JK 119 F8 ,yC-NRLF ^B 5L5 Mst SEP 34 iSlS ENGLISH OPINION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT (1783-1798) BY LEON FRASER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE Faculty of political science COLUMBIA university NEW YORK I9I5 ENGLISH OPINION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT (1783-1798) BY LEON FRASER 11 SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY NEW YORK 1915 C4-- Copyright, 1915 BY LEON FRASER SUSAN DAYTON BONAR 311454 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2008 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/englishopinionofOOfrasrich CONTENTS PART I BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION Introductory 9 CHAPTER I— At the Beginning 15 CHAPTER II— From the Definitive Treaty of Peace to the Annapolis Convention 31 CHAPTER III- At the Dawn of Federal Existence 45 CHAPTER IV-The Reception of the Constitution 55 PART II AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION Introductory 63 CHAPTER I— The Views of the Radicals 67 CHAPTER II— The Opinion of the Conservatives 85 CHAPTER III— The Administration, Fox, and Burke 99 CHAPTER IV— Criticism of Constitutional Organization 107 PART I BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION INTRODUCTORY. Gladstone's panegyric of our charter of government is classic and fanciful: "As the British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has proceeded from the womb and long gestation of progressive history ; so the American Constitution is, so far as I can see, the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given moment by the brain and purpose of man."^ If this was the opinion of the Prime Minister of Queen Victoria, what was the opinion of the Prime Minister of George III? How did Burke, political philosopher, and philosophical politician, regard the gov- ernment which resulted from the Revolution he had so insistently endorsed? When the Colonies wrested inde- pendence from the Crown, what was the horoscope for the new nation cast by English statesman, thinker, pamph- leteer, penny-a-liner? What did they think of the experi- ment under the Articles of Confederation? While the Con- stitutional Convention was sitting in Pliiladelphia, what were the newspapers saying in London? When the fruit of the Convention's deliberations was published and put into practice, what was the general judgment on the federal, presidential, republican scheme, then somewhat of a new thing under the sun? It is the purpose of these pages to answer these ques- tions. They present an anthology of opinion. They aim to indicate the British view of American conditions from the signing of the provisional Treaty of Peace,^ when the majority of Englishmen were certain that the upstart i"Kin Beyond the Sea," North American Review, September, 1878 ; re- printed in Gleanings of Past Years, 1879, I., 212. 230 November, 1782. 10 INTRODUCTORY Confederation was destined to be short-lived, until about the middle of the administration of John Adams when the majority conceded that the United States was entitled to an increasingly important place in the family of nations. We shall observe the divergent views of radicals and con- servatives, Jacobins and monarchists. We shall see how concerned were the friends of America during the long war over the events in the disordered interregnum from the recognition of independence to the adoption of the Constitution ; and how the remaining English gloated. We shall examine the proposals for a better government which unoccupied Britons framed for American consumption. We shall notice the reception of the actually adopted Constitution among those who had lately been our foes, with particular reference to the criticism of its theory and operation that came from the innumerable pens of the political critics and criticasters who crowd this period, and from the lips of orators in Parliament and in public who brought forward America, the horrible example, or the triumphant success. Naturally there is some difficulty in asserting that the written evidence which remains — contemporary books, histories, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, narratives of travellers, parliamentary debates, diplomatic dispatches, letters, biographies and memoirs of the time — represents exactly and fully the entire English attitude toward the stripling state. Some expressed opinion may be merely individual. Some widespread opinions may not have been expressed in permanent form. But, since people have their thinking done for them, it may be posited that a statement found in half a dozen varied sources represents in a general way the prevailing thought of the day. When we find in the Times, and in a political pamphlet, in a stray personal letter, in an autobiography, and in a traveller's tale the reiterated assertion that with the retirement of Washington from the Presidency, the United States will disintegrate at the first election, it may fairly be said that INTRODVCTORT 11 many Englishmen took this view. People readily believe what they desire. In the bundle of excerpts which follow we shall dis- tinguish what appears to be popular opinion from the merely individual or eccentric. We must remember, too, that there is no such phenomenon as a national opinion which is a unit. Thought within nations is cut by strata. There are the pros and cons, liberals and conservatives, Foxites and Pittites. In this study we shall note how persons looking at the same facts interpreted them to square with preconceived notions of governmental right and wrong. In general the radicals and anti-administra- tion men were pro- American through thick and thin. In general the Conservatives belittled the success of the new institutions, and the administration statesmen looked grudgingly at the contrast between republican principles across the Atlantic and across the Channel. Advocates of parliamentary reform or economic betterment shouted America up. Defenders of King, Church, and State cried her down. But a drift of fundamental opinion is ascertainable. It is easy to look behind the benevolent expressions of our sympathizers in 1782-88 and find that their enthusiasm is a little puffed in face of the facts of the situation. Their hearts were not so strong as their voices. It is easy to detect in the acrid remarks of our opponents in 1790-96 some additional acerbity because the experiment is lasting so long. While the well-wishers become more sincerely confident, the adversaries grumble. Indeed, as in America itself, English opinion seems slowly to have evolved from an initial certainty that the union was bound to fail, to an ultimate confidence that heavy odds were in favor of its endurance. Changing opinion caused an altered attitude in political relations between the two countries. It is not complete to assert, as Professor McLaughlin asserts, that "England refrained from entering into a commercial treaty because 12 INTRODUCTORY she believed the enforcement of navigation laws would put money in her merchant's pockets."^ There were other and more important factors coupled directly with the con- ceptions about existing American government held by her statesmen. We shall find a marked and causal transition in the English notion of American institutions from 1784, when our representatives were dilly-dallying for months in the vain hope of consummating a commercial treaty, and the ideas of ten years later when Jay was able to arrive at an agreement. There is a distinct reason for the un- similar receptions accorded Rufus King, who was wel- comed Minister to the Court of St. James's in 1796, and John Adams who presented his credentials in 1785. Of Adams's arrival an English newspaper spoke thus: "An ambassador from America — Good Heavens, what a sound! The Gazette surely never announced anything so extraordinary before, nor on a day so little expected. . . . 