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 ON MR. SPENCER'S 
 FORMULA OF EVOLUTION.
 
 O&ffantjme Jpreas 
 
 BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO. 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON
 
 ON ME. SPENCER'S 
 
 FORMULA OF EVOLUTION 
 
 AS AN EXHAUSTIVE STATEMENT OF THE 
 CHANGES OF THE UNIVERSE, 
 
 L 
 
 MALCOLM GUTHRIE. 
 
 FOLLOWED BY A RESUME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CRITICISMS 
 OF SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES." 
 
 LONDON: 
 TKUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. 
 
 1879- 
 
 [All rights reserved.]
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THIS criticism is not written in a spirit hostile to the 
 doctrine of Evolution, considered as a development ac- 
 cording to natural orders of sequence from the more 
 simple to the more complex, nor to the theory of the 
 development of the higher organisms from the lower. 
 
 Free from all bias, it is simply intended to be a 
 logical examination of an important theory which has 
 been placed before the thinking world for its acceptance. 
 This criticism I present in the following manner : 
 First, I ask what Mr. Spencer means by Philosophy, 
 and what is the problem it involves. I find, according 
 to him, that Philosophy is completely unified knowledge, 
 and that 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY 
 is 
 
 To state an intelligible formula, which, by its application 
 to the Homogeneous, will explain, and enable us to construct, 
 ideally, all the changes of the universe. 
 
 I then enter upon an inquiry into Mr. Spencer's For- 
 mula of Philosophy, which, though intelligible, appears 
 
 6
 
 vi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to me insufficient, inasmuch as its two factors, Matter 
 and Motion, do not afford an explanation of the facts of 
 life and mind. 
 
 I then attempt to amend the formula by the introduc- 
 tion of the term Force, which Mr. Spencer largely employs 
 in his preliminary exposition, but which he has after- 
 wards allowed to drop out of the formula, and I then 
 find that the amended formula, though sufficient, is 
 unintelligible. 
 
 I next endeavour, from a study of Mr. Spencer's ex- 
 position, to frame a formula which shall be a true repre- 
 sentation of it, but which, at the best, I am only able to 
 make a sufficient formula by making it vague, and to that 
 extent unintelligible. 
 
 From which it results, that although the changes of 
 the universe, in all its departments, conform to certain 
 general processes of development or Evolution, and thus 
 present a general similarity in the order of their changes, 
 yet we cannot state an intelligible formula, which, by its 
 application to the Homogeneous, will enable us to account 
 for and construct, ideally, the changes of the universe. 
 
 From this it follows, that however much I may ad- 
 mire, and however much our thinkers may value, some 
 of Mr. Spencer's great generalisations, we must come to 
 the conclusion that he has not succeeded in solving the 
 main problem which he submits and sets down as the 
 aim of his work. 
 
 The implication is that no such problem of Philosophy
 
 INTRODUCTION. vii 
 
 can ever be solved, and that there is in the universe a 
 factor which is more than Matter and Motion, and more 
 than Force considered as the sum total of them. 
 
 This factor, and its import as a matter of science and 
 of individual personal value, is reserved for considera- 
 tion in the fifth and concluding portion of this criticism. 
 
 As a matter of interest to the student of Mr. Spencer's 
 Philosophy, I append the results of a task which I 
 lately undertook for my own instruction. This consists 
 of a statement of the principal criticisms affecting the 
 essential theories involved in the work, so far as they 
 have come under my notice. 
 
 This work is an elaboration of papers read before the 
 Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, Sessions 
 1877-78 and 1878-79. The references are to "First 
 Principles," third edition, October 1875. 
 
 2 PARKFIELD ROAD, 
 
 LIVERPOOL, June 1879.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION, ....... v 
 
 PART I. 
 THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY, .... i 
 
 PART II. 
 
 AN INQUIRY AS TO THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE SUF- 
 FICIENCY OF MR. SPENCER'S FORMULA, . . 7 
 Definitions of Matter and Motion, 
 
 A Study of the Process of Dissolution, . . . 1 1 
 
 A Study of "the Homogeneous," . . . . 17 
 
 How Affected by Gravitation, .... 20 
 
 On the " Instability of the Homogeneous," . . 23 
 
 The Formula applied to Primary Evolution, . . 29 
 The Formula Considered with Respect to the Origin of 
 
 Organic Matter and Organisms, ... 30 
 An Endeavour to Realise what is meant by Resolving all 
 
 Changes into Factors of Matter and Motion, . 66 
 
 Conclusion of the Argument, .... 69 
 
 PART III. 
 
 AN INQUIRY AS TO THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY 
 OF MR. SPENCER'S FORMULA, WITH THE INCLUSION 
 OF THE TERM " FORCE," .... 73 
 
 Force in Relation to Matter and Motion, and on Force 
 
 as an Unknowable Factor, . . . . 73
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Criticism of "First Principles," ... 77 
 
 Of Chapter I. Philosophy Defined, . 7 8 
 
 Of Chapter II. The Data of Philosophy, . . 79 
 
 Of Chapter III. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, Force, . 79 
 
 Of Chapter IV. The Indestructibility of Matter, . 86 
 
 Of Chapter V. The Continuity of Motion, . . 87 
 
 Of Chapter VI. The Persistence of Force, . . 88 
 Of Chapter VII. The Persistence of Relations amongst 
 
 Forces, ....... 91 
 
 Of Chapter VIII. The Transformation and Equivalence 
 
 of Forces, ...... 93 
 
 Of Chapter IX. The Direction of Motion, . . 96 
 Of Chapter X. The Rhythm of Motion, ... 97 
 Of Chapter XL Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recom- 
 mencement, ...... 97 
 
 Of Chapter XII. Evolution and Dissolution, . . 99 
 
 Of Chapter XIII. Simple and Compound Evolution, . 104 
 Of Chapters XIV., XV., XVI., and XVII. The Law of 
 
 Evolution, . . . . . .108 
 
 Of Chapter XVIII. The Interpretation of Evolution, . 115 
 
 Of Chapter XIX. The Instability of the Homogeneous, 120 
 
 Of Chapter XXII. Equilibration, . . . 121 
 
 Of Chapter XX. The Multiplication of Effects, . . 122 
 Of Chapter XXI. Segregation, . . . .124 
 
 Of Chapter XXIII. Dissolution, . . . . 124 
 
 Of Chapter XXIV. Summary and Conclusion, . . 124 
 Summary of Criticism, . . . . .128 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 AN ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA AGREEABLE TO MR. 
 SPENCER'S EXPOSITION OF EVOLUTION, AND AN IN- 
 QUIRY AS TO ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AS THE FORMULA 
 OF PHILOSOPHY, . . . . .132 
 
 By the Omission from the Formula of the terms "Matter" 
 and "Motion," leaving Integration as the Essence 
 of Evolution, without specifying the Nature of the 
 Factors or Activities, . . . . .132 
 
 "Integration" as applied to Sidereal and Geologic 
 
 Evolution, ; 133
 
 CONTENTS. xi 
 
 As applied to Organic Evolution, . . . 133 
 
 As applied to Further Organic Evolution, . . 134 
 
 As applied to Super-organic Evolution, . . 135 
 
 As applied to Language, . . . . 136 
 
 As applied to Science, . . . . 137 
 
 As applied to the ^Esthetic Arts, . . . 137 
 
 Criticism, ...... 138 
 
 By the Introduction of a Third Factor into the Formula, 
 
 viz., Feeling or Consciousness, . . . 139 
 
 Mr. Spencer on the Substance of Mind, . . 143 
 
 Mr. Spencer on the Composition of Mind, . . 147 
 
 Summary of Criticism, . . . . . 151 
 
 PART V. 
 
 CRITICISE OF THE BOOK ON "THE UNKNOWABLE," . 152 
 
 On the Relativity of Knowledge, . . . .152 
 
 On Naming and Correlations of Names . . . 153 
 
 On the term "the Relative," .... 155 
 On the term " the Absolute," . . . . 156 
 
 Statement of the Argument of the Chapter, with De- 
 tailed Criticism, . . . . . 157 
 
 On Ultimate Scientific Ideas, . . . . 1 75 
 
 As taken from the Formula of Evolution, . . 175 
 
 As rendered in this Chapter, . . . . 1 76 
 
 On Ultimate Religious Ideas, . . . .178 
 
 The Conflict, . . . . . .180 
 
 Any Reconciliation, . . . . .182 
 
 Mr. Spencer's Solution of it, . . . 182 
 
 Criticism thereof, . . . . .184 
 
 Possible Modes of Reconciliation, . . . 186 
 
 Dynamism, ....... 187 
 
 Conclusion, . . . . . . .188 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 THE FOREGOING AS AFFECTED BY MK. SPENCER'S "REPLIES 
 
 TO CRITICISM," ...... 189 
 
 The Absolute, . . . . . .189 
 
 Mind and Matter, ...... 192 
 
 Recapitulation, . . . . . .196
 
 xii CONTENTS. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS OF MR. 
 
 SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY, . , . . . 197 
 Professor Birks, .... .198 
 
 John Fiske, Harvard University, . . . .201 
 
 Dr. Martineau, . . . . . 216 
 
 Martineau and Tyndall, ..... 224 
 
 Professor Tyndall, ...... 224 
 
 The late Professor Clifford, ..... 230 
 
 " British Quarterly Review " (Mr. J. F. Moulton), . 240 
 
 G. H. Lewes, ...... 242 
 
 James Sully in the " Encyclopaedia Britannica, . . 242 
 
 Professor Bowne, ...... 248 
 
 Professor Green, . . . . . , 257 
 
 GENERAL SUMMARY, ..... 264
 
 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 PART I. 
 THE PEOBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 To frame, an intelligible Formula, which, by its applica- 
 tion to the Homogeneous, will explain and enable us 
 ideally to construct and account for all the changes of 
 the universe. 
 
 WE have before us "A System of Synthetic Philo- 
 sophy," vol. i. "First Principles," by Herbert Spencer, 
 and our first object is to understand it. We approach it 
 as students critical students ; we come to learn, but 
 we must understand as we go along. And the first 
 question that naturally occurs to us is, " What does Mr. 
 Spencer mean by Philosophy ? " 
 
 In part ii., ch. i. 37, we find Philosophy defined as 
 " knowledge of the highest degree of generality ; " or again, 
 " Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unifted knowledge ; 
 Science is partially-unified knowledge ; philosophy is 
 completely-unified knowledge." 
 
 Is philosophy, then, only the summary of our know- 
 ledge, or is it a representation of the changes of the 
 universe ? is it limited to our knowledge, or does it 
 
 A
 
 2 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 express the whole course of the history of things ? Does 
 it relate to the subjective or to the objective or to 
 both? 
 
 In sect. 1 8 6, "Summary and Conclusion," we find a 
 reply to this question : 
 
 " In commencing our search, ... it was shown that a philo- 
 sophy stands self-convicted of inadequacy if it does not formu- 
 late the whole series of changes passed through by every 
 existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the per- 
 ceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. 
 If it begins its explanations with existences that already have 
 concrete forms, or leaves off while they still retain concrete 
 forms, then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will 
 have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given. 
 And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of 
 possible knowledge, a philosophy which says nothing about 
 them falls short of the required unification. Whence we saw it 
 to follow that the formula sought, equally applicable to exist- 
 ences taken singly and in their totality, must be applicable to 
 the whole history of each and to the whole history of all" 
 
 Here we have, then, an explanation of the phrases, 
 " knowledge of the highest degree of generality," " com- 
 pletely unified knowledge," and find the statement im- 
 plied that philosophy, to be adequate, must express in a 
 formula " the whole series of changes passed through by 
 every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to 
 the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the 
 imperceptible." And we note in the first place an 
 ambiguity from not terminating the explanation at the 
 word " existence," for the succeeding part of the sentence 
 introduces the term "perceptibility." This is, however, 
 corrected in the following sentence, which, independently 
 of perceptibility, speaks of preceding or succeeding histo- 
 ries, and therefore comprehends all changes previous to 
 or succeeding to the existence of an organism to which
 
 THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 3 
 
 such changes are perceptible, but to which they are 
 nevertheless subjects of possible knowledge. 
 
 Philosophy, then, must express in a formula "the 
 whole series of changes passed through by every exist' 
 ence." To guard against misunderstanding, it is to be 
 presumed that the word "existence" includes not only 
 concrete bodies, such as solids, liquids, and gases, but 
 every form of matter and motion. What these latter 
 words mean will come under our consideration in due 
 time. 
 
 The Formula of Philosophy. 
 
 " The law sought must be the law of the continuous 
 redistribution of matter and motion. The changes every- 
 where going on ... are changes in the relative positions 
 of component parts, and everywhere necessarily imply 
 ... a new arrangement of motion. Hence we may be 
 certain, d priori, that there must be a law of the con- 
 comitant redistribution of matter and motion, which 
 holds of every change, and which, by thus unifying all 
 changes, must be the basis of a philosophy." 
 
 In what terms, then, must the formula be propounded? 
 In terms of the continuous redistribution of matter and 
 motion. " It could be no other than one defining the 
 opposite processes of concentration and diffusion in terms 
 of matter and motion, ... a statement of the truth /? 
 
 f/ 
 
 that the concentration of matter implies the dissipation G*&& 
 
 *'-" *^.. * * '' 
 
 of motion, and that, conversely, the absorption of motion 
 implies the diffusion of matter" (p. 542). 
 
 Here we note that the formula does not take into 
 account the existence of an organism to which these 
 changes are perceptible, but, quite independently of any 
 such relation, it is applicable to all changes of matter
 
 ; 
 
 4 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 and motion. This in corroboration of a previous con- 
 clusion that the formula of philosophy is to be freed 
 from relation to perceptibility. 
 
 This is an important point, for if matter and motion 
 were the two original factors, then they existed apart from 
 perception, and the latter was either added afterwards, 
 
 ji i ii m 
 
 or was a natural sequence from them. If added after- 
 wards, the formula containing the two factors is only 
 good till the third is added. If a natural sequence, then 
 it is not to be included in the formula, but is to be ex- 
 plained by it. But if not in it, then the formula must be 
 understood apart from perception and consciousness, which 
 can be done. And though we are obliged to say that 
 there can be no conception of matter and motion without 
 a perceiving body, yet a perceiving body can conceive of 
 what existed before it came into existence from concep- 
 tions derived from present experiences, and thus we can 
 conceive of the two factors, matter and motion, and their 
 changes and combinations anterior to the existence of a 
 perceiving body. 
 
 But if all this is denied, and it is stated that matter 
 and motion could not exist without consciousness, then 
 we have three factors which have to be included in the 
 formula, and we have to predicate matter and motion 
 and consciousness as the factors of Evolution. 
 
 As, however, Mr. Spencer includes only two factors in 
 his formula, to these two factors we limit our considera- 
 tions in Part II. of our criticism, however much we may 
 enlarge the scope of our speculations afterwards. 
 
 But we will pause a moment to consider the meaning 
 of the word " existence." I presume an atom of gold is an 
 existence. I presume an atom of hydrogen or of oxygen 
 is an existence. I presume that all the so-called ele-
 
 THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 5 
 
 mentary substances are existences. I suppose, also, 
 they would be held to be perceptible, since even in the 
 gaseous state, although invisible, they are capable of 
 manipulation, and therefore afford knowledge to the 
 mind. According to the passage before us, we are re- 
 quired to explain their passage into these differentiated 
 conditions, i.e., how gold became gold, and hydrogen 
 became hydrogen. As concrete existences, they must 
 have had preceding histories, which are subjects of pos- 
 sible knowledge, and which histories a formula of philo- 
 sophy is required to include. 
 
 And we are obliged, further, to conclude that the word 
 " existence" comprises those experiences which we term 
 heat and light, electricity, magnetism, &c., which are all 
 decidedly perceptible. 
 
 Also, does it not include gravitation ? and we might 
 ask, if it were not for introducing an element of confusion 
 prematurely into our studies, does it include conscious- 
 ness also ? 
 
 A further ambiguity appears in the word " formulate," 
 or " express in a formula." Does it mean the construc- 
 tion of a formula which shall, by its generality, comprise 
 the description of every change knowable by us ? or does 
 it mean a statement that shall explain the sequences of 
 all phenomena in intelligible terms? The former does 
 not account for sequences ; it only characterises the 
 totality of the changes. The latter claims to show the 
 nature of the relation of antecedent and sequence, so that 
 from any given state or condition of things (given the 
 requisite knowledge), we may be enabled to work out 
 all future sequences. The former is a loose and vague 
 generality, descriptive of the general character of changes; 
 the latter is penetrative and constructive. The latter is
 
 6 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 what Mr. Spencer appears to aim at, and is implied in 
 the title " Synthetic Philosophy ; " the former is all that 
 he accomplishes. 
 
 But this does not answer to the requirements of 
 philosophy, according to Mr. Spencer's own showing. 
 Explanations are wanted, not generalisations. We seek a 
 law of construction, so that from the homogeneous or 
 undifferentiated we can understand by deduction all the 
 subsequent differentiations, and see that what has hap- 
 pened must have happened. We presume to lay down, 
 then, as Mr. Spencer's understanding of the task of philo- 
 sophy, this synthetic problem, viz., to frame an intelligible 
 formula, which, by its application to the homogeneous, 
 shall enable us ideally to construct and account for all 
 the changes of the universe.
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 PART II. 
 
 AN INQUIRY AS TO THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND THE 
 SUFFICIENCY OF MR. SPENCER'S FORMULA. 
 
 THE quotation as to the law sought given on page 3 implies 
 that all knowledge is the knowledge of matter or material 
 substances and the knowledge of their motions. Com- 
 pletely unified knowledge is the expression in a formula 
 of the general or universal characteristics of all changes 
 of the motions, combinations, and relations of material 
 substances, and the formula which expresses these changes 
 in the most general way is the integration of matter 
 and the contemporaneous dissipation or transference of 
 motion. 
 
 The formula propounded by Mr. Spencer is as fol- 
 lows (p. 396) : 
 
 "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant 
 dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an 
 indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent hetero- 
 geneity, and during which, the retained motion undergoes a 
 parallel transformation." 
 
 This formula seems to be of a descriptive rather than 
 of a constructive character. It seems to summarise rather 
 than to explain. It does not, in its bare enunciation, 
 account for these integrations and dissipations. It does 
 not account for itself. Whether it attempts to do this 
 or not we will hereafter inquire. 
 
 ^ iVesru , * i */)(** 
 
 *3Uttitcfc 4H$* 
 
 A <f
 
 8 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Here let us pause to consider the meaning of words 
 included in the formula. 
 
 Definitions of Matter and Motion. 
 
 " Matter," 48. " We may therefore deliver ourselves 
 over without hesitation to those terms of thought which 
 experience has organised in us. We need not, in our 
 physical, chemical, or other researches, refrain from deal- 
 ing with matter as made up of extended and resistant 
 atoms ; for this conception, necessarily resulting from our 
 experiences of matter, is not less legitimate than the con- 
 ception of aggregate masses as extended and resistant. 
 The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis 
 of an all-pervading ether consisting of molecules, is 
 simply a necessary development of those universal forms 
 which the actions of the Unknowable have wrought in 
 us. The conclusions logically worked out by the aid of 
 these hypotheses are sure to be in harmony with all 
 others which these same forms involve, and will have a 
 relative truth that is equally complete." Matter, then, is 
 made up of extended and resistant atoms. 
 
 The differentiations of atoms, or, by preference, ultimate 
 units for atoms of the seventy or eighty so-called elemen- 
 tary substances are now regarded as composite, and, on Mr. 
 Spencer's hypothesis, are bound to be so regarded can, 
 then, only be in differentiations of extension, viz., shape or 
 size. Now, differentiations of shape and size are distin- 
 guishable and measurable ; and although the shapes and 
 sizes of ultimate units, if differentiated, are beyond our 
 observation, it is necessary to consider them as possessed 
 of shapes and sizes, which, if we had the capacity, would 
 be representable geometrically and arithmetically. There
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 9 
 
 could be no other differentiation in them. Their only 
 other property, viz., resistance, means merely that two of 
 them could not occupy the same space at the same time. 
 
 "Motion." I do not find the term "motion" ex- 
 plained apart from a perceptive organism. I only find a 
 description of the conception of motion, involving (sect. 49) 
 " a something that moves ; a series of positions occupied 
 in succession ; and a group of co-existent positions united 
 in thought with the successive ones. These are the con- 
 stituents of the idea." But as it is necessary to eliminate 
 the perceptive organism in accordance with the require- 
 ments of the formula which is to explain all changes 
 anterior to or subsequent to the existence of a perceptive 
 organism, we are obliged to modify the explanation of 
 the term. Motion, then, must be a description applicable 
 to the previous description of matter that is to say, to 
 extended and resistant atoms. So applied, we have for 
 the word " something" in the above quotation " extended 
 and resistant atoms" "that move." 
 
 Then, again, " a series of positions occupied in succes- 
 sion" must mean positions of each atom in relation to 
 itself, i.e., rotation ; or else in relation to other atoms, i.e., 
 a series of positions of atoms in relation to each other. 
 
 These movements, whether of rotation or of mutual 
 relation, are expressible in relation to an unit of movement, 
 and therefore in rates of motion. They can, therefore, be 
 described arithmetically. 
 
 We therefore find that the ultimate units which have 
 extension and resistance have also motion, and that the 
 whole of their differentiations are to be described in terms 
 of extension (shape or size), and in terms of motion 
 (rates or modes, i.e., rotary and relative). 
 
 And we also find that the only method of describing
 
 io SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 these differentiations is in terms of mensuration, i.e., in 
 terms of geometry and arithmetic. 
 
 The formula, then, only recognises two factors that 
 is to say, matter and motion ; or, since motion cannot 
 exist by itself, it is more correct to say matter in motion. 
 
 Elsewhere we find that matter is indestructible and 
 motion continuous. That is to say, that no atom ever 
 ceases to exist, though it may enter into ever-changing 
 combinations with other atoms, or may move at different 
 rates of motion. And, further, that no atom moves more 
 slowly without other atoms moving more quickly. No 
 motion is ever lost ; it is only transferred. 
 
 Whether any ultimate units can ever wholly lose their 
 motion is a question. But it is clear that we cannot have 
 motion without matter. 
 
 Note. This suggests a hypothesis concerning ether, for there 
 are three alternatives respecting these ultimate uniform units. 
 First, that they entered into permanent combinations, as known 
 to us in the so-called elements ; secondly, that some remained 
 free and uncombined, retaining their motion, or some degree of 
 it; thirdly, that some lost their motion altogether, although 
 capable of receiving it again. Now, if we conceive of ultimate 
 units having extension and resistance and relative gravity but 
 no special motion, we have a case similar to, say, a row of marbles 
 close together, having no motion, but capable of transmitting 
 motion from any centre of activity. Such a supposition would 
 be agreeable to the theory of the undulatory transmission of 
 light and heat. And since all solid, liquid, and gaseous bodies 
 are to be regarded as permeable bodies, existing in the ocean 
 of ether in much the same way as sponges exist in the sea, they 
 would be subject to disintegration from the violent interior 
 mechanical action of the contained ether. And the theory of 
 heat would be a theory of increased etherial excursion rather 
 than of increased molecular or atomic excursion, or of all three ; 
 and the theory of light would be one of undulations of ether. 
 
 Moreover, the theory of the indissolubility of the elements
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. II 
 
 would be the non-permeability of atoms by the ether, in conse- 
 quence of the smallness of the interstices, due to the composition 
 of the atom from ultimate units of the same size as the unit of 
 ether. So also the greater the degree of complexity, the greater 
 the facility for dissolution under heat. 
 
 There would also follow a supposition as to the individuality 
 of a body of ether in an aggregate due to the molecular construc- 
 tion of that body, and the contiguity and continuity of the units 
 of the contained ether. 
 
 And there might be other suppositions respecting magnetism 
 and electricity, &c., according to the views held of the existence 
 of free uncombined ultimate units of extension and resistance 
 with polarities, or having lost all motion. 
 
 Inquiry into the Application of the Formula of Evolution 
 and Dissolution, commencing with Dissolution. 
 
 By the light of the preceding statement of the scope of 
 philosophy and of the formula by which all the changes 
 of the universe are explained, let us set about the appli- 
 cation of it as an interpretation of these changes. And 
 we will commence with Dissolution, for this reason, 
 viz., that we may be able to reduce the contents of the 
 universe to its constituents, and thereby enable the mind 
 to form a clear conception of matter and motion, the two 
 factors of the formula, and accustom it to free those terms 
 from any other considerations than size, shape, mode or 
 rate of motion. In this way we shall be able to rid the 
 theory from any associations of consciousness or intelli- 
 gent ordering of processes, and get clear down to the 
 material and mechanical basis of things. 
 
 We shall see, in fact, the earth disappear and all life ; 
 then we shall see the whole solar system reduced to 
 vapour. Finally, the whole sidereal system snail dissolve 
 into nebulae, and when dissolution shall be completed by 
 ultimate dissolution of even the nebulae, we shall have to
 
 12 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 ask what that state will be, and thereby try to realise in 
 our own minds what that primal condition must have 
 been from which Evolution was bound to start, if it is to 
 be a complete statement of all changes. By thus realis- 
 ing the ultimate dissolution, we shall arrive at a starting- 
 point for Evolution, and then by the application of the 
 formula we shall endeavour to understand I. The for- 
 mation of the so-called elements, their relative quantities 
 and permanence. 2. Their distribution. 3. The motions 
 of heat, light, &c. 4. The origin of consciousness and life, 
 and the development of organisms and mind. 
 The process of dissolution is thus described : 
 
 " 1 8 1. For the earth, as a whole, when it has gone through 
 the entire series of its ascending transformations, must remain, 
 like all smaller aggregates, exposed to the contingencies of its 
 environment ; and in the course of these ceaseless changes in 
 progress throughout a universe of which all parts are in motion, 
 must, at some period beyond the utmost stretch of imagina- 
 tion, be subject to forces sufficient to cause its complete disin- 
 tegration. . . . There is a force at work which, it is held, 
 must at last bring the earth into the sun. This force is the 
 resistance of the etherial medium. From etherial resistance is 
 inferred a retardation of all moving bodies in the solar system. 
 ... If, then, retardation is going on, there must come a 
 time, no matter how remote, when the slowly diminishing orbit 
 of the earth will end in the sun ; and though the quantity of 
 molar motion to be then transferred into molecular motion will 
 not be so great as that which the calculation of Helmholtz 
 supposes, it will be great enough to reduce the substance of the 
 earth to a gaseous state." 
 
 Such will be the case with every member of the solar 
 system, until we arrive at the period when "the total 
 mass must become completely integrated, and its excess of 
 contained motion radiated into space." 
 
 Not only this, but since the stars, distributed irregu- 
 larly throughout the heavens, move in conformity with
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 13 
 
 the law of gravitation, they will undergo rearrangement. 
 " If we now ask the nature of this rearrangement, we find 
 ourselves obliged to infer a progressive concentration." 
 The question arises, " What must be the limit of such 
 concentrations ?" " An increasingly frequent integra- 
 tion of masses." "And if so relatively small a mo- 
 mentum as that acquired by the earth in falling to 
 the sun would be equivalent to a molecular motion suffi- 
 cient to reduce the earth to gases ol extreme rarity, 
 what must be the molecular motion generated by the 
 mutually arrested momenta of two stars that have 
 moved to their common centre of gravity through spaces 
 immeasurably greater ? There seems no alternative but 
 to conclude that it would be great enough to reduce the 
 matter of the stars to an almost inconceivable tenuity 
 a tenuity like that which we ascribe to nebular matter." 
 Then " the diffused matter produced by such conflicts must 
 form a resisting medium, occupying that central region of 
 the cluster through which its members from time to time 
 pass in describing their orbits a resisting medium which 
 they cannot move through without having their velocities 
 diminished. Every additional collision, by augmenting 
 this resisting medium, and making the losses of velocity 
 greater, must aid in preventing the establishment of that 
 equilibrium which would else arise, and so conspire to 
 produce more frequent collisions. And the nebulous 
 matter thus formed, presently enveloping the whole 
 cluster, must, by continuing to shorten the gyrations of 
 the moving masses, entail an increasingly active integra- 
 tion and reactive disintegration of them, until they are 
 all dissipated. Whether, &c. ... In any case, the con- 
 clusion to be drawn is, that the integration must continue 
 until the conditions which bring about disintegration are
 
 14 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 readied, and that there must then ensue a diffusion that 
 undoes the preceding concentration." 
 
 "This, indeed, is the conclusion which presents itself as a 
 deduction from the persistence of force. If stars concentrat- 
 ing to a common centre of gravity eventually reach it, then 
 the quantities of motion they have acquired must suffice to 
 carry them away again to those remote regions whence they 
 started. And since, hy the conditions of the case, they can- 
 not return to these remote regions in the shape of concrete 
 masses, they must return in the shape of diffused masses. 
 Action and reaction being equal and opposite, the momentum 
 producing dispersion must he as great as the momentum ac- 
 quired "by aggregation ; and being spread over the same quan- 
 tity of matter, must cause an equivalent distribution through 
 space, whatever be the form of the matter. 
 
 " When that integregation everywhere in progress throughout 
 our solar system has reached its climax, there will remain to 
 be effected the immeasurably greater integration of our solar 
 system with other such systems. There must then reappear in 
 molecular motion what is lost in the motion of masses; and 
 the inevitable transformation of this motion of masses into 
 molecular motion cannot take place without reducing the masses 
 to a nebulous form. 
 
 " 183. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the entire 
 process of things, as displayed in the aggregate of the visible 
 universe, is analogous to the entire process of things as displayed 
 in the smallest aggregates. 
 
 " Motion as well as matter being fixed in quantity, it would 
 seem that the change in the distribution of matter which motion 
 effects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried, 
 the indestructible motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distri- 
 bution. Apparently the universally co-existent forces of attrac- 
 tion and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm 
 in all the minor changes throughout the universe, also necessitate 
 rhythm in the totality of its changes, produce now an im- 
 measurable period during which the attractive forces predomi- 
 nating cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable 
 period during which the repulsive forces predominating cause uni- 
 versal diffusion alternate eras of evolution and dissolution."
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 15 
 
 It may be asked, Is there any occasion for carrying 
 the theory to such an extent ? Is there any necessity 
 for supposing the process of dissolution to be complete ? 
 for supposing other than partial processes of evolution 
 and dissolution ? I submit that all these suppositions 
 exceed the limit of legitimate philosophical speculation, 
 and are therefore futile. The author makes them, as he 
 is logically compelled to do, in accordance with the enor- 
 mous claims, as stated by him, of philosophy; and we 
 must therefore follow him to the full extent of his specu- 
 lations. But let us not do so blindly ; let us take care 
 not to lose ourselves in these obscurities, but to aim at 
 definite thought. 
 
 And it answers a good practical purpose in our 
 studies. For since it conducts us by gradual steps from 
 the complicated cosmos of the present to simpler and yet 
 more simple conditions, we can the better educate the 
 mind to the final realisation of that state of affairs out of 
 which evolution arises, and the better realise for our- 
 selves the application of the formula to those initial 
 changes and that primordial history for which it claims 
 to account. 
 
 As long as there is any differentiation, dissolution is 
 not complete. Every differentiation implies an anterior 
 history which has to be accounted for. Dissolution is 
 incomplete until homogeneity is attained. We must do 
 away with all differentiations of ultimate units until 
 they are alike in size and shape, and we must obliterate 
 all differentiations of their motions until the same de- 
 scription can be applied to all of them. 
 
 In studying the process of dissolution, therefore, we 
 find it to be the dissolution of combinations of molecules, 
 the further dissolution of molecules into atoms, and if
 
 1 6 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 there be any further dissolution of atoms into ultimate 
 units, then dissolution is not complete until this also has 
 been effected. And the question then arises, Does any 
 differentiation still remain differentiation of shape or 
 size differentiation in rates or modes of motion ? 
 
 And we also find that in this dissolution of the com- 
 binations of matter the process is accompanied by a trans- 
 ference of motion by which the motions of atoms or 
 ultimate units becomes more and more equalised. 
 
 So that the end of dissolution seems to be the dis- 
 integration of all combinations into ultimate units of 
 matter moving at equal rates. We have heterogeneity 
 becoming less and less heterogeneous ; will it ever reach 
 the homogeneous ? 
 
 It seems to me that the task prescribed by Mr. 
 Spencer for Philosophy requires of it that it should 
 account for all differentiations, since all differentiation 
 implies change, and all change a history. Homogeneity 
 must be the starting-point of Philosophy. 
 
 If not, then it must start from an arbitrary point, 
 which every one may determine according to his own 
 fancy. Each one may please himself at what degree of 
 differentiation he commences with the application of his 
 philosophical formula. Some may choose differentiated 
 atoms already formed ; some may choose living protein 
 ready made to their hands. 
 
 A philosophy stands convicted of inadequacy if it does 
 not account for every differentiation. The question as 
 to the origin of differentiation is not to be confounded 
 with the question as to the origin of existences or ulti- 
 mate undifferentiated units, but if differentiated matter is 
 postulated, then any degree of differentiation is equally 
 justifiable.
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 17 
 
 Philosophy is thus brought face to face with the Homo- 
 geneous, into which, by tracing out the ultimate process of 
 dissolution, \ve are logically led. 
 
 Can we picture to ourselves the Homogeneous ? 
 
 It is useful to try. 
 
 Study of the Homogeneous. 
 
 "We have, then, to suppose, in the first place, ultimate 
 units having resistance and extension. They must be the 
 same shape say spherical and the same size. 
 
 In the next place they are in motion. The motion 
 may be rotary, or relative, or both. If rotary, then the 
 motion must be in the same direction, and the axes 
 must be parallel, and they may have some universal 
 relation to a common centre ; or the motion may be 
 wholly (or in addition to the rotary motion) in relation 
 to each other. This motion would be one of movement 
 towards and movement from other units. 
 
 Here we reach a very difficult part of our subject. 
 We may altogether abandon the rotary movement, or we 
 may simply hold it in suspense to fall back upon in aid 
 of the explanation of subsequent differentiations and com- 
 binations. 
 
 But before going any further it is necessary to bear in 
 mind that the differentiation between matter and ether 
 has to be obliterated. In homogeneity there is not a 
 mass of units and ether. The atoms of matter and the 
 units of ether have become identified, and when we speak 
 of the Homogeneous we are not speaking of a mass and 
 of the medium in which it moves, but of a mass in which 
 the matter and the ether have become unified. 
 
 What we have to represent to ourselves, then, is a 
 mass a spherical mass of undifferentiated units, each
 
 1 8 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION, 
 
 unit moving towards what ? The neighbouring unit or 
 all the other units ? and then moving away from the 
 neighbouring or all the other units ? 
 
 With the why and how of the movement we have 
 nothing to do any more than with the how and the why 
 of the units themselves. 
 
 If we say that philosophy starts with the homo- 
 geneous, it is not required to account for the existence 
 of that matter and that motion which constitute it, 
 but only to describe the properties of the two factors, so 
 that by the application of the formula the results may be 
 worked out. The origin of the matter and the motion 
 is unknowable. But a complete philosophy is bound to 
 start from the homogeneous. It may be that a philo- 
 sophy is sufficient without being complete i.e., we may 
 go back to a differentiated state, and account for all 
 changes subsequent to that from the factors therein. But 
 then it is not a complete philosophy, and since Mr. 
 Spencer claims that Evolution is a complete philosophy, 
 we are bound to go back to the homogeneous ; and this 
 is really a logical necessity, for if one man chooses an 
 arbitrary starting-point, however remote, so may another 
 one select a point of much greater differentiation and be 
 equally justified. 
 
 The following is Mr. Spencer's account of the motions 
 of the ultimate units : 
 
 Page 223. " However verbally intelligible may be the pro- 
 position that pressure and tension everywhere co-exist, yet we 
 cannot truly represent to ourselves one ultimate unit of matter 
 as drawing another while resisting it Nevertheless this last 
 belief is one which we are compelled to entertain. Matter 
 cannot be conceived except as manifesting forces of attraction 
 and repulsion. . . . We are obliged to think of all objects as 
 made up of parts that attract and repel each other, since this is
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 19 
 
 the form of our experience of all objects. By a higher abstrac- 
 tion results the conception of attractive and repulsive forces 
 pervading space. "We cannot dissociate force from occupied 
 extension, or occupied extension from force, because we have 
 never an immediate consciousness of either in the absence of 
 the other. Nevertheless, we have 'abundant proof that force 
 is exercised through what appears to our senses a vacuity ; 
 mentally to represent this exercise, we are hence obliged to fill 
 the apparent vacuity with a species of matter an etherial 
 medium. The constitution which we assign to this etherial 
 medium, however, like the constitution we assign to solid 
 substance, is necessarily an abstract of the impressions received 
 from tangible bodies. The opposition to pressure which a 
 tangible body offers to us is not shown in one direction only, 
 but in all directions ; and so likewise is its tenacity. Suppose 
 countless lines radiating from its centre on every side, and it 
 resists along each of these lines and coheres along each of these 
 lines. Hence the constitution of those ultimate units through 
 the instrumentality of which phenomena are interpreted. Be 
 they atoms of ponderable matter or molecules of ether, the pro- 
 perties we conceive them to possess are nothing else than these 
 perceptible properties idealised. Centres of force, attracting and 
 repelling each other in all directions, are simply insensible por- 
 tions of matter having the endowments common to sensible 
 portions of matter endowments of which we cannot by any 
 mental effort divest them. 
 
 "Note. In brief, they are the invariable elements of the con- 
 ception of matter, abstracted from its variable elements, size, 
 form, quality, &c." 
 
 Kesuming, then, our consideration of the homoge- 
 neous, we have a sphere of ultimate units having like 
 motions of rotation or of mutual attraction and repul- 
 sion. What is the corollary of this statement, bear- 
 ing in mind the two propositions that motion is con- 
 tinuous, and that all action is equal and opposite ? That 
 all action is equal and opposite would seem to pre- 
 clude the notion of any motion whatever, but as motion 
 is continuous, we can only fall back upon this as a
 
 20 -SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 solution of the difficulty, viz., that each unit moves 
 towards its neighbour and then moves back to its 
 original place. In a sphere of these units there would 
 be an universal movement to the centre and an uni- 
 versal movement away from the centre, but from all action 
 being equal and opposite the units would be bound to 
 return to their original positions. 
 
 So far no differentiation is produced. 
 
 We have now to consider the question of gravitation in 
 respect to such a mass. It will be seen that so far we 
 have merely considered the subject free from gravitation. 
 On that supposition there is only a movement of an unit 
 to and from its neighbours. Now, as the outside units 
 have neighbours only on one side, the movement towards 
 them is not impeded by any movement in another direc- 
 tion, and this may possibly leave the next layer free to 
 close in upon the next interior layer of units, and thus 
 an universal concentric motion take place, to be followed 
 by an universal retrocession. Now, it may be argued that 
 the falling to the centre of such a vast mass of particles 
 creates a pressure upon the centre parts, which causes 
 some change of motion and some combinations of the 
 ultimate units. But admitting this, then, since action 
 and reaction are equal and opposite, everything is re- 
 versed and restored in the backward motion. 
 
 How Affected by Gravitation. 
 
 To get out of this difficulty it seems necessary to 
 add gravitation or the law by which the attraction of 
 matter exceeds repulsion. This, it seems to me, is a 
 necessity of the case, and is the first failure of our 
 formula.
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 21 
 
 But if we now add gravitation, according to Newton's 
 law, to the mass before us, how is our problem affected ? 
 
 Then, instead of an unit attracting its neighbour and 
 repulsing it, we have each unit attracting every other unit 
 inversely, according to the square of the distance. The 
 why or how is relegated to the same nescience as the why 
 and how of the ultimate units and their motions. 
 
 Here, then, we have set up a definite movement to a 
 centre. Action and reaction are not equal and opposite, 
 and concentration proceeds. 
 
 It cannot be supposed that there is no limit to the 
 process of condensation that would immediately com- 
 mence. But it would be carried to an extreme point. 
 All the ultimate units would be pressed into closer con- 
 tact and the interspaces obliterated. The pressure into 
 closer contact would no doubt cause changes of rates and 
 modes of motion, forming under the immense pressure 
 structural units (atoms), having special shapes, sizes, and 
 motions of their own, and perhaps, as we shall hereafter 
 show, they would be indissoluble that is to say, of a 
 permanent, indestructible character ; and the motion sup- 
 posed lost in the formation of these atoms might be 
 added to the motion of other units. 
 
 The result of such a process would be the formation of 
 a sphere of concentric layers from the centre to the cir- 
 cumference of atoms of varying degrees of density and of 
 different construction. But beyond this stage of hetero- 
 geneity we are unable to advance without the aid of ex- 
 ternal interference. The result that would be arrived at 
 would be an equilibrium, a sphere or structural whole in 
 which the matter and motion would have reached such a 
 state of harmonious relationship, each in its place and 
 moving in unison, that no further change would ensue.
 
 22 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Each unit and atom would be in harmony with its en- 
 vironment, like a wheel in a watch, with a perpetual 
 equal motion which was not lost. 
 
 In any case, an equilibrium. 
 
 That Mr. Spencer looks forward to arriving at such a 
 state of equilibrium, even from the present heterogeneous 
 condition of the universe, is evident from chap, xxii., " On 
 Equilibration." He says, p. 484 : 
 
 " In all cases, then, there is a progress towards equilibration. 
 That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which, as we 
 before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and which, 
 as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of every force 
 into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate 
 establishment of a balance." 
 
 Page 483. " And now towards what do all these changes 
 tend? . . . Does it work towards some ultimate state admitting 
 no further modification of like kind? . . . Evolution has an 
 impassable limit?" 
 
 Page 513. " If evolution of every kind is an increase in com- 
 plexity of structure and function that is incidental to the uni- 
 versal process of equilibration, and if equilibration must end in 
 complete rest, what is the fate towards which all things tend ? 
 . . . Omnipresent Death ?" 
 
 And again, p. 5 1 4 : 
 
 "That such a state must be the outcome of the processes 
 everywhere going on seems beyond doubt Whether any ulterior 
 process may reverse these changes and initiate a new life, is a 
 question to be considered hereafter. For the present it must 
 suffice that the proximate end of all the transformations we have 
 traced is a state of quiescence." 
 
 The theory is, that if in a condition of homogeneity, 
 matter in motion cannot remain in this state of homo- 
 geneity, but must move to its centre, and thereby pro- 
 duce heterogeneity as just described, and that this move- 
 ment must end in a state of equilibrium, or balance of 
 motions, of which the formula would be a = a.
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 23 
 
 In the progress of our studies, then, we have arrived 
 at a concentric equilibrium of matter in motion, beyond 
 which we can make no progress, for when we arrive at 
 the perfect equilibrium a=a, we cannot suppose any 
 further change than by supposing one a to be more 
 powerful than another a, which destroys the equation and 
 denies the equilibrium. We are thus obliged to come to 
 a stable equilibrium or else to a moving equilibrium of 
 alternations of concentration and retrocession, beyond 
 which equilibriums we can make no progress. 
 
 Unless, indeed, we import into our scheme the for- 
 mation of some other similar sphere, and put the two 
 into collision in order to produce that general mixing up 
 that seething cauldron of chaos out of which the 
 higher stages of heterogeneity are to be produced. If so, 
 we thereby deny the ultimate homogeneity from which 
 we were supposed to start. 
 
 In speculations like these the mind is lost; but a 
 philosophy which is to account for all changes from the 
 very first is bound to consider them. If it fails, it 
 should limit its claims to more modest proportions, and 
 we would consider its merits on the more limited field. 
 
 Consideration of Mr. Spencer's Argument on the 
 Instability of the, Homogeneous. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer justifies his position by abstract 
 argument. This argument is entitled " Instability of 
 the Homogeneous." We endeavoured to describe the 
 homogeneous, and admitted that if gravitation to a 
 centre must ensue that we would arrive at a condition of 
 heterogeneity, but that it would be also a state of 
 equilibrium. Now Mr. Spencer introduces a distinction 
 between stable and unstable equilibrium. Stable equili-
 
 24 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION 
 
 brium is one of a lasting character ; unstable equilibrium 
 is one which a very minute exterior motion will destroy. 
 
 Of course it will be seen at once that the difference 
 between a stable and an unstable equilibrium, according 
 to Mr. Spencer, is only one of degree. The disturbing 
 motion must in the one case be great, in the other small. 
 
 Now if we can get an unstable equilibrium so delicate 
 and an exterior motion so minute that we can imagine it 
 no motion at all, or not to put too fine a point upon it 
 the very next thing to no motion at all, we realise to 
 ourselves as near as possible the mainspring of Evolution 
 the leading idea of the philosophy which here and 
 there, throughout the long course of ages, only needs 
 one or two little similar touches to develop out into all 
 we see. The legerdemain is accomplished so deftly as to 
 elude the detection of the keenest observer, and we may 
 even deceive ourselves. 
 
 This is the argument (p. 402) : 
 
 " The condition of homogeneity," says Mr. Spencer, " is a 
 condition of unstable equilibrium. . . . The phrase unstable equi- 
 librium is one used in mechanics to express a balance of forces 
 of such kind that the interference of any further force, however 
 minute, will destroy the arrangement previously subsisting; and 
 bring about a totally different arrangement . . . The proposition 
 is, then, that the state of homogeneity . . . cannot be maintained." 
 
 Illustrations are given in the instances of a pair of 
 scales not remaining in equilibrium, particles scattered 
 on the surface of water, and finally, 
 
 " "Were it possible to bring a mass of water into a perfect state 
 of homogeneity into a state of perfect quiescence and exactly 
 equal density throughout, yet the radiation of heat from neigh- 
 bouring bodies, by affecting differently its different parts, would 
 inevitably produce inequalities of density and consequent currents, 
 and would so render it to that extent heterogeneous."
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 25 
 
 Page 404. "The instability thus variously illustrated is 
 obviously consequent on the fact that the several parts of any 
 homogeneous aggregation are necessarily exposed to different 
 forces forces that differ either in kind or amount and being 
 exposed to different forces, they are of necessity differently 
 modified. The relations of outside and inside, and of compara- 
 tive nearness to neighbouring sources of influence, imply the 
 reception of influences that are unlike in quantity or quality or 
 both ; and it follows that unlike changes will be produced in 
 the parts thus dissimilarly acted upon." 
 
 The argument as to the instability of the homogeneous 
 is condemned in the very statement of it. It is said to 
 be a condition of unstable equilibrium, viz., a balance of 
 forces such that the least external influence will disturb, 
 but will otherwise remain undisturbed. But since we 
 are talking of the homogeneous or balance of forces in 
 itself, and without any external influence, it follows that 
 the homogeneous or perfectly balanced is in itself stable. 
 It is only when we have the homogeneous or the equi- 
 librium plus external influence that we get instability. 
 
 Further, on the supposition of a state of homogeneity 
 or perfect equilibrium, it follows from the persistence of 
 relations amongst forces that they remain in such con- 
 dition. From the persistence of force this must be the 
 case, otherwise we have force (the disturbing force) arising 
 out of nothing, and we cannot conceive that it does not 
 arise except out of some existing or precedent force, 
 which is the application of Mr. Spencer's "Test of 
 Truth." 
 
 Mr. Spencer says (p. 405): 
 
 " No demurrer to the conclusion drawn can be based on the 
 ground that perfect homogeneity nowhere exists ; since whether 
 that stage with which we commence be or be not one of perfect 
 homogeneity, the process must equally be towards a relative 
 heterogeneity."
 
 26 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 The demurrer can be raised that perfect homogeneity 
 nowhere exists, and it does not follow from this state- 
 ment, or any of the previous ones, that, given a state of 
 perfect homogeneity, the process must be towards a state 
 of relative heterogeneity, for in all the cases instanced 
 certain conditions are requisite to produce it. The con- 
 ditions are external influences. The initial description of 
 an unstable equilibrium presupposes an external influ- 
 ence, however small, to disturb it, and all the illustra- 
 tions show that the condition of homogeneousness does 
 not become heterogeneous of itself, but only as affected by 
 external influences, and in a definite manner and degree, 
 according to the specific nature of those influences. So 
 that the proposition maintained is not the instability of 
 the homogeneous, but the instability of the homogeneous 
 under external influences ; and since the homogeneous 
 nowhere exists, it is rather the instability of the less 
 heterogeneous under external influences. 
 
 Perfect homogeneity without external influences to 
 disturb it, or a perfect symmetry of external relations, 
 Mr. Spencer admits himself is not unstable. 
 
 Page 407. "We need not here, however, commit ourselves to 
 such far-reaching speculations. For the purposes of the general 
 argument it is needful only to show that any finite mass of 
 diffused matter, even though vast enough to form our whole 
 sidereal system, could not be in stable equilibrium; that in 
 default of absolute sphericity, absolute uniformity of composition, 
 and absolute symmetry of relation to all forces external to it, its 
 concentration must go on with an ever-increasing irregularity, 
 and that thus the present aspect of the heavens is not, so far as 
 we can judge, incongruous with the hypothesis of a general evolu- 
 tion consequent on the instability of the homogeneous." 
 
 The fallaciousness of this reasoning is obvious. The 
 homogeneous is defined in words which I have italicised,
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 27 
 
 in which case it is admitted that heterogeneity -would not 
 ensue. The only cases where heterogeneity ensues upon 
 the homogeneous is where external influences produce it, 
 as explained before. Yet the conclusion of the quotation 
 speaks of an evolution consequent upon the instability of 
 the homogeneous, as if it was an active principle apart 
 from external influences. 
 
 The purport of this argument is obvious. The author, 
 in the establishment of a philosophy which has to ex- 
 plain everything that can have a potential history, is bound 
 to start with a state of things completely undifferen- 
 tiated, for every differentiation implies a history. The 
 undifferentiated is a state of homogeneity. But if the 
 homogeneous is unstable, we get a start towards hetero- 
 geneity, and out of that we can make progress. A country 
 friend of mine describes Evolution as "a lump with a 
 start in it." This is the start. 
 
 We have now to take up a postponed consideration, 
 and assume, to start with, the least departure from a state 
 of homogeneity, namely, a difference in the shape of the 
 mass. 
 
 Page 406. " If the matter of which stars and all other celestial 
 bodies consist be assumed to have originally existed in a diffused 
 form throughout a space far more vast even than that which our 
 sidereal system now occupies, the instability of the homogeneous 
 would negative its continuance in that state. ... In matter of 
 such extreme tenuity and feeble cohesion there would be motion 
 towards local centres of gravity, as well as towards the general 
 centre of gravity. . . . Heterogeneities thus set up would tend 
 ever to become more pronounced. Established mechanical 
 principles would justify him in the conclusion that the motions 
 of these irregular masses of slightly aggregated nebular matter 
 towards their common centre of gravity must be severally ren- 
 dered curvilinear by the resistance of the medium from which they 
 were precipitated ; and that in consequence of the irregularities
 
 28 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 of distribution already set up, such conflicting curvilinear motions 
 must, by composition of forces, end in a rotation of the incipient 
 sidereal system." 
 
 It will be at once noted in this statement of Mr. 
 Spencer's that he assumes a nebula moving in a medium. 
 It follows that the state of homogeneity about which Mr. 
 Spencer is arguing is not a state of homogeneity at all, 
 since there is already a differentiation between the nebula 
 and the medium, which differentiation is not accounted 
 for, and his whole argument is vitiated. 
 
 It is also to be noted that he does not state whether 
 this nebula is composed of ultimate similar units, and if 
 so, how they get differentiated. 
 
 But from the course of the argument, it would appear 
 that this differentiation had already taken place. The ne- 
 bulae that Mr. Spencer speaks of seem to be composed of the 
 seventy or eighty so-called elements in a vaporous con- 
 dition ; or at any rate, of units already so differentiated as 
 to fall naturally into these forms. But if Evolution fails 
 to account for this differentiation, either of the so-called 
 elements or of the differentiated units of which they are 
 composed, then both differentiations implying a previous 
 history, Evolution is convicted of inadequacy, accord- 
 ing to Mr. Spencer's own test of the adequacy of a philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 It may, however, be replied that Evolution does not 
 claim to supply all knowledge, but only formularises all 
 that is known, and claims a probability of the applica- 
 bility of the formula to what is not yet known. If so, let 
 it be so stated. Then we shall know that Evolution does 
 not claim to be a complete theory of the universe, and if 
 we find it correct to a certain extent, we accept it as so 
 limited.
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 29 
 
 It is very evident that Mr. Spencer's theory of Evolu- 
 tion only starts from the supposition of an unlimited 
 scattered group of nebulae, these nebulae consisting of 
 the seventy or eighty so-called elements in a gaseous con- 
 dition, and moving through a medium the whole ante- 
 rior history of which is wholly unaccounted for, and that 
 it so far fails, on the face of it, as a complete philosophy. 
 
 The Formula applied to Primary Evolution. 
 
 Now how far does Evolution, so far as we have gone, 
 answer to the test of a philosophy stated by Mr. Spen- 
 cer? Does it explain and account for the passage of 
 the imperceptible into the perceptible, and the percep- 
 tible into the imperceptible ? I do not say that in 
 the increase of knowledge at some future time it will 
 not do so; it would be presumptuous to limit future 
 attainments of thought. But I mean to say that at 
 the present time it has not done so, and the attempt 
 to do so, as will be seen, is not only so speculative as to 
 be futile, but also lands us in difficulties that seem in- 
 capable of solution, even under the license of speculation. 
 Therefore we conclude the inadequacy of the theory of 
 Evolution to account for the history of matter in motion 
 anterior to the state of differentiated nebulae, moving 
 through ether, and constituted of differentiated matter 
 (presumably the seventy or eighty so-called elements) in 
 a gaseous condition. 
 
 Evolution, therefore, fails to account for the first stage 
 of progress fails to show how an ultimate unit can part 
 with motion ; that it fails to account for the law of gravi- 
 tation to a centre; that, even if it accounts for the for- 
 mation of the elements, it does not account for their
 
 30 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 permanency on the variation of their cause, viz., pres- 
 sure ; and that it does not account for the existence 
 and distribution of the nebulae formed of mixed ele- 
 ments. 
 
 And, as a matter of fact, although Mr. Spencer does 
 sometimes speculate upon the original condition of things 
 and the primordial evolutionary process, he practically 
 starts with the nebula, in itself a highly complex body, 
 composed of differentiated matter, that is to say, the 
 seventy or eighty so-called elements in a gaseous con- 
 dition. But in so far as this complex state of the 
 heavens and this differentiated state of matter is not 
 accounted for except in a very speculative manner 
 indeed, we must say that Evolution falls short of being a 
 perfect philosophy. 
 
 Inquiry concerning the Origin of Organism on the Basis of 
 the Formula of Evolution. 
 
 We now come to another stage, in which it seems to me 
 that Evolution is not merely inadequate from possible 
 lack of the materials of knowledge, which inadequacy 
 might at some future time be made good, but in which 
 we seom to meet with facts utterly irreconcilable with 
 the theory of combinations of matter in motion as 
 accounting for all phenomena. I refer to the commence- 
 ment of life, to the constitution of protoplasm, to the 
 formation of living organism. 
 
 We cannot have much difficulty in understanding the 
 process of crystallisation as combinations of matter in 
 motion. If the combinations of ultimate units result in 
 definite grouping, with definite shape, as well as rate and 
 direction of motion, we can understand that in a liquid
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 31 
 
 medium, which is never in a state of perfect rest, the 
 imperceptible motions would bring the molecules or 
 atoms into contact, and their harmonies of movement 
 would induce aggregations into masses, the form of these 
 masses being derived from the shape of the group of 
 ultimate units forming the atom or molecule out of 
 which the mass is built up. 
 
 But when we study the phenomena of life and its 
 processes, even in the very simplest organism, we feel 
 that we come upon a totally different field of activity. 
 We cannot understand how any combination or recom- 
 binations of matter in motion can produce consciousness. 
 If consciousness can be explained geometrically and 
 arithmetically that is to say, as due to certain com- 
 binations of shapes and certain rates and directions of 
 motions then we could accept the formula of Evolution 
 as an explanation. But we cannot do so, and, as I indi- 
 cated before, this failure seems to me not an inadequacy 
 that can be supplied, but to be for all time utterly 
 beyond the reach of such an explanation. The case is 
 not parallel with crystallisation. In that case we can 
 understand that such an explanation is possible, but 
 in the case of life and organisms it seems impossible. 
 There appears to be no relation between the terms of a 
 proposition that should unite consciousness and matter in 
 motion, so that by the production of the one in certain 
 shapes and rates of motion the other would be produced. 
 I do not think I need enlarge upon this topic : all I 
 need point out is that the failure of the formula of 
 Evolution to account for consciousness does not affect in- 
 dependent theories of development, does not affect theories 
 of interaction of organism and environment, does not 
 affect theories of moral, intellectual, and social develop-
 
 32 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 ment, does not affect the law of the uniformity of 
 sequence, as holding good throughout them. 
 
