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POLITICAL REFORM 
 
 Representation of Minorities 
 
 MATTHIAS N. FORNEY 
 it 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THK AUTHOR AT 47 CEDAR ST. 
 1894. 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1894, BY M. N. FORNEY. 
 
 '44-'' \ / : 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 CLARK & ZUGALLA. 
 
 33 TO 43 GOLD STREET, 
 
 NEW YORK. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 CHAPTER I. Representation 5 
 
 II. Misrepresentation 14 
 
 III. The Evils of Majority Representation. . . .- 29 
 
 IV. The Representation of Minorities. 40 
 
 V. Cumulative or " Free " Voting 43 
 
 VI. Free Voting in Illinois 53 
 
 " VII. Objections to Cumulative Voting 65 
 
 VIII. Principles of Free Voting 88 
 
 IX. The Burnitz System of Election. 102 
 
 X. Political Evils which Free Voting would Lessen. 116 
 " XL Influence of Free Voting on Party Organization. 121 
 " XII. Objections to Minority Representation Con- 
 sidered 128 
 
 XIII. Advantages of Free Voting, 136 
 
 APPENDIX. A. Different Systems of Election for securing Mi- 
 nority Representation 147 
 
 B. "A Method of assuring to the Minorities as well 
 as to the Majority, at all kinds of Elections, 
 the number of Representatives corresponding 
 
 to their strength. " 159 
 
 " C. Election by Preponderance of Choice 175 
 
 D. Bibliography of Proportional or Minority Repre- 
 sentation 1 80 
 
 INDEX 189 
 
 M82791 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 When the compilation of the following pages was commenced the 
 intention was first, to describe briefly the evils growing out of the pres- 
 ent system of electing, by a majority or plurality of the votes cast in 
 each district, single members to represent the people in it, in national, 
 state or municipal legislative assemblies ; second, to show that by 
 increasing the size of or consolidating a number of the present dis- 
 tricts and electing several members from each, by a system which would 
 give minorities as well as majorities representation, at least some of 
 these evils would be remedied ; third, to give a very brief, simple, 
 and as clear an explanation as possible of what is meant by min- 
 ority, proportional or personal representation as it has been called 
 by different writers -then to collect from the various books and essays 
 on the subject some of the most convincing arguments which have 
 been advanced in favor of adopting some such method of electing rep- 
 resentatives to our national, state, and municipal legislative bodies. 
 
 In making such an explanation the practice which has prevailed in 
 Illinois, for more than twenty years, of choosing the members of the 
 House of Representatives in that State by a system of cumulative vot- 
 ing, afforded an object lesson from which the general principles of the 
 simplest form of minority representation could be described and made 
 obvious to those who are totally ignorant of the subject and at least 
 nineteen-twentieths of all who are ordinarily regarded as intelligent peo- 
 ple are included in this class more easily than in any other way. As 
 the Illinois system was used as an illustration, it was thought readers 
 would naturally ask how it has worked in practice. To answer this 
 anticipated inquiry a method of getting information was adopted which 
 has been used very successfully in various associations with which the 
 writer has been connected, for making investigations relating to tech- 
 nical subjects. This method is to prepare a series of questions framed 
 with a view to eliciting the kind of information which is wanted, and 
 then print them in the form of a circular of inquiry, and send copies 
 of it to those who are likely to be possessed of the information or ex- 
 
2 PREFACE. 
 
 perience which is desired and solicit replies to the questions. This 
 was done and answers were received from persons in all parts of the 
 State of Illinois, to whom the circular was sent, giving their opinions, 
 and the results of their observation and experience, with reference to the 
 practical working of the system of electing representatives to the legis- 
 lature of that State. The information thus obtained indicated the 
 merits and also some of the defects of the Illinois system of election. 
 This led to investigations for remedies for the defects indicated and 
 extended the scope of the following pages much beyond the purpose 
 with which their compilation was commenced. 
 
 It has been said that notwithstanding the fact that minority repre- 
 sentation has been discussed for nearly half a century, that the system 
 has secured but a limited adoption, probably because " no entirely 
 satisfactory plan has been proposed. ' ' The final object aimed at in 
 the following pages was to explain a system which it is thought would 
 be " satisfactory " and to set forth the reasons for that belief. 
 
 The writer feels that a word of apology is due to himself, on 
 account of the haste with which the book has been prepared. All the 
 work has been done in time which could be taken from the exacting 
 duties of editing a technical paper. While he has not consciously 
 "depended upon his imagination for his facts," he has often relied 
 upon his memory and quotations for his arguments. The abundance 
 of quotations, in fact, leaves little room for any claims of authorship, 
 but only for such as a compiler may make. In the latter capacity free 
 use has been made of the contributions of other writers on the subjects 
 of these pages, many of which are scattered through periodicals and 
 are thus difficult of access to the general reader. These quotations 
 were made because the facts and the arguments contained therein were 
 set forth with much greater force and clearness than the writer could 
 hope to command, and such quotations have often the additional 
 weight which is added by the names of distinguished authors. 
 
 The immediate purpose of the book was to present its subject to the 
 consideration of the members of the Constitutional Convention of this 
 State who are assembling at the same time that this preface is being 
 written. To accomplish that purpose it should now be in the hands of 
 those who are to revise the organic law of the State of New York. It was 
 
PREFACE. 3 
 
 only by the most incessant work that it was brought as near to com- 
 pletion as it now is. Its purpose requires that it be launched at once 
 with whatever defects it has and many will doubtless become obvious 
 when it will be too late to retrieve them. 
 
 Persons interested in the reform proposed in the following pages, 
 and disposed to give their aid and countenance to secure its adoption, 
 are invited to send their names and addresses to the writer. 
 
 M. N. FORNEY. 
 47 Cedar Street, New York. 
 May 8, 1894. 
 
POLITICAL REFORM 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 With the struggle for civil liberty there has always been a contest 
 for the representation of the people in legislative bodies. During the 
 colonial period of our existence disputes of this kind were frequent and 
 to-day, in the great city of New York and in other places where a 
 great part and often the best part of the people are deprived of 
 adequate representation in the municipal, state, and national govern- 
 ment the strife is still continued, A standing grievance in labor 
 strikes is that the representatives of the laborers are not " recognized " 
 and the interests of the men are thus without satisfactory representa- 
 tion. In the first written charter granted in 1606 to the colony which 
 was planted in Virginia, we are told* that none of the rights of self- 
 government or elements of popular government nor the elective fran- 
 chise was introduced into the form of government, and that the fruits 
 thereof were tyranny, confusion, oppression, poverty and suffering. 
 
 Contrasted with the results of this misrepresentative form of govern- 
 ment it is said that in 1619 Sir George Yeardley arrived in the Vir- 
 ginia colony with "commissions and instructions from the company 
 for the better establishinge of a commonwealth." It provided "that 
 the planters might have a hande in the governing of themselves, yet 
 was graunted that a generall assemblie shoulde be helde yearly once, 
 whereat were to be present the governor and counsell with two bur- 
 gesses from each plantation, freely to be elected by the inhabitants 
 
 ^Bancroft's "History of the United States." 
 
 5 
 
6 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 thereof, this ass^mbb'e to have power to make and ordaine whatsoever 
 laws and orders should by them be thought good and profitable for 
 their subsistence. ' ' 
 
 This charter ' ' had the general assent and the applause of the whole 
 nssemblie, with thanks for it to Almighty God and to those from whom 
 it had issued, in the names of the burgesses and of the whole colony 
 whom they represented. ' ' 
 
 Of this charter Bancroft says : "A perpetual interest attaches to 
 this first elective body that ever assembled in the Western world, rep- 
 resenting the people of Virginia, and making laws for their govern- 
 ment, more than a year before the Mayflower ; with the Pilgrims, left 
 the harbor of Southampton. ' ' 
 
 In 1621 a written constitution was established for the colony cre- 
 ating a general assembly to consist of the members of the council, 
 and of two burgesses to be chosen from each of the several planta- 
 tions by the respective inhabitants. The historian's comments on 
 this are : ' ' The system of representative government thus became in 
 the new hemisphere an acknowledged right. * * * It constituted 
 the plantation, in its infancy, a nursery of freemen ; and succeeding 
 generations learned to cherish institutions which were as old as the first 
 period of the prosperity of their fathers. ' ' 
 
 In Massachusetts it is recorded that "for more than eighteen 
 years ' the whole body of the male inhabitants ' constituted the legis- 
 lature ; the state was governed like our towns as a strict democracy. 
 * * * At length the increase of population, and its diffusion over a 
 wider territory, led to the introduction of the representative system, 
 and each town sent its committee to the general court. ' ' 
 
 In 1639 the first assembly of Maryland framed a declaration of 
 rights, which ' ' established a system of representative government. ' ' 
 
 The charter granted to Roger Williams in 1644 gave to the people 
 in Rhode Island "full power and authority to rule themselves." It 
 asserted that ' ' all men were equal ; all might meet and debate in the 
 public assemblies ; all might aspire to office ; the people for a season 
 constituting itself its own tribune, and every public law required con- 
 firmation in the primary assemblies. ' ' 
 
 In his book on ' ' Representative Government and Personal Repre- 
 
REPRESENTATION. 7 
 
 sentation," Mr. Simon Sterne refers to "the remarkable degree to 
 which the ideas of representative government and free institutions 
 were developed in the colony of New Netherland as early as 1645. 
 By the eighth clause of the instructions of the commissioners of the 
 Assembly of XIX, relative to the government of the colony, it was 
 declared that ' Further, inasmuch as the respective colonists have been 
 allowed by the freedoms to delegate one or two persons to give infor- 
 mation to the Director and Council at least once a year, of the 
 state and condition of their colonies, the same is hereby confirmed.'* 
 
 ' ' That the colonists were not contented with the simple right * to 
 give information,' but demanded a representative form of government, 
 is indicated by the petition of the commonalty of New Netherland, 
 etc., to Director Stuyvesant, in the year 1653, of which the fourth 
 clause contains the following very remarkable words : 
 
 ' ' ' Tis contrary to the first intentions and general principles of every 
 well-regulated government that one or more men should arrogate to 
 themselves the exclusive power to dispose at will, of the life and prop- 
 erty of any individual, and this by virtue, or under pretense of a law 
 or order, he or they might enact, without the consent, knowledge, or 
 election of the whole body, or its agents or representatives. 
 
 ' ' ' Hence the enactment of new laws or orders affecting the com- 
 munity or inhabitants, their lives or property, is contrary and opposed 
 to the granted freedoms of the Dutch government, and odious to every 
 free-born man, and principally so to those whom God has placed in a 
 free state or on newly-settled lands, which might require new laws or 
 orders, not transcending, but resembling as near as possible, those of 
 Netherland. We humbly submit that it is one of our privileges that 
 our consent, or that of our representatives, is necessarily required in the 
 enactment of such laws and orders. ' " * 
 
 In reviewing these events Bancroft says : "In the early history of 
 the United States, nothing is more remarkable than the uniform attach- 
 ment of each colony to its franchises ; and popular assemblies burst 
 everywhere into life with a consciousness of their importance, and an 
 immediate capacity for efficient legislation. ' ' 
 
 *" Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New York." Vol. I. 
 PP- 499, 55- 
 
8 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 In the management of their local affairs during the colonial period 
 it was, then, 'a. struggle for representation and every student of our early 
 history must be impressed with the fact that, in the long contest with 
 the mother country, which began soon after the first settlement on this 
 side of the Atlantic, and ended with our revolutionary war, it was al- 
 ways a contest for this right. 
 
 Just prior to the revolution in an examination before a committee of 
 the House of Commons, in England, Franklin testified as follows : 
 
 " An internal tax is forced from the people without their consent, 
 if not laid by their representatives. * * * The Americans think it 
 extremely hard and unjust, that a body of men, in which they have no 
 representatives, should make a merit to itself of giving and granting 
 what is not its own, but theirs ; and deprive them of a right they 
 esteem of the utmost value and importance, as it is the security of all 
 their other rights. * * * 
 
 " As to an internal tax, how small soever, laid by the legislature here 
 on the people there, while they have no representatives in this legisla- 
 ture, I think it will never be submitted to. * * * 
 
 "They (the people) find in the Great Charter, and the Petition 
 and Declaration of Rights, that one of the privileges of English sub- 
 jects is, that they are not to be taxed but by their common consent ; 
 they have therefore relied upon it, from the first settlement of the 
 province, that the Parliament never would, nor could, by color of that 
 clause in the charter, assume a right of taxing them, till it had quali- 
 fied itself to exercise such right, by admitting representatives from the 
 people to be taxed, who ought to make a part of that common con- 
 sent." * * * 
 
 This sentiment was finally formulated during our contest with 
 Britain in the acclamation of " No Taxation without Representation," 
 and partly under its incitement the historical cargo of tea was thrown 
 overboard in Boston harbor. 
 
 The banners which have been carried in the conflicts for liberty in 
 the past have always had inscribed on them a demand for representa- 
 tion, and at the present day the question of representation is often the 
 real one at issue in labor strikes and sometimes forms the chief ob- 
 stacle which stands in the way of amicable agreement and the settle- 
 
REPRESENTATION. 9 
 
 merit of disputes between employers and their men. At the critical 
 period of a recent strike on a railroad, the following notice was 
 issued by the president of the company : 
 * ' To all employes : 
 
 11 To correct any misapprehension regarding the position of the 
 officers of this company I would state that they are at all times ready 
 and willing to give patient hearing to complaints on the part of its em- 
 ployes, or any number of them, in any department. If dissatisfied 
 with the conclusions reached by the division superintendents or general 
 superintendent, the President will hear Iheir cases and decide, but we 
 decline to confer with organized committees composed of several 
 branches of the service, for the reason that we cannot know that such 
 committees fairly represent its employes. Engineers cannot, of course, 
 fairly represent grievances of telegraph men, nor can firemen properly 
 represent trainmen." 
 
 It will be seen that in this " notice " there were several collateral 
 issues involved and whether the President would have ' ' recognized ' ' 
 committees who " fairly" represented the employes, or whether he would 
 have acknowledged the right of the latter to select their own representa- 
 tives are probably questions which were not then decided, but will be 
 sure to continue to come up until some equitable decision is reached. 
 Among the commonest and it may be added often the righteous 
 ' ' grievances ' ' of workingmen is the refusal of employers to ' ' recog- 
 nize ' ' or treat with the committees who have been appointed by the men 
 to represent their interests, and probably the recognition of this right 
 of representation would in times past have done, and would do 
 much in the future to avoid these contests which, in modern times, 
 are so detrimental to the interests of both the parties engaged 
 therein. 
 
 While representing the American cause in England it is reported 
 that Franklin in an interview with a distinguished English statesman 
 said, " It seems to me that every body of men who cannot appear in 
 person should have a right to appear by an agent " (or representative). 
 The right of representation could not be more concisely or forcibly 
 stated and the doctrine is applicable to all our relations, be they polit- 
 ical, social or industrial. 
 
I O REPRESENTATION . 
 
 What may be called the philosophy or perhaps better the ethics 
 of representation, in civil government, is elucidated with remarkable 
 clearness and conclusiveness in Guizot's " History of Representative 
 Government, ' ' and at the risk of a long quotation the following extract 
 from that book is reprinted here : 
 
 " Starting from the principle that truth, reason and justice, in one 
 word, the divine law, alone possess rightful power, the reasoning of 
 the true doctrine of representation is somewhat as follows : Every so- 
 ciety, according to its interior organization, its antecedents, and the 
 aggregate influences which have or still do modify it, is placed to a 
 certain extent in a position to apprehend truth and justice as the di- 
 vine law, and is in a measure disposed to conform itself to this law. 
 Employing less general terms there exists in every society a certain 
 number of just ideas and wills in harmony with these ideas, which respect 
 the reciprocal rights of men and social relations with their results. 
 This sum of just ideas and loyal wills is dispersed among the individ- 
 uals who compose society, and unequally diffused among them on ac- 
 count of the infinitely varied causes which influence the moral and 
 intellectual development of men. The grand concern, therefore, of 
 society is that, so far as either abiding infirmity or the existing con- 
 dition of human affairs will allow, this power of reason, justice and 
 truth, which alone has an inherent legitimacy, and alone has the right 
 to demand .obedience, may become prevalent in the community. The 
 problem evidently is to collect from all sides the scattered and incom- 
 plete fragments of this power that exist in society, to concentrate them, 
 and form them, to constitute a government. In other words, it is re- 
 quired to discover all the elements of legitimate power that are dissem- 
 inated throughout society, and to organize them into an actual power ; 
 that is to say, to collect into one focus, and to realize, public reason 
 and public morality, and to call them to the occupation of power. 
 
 " What we call representation is nothing else than a means to ar- 
 rive at this result, it is not an arithmetical machine employed to 
 collect and count individual wills, but a natural process by which public 
 reason, which alone has a right to govern society, may be extracted 
 from the bosom of society itself. No reason has in fact a right to say 
 beforehand for itself that it is the reason of the community. If it 
 
REPRESENTATION. 1 1 
 
 claims to be such, it must prove that it is so, that is to say, it must 
 accredit itself to other individual reasons which are capable of judging 
 it. If we look at facts, we shall find that all institutions, all condi- 
 tions of the representative system, flow from and return to this point. 
 Election, publicity, and responsibility, are so many tests applied to in- 
 dividual reasons, which in the search for, or in the exercise of, power, 
 assume to be the interpreters of the reason of the community ; so many 
 means of bringing to light the elements of legitimate power, and pre- 
 venting usurpation. 
 
 " In this system, it is true and the fact arises from the necessity 
 of liberty as actual in the world that truth and error, perverse and 
 loyal wills, in one word, the good and evil which co-exist and con- 
 tend in society as in the individual, will most probably express 
 themselves ; this is the condition ot the world ; it is the necessary 
 result of liberty. But against the evil of this there are two guarantees : 
 one is found in the publicity of the struggle, which always gives the 
 right the best chance of success, for it has been recognized in all ages 
 of the world that good is in friendship with the light, while evil ever 
 shelters itself in darkness ; this idea, which is common to all the relig- 
 ions of the world, symbolizes and indicates the first of all truths. The 
 second guarantee consists in the determination of a certain amount of 
 capacity to be possessed by those who aspire to exercise any branch of 
 power. In the system of representing wills, nothing could justify such 
 a limitation, for the will exists full and entire in all men, and confers 
 on all men an equal right ; but the limitation flows necessarily from 
 the principle which attributes power to reason and not to will. 
 * # * * * 
 
 ' ' So far then from representation founding itself on the right, 
 inherent in all individual wills, to concur in the exercise of power, it on 
 the other hand rests on the principle that no will has in itself any 
 right to power, and that whoever exercises, or claims to exercise power, 
 is bound to prove that he exercises, or will exercise it, not according 
 to his own will but according to reason. If we examine the represen- 
 tative system in all its forms, * * * we shall see that such are 
 everywhere the necessary results and the true foundations of that 
 which we call representation. ' ' 
 
12 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The principle which attributes power to reason and not to will 
 and that a certain amount of capacity should be possessed by those 
 who aspire to exercise any branch of power, has been recognized in 
 our various kinds of government, national, state and municipal. In the 
 State of New York every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, 
 who has been a resident in his district and state a certain length of 
 time, is of a sound mind and who has not bribed or been bribed at or 
 made a bet on the elections, or been convicted of an infamous crime 
 can vote. The question whether this is the wisest discrimination 
 which could be made between those who are assumed to have and those 
 who have not the " capacity " for exercising the power which the fran- 
 chise gives will not be discussed now. The fact is this is the discrim- 
 ination which has been made not only in the State of New York but 
 is substantially the same in nearly all the other states in the Union. 
 It was said half a century ago " that the notion that in any large 
 community, government is the creation of the whole people, or 
 that it has in any proper sense, received the assent of all, is entirely 
 fanciful. The truth is, that even in the most favorable cases, but a 
 comparatively small portion of the people have actually any share in 
 directing the affairs of state ; and of that portion, a bare majority, as 
 will be shown, and often less, may usually prescribe the form and pol- 
 icy of the government, under which all are to live, and to which all 
 are held equally bound to render obedience. More than three-fourths 
 of the entire population are excluded by reason of their sex, age, or 
 other declared disqualification, from all participation in the right of 
 voting. The exclusion is somewhat arbitrary ; indeed, no more is 
 pretended than that it proceeds upon a general presumption of unfit - 
 ness which is adopted for the sake of convenience. ' ' * 
 
 In other words, in effect, it is asserted by the Constitution and 
 Laws of nearly all the states, that the persons described have the 
 "capacity" required or are qualified for the exercise of the power 
 which the franchise gives, and by inference it would follow that those 
 not embraced by the conditions, which have been enacted into law, 
 have not the capacity and are in fact disqualified. This discrimina- 
 
 * From " An Elementary Treatise on the Structure and Operation of the National 
 and State Governments of the United States," by Charles Mason, A. M. 
 
REPRESENTATION. 13 
 
 tion places very great limitations on the definition of our system of 
 government as ' Government of the People, by the People, and for 
 the People." 
 
 Interpreted in accordance with our legislation this formula is now 
 accurately expressed as Government of and for all the People by those 
 declared to be qualified. The " Sovereignty of the People" in New 
 York and other states really means the Sovereignty of the Male 
 Citizens of the age of twenty-one years, who have been Residents in 
 their Districts and States, a certain length of time, are of Sound Minds 
 and have not Bribed or been Bribed at nor made Bets in Elections or 
 been convicted of an Infamous Crime. The phrase the "Sovereignty 
 of the People" then in an American community really means, what 
 may be expressed, as the Sovereignty of the " Qualified" Para- 
 phrasing Guizot's language slightly our theory then is that " represen- 
 tation is a means of collecting from all sides the scattered and incom- 
 plete fragments of the power of reason, justice and truth that exist 
 amorjg the 'Qualified ' voters, to concentrate them and collect them 
 into one focus and call them to the occupation of power." This 
 theory should include the right of the " Qualified " "to appear by an 
 agent" or representative, which Franklin declared "every body of 
 men who cannot appear in person had," and which those of us, whom 
 the law says are qualified to vote, somewhat vaguely and, as we will 
 try to show, often erroneously imagine we possess. The Sovereignty 
 of the Qualified is the theory, but under existing practice and the 
 present administration of affairs the result is often very different, and 
 as has been said a bare majority of those qualified to vote often less 
 "may prescribe the form and policy of the government, under which 
 all are held equally bound to render obedience. ' ' 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 To show how a minority may govern the a priori demonstration 
 given by Mr. Alfred Cridge of San Francisco in a little pamphlet on 
 Proportional Representation, will be given. In this he says : 
 
 ' ' It can be demonstrated, aside from any actual experience, that 
 under representation by districts, minorities, from one-third down (the 
 proportion growing less with the increased number of parties), can 
 return a majority of the members in elective bodies." 
 
 He then gives the following illustrations of this suppose three 
 constituencies or districts having 3000 voters each, select each a 
 member to a representative body, and that the voters in the different 
 districts are divided between the two dominant parties as shown in 
 the following table : 
 
 DISTRICTS. 
 
 VOTERS. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVES 
 ELECTED. 
 
 REPUBLICANS. 
 
 DEMOCRATS. 
 
 First 
 
 2,OOO 
 2,000 
 
 I,OOO 
 1,000 
 
 3,000 
 
 Republican. 
 Republican. 
 Democrat. 
 
 Second 
 
 Third 
 
 
 Total Votes 
 
 4,000 
 
 5,000 
 
 
 It is obvious that with such a division of voters that in the first and 
 second districts Republicans would be elected, and in the third a Dem- 
 ocrat. The total number of Republican voters in the three districts is 
 4000 while the Democrats number 5000 so that we would have the 
 anomaly and the injustice of having 4000 Republicans represented by 
 two members while 5000 Democrats have only one, and yet this may 
 
 14 
 
MISREPRESENTATION . 
 
 and does occur under our present system which is 
 pie that " the majority should rule." 
 
 Another illustration with seven districts each 
 is cited by Mr. Cridge : 
 
 '5 
 
 based on the princi- 
 
 having 7000 voters 
 
 DISTRICTS. 
 
 VOTERS. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVES 
 ELECTED. 
 
 REPUBLICANS. 
 
 DEMOCRATS. 
 
 First 
 
 3,000 
 3,000 
 3,000 
 3,000 
 7,000 
 7,000 
 7,000 
 
 4,000 
 
 4,OOO 
 
 4,000 
 
 4,OOO 
 
 Democrat. 
 Democrat. 
 Democrat. 
 Democrat. 
 Republican. 
 Republican. 
 Republican. 
 
 Second 
 Third 
 
 Fourth 
 
 Fifth 
 
 Sixth 
 
 Seventh 
 
 
 Total Votes. . . . 
 
 33,000 
 
 l6,OOO 
 
 
 In this case 33,000 Republicans would have only three represent- 
 atives while 16,000 Democrats would have/^r, that is less than a third 
 of the voters in the seven districts would elect a majority of the repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
 Mr. Cridge gives still another illustration of seven districts each 
 with 7000 voters but divided among three parties, as shown on page 16. 
 
 Here we again have 49,000 voters in seven districts. The Popu- 
 lists with 12,000 less than a fourth of the whole would get a ma- 
 jority of the repiesentatives, while the Democrats with 17,000 votes 
 get none. Mr. Cridge says : 
 
 ' ' It may be claimed that the cases represented are extreme. But 
 there are other factors, of which we have so far taken no cognizance, 
 that will still further increase disparities. It is practically impossible 
 for voters in a mass to control party management ; and a very small 
 minority in the party not only can, but do, not only do, but must, 
 
i6 
 
 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 
 
 VOTERS. 
 
 
 REPRESENTA- 
 
 DISTRICTS. 
 
 REPUBLICANS. 
 
 DEMOCRATS. 
 
 POPULISTS. ^ 
 
 TIVES ELECTED. 
 
 First . . 
 
 2,OOO 
 
 2,000 
 
 3,OOO 
 
 Populist. 
 
 Second 
 
 2,OOO 
 
 2,000 
 
 3,OOO 
 
 Populist. 
 
 Third 
 
 2,OOO 
 
 2,000 
 
 3,OOO 
 
 Populist. 
 
 Fourth 
 
 2,000 
 
 2,000 
 
 3,OOO 
 
 Populist. 
 
 Fifth 
 
 4,OOO 
 
 ^.OOO 
 
 
 Republican. 
 
 Sixth 
 
 4,OOO 
 
 ^.OOO 
 
 
 Republican. 
 
 Seventh 
 
 4,OOO 
 
 3,000 
 
 
 Republican. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Votes. .. 
 
 20,000 
 
 17,000 
 
 I2,OOO 
 
 
 control the nominations, so that the option (not choice) of the voter, 
 in most cases, is to vote for one man that does not represent him in 
 preference to voting for another that would misrepresent him. If his 
 party wins, he is therefore misrepresented ; if it loses he is misrepre- 
 sented." 
 
 It will thus be seen that the results of elections depend very much 
 upon how districts are divided. Politicians have not been slow to 
 avail themselves of this means of influencing and controlling the re- 
 sults of elections. Such division of districts, for the advantage of one 
 party over another, is an evil inherent in the present system of elect- 
 ing representatives, and has long been known as gerrymandering, and 
 is denned in Webster's dictionary as " the division (of a state) into 
 districts for the choice of representatives, in an unnatural and unfair 
 way, with a view to give a political party an advantage over its oppo- 
 nent."* 
 
 * The following description and illustration of the origin of this term is taken from 
 the American Law Review for January, 1872 : 
 
 "The term Gerrymander, as it is well known, dates from the year 1811, when 
 Elbridge Gerry was Governor of Massachusetts, and the Democratic, or, as it was then 
 
MISREPRESENTATION. 17 
 
 In the report on Representation Reform made to the United States 
 Senate in 1869, of which Mr. Buckalew was chairman, it was said : 
 
 " Single districts will almost always be unfairly made. They will 
 be formed in the interest of party and to secure an unjust measure of 
 power to their authors, and it may be expected that each successive 
 district apportionment will be more unjust than its predecessor. Parties 
 
 termed, the Republican party, obtained a temporary ascendency in the state. In 
 order to secure themselves in the possession of the government, the party in power 
 passed the famous law of Feb. n, 1812, providing for a new division of the state into 
 senatorial districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the Federalists 
 should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all natural and customary 
 lines were disregarded, and some parts of the state, particularly the counties of Wor- 
 cester and Essex, presented singular examples of political geography. It is said that 
 
 Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian Centinel an outline of the 
 Essex outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the county, added with his pencil a 
 beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, as shown in the engraving 
 exclaiming " There that will do for a salamander. " " Salamander," said Mr. Russell, 
 the editor, " I call it a Gerry-mander. " The mot obtained vogue and a rude cut 
 
1 8 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 will retaliate upon each other whenever possible. The disfranchise - 
 ment suffered through one decade by a political party may be repeated 
 upon it in the next with increased severity, but if it shall happen to 
 have power in the legislature when the new apportionment for the state 
 is to be made, it will take signal vengeance for its wrongs and in its 
 turn indulge in the luxury of persecution. ' ' 
 
 In a speech made in Philadelphia in 1867 he said what is probably 
 just as true now that ' ' at this moment, from the British possessions 
 on the northeast to the Golden Gate of the Pacific, there is probably 
 not an honest apportionment law for members of Congress, and you will 
 scarcely ever have one, unless in an exceptional case where one politi- 
 cal interest shall have control of the upper branch of a legislature and 
 another of the lower, holding each other in check, and compelling 
 some degree of fairness in the formation of law." 
 
 As Prof. Commons in a paper on this subject said, " public opin- 
 ion cannot stop the gerrymander, because public opinion rejoices in 
 this kind of tit-for-tat. The fact that one party has unfavorably cut 
 up the state is good reason for the other party to retrieve itself when it 
 gets the power. If Congress should take the matter out of the hands of 
 the state legislature, it would be simply to do its own gerrymandering, 
 while state and municipal gerrymandering would still go on as before. ' ' 
 
 But it is not alone by gerrymandering that injustice is done through 
 our present system of electing single members by a majority of votes in 
 each district. The literature on this subject is full of glaring examples 
 of unfairness and violation of the principle that a Majority of Qualified 
 Voters should Rule. 
 
 The language used by President Garfield in the course of a remark- 
 able speech before the House of Representatives, in 1870, in support 
 
 of the figure published in the Centinel, and in the Salem Gazette, with the natural 
 history of the monster duly set forth, served to fix the word in the political vocabulary 
 of the country. So efficient was the law that at the elections of 1812, 50,164 Dem- 
 ocratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven elected by 5 1, 7 66 Federalists ; 
 and Essex county, which, when voting as a single district, had sent five Federalists 
 to the Senate, was now represented in that body by three Democrats and two Fed- 
 eralists. It was repealed in 1814, and the death and burial of the monster were 
 celebrated in prose and verse throughout the country." 
 
MISREPRESENTATION. 19 
 
 of a motion for .the election of congressmen by the cumulative vote 
 has often been quoted. He then said : 
 
 " When I was first elected to Congress in the fall of 1862 the State 
 of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 25,000, but by the 
 adjustment and distribution of political power in the state there were 
 fourteen Democratic representatives upon this floor and only five Re- 
 publicans. The state that cast nearly 250,000 Republican votes as 
 against 225,000 Democratic votes was represented in the proportion 
 of five Republicans and fourteen Democrats. 
 
 " In the next Congress there was no great political change in the 
 popular vote of Ohio a change of only 20,000 but the result was 
 that seventeen Republican members were sent here from Ohio and 
 only two Democrats. 
 
 " We find that only so small a change as 20,000 changed the rep- 
 resentatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and five Republicans 
 to seventeen Republicans and two Democrats. 
 
 " Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a system 
 that may in theory and frequently does in practice, produce such re- 
 sults as these. ' ' 
 
 Again he said : * 
 
 " In my judgment it is the weak point in the theory of representa- 
 tive government as now organized and administered, that a large por- . 
 tion of the people are permanently disfranchised. There are about 
 30,000 Democratic voters in my district, and they have been voting 
 for the last forty years without any more hope of gaining a representa- 
 tive on this floor than of having one in the Commons of Great Britain." 
 
 In an Address to the Public, which the American Proportional 
 Representation League issued at the time the Proportional Representa- 
 tion Congress was held in Chicago last summer (1893), it is said : 
 
 ' ' Twenty-three years have been added to the forty and still the 
 Democrats of that district maintain the forlorn hope. Iowa with 
 219,215 Republican votes and 201,923 Democratic votes at the election 
 of 1892, sent ten Republican congressmen and one Democrat to Wash- 
 ington. Every 21,921 Republicans of that state has a representative, 
 while the whole 201,923 Democrats have but one. In Kentucky the 
 case is reversed. The Democrats have a congressman for every 17,436 
 
20 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 votes, while the Republicans have one for 122,308. In Maine the 
 vote was 65,637 Republicans and 55,778 Democrats, but the Republi- 
 cans got all the four congressmen. In Maryland the vote was 91,762 
 Republicans and 1 13,931 Democrats, but the latter got the six congress- 
 men. The Republicans of Texas have not had a representative in Con- 
 gress since 1882. The Democrats of Kansas have not had a representa- 
 tive since the state was admitted to the Union, though they have 
 polled from a third to two-fifths of the vote of the state during that 
 time." 
 
 To show further how the majority system works in practice an 
 ordinary district in the State of New York in which a member of the 
 legislature is to be elected may be taken as an illustration. We will 
 select the vote for member of Assembly at the election in 1892 in Herki- 
 mer county, New York, where 6140 Republican, 5629 Democratic and 
 402 Prohibition votes were cast. The Republican candidate of course 
 was elected, and the 6140 voters of that faith were represented, whereas 
 the 5629 Democrats and 402 Prohibitionists were unrepresented. That 
 is, the Republicans in that county had some one in the legislature to ad- 
 vocate those views and measures concerning which they differed from their 
 political antagonists, whereas the Democrats and Prohibitionists had 
 not. To show the relative proportion of the votes of the two parties 
 clearly the Republican vote is represented by the parallelogram or area 
 R in Fig. i , shaded with diagonal lines, and the Democratic vote by 
 the black area D. The Prohibitionist vote is shown by the small area 
 indicated by the letter P, and which is shaded by cross lines. The 
 horizontal length of these areas represents correctly to a scale the mag- 
 nitude of the respective votes. 
 
 In Montgomery county a similar condition of things existed, 5590 
 
 Fig. i 
 
 Democratic voters, represented by the shaded area D in Fig. 2, elected 
 three candidates, and 5587 Republican votes, shown by the black area 
 R, and 377 Prohibition votes, P were unrepresented. It will be seen 
 from the diagram and also from the figures that in this latter case the 
 Republican and Prohibition votes added together exceed those of the 
 
MISREPRESENTATION. 21 
 
 Democrats, so that a minority of the voters in this county elected the 
 candidate. 
 
 To show the extent to which the qualified voters in the State of 
 New York were unrepresented, after the election held in 1892, a dia- 
 gram, Fig. 3, p. 22, has been drawn, in which the magnitude of the 
 votes cast by the different parties in each district is represented by 
 parallelograms as in Figs, i; and 2. These are correctly drawn to 
 a scale, the successful votes being represented by the areas shaded with 
 single diagonal lines and the unsuccessful votes by the black areas. 
 The scattering votes are shown by the small areas, on the ends of the 
 black areas, and which, as in Figs, i and 2, are shaded by cross lines. 
 The relative proportion of the successful votes which are represented 
 in the legislature to the unsuccessful vote which is -not represented, 
 is thus shown graphically at a glance. 
 
 The total vote for members of the legislature in the city of New 
 York at that election was 277,835 of which the Democrats cast 170,352 
 and elected all the members of the assembly. Although the Repub- 
 licans had over 100,000 votes they had not a single representative in 
 the assembly, senate or in the board of aldermen in the city. 
 
 Numberless other examples of the injustice of our present system 
 of voting could be cited from elections in every part of the country. 
 
 As John Stuart Mill* has justly said, "democracy as hitherto 
 practiced is the government of the whole people by a mere majority 
 of the people exclusively represented. 
 
 " That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number 
 to the greater, is a familiar idea ; and accordingly, men think there is 
 no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur 
 to them that there is any medium between allowing the smaller number 
 to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller 
 number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, 
 the minority must of course be overruled ; and in an equal democracy 
 (since the opinions of the constituents, when they insist on them, 
 determine those of the representative body), the majority of the peo- 
 ple, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the 
 
 Considerations on Representative Government," American edition, p. 145. 
 
DIAGRAM SHOWING THE VOTE FOR ASSEMBLYMEN IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK IN 1892. 
 
 The areas shaded by diagonal lines represent the votes of the parties having a 
 majority or plurality in the different districts ; the black areas the votes of the minority 
 parties and the small areas shaded with cross lines the scattering votes. 
 
Fig. 4. 
 
 VOTE FOR MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN 1892. 
 
 In Illinois three Representatives are elected from each district and each voter can 
 cast three votes for such representatives. He can distribute these as he likes ; that is, 
 he can give all of them to one candidate, or one and a half to one and one and a half 
 to another, or one to each of three, and the three candidates in each district "highest 
 in votes" are elected. In the above diagram the areas shaded with diagonal lines rep- 
 resent the votes for tJic tiircc members who were elected in each of the different Districts. 
 The areas shaded witfi horizontal lines represent the votes for candidates who were not 
 elected, and the black areas tht scattering 7':Wv. 
 
24 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the min- 
 ority should have no representatives at all ? Because the majority 
 ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the 
 votes, the minority none ? Is it necessary that the minority should 
 not even be heard ? Nothing but habit and old association can recon- 
 cile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal de- 
 mocracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportion- 
 ately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always 
 have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors 
 would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, 
 they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, 
 there is not equal government of inequality and privilege : one part of 
 the people rule over the rest : there is a part whose fair and equal share 
 of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to 
 all just government, but above all, contrary to the principle of democ- 
 racy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation." 
 
 There is no other political maxim more firmly fixed in the minds 
 of Americans -and more implicitly believed in than " majorities should 
 rule," and yet it often happens, as it did in Seneca and in other 
 counties of New York in 1892, that a minority elects and the majority 
 are unrepresented. The same thing .occurred in the ist and 4th 
 districts in Albany, in Chemung, Clinton, Columbus, the 2d district 
 of Dutchess, the 6th of Erie, Greene, the i6th district of Kings, Mont- 
 gomery, both districts of Oneida, ist ofOnondaga, Ontario, Otsego, ist 
 district of Queens, ist district of Steuben, 2d district of Ulster, 3d of 
 Westchester and in Yates counties. It is true that the representatives 
 in the State of New York were elected by the aggregate majority of the 
 voters, but the black areas in the diagram show at a glance how large 
 a proportion of the votes in the State of New York were unrepre- 
 sented in the assembly after the election of 1892. 
 
 It must be remembered that the unrepresented were voiceless and 
 voteless in the assembly. Consequently the powers of government 
 were exercised by a majority of the members elected. These may and 
 often do represent the views and interests of only a minority of the 
 voters, so that democracy as it is now constituted often fails to accom- 
 plish its ostensible purpose. To quote again from Mill : 
 
MISREPRESENTATION. 25 
 
 ' < All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Sup- 
 pose, then, that in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, 
 there is a contested election in every constituency, and every election 
 is caused by a small majority. The parliament thus brought together 
 represents little more than a bare majority of the people. This 
 parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a 
 bare majority of itself. What guarantee is there that these meas- 
 ures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people ? Nearly half 
 the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no in- 
 fluence at all in the decision ; and the whole of them may be, a major- 
 ity of them probably are, hostile to the measure, having voted against 
 those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining electors, 
 nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have 
 voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and even prob- 
 able, that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a 
 minority of the nation, though a majority of that portion of it whom 
 the institutions of the country have erected into a ruling class. If de- 
 mocracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no 
 means of insuring that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell 
 equally in the summing up. ' ' 
 
 The principle that the majority of the qualified voters should rule 
 is not questioned. If all of them were represented in proportion to 
 their numbers, then a majority of the representatives would rule and 
 they would represent a majority of the qualified voters. Under exist- 
 ing conditions the majorities in our governing bodies often do not rep- 
 resent majorities of voters. 
 
 In his book on Proportional Representation the late Hon. Charles 
 R. Buckalew of Pennsylvania said: 
 
 " It may be assumed that the average rate of virtual disfranchise- 
 ment of voters in our contested popular elections is fully two-fifths of 
 the total vote. This startling fact is the first one to be considered, and 
 considered attentively, in any intelligent examination of the great sub- 
 ject of electoral reform in the United States ; for all schemes for the 
 amendment of popular representation in government must be insuffi- 
 cient and illusory, which ignore it or underrate its enormous signifi- 
 cance. For it means that popular elections are unjust ; it exposes the 
 
26 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 principal causes of their corruption, and it may instruct us, if we duly 
 consider it, concerning those measures of change which will most cer- 
 tainly impart health, vigor and endurance to our political institutions. ' ' 
 
 At present a majority in any district, although it be a majority of 
 only one vote may determine who shall represent the people in that 
 district. When parties are of about equal strength, as is nearly al- 
 w r ays the case in ordinary times in free republics, the really influential 
 vote is not that of the mass of the citizens of one or the other party, 
 but of a small faction, the "balance of power party" as it is some- 
 times called. In a very forcible article in the Nineteenth Century for 
 February, 1884, Mr. Robert H. Hayward calls attention to the baneful 
 consequences of this instability of the representation caused by the 
 shifting of small majorities in nearly balanced constituencies. He says : 
 
 < ' If the beam of a balance be supported at a point very near to 
 its centre of gravity, the shifting of a small weight determines its in- 
 clination to this side or that. The system of majority voting has an 
 analogous action ; it balances those of the electors who have serious 
 political convictions and hold them strongly the steady Liberals 
 against the staunch Conservatives ; and then, if their weights are 
 nearly equal, the inclination of the beam of the political balance is 
 entirely at the mercy of a small body of electors, whose political views 
 are determined at best by some ephemeral cry, some clever catchword, 
 some panic fear, or some class interest, or in too many cases by those 
 baser considerations which it may be hoped the Corrupt Practices Act 
 of last session will have done something to restrain. ' ' 
 
 This condition has been jocosely designated as the " Scales of In- 
 justice ' ' and has been represented by the following engraving * in 
 
 THE SCALES OF INJUSTICE. 
 
 * "Proportional Representation," By Alfred Cridge, San Francisco. 
 
MISREPRESENTATION. 27 
 
 which the " Balance of Power" is supposed to be adjuster by the 
 1 ' influence " of the " floating vote. ' ' In other words, elections in 
 districts, counties, cities, states, and even in the whole nation are at 
 times, and perhaps not seldom, decided by the most corrupt portion 
 of the voters in the community. Our municipal, state and national 
 government then become illustrations of the Sovereignty of Bribery, 
 Spoils and Patronage. As an English writer has said * " the tyranny 
 of the majority is a sufficiently serious matter ; but the tyranny of a 
 comparatively few variable, not to say venal, votes, is an unmitigated 
 evil." 
 
 The same author says still further in commenting on our institu- 
 tions : 
 
 " That government by a chance, or manipulated, majority of a part 
 of the people should not only claim to be popular in the true sense, 
 but should, practically, be recognized as such, tacitly, if not avowedly, 
 would seem to be an unavoidable consequence of American democratic 
 institutions. Whether unavoidable in fact, or, possibly, only an acci- 
 dent, such is the actual position of affairs. ' ' 
 
 Going on still further this writer says in explanation of this condition 
 of things : 
 
 ' ' But, surely, if the right of suffrage be the mark of sovereignty, 
 and that sovereignty be the prerogative of the people, then those who 
 possess the right also possess the sovereignty, and those to whom the 
 prerogative belongs must be the people. If the logic is faulty, the 
 conclusion remains true ; since the voters are, in the United States, to 
 all intents and purposes the people. That is to say, that their will as 
 expressed by their votes constitutes what is called popular govern- 
 ment. ' ' 
 
 The real difficulty is that under our present system the will of the 
 people does not secure full expression through their votes. Unpalatable 
 as it may be, many of us cannot help recognizing the truth in the fol- 
 lowing picture of our institutions, which has been drawn by this same 
 writer : 
 
 "This, then," he says, "seems to be, under present conditions, 
 
 * F. W. Grey, Westminster Review. 
 
28 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 the ultima ratio of American Popular Government. The People is a 
 term equivalent to the majority of the votes for the time being ; that 
 majority, from the nature of the case, since the masses greatly outnum- 
 ber the classes, must, in only too many instances, consist of those least 
 fitted to exercise the right of suffrage. They hold, at any time, and 
 under all circumstances, the balance of power, their interest, in any 
 given election, being confined to the strongest of all possible motives 
 self-interest. Moreover, being exploited by the professsional poli- 
 ticians, whose long and varied experience has taught them the full 
 value and utmost possibilities of such material, they are better organ- 
 ized than any other of the many elements that constitute the sovereign 
 people. That the professional politician, with unlimited money, per- 
 fect machinery, long training, and a sufficient supply of venal votes, 
 should be master of the situation ' boss the whole show ' is only the 
 natural effect of the adequate cause." 
 
 This incisive critic points out too that Government of the People, 
 by the People, and for the People has often come to mean Government 
 of the Politicians, by the Politicians, and for the Politicians and for 
 their privileged employes. He leaves the question whether these 
 evils be inseparable from democratic institutions or only accidents due 
 to local causes unanswered. It is though a very serious one to all 
 American citizens. To believe that these evils are inseparable from 
 our institutions is to despair of reform or improvement in our govern- 
 ment. 
 
 In the phraseology of Guizot " the grand concern of society is that 
 the power of reason, justice and truth, which is dispersed among the 
 individuals who compose society, should be collected from all sides and 
 concentrated into one focus and called to the occupation of power and 
 be organized into an actual government," and as that distinguished 
 author says " what we call representation is nothing else than a means 
 to arrive at this result, it is * * * but a natural process by 
 which public reason, which alone has a right to govern society, may 
 be extracted from the bosom of society itself. ' ' 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 And now as a writer in the Nineteenth Century* asks "what 
 does majority representation mean? It means " he answers "that 
 the majority shall have everything and the minority nothing. It 
 means that, whether the number of members to be elected by each 
 constituency be large or small, the whole of the representation shall be 
 monopolized by that party which polls one more than half the votes and 
 that party which polls one less than half the votes shall have no repre- 
 sentation at all. ' ' 
 
 Going back to the history of the evolution of civil liberty and what 
 do we find always that good government is a sequence to a fa'ir and 
 just representation of the people in the administration of public affairs 
 and the exercise of political power. Our misgovernment comes from 
 the fact that the people who are adjudged qualified to take part in 
 governmental affairs are not fairly represented. In the city of New 
 York every voter at elections must practically choose between two 
 candidates in voting for aldermen, members of the legislature or mem- 
 bers of Congress. He has no choice of nominees excepting for those 
 whom the politicians choose to give him. If the majority in his dis- 
 trict is against him he is left without a representative. This condition 
 of things is not peculiar to New York City or New York State but 
 exists nearly everywhere, and grows out of the system of electing, by a 
 majority of votes, single representatives from districts in cities, 
 counties and states. This condition of public affairs was described 
 with great clearness and force in the article on The Machinery of 
 Politics and Proportional Representation^ from which quotations have 
 already been made, and in which it is said : 
 
 *" Proportional vs. Majority Representation." By Albert Grey, M. P., in the 
 Nineteenth Century for December, 1884. 
 
 f This appeared in the American Law Review for January, 1872. The author- 
 ship is not known to the writer. 
 
