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 / LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 Deceived O^g^W /( 9;2 , 
 
 ^Accessions No. /^-^J ^ . Class No. 
 Main Lib. 
 
GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 
 
 1888. 
 
 PART II. THE FIGHT. 
 
 
ALTERATIONS 
 INTRODUCED IN THE EDITION OF 
 
 Page 14, para. 32, ist and 2nd lines, dele " using the 
 magazine are," substitute " employing 
 rapid firing are." 
 
 Page 15, 4th line, dele "magazine fire," substitute 
 
 " rapid firing." 
 
 ,, 7th line, dele 800, substitute 1000. 
 
 3oo, 350. 
 
 Page 15, foot-note *, ist line, dele " para. ,28," substitute 
 
 " 1889, p. 75, para. 114." 
 2nd line, dele 200, substitute 250. 
 
 4th and 5th lines omit. 
 foot-note f, dele 875, substitute 1094. 
 n 330, 383- 
 
 Page 24, 2nd line from bottom, dele " and medium." 
 Page 26, 9th line, ak/ from " at first " to " Field Engi- 
 neering," end of I4th line, substitute "are 
 constructed in accordance with the Field 
 Pioneer Regs, for Infantry." 
 
K^v 
 
 veo 
 
 ste-ri 
 
 GERMAN 
 
 FIELD EXERCISE, 
 
 1888. 
 
 PART II. THE FIGHT. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 CAPTAIN W. H. SAWYER, 
 
 BRIGADE MAJOR, FIRST BRIGADE, ALDERSHOT. 
 
 LONDON : EDWARD STANFORD, 
 
 26 & 27, COCKSPUR STREET, CHARING CROSS, S.W. 
 1888. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 THE GERMAN EMPEROR'S MEMORANDUM . . ix 
 INTRODUCTION . xi 
 
 PART II. 
 
 THE FIGHT. 
 
 A. General Principles. 
 
 Introduction ........ i 
 
 The Use of the Drill Ground 3 
 
 Extended and Close Order 6 
 
 Fighting in Extended Order ..... 9 
 
 Procedure when opposed to the various arms . . 22 
 
 Employment of Entrenching Tools .... 25 
 
 The Duties of Officers and Men in action ... 27 
 
 Extent of Front and Subdivision .... 32 
 
 Attack and Defence ....... 40 
 
 B. The Several Units in Action. 
 
 The Company in action 51 
 
 The Battalion in action . . . . . . 57 
 
 The Regiment in action ...... 62 
 
 The Brigade in action . . . . . . 67 
 
 C. Concluding Remarks 72 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 1. Strength of German Units . . . . 77 
 
 2. Organisation of units 78 
 
 3. Normal Formations . . . ... 78 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE German Field Exercise, 1888, is divided 
 into three parts. 
 
 The first deals with the details of drill, the 
 second treats of the handling of troops in 
 action and their previous training for war, and 
 the third part embraces parade movements. 
 
 The first and third parts apply more par- 
 ticularly to the German army, whereas the 
 second is of general interest to soldiers of all 
 nations, being the most recent exposition 
 of the most approved principles of modern 
 European fighting. 
 
 The following three main conditions of 
 success are brought prominently forward : 
 
 1. The Commander- in - chiefs intentions 
 should be carried out in their integrity. 
 
 2. Subordinate Commanders, in co-operat- 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 ing to this end, should be given a free hand 
 within their own sphere of action. 
 
 3. The thorough training for war of the 
 individual soldier, with a view to qualifying 
 him for assuming responsibility, and acting 
 independently when necessary with judgment 
 and decision. 
 
 W. H. SAWYER, 
 
 Capt. " The King's Own" 
 Brigade Major, \st Brigade. 
 
 October, 1888. Alder shot. 
 
 NOTE. The words in large type are printed in 
 a similar manner in the German original. 
 
BERLIN, 
 ist September, 1888. 
 
 I issue to the Army this new Infantry 
 Field Exercise, in grateful memory of His 
 late Majesty, my Father, at whose instigation 
 it has been produced. Its object is to pro- 
 vide a larger scope for war training, at the 
 same time maintaining the discipline and 
 order which have been handed down to us. 
 
 The advantage gained by the simplification 
 of many of the formations, should on no 
 account be nullified either by verbal or 
 written additions to the Regulations by any 
 one, for the purpose of obtaining increased 
 outward uniformity, or for any other reason. 
 
 The freedom intentionally allowed, in the 
 training and its application, should not be 
 limited by any restrictions affecting the 
 principles of the Regulations. 
 
 I am firmly resolved to punish with dis- 
 missal any contravention of this my will. 
 
 Any infringement of the provisions of Parts 
 I. and III. will meet with severe censure, 
 while any misapprehension of Part II. should 
 be rectified by instruction. 
 
 (Signed) WILHELM. 
 
 TO THE 
 
 WAR MINISTRY. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1. THE object of drill is to train and prepare 
 both officers and men for war. All exercises 
 should therefore be in conformity with war 
 practice. The most important requirements 
 of war are strict discipline and order, together 
 with the utmost exertion of mental and 
 physical powers. The development of these 
 qualities to such a degree that they become a 
 second nature to the men, is one of the prin- 
 cipal objects of all exercises at drill and field 
 practices. 
 
 It is only by simplicity that results are 
 ensured in war. It therefore becomes merely 
 a question of mastering and practically apply- 
 ing a few simple formations. These, however, 
 should be practised with strictness, and directed 
 with certainty and precision. The provisions 
 of the Regulations deal solely with normal 
 
Xll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 formations, and are unconditionally binding 
 in their spirit and letter, in peace or in war. 
 All artificial elaboration is prohibited. 
 
 2. All Commanders of troops, from the 
 Company Commander upwards, are respon- 
 sible that the training of the units under their 
 command is carried out in accordance with 
 the Regulations, and should therefore be re- 
 stricted as little as possible in the choice of 
 means. Their immediate superiors are in 
 duty bound, to interfere, the moment they 
 notice any errors or shortcomings. 
 
 3. The mastering of the actual drill should 
 be accomplished in the Company. Battalion 
 drill embraces only close formations, Regi- 
 mental and Brigade Drill merely formations 
 of assembly. 
 
 The Battalion is the training school for 
 the fight. The whole system of Infantry 
 fighting, is based on the co-operation of the 
 several Companies with one another in the 
 various phases of the fight. 
 
 The uniform education necessary for under- 
 taking the duties connected with the training 
 and leading of troops, is imparted, in the 
 Regiment. Regimental, and more particularly 
 
INTRODUCTION. Xlll 
 
 Brigade exercises are a preparation for the 
 duties of higher commands. 
 
 Commanders of all grades are, however, 
 responsible that every part of the Field 
 Exercise is practised, and that the spirit of 
 its provisions is fully carried out. 
 
 4. Continuous practice of one a<nd the same 
 exercise, wearies both body and mind. The 
 exercises should therefore be varied. Their 
 duration and description should also be suited 
 to the powers of the men, otherwise their 
 energies become inevitably relaxed, which 
 produces an unfavourable effect on discipline. 
 
 5. The training on the drill ground should 
 be supplemented, as often as possible, by a 
 variety of operations on different descriptions 
 of ground. Wherever the state of the crops 
 renders this difficult during the finer seasons 
 of the year, the late autumn and winter 
 should be devoted all the more to the execu- 
 tion of these practices. 
 
 6. Exercises with troops at war strength, are 
 also of the greatest value. They should be 
 carried out at all times of the year, both at 
 drill and field practices. 
 
 7. The words of command are composed 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of two parts, cautionary and executive. The 
 former part is delivered slowly, the latter 
 sharply. The requisite pauses are indicated 
 in the Field Exercise thus . Slack words of 
 command result in slackness of execution. 
 Words of command should therefore be given 
 in a similar manner and with equal smartness 
 in all cases in every place and on all duties. 
 
 Officers may indicate the direction of march, 
 or order a halt, by means of signals with the 
 sword. In the latter case the sword should 
 be raised and immediately lowered. For the 
 purpose of indicating the rallying point to an 
 extended line, the sword should be kept raised. 
 Further signals, for the purpose of carrying 
 out particular measures, require to be specially 
 pre-arranged by Commanders. In the fighting- 
 line, the whistle is used to order the cease 
 fire, and to attract the attention of the men 
 to any order about to be given. 
 
 8. A uniform method of giving orders is 
 enjoined throughout the army, in order that, 
 in case of a change of Commanders, the dis- 
 positions made should be understood by the 
 troops. Such words of command (and sig- 
 nals) only, are therefore sanctioned, as are 
 
INTRODUCTION. XV 
 
 laid down in the Field Exercise. Should 
 those words of command prove insufficient to 
 meet any particular case, the issue of orders 
 should be resorted to (see Field Service Regs., 
 1887, Part L, para. 4).* 
 
 * It should be regarded as an invariable rule, that an 
 order should comprise everything, but no more, than that 
 which a subordinate is unable to arrange for independently, 
 with a view to attaining the prescribed object. The order 
 should therefore be short, clear, and distinct, as well as 
 adapted to the recipient's range of vision. 
 
 
PART II. 
 THE FIGHT. 
 
 A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1. The thorough mastery of the simple 
 formations laid down in Part I., forms the 
 basis for a careful and uniform training of In- 
 fantry. This training would, however, fail in 
 its main object, were it not to go hand in 
 hand with an intelligent application of these 
 formations to the requirements of war. 
 
 2. It is of course impossible to reproduce 
 the conditions of the battle-field to their full 
 extent on the drill ground. Besides the 
 casualties, the usual sensations are wanting, 
 which in reality exert such a detrimental 
 influence. These will, as a rule, cause a 
 lowering of the ideal performance of the troops, 
 and the measure in which this occurs, depends 
 
 B 
 
2 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 upon the morale of the troops and the amount 
 of the loss sustained. 
 
 3. To establish and to raise the morale 
 of the troops is, therefore, one of the principal 
 objects to be attained by the training in time 
 of peace, and all available means should be em- 
 ployed to this end and to the maintenance of 
 discipline. This will be achieved in a great 
 measure, by strict adherence to the several 
 formations at all practices. 
 
 4. The requirements of war are in no way 
 represented, but rather misrepresented by any 
 neglect of these considerations on the drill 
 ground. 
 
 The normal formations should be given up 
 without hesitation, whenever the varying cir- 
 cumstances of the fight require it. But dis- 
 cipline and order should never be lost, even 
 when different units become mixed up. 
 
 5. The requirements of war are fulfilled, 
 according to this, when the proper formations 
 are adopted for attaining the objects invari- 
 ably resulting from the situation assumed, 
 The formation selected, should be such as 
 would be ordered in war to insure the highest 
 fire action and which would be permitted 
 for the purpose of reducing the effect of the 
 enemy's fire. Whenever these two conditions 
 
THE USE OF THE DRILL GROUND. 3 
 
 are fulfilled (the former of which is always the 
 more important), the practice is in conformity 
 with the requirements of war. The more 
 logical the progress, in this spirit, from the 
 elementary to the more advanced exercise, 
 the more surely will the prejudicial impressions 
 experienced during the fight be overcome. 
 
 THE USE OF THE DRILL GROUND. 
 
 6. First and foremost the regulation for- 
 mations should be practised on the drill 
 ground. 
 
 7. Every fight should be conducted in 
 accordance with the object in view, the avail- 
 able strength and time, and the nature of the 
 ground. 
 
 The first of these factors is the ruling one, 
 and exercises the most influence in form- 
 ing plans. It determines the adoption of the 
 offensive or the defensive, or a withdrawal, 
 conducted under given conditions and lines of 
 direction. 
 
 The object in view, is principally illustrated 
 on the drill ground, and to this is due the special 
 value of the exercises conducted thereon. 
 
