N,^>^\ ,>-r" s- l / X ^i^'- .' c:>^ r .^ '^^ /' / /^ /' sJi>XV ..V ■.',.. '■.'Ri '%: LIBRARY )' EDITION DE LUXE The Works of George Rawlinson, M.A. The Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancie7it Eastern World PARTHIA NEW PERSIA VOLUME in. Maps, Diagrams and Illustrations THE NOTTINGHAM SOCIETY New York Philadelphia Chicago EDITION DE LUXE Limited to One Thousand Sets Printed for Subscribers Only 3 5-7 CONTENTS OF VOL. III. CHAPTER I. PAQB Geography of Parthia Proper. Character of the Region. Climate. Character of the surrounding countries 1 CHAPTER n. Early notices of the Parthians. Their Ethnic character and connections. Their position under the Persian Monarchs, from Cyrus the Great to Darius m. (Codomannus) 8 CHAPTER ni. 9ondition of Western Asia under the earlier Seleucidae. Revolts of Bactria and Parthia. Conflicting accounts of the establishment of the Parthian Kingdom. First War with Syria 16 CHAPTER IV. Oonsolidation of the Parthian Kingdom. Death of Tiridates and accession of Arsaces HI. Attacli on Media. War of Ai-tabanus (Arsaces III.) with An- tiochus the Great. Period of inaction. Great development of Bactrian power. Reigns of Priapatius (Arsaces IV.) and Phraates I. (Arsaces V.) Si* CHAPTER V. Ref^n of Mithridates I. Position of Bactria and Syria at his accession. His first War with Bactria. His great E.vpedition against tlie Eastern Syrian pro- vinces, and its results. His second war with Bactria, terminating in its con- quest. Extent of his Empire. Attempt of Demetrius Nicator to recover the lost Provinces fails. Captivity of Demetrius. Death of Mithridates 88 CHAPTER VL ystem of government established by Mithridates I. Constitution of the Par- thians. Government of the Provinces. Laws and institutions. Character of Mithridates 1 4S iy CONTENTS OF VOL. Ill CHAPTER VII. t>AGB Reign of Phraates n. Expedition of Antiochus Sidetes against Parthia. Re- lease of Demetrius. Defeat and death of Sidetes. War of Phraates with the Northern Nomads. His death and character 53 CHAPTER Vni, Accession of Artibanus H. Position of Parthia. Growing pressure upon her, and general advance towards the south of the Saka or Scyths. Causes and extent of the movement. Character and principal tribes of the Saka. Scythic War of Artabanus. His death 62 CHAPTER IX. Accession of Mithridates II. Termination of the Scythic Wars. Commencement of the struggle with Armenia. Previous history of Armenia. Result of the first Armenian War. First contact of Rome with Parthia. Attitude of Rome towards the East at this time. Second Armenian War. Death of Mithridates. 69 CHAPTER X. r»ark period of Parthian History. Doubtful Succession of the Monarchs. Accession of SanatrcEces, ab. B.C. 76. Position of Parthia during the Mithri- datic Wars. Accession of Phraates III. His Relations with Pompey. His death. Civil War between his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes. Death of Mithridates 77 CHAPTER XI. Accession of Orodes I. Expedition of Crassus. His fate. Retaliatory inroad of the Parthians into Syria under Pacorus, the son of Orodes. Defeat of Pacorus by Cassius. His recall. End of first War with Rome 84 CHAPTER Xn. Relations of Orodes with Pompey, and with Brutus and Cassius. Second War with Rome. Great Parthian expedition against Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor. Defeat of Saxa. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem. Parthians driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death of Pacorus. Death of Orodes 108 CHAPTER XHI. ieign of Phraates TV. His cruelties. Flight of Monaeses to Antony. Antony's great Parthian Expedition, or Invasion of Media AtropatenS. I-ts Complete Failure. Subsequent Alliance of the Median King with Antony. War be- tween Parthia and Media. Rebellion raised against Phraates by Tiridates. Pliraates expelled. He recovers his Throne with the help of the Scythians. His deaUngs with Augustus. His death and character Ill CHAPTER XIV. Shorts Reigns of Phraataces, Orodes II., and Vonones I. Accession of Arta- banus III. His relations with Germanicus and Tiberius. His war with Pharasmanes of Iberia. His first Expulsion from his Kingdom, and return to it. His Peace with Rome. Internal Troubles of the Parthian Kingdom. Second Expulsion and Return of Artabanus. His death 123 CONTEJS^S OF VOL. III. V CHAPTER XV. PAGE Doubts as to the successor of Artabanus III. First short reign of Gotarzes. He is expelled and Vardanes made King. Reign of Vardanes. His War with Izates. His Death. Second reign of Gotarzes. His Contest with his Nephew, Meherdates. His Death. Short and inglorious reign of Vonones U 141 CHAPTER XVI. Reign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails. His quarrel with Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by the Dahse and Sacee. Second Attack of Volagases on Armenia. Tiridates established as King. First Expedition of Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of Vardanes. Second Expe- dition of Corbulo. Armenia given to Tigranes. Revolt of Hyrcania. Third Attack of Volagases on Armenia. Defeat of Paetus, and re-establishment of Tiridates. Last Expedition of Corbulo, and arrangement of Terms of Peace. Tiridates at Rome. Probable time of the Death of Volagases 143 CHAPTER XVII. Results of the establishment of Tiridates in Armenia. Long Period of Peace between Parthia and Rome. Obscurity of Parthian History at this time. Relations of Volagases I. with Vespasian. Invasion of Western Asia by the Alani. Death of Volagases I. and Character of his Reign. Accession and Long Reign of Pacorus. Relations of Pacorus with Decebalus of Dacia. In- ternal Condition of Parthia during his Reign. Death of Pacorus and Acces- sion of Chosroes l64 CHAPTER XVm. Reign of ChosroSs. General condition of Oriental Affairs gives a handle to Trajan, Trajan's Schemes of Conquest. Embassy of Chosroes to Trajan fails. Great Expedition of Trajan. Campaign of a. d. 115. Campaign of a. d. 116. Death of Trajan, and relinquishment of his Parthian Conquests by Had- rian. Interview of Chosroes with Hadrian. Its Consequences. Death of ChosroSs and Accession of Volagases II 1 70 CHAPTER XIX. Reign of Volagases H. Invasion of the Alani. Communications between Volagases and Antoninus Pius. Death of Volagases II. and Accession of Volagases III. Aggressive War of Volagases III. on Rome. Campaign of A.D. 162. Verus sent to the East. Sequel of the War. Losses suffered by Parthia. Death of Volagases HI 182 CHAPTER XX. Accession of Volagases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescennius Niger. Part taken by Parthia in the Contest between Niger and Severus. Mesopotamia revolts from Rome. First Eastern Expedition of Severus. Its results. Second Expedition. Successes of Severus. His failure at Hatra. General Rfsults of the War. Death of Volagases IV 190 vi CONTENTS OF VOL. III. CHAPTER XXI. PAQB struggle between the two Sons of Volagases IV., Volagases V. and Artabanus. Continued Sovereignty of both Princes. Ambition of Caracallus. His Pro- ceedings in the East. His Resolve to quarrel with Parthia. First Proposal made by him to Artabanus. Perplexity of Artabanus. Caracallus invades Parthia. His Successes, and Death. Macrinus, defeated by Artabanus, con- sents to Terms of Peace. Revolt of the Persians under Artaxerxes. Pro- longed Struggle. Death of Artabanus, and Downfall of the Parthian Empire. 199 CHAPTER XXIL On the Architecture and Ornamental Art of the Parthians 212 CHAPTER XXIII. Customs of the Parthians— in Religion ; in War ; in their Embassies and Deal- ings with Foreign Nations ; at the Court; in Private Life. Extent of the re- finement to which they reached. Their gradnal Decline in Taste and Knowl- edge ....223 HISTORY OF THE SASSANIAN OR NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE. CHAPTER I. Condition of the Persians under the Successors of Alexander. Under the Arsacidae. Favor shown them by the latter. Allowed to have Kings of their own. Their Religion at first held in Honor. Power of their Priests. Gradual Change of Policy on the part of the Parthian Monarchs, and final Oppression of the Magi. Causes which produced the Insurrection of Artaxerxes 241 CHAPTER II. Situation and Size of Persia. General Character of the Country and Climate. Chief Products. Characteristics of the Persian People, Physical and Moral. Differences observable in the Race at different Periods 250 CHAPTER III. Reign of Artaxerxes I. Stories told of him. Most probable Account of his Descent, Rank, and Parentage. His Contest with Artabanus. First War , with Chosroes of Armenia. Contest with Alexander Severus. Second War wtf h Chosroes and Conquest of Armenia. Religious Reforms. Internal Ad- ministration and Government. Art. Coinage. Inscriptions 257 CHAPTER IV. Death of Artaxerxes I. and Accession of Sapor I. War of Sapor with Manizen. His first War with Rome. Invasion of Mesopotamia, a.d. 241. Occupation of Antioch. Espedition of Gordian to the East. Recovery by Rome of her lost Territory. I'eace made between Rome and Persia. Obscure Interval. Second War with Rome. Mesopotamia again invaded, a.d. 258, Valerian takes the Command in the East. Struggle between him and Sapor. Defeat and Cap- ture of Valerian a.d. 260. Sapor invests Miriades with the Purple. He takes Syria and Southern Cappadocia, but is shortly afterwards attacked by Odena- CONTENTS OF VOL. Ill vii PAOi> thus. Successos of Odenathus. Treatment of Valerian. Further Successes of Odenathus. Period of Tranquility. Great Works of Sapor. His Sculptures. His Dyke. His Inscriptions. His Coins. His Religion. Religious Condition of the East in his Time. Rise into Notice of Manes. His Kejection by Sapor. Sapor's Death. His Character 271 CHAPTER V. Short Reign of Hormisdas I. His dealings with Manes. Accession of Varahran I. He puts Manes to Death. Persecutes the Manichseans and the Christians. His Relations with Zenobia. He is threatened by Aurelian. His Death. Reign of Varahran H. His Tyrannical Conduct. His Conqutst of Seistan, and War with India. His War with the Roman Emperors Carus and Diocletian. His Loss of Armenia. His Death. Short Reign of Varahran HI 293 CHAPTER VI. Civil War of Narses and his Brother Hormisdas. Narses victorious. He attacks and expels Tiridates. War declared against hivn by Diocletian. First Cam- paign of Galerius, a.d. 297. Second Campaign, a d. 298. Defeat suffered by Narses. Negotiations. Conditions of Pealoympnt, of the Men. Non-seclusion of the Women. General Freedom from Oppression of all Classes LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS- VOL. m Map of Parthla Proper ..To face -page 1 " Parthian Empire at Its greatest extent To face page 49 " Sassanian Empire Tofacepage 256 b PLATE L Coiaof DiodotusI 2. Coin of Phraates I 8. Obverse of a Coin of Phraates I 4. Coins of Mithridates I 6. Coins of Mithridates I., Arsaces I.^ and Artabanus I /* Kf^fr- ^yfe?'^il»^.^Si;|^^, ^ I ^''l^saaS-"'*- ^ ,/-" ^^ :ffi'L/-\^ 36 35 34 68 61 .