LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. Class if I/ , /2 , _ fa 3, I**. - n [l\J+++ f IP t /f 10 C{ tENERAl T8 ADVERTISEMENT. THE first intention in writing the following pages, was to animadvert on some opinions relating to the principles of political economy, which had met with a very gene- ral circulation, through the medium of several well-written pamphlets on the depreciation of the currency. It became irksome, however, arid seemed hut an invidious task, to select from works that possessed generally a very high degree of merit, a few particular passages, merely to dwell upon their errors; and the author therefore determined to arrange. his own thoughts upon the subject, in an order that might admit of his incidentally commenting upon such opinions of other writers, as appeared to be in opposition to his own. It will perhaps be but too apparent that these remarks upon the principles of exchange have been written and sent to the press, with more haste than is altogether consistent with the respect due to the public ; and the author would willingly have delayed the publication till he had an oppor- tunity of revising and correcting the style : but the cir- cumstances of the present moment seem so peculiarly suited to a Treatise of this nature, that he has not been deterred by personal considerations, from communicating his opinions to the public, on a subject which has long occupied his at- tention. In the execution of his plan, his endearour has been, to . iv ADVERTISEMENT. hold a middle course between such a conciseness as might be incompatible with perspicuity, and that degree of super- fluous illustration which might appear to insult the under- standing of his readers. He is not without hopes that he may escape being classed with those K who, while they imagined that they themselves " had made important discoveries, uniformly found that " no discoveries had been made by their predecessors j" for the author neither pretends to discoveries himself, nor de- nies that merit to others. If the following observations have any claim upon the public attention, it can arise solely from the attempt to discriminate^ more accurately than has hitherto been done, the operation of causes that have been long known, and frequently discussed ; but which have not met with so distinct and detailed a consideration as the author deems essential to a due comprehension of the subject. May 1810, OBSERVATIONS, Xc. $c. Sfc. INTRODUCTION. JL HE principles which regulate the exchange will be investigated in the simplest manner, by an. arrangement that may lead the mind gradually from the separate consideration of the individual causes by which it is influenced, to the more com- plicated results that arise from their combined operation. C The effects of the exchange are first practically /felt, when the intercourse between foreign nations has rendered it necessary to make a remittance from one country to another. The usual mode of making a remittance, either for the discharge of debts previously existing, or for the purpose of investing it in foreign produce, is to purchase and transmit, to the person to whom the remittance is to be made, a foreign bill of exchange. 6 A foreign bill of exchange is an order addressed to some person residing abroad, directing him to pay a determinate quantity of foreign currency to the person in whose favor it is drawn. The quantity, therefore, to be paid, is fixed by the sum specified in the bill ; but the amount of Bri- tish currency to be given here, for the purchase of the bill, is by no means fixed, but is con- tinually varying, from causes which it is the object of this essay to explain. When the market price of foreign bills is high, the exchange is said to be unfavorable, because a larger sum will be required for discharging a given amount of foreign payments. When the market price is low, the exchange is said to be favorable, because the discharge of the same amount of foreign payments will be effected by a smaller quantity of British currency. What- ever therefore affects the price of a foreign bill, will affect the state of the exchange. Now the price of bills will depend, in the same manner as that of any other commodity, upon two causes : First, on their abundance or scarcity in the market, compared with the demand for them ; and secondly, on the value of the currency in which they are to be paid, compared with the va- lue of that with which they are bought. If there be a certain quantity of foreign b'.lls in the market, and at the same time a great demand for making foreign payments or investments, the holders of bills will soon feel the effect of the compe- tition for their purchase, and will refuse to part with them, except an additional price be given as a pre- mium. If, on the contrary, there be an abundant supply of bills in the murket, and not much de- mand for foreign payment or investment, there will be more persons inclined to dispose of bills, than there are persons desirous of purchasing them > and the holders, who wish to convert them into cash, will not be able to sell, except at a dis- count; go that this variation in the market price might take place, though the value of the cur- rency of the respective countries continued abso- lutely unchanged. Supposing, however, the quantity of bills in the market sufficient exactly to supply the demand, and that there are no more persons wishing to sell than there are persons wanting to purchase them, so that any alteration in their price, from this cause, is precluded; yet as the currency of all countries is subject to continual fluctuations in its value, the quantity of British currency to be given for a de- terminate quantity of foreign currency, at any period of time, will depend upon the comparative value of each. An English guinea may be worth, sometimes, a certain number of guilders, florins, 3 or piastres, and at others a very different number, depending either upon alterations in the value of the guinea, or of the guilder, florin, or piastre. The moment that these alterations take place, the in- formation is communicated from one part of the mercantile community to the other, and the price of foreign bills is regulated accordingly. The rale of the cDrftputed exchange, then, will vary from two causes, totally distinct from each other. The firs*-, arising from the abundance or scarcity of bills in the market, is the foundation of what may be called the real exchange, which depends upon the payments a country has to make, compared with those it has to receive, and has no reference to the slate of the cur- rency. The second, arising from alterations in the value of the currency, is the foundation of what may be called the nominal exchange, which has no refer- ence whatever to the state of debt and credit of the country. And as the effects, which the real and nominal exchange have upon the general dealings and commerce of the country, are as dis- tinct as their causes, the natural mode of investi- gating the subject will be to follow the order which this division points out; and after tracing the ope- ration of the real and nominal exchange indepen- dently of each other, to consider their combined effect, in treating upon the computed exchange. OF THE REAL EXCHANGE. IN order that the consideration of the real Ex- change may be kept perfectly distinct from that of the nominal, let it be supposed, during the review of this subject, that the Coin of any two coun- tries that have intercourse with each other is in a perfect state, as to purity and weight ; and that the proportion which the quantity of cur- rency bears to the commodities to be circulated by it in the respective countries, continues un- changed, so as to exclude any alteration in its value. In the commercial dealings which take place between any two nations, the surplus produce of the one will be exchanged for the surplus produce of the other. When neither of them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to the same country, the debts and credits of each will balance ; and there will be no- difficulty in mak- ing remittances from one to the other, without the actual transfer of Bulliorx or money : for as the Bills drawn by the merchants exporting produce would exactly equal, ii>. amount, the Bills drawn on the merchants importing produce, their mutual B 10 debts and credits would be easily liquidated by the transfer of Bills of Exchange ; and as the sup- ply of Bills would be equal to the demand for them, they would neither bear a premium, nor be at a discount, and the real Exchange would be said to be at par. At any particular period of time, however, it may happen that a nation may have imported to a greater amount than it has exported, and conse- quently have more payments to make than to re- ceive. If at that time payment were demanded, the balance due from the debtor country could only be liquidated by the transfer of money or ^Bullion ; and the merchant, rather than incur the expense of the freight insurance and commission attending its conveyance, will be induced to give more for a Bill of Exchange, than the sum for which it is drawn. A competition will be there- by created among the purchasers of Bills upon the creditoi * country, and they will bear a pre- mium in pro}, ^ortion to the demand. In that coun- try, on the contrary, there will be more persons holding, than the Te are persons wanting Bills, and the excess above t'L" 16 demand can only be convert- ed into Coin or Bu.^ on by sending them to the place upon which the> * are drawn. But this Bul- lion or Coin cannot be conveyed to the creditor, without his paying the exp xense ^ * ts transit; and the holder of a Bill in Jke creditor country, 11 if tye be desirous of converting it into money, will be content to receive something less than its amount. There will therefore be in the creditor country a competition to sell, and Bills will be at a discount in proportion to the supply. The pre- mium in one country will correspond with the dis- count in the other. Whatever, therefore, affects the proportion be- tween the payments to be made, and those to be received, will alter the state of the real Exchange. This proportion varies principally from the following circumstances: first, from the effects of favorable or unfavorable seasons creating a dif- ference in the customary supply of the annual pro- duce of the land : secondly, from the alterations which take place in the amount of the foreign ex- penditure of a country, arising either from the ex- penses of foreign establishments and expeditions, subsidies to foreign powers, or remittances to ab- sentee proprietors. The population of the countries that have com- mercial intercourse with each other, though it may vary considerably in long periods of time, is not subject to any sudden changes from year to year; the wants, therefore, for annual consumption may be considered as nearly constant; bat the supply of those wants depending principally on the an- nual produce of the land, will vary taa very great extent. If in any particular country there should 12 be a failure in a commodity which is also the com- mon growth of the neighbouring countries, the de- ficiency will be supplied, in a greater or less de- gree, by an increased importation ; and where the failure takes place in an article of the first necessity, as for instance, in corn, which forms the principal part of the food of the people, the importation will be augmented nearly in proportion to the extent of the deficiency. The average amount of annual imports will in these cases be exceeded, and the ordinary proportion of payments between the country and foreign nations proportion ably af- fected ; and though the effects of the failure of a corn crop, from its magnitude, and its being an article of the first necessity, are most apparent, an alteration similar in kind, but not in degree, will be induced by a failure in the produce of any commodity to the use of which a country has been long habituated. In an article of mere luxury, the deficiency of its produce, by occasioning an in- crease of its price, may contract the consumption, and thus cause the value of the quantity exported or imported to be in a certain degree uniform ; yet it may be easily conceived that a combination of circumstances would, even in commodities of less necessity than corn, lead to an unusual export or import, and therefore materially affect the state of debt and credit of a country. The second circumstance, which has been stated 13 as affecting the payments and receipts of a coun- try, is the variation in the amount of its foreign ex- penditure, under which head maybe included, the charge of maintaining its foreign establishments, civil and military, subsidies to foreign powers, and the remittances to absentee proprietors ; the last of which it may be sufficient merely to mention, since they must bear so very small a proportion to the sum total of the foreign expenditure of a great na- tion, that any variations in their amount would scarcely have a perceptible effect upon the general state of its payments and receipts. On the con- trary, the subsidies to foreign powers, and the ex- pense of maintaining the civil and military esta- blishments abroad, may vary, in times of war, to an enormous extent. Now this expenditure may be supplied either by the export of Bullion or Specie ; by purchasing foreign Bills in the home market, and sending them to the place where the money is wanted ; or by authorising the agents abroad to draw Bills upon the government, and discount them at the place where they are drawn, upon the best terms that the Bill-market will allow. By the export of Bullion or Specie the expendi- ture would be at once defrayed, without creating any debt against the country, and therefore with- out producing any effect upon the real Exchange ; but there are various reasons why this mode has 14 Hot been generally adopted. In the first place* the quantity of Bullion or Specie in a country which has no mines of its own, is exceedingly li- mited, and the total amount that can be spared or procured for exportation will bear a very small proportion to the foreign expenditure arising from protracted warfare. In the next place* there must always be a certain expense of insurance and freight attending its transport; and whenever, therefore, foreign Bills can be procured at a less premium than the amount of that expense, or Bills on the government abroad can be negociated at a less discount, the vehicle of Bills will necessarily be preferred to that of Specie or Bullion. The foreign expenditure of this country, as ap^ pears by the account presented to the Committee of Secrecy by Mr. Long, in 1797? was principally paid by the draft of Bills from the Continent upon England. A debt is thus created against the country equal to the amount of the Bills drawn upon the government, which must exist, in a greater or less degree, till the whole of those Bills are liquidated by the remittance of value of some kind or other. Whatever, therefore, be the* pro- portion between the payments to be made, and those to be received, at any period of time, arising from the ordinary commercial dealings; whatever be the quantity of Bills in the home or foreign market, which are, in fact, the evidences of that 15 proportion ; the foreign expenditure of government must derange the natural state of the balance, and produce an alteration proportional to its amount *. If the Bills be drawn from abroad, they will in- crease the quantity of British Bills in the foreign Bill market, and lower their vahefrom their abun- dance. If the foreign Bills be purchased at home for the purpose of remittance, the competition of government will immediately raise their price, and increase their scarcity. Whether the real Ex- change, therefore, at the time of the expenditure taking place, be favorable or unfavorable, it will always be the less favorable, or the more un- favorable, in consequence of that expenditure. We have hitherto been considering the demand for foreign Bills, as originating wholly in the ne- cessity of liquidating balances arising from trans- actions that had already taken place ; but there is another cause of demand, which springs from the desire of entering upon new commercial specula- * See the examination of Mr. Huskisson before the Commit- tee for enquiry into the policy and conduct of the Expedition to the Scheldt ; where he states the difficulty of making the re- mittances to Austria without lowering the Exchange, which was already from 18 to 20 per cent, against this country. See also Mr. Moore's Narrative of the (-kmpai^n in Spajn, and the difficulty of negociating Bills there, for the supply of the army in that country. 16 tions, whenever the relative prices hi the home and foreign markets are such, as to afford the pro- spect of an adequate profit. If the current real prices abroad are low, compared with those in the home market, there will be an increased demand for foreign Bills, for the purpose of making foreign investments ; and the extent of this demand will be in proportion to the probable amount of the profits to be derived, and the unemployed capital that will admit of being diverted into that channel. As soon as a foreign price-current is received, it is compared with the price-currents at home, and the conduct of the merchant is regulated accordingly. If commodities abroad be relatively cheap, there will be more purchasers than usual of foreign Bills; if they be relatively dear, there will be fewer purchasers than usual; and thus whatever be the real Exchange under any given . balance of payment to be made, and payment to be received, the arrival of a foreign price-current, or an alter- ation in the home price-current, will have an in- stantaneous effect upon the foreign Bill market; and the weekly, and sometimes daily, fluctuations in the course of the real Exchange, are attributable principally to the variations in this species of de- mand. It must not be inferred, however, that because the prices of commodities cause a fluctuation in the course of the real Exchange^ that therefore the 17 real Exchange causes a fluctuation in the prices of commodities. The prices of commodities in the home market (upon the supposition to which we constantly adhere, that the value of the cur- rencies throughout the mercantile republic remains unaltered) cannot depend upon the number of foreign Bills in the same market, but upon the abundance or scarcity of the commodities them- selves, compared with the real demand for them, that is, the wants of consumers ; and it is essential that this peculiar feature of the real Exchange should not escape the reader's attention, since it forms one of the leading distinctions between the real) and the nominal Exchange, and is the cause of the great difference of their effects upon the general exports and imports of the country. It may, then, be stated generally, that, when- ever there is a balance of debt against a country, arising, either from an excess of imports over ex- ports, a large foreign expenditure of government, or the remittance of foreign subsidies; whenever, in short, there is a demand for' foreign payment, or foreign investment, the price of foreign Bills will rise, and may bear a premium; and the price of Bills drawn on the country from abroad will fall, and be at a corresponding discount ; and, on the contrary, when there is a balance of debt due to a country, and a diminution of demand for foreign* payment or foreign investment, the price of Bills c 18 drawn from abroad will increase, and may bear a premium; and the price of foreign Bills will fall in the home market, and may be at a discount. What effects the real Exchange has upon the general exports and imports of the country, it will now be proper to enquire. The merchant is regulated in the conduct of his business, by a comparison of the prices which commodities bear in the home, and foreign market; his attention is directed to the prices current, ac- counts of which are constantly published, and im- mediately communicated by his correspondents abroad. If he finds that the price of any commo- dity abroad is so much higher than the price of the same commodity in the home market, that its sale abroad will pay the expences of freight and insurance, and at the same time leave him an adequate profit for his trouble, he will immedi- ately purchase and export the commodity in ques- tion. As soon as the bill of ladipg has been re- ceived by his correspondent to whom the goods are consigned, he will draw his Bill upon him for the amount ; and if the real Exchange be at par, will have no difficulty in procuring money equal to the value specified in the Bill, by negotiating it in the market at home. But if the real Exchange should not be at par, it is evident that his calcula- tion upon the profit he is likely to derive from the export, must include the premium, or discount. id which he will receive, or pay, in the disposal of his Bill. If the Exchange is unfavorable, or, in other words, if the payments to be made are greater than those to be received, foreign Bills will bear a premium ; and consequently, the addi- tional sum which he will receive on the dis- posal of his Bill, will enable him to export with profit, though the difference of prices of the com- modity at home and abroad were such, as would not allow him to export, with the real Exchange at par. The more unfavorable the real Exchange, the less might be the difference of prices that would induce him to export ; so that an unfavorable state of the real Exchange will operate as a bounty upon exportation, to the amount of the premium, which he will receive upon his foreign Bill. The same calculation upon the state of the real Exchange will be necessary, if the difference of prices at home and abroad should lead him to im* port. But whatever be the state of the real Ex- change, it will affect the importing merchant, and the exporting merchant, in a directly opposite manner: for the importing merchant must pay for the goods he imports, either by purchasing a foreign Bill to remit to his correspondent abroad, for which, if the real Exchange be unfavorable, he must pay a premium; or, if his correspondent abroad is authorised by the importing merchant to draw a Bill upon him for the payment of the goods 20 consigned, as that Bill cannot be converted into money without a loss, he must draw for such an ad- ditional sum above the invoice price of the goods, as will counterbalance the discount to be allowed in negotiating his Bill in the foreign market. This additional sum, therefore, paid by the import- ing merchant in the premium of the foreign Bill, or drawn for by the correspondent to make up the loss on the discount, will be so much deducted from his profit. Unless, then, the difference of prices at home and abroad be such as to admit of this deduction, the merchant must cease to import; so that an unfavorable real Exchange will operate as a duty upon importation, in proportion to the premium on a foreign Bill, or the corresponding discount on the Bill drawn from abroad; and in the same manner it is easy to see, that a favorable real Exchange will operate as a duty upon ex- portation, and will afford a bounty upon import- ation. An unfavorable real Exchange will, therefore, have the effect of forcing the exports of a country; because, during its unfavorable state, the merchant can afford to sell at a lower price to the foreign consumer, and this diminution of price will na- turally lead to an increased consumption. It will contract imports, because the importing merchant must sell foreign produce at a higher rate to the home consumer, to draw back the duty imposed 14 upon him by the unfavorable state of the real Ex- change, and consequently the high price will dirni-* nish the home consumption. It is evident that during an unfavorable state of the real Exchange, the bounty received by the exporting merchant does not depend upon the na- ture of the commodity he exports. Whatever kind of goods he sends abroad, it gives him the power of drawing upon the person to whom he consigns them, to the amount of their value ; and upon this Bill he receives the premium that the market affords. He will of course select those commodities for exportation, which, besides the premium afforded by his Bill, will give him the greatest profit, by the difference of price abroad and at home. Of a'l the commodities, which are the objects of request among trading nations, there is none perhaps that is subject to so little variation in its real price, as Bullion. The an- nual quantity produced from the mines is very nearly constant, its distribution, from the facility with which it is transported, is exceedingly uni- form, and its value, and consequently its real price, throughout Europe at least, must be consi- dered as nearly the same. Unless, then, the bounty afforded by the unfavorable state of the real Ex- change, were greater than the expenses attending the transit of Bullion, it would be of all others the Commodity * least likely to be selected by the ex- porting merchant : but that same uniformity of Value and of price, which would prerent its being exported before the premium on a foreign Bill ex- ceeded the expenses of the transit of Bullion, would be the very cause, why, as soon as the pre- iiiitim had reached that point, it would immedi- ately be chosen as one of the most eligible for ex* portation. The export and import of Bullion are generally Conducted by a class of the community remark- able for their shrewdness, and the small profits upon which they transact their business ; and as soon as the premium on a foreign Bill exceeds, by a very small amount, the expenses of the transit of Bullion* the certainty of the profit compensates in some degree for its smallness, and the opportunity, when it occurs, is seldom neglected. The adverse debt will thtfn begin to be paid, by the Bullion merchants exporting to take advantage of the pre- mium ; r and the competition will be such, that the real exchange will be very rapidly brought down, * Mr. Thornton, apparently from not being aware of the mode in which the export of ordinary produce was increased by an unfavorable real Exchange, seems to imagine that the greater part of the adverse balance must necessarily be paid in Bullion, (pp. 131 \o 134.) 23 so as no longer to afford a profit upon the export of this article. The exporters of consumable pro?- duce will during this period co-operate with the Bullion merchants ; and when the latter have ceased to derive a profit, the former will still con-* tinue their operations, till the unfavorable Ex*- change is reduced to par, or, in other words, till the expprts have been such, as to counterbalance the adverse debt, and render the quantity of foreign Bills in the market equal to the de- mand. From this statement it is obvious, that the na- tural limit to the amount of the real Exchange is the expense of the transit, of Bullion 5 and long before it has arrived at tha^t point, the export -of ordinary produce will be forced, and its import restrained j so that the real Exchange can scarcer ly begin to deviate from par, without calling into action a principle that will correct its deviation. It may oscillate a little on the one side, or the other, from its point of rest, but can hardly admit of remaining either permanently favorable, or per- manently unfavorable, to a nation, in the qrdinary course of its transactions *. * This observation must be understood to apply to the gene- ral balance that subsists bet een any one nation, and the whole of those with which it has commercial intercoui'se - } it being evi- 24 It must not be inferred, however, because the expense of the transit of Bullion is the limit of the real Exchange, that it is therefore a fixed limit, and capable of being estimated at a certain per- centage on the price of a foreign Bill : fbr when the real Exchange has caused a transit of Bullion to any considerable degree, it will at length create a difference in the market price of Bullion itself. This article will become scarce in the country from which it is sent, and abundant in that into which it is flowing. Its price will rise in the former, and fall in the latter. The exporter, there- fore, will then have to calculate the difference of prices in the home and foreign market; and if in the first instance the profit were but just sufficient to induce him to export, it is clear that after the change has taken place, the exportation of Bul- lion, under the same rate of Exchange, will cease. Mr. Boyd, in his evidence before the Secret Committee of the House of Lords, in 1797, re- specting the mode of remitting the Imperial loan to Vienna, states, " that he thought the remit- ".tances by Bills of Exchange were not quite " so favorable as those in Bullion ; but, if he had dent that where a nation trades with more than one coun* ry, the real Exchange may be constantly favorable with oncy it be constantly unfavorable wit'h another. " stuck exclusively to Bullion, the price of this " article would have risen so high here, and " probably sunk so low at Hambro', that in- " stead of a good, it would have become a bad " remittance." The limit therefore of the real Exchange can only be fixed at a certain rate, upon the supposition that the price of Bullion is the same in the home and the foreign market ; for when the real price of Bullion abroad is less than it is at home, the transit of Bullion will not take place, unless the rate of Exchange be suffi- ciently high, not only to pay the expenses of transit, but also to compensate for the loss attend- ing the difference of home and foreign prices. When, on the contrary, the price of Bullion abroad is higher than in the home market, it is equally evident that Bullion will be exported, when the real Exchange is less than the expenses of the transit of Bullion. And thus it is that a very small part of the pay- ment of an unfavorable balance is effected by the transit of Bullion, since its transit can scarcely begin to take place, without rendering it a more unprofitable article of export than ordinary con- sumable commodities. For the former cannot, generally speaking, be considered as a commodity the consumption of which will be augmented by a diminished price, its use being confined to the wealthy few, who are not likely to eocrease the D 26 quantity of their [late, or indulge themselves more freely in the purchase of ornamental manufactures, from the temporary variations in the market price of Bullion: but it is not so with ordinary produce. The great mass of mankind will always endeavour to purchase their comforts at the lowest possible rate. If by means of an unfavorable Exchange our merchants can supply the nations of the Con- tinent with British manufactures, cheaper than when the Exchange is at par, our manufactures will be bought and consumed; and in proportion to the degree in which the Exchange is unfavorable, in the same proportion, shall we be enabled to enter more easily into a competition with the manufac- turers abroad, even in their own market. A possible case may, nevertheless, be supposed, where the government may, from political causes, be induced to continue a scale of warfore, demand- ing a larger foreign expenditure than can be sup- plied by a proportional excess of exports over im- ports; and, consequently, if the quantity of Bul- lion in the country were extremely limited, the real Exchange might, notwithstanding the usual causes that check and prevent its fluctuation*, deviate so much from par, and create so great a drain of Bullion, as to raise its market price above its mint price. l. is* certain that ihs Bullion merchants would in that case, rather than pay the advanced market' 27 price, endeavour to collect the current Coin for the purpose of exportation: A pound of gold at tli2 English mint is coined into forty-four guineas and a half, or 4o/. 14.s\ 6cL * By exchang- ing, then, bank-notes at the Bank, for coin, they can always procure a pound of gold for 46/. 14r. 6d. in notes; and so long as they have this power of purchasing gold at the mint price, at the Bank, they will not give a higher market price else- where. If the paper, therefore, be convertible into Coin at the option of the holder, the Bullion merchants will be constantly pouring in their notes upon the Bank, to be exchanged for Coin, which will be exported f as fast as it can be pro- cured ; and thus a drain upon the Bank will be * Throughout this pamphlet, the Author, in speaking of Bullion, has confined his observations to Gold Bullion only ; iirst, because the Gold Coin is now the only one in which a le- gal payment can be made for debts above 25 1. in amount ; and, secondly, because he has deiived considerable assistance from, and had frequent occasion to refer to, Mr. Mushet's valuable Tables of the Exchange between London and Hambro', since the year 1760, in which the price of Gold Bullion only is noted. j- It is true the laws have affixed most severe penalties to the melting or exporting the current Coin of the realm ; but these penalties have always been found insufficient for its protection, the Coin having uniformly disappeared, whenever either of the above practices has been attended with an adequate profit. established, to a greater or less extent, in propor- tion to the amount of foreign payment that must be discharged ; before the real Exchange is suffi- ciently elevated to prevent any profit upon the ex- port of Bullion. As long as this drain continues, the Bank will be compelled to purchase Bullion, and to coin, for the purpose of supplying the de- mand occasioned by the return of its notes; and as the purchase must be made at the then market price, it is evident that in whatever degree that shall exceed the mint price, the Bank must sustain a loss proportional to the difference; and that a continuance of the drain, under such cir- cumstances, might eventually lead to its ruin. It was upon this ground that the Directors of the Bank, in the year 1795, remonstrated in so urgent a manner against any further loans to the Em- peror; lest the drains, which those loans occa- sioned, should prove fatal to that establishment. In a 1 tter from the Directors to Mr. Pitt, dated October 8, 1795, after observing upon the con- tinual drain that the loan to the Emperor had oc- casioned ; they proceed to state, " that the present cc price of gold being from 4/. Ss. to 4/. 4r. per xc ounce, and our guineas being to be purchased " at 31. 17^. 10^., clearly demonstrates the (as will be fully explained, in the Section upon the Nominal Exchange;) it seems unaccountable that he should so easily have yielded to the repj-esenta^ tions of the Directors; and it is the more to be lamented, since the impressions he then received, seem to have had considerable influence in pro- ducing the fatal measure of permanent restriction on Bank payments, which began in the year 1797, only fourteen months after this period. 31 But assuming it to be the fact, that the foreign ex- penditure at that period was greater than on any former occasion, and that the real cause of the drain was that assigned by the Bank Directors, still they had the means of prevention within their own power ; for it will be shewn, in the next Section, on the nominal Exchange, that when the currency of a country consists partly of Paper, and partly of Coin, and that the former bears a large proportion to the latter, the Bank can at all times contract the issue of its notes, and produce a considera- ble diminution in the total amount of the currency, By this means the nominal prices of commodities, and amongst the rest, that of Bullion, will be lowered. As soon, therefore, as a reduction has thus been effected in the price of Bullion below its mint price, the drain upon the Bank will at once be stopped ; since it will no longer be the interest of the Bullion merchant to purchase gold at the mint price, by exchanging notes at the Bank, when he can procure it at a cheaper rate in the market. The Bank Directors were so well aware of .this mode of counteracting the effects of a drain upon them, that they had recourse to it at the very pe- riod of making their remonstrances ; and the mar- ket price of Bullion, which had been 9?. 7d. per cent, below its mint price, in the beginning of the year 1795, and which probably might never have been raised, had not the Bank, at this period, ex* 32 tended its paper from 11 to 131 millions, was, by the subsequent contraction of it to 9* millions, again reduced, before the middle of the year 1796, to 9s. 7d. below the mint price. Unfortunately too for the country, this same counteracting prin- ciple was resorted to, when the drain took place in the beginning of the year 1797> arising, not from a demand for bullion for the purpose of export- ation, nor from an excess in its market price above the mint price, neither of which existed at the time * ; but solely from the alarm occa- sioned by the fears of invasion ; a drain that will always occur under similar circumstances, and which will be aggravated, rather than relieved, by a contraction of paper. It should be carefully remembered, that the pro* fit from the export of Bullion in consequence of an unfavorable real Exchange, does not arise from Bullion selling for a higher price in the foreign than in the home market, nor from any scarcity of Bullion abroad occasioning an extraordinary de- mand for it; but solely from the demand for * In January 1797, the computed Exchange between and London, was 5Z. 4s. per cent, in favour of London, and dur- ing the year rose to 13 per cent j it never being;, at any part of the year, less than 3Z . 2*. in favour of London. The market price of Bullion, at the same period, was never above it <> mint price. 35 foreign bills, for the purpose of making foreign payments, being so great, that the premium upon them exceeds the expenses of the transit of bul- lion; and, consequently, the transit will take place and afford a profit to the exporter, though the price of bullion be precisely the same abroad as it is at home. When such a quantity of bullion has been export- ed as to raise its market price above the mint price, the coin being obtainable at the mint price, will be exported in preference to bullion ; not in conse- quence of any depreciation in the value of the coin, for it will purchase the same quantity of ordinary produce after the rise of the J>rice of bullion as before ; nor because it is more valuable abroad than it is here, for it will not purchase more in the foreign than the home market; but it will be exported, for the same reason that the bullion is exported, to tiike advantage of the premium on foreign bills, and will be sent, though the price of bullion be precisely the same in the continental market as the English mint price. After what has been stated, it will be sufficient- ly apparent, upon what a false foundation the old notions respecting the advantages of a favorable balance of trade are built, and how futile all at- tempts must be to procure and detain bullion, be- yond the quantity that is actually wanted for con- sumption. The transit of bullion from a high or o E 34 low real exchange is an unnatural transit, not arising from the wants of the country into which it flows, but depending solely on the profits which a temporary pressure for foreign payments affords to the bullion merchants on the sale of foreign bills; and as soon as the cause that has produced the temporary influx subsides, (an event that will sooner or later necessarily take place, by the im- port of such ordinary produce as is wanted for the purposes of consumption, and increased enjoyment of the people,) the superfluous and unused quantity of bullion that has been accumulated, will flow back from the country where its abundance has rendered its real price low, to those nations from which it had been unnaturally sent, and where its scarcity will have rendered its real price high. Much of the confusion that attends this question would have been avoided, had the dealers in bills of exchange, and the dealers in bullion, (that is, the persons who export or import bullion for the supply of consumers,) been two distinct classes of merchants. It would then have been seen that the profits of the dealer in bills of exchange flowed through very different channels from those of the dealer in bullion. If at any time the course of exchange were such as to afford a profit to the bill merchant by the sale of foreign bills, he would export that bullion which had been imported for the use of the manufacturer, and would continue 35 to export till it no longer afforded a profit. The bullion dealer would then begin to re-import, in consequence of the difference of prices in the home and foreign markets, the bullion that the bill merchant had sent away, in consequence of the high premium on foreign bills. Whatever de- rangement the bill merchants might occasion in the quantity of bullion that would be otherwise naturally distributed among the different countries according to their wants, would be remedied by the operations of the bullion merchants, who would find their advantage in restoring the equili- brium that the bill merchants had destroyed. The dealer in bills of exchange would have employment, when there was the least difference between the prices of bullion in the home and foreign market, and the real exchange at the the greatest deviation from par. The bullion dealer would be most engaged^ when there was the greatest difference in these prices, and the real exchange at its least deviation from par. Had this distinction been attended to by Lord King, he would never have entertained such erro- neous opinions respecting the exports of silver from this country to India, nor have considered them as indications of an exchange constantly in favor of England against the Continent; for he would have, seen, that the export of bullion is uot regulated 36 merely by the speculations of the dealers in bills of exchange, but is effected, like that of any other commodity, when there is such a difference in its real prices at any two places, as will afford a pro- fit on its transit; an occurrence that will frequently take place, even with an excliangelit par. OF THE NOMINAL EXCHANGE. THE market price of a foreign bill has been stated to depend upon two circumstances : first, on the scarcity of bills in the market compared with the demand for them; and secondly, on the value of the coin or currency in which they are to be paid, compared with the value of the coin or currency with which they are bought. The first of these, as connected with the real exchange, formed the subject of the foregoing Section; we shall now proceed to examine the nature and effects of the second, on which depend the alterations of the nominal exchange ; and as in treating of the real exchange we endeavoured to 37 keep the subject as distinct as possible from the question of the nominal exchange, by supposing no alteration to take place in the value of the cur- rencies in the respective countries ; so in tracing the effects of the nominal exchange, we shall suppose the state of the real exchange to remain unaltered ; or the mutual dealings and intercourse between the nations composing the great mercantile republic to be such, that the price of foreign bills is not af- fected by any variation in their abundance or scarcity, but that the supply of them is constantly sufficient to answer the real demand. In this case the variations in their price can arise only from changes in the comparative value of the currencies in which they are paid, and those with which they are bought. It will not be necessary, therefore, to enter intq any enquiry respecting those changes which have taken place from the discovery of the American mines, or which have arisen from any cause that would affect all currencies in an equal degree; since the object is not to compare the value of currencies now, with what they were at any for- mer period, but to estimate the local alterations that have taken place in the currency of one country, without a corresponding alteration in that of others. The currency of every nation is subject to con- tinual fluctuations in its value, principally from three circumstances. First, An alteration in the quality and standard purity of the metal of which the coin is formed. Secondly, An alteration in the quantity of the metal contained in coin of the same denomination. Thirdly, An alteration in the total amount of the currency of a country, without a correspond- ing alteration in the commodities to be circulated by it. The first of these is now seldom resorted to in a civilized country, even under the most pressing necessities of the government. The second has been frequently adopted by princes and sovereign states, who through a mis- taken policy have imagined that they derived a benefit from diminishing the quantity of metal contained in their coins. The English pound con- tained, in the time of Edward the First, a pound of silver. The French livre contained a pound weight of silver, in the time of Charlemagne. The English pound contains, at present, only one third, and the French one 66th part of their ori- ginal value*; but I believe, except in Turkey, there is no instance of this practice being counte- nanced by any of the modern governments. The Smith's Wealth of Nations vol, i. p. 39. 39 metallic currencies, however, of most nations, even where the governments have been desirous of mainr taming them in a state of the utmost possible per- fection, have been much diminished in value by being worn from use, and dipt or otherwise de- graded by the illicit practices of the people. To avoid the confusion that would follow from the constant fluctuations in the value of currencies, merchants have adopted a mode by which they en- deavour to estimate the extent of these fluctua- tions; and for this purpose, have ascertained with tolerable accuracy, in what quantities of coin of the mint standard in different countries, an equal weight of gold or silver of the same standard fine- ness is contained. Thus it has been determined, that a pound sterling of the English mint contains the same weight of silver, of a certain fineness, as 33 schillings 8 grotes* of the Hambro' banco- * From the evidence before the Secret Committee of the House of lords, in the year 1797, it appears that there is a dif- ference in the mode of estimating the par of Exchange with Hambro' j the house of Goldsmid considering 33. 8. and Mr. Boyd's 34. 8. as the par of Exchange. The difference seems to have arisen, from the former estimating the par according to the standard of Hambro' banco money ; the latter, according to the actual currency of Hambro* which appears to be more than 3 percent, below the standard of the banco money. Upon this supposition there is less difficulty in reconciling the apparent contradiction, that 3 schillings above the par, has the same 4o money; and in speaking of the exchange with f lambro', 33. 8. is in the technical language of inerchants said to be the par of exchange. In the same manner the par of exchange with France is fixed at 24, because 24 livres of the mint stand- ard of France contain the same weight of silver, of a certain fineness, as the pound sterling of the English mint. By means of this rule, the merchants of one country would never be at a loss to estimate what quantity of their own money would be equivalent to a specific sum of foreign money, so far as re^ garded the weight of metal, provided the coins of the respective countries contained the due weight of their lespective mints. But in some countries the coins are more, in others less worn, and ciipt or otherwise degraded below the mint standard. When these alterations have taken place, it would be ne- cessary either to establish a new par of exchange, effect, one way, upon the transit of gold, that 4 grotes below par has the other ; a fact that was stated by Mr. Goldsmid's partner, but which he was unable satisfactorily to explain. If the Hambro' currency were so much degraded below tb banco money, that 35 schillings 4 grotes currency were worth vno more than 33 schillings 8 grotes banco money, there would be a nominal Exchange of 1 schilling 8 grotes against Hambro;, for every pound sterling j and if the par is estimated at 33. 8. 4 grotes below that sum, and 3 schillings above it, would be equally distant from the real par of 3ft schillings 4 grotes. 41 to guide merchants in their money transactions, or, as is now the general usage, not to alter the par of exchange, but to mark the fluctuation of the currency, by considering it as so much above or below the established par. In King William's time, before the reformation of the silver coin, (silver being then the metal in which the payments of the country were legally made,) the current coin was rather more than 25 per cent, below its stand- ard value. The established par, however, was not altered, but the exchange was said to be 25 per cent, against England *. Before the reformation of our gold coin in 1774, the guinea contained so much less than its standard weight, that it was de- graded 2 or 3 per cent, when compared with the French coin at the same period ; and the exchange between England and France was then computed to be 2 or 3 per cent, against this country ; upon the reformation of the gold coin, the exchange rose to par. The Turkish government, in the course of the last forty years, has made three great alterations in its coin. Before these frauds were committed, the Turkish piastre contained nearly as much silver as the English half crown; and in exchange, the par was estimated at 8 piastres to the pound sterling. The consequence of these * Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. ii, p. C 21G. F 42 repeated adulterations has been, the reduction of the silver in the piastre to one half, and a fall in the exchange of 100 per cent., bills on London hav- ing been bought in Turkey, in 1803, at the rate of 16 piastres for every pound sterling*. Now though it is not absolutely conclusive, that these alterations in the computed exchange were entirely owing to the fluctuations in the value of coin, because the real exchange at the time might not be constant ; yet the correspondence of the difference of exchange, with the acknowledged degradation of the coin, renders it more than probable, that the fall of the computed exchange arose from an alteration in the nominal exchange only. _^ It is unnecessary to enter further into the detail of the consequences that arise from the degrada- tion of the coin below its mint standard. As soon as that degradation (which never can remain long concealed) is discovered, the inconveniencies that would otherwise attend the commercial intercourse are obviated by a corresponding alteration in the computed exchange ; and though during the con- tinuance of the degradation, the nominal exchange will remain permanently unfavorable to the coun- try in which it prevails, it will be immediately re- stored to par, by a reformation of the circulating * Foster, on Commercial Exchange, p. 93. 43 medium. We will therefore, in the remaining part of this enquiry into the nature and effects of the nominal exchange, suppose, that the curren- cies are not degraded below their mint standards, and confine our observations to the third cause, which has been stated to affect the value of curren- cies, viz. the ratio, which the total amount of the currency in one country bears to the commodities to be circulated by it, compared with the ratio that the currencies of other countries bear to the com- modities which they are respectively employed to circulate. It is the fluctuation from this cause, which at present principally affects the nominal exchange. Had the currencies of commercial states been con- fined to the precious metals only, it is scarcely possible that any increase of currency, more than was demanded by the wants of increasing wealth, could have taken place in countries that had no mines of their own. As the metals of which the coin was composed must have been purchased at their value, no possible motive can be conceived, that would induce the holder of bullion to convert it into coin, unless there was a real demand for it. The circulating medium of modern times no longer consists of the metals only, almost all nations hav- ing adopted, on a greater or less scale, the use of paper currency, issued, generally, under the sanc- tion of government, by corporate bodies or bayks, 44 who are responsible for the payment of it in specie on demand. As the profits of these corporate bodies or banks are in proportion to the quantity of the paper they can permanently keep in circu- lation, there can be no doubt, that every effort consistent with prudence, will be made to aug- ment that quantity. But it is impossible that such an increase can take place in the quantity of any commodity that is given in exchange for others, whose quantity is not augmented in the same pro- portion, without affecting their comparative value. If the currency of a country is increased, while the commodities to be circulated by it remain the same, the currency will be diminished in value with respect to the commodities, and it will re- quire a larger proportion of the former to purchase a given quantity of the latter ; or, in other words, prices will rise. If we were in the habit of consi- dering money as purchased by commodities, instead of commodities being purchased by money, the diminution in the value of money from its abund- ance, would be immediately apparent. f( Mr. " Thornton admits, in the most explicit manner, " that if the quantity of circulating medium is cc permanently augmented, without a correspond- " ing augmentation of internal trade, a rise will " unavoidably take place in the price of ex- cc changeable articles. Indeed this is a principle " upon which ail th<; wrile-rs on Commerce, both 45 '* practical and speculative, are agreed : they have have ever been found adequate to its prevention. To account for this, there is no necessity for supposing a demand for bullion abroad. It is the conversion, that prevents the currency from ever exceeding the due proportion that is wanted for the purposes of circulation : for it can* never ex- ceed that proportion, without augmenting the no- minal price of bullion, and affording, as loiig as there is a superfluous quantity,, a profit to the melter. It is true thai the same conversion may take /.,. * The reader will apply the proper limitation to tliis* general assertion, which is not meant to convey the idea that the effect will be instantaneous, or that it may not be counteracted by other causes, but that the over-issue of currency will have this tend- ency, and that ultimately the nominal price of bullion will 1* raised above its natufal price, in prftportfoh to the 'over-issue.' H place, by exporting the com to stay foreign try, wher.e jjt vyill be estimated according to its weight in bullion, and pass for its intrinsic value ; an,d projoabjy this circumstance has Led so many writers to assign the capability of the transit of coin, as the reason why currency convertible into coin can never be depreciated by excess. But it is evident that, qf the twp modes of conversion, that by melting will be preferred, since it will be Unattended by any expenses qf transit. If the market price of bullion in London were 4 per cent. above its mint price, in consequence qf the depre- ciation qf currency, while at Hambro' there was no depreeiatjpn whatever, 100 guineas conveyed to the latter place would purchase the same value in commodities that 104 guineas would do in Lon- 4pn ; but as, the expense of sending them would amount to 3 per cent. *, there would be a profit to the exporter of one guinea only; whereas the 100 guineas, melted in London, would immedi- ately sell in the market for 109/. 4.9. , leaving a clear profit of four guineas by the operation. It is absurd, then, to suppose that any man would expose himself to the penalties of the law, by ex- porting coin for a profit of 1 per cent., when with- * The expense, as stated by Mr. Eliason, is 3/. 12s. lid. per cent.. Evidence Secret Committee House of ix^rds,, 1*97,, p. 9, out subjecting himself to severer penalties, he might, by melting it, secure a* pront of 4 per cent. It is the melting* therefore, in consequence of the high market price at home, and not the export in consequence of a high nominal exchange, that will cause the disappearance of the coin. It is true* that after the melting has proceeded for some length of time, (unless indeed the melted coin be purchased for the purpose of being re- comedy.) there Will' bo a- gradual accumulation of bulliort beyond what may be wanted for consump- tion-; and this abemdaUce may render the com- modity so- cheap, that the bullion merchant- may find' hid advantage in exporting, it, in consequence of the difference of tile real prices in the home and foreign markets. But this exportation is the effect of the melting, and not the cause of it. It is not a demand forthe exportation of bullion that has caused the melting of the coin ; but the coin being melted, to take advantage of the high no- minal price of bullion, hav lowered its real price so much, as to afford a profit upon its exportation. It is by no means necessary, however, that the bullion produced by the melting should be ex- ported, since there may be a greater demand for bullion at home, for the purposes of manufacture, than there is abroad. The melter will always de- rive bis profit by selling the melted coin at the high market price, which the bullion merchant 60 will be equally ready to give, \vhetherhesell to the home manufacturer, or the foreign whether, at the time, he be effecting the import or the ex- port of bullion. A want of attention to this distinction, so es- sentially necessary towards a just conception of the principle, which regulates the quantity of cur- rency and the increase of prices, has led to some very erroneous opinions respecting what is called the universal level of currency : for it has been maintained by many writers upon political eco- nomy, and implied by almost all, that specie leaves the country where it is depreciated in con- sequence of the inferiority of its value to the cur- rency of other countries * ; that if the currencies of * tliis error pervades Mr. Wheatley's Work on the Theory of Money and Principles of Commerce. He was well aware of the fact, that specie i frequently exported in consequence of an un- favorable exchange j .but as he does not admit of any alteration in the exchange, from the abundance or scarcity of foreign bills, (which is the real cause of the export pf specie, when it does take place,) he attributed the effect, to the difference in the va- lue of currencies ; and thence inferred, that the export of coin was the remedy for its depreciationa principle, that leads at once to the conclusion, that prices might be indefinitely aug- mented, if the currencies of all nations were proportionally increased. Mr. Ricardo and Mr. Mushet have fallen into the same error, respecting the export of specie, and do not seem to be a\\aie, that the alteration in prices, from over-issue or contraction of 61 other nations were depreciated in an equal portion, there would be no advantage attending the export ; and that upon the supposition of the currency being proportionally increased through- out the world, prices might be universally and in- definitely augmented ; whereas the export has no relation whatever to the value of currencies in other countries, but arises entirely from the relative va- lue of gold in the form of coip, and in the form of bullion. The coin of this country, when sent abroad, passes only for its intrinsic value, according to its weight, and it will not be sent abroad from an un- favorable nominal exchange, unless its value in the shape of bullion is greater than its value in the form of coin. But the real value of bullion on the Continent is no more affected by the depreciation, of the currency there, than it is here. If there be a profit upon the export of coin from this country at a time when the currency is depreciated here, and is not depreciated upon the Continent, there would be the same profit, if the currency of the Continent were depreciated also $ -for the market currency, has no effect upon the exports and imports of ordi- nary produce j since they uniformly describe commodities as flowing from the nominally cheap, to the nominally dear mar- ket, without adverting to the counteracting effects of the no- minal exchange. price of bullion, at which our exported coin wowM then be sold abroad, would be so much higher m proportion to> tfoe* depreciation of the foreign cur- rency. Suppose thafe the currency at London aiwt Harobro J being m their due proportions, and the nominal exchange at par, tile real yw*ice f billion corresponds in both places with the English B*mt price. Let the currency at JLondbn be depreciated by over-issue 4 per- cent. ; th m&rfcet price of bul- lion at London would then exceed the min* price 4 per cent.*, and the nominal etf^hangfc Would be unfavorable to the; sttme attiou-nt Uiitter those circumstances* & itterdtewi e^p^rtklg 100^'& Worth of specie to Haai&tfo', atid; d^awirt^ bill tipon hi* correspondent, W$ld guift 1 pr ceil. by tpsmsaetio: for- tlte peeiei dtt fe arri45Eil att bro* where the n*arfeetpme<$f b^i6tt^ ^ccerdi 1tie hypothesis, cdri*espodfe> with tie 'English price, would sell* in the bullion market for The English merchant would therefore draw for IOO/. ; and, foreign bills bearing a> premium, wouW sdl his bill in the English bill market for 10#/., Which, after deducting 5 per cent, for the expenses of transit, would leave him a profit of \L percent. Now suppose the currency at Hambro' to be also depreciated to the amount of 4 per cent. ; the no- ifcmai exchange will then be at par, but the- market- price- of buHkm* at Hambro* will exceed- the Eng- lish mint price 4 per cent. The lOO/.'s w-ofth of 63 will sell at Hambro' for 104/. ; the mer- chant will therefore draw upon his correspondent for 104/,, ami tke exchange being at par, will procure 104/. for his bill in the English bill market; and deducting 3 per cent, for the expenses of transit, he will obtain a. profit of I/, per cent, a* before. It has been already demonstrated that bullion will not be exported under an unfavorable nominal exchange, merely in consequence of that ex- change ; and the reason why specie is exported under the same circumstances, is, that the coin, while it remains here, passes for less than its worth, and that abroad it passes for its real value ; in this country it forms apart of the currency, and partakes f the depreciation, abroad, it passes as bullion, and is relieved from the depreciation. But it is quite clear that even in the export of specie, there WQuid be no profit whatever, unless its deprecia- tion were groaior than the expenses attending its export ; and therefore wore there no other remedy for a depreciated currency than the export of spe- $ie, the mwiiwl exchange might for any length of tirne canine unfavorable, to an extent somewhat |es than the expenses of the transit of bullion, But the feet is, that no such continuance of an unfavorable exchange, even to that extent, can take place, so long as the currency is gapable of being converted in^o bullion: for st SQO as the 64 epreciation is evinced by an elevation of the kef, price of bullion above the mint price, that mo* rnent the conversion of the superfluous currency commences ; and it depends upon the comparative demand for bullion, in this country, and the de^ ihand, upon the continent, whether the melted specie be exported or not. ' It must be admitted, that, as soon as the depre- ciation has exceeded the expenses of the transit of specie* and thus afforded an option as to the mode of converting it into bullion, the foreign merchant, by buying abroad the bills upon England, wnich will necessarily be at a discount, and ordering his correspondent to whom he sends the bills, to invest them in English specie, will be enabled to procure bullion at the English mint price. So that as long as he can dispose of the bullion at that price abroad, he will derive a profit equal to the ex* cess of the discount at which he has bought the English bills, aboye the expenses of the transit of specie. But it having been already shewn, that the profit on melting always exceeds the profit on exporting, by the amount of the expenses attend- ing the export, it can never be believed that a merchant would collect the current coin, and by exporting it, subject himself to the penalties of the law, for the sake of obliging his foreign corre^ spondent, and enabling him to acquire a profit of 1 per cent., when by melting the same coin, he 65 might. himself, with less risk, obtain a profit of 4 per cent. ., Again, if the nominal exchange were rendered favorable, 4 per cent, by a forced contraction of the currency, and the price of bullion were low- ered with that of other Commodities, so as to be 4 per cent, below the mint price ; would any mer- chant purchase foreign bills at a discount of 4 per cent, and send them to Hambro* to be invested in foreign coin, for the sake of gaining 1 per cent. upon its import, when, by employing the same capital in the purchase of bullion in the home market, and converting it into coin at the mint, he would derive a profit of 4 per cent. ? The only case in which a superior advantage .woulft be obtained from the export of specie, rather than from the conversion of coin into bullion, or fi 4 om the import of specie rather than the conversion of bullion into coin, would be, when the over-issue or contraction of the currency had created a pre- mium or discount of 4 per cent, on foreign bills, without producing an alteration of 1 per cent, in the market price of bullion. But it has been al- ready shewn, that the nominal price of bullion is raised or lowered in the same manner as that of other commodities, to which it would otherwise no longer t bear its natural relative value. Such an, occurrence, therefore, if possible, can be but tem- porary, and does not affect the general argument. I 66 Where the currency consists partly of coifi, and partly of paper convertible at option into coin, it is for the same reason absolutely impossible that it can continue permanently in a state of depreciation : for should the IBank be so imprudent as to issue notes beyond the demands of increasing wealth, as soon as the augmentation of prices, and a con- sequent unfavorable nominal exchange, denoted the depreciation of the currency, the market price of bullion would exceed its mint price, and all that portion of the circulating medium which could be converted into bullion would begin to disappear. The paper of the Bank would be returned to be exchanged for coin, which would be immediately melted, and sold in the form of bullion, for notes, at the advanced nominal price. These, in their turn, would be sent to the Bank to be in the same manner exchanged for coin, which would be melt- ed and sold as soon as procured. Now this process might be going forward, and continue to drain the Bank of its gold, without the slightest demand for bullion abroad, or without any demand for foreign payments. It would equally take place, though the country were re- ceiving payments instead of making them- --though it were importing bullion instead of exporting it. .Should the Bank persist in its over-issue, and still endeavour to throw the same quantity of notes into circulation, the Directors would be compelled to 67 purchase bullion, and coin it into guineas, in or- der to supply the drain occasioned by the return of their notes ; and as Mr. Thornton states, " they " will have to do this at the very moment when <( many are privately melting what is coined. " The one party might be melting and selling, " while the other is buying and coining ; and each " of these two contending businesses will be car- " ried on, not on account of an actual exportation " of each melted guinea to Hainbro'; but the ope- " ration, or at least a great part of it, will be con- " fined to London the coiners andmelters living " on the same spot, and giving constant employ - " ment to each other V Mr. Winthorp, in the evidence he gave be- fore the Secret Committee of the House of Com- mons in 1797, (p. 46 and 47,) concluded that be- cause there was a drain upon the Bank, there must necessarily be a drain upon the country ; and stated "his belief that the coffers of the Bank ge- " nerally shew whether money is coming into or " going llt of the country." I should hope it would be unnecessary, after what has been already * Thornton on Paper Credit, p. 125. Mr. Thornton admits that the melting is not always connected with the export of bullion ; but as the object of his Book was to shew that the currency was not depreciated, it was impossible for him to give even a plausible explanation of this part of his subject, without attributing the effect to an unfavorable real exchange. 68 observed, to offer any thing farther in refutation of such opinions. The drain upon the Bank will be^in under any circumstances, whenever the deprecia- tion of currency from over-issue has raised' the market price of bullion above its mint price ; and it will continue, till the loss which the Bank must suffer by the purchase of bullion to supply the drain, shall compel the Directors to diminish the number of their notes, so as to bring back the currency to its natural level. The price of bullion will then fall. to its mint price, and no longer afford a profit on being melted ; the nominal exchange will inva- riably mark the amount of the depreciation during its continuance; and when the depreciation ceases, the nominal exchange will rise to par. The adoption of a paper currency, therefore, can never be injurious to a country, so long as it is convertible at option into specie. The tempta- tion to its over-issue will always be sufficiently checked by the principle that has been just ex- plained ; and, independently of the convenience of making the larger payments, it will certainly be advantageous to carry on the circulation of a coun- try by a cheap, rather than a costly, machinery. It is obvious, that as the nominal prices of com- modities will be increased by the over-issue of currency, so, for the same reasons, the contrac- tion of it belo'v the natural wants of circulation, will diminish the nominal- prices in the same 69 proportion. A smaller quantity of currency will then measure the same value, and the nominal exchange will be favorable to the country where the value of the currency is increased. This is an event that does not often occur; for as the pro- fits of a bank that issues paper-money depend upon the quantity it can circulate, the directors $f the establishment will generally take care that the supply shall not be less than the demand. When the market price of bullion,- however, has from any cause been elevated above the mint price, the Bank has always the power of giving the currency an artifical value by a diminution of its total amount ; and it is evident 1 hat by such a diminution, the price of bullion will be lowered in the same proportion as that of any other com- modity. Bullion will then be of less value in the market than in the form of coin, and the merchant will carry it to the mint, to obtain the profit at- tending its conversion into specie. If, under such circumstances, there should be a demand for bullion for the purpose of exportation, this would evidently occasion no drain upon the Bank, while it could be procured at a cheaper rate in the market; and should the demand for exportation continue so long as to raise the price of this commodity, in consequence of its scarcity* the * The scarcity here spoken of refers only to the partial scarcity 70 Bank would always have the power by a greater contraction of its currency, to lower its nominal price, and thus preserve the superiority of its value in the form of coin over its value in the shape of bullion. It is thus that the value of the currency is made to correspond with that of the precious metals of which it is composed, or into which it is convert- ible; and as long as they continue to be the standard by which the value of other commo- dities is estimated, the circulating medium of the whole mercantile republic will suffer no per- manent alterations, but what arise from the variation in the intrinsic value of the precious ins- tate themselves. It is some proof of the truth of these positions respecting the uniformity of the value of currency, that from the period of the reformation of the gold coin in 1774, to the year 1797, the computed ex- change between London and Hambro' was gene- rally in favor of the former, arising, probably, from the superiority of our coin ; and that it seldom varied, except in 1793, more than 5 per cent, on the one side or the other of par. In arising m particular countries from the temporary unequal dis- tribution of bullion, and not an actual scarcity arising from a permanent diminution of the usual quantky produced at the mines. 71 that year th computed exchange rose to 10 ami 1 1 per cent, in favor of this country, owing to the sudden contraction of currency that took place in consequence of the run upon and failue of the country banks, at the breaking out of the French revolutionary war, which had the effect of raising the nominal value of the currency here to the degree indicated by the favorable ex- change. During the whole of this period the market price of bullion never exceeded its mint price, except in the year 1783, by the very trifling amount that has been already specified; and in the year 1795, when the Bank had extended its paper from less than 1 1 to upwards of 13 millions *nd a half. After this review of the subject, and the strong evidence which presents itself that the currency of a kingdom, whether consisting of coin only, or partly of coin and partly of paper, can never be augmented beyond its due proportion, so long as ttoe paper is convertible at pleasure into specie- can any one for a moment doubt of ths result, should this salutary check be removed, and at the same time the paper currency be made a legal tender for the payment of debts*? * By the Restriction Act, bank notes are not absolutely Ale- gal tender ; but if a tender be made in notes, the debtor caanol be arrested. Without this latter provision, motives of prud- ence might induce the Bank .so to restrain its is- sues, as not to create an. open discount upon its notes, and thus introduce a paper and a money price for commodities ; but under the protection now afforded by the Restriction Act, there is no reason why it should not push the issue of this currency to the utmost possible limit, and particu- larly if there be a confidence in the public, that sooner or later the notes will be convertible into gold. There is no doubt, that with respect to the Bank of England this confidence is strongly felt by the public, and with good reason. Bank of England notes are never issued but for a valuable considera- tion, being principally advanced either upon Ex- chequer bills or in discounting the bills of merchants. Unless, therefore, the government is unable tore- deem the former, or the .merchants should be in- capable of paying the latter when they become due, there must always be sufficient funds in the Bank to answer, the demands upon it *. The de- preciation from over-issue is therefore by no means necessarily connected with any want of confidence in the resources of the Bank, but rests upon an.en- * There must in fact be more than sufficient, since the value of the outstanding notes must be lass than that of the bills upon Which they were issued, by the amount of the interest deducted at the time they were discounted. 73 tirely different foundation, and might equally take place, whether the currency consisted partly of coin and partly of paper, or was composed entirely of the former: for it is not the paper only, but the whole currency, both the paper and the coin, so long as it remains in the form of coin, that is de- preciated by over-issue. But as the latter is con- vertible into bullion by melting, it will be con- signed to the crucible, for the purpose of removing the depreciation that it suffers, while it constitutes a part of the currency. The advocates for the Bank restriction triumph- antly ask, how it is possible that the notes can be depreciated, if 100/. in bank notes will purchase as much as 100/. in specie: but the question, as applied to the depreciation of the currency, is ab- surd ; for the notes and the coin are alike depreci- ated*, and therefore exchange, as before, for the * This opinion is controverted in the Edinbro* Review, No. 25, p. 54, apparently under an idea that, as the price of gold and silver is nearly the same in all the countries of the world, a de- preciation of the current specie in this country must necessarily be accompanied by a corresponding- depreciation of the currency of all nations upon the face of the earth . But there is a material distinction between the depreciation of the specie, and the de- preciation of the gold and silver that forms the specie. The first may be effected by the over-issue of the Bank, but that can have no influence on the real value of the bullion, which the specie contains. As an argumentum ad hominem against Mr. Thorn- K 74 same quantity of produce in the market. But their intrinsic value is not the same, because guineas being convertible into bullion, the one may be relieved from its depreciation by a change in its form ; whereas the other cannot *. This conversion is constantly going on, and must con- tinue till not a piece of coin is left in circulation, ton, it is indeed conclusive, because he imagines the remedy for a depreciated currency consists in the exportation of coin to other countries, where it is not so depreciated. It would be impossible, therefore, for the specie to continue permanently degraded, upon his principles, unless the value of the currency of every other nation were equally so. But it has been shewn that the remedy for depreciated currency from over-issue de- pends on its conversion into bullion, and not upon its export- ation. The gold and silver currency may therefore fall in value be- low the level of the currency of neighbouring states, but this cannot be the case with the gold and silver of which it is com- posed. * As long as the bank note for a guinea is convertible into gold bullion, at the option of the holder, its intrinsic value may be said to be the same as a guinea. Take away the convertibility, and the intrinsic value of the note is the value of the ink and paper of which it is composed. No banking operation, nor le- gislative provision, can ever alter the real value of the gold bullion in a guinea j but the number of nominal pounds to be given for that quantity of gold bullion, may be increased in the proportion that the total number of pounds in the currency is increased beyond what is wanted. 75 unless its weight be so much reduced below the standard as not to be worth the melting. The disappearance of the coin is the proof of its de- preciation. The reason why the ordinary shop- keeper does not make a distinction between the payments made to him in gold, and those which he receives in paper, is, the confidence he feels that at some time or other the notes will be paid in specie, and that he is in the meantime deterred by the penalties of the law from melting the guineas the only mode by which he can derive a superior profit, from a payment in coin. But the occupation of melting the specie is nevertheless followed by a less scrupulous class of the commun- ity, who have not hesitated to give a premium for guinea?,, whenever an opportunity offered of pur- chasing them, and of profiting by their conversion, without danger of detection *. But the difference in the intrinsic value of the notes and the guineas is not the less real, because it cannot openly be avowed. If the coin were allowed by law to be melted, if the penalties for this offence were less severe, or if guineas could be collected without exciting the suspicion of the officers of the Bank * An instance of this has recently come before the public, in consequence of an information against a person charged with selling guineas for more than they are allowed to pass for by law. 76 and the Mint, neither the Restriction Bill, nor the provision that bank notes may be tendered as legal payment, would prevent a paper and a money price for commodities, and consequently an open discount upon bank paper. The drain upon the Bank, in the year 1797 5 is allowed by all the Directors to have arisen from the alarm of invasion. The market price of bullion was, at the time, below its mint price; the ex- change with the Continent was in favor of London - 9 and therefore all the causes, that are usually as- signed, as creating a drain upon the Bank, were operating in a contrary direction. The alarm ori- ginated, according to the evidence given by Mr. Burdon, one of the proprietors of the Newcastle bank, before the Secret Committee in 1797? from the orders that had been issued for taking an ac- count of the stock of the farms of Northumber- land, for the purpose of regulating the mode in which the county was to be driven, in case of in- vasion. The farmers immediately sold their pro- duce at very low prices, and the notes which they received from the purchasers were poured in upon the persons by whom they were issued, to be ex- changed for specie; in consequence of which, the banks at Newcastle were obliged to stop payment, and their failure was followed by a similar run upon the country banks throughout the kingdom, many of which were in like manner obliged to stop. 77 The alarm was communicated to the metropolis, and occasioned a drain upon the Bank, which had already been called upon for considerable advances, in consequence of the run upon the country banks. The distress of the mercantile class, from the great extent of the failures, and the general distrust they occasioned, aggravated by a violent, and there- fore improvident, contraction of the usual quantity of bank paper, combined to produce that crisis which terminated in the restriction of cash pay- ments at the Bank. It is unnecessary now to en- quire how far this restriction at the time was po- litic or otherwise. It probably was a measure of prudence; but as the evil was temporary, so also ought to have been the remedy. It might have been expected, that the complete relief of the mer- chants, and the returning confidence of the peo- ple, would have been considered as the signal for discontinuing a law, which has given the Bank Di- rectors a power of permanently altering the value of the circulating medium of the country. It has, however, been decided otherwise ; and the conse- quence has been, that as the fears of the Bank Di- rectors have been dispelled, the quantity of cur- rency has been gradually increased, and has pro- duced all those symptoms, which any person ac- quainted with the theory of money and exchange would easily have anticipated; an augmentation in the price of commodities, an increase of the 78 market price of bullion over the mint price, and an unfavorable nominal exchange. The effect of the over-issue of bank-notes upon the computed exchange may be visible from com- paring the amount of the notes in circulation in the years 1795 and 1797, with the computed ex- change at the same periods. The amount was augmented in February 1795, to 132 millions*, and the exchange between Hambro' and London, which was then 6 per cent, above par, fell, before Sep- tember, to 31 percent, against England. In Febru- ary 1797* the paper in circulation was reduced to 81 millions, and the exchange bet ween Hambro* and London rose to 61. ISs. per cent, in favor of England. By the last returns presented to Par- liament, it appears that the bank notes now in cir- culation amount to 21 millions, the market price of gold in November was 15/. 