'Tis hard to say which can excite indignation most, the insolence of those who appoint the character, or the manners of those who receive it."^ Further, within the boundaries of the countries them- selves, there was a reciprocal influence of opinion and of institutions. England's contempt for our situation under the Articles of Confederation, her refusal to send an Am- bassador and to conclude a supplemental treaty was one element in the manifold influences which wrought the political reformation of 1787. The principles of repub- licanism, religious freedom, separation of church and state, and popular representation, practised across the water without any volcanic disruption of society, were shibbo- leths for Scottish Burgh reformer, Irish patriot, British radical, and thorns in the flesh of all good expounders of constitutional moQjirchy. Before assembling the English comments on the experi- ment in the great political laboratory we must sound a lA. C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution (1905), 105. 2Pm&. Advertiser, 6 June, 1785. mTRODVCTORY |3 word of warning. We must not expect too much. If we will ask ourselves first what naturally would be the criti- cism of a nation's people, somewhat embittered over the loss of a colony, when they speak of that colony's initial at- tempts at self-government and observe with comprelien- sible delight its feeble beginnings at walking alone, we shall find that the thoughts that come to our mind about the probable inferences and desires are curiously like those which were actually voiced. So our study will reveal noth- ing extraordinary, though it may make us dubious about the wisdom of political prophesy when we compare things as they are with things as early British critics said they were bound to be. We must remember, also, that the adoption of the Con- stitution looms as an occurrence of the first magnitude to us largely by virtue of its long endurance. In the winter of 1787-88 there was no tradition of veneration, as vitriolic pamphleteers who battled in the different states against the ratification of the document make evident. To the contemporaries it was simply a new plan, substituted for a failure, that was published in the British press in No- vember, 1787. They had been rather more interested in the failure than in the suggested modes of reform. Indeed, were it not for the fact that America had lately been a colony, it is doubtful whether the public would have turned aside from the absorbing trial of Warren Hastings, then coming on, to criticise the new venture. It would have mattered about as much to England as a reformed charter in Thibet. Yet we shall find a respectable amount of atten- tion from all, ranks of society directed toward the American political adventure from the Treaty of Peace to the adop- tion of the federal constitution, at its ratification, and at its trial during the administrations o Washington and Adams when it came to be discovered that the scheme of the federal convention was not a paper charter but a practical political organ. CHAPTER I. At the Beginning. When King George announced to his loyal Parliament the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with the American Plentipotentiaries, he was made to utter a supplication that veiled a precept. "I make it," he said, "my humble and earnest prayer to Almighty God . . . that America may be free from those calamities which have formerly proved in the mother country how essential monarchy is to the enjoyment of constitutional liberty."^ It may be doubted that His Majesty repeated this prayer in private. We know his resentment over the disappearance from the crown of the colonial jewels. That some of his subjects were rather hoping calamities would not be avoided, we can see from the following prophesies about America's future made at the beginning. During the war it had been often predicted that if the country became free, the States would speedily disinteg- rate.^ It had been pointed out that in the republican con- stitutions of the individual commonwealths lay the seeds of discord^ and that "the new states, being altogether popular and bearing a greater resemblance to the demo- cratical cantons of Switzerland than to the laws and ways of Great Britain"* were likely to become an appendage of some European power other than England — probably iHamard, XXIII, 207. 2Josiah Tucker, Cui Bono, 1781, 116. 3Jos. Galloway, Cool Thoughts on the Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence, 1780, 47. ^Galloway, Ibid, 47. 15 16 AT THE BEOINNINa France. At the eve of the close of the war Josiah Tucker burst into this tirade: "As to the future grandeur of America and its being a rising Empire, under one head, whether republican, or monarchical, it is one of the idlest, and most visionary notions, that ever was conceived even by writers of ro- mance. For there is nothing in the genius of the people, the situation of their country, or the nature of their dif- ferent climates, which tends to countenance such a sup- position. On the contrary every prognostic that can be formed from a contemplation of their mutual antipathies, and clashing interests, their difference of governments, habitudes and manners — plainly indicates that the Ameri- cans will have no center of union among them, and no common interest to pursue when the power and govern- ment of England are finally removed. Moreover, when the intersection and disunion of their country by great Bays of the sea, and by vast rivers, lakes and ridges of mountains; — and above all, when those immense internal regions beyond the back settlements, which are still un- explored, are taken into account, they form the highest probability that the Americans never can be united into one compact Empire, under any species of government whatever. Their fate seems to be— a DISUNITED PEO- PLE till the End of Time."^ Tucker thereupon staged an imaginary "Fourth of July orator" who declaimed about the tyranny of the republican leaders in comparison witli which the restrictions under England's rule were "mere dwarfs and pigmies." "We have been cheated, baffled and betrayed," he cries. "Great numbers have left us to return to Europe." As a means of averting this dismal future Tucker urged that the Col- onies should maintain some nexus with England, and com- pose their internal differences by partisan segregation after this fashion : The territory to be divided in quarters ; all from the Penobscot to the Connecticut, and from the Wui Bonof 1781, 117-19. AT THE BEGINNING 17 Hudson to North Carolina to be allotted to the Repub- licans. From the Connecticut to the Hudson and from North Carolina southward the land was to be given to the Loyalists.^ John Andrews, who later put together a four-volume history of Britain's multiple wars from 1775-83, in An Essay on Republican Principles,^ started his critique of the one time colonies more conservatively by suggesting that "the wisest politicians can by no means form the least con- jecture in relation to the future contingencies that may befall them. The Constitution is at present republican, but whether it will continue so in all of them is a point which will admit of much dispute.^ . . . Time only can dis- cover." He at once assumes wisdom, however, and pre- dicts that America has lost its "tranquility and happiness forever," that its distance will shield it from European wars^ that if freedom of the press is permitted, it will be under a variety of limitations.* But the great principle upon which America will shipwreck is that republics must be geographically small. "What may suit a people shut in narrow boundaries may not be equally fitted to a popu- lous nation inhabiting a large country. ... It is solely on this principle that we should strenuously resist all those who betray a predilection for that form of government in so extensive a tract of ground as the Island of Great Britain."