 I cannot think that the facts of life and organism 
 are explainable by the formula of Evolution. This 
 may or may not be a separate investigation from that 
 concerning consciousness. By some it is held to be so, 
 but to me the organic combination of two molecules into 
 such a connection that the definitions of life are appli- 
 cable to them, involves in each of them some fact of 
 feeling. And, therefore, some fact of feeling would seem 
 to precede life and organisation. But if feeling be the 
 result of the combination of two or more molecules, and 
 the organisation precedes feeling, even then we find that 
 in all the stages beyond this initial step feeling is the 
 principal factor inducing further changes, and is the active 
 factor principally taken into account, and the essential 
 element of all definitions of life. So that we may say 
 Without feeling no complex organism no life not even 
 a simple organism. Is feeling the result of mechanical 
 structure, or does it precede and form an essential factor 
 in organic structure ? 
 
 It would appear to me that the phenomena of life, 
 including nourishment, growth, decay, reproduction, adap- 
 tation, heredity, consciousness, memory, emotion, reflec- 
 tion, and will, however much they may conform to the 
 general modes or characteristics of material evolution 
 (which is not denied), cannot be accounted for as to 
 origin in any combinations of matter in motion, and can- 
 not be expressed in terms of geometry and arithmetic, as 
 all combinations of matter in motion are capable of being 
 expressed ; and since the formula of Evolution recognises 
 only combinations and recombinations of matter in motion, 
 it fails in its application to the phenomena of life and
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 33 
 
 organism as just enumerated, and is therefore inadequate 
 as a philosophy which professes to account for the whole 
 history of things. 
 
 Mr. Spencer on the Origination of Organism and 
 Consciousness. 
 
 But we will proceed to a consideration of Mr. Spen- 
 cer's own statement of the theory of the origin of living 
 organisms. The best statement we find on the subject is 
 in his letter to the editor of the " North American Eeview," 
 at the end of " Biology," vol. i., when, after criticism point- 
 ing out various defects of statement, he undertakes to 
 explain the hypothesis in such a manner that it cannot 
 be misunderstood. In justice to its importance, I. print a 
 considerable portion of this letter in extenso. In order to 
 escape any charge of an inadequate representation of Mr. 
 Spencer's views, I print more than is necessary for my 
 purpose ; to print it all would unnecessarily encumber 
 the argument. Size is a great deterrent to effective 
 criticism, and the size of Mr. Spencer's arguments, as a 
 rule, are greatly obstructive of their comprehensibility 
 and criticism, though it makes them imposing to an 
 impressible mind. 
 
 " From what I do not believe, let me now pass to what I do 
 believe. Granting that the formation of organic matter, and 
 the evolution of life in its lowest forms, may go on under 
 existing cosmical conditions ; but believing it more likely that 
 the formation of such matter and such forms took place at a 
 time when the heat of the earth's surface was falling through 
 those ranges of temperature at which the higher organic com- 
 pounds are unstable ; I conceive that the moulding of such 
 organic matter into the simplest types must have commenced 
 with portions of protoplasm more minute, more indefinite, and 
 
 C
 
 34 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 more inconstant in their characters, than the lowest Khizopods 
 less distinguishable from a mere fragment of albumen than 
 even the Protogenes of Professor HaeckeL The evolution of 
 specific shapes must, like all other organic evolution, have 
 resulted from the actions and reactions between such incipient 
 types and their environments, and the continued survival of 
 those which happened to have specialities best fitted to the 
 specialities of their environments. To reach by this process 
 the comparatively well-specialised forms of ordinary Infusoria, 
 must, I conceive, have taken an enormous period of time. 
 
 " To prevent, as far as may be, future misapprehension, let me 
 elaborate this conception so as to meet the particular objections 
 raised. The reviewer takes for granted that a * first organism ' 
 must be assumed by me, as it is by himself. But the concep- 
 tion of a ' first organism,' in anything like the current sense of 
 the words, is wholly at variance with conception of Evolution, 
 and scarcely less at variance with the facts revealed by the 
 microscope. The lowest living things are not, properly speak- 
 ing, organisms at all : for they have no distinctions of parts no 
 traces of organisation. It is almost a misuse of language to call 
 them ' forms ' of life : not only are their outlines, when dis- 
 tinguishable, too unspecific for description, but they change from 
 moment to moment, and are never twice alike, either in two 
 individuals or in the same individual Even the word ' type ' 
 is applicable in but a loose way ; for there is little constancy in 
 their generic characters : according as the surrounding conditions 
 determine, they undergo transformations, now of one kind and 
 now of another. And the vagueness, the inconstancy, the want 
 of appreciable structure, displayed by the simplest of living 
 things as we now see them, are characters (or absences of 
 characters) which, on the hypothesis of Evolution, must have 
 been still more decided when, as at first, no ' forms,' no ' types,' 
 no ' specific shapes,' had been moulded. That ' absolute com- 
 mencement of organic life on the globe,' which the reviewer 
 says I ' cannot evade the admission of,' I distinctly deny. The 
 affirmation of universal evolution is in itself the negation of an 
 4 absolute commencement ' of anything. Construed in terms of 
 Evolution, every kind of being is conceived as a product of 
 modifications wrought by insensible gradations on a pre-exist- 
 ing kind of being; and this holds as fully of the supposed
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 35 
 
 ' commencement of organic life ' as of all subsequent develop- 
 ments of organic life. It is no more needful to suppose an 
 ' absolute commencement of organic life ' or a ' first organism,' 
 than it is needful to suppose an absolute commencement of 
 social life and a first social organism. The assumption of sucli 
 a necessity in this last case, made by early speculators with their 
 theories of ' social contracts' and the like, is disproved by the 
 facts ; and the facts, so far as they are ascertained, disprove the 
 assumption of such a necessity in the first case." Principles of 
 Biology, voL i. p. 481 et seq. 
 
 The problems to be studied are thus indicated, viz., 
 "the formation of organic matter" and "the evolution of 
 life in its lowest forms." 
 
 We shall give our attention first to the formation of 
 organic matter, and for the time being pass our inter- 
 mediate text until we arrive at this portion of it : 
 
 " That organic matter was not produced all at once, but was 
 reached through steps, we are well warranted in believing by the 
 experiences of chemists. Organic matters are produced in the 
 laboratory by what we may literally call artificial evolution. 
 Chemists find themselves unable to form these complex com- 
 binations directly from their elements, but they succeed in 
 forming them indirectly by successive modifications of simpler 
 combinations. In some binary compound, one element of which 
 is present in several equivalents, a change is made by substitut- 
 ing for one of these equivalents an equivalent of some other 
 element, so producing a ternary compound. Then another of 
 the equivalents is replaced, and so on. For instance, beginning 
 with ammonia, NH 3 , a higher form is obtained by replacing 
 one of the atoms of hydrogen by an atom of methyl, so producing 
 methyl-amine, N(CH 3 H 2 ); and then, under the further action 
 of methyl, ending in a further substitution, there is reached the 
 still more compound substance dimethyl-amine, N(CH 3 )(CH 3 )H. 
 And in this manner highly complex substances are eventually 
 built up. Another characteristic of their method is no less sig- 
 nificant. Two complex compounds are employed to generate, by 
 their action upon one another, a compound of still greater com- 
 plexity ; different heterogeneous molecules of one stage become
 
 36 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 parents of a molecule a stage higher in heterogeneity. Thus, 
 having built up acetic acid out of its elements, and having, by 
 the process of substitution described above, changed the acetic 
 acid into propionic acid, and propionic into butyric, of which the 
 
 . . ( C(CH 3 )(CH 3 ;H ) 
 formula is < rv)fHO) \ > thls com P lex compound, by ope- 
 
 rating on another complex compound, such as the dimethl-amine 
 named above, generates one of still greater complexity, butyrate 
 
 of dimethyl-amine { {j^pO^ **** } N (CH 3 )(CH 3 )H. 
 
 Now, let us examine this statement in detail. We are 
 to presume that it is an illustration of the process of the 
 formation of organic molecules from inorganic molecules. 
 In this case we start witli ammonia, which is composed 
 of one atom of nitrogen and three of hydrogen. The atom 
 of nitrogen is composed of ultimate units of definite shapes 
 and sizes and motions, making up a complex indivisible 
 whole, having definite shape, size, and motions. These 
 are such that on coming into contact with atoms of 
 hydrogen, also complex atoms, and having definite shapes, 
 sizes, and motions, those shapes, sizes, and motions of the 
 nitrogen atom and the three hydrogen atoms are so har- 
 monious that like, say, cog-wheels in a watch, they catch 
 and form a more complex molecule, having also a definite 
 shape, size, and set of motions. If we could see them, we 
 could delineate them on paper, and describe and count 
 their motions. Then we proceed to replace one of the 
 atoms of hydrogen by an atom of methyl, and produce 
 a much more complicated system of shapes, sizes, and 
 motions, which also could be geometrically and mathe- 
 matically described. By the further action of acetic acid 
 a still more compound molecule is obtained, and in this 
 manner highly complex substances are built up. 
 
 Again, two complex substances are employed " to gene-
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 37 
 
 rate" and different heterogeneous molecules of one stage 
 " become parents of." These phrases are used to describe 
 the production of a more complex compound from two 
 complex compounds, which is simply an extension of the 
 process already described, and, to whatever extent carried, 
 simply means a molecule compounded of a great number 
 of atoms having great varieties of shape and size and great 
 varieties of motion, but all of such forms and such modes 
 and rates that they are capable of an arrangement into a 
 system like the divers shapes and movements of the mem- 
 bers of a solar system, and all of which, could we see them, 
 could be described geometrically and arithmetically. 
 
 Now this is called by Mr. Spencer an " organic mole- 
 cule ; " the action of one complex molecule upon another 
 is called " to generate," and the result " parentage." It 
 is only a question of the meaning of words. I did not 
 know before that organic and complex were identical in 
 meaning. I did not know that the mechanical change by 
 which one large wheel put into gear with a lot of small 
 ones with the resultant distribution of motion was an act 
 of generation, nor that the addition of 2 plus 2 was a 
 parentage of 4. 
 
 One would like to ask, before going any further, what is 
 the distinction between a complex molecule and an organic 
 molecule ? Mr. Spencer begins by calling certain mole- 
 cules complex, and ends by calling the still more complex 
 molecules organic. Is there anything in the latter that 
 is not in the former ? Is there more in the latter than a 
 system of shapes, sizes, and relations of motion ? I pre- 
 sume not, for how can there be ? What is it, and how 
 came it there ? 2x2 = 4, and 4 x 1 6 = 64 ; but the 
 latter, though more complex, is of the same construction 
 as the former. So Z\ and Q make Q and <[ | |>,
 
 38 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 yet the latter, though more complex than the former, is 
 constituted of the same factors. 
 
 I am told that the meaning of the distinction between 
 inorganic and organic molecules is that the latter are 
 
 O O 
 
 animal or vegetable products. If so, there could be no 
 such products before animals and vegetables existed ; and 
 life must have come out of complex molecules and not 
 organic ones, in this sense. 
 
 I am also told that the distinction is one merely of 
 convenience, and is altogether an arbitrary one. In this 
 case we prefer the term " complex " as being scientifi- 
 cally accurate, and as having no misleading connotations. 
 
 "We now quote from Mr. Spencer a kind of litany of 
 Evolution. 
 
 " See, then, the remarkable parallelism. The progress to- 
 wards higher types of organic molecules is effected by modifica- 
 tions upon modifications ; as throughout Evolution in general 
 Each of these modifications is a change of the molecule into 
 equilibrium with its environment an adaptation, as it were, to 
 new surrounding conditions to which it is subjected; as through- 
 out Evolution in general Larger, or more integrated, aggregates 
 (for compound molecules are such) are successively generated ; 
 as throughout Evolution in general. More complex or hetero- 
 geneous aggregates are so made to arise, one out of another ; as 
 throughout Evolution in general A geometrically-increasing 
 multitude of these larger and more complex aggregates so pro- 
 duced at the same time results ; as throughout Evolution in 
 general. And it is by the action of the successively higher 
 forms on one another, joined with the action of environing con- 
 ditions, that the highest forms are reached; as throughout 
 Evolution in general." 
 
 Bearing in mind that we have arrived only at complex 
 molecules, we find in the above quotation the introduc- 
 tion of terms drawn from the changes of life and 
 organism. "Coming events cast their shadows before."
 
 INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 39 
 
 The words used do not grow naturally out of the 
 mechanical factors we have been considering, but, like a 
 dissolving view in a magic-lantern, we trace the first 
 appearances of an utterly disconnected picture. 
 
 First we have " the progress towards higher types of 
 organic molecules." This must mean the progress to- 
 wards more complex molecules, the phrase " higher types " 
 being both ambiguous and superfluous, and is drawn from 
 biological science. Next, " is effected by modifications 
 upon modifications." Now we have found that the kind 
 of modification which a molecule undergoes, if such it 
 can be called, is the addition to, subtraction from, or 
 substitution of, atoms of such shapes, sizes, and rates and 
 modes of motion as fit them to form part of the mechani- 
 cal system of the molecule, or to be withdrawn from it 
 without destroying the combination of the rest, in much 
 the same way that we see conjurors add article upon 
 article to a moving equilibrium at the end of a stick, if we 
 could suppose the motion to be in the articles themselves 
 instead of imparted to them by the arm of the performer. 
 It does not seem quite correct to call this recombination 
 and reconstruction, or the reverse process a modification 
 of the molecule, as it is the substitution of an indefinite 
 and ambiguous word for one of a definite meaning. 
 
 "Each of these modifications (i.e., recombinations or 
 reconstructions) is a change of the molecule into equili- 
 brium with its environment." Let us examine what 
 this means. If we suppose chemical combinations to be 
 mechanical, they will be due to harmonies of shape, size, 
 and movement. So if we suppose an atom of suitable 
 size and shape for combination with another atom, as, for 
 instance, /\, itself composite, and another, \~], they 
 will combine thus, -^QQp^j an d if the rates of attrac-
 
 40 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 live and repulsive motion are the same, the combination 
 is stable, as, for instance, if the rate of movement is 2 
 and 2 to the unit of time, or one 2 and the other 4, 
 or one 3 and the other 4, and in proportion to the 
 greater number of synchronometric beats (or rotations) so 
 the stability of the complex molecule. Now, if a quantity 
 of complex molecules be put into a liquid medium con- 
 taining other complex molecules, either the molecules 
 will agree or disagree in their shapes, sizes, or rates of 
 motions. If they agree, then they form compounds, i.e., 
 more complex molecules in certain definite proportions. 
 If they do not agree, then they tear each other to pieces 
 and form new combinations with atoms of suitable shapes 
 and sizes and synchronometric motions. This is all that 
 can be meant by the change of a molecule into equi- 
 librium with its environment. 
 
 It does not invalidate my criticism that my illustrations 
 are not drawn from actual facts. I am arguing from Mr. 
 Spencer's premises, which, starting from matter in motion, 
 only admit of changes and recombinations of matter in 
 motion, by which I am necessarily obliged to translate all 
 his terms of generation, parentage, adaptation, environ- 
 ment, &c., into a mechanical representation. 
 
 " An adaptation, as it were, to new surrounding condi- 
 tions to which it is subjected." 
 
 The phrase "as it were" is not admissible into philo- 
 sophical writing, indicating merely a possible likeness or 
 an indefinite one a term of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
 A likeness or illustration in philosophy should be care- 
 fully considered and sparingly used, to the elucidation and 
 not to the confusion of a subject ; as, for instance, in the 
 illustration of the construction of a complex molecule from 
 the trick of the juggler just adduced. Here the "as it
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 41 
 
 were" refers to the word adaptation, and I do not think 
 it is correct. It is difficult to make out the meaning of 
 it in terms of matter in motion. In walking, I adapt my 
 pace to that of my companion. I adapt the size of my 
 cork to the size of the neck of my bottle. But I do not 
 see that when heterogeneous complex molecules come into 
 contact in a liquid medium that they adapt themselves 
 otherwise than by recombinations or reconstructions, as 
 above described viz., in accordance with harmonies of 
 size, shape, and modes and rates of motion. If they alter 
 themselves otherwise, it is equivalent to saying that they 
 alter their shapes or modes and rates of motion in order 
 to acquire such as will enable them to enter into com- 
 bination with molecules in their environment ; that a 
 molecule OCO will change itself to c^j to oblige op, and 
 thus form cggS, an ^ change its relative motion of 5 in 
 unit of time to 4 in order to harmonise better with 8 in 
 unit of time. 
 
 Adaptation of molecules would seem to imply that gold 
 in a jar of oxygen would change itself into hydrogen, in 
 order that it might unite with it to make water. The 
 word " adaptation " is not used in the science of chemis- 
 try, so far as I have been able to ascertain. 
 
 " Larger or more integrated aggregates (for compound 
 molecules are such) are necessarily generated." " Gene- 
 rated " here only means formed or constructed. 
 
 "More complex or heterogeneous aggregates are so 
 made to arise one out of another." 
 
 Here the word "complex" is made synonymous with 
 heterogeneous. A complex aggregate is a correct descrip- 
 tion of a complex molecule, which is a system of shapes, 
 sizes, and motions in definite relations ; but an aggregate 
 made up of similar complex molecules would not be
 
 42 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 called heterogeneous. There is also an ambiguity in the 
 phrase, " made to arise one out of another." They do not 
 seem words that can be adapted to express the relations 
 and sequences of matter in motion. If I have two com- 
 plex molecules, and if, by placing them in contact, a re- 
 combination ensues, and I have one, two, three, or four 
 molecules instead, I know that I have the same number 
 of definite specific atoms with which I started ; and if I 
 say that I made them " arise one out of another," all I 
 mean is that they are combined in a different manner. 
 
 " A geometrically-increasing multitude of these larger 
 and more complex aggregates so produced at the same 
 time results. And it is by the action of successively higher 
 forms on one another, joined with the action of environing 
 conditions, that the highest forms are reached." 
 
 "Highest forms" means more complex molecules, and 
 their action on one another means that their coming into 
 contact results in the formation of still more complex 
 molecules not always, but when the shapes, sizes, and 
 motions are harmonious. "Joined with the action of 
 environing conditions," must mean, not the environment 
 of suitable molecules, for that has just been discussed, 
 but the conditions of etherial motions, such as heat, light, 
 &c., and of a medium of suitable condition, such as water. 
 But both etherial motions and the medium are all ad- 
 mitted to be nothing more than matter in motion. 
 
 " When we thus see the identity of method at the two ex- 
 tremes when we see that the general laws of Evolution, as they 
 are exemplified in known organisms, have been unconsciously 
 conformed to by chemists in the artificial evolution of organic 
 matter ; we can scarcely doubt that these laws were conformed 
 to in the natural evolution of organic matter, and afterwards in 
 the evolution of the simplest organic forms. In the early world, 
 as in the modern laboratory, inferior types of organic substances,
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 43 
 
 by their mutual actions under fit conditions, evolved the superior 
 types of organic substances, ending in organisable protoplasm. 
 And it can hardly be doubted that the shaping of organisable 
 protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous 
 ways with extreme facility, went on after the same manner. As 
 I learn from one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein 
 is capable of existing under probably at least a thousand isomeric 
 forms ; and, as we shall presently see, it is capable of forming, 
 with itself and other elements, substances yet more intricate in 
 composition, that are practically infinite in their varieties of kind. 
 Exposed to those innumerable modifications of conditions which 
 the earth's surface afforded, here in amount of light, there in 
 amount of heat, and elsewhere in the mineral quality of its 
 aqueous medium, this extremely changeable substance must have 
 undergone, now one, now another, of its countless metamor- 
 phoses. And to the mutual influences of its metamorphic forms 
 under favouring conditions we may ascribe the production of 
 the still more composite, still more sensitive, still more variously 
 changeable portions of organic matter, which, in masses more 
 minute and simpler than existing Protozoa, displayed actions 
 verging little by little into those called vital actions which 
 protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest 
 known living things exhibit only in a greater degree. Thus, 
 setting out with inductions from the experiences of organic 
 chemists at the one extreme, and with inductions from the 
 observations of biologists at the other extreme, we are enabled 
 deductively to bridge the interval are enabled to conceive how 
 organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a continuance of 
 the process, the nascent life displayed in these became gradually 
 more pronounced. And this it is which has to be explained, 
 and which the alleged cases of 'spontaneous generation' would 
 not, were they substantiated, help us in the least to explain." 
 
 What is the purport of this argument ? We have 
 so far seen that the process of the chemist in the produc- 
 tion of complex molecules is the same as the natural 
 process, and it is difficult indeed to suppose that any one 
 would think otherwise, since the chemist only manipu- 
 lates the matters and motions which lie deals with. He
 
 44 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION, 
 
 does not and cannot alter them. He merely places them 
 in contact, and the mechanical sequences result. Mr. 
 Spencer, however, would draw some further conclusion. 
 Let us try to follow it out. 
 
 " When we thus see the identity of method at the two ex- 
 tremes, when we see that the general laws of Evolution, as they 
 are exemplified in known organisms, have heen unconsciously 
 conformed to hy chemists in the artificial evolution of organic 
 matter." 
 
 The first question that arises is respecting the impor- 
 tation into the study of a new term, " organism." Is this 
 identical with the term " organic molecule," and therefore 
 ,rith the term " complex molecule " ? "We are induced 
 to think so from the employment of the word "thus," 
 which evidently connects the paragraph with the preced- 
 ing one, and still more when we see that the process of 
 the evolution of an organism is likened to the " artificial 
 evolution of organic matter " by chemists. 
 
 " We can scarcely doubt that these laws were conformed to 
 in the natural evolution of organic matter, and afterwards in the 
 evolution of the simplest organic forms." 
 
 There is no doubt that the natural evolution of organic 
 if read as " complex " matter, is identical with the 
 artificial production by the chemist ; but what about the 
 evolution of the simple organic forms ? It is to be pre- 
 sumed that "organic" still means complex. The change of 
 the adjective having been satisfactorily effected, and, by re- 
 petition, pretty well established in our minds, we are now, 
 by a process of mere word evolution, required to change our 
 substantive " matter " into the substantive " forms." We 
 can only remark, that so far we have made no progress, 
 whether in the world of nature or in the laboratory, 
 beyond complex molecules, which are mechanical arrange-
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 45 
 
 ments of atoms of definite and harmonious shapes, sizes, 
 and motions. If " organism " be defined as a combina- 
 tion of organic molecules, and these organic molecules are 
 merely highly complex molecules; and if, again, these 
 highly complex molecules are composed of less complex 
 molecules, then a highly complex molecule is by this 
 definition an organism itself. For what is the distinction 
 between a highly complex molecule and an organism ? 
 They are both aggregates of the less complex. 
 
 " In the early world, as in the modern laboratory, inferior 
 types of organic substances, by their mutual actions under fit 
 conditions, evolved the superior types of organic substances, 
 ending in organisable protoplasm." 
 
 Here we remark the loose employment of several 
 words. " Types," for instance, employed in relation to 
 complex molecules, can only relate to the degree of com- 
 plexity which might, for our convenience, and for that 
 only, be so classified according to the number of atoms 
 or kinds of atoms composed in a molecule. The "organic 
 substances," of course, only means complex molecules, and 
 the whole sentence is simply a repetition in vague and 
 more advanced language of what we have had before, 
 until we come to the phrase " ending in organisable pro- 
 toplasm." If this means that nothing was organisable 
 before the evolution of protoplasm, we are justified in our 
 rejection of the word " organic " hitherto; or if the appli- 
 cation is the same now as heretofore, it simply means 
 protoplasm capable of being an item in a more complex 
 arrangement, which is the case with other complex 
 molecules. 
 
 " Organisable protoplasm." If we could only here 
 have a description of what was meant by this term, 
 and how it the organisable protoplasm was arrived
 
 46 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 at, we would feel safe in going further. Follow- 
 ing up the train of thought carefully, we have got as 
 far as a complex molecule, vast varieties of them, 
 in fact, and we find them capable of forming crys- 
 talloid and colloid masses, the particular form being due, 
 no doubt, to the form and composition of the mole- 
 cules themselves, or the mould or medium in which they 
 happen to be placed. Yet we hesitate on this account to 
 call them organisable. The word " organisable " does not 
 seem to be capable of expression in terms of matter in 
 motion. Is the atom forming part of the mechanical 
 structure of a molecule organised or organisable ? It is 
 an essential part of a moving system, without which that 
 system could not be what it is. And in this view it is 
 to be considered more essentially a part of an organic 
 whole, and therefore more organic than the molecule 
 which forms part of a crystal or of a colloidal mass. 
 But the fact is, that the newly introduced word organisable 
 is due to the necessity for finding a step " ending in pro- 
 toplasm." 
 
 What is protoplasm ? We know what it is, or rather 
 what its properties are, viewed from this side of creation, 
 or present constitution of the cosmos ; we want to get at 
 it from the other side. 
 
 If we try to advance to it from the inorganic, we 
 simply end in a highly complex chemical formula, and 
 all chemical formulas are expressions of combinations ot 
 shapes, sizes, and modes and rates of motions. Has this 
 chemical protoplasm any other properties ? If so, whence 
 came they ? 
 
 Is protoplasm the chemical formula by which it is to 
 be expressed, or is it something more ? We know it is, 
 and can be, on this basis of our reasoning, nothing more.
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 47 
 
 It is a molecule having special shapes, sizes, and motions, 
 being the resultant of the shapes, sizes, and motions of 
 its constituent atoms. If it is organisable that is to 
 say, if it forms part of a larger group, without which that 
 group would not be a coherent group, as it itself would 
 not be with the loss of one of its constituent atoms it 
 is only the same as the molecule constituent of a crystal. 
 So far have we got with the meaning of the term organ- 
 isable. 
 
 " And it can hardly be doubted that the shaping of organisable 
 protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous 
 ways with extreme facility, went on after the same manner." 
 
 We have next to consider the shaping of organisable 
 protoplasm. 
 
 Are we to understand that the shaping of organisable 
 protoplasm is the shaping of the molecules or the shaping of 
 masses of molecules ? As regards the shaping of the mole- 
 cules, we might, perhaps, admit the possibility of a highly 
 complex molecule of loose composition, which might 
 retain such relations of external motion as to retain its 
 molecular characteristics, yet be somewhat susceptible to 
 change of shape from external conditions. Yet it is a 
 very doubtful hypothesis. 
 
 As regards the shaping of masses of protoplasm, still 
 regarding it not as we know it, but only as a molecule 
 of factors of shapes, sizes, and motions, we presume the 
 mass could be shaped by external conditions in just the 
 same way that a mass of putty could be shaped. Let us 
 consider the matter in detail. 
 
 In the same manner as what ? If the shaping of 
 organisable protoplasm means the shaping of the mole- 
 cules of protoplasm, we have to consider the theory of 
 the plasticity of molecules. Are atoms plastic ? What
 
 48 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 is the meaning of "plastic," applied to molecules and 
 atoms ? We only know the plasticity of masses. Plas- 
 ticity is of two kinds that which is capable of alteration 
 of shape and retains the shape given, and that which 
 returns to its original shape ; the latter is more properly 
 termed elastic, although the latter has another meaning 
 in respect to compressibility and the return to the original 
 bulk. We can conceive of an atom composed of ultimate 
 units of a spherical, spheroidal, or other shape, without 
 angles, but of definite motions and sizes, like a miniature 
 solar system, which, in contact with other atoms, or 
 impact of other atoms, or moved by etherial currents 
 without disintegration of parts, should yet have the rela- 
 tions of distance of these parts slightly changed without 
 change in the resultant size or specific motions of the 
 atom. There would, however, be a slight change of shape, 
 according to the nature of the action of the motions 
 affecting it. Again, it is conceivable that molecules 
 made up of atoms destitute of angles might in the same 
 way change shape and yet preserve those definite relations 
 of size and motions which constitute it a specific molecule. 
 And again, in any colloidal mass composed of these par- 
 ticles there might be plasticity and elasticity. And it 
 seems reasonable to suppose that all these relations of 
 matter in motion, which are obvious to us in sensible 
 masses, should be attributed to the smallest aggregates of 
 atoms, or if not to these since they may be regarded as 
 indivisible and unchangeable complex units at any rate 
 to molecules which admit of etherial motions permeating 
 their constituents, rendering them subject to change and 
 divisibility. Yet it is not unreasonable to suppose either 
 that aggregates, such as molecules, and the more so 
 according to their size and complexity, should be subject
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 49 
 
 to different modes of influence to the indivisible units, 
 such as atoms. So granted that molecules, and more 
 especially highly complex molecules, more loosely bound 
 together than others, may be susceptible to change of 
 shape slightly, and while retaining their specific con- 
 stituents and motions, we may admit the plasticity of 
 some molecules. From similar methods we have the 
 plasticity of masses. The influence of heat, which means 
 the increased length of the beat of the molecule or of the 
 contained ether, implies the further separation of mole- 
 cules, and favourably influences the conditions of plasticity 
 of masses, and in like manner may favourably influence 
 the plasticity of the molecule. Then if the molecule and 
 any aggregate of molecules be plastic, their shapes will 
 continually be changing within certain limits, due to the 
 range of the atomic motions, according to the motions of 
 surrounding molecules, or currents of molecular or etherial 
 motion, with which they may be in relation. It is per- 
 haps, also, conceivable, since plasticity is affected by 
 heat or etherial vibrations, that on the cessation of this 
 heat the molecule should retain the shape it possessed 
 under the external influences, as before described, at the 
 moment of the cessation of the heat which rendered it 
 plastic, and this would enable us to admit the moulding 
 and shaping which Mr. Spencer speaks of; but these 
 acquired shapes would not be permanent, like the shape 
 of an atom or of a crystalloidal molecule, but, under the 
 conditions of increased heat, would resume their original 
 character of plasticity. 
 
 But the result, so far, has not carried us beyond com- 
 plex molecules, and we are still far from understanding 
 organisable molecules, otherwise than as capable of form- 
 ing items of colloidal or crystalloid masses. 
 
 D
 
 50 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 We have next to consider the combination of these 
 plastic complex molecules with each other, with other 
 plastic complex molecules, and with non-plastic complex 
 molecules, whether colloidal or crystalloidal. But this is 
 best done in the criticism of the next succeeding section. 
 
 In the meantime, passing over several sentences, the 
 criticism of which would be merely a repetition of what 
 we have already said, we come to one which demands 
 attention from the introduction of new terms, which 
 might suggest the acquirement by matter in motion of 
 qualities that cannot be described in terms of matter in 
 motion, and therefore impairs the accuracy of our reason- 
 ings. I refer to the passage, " The production of the still 
 more composite, still more sensitive, still more variously 
 changeable portions of organic (i.e., complex) matter, which 
 . . . displayed actions verging, little by little, into those 
 called vital actions which protein itself exhibits in a 
 certain degree, and which the lowest known living things 
 exhibit only in a greater degree." 
 
 I call attention here,-in the first place, to highly complex 
 molecules being more sensitive. I presume "sensitive" can- 
 not mean consciousness, but molecules more easily decom- 
 posable on account of the heterogeneity of their composi- 
 tion, exposing them to the action of a greater number of 
 other molecules, simple or complex, with which they may 
 come into contact ; or the decompositions effected by the 
 general actions of etherial motions, or the diverse actions 
 thereof in respect to the different constituent atoms. In 
 the second portion of the quotation we find a reference to 
 vital actions, which also is a new term which I cannot 
 render into terms of matter in motion, and the considera- 
 tion of which, together with the term " living," will come 
 in with the criticism of the next section. We note here
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 51 
 
 only, en passant, that the difference intended to be indi- 
 cated is one of degree only that is to say, increased 
 complexity of measurable rates and sizes and shapes, and 
 consequent increased instability when subject to the in- 
 
 % 
 
 fluence of even slightly inharmonious motions. 
 
 " Thus setting out with the experience of organic 
 chemists at the one extreme, and the inductions from the 
 observations of biologists at the other extreme, we are 
 enabled deductively to bridge the interval are enabled to 
 see how organic compounds are evolved, and how, by a 
 continuance of the process, the nascent life displayed in 
 these became gradually more pronounced." 
 
 It is true that we did see how complex (called organic) 
 compounds are evolved, but we did not perceive that they 
 displayed any life even nascent life whatever that 
 means ; nor did we see that this life became more " pro- 
 nounced," whatever that is. We failed altogether to get 
 beyond a complex molecule. Even if we got as far as 
 chemical formulas representing protoplasm, they were but 
 mechanical formulas ; the protoplasm had no characteristics 
 beyond matter and motion, and had no biological value. 
 
 We now take up the second problem, viz., " the evolu 
 tion of life in its lowest forms," which we may sufficiently 
 discuss by means of a consideration of the passages com- 
 mencing with the section at the top of page 486. 
 
 " Much evidence now conspires to show that molecules of the 
 substances we call elementary are in reality compound; and 
 that, by the combination of these with one another, and recom- 
 binations of the products, there are formed systems of systems 
 of molecules, unimaginable in their complexity. Step by step 
 as the aggregate molecules so resulting grow larger and increase 
 in heterogeneity, they become more unstable, more readily trans- 
 formable by small forces, more capable of assuming various 
 characters. Those composing organic matter transcend all others
 
 52 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 in size and intricacy of structure ; and in them these resulting 
 traits reach their extreme. As implied by its name, protein, the 
 essential substance of which organisms are built, is remarkable 
 alike for the variety of its metamorphoses and the facility with 
 which it undergoes them : it changes from one to another of its 
 thousand isomeric forms on the slightest change of conditions. 
 Now, there are facts warranting the belief that though these 
 multitudinous isomeric forms of protein will not unite directly 
 with one another, yet they admit of being linked together by 
 other elements with which they combine. And it is very signi- 
 ficant that there are habitually present two other elements, 
 sulphur and phosphorus, which have quite special powers of 
 holding together many equivalents the one being pentatomic 
 and the other hexatomic. So that it is a legitimate supposition 
 (justified by analogies) that an atom of sulphur may be a bond 
 of union among half-a-dozen different isomeric forms of protein ; 
 and similarly with phosphorus. A moment's thought will show 
 that, setting out with the thousand isomeric forms of protein, 
 this makes possible a number of these combinations almost 
 passing the power of figures to express. Molecules so produced, 
 perhaps exceeding in size and complexity those of protein as 
 those of protein exceed those of inorganic matter, may, I con- 
 ceive, be the special units belonging to special kinds of organisms. 
 By their constitution they must have a plasticity, or sensitive- 
 ness to modifying forces, far beyond that of protein ; and bear- 
 ing in mind not only that their varieties are practically infinite 
 in number, but that closely allied forms of them, chemically 
 indifferent to one another as they must be, may coexist in the 
 same aggregate, we shall see that they are fitted for entering 
 into unlimited varieties of organic structures." 
 
 " Much evidence now conspires to show that molecules 
 of the substances that we call elementary are in reality 
 compound; and that, by the combinations of these with 
 one another, and the recombinations of the products, 
 there are formed systems of systems of molecules, unima- 
 ginable in their complexity. Step by step as the aggre- 
 gate molecules so resulting grow larger and increase in 
 heterogeneity, they become more unstable, more readily
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 53 
 
 transformable by small forces, more capable of assuming 
 various characters." 
 
 This is all very comprehensible, but Mr. Spencer goes 
 on to say : " Those composing organic matter transcend all 
 others in size and intricacy of structure; and in them 
 these resulting traits reach their extreme," without specify- 
 ing what organic matter is as distinguished from complex 
 matter, which he has all along treated as identical with 
 it, but here seems to mark off as a special kind of complex 
 molecules. However, some light is thrown upon this 
 subject by the next passage. " As implied by its name, 
 protein, the essential substance of which all organisms 
 are built, is remarkable alike for the variety of its meta- 
 morphoses and the facility with which it undergoes them ; 
 it changes from one to another of its isomeric forms on 
 the slightest change of conditions." 
 
 From this it appears that the essential substance of 
 which all organisms are built is protein. The only organ- 
 isable matter then is protein, and when organisable matter 
 is spoken of it is protein that is meant. 
 
 It would seem further to follow, that the only organic 
 molecule is a molecule of protein, and that throughout this 
 criticism, wherever I have insisted upon the substitution 
 of the phrase " complex molecule " for " organic molecule," 
 I have been correct. The only correct use of the word 
 "organic" is in relation to the word "protein" a view cor- 
 roborated by a passage a few lines further on, where com- 
 pound molecules of sulphur or phosphorus and protein 
 are contrasted with those of inorganic matter. So that 
 when Mr. Spencer heretofore spoke of the "organic 
 chemists," he only meant chemists who produced complex 
 inorganic, i.e., non-protein molecules. 
 
 But what justifies the application of the term " organic "
 
 54 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 to compounds of protein, viewed not from our knowledge of 
 protein as derived from experience, but from our know- 
 ledge of protein as a mechanical molecule or combination 
 thereof, the result of Evolution ; that is to say, a plastic 
 complex molecule or aggregation composed of atoms having 
 specific shapes, sizes, and motions, and the resultant in 
 itself being a compound of specific shapes, sizes, and 
 motions, though a shape, owing to its plasticity, capable of 
 change under pressure. There is nothing so far to mark 
 them off by a distinguishing title from all other complex 
 molecules. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, speaking of molecules composed of sulphur 
 or phosphorus and protein, says of them : " By their con- 
 stitution they must have a plasticity, or sensitiveness to 
 modifying forces, far beyond that of protein." Here we 
 simply repeat that "sensitiveness" does not mean conscious- 
 ness or feeling of any sort, and that "modifying" only 
 means modification of shape and mechanical rearrange- 
 ments of atoms and motions. "And bearing in mind 
 not only that their varieties are practically infinite in 
 number, but that closely allied forms of them, chemically 
 indifferent to one another as they must be, may coexist in 
 the same aggregate, we shall see that they are fitted for 
 entering into unlimited varieties of organic structures." 
 We notice here specially " coexist in the same aggregate ; " 
 but it does not show how the aggregate was formed or 
 came into existence that is, in fact, the problem that 
 has to be solved. Is it merely a chance aggregate ? Sup- 
 posing that complex organic molecules have been formed, 
 that is to say, sulphur and phosphorus and protein. We 
 wish to know what aggregate they exist in, and how they 
 form it ? Do they adhere like the molecules of water or 
 iron? Later on it is said that they are fitted to enter
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 55 
 
 into unlimited varieties of organic structure. But whence 
 the structure ? and how organic ? How do three or four 
 of them get their first skin and thus form a definite 
 whole ? 
 
 To realise to ourselves and unless we think clearly it is 
 no use thinking at all the formation of an organism, we 
 have to consider a case like this. 
 
 Given a mass of highly complex molecules, each mole- 
 cule being an aggregate of atoms forming an equilibrium 
 like the solar system, to ascertain the mode of their be- 
 coming an organic whole, as thus : 
 
 This mass will be brought into contact in a liquid 
 medium forming a highly complex aggregate, and will be 
 subject to the influences of light, heat, &c., and there may 
 result modifications of molecules and of their relations. 
 But there will be no wearing out or waste or using up of 
 the energy of the substance, nor repair of waste. 
 
 Mr. George Lewes, speaking of the modes of substances, 
 says, speaking of life : " Their peculiarity consists in this; 
 they undergo molecular changes of composition and decom- 
 position which are simultaneous, and by this simultaneity 
 preserve their integrity of structure. They change their 
 state, and their elements yet preserve their unity, and even 
 when differentiating continue specific; unlike all other 
 bodies, are born, grow, develop, and decay through a pre- 
 scribed series of gradual evolutions, each stage being the
 
 56 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 indispensable condition of its successor, no stage ever ap- 
 pearing except in its serial order." 
 
 Now, to take the first stage. Is it asserted of a complex 
 molecule of sulphur or phosphorus and protein that this 
 molecule casts out some of its protein and assimilates other 
 from the environment ? If so, why so ? How did the cast- 
 off molecule of protein get out of relation with the other 
 part of the highly complex aggregate of which it formed 
 a part? Evidently only by means of some mechanical 
 agency in the environment, or of some etherial motion. 
 And how did some other molecule get into relation and 
 take its place? Would not the old molecule, being an 
 identical system of shapes, sizes, and motions, have done 
 just as well ? 
 
 "We cannot entertain the notion of an atom constituent 
 of a complex molecule getting worn out in consequence of 
 its relations of movement as part of that complex system 
 of motions; for it was by virtue of its harmonies of 
 shape, size, and motions that it entered into the combina- 
 tion, and what caused it preserves it. Such a change 
 would imply that it ceases to be what it is. It is not 
 merely cast out ; it has become something else that is to 
 say, some other element. If, however, the decomposition 
 has been effected by means of chemical recombination 
 with an exterior molecule, then the explanation is reason- 
 able, although we still do not see why one molecule should 
 be so taken up by an exterior molecule when there are 
 others in the environment with which it could combine. 
 But the notion of interior decomposition is not admissible, 
 for the sizes, shapes, and motions that caused the combina- 
 tion into the complex molecule tend to preserve that con- 
 stitution until affected by exterior agencies. 
 
 But again, if we speak of masses of protein and sulphur
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 57 
 
 or phosphorus, are we not speaking of amorphous masses, 
 chance aggregates, without definite shape or structure, like 
 a mass of putty ? What is there in the shape or composi- 
 tion of such a mass to imply the process of casting out and 
 replacement of its constituents upon purely mechanical or 
 chemical considerations ? All its changes would be due to 
 the impingement of external mechanical agencies^ 
 
 And beyond this I do not see that we can go. I see not 
 the slightest attempt to get at structure, and if a certain 
 structure could be thought out by means of harmonies of 
 sizes, shapes, rates, and modes of motion of highly complex 
 molecules under suitable conditions of external mechanical 
 agencies, such as a scratch in a rock, a hole in the sand, 
 &c., this structure would exist only so long as the favour- 
 ing conditions existed, and would then perish, and such 
 structures would come and go like the crystals of ice and 
 snow, like the clouds that float in the sky. The forms 
 would be evanescent as the shifting sands, or might last a 
 thousand years in a crack in the stone, like any chance 
 aggregate of clay. 
 
 But towards anything like consciousness, heredity, repro- 
 duction, memory, or any facts comprising the transmission 
 of qualities other than motion from one molecule to another, 
 or towards anything like structure other than that of a 
 cloud, which exists only so long and quite as long as en- 
 vironing conditions are favourable, we have no approach 
 whatever. The attempt to bridge over the process of Evo- 
 lution from the inorganic to the organic has proved a 
 failure. 
 
 An attempt of this sort may be regarded as one of three . 
 things : firstly, as an endeavour to represent in words an 
 actual and observed process of nature ; or, secondly, it may 
 be an attempt to represent and realise in thought what
 
 58 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 might be an actual, but is an unobserved, process of nature; 
 or, lastly, it may only be an evolution of words, represent- 
 ing a supposed process of nature. 
 
 The Evolution contained in the explanation we have 
 been considering appears to be one of words only. It is a 
 kind of ladder of semi-synonyms. The stair by which we 
 mount from the inorganic to the highest forms of life is 
 made up of words that bracket together biological and 
 chemical (i.e., mechanical) processes. It is a scheme 
 founded on the frailties of language. Complex is over- 
 lapped by organic, organic is overlapped by sensitive, sen- 
 sitive is overlapped by vital, and so we get life ; class or 
 degree is overlapped by type, complex combination is 
 called generation, greater complexity, and greater sensitive- 
 less, and generation is the generation of higher types. 
 Then there is adaptation to environment and correspond- 
 ing change of structure, and through generation again we 
 get heredity and the establishment of highly organised 
 living beings and organised experience.
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 59 
 
 The Evolution of Life. 
 
 THE STAIE OF LIFE, 
 
 BTWHICH WE MOUNT VERBALLYFROM 
 
 THE INORGANIC TO THE HIGHEST 
 
 FORMS OF LIFE. 
 
 The nascent life displayed 
 in these gradually becom- 
 ing more pronounced. 
 
 Lowest known living things, 
 and aggregates of them. 
 
 Verging little by little into those 
 called vital actions. 
 
 Still more composite, sensitive, and 
 changeable molecules. 
 
 Sensitive molecules. 
 
 Higher types of organic molecules. 
 
 Combination of complex molecules or parent- 
 age of molecules. 
 Generation of molecules. 
 
 Types of molecules. 
 
 I 
 
 I Hi| 
 
 Organic molecules. 
 Highly complex molecules. 
 Complex molecules. 
 Compound molecules. 
 Atoms or simple molecules. 
 I Matter in motion. Ultimate homogeneous units. 
 
 
 It is a process of knitting together of the terms used to 
 describe inorganic actions and the terms used to describe 
 the actions of living organisms. When this is done the
 
 60 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 explanation is supposed to be accomplished, but as a real 
 explanation it is a failure. 
 
 We have thus seen that not only are the phenomena of 
 consciousness, life, memory, generation, heredity, nourish- 
 ment, and decay unexplainable a priori from the inter- 
 action of the two factors matter and motion, but that Mr. 
 Spencer himself, in endeavouring to establish the theory 
 in this most ingenious and subtle reasoning, fails to bring 
 them within the processes of matter and motion, to what- 
 ever degree of complexity these processes may be carried. 
 
 We may, therefore, safely come to the conclusion that no 
 merely mechanical theory, that no merely materialistic 
 theory for to that it is, in fact, equivalent is able to 
 account for life and its changes. 
 
 " The existence of such physiological units, peculiar to each 
 species of organism, is not unaccounted for. They are evolved 
 simultaneously with the evolution of the organisms they com- 
 pose they differentiate as fast as these organisms differentiate ; 
 and are made multitudinous in kind by the same actions which 
 make the organism they compose multitudinous in kind. This 
 conception is clearly representable in terms of the mechanical 
 hypothesis. Every physicist will endorse the proposition that 
 in each aggregate there tends to establish itself an equilibrium 
 between the forces exercised by all the units upon each and by 
 each upon all Even in masses of substance so rigid as iron 
 and glass, there goes on a molecular rearrangement, slow or 
 rapid according as circumstances facilitate, which ends only 
 when there is a complete balance between the actions of the 
 parts on the whole and the actions of the whole on the parts ; 
 the implication being that every change in the form or size of 
 the whole necessitates some redistribution of the parts. And 
 though, in cases like these, there occurs only a polar rearrange- 
 ment of the molecules, without changes in the molecules them- 
 selves ; yet where, as often happens, there is a passage from the 
 colloid to the crystalloid state, a change of constitution occurs 
 in the molecules themselves. These truths are not limited to
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 61 
 
 inorganic matter ; they unquestionably hold of organic matter. 
 As certainly as molecules of alum have a form of equilibrium, 
 the octahedron, into which they fall when the temperature of 
 their solvent allows them to aggregate, so certainly must organic 
 molecules of each kind, no matter how complex, have a form of 
 equilibrium in which, when they aggregate, their complex forces 
 are balanced a form far less rigid and definite, for the reason 
 that they have far less definite polarities, are far more unstable, 
 and have their tendencies more easily modified by environing 
 conditions. Equally certain is it that the special molecules 
 having a special organic structure as their form of equilibrium, 
 must be reacted upon by the total forces of this organic struc- 
 ture ; and that, if environing actions lead to any change in this 
 organic structure, these special molecules, or physiological units, 
 subject to a changed distribution of the total forces acting upon 
 them, will undergo modification modification which their ex- 
 treme plasticity will render easy. By this action and reaction 
 I conceive the physiological units peculiar to each kind of 
 organism to have been moulded along with the organism itself. 
 
 " Setting out with the stage in which protein, in minute aggre- 
 gates, took on those simplest differentiations which fitted it for 
 differently-conditioned parts of its medium, there must have un- 
 ceasingly gone on perpetual readjustments of balance between 
 aggregates and their units actions and reactions of the two, in 
 which the units tended ever to establish the typical form pro- 
 duced by actions and reactions in all antecedent generations, 
 while the aggregate, if changed in form by change of surround- 
 ing conditions, tended ever to impress on the units a correspond- 
 ing change of polarity, causing them in the next generation to 
 reproduce the changed form their new form of equilibrium." 
 
 This paragraph is difficult to deal with. The first two 
 sentences take up the subject at a stage at which we 
 have not yet arrived. Then Mr. Spencer states: "This 
 conception is clearly representable in terms of the mechani- 
 cal hypothesis." He then argues from the rearrangement 
 of molecules in correspondence to changes of mass which 
 we may safely assume to be correct a corresponding change 
 in the organic molecules of an organic aggregate. But it
 
 62 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 must be borne in mind that we have not yet got an organic 
 aggregate beyond the atom of sulphur or phosphorus and 
 protein. And if we assume a mass of these smaller aggre- 
 gates, we may assume some change of its constituents to 
 take place, in accordance with pressure, cutting, heating, 
 freezing, passage of light, electricity, &c., in the same manner 
 as the molecules of a bar of gold might be modified by pres- 
 sure, cutting a piece off the end of it, heating, and the like. 
 Perhaps the changes would be greater in the former case, 
 on account of the greater complexity of the molecules, but 
 as it would be an unorganised mass, the changes would 
 only be in degree and not in kind. Mr. Spencer, however, 
 denies this. He says they " have their tendencies more 
 easily modified by environing conditions." Here we have 
 the importation of a new term, "tendencies." The only 
 tendency of an atomic motion is to go on, or to combine 
 its motion with another atom moving at a harmonious rate. 
 The only tendency (a term applicable only to the motions, 
 and not to the shapes and sizes of atoms and molecules) 
 of the motion of a molecule is to go on or to unite with 
 other molecules of agreeable motions. The modification of 
 a tendency of an atom or a molecule is to increase or 
 decrease their rates of motion. This can be done by heat 
 perhaps, and perhaps in some other ways, but it is rather 
 a doubtful sort of expression to say that the tendency of 
 their motion is changed. What is the meaning of the 
 word "tendency"? Does it apply to organised experi- 
 ence, and therefore a biological term, or is it a mechanical 
 term ? If so, it is only another expression for the con- 
 tinuity of motion. 
 
 The rest of the argument proceeds to discuss the rela- 
 4ons of an organism to its molecules. " By this action 
 and reaction I conceive the physiological units peculiar to
 
 INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 63 
 
 each kind of organism to have been moulded along with 
 the organism itself." 
 
 Before we have got an organism it is premature to dis- 
 cuss this question. If we have an organism, or set of 
 organisms, already in existence the whole question, in 
 fact, begged we can then discuss the interaction of 
 organism and its physiological units, but not till then. At 
 the same time it seems extremely difficult to me, and I am 
 sure it will be to others, to imagine an organism without 
 sensibility and consciousness to imagine an organism 
 which goes on through all its changes of birth, growth, re- 
 production, decay, in a manner which could be represented 
 by wheels revolving or pulsating molecules, &c. But if 
 sensibility and consciousness be added, how are they to be 
 expressed in terms of shape or size or rates of motion, 
 which are the only factors recognised in the formula ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer says more viz., " in which the units tended 
 ever to establish the typical form produced by actions 
 and reactions in all antecedent generations." He looks at 
 the matter persistently from this side of creation, not the 
 other. Why did the units tend to establish anything? 
 Why to establish a type? Do actions and reactions of 
 inorganic substances tend to the establishment of any type 
 of movement ? Does the pendulum acquire a tendency to 
 wag, or the striker to strike, or the spring to wind itself 
 up or down ? But the " antecedent generations " places 
 Mr. Spencer's argument as applicable to concerns much 
 later than the commencement of the propagation of life by 
 generation. How did the first tendency arise ? Was it 
 other than a mechanical tendency or motion to go on or to 
 unite with harmonious motions? The only tendency of 
 matter in motion is inertia. The only tendency of 
 shapes and sizes is to retain the shapes and sizes. The
 
 64 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 only tendency of motion is to go on moving at the same 
 rate. 
 
 And what is the meaning of the word " impress " in the 
 passage, " tended ever to impress on units a corresponding 
 degree of polarity " ? What is the polarity of an unit ? 
 What are the degrees of polarity? what are the changes 
 denoted by changes of polarity ? and how does one unit 
 impress another ? Or even granting an organism (which we 
 have not yet arrived at), how does that organism impress 
 any unit ? How are all these things to be expressed in 
 terms of matter and motion ? 
 
 " Setting out," &c. Here protein aggregates take on 
 differentiations which fit them for different mediums, that 
 is to say, a pentatomic or hexatomic atom of sulphur or 
 phosphorus, being on a flat surface, in an angle, or in a 
 corner, or two together, &c., would only be able to group 
 the protein in special shapes, for different mediums would 
 contain different mineral substances, which might be aggre- 
 gated with the protein molecules ; and if the mediums 
 changed, so would the aggregated molecule, in shape, in 
 size, in composition. Change in motion would be, in all 
 probability, change of molecular construction. But what 
 is there in this beyond the changes that would take place 
 in like manner in the inorganic ? 
 
 The rest of the argument it would not be fruitful to 
 follow, as' it falls under the general criticism, and the first 
 step, found to be insurmountable, precludes the rest. 
 
 To some such criticism as the foregoing I presume Mr. 
 Spencer undertakes a reply towards the end of his letter, 
 p. 491 : 
 
 " I have repeatedly and emphatically asserted that our con- 
 ceptions of matter and motion are but symbols of an unknow- 
 able reality; that this reality cannot be that which we sym-
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 65 
 
 bolise it to be; and that, as manifested beyond consciousness 
 under the forms of matter and motion, it is the same as that 
 which, in consciousness, is manifested as feeling and thought." 
 
 Beading it in this way, then, the integration of matter 
 and the dissipation of motion is what ? The integration 
 of one symbolic conception and the dissipation of another 
 symbolic conception.* Or is it the integration of that 
 which is symbolised and conceived of symbolically, and 
 the dissipation of something which is symbolised and con- 
 ceived of symbolically ? And this something is unknown 
 and unknowable. Then manifestly the formula of Evolu- 
 tion, which is the formula of a philosophy which was to 
 account for the history of every existence from its emer- 
 gence from the imperceptible to the perceptible, is Igno- 
 rance. It would seem, in ordinary language, to mean that 
 the integration of matter meant the approach together and 
 combination of movement of ultimate units, atoms, mole- 
 cules, masses, to be described geometrically and arithmeti- 
 cally, and that the dissipation of motion was the trans- 
 ference from one bit of matter to another of its rate of 
 motion, by which their measurable rates were mutually 
 increased and diminished, and on this supposition we have 
 discovered an intelligible but insufficient theory. But if 
 by matter we mean we don't know what, and by motion 
 we don't know what, but certainly not the matter and 
 motion that we have been discussing, then we have a 
 theory which may be sufficient, but is utterly unintelligible. 
 The formula which was to penetrate and show the organic 
 connection of all sequences is a formula with two blanks 
 in it. It is the integration of x and the dissipation of y. 
 
 * Are not integration and dissipation themselves symbolic conceptions 
 too ? If so, then to translate the formula of Evolution into exact 
 language would make it a most abstruse enigma. 
 
 E
 
 66 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Our hopeful primal ignorance ends in the certainty of it 
 cloaked in a specious intelligibility. 
 
 An Endeavour to make the Header understand the Meaning 
 of a Formula describing all Phenomena in terms of 
 Matter in Motion. 
 
 In order to assist those who are unacquainted with 
 the subject, I have printed a diagram illustrative of the 
 theory of Evolution. The representation is in the form of 
 two cones connected at the stpex. The upper one repre- 
 sents the unknowable, the absolute, the first cause which 
 Mr. Spencer treats of in his first book ; the lower one re- 
 presents the knowable. The only manifestation of abso- 
 lute force, or first cause, or of the unknowable, is as the 
 antecedent or cause of matter in motion. Once constitute 
 matter in motion, then from the indestructibility of matter 
 and the continuity of motion, everything else follows, and 
 the first cause, absolute force, or whatever you like to call 
 it, is done with altogether. There is no connection be- 
 tween the cone, so to speak, of the unknowable and the 
 cone of the knowable except at the apex, and the apex is 
 matter in motion and the formula of Evolution namely, 
 the redistributions of matter in motion. There are no 
 outside lines of connection or influence. The materials for 
 evolution once constituted, evolution proceeds and dis- 
 solution succeeds in enormous but interminable cycles in 
 the future, and so far from our being in a first era of evo- 
 lution, there may have already preceded us an eternity of 
 enormous rhythms of evolution and dissolution; so that 
 between the apex of the upper cone and the apex of the 
 lower cone there may be placed as many of these courses 
 of alternate eras of evolution and dissolution as any one
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 67 
 
 may fancy, each of them taking millions or billions of 
 years to complete its rhythm. But and this is the most 
 important thing to understand within the lower cone, and 
 in all preceding and succeeding cones, there is nothing but 
 matter in motion, rates of motion, shapes, sizes, and com- 
 binations and recombinations of these matter in motion 
 to start with, matter in motion all through. 
 