8^. 2d. per cent, above the mint price, and the exchange between Hambro' and London 16/. 18^. per cent, against England. Should any one still be sceptical on the subject, a short survey of the mode in which the business of the Bank is conducted will probably remove his doubt. It has been already shewn, that so long as its notes are convertible at option into specie, a bank can never permanently keep in cir- culation more paper than the wants of the country require. But it is not perhaps, quite so clear, in what manner the over-issues of a bank that is * Secret Committee of the House of Lords in 1797, p 176. 79 not liable to be called upon for cash payments, \vill augment the nominal prices of all commodities. The notes of the Bank of England are issued to the merchants who are in want of money, on the security of bills of exchange of not more than 60 days date, which are brought to the Bank for discount. On the receipt of the bill, the Bank gives to the merchant an equal amount in notes, deducting the interest at the rate of 5 per cent. When the bill is due, the Bank presents it for payment, and receives the amount in full, deriving a profit from the transaction equal to the interest of the notes for the time. The oftener this process can be repeated, and the greater the amount of the notes it lends, the greater will be its profits. Now it is evident, that if the purchases of the merchants could be effected by their own bills, it would be unnecessary for them to apply to the Bank for discounts; this application, then, is of itself a decisive proof that, the bills of private merchants will not pass in the market with the same facility as the bills of a national Banking Company. The conversion, therefore, of the bills into notes is an increase of currency, which could not take place without the assistance which a bank affords. Now the merchant regulates the scale of his so transactions by the amount of the capital he can command. The greater the extent of this capital, the larger the profits he will expect to derive from its employment. If he can make a profit of 10 per cent, by his business, he will always be willing to extend it by borrowing capital, for which he is to pay an interest of only 5 per cent. Here then are two parties exactly suited to the supply of each others wants, and co-operating from mutual interest towards the same object. The profits of the Bank are in proportion to the paper currency it can lend, and the expected profits of the mer- chant are in proportion to the paper currency he can borrow. Under such circumstances it is idle to talk of the Bank Directors having the power to contract their discounts when they perceive there has been an over-issue, unless a motive can be shewn for the exercise of that power. While the Restriction Act is in force, the only rule of their conduct will be the validity of the bills that are of- fered for discount, and they are bound by the duty they owe to the Bank Proprietors who appoint them, to profit by the facilities thus imprudently granted by the government, and to employ to the greatest possible advantage the funds of which they have the disposal. It is equally idle to say that the merchant will not employ all the capital he can command, or 81 that his credit will enable him to borrow*. By the facilities that are now given to discounts, the merchants can always, either by immediate ap- plication to the Bank by means of their bankers, or, if in the country, by the intervention of the country banks, coin their credit into currency, which will operate upon the markets wherever it makes its appearance: for the prices of any given supply of produce will depend upon the number of purchasers, and the extent of the capital they can command. The more easily capital can be procured, the greater will be the competition in the market. Whenever the prospect of a profitable speculation offers, merchants will be eager to embark in it, and the demand, which, under ordinary circumstances, would be regulated by the amount of real capital capable of being diverted into that channel, will now be augmented in proportion to t\iz. fictitious capital, called into existence by the facilities * See a whimsical pamphlet published by Mr. Smith on the Theory of Money. He asks, would bankers and merchants a^ply to have good bills discounted at the Bank, if bank notes were depreciated ? The answer to which is obvious. *The depreciation in no way affects the dealings of the merchants ; who buy and sell at the high nominal prices, and whose profits are nominally increased in the same proportion as money is depreciated. L afforded from the Bank discounts ; and thus an over-issue of notes will immediately take place, creating an additional number of purchasers, or increasing their powers of purchasing in propor- tion to the over-issue. If the increased currency be employed in a foreign speculation, it imme- diately acts upon the foreign bill-market, and creating there a fictitious demand, it affects the nominal exchange ; if it be employed by the bul- lion-merchant, it raises the^market price of that ar- ticle; if by the home dealer, it augments the prices of native commodities. No sooner has it left the merchants by whose means it was called into ex- istence, than it passes to the wholesale dealers and master manufacturers, who, in their turn, will raise the prices in their respective markets by a competition which is called into action merely by the over-issue. If the evil were confined to the increased quan- tity of currency thus thrown into circulation by the Bank of England, it might not be attended with injurious consequences of such magnitude as are now experienced : but the misfortune is, that the same law which protects the National Bank, and enables it thus to derange the natural state of the circulating medium^ confers the same power on all the country banks throughout the kingdom, which are now relieved from the fears and incon- venience to which under ordinary circumstances S3 they would be subject, should they at .any time be tempted to issue their notes beyond the amount which the wants of their respective districts might require. The country banks are, in the same manner as the Bank of England, enabled to supply their re- spective connexions with funds for speculation. If the excess of their paper should at any time excite doubts of their solvency, and create a run, they may be supplied by their correspond- ents in London with notes from the great cen- tral paper mint; and thus are all the lesser esta* blishments throughout the kingdom absolved from every difficulty. They issue their notes almost with* out limit, and by these means enable the country dealers to enter into speculations and purchases, which, without their assistance, could never have been effected. Can any one then be surprised that prices should rise, when, every addition of currency is attended with profit to the Bank by which it is issued ; and that there can never be an additional issue of currency without creat- ing additional purchasers to the same amount ? An objection has been urged against this view of the subject, which deserves to be noticed. It has been stated, that if only such bills are discounted at the Bank, as have been drawn in consequence of bondjide commercial transactions, no additional currency is thrown into circulation, more than the 84 wants of the mercantile community require ; that the bills so discounted are the representatives of the pro- perty, by the transfer of which they are created ; and thus a distinction has been attempted to be drawn between real and fictitious bills; or, as the latter are more generally termed, bills of accommodation. But it will not require much consideration to perceive that this, as far at least as concerns the over-issue of currency, is a distinction with little, if any, dif- ference. Mr. Thornton has well observed, that 4C notes given in consequence of a real sale of " goods cannot be considered as on that account " certainly representing any actual property. " Suppose that A. sells 100/. worth of goods to B. " at six months credit, and takes a bill at six " months for it ; and that B. Within a month after, " sells the same goods to C. at a like credit, tak- " ing a like bill ; that C. after another month, ic sells them to D. ; and so on : there may, at the " end of six months, be six bills of 100 /. each, " existing at the same time, and every one of e a drain upon the Bank, in consequence of the mar- ket price of bullion exceeding the mint price, from the over-issue of currency. Ordinary produce would be dear; the operation of the exports and imports would gradually restore the real exchange to par; and the nominal exchange would return to the same level by the conversion of the superfluous currency into bullion. Again, the computed exchange might be in favor of a country, under very opposite states of the real and nominal exchange. Thus it would be 2 per cent, in favor of this country, if the real exchange were 3 per cent, above, and the nominal exchange 1 per cent, below par. It would also be two per cent, in favor of this country, with a favorable nominal exchange to the amount of 3 { er 91 cent, and an adverse real exchange of 1 per cent. In the same manner, an adverse computed exchange might be shewn to arise from very opposite states of the real and nominal exchange*; and it would be easy to point out, under any given circumstances, in what manner the merchant would derive his profit from the produce he was engaged either in exporting or importing. Suppose, for instance, the computed exchange between Hambro' and London to be 1 per cent, against this country, and that this arises from a real exchange which is favorable to the amount of 4 per cent, and a no- minal exchange unfavorable to the extent of 5 per cent. ; let the real price of bullion at Hambro' and * Mr. Wheatley, who assigns the relative values of currencies aB the exclusive cause of the fluctuations in the computed exchange, has endeavoured to prove, that the rate of exchange has con- stantly corresponded with the relative issues of currency. But the tables published by Lord King and Mr.Musbet furnish abund- ant proof of fluctuations in the exchange, without a correspond- ing alteration in the currency. Since the year 1797, when the correcting principle of the nominal exchange was remoTed in consequence of the Bank Restriction Act, there is, as might be expected, a general coincidence between the increase of bank notes in circulation and the adverse computed exchange j yet even within that period, there have been considerable intervals when the computed exchange between Hambro' and London has. been in favor of the latter, and that too at the time when the greatest issues of currency recorded in Mr. Mu&et's tallies took place, viz. in May 1804, iiud January 1805, 92 London be precisely the same, and consequently the nominal prices different by the amount of the nominal exchange or 5 per cent. Now if the ex- pences of freight, insurance, &c. on the transit of bullion from Hambro' are 3 per cent, it is evident that a profit would be derived from the import of that article, notwithstanding the computed ex- change was 1 per cent, against us. In this case the merchant must give a premium of 1 per cent, for the foreign bill to pay for the bullion; 100/. worth of bullion at Hambro' would therefore cost him 101/. and the charges of importation would in- crease this sum to 104/. Upon the subsequent sale, then, for 105/. of depreciated currency in the home market he would derive from the transaction a profit of II. This sum is precisely the difference between the real exchange and the expenses of transit, that part of the computed exchange which depends upon the nominal, producing no effect ; since whatever is lost by its unfavorable state, is counterbalanced by a corresponding inequality of nominal prices. In the same manner it might be shewn, that with a favorable computed exchange, bullion might be flowing out of the country; but it would be tedious to multiply instances, which, as the intel- ligent reader will easily conceive, may be infinitely varied. Those which have been now adduced are sufficient to shew, what contradictory conclusions 93 may be drawn from any given rate of the computed exchange, and how impossible it is, from that alone, to determine either the relative value of currencies, or whether, what is usually called the balance of trade, be favorable or unfavorable to a nation *. * A singular instance of the confusion arising from a want of attention to these distinctions occurs in the following passage from the fifth' Number of the Quarterly ReviewV ^Mr '.Thornton " having used the following expression*' If- atany.timethe ' exchanges of the country become so unfavorable as to pro- * duce a material excess of the market over the mint price of " gold.' f Mr. Ricardo comments on this representation by " concisely saying, ' Here the cause is mistaken for the effect. * *' Mr/Thornton seems to us indisputably correct; not but that " the unfavorableness of the exchange, and the rise in the bullion " price of gold, alternately act as cause and effect; but the " former may, in some cases, not improperly be said to precede " the latter, and it certainly does so in the case of a bad harvest, " of which Mr. Thornton is speaking in this case." P. 157. Here it is evident that Mr. Thornton's observation, if confined to the real exchange is correct. Mr. Ricardo's comment, if limited to the nominal exchange, may also be considered as cor- rect, though it would have been more accurate to have stated, the unfavorableness of the exchange, and the excess of the mar- ket over the mint price of gold, both, as effects of the depreci- ation of the currency; and the Reviewer may be correct, if his observations are intended to apply to the computed exchange. The apparent contradictions arise from confounding the real, the nominal, and the computed exchange, under the general, unqua- lified term, exchange. 94 The merchant, by knowing the computed ex* change, and the current prices in the home and foreign market, and without any acquaintance with the theory of exchange, or the principles which regulate it, will always have sufficient prac- tical data to guide him in his commercial trans* actions ; but jjie statesman should beware in mak- ing general legislative provisions, that he is not misled by the partial statements of men, whose in- dividual interests are frequently in direct oppo- sition to the general welfare of the country. - Til is remark is not meant to convey any illiberal insinuations against a most useful and respectable class of the community; but experience sufficient- ly proves that self-interest gives a bias to the mind, which, without its being conscious of the influ- ence, will mislead and pervert the judgment. Perhaps a more than ordinary degree of caution is requisite* in this commercial country, where there seems to be a prevailing opinion, that the riches of the merchants are evidence of the benefits that the nation derives from its foreign trade; it being for* gotten, or unnoticed, that the profits of that class of persons are derived from the pockets of their countrymen; and that the advantages of foreign commerce consist in the stimulus it gives to the increase of the produce of the land and labour of the country; and to the opportunity which it affords, of exchanging the surplus produce thus 93 called into existence for an equivalent, and only an equivalent produce, collected from every climate, and materially contributing to the enjoyments and the comforts of the community. Of the Effects of the Depreciation of the Currency on the Expenditure of Government^ and on the Interests of the different Classes of the Com- munity. The foreign expenditure of government being principally discharged by the remittance or the draft of bills, must be subject to the premium or discount in proportion to the computed exchange. Whatever be the amount of that expenditure, it- will always be effected with greater or less advant- age, according fis the computed exchange is fa- vorable or otherwise. It is of no consequence, so far as the disbursements of the Treasury are con-, cerned, in what way the foreign expenditure- is ultimately discharged by the country : for as long as bills are made use of, as the immediate* mode of payment by the government, so lone? must the government, whenever the computed exchange is unfavorable, pay the premium for fo- reign bills,, or submit to the discount"^ - : *~ 96 and so long, on the other hand, will it derive the advantage of the discount on foreign, and the premium on its own bills, whenever the state of the computed exchange is in favor of the gountry. It is therefore most essential to the interests of go- vernment, that the computed exchange should at all times be as favorable as possible. Now this can only be produced by a careful attention to the state of the currency, and its effects upon the no- minal exchange ; for the circumstances that affect the real exchange are not, at all times, within its controul. Bad harvests and deficient crops will always cre- ate an encreased and unusual importation; and in the same degree, a demand for foreign payment. This will eventually, indeed, be discharged by an increased exportation ; but in the mean time, and during the continuance of the pressure, the real exchange will become unfavorable, and will conti- nue so till the consequent bounty upon all export- ed, and the duty upon all imported, commodities, shall restore it to par. The nominal exchange, on the contrary, is com- pletely within the controul of government, and can never be either permanently favorable or un- favorable, so long as the legislature exercises a due degree of vigilance over the state of the circulating medium. If the coin, in which the legal payments of the country are made, is not degraded, and the 97 paper is convertible at option into specie, it is im- possible that the currency can ever be reduced be- low the almost uniform value, which the precious metals preserve among the different nations of the earth ; because the depreciation of the currency will always be prevented, by the conversion of any superfluous quantity of it into bullion. Should the legislature be induced by temporary circumstances to interfere with this regulating prin- ciple, and restrict the issuers of notes from the obligation of paying in specie, the consequences are easily foreen, and must soon be felt. There will be no longer any limit to the depreciation of the currency ; the nominal exchange will continue permanently unfavorable, and will render the com- puted exchange so much the less favorable, or so much the more unfavorable, in proportion to the extent to which the currency may have been aug- mented beyond its natural amount. The government, under these circumstances, will be utterly unable to relieve itself from the loss which must be incurred upon the total amount of its foreign expenditure, in whatever mode it is dis- charged ; for the nominal exchange has a very dif- ferent effect on the foreign payments of the state, and those of merchants in the course of their com- mercial transactions. The exporting merchant gains a premium on his bill equivalent to the no- minal exchange, and by that advantage is repaid, N 98 what would be otherwise lost in the high price he must give for his goods here, and the low price at which he must sell them abroad j he derives no profit, and he suifers no loss. The importing merchant gives a premium for the foreign bill with which he pays for the produce he imports, but is repaid by the high nominal price at which he sells the produce at home. He also derives no profit, and sustains no loss. But the government has no means of repaying itself for the loss occasioned by the nominal ex- change. The equivalent is received abroad, and consumed there, and the bill for which the pre- mium has been given will purchase precisely the same quantity of produce, whatever may have been paid for it here. Neither would the situation of government be altered, if, under an idea of saving the nominal exchange, it were induced to export commodities for the immediate supply of its arm- ies, or its foreign establishments ; for independent- ly of the expenses of the transit, it would lose the whole amount of the nominal exchange, in the high prices at which the commodities would lie bought in the home market. 1C bullion could L procured, there would still be \\\i same loss ; fira, in the expenses of the transit; and secondly, in the high market price at which it must be bought here, while abroad it would pass for no more than its intrinsic value. 99 Without access to the documents and vouchers of government, there is-no very accurate mode of estimating the amount of the foreign expenditure; but some approximation to it may be made, by a comparison of the exports and imports. It has been already observed, that the foreign expendi- ture of a country can only be discharged by the export of commodities to an equal amount; and as the equivalent is received and consumed abroad, it follows, that in every country where there is a foreign expenditure, the exports must exceed the imports to that extent : the larger the expendi- ture, the greater will be the excess of exports over imports. From this acknowledged truth, the inference seems very obvious, or at least there is strong presumptive evidence to lead to this con* elusion, that if a foreign expenditure cause an ex- cess of exports over imports, an excess of exports over imports will denote a foreign expenditure. Yet even at this day there are not wanting men in the Cabinet, in the Senate, and among the best- informed classes of society, who still adduce as a proof of the gain?, that are made by foreign com- merce, this same excess, which indicates expend- iture, and not receipt*. Mr. Pitt was continually * The same inference has been drawn, from the excess of ex- ports, by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, while there 100 vaunting of the resources of the nation, as evinced by this circumstance; and Mr. Rose, in his " Brief sheets have been passing through the press. See his speech upon opening the budget. The gradual increase, both of the annual imports, and exports, has been frequently adduced as a decisive proof of the nourish- ing state of our commerce a conclusion that may be exceedingly fallacious. The nominal value of the exports and imports will in some degree keep pace with the increase in the nominal price of commodities, and will swell the apparent amount of merchandize exported and imported, without any material ad- dition to the actual quantity. That the present increase arises principally from this cause, is rendered more than probable, by a comparison of the relative amount of tonnage employed for the transport of that merchandize, in the years 1807 and 1809 The following table is drawn up from the returns made to the House of Commons, January SOth and March 24th, 1810 : Tonnage of Vessels, British and Foreign, including their repeated Voyages, in the several Ports of Great Britain, from and to all Parts of Europe. Year ended 5th Jan.. 1808 Inwards, Tons. 944.282 Outwards. Tons. 811.255 1810 882.255 814.811 Official Value of the Imports and Exports for three Quarters, ending the 10th of October. Year. Imports. Exports. 1807 19.717.396 22.464.875 1R09 29.000.782 39.824.104 As the nature of the commodities -is specified . in -the,returns, 101! Examination," states, with the same view, the an- nual -'balance of trade in favour of this country at 14,800,000/. Mr. Necker, acting upon similar principles, estimated the annual balance in favor of France at 3,000,000/. ; and all other countries have in like manner prepared official statements of exports and imports, and boasted of a favorable ba- lance *. Those, who have entered into the spirit of the observations upon the real exchange, will think it unnecessary that I should dwell upon these absurd opinions respecting a balance of trade, either favorable or unfavorable to a nation ; it be- ing evident, that, though at any particular mo- and does not appear to vary materially, as to the proportions of value and bulk in the respective years, the equality in the amount of tonnage employed is conclusive, that the apparent increase of trade is in a great measure nominal. * " There is no mine, however productive, that could supply ' the necessary stores for the balances that are claimed by the " different nations of the world. One country claims a balance " of 14,800,0001." and another of 5,000,COO/. another of 3, " and others of 2 and 1, to the aggregate amount of nearly " 40,000,0002. annually ; and as all assert their commerce to be " favorable, it is obvious that their collective balances must be " paid by a continual influx of bullion from the mines corre- " spondent with their amount ; but the annual produce of the " mines of the world does not exceed 7,000,0002." (Wheatley, on theThcpryof Money, p. 139.) 102 ment there may have been more produce sent from a country than has been received in return for it, and that bullion does occasionally pass to liqui- date the balance, this happens merely in conse- quence of a derangement of the usual commercial exchanges, and the bullion must eventually again leave the country into which it flows, unless de- tained there by the wants of the people, either for the purpose of ornamental manufacture, or an extended currency, in consequence of increased wealth. All trade, whether foreign or domestic, consists in an exchange of equivalents. Gold and silver will be sent as the equivalent, when gold and silver are wanted for use. The hardware and woollens of England are exchanged for the silks and the wines of France, because these are more desired than the bullion of France. If it were the taste of the people of England to use gold and silver for their ordinaiy utensils, the bullion of France would be demanded, as the equivalent. But they prefer the wines and silks, and rather than forego these luxu- ries, are content with utensils formed of coarser materials. When the exports exceed the imports, (as they must do, when there is a foreign expendi- ture, the equivalents for the excess are received " abroad in as full and ample a manner, as if the " produce which they purchased were actually im- " ported and entered in the Custom-house books, 103 ts and afterwards sent to the seat of war for cc consumption. But from the circumstance of " its not being inserted in the Custpm-house entries as value received against the produce " exported for its payment, the latter is deemed " to constitute a favorable balance, when it is in " reality exported to liquidate a balance against us *." Notwithstanding, therefore, the inaccuracy of the Custom-house returns, and the difficulty of ascertaining the actual value of the imports and exports, notwithstanding that the imports from the East and West Indies are confounded with the imports arising from trade, when in fact they are merely remittances - y the one, of territorial revenue invested in produce ; the other, of rents and profits remitted to absentee planters resident in this coun- try; notwithstanding also, that the contraband trade introduces an immense quantity of commo- dities, which do not appear in the Custom-house tarns; yet as the inaccuracies of one period are probably neither much greater nor less than those of another, if the ratio of the excess of exports to the foreign expenditure in one year, is known, it is fair to conclude, that the excess of any other * Sec Wheatley on the Theory of Money, p. 219. 104 year will be nearly in the same proportion to foreign expenditure of that year. It appears from the accounts presented by Mr. Long to the Secret Committee of -the House of Lords, in 1797, that the foreign expenditure in the" year 1796, the fourth year of the French revolu- tionary war, amounted to 10,649,000/. ; and the excess of exports above the imports, for the same year, taken from the Custom-house books, is 7,33l,494/. ; so that the foreign expenditure is to this excess in the ratio nearly of 10 to 7*. The excess of exports over imports for three quarters of the year 1809, is 17,359,229^ or above 23 mil- lions for the year, as appears by the returns from the Custom-bouse presented to parliament the 10th of January 1810; but as these returns are exclus- ive of the imports from India, the amount of those imports must be deducted, to make the calcu- lation correspond with the returns for 1796, in which those imports are included. The sale of the East India Company's goods, from March 1, 1809, to March 1, 1810, amounted to 8,237,035/. * The excess of exports over imports appears to be actually less than the foreign expenditure, in consequence of the pro- duce remitted from the East and West Indies being entered in the Custom-house returns as imports. 105 the excess of exports over imports for the year 1809, after deducting this sum, would be about 15 millions, which, according to the ratio obtain- ed for the year 1796, would give a foreign expend- iture of 21 millions; and considering the en- larged scale of our military operations* together with the establishments in Sicily and Malta, it will perhaps be thought not much beyond the truth. During the whole of the year 1809, the exchange between London and Hambro' was never less than 7 per cent, in favor of the latter ; and, increasing gradually towards the end of the year, it rose in the month of November to 16 per cent. Mr. Huskisson, in his examination before the Com- mittee for enquiring into the policy and conduct of the expedition to the Scheldt, states the diffi- culties of negotiating bills in Spain, and in the Mediterranean, as much greater than at Hambro' ; so that it is not improbable an additional expen- diture of some millions has been incurred in con- sequence of the unfavorable state of the exchange, occasioning a correspondent loss to this country, which might have been entirely avoided, had the currency been sufficiently contracted to reduce the computed exchange to par. Without, however, placing too much reliance upon an estimate, which at best can only be con- sidered as an approximation, it must be evident, O 106 that whatever may be the loss of government from this cause, it can only be supplied by laying ad- ditional burthens on the people. But this is not the only injury sustained in consequence of the depreciation of the currency ; the same evil per- vades the whole expenditure of government. Whatever purchases are made must be at an in- creased cost in proportion to the nominal high prices that an excessive currency produces. It will be felt through all the departments of the state, and the enlarged scale of expense must be balanced by an encreased scale of taxation. It is a matter of general notoriety, that money within these few years has been considerably reduced in value. The depreciation has been visibly going forwards since the time of the Bank restriction ; and as long as it continues, the interests of the Bank are in direct opposition to these of the government and the public. . If the evils of an excessive currency affected all classes of the community equally, there might be less reason for complaint ; but the misfortune is, that one class suffers no injury whatever, while another is subjected to the whole pressure, without the possibility of relief. It is of no consequence to the merchant whether he purchase with guineas the commodities which were formerly bought with shillings. His exports and 'his imports are in no 107 degree affected ; he is, in a great measure, relieved from the fear of pecuniary embarrassment ; and in the same degree that the value of money is lowered, his nominal profits are increased. Without pos- sessing greater means than before, of commanding the comforts and the luxuries of life, he feels him- self relatively raised in the scale of society, as far at least as property has the power of raising him, in proportion to the nominal thousands he re- ceives. The landed proprietor is subject to all the evils of a depreciated circulating medium during the continuance of his current leases. As they expire, an opportunity is afforded him of profiting from the high nominal prices of produce, by raising his rents, and thus, to a certain degree, of preserving his relative station in life ; but the uncertainty of seasons, and the consequent excessive variations in the prices of agricultural produce, will prevent him from increasing the amount of his income in O the same proportion that its value is diminished ; and as the depreciation proceeds, he must suffer from its effects, in proportion to the length of time for which his leases are renewed. But it is upon that class of the community, which receives a nominal income, that the depre- ciation of the currency aets with the greatest severity. The public creditor, the annuitant, the 108 clergyman, the physician, the lawyer, the soldier, and the sailor all the civil officers of government all persons receiving salaries only, in short, all those who have no produce to dispose of, by the high price of which they might have the opportu- nity of remunerating themselves for the losses which the depreciation induces. They not only bear the increased burthens which the govern- ment is compelled to impose in consequence of the depreciation, but the remainder of their income no longer possesses the same power of procuring the necessaries and comforts of life. Let this view of the injury sustained by the class receiving a nominal income be contrasted with the advantages which the Restriction Act has con- ferred on the Bank proprietors. Since the year 1797, the proprietors of Bank Stock have received, In 1799, a bonus of 10 per cent. Loyalty. Jn 1801, - - - 5 percent. Navy 5 per cent. In 1802, - 2* per cent. Ditto. In 1804, - - 5 percent. Cash. In 1805, - - 5 per cent, Ditto. In 1806, - - o per cent. Ditto. In 1807, the dividend was raised from 7 to 10 per cent, which, with the payment of the Property Tax, makes more than 11 per cent regular in- terest; and 100/. stock lias increased from 127i/. 109 its price in X 1797, to 280/. its price in 1809*. Besides which, there is generally understood to be a very large surplus, which has not yet been divided amongst the proprietors ; and, if the vast sums of money that have been expended during this periocj upon the buildings of the Bank, be considered, some idea may be formed of the immoderate pro- fits that have been acquired by this establishment. The question therefore is simply this, whether the interests of so large a part of the community are to be sacrificed for the benefit of the proprie- tors of bank stock, and the different banking part- nerships throughout the kingdom ; and it is yet to be explained on what grounds the continuance of a system can be justified, which, if it were wise at the time of its adoption, has long ceased to be either equitable or politic. It might be called for by im- perious necessity, during the moment of alarm, and may be agr.in resorted to, should similar circum- stances demand it; but in the mean time, it seems no more than right, that the Bank should be content with the profits that are to be acquired in a pursuit, which has at all times afforded an adequate remu- neration to tho>e who have embarked in it, without the assistance of a legislative provision, that has * .Reflections on the Abundance of Paper, &c. by Sir Philip Francis, 110 deranged, and will continue to derange, so long as it exists, the circulating medium of the country. Applications are continually making to parlia- ment for an increase of salary to those who are un- able to meet the pressure of the times, and to keep up appearances suitable to their stations in life. In- stances of this have recently occurred, as well in the case of the inferior clergy, as of the officers of the army and navy. The salaries in all public offices, and public trading companies, are obliged to be raised, to enable the persons who are employed in them to purchase the necessaries of life*. Those who sell as well as buy, have the means of trans- ferring the weight from their own shoulders ; but the possessor of a nominal income receives the same number of pounds, whatever be their value; he is a buyer only, and must submit to his fate. The effects of ordinary taxation are the depression of the same class, and a tendency, as it proceeds to confound the different ranks of society. It is the more incumbent therefore upon the legisla- ture to be careful, that this depressed class be not overwhelmed by that extraordinary taxation, which * Mr. Rose, in his pamplet on the Public Expenditure, in speaking of the increase of the expense of collecting the Excise revenue, observes, " The increase in the Excise is nearly alto- " gether for the augmentation of the salaries of the officers ou " the establishment, to enable trnmio exist." p. 54. Ill arises from the necessity of increasing the nominal revenue of government, in proportion to the de- preciation of its value. The mode in which these evils are to be reme- died, it is unnecessary, after what has been already said, for me to point out. When the cause that has produced the mischief is removed, the evils will subside of themselves. Lord King very justly observes, " Had parliament been called upon to " authorize any of those direct frauds upon the " currency, which have often disgraced arbitrary " governments ; had it been recommended to " them to raise the denomination of the current " coin, th MO can be no doubt that such a pro- " posal wo dd have been rejected with indigna- " tion. Yet an abuse of the same nature has " been established by law in this country. The " power of reducing the value of the currency by " a silent and gradual depreciation, is more dan- " gerous, from the very circumstance of its being " less direct, an i less exposed to observation*." The difficulty that now presents itself is, in what manner to revert to the former system, without in- jury to the Bank, or to the merchants, who have so long been indulged with the accommodation of t* Thpugbte~eB4he -Restriction of Cash Payments at the Bank, P- procuring the discount of their bills; and tlm difficulty is the more embarrassing, from the very peculiar and unprecedented combination of cir- cumstances that exists at the present moment. Iii consequence of the large army now maintain- ed by this country on the Continent of Europe, and in the Mediterranean, our foreign expenditure is unusually great ; and the export trade, which Under the ordinary facilities of commercial inter- course, Would enable us to defray this expenditure, is subjected to impediments from the conlroul ex 1 - ercised by the enemy over the commerce of the Continent, which it is difficult to overcome* Our fiierchanLs are compelled to find secret and cir- cuitous modes of introducing their merchandize into foreign countries, which, even after its intro- duction, is liable to immediate confiscation*.- * It bias been said, that, in the countries more immediately under the controuj. of the French, the merchants refuse to take bur produce in exchange, and demand specie or bullion in pay- la: nt for what we import from them. Should this be the fact, it L a strong proof that the French decrees have produced their effect, ar,d that the risk of confiscation has to a certain extent pre- vented British merchandize from being introduced into those countries. It will be impossible, under these circumstances, much longer to continue such a commercial intercourse, unless the means be found of procuring a veiy unusual supply of bullion from the American mines : and it will become a question, whether the South American market can take such a quantity of British pro- 113 This must operate as a very powerful check upon the export of the staple pro.duce of the country; and great as the comparative excess of exports appears to be, from the last returns of the Cus- tom-house that have been laid before Parliament, it is probable that the foreign expenditure would have demanded and produced a much greater ex- cess, but for the restrictions that the French de- crees have imposed upon our commerce. It is said, too, that the deficiency in the last year's harvest has occasioned an increased and unusual importation of foreign grain ; so that the real ex- change has been acted upon by the combined in- fluence of all the causes that can render it unfa- vorable, a large foreign expenditure, demanding an excess of exports which the restrictions on com- merce obstruct; and an increased importation, to supply the failure of an article of the first neces- sity, counteracting the effect of the export trade, and diminishing its excess. If the market price of duce as will be sufficient to supply the bullion that will be wanted for effecting the usual imports from Holland and France, and that part of the Continent, where, the French decrees can be enforced Independently of this, the. accumulation of bullion on the Con- tinent will by degrees . render its .real price so low, that the quantity to be given in exchange for commodities imported from thence, must be continually augmenting, and of course the price of continental produce so much enhanced to the con- sumer here, as at length to stop the consumption altogether. 114 bullion, therefore, were ever raised above the mint price by an unfavorable real exchange, it might be expected under the circumstances now enumer- ated ; and should this be the case, and the Bank be immediately rendered liable to the payment of its notes in specie, there would be no possibility of its withstanding the drain that would immedi- ately commence, without such a sudden contract- ion of paper as would endanger the stability of the merchants. For the nominal and the real ex- change being both unfavorable in a great degree, the process of melting the coin, and the export of bullion, would be carried on at the same time; the first, to take advantage of the difference be- tween the market and the mint price of gold; the second, on account of the excess of the premium upon foreign bills above the expenses of the transit of bullion ; and this drain would continue till the issues of bank paper were sufficiently contracted, to lower the market price of bullion below its mint price. It is not easy to ascertain what degree of con- traction might be requisite to produce this effect, for the issues of the country banks are probably to the full as much above their due proportion, as those of the Bank of England. In the year 1795, before the drain took place whic\h became the subject o^such serious complaints to Mr. Pitt, the usual amoim^ of bank notes in circulation was about 11 millions ;Xat the time of the drain, the 115 issue had been increased to 13 millions, and from the 25th of February 1795, to the 25th of Febru- ary 1797* had been violently contracted to 8^ mil- lions. At that time bank notes were in common circulation in all parts of the kingdom, and had not been so completely displaced as they have since been, by the country notes. The paper cir- culating medium, therefore, required for the capi- tal, and parts immediately adjacent, would pro- bably not exceed 10 millions. The quantity of coin at the same period may be estimated by the proportion between the cash and paper payments at the Bank, as given in evidence by Mr. Abra- ham Newland, before the Secret Committee of the House of Lords*. He states, that previously to the restriction, if the dividends to the public cre- ditor amounted to 14,000,000/., not more than from 1,300,000/. to 1,400,000/. would be paid in cash. If in so large a payment, where cash in any quantity might be demanded, and where there must have been many fractional sums, one tenth only were paid in specie, it is fair to con- clude that not more than one tenth would be given in the other money transactions of the metropolis. He adds, that 100,000/. would be sufficient for all the cash payments of the Treasury; that in the the groW produce of the Customs, which then amounted to 3,000,000/., the Bank did not re- ceive above 3000/. in specie ; in the produce of the Excise, stated at 7,000,000/., not more than 60,000/. ; and In the instalments of a loan, con- sisting of much larger sums, not above 1 per cent, upon the whole'*. So that taking 1 to 10 as the probable "proportion of the specie to the notes, there would be about one million of the former in circulation, making, together with the paper, 11 millions for the total amount of the currency of tile metropolis. By the last returns of the House of Commons, the bank notes in circulation on the 12th of Jan. in the present year, exclusive of the Bank post bills, amounted to 20,22,'810J.; and as the quantity of these notes that circulate in the country is very trifling, it is not improbable that the currency of the capital has been nearly doubled in the course of the last thirteen years. The general opinion is, that the country banks have made a still more ex- tensive use of the privileges which the Restriction Bill has afforded, and have multiplied their paper to an enormous amount. There seems every rea- son, therefore, to conclude, that the circulating medium would be under-rated at double i&amount, in the year 1797; and consequently that if the See Wheatley ou the Theory of Money, p. 142: 117 country does not require a greater quantity of currency now, than it did at that time, the Bank must contract its paper one half, or to about 1 1 millions, before commodities could be brought back to their natural prices *. ^ t ^ i Those who have attended to the distress in which the merchants were involved at the period to which we have referred, by a reduction of bank paper from 13 \ to 8 1 millions in two years, may conceive how infinitely more they must suffer by a sudden diminution of it from 21 to 11 millions, But this circumstance, which is a cogent reason against the immediate repeal of the Bank Re- striction Bill, is also the strongest proof of the effect which the contraction of currency has upon prices ; for whence could the distress of the mer- chants arise, but frtfm tli err being compelled to dis- pose of their stock at reduced prices ? They have now been so long habituated to the enhanced rates, that their purchases have been made with refer- ence to this system, and under an expectation of deriving their present high nominal profits from its continuance. The number of purchasers in the * Tlie increase of prices, arising from the gradual progress of taxation, will probably require a larger circulating medium than might be wauled in 1797- 118 market, occasioned by the increased issues of paper, will be withdrawn, when the paper is again contracted, and consequently the holders of pro- duce that has been bought upon credit, and for "which bills are outstanding, must sell in the falling markets, in order to meet their acceptances when they become due. The Bank also, in consequence of the drain, will be compelled to reduce its paper, which it cannot effect, without refusing its usual discounts. The merchant, no longer possessing the means as before, of coining his credit into cur- rency, must either sell, or be unable to make good his payments. In the same proportion as an in- crease of buyers was created by the over-issue, the contraction will create an increase of sellers ; and thus it appears evident, that so sudden a diminu- tion of currency, as would be necessary to protect the Bank, if the restriction were immediately withdrawn, would inevitably occasion great pe- cuniary distress, and be attended with the most in- jurious consequences to the credit and commerce of the nation. But there is no necessity for such violence. The Bank may gradually diminish the amount of its paper, in the same manner in which it has for the last thirteen years been gradually increased. It is true such a proceeding will not be so popular with the merchants, but it will not be attended with 119 any real injury to their interests, \vliilst it will confer a substantial benefit on the possessor of a nominal income, a benefit to^ which he is upon every principle of justice entitled. It is only necessary for parliament to determine the amount of the annual dimunition of the issues of the Bank, and to enforce the continuance of the measure, till it is found that the market price of bullion is permanently reduced, in a triflng de- gree, below its mint price. The currency will then be of the same value as if it consisted entirely of the precious metals, and the restriction may be removed without the slightest injury to trie Bank, or any real injury to the merchant. This experi- ment may be made with the utmost safety, both to the Bank and the country; because parliament will at any time have the power of increasing or diminishing the annual contraction, should it be found that, in the first instance, too low or too high a limit had been assigned*. * The Bank has been indulged so long in the exercise of the extraordinary privileges conferred upon it by the legislature, and has, by its extensive advances, acquired such a controiil over the finances of individuals, and of government, that ' it may, per- haps, have become questionable, whether the Directors of that establishment have not, at this moment, the power of dictating their own terms ; and whether the legislature may not be under the necessity o receiving, rather than of proposing conditions. 120 It will require, however, much caution and some firmness, lest the legislature should be misled by the clamours of those who will first feel the effects of the remedy ; for as the Bank will immediately experi- ence adiminution of its profits, and probably be at length compelled to lower the interest to the propri- etors ; as the issues of the country banker will be re- strained within their natural limits ; and as the merchant, under the first alarm which the falling prices will excite, and without forming a just con- ception t)f its cause, will not fail to exclaim against a system apparently so adverse to his interests; there can be little doubt but that the public, dur- ing its progress, will be assailed with the most gloomy predictions of the decline of the general Wealth, and the ruin of the commercial prosperity of the nation. But a full and accurate acquaint- ance with this most important subject, will lead the government and the people to disregard and despise such idle and interested clamours,-. to consider these effects not as symptoms of decay, %t -as evidences of the efficacy of a measure tend- ing to restore the energies of the country. It will teach them the necessity of perseverance, not vShpiild these conjectures have any foundation in truth, tjiey fur- nisftvthe most cogent reasons for the immediate extinction of a -powcrV^ whose existence is incompatible with the independence and the supremacy of government. 121 merely for the purpose of obviating those mischiefs which have hitherto been experienced, but in or- der to prevent the still greater evils, which must infallibly result from an adherence to the same system. Above all, it will induce them to submit with cheerfulness to those trifling and partial in- conveniencies, which may occasionally be experi- enced during the progress of the remedy, while they look forward with confidence to the re-esta- blishment of the ancient scale and order of things, and the consequent increase, not only of the com- forts of the great mass of the community, but of the resources, the powers, and the independence of the government. In tht following Tables, the figures indicating the per cent age in favor of, and against London, de- note pounds and the decimal parts of pounds, which are not carried beyond one decimal place. O-^<-r-iO*-*-HC CN 00 CO tt a Z fc O - Ctf CO * -f -^f ro t 8 124 125 V W) ,, V c-s o< c o c* cr-ctct c-,<>< ooooooooo O ct ,_, ft* xS m O CCNC^CNC'SCN^'- 1 SM ~2 126 oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo C 4) 3-1 9 > 4-1 o c c 2 - u G coo I * K S >,^- >: . a 0> 127 CN CM 0} CM C? OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO IS CN >> O( O< W O* CN O* O O co ^O CO CO fO co o o o o o o Il er centage n favor of London. rgh. Ji -C ..o .CJ -' 128 o ~ 4) .6 oooooooooooooooooooocoooooo I . 14 I"S * O "* O r> ro <*s tO t^ b* oo ^ co si" ^ O> O ^ * B rt ^S, c ^^^ c ^^S.S C 129 R 130 a S rt O C3 c. 2 III OOOOOOOOOO-OOOOOO OOO < ^'-i-o .8 CM O< CM CM CM Ot OlCi OOO 00 OOOOOO Per centage above its Mint Price. 111 COCO CO CO l^. l^ t^. t>. OJ O CN CX CM G^ O* (O CO CO CO CO Oi Oi O> O) O> O5 OO *** Oi CM xn ro co oo bu CO xn'co c fOfOi' ^ixsti > t ^^t< > is ^t^^ > is ^>.^ > fa ^t^^>* 131 3 o 111 HI '^5 o 0* Sf S CM CM O* CO 00 G-* OiOlOlOiOO) --t Jfc 1' CN CS(*C^ oooocoo o o o o o o M C S &"o . *t iO CO CN co O CO PO co >r> O5 oo O rt rt *^ Si* o 132 J 3 f>*> *n lt> C <& t& 8 to III bo w i-^ * o> OJ < Hamburgh. fC ~ 7^ -. ci ^ C > =t ^0.0 e rt^^-o c ^^0,0 = '"i ^^>- X J. TYLER, Printer, Rathbone Place. AX INTO THE EFFECTS PRODUCED our THE NATIONAL CURRENCY RATES OF EXCHANGE, BY THE RESTRICTION BILL,; EXPLAINING THE CAUSE OF THE HIGH PRICE OF BULLION; WITH PLANS FOR MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL COINS IN A STATE OF UNIFORMITY AND PERFECTION. THE THIRD EDITION, CORRECTED AND ENLARGED. With the Tables brought down to April 5, 181 1; and some remarks on Mr. Bosanquet's Observations on the Bullion Report. BY ROBERT MUSHET, OF HIS MAJESTY'S MIKT. PRINTED FOR ROBERT BALDWIN, PATERNOSTER-ROW, 1811. C. Baldwin, Printer, erf CONTENTS. Page CHAF. I. On the General Principles of Money 1 CHAP. II. On the connection between coined and paper Money 6 CHAP. III. General Principles of Exchange fluc- tuations in the par confined to the expense of trans- ID itting the precious metals from one country to another 8 CHAP. IV. On the Effects produced on the rates of Exchange by a debased currency IS CHAP. V. Bank Restriction Bill its general effects high price of bullion of commodities the de- preciation of currency unfavourable exchange with foreign countries ,...! CHAP. VI. Bank Restriction Bill its particular ef- fects injury or injustice to annuitants and others debasement of the national currency Country Banks not the cause of these evils 28 CHAP. VII. On the Effects produced on the rates of Exchange by a depreciated currency 37 CHAP. VIII. Proofs adduced to show that there exists no necessity for the continuance of the Restriction Bill 48 CHAP. IX. Objections of Mr. Bosanquet to the prin- ciples of the last Chapter answered, with remarks qn the theory of Mr. Locke 54 CHAP. X. On the Remedy which the foregoing facts suggest as calculated to redress the evils of the Bank Restriction Bill 67 CHAP. XI. Concluding Remarks on the pernicious tendency of the Bank Restriction Bill 70 CHAP. XII. Summary View of the Doctrines wliich the reasoning in thfi fnrpfrcnntr rhanters tenrl tn CONTENTS. CHAP. XIII. Observations on the principle on which the coins constituting the principal measure of pro- perty are fabricated on the propriety of establish- ing but one standard of money, and on the principles of seignorage . ;78 CHAP. XIV. Observations on the principle by which our silver coins have been fabricated : a plan of a re-coinage for preserving the silver currency in a state of uniformity and perfection 88 APPENDIX 101 1. A Table of the Market Prices of standard gold and silver, showing their relative proportion to eacli other ; with the par and course of exchange between London and Hamburgh ; showing the per centage in favour and against London ; also the per centage above and below the mint price of gold, from 1760 inclusive 104 2. A Table of the Monthly Account of the market prices of standard gold and silver, showing their relative proportion to each other, with the par, course, and rates of exchange between London and Paris, from the 3d day of January 17^2, to the 3d day of December 1793, both inclusive ..... .114 3. A Table of the Monthly Account of the market price of standard gold and silver, their relative proportion to each other, with the par, course, and rates of exchange between London and Paris, from the 3d day of January 1809, to the 5th of April 181 1, both included 115 4. A Reply to Mr. Grenfell's Examination of the Tables of Exchange annexed to the first Edition of this Work ..H6 AN ENQUIRY, Kc. CHAPTER I. On the General Principles of Money. JL HE complexity attendant on the study of money is not inherent in the subject, but has arisen, as Sir James Stewart remarks (Book III. Chap, vi.), from the defective information of those who have treated of it. They have been chiefly practical mn, whose habits have led them to a view of the money system, in particular stages only, without affording them a comprehensive survey of its origin and progress* They have consequently perplexed themselves, and obscured the study, by a multiplicity of technical words, as well as by theories formed on contracted notions. The debasements of coin also, to which almost all governments have resorted, have led to a per- version of words from their original meaning, and B have created in our money dialect, an apparent con- tradiction, which forms no small impediment to an accurate comprehension of the subject. .In order to attain an accurate and distinct notion of the theory of money, it will be necessary to take a view of its origin, and progressive advancement to that state in which it is found in all civilized countries. In some very simple states of society men are without the use of money ; wealth is a name un- known among them ; their wants are little more than the suggestions of nature, and these wants are easily supplied. In such states of society, all traffic must be carried on by barter alone. Great inconvenience must have attended the first operations of such a system, from the difficulty of proportioning pay- ments to the commodity purchased. If a man, says a writer in the Edinburgh Review,* wishes to pur- chase a hatchet, but has only a sheep to dispose of, which is worth six hatchets, he knows not how to accomplish his purpose. The man who has the hatchet to sell wants not to purchase a sheep, but a cloak ; while the man who has the cloak to dis- pose of has no occasion for a hatchet, but for some other commodity. In such circumstances it becomes a matter of expediency for every man to provide himself, if possible, with more or less of that commodity which most people will be willing to purehase, and with which he can most readily com- * Edinburgh Review, vol. 13, p. 47. It is, indeed, requisite to state, that the whole of this chapter is principally taken from tnO nrfl/^li> in frl^ot- tir/M'L- tr\ ipV\i>-*K tl/r T'tifVir-ori r** oK/"i7/i ic rv\ori mand the various articles for which he may have occasion. In some states of society this commodity is cattle. " The armour of Diomede," says Homer, " cost only nine oxen ; but that of Glaucus cost a hun- dred." In some parts of the coast of India, shells are said to be the medium of exchange, and on the sea coast of Africa iron at present is made use of for that purpose. But in the progress of society towards civilization, the inconvenience of such traffic was severely felt ; and no doubt, after various trials of other com- modities, the course of affairs led to the use of the precious metals, as the commodity for which most people would be willing to exchange the articles of which they had to dispose. Gold and silver, there- fore, are the commodities which every man at last purchases with the articles which he has to dispose of, knowing that he can most conveniently exchange them again in such proportions as he pleases, for the other goods that he may want. When the precious metals were first used, they were in the rude and unfashioned state of bars, and were bought and sold, in the different exchanges, by weight, like any other commodity. In time, however, it was found, that these metals might be adulterated, and the means of detection were not very obvious or easy. An expedient is devised. The governors of the community agree to fix a mark upon certain pieces of those metals which they have proved, and the people will not receive any pieces, but those on which that mark is found. These B 2 4 pieces accordingly these bars or ingots, they pur- chase with the goods they have to sell, and offer these bars again in sale for such goods as they wish to purchase. Still, however, considerable incon- venience exists. Those bars have often to be divided, and always to be weighed ; and this is very trouble- some. The government again extends its services. It agrees to fix a mark which shall indicate both the fineness of the metal, and its weight ; and to fix it on such pieces of various weights, as shall most effectually answer all the conveniences of purchasers. This is now the coined money of civilized society ; and it will appear abundantly evident, that there is nothing in all this which alters the nature of the metal, so coined, from that of a commodity. If it were a commodity bought and sold for its mere value, when it was rude bullion, it surely cannot be any thing else for the stamp, which is only intended to declare its quantity and quality.* From this it will follow, that gold and silver are commodities, whose, values are determined, like that of all other commodities, by the demand for them ; and that gold and silver, in coin, are nothing more * Consistently with this principle, the denominations of coin in this, as well as in other countries, were denominations of weight; a penny being originally (Reign of Edward I.) a penny- weight of silver; a pound, a pound weight of silver j and a shilling, a weight making the twentieth part of a pound. Now, it Will appear evident that, when an individual goes to market to purchase the commodity that he wants, he exchanges a given quantity of pennyweights of silver of an ascertained purity, as tlje equivalent of that commodity. It is an exchange of value for value. or less than bullion in such convenient shapes as to facilitate all exchanges in civilized society. Had a pound in silver coin remained equivalent to a pound weight of silver, our ancestors would not have been perplexed with the difference between mint and market price; nor the country subjected to the heavy expense of coinage, necessitated by their mis- apprehensions. CHAPTER II. On the Connection between coined and paper Money. HAVING seen that coins are commodities, which are bought and sold in the market for their value, like other commodities it will follow, that Bank notes are an obligation upon the issuers to pay a certain quantity of those coins, or commodities ; and these obligations are also bought and sold for their value, or that quantity of coin which they specify. Nothing can be more simple than this ; nor can it be con- ceived possible that a community would take in pay- ment notes of Bankers which possess no intrinsic value, if they were not payable in something that possessed value to the amount expressed in the body of the note. With us , the notes of Bankers are payable in gold or silver. Hence every individual in the community accepts of such notes, upon the faith of their receiving on demand a certain quantity of gold or silver, as therein specified. Another, and a very different species of paper money consists of notes, like the French assignats, forced into circulation by the authority of govern- ment, and containing no obligation on the issuer to pay in coin. The value of this kind of paper money \ ' is of course very doubtful ; while the value of the former can undergo no diminution, so long as the obligation to pay in coin continues to be fulfilled. In this country we are, happily, but little ac- quainted with such government paper. CHAPTER III. General Principles of Exchange, -fluctuations in the par confined to the expense of trans* mitting the precious metals from one country to another. THE par of exchange between different countries is determined by a comparison of the intrinsic value of their respective currencies ; for instance we say, 34 1 1* thirty-four schillings, eleven grotes and a quarter, are the par between Hamburgh and London ; because 34 schillings, 1 1 grotes and a -f contain a quantity of pure silver equal to the pure silver con- tained in twenty of our standard shillings. Again, in the case of Ireland, the currency of that country is inferior to ours by 8-^ per cent. ; hence ^108 6 8, Irish, is the equivalent at par of ^100 British. It is evident that if the currency of a country undergo alterations, its exchange with other coun- tries will vary in proportion to these alterations. Let us first examine the rate of exchange, considered * Upon enquiry upon change, I have ascertained from re- spectable author../, that 34, 1 1 are the real par between Ham- burgh and London, and not 33, 8. as was stated in the first edition of this work, Jt appears by the table of the intrinsic par of Exchange pre- sented by Dr. Kelly to the Bullion Committee, that the real par with Hamburgh is 35. 1 making * difference, from 34. about -J per cent, 9 without reference to alterations in currency. It is affected by the balance of mercantile transactions. If at Amsterdam, for example, a larger sum than usual is required for remittance to England, the brisk demand for bills creates a rise in the rate of exchange, a rise greater or smaller, according to the demand; this rise may continue progressive for weeks, yet it has a natural limit, beyond which in a free state of trade, it cannot go namely, the expense of transmitting the precious metals to Eng- land. The contract on the part of a buyer of goods is to pay a certain sum in specie, or in the equivalent of specie ; now the price of specie is, in fact, nearly equal all over the world ; and when the buyer finds for his creditor specie, instead of bills of exchange, he equally fulfils his contract. The expense of transmitting gold from London to Hamburgh, or vice versd, was in 1797* according to the evidence of Mr. Eliason (an eminent con- tinental merchant), before the committee of secrecy, t3 12 11 percent. In a state, therefore, of peace and unrestrained intercourse, the rate of exchange between England and Hamburgh could not, for any length of time, greatly exceed that rate, either on the one side of the water or the other. In regard to Ireland, it appeared by evidence before the committee, on Irish exchange in 1804, that the expense of transmitting slOO in cash, from Dublin to London, or vice versa, was between one and one and a half per cent, and the statement of Mr, Foster (Essays,, p. 175) affords a remarkable confirmation of the rule laid down in the preceding 10 paragraph ; for he informs us, that in the long in- terval from 1728, to 1797, the exchange never rose beyond the expense of sending gold from one country to the other, except under the temporary, and very peculiar circumstances of the year 1753. It has, however,, been contended, that in time an unfavourable balance of debt might exhaust a country of its gold, and then the rate of exchange would be regulated in exact proportion to the balance of debt ; it is, however, generally admitted, that an unfavour- able balance of debt has no such effect, that its tendency is to force exports, and diminish imports ; but neither to raise the exchange indefinitely, nor yet to exhaust the country of its circulating medium. For this reason, an unfavourable balance of debt produces an unfavourable rate of exchange ; and while this rate is less than the expense of transmit- ting gold, the debts of a country may be discharged through the medium of bills of exchange. When the exchange rises to the full amount of sending gold from one country to another, it necessarily stops there, as every person who has a debt to discharge would rather send gold, than pay a premium for a bill, surpassing the expense of sending gold. This exportation of gold causes a diminution of it in the country so exporting, and what remains must acquire a superior value from its scarcity. Consequently, the price of commodities must be diminished in proportion to the diminution of the circulating medium, and their cheapness has a natural tendency to force exportation. On the other hand, the country thus receiving the balance of debt must have j a redundant quantity of gold; its value must dimi- nish ; and the price of commodities will rise ; which high price will cause a diminution of exports, as a country cannot sell so much of a dear, as of a cheap commodity. The low price of gold, also, will attract the cheap commodities of that country which had parted with a quantity of its circulating medium. These imports being exchanged for gold, increase the exports of the one country, and diminish the exports of the other, or increase the exports of the one country, and the imports of the other. To render this more apparent, let it be supposed, that the whole circulation of England consisted of ten millions of gold, and that Ireland possessed the same amount ; and, in the course of commercial transactions between the two countries, that Ireland became indebted to England one million sterling, which debt could not be discharged, but by Ireland remitting to England, in gold, this amount ; it will be evident, that if Ireland export one million of her circulating medium, while the produce of her land and labour remains the same, that the nine millions which remain will represent the same quantity of commodities that ten millions did before this debt was paid ; and, consequently, the price of Irish commodities will fall in their value, in proportion to the diminution of the circulating medium. Their cheapness will give rise to exportation. England having added one million of gold more to her cir- culating medium, eleven millions will represent the same quantity of commodities as ten did formerly; this importation of gold will enhance the value of all 12 English commodities in a correspondent proportion to its increase, which will consequently discourage their exportation. The cheap commodities, how- ever, of Ireland, the cheapness of which forces their exportation, will come to England to be exchanged, not for English commodities which are dear, but for the redundant quantity of circulating medium which is cheap ; and this necessarily diminishes the export of English, and increases the import of Irish com- modities, till such time as the level of the circulating medium of each country is restored. And if this principle governs the balance of debt between Eng- land and Ireland, it will also govern it in all their commercial transactions with the rest of the world. The conclusion, therefore, at which we arrive is, that whatever may be the temporary and limited effect of mercantile transactions on the rate of ex- change, the permanent and great variations from par are caused by the altered value p the circulating medium. 13 CHAPTER IV. On the Effects produced on the rates of Ex- change by a debased currency. I HAVE already stated, that when the par of exchange has been fixed between two countries, the rate of exchange will vary in proportion to the variation in the value of the currency of either country; if, for instance, the legislature of this country debased the standard of our gold currency five per cent, while that of Hamburgh remained stationary, it would follow, that the pure gold contained in our pound sterling would no longer be worth thirty-four schil- lings, eleven grotes and a quarter, but would only be worth a smaller proportion of Hamburgh cur- rency. The diminution would be equal to the He- basement in the British currency ; the rate of ex- change, in consequence, would nominally be five per cent, against England. Similar effects would be produced on the rates of exchange, if the currency of this country became debased from a deficiency of weight ; as the rate of exchange is always calculated, not according to what the currency contains, but what it ought to contain; the rate, therefore, will be in the exact proportion to the deficiency in the value of the currency. The history of commerce abounds with examples of this. 14 Previous to the re-coinage in King William's reign, our silver coin was twenty-five per cent, belovr standard r and our exchange with Holland was twenty- five per cent, against us. Before the reformation of our gold currency, in 1774, the exchange with France was computed to be three per cent, against us, the French coins being much less worn than ours. Since 1774, the exchange has been against France, and in our favour. In the same manner, before that reformation, the exchange was generally against us with Amsterdam, Hamburgh, Venice ; but since the reformation, it has generally been in our favour.* A recent instance of the effects of degraded cur- rency on exchange, has been afforded by the bar- barous policy of the Turkish government. They have made three great adulterations of their coin ; the first in 3770; the second in 1787; and the third in 1796. Before these frauds, the Turkish piastre contained nearly as much silver as our half- crown ; and, in exchange, the common computation was eight piastres to the pound sterling. The con- sequence of these repeated adulterations has been a reduction of the silver in the piastre to one half, and a fall in the exchange of one hundred per cent. ; bills on London having been bought, in 1803, at sixteen piastres to the pound sterling.-^ In this country an unfavourable exchange, caused by a debased currency, has been accompanied with a high market price of bullion. In the case of the * Wealth of Nations, vol. 2. p. 2735. t Foster's Essays on Commercial Exchange, p, 94. 15 silver currency in King William's time, the price of silver rose to 6s. 5d. per ounce, as stated by Mr. Lowndes. In the case of the gold coins, previous to their reformation, the market price of gold, on, an average of 16 years, was 3 19 2-f- per ounce. When the currency was reformed, the exchange fell to par, and the market price of bullion fell to its mint price. It would seem, therefore, that a currency debased, either by adulteration, or by a deficiency of weight in the coins, may cause the exchange to be per- manently unfavourable to a country ; a circumstance which can only be remedied by a reformation of the circulating medium, and does not in the least degree depend on the balance of debt ; as the exchange depending on the balance of debt can at no time exceed the amount of transmitting the precious metals from one country to another. CHAPTER V. Bank Restriction Bill its general effects* high price of bullion of commodities the depreciation of currency -unfavourable ex- change with foreign countries. As the unexpected continuance of the present sys- tem of the Bank of England has been attended with effects which appear to have excited considerable surprise and attention, it is of some importance to show in what manner they have taken place ; and in so doing it will be proper to consider the state of the gold currency from 1760 to 1797* and from 1797 to 1810. On the accession of his present Majesty to the throne, the gold coins of this country were in a very debased state. Their deficiency in weight increased so rapidly, that, in the year 1773, the government found it necessary to take the subject into consider, ation ; the result of which was, the recalling of all the light coins from circulation, which were re- coined in the years 1774, 5, 6, and 7- From this period the gold coins were in a state of great per- fection, and were maintained in this state by frequent new issues from the mint. It is a fact worthy of particular notice, that for several years before the reformation of the gold coins, the market price of gold was considerably 17 7 higher than its mint price. From 1557 to 1773, a period of sixteen years, its average price was 3 1Q 2|- per ounce. But immediately after the re-coinage in 1774, the market price of bullion fell below the mint price; and, during a period of twenty years, from 1777 to 17Q7 5 the average price paid by the Bank Directors for gold, was only 3 17 74., which is 2-f-d. under the mint price. From this fact the conclusion cannot be con- sidered doubtful, that the high price of gold bullion was occasioned by the defective state of the gold coins ; that 3 19 2 of these coins did not contain more than an ounce of standard gold; consequently, it would not exchange for its nominal value, but according to the quantity of standard gold which it contained. And this fact is fully proved by the re- formation of the coins. When every 3 17 10^ contained an ounce of gold, the market price of gold immediately fell to its mint price ; an ounce of standard gold bullion could be readily obtained for 3 17 10J- in coins. During the above mentioned period of the defec- tive state of our gold coins, Lord Liverpool states, that foreign exchanges were very much influenced to qur disadvantage, and this circumstance Was one of the principal causes which induced the government to reform the coins. Lord Liverpool states another fact worthy of no- tice, that during the period already mentioned of .the defective state of the gold coins, the price of silver was influenced by their deficient, or perfect state* From 1757 to 1773, the average price 18 | which the Bank Directors paid for dollars, was 64fd. per ounce, equal to 66f d. for standard silver. But immediately after the re-coinage of the gold coins, the price of dollars fell, so that, on an ave- rage of twenty- four years, ending 17Q7, the Bank Directors have paid for dollars 61-^d. per oz. equal to 63^d. per oz. for standard silver, and less than the average price for sixteen years previous to the re- coinage by 3-f-d. per ounce, or 5 T 3 T V P er cent. From these facts, it would appear of very con- - siderable consequence to keep the gold coins in a state of the greatest possible perfection. By neg- lecting to do so, the exchange with foreign countries becomes against us. We have a rise in the price of gold ; the new and heavy coins are selected from .the light and debased, and exported for the profit attending the high market price of bullion. The price of all commodities rises in proportion. The price of silver is, also raised, which, with a currency somewhat assimilated to the perfection of our gold coins, would hold out a considerable temptation to melt, and export it ; and this is now prevented only by the very debased state of the silver currency. I come now to consider the state of the currency since 1797> the year in which the Bank suspended payment. The causes which led to this memora- , ble crisis in our pecuniary affairs, have already occu- pied a great share of the public attention ; I will, therefore, proceed to the consideration of the effects that have followed. It is generally admitted, that the value of a com- modity depends greatly on its scarcity or plenty. 19 Now there has been, within these twelve years, a remarkable increase in our amount of Bank notes. For several years before 17Q7, the amount of them in circulation did not exceed eleven millions, and bullion was cheap, being ^3 17 7 per ounce. But after 1797* the amount of Bank notes was progres- sively increased, and as soon as this increase became considerable, the price of bullion rose. Notes in circulation. Price of gold bullion. On 25th Dec. 1797 there were el 1,641, 4-00 3 \1 6 1798 12,708,657 3 17 6 1799 13,672,405 3 17 6 1800 15,251,240........ 4 5 The tables in the Appendix contain the quantity of notes, and price of bullion for the remaining years, and concur to show, that the rise of bullion has been consequent on the increase of notes. Bullion has never since 1800 been below a4, and it was lately so high as k J3. In further illustrating the subject on the high price of gold, it is of consequence to remark, that when silver was the money in which all bargains were concluded, the course of exchange for or against this country, was in proportion to the de- fective or perfect state of the currency, and this unfavourable exchange was accompanied with a high market price of silver bullion. Previous to the re-coinage of King William III. the exchange was as much as twenty five per cent, against this coun- try, and the market price of silver was 4s. 5d. per ounce, Foreigners considered the silver coins as C 2 20 the principal measure of property, and rated their exchanges accordingly. In 1717? the gold coins of this country were, by proclamation, declared legal tender, at the rate of twenty-one shillings to a guinea ; and since that period, no such unfavour- able exchange has taken place, although the silver coins were, and still continue, in a very defective state. Before the year 1717 the guinea was current for 21s. 6d., but when reduced to 21s. it was still so much over rated at the mint, in respect to silver, as to render it the standard of our money. Accord- ingly we find, that the course of exchange was con- siderably affected to our disadvantage, in consequence of the defective state of the gold currency, previous to its reformation in 1774. With this unfavourable exchange, we had a rise in the price of gold ; on the reformation of the coins, however, we had a fall in the rate of exchange, and also in the market price of bullion, as has been already stated. In these two instances, the defective state of the currency acted on the price of all commodities in the same manner as an increase of gold and silver would have done ; it was like increasing the nominal amount of pounds sterling in circulation. Let us suppose that they were increased one-fourth, as in the case of the silver coins, while the quantity of commodities remained the same, or nearly the same; does it not follow, that the price of all commodities would be augmented in a similar ratio ? That the consequences here stated actually followed the de- fective state of the silver currency, will appear from Mr. Lowndes' report to the Lords of the Treasury, 21 of the 12th Sept. 1695 ; in which he states, " that great contentions daily arose in all fairs, markets, shops, and other places throughout the kingdom, to the disturbance of the public peace, in conse- quence of the defective state of the silver coins ; that trade in general was on that account greatly lessened; that persons before they concluded any bargains, were under the necessity of settling the price, or value of the very money they were to re- ceive for their goods ; and that they set a price on them accordingly; that these practices had been one great cause of raising the price, not only of all mer- chandises, but of every article necessary for the sus- tenance of the people ; that the receipt and collection of the public taxes, revenues, and debts, were greatly retarded." P. 115. In 1797? when Bank of England notes were declared a legal tender, at the rate of twenty shil- lings to the pound, for such I conceive to be the spirit of the Restriction Bill, there was no longer any restraint on the Bank Directors in the emission of their notes. Previous to this period, they were perfectly aware that, if they issued their notes to excess, a rise in the price of gold would be the con- sequence, and that these notes would be returned to them to be exchanged for guineas, which would be melted down, and exported at the advanced market price. When the excess of their notes was thus withdrawn from circulation, the market price of gold fell to its mint price. This check alone was always sufficient to prevent, for any considerable time, an excess of Bank notes: and in the remon- 22 strances of the Bank Directors with Mr. Pitt, on the subject of advances to government, sufficient evidence is adduced to show, how well aware they were of the inconvenience of that excess. The evidence of Mr. Giles, the Governor of the Bank, before the Committee of Secrecy, tends also to the same conviction, as does the evidence at large.