^1 A HISTORY OF PARTHIA. CHAPTER I. Geography of Parthia Proper. Character of the Region. Climate. Character of the Surrounding Countries. The broad tract of desert which, eastward of the Caspian Sea, extends from the Moughojar hills to the Indian Ocean, a distance of above 1500 miles, is interrupted about midway by a strip of territory possessing features of much beauty and attraction. This strip, narrow compared to the desert on either side of it, is yet, looked at by itself, a region of no incon- siderable dimensions, extending, as it does from east to west, ' a distance of 320, and from north to south of nearly 200 miles. The mountain chain, which running southward of the Cas- pian, skirts the great plateau of Iran, or Persia, on the north, broadens out, after it passes the south-eastern corner of the sea, into a valuable and productive mountain -region. Four or five distinct ranges^ here run parallel to one another, having between them latitudinal valleys, with glens transverse to their courses. The sides of the valleys are often weU wooded ;' the flat ground at the foot of the hills is fertile ; water abounds ; and the streams gradually collect into rivers of a considerable size. The fertile territory in this quarter is further increased by the extension of cultivation to a considerable distance from the base of the most southern of the ranges, in the direction of the Great Iranic desert. The mountains send down a number of small streams towards the south ; and the water of these, judiciously husbanded by means of reservoirs and hanats, is capable of spreading fertility over a broad belt at the foot of the hills ;* Avhich, left to nature, would be almost as barren as the desert itself, into which it would, in fact, be absorbed. It was undoubtedly in the region which has been thus briefly 2 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. i. described that the ancient home of the Parthians lay. In this neighborhood alone are found the geographic names which the most ancient writers who mention the Parthians connect with them. ^ Here evidently the Parthians were set- tled" at the time when Alexander the Great overran the East, and first made the Greeks thoroughly familiar with the Par- thian name and territory. Here, lastly, in the time of the highest Parthian splendor and prosperity, did a province of the Empire retain the name of Parthyene, or Parthia Proper ;' and here, also, in their palmiest days, did the Parthian kings continue to have a capital and a residence/ Parthia Proper, however, was at no time coextensive with the region described. A portion of that region formed the district called Hyrcania ; and it is not altogether easy to deter- mine what were the limits between the two. The evidence goes, on the whole, to show that, while Hyrcania lay towards the west and north, the Parthian country was that towards the south and east,^ the valleys of the Ettrek and Gurghan constituting the main portions of the former, while the tracts east and south of those valleys, as far as the sixty -first degree of E. longitude, constituted the latter. If the limits of Parthia Proper be thus defined, it will have nearly corresponded to the modern Persian province of Khora- san. It will have extended from about Damaghan (long. 54° 10') upon the west, '° to the Heri-rud upon the east, and have comprised the modern districts of Damaghan, Shah-rud, Sebzawar, Nishapur, Meshed, Shebri-No, and Tersheez. Its length from east to west will have been about 300 miles, and its average width about 100 or 120. It wiU have contained an area of about 33,000 square miles, being thus about equal in size to Ireland, Bavaria, or St. Domingo. The character of the district has been already stated in general terms; but some further particulars may now be added. It consists, in the first place, of a mountain and a plain region — the mountain region lying towards the north and the plain region towards the south. The mountain region is composed of three main ranges, the Daman-i-Koh, or Hills of the Kurds," upon the north, skirting the great desert of Kharesm, the Alatagh and Meerabee mountains in the centre ; and the Jaghetai or Djuvein range, upon the south, which may be regarded as continued in the hills above Tersheez and Khaff. The three ranges are parallel, running east and west, but with an inclination, more or less strong, to the north of CH. I.] mVERS OF PARTHIA. 3 west and the south of east. The northern and central ranges are connected by a water-shed, which runs nearly east and west, a little to the south of Kooshan, and separates the head streams of the Ettrek from those of the Meshed river. The central and southern ranges are connected by a more decided mountain line, a transverse ridge which runs nearly north and south, dividing between the waters that flow westward into the Gurghan, and those which form the river of Nishapur. This conformation of the mountains leaves between the ranges three principal valleys, the valley of Meshed towards the south-east, between the Kurdish range and the Alatagh and Meerabee ; that of Miyanabad towards the west, between the Alatagh and the Jaghetai ; and that of Nishapur towards the south, between the eastern end of the Jaghetai and the western flank of the Meerabee. As the valleys are three in number, so likewise are the rivers, which are known respectively as the Tejend, or river of Meshed, the river of Nishapur, and the river of Miyanabad. '^ The Tejend, which is the principal stream of the three, rises from several sources in the hills south of Kooshan, and flows with a south-easterly course down the valley of Meshed, re- ceiving numerous tributaries from both sides, " until it reaches that city, when it bends eastward, and, finding a way through the Kurdish range, joins the course of the Heri-rud, about long. 61° 10', Here its direction is completely changed. Turn- ing at an angle, which is slightly acute, it proceeds to flow to the west of north, along the northern base of the Kurdish range, from which it receives numerous small streams, till it ends finally in a large swamp or marsh, in lat. 39°, long. 57°, nearly. '* The entire length of the stream, including only main windings, is about 475 miles. In its later course, however, it is often almost dry, the greater portion of the water being consumed in irrigation in the neighborhood of Meshed. The river of Nishapur is formed by numerous small streams, which descend from the mountains that on three sides inclose that city. Its water is at times wholly consumed in the culti- vation of the plain; but the natural course may be traced, running in a southerly and south-westerly direction, until it debouches from the hills in the vicinity of Tershecz. The Miyanabad stream is believed to be a tributary of the Gurghan. It rises from several sources in the transverse range joining the Alatagh to the Jaghetai, the streams from which all flow westward in narrow valleys, uniting about 4 THW SIXTH MOKARCIIY. [ch. l long. 57° 35'. The course of the river from this point to Pi- perne has not been traced, but it is believed to run in a general westerly direction along the southern base of the Alatagh, and to form a junction with the Gurghan a little below the ruins of the same name. Its length to this point is probably about 200 miles. The elevation of the mountain chains is not great. No very remarkable peaks occur in them; and it may be doubted whether they anywhere attain a height of above 6000 feet. They are for the most part barren and rugged, very scantily supplied with timber, ^^ and only in places capable of furnish- ing a tolerable pasturage to flocks and herds. The valleys, on the other hand, are rich and fertile in the extreme; that of Meshed, which extends a distance of above a hundred miles from north-west to south-east, and is from twenty to thirty miles broad, has almost everywhere a good and deep soil,'*^ is abundantly supplied with water, and yields a plentiful return even to the simplest and most primitive cultivation. The plain about Nishapur, which is in length from eighty to ninety miles, and in width from forty to sixty, boasts a still greater fertUity.'' The flat country along the southern base of the mountains, which ancient writers regard as Parthia, par excellence, '* is a strip of territory about 300 miles long, varying in width ac cording to the labor and the skill applied by its inhabitants to the perfecting of a system of irrigation. At present the Jcanats, or underground water-courses, are seldom carried to a distance of more than a mile or two from the foot of the hills ; but it is thought that anciently the cultivation was extended considerably further. Ruined cities dispersed throughout the tract '" sufficiently indicate its capabilities, and in a few places where much attention is paid to agriculture the results are such as to imply that the soil is more than ordinarily produc- tive."" The salt desert hes, however, in most places within ten or fifteen miles of the hills; and beyond this distance it is obviously impossible that the " Atak" or "Skirt" should at any time have been inhabited."' It is evident that the entire tract above described must have been at all times a valuable and much coveted region. Com pared with the arid and inhospitable deserts which adjoin it upon the north and south, Khorasan, the ancient Parthia and Hyrcania, is a terrestrial Paradise. Parthia, though scantily wooded," still produces in places the pine, the walnut, the CH. I.] BORDER DISTRICTS— CHORASMIA. 5 sycamore, the ash, the poplar, the willow, the vine, the mul- berry, the apricot, and nmnerous other fruit trees. '^ Saffron, asafoetida, and the gum ammoniac plant, are indigenous in parts of it.^* Much of the soil is suited for the cultivation of wheat, barley, and cotton." The ordinary return upon wheat and barley is reckoned at ten for one.^'^ Game abounds in the mountains, and fish in the underground water-courses." Among the mineral treasures of the region may be enumerated copper, lead, iron, salt,"" and one of the most exquisite of gems, the turquoise.*'-' This gem does not appear to be mentioned by ancient writers; but it is so easily obtainable that we can scarcely suppose it was not known from very ancient times. The severity of the climate of Parthia is strongly stated by Justin. '" According to modern travellers, the winters, though protracted, are not very inclement, the thermometer rarely sinking below ten or eleven degrees of Fahrenheit during the nights," and during the daytime rising, even in December and January,^- to 40° or 50". The cold weather, however, wliich commences about October, continues till nearly the end of March, when storms of sleet and hail are common.^' Much snow falls in the earher portion of the winter, and the valleys are scarcely clear of it tUl March. On the mountains it re- mains much longer, and forms the chief source of supply to the rivers during the spring and the early summer time. In summer the heat is considerable, more especially in the region known as the " Atak; " and here, too, the unwholesome wind, which blows from the southern desert, is felt from time to time as a terrible scourge. ^* But in the upland country the heat is at no time very intense, and the natives boast that they are not compelled by it to sleep on their house-tops during more than one month in the year."