^ This accepted bogie of eighteenth century political theory we shall meet again and again. ^ It is reiterated at every turn by writers with a smattering of political science. Andrews puts the doctrine so succinctly that it is worth presenting. The grand conclusion of his book and "the first maxim established is that a republican government is the fittest for a people not numerous, and enclosed within a narrow space of land, whose wealth is too moder- ate to create and support luxury, and who, at the same ilbid. ilUd, 79. 21783. Hhid, 17. iEssay, 16. sSee Federalist, Papers X & XIV. 18 AT TEE BEGINNING time, have no views of extending themselves, and have no reason to apprehend invasions."^ A traveller who toured America at the end of the con- flict came to conclusions opposite from Andrews on the liability of invasion. J. F. D. Smythe, Loyalist and former prisoner of war, said that he found the country very weak "and a prey to future wars. . . . Slie has acquired but a shadow. . . . Her versatile government will change so often that no description can be exact" and ultimately she will fall under French control.^ Similarly William Mac- intosh, a man of mystery whom we shall come upon once more when he formulates a complete Constitution for the United States, wrote in his Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa,^ "their democratical government will not in all probability be of long continuance. People .... will not long endure the insolence, abuse and depredations of up- starts at the head of armies and in the departments of power. ... I am convinced that North America will not long maintain its independence on Great Britain without falling more dependant on some other power or powers of Europe."^ Macintosh thought the "vast, unprotected coasts," "internal jealousies," "taxes" and "attitude of France" guaranteed this conclusion. One of the most dyspeptic of our critics at the beginning was stern old William Knox who had been in the Colonies and had served as under Secretary of State for America, who had witnessed the "growing disposition to independ- ence,"^ slipped away to England before the storm, and prayed for an adjustment which never came. For the delec- tation of good Tories like himself he prophesied as follows : ''Whoever thinks America will be a great Empire, let him look upon the map of North America, and calculate in what number of ages that vast continent will be over- WsHay, 80. 24 Tour in the United States of America, 1784, II., 413, aeg. 81781. ^Travels, I., 276. ^Extra Official State Papers, 1789,, I, 44. AT THE BEGINNING 19 spread . . . and the inhabitants then forced to submit to government. . . . The present state of the North of Asia may help us to form a judgment of what will be the state of North and indeed of South America, too. In Asia they carry on no foreign trade, and but little inter- course with the rest of the world, being equally unknow- ing and unknown — and such will the Trans-AUeghaney Mountain people be 4,000 years hence, if the world lasts so long. The inhabitants of the sea coast, who have much property in houses and other buildings and cultivated lands, must remain upon the spots they are fixed to, and must submit to some sort of government or other, but what- ever it may be, it must be feeble and without respect. . . . "I will go further and assure those States that if they do not recover their characters for integrity in their dealings and thereby restore their credit with the British merchants, and form such a connection with this country as shall secure for them its protection and umperage, they will de- generate into barbarous, if not into Barbary states."^ If those who bore our separation bitterly saw things a little black, the anti-administration men who had lauded Burke and Fox during the weary struggle, saw color of rose. While King George himself was writing to Fox "that revolted state . . . certainly for years cannot establish a stable government,"^ John Jebb became lyrical: "O America! liberated, triumphant, independent, home of heroes, asylum sent to suffering humanity ! Grateful it is to me to reflect, that in every stage of that calamitous contest, my heart has felt, my tongue has confessed, the justice of thy cause. America! where . . . the human species will at last obtain an asylum ; and every individual be permitted to enjoy a larger portion of civil and religious liberty than hath been indulged in any age or clime."' There were other panegyrists who reached Jebb's alti- HUd, 50-52. ^Memorials and Correspondence of Charles James Fox, 1853, II., 140. ^The Works of John Jebb, 1787, III., 321. 20 AT THE BEO INNING tude. "A Somersetshire Man," who contributed a series of letters to the Whitehall Evening Post on parliamentary representation, rhapsodized on "the rising state next in rotation to be the seat of science, of the arts and arms . . . the most powerful state in the world."^ Thomas Day con- gratulated humanity on this sample of civil and religious liberty.^ The translator of Abbe Mably's '^ Observations sur le Gouvernment et les Loix des Etats JJnis d'Ameri- que"^ had to revert to the classics to express his admira- tion: "0 fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint" In bis preface he states that the Americans have the best government on record and that they will be a great nation if only they keep from aristocracy, monarchy and luxury, the avoidance of which last curse, like the imperative smallness of republics, being one of the inflexible precepts for national welfare in the eighteenth century political theory, which we shall run across once more. Horace Walpole was delighted too. While the conflict was at its height he wrote the Earl of Strafford ; "I can- not talk, I cannot think on any other subject."* In re- porting the peace to the Countess of Upper Ossory he remarks, "America, secure of her liberty, has an oppor- tunity that never occurred in the world before of being able to select the best parts of every known Constitution,"^ and he expresses the hope that the check and balance system of England will be adopted. Walpole might have criticised the existing system, if he had willed. The English writers had the constitutions of the individual states before them and the Articles of Con- federation. It was a matter of congratulation that all the 19 May, 1783. ^Reflections on the Present State of England and tJie Independence of America, 1783, 106. 81784. 427 Nov., 1781, Letters (1903-05), XII, 105. 622 Jan., 1783, Ibid, XIII, 390. AT THE BEO INNING 21 Constitutions were comprised in a single volume.^ In a foreword to a collection of these documents the Reverend William Jackson complimented the Legislatures on adopt- ing the excellencies of the British Constitution and said: "the Americans framed constitutions of government for themselves. . . . Not a doubt can exist of their attaining the summit of political happiness." Criticizing an edi- tion of the same book which came out a year earlier, a writer in the Monthly Review concludes thus : "This publi- cation contains, take it all together, a greater portion of unsophisticated wisdom and good sense, than is perhaps to be met with in any other legislative code that was ever yet framed."^ The editor of the edition reviewed, J. L, DeLolme, after praising the system of representation and the bicameral legislature, which he says is modeled after England's, ac- curately defines the Articles of Confederation as "a treaty ... by which the United States are intended to be con- solidated into one common republic." In fact there was little misconception in England as to the powers conferred by these Articles^ and ample information, as we shall observe, about their shortcomings in operation. John Almon's Remembrancer^ which gave such complete infor- mation on American affairs, lamented "that so much pains have been taken to form and organize the Constitution of the several individual governments, and so little has been taken in that which respects the whole nation of America."