* Since, however, the Bank Directors have been liberated from all restraint in the issue of their notes ; if they increase them in an undue proportion to the whole produce of the land, and labour of the country, in which they are circulated, does it not follow, that this increase of money will operate, in a similar manner, on the price of all commodities, as the dis- covery of a gold or silver mine would do ? The effects of the discovery of the American mines are in the recollection of every one. Silver, compared to commodities, became cheap from so great an increase, and the money price of all commodities was enhanced. If, therefore, the Bank of England has issued notes to such an excess as to raise the money price of all commodities, it is no difficult matter to account for the very high price of gold, which is bought and sold in the market like any other commodity. Gold can no longer be said to be the principal measure of property in the country; and the transfer which I mentioned, as having taken place from the silver to the gold, on the latter being declared a legal tender, seems to have taken place m respect to Bank notes. Hence the money price * See Report of that Committee. 23 of gold in Bank notes has been of late & 13 per ounce, and, from the great increase of Bank notes, the amount of the nominal pound sterling has been increased in the country ; and the whole produce of the land and labour having continued the same, or having not increased in the same proportion, the price of all commodities has risen in proportion to this increased quantity of money. I have already proved, that when the defective state of the silver coins, previous to the re-coinage of King William III. increased the nominal amount of pounds ster- ling in the country, the price of silver bullion, and all other commodities rated in silver, rose in pro- portion to the increase of money. Now the very same thing has happened with respect to gold, and all other commodities, whose prices are rated in Bank of England notes. Having increased in an undue proportion to the whole produce of the land and labour of the country, these notes have become depreciated, and the same nominal amount will not command the same quantity of the necessaries and conveniences of life. To render this subject still more simple, let us suppose the whole circulation of the Bank of Eng- land to consist of ten millions of gold; and that they possessed a piece of ground, in which they discovered a gold mine, which enabled them to add, in a period of ten years, five millions more to the money in circulation; and let us suppose also, that the produce of the country is not rapidly advancing or declining : would the value of gold, and all other commodities rated in gold, be the same ta- 24 day as they were ten years ago, the day previous to the discovery of the gold mine ? No, surely, The money price of all commodities rated in gold would rise in price, in proportion to its increased quantity. However much the value of gold might be in- creased or diminished, yet its price would remain unaltered. If the ounce of standard gold were coined into 3 17 10-^ of gold coins, the price of that ounce would be precisely 3 17 1O. It could never exceed, and could nev 7 er fall below that price ; and if the ounce of gold were coined into ^5, the price of that ounce would be precisely 5, The standard or mint price of gold is invariable in its name or denomination, though not in its value. Let us suppose again, that the circulation of the Bank of England consisted of ten millions of gold, and from a wish to save the expense of maintaining the whole of this metallic currency in a state of per- fection, they issue Bank notes, which they find considerably cheaper ; and that upon the faith of these Bank notes being exchanged for gold when demanded, the community accept of them the same as if they were in reality pieces of coined money. Let us suppose further, that by an act of the Legis- lature, the Bank is liberated from the obligation of exchanging her notes for gold when demanded. All restraints on her issues immediately cease to exist: she may, as in the first supposition, add five mil- lions of notes to those in circulation, in a period of five or ten years; the community continuing to receive them, either from necessity, or from a 4 25 confidence that the Bank, at some future period, not very far remote, will give to the holders of these notes, gold to the amount therein specified in ex- change. Now, the reality of this supposition has been verified in the transactions of the Bank within these last thirteen years. In J7Q7, the Legislature liberated the Bank of England from the obligation of paying her notes in gold when demanded ; the consequence has been, that the average amount of her notes in circulation has increased from 1O to 21 millions. And while the community accept of these notes on the faith of the Bank being able some day to give gold in exchange for them, there can be no difference in the effects arising from this increase of money, whether it consist in the notes of Bankers, or in an increase of gold. In confirmation of this fact, it is only necessary to state, that Bank of England notes do not circulate out of the Island of Great Britain, and that any increase of them, while the public confidence, and the produce of the land and labour remain the same, must operate on the price of all commodities in the same degree, that an increase of the precious metals would do, and with this increased security, that the precious metals might find their way out of our island, and from scarcity become more valu- able, while the paper money, from its possessing no intrinsic value, is sure to remain at home, and produce all the effects which are here attributed to it. And if the Bank is allowed to retain her present monopoly for thirteen years longer, and increase the issue of her notes to twenty-seven or 26 thirty millions, the price of gold, and every other commodity, will experience a proportionate rise in price. Allowing that Bank of England notes are competent to supply the place of guineas in our currency, a great difficulty, however, arises in pro- portioning their number to the demands or neces- sities of the country while it is the interest of the Bank to lend, they will find borrowers even beyond the necessities of the community, and as all re- straint is now taken off the Bank Directors, they have increased the issues of their notes beyond all former precedent ; nor is it natural to suppose, that they will diminish the quantity of their notes in circulation, seeing it is not their interest, until they are obliged to do so. Let the check be restored, therefore, which formerly regulated the Bank in the issue of her notes. This check was the obligation to pay them in cash. Some have supposed, that the Bank cannot in- crease the issue of her notes to any improper length; for, say they, the rate of interest, which is regu- lated by the scarcity or abundance of money, will be a proof of there not being too much money in circulation, if the rate of interest remain stationary. The fallacy of this doctrine has been distinctly proved by Mr. Hume, in his Essay on Interest, and by Dr. Smith, who has also proved, that the rate of interest for money is regulated by the rate of pro- fits on that part of capital which does not consist in circulating medium; and that those profits are not regulated by, but are wholly independent of, the greater or smaller quantity of money, which may be employed for the purpose of circulation; that the increase of circulating medium will increase the prices of all commodities ; but will not lower the rate of interest. Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. book ii. chap. iv. CHAPTER VI. Bank Restriction Bill its particular effects injury or injustice to annuitants and others debasement of the national currency Cou?i- try Banks not the cause of these evils. THE depreciation of money which has followed in consequence of the Bank Restriction Bill, bears particularly hard on all annuitants, and that large class of individuals, whose sole dependence is placed on a fixed income ; those persons have the value of their revenue diminished to the whole amount of the depreciation on the currency, which appears from the tables in the Appendix to be about 16 per cent, so that ,84 per annum before the Restriction Bill passed, could command the same quantity of the necessaries of life as ^100 would at the present day, if no other cause whatever had acted upon the price of commodities.* It seems an unheard of evil, that the Bank of England should possess the power of diminishing, at her pleasure, the value of all the monied interest in the kingdom ! * That money has depreciated more than 16 per cent since 1797, I believe, is generally allowed ; but the depreciation which I here mention, as having taken place in the currency of the country, is very different from that caused by taxation. We have the misfortune, however, to suffer under both evils ! 29 Every contract made during the present system of the Bank of England must be founded in injustice, as will appear, if we suppose, for example, that a farmer leases a farm of his landlord at the rate of jlOO per annum, which rent the farmer is induced to give from the general high market price of all species of grain, which he supposes will continue and enable him to pay his rent. He finds, however, that the Bank is obliged to resume payments in cash, from which circumstance a fall of l6 per cent, takes place in the price of the whole produce of his farm. It is unnecessary to relate the distressing consequences to the poor farmer. Another evil, resulting from the continuance of the Restriction Bill, is the debasement which must necessarily take place in the gold currency fronv constant circulation, and from few new coins being issued to supply the place of those that become deficient in weight, which, according to the King's proclamation, are not a legal tender below a certain weight ; (the guinea for example, is not a legal tender, when it weighs less than five penny- weights and eight grains ;) also, from the tendency which Bank notes have to force the gold coins out of cir- culation : circumstances which on the repeal of the Restriction Bill might subject the country to the expense of a general re-coinage of all the gold monies. I have already stated, that for 16 years previous to the re-coinage of gold, the market-price of that metal averaged z 1Q 2f per ounce. z IQ 2-f- of the gold coins then in circulation did not weigh more 3O j than an ounce, being a deficiency of ^1 14 6-i- per cent. The gold coins, now in circulation, are rapidly advancing to this state of debasement : according to the last experiments made by the officers of his Majesty's mint, and laid before the committee of council for coin, in 1807, the guineas were debased by a deficiency in weight ^l 3 4 per cent, being Q \ 1 2i per cent, less than the average debasement for 16 years previous to the re-coinage. On the average of guineas and half guineas; the debasement by a deficiency in weight was l 12 11~ per cent, being only ^0 1 7 per cent, less than before the re- coinage. On the average of the guinea, half-guinea, and seven shillings piece, the debasement, by weight, was al 7 8^, being only *o 6 10^ per cent, less than before the re-coinage : and it is probable, that by this time, the debasement of the gold currency is fully equal to what it was before its reformation in 1774. If the Restriction Bill were just now repealed, it must be expected that the market-price of gold will not fall to its mint price, because of the deficiency in the weight of the coins : it required on an average of all species of gold coins in circulation, in 1807, about $ 18 ll-i- to weigh an ounce. The market- price of gold, (according to the principles to be laid down in the eighth chapter,) would be precisely $ 18 11-lr. Since the Restriction Bill passed, little attention has been paid to the state of the gold currency no guineas have been coined since 1799*. several small coinages of half-guineas and seven' shillings pieces $1 have been executed ; these, however, have only enabled the Bank to answer the demands on her for change in transacting the public business, and have not been able to prevent the debasement of the cur- rency. The gold coins now in circulation are deficient to a greater extent than allowed by proclamation ; and if this proclamation is enforced, the public at large will refuse the light coins, as they did previous to 1797. If it is suspended, the new guineas as issued from the mint will be melted and sold for the high market-price of bullion, caused by the debasement of the coins ; a succession of the same evils which existed previous to 1774, would be the consequence of such a measure; a general re-coinage is therefore forced upon the country, to avoid other evils ulti- mately as expensive. The expense of the re-coinage in 1774, amounted to about 7 50,000. A repeti- tion of this expense seems unavoidable ; so that in whatever point of view the Restriction Bill is con- sidered, it is fraught with oppression to the whole body of the people. It has been supposed by some, that every increase of Bank notes drove an equal amount of gold coin out of circulation. For example, if the Bank of England increased her notes from ten to twelve millions, the two millions of additional paper forced two millions of gold coins out of circulation. This, however, does not appear to be the case ; for if the paper money thus increased had only supplied the place of gold, there would have been no rise in the price of gold, s there would have been no more 32* | notes in circulation, than there would have been gold had no notes been used. There would have been no excess of currency. For several years pre- vious to the Restriction Bill, the average amount of Bank notes was about eleven millions. Since the restriction, they have increased to upwards of 21 millions ; if these IO millions of Bank notes had displaced an equal amount of coin, we should have experienced no rise in the price of gold. If we could ascertain what increase of Bank notes it would require to raise the price of gold 2O per cent, above its mint price, we could exactly determine the amount of the gold coin forced out of circulation ; having no means to ascertain this fact positively, its place can only be supplied by conjecture. We may suppose, that the whole produce of the land and labour of this country is nearly the same now, as it was in 1797? and the calamities of war will perhaps admit the supposition of but a small increase : at the same time that, whatever this in- crease may be, the improved methods of banking now adopted may render about the same quantity of circulating medium necessary, as in the former period. If it be allowed, that an increase of cir- culating medium of one- fifth raises the price of gold, and of all commodities, 20 per cent, it would follow, that if two millions and one- fifth were added to the 11 millions in circulation, being one-fifth of that sum, that the price of commodities would be aug- mented 20 per cent. We find, however, that lp millions have been added to the Bank notes in cir- culation, so that these 10 millions have only dis- 33 placed 7 millions and four- fifths of a million of gold coin, leaving thereby a permanent excess of cur- rency of ^2,200,000. Though this statement does not determine exactly the point in question, it gives an idea of the matter somewhat approaching to truth ; and it would appear, that if the Bank Directors diminished the amount of their notes to about 1 8 millions, the market-price of gold would fall as near to the mint price as the debased state of the coins would permit ; while, however, the present system is continued, the evil of a debased currency must be increased, and must render it both more difficult, and more expensive, to return to the old system of rendering Bank of England notes payable on demand. Since the first edition of this work was published, it has become a very general opinion, that the country Banks are the cause of all the evils which we have attributed to the Bank of England. As this is a question of great interest to the prosperity of the country at large, it may not be unnecessary to explain the nature of the connection existing between the Bank of England and the Country Banks. After the suspension of cash payments at the Bank of England, it was deemed necessary for the security of the country, to render the notes of Country Bankers payable in those of the Bank of England ; this obligation was a check upon the issues of the Country Banks ; they could only in- crease their notes as the Bank of England increased D '34 her notes. If the Bank of England diminished the amount of her notes, the Country Banks, if they understood their own interest, must have imme r diately followed her example. If the Country Bankers did not diminish the amount of their notes, as the Bank of England diminished hers, they would be liable to the inconvenience and danger of a run, caused by their mutual and unceasing competition ; and if these Banks have not Bank of England notes to answer all demands, they must necessarily stop payment: it is their interest to avoid this crisis. It may be asked, how are the Country Bankers to know when the Bank of England is diminishing her notes? To this it may be answered, by the difficulty their London correspondents find in getting discounts at the Bank of England, of which they are apprised. It will appear, therefore, that this obligation on the Country Bankers to pay in Bank of England notes, must operate on their issues in a similar manner to an obligation to pay in cash. This dependence of the Country Banks on the pleasure of the Bank of England can be further simplified and explained, by stating the natural con- sequence of an over-issue of notes by the Bank of England. Let it be supposed, that the Bank of England has made an over-issue of notes, say one million. Bank of England notes do not in general circulate many miles from London ; in the district, therefore, in which this over-issue has been made, a rise will take place in the price of commodities, and will be 35 proportionate to the increase of money. In the country, however, where no such increase has taken place, the price of commodities will have experienced no rise in price ; the high money price of com- modities in London, however, will tempt the com- modities of the country to come to the London market for the advantage of the high price ; in the country a scarcity will be experienced, and a con- sequent rise in price ; this increased price, however, cannot be paid without an increase of money. Money will be demanded, and, as it is the interest of the Country Bankers to lend, the void will be supplied ; and the high price of commodities, caused by this over-issue, will become general, and not local. It would, therefore, appear, that Country Banks can only increase the evil of an excessive paper circulation, by the latitude which is given to them, or rather the necessity which is imposed upon them, by the Bank of England. By an over-issue of the Bank of England to-day, she creates a demand upon the Country Bankers for a similar and correspondent issue to-morrow or next day. On the other hand, if after such over-issue the Bank of England found it her interest or necessity to withdraw a considerable quantity of her notes, the act might be attended with the failure of almost any number of Country Banks ; they would be unxepectedly deprived of the means of upholding their credit, their notes being payable in those of the Bank of England. Such is the precarious and dependant situation of D 2 36 our Country Banks, as connected with the Bank of England ; the extensive advantages derived from those Banks render it desirable that their security should be increased, and that they should be entirely independent of the Bank of England ; for, without imputing any improper motives to the conductors of that concern, political circumstances alone might compel them to such a sudden diminution of their notes, as might produce the calamitous circum- stances here ascribed to be within the limits of their present uncontrolled powers. CHAPTER VI. On the Effects produced on the rates of Ex- change by a depreciated currency. THE currency of a country is said to be depreciated when a given quantity of it will no longer exchange for a like quantity of that of another country ; for example, if the circulating medium of England was reduced in value Virth below its standard and re- cognised level, while that of Hamburgh remained stationary, the pound sterling of England would not exchange for 34 schillings, 1 1 grotes and a -J- f Hamburgh money, but for T V tn ^ ess ' The deprecia- tion of English money would in this case be ten per cent. ; and it is evident, that the rate of ex- change would be also ten per cent, against England. But from the doctrine already advanced, it would appear, that a currency of gold and silver only, or of gold and silver and paper, the latter convertible into the former at the option of the holders, could never, abstracting from debasement, be depreciated ; for the rapidity with which the precious metals retire from a cheap in quest of a dear market, would always take the surplus quantity out of the country ; and whatever excess and depreciation we have in our currency has a direct tendency to raise the value of the precious metals in other countries in a similar 38 ratio. The price of commodities compared to the gold and silver will be cheap, which will encourage exports to bring home th quantity of bullion neces- sary to restore the general level of those commo- dities. The depreciation of currency here described, is different from that species of depreciation, which the precious metals are subject to from the discovery of new mines, or an accumulation of gold and silver from those already known. In this latter case, while the precious metals may be depreciated to an in- definite extent, the currency of any one country cannot undergo a greater permanent depreciation than another, from the tendency which the precious metals have to seek the best market. Hence in all ages,, it has been found impossible for any country to retain more gold and silver than the demands of that country required. We must, therefore, seek the cause of a depre- ciation of currency, consisting of gold and silver and paper, the latter convertible into the former, in something else than mere excess, as any depreciation caused by such excess must be a very temporary evil, and from the very nature of things is daily working its own remedy. Since the Bank Restriction Bill took place, it has generally been supposed, that the excessive quantity of Bank notes in circulation has caused a consider- able depreciation in their value. The sign of thi^s excess and depreciation has been a permanently un- favorable exchange, and a high market price of 39 bullion, which never had taken place in this country while Bank notes were payable in gold on demand. When the Directors of the Bank of England were obliged to give gold for their notes on de- mand,* their quantity never could exceed the quan- tity of gold and silver, that would have circulated in their place, had there been no Bank notes ; but if they issued their notes to excess, it appeared imme- diately in the high price of bullion, and the un r favourable exchange. The price of gold was no longer rated in gold, otherwise it could not in the entire state of the gold coin have exceeded 3 17 10-J. per ounce : but its price in Bank notes varied in * Mr.Bosanquet, in his Observations upon the Bullion Report, has in several instances mentioned the circumstance of the Bank being obliged to provide guineas for the holders of her notes at the mint price of gold, even though she was obliged to pay more in the market for the gold of which such guineas were made. JMr. Bosanquct having stated that the Bank was compelled to do so, this must have a tendency to impress the public mind that there was something peculiarly harsh and unreasonable in the obligation. But Mr. Bosanquet must be aware, that any such impression is directly inconsistent with matter of fact. If the Ban'r had never issued a note, and there are man'y such Banks, would she not have felt obliged to the public to take her guineas on loan ? That she would, 1 think will not be disputed. But who er what obliges the Bank to issue any notes; is it not her own interest? and in proportion as her interest is advanced, must she not also feel obliged to the public to take her notes on loan in place of guineas. But who would say, if they wished to speak accurately, that a Bank in such circumstances is compelled to provide gold above its mint price. To believe Mr. Bosanquet's statements in their literal meaning, would be to admit that the Governor and Directors of the Bank managed the interests of their constituents under a system of compulsion. To promulgate such a doctrine would not entitle a man to many proselytes. 40 proportion to the amount of notes in circulation. Bank notes, not gold, for the time, became the principal measure of property, in which the price of all commodities was rated. Gold accordingly, as in Bank notes, was sometimes 3 18 and & per ounce. It will, however, appear evident, that while these notes were convertible into gold at pleasure f the dealers in bullion would take these to the Bank, and exchange every j3 1710^ for an ounce of gold coin, which, if melted and sold at the then market price, would make a considerable profit by so doing. But the excess of Bank notes could not remain for any length of time in circulation while this was practised ; nor, indeed, was it the interest of the Bank to force the issue of her notes under such circumstances, as she, by that means, rendered her- self liable to be exhausted of her guineas. On the contrary, it appears, from the evidence adduced be- fore the committee of secrecy, that when the ex- change became unfavorable, and the price of bullion rose above its mint price, the Bank Directors limited their discounts, until such time as the value of their notes was the same as their guineas, or until the market price of gold fell to its mint price, and with this fall the rate of exchange fell also.* * This principle, apparently so novel, and at present so much disputed by those who are interested in its non-existence, has nevertheless been firmly established for nearly a century, as wiU appear irom the following extract from " A Discourse concerning the Currencies of the British Plantations in America, &c." " The repeated large emissions of paper money are the cause of the frequent rise m the price of silver and exchange, uhich do 41 Since, however, the Bank Restriction Bill passed, this salutary check upon the issues of the Bank Directors has been entirely destroyed, and there can now exist no possible obstacle to the increase of their notes, but what their own prudence sug- gests. as regularly follow the same as the tides do the phases or courses of the moon. When no larger sums are emitted for some time fhan what is cancelled of former emissions, silver in exchange is at a stand ; when less is emitted than cancelled (which seldom Imp- pens), silver in exchange do fall. " This is plain to a kind of demonstration, from the history of the paper-money emissions in New England. " After silver had rose, Anno 1705, to 8s. per ounce, by light pieces of eight superseding the heavy pieces, it continued at that rate, while paper emissions did not exceed a due proportion to the current silver: An. 17U, we emitted ^50,0()O upon loan, and A. 171-3, Rhode Island, ,40,000, besides emissions oa distant funds for charges of Government : in the autumn, A 1715, silver became 15 per cent, advance above 8s.; that is, about PS. 2d. per ounce. Massechuset's Bay, A, 1717, emitted j 100,000 upon loan, and a very long period, silver rose to 12s. jjcr tuncc ; A. 1721, Massechuset's Bay emitted s:>0,000, and Rhode Island ^10,000 upon loan; silver, A. 1722, became 14s. per ounce. From that time a chargeable Indian war required large emissions, and silver rose to \6*.per ounce; it continued at this rate till A. 1728, emissions not being larger than cancelling?, A. 1727, Massechuset's Bay emitted 60,000, and A. 1728, Rhode Island emitted a40,000 upon loan; silver became 1 8s. pet ounce; A. 1731, Rhode Island emitted ,60,000 u pan loan (N. B. Besides the several loans in the course of this history, all the charges of the four Governments were defrayed by paper emission*), and silver beca?ne, A. 1732, 21s. per ounce ; A. 1733, Massechuset's Bay emitted ^7 6,000 upon funds of taxes, Rhode Island fil04-,000 upon loan and taxes, Connecticut ^50,000 upon loan, and A. 1734, silver became 27s, per ounce. From A. 1734, to A. 1738, more bills were cancelled than emitted, exchange fell from 440 to 400 per cent, advance. A. 1738, Rhode Island emitted alOO,OCO upon loan, silver rose from 2fs, tv 29s. per .- -Pa^e 2& 42 If I am correct in my view of this subject, tha high permanent rate of Exchange is a consequence of a depreciated currency, occasioned by an excess of Bank notes, which act on the rate of exchange in a similar manner, as if our currency was debased, either by adulteration of the standard, or by a de- ficiency in the weight of the coins. This depre- ciation affects the market price of the precious metals in the same manner as the debased currency affected it in the reign of King William the Third, and previous to the reformation of the gold cur- rency in 1774; and while this depreciation con- tinues, the unfavourable rate of exchange will con- tinue also ; and will be indicated by the excess of the market above the mint price of gold. In the case of an unfavourable exchange, caused by a balance of debt, the rate will at no time exceed the expense of transmitting the precious metals, bating the depreciation on Bank notes, or the excess of the market above the mint price of gold. With- draw the cause of the depreciation, as was done when the currency was debased, and we shall obtain the same beneficial results in the one case as in the other. Let the Directors of the Bank of England resume those principles for the rule of their conduct now, by which they were guided before the Restriction Bill took place. Let them on every rise of the exchange limit the amount of their discounts, and it will invariably happen as it did then, that a dimi- nution of their notes will cause a fall in the rate of exchange, and in the market price of bullion. 43 The observance of the same rules by the Bank of Ireland, in regard to the exchange, is stated in very explicit terms by the committee, which sat on their affairs in the year 1804. The committee, in mentioning the necessity of contracting the issues of paper money, say (page 7), " such has been the natural practice of Banks, previous to the restric- tion. Mr. Colville (a director) states it in very clear and forcible terms, as to the Bank of Ireland. Prior to \7Q7> they limited the amount of their issues as exchange rose. If prudence had not dictated such a course, necessity would have compelled a dimi- nution of their issues, by diminishing the stock of specie which could only be replaced at a loss pro- portionate to the existing rate of exchange; and your committee observe, that in fact, as well as in theory, the effect of such practice always was, and' must be the redress of the unfavourable exchange" Again (page 14), " your committee do in express terms declare their clear opinion, that it is incum- bent on the Directors of the Bank of Ireland, and their indispensable duty, to limit their paper at all times of an unfavourable exchange, during the con- tinuance of the restriction, exactly on the same principle as they would, and must have done, in case the restriction did not exist; and that all the evils of a high and fluctuating exchange must be im- putab'le to them if they fail to do so." That the language of this committee, pointed as it is, was not overcharged, is evident from a circurri- stance of which Mr. Parnell informs us,* that in * Parnell on Currency and Exchange, p. 15,4th Edition. 44 Feb. 1804, guineas were openly bought with these notes in Mr. Frank's office, Suffolk Street, Dublin, at a premium of ten per cent. In London the sale of guineas at a premium has not been so openly conducted; but it has, notwithstanding, been car- ried on to a great extent, and at a premium con- siderably above ten per cent. According to the principle which I shall endeavour to establish, viz. that the market price of gold can at no time exceed its mint price, provided every 3 17 104- contain an ounce of standard gold ; it would appear, that every excess of the mint price must be attributed either to a debased, or a depre- ciated currency. For example, if 3 17 10 i- con- tained an ounce of standard gold, the value of that ounce would be precisely $ 17 10-J-. But if it required four guineas of our present gold coin to weigh an ounce of standard gold, the price of an ounce would be precisely four guineas; and if the price of an ounce of gold in Bank notes is 4 13, while the ounce contains only 3 17 10-^, it follows that gold is more valuable than Bank notes by 15s. 1^-d.; the difference between the price of an ounce of gold as rated in respect to itself, and its price as rated in Bank notes. Again, if it be required of our present gold currency four guineas to weigh an ounce, the price of gold would not be higher than four guineas. And if it required 4 13 of Bank notes to purchase this ounce, or these four guineas, still the Bank notes would be less valuable than the four guineas by gs. which is a positive depreciation of Bank notes to that amount. But as the deficiency in the weight 45 of our present gold coins, according to the last experiments made by the officers of his Majesty's mint in 1807, amounted on the average of all spe- cies in circulation, to about 14- per cent, this, de- ducted from the excess of the mint price of gold, will leave a depreciation of Bank notes equal to about \& 13 per cent.* % * See Tables in the Appendix. f-The Bullion Committee, in enumerating the proofs of the de- preciation of Bank notes, brought forward the high market price of silver bullion among others, its having neaily corresponded with the high market price of gold, which could not, in any degree, be ascribed to a scarcity of silver. The importations having of late years been unusually large, while the usual drain for India and China has been stopped. (Report, p. 10, John- ston's edition.) Mr. Bosanquet is extremely angry with the Bullion Committee for having made this statem?nt, which, he says, " is unpardonabiy erroneous, for the fact which refutes it had " drawn the attention of the committee." (Page 34.) Mr. Bosanquet alludes to the examination of Mr. Merle before the committee, to whom the following questions were put: " What is a dollar worth now ? Four shillings and nine " pence: silver is about five pence an ounce above the coinage " price." " That is, about nine per cent., is it not? I suppose there- " abouts." " How do you account for the circumstance of gold being 16 " per cent, above its coinage price, and silver only nine ? I can- " not answer that question, because I am not conversant with " the foreign connexion." (Report, appendix of evidence, p. 40.) Without the aid of the foreign connexion it is possible to ex- plain what Mr. Merle could not account for, and in doing so J shall be able to show Mr. Bosanquet how far his severe accusa- tion of the Bullion Committee was consistent with matter of fact. Upon the 4th of July, 1809, the market price of doubloons was *g4 8 per ounce, equal to t 12 10J for standard gold; the same date, Spanish dollars were 5s. 6d. per ounce, equal to 5s. pd. for standard silver. These proportions'wcre as 16.27 to 1. The market price of gold was il9 5 3 per cent, above its mint price. The excess of the mint price of silver was only ^115 7 j. 46 The relative value of the two metals having (from 15.07 the mint proportions) become as 16.27 to 1, the difference is equal to 8 per cent., making the real li^e in the price of silver fg\9 5 7J per cent., or 5d. per cent, more than the rise in the price of gold. Again, upon the 6th day of March, 1810, t*n days after Mr. Merle was examined, the market price of doubloons was i 7 per oz., equal to a^-i J 1 10j for standard gold ; the same date Spanish dollars were 5s. 6Jd., equal to 5s. ^ol. for standard silver. These proportions were as 16 to 1. The excess of the mint price of gold was \1 9 6 per cent. The excess of the mint price of silver was only d\2 1 11 per cent. The- relative proportions of the metals having become as Irj to 1, is equal to 3 5J per cent., making the total rise in the price of silver 5 4j per cent, or 5s. Qjd. per cent, more than the rise in the price of gold. And if we deduct tor the rise in the mar- ket price of silver above its mint price, caused by the inaccurate determinations of the mint proportions, of which Mr. Bosanquet 1ms stated the average before the suspension of cash payments to be 1 J per ounce, or l 8 4j per cent, j then, on the first ex- ample, the real rise in the price of silver, caused by the depre- ciation of Bank notes, will be lG l6 3 per cent. ; on the second, ^15 17 per cent. Mr. Bosanquet, having stated that 'the price of silver had only risen 5% per cent, above its average price, before the restriction took place, seems to have committed an error of upwards of 10 per cent., but that his error is not unpardonable is easy to decide: the public, however, should naturally receive with jealousy the statements of practical men, who so confidently assert as facts, what are only apparently so. It seems singular that so acute an observer as Mr. Bosanquct lias proved himself to be, should have overlooked the important effect which is produced on the price of silver, in a country where gold is the standard, by an alteration in the relative, value of the two precious metal*, and more particularly so, as the Bullion Committee had directed the public attention to this most im- portant principle in the following pnssagf , in their valuable report ; " That permanent rise in the market price of gold ' above its mint price, which appears by Mr. Greffulhe's paper " to have taken place, for several years, both at Hamburgh and " Amsterdam, may in some degree be ascribed, as your coin- " mittee conceive, to an alteration which has taken place in the " relative value of the two precious metals all over the world ; *' concerning which, nufch curious and satisfactory information 47 14 will be found in the appendix, particularly in the documents laid " before your committee by Mr. Allen. (Ace. No. 21 to 33.) " From the same cause, a fall in the relative price of silver " appears to have taken place, in this country, for some time " before the increase of our paper currency began to operate. '* Silver having fallen in its relative value to gold throughout " the world, gold has appeared to rise in price in those markets " where silver is the fixed measure, and silver has appeared to *' fall in those where gold is the fixed measure." (Report, p. 7 and 3, octavo edition*) ' CHAPTER VIII. Proofs adduced to show that there exists no necessity for the continuance of the Restric- tion Bill. As the popular argument in favour of the con- tinnance of the Restriction Bill, has been the impossibility of the Bank resuming her payments in cas'i. while the price of gold is so much above its ot price, I shall here endeavour to prove that the price of gold can, in reality, at no time, be above its mint price, and that its being so at present, in appearance, is^ caused by the excessive quantity of Bank notes in circulation. As much misapprehension has existed on this subject, it will be necessary to explain the cause of it. The mint price of silver is 5s. 2d. per oz. and at this rate was legal tender in all payments, and to any amount^ until the 14th of his present Majesty, when it was enacted, that silver should be a legal tender to the amount of .25 only. The mint price of gold is 3 17 JOi per oz., that is, an ounce of gold is worth 3 1? 10J- of silver, coined at the rate of 5s. 2d. per oz. The gold coins were declared a legal tender at this rate in 1717 to any amount. In consequence of this measure, we became possessed of two standards 49 of money, each legal tender. I have already stated in what manner this declaration gave a preference to the gold coins, and they have continued since 1717 to be the principal measure of property. As the silver coins have continued to increase in de- basement since this period., it would appear that the gold coins have only a nominal reference to those of silver; for if the gold coins were valued in the present debased ones of silver, it would follow that in place of gold being worth ^3 17 10^ it would be worth about ^4 174 per oz. or 25 per cent, more than its mint price, the silver coins being this much debased below the standard of 5s. 2d. per oz. Hence it would appear that gold in bullion, since 1717 9 has not in reality been rated in silver, but in gold coins. The idea of gold in bullion being rated in our silver coins, while in reality it has been rated in those of gold, has been the cause of all the misapprehension respecting the mint and market price of gold, and which is likely to continue while we have two standards of money each legal tender. If the term. ^3 17 1CH- had been laid aside, and the word ounce substituted in its place, would it not have followed, that an ounce of gold was just an ounce of gold, and would have continued so to the end of time; its command over the conveniences and necessaries of life being exactly in proportion to the quantity of ounces in the country. But if we choose to continue the term 5 17 104-, which is just another name for an ounce of gold, it does not in the least degree alter the question; for if 17 104- contains an ounce of gold, an ounce 50 of gold cannot be worth more than 3 17 10-J-; or in other words, an ounce of gold cannot be worth more than an ounce of gold, if the same in purity, which we take for granted. This reasoning is confirmed, first, by the debased state of the gold currency, previous to its reforma^ tion, when 3 19 24 did not contain more than an ounce of gold; and, secondly, by the reformation of the gold coin. When every 3 17 10^- was made to contain an ounce of that metal, the price of gold immediately fell to its mint price^ at which it continued for 2O years, and must have continued so ad infinitum, had not the Bank Directors, by their imprudence, deranged the system of our cur- rency. If the gold coins had in reality been rated in silver, the guinea in place of being current for 21s. would have been current for nearly 3Os. as it was in 1695, previous to the re-coinage of silver in the reign of William the Third. The price of silver also would have risen in proportion, had its value in bullion been rated by the debased coin, to per- haps 6s. 5d. per oz ; 6s. 5d. of our present silver coin not containing more than an ounce of standard silver. The price of silver, however, was rated in gold from 1774 to 17Q7> and was purchased 5 per cent, cheaper, during that period, than it was for 1.6 years before, when the gold currency was much debased. Further, if silver had in reality been the standard pf our money, and the coins maintained in that 5 51 state of perfection, both as to weight and purity, that our gold coins have been, we would then have had an invariable price of silver ; if the mint price of silver was fixed at 5s. 2d. per oz. and every 5s. 3d. contained an ounce, the market price of the same standard silver never could exceed and never could be below that sum ; its price not being refer- rable to any other standard of value, and having a reference only to itself, its price could not alter; for how could 5s. 2d. be worth 6s. 5d. or an ounce become worth an ounce and a quarter ? the thing is impossible. According to this principle, gold would vary in its price in proportion to its quantity and the demand for it, its price would have been mea- sured by silver, as a standard invariable in its price or denomination; the reverse of this, however, has been the case; from 1777 to 1797 we had an inva- riable price of gold, and a varying price of silver; which is a clear and decided proof that gold, and not silver, has been the standard of the money of England. Having thus endeavoured to prove, that since the period in which gold coins were declared legal ten- der, their value has not been rated in silver; but in gold coins, and that silver in bullion has not been rated in the silver coins, but in those of gold, and consequently, that while 3 17 lOi of gold coins contained an ounce of standard gold, no differ- ence could possibly exist between the mint and market price of that metal; let us us next, to sim- . plify this fact, still further suppose, that we had only 2 52 gold coins in circulation, and in place of the sfrbr- trary arrangement of pounds, shillings, and pence, we had the more simple and clear terms, ounces, half and quarter ounces, it will be evident, that the value of these ounces, half and quarter ounces, would be subject to a variation in real value, in proportion to the quantity of them in the country; but no force of language can make an ounce more valuable than four quarter ounces, or an ounce any thing but an ounce. Now the term 3 17 lO-i- I have already proved to mean nothing but an ounce of gold ; it does not mean that amount in our silver coins, for it would require nearly 5 of our silver coins to be equivalent in value to an ounce of gold, taking them at the mint price. I have also proved, that if 3 17 10-^ contain an ounce of gold, no alteration even in that arbitrary term can possibly take place, and we have the experience of 26 years in proof of this assertion. If my reasoning on this subject has been correct, it will follow, that since Bank notes were declared a legal tender, the price of gold in bullion has no longer been rated in gold coins. I have also proved; that it was not rated in silver coins, otherwise its price would have been considerably higher than it has hitherto been. It appears then to have been rated in Bank notes, and its price accordingly, in Bank notes, has been ^4 13 per ounce. In this we have a further proof of what I before stated, that gold is no longer the principal measure of property, but Bank notes; for if gold had continued so, its market price never could exceed, bating the debasemement of the coins, its mint price of *3 17 30^; and if silver had been so, the market price of gold would have been about *$ per ounce, its equivalent in our debased silver coins. Further, if my view of this subject has been cor- rect., it follows, that there exists no just cause why the Bank of England should not resume payments in cash; and that the arguments of Mr. Henry Thornton, and all those who advocated the cause of the Restriction Bill, and its policy, possess no real foundation in truth. The mode of avoiding all danger will appear in the tenth chapter. CHAPTER IX, Objections of Mr. Bosanquet to the principles of the last Chapter anstvered, with remarks on the theory of Mr. Locke. MR. Bosanquet in his Practical Observations on the Report of the Bullion Committee, has objected to the accuracy of the principle stated in the last chapter. He says tf it is the strong hold of the theorists, and I shall not attack it otherwise than by facts." It will., therefore, be necessary to exa- mine the solidity of the facts adduced by Mr. Bo- sanquet against the theory in question. Because the market price of gold from May 1783 to May 1784 exceeded its mint price in the propor- tion of 3 17 10 ; to 3 18, and in 17Q5 in that of j3 1? 104- to ^4 3 and <^4 4, and because the Bank on one occasion paid as much as 4 8 for gold, Mr. Bosanquet infers that the theory in ques- tion cannot be accurately applied to practice. Upon these facts I would remark that in 1783 a period was put to the American war. The stimulus which com- mercial industry and speculation receives from so desirable an event as peace, has a natural tendency to call forth an increased circulation of money ; that this was the case in 1783 cannot be doubted that the Bank in this year had extended her issues to the utmost limits that a prudent consideration for her . 5-5 own safety would admit is certain, from the circum- stance of her having refused to advance money upon the loan of that year.* The excess of the mint price of gold, therefore, during the period here mentioned, must have been caused by a partial excess of Bank paper ; that this was. the opinion of the Directors of the Bank is evident from the precautionary measure they adopted, to avoid a greater excess of paper, and consequently of the mint price of gold. The circumstance of the Bank Directors having stated to Mr. Pitt, in 1795, that gold was ^4 3 and 3?4 4 per ounce, is the second fact brought forward by Mr. Bosanquet to prove the insufficiency of the theory in question. It is somewhat remarkable (as Mr. Ricardo says, page 31, the high price of bullion a proof of the depreciation of Bank notes), " that no price of gold above the mint price is quoted during the whole year (1795) in Wettenhall's list. In December, it is there marked ^3 1 7 6." I do not wish, however, to doubt the truth of the statement made to R^r. Pitt, though I am inclined to think the Bank Directors meant gold in coin rather than gold in bars ; but let us admit the fact as stated by the Directors, and I think it possible to prove to Nfr. Bosanquet, from the extent of the issues of the Bank, that such a rise in the price of gold was likely to be the result of such issues. In 1794, the average amount of Bank notes in circulation was * 10,699.520, but in the first quarter in 1/95 * See Bullion Report, Appendix, p. 92, Johnston's Ed. 56 these were increased e prices. to have been ^4 3, 4, a,nd t a4 8. It is for Mr. B. and the Directors of the Bank to explain " "tLis' 'fontfftdietioto. t Sen; tfce market prices of gold in the Appendix. 59 the fact admitted by the committee; for, if he did, there would be no necessity for his exclaiming with *such apparent delight, " this admission is like the lettjng out of water ; it must have its way, you can- not stop it." The meaning of the fact in question appears to me to be this, that by law no individual is allowed to export his own property, if it should , happen to be in the shape of guineas, or of bars melted from guineas, and rather than run the risk of violating the law, at those periods when it is necessary for him to export bullion, he would be contented to pay 3s. or 4s. per ounce more for such bullion as the law will allow him to export. This premium has hitherto been sufficient to produce abundance of exportable gold ; but whether it is obtained by perjury or not is a difficult question to decide. But this excess of the mint price of gold is not to be attributed to the imperfection of the prin- ciple which regulates its price, both at the mint, and in the market ; it is occasioned by some of the ancient laws of the land, the doubtful policy of which the committee very justly calls in question, and which Mr. Huskisson very justly observes ought to be repealed, were it only to diminish the tempta- tion to perjury. Let these laws be repealed, and every man at liberty to do with his property what he pleases, there would be no difference in price between bar gold and Portugal gold in coin ; for the demand for the latter., which is now caused by the laws against the exportation of English gold, would never be called into existence, for who would pay a pre- mium for Portugal gold, When English gold at its - 6o mint price could be obtained, and could be exported \vithout the risk, and consequent loss, of violating any law. The bullion committee have furnished us with a very valuable example of the truth of the opinion here expressed ; and as it is matter of fact, and not theory, and so justly confirms the truth of the principle in question, I shall lay it before my" readers : " The truth of these observations on the causes * e and limits of the ordinary difference between the " market and mint price of gold, may be illustrated " by a reference to the mode, explained in the evi- " dence, of securing a fixed standard of value for " the great commercial payments of Hamburgh. " The payments in the ordinary transactions in life " are made in a currency composed of the coins of " the several surrounding states ; but silver is the standard there resorted to in the great commercial payments, as gold is in England. No difference analogous to that which occurs in this country, " between the mint and market price of gold, can '* ever arise at Hamburgh with regard to silver, be- " cause provision is made that none of the three fc causes above specified (the expense of coinage, " the depreciation by wear, or the obstruction to " exportation) shall have any operation. The large ''.payments in Hamburgh are effected in Bank " money, which consists of actual silver of a given " fineness, lodged in the Hamburgh Bank by the li merchants of the place, who thereupon have a " proportionate credit in the Bank books, which " they transfer according to their occasions. The cc tl 61 " silver being assayed and weighed with scarcely any " loss of time, the first mentioned cause of fluctua- " tion in the relative value of the current medium " compared with bullion is avoided. Certain masses " of it being then certified (without any stamp being n what it ought to contain. If the rate of exchange exceed the expenses of transmitting gold from one country to another, with a currency consisting of gold and silver and paper, the latter convertible into the former, it must ne- cessarily be temporary, and will always effect its own remedy. I have endeavoured to establish, that the market price of gold cannot exceed its mint price, with a currency consisting of gold and silver only ; unless 76 the coins be debased by a deficiency in weight, in which case the excess of the market above the mint price of gold will indicate the exact degree of de- basement. With a currency consisting of gold and silver and paper, the latter convertible into the former at the pleasure of the holders, the market price of gold may exceed its mint price; but this excess is neces- sarily temporary, and always effects its own remedy. With a currency consisting of gold and silver and paper, the latter not convertible into the former, the market price of gold may rise above its mint price to an indefinite extent, and may become per- manent, which altogether depends on the discretion of the Bank, in the issues of her notes. The price of gold being rated in her notes will have a price according to their quantity in circulation; in this case, the excess of the market above the mint price of gold, is the amount of the depreciation on Bank notes. With a currency consisting of gold and silver and paper, the latter not convertible into the former, the rate of exchange may exceed the expense of transmitting the precious metals from one country to another ; the excess may become permanent, and it may rise to an indefinite extent, depending alto- gether on the amount of paper in circulation ; an evil for which the country can have no effectual and permanent remedy, but fn the obligation of the issuers of those notes, to pay them in gold or silver on demand. Whatever the rate of exchange ex- ceeds the expense of transmitting the precious 77 metals must necessarily be the amount of the de- preciation of Bank notes, together with the debase- ment in the currency, as the rate of exchange cannot exceed the expense of transmitting gold from one country to another, but in consequence of a debased or a depreciated currency. CHAPTER XIII. Observations on the principle on which the coins constituting the principal measure of pro- perty are fabricated on the propriety of establishing but one standard of money, and on the principles of seignorage. THE principle by which our gold coins have been fabricated during the greater part of a century having been fully explained in a preceding Chapter, it will be only necessary here to recapitulate. It appears that gold coins are now the exclusive standard mea- sure of property in this country, and that the price of gold, as fixed at the mint, is invariable ; that while every a3 17 10^- of our gold coins contain an ounce of standard gold, they will at all' times com- mand an ounce of gold bullion in the market. It must appear evident, however, that any imperfection in these coins should be carefully avoided, as the debasement will raise the price of gold in the market in proportion to its extent ; the new and heavy coins that may be issued from the mint, will be exchanged for the light and debased ones, and will be melted and sold for the profit attending the high market price. This practice must subject the country to a heavy loss in replacing the coins thus melted, and 79 which in their turn are likely to undergo the same fate. The reader is referred to the Tables of the prices of gold, in the Appendix, from 1760 to 1773, to show more particularly the effects produced by allowing the gold coins, which then, as well as now, were the principal measure of property, to become debased. Upwards of seven hundred thousand pounds on the average of every year during this period were issued from the mint. There was, however, no curing the evil but by a general recoinage of the light and debased coins, which reduced the price of gold to nearly a half per cent, below its mint price. The judicious regulations of the late Lord Liver- pool, announced in his Majesty's proclamations, that the gold coins should pass by weight as well as by tale ; and that the guinea should not be a legal ten- der, when it weighed less than five dwts. and eight grains, the half and third of the guinea in the like proportion, but should be returned to the mint to be recoined, were well calculated to maintain our gold currency in that state of perfection to which it was brought by the general recoinage. It is pro- bable, that if the Restriction Bill had not deranged our monetary system, we should have still possessed a currency in a state of perfection which few or no nations have ever enjoyed, and from which many and great advantages would always result to the country at larp;e. If it is considered, that the rate of exchange for or against a country, in a great measure depends on the perfection of the coins con- stituting the principal measure of property, this will further enforce the propriety and necessity of watch- 80 ing over the perfection of this standard of value, being a result in which the commercial community is so much interested. Among the objects which require the attention, vigilance, and study of the Legislature, the state of the money is not one of the least considerable. The aim of government should be to obtain what is re- quired in the shape of taxes with the least possible oppression to the subject, and this it carinot do, if it fetters his industry by imperfect systems of cur- rency, of which the country at large have com- plained as often as they have existed. If this country have the good fortune to see the Restriction Bill repealed, the proclamations of his Majesty should again be put in full force in support of the perfection of our gold currency for which so much money has been expended. When this desirable object is attained, it might be proper to establish an office in his Majesty's mint, for giving facility to the exchange of the coins be- come deficient in weight from wear, as stated in the proclamation; the government to determine at whose expense the exchange shall be made. An office of this nature anciently existed in the mint,, and the person who held it was called the King's exchanger. The following account of this office is given by Lord Liverpool : tc This officer appears not only to cc have exchanged the coins of one metal made at " the royal mint, for those made of another ; but as " the exportation of the coins of .the realm was " prohibited, he furnished persons going out of the " kingdom with foreign coins, in exchange for En- 4 81 cc glish coins ; and he furnished merchants, strangers, " coming into the kingidom, with the English coins, " in exchange for foreign coins : this officer had his " deputies in many of the out-ports and principal cc cities of the kingdom : a considerable profit was " made by this practice, of which the king is said * s to have had his share. When gold coins were fc exchanged for silver coins, a silver penny of that " time was taken for the exchange of each gold appears evident from its average price not exceeding 5s. 3^-d. during that period.* To guard, therefore, against all hazard of melt- ing the coin, the seignorage ought to be ten per cent, above the average price in question; were it less, past experience shows the possibility of a case existing, in which a profit would be made by melting the coin. It is not sufficient protection, as was proposed by Lord Liverpool, to make the seignorage equal only to the expense of coinage, which might be about 2i per cent. Besides, the additional 7-r per cent, would supply a fund to meet the deterioration of the coin, It is a matter of difficulty to fix what quantity of silver currency is requisite for the wants of the country. At present, it is supposed, there are only three millions in circulation; but this is evidently quite inadequate, as appears from the quantity of * From the alteration that appears to have taken place in the relative value of gold to silver in the market of Europe, the price of silver, in this country, should fall to about 5s. per ounce j in reality it is so, but is prevented from being manifest in the market by the depreciation now existing in our Bank paper j the price of silver, like that of gold, being rated in tkis depreciated paper, 92 shilling, half-crown, and crown Bank notes, which from time to time have been in circulation, and the otherwise general complaint of scarcity of silver coins. The amount issued at the recoinage in King Wil- liam's time is, perhaps, not a proper criterion to judge by. The situation of the country has con- siderably altered; our population and trade have greatly increased; but as all great payments have been made in gold, or in Bank notes, the quantity of silver currency wanted, it being so for the subor- dinate office of change solely, may upon the whole be less now than formerly. Without naming any specific sum, as an adequate supply for the wants of Great Britain and Ireland, on the plan about to be proposed, we may assume, as the supposed demand, a currency of five millions, supposing that less would not be a sufficient supply.* If we suppose then, that a recoinage of silver is to take place; that silver in place of the mint price of 5s. 2d. per oz. shall be rated at 5s. 3^-d. the * As an excess of silver currency would be attended with great inconvenience, and loss of capital to those in whose hands the superabundance might become fixed, it is necessary to remark, that by the plan here proposed, this excess could not in any great degree take place. As all demands would be made at the mint, no more would be issued than demanded. But to prevent the possibility of any such inconvenience, let it be en- acted, among the regulations of the Exchanger's Office, that every individual shall have the privilege of exchanging his silver coins for gold; and if gold is declared by law to be the stand- ard of our money, this convenience ought to be afforded to the public. 93 average price of the 24 years before-mentioned, or at the rate of 5s. 4d.* to avoid the inconvenience of fractions; and that a seignorage of 10 per cent, is to be imposed, the plan in contemplation would be, with a currency of five millions, that there should be coined at the mint half a million yearly, for ten successive years. The following table will show the operation of the seignorage during that period. * The alteration which has taken place in the relative value of gold to silver, already mentioned) may render it necessary to fix a mint price for silver somewhat lower than that stated above. A Table of Seignorage upon Coinage of Silver, at 10 per Cent. Amoun paid fo coining million per cent Amount of seigno rage on ^500,00 at 10 per cent Amoun of surplus on each yearly coinage Amount of collective interest on each yearly surplus. Total. First Year Deduct for coinage 2- Second Year Deduct for coinage Third Year Deduct for coinage Fourth Year Deduct for coinage Fifth Year Deduct for coinage Sixth Year Deduct for coinage Seventh Year Deduct for coinage Eighth Year Deduct for coinage Ninth Year Deduct for coinage Tenth Year Deduct for coinage 12,50 12,50 12,500 12.500 12,500 12,500 12,500 50,00 12,50 37,50 37,50 37,50 37,50 37,50( 37,500 37,500 37,500 37,500 37,500 1,875 3,843.75 5,919.93 8,081.48 0,360.55 2,753.58 5,266.56 7,904.32 0,674.55 37,500 39,375 41,343.75 43,410.93 45,581.48 47,860.55 50,253.58 52,766.36 55,404.32 58,174.55 50,00 12,500 50,000 12,500 50,001 12,500 50,000 12,500 50,000 12,500 50,000 12,500 12,500 50,000 12,500 12,500 50,000 12,500 12,500 50,000 12,500 25,000 75,000. 5,670.52 71,670.52 * 2^ per cent, is assumed as the expense of coinage, not with any reference to what the real charge may be, but from its render- ing the calculation more distinct. 95 At the end of ten years, that is to say, when the lOth half million has been one year in circulation, the clear amount of the seignorage fund would be 471,670. According to experiments made at the mint on the wear of our silver currency (as quoted by Lord Liverpool), it was found that the silver coins of King William's reign had lost about 25 per cent, in a century, which is at the rate of 24- per cent, every ten years. A silver currency already debased 1 per cent, by a seignorage, should be suffered to receive as little debasement from wear as possible. It may therefore be proper to recall it from circulation when it may have undergone a debasement of 2-- percent., as no law contributes more to the security of the public against base money, than the newness and uniformity of the coins. According, therefore, to our plan, supposing for example that the first issue of half a million took place in 1810, each coin bearing that date, another in 1811, another in 1812, &c. 8cc. until the whole ten half millions were issued, when the half million, first issued, has been in circulation ten years, it is recalled by proclamation, and exchanged for an equal quantity of new coin, bearing date 1820, every annual issue bearing the date of the year in which it was coined. The issi *, and recall pre-supposes an eleventh half million owned, to be exchanged for the half million just recalled. The expenses attending this recall and issue would be loss by wear on the half million recalled, at 24- per cent. 12,500 Cost of coining the new half mil- lion in exchange, at 2-i. per cent. . , 12,500 Together 25,OOO This expense to be defrayed as follows : A year's interest on the seignorage fund, say 23,750 Part of the half million in circulation may have been lost, and of course not being presented for exchange, there will be no occasion to make good the loss by wear on that part. Suppose it to be a twentieth, or ^25,000, the sum saved on this, at 2i per cent, would be 6'25 Expense of re-coinage saved on that amount at 24- per cent, < 625 Together 25,000 Not less than a- half a million would be issued of the new coins, but that 25,OOO of this new half million not being wanted for the purpose of replace- ment, the expense of its coinage does not apply to this account. It is proposed, that the deficiency on the half million recalled should be replaced by the importers 97 of bullion, and should also bear a seignorage of 10 per cent. Next year, the second half million issued might be replaced in the same manner, and the yearly routine of recalling half a million of coin ten years old,, and re-issuing another half million of new coin, might go on, ad infinitum, without calling on the public revenue for a shilling towards defraying the expense. The eleventh half million necessary to complete this plan, would have a clear surplus of 37,500, it bearing also a seignorage of 1O per cent. The interest on this sum added to the seignorage on the annual supplies, which are estimated at ^25,OOO, will constitute a fund of .4,375 per annum, which may be applied to defray part of the expenses of the mint establishment. The seignorage fund would probably be invested in the funds, under the management of public com- missioners appointed by Government. The principal advantages resulting from the adop- tion of such a plan would be : 1. The great public saving on the score of coinage. 2. The abundant stock of silver currency in a state which would be very difficult to counterfeit. 3. Steadiness in the price of silver bullion, as, instead of the present uncertainty of demand for coin, the quantity wanted would be defined, and after the first ten years would probably be insig- nificant, perhaps from 15,000 to .=50,000 per annum. 08 4. Regularity in the employment of the officer* and workmen at the mint. Hitherto their employ- ment has consisted of great temporary exertions, with long intervals of inactivity. During these in- tervals, their time and attention have been directed to other occupations. Such alternations are evi- dently unfavourable to the proper management of the establishment. How much more expensive would a large manufacture be if conducted in this manner, than by that even course which adapts sup- ply to demand. Let us now proceed to anticipate some of th* objections that are likely to be made to this plan. It may be urged that, were the old coins to re- main partially in circulation after the issue of the new, frauds might be practised by filing down the new coins to the reduced state of the old, and that if it be determined to recall the whole of the old coins at once, the half million or million proposed to be issued in the first instance, Would be a very inadequate substitute. The better plan might be to ascertain, if possible, the present amount of silver coin in circulation, to get ready a correspondent quantity of new coin, to make arrangements for the issue of the new at the same time in different parts of the empire, to prohibit the circulation of the old by proclamation, and to enjoin its speedy transmis- sion to the mint for the purpose of exchange. This plan it would be advisable to follow, although the first year's issue might in consequence be much above a million. It may be objected also, that the amount of the 99 seignorage would give encouragement to counter-* felting. It is important to remark^ that there are two classes of counterfeiters. One class prepares blanks of copper, or of some other inferior metal, which they face or case with silver or gold leaf of considerable thickness, and afterwards stamp. The other fabricate coin in the way practised at the mint, but with inferior metal. Guineas have been coun- terfeited in this manner, and are in intrinsic value about If s. 6d. They are nearly of the weight of the standard guinea, and afford a profit of about 16 per cent. The former class would not be benefited by the imposition of a seignorage: the second would certainly have a considerable advantage by it. How- ever, if guineas chiefly have been forged by this class, the objection does not apply so much to this argument, which regards silver. To answer all such objections, it is perhaps sufficient to observe, that the law should be made more explicit and effectual, it being impossible to stop such frauds, under any system of coinage, so long as the law continues in its present vague and inoperative state. It may be objected, that a currency, on which a seignorage has been taken, may fall in value below the denomination at which it was issued. The answer is plain; no such depreciation has taken place in consequence of the seignorage of foreign coun- tries, nor has any taken place in our own, although our silver currency has been degraded about 25 per cent, for half a century. Finally, it may be objected that it would be diffi- H 2 100 cult to recall the whole of the annual issue from circulation, and that part will remain out through the ignorance or inattention of the holders. The plan would be to give in the first place every facility to the exchange of new coin for old, appointing agents in every considerable town for that purpose, proclaiming a limited time, perhaps a month, for the completion of the proposed exchange, after which time it should cease to be current, and be receivable only on the part of the mint at its intrinsic value. The negligence of the holders would thus be punished with a fine of 121 per cent., namely 10 per cent, seignorage, and 2 per cent. wear. The agents for the exchange might be the country Bankers, and their number, as well as the length of time allowed, would admit of each piece being weighed at the time of exchange, which would be a great security, counterfeits being considerably lighter than the law- ful coin. As to the expense of this agency, it would be small, and it may be fairly looked on as provided for by the above-mentioned bonus of 12-1- per cent, on the part omitted to be sent within the time. 101 APPENDIX. J. HE following Tables contain the market prices of standard gold and silver, showing their relative proportions to each other ; with the par and course of exchange, showing the per centage in favour and against London ; also the per centage above and below the mint price of gold, from the 1st day of January 1760 to the 1st day of March 1811, both days in- clusive ; also a quarterly account of Bank of England notes in circulation since 1?90, taken from the accounts laid before the committee of secrecy, and from the annual statements laid before the House of Commons. N. B. The notes under five pounds are included. The prices of gold and silver, and the courses of exchange, have been extracted from Lloyd's lists. The first number, pub- lished every two months, has been selected and continued throughout the whole of the Tables. In the calculations in these Tables, gold has been made choice of as being the principal measure of property, agree- ably to the principles laid down in the foregoing Enquiry. They concur in proving, that a debased currency has the effect of raising the price of gold above its mint price they also concur in a remarkable manner in proving the invariability of the mint price of gold, to which important fact the reader's attention is requested ; it is also particularly requested to the effect which the operation of the Bank Restriction Bill has had on the price of gold, and to the actual amount of discount now existing on Bank notes in consequence. In the first edition of this work I stated the par of exchange with Hamburgh at 33 schillings and 8 grotes, and at that considered it as a fixed par ; from the best information which 102 I have been able to obtain upon 'Change since, 34 11 J arc considered as the par, and in the present edition I have stated it as such, I have also corrected the mistake of considering the par to be fixed ; because gold being the standard of the money of England, and silver in Hamburgh, there can be no fixed par between those two countries, it will be subject to all the variations which take place in the relative value of gold and silver. For example, if 34 schillings, 1 1 grotes and a J, of Hamburgh currency be equal in value to a pound sterling, or ^ of a guinea, when silver is 5s. 2d. per oz. they can no longer be so when silver falls to 5s. Id, or 5s. per oz. because a pound sterling in gold being then worth more silver is also worth more Hamburgh currency. To find the real par, therefore, we must ascertain what was the relative value of gold and silver when the par was fixed at 34 11J, and what is the relative value at the time we wish to calculate it, For example, if the price of standard gold was ^3 1? 10| per oz. and silver 5s. 2d. an ounce of gold would then be worth 15.07 ounces of silver, being the mint proportions, 20 of our standard shillings would then contain as much pure silver as 34 schillings, 1 1 grotes and a J j but if the ounce of gold was 3 17 10J and silver 5s. (which it was on the 2d January, 1798) the ounce of gold would then be worth 15.57 ounces of silver. If ^1 sterling in gold at par, therefore, be worth 15.07 times its weight in silver, then at 15.57 it would be at 3 per cent, premium, and 3 per cent, premium on 34 11J is 1 schilling, 1 grot and T \, so that the par when gold is to silver as 15.57 to 1 will be 36 schillings, 1 grot and T V The above calculation will be more easily made by stating as follows-: As 15,07 : 34. 11 J :: 15.5? : 36. 1 T V These Tables satisfactorily prove, that the rate of exchange cannot exceed the expense of transmitting the precious metals 103 from one country to another. From 1777 to 17^7> the period in which we possessed a perfect currency, the yearly average rate of exchange with Hamburgh never exceeded 5 per cent, on either side of the water.* A comparison of the rates of exchange, from 1760 to 1777 and from 1777 to 1797 S will prove the truth of the principle, that a debased currency has the effect of causing an unfavour- able exchange. The reader is requested to pay particular attention to the state of the exchange with Paris during the years 1?92 and 3, when from a depreciated currency, caused by an excessive issue of assignats, the exchange was upwards of 85 per cent, in favour of London, even at that early period of the depre- ciation of French paper. See Appendix, No. 2. Appendix, No. 3, contains a monthly account of the state of the exchange with Paris, from the 3d day of January* 1809, to the 2d day of April, 1811. A comparison of the rates of exchange with Hamburgh since the Bank Restriction Bill, with the rates of an equal number of years previous to that period, will sufficiently prove, that our currency is depreciated, that its influence on the rates of exchange accords with the principles laid dowfl in the foregoing Inquiry. The present state of the exchange with Hamburgh and Paris, and the market price of gold, are without precedent in these Tables, and can be accounted for upon no other principle than that of a depreciated circulating medium. * I cannot help expressing my surprise, that Mr. Bosanquet should not have seen the second edition of this pamphlet, which was published at least six months before his Practical Observations, &c. j in the corrected table of which, calculated upon the principle stated above, he would have found an explanation of those inaccuracies which he has pointed out as having appeared in the first edition respecting the exchauge with Hamburgh and Paris. For a further and more particular explanation of these points, I must 'refer the reader to the very ingenious and masterly reply of M. Ricardo to Mr. Bosanquet's Observations, &c., a work in the highest degree worthy of the attention of every one disposed to be well informed upon this interesting subject. 104 Ill IK 11 Per centage below the mfn price ef gold. 482 fi. rt j S S = g|i ^ g a 2 _v*:o" r$iijti <* 'S 42 v g -c o ce .2 jf o S -I T O ifl - ^ S a S oJ -,' co' -4 co' W r' co* co" o* o* -" ' o *5 106 Per centre Kelow the min price of pold. o oooo o o c <=? Per a-uta ove tlie min rice of gold. OOOO 107 ll? if -o il o *& ga- 5 s * n "* w o i ?e OJ os 0*3 a '- fj o os ifl x * * ' 30 OS O OJ 5 o t iO T CO rp rt 10 iO tfi c- 00 O t- O t- CT> QO O ^ -^ CO ooo o w> N - .112 t t-t-t t- t t t t COCOCO800OCOCOOOCOCOCOOOCOCOCOOOCOCOCOCOCOCOCO3OOOCOSO8OCO3O OOCOS V < T T < COrt (OOO^ICO" 1 ^ < O^CO'~'5O'-' iCOi-^QM 108 Per ceut elow the price of tl HOJMOJHM^NHC*^HHt01^H01'^^^ Gi C?) O Oi Gi G5 Gi Gi O O O Gi O Ct O Gi CO CO CO CO Per centage above the min price of gold. O) OJ 04 <** 0* 0? CO CO CO CO CO CO O O O O O O against London. Si* I , 00 -i CO O* O CO -* O) -< O? CO W N CO' QO* CO rj< -t GQ ^' C - O - O O -< O i-ft 2 ^ i TJJ 01 00 t-; Cj^OT fc^ CO OT ft O> O >0. t O Q 0. *J 5 t-^ O i-<* O C35 -* "* >fj Oi O O rt* CO -<" O O5 -<' O -* t^ CO -<" ^* 0* 0< 8* CO 111 .. ^ X . -. ................ ..-.-.. ^ <* -^ * * rf^< 00 0*5 00 W5 WOT 00 00 0*5 00 (JO 00 50 OD 0*5 <* ^ ___ rs=s ^ ' Hi SJ '^^ Vw' '-^^ W '^ ^ *^ 1 ^-^' '^ ^ ^V ^^ ^^ S^ ^*^ W _ S^ N^ SW =1 ^i> g'l ^U> si ^g.S si ^S," IS 109 110 oooooooooo * QOO5'rr < 0^*OCN' iC^i!?S a I > """~ * ~ ~ , *T ~ > *^ ^. "IN i> ""I ^ ^ ^l. ^. ''V J O5 *- C5 t- m ^ "# -N ift O ^| OJ 1^; Tji tfj O p-t O t-_ OJ ; t- ifl O 00 O -j ' ' ' m _ ^' co -t si c-j < -* in in oi M oi 5*3 0*5 o o* o o od ' o^ o o* c^' rr o>< O C5 OS iO C5 C> U5 10 05 ^ !N 0* 00 -t O) 00 * Oi OS O> CO CO CO 05 CO CO 05 o *n c- : o "* t- - -T! o t- ^ co f c> co o o o^ o> or c*j Ill r >O O T 1 < I I I I g I I <<->oco5O i -o 2 Z C-t-t-t- t- t- t- t- oooo ooooo oooooo Per tape bove the mint price of gold. a p Per centage against London. 00 Q Ot W Per ceutage in favour of London. t-' vi > >>'>_ vi >%>*;> u >>> ' 112 Amount of of England in circula Per centage of discount o Bank notes. "o .3 <* w . M o I 3 --a g 5 2 2fe?S s - s - -^HCO oo - p-i ao-Ht-coa>ci-s 3l^ .si I c s* TJ 3 O "o cr 1 a> nl 1^- = cl ^ C bO 8 2 is 11?. > Jji ^'su ^5^ Hi !i! r. a |l 1^1 s|l Jlf si ilf *, Ji nil o. 8 = 3 l|- = ?||5 liP !*? *JI! 113 8 $ " CO t- 1 1 1 1 g I .3 g w 00"* 00 80 CO 00 CO O* 01 Q) 0* 00 00 30 t- co ** a o ^* * I O . 00 5e* 8 Q^o 6 o to -* C X O - .HI . H I? !I Hi oooo o oooo oooooo ooooocooo s! T3 C* ^ a I^ Q ^^-M. 2 O A O ~ all O rr oz. per oz. other. Pan*.* at sight. London. 1792 Jan. 3 17 6 054 4.53 to 1 284 194 31 Feb. 3 3 17 6 054 4.53 284 39'.f March 2 April 3 3 17 6 3 17 6 054* 055 14.41 14.3 28 274 154 17.* May 1 3 17 6 5 5 14.25 27.* 17.* 36io June 1 3 17 6 056 14.09 274 17.* 35.A July 3 3 17 6 056 *4.09 274 18 34. August 3 3 17 6 055 14.3 274 174 37.-$ Sept. 4 3 17 6 055 14.3 274 194 M Oct. 2 3 17 6 055 14.3 274 184 Nov. 2 3 17 6 000 194 Dec. 4 3 17 6 054* 14.36 1 274 28. - 51 1793 Jan. 1 3 17 6 5 4| 14.36 1 274 17' 38. A Feb. 1 3 17 6 055 14.3 1 274 144 46.-A March 1 3 17 6 052* 14.88 1 28.* 15 47*. T * April 2 3 17 6 5 2J 14.88 1 28.* 12 57.1% May 3 3 17 6 052* 14.88 1 28.* June l 3 17 6 oil] 15.12 1 29-iA July 2 3 17 6 5 1 15.24 1 29.* 9 69-Yo August 2 3 17 6 5 1 15.24 1 29.* 44 85,-j Sept. 3 3 17 6 051* 15.12 1 74 73.j^ Oct. 1 3 17 6 5 l] 15.12 1 ^o,-ir& 9 69.4 Nov. 1 3 17 6 5 \i 15.12 1 Intercourse with France Dec. 3 3 17 6 000 ceased at this period. The par of exchange between London and Paris has been fixed &t . See Lord King on the Restriction Bill, p. 150, 2d edition. 115 f APPENDIX. No. III. A Monthly Account of the market prices of standard gold and silver, their relative proportions to each other, with the par, course, and rates of exchange between London and Paris, from the 3d day of January 1809, to the 5th day of April 1811, both included : extracted from Lloyd's Lists. Par Coiirjt ot P*r Per Price of Price of rheirrelative of exchange cent age centage itaiidard gold per oi. siaiulnnl Silver per oz- proportion to each oilier. exchange with vmbParit one day'* in favour of attaint* London. Paris. date. London. __ _____ 1809 Jan. 3 000 5 7i 22. 4 Feb. 3 000 000 22. 