 29 
 
30 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 "The unsatisfactory symptoms are everywhere much the same. 
 The character of the political machinery everywhere in use is such 
 that a great amount of preliminary work is needed to set it a going, 
 caucusing and canvassing, pulling of wires and greasing of wheels, 
 a work that from its nature must needs be performed by a small knot 
 of experienced workmen. It is inevitable that in this state of things 
 there should arise political ' rings, ' small coteries of political mana- 
 gers with every opportunity to control and direct the course of party 
 politics to their mutual advantage. Their injurious influence is felt 
 both by the public man and by the private citizen. Public life as a 
 career becomes practically closed to men of marked character and 
 independent views. The private citizen feels himself to be a tool in 
 the hands of his political advisers, and, finding the more obscure and 
 irksome of his public duties the attendance upon primary and nomi- 
 nating caucuses not only distasteful, but futile, abandons them in 
 disgust. Nor does he find more satisfaction in the exercise of the suf- 
 frage itself. Though nominally free to vote for whom he pleases,' the 
 knowledge that his vote is thrown away unless it is given for the 
 regular candidates, that is, that he may as well not vote at all as not 
 obey his political advisers, binds him hand and foot. He finds him- 
 self practically obliged to choose among candidates for none of 
 whom he probably cares a farthing, so that indifference to his more 
 public duties follows fast upon his distaste for the more obscure. He 
 soon cares as little to go to the polls as to go to the caucus. And 
 indeed he has everything to foster this indifference, for he knows that 
 if he belongs to the majority party his vote will probably not be 
 needed ; if to the other, that it will be of no avail. 
 
 ' ' But if the preliminaries of an election are thus injurious and 
 demoralizing both to public and private citizens, the results of an 
 election are a positive injustice. Our elections fail in their chief pur- 
 pose, that of furnishing a fairly representative body. It would seem 
 that a deliberative assembly, standing in the place of the whole body 
 of citizens, to discuss and decide in their behalf all matters of public 
 moment, should as nearly as possible resemble in its composition the 
 political community for which it stands, and that whatever varieties of 
 interest and opinion exist in the constituency should find adequate 
 
THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 31 
 
 expression among their representatives. The ideal method of elections 
 is certainly the one that would thus make the elected body a perfect 
 epitome of the body politic, giving to every political party large or 
 small, its fair share of members in the proportion of its numerical 
 strength. The fair and just system of representation would be a 
 system of proportional representation. 
 
 / " How far the present system of voting is from producing any such 
 results, and how unjustly and unfairly it works, is notorious. A politi- 
 cal contest is a struggle, not for a fair share of the representation, but 
 for the whole. The outvoted electors are reduced to political slavery ; 
 they have no voice whatever in public affairs. Their rights of repre- 
 sentation are taken from them, and are appropriated by their con- 
 querors. It is a war without quarter, and it is a contest in which the 
 sacrifices of the victors are hardly less serious than the losses of the 
 defeated party. Everything has to be yielded for the sake of victory, 
 and as eligibility becomes necessarily the prime quality in a candidate, 
 it naturally follows that, as we have said, men of mark give place to 
 men of no mark, and the representative assembly comes to be com- 
 posed for the most part of second-rate men, mere standard-bearers in 
 party warfare, hardly better known or more acceptable to the men who 
 voted for them than to their opponents. 
 
 " These evils, the disfranchisement of minorities and the con- 
 sequent tyranny of majorities ; the tyranny of political managers over 
 their followers, and the consequent helplessness and indifference of the 
 electors ; the tyranny of these same managers over public men, and the 
 consequent withdrawal from public life of men who are seeking an hon- 
 orable and independent career, these evils are co-extensive with rep- 
 resentative institutions, and are mainly attributed, by those publicists 
 who have undertaken to trace their causes, to the natural working of 
 an objectionable electoral machinery. The scheme of majority voting, 
 as almost everywhere practised, is not only vicious in principle, since 
 it excludes from representation a large fraction of the electors, but it is 
 so crude and defective in its operations that it needs, as we have said, 
 a special force of trained engineers to make it work at all. It is natural 
 that these men should make it work to suit themselves." 
 
 / In another article on Proportional Representation, published in 
 
32 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Putnam' s Magazine as long ago as June, 1870, the writer described 
 the evils of our present system of representation in the following 
 words : 
 
 ' l Our practice contravenes the fundamental principle of republican 
 government, which is that the majority must rule. This principle is 
 essential to the idea of such government. When the power resides in 
 all the citizens, the voice of the greater number must prevail, or the 
 minority will rule. This principle, carried to its legitimate result, re- 
 quires that every question shall be decided by the majority of those in 
 whom resides the ultimate power. As all citizens are equal in rights, 
 the consent of the larger number must necessarily overbear the consent 
 of the smaller number. * * * If the electoral machinery is such 
 as to express only the choice of a majority of the city's voters, the 
 minority is lost. In other words, all the persons concerned in a ques- 
 tion and having the right to decide it should be heard in person or by 
 representation. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
 "Under the false pretences of party, the elector is cheated or 
 seduced into voting for one of two men, neither of whom he likes or 
 would trust in the management of his private affairs. He is reduced 
 to a choice of evils, and he makes it under the pressure of party discip- 
 line. We all know that it is the custom for two conventions, suppos- 
 ing, as is generally the case, the division of the electors into two par- 
 ties, to select each a candidate, and for the voter to choose between 
 the two, or lose his vote altogether. This is the system in its best 
 estate, which supposes the primary meetings to contain only voters of 
 the party, and the delegates to be fairly chosen, and these in their 
 turn to discharge fairly their own duties of nominating candidates. 
 * * * But since there is no legal or- adequate provision for the 
 regulation of primary assemblies or nominating conventions, they are 
 in other districts carried by fraud or violence, so that it may be said 
 of not a few that the scheme then established is for two bodies of in- 
 competent or ill-intentioned men to put up each a man, and for the 
 rest of the community to take their choice between the two. 
 
 * * * * * 
 
 "A choice of bad men is, however not the only evil of the system. 
 
THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 33 
 
 The good men who find their way into our legislatures are crippled by 
 it. Their influence is weakened and their independence menaced. 
 When one of them opposes a favorite scheme of the party managers of 
 his district, he is sure to receive warning as well as a remonstrance. 
 Thus the representative and the constitutent are both demoralized. 
 
 ' ' These evils do not spring from a corrupt community. The ma- 
 jority of the people are not debauched. The fault lies in a vicious 
 electoral system, which produces a representation neither of parties 
 nor of the general public, \vhich constrains the majority, and stifles the 
 voices of large portions of the people. 
 
 ' * The importance of representation, or rather the evil of nonrepre- 
 sentation, is measured by the value of popular government. By leav- 
 ing a large number of citizens without voice in the state, we not only 
 lose the benefit of their counsel and cooperation, but we make them 
 discontented. The fraud and falsehood of the system beget other 
 frauds and falsehoods, and lower the moral tone of the whole commun- 
 ity. The vast power and patronage of government often depend upon 
 a few votes. Need we wonder that force and fraud should both be 
 used to procure them ? Parties are themselves deceived by their pre- 
 ponderance in legislatures, without considering how far it rests upon 
 a like preponderance out of doors. The opinions and wishes of large 
 portions of the people are disregarded. They see measures of great 
 significance adopted which they disapprove, but are powerless to pre- 
 vent, while they are unable to procure a consideration of others which 
 they think indispensable to the general good. If we can devise a 
 remedy, if we can by any means procure an electoral system, by which 
 the wishes of the whole people will be made known, and the votes of 
 their real representatives taken, on all measures of legislation, we shall 
 have saved the state from the danger which seems now to be impend- 
 ing over it. ' ' 
 
 The objections to elections by a majority were also presented very 
 clearly in an article by Mr. Leonard Courtney, published in the 
 Nineteenth Century of July, 1879. 
 
 These he said are that : ' ' You cannot trust any exclusive party to 
 act with justice to those who are wholly in their power, and whose cause 
 cannot be- pleaded before them. If the minority have not some one to 
 
34 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 speak up for their feelings and desires, the majority will act with injustice 
 towards them ; and this not so much from any set purpose to be unjust 
 as from the natural incapacity of men to understand the wrongs of 
 their neighbors. This is the case whether we consider the action of 
 employers towards workmen or of workmen towards employers ; of men 
 towards women ; and, if women were the rulers to the exclusion ot 
 men, no doubt it would be very much the same of women towards men. 
 No party can be trusted to exercise justice to an excluded party. No 
 one possesses the intelligence and imagination necessary before he can 
 put himself in the position of another so as to understand what another 
 wants. As the old proverb says, < No one knows how the shoe pinches 
 except him who wears it.' A man who wore sandals could not 
 very well understand the wants of the man who wore shoes. There 
 would, again, be no living connection between the ruling body and 
 the excluded body. There is no connection between the excluded 
 minority and the ruling majority. If men obtain no share in the 
 representation which constitutes the authority of a country, their po- 
 litical energies die away and disappear. They have faculties and 
 political feelings, but they assume a rudimentary character, they 
 become unenergetic, and so their energies entirely pass away. ' ' 
 
 The same writer described the effect of the present system on can- 
 didates by saying : 
 
 " Under the old plan the primary object is generally this : ' We 
 must have a man to keep the party together. We want a man who 
 will not lose the support of any section of the party. ' This last was 
 the great point held in view. You must keep the party together ; 
 therefore your candidate must have in him nothing that will drive 
 away any members of the party from adhering to the choice of the 
 few. In order to do that you must .have a man who will offend no- 
 body who will be far from all tendency to kick over the traces ; 
 Avhether in thought or in action, he must keep well within the party 
 lines. If he will vote steadily and pledge himself to support the leader 
 for the time being, he has the best chance of success. That is the way 
 in which the mass of members have been chosen, and candidates have 
 always been obliged to bear this in mind. The first duty of a candi- 
 date is to be prudent not to offend anybody to subdue his mind as 
 
THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 35 
 
 far as possible to the lowest level compatible with any life at all, and 
 to be careful not to disturb the prejudices of any section at all. That 
 is the necessity of getting a majority of any constituency. The result 
 is to produce a candidate with the gift of mediocrity. You would not 
 find a majority of your constituency to go together for a man who is 
 pronounced in his opinions, or in his character, or in the force of his 
 thought ; and the result is, that the strongest man has to be put aside 
 in order that the moderate man may be run, because the moderate man 
 has the best chance of winning. If this is anything like an accurate 
 representation of the facts, the result must be a degradation of the char- 
 acter of your candidates, and of your electoral body. If you get in- 
 different materials to work with, you cannot do good work ; and if 
 you send into the legislature such men as I have described, you will 
 not make a brilliant assembly out of them." 
 
 This picture is as true of practical politics in this country as it is of 
 the condition of public affairs in England which it was intended to de- 
 scribe. An American writer has pointed out that in- this country the 
 voter : u Though nominally free to vote for whom he pleases, the 
 knowledge that his vote is thrown away unless it is given for the regu- 
 lar candidates binds him hand and foot. He finds himself obliged to 
 choose arnong candidates for none of whom he probably cares a far- 
 thing, so that indifference to his more important public duties follows 
 fast his distaste for the more obscure (/. e. t attendance at primary 
 meetings and nominating caucuses). He soon cares as little to go to 
 the poll as to go to the caucus, and thus the political energies of large 
 sections of the community are condemned to atrophy and extinction, 
 for, unless men Imow that their vote can be made effectual, the right 
 to vote is hot appreciated, and the so-called privilege of citizenship 
 assumes 'in their opinion the appearance of a bitter mockery. ' ' 
 
 These evils are so great and are so apparent that many, who have 
 the true interests of their country, their state and locality very .much 
 at Heart often feel and speak oitterly and in a more or less despairing 
 torie of the future. Thus Mr. Simon Sterne in his book on Represen- 
 tative Government says : 
 
 "The process of creating a majority demoralizes most of those 
 who compose it ; it demoralizes them in this sense, that it excludes 
 
36 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 the action of their higher moral attributes, and brings into operation 
 the lower motives. They are compelled to disregard all individuality 
 and therefore all genuine earnestness of opinion ; to discard their po- 
 litical knowledge ; their deliberate judgment ; their calm and con- 
 scientious reflection, all must be withdrawn, or brought down to a 
 conformity with those who possess the least of these qualities. * * * 
 Wherever the majority is not held in check by a minority of almost 
 equal strength, it becomes a despotism and a despotism not founded 
 on the sentiments or traditions of a people can only perpetuate and 
 consolidate its power by intrigue and fraud. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Buckalew in a speech made in Philadelphia in 1869 said : 
 " Look at your existing political action and see whether it is not 
 a struggle for power instead of a struggle for justice ; whether it is not 
 a struggle by each interest to obtain all it can and retain all it can, 
 and to keep away from an opposing interest anything like a fair dis- 
 tribution of power or fair treatment. ' ' 
 
 That despair often takes the place of discouragement we all know 
 and perhaps sometimes feel, and when we hear of men as distinguished 
 as Dr. A. P. Peabody saying in a Baccalaureate Sermon at Harvard, 
 that " instead of a government by the people, we are threatened, if 
 the threat be not already fulfilled, with an oligarchy of demagogues, 
 for which a decent constitutional monarchy would be welcome," we 
 feel that there may be reason for anxiety for the future if not for de- 
 spair. Perhaps few of us have yet descended to the depths from which 
 Herbert Spencer has so recently renounced his faith in free institu- 
 tions, which, he says, " originally was strong (though always joined 
 with the belief that the maintenance and success of them is a question 
 of popular character), has in these later years been greatly decreased 
 by the conviction that the fit character is not possessed by any people, 
 nor is likely to be possessed for ages to come. A nation of which the 
 legislators vote as they are bid, and of which the workers surrender 
 their rights of selling their labor as they please, has neither the ideas 
 nor the sentiments needed for the maintenance of liberty. Lacking 
 them, we are on the way back to the rule of the strong hand in the 
 shape of the bureaucratic despotism of a socialistic organization, and 
 then of a military despotism which must follow it ; if, indeed, some 
 social crash does not bring this last upon us more quickly." 
 
THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 37 
 
 Matthew Arnold says : " Sages and saints are apt to be severe, it is 
 true ; apt to take a gloomy view of the society in which they live, and 
 to prognosticate evil of it. But then it must be added that their prog- 
 nostications are very apt to turn out right. Plato's account of the 
 most gifted and brilliant community of the ancient world, of that 
 Athens of his to which we all owe so much, is despondent enough. 
 ' There is but a very small remnant, ' he says, ' of honest followers of 
 wisdom * * * who have tasted how sweet and blessed a posses- 
 sion is wisdom, and who can fully see, moreover, the madness of the 
 multitude, and that there is no one, we may say, whose action in pub- 
 lic matters is sound. ' 
 
 " Perhaps you will say," Mr. Arnold continues, " that the major- 
 ity is sometimes good ; that its impulses are good generally, and its 
 action is good occasionally. But it lacks principle, it lacks persist- 
 ence ; if to-day its good impulses prevail, they succumb to-morrow ; 
 sometimes it goes right, but it is very apt to go wrong. Even a pop- 
 ular orator, or a popular journalist, will hardly say that the multitude 
 may be trusted to have its judgment generally just, and its action gen- 
 erally virtuous. It may be better, it is better, that the body of the 
 people, with all its faults, should act for itself, and control its own 
 affairs. * * * But still, the world being what it is, we must surely 
 expect the aims and doings of the majority of men to be at present 
 very faulty, and this in a numerous community no less than in a small 
 one. * * * Admit that for the world, as we hitherto know it, 
 what the philosophers and prophets say is true : that the majority are 
 unsound. Even in nations with exceptional gifts, even in the Jewish 
 state, the Athenian state, the majority are unsound. But there is the 
 remnant. Now the important thing as regards states such as Judah 
 and Athens, is not that the remnant bears but a small proportion to the 
 majority : the great thing for states like Judah and Athens is, that the 
 remnant must in positive bulk be so small, and therefore so powerless 
 for reform. To be a voice outside the state, speaking to mankind or 
 to the future, perhaps shaking the actual state to pieces in doing so, 
 one man will suffice. To reform the state in order to save it, to pre- 
 serve it by changing it, a body of wr jkers is needed as well as a leader 
 a considerable body of workers, placed at many points and operating 
 
38 THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 in many directions. * * * In our great modern states, where the 
 scale of things is so large, it does seem as if the remnant might be so 
 increased as to become an actual power, even though the majority be 
 unsound. Then the lover of wisdom may come out from under his- 
 wall, the lover of goodness will not be alone among the wild beasts. 
 To enable the remnant to succeed, a large strengthening of its numbers 
 is everything. ' ' 
 
 One of the main objects of the reform which is advocated in this 
 volume and which has been variously designated as minority represen- 
 tation, proportional representation and personal representation is to 
 give what Matthew Arnold calls ' ' the righteous remnant ' ' or the 
 minority a chance to succeed and to, exercise its due influence and 
 power. It, of course, would be optimistic to assume that minorities are 
 always righteous but it would be safe to assert, and be quite true, that 
 the righteous remnant is always a minority. What is proposed and 
 intended by minority representation is to give to each minority a share 
 of the members in the representative body proportional to its share in 
 the electoral body, along with such influence as it may be able to obtain 
 by the opportunity for statement and discussion of its opinions in the 
 legislative assembly. This ought not to be confounded, as it very 
 often is, with government by a minority. Its purpose and effect would 
 be to give a more perfect representation to every considerable aad 
 influential body of opinion in the whole electorate, and thus a more 
 perfect representation of all, and therefore of the real majority. Such 
 representation would include the ' ' righteous remnants. ' ' It would give 
 us a system under which the electors as a whole, and not merely a 
 majority, would be represented ; under which minorities would always 
 have a hearing, while the majority would be sure of their just prepon- 
 derance. 
 
 In this view of the case some reformers believe that a better method 
 of electing representatives for our national, state and municipal gov- 
 erning bodies may be, and in fact has been, found and adopted and 
 which will be explained. 
 
 It has been pointed out, and most voters have had occasion to 
 experience, that they have little or absolutely no power of choice in 
 the selection of candidates who are chosen. These to us<? the vernac- 
 
THE EVILS OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION. 39 
 
 ular of the practical politicians are " fixed " by the managers of the 
 political primary meetings and organizations in which the independent 
 voter generally can have little or no voice. In voting he must 
 nearly always accept one of two candidates in the nomination of neither 
 of whom has he had any influence. If he votes with the minority he is 
 at any rate so far as his opinions and interests differ from those of 
 the opposing party and its candidate unrepresented. 
 
 That such a system should fail ' l to call to the occupation of power 
 the scattered and incomplete fragments of reason, justice and truth 
 or " the righteous remnants" which exist in society ought perhaps 
 not to surprise us. Instead of government of and for the People by 
 those who are qualified it has given us in too many cases government 
 of all the People for and by Political " Bosses. " Free, FULL, and 
 JUST representation of the people, qualified to exercise political 
 power, is the fundamental principle on which all just republican gov- 
 ernment is dependent and it is by the adoption of this principle that 
 liberty has always been achieved and maintained. 
 
 There is abundant evidence to show that under our existing sys- 
 tem representation is not Free, nor FULL, nor JUST. How can we 
 secure more liberty in the choice of our representatives, how can we 
 have our own views and interests more completely represented, how 
 can we have fair play in elections ? 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 
 Those who have seen and felt the injustice and the evils of our 
 present method of electing representatives have proposed various ex- 
 pedients by which the evil may be, in a greater or lesser degree, miti- 
 gated. These schemes all have the one feature in common, that of 
 uniting or grouping neighboring districts together and electing more 
 than one representative from each of the consolidated districts. It 
 should be clearly understood that such an enlargement of districts by 
 consolidating a number of small ones, does not imply an increase in 
 the total number of representatives to be elected. It only means that 
 instead of electing one representative in each of say three small dis- 
 tricts that these districts shall be united so as to form one larger one, 
 and the three members will then all be elected from it, and each voter 
 will be given the privilege of voting for any or all of these different 
 candidates. The plan contemplates the consolidation of small dis- 
 tricts into larger ones, and apportioning the present number of repre- 
 sentatives among the enlarged districts. 
 
 Some method is then provided by which the voter can either vote 
 for a number of candidates or can concentrate his voting power on one 
 or two. 
 
 To make this quite clear it may be explained that in the State of 
 New York, and most other states, only one member of the legislature 
 is elected from each district. Usually there are then only two candi- 
 dates in each district, one Republican the other a Democrat, and often 
 neither of them fit men for the office, and not infrequently both dis- 
 reputable. Notwithstanding this the voter has no other choice he 
 must vote for either one or the other or lose his vote. 
 
 In the State of Illinois, to provide, in a measure, against these evils 
 what is called " cumulative voting " has been adopted. Under this 
 system the districts have been so formed that three members of the 
 
 40 
 
THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 41 
 
 House of Representatives are elected from each district and the con- 
 stitution of that state provides that " each voter may cast as many 
 votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected, or may 
 distribute the same, or equal parts thereof, among the candidates as he 
 shall see fit, and the candidates highest in votes shall be declared elect- 
 ed. ' * In other words a voter may cast three votes for one candidate, 
 or one and a half for one and one and a half for another, or one each 
 for three candidates. Representing three candidates by letters and the 
 votes by numerals, they may be given in any of the three following ways : 
 
 A 3 votes A i^ votes A i vote 
 
 B ij " B i " 
 
 C i " 
 
 These votes may, of course, be given to any candidates the voter 
 may select. To show the working of this, it will be assumed that in 
 some district of Illinois there are 9680 Democratic and 4920 Republican 
 voters. Having estimated their numbers before the election, the 
 Democrats knowing that they had a majority would nominate two 
 candidates and each Democratic voter could cast i ^ votes for each 
 candidate. They would then each receive 14,520 votes. The Republi- 
 cans being in a minority would nominate only one, and they would 
 each cast three votes, or ' ( plump ' ' for him, as it is called, so that he 
 would receive 14,760 votes. It will thus be seen that both parties in 
 this district were represented, the Democrats being in a majority elect 
 two candidates and the Republicans one. 
 
 The party having a bare majority can always, under this system, 
 elect two candidates, and if the minority have more than a fourth as 
 many votes as their antagonists they can elect one member. This 
 system thus gives not only a representation to both parties, under the 
 conditions named, but it also gives much greater freedom to the voters 
 than the old system of electing single members from the different dis- 
 tricts does, and it has therefore been very properly called by its chief 
 advocate, the late Senator Charles R. Buckalew, free voting. Its 
 freedom consists in this, that the voter can vote for any one or all 
 of three candidates, any or all of whom may be elected. Under the 
 ordinary system only one candidate can be elected in a district. 
 
42 THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 
 Next, if the voter ;has a- -preference for any candidate over others, 
 he can give all his votes for. the one, for two, or for three if he chooses. 
 It thus facilitates independent voting. -If unfit candidates are nomi- 
 nated, it gives very much greater opportunities- of success to a revolt- 
 ing, bolting or independent party, because the bolters can concentrate 
 their votes on one candidate. As has been explained, any candidate 
 may be elected if he. gets all the votes of more than a: fourth of the 
 voters. That is, by uniting a fourth of the voters -f- i in any district, 
 they can always elect a Representative, of their own. Thus in most of 
 the districts in southern Illinois, the Democrats have large majorities. 
 Under the ordinary system, of electing single representatives from each 
 district, the Republicans in that part of the state would not be rep- 
 resented, but under the method of cumulative or "free " voting, which 
 has been established in that state, if the Republicans in any district 
 have more than a fourth of the voters, they can elect a repre- 
 sentative. In the northern part of Illinois the reverse condition of 
 things exists. There the Republicans predominate, and if there was 
 no freedom of voting, most of the Democrats from that section would 
 be unrepresented. 
 
 The system of free voting thus gives both parties a representation 
 proportionate to their numbers. It has the advantage that it gives a 
 number of voters much smaller than a majority the power to elect their 
 own representative. In most sections of the country the labor party 
 has no representatives, for the reason that there are comparatively few 
 or no districts in which they have a majority of the votes. Under the 
 system of free voting which prevails in Illinois, if the party can control 
 more than a fourth of the votes in any district they could elect a can- 
 didate. The same is true of any other class of people. If those who are 
 most intelligent, who have been industrious, frugal and prudent, and 
 who have consequently accumulated property, and who pay the taxes, 
 fear God and love righteousness, desire a representative it is within their 
 power to elect one if they unite, and if they can control the requisite 
 fourth of the votes plus one or more. In other words, it gives any 
 class of voters exceeding one-fourth of all in any district, the power of 
 electing their own representative. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 The system of cumulative or " free ' ' voting which has been described 
 was adopted in the constitution of the State of Illinois, in 1870 and has 
 been in use ever since 1872. There has therefore been abundant op- 
 portunity of ascertaining its merits and demerits from practical experi- 
 ence. In order to get the testimony of persons in different parts of that 
 state who have had opportunities of observing, the working and the re- 
 sults of this system, a circular of inquiry was prepared by the writer 
 and sent to persons interested in public affairs in different parts of Illi- 
 nois. The following is a copy of that circular : 
 
 NEW YORK, November 25, 1893. 
 DEAR SIR. 
 
 A Convention has been called and delegates have been chosen at 
 the recent election in the State of New York for the revision of its 
 constitution. In view of this a number of persons in the city of New 
 York are considering the advisability of recommending the adoption 
 of provisions for some form of cumulative voting, for the election of 
 members ot our municipal and state legislative bodies, similar to the 
 system by which the members of the House of Representatives in the 
 State of Illinois are now elected. Under it, as you are doubtk&s 
 aware, three representatives are elected from each district and each 
 voter may cast as many votes for them as there are representatives to 
 be elected, which he may distribute as he likes. Some of the persons 
 here who are interested in this subject desire very much to get infor- 
 mation with reference to the practical working of cumulative voting 
 in your state, and it is with that object in view that this circular is 
 sent to you, and to others who have opportunities of judging of the 
 merits and demerits of the system referred to. You will be doing a 
 favor to some of the friends of good government and giving that cause 
 valuable assistance by answering the following inquiries and giving 
 any other information concerning the operation and effects of cumu- 
 lative voting in your state, which may throw light on that subject. 
 
 ist. Does the system of cumulative voting which has been adopted 
 
 43 
 
44 CUMULATIVE OR "FREE" VOTING. 
 
 in Illinois for the election of representatives to the legislature accom- 
 plish the object for which it was intended ; that is, does it give the 
 minority party in your district, whichever it may be, a representative 
 in the legislature? 
 
 2d. What effect does it have on the nomination of candidates for 
 office? In other words are better and more intelligent candidates 
 nominated and elected than were chosen under the old system of 
 electing one member from each district ? 
 
 3d. Is there any practical difficulty in the operation of the system, 
 either through the ignorance of voters, or of inspectors of election, in 
 counting the votes or in any other way ? 
 
 4th. Is there more or less opportunity under this than under the 
 old system* for bribery and corruption, false or erroneous counting ? 
 
 5th. It has been objected to this system that if a very popular man 
 is nominated that an undue proportion of the votes in his district may 
 be concentrated on him and that the remaining two candidates might 
 thus be elected by a small minority in your experience is this often 
 or ever the case? 
 
 6th. Do you consider the system a fair and just one, to all parties 
 concerned ; does it promote good government, or is the old system 
 now in use in all other states, of electing only one representative from 
 each district and giving each voter only one vote to be preferred ? 
 
 7th. Would it be advantageous to increase the size of the districts 
 so as to elect five, seven or more representatives from each, and give 
 the voter the privilege of casting as many votes as there are representa- 
 tives to be elected, and cumulate them as he chooses ? 
 
 8th. In your opinion would there be any advantage in adopting 
 the cumulative system for the election of members of Congress or mem- 
 bers of boards of aldermen in cities? 
 
 9th. Can you suggest any other system or method of electing rep- 
 resentatives which in your judgment would secure the election of better 
 men or improve legislation ? 
 
 loth. The parties making the inquiries request that you will add 
 below any further comments or suggestions as will aid them in getting 
 full and correct information concerning the advantages and disad- 
 vantages of cumulative voting, as it has been adopted in your state. 
 
 Name, 
 
 Sign here, 
 
 Address, _.. 
 
 Party Politics, 
 
CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 45 
 
 When replies to the above inquiries have been written enclose this 
 circular and mail it in the envelope addressed to 
 
 M. N. FORNEY, 
 
 47 Cedar St., New York City. 
 
 Copies of this circular of inquiry were sent to the editors of papers 
 in all parts of the State of Illinois, and additional copies were also en- 
 closed in stamped blank envelopes with the request to the editor that 
 he should address the envelopes to persons in his district who are in- 
 terested in public affairs, and who would likely give intelligent replies 
 to the inquiries. In all about 150 replies were received, which of 
 course represented a wide range of opinion and of varying degrees 
 of intelligence. 
 
 The answers to the first question : 
 
 Does the system of cumulative voting which has been adopted in Illi- 
 nois/or the election of representatives to the legislature accomplish the 
 object for which it was intended ; that is, does it give the minority party 
 in your district, whichever it may be, a representative in the legislature ? 
 were almost unanimous in the opinion that the system of cumulative 
 voting does give the minority party representation. The following are 
 a few of these answers received from Democrats, the residence of the re- 
 spondent being given in italics : 
 
 " It does. In my judgment it is one of the best laws ever en- 
 acted, and prevents dangerous majorities. Minorities always are rep- 
 resented." Dem. Mattoon. 
 
 ' ' Yes. And in every other district in the state, thus distributing 
 party representation throughout the state, instead of consolidating the 
 respective party representation in localities. ' ' Dem. Austin, Cook Co. 
 
 "Yes. It meets all expectations. There have been but two or 
 three instances in the whole State of Illinois since 1870, when the con- 
 stitution was adopted where any district has had more than two of the 
 three members of the House from the same party. ' ' Dem. Charleston. 
 
 ' ' It does almost always. Sometimes the minority is so small that the 
 dominant party in a district nominates and elects the entire number 
 required, but this happens infrequently." Dem. Chicago. 
 
 "We are here in the 47th Senatoral District ; since the cumulative 
 system of voting has been adopted the two leading parties (Democratic 
 
46 CUMULATIVE OR * ' FREE ' ' VOTING. 
 
 and Republican) have made it a practice to place only two candidates 
 each in the field. The Democrats are in the majority but the Republi- 
 cans never fail to secure one representative. ' ' Dem. East St. Louis. 
 
 "Yes, the majority party has found it impossible after several 
 attempts to elect their candidates. " Dem. Chester. 
 
 " Yes, except on extraordinary occasions." Dem. Monmouth. 
 
 " Yes, when the guess of the minority and the guess of the majority 
 in nominating conventions are correct." Dem. Chicago. 
 
 1 ( Yes, it gives one representative to the minority but sometimes at 
 the expense of the majority which is traded or bought. ' ' Dem. Flora. 
 
 "It does. Still when the vote between the parties is very close 
 each party having two candidates and three to be elected it results that 
 some popular candidate draws from his running mate and trie minority 
 party elects two of the three representatives. ' ' Dem. Carlyle. 
 
 ' ' Yes. We the Democrats always have our tickets printed i ^ votes 
 for each candidate and always nominate just two candidates and elect 
 them, only giving the Republicans one representative. " Dem. Carlyle, 
 Clinton Co. 
 
 ' ' Yes. It has very seldom been attempted by any one party to 
 elect all the representatives in a district and when tried it has failed. ' ' 
 Dem. Pontiac. 
 
 "'In -my district the minority party as shown by the election of 
 1892 elected two representatives and the majority party but one. This 
 was caused by the tidal wave of that year. The district when formed 
 was largely Republican and the Democrats named but one man, hence 
 the above result;" Dem. Evanston. 
 
 ' ' I can't say that it fully accomplishes the intended result. It 
 gives the minority party one representative, and at one election the 
 third party elected one man only once though. ' ' 'Dem. Havana. 
 The "folio wing replies were received from Republicans : 
 
 "Yes, as a whole. The longer it is in force the beher the people 
 understand ft and the smoother it works. * ' Rep. Coinns'tnlle. 
 
 "It does fully, and has never failed I believe in giving the minority 
 a representation/* Rep. Dixon. ' 
 
 " Ifi r -'al'l' districts where the minority party have one-third of the 
 votes-- they- seldom, or never, fail to get one iepresentative. I am in a 
 
CUMULATIVE OR "FREE" VOTING. 47 
 
 part of the old 34th district. We Republicans never failed to get one 
 member against an odds of 2000 majority." Rep. Havana. 
 
 "The minority in this district never has failed to elect a member 
 under our present system of legislative voting. I never have known it 
 to fail in any case in the state. ' ' Rep. Champaign. 
 
 ' ' It does except in districts where the minority party has less than 
 one fourth of the entire vote. " Rep. Ottawa. 
 
 "It does. This district is so strongly Democratic that without it 
 the Republicans could have no representative. As it is the Republicans 
 always elect one of the three representatives, thus the minority of our 
 district is heard. ' ' Rep. Beardstown. 
 
 1 ' It does. In this district the Democrats are very much in the 
 minority but by casting the three votes alone each voter (one for each 
 representative) for their own nominee he is elected. ' ' Rep. Elgin. 
 
 "Yes; and by reason of the temptation to plumping that is 
 cumulating three votes on one canditate it frequently enables the 
 minority party to elect two of the three members. ' ' Rep. Chicago. 
 
 "Yes. It always gives the. minority one and sometimes two. 
 All accidents result in favor of the minority, which not infrequently 
 elects two members because of an unequal division of the majority 
 vote between two candidates. ' ' Rep. Springfield. 
 
 " Under the cumulative system the minority party has always had a 
 representative, and sometimes two,- when there- -was more 'plumping' 
 on one side than on the other. ' ' Rep. Warsaw. 
 
 '-'It does. Sometimes, though rarely, it gives a third : and weaker 
 party a representative instead of the party second in- strength.-" Rep. 
 Bushnell. 
 
 " Yes, invariably. The Republicans might elect three, if every 
 voter cast one vote straight for each candidate, but they always concede 
 one candidate to the opposite party for prudential reasons. ' ' Rep. 
 Naperville. , 
 
 " It does, and may give two if the "stronger party do not put up 
 good men." Rep. Beardstouni. 
 
 " Yes, it does in every district in the state. At the first election- 
 held under the law there was one district so strong Republican that 
 they elected all three representatives." Rep. Effingham. 
 
48 CUMULATIVE OR "FREE" VOTING. 
 
 To show from the election returns what effect this system has 
 on an election in the whole state and to compare the results with those 
 in the State of New York the returns of the election of members of the 
 legislature in 1892 in Illinois have been plotted in a diagram, Fig. 
 4, p. 23, which is similar to Fig. 3, which represents the vote in 
 the State of New York, in the same year. Inasmuch as each voter 
 in Illinois has three votes, the votes cast for each candidate have been 
 divided by three in order that the diagram may be comparable with 
 Fig. 3, which represents the results of the New York election. 
 
 Before comparing the two diagrams a little further explanation is 
 needed. In those districts in Illinois in which the two prominent parties 
 are nearly equal, it happens often that each is sanguine enough to think 
 that they can elect two candidates to the House of Representatives, and 
 consequently they each put two in the field. As only three can be 
 elected of course one of the four must be defeated. This was the case 
 in the ist, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th districts. In each of the first two, 
 two Democrats were elected and one Republican, and in the third two 
 Republicans and one Democrat. In the ist and 2d districts a Repub- 
 lican was defeated in each, and in the third a Democrat. Now in the 
 first two it cannot be said that the Republicans were not represented. 
 They had one member for each district, but were not fully represented 
 according to their numbers. This is also true of the Democrats in the 
 3d district. The areas A, B, and C, Fig. 4, which represent the 
 votes cast for the unsuccessful candidates, are therefore shaded with 
 dark horizontal lines, and show the voters who were only partially 
 represented. The small black areas represent the scattering voters 
 who cast their votes for Prohibition, Populist and Labor party candi- 
 dates, none of whom were elected. 
 
 A comparison of the two diagrams, Figs. 3 and 4, the one rep- 
 resenting the vote in the State of New York under the old system of 
 single representatives from each district, and the other that in Illinois 
 under free voting, shows very distinctly the relative number of voters 
 who are unrepresented in the two states the black areas in both cases 
 indicating the unrepresented, or practically disfranchised, and the dark 
 areas in Fig. 4 those who were only partially represented. By com- 
 paring these two diagrams, the black areas show at a glance how very 
 
CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 49 
 
 much greater the number of unrepresented voters was in the State of 
 New York, under our present system of electing one representative 
 from each district, than it was in Illinois when three representatives 
 are elected by a system of free voting. 
 
 The observations of John Stuart Mill again serve our purpose best 
 in commenting on the kind of injustice which the diagram shows, 
 resulted from the election in New York. The only answer he says 
 "which can possibly be made is, that as different opinions predomi- 
 nate in different localities, the opinion which is in a minority in some 
 places has a majority in others ; and, on the whole, every opinion, 
 which exists in the constituencies obtains its fair share of voices 
 in the representation. * * * The constituencies to which 
 most of the highly educated and public-spirited persons in the 
 country belong, those of the large towns, are now in great part 
 either unrepresented or misrepresented. The electors who are on 
 a different side in party politics from the local majority are mis- 
 represented. Of those who are on the same side, a large propor- 
 tion are misrepresented, having been obliged to accept the man who 
 had the greatest number of supporters in their political party, though 
 his opinions may differ from theirs in every other point. * * * 
 Speaking generally, the choice of the majority is determined by that 
 portion of the body who are the most timid, the most narrow-minded 
 and prejudiced, or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class 
 interest." 
 
 In addition to what Mill has so forcibly said it may be added 
 that it is but a slight satisfaction for a Republican merchant or banker 
 in New York City, who is denied representation in the state legisla- 
 ture, to know that a rural member from St. Lawrence or Chemung 
 county, who belongs to the same party, will vote to levy taxes or 
 legislate on financial affairs for him ; nor will a Democrat in Catta- 
 raugus feel compensated for the defeat of his party in his own county, 
 by the knowledge that his views and interests will be looked after at 
 Albany, by a Tammany heeler from the slums of New York City. 
 Under a system of free voting the Republican merchant or banker of 
 New York could help to elect a member who would coincide with his 
 views and opinions and who would understand and could and would 
 
50 CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 
 
 represent his interests, and the Democratic farmer in Chautauqua could 
 help to send some one to the assembly who was sound on the oleo- 
 margarine and other rural questions. Free voting permits minorities 
 in all sections to be represented, and thus gives to every body of men 
 who cannot appear in the legislature in person, the right claimed by 
 Franklin, ' ' to appear by an agent. ' ' 
 
 From the almost unanimous testimony of many witnesses in all 
 parts of the states who replied to the circular which was sent to them, 
 and who gave their answers quite independently of each other, and 
 also from the returns of the state election in Illinois in 1892 which 
 have been plotted in Fig. 4 it is shown conclusively that the system 
 of cumulative or free voting which has been adopted in that state, does 
 give the minority party, in every district in which it has more than a 
 fourth of the votes, a representative in the legislature. As a matter of 
 fact there was not a single district in Illinois in 1892 in which one 
 party elected all three of the representatives, although that might and 
 has happened when the minority party had less than a fourth of all the 
 votes in some districts. 
 
 Whatever may be thought of the cumulative system it must be 
 conceded that through it minorities are represented. Is this a desirable 
 result or is it not ? 
 
 In a report to the U. S. Senate made on March 2, 1869, Mr. Buck- 
 alew from the Select Committee on Representative Reform said : 
 
 " By the free vote the whole mass of electors are brought into di- 
 rect relations with government, and particularly with that department 
 or branch of government which makes the laws. All will participate 
 really in choosing representatives, and all will be represented in fact. 
 Now, the beaten body of electors choose nothing, unless it be mortifica- 
 tion, and are not represented at all. For the theory that they are rep- 
 resented by the successful candidates against whom they have voted 
 that these candidates when installed in office represent them is plainly 
 false. An elected official represents the opinions and the will of those 
 who choose him, and not of those who oppose his selection. As to 
 the latter he is an antagonist and not a representative ; for his opinions 
 are opposed to theirs, and their will he will not execute. And this 
 must always be the case when political parties act upon elections and a 
 
CUMULATIVE OR "FREE VOTING. 51 
 
 majority or plurality rule assigns to one party the whole representation 
 of the constituency. ' ' 
 
 Testimony regarding the working of the system of free voting in 
 Illinois, which will be quoted later, make the following extract from a 
 report made to the British Parliament by Lord Cairns, to show the 
 advantages which would be gained by having minorities represented, 
 appear prophetic. In that report he said : 
 
 " You will have from the same constituency two members repre- 
 senting the majority and one representing the minority, communicating 
 freely with each other, and without the slightest tinge of jealousy or 
 apprehension that the interests of one would jar or conflict with the 
 interests of the other in the constituency. * * * Again, with 
 regard to the constituency itself and this is one of the most impor- 
 tant views of the case observe the advantages which would be gained : 
 First, I believe that you would gain the greatest possible local satisfac- 
 faction ; there is nothing so irksome to those who form the minority of one 
 of those large constituencies as finding that from the mere force of num- 
 bers they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power; 
 that it is vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs ; 
 that the elections must go in one direction, and that they have no po- 
 litical power whatever. On the one hand the result is great dissatisfac- 
 tion, and on the other // is disinclination on the part of those who form 
 the minority to take any part in affairs in which it is important they 
 should take a prominent and conspicuous part. ' ' 
 
 Mr. Calhoun, who was a profound student of our institutions and 
 who foresaw some of the dangers in store for us, said * : 
 
 " The right of suffrage is, indeed, the indispensable and primary 
 principle ; but it would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose, 
 as many do, that it is of itself sufficient to form constitutional govern- 
 ments. To this erroneous opinion," he adds, "may be traced 
 one of the causes why so few attempts to form constitutional govern- 
 ments have succeeded ; and why, of the few which have, so small a 
 number have had a durable existence. It has led not only to mistakes 
 in the attempt to form such governments, but to their overthrow, when 
 they have, by some good fortune, been correctly formed. So far from 
 *" A Disquisition on Government." 
 
5 2 CUMULATIVE OR ' ' FREE ' ' VOTING. 
 
 being of itself sufficient however well guarded it might be, and how- 
 ever enlightened the people it would, unaided by other provisions, 
 leave the government as absolute as it would be in the hands of irre- 
 sponsible rulers, and with a tendency, at least as strong, towards op- 
 pression and abuse of its powers. * * * * The dominant party 
 for the time," he repeats, "would have the same tendency to op- 
 pression and abuse of power which, without the right of suffrage, irre- 
 sponsible rulers would have. No reason, indeed, can be assigned why 
 the latter would abuse their power, which would not apply with equal 
 force to the former. The dominant majority for the time would in 
 reality, through the right of suffrage, be the rulers the controlling, 
 governing, and irresponsible power and those who make and execute 
 the laws would for the time in reality be but their representatives and 
 agents. ' ' And he proceeds to show that the abuse of the power which 
 would thus be acquired could only be counteracted by giving to each 
 division, or interest, through its appropriate organ, a concurrent vote. 
 
 The American Proportional Representation League, in an address 
 issued in the first number of its Quarterly Review says : 
 
 ' ' Thoughtful, earnest citizens are confronted with the fact that 
 wherever reform must be obtained through political action, that action 
 is delayed, if not prevented, by a system of representation which fails 
 to accomplish the purpose for which it was intended. The various 
 reformers, as they approach the law making bodies, whether they be 
 city councils, state legislatures or national congresses and parliaments, 
 find that that branch of 'government which should reflect in miniature 
 the whole country, instead mirrors the opinions of only a privileged 
 few. Though these reformers may number a considerable part of the 
 body politic, they find it impossible to secure representation in the 
 halls of legislature. 
 
 "The effect of this state of affairs has been to create a feeling of 
 recklessness on the part of some men and of apathy on the part of 
 others. Some propose to right their grievances by force ; others give 
 up the fight and withdraw from the field in disgust. All are prone to 
 despair when they realize the Herculean task of securing a hearing of 
 the so-called representatives of the people. ' ' 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 In propounding a system of free voting as a remedy for some of 
 the evils which have been described the objection is often made by 
 those who have little or no knowledge of any such systems that 
 they are all "theoretical," "impracticable," or "academic," and 
 are altogether unworkable, and as a climax to such arguments 
 those who use them call all who advocate any such system ' ' doc- 
 trinaires. ' ' Practical politicians and chronic objectors, who are igno- 
 rant of the fact that this system has been in successful use in Illinois, 
 and elsewhere, for more than twenty years, tell us with great assump- 
 tion of superior wisdom that such schemes are all very well in theory, 
 but in practice they will not work, and have a great deal to say about 
 ignorant voters, corrupt election inspectors, wily politicians and gen- 
 eral popular stupidity. Fractional votes are especially objected to, on 
 the ground that ignorant voters could not comprehend them, and that 
 stupid inspectors of election could not count them ; and that such a 
 system of voting would open the door to much corruption, and would 
 facilitate and lead to miscounting. For the reason that such objec- 
 tions are so frequently made and in order to get some testimony with 
 reference to the practical difficulties encountered in the operation of 
 the system, the third question in the circular of inquiry was pro- 
 pounded. This was as follows : 
 
 3d. Is there any practical difficulty in the operation of the system, 
 either through the ignorance of voters, or of inspectors of election, in 
 counting the votes, or in any other way ? 
 
 To this a very large majority of those who replied answered it 
 with a simple negative, and gave testimony that there was no practical 
 difficulty in the operation of the system, and only a very small pro- 
 portion of those who answered spoke of any trouble at all. The fol- 
 lowing are a few of the answers received : 
 
 " Was at first, as with all new rules, but none are now experi- 
 enced." Rep. Beardstown. 
 
 53 
 
54 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 " I think not. It is easily learned and used, and the inspectors 
 learn to count such votes readily. ' ' Rep. Naperville. 
 
 " None to speak of. Voters sometimes wish to change their votes 
 and ask for instruction. In my experience for eight years as a town 
 officer do not remember of a lost vote. ' ' Rep. Carrollton. 
 
 ' ' No ; the difficulties feared with regard to counting of votes under 
 the various systems proposed by reformers are about wholly imaginary. ' ' 
 Dem. Chicago. 
 
 11 No ; I have served on many boards no trouble at all." Dem. 
 Charleston. 
 
 " Not in this state. The tickets being printed thus if three repre- 
 sentatives, two on majority and one on minority. The majority tickets 
 give i *4 votes to each candidate, the minority 3 votes to its candidate. ' ' 
 Rep. Virden. 
 
 " None. ij4 votes each are placed on the ballots opposite the 
 majority candidates' names, and 3 votes opposite the name of the mi- 
 nority candidate." Rep. Manchester. 
 
 " None whatever. All understand it and everything works like a 
 charm. Tickets are printed i^ votes for A and B each and 3 votes 
 for C and thus there is no trouble. ' ' Rep. Joliet. 
 
 ' ' It has always been very simple at our place as the majority party 
 get two out of three representives, they print their tickets : 
 John Jones, i ^ votes. 
 Frank Link, i^ votes." 
 
 Rep. Paris. 
 
 " No difficulty in either point or in any respect. The central com- 
 mittee generally has one vote for each of three candidates printed on 
 the -ticket, i^ if two, or three votes if only one candidate." Rep. 
 Naperville. 
 