^ The countries by which Parthia Proper was bounded were the following : Chorasmia, Margiana, Aria, Sarangia, Sagartia, and Hyrcania. Chorasmia lay upon the north, consisting of the low tract between the most northerly of the Parthian mountain chains and the old course of the Oxus. This region, which is for the most part an arid and inhospitable desert,'" can at no time have maintained more than a sparse and scanty population. The Turkoman tribes which at the present day roam over the waste, feeding their flocks and herds alternately on the banks of the Oxus and the Tejend, or finding a bare subsistence for them about the ponds and pools left by the winter rains, represent, it 6 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. i. is probable, with sufficient faithfulness, the ancient inhabitants, who, whatever their race, must always have been nomads, and ofln never have exceeded a few hundred thousands. " On this side Parthia must always have been tolerably safe from at- tacks, unless the Cis-Oxianian tribes were reinforced, as they sometimes were, by hordes from beyond the river. On the north-east was Margiana, sometimes regarded as a country by itself, sometimes reckoned a mere district of Bac- tria. '* This was the tract of fertile land upon the Murg-ab, or ancient Margus river, which is known among moderns as the district of Merv. The Murg-ab is a stream flowing from the range of the Paropamisus, in a direction which is a little east of north ; it debouches from the mountains in about lat. 36° 25', and thence makes its way through the desert. Before it reaches Merv, it is eighty yards wide and five feet deep,'" thus carrying a vast body of water. By a judicious use of dykes and canals, this fertilizing fluid was in ancient times carried to a distance of more than twenty-five miles from the natural course of the river ; and by these means an oasis was created with a circumference of above 170, and consequently a diame- ter of above fifty miles."" This tract, inclosed on every side by deserts, was among the most fertile of all known regions ; it was especially famous for its vines, which grew to such a size that a single man could not encircle their stems with his two arms, and bore clusters that were a yard long."' Margiana possessed, however, as a separate country, little military strength, and it was only as a portion of some larger and more populous territory that it could become formidable to the Par- thians. South of Margiana, and adjoining upon Parthia toward the east, was Aria, the tract which lies about the modern Herat. This was for the most part a mountain region, very similar in its general character to the mountainous portion of Parthia,"* but of much smaller dimensions."^ Its people were fairly war- like ; but the Parthian population was probably double or triple their number, and Parthia consequently had but little to fear in this quarter. Upon the south-east Parthia was bordered by Sarangia, the country of the Sarangse, or Drangse. This appears to have been the district south of the Herat valley, reaching thence as far as the Hamoon, or Sea of Seistan, It is a country of hills and downs,"" watered by a number of somewhat scanty streams, which flow south-westward from the Paropamisus to en. II.] EYRCANIA. 7 tha Hamoon. Its population can never have been great, and they were at no time aggressive or enterprising, so that on this side also the Parthians were secure, and had to deal with no formidable neighbor. Sagartia succeeded to Sarangia towards the west, and bordered Parthia along almost the whole of its southern frontier. Ex- cepting in the vicinity of Tebbes and Toun^^ (lat. 34°, long. 56° to 58°), this district is an absolute desert, the haunt of the ga- zelle and the wild ass," dry, saline, and totally devoid of vege- tation. The wild nomads, who wandered over its wastes, ob- taining a scanty subsistence by means of the lasso,*' were few in number," scattered, and probably divided by feuds. South- ern Parthia might occasionally suffer from their raids; but they were far too weak to constitute a serious danger to the mountain country. Lastly, towards, the west and the north-west, Parthia was bordered by Hyrcania, a region geographically in the closest connection with it, very similar in general character, but richer, warmer, and altogether more desirable. Hyrcania was, as al- ready observed,*^ the western and north-western portion of that broad mountain region which has been described as inter- vening between the eastern shores of the Caspian and the river Arius, or Heri-rud. It consisted mainly of the two rich valleys of the Gurghan and Ettrek, with the mountain chains inclos- ing or dividing them. Here on the slopes of the hills grow the oak, the beech, the elm, the alder, the wild cherry ; here luxu- riant vines spring from the soil on every side, raising them- selves aloft by the aid of their stronger sisters, and hanging in wild festoons from tree to tree ; beneath their shade the grovmd is covered with flowers of various kinds, primroses, violets, lihes, hyacinths, and others of unknown species ; while in the flat land at the bottom of the valleys are meadows of the soft- est and the tenderest grass, capable of affording to numerous flocks and herds an excellent and unfailing pastui-e.'" Abun- dant game finds shelter in the forests," while towards the mouths of the rivers, where the ground is for the most part marshy, large herds of wild boars are frequent ; a single herd sometimes containing hundreds. ""^ Altogether Hyrcania was a most productive and desirable country, capable of sustaining a dense population, and well deserving Strabo's description of it as "highly favored of Heaven."" The area of the country was, however, small ;'* probably not much exceeding one half 8 THE SIXTH MONAROnr. [cii. :i. that of Parthia Proper ; and thus the people were not sufSciently numerous to cause the Parthians much apprehension. The situation and character of Parthia thus, on the whole, favored her becoming an imperial power. She had abundant resources within herself ; she had a territory apt for the pro- duction of a hardy race of men ; and she had no neighbors of sufficient strength to keep her down, when she once developed the desire to become dominant. Surprise has been expressed at her rise." But it is perhaps more astonishing that she passed so many centuries in obscurity before she became an important state, than that she raised herself at last to the first position among the Oriental nations. Her ambition and her material strength were plants of slow growth; it took several hundreds of years for them to attain maturity : when, how- ever, tliis point was reached, the circumstances of her geo- graphical position stood her in good stead, and enabled her rapidly to extend her way over the greater portion of Western Asia. CHAPTER II. Early notices of the Parthians. Their Ethnic character and connections. Their position under the Persian Monarchs, from Cyrus the Great to Darius III. {Codomannus.) Ilapdwp veVos SkuAi.koi'. — Arrian, Fr. 1. The Parthians do not appear in history until a comparatively recent period. Their name occurs nowhere in the Old Testa- ment Scriptures. They obtain no mention in the Zendavesta. The Assyrian Inscriptions are wholly silent concerning them. It is not until the time of Darius Hystaspis that we have trust- worthy evidence of their existence as a distinct people. ' In the inscriptions of this king we find their country included under the name of Parthva or Parthwa among the provinces of the Persian Empire, joined in two places with Sarangia, Aria, Chorasmia, Bactria, and Sogdiana, "^ and in a third with these same countries and Sagartia.^ We find, moreover, an account of a rebellion in wliich the Parthians took part. In Jje troubles which broke out upon the death of the Pseud o* CH. 11.] EARLY NOTICES OF THE FABTHIAN8. 9 Smerdis, B.C. 521, Parthja revolted, in conjunction (as it would seem) with Hyrcania, espousing the cause of that Median pre- tender, who, declaring himself a descendant of the old Median monarchs, set himself up as a rival to Darius. Hytaspes, the father of Darius, held at this time the Parthian satrapy. In two battles within the limits of his province he defeated the rebels, who must have brought into the field a considerable force, since in one of the two engagements they lost in killed and prisoners between 10,000 and 11,000 men. After their second defeat the Parthians made their submission, and once more acknowledged Darius for their sovereign.* With these earliest Oriental notices of the Parthians agree entirely such passages as contain any mention of them in the more ancient literature of the Greeks. Hecateeus of Miletus, who was contemporary with Darius Hystaspis, made the Parthians adjoin upon the Chorasmians in the account which he gave of the geography of Asia. ^ Herodotus spoke of them as a people subject to the Persians in the reign of Darius, and assigned them to the sixteenth satrapy, which comprised also the Arians, the Sogdians, and the Chorasmians. * He said that they took part in the expedition of Xerxes against Greece (B.C. 480), serving in the army on foot under the same commander as the Chorasmians, and equipped like them with bows and arrows, and with spears of no great length.' In another pas- sage he mentioned their being compelled to pay the Persian water tax, and spoke of the great need which they had of water for the irrigation of their millet and sesame crops. ' It is evident that these notices agree with the Persian ac- counts, both as to the locality of the Parthians and as to the fact of their subjection to the Persian government. They fur- ther agree in assigning to the Parthians a respectable military character, yet one of no very special eminency. On the eth- nology of the nation, and the circumstances under which the country became an integral part of the Persian dominions, they throw no light. We have still to seek an answer to the questions, "Who were the Parthians?" and "How did they become Persian subjects?" Who were the Parthians ? It is not until the Parthians have emerged from obscurity and become a great people that an- cient authors trouble themselves with inquiries as to their ethnic character and remote antecedents. Of the first writers who take the subject into their consideration, some arc con- tent to say that the Parthians were a race of Scyths, who at a 10 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. n. remote date had separated from the rest of the nation, and had occupied the southern portion of the Chorasmian desert, whence they had gradually made themselves masters of the mountain region adjoining it." Others added to this that the Scythic tribe to which they belonged was called the Dahee ; that their own proper name was Parni, or Apami ; and that they had migrated originally from the country to the north of the Palus Mseotis, where they had left the great mass of their fel- low tribesmen. " Subsequently, in the time of the Antonines, the theory was started that the Parthians were Scyths, whom Sesostris, on his return from his Scythian expedition, brought into Asia and settled in the mountain-tract lying east of the Caspian." It can scarcely be thought that these notices have very much historical value. Moderns are generally agreed that the Scythian conquests of Sesostris are an invention of the Egyptian priests, which they palmed on Herodotus "^ and Diodorus. " Could they be regarded as having really taken place, still the march back from Scythia to Egypt round the north and east of the Caspian Sea would be in the highest degree improbable. The settlement of the Parthians in Parthia by the returning conqueror is, in fact, a mere duplicate of the tale commonly told of his having settled the Colchians in Colchis, '■* and is equally worthless. The earlier authors, moreover, know nothing of the story, which first appears in the second century after our era, and as time goes on becomes more circumstantial.'