 I will now endeavour to correct an erroneous view of 
 Evolution which is sometimes entertained, or which leads 
 to its being viewed in a favourable light. It is that view 
 of it which understands it simply as a generalisation of 
 the modes of force. This view seems to recognise bodies 
 as having properties, and almost recognises different kinds 
 of forces. Thus the properties of bodies, such as specific 
 gravity, chemical affinities, thermic relations, &c., are sup- 
 posed to be inherent, and forces are sometimes spoken of 
 as being entities with qualities of their own, such as mag- 
 netism, electricity, &c. But such notions are utterly out 
 of place in connection with any theory of Evolution, for 
 these properties of bodies are only modes of motion, and 
 these forces are only modes of motion, all of them having 
 to be accounted for by Evolution. Some seem to accept 
 the nebulous condition as the starting-point, but such a 
 point is an arbitrary one, just as much as any later point 
 that others might wish to start from, and those who do so 
 are Developmentalists, and not Evolutionists. Thus Dr. 
 Drysdale, who takes such a decided stand as an Evolu- 
 tionist, holds an imperfect theory, in that he believes in 
 the inherent properties of matter, and only allows force = 
 motion an influence in relation to these properties; not 
 allowing, apparently, that these properties are only rates 
 and directions of motion, and having a previous history 
 of their combinations. I derive this from his work
 
 68 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 on the "Protoplasmic Theory of Life," page 216. He 
 says : 
 
 " Throughout the world of variety of chemical compounds, in 
 no case is mere force, or ' that which is expended in the pro- 
 duction of motion,' the determining cause of any form, shape, 
 or specific affinity. I may conclude hy illustrating, with the 
 diagram formerly given, the above views of the subordinate 
 nature of force in the development of the secondary properties 
 of matter, and its dependence upon the determining powers of 
 the inherent properties of matter in all cases : 
 
 The properties of matter Force, in all its forms, 
 according to its kind probably 
 
 II II 
 
 Determining powers Motion 
 
 Action or work." 
 
 The necessity for keeping in view this so-called " radical 
 distinction between property and force " is corroborated by 
 quotations from Mr. James Croll and from Professor 
 Tyndall, the latter to the effect that "energy is conditioned 
 by its atomic machinery." Whether Dr. Drysdale has 
 changed his views or not since 1874 I do not know, but it 
 seems to me that many others besides himself think that 
 it suffices to start from a nebula composed as described 
 to constitute an all-comprehensive philosophy. But any 
 one starting from that, as any one starting from the 
 commencement of life or any other arbitrary point, is a 
 Developmentalist and not an Evolutionist. 
 
 I would strenuously impress upon every one wishing pro- 
 perly to understand the formula of Evolution that there is 
 nothing in the universe but matter, i.e., extension in vari- 
 ous rates of motion and combinations of motion. There 
 is no light, no colour, no hot or cold, no smell or flavour, 
 only rates of vibration of ether or molecules. I don't
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 69 
 
 know how far I may go in saying what there is not, with- 
 out getting into an entanglement ; but of this we may he 
 quite certain, that there is nothing but matter in motion, 
 and all qualities and properties of matter are merely differ- 
 entiations of shapes or sizes, and differentiations of rates 
 and directions of motion, and the complex combinations of 
 these. What we call them are the names of our modes of 
 consciousness of them. 
 
 Conclusion of the Argument. 
 
 My task so far has been to show that both from the 
 formula and definitions, as well as from the explanation of 
 evolution and dissolution furnished by Mr. Spencer, the 
 philosophy is simply and purely one of the combina- 
 tion and recombination of ultimate units, having equal 
 mutual motions of attraction and repulsion. The first 
 compound is, say, into atoms, the next into molecules, 
 the next into liquid and solid states and molar motion, the 
 next into organic and various complications. But the 
 great point to bear in mind is, that there is nothing im- 
 ported into the problem at any stage but what was there 
 at the first. All that we have at the first is matter in 
 motion, and that is all that we have at the last. Now, 
 passing over certain primary difficulties already sufficiently 
 discussed, viz., the law of gravitation, the distribution and 
 permanence of the elements, all of which might possibly 
 be explained, what we are bound to assert from the 
 postulate is, that the only differentiations of which matter 
 in motion is capable are size and shape, and different 
 rates, and, perhaps, directions of motion. Therefore, all 
 the combinations and recombinations of units are capable 
 of being expressed in terms of shape, size, and rates and
 
 70 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 directions of motion ; that is to say, in terms of geometry 
 and arithmetic. 
 
 Can this be done ? And the question I propose is not 
 one that might have been proposed with regard to the 
 science of astronomy after the laws of sidereal and plane- 
 tary motion had been discovered. The answer to such a 
 question would have been: Yes, it is only a matter of time 
 and labour ; we can see clearly that the task is possible. 
 My question is, Is it possible in this case ? Can we 
 express protoplasm in terms of size and shape, and rates 
 and directions of motion? Can we express genesis and 
 adaptation and heredity in terms of matter in motion ? 
 Can we describe organism in such a way ? Can we explain 
 emotion, thought, and consciousness in terms of matter in 
 motion ? On the Evolution theory we are bound to do so. 
 The charge against it is that it is merely a mechanical 
 theory ; and though I did not think so at first, I find on 
 examination that, notwithstanding the disclaimers of Book 
 I., and the use of the mysterious terms "force" and 
 " forces" in Book II., it really is so ; and being so, the con- 
 stitution of the universe, including life, organisms, con- 
 sciousness, thought, emotion, ought to be capable of 
 mechanical expression ; it only requires time and study to 
 work it out. 
 
 But I maintain that this cannot be done, and until it 
 is done we cannot allow Evolution to take rank as an 
 exhaustive theory of the universe, whatever merits it may 
 otherwise possess. 
 
 To conclude, the summary of the criticism is this : that 
 since Evolution is not able to apply its laws to an explana- 
 tion of the origin and continuance of the seventy or eighty 
 so-called elements, and since Evolution is not able to 
 express life, heredity, adaptation, growth, consciousness,
 
 ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 71 
 
 thought, and emotion in terms of matter in motion, in so 
 far it fails as an exhaustive theory of the universe. 
 
 I am aware that Mr. Spencer would repudiate this criti- 
 cism as unfair, on the ground that the position I assign 
 him is too mechanical and materialistic a position which 
 he repudiates in the letter from which I have already so 
 largely quoted. 
 
 He says, " The common uses of the words ' mechanical ' 
 and 'mechanist' are such as inevitably call up in all minds 
 the notions of visible masses of matter acting on one 
 another by measurable forces and producing sensible 
 motions." His remarks in continuance show the inade- 
 quacy of such notions, for science now recognises motions 
 of matter which are not sensible nor measurable, and pro- 
 ducing motions which are not sensible nor measurable. 
 But we must note that they are not insensible nor im- 
 measurable on account of difference of nature, but on 
 account of our incompetency. However much removed 
 from our recognition and manipulation of them by reason 
 of their minuteness, matter is matter still, and motion is 
 motion ; and if within our reach, there is not the minutest 
 of either of them that could not be described in terms of 
 geometry and arithmetic. If this is not materialistic I 
 do not know what is. but this charge and its repudiation I 
 deal with elsewhere.
 
 73 
 
 PART III. 
 
 AN INQUIRY AS TO THE INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUFFI- 
 CIENCY OF ME. SPENCER'S FORMULA, WITH THE 
 INCLUSION OF THE TERM "FORCE." 
 
 IT will have been observed that in the preceding part 
 of this criticism I have employed the term "matter in 
 motion," and have avoided the use of the word "force," 
 although it appears so prominently in the pages of Mr. 
 Spencer's work. This has not been accidental, but by 
 design, indicating as it does one of my main criticisms of 
 Mr. Spencer. 
 
 I can logically take up one of two positions. The first 
 recognises matter, whose properties are merely those of 
 extension, which are capable of being described in terms of 
 geometry and arithmetic. I can also recognise as the sole 
 active properties of matter its modes and rates of motion 
 the motion, that is to say, of ultimate units, atoms, 
 molecules, or masses, also capable of measurement. 
 
 The second position recognises matter and its activity or 
 activities matter as endowed with force or forces. 
 
 Let us consider the second position first. If we merely 
 recognise the activity or activities of matter, we adopt a 
 term which is comprehensive enough, but is not in the 
 least explanatory or unificatory. For what does it mean ? 
 Does it mean that matter has any other kind of activity 
 than is exhibited in motion, or that there is any other kind 
 of motion or activity of matter than that which is capable
 
 74 SPENCER 'S FORMULA OF E VOL UTION. 
 
 of communication by impact or contact, or otherwise ac- 
 cording to the laws of mechanics ? If by the activity of 
 matter is meant no more than this, then we have an ex- 
 planation which, if correct, unifies all phenomena and 
 renders them all intelligible. But if we only mean the 
 recognition that all changes are the activity of matter, we 
 merely apply a word that covers or includes all those 
 changes in a general term, but affords no explanation or 
 constructive unification. 
 
 And if we speak of matter as endowed with forces, we 
 are in the same position. We recognise differentiated 
 forces, but fail of unification. And if. we recognise, as Dr. 
 Drysdale recognises, matter endowed with properties which 
 are put in motion by force, we lose ourselves in mysticism. 
 And, in fact, in either of these two latter cases, we do 
 not know what we mean when we talk of forces, or of 
 matter having properties set in motion by force. But the 
 researches of the last quarter of a century have identified 
 all forces, and we have the doctrine of the correlation of 
 forces, and the corollary of the conservation of energy or 
 the persistence of force. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, accepting the modern doctrine of the con- 
 servation of energy or the persistence of force, apparently 
 unifies forces into one force ; but what I want to know is, 
 does he mean more than this, viz., that matter which is 
 composed of space-occupying units, having shape and 
 measurement, has any other active property than that of 
 motion, capable also of being measured, and capable also 
 of being augmented or diminished by transference to or 
 from other matter, and of entering into relations according 
 to shape, size, and modes and rates of motion, with other 
 matter, thus forming atoms, molecules, and masses in cos- 
 mical relations ?
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 75 
 
 If by " force " this is what is meant, viz., the motion of 
 matter, I can understand it ; if more than this is meant, 
 I do not understand it. Can Mr. Spencer express it in a 
 mathematical formula or not ? 
 
 For information on this subject I referred to Magnus' 
 " Elementary Mechanics," and I find that 
 
 s = tv 
 
 is the fundamental proposition of uniform motion. 
 Also that 
 
 v = tf 
 
 is the algebraical expression of uniform acceleration of 
 motion. 
 
 In dynamics I find that 
 
 P=Mp 
 as the fundamental equation of Dynamics, 
 
 But these all relate to aggregated bodies and presume 
 the law of gravitation. They refer simply to matter and 
 motion. 
 
 It may be said that Mr. Spencer assigns force as the 
 unknown and unknowable cause of matter and motion. If 
 so, it is equal to its results, and we can judge of it and 
 measure it by its results, and we need only deal with its 
 resultants. 
 
 Having disposed of forces i.e., differentiated permanent 
 forces as all resolvable into force we call it the unknown 
 and unknowable. Does this mean that it is in its origin 
 unknown and unknowable, or that it is now to us un- 
 known and unknowable? If the former, we agree at once. 
 The origin of matter and force is unknowable. If the 
 latter, then there are two or three matters to discuss.
 
 76 SPNCEK'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Force is known only by its manifestations. Its mani- 
 festations are matter in motion. Has it any other mani- 
 festations ? Is it an ever-present cause or a primal cause 
 only? 
 
 If a primal cause only, then, when it has once consti- 
 tuted the mass of primordial units, and endowed them 
 with motion, and perhaps gravitation, it is done with, and 
 can be relegated to Book I. on the unknowable, and dis- 
 missed from philosophy altogether, which is complete 
 without it. 
 
 But if an ever-present cause, then, if it is an augmenting 
 or diminishing cause, either of matter or of the motion of 
 matter, philosophy is impossible unless it is in uniform or 
 rhythmical rate of increase or diminution. But if, as an 
 ever-present cause, it increases or diminishes irregularly, 
 or endows matter or motion with properties that are not 
 measurable, then also philosophy is impossible. And if 
 there be a law of increase or diminution, and this law is 
 unknown or unknowable, then again philosophy is impos- 
 sible. 
 
 But these propositions, I understand, are not admitted 
 by Mr. Spencer, who contends for the uniformity of the 
 quantum of matter and of the quantum of motion, and I 
 do not think he admits of interference of cause in the 
 addition of any other properties to matter or motion. 
 
 But if force is an ever-present cause of matter and of 
 the motion of matter, and these are uniform in quantity, 
 and affect one another in their relations of co-existence 
 and sequence only, in accordance with their properties of 
 size, shape, mode, and rate of motion, then the statement 
 that force is the ever-present cause of them limits the 
 operations of force to their manifestations, and though we 
 may still say that we do not know force in itself (what-
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE* 77 
 
 ever that means), we do know force, inasmuch as we do 
 know all its manifestations. If it has any others, they do 
 not concern the cosmos, and therefore in a philosophy 
 which is an exhaustive theory of the changes of the 
 cosmos it has no place. A cause is only equal to its 
 effects. If we know the effects, we know the cause. If 
 there is nothing in the effects of force but matter in 
 motion, we know force so far as it is necessary for the 
 purposes of philosophy to know it, and we also know that 
 it thereby becomes a useless term. 
 
 If in a philosophy which unifies our knowledge and ac- 
 counts for all changes in the cosmos we admit the term Force, 
 we can only admit it on a comprehensible definition, in 
 which case its definition takes its place. But if we admit 
 it, and state that it is unknowable, then as a term of an 
 explanation it is sheer nonsense to introduce it, for it would 
 render our explanation and our philosophy altogether vain. 
 All philosophies so far have been 
 
 Philosophy = Special Philosophy + the Unknowable. 
 
 And the algebraical representation of the Evolution philo- 
 sophy, if force is unknowable, is 
 
 Evolution MM n , or else Evolution = MM n x. 
 
 A philosophy which introduces x, the unknowable, into its 
 terms, can scarcely claim to be a complete unification of 
 knowledge. 
 
 After this preliminary explanation of the grounds of my 
 criticism, it is my task to examine the main course of Mr. 
 Spencer's argument in its exposition in Book II. on the 
 Knowable. 
 
 This criticism may appear very curt and summary, and 
 therefore it may seem wanting in due respect to one of 
 our leading thinkers ; and my own feelings would dictate
 
 7 8 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 an exhaustive and detailed criticism. But it is obvious 
 that this would require a book almost as large as that 
 which I criticise. Therefore, if I am somewhat summary 
 in my remarks, it will be because I am obliged to be 
 concise. 
 
 OF CHAPTER I. 
 Philosophy Defined. 
 
 I have no objection to this chapter, the summary of 
 which is 
 
 "Knowledge of the lowest kind is ununified knowledge; 
 science is partially unified knowledge ; philosophy is completely 
 unified knowledge." 
 
 I would merely remark, that since knowledge is not yet 
 commensurate with the totality of the changes of the 
 cosmos, any philosophy must be of a tentative character ; 
 and if we would include in it all the past changes which 
 are implied in the present constitution of the cosmos, that 
 application of it must be of a somewhat speculative 
 character. 
 
 But if philosophy is only completely unified actual know- 
 ledge, it does not mean that it is an unification of all past 
 changes of the cosmos, which, even if knowable, are, as a 
 matter of fact, unknown, and therefore do not form part of 
 the body of knowledge. 
 
 At the same time, we must not omit to bear in mind the 
 much more ambitious claim made for philosophy by Mr. 
 Spencer, p. 541 
 
 " A philosophy stands self -convicted of inadequacy if it does 
 not formulate the whole series of changes passed through by every 
 existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the perceptible, 
 and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. If it begins
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 79 
 
 its explanations with existences that already have concrete forms, 
 or leaves off while they still retain concrete forms, then mani- 
 festly they had preceding histories, or will have succeeding his- 
 tories, or both, of which no account is given ; and as such pre- 
 ceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible knowledge, 
 a philosophy which says nothing about them falls short of the 
 required unification," 
 
 OF CHAPTER II. 
 The Data of Philosophy. 
 
 See p. 157. "In brief, our postulates are: An unknow- 
 able power ; the existence of knowable likenesses and differences 
 among the manifestations of that power ; and a resulting segrega- 
 tion of the manifestations into those of subject and object." 
 
 Only the two latter data are treated of in this chapter. 
 The first datum, " an unknowable power," is the theme of 
 Book I. Our criticism before expressed is this : Since 
 philosophy is an unification of the knowable, and the know- 
 able comprises all the manifestations of the unknowable, 
 the datum of ' an unknowable power ' simply means the 
 recognition of the unknowability of the force or power 
 which originally set those manifestations going, or which 
 also keeps them going, but in such unchanging relations 
 that neither any supposition as to it being one or the 
 other, or any such supposition at all, adds anything to our 
 knowledge, nor explains anything, nor unifies anything. 
 
 OF CHAPTER III. 
 Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force. 
 
 I do not think it essential to the argument to criticise 
 considerable portions of this chapter, though I do not 
 wholly agree with them.
 
 So SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Space I do not regard as an entity, but as merely an 
 abstraction of relations of distance. 
 
 In like manner, Time is not an entity, but an abstraction 
 of relations of successions of changes. 
 
 Matter, p. 166. "Hence the necessity we are under of 
 representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of matter as 
 being at once extended and resistent : this being the universal 
 form of our sensible experiences of matter, becomes the form 
 which our conception of it cannot transcend, however minute 
 the fragments which imaginary subdivisions produce." 
 
 Motion, p. 1 68. "A something that moves; a series of 
 positions occupied in succession ; and a group of co-existent 
 positions united in thought with the successive ones these are 
 the constituents of the idea." 
 
 Force. Force is said to be the ultimate of ultimates. 
 Mr. Lewes defines it as the activity of matter, without pro- 
 mulgating a formula as to the nature of that activity being 
 an unification of all activities. Mr. Spencer posits force as 
 the primordial experienco_ It is difficult to make out 
 whether he is speaking of the bistory or genealogy of 
 knowledge, or of the constitution ancTTiistory of the cosmos. 
 Our experience is the succession of states of consciousness, 
 wbetber faint or vivid. We have experiences of resist- 
 ance (matter), and we have experiences of change (motion), 
 and we have experiences of the combinations of matter and 
 the combinations of motion. Need we go beyond this, and 
 say that these are manifestations of something else, and 
 call that something else force ? There is nothing gained by 
 doing so ; it seems both gratuitous and useless. 
 
 He says (p. 169) : 
 
 " Thus all other modes of consciousness are derivable from ex- 
 periences of force ; but experiences of force are not derivable from 
 anything else. Indeed, it needs but to remember that conscious- 
 ness consists of changes to see that the ultimate datum of con-
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 81 
 
 sciousness must be that of which change is the manifestation ; 
 and that thus the force by which we ourselves produce changes, 
 and which serves to symbolise the cause of changes in general, is 
 the final disclosure of analysis." 
 
 I do not feel any necessity, for my part, when I recognise 
 changes in my consciousness, to acknowledge the existence 
 of a something of which these changes are a manifestation. , 
 I recognise the indestructibility of matter and the con-j 
 tinuity of motion, and the uniformity of sequence amongst 
 changes, and am thus led to seek amongst anterior states \ 
 for the sequence I experience ; but I see no necessity for 
 positing a something of which these states and sequences 
 are manifestations. It is useless and unwarranted. 
 
 But it is said, " the force by which we ourselves produce 
 changes ... is the final disclosure of analysis," and " it 
 serves to symbolise the cause of changes in general." 
 
 To take the latter clause first, what is predicated is the 
 "cause of changes in general." Are we to consider all 
 changes to be evolution, i.e., the integration of matter and 
 the dissipation of motion, or dissolution, i.e., the disintegra- 
 tion, of matter and the resumption of motion ? If so, then 
 all changes are of matter in motion, and the cause looked 
 for is the cause of these changes. But admitting that we 
 look for the cause of any particular change in the state of 
 things immediately preceding that change, and of all 
 changes in the same way, we are thrown back into infinite 
 time and the study of the homogeneous before there was 
 any change if we wish to discover the " cause of changes 
 in general." 
 
 As to the force by which we ourselves produce changes 
 serving to symbolise this cause of all changes in general, it 
 can only mean either that the experiences of matter and 
 motion which constitute ourselves enables us to under-
 
 82 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 stand matter in motion elsewhere, and the nature of their 
 relations; which, considering that we do not yet under- 
 stand ourselves or the nature of consciousness, I deny. 
 Or it means that the experiences of will and volition we 
 possess symbolise an original will and volition, which is 
 a theory well worthy of consideration ; but, as a matter of 
 science, if its only manifestations were constituting matter 
 and setting it in motion, and is a constant and unvarying 
 factor in the universe, it may practically be left out. 
 
 Is force objective or subjective ? If taken to be the 
 former and since it is said to have existed anterior to 
 consciousness, it is reasonable to regard it as such then it 
 can only have been the unknown original or constant pre- 
 sent cause of the totality of matter and motion, and is 
 only interpretable in the terms thereof. 
 
 If taken to be the latter, how is it to be described? 
 Evidently not in nervous tremors, for those are motions of 
 matter, and truly objective. Is it the consciousness of 
 these nervous tremors? But mere consciousness is not 
 force. Force implies a power applied and a result. Con- 
 sciousness does not imply activity. 
 
 If consciousness is a force, then the question arises, Is it 
 a force that is interchangeable with the physical forces ? 
 or is it a force that is not so interchangeable ? Do different 
 nervous tremors resulting in correspondent reflex move- 
 ments, and of which there is a consciousness, receive any 
 modification or influence from this consciousness ? 
 
 We do not even suggest any reply to these questions. 
 
 To consider now the first clause of our quotation. 
 "Thus all other (i.e., than a single impression of force) 
 modes of consciousness are derivable from experiences of 
 force ; but experiences of force are not derivable from any- 
 thing else." Consciousness consists of changes. A mode
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM " FORCE." 83 
 
 of consciousness means a consciousness which differs from 
 some other consciousness. Mr. Spencer says these modes 
 of consciousness are derivable from experiences of force. 
 I suppose he means are experiences of force. But these 
 experiences of force are not derivable from anything else. 
 Certainly not if they are experiences of force. But he 
 said that consciousness consists of, or is the experience of, 
 changes. Where does Mr. Spencer get his force from ? 
 We only recognise changes, and perhaps degrees of change. 
 Surely force is an idea added to the primordial experience 
 of consciousness, and is not the primordial experience. 
 
 We next come to the algebraical representation of the 
 subject. If matter and motion are represented by x and y, 
 and force is represented by z, we may ascertain the values 
 of x and y in terms of z, but the value of z can never be 
 found. This looks very exact and scientific, but I would 
 like the operation performed so as to be able to under- 
 stand it. Does it mean that x + y = z ? If so, then, if the 
 value of x and y are known, we know the value of z, or it 
 is known so far as it is a factor in the cosmos, and for all 
 practicable purposes, if z is the ultimate of ultimates, x + y 
 are equal to it, and may stand in its room as the ultimate 
 of ultimates. 
 
 Mr. Spencer goes on to speak of an undecomposable 
 mode of consciousness. Can any mode of consciousness 
 (the word "mode" seems to me superfluous) be decom- 
 posed ? There is a consciousness of seeing articles in a 
 room. This may be regarded as a complex consciousness, 
 and may be decomposed into, so to speak, its separate 
 parts. But is each separate part decomposable ? I have 
 a consciousness of co-existence, and I have a consciousness 
 of succession. I have a consciousness of change. If I lift 
 an article I have a consciousness of tension of the muscles,
 
 84 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 and I have a consciousness of resistance of the floor on 
 which I stand. These are all simple items of experience, 
 and I call them by certain names. The only one I call by 
 the name of force is that of lifting, but muscular tension 
 is no more primordial than taste or the sensation of 
 breathing. Beyond this- the idea of force is a growth of 
 varied and multiform experience, and, as used by Mr. 
 Spencer with respect to preconscious existences, is a gene- 
 ral term covering the terms " matter " and " motion." 
 
 Mr. Spencer adds that all other modes of consciousness 
 may be decomposed into experiences of force. I presume 
 he means experiences of motion, i.e., experiences of nervous 
 shocks and vibrations, and cerebral molecular motion. 
 
 But speaking of this undecomposable mode of conscious- 
 ness, which I presume to be consciousness of force, " can- 
 not be itself the power manifested to us through pheno- 
 mena has already been proved" (sect. 18). 
 
 This means that the consciousness cannot be the power 
 which is consciousnessed. Therefore there is a force 
 which produces the changes of matter and motion of 
 which we are conscious. This we have already considered. 
 But what is this consciousness ? It cannot be the force or 
 the power cognised. Mr. Spencer, in fact, does not say 
 that it is. But he does not say what it is, nor how in- 
 cluded in the formula of Evolution. 
 
 Force he describes in very indefinite language, and we 
 reserve the consideration of it till the next portion of our 
 criticism. We must notice here a distinction that is drawn 
 between some " unknown force which is the correlative of 
 the known force." Leaving out the " correlative," I merely 
 draw attention to the phrase "known force." We are 
 studying the book on the Knowable, and I would like to 
 know what is the known force. Is it merely the con-
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 85 
 
 sciousness of change, or the consciousness of muscular 
 tension, or the consciousness of results of matter in motion, 
 or, stepping outside consciousness, is it matter in motion 
 in relation with matter in motion? Surely a Jcnoivn force 
 is capable of definition and description. 
 
 Let me now ask a few questions. Does the scope of 
 philosophy include times anterior to and subsequent to the 
 existence of organised and conscious beings ? 
 
 If so, did force exist before, and will it exist after, such 
 a period ? It is to be presumed that there was a time 
 when neither man nor any other sentient being existed. 
 
 Now it would simplify matters if we could know the 
 state of affairs under these conditions. Was there any- 
 thing in the totality of the cosmos but a certain quantum 
 of matter and a certain quantum of motion ? If not, then 
 the changes in the cosmos might require a philosophy which 
 would unify the explanation of their changes and account 
 for their differentiations, but it would be a philosophy 
 which would be limited, in terms of its formula, to 
 matter and motion ; and if the word " force " were intro- 
 duced, it would simply be as the unknown original cause, 
 or primarily constant quantity, which kept in existence 
 the quantum of matter and motion. 
 
 What was force anterior to consciousness ? What will 
 it be subsequent to consciousness ? 
 
 Force, indeed, seems to have come into existence with 
 consciousness. Is it another name for consciousness ? It 
 would really seem to be so the consciousness, more or 
 less forcible, of change. 
 
 Page 171. "An unknown cause of the known effects, 
 likenesses, and differences among these known effects, and a 
 segregation of these effects into subject and object these 
 are the postulates without which we cannot think."
 
 86 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 It is here said that we cannot think without postu- 
 lating an unknown cause of the known effects which we 
 call phenomena. I do not see that this is essential to 
 thinking. I can recognise phenomena and modes of 
 consciousness, and confine my thinking to their known 
 relations of co-existence and sequence without concerning 
 myself with the unknown cause, which I apprehend Mr. 
 Spencer to place right away in the beginning of things, or 
 else to be a constant unvarying quantity, commensurate 
 with, and behind, as it were, the known, in which latter 
 case it is simply to be ignored. 
 
 OF CHAPTER IV. 
 The Indestructibility of Matter. 
 
 I have to offer no adverse criticism to the theory of the 
 indestructibility of matter. The following questions sug- 
 gest themselves, however. Does matter exist which has 
 lost all its individual motion ? Does matter exist which 
 has lost all gravitation ? Is the rotary motion of an ulti- 
 mate unit a motion or a force ? Is the excursive motion 
 of an ultimate unit to be described as a motion or a force ? 
 Is the motion of each ultimate unit towards every other 
 unit a motion or a force ? And consequently, is the move- 
 ment of every mass of units towards other masses at rates 
 inversely to the square of their distance to be described 
 as a motion or a force ? This is very important. 
 
 Is force arrested motion. Is our consciousness of force 
 the consciousness of arrested motion ? Is all conscious- 
 ness the consciousness of arrested motion ? Is equilibrium 
 a balance, not of forces, but of motions ? 
 
 In the further progress of our criticism we are in con-
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 87 
 
 siderable difficulty from an incapacity to attach any defi- 
 nite meaning to Mr. Spencer's use of the word " force," and 
 to his employment of the term " forces." Since we under- 
 stand him to limit the manifestations of force to matter and 
 motion, we can only understand him to mean by " force " 
 matter in motion ; by " forces," specially recognised modes 
 of matter in motion ; and by such terms as " combinations 
 of forces," "special relations of different quantities," as 
 shapes and rates and modes of motion, either etherial, 
 atomical, molecular, molar. Thus interpreted, force is 
 merely a shorthand term of useful application. 
 
 Thus, when the piece of gold (p. 178) is found to weigh 
 less, we postulate " that the quantity of matter is finally 
 determinable by the quantity of gravitative force it mani- 
 fests." Should we not say "by the quantity of arrested 
 motion " ? 
 
 Page 179. "Thus, then, by the indestructibility of matter 
 we really mean the indestructibility of the force with which 
 matter affects us." I presume matter exists independently 
 of its affecting us, and therefore its definition is indepen- 
 dent of the term " force." 
 
 OF CHAPTER V. 
 The Continuity of Motion, 
 
 Page 1 84. " Motion can never be lost, but can only be 
 transferred." This is the keynote of the chapter. 
 
 In accordance with the foregoing criticism, however, we 
 find much to which we demur. For instance (pp. 187, 
 1 88) : " It remains to be pointed out that the continuity of 
 motion, as well as the indestructibility of matter, is really 
 known to us in terms of force." The inquiry naturally
 
 88 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 arises, " What are the terms of force ? " We know the word 
 force, but we do not know what it means, and thus we are 
 referred from the known to the unknown. The terms of 
 motion are the terms of arithmetic and geometry, but force 
 defies all terms. 
 
 A consideration of the next chapter, however, will decide 
 our estimation of this one. 
 
 OF CHAPTER YL 
 The Persistence of Force. 
 
 Page 1 89. " What is the force of which we predicate 
 persistence ? " 
 
 " It is not the force we are immediately conscious of in 
 our own muscular efforts ; for this does not persist." 
 
 We here come upon the consideration of a most difficult 
 matter, our decision upon which will decide the value of 
 Mr. Spencer's philosophy. 
 
 Viewed in accordance with the line of thought hitherto 
 pursued, the remark to be made would be this. We would 
 say that it is not the force we are immediately conscious 
 of, for that does not persist. Therefore, when the human 
 race ceases to exist, and the whole animal and vegetable 
 kingdoms come to an end, the force that would still 
 persist would be a force unrelated to consciousness or 
 feeling. And similarly anterior to vegetable and animal 
 life i.e., to consciousness or feeling we have to think 
 of the force that then persisted unrelated to conscious- 
 ness". What are we to say of it ? Only this, that it was 
 a fixed quantity, and that it operated in one of two ways 
 (l.) That it was the original cause of matter in motion, 
 with perhaps gravitation; (2.) That it was a constant
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 89 
 
 quantity keeping them going. And also, that since its 
 results are constant in measurable quantities of matter 
 and measurable quantities of motion, these latter are 
 sufficient expression for the state of affairs, without any 
 reference to the unknown cause, force, which is a metem- 
 pirical phrase to be eliminated from philosophy. It would 
 also seem that since force is a constant quantity, and was 
 fully manifested in matter and motion anterior to feeling, 
 there was none left to manifest itself in feeling except by 
 the transformation of some other of its manifestations, 
 i.e., matter or motion into feeling. Are we to understand 
 that this is intended to be taught? Or are we to con- 
 clude that consciousness and force are indissolubly con- 
 nected, and that effort and muscular tension are also 
 involved, and that before consciousness there was no 
 force ? 
 
 " I am conscious " is primary. Then we notice differences 
 amongst our consciousnesses, and we are conscious of exert- 
 ing personal effort and muscular tension. Here conscious- 
 ness of force comes in, and we are conscious of resistance 
 to our force, and we think of exterior force. But do we 
 not thereby think of it in terms of consciousness, and 
 would it not be, no consciousness no force, whereas matter 
 in motion would still exist and persist? The origin or 
 cause of matter in motion is unknowable, and to this 
 those who are inclined may give the name of force so 
 long as they do not confuse the measurable matter and 
 motion which are its known functions by any vagueness 
 derived from the unknowable. 
 
 True, the question may be asked, Are not the motions of 
 gravitation and of attraction and repulsion to be put down 
 to force ? You may, so long as you do not use the term 
 in a scientific explanation (for it does not explain any-
 
 90 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 thing), but put it separate in the introduction, and confine 
 the treatment of the subject to that which is measurable, 
 and which will afford explanations. 
 
 But let us examine Mr. Spencer's argument more in 
 detail. After the example of raising an object from the 
 ground (p. 1 89), he says : " We are compelled to admit that 
 force, as it exists out of our consciousness, is not force as 
 we know it;" but, " Hence the force of which we assert per- 
 sistence is that absolute force of which we are indefinitely 
 conscious as the necessary correlate of the force we know." 
 
 The argument is this : We are conscious of the exertion 
 of force, therefore there is a correlative force against which 
 we exert ourselves. We call it an absolute force, I sup- 
 pose, because it exists i.e., acts independently of our 
 consciousness of it. This force, in the instance given, is 
 gravitation, which denotes, I suppose, a mode of inter- 
 relation of matter in motion stateable in terms of measure- 
 ment. Other names are given to other modes of inter- 
 relation of matter in motion which are also measurable. 
 
 But as to the cause. Of the how and the why of these 
 modes of interrelation of matter in motion we know nothing, 
 and so long as these modes are explainable according to 
 the harmonies of shapes and sizes, and of rates and modes 
 of motion, we may safely ignore, from a purely scientific 
 and philosophic point of view, all these questions. 
 
 The formula of Evolution is founded on this supposi- 
 tion, and the doctrine of the correlation and transforma- 
 tion of forces implies it. 
 
 But if such an explanation is insufficient, then we may 
 perhaps be obliged to recur to force, or even to a will cor- 
 responding to that of which we are conscious, to eke out 
 the explanation of the universe. But in this case we do 
 not reach a definite, intelligible explanation of the universe
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE? 91 
 
 one by which we could ideally construct it out of the 
 homogeneous. 
 
 " Thus, by the persistence of force, we really mean the 
 persistence of some power (force ?) which transcends our 
 knowledge or conception ; . . . that which persists is the 
 unknown cause of these manifestations." The cause 
 unknown but the results all known, and therefore no con- 
 fusion arises, and a formula of philosophy possible ; or else 
 the results not all known, and a philosophy and universal 
 formula of explanation impossible. 
 
 But the tenor of Mr. Spencer's argument is, that a 
 formula of philosophy is possible, and therefore that all 
 the results of the unknowable force are knowable. The 
 unknowable force is thus eliminated from philosophy ; and 
 throughout his exposition of evolution and dissolution, 
 when he uses the term " force," it is to be understood as a 
 kind of shorthand term for " matter in motion," for they 
 are the only known functions of the absolute force, and 
 are all stateable in terms of mathematics and geometry. 
 
 With this understanding we accept the doctrine of the 
 persistence of force, limiting it, however, to its known 
 functions. 
 
 But if we include consciousness in force, and acknow- 
 ledge it to be one of the interchangeable forces included in 
 the persistence of force, then we shall not be able to re- 
 cognise an intelligible formula of Evolution. 
 
 OF CHAPTER VII. 
 The Persistence of Relations amongst Forces. 
 
 The persistence of force means, then, the persistence of 
 the functions of force ; that is to say, matter in motion.
 
 92 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 There is a quantum of matter and a quantum of motion, 
 and however much the motion of some matter is accele- 
 rated or retarded, it is only in corresponding retardation or 
 acceleration of the motion of other matter, and the sum of 
 matter is constant. This is the persistence of force. 
 
 What are forces ? It is to be presumed that, in accord- 
 ance with harmonies of shape and motion, some matter 
 in motion enters into combination with other matter in 
 motion, forming differentiated aggregates. Is this the 
 meaning of a force or forces ? I cannot make anything 
 else out of it. 
 
 Is heat a force ? It is called by scientists, I believe, " a 
 mode of motion." I believe light, electricity, magnetism, 
 are all called modes of motion. I suppose gravitation also 
 is a mode of motion. The atomic theory would go to show 
 that chemical affinity is due to modes of motion. 
 
 In any case, it would scarcely be contended that they 
 are different forces, since it has already been established 
 that there is only one force. Forces, then, can only be a 
 colloquial term, and means differentiated matter in motion, 
 or differentiated modes of motion of matter. 
 
 The persistence of relations amongst forces, as thus ex- 
 plained, will be readily admitted. Since the quantum of 
 matter and motion is constant, there is no interfering 
 cause, and the relations of the shapes, sizes, modes, and 
 rates of -motion are as constant as 2 + 2 = 4, and that the 
 three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. 
 
 Of course, if there is any interference anything else 
 put into the universe then the explanations founded 
 upon the persistence of force or of its relations (unifor- 
 mity of sequence) would not be valid. 
 
 The persistence of relations among forces negatives the 
 idea of any other new relations amongst them than
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 93 
 
 those of size, shape, rate or mode of motion, or of the 
 aggregates of them, since matter and motion are the only 
 functions of force, and the only functions recognised in 
 the formula of Evolution; and thus the persistence of 
 relations amongst forces is hostile to the evolution of any 
 new kind of relation, such as feeling or consciousness, and 
 all the phenomena of biology, psychology, and sociology 
 that are dependent upon the new factor. 
 
 OF CHAPTEK VIII. 
 The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces. 
 
 The same question naturally arises in this as in the 
 last chapter What are forces? I have defined them 
 as differentiated aggregates of matter in motion. With 
 this definition one may accept and understand the doc- 
 trine of the interaction, transformation, and equivalence of 
 forces. 
 
 As a manifestation of something else as a form or mode 
 of force, the doctrine is incomprehensible, for force itself 
 being unknowable, the interactions of the unknowable 
 must be incomprehensible. 
 
 But the difficulty is in the language employed, not in 
 the processes of nature and in their comprehension. If 
 light is turned into electricity, we acknowledge the general 
 fact that matter in motion in one mode has altered its 
 mode of motion, and certain other matter in motion has 
 concomitantly altered its mode of motion, but that the 
 amount of motion remains the same. As, for instance, of 
 two factors a and &, having motion 2m and 4m respec- 
 tively, then 
 
 a 2m + & 4ra = a 6 6m ;
 
 94 SPENCER'S FOR. VULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 but if from some causal relationship there be a transference 
 of motion, then 
 
 a 3771 + b $m is still = a b 6m 
 and 
 
 a + b 6m a b 6m. 
 
 These are all measurable quantities of matter, a and b, 
 and measurable quantities of motion, and by their mea- 
 surement they are known to be equivalent. And how is 
 force known to be equivalent except by measurement, and 
 how is force measurable otherwise than as matter and 
 motion? The only transference is a transference of motion, 
 not of the indefinite something force, but of measurable 
 motion. 
 
 If we pass over this chapter somewhat briefly, it is 
 not for want of interest, but that it does not in principle 
 call for remark, interpreting some of the words employed 
 in accordance with the foregoing criticism. Into some 
 of the illustrations given I am not qualified to go, and 
 my main object does not seem to require that I should 
 do so. 
 
 That part of the chapter which treats of vital phenomena 
 is the most puzzling, for while we see the dependence of 
 an organism upon the motions or matter in motion of 
 its environment, and thus recognise the transformation of 
 matter in motion into other matter in motion, there still 
 appears to be something about the process very peculiar ; 
 for instance, that from the same raw material forming the 
 food of men and animals such different results should 
 follow, such different memories, habits, instincts, and in 
 all of them that fact of an entirely different order from 
 the constituents of the food, viz., consciousness. 
 
 In carrying on the argument to mentality and to 
 sociology, as Mr. Spencer does in this chapter, it would
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 95 
 
 appear that an entirely different meaning attaches to the 
 term "force" and "forces" to that which applies to the 
 matter in motion of inorganic bodies due to the considera- 
 tions previously detailed. 
 
 Hitherto we have spoken of force as the unknown 
 cause of the known or knowable functions of matter in 
 motion, which are stateable in terms of measurement i.e., 
 in terms of mathematics and geometry. When we introduce 
 life and the facts of consciousness, of waste and repair, 
 generation, heredity, modifiability, &c., we have phenomena 
 which cannot be thus represented ; and if we speak of them 
 as forces, we use that word with an entirely different 
 meaning, although these " forces " may be supposed to be 
 derived from the "forces" of inorganic nature. And 
 although we discern in the activities of organisms and of 
 societies the same characteristics of modes of activity as, 
 for instance, uniformity of sequence, movement in the line 
 of least resistance, &c. we accept the facts as items of 
 weighty import ; but this acceptance does not blind us to 
 the defect of connection which we have just pointed out. 
 The transformation and equivalence of force admitted is 
 not recognised to be the same as the transformation and 
 equivalence of force as between heat and gravitation ; and 
 even if it is admitted, it is so with a plus, which plus 
 would seem to be a plus of a different kind to shape, size, 
 mode or rate of motion, of a different nature to the 
 changes by which all the other " forces " are accountable. 
 
 With regard to this Mr. Spencer states (p. 217) : 
 
 " How this metamorphosis takes place, how a force existing 
 as motion, heat, or light can become a mode of consciousness, 
 how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation 
 we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in 
 the brain to give rise to emotion, these are mysteries which it is
 
 9 5 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries 
 than the transformations of the physical forces into each other." 
 
 Really this is most puzzling. We are given a formula 
 which shall account for all changes, and we are now 
 brought to a change which cannot be accounted for a 
 mystery ! The very end and object of our studies brought 
 to nought, and even the transformations of the " physical 
 forces" viz., aggregates of matter in motion into each 
 other, which we thought had been theoretically explained 
 as the harmonies of shape and size, mode and rate of 
 motion, are pronounced mysteries equally profound ! 
 
 The philosophy which explains everything by a formula 
 says of these questions (p. 218) : 
 
 " They have simply the same insolubility as all other ultimate 
 questions. We can learn nothing more than that here is one of 
 the uniformities in the order of phenomena." 
 
 Philosophy, or an intelligible formula that from the 
 homogeneous shall enable us ideally to construct all the 
 changes of the universe, appears, then, to be impossible. 
 
 OF CHAPTER IX. 
 The Direction of Motion. 
 
 In this chapter Mr. Spencer seems to be starting de novo. 
 Sections 74 and 75 take us to the beginning of things and 
 the ultimate constitution of the universe. For criticisms 
 upon them I refer to the second part of this examination. 
 
 The key to the chapter is the last paragraph of sect. 75. 
 
 " As a 'step towards unification of knowledge, we have now to 
 trace these general laws throughout the various orders of change 
 which the cosmos exhibits. We have to note how every motion 
 takes place along the line of greatest traction, of least resistance,
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE? 97 
 
 or of their resultant ; how the setting up of motion along a cer- 
 tain line becomes a cause of its continuance along that line; 
 how, nevertheless, change of relations to external forces always 
 renders this line indirect ; and how the degree of its indirectness 
 increases with every addition to the number of influences at 
 work." 
 
 With the reservation that no account has been given of 
 the origin of the organic or of organism, of consciousness 
 or mind, there is no objection to the application of the 
 proposition to the motions of life and sociology, although 
 some very nice questions as to individual volitions might 
 arise ; as, for instance, when the choice lay in the direction 
 of the greatest resistance. 
 
 OF CHAPTER X. 
 The Rhythm of Motion. 
 
 To me a novel doctrine, and beautifully explained. I, 
 however, understand " force" to be a shorthand expression 
 for aggregates of matter in motion. 
 
 OF CHAPTER XI. 
 Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recommencement. 
 
 " Sect. 92. To resume, then, we have now to seek a law of 
 composition of phenomena, co-extensive with those laws of their 
 components set forth in the foregoing chapters. Having seen 
 that matter is indestructible, motion continuous, and force per- 
 sistent having seen that forces are everywhere undergoing 
 transformation, and that motion, always following the line of 
 least resistance, is invariably rhythmic it remains to discover 
 the similarly invariable formula expressing the combined con- 
 sequences of the actions thus separately formulated." 
 
 G
 
 98 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Page 277. " The law we seek, therefore, must be the law of 
 the continuous redistribution of matter and motion. . . . The ques- 
 tion to be answered is, What dynamic principle, true of the 
 metamorphosis as a whole and in its details, expresses these ever- 
 changing relations?" 
 
 Here I notice a great obscurity, due to a change in the 
 terms. The law we seek, must be the law of the continuous 
 redistribution of matter and motion. Waiving any criti- 
 cism of the word " law," and accepting it as an expression 
 of uniformity of action, we read the sentence thus: 
 "The formula we seek must express the continuous re- 
 distribution of matter and motion." We notice that we do 
 not aim at seeking the cause or origin of matter and motion, 
 nor the cause of gravitation, nor a constructive formula 
 starting with them, but only a formula or sentence that 
 will cover the description of the changes of the universe, 
 from a state of homogeneity or of less heterogeneity to 
 the state as we see it now. 
 
 But the object is restated and changed when it is said 
 that "the question to be answered is, What dynamic 
 principle . . . expresses these ever-changing relations?" 
 What is a dynamic principle? and does it ever express 
 anything ? I must state that, after the closest considera- 
 tion and best endeavours to understand what a " dynamic 
 principle" is, I am utterly unable to form the least notion. 
 
 I must, therefore, fall back upon that which I can under- 
 stand by " the continuous redistribution of matter and 
 motion." Having thus realised the object, I hold it over 
 for a few chapters, when I will recur to it, to see how that 
 object has been attained.
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 99 
 
 OF CHAPTEE XII. 
 Evolution and Dissolution. 
 
 The first paragraph is to the uninitiated a yery great 
 puzzle indeed. I do not know whether to put it down to 
 intrinsic faultiness of statement or to my own incapacity 
 But I do not think that any ordinary reader of good in- 
 telligence would be able to make anything out of it, and 
 one would suppose that a book should be written so as to 
 be understood by such an one. 
 
 Let us go into detail. Mr. Spencer says : " An entire 
 history of anything must include its appearance out of the 
 imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible." 
 This implies a percipient, and renders the history of any- 
 thing dependent upon the existence of a percipient. But 
 it is evident that the changes of matter in motion are not 
 dependent upon a percipient. Mr. Spencer is conscious of 
 this difficulty, and says : " Unless on the assumption that 
 it acquired a sensible form at the moment of perception, 
 and lost its sensible form the moment after perception, it 
 must have had an antecedent existence under this sensible 
 form, and will have a subsequent existence under this 
 sensible form. These preceding and succeeding existences 
 under sensible forms are possible subjects of knowledge; and 
 knowledge has obviously not reached its limits until it has 
 united the past, present, and future histories into a whole." 
 
 The question then arises, What is a sensible form existent 
 apart from perception ? This is important as a necessary 
 demarcation of the limits of investigation. All sensible 
 forms that we know are formed of matter and motion 
 all their properties are sizes, shapes, and motions. Are we, 
 then, to conclude that every combination of matter and
 
 ioo SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 motion is a sensible form, or only such of them as could 
 be sensible if there were the human perceptions to perceive 
 them, ignoring all others ? This latter would seem imper- 
 fect, as different men and races have different ranges of 
 perception, and some individuals of the race have no per- 
 ception of light, colour, or sound, and yet the sensible 
 forms of which they are ignorant exist to others, and are a 
 subject of possible knowledge. "We, therefore, seem forced 
 to assign as the scope of all possible knowledge the range 
 of all past and future changes of matter and motion, quite 
 irrespective of the limitations of perceptibility and sensible 
 forms. 
 
 In the second sentence of the section Mr. Spencer speaks 
 of " a concrete form." What is a concrete form ? Is not 
 a concrete form the combination of position and motion of 
 two ultimate units having definite motions into an atom 
 differentiated from the ultimate units and from other 
 combinations thereof ? If not, then what are the limits 
 and what is the meaning of " concrete forms "? But if so, 
 then "be it a single object or the whole universe, any 
 account which begins with it in a concrete form or leaves 
 off with it in a concrete form is incomplete, since there 
 remains an era of its knowable existence undescribed and 
 unexplained." 
 
 But we have again a reference to the unknowable and 
 to Being conditioned so as to act on our senses, and the 
 question is put, How came it thus conditioned ? and how 
 will it cease to be thus conditioned ? 
 
 Now, it will be acknowledged at once that the unknow- 
 able has no meaning, and we proceed to inquire as to the 
 meaning of Being so conditioned as to act on our senses. 
 We want to know what Being is ? what is meant by it 
 being conditioned ? and how it was done ? These, perhaps,
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 101 
 
 seem severe questions. In framing an answer to them in 
 my own mind, I understand being to be undifferentiated 
 matter in motion. I take conditioned to be the differenti- 
 ation ; and as to how it was done, I suppose by gravitation, 
 or the motion of every unit towards every other unit or to 
 its neighbouring unit. Beyond that one cannot go. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer says " so conditioned as to act on our 
 senses." This seems to me to be putting the cart before 
 the horse. I presume the conditioning was done long 
 before the senses were formed. The question rather is, 
 How came the senses to be conditioned ? How came we 
 to be conscious of the perceptible and of sensible forms ? 
 
 Moreover, if the scope of philosophy is independent of 
 perceptibility, it is independent of the limitations of con- 
 crete forms, and is bound to account for all changes from 
 the homogeneous. 
 
 We now approach the formula which shall consolidate 
 philosophy, and gain an idea as to what that formula 
 shall relate ; and on perusing sect. 94 the reader will see 
 that it relates to matter and motion only. 
 
 " Sect. 94. Already in the foregoing paragraphs the outline of 
 such a formula is foreshadowed. Already in recognising the 
 fact that science, tracing back the genealogies of various objects, 
 finds their components were once in diffused states, and pursuing 
 their histories forwards, finds diffused states will be again 
 assumed by them, we have recognised the fact that the formula 
 must be one comprehending the two opposite processes of con- 
 centration and diffusion ; and already, in thus describing the 
 general nature of the formula, we have approached a specific 
 expression of it. The change from a diffused imperceptible state 
 to a concentrated perceptible state is an integration of matter and 
 concomitant dissipation of motion ; and the change from a con- 
 centrated perceptible state to a diffused imperceptible state is an 
 absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter. 
 These are truisms. Constituent parts cannot aggregate without
 
 102 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 losing some of their relative motion ; and they cannot separate 
 without more relative motion being given to them. We are not 
 concerned here with any motion which the components of a 
 mass have with respect to other masses ; we are concerned only 
 with the motion they have with respect to one another. Con- 
 fining our attention to this internal motion, and to the matter 
 possessing it, the axiom which we have to recognise is that a 
 progressing consolidation involves a decrease of internal motion, 
 and that increase of internal motion involves a progressing 
 unconsolidation. 
 
 " When taken together, the two opposite processes thus for- 
 mulated constitute the history of every sensible existence under 
 its simplest form. Loss of motion and consequent integration, 
 eventually followed by gain of motion and consequent disinte- 
 gration see here a statement comprehensive of the entire series 
 of changes passed through: comprehensive in an extremely 
 general way, as any statement which holds of sensible existences 
 at large must be, but still comprehensive in the sense that all 
 the changes gone through fall within it. This will probably be 
 thought too sweeping an assertion, but we shall quickly find it 
 justified." 
 
 Sect. 97 shoul'd "be read carefully. It contains a defi- 
 nition and explanation of the use and meaning of the 
 words " evolution " and " dissolution." Mr. Spencer specifies 
 what he does mean and what lie does not mean in the use 
 of them. Thus, throwing aside all other meanings, the 
 signification lie attaches to the word "evolution" is the 
 integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of 
 motion. It will be noted that the word " force " does not 
 occur in the definition. 
 
 But after all the care expended in the definition of evo- 
 lution and dissolution, it is all vitiated by the concluding 
 paragraph. 
 
 " While, then, we shall by dissolution everywhere mean 
 the process tacitly implied in its ordinary meaning the 
 absorption (transference ?) of motion and the disintegration
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 103 
 
 of matter; we shall everywhere mean by evolution the 
 process which is always an integration of matter and dissi- 
 pation of motion, but which, as we shall see, is in most 
 cases much more than this." 
 
 The confusion is caused by the last few words. What 
 evolution was defined to be is then not complete ; it is in 
 most cases much more than what it was said to be. 
 Surely a curious definition this. The antithesis of dissolu- 
 tion, after all, is not perfect. Dissolution is dissipation of 
 matter and transference of motion, but evolution is some- 
 thing more than the opposite process. And as a matter of 
 fact, it will be found that in the process of dissolution as 
 described by Mr. Spencer he keeps pretty well to his 
 limitations of the words "matter and motion," and in the 
 few cases in which he uses the word " force," it might 
 easily be substituted by the words "matter in motion;" 
 whereas in his description of the processes of evolution 
 there is a constant recurrence to that occult word, which, 
 represented by the symbol x, stands for anything the 
 reader likes to fancy. 
 
 Dissolution then is 
 m 2m m m ra 4 " 1 ra"* changing into \ m m m m 
 
 V 
 
 Evolution is 
 
 fff\ 771 /YY) ftl /YY) 1ft /YY) 771 | ( /vy) 2 "^ Wl *" / W9 4 ^* Wl "* 
 
 II v llv Ii v lilt- "\ * j 1 III, llv Hv^ II v 
 
 /- cnanjjing into -\ . -n 
 
 m m m m m m \ + Jb 
 
 j \ 
 
 In this representation ra stands for matter, the small ra 
 for motion, and the numerals for quantities of motion. F 
 symbolises force, and it would be better if Mr. Spencer 
 had used it instead of the whole word throughout his ex- 
 position, as it would more correctly represent the indefinite 
 character of its value. 
 
 In sect. 105, however, I find that Mr. Spencer recurs to
 
 104 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 this " something more," and the something more that he 
 refers to is compound evolution, which is technically no- 
 thing more than varied relations of matter in motion. 
 
 OF CHAPTER XIII. 
 Simple and Compound Evolution. 
 
 This is a very important chapter, and requires very care- 
 ful study. I do not know that we can object to the de- 
 scription of compound evolution by means of secondary 
 changes in the process of concentration and dissipation. 
 
 Sect. 103, however, should be well examined. It relates 
 to organic matter, i.e., protein, of which the distinctive 
 peculiarity " consists in the combination of matter into a 
 form embodying an enormous amount of motion at the 
 same time that it has a great degree of concentration." 
 
 This, in the first place, does not conform to the ex- 
 pressed law of evolution, which is the concentration of 
 matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion, but as 
 it recognises merely changes of matter in motion, we are 
 willing to accept it without objection. 
 
 But what is the meaning of " motion locked up " ? Of 
 course it cannot mean motion not going on. That would 
 be a flat contradiction ; just the same as speaking of a 
 thing whose existence is suspended. It would have gone 
 out of existence, but it is ready to come into existence 
 again. It means, I suppose, that there is a great amount 
 of molecular or atomic motion actually going on in the 
 interior of the mass, or even in the interior of the mole- 
 cule, which does not affect the relation of the mass or the 
 molecule with its environment. 
 
 Page 298. "Hence, as the characters of elements, though
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 105 
 
 disguised, cannot be absolutely lost in combinations, it is 
 to be inferred that the protein molecule concentrates a 
 comparatively large amount of motion in a small space." 
 
 The characters of the elements are shapes, sizes, modes 
 and rates of motion. When they enter into combinations 
 with others, the result is change of motion. Is this what 
 is meant by " disguised " ? The motion in any case is 
 certainly not lost, but the inference is, therefore, not that 
 it is still there unchanged, .but disguised so that it cannot 
 be perceived; but that it has been transferred or com- 
 pounded, and is a factor with others in a resultant motion. 
 