 The application of the authorised formations 
 on the drill ground is, however, limited to 
 
 B 2 
 
4 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 those practices which are intended to illus- 
 trate general tactical principles in the deploy- 
 ment and subdivision of troops and in the 
 conduct of the fight. For this purpose, the 
 nature of the ground should not be considered, 
 and it is possible to do so, because the selection 
 of suitable formations, depends more on the 
 special character of the tactical task imposed, 
 and on the relations to the other units, than 
 on the peculiarity of the ground. 
 
 8. This rule, however, does not preclude 
 advantage being occasionally taken of the 
 formation of the ground as in war. Where 
 the possibility exists of practising on the drill 
 ground under assumed conditions, the attack 
 of a height, a village, or a wood, the disposi- 
 tion for the defence of a ridge, the advance or 
 retreat through a defile, it would be a neglect 
 of favourable circumstances, if the most were 
 not made of the opportunity offered. 
 
 As it is, however, more important to accom- 
 plish the object of the fight, than merely to 
 take advantage of the ground, practices having 
 the former object in view should be more fre- 
 quent on the drill ground than the latter. 
 
 The fact should be intimated to the troops 
 being exercised, whenever it is intended to take 
 the formation of the ground into consideration. 
 

 THE USE OF THE DRILL GROUND. 5 
 
 9. By making this use of the ground there 
 is, of course, a lack of variety. 
 
 The natural objects always remain the same 
 for the same garrison. Special care should 
 therefore be taken to prevent a certain set of 
 tactical ideas becoming habitual, with the 
 result that the practices carried out develop 
 into local tactics, which would eventually 
 degenerate into lifeless forms. 
 
 On the other hand, the desired variety may 
 be obtained by means of simple suppositions 
 capable of being generally understood, as to 
 the existence of any particular description of 
 ground, a defile, &c. 
 
 10. In any case, the frequent execution of 
 field-practices is necessary, in conjunction with 
 the exercises conducted on the drill ground. 
 The troops will derive most profit from 
 the practices off the drill ground, when the 
 foundation has been laid by means of previous 
 exercises on the drill ground, for the thorough 
 grasp of the ruling principles and of the 
 relative value of the formations to be adopted. 
 A change from the drill ground to the country 
 commends itself also for inspections, where 
 such a procedure obtains. 
 
 11. For tactical exercises of every descrip- 
 tion, it is advisable to indicate the enemy's 
 
6 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 position, if even by means of a few men and 
 some flags. ''Occasionally, the strength of the 
 enemy may be increased with a view to repre- 
 senting the positions and movements of the 
 troops in rear of his position. It is likewise 
 admissible, occasionally to exercise two 
 approximately equal forces in operating 
 against each other. 
 
 EXTENDED AND CLOSE ORDER. 
 
 12. Infantry should be able to fight over 
 any description of ground practicable for an 
 active man, and to surmount obstacles even 
 of a serious nature, when fully equipped. 
 Extended order is specially adapted for this 
 purpose. 
 
 13. The Infantry fight will as a rule be 
 decided by fire action, and this is most fully 
 developed in extended order. The delivery of 
 fire by bodies in close order, is the exception. 
 
 14. Large bodies in close formation, are 
 liable to suffer very heavy losses in a short 
 space of time when within the enemy's effective 
 infantry fire. This renders it necessary that 
 the brief moments favourable for their actual 
 insertion into the fight, should be seized with 
 accuracy. The action of the fighting line, on 
 the other hand, may be extended over hours. 
 

 EXTENDED AND CLOSE ORDER. 7 
 
 15. The uniform action, exercised by the 
 commander of a large mass compressed, 
 whether in depth or breadth, into a restricted 
 space, is the object of close formations. 
 Formerly, the only limit restricting the size of 
 a body of troops, was the distance the word of 
 command could travel. The increased effect 
 of fire, now necessitates a further subdivision 
 of bodies in close formation. 
 
 16. In extended order, the soldier is not 
 rigidly bound to a fixed place or position of 
 the body, or to the prescribed motions in 
 handling the rifle. On the other hand, sound 
 judgment, physical activity, boldness and self- 
 reliance, great dexterity in the use of the rifle 
 and in taking advantage of the ground, 
 together with unremitting attention, are now 
 required of him by his leaders. 
 
 17. Intersected and close country, as well 
 as the noise and other dissolving influences of 
 the fight, increase the difficulty of leading 
 troops in extended order. This difficulty 
 greatly increases the labour of training. It is 
 during the fight in extended order, therefore, 
 that it becomes most apparent whether troops 
 have been thoroughly trained and disciplined, 
 for a decrease of the commander's direct 
 influence on the leading of the troops, is 
 
GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 accompanied by increased demands upon the 
 independent action of the individual soldier. 
 
 18. Fighting in extended order and the 
 correct application of its various formations, 
 passing from extended to close order and vice 
 versa, require, therefore, to be practised more 
 thoroughly than the application of close 
 formations, in which the Infantry fight was 
 formerly conducted, extended order then 
 taking merely a secondary part. 
 
 19. Extended order, is the formation now 
 principally employed in action. 
 
 The fight is commenced, and in most cases 
 carried through to the end, in extended order. 
 
 The extended line becomes, therefore, the 
 principal fighting formation of Infantry. 
 
 20. Close formation nevertheless still re- 
 tains its full use in the case of troops held in 
 readiness for action, and for reserves and 
 supports to the fighting line. It also gives 
 an impulse to the fight which in certain cases 
 determines the final issue. In the first line, 
 close formation will, however, only be used in 
 exceptional cases. But an action can never be 
 fought out to the end in close formation alone, 
 without the employment of extended order. 
 
FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 9 
 
 FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 
 
 General Observations. 
 
 21. The increased importance of the fighting- 
 line, imparts a special significance to its lead- 
 ing. The freedom of movement and the 
 independent use of his rifle, which the soldier 
 is allowed in the fighting-line, tend to render 
 him more qualified and capable for the per- 
 formance of his duties. 
 
 During his training, the soldier should be 
 made aware of the fact that his duties when 
 fio-htincr in extended order, differ from those 
 
 o o 
 
 in close formation. It should be clearly im- 
 pressed upon him, that he can only do really 
 good service under all circumstances, by 
 exerting his powers to the utmost. Being 
 allowed greater freedom of movement, he 
 should always be on the alert, and ever ready 
 to take rapid and well-considered independent 
 action. 
 
 It is the officer's duty to develop the judg- 
 ment and self-reliance of the soldier, by means 
 of instruction suited to his powers of under- 
 standing, and above all to convince him, that 
 the soldier's greatest danger lies in turning 
 his back to the enemy. 
 
10 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1888. 
 
 Extension. 
 
 22. Every engagement, is ^commenced by 
 throwing out troops in extended order. 
 
 The primary object is to gain touch with 
 the enemy, retaining at the same time perfect 
 freedom of action. Only a small number of 
 men should, therefore, be extended at first, 
 and that without hurry. 
 
 A further reason for covering the advance 
 by a weak extended line, such as is usually 
 required at the outset of a fight, is to avoid 
 surprise. In case the troops are surprised, 
 notwithstanding this precaution, the first thing 
 to be done is to regain freedom of action, by 
 rapidly opposing the enemy with an equal force. 
 
 23. The forming of further plans, will de- 
 pend upon whether it is intended to fight a 
 containing or a decisive action. In the latter 
 case, as soon as a clear estimate has been 
 formed, of the numbers required for the suc- 
 cessful issue of the operation, there should be 
 no hesitation in deploying the necessary force 
 and inserting it into the fight, in a formation 
 favouring effectual co-operation. No greater 
 fault can be committed, than to commence 
 an action with insufficient forces, with the in- 
 tention of reinforcing them by degrees. It 
 

 FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER II 
 
 amounts to continually engaging superior with 
 inferior forces, and voluntarily relinquishing 
 the advantages due to superiority of numbers. 
 The failure of an operation entails not only 
 useless losses, but also a deterioration of the 
 morale of the troops. 
 
 24. Every engagement intended to be of 
 a decisive character, will entail the occupation 
 of the entire space available for deployment 
 by a dense fighting line. 
 
 The extent of this space, depends upon the 
 nature of the ground and the neighbouring 
 troops engaged. 
 
 25. A comparatively narrow front is re- 
 quired at the commencement of the fight, for 
 the prosecution of which, the commander 
 intends retaining the greater portion of his 
 force. The fighting line may be of various 
 density at first. In any case, on entering 
 upon a fight likely to prove long and costly, 
 the front should not be increased to such 
 an extent as to preclude its being occupied 
 with a fighting-line of constant density and 
 maintaining its full fire-action throughout. 
 According to this, a company at war strength 
 in extended order should not occupy a front 
 much exceeding 100 metres.* 
 
 * 109*3 yards. 
 
12 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 Even during tactical manoeuvres, a normal 
 front of 100 metres should be allowed for a 
 company in extended order. This extension, 
 as compared with the strength of the company, 
 is greater than that adopted in war. This, 
 however, is equalised by the fact that the 
 fighting-line is not thinned by casualties as 
 in war. 
 
 26. A rigid adherence to the regulated 
 intervals in the fighting-line, should never be 
 insisted on. 
 
 The men are, on the contrary, to be dis- 
 tinctly instructed to close up or open out for 
 the purpose of availing themselves of cover, 
 especially when the extension is followed by 
 an advance, during which they are unable to 
 continue firing. Neither the direction nor the 
 rate of advance should, however, be allowed 
 to suffer thereby, and the total length of the 
 line should not be appreciably increased. 
 
 27. Careful attention to dressing, is of even 
 less consequence than the preservation of 
 intervals. The only thing to be considered 
 in this respect, is that the several portions of 
 the fighting-line do not interfere s with one 
 another in their movements and fire. 
 
 In the case of smaller units, still beyond the 
 sphere of the enemy's influence, this in no way 
 
FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 13 
 
 precludes a part of the fighting-line being 
 ordered to direct, with a view to facilitating 
 their advance. 
 
 28. When the fighting-line is approaching 
 the position to be occupied, or when the ex- 
 tension takes place on the position itself, the . 
 subordinate Commanders should lead their 
 parties in such a manner as to enable each 
 soldier to take up such a position within the 
 space available, as will afford him the best 
 field of fire and cover. 
 
 Should the flanks remain unprotected either 
 by other troops or by natural obstacles, a few 
 men under an intelligent leader should invari- 
 ably be despatched, as a fighting patrol, to 
 keep up a sharp look out on the flanks. 
 
 29. Reinforcements become necessary, 
 when the fire-action of a fighting-line, which 
 has suffered, requires to be sustained or in- 
 creased, or when a fresh impulse is needed to 
 enable it to continue its advance. 
 
 Fire Action. 
 
 30. The action of Infantry consists primarily 
 of the fire of the extended fighting-line. It 
 is able, solely by its fire, not only to repel the 
 enemy and prepare the attack, but also under 
 
 
14 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 certain circumstances, to decide the issue. In 
 most cases, an overwhelming fire, concentrated 
 on the decisive tactical points up to within 
 short range, will produce such an effect that 
 when the final rush is made, the position will 
 be found to be either evacuated or only 
 weakly held by the enemy. 
 
 Such fire-action requires coolness and dex- 
 terity in shooting on the part of the soldier 
 and fire discipline. 
 
 31. The fire-effect of entire fighting-lines, 
 depends upon the direction of the combined 
 performances of a large number of rifles. 
 
 The simultaneous employment of the same 
 kind of fire, by the several portions of the line, 
 is not required. The indication, as an excep- 
 tional measure, of particular objectives to 
 different units, requiring the employment of 
 special descriptions of fire, is not precluded. 
 
 32. The proper moments for using the 
 magazine are : 
 
 In the attack : in the final preparation for 
 the assault. 
 