^ Even the special connection of the Parthians with the Dahse, and their migration from the shores of the Palus Mseotis, may be doubted. Strabo admits it to be uncertain whether there were any Dahee at all about the Maeotis ; '° and, if there were, it would be open to question whether they were of the same race with the Dahse of the Caspian." As the settlement of the Parthians in the country called after their name dated from a time anterior to Darius Hystaspis, and the Greeks cer- tainly did not set on foot any inquiries into their origin till at least two centuries later, '* it would be unlikely that the Parthi- ans could give them a true account. The real groundwork of the stories told seems to have been twofold. First, there was a strong conviction on the part of those who came in contact with the Parthians that they were Scyths ; and secondly, it was believed that their name meant " exile." '" Hence it was necessary to suppose that they had migrated into their country from some portion of the tract known as Scythia to the Greeks, CH. II.] TUE PABTEIANS, SCTTHS. H and it was natural to invent stories as to the particular cir- cumstances of the migration. The residuum of the truth, or at any rate the important con- viction of the ancient writers, which remains after their stories are sifted, is the Scythic character of the Parthian peo- ple. On this point, Strabo, Justin, and Arrian are agreed. The manners of the Parthians had, they tell us, much that was Scythic in them.-" Their language was half Scythic, half Median.^' They armed themselves in the Scythic fash- ion." They were, in fact, Scyths in descent, in habits, in character. But what are we to understand by this ? May we asstune at once that they were a Turanian people, in race, habits, and language akin to the various tribes of Turkomans who are at present dominant over the entire region between the Oxus and the Parthian mountain-tract, and within that tract have many settlements ? May we assume that they stood in an attitude of natural hostility to the Arian nations by which they were surrounded, and that their revolt was the assertion of inde- pendence by a down-trodden people after centuries of subjec- tion to the yoke of a stranger ? Did Turan, in their persons, rise against Iran after perhaps a thousand years of oppression, and renew the struggle for predominance in regions where the war had been waged before, and where it still contmues to be waged at the present day ? Such conclusions cannot safely be drawn from the mere fact that the Scythic character of the Parthians is asserted in the strongest terms by the ancient writers. The term "Scythic" is not, strictly speaking, ethnical. It designates a life ratlier a descent, habits rather than blood. It is applied by the Greeks and Eomans to Indo-European and Turanian races indiffer- ently," provided that they are nomads, dwelling in tents or carts, living on the produce of their flocks and herds, uncivi- hzed, and, perhaps it may be added, accustomed to pass their lives on horseback. We cannot, therefore, assume that a na- tion is Turanian simply because it is pronounced "Scythic." Still, as in fact the bulk of those races which have remained content with the nomadic condition, and which from the ear- liest times to the present day have led the life above described in the broad steppes of Europe and Asia, appear to have been of the Turian type, a presumption is raised in favor of a people being Turanian by decided and concordant statements that it is Scythic. The presumption may of course be re^ 12, THE SIXTH MONAECHT. [ch. ii. moved by evidence to the contrary ; but, until such evidence is produced it has weight, and constitutes an argument, the force of which is considerable. In the present instance the presumption raised is met by no argument of any great weight; while on the other hand it receives important confirmation from several different quar- ters. It is said, indeed, that as all, or almost all, the other nations of these parts were confessedly Arians (e.g. the Bactrians, the Sogdians, the Chorasmians, the Margians, the Arians of Herat, the Sagartians, the Sarangians, and the Hyrcanians), it would be strange if the Parthians belonged to a wholly different ethnic family.^* But, in the first place, the existence of isolated nationahties, detached fragments of some greater ethnic mass, embodied amid alien material, is a fact famihar to ethnologists;" and, further, it is not at all certain that there were not other Turanian races in these parts, as, for instance, the Thamanseans. Again, it is said that the Parthians show their Arian extraction by their names; but this argument may be turned against those who adduce it. It is time that among the Parthian names a considerable number are not only Arian, but distinctly Persian — e.g., Mith- ridates, Tiridates, Artabanus, Orobazus, Rhodaspes — but the bulk of the names have an entirely different character. There is nothing Arian in such appellations as Amminapes, Bacasis, Pacorus, Vonones, Sinnaces, Abdus, Abdageses, Gotarzes, Vologeses, Mnasciras, Sanatroeces; nor anything markedly Arian in Priapatius,"^ Himerus, Orodes, Aprgeteeus, Omos- pades, Parrhaces, Vasaces, Monesis, Exedares. If the Par- thians were Arians, what account is to be given of these words ? That they employed a certain number of Persian names is suflBciently explained by their subjection during more than two centuries to the Persian rule. We are also distinctly told that they affected Persian habits, and desired to be looked upon as Persians." The Arian names borne by Parthians no more show them to be Arians in race than the Norman names adopted so widely by the Welsh show them to be Northmen. On the other hand, the non- Arian names in the former case are hke the non-Norman names in the latter, and equally indi- cate a second source of nomenclature, in which should be con- tained the key to the true ethnology of the people. The non- Arian character of the Parthians is signified, if not proved, by the absence of their name from the Zendavesta, The Zendavesta enumerates among Arian nations the Bac- CH. 11.] TURANIAN CAST OF THE NAMES. 13 trians, the Sogdians, the Margians, the Hyrcanians, the Ai'ians of Herat,, and the Chorasmians, or all the important nations of these parts except the Parthians. The Parthian country it mentions under the name of Nisaya ^* or Nisaea, implying apparently that the Parthians were not yet settled in it. The only ready way of reconciling the geography of the Zenda- vesta with that of later ages is to suppose the Parthians a non-Arian nation who intruded themselves among the early Arian settlements, coming probably from the north, the great home of the Turanians. Some positive arguments in favor of the Turanian origin of the Parthians may be based upon their names. The Parthians affect, in their names, the termination -ac or -aTc^ as, for instance, in Arsac-es, Sinnac-es, Parrhaces, Vesaces, Sana- trseces, Phraataces, etc. — a termination which characterizes the primitive Babylonian, the Basque, and most of the Tura- nian tongues. The termination -geses, found in such names as Volo-geses, Abda-geses, and the like, may be compared with the -ghiz of Yenghiz. The Turanian root annap, "God," is perhaps traceable in Amm-inap-es. If the Parthian ' ' Chos- roes " represents the Persian " Kurush" or Cyrus, the corrup- tion which the word has undergone is such as to suggest a Tatar articulation. The remains of the Parthian language, which we possess, beyond their names, are too scanty and too little to be de- pended on to afford us any real assistance in settUng the question of their ethnic character. Besides the words surena, "Commander-in-chief," and Jcarta or Jcerta, "city," "fort," there is scarcely one of which we can be assured that it was really understood by the Parthians in the sense assigned to it." Of these two, the latter, which is undoubtedly Arian, may have been adopted from the Persians:'" the former is non-Arian, but has no known Turanian congeners. If, however, the consideration of the Parthian language does not help us to determine their race, a consideration of their manners and customs strengthens much the presumption that they were Turanians. Like the Turkoman and Tatar tribes generally, they passed almost their whole lives on horseback, conversing, transacting business, buying and selling, even eating on their horses." They practised polygamy, secluded their women from the sight of men, punished unfaithfulness with extreme severity, delighted iji hunting, and rarely ate any flesh but that which they obtained in this way, were 14 THE SIXTH MONAliCHY. [ch. n. moderate eaters'^ but great drinkers, " did not speak much, but yet were very unquiet, being constantly engaged in stir- ring up trouble either at home or abroad.'* A small portion of the nation alone was free; the remainder were the slaves of the privileged few.'^ Nomadic habits continued to prevail among a portion of those who remained in their primitive seats, even in the time of their greatest national prosperity ;'* and a coarse, rude, and semi-barbarous character attached always even to the most advanced part of the nation, to the king, the court, and the nobles generally, a character which, despite a certain varnish of civilization, was constantly show- ing itself in their dealings with each other and with foreign nations. "The Parthian monarchs," as Gibbon justly ob- serves," "hke the Mogul (Mongol) sovereigns of Hindostan, delighted in the pastoral life of their Scythian ancestors, and the imperial camp was frequently pitched in the plain of Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the Tigris." Niebuhr seems even to doubt whether the Parthians dwelt in cities at all.'