 "We have here the curious and new notion of a concentra- 
 tion of motion. We have heard hitherto of a concentration 
 of matter : the concentration of motion 
 is new. It means, I suppose, that if ) \ 
 
 these dots represent molecules moving 
 
 in the limits of the space assigned, that 
 
 by some means these limits might be reduced as under ; 
 
 only the law of Evolution, that the con- 
 
 centration of matter is accompanied by the '. '.'.'.'. 
 dissipation or transference of motion, is not 
 complied with in this case, but that a more rapid motion 
 through the smaller spaces is set up instead, and thus 
 motion may be said to be concentrated. I do not know 
 whether this is justifiable or not, but since it introduces no 
 new factor, I am willing to admit that it may be so : at the 
 same time it seems to me that as the properties of an atom 
 or molecule, beyond its mere shape and size, consist only 
 in the speciality of its motions, that if these are changed it 
 ceases to be what it was. However, there maybe intri- 
 cacies of relationship of matter in motion which we are 
 as yet unable to explain. 
 
 What is the meaning of nitrogeneous compounds ab-
 
 io6 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 sorbing heat ? Does it mean that the molecules move 
 more quickly, or that the intersticial ether moves more 
 rapidly, or that there is an increase in the quantity of it ? 
 Of course, in any case, the absorption of heat must mean 
 the increase of motion of something. Mr. Spencer calls it 
 "insensible motion in a free state the motion we call heat." 
 Does " motion in a free state " mean motion not of matter ? 
 If so, how can that be ? In any case, whether sensible or 
 not, it must be motion of something, and that something 
 in relation to environment, even if only to intermolecular 
 environment. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, in this chapter, does not attempt to account 
 for the organic or for organism ; and as I have already 
 criticised the attempt that he does make elsewhere, it is 
 not necessary for me to dwell upon this matter. The 
 argument drawn from the comparative bulk of the con- 
 stituents of the human body, if free and uncombined, when 
 compared with their bulk in combination, is obscure as 
 to the inferences to be drawn, and even if we admit the 
 inference drawn by Mr. Spencer, which is not unwarranted 
 very reasonable, in fact we may do so on the safe 
 ground of the relationships of matter in motion, though 
 their organisation remains unexplained. But there is a 
 plus, an unknown factor, which has entered into the pro- 
 cess. So in the continuation of the argument into organic 
 development, after this plus or unknown factor has made 
 its appearance, the argument, allowing for this plus, still 
 holds good in the formation of those secondary changes 
 which are called compound evolution. 
 
 We would further suggest a question as to the origin of 
 compound evolution. For if we start with "the homo- 
 geneous," and find that by simple evolution a mere process 
 of concentration takes place, accompanied by a differentia-
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 107 
 
 tion and combination of ultimate units until a certain 
 equilibrium is effected, then we arrive at the end of simple 
 evolution. 
 
 But how does compound evolution arise ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, p. 287 : " Where the only forces at 
 work are those directly tending to produce aggregation 
 or diffusion, the whole history of an aggregate will com- 
 prise no more than the approaches of its components 
 towards their common centre and their recessions from 
 their common centre." As I understand the formula of 
 Evolution, there are no other forces than those referred to, 
 and therefore, starting from " the homogeneous," this is the 
 whole history that can result from the formula of Evolu- 
 tion. If we start from a mass of homogeneous units, and 
 the law of action and reaction as equal and opposite, I do 
 not see how any other history is possible. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer goes on to describe compound evolu- 
 tion, and to describe the circumstances under which it will 
 arise. These circumstances are complex conditions already 
 implying a precedent compound evolution. But this pre- 
 cedent compound evolution is wholly unaccounted for. 
 The statement, or argument if it be one simply begs 
 the question. How compound evolution can arise out of 
 simple evolution is not shown, and therefore, again, we 
 are at a loss to account for the origin of compound evo- 
 lution. 
 
 In fact, it is very evident that a complex or differen- 
 tiated state is requisite for a compound evolution. How 
 to account for this complex and differentiated state, from 
 which only compound evolution that is to say, the state 
 of things as we find them now is only to be produced, the 
 statement of Evolution by Mr. Spencer fails to show, and, 
 therefore, as a philosophy proposing to account for the
 
 io8 SPENCER^ S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 whole history of things, from the imperceptible to the per- 
 ceptible, proclaims its own inadequacy. 
 
 The fact of the matter is, Mr. Spencer starts, not from 
 the homogeneous, but from the hypothesis of an indefinite 
 tract of ether interspersed with nebulous clouds, composed 
 of what we know as the seventy or eighty elements in a 
 vaporous condition, but how produced and why retaining 
 their characteristics, he does not attempt to show; and 
 from this hypothesis he works out the processes of Evolu- 
 tion, but it is clear that it is not a complete philosophy ; it 
 is not Evolutionism as defined, but Developmentalism, 
 taking as its starting-point a very remote stage, but, never- 
 theless, just as arbitrary as that of any one else who starts 
 at a later stage. 
 
 OF CHAPTERS XIY., XV., XVI., AND XVIL 
 
 The, Law of Evolution. 
 
 Here I think I may save time and trouble by a general 
 criticism. These chapters are very interesting and very 
 instructive, whether the particular formula I am criticising 
 is valid or not. 
 
 In each chapter a certain conclusion is arrived at, form- 
 ing a cumulative exposition, each item of which, worked 
 out separately and in full detail, is summarised into one 
 important characterisation of the process of Evolution. 
 
 Page 396. " The formula finally stands thus : Evolution is 
 an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, 
 during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent 
 homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity ; and during 
 which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transforma- 
 tion."
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 109 
 
 " Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant 
 dissipation of motion." 
 
 To this, however, there is a most important exception in 
 the case of nitrogeneous compounds, where, as we found, 
 there took place a " concentration of motion." 
 
 Again, if consciousness is included in Evolution that is 
 to say, if the change from unconscious matter to conscious 
 matter has to be accounted for by Evolution then the con- 
 centration of matter and dissipation of motion, or the alter- 
 nation of the process, does not account for it. 
 
 "During which the matter passes from an indefinite, 
 incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent hetero- 
 geneity." 
 
 It will be evident, in looking through these chapters, 
 that Mr. Spencer does not start from a state of homo- 
 geneity, and therefore his formula is wrong, unless he 
 is prepared to assert a state of perfect homogeneity at 
 the commencement of Evolution, and to argue therefrom. 
 This position elsewhere he would seem to adopt, and has 
 already, in the first part of this criticism, received our 
 consideration. But in the chapters now under review it 
 will be seen that the advance in all cases is from the less 
 heterogeneous, and not from the homogeneous. 
 
 " During which the retained motion undergoes a parallel 
 transformation." 
 
 In this passage there is some obscurity of expression, as 
 it seems difficult to apply some of the terms to motion. 
 Thus there is no indefinite motion nor incoherent motion ; 
 but there are motions of bodies more or less in definite and 
 permanent relation to each other, and we can understand 
 that the progress made is from the homogeneous, separate, 
 and individual motions to combined motions, and intri- 
 cately related motions, and diversities of relations of combi- 
 nations.
 
 1 10 SPENCER 'S FORMULA OF E VOL UTION. 
 
 In our examination of chapter ii. we found that Mr. 
 Spencer set before himself the problem the solution of 
 which we have just been considering. Let us now consider 
 that problem, and see if it meets with an equal solution. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says (chapter xi., p. 274) : 
 
 " The decomposition of phenomena into their elements is but 
 a preparation for understanding phenomena in their state of 
 composition as actually manifested. To have ascertained the 
 laws of the factors is not at all to have ascertained the laws of 
 their co-operation. The question is not how any factor matter, 
 or motion, or force behaves by itself or under some imagined 
 simple conditions ; nor is it even how one factor behaves under 
 the complicated conditions of actual existence. The thing to be 
 expressed is the joint product of the factors under all its various 
 aspects. Only when we can formulate the total process have we 
 gained that knowledge of it which philosophy aspires to." 
 
 The argument is elaborated in sect. 92, p. 276. "To 
 resume, then, we have now to seek a law of composition 
 of phenomena co-extensive with those laws of their com- 
 ponents set forth in the foregoing chapters." 
 
 These components, I suppose, are matter (i.e., units of 
 extension and resistance), motion (i.e., equal mutual motions 
 of attraction and repulsion), force (i.e., the unknowable 
 cause of matter in motion). 
 
 " Having seen that matter is indestructible, motion con- 
 tinuous, and force persistent having seen that forces " 
 (note "forces" a differentiation of matter in motion 
 roughly called lyy that name, and implying the attainment 
 of a certain stage in evolution) " are everywhere under- 
 going transformation, and that motion, always following 
 the line of least resistance, is invariably rhythmic, it re- 
 mains to discover the similarly invariable formula ex- 
 pressing the combined consequences of the actions thus 
 separately formulated."
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM " FORCE." in 
 
 Page 277. " The law we seek, therefore, must be the law 
 of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion." 
 (Note, omitting force and forces?) :t Absolute rest and 
 permanence do not exist. Every object, no less than the 
 aggregate of all objects, undergoes from instant to instant 
 some alteration of state. Gradually or quickly it is re- 
 ceiving motion or losing motion " (Note, moves more 
 quickly or moves more slowly, as other aggregates move more 
 slowly or more quickly] " while some or all of its parts are 
 simultaneously changing their relations to one another. 
 And the question to be answered is What dynamic prin- 
 ciple, true of the metamorphosis as a whole and in its 
 details, expresses these ever-changing relations ? " 
 
 Here force is discarded, and the subsequent reply in the 
 formula of Evolution and dissolution omits it, although its 
 employment in the singular and the plural is still retained, 
 with a very confusing result, as if in the redistributions of 
 matter and motion some outside force or forces not included 
 in them were perpetually interfering with their processes. 
 
 And I must here endeavour to remove any misappre- 
 hension arising from the meaning of the word " evolution," 
 as seeming to imply more than the formula I have several 
 times quoted. It is taken to mean sometimes a process of 
 " unfolding," but there may be some who call themselves 
 Evolutionists, because they believe that all successions of 
 things are processes of growth or unfolding, as if from a 
 germ something like the development of a plant, or an 
 animal, or a society. All such notions and associations, 
 however true they may be, are not to be identified with 
 the doctrine of Evolution as expounded by Mr. Spencer, 
 and it is that alone that I am dealing with. There is no 
 more a process of unfolding in the formula of Evolution we 
 are dealing with than is expressed in the relations of the
 
 H2' SPENCER 'S FORMULA OF E VOL UTION. 
 
 size and rates of rotation of an engine-shaft, and the sizes 
 and rates of motion of all the wheels and cog-wheels of 
 the machinery. The notion of unfolding or development 
 is utterly foreign to the formula. It is physics, it is 
 mechanics from first to last, and the formula cannot be 
 amended without radically altering the character and 
 nature of it and its processes. 
 
 Page 327. "Evolution, then," he says, "under its primary 
 aspect, is a change from a less coherent form to a more 
 coherent form, consequent on the dissipation of motion 
 and integration of matter." 
 
 And again, page 285: "Evolution, under its simplest 
 and most general aspect, is the integration of matter and 
 concomitant dissipation of motion, while dissolution is the 
 absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of 
 matter." 
 
 I think an improved statement would be : " Evolution is 
 the integration of ultimate units into definite and specific 
 relations of an increasingly complex character, which pro- 
 cess is accompanied by a loss of rates of motion, which 
 is transferred in a quantitative degree in acceleration of 
 the rates of motion of other units or combinations of 
 units, during which aggregates of matter pass," &c. 
 
 But however this may be, the terms "force" and 
 " forces " are not included in the terms of the definition, 
 and therefore I think that in the subsequent working out 
 of the theory of Evolution they are quite out of place, and 
 the cause of much confusion in the mind of the reader. 
 The confusion is this: one is. apt to think that there is 
 after all in Evolution an element of mystery, something 
 that cannot be gauged and measured, something that can- 
 not be put down geometrically and the number of its 
 vibrations counted. Surely in any sound system, perfectly
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE? 113 
 
 cohesive and complete, the terms of the all-embracing for- 
 mula are sufficient for its own exposition. 
 
 Either, then, Mr. Spencer has committed the grave lite- 
 rary fault of confusing his readers by the use of terms not 
 included in his formula a literary fault capable of correc- 
 tion or in the working out of his system he has found 
 his formula insufficient a still graver objection. For if 
 the formula is insufficient, the whole key to the secrets of 
 the universe is lost, and we find ourselves wandering in a 
 labyrinthine puzzle. Which is it ? 
 
 What is required ? A correction of the exposition or a 
 correction of the definition ? If it is necessary to predi- 
 cate any special forces other than that constituting matter 
 and motion, and presiding over its concentration at the 
 outset of Evolution, let it be done. 
 
 I do not presume to say that Mr. Spencer is wrong ; I 
 only presume to speak of the impression his book produces 
 upon an ordinary mind in its endeavour to understand 
 clearly what is meant. I have found great difficulty in 
 following the thread of the argument. The book is like 
 the process of Evolution itself; we never know where 
 we are ; we seem to slip from one thing into another so 
 easily, that in the transmutation and connection of words 
 we often have a difficulty in making out our position 
 at all. 
 
 In this instance we are duly and solemnly impressed 
 with the associations of the unknowable in connection 
 with the word " force," which henceforward we surround 
 with an element of mystery, and when we afterwards meet 
 with it in the exposition of Evolution, in the formula oi 
 which it is not included, we seem to have joined company 
 again with a mystical companion from whom we had in 
 thought parted with for ever, and whose image remained
 
 1 1 4 SPENCER 'S FORM ULA OF E VOL UTION. 
 
 only in our minds as a reminiscence of the last shadowy 
 dream of kindly, old-fashioned superstitions. 
 
 It seems to me that the words " force " and " forces " 
 should have been strictly defined in their employment in 
 the description of Evolution, or that there should have 
 been an intermediate book between the Unknowable and 
 the Knowable, giving a formal and final account of the use 
 of the terms. If force is the cause of matter, and the 
 cause of the motion, of matter, it is only equal to its 
 results ; and if we know its results, we know it as we only 
 can know it. If its results are matter in motion in various 
 combinations if we take account of all matter and all 
 motion, and all combinations thereof we know all we 
 can know; and even if force is the cause of them, it 
 becomes to us indifferent. It is no factor in our expo- 
 sition. 
 
 It would take a long paper to apply this criticism in 
 detail right through the chapters on Evolution. I can- 
 not do more than indicate it. It may be my fault, 
 but I must confess I cannot understand a good many 
 applications of the terms " force " and " forces," as in the 
 expressions " surplus force," " excess of force," &c. ; and the 
 predication of eras, when the attractive forces predominate, 
 and alternate eras, when the repulsive forces predominate, 
 I cannot quite realise in thought from wondering what has 
 become of the others in the meantime. 
 
 My objection is to the employment of the terms "force" 
 and "forces" in the book on the Knowable and in the 
 exposition of the theory of Evolution. To say the least of 
 it, systems of philosophy ought to be worked out in terms 
 of their own definitions. They ought to be worked out like 
 Euclid. If Euclid changed his definitions in the elaboration 
 of his theorems and problems, instead of constantly referring
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE" 115 
 
 back to axioms and definitions, no satisfactory result would 
 be arrived at. And Mr. Spencer in his statement of the 
 formula of Evolution says nothing about "force" or 
 " forces." 
 
 OF CHAPTER XVIII. 
 The Interpretation of Evolution. 
 
 How are we to approach the criticism of this chapter ? 
 The subject-matter of it is a problem. 
 
 " Sect. 147. The task before us, then, is that of exhibiting 
 the phenomena of Evolution in synthetic order. Setting out 
 from an established ultimate principle, it has to be shown that 
 the course of transformation among all kinds of existences cannot 
 but be that which we have seen it to be. ... In other words, 
 the phenomena of Evolution have to be deduced from the per- 
 sistence of force. As before said : ' To this an ultimate analysis 
 brings us down; and on this a rational synthesis must build 
 up.' This being the ultimate truth which transcends experience 
 by underlying it, so furnishing a common basis on which the 
 widest generalisations stand, these widest generalisations are to 
 be unified, by referring them to this common basis, ... we 
 have similarly to affiliate the universal traits of Evolution, by 
 showing that, given the persistence of force, the redistribution 
 of matter and motion necessarily proceeds in such a way as to 
 produce them." 
 
 The formula of Evolution is : " Evolution is an integra- 
 tion of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, 
 during which the matter passes from an indefinite, inco- 
 herent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, 
 and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel 
 transformation." 
 
 The problem as stated is, " Setting out from an estab- 
 lished ultimate principle," &c., " in other words, the pheno- 
 mena of Evolution have to be deduced from the persistence 
 of force."
 
 j 1 6 SPENCER 'S FORMULA OF E VOL UTION. 
 
 The question is, I suppose What state of affairs at 
 the first will account for the state of affairs at the last ? 
 
 We have, then, to start with an indefinite, incoherent 
 homogeneity of matter and motion. Homogeneity we have 
 already considered, and we found it consist of a mass of 
 ultimate units of like size, shape, and motion. But we were 
 forced to predicate of it a certain shape, viz., spherical, in 
 order to attain our idea of homogeneity. An equal relation 
 of motion implies similarity of space relationship, and this 
 is most nearly approached in a sphere, since there is only 
 one central result of motion instead of many. This, how- 
 ever, is definiteness, and it is coherency. We seem there- 
 fore obliged to deny that the homogeneous is indefinite 
 and incoherent. This is a criticism, however, that ought 
 to have been brought forward in the last chapter. 
 
 Now to this state of homogeneity we have to apply the 
 principle of the persistence of force and see what comes of 
 it ? And as it is very difficult to imagine homogeneity, 
 and as it is difficult if not impossible to frame a concep- 
 tion of force and therefore of the persistence of it, it is a 
 problem that eludes mental effort to apply the principle 
 of the persistence of force to homogeneity so as to pro- 
 duce the known condition of things. If it is said that we 
 do not know force, we are asked to explain the known by 
 the unknown, and to include in knowledge to make it 
 more known that which is utterably unknowable to 
 deduce the known from the unknown to produce some- 
 thing out of nothing to unify knowledge by verbal 
 mysticisms. 
 
 We have already considered this subject, and came to 
 the conclusion that if we know all the effects of force, we 
 know force. The known effects of force are matter and 
 motion, or, more properly, matter in motion. We also know
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 117 
 
 that these are constant quantities, and to that fact we may, 
 if we like, give the name of the persistence of force ; and 
 if from this we can deduce all the traits of evolution, and 
 account for all changes in the cosmos, we unify philosophy. 1 
 But we must take care fully to realise to ourselves and 
 always to bear in mind that the persistence of force means 
 nothing more than the constancy of the quantum of matter 
 and of motion. 
 
 Very well, then, can we on the ground of the constant 
 quantity of matter in motion deduce from it, on its appli- 
 cation to the homogeneous, all the known changes of the 
 cosmos ? 
 
 In the first part of our criticism we tried to do so, and 
 failed. 
 
 But how does Mr. Spencer set about to prove that the 
 persistence of force accounts for all changes? In this 
 way. 
 
 In chapter xix. he advances the theory of the instability 
 of the homogeneous. As just remarked, we have in the 
 first part of our criticism considered this, and found it a 
 failure. 
 
 However, let us consider Mr. Spencer's argument in sect. 
 155, in which he undertakes to show "that this general 
 truth is demonstrable A priwi" 
 
 " We have to prove specifically that the instability of the 
 homogeneous is a corollary from the persistence of force." 
 
 Now how does one set about getting a corollary? I 
 thought a corollary was a natural and inevitable conclusion 
 of thought from the terms of a proposition, and if I try to 
 frame a proposition the terms of which shall describe the 
 homogeneous, I cannot see that it contains any cause of 
 
 1 But if we do not know all the effects of force in the cosmos, then 
 philosophy is impossible.
 
 nS SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 change, nor can I see that the persistence of force (i.e., the 
 constancy of the quantity of matter and motion) should 
 be the cause of instability or change. On the contrary, the 
 corollary that I should draw from the constancy of the 
 quantity of the matter and motion would be the permanency 
 of the established relations. If, on the other hand, I ima- 
 gined the inconstancy of the quantums as opposed to the 
 permanence and persistence of force, I could naturally draw 
 the corollary of instability and change. But the varia- 
 bility of the quantity of matter and motion is denied. The 
 permanence, constancy, and persistence seem to me to pre- 
 clude change. 
 
 What is a priori reasoning ? I should have thought the 
 above was, if there is any such process. 
 
 Mr. Spencer undertakes to demonstrate the instability 
 of the homogeneous a priori. But he sets to work induc- 
 tively, and adduces a variety of instances where the homo- 
 geneous is found to be unstable. . Is this a priori reasoning ? 
 Is it a deduction from the persistence of force i.e., the con- 
 stant quantity of matter and motion ? 
 
 However, to take the argument on its own merits, Mr. 
 Spencer supposes a mass of matter and another piece of 
 matter striking it. He takes a body upon which radiant 
 heat is falling. Then he takes a force and forces, what- 
 ever these may be, and shows how changes are produced 
 by their interaction. He speaks of the results of two 
 sets of factors. 
 
 Now, I ask is this the homogeneous ? Does any number of 
 bodies homogeneous in themselves, and subject to a variety 
 of motions such as heat, constitute the homogeneous ? Does 
 any argument drawn from relations of the heterogeneous 
 throw any light upon the nature of the homogeneous ? 
 Does it constitute an a priori proof of the instability of the
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 119 
 
 homogeneous from the constancy of the quantity of matter 
 in motion ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer continues (p. 428) by arguing that, "even 
 apart from the action of any external force, the equili- 
 brium of a homogeneous aggregate must be destroyed by 
 the unequal actions of its parts on each other." 
 
 Then follows a very good argument if for "parts" is read 
 "units," which I suggest, not to alter the argument, but to 
 render it more clear, since " parts " might be taken to mean 
 "quarters" or "tenths," or any aggregate of units. 
 
 " That mutual influence which produces aggregation (not 
 to mention other mutual influences) must work different 
 effects on the different parts, since they are severally ex- 
 posed to it in unlike amounts and directions. This will be 
 clearly seen on remembering that the portions of which 
 the whole is made up may be severally regarded as minor 
 wholes; that on each of these minor wholes the action 
 of the entire aggregate 'then becomes an external incident 
 force; that such external incident force must, as above 
 shown, work unlike changes in the parts of any such 
 minor whole ; and that if the minor wholes are severally 
 thus rendered heterogeneous, the entire aggregate is ren- 
 dered heterogeneous." There is another little flaw here, I 
 perceive. The part is regarded as a minor whole, having 
 parts which are modified. It would be better to regard the 
 change produced as one of motion, viz., the motion of the 
 ultimate unit. This argument relates then to the homo- 
 geneous made up of like units and equal motions. Now 
 all this was considered in the first part of our criticism, and 
 we are not making progress. We considered a spherical 
 mass of like units having motions of equal mutual attrac- 
 tion and repulsion, and got a total movement in the mass 
 of alternate concentration and retrocession, nothing more.
 
 120 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Motion implies instability in a certain sense, but the 
 rhythms of concentration and expansion, being regular, 
 are stable relations and produce no definite coherent com- 
 binations. 
 
 The question is, Does the constancy of the quantity of 
 matter and motion imply change ? Mr. Spencer has not 
 shown that it does. 
 
 The next question is, Does the supposition of the homo- 
 geneous, i.e., a spherical mass of like units having equal 
 mutual motions of attraction and repulsion, imply change 
 or differentiation ? I think not, but, if so, it ends even- 
 tually in equilibration. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, on page 429, makes a representation of the 
 homogeneous, but as the idea of infinity is introduced, the 
 supposition is, as he says, inconceivable. 
 
 We have dwelt thus long on the interpretation of evolu- 
 tion, or the synthesis of evolution, and its first step from 
 the homogeneous, as we consider it of vital importance in 
 the study of a philosophy which professes to account for 
 all changes. The first step is always the most difficult, as 
 well as the most important. 
 
 Our conclusion is, that, as a matter of thought and argu- 
 ment, the instability of the homogeneous is not deducible 
 as a corollary from the persistence of force i.e., the con- 
 stancy of the quantity of matter in motion. And since 
 all the further changes of Evolution are dependent upon 
 this, then no other change or characteristic of Evolution 
 is a logical corollary from the persistence of foree. 
 
 OF CHAPTEK XIX. 
 TJie Instability of the Homogeneous. 
 This chapter has already received our attention, and 
 passing over the two next chapters, we examine chapter
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM " FORCE." 121 
 
 xxii. next, because we argue that from the homogeneous 
 an "equilibrium" is arrived at before "a multiplication 
 of effects." 
 
 OF CHAPTER XXII. 
 Equilibration. 
 
 Given the homogeneous and granted concentration, this 
 concentration would proceed until an equilibrium of motion 
 was attained. An equilibrium of motion once attained is 
 represented algebraically thus 
 
 <m m n = m m n 
 and no further disturbance of relation is possible. 
 
 This is a corollary from the constancy of the quantity 
 of matter in motion, and the consequent persistency of the 
 relations of matter in motion. 
 
 To suppose any other matter in motion which shall 
 disturb it is to suppose something coming into existence 
 out of nothing, and to deny the constant quantity of 
 matter in motion. 
 
 Therefore an equilibrium once set up remains for ever, 
 and no further change is possible. 
 
 An equilibrium is, however, stateable in two ways. 
 
 If we say that an equilibrium is rest that is to say, 
 no motion we would seem to say that all motion ceases, 
 which is a denial of the proposition that motion is con- 
 tinuous, and an assertion that motion goes out of existence. 
 One motion cannot cancel another. The only equilibrium - 
 of motion can be alternation. 
 
 We are, therefore, forced to suppose that the equilibrium | 
 established must be an equivalent alternate motion. 
 
 This agrees with the axiom that all action is equal and 
 opposite. The equilibrium established would, therefore, 
 be an alternate and equal concentration and retrocession.
 
 122 SPENCEK'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 This is an equilibrium, and since no extra matter and 
 motion can come into existence to disturb it, it will go on 
 for ever. 
 
 And supposing a state of very complex heterogeneity, 
 even then, according to Mr. Spencer, we are ever progress- 
 ing towards a state of equilibrium, which, once attained, 
 there does not seem any possibility of further disturbance. 
 
 This is a long and interesting chapter, and I do not see 
 any necessity for a detailed criticism. The above seems 
 to me a correct summary of the position, and the correct 
 corollary to be drawn from it. I think the reader will 
 find it fully corroborated by a perusal of sect. 176 in this 
 chapter. I have taken this chapter out of its order in the 
 work in order to present the first difficulty in the syn- 
 thesis of Evolution which we are engaged upon, for if we 
 shortly arrive at an equilibrium or perfect balance of 
 matter in motion in their interrelations, we come to a full 
 stop. 
 
 OF CHAPTER XX. 
 Tlie Multiplication of Effects. 
 
 I object very much to the first paragraph of this chapter. 
 It is an instance of loose writing throughout. 
 
 " To the cause of increasing complexity set forth in the 
 last chapter we have ... to add another. . . . Even in 
 the absence of the cause already assigned, it would neces- 
 sitate a change from the homogeneous to the heteroge- 
 neous." l 
 
 We read the following paragraph very carefully to see 
 how the homogeneous can be rendered heterogeneous, and 
 find that the homogeneous referred to is not the homo- 
 
 1 Mr. Spencer speaks of a conflict between force and matter. This 
 would seem to be an oversight, only that it is reprinted upon page 432.
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 123 
 
 geneous at all, but heterogeneity that is to say, differen- 
 tiated concrete bodies in relation with external forces, so 
 this argument falls to the ground. 
 
 Our general criticism of the chapter follows naturally 
 from the great objection made on page in, viz., that, 
 after giving a definition of Evolution, which contains the 
 two factors matter and motion, although Mr. Spencer had 
 proposed to include three, viz., matter, motion, and force ; 
 yet when he comes to the synthesis of Evolution he picks 
 up the omitted factor, and works out the synthesis as if 
 it had been included in the definition. 
 
 Thus, if we refer to our diagram, it is as if he had 
 narrowed everything down to the formula placed at the 
 apex, and had afterwards opened out a supplementary 
 channel between the upper cone and the lower one. In 
 addition to this, if consciousness be not accountable as 
 matter in motion, a second channel might have to be 
 opened lower down in the lower cone. 
 
 The reader must carefully bear in mind that, according 
 to the definition of Evolution, there are only two factors to 
 be taken into account in the synthesis of Evolution, viz., 
 matter and motion. Therefore when, in this chapter on 
 the multiplication of effects, he comes upon the terms 
 " force " or " forces," with or without a variety of adjec- 
 tives, such as "a single force," "forces that widely di- 
 verge," "forces differing in their kinds," he is bound to 
 translate their processes and relations into terms of mat- 
 ter in motion, expressible in shapes, sizes, modes, and 
 rates, by geometry and arithmetic. 
 
 And we must also bear in mind that the multiplication 
 of effects, however produced, and however complex they 
 may be, by the terms of thfe definition of Evolution can 
 only be a multiplication of the relations of matter ir
 
 124 SPEXCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION, 
 
 motion : that is to say, no new kind of force or quality can 
 find its way amongst them. For, given shape and size, and 
 given mode and numbers of rates of motion, it is possible 
 to calculate the universe. The whole cosmos is merely an 
 arithmetical and geometrical problem. There is no new 
 factor introduced. Or if there is, the formula of Evolution 
 is wrong. 
 
 OF CHAPTER XXL 
 
 Segregation. 
 
 My criticism on this chapter follows on the same lines 
 as the last. The general proposition is this, and is quite 
 acceptable if the word "motion" be substituted for the 
 word "force." 
 
 " That in the actions and reactions of force and matter 
 an unlikeness in either of the factors necessitates an un- 
 likeness of the effects, and that in the absence of unlike- 
 ness in either of the factors, the effects must be alike." 
 
 OF CHAPTER XXIII. 
 Dissolution. 
 
 This chapter was very fully considered at the commence- 
 ment of the criticism. 
 
 OF CHAPTER XXIV. 
 Summary and Conclusion. 
 
 In the last paragraph of page 541, Mr. Spencer makes a 
 clear and uncompromising statement of the claims of philo- 
 sophy, which we have referred to in the course of this 
 criticism, and which we have quoted at length on page 2.
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 125 
 
 In the two succeeding paragraphs, page 542, he gives an 
 equally definite statement of the factors by which all phe- 
 nomena are to be explained. 
 
 " By these considerations we were brought within view of the 
 formula. For if it had to comprehend the entire progress from 
 the imperceptible to the perceptible, and from the perceptible to 
 the imperceptible ; and if it was also to express the continuous 
 redistribution of matter and motion, then, obviously, it could be 
 no other than one denning the opposite processes of concentra- 
 tion and diffusion in terms of matter and motion. And if so, 
 it must be a statement of the truth that the concentration of 
 matter implies the dissipation of motion, and that, conversely, 
 the absorption of motion implies the diffusion of matter. 
 
 " Such, in fact, we found to be the law of the entire cycle of 
 changes passed through by every existence ; loss of motion and 
 consequent integration, eventually followed by gain of motion 
 and consequent disintegration. And we saw that, besides applying 
 to the whole history of each existence, it applies to each detail of 
 the history. Eoth processes are going on at every instant ; but 
 always there is a differential result in favour of the first or the 
 second. And every change, even though it be only a transposi- 
 tion of parts, inevitably advances the one process or the other." 
 
 "We cannot help thinking that Mr. Spencer confuses a 
 description of the general processes of changes with the 
 explanation of them. An explanation would be such as 
 this: Given a quantum of ultimate units in motion, certain 
 facts of mutual relation of size and shape, mode and rate of 
 motion, then there will result from the harmonies or dis- 
 cordances of them certain definite changes, i.e., combina- 
 tions and recombinations into aggregates having complex 
 -relations, which, although practically incalculable, are 
 nevertheless comprehensible, and we would be able to 
 understand how the state of affairs at the first necessitated 
 all subsequent changes. A description, however, does not 
 afford such an insight or furnish us with an organon for
 
 126 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 construction, but admitting any number of original factors, 
 simply finds that all changes of them are either into 
 definite combinations or dissolution of combinations. So 
 that we can frame a formula which shall be a descrip- 
 tion of processes, but yet not form an explanation of 
 them. 
 
 It is just possible that the unification of knowledge that 
 Mr. Spencer claims is not to be sought for in the formula 
 of Evolution, but in the expression "the persistence of 
 force." 
 
 Page 549. "But the fact which it here chiefly concerns us to 
 remember is, that each of these laws of the redistribution of matter 
 and motion was found to be a derivative law the law deducible 
 from the fundamental law. The persistence of force being 
 granted, there follow as inevitable inferences ' the instability of 
 the homogeneous,' and ' the multiplication of effects ; ' while 
 * segregation ' and ' equilibration ' also become corollaries. And 
 thus discovering that the processes of change formulated under 
 these titles are so many different aspects of one transformation 
 determined by an ultimate necessity, we arrive at a complete 
 unification of them a synthesis in which Evolution in general 
 and in detail becomes known as an implication of the law that 
 transcends proof. Moreover, in becoming thus unified with one 
 another, the complex truths of Evolution become simultaneously 
 unified with those simpler truths shown to have a like affiliation, 
 the equivalents of transformed forces, the movement of every 
 mass and molecule along its line of least resistance, and the limi- 
 tation of its motion by rhythm ; which further unification brings 
 us to a conception of the entire plexus of changes presented by 
 each concrete phenomenon, and by the aggregate of concrete 
 phenomena, as a manifestation of one fundamental fact a fact 
 shown alike in the total change and in all the separate changes 
 composing it." 
 
 But then we do not understand the persistence of force, 
 and therefore "the unification" does not "bring to us a 
 conception of the entire plexus of changes presented by
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 127 
 
 each complete phenomenon ... as a manifestation of one 
 fundamental fact." 
 
 The only definite idea capable of enabling us to form 
 such a conception is by interpreting persistence of force 
 into constancy of quantity of matter in motion, and this 
 we have found fails in some respects of the required uni- 
 fication. 
 
 In sect. 194, Mr. Spencer says, page 556: "Before pro- 
 ceeding to interpret the detailed phenomena of life, and 
 mind, and society in terms of matter, motion, and force, the 
 reader must be reminded in what sense the interpretations 
 are to be accepted." It appears from this that the pheno- 
 mena of life, mind, and society are not to be interpreted by 
 the stated formula of Evolution, which mentions only matter 
 and motion. They are to be interpreted also in terms of 
 force, whatever the terms of force may be, and which are 
 not given anywhere in the work. We are therefore in- 
 vited to enter upon an inquiry, and to use a word and 
 terms of a something, the first of which is undefined and 
 asserted to be undefinable, and the second of which (the 
 terms) are not given. 
 
 The only terms which we can by implication give to 
 force are matter and motion ; yet, since they are two of the 
 three factors given, the third of which is force, they would 
 thereby seem to be excluded as terms of force. 
 
 If matter and motion were the terms of force, then the 
 theory would be materialistic ; but Mr. Spencer goes on to 
 repudiate this sense of his interpretations of the pheno- 
 mena of life, mind, and society. Therefore the terms of 
 force must include more than the terms of matter and 
 motion, which are the two factors in the stated formula of 
 Evolution. This being the case, since what this " plus " is 
 is not given, nor the terms of it, it will naturally seem to
 
 128 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 follow that all the subsequent interpretations of pheno- 
 mena in the volumes on Biology, Psychology, and Sociology 
 are vitiated by this initial defect. 
 
 The final paragraph of the chapter will be considered in 
 the third part of this criticism. 
 
 Summary of Criticism. 
 
 My object throughout this criticism has been to show 
 that there has been a vital discrepancy between Mr. 
 Spencer's formula of Evolution and the exposition of the 
 steps that lead up to it, on the one hand, and the synthesis 
 deducible from it, on the other. 
 
 The formula of Evolution is framed upon the mutual 
 relations of two factors, viz., matter and motion, or matter 
 in motion. The preceding argument and the succeeding 
 synthesis both include force. 
 
 It follows from this either that the formula should be 
 amended so as to include force, or that the exposition 
 and synthesis should be amended so as to exclude it. 
 
 We have endeavoured to amend the synthesis so as to 
 make it conformable to the formula, and having done so, 
 we find two or three insuperable difficulties, viz. : 
 
 Firstly, A probable one in the initial change from the 
 homogeneous. 
 
 Secondly, In the change from the first equilibrium and 
 ,he distribution and permanence of the so-called elements. 
 
 Thirdly, In the change from the unconscious to the con- 
 scious, with its consequent phenomena of organism and 
 life. 
 
 Fourthly, The contradictory phenomena of the concen- 
 tration of motion in nitrogenous compounds. 
 
 From which we conclude that no explanation of the 
 universe based only upon the two factors matter and
 
 'INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM "FORCE." 129 
 
 motion is able to account for all the changes in the cosmos. 
 Let us, however, see if we can amend the formula of 
 Evolution so as to introduce the term " force." 
 
 " Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant 
 dissipation of motion (which are themselves manifestations 
 of a persistent force), during which," &c. But it is evident 
 here that the parenthetical interpolation is merely ex- 
 planatory of the antecedents of Evolution, and not of its 
 sequences, as given in the following part of the formula, 
 and our first attempt fails. 
 
 Or we might say : 
 
 " Force constitutes matter, and those motions of attrac- 
 tion and repulsion which it manifests, and Evolution, is," 
 &c. But this again only relates to the antecedents of 
 Evolution, not to its sequences. 
 
 If we wish to get it into the sequences we would have 
 to say, "Evolution is an integration of matter and con- 
 comitant dissipation of motion, and in which force " does 
 something what shall we say ? interferes occasionally to 
 disturb equilibrium, or to endow protein or protoplasm 
 with consciousness ? " and during which," &c. But this 
 is an indefinite formula, and falls short of the requisite 
 unification of knowledge, for knowledge means definite 
 comprehension and not vague fancies ; besides, it does not 
 say what that persistent force is doing when it is not so 
 occupied. 
 
 It may be that this is the most complete formula that 
 we can reach; but if so, it would intelligibly assert, on 
 the face of it, an unknown power and deny the possibility 
 of a perfect philosophy. 
 
 Therefore, if we seek to amend the formula of Evolution 
 so as to include force, we insert in it a term to which we 
 
 can attach no definite meaning, and the formula and its 
 
 I
 
 130 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 application (since it contains an unknown quantity) does 
 not afford complete explanations, but confesses an element 
 of mystery. 
 
 But since Mr. Spencer expressly claims that Evolution 
 accomplishes all that it is required of a philosophy to do, 
 viz., to unify and account in an intelligible formula for the 
 history of all changes in the cosmos from the beginning to 
 the end, we are obliged to declare that both the formula 
 and the exposition are insufficient, and that the Evolution 
 philosophy is in both respects a failure. 
 
 But acknowledging that Mr. Spencer himself admits an 
 unknowable element, it is to be demanded of him whether 
 this unknowable is to be placed at the beginning of things 
 as the constitutor of matter in motion, or is to be regarded 
 as a constant quantity merely keeping them going; in 
 either of which cases, as we have seen, since we have all 
 its effective functions, it may be omitted from the formula 
 and the exposition ; or, if it is now, or ever has been, an 
 interfering power of unknown functions, in which case a 
 formula of philosophy is impossible. 
 
 Or is this force to be regarded as having known func- 
 tions, but which are not expressible in terms of matter and 
 motion, but, nevertheless, regular in their modes of opera- 
 tion a discernible element, having other functions than 
 matter in motion, and expressible, say, as consciousness, 
 from which factor, perhaps, by known laws of sequence, 
 the phenomena of organism, life, mind, and society might 
 follow. 
 
 This is a supposition that, in the present state of human 
 knowledge, we are unable to realise to ourselves, i.e., form 
 a clear conception of, and therefore for the present can- 
 not be accepted as the formula of philosophy which is to 
 account for all changes of the universe.
 
 INCLUSIVE OF THE TERM " FORCE." 131 
 
 Whether such a thought forms the germ of a future 
 philosophy or not, whether it is really the correct expres- 
 sion of Mr. Spencer's philosophy or not, we cannot deter- 
 mine. But in the meantime we are obliged to declare that, 
 in spite of Mr. Spencer's attempt, such an unification has 
 not yet been successfully made.
 
 ( 132 ) 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 AN ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA AGREEABLE TO 
 MR. SPENCER'S EXPOSITION OF EVOLUTION, AND 
 AN INQUIRY AS TO ITS INTELLIGIBILITY AND SUF- 
 FICIENCY AS THE FORMULA OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 HAVING started by stating the problem of philosophy to be 
 the framing of an intelligible formula, which from a state 
 of homogeneity should account for all the changes of the 
 universe, we found that the formula propounded by Mr. 
 Spencer, although intelligible, was insufficient. We next 
 attempted an amended formula which should comprise 
 the term " force," a term so constantly brought forward by 
 Mr. Spencer in his treatment of the subject, and we found 
 that no intelligible formula could be stated which included 
 it. We now purpose an attempt to frame a formula which 
 shall be agreeable to Mr. Spencer's exposition of the 
 changes of the universe, and which shall have constructive 
 efficiency in that exposition, so that by its formulation the 
 problem of philosophy shall be solved. 
 
 The only way that I can see for avoiding the material 
 and mechanical limitations of the formula is not by the 
 introduction of the term " force," which we have seen to 
 be impracticable, but by the elimination of the terms 
 " matter " and " motion," or by the inclusion of a third 
 factor, viz., " feeling " or " consciousness." 
 
 Let us try the first proposal, when the formula would
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 133 
 
 read thus (the italics indicate the omissions and the 
 capitals the substitutions) : 
 
 " Evolution is (the) integration (of matter and the con- 
 comitant dissipation of motion}, during which (the matter) 
 EVEKY EXISTENCE passes from an indefinite, incoherent 
 homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and 
 during which (the retained motion) THE ACTIVITIES undergo 
 a parallel transformation." 
 
 It may be objected to this amendment that it is not an 
 alteration of meaning. But here activity is meant to in- 
 clude consciousness, life, reproduction, heredity, &c., which 
 are not included in the term "motion." This formula 
 would leave the origin of matter and motion and con- 
 sciousness unexplained it would simply formulate the 
 results of their integration. 
 
 And I put it forward as the only formula I can frame 
 which nearly expresses Mr. Spencer's exposition of Evolu- 
 tion. 
 
 Eespecting the word " integration," I apprehend it means 
 concentration, or perhaps more correctly combination, or 
 entering into permanent relations or definite combination. 
 
 Let us see how the amended formula corresponds with 
 the exposition of Evolution. 
 
 Sidereal Evolution, sect. 108, corresponds with the ori- 
 ginal formula and with the amended one. 
 
 Geologic Evolution, sect. 109, also corresponds with both. 
 
 Organic Evolution is omitted by Mr. Spencer in his 
 " First Principles," and has had to be considered separately 
 by ourselves. Our conclusion was that the original formula 
 was insufficient to account for it, since there is something 
 more in it than matter (extension) and motion (rates or 
 modes), but the amended formula is applicable to it, since 
 the term activities includes more than motion.
 
 134 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Further Organic Evolution, sect, no, sets out with 
 the statement that every organism is an integration, 
 because all its constituents were once scattered. These 
 constituents being absorbed into the organism, and per- 
 haps adding to its growth, is a process of integration. 
 This is undoubtedly an integration of matter, although 
 it is not a dissipation of motion. (See sect. 103.) The 
 cause of the integration and of the particular modes 
 of it is not given, which is a very important omission. 
 But as an organism is something more than an integra- 
 tion of matter, according to harmonies of shape, size, 
 mode or rate of motion, it does not come within the 
 original formula, although it may be included in the 
 amended formula. 
 
 The formations of separate organs in the embryo are 
 called " secondary integrations," but how these particular 
 modes of secondary integrations are brought about is not 
 stated. Surely they are more than integrations; they 
 are structural integrations, and what is the cause of the 
 structure ? Anything more than harmonies of size, shape, 
 modes or rates of motion ? If so, then the first formula 
 is not applicable, though the latter may be. These so- 
 called " secondary integrations " comprise all the organs 
 of the bodies of animals and of the bodies of plants. 
 
 We have next " integrations by which organisms are 
 made dependent upon one another. We may set down 
 two kinds of them those which occur within the same 
 species, and those which occur among different species." 
 A case of the first kind is that of gregarious animals. 
 There is a certain degree of combination ; they hunt in 
 packs, and form bodies united by co-operation. I sup- 
 pose this might be called integration, and, since animals 
 are made of matter, it would be an integration of matter;
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 135 
 
 but it would not be due directly nor indirectly to inte- 
 grations arising from the harmonies of size, shape, mode, 
 or rate of motion ; nor can I make out in the constitution 
 of a herd of buffaloes or a hive of bees, if they are cases 
 of integration of matter, where there is any corresponding 
 loss of motion. It seems a case of an utterly different 
 kind to those referred to in the 'original formula of Evo- 
 lution. 
 
 Page 3 i 5. " How organisms in general are mutually 
 dependent, and in that sense integrated," surely adds a 
 new meaning to the word. The interdependence, of plants 
 and animals, and of different species of plants and plants, 
 and of animals and other animals, surely cannot be called 
 a process or state of integration of matter, however other- 
 wise we might apply the word. And in any case, where 
 is the corresponding dissipation of motion ? What motion 
 has been lost, and to what has it been transferred ? 
 
 Super- Organic Evolution, in sect. 1 1 1, a case is given 
 in the formation of tribes out of wandering families, the 
 amalgamation by conquest or otherwise of these tribes 
 into larger ones, and of these again into nations. The 
 higher combinations being relatively stable and well 
 organised. 
 
 This is integration, but is it the integration of matter 
 and concomitant dissipation of motion spoken of in the 
 formula ? Is there any dissipation of motion ? and is 
 the integration not of a different kind to that referred to 
 in the formula, i.e., due to other causes than gravita- 
 tion the complex results of combinations due to har- 
 monies of size, shape, mode and rate of motion ? 
 
 But there is another instance. There is the inte- 
 gration into groups. These are of two orders the re- 
 gulative and the operative : the former comprising the
 
 136 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 governmental, administrative, military, ecclesiastical, legal, 
 &c. ; the latter comprising the industrial groups, the manu- 
 facturing, the artisan, the agricultural, &c. 
 
 It seems a great stretch of the use of the term to call 
 this " integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
 motion." It may truly be regarded as integration of men, 
 or integration of industries and occupations, and may, 
 therefore, come within the amended formula, but not 
 within the original 
 
 But we are to go further, and are asked to consider 
 the cases of language, science, and the arts, industrial 
 and aesthetic. 
 
 Sect. 112. Language is described as an evolution, and, 
 since evolution is integration, we have to ask, Is it an 
 integration of matter ? But we cannot say that language 
 is matter, and must, therefore, say it is an integration of 
 motion. But is there such a process as the integration of 
 motion ? It is not hinted anywhere that there is. We 
 are told that the " retained motion undergoes a parallel 
 transformation," i.e., from " an indefinite incoherent homo- 
 geneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity." But this 
 is not integration of matter with a concomitant dissipa- 
 tion of motion. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer does not say whether he speaks of 
 matter or of motion. He speaks of words : " Originally 
 the words used for the less familiar things are formed by 
 compounding the words used for the more familiar things. 
 Thus long words are formed, but since for convenience 
 they get contracted in use into short ones," &c. This is 
 integration. But integration of what ? and how does it 
 get within the formula ? 
 
 The same process takes place in the tenses and cases, 
 and with respect to the general construction of language
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 137 
 
 Sect. 113. " The history of science presents facts of the 
 same meaning at every step. Indeed, the integration of 
 groups of like entities and like relations may be said to 
 constitute the most conspicuous part of scientific progress. 
 A glance at the classificatory sciences shows us that the 
 confused incoherent aggregations which the vulgar make 
 of natural objects are gradually rendered complete and 
 compact, and bound up into groups within groups." At 
 the same time there is an integration of all the sciences by 
 means of wider generalisations, ending in the Evolution 
 philosophy itself. 
 
 We have to repeat the question, Is this so-called inte- 
 gration of science " an integration of matter and concomi- 
 tant dissipation of motion " ? We are now speaking of 
 men's thoughts, not of matter, and we suppose not of 
 motion. We consider that these processes are not in- 
 cluded in the original formula, although they may be 
 included in the amended one. 
 
 Sect. 114. " Nor do the industrial and sesthetic arts 
 fail to supply us with equally conclusive evidence." The 
 progress from isolated rude tools to highly complex 
 machinery is said to be a process of integration. Is it of 
 matter, and is there a concomitant dissipation of motion ? 
 
 And in painting there is a progress from miscellaneous 
 depicting to a proper co-ordination of parts. 
 
 So also there is progress from the incoherent and the 
 fragmentary to the co-ordinated and coherent in the his- 
 tory of music and literature. 
 
 As to these we ask the same question. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, in summing up, sect. 115, says : "Evolu- 
 tion, then, under its primary aspect, is a change from a 
 less coherent form (of what ?) to a more coherent form 
 (of what ?), consequent on the dissipation of motion and
 
 I 3 8 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 integration of matter." In answer to the queries, are we 
 to say matter and motion, or the former only ? That is 
 to say, the integration of matter and concomitant dissipa- 
 tion of motion results in a change from the less coherent 
 to the more coherent form of matter, and to differentia- 
 tion of motion of matter. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says this is the universal process through 
 which all sensible existences pass, including the solar 
 system, the earth, organisms, societies, language, science, 
 art. 
 
 What is the concomitant process with integration of 
 society, thought, language, science, industry, and art ? 
 Evolution is stated to be a double process, viz., an inte- 
 gration and a dissipation. We can understand that with 
 the integration of matter there is a concomitant dissipa- 
 tion of motion. With the integration of the above what 
 dissipation is there ? It is an integration of matter ; 
 is it a dissipation of matter, or is it a dissipation of 
 motion, or an integration of motion ? We cannot even 
 frame a hypothesis. We can understand the economy of 
 motion in shortening a long word into a monosyllabic 
 one, but that is not a dissipation or transference of 
 motion from one body to another; or have we an in- 
 tegration which has no concomitant process ? 
 
 Our criticism amounts to this, that the cases men- 
 tioned, though perhaps integrative processes, are not all of 
 them integrative processes of matter, and therefore do not 
 come within the formula of Evolution, though they might 
 be comprised within the amended formula. 
 
 But this amended formula being vague, and not speci- 
 fying the nature of the activities referred to, is itself on 
 that account insufficient as a formula which shall unify 
 philosophy. It has no power of synthesis which, from a
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 139 
 
 given state of the cosmos, shall enable us to explain and 
 ideally construct the cosmos as we know it. 
 
 We are therefore forced to introduce a third factor, 
 and this third factor is supposed to be feeling or con- 
 sciousness ? 
 
 The question then arises, Was this third factor in the 
 homogeneous at the beginning, or was it added at a cer- 
 tain stage and made dependent upon certain conditions ? 
 
 The problem of philosophy, as already stated, requires 
 "from a state of homogeneity," &c. We would there- 
 fore be obliged to predicate consciousness as a property 
 of the ultimate units. We have already seen that it 
 cannot be a development or product of the two factors 
 already acknowledged, viz., matter (extension only) and 
 motion. We must also acknowledge that consciousness 
 is neither matter nor motion, else it could be described 
 geometrically and mathematically, although the conscious- 
 ness is the consciousness of them. We are therefore 
 forced into the predication of consciousness as a property 
 of the ultimate units. 
 
 On this supposition are we able to suppose a transfer- 
 ence of consciousness in the same way as there is a trans- 
 ference of motion. If so, then some matter would be- 
 come less conscious, while other became more conscious. 
 There would be a sum total or fixed quantum of con- 
 sciousness in the same way as there is a fixed quantum 
 of matter and a fixed quantum of motion. 
 
 Carrying the inquiry further, we would have to ask 
 how the changes of consciousness could be affected by 
 integration of matter. It would still have to be recog- 
 nised that gravitation to a centre (however explained) 
 would be the original disturbing movement from the 
 homogeneous. This would be followed by integration
 
 HO SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion. The 
 question arises, What would become of the conscious- 
 ness ? Would it accompany the motion ? The degree 
 of consciousness is, so far as we know it, in propor- 
 tion to the activity of motion rather than to the inte- 
 gration of matter. Yet this involves us in difficulties, 
 for we cannot say that heat, light, &c., are conscious. 
 Organism is the requisite for self-consciousness. For 
 self-consciousness we require both complex integration 
 of matter and great amount of motion. 
 
 Although we can understand the shapes and sizes of 
 matter, and although we can understand the transference 
 of motion, and can form for ourselves a tolerably correct 
 notion of the formation of complex and still more com- 
 plex molecules, we cannot imagine the method or manner 
 of the transference and concentration of consciousness ; 
 we can only suppose it to go with increased complexity, 
 which is increased multiplicity of ultimate units in a 
 molecule and increased activity of them ; so that the for- 
 mula would have to include in it the phrase, " and during 
 which also the consciousness undergoes a parallel trans- 
 formation." 
 
 There is, however, an alternative supposition, viz., that 
 the third factor is an added factor. This alters the 
 ground of philosophy altogether. On this supposition the 
 cosmos is not a constant quantity, but every now and 
 again receives an accession of something entirely new. 
 In this case we have to provide a formula for each stage, 
 or else a formula for the new factor conformable to the 
 operative conditions of the others which is not quite so 
 revolutionary. 
 
 On this latter supposition, we know not how many addi- 
 tions may have been made, nor what can still be added.
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 141 
 
 This excludes the notion of growth or development 
 from the homogeneous, although it may not exclude the 
 notion of growth from the homogeneous with various 
 additions. In this case the formula would have to cor- 
 respond. 
 
 However accounted for, we have to make a fresh start 
 from highly complex molecules which are also conscious. 
 
 The inquiry thereupon ensues, What results from the 
 consciousness of a molecule ? Is it in any respect an 
 active factor in subsequent changes ? It has not been 
 regarded as an active factor in all anterior changes. It has 
 hypothetically accompanied the integration of matter and 
 concomitant dissipation of motion, and has itself become 
 more intense when the integration of matter has gone on 
 with an increase of motion in the same molecule, but it 
 has not been a modifying factor. We may, if we like, 
 suppose that the harmonies of shape, size, and mode and 
 rate of motion, which cause combination, also cause 
 pleasure, and that disassociation causes pain, but since 
 those combinations and disassociations are entirely de- 
 pendent upon the relations of the shapes, sizes, and 
 motions, the consciousness of them has not been an 
 active factor. Consequently, no degree or complexity of 
 such combinations or disassociations, however much they 
 may intensify the pleasure or the pain, will allow of these 
 pleasures and pains having an influence upon the result. 
 
 We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that if con- 
 sciousness was an original factor in the homogeneous, it 
 must always have been an active and not a passive fac- 
 tor, for thejictive cannot come out of the passive. The 
 difficulty, then, is to state what was the "activity of the 
 consciousness of matter. How it could affect the n?otion 
 of matter it is impossible to imagine. If, in the reconi-
 
 142 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 positions of matter and motion, it came in as an outside, 
 untransformable force, it could only influence these re- 
 compositions by altering shape or size, or by increasing or 
 retarding motion, but these are, by the supposition, fixed 
 quantities, and we are now supposing a case of creation or 
 extinction of matter or of motion which is not allowable. 
 
 And even if we suppose that consciousness and motion 
 are transformable, it would seem to imply that conscious- 
 ness is motion and motion consciousness. But conscious- 
 ness cannot be described geometrically or mathematically, 
 and therefore is untransformable into motion. 
 
 We are again obliged to beg the whole question of 
 consciousness anterior to highly complex molecules, and 
 postulating consciousness of them, we have to inquire the 
 value of it as a factor in subsequent recompositions. We 
 have also to leave undecided its mode of action, so that 
 the question of motion of matter shall remain constant 
 and unchanged. 
 
 We can only postulate as the function and active pro- 
 perty of consciousness, as the unit of our factor, a pleasure 
 at harmonious combination of shape, and size, and motion, 
 and a pain at disharmony. We also have to postulate a 
 continuity of consciousness along with continuity of com- 
 plexity. 
 