 In the defence : in repelling the enemy's 
 advance to the assault. 
 
 In receiving a charge of cavalry and on all 
 other occasions during the fight, when a 
 sudden and direct collision with the enemy 
 
I 
 
 FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 15 
 
 occurs (attack and defence of works, localities, 
 woods, &c.) 
 
 In firing on a retreating enemy. 
 
 Magazine-fire is only used in combination 
 with the fixed sights, and the small flap.* It is 
 only exceptionally employed at ranges between 
 800 and 300 metres,! when brief opportunities 
 occur of firing at particularly important objects 
 and increased fire-action is ordered. 
 
 The employment of magazine-fire, under 
 circumstances justifying its use, is frequently 
 left to the discretion of the individual soldier. 
 In order that the highest capability of the 
 rifle may not be prematurely exhausted, the 
 individual soldier should be thoroughly trained 
 to retain the magazine for those moments, in 
 which it is desired to press the fight to an 
 immediate issue, or when it becomes necessary 
 to ward off some threatening danger. 
 
 33. It should be regarded as an invariable 
 rule, with regard to the employment of fire, 
 that it is only of a decisive nature, when 
 delivered at such ranges as will insure its 
 
 * " German Muskt. Regs., "para 28. 
 
 Fixed sights used up to 200 m. (219 yards). 
 Small flap 300 m. (328 yards). 
 
 With the new M-7i powder, at average temperature, by 
 making a slight allowance, up to 250 and 350 m. resp. 
 t 875-330 yards. 
 
l6 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 taking effect on the enemy's troops. To 
 which arm these belong, is not a matter of 
 primary consideration. In the majority of 
 instances, the enemy's infantry would be the 
 most important and profitable objective : at 
 the same time, firing at batteries should not 
 be overlooked. The choice of objects to fire 
 at, is primarily decided by their temporary 
 tactical importance. The next objects to be 
 selected are those which, owing to their height, 
 depth, width, and density, offer a prospect of 
 high results. 
 
 Good troops should be capable, when their 
 own fire does not promise to be effective, of 
 remaining under the enemy's fire without 
 replying to it. 
 
 34. It is only in very rare cases, that the 
 employment of indirect fire should be 
 attempted, and even then, only when known 
 ranges and the stationary character of the 
 object with regard to the curvature of the 
 the trajectory, render a proportionate result 
 probable, for example against troops behind 
 entrenchments. 
 
 35. As a rule, the direction of the firing is 
 confined to those commanders who are in the 
 fighting line itself, namely the Zug * and Com- 
 
 * Pronounced " tsoog." 
 
FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 17 
 
 pany leaders. Other duties devolve on the 
 higher Commanders in action, which they are 
 not permitted to neglect by intruding into 
 the sphere of their subordinates' command. 
 They can only co-operate, by despatching the 
 requisite forces to those parts of the fighting 
 line, whence they intend to produce increased 
 or concentrated fire-action. 
 
 In peace-manoeuvres, however, the higher 
 Commanders should take care that the direc- 
 tion of the firing, is properly attended to by 
 the subordinate leaders. 
 
 36. The direction of the firing during the 
 course of a fight, can frequently be but im- 
 perfectly carried out, owing to the casualties 
 among the leaders in the fighting-line, which 
 vary according to circumstances. But even 
 then, the fire-discipline of the men who are 
 left more or less to themselves should be 
 maintained. Among properly trained and 
 disciplined troops, the judgment of the indi- 
 vidual soldier and the example given by the 
 men of superior intelligence and courage, 
 exert a powerful influence on the conduct of 
 the fighting-line, and thus render the success- 
 ful continuance of the fight possible, against 
 an enemy who will by this time, find himself 
 
 in^an equally difficult position. 
 
 ^~^ --\ -*^" 
 
 TTTTtJ 
 
 -Lil K 
 
 m tf T TTT8 T3 
 
1 8 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, lS88. 
 
 37. It should be borne in mind from the 
 very beginning of the fight, that the amount 
 of ammunition carried is limited, and its 
 consumption represents an expenditure of 
 power, which should only occur when most 
 advantageous. On the other hand, should it 
 be decided to direct the fire on any particular 
 point, the full amount of ammunition required 
 to fulfil the object of the fight should be used, 
 as the tendency of an ineffectual fire, is to 
 lower the morale of the troops and to raise 
 that of their opponents. The judicious 
 husbanding of ammunition is, therefore, an 
 indispensable condition, especially at long and 
 medium ranges, in order that the ammunition 
 required to achieve success, may not be defi- 
 cient at the critical moment. 
 
 The principles regulating the supply of 
 ammunition in action, are laid down in the 
 Field Service Regs., 1887, paras. 313 to 321. 
 
 Movements. 
 
 38. The movements of an extended fighting- 
 line, are executed on the supposition that it 
 is in contact with the enemy. They should 
 therefore be extremely simple. 
 
 Beyond the range of the enemy's fire, the 
 main points to be attended to, are the main- 
 
FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 19 
 
 tenance of order and connection. Within the 
 sphere of the enemy's fire, the principal con- 
 sideration, is to get at the enemy by the 
 shortest way. 
 
 39. When advancing or retiring, the pre- 
 servation of the proper direction, is of primary 
 importance. Slight changes of direction, may 
 be effected by inclining to the right or left 
 as long as the enemy's fire is not too severe. 
 Extensive flank movements under fire, are 
 not permissible. 
 
 Changes of front under fire, should be quite 
 the exception. Should it become necessary 
 to form a fighting-line to another front, a fresh 
 line is formed in the required direction from 
 the closed bodies in rear, that portion of the 
 old fighting-line, which may no longer be 
 required, being withdrawn. 
 
 40. The movements of the fighting-line are 
 executed, as a rule, in quick time. When it 
 becomes a question of reaching a certain point 
 before the enemy, or of crossing spaces 
 swept by the enemy's fire, it is done at the 
 double. When the distance to be crossed is 
 long, after proceeding a certain distance at the 
 run, it may be necessary to make a halt, 
 during which the men should lie down. When 
 within effective range, a further advance is pre- 
 
 C 2 
 
20 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 pared by fire during the halt. In executing 
 the advance by rushes, one portion of the 
 fighting-line should keep up its fire, under 
 cover of which the other portion will be able 
 to advance. The distance covered in each 
 rush, when in the presence of the enemy, 
 depends upon a great variety of circumstances 
 (nature of ground, composition of troops, 
 severity of enemy's fire). 
 
 41. It should be borne in mind, that the 
 advance is very apt to slacken when employ- 
 ing this method of attack, notwithstanding the 
 large expenditure of strength entailed. 
 
 The great difficulty, which increases with 
 every rush, of getting a fighting-line to advance 
 from cover to cover when under a heavy fire, 
 should cause the advance by rushes to be 
 employed with caution. Should the enemy's 
 fire admit of it, the advance should be con- 
 tinued uninterruptedly. At drill, therefore, 
 the advance by rushes should neither be com- 
 menced too soon, nor practised as the only 
 suitable formation for advancing over level 
 ground. 
 
 Everybody should rather be thoroughly 
 imbued with the idea, that the desired result 
 can only be secured by continuous pushing 
 on to the front, combined with well-considered 
 
FIGHTING IN EXTENDED ORDER. 21 
 
 preparation by fire ; and that, on the other 
 hand, prolonged delay under the fire of a well- 
 protected opponent, must necessarily entail 
 heavy losses ; and, finally, that a retirement is 
 synonymous with annihilation. 
 
 42. The most favourable circumstances for 
 an uninterrupted advance, are those under 
 which the enemy's fire can be kept down by 
 superior fire, from a flanking or commanding 
 position. 
 
 43. Firing on the move, produces an insig- 
 nificant effect owing to the difficulty of hand- 
 ling the rifle steadily, taking a good aim, and 
 making careful observations whilst in motion. 
 It is, therefore, only applicable under special 
 circumstances, for example, in order to pre- 
 vent the undisturbed delivery of the enemy's 
 fire, during a retirement of the fighting-line. 
 
 Closing. 
 
 44. The fighting-line is closed up, at the 
 conclusion of the fight or after the requisite 
 fire has been delivered on the retreating 
 enemy. During a retreat, closing is only 
 possible after the enemy's pursuit has ceased. 
 
 45. Troops are closed on principle, facing 
 towards the enemy ; when closing on the 
 move, they face in the direction followed. 
 
22 
 
 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888, 
 
 46. It is of no consequence in action, that 
 every individual soldier and every small unit 
 should resume their original places, but it is 
 of importance that closed bodies should be 
 collected rapidly. 
 
 PROCEDURE WHEN OPPOSED TO THE 
 VARIOUS ARMS. 
 
 47. In the case of Infantry v. Infantry the 
 
 result depends, apart from moral factors, on 
 the musketry training, fire-discipline, and the 
 direction of the firing. 
 
 The Commander's task is to bring as many 
 rifles as possible into action, or to gain the 
 upper hand by concentrating the fire-effect of 
 extended lines on decisive points. 
 
 The application of this principle is rendered 
 easier, when cover can be obtained from the 
 fire of the other portions of the enemy's line. 
 
 48. The individual Infantry soldier 
 should realise the fact, that he is more 
 than a match for a Cavalry soldier, even on 
 open and level ground, if on encountering 
 him, he is in immediate readiness to open fire. 
 He need not even hesitate to engage several at 
 a time, if he retains his calmness and presence 
 of mind, and uses his rifle correctly as a 
 
PROCEDURE WHEN OPPOSED TO VARIOUS ARMS. 23 
 
 repeater, without taking his eye off his oppo 
 nents. 
 
 Infantry should remain convinced, that 
 it has nothing to fear from Cavalry, even in 
 superior numbers, if it retains its coolness 
 and firmness. Every formation is suitable 
 for repelling Cavalry, which admits of its being 
 opposed by the well-aimed fire of masses at 
 the halt. 
 
 The most effectual manner of receiving 
 Cavalry, is to bring the greatest available 
 number of rifles to bear upon it. 
 
 Only those formations therefore (i.e. changes 
 of front) which favour this, need be executed 
 against Cavalry. Infantry that does not dare 
 to receive Cavalry in extended order, when 
 its flanks are protected by the fire of troops 
 echeloned in rear, would not find safety even 
 in square. 
 
 49. Extended Infantry, when running, are 
 at the mercy of Cavalry, whereas when firing 
 steadily, they can face a Cavalry charge with 
 the fullest confidence. If the ground affords 
 them cover and protection, their power is 
 increased. Infantry engaged with the enemy's 
 Infantry, should in any case endeavour to 
 avoid assuming close formation, even when 
 threatened by Cavalry. Infantry is able to 
 
24 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 advance even in the open, without regard to 
 the enemy's Cavalry, as long as the latter is 
 not supported by superior Artillery or Infantry, 
 or is in such superior numbers that it can 
 attack simultaneously from different directions 
 with several lines. 
 
 50. The adoption of the square formation, 
 can only be considered suitable when required 
 by special circumstances, such as when the 
 troops have expended their ammunition ; when 
 they have been severely shaken by previous 
 heavy losses during the fight ; or when com- 
 pelled to retreat over open ground in the 
 presence of threatening Cavalry, superior in 
 numbers. 
 
 Infantry engaged with Cavalry, should 
 bear in mind that, in all other cases, the 
 latter are justified in counting it as an ad- 
 vantage gained, as soon as they succeed in 
 compelling them to discontinue their move- 
 ments and to assume formations which will 
 interfere with the development of the most 
 effective fire-action. 
 
 51. In engaging Artillery, it should be re- 
 membered, that to this arm belongs the 
 superiority of fire at long and medium ranges. 
 It is only at about 1000 metres* that the 
 
 * 1094 yards. 
 
THE EMPLOYMENT OF ENTRENCHING TOOLS. 25 
 
 relative conditions become equalised, and at 
 the shorter ranges the Infantry gains the 
 superiority. 
 