* He represents them as maintaining from first to last their nomadic habits, and regards the insurrection by which their empire was brought to an end as a rising of the inhabitants of towns— the Tadjiks'" of those times — against the Ilyats or wanderers, who had oppressed them for centuries. This is, no doubt, an overstatement; but it has a foundation in fact, since wandering habits and even tent-life were affected by the Parthians during the most flourishing period of their empire. On the whole, the Turanian character of the Parthians, though not absolutely proved, appears to be in the highest degree probable. If it be accepted, we must regard them as in race closely alhed to the vast hordes which from a remote antiquity have roamed over the steppe region of upper Asia, from time to time bursting upon the south, and harassing or subjugating the comparatively unwarUke inhabitants of the warmer countries. We must view them as the congeners of the Huns, Bulgarians, and Comans of the ancient world; of the Kalmucks, Ouigurs, Usbegs, Eleuts, etc., of the present day. Perhaps their nearest representatives will be, if we look to their primitive condition at the founding of their empire, the modern Turkomans, who occupy nearly the same districts ; if we regard them in the period of their great prosperity, the Osmanli Turks. Like the Turks, they combined great mili- tary prowess and vigor with a capacity for organization and government not verj^ usual among Asiatics. Like them, they CH. IT.] PARTIIIANS CONQUERED BY CYJiUS. 15 remained at heart barbarians, though they put on an external appearance of civiUzation and refinement. Like them, they never to any extent amalgamated with the conquered races, but continued for centuries an exclusive dominant race, encamped in the countries which they had overrun. The circumstances under which the Parthians became subjects of the Persian empire may readily be conjectured, but cannot be laid down positively. According to Diodoiois, who probably followed Ctesias, they passed from the do- minion of the Assyrians to that of the Medes, and from depend- ence upon the Medes to a similar position under the Persians."" But the balance of evidence is against these views. It is, on the whole, most probable that neither the Assyrian nor the Median empire extended so far eastward as the country of the Parthians."' The Parthians probably maintained their inde- pendence from the time of their settlement in the district called after their name until the sudden arrival in their country of the great Persian conqueror, Cyrus. This prince, as Herodotus tells us, subdued the whole of Western Asia, proceeding from nation to nation, and subjugating one people after another. The order of his conquests is not traceable; but it is clear that after his conquest of the Lydian empire (about B.C. 554) he proceeded eastward, with the special object of subduing Bactria."^ To reach Bactria, he would have to pass through, or close by, Parthia. Since, as Herodotus says,"^ "he conquered the whole way, as he went," we may fairly conclude that on his road to Bactria he subjugated the Parthians. It was thus, almost certainly, that they lost their independence and became Persian subjects. Competent enough to maintain themselves against the comparatively smaU tribes in their near neighborhood, the Chorasmians, Hyrcanians, Arians of Herat, Bactrians, and Sagartians, it was not possible for them to make an effectual resistance to a monarch who brought against them the entire force of a mighty empire. Cyrus had, it is probable, little difficulty in obtaining their submission. It is possible that they resisted ; but perhaps it is more probable that their course on this occa- sion was similar to that which they pursued when the Macedo- nian conqueror swept across these same regions. The Parthi- ans at that period submitted without striking a blow,"" There is no reason to believe that they caused any greater trouble to Cyrus. When the Persian empire was organized by Darius Hystas- 16 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [cu. iii. pis into satrapies, Parthia was at first united in the same government with Chorasmia, Sogdiana, and Aria." Subse- quently, however, when satrapies were made more numerous, it was detached from these extensive countries and made to form a distinct government, with the mere addition of the comparatively small district of Hyrcania."' It formed, ap- parently, one of the most tractable and submissive of the Persian provinces. Except on the single occasion already noticed,*^ when it took part in a revolt that extended to nearly one-half the empire, ^* it gave its rulers no trouble; no second attempt was made to shake off the alien yoke, which may indeed have galled, but which was felt to be inevitable. In the final struggle of Persia against Alexander, the Parthians were faithful to their masters. They fought on the Persian side at Arbela; '"' and though they submitted to Alexander somewhat tamely when he invaded their country, yet, as Darius was then dead, and no successor had declared himself, they cannot be taxed with desertion. Probably they felt little interest in the event of the struggle. Habit and circum- stance caused them to send their contingent to Arbela at the call of the Great King; but when the Persian cause was evidently lost, they felt it needless to make further sacrifices. Having no hope of establishing their independence, they thought it unnecessary to prolong the contest. They might not gain, but they could scarcely lose, by a change of masters. CHAPTER III. Condition of Western Asia under the earlier Seleucidm. Re- volts of Bactria and Parthia. Conflicting accounts of the establishment of the Parthian Kingdom. First War with Syria. To idvoi; Maice5oi'(ov iLTvi» CH. VI.J PARTEIAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. 47 CHAPTER VI. System of government established by Mithridates I. Constitu- tion of the Parthians. Government of the Provinces. Laws and Institutions. Character of Mithridates I. " Rex, magno et regio_animo."— Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 3. The Parthian institutions possessed great simplicity ; and it is probable that they took a shape in the reign of Arsaces I., or, at any rate, of Tiridates, which was not greatly altered after- wards. Permanency is the law of Oriental governments ; and in a monarchy which lasted less than five hundred years, it is not hkely that many changes occurred. The Parthian institu- tions are referred to Mithridates I., rather than to Tiridates, because in the reign of Mithridates Parthia entered upon a new phase of her existence — became an empire instead of a mere monarchy ; and the sovereign of the time covdd not but have reviewed the circumstances of his State, and have determined either to adopt the previous institutions of his country, or to reject them. Mitlu-idates I. had attained a position which en- titled and enabled him to settle the Parthian constitution as he thought best; and, if he maintained an earlier arrangement, which is uncertain, he must have done so of his own free will, simply because he preferred the existing Partliian institutions to any other. Thus the institutions may be regarded as start- ing from him, since he approved them, and made them those of the Parthian EMPIRE. Like most sovereignties which have arisen out of an associa- tion of chiefs banding themselves together for warlike purposes under a single head, the Parthian monarchy was limited. The king was permanently advised by two councils, consisting of persons not of his own nomination, whom rights, conferred by birth or office, entitled to their seats. One of these was a family conclave (concilium domesticum), or assembly of the full-grown males of the Royal House ; the other was a Senate comprising both the spiritual and the temporal chiefs of the nation, the Sophi, or " Wise Men," and the Magi, or "Priests." ' Together these two bodies constituted the Megistanes, the 48 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. vi. " Nobles" or ;" Great Men"— the privileged class which to a considerable extent checked and controlled the monarch. The monarchy was elective, but only in the house of the Arsacid^ ; and the concurrent vote of both councils was necessary in the appointment of a new king. Practically, the ordinary law of hereditary descent appears to have been followed, unless in the case where a king left no son of sufficient age to exercise the royal office. Under such circumstances, the Megistanes usually nominated the late king's next brother to succeed him,'' or, if he had left behind him no brother, went back to an uncle. ^ When the line of succession had once been changed, the right of the elder branch was lost, and did not revive unless the branch preferred died out or possessed no member qualified to rule. When a king had been duly nominated by the two councils, the right of placing the diadem upon his head be- longed to the Surena,^ the " Field-Marshal," or "Commander in Chief of the Parthian armies." The Megistanes further claimed and sometimes exercised the right of deposing a mon- arch whose conduct displeased them ; but an attempt to exer- cise this privilege was sure to be followed by a civil war, no monarch accepting his deposition without a struggle; and force, not right, practically determining whether he should remain king or no. After a king was once elected and firmly fixed upon the throne, his power appears to have been nearly despotic. At any rate he could put to death without trial whomsoever he chose ; and adult members of the Eoyal House, who provoked the reigning monarch's jealousy, were constantly so treated.* Probably it would have been more dangerous to arouse the fears of the "Sophi" and "Magi." The latter especially were a powerful body, consisting of an organized hierarchy, which had come down from ancient times, and was feared and vene- rated by aU classes of the people. * Their numbers at the close of the Empire, counting adult males only, are reckoned at eighty thousand ;' they possessed considerable tracts of fertile land,* and were the sole inhabitants of many large towns or villages, which they were permitted to govern as they pleased. '' The arbitrary power of the monarchs must, in practice, have been largely checked by the privileges of this numerous priestly caste, of which it would seem that in later times they became jealous, thereby preparing the way for their own downfall." The dominion of the Parthians over the conquered provinces was maintained by reverting to the system which had pre- en. VI.] THE GREEK TOWNS. 49 vailed generally through the East before the accession of the Per- sians to power, and establishing in the various countries either viceroys, holding oflQce for life, or sometimes dependent dy- nasties of kings." In either case, the rulers, so long as they paid tribute regularly to the Parthian monarchs and aided thenx in their wars, were allowed to govern the people beneath their sway at their pleasure. Among monarchs, in the higher sense of the term, maybe enumerated the kings of Persia,'^ Elymais,'^ Adiabene, '* Osrhoene,'^ and of Armenia and Media Atropatene, when they formed, as they sometimes did, por- tions of the Parthian Empire. The viceroys, who governed the other provinces, bore the title of VitaxcB (/?i^raK£5), and were fourteen or fifteen in number.'