 The secondary problem, then, would be from these pos- 
 tulates respecting consciousness to work out the develop- 
 ment of organisms, their adaptations and changes, their 
 compositions, morphology, differentiations, biology. Also 
 memory, transmission of impressions, molecular wear and 
 tear, and reconstitution, generation, heredity, &c. 
 
 But it will have been noticed that we are in this 
 assuming a most important position, and most unjustifi- 
 ably, viz., that consciousness can influence, modify, and
 
 A TTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 143 
 
 affect motion without being motion or adding to the 
 quantum of motion. 
 
 Now, some such view as this, it seems to me, must be 
 taken of the development of life from organic molecules, 
 which we have already seen are insufficient, if considered 
 merely as complex molecules formed only from harmonies 
 of shape, size, and motion. And, in fact, it really appears 
 to be Mr. Spencer's position, if we read carefully his 
 chapter on the " Substance of Mind " in vol. i. of his 
 " Principles of Psychology." 
 
 In it he distinctly states that there is more in organ- 
 isms made up of molecules formed by harmonies of shape, 
 size, and motion, than matter and motion. If this is so, 
 then his formula of Evolution, which only recognises 
 these two factors, must be insufficient to account for this 
 plus, and the amended formula which transcends these 
 limitations must be adopted. 
 
 PAKT II. CHAPTER I. The Substance of Mind. 
 
 Page 151. " It is possible, then may we not even say pro- 
 bable that something of the same order as that which we call a 
 nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness, and that all 
 the unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike modes of 
 integration of this ultimate unit" 
 
 Page 153. "A conceivable solution is afforded by this 
 hypothesis of two problems, which, in its absence, seem entirely 
 insoluble. How is it possible for feelings so different in quality 
 as those of heat, of taste, of colour, of tone, &c., to arise in ner- 
 vous centres closely allied to one another in composition and 
 structure 1 And liow, in the course of Evolution, can there have 
 been gradually differentiated these widely unlike orders, and 
 genera, and species of feelings ? Possible answers are at once 
 supplied if we assume that diverse feelings are produced by 
 diverse modes, and degrees, and complexities of integration of 
 the alleged ultimate unit of consciousness. If each wave of
 
 144 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 molecular motion brought by a nerve fibre to a nerve centre has 
 for its correlative a shock or pulse of feeling, then we can com- 
 prehend how distinguishable differences of feeling may arise 
 from differences in the rates of recurrence of waves, and we can 
 frame a general idea of the way in which, by the arrival through 
 other fibres of waves recurring at other rates, compound waves 
 of molecular motion may be formed, and give rise to units of 
 compound feelings, which process of compounding of waves and 
 production of correspondingly compounded feelings, we may 
 imagine to be carried on without limit, and to produce any 
 amount of heterogeneity of feelings." 
 
 It will be seen here that consciousness is not regarded 
 as a mode of motion. The unit of feeling is a feeling of 
 motion of matter, but is not the motion itself, nor a motion 
 ,t all. It is, therefore, not contained within the terms 
 of the formula of Evolution, and is not to be accounted 
 for by it. And since it is not motion, we cannot see 
 that it can modify or affect motion in any way. The 
 only way in which motion can be affected is by motion, 
 and since consciousness is not motion, it cannot affect or 
 modify it (volition). Consciousness is simply a conscious- 
 ness of motion and its reactions. We do not see even 
 how it can be a registration of them (memory). If 
 consciousness were motion, then all motion is transform- 
 able into it and vice versa, and it could be described 
 mathematically and geometrically. But if it caused 
 motion without being motion, then the quantum ot 
 motion is not constant. 
 
 It is sufficient, however, to note that consciousness is 
 not included in the formula of Evolution, and that the 
 integration of units of feeling is not an integration of 
 matter nor a mode of motion. It would have to come 
 under the amended formula. 
 
 In sect. 6 1 of the Psychology Mr. Spencer exhibits a
 
 A TTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 145 
 
 parallel between the compositions of matter and the com- 
 positions of mind. 
 
 In the first place, he dwells upon the results of 
 physical analysis as pointing to the conclusion that all 
 matter, as we know it, is built up of ultimate similar 
 units, and continues : 
 
 " If, then, we see that by unlike arrangements of like units 
 all the forms of matter, apparently so diverse in nature, may 
 be produced ; if, even without assuming that the so-called ele- 
 ments are compound, we remember how from a few of these 
 there may arise, by transformation and by combination, numerous 
 seemingly simple substances strongly contrasted with their consti- 
 tuents and with one another, we shall the better conceive the pos- 
 sibility that the multitudinous forms of mind known as different 
 feelings may be composed of simpler units of feeling, and even of 
 units fundamentally of one kind. "We shall perceive that such 
 homogeneous units of feeling may, by integration in diverse ways, 
 give origin to different though relatively simple feelings, by com- 
 bination of which with one another more complex and more 
 unlike feelings may arise ; and so on continuously." 
 
 We confess ourselves somewhat at a loss here to 
 understand the word " integration," as applied to units of 
 feeling. We can understand two ultimate units of matter 
 (extension only) in motion, from their harmonies of shape, 
 size, and motion, entering into combination when brought 
 by gravitation into contact, but we cannot understand 
 one ultimate unit of feeling being combined with another. 
 If it means constant association, in the manner of the 
 association of ideas, it only means that there is the con- 
 stant impression produced by the constant cause the 
 uniformity of feeling produced by uniformity of com- 
 plexity of motions so long as they continue ; but there is 
 not any cause of continuance of impression after the cause 
 has ceased, and therefore no cause of revivability of an 
 
 K
 
 I 4 6 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 absent impression from association with a present one 
 with which it is usually accompanied. Feeling or con- 
 sciousness, from the nature of the supposition made, 
 is utterly passive the mere consciousness of passing 
 motions. 
 
 In sect. 62 we have a very excellent discussion of the 
 relations of matter and mind, in which it is shown that 
 the latter cannot be represented in terms of matter and 
 motion. If by object is meant matter and motion, and 
 if by subject is meant feeling or consciousness, as we 
 suppose Mr. Spencer means, then (p. 1 5 7), " So far from 
 helping us to think of them as of one kind, analysis 
 serves but to render more manifest the impossibility of 
 finding for them a common concept a thought under 
 which they can be united. Let it be granted that all 
 existence distinguished as objective may be resolved into 
 the existence of units of one kind. Let it be granted 
 that every species of objective activity may be under- 
 stood as due to rhythmical motions of such ultimate units ; 
 and that among the objective activities so understood are 
 the waves of molecular motion propagated through nerves 
 and nerve centres. And let it further be granted that all 
 existence distinguished as subjective is resolvable into 
 units of consciousness similar in nature to those we know 
 as nervous shocks ; each of which is a correlative of a 
 rhythmical motion of a material unit, or group of such 
 units. Can we, then, think of the subjective and objec- 
 tive activities as the same ? Can the oscillation of a 
 molecule be represented in consciousness side by side 
 with a nervous shock and the two be recognised as one ? 
 No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of 
 / feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion 
 becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two 
 
 " '***' '
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 147 
 
 into juxtaposition, and 'the immediate verdict of con- 
 sciousness thus given might be analytically justified were 
 this a fit place for the needful analysis. For it might be 
 shown that the conception of an oscillating molecule is 
 built out of many units of feeling, and that to identify 
 it with a nervous shock would be to identify a whole 
 congeries of units with a single unit." 
 
 It would even seem from this that the unit of feeling 
 and the unit of motion, to say nothing of the unit of 
 matter, are not all comprehended in the "Persistence of 
 Force," for the unit of feeling has nothing in common 
 with the unit of motion. 
 
 In the following chapter, on " The Composition of 
 Mind," Mr. Spencer shows the parallelism which exists 
 between the evolution of mind and the evolution of matter 
 that is to say, there goes on subjectively a change " from 
 an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent 
 heterogeneity." But it is a parallelism only, and cannot 
 be included in the terms of the formula of Evolution. 
 Mental action is not the integration of matter and con- 
 comitant dissipation of motion, but the continuous differ- 
 entiation and integration (?) of states of consciousness. 
 
 We now request the reader's attention to two points. 
 
 First; we would remind him of the problem of Philo- 
 sophy with which we started, and of the formula of Evolu- 
 tion which was adduced as the solution of it, and ask 
 him if that formula after the above extract can be held 
 to contain an explanation of mind, of consciousness, of 
 units of feeling ? If not, then the formula fails as a 
 solution of the problem of Philosophy. 
 
 On the other hand, if we amend the formula of Evolu- 
 tion as now proposed, viz., by the exclusion of the words 
 matter and motion, the formula contains as its principal
 
 148 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 idea whatever is meant by the word integration or is im- 
 plied in the use of it, and the three factors are matter, 
 motion, and feeling. 
 
 In this case the formula might be made to contain all 
 the factors constituting the substance and activities of 
 the universe, and might denote the general characteristic 
 of the process of differentiation and recomposition, but 
 it would have no constructive value ; it would not enable 
 us, that is to say, by its application to the homogeneous, 
 to account for and build up the universe as we know it. 
 
 We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that, even 
 upon the more extended field of three factors, however 
 admirable and valuable the work which Mr. Spencer has 
 undertaken for the elaboration of a synthetic philosophy, 
 the amended formula is not valid as a solution of the 
 problem of Philosophy. There may be a likeness of pro- 
 cess and an inter-dependence, but we have not reached a 
 constructive organon. 
 
 We must, however, do Mr. Spencer the justice to 
 state, that although he holds these views as to the units 
 of feeling, he still adheres to his view of Evolution as 
 explained in " First Principles." It seems to us a contra- 
 diction ; nevertheless, it is fair to him to state that he 
 does so. 
 
 For this read sect. 5 5 in the " Principles of Biology," 
 in which it is claimed that Evolution is continuous. 
 
 "... Evolution being a universal process, one and 
 continuous throughout all forms of existence, there can 
 be no break, no change from one group of phenomena to 
 another without a bridge of intermediate phenomena." 
 
 Geology is a continuation in detail of astronomy. 
 
 "The separation between biology and geology once 
 seemed impassable, and to many seems so now. But
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 149 
 
 every day brings new reasons for believing that the one 
 group of phenomena has grown out of the other. . . . 
 The chasm between the inorganic and the organic is 
 being filled up." 
 
 Page 138. "Biology is a specialised part of geo- 
 geny, . . . and psychology is a specialised part of 
 biology." 
 
 From this it would appear that we have nothing more 
 in at the last, i.e., psychology, than we had at the begin- 
 ning, viz., matter and motion. The only difference is 
 in the degree of complexity and differentiation and the 
 complexity of the relations of aggregates of matter and 
 motion. But Mr. Spencer, as we have seen, states that 
 feeling or consciousness is inexpressible in terms of matter 
 and motion, and hence the contradiction. 
 
 We are therefore forced to suppose that Mr. Spencer 
 holds some tacit theory of development a theory not 
 merely of Evolution proper as defined sect. 97, p. 285, of 
 " First Principles." " As ordinarily understood, to evolve 
 is to unfold, to open and expand, to throw out, to emit ; 
 whereas, as we understand it, the act of evolving, though 
 it implies increase of a concrete aggregate, and in so far 
 an expansion of it, implies that its component matter has 
 passed from a more diffused to a more concentrated 
 state has contracted. . . . We are obliged ... to use 
 evolution as antithetical to dissolution." 
 
 It is true, as pointed out by us, p. 103 of this criti- 
 cism, that Mr. Spencer says, " All we can do is carefully 
 to define the interpretation to be given to it ; " but he 
 winds up by saying that evolution is not merely anti- 
 thetical to evolution, that it is, in fact, more than the 
 antithesis of dissolution. 
 
 " While, then, we shall by dissolution everywhere
 
 ISO SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 mean the process tacitly implied by its ordinary mean- 
 ing the absorption of motion and disintegration of 
 matter we shall everywhere mean by evolution the 
 process which is always an integration of matter and 
 dissipation of motion, but which, as we shall now see, is 
 in most cases much more than this." 
 
 At the time we thought that the " much more " was 
 conformable to the formula of Evolution, which only 
 recognises two factors, matter and motion, and meant 
 only the complexities of the relationships of the molecular 
 and molar aggregates of matter and motion. But it now 
 occurs to us that the "much more " must be the evolution 
 of a new factor, which is not merely a relation of matter 
 and motion, but a something of a different nature. If 
 this is the theory, we ought to be informed, and the 
 formula should be made to correspond. 
 
 It is sometimes said of two combinable substances, that 
 if we know their properties we cannot know thereby the 
 properties of their combination. But I maintain that if 
 the properties of hydrogen are expressible in terms of 
 geometry and mathematics, and the properties of oxygen 
 are expressible in the same way, then the properties of 
 the compound, water, are also capable of being worked out 
 beforehand by any one who has the data. In the same 
 way, if any one seeks to hide the evolution of conscious- 
 ness under this plea, we reply that any one who has the 
 data of the shapes, sizes, and motion of the atoms that 
 constitute organic molecules can work out and state in 
 terms of geometry and mathematics its property of con- 
 sciousness in the same manner that the dynamic problem 
 of water can be worked out and expressed. No new 
 factor is introduced. If a new factor is introduced, then 
 the theory and formula of Evolution must be changed so
 
 ATTEMPT TO FRAME A FORMULA. 151 
 
 as to account for the introduction, or failing to account 
 for it, must admit it as an interfering factor, the origin 
 of which is unknown. 1 
 
 To conclude this part of our criticism, we find that the 
 task we undertook, viz., to construct a formula which 
 should express Mr. Spencer's exposition of Evolution, 
 results in either a formula which omits naming the 
 factors of the cosmos, and simply describes the general 
 nature of their changes, though it does not disclose the 
 law of their relations, or else it must include a third 
 factor, viz., feeling, in which case again it does not dis- 
 close the law of its relations with the other factors. 
 But both these formulas are vague and of no construc- 
 tive efficiency. They both leave the problem of philo- 
 sophy unsolved, and, properly speaking, are neither suffi- 
 cient nor intelligible. 
 
 1 Observe on p. 109 the loose manner of using the word "factor." 
 "The new factor which differentiates chemistry from molecular physics is 
 the heterogeneity of the molecules with whose redistribution it deals." If 
 heterogeneity is a new factor, what are the functions of the factor?
 
 ( '52 ) 
 
 PART V. 
 CRITICISM OF THE BOOK ON " THE UNKNOWABLE." 
 
 On the Relativity of all Knovjledge. 
 
 THE doctrine of the Kelativity of Knowledge appears to 
 be this : 
 
 After the establishment, in the course of evolution, of 
 organisms with nerves and nervous centres, and the con- 
 sciousness of nervous tremors which are made up of the 
 little shocks which are the units of feeling, there super- 
 vened a knowledge or memory of them, and afterwards 
 an integration of the knowledge of these consciousnesses 
 by means of a process of distinguishment and grouping. 
 Then arose the fact of the representation of these differ- 
 ences and likenesses by means of symbols, that is to say, 
 names. 
 
 Knowledge is therefore said to be relative, because it 
 is the knowledge of the manner in which the environ- 
 ment is related to us. We are ourselves the product of 
 the environment, and our knowledge of our relations with 
 it is the sum of our knowledge. 
 
 But knowledge is also relative because all our know- 
 ledge consists of the relations of things between them- 
 selves, or rather between different items of knowledge.
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 153 
 
 Knowledge includes two factors that which knows or 
 is conscious, and that which is known or is conscious- 
 nessed. Without either of these there would be no 
 knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is relative. 
 
 Naming is only legitimate when of actualities, or if 
 founded upon actualities. Actualities are only either 
 
 Matter ) 
 
 HT .L- r r combinations thereof, 
 Motion ) 
 
 and 
 
 Modes of consciousness. 
 
 Now, since naming is a mark of differentiation, a name 
 implies more than the individual application of it. The 
 name " apple " denotes the apple and implies other things 
 that are not apples. Hence, all names are correlative. 
 They denote the individual or group, and imply all others 
 of the group or of the totality. 
 
 Thus " man " implies either all other objects or all 
 other animals. 
 
 Thus "redness" denotes a particular sensation or a 
 certain rate of motion, and correlates all other sensations 
 of the same sort, or all other rates of motion that are 
 received upon the eye. 
 
 So " hard " correlates all other feelings of pressure, and 
 " round " correlates all other shapes. 
 
 All names, then, are relative, that is to say, all but one 
 class of names, viz., the class of names relating to the 
 totality of things. One thing comprised in a totality 
 implies the rest. The totality implies only its consti- 
 tuents, and if relative, is relative only to the knower. 
 
 Let us consider them. 
 
 The cosmos. 
 The universe. 
 Existence. 
 
 The total. 
 The whole. 
 The sum.
 
 154 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 These have no correlatives outside themselves, only to 
 the contained, or to that part of the contained which 
 cognises it. 
 
 The total implies the factors ; the whole implies the 
 parts ; the universe, the cosmos, implies its constituents 
 and nothing more. Existence is another name for the 
 cosmos. If it has smaller applications in the singu- 
 lar number, and refers to particular combinations of 
 matter and motion at particular times, its correlatives are 
 other existences at the same or other times. 
 
 It may be said that existence implies non-existence, 
 and that this is the true correlative. We reply that we 
 are not dealing with words except as the representatives 
 of things and experiences. A denial of existence is a 
 denial of our consciousness, but we are only dealing with 
 our consciousness and its products, and if we deny our 
 consciousness, then all knowledge comes to an end and 
 no names are required. A denial of existence is not an 
 assertion of a positive non-existence, but simply an asser- 
 tion of non-consciousness. 
 
 So, then, the correlative of " something " is not 
 " nothing," but " other things." The correlative of " exist- 
 ence " is not " non-existence," but " co-existence." Non- 
 existence is not a state or quality or relation of an 
 object, and cannot be stated in terms of matter or 
 motion or consciousness, which are the contents of all 
 knowledge. 
 
 So names of groups regarded in one respect imply the 
 individuals of their group, and in another respect all 
 those which are not of their group. But, properly speak- 
 ing, correlation is a term of differentiation rather than of 
 likeness. When groups get so large that there is no 
 differentiation, then there are no correlative terms. When
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 155 
 
 names include everything there is no differentiation and 
 no terms of correlation. There is nothing to correlate 
 with, and there is no requisition for a correlative term. 
 Let us now consider the term 
 
 " The Relative" 
 
 Mr. Spencer applies it thus. We only have a knowledge 
 of "The Relative." And since all knowledge is relative, he 
 calls all known or knowable things, and all experiences 
 of consciousness, " The Relative." Now, in what does this 
 use of the term differ from " The Cosmos " or " The Uni- 
 verse " ? It equally with them denotes the sum total of 
 existence and all the included aggregations and modes of 
 activity. It accentuates perhaps as a part of that totality 
 of existence the inclusion in it of conscious beings, but it 
 does not differ from them in the sum of its contents. Its 
 correlative will, therefore, be (if it has any) all related 
 things. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer argues that the correlative of " The 
 Relative " is the non-relative. Now this is to be dealt 
 with on the same lines as the term " Existence," as having 
 for its correlative the term " Non-existence." We know 
 of nothing that is not relative ; we make use of the 
 name " The Relative " not to mark off one class of experi- 
 ence from another class of the same sort, in which case 
 any selected name implies the rest; but to express the 
 totality of things, in fact, the cosmos, and to indicate 
 specially either its knowability to us or its interdepend- 
 ence throughout, and if this special limitation implies 
 marking off, it marks off only that which is not known or 
 cannot be known. 
 
 Of the existence of any non-relative we do not know. 
 It is beyond the pale of our knowledge.
 
 1 56 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer goes further, and gives a name to the 
 non-relative, and calls it 
 
 " The Absolute." 
 
 His argument in the matter we will consider presently. 
 We would first enter a protest against the illegitimate 
 naming of abstractions. 
 
 Generalisation is the naming of groups of aggregates or 
 of states of consciousness. 
 
 Names such as redness, liquidity, &c., are not abstrac- 
 tions, properly so called, but generalisations, partly of 
 states of consciousness, partly of the external causes of 
 those states of consciousness. 
 
 Abstractions are such as vitality, space, time, &c. 
 
 Gravitation, heat, magnetism, &c., properly speaking, 
 are only modes of motion of something. And these 
 modes of motion are capable of geometrical and mathe- 
 matical expression. Vitality differs from these, and is 
 only the naming of a process or group of processes. It 
 is nothing in itself. It is a useful term, and marks off 
 these perfectly distinguishable processes from processes 
 which are non- vital. 
 
 Space is an abstract of relations of distance, and of our 
 experience of these relations. But it is not a real. It 
 is a non- entity. It does not imply non-space, but the 
 totality of distance relations. It is a convenient term, 
 but it is only an abstraction. 
 
 So time is an abstract of the relations of sequence. 
 No sequences, no time. Time is a non-entity, but a very 
 convenient abstract term. It is the total of sequences, 
 and its correlative is not non-time but groups of se- 
 quences. 
 
 There are no real antinomies. Every name means
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 157 
 
 only itself, and by implication every other. No name 
 implies non-existence. One item of knowledge implies 
 itself and its differentiation from all other items of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, in his reply to Sir William Hamilton, ad- 
 mits that the whole correlates not with another whole or 
 aggregate, but with its parts, which is an exactly similar 
 view, and I ask the reader to co-ordinate the relative in 
 the same way. 
 
 The relative, therefore, is equivalent to the knowable, 
 and comprehends both the objective and the subjective. 
 It is a name of the cosmical class, and implies nothing 
 but what it contains. If any, its only implication is 
 the correlative. 
 
 With these preliminary considerations let us now exa- 
 mine Mr. Spencer's chapter On the Eelativity of all Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Statement of the Argument of the Chapter, with detailed 
 Criticism. 
 
 The argument of the chapter is this : 
 
 " If, respecting the origin and nature of things we make some 
 assumption, we find that through an inexorable logic it inevitably 
 commits us to alternative impossibilities of thought ; and this 
 holds true of every assumption that can be imagined. 
 
 " If, contrariwise, we make no assumption, but set out from 
 the sensible properties of surrounding objects, and, ascertaining 
 their special laws of dependence, go on to merge these in laws 
 more and more general, until we bring them all under some 
 most general laws, we still find ourselves as far as ever from 
 knowing what it is which manifests these properties to us ; clearly 
 as we seem to know it, our apparent knowledge proves on exami- 
 nation to be utterly irreconcilable with itself." 
 
 The assumption lying at the basis of this quotation is
 
 1 58 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 that, given the contents of knowledge, as consisting of 
 matter, motion, and perhaps consciousness, these, although 
 sufficient factors to account for and explain all that is 
 contained in our knowledge, are insufficient to explain, 
 firstly, their origin, and secondly, their own nature. 
 They are only appearances. There is a something of 
 which these are the manifestations. There is a reality 
 existing behind these appearances which we can never 
 know. 
 
 Leaving out of the question the origin of things, let us 
 inquire what is meant by this supposition of a reality 
 underlying appearances of which matter, motion, and con- 
 sciousness are but the manifestations. The question that 
 naturally arises is, why we should form such a supposi- 
 tion at all. If we know sufficient of matter, motion, 
 and consciousness to explain and account for all sequences, 
 knowledge is complete. 
 
 It is only when we come to inquire backwards for the 
 set of activities called causes immediately preceding cer- 
 tain others, and so on as far back as imagination can 
 carry us first, perhaps, to the origination of consciousness, 
 and then still further back to the origin of the primal state 
 of homogeneousness in the constitution of the sphere of like 
 units, having equal mutual motions of attraction and 
 repulsion, that the mind fails to understand. Its realities 
 are its states of consciousness, and the causes of them in 
 the environment. It does not regard them as appear- 
 ances at all, for they are the only realities. It sees no 
 necessity for the gratuitous assumption that they are not 
 real, but only manifestations of a reality. It is for those 
 who say so to prove it. 
 
 The question as to origin we will deal with hereafter. 
 But if we simply confine ourselves to the contents of
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 159 
 
 knowledge we recognise no unknowable reality. If it 
 is unknown and if it is unknowable it is not real. Since 
 all knowledge is relative, real is a relative term, and 
 means existence in relation to us and to other reals, 
 the whole forming part of the universe of sequences, and 
 therefore all reality is knowable. To speak of an un- 
 knowable reality is therefore a contradiction of terms. 
 The unknowable, if anywhere, is at the beginning of 
 matter and motion and consciousness. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says that "human intelligence is incap- 
 able of absolute knowledge." He uses this word in two 
 senses ; in one sense as equivalent to perfect or perfectly, 
 in the other as relating to an unknowable reality called 
 the absolute. In either case the remark is true. 
 
 However, Mr. Spencer's first object agrees with our 
 views. He undertakes to show in this chapter that we 
 can have no knowledge except of those things which are 
 related to us and to each other. 
 
 He undertakes to show this by a consideration, firstly, 
 of the product of thought, and, secondly, by a consideration 
 of the process of thought. 
 
 An examination of the product of thought results in 
 this : 
 
 " For if the successively deeper interpretations of nature which 
 constitute advancing knowledge are merely successive inclusions 
 of special truths in general truths, and of general truths in 
 tnitlis still more general, it obviously follows that the most 
 general truth, not admitting of inclusion in any other does not 
 admit of interpretation. Manifestly, as the most general cogni- 
 tion at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one, 
 it cannot be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation 
 must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable." 
 
 All this is undoubtedly true.
 
 160 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 The same result is arrived at from a consideration of 
 the process of thought. 
 
 This is worked out partly by means of an extract from 
 Sir William Hamilton, who maintains the relativity of 
 knowledge, and concludes that " the absolute is conceived 
 merely by the negation of conceivability." 
 
 It is a mere blank, in fact. It is unthinkable, for if 
 we think of it, it must be in relation, even if it be only as 
 an unknown reality manifesting itself to us in matter, 
 motion, and consciousness, and if it is in relation to the 
 relative it is itself relative. 
 
 Mr. Spencer follows up by a long quotation from Mr. 
 Mansel, in which the argument against the conceivability 
 of the absolute is admirably stated. 
 
 " The absolute, on the other hand, is a term expressing 
 no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by 
 which thought is constituted. To assume absolute exist- 
 ence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation 
 existing when the related terms exist no longer." 
 
 In sect. 2 5 Mr. Spencer introduces a very clever argu- 
 ment, showing that life and mind being the establishment 
 of correspondences with the external world, can only 
 allow of knowledge (which is part of life and mind) com- 
 prising a knowledge of these correspondences and rela- 
 tions. Therefore all knowledge must be relative. " If, 
 then, life in all its manifestations, inclusive of intelli- 
 gence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous 
 adjustment of internal relations to external relations, the 
 necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes 
 obvious." 
 
 Sect. 26. But although Mr. Spencer quotes from Sir 
 William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel approvingly, and 
 enforces their arguments by a very cogent one of his own,
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 161 
 
 the effect of which is to reduce the absolute to a nega- 
 tion, he nevertheless thinks it involves a grave error. 
 
 The logic he considers perfect if the premiss be correct. 
 But he considers that the premiss excludes an all-impor- 
 tant fact. 
 
 " To speak specifically : Besides that definite consciousness 
 of which logic formulates the laws, there is also an indefinite 
 consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete 
 thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, 
 admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible 
 to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that they 
 are normal affections of the intellect." 
 
 Then follows some imperfect reasoning. In the first 
 place, there is a want of continuity in the argument, for 
 Mr. Spencer does not go on immediately to explain what 
 he means by 
 
 " Normal affections of the intellect," 
 
 of which 
 
 " Indefinite consciousness," 
 " Incomplete thoughts," 
 are the affections. 
 
 No doubt this is taken up afterwards, and in the mean- 
 time we merely make a note of it. 
 Mr. Spencer next says 
 
 " Observe, in the first place, that every one of the arguments 
 by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, dis- 
 tinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the 
 relative. To say that we cannot know the absolute is by impli- 
 cation to affirm that there is an absolute. In the very denial 
 of our power to learn what the absolute is there lies hidden the 
 assumption that it is, and the making of this assumption proves 
 that the absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, 
 but as a something." 
 
 The case is this : one party states that all knowledge 
 
 L
 
 1 6a SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 is relative i.e., of things to us and to one another. The 
 term " the relative " is then invented, which is, in reality, 
 only equivalent to "the cosmos," or "the totality of 
 things." Then there is an erroneous impression derived 
 from the naming of things according to their differentia- 
 tions, as implying the existence of things that differ from 
 them in respect of the absence of the special characteris- 
 tic which is the signification of the given name ; that 
 such an implication extends to the totality of things, and 
 that, therefore, "the relative" implies the existence of 
 " the non-relative." The next step is to convert this 
 negative term into a positive one, viz., "the absolute." 
 The final step is when one party, denying the existence 
 of " the absolute," uses the words, " "We cannot know the 
 absolute," is replied to by saying, " Then you admit the 
 absolute exists ? " 
 
 It is as if one said " Nothing exists." Here is a sub- 
 stantive and a verb. A substantive i.e. Something 
 exists ; what is the name of that something ? Its name 
 is Nothing. Then something is nothing and nothing is 
 something, and whatever it is it exists. 
 
 The test is, what does it do ? How do we know of its 
 existence ? Let us have a description of it. 
 
 It is equally possible of 
 
 "The absolute exists" 
 
 as of 
 "Nothing exists." 
 
 The use of the negative sign is apt to be misleading. 
 In the series o, I, 2, 3, &c., the figure nought stands for 
 nothing. Yet it is there, and it is made use of. In the 
 first place, as thus twenty and nought is twenty, i.e., 20. 
 It is also used as a remainder I i = o. It is con- 
 venient to treat it as a something. We use it with the
 
 " THE UNKNOWABLE? 163 
 
 verb " is," and, therefore, according to Mr. Spencer in his 
 criticism of the employment of the word " absolute " in the 
 same way, this nought is nothing, is something. 
 
 " The noumenon everywhere named as the antithesis of 
 the phenomenon is throughout necessarily thought of as 
 an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that 
 our knowledge is a knowledge of appearances only, with- 
 out at the same time conceiving a reality of which they 
 are appearances ; for appearance without reality is un- 
 thinkable." 
 
 In the first place, I do not know what phenomenon and 
 appearances are in the Evolution philosophy. We have in 
 it modes of consciousness, and we have matter and motion 
 and their combinations. I suppose appearances relate to 
 our modes of consciousness in correspondence with the 
 environment. I suppose phenomenon, if it differs from 
 the above, to apply to the relations of matter and motion 
 irrespective of consciousness. The word " appearances," 
 then, correlates the consciousness and the matter in motion, 
 and the term " phenomenon " correlates matter and motion, 
 or certain combinations thereof. In the former case the 
 appearances imply something which is apparent, viz., matter 
 in motion. " Things in themselves " are found to be not 
 yellow and heavy and hot, &c., but matter and motion 
 and our consciousness of them. Mr. Spencer has himself 
 succeeded more than any one in explaining " things in 
 themselves," although he has not explained consciousness. 
 
 Mr. Spencer concludes " an argument, the very con- 
 struction of which assigns to a certain term a certain 
 meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has 
 no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide." The 
 reply is, that we shall henceforth refuse to take a term 
 which is found both unnecessary and misleading. We
 
 164 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 shall be wary of inadvertently adopting it again, and shall 
 neither use the terms " the relative " nor " the absolute," 
 but confine ourselves to stating that all knowledge is of 
 consciousnesses and their causes in the environment, viz., 
 certain combinations of matter and motion. 
 
 Mr. Spencer next proposes " to analyse our conception 
 of the antithesis between relative and absolute." 
 
 He says, " It is admitted that . . . the relative is itself 
 conceivable as such only by opposition to the irrelative or 
 absolute." 
 
 Sir William Hamilton says that there are cases where 
 correlatives are merely negations, and these cases are not 
 realities ; therefore, the relative does not imply the posi- 
 tive existence of the non-relative or the absolute. 
 
 Our view of the matter was given at the beginning of 
 the chapter, in which we said that wholes are only cor- 
 related to their parts, and that the term " the relative " 
 is a whole, and, if it has any correlative, it is " the cor- 
 relative " and not " the absolute." "We, therefore, do not 
 admit that " the relative " is itself conceivable as such 
 only by opposition to the irrelative or absolute. 
 
 The difficulty is got over by recalling the process of 
 naming. Naming is the distinguishment by symbols of 
 differentiations of items of knowledge. Names denote 
 specific differences of known objects, or modes of con- 
 sciousness, or their relations. Therefore names only cor- 
 relate with names of the known, not with the unknown. 
 
 Knowledge is of matter, motion, and consciousness 
 only, and their relations. Names are only valid and have 
 a meaning in respect of these. All valid names are 
 limited to these. It is true we sometimes give names to 
 imaginaries, to false ideas, and to abstractions treated as 
 reals, such as force, vital principle, &c., but such mistakes
 
 " THE UNKNOWABLE? 165 
 
 have to be rectified. Thus names being distinctive are 
 bound to correlate, but can correlate with nothing but 
 that from which the object or relation has to be distin- 
 guished, and this is obliged to be known or else it 
 could not be distinguished, and the correlation cannot 
 extend beyond the limits of the knowable, i.e., matter, 
 motion, consciousness, or their relations. It cannot ex- 
 tend to anything not known. 
 
 As knowledge extends the necessity for naming ex- 
 tends. 
 
 If, then, we say of anything that it is finite or limited, 
 we recognise that it has boundaries known to us in con- 
 tradistinction to those objects which have no known 
 boundaries. The correlative in this case is not infinite 
 or unlimited, but nescience of limits. The things are 
 known, but not their limits. Prom these we mark off 
 the things we know as having limits by calling them 
 limited or finite. Names always correlate with other 
 knowledge, never with the unknown. The correlative of 
 a relative name must be a relative, and both must be in 
 the sphere of the known in order to be able to be distin- 
 guished and thereby named. 
 
 It is only from a knowledge of both that difference is 
 recognised, a name given and a correlation determined. 
 There can be no such process between the known and the 
 unknown, and, therefore, there can be no correlation be- 
 tween the known and the unknown. 
 
 Since all knowledge is relative to ourselves, it is limited 
 to our powers of knowing. If an ant says of a forest it 
 is infinite, it is because it is beyond its power of cogni- 
 tion. We know it to be limited, but say that the universe 
 of stellar systems is infinite. But we do not know. The 
 term is relative to ourselves. It means that we are
 
 1 66 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 ignorant of limits in distinction from those objects we 
 know as limited. Hence the correlative of finite is nesci- 
 ence of limits. So of the order of sequences. We can 
 only personally cognise the sequences of less than one 
 hundred revolutions of the earth round the sun, and 
 history only records those of a few thousands of them. 
 Beyond these limits we do not know. "We say of our 
 experience that it is limited. But the correlative of 
 Finite Time is not Infinite Time, but nescience of the 
 limits of sequences. 
 
 We cannot say of space and time that they are infi- 
 nite or endless. We cannot grasp the meaning of these 
 words. They are unrepresentable in thought. We can 
 only say of them that we know no limits. Again, then, 
 the correlative of finite and limited is nescience of 
 limits. 
 
 Speaking of space and time, we must again say that 
 they are mere abstractions and not reals. Without 
 objects and sequences there could be neither space nor 
 time. They are only abstractions of relations and have 
 no correlatives. 
 
 What, then, is this Absolute ? When we say of it that 
 it is non-relative, what do we mean ? Non-relative to 
 us, or non-relative to the cosmos ? or that it is a word 
 that has no correlative ? But, as a word, its correlative is 
 the relative ; so it is said. Does it mean that it is not re- 
 lated to our consciousness or knowledge ? Then we know 
 not that there is such an existence, and having no reason to 
 suppose it, we drop the suggestion of it out of our minds 
 at once. Or does it mean that it is not related to the 
 cosmos ? Then, again, it is utterly beyond our know- 
 ledge, and there is no utility in the hypothesis. 
 
 But it is said to have manifestations. If so, it is re-
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 167 
 
 lated to its manifestations, and is therefore relative ; and 
 through its manifestations it is known to us, and there- 
 fore it is relative to us ; and it is therefore not The 
 Absolute. 
 
 But absolute force is mentioned. This characterises 
 absolute, and makes it relative to the cosmos and to us, 
 and it is no longer the absolute. And again the passage 
 occurs, " The absolute force of which we are conscious." 
 Surely if we are conscious of it it is not absolute but 
 relative. 
 
 Let us now consider Mr. Spencer's argument on p. 
 90. He says 
 
 " Our notion of the limited is composed, firstly, of a conscious- 
 ness of some kind of being, and, secondly, of a consciousness of 
 the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of 
 the unlimited the consciousness of limits is abolished, but not the 
 consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true that in the 
 absence of conceived limits this consciousness ceases to be a con- 
 cept properly so called ; but it is none the less true that it remains 
 as a mode of consciousness. If, in such cases, the negative con- 
 tradictory were, as alleged, ' nothing else ' than the negation of 
 the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then it would clearly 
 follow that negative contradictories could be used interchange- 
 ably ; the unlimited might be thought of as antithetical to the 
 divisible, and the indivisible as antithetical to the limited. 
 While the fact that they cannot be so used proves that in con- 
 sciousness the unlimited and the indivisible are qualitatively 
 distinct, and therefore positive or real, since distinction cannot 
 exist between nothings. The error . . . consists in assuming that 
 consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions, to the 
 entire neglect of that which is limited (unlimited ?) and con- 
 ditioned (unconditioned ?). It is forgotten that there is some- 
 thing which alike forms the raw material of definite thought, 
 and remains after the definiteness which thinking gave to it 
 has been destroyed." 
 
 The question then is, What is this raw material of
 
 1 68 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 consciousness and thought which, by having boundaries, 
 is recognised as limited, but which, not having boun- 
 daries, must be called unlimited ? Is it an indefinite con- 
 sciousness which is not capable of analysis ? It appears 
 to me that this raw material can only be regarded, first, as 
 the cosmos of matter and motion, and that it is indefinite 
 according to the inadequacy of the correspondence be- 
 tween the inner activities and the environment, more 
 particularly in the case of the infant from imperfection 
 of growth to a normal standard; and, secondly, in the 
 adult from want of education in the Evolution philosophy. 
 But when this is learned there is no raw material, how- 
 ever much there may be of unorganised knowledge. 
 Though we cannot grasp the boundaries of the cosmos, 
 nor make our experience coeval with the whole history 
 of its changes, we know that these cosmos and these 
 changes are of matter and of motion, which are definite 
 and comprehensible. And when we speak of the limited 
 and of the nescience of limitation, we speak of definite 
 objectivities, and not of an unknowable, and the conver- 
 sion of such nescience into an absolute is a fault of 
 reasoning. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, however 
 
 " Now all this applies by change of terms to the last and 
 highest of these antinomies that between tlie relative and the 
 non-relative. We are conscious of the relative as existence 
 under conditions and limits ; it is impossible that these condi- 
 tions and limits can be thought of apart from something to 
 which they give the form. The abstraction of these conditions 
 and limits is, by the hypothesis, the abstraction of them only ; 
 consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of some- 
 thing which filled up their outlines; and this indefinite some- 
 thing constitutes our consciousness of the non-relative or abso- 
 lute. Impossible though it is to give to this consciousness any
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE."' 169 
 
 qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is not the less 
 certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible 
 element of thought." 
 
 When we think of that which is limited and condi- 
 tioned, we are obliged to think of matter and motion. 
 We can only think of matter and motion as of a mass of 
 ultimate units having shape, size, and modes and rates 
 of motion. When we would go further back than this, 
 and ask what it is that has motion, we say it is 
 matter. When we ask still again what is matter, we 
 say extension, i.e., that which has shape and size and re- 
 sistance. Beyond this we cannot go. The answer that 
 Mr. Spencer would apparently give would be, " It is the 
 absolute." There must be a something that is possessed 
 of extension, resistance, shape, and motion. This some- 
 thing must have a name. It is the absolute. If we accept 
 his answer, we remark that this absolute is conditioned 
 and limited specifically, and in its totality by the totality 
 and conditions of matter ; that it corresponds in every 
 way with the definitions of matter. It is an interchange- 
 able term with matter, and therefore superfluous and mis- 
 leading. The indefinite something is no more than our 
 obscure appreciation of matter, and is admitted to be 
 what Mr. Spencer claims : " A positive and indestructible 
 element of thought." But it is not the absolute ; and by 
 its very title it cannot possibly be an element of thought, 
 for every element of thought is related to an object of 
 thought. 
 
 Mr. Spencer proceeds to show that if we do not admit 
 the absolute we cannot think of the relative. He says 
 that contradictories cannot be known except as in rela- 
 tion to each other. We ask, are correlated words con- 
 tradictories ? " And thus the relative can itself be con-
 
 i;o SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 ceived only by opposition to the non-relative. It is also 
 admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of 
 a relation implies a consciousness of both the related 
 members." 
 
 We notice here that the adjective " relative," as applied 
 to our knowledge of the objective, to distinguish it from 
 a hypothesis of knowledge which is not relative, or to 
 knowledge which is beyond our reach as, for instance, 
 the whole of the past is changed into a noun, "the 
 relative," in which case it is equivalent to " the cosmos." 
 And so, as the relative cannot be thought of without 
 thinking of the related, then we are bound to think of 
 the related term in accordance with the laws of the rela- 
 tions of the terms of wholes, viz., its component parts 
 that make up the cosmos or its equivalent, the relative. 
 Mr. Spencer says also that consciousness of a relation 
 implies a consciousness of both the related members, but 
 if the relative implies the absolute, then the latter, being 
 present in consciousness, is a something that can be con- 
 sciousness ed, is in relation to that which is conscious of 
 it, and is therefore not " the absolute " or " non-relative." 
 
 Mr. Spencer next proceeds to show that both Sir 
 William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel " distinctively imply 
 that our consciousness of ' the absolute/ indefinite though 
 it is, is positive and not negative." This assertion re- 
 specting them appears to be justifiable, but it is certainly 
 inconsistent. However, as they have already clearly 
 proved along with Mr. Spencer that we can know nothing 
 beyond " the relative," not even that there is anything 
 beyond " the relative," we must count it for nothing, par- 
 ticularly as the statement is not reasoned out as presented 
 by Mr. Spencer. At the same time, Mr. Spencer himself 
 maintains the existence of " the absolute," and we confine
 
 " THE Ui\KNO WABLE." 1 7 r 
 
 ourselves to his arguments. We may ask What is the 
 meaning of " positive " ? Is it not an actuality in rela- 
 tionship with another actuality ? If so, to say that " the 
 absolute " is positive is to say that it is relative. When 
 the absolute becomes positive it commits suicide. 
 
 But the belief in the " positive character of our con- 
 sciousness of the unconditioned " is rendered more certain 
 by other considerations. We cannot conceive of space and 
 time as limited or unlimited, nevertheless " there is yet 
 in our minds the unshaped material of a conception." 
 So, also, we cannot form a circumscribed idea of cause, 
 " and we are consequently obliged to think of the cause 
 which transcends the limits of our thought as positive 
 though indefinite." " The momentum of thought inevit- 
 ably carries us beyond conditioned existence to uncon- 
 ditioned existence ; and this ever persists in us as the 
 body of a thought to which we can give no shape." 
 
 We reply that there is no entity called space ; all we 
 know is matter and motion : and there is no entity called 
 time; all we know is sequence. The relations of the 
 former, size, shape, and distance, give rise in us to the 
 abstraction " space," and the relations of the latter give 
 rise in us to the abstraction " time ; " neither is there an 
 entity called cause, the sequences of events being deter- 
 mined by the combinations of matter in motion in rela- 
 tion to other matter in motion. 
 
 There is, it is true, a momentum of thought, but it 
 carries us back, not to unconditioned existence, which 
 means " nothing," but to a question as to final causes 
 what caused the matter and the motion ? The reply is, 
 we cannot know. But this is not the body of a thought ; 
 it is a mere blank. 
 
 Mr. Spencer next goes on to discuss real existence,
 
 172 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 concluding, " Yet, as we cannot expel the entire contents 
 of consciousness, there ever remains behind an element 
 which passes into new shapes. The continual negation 
 of each particular form and limit simply results in the 
 more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, 
 and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed 
 and unlimited." Here Mr. Spencer is speaking of the 
 state of our minds, not of the objective world, and to this 
 state of our minds he would make the objective world 
 correspond. "We must say that we fail to accomplish 
 what Mr. Spencer asks us to do. We can imagine the 
 solar system dissolved, and the whole cosmos reduced to 
 its original ultimate units, but we cannot think of these 
 ultimate units as having no shape or size. It is just as 
 unthinkable to think them out of existence as to think 
 them into existence. And as to the quantity of them, 
 we cannot think of it otherwise than as limited, however 
 vast ; and if we are to call this " the absolute," it simply 
 means the primal cosmos. 
 
 Mr. Spencer may well .ask (p. 94) 
 
 " How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness of the 
 unformed^ and unlimited, when, by its very nature, conscious- 
 nesisTspossible only under forms and limits ? 
 
 " Such consciousness is not, and cannot be, constituted by any 
 single mental act, but is the product of many mental acts. In 
 each concept there is an element which persists. It is alike im- 
 possible for this element to be absent from consciousness, and for 
 it to be present in consciousness alone ; either alternative in- 
 volves unconsciousness the one from the want of the substance, 
 the other from the want of the form. But the persistence of this 
 element under successive conditions necessitates a sense of it as 
 distinguished from the conditions, and independent of them." 
 
 Here we have a substance, viz., matter, and we have 
 it variously conditioned in shape, size, mode and rate of
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 173 
 
 motion, and the question reverts to the identification of 
 matter or ultimate units, or the homogeneous, with " the 
 absolute," as before discussed. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer would assist us by an illustration. 
 We are asked to take away from the notion of a piano 
 the conception of strings, hammers, dampers, pedals, and 
 visual appearance. By doing so we get an indefinite 
 notion of general existence. " By fusing a series of 
 states of consciousness, in each of which, as it arises, 
 the limitations and conditions are abolished there is 
 produced a consciousness of something unconditioned." 
 We are asked, in fact, to follow out the process of dis- 
 solution, and when we have arrived at ultimate units, 
 which is the notion of " general existence," we are asked 
 to think these away, and the remainder will be in this 
 case 
 
 Something unconditioned = the absolute = nothing. 
 
 " This consciousness is not the abstract of any one group 
 of thoughts, ideas, or conceptions, but it is the abstract of 
 all thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. That which is com- 
 mon to them all, and cannot be got rid of, is what we 
 predicate by the term existence. ... It remains as an 
 indefinite consciousness of something constant under all 
 modes. . . . The distinction we feel between special and 
 general existence is the distinction between that which 
 is changeable in us and that which is unchangeable." But 
 we are not conscious of anything that is unchangeable, 
 and general existence is only the totality of things ; we 
 have no consciousness of something constant under all 
 modes ; and as to an " abstract of thoughts, ideas, and 
 conceptions," we cannot understand what is meant. It 
 is evidently a purely mental process relating to thoughts
 
 174 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 and modes of consciousness, and does not relate to the 
 constitution of the cosmos. 
 
 Page 96. " The contrast between the absolute and 
 the relative in our minds is really the contrast between 
 that mental element which exists absolutely and those 
 which exist relatively." 
 
 What is a mental element ? What is meant by its 
 existing ? How does it exist relatively ? And what is 
 meant by its existing absolutely ? 
 
 With respect to the latter question, it is evident that, 
 if it exists as a mental element at all, it does not exist 
 out of relation, and, therefore, not absolutely. 
 
 It is very evident that the absolute that Mr. Spencer 
 argues for is identical -with the primal state of matter in 
 motion, in relation, under limits and conditions to our 
 consciousness. We know that things do not exist as we 
 know them, viz., as red, hot, sweet, loud, &c., and that 
 even the relations of aggregates of matter and motion, 
 which cause the vibrations, &c., which affect us, and to 
 which we give these names, themselves are differentia- 
 tions from a primal state of matter ; and it is either this 
 primal state, or the same as involved in the totality of 
 existence, that gives rise to the notion of general exist- 
 ence, or the absolute, or that which persists under 
 changeable forms, and thus we can understand with Mr. 
 Spencer in the concluding sentence of the chapter "how 
 impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an 
 actuality underlying appearances, and how from this 
 impossibility results our indestructible belief in that 
 actuality." 
 
 What that actuality is we have already seen. It is 
 not the absolute a fiction utterly unworthy of credence 
 but the ultimate units of matter and motion.
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE:' 175 
 
 On Ultimate Scientific Ideas. 
 
 Science is systematised knowledge. Knowledge con- 
 sists of a more or less perfect cognition of the knowable. 
 Ultimate ideas of the knowable are those of the most 
 general character, and are naturally the factors dealt 
 with in the formula which generalises the relations or 
 history of the knowable. We, therefore, naturally refer 
 to the book on " The Knowable " for an estimate of ulti- 
 mate scientific ideas. We are surprised to find them 
 treated of in the book on " The Unknowable." 
 
 The formula of Evolution, which sums up all know- 
 ledge, is this, "Evolution is an integration of matter 
 and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which 
 the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homo- 
 geneity to a definite, coherent, heterogeneity, and during 
 which the retained motion undergoes a parallel trans- 
 formation." 
 
 Now this formula, being placed in the book on the 
 knowable, is supposed to have an intelligible meaning 
 to be capable of being known and understood. Other- 
 wise it could not be advanced as a formula which is cap- 
 able of explaining the history of the universe. And each 
 of its terms is to be supposed to have a definite meaning, 
 otherwise what is the use of it ? 
 
 The ultimate scientific ideas, then, are matter and 
 motion. 
 
 Let us consider for a moment the nature of knowledge. 
 
 Life is defined as the continuous adjustment of inner 
 and outer relations. Mind as part of life is regarded as 
 the establishment of correspondences between inner and 
 outer relations. The absence of one end of a correspon- 
 dence precludes knowledge. There must be the twofold
 
 i;6 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 relation. These correspondences are called actualities or 
 realities, and are the only actualities and realities that we 
 know. 
 
 To the objective as well as to the subjective parts of 
 these correspondences we give names as well as to the 
 inter-relations of each within itself. 
 
 Consequently, the term matter has a definite meaning, 
 and the term motion has a definite meaning, and thereby 
 only can the formula of Evolution be intelligible and 
 valuable. 
 
 What are these meanings ? They are given in Book 
 ii. chap, iii., and have already been considered by us in 
 the course of our criticism. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer says in the chapter now under con- 
 sideration that they, with the notions of space, time, and 
 consciousness, are incomprehensible. 
 
 But after all, it is only the subject-matter of the last 
 chapter over again. What we include in the terms we 
 know, and, therefore, we know what we mean by the 
 terms. But somebody thinks, we know not who, and we 
 know not why, that there ought to be something else in 
 the terms, and that something else we do not know and 
 cannot understand. But it must have a name, and it is 
 to be called noumenon, or the absolute, or essence, or some 
 name which, having no meaning, shall be fitted as near 
 as possible to represent that which has no existence. 
 
 This will be seen by a consideration of sect. 21, in 
 which Mr. Spencer says, " Ultimate scientific ideas, then, 
 are all representative of realities that cannot be compre- 
 hended." He says we cannot understand " that which 
 remains behind " nor the " intrinsic nature " of pheno- 
 mena. " Force, space, and time pass all understanding ; " 
 he " can give no account either of sensations themselves
 
 " THE UNKNOWABLE." 177 
 
 or of that something which is conscious of sensations ; " 
 " in its ultimate essence nothing can be known." So also 
 in " time " there is an impossibility of thought both in 
 the remote past and as to the extreme future. And 
 again, " objective and subjective things he thus ascertains 
 to be alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis." 
 
 From this it would appear that there is a matter, 
 motion, space, time, and consciousness which we do 
 understand, because they come " within the range of 
 experience," and which are included in the formula of 
 Evolution and its subsequent exposition ; and there is 
 another set which we do not understand, because we are 
 prevented by our " impotence in dealing with all that 
 transcends experience." Or it may be better stated that 
 the matter, motion, &c., that we do know are manifesta- 
 tions of a presumed something that we do not know ; and 
 we are thrown back upon the discussion contained in the 
 last chapter. 
 
 However, we come to this as a conclusion : that ulti- 
 mate scientific ideas are within the domain of the know- 
 able, and that when we make use of the words matter, 
 motion, &c., we mean something definite and expect to 
 be understood. 
 
 If we say that the ultimate ideas contained in the 
 knowable are not knowable, why are they retained in the 
 knowable ? But ultimate scientific ideas, to be ideas 
 and to be scientific, must be known, and it is a mistake 
 to class them with the unknowable. 
 
 If we say that they are only manifestations of some- 
 thing else which we do not know, and which may have 
 other manifestations which we do not know, such a some- 
 thing is beyond the pale of science and is not an ultimate 
 scientific idea. 
 
 M
 
 i;8 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 And if we say that we cannot account for the genesis 
 of things or of consciousness, this confession of ignorance 
 cannot be converted into an ultimate scientific idea. 
 
 Ultimate scientific ideas, then, are comprehensible, else 
 they would not be scientific, i.e., knowable. Mr. Spencer 
 says that they are " all representative of realities that 
 cannot be comprehended." 
 
 It is true that beyond the ultimate we know nothing. 
 All beyond is hypothesis. We do not even know enough 
 to say that the matter and motion that we do know are 
 manifestations. All is a blank. 
 
 On Ultimate Religious Ideas. 
 
 As " religion " is a word of very wide and vague mean- 
 ing, it is capable of definition and application in a great 
 variety of ways, according to the discretion of the writer. 
 
 To us" it appears to involve two items. Firstly, an 
 idea, and, secondly, an emotion to which this idea is re- 
 lated. 
 
 This emotion has been very variously directed with 
 more or less of logical guidance, and sometimes with none 
 at all. And it is an emotion associated with other emo- 
 tions producing very complicated results. 
 
 It is not, however, our purpose to write an essay upon 
 the subject, but only to bring out our view of the intel- 
 lectual element of the object contained in all the great 
 and predominant manifestations called religious. 
 
 And it appears to me that this main idea has been the 
 recognition of external non-human will. 
 
 The association of action with individual will, with 
 design and intention, is one of the earliest experiences of 
 infancy. So in the infancy of the human race all such 
 activities and variations of activities, especially of those
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE? 179 
 
 that are unexpected, except, perhaps, those uniformities 
 of nature which daily familiarities have caused to be 
 taken as a matter of course, have presumably been asso- 
 ciated with manifestations of external will; 
 
 There would be accessory causes of such beliefs, as so 
 carefully shown by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Tylor in their 
 expositions of the growth of a belief in the existence of 
 spirits of departed chiefs, &c. 
 
 In monotheism, as in polytheism, the hopes and fears, 
 the religious adoration and theological teachings, all 
 centre round the supposed relations of human wills with 
 the Divine Will, and in accordance with the belief in 
 the extent of the relation between the human wills and 
 the Divine Will have been the variations and perturba- 
 tions of religion. 
 
 And even when the Divine Will has been placed 
 back in its relation to the human right away at the be- 
 ginning of things or at the beginning of humanity, still 
 the religious sentiment found its legitimate object, more 
 particularly if a constant though purely spiritual com- 
 munion was recognised. 
 
 And even pantheism finds a shadow to cling to in a 
 Being that, although working itself out, is doing so to a 
 well-ordered end. 
 
 But when pantheism takes the form of a blind de- 
 velopment anywhere, anyhow, and towards no specific 
 end, and the human will forms no part of a relation to 
 another will, then the legitimate religious idea, as defined 
 and justified at the commencement of this section, has 
 escaped from the mind. There may be vague hopes and 
 aspirations left which will make the intellect frame for its 
 satisfaction some vague object, but the essential point of 
 a religion is gone.
 
 i8o SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 But if this is denied, and it is said that we have no 
 right so to limit the use of the term religion, we would 
 point out that although there may be a justification of 
 the varied use of an indefinite word, there is in this case 
 a marked departure in the employment of the term. 
 There is a distinct change of the intellectual position 
 in this respect, that there is no longer any relation of 
 will to exterior will. And even although there may be 
 a desire for a conformity to human will and for harmony 
 with the grand course of things, there is no personality 
 in the relationship. The object of the sentiment is not 
 a personality an individual. There is a marked change 
 of intellectual attitude. 
 
 And this idea of a relation to an external will will be 
 found, I think, to be the main idea which, on the part of 
 religion, has been in conflict with that progress of science, 
 or the systematisation of knowledge and of events which 
 forms the gist v of the next chapter. 
 
 The Conflict. 
 