 Infantry should endeavour to get as close 
 as possible to Artillery, by availing itself of the 
 formation of the ground. Infantry fire should 
 first be directed on any teams that may be 
 visible, and then on the gunners. Cases may 
 occur, in which Infantry may engage Artillery 
 with effect at the longer ranges. This entails 
 the expenditure of a considerable amount of 
 ammunition. Infantry should never, however, 
 consider it to be their duty, to take the place 
 of, or to compete with, Artillery at long 
 ranges. Such a procedure, only leads to waste 
 of ammunition. 
 
 THE EMPLOYMENT OF ENTRENCHING 
 TOOLS. 
 
 52. The increased importance of artificial 
 cover, is due to the fire-action of the modern 
 rifle. Prepared at the right time and place, the 
 service it renders the troops and their leaders 
 is important, and at times indispensable. 
 
 It should, however, be subservient to the 
 leader's plans, and should in no way govern 
 them. The latter is the case, when the 
 entrenchments are commenced before the 
 
26 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 Commander's plans are definitely formed. 
 The premature strengthening of ground is 
 positively detrimental, and restricts freedom 
 of movement. 
 
 Tactical training is required on the part of 
 Commanders, in order to know when and 
 where, as well as how, to entrench. 
 
 The simplest kind of artificial cover is the 
 shelter trench, which at first is intended for 
 men lying down, and, if time admits, is 
 deepened and strengthened for firing kneeling 
 and standing. They are constructed in accord- 
 ance with the instructions laid down for the 
 training of Infantry in Field Engineering. 
 
 On the defensive, the pacing and marking 
 of distances, should be combined with the 
 construction of entrenchments. Even in the 
 attack, entrenching tools may be of great 
 service in the retention and strengthening of 
 positions gained. 
 
 The construction of shelter trenches, either 
 on or off the drill ground, is frequently im- 
 practicable, even when required by the assumed 
 tactical situation, owing to circumstances 
 which have to be considered in time of peace. 
 In such cases the construction of shelter 
 trenches should, at least, be indicated by 
 taking all the necessary preliminary steps. 
 
DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND MEN IN ACTION. 27 
 
 THE DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND MEN 
 IN ACTION. 
 
 The Officer. 
 
 53. The difficulty of commanding troops, 
 increases in proportion as the possibility 
 diminishes of exercising a personal control 
 down to the lowest ranks, and of effectively 
 delivering words of command. The method 
 of issuing orders should therefore be such, as 
 to facilitate the attainment of the desired 
 object in action, and this depends to a certain 
 extent, on the suitable selection of the Com- 
 mander's place. 
 
 Orders should therefore be issued by Com- 
 manders during peace manoeuvres, from the 
 same place and in the same attitude, as in 
 war. A Commander may always make 
 himself and his subordinate commanders 
 exceptions to this rule whenever, and to what- 
 ever extent, he may consider it an advantage 
 in the training of the troops. By occasionally 
 dismounting, however, mounted officers will 
 learn fully to realise and overcome the diffi- 
 culties of command, and the men will become 
 accustomed to seeing their leaders dismounted 
 under a heavy fire. 
 
28 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 54. When fighting in extended order, the 
 attention of officers of all ranks should be 
 particularly directed to the maintenance of 
 connection, order, and command. Besides this, 
 the higher Commanders should take care that 
 the troops do not escape from their control, 
 and the subordinate Commanders should 
 endeavour on the accomplishment of their 
 task, to rejoin the body of troops they belong 
 to, or to place themselves at their disposal. 
 
 These conditions, will be fulfilled when the 
 higher Commanders refrain from ordering 
 more than they should or could order,and when 
 the executive Commanders unite in working 
 for the attainment, of the appointed object, 
 and abstain from abusing the independence 
 accorded to them. 
 
 The exercise of independence within these 
 limits, is the foundation of great results in 
 war. 
 
 These considerations are applicable to the 
 lowest rank of Commanders. 
 
 55. The Zug leader should take up such 
 a position as will enable him to superintend 
 the fire-action of his men. He arranges the 
 disposition of his Zug in the space allotted 
 to it, and decides on which objects the fire is 
 to be directed, either in accordance with 
 
DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND MEN IN ACTION. 2Q 
 
 his instructions or on his own responsibility. 
 He follows closely, the measures taken by 
 the enemy and endeavours, according to 
 his ability, to co-operate with the adjoining 
 Ziige in the fighting-line. He endeavours to 
 ascertain, previous to a further advance, how 
 the fighting-line, or portions of it, could be 
 brought up closer to the enemy ; whether, or in 
 what manner, a turning movement could be 
 initiated ; or whether advantage could be taken 
 of any exposed point in the enemy's line. The 
 Zug leader in the fighting-line, will best be 
 able to observe any opportunity of seizing an 
 advantageous position, or of gaining an ad- 
 vantage over the enemy. He should then 
 make up his mind how far. he should, on his 
 own responsibility, turn such advantage to 
 account. 
 
 56. The Group leader assists the Zug 
 leader, and is responsible in his own sphere, for 
 the placing of the men, for the adjustment of 
 the sights, the proper handling of the rifle, the 
 consumption of ammunition, and the replen- 
 ishing of the magazine. 
 
 The Soldier. 
 
 57. The soldier generally goes into action 
 after harassing exertions and marches, which 
 
30 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 are rendered more trying by the privations 
 of war. He should, even under such circum- 
 stances, retain his energy, courage, calm 
 judgment, and his power of rapid decision. 
 These qualities, of which he stands most in 
 need in moments of imminent peril, should be 
 developed by the training he receives. 
 
 The man whose firmness of character, inde- 
 pendence and disregard of self, are thoroughly 
 developed by sound training, who by gradual 
 preparation is able to undergo severe bodily 
 exertion, and who is well instructed in the 
 simple rules applicable to the various incidents 
 of the fight, will also be able successfully to 
 overcome the powerful emotions produced by 
 the Infantry fight, and to behave as a reliable 
 soldier in action. 
 
 58. During the advance, he must bear in 
 mind that he is not to halt without a direct 
 order, however severe the losses or the fire may 
 be. Running to the rear leads to annihilation. 
 On the other hand, an attack really pushed 
 home with determination, will always 
 succeed. 
 
 59. On the defensive, he should not move 
 from the spot he is ordered to hold. He 
 should do this with all the more confidence, 
 knowing that his fire becomes the more an- 
 
DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND MEN IN ACTION. 31 
 
 nihilating the nearer the enemy approaches. 
 The soldier should therefore preserve his 
 ammunition for firing at short ranges, and then 
 use it with certain effect. 
 
 60. Every soldier should endeavour to 
 remain with the body of troops to which 
 he belongs. Whoever is found remaining in 
 rear of .the fighting-line to which he belongs, 
 without orders or without being wounded, or 
 whoever carries wounded out of action with- 
 out orders, is guilty of cowardice. Any man 
 who has become separated from his company 
 during the fight, should immediately attach 
 himself to the nearest body of troops in the 
 fighting-line, place himself under the orders of 
 the officer or non-commissioned-officer in 
 command, and render him the obedience due 
 to his own superior. After the fighting is 
 over, every soldier who has lost his corps, 
 should look for it, and rejoin it without delay. 
 
 61. Men who in the stress of the fight, feel 
 that their determination and judgment are 
 deserting them, should look to their officers. 
 Should there no longer be any present, there 
 will be plenty of non-commissioned-officers 
 and brave men, whose example will assist 
 them in recovering themselves. 
 
32 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 EXTENT OF FRONT AND SUBDIVISION. 
 
 62. The extent of front taken up by a body 
 of troops, depends upon whether it has to fight 
 by itself or in close connection with other 
 troops. In the latter case, either one or both 
 its flanks will be supported. 
 
 It further depends upon whether the fight 
 is to be of an offensive or defensive character, 
 or whether a retirement is intended. 
 
 63. The necessity for conducting an inde- 
 pendent fight under varying circumstances, 
 through the successive phases of its develop- 
 ment, precludes the possibility of a simul- 
 taneous employment of the entire force in 
 a single line, from the commencement. 
 
 As a rule it will be necessary to procure more 
 detailed information, during the preliminary 
 operations, of all circumstances that may tend 
 to influence the conduct of the fight. 
 
 64. The subdivision of troops in depth, 
 in at least two bodies, the leading one of 
 which being the weaker and serving to open 
 the fight, arises from this necessity alone. If 
 these bodies succeed in clearing up the situa- 
 tion sufficiently to allow of the steps required 
 for carrying through the fight being decided 
 upon, a portion of the force should be held 
 
EXTENT OF FRONT AND SUBDIVISION. 33 
 
 back in reserve, for the purpose of meeting 
 unforeseen circumstances and bringing about 
 a decisive result. 
 
 It resolves itself, therefore, into a depth 
 formation in three separate bodies, and a yet 
 further subdivision might become necessary 
 under certain circumstances, such as the 
 necessity for special flank protection. These 
 additional subdivisions, however, should, if 
 possible, be avoided, as the proper employ- 
 ment of the reserves generally renders them 
 unnecessary. 
 
 65. The relative strength of the several 
 bodies in the deep formation, cannot be laid 
 down to meet all cases. As a rule the lead- 
 ing body, whose duty it is to open the fight, 
 should be as weak as possible, that retained 
 as a reserve as strong as possible. The 
 former should generally not exceed, the latter 
 not fall short of a quarter of the whole. 
 These proportions are only meant to serve 
 as a general guide, and should not lead to a 
 breaking-up of corps. 
 
 66. It will not be possible to retain the 
 adopted subdivision throughout the fight. In 
 the first place, the body of troops told off to 
 sustain the fight should co-operate with the 
 one detailed to commence it, either all at once 
 
 D 
 
34 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 or by degrees, and finally the reserve will be 
 utilised as required to confirm success or to 
 cover retreat. 
 
 This closing-up will nearly always cause 
 an increase of front. 
 
 67. For this reason alone, the front taken 
 up at the commencement of the fight, should 
 be a comparatively narrow one ; otherwise, the 
 front will be unduly extended during the 
 course of the fight, or a premature mixing up 
 of different commands will occur. 
 
 The question therefore arises in making the 
 preliminary arrangements for a fight : How 
 deep a formation should be adopted, and how 
 narrow a front may be taken up ? 
 
 Troops fighting independently, should bear 
 in mind that the extension of front only 
 furthers the desired result, when the flanks 
 are protected from turning movements. 
 
 68. In the case of troops associated with 
 other troops, being called upon to take part in 
 the fight, the extent of front to be taken up 
 will generally be given. The possibility of their 
 being threatened on the flanks, or even of being 
 able to deliver a flank attack, will invariably be 
 left out of consideration, when neither flanks 
 are exposed. These circumstances, point to 
 a disposition in which a larger force is thrown 
 
EXTENT OF FRONT AND SUBDIVISION. 35 
 
 into the fighting-line, and in which a special 
 or particularly strong reserve is not required. 
 
 Troops supported on both flanks, are there- 
 fore justified in developing the strongest 
 fighting-line ; those supported on one flank 
 only will, in the majority of cases, take up 
 their deep formation and develop their front 
 on the exposed flank. 
 
 69. Our Infantry, with its excellent mus- 
 ketry training, is able to repel any front attack 
 by its fire. The enemy will suffer immense 
 losses in the attack, and once repulsed, his 
 confidence will be so severely shaken that he 
 will hardly attempt to renew the attack. 
 
 70. Infantry which remains unaffected by 
 losses due to the enemy's long-range fire, and 
 receives his assault with a steady fire, is so 
 strong in front, that if it avails itself skilfully 
 of the advantages offered by the ground or by 
 shelter trenches, will not require any direct 
 support. 
 