* The writer held that insufficient powers were granted Congress for efifectual administration. Parliament and publicists were clear on the constrained prerogatives of the confederate legislature. Speaking to iThe Articles were published by Stockdale, 1783 and 1783, by Walker, 1782, Dublin edition, 1783, in the Anrmal Register for 1776, in W^illiam Gordon's History of the United States of America, 1788, III, 24-35, in the English translation of LaCroix's Review of the Constitutions of Europe and the United States of America, 1792, I, 460-475. 2Jfom. Chronicle, 3 September, 1784 ; 3 February, 1783. ^The Whitehall Ev. Post, 19 August, 1783, summarized them: Con- gress can resolve anything, but execute nothing. 42 July, 1782. 22 AT THE BEGINNINO the Lord's Address to His Majesty in answer to the speech which had announced the preliminary peace pact, Lords Walsingham,^ Hawke,^ and Sackville^ reminded the upper House that in the United States a treaty was not supreme law/ and that Congress had only power to recommend.^ They likened that body to the King at home, calling it "the executive arm of America."^ When opposition ran high to pinning the claim of the Loyalists on the uncertain clause of the Treaty, "Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective States,"* Shelburne in- genuously said, " 'recommend' was all in the nature of things we could procure. Peremptory language is not the language of a new state."^ Lord Sheffield in his famous pamphlet, "Observations on the Commerce of the American States,"® after proving to his own satisfaction the worthlessness of American trade, after remarking that West of the Alleghanies" the author- ity of Congress can never be maintained,"^ made a more irritating and exact statement to the effect that "no treaty can be made with the American states that can be binding on the whole of them. The Act of Confederation does not entitle Congress to form more than general treaties . . . when treaties are necessary ^ they must be made with the States separately: Each State has reserved every power relative to imports, exports, duties, etc., to itself. But no treaty at present is necessary."^ This view of Congressional impotence was so widespread in Great Britain that it was actually doubted by some whether Congress had enough authority to ratify the Treaty of Peace.® Sackville presumed that "all the powers in Europe would be kept waiting for the individual States to act" on it "since Congress was inadequate."^" This doubt ^Hansard, XXIII, 386. 4Art. V, Treaty of Paris. 2IbU, 383. 5Hansard, XXII, 412. 3IMd, 404. 61783. TOhservaHons, 102. ilUd, 110 ; italics, Sheffield's. ^Whitehall Ev. Post, 21 AugTist, 1783. los. to Knox, Hist. Mss. Com.; 12th Rep., VI, 192. AT THE BEGINNING 23 played a very material role in the long refusal of the Ministry to consider a commercial arrangement or to send out a ministerj and consuls.^ One paper computed' that "if every State in America sends an envoy resident to the Courts of Europe, they will amount to 150 persons."^ George Chalmers in a monograph on international legal points arising out of the Kevolution wrote: "It is surely a question of no small moment whether there at present exists within the United States any power which can law- fully conclude a commercial treaty."^ He pointed out that while "some of the States imposed duties, New Jersey and Connecticut opened free ports,"* and he likened the "in- curable, irresolute Congress to the boy, humorously rep- resented by Reynolds in the dress and figure of Henry VIII, and who impressed the mind with the idea of a per- sonage of great bulk with little force."^ The troubles of Congress formed a favorite butt of ridi- cule throughout the hazardous period till the Constitution was framed. A "vox et praeterita nihil/' "a moonshine government," said the columnist who weekly contributed "An Abridgement of the State of Politics for the Week" to the Whitehall Evening Post.^ "They retire from the eye of a traveller," wrote an anonymous critic whose "Ob- servations" were enclosed by Sir Guy Carleton in a letter he sent to Lord North. '^ "A little time and the authority of Congress will sink to that of the Council of the Amph- ictyons; the State will draw as little together as the States of Holland; separate views and separate interests must forever divide them," was another comment.^ As a result of this condition British opinion at the dawn of our existence saw but two possibilities — an immediate and fundamental revision of the Articles, or disruption.' iFranklin, Works, VIII, 345; Dip. Corresp., 1783-89, II, 297. 2Pw6. Advertiser, 29 August, 1783. ^Opinions on Interesting Subjects of PuMic Law cmd Commercial Policy, 1784, 160. ilMd, 162. HUd, 164. 65 and 16 Augnist, 1783. 713 October, 1783, Colonial Office Papers, Canada, Class V, Vol. CXI. iPuh. Advertiser, 23 May, 1783. ^Corresp. and Pub. Papers of John Jay, 1891, III, 66, 95. 24 AT THE BEGINNING If disruption took place, there were four theories of the outcome: The United States would become a monarchy, probably with Washington as king; it would come back to England; it would become an appendage of France; it would split into two or three separate republics. With the retirement of Congress to Princeton before the onset of the disgruntled unpaid Lancaster soldiers our evil wishers over the water thought the deathknell had rung, as they did once more when Shay rebelled in Massachu- setts. "Their High Mightinesses, the United States, or their representatives, the Congress, driven from the metropolis, the seat of the newborn Empire, to Princetown ( cautiously named Princeton) — by whom? By their own soldiers lead on by no higher power than Sergeants! Very ominous! It looks as if the next convocation of Congress would be at King Town under the shadow of royalty."'^ "At Princetown they certainly will not remain. . . . By the time the weather grows warm, they will sit nowhere/^ was the report of a secret agent on American soil whose dispatch was forwarded to the Foreign Oflfice by Sir Guy Carleton.^ Laurens^ in London, wrote to our Minister at Paris that the enemies of the United States had exulted and the friends had too much, "abandoned themselves to dread that the soldiery had assumed the reins of govern- ment and that all the states of America were rushing into anarchy."^ "The consequence which the people of this country draw from these disorders is that the present government of America cannot continue under its present form, but that either a monarchy or the separation of each state from another will take place," said Richard Champion, a critic kindly disposed toward America, in his answer to Shef- field's emphatic pamphlet."* "It is by no means a certainty." ^WMtehall Ev. Post, 2 Aug^ust, 1783. 213 October, 1783, C. O. Papers, Can., Class 5, Vol. CXI. 39 August, 1787, Dip. Corresp. of the Rev. (Wharton), VI, 697. *Conni(leration8 on the . . . Situation of Great Britain and the United States, 1784, 136, AT THE BEGINNING 25 he continued, "that Congress will ever recover a permanent authority over all the States. The necessity of a sovereign power may produce a temporary one to compose the pres- ent differences. . . . There will be three great republics, according to the dissimilitude of their manners, customs, and commerce. The New England States will make one. Nature ha3 united them in the strongest manner. New York, the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia will form another, the richest and most powerful. . . . The third government in America will be the Carolinas and Georgia."