 To the extent that men have believed in invisible, ex- 
 ternal, personal wills, to that extent have they adapted 
 their conduct thereto, in the same manner that they have 
 adjusted their actions to visible external personalities. 
 These invisible beings have been supposed to possess 
 likings and antipathies, and to have required propitiation 
 and deference. They have been regarded as taking an 
 interest in human affairs and in the conduct of indi- 
 viduals ; to be capable of displeasure and vindictiveness, 
 and susceptible to persuasion. The character of these in- 
 visible beings has depended for the most part upon the 
 intellectual calibre and moral advancement of different 
 peoples, but in all cases they have been regarded as sus-
 
 " THE UNKNO WA BLE" 1 8 1 
 
 ceptible to pleasure and displeasure, and in accordance 
 therewith to have dealt with the fates of individuals and 
 nations. 
 
 It is obvious that the non-recognition of this authority 
 on the part of any individual or individuals would natu- 
 rally cause displeasure on the part of the rest of the 
 community in much the same manner as high treason 
 against the head of the state. A defiance of the power 
 of the invisible personalities would shock the educated 
 associations of awe and veneration; it would render a 
 defence of their invisible friend or ruler urgent, the fear 
 of involving the community in the offences of the one, 
 the fear of others being led away into similar dangerous 
 courses, would all combine to resist and condemn any in- 
 novations of thought which would largely bring the course 
 of events into the class of scientific order, and remove 
 them from the domain of external personal power. 
 
 And this has been the nature of any conflict there has 
 been between science and religion. 
 
 It is true that the conflict has been rendered more 
 dignified, and perhaps, at the same time, made more in- 
 tense, when the invisible external will has been regarded 
 as possessing universal power, and as being related to 
 humanity as a moral lawgiver, more particularly when 
 associated with the doctrine of eternal damnation as the 
 consequence of the merited displeasure of that being. 
 But the conflict has always been essentially of the same 
 character, viz., as to the extent to which events are attri- 
 butable to natural orders of sequence, and the extent to 
 which they are amenable to a Divine interference. 
 
 Nor has the conflict been uninfluenced by collateral 
 considerations. Grave and serious persons could not 
 view without alarm any innovations which might do
 
 1 82 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 away -with the groundwork and authority of good con- 
 duct. Without a lawgiver, without a system of rewards 
 and punishments, where would be the majesty and the 
 imposing force of moral law ? and where would be the 
 incentives to a. virtuous life and the deterrents from a 
 vicious one ? 
 
 Such has been the nature of the animus against the 
 advances of science. On the part of science there has been 
 no animus, but the simple advance of inevitable logic. 
 
 The result has been the continually increasing limita- 
 tion of the area of activity of an invisible external will 
 and an increased recognition of the extent of a natural 
 order of sequences. 
 
 Any Reconciliation ? Statement of the Difficulty. 
 
 The question arises, How does religion view the Evolu- 
 tion theory? If we adopt the formula of Evolution, 
 then all events of the universe are accounted for by the 
 integration of matter and the concomitant dissipation of 
 motion, and there is no room left for an external will. 
 This notion is simply abolished. There is no religion 
 left at all in the sense in which we have been using the 
 term. 
 
 It is true that the sentiment which has attached itself 
 to the external personality may be transferred to some 
 other object, some abstraction called the universe or 
 humanity, and so afford satisfactory exercise for the natu- 
 ral sentiment, but the intellectual function is totally 
 changed, and it is that only with which we have to do. 
 It is that which has been the essence of the conflict. 
 
 Mr. Spencers Solution of it. 
 But Mr. Spencer advances a hypothetic reconciliation.
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE? 183 
 
 Every religion is regarded by him as a theory of the 
 origin and order of things. 
 
 Page 44. " Now every theory tacitly asserts two things ; 
 firstly, that there is something to be explained; secondly, that such 
 and such is the explanation. Hence, however widely different 
 speculators may disagree in the solutions they give of the same 
 problem, yet by implication they agree that there is a problem 
 to be solved. Here, then, is an element which all creeds have 
 in common. Religions diametrically opposed in their overt 
 dogmas are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the 
 existence of the world with all it contains and all which sur- 
 rounds it is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this 
 point, if on no other, there is entire unanimity." 
 
 This soul of truth underlying the grossest superstitions 
 is found to be " the constituent which may be claimed 
 alike by all religions," and in every respect answers to 
 proper requirements. 
 
 It is " the vital element in all religions," for it is the 
 element which survives every change, and thus is capable 
 of including even atheism within the definition of religion. 
 
 The vital element of religion is, however, very variously 
 expressed, as thus : 
 
 Page 44, line 6 " A problem to be solved." 1 
 
 44, ii "A mystery ever pressing for interpretation." 
 
 45, 14 "Inscrutableness of creation." ("Thus, while 
 other constituents of religious creeds one 
 by one drop away, this remains and ever 
 grows more manifest, and so^is^shown to 
 be the essential element.") 
 
 45, ,, 23 "The omnipresence of something which 
 passes comprehension " (" that most ab- 
 stract belief which is common to all re- 
 ligions "). 
 
 46, 6 " A far more transcendent mystery, . . . not 
 a relative but an absolute mystery " (what- 
 ever an absolute mystery may be).
 
 184 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Criticism thereof. 
 
 Now, if this is to be accepted as the essential element 
 of religion, a reconciliation with science is easy and ob- 
 vious. For what are the pursuits of science but an en- 
 deavour to ordinate and systematise knowledge, leading 
 up in the end to an endeavour to embrace all knowledge 
 in a comprehensive formula, and then to ask what beyond 
 that? 
 
 In fact, all through the chapter on ultimate religious 
 ideas religion is only science in disguise. What is treated 
 of is the scientific or knowing element in religion ; the 
 only speciality about it being that it is concerned with 
 the wrong end. It occupies itself with the beginnings of 
 the universe. It is scientific speculation. It endeavours 
 to explain the universe, and, separated from the religious 
 sentiment, its hypotheses are simply and purely intellectual 
 speculations, as is the Evolution theory. 
 
 Taken in this point of view, religion and science are 
 identical and require no reconciliation. In fact, they have 
 in this respect never been in conflict. 
 
 It is as if two people going to law may be said to be 
 fundamentally agreed in that they both admit that there 
 is a problem to be solved ; they only differ in the minor 
 point as to the possession of a certain amount of properly. 
 So any two people having any dispute may be said to be 
 agreed in this, that there is a problem to be solved, and 
 thus anything can be reconciled to anything. 
 
 But it may be well asked what is the value of such a 
 reconciliation ? 
 
 But a different basis of reconciliation is adduced, 
 viz. : 
 
 " If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis
 
 "THE UNKNOWABLE." 185 
 
 of this reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and 
 most certain of all facts : that the power which the uni- 
 verse manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." 
 
 This idea is worked out in chapter v. 
 
 In the first place, the absolute is asserted to be a neces- 
 sary datum of consciousness. This is the basis of agree- 
 ment we set out to seek. Various modes of science agree 
 in the assertion of a " reality utterly inscrutable in nature," 
 and in it " religion finds an assertion essentially coincid- 
 ing with her own." 
 
 Eeligion from the very first has always acknowledged 
 a mystery. It has constantly done battle for the doctrine 
 " that all things are manifestations of a power that trans- 
 cends knowledge." 
 
 Science is obliged to acknowledge the same ultimate 
 truth, in that, however much it may succeed in formu- 
 larising knowledge, and thus succeed in affording explana- 
 tions of sequences, it can never get beyond a certain 
 point. If from the homogeneous, made up of matter and 
 motion, it can explain the universe, it cannot explain the 
 existence of that matter and motion nor the fact of the 
 mutual relations of matter and of motion, and, therefore, 
 it is obliged to suppose an initiatory power that transcends 
 knowledge. 
 
 We do not ourselves see the practical value of such a 
 reconciliation. What is the value of a mystery, of a pro- 
 blem to be solved, of an inscrutable power that only mani- 
 fests itself to us in the formula of Evolution as applied 
 to the homogeneous ? It is of no scientific value. If 
 we ask, Has it a religious value ? then, since in Mr. 
 Spencer's view this question would mean, Has it any value 
 in explaining the origin of things ? we would reply, It 
 has no value in this respect. But if we mean religion as
 
 1 86 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 heretofore defined by ourselves, then again we would 
 reply, It has no value. It is no item of knowledge ; it 
 is no item in our emotional nature ; it is no item in our 
 environment to which it is necessary to adapt ourselves. 
 Its interest to us is nil. 
 
 It is only of value when we begin to attach to it any 
 definite ideas of personality, or regard it as possibly con- 
 taining such an idea. Then indeed it becomes a matter 
 of interest to us, and resumes its place as an object of 
 religious importance, taking religion as defined by us. 
 
 Possible Modes of Reconciliation. 
 
 It would not be difficult to enumerate the possible 
 modes of reconciliation between the identification of the 
 Inscrutable Power with personality, and the ultimate 
 conclusions of science as expressed in the formula of 
 Evolution. And this is the reconciliation that is asked 
 for by the mass of mankind permeated by religious ideas. 
 The very abstract agreement proposed by Mr. Spencer is 
 regarded as a reduction to vacuity. 
 
 Such modes of reconciliation would divide themselves 
 into classes. 
 
 1 . Theories of personal origin, with intention and fore- 
 thought, with an ultimate relation to human personalities. 
 
 2. Pantheistic theories, in which, in some way, the 
 original personality is related to some or all human per- 
 sonality. 
 
 3. Theories of an original constitution of the cosmos 
 and of its order, according to the formula of Evolution, 
 and subsequent Divine communion with human person- 
 alities. 
 
 4. Theories similar to the last, with the addition of 
 more or less Divine intervention in the natural order of
 
 " THE UNKNOWABLE." 187 
 
 things, going even so far as to give a revelation of the 
 Divine will and purposes. 
 
 It is not, however, our business to consider these. "We 
 mention them only as indicating the kind of reconciliation 
 that is required in respect of a settlement of the actual 
 conflict that has taken place throughout all ages in the 
 names of science and religion, and to show how far off is 
 Mr. Spencer's solution from solving the difficulty as it 
 exists and has existed in the minds of men. 
 
 Dynamism. 
 
 But if we are to exclude from our consideration alto- 
 gether any belief in an invisible external will, either at 
 the beginning, the present, or the end, and if we are to 
 take consciousness as itself but a mode of matter and 
 motion, then we have to accept the formula of Evolution 
 as the all in all. 
 
 Such a result would most profoundly affect the hopes, 
 the aims, and the conduct of mankind. 
 
 It would not be fair to advance adverse criticism of 
 Mr. Spencer's "Principles of Morality" before publica- 
 tion, although their nature can to some extent be fore- 
 seen. But it would seem, prima facie, that the work 
 will fundamentally alter the grounds of moral obliga- 
 tion. 
 
 If, as we surmise, conduct will be regarded as the ad- 
 justment of organisation and environment, then the com- 
 pleteness of this adjustment is the aim of individual 
 endeavour. To this aim all others must be subordinate. 
 All the old notions of conscience, duty, &c., must give 
 way. They themselves will derive their only authority 
 therefrom as part of a social organism. 
 
 One is naturally inclined to ask, What will be the
 
 1 88 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 result on individuals of the promulgation of this doctrine, 
 and, in the course of time, what -would be the result on 
 society at large? 
 
 In this matter I am but expressing the vague fear of 
 an unknown future. I must own also that in doing so 
 I am departing from the main theme of my criticism, 
 which is the formula of Evolution as accounting for the 
 cosmos, as we know it. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 Our task of criticism may now be considered as com- 
 plete. It might have been made longer, and it is not 
 out of any disrespect that the many important points 
 have been treated so summarily. It has been our object 
 to be as concise as possible. The criticisms are such as 
 came up in our endeavour to understand and master the 
 full scope of Mr. Spencer's book. We submit them for 
 the consideration of the students of the new philosophy.
 
 PART VI. 
 
 THE FOREGOING AS AFFECTED BY MR. SPENCER'S 
 "REPLIES TO CRITICISM." 
 
 ON the completion of the foregoing criticism I read 
 carefully Mr. Spencer's "Eeplies to Criticism" (Essays, 
 vol. iii.), in order to see if any of the points had been 
 already discussed, and I find that the question as to The 
 Absolute and one or two other matters call for a few 
 further remarks. 
 
 The Absolute. 
 
 The question as to The Absolute seems to me all 
 verbiage I say it with due respect to be a discussion 
 of no practical application or value to savour too much 
 of old metaphysical treading out the chaff. 
 
 The discussion seems to arise from the proposition 
 " All knowledge is relative." Now this is no doubt true 
 enough. It is the realisation of a certain truth in our 
 own minds in its enunciation, but it does not seem to 
 lead to anything else except in the hands of mystics. 
 It simply asserts the fact of a correspondence between 
 the knower and the known the subject and the object 
 and presumably of relations amongst the items of the object. 
 But immediately thereupon the mystic calls The Known 
 and its interrelations The Eelative. After all, it is 'know- 
 ledge that is being spoken of and its relativity, not The
 
 190 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 Relative or The Known. But if we admit The Relative, 
 it is so from the fact of its being known, and its cor- 
 relative is The Knower. 
 
 But if we say The Relative implies the Non-relative, here 
 it seems to me we have a something an entity actually 
 growing out of a word. We have an entity to which we 
 give a name, and out of this name we construct another 
 entity of which we had no idea beforehand ; a piece 
 of word-jugglery that I cannot understand. It can be 
 replied to by similar verbal ingenuities; for if The 
 Absolute another name for the Non-relative is made 
 correlative with The Relative, it is put into a relation 
 and ceases to be absolute, i.e., non-related. 
 
 But the question really seems to be, Is there an 
 "inscrutable Force" of which all things are manifesta- 
 tions ? If so, why call it by such a name as the Abso- 
 lute and rely upon verbal subtleties for its proof ? But 
 Mr. Spencer thinks, upon other grounds, there is such an 
 "inscrutable Force." 
 
 His argument is this. We are able to account for 
 and ideally construct the whole universe on the applica- 
 tion to the homogeneous of the formula of Evolution, 
 which contains the two factors " matter " and " motion." 
 These are the ultimate scientific i.e., knowable, com- 
 prehensible ideas, otherwise the formula would be 
 valueless as an unification of knowledge. This matter 
 and this motion are fixed quantities, and work out all 
 subsequent developments purely from interrelations and 
 combinations due to primal gravitation or motion towards 
 each other. 
 
 But after all, he says, we cannot understand matter 
 and motion " in their ultimate natures " (Essays, vol. iii 
 p. 258^. I must say that I do not know what this
 
 "REPLIES TO CRITICISM." 191 
 
 means. It seems to me that, if I understand the inter- 
 relations of matter and motion and their combinations, I 
 understand their natures. I know their value as factors 
 in Evolution, and it is quite gratuitous to say that they 
 have any other natures, and quite valueless. What is 
 the meaning of " ultimate nature " and " things in them- 
 selves " ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, "Essays," vol. iii. p. 262: "I 
 have contended . . . that the consciousness of that 
 which is manifested to us through phenomena is positive 
 and not negative." I truly admit with him that that of 
 which we are conscious is positive and not negative. 
 But of what are we conscious ? Nothing but motion, or 
 matter in motion, or matter and motion, whichever is the 
 best way of putting it. The modes of consciousness 
 differ, for the combinations and modes of matter and 
 motion are so varied, but our consciousness is limited to 
 these. Even if we take consciousness of our own bodies, 
 it is only consciousness of matter and motion, according 
 to the formula of Evolution. Why must we say they 
 are something else, or manifestations of something else ? 
 Surely it is most gratuitous. If they are manifestations 
 of something else which we choose to call an "inscrut- 
 able Force," then, since this Force is limited in its mode 
 of manifestation by matter and motion, the quantity 
 of which is fixed, and the whole series of cosmical 
 sequences is a resultant of the original quantity without 
 any guidance or interference, then the inscrutable Force 
 amounts to nothing in the course of things, and is not 
 immediately conscious to us is but a device of the intel- 
 lect with respect to the far-off primal constitution of things. 
 
 But if it is a present factor in the universe as it 
 may be then it is an incalculable, unknowable element,
 
 1 92 SPENCER 'S FORMULA OF E VOL UTION. 
 
 and no formula of philosophy is possible, and Mr. Spencer's 
 synthetic philosophy no use. 
 
 And certainly it is to that far-off primal constitution 
 of things that we are forced by the Evolution philosophy 
 to relegate that " inscrutable Force." 
 
 The mind naturally seeks backwards for the set of 
 activities which produced the later sequences, and so on 
 back to the beginning. And what are we to say of that? 
 Are we to say that things must have been created and 
 constituted by an " inscrutable Force " ? That is the 
 only place left for it by Mr. Spencer. But Mr. Spencer 
 has examined every possible theory of the beginning of 
 things, and finds that there is no conceivable hypothesis 
 only Nescience. 
 
 Why, then, should we not content ourselves with Ne- 
 science to start with, and the formula of Evolution to go 
 on with ? 
 
 If this is insufficient, then Mr. Spencer's Evolution 
 philosophy is insufficient. 
 
 On Mind and Matter. 
 
 The charge of materialism comes up several times in 
 Mr. Spencer's replies to critics. Can we wonder at it ? 
 His formula of Evolution only comprises matter and 
 motion, and the subsequent Evolution only recognises 
 them. When he says that we only recognise matter 
 and motion as modes of Force or manifestations of Force, 
 which is itself inscrutable, the explanation does not do 
 away with the charge, for all that is then meant by the 
 charge, accepting the interpretation, is that all the cosmos, 
 including humanity, are modes of these manifestations of 
 Force called matter and motion. All sequences, including 
 life and mind, are, firstly, modes of matter and motion, and
 
 "REPLIES TO CRITICISM." 193 
 
 are included in the synthesis of the formula of Evolution ; 
 and secondarily are, from the fact of matter and motion 
 being modes of something called Force, modes of that 
 Force which we call inscrutable, because we predicate its 
 existence, although we have no reason for doing so. 
 
 Twice in the course of his replies to critics, Mr. 
 Spencer quotes the following passage as a reply to the 
 charge of materialism : 
 
 " See, then, our predicament. We can think of matter only 
 in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of 
 matter. When we have pushed our explanations of the first to 
 the uttermost limit, we are referred to the first for a final 
 answer ; and when we have got the final answer of the second, 
 we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it. 
 We find the value of x in the terms of y ; then we find the 
 value of y in the terms of x ; and so we may continue for ever 
 without coming nearer to a solution." Prin. of Psy., 272. 
 
 This is true enough, but what we want to know is 
 is mind included in the formula of Evolution ? That 
 formula is supposed to embrace everything, for it is 
 advanced as the unification of all sequences from The 
 Homogeneous; and, amongst others, it is supposed to 
 account for the coming into existence of those feelings and 
 modes of consciousness which constitute " Mind." We 
 may be in the puzzle described, but, as regards the validity 
 of the Evolution philosophy (Evolution meaning concen- 
 tration and its effects, and not unfolding), we want to 
 know if mind is included in it. Evidently in a complete 
 synthetic philosophy it must be, and can only there- 
 fore be a mode of motion of matter. The charge, there- 
 fore, against the Evolution philosophy on the ground of 
 being materialistic seems to hold good. 
 
 Mr. Spencer speaks of " the inscrutability of the rela- 
 
 N
 
 194 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 tion between subjective feeling and its objective correlate 
 which is not feeling an inscrutability which meets us 
 at the bottom of all our analysis." 
 
 This is indeed the great stumbling-block. This in- 
 scrutability, as well as the action of the "inscrutable 
 Force," seems to preclude the possibility of a synthetic 
 philosophy which shall unify all knowledge. Amidst so 
 many inscrutabilities how can we hope for an intelligible 
 synthesis ? 
 
 The objective world we may know, and the subjective 
 world we may know, and Evolution or Development we 
 may darkly recognise, but of a formula that is capable of 
 reducing them all to one explanation we despair. 
 
 But this passage requires a little more examination: 
 
 " We can think of matter only in terms of mind. "We can 
 think of mind only in terms of matter, . . . and so we may 
 continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution." 
 
 What are the terms of matter, and what are the 
 terms of mind ? We presume the terms of matter 
 include the terms of motion. We presume that matter 
 and motion are never disassociated, for they are the two 
 factors recognised in the formula of Evolution. The 
 terms of matter are extension, and the terms of motion 
 are relations of movement, both capable of representation 
 geometrically and mathematically. The terms of mind 
 are feelings or consciousness of some of these combina- 
 tions of matter in motion. Therefore, when Mr. Spencer 
 says that we can only think of matter in terms of mind, 
 he means that that combination of matter in motion 
 which is called a human organism can only think of 
 matter and motion in terms of its own consciousness of 
 matter and motion, either internal or external ; and when
 
 "REPLIES TO CRITICISM." 195 
 
 Mr. Spencer says that we can only think of mind in 
 terms of matter, he means that without this combina- 
 tion of matter and motion which constitute the human 
 organism there could be no thinking, and that as this 
 thinking is only the consciousness of matter in motion, 
 therefore we are obliged to describe it in terms of matter, 
 i.e., in terms of geometry and mathematics. It is not 
 meant, I suppose, that the consciousness can be so 
 described, but that everything of which we are conscious 
 can be so described. 
 
 And this brings us again to the inquiry, Was there 
 anything in the primary homogeneous more than matter 
 and motion? There is nothing else recognised in the 
 formula of Evolution. So we presume Mr. Spencer 
 means to imply that life and all its developments, in- 
 cluding consciousness, are merely modes of matter and 
 motion. If so, the charge of materialism is valid. 
 
 As to how we think and the terms we use, that 
 brings us back to the subject of the Eelativity of Know- 
 ledge. Terms are names we give to items of Knowledge. 
 Properly speaking, there are no " terms of matter." All 
 terms are mental. There are terms relating to subjective 
 facts, and there are terms relating to objective facts. 
 Some of the latter may be called "terms of matter;" 
 properly speaking they are terms of our consciousness of 
 matter. And in any case, the discussion as to our modes 
 of thinking and difficulties of language does not affect the 
 question of fact as to whether the formula of Evolution 
 is not materialistic, i.e., capable of explaining all things, 
 including life and mind, as temporary combinations of 
 extension and motion capable of being represented geo- 
 metrically and mathematically.
 
 196 SPENCER'S FORMULA OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 To recapitulate, I will remind the reader of the plan of 
 this criticism. 
 
 First, I asked "What is the Problem of Philosophy 
 according to Mr. Spencer ? " and I found that it was " To 
 state an intelligible formula, which, ly its application to the 
 homogeneous, will explain and enable us to construct, ideally, 
 all the changes of the universe" 
 
 I then gave the formula advanced by Mr. Spencer, 
 which, although intelligible, proved to be utterly inade- 
 quate, inasmuch as its two factors, Matter (i.e., extension) 
 and Motion do not explain Life and Mind. 
 
 I then attempted to amend the formula by the intro- 
 duction of the term Force a term largely employed by 
 Mr. Spencer, but omitted from the formula and I found 
 the result unintelligible. 
 
 I next endeavoured, from a study of Mr. Spencer's 
 exposition, to frame a formula that should be a true repre- 
 sentation of it, which formula proved to be so vague and 
 unsatisfactory that it was really useless for our purpose. 
 
 From this I have concluded that Mr. Spencer has failed 
 in the task he set himself, and that the Problem of 
 Philosophy remains, so far as our studies have extended, 
 unsolved.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS 
 OF MR. SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 HAVING thus completed our own study of Mr. Spencer's main 
 theses, we naturally turn to a consideration of the manner in 
 which his work has been regarded by other minds. We know 
 the high estimation in which Mr. Spencer's labours are deservedly 
 held by most thoughtful men, and especially by men of 
 science. We know that there is sufficient justification for this 
 in the more scientific and detailed labours of the later volumes 
 of his work, quite irrespective of the large claim set up for his 
 philosophy in the first volume, and of the particular formula we 
 have just disputed. 
 
 I have therefore searched around on all sides to enlarge my 
 judgment, and for the use of the student of Spencer's works I 
 append the result of my reading. I must acknowledge my surprise 
 at the absence, so far as I can ascertain, of a thoroughly exhaus- 
 tive criticism of " First Principles," although the main deficiencies 
 of the theory propounded have been vigorously handled by several 
 eminent thinkers in articles contributed to reviews. 
 
 I first referred to some of the critics to whom Mr. Spencer has 
 himself replied. As a rule, I find that the term " evolution " has 
 not been used in any very definite sense. It seems to have been 
 understood generally as an orderly progress of some sort. Some 
 writers, however, have accepted it in the very restricted sense as 
 defined by Mr. Spencer, viz., the concentration of matter and 
 concomitant dissipation of motion. Others, again, have admitted, 
 as Mr. Spencer himself does sometimes, an additional indefinite 
 factor called " force." On the whole, the criticisms have recog- 
 nised the main characteristic as being deterministic and non-
 
 198 APPENDIX. 
 
 teleological, and as actually dealing with matter and motion, 
 whether ultimately they are manifestations of something else 
 or not 
 
 I then looked up a variety of notices of " First Principles " and 
 of the theories contained in it. My abstracts and remarks 
 will be found very scanty and inadequate, for to discuss the 
 subjects treated of in an exhaustive manner would make a large 
 book. They must be taken as they are intended, namely, as 
 short notices to assist the student in his consideration of the 
 main theses under our review. 
 
 Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doctrine of Evolution, 
 including an Examination of Mr. H. Spencer's "First 
 Principles" By T. E. BIRKS, M.A., Professor of Moral 
 Philosophy, Cambridge. Macmillan & Co., 1876. 
 
 I mention this book on account of its being one of the very 
 few direct detailed criticisms of Mr. Spencer's " First Principles." 
 The very startling title implies that the writer does not distin- 
 guish between melodramatic "fatalism" and respectable "deter- 
 minism." The writer, holding a strongly orthodox position, is not, 
 in any case, capable of accepting Mr. Spencer's conclusions, and his 
 criticisms are to be taken as a wholesale attack upon an adver- 
 sary rather than as the discriminative judgment of an impartial 
 critic. The title, preface, and introduction are all very theo- 
 logical, and the peroration at the end of most of the chapters 
 marks them as having been lectures composed with a certain 
 intention to produce an effect upon an audience. This circum- 
 stance is somewhat against the utility of the book, and, as a 
 matter of fact, we find several cases of injustice to Mr. Spencer ; 
 as, for instance, on p. 154, where Mr. Birks speaks of the con- 
 tinuity of motion, and represents motion as being conceived by 
 Mr. Spencer as a substance a liquid capable of being poured 
 from one vessel into another ; whereas the transference of motion 
 is simply this, viz., that if you have a wheel going round at a 
 given rate, and another wheel is put into gear with it, the latter 
 will move faster and the former more slowly. Now although 
 there are numerous differences in cases of the transference of 
 motion, yet they are all changes of relative rates of motion, and 
 not the transference of a substance, liquid or otherwise.
 
 BIRKS. 199 
 
 There are many other misunderstandings as to which the 
 reader must be on his guard. 
 
 On the other hand, the book is -worthy of the attention of stu- 
 dents from the number of valid criticisms made against the " First 
 Principles," more particularly in pointing out the confused and 
 unsatisfactory manner of the exposition, and in adducing quite a 
 number of incompatible statements. Whether or not these are 
 minor errors capable of correction, and not affecting the validity 
 of the main argument, is a matter for consideration. 
 
 Chap, v., on the " Keality of Matter," calls attention to con- 
 trary definitions of reality, which is said in one case to be an 
 external object, the antecedent of impressions, and afterwards is 
 defined as " persistence in consciousness." And the writer, with 
 some justice, complains that "consciousness or states of con- 
 sciousness, phenomena or appearances, relative realities, abso- 
 lute realities, the absolute reality, and the unknowable are 
 named in such a way that it is impossible to know which are 
 meant to be the same, and which are distinguished from each 
 other" (p. 113). 
 
 On p. 1 20 we find manifestations of the unknowable ob- 
 jected to on the ground that the former term destroys the latter. 
 And attention is called, p. 122 et seq., to a passage (and there 
 are many such in Spencer) which we have ourselves endeavoured 
 to understand with patient assiduity, but without success. It is 
 only by detailed examination, such as Professor Birks here gives, 
 that the radical faultiness of Mr. Spencer's style of exposition is 
 fully appreciated, and the apparently systematic and methodical 
 treatment of his subject, together with his loftiness of abstraction, 
 are found to be illusive. We attempted ourselves to make an 
 index of the definitions and propositions contained in "First 
 Principles," but we were not able to succeed. 
 
 There is no important item of criticism in chap, vi., on the 
 " Indestructibility of Matter," and the remarks on the " Con- 
 tinuity of Motion" in the next chapter seem to me to be totally 
 wrong, and even unfair. Mr. Spencer says of neither matter nor 
 motion that they are self -existent ; he declines to make any 
 supposition. 
 
 The section on the " Conservation of Force" (p. 159) is, how- 
 ever, deserving of study as exhibiting the indefiniteness and 
 confusion of Mr. Spencer's statements, say from pp. 161 to 167
 
 200 APPENDIX. 
 
 and p. 171. The passages are too long for quotation. The 
 persistence of force being the mainstay of Mr. Spencer's philo- 
 sophy, renders a clear meaning of the term "force" very im- 
 portant ; but the writer's search for it, like mine, appears to have 
 been in vain. 
 
 The chapter on "Evolution" is not worthy of much attention 
 as valid criticism. The chapter on " Force and Life," however, 
 brings out in the discussion on the definition of "life" the difficulty 
 of framing a merely dynamic physical formula which shall cover 
 the assimilative and disintegrating processes of animal and vege- 
 table life, by which, for instance, the incoming molecules are 
 endowed with the memories and predispositions of their pre- 
 decessors (p. 281), so as to result in growth and nutrition, 
 special structure, and reproduction. "Without assenting to the 
 author's positions, his remarks deserve consideration. The term 
 " organic polarity " is very properly questioned as having any 
 very definite meaning. The writer here also discusses potential 
 energy. I differ both from him and Mr. Spencer in the validity 
 of the use of this word, except as applied to unforeseen effects, 
 the unforeseeingness being due to our want of knowledge of all 
 the antecedents. As applied to entities, as applied to activities 
 supposed to be in abeyance as, for instance, potential energy, 
 potential force, potential motion I should suppose that they do 
 not exist at all while they are not in action. When the motion 
 of any object ceases, it may be revived ; but until it is revived 
 there is no motion, and to speak of it as being in existence as 
 potential motion seems to me to be a mistake ; and so of potential 
 energy and force. If force and motion are constant quantities, 
 they are always actual and never potential As well might one 
 speak of potential matter. Motion locked up or not going on, 
 and force or energy in abeyance, are much the same as matter 
 going out of existence for a time. 
 
 Chapter ix. contains an interesting account of the various 
 theories of the primal factors of the universe. 
 
 A perusal of the first four chapters in this book will assist the 
 reader still further into the confusion and bewilderment natural 
 to the discussion of The Eelative, The Absolute, and The Un- 
 knowable. He will make up his mind to avoid this controversy 
 as much as possible. He will be confirmed in the belief that 
 there is a limit to human knowledge and speculation, and in
 
 FISKE. 201 
 
 the opinion that a philosophy is futile which undertakes to 
 account for every change from the homogeneous. 
 
 The value of this book is not so much in its direct criti- 
 cisms as in its suggestiveness of the need of careful study 
 on the part of the student himself. Perhaps I rather under- 
 rate its value ; it would be very useful but for a quantity of 
 objectionable matter which creates confusion. 
 
 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, based on the Doctrine of 
 Evolution, with Criticisms on the Positive Philosophy. 
 By JOHN FISKE, M.A., LL.R, Harvard University. Mac- 
 millan & Co., 1874. 
 
 This book is not so much a criticism of Mr. Spencer's works 
 as an exposition of them with additional original matter. It is 
 Evolution done into readable English. It does not aim at great 
 elaboration of details nor complete accuracy. It is of great 
 assistance in the study of Spencer, where the mind is apt to 
 get lost in the monotonous wealth of illustrations. The work 
 gives one the impression of great conscientiousness of thought, 
 together with a certain fondness towards the Cosmic theories. It 
 is a well- written book, exhibiting a mastery of the subject, and 
 altogether pleasurable and instructive. The author handles the 
 great problems of his study well and carefully. He has nothing 
 but praise for Mr. Spencer, and entertains a great admiration for 
 his abilities and successful accomplishments. We must not look 
 here for what is to be said against Mr. Spencer's theories ; but 
 perhaps we may look for some strengthenings of deficiencies, some 
 obscurities done into definiteness, or perhaps, on the other hand, 
 some errors made more manifest. In any case, Mr. Fiske's 
 work may be recommended to candid consideration. We can- 
 not pretend to do the book justice. It extends over nearly a 
 thousand pages ; our remarks must be limited to half a dozen. 
 
 I first ask of the author what he means by philosophy. And I 
 get my answer, vol. i. pp. 39-44 : "It is only when the deepest 
 truths respecting physical, chemical, vital, psychical, and social 
 phenomena come to be regarded as corollaries of some universal 
 truth some truth common to all these orders of phenomena 
 that such a body of doctrine becomes possible. Such a body of 
 doctrine is what we call philosophy, in distinction from science.
 
 202 APPENDIX. 
 
 While science studies the parts, philosophy studies the whole. 
 While science, in its highest development, is an aggregate of 
 general doctrines, philosophy, in its highest development, must 
 be a synthesis of all general doctrines into a universal doctrine." 
 
 Again, speaking of Comte, voL i. p. 253 : " Though he insisted 
 upon the all-important truth that philosophy is simply a higher 
 organisation of scientific doctrines and methods, he fell into the 
 error of regarding philosophy merely as a logical Organon of the 
 sciences, and he never framed the conception of philosophy as a 
 universal science, in which the widest truths obtainable by the 
 several sciences are contemplated together as corollaries of a 
 single ultimate truth" 
 
 What, then, is the universal truth from which all others are 
 to be regarded as corollaries ? 
 
 Chap. xi. asks how we are to set about the task of finding it. 
 By induction and subsequent analysis ? " Or, on the other hand, 
 we might begin by searching directly for this ultimate axiom ; 
 and, having found it, we might proceed to deduce from it that 
 widest generalisation which interprets the most general truths 
 severally formulated by the concrete sciences. . . . The latter, or 
 synthetic method of procedure, is much better adapted for our 
 present purpose than the former or analytic method." See 
 p. 265 et seq. Where is this search to be made? Not in the 
 abstract or the concrete sciences (p. 268), but in the abstract- 
 concrete; and we find that "the widest theorems, therefore, 
 which the three abstract-concrete sciences can unite in affirming, 
 must be universal propositions concerning matter and motion. 
 Obviously it is in this region of science that we must look for 
 our primordial theorem." 
 
 The question then arises, What is matter and what is motion ? 
 Evidently they are, in the first place, terms applied to mental 
 ideas, images, symbols, and as such stand for feelings resultant 
 from objective existences, and thus mediately they stand for those 
 objective existences. 
 
 These are found (p. 280) to be continuous, i.e., "matter is in- 
 destructible" and "motion is continuous;" and if these twin 
 theorems are considered, they imply a yet deeper truth (pp. 
 281-283), viz., that "force is persistent." 
 
 If we again ask, What is force ? we find again that it is a 
 mental term ; but it is not so easy to refer it to its origin nor to
 
 
 i,* 
 
 203 
 
 say what it means. All our experiences of matter and motion 
 are said to be experiences of Force, which, I presume, is the ex- 
 perience of the resistance or motion of the matter of which we 
 are composed in relation to external matter and motion, and of 
 the self-consciousness of that matter of which we are composed. 
 Our knowledge of Force is thus limited to its manifestations, 
 viz., a quantum of matter, i.e., resistance and extension, and a 
 quantum of motion, F = M + Mn, but since it does not add to 
 our knowledge nor explain anything, it seems superfluous and 
 misleading to introduce the term at all. 
 
 What is the Force of which he asserts the persistence ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, "First Principles," pp. 189, 190, 192, "It 
 is not the force we are immediately conscious of in our mus- 
 cular efforts ; for this does not persist. Nor can we predicate 
 it of those objects to which our muscular efforts are opposed." 
 Therefore " we are compelled to admit that force as it exists out 
 of our consciousness is not force as we know it. Hence the 
 force of which we assert persistence is that absolute force of 
 which we are indefinitely conscious as the necessary correlate of 
 the force we know." We know no force of which we are con- 
 scious but the force to which it is opposed ; we do not know it, 
 but it is a correlate, and being a correlate it cannot be called 
 absolute or non-related, although it may be called inscrutable 
 particularly if the force of which we are conscious and have 
 knowledge is also one of its manifestations. But that force is 
 more than the summation of matter and motion is not made 
 apparent 
 
 The author then considers the question (p. 204), What warrant 
 have we for the fundamental axiom that force is persistent? When 
 this axiom is established as the primordial truth from which all 
 others are corollaries, we naturally ask, What are the corollaries ? 
 
 When we are asked to deduce corollaries from the persistence 
 of force, we inquire whether the force referred to is knowable or 
 unknowable. If the former, then the only force we know may 
 be ist, Consciousness, but this does not persist; or it may be 
 matter and motion ; or it may be all three. But if the persis- 
 tent force we know is indestructible matter and continuous 
 motion, we are asked to make these latter corollaries of them- 
 selves when we are asked to deduce them from the persistence 
 of force. But if, again, it is the unknowable force from which
 
 204 APPENDIX. 
 
 we are asked to deduce the corollaries of the indestructibility of 
 matter and the continuity of motion, we naturally ask, How can 
 we get corollaries from what we do not know ? How can we 
 deduce knowledge out of ignorance ? 
 
 Is it too much to ask if the existence of matter is a corollary 
 from the persistence of force ? or if the existence of motion is a 
 corollary from it? or if, vice versa, the existence of force is a 
 corollary from the existence of matter and motion ? A good deal 
 will depend upon whether we are speaking of our consciousness 
 of force or of something external independent of consciousness. 
 If the latter, then we do not see that matter and motion are 
 corollaries from force ; if the former, then they may be corol- 
 laries from force. Then, again, is consciousness itself a corollary 
 from the " fundamental axiom " of the persistence of force ? 
 I may say that the author does not deal with these corollaries, 
 and the presumption is that there is more than one fundamental 
 axiom. The corollaries adduced by him are the persistence of 
 relations amongst forces, the correlation of forces, the transference 
 of motion, the rhythm of motion, and so we get on to the law 
 of Evolution (p. 350), which, of course, is Mr. Spencer's formula. 
 
 Now there is no attempt to show that Evolution is a corollary 
 from the persistence of force, given a quantum of matter and a 
 quantum of motion and predicating homogeneity. 
 
 Mr. Fiske starts, p. 360, with a nebula containing hetero- 
 geneous constituents and heterogeneous motion, and calls that by 
 implication a corollary from the persistence of force. 
 
 After completing the planetary evolution and the evolu- 
 tion of the earth, he reaches eventually the beginning of life. 
 This difficulty our author deals with boldly. He makes the most 
 of Dr. Bastian's experiments, which, after all, he has to confess 
 are merely of a suggestive value. And (p. 430) 
 
 " For the present, in representing to ourselves how life may 
 have originated upon the earth, we are reduced to a few most 
 general considerations. However the question may eventually 
 be decided as to the possibility of archebiosis occurring at the 
 present day amid the artificial circumstances of the laboratory, 
 it cannot be denied that archebiosis, or the origination of living 
 matter in accordance with natural laws, must have occurred at some 
 epoch in the past. That life has not always existed upon the 
 earth's surface is certain ; and the following considerations will
 
 FISKE. 205 
 
 show that in its first appearance there need not have heen any- 
 thing either sudden or abnormal" 
 
 Now to say that archebiosis must have occurred because there 
 is life now and once there was not, is a very different thing from 
 saying that it must have occurred because it is an inevitable 
 corollary from the persistence of force. This is the task that 
 the author next sets himself, and there can be no dispute about 
 it that he fails. 
 
 The general considerations he refers to are a combination of 
 the elements of organic bodies in a cooling world (p. 433). 
 
 " Here we obtain a hint as to the origin of organic life upon the 
 earth's surface. In accordance with the modern dynamic theory 
 of life, we are bound to admit that the higher and less stable 
 aggregations of molecules which constitute protoplasm were built 
 up in just the same way in which the lower and more stable aggre- 
 gations of molecules which constitute a single or double salt were 
 built up. Dynamically" (notice the limitation) "the only dif- 
 ference between carbonate of ammonia and protoplasm which can 
 be called fundamental is the greater molecular complexity and 
 consequent instability of the latter. We are bound to admit, 
 then, that as carbonic acid and ammonia, when brought into 
 juxtaposition, united by virtue of their inherent properties as 
 soon as the diminishing temperature would let them; so also 
 carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen, when brought into jux- 
 taposition, united by virtue of their inherent properties into 
 higher and higher multiples as fast as the diminishing tempera- 
 ture would let them, until at last living protoplasm was the 
 result of the long-continued process." 
 
 I ask, should not the adjective "living" be substituted by the 
 adjective " chemical " ? The introduction of the word " living " 
 seems to be begging the question. 
 
 Page 434. "In view of these considerations, it may be held 
 that the evolution of living things is a not improbable concomi- 
 tant of the cooling down of any planetary body which contains 
 upon its surface the chemical constituents of living matter." 
 
 Pursuing our logical course of deducing corollaries from the 
 persistence of force as applied to matter and motion, we find the 
 result attenuated into a "not improbable concomitant." 
 
 This failure is confessed in the preceding section, viz. : 
 
 "It is at the same time true that the ultimate mystery the
 
 206 APPENDIX. 
 
 association of vital properties with the enormously complex 
 chemical compound known as protoplasm remains unsolved, 
 . . . and very likely we shall never know." 
 
 I ask the author candidly to say, if any mystery is left un- 
 explained i.e., any fact or truth that is not capable of being 
 included in a corollary from the persistence of force if that 
 fundamental axiom really is the Organon or instrument of syn- 
 thesis which he claims it to be ? 
 
 If there are other mysteries, so much the worse for the 
 Organon ; but I think he is mistaken in saying that there are 
 similar mysteries. He says that " it is equally mysterious that 
 starch or sugar or alcohol should manifest properties not displayed 
 by their elements." Now, since these elements are composed of 
 certain units having definite shapes, sizes, modes and rates of 
 motion, they are capable, under given conditions of medium and 
 motion, of entering into specific combinations with other elements 
 which shall have shapes, sizes, modes and rates of motion, the 
 resultant being different from those of the two or more which 
 entered into the combination. These resultants, if we had the 
 requisite knowledge of the original mechanical factors, we could 
 calculate. It is true we could not calculate our altered sensa- 
 tions, e.g., taste ; but that is another question. 
 
 On p. 430 the author also refers to acquired tendencies and 
 heredity, but he does not endeavour to account for these as 
 corollaries from the persistence of force. 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding these admissions, he winds up the chapter 
 very complacently (p. 435) : 
 
 " In this account of the matter we have completed, so far as 
 is needful for the purposes of this work, our exposition of the 
 evolution of the earth. . . . "We have witnessed . . . resulting 
 at last in the genesis of compounds manifesting those properties 
 which we distinguish as vital." " It is only for reasons of con- 
 venience that the formation of primeval protoplasm is assigned 
 to a different science from that which deals with the formation of 
 limestone or silica." But again, on the other hand, he says : 
 "It is not pretended, however, that these considerations fulfil 
 all the requirements of a scientific explanation of the genesis of 
 life." In this respect he follows Mr. Spencer and alternately 
 says, Ah ! now I have it see how plain it is ! And then again 
 Mystery ah ! !
 
 FISKE. 207 
 
 The next chapter, on "Special Creation or Derivation?" is 
 of very secondary importance as a step in the advancement of the 
 synthesis, since it is dependent altogether upon the preceding 
 one. Yet granted life, feeling, or consciousness in vast masses 
 of almost formless protoplasm, combinations and definite forms 
 might ensue ; still the mystery of the acquirement of tendency, 
 reproduction, and heredity would remain unexplained as a corol- 
 lary from the persistence of force. 
 
 And even the formula of Evolution would be difficult of appli- 
 cation, as already indicated in our criticism of Spencer, more 
 particularly with respect to memory, the establishment of intel- 
 lectual correspondences, the classification of cases, things, and 
 relations. For under what clause of the formula of Evolution do 
 they come? The formula recognises only "the integration of 
 matter and the concomitant dissipation of motion," and what are 
 these that we wish to include in the formula ? Truly the cha- 
 racteristics of mental evolution in respect of advancement from 
 indefiniteness to definiteness, complexity and heterogeneity, are 
 similar to physical evolution ; but are they the physical evolu- 
 tion itself as specified in the formula ? 
 
 The word " integration " is constantly used in the account of 
 the composition and evolution of mind, thus tending to give a 
 verbal similarity to the representation of its development with 
 that of the physical world ; but it means in this case definite 
 combination of feeling, and not the integration of matter mentioned 
 in the formula of Evolution. Thus we find, vol. ii. p. 119, " Under 
 its most general aspect all mental action whatever is definable 
 as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of 
 consciousness" Page 155 " There is an integration of the 
 present impressions with such past ones as they resemble, and 
 a differentiation of them from such past ones as they do not 
 resemble." Again, p. 373 " The doctrine of Evolution . . . 
 represents also the most extensive integration of correspondences 
 that has yet been achieved." So, while there is a formula of 
 life, there is a formula of psychical evolution (p. 119), and a 
 formula of social evolution (p. 223). That there is some 
 difficulty in including these in the general formula of Evolu- 
 tion is shown by the author's remarks, p. 162 : "While steadily 
 refraining from the chimerical attempt to identify mind with 
 some form of matter or motion, it has nevertheless been shown
 
 208 APPENDIX. 
 
 that, owing 'to the mysterious but unquestionable correlation 
 which exists between the phenomena of mind and the pheno- 
 mena of matter and motion, it is possible to describe the evolution. 
 of the former by the same formula which describes the evolution 
 of the latter." This is true if the terras matter and motion 
 are omitted from the formula, and it is thus made to relate to pro- 
 cesses only. In this case there might be any number of factors, 
 and the formula would only deal with definite combinations of 
 them. 
 
 Thus we come to the same conclusion as that to which our 
 examination of Spencer led us, viz., that as a System of Philo- 
 sophy i.e., the establishment of a fundamental truth or axiom 
 from which all others can be derived as corollaries the Evolu- 
 tion formula, and the axiom of the persistence of force, are 
 insufficient, and the attempt to establish a universal philosophy 
 is a failure. 
 
 In the body of our essay we discussed the question as to con- 
 sciousness being a mode of motion. Here we suggest the ques- 
 tion as to whether it is to be considered a mode of force. If 
 so, is it a constant quantity, the same as those other modes of 
 force called matter and motion 1 We presume it must be, else 
 we have something coming into existence and going out of exist- 
 ence, which, Mr. Spencer says, is inconceivable. 
 
 According to " First Principles," p. 1 69, " matter and motion, 
 as we know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of 
 Force." A manifestation, properly speaking, means something 
 known to a conscious being capable of knowledge ; but Mr. 
 Spencer deals with real existences previous to the existence of 
 such beings, and therefore we have to translate the word " mani- 
 festation " into " modes of activity," and omit the phrase " as we 
 know them," At the same time, it seems better to retain the 
 word manifestation, as implying a power capable of transforming 
 itself into different modes, and by this means we retain the 
 unificatory idea, and avoid the application of the term " mode of 
 activity" to matter. If this is justifiable, then the following 
 considerations occur to the student : 
 
 If matter and motion are the manifestations of force, then 
 force preceded both matter and motion, and was the sole exist- 
 ence. For if matter and motion were coeval with force, then 
 they were conditions of force and not manifestations of it.
 
 FISKE. 209 
 
 The existence of a thing must precede its manifestation, otherwise 
 existence and manifestation must be words having the same 
 meaning, and the word manifestation will have no meaning be- 
 yond existence, in which case force is merely a term, being the 
 summary of matter and motion ; and the phrase persistence of 
 force, a summary of the indestructibility of matter and the 
 continuity of motion. It is the total of an addition. 
 
 But if, on the contrary, it is stated that the existence of force 
 preceded the existence of ..matter and motion, and that the latter 
 are only manifestations of the former, then there was a time 
 when matter and motion did not exist, which Mr. Spencer 
 denies we can conceive, but which nevertheless we are hereby 
 bound to conceive. 
 
 Moreover, if matter and motion are only manifestations of a 
 primal existence called force, we want to know if this is not 
 the homogeneous from which all changes started. If so, how can 
 we apply to it the unproved principle of the instability of the 
 homogeneous, which instability we found to be due to external 
 influences, for in this case there would be no externality ? And 
 again, if force is persistent, it means that it remains force, and 
 does not change to anything else, and its manifestations are not 
 differentiated. Again, can we apply to the sole existence of 
 Force the formula of Evolution, and deduce therefrom the dif- 
 ferentiation of force into matter and motion ? Does the formula 
 of Evolution account for these manifestations of force ? 
 
 Again, if matter and motion are only different manifestations 
 of the same thing, it is to be presumed that they are interchange- 
 able one form of manifestations may be changed into another 
 form. Matter may go out of existence and become motion. 
 Motion may cease and become matter, so long as the quantum of 
 force remains the same. Thus an atom or ultimate unit may cease 
 to exist so long as the force of which it is the manifestation is 
 transferred to the acceleration of the motion of some other atom 
 or unit. And conversely one atom or unit moving very rapidly 
 may become two units moving slowly, for the quantum of force 
 remains the same. 
 
 It is to be presumed, also, that if force existed antecedent to 
 matter and motion, it could exist unconditioned by these mani- 
 festations, and its quantum is not to be reckoned by the total 
 of the two, for there is no necessity for supj osing all or any of 
 

 
 2io APPENDIX. 
 
 it becoming manifested in these particular ways. It is not 
 illogical, then, to suppose a part or quantum of force still un- 
 ranked with the manifestations of matter and motion, but 
 capable at any time, on conditions unknown, of becoming so. 
 This does away with the ideas of the permanently fixed quantum 
 of matter and the permanently fixed quantum of motion, which 
 may not only be changed from one to the other, as already seen, 
 but may receive accessions at any time. 
 
 It therefore does not follow from the persistence of force that 
 there is a fixed quantum of matter and of motion. And unless 
 there is any necessity shown why the whole of force should be 
 used up into manifestations of matter and motion, there may be 
 an unresolved quantum capable of adding to these manifestations 
 of itself at any time, and, for anything we know to the contrary, 
 may have other modes altogether of manifesting itself say, for 
 instance, in consciousness. 
 
 We come to the conclusion, then, that the indestructibility of 
 matter and the continuity of motion are not corollaries from 
 the notion of the persistence of force, but that this idea is built 
 up from the two former, of which it is merely the summation. 
 It is therefore erroneous to put it down as the fundamental 
 truth of philosophy. It is derived, and not fundamental. The 
 fundamental truths are the indestructibility of matter and the 
 continuity of motion, and perhaps the consciousness which 
 recognises them. 
 
 If, on the other hand, it is the fundamental truth, then the 
 conclusions follow that I have just enumerated, and the formula 
 of Evolution is utterly inadequate to represent it, as indeed it is 
 utterly inadequate to account for all the changes of the universe. 
 At the same time there is a greater correspondence between the 
 primordial truth, so escaping from the bondage of the formula, 
 and those facts of the universe which the formula strives vainly 
 to compass. Is it too much to say that there is in the universe 
 more than is contained in the formula, more than man can ever 
 put into words ? that while he may know part and generalise 
 part, and predicate likenesses of processes, and recognise the 
 same characteristics of procedure throughout, it will never be 
 possible for him to comprehend all 1 that there are things which 
 elude his eager grasp, and abysses he cannot fathom 1 
 
 A notice of this book would be incomplete without a reference
 
 FISKE. 2ir 
 
 to the author's emphatic repudiation of Materialism, his practical 
 acceptance of Spiritualism, his rejection of "blind force," his 
 acknowledgment of a Divine power, and his advocacy of religion 
 under the term " cosmic theism." 
 
 This matter is fully stated vol. ii. p. 375 et seq. Indeed, the 
 consideration of it takes up the rest of the book to p. 508, and I 
 cannot attempt to do it justice. I quote a few passages merely 
 as indicating the line of thought. 
 
 Page 375. " We have already, in the earlier part of this work, 
 been brought to the conclusion that the phenomenal universe is 
 the manifestation of a Divine power that cannot be identified 
 with the totality of phenomena ; we have now to unfold some- 
 what more fully what is meant by this theistic conclusion. We 
 have, at every fitting opportunity, declared that the phenomena 
 of mind can in no wise be explained as movements of matter, 
 while at the same time a law of evolution expressed in terms of 
 matter and motion is found to include the order of sequence of 
 psychical phenomena. We must now attempt to clear away the 
 difficulties which to many minds no doubt cluster around the 
 seeming paradox. We have also hinted that, beside the sphere 
 to be assigned to morality, there is a wider sphere to be assigned 
 to religion ; it behoves us now to show what are the general 
 functions of religion, in accordance with our fundamental view 
 of life as an adjustment between inner and outer relations. . . . 
 The central problem which must first occupy us, and the decision 
 of which will affect the treatment of all the others, is the problem 
 of theism." 
 
 Page 377. "While upon the time-honoured statical view of 
 things, any given group of phenomena was explained by a refer- 
 ence to the direct creative action of a Divine power extraneous 
 to the cosmos ; on the other hand, upon the modern dynamical 
 view of things, any given group of phenomena is explained by a 
 reference to some antecedent group of phenomena, while all 
 phenomena alike are regarded as the sensible manifestations of a 
 Divine power immanent in the cosmos. ... As was clearly shown 
 in the first part of this work, and as will presently be still more 
 emphatically reiterated, our cosmic philosophy is based upon the 
 affirmation of God's existence, and not upon the denial of it, like 
 irreligious Atheism, or upon the ignoring of it like non-religious 
 Positivism. The question which we have now to answer concerns
 
 212 APPENDIX. 
 
 the existence of a limited personal God, who is possessed of a 
 quasi-human consciousness, from whose quasi-human volitions 
 have originated the laws of nature, and to whose quasi-human 
 contrivance are due the manifold harmonies observed in the uni- 
 verse. Is this most refined and subtilised remnant of primitive 
 anthropomorphism to be retained by our cosmic philosophy, or 
 is it to be rejected ? And if it is to be rejected, what are the 
 grounds which justify us in rejecting it?" 
 
 Chap. ii. of Part iii. is against anthropomorphic theism, and 
 chap. iii. is a survey of the groundwork of cosmic theism. 
 "We summarise the latter as follows, viz. (p. 412) : "The vast 
 synthesis of forces without us, which in manifold contact with 
 us is, from infancy till the close of life, continually arousing us 
 to perceptive activity, can never be known by us as it exists 
 objectively, but only as it affects our consciousness." Thus the 
 universe itself is inscrutable to us. (Page 413) "Underlying 
 this aggregate of phenomena we have found ourselves compelled 
 to postulate an absolute reality a something whose existence 
 does not depend on the presence of a percipient mind, which 
 existed before the genesis of intelligence, and would continue to 
 exist though all intelligence were to vanish from the scene." 
 This something is called force, absolute force, the unknown 
 cause of these manifestations, an unconditioned reality, without 
 beginning or end, absolute Being, formularised thus : " There 
 exists a POWER, to which no limit in time or space is conceivable, 
 of which all phenomena as presented in consciousness are 
 manifestations, but which we can know only through these 
 manifestations. " 
 
 This formula, arrived at objectively and subjectively, expresses 
 the fundamental truth of theism the existence of God. This is 
 contrasted with Comtism. The author states, p. 422 : " When, 
 summing up all activity in one most comprehensive epithet, 
 we call it force, we are but using a scientific symbol, expressing 
 an affection of our consciousness, which is yet powerless to ex- 
 press the ineffable reality. To us, therefore, as to the Israelite 
 of old, the very name of Jehovah is that which is not to be 
 spoken. . . . We shall never fathom this ultimate mystery, we 
 shall be no nearer the comprehension of this omnipresent Energy. 
 Here science must ever reverently pause, acknowledging the pre- 
 sence of the mystery of mysteries. Here religion must ever hold
 
 F1SKE. 213 
 
 sway, reminding us that from birth until death we are dependent 
 on a Power to whose eternal decrees we must submit, to whose 
 dispensations we must resign ourselves, and upon whose con- 
 stancy we may implicitly rely." 
 