 71. This Infantry has only one vulnerable 
 spot, namely, the flank, as far as it is unpro- 
 tected either by the ground or by other troops. 
 
 The security of its flanks exercises, there- 
 forej a decisive influence on the result. 
 
 The most effective manner of securing the 
 flanks, is by adopting a suitably organised 
 
 D 2 
 
36 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 deep formation. But in this case, the prin- 
 cipal consideration is where to post the 
 troops retained in rear (Reserves). 
 
 72. They are liable to suffer severely from; 
 the fire directed on the fighting-line, if posted 
 in rear of its centre in close formation. In 
 order to withdraw them from this effective fire, 
 they would have to be kept back so far, that 
 the distance to be traversed would prevent 
 their timely employment. 
 
 73. The best position for the troops held 
 in reserve is, therefore, in rear of the flanks 
 of the fighting-line, unless special circum- 
 stances require it otherwise. 
 
 74. The tactical situation and the nature 
 of the ground, decide as to the flank in rear 
 of which the Reserves should be kept The 
 flank on which the final decisive action is 
 likely to occur, should be principally con- 
 sidered. 
 
 It should be noted, that loss of time is 
 entailed by moving up the Reserves to a 
 flank, which must, besides, as a rule, be per- 
 formed under fire. 
 
 75. The distances to be maintained by the 
 troops held in reserve, are regulated principally 
 by the object of the fight 
 
 Previous to entering into the decisive phase, 
 
EXTENT OF FRONT AND SUBDIVISION. 37 
 
 troops in close formation should, as far as 
 possible, be kept under cover. 
 
 If it be determined to bring on the final 
 crisis, the distances should be reduced during 
 the course of the fight. All the Commanders, 
 down to the lowest, should then be animated 
 by a single desire, namely, to be in front, 
 and to perform their part in securing the 
 victory. 
 
 The crisis is generally of short duration, 
 and in the few brief moments available, the 
 troops still remaining intact must be disposed 
 of as required. 
 
 Should it not be intended to bring 
 matters to a final issue, the distances 
 between the bodies in deep formation should 
 be increased. 
 
 76. The distances depend, further, on the 
 ground. 
 
 Open ground requires greater distances, 
 and under fire, broader formations. (Strong 
 fighting-line with line formation in rear). 
 
 If during the attack, it be found impossible 
 to keep the lines in rear, out of the enemy's 
 fire, care should at least be taken that two 
 lines are not struck simultaneously by one 
 Shrapnel shot, or by a shower of bullets. 
 
 The requisite distance is therefore increased 
 
38 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 to over 200 m.*, which should only be lessened 
 when the finakissue is imminent. 
 
 Cover, admits of a reduction of distances. 
 The Commanders should not fail to take 
 advantage of this, as the rapid reinforcement 
 of the advanced lines becomes more fre- 
 quently necessary in this case. This holds 
 good especially in wood fighting, in which, 
 movements of closed bodies are principally 
 confined to the roads. 
 
 When fighting in the dark, the relative 
 importance of the various features of the 
 ground undergoes a complete change, and the 
 possibility of directing aimed fire on decisive 
 points is precluded. Offensive operations, 
 conducted without changing the direction of 
 the advance, and with a very distinct objective 
 previously indicated, are confined to short, 
 well-known stretches of ground, as far as pos- 
 sible bounded on either side. Company 
 columns in their simplest formations, placed 
 abreast or in rear of one another, covered at 
 a short distance by an extended line, is the 
 best formation preparatory to a hand-to-hand 
 fight, or for engaging in a vigorous musketry 
 fight, with heads of columns at close quarters. 
 Any further splitting-up of troops would be 
 calculated to cause confusion. On the defen 
 
 * 219 yards. 
 
EXTENT OF FRONT AND SUBDIVISION. 39 
 
 sive, the object is to hold the position occupied, 
 without a further subdivision of the troops* 
 
 The firing should be brief and severe, and 
 only delivered at the shortest ranges. Arrange- 
 ments should be made by daylight, to sweep 
 the roads leading from the enemy by fire. 
 When therefore, a night attack may be 
 expected, the advanced line of outposts should 
 be strengthened. The co-operation of the 
 troops on either flank, is confined to unex- 
 pected flank attacks. 
 
 77. It becomes frequently necessary to 
 reduce the distances on the drill ground, in 
 accordance with the limited space available. 
 Should this be unnecessary, it will be advan- 
 tageous in the training of the troops, if the 
 proper distances are maintained. 
 
 78. Troops in close formation have, as a rule, 
 to conform to the movements of the fighting- 
 line. 
 
 Their approach to the fighting-line, invari- 
 ably indicates the approaching termination of 
 the fighting. They may be employed either 
 to reinforce the fighting-line, or for delivering 
 the attack. In which latter case, they would 
 retain their close formation. 
 
 The manner of their employment, depends 
 upon the object of the fight, the time available, 
 and other considerations. 
 
40 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 
 
 79. In the offensive, a fundamental distinc- 
 tion should be drawn between the attack of a 
 fully developed front, well prepared for defence, 
 and an encounter between troops in motion. 
 
 80. The encounter between bodies of troops 
 in motion, so frequent in war, develops itself 
 from the depth of the column of march, against 
 an opponent who is likewise deploying for 
 action. 
 
 In such engagements, the leading troops 
 should gain the requisite time and space, to 
 enable the columns to deploy. 
 
 On these occasions, the subordinate leaders 
 should only exercise such a measure of inde- 
 pendent action, as is admissible without 
 interfering with the conriection between the 
 progressive deployment of the whole force, 
 and that of the leading troops. It is in this 
 spirit, that the Company at the head of the 
 Battalion acts. The same occurs at head of 
 the Advance Guard, &c. On the one hand, 
 the object is to forestall the enemy in his 
 deployment for the fight, whilst on the other 
 hand, the independent action of the leading 
 troops should be restricted, so as not to inter- 
 fere with the intentions of the Commander. 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 41 
 
 It thus becomes apparent how important it 
 is, that the commencement of an encounter 
 between troops in motion, should find the 
 Commander at the head of the column. The 
 simultaneous issue of orders for the conduct 
 of the fight, and for the deployment into 
 position from column of route, will thereby be 
 rendered possible. 
 
 The attack should be delayed as little as 
 possible, by the deployment for the fight. 
 Preparatory extensions at the halt, only cause 
 delay. 
 
 The preliminary phases of our engagements, 
 will generally bear this character. 
 
 81. Should the enemy have nearly com- 
 pleted his deployment, or should he be 
 already partially in position, the extension of 
 the foremost troops should be carried out with 
 increased caution. The front should be in- 
 creased by the continued deployment, and the 
 Commander's orders should be awaited. In 
 order to issue these in time, the Commander 
 should unquestionably be on the spot 
 
 82. The attack of a position completely 
 occupied, and perhaps prepared for defence, 
 should, on the other hand, be planned by the 
 Commander from the very commencement. 
 The independent action of the individual, 
 
42 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 should not be allowed to cause the deployment 
 to be made at haphazard. The enemy has in 
 this case, clearly surrendered the advantage 
 of the attack, the Commander consequently, 
 gains the advantage of being in a position to 
 choose the direction and manner of his attack. 
 In such cases the deployment for the fight, 
 is made in accordance with the intentions 
 of the Commander, previous to commencing 
 the action. 
 
 The difficulty of crossing ground com- 
 manded by the enemy's fire, may render it 
 necessary to advance under cover of darkness. 
 In such cases, the troops would generally be 
 advanced the day before, as far as possible 
 without getting within range of the 
 enemy's fire, and the first line pushed forward 
 in the dark to such a position, as would enable 
 it to open fire at break of day. 
 
 A planned attack will only then have any 
 chance of success, when it is able to secure 
 a superiority of fire. 
 
 The superiority of Artillery fire is the first 
 thing to be aimed at. It prepares the ground 
 over which the Infantry attack has to advance. 
 
 Should the ground offer suitable rallying 
 points in front of the enemy's position, these 
 should be seized first. The larger deploy- 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 43 
 
 ments for the fight are effected in rear of such 
 points. It is a rule for advanced troops, to 
 endeavour to get up as close to the position 
 as the ground will allow, in order to open fire. 
 
 Strong fighting-lines will work up gradually 
 to the position, and endeavour to overpower 
 the enemy with their fire. These will best be 
 supplied by the troops whose duty it is to 
 sustain the fight. When the fighting-line has 
 succeeded in arriving within a short distance 
 of the enemy, the supports, brought up as close 
 as possible, should be ready for immediate 
 action. 
 
 Until a superiority of fire has been gained, 
 or the enemy appears to be seriously shaken, 
 the assault can only be delivered at a heavy 
 cost. The final stroke should therefore be 
 deferred, until the necessary fire-effect has 
 been attained, 
 
 The fighting-line will be the best judge of 
 the results attained. It is the first to recog- 
 nise when and where the enemy's resistance is 
 decreasing ; it is able to avail itself most 
 quickly of any advantage gained ; the final 
 assault will therefore frequently emanate from 
 the fighting-line. It then becomes the duty 
 of the supports at once to follow the fighting- 
 line with a view to supporting it and to 
 
44 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1888. 
 
 protecting it from counter attack. Generally, 
 however, the Commander of the fighting-line 
 should bear in mind, that the order to assault 
 should be given by him, and at the right time- 
 When the fighting-line has arrived to within 
 short range of the enemy, and, having been 
 sufficiently reinforced, has paved the way for 
 the assault by the highest attainable fire- 
 action, the bodies of troops echeloned in rear 
 should be brought up to the foremost line 
 without a halt, and together with it should 
 deliver the final blow. The drums of all closed 
 bodies, commence beating from the moment 
 that the advance to the assault can no longer 
 be concealed from view. Whether the closed 
 bodies find themselves alongside or in rear of 
 each other, what their formation is, and 
 whether the Commander should still retain a 
 reserve, depends entirely upon circumstances. 
 In this most decisive moment of the attack 
 there is only one watchword for a fighting-line, 
 and that is " Forward " Forward ! straight 
 for the goal ! The beating of drums, the con- 
 tinuous sounding of the "Rapid advance" 
 by all the buglers, sets everybody, even the 
 hindmost, in motion, and with cheers, the 
 assaulting troops throw themselves upon the 
 enemy. 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 45 
 
 Any further addition to the rules laid 
 down above, for regulating the procedure of 
 attack is prohibited. 
 
 83. Procedure after a successful attack. 
 It is not sufficient to have captured the 
 enemy's position its retention should also be 
 secured. This is effected by the pursuit of 
 the retreating enemy, and by placing the 
 points captured in a state of defence. Should 
 villages, farmsteads, woods, &c., form part of 
 the enemy's position, the attack on them 
 should be pushed uninterruptedly through to 
 the further boundary. The further pursuit 
 does not, as a rule, consist of pushing on, but 
 of firing on the enemy, during which time, the 
 troops which have carried out the assault, 
 occupy the position captured and re-form. 
 They will thus, in a short space of time, be 
 prepared for renewed operations. 
 
 84. The enveloping movement. The 
 superiority of fire essential to success, can be 
 most easily secured by an enveloping move- 
 ment. This should be provided for beforehand 
 in the original dispositions, either by advanc- 
 ing from different directions, or by causing the 
 troops in rear of the fighting-line to join in 
 the attack. 
 
 Attempts at executing enveloping move- 
 
46 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 ments with portions of the Infantry in the 
 foremost fighting-line, already extended and 
 probably even already engaged, where they are 
 not specially favoured by the ground, are not 
 likely to succeed, and lead to a mischievous 
 splitting-up of forces. 
 
 85. The defence. No other kind of fighting 
 is so dependent on the formation of the ground 
 as the defensive. To carry it out, localities, 
 heights, ravines, woods, defiles, &c., are re- 
 quired. 
 