^ The remark has been made by the historian Gibbon" that the system thus estab- lished "exhibited under other names a lively image of the feudal system which has since prevailed in Europe." The comparison is of some value, but, like most historical parallels, it is inexact, the points of difference between the Parthian and the fsudal system being probably more numerous than those of resemblance, but the points of resemblance being very main points, not fewer in number, and striking. It was with special reference to the system thus established that the Parthian monarchs took the title of " King of Kings " {fiadiXEvi /SadiXsGov), SO frequent upon their coins,'* which seems sometimes to have been exchanged for what was regarded as an equivalent phrase,'* "Satrap of Satraps" {darpaTtrji r^v darpaTtoov). This title seems to appear first on the coins of Mithridates I. In the Parthian system there was one anomaly of a very curious character. The Greek towns, which were scattered in large numbers throughout the Empire,"" enjoyed a munici- pal government of their own, and in some cases were almost independent communities, the Parthian kings exercising over them little or no control. The great city of Seleucia on the Tigris was the most important of all these : its population was estimated in the first century after Christ at six hundred thousand souls ;^' it had strong walls," and was surrounded by a most fertile territory." It had its own senate, or mimi- cipal council, of three hundred members, elected by the people to nile them from among the wealthiest and best educated of the citizens."* Under ordinary circumstances it enjoyed the blessing of complete self-government, and was entirely free from Parthian interference, paying no doubt its tribute, but 50 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. vi. otherwise holding the position of a "free city." It was only in the case of internal dissensions that these advantages were lost, and the Parthian soldiery, invited within the walls, ar- ranged the quarrels of parties, and settled the constitution of the State at its pleasure. Privileges of a similar character, though, probably, less extensive, belonged (it would seem) to most of the other Greek cities of the Empire. The Parthian monarchs thought it polite to favor them ; and their practice justified the title of "Phil-Hellene," which they were fond of assuming upon their coins. On the whole, the policy may have been wise, but it diminished the unity of the Empire ; and there were times when serious danger arose from it. The Syro-Macedonian monarchs could always count with certainty on having powerful friends in Parthia, whatever portion of it they invaded ; and even the Romans, though their ethnic con- nection with the cities was not so close, were sometimes indebted to them for very important assistance." We are told that Mithridates I. , after effecting his conquests, made a collection of the best laws which he found to prevail among the various subject peoples, and imposed them upon the Parthian nation.'^'' This statement is, no doubt, an exag- geration; but we may attribute, with some reason, to Mith- ridates the introduction at this time of various practices and usages, whereby the Parthian Court was assimilated to those of the earlier Great Monarchies of Asia, and became in the eyes of foreigners the successor and representative of the old Assyrian and Persian Kingdoms. The assumption of new- titles and of a new state — the organization of the Court on a new plan — the bestowal of a new character on the subordinate officers of the Empire, were suitable to the new phase of its life on which the monarchy had now entered, and may with the highest probability, if not with absolute certainty, be as- signed to this x)eriod. It has been already noticed that Mithridates appears to have been the first Parthian sovereign who took the title of ' ' King of Kings."" The title had been a favorite one with the old Assyrian and Persian monarchs,^* but was not adopted either by the Seleucidae or by the Greek kings of Bactria." Its re- vival implied a distinct pretension to that mastery of Western Asia which had belonged of old to the Assyrians and Persians, and which was, in later times, formally claimed by Arta- xerxes,'" the son of Sassan, the founder of the New Persian Kingdom. Previous Parthian monarchy had been content to CH. VI.] TITLES AND STATE OF THE KINO. 51 call themselves "the King," or "the Great King " — Mithridates is "the King of Kings, the great and illustrious Arsaces." At the same time Mithridates appears to have assumed the tiara, or tall stiff crown, which, with certain modifications in its shape, had been the mark of sovereignty, both under the Assyrians and under the Persians. Previously the royal head- dress had been either a mere cap of a Scythic type, but lower than the Scyths commonly wore it ;" or the ordinary diadem, which was a band round the head terminating in two long ribbons or ends, that hung down behind the head on the back. According to Herodian, the diadem, in the later times, was double;'- but the coins of Parthia do not exhibit this pecu- liarity. [PI. 1, Fig. 4. J Ammianus says" that among the titles assumed by the Parthian monarchs was that of "Brother of the Sun and Moon." It appears that something of a divine character was regarded as attaching to the race. In the civil contentions, which occur so frequently throughout the later history, com- batants abstained from lifting their hands knowingly against an Arsacid, to kill or wound one being looked upon as sacri- lege." The name of 0£oS was occasionally assumed, as it Avas in Syria; and more frequently kings took the epithet of OEOTtdrcjp, which implied the divinity of their father."* After his death a monarch seems generally to have been the object of a qualified worship; statues were erected to him in the temples, where (apparently) they were associated with the images of the great luminaries. ^^ Of the Parthian Court and its customs we have no account that is either complete or trustworthy. Some particulars, however, may be gathered of it on which we may place re- hance. The best authorities are agreed that it was not station- ary, but migrated at different times of the year to different cities of the Empire, in this resembling the Court of the Achaemonians. It is not quite clear, however, which were the cities thus honored. Ctesiphon was undoubtedly one of them. All writers agree that it was the chief city of the Empire, and the ordinary seat of the government." Here, according to Strabo, the kings passed the winter months, delighting in the excellence of tho air.'" The town was situated on the left bank of the Tigris, opposite to Seleucia, twelve or thirteen miles below the modern Baghdad. Pliny says" that it was built by the Parthians in order to reduce Seleucia to insignificance, and that AvheD it failed of its purpose they built another city. 52 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [cH. vi Vologesocerta, in the same neighborhood with the same ob- ject; but the account of Strabo is more probable — viz., that it grew up gradually out of the wish of the Parthian kings to spare Seleucia the unpleasantness of having the rude soldiery, which followed the Court from place to place, quartered upon them. *" The remainder of the year, Strabo tells us, was spent by the Parthian kings either at the Median city of Ecbatana, which is the modern Hamadan, or in the province of Hyrca- nia." In Hyrcania, the palace, according to him, was at Tap6 ■*' and between this place and Ecbatana he no doubt re- garded the monarchs as spending the time which was not passed at Ctesiphon. Athenseus, however, declares that Phages was the spring residence of the Parthian kings ;" and it seems not unhkely that this famous city, which Isidore, writing in Parthian times, calls " the greatest in Media,"** was among the occasional residences of the Court. Parthia itself was, it would seem, deserted;" but still a city of that region preserved in one respect a royal character, being the place where all the earlier kings were interred.*" The pomp and grandeur of the Parthian monarchs are de- scribed only in the vaguest terms by the classical writers. No author of repute appears to have visited the Parthian Court. We may perhaps best obtain a true notion of the splendor of the sovereign from the accounts which have reached us of his relations and officers, who can have reflected only faintly the magnificence of the sovereign. Plutarch tells us that the general whom Orodes deputed to conduct the war against Crassus came into the field accompanied by two hundred litters wherein were contained his concubines, and by a thousand camels which carried his baggage.*' His dress was fashioned after that of the Medes ; he wore his hair parted in the middle and had his face painted with cosmetics.*" A body of ten thousand horse, composed entirely of his clients and slaves, followed him in battle.*" We may conclude from this picture, and from the general tenor of the classical notices, that the Arsacidae revived and maintained very much such a Court as that of the old Achaemenian princes, falling probably somewhat below their model in politeness and refinement, but equalling it in luxury, in extravagant expenditure, and in display. Such seems to have been the general character of those practices and institutions whicli distinguish the Parthians from the foundation of their Empire by Mithridates. Some of CH. vii.] BEIGN OF PHRAATES II. 53 them, it is probable, he rather adopted than invented; but there is no good reason for doubting that of many he was the originator. He appears to have been one of those rare indi- viduals to whom it has been given to unite the powers which form the conqueror with those which constitute the suc- cessful organizer of a State. Brave and enterprising in war, prompt to seize an occasion and to turn it to the best advan- tage, not even averse to severities where they seemed to be required, he yet felt no acrimony towards those who had resisted his arms, but was ready to befriend them so soon as their resistance ceased. Mild, clement, philanthropic,^" he conciliated those whom he subdued almost more easily than he subdued them, and by the efforts of a few yeare succeeded in welding together a dominion which lasted without suffer- ing serious mutilation for nearly four centuries. Though not dignified with the epithet of "Great," he was beyond all question the greatest of the Parthian monarchs. Later times did him more justice than his contemporaries, and, when the names of almost all the other kings had sunk into oblivion, retained his in honor, and placed it on a par with that of the original founder of Parthian independence.^' CHAPTER VII. Reign of Phraates II. Expedition of Antiochus Sidetes against Parthia. Release of Demetrius. Defeat and Death of Sidetes. War of Phraates ivith the Northern Nomads. His death and character. " Post necem Mithridates, Part honim regis, Phrahates Alius ejus rex constituitur."