4 March 3 April 4 4 10, 4 11\ 5 5 5 7J 16.49 to 1 16.18 1 26. 5 35.15 20.19 20.19 20. 18- /o May 2 4'11 056* 16.42 1 26. 3 20.19 19.il June 2 4 10 '0 5 ll 16. 1 25. 9 20. 21. T July 4 4 12 JOJiO 5 8* 16.27 1 25.18 20. .fr August 1 000 5 9 20. 1810 Sept. 5 4 9 10 5 &| 15.74 1 25. 1 20. 20. Oct. 3 000 000 20. Nov. 3 000 5 9 19. 6 Dec. 1 000 000 19.16 Jan. 2 000 5 7 19.16 Feb. 13 4 12 10& 5 8 16.27 1 25.18 19.10 24. ,V March 6 4 11 101 059 15.97 1 25. 9 19.16 22- ft April 3 000 000 21.16 May 1 000 5 9 21.11 June 1 4110 5 10 15.42 1 24.11 21.16 "A July 3 000 000 21. 1 August 3 000 000 21. 1 Sept. 4 000 000 21. O-.-t. 2 4 13 10 5 11 15.86 1 25. 5 21. 8 15. Nov. 2 000 000 20. 6 Dec. 7 000 000 20. 2 1811 Jan. 1 000 000 19. 8 Feb. 1 4 11 5 11 15.13 1 24. 2 17.16 26. ft March 1 4 13 6 000 17.16 April 5 5 100 6 2 16.52 26. 6 17. 6 34. A In the above calculations I have considered the par between London and Paris to be 24 livres to the pound sterling, which I am informed is the reputed par on the London exchange. It appears by the table of the intrinsic par of exchange presented by Dr. Kelly to the Bullion Committee, that the real par in Paris new coins by assay is 25 liv. 4 s. 5 den. or 24 fr. 91 cent?. I 2 APPENDIX. No. IV. A Reply to Mr. Grenfetfs Examination of the Tables of Exchange annexed to the fast Edition of this Work. MR. GRBNFBLL, in a Postscript to his Defence of Bank Notes, has given an examination of the Tables of Exchange annexed to the first edition of this work, by which he has endeavoured to prove, that Bank notes are not depreciated \ because since 17$7> ^ e P oun( ^ sterling in England has exchanged for more than 33 shillings, 8 grotes, that being stated as the par between the two countries. If Mr. G. had put himself to the trouble to have made the same experiment on the thirteen years immediately preceding the Restriction Bill, that he has made on thoee that followed, that never- to-be-forgotten era, he would have found, that in the former period the pound sterling in England had really exchanged for 34s. lOjgr. ; so that according to Mr. Grenfell's own principle, the currency of this country must have undergone a depreciation of 10| grotes since that time, or about 2J per cent., because an equal quantity of it has not exchanged for a like quantity of Hamburgh currency. As the principle which Mr. G. has assumed may have a tendency to mislead those who are interested in the Defence of Bank Notes, it will be necessary to expose the fallacy n; and absurdity of it. In the commencement of the seventh chapter of the first edition of this work, I have stated that, " the currency of a country is said to be depreciated when a given quantity of it will no longer exchange for a like quantity of that of another country ; for example, if the cir- culating medium of England was reduced in value ^Jth below its standard, and recognized level, while that of Ham*- burgh remained stationary, the pound sterling of England would not exchange for 33s. 8gr. but for ^th less." The meaning of this passage, although it appeared to me suf- ficiently perspicuous, is not understood by Mr. Grenfell, and his misunderstanding has led him to conclude that, " the currency of this country has not been depreciated, because an equal quantity of it has actually been exchanged for rather more than an equal quantity of the currency of another country." It is necessary, on this account, to explain the passage just cited. If the guineas of England, which are admitted to be the standard of our currency, were diminished one tenth by clipping, it must appear obvious, that a merchant in Ham- burgh purchasing a bill upon London, would not give 33s. 8gr. for the gold contained in the pound sterling so dimi- nished; he would give a number of schillings and grotes which would be equal in value to the gold contained in the pound sterling. It will also follow, that if the currency of England, being paper, is reduced in value T ^th by an in- crease in its quantity, a merchant in Hamburgh will not give 3Ss. 8gr. for the pound sterling, because the pound sterling in the English, or in the Hamburgh market, will not purchase a quantity of silver equal in value to the silver contained in 33s. 8gr.; if it purchase ^th less, then the Hamburgh merchant will only give about 30s. 4gr. for the pound sterling. It is in this manner that a comparison of the 118 intrinsic values of the respective currencies of two countries will determine the par between them. Had Mr. Grehfell sufficiently weighed this fundamental principle, I believe he would have paused a little longer before he drew his conclusion that " Bank Notes are not depreciated." But, for the sake of argument, let Mr. G's assumption be admitted, let 33s. 8gr. be taken as the fixed par between London and Hamburgh, that is to say, let the pure silver in 33s. 8gr. be regarded as equal to the pure silver contained in twenty of our standard shillings ; these proportions being fixed, any derangement of them, accord- ing to Mr. G's principle, must be a depreciation of currency; for example, if the pound sterling has exchanged for 34 schillings, on the average of thirteen years, the currency of England has, during that period, been at a premium of 1 per cent, while that of Hamburgh has been depreciated to that amount. Mr. G's principle proves the very converse of what he wishes and what he pleads for. If the currency of Hamburgh was depreciated when 34 schillings were given for our pound sterling, our pound sterling must be depre- ciated at present, because Hamburgh will not give more than 28s. 6gr. or 29 schillings for it, constituting an unfavor- able exchange, or a depreciation on our currency of about 20 per cent. It would have been unnecessary to have added more on this subject, but Mr. Grenfell has strayed so very wide of the principle on which the doctrine of favorable or unfavor- able exchange depends, that it may be necessary to explain it to him, to show him more clearly the absurdity of the prin- ciple which he has advanced. No exchange .in strictness can exist between two countries while the exports from the one balance the imports from the other. For example, if the exports from England to Ham- burgh were to the same amount as the imports from that country to this, the exchange would be at par ; bills upon London sold on the Hamburgh exchange would be at par, as would bills on Hamburgh sold on the London exchange. But if the exports of England to Hamburgh amounted to *l 00,000, while the imports from Hamburgh were only i90,000, a balance of debt would be created between the two countries. As more bills in consequence would be drawn in London upon Hamburgh, than in Hamburgh upon London by a 10,000, the bills in London would be natu- rally at a premium ; the merchants in Hamburgh having this debt to pay in London, and being inclined to give a premium upon London bills for the purpose of discharging it. Thus it appears, that it is the scarcity of London bills, and the competition among the Hamburgh merchants to discharge each his debt at the cheapest rate that causes bills on London to sell at a premium. The amount of this premium is the extent of the unfavorable exchange to Hamburgh, and the favorable exchange to London. When all the bills, how- ever, which were drawn in Hamburgh upon London are sold, Hamburgh is still indebted to London 10,000 ; she has no mode of discharging thi* debt but by a direct remit- tance of that sum in gold or silver. The profit of the bullion- merchant, and the expense of freight and insurance are the necessary and unavoidable charges attending the transporta- tion of this metal. But it would be absurd to say, as in the first instance, that because a Hamburgh merchant could pay Jiis debt by giving one or two per cent, premium for a bill on London, or four per cent, for sending gold or silver to pay it, that the currency of Hamburgh was depreciated. It might with equal propriety be affirmed, that a bill remitted by a merchant in Edinburgh to his correspondent in London, was depreciated to the amount of the postage ; and with equal justice, it may be said that the signature of a member of the House of Commons could prevent the Edinburgh merchant'* bill from being depreciated. 120 i According to the principle which I have just explained, our unusual amount of imports from the Baltic during the last year, can have no greater effect upon the rates of exchange with Hamburgh, through which our principal payments to the northern states are made, than the expense of sending the precious metals there ; and as Mr. Eliason stated the charge of sending gold to Hamburgh to be ^3 12 lid. per cent, in 1797, it certainly cannot now cost upwards of ^20, the average of the exchange with Hamburgh against London, during the year 1809. 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LETTERS SER1O-COMICAL AND IRONICAL, ON EDUCA- TION* from CAM ELEON, an experienced Schoolmaster, t* his Brother. " Ridentem dicere Terum " Quid yetat ?" In one Volume, small Svo. Price 6s. THE DEPRECIATION jsi* THE PAPER CURRENCY OF GREAT BRITAIN PROVED.. BY THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE. JLoriBon: PfclNTED FOR LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, AND BROWN, PATER- NOSTER-ROW; J. BUDD, PALL-MALL; AND CONSTABLE AND CO. EDINBURGff. J. M'CREERY, Printer, Black-Horse-Court, Fleet-Street, London. ADVERTISEMENT. IN this publication, the author has carefully avoid- ed all discussion of the fittest means of redressing the grievance, the existence of which he has en- deavoured to prove. For, in his opinion, it would be a ridiculous waste of time and of labour, to explain the nature of the remedies most likely to be efficacious, to a people who are at present so much misled by the folly, or deceived by the arts, of those to whom the government of the country is intrusted, as generally ^ to regard the symptoms of their disorder as conclu- sive evidence of the vigorous state of their health. But, whenever the public have recovered from this delusion, and appear to be impressed with a just sense of the perilous state in which they are placed, his efforts will not be wanting in endea- vouring to suggest the mildest, and the most ADVERTISEMENT. certain means of restoring our circulation to its former salutary state, the benefits of which have been so long and so invariably experienced in this commercial country. In the mean time, he must say, that he neither thinks this fortunate change will follow as a matter of course, from our enjoying the blessings of Peace; nor does he believe that it can be effected by the unaided efforts of the Directors of the Bank of England. He conceives the interposition of parliament, in a variety of ways, to be necessary -, and the great question must be, how an effectual interposition for removing the evil, can be directed in the man- ner best calculated to prevent a violent shock, from the too sudden sensation of those latent, but daily increasing calamities, which, if not arrested in their progress, must terminate in that convulsive change of property, and consequently of power, that has justly been denominated the ruin of a country. THE DEPRECIATION OF OUR PAPER CURRENCY PROVED, &c." IT has been universally admitted, throughout all the numerous publications, to which the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, appointed to inquire into the high price of gold bullion has given rise, that for a length of time a difference of value has existed betwixt coin or gold and the Notes of the Bank of England, amounting to fifteen or sixteen percent, and more recently, in the opinion of many, exceeding twenty per cent. Attempts have, indeed, been made to establish a distinction betwixt coin and gold, and to assert that this difference in value is only in reference* to gold in bullion, whilst Bank Notes remain in every respect equivalent to the coin of the realm ; but this opinion cannot be maintained, for the real value of coin depends, not on a piece of gold being called a guinea, or a piece of silver a shilling, but on the quantity of pure gold or silver it contains ; B and we know by experience, that the price of bul- lion, and the state of exchange with foreign coun- tries, both before and after the re-coinage in 1772, concurred in shewing that our coin passed for its value by weight, without reference to its value in tale. At all events, such a distinction is unauthorized under the law, as it now stands, because the guineas issued from the mint are, by statute, deprived of the character of coin, if reduced in weight one grain and thirty eighty-nine parts of a grain ; and since the recent trial of De Yonge it must appear per- fectly nugatory, for, on that occasion, notes were proved to bear to coin the same proportion in value they did to gold, whilst it was decided, that the advantage derived from the sale of coin for a higher denominative value in notes, was no illegal benefit.* * Lord Castlereagh, following the opinion of many others who have written on the subject, has stated, p. 13 in his Speech on the Report of the Bullion Committee, that " there is no just '* ground to consider the note as depreciated ; both the note and " the coin were intended for internal circulation, and for internal " circulation alone : the contingent but illegal profit derived from " diverting the coin from its legitimate purpose, is a species of " value, which the Bank Paper never was, in equity or in fact, " intended to represent. It is only, through the operation of " causes destructive of the established system of our standard " coinage, that this advantage can attach to coin over Bank " Paper. To derive such an illicit benefit is an abuse ; and so " far as it may operate at this moment to occasion a disparity of " value between coin and notes, the difference is very incorrect- "ly Indeed it is surprising that (before the Act of last session) the legality of selling Bank Notes for coin should have been seriously questioned in a court of law ; for in the reign of William III. Bank Notes publicly circulated at a discount as against coin, and though the amount of that dis- count was as openly stated in the newspapers, as the value of government securities, no doubt ever occurred to the eminent lawyers of that day, on the legality of the transaction. Without, therefore, entering into further de- tails to repel this groundless distinction, it may be considered as universally admitted, that there has existed, within these last two years, a dif- ference of value betwixt gold or coin and Bank Notes, which has increased rapidly, and now a- mounts to upwards of twenty per cent. This circumstance might, perhaps, be deemed sufficient of itself, to authorize the opinion, that the paper of the Bank of England is depreciated - y " ly described under the term of " A depreciation of Bank Pa- " per." But this doctrine, which falsely assumes that the value of coin can be regulated by law, by means short of a maximum on the price of commodities, is evidently founded on a misunderstanding of the law ; for in the case of De Yonge it was declared to be the opinion of all the judges present, " that the exchange described " on this record, that is, of guineas for Bank Notes, taking such " guineas at a higher value than they were current for, under " the king's proclamation, was not an offence against the 5th and " 6th Edward VI. upon which the indictment was founded." 4 for though it is true, that a variation in the compa- rative value of any two commodities, must, when unexplained, give rise to a doubt, whether the change proceeds from an increase in the value of the one, or a diminution in the value of the other ; yet it does not appear that such a doubt can arise from a difference betwixt the value of paper and of the coin it represents. Bank Notes, when differing in value with what they engage to pay on demand, cannot with ac- curacy be considered as! a case of variation in the value of two several commodities. They are only engagements to deliver a certain species of commodity, and do not in themselves possess the character of a commodity. A Note of the Bank of England, promising to pay one pound sterling on demand, being in truth an obligation to furnish the person who presents it, with a portion of gold certi- fied by the mint stamp to contain one hundred and thirteen grains, troy weight, of pure gold, or a portion of silver, certified, in like manner, to con- tain seventeen hundred and eighteen grains and seven-tenths of a grain, troy weight, of pure sil- ver ; for the former is the quantity of gold that forms a pound sterling by the regulation in 1601, and the latter the quantity of silver forming a pound sterling, as fixed in 1728.* * The quantity of standard gold and silver in a pound sterling is, of the former 123.273 grains, of the latter 1858.060 grains. It is, however, strenuously maintained, by men. whose habits lead the public to presume great knowledge on the subject, and whose errors, in the situation in which they are placed may pro- duce tjhe greatest national calamities, that the papp of the Bank of England is not diminished in value : that what is only an apparent deprecia- tion of paper proceeds from a real augmentation of the value of gold: alid these opinions require the most minute consideration, as they lead to con- sequences deeply affecting the interest of every individual, as well as the general welfare of the country. If a note was issued promising to deliver on de- mand a yard of cloth, and specifying distinctly its quality and its breadth, it is obvious that such a note must partake accurately of the value of the cloth. It could never rise in value above the cloth ; its value could never be depressed below that of the cloth, for the variations in its value must be regu- lated by the value of that article to which it must of necessity be equivalent. i From the habit of using Bank Notes when paya- ble in coin on demand, as a measure of the value of commodities, and of giving them as an equiva- lent for the commodities so measured, it has been, by the vulgar, conceived, that they may possess a value of their own, differing in degree from that of the pieces of gold and silver they promise to -pay. But a note engaging to deliver a given quantity of gold and silver of a specific fineness, can no more possess value differing from that of the gold or silver it obliges the issuer to pay, than a note promising a yard of cloth, and speci- fying the breadth and fineness of it, can differ in value from the cloth. The gold and silver which the one promises to pay, is generally used as a measure for the value of cloth and other commodities : the cloth which the other promises to deliver is used as a com- modity, of which we are accustomed to measure the value by means of gold and silver, the com- mon measure of value resorted to in all civilized countries. We talk, therefore, of buying with the former and of selling the latter ; and this mode of habitually expressing ourselves, creates an impression that the value of the gold, which in common transactions we assume to be fixed, is really invariable. Whilst to the cloth, the varia- tions in the value of which we are accustomed to express, we attribute not only the changes of value which it undergoes, but also those that take place in the coin or gold by which it is measured. This process of erroneous reasoning naturally creates a disposition to transfer the quality of pos- sessing fixed value to notes payable in gold, whilst on the same principle it gives rise to a feeling that the note promising a yard of cloth, must suffer the same fluctuations in value we are habituated to re- mark in the article it represents. Though in reali- ty the note promising gold must vary in value with gold, from the power of commanding which it alone derives value, just in the same manner as the note engaging to deliver cloth is regulated by the value of that commodity. In truth, a Bank of England Note possesses, and can possess no value, differing from, or indepen- dent of the coin it engages to pay ; to state that it has a positive value varying from that of the coin, is to suppose that it possesses in itself a power of measuring value, and of acting as an equiva- lent, or, in other words, it is to bestow upon it those attributes which belong to the commodity it engages to deliver. To maintain that a note promising to deliver a yard of cloth on demand, possessed on that ac- count the qualities of that commodity, and was ca- pable itself of being made into an article of cloth- ing, would excite universal ridicule ; yet it is dif- ficult to say, how the reasoning that would lead to that conclusion can be considered as materially differing from the train of argument that must ne- cessarily be resorted to, to vindicate the opinion that a note, promising a quantity of coin on de- mand, has a power of measuring value differing from, and unconnected with that of the coin which it promises to pay. If a person who sold paper was to adopt the practice of giving a small piece of gold, of the weight of seven grains, promising to deliver a quire of paper on demand, it is certain that such a piece of gold, whilst the paper continued to be de- livered, to those who presented it, would secure the means of communicating with their corres- pondents. But if not being able to procure the paper the proprietor of the seven grains of gold was to attempt to use it as a substitute for the paper, he would soon be convinced that the gold possess- ed none of the properties of the material, which the person who issued it contracted to deliver. Yet if an engagement in paper to pay in gold could transfer to the paper the quality of measur- ing value, it would be difficult to discern why an engagement in gold, to pay a given quantity of paper, should not bestow upon the gold the qua- lities of the paper. Till of late all this reasoning might have appear- ed superfluous, the truth of the proposition it aims at sustaining was held to be indisputable. But when we are now told that Bank Notes are not depreciated : that though they are not ex- changeable against coin or gold, at the supposed advanced value of that metal, they nevertheless ac- curately represent the value gold coin enjoyed previous to the restriction ; or the average value of gold coin for a certain number of years :* What is it but to attribute to Bank Paper the power of acting as an equivalent, and of being a measure of value, on a scale differing from that which coin affords, of which it falsely purports to be the equi- valent ? * " To assert that Notes have fallen in value, because they have not risen with the precious metals, or that they have fallen com- pared with the currency of other countries, because they are not convertible at this moment, without loss, into them, does appear to me to be a most inaccurate state of the question, founded on a total misrepresentation of the first principles of our paper currency." Lord Castkrcagh's Speech on the Report of the Bullion Committee, p. 41. " But," says Mr. Huskisson (p. 43), " It is said that gold is dear, Bank Notes cheap ; but Bank Notes are of the same value as gold !" Thus stated the proposition certainly appears absurd, but we would just observe that it is a perversion of the following ; that Bank Notes bear their usual proportion to the average value of gold, but that gold has now experienced a temporary rise of price in the home market above that average." Review of Mr Huskisson' s Book, p. 24 of the " British Review'' (supposed to be the work of a person high in office.) " If ten ounces of gold now are worth as much as twelve ounces were before, why should the holder of notes receive now so much a greater value in gold than he did before ? Or can it be said truly that he suffers an injustice, because he is not permitted lo do so?" Observations on the State of our Currency t by the Earl of Ross, p. 25. 10 It is these and similar assertions that have now rendered it necessary to establish, by argument, that Bank Notes, from the circumstance of their being engagements to pay a given quantity of coin or gold on demand, are, in respect of value, identi- fied with coin : and that a difference of value from what they promise to pay can therefore only origi- nate from a want of power in the notes themselves to secure the possession of it ; for whilst they enjoy that power, and things that are equal to one and the same thing continue to be equal to one another, a guinea and a guinea-note must be equivalent. If this statement is just, it seems as easy to com- prehend why the value of a Bank Note may in con- sequence of this deficiency of power, be diminished in comparison of the coin it promises to pay, as it is difficult to conceive how such an alteration of circumstances in the Note can occasion a variation in the value of the gold; and it becomes impossi- ble to imagine how it should augment the value of the gold, which, as we shall afterwards shew, must be banished from use in the country where such an occurrence takes place, and must, on that account, sustain a diminution of demand, which tends inva- riably to lower the value of every commodity. It is with confidence, therefore, it is asserted, that the difference of value betwixt gold and Bank Notes, which never did exist, whilst they possessed the power of commanding coin, must arise from 11 the deficiency in the value of the Note, which has sustained this loss of power; and not from an in- crease in the value of the coin on which this alter- ation in the character of the Note can produce no effect. It must also be remarked, that the accuracy of the opinion that Bank Notes possess an identity of value with the coin they promise to pay, and that this identity of value can in no degree be inter- rupted by a variation in the value of that portion of coin or gold which they represent, does not rest solely on general reasoning, for it is a proposition of the truth of which we have the most ample ex- perience in the course of the last century. Coin, and gold or silver, though the best and most accurate measures of the value of commodities from day to day, have themselves no fixed value. '- The increase of the quantity of bullion is stated by Sir George Shuckburgh (who, in his reasoning, wisely considers the value of coin to be completely dependant on the value of the material of which it is made) to have reduced the value of coin more than one-half in the course of the last century : eight shillings and five-pence halfpenny, in the year seventeen hundred, being, according to the calculations in his tables, equal to a pound sterling in eighteen hundred. i During the whole of this period, the Bank of 12 England were in the practice of issuing Notes pay- able in coin ; yet, notwithstanding this great and gradual diminution in the value of coin, it never was suggested that there was, or could be, a dif- ference betwixt the value of a Bank Note, and the value of that portion of coin it promised to pay. Notes of the Bank of England were never supposed to represent abstract values. Bank Notes were al- ways considered as representing one hundred and thirteen grains of pure gold, and seventeen hun- dred and eighteen grains of pure silver ; and the doctrines now prevalent, that they represented the value those metals possessed ten years before, or their value on an average of a number of years, was never once thought of. Yet it is impossible to imagine how Bank Notes should have assimilated themselves to coin during the whole progressive depreciation that took place in its value $ and that they should assimilate them- selves to thepast value of coin, or to its average value for a number of years, the moment it is sup- posed to increase "in value : for it would indeed be a strange and unintelligible connection in respect of value, betwixt Notes and the coin they repre- sent, if the former were always identified in va- lue with the latter, when it remained stationary, or declined in value; and as uniformly assumed a distinct and determinate value of their own, the moment coin began to rise in value? From this short analysis of the relation which Bank Notes bear to coin, it seems perfectly clear, that, in reference to value, they can only be re- garded as if they were the identical portion of coin they engage to pay on demand : that nothing but a deficiency of power to command it can make them appear in any other point of view ; and that, though this loss of power in Bank Paper may di- minish the value of the Note, it cannot increase the value of the coin, which undergoes no change or alteration of character. On this ground alone, therefore, the absurdity of conceiving that the difference in value between coin and Bank Paper arises from an increase in the value of coin, and not . from a depreciation of Paper, might be rested. But as this is a ques- tion, on the decision of which must rest the cha- racter of the late proceeding in parliament in pass- ing " An Act for making more effectual provision " for preventing the current gold coin of the realm " from being paid or accepted for a greater value " than the current value of such coin; for pre- " venting any Note or Notes of the Governor and " Company of the Bank of England from being cc received for any smaller sum than the sum there- " in specified; and for staying proceedings upon " any distress by tender of such Notes ;" as well as the merits of the controversy in respect to the conduct of the Bank, its importance may be thought to require examination abstractedly from 14 the relation that bullion and Bank Notes bear to each other, and a statement of the grounds on which it distinctly appears ; 1st, That coin and gold have not increased in value. 2d, That Bank Paper has got into a state of depreciation. Before, however, entering into the discussion which is requisite to elucidate these two proposi- tions, it may be proper to state what are now ge- nerally considered to be the circumstances that confer value, and what it is that regulates the rise or the fall of value in all commodities. Nothing in itself possesses value; the existence of that quality is perfectly independent of any cha- racteristic inherent in the commodity that has ac- quired it. It is an attribute incident to all com- modities that become the objects of mens* desire, and that conjoin with the circumstance of being useful or delightful to man, that of existing in scarcity. i It may be, therefore, truly stated, that value can only be conferred by exciting the desires of, men for something that exists in a degree of scarcity ; or by rendering scarce that for which, though un- limited in quantity, men naturally feel a desire. lo These premises evidently lead us to conclude, that unless a substance could be found, subject to no alteration in its quantity, and uniformly excit- ing the same portion of desire, every thing valuable must be subject to variations in value. It is also clear, that all such variations must be produced by one of four circumstances : 1st, A commodity must be subject to an increase of its value from a diminution of its quantity. 2d, It must sustain a diminution of value from an augmentation of its quantity. 3d, An increased demand must tend to create an augmentation of value. 4th, A failure of demand must give rise to a di- minution of value. Further, as it would be as impossible to attempt to measure, or to express the degrees of value which any commodity enjoys, by means of a thing that did not itself possess value, as it would be to have recourse to a mathematical point for a mea- sure of dimension, the value of every commodity, when expressed in common language, must be sub- ject to variation in consequence of eight different contingencies : 16 1st, From the four circumstances above stated, in relation to the commodity of which the value is to be expressed. 2d, From the same four circumstances in rela- tion to the commodity adopted as the measure of value. From this short detail of the principles on which the value, the variations in value, and the expres- sion of those variations depend, it follows that there must be a marked difference in the nature of the variations to which commodities must be liable. Some will vary in value in one place from the value they possess at another. Some will be liable to sudden variations even at the same place ; whilst others, subject to more gradual and slow variations, will always maintain nearly an equality in value in different places, * It is therefore of the greatest importance in the conduct of the exchanges of the superfluities of one man for those of another, to select as a mea- sure of value and medium of exchange that com- modity least subject to variation of value in the different places where the parties reside - y and least likely to alter in its value within the short space of time in which the transaction is carrying into effect. Gold and silver, from the ease with which their 17 precise purity can be ascertained, as well as their divisibility into pieces of different sizes, are emi- nently calculated to act as money; but these are properties they enjoy only in common with lead and other inferior metals. What they exclusively con- join with these qualities is, the character of steadi- ness in respect to value within a short space of time, whilst they enjoy in a greater degree than any other commodity, uniformity in value throughout the world. These are the attributes, which without any con- vention, or even implied agreement, have induced mankind in civilized society, universally to adopt gold and silver as the materials best suited for the matter of money. When, therefore, we are told that gold has risen *up wards of twenty per cent, within the limited space of two years, we are informed that it has suddenly lost that character for uniformity of value which mankind by their conduct had unanimously ascribed to it. Nay, more, we are desired to believe that this metal is no longer subject to that slow, but steady diminution of value which experience has shewn (in consequence of its gradual increase in quantity being uniformly greater than the* augmen- tation of demand for it) to be the character of those variations in value it has always sustained ; and to give credit to the assertion, that gold, in vio- lation of every principle, had so far altered its na- c 18 ture, as to have risen in value within the space of two years, more than other commodity. Some general reasoning might have been ex- pected from those who maintain this hypothesis, to explain the causes of such an extraordinary and sudden exception to this constant and invariable rule, by which, in the opinion of all who have written on the subject, the variations in the value of gold and silver had been guided. But far from attempting to give any explanation or reasonable account of so improbable an altera- tion, there is not even the smallest uniformity in the statements of those who assert that this singular change in the value of these metals has taken place : for some are of opinion, that it is on the continent of Europe that gold has so rapidly in- creased in value 5 others, confident that a rise has taken place in this country, in the value of gold, admit (what indeed appears incontrovertible) that it has undergone no similar change abroad; and there are not a few who endeavour to supply the total want of every thing like reason in support of their theory, by the ardour with which they announce the conclusion that both gold and silver have risen in value throughout the markets of the world. That it is the great demand for gold, and its 19 increased value on the continent of Europe, -which is the cause of its being withdrawn from this coun- try, is an opinion supported by authority no less respectable than that of the Governor of the Bank of England, who in his examination before a select committee of the House of Commons, appointed to inquire into the cause of the high price of gold bullion, distinctly states his conviction, that it is the high price of gold abroad that has made our gold coin disappear from circulation in this country. The committee in their report have themselves truly observed, that this opinion is unsupported by any detail of facts, and that it is contradicted by those who seemingly possess the greatest knowledge of the state of the foreign markets.* Besides, it is no- torious that gold has not risen in a manner to au- thorize this opinion, either at Hamburgh or Amster- dam, where its value, *as expressed in silver, which is the only legal tender, has experienced no altera- tion similar to what is supposed to have taken place in this country. But in truth the speeches of two of the most * See the examination of A. Goldsmid, Esq. and of John Lewis Greffulhe, Esq. annexed to the Report of the Bullion Com- mittee. C 2 20 strenuous advocates in favour of the present system of circulation,* recently published by authority, clearly demonstrate that neither the value of gold or silver have undergone any unusual or material variation on the continent of Europe. In the former of these speeches, Sir George Shuckburgh's calculations are referred to, to shew that gold had diminished in value, betwixt the year 1797 and the year 1800 ; thus sanctioning the principle on which the value of gold is ascertained in these tables. It is therefore impossible that the author of this speech can have been ignorant, that in these calcu- lations, as published in the Philosophical Trans- actions, the depreciation of the value of metallic money, after making allowance for the various changes in the weight and alloy of our coins, is inferred from the rise in the price of labour, and of numerous articles of provisions. That the reasoning on which this inference pro- ceeds is equally applicable to the Continent of * The Right Honourable George Rose, Treasurer of the Navy, Clerk of Parliament, and Vice-President of the Board of Trade and Viscount Castlereagh, late one of His Majesty's Secretaries of State. f Mr. Rose's Speech, page 20. 21 Europe, as to this country, is apparent : how then can any one who sanctions these tables with his approbation, deny, that if a rise has taken place in the price of commodities at Paris, where gold and silver almost exclusively circulate, these metals must have continued to sustain the same slow and gradual diminution in value, to which Sir George Shuckburgh has shewn they have long been sub- ject. For it must be obvious that if gold and silver had really increased in value in the capital of France, to the extent of fifteen or twenty per cent, in consequence of that extended demand for them, which the Governor of the Bank has alluded to, provisions and other necessaries so far from rising in value, must, on the principle of these tables, have undergone a rapid diminution. The penetration, however, of the Vice-President of the Board of Trade, who by licence now regulates the whole commerce of this country, has led him, in the act of maintaining that gold has greatly risen in value, to inform the public* that Monsieur Silvestre, in a report made to the Agricultural Society at Paris, in 1805, had stated the price of labour to be increased from one-third to one-half in different places of France, and that beasts of labour, and all articles requisite for a farmer's fa- mily, were [augmented in the same proportion. Further, that Monsieur Daru had stated to the le- * Ibid. P . 31. 01 gislative body, so late as the year 1810, that the difference betwixt the value of money at that time and the year 1791, was such, that the same income did not in January last represent more than two- thirds of what it did at the former period. Facts which conclusively prove, that the value of gold and silver money cannot have increased on the Continent of Europe.* Thus the value of gold estimated in silver abroad : the evidence of the merchants best acquainted with the state of the foreign markets ; and even the admission of those who are most eager in con- tending that the difference of value betwixt gold and Bank Paper proceeds from a rise in the value of the former, concur in making it evident, that the value of that metal has undergone no material change on the Continent. If gold then has risen in value at all, it must be in the home market and yet it requires very little reflection to discern the complete impossibility of there existing in this country a partial rise in the value of that metal to the extent of twenty or even of fifteen per cent. * Lord Castlereagh in his Speech pn the second reading of Lord Stanhope's bill, page 48, resorts to the same reasoning. Both these statesmen have extracted this evidence of the inac- curacy of their own argument from a pamphlet entitled " A " Review of the Controversy respecting the High Price of our " Bullion, and the State of our Currency." p. 35. 23 In the first place, there is against this hypothe- sis, the direct information of merchants, of the greatest character, whose statements distinctly es- tablish, that notwithstanding the unfavourable state of our exchange with the Continent, the value of a pound of gold bullion, is exactly the same at Hamburgh and London,* and that there is only the small difference of seven shillings and sixpence in the value of a pound weight of standard gold betwixt Paris and London,-f that is, it is * Extract of the Evidence of A. Goldsmid, Esq. What Bill on England could be purchased at Hamburgh, ac- cording to the last accounts of the course of exchange, for 100 ounces of English standard gold ? About o460. How much English standard gold for exportation, could be purchased in London for o460. ? 100 Ounces. Then the price of gold at Hamburgh and the price of gold in London are nearly equal ? They are. See also the Evidence of John Lewis Greffulhe. f Seven shillings and sixpence is to o50. 19s. 3d. the value of a pound of pure gold, as fourteen shillings and eight-pence halfpenny is to o6100. Extract from the Evidence of A. Goldsmid, Esq. You have stated that a guinea, or gold equal to what is con- tained in a guinea, is worth about 25*. at Paris j that is, a dif- ference of c8. 18s. upon 44 guineas and a half; so that gold equal in weight to what is contained in 44 guineas and a half, would sell at Paris for <55. 12s. 6d. do you mean to say that the above quantity of gold would purchase at Paris a bill ou London for o55. 12*. 6d. ? Nearly so. What 24 nearly two-thirds of one per cent, higher at Paris, where it has been shewn, that it has not risen in value, than in London, where this rise in value is supposed to exist. Secondly, it is impossible that any one, in the slightest degree conversant with the mere ele- ments of political economy, can seriously believe that a commodity which abounds on the Conti- nent, and which has disappeared from circulation in this country, can be higher by fifteen or twenty per cent, here, than it is in the foreign markets. For if gold was to desert the country where it was most valuable, and resort in abundance to that in which the least could be obtained in exchange for it, it would be a violation of the invariable rule, that every commodity finds its* way to the market where its value is highest. There are those, however, who maintain that the balance of trade and of payments, with the Con- tinent of Europe, are at present so much against What would a pound of gold in London cost, at \rhat you have stated to be the present market-price of gold in London, namely <. 12s. per ounce ? Does it not follow from what you have now stated, that the pound of gold in London and at Paris, is at present nearly of the same value, the difference being only 7s. 6d. per pound ? It does. this country, as to make it impossible that gold or silver should remain in circulation, and to have occasioned the state of our exchanges, as well as the recent high price of bullion ; and as this mode of accounting for the present state of our circulat- ing medium is resorted to by almost all who have strangely discovered in the increase of paper, to which the restriction of cash payments at the Bank has given rise, an improved system for the conduct of the circulation of this great mercantile country ; it seems necessary to go into a little de- tail, to shew how seldom it can happen, that the exchange resulting from the state of trade and pay- ments can be so unfavourable to a country, as to induce the merchants (who must always be presumed to act upon the principles of securing the greatest profit) to export coin; and how impossible it is that this, or any country, should by such means be drained of its metallic currency. That the exchange seldom can fall against any country to the extent of making it profitable to export the circulating coin, is one of those propo- sitions that has been rarely controverted ; and it is often more difficult briefly to establish by argu- ment what has generally been received as self-evi- dent, than to give a short view of a question which has usually been the subject of controversy. For- tunately, however, this long received opinion may be illustrated without entering into very tedious details. 26 Let us suppose, as was asserted by the mer- chants examined in the year 1797, when the re- striction'on cash payments was imposed, that the expence of sending bullion to Hamburgh was three and a half per cent. ; from this statement it is evident that gold could not be conveyed from England to Hamburgh, the exchange being un- favourable to the extent of three per cent, without a loss of a half per cent. Before, however, the exchange could fall even to three per cent, there must have been so many efforts on the part of the merchants to rectify it, in consequence of the encouragement an unfavour- able exchange, founded on the balance of pay- ments, always must give to the exportation of com- modities, and the effect it must have in preventing the importation of them, that it is hardly possible it can ever fall so low, if uninfluenced by the cir- cumstance of great remittances from political con- siderations. For example, if five per cent, is deemed a fair mercantile profit, without which a mer- chant cannot have a proper return, on a cargo carried from England to Hamburgh, it is obvious that as long as the prices of cloth in England and at Hamburgh are such as to give only a profit of three per cent, on the resale, an exportation of cloth from England to Hamburgh cannot take place, if the exchange is at par ; but if, beside . 27 the profit of three per cent, on the cloth, there is a profit of two and a half per cent, on the exchange, that is, if a bill on London for one hundred pounds can be purchased at Hamburgh for ninety seven pounds ten shillings, then cloth will be immedi- ately exported, because the profit by the ex- change, and the profit by the cloth, will, when combined, afford a profit upon the transaction of no less than five and a half per cent. On the other hand, suppose the difference of the price of German linen at Hamburgh, and in London, to be such as to afford a profit of six per cent, when resold in England, still, as before the money could be returned to Hamburgh, there would be a loss of two and a half per cent, one hundred pounds in London producing only ninety seven pounds, ten shillings, at Hamburgh, it is ob- vious linen could not be carried to England, because instead of producing five per cent, which is assumed to be the fair mercantile profit, the transaction combining the gain upon the linen, and the loss on the exchange, would only afford a profit of three and a half per cent. Thus, before it can happen that the real ex- change, arising from the balance of payments, can fall so far as to make it possible for a merchant to export gold without a loss, there must be a want of commodities in the country, which on ex- portation will afford a profit, such as when com- 28 bined with the rate of exchange, holds out the prospect of a fair profit to the merchant; for, as long as there are commodities of that description, they must be conveyed in preference to gold; and every such exportation co-operates with a ne- cessary diminution of imports, as above explained, to equalize the balance of payments : and by thus rectifying the exchange, to prevent the possibility of gold being exported without a loss. It may however be said, that admitting all this political arrangements may give rise to the necessity of expenditure abroad, to such a degree as to occa- sion the continuance of an unfavourable exchange, even after the various commodities of a country have been conveyed to an extent, that their abundance in the country that receives them, prevents their return- ing any profit to enhance that which the exchange affords : that this is the situation of this country, and that under such circumstances bullion must be exported. But, even granting this statement to be true, it is in the nature of things impossible that the prac- tice of exporting bullion, as a means of restoring the balance of payments, should be long pursued, either in this or any other country ; and it is most completely impossible, that it can be carried on for that purpose so as to deprive any country of its current coin in circulation. For the quantity of the coin of a country that can at any time be with- 29 drawn from circulation to effect this object, is small indeed, as must be obvious to those who re- flect, that the moment gold begins to be exported the value of that which remains must increase, or, in other words, the value of all the commodities in the country must diminish ; and of course, that they will again present themselves to the foreign merchant in a state, such as combining the pro- bable profit on their exportation with the profit on the exchange, will make it once more a loss to him to export bullion. It is also clear, that if from political causes, a ne- cessity for further payments should again fill the foreign markets with our manufactures, to an ex- tent that rendered them incapable of being profit- ably exported, and that the exportation of gold should be reverted to ; the moment a little more of our gold is withdrawn, a further reduction of the price of our manufactures would again make the exportation of gold the least profitable means of paying a foreign debt. Thus, before any country can be drained of its gold, by an unfavourable balance of foreign pay- ments, the commodities of its growth and pro- duce must in the progress of this operation be re- duced in value to a mere trifle. Such is the reasoning that seems to justify the opinion formerly held by practical merchants of the 30 greatest eminence,* that no country can suffer a great diminution of its coin from the state of the ex- change, arising out of an unfavourable balance of payments -, for the moment such an exportation commences, a fall in the price of commodities, in consequence of the rise in the price of gold, will ensue, which must be a check to the practice ; as the superior profits that will arise from the state of the exchange,and the further reduced price of goods, must induce merchants again to recur to the more profitable channel of merchandise for conveying their remittances. But by those who wish to prove that the dif- ference betwixt the value of gold and paper arises from an advance in the value of gold, all reasoning concerning the commercial relation of one country to another, however just in the usual state of things, is held inapplicable in the present state of Europe. They regard the ports of the Continent as her- metically sealed ; and representing this country as unable to force the articles with which she would discharge her obligations, through the barrier poli- tical circumstances has interposed, ascribe to the commercial decrees of France the power of pre- * See the Evidence of Mr. Winthorpe, one of the Directors of the Bank of England. Irish Exchange Report, p. 38. venting our manufactures from making their way to a foreign market, and of rendering the exporta- tion of coin inevitable.* That this country could be drained of its coin * Unlike, as in former times, when the intervention of neutral states, or the ingenuity of our merchants, made exportation, even in a period of war, little liable to obstruction, England is now with teeming warehouses, unable to force the articles, with which she would discharge her obligations, through the barrier which po- litical circumstances have interposed. The Principles of Currency and Exchanges, applied to the Report from the Select Committee of the House of Com- mons (Supposed to be the Work of an eminent Banker.) page 43. I am, on the contrary, ready to admit that the adoption of such a measure can only be justified by an adequate necessity. In the present instance, what is the fact ? That the ruler of France has determined, at the price even of inflicting commercial ruin upon those over whom he rules, to exclude your trade from the Continent. If he does not succeed effectually in doing so ; if much still finds its way, his system has had the effect ; compara- tively at least, of turning the balance of intercourse against us, and thus influencing the exchange. His decrees are less effectual to prevent the produce of the Continent from finding its way to us, than in excluding our produce from the Continental Markets. Hence an obvious cause of an unfavourable exchange. In ordinary times, the immediate effect of such an unfavourable exchange would be, by a reduction of price to the foreign consumer, resulting from the advantage of the exchange, to force out a greater proportion of our manufactures: the quantity of bills would be thereby aug- mented* cannot be admitted, even if the statement of facts were accurate from which this inference was drawn. But is it true that British produce and manufac- tures have been totally excluded from the Conti- nent ? Does it not, on the contrary, appear from the accounts before Parliament, that in the last two years, during which the exchanges have be* come so unfavourable, and bullion has risen to so great a value in Bank Notes, as to make our coin disappear from circulation, there has been a greater increase of our trade,* and even of our merited, and the precious metals would, in but a comparatively small amount, be sent abroad. So long as goods could be applied to settle the account, the price of bullion would not rise materially above its natural price. But now goods cannot be sent as in ordinary times. Speech delivered by Lord Castlereagh, May 8, 1811, page 26. * Official Value of Exports from Great-Britain in the following years : Years. British Pro- duce by thus sinking what they have borrowed ; by repeated emis- sions they have opportunities of paying a former debt, by run- ning further in debt, till at length they become insolvent. Discourse on the Currency of the American Colonies, p. 39. * See the Evidence of Mr. French, (Irish Exchange Commit- tee, page 131) ascribing the increased importation of goods to the extension of credit, since the augmentation of paper ; and stating an instance of an individual increasing his imports from 1 0,000, to <80,000. per ann. which he never could have don under any other circumstances. f The following description of the extravagant demand for commodities at Paris, during the year 1719-20 is extracted from the History of Mr. Law's System. Quant d ces hommes nouveaux dont il est fait mention, se trouvent extrement charges de papier, ils se donnerent tous les mouvements imaginables pour le realiser ; ce qui fit monter a un prix excessif toutes les choses necessaires d Tentretien de la vie. Les Merchands vendirent jusqu' a vingt cinq ecus Taune de drap, qui ne valoit auparavant que seize d dix-huit francs ; le velours, les etofes de soye, et autres merchandizes a proportion. Les loyers des maisons etoient exorbitans, la fa9on de toute sorte d'ouvrages se payoit au triple ; il y avoit des pieces d'or- f^vrerie, dont le prix du travail cxcedoit deux fois la matiere ; enfin tout etoit totlement bouleverse, que les gens senses ne sa- voient meme plus a quoi s'en tenir. II faut remarquer que la rue St. Honore que ci-devant auroit fourni de quoi vetir superbement toute la France et les voisins, se trouvoit alors comme epuissee ; sur-tout onn'y voyoit plus de velours D 2 56 shew that it is a uniform consequence of an over- issue of paper monqy. The augmentation of our commerce is indeed great ; but great as it is, it cannot appear extra- ordinary to any one, who has maturely considered the necessary effects of a great increase of paper in a country, where the habits of extended credit be- twixt man and man, and all the numerous devices to economize the use of circulating medium, must render any addition infinitely more efficacious. Lord Liverpool, in his letter to the King on the Coin of the Realms, states that, " when the situa- " tion of the Bank of England was under the consi- " deration of the two Houses of Parliament in the " year 1797* it was his opinion, and that of many * c others, that the extent to which paper currency ,* c had then been carried, was the first and principal, though not the sole cause of the many difficulties to which that corporate body was then, and had of late years, from time to time, been exposed velours, ni d'etofes d'or ; le commencement de 1'hiver avoit emporte tout ce qui s'en etoit trouve dans les magazins. Cette saison, si triste d'ailleurs, avoit, du terns du systeme, plus d'eclat et de brillant que le plus beau printems d'aujourd'hui, soit par les habits de velours de toutes les couleurs, doubles de tissues d'or et d'argent, soit par les galons et les broderies magnifiques : quant aux pierreries, leur eclat eblouissoit les yeux aux Cours et aux spectacles ; et le nombre de nouveaux Carosses mis sur pied, paroit aujourd'hui, incroyable a ceux a qui on le raconte. " 37 " in supplying the cash occasionally necessary for " the commerce of the kingdom."* He further adds, that cc it seems to have been " discovered of late years in this country, that by " a new sort of alchemy, coins of gold and silver, " and almost every other sort of property, may be " converted into paper ; and that the precious me- " tals had better be exported, to serve as capital to Or. De Russie . . 80,000 3,200 De Hongrie . . 92,000 4,666 De Suede & de Norwege . . 15,000 De France . . 3,000 De Piemont . . 2,300 De Saxe . . . 50,000 De Hartz . . . 37,000 De Magdebourg 3,000 Argent 282,300 Or 7,866 V Argent evalue a 52. par le marc I/Or a 780 fr. le Marc 14,679,600 fr. 6,135,480 PRODUIT DES MINES DE L'AMERIQUE. Amerique Espagnole . . 159,000,000 Bresil . . SO^OaOOO Produit total des mines d'Or & d'Arg. . 229,315,086 fr. In reducing this sum to English money, at the rate of six francs, sixteen cents, to the sterling crown, or twenty -four francs, sixteen for centuries invariably suffered a gradual diminu- tion in value, without a trace of their having at any time sustained a rise in value, cannot appear surprising ; especially when we recollect, that in- creasing opulence and credit tend to supersede the necessity of so frequently resorting to the use of coin, the chief source of the demand for them ; and that mankind, ever attentive in the progress of im- provement to devise means of saving labour, or expenditure, which from its power of commanding labour, may be regarded as the same thing, have sixteen twenty-fifths of a franc to a pound sterling (the propor- tion fixed in the Imperial Almanac for the year 1810) the total value of Gold and Silver drawn from these mines is o9,326,910. 14*. 3d. SECOND ESTIMATE. Countries. Gold. Silver. Value of both in Francs. Europe . . America . North Asia Kilo- grams. Value in Francs. Kilo- grams. Value in Francs. 16,171,888 236,353,667 6,677,333 1,297 17,291 538 4,467,444 59,557,889 1,853,111 53,670 795,511 21,709 11,704,444 176,795,778 4,424,222 Total 19,126 65,878,444 869,960 193>324444 259,202,8^8 Reducing this sum to English pounds, on the same principle a* has been already adopted, it amounts to cJO,5 19,597. 14s. 6d. These Estimates do not include the Gold and Silver collected in China, Japan, Tonquin, Central Asia, and the interior of Africa, but exhibits the whole amount of the precious metals brought annually into the commerce and circulation of Europe. been and are in the constant habit of studying with success the means of economizing the use of coin. What reason then has been suggested ; what reason can be given sufficiently forcible to authorize the belief that these metals, (the cause of the gra- dual depreciation of which is so obvious,) have, within these two years, suddenly ceased to suffer that loss of value, which it is admitted they have slowly but uniformly and progressively sustained, to an extent, that eleven-pence and twenty-nine two hundred_and eighty-one parts of a penny, are represented in the year 1050 to be equal in value to a metallic pound in the year 1800, that is, that one pound sterling at the former period was equal in value to twenty-one pounds, twelve shillings, threepence- halfpenny, and ten thirteenths of a farthing at the latter.* * It is singular that many of the advocates for the present sys- tem of circulation, who in former publications have talked with enthusiasm of the Tables published in the Philosophical Transac- tions, by the aid of which these calculations are formed, now at- tempt to make quibbling distinctions on the subject, and even to controvert the principle they applauded. Mr. Chalmers, for example, the author of the Considerations on Commerce, Bullion, and Coin, has the following note in that part of his Estimate of the Commerce of Great-Britain in which he treats of the increase of the Civil List " The historian of our Revenue (Sir John Sinclair) does not " distinctly 0,5 But even this is a weak and imperfect statement of the difficulties which must be encountered by those who contend that the difference betwixt rds, 145 experience can suggest wiser measures, than those pursued in 1696, to restore the credit both of Go- vernment and of the Bank nor can there in any age be exhibited more firmness in enforcing against popular opinion, measures which a very critical situation of affairs rendered absolutely necessary for the salvation of the country. To do away that temptation to hoarding, origU nating from the false hopes that had been excited by the reasoning of those who, assuming that gold and silver had augmented in value, argued that the denominative value of our coin should be raised, it was on the very first day of their meeting, declar- ed by the Commons House of Parliament, cc That Lords, 1797, that the advances to government were in February .11,718,730; and from the Report of the Committee of Se- crecy at the Bank, on which the Resolution of the 26th of Oc- tober proceeded, we learn that at that time these advances were only ,44258,140. Thus we see those very intelligent directors, who had the management of the Bank in the year 1797, when they acted under an apprehension of being liable to pay cash in value equal to the denomination of their notes/ pursuing a very differ- ent line of conduct from that announced by Mr. Godfrey, t( of " furnishing all who cduld give security with money," for in the short space betwixt the months of February and October 1797, they called in advances to government to the amount of 7,460,590, and by that means were enabled greatly to in- crease their stock of cash and bullion. See the Report of House of Commons, Nov. 1797. Appendix, No. 3. L 146 " they would not alter the standard of gold or " silver in fineness, weight, or denomination."* And, if possible, to reinstate, the Tallies in public estimation, or at least to arrest the progress of that fall in their value which had been so rapid, it was at the same time resolved, " That all Parliamentary " Funds, which had been made credit for loans " from the subject, since His Majesty's accession " to the crown, should be made good."f But the evil was too deeply rooted to be re- medied by the declaration of general principles, however sound : for that loss of credit the Bank had suffered, from a sudden reverse of fortune, oc- casioned by its extended issues and the want of foresight concerning the effects of liability to pay in standard silver, had given rise to a feeling of diffidence and mistrust concerning all pecuniary arrangements. The Bank, indeed, had made great exertions to sustain its credit, but suspicion founded on hesitation in performing pecuniary engage- ments is not easily allayed. Suddenly to create confidence was impossible. To put things in a state by which it might be gradually restored * Commons Journals, vol. xi. p. 567. t Ibidem, 147 was all that with any prospect of success could be attempted. To many who were well informed, to those concerned in the government of the country, and even to the greater part of the Proprietors of the Bank, it seemed doubtful whether for a length of time its lost credit could be restored, and whether it was not expedient to withdraw its whole paper from circulation ; whilst to all it appeared necessary, notwithstanding the resolution passed to secure the gradual discharge of Tallies, imme- diately to reduce the amount of those that were outstanding. To effect these two objects, an enlargement of the capital of the Bank, was recommended by the Committee appointed to take into consideration that part of His Majesty's speech that related to public credit : four-fifths of this subscription to be paid in Tallies, and one-fifth in Bank Notes. The amount of the additional capital seems neither to have been limited by the Resolutions of the House of Commons, nor by the Act of Parlia- ment, founded on them for engrafting on the Bank, and there are strong grounds to imagine that it was intended to withdraw all the Bank Notes then in circulation. For in a Report of the arguments used at a meeting of Propri- etors of Bank Stock, to take the measure under 148 consideration, it is said to have been supported oil the following grounds. " First, That all their Bills and Notes will be " brought in with the Tallies, and so at once help " them out of debt. " Secondly, As a natural consequence of the " former, their Bills and Notes will then be at par, (e or equal to money, for the payment of debts or cc Bills of Exchange. " Thirdly, That being once out of debt, and " their Bills or Notes equal with money, they may " begin to establish a new and lasting credit. " Fourthly, That the Bank cannot otherwise " recover their credit in many years ; and that till " their Bills or Notes go current again, at par with 764, 196 10 6 annexed with In- 1 Cash ... .3 terest . . .} To Monies borrow- ) gnn ftn _ ft By Half a Year's ed in Holland 300001 To Interest - ft nno ftrt upon Bank Bills ' + we rt rt -.onnnM/ .r > standing out ow -Unnnnn n n By Half a Year'sN ^ J 300,000 J Deficiency of 1 due") the Fund off ills J 17,876 100,000/. per r . . j Ann. in the 2d I Year ... .7 Balance . . 125,315 2 11 By Mortgages, Pawns, other Securities, and Cash . ,2,101,187 13 5 ^2,101,187 13 5 London, November 10, 1696. Examined by order of the Court of Directors, Per.Tno. MERCER, Accountant. APPENDIX, 189 The said List of Tallies on Parliamentary Funds. s. d. On the 4th year's Land Tax 431,924 4 On continued Impositions on East India goods, 94,960 12 3 On the 4th year's Custom 20015 9 On the 3d year's Land Tax 122,029 4 7 On the Post-Office Security 60,629 1 8 On the 2d year's Customs 109,014 13 8 On Wines, Vinegar, &c 184,82318 3 On the Coal Act 174,775 19 6 On the 3d year's Customs ..... 130,71313 1 On Marriages, &c 431 12 On Joint Stocks 2,884 1 1 On | Excise 24,667 19 2 On the Reversionary Annuities .... 141,865 16 On the Salt Act 250,000 O On Paper and Parchment 11,310 4 6 Interest grown due thereon 44,345 4 5 '1,784,576 16 5 London, November 10th, 1696. Examined by order of the Court of Directors, Per THO. MERCER, Accountant. Ordered, That the said papers be referred to the consider- ation of the Committee of the whole House ; who are to con- sider further of that part of His Majesty's Speech which re- lates to the credit of the nation; and of the supply to be granted to His Majesty, for making good the deficiencies of parliamentary funds. Ordered, That the Governor and Directors of the Bank of England do attend the said Committee. 1QO APPENDIX. Resolved, That this House will, to-morrow morning, re- solve itself into the said Committee of the whole House. Jovis 10* die Decembris, 1696. , Sir John Bolles reported from the Committee appointed to inspect the books of the Bank of England, and examine into their accounts given into the House, that they had in- spected the books, and examined into their accounts accord- ingly ; and had directed him to report the matter thereof to the House ; which he read in his place ; and afterwards deli- vered in at the Clerk's table : where the same was read ; and is as followeth, viz. That as to the item of c893,SOO. the first article on the debit side in the said account, it appeared by the books of the said Bank, to be the balance of a debt due to sundry persons for sealed Bank Bills standing out : - That as to the item of .764,196. 105. 6d. it appeared tp the Committee, that .68,669- 65. Id. part of that sum hath been issued out in notes, called Specie Notes ; which carry inte- rest, if for <20. or upwards, at the rate of age 2 1,) and this opinion appears to be founded on the principle, which the Committee assumes to be indisputable, " that the difference of ex- change, resulting from the state of trade and payments between two countries, is limited by the expense of conveying and insuring the precious metals from one country to tihe other." (P- M) On these points there seems no difference whatever in the three Treatises ; the coincidence of opinion, and even of expression, is as close as possible, and the Committee appears to speak the common sentiment of those who consider the paper-currency to be excessive, .when they sum up their previously-expressed opinions in these words : " that there is at ipresent an excess in the paper-circulation of this country, of which the most unequivocal symptom is the very high price of Bullion, and, next to that, the low state of the continental exchanges : that this excess is -to be ascribed to the want of a sufficient cheek and controul on the issues of the paper of tbe 8 Bank of England, and originally to the sus- pension of cash-payments, which removed the natural and true controul." (page 30.) My purpose is to ascertain the sufficiency of the grounds on which these opinions are found- ed, the truth in point of fact of the several propositions laid down by the Committee. 1st. That the variations of the exchange with foreign countries can never, for any considera- ble time, exceed the expense of transporting and insuring the precious metals from one coun- try to the other. 2d. That the price of Gold Bullion can never exceed the mint-price, unless the currency, in which it is paid, is depreciated below the value of gold. 3d. That, so far as any inference is to be drawn from Custom-House returns of exports and imports, the state of the exchanges ought to be peculiarly favourable. 4th. That the Bank, during the restriction, possesses exclusively the power of limiting the circulation of bank-notes. 5th. That the circulation of country bank- notes depends upon; and is proportionate to, the issues from the Bank. Lastly. That the paper-currency is now ex- cessive, and depreciated in comparison with gold, and that the high price of Bullion and low fates of exchange are the consequences as well as the sign of such depreciation. Before I attempt to investigate the truth of these propositions, by reference to the docu- ments with which the Report has furnished me, it may be convenient to ascertain what, on a full admission of all the arguments and reasonings of the Committee, is the extent of the evil they point out, what the present state of the national currency, as resulting from the criterion established in the Report. There is annexed to Mr. Mushett's pamphlet a ta- ble, shewing, 1st, the rate of exchange with Ham- bro' and Paris,for 50 years past, and how much it has been, in each instance, above or below par. 2d. The price of gold in London, and a com- parison of this price with the English standard, or mint price. 3 d. The amount of bank-notes in circulation, and the rate of their assumed depreciation, by a comparison with the price of gold. On reference to these tables it appears that, for about two years antecedently to the suspension of cash- payments, the exchange had been, in some degree, unfavourable to England; that, at the immediate period of the suspension, and for two years and a half succeeding that measure, from Nov. 1796 to July 1799, the exchange was very greatly in favour of England, and gold 10 at the mint-price. That, between the end of 1799 and 1802, the exchange was against Lon- doh and the price of gold considerably above the mint-price. That, from the end of 1802 to the end of 18 8, the exchanges were for six years considerably in favour of Great Britain, and the price of gold stationary, at 2| per cent, above the mint price. * Subsequently to the end of 1808 the exchanges have fallen, the price of gold has risen as before stated, and these circumstances have led to the investiga- tion of the Committee. It results from this reference, that, admitting the criterion established by the Report, as the test of an excess of paper, the grievance complained of is of recent date, that it had no existence for six years pre- viously to 1809, and' that the circulation of bank-notes during this period did not therefore exceed the natural wants of the public and was not excessive. This inference appears undenia- ble. I do not mean to infer that 17 or 18 milli- ons of bank-notes then in circulation may not" be too much, under other circumstances ; but I conclude, that Mr. Ricardo's opinion, that the * It ma'y be said, that even then the price of gold was above the mint-price; but it appears by the questions of the Committee and Mr. Goldsmid's evidence that the supply of gold was ver> small, and the price of \ per oz, was fixed by the Bank of England, whence ." the demand exceeded all competition." 11 paper-currency had long been excessive, when he wrote in 1809, was incorrect, that Mr. Mushett had not referred to his tables when he stated that the sign of this 'excess has been a perma- nently unfavourable exchange. It results equally from this theory, that du- ring the year 1 809, and subsequently, the circu- lation of paper has been excessive, because both the exchanges and price of bullion indicate such excess, During a part of this period* from July to Nov. 1809, the loss on the ex- change amounted to nearly 20 per cent. We learn, however, from the Report, that, in the spring of 1810, the exchanges experienced a gradual improvement, that on Hamburgh rose from 28, the lowest rate, to 31, that on Ams- terdam from 30 to 33 : 5, that on Paris from 19 ; 6 to 21: 11. "The exchange on Hamburgh appearing (as stated in the Report) to be 9 per cent, that on Amsterdam 7 per cent, and that on Paris 14 per cent, against this country. " These calculations do not ex- actly agree with those of Mr. Mushett ; admit- ting, however, the correctness of the state- ment by the Committee, a small proportion only of the loss thus experienced on the exchanges with the continent is to be ascribed, according to the opinion of the Committee, to, )C the depreciation of our currency. It is a principle laid down by the Committee, and which they consider to have been long settled and understood, " That the difference of exchange resulting from the state of trade and payments between two countries is limited by the expense of conveying and insuring the precious metals from one country to the other." It will be equally admitted that, in the event of an unfavourable balance of pay- ments, the depression of the exchange must ne- cessarily attain this limit, before the balance can be adjusted by the exportation of gold. The Committee endeavoured to ascertain the extent of this limit, that is the expense of send- ing bullion abroad, under present circum- stances, and they come to the conclusion. " that this expense in the last half of the last year (1809) di4 not exceed 7 per cent. and( they observe that an expense to this extent does not afford an adequate explanation of a fall in the exchanges so great as from 16 to 20 per cent, below par. " The increased cost/" they add, u of such remittance would explain, at those moments when the risk was greatest, a fall of something more than 7 per cent, in the exchange with Hamburgh and Holland, and a fall stilt greater perhaps in the exchange with Paris ; but the rest of the fall, which has 15 actually taken place, remains to be explained in some other manner." The expense of sending gold abroad was in no degree less in the spring of 1810 than in the autumn of 1809; and it follows, there- fore, that, according to the statements of the committee, the loss on the Dutch exchange, in the months of March and April last, was exactly equal to the expense of sending gold as a remittance ; on that on Hambrugh 2 per cent, greater ; and that, on the exchange with Paris, it was undefined, because the expense of sending gold to Paris was not ascertained. According to Mr. Mushett's calculations of the par between London and Paris, the loss on the French exchange was 2 per cent, more than the expense of sending gold to Holland : As this was the state of things for some months prior to the date of the Report, and at the period when it was presented, it will, perhaps, with some, be a subject of regret that the passage referring to the extreme of the lowest depression of the exchange was not expunged, as the event had proved it to be one of those temporary effects which the Committee had previously determined to dis- regard. Whether, however, the difference, which re- mains to be accounted for in some other manner 14 be 2 per cent, or 1 1 per cent, it is not necessary to travel out of the Report to assign a cause for it, without recurring to depreciation : " Re- ferring to the evidence of a continental merchant, on whose opinion the Committee appears to place much reliance, they state : " That poli- tical events, operating upon the state of trade, may often have contributed as well to the rise as to the fall of the exchange ; and, in particular, that the first remarkable depression, in 1809, is to be ascribed, as has been stated in the evidence already quoted, to commercial events, arising out of the occupation of the north of Germany by the troops of the French Emperor; the evil has been, that the exchange, when fallen, has not had the full means of recovery, under the existing system :" these means are explained to be, " the clandestine transmission of guineas, which improved it for the moment by serving as a remittance." Thus, then, it appears, that, on a full ad- mission of all the principles adopted by the Committee, and of their application to the present case, the foreign exchanges were, at the time when the Report was presented, and for three months prior thereto, about 2 per cent, below the natural limit of depression ; that this excess was th* emnant of a much greater 35 depression, occasioned by political events in the preceding year, during a period in which the means of exporting English gold coin, at the mint-price, in payment of debts, were withheld. When it is stated that, for 6 months since the date of the Report, the exchanges have continued at or about the same standard, or rather higher, and that at present the loss on the exchange is barely equal to the expense and risk of transporting gold, it will probably be thought that the question, as a practical question of national importance, is altogether at rest. That there is no necessity, at least, for the adoption of hasty remedies, even though the correctness of the general reasoning of the Committee should, on full inquity, be conceded. But I do not admit its correctness: I do not believe that the fall of the exchange and the encreased price of bullion indicate excess and consequent depreciation of our paper-currency ; and I doubt it, because the premises, on which this opinion is founded, are unsound, and the conclusions contrary to experience. The basis of the argument of the Committee, to the examination of which I now proceed, is that which I have shortly stated in page 8 as the first proposition, viz. " that the difference of exchange, resulting from the state of trade and payments between two countries is limited 16 by the expense of conveying and insuring the precious metals from one country to the other ; at least, that it cannot, for any considerable time, exceed that limit :" (Rep. p. 1 1.) there- fore, all excess of depression on the exchange, beyond the expense of conveyance, is to be attributed to depreciation of our currency. This proposition is so fully admitted, and so broadly stated, in each of the publications to which I have alluded, that it is not even guarded by the condition, that the country, by which the balance of payments is due, shall possess bullion or specie sufficient to liquidate it ; but, boldly as the principle is asserted, and strongly as reason appears to sanction it, I insist that it is not generally true, and that it is at variance with fact. It is stated, in the Report, from the evi- dence before the Committee of 1797, that the average expense, at that time, of con- veying specie from London to Hamburgh, was 3| per cent, yet, on reference to the course of exchange with Hamburgh, in Mr. Mushett's tables, it appears that, from the beginning of 1797 to the middle of 17.99, the exchange was continually in favour of Great Britain more than twice the expense of conveying gold ; and, for eighteen months of that time, 1 1 to 12 per cent, in our favour, or from 7 to 17 8 per cent, beyond such expense: nor does tliis profit appear to have occasioned any considerable importation of gold, which, dar- ing this period, rose to the mint-price, although, for several years before, it had, nominally at least, been below it. In the years 1764 to 1768, prior to the recoin- age, when the imperfect state of the coins occa- sioned gold to be 2 to 3 percent, above the mint- price, the exchange with Paris was 8 to 9 per cent, against London, at the same time the exchange with Hamburgh was, during the whole period, to 6 per cent, in favour of London ; here appears, then, a profit of 12 to 14 per cent, for the expense, in time of peace, of paying the debt to Paris with gold from Ham- burgh, which must have exceeded the fact by at least 8 or 10 per cent, and it is worthy of remark, that the average exchange with Ham- burgh, for the years 1766 and 17^7, of 5 per cent, in favour of London, added to 2 per cent, the price of gold above the mint-price, constituted a premium of 7 per cent, on the importation of gold into England, or, deduct- ing 1% per cent, for expenses in time of peace, a net profit of 5 per cent, yet the exchange was not rectified thereby. Again, in 177.3, 6, and 7, after the recoinage, we find the exchange 18 on Paris 5, 6, 7, and 8, per cent, against London in time of peace, when half the amount would have conveyed gold to Paris, and one-fourth have paid the debts of Paris at Amsterdam. In the years 1781, 2, and 3, being years of war, the exchange was constantly from 7 to 9 per cent, in favour of Paris; and, during this period, gold was the common circulation of this country, and the Bank was compelled to provide it for the public at the mint-price. It has been already shewn how little effect the precious metals produced towards equalising the exchange with Hamburgh, during the years 1797 and 1798; and another instance may be adduced in the years 1804 and 1805, when the Paris exchange varied from 7 to 9 per cent in favour of London. In every case here cited the fluctuations of the exchanges greatly exceeded the expense of conveying gold from one country to the other, and to a much greater degree in most of them than in the present instance; the circumstances of the times were, it will readily be admitted, more favourable to intercourse, on those occasions, than they now are, and the state of metallic circulation afforded faci- lities not now experienced here. Yet, under all these advantages, the principle assumed by the Committee was not operative, and cannot 19 therefore be admitted as a solid foundation for the superstructure of excess and deprecia- tion, attempted to be raised upon it. If it be said that probably, on these several occa- sions, gold was proportionately dear on the spot to which the exchange was^unfavourable, I admit the fact as probable, because I am without evidence respecting it ; but, if the price of gold abroad enters necessarily into the calculation of the "natural limit" of depres- sion of the exchange, then the course of foreign exchanges, rectified by the expense of sending gold abroad, does not form a just criterion of the adequacy or excess of our circulating medium, There appears also a defect in the application ^ of. the principle to the particular case under the consideration of the Committee. It is admitted in the Report "that the first remarkable depression of the exchange, in 1 809, is to be ascribed to commercial events, arising out of the occupation of the north of Germany by the troops of the French emperor.' J (p. 16.) If a depression equal to three times the cost of sending gold be admitted as the effect of any other cause than depreciation of currency, it can be considered as not overturning the principle of limitation, only by viewing the fall in question as an "occasional depression;" 20 but, if taken as an occasional depression only, (as the event indeed proved,) how can it be brought forward as evidence of an excess of currency, the Committee having established " a considerable duration" as a necessary con- dition to reii(]f r the course of exchange a just criterion ? The circumstances I have stated, respecting the exchanges on former occasions, were not perhaps brought under the notice of the Com- mittee; but they had two facts prominently before them, bearing immediately upon the question, of which they have taken no notice. Mr. Greffulhe offered this problem to the Com- mittee: "During the depreciation of English currency on the continent of Europe, a pre- mium was paid for it in America in hard dol- lars." The balance of payments may be against us with one country, and in our favour with another ; and, if the exchange is regulated by this balance, it will exhibit corresponding ap- pearances, particularly where those countries are remote. But, if the currency be depreciated be- low the value of gold, it is so positively, not relatively, and all exchanges must equally feel the influence of the depreciation. The other tact I learn from the paper 6\5, in the Appendix to the Report; between January 1809 and May 1810, the Swedish exchange 21 rose (against Sweden) 25 per cent, and was at that date 24 per cent, in favour of London. What are the circumstances of Swedish cur rency? We collect them incidentally from the examination of Mr. a continental mer- chant ( p. 75 ) " Have you ever known the exchange to fall to the extent of 12 to 15 per cent, in any part of Europe, in which it was computed in coin, containing a fixed quantity of gold or silver, or in paper, or bank-money, exchanged at a fixed agio either for such gold or silver, or for gold or silver bullion of definite amount."