 The object to be considered in every 
 defensive operation, is the effective use of 
 fire. This point is the prominent considera- 
 tion, in selecting and in artificially strengthen- 
 ing a position. 
 
 As soon as the direction of the enemy's 
 attack is ascertained, the fighting-line is fixed 
 at such a strength, from the very first, as may 
 appear requisite to maintain a firm hold on the 
 position, taking the ground and the object of 
 the fight into consideration. Shelter-trenches 
 and other cover are prepared, the ranges to 
 important points are taken, ammunition is 
 distributed from the ammunition carts to the 
 troops, who, when posted, place it in a handy 
 position ready for use. 
 
 The supports are brought up, and in certain 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 47 
 
 circumstances are drawn quite close up to the 
 fighting-line. The distances should be reduced. 
 Reserves are kept back only so far as to 
 be sheltered from the enemy's fire, but near 
 enough to be close at hand for the defence of 
 their respective sections. 
 
 The number and extent of the sections will 
 vary in accordance with the nature of the 
 position. The worse the interior communica- 
 tions, and the less the possible supervision of 
 the position, the more numerous and the 
 narrower the sections. For the occupation of 
 the position, distribution in depth is the ruling 
 condition. Each section is organised as a 
 separate command, arranging for its own 
 reserve. The following are the principal 
 points to be considered in deciding upon the 
 position for the main reserve, i.e. of those 
 forces which are not tied down to a particular 
 section of the position. The defence whose 
 only object is to repel the enemy (outpost and 
 rear-guard actions) can confine itself to main- 
 taining its position. On the other hand, the 
 defence whose object is to achieve a de- 
 cisive result, must be combined with the 
 attack. The pure defensive will never result 
 in the annihilation of the enemy. In accord- 
 ance with this, troops should be economised 
 
48 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 in the distribution for local defence, and the 
 main reserve should be assembled at a point 
 from which, owing to the general situation 
 and the nature of the ground, an offensive 
 movement could most readily be executed at 
 any given moment. This, as a rule, will prove 
 to be on one of the flanks. This arrangement is 
 the best provision against enveloping move- 
 ments, which are the greatest danger to which 
 strong positions are exposed. 
 
 The larger the defending force, the greater 
 should be the interval between the main- 
 reserve and the flank. Greater space will 
 thereby be afforded for deployment and 
 advance to the attack, which would threaten 
 that of an enemy in flank, and increase the 
 security from enveloping movements. 
 
 A caution is necessary against completely 
 occupying positions before the direction of the 
 enemy's attack is ascertained. 
 
 86. No regulations can be made to meet 
 the case of a retreat, after a defeat. The 
 choice of direction in their retreat, no longer 
 belongs to troops engaged with the enemy, 
 when once repulsed or withdrawn. When 
 followed up by the enemy, troops must retire 
 without change of formation, perpendicularly 
 to their front, and require to be relieved, 
 
ATTACK AND DEFENCE. 49 
 
 in order to enable them to prepare for making 
 a fresh stand. The deduction from this is, 
 that a retreat can only be regulated when the 
 troops are still in deep formation. It should, 
 however, be remembered that it would be 
 wrong for troops who are called upon to fight 
 a decisive action, to keep back a reserve 
 for the purpose of covering their re- 
 treat, instead of employing it during 
 the fight. The Commander should make 
 up his mind in good time, as to ordering a 
 retreat, and taking the necessary measures for 
 carrying it out. 
 
 The selection of a position for the relieving 
 troops, should depend upon the resisting power 
 of the troops engaged, but should be sufficiently 
 near to save the retreating line from disorgan- 
 isation. Relieving positions, are more favour- 
 ably situated when taken up just on the flank 
 of, than immediately on the line of retreat. 
 The Commander details the troops intended 
 for relieving purposes from that portion of his 
 force, which is still intact. The troops occu- 
 pying the relieving position, offer the enemy 
 such opposition, as will afford the retreating 
 force time and space to re-form unmolested. 
 This condition, determines the duration of the 
 resistance offered. Should there be no chance 
 
 E 
 
50 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 of a timely arrival of fresh troops giving a 
 favourable turn to the situation, the relieving 
 troops must be withdrawn. 
 
 In most cases it would be necessary to take 
 up another relieving position. 
 
 A well-conducted retreating action, should 
 eventually lead to the formation of the column 
 of march, with a properly formed rear guard. 
 In ordering a withdrawal, the Commander 
 should distinctly indicate the point on which 
 to fall back, and order where, and by what 
 troops, the relieving position should be taken 
 up. The Commander will only be in a posi- 
 tion to fulfil these duties, if, after having taken 
 these measures, he leaves the scene of action 
 and gives the withdrawing troops their respec- 
 tive orders in person. The rest is the concern 
 of the subordinate commanders. Every un- 
 necessary show of front, for the purpose of 
 supporting troops occupying a relieving posi- 
 tion, proves as a rule, a disastrous mistake, as 
 it then becomes a matter of great difficulty to 
 disengage troops from the fight. 
 
 87. These regulations, do not lay down 
 either instructions or views for every descrip- 
 tion of fight. They do not deal with containing 
 actions, feigned actions, or demonstrations. 
 The conduct of such engagements, which 
 
THE COMPANY IN ACTION. 51 
 
 varies considerably according to the situa- 
 tion, is in each case the business of the Com- 
 mander. 
 
 It will always be necessary for the Comman- 
 ders to decide, in the different cases, whether 
 a formation of greater depth is to be adopted, 
 and what extent of front is required for 
 deployment 
 
 B. THE SEVERAL UNITS IN 
 ACTION. 
 
 (Units of Command.) 
 THE COMPANY IN ACTION. 
 
 88. The Company should be capable of 
 executing all the movements laid down 
 (extending, closing, rapidly changing from 
 extended to close order, and vice versd, &c.) 
 on a brief order or signal from its Commander. 
 
 Fighting in extended order requires, further, 
 that every Zug, and each of its component 
 Groups, be capable of finding out for itself the 
 right way of executing the task imposed, or 
 resulting from the tactical situation. As soon 
 
 E 2 
 
52 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 as the object of the fight, renders it no longer 
 necessary for the Zug to remain extended, 
 it will, without waiting for the order, close 
 and rejoin the Company column. The 
 Group closes when it can no longer act, and 
 resumes its place in close formation, in the 
 rallying Zug. The practical execution of 
 this principle should, by practice, become a 
 matter of habit. When ordered to extend, the 
 Zug leader takes command of his Zug. 
 During the course of the fight, the Commander 
 has frequently no time at the right moment, 
 and still more frequently no means, for the 
 transmission of the order to change front or 
 close. At the end of the fight the Zug, and in 
 it the group, should nevertheless be found in 
 its right place. Where that is, cannot be de- 
 cided beforehand. 
 
 89. The Company finds itself only excep- 
 tionally, when detached, in the position of 
 having to undertake a fight by itself. As a 
 rule, it fights as part of a Battalion. Whereas 
 the Company Commander has to work entirely 
 on his own responsibility in the execution of his 
 task when acting independently, when his 
 Company forms part of a Battalion, he is bound, 
 in making his dispositions, to consider his 
 connection with the other companies. The 
 
THE COMPANY IN ACTION. 53 
 
 latter case, demands that the Commander 
 should not lose sight of what is going- on near 
 hini, and in rear of him, notwithstanding that 
 his attention is principally taken up by what 
 is occurring in his front. 
 
 The fight of the Battalion should be con- 
 sidered as a whole, the limits of which should 
 not be overstepped by any of its component 
 parts. But even within these limits, the inde- 
 pendence of the Company, of which it should 
 not in any way be deprived, is great as soon 
 as it enters into the fight. Orders from the 
 rear are quickly overtaken by events. A con- 
 stant waiting for orders, would render it 
 impossible for the Company to act rightly, and 
 at the proper moment 
 
 The independent forming of plans should, 
 however, always be regulated by the consider- 
 ation, that the connection with the Battalion as 
 as a whole, and the proper place in the same 
 throughout all the varying circumstances, 
 should be maintained. 
 
 90. The employment of a weak fighting-line 
 at the commencement of the action is ad- 
 visable, because with a strong fighting-line, a 
 change in the dispositions or a change of front 
 is always difficult, and when executed under 
 fire, always accompanied with loss. As a rule, 
 
54 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, l8S8. 
 
 entire Ziige are inserted by degrees into the 
 fighting-line. Whereas the simultaneous ex- 
 tension of several Ziige as a fighting-line, 
 would only be ordered under special circum- 
 stances, the extension of only half a Zug, or 
 even of a smaller party, is not precluded when 
 the object is to secure the Company against 
 surprise. 
 
 91. The progressive development of the 
 fight entails an increase of fire-action in the 
 foremost line, and, at the same time, the filling 
 up of casualties. For this purpose, the 
 fighting-line of a Company, may either be 
 prolonged or strengthened by the insertion of 
 reinforcements. The former procedure favours 
 the proper exercise of command and fire- 
 discipline, and should therefore, where practic- 
 able, be adopted. Notwithstanding this, the 
 latter will be of more frequent occurrence, for 
 when working in combination with other 
 troops, the requisite space for the prolongation 
 of the fighting-line will generally not be avail- 
 able. The Company should therefore, be so 
 trained, that the complete exercise of command 
 is not lost by the intermixture of men belong- 
 ing to different Ziige and Groups. 
 
 92. The extension of an entire Company 
 should, if possible, be avoided, or at least 
 
THE COMPANY IN ACTION. 55 
 
 postponed as long as practicable. A Company 
 entirely extended, is no longer under the con- 
 trol of the Commander in an attack, and, even 
 when occupying a position, can no longer be 
 commanded by him as a whole. It is then, 
 still further withdrawn from the command of 
 the Battalion Commander. The Company 
 Commander should therefore aim at retaining 
 a closed body under his control, in rear of the 
 fighting- line, as long as possible. It is only 
 with this body, that he will be able to fill up 
 the casualties, to support the attack or 
 defence, or to ward off any threatened flank 
 attack. 
 
 93. The support of a Company, a portion 
 of which has been extended, will, as a rule, be 
 formed by the remainder. The formation of 
 a smaller intermediate support, between the 
 fighting-line and the main-body of the Com- 
 pany, becomes necessary when the close 
 proximity of such a body to the fighting- 
 line is required. The necessity of flank pro- 
 tection, may likewise lead to the posting of 
 special bodies in rear of a flank. Such a 
 subdivision is always disadvantageous, and 
 should therefore be restricted to exceptional 
 cases. 
 
 The respective distances of the closed bodies, 
 
56 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 are regulated by the circumstances of the fight, 
 and by the formation of the ground. They 
 should be such as to ensure the right- 
 timed support of the fighting-line. The 
 choice of formation, is dependent on the 
 ground and the enemy's fire. When visible 
 by the enemy, the line is preferable ; the 
 column, on the other hand, can obtain cover 
 more readily. 
 
 94. If required, the entire strength of the 
 Company should be applied in order to sustain 
 the fight. Finally, whether the whole Com- 
 pany should be extended in the fighting-line, 
 or whether closed bodies should be -employed 
 at the last, depends upon the circumstances 
 under which the Company is fighting. In 
 any case, the intensity of fire should be 
 raised to the highest attainable pitch, 
 which should, if possible, be maintained 
 until the beginning of the end. 
 
 An isolated Company in action, having 
 to provide for its own support and flank pro- 
 tection, should employ the troops used for this 
 purpose in close formation, which will be found 
 most suitable whether on the offensive or 
 defensive. 
 
 When forming part of a Battalion, the 
 various duties of the attack and defence 
 
THE BATTALION IN ACTION. 57 
 
 will be divided amongst the several Com- 
 panies. 
 