 " If strict party ticket is voted by electors, no difficulty. In off 
 years under the Australian ballot system some difficulty is experienced 
 by ' scratchers ' and there is the mischief to play often." Rep. East 
 St. Louis. 
 
 ' ' Under the Australian system the ignorant or timid voter votes the 
 ticket as printed, whereas if they had intelligence or confidence they 
 would plump on one candidate. Counting is no objection." Joliet. 
 
FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 55 
 
 " None upon which any opposition to the system could be based. 
 There is certainly some difficulty inasmuch as it taxes the attention of 
 election clerks more severely than a simpler system." Dem. East St. 
 Louis. 
 
 A few not exceeding a half dozen of those who have replied to the 
 inquiries in the circular say that there is some difficulty in working cumu- 
 lative voting with the Australian ballot system, or was, when the latter 
 was first introduced. A few more of the respondents say that some- 
 times inspectors of election have difficulty in counting up fractional 
 votes, but the general tenor of the testimony collected from all parts of 
 the state shows in the most indisputable way, that there is no practical 
 difficulty at all in the operation of this method of voting. It may be 
 "theoretical," it maybe "academic," and not in accord with the 
 tenets or interests of ' ' practical politics, ' ' nevertheless it works with 
 little or no friction, and it only needs the lubrication of the good will 
 of those who believe in justice and righteousness as principles which 
 should control the adminstration of government to make it work satis- 
 factorily anywhere. To those who recklessly stigmatize the system as 
 ' ' impracticable ' ' and ' ' unworkable, ' ' and who generally belong to 
 that large class of people who deem it superfluous to consider whether 
 any measure is right or wrong, wise or unwise before condemning it, it 
 may be said that twenty-two years of favorable experience with this 
 system, in a great state like Illinois, is strong testimony to prove that 
 at least it '^practicable^ and to the charge that it is "unworkable" it 
 may be answered that it does work and has worked successfully and sat- 
 isfactorily for nearly a quarter of a century, in communities differing as 
 widely in their characteristics as the rural districts of ' ' Egypt " * do 
 from the cosmopolitan society of Chicago. 
 
 To get the general opinions of people familiar with the working of 
 cumulative voting in Illinois, of the merits and advantages of that sys- 
 tem as exemplified by its operation in that state, the following question 
 was included in the circular of inquiry : 
 
 6th. " Do yoti consider the system (of cumulative voting) a fair and 
 just one to all parties concerned ; does it promote good government, or is 
 
 * The southern part of Illinois is jocosely called " Egypt." 
 
56 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 the old system, now in use in all other states, of electing only one rep- 
 resentative from each district and giving each voter only one vote to be 
 preferred?" 
 
 One hundred and thirty-six replies were received to the circular. 
 Of these 68 came from Republicans, 43 of whom were decidedly in 
 favor of the Illinois system of cumulative voting, 20 were opposed to 
 it and 5 were doubtful. Of the 58 Democrats who answered 43 were 
 in favor of, 9 were opposed to, and 6 were doubtful concerning its 
 merits. Four Prohibitionists were in favor and i opposed to it ; the 
 3 independents and 2 Populists were all in favor of it. The opinions 
 therefore as expressed by respondents to the circular, who were scat- 
 tered all over the state, were 95 in favor, 30 opposed to and n doubt- 
 ful about the merits of cumulative or free voting. 
 
 Quotations from some of the answers received to the question last 
 quoted will be a tolerably good indication of the opinions of people 
 in Illinois with reference to the advantages and disadvantages of the 
 system of voting and electing representatives in their state. A con- 
 siderable proportion of those who answered the question simply ex- 
 pressed their preference of the cumulative plan to the old method of 
 electing single representatives. The following replies will, however, 
 give some idea of how it is regarded by persons interested in the ad- 
 ministration of public affairs in that state : 
 
 " All things considered, it is a good system. It keeps both parties 
 alert in every corner of the state, and the minority gets its deserts 
 rather better than it otherwise could. " Independent. Chicago. 
 
 " It helps in that it prevents a big party majority. For instance, in 
 the Illinois senate Democrats have a good working majority. In the 
 House they have so little that the members must all attend. ' ' Mug- 
 wump. Decatur. 
 
 ' ' All are satisfied apparently with the law and its workings. ' ' Pro- 
 hibitionist. Bunker Hill. 
 
 1 ' It is better than the old plan, but not so effective nor just and 
 wise as the quota system would be. There are no objections to the Illi- 
 nois law that could not be remedied by an extension of the idea, so as to 
 give minority parties representation in law-making bodies, and at the 
 same time do entire justice to majorities." Populist. Joliet. 
 
FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 57 
 
 " In my opinion it is the best and fairest system ever devised to 
 obtain a representation of all parties. I was a member of the Consti- 
 tutional Convention which adopted the minority plan in 1870, and I 
 have also served as a member of the state senate in 1877 and 1879, 
 and have had an opportunity of seeing the practical working of the 
 scheme, and I have found that the best members of the lower house 
 were formed of the minority members, and that the best character of 
 the legislation was favored by them and enacted into laws through their 
 efforts and influence. Through them corrupt legislation and the efforts 
 of the ward politicians of cities, of the majority party who break into 
 the legislature by party strength can be checkmated and prevented. ' ' 
 Dem. Carmt. 
 
 " I think our system a fair one and that it is here to stay. The 
 cumulative system of voting has the distinct advantage of being an ob- 
 stacle in the way of gerrymandering and other schemes of professional 
 politicians." Dem. Havana. 
 
 1 1 I think our way the better. It is a good law because it permits 
 the minority party to have a representative to look after their interests 
 and introduces measures beneficial to that party. // causes the masses to 
 take more interest in legislation and this is the only hope of our country. 
 Every party should be able to invite investigation. ' ' Dem. Jerseyville. 
 
 1 ' I have had doubts on the subject, but I believe I would not favor 
 a change from the present mode. By cumulative voting both parties 
 in each district are pretty certain to be represented in the legislature, 
 so that the whole people of each district is more likely to take an interest 
 in the legislature than if a portion of such people had no representative 
 of their political faith. The representatives themselves will be in con- 
 sultation with the people and work up this interest which I deem ben- 
 eficial. People like to consult representatives of their own political 
 faith." Dem. East St. Louis. 
 
 " I prefer the cumulative system as used in this state. Our several 
 tickets are printed on one sheet of paper, Dem., Rep., Peo. and Pro. 
 A voter can cast three votes for any of the candidates, or can vote one 
 vote for three candidates, or one-and-a-half votes for two candidates. 
 In my opinion it is an excellent system or method of voting. ' ' Dem. 
 Augusta. 
 
58 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 ' ' We think the system a fair one and to be preferred to the old 
 system. In districts close politically each party is compelled to select 
 wisely as to men and to urge an equal divide in voting, or suffer for 
 failure to do so. In other districts poor material and the conduct and 
 result of campaign cannot be said to be improved by our Illinois 
 method." Dem. Murphysboro. 
 
 ' ' I think it is the best system that can be adopted all things con- 
 sidered. In this state it gives the minority a chance to be heard in 
 the legislature and if they but send good men then they can accomplish 
 much. I am decidedly in favor of the system as in vogue here and 
 would not consent to a change back to the old way. We certainly get 
 as good and as intelligent representatives, and in every district in the 
 state the system gives the minority party an opportunity to be repre- 
 sented. My advice is to adopt it in every state." Dem. Joliet. 
 
 11 1 consider the system fair and better than the old system. I 
 have had a great deal of actual experience in cumulative voting, hav- 
 ing been elected to our General Assembly five times. It gives both 
 parties a representative from all sections of the state. It insures the elec- 
 tion of better men, as they are compelled to run over a large district, 
 and must of necessity be men of standing at home and acquaintance 
 abroad. It is usually the unpopular candidate on the ticket that runs 
 ahead, as he may induce his friends to cast three votes for him, while 
 the popular candidate will urge an equal division of the votes. ' ' Dem. 
 McLanesboro. 
 
 " It is fair and just as far as it goes, and an improvement on the 
 old system and is better than the old, but it makes party lines too 
 close. We do not get a perfectly representative body. The ' quota ' 
 system gives a perfect representative body and in addition does away 
 with the gerrymander. ' ' Dem. Elgin. 
 
 ' ' I think the system fair and // operates to make a change of control- 
 easier to accomplish" Dem. Decatur. 
 
 "I prefer our system as it insures the minority a representation 
 large enough to criticise with effect. ' ' Dem. Alton. 
 
 " It is a most fair system to all, and much preferable to the old 
 method. Get a copy of the Illinois law and adopt it as it is together 
 with the Australian system of voting." Dem. Mattoon. 
 
FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 59 
 
 " Yes ; I think the minority system is the better, for under it nei- 
 ther party ever obtains an overwhelming majority in the le^islat-re. 
 Its merit is that each party has nearly the same representation in the 
 General Assembly, the majority for either being small." Dem. Austin, 
 Cook Co, 
 
 " I consider the system a fair one for all parties, as it gives all a. 
 chance to secure representatives in the legislature." Dem. Chester. 
 
 " It is a good plan in the right direction not perfect but to be 
 progressed. The old system is certainly not to be preferred. All the 
 people should be represented in all legislative assemblies. The system 
 as to minority representation and cumulative voting in Illinois has 
 produced good results and is in the right direction, though not yet 
 perfect in details of operation." Tariff Reform Dem. Chicago. 
 
 " I like the minority plan. Its sole merit is that it gives all the 
 people everywhere a representation, that it more nearly voices the 
 people than the majority plan." Dem. Carlyle. 
 
 ' ' Yes ; prefer the Illinois system, think it promotes good govern- 
 ment." Dem. Pontiac. 
 
 ( ' I can conceive of nothing better or fairer in the way of repre- 
 senting the people in the popular branch of a state legislature, and 
 think it far better than the old one of electing one member from each 
 district. One advantage, in my opinion, is the tendency to lessen the 
 expenditure of money in the canvass preceding election. To some 
 extent this expenditure is made in the primary canvass, but the evils 
 resulting from it are not nearly so great or perceptible. ' ' Dem. Jack- 
 sonville. 
 
 ' ' I feel sure that I am right in saying that the voters of our state 
 would not consider a proposition to change the law. After a trial since 
 1870, I feel sure that it is universally satisfactory. There is always a 
 good minority representation, which is surely a good thing for the 
 people." Dem. Monmouth. 
 
 ' ' The system is fair, and is to be commended more on account of 
 giving all classes representation than for any other cause." Dem. 
 Metropolis. 
 
 " Think it somewhat to be preferred, as giving minorities in cities 
 and counties a hearing. It does not greatly change political com- 
 
60 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 plexion of our legislature, but parties have representatives from all 
 parts of the state, instead of from the strongholds only." Dem. 
 Quincy. 
 
 1 ' I consider the system far superior to the old and believe that the 
 people are thus better represented. ' ' Dem. Macomb, 
 
 " Yes ; it makes the parties careful to nominate stronger men, than 
 they would if one party had a big majority, and yet very shallow men, 
 as a rule, run for the House." Dem. Charleston. 
 
 1 ' I think that this system combined with the Australian ballot sys- 
 tem gives the people an opportunity to choose the best men nominated 
 regardless of party politics. Any man with an objectionable record, 
 placed in nomination by either party, would be minus votes at the final 
 count of ballots. Dem. East St. Louis. 
 
 The following are answers received from Republicans. 
 
 " It is eminently fair and just to all parties, and tends to promote 
 good government because it gives all views of respectable following a 
 chance to be heard, and, from a non-partisan view is to be preferred. 
 It insures a fair representation of the minority in spite of gerrymander. 
 In the districts where the strength of the parties is not equally 
 divided and the strength of neither party will justify placing three 
 candidates on their ticket, the majority party usually nominates two 
 and the minority but one candidate ; the fight having been settled 
 in the primaries. If nearly even, each party puts up two and the 
 unpopular or unfit candidate must go. The same when the strength is 
 such that one party puts up three and the other two candidates, thus 
 forcing the selection of good men. Put up a good man and a bad one 
 on the same ticket, if his party gives the good one three votes it will 
 defeat the bad one." Rep. Carmi. 
 
 " There is room for more than one opinion here, but as a general 
 thing the plan is satisfactory. I think the objections to the plan come 
 from the majority party as the law works to the advantage of the min- 
 ority, giving them better representation." Rep. Shelbyville. 
 
 " I consider the system fair and just and has a tendency to promote 
 good government. I know that it is better than the old system. ' ' Rep. 
 Altamont. 
 
 " The system is beneficial locally in eliminating partisan bitterness. 
 
FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 6 1 
 
 As all three of the candidates are sure of election there is no tempta- 
 tion to make a fight against them. ' ' Rep. White Hall. 
 
 * ; The system seems to work well in our state, since we have got 
 used to it. Take a large section of country where heretofore one party 
 took all. It is now divided which seems to give better satisfaction. 
 Rep. Paris. 
 
 " I think the present system in Illinois is far preferable to the old 
 system, as in this portion of the state we never had a Republican rep- 
 resentative under the old system, but now always have. So when per- 
 sons have business before the legislature they have some .one of their 
 own party to transact their business. ' ' Rep. Effingham. 
 
 " We like our system very much indeed." Rep. Elgin. 
 
 11 Generally I consider that the cumulative system is productive of 
 the best results. Everything considered, in my opinion, the cumula- 
 tive system, as used in this state is the best that could be adopted. ' ' 
 Rep. Lockport. 
 
 "After twenty years of experience I heartily endorse minority rep- 
 resentation. If in a district of 20,000 voters the majority is 200 the 
 two majority men would represent 10,200, the one minority man 
 would represent 9800 voters. I think it is the best system, as far as I 
 have had opportunity to observe that has ever been in practice, for it 
 makes no difference how large a majority there is the minority is sure 
 of a representative."* Rep. Brooks, Madison Co. 
 
 ' ' I think the cumulative system is as fair a way as an assembly can 
 be chosen. I much prefer it to the old way of electing members. ' ' 
 Rep. Urbana. 
 
 ' ' I am confident that the system works generally to the satisfaction 
 of our people. ' ' Rep. Moline. 
 
 "I like the system, think it the best. Its tendency is good it 
 causes thought and care in presenting candidates. ' ' Rep. Beardstown. 
 
 " The system is fair and just. I have never heard a wish among 
 intelligent men to return to the old system. ' ' Rep. Dixon. 
 
 " The system is a good one. I believe in minority representation 
 and this secures it. It is a great improvement over the old system. 
 
 * A minority must have more than a fourth of the votes to be sure of a representa- 
 tive. 
 
62 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 Because I have the power in belonging to a majority party is no reason 
 why I should disfranchise my neighbor who belongs to a minority 
 party." Rep. Joliet. 
 
 "I consider our system a very just one, from the fact that the 
 minority party has from all parts of the state a representation, and 
 small and independent parties have the same chance as in other sys- 
 tems. " Rep. Carrollton. 
 
 " The cumulative system is good because it induces party organi- 
 zation in each district ; hence each side is more or less watched. Also 
 it gives representation to all shades of opinion from every part of the 
 state. The more country representatives in the legislature the better. ' ' 
 Rep. Beardstown. 
 
 " I have served in the Illinois senate over forty years ago in the 
 same district with Abraham Lincoln in which he was elected to the 
 House during my term. The system is eminently fair and just, es- 
 pecially to minorities, insuring representation to parties that are in bare 
 minority, and double representation to the majority." Rep. Havana. 
 
 ' ( Yes ; I think it is preferable to the old system, for the reason 
 that the minority party has a representative from each district. ' ' Rep. 
 Virden. 
 
 " I much prefer our present system. I consider the same fair and 
 just to all parties concerned. In our legislative district (which is 
 largely Republican) we elect a Republican senator and two Republi- 
 can representatives, while the Democrats elect 'one representative. If 
 it were not for our present system the Democrats would not be rep- 
 resented in our district at all. The Republican convention nominates 
 two and the Democrats one representative. The reverse of this is true 
 in Democratic districts. ' ' Rep. Naperville. 
 
 " Yes, it is fair and just and it makes a better government, as the 
 majority is more careful in making laws, as the majority necessarily is 
 small and the minority keeps them in check. It has given entire satis- 
 faction in our state, and I regard it as a big improvement over the old 
 plan." Rep. Bushnell. 
 
 ' < I prefer the minority system. It is good from this point of view ; 
 the parties are more evenly balanced or divided in the legislature and 
 it renders them more careful in legislation." Rep. Alton. 
 
FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 63 
 
 " When the system was adopted the southern half of Illinois was 
 decidedly Democratic and the northern counties were just as pro- 
 nounced Republican. On that account the cumulative system was 
 particularly beneficial, as it gave both sections a better representation 
 than under the old system. ' ' Rep. Dixon. 
 
 1 ' Objections to the system come only from strong partisans who 
 belong to the majority party and who want everything in the way of 
 office which they can get. Until something better can be devised we 
 had better cling to this and extend it as widely as possible. ' ' Rep. 
 Joliet. 
 
 ' ' It seems to me the tendency of the system of cumulative voting 
 is an educational element it gives power to the weak, hope to reform, 
 clips the wings of party domination, gives the minority a voice in 
 legislation and has a tendency to put better men before the people. ' ' 
 Rep. Beardstown. 
 
 From the testimony which has been presented it may then be fairly 
 claimed for the system of voting adopted in Illinois : 
 
 1. That it gives voters three candidates to choose from, all of 
 whom can be elected, instead of only one as in the old method of elect- 
 ing single representatives from each district. In other words it gives 
 more freedom and independence in the choice of candidates. 
 
 2. It secures representation to minorities, which include more 
 than a fourth of the voters in a district, and who unite on a candidate. 
 
 3. There is little or no difficulty in the practical operation of 
 the method of voting, either on the part of the voter in giving all his 
 votes to one candidate or in dividing them equally between two 
 or three candidates, or in counting the votes when thus divided. 
 
 4. It is an obstacle in the way of, and lessens the evils and chances 
 of gerrymandering. 
 
 5. It leads the people generally to take more interest in public 
 affairs, because all can have a part in legislation and the conduct of the 
 government. 
 
 6. It makes a change of representation easier to accomplish and 
 " clips the wings of party domination." 
 
 7. It gives a minority in the legislature large enough to criticise 
 with effect and influence and hold in check the action of the majority, 
 
64 FREE VOTING IN ILLINOIS. 
 
 and by dividing the representation more equally, makes all more care- 
 ful in making laws. 
 
 8. It is claimed that the minority representatives are generally abler 
 and better men than those elected by the majority, but the testimony 
 relating thereto is conflicting and to some extent contradictory. 
 
 9. By giving a more just representation to the two or more parties 
 in each or most districts it lessens party bitterness. 
 
 These results are certainly of very great importance in promoting 
 good government. The advantages gained thereby will be more 
 fully discussed later on. There is however an obverse side to this as 
 there is to all questions, which will be referred to in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 Experience in Illinois has indicated some objections to the system of 
 cumulative voting as adopted and practiced there and while the prepon- 
 derance of public sentiment is strongly in its favor it is not unanimous. 
 Each voter as has been explained, has three votes and can give all 
 three of them to one candidate or i ^ to one and i^ to another or i to 
 each of three. He must designate on his ticket how his votes are 
 to be distributed. This distribution is generally determined by an 
 estimate of the strength of the parties by the party managers. If it is 
 thought that either party has a decisive majority, that party usually 
 nominates two candidates and the other nominates one. If the parties 
 are nearly equally divided they each nominate two. In the former 
 case, the nomination is generally equivalent to an election. In the 
 last if either party has more votes than its opponents and if those votes 
 are equally divided between its two candidates they will both be 
 elected. Thus suppose the Republicans have 3637 votes and the 
 Democrats 3636 and the former nominate A and B as candidates and 
 the democrats nominate C and D now if the Republicans all cast 1 1^ 
 votes for A and i^ for B they will each have S4SS/4 votes. If the 
 Democrats do the same thing for C and D they will each have 5454 
 votes, and both Democrats will be elected and one Republican. If 
 however two of the Republicans should ' ' plump ' ' for A that is give 
 all three of their votes to him then A would have 5458^ votes, 
 B 5453J/2, C5454, and D 5454. Consequently A and Cand D would 
 have the highest vote and B would be defeated. In other words only 
 one of the Democrats and both of the Republicans would be elected. It 
 will thus be seen that where there is any doubt about which party has 
 the largest vote a candidate may secure his election easier by taking 
 votes from and defeating his colleague than to get them from his op- 
 ponent. It therefore may become and often is a contest between 
 colleagues instead of between political antagonists. That this actually 
 does occur is abundantly shown by the replies received to our fifth en- 
 quiry which was as follows : 
 
 65 
 
66 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 5th. // has been objected to this system that if a very popular man is 
 nominated that an undue proportion of the votes in his district may be 
 concentrated on him and that the remaining two candidates might thus be 
 elected by a minority in your experience is this often or ever the case ? 
 
 A Republican correspondent graphically describes what sometimes 
 occurs under the circumstances. He says : 
 
 * ' When a district is very nearly equal in political strength but two 
 men are usually nominated on each side. A very popular candidate is 
 liable to gather votes from his running mate, and thus put them so far 
 apart that their two adversaries will run in between them, especially if 
 they are well matched and run well together or in a bunch, and it hap- 
 pens in every campaign in this state, that a majority candidate is 
 slaughtered, and although it seldom affects the result politically, for 
 the reason that such accidents come to both sides, yet it leads to bad 
 blood and open accusations of bad faith. 
 
 " The system puts a nominating convention on its good behavior 
 Avhen it comes to nominating candidates. They must see to it that 
 their candidates are well yoked and well matched for running ; for to 
 win they must keep neck and neck. If the city population preponder- 
 ates in the district it is poor policy to put a city and country candi- 
 date in the same team. A stampede would put the farmer far in the 
 lead. In a manufacturing district a labor man with a farmer or a law- 
 yer or merchant makes a poor team to manage. A churchman and 
 a sport won't work. A kid and an old man is no better. A native 
 and a naturalized person is sure defeat for one or the other in a close dis- 
 trict. In making nominations the convention must find pairs with 
 respect to all the usual and ordinary elements entering into a hot polit- 
 ical campaign. A candidate that runs too far ahead is just as danger- 
 ours to his party as the man who runs far behind, which is not the 
 case in the old system. Under the latter the man runs ahead does so 
 at the expense of his adversary, but under the cumulative system it is 
 at the expense of his colleague. His best friends and admirers, politi- 
 cally, plump three votes, which takes ^ from his colleague and that, 
 too, when it is not necessary to elect him, The fear that he might get 
 left induces his friends to plump, just to keep him abreast with his col- 
 league. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING, 67 
 
 "A great deal of plumping is done in every election, but if it is 
 caused by natural causes, such as location, trade, profession, nation- 
 ality, color or social standing, the candidates come out even if they 
 both are on an equality and evenly matched. If both are from the 
 country or from the city, each will receive about the same number of<* 
 plumpers in his locality. If both are mechanics the labor unions will, 
 divide fairly between them. If both are German, Irish, or natives, 
 their several clans will deal fair with them. 
 
 ''Whatever advantage or disadvantage there is in the system, it 
 will accrue to both parties alike; and I can't see why if one party 
 should be for it the other should be against it. 
 
 "The weak point in the system is that it breeds suspicion, jeal- 
 ousy, and bad blood between the candidates, and sometimes leads to 
 an open rupture among political friends. With two candidates on a 
 side and only three seats to fill, one candidate will be left. Undue 
 zeal or popularity on the part of one may defeat his colleague. A 
 stampede which both sides are working for may produce the same re- 
 sult." Rep. Ottawa. 
 
 Other correspondents confirm this testimony, as will be seen from 
 the following answers received to the 5th question : 
 
 " Probably the greatest objection to be urged against the system is 
 1 plumping,' which sometimes defeats one of the majority candidates, 
 as it is found both could have been elected if the voting had been 
 fair." Dem. Henry. 
 
 "The difficulty in the cumulative voting is that the friends of can- 
 didates will ( plump, ' and thus it has happened that the majority 
 party would only elect one out of three, by the friends of the success- 
 ful candidates plumping, who would thus receive many more votes 
 than enough to elect." Rep. Moline. 
 
 "One of my objections is that it hinders a fair stand-up fight be- 
 tween parties and candidates. It is as frequently as not a fight between 
 two candidates on the same ticket rather than between candidates on 
 opposing tickets. It is easier for a candidate to gain his election at 
 the expense of his colleague than at the expense of the opposing party. ' ' 
 Dem. Freeport. 
 
 " It has frequently happened that the majority party, with plenty 
 
68 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 of votes to elect its two candidates, has elected but one, because his 
 friends ran him far ahead to make it appear that he was very popular, 
 or for other personal reasons, and the party entitled to but one repre- 
 sentative secured two. * * * In the close districts, where each 
 party names two candidates, its working is always uncertain and leads 
 to attempts at all kinds of trickery. In the safe districts the majority 
 party never names more than two candidates, and thus insures their 
 election, and the minority usually names but one, so that the voters 
 really have no choice, as these then are sure to be elected. ' ' Rep. 
 Springfield. 
 
 11 The plan in Illinois has been the means of provoking a great 
 deal of ' bad blood ' between the friends of a successful candidate and 
 those of one who was defeated on the same ticket, resulting in fre- 
 quently giving the minority two representatives. Again with two can- 
 didates in the field, one a good and capable man, the other incapable 
 and perhaps disreputable, the disposition of party leaders is to make a 
 hard fight for the latter, who is deemed the weaker, in order to save 
 party supremacy, and not infrequently with the result that the good 
 man is defeated and the unworthy candidate elected." Rep. Warsaw. 
 
 " I think it has become the universal custom in Illinois for each 
 party to nominate but two candidates and in this and other counties, 
 where one party is in a hopeless minority, it is a growing custom to 
 nominate but one, as the fight between two men on the same ticket, 
 when only one of them can be elected, leads to divisions and feuds 
 which weaken the whole ticket. ' ' Rep. Springfield. 
 
 "A popular man overbalances his running mate and thus gives to 
 the minority party two out of three representatives ; sometimes the best 
 electioneerer causes the same result. ' ' Rep. Warsaw. 
 
 " The popular man is most likely to ' get there ' by a large major- 
 ity ; the less popular may be left entirely or merely slip in. The cen- 
 tral committee tries to regulate that but does not always succeed." 
 Rep. Naperville. 
 
 ' ' This sometimes is the case and to my notion is the worst feature 
 in the system." Rep. Alton. 
 
 " Yes, this occurs rather frequently and is the real objection to the 
 system. Selfish men use it to their advantage and a popular candi- 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 69 
 
 date will, by no fault of his own, defeat his colleague on the same 
 ticket." Rep. Springfield. 
 
 ' ' The massing of the vote on one candidate may and does, often 
 defeat a worthy colleague. ' ' Rep. West McHenry. 
 
 ' ' In some instances the friends of a candidate will become scared 
 and ' plump ' three votes for him, defeating his running mate. ' ' Rep. 
 Moline. 
 
 " When the district is considered to be close, then the temptation 
 of the candidate's particular friends to 'plump' for him is strong. 
 By this means the minority sometimes secures two members." Rep. 
 Chicago. 
 
 " Often a good man on the majority side is sacrificed by ' plump- 
 ing ' for the other candidate on the ticket with him. ' ' Rep. Cham- 
 paign. 
 
 " More opportunity I think as the plumping of three votes for one 
 candidate may elect the worst one of four candidates. ' ' Rep. Austin. 
 
 11 When the vote between the parties is very close, each party hav- 
 ing two candidates and three to be elected, it results that some popu- 
 lar candidate draws from his running mate and the minority party 
 elects two of the three. ' ' Dem. Carfyle. 
 
 "It is usually the unpopular candidate on the ticket that runs ahead, 
 as he may induce his friends to cast their votes for him, while the pop- 
 ular candidate will urge an equal division of the votes. ' ' Dem. Me 
 Leansboro. 
 
 11 It has quite frequently occurred that the best man of one or the 
 other party was defeated by his competitor on the same ticket who 
 urged his friends to give him three votes as he otherwise would be 
 beaten." Dem. Freeport. 
 
 11 ' Plumping ' three votes for one man is common. I have known 
 two members of the minority party to be elected in a district because 
 a candidate of the majority party pulled to himself more than his share 
 of the party vote. " Ind. Chicago. 
 
 "In 1890 in two districts of this state, the i2th and i6th, which 
 were very close the Democratic party lost one candidate in each district 
 because both the leading parties had nominated two candidates each 
 and one of the candidates got his friends to ' plump ' for him and he 
 
70 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 ran away ahead, while the other man with him was defeated when the 
 two combined had many more votes than the two Republican candi- 
 dates. " Dem. Havana. 
 
 1 ' It is not unusual for the minority to get two of the representatives 
 because of the more popular man on the majority ticket running ahead 
 of his mate. This is liable to happen in close districts. ' ' Rep. 
 Pontiac. 
 
 " This has happened once in this, the 4yth district." Dem. Belle- 
 ville. 
 
 ' ' This is often the case, and then when the man comes up for re- 
 election every one says, well, so and so is all right, see how many 
 votes he got at the last election we will just help the weak man, and 
 I have known the really strong man to be defeated in the endeavor to- 
 elect both men it has happened in this district several times. ' ' Rep. 
 East St. Louis. 
 
 " I have seen this same trouble in our district several times." Rep. 
 Waukegan. 
 
 " There is danger of this unless great precautions are taken by party 
 managers. This has occurred here. ' ' Rep. Elgin. 
 
 " This happened in Iroquois orKankakee county in 1890." Dem. 
 Peoria. 
 
 " When a third party has a candidate it sometimes happens that one 
 of the two majority candidates plays the other false and through his- 
 'workers' has three votes cast straight for himself and the third 
 party man may slip in instead of his majority party colleague. ' ' Dem. 
 Shelbyville. 
 
 " Not often, but is sometimes; not always because the man is popu- 
 lar, but that he is active, and works. This is a very serious objection 
 to my mind. ' ' Rep. Moline. 
 
 " This is an objection undoubtedly." Dem. Carthage. 
 
 11 Does not give third and fourth minority candidates a chance. It 
 is very unsatisfactory in its results because very often good men are de- 
 feated by too many votes being cast for one man of the two usually 
 nominated by the two old parties. * * * The only practical diffi- 
 culty is that a voter cannot tell when he is casting more votes than a fav- 
 orite candidate needs. ' ' Pop. Jo lie t. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 7 1 
 
 That the direct evils resulting from " plumping " however are not 
 very serious is indicated by the fact that in 1892 there was but one dis- 
 trict (Fig. 4, p. 23) in which a minority party elected two representa- 
 tives and the majority only one. This occurred in the sixth district, 
 when the Democrats cast 61,637 votes and elected only one representa- 
 tive, and the Republicans with only 5 1,685 votes elected two. It will be 
 noticed that correspondents mention some other cases which occurred 
 at other elections, but such instances appear to be comparatively infre- 
 quent, and about two -thirds of those who answered the inquiry say- 
 that it seldom or never occurs that the minority party in a district 
 elects a majority of the representatives. One Populist in Joliet says : 
 " It has happened three or four times in fifteen years." The worst 
 evil resulting therefrom is probably the sense of injury or injustice 
 produced in the minds of persons with a strong feeling of party fealty 
 or allegiance. As one of the correspondents says : "It breeds sus- 
 picion, jealousy and bad blood between the candidates, and sometimes 
 leads to open rupture among political friends." Others say: "It 
 leads to all kinds of trickery" ; and " to divisions and feuds which 
 weaken the whole ticket." The instance mentioned by the corre- 
 spondent from Warsaw indicates how a good man may be sacrificed by 
 party leaders for another candidate who is incapable and perhaps un- 
 worthy. The whole matter is summed up by the correspondent from 
 Joliet who says that ' ' the only practical difficulty is that a voter can- 
 not tell when he is casting more votes than a favorite candidate needs." 
 and another points out that the Illinois system " gives the minority 
 party representation when the guess of the minority and the guess of 
 the majority in nominating conventions are correct." 
 
 Any element in a system of electing representatives which makes 
 the results depend even to a limited extent on correct guessing or 
 chance will not commend itself to those who want good government. 
 It will be shown later on that the uncertainty in the working of cumu- 
 lative voting due to such causes would be very much greater if the 
 number of representatives to be elected from each district was 
 increased, so that more than three were elected in each district. The 
 reason for increasing the number by enlarging the districts will be 
 pointed out later, but without doing so now it will be apparent that if, 
 
72 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 say seven representatives are elected from each district, voters would be 
 more perplexed to know whether to give all their votes to one canjdi- 
 date or divide them between two, three, four or more, than they would 
 be if only three are elected, when usually the only question to be de- 
 cided is whether to give all their votes to one man or divide them 
 between two candidates. If this difficulty of cumulative voting could 
 be overcome the perplexity of the voter and the objection which has 
 been made to the system, that there is an element of uncertainty and 
 some chance involved in the result, would both be obviated, and by 
 removing the fortuitous feature the voter could exercise his privilege 
 with more knowledge and freedom. 
 
 It sometimes happens though that the character of a man or a 
 measure are indicated by the enemies he or it makes. The opposition 
 to cumulative voting may possibly be indicative of its merits as well as 
 of its demerits. The testimony elicited by the circular of inquiry may 
 perhaps throw some side light on the subject. Thus a Republican 
 says : 
 
 " I think the objections to the plan come from the majority party 
 as the law works to the advantage of the minority, giving them better 
 representation." Rep. Shelbyville. 
 
 Another Republican from Rock Island says : 
 
 < ' From the standpoint of minority representation it is very satis- 
 factory ; from a partisan standpoint it is an advantage to the Demo- 
 cratic party, as it gives them a larger representation in the House than 
 they would otherwise have. The northern two-thirds of Illinois is 
 mainly Republican and the southern end ( ' Egypt ' ) Democratic, and 
 the larger population is north. ' ' 
 
 ' ' I think the system a fairly good one. Objections to it come only 
 from strong partisans who belong to the majority party and who want 
 everything in the way of office which they can get. ' ' Rep. Joliet. 
 
 As Illinois is ordinarily a Republican state it can perhaps be under- 
 stood why some persons of that faith are inclined to oppose a system 
 which lessens their political influence and power. To those who are 
 inclined towards the side of justice and righteousness, in the ad- 
 ministration of political affairs, the objections of these opponents of 
 cumulative voting become arguments in its favor. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 73 
 
 But it has also been objected to the Illinois system that under it 
 it is difficult if not impossible for third or independent parties to elect 
 candidates. The following is some of the testimony of correspondents 
 with reference to that point : 
 
 "Our system is called minority representation but never but once 
 has a third party candidate been elected from this, Will county, in 
 twenty years." Populist. Joliet. 
 
 " From the standpoint of the two parties it does, but when a third 
 party is a factor, unless aggregating a given number of votes it does 
 not, I think." People's Party. Abingdon, Knox Co. 
 
 * ' I believe that the quota system in some form would improve 
 matters and at least give the minorities, now virtually disfranchised, a 
 voice in government. " Prohibition. Geneva. 
 
 In the election in Illinois in 1892 not a single third party member 
 was sent to the House of Representatives, although the Prohibitionists 
 had 24,684 votes and the People's Party 20,108 out of a total of 
 72,948. The quota which should have elected a member of the 
 legislature was 5705, so that if those parties could have concentrated 
 their votes the one could have elected four and the other three mem- 
 bers. There is no report that any candidate was elected in opposition 
 to the two dominant parties. It will thus be seen that in Illinois there 
 is only a limited amount of freedom in voting. The remedy for this 
 and some of the other evils which have been pointed out is to increase 
 the size of the districts and the number of representatives to be elected 
 from each, as will be more fully shown farther on. 
 
 Another objection to the system of cumulative voting, in use in 
 Illinois, has been pointed out by persons familiar with its operation in 
 that state. The following quotations bearing on this objection are 
 given from the answers received to the circular of inquiry. A Demo- 
 crat in Chicago says : 
 
 "The party in majority usually puts up two candidates, the 
 minority one, very rare that either puts up three. Under these con- 
 ditions the nomination settles the election the people practically 
 have nothing to do with the matter. Instead of giving the voters more 
 control of the legislature the opposite result is achieved in so far as any- 
 thing is accomplished which is not considerable." Dem. Chicago. 
 
74 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 ' ' The certainty of election which follows the nomination as made 
 under this system, leads, sometimes I fear, to the election of ' machine 
 politicians ' by small political rings. ' ' Dem. Chicago. 
 
 ' ' A nomination is often looked upon as being equivalent to an 
 election, and the result is inferior men are frequently elected. If the 
 district is very close and two men are nominated by each of the two 
 leading parties good men are usually named by both. ' ' Dem. Evan- 
 ston. 
 
 " There is no contest here only for the nomination. After that the 
 successful candidate has nothing to do but pay his share of the campaign 
 expenses. ' ' Dem. Hillsboro. 
 
 ' ' A nomination under this system is equivalent to an election, and 
 nominations are fought for by men who would not dare run under the 
 old system." Dem. Jacksonville. 
 
 " The only objection is that in districts where there is a large 
 majority either way that nominations on both sides are equivalent to 
 election, because the dominant party will nominate two and the minor- 
 ity one, and of course all are elected." Rep. Havana. 
 
 " The effect on the nominations and the elections is BAD, the two 
 candidates of the majority party and one from the minority are gener- 
 ally elected no matter who they are nor how they got the nomination. ' ' 
 Dem. Freeport. 
 
 ' ' The nomination of the minority candidate being equivalent to 
 an election, thus the people in convention seeking to put its best men 
 forward. ' ' Rep. Virden. 
 
 " It does not secure better men, but perhaps the reverse, for the 
 nominations being equivalent to election are more likely to be con- 
 trolled by rings and politicians and there is no incentive to put forward 
 the best men. This is especially true of the minority. ' ' Rep. Pontiac. 
 
 " In nine cases out of ten nomination is equivalent to an election 
 and it is only necessary for candidates to pack the caucuses when they 
 can bid defiance to the voters. " Prohibition. Geneva. 
 
 ' < Since a nomination is under ordinary circumstances equivalent 
 to an election it becomes a chase of the politicians for nomination." 
 Rep. Mali tie. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 75 
 
 ' ' A political ' boss ' secures a minority nomination and prevents 
 a second nomination by his party, thereby insuring his own election 
 without contest. Unless party pressure is strong nominations are made 
 of three candidates for three offices, the whole being cut and dried." 
 Ind. Chicago. 
 
 11 Nominations nearly always mean election and the result is evil.' ; 
 Rep. Jacksonville. 
 
 ' ' In a district where nomination means election it might be easier 
 to ' get there ' by corrupting the convention than by corrupting the 
 people. Yet it has not been our lot to be troubled by corruption in 
 the convention or elsewhere so far as I know. ' ' Rep. Naperville. 
 
 ' ' In this district nomination is equivalent to election. Two Re- 
 publicans and one Democrat being sure of election other minority 
 parties have no chance." Dem. Elgin. 
 
 ' ' There is no more opportunity for bribery and corruption and less 
 occasion, since there are usually only three candidates nominated all 
 of whom are sure of election. ' ' Prohib. Geneva. 
 
 The evil indicated in the testimony which has been quoted it must 
 be admitted, is a serious one, but is one which might have been and 
 was anticipated by those who had studied the subject carefully. The 
 reason for this will be apparent if it is observed that more than a fourth 
 of the voters under this system can always elect a candidate, if they 
 concentrate their votes on him, no matter how their opponents may use 
 their votes and the latter if they have a bare majority, by dividing their 
 votes equally betwe'en two candidates can always elect them both. 
 Consequently under ordinary circumstances, the party in the majority 
 would nominate two candidates, and the minority would nominate one. 
 If either should nominate more they would endanger the success of their 
 ticket. Therefore, if by means of party organization, or other means 
 the proportion of the voters named can be influenced, so as to 
 give their votes for the respective party tickets, then the two nominees 
 on the one ticket and the one on the other would be sure of election. 
 If the parties are nearly equally divided then each would probably 
 nominate two candidates. One of them would of course be defeated. 
 With three candidates all of them will be quite certain to be elected. 
 With four only one will be defeated. 
 
76 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 Is the evil which has been pointed out by our respondents in Illi- 
 nois and was foreseen by Mr. Sterne, and others, inherent in the sys- 
 tem of minority representation or is it only a defect in the method 
 adopted in that State which is remediable ? The tyranny from which we 
 are all suffering, majorities, minorities and individuals alike, is that 
 of parties, party managers, caucuses, " machines " and " bosses." Ap- 
 parently the voters in Illinois have in some respects but little more free- 
 dom from party domination than voters have where cumulative voting 
 does not prevail. 
 
 To ascertain what influence, if any, the Illinois system of cumula- 
 tive voting exerted in the selection of men for office the following 
 question was propounded in the circular of inquiry : 
 
 2d. What effect does it (the Illinois system) have on the nomina- 
 tion of candidates for office ? In other words, are better and more in- 
 telligent candidates nominated and elected than were chosen under the old 
 system of electing one member from each district ? 
 
 About two-thirds of those who replied said that they could not see 
 that it had any influence on the selection of candidates, or that better 
 men were selected now than under the old method of electing single 
 members from each district. About a quarter of the respondents said 
 there was a decided improvement in the character of the candidates 
 nominated, and about a tenth of the replies expressed the opinion that 
 the men chosen for representatives under the present Illinois system 
 were worse than those who were formerly selected. 
 
 The following are some of the optimistic answers : 
 
 ' ' The minority candidates are usually more capable men than were 
 selected under the old plan. ' ' Rep. Wtiite Hall. 
 
 " In my opinion it has so operated. The nomination of the minor- 
 ity candidate being equivalent to an election, thus the people in con- 
 vention seeking to put its best men forward. ' ' Rep. Virden. 
 
 ' ' This system perhaps has the effect of giving us better men than 
 the other, but the best men do not go to the legislature tinder either 
 system." Rep. Springfield. 
 
 11 In close districts it has a tendency to make the party which or- 
 dinarily has the small majority nominate two strong candidates for 
 fear one may be beaten. While stronger candidates are not always 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 77 
 
 better and more intelligent in the long run they probably would be. ' ' 
 Rep. Springfield. 
 
 " In the rural districts I am satisfied we get better candidates as a 
 rule that is, the minority does. ' ' Rep. Shelbyville. 
 
 <( In this particular, no effect, except where the majority is small." 
 Rep. Quincy. 
 
 "The minority party generally puts up a good man. Having 
 lived in a locality a long time where the majority party takes every- 
 thing, if the minority get a chance they generally select the best ma- 
 terial, as it is their first opportunity to get a man in." Rep. Paris. 
 
 " It compels good nominations in all districts where the minority 
 party has more than forty per cent, of the vote. A poor nomination 
 by either side would lose a seat to the majority, and it would destroy 
 all chance of winning a seat to the minority." Rep. Ottawa. 
 
 " The action of the law compels parties to be very careful in their 
 nominations and usually the best of men are selected for candidates. ' ' 
 Dem. Matt oo ?i. 
 
 "Usually so. The most available candidate is sometimes selected 
 but usually the best and most intelligent are put forward." Dem. 
 Joliet. 
 
 " If it has any effect at all on nominations its tendency is to bring 
 out the best from each party, as a nomination, except in very close dis- 
 tricts, where four are made, is about equivalent to an election, and this 
 fact tends to make the contest for nomination more active, thus inter- 
 esting a larger number of people in the respective parties." Dem. 
 Jacksonville. 
 
 "The minority party generally sends a good man the majority, if 
 small, usually selects two popular men fearing the other party will nom- 
 inate two and elect. In such cases there is some improvement over the 
 other system. ' ' Rep. Havana. 
 
 " I think we select better men. The reason is that we have a larger 
 territory to select from." Rep. Effingham. 
 
 "I believe that the minority party of a district is more apt to nom- 
 inate a better man than under the old system. It certainly has no bad 
 tendencies in that regard." Rep. Dixon. 
 
 " Without doubt better men are nominated. The parties cannot 
 
78 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 afford to put up a bad man as the independent vote would reach him. ' ' 
 Rep. Collinsville. 
 
 " I have not perceived that it causes any better or more intelligent 
 men to be nominated than under the old system. The minority mem- 
 ber, however, is frequently an able man, and superior to the majority 
 members of his district in ability and intelligence. ' ' Rep. Chicago. 
 
 " Yes ; especially is this true of the minority candidates, and gen- 
 erally as to both or all party candidates having a chance of election, 
 the reason partly that good men will not accept nomination for 
 office when there is no chance of election. It frequently happens 
 that only enough candidates are placed in nomination to fill the three 
 places." Rep. Carmi. 
 
 " It induces the strong party to be careful to bring out good men, 
 at least popular ones, or the minority may secure the election of the 
 majority of candidates by running the most popular candidates. ' ' Rep. 
 Beardstown. 
 
 The following are some of the opinions of pessimistic respondents 
 to the question asked. 
 
 "It is very unsatisfactory in its results because very often good 
 men are defeated by too many votes being cast for one man of the two 
 usually nominated by the two old parties. I would not advise New 
 York or any other state to follow the Illinois law. Proportional Rep- 
 resentation is the only true basis to work on. The Gove or any feasi- 
 ble application of the principle of quota or proportional voting." 
 Pop. Joliet. 
 
 ' ' Sometimes yes, sometimes no. It frequently has this effect : A 
 political ' boss ' secures a minority nomination and prevents a second 
 nomination by his party, thereby insuring his own election without 
 contest. Unless party pressure is strong nominations are made of three 
 candidates for three offices, the whole being cut and dried." Ind. 
 Chicago. 
 
 " Makes this matter much worse. Leads directly to deals between 
 politicians of both (opposing) parties. This occurs particularly in 
 cities. The minority party puts up only one candidate of course, and 
 the ' gang ' runs the primaries. The ' gang ' does not belong to one 
 party, but is made up of the ' active ' men of both. ' ' Dem. Chicago. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 79 
 
 "A nomination under this system is equivalent to an election, and 
 nominations are fought for by men who would not dare run under the 
 old system. My opinion is that the candidates under this system are 
 not so good as under the old." Dem. Jacksonville. 
 
 "Not having lived in Illinois under the old system I can only 
 compare it with other states and see no advantage. Think the tend- 
 ency is the other way, since in nine cases out of ten nomination is 
 equivalent to an election, and it is only necessary for candidates to 
 pack the caucuses when they can bid defiance to the voters. ' ' Prohib. 
 Geneva. 
 
 " I believe the effect on the nominations and the elections is BAD ; 
 the two candidates of the majority party and one from the minority are 
 generally elected, no matter who they are, nor how they got the nom- 
 ination." Dem. Freeport. 
 
 It will be apparent though and was pointed out by Mr. Sterne and 
 others that if the districts were made large enough, so that small minor- 
 ities could have representation, there would be a corresponding increase 
 of freedom to the voter. Obviously the voter will be freer to choose, 
 if he can select from five or seven candidates to be elected in a large 
 district, than he would be if his choice is limited to one or three to 
 be elected from a small one. If for example five members are elected 
 from a district, then one-sixth of the voters -f- i can always elect a 
 candidate by the cumulative plan, whereas if only three are elected, it 
 will require "one-fourth of the votes -f- i to succeed. If there are 
 seven then one-eighth -\- i can elect. In other words it is plain 
 that a smaller fraction of all the voters in a district are required to 
 elect if there are many candidates, than if there are only a few. It has 
 been pointed out before that it will be easier to influence a sixth of the 
 voters in a large district than a quarter or a half in smaller ones. 
 With five members to elect the majority party might have three and 
 the minority two if seven were eiected they could be divided into 
 groups of four, and three, or some other proportion. This would give 
 very much greater freedom of choice, not only within the parties but 
 also to independent voters, and it is also certain that if it were possible 
 for a fourth, a sixth, or an eighth of the voters in a district to nom- 
 inate and elect a candidate party managers would be cautious about 
 
80 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 presenting men who are obviously unfit and this would lead to the 
 selection of better candidates. 
 