-^ Ans. "No, never; except in countries where the export of their currency has been effectually prohibited, such as Sweden ; I do not recollect any other country where paper, resting upon the foundation of coin, the latter is effec- tually prohibited from being exported.*' Q.IIow is that prohibition made effectual in Sweden? "By the bank not issuing specie to any amount, when the exchange is depreciated". Sweden was greatly indebted to England, for goods sent thither for the supply of the continent and north of Europe. Gold could not be exported, and therefore the premium on remittance by bills was great ; this seems a very natural effect, and one which will not surprize any one ; yet to account for an effect exactly similar, under similar circumstances, we are required to ad- jrrit that our paper-currency is depreciated, 22 whilst the Americans were giving a premium for it in hard dollars. It will be recollected that the question now agitated is not whether any inconvenience attends the substitution of pa- per for gold, as the medium of circulation, but whether that paper be now excessive in amount, and depreciated in value. As the result of the facts I have adduced, I assume that from the state of the foreign exchanges no such inference can justly be drawn.* * The terms favourable and unfavourable applied to the exchange are, perhaps, correct, as indicating a coi responding balance of trade and payments; but a favour- able exchange is frequently a very unfavourable circumstance, and vice versa. A British merchant sent goods to Sweden for sale early in 1809 ; they were valued at 1000 rix dollars; the exchange being at four rix dollars per pound sterling, they would then have produced, by remittance, 250. They were actually sold for 1000 rix dollars in the beginning of 1S10; and, remitted for at the exchange of five, produced > 200. The funds for the bill were provided by a consign- ment of goods from Sweden ; and England, therefore, recei- ved goods worth ^"200 in payment of the original export instead of 250, which it would have received had the ex- change not become so favourable. In a more familiar instance England benefits by an unfavourable exchange. When the Dutch had large sums in our funds, the dividends were re- mitted periodically, and a real or supposed demand for bills on Holland, at those periods, occasioned a fall on the ex? Change. Thirty-three shillings Flemish, for instance, were given in exchange for a pound sterling, instead of 34, s. The exchange was, therefore, less in favour of London. Yet it is 23 The Committee considers, ho wever, the price of gold as the most certain sign of excess and depreciation. " An ounce of standard gold-bullion will not fetch more in our market than 3 : 17 : 10|-, unless 3 : 17 : 10^ in our actual currency is equivalent to less than an ounce of gold ; " yet gold -bullion does bear in London a higher price than this standard or mint-price ; whence a de- preciation of the paper is inferred, which Mr. Mushett estimates to have amounted, in Sep- tember, 1 809, to 1 3 : 7 ' : per cent. Whilst sanctioning this old, and in the abstract in- controvertible, theory, and, as applying it to the present case, the Committee do not appear to have recollected, that, having admitted an ade- quate cause for the fall of the exchange, from commercial and political events, the increased price of gold-bullion to any extent, within the equivalent of the depression, is only a conse- quence ; and the documents in the Appendix \ shew that the price of gold-bullion did not at any period of the depression of the exchange exceed the price which it was worth as a remit- tance, compared with its value in foreign mar- kets. From the calculations furnished by Mr. evident that on every 33 pigs of lead, blocks of tin, or ounces of gold, sent to Holland, to provide funds for payment of the dividends, one pig, block, or ounce, was saved to this country. 24 Greffullie to the Committee, (Appendix 58,) it appears, that, in the spring of 1810, an ounce of gold, of English standard weight, was worth, at Hamburgh, 4t : 17 : sterling, the price being 101, and the exchange QQs. At this time the extreme price of bullion, in London, was 4i : 12 : 0, or 5| per cent, below the price at Hamburgh* At the same time the price of gold, at Paris, exceeded its value here by 8| per cent, and, at Amsterdam, by 7 per cent, at the then current exchanges. The ex- pense of conveyance to Holland being then about 7 per cent, gold would not then pay for importation, neither would it be exported, merely with a view to profit^ though it would be exported, and was in fact exported, in pre- ference to bills in abundance of instances, which might readily have been ascertained by the Committee. On reference to the paper, No. 60, in the Appendix to the Report, it appears, that, in June, July, August, and September, 1809, the price .of gold, at Hamburgh, was 104J, and the exchange %&s. if at 101, and 29s. there was a profit on the export of gold from hence to Hamburgh of 5| per cent, it follows that at 104f, and 28 s* there was a profit of 12 ; or, deducting the expenses of conveyance, that gold, if bought here at 4 ; 12 : per ounce, was a cheaper remittance by 5^ per cent, than 25 a bill at the current exchange. This satne do* cument, No. 60, shews also, that within twelve months the price of gold at Hamburgh varied from 100^ to 104f, the exchange with Great Britain in both instances, and during the inter- vening period of eight or nine months, being at 28 s. We find the price of gold continuing, in other instances, at 104, whilst the exchange rose from 28 s. to 29 s. lid. even to 30s. 8d. variations of 4 or 5 per cent, in the cost of a remittance in gold, which remained nearly stationary in its price here during the whole period. These fluctuations seem to militate against the intimacy of connexion which the Committee assumes to exist between the course of exchange and the price of gold, in places where the currency is gold or convertible into it. And the facts stated, respecting the actual price of bullion in the foreign markets, satisfactorily meet the observations of the Com- mittee, implying that they discover no advance of the price of gold in those markets analogous to that which has obtained here. Refering to Mr. Greffulhe's documents, No. 58, they observe, in deed, that it is important, " as it shews that " the actual prices of gold in the foreign mar- kets are jsut so much lower than its market- price here as the difference of exchange amounts to." Mr. Greffulhe's observations E 26 pn this paper convey a different impression : " One of the papers I have delivered in shews (he says) the foreign prices of gold reduced into sterling money at the present low rates of exchange, and the excess above the market- price here may be considered as about equal to the charges of conveyance? (page 3) ; nor is this excess of price at Hamburgh merely re- lative, and arising out of the exchange. It ap- pears by the paper, 56, in the Appendix, that the prices of gold at Hamburgh have, in the two last years, risen considerably, as the fol- lowing extract shews " highest and lowest pri- " ces of gold at Hamburgh, in the years 1 806-7, and 1808-9. lowest highest. lowest, highest. At Hamburgh, 1S06, 98 103 180S, 102 106 1807, 98| 101J 1809, 101J 104J" The price of gold, at Hamburgh, was, therefore, between three and four per cent, higher, on the average of the years 1808 and 9, than in the two years which preceded them. I observe, also, that the fluctuations in the price of gold, at Hamburgh, f where, as the Report informs us, " Silver is not only the measure of all ex- changeable value, but is rendered an invariable (or unvarying) measure," have, within a period of two years, amounted to no less than eight per cent. But, it will be said, gold at Ham- 27 burgh is a commodity ; here it is the standard of value ; and an ounce of gold cannot sell for more than an ounce of gold of equal quality, unless the medium of payment is of less value than an ounce of gold. Mr. Mushett is of opinion, " that the price of gold can in reality, at no time, be above its mint-price, and that its being so at present in appearance is caused by the excessive quantity of bank-notes in circulation." This is the strong hold of the theorists, and I shall not attack it otherwise than by fact. The theory may, however, xbe correct, and its application erroneous." In the Report of the Committee, I find this statement, page 4. " Upon referring, for a course of years, to the tables, which are pub- lished for the use of the merchants, such as Lloyd's List and WettenhalFs Course of Ex- change, your Committee have found, that, from the middle of the year 1773, when the refor- mation of the coin took place, till about the mid- dle of the year 1799, two years after the sus- pension of cash-payments by the Bank, the market-price of standard gold in bars remained steadily uniform at the price of ,3 : 17 : 6, be- ing, with the small allowance for loss by deten- tion at the mint, equal to the mint-price of 3 : 17 : 1(% with the exception of one year, 28 from May, 1783, to May, 1784, when it was occasionally at 3 : 1 8 : ; during the same period, it is to be observed, the price of Portu- gal gold coin was occasionally as high as 4t : 2 : 0; and your Committee also observe, that it was stated to the Lord's Committee, in 1797, by Mr. Abraham Newland, that the Bank had been frequently obliged to buy gold higher than the mint-price, and, upon one oc- casion, gave as much for a small quantity, which their agent procured in Portugal, as ,4:8:0. But your Committee find, that the price of standard gold, in bars, was never, for any length of time, materially above the jnint-price during the whole period of twenty- four years, which elapsed from the reformation of the gold-coin to the suspension of the cash- payments at the Bank." I submit the whole passage to my readers, that I may not risk misrepresenting its mean- ing, which I profess not to understand. Do the Committee mean, that the value of stand- ard gold in the market was only 3 : 17 : 10f, or 3 : 18 : 0, when the Portugal, gold, from which it was made, was worth ,4:2:0? To me it appears evident, that the sentence re- specting Bank purchases, beginning " during the same period," and ending at " <& : 8 : 0," introduced after the report was framed, 29 and its operation on the statement not exactly perceived. It appears also to have escaped the notice of the Committee, that, in 179->, the directors of the Bank stated to Mr. Pitt, that the price of gold was ..4:3:0 and ,4:4:0 per ounce ; and that their guineas being to be purchased at 3 : 17 : 10^- pointed out clearly the ground of the fears of the Bank of a continued demand for them, (see Report of Lord's Committee anno 1797.) The fair inference from the information gain- ed from Mr. Newland, and from the Bank di- rectors, seems to be this : that, although it ap- pears, by the printed lists, that, during the whole period between the recoinage and sus- pension of cash-payments, standard gold never exceeded the mint-price more than the differ- ence between 3 : 17 : 10J and ,3 : 18 : per ounce, yet that, in fact, the foreign gold coin from which such standard gold was made did sell for 4 : 9 : and 4:4:0. That the Bank was in the habit of paying these prices, and, on one occasion, paid 4:8:0, or 13 per cent, above the mint-price. During this period bank-notes were at once convertible into gold, and the coin was in the most per- fect state. The real question before us is, not what was the price of that gold which the 30 Bank was compelled to deliver to the public on demand at < 3 : 17 : 10J, but what was the price at which gold could be elsewhere ob- tained ? 4 : 3 : 0. 4:4:0, say the Bank directors. Aye, .4:8:0, says Mr. Newland. An ounce of standard gold did then sell for more than an ounce of standard gold. This, says Mr. Mushett, is impossible. HO. 38 be admitted as possible, that an incontrovertible theory may, even in the hands of the ablest men, be erroneously applied. I will next call the attention of my readers to that part of the Report which relates to the balance of trade and payments : The Committee is of opinion, that the favoura- ble balances of the two former years ought to render the exchanges in the present year peculiarly favourable ; but, observing how en- tirely the present depression of the exchange 'with. Europe is referred by many persons ( being indeed all those who were examined ) to the great excess of our imports above our exports, they called for an account of the actual value of those for the last five years: what they called for they received ; but, by a most unaccountable omission, they have never re- ferred to it, and appear to have formed their opinion upon documents altogether irrelevant to the subject before them. In the body of the Report, pages 12 and 1 3, are two statements of exports and imports for five years preceding 1810; from the first of which it appears, that the balance of the actual value of exports and imports to all parts of the 'world in 1809 was ,14,834,000: by the second, it is shewn that the balance in favour of Great Britain on its trade, with 39 the continent of Europe alone, computed in official value, for the year 1 809, was 1 4, 1 70, 758, to which latter statement the Committee adds this observation. " The balances with Europe alone, in favour of Great Britain, as exhibited in this imperfect statement, are not far from corresponding with the general and more ac- curate balances before given. The favourable balance of 1809, with Europe alone, com- puted according to. the actual value, would be much more considerable than the value of the same year in the former general statement? that is much more than ,14,834,000: we will suppose, in even numbers, 15 millions. Now this assertion involves an actual error of half its object, for it appears, by the papers 75 and 76 in the Appendix, being accounts of offi- cial and real values of exports and imports to die continent of Europe, that the amount of the actual value of exports in 1 809 was <27, 109,337 of the imports 19,821,601 leaving the balance in favour only ^7, 368,736 If the average of the two years 1809 and 1810 were taken, the balance would be c6,200,000, being a difference on the two years of .8,600,000 ; or, on the single year to which the observation, though not the reasoning, 40 of the Committee was confined, of <7,500,GOa, but this is not by any means the extent to which the impression conveyed by the obser- vation of the Committee is erroneous ; the sin of omission greatly exceeds in this in-?, stance the positive fault. These Custom-Hotise documents are defective, the Committee ob- serve, because they do not include any ac- count of freight paid to foreigners, at this time peculiarly large, or of the sums received from them for the employment of British shipping. They leave out of consideration interest on ca- pital on either side ; the pecuniary transactions between the governments of Great Britain and Ireland ; contraband trade, and the imports and export of bullion ; also the important ar- ticles of bills drawn on government for naval, military, and other foreign, expenses. A Committee, appointed to inquire, might have been expected to endeavour at least to ascertain the extent and operation on the balance of these several items of exception; but they dismiss the subject with a regret, that there has been some difficulty and de- lay in executing an order for the account of the government bills. I have thought it right to be more inquisitive, and am enabled, from the documents in the Appendix, and where these are deficient from accounts obtained from the 41 public offices, to exhibit the following statement of the foreign expenses of government Amount of bills drawn on the Trea- sury, between Dec. 1808, and Dec. 1809, (Army Extraordina- ries,) Appendix, 70, A 1 . . . 4,162,390 Deduct bills .drawn from the West Indies, Africa, and America . . 903,366 Amount affecting the European ba- lance 3,258,824 The specie and bullion exported by the paymasters-general amount- ed, in 1808 and 1809, to upwards of five millions, of which, in 1809, (Appendix, 79-). 1,540,000 In addition to these sums, and of the same nature, are bills drawn on the commissary-in-chief . 328,767 On the Pay-Office, (ordi- nary of the army,) . . 1,793,778 On the Victualling-Office 897,095 On the. Navy-Board V. . 672,820 On the Transport-Board . 295,705 On the Board of Ordnance 212,753 4,200,918 The accounts I have ob- tained do not distinguish European from other 42 services, admitting a de- duction in equal pro- portion to that on the extraordinaries, 'which is ascertained, about . . 900,000 Leaves the amount affecting the Eu- ropean balance .......... 3,300,918 In estimating the neutral freight, I will suppose the amount paid by foreigners to British ships, in 18C>9, equal to that paid by Great Britain to neutrals for corn,* wine, and brandy, from France, and for the intercourse between Heli- goland and the continent, and confine the deduction to the neu- tral freight in the Baltic trade alone. I have sufficient grounds for estimating this trade, in 1809, " at 200,000 tons and upwards, the rate of freight 20 per ton and two-thirds neutral," hence arises a debt of 2,600,000 10,6.99,732 This sum-exceeds by three millions the ba- lance arising on British trade with the conti- * The importation *)f .corn in six months exceeded 600,000 quarters 43 nent in 1809, supposing the whole amount of our exports to have been paid for within the year. This, it appears by the evidence, was not the fact Nor can the deficiency have been made good (according to the idea of the Committee) by balances due from former years ; for, by reference to t\ie same documents, Nos. 75, ?6, we learn that, in 1808, the balance in our favour was only five millions, subject to deductions of a like nature,* and that, in 1807, it was two millions against us, without rcfer^ cnce to them, the real value of imports from the continent of Europe having been 17,442,755 and the value of exports, only . . 15,420,514 Balance against us, 2,022,241 * Nor does the preceding statement adequately represent the amount of our foreign payments. The pay of officers on foreign service and in garrisons is, for the most part, received by, and drawn from, their respective agents. The mo- ney transactions with Ireland are not noticed, the first feature of which is the loan of If mil- lions, raised in this country for the service of that; neither is any deduction made for that * In 1808, the Treasury -bills for European services amounted to . . . . : lj millions, and the exportation of specie by the paymasters 3| ditto. These two items alone absorbing the whole balance. 44 proportion of our exports, which being the produce of foreign colonies in our possession belong to residents abroad, or, if sold in England, con- > stitutes a debt to the Dane or Hollander. The interest due to foreigners, for money in our funds, is also left out of the account ; but, ta- ken as it stands, the result is, that from the estimated favourable balance of fifteen millions, as assumed by the Committee, are to be deduct- , ed, first, the error in point of fact, 7,500,000 and next, the account of the items of foreign service, &c. on the prin- ciples established in the Report . . 10,700,OOQ constituting a real difference affect- ing the argument respecting the course of exchange of 18,200,000 I need not solicit attention to th result of this inquiry into the accuracy of the opinion promulgated in the Report, viz. that the state of the exchanges ought, during the present year, to be peculiarly favourable, but I offer one ob- servation to the serious consideration of the public. The usual cause of variations in the foreign exchanges and price of bullion being the fluc- tuations in the balance of payments, due to or by Great Britain, the real object of the ap- pointment of the Committee was to ascertain 45 whether the same .or any other cause operated in the instance referred to them.. The chief ob- ject of investigation would naturally he, there- fore, the actual state of trade and payments;, and the reader of the, Report presumes, that the facts stated, and the inferences drawn, are de<- duced from every procurable document, tending to illustrate this leading point of inquiry. In- stead . of this, the Committee has, it appears, supposed and assumed the fact on which the whole question turns, without waiting for the means of information, (for Mr. Irving's pa- pers 75 and 76 are dated on 1st of June, and the Report was presented on the 8th) or making use of it when in their possession. The Report states loosely, that this favourable balance of 15 millions should be subjected to some rectifications, without ascertaining what their effect would be ; and, owing to this haste, con- veys to parliament this most erroneous impres- sion, that our resources and means of foreign expenditure are still great; instead of apprising them of a fact which would, I apprehend, have been new, and perhaps not very accepta- ble to the public, that, in 1807, the whole of our foreign expenditure, whatever it was, was an addition to a debt to the continent of Eu- rope of two millions sterling; that, in 1808, the total of the foreign expenditure for the ordinary 46 of the army abroad, of Bills on the Navy, Vic- tualling, Transport, and Ordnance, Boards, was a debt incurred ; and that in the last year there was a deficiency of 3 or 4 millions encreased by whatever proportion of 27 millions of exports was not paid for within the year. The evidence of all this was before the Committee, or at its command; had they thought fit to bring it for- ward, it is probable the public would have deem- ed the rate of exchange and price of bullion sufficiently accounted for, without engaging in any very vehement controversy, respecting the accuracy of the abstract theories of the Report. In proportion as our faith in the Report is staggered, in proportion as we feel compelled to receive with caution the opinions of the Com- mittee, will those of the practical men rise in estimation. In defiance of documents and of statements to Parliament on authority of vast favourable balances, it was the declared opinion of every such man before the Committee, that the balance of payments has been against us, and so the fact has proved. I trust it will not be thought that I treat lightly, much less with anything like disre- spect, the arguments contained in the Report, and the publications to which I hav r e alluded. I pass them by, because my sole object is tp adduce facts on which others may reason. It 47 would unquestionably be difficult to deny the abstract truth of many of the theories con- tained in them ; but, if abstractedly true, they are not always applicable. At a time when the absence, at least, if not the scarcity of gold is the ground of complaint, they reason on its operation as a vis mediatrix, as if it still form- ed the circulating medium, and was every where attainable. They speak of increased ex- portation from reduced prices as a general con- sequence, wholly disregarding the operation of embargoes, non-intercourse enactments, licen- ces, orders of council, and Milai decrees, in the particular case. At a moment when we were compelled to receive corn, even from our enemy, without the slightest stipulation in fa- vour of our own manufacturer, and to pay neu- trals for bringing it, Mr. Ricardp tells us, that the export of bullion and merchandize, in pay- ment of the corn we may import, resolves it- self entirely into a question of interest, and that, if we give coin in exchange for goods, it must be from choice, not necessity. Whilst providing against famine, he tells us, that we should not import more goods than we export, unless we had a redundancy of currency : wri- ting in the end of 1809, Mr. Ricardo tninks it necessary for Mr. Thornton to shew, (in sup- port of his opinion, that a demand for bullion, 48 and an increased price, might be occasioned by an importation of corn,) " Why 'an unwilling- ness should exist in the foreign country to re- ceive our goods in exchange for their corn; and, that if such an unwillingness did exist, we should consent to indulge it." This equalising system is a very just one, where it meets with no external impediments ; but, when applied to practice, it appears to me like the experiment in vacuo, where all friction, all obstruction, being removed, and the power of gravitation alone allowed to operate, the guinea and the feather descend with equal velocities. The fact is undeniably true under the circumstances of the experiment, but it is true only within 'the limits of an exhausted receiver, and is, there- fore, wholly inapplicable to any of the common purposes of life. The three propositions, to which I have in the preceding pages called the attention of the rea- der, appear to have been brought forward by the Committee, as well as by the authors on whose theories the Report is founded, to induce the admission of the depreciation of the paper- currency of this country as the necessary con- sequence of the impossibility of accounting for the depression of the exchanges and the in- creased price of bullion in any other way; they may be termed negative arguments. If, 49 by what has been brought under the notice of the reader, this dilemma is in any degree re- moved, the positive arguments which remain to be examined are relieved of a weight which oppresses and restricts their free operation in the Report of the Committee. The Committee is of opinion, that the paper- currency is issued to excess. This opinion is founded on two minor propositions : 1st. That the Bank possesses the power of adding to the amount of their notes in circu- lation beyond the absolute deman^l for paper, as a circulating medium. 2nd. That their issues regulate those of the country banks, which are dependant upon and proportionate thereto. Previously to the year 1797, the affairs of the Bank of England were veiled in mystery; the amount of their notes in circulation was not even conjectured by the best-informed men ; and it was deemed a sort of sacrilege to pry into their secrets. At that period many lead- ing facts were made known, and information has since been annually communicated to Par- liament of the extent of their issues ; much ad- ditional light was thrown on the nature of their dealings, by the Finance Committee, in 1807; and it might reasonably have been expected, that all that could, with propriety, be made H 50 public would have been developed on the pre- sent occasion. Such expectation, wherever it was entertained, has been greatly disappointed : instead of ascertaining facts which the expe- rience of the Governors and Directors who were examined would have stamped with the seal of authority, the Committee has, generally speaking, called for opinions, and, where these have proved adverse to the theory which it was intended to establish, has been more occu- pied in refuting them, and proving their ab- surdity, than in ascertaining on what they were founded. In the examinations of the Directors of the Bankj inserted in the Appendix, I find but two facts of any importance bearing on the question now under consideration, viz. the power of the Bank to increase at pleasure the circulation of their notes, the one was wholly disregarded and the other treated as absurd ; both occur in answer to the question ; " What is the cri- terion which enables the Bank to keep the issue of bank-notes within the limit which the occa- sion of the public requires, and to guard against excess in the circulation of the country?" This question occurs virtually more than once, and the answer is this ; 1st. The paper would revert to us, if there were a redundancy in cir- culation ; 2dly. By discounting only solid paper, 51 given, as far as we can judge, for real transac- tions. It would have been highly interesting to have procured some practical illustration of the first part of the answer, and it was indis- pensihly necessary to a right understand- ing of the subject, to have obtained full ex- planation of the latter. To the former, the Committee paid very little attention ; and they appear to have held the latter extremely cheap; yet this latter criterion seems to be considered as a sort of Bank axiom, and has a sanc- tion which entitles it to more respect than it has received. To understand this subject aright, it is requisite to analyse, in some de- gree, the circumstances attending the circu- culation of bank-paper. Mr. Kicardo has assimilated the J3ank of England, . during the restriction, so far as relates to the effects of its issues, to a gold-mine, the produce of which, being thrown into circulation, in addition to a circulating- medium already suf- ficient, is an excess; and has the acknow- ledged effect of depreciating the value of the existing medium, or, in other words, of raising the prices of commodities for which it is usually exchanged. But Mr. Ricardo has not stated, what is essential to the compari 7 sion, why it is that the discovery of a gold- mine would produce this effect. It would pro- duce it, because the proprietors would issue it, for whatever services, without any engage- ment, to give an equal value for it again to the holders, or any wish, or any means, of calling back and annihilating that which they have issued. By degrees, as the issues 'increase they exceed the wants of circula- tion ; gold produces no benefit to the holder as gold; he cannot eat it, nor clothe himself with it; to render it useful, he must ex-* change it either for such things as are im- mediately useful, or for such as produce re- venue. The demand and consequently the prices of commodities and real properties, measured in gold, increases and will continue to increase so long as the mine continues to produce. And this effect will equally follow whether, under the circumstances I have supposed, the issue be gold from a mine or paper from a government-bank. All this I distinctly admit ; but, in all this statement, there is not one point of analogy to the issues of the Bank of England. The principle on which the Bank issues its notes is that o' ? loan. Every note is issued at the requisition of some party, who be- comes indebted to the Bank for its amount, and gives security to return this note, or an^ 53 other of equal value, at a fixed and not re- mote period, paying an interest, proportion- ed to the time allowed. " The notes of the Bank of England," the Committee observes, " are principally issued in advances to govern- ment for " the public service," (anticipations ; of the taxes and instalments of loans, to be repaid by the public,) and in advances to the merchants upon the discount of their bills/' It is a consequence of this mode of issue that it costs something, namely the interest on the the money borrowed, to take a note out. of the Bank. No note is isued in payment of any ser- vice, moral or physical, constituting the cowhide-, ration font, and there is therefore no analogy be- tween the circumstances of the issues from a gold mine and those from the Bank of England* In the case of an excessive issue of gold beyond the the wants of circulation, the excess is brought to market to be made 'productive, it grows cheap, and commodities grow dear. In the case of an excess of bank-paper the remedy is more simple : the " surplus/' says tiie late Governor of the Bank, " would revert to us by a diminished application for discounts and advances on go- vernment-securities." This parr of the subject requires illustration, because it cannot be very generally understood by those who must ulti- mately decide on the merits of the Report. .54 The Comniit^e has entered into some detail in the Report, and has annexed some documents in the Appendix, to illustrate the practice which obtains in the transaction .of business by the London bankers, and in the money-circulation of the metropolis, but their observations afford a very inadequate view of the subject, and the whole of page 23 must be taken as evidence that, by those who drew the Report, the subject was not perfectly understood. By the practice of London, strengthened by a, resolution of the Bank of England, not to discount any bill unless payable at the house of a reg,iilar banker, all the commercial payments of the metropolis, as well as those of the coun- try transacted in London, are made through the agency of a banker. In 19 cases out of 20, where the payment is not to a revenue-board, the business is transacted between two bankers, one on the part of the debtor, the other on the paTfcof the creditor. It is become an establish- ed practice between bankers not to call upon each other for these payments before 4 o'clock ; and then mutually to write off or exchange the res- pective charge which each has upon the other,and to pay the difference only ; by which contri- vance, so great an economy of bank-notes is ef- fected, that an average of ,220,000 of notes is found sufficient, according to the evidence of 55 the inspector of the clearing-house, to settle the balance of daily transactions to the amount of ^4, 700,000. Owing to this circumstance the bankers have been enabled to lower, yery consi- derably, their stock of notes, and < to place the 1 same productively in bills and others securities. This comparatively unprepared state to answer unforeseen demands has led to other improve- ments in banking. A great proportion of ban- kers have now accounts open with the Bank, where, if they take care to hold a sufficiency of good bills, they can always get money at one day's notice ; and, as a still farther accommoda- tion, accredited brokers now hourly walk Lom- bard-street, take the superfluous cash of one banker, and lend it to another, in any sums for any time, a week, a day, or for an indefinite pe- riod, to be repaid when called for ; nay, so nicely is the scale now adjusted, that a loan of bank- notes before 3 o'clock, repayable by draft at the clearing at four, is no uncommon or unimportant accommodation to the most opulent parties in the money-market. From this statement it is evident that the banking-houses in London are like so many cis- terns, disposed on each side of the street, be- tween which pipes of communication are intro- duced, the overplus of one will presently find- 56 its way into the next, and whilst one is deficient none will overflow. The Bank has of late become a party to a very important arrangement to economise bank-notes. The daily demand of the Bank on the bankers for the amount of bills accepted and payable at their Several houses is of course considerable, and used to be made at an early period of the day, before the notes were, issued for bills discounted on the same day, and with- out any previous information to the bankers of what the amount charged on them might be, and of which they had no means of judging. The Bank has, for some time past, notified the extent of the demand in the early part of the day, and taken the amount at four o'clock ; receiving in part-payment any draft on the Bank for discount, or otherwise, which the bankers may happen to hold, instead of bank-notes. Every endeavour, it may fairly be inferred, therefore, is used to economise bank-notes, and restrict the circulation ; by the bankers, for the purpose of increasing their profits, which depend on the proportion of their deposits which they can turn into quick stock ; and by the Bank, with a view to the public accommodation, or to save an unprofitable issue of bank-notes. Still, it may be said, if the Bank gives way to the 57 applications for discount, which may be as un- limited as the spirit of adventure, bank-notes may be multiplied ad infmitum, at the will of the Directors. The Bank Directors say other- wise, " If we issue too many notes, the excess will return upon us." There exists in the commercial world that de- gree of disinclination to discount at the Bank which leads every man to recur to his banker for assistance before he sends his paper to the Bank ; and on the other hand a banker does not allow a respectable customer to go to the Bank for accommodation, whilst he can with any convenience furnish it himself. This is, in some measure, matter of feeling on both sides ; and not only so, for the Bank advances money on bills of a particular description only, and is un- deviating in its adherence to rules, and even to forms ; neither does it take bills as a security for money to be repaid at the will of the bor- rower, as bankers do; but assumes the pro- perty in the bills, deducting discount for the whole term unexpired ; so that a party wanting money for a week must pay two months iu- terest for it, if he have no bills at shorter date to offer. I have already shewn with what degree of rapidity money finds its level amongst the bankers in London, and it results, therefore, as i 58 a general inference, that, whilst there is money unemployed and to spare in the city, discounters of the first class will not present themselves at the Bank ; this statement will lead, I apprehend, to an explanation of the an- swer of the Directors to the inquiry of the Committee as to any rule by which they regulate their issues of notes so as to prevent excess. So long as the amount of notes in the hands of the public is not more than the par- ties holding them are willing to retain in their hands unemployed, for the purpose of making their daily payments, there is obviously no ex- cess of that description which influences the price of commodities. When the amount goes beyond this, the surplus instantly fastens on the best bills and most eligible government-securi- ties, chiefly on the first ; and the effect even of a very small surplus will, whilst it continues, be surprisingly great. If it fall into the hands of any discounter who lias occasion to pay money to the re venue- boards or to the Bank, the notes are cancelled, and the excess removed. If other- wise, the same sum of ,50,000 may pass suc- cessively through the hands of every banker in Lombard-street, and absorb in its passage all the best bills in the market, to an unlimited amount; for if A. a merchant, borrow it of B. a banker, fae immediately pays it away to C. who deposits 59 it without loss of time (indeed, as I before ol> served, he never withdraws it) with the same or other bankers ; but, however often this trans- action takes place during the day, it makes no real reduction in the supposed excess of notes, which will be as superabundant after the last discount it has effected as before the first. But the ca^se will be speedily altered, the demand for discounts at the Bank is diminished on the morrow, to the extent of the multiplied acconir modation afforded by the excess, whilst its call on the public for the payment of discounted bills falling due is undiminished. The redundancy of .notes reverts, therefore, (and in more than a due proportion, which ac- counts for some of the effects frequently ex- perienced,) to the Bank, more being paid in than are taken out, and the amount in circulation is diminished. The recurrence of a demand for notes by the first class of discounters (those which the di- rectors distinguish as solid paper for real trans- actions) will indicate at once the abatement of the excess ; and it does appear to me that the criterion, or rule, which the directors have stated is a sufficient one. The effectual and rapid operation of this con troul over the Bank issues receives satisfactory illus- tration by reference to the amount of bank-notes in circulation at the period immediately preceding 60 and following the issue of dividends, the in- creased circulation arising from an issue on each of these occasions of upwards of five millions being within very few days hardly perceivable. In April 1809, for instance, im- mediately preceding the payment of dividends, the amount of notes of c5 and upwards was . < 13,000,000 Subsequently to the 1 1 th an issue took place of four millions, yet on the 7th of May the amount in cir- culation was only 13,100,000 On the 7th of July, after the quar- terly payment had been made to the Bank, and when the circulation was at its lowest ebb, the amount of notes above 5 was 12,800,000 And of the issue of seven millions between the 1 1th and the end of the month, no evidence appeared on the 7th of August beyond a circula- tion of 13,100,000 How much earlier the effect was produced the paper in the Appendix to the Report does not in these instances shew, but the more detailed accounts No. 38, 39, and 40, enable me to state that in January, 1810, the large issue made on the 9th and subsequent day had lost its ef- fect by the 22d, on which day the circulation was reduced below the average of December ; 61 on this occasion, the speedy reduction may be considered, perhaps, as promoted by the partial redemption of the loan in the hands of the Bank at that period. But in April no such cause operated, yet it appears that by the 2 1st of April the circulation was within ,100,000 of the amount on the 31st of March, although in the intervening period nearly four millions had been issued for dividends on the public funds. In the year ending Jan. 1810, the interest on the public funds, exclusive of the proportion received by the commissioners for reducing the debt, amounted to about 26 millions, or, de- ducting the property-tax, to 23^ millions; which was issued to the public quarterly, in the pro- portions of 7^ millions in Jan. and July, and 44- millions nearly in April and October.* It is observable that, although the January and July dividends exceed by three millions those of the other quarters, there is no perceivable dif- ference in the period within which the circula- tion is reduced to the average amount. The efficiency of thecontroul which the pub- lic holds over the issues of the Bank is in some * It appears by the account No. 4, in the Appendix to the second report of the Finance Committee of ISO/, thet the amount of dividends due is generally issued within about 500,000, before the end of the month in which it is pay w - M* 62 measure governed by the amount of discounted bills in the hands of the Bank, compared with the amount of advances to government on se- curities payable at more remote or less .certain periods, and the total amount of notes. The two latter amounts we know, the former is not distinctly before the public, but the Committee has stated, from a communication made in con- fidence, that, whilst the advances to govern- ment for the two last years are less than they were for any of the six years before the restric- tion, the amount of bills discounted in the last year bears a very high proportion to their largest amount in any year preceding 1797; without going into calculation it will readily be allowed that the amount of these bills, this demand on the public, far exceeds any possible or supposed excess; and, if there be any where a superabund- ance of notes, it is therefore very easy to re- duce it. I have entered into the preceding detail for the purpose of shewing the practical operation of the rule by which, as the directors have stated, the bank regulates its issues so as to avoid ex- cess. I think it will be satisfactory to my prac- tical readers. By those of a more speculative cast the theories of the Report will still be pre- ferred, but for such I have a more cogent ar- gument in stove, and one to which they will 63 hardly demur; whether the rule in question be really the governing principle of the Bank, 01 whether it was thrown before the Committee with any malicious intent, I dare not decide, but the fact certainly is, that the axiom, 01 rule of conduct, on which the Committee has been pleased to heap contempt and ridicule, respect- ing which they have declared that the doctrine is fallacious, and leads to dangerous results, was promulgated by, and is founded on, the autho- rity of Dr. Adam Smith, and was proposed to the Committee nearly in his own words. I quote the passage from the second chapter of the second book of the Wealth of Nations. " What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker of any kind is not either the whole capital with which he trades, or even any considerable part of that capital, but that part of it only which he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in xeady money, for answering occasional demands. If the paper which the Bank advances never exceeds this value, it can never exceed the value of the gold and silver which would necessarily circulate in the country if there were no paper-currency, it can never exceed the quantity which the circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ." True ; but how shall we ascertain when it exceeds this value. " When a bank discounts to a 64 Merchant a real bill of exchange, drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, which, as soon as it becomes due, is really paid by that debtor, it only advances to him a part of the value which he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money jor answering occasional demands" Consequently its advances will not exceed the quantity which the circula- tion of the country can easily absorb and em- ploy. That the Committee may be right and Dr. Smith wrong is very possible ; I am not theorist enough to decide between them ; but the whole weight of Adam Smith's authority lies on the passage, and must be raised before the theory contained in it can be overturned. It is brought forward by him expressly as a rule for the con- duct of banks, and he adds, " little expense can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers of such a bank. (Ed. 179& vol. 1, page 455.) In the course of the examination of the Bank Directors by the Committee, it appear- ed thatf they do not refer to the state of the exchanges and price of bullion as a rule by which to regulate their advances, conceiving " that there is no connexion be- tween the exchanges and the amount of Bank circulation. " That this is also a great prac- tical error, the Committee infers from the ex- 65 periehce of all nations, where a paper-currency has been in use, and they advert briefly to the effects produced on the exchanges by the paper-currencies of North America, of France, of Portugal, and Austria. They observe, how- ever, that "-excess and want of confidence have usually combined to depreciate the paper- currency of foreign countries ; but, as want of confidence has no place in our situation at present, they adduce examples of the other sort, in which the depreciation was produced by excess alone." As the anecdotes are stated, it would certainly appear that the paper was in the adduced instances excessive, and yet the fact most assuredly is, that in neither case was excess the cause of the de- preciation, and the assumption directly con- tradicts the obvious meaning of the docu- ments referred to. The first instance pur- ports to be cited from Adam Smith, and refers to the latter part of the 2d chap, of the 2d book of the Wealth of Nations. It is thus given in the Report, (page 17.) "In Scotland, about the end of the seven years war, banking was carried to a very great excess, and, by a prac- tice of inserting in their promissary notes an optional clause of paying at sight or 6 months after sight with interest, the conver- tibility of such notes into specie at the will K 66 of the holders was, in effect, suspended. These notes accordingly became depreciated, in com- parison with specie ; and while the abuse lasted the exchange between London and Dumfries, for example, was sometimes 4 per cent against Pumfries, while the exchange between London and Carlisle, which is not 30 miles distant from Dumfries, was at par. The Edinburgh banks, when any of their paper was brought in to be exchanged for bills on London, were accustomed to extend or contract the date of the bills they gave, according to the state of exchange, diminishing in this manner the value of their bills, nearly in the same degree in which the excessive issue had caused their paper to be depreciated. This excess of paper was at last removed by granting bills on London at a fixed date," Sec. That the depreciation might be thus re- medied is natural enough ; but it is not an equally obvious remedy for excess. The fact is, that, in the original passage in the Wealth of Nations, there is not one word about excess ; and Dr. Smith assigns a dif- ferent cause and also a different remedy for the depreciation. Speaking of the optional clause, he says " the promissary notes of those banking companies constituted, at that time, the far greater part of the currency 67 of Scotland, which this uncertainty of pay- nent degraded below the value of gold and silver money ;" he states the fact respecting the difference of exchange between Dumfries and Carlisle, and adds : " but at Carlisle bills were paid in gold and silver, whereas at Dumfries they were paid in scotch bank-notes, and the un- certainty of getting those bank-notes exchanged for gold and silver coin had thus degraded them below the value of that coin: The act of parliament which suppressed 10 and 5 shilling notes suppressed likewise this op- tional clause, and, thereby restored the ex- change between England and Scotland to its natural state." Again the Committee refers to two tracts in Lord Somers' collection, one by Mr. God- frey, one of the original directors of the Bank, the other by Dr. Drake, published in 16*99; as authority for the statement, "that within a short period after the establishment of the Bank, (during the financial distresses in the reign of King William,) the effects of a depreciation of the coin, by wear and clipping, was coupled with the effects ofanexcessiveissue of paper, and that, by the liberality of their loans," ( to government and to individuals, ) " the quantity of the notes of the Bank became excessive, their relative value was depreciated, and they fell to a discount of 17 per cent,* 68 and the exchange with Holland, which had been before a little affected by the remittances for the army, sank as low as 25 per cent, below par. At length the true remedies were resorted to, first by a new coinage of silver, &c. and, secondly, by taking out of circulation the excess of bank-notes; this operation appears to have been effected very judiciously, : Parliament consented to enlarge the capital-stock of the Bank, but annexed a condition, directing that a certain propor- tion of the new subscriptions should be made good in bank-notes, In proportion to the value of bank-notes sunk in this manner the value of those which remained in circula- tion began to rise; in a short time the notes were at par, and the foreign exchanges near- ly so." I have referred attentively to both these tracts, and have endeavoured fully to compre- hend their meaning as well as their language, and am unable to extract one syllable from either of them, to countenance the idea of excessive circulation in the instance referred to as the cause of depreciation of the notes, or of the reduction of the rates of exchange, al- though the fact of depreciation is distinctly sta ted . Mr. Godfrey's tract is important to the present purpose only as it shews that the adr f>9 vances of the Bank were made, at that tune, on principles so different from those which for a century past have governed its conduct as to preclude all comparison or analogy. The Bank advanced money on real securities ; mortgages and pledges of commodities not perishable ; they also allowed an interest of 3 per cent, on their notes in circulation. But Mr. Godfrey mentions neither excess nor depreciation. The important parts of the statement are taken from Dr. Drake ; but I cannot con- cur in the paraphrase of the Committee : he speaks of the deteriorated state of the coin, and of the difficulties which had attend- ed the recoinage just then completed. He states that the notes of the Bank had been at a discount of 20 per cent. and the government- tallies at a discount of 40, 50, and 60, per cent, and that Parliament had provided a re- medy, 1st, by a new coinage of silver, and, 2dly, by authorising the Bank to augment its capital on condition that the subscriptions should be made ^ in tallies and in bank-notes. The sub- scription amounted to one million,and Parliament assigned funds for interest thereon at 8 per cent, to be raised by a tax on salt. By this measure ^800,000 of tallies were taken out of the mar- ket, and ,200,000 of bank-notes also; but the condition of the subscription referred obvi-r 70 pusly to the obligation to take 4 tallies ; which hung as a weight on the exchequer, and which it could not discharge; be this as it may, Par- liament had certainly no idea that bank-notes were excessive in the sense of the Committee; for Dr. Drake says, that, as a r* medy for the scarcity of money, Parliament issued 2 millions of .exchequer-bills as low as 5 and jlO each, ** which answered the necessities of commerce among the meaner people for the common con- veniences of life," and, " these bills passed in payment as so many counters, which the peo- ple were well enough satisfied to receive, be- cause they knew the exchequer would receive them again as so much ready money." Can it be assumed under these circumstances that the depreciation of bank-notes was occasioned by their excess as a medium of circulation ? Dr. Drake certainly says, " the value of 200, 000 of bank-notes having been sunk ,by the new subscriptions, the rest, as it was reasonable to believe they would, began presently to rise in worth," and this expression might seem to countenance the statement of the Committee, but Dr. Drake's opinion, supposing he intend- ed to distinguish between excess and discredit, is of less weight than his facts, and he states that no other way could have been found out to have retrieved their sinking credit;" " that Parliament took into consideration by what 71 means they might restore t}it wedit of the bank of England, which was then at a low* ebb," and I know not where the Committee has met with the information (the correctness of which I do not mean to impeach) that the Bank Stock was at a premium, whilst the notes were at a discount. An adequate cause of the deprecia- tion of their paper might easily be discovered, without supposing it excessive. 1st. Bank- notes were payable in silver, then a legal ten- der and the usual medium of payment, which was so depreciated by clipping, that 30s. were given in exchange for a guinea : moreover, du- ring the recoinage the Bank " thought proper," as Dr. Smith expresses it, " to discontinue the payment of their notes, which necessarily oc- casioned their discredit ;" and the Bank had not only lent their whole capital to govern- ment, (then in such difficulties, that Dr. Drake observes, unless a remedy had been found for the loss of credit, the new government could not have continued much longer,) but held tallies (then at a disconnt of 40, 50, and 60, per cent.) to an amount exceeding that of their notes outstanding, and had even borrow- ed money in Holland, as appears by the ac- count presented by them to the House of Com- * See Dr. Drake's tract, entitled " a short History of the last Ptr!tament,"in vol. 8. of Lord Somers* Collection, page 164. 72 irons, on the 4th of Dec. 1696, which I find tran sen bed in Mr. Fairman's Brief, and appa- rently accurate, Account of the British Funds. The account is thus stated : To sealed bills outstanding . 893,800 To notes for running-cash . 764,196 10 O To money borrowed in Holland 300,000 O To interest due on bank-bills outstanding 17,876 ,1,975,872 10 O The assets to answer this debt \vere : By tallies on several parlia- mentary securities .... culation, when they intimate, that the cause of the increased price of all commodities is to be found in the state of the currency of the coun- try; and, that the Bank is responsible for the effect on prices not merely in the ratio of its own excess of paper, but in that of the excess of country-bunk paper also. But nothing is done in the Report towards either of these ob- jects, and its language has an obvious tendency to sanction the popular notion, that the in- creased price of commodities is evidence of a depreciation of currency. Theiv are two obvious and practical causes of the augmentation of prices in Great Britain, since the date of the restriction-bill, the effects of which should have been accurately ascer- tained, before a cause not obvious, wholly speculative, and against the hasty adoption of which even theorists have cautioned us, was assigned in the Report. The caur.es to which I allude are, the alter.- ed state of the corn-trade, and the scarcity arising put of it in 1800 and 1801 : And the increase, of taxes since the com- mencement of the war in 1793. From the year 1790, Great Britain has cea- sed to produce com enoggh for its own con- sumption ; and has annually imported large supplies. At the end of 17.99, there was no stock on hand, and, during the deficient har- vests of 1800 and 1801, the importations were greatly inadequate to -supply the loss. The scarcity and consequent measures of those years are yet fresh in our recollection ; seven- teen acts of parliament passed with reference to this subject in the last six weeks of 1800. Bounties were granted, and every substitute adopted, yet the average price of wheat jf0r the two years, throughout England and Wales, was 109s. to llOs. and bread rose to 18 d. the quartern loaf. It became necessary to advance the wages of all descriptions of labour, and these, as well as the pay of the army and navy, Avere raised to the standard of the current pri- ces. Although the price of grain subsequently fell, the wages of labour did not experience a reduction ; and they remain at present nearly at the standard to which they were advanced about the years 1800 and 1801. If the price of labour be now, as it is generally understood to be, fully adequate to the present high price of provisions and commodities, the excess, during the abatement of price, in the years succeeding 1801, from an average of 110s. to an average of 67^. in 1802, 75s. 76s. and 79 s. in 1805, 1806, and 1807, has operated as 94 a cause instead of being the effect of high prices, and has defeated the endeavours of Parlia- ment so to apply the taxation as not to affect the wages of labour, and has produced the $ame effect which a direct tax on labour would liave occasioned. It is, perhaps, impossible to ascertain in what degre e the prices of commo- dities generally have been affected by this ex- traordinary advance of the wages of labour, but it appears from the communications made to the Board of Agriculture, that the advance of wages to labourers in husbandry, between 179 , when export ceased, and 1804, amount- ed to 37 per cent, on the prices of 17.90. There are readier means of ascertaining the effects of increased taxation. In 1793, as I before stated, the net revenue amounted to about sixteen millions ; but it is the gross re- venue which the subject pays, and we may, therefore, call it, at that time, seventeen mil- lions. The gross revenue of one year, to January, IcSlO, amounted to ,70,240,226, as appears by the account delivered to Parliament, on the 24th of March, being an addition to the charge on the land, the labour, the revenue, and expen- diture, of British subjects, since 1793, of 5 3, 240, 000. According to every principle of political eca- 95 nomy, a tax on land, labour, or industry, is a tax on the produce of each, as fully, if not so directly, as the taxes levied on goods at the Custom-house or Excise- office, and, therefore, this sum of fifty-three millions must be, and now is, added to the aggregate price of com- modities in Great Britain, beyond their price in 1793, except in so far as the direct and per- sonal taxes fall on those who, living on fixed incomes, have not the means, by the increased price of their labour, increased profits, or in- creased rents, to relieve themselves of the bur- then. The direct taxes amount to about one- fourth of the whole, and the proportion of these, which falls on certain incomes, does not affect the price of commodities. If certain in- comes be taken at an amount equal to the in- terest on the funds, (not meaning thereby, that a large proportion of stock-holders do not indemnify themselves elsewhere, as proprietors of land, merchants, traders, and manufacturers, but to allow a sum adequate also to the an- nuities on land, salaries of office, &c.) a pro- portion equal to one-sixth of a fourth of the general taxation may be considered as posi- tively taken out of the pockets of those who pay it. To obviate objection, let it be admit- ted that -rVth instead of ~th is so taken. The remainder, about 47 to 48,000,000, is an annual 96 augmentation to the price of commodities in Great Britain, Now, the aggregate price of these commodities cannot exceed the total income, or revenue, by means of which they are consu- med, which, from the best judgement that can be formed of it from parliamentary documents^ does not exceed 140,000,000, so that, of the present price of commodities, one-third taken on average, (some more, some less, according as they are more or less immediately affected by taxation,) must be considered as represent- ing the taxes imposed since 1793; and one- third of the present price is, of course, equal to half the price of 1793. If any doubt should be entertained, whether landholders, for instance, have really been able to indemnify themselves to this extent, and to raise an additional income equal to such an amount of taxation, I may at once refer to satis- factory documents in proof of it. In the Re- port of the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry, on Greenwich Hospital, is a statement of the rents of the Derwentwater estates, now pos- sessed by the Hospital, shewing an increase, be- tween the years 1790 and 1805, from ^1^,300 to of 24,700, being one-fourth of the present rents; but the last four years, in which very considerable additions have been made to the rents, are not included. The average increase 97 of rent on arable land, thoughout the king- dom, between 1790 and 1803, as returned to the Board of Agriculture, was 40 per cent, on the rents of 1790, or < 28 per cent, on those of 1803, to which returns the sam^ observation respecting the period not included will apply. To what rise in the price of commodities does the Committee allude which is not justified by the multiplied operation of an increased public demand on the produce of the land and labour of the country, to the extent which has here been stated ? The price of corn has fluctuated so much since the supply has, under the incon- veniences of war, depended on importation, that it is become, except on very long averages, an unfit standard of comparison : as early as 1795 and I79fy I find the quartern loaf, for many months together, at \5d. and, as late as 1807, the average of the year not exceeding 1 1 d. and 11^ d. in the course of a single year, and even in succeeding mouths, varia- tions in price, on the average of the kingdom, of _L and even % of the value of the commo- dity. The average price of wheat for the year 1800 was 1 V2s. 8^/. and, for the year 1802, 67s. 7 d. such fluctuations have obvious re- ference to supply and demand, and can in no degree be referred to corresponding variations, o 98 either in* the cost of the article or the medium of payment*. Meat has fluctuated less in price than corn : the increase of price appears to have been progressive, from about 7 (L to 10 d. per Ib. but has not exceeded the proportion resulting rom the natural effect of taxation. The metals which are the produce of British soil, of which the supply is always equal to ttie demand, might perhaps form a better standard of comparison : but, in this commercial coun- try, it is difficult to fix on any commodity which is not affected by the circumstances of war or peace, as in the case of timber or hemp ; comparative scarcity or superabundance, as tallow and coffee ; want of demand, as in the * ] have extracted from the Gazette the weekly prices of grain in the five years preceding the restriction, from 1792 to 1796, and the five last years, from 1806 to 1810 inclusive, both periods including great fluctuations of price, but neither the extremes of the years 1800 and 1801. Wheat. Barley. Oats. s. d. s. d. s. d. The average of the last five years is, 87 2 43 30 6 A deduction of these prices of 4 29 144 102 would leave 582 288 204 The average of 1792 to 1796 is 57 6 34 20 6 but I do not think that any fair 1 inference can be drawn from the result, because, throughout the whole period, the prices have been regulated more by importation than any internal circumstances. case of East-India goods ; or want of supply, as those from Italy and the Levant. Then, again, speculation intervenes, and raises ex- orbitantly the price of wool, the bubble bursts, and wool is an unsaleable commodity. A bad harvest occasions a large demand for sugar at home; a friendly disposition in Sweden carries all the surplus abroad. A good harvest closes the distillery against sugar ; French influence shuts the Swedish ports against us, and sugar has no price. The price of wheat depends on intercourse with America; the distillery influen- ces barley ; the value of oats is regulated by im- portation from Holland. How, in this chaos, the Committee can discover the depreciation of our currency in the price of commodities I know not ; yet, says the Report, " the prices of all commodities have risen, and gold appears to have risen in its price only in common with them. If this common effect is to be ascribed to one and the same cause, that cause can only be found in the state of the currency of this coun- try." On this most extraordinary pas? .ge I shall only observe " that your if is a great peace- maker." It is not possible to follow the subject of re- lative prices to any satisfactory point^ without engaging in a very protracted investigation and a multitude of figures, which I wish to 100 avoid ; enough has been adduced to shew that an increase in the prices of commodities of nearly one-half on those current in 1793 is naturally accounted for, without assuming a deprecia- tion of currency, and that, unless a pair of shoes, a hat, or a coat, which would, in 1793, have cost 8 s. a guinea, and 3 guineas, cost now niore than 12 $. 51 s. 6d. and four guineas and a hai the increase of price is not greater than may he naturally accounted for, from the effect of increased taxation. Should any persons be disposed to pursue the inquiry farther, they will recollect that the ef- fect on prices produced by taxation is exclusive of, and independent upon, such increase as may be occasioned by circumstances specially af- fecting particular commodities ; as great scared ty compared with the demand, restraints impo- sed on introduction or exportation, or heavy direct duties, as in the case of Wine, Spirits, or Sugar. In adducing taxation as the cause of an increased price of commodities I am not certainly introducing any novel principle, but the more men of every rank have felt the necessity of augmenting their incomes, the more attention has been paid to obtain such increa- sed income from land, the more operative has the principlebecoine ; and it does not appear 101 that the Committee have allowed sufficiently for its effect. I shall only add a few observations on the recommendation of the Committee to Parlia- ment, as the result of their inquiry. This recommendation is conveyed in the shape of opinion, " That the system of the circulating medium of this country ought to be brought back with as much speed as is com- patible with a wise and necessary caution to the original principle of cash-payments, at the option of the holder of Bank-paper/' " Ac- cording to the best judgement the Committee has been able to form, no sufficient remedy for the present or security for the future can be pointed out, except the repeal of the law which suspends the cash-payments of the Bank of England." And the Committee " suggest that the restriction of cash-payments cannot safely be removed at an earlier period than two years from the present time, as it would be hazardous to compel the Bank to pay in six months, should peace be concluded within that period, and would be found wholly impracti- cable." The Committee are, therefore, of opinion, " that, even if peace should intervene, two years should be given to the Bank for resu- ?ning its payments ; but that, even if the war 102 should* be prolonged, cash-payments should be resumed by the end of that penod." Persuaded as I am that both the rate of ex- change and price of gold are controuled at present by the foreign expenses of government, operating upon a small favourable balance, I cannot of course anticipate any difficulty in the resumption of cash- payments by the Bank, when those expenses shall have ceased. Nor, supposing them to continue, can I contemplate greater facility in resuming them at the expira- tion of two years than is now experienced. The Committee can hardly expect any increa- sed activity in our manufactures from a reduc- tion of the accommodation they have experien- ced; or an increased exportation to the conti- nent as the effect of reduced prices ; (presu- ming, as the Committee seem disposed to do, that such reduction is just and practicable ;) because we see already that a profit of 3 and even 400 per cent, on colonial produce, on coffee particularly, the article most wanted in France, and most superabundant here, is not a lever powerful enough to obtain for it an in- troduction. Our imports consist, for the most part, of articles \vith which we cannot dis- pense, without abandoning altogether the con- test in which we are engaged. Jf our imports 103 are not diminished, our exports increased, or our foreign payments lessened, I do not see how the utmost stretch of inconvenience which, by reducing the circulation, the nation may be made to suffer, will improve the exchange or lower the price of gold. I could point out effects of a very different nature, which will unquestionably result from it. On former oc- casions, mercantile distresses improved the ex- change, by inducing the, merchants to draw bills on their correspondents abroad to raise money, which they would provide for by ex- ports, even at a loss. But even this wretched shift cannot now be practised ; there is no mar- ket on which bills are current to which goods can be sent. Whilst offering their suggestions to Parlia- ment no doubt the Committee had distinctly in view The evils and inconveniences which they propose to remedy ; The mode in which the remedy will be pro- duced by the adoption of the recommenda- tion ; , And the consequences with which that a- doption will be attended. These points are not, however, brought promi- nently forward in the Report, and we are left to discover, as we can, what the measure is intend- 104 ed to effect, and how it is to be effected,, u A return to the ordinary system of bank- ing" can alone, say the Committee, " ef-> fectually restore general confidence in the value of the circulating medium of the king- dom ;" "the serious expectation of this event must enforce a preparatory reduction of the quantity of paper;" "and the anticipation of the time when the Bank will be constrained to open, may also be expected to contribute to the improvement of the foreign exchanges," which, the Committee informs us, " they have abundantly shewn the Bank to have the power of controuling." On these intima- tions of the objects of the Committee it is obvious to remark, that the restoration of confidence is a work of supererogation : the Report had previously informed us that "want of confidence has no place in our present situation." The Committee have admitted that the fall of the exchange was occasioned by political circumstances, operating on the commerce of the country, yet they anticipate its improvement from modifications of our currency; They say nothing about the price of bullion, which is expected, doubtless, to return when the Bank shall have sufficiently controuled the exchange; although "Mr. Locke and many other writers have clearly 105 demonstrated, that the coins of any country can only be retained within it when the ge- neral balance of trade and payments is not unfavourable," (Lord Liverpool's letter to the King, page 10$,) and these effects are all to be produced by a reduction in the quantity of pa- per, although no attempt has been made to shew from whence any superfluity can be with- drawn. "The rate of wages of common country labour adapts itself more slowly to the changes which happen in the value of money than the price of any other labour or commodity; and the pay of some classes of public servants, if once raised, in consequence of a depreciation of money, cannot so conveniently be reduced again," such is the opinion of the Committee. Yet, in the midst of war, when those classes are numerous, when that labour is scarce, and the wages of both have adapted them- selves very fully to the present value of com- modities, the Committee recommend a forced reduction in the price of the produce of land and labour, from whence those wages are to be. defrayed. That this is the intended effect of the reduction of Bank-paper will be readily understood and admitted by those who have attentively considered the princi- ples of circulation laid down by the Committee. Let it be remembered also that the taxes are 106 for the most part^erf, not proportional, rates; they, too, as well as the wages of labour, are adapted to the existing value of commodities, or rather the value of these has adapted itselt to the rate of taxation. Nor is this reduction intended to be a trifling one: the Committee observe, that, in the present state of our cir- culation, to compel the Bank to pay specie in six months would be most hazardous, and would bj found wholly impracticable. Weight, and Value, of each, & c . by J. Ede, Goldsmith/ 1 vol. Price 10s. 6d. New Works published by J. M. Richardson. 7. AMERICAN CANDOUR, being a Trad lately pub- lished at Boston, entitled an Analysis of the late Cor- respondence between our Administration and Great Britain and France, with an Attempt to shew what are the real Causes of the Failure of the Negociation. Price 3s. 6d. 8. The Stocks Examined and Compared, or a Guide to Purchasers in the Public Funds, containing an Account of the different Funds, from the Times of their Creation^, with Statements of the National Debt, a View 'of the Progress of the Sinking Fund, and an Account of the American Funds, by William Fair/man, Life-Accomptant of the Royal Exchange Assurance, 1 vol. 8vo. boards. Price 6s. 9. Tables, formed upon a New and Easy Principle for calculating the Value of Stocks and Annuities and for a ready Dispatch of Business in the Public Funds, by William Blewert, 2d edition, improved, 1 vol. "bound. Price I0s.6d. 10. Essai sur le Systeme Militaire de Bonaparte, suivi d'une courte Notice sur la Revolution Franchise, et le Couronnement de sa Majeste Corse, par C. H. S. Officer d'Etat-Major Moscovite, 1 vol. sewed. Price 7s. 1 1 . Hamlet Travestie, in three Acts, with Annota- tions by Dr. Johnson and George Steevens, Esq. and other Commentators, 1 vol.. 12mo. boards. Price 5s. 12. The Hydro-Aeronaut, or Navigators Life-Buoy ; being an effectual Method of preventing the Loss of Lives by.Drowning, in Cases of Shipwreck and others, %y Thomas Clegh or n, 1vol. 12mo. boards. Price 5s. Jn and Marchant, Printers, Jugrara-Coort, London. -5 OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEPRECIATION OF MONEY, AND THE STATE OF OUR CURRENCY. WITH SUNDRY RELATIVE TABLES. By EGBERT WILSON, ESQ. ACCOUNTANT IN EDINBURGH, ONE OJ? THE DIRECTORS OF THE BANK OF SCOTLAND; SfC. EDINBURGH : Printed by C. Stewart, JOHN ANDERSON, PARLIAMENT SQUARE, EDINBURGH AND LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME & BROWN, LONDON. 1811, ARRANGEMENT. 1. Respecting the Existence and Extent of the Deprecia- tion 1 2. Respecting the Causes of the Depreciation, considered as affecting the real value of Gold and Silver ... 5 3. As to the Question Whether a Depreciation has taken. place in our Currency, independently of the real Depreciation of Gold and Silver 19 4.Tables illustrative of the preceding Observations .... 35 No. 1. Abstract of the Yearly Importation and Expor tation of Grain of all sorts to and from Britain. Of the Prices at which the Importation of Wheat has been permitted, and the actual Prices of Wheat in England and Wales, from 1700 to 1810, both inclusive 37 No. 2. Abstract of the average Price of Wheat. The Course of Exchange with Hamburgh, and the Market Price of Gold, taken Quarterly, from Jan. 1780 to Jan. 1811 ; and the Price of the Three per Cents, from Jan 1792 to Jan. 1811 51 No. 3. Abstract of the Amount of Bank of England Notei in Circulation, from 1790 to 1810 57 No. 4. Comparative Values of the Annuities to the Na- tional Creditors in 1797 and 1810 65 With Remarks on each of these Tables. CONCLUSION, 67 APPENDIX. Abstract of the Fiar Prices of Wheat, Bar* ley, and Oats, for the County of Edinburgh, from 1640 to 1809 inclusive 73 OBSERVATIONS, &c. SECTION I. Respecting the Existence and extent of the Depre- ciation. IT is observed by Dr Adam Smith, that, in all the different stages of wealth and improvement, we can judge better of the real value of silver by comparing it with corn, than by comparing it with any other commodity, or set of commodities. Labour and subsistence, indeed, as they are the original price paid for gold and silver, so in all the future transmissions thereof, they are the only real standards of the exchangeable value of these metals. Previously to the discovery of America, a small quantity of silver exchanged for a large quantity of corn; but after that discovery, silver, as stated by Dr Smith, ' sunk in its real value, or would exchange * (or a smaller quantity of labour than before, and * corn rose in its nominal price, and, instead of be- ' ing commonly sold for about two ounces of silver ' the quarter, or about ten shillings of our present ' money, came to be sold for six and eight ounces < of silver, or about thirty and forty shillings of our 6 present money.' On a review of the prices of corn, before and after the discovery of the American mines, Dr Smith con- cludes, that the discovery of these mines, in lower- ing the value of silver, had produced its full effect at or about the year 1636. That, for a considerable time afterwards, little variation took place in the value of silver, and it again rose somewhat in proportion to the value of corn, during the first sixty-four years of the eighteenth century. About the year 1763, a very considerable rise in the money price of corn took place in Great Britain, from causes to be afterwards explained ; but from that time till the year 17.94 there was little or no va- riation in the value of silver, compared with that of corn. Since the year 1794, however, there has taken place in this country, a rise in the nominal price of corn, or depression in the Value of gold and silver, altogether without example, since the first discovery of the American mines. Thus, on comparing the average price of wheat for the 16 years, i 7 79 and 1794 inclusive, with the average price for the 1 6 years, 1795 and 1810 in- clusive, the difference will be found to be equal to about 73 per cent.