 After the desired fire-effect has been pro- 
 duced, the assault is delivered at a smart run 
 on the points indicated in the enemy's 
 position. 
 
 95. The Commander should retain the 
 control of his company during the fight. He 
 conveys his intentions to the Zug leaders in 
 the form of concise and clear orders, and then 
 takes up such a position as will enable him to 
 direct his Company. He arranges for the 
 supply and distribution of the ammunition 
 brought up from the rear, with all the means 
 at his disposal on the battle field. 
 
 THE BATTALION IN ACTION. 
 
 96. The Battalion possesses, in its four Com- 
 panies, an organisation that enables it to adapt 
 itself most readily to whatever task may be 
 allotted to it in action. 
 
 The method adopted by the Commander in 
 working his Battalion in action, is to assign 
 tasks to the several Companies. Direct inter- 
 ference with the Ziige of individual Companies, 
 is only permitted when evident misunder- 
 standings or mistakes, threaten to divert 
 
58 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 the course of the fight into improper direc- 
 tions. 
 
 It is the duty of the Battalion Commander 
 at the commencement of the fight, to impart 
 his orders briefly, clearly, and with precision 
 to each one of his Company leaders if possible 
 in the presence of all leaving the manner of 
 execution to them. 
 
 He should be guided by this principle, 
 throughout the course of the action. His 
 endeavour should be, to maintain the co- 
 operation of the several Companies with one 
 another during the fight. The Companies on 
 their part should strive equally to preserve 
 this co-operation by accomplishing the tasks 
 assigned to them. 
 
 The Battalion Commander has often no time, 
 and still oftener no means, for the transmission 
 of an order in proper time. The termination 
 of the fight, should nevertheless find the several 
 Companies at their right places. Where that 
 is, cannot be decided beforehand. 
 
 97. The Commander will, in the majority 
 of cases, do well to postpone the extension 
 of entire Companies as long as possible. 
 
 Entirely extended Companies, are no longer 
 under the control of the Commander, and even 
 when occupying a position, can no longer be 
 
THE BATTALION IN ACTION. 59 
 
 commanded by him as a whole. Should a 
 strong fighting-line be required, it is prefer- 
 able at once to make use of several Companies, 
 forming their own support. This at the same 
 time prevents, as far as possible, the premature 
 ^mixing up of different Companies. 
 
 98. The disposition of the Battalion is regu- 
 lated by the object of the fight and by the 
 ground. No general rule exists, as to whether 
 a Battalion should have its four Companies or 
 only one in the front line. Whether it should 
 enter into the fight formed in one, two, or three 
 successive lines, the Commander possesses a 
 free choice according to circumstances. 
 
 The entire Battalion may deploy for the 
 fight at the halt, on any given Company, or, if 
 required, it can take up its position on the 
 move. The former will be the rarer case ; it 
 should, however, be equally practised. None 
 of the various formations should be turned 
 into fixed rules. 
 
 99. In the majority of cases, it will be ad- 
 visable to extend the Companies only as 
 required, retaining the remainder of the 
 Battalion in hand. For example, when a 
 fight is commenced on the march, by the 
 leading Company of the Advanced Guard, and 
 it becomes necessary to extend their front to 
 
,60 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 a flank, a second Company is employed for 
 this purpose. If it can be gathered from tie 
 progress of the fight, on which flank the main 
 body should be posted, or which flank is 
 threatened, the troops remaining in hand 
 will be formed up in rear of it. The cir- 
 cumstances which influence the manner of 
 co-operation of the four Companies, as well 
 as their extension and relation to each otjjer 
 during the fight, may vary considerably. 
 The Battalion Commander will always be in 
 a position to meet these circumstances, if he 
 maintains a deep formation, and only employs 
 his Companies where they are clearly required. 
 He should employ a sufficient number of 
 troops at the proper time, but should gua*d 
 against their premature absorption. 
 
 100. The movements of a Battalion once 
 extended, should be regulated by the indication 
 of a point to march on. With regard to the 
 amount of space occupied by a Battalion ex- 
 tended in action, it should be remembered that 
 the greatest measure of extension is given by 
 that of four Companies in a line. In extending 
 thus, however, the Battalion Commander 
 manifestly surrenders an important share of 
 his influence on the course of events. But 
 in the case of a Battalion fighting alone, when 
 
THE BATTALION IN ACTION. 6 1 
 
 the required space is undoubtedly available, a: 
 narrowing of front and an increase in depth, is 
 generally enjoined as the fighting formation. 
 As a rule, therefore, the front occupied in 
 action will be a narrower one. 
 
 The necessity for a deep formation, is 
 greatest in defensive positions, for a Battalion 
 fighting alone, and for extension at the com- 
 mencement of the fight. The narrower the 
 front taken up, the further should be the 
 flanking troops from the flanks. , 
 
 101. The only troops remaining at the dis- 
 posal of the Battalion Commander for carrying 
 on the fight, are those stationed either in 
 echelon or in rear of the centre. It is with 
 regard to these, that he selects his own position, 
 which is only quite exceptionally in the fore- 
 most line, nearly always with the troops 
 retained in rear, but in any case in some place 
 whence he can exercise supervision over his 
 Battalion in action. 
 
 He will frequently, only be able to affect 
 the fire-action of the Companies, by directing 
 the fresh supplies of ammunition to those 
 points in the fighting-line, where it may be 
 most needed. 
 
 102. Should a Battalion be drawn from the, 
 reserve, for the purpose of bringing the fight, 
 
62 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 which has been prepared by the fire-action 
 of other troops, to an immediate conclusion, it 
 should endeavour to profit by its previous 
 concentration. 
 
 In such cases the companies, opened out to 
 short intervals from each other, are enabled to 
 adopt a suitable fighting formation. 
 
 THE REGIMENT IN ACTION. 
 
 103, The Regiment, owing to its history, its 
 training as a whole, the homogeneity of its 
 corps of officers, and the number of its com- 
 ponent parts (3 or 4 Battalions, as the case 
 may be), is specially adapted for the inde- 
 pendent execution of tasks that may be 
 allotted to it in action. It is in the Regiment 
 that the instinct of co-operation is keenest^ 
 and the Commander is assisted by its organ- 
 isation in forming an accurate estimate of the 
 reinforcements required in action. The Com- 
 mander appoints to the Battalions their re- 
 spective tasks, leaving them perfect freedom 
 as to the manner of execution. 
 
 Interference with the conduct of individual 
 Companies should be restricted to rare excep- 
 tional cases, and is only justifiable when the 
 action of subordinate leaders threatens seriously 
 to interfere with the execution of the Com- 
 
THE REGIMENT IN ACTION. 63 
 
 mander's general intentions, and there is no 
 time to issue the necessary orders through 
 the proper channel. 
 
 The Commander retains his controlling 
 influence on the Battalions employed in the 
 foremost line during the fight most effectually, 
 by allotting to them separate sections of the 
 positions when on the defensive, and when on 
 the march or on the offensive by giving them 
 respectively points to march on. This may 
 be done, according to circumstances, by indi- 
 cating to Battalions a general point of direction, 
 situated at a sufficient distance from the front, 
 or by giving them separate objectives, or, 
 finally, by ordering one Battalion to follow 
 the required direction of march or attack, 
 directing the remainder to conform. 
 
 The co-operation of Battalions fighting 
 alongside each other, should be regulated by 
 directing their advance on some object in 
 their front, and never by causing them to 
 dress by a flank. Battalions, therefore, fight- 
 ing alongside each other, will never be dressed 
 by a flank. On the other hand, it will doubt- 
 less be very frequently necessary, to order 
 connection to be kept up during the fight by 
 the centre or by a flank. 
 
 104. The forces kept in hand by the Regi- 
 
64 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 mental Commander, are the only means he 
 possesses for developing the fight in depth or 
 breadth as required by circumstances, or in 
 accordance with his intentions. He will never 
 allow more Battalions to pass out of his control 
 than are actually necessary for the progressive 
 development of the fight. He thus retains 
 control over that portion of the battle-field 
 which falls to his share, and remains well 
 prepared for the various contingencies of the 
 fight. It is more particularly only in this 
 manner that the enemy's flank can be turned, 
 or his flank attacks warded off successfully. 
 The Commander is only able to execute a 
 fresh change of front by employing the Bat- 
 talions retained in rear, those already engaged 
 being tied down to their fighting front. The 
 difficulty of pushing on the foremost fighting 
 line, increases with the numbers employed. 
 
 The preliminary deployment for the fight, 
 which should be prepared for by the Regi- 
 mental Commander while still in column of 
 march or formation of assembly, must there- 
 fore precede the accurate determination of the 
 front to be occupied when in action. The 
 disposition of the Regiment in breadth or 
 depth, is regulated by the extent of this front 
 and by the relative position of the Regi- 
 
THE REGIMENT IN ACTION. 65 
 
 ment to the neighbouring troops. The 
 narrower the first deployment, the greater 
 should be the interval between the bodies re- 
 tained in rear. 
 
 105. It makes a considerable difference 
 whether the Regiment enters into the fight from 
 column of march, or from formation of as- 
 sembly. The leading Battalion may, in the 
 former case find itself already engaged by the 
 time the next one arrives on the ground. A 
 deep formation for the leading Battalion, and 
 the earliest adoption of column formation for 
 the remainder, with a view to shortening the 
 column of route, is then rendered necessary. 
 The deployment for the fight should already 
 have been begun, during the advance to 
 occupy the position indicated by Regimental 
 Commanders. 
 
 106. A flank march in the presence of the 
 enemy which might possibly become neces- 
 sary, can only be conducted with sufficient 
 safety, when the formation adopted at the 
 commencement of the movement is such as 
 to ensure a right timed and properly organised 
 deployment towards the enemy. Such a 
 flank march within effective range of the 
 enemy could, however, only be carried out 
 when covered by the formation of the ground. 
 
 F 
 
66 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 107. A normal extension of front cannot be 
 laid down for an Infantry Regiment. The 
 extent of front it occupies, depends upon the 
 nature of the unit of which it forms part, as 
 well as upon the object of the fight, and the 
 character of the ground. The extent of front 
 of a Regiment fighting alone, on the other 
 hand, should at the commencement rarely 
 exceed that of two Battalions extended 
 alongside each other. 
 
 108. In carrying out the attack, the Regi- 
 ment once deployed, moves, as a rule, direct 
 to the front. Should any inclination to a 
 flank become necessary, it is indicative of a 
 mistake committed in the original deploy- 
 ment. The remedy for such a mistake, lies 
 generally in bringing up the troops echeloned 
 in rear, but it will nearly invariably result in 
 the weakening of the blow delivered. 
 
 109. For the due execution of the tasks 
 imposed upon him, the Regimental Commander 
 should take up a properly selected position. 
 At the commencement, this will be in front, 
 His presence is principally required there, in 
 the case of an encounter between troops in 
 motion. During the fight, he can generally 
 direct his troops to the best advantage from 
 the vicinity of the bodies echeloned in rear, 
 
THE BRIGADE IN ACTION. 67 
 
 that is, whence he can exercise the best super- 
 vision over the deployment of his Regiment- 
 Should his Regiment be fighting in Brigade, he 
 should select such a position as will enable 
 him to keep up communication with the 
 Brigade Commander. 
 
 THE BRIGADE IN ACTION. 
 
 110. The Brigade is the largest unit of 
 command which it is possible to exercise on 
 limited areas. 
 
 As a Battalion at war strength with its light 
 baggage occupies 400 m.* of road, the distance 
 taken up by a Brigade is so considerable, that 
 the character of the fight is at times seri- 
 ously affected thereby. 
 
 The action of the Brigade depends upon 
 the time required for deployment, it is there- 
 fore important to keep in view the difference 
 between the distances required by the same 
 units at war strength, and on a peace footing. 
 