— Justin, xlii. 1, § 1. Mithridates was succeeded by his son, Phraates, the second monarch of the name, and the seventh Arsaces. This prince, entertaining, like his father, the design of invading Syria, and expecting to find some advantage from having in his camp the rightful occupant of the Syrian throne, ' treated the captive Demetrius with even greater kindness than his father had done, not only maintaining him handsomely, but even giving him his sister Rhodogune, in marriage.' Demetrius, however, was not to be reconciled to his captivity by any such blandish- 54 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. Vlt ments, and employed his thoughts chiefly in devising plans by which he might escape. By the help of a friend he twice managed to evade the vigilance of his guards, and to make his way from Hyrcania towards the frontiers of his own kingdom ; but each time he was pursued and caught without effecting his purpose.^ The Parthian monarch was no doubt vexed at Ms pertinacity, and on the second occasion thought it prudent to feign, if he did not even really feel, offence : he banished his ungrateful brother-in-law from his presence,^ but otherwise visited his crime with no severer penalty than ridicule. Choos- ing to see in his attempts to change the place of his abode no serious design, but only the wayward conduct of a child, he sent him a present of some golden dice, implying thereby that it was only for lack of amusement he had grown discontented with his Hyrcanian residence. ^ Antiochus Sidetes, the brother of Demetrius, had been gen- erally accepted by the Syrians as their monarch, at the time when the news reached them of that prince's defeat and cap- ture by Mithridates. He was an active and enterprising sov- ereign, though fond of luxury and display. For some years (B.C. 140-137) the pretensions of Tryphon to the throne gave him full occupation;^ but, having finally established his au- thority after a short war, and punished the pretender with death, he found himself, in B.C. 137, at Uberty to turn his arms against foreign enemies. He would probably have at once attacked Parthia, but for the attitude of a nearer neigh- bor, which he regarded as menacing, and as requiring his im- mediate attention. Demetrius, before his departure for the East, had rewarded the Jews for services rendered him in his war with Tryphon by an open acknowledgment of their inde- pendence.' Sidetes, though indebted to the Jewish High Priest, Simon, for offers of aid against the same adversary,* could not bring himself to pay the price for it which Demetrius had thought reasonable— an independent Palestine appeared to him a danger close to his doors, and one that imperilled the very existence of the Syrian State. Accordingly, he had no sooner put down Tryphon than he resolved to pick a quarrel with the Jews, and to force them to resume their old position of vassal- age to Syria." His general, Cendebaeus, invaded their country, but was defeated near Azotus. '" Antiochus had to take the field in person." During two years, John Hyrcanus, who had succeeded his father, Simon (b.c. 135), baffled all his efforts; but at last, in b,c. 133, he was forced to submit, to acknowli CH. vn.] HIS WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS SlDETES. 55' edge the authority of Syria, to dismantle Jerusalem, and to resume the payment of tribute. Sidetes then considered the time come for a Parthian expedition, and, having made great preparations, he set out for the East in the spring of B.C. 129. It is impossible to accept without considerable reserve the accounts that have come down to us of the force which Antio- chus collected. According to Justin, '^ it consisted of no more than 80,000 fighting men, to which was attached the incredible number of 300,000 camp-followers, the majority being com- posed of cooks, bakers, and actors. As in other extreme cases the camp-followers do but equal or a little exceed the number of men fit for service, " this estimate, which makes them nearly four times as munerous, is entitled to but little credit. The late writer, Orosius,'* corrects the error here indicated; but his account seems to err in rating the supernumeraries too low. According to him. the armed force amounted to 300,000, while the camp-followers, including grooms, sutlers, courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third of the number. From the two accounts, taken together, we are perhaps entitled to con- clude that the entire host did not fall much short of 400,000 men. This estimate receives confirmation from an independent statement made by Diodorus, with respect to the number who fell in the campaign — a statement of which we shall have to speak later. '^ The army of Phraates, according to two accounts of it" (which, however, seem to represent a single original authority), numbered no more than 120,000. An attempt which he made to enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries failed, the Scyths being willing to lend their aid, but arriving too late to be of any use. '' At the same time a defection of the subject princes'* deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents which usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these cir- cumstances it is more surprising that he was able to collect 120,000 men than that he did not bring into the field a larger number. The Syrian troops, magnificently appointed'* and supported by a body of Jews under John Hyrcanus,^" advanced upon Babylon, receiving on their way the adhesion of many of the Parthian tributaries, who professed themselves disgusted by the arrogance and pride of their masters.^' Phraates, on his part, advanced to meet his enemies, and in person or by his generals engaged Antiochus in three battles, but without sue- 56 THW SIXTH MONARCHY. l.ctt. rit , cess. Antiochus was three times a conqueror. In a battle fought upon the river Lycus (Zab) in further Assyria he de- feated the Parthian general, Indates, and raised a trophy in honor of his victory. ■''^ The exact scene of the other com- bats is unknown, but they were probably in the same neigh- borhood. The result of them was the conquest of Babylonia, and the general revolt of the remaining Parthian provinces," which followed the common practice of deserting a falling house, and drew off or declared for the enemy. Under these circumstances Phraates, considering that the time was come when it was necessary for him to submit or to create a diversion by raising troubles in the enemy's territory, released Demetrius from his confinement, and sent him, sup- ported by a body of Parthian troops, to reclaim his kingdom. "* He thought it probable that Antiochus, when the intelhgence reached him, would retrace his steps, and return from Babylon to his own capital. At any rate his efforts would be distracted ; he would be able to draw fewer reinforcements from home ; and he would be less inclined to proceed to any great distance from his own country. Antiochus, however, was either uninformed of the impend- ing danger or did not regard it as very pressing. The winter was approaching ; and, instead of withdrawing his troops from the occupied provinces and marching them back into Syria, he resolved to keep them where they were, merely dividing them, on account of their numbers, among the various cities which he had taken, and making them go into winter quar- ters." It was, no doubt, his intention to remain quiet during the two or three winter months, after which he would have resumed the war, and have endeavored to penetrate through Media into Parthia Proper, where he might expect his adver- sary to make his last stand. But Phraates saw that the position of affairs was favorable for striking a blow before the spring came. The dispersion of his enemy's troops deprived him of all advantage from the superiority of their numbers. The circumstance of their being quartered in towns newly reduced, and unaccustomed to the rudeness and rapacity of soldiers and camp-followers, made it almost certain that complications woxild arise, and that it would not be long before in some places the Parthians, so late- ly declared to be oppressors, would be hailed as liberators. Moreover, the Parthians wei'e, probably, better able than their adversaries to endure the hardships and severities of a cam- CH. vn.i ATTEMPT AT NEGOTIATION FAILS. tl paign in the cold season."" Parthia is a cold country, and the winters, both of the great plateau of Iran and of all the moun- tam tracts adjoining it, are severe. The climate of Syria is far milder. Moreover, the troops of Antiochus had, we are in- formed, been enervated by an excessive indulgence on the part of their leader during the marches and halts of the preceding summer." Their appetites had been pampered; their habits had become unmanly; their general tone was relaxed; and they were likely to deteriorate still more in the wealthy and luxurious cities where they were bidden to pass the winter. These various circumstances raised the spirits of Phraates, and made him hold himself in readiness to resume hostilities at a moment's notice. Nor was it long befoi-e the complications which he had foreseen began to occur. The insolence of the soldiers"" quartered upon them exasperated the inhabitants of the Mesopotamian towns, and caused them to look back with regret to the time when they were Parthian subjects. The requisitions made on them for stores of all kinds was a further grievance."'-' After a while they opened communications with Phraates, and offered to return to their allegiance if he would assist them against their oppressors. Phraates gladly listened to these overtures. At his instigation a plot was formed like that which has given so terrible a significance to the phrase "Sicilian vespers.'' It was agreed that on an appointed day all the cities should break out in revolt : the natives should take arms, rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, and kill all, or as many as possible. Phraates promised to be at hand with his army, to prevent the scattered detachments from giving help to each other. It was calculated that in this way the invaders might be cut off almost to a man without the trouble of even fighting a battle. But, before he proceeded to extremities, the Parthian prince determined to give his adversary a chance of escaping the fate prepared for him by timely concessions. The winter was not over; but the snow was beginning to melt through the increas- ing warmth of the sun's rays, '■"' and the day appointed for the general rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambassadors to Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire on what conditions it would be granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according to Diodotus, was as follows: "If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius, from captivity, and deliver him up with- out ransom, " at the same time restoring all the i)rovinces 58 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. vii. which had been taken from Syria, and consenting to pay a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had ; but not other- wise." To such terms it was, of course, impossible that Phraates should listen; and his ambassadors, therefore, re- turned without further parley. Soon afterwards the day appointed for the outbreak arrived. Apparently, no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops were everywhere quietly enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, when, suddenly and without warning, they found themselves attacked by the natives.'