-: or, 1731. now, will only pur- chase the same quantity of wheat which 100/. would have done prior to the year 1795. On many other articles of home produce, not af- fected by direct taxation, the rise has been still greater ; and, on the price of ordinary labour, it will be found very nearly to correspond with that on wheat. Thus, preceding the year 1795, the aver- age price of labour might be taken at seven shillings per week, but cannot now be stated at less than twelve shillings, making a difference of betwixt 7 1 and 72 per cent. In like manner the money prices, or nominal value of all real property, of whatever nature or de- scription, have risen in an equal, if not a greater, proportion. This depreciation may have affected either the real value of gold and silver, or it may have been con- fined to our currency, or it may have consisted not only of a depreciation of gold and silver, but also of our currency. It is of importance to keep in view the distinc- tion betwixt a real depreciation of gold and silver, whether arising from general or local causes, and a depreciation of our currency : for, in so far as it may arise from general causes, it can admit of no remedy on our part ; but if it is either a depreci- ation of gold and silver, arising from local causes, or a mere depreciation of our currency, the evil, in either case ought to admit of a remedy, though the remedies in these two cases may be very different. SECTION II. Respecting the Causes of the Depreciation, considered as affecting the real value of Gold and Silver. A DEPRECIATION of the real value of gold and sil- ver, may be owing either to general causes affect- ing their value in the general market of the com- mercial world, such as the increased fertility of the mines, or it may be owing to the particular institu- tions and circumstances of the country in which it has taken place. _/ Had the depreciation which has taken place in this country been owing to the increased fertility of the mines, it might have been expected that gold and silver would have appeared in great abundance in this, the most commercial country in the world. So far from such being the case, however, it must be admitted, that the suspension of our cash-payments in the year 1797, and its subsequent continuance to 6 the present time, afford proofs of a scarcity, rather than of plenty of gold and silver. The value of gold and silver would also have fallen^ in the rest of Europe, to an equal degree as in this country. It will be difficult, however, on that sup- position, to account for the strong tendency which gold and silver have shewn, ever since the year 1 794, to leave this country, and to flow to the Continent ; and for the difficulty that has been experienced, in all our endeavours to bring them back, even with the advantage of a favourable exchange : and, even al- though a considerable depreciation of money may be shown to have taken place on the Continent, this may be, in part, attributed to the addition of a large portion of the gold and silver of Great Britain to the stock of the rest of Europe. It is, no doubt, true, that the silver mines of A- merica have become greatly more productive within the last hundred years ; but it is not from the abso- lute quantity of gold or silver raised, that any depre- ciation of their value can be inferred. The increased quantity maybe, and most probably has been, owing to the increased demand ; and, in that case, though the absolute quantity should be ever so much in- creased, yet if they are still attainable only at the same expense of labour, their real value in relation to corn and labour, the true standards of that value, will remain unchanged. Besides, it is proved by the accounts subjoined to the report of the Bullion Committee, that the great increase in the produce of the silver mines took place as far back as the year 1773 ; and if the pre- sent depreciation of money is owing to that cause, it may be asked, why it did not operate prior to 1 794, as it certainly did not, or, at least, in a very slight degree ? It may be concluded, therefore, that, although the extraordinary depreciation of money in this country, within the last sixteen years, may have been in part owing to the increased abundance of gold and silver in Europe ; yet it cannot be altogether accounted for by that cause, and must have depended, in part at least, on local or temporary causes peculiar to this country. These, I apprehend to be 1. The increase of our consumption of corn to such an extent as greatly to exceed our ordinary annual production. This increased consumption is to be ascribed to the extension of our colonial terri- tories, the increase of our commerce and manufac- tures, and the progress of the funding system. Its commencement may be dated from about the year 8 1763; at or soon after which Britain ceased to be an exporting, and became a regularly importing country of corn; and a permanent rise in the price of corn was the necessary consequence. But all the above-mentioned causes of increased con- sumption have operated to a much greater extent since the year 1790, than in any former period of equal duration, as is clearly proved by our pro- gressive increase of importation since that period; and they have been further aided by a great war ex- penditure in that period. 2. The frequent recurrence of deficient crops, and interruption of our usual supplies from abroad, par- ticularly the failure of crop 1795, the still greater failure of crops 1799 and 1800, and the partial fail- ure of crops 1 804, 5, 6, 8, and 9? while our supply from abroad was rendered more precarious than formerly, by the effects of the war, and by scarcities existing at different times in other countries ; and the expense of importation was greatly increased by the high rates of freight and insurance. 3, The state of our corn importation laws, par- ticularly the law of 1804, by which the price at which wheat might be imported, at a low duty, was at once raised about 24 per cent. 9 To which may be added the effect of the Order's in Council, 1 807, and their consequences. t * All these causes tending to the raising of the mo- ney-prices of corn and labour ; and, 4. The suspension of our payments in specie, en- abling us to maintain these increased nominal prices, which must otherwise have been checked by the li- mited nature of the circulating medium, while it con- sisted either of gold and silver, or of paper convert- ible into gold and silver, at the will of the holder. The influence of the price of corn in regulating the price of labour, and of all articles of home pro- duce, is thus stated by Dr Smith, in his argument -respecting the effect of our corn laws. ' This enhancement of the money-price of corn, ' however, it has been thought, by rendering that e commodity more profitable to the farmer, must ne- ' cessarily encourage its production. ' I answer, that this may be the case, if the effect ' of the bounty was to raise the real price of corn, or ' to enable the farmer, with an equal quantity of it, B 10 * to maintain a greater number of labourers in the c same manner, whether liberal, moderate, or scanty, e than other labourers are maintained in his neigh ' bourhood. But neither the bounty, it is evident, ' nor any other human institution, can have any such ' effect. It is not the real, but the nominal price of c corn which can, in any considerable degree, be c affected by the bounty ; and, though the tax which c that institution imposes upon the whole body of the * people may be very burdensome to those who pay 1 it, it is of very little advantage to those who re- * ceive it, c The real effect of the bounty is not so much to c raise the real value of corn, as to degrade the real * value of silver ; or to make an equal quantity of it * exchange for a smaller quantity not only of corn, ' but of all other home-made commodities ; for the c money-price of corn regulates that of all other 6 home-made commodities. e It regulates the money-price of labour, which . * must always be such as to enable the labourer to ' purchase a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain ' him and his family, either in the liberal, moderate, e or scanty manner in which the advancing, station- * ary, or declining circumstances of the society oblige ' his employers to maintain him. 1 11 c It regulates the money-price of all the other parts ' of the rude produce of land, which, in every pe- * riod of improvement, must bear a certain proper- ' tion to that of corn, though this proportion is dif- ' ferent in different periods. It regulates, for ex- e ample, the money-price of grass and hay, of but- 6 chefs meat, of horses and the maintenance of 6 horses, of land-carriage consequently, or of the c greater part of the inland commerce of the coun- ' try. c By regulating the money-price of all the other ' parts of the rude produce of land, it regulates that ' of the materials of almost all manufactures. By e regulating the money-price of labour, it - regulates ' that of manufacturing art and industry; and by re- e gulating both, it regulates that of the complete ma- ' nufacture. The money-price of labour, and of * every thing that is the produce, either of land or ' labour, must necessarily either rise or fall, in pro- * portion to the money-price of corn. * Though, in consequence of the bounty, there- c fore, the farmer should be enabled to sell his corn ' for four shillings the bushel instead of three and c sixpence, and to pay his landlord a money-rent c proportionable to this rise in the money-price of * his produce ; yet if, in consequence of this rise in 14 * the price of corn, four shillings will purchase n<* ' wore home-made goods, of any other kind, than ' three and sixpence would have done before, neither 6 the circumstances of the farmer, nor those of the t landlord, will be much amended by this change. 4 The farmer will not be able to cultivate much bet- 4 ter ; the landlord will not be able to live much ' better. In the purchase of foreign commodities, ' this enhancement in the price of corn may give ' them some little advantage. In that of home-made ' commodities, it can give them none at all ; and al- ' most the whole expense of the farmer, and the far ' greater part even of that of the landlord, is in c home-made commodities, c That degradation in the value of silver, which ' is the effect of the fertility of the mines, and which operates equally, or very nearly equally, through ( the greater part of the commercial world, is a mat- '. ter of very little consequence to any particular coun- f try. The consequent rise of ail money-prices, ' though it does not make those who receive them c really richer, does not make them really poorer. c A service of plate becomes really cheaper, and i every thing else remains precisely of the same real : value as before. f But that degradation in the value of silver, which * being the effect either of the peculiar situation, or * of the political institutions of a particular country, * takes place only in that country, is a matter of very * great consequence, which, far from tending to make 6 any body really richer, tends to make every body ' really poorer. The rise in the money-price of all < commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that * country, tends to discourage, more or less, every * sort of industry which is carried on within it, and 4 to enable foreign nations, by furnishing almost all ' sorts of goods for a smaller quantity of silver than ' its own workmen can afford to do, to undersell * them not only in the foreign, but eveu in the home * market' And, afterwards, he observes, ' The bounty, as it raises in the home market not c so much the real as the nominal price of our corn, as it augments not the quantity of labour which a c certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ, c but only the quantity of silver which it will ex- e change for, it discourages our manufactures, with- * out rendering any considerable service either to ' our farmers or country gentlemen. It puts, in- c deed, a little more money into the pockets of both ; * and it will, perhaps, be somewhat difficult to per- c suade the greater part of them, that this, is not ren- 14 dcring them a very considerable service. But if this money sinks in its value, in the quantity of la- bour, provisions, and home-made commodities d all different kinds, which it is capable of purchas- ing, as much as it rises in its quantity, the service will be little more than nominal and imaginary.' The effect of the re-action of a rise in the price of labour, in raising and keeping up the price of corn, is thus illustrated by Mr Malthus. c No person/ he observes, e will venture to doubt, ' that if we were to give three additional shillings a- { day to every labouring man in the kingdom, in ' order that he might have meat for his dinner, the ' price of meat would rise in the most rapid and un- * exampled manner. But, surely, in a deficiency of 6 corn, which renders it impossible for every man to * have his usual share, if we still continue to furnish 1 each person with the means of purchasing the same c quantity as before, the effect must be in every re- ' spect similar.' < > And again, ' If we were to double the fortunes of f all those possessing 100/. a-year, the effect on the ' price of grain would be slow and inconsiderable ; 15 f but if we were to double the price of labour through- ' out the kingdom, the effect in raising the pries of c grain would be rapid and great. The general prin- ( ciples, on this subject, will not admit of dispute/ MrMalthus seems, also, to have been fully aware, that the effects he has supposed, could not have been produced in the ordinary state of our circulating me- dium. e On the commencement, therefore, of this 'extensive relief, which would necessarily occasion ' a proportional expenditure in provisions throughout ' all the ranks of society, a great demand would be 4 felt for an increased circulating medium. The na- ' ture of the circulating medium, then (1799 and * 1800) principally in use, was such, that it could be ' created immediately on demand, From the ac- ' counts of the Bank of England, as laid before Par- ' liament, it appeared that no very great additional * issues of paper took place from this quarter. The ' 3% millions, added to its former issues, were not ' probably much above what was sufficient to supply * the quantity of specie that had been withdrawn * from the circulation,' Sec. 6 The demand, therefore, for an increased circu- Mating medium, was left to be supplied by country * bankers ; and it could not be expected that they c would hesitate in taking the advantage of so pro- 16 f fitable an opportunity. The paper issues of a ' country bank are, as I conceive, measured by the 4 quantity of the notes which will remain in circula- c tion ; and this quantity is again measured, suppos- c ing a confidence to be established, by the sum of * what is wanted to carry on all the money trans- ' actions of the neighbourhood. From the high price of provisions all these transactions became more c expensive. In the single article of the weekly pay- c inent of labourers wages, including the parish al- 6 lowances, it is evident that a very great addition to ' the circulating medium of the neighbourhood would ' be wanted. Had the country banks attempted to * issue the same quantity of paper, without a parti- e cular demand for it, they would quickly have been 6 admonished of their error, by its rapid and pressing ' return upon them : but at this time it was wanted ' for immediate and daily use, and was therefore ea- ' gerly absorbed into the circulation.' By the combined action and re-action of this en- hancement of the prices of corn and labour, aided by the suspension of our cash payments, a tempo- rary depreciation, in the exchangeable value of mo- ney, has been produced in this country ; one conse- quence of which has been an increase in the quan- tity of our paper currency, partly by its forcing gold out of circulation, and partly (through the enhance- 17 ment of prices) by its increasing the demand for Circulating medium. And what proves, indisputably, that this deprecia- tion was the result of temporary and particular, and not of permanent and general causes, was the return of the prices of corn to their usual level, uniformly as these causes ceased to operate. Thus, in winter 1798 1799, after the two abundant crops of 1797 and 1798, the price of wheat fell so low as 48s. per quarter: and again, even after the extravagant prices of 1799 and 1800, it fell, in Spring 1804, in conse- quence of the abundant crops of 1801, 2, and 3, to 49s. per quarter. Another important conclusion to be derived from the return of the prices of corn to their natural level on the two above-mentioned occasions., is, that the bank restriction, and the increased issues of paper currency, had of themselves no direct effect in rais- ing or keeping up these prices; for, in Spring 1799? when wheat was at 48s. to 49s. the quarter, the sus- pension had subsisted two full years, accompanied with a considerable increase of paper currency ; and, in Spring 1804, it had subsisted seven years, and the paper circulation had nearly attained its highest a- mount, yet, on both occasions, the price of wheat was C 18 under, rather than above its natural standard, the importation price. Since the year 1804, the return of these low prices of wheat must have been effectually prevent- ed by the operation of the corn law of that year, whatever had been the state of our crops. Note. From the year 1773 to the year 1791, wheat was permitted to be imported from foreign countries, when the price in this country reached 48s. the quarter. By act passed in 1791, the importation of wheat from foreign countries was prohibited till the price reached 50s., and then only on payment of a duty of 2s. 6d., falling to 6d. when the price reached 54s. In 1804, the prohibition was extended till the price in this country should reach 63s. the quarter, and then only on payment of a duty of 2s. 6d., falling to 6d. when the price should reach 66s. the quarter. l This alteration in 1804 was equal to about 35 J per cent on the price prior to the year 1791, or 24 per cent, on 52s. 6d., the price and duty from 1791 to 1804. SECTION III. On the Question Whether a depreciation has taken place in our Currency., independently of the real depreciation of Gold and Silver ? THE only certain proofs of a depreciation of cur- rency, are, 1st, A nominal rise in the price of gold and silver bullion, when estimated in the depreciated currency, commensurate with the extent of the depreciation : thus, supposing a guinea of the debased money to be worth only ten shillings and sixpence, the price of gold, in place of 3l. 17 J [1,048,324- 2,^08 1,04'J,016 394 1 18 6 n L.lOi- 10 11 TABLE I. FIRST PERIOD from 1700 to 1763 inclusive. Total Ex- Total Im- Excess of- _ j Improtatibn i . Excess of L r ice of Wheat' Average actual portation. portation. Exportation. Im P ortationjf ncJuding duty | Price for England. Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. Brought forward 26,443,081 199,205 L.104 10 11 1752 886,712 14,629 872,083 L.3 9 4 2 1 10 3 683,244 7,066 676,178 394 245 4 795,697 57,047 738,650 394 1 14 9 5 665,739 2,899 662,840 394 1 13 9 6 408,170 56,461 351,709 394 253 7 80,656 167,301 86,645 law suspended. 300 8 22,484 64,561 42,077 394 2 10 O 9 484,916 1,688 483,228 394 1 19 10 1760 752,434 12 752,422 394 1 16 6 1 925,119 73 925,046 394 i 10 ar 2 763,070 18,432 744,638 394 1 19 3 661,212 238,248 422,964 394 209 33,072,839 327,927 327,927 L.129 7 3 Total excess of exportation 32,744.912 Average annual excess 5 1 1 ,639 Average price of Wheat for these 64 years - L.2 5 40 TABLE I. SECOND PERIOD from 1763 to 1794. Total Ex- portation- Total Im- portation. Excess of Exportation. Excess of Importation Importation price of Wheat, including duty, Average actual Price for England. Qtiarters. Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. 1764 675,459 139,931 535,528 L.3 9 4 L.2 6 9 j^ 457,730 218,031 239,699 394 2 14 6 302,794 247,518 54,276 law suspended. 216 7 50,481 907,420 856,939 ditto. 346 8 40,256 649,173 608,917 ditto. 306 9 119,190 114,273 4,917 ditto. 231 1770 294,866 124,225 170,639 394 290 1 96,573 217,375 120,802 394 272 2 61,685 140,651 78,966 law suspended. 2 10 8 3 44,070 520,598 476,528; 280 2 11 1,005,059 2,142,152 1,005,059 L.25 8 2 Total excess of Importation - 1,1 37,093 Yearly average 1 1 3,709 Quarters. Average price of Wheat for these ten years L.2 10 10 1774 51,099 926,174 875,075,L.2 8 L.2 12 8 5 191,007 1.1')3,407 972,400| 280 284 6 .. ? 448,801 315,127 449,901 690,033 1,100; 280 374,906! 280 1 18 2 256 8 340,924 417,138 76,614 280 220 9 378,116 406,073 27,957 280 1 13 8 1780 471,819 224,616 247,275 280 1 15 8 1 317,251 297,864 19,387 280 248 2 326,344 141,407 184,937 280 2 7 10 3 134,159 jl,070,960 936,801 280 2 12 8 451,599 3,264,853 L.22 1 2 451,599 Total excess of Importation 2,813,254 Yearly average 281,325 Quarters. Average price of Wheat for these ten years L.2 4 4-1 TABLE I. SECOND PERIOD from 1763 to 1794. Total Ex- portation. Total Im- portation. Excess of Exportation. Excess of Importation Importation irice of Wheat, ncluding duty. Average actual jeice for England* Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. 1784 187,395 631,722 444,327 L.2 8 L.2 8 10 5 353,433 497,738 144,305 280 2 1 10 6 359,402 631,662 272,260 280 1 18 10 7 303,666 664,525 360,059 280 212 8 356,555 584,918 228,363 280 250 9 513,019 564,576 51,563 280 2 11 2 1790 312,816 1,046,515 833,699 280 2 13 2 1 146,743 1,380,436 1,233,693 2 12 6 270 2 417,390 1,008,401 591,011 2 12 6 2 2 11 3 117,686 1,382,701 1,265,015 2 12 6 2 8 11 4 154,170 1,462,575 1,308,405 2 12 6 2 11 8 Excess of Importation 6,732,700 Yearly average 612,063 Quarters. Average price of Wheat for these eleven years Average price for 16 years, 1779 & 1794 inclusive Average price for 31 years, 1764 & 1794 inclusive L.25 10 6 L.2 6 5 L.2 5 4 L.2 7 1 Difference on the average of the 16 years, 1779 and 1794 inclusive, and the average of the succeeding 16 years, 1795 and 1810 inclusive, 73 * T per cent, on the former. 43 Mi TABLE I. THIRD PERIOD from 1794 to 1800. Total Ex- portation. Total Im- portation. Excess of Exportation. Excess of Importation Importation price of Wheat, including duty. Average actual price for England. Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. Quarters. 1795 18,208 822,831 804,623 L.2 12 6 L.3 14 2 6 38,757 1,875,646 1,836,889 2 12 6 3 17 1 7 74,207 1,146,250 1,072,057 2 12 6 2 13 1 8 82,438 1,295,276 1,212,838 2 12 6 2 10 3 9 89,483 1,008,808 919,325 2 12 6 376 1800 33,169 2,030,875 1,997,706 2 12 6 5 13 7 1 2 12 6 5 18 3 2 2 12 6 375 3 2 12 6 2 16 6 4 356 3 1 5 356 4 7 10 6 356 3 19 7 356 3 13 3 8 356 3 19 9 356 4 15 7 1810 356 563 Total excess of Importation - 7,843,438 Yearly average 1,307,239 Quarters. Average price of Wheat for these 16 years Average price for ten years, 1801 & 1810 inclusive Ditto for six years, 1805 1810 inclusive Ditto for three years, 1808 & 1810 inclusive L.62 18 10 L.3 18 8 L.4 2 3 4 6 10 4 13 7 NOTE. The accounts of the yearly importation and exportation of Corn having been taken from different sources of information, may not be in every instance minutely correct ; but any inaccu- racy of this kind can have no effect on the general argument. It was intended to have completed them to the year 1811; but this was delayed for want of the* necessary information. There is no reason to believe, however, that the average ex- cess of importation for the years 1801 & 1810 inclusive, has been under the average excess for the years 1795 & 1800 in- clusive. Had the usual consumption of the distillery') jen going on, it must have been still greater. REMARKS. 1. It will be observed, that the great change by which Britain, from being an exporting, became an importing country of corn, took place at or about the conclusion of the war which terminated in 176S, and was probably the consequence of that war, which contributed more than perhaps any preceding one, to the increase of the wealth and power of the empire. 2. So long as Britain continued an exporting coun- try of corn, the importation price of wheat, however high, had no effect whatever in keeping up the ac- tual price of it: but, so soon as it became an im- porting country, the importation price had an obvi ons influence on the actual price. This influence seems to have been greatest immediately after the change took place, probably because a provision for this new demand was not yet legularly established in 44 the foreign markets. The average price of wheat was, accordingly, higher during the ten years from 1763 to 1773, than for the succeeding ten years from J773 to 1783, or from 1783 to 1793. This, however, may have been in part owing to the then debased state of the gold coin which was reformed in r/73 and 1774 3. The excess of our importation over our ex- portation of corn, seems to have increased in the greatest ratio since the year 178.9, the commence- ment of the troubles in France ; and from the enor- mous amount to which that excess has now arisen, the nominal price of coin in this country must be considered, in a great measure, if not altogether, re- gulated by the prices at which importation is per- mitted. 4 Keeping in view the effect of this great change in the circumstances of this country, there seems to be nothing in the price of corn that can warrant the conclusion, that any general depreciation of money had taken place from the year 1700 to 1794 ; and, assuming the price of wheat as the standard, the value of money must be held to have risen rather than fallen, during the last 31 years of that period. 5. The two great and fundamental errors in our 3 internal economy, to which the late depreciation of money, and the continued suspension of our y;dy meats" in specie are to be principally ascribed, seem to have been these. 1. The assumption of the fallacious principle, that to raise, by artificial means, the price of corn, would, by encouraging agriculture, increase pro- duction, and ultimately tend to lower the price of corn. This principle appears to have been acted upon in raising the importation prices of corn in the year 1791, and probably had also some effect in again raising these prices in the year 1804. 2. The raising of the nominal price of labour, in order to enable the labourer to pay the enhanced prices of provisions, which may be considered as the necessary consequence of the former. This was first acted upon in the year 1795*; again in the years 1 800 and 1801; and, lastly, since the year 1 804 : and this increased price of labour was, in its turn, made the principal ground for raising the impor- tation prices of corn in 1804. The exactness with which the price of labour has adjusted itself to the enhanced price of corn since 1795, shews clearly the connection betwixt them. * See Burke's Tract, entitled, Thoughts and Details oa Scarcity, written in November 1795. 46 The obligation to pay in specie was the only check on this mode of depreciating money, and was oper- ating to correct the depreciation which had takes place in t79 5 and 1796, when the check itself was removed, in the beginning of the year 1797. So that, although the suspension of our cash payments was not, in itself, the direct cause of the depre- ciation of money, yet it was the sine qua non, with- out which the depreciation could not have taken place. 6. The alteration of the corn law in 1804 opposes the greatest obstacle, if not an absolute bar, to the resumption of our cash payments : for not only does it infer such a depreciation of money, here, as must give it a strong tendency to leave the country, but it must increase the drain, either of specie or other goods, from this country, by making us pay higher prices for the corn we import, than we otherwise would be obliged to do. Were it not for our corn laws, the importation would be regular and gradual, and the demand would have comparatively little effect on the foreign markets; but by the operation of our corn law, the demand from this country is necessarily irregular and uncer- tain; and as, at all everts, the existing prices in this country must be high, the foreign merchants are led, to demand, and our importing merchants enabled to 47 give; higher prices than would otherwise have ob- tained. This effect of our corn law, together with the exportation of our specie, must have contributed greatly to the raising of the price of corn in the fo- reign market 7. Corn, as the principal means of subsistence, must always be the ultimate real standard of value; and the chief use of money is to regulate the nomi- nal price of that standard; and in this respect it served as a check to keep that price within limited bounds, till the check itself was removed by the sus- pension of our cash payments. Since that event, the price of corn has lain under no check, excepting what may arise from the influence of its price in other countries; and this, again, lies entirely unjer the controul of our importation laws, and has also been prevented from operating by various causes. It seems evident, therefore, that, under these circum- stances, to raise the importation prices of corn, is, in so far as the national creditors and moneyed interest are concerned, a meusure of much the same nature as to raise the denomination of the coin. The prac- ' ticability of paying in specie may be considered as the limit, beyond which this mode of raising prices, ought, on no account, to be carried. It may be further remarked on this subject, that 48 the enhancement of the price of corn, by means of the importation laws, can ultimately have no effet . whatever in encouraging agriculture, as the increas sd nominal amount of the gross produce will be fully counterbalanced by increased rent, increased taxes, and increased expense of management. Neither will the increase of rent ultimately benefit the landlord ; so that, in the final result, the raising of our impor- tation prices of corn can have no other effect, than that of operating, through the depreciation of money, as an indirect tax, exclusively affecting the national creditors and moneyed interest, and as a discourage- ment to the sale of our manufactured produce in fo- reign countries. 8. With regard to the effect of taxation, as con- nected with the depreciation of money, it may be ob- served, that the proper fund of taxation consists of that part of the national income which goes to the maintenance of luxury. Taxation, in this country, has generally proceeded on this principle; and, in so far as it has done so, it is evident that it could have had little or no effect on the prices either of labour, or the necessaries of life, nor, of course, on the ge- neral vdiue of money ; and, accordingly, no general depreciation of money seems to have taken place either during the course of the American war, or in consequence of it. 49 This fund of taxation is derived either (].) from the profits of skill, and capital actively employed; ;a) From the rent of land; or, (3.) From the in- terest of money, annuities, or fixed salaries ; all of which ought to bear the burden of the taxes rate- ably and proportionally, according to the means of the above description respectively attached to them. In so far as regards the third class, this fund of taxation has been much narrowed by the deprecia- tion of money. But, as to the first and second classes, to judge from their expenditure, the fund of taxation, so far from being impaired, is probably much greater than it was at the commencement of the last war, in the year 1793. If the above-mentioned principle be well-founded, there can be no just reason for any one of the classes being allowed to shift their share of the burden from their own shoulders, and throwing it upon those of the other ; though, it must be admitted, that the de- preciation of money has operated greatly to the re- lief of the first and second classes, at the expense of the third. 9- That the increase of national wealth or capital does not infer any depreciation of money, is clearly G shewn by Dr Smith (Wealth of Nations, Book I. Chap. 2.). The effect of such increase is, not to de- preciate gold and silver, but to reduce the profits capital, or the rate of interest ; and the application of the sinking fund merely accelerates the accumula- tion of capital, and reduction of the rate of interest, but has no effect on the value of money. 10. If, by the re-establishment of a general commer- cial intercourse with other countries, the prices of corn in this country w r ere to be reduced to the stand- ard of the importation prices, it would speedily be found that the price of labour had adjusted itself to a still higher standard, insomuch that there would be equally just grounds for again raising the importation prices as existed in the year 1804, and to at least as great an extent. But, in the present circumstances of the country, no such measure can be proposed, without the most obvious injustice. TABLE II. ABSTRACT of the Average Prices of Wheat; the Course of Exchang with Hamburgh ; and the Market Price of Gold, from January 178 to January 1811 ; and of the Prices of the 3 per cent. Consols, fro: January 1792 to January 1811. The per centage on the Exchange is computed from the par of 34 5| Flemish Shillings to the Pound Sterling, and the right hand Jigures are decimal parts. Dates. Average price of Wheat per quarter for England and Wales. Course of Exchange with Hambro'. Per Cent- age in fa- vour of London. Per Cent- age against London. Price of stand- ard Gold per ounce. 1780 Jan. \ 34.6 0.6 L.3 17 6 April, f July, ( L.I 15 8 35.2 34.8 2.25 1.1 3 17 6 3 17 6 Oct. 3 33.10 1.33 3 17 6 1781 Jan. ^ 34.1 06 3 17 6 April, f 2 A ft 33.7 2.06 3 17 6 July, ? ft JS 32.1 6.44 3 17 6 Oct. 3 31.11 6.92 3 17 6 1782 Jan. ->, 31.9 7.41 3 17 6 April, ( 2 7 10 32.11 4.02 3 17 6 July, ? 32.11 4.02 3 17 6 Oct. 3 31.8 7.65 3 17 9 1783 Jan. ^ 32.7 4.97 3 17 9 April, f 21O Q 31.9 7.41 3 18 July, ( J. ** \J 31.6 8.13 3 18 Oct. ) 32.9 4.5 3 18 Dates. Wheat per Quarter. Exchange with Hambro'. Per Cent- age in fa- vour of Per Cent- age again s London. Price of Gold per ounce. Price of 3 p. cent. Consols. London. 1784 Jan. "| 33.8 1.82 L.3 18 April, 1 LQ ft 1O 34.3 0.12 3 18 July, f O J. V/ 34.3 0.12 3 17 10 Oct. J 34.7 0.85 3 17 10^ 1785 Jan. | 35. 2.06 3 17 10^ April, 1 2 1 10 35.4 3.03 3 17 10 ; July, f 35.4 3.03 3 17 6 Oct. J 35.3 2.8 3 17 6 1786 Jan. ^ 34,10 1.57 3 17 6 April, I 1 18 10 34.11 1.82 3 17 6 July, f Oct. J 34.6 34.4 0.6 0.12 3 17 6 3 17 6 1787 Jan. S 34.5 36 3 17 6 April, 1 212 34.7 0.85 3 17 6 July, f 34.9 1.33 3 17 6 Oct. J 34 11 1.82 3 17 6 1788 Jan. "} 35.1 2-3 3 17 6 April, I 250 35.5 3.27 3 17 6 July, f 35.1 2.3 3 17 6 Oct. J 34.11 1.82 3 17 6 1789 Jan. -| 34.11 1.82 3 17 6 April, 1 2 11 2 35.7 3.78 3 17 6 July f 35.7 3.78 3 17 6 Oct.' J 35.3 2.8 3 17 6 1790 Jan. "| 35. 2.06 3 17 6 April, 1 O 1 Q O 35.6 3.51 3 17 6 July, f * 35.7 3.78 3 17 6 Oct J 35.10 4.5 3 17 6 1791 Jan. ^ 35.7 3.78 3 17 6 April, [ 9. 7 O 35.10 4.5 3 17 6 July, f Oct. J X> / V/ 35.10 35.4 4.5 3.03 3 17 6 3 17 G 1792 Jan. > 34.9 1.33 3 17 6 90{ April. 1 o <* 1 1 34,4 0.12 3 17 6 95 July, f *- ft X 34.5 0.36 3 17 6 91 Oct. J 34.3 0.12 3 17 6 89{ 1793 Jan. ^ 35.3 2.8 3 17 6 76 ApriU I Q Oil 38.2 11.29 3 17 6 78 July, f *4 Oil 36.5 6.2 3 17 6 77 Oct. J 35.8 4-02 3 17 6 75 1794 Jan. ^ 35.10 4.5 3 17 6 70 April, 1 211 ft 36.7 6.68 3 17 6 68 July, f 11 O 36. 4.97 3 17 6 67 Oct. J 33,3 3.03 3 17 6 64 Dates. Wheat per Quarter. Exchange with Hambro'. Per Cent- ge in fa- vour of London. Per Cent- age against London. Price of Gold per ounce. Price of 3 p. cent. Consols. 1795 Jan. L.2 15 5 34.10 1.57 L.3 17 6 62J April, 312 34.8 1.1 3 17 6 65 2 July, 41 32.3 5.95 3 17 6 67| Oct. 3 14 2 32.9 4.5 ~| from 1796 Jan. 4 11 3 33. 3.78 U 4 to 68" April, 4 18 3 34.10 1.57 /4 ft 67 July, 4 1 5 33.7 2.06 3 17 6 59 Oct. 322 34.6 0.6 3 17 6 59 1797 Jan. 2 16 35.5 3.27 3 17 6 55 April, 296 35 6 3.51 3 17 6 51 July, 298 36.7 6.68 3 17 lOf 52 Oct. 335 37.10 10.3 3 17 lOf 50 1798 Jan. 2 11 2 38.2 1 1 29 3 17 10{ 48 April, 2 11 3 37.8 9>2 3 17 10| 49 July, 2 10 8 37.7 9.5b 3 17 10* 47f Oct. 292 37,9 10.06 3 17 9 51 1799 Jan. 589 37.8 9.82 3 17 9 53 April, 2 16 1 36.10 7.4t 3 17 9 55 July, 3 3 10 35.2 2.55 3 17 9 62 Oct. 3 16 1 32. 6.68 3 17 9 60 1800 Jan. 4 12 7 31.6 8.13 Sfff*SkYVl 61f April, 583 31.8 7.65 1 1 U ill 64 July, 6 14 5 32.3 5.95 to 63 Oct. 4 19 6 32.2 6.2 I. is 4 /? 64 1801 Jan. 6 19 31. 5 to 8.37 4 o - 60 29.8 Anril, 7 14 8 31.4 8.61 43 61 July, 698 31.7 7.89 60| Oct. 466 32.8 4.73 6S 1802 Jan. 3 15 6 32. 6.68 68 April, 3 9 10 33.1 3.51 430 77 July, 3 6 10 33.3 3.03 74 Oct. 3 1 10 33.5 2.55 68 1803 Jan. 2 16 9 34.3 0.12 70 April, 2 16 5 34.2 0.36 64 July, 2 19 7 34.2 0.36 54 Oct. 2 14 6 34.5 0.36 53 1804 Jan. 2 12 3 34.8 1.1 4 55 March, 297 35. 2.06 4 56 April, 2 10 9 35.10 4.5 4 _ _ 56 July, 2 12 1 35.8 4.0* 4 55 Oct. 3 5 10 35.8 4.U2 4 . 57 1805 Jan. 462 3 .5.0 3.51 4 . 60 April, 4 11 11 35.5 3/27 4 _ 58 July, 4 13 5 35,7 3.78 4 59 Oct. 4 4 11 33.9 3.03 4 5$ Dates. Wheat per Quarter. Exchange with Hambro'. Per Cent- age in fa- vour of London. Per Cent- age against London. Price of Gold per ounce. Price of 3 p. cent. Consols. 1806 Jan. L.3 15 11 33.8 1.82 59 April, 3 14 5 34.2 0.36 60 July, 4 1 10 34.5 0.36 62 Oct. 42 33.6 2.3 61 1807 Jan. 3 16 9 34.8 1.1 59 April, 3 16 10 34.10 1.57 62 July, 3 13 34.5 0.36 6S Oct. 3 10 5 34.4 0.12 62 1808 Jan. 396 34.4 0.12 63 April, 3 10 1 34.6 0.6 66 July, 4 1 1 35.5 3.27 68 Oct. 465 33. 3.78 66 1809 Jan. 4 10 4 31.3 8.86 L 65 April, 4 14 1 31. 9.58 1 from 68 July, 4 8 1 28.8 16.4 f L. 4 9 68 Oct. 5 8 10 29. 15.42 V to 68| 1810 Jan. 516 28.9 16.15 t L. 4 13 68{ April, 554 31. 9.58 1 69f July, 5 13 4 30.2 12.02 r 69 Oct. 5 1 1 30.10 66 1811 Jan. 4 14 7 26.6 22.7 66 In stating the exchange, the Author has purposely avoided taking into account the occasional variations in the relative values of gold and silver, as these appear to be of such an undefined or accidental nature as to be unfit to be assumed as the ground of any general conclusions : and, at any rate, it does not appear that the doing so could have any ways tended to invali- date the hypothesis maintained by him. REMARKS. 1. The effect of the depreciation, in increasing the floating capital, and making money plentier in the market, will be apparent from observing the fluc- tuation of the three per cents, after January 1795. From the beginning of the war, in 1793, they had continued gradually to fall till January 1795; but from that time they gradually rose, along with the price of corn, till spring 1796, when they again sunk with the price of corn, till they reached their lowest point of depression in summer 1798- They did not much recover till spring 1799? when they again rose with the price of corn, and continued high during the whole of the year 1 800, and afterwards till the peace. In like manner, after the renewal of the war in 1803, they shewed little signs of recovery, till the high prices commenced in harvest 1804; since which, their fluctuations have corresponded pretty regularly with those of the price of corn. Had it not been for the Bank restriction, the dearth of corn would have tended to depress, in place of raising, the price of the public funds. 6 66 2. It will be observed, that the fluctuations in the price of gold bullion have uniformly been dependent on the state of the exchange. Thus, the first instance in which it rose above the mint price was during the depressed state of the exchange in 1783; the second instance during the depression of the exchange in 1795; the third instance in 1800, 1801, and 1802; and the last instance in 1809 and 1810. 3. The unusually high state of the exchange dur- ing the years 1797 and 1798, may, perhaps, have been owing to the lessened demand for specie in this country, after the suspension of our cash payments. So that the difference on the exchange might extend to the expense not only of the transmission, but of the re-transmission of bullion, or to double its usual limit. 4. The drain of specie which preceded the sus- pension, may be accounted for by the effect of the real depreciation of money which had taken place in 1795 and 17P6, with at least as much probability as by the practice of hoarding, through the fear of in- vasion, the cause to which it was ascribed at the time, and which it is difficult to conceive could be carried to such an extent as materially to affect the circula- tion of the kingdom. TABLE III. ABSTRACT of the amount of Bank of England Notes in circulation. L. 5 and upwards, including post bill. Under L.5 Total Average of 1790 L. 10,217,360 L.I 0,2 17,360 1791 11,699,140 11,699,140 1792 11,349,810 11,349,810 1793 11,493,125 11,493,125 1794 10,699,520 10,699,520 1795 Jan. 31 12,715,310 12,715,810 Feb. 28 14,017,850 14,617,850 Mar. 28 10,444,359 10,444,350 April 24 12,040,110 12,040,110 May 30 10,316,600 10,316,600 June 27 10,661,920 10,661,920 July 24 11,420,350 11,4-20,350 Aug. 29 - - 11,176,280 11,176,280 Sept. 26 10,775,130 10,775,130 Oct. 31 11,082,120 11,082,120 Nov. 28 11,503,110 11,503,110 Dec. 24 11,696,270 11,696,270 1796 Jan. 29 10,746,650 10,746,650 Feb. 27 10,647,720 10,647,720 Mar. 26 10/287,180 10,287,180 April SO 11,661,760 11,661,760 May 28 10,303,630 10,303,630 June 25 9,882,190 9,882,190 July 30 9,788,480 9,788,480 Aug. 27 9,427,510 9,427,510 Sept. 24 9/109,050 9,409,050 Oct. 29 9,744,510 9,744,510 Nov. 26 9,914,970 9,914,970 Dec. 31 9,204,500 9,204,500 1797 Jan. 28 10,024,740 10,024,740 Feb. 25 8,64-0,250 8,640,250 Prior to March 1 797, there were not any Bank of England Notes in circulation under the value of 5. H TABLE III. ABSTRACT of Bank of England Notes in circulation. 5. and upwards, including post bill. Under 5. Total. 1798 Feb. 1 L.I 1,855,430 L. 1,541,910 L.I 3,397,340 May 1 13,160,030 1,956,060 15,116,090 Aug. 1 10,397,340 1,928,090 12,325,430 Nov. 1 10,696,100 1,814,950 12,511,05Q 1799 Feb. 1 12,066,310 1,680,010 13,746,320 May 1 12,774,340 1,663,500 14,437,900 Aug. 1 12,279,540 1,600,000 13,879,540 Nov. 1 12,513,900 1,671,650 14,185,550 1800 average above - _ 15,000,000 1801 average 13,454,367 2,715,182 16,169,549 1802 - 13,917,977 3,136,477 17,054,454 1803 to 1807, average about . . 17,000,000 1808 May 13,429,640 4,062,260 17,491,900 Aug. 13,521,380 4,123,290 17,644,670 Nov. 13,255,460 4,211,710 17,467,170 1809 Feb. 13,226,860 4,333,200 17,560,060 May 14,137,410 4,509,470 18,646,880 Aug. 14,649,090 5,162,240 19,811,330 Nov. 1 14,481,100 5,468,190 19,949,290 1810 Jan. 7 13,864,950 5,663,080 19,528,030 20 14,699,090 5,914,400 20,613,490 Feb. 1 15,040,360 5,894,040 20,934,400 23 14,775,580 5,857,500 20,633,080 Mar. ii 14,795,110 5,922,900 20,718,010 April 7 14,703,580 6,104,170 20,807,750 May 5 15,143,910 6,161,020 21,304,930 12 15,009,290 6,114,540 21,123,830 REMARKS. 1. It will be evident, on comparing the preceding Table with the Table, No. 2, that, although for the first two years after the Bank restriction, the quantity of its notes was greatly increased, yet this had no effect w : hatever in raising prices. On the contrary, the prices, both of provisions and of the public funds, continued gradually to fall till spring 1799) when the price of corn was first raised, by the unfavourable prospect of that year's crop; which 3hews that the mere increase of our paper circulation was not the efficient cause of the rise of prices. C 2. The most considerable increase of the Bank's circulation took place in the years 1800, 1801, and ] 802 ; after which it continued nearly stationary till 1 809, excepting in the articles of ll. and 2/. notes, which have gone on progressively to increase as guineas have been withdrawn from circulation, and melted or exported. During 1809 and 1810, the Bank's circulation again underwent a considerable 60 increase : but this, also, chiefly in the small notes, owing to the depressed state of the exchange drain- ing the country still more of its gold ; and partly, also, to the increased exertion in our manufacturing industry and export trade, to which our great foreign expenditure acted as a powerful stimulus. 3. The real increase of the* total circulation of the country is not to be measured by the increase of bank notes; but allowance must be made for the specie withdrawn. If the following estimate be correct, it will be found, that the absolute increase of circulating me- dium since the Bank restriction, has been much less than what is commonly supposed. 61 Circulation in 1794. 'Paper Bank of England - - L. 11.000,000 Other Banks, say 250, at 35,000/. each 8,750,000 L. 19,750,000 Specie, at the lowest estimate by the Earl of Li. verpool, viz. Gold - - - L. 25,000,000 Silver ... 5,000,000 ' 30,000,000 L. 49,750,000 Deduct Bankers Deposits, say . 7,750,000 Real circulation in 1794 - L.42 5 000 3 000 Circulation in 181 0. Paper Bank of England . . - L. 20,000,000 Other Banks, 735, at 35,000/. each , 25,725,000 L. 45,725,000 Specie Gold . . L. 3,000,000 Silver . . 4,000,000 _ 7,000,000 L. 52,725,000 Deduct Bankers Deposits, say . 2,725,000 Real circulation in 1810 L, 50,000,000 Making an addition of eight millions to the total circulation io 1794. Iti place of tliis addition implying any excess w our circulating medium, the wonder is how the bu- siness of the country can now be carried on with so small an addition to it : for not only has there been a great increase of our trade since the 1794, but the effect of the corn-law of 1804, alone, must have been to raise the prices of provisions and labour about 24 per cent, above their prices in 1794; and, of course, must have given employment to a corresponding ad- dition to our circulating medium, and this altogether independent of the other accidental causes by which the prices of provisions and labour have been kept up, generally far above the standard of the corn-law of 1804. So far } therefore, from the circulating me- dium having been issued to excess, it is evident that it must have been managed with much greater eco- nomy than formerly. 4. It will be observed, on comparing the two Ab- stracts, No. 2 and 3, that the state of our foreign ex- changes has been noways connected with the increase or diminution of our paper currency. Thus, after its depression in 1795, the par of the exchange was restored in the beginning of 1796, without any re- striction of our paper currency. A restriction, in deed, afterwards took place ; but this was owing to an entirely different cause, the run on the Banks, in 6 the end of 179$ and beginning of 1797', aftc exchange was restored. Again, after the great and long continued depres- sion in 1800, 1801, and 1802, the par of the ex- change was restored, under an increasing rather than a diminishing paper circulation in 1803 and 1S04. The reduction of our paper circulation, indeed, never can be the means of restoring the exchange. The only way of correcting an unfavourable ex- change, is by increasing our exportations relatively to our importations, which a low rate of exchange holds out a strong inducement to do ; and this may be done with equal effect, either by exporting bullion or other goods. The export of bullion generally oc- casions a demand on the banks for gold ; and this may induce them to restrict their paper circulation ; but such redaction is evidently the consequence of adopting that method of restoring the exchange, and not the means of restoring it. If a reduction, or great restriction of our paper circulation were now to be adopted, as the means of enforcing the re- importation of gold, this must ne- ccs.-arily expose the trading part of the community to great inconvenience and distress ; and gold might be re-imported, but under circumstances of great na- 64 t-ional disadvantage, as our goods would be given away for probably less than half their value in ex- change for it. But, in place of restoring the par of the exchange, the importation of gold, like the im- portation of any other commodity, would increase the balance against us, and must have the effect of depressing the exchange, as much as the exportation of our gold had the. effect of supporting it. In the present circumstances of the country, however, any measure of this kind seems to be altogether imprac- ticable. 5. Were it declared that the banks should pay in specie against a given time, they would be induced, i'roin a regard to their own safety, to call in their notes before that period arrived. But they could do so without putting specie in their place. They have only to discontinue their issues for a few months, and the whole of their notes would be returned to them ; not for payment in specie, but to retire the bills and other obligations, on the security of which they were issued. The distress, therefore, would be more felt by the public than by the banks, and most justly ; because it was by them, and not by the bank- ers, that the gold and silver were abstracted from circulation, and melted or exported. TABLE IV. COMPARATIVE values of the Annuities payable to the Na- tional Creditors in the year 1797, and in the year 1810, converted into Wheat ; the first according to the average price of six years, 1789 & 1794 inclusive; and the second according to the average price of six years, 1805 & 1810 inclusive. The amount of the annuities payable to the national credi- tors as they stood in January 1797, including the interest of the loan of 18,000,000 in December 1796, but exclusive of the interest of the debt redeemed, was about 14,000,000. Quarters. Which converted into wheat, at the average price of the six years, 1789 & 1794, inclusive, being 2 : 9 : 2 per quarter, is equal to - - 5,694,915 The amount of the annuities to the national cre- ditors payable in 1810, exclusive of those redeem- ed, may be stated at about ^23,000,000. Which converted into wheat, according to the aver- age price of the six years, 1805 & 1810 inclusive, being * 4 : 6 : 10 per quarter, is equal to - 5,297,504 Difference in favour of the annuities 1797 - 397,411 To which might be added 529,750 quarters ior the tenth retained in 1810 ia name of property tax. i 66 This result does not proceed from inability to pay the na- tional creditors according to the real value of their annuities, as well as to defray the expence of the war, since it could be shown, that the unmortgaged surplus produce of the capital and industry of the country and its dependencies, is certainly at least as great as it ever was at any former period. These annuities, and the interest of money due from one indi- vidual to another, exist merely in the shape of burdens, general or special, on the active capital, and industry of the country. The real capital consists of its lands, houses, machinery, agri- cultural, mining and manufacturing stock, and the stock of goods on hand prepared for consumption : and it is evident, that, in proportion as the value of the national annuities and interest of money is diminished, the real capital and industry must be relieved. The circumstance of the depreciation of money having been progressive, must have given a great stimulus to industry, as rising prices, from whatever causes produced, never fail to do. To form an estimate of its effect in increasing floating capi- tal, let the real capital be stated at 2000 millions, and the de- preciation to go on at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum ; here is a nominal addition to the fund of credit of the country of 100 millions yearly. The exportation of our specie must have also considerably increased the resources of the country. CONCLUSION. UPON the whole of what is before stated, it may be concluded, 1. That the depreciation of money within the pe- riod of the last sixteen years, has originated from the peculiar circumstances, and internal regulations of this country, pointed out in the second branch of the foregoing observations, and not from general causes. 2. That this depreciation, which has affected gold and silver, as well as our currency, has given a tend- ency to these metals to flow out of this country, as well as to an increased consumption of them in our manufactures ; and the same cause has presented an impediment to their return from the continent of Europe, when the exchange happened to be favour- able to this country, 1 68 3. That the suspension of our cash payments has no otherways contributed to the depreciation of mo- ney, than by removing that check on the nominal prices of corn and labour, which a medium of circu- lation of limited extent must have necessarily im- posed, and by admitting of the addition of a consi- derable part of our gold and silver to the stock of the rest of Europe ; and that the increase of our paper currency has been merely the effect, 1. Of the en- hanced prices of labour and commodities : 2. Of a real increase of our trade : and, 3. Of the ab- straction of gold and silver from circulation. 4. That the extension of our paper circulation has had no effect whatever in producing the present un- favourable state of the exchange with foreign coun- tries : but the measure of the depression is materi- ally affected by the disuse of specie in the circulation of this country ; and the present high price of bul- lion is the effect of the demand for it, occasioned by the low rate of the exchange, 5. That the experiment of resuming our payments in specie cannot be tried with any chance of success, while the exchange with foreign countries is unfa- vourable; and that, therefore, the first step to be taken, is to restore the par of the exchange by en- couraging exportation, and discouraging importation, 69 and by a reduction of our foreign expenditure, so soon as circumstances will permit : but the reduc- tion of our paper circulation would, of itself, have no such effect. Lastly, supposing the exchange favourable, the practicability of our resuming, and persevering in, the use of specie in our internal transactions, will depend not so much on our ability to procure the; necessary supplies of gold and silver, as on the dif- ficulty of reducing the enhanced prices of corn and labour which have taken place under the system of restriction of our cash payments ; and this difficulty has been greatly increased by the alteration of our corn importation laws in 1804. THE ENt). APPENDIX. APPENDIX, ABSTRACT of the fiar prices of the best Wheat, Barley and Oats for the County of Edinburgh from 1640 to 1809. NOTE. The Boll of Wheat is equal to - .51997 r , And the Boll of Barley or Oats to .7573 J ^ ns " 8J The first being about one half and the second about three-fourths of the English Quarter. Years. \ Wheat p. Boll. Barley p. Boll. Oats p. Bell. 1640 L. 11 1A L. 10 Lff Q 8 . 7 2&nr 41 no return , 42 16 8 16 IA 43 14, 5 A' n 1A 9 T 44 13 4 10 6A - 8 10A 45 11 IA 8 10A 6 8 46 11 8 8 4 6 1A 4T 18 4 12 2A 10 6A 48 i i 1A 16 8 , 15 6 8 49 1 2 2A 18 4 16 $ 50 1 2 2A 17 gA 16 8 51 1 10 18 4 12 16 8 52 18 4 16 8 12 6 53 no return __ __ - 54 - 7 6A 7 9 4 5A 55 11 8 n 1A 5 6A 56 11 HA 10 6A ~ 6 11A 57 11 1A 10 6A 6 8 58 no return , -.,.. 59 18 4 10 6A -- 10 10 60 18 4 10 6A 10 10 61 18 4 15 10 6A 62 15 - 12 6 7 9A 63 15 11 8 ^7 O 4- ^ 64 11 8 9 5A 5 6A 65 12 6 9 2 6 4 66 - - - 10 6A 10 6 8 67 9 2 10 10 6 4 68 10 6 10 '68 Carried forward L,19 3 1L.15 14 SAIL. 11 K 9 11 76' Years. \ Wheat p. Boll. Barley p. Boll. Oats p. Boll. Brought forward L.23 5 1 L.19 13 2 L.15 12 6A- 1737 L. 13 4 11 8 8 10 38 11 9 10 6 10 39 13 7 12 9 4 40 1 2 11 17 8 14 6 41 14 2 11 i-A 9 4 42 11 11 Mr 7 6 43 10 9 4 6 6 44 11 10 10 6 9 4 45 15 6 11 8 11 46 - 14 11 8 9 4 47 13 8 11 2 7 8 48 14 4 11 4 9 49 13 4 10 6 9 50 13 6 10 7 9 4 1751 16 10 12 11 8 2 15 13 12 3 15 14 10 6 4 12 8 10 5 9 5 13 8 11 11 6 1 2 16 8 15 7 18 9 14 9 12 8 15 10 6 8 8 9 13 4 10 5 8 1760 13 6 10 3 8 4 1 14 10 6 90 2 19 6 14 3 15 3 16 8 14 10 6 Total L. 43 13 2 L.36 5 O^jL.29 8^ Average of 62 years L. 14 1 L. 11 6f |L._ 9 4A 77 Years. \ Wheat p. Boll. Barley p. Boll. Oats p. Boll. 1764 L. 19 L. 13 9 L. 12 2 5 1 16 6 14 6 6 19 6 18 14 3 7 110 14 14 8 1 11 9 10 9 18 13 11 6 1770 18 6 13 9 12 1 1 1 16 3 14 8 2 ... 1 2 6 17 6 14 G 3 1 2 3 17 4 14 Sums L.1Q 1 9 L. 7 11 10 L. 6 11 7 Average of these 10 years L. 1 2 L. 15 2 L. 13 1 1774 L. 1 1 L. 16 3 L. 13 6 5 19 13 4 10 6 ... 18 6 12 o 10 7 1 13 9 10 6 8 18 14 11 9 14- 6 11 3 090 1780 1 14 11 1 - 106 13 10 2 1 5 1 1 17 3 1 18 14 6 Sums L. 9 16 6 L. 7 6 7 L.5 16 6 Average of these 10 years L.19 7 L.O 14 7]- L.O 11 7J. 1784 L. 00 L. 17 L. 14 5 9 14 11 6 19 6 16 6 14 3 7 ... 1 4 1.5 6 13 4 8 1 10 13 6 10 6 9 3 11 15 3 12 1790 , - 3 17 4 14 10 1 7A 18 3 14 4 2 ... 1 19 11 15 3 3 4 T % 18 104- 15 6 4 ... 4 9 19 9 15 Sums L. 12 1^ L.9 5 10* L.7 9 10 Average of these 11 years L. 1 1 11 L.O 16 10| L.O 13 7|- Years. \ Wheat p. Boll. Barley p. Boll. Oats p. Boll. 1795 .... 6 8 9 Average of these 5 years 1800 .... 1 2 3 4 5 - - 6 7 8 9 Average of these 10 years L. 2 3 1 5 9 133 1 2 7 209 L. 1 3 1 2 6 17 7 17 4 1 13 1 L. 19 6 14 4 13 6 14 1 9 4 L. 7 15 4 L. 5 13 6 L. 4 10 8 L. 1 11 0| L. 1 2 8i L. 18 1*- L. 2 18 9 1 15 1 6 6 163 220 1 10 1 18 1 :2 6 276 220 L. 2 7 1 5 6 H 6 18 6 1 10 139 1 6 1 10 1 10 1 10 6 L. 1 13 2 16 6 15 6 17 6 18 6 18 9 1 1 7 1 4 1 9 L. 18 18 6 L. 13 12 4 L.10 Jl 8 L.I 17 10 L. 1 74 L. 1 1 2 Amo'. of Prices from 1763 to 1 773 L.10 1 9 from 1773 to 1783 9 16 6 from 1783 to 179* 12 U 7 11 10 76? 9 5 10^ 6 11 7 5 16 6 7 9 10 Average of these 31 years Amo r . of Prices from 1795 to 1799 from 1800 to 1809 i Average of these 15 years L.31 18 4-i L.24 4 3,; L.19 J7 11 L.I 7 L. 15 74 L. 12 10 L.7 15 4 ]8 18 6 L. 5 13 6 13 12 4 L. 4 10 8 10 11 8 L.26 13 10 L.19 5 JO L. 15 2 4 L. 1 15 7 L. 1 5 8.; L.I 1 Difference on the averages of the 31 years, 1764 and 1794 inclusive, and tin 15 years, 1795 and 1809 inclusive, 72,V P er ccnt - of the former. COMPARATIVE PRICES of Wheat, Barley, and Oats converting the Wheat Measure to that of Barley and Oats the proportion of the former to that of the latter being as 2236.111 to 3257.226. Wheat p. Boll. Barley p. Boll. Oats p. Boll. From 1640 to 1700 L. 1 1 L. ]2 3 L. 9 1700 to 1763 106 11 8J 09 4-^,- 1763 to 1794 1 9 11-*- 1.5 74- 12 JO to 1809 - 2 11 10 1 5 8i 1 1|- Thus, from 1640 to 1700, the price of Barley was 58 per cent, of the price of Wheat. From 1700 to 1763, about 57 per cent. 1763 to 1794, about 52 per cent. 1794 to 1809, about 50 per cent. Oats were, in the first period, about 43 per cent, of the price of Wheat. In the second period, about 45 i- per cent. In the third period, about 43 per cent. And in the fourth period, about 39} per cent. So that, upon the whole, the rise in the price of Wheat has exceeded that in the price of Oats and Barley, and both nearly in -the same proportion, which may be accounted for from Wheat having become more and more the food cflf the labouring part of the community. Printed by C. Stewart. THE PRINCIPLES OF CURRENCY AND EXCHANGES APPLIED TO Report FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE or THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE HIGH PRICE OF GOLD BULLION, LONDON: PRINTED AND SOLD BY W. -WINCHESTER AND SON, 61, STRAND. Dec. 1, T//E PRINCIPLES OF CURRENCY AND EXCHANGES, 1 HE House of Commons have ordered the Report of the Bullion-Committee to be printed. By so doing they have enabled the public to avail itself of the various information which it contains, and to form a judgment on the recommendations with which it concludes. These recommenda- tions are now waiting the final decision of Par- liament. On a subject usually so little studied, yet at this time so interesting to every part of the community, an examination of some of the leading principles of currency and exchanges may contribute somewhat to a just decision; and, however much the opinions resulting from such examination may differ from those of the Com- mittee, they cannot be considered as in the Jeast degree disrespectful to the Members of which it was composed. A 9 The The subjects proposed to the Committee for consideration were The high price of gold bullion, The state of the circulating medium, and The state of the exchanges between Great Britain and foreign parts ; On which, after entering into a detail of prin- ciples, and of the evidence submitted to them, they came to the following conclusions : " That there is at present an excess in the i; paper circulation of this country, of which * the most unequivocal symptom is the very *' high price of bullion ; and, next to that, the * low price of continental exchanges. " That the excess is to be ascribed to the want of a sufficient check and control in the issues * of paper from the Bank of England ; and origi- ' nally to the suspension of cash-payments, " which removed the natural and true control. " And they add, that, upon a general review 4i of the subject, they are of opinion, that no " safe, certain, and constantly adequate provision " against an excess of paper-currency, either oc- " casional or permanent, can be found, except in " the convertibility of ail such paper into specie." After the most careful examination, I presume to differ from the Committee in each of these conclusions : 1 shall therefore, according to the plan plan of examination which I have stated, first submit such other opinions as appear to me more justified by existing appearances; and then ex- plain, as distinctly as I can, on what ground I venture to dissent from such high authority. My own opinions are That there is at this time no excess in the paper circulation of the country. That there is a sufficient check and control on the issues of paper, both from the Bank of Eng- land and from country banks. And That the currency of the country is in no de- gree depreciated by the use of paper. That the high price of bullion is owing to the present state ofthe foreign commerce of the coun- try combined with its foreign expenditure, entirely unconnected with the extent of its paper cir- culation. And That our present unfavourable exchanges are in no way caused by our paper-currency. These opinions range themselves into two classes, the three first being governed by the principles which affect circulation, and the two Fast by those which regulate exchanges. I shall accordingly examine them separately under those heads. PART I. PART I. That there is at this time no excess in the paper circulation of the country ; that there is a sufficient check and control on the issues of paper, both from the Bank of England and country banks ; and that the currency of the country is in no degree depreciated by the use of paper. THE first money which circulated in any country must have been, as our coin is, alto- gether composed of the precious metals, or of some other article intrinsically valuable ; but, in almost every modern State where regular laws pre- vail, the currency has received a mixture of paper, which is not valuable in itself, but is only the representative of what is so. In the early stages of society, the seller of any article of use or con- venience felt he was not secure in parting with it, unless, at the moment, he received in return an equivalent of some article of like intrinsic, value; and thus money, during this rude state of th,ngs,was, of necessity, composed of some mate- rial in universal estimation : but, in the progress of time, ( 7 ) time, as the force of established laws became more and more felt and relied upon, men became more and irioi'e satisfied that a pledge or written en- gagement, promising the payment of a specific sum at a fixed time, was, during the existence of such laws, nearly of the same value as an actual transfer, at the moment, of gold or silver, or any other article of intrinsic worth, and was often more convenient. Within this period, individuals and establish- ments, seeing the economy of specie which sucji written notes gave rise to in single transactions, began, under the sanction of their general cha- racter for wealth and prudence, not only to grant such notes in all their own dealings, but to make them pass in the intercourse between other men. These notes (at first in England termed goldsmiths' notes) engaged to pay to the holder of them, on de- mand, a certain portion of the coin of the country ; and it was apparent, that, so long as the parties en- tering into such contracts were capable of fulfill- ing them, their notes or obligations were of equal value with the precious metals ; and, in some respects of convenience, more desirable. If an absolute assurance could be given with every note, whether of the Bank of England or of an individual, that the holder could at com- mand convert it into real property of the value which ( 8 ) which it purports to bear, it must be owned that, at least for all the larger payments, it would be preferred to gold or silver. If, for every transaction of one thousand pounds, 952 guineas were to be carried, as would often be required, to a considerable distance, to be there told over, and each piece examined separately, as to weight and purity, how would the great operations of the State and of commerce be embarrassed ? Al- though in a less degree, something of the same disadvantage still attends the use of gold for smaller payments ; while, in the use of paper, not only we are saved the trouble of a more tedious reck- oning, but. we know there can be no deteriora- tion in passing from hand to hand : and in case of loss, either by fraud, by violence, or by acci- dent, there are easier means of remedying the injury. It is not pretended that a paper currency, or one principally composed of paper, is wholly free from objection. I admit that it is more liable than coin is to be counterfeited ; arid that it gives, perhaps, too great facility to men who issue notes without capital, as some country bankers certainly do, to impose upon the lower classes of the community in their neigh- bourhood. It is not, however, the immediate object of the present Inquiry to go into a com- parison ( 9 ) parison of the advantages or disadvantages of paper-currency, contrasted with gold and silver : that point may, 1 think, fairly be considered as having been decided by the relative quantities which, till 17Q7, the public voluntarily held of each. The leading object of the present section is to ascertain one fact, whether there be an actual excess in that part of our circulation which is composed of paper ? To decide on this we must first agree on the O duties to be performed by money. By money, in the sense in which I here use it, I mean the circulating medium, or currency of the country, whether it be composed of the precious me- tals, of paper, or a mixture of both. The duty of this mass, be it pure or mixed, is solely to facilitate and render convenient the pay- ments, the exchanges, and, generally, the transactions of the community : but, to perform such a duty, it is necessary that there should be some limit to its amount : it is indispensable that no set of men should be able, by issuing paper for their own advantage, to increase the quantity of this useful instrument, until its essential qualitv, that of a measure of value, is lost; and happily such is the case. The restriction of the Bank, which is supposed by some persons to have foroken down the only guard against excess, by suspending suspending its payments of cash, has still left in full force another more powerful limitation im- posed upon the circulating medium of the coun- try by one of the first principles of our nature our self-interest. To illustrate this, I ask, I ask my reader, what sum of money, what value in the circulating me- dium of the country, whether of gold and silver, or of notes, he keeps in his pocket, or in his house? The answer must necessarily be, from one, a little more; from another, a little less; but, from the richest to the poorest, from the highest to the lowest condition, there will be ad- mitted to exist this governing rule a constant desire that the actual sum so kept should be as little as the convenience or supposed necessities of the individual will admit. All have so apparent an interest in this rule, that its existence must find a ready assent in every mind. Too large a value in what is transferable by mere possession not only exposes our persons and our homes to un- necessary risk, but the value thus left in some hazard is kept at an actual sacrifice of the ad- vantage which we forego in its not being usefully employed. Generally speaking, one of our first cares, on receiving large sums of money, is how again to dispose of them to our advantage; and if we are more regardless of lesser sums, it is because ( 11 ) because they form a part of that limited mass of which we anticipate the use. A care so re- gulated occupies the whole district in which we live, and the whole kingdom. Like the general anxiety which Nature has implanted in us for the preservation of our health, we have a desire as uniform, though perhaps not so powerful, for the care of our fortunes; and if, occasionally, there be found an exception in the passion for hoarding, which sometimes seizes distrustful minds, the pity and surprise which such mis- taken avarice excites are only new proofs of the universal operation of a more reasonable eco- nomy. But, admitting that individuals thus act under the influence of prudential considerations, are there not, I shall be asked, merchants, trading companies, corporations, and the Government it- self, who all contribute in adding to the circulating currency of the country, and in increasing it to an indefinite amount ? I admit that they all do ex- tend the limits of circulation ; but all are go- verned by the same or a greater degree of eco- nomy in the sums they keep at their own cost and risk. The Government (we see by the Re- port) keeps no useless money in the Exchequer ; and it will easily be believed that merchants and traders, who deal in iffcney for no other end than ( 1* ) try, carry them on for the profit they yield ; and their profit clearly must depend upon the extent of paper they send forth. Is there, then, no li- mitation ? Is it owing to the moderation of their desires that these rrjen, instead of issuing only forty-five millions, do not issue four hundred? Fortunately, it is not to such moderate desires that we owe our security against redundancy : the check of a saturated circulation interposes; and the least excess beyond the wants of the public, estimated by each individual for himself, flows back upon the Bank of England or the country banker who occasions it. The way in which this takes place is different in London from what it is in the country. In the latter situation, the methods to which bank- ers have recourse for introducing their notes into circulation are loans to their neighbours on bonds, on bills discounted ; and sometimes, though rarely, on mortgage. The borrower, in retnrn for the accommodation of such loans, receives the sum, with which he is indulged, in the notes of the lending banker, who thus, in fact, advances only his credit, and not his money, and it is the interest of both parties, especially of the lender, that these notes should not re- turn soon for payment ; they therefore cir- culate at first from favour, till at length cus- tom, torn, and the regularity with which they are al- ways acquitted when brought for payment, gives them, and succeeding issues, the ready accept- ance of the whole neighbourhood. In the un- equal contest between gold and paper which hence ensues, it is easy to foretel which will at last prevail : every accommodation and induce- ment is held out by the parties interested to dif- fuse the latter, while the former has no advocate but its intrinsic value, which, while great con- fidence in paper prevails, is little regarded. What then follows ? The range of this bank, we have supposed, which is confined to the circle in which the partners are known, are ob- served, and are trusted, becomes filled with their notes to the extent of the former circulation of metals, joined perhaps to the notes of some for- mer establishments ; and gold, no longer wanted here, but still possessing qualities of universal at- traction, finds its way to other districts, and finally to other countries. This done, the measure is full ; the banker can, by no assiduity or skill, force upon his neighbourhood more of his notes than there was before of specie and of other notes : should he attempt to do so, they will return in- cessantly upon him, and he will be called upon for their value in what is of universal, not of local, request ; that is, he will be called upon for gold? gold, or for Bank of England notes; which last, although not absolutely of universal value, are so in England, when compared with the paper of any county or district. But I have stated that there are two sources whence notes proceed and, admitting that the circulation of provincial banks is thus limited by liability "to payment in Bank of England notes, what check is there on that great and powerful body, the Bank itself? Although of a different kind, there is one possessing equal powers of con- trol which restrains here also, I put out of view the respectability of the Directors of the Bank, whose character secures us against any at- tempt at a forced circulation. I likewise leave out of my argument the original duties imposed upon that establishment, which was first formed, not, for the mere purpose of profit to the under- takers, but for the convenience and support of commerce and commercial men. Absolving the Directors from these obligations, I will, for the sake of argument, suppose them entering into the management of therr trust with all the eager- ness of private adventurers, and seeking only th extension of their profits in the diffusion of their notes. I will add to this, what is the fact, that, since the Suspension Act, they are placed in a more favourable situation for effecting a redun- dant issue than country bankers ever were, be- cause, ( 17 ) cause, as I have shewn, the latter must pay any excess they may have sent forth in the paper of some other establishment, esteemed more solid than their own, which cannot be the case with the Bank of England. Still the circulation even of this apparently unfettered establishment is li- mited: its managers cannot induce the population within their sphere to carry in their pockets, or hoard in their bureaus, more of bank-notes than each man anticipates the want of for his own purposes; and that this universal limitation ex- ists here, as it does every where, becomes appa- rent when we trace the mode in which the issues of the Bank are made. They are of three kinds : The first consists of advances to Government of their own notes in anticipation of some of the established taxes. The second consists in issuing to the public their notes in payment of the public dividends. The third is the fund destined for commercial accommodation, and consists of the like notes issued in discount of bills. In one or other of these channels all Bank of England notes find their way into circulation ; and a very little con- sideration will shew how necessarily, and how soon, they must all find their way back into the bank from whence they issued. As the public Exchequer is, bylaw, alike open B tO ( 18 ) to bank-notes and to the gold and silver coin of the country, and as scarcely any of these pre- cious metals now mix in the payments of the metropolis, it follows, that, in the course of the year, the anticipations to Government on account of taxes must necessarily be repaid to the Bank by a return of its own notes thus paid as duties into the public Exchequer, and afterwards trans- mitted to the Bank. Jn the same manner the public dividends are issued from and returned to the Bank : from five to six millions every quarter are thrown into cir- culation from this source ; but, though thus sent forth, the notes of which these issues are com- posed cannot remain out above a certain length of time. Before the expiration of the same quarter, the duties and taxes, which are to provide the means of paying the next issue of dividends, must find their way into the Exchequer, and from thence must without delay be transmitted to the Bank, thus occasioning an absorption equal to the late effusion. The last mode which the Bank employs for diffusing its notes is the discount of bills ; this operation, as is generally known, consists in ad- vancing to merchants and traders the amount of bills which have a limited term (not exceeding sixty-five days) to run, and which the wants of ( 19 ) of the parties make it necessary for them to turn into money before the period of payment arrives. The sum thus issued, it is believed* amounts to ten or twelve millions; be it what it may, it is evident that the whole of the bills so dis- counted arid transferred into the hands of the Bank will become due in two months, that they will then be sent out for payment, and that as many notes will be received by the Bank in their dis- charge, and be thus withdrawn from circulation, as were issued by that body at the time of their discount. But may not the sum thus issued in payment of dividends and in anticipation of taxes become so enormous, that, joined with the issues on discounted bills, the aggregate may be redun- dant without the means of relief which holders of country notes possess, in having the power to demand payment in other currency ? This can- not be ; above a million of notes are every week returned to the Bank in discharge of bills dis- counted, and are thus altogether withdrawn from circulation ; above a million, it is true, are again usually sent forth upon other bills discounted : but they are advanced on fresh applications occa- sioned by public wants, and the amount is accord- ingly continued the same, or experiences an in- crease or a diminution exactly corresponding to H 2 those ( 20 ) those wants. This applies to every similar period ; in every ten weeks, that is, five times in every year, the public, by forbearing to desire new advances of notes, have the power to suppress one half of the Bank's circulation. During all this time, too, the Exchequer is affording the same protec- tion against excess : in every thirteen weeks above fifteen millions of notes are withdrawn from cir- culation in payment of contributions and taxes ; and thus, four times a year, the public have, through this channel, the means of closing its transactions with the Bank to the extent of the remaining half of its circulation. It therefore appears, that should any distrust of the Bank's good conduct ever be excited, or should any rival to its present universal circulation ever be esta- blished, it is possible for the community at any time to recover payment of every note issued by that body within three months. What is thus possible, in an extreme case, is possible and practised every day, to a limited ex- tent. Whenever the quarterly payments of the public dividends, or any other cause, throws an unusual number of notes into circulation, the Bank feels the demand commonly made to it for issues upon discount immediately reduced. At such times the depositories of mercantile men being overcharged with bank-notes, the owners seek ( 21 ) seek for productive employment of the excess in discounting bills ; and the industry which the interest of individuals inspires, added to the greater latitude and convenience which their rules admit of, in many important respects, will always insure to them, in preference to the Bank, this means of investing their surplus money. Ex- actly, therefore, by so much as the excess of its notes in the hands of the public at any moment amounts to, the Bank will immediately be abridged of its usual power of diffusion. In this manner the portion of our currency which is of paper expands with the expansion of the operations it has to perform, and collapses as these operations become less numerous or of less value ; and thus it is never redundant, nor ever deficient in amount. In this respect it is infinitely preferable to gold, which cannot be increased by the wants of the public ; and which, depending on foreign influences, is liable to be often inconveniently reduced, and sometimes to be almost annihilated (as we now see it is) by our foreign exchanges turning against us. Yet this convenience arising from the use of paper the Committee would take away, and they recom- mend as a measure of precaution, preparatory to the Bank resuming payments in gold, that part of its circulation of paper should be abridged. Should such ^gmctjp4i:J T jMiiii4. be adopted, the -ifl. Tr*'m^e rt&f&XZ**-**^ consequence ( 20 ) those wants. This applies to every similar period ; in every ten weeks, that is, five times in every year, the public, by forbearing to desire new advances of notes, have the power to suppress one half of the Bank's circulation. During all this time, too, the Exchequer is affording the same protec- tion against excess : in every thirteen weeks above fifteen millions of notes are withdrawn from cir- culation in payment of contributions and taxes ; and thus, four times a year, the public have, through this channel, the means of closing its transactions with the Bank to the extent of the remaining half of its circulation. It therefore appears, that should any distrust of the Bank's good conduct ever be excited, or should any rival to its present universal circulation ever be esta- blished, it is possible for the community at any time to recover payment of every note issued by that body within three months. What is thus possible, in an extreme case, is possible and practised every day, to a limited ex- tent. Whenever the quarterly payments of the public dividends, or any other cause, throws an unusual number of notes into circulation, the Bank feels the demand commonly made to it for issues upon discount immediately reduced. At such times the depositories of mercantile men being overcharged with bank-notes, the owners seek ( 21 ) seek for productive employment of the excess in discounting bills ; and the industry which the interest of individuals inspires, added to the greater latitude and convenience which their rules admit of, in many important respects, will always insure to them, in preference to the Bank, this means of investing their surplus money. Ex- actly, therefore, by so much as the excess of its notes in the hands of the public at any moment amounts to, the Bank will immediately be abridged of its usual power of diffusion. In this manner the portion of our currency which is of paper expands with the expansion of the operations it has to perform, and collapses as these operations become less numerous or of less value ; and thus it is never redundant, nor ever deficient in amount. In this respect it is infinitely preferable to gold, which cannot be increased by the wants of the public ; and which, depending on foreign influences, is liable to be often inconveniently reduced, and sometimes to be almost annihilated (as we now see it is) by our foreign exchanges turning against us. Yet this convenience arising from the use of paper the Committee would take away, and they recom- mend as a measure of precaution, preparatory to the Bank resuming payments in gold, that part of its circulation of paper should be abridged. Should such *","'" MmM-nln* 1 *"** be adopted, the 'i**' consequence ( 22 ) consequence would necessarily be, that the pub- lic would either experience the embarrassment and inconvenience of a deficient medium for their daily transactions., or, following the practice of the country, they would be obliged to have re- course to the notes of private bankers to supply the void. With such a control, then, as exists in our habits of economy, and with such additional limitations as I have just shewn are imposed by their own interest on the Bank of England and country bankers, it seems unnecessary to adduce other arguments to prove that there is no excess in the circulating medium of the country. If any other evidence be required, it may, I think, be found in a comparison of the actual circulation in 1797 (which was exempt from all imputation of redundancy) with that of the present time. In this comparison I shall omit entirely the whole circulation of country banks. The Report justly remarks, " that the same check, which the " convertibility into specie under a better sys- 44 tern provides against the excess of any part " of the paper circulation, is, during the present " system, provided against an excess of country " bank ( 23 ) " bank paper, by its convertibility into Bank of " England paper." The alleged superflux, then, must be found in the issues of the Bank of Eng- land ; and this I shall now examine. Referring to the Report, page 25, I find that the average amount of bank-notes in circula- tion in May last, when the amount was at the highest, was In Notes of 5, In Notes and upwards, under <$, 14 Millions. 