^ So confident was Champion of this outcome that he recommended the immediate appointment of three consuls that they might be in the different sections when the rift came. Rumors of anarchy and recourse to the protection of Great Britain or France we^^e rife on every hand.^ It was reported that Washington was so disgusted with affairs that he had left for Europe.' Sadness overcame Franklin as he contemplated the coming ruin of his country.* Carle- ton, addressing Lord North from New York, seemed to corroborate the London paragraphs by stating that "an- other revolution is inevitable and at no great distance." He said there were four factions in the States, the "fierce Republicans," those who looked back to Great Britain, many who "turn their eyes to General Washington and consider him the only character able to preserve them from anarchy and destruction" and "there are in the different states persons who boldly assert that a king is indispens- ably necessary for the tranquility of the country."^ Another factor besides Congressional weakness which made Englishmen prone to believe an eruption at hand t-Ibid, 142. Same view expressed by E. Bancroft, 8 November, 1783, C. O. Papers, Can., Class 5, Vol. CXI. 2Whitehall Ev. Post, 2 January, 31 July, 9 and 18 AugTist, 1783; Mom Post, 25 July and 11 December, 1783 ; Polit. Mag., May and August. 3Mor». Post, 28 August and 1 September, 1783. *Morn. Post, 11 December. 613 October, 1783, C. O. Papers, litd. 26 AT TEE BEGINNING was the libidinous republicanism supposed to be rampant in the late revolted colonies. Our friends like Jebb called it "divine liberty." The King's followers who had seen this divine liberty take the form of armed resistence called the goddess a less soft name. After independence was won satirists parodied the progress of American Republican- ism in squibs like this : "The relaxation of government is so great at present and the levelling principle among the lower classes so predom- inant that there are in fact hardly any servants to be found. People are highly dissatisfied with their present rulers, the majority of them being well known to be beg- gars."^ "They are all Kings, all rulers, all Judges of the Court : A perfect level and equality of character prevails through- out so that every lady may cook her own meat and every gentleman black his own shoes."^ In despair people were leaving the country; the population had decreased im- mensely since British rule had ended. This last belief was prevalent.^ A way out of chaos in English eyes, if we may judge by the newspaper columns, was a recasting of the Articles with the provision of a central government of real sub- stance. They seemed at first to have considered it a matter of course that this would be done. "Immediately after the receipt of official information regarding the recog- nition of the independence of America by Parliament, Congress will seriously apply themselves to the arduous business of forming a code of laws for the government of the several provinces," stated the Whitehall Evening Post, Jan. 4th, 1783.^ On July 31st it printed an account an- nouncing that the United States "by their Deputies in Congress, have agreed to and finally settled upon a second Treaty of Union, offensive and defensive, very similar to iMom. Post, 30 June, 25 July, 6 and 18 October, 1783. 2Morn. Post., 10 September, 1783; Lon. Chronicle, 20 May, 1784; Smythe, Travels, II, 413. SDitto, Pub. Advertiser, 20 February and 21 August, 1783. AT THE BEGINNING 27 their last." The statement was denied in the Public Ad- vertiser of September 17th. "Not the least alteration has been made," it was asserted. Two English admirers then came forward with proposed remedies for the situation. They were Thomas Pownall, successively colonial Governor of Massachusetts, New Jer- sey, and South Carolina, who had been a spectator of the Congress of Albany,^ and knew the diflflculties in the way of closer union, and the non-conforming Richard Price, whom we shall meet again when he delivers a discourse on the love of country which sets Edmund Burke compos- ing some frantic reflection on the French Revolution. Price's heart was in the American cause. Until his death he termed the American conflict "glorious."^ He was a fre- termed the American conflict "glorious."" He was a fre- quent correspondent of "the fathers." In 1778 Congress wanted him to come to this country to manage the finances of the Confederacy.^ In 1783 Yale conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Laws.* To his view of the critical period under the Articles we shall have occasion to recur. Pownall's corrective advice^ started with a generaliza- tion that must have puzzled "Their Freedoms," the sover- eigns, "that is the citizens," of America : "Feel as one soul the concentrated vigor of sovereign imperium: feel the self poise of your natural station, the center and balance of your force, the course and range of your organized energy, the spring of actuality in your political person, and you will find it no difflcult matter to stand firm on the basis of'your sovereignty."^ After additional welter of words and lengthy congratula- tions to "Human Nature" on American liberty, Pownall gets down to a remedy for governmental defects: Grant Congress power to negotiate treaties, he says, and create an executive organ. "Some caution is necessary lest the iDict. Nat. Bio., XLVI, 265. ^Discourse on Love of Country. Wip. Rev. Corresp., Sparks, II, 47. iDict. Nat. Bio., XLVI, 335. 5A Memorial Addressed to the Sovereigns of America, 1783; 6/6id, 17. 28 AT THE BEOINNINQ Committee of the States sitting in the recess of Congress, the representation of a representation, should in ordinary supersede Congress. But does not the occasion of appoint- ing such a Committee arise from a defect, namely that of not providing for the administrative part of government?"^ For the executive he recommends "a mixt monarchical form." Let there be two annually elected consuls, of equal powers and dignities, responsible to the States at large, not Congress. Let them have high honors and titles — Protectors, Stadtholders, Presidents — and represent "the majesty of the people." Each will be a check on the other, both will be a check on Congress, from whose mandates they shall have an appeal to the States. And Congress shall have a check on them by the stipulation that the Sec- retary of Congress shall sign each of their acts. Pownall neglects to say in what manner the consuls are to be elected or to be responsible to the states.^ With Washingtonian sagacity he bids the young nation "avoid faction and entangling alliances." Confederations, like youths, are prona lihidines; after the unifying com- pulsion of an external enemy is removed, faction may raise its head. Further political prescription for a success- ful future includes rotation in office, full representation of the people, steps toward eliminating slavery, religious freedom, free trade, no imprisonment for debt, and a modification of oaths. ^ Price, in his panacea,* placed a finger on another crying weakness of the Articles when he suggested that the States grant Congress complete power over raising revenue and coining money. He wanted full treaty making preroga- tive conferred. The Legislature was to be kept small and proportioned to the population after a census had been taken. For the executive and judicial branches no reform was offered. Avoidance of hereditary titles, primogeniture, test oaths, a standing army and of foreign trade were the i/ftirf, 100. 2IM4, 46. 