 "We have avoided criticisms by the way, though tempted much 
 to animadvert on the viciousness of all arguments in which the 
 word "absolute" is introduced. We pause here, however, to 
 remark upon the extraordinary result at which we have arrived, 
 when we consider that the author strenuously repudiates from 
 his religion every vestige of anthropomorphism, every trace of 
 intelligence. For he reminds us that we are dependent upon a 
 Power who has made decrees to which we must submit ; to 
 whose dispensations, i.e., arrangements in relation to ourselves, 
 we must resign ourselves ; and upon whose constancy (faithful- 
 ness to us, or persistence of decrees 1} we may implicitly rely. 
 It is said that a lover sees in his mistress a good many more 
 charms than she really possesses : may it not be so with a philo- 
 sopher and his formulas 1 The author says, " Here science must 
 ever reverently pause, acknowledging the presence of the mystery 
 of mysteries." I do not know at all why I should be reverent 
 before the mysterious, i.e., that which I cannot understand. The 
 savage worshipped the white man's watch, and fell down in awe 
 before a paper which had carried a written message. I have no 
 reverence for a cosmic or for a solar system. If a stellar system 
 in the galaxy of the sky has no life and mind in it, it may be 
 obliterated from the face of the heavens and leave me uncon- 
 cerned. I have no reverence for the whole cosmos itself if it 
 manifests nothing but a force which has no intelligence in it, 
 anthropomorphic though such a notion may be. My reverence 
 is not excited by vastness of chemical processes. I am no more 
 in awe of a volcano or a thunderstorm than of the fire in my 
 grate or the galvanic battery on my table. Nor do I tremble 
 when gazing upon the scattered fires of the primal furnace, nor 
 that burnt-out cinder the moon ! How many tons of lime- 
 stone, how may cubic feet of oxygen and hydrogen, excite the 
 reverence of our author ? But the savage was right when he 
 worshipped the watch and reverenced the scroll, for a higher 
 intelligence was manifested there ! 
 
 While sympathising with the author in his religious aspira- 
 tions, I cannot approve of this attempt to palm off an empty
 
 214 APPENDIX. 
 
 abstraction upon my sympathies, and of this wresting of religious 
 language from its proper application towards an intelligence to 
 do service for an abstraction. However, the difficulty is cer- 
 tainly great to have a God who is not a personality endowed 
 with intelligence. 
 
 This difficulty the author proceeds to consider in his remarks 
 on Pantheism (pp. 423-425). The result is that God must be 
 considered as a power or force, about which (not whom) nothing 
 can be known, and from which must be disassociated both in- 
 telligence and volition ; and even, if we come to that, which we 
 must not regard even as force, for the very terms matter and force 
 (p. 430) "are mere symbols, which stand tant Ken que mal for 
 certain generalised modes of Divine manifestation : they are no 
 more real existences than the x and y of the algebraist are real 
 existences." So also the word " divine " is a mere symbol of a 
 something, we really cannot know what ; and the wedding ser- 
 vice of science and religion, like that of the Church of England 
 ritual, ends in blank " amazement " ! We are afraid the prayer 
 for a fruitful progeny is of doubtful hope. 
 
 Chap. iv. treats of matter and spirit, at p. 434. "What 
 concerns us is the initial non sequitur that every attempt to in- 
 terpret mental manifestations by a reference to material structure 
 involves the assertion of Materialism. This is the non sequitur 
 which lies at the very bottom of the theological misrepresentation, 
 and its utter fallaciousness needs to be thoroughly exposed." 
 
 After saying that matter is merely a symbol, and is not a real 
 existence, we are at a loss how to appreciate the term mate- 
 rialistic here. However, I suppose matter must be accepted as 
 a manifestation of the inscrutable force, but what we know of 
 matter, in so far as it is knowable, is, that it is resistant and ex- 
 tended, and can be described geometrically and arithmetically, 
 and that it has motion. And when it is included in the formula 
 of Evolution, we have a definite notion that all changes are 
 changes of combinations of resistance, extension, and motion 
 which are capable of geometrical and arithmetical expression. 
 And since matter and motion are the manifestations originally 
 of an initial force, or the exponents of an existent force limited 
 by the limitations of the formula of Evolution, then all changes 
 occurring in the universe have to be ascribed to changes of com- 
 binations of matter and motion, and are to be called materialistic ;
 
 FISKE. 215 
 
 and since the facts of consciousness and mind are amongst those 
 changes, the theory which accepts the formula of Evolution, 
 notwithstanding its claim for an initial force which is not 
 materialistic, and an outcome of mind which is not materialistic, 
 is justly open to the charge, and must either accept it or abandon 
 its formula. Indeed, there is no other factor mentioned in the 
 formula than matter and motion ; and witness the futile attempt 
 made to galvanise chemical combinations into vital processes. 
 
 It would appear, however, that practically both Mr. Spencer 
 and his disciple abandon the formula of Evolution, and, there- 
 fore, the unification -of philosophy. 
 
 The author proceeds to considerations which show that the 
 materialistic hypothesis of mental phenomena is untenable. In 
 this interesting chapter there are many powerful and cogent 
 passages too long as well as too numerous for quotation. We 
 give one only : 
 
 " Henceforth we may regard Materialism as ruled out, and 
 relegated to that limbo of crudities. . . . The latest results of 
 scientific inquiry, whether in the region of objective psychology 
 or in that of molecular physics, leave the gulf between mind and 
 matter quite as wide as it was judged to be in the time of 
 Descartes. It still remains as true as then that between that of 
 which the differential attribute is thought and that of which the 
 differential attribute is extension there can be nothing like 
 identity or similarity. Although we have come to see that 
 between the manifestations of the two there is such an unfailing 
 parallelism that one group of phenomena can be correctly de- 
 scribed by formulas originally invented for describing the other 
 group, yet all that has been established is this parallelism. . . . 
 Eich as are the harvests which science has obtained from these 
 two fields, the fence which divides them has never been broken 
 down ; and until the insuperable distinction between subject and 
 object, between the conscious and the unconscious, can be tran- 
 scended, it can never be broken down." 
 
 Chap. v. is on "Keligion as Adjustment," the principle of 
 which is stated on p. 465. "A philosophy of morality has for 
 its subject-matter the principles of action conducive to the right 
 living of the individual, so far as the well-being of the community 
 is concerned ; so a philosophy of religion has for its subject- 
 matter the relations of the individual to the Inscrutable Power
 
 216 APPENDIX. 
 
 manifested in the universe, and the principles of action con- 
 ducive to his right living, considered as a part and parcel of the 
 universe." 
 
 " The religious sense is primarily based upon the aspiration 
 the noblest which any creature can entertain after complete 
 f ulness of life ; and any thought or act, any sin of omission or of 
 commission, inconsistent with such aspiration, awakens the pain- 
 ful consciousness of shortcoming, without any reference to those 
 lower considerations of pleasure and pain of which alone 
 Hedonism takes cognisance." 
 
 I do not know to what extent we should feel ourselves con- 
 cerned with an Inscrutable Power which has no personality or 
 volition, or what regard we should pay to the harmony of the 
 universe beyond concern for our own happiness and the happi- 
 ness of the community. There is no doubt that such a senti- 
 ment might grow up naturally, for all sorts of correspondences 
 grow up in the mind between itself and externalities, and a cor- 
 respondence between it and the whole course of the universe 
 might be established and cultivated, but then it might be shown 
 to be unreasonable. It is a mere sentiment towards an object of 
 the highest degree of abstraction. 
 
 The consideration of the work thus tends to show that the 
 formula of Evolution is insufficient to explain the universe, what- 
 ever parallelisms may exist between it and any supplementary 
 formula that can be devised to make up for the deficiency. 
 
 It also shows that cosmic theism is a religion only affecting 
 the most highly cultivated, refined, and philosophic minds, quite 
 out of the reach of ordinary struggling humanity. It may be as 
 beautiful as a star in the heavens, to be seen only through a 
 powerful telescope by the astronomer who knows where to find 
 it, but it is as far away. 
 
 Dr. Martineau's Essays. 2 vols. London, Trubner&Co., 1879. 
 Essay, " Science, Nescience, and Faith" and " The Place 
 of Mind in Nature" a Lecture by Dr. Martineau. Lon- 
 don, Williams & Norgate, 1872. 
 
 I might refer to almost all of Dr. Martineau's essays as eluci- 
 dative of this faith in the existence of a Power that is more 
 than matter and motion. He is a teacher as well as a critic.
 
 MARTINEAU. 217 
 
 But it is not now our province to examine his doctrine as to 
 the existence of a Supreme Mind in nature.* "We shall only 
 examine the critical portion of his notices of the doctrine of 
 Evolution. And if one had to perish by the sword of criticism, 
 would one not choose to be slain by that keen Damascus blade 
 so sharp and yet so beautiful, so trenchant and yet so richly 
 wrought, and withal descending in its strokes with such dreadful 
 glitter and polish of steel? 
 
 To dissect an article of Dr. Martineau's, to get at the structure 
 of the argument, is as bad as pulling to pieces a beautiful plant. 
 There is in each essay so much appealing to the feeling of beauty, 
 so much relating to our highest sentiments, that we have to out- 
 rage these much in moving the elegancies aside in order to leave 
 bare the skeleton of firm structure. Not, however, that the 
 philosophic exposition gains by these elegancies of expression. 
 
 In the latter essay, Dr. Martineau regards the recognition of 
 mind as the essential object of religion, and rejects mere wonder. 
 
 " In dealing with these three conceptions of creation, con- 
 struction, evolution there is one thing on which religion insists, 
 viz., that mind is first, and rules for ever ; and whatever the pro- 
 cess be, is its process, moving towards congenial ends." 
 
 But an evolutionary process is quite consistent with religion 
 as thus regarded. 
 
 "Let this be granted, and it matters not by what path of 
 method the Divine thought advances, or how long it is upon 
 the road." 
 
 Nevertheless, if the evolutionary process be accepted, it is apt 
 to foster a variety of illusions. These are, firstly, our altered feel- 
 ings with reference to the authority of the moral sense, obligation 
 to a Divine ruler, our faith in the intuitions of conscience. For 
 " it usually treats as a superstition our natural reverence for the 
 rational moral and religious intuitions as sources of independent 
 insight and ultimate authority ; and, in order to estimate them, 
 translates them back into shorthand experiences of sensible ex- 
 perience and social utility." 
 
 However, if Mind be granted at the beginning, and Evolution 
 
 be accepted as its process towards an end, we think confidence 
 
 should be restored however, this is what Mr. Fiske would say. 
 
 And, indeed, the solution of the problem is indicated by Mr. 
 
 * For this see specially "Essays," vol. ii. pp. 185-189.
 
 218 APPENDIX. 
 
 Martineau himself in saying that we are to look for the functions 
 of our highest faculties in their last stage, not their first. 
 
 The second part of this essay deals with the origination of life 
 out of inorganic substances. Start, he says, with the homo- 
 geneous, and you cannot advance the history one hair's-breadth 
 through an eternity. Again, present it with an object of hetero- 
 geneous elements, and again you cannot advance beyond the 
 water and the air, the salts of the ocean, and the earthy or rocky 
 compounds that comprise the crust of the globe. 
 
 An argument advanced against the mere materialistic and 
 mechanical origin of the universe is thus expressed by Dr. 
 Martineau : 
 
 "If all force is to be conceived as one, its type must be looked 
 for in the highest and all-comprehending term ; and mind must 
 be conceived as there. . . . Or, if you retain the forces in their 
 plurality, then you must assume them all among your data, and 
 confess, with one of the greatest living expositors of the pheno- 
 mena of Development (Lotze), that unless among your primordial 
 elements you scatter already the germs of mind as well as the 
 inferior elements, the Evolution can never be wrought out." 
 
 In the essay on " Science, Nescience, and Faith," Dr. Mar- 
 tineau deals, in the first instance, with the theory of The Absolute. 
 Referring to the different moods of the scientific man and the 
 prophet, he brings out the distinction between the views of an 
 age in which science is predominant and an age in which reli- 
 gion is predominant, and then proposes the question, " What can 
 we say, and on what warrant, respecting that invisible sphere of 
 Power behind phenomena 1 " 
 
 The position gathered by Mr. Spencer from the critique of 
 opposite opinions is that the Supreme Cause is incognisable. 
 Thus we arrive at the Absolute. Upon this Mr. Martineau 
 says : 
 
 "The doctrine of religious nescience has been rendered so 
 familiar by Mr. Mansel as to belong to the common stock of 
 contemporary thought, and to make any full exposition of its 
 grounds unnecessary. It assumes that God, if acknowledged 
 at all, must be entitled to the epithets ' absolute ' and ' infinite ' 
 on the one hand, and ' cause ' on the other. Supposing this to 
 be admitted, several contradictions arise between the parts of 
 the admission and some positions to which thought is incom-
 
 MARTINEAU. 219 
 
 petent altogether. To be ' absolute,' for instance, means to be 
 out of all relations ; to be ' cause ' means to stand related to an 
 effect ; and the same object cannot be both. Again, ' infinite ' 
 being is unexclusive being, to which nothing can be added and 
 no new predicate attached ; ' causal ' being is transitive and 
 productive, passing to conditions not occupied before, and 
 adding to the stock of existence, or functions of existence, 
 chargeable upon it. The epithets are therefore incompatible. 
 Moreover, the very nature of thought itself imprisons us within 
 the circle of relative things ; for it carries in it a necessary 
 duality, and consists in marking off and distinguishing object 
 from subject, body from space, attribute from substance, prior 
 from posterior, and individuals, classes, and qualities inter se. 
 Apart from a field or term of comparison, cmy-ihmg proposed for 
 thought becomes wo-thing, and only a vacancy remains ; nor is 
 the vacancy itself appreciable but by standing over against the 
 self that looks into it. If then, to think is, on the one hand, to 
 note the confines of things, it can never pass beyond the finite ; 
 and if it is, on the other, to discriminate their contents and pro- 
 perties, it can never pass beyond the relative. The absolute and 
 infinite cannot therefore present itself to the intellect at all. So 
 the warrant for the doctrine of religious nescience is simply this, 
 that God is ' absolute,' and we can know nothing but the 
 relative. 
 
 "Of one point, however, Mr. Spencer declares we may be sure, 
 and that upon the highest guarantee, the same a priori necessity 
 of thought which enforces the nescience itself, viz., that the abso- 
 lute exists in reality, though denied to apprehension. For were 
 it" otherwise there could be no relative, relativity itself being in its 
 term cognisable only by contrast with the non-relative, and forming 
 a duality with it. Take away its antithetic term, and the relative, 
 thrown into isolation, is set up as absolute and disappears from 
 thought. It is indispensable, therefore, to uphold the absolute 
 in existence, as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes 
 our whole intellectual domain. Be it so ; but when saved on 
 this plea to preserve the balance and interdependence of two 
 co-relatives the ' absolute ' is absolute no more ; it is reduced 
 to a term of relation ; it loses therefore its exile from thought ; 
 its disqualification is cancelled; and the alleged nescience is 
 discharged."
 
 220 APPENDIX. 
 
 Then follows a long consideration of metaphysical terms, into 
 which it would be impossible for us to enter in a short notice 
 like this. 
 
 The principal point would be found, I think, to be the discus- 
 sion of "Causation," Essays, voL i. p. 197 et seq. : 
 
 " Mr. Spencer freely allows that we are obliged to regard 
 every phenomenon as the manifestation of some Power; that 
 ' we are obliged to regard that Power as Omnipresent ' (p. 99) ; 
 that ' we are no more able to form a circumscribed idea of Cause 
 than of Space or Time, and we are consequently obliged to 
 think of the Cause which transcends our thought as positive 
 though indefinite ' (p. 93) ; that we have a right to trust this 
 demand for originating power ; and that on this reposes our in- 
 destructible belief in an ultimate Omnipotent Reality. Here 
 already are several predicates assigned which hardly consist with 
 the proclamation that the Primary Existence is wholly unknown ; 
 that Being, it seems we may say, is One, Eternal, Ubiquitous, 
 Omnipotent, manifested as Cause in all phenomena. Is there 
 not more explicitness here than could be expected from an entity 
 absolutely latent? But this is not all. Our author further 
 identifies the First Cause with what appears in science under the 
 name of ' Force,' and is tracked through the metamorphoses of 
 physical, chemical, vital, and other phenomena. The dynamic 
 principles that we carry into our interpretation of nature, that 
 Force is persistent through all expenditures, and one under every 
 disguise are in truth but the transformed expression of the 
 axiom of ultimate Causation. The primary and secondary 
 agencies being thus merged into one, and conjointly made objects 
 of a priori apprehension, the next question naturally is what 
 in the last resort means this word ' Cause ' ? Pursued backward 
 to its native seat, as a form of the intellect itself, what type 
 does the thought present ? Mr. Spencer truly says, ' the force 
 by which we ourselves produce changes, and which serves to 
 symbolise the cause of changes in general, is the final disclosure 
 of analysis' (p. 235); he admits that we cannot match our 
 own voluntary effort against an external force, and regard 
 them as susceptible of a common measure, without assuming 
 them to be like in kind (pp. 58, 254); and as 'no force save 
 that of which we are conscious during our own muscular efforts 
 is immediately known to us,' while ' all other force is mediately
 
 MARTINEAU. 221 
 
 known,' it is clearly the inner volition that serves as prototype 
 of all exterior power, and defines what the intellect intends by 
 the word Cause. Now combine these several propositions. One 
 power we immediately know. That power is Will. Others, if 
 assumed by us, rrmst be assimilated to this. But behind every 
 phenomenon we must assume a power. And all such powers 
 are modes of one and the same. And that one is identical with 
 the First Cause and Ultimate Reality of Being. The inference is 
 irresistible, that by a fundamental necessity of thought we are 
 constrained to own an ever-living Will, a Personal Agent, as 
 Author and Administrator of the universe. This is precisely 
 what the Theist maintains ; and includes all that he can gather 
 from the bare contemplation of physical nature, apart from the 
 moral experiences and the spiritual history of humanity. Col- 
 lected from so limited a ground, the ground too least rich in 
 phenomena of the highest expression, it is but a meagre and 
 imperfect form of faith. But still it dissipates the theory of 
 nescience. It vindicates some distinct apprehensions of the 
 ' Supreme Eeality.' And drawn as it is directly from the statements 
 of an author who controverts it, it is a matter of some curiosity 
 to see how he evades the apparent cogency of his own premises. 
 
 " He forsakes the line of proof by a very simple device. The 
 likeness between our own force and that which operates around 
 us, though a necessity, is also, he conceives, an illusion of 
 thought ; and so we must give up our first natiiral belief that 
 the universe is at the disposal of a Mind, the Divine counterpart 
 of ours. There is no other conception open to us in our appre- 
 hension of outward causality ; and yet this conception fails, and 
 betrays us into absurdity. How so 1 Because it implies that 
 the weight which I lift with my muscles must, in order to pull 
 against me, be furnished with muscles too ; and whatever teaches 
 me that the objects about me are not alive destroys the assumed 
 resemblance between the inner and the outer world. The case 
 is thus stated : 
 
 " ' On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to 
 that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair ; and we 
 cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like 
 in kind ; since equality is conceivable only between things that 
 are connatural. The axiom that action and reaction are equal 
 and in opposite directions, commonly exemplified by this very
 
 222 APPENDIX. 
 
 instance of muscular effort versus weight, cannot be mentally 
 realised on any other condition. Yet, contrariwise, it is in- 
 credible that the force as existing in the chair really resembles 
 the force as present to our minds. It scarcely needs to point 
 out that the weight of the chair produces in us various feelings, 
 according as we support it by a single finger, or the whole hand, 
 or the leg ; and hence to argue that as it cannot be like all these 
 sensations, there is no reason to believe it like any. It suffices 
 to remark that since the force as known to us is an affection of 
 consciousness, we cannot conceive the force existing in the chair 
 under the same form with endowing the chair with conscious- 
 ness. So that it is absurd to think of force as in itself like our 
 sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of it if we realise 
 it in consciousness at all' (p. 58). 
 
 " There would be something in this reasoning if the muscles 
 were the Personal Agent disposing of the chair, and their sen- 
 sations the power he put forth. The causality, however, does 
 not lie in them, but behind them ; they are themselves obedient 
 to a mandate from within ; and their sensations, which occur 
 only in the execution of the act, do not even begin till that 
 mandate has given the signal. Were the muscles altogether 
 insensible, the power at headquarters would not on that account 
 be disqualified for action, or be unconscious of itself. We may 
 entirely discharge out of the account the whole of this merely 
 ministerial apparatus, with all its supposable varieties. It is 
 not this which even the simplest individual be it that small 
 ' child ' so much dandled by the psychologists, or the everlasting 
 ' peasant ' preferred by bachelor philosophers, or the ' fetish- 
 worshipper ' in favour with Mr. Mill attributes to the external 
 objects acting upon him ; and his discovery that they do not 
 possess it disabuses him of no previous idea. What he plants 
 in idea behind the phenomena that strike him is similar, not to 
 his muscles which obey, but to his Will which bids ; and of this 
 idea, though it has a history to go through in correspondence 
 with his culture, no progress of reason, we feel assured, will ever 
 disabuse him. At last, as at first because by a necessity of 
 thought which runs through all experience he has to think of 
 Causality as meaning Will, and to borrow all his dynamic lan- 
 guage 'attraction,' 'repulsion,' 'tension,' 'percussion,' 'active/ 
 'passive,' 'weak,' 'strong,' 'overcome' 'resist' from familiar
 
 MARTINEAU. 223 
 
 instances and conditions of "Will If not, there must be some 
 point and some process for unlearning his original postulate, and 
 substituting some other idea of power. Yet this can never be. 
 For, confessedly, it is beyond the competency of experience, 
 however refined, to disclose anything but laws ; the mystery of 
 force evades the penetration of the observer, and therefore has 
 no presence among the materials of inductive generalisation ; 
 science did not give it, and science cannot take it away ; it lies 
 on another field, where the correction or corroboration of pheno- 
 menal knowledge can never meet it. Born as a pure intellectual 
 datum, it remains among our intellectual reserves, withdrawn 
 not only from every actual, but from every possible contradic- 
 tion an indestructible and unalterable postulate, inherent in the 
 very organism of reason itself." 
 
 Then follows an identification of cause or force with mind and 
 the unification of philosophy into the unification of one original 
 mind. 
 
 The article terminates by an examination of Mr. Spencer's 
 position as between that of the theist and that of the positivist, 
 the conclusion arrived at being that it is untenable and incom- 
 prehensible. 
 
 To revert to the commencement of the essay, there is, it seems 
 to me, a very valid criticism with respect to Mr. Spencer's attempt 
 to find a common formula for the propositions of the theist and the 
 atheist viz., that a Being exists and that a Being does not exist. 
 
 The principal question as between Dr. Martineau and Mr. 
 Spencer seems to me to be this. Is the Inscrutable Power of Mr. 
 Spencer an intelligence or not ? Now, if Mr. Spencer had suc- 
 ceeded in showing that the universe was capable of explanation 
 in the terms of his formula, the verdict would have been with 
 him ; but as we have found it to be utterly insufficient for such 
 an explanation partly admitted by himself, and wholly con- 
 fessed by his disciple Mr. Fiske we have to assert in the uni- 
 verse something more than matter and motion ; and if there is an 
 original Inscrutable Power, of which these are but manifestations, 
 then it has other modes of manifestation, and the only other 
 mode of manifestation we know is consciousness, which is the 
 basis of mind. Of this we can say next to nothing it is to us 
 a mystery. But in so far as it is to be regarded as a manifesta- 
 tion of force or power, it is to be regarded as included in the
 
 224 APPENDIX. 
 
 notions we attach to those ideas. With any interpretations or 
 corollaries therefrom, we have in these pages, which are merely 
 critical, nothing to do. 
 
 There are several difficulties and criticisms adduced by Dr. 
 Martineau which are satisfactorily answered by Mr. Spencer 
 in his "Replies to Criticisms" without affecting the force of 
 the above. 
 
 Martineau and Tyndall. 
 
 It is not our province to discuss all the modern controversies 
 that have arisen respecting the subject-matter of our studies, but 
 we would recommend the student to a perusal of the controversy 
 between Dr. Martineau and Professor Tyndall as of great assist- 
 ance in a consideration of the questions under our review. It 
 is comprised in the following : 
 
 Fragments of Science. By JOHN TYNDALL, F.RS. Long- 
 mans & Co. 
 
 Religion as affected by Modern Materialism. By JAMES 
 MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D. "Williams & Korgate. 
 
 Modern Materialism : its Attitude towards TJieology. By 
 JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D. "Williams & Nor- 
 
 The controversy relates principally to the Value to be attached 
 to the factor called "force," Professor Tyndall advocating the 
 enlargement of the definitions of matter and force so as to com- 
 prehend all subsequent developments, but failing to give suffi- 
 cient definitions ; and Dr. Martineau contending that our only 
 experience of force being that of the exercise of our own will, 
 the force manifested in the universe must be that of a Divine 
 will. On both sides the discussion is maintained in a very able 
 manner, and should receive the attentive perusal of the student 
 of "First Principles." 
 
 Professor Tyndall. 
 
 The papers contributed to the various Eeviews by Professor 
 Tyndall upon Dr. Bastian's experiments, and giving an account 
 of some of his own, are also a valuable addition to the subject,
 
 TYNDALL. 225 
 
 as showing experimentally the failure of the attempt to pro- 
 duce the organic from the inorganic. See 
 
 Nineteenth Century, January 1878 and November 1878. 
 
 This brilliant writer and careful thinker has at various times 
 expressed his views upon the principal theses of the doctrine of 
 Evolution. The most recent expression of his opinions is to be 
 found in the Nineteenth Century for November 1878, article 
 " Virchow and Evolution." 
 
 With respect to the main problem of philosophy as pro- 
 pounded by Mr. Spencer viz., the validity of a formula which 
 shall furnish the required unification of knowledge, Professor 
 Tyndall says : "In 1867 I told the working men of Dundee, 
 that while making the largest demand for freedom of investiga- 
 tion, while considering science to be alike powerful as an in- 
 strument of intellectual culture and as a ministrant to the 
 material wants of men ; if asked whether science has solved, or 
 is likely in our day to solve, ' the problem of the universe,' I 
 must shake my head in doubt. I compare the mind of man to 
 a musical instrument with a certain range of notes, beyond which 
 in both directions exists infinite silence. The phenomena of 
 matter and force come within our intellectual range, but behind, 
 and above, and around us the real mystery of the universe lies 
 unsolved, and, as far as we are concerned, is incapable of 
 solution." 
 
 I understand this to be a repudiation of the formula of Evolu- 
 tion as a sufficient solution of the problem of philosophy as set 
 out in Mr. Spencer's " First Principles." 
 
 On the question of the origin of the organic from the inorganic, 
 and the impossibility of finding an explanation of consciousness 
 in any mechanical theory, there are many interesting passages. 
 Indeed, this incompetency of matter and motion is so repeatedly 
 and emphatically expressed, that there can be no mistake about 
 Professor Tyndall's opinions. 
 
 Page 8 1 8. " We may even take a step further and affirm that 
 the brain of man the organ of his reason and his sense with- 
 out which he can neither think nor feel, is also an assemblage of 
 molecules acting and reacting according to law. Here, however, 
 the methods pursued in mechanical science come to an end ; and 
 if asked to deduce from the physical interaction of the brain 
 
 P
 
 226 APPENDIX. 
 
 molecules the least of the phenomena of sensation or thought, 
 we must acknowledge our helplessness. . . . Between molecular 
 mechanics and consciousness is interposed a fissure over which 
 the ladder of physical reasoning is incompetent to carry us." 
 
 Page 820. " We cannot deduce consciousness from motion, 
 or motion from consciousness, as we deduce one motion from 
 another. Nevertheless, observation is open to us, and by it 
 relations may be established which are at least as valid as the 
 conclusions of deductive reason. The difficulty may really lie in 
 the attempt to convert a datum into an inference, an ultimate 
 fact into a product of logic." 
 
 Page 821. "On both sides of the zone here assigned to the 
 Materialist he is equally helpless. If you ask him whence is 
 this ' matter ' of which we have been discoursing who or what 
 divided it into molecules, and impressed upon them this neces- 
 sity of running into organic forms he has no answer." 
 
 Page 827. "Do states of consciousness enter as links into 
 the chain of antecedence and sequence which gives rise to bodily 
 actions? Speaking for myself, it is certain that I have no 
 power of imagining such states interposed between the mole- 
 cules of the brain, and influencing the transference of motion 
 among the molecules. The thing ' eludes all mental presenta- 
 tion.' Hence an iron strength seems to belong to the logic 
 which claims for the brain an automatic action uninfluenced by 
 consciousness. But it is, I believe, admitted by those who hold 
 the automaton theory that consciousness is produced by the 
 motion of the molecules of the brain ; and this production of 
 consciousness by molecular motion is to me quite as unpresent- 
 able to the mental vision as the production of molecular motion 
 by consciousness. If I reject one result, I must reject both. /, 
 however, reject neither, and thus stand in the presence of two 
 incomprehensibles, instead of one incomprehensible." 
 
 " Here I secede from the automaton theory, though maintained 
 by friends who have all my esteem, and fall back upon the avowal 
 which occurs with such wearisome iteration throughout the fore- 
 going pages, namely, my utter incapacity to grasp the problem." 
 
 "This avowal is repeated with emphasis in the passage to 
 which Professor Virchow's translator draws attention. What, I 
 there ask, is the causal connection between the objective and the 
 subjective, between molecular motions and states of conscious-
 
 TYNDALL. 227 
 
 ness ? My answer is: I do not see the connection, nor am I 
 acquainted with anybody who does. It is no explanation to say 
 that the objective and subjective are two sides of one and the 
 same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two 
 sides ? This is the very core of the difficulty. There are plenty 
 of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. 
 Does water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon the 
 window pane ? If not, why should the molecular motion of the 
 brain be yoked to this mysterious companion consciousness? 
 We can form a coherent picture of all the purely physical processes 
 the stirring of the brain, the thrilling of the nerves, the dis- 
 charging of the muscles, and all the subsequent motions of the 
 organism. We are here dealing with mechanical problems which 
 are mentally presentabla But we can form no picture of the 
 process whereby consciousness emerges, either as a necessary 
 link or as an accidental by-product of this series of actions. The 
 reverse process of the production of motion by consciousness is 
 equally unpresentable to the mind," et seq. 
 
 These passages confirm my impression that Professor Tyndall 
 does not accept the formula of Evolution as a solution of the 
 problem of Philosophy as stated by Mr. Spencer. 
 
 But can man rest contented with the position of nescience ? 
 
 Dr. Martineau cannot, and teaches the doctrine of a pre- 
 existing mind. Professor Tyndall cannot, but is unable to advance 
 any doctrine He advocates patient waiting ; a Newton may 
 some day arise to prove that the principles involved in the con- 
 struction of a butterfly's wing are qualitatively the same as those 
 brought into play in the formation of the solar system. 
 
 Page 8 1 8. " We may even take a step further, and affirm that 
 the brain of man the organ of his reason and his sense, without 
 which he can neither think nor feel is also an assemblage of 
 molecules, acting and reacting according to law." See also the 
 hopeful expression with respect to the philosophy of the future, 
 in an extract from an article of his in the Saturday Review, 
 quoted on page 819. 
 
 Notwithstanding this profession of nescience, Professor Tyndall 
 cannot but think favourably, even if he does not quite believe 
 in, the theory that all present existences, not excluding organism 
 and consciousness, are the natural results of the cooling of a 
 mass of nebulous vapour.
 
 228 APPENDIX. 
 
 " Supposing the molecules of the human body, instead of re- 
 placing others, and thus renewing a pre-existing form, to be 
 gathered first-hand from nature, and placed in the exact relative 
 positions which they occupy in the body. Supposing them to 
 have the same forces (motions ?) and distribution of forces, the 
 same motions and distribution of motions would this organised 
 concourse of molecules stand before us as a sentient, thinking 
 being ? There seems no valid reason to assume that it would 
 not. Or supposing a planet carved from the sun set spinning 
 round an axis, and sent revolving round the sun at a distance 
 equal to that of our earth, would one consequence of the refri- 
 geration of the mass be the development of organic forms? I 
 lean to the affirmative." Belfast Address, quoted p. 820. 
 
 In the South Kensington Museum there is a collection of the 
 solid chemical constituents of a man with a cube on which is 
 marked the number of volumes of the gaseous elements that also 
 enter into his composition. Is Professor Tyndall inclined to 
 think that if all these were got together in suitable arrangement 
 to form a man, his Frankenstein would answer to Hamlet's 
 description of the paragon of animals 1 Surely if feelings and 
 memories are registered in structure, if you get the structure you 
 get the feelings and memories. It may be a necessary course in 
 Evolution from the fire-mist that there should be stages of 
 development, but if the result is structure out of the chemical 
 elements, surely if we got the structure off-hand, without all the 
 precedent developments, we secure all the results just the same, 
 and we have a man fully equipped with a stock of fictitious 
 memories, and ready to take his place in society. Professor 
 Tyndall leans to the affirmative of this hypothesis. 
 
 What is the way, then, out of the apparent contradiction of 
 this affirmative leaning and the repudiation of the mechanical 
 doctrine of organism and consciousness ? 
 
 It is by a new definition of matter. 
 
 This amended definition is indicated by a quotation from 
 Ueberweg, " one of the subtlest heads that Germany has pro- 
 duced" (p. 812). 
 
 " Take a pair of mice and a cask of flour. By copious nourish- 
 ment the animals increase and multiply, and in the same propor- 
 tion sensations and feelings augment The quantity of these 
 latter possessed by the first pair is not simply diffused amongst
 
 TYNDALL. 229 
 
 their descendants, for in that case the last must feel more feebly 
 than the first. The sensations and the feelings must necessarily 
 be referred back to the flour, where they exist, weak and pale it 
 is true, and not concentrated as they are in the brain." 
 
 Tyndall adds : " We may not be able to taste or smell alcohol 
 in a tub of fermented cherries, but by distillation we obtain from 
 them concentrated Kirschwasser. Hence Ueberweg's comparison 
 of the brain to a still, which concentrates the sensation and feel- 
 ing pre-existing, but diluted in the food." 
 
 We may remark that we do not see the comparison ; for alcohol 
 is merely some of the molecules separated by the mechanical 
 action of heat from other molecules, and recombined with some 
 others actually co-existing in the original mixture ; unless, in- 
 deed, the feelings of the mice are to be regarded as molecules. 
 
 By a similar process of reasoning, the still more rudimentary 
 elements of feeling have been collected and concentrated by the 
 wheat ears out of the field in which they were grown. The 
 sensations and the feelings came out of the ground ! 
 
 Is it this we are to infer ? Are there molecules of feeling ? 
 and do they from some law (not of motion), not yet ascertained, 
 enter into combination whenever some law (not of gravitation) 
 brings them into contact with accidentally formed molecules of 
 chemical protoplasm ? 
 
 Or if this be repudiated ; if it be not accepted that there are 
 special separate units of feeling scattered throughout the pri- 
 mordial nebula, then we must look for an amended definition of 
 all the ultimate units of matter. 
 
 This, it seems to me, is what Professor Tyndall looks to, since 
 if the primordial fire-mist only includes ultimate units of exten- 
 sion and motion, and from these feelings and organisms cannot 
 be produced, then the ultimate units must contain more than 
 extension and motion. The definition of matter must be amended 
 so as to provide for the results. 
 
 Professor Tyndall justifies this view as against Dr. Martineau's 
 criticisms, and we think succeeds in making good his right in 
 fact, his duty to amend the definition of matter. 
 
 He does not, however, give an amended definition, and we do 
 not see how this can be done except by saying that all the ultimate 
 units are conscious. Then although this consciousness might be 
 unorganised, there might be a process of evolution by concen-
 
 230 APPENDIX. 
 
 tration of this consciousness (I confess the method or even mean- 
 ing of this is incomprehensible to me), and thus organisms and 
 thought might be produced. This is the only interpretation I 
 can give to the only improved definition of matter, and I do not 
 see that it is superior in any way or more comprehensible than 
 Dr. Martineau's original Supreme Mind. 
 
 The Late Professor Clifford. 
 
 Virchow on the Teaching of Science. Nineteenth Century, 
 
 April 1878. 
 On the Nature of Tilings in TJiemselves. Mind, No. IX. 
 
 The same problem receives the same kind of treatment from 
 most of the eminent writers who favour the modern Evolutionist 
 doctrine. The consideration ruling their minds is thus ex- 
 pressed by Professor Clifford 
 
 " "We know from physical reasons that the earth was once in 
 a liquid state from excessive heat. Then there could have been 
 no living matter upon it. Now there is. Consequently non- 
 living matter has been turned into living matter somehow. We 
 can only get out of spontaneous generation by the supposition," 
 &c. Nineteenth Century, p. 729. 
 
 This somehow is suggested by an example adduced (pp. 726, 727) 
 of the formation of benzine in a red-hot tube from acetylene. 
 A false analogy is drawn between " pre-existing benzine " and 
 " pre-existing life," and then an explanation is rendered upon a 
 mechanical basis. This benzine is one of the products of organic 
 bodies, and is therefore called organic ; therefore we have a 
 mechanical explanation of organic molecules, without, however, 
 being endowed with any other than mechanical properties. 
 
 " Now, those persons that believe that living matter, such as 
 protein, arises out of non-living matter in the sea, suppose that 
 it is formed like all other chemical compounds. That is to say, 
 it originates in a coincidence, and is preserved by natural selec- 
 tion" (p. 728). 
 
 Here living matter is regarded merely as a chemical com- 
 pound. Why, then, is it called living? We have the answer 
 in the next sentence. 
 
 " Still the coincidence involved in the formation of a mole- 
 cule so complex as to be called living" &c.
 
 CLIFFORD. 231 
 
 Hence a living molecule is only a highly complex molecule. 
 But 
 
 " Possibly, however, the molecule has from the beginning that 
 power which belongs to other chemical bodies, and certainly to 
 itself when existing in sensible masses, of assisting the forma- 
 tion^of its like. Once started, however, there it is ; the spon- 
 taneous generation believed in as a possibility by the Evolu- 
 tionist has taken place." 
 
 Here it is well to stop and examine the nature of the assistance 
 given, say, by molecules of acetylene in the passage of benzine 
 through a red-hot tube to the formation of its like, to see if 
 there is any ground for calling such assistance spontaneous gene- 
 ration. I presume the phenomenon to be purely mechanical, and 
 to be expressed thus : a number of complex molecules consisting 
 of atoms composed of ultimate units, being systems of shapes, 
 sizes, and modes and rates of motion, are subjected to the action 
 of heat, i.e., a mechanical appliance which alters the relations 
 of the component atoms by separation, which separation, freeing 
 some or all of the atoms, throws them into other relations of 
 position, and thus enables them to enter into other combinations. 
 This combination when effected becomes a factor itself in the 
 current, and even if only as an obstruction, or perhaps as an 
 active hammer may knock the original constituents about in 
 such a manner as to assist in the process of dissolution and re- 
 combination. I do not derive any assistance here in trying to 
 solve the problem of spontaneous generation. 
 
 It is true that these explanations are always interspersed with 
 appeals to time to assist the explanation by the immensity of its 
 periods, as if in the course of a million of years a fly-wheel 
 would go of itself. Given minuteness so small as to elude sense 
 and puzzle the intellect, given complexity so great as to baffle 
 representation, given changes that are asserted to be insensible, 
 given time so long as to weary inert matter into consciousness of 
 itself, surely we can get life ! 
 
 No ! The only way out of the difficulty is, as indicated by 
 Professor Tyndall, to revise the definition of matter. How is 
 this to be done ? Professor Clifford attempts the problem in the 
 second essay quoted above. In the first place he describes the 
 correspondence and parallelism between mind-action and brain- 
 action (Mind, p. 63).
 
 232 APPENDIX. 
 
 " "We come, finally, to say, then, that as your consciousness is 
 made up of elementary feelings grouped together in various ways 
 (ejective facts), so a part of the action in your brain is made up 
 of mere elementary actions in parts of it, grouped together in the 
 same ways (objective facts). The knowledge of this correspon- 
 dence is a help to the analysis of both sets of facts but it 
 teaches us in particular, that any feeling, however apparently 
 simple, which can be retained and examined by reflection, is 
 already itself a most complex structure. We may, however, 
 conclude that this correspondence extends to the elements, and 
 that each simple feeling corresponds to a special comparatively 
 simple change of nerve matter." 
 
 " Can a feeling exist by itself without forming part of a con- 
 sciousness ? " This question is answered affirmatively, and this 
 answer is required by the doctrine of Evolution. " For if that 
 doctrine be true, we shall have along the line of the human 
 pedigree a series of imperceptible steps connecting inorganic 
 matter with ourselves. To the later members of that series we 
 must undoubtedly ascribe consciousness, although it must, of 
 course, have been simpler than our own. But where are we to 
 stop ? In the case of organisms of a certain complexity con- 
 sciousness is inferred. As we go back along the line the com- 
 plexity of the organism and of its nerve action insensibly 
 diminishes ; and for the first part of our course we see reason to 
 think that the complexity of consciousness insensibly diminishes 
 also. But if we make a jump, say, to the tunicate molluscs, 
 we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness at 
 all. Yet not only is it impossible to point out a place where 
 any sudden break takes place, but it is contrary to all the 
 natural training of our minds to suppose a breach of continuity 
 so great. All this imagined line of organisms is a series of 
 objects in my consciousness ; they form an insensible gradation, 
 and yet there is a certain unknown point at which I am at 
 liberty to infer facts out of my consciousness corresponding to 
 them. There is only one way out of the difficulty, and to that 
 we are driven. Consciousness is a complex of ejective facts, 
 of elementary feelings, or rather of those remoter elements which 
 cannot even be felt, but of which the simplest feeling is built 
 up. Such elementary ejective facts go along with the action of 
 every organism however simple ; but it is only when the material
 
 CLIFFORD. 233 
 
 organism has reached a certain complexity of nervous structure 
 (not now to be specified) that the complex of ejective facts 
 reaches that mode of complication which is called consciousness. 
 But as the line of ascent is unbroken, and must end at last in 
 inorganic matter, we have no choice but to admit that every 
 motion of matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or event 
 which might be part of a consciousness. From this follow two 
 important corollaries. 
 
 " i. A feeling can exist by itself without forming part of a 
 consciousness. It does not depend for its existence on the con- 
 sciousness of which it may form a part. Hence a feeling (or 
 an eject element) is Ding-an-sich, an absolute, whose existence 
 is not relative to anything else. Sentitur is all that can be said. 
 
 "2. These eject-elements which correspond to motions of 
 matter are connected together in their sequence and co-exist- 
 ence by counterparts of the physical laws of matter. For other- 
 wise the correspondence could not be kept up." 
 
 " That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest 
 feeling is a complex, I shall call mind-stuff. A moving mole- 
 cule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness, 
 but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are 
 so combined together as to form the film on the under side of a 
 jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them 
 are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of sentience. 
 When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and 
 nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of 
 mind-stuff are so combined as to form some kind of conscious- 
 ness ; that is to say, changes in the complex, which take place 
 at the same time, get so linked together that the repetition of 
 the one implies the repetition of the other. When matter takes 
 the complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding 
 mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness having 
 intelligence and volition." 
 
 The conclusions reached in the paper are (p. 66) : 
 
 " Hence we are obliged to identify the thing-in-itself with 
 that complex of elementary mind-stuff which on other grounds 
 we have seen reason to think of as' going along with the material 
 object. Or, to say the same thing in other words, the reality 
 external to our minds which is represented in our minds as 
 matter, is in itself mind-stuff."
 
 234 APPENDIX. 
 
 " The universe, then, consists entirely of mind-stuff. Some 
 of this is woven into the complex form of human minds, con- 
 taining imperfect representations of the mind-stuff outside them, 
 and of themselves also, as a mirror reflects its own image in 
 another mirror ad infinitum. Such an imperfect representation 
 is called a material universe. It is a picture in a man's mind of 
 the real universe of mind-stuff.* 
 
 " The two chief points of this doctrine may be thus summed 
 up: 
 
 " Matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff is the thing 
 represented. 
 
 " Eeason, intelligence, and volition are properties of a com- 
 plex, which is made up of elements themselves not rational, not 
 intelligent, not conscious." 
 
 The question now arises, How are we to interpret this new 
 definition of matter, and how does it affect the formula of 
 Evolution ? One has a kind of feeling of having walked over 
 the edge of a precipice into vacuity, and it takes some little con- 
 sideration to realise one's position. I do not think, so far as we 
 are concerned, we are called upon to explain the new term 
 "eject," nor to consider the process of reasoning which leads 
 to these conclusions, nor to discuss the nature of perception 
 and conception; we need only note the conclusions arrived 
 at. These I cannot quite understand. Suppose I consider 
 
 * This passage is very difficult to understand. The worst of it is, that 
 the professor of philosophy sitting at his desk is as hard to get at as the 
 preacher in his pulpit. We have continually to ask, What does he mean ? 
 and this occasionally seems extremely impertinent, and yet we cannot get 
 along without a clear understanding. Here we have 
 
 1. An universe consisting of mind-stuff. 
 
 2. Part of this universe is woven into human minds. 
 
 3. The disposal of the other part is not described, except that 
 
 4. These human minds contain representations of the mind-stuff outside 
 them. 
 
 5. This outside part so represented is called a material universe. 
 
 6. The material universe as so represented is a picture of the real universe 
 of mind-stuff. 
 
 But this throws no light on the mechanical combinations of size, shape, 
 and rates of motion, nor upon different modes of consciousness of them, 
 viz., radiance, colour, touch, smell, odour, &c. 
 
 The whole article suggests numerous questions which would have to 
 be answered before it could be understood.
 
 CLIFFORD. 235 
 
 matter to be a mental picture, in which mind-stuff is the thing 
 represented, then I first ask the meaning of these words which ex- 
 plain what matter is. I find, in the first place, that (p. 66), "there 
 is a perception in the man's mind, which we may call the mental 
 image." Matter, then, is a mental image or picture, which is a per- 
 ception, for they all seem to he identified. This perception or 
 mental image or picture relates to some external reality, and this 
 external reality, which we call matter and motion, is to be called 
 mind-stuff. The reason for this seems to be (p. 65), " That every 
 motion of matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or 
 event which might be part of a consciousness." And again, 
 " A moving molecule of inorganic matter possesses ... a 
 small piece of mind stuff." If we accept the new reading of 
 matter, I suppose we should say, " a moving molecule of inor- 
 ganic matter is a mental image in which mind-stuff is the 
 thing represented." What then is mind-stuff? That which is 
 capable of being organised (concomitantly with some organisa- 
 tions of inorganic matter) into consciousness or mind, but other- 
 wise not capable of being described. It is an unknown element 
 utterly incapable of being described, and not known to be 
 possessed by inorganic molecules, but only inferred. By it, how- 
 ever, we are called upon to understand a definition of matter. 
 "We only know a candlestick as a combination or arrangement 
 of molecules of mind-stuff (inorganic matter) having definite 
 shapes, sizes, modes and rates of motion. But, as recently 
 quoted, inorganic molecules are said not to be mind-stuff but 
 to possess a small piece of it, thus making a distinction between 
 them. A variety of questions then arises. How does a moving 
 molecule of inorganic matter possess a small piece of mind-stuff? 
 "What is the nature of the co-relation ? is it variable in corre- 
 spondence with the integration of matter and the dissipation of 
 motion ? or, again, does it go with the latter or stop with the 
 former ? If some matter transfers all its motion to some other 
 matter, does it lose its piece of mind-stuff? Is there a trans- 
 ference of mind-stuff the same as there is a transference of 
 motion ? is there also a fixed quantum of mind-stuff the same 
 as there is a fixed quantum of matter and of motion ? But then, 
 after all and there is the puzzle matter itself is nothing but 
 mind-stuff ! and we do not know what mind-stuff is except that 
 it is not rational, not intelligent, not conscious.
 
 236 APPENDIX, 
 
 It seems to me that this definition of matter throws all the 
 preceding part of the essay into confusion. If I start to read it 
 again, and transform the word matter, wherever I meet with it, 
 into the meaning arrived at in the conclusion, I find myself 
 in an ocean of verbal troubles. And what is the use of a defi- 
 nition so laboriously arrived at if we are not to make use of our 
 discovery in the practical application of it ? 
 
 For instance, one of the main arguments of the paper is the 
 parallelism between the organisation of inorganic molecules of 
 matter and the organisation of mind the complexity of the 
 one going with the complexity of the other. With the new 
 definition the parallelism would be between the increased 
 complexity of molecules of mind-stuff and the increased com- 
 plexity of the element of consciousness, which seems to me, so 
 far as I can understand it, to be mind-stuff also. What then is 
 the nature of the differentiation 1 One set of combinations of 
 mind-stuff is as complex as the other. Why should one set be 
 said to be made up of molecules of matter if matter itself is 
 mind-stuff, and the other set be said to be made up of the 
 elements of mind-stuff? 
 
 Again, referring to the quotation commencing " The universe, 
 then, consists entirely of mind-stuff," &c., the human mind is 
 said to contain imperfect representations (i.e., pictures or images 
 or perceptions) of the mind-stuff outside them. Such a repre- 
 sentation in the mind of the mind-stuff outside them is called 
 the material universe, so that the term " material universe " is 
 applicable not to an externality but to an internal representation 
 of it. But whence comes the representation ? Surely from an 
 externality ; and surely this externality must be the material 
 universe. But this material universe is only mind-stuff. 
 
 Again, what is the difference between a mental image and a 
 cerebral image. I can attach no meaning to the latter. I sup- 
 pose the brain is composed of molecules of matter (i.e., extension 
 and resistance) having shapes, sizes, modes and rates of motion, 
 and while I can understand a cerebral motion (throb, pulsation, 
 vibration, &c.), I cannot interpret image by any term of motion. 
 But, according to the new definition of matter, I must say that 
 the cerebral image is mind-stuff, so combined in the arrange- 
 ment of inorganic molecules i.e., extension and resistance 
 only, and having also arrangements of motion, that these
 
 CLIFFORD. 237 
 
 shapes, sizes, and motions produce that combination of them 
 which is a cerebral what? image? or simply a passing series of 
 motions ? The latter, I think, for I cannot understand a piece 
 of machinery so complex as to produce in itself an image of 
 itself perceptible to itself. I cannot express it in terms of 
 mathematics and geometry. Professor Clifford says that mirrors 
 may reflect each other. This implies a mechanical image. But 
 such an image is nothing more than the firing off of an immense 
 number of small shots on a hard surface, and they all glance off 
 according to the rate and the angle of incidence, and retain their 
 relative position on some other receiving plane. There is no 
 image of the object which cast off these shots ; there is no image 
 without a mental perception or consciousness. 
 
 To me it appears hopeless confusion, and Professor Clifford 
 adds in a note : " The question is one which is peculiarly diffi- 
 cult to make out precisely what another man means, and even 
 what one means one's-self." 
 
 Clifford's theory seems to point to an attempt to identify the 
 supposed underlying substance of mind and matter, so as to 
 explain secondarily the nature of the connection and the 
 parallelism of their evolution. The term "mind-stuff," then, 
 applies to a something which manifests itself partly in the evo- 
 lution of organised mind which takes the mode of conscious- 
 ness, and partly in the evolution of organised mind which takes 
 the form of aggregates of matter in motion. Both are mind- 
 stuffs, but differentiated in their modes. Thus, after all, it 
 seems only a dressing up like so much new philosophy is 
 of old notions under new names. In this case it is Noumenon, 
 Absolute Force, The Absolute, an Inscrutable Power over again 
 under the idea of a primordial mind-stuff. And we have the 
 old questions over again Is it a fixed quantum, and are its 
 conditions as modes necessary conditions ? or else how did the 
 differentiations into modes how did the evolution of it into 
 complex forms take place ? 
 
 Clifford's theory must be taken as a realistic and not as an 
 idealistic theory that is to say, he evidently conceives of a 
 universe of real existence prior to percipient mind, but he 
 affords no explanation of those evolutions by which some por- 
 tions of it became self-conscious. Would he have applied Mr. 
 Spencer's formula of Evolution ?
 
 238 APPENDIX. 
 
 Eeverting to our main study of Mr. Spencer's formula of 
 Evolution, we may remark that some such theory as this seems to 
 be tacitly implied in the working out of the processes of the Evo- 
 lution of Biology and Psychology, as treated of in those special 
 volumes of Mr. Spencer's work. Of course it will be seen that 
 such an assumption is not warranted by the formula of Evolu- 
 tion, which only comprises the two factors of matter (taken as 
 extension and resistance) and motion. And the insufficiency of 
 these appears to be universally acknowledged by all the Evolu- 
 tionist philosophers, and by the scientific men who accept their 
 doctrines. 
 
 Hence the necessity for a new factor or a new definition of 
 matter. For our part, we do not think it wise to foist the extra 
 agent into a definition of matter. This appendage to the defini- 
 tion of matter is so powerful and important that it would 
 entirely alter the import of the word, and reminds one of Dun- 
 dreary's reflection, "If the tail had been stronger, I make no 
 doubt the tail would waggle the dog;" for the addition to the mean- 
 ing of the word would be of more importance than the original one. 
 There is more than enough confusion of terms already, and to add 
 to the definition of matter, which we consider merely as exten- 
 sion and resistance, capable of being described mathematically 
 and geometrically, is not to produce definition but undefinition. 
 Besides, unless it is an universal and uniform adjunct of exten- 
 sion and resistance, it is not essential to the idea of matter. 
 If, like motion, it is transferable, like motion also it can be 
 wholly transferred, and thus wholly lost to some portions of 
 matter. 
 
 To define the meaning of a substantive word is to describe that 
 which is permanent to the thing described, to include in it all 
 that appertains to its permanent constitution, and to omit from 
 it all that can be taken away from it, and yet it shall remain 
 what it is. Thus motion is not essential to the definition of 
 matter, because it can be transferred from one particle of matter 
 to another, so that one particle moving faster than another does 
 so by receiving from another some part of its motion, or even all 
 its motion ; for we can imagine, and have reason to believe in, 
 the existence of matter which has thus lost by transfer all its 
 motion (ether). It is still matter, since it possesses extension 
 and passive resistance ; and thus motion is not part of the defini-
 
 CLIFFORD. 239 
 
 tion of matter, although it is universally the accompaniment of 
 matter, but is to be regarded as a separate factor. Motion is 
 capable of concentration i.e, more motion in some aggregations 
 of matter; and of dissipation by equalisation; and we are entitled 
 to speak of it as a separate factor from matter, and not as a part 
 of the definition of it. The factor of consciousness is to be 
 regarded in a similar manner. For if it is capable of concentra- 
 tion, as seems to be claimed for it by Ueberweg and Clifford, it must 
 be that some matter parts with it, and other matter receives an 
 accession of it ; and thus, similarly to motion, it is not essential 
 to matter, and, similarly to motion, it is to be regarded as a 
 separate factor. And we have to add to our cosmic stock in 
 trade " a fixed quantum of consciousness," and derive it also 
 from the " Persistence of Force " ? 
 
 It would then follow that it is a third factor in the initial 
 starting-point of Evolution, and it would have to take its place 
 in " the homogeneous." We have already considered the homo- 
 geneous as containing two terms, matter and motion, if not 
 three, viz., matter and motion and force. Now we have to add 
 mind-stuff, bearing in mind that this mind-stuff is not rational 
 nor intelligent nor conscious. 
 
 If we ask whence this differentiation into matter, motion, force, 
 and mind-stuff, Evolution fails to respond. 
 
 If everything is a corollary from the persistence of force, 
 whence the necessary inference of mind-stuff? We have before 
 asked the question as to matter and motion. 
 
 It seems to me that there is no more nonsense in supposing 
 the one initial agent (for philosophy, according to Mr. Spencer, 
 requires such an unification) to be mind-stuff than to suppose it 
 to be force. Indeed, may we not ask ourselves, Are they not 
 the same ? 
 
 However, our object in this study is not discovery but criticism, 
 and the result of our criticism so far has been to discredit the 
 possibility of an unificatory synthetic philosophy; to invali- 
 date the formula of Evolution; to exhibit the inadequacy of 
 force, taken as the totality of matter and motion, in the expla- 
 nation of the cosmos, and to show the necessity for a third 
 factor in the universe containing something of the nature of 
 mind.
 
 240 APPENDIX. 
 
 British Quarterly Review, October 1873 and January 1877. 
 