6 Millions. I find, also, that, pre- vious to the restriction of 1797, the sum of notes of 5 and up- wards was from 10 to 1 1 millions ; I will take the average 10| Millions. And that of notes under that value there were None. 3\ Millions. 6 Millions. Thus shewing an increase in thirteen years of six millions in notes under d, and three mil- lions and a half in notes of a higher value. Of the first description, (those under 5,) the Commit- tee admit " that a part must be considered as " being introduced to supply the place of the " specie ( 24 ) " specie which was deficient at the period of " suspending cash-payments ;" but this admis- sion is evidently insufficient. In considering what void is filled up by small notes, our con- cern is not with the degree of deficiency of gold at the time of suspension, but with the actual amount of the void at this moment, after thirteen years of great waste by melting and exportation. At the time when the Bank ceased to pay gold, the proportion of the precious metals in our payments was still great, compared with its present amount ; and accordingly we see, in the do- cument referred to, that the whole issue of small notes in the first two years was under two mil- lions ; by regular progression the sum increased to 3, to 4, to 3, until now it has reached to 6 millions ; but the experience of every man in the habit of witnessing the money tran- sactions of the capital will, I think, tell him that gold, in the same or in a much greater pro- portion, has gradually disappeared ; arid that now, so far from a part of this hew description of notes being sufficient, the whole of jt is unequal to sup- ply the decrease of specie in the last thirteen years, during a great part of which there have been such strong temptations to melt it down. It appearing then that the substitution of notes for guineas in our lesser transactions is a mere con- version version of our currency from one kind of circulat- ing medium to another, and not an addition to its amount, it follows that the whole of the excess (if there be any) of Bank of England paper is to be found in the class of notes which are above the value of five pounds : this increase, or this excess, has, in the period referred to that is, in the last thirteen years amounted to three mil- lions and a half. I have stated, that, in the unimpeached times which preceded the restriction, the notes of the Bank of England in circulation amounted to between ten and eleven millions ; and in those days there also was seen in use that pro- portion of guineas which has been banished by the smaller notes. These, I have shewn, there is every reason to believe, amounted to as much as the notes which now supply their place six millions ; many circumstances lead me to think they amounted to more : taking them, however, at the computation I have made, the mixed cir- culation of London before 1797* in gold and Bank of England notes, could not be less than sixteen millions and a half. It is now twenty millions, exclusive of the small portion of gold which yet remains, being an increase of about one -fourth. But in the same period has there been no change ( 26 ) change whatever in the condition of society ? has there been no addition to the population within the sphere of the Bank's circulation? has there been no greater number of commercial tran- sactions to adjust, or larger public revenue to re- mit into the Exchequer? In each of these, singly, 1 think I see almost a sufficient demand to draw forth the additional sum in dispute; and I must have recourse to a suggestion of the Committee, " that the notes are of late more economised in " great transactions," to account for the fact, that this increase is not greater. Some of these points, which I have touched on as necessarily involving an increased use for Bank paper, admit of more certain calculation ; these all warrant my position, that the increase we witness is not more than is necessary for the extended functions it has to perform. The issues for the public service, and the emissions from theBankin dividends,have each risen much above a fourth ; and while these great operations in the capital are thus inviting an increase of notes by our increased occasions, above seven hundred country banks, which formerly held in gold the sum which they deemed it prudent to keep as a deposit in their command, now retain that portion in Bank of England paper, thus at- tracting a great permament issue of bank-notes to districts to which they never reached before. It is ( 27 ) is difficult to form any conjecture of the sum thus locked up ; but, stating it so low as one thou- sand pounds for each house, we find, in a single general measure, one-fourth of the alleged ex- cess accounted for. The increase of wealth and population in London and its neighbourhood, where bank- notes almost exclusively circulate, does not ad- mit of a like certainty of calculation ; but the great towns, for so ^hey are, which have been added to the northern and eastern parts of the City and Westminster, and the increase of villages in every direction, as well as the crowded appear- ance of our streets and markets, must satisfy us of the increased number of candidates for the currency in use. But not only is the number of persons greater, but a large proportion have greater concerns to adjust ; not only there are more considerable merchants, more bankers, -more agents, more dealers in every species of pro- perty, in the period under consideration ; but each man^s transactions are numerically and actually increased. He has, in most instances, more rent to pay, more taxes, and more for the purchase of most articles of consumption ; while, on the other hand, there is an equal increase in his receipts. In the upper ranks of society, except to those who unfortunately have only fixed incomes, there are every ( 28 ) every where increased rents of land, increased pro- fits of trade ; while, in the lower ranks, there are increased wages in every employment. When I take all this into view, I cannot think that the increase of one-fourth in the circulation of this prosperous and busy district exceeds that just demand which, I still hold, is regulated by each man's view of his own convenience. 5 I think I have shewn the existence of a re- stricting principle in our nature and habits, which, by limiting the quantity of money in every man's pocket or possession to the amount he finds ne- cessary for his daily exchanges, limits, by con- sequence, the whole circulation of the realm. I have shewn how this principle operates in the limits it imposes on the two great sources of paper-currency, the Bank of England and country banks, and I have shewn, by a comparison be- tween 1797 (a time of acknowledged purity of system) and the present day, that the Bank of England has not increased its issues beyond the amount they would have naturally reached had payments in cash never been suspended. But the Committee, not placing (as I think) sufficient weight on these considerations, decide " that no safe, certain, and constantly adequate " provision against an excess of paper-currency, " either ( 29 ) " either occasional or permanent, can be found, " except in the convertibility of all such paper " into specie." Let us shortly examine this position : Taken in its utmost extent, it would lead to a practical impossibility. If, in times of the greatest abundance of specie, the public, from any cause, had called upon the Bank, and upon every country banker, for the sum declared in their notes to be held on the usual condition of repayment on demand, the Bank of England and the country banker must have been alike in- capable of fulfilling the letter of their engage- ments. The Bank, even in times when its en- gagements only amounted to about ten millions* when there was much more than that sum in specie in the kingdom, and when its credit was as yet unquestioned, found, in 1797, that it had pledged itself to a promise which it was unable to fulfil ; and the Legislature was obligsd to inter- pose, by a suspension of the established law, and by exempting it from the obligation of pay- ing in specie. What then was the actual de- gree of convertibility of paper before the Re- striction Act? It was something greater than sufficed for common and ordinary occasions on one hand, and less than was necessary for the extreme of popular alarm on the other. The truth ( 30 ) truth is, as the times become more secure, and more confidence prevails, there will always be a greater proportion of paper; and this has been uniformly the case in the last century, till now, when little else is seen in use. Happily we have not lately experienced, except in the short alarm of 1797, a doubtful state of public se- curity. Should any such state of things, or any internal dangers, unfortunately arise in this country, our regular laws being sus- pended, our mutual confidence being banished, gold and silver, these so much desired metals, will reappear; but they will come, in such sup- posed case, not as tokens of plenty and security, but as proofs that want of confidence prevails ; and that once more, as in early times, the seller of any article will feel no security but in receiving at the moment another article of like intrinsic value from the buyer. It is clear, then, that whether now, or before the restriction of 1797, the convertibility of pa- per into gold beyond a very limited extent never existed. But if it is not convertible into gold, is it therefore of no value ? is there nothing of intrin- sic worth into which those who are fearful of its security may convert it in the temporary absenca of thisone article ? Yes, into every thing that men desire, or that gold can purchase ; and, when or- dinary dinary times return, it will again be exchangeable into gold itself, as if the present interruption had not happened. Gold, it must be remembered, is but one of the many articles which minister to our comfort or convenience : in the poorest times of our history, we, perhaps, had proportionably the greatest quantity of it, because there was then least dependence on the force of laws, and fulfilment of written obligations ; but, taking any mo- ment since the Revolution, there never were twenty-five millions in circulation in the country. How small, then, is this portion of our wealth, which we so much regard, compared with the great mass of two or three thousand millions, which we enjoy in lands, in houses, in merchandise, in shipping, in manufactures, and in every thing that constitutes wealth. If we have reason to be satis- fied that the issuers of corporate or private notes possess a sufficient portion of these ar- ticles, of intrinsic W9rth, which the law will com- pel the conveyance of to us, when required, why should we be thus tenacious of payment in gold, which the next moment it would be our bu- siness not to hoard or to enjoy, but again to send forth in purchase of some one or other of these very objects we now so much set at nought ? Practically speaking, men have always acted on this conviction ; and have, on no emergency of late years, save that of 1797, demanded gold in ( 32 ) in their dealings : and although, in theoretical dig- qussions, we are pleased with a supposed power of calling for our debts in the precious metals, it is obviously impossible to exercise that power to any extent. However much in theory we may be pleased to contemplate the pure system of con- vertibility into gold, we can have no proof more convincing of the public being satisfied with other security than we saw in the effects of the suspen- sion of the Bank's payments in coin ; a measure as sudden as it was unprecedented ; one, too, adopted at a moment of general alarm from other causes, but which never for an hour rendered the notes of that body of less ready acceptance. Had the paper part of our currency retained its value only by its convertibility into gold, it must have fallen gradually for the last twenty years ; during which time the proportion it contains of the precious metals has been declining. In the last ten years, it ought, by this rule, to have fallen above a half; and, judgingby the power of conver- sion it now possesses, a bank-note of one pound ought not to be worth five shillings ; yet we see our notes retaining their original credit, commanding every article at their original value, and ex- changing for our coin itself in every transaction in which they meet. The truth appears to be, that all excess of paper-currency is restrained by the causes we have stated; and its con- vertibility ( 33 ) vertibility into gold, in a very small degree, is sufficient for convenience, as well as for pre- serving it from depreciation. I repeat, then, after assigning my reasons for so thinking, that, There is no excess in the paper circulation of the country; That there is a sufficient check and control over the issues of paper from the Bank of Eng- land and from country banks ; and That the currency of the country is in no de- gree depreciated by the use of paper. AT this place it is possible I may be asked, by some person not attending to the scope of this discussion, why I detain the reader with argu- ments about restrictions and limitations ? why I do not appeal to every man's and every day's experience, and shew that the currency of the land will buy as much bread, as much meat, and as much of every, necessary of life now, as it did thirteen years ago. I answer, that this makes no part of my present plan. A Commit- tee of the House of Commons having stated, that a depreciation has taken place in our cur- rency, arising from the specific cause of an ex- cessive infusion of paper, my plan and object is c to ( 34 ) to shew that there is no such excessive infusion, and that consequently any remedies grounded upon that assumption must be unnecessary. But, consenting to a momentary departure from the im- mediate question, 1 am again asked generally, whether the currency of this country has not of late years lost some part of its value, compared with all the other articles which we usually em- ploy it to purchase ? I answer, that I feel and be- lieve it has; and that the same nominal income will not now enable the owner to obtain the same comforts and conveniences of life, which it did twenty or even ten years ago. But, to use a homely expression, let us put the saddle on the right horse, and not blame paper for a fault which is, in part, ascribable to gold* itself. Not only in England, but throughout Eu- rope, gold has lost part of its value, compared with commodities ; and the presumption there- fore is, that that depression which took place after the discovery of America, and which had such manifest effects at that time, still exercises an unobserved, but gradual, power. Writers are divided in opinion as to the degree of this excess in the supply of gold and silver above the wants of Europe ; but, considering the care with which such precious articles are husbanded, it is scarcely possible that the annual importation from the new world ( 35 ) World should not considerably exceed the annual waste and the export to Asia, and thus pro- duce some slight diminution of their value. An- other cause for the loss of value which money experiences in this'country is the actual increase in price of the articles themselves which it is used to purchase. In a country insulated as ours now is, by political as well as natural circum- stances, every increase of population must make an increase in the demand for all the articles which land and industry produce. To raise the former, worse soils and more unfavourable situ- ations must be taken into cultivation ; and the produce therefore will be obtained, and must be sold, at an increased expense. To create the latter, men must be paid at a higher rate of wages, be- cause in every state of society, and especially in one progressive, as that of England is, men must receive somewhat above what is necessary for their support ; and the expense of that support will be regulated principally by the cheapness or dearness of food. The operation of taxes is ana- lagous to that of an increased price of the pro- duce of land, and has had its full share in the enhancement of prices. The lower orders in every country pressing closely upon the limits which will suffice to nature for their sub- sistence, it -follows, that, after a certain c 2 point ( 36 ) point, whatever is taken from them in taxes, which are either direct, or which mix in the price of their food or clothing, must be com- pensated in greater wages or earnings. The taxes, indeed, which reach this humble rank of society in Great Britain, are very light ; but, added to the increased price of food, they have every where produced an increase of wages. When then we, on one hand, take into our view the depreciation which, in some given degree, is experienced throughout Europe in the precious metals; and when, on the other, we consider how often increased wages mix and accumulate in every production we pay for; when, also, we find every article brought to us loaded with the taxes necessary for the State ; surely we may see in these very powerful and universal causes, operating upon one hundred and fifty or two hundred millions, at which we may estimate the income of the country, a sufficient explanation of the declining power of money, without seeking for it in the comparatively trifling actual addition, if any, to our circulating medium. But, in this enumeration of causes which take from the power of money, by enhancing the price of all the articles of life, 1 am told I have omitted one not only very important in its effects, but one, immediately connected with the subject of cir- culation : ( 37 ) culation : it is conceded to me that there is no depreciation of bank-notes, nor any excess in their amount; yet it is maintained that the fa- cility with which they are procured from the Bank, by the mode of discount peculiar to com- mercial men, calls into existence an increase of purchasers in our markets, whose competition heightens the price of every article!! This will not be urged by any person acquainted with the subject of production ; an increase of capital (which this is to the small degree in which it ex- ists) never raises the price of commodities, but has exactly the opposite effect ; an increase of consumers, in any given state of supply, will raise the price of every article which is the ob- ject of their wants ; and the enhanced price will continue until the stimulus of the increased de- mand has created a proportionably increased pro- duction ; but a competition of consumers is re- gulated by principles quite distinct from a com- petition of merchants, who buy to sell again : these must always have in view the price which the article they are in treaty for will obtain at its ultimate market ; and, whether there be ten such competitors or a hundred, whether each has car- ried to the place of competition one hundred pounds of bank-notes or one thousand, he must still be limited, in the offer he can afford to make, by ( 38 ) by the price which he expects to obtain in selling again. So far, indeed, from this increased capital being the occasion of high prices, it is one of the principal means of keeping them down ; a com- petition of capitalists, like a competition of ma- nufacturers, restricts their respective profits: at this moment we see so much capital in the coun- try, that, from the want of more productive em- ployment, it is lent to Government on terms much lower than during any former war. In Holland, where individual capital* was more ge- neral than in any other part of Europe, the profits arising from it were the' lowest. A great capital is the principal advantage which any country has in entering into a competition of sales with other nations; it makes roads, it erects machinery, it promotes canals ; and, in the exact proportion in which it produces these facilities to production, it brings into our own and into fo- reign markets every article of necessity or luxury at a diminished price. Such are the effects of capital ; and, in a trifling degree, such would be the effect on the price of commodities resulting from an increased degree of accommodation from the Bank, were it not prevented by the restricting bounds which limit circulation. PART PART II. That the high price of bullion is owing to the present state of the commerce of this coun- try with the rest of Europe, entirely un- connected with the extent of the paper cir- culation; and that our present unfavourable exchanges are in no way caused by our paper currency. HAVING shewn that the amount of our cur- rency is fixed by an impassable boundary, which precludes the possibility of excess; having shewn that the convertibility of the portion which is paper, into that which is of the precious metals, was always limited ; having shewn that (except in times of alarm, when it might be better if there were none) a very moderate degree of conver- tibility is necessary for the common purposes of life ; and appealing to every man's experience, that, in the small, indeed, but frequent exchanges in which gold and silver now mix, paper and these precious metals pass at a like value, thus establishing a standard for the former; it follows, that our currency is not now depressed by the use of paper. But I am desired to take a guinea, and to melt it down ; - ( 40 ) down ; and I am shewn that the moment it is freed from the stamp of law, as soon, in short, as it be- comes bullion, it rises in value; and that that portion of gold, which yesterday exchanged only for a one-pound note and one shilling, novy ex- changes for the same note, and four shillings and six-pence. This evidently must proceed from one of two causes ; it must proceed from the currency of which it late made a part having fallen below its usual value, or from gold in the shape of bullion, which it has now become, having risen above it. I think I have shewn that it is not in the former of these causes : and when I turn to the other alternative, and see so many circumstances combining to prove that bullion has risen above its ordinary price to the whole extent of the dis- parity, yam led to express my surprise that any doubts should ever have arisen on the subject. At this place let me again revert to a few ge- neral principles ; and guard my reader against what, till this discussion arose, I should have termed the exploded belief, that gold is an unvarying standard. In addition to the many excellencies which gold possesses, of divisibility, of portability, of being less perishable and more pure than any other substance we know of, it possesses also the merit of varying less in value from year to year, or { 41 ) or in one place compared with another, than any other metal : but it must not be inferred that gold is therefore subject to no variation ; since the discovery of America, and the influx which the mines of that part of the world have poured upon Europe, its value has fallen in this country to one-third : like every other article which ministers to our convenience or comfort, it is bought by human labour ; and, being obtained in the new world with less expense of trouble than it was in the old, it has proportionably become cheaper in the great degree we have seen. Upon the same principle, it is also subject to some variation from locality : in America, where it is recently dug from the mine, it must necessarily be cheaper than in Europe, which it reaches with all the ex- penses of freight and hazard attending upon so long a conveyance. It is, therefore, subject, like other commodities, to variation of value, according to time and place; although, from the regularproduction of the mines whence it issues, and the small expense of trans- porting it compared with more bulky articles, it is less so than any other substance ; and in ormnary times, when the intercourse between every part of the world is free, it is, for all the common purposes of society, a sufficiently per- fect measure of value. Thus Thus it has continued (allowing for the consi- derable but regular depreciation just mentioned) for nearly three centuries, and thus it will pro- bably always continue, to serve as the best ap- proximation to a perfect standard : it has not changed its nature, nor will it in any material degree be less useful to mankind that we occa- sionallysee,andnowfeel,itsnatural tendency to an equal value transiently interrupted by political cir- cumstances. We have hitherto experienced very little inconvenience from such local and tem- porary alterations ; nor shall we now from that we witness, if we do not create inconveniences by improper interference. Without entering into the intricacies of foreign exchanges, it must be evident to every man, who will consider the subject, that when a country, like an individual, makes purchases more in value than it sells in return, that country must, for the moment, remain in debt to the extent of the differ- ence: it must be equally clear, that, if a nation obtains from other countries advances for the maintenance of its subjects detained abroad, for the support of its armies on foreign service, or for the payment of its subsidies to other States or Princes, to the extent of all these, for the time, the accommodated country will be in debt. In all these ways has England been accommodated and become ( 43 ) become indebted to the Continent ; in most of them does it still continue to be accommodated, and to contract new debts ; and, unlike as in former times, when the intervention of neutral States, or the ingenuity of our merchants, made exportation, even in a period of war, little liable to obstruction, England is now, with teeming warehouses, unable to force the articles with which she would discharge her obligations, through the barrierwhich political circumstances have interposed. But there is a limit to all credit, and particu- larly to the extent in which merchants on the Continent, who are generally less affluent than our own, can afford to make advances to this country. Something then must be remitted in discharge of past advances, or intercourse must cease. In endeavouring to continue so useful and so profitable an intercourse, every expedient which private ingenuity can suggest will be de- vised to defeat the obstruction, of whatsoever nature jt may be : the convenience of every port for admission will be examined, the assistance of neutral flags and neutral ships will be resorted to ; and, above all things, the aptitude of particu- lar articles for secret and expeditious transport will be anxiously investigated : and in this inves- tigation, in this comparison of qualifications, will gold gold be forgot ? Is it probable that that commo* dity, which, of all others, is, in proportion to its value, the most easily transported, the most easily concealed, and the most sure to find a ready market, will be overlooked by men so acute as our merchants are ? The very reverse is the case : the first thing that feels the impulse of an unfa- vourable exchange is this very gold, which the Committee would seem to think unsusceptible of influence. What then follows this demand for gold ? All the train of appearances which result from a de- mand for other articles : it becomes more and more scarce it gets higher and higher in price. But, if the demand for any article of which there is an extended market if the demand for woollens or linens, for example, the supply of which is capable of being increased to a great extent, raises the price in their respective in- stances, how much more suddenly must the price of gold be affected, of which the English market is so limited ? There is, perhaps, no country in the world, in proportion to its wealth, that has so little. We have not, as at Ham- burgh and Amsterdam, a constant transmission through our provinces of foreign coins: our own coin is. very limited ; what there is can afford but little relief, being barred by penal statutes from the use use immediately desired of exportation. Our gold and silver plate can contribute as little to the end in view, as scarcely any increase of value, by a high exchange, would compensate the loss it would sustain in being deprived of its fashion and workmanship, What then remains to con- stitute the English market ? Only the small sura of a few hundred thousand pounds, which we find, from the Report, passes annually through the Bullion-Office ; and which, stimulated by such urgent occasions, it is no wonder we see in- creased in price. In reply, I am asked, are not the mines of the new world open to us as to the other na- tions of Europe ? But the produce of the American mines are usually brought to Spain, and, being there, we do not want to have them brought to England at a time when the sole purpose for which they are in such request is to send them back to that country, or some other part of the continent of Europe. Such quanti- ties of specie, indeed, as our commercial inter- course with the Portuguese and Spanish settle* ments enable us to procure, are brought home, and form, as we see, the principal part of the scanty fund deposited at the Bank ; -but how ineffectual is this to settle the heavy ba- lance of payments we are every day incurring ? If we require an additional proof that gold and silver ( 46 ) silver are urgently wanted by this country, and that its usual stock and ordinary resources are unequal to the demand, we shall find that proof in the conduct of Government itself, which, after exhausting every scheme for supplying our necessities on the Continent by common means, have been obliged, in repeated instances, to enter into contracts with the Spanish settle- ments, and to grant licences for the transmission of specie from thence, even when intercouse was shut against other things. Could Govern- ment have found the precious metals as* it could have done shoes, or clothing, or provisions, in England, would it have had recourse to such modes? The conclusion is inevitable: it is a new proof that the British market or deposit of the precious metals is extremely small, and must necessarily be easily affected in price by any urgent demand, Whenever the imports and the foreign ex- penses of this or any other country exceed its ex- ports, its exchanges will be unfavourable, and gold dear ; whenever the reverse is the case, when our exports exceed our imports and foreign charges, our exchanges must be favourable, and gold cheap. How then can that be considered as an undeviating measure, which is thus ever affected by circumstances so uncontrollable? It will be asked how it then happens, that, in all ( 47 ) all the changes we have seen arising from the state of our exports and imports, gold, after a long series of years favourable to England, has never fallen much under the price it bears re- latively to other commodities ? The answer is plain: when the balance of trade was against the Continent, it had always the option to pay its debts in whatever best suited our market, and, consequently, there never could be any redundancy of this, more than of any other ar- ticle of commerce ; as soon as the measure of our wants became full, the surplus would flow back to where it was more desired, and other articles would be selected, more suited to our market. But it will be said this theory does not hold good at the present moment. The measure of the Continental market is admitted to be full : gold, therefore, not being dear there, there cannot be the usual attraction of a high price to excite ex- portation from England ; yet the tendency of the current is strongly that way. This is one of the phenomena arising from our new situation : our motive for exportation now, is not as it used to be a high foreign market ; but it is one equally powerful the necessity of discharging a large foreign debt, which "the political obstruction of the times makes it more advantageous to liquidate by this, than by any other article more difficult to transport. At such moments our commercial greatness greatness even turns against us by the unwieldi* ness of the operations it imposes on the precious metals to perform. Should France, in her com- paratively limited intercourse with other States, experience a depression of her exchanges, the currency of that immense empire would scarcely feel the drain; while England, dealing as it does for millions, and expending millions in foreign objects of policy, must necessarily with a li- mited currency have greater variations in her ex- changes, and these variations will be greater or less as her trade and payments happen to con- cur or counteract each other. I cannot anticipate the necessity of further illustrations to prove that at this time, and in this country, gold is dear: it seems extraordinry, that, instead of acknowledging it, as we do every other article of commerce, to be dearer when it is of more difficult attainment, we look, at the expense of insuperable objections on the other side, for arguments to shew that its rise in price is not a proof of an increase in its exchangeable value, but of an excess in the currency with which it is bought. Let us try these two op- posite opinions one way more, by the test of consistency in their effects. First, to shew that gold varies, that is, rises and and fails with the demand for it, I compare it with the state of our exchanges, which indicate the decree of that demand : In the years 1797, 1793, and 1799, I find the exchanges greatly in favour of this coun- try- In 1800, 1801, and 1802, the exchange became unfa- vourable, and was 4, 5, and 6 per cent, against England. In 1803, 1804, and 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1808, the ex- change, with the exception of a few months in 1805 and 1806, continued favourable. At the end of 1808, and through all 1809, a very great and unfavourable alteration took place in our exchanges ; they fell to 1 5, 16, and 20 per cent, under par. Gold, not then being want- ed for more than ordinary de- mands, remained at its stand- ard price. Accordingly gold, the most exportable of all articles, ac* quired a new Value, arid be- came dear, and sold at 4/. IJT. 4/. 2s. and 4/. 3s. per ounce, which is an increase of about 4, 5, and 6 per cent. And we find gold, as we had reason to expect, at a corre- sponding price ; it was all this time almost unvaryingly at 4/. per ounce. Then gold became in re* quest ; it was wanted to satisfy foreign demands, and accord- ingly it rose to 12, 14, and 15 per cent. In April of the present year And gold accordingly fell the exchanges recovered a to within 10 per cent, of the little, and were only about Mint price. 10 per cent, against this country ; - Next, to shew that currency has not fallen, I j> take ( 50 ) Gold never altered its price ; its price in currency never increased. take the same test of a comparison. -If it has lost its value from excess, it must have sunk in some degree proportionable to the increase of that excess. Let us see how the fact corresponds with that principle : In the years 1797, 1798, and 1799, during those im- mediately succeeding the sus- pension of cash-payments, and consequently of the greatest alarm, and during which there was sent forth an addition of 5\ millions to the circulation of bank-paper, be- ing an increase of above 50 per cent. in these years, when the effects of the excess, had there been any, must have be^n most apparent, In the years 1800, 1801, and 1802, an increase took place in the issue of bank- paper of three millions more, being an additional increase of 23 per cent. In the years 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806, and 1807, a fur- ther increase of issues took place to the extent of a mil- lion and a half, making in all an increase on the original cir- culation of a hundred per cent, From Gold bullion became dear in these years of unfavour- able exchange ; gold rose in value 4, 5, and 6 per cent. Gold bullion became cheaper ; it fell back to within 25. of the Mint price. From January 1808, to Yet gold rose from par te Christmas 1809, there was 12 or 15 per cent, above the little or no increase of paper ; Mint price. In April 1810, although Yet gold fell to 10 per there was no decrease of Bank cent, of England paper, Can any proof be more decisive than that which these statements afford that the prices of bullion have had no correspondence with the issues of bank-notes ? The Committee do not indeed allege that our currency is depreciated to the whole extent of the rise which bullion has experi- enced ; they limit the charge they bring by stating only that it must exist to a certain degree : even so qualified, this opinion is not just, but, car- ried to the full extent, as it has been by some persons, it leads to the most obvious absurdities. According to the creed of such persons, that gold is invariable, and that the cause of its departure from the Mint price must be found in the varia- tion of our currency, it would follow That in 1800 the whole currency of Great Britain became depreciated to the extent of six per cent, and consequently that it lost about three millions of its value; And that, in 1804, with a greater proportion of paper, with a larger public debt, and with an ex- D 2 tended tended war, the same currency, in all these re- spects less secure, recovered all the value it had lost. Were such opinions just, it would follow also, that if Mr. Goldsmid, in executing any very urgent commission, should raise bullion two or three per cent, above the usual price, he would by such rash act strike off a million from the value of our currency : but the truth is, in all these instances it is only a few ounces of bullion that have got dearer or cheaper; our currency remains just the same. At this place I shall again shortly depart from the direct course of these Observations, to notice, the argument of a class of advocates for the mea- sure recommended by the Committee, but who urge it upon different grounds. These Gentlemen allow that our currency is not depreciated ; that gold is increased in value to the whole extent of the disparity we see; but, admitting all* this, they say, a pound of gold, having been coined into 44 guineas and a half, the holder of a bank-note for 46/. l6s. 6d. (the sum corresponding with 44i guineas) is entitled at all times to a pound of gold ; and he is so, they say, by the express letter of his contract, ami and by the law of the country, even now, when a pound of gold is worth fifty-six pounds. But, independent of the injustice of placing the par- ties to any contract in a situation not in contenv plation at the time of making such contract (a situation resembling that of a mortgager pressed to sell his estate in a time of great depression of property, which a court of equity would not permit), the very terms of the contract are against this reasoning. There is not in existence any note of the Bank of England, or of a country bank, engaging to pay a pound of bullion: tin? engagement such notes contain is to pay a certain portion of the coin of the realm ; which coin, bereft as it is, and always has been, of exporta- bility, is of the same value now that it was when it issued from the Mint; and never was intended to give to the possessor the fluctuating and now very unusul advantages of bullion, from which it is so distinctly separated by the law. Of the same kind is the popular instance of a public dividend ; inasmuch as it is the opinion of the Committee carried to the extreme. A believer in depreciation carries me to the Bank, and there shews me a small ingot, which was once a guinea, but which now he proves to me he could sell for 1 /. 4s. 6d. In coin of this value, he reminds me, was once paid every pound of these dividends now poured upon the public in notes, these depreciated depreciated notes, which, compared with this piece, are worth only seventeen shillings for every nominal pound. But is not the answer plain ? Let this ingot again receive the unvarying cha* racterof coin which the law gave it, and meant it should always retain; let it once more be secured by the Tower stamp from those in- fluences which its exportability subjects it to, and which now affect it so much ; take from it that susceptibility of change, which, as bullion, makes it unfit for a measure of value ; confine it, as our coin always has been, to its use of a domestic standard ; then that ingot, that guinea, will be of the value of this note and this shilling; it will then be of the value it bore when you paid it to the State in purchase of this very dividend ; and it will be of the value to which it will once more return when it has lost the enhancement it now experiences from temporary and unexam- pled causes. SUCH SUCH is the reasoning which has led me to a conriction that there is no depreciation of our currency, and that the present enhanced price of bullion is owing to the unfavourable state of our intercourse with the Continent. In stating the grounds of my opinion, I have endeavoured to anticipate such objections as occurred to me might be made on each point : I shall now very shortly examine the principles and reasoning which are detailed in the Report as the grounds of an opposite conclusion. In the first page the Committee state the price of bullion for four years, ending with 1809 : in the next page they state our foreign exchanges for the same period, and shew that they exactly correspond with each other, rising and falling at the same time. The natural inference to be drawn from this correspondence would seem to be, that the high or low price of bullion arose from the state of the exchange ; that they were cause and effect; but a different conclusion is formed " so extraordinary a rise in gold, cou- " pled with so remarkable a depression of ex- " change, points out something in our domestic " currency as the cause of both appearances/' They ( 56 ) They then proceed to examine separately the high price of gold and the low state of exchange; in each of which they appear to adopt very ob- jectionable opinions. In Part I. they lay down as a principle, " that, " in a sound state of our currency, the founda- " tion of which is gold, no demand for gold, " however great, can have the effect of produc- " ing here, for any considerable time, a mate- " rial rise in its market-price." If I have made myself at all understood in a former page, (p. 44,) it must, I think, be apparent that a high market- price of gold must continue just as long as the exchange is unfavourable, however long that may be : whilfe we have an unfavourable balance to pay, we shall ever wish to pay it, amongst other things, in that article which is of cheapest con- veyance; and that article will in consequence be dear : when we have no balance to pay, that article will then, and not till then, resume its former level. In the next paragraph the Committee state that there is no unusual demand on the Con- tinent, no high market-price of gold there, to ac- count for the high price here, That there is no unusual demand abroad is admitted; but there is no uer.essfty for a high foreign market to make a great demand at home ; it is dear here, as I h^e shewn, because it is easier to convey the value value of fifty pounds into the heart of France, or of the Continent, in the shape of a pound of gold, than in that of a hogshead of sugar or a bale of cloth. In page 5 the Committee enter into an ex- amination of the nature of gold as a measure of value, to shew that, however it may vary in value, compared with other commodities, it cannot vary from itself; that an ounce of gold, therefore, now buying 4/. 2s. of our currency, instead of 3l. \Ss. as it used to do, is a proof that our currency is cheaper. This, too, I have ex- plained : our currency is the same ; the export- able gold here instanced has acquired a new power that of paying at the cheapest rate a foreign debt and consequently a new value; but it is a value which it will lose when the balance of trade and payments turns again in our favour. That portion of our gold which is in coin, which we have barred from exportation, arid, of course, from this accidental quality, re- mains as it was, at the Mint price ; and the dif- ference, estimated in the Report, page 6, at 4J per cent, is only an enhancement in the given price of exportable bullion as an article of trade, The section concludes by this position " that a 44 general rise of all prices, and in the market-price f< of gold, with a fall of foreign exchanges, will be " c the " the effect of an excessive quantity ofcirculating 18, and 19, in order to shew the evils arising from excessive issues, the Com- mittee refer to instances in the Bank of England soon after its establishment ; in the Bank of Ireland in J804, and in certain banking companies in Scotland after the seven-years' war, in each of which, great inconveniences are alleged to have arisen from an over-issue of paper. These in- stances are little more than glanced at in the Report ; I shall therefore only notice each as shortly. With regard to the first, the Com- mittee themselves furnish us with the most com- plete explanation, by stating that the coin of that day was depreciated by wearing and clipping, and that the credit of the Bank was injured for a time by the "straits" it was in to keep up its pay- ments in specie, then the only test of solvency : this, coupled with an error it fell into of too much, identifying itself with the Government, then also in great difficulties, could have no other result at a time when banking establishments were still new, and when men must have watched their conduct with a caution corresponding to their recent in- troduction. The case of Ireland is an illustration of all the principles ( 63 ) principles I have laid down. Between 1799 and 1804, the alarm of a threatened invasion, and the terrors of an existing rebellion, impelled a considerable portion of the Irish community, with an anxiety proportioned to the danger, to re- move themselves and their property to a place of greater security. What was the conse- quence ? Exactly what we have seen is the con- sequence of our present necessity in this country to send remittances to the Continent: Irish individuals and Irish families gave more and more for bills upon England ; the exchange on this country got higher and higher, and gold rose in Dublin to a corresponding premium. It not that an Irish gentleman, so alarmed, thought the Bank of Ireland had issued too many notes that he wished to exchange them for those of England ; but because he wished the whole or some part of his property to be out of the reach of risks then peculiar to that part of the empire. The whole phenomena of that day are in strict uniformity with those of the present times: gold, the most exportable of all commodities, con- tinued in Dublin at a premium, while, in London, a bill drawn upon Dublin could not be sold but at a great loss ; and for the most obvious reason, because the person purchasing was taking that risk which the seller was so desirous to divest himself himsejf of: jet, in this state of things, bills on Belfast sold in London at their usual rate : they did so, because, in the north, gold was still the cir- culation of the country ; and as soon as the draft was paid in this metal of intrinsic value and uni- versal request, it was sent to England: but Time, the silent yet certain restorer of an- ordi- nary state of things, has gradually done what Government and the Committee of that day in vain attempted to perform ; the high ex- change drew forth, in their natural succession, the gold, the silver, the linens, the provisions, the produce and the industry of Ireland ; those individuals who were most alarmed, thus got greater means of remittance ; while in the same time the alarm itself was gradually subsiding, till now we see in Ireland, what we ought to anticipate seeing in this country, relatively with the Continent, the exchange restored to par, and that, too, with a circulation of notes in Ire- land as unlimited and as great as it was in the deprecated year of 1804-. The case of the banking companies in Scot- land seems at first view to be the most favour- able to the arguments of the Committee ; their fault was certainly in part that of over-issues : it was an ill-advised attempt at extensive circula- tion in an early stage of country banking, when its principles principles were not understood; the evil com- plained of, however, was corrected by with- drawing from the notes of those banking com- panies the optional clause, which made them uncertain and inconvenient, and by assimilating them to the notes which now circulate in the same district at their full value. In Part IV. the Committee is led to an ex- amination of the progressive increase and present amount of the paper circulation of the country, whether of the Bank of England, or of provincial banks. That of the Bank of England I have already considered in the early part of these Ob- servations : it only remains to examine the esti- mates which are adopted of the last, and to re- mark on an apparent mistake in principle in de- tailing the extraordinary difficulties of 1793, in page 27. The year 1793 was one of singular distress throughout the country ; there was a failure of confidence and of private credit : in both cases, men distrusting the solidity of houses engaged in trade wished to withdraw their funds from a real or supposed risk. In this moment of danger the Committee imply that the Bank ought to have extended its discounts, and thereby have relieved the distress it witnessed ; but surely it was not the duty of the Bank to take the peril E on ( 66 ) on itself v and to assist every embarrassed establish* merit at the risk of its own safety. What was the real evil ? It was not a want of the currency of the country then existing ; it was not a decrease of the medium, used to make exchanges (the sole legitimate purpose of money, and of the Bank's circulation), that caused the distress ; the cur- rency of that year of difficulty was probably as great as it was in that before, or in that which succeeded ; and had the Bank attempted to in- crease it to any considerable degree, the super- flux returning on them would have created that drain on them which they saw so fatal to others. But it was not notes, it was mutual confidence which was wanting, and the evil was cured by a restoration of that confidence. The Govern- ment appointed Commissioners to inquire into the solvency of such houses as applied for relief: to such as established their claims it lent the pledge of its own security by issuing Exchequer- bills to them; and thus Government, without add- ing to the circulation, did what the Bank would in vain have endeavoured to do at the expense of its established rules, and at the hazard of its reputation for prudent management. In pages 28 and 29 the Committee bring a heavy charge of excess against country banks. ID the latter they give a statement of the number of notes ( 67 ) hotes of these establishments, above two guineas, stamped in the year 1808, compared with those stamped in 1809; and from it a conclusion is drawn, " that the total amount in circulation " of this class of notes alone was in 1809 in- " creased three millions ; a sum which, added " to an increase of a million and a half in the " same year from the Bank of England, was an " addition to the circulation of Great Britain " alone little short of the amount which, in any " one year sin^e the discovery of America, has " been added to the circulating coin of the " whole of Europe/' But I submit whether the principle on which this calculation is made be not evidently er- roneous. The notes in question are limited in their duration to three years ; if few ^Vere issued in 1803, few, at the expiration of their term of three years, would require to be restamped in 1808; while, if many were stamped in 1806, many would require to be renewed in lfc>09 : so that, even supposing there was no addition to the circulation, a great increase would appear by comparing the year 1808 with 1809: accord- ingly we find, in the Appendix, No. 53, that the corresponding years of 1806 and 1809 were both unusually productive. The just test of compari- son, then, is not the amount thus paid for stamps E 2 in ( 63 } in any one year ; it is the amount paid in any three years. On any given day, the amount of the circulation of the country must be all the notes stamped within the three preceding years of that day : all the notes stamped after the commence- ment of the period must be still in force and in use ; all stamped before that era must be ex- pired, and of course withdrawn : allowing, there- fore, for a few which may remain out beyond their appointed time, but which do not affect the comparison, as the allowance applies alike to every year, the comparison of which the Ap- pendix affords us the materials stands thus : Above 2 2s. Above 5 5s. Duty paid for reissuable notes in the three years ending October, 1807 80,226 <38,4-S2 Ditto i 808 74,322 33,277 Ditto 1809 77,606 36,1S4 (Deducting increased duty 1809) Shewing that, although there was an increase of stamps corresponding to about a million in 1809, yet that, even then, the circulation, so far frorri being increased, was above half a million less than it was in 1807. CONCLUSION IN the present actual state of our foreign ex- changes, when a given quantity of gold pays a larger portion of a debt on the Continent than any other article in this country of equal value, a judicious merchant, in examining his stores, would determine to export his stock of the precious metals, and, after benefitting by the present certain increased prices, he would trust to a change of times for an oppor- tunity of replacing it, when the tide of ex- changes (as sooner or later it will do) sets in the contrary way, and when gold and silver again drop to the Mint price. Had our Government or the public hoarded millions, it would have been their true interest to have followed the same course at this time : and the judicious part of the latter now do so, to the extent of their means, being ever careful to sell dear, and to buy cheap. But the Committee, seemingly in op- position to the maxims which govern us in common life, reject the delay of a few months or years, when peace, and its consequent, favour- able exchanges, will have made the replenish- ment ( 70 ) ment of our stores free from difficulty ; and they select a most unfavourable moment for attempt- ing what is nearly impossible ; but which, sup- posing it possible, would at all events be inju- dicious as to the time of execution. They recommend that, in two years, the Bank should resume its payments in gold, whether peace be restored or not. If peace shall then pre- vail, the order will have been superfluous, as the law unaltered already directs cash-payments in that event. Should peace not be restored, the Bank,thenceforward,insteadofjoininginthecom- mon tendency of the community to export in the liquidation of our foreign debts, must counteract that current, and must add to our unfavourable balance by increasing our imports : they must raise the difficult supplies, which they will be obliged to provide for their cash-payments, by the most ruinous means to themselves; for they must purchase abroad, to bring it home, that very commodity which the whole trading world are seeking at home to send abroad. Still, if the sacrifice of one, or two, or three millions, could be supposed sufficient for the object in view, it might be desirable to relieve fearful minds at that expense ; but is it not apparent, that one supply, or one hundred supplies, will not suffice in the given state of exchanges ? Have we not seen at least ( 71 ) least eight or ten millions of our specie melted down and sent away in the last fifteen years ? and can we expect, with the same inducements for exportation, that the same consequence will not follow again ? Certainly this will happen ; and the Bank, to their sorrow, and to the surprise of those who hoped better results, will, after years of expense, and the waste of millions, find their coffers as empty of the precious metals as they are at present. It is clear then we ought to leave to more fa- vourable times, and to the alteration of our foreign exchanges, (which will, of itself, correct the evil,) that disparity in value of our bullion and our currency which the proposed regulations in the Bullion Report can never correct. Car- ried to the extreme of possibility, those regu- lations would produce the most inconvenient ef- fects : it is within possibility, that the Bank, constantly coining and constantly importing to supply a waste greater than it could replace, might be obliged to declare its inability to keep out its notes at this expense, and might find itself under the necessity (I put an extreme case) of withdrawing its paper from circulation altogether. What then would be the result ? Either the pub- lic must be satisfied with a worse currency, and accept for their convenience the notes of private bankers ( 72 ) bankers to the extent of the void ; or they must import twenty millions of the precious metals to perform the offices which bank-notes now ex- ecute so well. In the former case our exchanges would remain exactly as they are now ; in the latter almost inconceivable case, we should d what ? not keep our currency at the standard, not preserve an equal measure of value, but we should, at the expense of a million a year in in- terest for the use of this expensive instrument, and of two or three millions in unfavourable ex- changes to acqnire it, bring up our currency to the war-price of bullion, which price, obtained by such sacrifices, it would again lose the hour after peace and free intercourse were restored. To supply our wants at such a time would seem to resemble the improvidence of an indi- vidual who should lay in a stock of ice in sum- mer, or of fruit in December. But. admitting this expensive consequence of ordering the resumption of cash-payments to be highly inconvenient, I am asked, bad as the al- ternative is, is it not better than a breach of faith on the face of every note we see in cir- culation ? The contract contained in every pro- missory note is, that the holder should receive, when he pleases, the sum therein specified, in one or other of the precious meials, which our laws ( 7S ) laws make exclusively a legal tender: what- ever it might do, therefore, as to future con- tracts, was it not a departure from justice when the law of 1797- absolved the issuers of notes from a positive engagement contained in all these obligations then existing ? But let us here not blame the statute of 1797 for more than it has done : it has indeed prohibited the Bank of England from payment of its notes in coin ; but, with the exception of a trifling form in holding to bail, it has left the law exactly as it stood before, with regard to the rest of the community : every individual stands precisely as he did before 1797, and is as liable to a settlement of his debt in the coin which the law alone acknowledges as he ever was. If he is not called upon for gold, it is from no legal bar to that demand, but from the acqui- escence of the public in a difficulty imputable to causes out of his control ; and if, in the thirteen years during which the precious metals have been so scarce, we have seen no exercise of this power over the person and property of the iss u ers of notes, it forms a strong additional evidence that the pub- lic do not feel either inconvenience or any de- creae of confidence. But if the law (it will still be said) is left un- altered between man and man, it is not so left with reference to the Bank of England. With re- gard' ( 7* ) gard to that body, the law is suspended ; and the holder of one of its notes cannot, as against his neighbour, proceed to judgment, and seize its goods. But it must be always remembered that this is not done from partiality to the Bank ; the consequences of the new law may have incidentally promoted the advantage of that body, but it is on public grounds that the Restriction Act is justified. When it foresees public incon- veniences, does not the Legislature constantly interfere with private rights ? When grain is too profusely exported, does it not impose a restric- tion on the owners against further exports ? When an individual would circulate his own notes for sums under twenty shillings, does not the law interpose on the ground of public inconve- nience ? Surely then, when the extraordinary circumstances of the times presented such tempta- tions to break one of our acknowledged laws, and when the coin of the country was daily melted down and exported by men who could neither be controlled nor detected, it was timetoputan end to the source of their traffic, and, by preventing the Bank from being made the channel of supply for such purposes, not only to preserve a part of our coin from annihilation, but, in relieving the Bank from such demands, to relieve the community from ( 75 ) from the intolerable expense of purchasing gold only to coin, and of coining gold only to be melted down. In the Act, as it now stands, it may be said the innovation on the former law has been carried to an unnecessary extent. It is true that, by the liability which is imposed on the public Exche- quer to receive Bank of England notes, the State has pledged itself for their validity, and there can never be any practical difficulty in the disposing of any amount at the value they purport to bear : but still it may be said, that it would be more con- formable to our usual habits if the law were re- stored to its former state, and if we could again demand payment of our debt in this as we do in all other cases, by a direct appeal to our debtor, the Bank itself; by the Restriction Act we can still demand of it to exchange a note of a hundred or a thousand pounds for any others of a like amount ; but here our power ceases ; and we not only cannot by any legal pro- ceeding seize its stock of the precious metals, which may perhaps be considered as under the guardianship of the State ; but we are prevented from proceeding against its effects in bills dis- counted, or against the mortgage it holds on the whole property of the country, in the shape of advances to Government. But it must ever be borne ( 76 ) borne in mind that the Restriction Bill is not the act of the Bank, imposed to protect it against the just rights of its creditors; it was an act of the Legislature, adopted on public grounds, and in fulfilment of one of the duties of Govemutent to prevent or lessen a public evil in the ex- portation of our coin ; and it would be obviously unjust to expose the whole property of the Bank of England to confiscation because it does not do what it declares itself willing to do, at all hazards, when permitted, and which it will again do when- ever the law declares it is no longer bound by the fetters which public convenience now im- pose upon it. I trust it will not be thought that those who thus argue against the removal of the Bank re- strictions during war, and of course during the probable continuance of unfavourable exchanges, are therefore indifferent to the advantages of a safe, a convenient, and an unvarying currency, or to the benefit of a certain mixture of the pre- cious metals in its composition. The efficient state of this useful instrument, to which we daily and hourly have recourse for assistance, deserves our peculiar care; but we ought to watch it without any of those prejudices or alarms which we daily see in men otherwise in- telligent, who impute our debts, our taxes, our commercial ( 77 ) commercial distresses, to some irregular action of this (to them) unintelligible machine. The sole and exclusive use of money, in the sense of currency, is to constitute a convenient and certain standard of value in the exchanges of society: other advantages being alike, what- ever instrument performs this office at the least expense must be the best. Between the ex- pense of gold and that of paper there is no com- parison ; and accordingly, during the last cen- tury, in which paper began to be a candidate for public favour in opposition to gold, it has gra- dually gained upon its rival. In a former page I have noticed the advantages it possesses in being more portable, more easily reckoned ; in addi- tion to these, I think I may now state, that, joined with a certain mixture of gold and silver? it is more unvarying in its value ; it is not sub- ject to the influences of our foreign commerce or our foreign policy ; and it increases or decreases in exact correspondence as the society expands or contracts. The security which gold affords to its possessor, in a time of general alarm, is an ad- vantage of a very questionable nature; it gives a few persons a supposed safety, which it would be better that they should only feel in join- ing to ward off the common danger. With all these considerations, however, to reconcile me to the ( 78 ) the existing state of our circulation, I still admit it to be one of necessity and constraint : nothing short of urgent reasons of State warranted the first Suspension Act ; and nothing but a continuance of the same causes can justify the present. There are real advantages attending the partial use of gold, arising from its intrinsic value ; there are other benefits not less desirable, resulting from the confidence and security which in many cases it inspires ; and, in a well-regulated currency, the public ought to be unfettered in their choice of an instrument which they pay for alike whether it be composed of gold or of paper. That we have not now thischoiceis the result of political circum- stances entirely out ofour control. Happily, when once removed, there is every reason to believe that they can never recur; it is not to be antici- pated that the Power which now holds the Con- tinent in bondage, and shuts its ports against our commerce, will always be able to exercise the same injurious sway. Whenever that ceases, and with it ceases the necessity ofour late foreign expenditure, we shall again see the precious me- tals at their Mint price ; and our currency will then, without any expense, be restored to such proportions of coin and paper as the community, guided only by views of convenience, will require. In the mean while it must be a source of great satisfaction ( 79 )' satisfaction to those who concur in the opinions I have submitted a satisfaction consistent with the greatest respect 'for the Committee to feel that the evils arising from a depreciated cur- rency do not exist ; that our foreign exchanges have not suffered from that cause ; and that there is no real necessity for adopting the sug- gestions of a Report, which, if followed up by an act of the Legislature, there is much reason to fear would disappoint the expectations of those who framed it. THE END. Printed by W. CLOWES and Co. Northumberland-court, Strand, London. OBSERVATIONS ON THfi REPORT OF THE BULLION COMMITTEE. BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, BART. M. P. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. BULMER AND CO. CLEVELAND-ROW,, ST. JAMES'S; AND SOLD BY T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, STRAND; J. STOCKDALE, PICCADILLY; AN1> J. M. RICHARDSON, CORNHILL. 1810. \ [Pries Two Shillings and Six-pence.'] ADVERTISEMENT. r OR several years past, my attention has been almost exclusively directed, to objects connected with the agricultural interests, and improvement of the country. Financial in- quiries, though formerly a favourite pursuit, had been for some time laid aside, and would not probably have been resumed, at least for the present, were it not that some rumours had gone abroad, that a Select Committee, appointed " to enquire into the " cause of the high price of bullion, and to "take into consideration the state of the " circulating medium, and of the exchanges " between Great Britain and foreign parts/' had resolved to recommend to Parliament, restrictions on our paper circulation; an idea which seemed to me likely to produce the most fatal consequences to the most important interests of these kingdoms. I IV ADVERTISEMENT. was thence induced to feel the utmost anxiety for the perusal of a Report, which, at the conclusion of the session, they had presented to the House. Upon examining that Report-, I found it liable to various objec- tions, to which it seemed to me essential, that the attention of the public should be called with as little delay as possible. That became the more necessary as, owing to the state to which mercantile credit had unfortunately fallen, the adoption of such measures as the Bullion Committee had proposed, would have most seriously aggravated the evil. Convinced indeed, that the prosperity of the country, in regard both to its Agricul- tural and "Commercial interests, nay, that the very safety and existence of the British Empire, depend on the preservation of our present system of circulation, I could not hesitate a moment, however unwilling to engage in political controversy, to enter my public protest against the doctrines promul- gated by the Bullion Committee. With a zeal for inforcing certain speculative prin- ADVERTISEMENT. ciples, they seem to me to have incautiously recommended measures, which, for the rea- sons to be afterwards explained, cannot be too strongly reprobated. We have already difficulties enough to struggle with, pro- ceeding from other causes ; it would not be prudent, therefore, to add to the number, by cramping our circulation, and introducing all that train of internal misery which would inevitably follow. I trust that the wisdom of the legislature will shield us from the ruin of which such measures would be productive. When the subject is discussed in Parliament, with all that information and ability, by which the British Senate is distinguished, I am not without hopes, that the Committee themselves will see grounds to alter the opinions they have hitherto entertained regarding it. In the interim, the following Observations on their Report, are respectfully submitted to the consideration, both of the Committee, and of the Public. Terrace) Palace-yard, Westminster, IQth September^ 1810. V* ADVERTISEMENT. N. B. It is requested, that the reader will nqt view this momentous subject, as a mere mercantile question, but as one of general im- portance, which ought to be considered on a great scale. What though facility in obtaining money, may have occasioned some unsuc- cessful commercial speculations, (and their want of success may perhaps be principally ascribed to other causes), yet is such a cir- cumstance, however much to be regretted, to be put in competition with all the political advantages of an abundant circulation ? Are not new roads, new canals, new harbours, new enclosures, and new improvements of every description, going on successfully, in the midst of this tremendous war, with a spirit hither- to unpararelled ? Is not our revenue pro- ductive beyond the expectations of the most sanguine ? And are not our public loans pro- curable on the most advantageous terms to the nation? What cause then have we to lament over public misery ? That abundance ADVERTISEMENT. Vll of circulation, which is the great source of our opulence and strength, may be attended with some disadvantages ; but enforcing any material diminution, of that mine of national prosperity, would be a species of political sui- cide, altogether unpardonable. OBSERVATIONS THE REPORT OF THE BULLION COMMITTEE. ER since the commencement of the Revolution in France, it has been the darl- ing object of those who have successively governed that country, to injure the public credit, to diminish the financial resources, and to undermine the commercial prosperity of Great Britain. The trade and wealth of these kingdoms, and the confidence so justly reposed in their permanence and soli- dity, were galling contrasts to the wretched state, to which, in these, as well as in other material respects, France had been reduced, by the councils of the rash, the ignorant, and the designing. The rulers of France well knew, that our naval and mili- tary power, and the influence we possessed in the councils of other nations, depended on B CO our credit and opulence ; and if these could be diminished or destroyed, the most efficient obstacle would then be removed, to the ac- quisition of that universal dominion, to which France, under all its successive changes, has uniformly aspired. The steps taken by France in carrying on its commercial warfare against this coun- try, have been distinguished by unbounded violence. Wherever its armies penetrated, the private property of British subjects was most anxiously searched for, and confiscated as lawful plunder. In the harbours of nations, nominally independent, French consuls and custom-house officers were stationed, to hinder the admission of British goods, or to seize them wherever they might be landed. Countries were subdued, seemingly for the sole purpose of preventing the possibility of their holding any trading % intercourse with England ; and for the first time in the history of mankind, armies were employed along the coasts of trembling nations, not to protect them from the ravages of con- C3 3 tagidus disease, as has sometimes beeri at- tempted, but to prevent their obtaining various articles, the acquisition of which, they deemed so essential for their comfort, that they were willing, at any price, to pur- chase them. There was reason to apprehend, that measures of so unusual a nature, conducted with much energy and perseverance, and in- forced over a great extent of country, would necessarily be productive of injurious conse- quences to the commercial interests of Great Britain. It was hardly possible to expect, that under such penal restrictions, our trade would be carried on in a regular manner, or through the accustomed channels. The very remit- ting of thedebts due to British merchants, was attended with much difficulty and danger. Great mercantile houses, by whose means the commerce of exchange had formerly been regulated, and conducted on the fairest and most equitable principles, to the general advantage of trading nations, had been compelled to abandon that line of business ; and the exchange, owing to the Ba C43 want of such useful middle men, had no guide to regulate it. In consequence of these, and of other causes to be afterwards explained, the rate of exchange had become, in a considerable degree unfavourable to this country ; the price of bullion rose ; the value of our paper currency, it was alledged, was proportionally depreciated; and these cir- cumstances, which, without legislative in- terference, would have gradually rectified themselves, were represented, as grounds of public danger, and of most serious alarm. The evil, it was indeed contended, had at last become so formidable, that a parliamentary inquiry was indispensable; and great public advantages were predicted from the propo- sed investigation. Inquiries regarding points of so delicate a nature as the circulation of a country, (on which its prosperity, and indeed the comfort and happiness of every individual in it so much depend), cannot be too cautiously entered into, nor the subject too maturely considered, before any step is taken, or even remedies are suggested. Being a point of C5D such general and common interest, it was natural for any government to suppose, that it would be impartially investigated, whoever were appointed to examine it; and above all, that the chimeras of political speculation, would never be set up against the results of practical experience. The minister therefore consented to the motion for the appointment of a Committee, took hardly any concern in the nomination of its members, and no part in its deliberations, until unfortunately it was too late. The members of the Com- mittee had made up their minds regarding the points under discussion; and when the prin- ciples on which the Report was to be drawn up, came to be settled, the First Lord Com- missioner of His Majesty's Treasury, found himself in a small minority. The members of the Committee thus constituted, were certainly persons of distin- guished abilities, and competent to the task of conducting the proposed .investigation, could they have totally divested themselves of various prejudices, by which thejudgment of the best Sntentioned may occasionally be warped, and had they given themselves suf- ficient time to carry through so extensive an inquiry. To their labours we are indebted for a great mass of useful information, and the Report is drawn up with as much ingenuity as the nature of the subject would admit of. But to the general form and substance of that Report there are, among many other, the following most serious objections. 1. Though authorised merely to report the result of their inquiries, and their obser- vations thereupon, they have exceeded the bounds of their commission, by stating their opinions, and suggesting remedies; points regarding which, the House had not autho- rized them to inquire.* 2. They have also reported the evidence of an anonymous witness, contrary to the usage of Parliament, unless special reasons can be, and actually are assigned, for the concealment ; and they seem to have laid peculiar weight on the doctrines of this * See Report, p. 2. the second paragraph, Sect. No.I.j nameless individual. Yet this unknown in- dividual may be a foreigner, or a person usually resident abroad, who may not be so anxious, as a British merchant would neces- sarily be, to deliver opinions favourable to the prosperity of this country. 3. In the third place they have reported, as will afterwards be fully established, con- trary to the weight and mass of evidence brought before them ; and in regard to one particular point, as they themselves admit, contrary to the testimony of most of the wit- nesses examined by them.* One fact, con- nected with misstated or neglected evidence, is particularly striking. On the s^th of February Mr. Merle, who is practically conversant with such inquiries, was ex- amined, regarding the difference between the mint price, and the actual value of silver. He states, that a dollar is worth four shil- also the first paragraph of Sect. III. p. 15; also p. 30, and p. 31, where the following expression is made use of: " The Committee report it to the House as their tpinion" t Report, p. 2. line 1 1 from bottom. lings and four-pence at its standard price ; but at the time when he was examined, that it would fetch in reality four shillings and nine-pence, consequently the difference was rather more than five-pence per ounce, or about gi per cent, above coinage price * No notice is taken of so important a fact in the course of the Report. It was more conso- nant to the prejudices of those by whom that Report was framed, to rely on Wetten- hall's tables, where the Committee found new dollars quoted at five shillings and eight- pence per ounce ; and the difference between the mint and the current price, is then imme- diately mounted up toi 5 instead of i$l. 6s, d. per cent.-f With the same carelessness in regard to accurate calculation, in page i of the Report, Spanish gold is stated to be * See Appendix, p. 54. A dollar weighs lydwts. 8grs. Since the Report was printed, a dollar has become worth *j. nd. or about 2 per cent, higher, and foreign bar gold has fallen from 4| to 5 per cent. A further proof that the exchange does not govern the price of bullion. t 5-r. &/. per ounce, would only be 137. 6s. 4*/.,which is nearly 2 per cent, less than the Committee have stated. C93 from 4,i to 4^ grains better, whereas it should be worse than standard. It is much to be lamented, that the draw- ing up of a Report, of such vital consequence to the most essential interests of the country, should have been so hastily executed, before all the members of the Committee could pos- sibly have had leisure thoroughly to consider such momentous questions, in all their bear- ings, or minutely to examine all the evidence that had been adduced on the occasion. It is also unfortunate, that such a Report should have been presented at the close of a session, and printed and dispersed during a recess, by means of which, Parliament is precluded from taking immediate steps to counter- act any ruinous doctrines that might be therein circulated, under the sanction of its name. It is the more necessary, therefore, till the House is re-assembled, that the Report, should, in the interim, be examined by such private individuals, as may have directed their attention to isiquiries of that nature, more especially by those, who, like t io 3 myself, are deeply impressed with a convio tion, (the grounds of which shall afterwards be explained.); " That the suggestions of the Bullion " Committee, if ever carried into effect, " would do more mischief to the British " Empire, than the fleets and armies of Na- " poleon will ev^r be able to accomplish/'. Before we proceed, however, to examine this Report, it may be proper to state the situation of the country, in regard to its commerce and finance, as admitted by the Committee itself, and to consider whether any pregnant proofs cannot be adduced of its prosperity, at the period when the Report was drawn up, and which nothing but doc- trines, in the highest degree impolitic 'and mischievous, circulated under the sanction of a Parliamentary Committee, could have clouded even for a moment. In the Report, (page 28), the country is said to possess " a high state of mercantile, 5 I ^>9 I 3 Difference, 19,782,850 Imports, An. 1809 36,255, 209! Ditto, An. 1796 23,187,319 Difference, 13,067,890 Average price of 3 per cent, -i 68 I 9 consols. An. 1809 / Ditto, An. 1796 - 58 18 7 Difference, .9 3 2* Rate of Interest on Loan, An. 1809 - 442! Ditto, - An. 1796 4 13 3 Difference, o 9 oj * Estimating the East India and the China trade as in 1808, the account not being yet made up. t This is the average price of the 3 percent, consols, as purchased by the Commissioners for reducing the na- tional debt. If the value of the interest paid to the public creditor is depreciated,what an object it is, to have such an increased price for the capital ? C 3 Public Revenue, An. 1809 Ditto, . An. 1796 Difference, 30,079,759 Compared to our situation in 1796, such was the state of this country immediately prior to the year 1810, when we are told, " that " the opinions of persons of practical detail, " are vague and unsatisfactory ;"-j* a new theory, unsanctioned by recent experience, is recommended to our adoption, and we are seriously called upon to overturn a system, on which our power and prosperity have arisen to a height altogether unexampled. We shall now proceed more minutely to consider this inauspicious Report, adopting, with some alteration in point of arrangement, the four heads dwelt on by the Committee, namely, i. the state of our exchanges: 2. the high price of Bullion ; 3. the conduct * How could such a revenue, and the immense trade, and more extended agriculture of this country be car- ried on, if the circulation of Bank notes were reduced to eleven millions, independent of Government paper, and commercial discount, as recommended by Sir Francis Baring ? t Report, p. 9, at bottom. t Hi of the Bank of England, in the regulation of its paper currency; and, 4, the amount of our paper circulation, and whether it ought to be restricted. It will then be proper to exa- mine the plans suggested by the Committee, for the amelioration of our unfortunate condi- tion at the period when their labours com- menced, of which miserable state, the rea- der, from the preceding accounts will be enabled to form some idea; a state which > it would appear, required none of those remedies, which the Committee have so in- cautiously, and so hastily recommended. SECTION I. THE RATE OF EXCHANGE. THE Rate of Exchange having been fr some time past unfavourable to this country, and that circumstance having occasioned the high price of Bullion, and the alledged depreciation of our paper currency, it is pro- per to commence our observations on the Report with that branch of the subject. In the discussion of this head it will be necessary to advert to the following particulars; iThe causes of the rate of exchange being against this country ; . whether the present state of our currency has any connexion what- ever with that circumstance; and, 3. what are the most likely means of restoring the exchange to its former favourable rate. 1. CAUSES OF THE UNFAVOURABLE RATE OF THE EXCHANGE. IT were much to be wished that the Com- mittee, instead of making a parade of the superiority of speculative politicians, over persons of practical detail,* had favoured us with a distinct statement of the various cir- cumstances, which, in the opinion of the intelligent individuals who appeared before them, had occasioned that unfavourable rate, and not contented themselves with a few extracts from the evidence given by some of the witnesses. Nothing but the hurry with which the Report seems evidently to have been drawn up, can justify the neg- * See Report, p. 10, lecting so important a part of the duties of the Committee. It is not incumbent upon any other individual to supply the defect. At the same time, it may be satisfactory to the reader, to have the circumstances detailed, which are supposed to have contributed to an event, which the fertile imaginations of the Committee have magnified into such transcendant importance, that we are bound, in consequence thereof, to overthrow a sys- tem, under which this country has so emi- nently prospered. The causes of the unfavourable rate of exchange are in a great measure purely commercial ; though some of them are of a mixed, and some of a political nature, and some may be arranged under the general head of miscellaneous. The purely commercial are, i. a greater amount of import than usual, principally from the Baltic, from France, and from Holland.