 In other words the larger the districts, and the greater the number 
 of members elected from each of them, the freer will be the choice of 
 the electors, and the larger the number of members elected by each 
 party in each district, the greater the freedom and independence of 
 choice within the parties. Different sections, shades of opinion, in- 
 terests, views and principles, in the same party, may then each have 
 their representatives, under such a system, and at the same time with a 
 greater freedom of choice it might not be necessary for any to surrender 
 allegiance to their common party flag, but they could elect a member 
 of their own party who would satisfactorily represent the special views 
 and interests of those who are not satisfied with other nominees. 
 
 It should, perhaps, be made perfectly plain here again that an in- 
 crease of the number of members to be elected from each district 
 does not necessarily imply an increase in the total number to be 
 elected, but only an increase in the size or a consolidation of existing 
 districts. Thus in the State of New York, there are at present 128 
 assembly districts. If it should be determined to elect five members 
 from each district, the present ones could be consolidated into say 
 twenty-six, making the total number of assemblymen 130; or if it 
 should be decided to elect seven from each, they could be consolidated 
 so as to form say twenty districts, which would give 140 members. 
 
 To ascertain the views of persons in Illinois familiar with the 
 working of cumulative voting in that state with reference to the ad- 
 visability and practicability of enlarging the districts in that state the 
 7th question was asked in the circular of inquiry : 
 
 7th. Would it be advantageous to increase the size of the districts so as 
 to elect five, seven or more representatives from each, and give the voter 
 the privilege of casting as many votes as there are representatives to be 
 elected, and cumulate them as he chooses ? 
 
 A very large majority of those who replied to the circular were 
 opposed to any increase in the size of districts and the number of 
 representatives to be elected from each and say they can see no 
 advantage in such a change. A few who have been students of the 
 principles of proportional representation were, however, decidedly 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 8 1 
 
 in favor of such an increase. Evidently the majority of the cor- 
 respondents regarded such a change as an innovation for which they 
 saw no good reason. The arguments urged against it were that it 
 would make the system of voting more cumbrous, complicated and 
 confusing. One or two thought that it would facilitate bribery, add 
 to the cost of the campaign, and one correspondent wrote: "The 
 districts are large enough. A voter, too far away from his candidate, 
 is apt to stay in his corn-field, and not go out at election." An in- 
 crease in the number of members to be elected would undoubtedly 
 add to the difficulties of conducting elections by cumulative voting, 
 but these difficulties it is thought would be entirely obviated if the 
 Burnitz system of counting votes, which will be explained, was 
 adopted, as will be shown farther on. 
 
 There are however some other difficulties which will be encountered, 
 with any system, if the districts are enlarged, and there are some limita- 
 tions and restrictions which appear desirable and should be placed on 
 the number of representatives to be elected from each. 
 
 In the first place, if too many candidates are presented, electors 
 will not take an interest in all whom they must select from. The aver- 
 age voter may be concerned in the qualifications, characters, opinions 
 and political principles of two or three candidates to be voted for, and 
 may extend that interest to five or seven, but when required to look 
 into the antecedents of a dozen or twenty men, the duty will likely be 
 performed in a very perfunctory manner. Ordinary men are soon 
 wearied by public duties, and will give but little time or thought or 
 labor to them. 
 
 There can be no doubt too, as has already been pointed out, that the 
 larger the number of candidates elected from each district by the 
 cumulative system, the greater will be the difficulties of assigning, dis- 
 tributing and counting votes. Under that system, as has been shown, 
 parties must estimate their strength before the elections, and must be 
 guided by such estimates in determining how many candidates to nomi- 
 nate and how to distribute the votes which they can control. With 
 three members to be elected, it is usually only a question whether to 
 nominate one or two candidates, and the distribution of the votes is 
 correspondingly simple, but if there are five candidates it would be a 
 
82 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 question for each party whether to put one, two, three or four in the 
 field, and if there were seven to be elected the difficulty would be still 
 greater, and voters would be perplexed and uncertain in determining 
 how many candidates to vote for and how many votes to cast for each. 
 Even in Illinois, as has been shown, with only three members to elect 
 from each district, owing to improper distribution of votes it happens 
 at times that votes are wasted and the minority party elects two candi- 
 dates and the majority only one. An example of this, which has been 
 referred to, occurred in the sixth district in 1892. At that election 
 the Democrats cast 61,637 votes for their candidate and the Repub- 
 licans gave 25,957 for one and 25,728 for the second one and 
 thus elected both, although the Democrats had very nearly 10,000 
 more votes than their successful antagonists. Although this does not 
 occur often in Illinois, yet it can be seen that if greater freedom were 
 given to voters by enlarging the districts and increasing the number of 
 representatives to be elected from each, the liability to such misadven- 
 tures would be much increased, and it would be correspondingly dif- 
 ficult for parties and individuals to know how to distribute their votes. 
 Thus with seven members to elect and only two parties in the field, 
 even if there was no very great disparity in their respective numbers it 
 would especially where there was much political agitation be difficult 
 to know whether either party could elect three, four or five members, 
 and in case of a political revolt, it would often be impossible for the 
 independents or the ' ' regulars ' ' to know whether to rim one, two, 
 three or more candidates. A miscalculation might mean total defeat, 
 and the impossibility of knowing how votes should be distributed would 
 often result in their waste. 
 
 Most of these difficulties, which are inherent in the system of cumu- 
 lative voting, as already stated, have been anticipated and commented 
 on by writers and students of this subject. Thus Mr. Sterne in his 
 admirable book, to which the public generally owe so much, says : 
 
 " If we make the districts large enough * * * and thus 
 give, by the cumulative plan, a representative to any small minority in 
 the community, there can be no opposition to the plan proposed, ex- 
 cept its cumbersomeness ; but with small districts electing but three 
 members it has the disadvantage that, while it gives to the minority 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING 83 
 
 one representative, it does not get rid of, but on the contrary makes 
 permanent, party action and party machinery, and, in making a nomi- 
 nation equivalent to an election, removes the corruption from the 
 election to the nominating conventions. The residents of New York 
 have seen such a plan work very badly in the election of their boards 
 of supervisors. ' ' 
 
 Prof. Ware in an article in The American Law Review for Jan- * 
 uary, 1872, said of this branch of the subject: 
 
 * ' The task which it [the cumulative method of voting] imposes 
 upon the elector of dividing his suffrages among his candidates, is one 
 which it is difficult to perform intelligently. In point of fact, it must 
 in most cases be done at haphazard, or upon some arbitrary or fanciful 
 principle, thus giving an arbitrary element a material influence on the 
 result. 'In the different practical trials which this reform has met/ 
 says M- Naville, * two things have been recognized, the excellence of 
 the new principle, and the defective nature of the processes by which it is 
 applied, processes which impair the liberty of the voter and the justice of 
 the results S 
 
 * * * The system is liable to produce most unexpected and 
 undesired results through a waste of votes, and this can only be 
 remedied by a rigid discipline which destroys the freedom of the elec- 
 tor, and practically places the election in the hands of party mana- 
 gers." t 
 
 Mr. S. Dana Horton * states the objection " that the more popu- 
 lar the candidate the less chance is there of proportional representa- 
 tion. The people's favorite will get plumpers in profusion, many 
 votes will be wasted, and so large a plurality may elect no more offi- 
 cers than a minority. * * * In districts electing three represen- 
 tatives, the special dangers of this, but at the same time also the advan- 
 tages of any system are reduced to a minimum. The larger the district 
 the more dangerous the peculiarities of this system. Were it tried on 
 such a scale as that of congressional elections in Ohio, anything like 
 fairness or proportionality would at first be impossible." 
 
 Cumulative voting was adopted for the election of members of 
 
 * Article on Proportional Representation. Penn Monthly, for June, 1873. 
 
84 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 English school boards in 1870. The rule as it stands in the Elemen- 
 tary Education Act of that date is as follows : 
 
 " At every such election every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to 
 the number of members of the school board to be elected, and may give all such votes 
 to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit. ' ' 
 
 Some interesting testimony with reference to the practical working 
 of this method of electing members of English school boards has been 
 given. 
 
 Commenting on it, Mr. G. ShawLefevre, an opponent of minority 
 representation, in an article on that subject in the Contemporary Review 
 for May, 1884, says: 
 
 ' ' The effect of the system adopted has been to give undue weight 
 to small sections. Majorities and the more powerful sections of the 
 electors have not been able to secure a representation in proportion to 
 their numbers. The difficulties of organizing their voters so as to pro- 
 duce their maximum effect when the members to be elected are many, 
 ranging from five to fifteen, are insuperable, and have deterred them 
 from putting forward candidates in proportion to their real strength. 
 
 ' ' There has, therefore, been in recent contested elections a waste- 
 ful accumulation of votes upon the successful candidate of the more 
 powerful sections, and small groups and sections have consequently 
 been able to secure the return of members, when their numbers did not 
 really entitle them to it. Men have been returned upon boards in this 
 way who have proved to be a power only for mischief. This evil has 
 become more apparent as experience has been gained, and as candi- 
 dates have found that by obtaining the cumulative votes of a group 
 or section they could be returned without difficulty. ' ' 
 
 In an article by John Westlake, Q. C., in the Contemporary Review 
 for March, 1884, on Proportional Representation, in which the author 
 advocates that principle, he says that its "application to school board 
 elections is well established, but needs reform in detail ' ' and expresses 
 the hope that ' ' the spectacle of its working must influence the contro- 
 versy as to the parliamentary application. ' ' 
 
 Continuing, he says : 
 
 < ' Let us turn now to what the rudimentary cumulative vote has 
 failed to do. Each shade of opinion held by a numerous body of elec- 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 85 
 
 tors, though represented, has not had its proportional representation. 
 It is evident that a party which runs more candidates than in propor- 
 tion to its numbers risks returning fewer candidates than in proportion 
 to its numbers, and not only has this risk been often realized, but often 
 also the fear of it has prevented a party from running its due number 
 of candidates. Again, even when the due number, and that only, has 
 been run, all have not been returned, because the votes of their sup- 
 porters have not been evenly divided among them. // would seem as 
 if those who established the cumulative vote had greater faith in the power 
 .of organizing than the event has justified. I will give a few instances of 
 the waste of votes, drawn from the last two general elections for the 
 London School Board, because nine years' practice had preceded even 
 the first of the two, and it may therefore be supposed that the power 
 of organizing had reached as full a development as can be expected. 
 In order to appreciate them thoroughly, it is necessary to explain what 
 is meant by a quota. If 10,000 votes are given at an election, and 
 three members are to be elected, the proportional principle requires 
 that any candidate who has received 2501 votes should be elected, be- 
 cause the remaining 7499 votes cannot be so distributed as to give as 
 many as 2501 to more than two others. A little reflection on this 
 example will show the truth of the following rule : Divide the number 
 of votes given by the number of members to be elected, plus one ; the 
 quotient, plus one, is the quota, that is, the number of votes which on 
 the proportional principle will entitle a candidate to be elected. If the 
 quotient is fractional, the quota is the next higher integer. 
 
 " Now, in the city of London, in 1879, there were four members 
 to elect and 23,591 good votes were given. Therefore the quota was 
 4719; but the highest on the poll got 7153 votes and one member 
 was elected with 2089, or considerably less than half the quota. 
 
 " In the Hackney division, in 1879, there were five members to 
 elect and 60,992 good votes were given. Therefore the quota was 
 1 0,1 66 ; but the highest on the poll had 13,727 votes and one mem- 
 ber was elected with 4728, or again less than half the quota. 
 
 "In the Lambeth division, in 1882, there were eight members to 
 ^lect, and 153,142 good votes were given. Therefore the quota was 
 17,016, but the highest on the poll had 34,896 votes, or more than 
 
86 OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 
 
 twice the quota, while two members were elected with 8888 and 8190,, 
 or about half the quota. 
 
 " It is important to observe that the wasteful accumulation of votes 
 on some candidates leads to the election of others with a very small 
 number of votes, because this is the second point in which the work- 
 ing of the actual school board system is open to objection. It is de- 
 sirable that each shade of opinion held by a numerous body of electors 
 should be represented, but it is not desirable that very small bodies 
 should have the power of returning candidates. If a very small group 
 is composed of the partisans of a real shade of opinion, their exclusion 
 will not shake public confidence in the representative assembly, as 
 that of a large group would do, and they can still propagate their 
 views in the press and at meetings. More often, however, a very small 
 group is composed of the partisans of a candidate ; and he, again, is 
 often one whose personal qualifications have not recommended him for 
 selection to the great body of those with whom his opinions, so far as 
 he has any, would connect him. Now few who know anything of the 
 working of assemblies will doubt the importance of keeping bad mem- 
 bers out, if possible. Their power for mischief is increased by their 
 election ten-fold more than the power of an average candidate for good 
 is increased by his election, while an exceptionally good candidate 
 can generally impress himself on a large body of supporters. It is 
 therefore an additional evil, incidental to the wasteful accumulation of 
 votes on some candidates that it facilitates the success of small com- 
 binations in favor of others. * * * Many, worthy candidates, who 
 represented considerable bodies of opinion, have been left with small 
 fractions of quotas through the undue accumulation of votes on other 
 representatives of the same opinions ; and in the instances I have 
 quoted I have had no reference at all to the worthiness or otherwise of 
 the persons concerned. I have selected them only to show, by strik- 
 ing examples, that election by too few votes is the necessary accompani- 
 ment of election by too many; and then I leave it to every one's 
 knowledge of human nature to assure him that, among the elections 
 made by too few votes, many must be such as he would regret. 
 
 " The direction then, in which the actual school board system of 
 election has to be improved is that of giving some assistance to the 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE SYSTEM OF VOTING. 87 
 
 power of organizing, which has been found insufficient, while adding 
 as little as possible that is novel to a system which has the great 
 advantage that all are now familiar with it." 
 
 Notwithstanding the objections to cumulative voting which have 
 been pointed out, it is nevertheless believed, that, even in the somewhat 
 imperfect form of the Illinois plan, it has very great advantages 
 the particulars of which have been set forth in the preceding 
 pages over our present system of single member districts. Even with 
 the difficulties which have been pointed out it is thought that if the 
 number of members to be elected in each district, by cumulative votes, 
 were increased to say five or seven, the additional freedom which would 
 thereby be acquired by the voter, would greatly outweigh the disadvan- 
 tages resulting from the uncertainties and perplexity which he would 
 encounter in the distribution of his votes. In other words the election 
 of three members from each district by cumulative voting is better than 
 our present system of electing only one by a majority of the votes ; the 
 election of five would be still better and seven or a greater number 
 would probably be still more advantageous. The disadvantages in this 
 system, it is believed, though, may be entirely overcome by a very 
 simple method of voting and counting cumulative votes, the principles 
 of which will be explained in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 Many different plans and methods of voting have been devised and 
 proposed for giving representation to minorities and to voters the 
 greatest amount of freedom, independence and certainty in the results 
 of the exercise of the franchise. 
 
 No attempt will be made now to describe or explain all of them. 
 Some of them are very complicated and when they were brought up for 
 consideration in the British Parliament they provoked the remark from 
 John Bright with which perhaps some persons interested in the sub- 
 ject may sympathize " that they have this disadvantage, that scarcely 
 any one can understand them." 
 
 For the present, what will be said will be confined to an in- 
 quiry into the principles which ought to control cumulative voting if 
 it is to be entirely free, and to the means of complying with such prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 With this purpose in view it will be supposed that three candidates 
 are to be elected from a district and that ' ' each voter may cast as many 
 votes for one candidate as there are representatives to be elected, or 
 may distribute the same or equal parts thereof among the candidates as 
 he shall see fit," as provided in the Constitution of the State of Illinois. 
 For purposes of illustration it will be assumed that we have a district 
 in which say the Republicans are in a minority. In that event they 
 would nominate and run only one candidate, and if the party is well 
 disciplined each voter would cast all his votes for this candidate, who will 
 be designated as A. If the Republicans were sure of a majority of voters 
 in the district they would then know that they could elect two candi- 
 dates, say A and B, and the voters would all be instructed to give i ^ 
 votes to each of them. If they had three-fourths of the votes then 
 they could elect all three candidates, and under effective party manage- 
 ment all the electors would be instructed to give one vote to each of 
 
 88 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 89 
 
 three candidates, A, B and C. It will be seen then that a voter can 
 vote in any of the three following ways : 
 
 FIRST. SECOND. THIRD. 
 
 A 3 votes. A i ^ votes. A T vote. 
 
 B \y 2 votes. B i vote. 
 
 C i vote. 
 
 It has been assumed that in determining how to vote he is to a cer- 
 tain extent sure of the number of votes which will be cast for the Re- 
 publican candidate. This would, however, seldom be the case. There 
 would always be more or less uncertainty whether his party can elect 
 one, two or three candidates. It would therefore be desirable that in 
 case all his votes are needed to elect the candidate whom he prefers to 
 any of the others, or his first choice, that they should all be counted 
 for that one. If, however, two candidates of the party with which the 
 voter is identified can be elected, by dividing all the votes of the party 
 equally between them, then he would ordinarily desire that his votes be 
 so apportioned between the two, whom he or his party would select in 
 preference to a third. If three candidates could be elected by an equal 
 division of the votes among them .then the voter would naturally give 
 one vote to each of three. 
 
 The voter in other words, should have " the power of expressing his 
 approbation of a considerable number of candidates, by naming them 
 as successors to his vote, without damaging the chances of those who 
 stand highest in his preference."* In other words he should be able 
 to express by his vote in substance this : "I prefer A, the candidate 
 whose name I have placed or marked first on my voting paper or ticket, 
 who is my first choice ; and if they are needed for his election all my 
 votes are to be counted for him. If there are a sufficient number of 
 persons belonging to my party, or holding the same opinions or having 
 the same interests as mine, and who vote as I do, to elect two candidates 
 in this district, then I want my votes to be equally divided between A 
 and B, the latter being my second choice, and his name is placed or 
 marked second on my ticket. If there are a sufficient number of voters 
 
 * From a Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference of members of the 
 Reform League of England and others on Mr. Hare's scheme of representation, held 
 28th February, and ;th and 2ist of March, 1 868. 
 
90 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING- 
 
 who vote as I do to elect three candidates then C is my third choice 
 and is so indicated in my ticket and my votes are to be divided equally 
 between A, B and C" 
 
 To fulfill these requirements a system of voting must have what 
 engineers and mechanics call automatic action. It must have an in- 
 herent power of adaptation to the condition which may exist at any 
 election and effect a distribution of votes among all the parties and in- 
 terests that may manifest themselves in the ratio of their numerical 
 strength. This should be effected too with the smallest possible 
 sacrifice of the elector's personal liberty of choice. 
 
 This it is thought can be accomplished by adopting a very simple 
 way of counting cumulative votes, similar to that proposed by Dr. 
 Gustav Burnitz and Dr. George Varrentrapp in a pamphlet * published 
 in Frankfort on the Main in 1863. A translation of this pamphlet is 
 published in appendix B in this volume, to which the reader is referred. 
 Without considering in detail the theories and methods contained in 
 that pamphlet, the principle proposed by its authors may be illustrated 
 by applying it to the vote of the hypothetical elector, the possible dis- 
 tribution of whose votes was printed in tabular form on page 89. 
 
 Assuming that his first choice of the candidates is A, the second 
 B, and the third C, then, as pointed out, his votes may be given in 
 either of the three ways indicated in the table. If all of them are 
 given to one candidate then they should of course all three be counted 
 for him ; if they are divided equally between two candidates then, obvi- 
 ously, his second choice would get only half of the voter's votes. In 
 fact if he votes for a second choice candidate, it implies that he has 
 divided his three votes between two candidates, and therefore a second 
 choice candidate cannot receive more than half as many votes as one who 
 is a first choice. If the votes are distributed equally among three 
 candidates, then the third could get only one third of the elector's 
 votes. It is therefore obvious that a third choice candidate cannot 
 get more than a third as many votes as one who is first on the list. 
 
 Supposing though, that instead of one Republican voter, that 
 there are a thousand, all of whom have the same preferences as our 
 
 * " A Method of Assuring to the Majority as well as the Minorities, at all Kinds of 
 Elections, the Number of Representatives Corresponding to their Strength. 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING, 91 
 
 hypothetical elector has, that is, the first choice candidate of all of 
 them is A, their second B, and their third C. It is plain that if they 
 all give their three votes to A, that he will have 3000, but if they 
 divide them equally between their first choice candidate A, and a 
 second choice B ', then B could only get 1500, or half as many votes 
 as A could get if they were all given to him. In other words, on this 
 system, a second choice candidate can get only half as many votes as a 
 first choice would receive if they are all concentrated on him. If the 
 votes are divided among three candidates then it is also obvious that 
 the third can get only <one-third as many as the first may .have ifihe 
 voters should plump for him. 
 
 As each of the 1000 voters has three votes, the total number is 
 3000 which may all be given to the first choice candidate if the whole of 
 them are needed to elect him. If they are divided equally between two 
 candidates then the second choice cannot get more than 1500, or half 
 as many as the first, and if divided among three the third will get 
 only 1000, or one-third as many as the first. 
 
 To determine the maximum number of votes therefore which each 
 candidate can have, all first choice votes should be divided by i, all 
 second choice by 2, all third by j. This is the fundamental principle 
 underlying Drs. Burnitz and Varrentrapp's system, the simplicity of 
 which will recommend it. 
 
 Let it be supposed further that the Democrats also nominate three 
 candidates, Z>, ^"and F, and that they have 1 200 voters who can cast 3600 
 votes and that the preference of these voters is expressed in the order 
 in which the candidates are named, that is, D is their first choice, E 
 the second and F the third. Then obviously the greatest number 
 of votes which D could get would be 3600, E could get 1800 and 
 ^1200. Arrange these figures in tabular form and they will be as 
 follows : 
 
 REPUBLICAN. DEMOCRATIC. 
 
 ist choice, A, 3,000 votes. D, 3,600 votes. 
 
 2d " B, 1,500 " E, i, 800 " 
 
 3d " C, 1,000 " F, 1,200 " 
 
 As "the three candidates highest in votes shall be declared 
 elected " it is plain that A, D and E will have the highest number in 
 
92 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 whatever way the votes can be counted. If they are needed to elect the 
 first choice candidates 3000 votes can be counted for A and if they are 
 required to elect />he has 3600 to elect him. If the votes are equally 
 divided between the first and two second choice Republican candi- 
 dates A and B, then B will have only half as many as A, or 1500, 
 while if the Democratic votes are divided equally between D and E, 
 E would then have 1 800 or half as many as D. The vote would 
 therefore be as follows : 
 
 A 3,000 votes. D 1,800 votes. 
 
 E i,Soo " 
 
 No other division of the votes can give any of the candidates more 
 than E has if the Democratic votes are equally divided between D and 
 E. Obviously then A, D and E are elected. 
 
 The principle which underlies this division of votes and which has 
 been explained, is that if a voter divides his votes equally between two 
 candidates he can give only half as many for his second choice candi- 
 date as he could for one alone, and if he divides his votes equally be- 
 tween three he can give only one-third of them to his third choice 
 in other words, second choice votes count for only half as much as 
 first choices do, and third choice votes for only one-third as much as 
 those for first choices. Without elucidating the subject any further now 
 we may deduce the following very simple rule or law for this method 
 of free voting which for the sake of explicitness will be called the 
 Burnitz system which is applicable to the election of any number of 
 representatives in Congress, state legislatures or municipal or any other 
 legislative or corporate bodies or associations. 
 
 RULE FOR VOTING. 
 
 Each voter may give on his ballot, the names of not exceeding * 
 
 candidates for whom he votes, and may indicate his preferences for such 
 candidates by ordinal numbers marked opposite their names ; or, in the 
 absence of such numbers, the order in which the names are inscribed on 
 his ticket shall indicate the order of his preference, and as many votes . 
 shall be counted for each name as there are candidates to be elected. 
 
 It will be seen that this rule does not require the voter to do any- 
 * The number to be elected, which, in this example, is three. 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 93 
 
 thing which he is not obliged to do under the present system of voting. 
 He is now compelled to have the name of a candidate whom he pre- 
 fers written or printed on his ticket. That is all that is required in 
 the proposed plan. It is true that under the new system a voter has 
 the privilege of voting for more than one candidate if he chooses, but 
 he need not exercise that privilege unless he wishes to do so. If he 
 does vote for more than one, his preference or choice will be implied 
 by the order in which the names of the candidate are arranged. 
 
 If this method of voting was adopted it is probable that the dif- 
 ferent parties would then, as now, have tickets printed and would ar- 
 range the names in some order which would comply with the views of 
 the party managers. This arrangement the voter could accept if he 
 likes it, but if the arrangement adopted by the party is not satisfactory 
 to him he could change it by simply writing a number opposite the 
 name of each or any candidate. The candidates names on the tickets 
 might or would be printed somewhat as follows : 
 Choice FOR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 
 Henry 
 
 Gladstone. 
 
 
 Dennis 
 
 O'Connor. 
 
 
 Julius Bismarck. 
 
 Voted in this way it would mean that Gladstone was the voter's 
 first choice, O'Connor his second, and Bismarck his third. If this 
 order was not in accordance with the preference of the voter he might 
 take a pencil or a pen and mark i opposite his first choice, which it 
 will be assumed is O'Connor, 2 opposite his second choice which 
 might be Bismarck, and 3 opposite his third choice, so that his ticket 
 would then be as follows : 
 
 Choice FOR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 3d Henry Gladstone. 
 
 ist Dennis O'Connor. 
 
 2d 
 
 Julius Bismarck. 
 
94 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 Now at the risk of repeating what has already been said the reader 
 will be asked to observe : 
 
 1. The voter need not vote for more than one candidate unless he 
 chooses to do so. 
 
 2. He can vote for as many as he likes not exceeding the number to 
 be elected. 
 
 j. He need not indicate his preferences if he has none, or does not 
 want to do it. 
 
 4. If the order in which the names are inscribed on the ticket does 
 not represent his preferences, he can change it by simply placing a number 
 opposite to any or all the names. 
 
 jr. He can put a paster over any of the names or erase it if he does 
 not want to vote it or ,desires to substitute some other name. 
 
 Surely any voter who can exercise the franchise now could do so 
 if this method of free voting was adopted, for the obvious reason that 
 he would not be required to do anything then which he is not doing 
 now when he avails himself of the glorious privilege of taking part in 
 the government of our country. 
 
 But it will be said that if a voter is permitted to divide his votes 
 among as many candidates as he chooses, the difficulty will be not in 
 casting but in counting the votes. Let us see what this difficulty will 
 be. 
 
 In the first place under the proposed system the inspectors and 
 registers of election must count and record how many first, how many 
 second, and how many third choice votes are cast for each candi- 
 date. This, of course, implies some little extra labor and a little 
 additional time. To do this when the polls are closed, the ballots 
 can be assorted first according to ihejirst choice votes that is, it may 
 be assumed, all those on which A is the first choice 'are sorted together 
 in a pile, then those on which B is the first choice, and those of C, 
 D, E and F, and the ballots in each pile are then counted and the 
 number of first choice votes for each candidate are entered in a blank 
 somewhat like the following : 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 95 
 
 RETURN OF VOTES CAST IN THE ELECTION DISTRICT. 
 
 Choice. 
 
 CANDIDATES. 
 
 A 
 
 B 
 
 C 
 
 D 
 
 F F 
 
 E ! F 
 
 ISt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 When this is done the ballots are reasserted according to the sec- 
 ond choice, counted and entered, and afterwards the process would 
 be repeated for the third choice. When the votes cast are entered in 
 the blank it would appear somewhat like that shown below. This, 
 
 RETURN OF VOTES CAST IN THE FIRST ELECTION DISTRICT. 
 
 Choice. 
 
 CANDIDATES. 
 
 A 
 
 B 
 
 C 
 
 D 
 
 E 
 
 F 
 
 ISt 
 
 2750 
 
 2OI 
 
 49 
 
 3333 
 
 166 
 
 101 
 
 2d 
 
 189 
 
 2726 
 
 85 
 
 184 
 
 3 2 74 
 
 142 
 
 3d 
 
 108 
 
 '85 
 
 2607 
 
 97 
 
 374 
 
 3129 
 
 or a copy of it, would then be sent to the district canvasser or board 
 or other authority appointed for making the final count of the dis- 
 trict, who would enter the returns on a blank somewhat like that on 
 page 96, in which the number of the election district would be entered 
 in the first column, the number of ist, 2d and 3d choice votes cast for 
 A would be entered on the same horizontal line, as the number of the 
 district, and in the appropriate columns below the candidates' names, 
 where the returns belong, as indicated by the headings. The same 
 would be done with the votes for the other candidates, and the re- 
 
9 6 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 I O- 
 
 I I * 
 
 VO 
 
 oo 
 
 M 
 
 vO 
 N 
 r^ 
 
 fll a 
 
 W ! ^ 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 97 
 
 turns from all the other election districts. When the returns from all 
 the districts are entered the ! votes in each vertical column would be 
 added up, which gives the total number of ist, 2d and 3d choice votes 
 cast for each candidate in the whole assembly or other district. 
 
 Now to count these votes in accordance with the principles which 
 have been explained 'the 'folio wing rule has been formulated : 
 
 RULE FOR COUNTING THE VOTES. 
 
 The first, second and third preference votes for the different candidates 
 shall each be counted separately ; the total number of first preferences, 
 for each candidate, shall be divided by i, the second preferences by 2 and 
 the third by j. The quotients thus obtained for each candidate shall be 
 added together and their sum will be his elective quotient. The three 
 candidates having the highest elective quotients shall be declared elected. 
 
 To make the final determination or summation of the votes a blank 
 somewhat like that shown on page 98 could be used. The sums from 
 the returns in the table like that on page 96 would be carried to the appro- 
 priate column in the table on page 98. Next to the column headed 
 ' ' votes' ' is another headed ' ' quotients. ' ' Then in accordance with the 
 rule for counting, the first choice votes for each candidate are divided 
 by i , and the quotient is carried into the adjoining column headed ' 'quo- 
 tients" or what is the same thing the entire number of first choice votes is 
 carried into this column. The second choice votes are then divided by 
 two and the quotients carried into the column of quotients, and the 
 third choice votes are divided by three and the quotients are transferred 
 to column of quotients. In the table on page 98 such division has been 
 made with imaginary figures. When this has been done for the votes 
 of all the candidates the columns of ' ' quotients ' ' are added up and 
 the sums are the li elective quotients " and "the three candidates hav- 
 ing the highest elective quotients shall be declared elected. ' ' Striking 
 out the lowest election quotients until three only are left makes it 
 obvious that A, D and E are elected. 
 
 Considerable objection has been made to cumulative voting on 
 account of the difficulty of counting fractional votes which must be 
 employed if voters are permitted to divide their votes equally among 
 different candidates. In Illinois voters can divide their votes into 
 
98 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 z w 
 
 w 
 
 U 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 99 
 
 halves. A few of the respondents to the circular of inquiry on this 
 subject say there is sometimes difficulty in counting fractional votes of 
 as little vulgarity as a ^ . If more than three candidates should be 
 elected from a district it would be necessary to add up halves, thirds, 
 quarters, fifths and perhaps other fractions still more vulgar. That 
 ignorant inspectors and registers of election might find difficulty in 
 doing this is quite probable. Especial attention is called to the fact 
 that with the system which is proposed here inspectors have no other 
 duty to perform than to count and record the votes cast in the district. 
 They must count three classes of votes for each candidate instead of 
 one when three are elected. This is the only addition to the amount 
 or the complexity of their work. 
 
 Neither are the duties of the district canvassers increased in com- 
 plexity further than to require that the ist, 2d and 3d votes cast for each 
 candidate shall be divided by i, 2 and 3 respectively. Other than 
 this, the only mathematical qualification required for the performance 
 of their duties is the' ability to add up columns of figures representing 
 the votes cast and that intellectual equipment they must have now. 
 The fractional votes which are so much dreaded by some do not appear 
 at all excepting perhaps as final quantities in the quotients when the 
 total votes are not susceptible of equal division by the ordinal numbers 
 which represent the preferences of voters. It should be observed : 
 
 1. That the voter need not do anything which he is not required 
 to do now. 
 
 2. All that the inspectors of election, poll and ballot clerks in the 
 local districts must do which is not required of them at present is 
 to count and record several classes of votes for each candidate, instead 
 of one class for one candidate. 
 
 3. The complexity of the general district canvassers duties and the 
 amount of work which they must do are increased only by the require- 
 ment of recording and summing up three classes of votes for each 
 candidate, instead of one class for each and dividing the sums by i, 2 
 and 3, and summing up the quotients. 
 
 There is nothing in the proposed method of voting which requires 
 any additional mental effort greater than the voter must now exert. If 
 there be anything which affords a pretense of foundation for the charge 
 
IOO THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 of complexity, it is the appropriation of the votes after the ballot or 
 polling is over ; and this is to be performed by properly instructed and 
 responsible officers, under careful and scrupulous control, and subject 
 to the critical inspection of the parties especially concerned. But even 
 if there is some slight addition to the duties of the officers of elec- 
 tions and to the complexity of the methods of counting the votes it 
 may be answered that ' ' the object of government is justice and not 
 simplicity." 
 
 But those to whom this improved system is proposed may very 
 properly ask what advantages will it have over the Illinois method of 
 cumulative voting ? ' 
 
 To this it may be answered that it will obviate entirely that prac- 
 tical difficulty pointed out by the correspondent from Joliet which is 
 that ' ' a voter cannot tell when he is casting more votes than a favorite 
 candidate needs. ' ' It will remove entirely the motive and inducement 
 for " plumping " when there is no need for it and the evils which re- 
 sult therefrom and which have been indicated by some of the respon- 
 dents to the inquiries which have been made concerm'ng the working 
 of the Illinois system. It will give to each or any party a number of 
 representatives proportionate to its votes and make it unnecessary for 
 the party managers or the voters to estimate the strength of their party 
 in order to determine how many votes to cast for respective candidates. 
 It would in effect say to voters, "you can select the candidate who is 
 your first preference and cast your vote for him. If all your votes are 
 required to elect your first choice they will all be counted for him. If, 
 however, there are enough votes cast for the candidates both of your 
 first and second choice then your votes will be divided between those 
 two or if it is possible to elect the three preferred by you then your 
 votes will be divided equally between those three. ' ' The system is 
 "automatic ' ' and adapts itself perfectly to the varying strength of par- 
 ties and to the wishes, intentions and preferences of voters and gives 
 them the utmost freedom in assigning their votes to whoever will repre- 
 sent their views and interests most satisfactorily. It enables the voter 
 at the polls to declare in substance this which has been expressed 
 before "If required to elect the candidate whom I have indi- 
 cated as my first choice I hereby direct that all my votes be given 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREE VOTlNd.' JOI 
 
 to him if they are needed to elect him? Tf "there are a'dufficidrA 
 number of votes cast for him and for the candidate I have designated 
 as my second preference then I direct that my votes be divided equally 
 between the two. If enough vote's are 'cast 'to elect both of these 
 candidates and the one whose name I have selected as ( my third choice 
 then my votes are to b$ divided equally between all. three. ',' , 
 
 This system is equally welLadapJed to the election of a larger num- 
 ber of representatives than three as it. is to that number, and its advan- 
 tages become more marked whe,n. the n-umber is increased as will be 
 shown farther on. 
 
I CHAPTER IX, 
 
 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact, as was said by a writer in the Nation, 
 " that when properly stated, the correctness of the principle of minority 
 representation forces admission," and that the principle has been 
 before the world and has been earnestly discussed and advocated by 
 some of the ablest minds in Europe and this country, it must be 
 admitted that, nevertheless, it has made comparatively little advance. 
 The adoption of cumulative voting in Illinois, nearly twenty-five 
 years ago, and the election of members of the legislature in that state 
 ever since by that system, its application to the election ot school 
 boards in England, and of the members of the governing bodies in 
 some cities and corporations here, the adoption of the principle of pro- 
 portional representation in Denmark and some of the cantons of 
 Switzerland, is about all the advance that has been made. 
 
 As long ago as September, 1886, the editor of the Nation began 
 an article in that paper with the remark that ' ' For several years 
 past the question of 'personal,' or 'proportional,' or 'minority' 
 representation, which at one time attracted a good deal of attention, 
 has been tacitly dropped out of sight." One of the reasons given 
 for the disappearance of the subject from public discussions was that 
 " the reform of the civil service was more imperatiye, and the cham- 
 pions of reform in administrative methods wisely concentrated all 
 their efforts for the time upon the one principal issue. But, ' ' this 
 writer continues, "the chief reason for the loss of interest in it was 
 undoubtedly the want of any thoroughly satisfactory scheme of propor- 
 tional representation. ' ' 
 
 Most persons who are at all familiar with the subject, and the dis- 
 cussion of it, during the past twenty-five years or more, will, it is 
 thought, agree that this reason for the loss of interest in the subject is 
 probably the true one. 
 
 One of the purposes of this compilation has been to show the re- 
 
THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 1 03 
 
 suits and the advantages and disadvantages of the system of electing 
 representatives by cumulative voting in the -State of Illinois. It is 
 thought that the evidence submitted has shown that a distinct gain in 
 the promotion of good government has resulted there from that method 
 of election although the experience of more than twenty years has 
 shown some serious defects in it, which have been pointed out and are 
 now recognized. Cumulative voting is therefore not a ." thoroughly 
 satisfactory scheme," although in justice to the advocates of minority 
 representation, it should be said that the defects of the Illinois system 
 were anticipated at the time, or very soon after it was adopted. In 
 view of this experience, and of the fact that nowhere in the world 
 has there been any general adoption of the principles of minority 
 representation, notwithstanding that it has been advocated by some 
 of the most eminent public men in this and in European countries, 
 those in whose minds the justice and righteousness of its principles 
 have ' ' forced admission, ' ' may be expected to have an answer to the 
 question whether now, after twenty or thirty years, or more, of dis- 
 cussion and experience with various systems of cumulative and other 
 kinds of voting, there is any one which in the words of the writer in 
 the Nation, is ' ' thoroughly satisfactory. " It is true that such a demand 
 seems somewhat inordinate. The adoption of minority representation 
 in our elections implies a peaceful revolution in the methods by which 
 power is conferred on those who are to govern us. To expect that a 
 scheme which would be thoroughly satisfactory would be evolved by 
 comparatively a few years' experience, is to expect a result seldom 
 attained in methods of government. A scheme which is satisfactory 
 to the extent only of being an advance over the old method of elec- 
 tions of single members in each district, by a majority of the voters, 
 and this may rightly be claimed for cumulative voting is about all 
 that can be reasonably expected at the present juncture. 
 
 It remains to show that the system of voting and of assigning and 
 counting votes, which has been explained, will overcome the difficulty 
 which voters would encounter under the cumulative plan, of knowing 
 how many candidates to vote for and of dividing their votes equally 
 among them, and of counting the votes, if the districts are enlarged 
 and the number of members to be elected from each is increased. 
 
io 4 
 
 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 ,To do this it will be supposed that A, 23, C, D and E are candi- 
 dates of .one party in a district where five members are to be elected. 
 
 A voter,: if he divides his votes equally among different numbers of 
 candidates .could distribute them in any -of the five following ways : 
 
 A, 5 votes'. 
 
 A, 
 B, 
 
 votes. 
 
 A, 
 
 B, 
 C, 
 
 votes. 
 
 '4 5 
 
 
 A, i % votes, 
 
 A, I 
 
 vote. 
 
 "B,rX ' 
 
 B,i 
 
 < 
 
 c, ix " 
 
 C, i 
 
 
 
 D,iX " 
 
 D, i 
 
 " 
 
 
 E, i 
 
 " 
 
 If there were seven candidates then the votes could be divided in 
 the following seven different ways : 
 
 i 
 A, 7 vt. 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 A, 3^ vt. 
 
 A, 21^ Vt. 
 
 A, i^ 
 
 B, 3/2 " 
 
 B, 2>^ 
 
 B, i^ 
 
 
 C, 2>| " 
 
 C, i^f 
 
 
 
 D, IX 
 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 A, 
 
 f vt - 
 
 A, 1 1 A i 
 
 rt. 
 
 A. 
 
 vt 
 
 B, 
 
 f " 
 
 B, 1/6 
 
 < 
 
 B, 
 
 
 c, 
 
 8 < 
 
 C, 1/6 
 
 
 
 c, 
 
 
 D, 
 
 f " 
 
 D, 1/6 
 
 < 
 
 D, 
 
 
 E, 
 
 t " 
 
 E, 1/6 
 
 < 
 
 E, 
 
 
 
 
 F, 1/6 
 
 < 
 
 F, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 G, 
 
 
 It can readily be seen how great the difficulty would be for electors 
 and for parties which influence or control them, to know how under 
 such conditions to distribute their votes. Besides this perplexity there 
 is also the ignorant voter and stupid election inspector and poll clerk 
 whose incapacity must be considered. It would probably be quite be- 
 yond the mathematical attainments of even average voters to divide 
 five votes equally between three or four candidates, and to distribute 
 seven equally among three, four, five or six would drive them to dis- 
 traction, or the inaction of non-voting. Then in the counting of votes 
 it is very doubtful whether ordinary inspectors of election and ballot 
 clerks would be able to add up correctly columns of figures including 
 halves, thirds and quarters, and if complicated with fifths and sixths it 
 would be hopeless to expect correct results. 
 
 It has been explained that in three member districts a voter is not 
 required by the proposed system of voting to vote or make up his 
 ballot any differently than he must at present. That is, he can vote 
 for a single candidate in exactly the same way as he does now, but 
 he has the privilege of voting for more than one, not exceeding the 
 
THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 105 
 
 whole number to be elected if he chooses to avail himself of that priv- 
 ilege. His preferences for the different candidates may be indicated 
 by the order in which the names are arranged on his ticket. If this 
 order does not accord with his preferences it is provided that he can 
 change it by. simply inscribing ordinal numbers opposite the names of 
 the candidates. It is repeated that, the voter need not do anything 
 more in voting than he does now but he has the additional privileges 
 which have been explained. Now in applying this method to the 
 election of five or seven, or any number of representatives, the 
 principle and the practice so far as the voter is concerned is identical 
 to that employed in electing three members excepting that he has the 
 privilege of voting for more candidates, that is, as many as there are 
 members to be elected, and can indicate his preferences in the 
 same way as before. An illustration of its application to a five mem- 
 ber district may make this a little clearer. 
 
 To do this it will be supposed that each of the dominant parties, 
 the Democratic and Republican, nominate as many candidates as there 
 are members to be elected ; and that the following represent the re 
 spective tickets of the two parties : 
 
 REPUBLICAN TICKET. 
 
 Choice. 
 
 FOR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 
 James Allen. 
 
 
 David Foster. 
 
 
 Alexander Pratt. 
 
 
 Robert Booth. 
 
 
 Lyman Wheeler. 
 
106 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 DEMOCRATIC TICKET. 
 
 Choice. 
 
 FOR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 3 
 
 Frank Campbell. 
 
 2 
 
 Josiah Weeks. 
 
 4 
 
 Allen Bush. 
 
 i 
 
 Dennis Flannigan. 
 
 5 
 
 Aaron Goldberg. 
 
 These would be printed as they now are under the existing laws 
 and regulations prevailing in the different states. If a Republi- 
 can voter was satisfied with the ticket as printed and provided by 
 his party managers, he would vote it just as it is represented. 
 By doing so he would be declaring his preference for the candi- 
 date James Allen named first in the list, who would be his first 
 choice. His second choice would be the one David Foster who 
 stands next on the list, and his third choice would be Alexander Pratt, 
 and so on. But supposing that a voter was not satisfied with the order 
 of preference in which the candidates are named- for instance, if the 
 first choice of a Democratic voter was not Frank Campbell but Dennis 
 Flannigan, in order to express this preference in his vote all he would 
 be obliged to do would be to inscribe a figure i in front of Flannigan's 
 name as shown. If Josiah Weeks was his second choice he would 
 mark his name accordingly, and would also mark the other candidates 
 in the order of his preference as shown. As remarked before, there is 
 nothing in the proposed method of voting which requires any mental 
 effort greater than that which a voter must exert at present. 
 
 Let it be supposed though that the independent Democrats in the 
 district are dissatisfied with the ticket nominated by the regulars, and 
 that they think they can elect a candidate who will represent them 
 more acceptably. They therefore conclude to nominate a ticket of 
 their own, but are uncertain whether they can elect more than one 
 
THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 107 
 
 candidate, and being reasonably well satisfied with the third of the 
 regular Democratic nominees, they conclude to make him the second 
 candidate on a ticket headed by Thomas Tiffany, an " anti snapper,'* 
 we will assume. 
 
 This ticket would then be as follows : 
 
 INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC TICKET. 
 
 Choice. 
 
 FOR ASSEMBLY. 
 
 Thomas Tiffany. 
 
 Allen Bush. 
 
 Each voter can now vote one of the regular tickets if he chooses to 
 do so, or he can scratch out any name he likes, or if they are riot ar- 
 ranged in the order of his choice he can change it by placing an or- 
 dinal number opposite any name which will designate which candi- 
 date is his ist, 2d, 3d, 4th or 5th choice, as has been explained. In 
 other words he has the utmost liberty in voting. If he chooses he can 
 vote for one candidate, just as he does now, or for two, three, four or 
 five. If the names have been inscribed by the party managers in the 
 regularly printed tickets in the order of the voter's preference, he votes 
 it as printed. If their order is not in accordance with his preferences, 
 he indicates the latter by marking ordinal numbers opposite the names 
 which will express it. He is not obliged, as in Illinois, to indicate on 
 his ticket how many votes he will give to each candidate. What he 
 expresses in effect is " I will give all my votes to my favorite candi- 
 date, who is my first choice, if they are needed to elect him, or I will 
 divide them between as many of my two, three or more favorites as 
 can be elected. ' ' Whether they can be will be determined by the 
 counting of the votes. 
 
 The independents it will be supposed are in revolt. The regular 
 Democrats have as they often do placed an unfit and unsatisfactory 
 candidate at the head of their ticket, which determines some of the 
 
108 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 --..;->. ,i , .. ;i ,.-. ; .... :r : . ra .'>, - , : ^ -* 
 
 voters f'6'rnake "aii ; independent nomination, and run ah independent 
 ticket?H^|/ J ^glect Thomas Tiffany^ a many it will be. assumed, of 
 marked ability and integrity and with the qualifications demand'ed by' 
 the independents to represent their 'views and interests and place him 
 at the head of their ticket. They then agree by a canvass of the dis- 
 trict to vote for him as their ist choice. 
 
