiment of light artillery (note) 37 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel and colonel Second artillery 39 
 
 Brigadier-general 40 
 
 Remarks concerning the equipment of light artillery 66 
 
 Regulations compiled by 211 
 
 Makes proposition to War Department to go to Europe ; proposition 
 rejected , 301 
 
 SCHOOL OF PRACTICE : 
 
 Established 122 
 
 Broken up 124 
 
 Re-established . 125 
 
404 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 SCHOOL OF PRACTICE Continued. 
 
 Career of. 121-128 
 
 Remarks upon course there pursued 128-132 
 
 Light artillery 137, 138 
 
 European practices 140 
 
 SCHOFIELD, MAJOR-GENERAL : 
 
 As Secretary of War, establishes field artillery school 137 
 
 Efforts to secure sucqess of same...., 138 
 
 SECRETARY AT WAR: Duties of. 160 
 
 SECRETARY OF AVAR : 
 
 Fulfills functions of former Secretary at War 161 
 
 Has supervision of artillery technical affairs from Revolution to 1812.. 165 
 
 SERGEANTS, ORDNANCE : Grade established 47 
 
 SHERMAN, CAPTAIN T. W. : 
 
 Company commanded by, equipped as light artillery 62 
 
 His company (E), Third artillery, re-equipped as field artillery 64, 65 
 
 SHIELDS, SENATOR : Introduces bill to create office of chief of artillery 186 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA regiment of artillery 9, 347 
 
 STEEL : Introduction of, in heavy ordnance construction 271-273 
 
 STEVENS, EBENEZER : 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel commandant of artillery in Northern Department.. 8 
 
 Origin of corps commanded by 9, 338-340 
 
 Distinguished conduct of ; 9 
 
 Assignment of, to Second artillery, September, 1778 10 
 
 STEVENS, CAPTAIN WILLIAM : 
 
 Remarks on personal armament of artillerymen 190 
 
 System of discipline for the artillery 299 
 
 ST. CLAIR : 
 
 Appointed major-general 26 
 
 Defeated by Miami Indians 26 
 
 Superseded by General Wayne 26 
 
 STODDARD, MAJOR AMOS, compiles system of artillery manoeuvres 301 
 
 STROBAGH, JOHN MARTIN: 
 
 Lieutenant-colonel Pennsylvania artillery regiment 7 
 
 Death of 16 
 
 SUPERINTENDENT OF MILITARY STORES, duties of. 161, 162 
 
 SURVEYOR OF ORDNANCE : 
 
 Office of, created 155 
 
 Reports of, and results 157, 158 
 
 TACTICS : 
 
 Instruction for field artillery 59,60 
 
 Deficiency of artillery during Revolution 77 
 
 Stevens' System of Discipline the pioneer work in the United States.... 299 
 
 Systems prepared by Hamilton, Pinckney, and Wilkinson 300 
 
 Proposition of Captain Winfield Scott to improve the 301 
 
 Major Amos Stoddard's System of. 301 
 
 The Artillerists' Companion, to some extent a treatise on 302 
 
 Works of H. Lallemand 302, 303 
 
 Tyler's Translation of Manual for Artillery 303 
 
 Gribeauval system of. 304, 305 
 
 Anderson's instruction for field artillery 305 
 
 modifications in, promulgated in 1845 306 
 
 Systems of, for siege, mountain, and heavy artillery 306 
 
 field artillery of 1860 307 
 
 The assimilated, promulgated in 1873 308, 309 
 
 TidbalFs Manual for Heavy Artillery 309, 310 
 
INDEX. 405 
 
 PAGE. 
 TACTICS Continued. 
 
 Field artillery 312-330 
 
 Tactics of Revolution merely traditional 312 
 
 Tousard's mention of the Revolutionary 312 
 
 The manual of the piece, by Revolutionary practices 313 
 
 The main features of Kosciusko's system 313-315 
 
 Stoddard's 315, 316 
 
 Lallemand's 316-318 
 
 Anderson's Translation 319, 321 
 
 The system of 1845 321, 322 
 
 1860 323-325 
 
 Early attempts at assimilating 325, 326 
 
 Assimilation should not be indulged at a sacrifice of the natural tac- 
 tical elements of the various arms of service 326 
 
 The assimilated system of 1872 325-330 
 
 TIDBALL, CAPTAIN : 
 
 Company of, equipped as horse artillery 70 
 
 Major, manual of heavy artillery 310 
 
 TOUSARD, BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL Louis DE : 
 
 Major artillerists and engineers 27 
 
 Appointed inspector of artillery 29-114 
 
 Promoted lieutenant-colonel commandant Second regiment artillerists 
 
 and engineers 32 
 
 Discharged from active service 32 
 
 TOWSON, CAPTAIN NATHAN : 
 
 Assigned to light artillery ; 44 
 
 Nominated from paymaster-general to colonelcy Second artillery 
 
 (note) 46, 4 1 !, 48, 49 
 
 TROOPS provisionally retained in service when Revolutionary army dis- 
 banded 349 
 
 TRUMBULL, JOSEPH: Member board of war and ordnance 11 
 
 TYLER, LIEUTENANT DANIEL : 
 
 Services in the line of technical artillery 239-242 
 
 Translations of tactics 303, 305 
 
 VALLEY FORGE : 
 
 Army encamped at 10 
 
 reorganized at.. 12 
 
 WADE, WILLIAM: Remarks of regarding artillery carriages 233 
 
 WADSWORTH, DECIUS : 
 
 Major of artillerists 32 
 
 Chief of ordnance 173 
 
 Devises a system of artillery materiel 233 
 
 Strictures of, on report of an ordnance board 235 
 
 Retirement of, from service 236 
 
 Recommends artillery system adopted in 1816 278 
 
 Letter of, regarding this system 386, 387 
 
 WALBACH, MAJOR JOHN B. : Retained at reorganization of 1821 46 
 
 WASHINGTON : 
 
 General, invested with extraordinary powers 6 
 
 authorizes raising three artillery battalions 6 
 
 intrigues against 11 
 
 intrigues against result 12 
 
 Lieutenant-general, proposes plan for organization of army 30 
 
 General, apportions the field artillery to brigades . 76 
 
 Order of, relating to artillery personnel 209 
 
 recommends the procuring brass guns 257 
 
 52 
 
406 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE, 
 WAYNE, MAJOR-GENERAL : 
 
 Commanding the forces on frontier 26 
 
 Defeats Miami Indians 27 
 
 WILKINSON, JAMES : 
 
 Letter of General, regarding light artillery company 36, 195 
 
 equipment of light artillery 198 
 
 Work of General, on a system of tactics.. : 300 
 
 WILLIAMS, JONATHAN : 
 
 Major Fourth battalion Second regiment artillerists and engineers 31 
 
 Appointed chief of corps of engineers 121 
 
 Translates Kosciusko's system of manreuvres 313 
 
 WOOLSTONECRAFT, CAPTAIN: Report concerning light artillery 195 
 
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