* 2. The trade having been carried * Mr. Lyne's evidence, p. 60. C 73 on in foreign ships, and at a very heavy expence of freight, sometimes to the amount of fifty per cent, on the original cost of the goods.* 3. The manner in Which the price of the goods imported from the Baltic were drawn for ; the bills being negociated immediately on the shipments taking place, without consulting much the interest of the proprietors in this country, who would natu- rally have wished to defer the negotiation till a demand for such bills had taken place.-f 4. The greater difficulty and hazard in carrying on bill and bullion operations be- tween this country and the Continent, and also between some parts of the Continent and others, which consequently require greater profit, to cover those risks, and occasioned thereby an augmented depression in the ex- change. J 5. The want of middle men, who formerly were accustomed to employ great capitals in exchange operations, but who, from the increased difficulties and dangers . * Mr. Greffulhe's evidence, p, 66. t Evidence of Mr. - J Mr, Lyne, p. 60. c to which such operations are now subject, are at present rarely to be met with : such middle men were accustomed to make combined exchange operations, which tended to anticipate probable ultimate results;* and the rates of Exchange were thus kept more steady, than could have been the case with- out such aid. 6. The small amount of exports compared to imports in our trade with France and the Baltic.-f 7. The long credit given to foreign merchants for goods exported, the price of which, particu- larly those sent to South America, has not vet come back.J and, 8. The lower prices at which foreigners obtained their supplies. The mixed causes, or those partly commer- cial, and partly political, are, the system of commercial warfare carried on against this country, by which the admission of British goods into the Continent was checked ; com- munication even by letters became difficult and uncertain ; whilst no suit at law could be * Mr. , p. 82. Mr. Abraham Goldsmid, p. 94. t Mr. Greffulhe, p. 66. Mr. Whitmore, p. 90. J Mr. Lyne, p. 60. Mr. Greffulhe, p. 68. ['9] instituted in the Courts of Justice there,against any person who chose to resist the payment of a returned bill, or to dispute the charges of re-exchange.* 2. The decrease of foreign export, and consequently an unfavourable state of exchange, was also owing, not only to the decrees in France, but to the orders of council in England, and to the American em- bargo; the last in particular, by which the Americans were prevented from carrying their own produce, and the produce of the enemies colonies, to the Continent of Eu- rope, which would have operated upon the exchange in a great measure, as an export from this country. -f The causes purely political, are, the pay- ment of foreign subsidies, the maintenance of our troops abroad, and the bills drawn on our Government for naval and other ex- pences in foreign countries J The rate of exchange must also be affected * Mr. evidence, p. 78. t Mr. Cunningham's evidence, p. 130. J Mr. Greffulhe, p. 68. Mr. p. 78. Cs by various circumstances of a miscellaneous nature, as the interest on capital in England possessed by foreigners, as well as on capital abroad belonging to inhabitants of Great Britain ; the contraband trade between Great Britain and other countries, and the amount of bullion exported or imported.* These political and miscellaneous causes,notbeingincludedin those official documents, by which the balance of trade is commonly estimated, hence the rate of exchange must depend, not on that balance, but on the balance of payments. 3. WHETHER THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR CURRENCY HAS ANY CONNEXION WHAT- EVER WITH THE STATE OF THE EXCHANGE. IN addition to these causes, some have con- tended, and it is the great object of the Report to establish that point, that the unfavourable rate of the exchange, is owing to the state of our currency, and that if we were once more to revert \b our old system, and to remove all restrictions on the payment of cash at the * Report, p. u. C 3 Bank, a favourable state of exchange would be the necessary consequence. No doctrine can possibly be more adverse to the evidence annexed to the Report, whe- ther as containing matter of opinion, or matter of fact. Let the reader consider what follows : " I do not agree in opinion with those who conceive that the depression in our exchanges, and the consequent export of our specie are occasioned by bur circulating medium being confined to Bank notes ; inas- much as bills on foreign countries are here attainable, precisely at the same rates of ex* change, whether they be be paid for in Bank notes, or in guineas/' (Mr. Lyne's evidence, Report, p. 61.) " I conceive the state of the paper currency of this kingdom, and the state of the exchanges upon foreign parts, are subjects almost unconnected, and that have but little influence on each other. In proof I beg leave to adduce two fac^s, from which it appears, that at two several periods, the exchange, for a length of time r improved in favour of this country, whilst the amount of Bank notes was gradually increasing/' (Mr. Greffiilhe's evidence, p. 70.) " I do not conceive that the diminution of the paper of the Bank, would, either immediately or remotely, tend, in any shape whatever, to an improvement of the exchange." (Mr. Har- man's evidence, p. 14,3.) " The man who takes a bill at Hamburgh on London, pur- chases it for purposes of his own, either to purchase a commodity, c/ to pay a debt." Mr. Goldsmid's evidence, p. 43.3 In ei- ther case it is evident the established currency of England will answer his purpose. Two ac- counts were also produced, one by Mr. Whit- more, intituled, " The amount of Bank notes in circulation on Saturday night in each week of the year 1 797, and the course of exchange on Hamburgh on the following Tuesday; and the other by Mr. Pearse, intituled, a comparison of the amount of Bank notes, and rates of the Hamburgh exchange at va- rious periods. (See Appendix to the Minutes of Evidence, Nos. 47 and 49), both proving in the most satisfactory manner, as a matter of fact, that there is no connexion whatever, between the amount of paper currency i by the Bank of England, and the rate of exchange.* Sir Francis Baring indeed states,(and much weight is certainly due to the sentiments of so respectable a character), that the two great circumstances which affect theexchange, in its present unfavourable state,are, the restrictions upon trade with the Continent, and the in- creased circulation of this country in paper, as productive of the scarcity of bullion ;-f but he does not seem to have considered the various other causes enumerated in the preceding sec- tion. By another evidence, the whole deprecia- tion of the exchange is ascribed originally to * Nothing can be more decisive in support of the doc- trine, that the amount of Bank Notes has no effect upon the exchange, than the paper given in by Mr. Pearse, No. 49, p. 199. From January 1803 to the end of the year 1807, a period of not less than about 4 years, the amount of Bank Notes fluctuated from i6| to 18 mil- lions, and the exchange on Hamburgh varied from 32*. \od. to 351. 6*/. becoming more favourable as the amount of Bank Notes increased. t Sir Francis Baring, in his evidence, alludes to the seven years war, and to the American ; but how different the scales, either in regard to extent or duration, com- pared to the present ? the measures of the enemy, and its not hav- ing recovered itself, is attributed to the cir- cumstance, of the paper of England not being exchangeable for cash.* But this doctrine is ably refuted by Mr. Lyne, who contends, that though gold, being of a more portable nature, would sooner find its way to the Continent, and consequently would produce the speediest effect, yet that merchandize of lawful export, would produce a greater effect in reducing the difference of exchange ; for guineas, colonial produce, manufacture, or any other article of commerce, are all change- able or saleable on the Continent for the same article, namely, the circulating medium there, whatever that may be. The effect on the Continent, therefore, would be the same, whe- ther goods or gold were made use of. Whereas, on this side, it would be infinitely better, instead of sending gold, (which would be confined to a few), to export goods, which would produce a competition, and a conse- * Minutes, p. 79, C*5 J quent advance of exchange in favour of England.* g. WHAT ARE THE MOST LIKELY MEANS OF RESTORING THE EXCHANGE TO [TS FORMER FAVOURABLE STATE ? THE great corrective of any mischief, arising from an unfavourable state of exchange, in the judgment of the Committee is, the repeal of the law which suspends the cash payments of the Bank of England. -f I wish most sincerely that the Committee had examined the subject more minutely, before they had hazarded such an opinion. A favourite evidence had declared, " that a free circulation, and liberty to export the coin of the country, in his opinion was the only effectual remedy;" but he adds, " if that is not deemed practicable, I conceive that many palliatives may be applied /'J Yet the nature of those palliatives, the Committee never gave themselves any trouble to ascertain. * See Mr. Lyne's valuable Communication. Report of the Committee, Appendix p. 60 and 61. t Report, p. 31. $ See Appendix to the Report, p, 87. Mr. Greffulhe, a most intelligent witness, states, " that at this moment the Board of Trade might promote an increase of the ex- ports to France ;"* but though such an expor- tation would have in some degree contributed to render the exchange more favourable, not the least inquiry is made into the grounds of so important an assertion. In short, it looks as if there were a fixed determination, neither to recommend, nor to make any minute inquiry, regarding any other remedy, but the opening of the Bank. That is the more to be lamented, as the Committee might easily have ascertained, that there was no difficulty in raising at home, or procuring from our colonies in America, or our possessions in the East Indies, a variety of articles, by means of which our imports would have been mate- rially diminished, and by that alone an end put to that mighty bugbear, the unfavourable state of the exchange, the importance of which has been so greatly exaggerated. I have not the least doubt that our export trade also, might be greatly improved ; but if we could only reduce our imports from hostile nations, the business would be accomplished. The * Appendix to the Report, p. 68. practicability of a very considerable dimi- nution in that respect, I pledge myself, in the course of the ensuing session, to prove in Parliament. SECTION II. ON THE HIGH PRICE OF BULLION. THE necessary consequence of an unfa- vourable rate of exchange is, an increased demand for coin or bullion, as being the rea- diest remittance, where bills, on moderate terms cannot be procured ; in consequence of that demand the value of the precious metals must rise, as was experienced in the reign of King William, when guineas were as high as thirty shillings each.* Nothing however can be more absurd, than to make any rise in the price of bullion, the ground of serious alarm, more especially at a period like the present, when the nature and principles of circulation, are so much better understood than formerly was the case. To explain the grounds of this assertion, I shall submit to the reader's con- sideration, some political axioms regarding coin and bullion, which, however, unworthy they might be deemed the attention of * Report, p. 17. speculative politicians, yet I am glad to find are sanctioned by the authority of persons of practical detail. GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING COIN OR BULLION. THE wealth of a nation properly consists in the goods or merchandize it possesses, whether arising from the produce of the soil, from internal industry,-*--or from foreign commerce. The precious metals, in which a part of that wealth consists, may be described as a species of merchandize, which, by common consent, answers three important purposes. 1. That of enabling individuals to receive the value of their labour, for an article uni- versally exchangeable. 2. That of transferring property in goods, from one individual to another, or from one nation to another, without the trouble of actual barter ; and , 3. That of enabling the government of a country to obtain a revenue, and to defray the public expences; for if the Exchequer were under the necessity of taking goods in kind, in what manner could the various arti- cles it required, be either collected, or secured till wanted ; or how could a nation fit out a fleet, or maintain an army, or defray the va- rious other expences to which it is liable ? It is however, in early ages of society alone, before the credit of a government is esta- blished, and property, (whence the credit of the individual arises), is secured, that the pre- cious metals exclusively answer these impor- tant purposes. In ages of civilization and refinement, a well regulated paper currency, with a small proportion of these metals in a state of coinage, to which united, the gene- ral appellations of emulation or of money may be given, is equally useful, indeed on many accounts, to be afterwards explained,* even more advantageous ; and the precious metals ought, in commercial periods of society, to be accounted merely as a species of merchan- dise, the increase or diminution of which, has no decisive influence on the wealth or prosperity of a country, and which, if left to itself, soon finds its just level. See the Appendix, Cs IT was with much satisfaction, I found the idea, that coin or bullion ought to be consi- dered merely as merchandize, sanctioned by the authority of some of the most respect- able witnessses, examined before the Bullion Committee.* But the rate of exchange is not the sole cause of the high price of bullion at present. It appears from the Appendix to the Report, that the following circumstances have contri- buted to that event, i . The French when they were in Portugal, so drained that country of gold, that none could since be procured from that quarter.-f 2. There is a great demand for bullion from jewellers, in consequence of their trade increasing,^ and much gold is pur- chased for various branches of manufacture^ 3. From the apprehension of a rupture be- tween Great Britain and North America,a great desire was necessarily created on the part of our manufacturers, and dealers in cotton, to import that article from the Brazils, and in * See Mr. Hughan's evidence, p. 62 ; Mr. Greffulhe's, p. 70 ; and Mr. Chambers's, p. 102. t Mr. Lyne's evidence, p. 60. J Mr. Merle 's evidence, p. 50. Mr. Binn's evidence, p. 44. US* 3 order to procure it, gold and silver were exported to that country, both because in the Brazils there were no takers of bills on Eng- land, and as the importer could make his purchases more rapidly by sending cash.* 4, It is also stated, that there has been an unusual demand for gold, for the use of the French armies .-f 5. But above all, the state of the times, the failure of confidence, and the apprehension of future revolutions, have led to the practice of hoarding, and consequently the withdrawing of gold altogether from cir- culation, and that to a considerable extent. Whilst matters therefore continue as they are, it is in vain to expect that gold can be- come abundant, however much it might be given out. When a person is resolved to hoard, he does not consider the price he pays for the article he is in search of. A few shillings more or less, which would alarm a Bullion Committee, would be considered of little moment, if he could thereby obtain his object, that of securing a hidden store for times of difficulty and danger. Who ever takes the trouble of considering * Evidence of Mr. Lyne. This gold and silver, I understand, is now returning fast. t Mr. Goldsmith's evidence, p. 56. J Mr. Greffulhe's evidence, p, 101. these observations, will probably be of opi- nion, that bullion . is merely merchandize; that we might as well institute an inquiry into the price of diamonds, of cochineal, or of sugar, as of gold ; and that compelling the Bank of England to pay in cash, were it a practicable measure, could be of no service whatever in the present state of Europe* exposed as it is to endless calamities, and liable to every species of plunder and op- pression. SECTION III. ON THE CONDUCT OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND IN REGARD TO ITS CIRCULATION. THE lofty manner in which the Directors of the Bank of England are told, " that they possess no distinct and certain rule to guide their discretion in controlling the amount of their circulation, and that their recent policy involves great practical errors, which, it is of the utmost public importance to correct/'* comes with peculiar grace from a Com- mittee, who have not stated, in precise terms, the rules which the Directors have actually laid down, and examined their efficiency. * Report, p, 24. C333 The rules on which the conduct of the Bank is regulated, in regard to the issuing of its notes, may thus be shortly stated, i. To advance to Government on the security of Exchequer Bills, issued on the credit of taxes, the produce of which is constantly coming in. 2. To advance on Exchequer Bills, issued under the authority of Parlia- ment for various purposes, if other purcha- sers do net offer, when it is necessary to relieve the market for the accommodation of the public.* 3. To advance on the loans of the year, the repayment of which can be depended on, as the fund is pledged for the advance, and can be sold if necessary. 4. To ad- vance on legitimate mercantile paper, payable within two months, or at any shorter period, and having three names on it. 5. Never to advance at less interest than 5 per cent. ; and 6. To consider not only the solidity of the paper, but also the amount of the accommodation the individual applying for it already has. -f It is owing to the Committee having kept this last rule entirely out of their view, that they triumphantly exclaim, " though the * Sec Mr. Pearse's evidence, p. 118. t See Mr. Whitmore's evidence, p. 89. D t 343 Directors state the broad principle that there can be no excess of their circulation if issued according to the rules of discount, yet they disclaim the idea of acting up to it in its whole extent."* They cannot act up to it in its whole extent, because they must restrict their advances to indiv lual applicants, and must not risk too much property on the same secu;ty. Besides, tiie instant any superfluous issue is made, it reverts upon the Bank; for no individual, particularly any person conversant in business, will ever think of keeping in his possession any paper for which he has no occasion, and for which he must pay an interest of 5 per cent. Bankers, therefore, contrive every possible means, to diminish the amount of notes in their pos- session, in which, if they had not been suc- cessful, even the present amount of notes would have been too much restricted for the circulation and increasing demands of the country. But the best answer to any charge of over- issuing on the part of the Bank, is this, that if the large notes of the Bank were to be di- minished, in the proportion of one half, it * Report, p. 24. C353 would be impossible to conduct the affairs of the metropolis;* and as it is, with all the paper now in circulation, w There is a period prior to the payment of the dividends, in which large sums of momy are paid to the Bank from tax gatherers, which, at such times occa- sions great scarcity, and is an inconvenience to trade!'*^ If that is the case at present, to what a state OF ACTUAL MISERY would not the mer- cantile interest be reduced, if there were to be any material reduction in the accommo- dation they now receive, or if the amount of our paper circulation were to be materially diminished ? SECTION IV. ON THE AMOUNT OF OUR PAPER CIRCULATION, AND WHETHER IT OUGHT TO BE DIMINISHED* IN a paper printed by way of Appendix, I have endeavoured briefly to explain, the general nature of coin, or money, the advan- tages of paper currency, and the necessity of preserving the circulating medium, in propor- * See Mr. Tritton's evidence, p. 142. \ Mr, Richardson's evidence, p. 149. Da [36] tion to the demands for it, rather than suffer- ing it to diminish. It is there observed, that Money, (by which is meant a well regulated paper currency, with a certain proportion of coin) becomes, in a civilized state of society, the medium of barter both for labour and goods, and in a manner the source or basis of Public Revenue. It is necessary therefore to preserve a due proportion between its amount, and i. The quantity of labour that must be paid for ; 2. The quantity of goods or merchandize, the property of which must be transferred ; and 3. The total amount of the demands and ex- pences of the Exchequer, whether arising from taxes, public loans, or any extraordi- nary species of contribution, The quantity of the medium of circulation, however, instead of being stationary, ought to be increasing. i . To promote a greater quantum of labour, oiithe increase of which the wealth and pros- perity of a country so much depend, and which is always increasing where a circulat- ing medium abounds, s. To facilitate the transfer of a greater quantity of goods, among a greater body of [37'] people, as the commerce and population of a prosperous country are always augmenting; and, 3. To enable the people, should it be ne- cessary, to furnish, without inconvenience, greater supplies to the Exchequer. These general principles are then applied : 1. To the case of an increased quantum of labour or industry ; z. To an increased com- merce in, or transfer of goods ; and 3. To an increased revenue : and the deduction from the whole is this, " that an increase of labour "or industry, a more extended commerce, " and an encreased revenue, require perpetual " additions to the circulating medium of a " country." Being deeply impressed with the incon- trovertible solidity of these doctrines,- 1 can- not possibly concur in any measures for re- ducing our circulating medium, and thereby cramping all our exertions, and materially endangering 9ur security. Whether any re- gulations are necessary regarding Country Bankers, for the protection of the public against fraud, is an important subject, diffe- rent from the question regarding the quan- tum of circulation ; but in regard to the Bank of England, as it is proved that no pains are taken to force Bank notes into circulation, or to retain them in it, no material excess, in the opinions of the most respectable practical authorities, can therefore take place. No circulation, unless forced, can go beyond what the immediate wants of the public re- quire, for if there is any redundancy, it imme- diately reverts on the Bank that issues it* The Committee do not concur in these opi- nions* Unfortunately they seem extremely unwilling to give much weight to the doc- trines of persons, who have nothing but ex- perience, and practical detail, to recommend them to attention. SECTION V. ON THE MEASURES RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE. WE shall now proceed to consider the plan recommended by the Committee, that of repealing the law which suspends the cash payments of the Bank of England, and remov- ing any restriction on such payments, at the period of two years from the present time, (Report, p. 31,) previously niaking some ob- * Mr. Whitmore's evidence, p. 79, and 97. C 39 3 servations on the grounds on which that system is founded. We are told in the (Report, p. 31,) that any sucli general excess of currency as lowers its relative value, is attended with disadvan- tages to the country. If it were granted, that to a certain extent, such was the case, the question is, whether tb? advantages do not preponderate ? If the new system we have adopted, contributes to the public safety, ena- bles us to carry on the most momentous war in which we ever were engaged, increases our agriculture, our commerce and revenue, places us, as admitted by the Committee, (Report, p. 28), in a high state of mercantile and public credit, and makes us, as 1 trust will continue to be the case, the admiration of the uni- verse ; what matters it then, whether the cir- culation of gold or of paper is the instrument of our prosperity ? But above all, the ap- prehensions entertained by the Committee, that the situation of the country labourer is thereby deteriorated, has no foundation whatever. Their comfort depends, not on having occasionally high wages, bat on their having a regular and constant demand for their labour. That can only be the case where [ 4 ] a circulating medium abounds. Where that circumstance takes place, no man need to remain idle ; and where the demand is great, wages will rise more rapidly, than where persons are deterred from employing labour- ers, by the difficulty they find in paying them. Besides, in England, the country labourer and his family are secured by law in their subsistence ; and in Scotland, servants in husbandry, are chiefly paid in kind, and consequently their income increases, with the price pf those commodities in which the greater part of their wages is advanced. As to the idea entertained by the Com- mittee, that our paper currency is depre- ciated, a number of the most intelligent witnesses brought before it, have proved the reverse.* It may sometimes be difficult to * " I do not believe that there has been any difference in paying in specie, or Bank paper." [Mr. Merle's evi- dence, Report p. 52,] " The dearness of gold and silver cannot be called a discount on Bank notes." [Mr. GrefFulhe's evidence, p. 71.] "I never considered Bank notes to be depreciated. " [Mr. Abraham Goldsmid's evidence, p. 93.] Mr. Chambers is asked, " Is it your opinion that the currency of England is depreciated." Answer " Ctrtainly not." [Report, p. 102.] Mr. Co- ninghamis asked, " Do you consider the paper currency obtain silver for a note, but it would be equally so to get change for a guinea; and'' the scarcity of silver money will never be got rid of, until we put a proper seignorage on the coinage of that species of metal. Not knowing what effects might result from the doctrines of so respectable a Committee, I had provided myself, when lately coming from Edinburgh to London, with some gold, in addition to the notes of the Bank of England. I found, however, the coin quite useless, and in a journey of about four hun- dred miles, not the least hesitation was ex- pressed, to receive, and, when necessary, to change into silver, the depredated currency of the country. But we are told, that a reduction of paper circulation, would diminish the price of pro- visions. Would it not, however, in a still greater proportion, disable the great body of the people from having the means of pur- chasing them ? Would not lower prices also, have a tendency to discourage the growth of grain, and to damp the exertions of the farmer ? The wonder is, not that of this country as depreciated." Answer- Certainly not." Report, p. 128. provisions are high, but that with such a war, against such an enemy, with armies in every quarter of the globe, and fleets commanding every ocean in it, we should be able at the same time, to carry on our agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, in the manner, and to the extent we are doing. Nothing else gives us ability to go on, but the abundance of our circulating medium, which operates like blood in the human frame, nourishing every part of the system, and enabling it to perform its functions. In regard to the plan of opening the Bank for payment in cash in two years, there are three points to be considered, i. Is it prac- ticable? 2. Would it be of any use? and, 3. Would it not be, instead of an advantage, a material detriment to the public? 1. IS IT PRACTICABLE TO OPEN THE BANK IN TWO YEARS. SINCE it was found necessary to prevent the payment of cash at the Bank of England, when the exchange was in our favour, and when the Notes in circulation, including Bank Post Bills, amounted to the sum of C433 only 8,64,o,2o/. (which was the case on the 27th Feb. 1797) ' how is it possible then to remove the restriction, when the amount of the Bank circulation, is now stated by the Committee, (Report, p. 25. ),at si^g.gSo/., making a difference ot 12,609,7301., besides an addition of at least io,ooo,ooo/. by the paper of Country Banks ? It would be neces- sary, in order to carry on this great operation, to export goods, to the amount of at least 2o,ooo,ooo/., without knowing where to find markets that would take such a quantity, and give us bullion in return; and if we could import bullion to that amount, the present unfavourable rate of exchange, would be constantly draining it away, in addi- tion to all the diminution that would arise from hoarding. The idea of sending out 2o,ooo,ooo/. of the property of this country, for the sole purpose of obtaining a medium of circulation, when we can do without it, is so absurd, and the impracticability of acquir- ing, and still more of the retaining the gold or silver we could obtain, after it came, is so self-evident, that it is astonishing how such a measure could possibly be recommended by any respectable authority. The Com- mittee itself, (Report p. 32.), admit, that 117 the present state of our circulation, it would be hazardous to compel the Bank to pay cash in six months; and indeed they acknow- ledge, that in so short a period it would be found wholly impracticable. They there- fore recommend that the space of two years should elapse before the restriction is re- moved. But what reason have we to expect, that the measure would be more practicable two years hence, than at present? The real cause why the payments in cash at the Bank are suspended, is the unprecedented state of the Continent of Europe. Whilst it remains subjected to the power of one individual, the determined enemy of this country, it is hardly to be expected, that the Bank of England can be opened. The attempt would be in vain, and were it tried, we should once more be reduced to the necessity, with increased disadvantages, of shutting up the Bank. C 45 2, WOULD IT BE OF ANY USE TO OPEN THE BANK FOR PAYMENT IN CASH ? BUT were the measure practicable, I do not see any possible advantage that could be derived from it. The value of gold, instead of falling, must rise, in consequence of the greater demand for it. The exchange could only be affected by it, in so far as the bullion that was exported could go, and not a step farther. Besides, there is a great fallacy in the argument, that opening the Bank would improve the exchange, by the exportation of bullion. By the existing laws, no gold can be exported but in the shape of foreign coinage, or of bullion, not melted into bars from the Coin of this country. It would be of little consequence, therefore, if that law continued in force, whether the Bank issued guineas, or not, provided those guineas ' could not be exported. The possibility of such a measure having any effect upon the exchange, must therefore entirely depend on the supposition, that guineas might be ex- ported in payment of our foreign debts, which cannot be done, without either smug- gling, or a total alteration of the law with regard to that important branch of our policy. Indeed compelling the Bank to give gold and silver in exchange for notes, would in- duce the nation in general to believe, that there must be some considerable advantage in possessing coin instead of paper. Every individual would thence be anxious to secure as much specie as possible, and the system of private accumulation, however unneces- sary, would increase, and thus the credit of our paper circulation would inevitably be shaken. C473 3. WOULD IT NOT BE, INSTEAD OF AN AD- VANTAGE, A MATERIAL DETRIMENT TO THE PUBLIC, TO OPEN THE BANK? WHEN Mr. Whitmore, Governor of the Blank of England at the time, was asked, " Whether opening the Bank would be likely to produce any derangement of our commerce; and whether, if the measure were determined on by Parliament, some re- strictions of the Bank issues ought not to take place, with a view to prepare for the opening ?" his answer was ec Provided it was impera- tive on the Bank to open, I should think a restriction of the Bank issues would be necessary, not-withstanding the fatal conse- quences that might arise from it to the com- merce and revenue of the country"* With this declaration from the greatest practical authority staring them in the face, the Committee do not scruple to recommend a measure, " that would be attended with " fatal consequences to the commerce and " revenue of the country." * Appendix to the Report, p. 126. There is nothing, indeed, that speculative politicians, who entertain a peculiar prejudice in favour of any particular doctrine, will not approve of, if it has the effect of establishing the system they wish to recommend. All the immediate mischief is overlooked, from the expectation of future advantages which may never be realized. There cannot be a stronger proof of this assertion, than the opi- nion declared to this Committee by one of the witnesses brought before it. He broadly states "that however great the inconvenience to individuals, he conceives that a very mate- rial reduction of the circulating medium in this country, (by which he does not mean to make any distinction between coin and paper), would have the immediate effect of raising the exchange so far above par, as to enable foreigners to send bullion to this country fen* the liquidation of their debt, pro- vided this principle were carried to such an extremity/'* Is it not astonishing the cool- ness with which this witness tals of indivi- duals being put to an inconvenience by the want of the circulating medium; in other * Appendix, p. 85* [49] words, of money to carry on their business ? Is it nothing but inconvenience to a merchant, to be unable to pay the demands upon him ; to be obliged to call his creditors together; to appear as a bankrupt in the Gazette ; and to see his wife and family, and perhaps a number of his dearest connexions, reduced to beggary v and ruin ? Yet thousands of re- spectable individuals, now carrying on a flourishing commerce, might be reduced to such inconveniencies, if the wild and impracti- cable chimera, of compelling the Bank to pay in cash, were attempted to be carried into effect. Nor would these inconveniencies be re- stricted to commercial men: the landed and farming interests would stiffei perhaps in a still greater degree. They are at pre- sent enabled to go on, not-withstanding the increased expence of cultivation, and th? pressure of heavy taxes, in conse- quence of the additional prices which their commodities fetch, and the facility with which they obtain payment, owing to the abundance of a circulating medium ; but if the taxes remain as they are, and if, incon- E C503 sequence of the diminution of the circulating medium, their commodities should become unsaleable, except at low prices, and with payments either distant or uncertain, the agricultural interest would be undone. To this important subject, I earnestly request their particular attention before it is too late. Let them recollect, that they are fully as much interested, as any other class of the commu- nity, in keeping up an abundant, rather than a diminished medium of circulation. But the most alarming circumstance is, the mischievous effect that it would 'hare on the public revenue and credit of the country. If our circulating medium were reduced one half, (which must be the case if the Bank were opened ), the revenue would fall in pro- portion. It would then be necessary, either to diminish the interests of the public funds, to one half, or to dismiss one half of our fleets and armies. That is the dilemma to which Napoleon would wish to reduce us. Little did he imagine, that so favourite an object, would be promoted by British politicians, who, in their rage for establishing speculative doctrines consider the opinions of persons of practical detail, (< as vague and unsatisfactory." SIR JOHN SINCLAIR'S REMARKS ON MR. HUSKISSON'S PAMPHLET. MMM WITH AN EXPLANATION OF THE REAL NATURE, AND ADVANTAGES, OP THE PRESENT SYSTEM OP CIRCULATION. " Had matters been left without any change at all, no bad 11 consequences would have followed. These existed only in ths tl heads of Theorists." (Sir James Steuart's Pol. Ecom Book IV, cap. 31). REMARKS ,.,v5 ON A PAMPHLET INTITLED, " The Question concerning the Depreciation of the " Currency Stated and Examined." BY WILLIAM HUSKISSON, ESQ. M. P. TOGETHER WITH SEVERAL POLITICAL MAXIMS REGARDING COIN AND PAPER CURRENCY, INTENDED TO EXPLAIN THE REAL NATURE, AND ADVANTAGES, OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM. BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, BART. M. P. AUTHOR OF THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC REVENUE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. LONDON: PRINTED BY W. BULMER AND CO. CLEYELAND-ROW, ST. JAMES'S; AND SOLD BY T. CADELL AND W. DAVJES, STRAND; J. STOCKDALE, PICCADILLY; AND J. M. RICHARDSON, CORNHILL. l&LO. [Pn'ce Two Shillings and Sixpence..] ADDRESS TO THE READER. facts have recently come to my know- ledge regarding, i. A fall in the price of gold ; and, 2. The rate of exchange with Ireland, which, I trust, will put an end to any pro- longed discussion respecting the propriety of altering our present system of circulation : I thought it right, therefore, to lose no time in lay- ing them before the Public. It seemed to me also necessary, to state sme observations, on the proposed measure of compelling the Bank of England to purchase bullion at any price, and to add a statement of that fall in the value of funded property, which has taken place, in con- sequence of the alarm occasioned by the pro- ceedings of the Bullion Committee. i. Fall in the Price of Gold. The foundation of the whole proceedings of the Bullion Committee rested upon this fact, that the market price of gold, when the Report was ordered to be printed, (bth June, 1810), was 4. 105. per oz. or 15^ per cent, above the Mint price. (Rep. p. i). This was attributed to an excess in the paper circulation of the country : (Rep. p. 30). It was therefore contended, " that " a rise in the market price of gold, was the " effect of an excessive quantity of circulating " medium in a country, which has adopted a " currency, not exportable to other countries, '! or not convertible at will into a coin which is ^exportable." (Report, p. 8). * All these speculations, however, are now for- tunately overturned by one plain fact, of which I have just been informed, from most unexcep- tionable authority (Mr. Merle). He states, that according to the last prices, gold bullion has al- ready fallen in price 7 per cent, and consequently that the price of gold, instead of being i,5|, is only 8i per cent, above the Mint price/* l^ere is reason also, to hope that, notwithstanding the * The Committee made the difference i$\ per cent, in, the following manner : Foreign bars 22oz, 4 10 a 90 .100 o o [22 4 10 a 77 86 10 5 * 3 9 7 on ^86. 10^. 5^. is at the rate 6f 15^- per cent. The present difference is thus calculated : Foreign bars fat the 1 r . to . T , >22oz. 4 10 a go ioo o o price inJuneiSioj, / The present price 22 4 10 a 84 6 93 17 7 625 which upon the sum of 93. 17^- yd. is as nearly as possible 7 per cent. ; and which deducted from 15^, leaves the dif- ference between the present market price, and the Mint price, only 8 percent, which has often been the case before,. C73 alledged excess of Bank notes, and the conse- quent alledged depreciation of our currency, (neither of which assertions have any just foun- dation), that it will be still lower; but at any rate, if there were any good grounds for the doctrines of the Committee, regarding the effect of paper currency on the price of gold, how could it have fallen even Tf per cent, in so short a period ? 2. Exchange with Ireland. Another favourite doctrine is, that any great fall in the rate of exchange, is owing to excess of currency : let us see how far such an idea is justified by fact. In the year 1804,, an alarm was created re- garding the state of exchange between this country and Ireland, which it was contended, was altogether owing to the excess of paper issued by the Bank of Ireland ;* and ingenious men amused themselves with speculations re- garding the alarming state of Ireland, and the necessity of redressing its pecuniary grievances. The Directors of the Bank of Ireland took * This doctrine was very ably maintained by Lord Lau- derdale, in a pamphlet intitled " Thoughts OH the Alarming '* State of the Circulation, and on the means of redressing " the Pecuniary Grievances in Ireland." Printed Anno 1805. C 83 fright at the inquiry, and actually reduced their circulation from 3,000,000. to 2,410,000. It appears, however, from the Report of the Bullion Committee, (p. 19), that the Directors of that Bank, had again, most wisely, increased their issue to 3,1 00,000. What has been the consequence of a greater issue than ever? Not an exchange of 18 per cent, against Ireland, as wag the case in the year 1804, but an exchange of 91, which is only i^ per cent, above par; and about two years ago, it was under 8 per cent, whilst the par is 8f . Is not that fact a de- cisive proof, that abundance of currency has nothing to do with the rate of exchange, and that the Directors of the Bank of England, did not fall into a great practical error, when they regulated their issues, neither by the price of bullion, nor the rate of exchange ? 3. On the Bank of England being compelled to purchase Gold at any Price, to carry on its Circulation. It is recommended by the Bullion Committee, that two years hence, the Bank of England shall be compelled to exchange its notes for gold, in which case, it must purchase bullion at any price. This plan w^s recommended by the Com- mittee, when the price of gold was ^\os. per oz. and as the Mint price is only 3, 175. io{d. it is evident, that the Bank must lose ig-J per cent, by all such transactions. The Bank of England maintains its credit and character, by carrying on a profitable business, under a most judicious system ;* but if it were to engage in great trans- actions, by which it was to lose \*>\ per cent. I should be glad to know, what would be thought of the wisdom of its Directors. In fact, the Bank, with such a burden, must give up issuing paper. Indeed, no one would take the notes of a corporation, that would persevere in carrying on so ruinous a business. Mr. Huskisson having, however, proved to his own conviction, that a light guinea is more valuable than a heavy one, he will next, I sup- pose, undertake to persuade the Directors of the Bank of England, that purchasing bullion, with a loss of only 10 or 15 per cent, is a most profitable transaction. * The rules of the Bank of England are highly judicious, and I believe strictly observed. They never issue a note but, i. On mercantile paper, that seems to them per- fectly unexceptionable ; (and I believe the losses they sustain by discounting such paper, considering the extent of their transactions, are very inconsiderable ;) or, 2. On Parlia- mentary security. And here it is proper to observe, that they never advance any money on- public securities, unless a Bill has not only gone through both Houses, but has actually received the Royal Assent ; the Votes of the House of Commons, though sanctioned by the .Lords,, not being /considered as sufficient. 4, Upon the Fall in the Value of the Funded Property of the Country, in consequence of the Proceedings of the Bullion Committee. It is admitted by the Bullion Committee, that the country was in a high state of mer- cantile, and of public credit, when its inquiries commenced. The numerous bankruptcies, which have since happened, may have been principally occasioned by other causes, but the fall which has taken place in the value of stocks, must be greatly owing to the attack that has most unfortunately been made on our cir- culation. Its effects abroad have been so great, that, I understand, there never was so much stock belonging to foreigners, in proportion to the extent of foreign property, sold, as since the Report of the Bullion Committee has been in circulation. The remitting of the value of the stock thus sold, has rendered the exchange, (if any exchange can be said to exist at such a time) , less favourable than otherwise would have been the case. In order to ascertain to what extent that fail has gone, I thought it necessary to pro- cure, a statement of the prices -of the different stocks, on the s^d February, and ist Decent ber 181 o, to which the reader's attention is earnestly requested. S'S'S o J g CU o3 0,g c ^ oo o c< O vO OO o '"* T >^ O i- <^ M OO c 'O vo o >. ro f.OO oc M *, * ^*- rx co r> Ni co co oo DO ^i- vo CO ro VO CO 00 \r\ ro O OOO CO O M SO O O O O 8 I>^ ON G O COO OON O O>"^"C s IVftC<'OON' CO M OO VO M co n t^x HI VC I I oo" CO CO "1 00 M . ro 00 o . r/5 J3 to N) K M r.| w u > I I'? ON vo W vo VO 00 M VO M . -o .2 ' *: ' ' '1 ' a'o-H C C M S- Thus it appears, that the value of funded property, has already fallen to the enormous amount of 17, i82,4g2/. It is to be hoped that such a statement will awaken the attention of the proprietors of the stocks in general, to the necessity of preserving our present system of circulation unimpaired, and to the danger of tampering with our paper currency at such a time as this. From the preceding statement it is evident, that the proprietors of Bank stock, have already suffered, in the value of their property, to the amount of nearly four millions sterling, (3,725,568/.) It is farther suggested, that they shall carry on a commerce, by one branch of what they are to lose at the rate of from 8 to i^i per cent. ; yet when these proprietors are assembled, it is considered to be indecorous in them, to raise any clamour against pro- ceedings, by which their most substantial in- terests are so deeply affected. On the whole, whoever will take the trouble of considering the facts above detailed, and the observations arising therefrom, must see the danger of permitting visionary speculations, to interfere with the practical concerns of Govern- ment; more especially, regarding measures, on which depend the interests and the comforts [ 13 ] of all classes of society. In the words of Sir James Steuart, " if matters are left without any " change at all, no bad consequences will " follow. These exist only in the heads of " theorists." ADVERTISEMENT. IT is much to be lamented, that any contro- versy regarding the circulation of the country, should have arisen at a moment, when we have so many other important questions to distract our attention. Those who wish for an altera- tion in the established system, admit, that the nation, immediately prior to the publication of the Bullion Report, " was in a high state c of mercantile, and of public credit;" the friends of the existing system, therefore, are extremely apprehensive, that any change in our circulation, might completely overthrow that proud situation which we have so long maintained. The opponents of the present sys- tem, on the other hand, contend, that an unre- stricted issue of paper, has occasioned the high price of Bullion, and an unfavourable rate of exchange ; and instead of exercising their inge- nuity, to discover other modes by which the ex- cess might be limited, there is none, they affirm, but the power of converting our paper currency into coin. If the issue of Paper, however, be too ex tensive, various modes might be thought of, that would answer that purpose, without run- ning the risk of destroying a system, under which, although it may have been attended with some disadvantages, the nation has flourished. All that the friends to the present system seem to wish for is, that matters should be suf- fered to remain as they are, during the course of the present war, resting the responsibility of any mischief that can possibly result therefrom, on the Ministers of the Crown, on the one hand, and on the Bank Directors on the other. If the power vested in the latter, should be reckoned too great, restrict their power, but do not destroy the system. When the war shall be over, the sub- ject may then be resumed without public danger; and Parliament, with more leisure to discuss C '7 3 the subject, and with some additional experience, will be enabled to devise such regulations, re- garding the circulation of the country, as may contribute to, and, I trust, confirm, its prosperity. Comparison of the years 1809 and 1796, in regard to Commerce, Public Credit and Revenue. In order that the reader may be fully aware of the importance of the subject now under discussion, how much the nation has flourished, in a variety of important particulars, since ( the Restriction Bill took place, and what its state would be, if the former system was re- established, his attention to the following statements is earnestly requested. It may be proper to add, that the year 1809, was the one immediately prior to the appoint- ment of the Bullion Committee ; and the year 1796, was the one immediately prior to the restriction on payments in cash at the Bank of England. Exports, An, 1809 Ditto, An. 1796 35 l8 >9 x 3 Difference, 19,782,850 B C * D Imports, An. 1809 - 3 6, 25 5 ,209* Ditto, An. 1796 23,187,319 Difference, $3,067^890 Average price of 3 per cent, "i 68 I consols. An. 1809 / Ditto, An. 1796 r 58 18 7 Difference, 9 3 2t Rate of Interest on Loan, An. 1809 4 4 2.J Ditto, - An. 1796 4 13 3 Difference, o 9 of Public Revenue, An. 1809 - ^59>3 I >84-B J Ditto, . An. 1796 - I Difference, ^39*080,259 Is it possible that any individual can seriously * Estimating the East India and the China trade as in 1808, the account not being yet made up. t This is the average price of the 3 per cent, consols, as purchased by the Commissioners for reducing the na- tional debt. If the value of the interest paid to the public creditor be depreciated, what an object it is, to have such an increased price for the capital ? J How could such a revenue, and the immense trade, and more extended agriculture of this country he carried on, ii the circulation of Bank notes we^e reduced to eleven millions, independent of Government paper, and com- mercial discount, as reeommended by Sir Francis Baring ? resolve to tamper with the situation of a country, which the preceding statements represent K> bk so uncommonly flourishing ? Is it not fair to reason, that if our circulation were reduced to its amount in 1790, (which would necessarily result from the suggestions of the Bullion Committee), that our commerce am! revenue would not differ materially from whkt they were at that time ? That our stocks would be reduced to the same price, which then vfras the casie? whilst the interest on our public loaHns would be increased to the sairie standard? Above all-, ho-\tf wotild k be pbssibte, with a cir- culation diminished to' at feast OTC half of itsr present amount, to furnish the same revenue ? I question much, whether in that case, we should be able to pay even the ttrnfcteen millions' which were raised 1 in the year 175)6; and if more were attempted to be exacted, can it be doubted, that every individual' it* the country would be placed ih a situation of the utmost difficulty and distress ? I earnestly,, therefore, intreat those, who have any stake in the country,* of whatever Bo i^ C description, to unite in maintaining a system, which, in the present circumstances of Europe, can alone preserve the nation from destruction. It is an old and a true saying, " Fas est> et abhoste doceri:" Let us endeavour, therefore, to ascertain, what are the wishes of the enemy in regard to the renewal of cash payments at the Bank ; for we may be well assured, that the measures that France would recommend, it is not for our interest to follow. Fortunately, the wishes of France, in this respect, have been publicly announced from official authority.* Napoleon has not been able to dissemble his joy, at the prospect, of seeing the greatest obstacle to his ambitious views, (the credit and circulation of this country), as he vainly flattered himself, on the eve of being destroyed ; and he had already anticipated the glorious era, when one half of the merchants of England would be compelled to stop payment, and when his favourite measures of commercial hostilities against us, (his decrees of Berlin and of Milan), would be * The Journal de V Empire is a Government paper.] C 3 felt in their full force. He believes us so infatuated, that his warning voice will not awaken us to a sense of our danger. The measure of opening the Bank, however, fortu- nately has not yet been resolved on, by any authority capable of carrying it into effect ; and I trust, when its mischievous consequences are duly considered, it will not^ till the times are materially altered, be seriously attempted. I cannot conclude without stating my full con- viction, if it were to be enacted that the Bank should resume its pay mentsin cash, that it would be utterly impossible to procure coin sufficient, to carry on our immense commerce, and our improving and more extended agriculture ; to maintain our great fleets, and our numerous armies ; to collect our increasing revenue ; to defray our vast expenditure ; and, in short, to carry on the multiplied daily and hourly tran- sactions of common life. All these would in a great measure be brought to a stand, if our paper currency were to be annihilated. It would be much the same thing, in these unheard of times, if the Bank were again compelled to resume its payments in cash ; for, in that case, it could hardly venture to issue a note, without having specie ready to exchange for it* We have lately heard much of the miserable state to which numbers in Salisbury were reduced, where, for want of a circulating medium that would pass, they could hardly procure a morsel of bread. If those who have excited a clamour against bank-notes, were to be successful, the public at large, would soon experience the same difficulties. Men, from distress and despair, would then become ripe for revolution, and ready to involve themselves and their country, in all the horrors attending it. If our present system therefore were unfor- tunately to be overturned, whoever might live to make the comparison, would probably find, that the year 1809, and the commencement of they^aj 1810, were the most flourishing periods in our history, in regard to commerce, revenue, finance, and evtry species of agricultural and in** ternal improvement, the best and most substan- tial sources of public- prosperity. London, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. HAVING already stated, in the History of the Public Revenue of the British Empire,* my sen- timents on the circulation and paper currency of the country ; and having so lately published my thoughts on the Report of the Bullion Committee ; I had resolved to reserve> what farther observations had either occurred to my- self, or had been communicated to me by * See Hist, of the Revenue, printed, An. 1803, Vol. II. p. 318 and 319, &c. It is therein stated, about seven years ago, " that it is hardly possible to suppose, that the Bank " of England, as at present constituted, can ever again open " to any effective purpose, as the least rumour of war, " or any continuance of an Unfavourable state of exchange, " must compel it to shut again its coffers, and to suspend its " payments in cash." Nothing can be more unfair there- fore than to attribute any change of opinions in the author of that work, though, where there are grounds for it, why should an erroneous opinion be pertinaciously persevered in, because it happened once, perhaps hastily, to be taktn up. In regard to coin and paper currency, the author of this work, wished to maintain, as long as possible, tnc credit of the Bank of England on its original footing: he now sees clearly the advantages of the new system, and is bound, as a friend to the public welfare, to defend it. others, regarding these important subjects,/ until the question came to be discussed in Par- liament, where the solidity of the arguments to be adduced on either side must ultimately be determined ; but having been led to peruse a work, entitled, " The Question concerning the " Depreciation of our Currency, stated and ex- " amined, by W. Huskisson, Esq." I found myself therein so pointedly called upon, to ex- plain, and vindicate the opinions I entertain,* that, however unwilling to enter the lists of political controversy, I could hardly avoid accepting of a challenge thus publicly an- nounced. It seems to me, independently of these personal considerations, incumbent upon those, * Mr. Huskisson says in his Preface, p. n. " I am " anxious to meet upon a fair and equal footing, those per- " sons wh have publicUy attacked the Report of the Corn* *' mittee. I wish to draw from them either an admission ot " the principles which I state ; or a clear and explicit expo- " sition of their own. If they admit the principles stated " by me, it is for them to reconcile their own deductions to " those principles so admitted ; and to disprove mine. Ifthe " difference between us be as to principles, let them lay * fairly .before the public those on which their theory is ** built, and shew the practical consequences to which their " own principles would, in their own opinion, lead." I have therefore annexed a clear and explicit exposition of the principles I maintain. It might easily have been spun out 'into a pamphlet as long as Mr. Huskisson's, had I judged ii necessary. whose attention has been directed to such in- quiries, to lay before the public, a clear and explicit declaration of their sentiments on the subjects of coin and paper currency, and that with as little delay as possible, on two grounds, recognized by Mr, HuSkisson; i. the importance of the question ; and, 2. the neces- sity of having it thoroughly considered, pre- viously to its discussion in Parliament. In regard to the first point, the importance f the question, mv ideas go far beyond those which the Honours ole Gentleman seems to en- tertain. He admits " that it affects,in its prac- " tical consequences, the interests and the com- " forts of every class of society/' (Preface p, 13) ; but that is nothing to the view in which the question ought, in my apprehension, tobe considered. On thedecision of that question, depend, not only the interests and the comforts of every class of society, but the very safety and existence of this great Empire ; in other words, its security against foreign conquest, or internal convulsion ; either, or both, of which must necessarily follow, if the currency of the coun- try be rashly tampered with, or its established system of circulation overthrown. As to the propriety of having the subject thoroughly discussed, previously to its brought under the consideration of Parliament, I perfectly concur with Mr* Huskisson in the observation he makes, (Preface, p. 12), "that " it is a subject upon w r hich many persons " would rather collect their ideas, and form " their decision, in the leisure of the closet, than *' in the warmth of debate/' These grounds have induced me, however reluctantly, to undertake the unpleasant task of examining the lucubrations of a gentleman, who having held offices of considerable moment, and whose character, as a person of business, intelligence and ability, being well known, it was natural to expect much important infor- mation from any observations which he might be disposed to publish. I certainly lament, as much as he does, that the subject should at all be considered as a party question ; but, most unfortunately, the motion for the appointment of the Bullion Com- mittee was made by a gentleman connected with the opposition party ; the majority of the members who constituted the Committee, are supposed to be hostile to the ministers who governed the country at the time when the Report was presented ; the doctrines of that Report have been applauded by all those who, in newspapers or other publications, support CM 27 J the claims of a particular party to the govern- ment of the Empire ; and any person, who presumed to controvert the opinions of the Committee, became the object of v their most virulent abuse. These circumstances tend to indicate, that a number of individuals have formed an idea, that maintaining the doctrines of the Bullion Committee, may serve the pur- poses of the party to which they are attached. As to the clamour raised on the other side, ( which is greatly inferior to what might have been expected regarding a question which affects the interests and comforts of every class of society ), it is impossible for those, who see such a subject unnecessarily pressed forward, and the discussion persevered ir-, to abstain from loudly proclaiming their horror at such proceedings : More especially when the bare suggestion of such measures as the Committee has recom- mended, has already proved the source of infinite mischief, and when, to the best of their judg- ment, such measures, if they were really to be acted upon, would terminate in the destruction of the country. We are told, however, " that it was for the " House of Commons to consider whether " they should appoint a Committee at all, or " refer such a subject to such a mode of " examination ; and that nothing can be more " unjust than to impute blame to the Members c * of a Committee, acting under the orders of " the House, in the due discharge of a duty, " which the House had thought proper to im- " pose upon them." There never was, in my apprehension, a more unjust attack on the House of Commons, upon whom all the odium of any mischief that may arise from the Report, is thus attempted to be thrown. On a motion made by a learned Member of the House, a Committee was appointed " to enquire into " the cause of the high price of Gold Bullion, " and to take into consideration, the state of the " circulating medium, and of the exchange be- " tween Great Britain and Foieign| Parts, and " to report the same, with their observations " thereupon, from time to time, to the House." The Committee were certainly thus authorised, not only to report the evidence, but to make their observations upon it, if they judged it necessary. They might, even, with perfect propriety, have reported the evidence alone, re- quesing the House itself to form the conclusions ; or, if the subject appeared to them of great difficulty and importance, they might have post- poned presenting the Report altogether until another session, instead of hastily throwing to- gether so defective a performance, which they C 39:3 had not leisure thoroughly to digest ;* above all, it is questionable, whether it was proper to pre- sent a Report, on such a subject, involving in it, as the Honourable Gentleman admits, " the interests and the comforts of every class of " society -, at the very close of a session, when it was impossible for the House to know its con- tents, or to judge whether it was fit to be printed and circulated as a parliamentary document, Here again, I suppose, the House is to be blamed, for having received the Report at such a time, and, having ordered it to be printed, from the confidence it placed in the judgment and the patriotism of its Committee. This leads me to allude to a circumstance, connected with the appointment of the Bullion Committee, which it is impossible to contem- plate for a moment, without infinite regret. The appointment of Select Committees, to collect useful information, to digest the in- formation thus collected, to suggest, when specially authorised to that effect, what pro- ceedings it might be proper for Parliament to adopt, regarding a subject thus investigated, and afterwards to bring in such Bills as might be necessary to carry the measures proposed by them, if approved of by the House, into effect, is a system, which has been productive of * The last evidence was examined on the 25th of May, and the Report presented on the 8th of June. many useful regulations : but the proceedings of the Bullion Committee will make future minis- ter*, and future parliaments, extremely cau- tious in sanctioning such appointments ; it is ' impossible therefore to foresee the public mis- chief which may thence arise. A Committee may be appointed on very plausible pretences-, it may unnecessarily postpone bringing its pro- ceedings to a close, and, at the very last day of a session, it may present a Report* in the pre- paring of which, the Committee have gone fiatf beyond the powers with which they were in- trusted. The Report however is prifirted,aawl is circulated during a long recess, under the sanc- tion of Parliament; and after much mischief has been done, when the Committee are asked,.how all this came to pass ? it is gravely answered, " The House of Commons, and not we,, are to " blame the House appointed- us> atid we have " done but our duty/* I mention a possible ease,, the very idea of which may prevent many useful inquiries. Indeed respectable members of the House will, in future, become extremely unwilling to take any share in such investiga- tions, since they may inadvertently be led, to concur in the recommendation of measures, wJiich may ultimately prove destructive to t/he public, interesti However, much these circumstances are to CsO be lamented, I beg to have it understood, that, though now under the necessity of controvert- ing the doctrines of the Committee., yet that I feel no want of respect for the gentlemen who constituted it, nor any alteration in that personal regard which I have long entertained for some of its members. They were placed indeed, as many Committees are, in a very awlovard situa- tion. Gre::t thin gs were expected from tten^and they were of course perpetually teased to bring forward their Report, from an anxiety to, know what they intended. The variety of important business discussed in the coarse of the> Isust ses- sion, prevented them from paying that unceas- ing attention to the subject, which its iitfrica^y and importance demanded ; a#d probably % they thought, that it was of less consequence what doctrines were contained in the Report, as they were afterwards to be fully discussed in the House, before they could possibly be acted upon. Besides, the subjects of coin and paper currency, are questions of great diffic ultv,, re- garding which much may be said on bath &k j , and in the deciding of wh : ch, persons ixsay 3 I trust, fairly and conscientiously, entertain dis- cordant opinions. I must now take the liberty of explaining the circumstances which have induced me to sqactiye a part in, this investigation, C 30 Some years have elapsed since I originally published the " History of the Public Revenue " of the British Empire," in the second volume Of the third edition of which, printed Anno 1803, I fully explained the ideas which had occurred to me, on the subjects of Circulation and Paper Currency, and which are exactly si- milar to those which ! have lately maintained. Being fully convinced that the power and prosperity of this country, entirely depended on supporting its established system of circulation, as soon as it was surmised that the Bullion Committee had proposed to open the Bank, and consequently to overturn that system, I took the liberty of addressing a Letter to the Chairman, of which the following is a copy. Copy of a Letter from Sir John Sinclair, to the Chairman of the Bullion Committee. SIR, I REGRET much to understand, that some ideas are entertained, of restricting the number of Notes issued by the Bank of England, which I am persuaded would be attended with the most injurious consequences to the agriculture, the commerce, and the revenue of the country. I have thought it necessary therefore, to submit to the consideration of the Bullion Committee, some thoughts upon the subject, in the enclosed t 33 3 paper. Some check to the unlimited circulation of private Banks, would, I am persuaded be highly expedient; but in regard to Corp orations, established for the purpose of issuing either large or small notes, any restriction can hardly be politic or advisable, if the security is unex- ceptionable; for any real unnecessary surplus of Notes, will soon return upon those who issue them. I beg to conclude, with expressing my full conviction, that if the paper circulation of the kingdom is put on a proper footing, in regard to the following particulars: i. Suffering none to be issued, but on the most undoubted secu- rity : 2. Taking care that as much paper cur- rency is in circulation, as the increasing wealth, population, and revenue of the country de- mands : and 3. Issuing small notes, as well as large ones, without which the system is not complete : if these principles are acted upon, there will be no difficulty, in finding pecuniary resources, for carrying on the war in which we are at present engaged, for twenty years more, and longer if it should be necessary. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your faithful and obedient Servant, No. 5, Terrace, Palace-yard, April, 1810. c No notice was taken of this communication. Whoever will give themselves the trouble of rig it, will prohahly admit, that if any mis- chv' shall arise from the Report of the Bullion Committee, they were fairly warned, on the igth of Apr 1 last, of the dangerous consequences which would result from the measures they in- tended to propose. The Report, though ordered to he printed on the 8th June, did not reach me in Edinburgh till about the i6th of August. I happened then to be on the eve of setting out for London, and resolved to take the Report with me, as a com- panion during the journey. It is impossible to express the astonishment and ivgret which I felt on the perusal of that performance. On my arrival in London, I found the whole mer- cantile world in the utmost distress, which was greatly aggravated by the idea, that the Report would be acted upon as scon as Parliament re- assembled. Not a person seemed resolved, either to maintain the advantages, or to vindicate the solidity of the established currency of the coun- try/ I could not therefore resist the inclination which 1 felt, to come forward at such a crisis; being apprehensive that the Bank Directors might be deterred from acting with sufficient energy in Checking the misfortunes of the com- mercial world at that time, unlejs they were C w 3 \ that thedortrii es of the Committ, were not so univerially admitted, as they had M led to inv -nd con,si v |ii(*mly illicit not bo n!: adopt-'d. I v . th n< Ul to publish some observations on ilu- !!oj on of the C nnuMcr, which h n lor :;i;mr lime ! ! thr I'uhlir. 1 .shall no\v { to m,: rva- tions on Mr. Huskisson's painp laras it scerps 1 inv,. iiiM liis .scntinuMi!,s in t!ic \u>rds Iw ma;!-, ui of, and next the KVrnai-ks \\hu-n , OCCUrmd ; n the dortriiu:; he has pro- mi: I .shall then conclude, with explaining the princij)K s on \vhic:h I (Miiceive (lie pa; cm i nmtry is now established ; any ; \\ith which, in the f moineni, would, I am ! 'led with infinite, and ( , misch. In llie follow!" 'rva(ioiis ; thctliirdcditio:i of i!ie ^-.inh. OliSIOilVATIONS ON MR. IIUSKISSON'S PAMPHLET. J'/r/'ti! <). " The necessity jtoftrmation (r'^:uv!injr the f all those erroneous ideas regarding coin and paper currency, which the Honourable Gentleman has unfortunately imbibed. Instead of resting on tbe improved experience of modern times, he has suffered his judgment to be warped, by tbe his- tory of former periods, and by authors whose supreme authority, in questions of political eco- nomy, can be no longer recognized. A Locke, and other authors of former periods, could only reason according to the circum- stances of the times in which they lived, and on the facts to which they had access; but the same doctrines could never be applicable to such an era as that in which we live. Could they have formed an idea, of the whole Conti- nent of Europe being made subject to the dominion of one man ? Could they have fore- seen, a general anxiety to hbard, arising from the oppression to which whole states were subjected, and the commercial intercourse of nations put under trammels hitherto un- heard of? No man can be absurd enough to suppose, that the same rules or principles, are applicable to a state so forced and unnatural, as to the more fortunate period, when Europe was divided among a number of independent states, under governments either free, or not tyrannically exercised ; where, in the midst of war, no idea was entertained of any general stop to commercial intercourse; and where, for the sake of mutual convenience, nations regu- lated their conduct, according to principles, to which the emphatic name of " The cdde of nations" was given, the authority of which unfortunately is no longer recognized. Besides, new discoveries are constantly making in com- merce, in manufactures, in medicine, in agri- culture, in mechanics, and in all the other arts and sciences; and why should not some be also made in political economy ? I must here take the liberty of remarking that, whatever respect we may entertain, for the celebrated Locke, as a metaphysician, and as a zealous and able friend to liberty and morals, yet no one, at all acquainted with the political history of this country and of America, will ever be disposed to quote him, as decisive authority, by which any practical measure of Government ought to be regulated.* It is well known that * The plan of government for this new colony, (Carolina), C383 Mr. Locke was desired to draw up a Constitu- tion for the province of Carolina. He exercised, on that occasion, all the political ability of which he was capable; but so different is theory from practice, that this constitution was foundry experience, totally unfit for the government of a country. The theories of Mr. Locke on coin and paper currency, are equally inapplicable to the circu instances of these times. Were Agriculture the .subject of discussion, it would be idle to rest on the ancient dogmas of a Columella, or the Georgics or Virgil. More useful information is to be obtained, from an experienced farmer of the improved modem school, than from all the ancient authors \vh'o have written on husban- dry.* In the same manner, intelligent mer- was drawn up by the famous Locke ; a philosopher, who \vas a friend to mankind, and to that moderation and justice which should be the only rule of their actions. Being more of a metaphysician than a statesman, it is certain that the same man, who had dissipated and destroyed so many errors in his theory concerning the origin of ideas, made but very feeble advances in tie paths of legislation. Raynal's Hist, of the Indies, translated by Justamond, Vol. VII- p. 341, &c. * Suppose that an author was determined to write a book on Agriculture, and wished to explain to his readers, the best mode of separating the grain from the straw. He might, on consulting ancient authorities solely, collect much information, as to the different sorts of flails, their length, 393 chants, well-informed bankers, or even the reprobated Directors of the Bank of England, who are guilty, according to the Report of the Bullion Committee, of great practical errors in the management of that vast concern,* would have given the Honourable Gentleman, more valuable information regarding coin and paper currency, than he has been able to derive, from all those ancient authors by whom he appears to have been misled. Preface, page i and 2. " I committed to paper, the substance of were required, to however, that individuals should be compelled to receive a species of money, which would not be accepted of at the Exchequer, in payment of those taxes to which they were liable. But since the Exchequer has received Bank notes in payment of taxes, all those ancient regulations are virtually abrogated ; and whilst bank paper is received at the Exchequer, as readily as gold,and will purchase with as much facility, every article he wishes for, no man can justly complain of any defect in our circulation. Pamphlet, p. 13. " It follows that the difference between " and 4$/. 145. 6d. or between 12 and " ounces of gold, arises from the depreciation of " the paper ; and is the measure of that depre- " ciation, as well with respect to gold, the come upon " it for the payment of this balance ; and " thereby the coin, which it had provided !6 for home demand only, is drawn out." Book IV. chap. 7. Observation. The justness of these remarks can hardly be questioned ; it is evident, therefore, that it would require 7, 000,000. in specie, to cir- culate ^2 f, 000 ,000. of Bank Notes, the a- mount necessary for the demands of the coun- try at this time. If the Bank were compelled to have always 1 ,000 ,000. in its coffers, which it must now purchase at a loss of 8% per cent., and which, from any great additional demand, would soon rise toJ5 or 20 per cent. and which it mast be constantly replacing; I should be glad to know, in what the profit of the Bank would consist, and whether it would be worth its while to issue a single note, with the risk of its being converted, at such an ex- pence, into specie. 3. On the Advantages of Paper Currency. " In countries where nothing circulates but " the metals, when coin becomes scarce, it is " hardly possible to find any credit at all in " the remote provinces ; and even in the cen- " tre of circulation, the interest paid for the " use of it, must rise very considerably, and " must stand high for some time, before Bui- " lion, for the purpose of coinage, canbe-im- " ported. Paper money, on the other hand, <; when Banks and trade are well established, " is always to be found. No part of it lies " dead not even for a day, when employed " in trade ; it is not so of coin/ 1 Steuart's Polit. Econ, Book IV. chap 12- " To the Banks of Scotland, the iroprove- " ment of that country is entirely owing." Ditto, Vol. III. p. 197. Observation. These remarks are perfectly just. The prosperity both of England and of Scotland, ought principally to be attributed to the Bank- ing establishments in those two countries, and the judicious principles by which they are regulated. Any attempt therefore, cal- culated for the purpose of diminishing their power, or restricting their circulation, cannot be two vigorously opposed. 4. On the necessity of having Bank Notes con- vertible into Specie. " IT is said that bank notes can never be re- " ceived as specie, but from a persuasion that " they may be exchanged for it on demand.*' u To this the answer is obvious ; that it " is sufficient that bank notes be received as tc " value, and that they answer every purpose 44 in carrying on alienation. The use of paper 44 money is, to keep the reckoning between 44 parties who are solvent; the use of specie p- 4t pressed. But if he pursue his plan systo u matically, circulation will be kept full, his " credit will be supported, his taxes will be " paid, and his people will be easy, because " no check v/ill be put either to their indus- " try or consumption for want of money/' Steuart's Pol. Econ. Book. IV. chap. 10. Observation. The doctrines contained in this paragraph* ccmpletely justify the observations contained in the fifth political maxim. It were to be wished that those, who are anxious to for 11 a just opinion regarding coin and paper cur- rency, would study the works of an author, whose " Inquiry into the principles of Poli- 44 tical Economy," was the labour of IB years diligent research, and whose works cannot be surpassed by those of any other political au- thor, for ingenuity of thought, justness of rea- soning, and soundness of judgment. 6. On Public Loans. " As the object of the borrower is, to have " interest low, the statesman who intends to " borrow, must use all possible means to in- " crease the quantity of money in circulation." "But if coin alone be used as money, and if " this coin be sent out of the country, when " borrowed, and if what is sent away cannot be " replaced, at will, the scheme of augmenting *' money becomes impracticable : it will daily 46 become more scarce, more difficult to pro- 4t cure, and interest must rise higher every 44 day. Symbolical, or paper money, that is cre- 44 dit, must then be established at home, upon 44 the firmest basis : this will enable every one 44 to pay what he owes, consequently the taxes " will be paid, the creditors will receive what ct is due to them regularly, money every year 46 will augment in proportion as debts are " contracted, and if borrowing do not augment F C 74 3 CJ beyond this proportion, interest will not rise, u and if borrowing should fall below this pro- " portion, interest will sink." Steuart's Polit. Econ. Book IV. chap. 10. Observation. These doctrines are invaluable, and are completely justified by the recent experience of this country. Those who cannot feel their importance, do not merit the name of States- men. London : printed by W. Bulmer and Co. Gere land-row, St. James's* DEPT &- [late recall. REC JUN" 7 ; i*W76" Uni5 5en - era] Ll ' b rary University of r^i;*/__-