 111. It is only a Brigade composed of three 
 Regiments, or of two Regiments and a Jager 
 Battalion, that possesses the advantage of a 
 tripartition. When the subdivision is in two 
 parts, the Brigade Commander will frequently 
 
 * 427 yards. 
 
 F 2 
 
68 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 be compelled to set aside a reserve, according 
 to the object of the fight not less than one 
 Battalion. 
 
 112. The best fighting-formation for the 
 Brigade, is with its Regiments placed alongside 
 each other, dividing the front occupied, and 
 regulating their own reinforcements as required. 
 
 But the adoption of this normal formation 
 is not always possible from the commence- 
 ment, nor should the more important con- 
 siderations bearing on the fight be sacrificed 
 in the endeavour to assume it. 
 
 Occasionally, in the encounter of troops in 
 motion, the needs of the foremost line may 
 render the hurried adoption of a broad forma- 
 tion imperative, the majority of the Battalions 
 of the leading Regiment being thus at once 
 brought up alongside each other in the first 
 line. Such circumstances render it specially 
 necessary for these Battalions to arrange for 
 their own supports and reserves, as the leading 
 Battalion should never count upon the Battalion 
 following it, being available for the support of 
 its fighting-line. The rule should be strictly 
 adhered to under all circumstances, that 
 each Regiment is to be allotted its own 
 separate task, and that the Brigade Com- 
 mander should confine himself to delivering 
 
THE BRIGADE IN ACTION. 69 
 
 his orders only to Regiments. The mixing- 
 up of Regiments is disadvantageous, and 
 should not, if possible, be resorted to. 
 
 In the majority of such cases, therefore, the 
 Regiment next in succession in the column of 
 route will form up in rear of one of the flanks, 
 and will be kept there as a decisive reinforce- 
 ment. The more circumstances may have 
 necessitated a hurried deployment into a 
 broad formation at the commencement, the 
 more carefully should this reinforcement be 
 there retained. 
 
 113. The Brigade is such an important body, 
 owing to its fighting power and the space it 
 occupies when deployed for fighting, or on the 
 line of march, that it may fairly be required to 
 fight simultaneously and as a body, in several 
 directions. In this case the distances covered 
 by its component parts, from their respective 
 positions in the column of march previous to 
 deploying in the required direction, are con- 
 siderable. The moving to a flank of troops 
 already deployed, is no longer possible in this 
 instance. The Commander should bear in 
 mind that the length of the Brigade column 
 of route should be reduced in proper time 
 previous to a deployment, by the deployment 
 of its several parts and subsequent closing up 
 
70 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 of the troops in rear. The several portions 
 will avail themselves of any halts that may 
 occur, for the purpose of obviating unneces- 
 sary delays in the deployment of the whole. 
 
 Together with the orders for the fight, the 
 Regiments are given their respective points of 
 attack, or sections of ground to be defended. 
 The better connected these are, the more com- 
 plete will be the co-operation of the Regi- 
 ments. 
 
 114. The selection of the Brigade Com- 
 mander's position is of great importance and 
 should be changed as rarely as possible. 
 
 The commencement of an action should 
 find him at the head of his Brigade ; for neither 
 reports, nor information, nor maps can take 
 the place of a personal inspection of the 
 enemy's position, that of the neighbouring 
 tro6ps, or of the ground. In that position he 
 is best able effectually to direct the initial 
 deployment, on which the subsequent course 
 of the action so greatly depends. It likewise 
 enables him to seize advantages over the 
 enemy by arriving at timely decisions, to 
 ensure his troops taking the shortest routes, 
 to direct their action into proper channels, and, 
 finally, to prevent any irregular action on the 
 part of the commander of the advanced troops. 
 
THE BRIGADE IN ACTION. 71 
 
 During the action, however, the Commander 
 remains sufficiently in rear to enable him to 
 exercise supervision over the several parts of 
 his Brigade. This will generally be in the 
 vicinity of the troops he has retained at his 
 own disposal. It is only from there that he 
 can still control the course of the fight He 
 delivers his orders, as a rule, to his immediate 
 subordinates. Should circumstances compel 
 him to deviate from this rule, and to give 
 individual Battalions direct orders for the 
 execution of urgent measures, he should at 
 once inform the Regimental Commander of 
 the fact, with whom he should maintain 
 uninterrupted communication. 
 
 115. The average extent of front of a 
 Brigade in action, may be deduced from 
 experience gained in war. 
 
 A Brigade of six Battalions, in its initial 
 deployment for the fight, has occupied a front 
 of 1000 1200 metres.* 
 
 116. The execution of tactical exercises 
 presents the greatest difficulty in the case of a 
 Brigade, owing to the space required for its 
 movements and deployments for action. The 
 object to be attained on the drill ground, will 
 not be so much the conduct of one fight in its 
 
 * 1094-1313 yards. 
 
72 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 various stages, as the representation of a variety 
 of deployments under different suppositions. 
 Practice in adopting formations suited to the 
 object in view, forms the most important 
 tactical task of the Brigade. The conduct of 
 the fight, on the other hand, should, whenever 
 possible, be practised in the country. 
 
 C. CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
 
 117. The simplicity of the formations and 
 rules laid down in these Regulations, must 
 favour thoroughness of training. 
 
 They suffice for the requisite uniform 
 training of the whole of the Infantry, and 
 their simplicity is a guarantee that the re- 
 serve men rejoining the colours on the order 
 for mobilisation, relearn them in the shortest 
 possible time. A close watch should, however, 
 be kept, that the strict discipline developed 
 on the drill ground, is maintained so far as 
 circumstances admit, during field practices 
 as well as on the battlefield. 
 
 118. The foregoing aspects of the fight, 
 afford an ample variety of exercises. The 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS. 73 
 
 principles of deployment for attack, defence, 
 retreat, or execution of a turning movement, 
 with or without flank protection from other 
 troops or the ground, combined with changes 
 of front, and transition from one tactical oper- 
 ation into another, finally, with or without 
 taking the formation of the ground into account, 
 should be represented, practised, and clearly 
 inculcated on the drill ground, under the 
 supposition of the simplest possible situations 
 of war. 
 
 119. It is the duty of Commanders to 
 practise all the principles laid down by these 
 Regulations .during the period of training at 
 their disposal. The variation of the assumed 
 situation furthers tactical training. Prac- 
 tising particular representations of the fight 
 is prohibited. 
 
 120. The Inspecting Officer prescribes a 
 task to be performed at the Inspection. It 
 it only in this manner that he is enabled to 
 form a correct opinion as to the thoroughness 
 of the tactical training of the troops, and 
 especially of that of officers of all grades. 
 
 121. It should be borne in mind that the 
 formations and principles laid down only deal 
 with the simplest cases, and, owing to change 
 of circumstances, will frequently experience 
 
74 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1 888. 
 
 modification when applied in the presence of 
 the enemy. In the event of this being neces- 
 sary owing to the nature of the fight, all 
 Commanders each one in his own sphere, 
 should be practised to adapt their plans rapidly 
 and without hesitation to any situation, and 
 should always realise that omission and 
 neglect will form a heavier indictment 
 against them, than a mistake in the selec- 
 tion of adopted means. Adherence to certain 
 formations, should never be allowed to divert 
 their attention from essentials. 
 
 122. The aim of all exercises, as well as of 
 the whole course of training, should be to 
 preserve and foster the existing predilection 
 for the offensive. 
 
 As soon as a fair field of fire is obtained, 
 and circumstances do not point to the necessity 
 of bringing the fight to an immediate conclu- 
 sion, the Infantry should endeavour to reap to 
 the full the great advantage to be derived from 
 a steady fire of troops in position. It should 
 therefore be accustomed, at any moment and 
 at every turn of the fight, rapidly, if even only 
 temporarily, to develop its fire-action to its 
 highest possible intensity, in order to be able 
 subsequently to attack the enemy with all 
 the more energy and effect. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS. 75 
 
 123. During the field practices of the larger 
 units the husbanding of the men's strength 
 at the right time should receive due con- 
 sideration. This point should receive constant 
 attention, all the more because the troops may 
 when necessary, be required to fight regardless 
 of odds,to exert themselves to the utmost, and 
 to exhibit entire self-sacrifice. 
 
 124. The larger the scale of the fight, the 
 greater the scope for individual action. The 
 attention of Commanders should be devoted 
 more to carrying out their special task as a 
 whole, than to the supervision of details. The 
 attainment of any object by the employment 
 of uniform means on the part of the several 
 units, should not therefore be considered of 
 any importance. But the scope allowed to 
 subordinate leaders, should never be per- 
 mitted to interfere with the plans of the 
 Commander, and under all circumstances 
 the maintenance of tactical order and the 
 internal cohesion of the troops should be 
 insisted upon. 
 
 125. The more advanced practices with 
 mixed units, and even tactical exercises in 
 which the presence of the various arms is 
 supposed, produce tactical situations, and call 
 forth decisions which are far beyond the scope 
 
76 GERMAN FIELD EXERCISE, 1878. 
 
 of these Regulations. These Regulations in no 
 way exhaust tactical instruction ; they confine 
 themselves to dealing with the fundamental 
 rules. But the troops will be able, even in 
 action, to cope with any possible task, if they 
 have, by practice, mastered the rules contained 
 in these Regulations. 
 
 Their training may properly be considered 
 as successfully accomplished, when they 
 are capable of performing what is 
 required in war, and when no part of 
 what has been taught on the drill 
 ground, has to be unlearnt on the 
 battle-field. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
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78 APPENDIX. 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 Zug = 2 Half Ziige (subdivided into sec- 
 
 tions of not more than 6 and 
 not less than 4 files each). 
 
 Company = 3 Zlige. 
 
 Battalion = 4 Companies. 
 
 Regiment = 3 or 4 Battalions. 
 
 Brigade = 2 Regiments (3 in some cases). 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 NORMAL FORMATIONS. 
 
 Ziige, Companies, Battalions, Regiments, are 
 always numbered Right to Left. The distances 
 between Ziige and Companies in all Column 
 Formations, are invariably 7 paces. 
 
 A. Company Formations. 
 
 In two ranks. 
 
 1. Line. 
 
 2. Company Column. No. i Zug in the centre. 
 
 No. 2 leading. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 79 
 
 i. Double Column 
 
 B. Battalion Formations. 
 
 The Companies in Battalion are always in Com- 
 pany Column. 
 
 ist and 3rd Companies 
 abreast; No. i on the right, 
 with 2nd and 4th in rear. 
 
 This formation is adopted for 
 purposes of assembly, and 
 for movements outside the 
 sphere of the enemy's fire. 
 
 Companies form up in rear 
 of one another. No. i in 
 front ; remainder in suc- 
 cession to the rear. 
 
 Used for purposes of as- 
 sembly, when a narrow 
 front is required, or 
 when a march is to be 
 commenced from the point 
 of assembly. 
 
 The Companies are formed 
 up in line of compy. cols. 
 
 Used for parade purposes, 
 and when the intended 
 deployment demands a 
 greater extent of front 
 than of depth. It is not 
 suited for executing Bat- 
 talion changes of front. 
 It is always adopted for 
 re-assembling after a fight, 
 unless otherwise ordered. 
 
 2. Deep Column < 
 
 3. Broad Column 
 
80 APPENDIX. 
 
 C. Regimental Formations. 
 Battalions are usually formed in Double Column, 
 in one or two lines. If composed of 3 Battalions, 
 2 are in front, and i in rear of the centre. 20 paces 
 interval between Battalions, 30 paces distance 
 between lines. 
 
 D. Brigade Formations. 
 
 1. In wings. Regiments in mass of " Battalion 
 
 Double Columns," formed up alongside each 
 other. 
 
 2. In line. The junior Regiment in front. 
 Intervals and distances are the same as for the 
 
 Regiment. 
 
 ^^STS**^ 
 
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