3/&}<7, 93. ^Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, 1784. AT THE BEGINNING 29 open sesame to political success in Price's plan, provid- ing they were superadded to his redemption sinking fund which should absorb the public debt, and providing also the other then existing American institutions were pre- served. Price admired the state constitutions and the American "yeomanry, distinguished people, clothed in homespun, strangers to luxury." When he came to write the closing paragraph of his optimistic Observations he was forced to admit that actual- ities over the water proved his essay to be pitched in too high a key. "My hopes are lowered," he said. In fact, at the close of the first year of our existence after the war, British friend and foe thought that another year might be the last. When we reflect that the American experiment ran counter to all accepted political tenets of the day, and recall the shabby showing in political practice made by our forefathers in 1783 — the year of the Newburg Ad- dresses, of New York's refusal to grant power to Congress over imports, and of Washington's resignation before an almost empty House — we can but acknowledge the sanity of English doubters. During these trying times men within our borders feared the Confederation would after all turn out, in Lord North's phrase, to be "a rope of sand." How this view kept gaining credence over the ocean, until the Federal Constitution compelled other conclusions, we shall see in succeeding chapters. CHAPTER II. From the Definitive Treat"? of Peace to the Annapolis Convention. The definitive Treaty of Peace was signed September 3rd, 1783. It was ratified by Congress January 14th, 1784. The amazement in England^ over the fact that Congress had diflSculty in assembling a quorum even for this important negotiation gives the keynote to her attitude toward us in the period which we are now to consider. An impotent legislature, a discordant union, anarchy uncontrollable, poverty, bankruptcy, final confusion and absorption by the one time mother country were the verdict of our British enemies and the fear of our British friends. Their views were based on fact, not, as in the instance of the initial prophesies, on inference. It is unnecessary to restate here the squalid situation of our national gov- ernment in the critical period. We shall see its history amply reflected in the British accounts and impressions. They indicate full knowledge of the basic circumstances which brought turmoil in their train — the apotheosis of state individualism, the chaos of the monetary system, the inability of Congress to superintend commercial affairs, to levy duties and taxes, or to meet the interest on the pub- lic debt, the non-payment of quotas, the lack of executive head, the necessity upon the central government of acting through the states and not directly upon individuals, the internal rebellion, inter-state rivalry and financial pros- tration. What more concerns us is how England got its iLanrens to Pres. of Congress, 24 April, 1784, Dip. Corresp. of Am. Rev. (Wharton), VI, 795. 31 32 TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION information and what are the sources upon which our opinion of their opinion is to be formed. First of all the cabinet kept up a system of espionage. Examination of unpublished dispatches in the Colonial Office Papers and Foreign Office Records at the Public Record Office, London, reveals the existence of several agents who secretly kept the government advised. There is some evidence that at the beginning Great Britain really considered reconquering the lost colonies. There is much evidence that she watched the progress of affairs across the Atlantic with a sleepless eye, perhaps fancying the day was not far off when, of their own free will, the dis- tracted states would seek to be retaken into the fold. Some of the agents are anonymous. Lord Dorchester, more commonly known to us as Sir Guy Carleton, while Governor General of Canada forwarded in his mails many unsigned "Observations," and "Intelligences" which were sent to him overland from the States. Other tell-tale dis- patches were conveyed to the Ministry direct. They run from 1783-1791. A few of these documents are written in such masterly fashion and with such illuminating com- ment that some relevant portions are printed. They show that at least one man of insight and culture served the British cause. Certain other monthly "Occurrences from New York" are signed by P. Allaire, a mediocre person who received £200 a year for his underhandness.^ The communications were addressed to Sir George Yonge, Secretary at War, and by Yonge passed on to Carmarthen, Grenville, Rose and occasionally Pitt. They continue from 1786-90, when Carmarthen ordered them stopped.^ Allaire's method of securing facts may be judged from his letter of August 3rd, 1786, announcing that he had taken in as boarders "David Ramsay, Delegate from South Carolina and Col. Lee of Virginia. . . . My object in permitting these gentlemen lAust to Yonge, 2 March, 1791, F. O. Recs. Amer. Ser. I, Vol. IX. 2Aust to Yonge, 20 November, 1790, Ihid, Vol. VIII. TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION 33 in my house was for certain purposes you are no stranger to, or be assured I would not have condescended to take boarders. ... In long winter evenings something may be acquired and learned. "You ask to have the debates in Congress — it's impos- sible as no person is admitted but the members. I make no doubt that some of the members, being commercial men, might accept of your offer and do business with your house. . . . The President of Congress^- has agreed to board with me."^ Other dispatches prove that the word commercial in Allaire's vocabulary meant venal. He said he would not propose to Ramsay and Lee "their going into the business, as the United States would be too little for my residence."^ During 1783-4 Edward Bancroft,, who sold to the British government Deane's confidences about the mission to France during the Revolution, was in this country for- warding continual impressions of the blackest hue and giving advice as to the best method of getting the colonies again under control. After the federal government was started Major George Beckwith was ordered from Canada on frequent trips to the national seat, and his reports to Dorchester were sent across to the home government. Beckwith's presence was known to the United States officials,^ but the extent of his underground inquisitive- ness was concealed. Added to the private agents whose accounts influenced the expressed English opinion, there were of course the diplomatic and consular officers. Sir John Temple came out as first Consul General in 1785, arriving November 20th. Phineas Bond, who made his headquarters at Phila- delphia, became Consul in 1786. George Miller, Consul for the Southern States, received his appointment the year following. Before the submarine cable and ubiquitous press correspondent, the diplomat was a vehicle of news and iNathaniel Gorham was President at this time. 2F. O. Eecs. Amer., Ser. I, Vol. IV. sjefEerson, Writings (Ford), I, 173; V. 324. 34 TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION moulder of opinion. From the dispatches of these men, as later from those of Hammond and Liston, the Min- isters, and Hamilton and Macdonogh, the additional Con- suls, we shall glean some English criticism of American affairs.^ Besides the contemporary letters and memoirs, some English valuations are to be gathered from editorial ex- pressions in the press, and what the popular view must have been can be conjectured from the unceasing stream of stories about American lawlessness and disruption which newspapers and magazines published. They ran excerpts from American papers brought by the packet boats. They published letters from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston.^ They purveyed American in- telligence received in the most roundabout fashion, regu- larly from St. Yago de la Vega and occasionally even via Vienna ! The worse the news, the more they printed. As Jay put it, we really experienced more tranquility than "the English newspapers allowed, or their writers seemed to wish us."