 It would be an interesting but too laborious a task to compile 
 an account of the valid criticisms contained in all the magazines 
 and reviews with reference to the Evolution theory since the 
 publication of " First Principles," and there is no doubt that 
 this work and the works of Mr. Darwin have given rise to a 
 great amount of careful thought. I call the attention of the 
 student to the above, because I am informed that they have had 
 considerable influence in the formation of an unfavourable esti- 
 mation of the work under review in certain circles. 
 
 The article in the British Quarterly Review for October 1873 
 is written in a very irritating manner, which the student cannot 
 but consider a great nuisance, as it is perpetually distracting his 
 attention, and makes him suspect an animus, which in itself is 
 detrimental to the value of the work undertaken by a critic. 
 
 The contents of the paper are as under : i. Difficulties of a 
 commensurate criticism, owing to the wide scope of the work and 
 the indistinctness of the propositions. The writer undertakes the 
 task of an examination from the point of view of the physicist. 
 2. Objections to Mr. Spencer pronouncing so many things incon- 
 ceivable. 3. Asserted errors and false notions in physics. 4. 
 The persistence of force not a datum of consciousness, and the 
 assigned corollaries not corollaries. 5. Many different renderings 
 of the term " Persistence of Force." 6. Mechanical difficulties. 
 7. The a priori proof of the great generalisations of physics 
 criticised and opposed. This occupies the most considerable 
 portion of the essay. 8. Objections to some of Mr. Spencer's 
 inductions. 9. Concerning the limitations of the criticism, and 
 objecting to Mr. Spencer's perpetually changing the signification 
 of his terms. 
 
 This article should not be read except in connection with Mr. 
 Spencer's reply, published in the third volume of his Essays. 
 
 The number for January 1877 contains some apposite criticism, 
 but it should be perused with a just and careful attention. The 
 main points seem to be : i. A charge against Mr. Spencer that 
 he holds by the visible and that which can be mentally seen and 
 embraced, and that he rejects whatever cannot be conceived. 
 2. That those objects which transcend our powers of conception 
 can only produce in us symbolic conceptions, which do not
 
 MOULTON. 241 
 
 represent, but only stand for, the realities. " Conceivableness 
 or comprehensibility, in truth, in the sense of possible conscious 
 representation, rigorously applied as a criterion of the limits, 
 and consequently of the character, of thought, would almost 
 seem to exclude reasoning altogether." " Our mental picture of 
 a pebble or a shell is as imperfect, as symbolic, as that of the 
 earth itself." 3. "In what sense can Mr. Spencer's ultimate 
 ideas be said to be ideas at all, since they are pronounced to be 
 inconceivable, or, according to the title of the division of his 
 subject in which he treats of them, ' unknowable'? " " If force, 
 motion, personality, are ultimate ideas, and yet are unknown 
 and unknowable, then ultimate ideas do not enter or belong to 
 our minds at all, and can neither support, limit, nor otherwise 
 affect our reasoning or thought." 4. A criticism I do not under- 
 stand, viz., that Evolution presupposes time and space. It seems 
 to me that Evolution presupposes matter and motion, of which 
 space and time are merely the interrelations. 5. Criticism of 
 that positive element of consciousness which persists notwith- 
 standing the negation of limits the raw material of definite 
 thought. On this point I cannot but think that Mr. Spencer 
 is substantially correct, but that it is to be interpreted in the 
 manner indicated in my criticism of the Unknowable. The 
 writer of this article concludes, that " it would thus appear that 
 Mr. Spencer means by unknowable, not what cannot be known, 
 but what cannot be definitely known known under limits," 
 Granted that writers may have the right to use words in any 
 given meaning, there is always the danger both of the writer and 
 of the reader forgetting the arbitrary assigned meaning and 
 reverting to the ordinary one. " No one is likely to dispute the 
 truth that we cannot have a definite or limited knowledge a 
 consciousness with limits of that which is itself indefinite and 
 without limits." 6. An examination of force as the ultimate of 
 ultimates. The criticism amounts to this " No consciousness, 
 no force." This criticism appears in my examination, and is 
 very forcibly expressed in Dr. Martineau's essays, as previously 
 indicated. 
 
 This notice of Mr. Moulton's really important criticisms may 
 be deemed very inadequate by the admirers of them, but a long 
 notice would have necessitated a valuation of the merits of a 
 long, subtle, and acrimonious controversy, a task which one does 
 
 Q
 
 242 APPENDIX. 
 
 not feel disposed nor competent to undertake. If the writer 
 would revise his papers, deleting all the bitterness, he would 
 contribute something valuable to the literature of Evolution. 
 
 The rest of the paper deals with Sociology, and is beyond the 
 present scope of our studies. 
 
 G. H. LEWES' Problems of Life and Mind. Two vols. 
 
 Triibner & Co. London, 1875. 
 G. H. LEWES' The Physical Basis of Mind. Triibner & Co. 
 
 London, 1877. 
 
 I feel that I cannot omit a reference to the above volumes, 
 for although I have only partially read them, I find that 
 the writer deals in a clear and masterly manner with many of 
 the problems which we have been considering in the course of 
 our studies. They are, however, dealt with in such a detailed 
 and methodical manner, and the work itself is so large, that they 
 require a special study and examination. 
 
 An Article by Mr. James Sully in the " Encyclopaedia Britan- 
 nica" VoL VIII. Ninth Edition, 1879. 
 
 All students of Spencer should read this article, as it gives a 
 very wide review of the subject of Evolution theories, and enables 
 the reader to form a better idea of the general scope and bearing 
 of any individual work. It assists the reader, by giving him a 
 general summary of the whole of the matters under consideration, 
 and in assigning to any particular writer his place in the battle. 
 He sees not only with the eyes of the fighter, but with the eyes 
 of the onlooker. He understands better the position of the 
 author, his aims and endeavours, and is enabled to adjudge to 
 him more readily his proper place and weight. 
 
 I quote a few passages : 
 
 Page 751. "The most general meaning of Evolution may be 
 defined as follows : Evolution includes all theories respecting the 
 origin and order of the world which regard the higher or more com- 
 plex forms of existence as following and depending on the lower 
 and simple forms, which represent the course of the world as a 
 gradual transition from the indeterminate to the determinate, 
 from the uniform to the varied, and which assume the cause of 
 this process to be immanent in the world itself that is thus
 
 SULLY. 243 
 
 transformed. All theories of Evolution, properly so called, re- 
 gard the physical world as a gradual progress from the simple to 
 the complex, look upon the development of organic life as con- 
 ditioned by that of the inorganic world, and view the course of 
 mental life, both of the individual and of the race, as correlated 
 with the material process. This definition covers roughly the 
 principal historical systems bearing the name of Evolution, as 
 well as others which have hardly as yet been characterised by 
 this title. 
 
 " It is clear by this definition that we cannot now press the 
 etymological force of the word. Evolution has no doubt often 
 been conceived as an unfolding of something already contained 
 in the original, and this view is still commonly applied to organic 
 evolution, both of the individual and of the species. It will be 
 found that certain metaphysical systems of Evolution imply this 
 idea of an unfolding of something existing in germ, or at least 
 potentially in the antecedent. On the other hand, the modern 
 doctrine of Evolution, with its ideas of elements which combine 
 and of causation as transformation of energy, does not necessarily 
 imply this notion. It may be remarked that some of the argu- 
 ments brought against the modern doctrine rest on the fallacious 
 assumption that the word is still used in the etymological sense, 
 and that consequently that which evolves must contain in some 
 shape what is evolved (e.g., inorganic matter must contain life 
 and consciousness). 
 
 " Evolution is thus almost synonymous with progress, though 
 the latter term is usually confined to processes of development in 
 the moral as distinguished from the physical world." 
 
 The writer goes on to give a very instructive resume of the 
 forms of doctrine of Evolution. 
 
 i. " How far is the process a real objective one?" For very 
 different views may be taken of the reality of the process of be- 
 coming, generation, and transformation. 
 
 " On the one side we have the extreme view of the Eclectics, 
 that there is no such thing as change or individual object, that 
 real being is one and unchangeable, and that what appears like 
 the formation and destruction of things is an illusion of the 
 senses. At the other extreme, we have the view that all reality 
 consists in the process of becoming, or self-realisation, and that 
 nothing persists save this law of Evolution itself. Between these
 
 244 APPENDIX. 
 
 two extremes there lie a number of intermediate conceptions, as 
 that of a varying and progressing activity, of a persistent force, 
 or of a gradual manifestation of an unchanging substance." 
 
 2. " What is the nature of that reality which makes the content, 
 so to speak, of the process of Evolution 1 " 
 
 " First of all, the material and the mental may be regarded 
 from a dualistic point of view as perfectly distinct kinds of reality. 
 According to this view, physical evolution as taking place in the 
 inorganic world, and mental evolution as unfolded in man's 
 history, are two unconnected processes. Further, the fact of 
 their correlation in organic development must either be left unex- 
 plained altogether or can only be referred to the arbitrary action 
 of some supernatural power. 
 
 " Opposed to this dualistic conception of reality there are the 
 monistic conceptions, which conceive of all parts of the process 
 of evolution as homogeneous and identical. Of these, the first 
 is the materialistic, which assumes but one substance, and regards 
 mind as but a property or particular manifestation of matter." 
 
 "The next monistic conception is the spiritualistic, which 
 assumes but one substance mind, and resolves the -reality of 
 the material world into a spiritual principle. According to this 
 way of looking at the world-process, material and mental evolu- 
 tion are but two continuous phases of one spiritual movement. 
 From the operation of inanimate nature up to human history it 
 is the same spiritual reality which manifests itself. 
 
 "Finally, there is the monistic conception in the narrow 
 modern sense, viz., that which views the material and the 
 mental as two sides of one and the same reality. According to 
 this view, physical evolution as manifested in the material world, 
 and mental evolution as seen in human life, may each be regarded 
 as a two-sided process." 
 
 3. " How is the process effected ? " 
 
 The replies to this question are too long for quotation, and I 
 must refer the student to the article itself. Their substance is 
 this : 
 
 "There are two strongly-contrasted modes of viewing all 
 action or change. The first is drawn from the region of physi- 
 cal events, and views the change as conditioned by antecedents 
 or efficient causes. This way of looking at change gives the 
 mechanical view of Evolution. The second is drawn from the
 
 SULLY. 245 
 
 region of our conscious volitions regarded as themselves unde- 
 termined by antecedent causes, and conceives of change as re- 
 lated to and determined by some end or purpose. This gives 
 the teleological view of Evolution." 
 
 " Adopting this distinction between the mechanical and teleo- 
 logical conception of Evolution as the essential one, we may 
 roughly classify the various systems of Evolution under three 
 heads (a) those in which the mechanical view predominates ; 
 (b) those in which the teleological view predominates ; and (c) 
 those in which the two views are combined in some larger con- 
 ception." 
 
 Then follows a description of the mechanical interpretation 
 and its difficulties with respect to conscious life and of the 
 modifications (three) adopted in order to obviate them. 
 
 This is succeeded by an account of the principal teleological 
 theories, in which appears "the element of purpose," and in 
 which " nature is personified as a worker who aims unconsciously 
 and instinctively at some dimly descried end." 
 
 And finally, we have a description of the systems which seek 
 to combine the teleological and the mechanical view of Evolution. 
 
 It will thus be seen that when any man speaks or writes for 
 or against Evolution without defining what he means, his deliver- 
 ances are of no effect, and his hearers or readers, naturally in- 
 terpreting the term according to their own notions, are confirmed 
 or shaken in their belief in a vague, varying sort of way, and 
 there is a great deal of hazy assent or dissent without any very 
 clear conception on the part of speaker or hearer. Thus we 
 have heard Evolution accepted in sermons in the orthodox pulpit 
 and in the Unitarian pulpit, but the preachers have not stated 
 which kind of Evolution they referred to. So in discussions in 
 learned societies the same lack of definiteness is to be found. 
 
 The writer of the article next gives a long history of the pro- 
 gressive recognition of Evolution, in which the part of the 
 greatest interest to the students of Spencer will be found to be 
 the "Modern Doctriiie of Evolution" p. 763. 
 
 " We now approach the period in which the modem doctrine 
 of Evolution in its narrow sense has originated. This doctrine 
 is essentially a product of scientific research and speculation. 
 It is a necessary outcome of the rapid advance of the physical 
 sciences. Its final philosophic form cannot yet be said to be
 
 246 APPENDIX. 
 
 fixed. It may be defined as a natural history of the cosmos, 
 including organic beings, expressed in physical terms as a 
 mechanical process. In this record the cosmic system appears 
 as a natural product of elementary matter and its laws," &c. 
 This is followed by a short notice of Darwin, Wallace, Spencer, 
 Clifford, Lewes, &c. 
 
 I notice with regard to Spencer that he says, " He excludes 
 all consideration of the question how life first arose, though it is 
 clear that he regards the lowest forms of life as continuous in 
 their essential nature with sub-vital processes." 
 
 Also I notice, " that just as he does not seek to explain the 
 first appearance of life as a whole, so he does not seek to explain 
 the first dawn of mental life." 
 
 It seems to me that here the writer is in error, for he goes on 
 immediately to give Mr. Spencer's explanation of the gradual 
 development of mental life, and it will be seen by a reference to 
 my criticism that Mr. Spencer also endeavours to explain the 
 development of organic life and consciousness. 
 
 The writer gives a very just summary of the biology, psycho- 
 logy, and of the ethical and sociological developments of Mr. 
 Spencer's theory of Evolution. 
 
 The following passage is deserving of notice : 
 
 " Mr. Spencer makes little use of his metaphysical conception 
 in accounting for the evolution of things. He tells us neither 
 why the unknowable should manifest itself in time at all, nor 
 why it should appear as a material world before it appears under 
 the form of mind or consciousness. Indeed, Mr. Spencer's 
 doctrine of Evolution cannot be said to have received from its 
 author an adequate metaphysical interpretation. The idea of the 
 unknowable hardly suffices to give to his system an intelligible 
 monistic basis. In truth, this system seems in its essence to be 
 dualistic rather than monistic." 
 
 The final section of the article is an excellent and impartial 
 consideration of the " Interpretation of Modem Scientific Doc- 
 trine." 
 
 It is the outcome of scientific research of the positive method, 
 and is of a mechanical rather than of a teleological character. 
 But it still awaits its final philosophic interpretation. 
 
 The universal applicability of the doctrine to physical and 
 mental phenomena may be allowed. But there are wide gaps in
 
 SULLY. 247 
 
 our knowledge of both orders ; as, for instance, as to the neces- 
 sity of the process from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. 
 Again, the transition from the inorganic to the organic is far 
 from conceivable. Again, in spite of Mr. Spencer's brilliant 
 demonstration of the general continuity of mental life, much 
 remains to be done before all the steps in the process (e.g., from 
 particular to general knowledge, from single feelings to self-con- 
 sciousness) are made plain. 
 
 " As a unifying generalisation it is clearly limited by the fact 
 of the correlation of mental and physical evolution. These two 
 regions of phenomena may be seen to manifest the same law, 
 yet they cannot be identified. All the laws of physical evolution 
 can never help us to understand the first genesis of mind ; and 
 this difficulty is in no way reduced by Mr. Spencer's conception 
 of a perfect gradation from purely physical to conscious life. 
 The dawn of the first confused and shapeless feeling is as much 
 a ' mystery ' as the genesis of a distinct sensation." 
 
 The writer then discusses the theory of vibrations of indivisible 
 atoms accompanied with a mode of feeling, as the basis of a 
 theory of mind evolution. He also assigns a limit to the explana- 
 tion to be effected by such a hypothesis. 
 
 " Such being the limits set to the scope of explanation by the 
 idea of Evolution, the question arises whether these apparently 
 permanent gaps in our scientific knowledge can be filled up by 
 extra-scientific speculations." The attempt to do so leads us 
 back to a consideration of that ultimate nature of matter, force, 
 and mind. " What, it may be asked, are the realities correspond- 
 ing to these terms, and how are we to conceive of their mutual 
 relations 1 " The result of the consideration of the matter is 
 found to be " Xo one of the metaphysical doctrines which are 
 at our command is so plainly and completely adapted to trans- 
 form it into a final doctrine of existence, that it must of necessity 
 be accepted at once and by all" Thus the question as to the 
 possibility of filling up the gaps in our scientific knowledge 
 speculatively is answered in the negative. 
 
 The bearing of Evolution upon moral and religious ideas is 
 then discussed. 
 
 The article winds up with a list of the best works upon the 
 different branches of the subject of Evolution, which the student 
 would do well to consult.
 
 248 APPENDIX. 
 
 The Plnlosophy of Herbert Spencer: Being an Examination 
 of the " First Principles " of his System. By B. P. BOWNE, 
 A.B. New York : Nelson & Phillips, 1876. 
 
 " Professor Bowne, of the New Boston University, has elabo- 
 rated his strictures of Herbert Spencer into a small volume, 
 which is one of the most subtle and forcible criticisms of the 
 ' First Principles ' and the ' Psychology ' that have ever pro- 
 ceeded from an essentially evangelical standpoint." Mind, No. 
 13 ; article, " Philosophy in the United States." 
 
 In consequence of this remark I procured the work referred 
 to, and after its perusal I am able to recommend it as a sub- 
 stantial and sound criticism. The evangelical standpoint is not 
 discernible, although a theism is indicated and maintained. 
 The criticism is fundamental, and not of odds and ends. It is 
 not a mere tossing about of details, but a disjointing of struc- 
 ture, whereby .the system should fall into an ineffective heap. 
 The abuse is mainly polite and pleasant. The sarcasm is properly 
 measured and well directed, sufficient to give zest without dis- 
 tracting the reader with bad feelings. Each part is very well 
 handled ; but the summary and conclusion, forming chapter vi., 
 though starting well, falls off into weakness of construction and 
 feebleness of statement. The writer has evidently been a diligent 
 student of Dr. Martineau, whose influence is markedly dis- 
 cernible, both in the lines of thought and in detail of expression 
 and illustration. 
 
 The positive teaching of the book is weak and incidental, and 
 I cannot but think it a mistake on the part of any writer who 
 undertakes the task of a criticism to mix up with his examina- 
 tion of another man's work any positive teaching of his own 
 that is to say, if his object is a pure and impartial consideration 
 of a theory propounded for public acceptance. It distracts the 
 student, by raising up far other lines of thought for which he is 
 not prepared, and leaves the critic open to a counter-attack, in 
 which, if he is discomfited, all his valid criticism is apt to 
 perish. In reading this book, let us then draw our pencils 
 through the positive teaching, and see how the criticism of 
 Mr. Spencer stands on its own merits.
 
 BOWNE. 249 
 
 CHAPTER I. What is Evolution? 
 
 The theist will accept evolution if it is granted that Mind is 
 the primal cause and the eternal ruler of the universe. The 
 writer says, however, that the new philosophy only recognises 
 matter and force. This is not quite correct, as the student will 
 remember, for matter and motion are the factors of the Formula 
 of Evolution. The strict Evolutionist, however, does not grant 
 the above-stated position of the theist, but either from force 
 or from matter and motion would deduce the universe. The 
 task of Evolution, as understood by the critic, is to explain the 
 cosmos as it exists now, including all the facts of life and mind, 
 as results of a process of condensation of a cloud of atoms. The 
 writer well remarks, " It may even be questioned whether many 
 of the Evolutionists themselves properly appreciate the task they 
 have to perform." 
 
 CHAPTER II. Laws of the Unknowable. 
 
 It is unsatisfactory to give an account of an unsatisfactory 
 subject, and strange that people should have so much to say 
 about that which is unknowable. The writer, treating of the 
 reconciliation of Science and Religion, coincides with many 
 other critics, and considers that a denial of the personality of 
 God destroys the object of Eeligion. 
 
 He next gives an account of the doctrine of " unknowable- 
 ness," and, after many examples ha ve been considered, he thus 
 characterises some of the speculations : " There seems to be a 
 kind of intellectual shuffling going on, a playing fast and loose 
 with words, as the ' absolute,' ' infinite,' ' conditioned,' ' uncon- 
 ditioned,' &c. There is an air of conjuring and thimblerigging 
 over the whole." This amounts to a charge of indefiniteness 
 and the loose employment of terms a charge which is often 
 brought against Mr. Spencer. 
 
 The next criticism is p. 30, where the writer advances as Mr. 
 Spencer's opinion that " the test of the knowable is its ability 
 to come before the representative faculty," and asks if all the 
 terms and many of the facts which are the bases of science are 
 capable of mental representation. If not, then science is impos- 
 sible. The converse rather is true, he considers, viz., that there
 
 250 APPENDIX, 
 
 are many knowables that are not capable of mental representa- 
 tion consequently the latter cannot be the test of knowable- 
 ness. If Mr. Spencer adheres to that test, he says, it does away 
 with the foundation of his own philosophy. Is " force," as an 
 instance, capable of mental representation? All the funda- 
 mental notions of science are incapable of mental represen- 
 tation. 
 
 On p. 36 appears an examination of the " fundamental 
 reality," the object of which is to show a contradiction of reason- 
 ing on the part of Mr. Spencer, as thus expressed : 
 
 " Whatever involves the idea of "Whatever involves the idea of 
 self-existence is an untenable hypo- self-existence is an untenable hypo- 
 thesis, thesis. 
 
 "God involves the idea of self- "The fundamental reality in- 
 
 existence. volves the idea of self-existence. 
 
 " God is an untenable hypothesis. " The fundamental reality is not 
 
 an untenable hypothesis." 
 
 Again, p. 38, "As the result of his criticism of scientific and 
 religious ideas, Mr. Spencer concludes that a ' fundamental 
 reality ' underlies the universe, and that this is ' unknown and 
 unknowable.' " The writer, after a consideration of Mr. Spencer's 
 argument, thinks that it " proves an unexplainable, but not an 
 unknowable ; for though we cannot give the rationale of that 
 final fact, by the supposition we know it as a fact. To return 
 to our illustration, the essential nature of gravitation is a pro- 
 found mystery ; but gravitation as a fact, the law of its varia- 
 tion, the truth that it includes all the particular facts mentioned, 
 all these things science regards as beyond question. Clearly the 
 incomprehensible may be known as a fact, and its laws and rela- 
 tions may also constitute a part of our most assured knowledge. 
 Mr. Spencer's conclusion is an extremely commonplace one, that 
 argument and all explanation postulate something for their 
 foundation and support. I admit most cheerfully that explana- 
 tion must assume the unexplainable or independent ; but I 
 deny that this unexplainable is the unknowable " (p. 41). 
 
 Then follows, p. 45, an examination of the doctrine of 
 "Relativity," including a consideration of "pure being," with 
 respect to which latter he says 
 
 " Again, the doctrine sometimes reads : "We cannot know pure 
 being that is, being without attributes but only the attributes
 
 BOWNE. 251 
 
 of being. . . . We cannot know pure being, for the sufficient 
 reason that there is no such thing to know. All this talk about 
 pure being arises from a pernicious habit into which thinkers 
 fall of thinking that whatever can be separated in thought can 
 be separated in fact," &c. 
 
 On p. 48 commences a review of the Idealism and Eealism 
 of Spencer, the conclusion of which is thus stated on p. 
 
 56:- 
 
 " Thus far Mr. Spencer has established nothing which could 
 not have been admitted beforehand ; he has laboriously proved 
 two truisms : first, that all our knowledge must be related to 
 our faculties ; and, second, that being without attribute or power 
 or manifestation of any kind is unknowable ; both of which may 
 be admitted without at all impairing the fact that what know- 
 ledge our faculties do give us is objectively real. If, however, 
 he chooses to deny this, then, as we have seen, his only landing- 
 place is absolute Idealism, which Mr. Spencer says is insanity. 
 As between Religion and Science, his argument thus far tells with 
 equal force against both. Religion involves unthinkable ideas, 
 which fact Mr. Spencer looks upon as sufficient warrant for 
 banishing it to the outer darkness of the unknowable. But 
 Science also involves equally unthinkable ideas, and must, there 
 fore, go along with Religion." 
 
 Then follows (pp. 57-76) a long examination of Hamilton, 
 Mansel, and Spencer on The Absolute, concluding thus : 
 
 " My excuse for this long and dry discussion is the religious 
 importance of the question. The only important bearing of the 
 nescience doctrine is the religious one. Science would go on in 
 just the same way as at present, collecting and co-ordinating its 
 facts, though the facts were proved to be phantoms. Common 
 life would experience no change. The most thoroughgoing 
 know-nothing would be as eager to get bread as the realist ; he 
 would be as careful to keep out of a relative fire or a relative 
 river. . . . 
 
 " But it is not so in morals and religion. There we are not 
 forced to act ; there we are constantly seeking some excuse for 
 inaction. Even the suspicion that our religious ideas are delu- 
 sions leads to a speedy relaxation of moral effort, as they 
 know too well who have at any time made nescience their 
 theology."
 
 252 APPENDIX. 
 
 CHAPTER III. Law of the Knowable. 
 
 We now come to the most essential portion of the criticism. 
 As we have before remarked, Part I. of "First Principles" is 
 non-essential to the work. In fact, it is rather misleading, for 
 it directs the attention of the student into the mysterious, 
 and takes away his discernment of the Problem of Philosophy 
 and the Formula of Evolution as the main object of the 
 work. 
 
 The first section of this chapter is taken up with a con- 
 sideration of the fundamental ideas of science, and of their 
 validity as a priori truths, the writer asserting that they have 
 really been discoveries by the inductive process. Mr. Spencer's 
 fundamental reasoning is severely criticised, as thus : 
 
 " No possible amount of experiment and induction would avail 
 to prove these doctrines for all time and space ; and unless they 
 can get some a priori support, they must present a sorry figure 
 in so great a field. Indeed, these doctrines, as Mr. Spencer 
 points out, are incapable of inductive proof. Matter can be 
 proved indestructible only by assuming the persistence of force, 
 and force can be proved indestructible only by assuming matter 
 to be indestructible. The argument is circular, and hence worth- 
 less; one or other of these doctrines must be based upon 
 a priori considerations." 
 
 The writer goes on to show that Mr. Spencer, "in one 
 place . . . tells us that a necessity of thought is no sign of a 
 necessity of fact ; and then he offers us a necessity of thought 
 as the best possible proof of an external fact" (p. 85). "This 
 reasoning, which is repeated in proof of the persistence of force, 
 amounts to this : what we cannot conceive is impossible. We 
 cannot conceive either creation or annihilation ; hence they are 
 impossible" (p. 86). This the writer proceeds to answer by 
 adducing from Mr. Spencer a number of instances of incon- 
 ceivabilities which, nevertheless, are accepted by the intellect ; 
 in addition to which is brought forward Mr. Spencer's own 
 test of truth, namely, the inconceivability of the negative ; 
 whereupon he remarks : 
 
 "Inconceivability is an ambiguous term. Some statements 
 violate the law of our reason, others transcend our reason. 
 To the first class belong all contradictions ; ... to the
 
 BOWNE. 253 
 
 second belong all inquiries about the inner nature of things," 
 &c. 
 
 " Yet Mr. Spencer uses this mental impotence as a sufficient 
 test of objective reality. "We cannot explain how a thing can 
 be ; hence it cannot be. Part I. loads our mental faculties with 
 opprobrium ; Part II. constitutes them the measure, not merely 
 of knowledge, but of existence. Part I. declares inconceivability 
 worthless as a test of reality; Part IL makes it the test of 
 proof." 
 
 The second section, commencing at p. 90, deals with the 
 correlation of forces. The writer first speaks of the confusion 
 arising from the indiscriminate use of the terms " motion " and 
 " force." 
 
 " Heat is a mode of motion and a mode of force at the same 
 time. Motion produces magnetism, magnetism is motion, 
 magnetism is force, motion is force. The same is said of light 
 and electricity ; both are motions and both are forces. Yet the 
 universal definition of force describes it as the hidden cause of 
 motion or change. When pressed for a definition, there is no 
 scientist who would view them in any other relation. To use 
 cause and effect as interchangeable and identical involves a most 
 remarkable confusion of ideas. But Mr. Spencer is not alone in 
 this error. I do not know a single scientist who has maintained 
 the proper distinction between force and motion. It would be 
 easy to fill pages with quotations from the writings of the most 
 prominent scientists all illustrating the same confusion. In 
 truth, the majority of scientific men do not understand the 
 doctrine of correlation. Heat, light, electricity, &c., are not 
 forces, but modes of motion, any one of which can produce all 
 the rest. This passage of one mode of motion into another 
 mode is its correlation ; but this correlation is the correlation of 
 motions, and not of forces." 
 
 I do not know that the writer mends matters in the next 
 passage by stating what is requisite to prove the true corre- 
 lations of forces. Nor do I understand him when he goes on 
 to consider the question as to the correlation of vital forces 
 with physical forces. "What is the proof that vitality is a 
 function of material forces ? " 
 
 It would have been well first to have considered if vitality 
 was a correlation of motion, and took its place as life
 
 254 APPENDIX. 
 
 mind consciousness in the circle of the changes of 
 motion : 
 
 Heat 
 
 = Consciousness 
 
 II 
 
 
 
 J 
 
 1 
 
 "o 
 
 ? 
 
 s 
 
 Si 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 o 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S 
 
 5 
 
 making a quantum of motion of matter, each mode of which 
 is interchangeable with any other. 
 
 However, the writer pursues his argument on the lines laid 
 down by Mr. Spencer, viz., on the basis of the correlation of 
 forces, and finds that " all that is really made out is that heat 
 and light are necessary conditions of vital action ; but surely 
 the conditions of the action and the power acting need not 
 be the same." The writer adduces long arguments to show 
 that vitality is not a mode of force transformed from the 
 physical forces. The value of this criticism I am unable 
 to understand until I understand the meaning of the term 
 " force." 
 
 In the third section the writer asks, " Let us see whether he 
 succeeds any better in proving the identity of the physical and 
 mental forces." After quoting Mr. Spencer largely, he says 
 (p. 109) : 
 
 " Disengaged from swelling statement it reads thus : Physical 
 forces, such as light and heat, excite sensations ; therefore sensa- 
 tions are transformed light and heat. 
 
 " Sensations, being pleasant or painful, are followed by 
 motion either toward or from the object of sensation ; hence 
 mechanical motion and its equivalents are the correlates of 
 sensation. 
 
 " Again, mental action is attended by certain physical condi- 
 tions ; hence they are one. 
 
 " Indeed the whole argument may be summed up in this : 
 Physical states excite mental states ; hence each is a form of the 
 other.
 
 BOWNE. 255 
 
 " Now, looking at this merely with a logician's eye, it must 
 be confessed that it falls far short of proof. It establishes re- 
 lation, not identity," &c. 
 
 But the writer has more to say than this (p. in) : 
 
 " But psychology has yet another aid to offer to the " New 
 Philosophy." It demands the authority for the belief in force 
 at all. It summons the Evolutionist to tell where he discovered 
 this force with which he conjures so mightily. And just here 
 every system of mechanical atheism is speechless. For it is 
 admitted now by all that force is not a phenomenon, but a 
 mental datum. Hume did philosophy a good service in show- 
 ing that nature presents nothing but sequence, and this is 
 rigidly true. The keenest eye, looking upon the armies of 
 phenomena which manoeuvre in the physical world, could detect 
 nothing but succession. Eegiment after regiment might march 
 by us in time-order, but they could give us no hint of power. 
 This idea is home-born, and born only of our conscious effort. 
 It is only as agents that we believe in action; it is only as 
 there is a causation within that we get any hint of causation 
 without. Not gravitation, nor electricity, nor magnetism, not 
 chemical affinity, but will, is the typical idea of force." 
 
 It would follow from this that science should either accept 
 force as a manifestation of will or reject it from its system 
 altogether. The writer says, with what justice I know not, 
 that some rigorous Baconians, as Comte and Mill, have tried 
 the latter plan, and fell into ridiculous contradictions. But 
 upon this matter I am not able to offer an opinion. The posi- 
 tive doctrine here adduced by the writer we leave out of con- 
 sideration, as not being a criticism of Mr. Spencer. The con- 
 clusion of the section will be acceptable to many Evolutionists, 
 viz. (p. 126) : 
 
 " This idea of force, which is as much the necessity of science 
 as it is of religion, makes an honourable reconciliation possible, 
 because it enforces on the one hand the need of an originating 
 and controlling mind, and on the other leaves the method of its 
 working undetermined. Science discovers laws, but is forced 
 to provide an ever-active Administrator ; this satisfies religion. 
 Religion proves an ever-living Will, but is compelled to grant 
 its steady method ; this satisfies science. Thus each can look 
 without aversion on the claims of the other."
 
 256 APPENDIX. 
 
 This passage shows the thought that is uppermost in the 
 writer's mind, for he diverges from his negative criticism of 
 Spencer to advance positive doctrines. It is very well to ad- 
 vance positive doctrines, but it has led us off our study of 
 Spencer's main theses. 
 
 The fourth section is an extension of the same argument : 
 
 " Let us grant that he assumes the existence of a universal 
 impersonal force, and inquire how he accounts for the intelli- 
 gence which the universe seems to manifest" (p. 127). 
 
 This is found to be in the chances of One Force of infinite 
 differentiations, the statement and examination of which is the 
 weakest piece of critical examination in the book. 
 
 The writer next examines the doctrine of " Segregation " (p. 
 133), which is much to the point, and he very justly questions 
 the identity of the process of segregation of masses under action 
 of a medium with the segregations of organisms and of organic 
 and mental processes. " All these are instances of segregation," 
 and " Mr. Spencer has a way of using the vaguest and most far- 
 fetched analogies as identities, which often make it impossible 
 to get at any denned meaning." 
 
 The writer then questions the explanation of organic develop- 
 ment on the basis of Mr. Spencer's theory, on which he aptly 
 remarks that 
 
 "Mr. Spencer seems to have forgotten that he is engaged 
 in proving the doctrine of evolution, and cannot be allowed 
 to assume it. The force of his reply lies entirely in the assump- 
 tion that evolution is an established fact. This, however, is 
 not the only time that Mr. Spencer has done this. Many 
 of his arguments, as we shall hereafter see, assume the point 
 in dispute, and are worthless without the assumption." 
 
 This is something to be borne in mind in reading the " First 
 Principles." In many passages of this chapter I find that the 
 writer's indignation has exceeded the proper bounds of expres- 
 sion, which is very regrettable. Has not Mr. Spencer under- 
 taken and performed his task in good faith and with a con- 
 scientious effort to arrive at the truth? Both the eminence 
 of the author and the dignity of the subject should exercise a 
 restraining influence upon the critic. Besides, the judicious 
 critic is content to leave the logical inferences of his criticisms to 
 the reader.
 
 iAJa It 
 
 GREEN. 257 
 
 CHAPTER IV. Principles of Psychology. 
 This is a long chapter, extending from p. 146 to p. 217, 
 and deals with matters highly important and not inapposite 
 to the main and fundamental ohject of our study in this volume, 
 but an account and criticism of it would be apt to carry us too 
 far. The general bearing of it is to show the insufficiency of 
 the explanation of mental facts upon the theory of Mr. Spencer, 
 as expressed in his Formula of Evolution. The critical part 
 is cogent and strong; the positive doctrine taught, or rather 
 indicated, is weak. The writer notices Mr. Spencer's acknow- 
 ledgment of a unit of motion and a unit of feeling having 
 nothing in common, and his admission that " the antithesis of 
 subject and object is never to be transcended while conscious- 
 ness lasts," and very properly criticises the attempted explanation 
 of the nexus. A variety of other difficulties seem very well 
 treated, but are in advance of our present studies. 
 
 CHAPTER Y. The Tlieistic Argument. 
 
 The first section discusses the teleological argument. The 
 second section considers the theory of the construction of the 
 cosmos out of the homogeneous and the Darwinian theory 
 of development of organisms. The third section contains a 
 discussion of Pantheism. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. Summary and Conclusion. 
 I might have given this chapter instead of the foregoing 
 summary, but that I wished to emphasise some portions of the 
 criticism more than others, and to introduce some critical 
 remarks. 
 
 Articles in the Contemporary Review, December 1877, March 
 1878, July 1878, on "Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. G. H. 
 Lewes : their Application of the Doctrine of Evolution to 
 Thought." 
 
 As Professor Green possesses a considerable reputation and 
 influence, it is well that we should acquaint ourselves with his 
 views. His thought seems somewhat laborious, but very clear 
 and careful. Would it not be well if those who belong to the 
 
 R
 
 258 APPENDIX. 
 
 school of thought which pre-eminently claims the title of 
 " scientific" should sometimes step outside their circle and view 
 things from another point of view altogether? This is what 
 Professor Green invites us to do. The study of our subject 
 hitherto has been of the following nature, viz., Accepting Mr. 
 Spencer's statement of the Problem of Philosophy, can we, 
 by the Formula of Evolution, account for the cosmos as it 
 is? Professor Green would seem to dispute the correctness of 
 the problem. To him the fundamental problem is not the 
 construction of the universe, but " How is knowledge pos- 
 sible?" 
 
 He thinks that modern philosophy was brought to a crisis by 
 Hume ; that his professed followers in this country have really 
 ignored him, but that the problems he laid down have been truly 
 followed and worked out by Kant and HegeL He therefore pro- 
 poses to himself the task in these essays thoroughly to over- 
 haul the best representatives of modern " empirical psychology." 
 " Only by a direct examination of that psychology itself, as re- 
 presented by our ablest writers, can we expect to produce the 
 conviction that this primary question of metaphysics still lies at 
 its threshold, and is finding nothing but a tautological or pre- 
 posterous answer." 
 
 The writer justifies this manner of putting the question, and 
 shows that the Positive philosophy, while repudiating, really 
 accepts a metaphysical basis. " It is unaware of the assump- 
 tions which it unintentionally makes in order to its own justi- 
 fication." Beyond certain limits the alliance between psychology 
 and physiology is simply illusive. "It has merely served to 
 give a semblance of scientific authority to what is, in fact, a 
 crudely metaphysical answer to questions which, rightly under- 
 stood, it has nothing to say." 
 
 After re-stating the question, "How is knowledge possible?" 
 the writer gives the supposed reply of his reader. " This 
 seems to be an uncouth way of asking how I and other men 
 have come by the knowledge we possess. The answer is, 
 that we have been taught most of it, but that ultimately, 
 as our best physiologists teach, it results from the production 
 of feeling in us by the external world and the registration 
 of feeling in experience." Mr. Green says that no true disciple 
 of Kant or Hegel will dispute this, but only its sufficiency.
 
 GREEN. 259 
 
 "It is not to the purpose to tell him that consciousness is 
 a simple ultimate fact. Knowledge is quite other than mere 
 consciousness, and, being so, admits of and requires explana- 
 tion. The fact just stated is not an explanation of it, but 
 a summary of what requires explanation. It either merely 
 amounts to the fact that we know because something makes us 
 know, . . . or it is only more than this because the ' something' 
 is determined as a ' world,' as ' real,' and as ' external,' and as 
 in some way reflecting itself in our experience. It is the 
 analysis of these further determinations and of all which they 
 imply that is the proper task of the metaphysician. . . . The 
 question before him is thus one relating to the object of know- 
 ledge. What are the conditions implied in the existence of such 
 an object ? And an answer to this question forms the neces- 
 sary prolegomenon of all valid psychology. Till this is fairly 
 dealt with, an inquiry into the subjective process through which 
 the individual comes by his knowledge can only have an illusive 
 result, for it will be assuming an answer to a question of which 
 the bearings have not been considered, and will therefore be at 
 the mercy of crude metaphor and analogy in its assumption. It 
 is this question which it is Kant's great merit to have clearly 
 raised, and which he fixed in the formula, 'How is nature 
 possible V " It is then shown how this formula was forced upon 
 Kant by the previous historical development of philosophical 
 thought, and it is asserted that the object-matter of all philosophy, 
 physical or metaphysical, has been fixed by Locke once for all 
 as in some sort consciousness. To enter into the true meaning 
 of this is the true baptism into philosophy. 
 
 " If from the proposition, which all admit, that knowledge is 
 of appearances, we go on to inquire into the nature of appear- 
 ances, we find the natural man summoning in an explanation of 
 them which neutralises the admission that they are appearances, 
 or that they are relative to consciousness at all. They are ex- 
 plained as molecular changes of a nervous organisation. Begin- 
 ning with a doctrine which, if it means anything, means that only 
 in a world of consciousness can any material relation be known, 
 we are asked to explain consciousness itself as one sort of such 
 material relation.' 
 
 " In Locke himself, the determination of the object of know- 
 ledge as lying in ideas is virtually cancelled on almost every
 
 260 APPENDIX. 
 
 page where it occurs." Then follows an examination of Locke, 
 which is a launching out into the general question of the meaning 
 of "subject" and of "object" and of their relations. 
 
 "We pause here to inquire as to the duty of the student of 
 philosophy, who has been brought up so far under the so-called 
 scientific training, when in his study of Mr. Spencer, who is 
 supposed to be the outcome of the modern scientific spirit, he is 
 thus met by the assertion that he must explore metaphysics as 
 a necessary prolegomenon of all study when he is thus led 
 up within view of those vast fields of metaphysical explora- 
 tions which he has shunned and dreaded all his lifetime? The 
 thought presents itself, If he takes the plunge into that sea of 
 troubles, will he ever come out of it again ? He recalls Bacon's 
 characterisation of metaphysical studies as vermicular, where 
 the mind wanders about amongst old worm-eaten passages 
 studies in which positions remain positions still, and ques- 
 tions remain questions in which one teacher comes up after 
 another with new phraseologies, but the eternal question remains 
 unsolved. Metaphysics, a toothless Sphynx, going through the 
 centuries with his riddle, and threatening to devour, but im- 
 potent in a busy and unheeding world. 
 
 However, upon consideration, the student feels bound to lay 
 aside his prejudices, and to endeavour to form for himself some 
 estimate of the position as advanced in the foregoing quotations. 
 
 Does Mr. Spencer's statement of the Problem of Philosophy 
 meet the case as therein stated ? Does it include the problem as 
 given by Professor Green ? Does Mr. Spencer show " How is 
 knowledge possible ?" and, by implication, " How is nature 
 possible ?" 
 
 "We recall at once that Mr. Spencer's statement of the problem 
 is obscure, for it reads, firstly, as an unification of knowledge ; 
 and again as a problem of construction, by which existence, in- 
 dependent of and antecedent to consciousness and knowledge, 
 came to be organised, including amongst its results our own 
 selves, with our consciousness and knowledge. It is the latter 
 statement of the problem which we have accepted as correct and 
 criticised, and it would seem to us that if Mr. Spencer had suc- 
 ceeded in his attempt, Professor Green's necessary prolego- 
 menon would have been ruled out of court, since it could have 
 been shown how knowledge is possible ; but since he has not
 
 GREEN, 261 
 
 succeeded, lie lias not shown how knowledge is possible. Can 
 Professor Green, or Kant, or Hegel ? I must ascertain if they 
 undertake this task, and, if so, how they hare succeeded? 
 
 The problem, appears to be the same in both cases one ap- 
 proaching it from, the physical side, the other from the side of 
 consciousness ; but philosophy does not seem yet to have been 
 able to bridge the gulf between them ; the problem of the order 
 of the universe is yet to be solved. 
 
 It would appear, from what I can judge, that the school of which 
 Professor Green is an exponent confines the terms "reality" and 
 " existence " to that which forms part of consciousness and know- 
 ledge. Even when they speak of " material " and " nature," 
 they only refer to terms or items of knowledge and conscious- 
 ness. Because we can talk of nothing but of our knowledge of 
 things as related to ourselves things have no relations amongst 
 themselves independently of our knowledge whereas the 
 records of geology show an age of physical activity long before 
 there was any consciousness. The difficulty appears to be in an 
 ambiguity of the term " reality." Realities would seem to be of 
 two classes : the primary realities such as are in direct relation 
 to our consciousness ; and the inferred realities, which are not 
 present in consciousness. The inferred order of the universe and 
 the inferred relation of things to each other in co-existence and 
 sequence seem to me just as much realities to us as those of which 
 we are immediately conscious. It is possible that the meta- 
 physicians do not mean anything different from ordinary men 
 in the net result, and that ordinary men could agree to their 
 explanations after proper study ; but is any real progress made ? 
 
 It would seem that the metaphysicians, in the position 
 they take up of insisting upon the preliminary study of the 
 question, " How is knowledge possible ?" hold up a perpetual 
 bar to any answer to their own question, if they do not admit 
 independent existences and interrelations of things independent 
 of consciousness. 
 
 So far, both from the side of the metaphysicians and from 
 the side of the physicists to use these terms rather broadly 
 there is no explanation of the mutual relations of conscious- 
 ness and knowledge, on the one side with matter (taken as 
 extension and resistance), and motion on the other. The phy- 
 sicist cannot account for mind ; the metaphysician or ontologist
 
 a6a APPENDIX. 
 
 cannot account for matter, nor, for the matter of that, for mind 
 either. Neither of those can explain the connection between 
 them. The metaphysician can explain the law of knowledge, 
 bat he cannot show, any more than Mr. Spencer or the physio- 
 logists, how knowledge is possible and how nature is possible. 
 
 One remarkable feature in the writings of metaphysicians of 
 the school of Professor Green is their acceptance of a normal 
 mind for the basis of their studies, and the apparent excision 
 from their study of all relations or rather of all inconvenient 
 idUtians with other mninaiimi They do not often refer to the 
 wecids of geology, to the Darwinian theory of development, to 
 the development of the individual from the germ, to varia- 
 tions of mentality, to comparative mentality, nor do they ever 
 Mam to nek a theory which shall unite the whole. Yet all 
 thes* are studies that cry loudly to the metaphysician for affilia- 
 tion not to be left relationkss in the cold. Unless accepted 
 and explained, we always doubt lest, in place of these legitimate 
 children, metaphysics is nursing the offspring of some cherished 
 hutunbwfulilhtsioa. 
 
 T& resume our account of Professor Green^ criticism. Assnm- 
 
 consist or be fawadad. upon vtmaummnm^ then, speaking of 
 Hume^ doctrine* he says : 
 
 ** He can recognise no meaty of &e world, no uniformity of 
 , -varjiBg in every individual and every 
 
 age, with which one idea suggests awiftBg in Memory or ima- 
 gHMliiiiiii Hence the peoafiar. ditteaBy of adjimliafe his system, 
 s far as it is MtthfmUy maintamed, to the procedure of the 
 physical MManB a flMlraiHj which the modern 'experien- 
 tiafiat* aa.vw a^awlf ly acnoaiig liothfteiealily of an objective 
 ordet^ and am ekaaejatarj conseaousness of it, as antecedents of 
 Ilini JBIIUI HI lij aliiii t liniiVi|g,ii iin allaiaiiil He cannot, how- 
 any superiority over Home for so doing: He is 
 the pranms qneetkn which Hume was trying 
 *rfT-m T T-nrH if tirtrfl^ajMH rfhtimrr, * ~ "^y trr 
 Tfe wodeva 'BMBavtialnt ' K taking 
 awHJargMted,alogwith a theory of 
 xeafitp w/fciA exehdes it. Hnae was trying to rrplani it 
 mwmy, m odor tkat tke COM tkcorr of reality 4fe &MTT that 
 itkfertims ai^ht be vmaatoaaOj maintained."
 
 GREEN, 263 
 
 And as Hume is misapprehended, so Kant is supposed to be 
 superseded. But Professor Green holds that this is not so, for 
 the " experientialist " also misunderstands Kant. 
 
 " If the alternative really lay between experience and ready- 
 made, unaccountable intuition as sources of knowledge if the 
 point in dispute were whether theories about nature should be 
 tested merely by logical consistency or experimentality verified 
 whether subjective beliefs should be put in the place of ' sub- 
 jective facts,' or brought into correspondence with them the 
 ' experientialists ' would be entitled to all the self-confidence 
 they show. That the question does not so stand, they can 
 scarcely be expected to admit till their opponents constrain 
 them to it ; and in England hitherto, whether from want of 
 penetration or under the influence of a theological arriere pengee, 
 their opponents have virtually put the antithesis in the form 
 which yields the * experientialists ' an easy triumph. Both sides 
 are, in fact, beating the air till they meet upon the question, 
 What constitutes the experience which it is agreed is to us the 
 sole conveyance of knowledge ? What do we mean by a fact ? 
 In what lies the objectivity of the objective world ? " 
 
 We can scarcely be expected to give Mr. Green's replies to 
 these questions, nor to give his full criticism of Mr. Spencer. 
 We must refer the student to the articles themselves ; but the 
 reader must bear in mind that Mr. Spencer has two theories 
 of Evolution one without, and one with, the factor of 
 "feeling." 
 
 The subjects dealt with in the papers are mainly those of 
 object and subject, reality, the independence of matter, and the 
 nature of experience all of which, the writer undertakes to 
 show, are not properly or satisfactorily dealt with by Mr. Spencer 
 and Mr. Lewes. And since they form the necessary prolego- 
 menon of the study of philosophy, it is to be presumed that 
 the Evolution philosophy cannot be accepted. The primary 
 questions of philosophy, as stated by Professor Green, viz., 
 "How is knowledge possible?" and "How is nature possible?" 
 remain unanswered by the doctrine of Evolution. 
 
 In any case, it would seem that Professor Green makes out a 
 good case for the attention of the honest and painstaking student 
 to the views of the metaphysicians, and gives a valid challenge 
 to his opponents to meet him on his own ground.
 
 264 APPENDIX. 
 
 GENERAL SUMMARY. 
 
 The general conclusions to which our studies have brought 
 us appear to be these : 
 
 First, as regards Mr. Spencer's workmanship, it would seem 
 to be the general opinion that it is not executed in that clear 
 and well-ordered manner that is to be expected in a philo- 
 sophical work. The terms employed are not properly defined ; 
 the propositions are indistinct ; words are used in different 
 senses in different places without any indication of a change 
 of meaning ; some words are used which have no definable 
 meaning at all. It is even said that, in consequence of these 
 deficiencies, the results are not merely confused and nebulous, 
 but absolutely contradictory. These complaints are not made 
 by adversely prejudiced minds only, but by men who have every 
 desire to understand and to accept an explanation of an orderly 
 development of the universe. All this would seem to demand 
 from Mr. Spencer a rewriting of his "First Principles," for 
 although he may hold in his own mind a clear and complete 
 theory, yet he cannot fail to recognise the difficulties experienced 
 by so many of his readers with the very best desire to appreciate 
 and understand him. And when we consider the difficulties 
 and incompetencies of language, no blame is to be attached to 
 a writer upon a difficult subject if he does not always make 
 himself understood ; yet, when the difficulties are stated, blame 
 may justly be attributed to the author who does not seek to 
 remove them. Indeed, considering that the preface to a book 
 is generally written last, when the subject is complete in the 
 author's mind, may we not claim that the " First Principles " 
 should at least receive a revision from the author when his 
 work is complete? Should we not regard it as a "working 
 hypothesis," a tentative theory, and at the end of his elabo- 
 ration of it should the test of the results not be applied to it ? 
 and, if necessary, should it not receive some modifications 
 according to the exigencies of the case ? 
 
 I advance these remarks with due and great respect to Mr. 
 Spencer's high position in the literary and philosophical world, 
 and I mean no disparagement to those great intellectual suc- 
 cesses which are sound and good work ; but these great accom- 
 plishments should not absolve the author from just strictures
 
 SUMMARY. 265 
 
 upon imperfect work, nor from the necessity of rendering more 
 clear the exposition of the more ambitious scheme propounded 
 in the "First Principles" to which we have more especially 
 directed our studies. 
 
 We have also found that the religion indicated by Mr. 
 Spencer is of no value or efficacy in influencing human action, 
 and although something else may be substituted in its place, 
 viz., a kind of " cosmic emotion," yet it is not likely to be of any 
 efficacy in the affairs of the world. Comtism recognises nothing 
 beyond the Knowable ; Spencer recognises the Unknowable as 
 a positive. Nescience implies unknown possibilities, and dis- 
 turbs the self-complacency of Comtism. Mr. Spencer even goes 
 further, and recognises a Power, although it is an Inscrutable 
 Power, and regarding this Power there are many possibilities. 
 How should our lives be influenced by the possibilities of this 
 Inscrutable Power? 
 
 But we have also found that too much stress has been laid 
 upon this portion of Mr. Spencer's theories. We have found 
 that this subject, so attractive to the imagination and so im- 
 portant to the interests of mankind, has led the mind off from 
 the main line of Mr. Spencer's argument, and tended much to 
 confuse the consideration of it. For after all, from a merely 
 logical fpoint of view, the book on the Unknowable is non- 
 essential to Mr. Spencer's philosophy. If it were excised 
 from the book, it would leave the mind free to examine on its 
 own merits the real and substantial theory of the work as con- 
 tained in the part on the Knowable. 
 
 This theory is found to be, firstly, a claim for philosophy; 
 and, secondly, a formula which shall satisfy that claim. 
 
 With respect to this essential portion of the work, the 
 general opinion of critics seems to be that Mr. Spencer has 
 failed. His theological opponents not merely those that are 
 thoroughly ingrained in orthodox prepossessions, but those who 
 manifest unbiassed and careful thought advance objections 
 which Mr. Spencer has not yet met, and which the student may 
 fairly demand shall be replied to. His purely philosophical 
 and scientific critics also argue his failure to accomplish the task 
 he has set Evolution to fulfil. 
 
 It is considered, also, that Mr. Spencer and his disciples 
 admit the insufficiency of the theory to account for the facts of
 
 266 APPENDIX. 
 
 life and mind, and that it is inconsistent to hold on by the 
 soundness of the theory when these incompetencies are allowed. 
 Again, those amongst the eminent scientists of the day who 
 most favour Mr. Spencer's theories appear to be in a state of 
 puzzle. They would like to accept them if they could. The 
 study of the world and the cosmos points to unity, and it also 
 indicates orderly development, and they naturally search for 
 some mode of expressing this unity and order with a natural 
 bias towards that physical science which is the most perfect 
 exhibition, in the present state of human knowledge, of that 
 order. But the most candid and careful of them feel bound to 
 express the incompetency of science to include in any formula 
 certain facts of life and mind, and by implication reject Mr. 
 Spencer's Formula of Evolution as satisying the requirements of 
 philosophy. 
 
 One positive result of our studies has been the recognition 
 of the insufficiency of a materialistic and mechanical theory of 
 the universe. This conviction grows upon the mind the more 
 deeply the matter is studied. Does, then, nature disclose an 
 original mind? Perhaps we cannot say in any positive and 
 certain manner that she does so, but the balance of probabilities 
 is in favour of that theory. We cannot say that that mind is 
 like ours ; we cannot attribute to it from a study of nature 
 like passions or thoughts to our own ; but, as between two rival 
 theories, the presumption is strongly in favour of that which 
 recognises in some form or another the existence of mind in 
 nature. 
 
 If the mechanical and materialistic hypothesis is clearly found 
 insufficient to account for some of the facts of the universe, the 
 mind naturally asks What are the alternative hypotheses ? 
 The only alternative hypothesis is one founded upon the nature 
 of the facts that are unresolved by the other, viz., the facts of 
 life and mind. Although the inference is obscure, yet the 
 general nature of the explanation is indicated. Or there may 
 remain an unknown hypothesis, taking the form of an Unknow- 
 able or Inscrutable Power or Force ; but even then it seems 
 clear that it must contain within it that which comes out of it, 
 that it implies in its constitution the elements of feeling and 
 mind as we know them, and if it differs from them it does so 
 by transcending and comprehending them.
 
 SUMMARY. 267 
 
 The only escape from this preponderance of probabilities is 
 by Agnosticism. But there is no pure nescience logically 
 acceptable. It may be used as a condoner of logical idleness 
 and intellectual superciliousness ; it may cover pride or stifle 
 the cry of despair ; it may be a mental anaesthetic ; but to 
 the earnest thinker there can be no pure nescience. Nescience 
 admits all sorts of possibilities. The Agnostic cannot say that 
 any explanation is not the right one ; his position demands that 
 he should say "It may be," as well as "It may not be." 
 Nescience does not confer quiescence of thought. It gives no 
 rest Behind the veil are all sorts of possibilities. What are 
 our relations to these unknown possibilities ? 
 
 The nescience of Mr. Spencer accepts the positive belief in 
 the inadequacy of the mechanical and materialistic hypothesis. 
 This is a valid definite result. It recognises an all-producing 
 though Inscrutable Power. Other interpreters infer from its 
 results something of its nature. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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 EDINBURGH AND LONDON
 
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