 The counting and return of the votes to .the district canvassers from 
 the different election districts would then be exactly the same as has been 
 already described and made in a blank similar to that on page 95, ex- 
 cepting that there would be the names of more candidates on it. These 
 returns would be entered on a blank similar to the one on page 96, but 
 with columns for ist, 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th choice votes instead of three 
 only. When all the returns are received and tabulated and the votes 
 in each column are added up the sums at the foot of the columns would 
 be carried to the appropriate places in a blank similar to the one on 
 page 98, but with five horizontal lines for the five classes of votes. 
 The sums thus entered in this blank are then divided by the ordinal 
 numbers and the quotients carried into the columns with that head- 
 ing. It is assumed that the figures in the last blank represent the 
 results of an election in a district in which three members are to be 
 elected. The quotients for each candidate are then added up, and the 
 lowest one is crossed out. This operation is continued until only five 
 quotients, which are the highest, are left. The candidates for whom 
 these were cast, being " the highest in votes," are elected. 
 
 This system can be applied to the election of seven, nine or any 
 number of representatives from a district and will always give a repre- 
 sentation proportioned to the number of any body of electors who may 
 vote for the same candidate or candidates. 
 
 In order to make the practice which exists in Illinois and the sys- 
 tem which has been explained here more nearly parallel, it has been 
 assumed in the explanation of the latter that when three members are 
 to be elected, that each voter can give three votes for each candidate, 
 but in the final count those cast for the second choice candidate are to 
 be divided by 2 and those for the third choice by 3. To carry out 
 this parallel, if five members are to be elected then each voter should 
 be allowed to give five votes for each, those for the second, third, 
 
THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION, 109 
 
 fourth and fifth choice candidates to be divided by 2, 3, 4, and 5, as 
 has been explained. 
 
 It does not matter so, far as the result is concerned whether each 
 vioter gives five votes to each candidate or whether he gives one to 
 each, which may be divided into five parts. It is only a difference 
 in the method of expressing and representing the fact that the voter 
 has a certain amount of voting power or potency, all of which may be 
 given to one candidate, or a half to another, or a third to another, and 
 so on. It is a mere verbal distinction to call the voting power which 
 an elector can give to one candidate five votes, or to call it one vote 
 divided into five parts. As there undoubtedly is more or less popular 
 prejudice against allowing a voter to cast more than one vote for a single 
 candidate, it would seem to be better if "a. system of free voting is 
 adopted" to call each person's voting power one vote, and permit it to 
 be divided and distributed in equal parts thereof among different can- 
 didates. As explained this would not affect the final result in any way. 
 
 Owing to the prejudice referred to, it therefore seems in every way 
 desirable that the votes of electors should be limited to one for each of 
 as many candidates as he chooses to vote for, not exceeding the num- 
 ber to be elected in the general district. It is therefore recom- 
 mended that each voter simply give the names of the candidates he 
 prefers in his ballot and that one vote be counted for each, the votes to 
 be subject to the division in the final count, which has been explained. 
 
 The number of representatives elected in each district should how- 
 ever always be an odd one, that is three, five or seven and not four, 
 six or eight. The reason for this may perhaps, be made plain easiest by 
 an illustration. Let it be supposed that the Democrats in a district 
 have 36,360 voters and the Republicans 48,470, and that six members 
 are to be elected. If each of the two parties runs three candidates and 
 all the voters cast one* vote for each candidate, in the manner 
 which has been explained and recommended, then on the final divi- 
 sion and count, the result would be as follows : 
 
 *In practice there would of course be more or less scatteiing of votes, that is, some 
 voters would select one candidate for their first, second third, etc. , choices and some 
 would choose others ; it is not likely that all would vote in the same way as has been 
 indicated in the table for the purposes of this illustration. 
 
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 REPUBLICANS 
 
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 Elective Quotients 
 
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 Elective Quotients. 
 
 
 CHOICE. 
 
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 CHOICE. 
 
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THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. Ill 
 
 Striking out the lowest elective quotients beginning with 6060 and 
 successively 7272, 8078*, 9090, 9694 and 12,117^ until there are 
 only six such quotients left and it will be seen that A, J3 and C, 
 on the Democratic ticket and G, J7 and /on the Republican would be 
 elected. That is the Republicans with only 36,360 votes will elect as 
 many representatives as the Democrats do with with 48,470. A little 
 analysis will show that if six members are elected ' l unless the party 
 in a majority exceeds the minority, in a proportion of more than four to 
 three, it cannot secure a majority of members , when both parties make 
 the best use of their numbers"* and three members of each party 
 would be elected in the preceding example in spite of the fact that 
 the Republicans had a majority of 12,110. 
 
 If there is any one political maxim more firmly rooted in the 
 American mind than another it is the one which asserts that "the 
 majority should rule. ' ' As has been said ' ' popular opinion has elevated 
 it to the sanctity of a great principle of free government. " A system 
 of election which would withhold from majorities power which it is 
 thought rightfully belongs to them would be certain to encounter great 
 public opposition and excite great dissatisfaction, and would not be 
 tolerated for any great length of time. If however five or seven or 
 any other odd number of members were elected from each district by 
 the method which has been explained, then whichever party has a 
 majority of voters can always elect a majority of the representatives. 
 Thus with the figures which have been used for the preceding 
 illustration, if only five candidates were to be elected then C 
 would have been defeated and the Democrats would have elected 
 two and the Republicans three. If seven members were elected 
 then J would have had to be counted in and the Republicans would 
 have had three and the Democrats four. This same result would 
 be reached if the Democrats had a majority of only one. In other 
 words if an odd number of candidates are elected from each district, 
 then, if there are two parties nearly equally divided the one having a 
 bare majority of the voters can always elect a majority of the represen- 
 tatives ; which accords with the traditional rights of majorities. It is 
 
 *G. Shaw Lefevre, in Nineteenth Century, of May, 1884. 
 
112 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 true that if a third party should run a candidate in a district in which 
 an odd number of representatives is to be elected, it might produce 
 the same condition of things between the first and second parties that 
 would exist if an even number of candidates were elected in the district 
 by two parties alone, but in that event, the result would be due and 
 would be attributed to the action of the third party and it would not 
 be a result inherent in the system of election. In times of great 
 political excitement, to withhold from the party which has a decided 
 majority of the voters, the advantage accruing from having a majority 
 of the representatives, would be certain to produce great public hos- 
 tility from them which might lead to very serious results. 
 
 The modification of the Burnitz system for electing representatives 
 to national, state, municipal and corporate bodies may then be sum- 
 marily described as follows : 
 
 ist. An odd number of representatives greater than two should be 
 elected in each district. 
 
 2d. Each voter may give on his ballot the names of not exceeding 
 
 * candidates for whom he votes, and may indicate his preferences 
 
 for such candidates by ordinal numbers marked opposite their names ; 
 or, in the absence of such numbers, the order in which the names are 
 inscribed on his ticket shall indicate the order of his preferences. 
 
 $d. The first, second, third, fourth, etc., preference names for the 
 different candidates to be counted separately ; the total number of first 
 preferences of each candidate to be divided by one, the second preferences 
 by two, the third by three, and so on. The quotients thus obtained for 
 each candidate to be added together, and their sum will be his elective 
 quotient. The number of candidates who are to be elected having the 
 highest elective quotients shall be declared elected. 
 
 This system is applicable to and is adapted for any kind of elec- 
 tions in which any number of members greater than two are to be 
 elected. It is as well suited to the election of presidential electors 
 and members of Congress as it is to state legislatures, and representa- 
 tives in municipal governing bodies, primary meetings, corporate or 
 other associations. It is believed that if it is adopted any number of 
 
 *The number to be elected. 
 
THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 113 
 
 members may be elected in a district without encountering any of the 
 difficulties which have been experienced with cumulative voting. Its 
 advantages may then be finally summed up as follows : 
 
 i st. It will give perfect freedom to the voter in the selection of 
 candidates and the concentration of his votes, and will give them 
 their full efficacy. No additional mental or physical effort greater 
 than that which is demanded by the present method of voting will be 
 required of him, either antecedent to or during the act of casting his 
 ballot. 
 
 2d. No other duties are demanded of inspectors of election, poll 
 and ballot clerks, than are required now, excepting to count and 
 record several classes of votes, for each candidate, instead of one 
 only. 
 
 3d. The general district canvassers will be required, as now, to re- 
 cord and sum up the votes reported from the local districts, to divide 
 the sums by their ordinal numbers and then sum up the quotients. 
 The only additions to their duties are those resulting from the increase 
 in the number of ordinal classes of votes or preferences for candidates, 
 the division of the sums of their votes by their ordinal numbers, and 
 the final summation of the quotients, which are all very simple pro- 
 cesses. 
 
 "If," as was said of the Hare system, "there be anything 
 which affords a pretense of foundation for the charge of complexity, it 
 is the appropriations of the votes after the ballot or polling is over ; 
 and this is to be performed by properly instructed and responsible offi- 
 cers, under careful and scrupulous control, and subject to the critical 
 inspection of the parties especially concerned." Surely a charge that 
 the proposed system is complex has little basis to rest on, and even if it 
 had the response might again be made that ' ' the object of government 
 is justice and not simplicity. ' ' We have it on the authority of the mod- 
 ern philosophers that ' ' all organic development is a change from a 
 state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity. ' ' Political evolution 
 is a like process. 
 
 In order to formulate the general principles of the Burnitz system 
 of election into a concrete form the following amendment to the Con- 
 stitution of the State of New York has been framed. It is based on 
 
114 THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 tho one proposed by the Proportional Representation Society of New 
 York, which contains a provision for the election of state senators and 
 assemblymen and members of the legislative bodies of cities by a sys- 
 tem of cumulative voting. The following amendment is intended as a 
 substitute for some of the provisions of Article III. of the present 
 Constitution : 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 SECTION I. The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and 
 Assembly. 
 
 SEC. 2. The Senate shall consist of thirty-five members, and the Assembly of one 
 hundred and forty members. The Senators and the Assemblymen shall be chosen for 
 two years. 
 
 SEC. 3. The Legislature, at its first session, after this article shall have become 
 part of the Constitution, shall divide the State into five Senate districts, and declare the 
 boundaries thereof ; and shall also divide the State into twenty Assembly districts and 
 declare the boundaries thereof. 
 
 SEC. 4. The Senate and Assembly districst shall consist of convenient and con- 
 tiguous territory, shall have a population, excluding aliens, as nearly equal as may be 
 conveniently practicable and not less than seven -Senators and seven Assemblymen shall 
 be elected from each district at the same time. 
 
 SEC. 5. And to insure a real freedom of voting for and of election of Senators 
 and, Assemblymen, each qualified voter in each of these districts may give on his bal- 
 lot the names of not exceeding seven candidates for the Senate and Assembly respec- 
 tively, for whom he votes ; and may indicate his preferences for such candidates by 
 ordinal numbers marked opposite their names ; or, in the absence of such numbers the 
 order in which the names are inscribed on his ballot. shall indicate the order of his 
 preferences. 
 
 SEC. 6. After the closing of the polls on the day of election, the canvass in each 
 election district shall be completed by ascertaining and counting,, separately, and mak- 
 ing returns to a Board of District Canvassers, in the respective Senate and Assembly dis- 
 tricts, of the number of the first, second, third, etc. , votes given for each candidate. 
 Prom the returns so made the Boards of District Canvassers in each district shall deter- 
 mine the total number each of first, second, third, etc. , preference votes cast for each 
 candidate in the respective districts. The total number of first preference votes for 
 each candidate shall then be divided by I, the total number of second preference 
 votes by 2, the third by 3 and so on. The quotients thus obtained for each candi- 
 date shall be added together and their sum will be his elective quotient. The seven 
 candidates for the Senate and Assembly having the highest elective quotients in the 
 respective districts shall be declared elected. 
 
 SEC. 7. If a member of the Senate or Assembly shall die or resign, or his seat 
 become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the can- 
 
THE BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 1 15 
 
 didate who had the next highest elective quotient of the body of electors to which 
 such member belongs. 
 
 SEC. 8. The Legislature shall also enact a law requiring the several cities of the 
 state to be divided into districts for the election of the members of their respective leg- 
 islative bodies, which election shall be according to such method of free voting and 
 election, described in Sections 5 and 6 of this article. 
 
 SEC. 9. Such municipal districts shall have, as nearly as practicable, an equal 
 population, exclusive of aliens. Not less than seven such members shall be elected 
 from each of the districts at the same time. 
 
 SEC. 10. In case of a vacancy occurring in any such municipal legislative bodies 
 it shall be filled in the same manner as presented for Senators and Assemblymen in 
 Section 7 of this article. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 
 
 To show still further some of the political evils from which we are 
 now suffering, and how they could be overcome, by a system of free 
 voting, an illustration will be given. In the city of New York the 
 nomination of candidates for the state legislature and the local board 
 of aldermen is almost absolutely controlled by the professional politi- 
 cians and party managers in and through their organizations, caucuses 
 and party machinery. We, the voters, are victims of the "machines," 
 and as a practical politician recently said : "It's great sport to see peo- 
 ple go to the polls in herds and vote like cattle for the ticket we pre- 
 pare. * * * The people think they make the nominations, but 
 we do that business for them." The candidates thus nominated as 
 some one else has said "represent, not the will of the majority, but 
 the tyranny of an active and unscrupulous minority. " If he had said 
 of two or more minorities who give us a choice of evils in the candi- 
 dates they nominate the statement would have been more nearly in 
 accordance with the experience of many voters. Under this tyrannical 
 control of political affairs, as Mr. Sterne has said in his book, from 
 which we have quoted before : ' ' To become one of the dominant 
 majority, the citizen must attach himself to the party in power, or to 
 one which has the opportunity to come into power ; to do so the voter 
 must, in a majority of cases, surrender his individual preferences as to 
 men, and as often to measures, which he believes to be for the public 
 welfare, so that some of his opinions may prevail, or that some tenet 
 of the opposite party, to which he is more especially adverse, may not 
 become law," or what is perhaps still worse for the public welfare 
 " many men, not liking the choice of evils which party machinery 
 presents to their view, prefer to disfranchise themselves rather than be- 
 come party to the elevation of unfit and improper men to political 
 power. * * * If they belong to the minority in opinion 
 they throw away their votes, as representation is denied to the min- 
 
 nS 
 
POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 117 
 
 ority. If they belong to the majority, they may be compelled 
 to vote for men who turn uppermost in the machinery of party, 
 and in whose professions that they will carry out the party princi- 
 ples they have no faith." In support of this Mr. Sterne also 
 quotes what Mr. J. Francis Fisher says in a pamphlet on Reform 
 in Municipal Elections: " that, in the progress of years, when 
 he wished to take his humble part as a constituent unit in the 
 body politic, he found himself thrust aside from the procession of state 
 as if he had no legitimate place in its ranks. At the various elections 
 he seldom found any candidate presented to him whom he could sin- 
 cerely approve ; still more rarely one whom he could support with zeal. 
 He always voted for those he thought the worthiest and generally without 
 party prejudice, and the result was that he was almost always in the 
 ranks of the defeated. Although classed among the educated and 
 wealthy, he felt himself as much disfranchised as if he had been ex- 
 cluded from the polls by law. He had no voice in any nomination, 
 only a selection among those he would not have chosen. Many of his 
 most valued friends were in the same category, and with him almost 
 despaired of redress. ' ' This was written more than twenty-five years 
 ago and probably it will express with more or less accuracy what many 
 persons have experienced at nearly every election held during that 
 period. It happens often that honest men having the public interest 
 and good government ^at heart are disposed to use their influence and 
 power, whatever it may be to secure the election of worthy representa- 
 tives. To quote Mr. Sterne again : " In every electoral district, in every 
 community, some men will be found with penetration enough to dis- 
 cover the weaknesses, the follies, and the vices of their neighbors, and 
 who are both skillful and unscrupulous enough to make them sub- 
 servient to their own ends." When the public spirited patriotic 
 citizen goes out in the service of his city, his state or his country, he 
 often finds that there is no scarcity of the class of people described by 
 Mr. Sterne, and he may learn that there is one body of them in league, 
 it not with the vice, at least with the vicious in the district, and another 
 apparently antagonistic to the first, but with common interests in 
 venality and the two are bound together for the protection of those 
 interests, and ready to condone any of the short-comings or wrong- 
 
Il8 POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 
 
 doings of their adversaries for the sake of an alliance for the protection 
 of their selfish aims or purposes. 
 
 With the exception of Illinois all our states, cities and towns are, 
 for representative purposes, divided into districts, each district having 
 a certain number of inhabitants who have but one representative, who 
 is necessarily elected by a majority of the voters in the district. " The 
 hallucination of this," as Mr. Sterne says, " is, that the right of the 
 majority to govern carries with it the right of the majority to sole rep- 
 resentation." In the assembly and aldermanic districts of the city of 
 New York the Democrats generally have decided majorities. There is, 
 nevertheless a very large body of Republican voters scattered over the 
 city who are almost entirely unrepresented in the state legislature and 
 in the board of aldermen. The primaries are in the hands of the 
 politicians who are prone to make such nominations as will best secure 
 their nefarious purposes. From these candidates we, the Democratic, 
 Republican, or independent voters must choose the persons who are 
 to be our representatives. There is no freedom of choice, on the con- 
 trary there is constraint and compulsion to vote for men we would not 
 choose to represent us if we were free to make our own selection. 
 The Democrats having a majority of the votes generally elect their 
 candidates, with the result that the large body of Republican and in- 
 dependent voters in New York are unrepresented or are practically 
 disfranchised. Just the reverse of this is true in many of the counties 
 where the Republicans are in a majority. 
 
 11 Absolute acquiescence in the will of the majority, fairly pro- 
 nounced," Mr. Buckalew said, " is a vital principle 'of our system, or 
 one at least, which must be applied and carried out constantly, or our 
 experiment of free government would end in failure. But Mr. Mill 
 long ago pointed out the fact that the majority vote, as heretofore ex- 
 isting in Great Britain and in the United States, does not secure the 
 will of the majority that, in point of fact, the rule which we get 
 from it, as we apply it is a rule of the majority of the majority, or 
 often of a small portion only of the people. In the first place at the 
 popular elections you count out all the minority voters ; you count or 
 allow only majority votes and put aside the rest. A large part of the 
 people, then, are virtually disfranchised, they have no further voice in 
 
POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 119 
 
 the government beyond the giving of fruitless votes, which, after being 
 scored down, are in effect scored out again. Then the representa- 
 tives so chosen meet in a legislative body, and when any measure of 
 policy is to be voted upon, the majority rule is applied again, and the 
 minority of the legislative body ignored, so that the majority of the 
 legislative body pronounces the rule of law for the citizen. 
 
 " Besides, in practice in this country, legislative majorities, upon all 
 measures of a political character at least, and many others, act under a 
 system of consultation that is, under what we call the caucus rule. 
 The representatives of the majority in the representative body meet 
 together, and subject their wills to the decision of a majority of them- 
 selves ; and that caucus decision, concerted and settled in secret, be- 
 comes the law of the state. The caucus is in the third degree removed 
 from the people, and there are three eliminations of popular power be- 
 fore the law is enacted. Therefore I say you do not necessarily secure 
 the rule of the majority under your majority vote, because the majority 
 of the legislative body, made up as I have described it, and acting as 
 it does, may very likely represent only a minority of the people out of 
 doors, and such, in point of fact, is frequently the case. ' ' 
 
 A great evil, too, in our country is the frequent changes in the 
 membership of our legislative bodies. This was very forcibly stated in 
 the report of a Select Committee on Representative Reform of which 
 Mr. Buckalew was chairman submitted to the Senate of the United 
 States in 1869. It was then said : 
 
 " It is believed that changes are now too frequent in the House, 
 and that the public interests suffer detriment from this cause. The 
 committee give their unqualified approval to that provision of the con- 
 stitution which assigns short terms of service to members of the House. 
 But frequency of election does not involve rapidity of change. Pop- 
 ular power may be retained over the House, and yet the great part of 
 its members be continued by reelection for a considerable period of 
 time ; in other words, frequent elections and permanent membership 
 are not incompatible. 
 
 " But, in point of fact, the members o r the House are frequently 
 changed so that members of less than four years' service always con- 
 stitute a large majority, and it is a rare case that a member continues 
 
120 POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 
 
 beyond a third term. Under such a system or practice of rapid 
 change, the average character of the House for ability cannot be high. 
 Two and four year men can know but little of the business of govern 
 merit, can be but imperfectly qualified to curb abuses in the executive 
 department, and to expose or comprehend the true character of most 
 questions of domestic and foreign policy. 
 
 "There are several reasons which account for frequent change in 
 the membership of the House, of which the single-district system is 
 chief. The fluctuation of party power is next in importance, but is 
 intimately connected with the former. The single-district system has 
 carried the idea of local representation to excess, and has produced a 
 class of inconveniences peculiar to itself. The idea of assigning a 
 representative by law to a special district within a state is naturally 
 supplemented by the idea of rotation in the representative privilege 
 among the localities within the district. Hence, very commonly 
 party nominations are made in turn to the several counties, parishes, or 
 other municipal divisions of the district, which necessitates the fre- 
 quent selection of new men for representative nomination. The claim 
 of locality becomes more importunate, and is often more regarded 
 than the claims or fitness of candidates in making party nominations, 
 and this although there is no diversity of interest among the people in 
 the different parts of the district. The other cause which we have 
 mentioned cooperates with this, though subordi nate to it in effect. 
 Changes of party power in districts where one party does not largely 
 predominate over another, are at all times likely to occur and to defeat 
 the member of the House from the district, although his own party 
 may desire to continue him in the public service. These causes of 
 change would have but slight operation if delegations from states were 
 elected by general ticket, and would have still less if they were selected 
 upon the plan of cumulative or free vote as the practicable and effec- 
 tual measure of reform. It will continue members of merit for long 
 periods of time in the House, because it will relieve them and those 
 who support them from the causes of change above mentioned. They 
 can be reflected with certainty so long as * the party whose representa- 
 tives they are desire their continuance in service, and it may be rea- 
 sonably expected that some men of distinction and intellectual power 
 
POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 121 
 
 will always be found in the House whose period of service counts by 
 twenty or thirty years. They will be the great representatives of the 
 party, and will give lustre and power and usefulness to the House, 
 while they will be the objects of profound attachment and of honest 
 pride in the states they represent. Congress will become, much more 
 than at present, a theatre of statesmanship and a fit representative of a 
 great people, whose extended territory, diverse populations and varied 
 interests demand great ability and wisdom in the enactment of the 
 laws. Our present system, .admirably calculated to repress merit, will 
 be supplanted by one which will produce precisely the opposite result. 
 
 " At present a member of the House holding his seat insecurely 
 cannot devote himself to public business with that zeal and confidence 
 which his position demands He is involved all the time in a contest 
 for official existence, and his energies are thereby absorbed and wasted. 
 If he has a just ambition to serve the people he must repress rivals at 
 home, must overcome a rule of rotation in his district and fortify him- 
 self against fluctuations of party power. It will be expected . of him 
 that he shall distribute the patronage of the government to men who 
 will be efficient in his support for reelection ; and thus appointments 
 to office and government contracts are to be his peculiar study and 
 their distribution a leading object of his labor. And he must be lib- 
 eral in his expenditure of money upon elections to retain his popular- 
 ity and place ; and the more of political contribution from abroad he 
 can obtain to influence elections in his district the more admired and 
 the more secure he will be. 
 
 " In brief, his time and his efforts, instead of being expended for 
 the public, must be expended on personal objects if he desires to re- 
 main for any considerable time a representative of the people. Un- 
 doubtedly many of the best men of the country must be deterred from 
 entering upon a congressional career, continuance in which requires 
 such sacrifices to an evil system, so much of unpleasant effort, attended 
 with more uncertainty and probable mortification. ' ' 
 
 One of the greatest political evils from which we are now suffering 
 is the indifference and apathy which exists among voters with refer- 
 ence to political affairs. They say with much truth why should we 
 go to primaries ? We can have no influence there unless we surrender 
 
122 POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 
 
 our opinions and independence to those who control these organiza- 
 tions ; why should we vote ? We have only a choice between two 
 candidates, both unworthy. When this subject was discussed in the 
 British Parliament some years ago, Lord Cairns said : " With regard 
 to the constituency itself and this is one of the most important views 
 of the case I believe you would gain the greatest possible satisfaction; 
 there is nothing so irksome to those who form the minority of one of 
 those large constituencies as finding that from mere force of numbers 
 they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power; that 
 it is vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs ; that 
 the elections must go in one direction, and that they have no political 
 power whatever. On the one hand the result is great dissatisfaction, 
 and on the other it is disinclination on the part of those who form the 
 minority to take any part in affairs in which it is important they should 
 take a prominent and conspicuous part." 
 
 In the same debate Mr. Buxton said : " They (the minority) feel it 
 totally hopeless to attempt to carry a candidate, and they resign them- 
 selves with more or less bitterness to political death. They feel that they 
 are altogether excluded from any influence whatever over the destinies 
 of their country : not merely that they cannot hope to rule, but that 
 they cannot even be represented in the council of the nation. They 
 accordingly sink into hopeless apathy, while the majority having every- 
 thing their own way, not enjoying the advantage of being opposed and 
 forced to struggle and strive, would themselves also be likely to grow at 
 once apathetic and arrogant. He was not devising this state of things out 
 of his own imagination ; they knew that exactly this had happened in 
 many instances both across the water and in certain constituencies at 
 home when one party * * * had held irresistible sway. 
 
 " But now suppose * _* * the arrangement proposed (propor-. 
 tional representation) were adopted ; immediately every elector in 
 the constituency would be stirred into life. Those who belonged to 
 the minority instead of giving up the whole affair as a bad job, shrug- 
 ging their shoulders, and feeling that although they were Englishmen 
 they were as destitute of political influence as if they were so many 
 Indians, would immediately organize themselves as a party to form a 
 committee f o look out for a candidate and combine to carry him. 
 
POLITICAL EVILS WHICH FREE VOTING WOULD LESSEN. 123 
 
 # # * Political deadness would be exchanged for political anima- 
 tion.'' 
 
 It was said in the Address to the Public of the American Proportio lal 
 Representation League : " When every citizen votes with the full assur- 
 ance that each individual vote bears directly upon the final result, the 
 men who have withdrawn in despair from politics as something with 
 which an honest man can have nothing to do, will return to their duty. 
 
 In his article already quoted from Mr. Leonard Courtney said, that 
 with minority representation " you will have a real and not an arti- 
 ficial democracy. According to the idea of this system any adequate 
 number could join together, select their man, and send him in. It 
 follows that if there arose a political thinker in the country, men would 
 come together throughout the country and return him. Men would 
 gather round him and send him in, and you would thus have intro- 
 duced into the House of Commons elements of life, strengthening and 
 vivifying the whole ; instead of making medicrocity a condition with- 
 out which nobody could enter, you would have life and energy secured 
 in the return of able men ; and of course if you got candidates thus 
 independent you would change the House of Commons, and you would 
 operate upon the people outside. ' ' 
 
 As some one else has said : ' * While it is constantly for the interest 
 of cliques and minorities to put knaves and simpletons into office, it 
 never can be to the interest of the majority to be, represented by them." 
 The majority of our fellow citizens wish to be represented by the ablest 
 and best men that the community can furnish ; and Mr. Mill has said : 
 " The multitude have often a fine instinct for distinguishing an able man 
 when he has the means of displaying his ability in a fair field. ' ' Give 
 them freedom of selection and the people of the country, it is believed, 
 may be trusted to select able and also honest men. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 It may be thought that a system of free voting like that which has 
 been described may diminish the influence of party organization in po- 
 litical affairs. Undoubtedly it would give greater independence to 
 individual voters, but this would make it none the less possible to 
 combine for party purposes, if such combination were desirable. Re- 
 garding this Mr. Buckalew will again be quoted : "So long, ' ' he 
 said, "as free play is permitted to the human mind in political affairs, 
 there will be parties, and government must be organized and adminis- 
 tered with reference to them, and that all attempts based upon the 
 assumption that it is possible to conduct public affairs without parties, 
 are idle and vain ; in fine, that all attempts based on that idea must 
 result in complete and disastrous failure. No such object has been 
 proposed by persons in this country, or beyond the ocean, who have 
 supported this plan of the free vote or cumulative voting. All they 
 propose is to put into the hands of political parties an instrument 
 by which they can act justly at elections, by which they can obtain for 
 themselves a fair share of power by their own votes and by which it 
 will be impossible for them to take from their fellow-citizens any por- 
 tion of political power which belongs to them." 
 
 Discussing this same branch of the subject an' English writer * in 
 the Westminster Review for January, 1884, says: 
 
 "A system of preferential voting takes from party organization none 
 of its legitimate influence and power, but it gives any section of the 
 party dissatisfied with the choice of their local association an appeal 
 from its decision. Without endangering the seat they may, if they can, 
 start a more satisfactory candidate, and can take the opinion of the 
 constituency upon the merits of the rivals, not by any fallacious party 
 vote, taken beforehand, but by a test-ballot forming part of the actual 
 process of election. Under these circumstances the association 
 (caucus) will no longer enjoy the dangerous privilege of irresponsible 
 
 * J. Parker Smith. 
 
 124 
 
INFLUENCE OF FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 125 
 
 and absolute authority, but will be in the position of a constitutional 
 ministry liable to have their decisions reversed and discredited unless 
 they can carry along with them the majority of their party. ' ' 
 
 While free voting is adapted to party organization it also facili- 
 tates, as Mr. Buckalew says, ' ' the bolting of nominations by an ag- 
 grieved interest, for such interest, if of respectable size, can repre- 
 sent, by its own votes, without disturbing or changing the whole 
 result of an election. * * * 
 
 "Bolting is deprived to a great extent of its mischievous charac- 
 ter, bolters being only able to represent themselves by their own votes 
 when their number is adequate, without being able to turn an election 
 upside down or prevent a just division of the offices between par- 
 ties. ' ' 
 
 " Proportional representation," Prof. John R. Commons* says, 
 " would permit independent movements within the party without risk- 
 ing the defeat of the entire ticket, simply by allowing the nomination 
 of a new ticket composed partly of independents and partly of the reg- 
 ular ticket. ' ' 
 
 One of the great evils of democratic government, which is especially 
 noticeable in great cities, is the facility with which the most ignorant 
 and venal voters can be combined and controlled as Mr. Sterne says 
 "by men with penetration enough to discover the weaknesses, the 
 follies, and the vices of their neighbors, and who are both skillful and 
 unscrupulous enough to make them subservient to their own ends. ' ' It 
 may be added that venality is often the only weakness, folly and vice 
 which need be discovered in order to make such voters subservient to 
 the purposes of corrupt politicians. The influence of such bodies of 
 voters, thus controlled, given to either of the dominant parties, will 
 often decide which one of them will be in a majority, in districts in 
 which a single representative is elected. Unfortunately the organiza- 
 tion of the intelligent and the worthier electors is not so effective in 
 controlling elections, because, owing to the fact that they hold some 
 definite political principles, or possibly prejudices, they, for that 
 reason, give their adherence or votes to one party or the other, while 
 
 * Proportional Representation a Remedy for Gerrymandering, a paper submitted to 
 the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
 
126 INFLUENCE OF FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 
 
 those who determine on which side the majority shall be are not en- 
 cumbered by any such scruples, but vote, ' ' for revenue only. ' ' The 
 method of the practical politicians is a very simple one and one which 
 they have not been slow in comprehending. It is briefly this first 
 announce in the ' ' platforms ' ' of each of the two dominant parties some 
 general principles and measures which will secure the adherence of 
 nearly equal portions of the honest voters to each. This will leave a 
 remnant of say one-fifth or some other fraction of all the voters. All 
 that is needed then to carry the election, is to cajole or to bribe a major- 
 ity of this unrighteous remnant. The professional politicians are not 
 usually slow to work the corrupt remnant, in their vernacular, " for all 
 it is worth. ' ' The political influence of the intelligent, upright and 
 worthy portion of the community is therefore, generally, "in the 
 inverse ratio of their mental and moral capacity and value. Unless 
 this evil is encountered by giving to intellect and integrity a greater 
 freedom and effectiveness of action not freedom to bribe and cajole ; 
 but freedom for pure and honorable effort and therewith, higher and 
 better inducements to act, will surely leave them in this country as 
 elsewhere in like circumstances, degraded and powerless. ' ' * 
 
 The reform of our elective machinery which is advocated would 
 make combinations of the better elements in society easier and more 
 effective in political affairs than they can possibly be now. It is true 
 that the corrupt portion of the voters would have equal facilities for 
 combining but they would no longer be able to control political affairs, 
 and their sole object and that of their leaders is to control the power, 
 patronage and ' ' boodle. ' ' Take away their power to do this and the 
 motive for their being " in politics" is gone. As the Hon. Charles 
 Francis Adams said in a recent article in the Proportional Representa- 
 tion Review : 
 
 ' ' Consider what an enormous influence this would give to the 
 intelligent individual voter ! How it would bother the municipal 
 ' boss ! ' Voters are now divided up and segregated by artificial 
 lines ; they are in this way so placed that they can be manipulated by 
 astute political managers to the utmost possible extent. Their efforts 
 at a better state of things can be thwarted. Under the system pro- 
 * Thomas Hare in Macmillari 's Magazine, February, 1862. 
 
INFLUENCE O7 FREE VOTING IN PARTY ORGANIZATION. 12 J 
 
 posed they, would be free from all restraints and put in position where 
 the individual could make himself felt, provided he desired so to do. 
 He could not be tied hand and foot. 
 
 " Take the city of New York. We all know the character of those 
 composing the legislative department of the city. It is notorious it 
 could not be worse than it is. Suppose that instead of the present 
 board of aldermen and its common council the city of New York were 
 to elect one legislative body in such a way that every proportionate 
 part of the voters should have one representative. Suppose every vote 
 to bear directly upon the final result, with all useless majorities and 
 wasted minorities given their proper effect. If the council consisted 
 of 21 members any body of citizens numbering one 2istpart of the 
 whole number of voters could and would have one representative. 
 Would not the inevitable result be the nomination as candidates by 
 citizen organizations of at least a certain number of men, who, if 
 elected would give weight and character to that body ? Would not the 
 result naturally be that men of the class now composing the legislative 
 department of New York city either would not be brought forward as 
 candidates at all, or if brought forward before the constituency as a 
 whole, and no longer in wards, would be left in the election at the 
 foot of the poll ? Every reform organization hoping to represent one 
 twenty-first part of the total vote thrown would be under the highest 
 possible inducement to put forward as its candidate the man of the 
 strongest character, and the man most widely and favorably known. 
 The objection to bringing forward men who were only locally known 
 would be equally great. The object of each organization would nec- 
 essarily be to nominate candidates who would draw to themselves the 
 greatest number of votes in the constituency at large. The political 
 prison lines, now known as ward lines, would be thrown down. ' ' 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 
 
 But it may be said as Disraeli did say that, " cumulative voting, 
 and other schemes having for their object to represent minorities, that 
 they were admirable schemes for bringing crotchety men into the 
 House," or as John Bright said, they would "put in the nominees of 
 little cliques, " or to quote Gladstone's words, "we do not want to 
 have represented immature particular shades of opinion." Now what 
 is a " crotchet " ? Nearly all legislative innovations are, at first, re- 
 garded as being "crotchets" or, as the dictionary expresses it, 
 "perverse fancies." If as De Quincey said, "these cannot be ex- 
 plained to any rational man, ' ' then of course it is not desirable that 
 they should have representation. The abolition of slavery, the estab- 
 lishing of free trade and civil service reform, and even honesty in the 
 public service, all were, or are, regarded as crotchets. If opinions are 
 held by any considerable body of men even if they are crotchets 
 it is altogether better that they should have a fair hearing. If they 
 cannot be ' ' explained to rational people, ' ' the hearing will do 
 little harm. Mr. Bright' s remark is perhaps true that "little" 
 cliques should not be heard in the halls of legislature, but the 
 force of his remark is in the word "little" Ought big "cliques" 
 to be heard, that is, if any considerable body of intelligent voters 
 hold any opinions relating to the conduct of public affairs, 
 ought they to be heard? It may be true, as Gladstone said, that 
 "immature particular shades of opinion" ought not to be repre- 
 sented, but if the shades of opinion are mature and generally held by a 
 sufficient number of people, so as to form important political interests 
 in the country then they should have representation and be heard, even 
 though those who hold such opinions are not in a majority. It is true 
 that the time of legislative bodies and the patience of legislators ought 
 not to be consumed and wasted by " cranks " and " wind-bags," but. 
 as a writer in the North American Review in 1862*, said : " If the 
 
 * P. 240. 
 
 128 
 
OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 1 29 
 
 legislative assembly be in its prime intent and use a parliament, a talk- 
 ing body, every numerous and respectable party among the people has 
 an undoubted right to its share in the talk; every significant phasis of 
 opinion has a right to be presented and advocated ; or, to state the 
 case still more strongly, the nation has a right to such practical wis- 
 dom as can be elicited only by the free comparison and discussion of 
 opposing and divergent theories and measures ; and the legislators who 
 represent a bare majority have no right to close their ears and minds 
 to the most ample and forceful presentation of the views and arguments 
 of the minority." 
 
 Mr. Gladstone in his discussion of this question laid down that 
 "the principle of parliamentary representation is that we should 
 recognize each constituency as being in itself an integer, and what we 
 want in the House is the prevailing sense of the community. ' ' Now 
 is it more philosophical and just to regard bare majorities in restricted 
 geographical districts as political ' ' integers ' ' or considerable bodies of 
 qualified voters holding common opinions, having like interests, and 
 whose " wills are in harmony with respect to the reciprocal rights of men 
 and social relations, ' ' but who are scattered over wider areas than the 
 present constituencies are ? Just representation it would seem should be 
 based on the theory that bodies of people whose interests and opin- 
 ions are harmonious are the true political integers which ought to be 
 heard. 
 
 The strong argument though which is advanced by the opponents 
 of minority representation is that " it is desirable that the party which 
 has a majority in the country should have a good working majority, 
 considering the power of obstruction even a small minority can exert. 
 Is it not therefore desirable that the majority in Parliament should be 
 greater than that in the country ? " It has been said that it is a mis- 
 take to assume that the main object of law is to administer justice 
 that it is asserted is only an incident to its operation but its main 
 purpose is to end dispute and contention. So it may be said of legis- 
 lative bodies that it is not of the utmost importance that their acts 
 should be the wisest possible, but they should be decisive so as to 
 maintain ' < law. ' ' The argument of the opponents of minority repre- 
 sentation is that it will weaken the decisiveness of governments, by re- 
 
130 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 
 
 ducing majorities. But this occurs under the present system where 
 opinions in legislative bodies are nearly evenly balanced, as they often 
 are, and, if public opinion is very equally divided is it not better, in 
 every way, that both sides should at least be fully heard ? When elec- 
 tions are decided by bare majorities, it often happens that there are 
 sudden changes and one party is turned out and another put in. A 
 vacillating government, or one which changes suddenly from one side 
 to the other of important questions, is worse than one with a small 
 majority. When majorities are very large parties for that reason are 
 liable to split into factions and become disorganized. When public 
 opinion is emphatic the government may also be so, but when there is 
 a nearly equal division of opinion government should be cautious and 
 conservative. 
 
 Considerable complaint comes from Illinois of the narrowness of 
 the majority in the House of Representatives, in that state, owing to 
 the representation of both parties through cumulative voting. 
 
 The following are some of the opinions received in reply to the 
 circular of inquiry : 
 
 " The majority ought to rule and it does not always rule under the 
 cumulative system. " Rep. Springfield. 
 
 "It gives in Illinois Republican representatives in Democratic 
 districts and Democratic representatives in Republican districts. Thus 
 it weakens the dominant party and so far as I can see helps none but 
 it gives the minority a representation everywhere." Rep. Sandwich. 
 
 ' ' In some instances the system has so equally divided the members 
 of our legislature politically as to prevent action. The cumulative 
 system would give minorities in Congress and in the boards sufficient 
 strength as to prevent action. ' * Dem. Anna. 
 
 "Some of the disadvantages are, the legislature is too close as 
 instance U. S. senatorships that have been obtained in this state by 
 questionable means that is never a majority of more than a dozen, 
 and it is very often two or three ; that you will concede is too close, it 
 is not a good working majority. ' ' Rep. Austin. 
 
 " The worst result of the system is that it gives the minority undue 
 strength and advantage. In Illinois under this system the minority 
 may be said to control legislation, for the legislature is usually so evenly 
 
OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 131 
 
 balanced that the majority party, which is held responsible for the acts 
 of the session, finds its hands tied and can do little without the con- 
 sent of the minority. It has happened also that the minority party has 
 gained control of the lower house, though the majority against them 
 in the state was large. Great and desirable reforms in legislation have 
 been hindered and defeated because of this. The two parties being so 
 evenly balanced that each could throw the blame of failure on the other." 
 In our system of government the majority must be held responsible for 
 legislation, and a system that gives the minority almost equal strength 
 and puts every weapon of obstruction and hindrance in its hands is not 
 a good system. ' ' Rep. Pontiac. 
 
 The mathematics of this objection does not, however, seem to be 
 quite satisfactory or conclusive, for the reason that what a party would 
 gain in one section it would be likely to lose in another. Thus the 
 northern part of Illinois is predominantly Republican and the southern 
 half* Democratic, consequently the influence of the one section would 
 counteract that of the other. In the State of New York the Republi- 
 cans would gain largely in the city of New York, by free voting, but 
 would lose in the rural districts. In Illinois the state senators are 
 elected by a majority of the voters in single districts, while the mem- 
 bers of the House are elected on the cumulative plan. In 1892 
 there were 22 Republican and 29 Democratic senators elected. The 
 House consisted of 75 Republicans and 78 Democrats. It is true the 
 majority of the Democrats in the senate was larger than in the House, 
 but the difference is not greater than might be accounted for by 
 accidental circumstances or as the result, possibly, of the gerry- 
 mander. 
 
 When this subject was under discussion ten or more years ago, in 
 England, Mr. Bright " claimed to have demolished John Stuart Mill 
 and his views on proportional representation, to the effect that if pro- 
 portional representation had been the practice in the United States at 
 the time of the war of secession that it would have been impossible to 
 have prosecuted it or abolished slavery. 
 
 1 ' The answer to Mr. Bright is that if proportional representation 
 had been the principle on which their elections had been conducted, 
 
 *The extreme southern counties are also Republican. 
 
132 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 
 
 slavery would have been abolished, and the war would never have taken 
 place. ' ' * 
 
 Of this Prof. Ware in his article in the American Law Review 
 said : 
 
 " Could the principle of proportional representation have been 
 recognized in the composition of the House of Representatives twenty 
 years ago, it would have introduced into Congress a large number of 
 northern Democrats and southern Whigs, occupying a middle ground 
 and holding the balance of power men out of favor at home, but 
 strong enough both in numbers and position to check the violence that 
 led at last to the civil war. ' ' 
 
 This statement was emphatically accepted and endorsed by the sen- 
 ate committee in their report on representative reform, to which refer- 
 ence has already been made. According to that report, the declared 
 opinion of the picked and chosen members of the United States Sen- 
 ate is : 
 
 ' ' The absence of the cumulative vote in the states of the south, 
 when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break 
 the Union, was unfortunate, for it would have held the union men of 
 those states together, and given them voice in the electoral colleges 
 and in Congress. 
 
 " But they were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of elec- 
 tions, and were swept forward by the course of events into impotency 
 or open hostility to our cause. By that rule they were shut out of the 
 electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without 
 due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to 
 secession and to civil war ; their leaders were struck down at unjust 
 elections, and could not speak or act for them in their own states' or at 
 the capital of the nation. 
 
 ' ' By facts well known to us we are assured that the leaders of the 
 revolt with much difficulty carried their states with them. Even in 
 Georgia, the empire state of the south, the scale was almost balanced 
 for a time, and in most of these states it required all the machinery 
 and influence of a vicious electoral system to organize the war against 
 us, and hold those communities compactly as our foes. ' ' 
 
 * Albert Grey, in Nineteenth Century of December, 1884. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 133 
 
 The strong argument in reply to the objection that a government 
 in which all bodies of opinions and interests are represented will be less 
 decisive than one in which local majorities control is that: ''there 
 will be less fluctuation under a system of proportional representation, 
 because the people who fluctuate will affect only their own quotas, in- 
 stead of affecting the representation of those who are staunch by turning 
 the majorities in a large number of districts. Now a steady pressure 
 is not less potent for progressive legislation, and is more likely to be 
 wisely applied than an occasional rush. The majorities obtained by 
 large turn-overs are in truth too insecure in themselves to afford steady 
 support to a minister."* 
 
 Another argument that is often urged against minority representa- 
 tion is that the plan destroys the local character of the representation. 
 Of this argument Mr. Mill observed : " Every constituency, it is said, 
 is a group, having certain interests and feelings in common, and if 
 you disperse these groups by allowing the electors to group themselves 
 in other combinations, those interests and feelings will be deprived of 
 their representation. Now I fully admit that the interests and feel- 
 ings of localities ought to be represented, and I add that they always 
 will be represented, because those interests and feelings exist in the 
 minds of the electors ; and as the plan I propose has no effect but to 
 give the freest and fullest play to the individual electors over prefer- 
 ences, his local preferences are certain to exercise their proper amount 
 of influence. I do not know what better guardian of a feeling can be 
 wanted than the man who feels it, or how it is possible for a man to 
 h^ve a vote, and not carry his interests and feelings, local as well as 
 general, with him to the polling booth. Indeed, it may be set down 
 as certain that the majority of voters in every locality will generally 
 prefer to be represented by one of themselves, who is connected with 
 the place by some special tie. It is chiefly those who know themselves 
 to be locally in a minority, and unable to elect a local representative 
 of their opinions, who would avail themselves of the liberty of voting 
 on the new principle. As far as the majority were concerned, the 
 only effect would be that their local leaders would have a greatly in- 
 creased motive to find out and bring forward the best local candidate 
 
 * Nineteenth Century , February, 1885. 
 
134 OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 
 
 that could be had, because the electors, having the power of transfer- 
 ring their votes elsewhere, would demand a candidate whom they 
 would feel it a credit to vote for. The average quality of the local 
 representative would consequently be improved, but local interests and 
 feelings would still be represented, as they cannot possibly fail to be,, 
 as long as every elector resides in a locality. ' ' 
 
 This is in substance saying that if electors regard their local in- 
 terests as of more importance than general interests they can and prob- 
 ably will vote for some one who will represent their local interests 
 most satisfactorily. If on the other hand they are most concerned in 
 some measures relating to the general public weal, then they would 
 select and vote for the candidate or candidates who would most satis- 
 factorily represent these interests. In other words they would be FREE 
 to vote for the promotion of either local or general interests as they 
 choose or possibly for both. The question then arises whether it is 
 desirable that electors should be at liberty to give their political influ- 
 ence for the advancement of those interests which they regard as being 
 the most important be they local or general. Probably few voters will 
 hesitate about deciding in favor of the greatest freedom in the exercise 
 of the right of suffrage. 
 