^ A Swiss gentleman, depending on their ac- counts, told Jefferson that he feared Dr. Franklin would be stoned by the people for having been instrumental in the secession from Great Britain.* During this perilous period scarcely a word of praise is to be found anywhere expressed by anyone. In 1784 a convention of delegates of the Koyal Burghs of Scotland, bent upon parliamentary reform, drank some toasts to "The American Congress" and said the American people had taught the Scottish to assert their rights,^ but this en- dorsement really related back to the Eevolutionary days instead of to the contemporary juncture. In 1785 a Fox- ite publication lauded American freedom, but admonished iBond's letters are in Am. Hist. Assoc. Report, 1896, I, 517-69. A few of Temple's are given in the appendices to Bancroft's Hist, of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States of America (1882). 2Franklin thought most of them fabricated in London, Works, VIII, 369. Jefferson thought the writers were employed by the Ministry, Writings, IV, 102. ^Papers, III, 188. ^Writings, IV, 34. 5.¥orn. Herald, 8 July, 1784. TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION 35 the former colonists to form a system of government which would establish the authority of Congress.^ In 1786 there was considerable praise for the Virginia act of re- ligious toleration.^ But the stern facts of American pro- ceedings, added to the bitterness of the Tories^ and the general dissatisaction with the legislation of the States in alleged violation of the treaty guarantees about Loyalist property and ante-bellum merchant's debts precluded any sentiments of benevolence. In general it may be said that British predictions at this time were six : There would be another revolution. There would be no government at all. There would be general financial ruin. The States would not act as a nation. They would come back to the supervision of Great Britain, as a large American party already desired. The "most miser- able country," "the Disunited States," because of mutual jealousies and the diverse interests of the agrarian and commercial classes,* would break into two or three^ or thir- teen^ independent republics. As a consequence of these ex- pectations the Ministry disregarded our commercial over- tures, and further seem to have busied themselves injuring our reputation on the continent.^ The inference that there would be no government and another revolution was based on the impotence of Con- gress. "We hear that the Committee of the States which were left by Congress are dispersed, so that the government of the United States is entirely suspended."^ "The state of Legislative power is such in the United States as to give alarming symptoms that some other change will take place in that continent," said the London Chronicle shortly before it announced the secession of seven members of Congress."^ Those who attend are mainly actuated by the -i-Pol. Herald, I, 25. Wents, Mag., May and September, 1785. 3For Johnson's attitude in 1784, see Boswell's Life (Hill, 1887), IV, 283. 4Adams to Jay, Works, VIIT, 289. SDeane to Beaiimarchais, 2 April, 1784, Deane Papers, N. Y. Hist. 6Lond. Chronicle, 2 November, 1784. TPost, 42. SLon. Chronicle, 2 November, 1784. 926 February, 1784. 36 TREATY OF PEACE TO TEE ANNAP0LI8 CONVENTION desire of preserving the appearance of regular govern- ment," said another paper.^ Though six weeks late in coming together already, "still but four states are repre- sented and some of the Southern members have gone home disgusted," was a further observation.^ Congress is "ut- terly contemptible,"^ "too feeble to command either respect or obedience,"* "have neither power, authority, nor credit, each state taking pride in showing their sovereignty and separate authority,"^ wrote Allaire, Beckwith and Temple respectively. Refusal of the States to pay quotas or to grant power over navigation laws, and the lack of an executive branch were duly dwelt upon.^ The Political Magazine quotes McFingal, "You shall be viceroys, it's true. But we'll be viceroys o'er you." "Everything hastens to another revolution in America," wrote William Smith to Nepean.^ Other comments were : "The country will experience some dreadful political con- vulsion ;"^ "it is more than probable that general confusion will take place ;"^ "every ship from the new states brings fresh accounts of their deranged affairs — they have be- come progressively worse and worse and now bid fair to come to an issue ;"^*^ "there are two classes of merchants and farmers who divide nearly all America, are discon- tented and distressed. Some great change is approach- ing."^^ Poverty, bankruptcy and business inertia were repre- iPm6. Advertiser, 8 December, 1785. 2Smith to Sydney, 11 January, 1785, F. O. Eecs., Amer., Ser. I, Vol. III. 3"Intelligence," 4 June, 1785, Itid. 4B, to Fraser, 28 May, 1785, F. O. Recs., Vol. III. 5T. to C, 4 August, 1786, F. O. Recs., Vol. IV. ^Mom. Post, 16 April, 1785; Mom. Herald, 30 June, 1786; Gents. Mag., August, 1784 ; Pol. Mag., April, 1787. 77 August, 1785, F. O, Recs., Vol. III. Wents. Mag., February, 1784. 9T. to C, 4 October, 1786, F. O. Recs., Vol. IV. lOMorn. Post, 30 June, 1785. ""Intelligence," 4 June, 1785, F. O. Recs., Vol. III. TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION 37 sented as contributing in bringing on the revolution which might lead the colonies under the old flag. The form of government was destructive of trade and com- merce.^ It was said that not a man in Georgia could afford a bottle of wine.^ There were daily bankruptcies in New York and its people were ruined.^ Business every- where was at a standstill.^ Cattle were being seized for taxes from "Boston to the Carolinas."^ "There is a new mode of taxation in the State of New York which cannot fail to be pleasant to a people who are so fond of freedom ; this is proportioning the collection to the amount of goods a man may have in his shop, and seiz- ing perhaps an hundred pounds at a time in the shop of a wealthy man, and taking not a fraction from his neigh- bor."^ "People are fleeing to Vermont to avoid the anarchy and confusion which prevail in other quarters."^ In consequence of all these reports the English papers were filled with warnings to avoid business with Ameri- can merchants who would not pay debts contracted before the war and could not pay those accruing since.^ The London Gazette of 19 October, 1784, announces the fail- ure of Messrs. Blanchard and Lewis for £227,000 "because American merchants won't pay." Two days later another unpaid English factor shot himself "and left a discon- solate widow and nine children."^ American knavery was a favorite theme. The laws of the states discriminating against English creditors were published and denounced. "Why should the Americans call the Algerines pirates?" asked the Puhlic Advertiser}^ The complaints of British merchants to the Ministry demanding some protection led to the appointment of Phineas Bond.^^ iPol. Mag., January, 1785. 2Ibid., Febriiary, 1785. 3"Intelligence," 4 June, 1785, F. O. Recs., Vol. III. *Lon. Chronicle, 26 February, 1784. 5Morn. Post, 25 April, 1785. sMorn. Post, 2 May, 1785. 7Ditto. »Morn. Post, 29 June, 1785. 9Z/0n. Chronicle, 21 October, 1784. 1012 Aug-ust, 1786. iiSee Bond's first letter. Am. Hist. Assoc. Rept., 1896, I, 517. 3S TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION Assertions of American political and financial anarchy were broad in 1785, but broader in 1786. In the former year the Political Magazine told its readers that chaos was at hand — three counties in North Carolina revolting, Ver- mont and the New Hampshire disaifected, the State of New York refusing to grant Congress power to lay an im- post, Connecticut "petitioning to come under the protec- tion of Great Britain," the island of Nantucket about to decide (sic) forgery and bankruptcy making alarming progress."^ Under the caption "False Prophecies for 1786 and Eealities of 1786" the Public Advertiser ran a para- graph which, though over-stressed, sums up the general English attitude toward the close of the perilous period : "Anarchy their King — laws disregarded — Justice driven from their dominions — roguery encouraged by their wild assemblies — a people disunited in all — their shipping rot- ting in their neglected ports — their Empire crumbling to atoms — treacherous — wretched and poor — harrassed by the Aborigines — unable to avenge or protect themselves, they are insulted by all — they are a people not to be trusted — a people laughed at and despised by all nations — an ex- ample of rebellion and ingratitude ! ! !"^ There was but one way out from the English viewpoint — ^return to the protecting aegis of Great Britain,^ a con- clusion, it was believed, devoutedly wished by a large number of our citizens. We have seen the solution offered in 1783. We shall see it suggested again. "It is under- stood," Washington wrote to Jacob Read, "that the British Cabinet wished to recover the United States."* In 1784 their agent Bancroft writes that the best way of breaking the colonies in twain and resecuring them is to enforce strict commercial discrimination until they "clamor loudly lAugust, 1785. 212 August. iPolit. Herald, 1785, II, 38 ; Eur. Map., December, 1786 ; Adams to Jay, 21 October, 1785, Works, VIII, 325; Smith to Jay, 6 December, 1785, Dip. Corresp. (1783-89), V, 377. 4X1 Augnst, 1784, Works, X, 398. TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION 39 . . . for the former connection with Great Britain."^ Temple, two years later, comes back to the old theme: "I'erhaps in the hour of their distress and confusion some or all of the states may seek for European friendship, council and advice, if they do so, my most hearty wish is, that wisdom may lead them to look up to that sovereign to whom they once happily belonged, and who only of all sovereigns on earth, hath or can have any unfeigned regard for their real welfare and happiness. My voice and my utmost influence in this country, still guided by prudence, shall steadfastly and faithfully correspond with my wishes."^ These accounts and predictions were not merely the space-filling fancies of newspaper hacks and the expressions of secret agents and diplomats eager to please the ear of the Foreign Office. They reflect the thoughts of persons of low and high degree. No less a man than our former advocate, Edmund Burke, acquiesced in such deductions; and like comments were sent out by Colonel Thomas Dundas to our former enemy. Lord Cornwallis, then in India. When Burke, in the summer of 1785, was on his way from London to Glasgow where he was to be reinstalled Kector of the University, he stopped to visit Thomas Somerville, the divine, at Jedburgh. With Burke was his son, Windham, and Sir Gilbert Eliott. Writing his memoirs in 1814, Somerville says of this visit : "I was not a little surprised by the disparaging and even contemptuous terms in which he expressed himself with regard to the Americans. . . . He said he would not be surprised at the defection of the colonies from the union. I believe he mentioned the Southern States. Their con- stitution was not then settled, and the democratic party threatened to overpower the interests of the federalists, to whom he gave full credit for wisdom and patriotism. Of 126 August, 1784, F. O. Papers, Ibid, Vol. III. 24 October, 1786, F. O. Papers, Ibid, Vol. IV. 40 TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION Washington he spoke with enthusiasm, and said that his character would be transmitted to the latest ages as the first of heroes and patriots."^ Dundas wrote Cornwallis in 1786: "The Americans are a most unhappy people. Every day brings us a new ac- count of their distracted state. Some accounts say that the present wish of the country is to return to the situation they were in before the war."^ The Cabinet, too, seems to have been convinced that America had no central government and had little liklihood of getting one.^ It was hostile,* despite the King's diplo- matic assurance that he "would be first to meet the friend- ship of the United States."^ Evasively, if not discourte- ously, it repeatedly kept our envoys waiting. When in April, 1786, Carmarthen granted an interview to the Com- missioners seeking a commercial treaty his Lordship "harped on the old string, the insufficiency of. the powers of Congress."^ The string had been harped on somewhat stridently in Dorset's dispatch on the offer to conclude a commercial arrangement, which set forth in official form the Cabinet's view of American government during this period : "I have been in answer thereto instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested, whether you are merely com- missioned by Congress, or whether you have received separate powers from the respective states. A Committee of North American merchants have waited upon his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for foreign affairs to express how anxiously they wish to be informed upon this subject, repeated experience having taught them in iJ/y Own Life and Times, Thomas Sumerville, 1861, 222. Worresp. of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis. 1859. I, 279. 3Adams to Jay, 19 July, 1785, Dip. Corresp. (1783-89), IV, 241. 4Jeff. to Page, 4 May, 1786, Writings (Ford), IV, 212. Jay and Wajsh- ington thought England had a hand in Shay's rebellion. Jay to Jeff., 4 December, 1786, Dip. Corresp. (1783-89) III, Washington, Works, XI. 5 Adams to Jay, 2 June, 1785, Dip. Corresp. (783-89), IV, 198. «Report of Commissioners to Jay, 25 April, 1786, Dip. Corresp. (1783- 89), II, 336. TREATY OF PEACE TO THE ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION 41 particular, as well as the public in general, how little the authority of Congress could avail aught in any respect, when the interest of any one individual state was even concerned, and particulaly so, where the concerns of that particular State might be supposed to militate against such resolutions as Congress might think proper to adopt. The apparent determination of the respective states to regulate their own separate interests, renders it absolutely necessary, towards forming a permanent system of com- merce that my Court should be informed how far the Com- missioners can be duly authorized to enter into any en- gagements with Great Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one of the States to render totally fruitless and ineffectual."^ Jefferson, who was one of the Commissioners addressed, has left it on record that he knew this letter was couched in softer tones than were the instructions of the Ministry to Dorset.^ When Adams, another of the Commissioners, appeared at St. James's as our first Minister to Great Britain,^ in one of the newspapers which continually ridiculed him, appeared this squib: "Mr. Adams is in rather an unusual predicament, for though he represents all the States, he in fact represents none, at least no one particular State is answerable for his appointment, neither can he name one that is ready to pay his expenses."* The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, writing to Pitt about a treaty containing a "most favored nation" clause said, "Let me ask . . . whether the American states are to be considered among the 'nations?' "^ It seems likely that uncertainty of this kind, as much as any other circum- ID. to Commissioners, 26 March, 1785, Dip. Corresp. (1783-89), II. 297. ^Writings, IV, 42. 31 June, 1785, A. to Jay, Works, VIII, 254.