 Besides this reason, as Mr. Horton has said, " the argument in favor 
 of the single district that it gives district local interests a hearing, is 
 to-day in part neutralized by the rapidity of travel and the facilities of 
 communication." As another writer has said : " the end and object 
 of reform, whatever it may be, is best attained by the representation of 
 electors and not of localities. ' ' Mr. Courtney * stated this argument 
 very well in saying that " there would be no more loss of local feel- 
 ing than the people living in localities wish to lose. If people are so 
 animated with a local feeling that they must vote for one man in their 
 own neighborhood, they would have perfect liberty so to do. You 
 give them power to join with those who are allied with them in feel- 
 ing and thought, instead of with those who live next door ; but you 
 don't force them to go afield, and whenever local wants demanded 
 local representation they would be sure to secure it. ' ' 
 
 Furthermore, where is the justice or the wisdom of refusing to 
 
 * Nineteenth Century for July, 1879. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO MINORITY REPRESENTATION CONSIDERED. 135 
 
 authorize a man to make laws for us because he lives on the other side 
 of some arbitrary line which separates one district from another. As 
 Mr. Quincy * has said : "Is there any person outside of politics, and 
 outside a mad-house, who desires a law to forbid him from employing 
 a worthy man, whether as blacksmith, doctor, lawyer or legislator 
 because he lives in an adjoining town, or perhaps across the street in 
 the next ward ? ' ' 
 
 Sometimes the principle of local representation is reduced to an 
 absurdity. Thus in the lower wards of New York city there is pro- 
 perty the value of which is probably greater than that in any equal 
 area in the world and amounts to many millions ; and yet, in those 
 wards, almost, if not quite, the only persons who vote for representa- 
 tives, from these districts, in Congress, the state legislature and the 
 common council of the city, are the janitors of the buildings, as they 
 are the only residents in these districts. 
 
 * " The Protection of Majorities," by Josiah Phillips Quincy, 1879. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 It may, not unfairly, be asked what would be gained, practically, if 
 the system of free voting which has been described were adopted in the 
 city and State of New York, or in other cities and states, and we were 
 to elect say seven representatives to our state and municipal legislative 
 bodies from each district enlarged with that object in view ? 
 
 It may be replied in the first place, it would make it possible for 
 any body of voters exceeding an eighth of all in the district to elect 
 a candidate by uniting and casting all their votes for him. That this 
 could be done can be shown by an assumed example : Supposing that 
 there are 30,632 voters in a district, in which seven representatives are 
 to be elected, then one-eighth of the voters plus i would be equal to 
 3830. It will be supposed that our hypothetical district is located in 
 one of the strong Democratic sections of New York city and that 22,- 
 972 voters are Democrats and 7660 are Republicans. The Democrats 
 let it be assumed, are confident, as they have been in the past, that they 
 can carry everything before them and therefore they nominate a full 
 ticket of seven candidates for aldermen. A, J3, C, D, , ^and G, 
 let us say, and all the voters being loyal to the ticket vote it ' ' straight. ' ' 
 The Republicans being in a very decided minority nominate only three 
 candidates, If, /andy, and they all vote their regular ticket. The 
 results of the election would then be as shown in the' third column of 
 the table on next page. 
 
 It will be supposed further that when the voting is completed and 
 all the votes in the districts have been counted, that the Burnitz 
 method, for the final computation is employed, that is, the total 
 number of first choice votes for each candidate to be divided by I, the 
 total number of second choice votes by 2, the third choice by j, and so on. 
 If this is done and if the seven candidates who receive the highest 
 quotients are elected it will be seen that the 7660 Republicans in this 
 district have elected two of their men. This they can do under the 
 
 136 
 
ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 137 
 
 Burnitz system of free voting in spite of any combination which the 
 Democrats can make against them. 
 
 DEMOCRATIC VOTE. 
 I 2 3 
 
 REPUBLICAN VOTE. 
 
 2 3 
 
 Candidate. 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Quotients 
 
 Candidate. 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Quotients 
 
 ist A 
 
 22,972 
 
 22,972 
 
 ist H 
 
 7,660 
 
 7,660 
 
 2 d B 
 
 22,972 
 
 11,486 
 
 2d I 
 
 7,660 
 
 3,830 
 
 3d C 
 
 22,972 
 
 7>657i 
 
 3d J 
 
 7,660 
 
 _I_^M^J> 
 
 ^^^^^^^3 
 
 4th D 
 
 22,972 
 
 5,743 
 
 
 
 
 5th E 
 
 22, 9 7 V 2 
 
 4,594f 
 
 
 
 
 6th F 
 
 22,972 
 
 r****t 
 
 
 
 
 7th G 
 
 22,972 
 
 .. ~Q~ R 
 Jl T 
 
 
 
 
 The principle on which this result is based may be expressed math- 
 ematically if we suppose jV equals the total number of votes, then 
 
 In other words, one-eighth of #//the votes -f- i vote (or any other 
 number) is greater than one-seventh of the remainder of all the votes. 
 Consequently if one candidate gets more than one-eighth of the votes 
 there will not be enough left to give each of seven candidates more 
 than that number. 
 
 Another illustration of the working of the system may be given. 
 Supposing that the two dominant parties should, as they often do 
 now, nominate unfit candidates, and the intelligent and respectable in- 
 dependent voters in the district revolt and conclude to make nomina- 
 tions and run candidates of their own. Not being sure of their strength, 
 but hoping to be able to elect more than one candidate, they conclude 
 to put two in the field. It will be supposed that the Democrats run 
 seven candidates, A, B, C, D, E, J?and G and the Republicans five, 
 H, /, y, K and L and the Independents two, O and P, ,and that the 
 
13* 
 
 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 vote is as follows: Democrats, 19,221; Republicans, 17,917; In- 
 dependents, 7430. The result under the Burnitz system of free voting 
 would be as shown in the following table : 
 
 DEMOCRATIC. 
 
 REPUBLICAN. 
 
 INDEPENDENT. 
 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 I 
 
 2 I 
 
 3 
 
 , 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 Cand. 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Quotients 
 
 Cand. 
 
 Votes. 
 
 Quotients 
 
 Cand. 
 
 Votek 
 
 Quotients 
 
 1st A 
 
 19,221 
 
 19,221 
 
 1st H 
 
 17,917 
 
 17,917 
 
 ist O 
 
 7,430 
 
 7,430 
 
 2d B 
 
 19,221 
 
 9,6*o# 
 
 2d I 
 
 17,917 
 
 ,95K 
 
 2d P 
 
 7,43 
 
 4_aii. 
 J' J 
 
 -3d C 
 
 19,221 
 
 6,407 
 
 3dJ 
 
 17,917 
 
 5,972^ 
 
 
 
 
 4th D 
 
 19,221 
 
 ' O^vrty 
 ^^^ 
 
 4th K 
 
 17,917 
 
 i nraV 
 ^^^^7* 
 
 
 
 
 5th E 
 
 19,221 
 
 o. g^A 
 ^^"""^^o 
 
 5th L 
 
 17,917 
 
 -, rfttft 
 J'J" J& 
 
 
 
 
 6th F 
 
 19,221 
 
 ^^rt^^^^y 
 
 ^fr^^yy^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7th G 
 
 19,221 
 
 r, fjnq 
 mj ) uu J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 That is, the Democratic and Republican parties would both elect 
 three candidates and the Independents one. It is true that in this 
 case the Democrats have more votes than the Republicans, they both 
 elect the same number of candidates. The Republicans and Independ- 
 ents together get four representatives but as their aggregate numbers 
 exceed the Democrats this result is fair. Evidently there is more 
 justice in such a result than ordinarily follows where single repre- 
 sentatives are elected from each district. It has already been stated 
 that in 1892, although the Republicans had nearly 100,000 voters in 
 the city of New York they did not elect a single alderman, assembly- 
 man or state senator. 
 
 But the operation of such a system would have other very important 
 consequences. It would as has been shown enable any body of voters 
 exceeding one-eighth to elect their candidate. The effect, of this would 
 be that they would be freed from the tyranny of the caucus and 
 " machine politics/' because by nominating their own candidate and 
 concentrating their votes on him any fractional part of the voters in a 
 district, exceeding an eighth, could elect one or more representatives 
 in spite of the political managers. What is perhaps of equal impor- 
 
ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 139 
 
 tance, they would be able to reelect him and keep him in office so 
 long as he represented them satisfactorily. This would give to a 
 representative much more independence than he can have if his elec- 
 tion is dependent upon a fickle majority of all the voters in a smaller 
 district. Under the system which is here advocated he would owe 
 his election to the votes of a comparatively small and select constituency 
 having interests, opinions and political principles which he has been 
 chosen and which he is presumably fitted to represent, and, so long 
 as he does this to the satisfaction of those who elected him, they can, 
 if they choose, continue him in office. In the performance of his duties 
 he would have only the demands of his own individual constituents to 
 satisfy, and would not be obliged to make his opinions and conduct 
 concur with the views, the prejudices, the ignorance and perhaps the 
 vices of some of those who help to form a popular majority. 
 
 The system of free voting which is advocated herein, would give 
 the most intelligent and best educated classes in the community the 
 power to choose and elect men of distinguished ability as their repre- 
 sentatives, a privilege which under the existing condition of things 
 they can rarely do now. In discussing this side of the subject Mr. 
 Mill said : 
 
 " The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern 
 civilization, is towards collective mediocrity ; and this tendency is in- 
 creased by all reductions and extensions of the franchise, their effect 
 being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more and 
 more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But, 
 though the superior intellects and characters will necessary be out- 
 numbered, it makes a great difference whether they are heard. In the 
 false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, gives it 
 only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may 
 have no organs at all in the representative body. ' ' 
 
 Although the following remarks by Mr. Mill referred to the Hare 
 system of electing representatives, the arguments are equally cogent in 
 support of the system of free voting advocated here. 
 
 " The minority of instructed minds," he says, " scattered through 
 the local constituencies would unite to return a number proportioned 
 to their own numbers of the ablest men the country contains. They 
 
140 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 would be under the strongest inducement to choose such men, since in 
 no other mode could they make their small numerical strength tell for 
 anything considerable. The representatives of the majority, besides that 
 they would themselves be improved in quality by the operation of the 
 system, would no longer have the whole field to themselves. They would 
 indeed outnumber the others, as much as the one class of electors out- 
 numbers the other in the country ; they could always outvote them, but 
 they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their crit- 
 icism. When any difference arose they would have to meet the argu- 
 ments of the instructed few by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent ; 
 and since they could not, as those do who are speaking to persons 
 already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would 
 occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in 
 the wrong. As they would in general be well-meaning (for this much 
 may reasonably be expected from a fairly-chosen national represen- 
 tative), their own minds would be insensibly raised by the influence of 
 the minds with which they were in contact, or even in conflict. The 
 champions of unpopular doctrines would not put forth their argu- 
 ments merely in books and periodicals, read only by their own side ; 
 the opposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and 
 there would be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength in 
 the presence of the country. It would then be found out whether the 
 opinion which prevailed by counting votes would also prevail if the 
 votes were weighed as well as counted. The multitude have often a 
 true instinct for distinguishing an able man when he has the means of 
 displaying his ability in a fair field before them. * * * If the 
 presence in the representative assembly can be insured of even a few of 
 the first minds in the country, though the remainder consist only of 
 average minds, the influence of these leading spirits is sure to make 
 itself insensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they be 
 known to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion 
 and feeling. * * * 
 
 "The only quarter in which to look for a supplement, or com- 
 pleting corrective to the instincts of a democratic majority, is the 
 instructed minority ; but, in the ordinary mode of constituting dem- 
 ocracy, this minority has no organ. * * * The representatives who 
 
ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 14! 
 
 would be returned by the aggregate of minorities would afford that 
 organ in its greatest perfection. A separate organization of the in- 
 structed classes, even if practicable, would be invidious, and could 
 only escape from being offensive by being totally without influence. 
 But if the elite of these classes formed part of the parliament, by the 
 same title as any other of its members, by representing the same num- 
 ber of citizens, the same numerical fraction of the national will their 
 presence would give umbrage to nobody, while they would be in the 
 position of highest vantage, both for making their opinions and coun- 
 sels heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part in 
 public business. Their abilities would probably draw to them more 
 than their numerical share of the actual administration of govern- 
 ment. * * * The instructed minority would, in the actual vot- 
 ing, count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would 
 count for much more, in virtue of their knowledge, and of the influ- 
 ence it would give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted 
 to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it 
 from the various deteriorating influences which assail the weak side of 
 democracy, could scarcely by human ingenuity be devised. A dem- 
 ocratic people would in this way be provided with what in any other 
 way it would almost certainly miss leaders of a higher grade of in- 
 tellect and character than itself. Modern democracy would have its 
 occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior and guiding 
 minds." 
 
 As Dr. Holmes says, not only are there two sides to every ques- 
 tion, but most subjects appear to be at least hexagonal. This one 
 seems to be of that kind, and Mr. Quincy in looking at another side 
 of this ideal polyhedron says : 
 
 ' ' While it is a matter of serious concern that so many men of high 
 intelligence and sturdy character are virtually disfranchised by the 
 caucus system, it is no less unfortunate that the great body of laboring 
 men are nearly as powerless in the hands of the managers. Our social 
 organization, which has experienced so great changes in the past, is 
 destined to profound modifications in the future. Whether these shall 
 come about violently or gradually, whether we shall rise to a nobler 
 civilization, or pass into a period of chaos, depends upon the adequate 
 
142 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING.' 
 
 representation of the working classes. Plato has significantly told us 
 that each Grecian state enclosed two states one composed of the rich, 
 the other of the poor. Our American states are coming to be divided 
 in the same way ; and, under the management of caucus politicians, 
 the dividing line will be constantly deepening. Manual labor has no 
 adequate representation in our government. The money powers and 
 knavish combinations which hold sway in the caucus have too often 
 offered the workingman only a choice between two evils. ' ' 
 
 The system of election which is advocated here, would give to 
 any body of workingmen, exceeding an eighth of the voters in a 
 district, the power to elect a representative of their own, and they 
 could do this independently of any caucus or alliances with party man- 
 agers by which their own real interests would be bargained for and 
 bought and sold by cunning, adroit and unscrupulous party managers. 
 Under this system laboring men would have the same independence 
 that it would give to those who have been favored with all the advan- 
 tages which are derived from education, knowledge and superior 
 opportunities. Not that the interests of these two classes are in any 
 sense antagonistic, for as Mr. Quincy well says : "in the last analy- 
 sis we shall always find that the real and permanent interest of any 
 class is identical with the real and permanent interest of all classes. 
 * * * Men of independent thought, thorough instruction, and 
 high morality, are the natural allies of the humble and the wronged ; 
 but such men are as worthless to the political managers as they are 
 precious to the people. ' ' 
 
 It is probable too, that nothing would do so much to enlighten 
 working men with reference to their political rights, duties and rela- 
 tions as to be represented by members of their own selection, elected 
 by their own votes and sent to our legislative bodies to speak for the 
 people who sent them there. Such representatives would be obliged, 
 as Mr. Mill says, ' ' to meet the opposing ranks face to face and hand 
 to hand, and there would be a fair comparison of their intellectual 
 strength in the presence of the country, ' ' and the representatives of 
 the laboring men would have to meet the arguments of the instructed 
 few by reasons, at least apparently, as cogent, ' ' and as the same author 
 significantly says, " it would occasionally happen to them to become 
 
ADVANTAGES OB' FREE VOTING. 143 
 
 convinced that they were in the wrong. ' ' The converse of this, in 
 all probability, would sometimes occur, that is the < ' instructed few ' ' 
 would be convinced by the representatives of the workingmen of the 
 justice and righteousness of the claims and interests of " labor. " In 
 this view, what could be more wholesome for the whole body politic, 
 in the present condition of discontent among workingmen and the 
 antagonism that so often exists between them and their employers, 
 than to have the former, as well as the latter, fairly represented in our 
 legislative bodies. The workingmen with the limited educational ad- 
 vantages which most of them have had, and oftener still, with more 
 limited pecuniary resources, their lack of knowledge and experience 
 in the management of political affairs, their ignorance of the princi- 
 ples in accordance with which wise legislation must be framed, are 
 often moulded by the corrupt politicians to serve their uses, as clay is 
 shaped by the potter, or are kneaded like dough in the hands of the 
 baker, only to have their just interests neglected later and to be flat- 
 tered and cajoled when their votes are again needed. Under the pres- 
 ent system of electing representatives the only way that workingmen 
 can secure representation is by cooperation with the political man- 
 agers. While the latter are bargaining for the votes of the men, they 
 are also trading with those whom the men regard as their antagonists, 
 and thus the true interests of both parties are ( ( sold out ' ' before 
 the member to be elected gets into office or power. Free voting 
 would make it possible for workingmen to choose, nominate and elect 
 their own candidates independently of the politicians and without their 
 agency or cooperation. It would give to the working classes real 
 freedom and independence in the election of their representatives. The 
 system therefore appeals with great force to laborers, workingmen and 
 mechanics of all classes for their support. It will place in their hands 
 an instrumentality, which will give them the power to be represented 
 by members of their own selection, in all legislative bodies, who may 
 be true and faithful advocates of their real interests, and be untram- 
 meled by bargains with those whom the men regard as their op- 
 pressors. 
 
 But the great and incontestible argument in favor of free voting is 
 its inherent justice not to one class alone, but to all classes, as it will 
 
144 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 enable any considerable body of voters in any district to secure rep- 
 resentation. The principle upon which it is based is that the opinions 
 of the entire people, and not those of a mere majority alone, should be 
 represented in our legislative bodies, and that in them minorities as 
 well as majorities, advocates and opponents, petitions, remonstrances, 
 and protests of all sorts and what may be regarded as heresies as well, 
 may all be represented and are entitled to a hearing. 
 
 What Professor Ware said in his article in the American Law 
 Review for Jan., 1872, of other similar schemes of electoral reform, is 
 equally true of the one which is advocated here. " In the first place ' ' 
 he says, " the representative body itself would promise to be not only 
 more justly but more efficiently made up. Not only would the proper 
 political organizations be more fully represented, and that under con- 
 ditions likely to bring out their best men, but other interests which at 
 present have no hearing, or at least are heard of only through the 
 politicians, could, if they saw fit, send their own men, and their best men, 
 to speak for them. There could hardly fail to result a deliberative body 
 far beyond what we are in the habit of seeing, in point of ability 
 and character, embracing a much greater range of knowledge and 
 experience, and embodying a much greater variety of opinion and 
 conviction. Such a body, truly representative, and containing within 
 itself the accredited agents of all parties and interests, need not look to 
 the newspapers or to the lobby for facts or for arguments. It would 
 be competent to do its appointed work of investigation and discussion, 
 and gain in self-respect and in public estimation accordingly. The more 
 this was felt to be the case, the more it would come to be perceived that 
 real head work was being done, the more careful would all parties and 
 interests become to be represented by their best men. It is true that 
 the scheme of proportional representation would permit the extremists 
 to send extreme men. But it would also permit moderate men to be 
 represented by men of their own kind, a kind which the majority 
 rule is sure in times of excitement, when they are most needed, to send 
 to the wall. ' ' 
 
 Or, as another writer* has said, by the representation of minorities 
 ' ' you will have a real and not an artificial democracy. According to 
 
 * Leonard Courtney in the Nineteenth Century for July, 1879. 
 
ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 145 
 
 the idea of this system any adequate number could join together, select 
 their man and send him in. It follows that if there arose a political 
 thinker in the country, men would come together throughout the 
 country and return him. Men would gather round him and send him 
 in, and you would thus have introduced into the House of Commons 
 elements of life, strengthening and vivifying the whole ; instead of 
 making mediocrity a condition without which nobody could enter, 
 you would have life and energy secured in the return of able men, and 
 of course if you got candidates thus independent you would change 
 the House of Commons, and you would operate upon the people out- 
 side." 
 
 This is equally as true and as applicable to our own national, state 
 and municipal bodies as it is to the British Parliament. 
 
 The same writer says further : ' ( One great result that would arise 
 from the reform would be disintegration of party. Parties would not 
 cling together so closely as they do now. * * * You would more 
 freely detach men, one by one, from any majority. At present scarcely 
 any member of a party ever dares desert it ; but if a man had not to 
 depend for his seat on mere party cohesion within a limited area if 
 he knew that his independence would bring support from a wider 
 range you would have more freedom of thought, and there would be 
 more room for conversion than you now have. Not that men are not 
 converted now. Many are converted in their minds, but they do not 
 change their votes." 
 
 But to those of us who for years have been tyrannized over by 
 ignorant, corrupt and debased political bosses ; who have been humil- 
 iated beyond expression by their overbearing insolence ; who have 
 been overwhelmed with shame by the demoralization and putrescence 
 of our municipal, state and sometimes the national governments ; and 
 who are full of indignation and ready for lawful rebellion to release 
 ourselves from the iniquitous reign under which we are living the 
 contemplation of a condition of things under which the reputable and 
 decent portions of the community could bid defiance to our despised 
 oppressors, fills us with hope and should inspire all who yearn for free- 
 dom to exertion and effort to throw off the yoke which now oppresses 
 us. The adoption of a system of Free Voting would overthrow the 
 
146 ADVANTAGES OF FREE VOTING. 
 
 bosses, would undermine their power, spread consternation in their 
 ranks and make us all free. Or as the editor* of Mr. Buckalew' shook 
 on Proportional Representation, has said in his preface : 
 
 "The reform when accepted generally, will purify elections, 
 establish justice in representation, elevate the tone of public life and 
 give additional credit and lustre to that system of government by the 
 people which is our proudest boast, and our best legacy for those who 
 come after us. " 
 
 To the pessimists who despair of ever effecting so desirable a reform, 
 the language of Mr. Hare, the apostle of minority representation, may 
 be quoted : 
 
 " The quiet admission," he said, " that we are all of us so ready 
 to make, that, because things have long been wrong, it is impossible 
 they should ever be right, is one of the most fatal sources of misery 
 and crime from which the world suffers. Whenever you hear a man 
 dissuading you from attempting to do well, on the ground that perfec- 
 tion is 'Utopian,' beware of that man. Cut the word out of your 
 dictionary altogether. There is no need for it. Things are either 
 possible or impossible ; you can easily determine which, in any given 
 state of human science. If the thing is impossible, you need not 
 trouble yourselves about it ; if possible, try for it. It is very Utopian 
 to hope for the entire doing away of drunkenness and misery out of the 
 Cannongate ; but the utopianism is not our business the work is. ' ' 
 
 * John G. Freeze. 
 
 THE END. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRE- 
 
 RESENTATION. 
 
 Under the cumulative system, which has little or no capacity for 
 automatic adaptation, as one of our correspondents from Illinois 
 pointed out, and as the reports of the working of that system in the 
 election of members of English school boards indicate, "a. voter can- 
 not tell when he is casting more votes than a favorite candidate needs. ' ' 
 If a larger number of candidates are elected by that system from each 
 district than are now elected in Illinois, then this difficulty will be 
 increased in a considerably greater ratio than the increase of the 
 numbers to be elected. If a greater number are not elected in each 
 district than are now returned in Illinois, then the freedom of voters 
 is curtailed in about an inverse proportion to the number elected. 
 
 As a remedy for these evils what is known as the quota system has 
 been proposed/ A number of such plans have been devised which 
 differ from each other in their details, but may generally be described 
 as follows : The total number of votes cast at an election in a general 
 district is divided by the number of representatives to be elected. The 
 quotient forms the electoral basis, or "'quota," that is to say, every 
 candidate obtaining this "quota" of votes shall be elected.* No 
 more than the quota strictly necessary for his election is counted in 
 favor of any candidate. The surplusage of votes given to any elected 
 candidate is to be distributed in favor of other candidates. 
 
 The great difficulty about most, if not all, of the plans of this kind 
 which have been proposed, is first, as John Bright perhaps jeeringly 
 said, very few people can understand them. The next difficulty is in 
 deciding which of the votes obtained by each candidate shall count for 
 his own election, and which of them shall be released in favor of 
 other candidates. One of the writersf in describing the Hare system 
 
 * This is the " quota" adopted by some of the advocates of this plan. It has 
 been shown though, that this is not the true quota. See p. 154. 
 
 f From a report by Mr. Robt. Lytton, Her Majesty's Secretary of Legation, on the 
 election of representatives for the Rigsraad, 1863. 
 
 147 
 
148 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 
 
 says, this ' ' shall be decided in such a way as to secure the representa- 
 tion by the candidate in question of all those who would not otherwise 
 be represented at all. The remaining votes not needed for his return, 
 to be disposed of by lot or otherwise. ' ' The latter seems to be a favorite 
 resource of the authors of some of the methods which have been de- 
 vised. But the admission of any fortuitous conditions whatsoever into 
 our electoral machinery should be condemned. The sovereign will of 
 the qualified voters should be and is the governing power in republics, 
 and is the only power to which we owe allegiance. Once give the 
 goddess of chance dominion even to a limited extent, and the conse- 
 quences are not easily foreseen. 
 
 It would lead too far to attempt an analysis of the various ' ' quota ' ' 
 schemes of voting which have been proposed, but that the objection 
 which has been pointed out exists in some, if not all, of them has been 
 indicated by other writers on this subject from whom a few quotations 
 will be given : 
 
 In answering this objection* some of the friends of the system, 
 known as ' ' the Single Transferable Vote, " say : ' ' The second votes' 
 will in general be given to candidates of the same party with those 
 named first on the same papers. Therefore the chance will not operate 
 as between party and party, but, which is much less important, as be- 
 tween different candidates of the same party. 
 
 ' ' Moreover, the chance will operate within very narrow limits on 
 such large numbers as will have to be dealt with." 
 
 That the element of chance does exist with this system it will be 
 seen, is freely admitted by its advocates. 
 
 Mr. Alfred B. Mason, in writing of the Hare system, f said : 
 " There are three grave objections to this admirable scheme. First, 
 in transferring votes the wishes of very many of the electors may be 
 wholly ignored. * * * In every election the element of chance 
 is introduced and the element of choice correspondingly disre- 
 garded." 
 
 * " Proportional Representation : Objections and Answers." By Sir John Lubbock, 
 Bart., M. P. ; Leonard Courtney, M. P. ; Albert Grey, M. P., and John Westlake, Q. 
 C The Nineteenth Century, February, 1885. 
 
 v A New Theory of Minority Representation. The New Englander, July, 1874. 
 
FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 149 
 
 Mr. Frederick Seebohm, in the Contemporary Review for Decem- 
 ber, 1883, says : 
 
 "Mr. Hare's system, even as modified by Mr. Parker Smith, is 
 understood by nearly all practical politicians to be too complicated, 
 and to leave too much to chance. ' ' 
 
 The writer in the American Law Review of January, 1872, re- 
 ferring to the Hare and the Free List Systems, says : 
 
 "The process of counting the votes, involving as it does a con- 
 tinual transferring of ballots, is not easy to follow in imagination, and 
 is likely to present to the mind that does not fully enter into it, the 
 aspect of an ingenious juggle or hocus-pocus that somehow produces 
 in the hands of skillful persons most unexpected results, and that 
 could, probably, in the hands of men yet more deeply skilled be 
 made to produce any results they might desire. Moreover, the con- 
 spicuous existence of an arbitrary and fortuitous element, in that the 
 order in which the ballots are counted may materially affect the result, 
 although not displeasing to the philosophical mind, which recognizes 
 the fact that a problem involving so many variable quantities must, 
 in the nature of things, admit of a number of solutions all equally 
 satisfactory, may naturally be a source of annoyance and distrust to the 
 every day citizen. ' ' 
 
 Mr. G. Shaw Lefevre, referring to the system known as the Single 
 Transferable Vote says: " It would be a mere chance which of the 
 candidates other than the one whose quota is first filled, would be the 
 unsuccessful one on either side, for there is no provision for taking 
 into account the order df'tfre preference on the papers used in making 
 up the quota of the first or other candidates on the list, and the result 
 might be very materially affected if the order of preference on these 
 earlier and more numerous papers, were taken into account. ' ' 
 
 Miss Catherine H. Spence, of Australia, one of the latest advocates 
 of what she called " Effective Voting," in a paper read before the 
 World's Proportional Representation Congress in Chicago last summer 
 {1893), said of The Single Transferable Vote that it "gives that accu- 
 rate measure of the proportional strength of the two main parties and 
 of outside parties which is so desirable. The contention as to the 
 -element of chance with regard to surplus votes must be met by laying 
 
150 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 
 
 down strict rules which apply to all" This is a virtual admission of the 
 charge that chance is an element in the system advocated, and that 
 ' 'strict rules" are needed to "meet" this difficulty. Apparently 
 after the exercise of the ingenuity of many writers on this system for 
 a quarter of a century or more, this fortuitous element has not yet been 
 entirely eliminated from the system which Miss Spence advocated 
 with so much ardor. 
 
 In a paper by Mr. William H. Gove, of Salem, Mass. , which was 
 read at the same congress, the author said of the Hare system : 
 
 "The novelty and comparative complexity of the Preferential 
 Vote would render its adoption very difficult, and if adopted it would 
 work unsatisfactorily because so few would mark more than one or two 
 names, or mark them so as to distinguish between them. 
 
 ' ' The second objection is the danger of a fraudulent count, which 
 cannot be detected by the public or in any other way than by a re- 
 count. 
 
 " Suppose one hundred votes cast showing a first choice for X, fifty 
 of whom show A as second choice, and fifty show B as second choice, 
 arid that fifty of X\s votes are to be transferred as a surplus. Then, 
 although the votes to be transferred are selected by lot, as the system 
 intends, and although any one selection by lot may hardly produce a 
 materially different result from any other selection fairly made in the 
 same way, it is plain that unfair enumerators might, by selecting the 
 votes to be transferred; turn over all the fifty surplus votes either to A 
 or B as they might choose, and thus the result might be very seriously 
 affected. The suspicion of this, even if in most cases groundless, is- 
 in itself a strong objection to a system which justifies it. And it is to 
 be .observed that this objection has the more force where the ballot is 
 secret, and did not arise to so great an extent in the original plan pro- 
 posed by Thomas Hare in which the ballots were to be openly given, 
 signed by the respective voters and preserved after the election for 
 public inspection. ' ' 
 
 At the meeting of the Proportional Representative Congress which 
 was held in Chicago last summer a number of systems for securing 
 proportional or minority representations were presented and consid- 
 ered. Two of those were . approved by action of the Congress, and 
 
FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 151 
 
 therefore it may be inferred that they were the most satisfactory plans 
 proposed by the friends and advocates of the principles which were 
 there discussed, and who were present at those meetings. Inasmuch 
 as the system of election proposed by Doctors Burnitz and Varrentrapp 
 has been explained and proposed as a substitute for cumulative voting, 
 and it is thought would obviate most if not all of the defects of the 
 latter system, a comparison and analysis of the three plans may help 
 to indicate which of the three comes nearest to being ' ' a thoroughly 
 satisfactory scheme. ' ' With this object in view they are printed on 
 the following pages and for convenience of reference are numbered I, 
 II, and III. 
 
 I. 
 
 GOVE SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF A BILL FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CON- 
 GRESS ACCORDING TO THE " GOVE " OR SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE SYSTEM, 
 ONE OF THE Two SYSTEMS ENDORSED BY THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
 CONGRESS IN CHICAGO, AUGUST 12, 1893 : 
 
 SECTION I. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected at 
 large in their respective states. 
 
 SEC. 2. In any state a ticket composed of as many candidates as the number of 
 representatives which said state is entitled to choose may be nominated by any body of 
 voters whose numbers equal one per cent, of the total vote cast for such representatives 
 at the last preceding election, or by a petition of the same number of voters ; and a 
 ticket composed of a smaller number, or of a single candidate, may in like manner, be 
 nominated by a smaller number of voters. But no voter shall join in the nomination 
 of more than one such ticket. 
 
 SEC. 3. At any time .after his nomination and not less than three weeks before the 
 day of election, any of said candidates may furnish to the secretary of said state a 
 statement in writing signed by himself and acknowledged before any official authorized 
 to take acknowledgment of deeds, which statement shall contain the names of one or 
 more others of said candidates with whom he believes himself to be in accord on the 
 most important public questions, and to one or more of whom he wishes to transfer 
 any ineffective votes cast for himself. And all such statements shall be published for 
 the information of all voters in convenient tabular form not less than two weeks before 
 the day of election, and said statements shall be opened for the inspection of the press 
 and public generally as soon as received. 
 
 SEC. 4. Every legal voter shall be entitled to cast his vote in favor of any person 
 eligible to said office. No person shall vote for more than one candidate. And every 
 candidate receiving a quota of votes, to wit, the number obtained by dividing the total 
 vote cast by the number of representatives to be chosen, shall be declared elected. 
 
152 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 
 
 Ineffective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate for 
 whom they were originally cast to a person named in the list, if any, furnished by said 
 candidate as provided in section 3. 
 
 SEC. 5. The following shall be deemed ineffective votes and shall be transferred 
 in the order named. 
 
 1. Any votes cast for a candidate in excess of a quota as defined in Section 4, 
 beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote and proceeding to the one next 
 highest and so on. 
 
 2. Votes cast for candidates who have since their nomination died or become in- 
 eligible, in the same order. 
 
 3. Original votes cast for candidates who received the smallest number of votes, 
 beginning with the candidate having the smallest total vote and proceeding to the one 
 next lowest, and so on, until the number of candidates whose votes have not been 
 transferred as far as possible added to those who have received a quota equals the 
 number of representatives to be chosen. Thereupon these shall be declared elected. 
 
 SEC. 6. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate 
 named in his said list, living and eligible at the time of counting the vote, for whom 
 the largest number of votes were originally cast and whose vote . by transfer or other- 
 wise does not equal the total vote cast divided by the number of representatives to be 
 elected, hereinbefore defined as the quota. If the same number of votes were origin- 
 ally cast for two or more candidates named in said list, the candidate residing nearest 
 the one from whom the votes are to be transferred shall be preferred. 
 
 SEC. 7. In case a vacancy shall occur in the delegation of representatives from 
 the state after election, any ineffective votes which have been assigned to the member 
 whose seat shall have become vacant shall be returned to the candidate for whom they 
 were originally cast, and so many of those as are not then effective, together with the 
 votes originally cast for said member, shall be redistributed to candidates who pre- 
 viously failed of election in the same manner as if said member had died or become 
 ineligible before canvassing of the votes, and the candidate not before elected who 
 shall then appear to have the largest number of votes shall b.e declared elected. 
 
 II. 
 FREE LIST SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF A BILL FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE 
 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, BASED UPON THE FREE LIST SYSTEM AS EMBODIED 
 IN THE GENEVA LAW, AND THE BILL PROPOSED IN THE 520 CONGRESS BY THE 
 HON. TOM F. JOHNSON, OF OHIO, ONE OF THE Two SYSTEMS ENDORSED BY 
 THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION CONGRESS IN CHICAGO, AUGUST 12, 1893 : 
 
 SECTION I. The members of the House of Representatives shall be voted for at 
 large in their respective states. 
 
 SEC. 2. Any body of electors in any state, which polled at the last preceding con- 
 gressional election one per cent, of the total vote of the state, or which is endorsed by 
 a petition of voters amounting to one per cent, of such total vote, may nominate 
 
FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 153 
 
 any number of candidates not to exceed the number of seats to which such state is 
 entitled in the House, and cause their names to be printed on the official ballot. 
 
 SEC. 3. Each elector has as many votes as there are representatives to be elected, 
 which he may distribute as he pleases among the candidates, giving not more than one 
 vote to any one candidate. Should he not use the entire number of votes to which he 
 is entitled, his unexpressed votes are to be counted for the ticket which he shall desig- 
 nate by title. The votes given to candidates shall count individually for the candidates 
 as well as for the tickets to which the candidates belong. 
 
 SEC. 4. The sum of all the votes cast in any state shall be divided by the number 
 of seats to which such state is entitled and the quotient to the nearest unit shall be 
 known as the quota of representation. 
 
 SEC. 5. The sum of all the votes cast for the tickets of each party or political 
 body nominating candidates shall be severally divided by the quota of representation, 
 and the units of the quotients thus obtained will show the number of representatives to 
 which each such body is entitled, and if the sum of such quotients be less than the 
 number of seats to be filled the body of electors having the largest remainder after di- 
 vision of the sums of the votes cast by the quota of representation, as herein specified, 
 shall be entitled to the first vacancy, and so on until all the vacancies are filled. 
 
 SEC. 6. The candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates and found 
 entitled to representation under the foregoing rules, shall receive certificates of election 
 in the order of the votes received, a candidate receiving the highest number of votes 
 the first certificate, and so on ; but in case of a tie, with but one vacancy to be filled, 
 the matter shall be determined by lot between the candidates so tied/ 
 
 SEC. 7. If a member of the House of Representatives shall die or resign, or his 
 seat become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the 
 candidate having the next highest vote of the body of electors to which such member 
 belongs. 
 
 III. 
 BURNITZ SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 AN OUTLINE OF A BILL FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE 
 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, BASED UPON THE SYSTEM PROPOSED BY DOCTORS 
 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP. 
 
 SECTION I. The members of the Houseof Representatives shall be elected on a gen- 
 eral ticket in their respective states. 
 
 SEC. 2. In any state candidates for election to the House of Representatives may 
 be nominated by a petition of a number of voters for each candidate so nominated, 
 equal to one per cent, of the quotient, obtained by dividing the total number of votes 
 cast for such representatives in the state at the last preceding election, by the number 
 of representatives to which the state is entitled, and cause their names to be printed in 
 the official ballot. But no voter shall join in the nomination of more than one such 
 candidate.* 
 
 * A suitable penalty to be fixed for a violation of this provision. 
 
154 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 
 
 SEC. 3. Each qualified voter may give in his ballot the names of not exceeding 
 -* candidates for whom he votes and may indicate his preferences for such can- 
 
 didates by ordinal numbers marked opposite their names; or in the absence of such 
 numbers the order in which the names are inscribed on his ballot shall indicate the 
 order of his preferences. 
 
 SEC. 4. The first, second, third, etc. , preferences for each candidate shall each be 
 counted separately ; the total number of first preference votes for each candidate shall 
 then be divided by one, the total number of second preference vote by two, the third 
 by three and so on. The quotients thus obtained for each candidate shall be added 
 
 together and their sum will be his elective quotient. The * candidates having 
 
 the highest elective quotients shall be declared elected. A tie with but one vacancy 
 to be filled shall be decided by lot. 
 
 SEC. 5. If a member of the House of Representatives shall die or resign, or his 
 seat become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the 
 candidate having the next highest election quotient of the body of electors to which 
 such member belongs. 
 
 The difficulty of understanding each of these three different schemes 
 respectively will, it is thought, be apparent in reading them over. 
 Their relative complexity is indicated to some extent by the fact that 
 it has taken 710 words to describe the I. or Gove System of election, 
 453 for the II. or Free List System and 316 for the III. or Burnitz 
 System. It is also thought that the series of measures, described in the 
 latter method of voting, for computing the vote are much less involved 
 and easier of comprehension by the ordinary mind than those of either 
 the Free List or the Gove Systems. 
 
 In both of these schemes the method of calculating the quota given 
 does not seem to be correct. It was shown by Mr. Droop in 1868 
 that the necessary minimum, or quota, of votes which is enough to 
 make the election of a candidate certain is ' ' the number obtained by 
 dividing the whole number of votes, given at an election, by the number 
 of members to be elected, plus one, and increasing the quotient, or the 
 integral part of the quotient, by one. Thus if five members are to be 
 elected and there are 36, 360 votes, if we divide this number by 5 -j- 1 = 6 
 and we have 6060. Then 6060 +1 = 6061 = the elective quota. Any 
 candidate securing that many votes will be elected no matter how his 
 opponents votes may be combined against him. 
 
 The principles of the Gove system, were explained by its author 
 
 *The number to be elected. 
 
FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 155 
 
 at the Chicago Congress. In his paper, which was read there, he said 
 that : " According to this system, each candidate, officially nominated, 
 may file a list to be published with the nomination indicating such other 
 candidates as he believes to be so far in accord with him that he wishes 
 his ineffective votes to be transferred to some one or more of them. 
 The transfer is then made, if necessary, to the one on this list needing 
 it, who has shown the greatest personal popularity by receiving the 
 largest direct vote. 
 
 ' ' The voter knowing this list has only to select a single candidate 
 and vote for him, and the thing takes care of itself; he knows that if 
 his vote cannot count for the candidate for whom it is cast, it will 
 count for some other of the same general way of thinking. In voting 
 he takes into account two things, the candidate and his list, just as he 
 now regards the candidate and his party. And this plan is especially 
 useful in cases where a candidate is independently nominated, as it 
 leads him to declare his political affiliations, and thus inform the voter 
 of the political position he assumes. It is true that the list of the 
 candidates could ordinarily be made up by inserting the names of all 
 other candidates of his party, but the parties would be smaller than 
 now, either third parties or sub-parties prevailing, and when a party 
 containing district elements had not divided into, sub-parties, the same 
 result would be obtained, as each candidate would be apt to place 
 upon his list only the candidates of his own section of the party. ' ' 
 
 In voting under this system an elector would, in effect, be giv- 
 ing his vote to a candidate with the understanding, that if it was not 
 needed or was ineffectual in electing that candidate, it was to be 
 transferred to some other candidate, who was named before the elec- 
 tion by the person voted for. Candidates having too many or too few 
 votes to elect them would thus have a number of what, in effect, would 
 be proxy votes, to be disposed of in accordance with their declaration 
 made before the election. It seems difficult to foresee just what the 
 effect of this would be in the hands of corrupt politicians and candi- 
 dates nominated by and controlled by them. That it might be a pro- 
 lific cause of evil, unless the transfer subsequent to the election was 
 made compulsory and could be enforced by legal process, seems proba- 
 ble. That it might also be made a baneful instrumentality for making 
 
156 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION 
 
 political bargains beiore the election is also to be feared. The election 
 of all the members would, probably, not be decided by the direct votes 
 of the electors, but by a secondary transfer of their votes to the candi- 
 dates who were named by the persons voted for, as being ' in accord 
 with them on the most important public questions. ' ' There appears 
 to be danger that the intentions of the voter might be diverted from 
 his purposes by the transfer of his vote by one candidate to another. 
 This plan undoubtedly would give representation to minorities, which 
 would also be proportional to their numbers, which would be a great 
 gain over our present method of electing representatives, and, if no 
 other system was available, its adoption might be advisable. 
 
 The provisions of the II. or Free List system are at first a little puz- 
 zling. A voter has as many votes as there are candidates to be 
 elected. He can give one of them to each of as many candidates as 
 he chooses. These are counted for the candidates voted for. Then 
 besides this all of his votes are counted for the party to which the can- 
 didates he has voted for belong. After the election all these party votes 
 are divided by the elective quota which determines how many mem- 
 bers that party is entitled to, and that number of candidates who have 
 received the highest number of individual votes are declared elected. 
 The same method is of course applied to the other parties. 
 
 This would also give minority and proportional representation to 
 parties', and would thus be a great improvement over what we have 
 now. It seems though besides being somewhat difficult to understand, 
 to have what is perhaps a minor defect in not favoring independent 
 voting within parties. This will be explained by an illustration : 
 
 It will be supposed that five members are to be elected in a district 
 and that the Republicans have 18,183 voters and the Democrats 
 18,177, an d that the regular Republicans have nominated A, B and C 
 as candidates and the Democrats F, G and H, and that the voters 
 cast their votes for the regular nominees of their parties, as follows : 
 
 REPUBLICANS. DEMOCRATS. 
 
 A 18,184 votes. F 18,178 votes. 
 
 B 18,183 " G 18,177 " 
 
 18,182 " H 18,176 
 
FOR SECURING MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 157 
 
 As each voter can cast five votes for his party the Republican party 
 would have 18,183X5=90,915 and the Democratic party would have 
 18,177X590,885 or a total of 181,800. The true quota of this 
 number would be ascertained by dividing the number of candidates 
 _}-i 5-{-i 6 which will give 30,300. Adding i to this =30,301 = 
 the true quota, which divided into 90,915, the vote for the Republican 
 party, gives three as the number of members to which that party is en- 
 titled. Divided into 90,885, the vote for the Democratic party, and 
 we have only two, the number of members to which it is entitled. 
 Consequently A, B, C, J?and G would be elected. 
 
 Supposing though that there are 6061 Republicans who are not 
 satisfied with A y B and Cas candidates and consequently they nomi- 
 nate a fourth Republican, D, and have his name on the regular ticket 
 and that they vote for him. As they each have five votes they would 
 have a total of 30,305 which is more than the quota. The vote for 
 the different candidates would then be as follows : 
 
 REPUBLICANS. 
 A 12,123 votes. 
 B 12,122 " 
 
 C 12,121 " 
 
 D 6,061 " 
 
 As there are the same number of Republican voters, who vote that 
 ticket as before, the vote for the party would be the same as then, 
 which would entitle it to three members, but as the three candidates 
 who receive the highest number of individual votes are the ones se- 
 lected to represent the party, A, B and C would still be chosen, 
 although there is a quota of voters in favor of D, sufficient to elect 
 him, by a correct system of election. The only way they could suc- 
 ceed then would be to run D on an independent ticket. 
 
 It seems very desirable that there should be freedom of voting within 
 party lines, as well as that successful bolting should be made possible 
 and that electors should be able to concentrate their votes effectually 
 on any candidate, either within or without the party, whom they may 
 prefer. This it is thought the Burnitz system of election will permit 
 them to do, of which it may be said as Mr. Buckalew wrote of the 
 
158 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF ELECTION. 
 
 cumulative system although experience has not fully sustained his 
 favorable opinion of it that ' ' it combines the advantages of other plans 
 without their imperfections, while it is not open to any strong objec- 
 tion peculiar to itself. It will adjust itself to all cases, and it will 
 have the most important and effectual sanction ; for it will be put 
 under the guardianship of party interest, always active and energetic, 
 which will give it directive and complete effect to the full and just 
 representation of the people. ' ' * 
 
 *" Proportional Representation." By Hon. Charles R. Buckalew. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 A METHOD OF ASSURING TO THE MINORITIES AS WELL AS TO THK 
 MAJORITY, AT ALL KINDS OF ELECTIONS, THE NUMBER OF REPRE- 
 SENTATIVES CORRESPONDING TO THEIR STRENGTH. 
 
 Described by GUSTAV BURNITZ, PH. p., and 
 GEORGE VARRENTRAPP, M. D. Frankfort on the Main. 1863. 
 
 ( Translated by Frank Weitenkampf. ) 
 
 On the occasion of the various attempts at a constitutional change 
 in Frankfort, a proper method of electing representatives always proves 
 a special difficulty ; even within the same party an agreement was not 
 effected, neither formerly nor at present. The wish to contribute to 
 a solution of this difficulty, was the principal cause that prompted us 
 to seek for a law by which the number of representatives obtained by 
 the various parties would be in proportion to the number of their 
 members. We believe that we have found this law, a law which 
 preserves its validity in all kinds of election. We recommend it for 
 trial. 
 
 As soon as any association of individuals, social or scientific, re- 
 ligious or political, has become too numerous to manage its affairs 
 itself or even only to control such management itself, it finds it 
 necessary to transfer its authority to a smaller number of representa- 
 tives. The election of these representatives is therefore an important 
 action of far-reaching results. In all sorts of communities, if they are 
 sound and vigorous at all, this importance is recognized. It will be 
 regarded as a proper and suitable election of representatives if, in the 
 corporate body elect, the opinion of the majority of those convened 
 for election preponderates, and if the men of most ability and 
 integrity obtain a seat and vote in the same. It does not lie within 
 the sphere of legal provisions to see that the voters really cast their 
 votes for the -most suitable individuals ;. education in general, and 
 especially in the line of the community in question i. e., social, 
 political, or other education, will qualify and instruct for that pur- 
 
 159 
 
l6o BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 pose. On the other hand, the proper and genuine expression of the 
 opinion and the will of the majority (for the good of the community) 
 is, indeed, dependent upon proper ordinances and laws. The pur- 
 suit of this object has given rise to the most varying provisions. 
 To speak, first of all, of elections in political communities : here, 
 with universal as well as limited suffrage, elections in larger 
 and smaller districts, elections according to rank, professions and 
 classes, secret and public, direct and indirect elections have all been 
 recommended. On none of these points has an agreement been 
 arrived at. 
 
 Improvement of the election laws is striven for everywhere, even 
 apart from the prime and most important endeavor to keep unauthor- 
 ized influences away from the elections. In this effort we seem, at 
 present, to have arrived at a decided turning point, which at the same 
 time, in our opinion, demonstrates a great advance. This is the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 All honest and intelligent friends of liberty and truth have sought 
 above all to realize the problem of assuring to the majority of the 
 voters a majority of the elect. But numerous difficulties, varying ac- 
 cording to locality and other conditions, have hitherto permitted only 
 incidental attention to the further problem of procuring representation 
 also for the minority of the voters. 
 
 Hare, the first to observe this decidedly and clearly, developed it 
 in his ' ' Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary 
 and Municipal." Hare's system has been much discussed, especially 
 among others, in Frankfort papers ("Zeit," December, 1861, Nos. 
 213 and 225, and "Frankfurter Reform," Nos. 58, 62, 65, etc.) 
 But it found more opponents than advocates, nor has it as yet found 
 practical application anywhere. To us it appears difficult, compli- 
 cated, and indistinct. Cancelling and adding votes does not seem to 
 be the right way of determining the relative worth which a party as- 
 cribes to its various candidates. 
 
 If we desire to arrive at a proper solution of the difficult problem 
 of producing a method of election which does not invade the liberty 
 of the individual voter, which assures to the majority of the voters a 
 majority of the elect, but at the same time makes provision for an, at 
 
1U KX1TZ AND VARRENTRAPP' S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. l6l 
 
 least, approximately adequate representation of the minority, it will be 
 well to begin with a consideration of the simplest conditions. 
 
 We therefore take a corporate body purely social, religious, po- 
 litical or other of 1000 persons as an example ; we furthermore as- 
 sume that all the members agree in their opinions and purposes. It is 
 incumbent upon this corporate body to appoint a representative. How 
 will this corporate body proceed ? It will convene and will under- 
 take an inspection, or an estimation ( Werthschatzung} of its members, 
 in order to ascertain what person seems most suitable and capable to rep- 
 resent the corporation either in general or fora specified purpose. This 
 proposed examination or estimation, in such a homogeneous corporate 
 body as assumed, would presumably result in the casting of all votes for 
 one person. If a second representative, a third one, and so on, are then 
 to be elected, one after the other, then, the conditions otherwise re- 
 maining the same, the renewed estimation will lead to the same result ;, 
 the united vote would again be given, to a second and to a third per- 
 son. All those elected in such manner have received the same num- 
 ber of votes, and yet these votes have not the same value in the sense 
 of the voters, these votes in their equality in numbers do not corre- 
 spond to the unequal value set by the voters upon the election of the- 
 first, second, and third elect. For the second received his 1000 votes 
 only because and after the first had already been elected, the third 
 after the second, etc. The value of seeing the second elected was a 
 subordinate one in comparison with the value set on the election of 
 the first. This value or the prospect of the second, third, etc., was 
 therefore only ^, ^, ^, etc., as large as that of the first. The fol- 
 lowing relation therefore appears : 
 
 1000 1000 1000 
 
 1000 : : : . 
 
 234 
 
 These numbers, which, in distinction from the votes received 
 in reality by each one, and also in order to simplify matters, we shall 
 call the election- figures, correspond to the estimation which was set 
 upon the individual by the corporate body, and thus makes clear the 
 real will of the corporate body. 
 
 This estimation is more clearly apparent if the problem is inversely 
 presented. Again we take a corporate body of 1000 persons; it had 
 
1 62 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP* S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 hitherto elected 10 representatives at one election, and had unani- 
 mously given them each the same number of votes. As the unanimity 
 of the corporate body left no prospect of an electoral contest, the cited 
 estimation of the individual candidates did not appear necessary. But 
 now a change is produced through some circumstance or other, so that 
 the same corporate body has in future to appoint only 9 representa- 
 tives instead of 10. It must therefore proceed to an estimation, although 
 in an inverse direction ; an agreement must be arrived at as to the one 
 among those ten men on whose election the least value is set. This is 
 repeated if the number of representatives is to be reduced to 8, 7, 6, 
 etc. ; an ascertaining of the least qualified continues to take place. Still 
 assuming a corporate body that is entirely in accord as to its views and 
 purposes, the question as to which of the former representatives is not 
 to be reflected, now that their number is reduced, will of course be 
 decided with the same unanimity with which those to be elected were 
 formerly agreed upon. In both cases the number of votes was the 
 same for all the representatives, and yet the corporate body by no 
 means set the same value on the individual elections. The one who 
 was the last to be elected and the first to be removed was probably 
 rated at but one-tenth of the estimation in which the one first elected 
 was held. 
 
 This simple example, hardly likely to occur in reality, of a com- 
 plete unanimity of all the members of an electoral body, has been 
 purposely presupposed in order to show that in each election an 
 estimation takes place, even though it does not become apparent 
 to the consciousness of the electors until the previous election 
 undergoes a change (diminishing, or the like). The conception of 
 the election-figure, as the expression of this estimation is therefore 
 founded in the nature of an election, and does not arise under certain 
 conditions only. This will appear more clearly yet at elections in 
 which various opinions stand in opposition to each other. 
 
 Each of the different parties existing in an electoral body will 
 nominate its own candidates when an election is to take place. What 
 was observed before in the homogeneous society is repeated in the sepa- 
 rate parties : they muster their members and proceed to an estimation 
 of the same. 
 
BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP's SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 163 
 
 We will assume that there is i representative to be elected, and 
 that there are three parties opposed to each other, one of which 
 controls 1500, the second 900, the third 600 votes. Here, the can- 
 didate of the first party, receiving 1500 votes, is elected, and that 
 justly, as the one on whom the highest measure of concurrence is con-, 
 centrated. If a second election is then to be held, closely drawn ] 
 party-lines again resulting in a strict party vote of 1500, 900, and 600* 
 for the different candidates, the candidate of the first and relatively 
 strongest party will again be elected, and so on in further elections, if 
 more representatives are to be elected. The same result is arrived at 
 if 3, 6, 10, or more representatives are voted for at one election ; only 
 the candidates of the strongest party will be victorious at the ballot- 
 box; the minority, be it large or small, will always remain entirely 
 without representation. 
 
 This takes place because only the number of votes cast is taken 
 into consideration, and not the order of rank given by a party to its 
 different candidates, in its relation to the relative strength of the sep- 
 arate parties. This relation changes, according as one or more repre- 
 sentatives are to be elected. 
 
 1. At every election of one or more representatives by a number of 
 persons, an estimation or valuation of those recommended for election 
 either in general or with a view to the attainment of some special object 
 will take place, consciously or unconsciously, and even within the same 
 party. This estimation appears at the election in two ways : (#) by the 
 number of votes cast for the individual candidate ; (/;) by the order of 
 rank in which he is placed by his electors in relation to the other can- 
 didates nominated by the same party ; this order of rank expresses the 
 estimation set upon a candidate above the others of the same party, 
 the measure of the chance of success which the party wishes to 
 give one of its candidates above the others. Only at the election of a 
 single representative do both estimations concur in one election-figure. 
 
 2. When several representatives are to be elected, and several par- 
 ties differing in strength are opposed to each other, it is necessary 
 clearly to show on the one hand the strength of the separate parties 
 (that is, the number of votes bestowed by them on the individual can- 
 didates), and on the other hand the different estimation which the 
 
1 6 4 
 
 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 separate parties set upon their individual candidates, and to contrast 
 them in a proper relation. This is done by means of the election- figure 
 which results if the absolute number of votes received by a candidate is 
 divided by the relative number of rank (i. e., that given him on the 
 different ballots). 
 
 If this law is put into effect, the majority of the voters will always 
 elect a corresponding majority of the representatives, but the minority 
 will also receive the number of representatives corresponding exactly 
 to its strength. 
 
 This will be made clear by some examples representing various 
 party relations that occur, and at the head of which we place the ex- 
 ample already referred to. Three parties, of 1500, 900, and 600 
 votes, go to the ballot-box, and the following results appear. 
 
 Old method of counting. 
 
 Party Party Party 
 
 Candidate. A. B. C. 
 
 ist 1500 900 600 
 
 2d 1500 900 600 
 
 3d 1500 900 600 
 
 4th 1500 900 600 
 
 5th 1500 900 600 
 
 6th 1500 900 600 
 
 yth 1500 900 600 
 
 8th 1500 900 600 
 
 9th 1500 900 600 
 
 loth 1500 900 600 
 etc. 
 
 following results appear. 
 
 Election-figure by ordinal rank. 
 
 Party Party Party 
 
 A. B. C. 
 
 C. 
 
 600 
 
 ___ - 600 
 
 1500 ooo 
 
 -A- =1500 H__ goo 
 
 11500 ooo 600 
 
 '- 75 ^r~= 45 -r- =300 
 
 ooo 600 
 
 --=300 = 200 
 
 o o 
 
 1500 oo 
 
 - = 500 -- 
 
 o o 
 
 I ZOO 000 
 
 4 = 375 ~ 
 
 1500 QOO 600 
 
 -2- = 300 - -=180 -- 
 
 D DO 
 
 600 
 
 600 
 
 -4 =I5 
 
 250 
 2I 4 
 
 600 
 
 -_ 
 
 60O 
 
 75 
 
 I COO 
 
 - - 
 
 I COO f QOO 600 
 
 - = 166 - =100 = 66 
 
 9 99 
 
 QOO 600 
 
 ^ o = 90 io = 60 
 etc. 
 
BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP's SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 165 
 
 According to this, the number of representatives obtained by 
 each party would be : 
 
 By old method of counting. 
 
 Party 
 A. 
 
 6 
 10 
 
 Party 
 B. 
 
 mting. 
 
 By the 
 
 election figtire. 
 
 Party 
 
 Party 
 
 Party 
 
 Party 
 
 C. 
 
 A. 
 
 B. 
 
 C. 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 I * 
 
 HJ 
 
 
 
 
 
 o> 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 M 
 
 
 
 
 
 B 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 ~"- 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 At an election 
 of 6 representatives. 
 I0 
 
 I2 I2 
 
 " 1 6 " 1 6 
 
 20 " 2O 
 
 " 25 " 25 
 
 For the second representative, the 900 votes cast by the second 
 party for its first candidate already yield a higher election-figure than 
 those cast by the first party for its second candidate, /. e. , 900 is more 
 
 than I5 ; similarly, 600 is more than 5fJ. 
 
 Now, if two parties having respectively 60 and 38 votes for 
 instance, are opposed to each other, the following relation appears 
 according to the two systems : 
 
 Old method of counting. 
 
 By the election-figure. 
 
 andidate. 
 
 Party A. 
 
 Party B. 
 
 Party 
 60 
 
 A. 
 
 g 
 
 Party B. 
 
 ISt 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 i 
 
 60. 
 
 i 
 
 - 38 
 
 2d 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 60 
 
 2 
 
 30 
 
 I 8 
 
 2 
 
 = 19 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 ^8 
 
 
 3d 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 3 
 
 20 
 
 3 
 
 = I2 -5 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 _o 
 
 
 4th 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 
 15 
 
 -J- 
 
 = 9-5 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 ^8 
 
 
 5th 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 5 
 
 12 
 
 ~5~ 
 
 7-6 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 ~g 
 
 
 6th 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 
 IO 
 
 -g- 
 
 = 6.3 
 
 7 th 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 60 
 
 7 
 
 8-5 
 
 A 8 
 
 7 
 
 = 5-4 
 
 8th 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 60 _ 
 
 8 ~~ 
 
 7-5 
 
 38 
 
 8 
 
 = 4-7 
 
 9th 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 60 
 
 9 
 
 6.6 
 
 38 
 
 9 
 
 = 4.2 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 loth 
 
 60 
 
 38 
 
 \j\j 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 = 3-8 
 
i66 
 
 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 Thus, by the first count of votes, the second party remains entirely 
 without representation ; by the sytem of computing election-figures, on 
 the other hand, it receives one representative at an election of 3, 2 
 against 3 out of 5 representatives, 3 against 5 out of 8 representatives, 
 4 against 6 out of 10 representatives, 5 against 8 out of 13 represen- 
 tatives, or 2 out of 5, 3 out of 8, 4 out of 10, 5 out of 13. 
 
 The same result takes place when there is a larger number of 
 parties : 
 
 Old 
 
 method of counting. 
 Party. 
 
 By the Election-figtire. 
 Party. 
 
 A. 
 
 1st Repre. 480 
 
 B. 
 250 
 
 C. D. 
 
 150 90 
 
 A. 
 
 80 
 
 B. 
 
 i 
 
 C. 
 ISO 
 
 50 -f-=i$o 
 
 D. 
 90 
 
 ^-= 9 o 
 
 ^ 
 
 2d 
 
 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 250 
 =240 -^-=125 
 
 2 2 
 
 2 
 
 75 
 
 T=*S 
 
 
 3d 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 ~3~~ 
 
 60 
 
 3 
 
 83.3 
 
 50 = 
 
 So 
 
 ^= 3 
 
 
 4 th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 =120 
 
 4 
 
 250^ 
 
 4 
 
 62.5 
 
 l -T= 
 
 37-5 
 
 ^-=22. 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 5 th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 5 
 
 96 
 
 ~5~~ 
 
 50 
 
 ~5~~ 
 
 3 
 
 ^ =l8 
 
 
 6th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 80 
 
 ~6~~ 
 
 41.6 
 
 *= 
 
 25 
 
 -^='5 
 
 
 7 th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 48o_ 
 
 7 
 
 68.5 
 
 7 
 
 35.7 
 
 ~7~~ 
 
 21.4 
 
 ^=12. 
 
 8 
 
 8th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 60 
 
 ~8~ = 
 
 31.2 
 
 ~~8~~ 
 
 18.7 
 
 T="- 
 
 2 
 
 gth 
 
 '< 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 48o_ 
 9 
 
 53-3 
 
 ~9~~ 
 
 27.7 
 
 ~lT~~ 
 
 16.6 
 
 9 ~ 
 
 
 loth 
 
 '< 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 10 
 
 48 
 
 10 
 
 25 
 
 IO 
 
 15 
 
 10 9 . 
 
 
 nth 
 
 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 ii ' 
 
 43-6 
 
 ii 
 
 22.7 
 
 II 
 
 13-6 
 
 5^=8 
 
 II 
 
 I 
 
 1 2th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 12 """ 
 
 40 
 
 12 
 
 20.8 
 
 IJ 
 
 12.5 
 
 9 7 
 12 ' 
 
 5 
 
 1 3 th 
 
 " 480 
 
 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 48o_ 
 
 13 
 
 3 6 -9 
 
 13 . - 
 
 19.2 
 
 i5_ 
 
 13 
 
 ii. 5 
 
 1T= 6 
 
 9 
 
 1 4th 
 
 " 480 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 34-2 
 
 14 ~ 
 
 17-8 
 
 ^4~~" 
 
 10.7 
 
 ir= 6 
 
 4 
 
 1 5th 
 
 " 480 250 
 
 150 90 
 
 480 
 
 32 
 
 TC 
 
 16.6 
 
 1C 
 
 IO 
 
 ^2.= 6 
 
 TC: 
 
 
BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP's SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 167 
 
 Thus, by the old method of counting votes the party A (number- 
 ing 480 votes), although it is weaker than the other parties put to- 
 gether, elects all of its representatives, no matter how many are voted 
 for, while by our method of counting on the basis of the election-fig- 
 ure, representatives are elected as follows : 
 
 BY PARTY. 
 
 
 A 
 
 B 
 
 C 
 
 D 
 
 Of io Representatives, 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 I 
 
 i Representatives. 
 
 " 12 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 i " 
 
 M IS 
 
 8 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 i " 
 
 " 20 
 
 IO 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 2 " 
 
 " 27 
 
 14 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 2 " 
 
 M 36 
 
 19 
 
 9 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 " 4 6 
 
 2 3 
 
 12 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 " 57 
 
 28 
 
 15 
 
 9 
 
 5 
 
 If not only a few parties exist, but a separation into very many par- 
 ties, a similarly just result is attained. Five hundred and fifty voters 
 are divided into ten parties ; and each has less than -^ of the votes. 
 
 Party. 
 
 A. 
 
 B. 
 
 C. 
 
 D. 
 
 E. 
 
 F. 
 
 G. 
 
 H. 
 
 I. 
 
 K 
 
 
 
 M 10 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 IOO 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 N =50 
 
 =45 
 
 =40 
 
 =35 
 
 = 3 o 
 
 =25 
 
 =20 
 
 =15 
 
 =10 
 
 = 
 
 s 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 IOC 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 7O 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 .-: 
 
 re = 33-3 
 
 
 =26.6 
 
 =23-3 
 
 =20 
 
 =16.6 
 
 =13-3 
 
 =IO 
 
 = 6.6 
 
 = 
 
 3-3 
 
 d 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 
 8 : 
 
 IOO 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 1 
 
 4 =25 
 
 =22. 
 
 =20 
 4 
 
 =17.5 
 
 T =I5 
 
 =12.5 
 4 
 
 =IO 
 
 T = 7<s 
 
 7= 5 
 
 4 
 
 2-5 
 
 | 
 
 IOO 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
 50 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 IO 
 
 
 
 
 if) = 20 
 
 =18 
 
 =16 
 
 =I4 
 
 =12 
 
 =10 
 
 = 8 
 
 = 6 
 
 = 4 
 
 = 
 
 2 
 
 
 5 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 5 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 s 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 IOO 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 70 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 20 
 
 IO 
 
 
 
 =16.6 
 
 
 =13-3 
 
 =11.1 
 
 =IO 
 
 -= 8.3 
 
 = 6.6 
 
 = 5 
 
 = 3-3 
 
 = 
 
 1.6 
 
 According to this, the following number of representatives are 
 elected by the separate parties : 
 
 I. K. 
 
 of 10 representatives 
 
 " 15 
 
 " 18 
 
 " 20 " 
 
 25 
 
 A. 
 
 B. 
 
 C. 
 
 D. 
 
 E. 
 
 F. 
 
 G. 
 
 H. 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 i 
 
l68 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP's SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 If it is thought right that the majority of the voters should decid- 
 edly have a majority, but not all, of the representatives, and that the 
 minority or minorities should also have a representation proportional 
 to their strength, then nothing is necessary but that, at elections at 
 which different parties are opposed to each other be it for the elec- 
 tion of a few or of many representatives the voters, on casting their 
 votes, should show their relative preference for their different can- 
 didates, that is, on whose election they lay the greatest weight, 
 on whose election the second-greatest, on whose election the third- 
 greatest, fourth-greatest, etc. For the moment this demand, because 
 unusual, will perhaps seem singular to one voter or the other, but if he 
 be a reasonable man, it will not be difficult to convince him of the 
 usefulness, nay necessity of the required valuation and classification ; 
 for without it a just and reasonable system of election is not possible. 
 But, certainly, only that system of election is just and reasonable the re- 
 sults of which give an exact impression of the views predominating in 
 an electoral body, which procures freedom and proportional represen- 
 tation for each opinion. In future we shall no longer speak of an 
 " absolute removal of our opponents, " or of "being ourselves abso- 
 lutely removed," but of " representation of the different parties accord- 
 ing to their strength. ' ' Each party will strive, as heretofore, to induce 
 as many as possible of its members to vote, so that it may obtain as 
 many representatives as possible. And if the majority acknowledges 
 the right of the minority to a proportional representation, and also 
 expects the minority to take a very active part in the election, it will 
 also recognize that it probably cannot elect all of its nominees, but, 
 out of 10 representatives, for instance, can count on only 8 or 7, per- 
 haps only on 6 ; it must therefore make up its mind as to which of its 
 men it prefers, which first, which second, etc. This valuation and 
 classification is made known by putting the candidates in this order 
 on the ballot, and no longer in alphabetical or other accidental order. 
 That is to say, not Alt, Becker, Christ, Dorr, etc., but : 
 
 1. Becker. 5. Alt. 
 
 2. Fritz. 6. Christ. 
 
 3. Haas. 7. Dorr. 
 
 4. Gerhard. 8. Engel, etc. 
 
BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 169 
 
 A well-disciplined party will come to an understanding as to such 
 a succession, even though some sensibilities will be offended. But this 
 will in no wise prevent the individual in the party from making some 
 modifications in this succession ; by such alterations he by no means 
 produces lost votes, nor does he, on the whole, change the result of 
 the election, unless very many members of his party happen to be of 
 the opinion that Mr. Alt, set down as No. 5 by the election-committee, 
 had not been justly placed before Mr. Christ, set down as No. 6. Even 
 so-called " mugwumps " or independents, who choose a few candidates 
 from this and that party, will have a certain influence on the election, 
 inasmuch as they only reach a certain number, and really take such 
 names from the various parties, to which a certain prominence has 
 already been given by their own parties. 
 
 As regards the unavoidable irregularities in an election on a large 
 scale it is simply necessary to say that the present system is by no 
 means tied down to the regularity which has been followed in these 
 examples for the sake of clearness, but that it can, in fact, be applied 
 just as well to the most scattering and various conditions of elec- 
 tion, if only its underlying principle is adhered to, /. <?., that each 
 candidate receives an ordinal number or order of preference which 
 makes it possible to compute his election-figure. 
 
 This method of counting votes is furthermore equally applicable, 
 valid and just, in the most diverse systems of election, in direct and 
 in indirect election, with universal suffrage or an elective franchise 
 limited by census, etc., in elections by ranks or classes. This seems 
 hardly to require further elucidation. In larger countries the electoral 
 districts are usually so distributed that only one representative has to 
 be elected in each ; then the geographically different organization of 
 the population (agricultural and manufacturing districts, mercantile 
 cities, different denominations, and the like) usually procures currency 
 for the difference of interests and opinions, at least to a certain degree. 
 It should be determined, moreover, when a more just count of votes 
 becomes possible, if it would not be better to enlarge those election 
 districts, in which several representatives must be elected, consider- 
 able minorities would then be sure of some representation, which 
 they lack entirely under the present systems of election. 
 
1 70 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 This method of counting, as is easily seen, commends itself, not 
 only at the general elections of deputies, but also at the election of 
 larger committees in the chambers of deputies themselves, in clubs, 
 etc., in short, everywhere where minorities are opposed to a majority. 
 Such committees would in future offer an exact and just image of the 
 various parties in the chambers. 
 
 Only when due representation is given in such manner to the min- 
 orities, do provisions such as the one that at least two-thirds of the 
 votes must be cast for an intended constitutional change, attain their 
 true significance. 
 
 No matter where this method of counting is applied, no difficulty 
 will ever arise. The officers of election will simply have a slight in- 
 crease of work. Beside tabulating the returns, which must be per- 
 formed with the greatest exactness, they must do a number of sums in 
 division ; their services will perhaps be required for a day longer than 
 formerly. But this extra work and the attendant expense (a day's 
 pay for computers) are so inconsiderable in comparison with the great 
 object aimed at, that a thorough discussion of this point seems hardly 
 necessary. 
 
 An elucidation of the defects in the systems of election existing. in 
 the various countries, and of the improvement which might be effected 
 in them by our method of counting, would lead too far. Every at- 
 tentive reader, who is acquainted with the election-laws of his coun- 
 try, will be able to institute such a comparison for 'himself. By way 
 of example, however, we will examine at least two election-laws more 
 closely : that of a small state, the defectiveness of which has long been 
 acknowledged by all its citizens, but which has still not been im- 
 proved, simply because no one has offered a satisfactory substitute 
 (Frankfort, free city), and that of Germany, such as it was proposed 
 in the reform-bill as a method of chosing delegates. 
 
 In Frankfort every citizen is entitled to vote, and the citizens are 
 divided into three classes: i. scholars, artists, officials, etc. 2. 
 commercial men. 3. tradesmen. The city forms only one election- 
 district. Every year each citizen chooses 25 citizens in his own 
 division; the 75 delegates thus chosen then, by a majority of votes, 
 elect 57 deputies. This is not the place to examine whether the kind, 
 
BURXITZ AND VARRENTRAPP'S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 171 
 
 number and size of these classes are proper ; we simply accept them 
 as an existing fact. Now what is the result of such a class-election ? 
 Various contingencies may arise here, all of which have a. pretty 
 equally defective result. In describing these contingencies we prefer- 
 ably cite such as have really occurred here. 
 
 1. In all three classes, one party (it maybe, for instance, the old 
 liberal) preponderates, it therefore elects the 57 representatives from 
 its midst, and the minority remains wholly unrepresented. This is 
 the case even when the majority is only a relative one, that is, if it 
 numbers 2000 votes for instance, while the democratic and the con- 
 servative parties control 1500 votes each. 
 
 2. A still more defective result is obtained if the two extreme par- 
 ties, in order to overthrow the central party, wish to combine and 
 enter into a compromise which is opposed to the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of each. 
 
 3. If the old liberal party has been victorious in two divisions, 
 and the democratic in the third, the 50 old liberal electors elect all 
 the deputies from their own party, and the 25 democratic delegates 
 have no influence whatever. 
 
 4. If the old liberal party is victorious in the second division, and 
 the conservative in the third, while in the first they are so close to 
 each other that the old liberals number 13 and the conservatives 12 
 delegates, then 38 old liberals will confront 37 conservatives on the 
 day of election of deputies, and if they be well-drilled partisans, the 
 former will elect all the deputies. But what takes place ? A delegate 
 of the second division (an old liberal) falls ill, the first deputy-dele- 
 gate of this division of course belongs to the conservative party, and 
 now in reality the opposite takes place, only conservatives being 
 elected. This took place on October 28, 1850. 
 
 5. Or the old-liberals are victorious in the first-class, the demo- 
 crats in the second, the conservatives in the third. Each party has 
 25 electors; but at least 38 votes are necessary for the valid election 
 of a deputy. In this case a defective compromise will finally lead to 
 a result that can hardly be good. 
 
 By way of remedy, direct election and a larger number of dis- 
 tricts were recommended. But such districts would be created quite 
 
172 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 arbitrarily and fortuitously ; no districts are to be formed here which 
 represent different social interests. It is not possible to form classes 
 according to property or taxes, as no census ever existed here. But if 
 our method of counting should find favor, the one-election district 
 might very well be continued, and all classes disregarded. Neither 
 direct nor indirect elections are in any way anticipated ; in the one as 
 in the other, the method of determining election-figures will assure 
 adequate representation to a minority or several minorities. 
 
 It is also not our business here to examine the political side of the 
 delegate-project. Though it be in itself more proper than direct 
 election, though it alone be able to prevent dissension between the 
 various country representations and the national representation, though 
 there be nothing else possible to Austria, all of which has been re- 
 peatedly asserted by the friends of the delegate-project, at all events it 
 will be conceded that an unavoidable, nay, necessary and therefore 
 irremediable defect of the same consists in this, that the representation 
 of each country will only send its majority to the house of delegates, 
 nay, that in the proper interest of the party it cannot act otherwise, 
 because it must expect a similar proceeding with regard to the other 
 country representations in which the opposite party has the majority. 
 Thus, at present, the Prussian chamber of deputies would doubtless 
 send no feudalists or clericals, the Bavarian one none of the progres- 
 sive party, that of Wurtemberg none favoring smaller Germany, Nas- 
 sau and Darmstadt no " greater Germany" men. Thus, as an au- 
 thority on political science has more fully shown, the members of the 
 convention of delegates would, it is true, be grouped according to 
 political views, but this would be attended by no sort of mixture of 
 the separate countrymen. The division by states would therefore 
 make itself felt primarily, and such a convention would very probably 
 further a particularistic separation of the citizens of the individual 
 German states, while it really ought to form a most important medium 
 for combination and amalgamation. All these disadvantages are com- 
 pletely done away with as soon as the method of counting by election- 
 figures, as recommended, is introduced at the election of representa- 
 tives of the countries for the convention of delegates. Then the 
 Prussian feudalists and clericals, as well as the Bavarian progressive 
 
BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 173 
 
 party, would be sure to send their adequate contingent to the conven- 
 tion of delegates. Of course, this universal representation of the 
 various parties, corresponding to their relative strength, would be still 
 more complete, if the same method of counting had already been fol- 
 lowed at the election of the deputies in the individual states. 
 
 The result of the proposed method of counting may, according to 
 the preceding, be summarized as follows : 
 
 1 i ) The parties existing in a population find their original relative 
 strength in the representation obtained on the basis specified. 
 
 (2) The minorities are adequately represented, while all the rights 
 of the true majority are preserved ; the latter will decide at every 
 vote. 
 
 (3) Each party is represented by those members which it holds in 
 highest estimation. 
 
 (For mathematical demonstration see next page. ) 
 
174 
 
 BURNITZ AND VARRENTRAPP S SYSTEM OF ELECTION. 
 
 MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION. 
 
 Let a be the number of votes received by the candidate of the 1st party. 
 " b " " ". " " " " " " " " 2d " 
 
 
 ; ' 3d ' 
 es to be elected. 
 
 L by the separate parties, 
 e, will, according to this, appear as follows : 
 -,/ ab I 
 
 x ) 
 
 y y the number of the candidates electee 
 
 zj 
 The electoral lists, placed side by sid 
 
 a b c 
 a b c 
 
 2 2 2 
 
 a b c 
 
 L a+b+c J 
 
 b 
 -/ ^ I 
 
 333 
 a b c 
 
 ~4~ ~4~ ~4~ 
 
 a D c 
 n n n 
 and 
 a b 
 
 ~*~~ "T" 
 b c 
 
 y "" z 
 x + y + z = n 
 
 I a+b+c J 
 b c 
 
 5j n{ b I" Z 
 l a+ b+cJ 
 
 , / b I 
 
 t a _^b+c J 
 
 b 
 
 _n{ cb I 
 
 l(a+b^c)bJ 
 
 -n/ C \ 
 
 (. a _ub4-c J 
 consequently 
 Y -.J a I 
 
 I a+b-hc J 
 
 ( b ) 
 y n < > 
 
 i) JL =: JL 
 
 x y 
 
 x ay 
 
 ' b 
 
 2) JL^JL 
 
 y z 
 
 * = -2- 
 
 3) ^ + i+y=- 
 
 ay + cy -j- by = bn 
 
 f b ) 
 
 y n { . - - V 
 
 I a+b^c J 
 7 - P J c X 
 
 1 a+b-fc J 
 
 The strength 'of the original parties, 
 however, reduced to n, is shown in the 
 following formations : 
 i) a-|-b-j-c . a _ n : x 
 
 x = *f a 1 
 
 1 a-j-b-j-c j 
 2) a+b-f c : b = n : y 
 n/ b X 
 
 (. a+b+c J 
 b 
 
 7 n ia+b^ci 
 3) a+b+c : c = n : z 
 
 4^ a = n J b I 
 
 , n/ C X 
 
 x U+b-j-cJ 
 
 ( b ) 
 na < > 
 
 I a-^b-f-c ) 
 
 Hence it appears that the election- 
 figures correspond exactly to the relation 
 of the parties to each other. 
 
 x = r % a+b ^ c ) 
 
 b 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 
 By Dr. L. B. Tuckerman, Cleveland, Ohio. 
 
 The following interesting paper on this subject was also 
 those which were read at the Proportional Representation Congress 
 held in Chicago last year (1893), and is reprinted from the Propor- 
 tional Representation Review for September of that year : 
 
 In the city of Cleveland, Ohio, the elements composing the labor 
 party have worked out a method of their own for securing proportion- 
 al representation in caucuses and conventions, and for avoiding dead- 
 locks where only a single person is to be nominated. The work can- 
 not be said to be wholly that of any one person, all have contributed 
 to the result, suggesting improvements here and eliminations there till 
 we have developed a method which practically is found to work easily 
 and satisfactorily. The method, which I shall call "The Cleveland 
 Method," is based on the idea of preponderance of choice a first 
 choice does and ought to outweigh a second choice, a third, and so 
 on ; and this preponderance is expressed in numerals according to 
 a perfectly simple rule which any person of ordinary intelligence can 
 apply without difficulty. The rules are as follows : 
 
 i. Each voter will write on his ballot as many names as there are 
 persons to be chosen, writing the names in the order of his choice ; 
 first choice, first ; second choice, second ; and so on. When nomi- 
 nations are made before balloting it is more convenient to write them 
 on a board where all can read them. 
 
 2. In tallying the vote the tellers will read the last name on each 
 ballot, first, crediting that name with one tally ; the name next to the 
 last, second, crediting the same with two tallies; and so on, always 
 crediting the name written first on each ballot with as many tallies as 
 
 there are names written on that ballot. 
 
 vSmith. 
 
 Thus a ballot written : 
 
 would be read : Coleman, one ; Fetzer, two .; 
 
 Jones, 3 ; Brown, four ; Smith, five. Coleman. 
 
 Brown. 
 
176 ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 
 
 And if a voter fails to write as many names as he is allowed to, no 
 variation is made in the method of tallying the voter simply loses so 
 much of his vote, which he has a right to do if he chooses the last 
 name still counts one tally, the next to the last, two, and so on. 
 
 3. The person receiving the highest number of tallies is first de- 
 clared elected ; the person receiving the next highest, next ; and so on 
 until all the vacancies are filled. In case of a tie with but one vacancy 
 to be filled, the incumbent is determined by lot. 
 
 The practical working of this rule (and we have tried it over and 
 over again) is, that every element in the electing body large enough 
 to have a quota, finds itself proportionately represented, and by its 
 own first choice or choices. 
 
 Suppose, for instance, a caucus in a ward containing one hundred 
 voters. They are to choose delegates to a convention. Suppose there 
 are two factions, one counting on 55 voters and the other 45, and the 
 contest so lively that a full vote is polled. Suppose further, that the 
 first faction decides to support A, B, C, D and E, in the order named ; 
 and the second, _/% G, If, /and K, under the Cleveland method, the 
 resulting ballot will tally as follows : 
 
 A, 55X5 275 F, 45X5 225 
 
 B, 55X4 220 G, 45X4 180 
 
 C, 55X3 165 . H, 45X3 135 
 
 D, 55X2 no I, 45X2 90 
 
 E, 55Xi 55 K > 45Xi 45 
 
 The five highest are A, F, B, G and C; three of the majority 
 faction and two of the minority the first choices, the representative 
 men of both factions. The advantage of this method in a caucus or 
 convention is, that it reaches the result, certainly, directly and quickly, 
 there is no counting the number of ballots cast and dividing by the 
 number of persons to be chosen to find what the quota is ; there is no 
 distribution of second choices, with the dissatisfaction that sometimes 
 arises therewith ; the question whether the result would have been 
 different had the ballots been counted in a different order. The 
 ballots are tallied according to a simple rule the fairness of which 
 commends itself to any man of ordinary intelligence, and the more 
 sharply the lines are drawn between factions, the more nearly will each 
 
ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 177 
 
 faction be found to have secured its exact proportion of the represen- 
 tation. 
 
 WHERE ONE is TO BE CHOSEN. The three ballot rule. 
 
 1. A majority of the votes cast shall be necessary to an election. 
 
 2. In case no candidate receives a majority on the first ballot, a 
 second ballot shall be taken in which each person shall express on his 
 ballot his first choice and his second choice, by writing the two names 
 in the order of his choice ; a first choice tallies as one vote and a 
 second choice as half a vote. A vote is not counted when the voter 
 fails to express his second choice on his ballot as required. 
 
 3. In case no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast on 
 the second. ballot, a third ballot is taken between the two candidates 
 receiving the highest number of votes on the second ballot, votes cast 
 for other candidates being not counted. 
 
 To give an example of the working of the rule, suppose a congres- 
 sional district containing five counties and aggregating 500 delegates. 
 in convention. Suppose the candidates before the convention, each 
 county, of course, having a " favorite son," to be A, with 150 dele- 
 gates pledged ; B, with 150 ; C, with 100 ; Z>, with 60 ; and E, with 
 40. It only needs a little mulishness on the part of the delegates to 
 deadlock such a convention indefinitely. Under the three ballot rule, 
 however, the first ballot would stand as follows : 
 
 A, 150; B, 150; C, 100 ; D, 60; E, 40; 500 votes cast and 
 no election. 
 
 On the second ballot, however, while each delegate would stand 
 by his instructions or his pledge and vote for the same candidate as 
 before, he must also express his second choice on pain of losing his 
 vote altogether. And that second choice must be another of the can- 
 didates before the convention. Here individual judgment or prefer- 
 ences come into play and delegations solid for first choice will often 
 divide on second choices. Suppose in this case A's supporters vote 
 for E as second choice ; B' s divide, voting 50 for A and 100 for E ; 
 Cs and D's going, say to E also, and E' s to A, and likewise remem- 
 bering that a second choice counts as half a vote, the second ballot 
 would tally as follows : 
 
 A, 195; B, 150; C, 100 ; D, 60; E, 245; total, 750. 
 
178 ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 
 
 Again there is no election, no candidate has received a majority, 
 but the preponderance of choice has designated two men ; A, with 
 195 votes, and , with 245, as the two really prominent men before 
 the convention. All the rest are dropped and the third ballot settles 
 it between these two. Like the other rule it works certainly and 
 quickly. Under it no charge of unfairness can arise, and there is no 
 time for trades and dickers and no place for the bitterness and per- 
 sonal animosities that always remain after a long deadlock, a bitter- 
 ness which not infrequently lays out at the polls the candidate who was 
 finally successful in convention, even when the party whose nominee 
 he is, has a substantial majority under ordinary circumstances. 
 
 [This method of election, it will be seen, is almost identical in princi- 
 ple with the Burnitz system. The difference being that instead of divid- 
 ing the votes for different candidates by the numbers which indicate the 
 order of their preferences, they are multiplied by the ordinal numbers ar- 
 ranged in the inverse order of preference. Thus the votes for ihejirst 
 choice candidate, when five are to be elected, is multiplied by 5, the 
 second choice by 4, and so on, the fifth being multiplied by one. It 
 does not seem as though this method distributed the elector's voting 
 power correctly. If a voter has five votes which he can give or dis- 
 tribute among one or more candidates as he chooses, then he may 
 .give all five to one, but if he distributes them equally between two 
 candidates then obviously the second can get only 2)4 votes. In the 
 illustration which the author of this paper has given the 55 voters 
 might give 275 votes for A, but if they divide them' equally between 
 A and B, B would receive only 137}^, instead of 220, which have 
 been assigned to him. If this method of computing the votes is 
 adopted it would seem as though the multipliers should be 5 , 2 y z , 
 1^3, i ^ and i, instead of 5, 4, 3, 2 and i. The proposed multi- 
 pliers would give exactly the same results as the Burnitz system, but it 
 is much simpler to divide the total votes of the different orders of 
 choice by i, 2, 3, 4 and 5 than to multiply them by 5, 2^, i^i, 
 i*^ and i. 
 
 The interesting facts stated in the paper, however, are that this 
 method securing proportional representation in the labor party in 
 
ELECTION BY PREPONDERANCE OF CHOICE. 179 
 
 Cleveland was developed by the cooperation of a number of its 
 members, and that the practical working of the system after many 
 trials by a party composed of as many diverse elements as will nat- 
 urally be found in the labor party of a great city like Cleveland has 
 .been satisfactory, and that since it has been adopted, every element in 
 that party, large enough to have a quota, finds itself proportionally 
 represented.] 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MINORITY, PROPORTIONAL OR PERSONAL REPRE- 
 SENTATION, CUMULATIVE OR FREE VOTING, ETC. 
 
 [The following list of books, periodicals, addresses and magazine 
 articles on the above and kindred topics has been prepared and is 
 as full as the means and the time at command would permit, but no 
 pretensions to completeness are made. As the writer knows no other 
 language than his mother tongue and that somewhat imperfectly the 
 reference to literature in foreign languages is, as will be seen, very lim- 
 ited. It is hoped, though, that this list, imperfect as it is, may be 
 useful to those who want to extend their knowledge of the important 
 subjects to which the publications enumerated refer. These have been 
 arranged chronologically to indicate the relative positions in the order 
 of the discussion which the different publications occupied. This ar- 
 rangement, it was thought, would be the most useful to those who are 
 studying these subjects 
 
 Acknowledgment should be made to the list of books published 
 with Prof. Ware's article in the American Law Review of January, 
 1872, to a "Bibliography of Proportional Representation," by Prof. 
 John R. Commons, in the Proportional Representation Review of Decem- 
 ber, 1893, and to Poole's Index. The author will be glad to receive 
 any additional titles of books, essays or other publications relating to 
 these subjects, which may be included in a more complete list here 
 after.] 
 
 ' The Representation of Minorities of Electors to Act with the Majority in Elected 
 Assemblies." By Thomas Gilpin. Philadelphia, 1844. This is the first book pub- 
 lished on the subject of proportional representation, though Norway, in the Constitu- 
 tion of 1814, seems to have been the first to make an attempt to give representation to 
 the minority. 
 
 " De la Sincerite du Gouvernement Representatif, ou Exposition de 1' Election 
 veridique." Par Victor Considerant. Geneve, 1846. Reprinted by the Swiss Society, 
 Zurich, 1892. 15 centimes. Of historical importance, being the first brochure on 
 proportional representation in Switzerland. The arguments have not been surpassed. 
 
 " A Disquisition on Government, and a Discourse on the Constitution and Govern- 
 
 iSo 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. l8l 
 
 ment of the United States." John C. Calhoun. Edited by R. C. Cralle. Charles- 
 ton, 1851 
 
 " Minorities and Majorities, Their Relative Rights : A Letter to Lord John Rus- 
 sell, M. P., on Parliamentary Reform." James Garth Marshall. London, 1853. 
 
 "Minorities and Majorities, Their Relative Rights." James Garth Marshall. 
 (Review of) Edinburgh Review, July, 1854. p. 1 1 6. 
 
 " The Machinery of Representation." By Thomas Hare. London : Maxwell, Bell- 
 Yard, 1857. 
 
 " Parliamentary Government Considered in Reference to a Reform in Parliament." 
 By Earl Grey. (Review of) North British Review. May, 1858. p. 43. 
 
 "On the Application of a New Statistical Method to the Ascertainment of the 
 Votes of Majorities in a More Exhaustive Manner." Thomas Hare. Journal of the 
 Statistical Society, September, 1860. p. 337. 
 
 "The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." First edition. 
 Thomas Hare. London, 1859. 
 
 " Mr. Hare's Reform Bill Simplified and Explained." Henry Fawcett. 1860. 
 
 " Representation of every Locality and Intelligence." Fraser 1 s Magazine. April, 
 1860. p. 536. 
 
 " Minority Representation, New Theory of." De Bow 1 s Review. November, 
 1860. p. 631. 
 
 Thomas Hare. Journal of the 
 
 Statistical Society. June, 1860. pp. 337, 347. 
 
 ' Report of Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Franchise." June 26, 
 1860. 
 
 Thomas Hare. Journal of the 
 
 Statistical Society. September, 1860. pp. 351-2. 
 
 " A Plea for a Pure Democracy." Miss Spence. .Pub. in South Australia, 1861. 
 
 " Usque ad Calum." Thomas Hare. p. 39. London: Sampson Low, Son & 
 Co. 1862. 
 
 " De la Representation des Minorites." M. Morin. Geneve, 1862. 
 
 "True and False Democracy. Boston. Prentis & Deland. Congress Street, 
 1862. 
 
 " Suggestions for the Improvement of Our Representative System." By Thomas 
 Hare. Macmillan' 's Magazine. February, 1862. p. 295. 
 
 " A Few Remarks on Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representation." By G. O. Trevel- 
 yan, B. A. Macmillarf s Magazine. April, 1862. p. 480. 
 
 " Ideal of a Local Government for the Metropolis." Thomas Hare. Macmillaris 
 Magazine. April, 1863. p. 445. 
 
 North American Review, Vol. XCV., 
 
 1862. p. 240. 
 
 "Considerations on Representative Government." John Stuart Mill. 365pp. 
 New York: Harper Bros. 1862. The chapter in this book on " True and False 
 Democracy; Representation of all, and Representation of the Majority only," is one 
 
1 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 of the best statements of the reasons for giving minorities representation, ever pub- 
 lished. Later editions of this book have been issued. 
 
 " The Degradation of our Representative System and its Reform." By J. Francis 
 Fisher. Philadelphia. 1863. 
 
 " Methode, bei jeder Art von Wahlen sowohl der Mehrheit als den Minderheiten 
 die ihrer Starke entsprechende Zahl von Vertretern zu sichern. ' ' Dargestellt von Dr. 
 phil. Gustav Burnitz und Dr. med. Georg Varrentrapp. Frankfort a. M. 1863. i6pp. 
 A translation of this pamphlet is given in pages 159-174. 
 
 Christian Examiner. Boston, 1863. 
 
 Report of Mr. Robert Lytton, Her Majesty' s Secretary of Legation at Copenhagen,, 
 on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad. Presented by Command. 1864. 
 (Printed in the London Daily News, Aug. 30-31, 1864; also as an appendix to a 
 speech by John Stuart Mill on Personal Representation, delivered in the House of 
 Commons May 29, 1867, and printed in pamphlet form, by Henderson, Raib and 
 Fenton, Printers, 23 Berners Street, Oxford Street, London, 1867.) This report deals 
 with the system as applied in Denmark, by Minister Andrae. 
 
 "Les Elections de Geneve. Memoire Presente au Conseil Federal et au Peuple 
 Suisse." Ernest Naville. Lausanne et Geneve. 1864.* 
 
 " Conseil de 1' Association Reformiste." Rapport du President. Ernest Navillev 
 Geneve. 1865.* 
 
 "Personal Representation." A Review of Hare's Election of Representatives. 
 Westminster Review, Oct., 1865, p. 145. 
 
 "Individual Responsibility in Representative Government." Thomas Hare. 
 Fortnightly Review, March 15, 1866. p. 350. 
 
 " Principles of Representation." Edward Wilson. Fortnightly Review, April I,. 
 1866. p. 421. 
 
 " Reform in our Municipal Elections. " J. Francis Fisher. Philadelphia. 1866. 
 
 " The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." A Treatise by 
 Thomas Hare. Third Edition, Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867. 350 pp. 
 This is the most complete treatise on the subject to^which it 'relates that has yet been 
 published. Later editions have been issued since the first one. 
 
 "Personal Representation." Nation, Aug. 15, 1867. 
 
 "The Tyranny of the Majority." The North American Review, Jan., 1867. 
 p. 205. 
 
 "Personal Representation." By David G. Croly, In Galaxy, July, 1867. p. 307. 
 
 " Report to the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York on Personal 
 Representation." Prepared at the request, and printed under the auspice* of the 
 Personal Representation Society, by Simon Sterne. New York. 1867. 
 
 " Personal Representation." Speech of John Stuart Mill, M. P., in the House of 
 Commons, May 29, 1867 ; with an Appendix, containing reports of Discussions and 
 Publications in France, Geneva, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the Aus- 
 
 * The writings of Professor Naville are numerous, and besides giving remarkable exposi- 
 tions of the subject they are a complete history of the movement in Switzerland. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 183 
 
 tralian Colonies, and the United States. London. 1867. Henderson, Raib & Fen- 
 ton, Printers, 23 Berners St., Oxford St. 
 
 ' ' Representative Reform. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference 
 of Members of the Reform League, and Others, on Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representa- 
 tion." London. Triibner & Co. 1868. 
 
 " Ls Minorites et le Suffrage Universe!. Par le Baron de Layze. " Paris. 1868. 
 
 " Del Potere Elettorale negli stati Liberi. Par Luigi Palma." Milano. 1869. 
 
 " Rapport de la Majorite de la Commission nomine par le Grand Conseil de la Re- 
 public et Canton de Neuchatel pour la Revision de la Loi Electorale, 1869." 
 
 " Report of the Select Committee of the United States Senate on Representative 
 Reform." Government Printing Office, 1869. Reprinted in " Proportional Repre- 
 sentation." By Senator Buckalew, Philadelphia. 
 
 "A Scheme for Proportional Representation." Walter Baily. London. 1869. 
 Mr. Baily' s system seems to be similar to the Gove System. 
 
 " Recent Discussions on the Representation of Minorities." The Princeton Re- 
 view ot October, 1869. p. 581. 
 
 " On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing Representa- 
 tives." By H. R. Droop. London. 1869. 
 
 " Constitution of the State of Illinois as Adopted in Convention, with an Address 
 to the People." Chicago. 1870. 
 
 " Proportional Representation." David Dudley Field. Putnam's Magazine, 
 June, 1870. p. 712. 
 
 " Representation Proportionelle de la Majorite et des Minorite." Par J. Borley. 
 Paris. 1870. 
 
 "Teoriadella Elezione Politica." Guido Padebetti. Naples. 1870. 
 
 " Le Suffrage Universel dans 1'Avenir." Eugene Aubry-Vitet. Revue des Deux 
 Mondes du 15 Mai, 1870. 
 
 " Representative Government and Personal Representation." Simon Sterne. 
 237 pp. Philadelphia : Lippincott & Co. 1871. $1.75. An able presentation of the 
 Hare System simplified and adapted to American institutions. 
 
 Proceedings of the American Social Science Association. The application of 
 Mr. Hare's method of voting to the nomination of Overseers of Harvard College. New 
 York. 1871. 
 
 Sessional Proceedings of the National Association for the Promotion of School 
 Science, The School Board Elections. London. 1871. 
 
 "Memorandum on the History, Working and Results of Cumulative Voting.'* 
 ( Prepared for the information of the Belgian Government. ) London. Printed at the 
 Foreign office. 1871. 
 
 "The Cumulative Method of Voting." As exhibited in the late School-Board 
 Elections. Birmingham. 1871. 
 
 " La Question Electorale." Par Ernest Naville.* Geneve et Bale. 1871. (A 
 resume of the publications of the Association Reformiste. ) 
 
 * Refers to note on p. :82. 
 
184 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 Proceedings of the American Social Science Association. The Application of 
 Mr. Hare's Method of Voting to the Nomination of Overseers of Harvard College. 
 New York. 1871. 
 
 Sessional Proceedings of the National Association for the Promotion of Social 
 Science. The School- Board Elections. London. 1871. 
 
 "Minority Representation in Europe." T. Hare. American Social Science 
 Journal, vol 3. 1871. p. 185. 
 
 " A Short Explanation of Mr. Hare's Scheme of Representation. " By Millicent 
 Garrett Fawcett. Macmillan" 1 s Magazine. April, 1871. p. 481. 
 
 " Minority Representation." 7 he Nation. August 3, 1871. p. 69. 
 
 " Proportional Representation." C. R. Buckalew, ex-U. S. Senator, Penn. 
 Edited by John G. Freeze. Philadelphia : William J. Campbell. 1872. 8vo. 
 Price $3.00. Includes speeches, addresses, and report of the Senate Committee. 
 Favors cumulative vote. 
 
 " Minority or Proportional Representation. Its nature, aims, history, processes 
 and practical operation. " By Salem Dutcher. New York : U. S. Publishing Co. 1872. 
 165 pp. Price $1.50. 
 
 " The Machinery of Politics and Proportional Representation." By Prof. Wm. R. 
 Ware. The American Law Review. January, 1872. p. 255. 
 
 " Minority Representation." T. Gilpin. Penn Monthly. July, 1872. p. 347. 
 
 " Minority Representation." Simon Sterne. Nation. July, 1872. p. 69. 
 
 "Redistribution of Political Power." By E. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen. Mac- 
 millan's Magazine. November, 1872. p. 67. 
 
 "Proportional Representation." By S. Dana Horton. The Penn Monthly. 
 June, 1873. P- 3^4. 
 
 " Reforme Electorate. " M. Leon Petz de Thoze. Bruxelles, 1874. p. 8. 
 
 " Le Progres de la Reforme Electoral en 1873." Ernest Naville. Geneve, 1874.* 
 
 "A New Theory of Minority Representation. " By Albert B. Mason. The New 
 Englander, July, 1874. p. 573. 
 
 Leslie Stephen. Fortnightly Review, 
 
 June, 1875. 
 
 "A Note on Representative Government. " Thomas Hare. Fortnightly Review, 
 July I, 1875. p. 102. 
 
 "The Protection of Majorities or Considerations Relating to Electoral Reform." 
 Josiah Phillips Quincy. Boston : Roberts Bros. 1876. 
 
 " Les Progres de la Reforme Electoral en 1874 et 1875." Ernest Naville, Geneve. 
 1876.* 
 
 4 ' The Representation of Minorities. ' ' By Leonard Courtney, M. P. Nineteenth 
 Century, July, 1879. p. 141. 
 
 " La Democratic Representative. " Ernest Naville.* Geneve et Paris. 1881. 
 
 " On Methods of Electing Representatives. " H. R. Droop. Journal of the Sta- 
 tistical Society, }vnz, 1881. p. 141, 
 
 * Refers to note on p. 182. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 185 
 
 " The People's Power ; or How to Wield the Ballot. " By Simeon Stetson. San 
 Francisco : W. M. Henton. 1883. 63 pages, paper, 25 cents. 
 
 "Proportional Representation." (Italian.) Cav. Francesco, Sec. to the State 
 Council. Rome. 1883. 
 
 "The English Radicals and Minority Representation." The Nation, October 25, 
 
 1883. p. 347. 
 
 "Minority Representation." J. Parker Smith. Spectator, November 10, 1883. 
 
 P- 1444- 
 
 " The Minority Vote. " Spectator. December 15, 1883. p. 1617. 
 
 "Proportionate Representation." By Frederic Seebohm. Contemporary Review. 
 December, 1883. p. 905. 
 
 " Parliamentary Reform : Minority Representation. " By J. Parker Smith. West- 
 minster Review. January, 1884. p. 163. 
 
 " Proportional Representation. " By Robert B. Hay ward. The Nineteenth Cen- 
 tury. February, 1884. p. 293. 
 
 "Proportional Representation: A Practical Proposal. " By John Westlake, Q. C. 
 Contemporary Review. March, 1884. p. 417. Also reprinted for the Proportional 
 Representation Society. 
 
 " Representation and Misrepresentation." I Westminster Revie^u. April, 1884. p. 392. 
 
 " Proportional Representation. " By Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M. P. Nineteenth 
 Century. April, 1884. p. 703. 
 
 " A Test Election. " By H. O. Arnold Forster. Nineteenth Century. April, 
 
 1884. p. 716. 
 
 " The Representation of Minorities. " By G. Shaw Lefevre. Contemporary Re- 
 view. May, 1884. p. 714. 
 
 "Proportional vs. Majority Representation." By Albert Grey, M. P. Nineteenth 
 Century. December, 1884. p. 935. 
 
 "Fair Representation." Walter E. Smith. London : Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 
 
 1885. 63 pages. Price (paper) is., cloth, 6s. A careful examination of various 
 plans of Proportional Representation. 
 
 " La Democratie Representative. Representation Proportionelle de la Majonte et 
 des Minorites." By Edouard Campagnole. Rue Soufflot, Paris, 1885. 
 
 " The D'Hondt System and the Single Transferable Vote." (Italian.) Florence. 
 1885. 
 
 "Representation and Misrepresentation. The Crusade for Proportional Represen- 
 tion." Thomas Hare. Fortnightly Review. February I, 1885. p. 202. 
 
 " Proportional Representation : Objections and Answers." By Sir John Lubbock, 
 Bart., M. P. ; Leonard Courtney, M. P. ; Albert Grey, M. P. ; and John Westlake, 
 Q. C. The Nineteenth Century. February, 1885. p. 321. 
 
 "Practical Consideration on the Representation of Minorities. " By I. Boyd Kin- 
 near. Fortnightly Review. February 15, 1886. p. 49. 
 
 " Working Men on Minority Representation." The Nation. September 16, 1886. 
 p. 229. 
 
1 86 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 ' ' Die Frage der Einfiihruiig einer Proportionalvertretung Statt des Absoluten 
 Mehres." Bischoff Von Hagenbach. Basel, 1888. 
 
 " Le Suffrage Universal et le Regime Parlementaire. " Par M. Paul Lafitte. 1889. 
 
 "Representation, Imperial Parliament, No. 2." 6th thousand. By Sir John Lub- 
 bock. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1890. 90 pages. Paper, gd. A brief, 
 clear discussion. Favors the single transferable vote. Sir John Lubbock is president 
 of the English Proportional Representation Society. 
 
 " Bericht des Grossrats." Kommission iiber das Initiativbegehren betreffend 
 Einfuhrung der Proportionalvertretung, bei den Wahlen in den Grossen Rat. Basel, 
 1890. 
 
 "Congressional Directory Supplements, 1890 and following, Washington." Maps 
 and population of all Congressional Districts for each Congress, beginning with the 
 5 1 st. A telling object lesson. 
 
 " Representation Proportionalle des Opinions Differentes dans les Elections." Par 
 J. Curie, Paris, 28 Rue Serpente, 1891. 
 
 "La Representation Vraie et la Revision." Jean Mormnaert. Societe Beige de 
 Librairies. Bruxelles, 1891. 
 
 "The Gerrymander of Wisconsin." A. J. Turner. A review of the legislative 
 apportionment act of 1891. The author. Portage, Wisconsin. 26 pages. Maps and 
 statistics of a remarkable legislative gerrymander, since declared unconstitutional by the 
 Supreme Court. 
 
 " Proportional Representation a Remedy for Gerrymandering." By Prof. John R. 
 Commons. Philadelphia : American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1891. 
 
 "An Unrepresentative Congress." Stoughton Cooley. Belford^s. December, 1891. 
 
 " A New Plan for Minority Representation." J. R. Commons. Review of Re- 
 views. November, 1891. 
 
 "An Appeal to the Canadian Institute on the Rectification of Parliament." San- 
 ford Fleming. Toronto : The Copp Clark Co., 1892. 173 pages. Contains an- 
 nouncement of prizes by the editor and well selected extracts from writers on party 
 politics and electoral reform. Contains also the report of Lord Lytton on the election 
 of representatives in Denmark. 
 
 " Legal Disfranchisement." Stoughton Cooley. Atlantic Monthly. April, iC92. 
 
 " The Slaying of the Gerrymander." Stoughton Cooley. Atlantic Montidy. 
 May, 1892. 
 
 "How to Abolish the Gerrymander." J. R. Commons. Review of Reviews. 
 December, 1892. 
 
 Cridge, Alfred. "Proportional Representation. Including its relations to the 
 Initiative and Referendum." San Francisco. 1893. Published by the author, 429 
 Montgomery Street. 10 cents. 
 
 "Proportional Representation." A series of 13 articles in The Twentieth 
 Century, 19 Astor Place, New York, by J. R. Commons, beginning June 29, 
 
 1893. 
 
 "Proportional Representation." W. D. McCrackan. Arena. February, 1893. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 187 
 
 " Proportional Representation. " Stoughton Cooley. New England Magazine. 
 March, 1893. 
 
 " Why Municipal Government Fails." Stoughton Cooley. American Jottrnai 
 of Politics. August, 1893. 
 
 Essays Received in Response to an Appeal by the Canadian Institute on the 
 Rectification of Parliament. Toronto : The Copp Clark Company, Limited. 1893. 
 
 "Primary Elections. A Study of Methods for improving the Basis of Party 
 Organization." Daniel S. Remsen. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1894. 
 
 PERIODICALS. 
 
 La Representation Proportionate. Paris, F. Pichon, 1 888. 524 pages, 10 fr. 
 Published under the auspices of the Societie pour 1' etude de la representation propor- 
 tionelle of France. An able exposition of the reform by the secretary of the society, 
 and a complete history of legislation in all countries. 
 
 La Representation Proportioned Revue Mensuelle. Bruxelles, Belgium. Pub- 
 lished since 1882. 5 fr. yearly. The organ of L' association Reformiste beige pour la 
 Representation Proportionelle. Contributions from the foremost continental reformers. 
 The volume for 1885 contains a full account of the international congress at Anvers. 
 
 Bulletin de la Societe Suisse pour la Representation Proportionelle. H. Georg r 
 librairie-editeure. Geneve et Bale, 1885. Prix du numero 50 centimes. 
 
 Hope and Home. Alfred Cridge, editor and proprietor. San Francisco. 25 c. a 
 year. Devoted to Direct Legislation and Proportional Representation. 
 
 The Proportional Representation Review. Published quarterly by the American 
 Proportional Representation League of Chicago. 
 
 "THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION REVIEW." 
 
 CONTENTS OF SEPTEMBER NUMBER, 1893. 
 
 The Proportional Representation Congress. 
 
 Outline of Bill Based on Free List System. 
 
 Outline of Bill Based on Gove System. 
 
 Proportional Representation, Prof. John R. Commons. 
 
 Ticino as an Object Lesson, W. D. McCrackan. 
 
 Effective Voting, Catherine H. Spence. 
 
 The Gove System, Wm. H. Gove. 
 
 The Proxy System, Montague R. Leverson. 
 
 Majority Myths, Alfred Cridge. 
 
 The Solution of the Problem, T. Curie. 
 
 Preponderance of Choice, Dr. L. B. Tuckerman.* 
 
 Address of The American Proportional Representation League. 
 
 * See p. 175. 
 
1 88 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 
 CONTENTS OF DECEMBER NUMBER, 1893. 
 
 Proportional Representation as a Means of Political Reform, William Dudley 
 Foulke. 
 
 The Application. Form of Ballot for the Four List System. 
 
 The Cumulative Vote, John Z. White. 
 
 Proportional Representation in Switzerland, Prof. Ernest Naville. 
 
 A Bibliography of Proportional Representation, Prof. John R. Commons. 
 
 State of the Movement. 
 
 Editorial Notes. 
 
 CONTENTS OF MARCH NUMBER, 1894. 
 
 Reform in City Government, Hon. Charles Francis Adams. 
 The Line of Least Resistance. 
 
 The Present Condition of the Proportional Representation Question in France, 
 Lieut. -Col. J. Curie. 
 
 Proportional Representation in Belgium, Prof. John R. Commons. 
 State of the Movement. 
 Editorial Notes. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Abingdon 73 
 
 Able man 123, 139, 140 
 
 Absolute government 52 
 
 Adams, Charles Francis 126 
 
 Address of Am. Prop. Rep. League. . 123 
 
 Alderman 44, 127, 138 
 
 Altamont 60 
 
 Alton 58, 62, 68 
 
 Am. Academy of Pol. and Social 
 
 Science 125 
 
 American Law Review. . . 1 6, 29, 83, 
 
 132, 144, 149 
 
 American Prop. Rep. League 19, 123 
 
 Am. Prop. Rep. League, address of. . 52 
 
 Anna 130 
 
 Apathy 52 
 
 Apathy and indifference of voters .121, 122 
 
 Appendix A 147-158 
 
 Appendix B. . 159-174 
 
 Appendix C 175-179 
 
 Appendix D 180-188 
 
 Apportionment law 18 
 
 Appropriation of votes 100, 113 
 
 Arnold, Matthew 37, 38 
 
 Arrogance of the majority 122 
 
 Assemblymen 138 
 
 Assemblymen, election of 114 
 
 Assigning votes 81 
 
 Athenian state 37 
 
 Athens 37 
 
 Augusta 57 
 
 Austin 45, 59, 69, 130 
 
 Austria 172 
 
 Australia 149 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Australian ballot 54, 55 
 
 Australian system of voting 58, 60 
 
 Automatic action 90 
 
 Automatic adaptation 147 
 
 Automatic system 100 
 
 Average minds 140 
 
 Bad-blood 67, 68, 71 
 
 Balance, beam of 26 
 
 Balance of Power 27, 28 
 
 Ballot clerks 99, 113 
 
 Ballots, return of 95 
 
 Ballots, transferring 149 
 
 Bancroft 6, 7 
 
 Banker 49 
 
 Bavarian 172 
 
 Beardstown 47, 53, 61, 62, 63, 78 
 
 Belleville 70 
 
 Best men, deterred from holding office 121 
 
 Bet 12 
 
 Bibliography 180-188 
 
 Bill for election of congressmen. .151, 
 
 152, 153 
 
 Bitterness, party 60, 64 
 
 Blank for return of votes 95, 96 
 
 Blanks 108' 
 
 Boards of supervisors. 75 
 
 Bolting 125, 157 
 
 Bosses 76, 145 
 
 Bosses, government by 39 
 
 Boss, municipal 126 
 
 Boss, political 75, 78 
 
 Boston harbor 8 
 
 Bribed ... 12 
 
 189 
 
1 90 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Bribery .44, 81 
 
 Bribery, sovereignty of 27 
 
 Bright, John 88, 128, 131, 147 
 
 British Parliament 122, 145 
 
 Brooks 6l 
 
 Buckalew, Chas. R. . .17, 25, 36, 41, 
 
 50, 53, 118, 124, 125, 146, 157, 158 
 
 Bunker Hill 56 
 
 Bureaucratic despotism 36 
 
 Burnitz & Varrentrapp' s system of 
 
 election 90, 159, 174 
 
 Burnitz, Dr 90, 91, 150, 153 
 
 Burnitz, Gustav, paper by 159 
 
 Buniitz method of computation 136 
 
 Burnitz system of election. . . .81, 92, 102, 
 112, 113, 137, 138, 153, 154, 157, 178 
 
 154, 157 
 
 Bushnell 47, 62 
 
 Buxton, Mr 122 
 
 Cairns, Lord 51, 122 
 
 Calhoun, Mr 51 
 
 Campaign expenses 74 
 
 Candidate, popular and unpopular. ... 58 
 
 Candidates, choice of 93 
 
 Candidates, number of to be elected in 
 
 a district 8l 
 
 Canvassers, district. .99, 113 
 
 Carlyle 46, 59, 6 9 
 
 Carmi 57, 60, 78 
 
 Carrollton 54, 62 
 
 Carthage 70 
 
 Caucuses 76, 79, 81, .138, 142, 
 
 175, 176 
 
 Caucuses, attendance on 30 
 
 Caucuses, packing of ............... 74 
 
 Caucus rule 119 
 
 Caucus system 141 
 
 Certainty of election 74 
 
 Champaign 47, 69 
 
 Chance 71, 72, 148, 149 
 
 Characters, superior 139 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Charleston 45, 54, 60 
 
 Charter g 
 
 Chester 46, 59 
 
 Chicago.... 1 9, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 
 56, 59, 69, 73, 74, 75, 78, 149, 
 
 150, 151, 152, 155 
 
 Chicago Congress 154, 155 
 
 Choice 177, 178 
 
 Choice of candidates 93 
 
 Churchman 66 
 
 Circular of enquiry 43 
 
 Cities, members of legislative bodies of 1 14 
 
 City candidate 66 
 
 City population 66 
 
 Civil liberty , 5, 29 
 
 Civil service reform 128 
 
 Civil war 132 
 
 Classes, instructed 141 
 
 Classes of votes 113 
 
 Cleveland method 175 
 
 Cleveland, O 175, 179 
 
 Cliques 173 
 
 Cliques, should be heard. 128 
 
 Colleague 65, 69 
 
 Collective mediocrity 139 
 
 Collinsville 46, 78 
 
 Combination of parties 171 
 
 Committee on Rep. Reform 50 
 
 Committees 9 
 
 Common Council of N. York 127 
 
 Commons, John R. . 18, 125 
 
 Complexity 100, 113 
 
 Computing votes 154, 178 
 
 Congress 120 
 
 Congressional district 177 
 
 Congress, members of ....... 1 8, 44, 112 
 
 Congress Prop. Rep. . .150, 151, 152, 154 
 Congress, representatives in . . 151, 152, 153 
 Congress, World's Prop. Rep. . . .149, .155 
 
 Constituency an integer 129 
 
 Constitution 12 
 
 Constitutional convention ,.43, 57 
 
INDEX. 
 
 191 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Constitutional monarchy 36 
 
 Constitution of Illinois 41, 43 
 
 Constitution of State of New York, 
 
 amendment to 113, 114 
 
 Constitution of the State of Illinois ... 88 
 
 Contemporary Revie^o 84, 149 
 
 Contention 129 
 
 Convention, constitutional 43 
 
 Convention, nominating 66 
 
 Conventions 1 75 
 
 Cornfield 81 
 
 Corporate associations 1 12 j 
 
 Corporate body 161, 162 | 
 
 Corrupting the convention 75 i 
 
 Corruption 44, 83 
 
 Corrupt voters, combination of 126 
 
 Cost of campaign 81 
 
 Count, fraudulent 150 
 
 Counting, method of 171, 173 
 
 Counting votes.. 44, 53, 54, 55,63, 
 
 Si, 94, 97, 99, "3, HO, 149, 
 
 169, 170 
 
 Country candidate 66 
 
 Courtney, Leonard. .. .33, 123, 134, 
 
 144, 148 
 
 Crash, social 36 
 
 Cridge, Alfred 14, 15, 26 
 
 Crime, infamous 12, 13 
 
 Crotchets 128 
 
 Crotchety men 128 
 
 Cumulative system. . . .66, 79, 81, 82, 
 
 83, 130, 131, 147, 157 
 Cumulative system, advantages of. ... 63 
 Cumulative system, cumbersomeness 
 
 of 82 
 
 Cumulative system, objections to . .83, 84 
 
 Cumulative voting. . . .40, 43, 44, 45, 
 
 5o, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 
 
 67, 71, 72, 73, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 
 
 85, 87, 88, 90, 97, 100, 102, 103, 
 
 113, 120, 128, 132, i$o 
 Cumulative voting, objections to 65 
 
 Darmstadt 172 
 
 Dead-locks 175,, 178 
 
 Deals 78 
 
 Decatur 56, 58 
 
 Decisiveness 133 
 
 "Decisiveness," the aim of govern- 
 ment 129 
 
 Deliberative assembly 30 
 
 Deliberative body 144 
 
 Demagogues, oligarchy of 36 
 
 Democratic government, evil of 125 
 
 Democratic majority 140 
 
 Demoralization of government 145 
 
 Denmark 102 
 
 De Quincey 128 
 
 Despair of citizens 123 
 
 Despotism, bureaucratic 36 
 
 Despotism, military 36 
 
 Diagram of vote of Illinois 23 
 
 Diagram of vote of New York 22 
 
 Disfranchisement 18, 25, 116, 117 
 
 Disfranchiserncnt of the people 19 
 
 Disintegration of party 145 
 
 Disraeli 128 
 
 Distributing votes Si, 82 
 
 Distribution of votes. . .72, 87, 89, 90, 104 
 
 District canvassers 99, 113 
 
 Districts , 40 
 
 Districts, enlargement of. . . .79, So, Si, 83 
 Districts, enlargement of docs not im- 
 ply an increase of members 80 
 
 Districts, increase of 171 
 
 Districts, single 1 18 
 
 Districts, size of 44 
 
 Divine law 10 
 
 Division of votes 63, 104 
 
 Divisions 71 
 
 Dixon 46, 61, 63, 77 
 
 Doctrinaires 53 
 
 Dominant majority Il6 
 
 Dominant parties 137 
 
 Droop, Mr 154 
 
 j Dutch government 7 
 
192 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 East St. Louis. . . .46, 54, 55, 57, 60, 70 
 
 Education Act, Elementary 84 
 
 Effective voting 149 
 
 Effingham 47, 64, 77 
 
 Egypt 55, 72 
 
 Election, Burnitz system of IO2, 153 
 
 Election by Preponderance of choice. . 175 
 
 Election clerks 55 
 
 Election- committee 169 
 
 Election figures. . 161, 162, 163, 164, 
 
 165, 166, 169, 172 
 
 Election, free list system of 152, 154 
 
 Election, Gove system of 151, 154 
 
 Election inspector, stupid 104 
 
 Election laws 1 60, 170 
 
 Elections 160 
 
 Elections, purification of 146 
 
 Elections, result of 16 
 
 Elective machinery, reform of 126 
 
 Elective quota 156 
 
 Elective quotient 97, 112 
 
 Electoral body 162 
 
 Electoral machinery 32 
 
 Electoral system, vicious 33 
 
 Elementary Education Act 84 
 
 Elgin 47,58,61, 70, 75 
 
 Employers 34 
 
 English school boards 84, 147 
 
 Enlargement of districts 80, 8 1 
 
 Enlargement of districts, does not im- 
 ply an increase of members 80 
 
 Estimation 161, 162, 163 
 
 Evanston 46, 74 
 
 Evils of majority representation 29 
 
 Expense of counting 170 
 
 Expenses, campaign 74 
 
 Extreme men 144 
 
 Farmer 66 
 
 Feuds 7i 
 
 Fight 68 
 
 Fight, fair stand-up 67 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 First minds 140 
 
 Fisher, J. Francis 117 
 
 Floating vote 27 
 
 Flora 46 
 
 Formula 137 
 
 Fortuitous conditions 148 
 
 Fortuitous element : 149, 150 
 
 Fortuitous feature 72 
 
 Fractional votes 53, 55, 97, 99 
 
 Franchise, extensions of 139 
 
 Franchises 7 
 
 Frankfort 159, 160, 170 
 
 Frankfurter Reform 160 
 
 Franklin, Dr 8, 9, 13, 50 
 
 Fraudulent count 150 
 
 Freedom 143 
 
 Freedom in the exercise of suffrage. . . 134 
 
 Freedom of choice 63 
 
 Freedom of voting 88, 113, 157 
 
 Freedom to the voter 79, 8 
 
 Free list system 149, 156 
 
 Free list system of election 152, 154 
 
 Freeport 67, 69, 74, 79 
 
 Free voting. .41, 43, 48, 50, 56, 109, 
 
 120, 131, 137, 139, 143, 145 
 
 Free voting, advantages of 136 
 
 Free voting, evils which it would 
 
 lessen no 
 
 Free voting, influence on party or- 
 ganization 124 
 
 Free voting in Illinois 53 
 
 Free voting, principles of 88 
 
 Freeze, John G 146 
 
 "Gang" 78 
 
 Garfield, Pres 18 
 
 General Assembly 58, 59 
 
 Geneva 73, 74, 79 
 
 Geneva law 152 
 
 Georgia 132 
 
 German States 172 
 
 Germany 170, *72 
 
INDEX. 
 
 -'93 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge 16 
 
 Gerrymander. .16, 17, 18, 57, 58, 60, 
 
 63, 125, 131 
 
 Gladstone 128, 129 
 
 Good government, promotion of 44 
 
 Good men crippled 33 
 
 Government by bosses 39 
 
 Government by the politicians 28 
 
 Government, demoralization of 145 
 
 Gove system 78, 151, 154 
 
 Gove, Wm. H 150 
 
 Great Britain 118 
 
 Grecian state 142 
 
 Grey, Albert 29, 132, 148 
 
 Grey, F. W 27 
 
 Grievances of working men 9 
 
 Groups, small should not be repre- 
 sented 86 
 
 Guess 71 
 
 Guizot 28 
 
 Guizot's History of Rep. Government. 10 
 
 Hackney division 85 
 
 Hare' s scheme 89 
 
 Hare's treatise and system. . 113, 139, 
 
 147, 148, 149, 150, 160 
 
 Hare, Thos 126, 146, 150, 160 
 
 Havana 46, 47, 57, 62, 70, 74, 77 
 
 Hayward, Robt. H 26 
 
 Henry 67 
 
 Heresies. 141 
 
 Herkimer county 20 
 
 Hillsboro 74, 75 
 
 Hocus-pocus 149 
 
 Holmes, Dr 141 
 
 Horton, S. Dana 83, 134 
 
 House of Commons 8, 123, 145 
 
 House of Representatives 41, 43, 132 
 
 House of Rep., changes in 119, 120 
 
 Ignorance of voters 44, 53, 54, 104 
 
 Ignorance of inspectors 53 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Illinois. .40, 41,42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 
 5o, 51, 53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 63, 65, 
 68, 71, 72, 73, 76, 79, 80, 82, 88, 
 
 97, 102, 107, 108, 118, 130, 131 
 
 Illinois law 7& 
 
 Illinois, system. , 76, 87, loo, 103. 
 
 Impracticable 53, 55 
 
 Independence 143, 145 
 
 Independence in the choice of candi- 63 
 
 dates 63 
 
 Independence in voting 88, 156 
 
 Independence of representatives 139. 
 
 Independence of voters 124. 
 
 Independent men, withdrawal of 31 
 
 Independent movements 125 
 
 Independent parties 62, 73, 
 
 Independents 82, 169 
 
 Independents, revolt of. 107 
 
 Independent ticket 107, 157 
 
 Independent views 30 
 
 Independent voters 79 
 
 Indifference and apathy of voters 121 
 
 Ineffective votes 155 
 
 Influence of free voting on party organ- 
 ization 1 24 
 
 Inherent justice of free voting 143. 
 
 Injury, sense of 7 1 
 
 Injustice, sense of 71 
 
 Insecurity of office 121 
 
 Inspector, election, stupid 104 
 
 Inspectors, ignorance of 53 
 
 Inspectors of election. .44, 55, 94, 99, 113 
 Instinct for distinguishing an able man 140 
 
 Instructed classes 141 
 
 Instructed few 140, 143 
 
 Instructed minority 139, 140, 141 
 
 Integer 129 
 
 Intellect and integrity 125 
 
 Intellects, superior. . . f 139 
 
 Interest in public affairs 63 
 
 Inverse order of preference 178 
 
 Iowa ,,,,,,,,,,.,,, t I 9 
 
i 9 4 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 Iroquois county 7 
 
 Jacksonville 59,74, 75,77, 79 
 
 Janitors of buildings 135 
 
 Jealousy 67, 7 1 
 
 Jerseyville 57 
 
 Jewish state 37 
 
 Johnson, Tom F 152 
 
 Joliet. .54, 56, 58, 62. 63, 70, 71, 72, 
 
 73, 77, 78, ioo 
 
 Judah. 37 
 
 Juggle 149 
 
 Justice 10, 28, 138 
 
 *' Justice and not simplicity " . . . . IOO, 113 
 
 Justice, establishing of 146 
 
 Justice, not the main object of law. . . 129 
 Justice of free voting 143 
 
 Kankakee county 7 
 
 Kansas 20 
 
 Kentucky , 19 
 
 -"Kid".. 66 
 
 *' Labor " 143 
 
 Labor man 66 
 
 Labor party 41, 175, 178, 179 
 
 Labor strikes 5,8, 9 
 
 Labor unions 67 
 
 Lambeth division 85 
 
 Law for election of representatives. . . 159 
 
 Law, justice not its main object 129 
 
 Law Review, Am 16, 29 
 
 Lawyer 66 
 
 Leaders of a higher grade of intellect. 141 
 
 Leading spirits 140 
 
 Lefevre, G. Shaw 84, III, 149 
 
 Legislature, improvement of 44 
 
 Legislative assembly, a talking body. . 129 
 
 Legislatures, state, members of 112 
 
 Liberty, civil 29 
 
 Liberty in voting 107 
 
 Limited freedom of voting 73 
 
 I PAGE. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham 62 
 
 Local feeling 131 
 
 Local interests 131 
 
 Localities should be represented. .133, 134 
 
 Locality, claims of. 120 
 
 Local representation ^34, 135 
 
 Lockport 61 
 
 London School Board 85 
 
 Lot 148, 150, 176 
 
 Lubbock, Sir John 148 
 
 Lytton, Rob't 147 
 
 Machine politicians 74 
 
 Machine politics 138 
 
 Machinery of Politics and Prop. Rep. . 29 
 
 " Machines " 76 
 
 Macmillarf s Magazine 126 
 
 Macomb 60 
 
 Maine 20 
 
 Majority, acquiescence in will of. ... 118 
 
 Majority, dominant 116 
 
 Majority, must be held responsible for 
 
 legislation 131 
 
 Majority representation, evils of 29 
 
 Majority, right to govern and to sole 
 
 representation 1 18 
 
 Majority, rule of. nS 
 
 Majority should rule 15, 24, 25, in 
 
 Majority system, working of 20 
 
 Male citizens 13 
 
 Manchester 54 
 
 Manual labor, unrepresented 142 
 
 Maryland : 6, 20 
 
 Mason, Alfred B 148 
 
 Mason, Charles. 12 
 
 Massachusetts 6, 16 
 
 Mathematical demonstration 1 74 
 
 Mattoon 45, 58, 77 
 
 McLanesboro 5^, 69 
 
 Mechanics 67 
 
 Mediocrity 123 
 
 Mediocrity, collection 139 
 
INDEX. 
 
 195 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Members, bad, should be excluded. . . 86 
 
 Members of Congress 44, 112 
 
 Men of distinguished ability 139 
 
 Men of high intelligence 141 
 
 Merchant 49, 66 
 
 Merit, repressive of 121 
 
 Method of assuring to the minority. . . . 159 
 
 Metropolis t 59 
 
 Military despotism 36 
 
 Mill, John Stuart 21, 24, 49, 118, 
 
 123, 131, 133, 139, 142 
 
 Minds, just and average 140 
 
 Minorities are represented 50 
 
 Minorities have undue strength 130 
 
 Minorities, representation of 40 
 
 Minority candidate 74 
 
 Minority, despair of 122 
 
 Minority, instructed 139 
 
 Minority, may govern 14 
 
 Minority members 57 
 
 Minority representation 103, 123, 156 
 
 Minority representation, objections to 
 
 considered 128 
 
 Minority representation, principle of. . 102 
 
 Minority representation, systems of. . . 147 
 
 Minority representatives 64 
 
 Misrepresentation 14 
 
 Moderate men 144 
 
 Moline 61, 67, 69, 70, 74 
 
 Monarchy, constitutional 36 
 
 Money powers 142 
 
 Monmouth 46, 59 
 
 Montgomery county . . 20 
 
 Mortification 50 
 
 " Mugwumps" 169 
 
 Multitude, can distinguish an able man 123 
 
 Multitude, the 37 
 
 Municipal governing bodies, numbers 
 
 of 112 
 
 Murphysboro 58 
 
 Waperville 47, 54, 62, 68, 75 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Nassau 172 
 
 Xa/ion 102, 103. 
 
 Native 66 
 
 Naturalized person 66 
 
 Naville, M 83; 
 
 New Englander 14$ 
 
 New Netherland 7 
 
 New theory of Minority Represntation 14$ 
 
 New York 12, 13, 14 
 
 New York city. .21, 29, 43, 116, 118, 
 
 127, 131, 135, 136 
 New York state . .20, 21, 24, 29, 40, 
 
 48, 49, 78, 80, 83, 131, 136 
 Nineteenth Century. .26, 29, 33, ill, 
 
 132, 133, 134, 144, 148- 
 
 Nominating conventions 32, 35, 66 
 
 Nomination equivalent to election . . 74, 
 
 75, 77, 79 
 
 Nomination of candidates 44, 76 
 
 Nominations, control of 1 6 
 
 A T orth Am. Review I2& 
 
 Objections to cumulative voting 65 
 
 Objections to minority representation 
 
 considered 128 
 
 Obstruction 131 
 
 Odd number of representatives. .109, 
 
 III, 112 
 
 Ohio 19, 83 
 
 Old man 66 
 
 Opinion, representation of all shades of 62: 
 
 Opponent 65; 
 
 Optimistic answers 75 
 
 Order of names on ticket 105, 
 
 Order of preference 149- 
 
 Ordinal numbers. . . .92, 99, 105, 107, 
 
 108, 112, 113, 178: 
 
 Ordinal rank 164. 
 
 Organization of electors 125 
 
 Organization, party 124 
 
 Organizing, power of 85, 87 
 
 Ottawa 47, 67, 77 
 
190 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Pairs of candidates 66 
 
 Paris 54, Gi, 77 
 
 Parliament. . . 8 
 
 Parliament, British 122 
 
 Parties, influence of 124 
 
 Parties, strength of 65 
 
 Partisans, strong 63, 72 
 
 Party 32 
 
 Party allegiance 80 
 
 Party bitterness 64 
 
 Party domination. 36 
 
 Party fealty 71 
 
 Party interest 158 
 
 Party managers 79, 107 
 
 Party organization 62 
 
 Party organization, influence of free 
 
 voting on 121 
 
 Party supremacy . 68 
 
 Party, disintegration of 145 
 
 Paster 94 
 
 Patronage, distribution of 121 
 
 Patronage, sovereignty of 27 
 
 Peabody, Dr. A. P 36 
 
 Perin Monthly 83 
 
 People, Government of 13 
 
 People, Sovereignty of 13 
 
 People, the 12, 28 
 
 Peoria 7 
 
 Pericles I4 1 
 
 Perplexity of voters 7 2 
 
 Pessimists 146 
 
 Pessimistic respondents 7^ 
 
 Petitions 144 
 
 Platforms 125 
 
 Plato 37, 142 
 
 Plump 41, 54, 65, 66, 67, 69 
 
 Plumpers 83 
 
 Plumping 47, 67, 69, 71, 100 
 
 Political bargains 156 
 
 Political boss 75, 7, 145 
 
 Political evils which free voting would 
 
 lessen.. 116 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Political evolution 113 
 
 Political managers, tyranny of 31 
 
 Political power 51 
 
 Political power, exclusion of voters 
 
 from 122 
 
 Political revolt 82 
 
 Political thinker 123, 145 
 
 Politicians 57 
 
 Politicians, control of 74 
 
 Politicians, government by 28 
 
 Politician, professional 28, 125 
 
 Poll clerks 99, 104, 113 
 
 Pontiac 46, 59, 70, 74, 131 
 
 Poor 142 
 
 Popular man 44, 66 
 
 Popular representation 25 
 
 Potency, voting 109 
 
 Practical politician, remark of 116 
 
 Practical politicians 53 
 
 Practical politicians, method of 125 
 
 Preference of voters . . . .99, 105, 106, 
 
 107,. 149 
 
 Preferences 94, loo, 168, 178 
 
 Preferences for candidates 92, 113 
 
 Preferential voting 124, 150 
 
 Preponderance of choice, Election by. 175 
 
 Preponderance of parties 171 
 
 Presidential electors 112 
 
 Primaries . 78, 121 
 
 Primary assemblies . . '. 32, 35 
 
 Primary canvass . . . 59 
 
 Primary meetings 112 
 
 Principles of free voting 88 
 
 Professional politician 28 
 
 Proportional representation. . . .78, 83, 
 
 84, 85, 122, 131, 132, 156 
 Prop. Rep. a remedy for Gerrymand- 
 ering '. 125 
 
 Prop. Rep. Congress. . .19, 150, 151, 
 
 Proportional representation, need of a 
 
 satisfactory plan of 1 02 
 
INDEX. 
 
 I 9 7 
 
 PAGE, 
 
 Prop. Rep. League, Am 19 
 
 Proportional Representation : Objec- 
 tions and answers 148 
 
 Prop. Rep. Review 126 
 
 Proportional Rep. Society ot New York 114 
 Proportional representation, students of 80 
 
 Proportional voting 78 
 
 Prop. vs. Majority Rep . 29 
 
 Protests 144 
 
 Proxy votes 155 
 
 Prussian chamber of deputies 172 
 
 Prussian feudalists 172 
 
 Public aftairs, interest in . 63 
 
 Publicity , 1 1 
 
 Public life 30 
 
 Public life, elevation of . . . 146 
 
 Put nan? ' s Magazine 32 
 
 Qualified, sovereignty of 13 
 
 Qualified voters 13 
 
 Quincy 60, 77 
 
 Quincy, Josiah Phillips 135 
 
 Quincy, Mr 141, 142 
 
 Quota 147, 157. 176 
 
 Quota, definition of 85 
 
 Quota, elective 156 
 
 Quota, method of calculating 154 
 
 Quota schemes 148, 149 
 
 Quota system 58, 73, 78 
 
 Quotient, 'elective 97 
 
 Quotients 97, 99, 108, 112, 113 
 
 Reason 10, II, 28 
 
 Rebellion 145 
 
 Recklessness 52 
 
 " Recognition," of committees 9 
 
 Recording votes 99 
 
 Reelection of members of the House. 119 
 
 Reform in municipal elections 117 
 
 Reform League of England 89 
 
 Registers of election 94 
 
 Remnant.. 37,38, 39, I2 5 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Remonstrances 144 
 
 Report of Select Com. on Rep. Reform. 119 
 
 Representation 5, 8, 10 
 
 Representation, change of 63 
 
 Representation, more just 64 
 
 Representation of minorities 40, 63 
 
 Representation, right of 9 
 
 Representative body . 144 
 
 Representative government 6, 19, 139 
 
 Rep. government and Personal Rep. . 6 
 
 Rep government, history of io 
 
 Representation, equal division of 64 
 
 Representatives in Congress .151, 152, 153 
 Representatives, independence of. .... 139 
 Representatives, number in district 
 
 should be odd 109, in, 112 
 
 Representative system 6 
 
 Requirements of voters 99 
 
 Return of votes. , , , , 95, 96 
 
 Review of Am. Prop. Rep. League. . . 52 
 
 Revolt of independents 107 
 
 Revolt, political 82 
 
 Rhode Island, people of 6 
 
 Rich 142 
 
 Righteous remnant 38, 39 
 
 Right of majority to govern 118 
 
 Right of majority to sole representa- 
 tion 118 
 
 Right of suffrage 27, 5 1 
 
 Rigsraad 147 
 
 Rings 30, 74 
 
 Rock Island 72 
 
 Rule for counting votes 97 
 
 Rule for voting 92 
 
 Running mate 46, 66, 68 
 
 Rupture among political friends 67 
 
 Rural districts 77 
 
 Rural member 49 
 
 Salem 150 
 
 Sandwich 130 
 
 Scales of Injustice 26 
 
198 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 School Board, London 85 
 
 School boards 102, 147 
 
 School boards, English 84 
 
 School board system 86 
 
 " Scratchers. " 54 
 
 Secondary transfer of votes 156 
 
 Seebohm Fredk 149 
 
 Select Committee on Rep. Reform. ... 50 
 
 Senate committee 132 
 
 Senate of Illinois 62 
 
 Senate of U. S 119 
 
 Senators, election of. 114 
 
 Senator, state 138 
 
 Sex 12 
 
 Shelbyville 60, 70, 72, 77 
 
 Simplicity 100 
 
 Single district 134 
 
 Single- district system 120 
 
 Single transferable vote 148, 149, 151 
 
 Slavery 128, 131, 132 
 
 Smith, J. Parker 124, 149 
 
 Social crash 36 
 
 Socialistic organization 36 
 
 Social organization 141 
 
 South, states of 132 
 
 Sovereignty 27 
 
 Sovereignty of bribery, spoils and pa- 
 tronage 27 
 
 Sovereignty of the People 13 
 
 " Sovereignty of the Qualified " 13 
 
 Spence, Catherine H 149, 150 
 
 Spencer, Herbert 36 
 
 Spoils, sovereignty of 27 
 
 " Sport" 66 
 
 Springfield 47, 68, 69, 76, 77, 130 
 
 Stand-up fight 67 
 
 State legislatures, members of 112 
 
 Sterne, Simon. .7, 35, 75, 76, 79, 82, 
 
 116, 117, 118, 125 
 
 Strikes 5, 8, 9 
 
 Stuyvesant, Director 7 
 
 Suffrage, right of . .27, 51 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Summation of votes 97, 98 
 
 Superior intellects and characters .... 1 39 
 
 Suspicion 67, 71 
 
 Switzerland 102 
 
 Talking body 129 
 
 Tallying votes 175, 176 
 
 Taxation, none without representation . 8 
 
 Tax , internal 8 
 
 Tellers 175 
 
 Texas 20 
 
 Theoretical 53, 55 
 
 Thinker, political 123 
 
 Third party 112 
 
 Third party candidate 73 
 
 Three ballot rule 177 
 
 Ticket, independent 107 
 
 Ticket, order of names on 105 
 
 Tickets 54, 93 
 
 Tickets, samples of 105, 106 
 
 Timid voter 54 
 
 Transferring ballots 149 
 
 Transferring votes 155 
 
 Transfer of votes 156 
 
 Trickery 7 1 
 
 Truth 10, 28 
 
 Tuckerman, Dr. L. B., paper by. ... 175 
 
 Tyranny of bosses 145 
 
 Tyranny of majority 27 
 
 Tyranny of political managers 31 
 
 Tyranny, party 76 
 
 Union men of the South 132 
 
 United States 118, 131 
 
 United States, early history of 7 
 
 Universal representation 173 
 
 Universal suffrage 25 
 
 "Unworkable" 53, 55 
 
 Urbana : 61 
 
 Utopian 146- 
 
 Vacillating government 13 
 
INDEX. 
 
 1 99 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Varrentrapp, Dr. (ieorge.go, 91, 15?, 
 
 J 53, 159 
 
 Venality of voters : 125 
 
 Venal votes 2,8 
 
 Virden 54, 62, 74, 76 
 
 Virginia, charter of 5 
 
 Vote, computing 154 
 
 Voter, freedom of. 79, 80 
 
 Voter, ignorant 54, 104 
 
 Voters, corrupt combinations of 126 
 
 Voters, ignorance of. 44, 53 
 
 Voters, preference of 99 
 
 Voters, requirements of. 99 
 
 Voter, what he expresses 107 
 
 Votes, appropriation of .' 100, 113 
 
 Votes, assigning, distributing and 
 
 counting them 8l, 82 
 
 Votes, classes of 113 
 
 Votes, counting and recording of 99 
 
 Votes, counting of. . . .44, 94, 97, 99, 
 
 "3, H9 
 
 Votes, counting and weighing 140 
 
 Votes, distribution of. .72, 87, 89, 90, 
 
 100, 104 
 
 Votes, division and counting of 63 
 
 Votes, division of 97 
 
 Votes, fruitless 119 
 
 Votes, ineffective 155 
 
 Votes, number given to each candidate 109 
 
 Votes, return of 95, 96 
 
 Votes, secondary transfer of 156 
 
 Votes, summation of 97, 98 
 
 Votes, transferring 155 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 Votes, venal 28 
 
 Votes, waste of 83, 84 
 
 Voting 63 
 
 Voting, how it is done 94 
 
 Voting, liberty in 107 
 
 Voting power 109 
 
 Voting, rule for 92 
 
 Ward politicians 57 
 
 Ware, Prof 83, 132, 144 
 
 War of secession 131 
 
 Warsaw 47, 68, 71 
 
 Waste of votes 84 
 
 Waukegan 70 
 
 Weighing votes 140 
 
 Westlake, John 84, 148 
 
 West, McHenry 69 
 
 Westminster Review 27, 124 
 
 White, Hall 61, 76 
 
 Will county 73 
 
 Williams, Roger 6 
 
 Wills, individual 10, n 
 
 Wisdom 37, 38 
 
 Working classes 143 
 
 Working classes, representation of ... 142 
 
 Working majority 129 
 
 Working men 34, 142, 143 
 
 Workingmen, representation of 143" 
 
 World's Prop. Rep. Congress 149, 155 
 
 Wurtemberg .....; 172 
 
 Yeardley, Sir George 5 
 
 Zeit. . . .160 
 

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