^ Taken at disadvantage, it was impossible for them to make a successful resistance ; and it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacred in their quarters. Antiochus, and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far as we hear, escaped into the open field and contended for their lives in just warfare." It had been the intention of the Syrian monarch, when he took the field, to hasten to the protection of the troops quartered nearest to him ; but he no sooner commenced his march than he found himself confronted by Phraates, who was at the head of his entire army, having, no doubt, anticipated Antiochus's design and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious to engage at once, as his force far outnumbered that command- ed by his adversary ; but the latter might have declined the battle, if he had so willed, and have, at any rate, greatly pro- tracted the struggle. He had a mountain region— Mount Zagros, probably— within a short distance of him, and might have fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at great disadvantage ; but he was still at an age when caution is apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true courage. Despite the advice of one of his captains, he de- termined to accept the battle which the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe whom he had three times defeated.^* But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by his army. Though Antiochus fought strenuously," he was de- feated, since his troops were without heart and offered but a poor resistance. '" Antiochus himself perished, either slain by the enemy or by his own hand.'' His son, Seleucus, a boy of tender age,'* and his niece, a daughter of Demetrius,'" who had accompanied him in his expedition, were captured. His troops Were either cut to pieces or made prisoners. The entire num- ber of those slain in the battle, and in the previous massacre, was reckoned at 300,000.'"' Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was the last tn. vn.] PHRAATES AFTER HIS VICTORY. 5^ which any Seleucid monarch conducted into these countries — the final attempt made by Syria to repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces. Henceforth Parthia was no further troubled by the power that had hitherto been her most dan- gerous enemy, but was allowed to enjoy without molestation from Syria the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in fact, had from this time a difficulty in preserving her own ex- istence. The immediate result of the destruction of Antiochus and his host was the revolt of Judsea,," which henceforth maintained its independence uninterruptedly. The dominions of the Seleucidae were reduced to Cilicia and Syria Proper,^- or the tract west of the Euphrates, between Amanus and Pales- tine. Internally, the state was agitated by constant commo- tions from the claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty : externally, it was kept in continual alarm by the Egyptians, Arabians, or Eomans. During the sixty years" which elapsed between the • return of Demetrius to his kingdom and the con- version of Syria into a Roman province, she ceased wholly to be formidable to her neighbors. Her flourishing period was gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which there was no recovery. It is surprising that the Romans did not step in earlier and terminate a rule which was but a little removed from anarchy. Rome, however, had other work on her hands ; and the Syrian kingdom continued to exist till B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund condition. But Phraates could not, without prophetic foresight, have counted on such utter prostration following as the result of a single — albeit a terrible— blow. Accordingly, we find him still exhibiting a dread of the Seleucid power even after his great victory. He had released Demetrius too late to obtain any benefit from the hostile feeling which that prince probably en- tertained towards his brother. Had he not released him too soon for his own safety? Was it not to be feared that the Syr- ians might rally under one who was their natural leader, might rapidly recover their strength, and renew the struggle for the mastery of Western Asia? The first thought of the dissatisfied monarch was to hinder the execution of his own project. De- metrius was on liis way to Syria, but had not yet arrived there, or, at any rate, his arrival had not been as yet reported. Was it not possible to intercept him? The Parthian king has- tily sent out a body of horse, with orders to pursue the Syrian prince at their best speed, and endeavor to capture him before he passed the frontier." If they succeeded, they were to bring 60 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. vil him back to their master, who "would probably have then com- mitted his prisoner to close custody. The pursuit, however, failed. Demetrius had anticipated, or at least feared, a change of purpose, and, having prosecvited his journey with the great- est diligence, had reached his own territory before the emissa' ries of Phraates could overtake him.^^ It is uncertain whether policy or inclination dictated the step which Phraates soon afterwards took of allaying himself by marriage with the Seleucidae. He had formally given his sister, Rhodogune, as a wife to Demetrius,^" and the marriage had been fruitful, Rhodogune having borne Demetrius several children." The two houses of the Seleucidse and Arsacidae were thus already allied to some extent. Phraates resolved to strengthen the bond. The unmarried daughter of Demetrius whom he had captured after his victory over Antiochus took his fancy; and he deterinined to make her his wife."^ At the same time he adopted other measures calculated to conciliate the Seleucid prince. He treated his captive, Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, with the greatest respect.^" To the corpse of An- tiochus he paid royal honors;^" and, having placed it in a silver coflSn, he transmitted it to the Syrians for sepulture. " StUl, if we may believe Justin, ^" he entertained the design of carrying his arms across the Euphrates and invading Syria, in order to avenge the attack of Antiochus upon his territories. But events occurred which forced him to relinquish this enter- prise. The Scythians, whom he had called to his aid under the pressure of the Syrian invasion, and who had arrived too late to take part in the war, demanded the pay which they had been promised, and suggested that their arms should be employed against some other enemy. " Phraates was unwilling either to requite services not rendered, or to rush needlessly into a fresh war merely to gratify the avarice of his auxiharies. He therefore peremptorily refused to comply with either sugges- tion. Upon this, the Scythians determined to take their pay- ment into their own hands, and began to ravage Parthia and to carry off a rich booty. Phraates, who had removed the head- quarters of his government to Babylonia, felt it necessary to entrust affairs there to an officer, and to take the field in per- son against this new enemy, which was certainly not less for- midable than the Syrians. He selected for his representative at the seat of Empire a certain Himerus^* (or Evemerus),"a youth with whom he had a disgraceful connection, and having estabhshed him as a sort of viceroy, ^^ marched away to the north- CH. vn.3 i)EATII OF PHRAATWS. 6l east, and proceeded to encounter the Scythians in that remote region. Besides his native troops, he took with him a number of Greeks, whom he had made prisoners in his war with Antiochus. " Their fidehty could not but be doubtful ; probably, however, he thought that at a distance from Syria they would not dare to fail him, and that with an enemy so barbarous as the Scythians they would have no temptation to fraternize. But the event proved him mistaken. The Greeks were sullen at their captivity, and exasperated by some cruel treatment which they had received when first captured. They bided their time ; and when, in a battle with the Scythians, they saw the Parthian soldiery hard pressed and in danger of defeat, they decided matters by going over in a body to the enemy. The Parthian army was com- pletely routed and destroyed, and Phraates himself was among the slain. "" We are not told what became of the victorious Greeks ; but it is to be presumed that, like the Ten Thousand, they fought their way across Asia, and rejoined their own countrymen. Thus died Phraates I., after a reign of about eight or nine years. ^^ Though not possessing the talents of his father, he was a brave and warlike prince, active, entei'prising, fertile in re- sources, and bent on maintaining against all assailants the honor and integrity of the Empire. In natural temperament he was probably at once soft"" and cruel." But, when policy requii*ed it, he could throw his softness aside and show himself a hardy and intrepid warrior."^ Similarly, he could control his natural harshness, and act upon occasion with clemency and leniency." He was not, perhaps, withoiit a grim humor, which led liim to threaten more than he intended, in order to see how men would comport themselves when greatly alarmed."* There is some evidence that he aimed at saying good things; though it must be confessed that the wit is not of a high order."' Altogether he has more character than most Oriental monarchs; and the monotony of Arsacid biography is agree- ably interrupted by the idiosyncrasy which his words and con- duct indicate. 62 THE SiXm MONAilCHY. [ch. viii CHAPTER VIII. Accession of Artahanus II. Position of Parthia. Growing pressure upon her, and general advance towards the south, of the SaTca or Scyths. Causes and extent of the move- ment. Character andprincij^al tribes of the Saha. Scythic war of Artahanus. His death. "Imperium Asiae [Scytha3] terqusesivere."— Justin, ii. 3, § i. The successor of Phraates was his uncle, Artahanus, * a son of Priapatius. It is probable that the late king had either left no son, or none of sufficient age to be a fit occupant of the throne at a season of difiiculty. The ' ' Megistanes, " therefore, elected Artahanus in his nephew's place, ^ a man of mature age, ^ and, probably, of some experience in war. The situation of Parthia, despite her recent triumph over the Syro-Macedo- nians, was critical ; and it was of the greatest importance that the sceptre should be committed to one who would bring to the discharge of his ofiice those quahties of wisdom, promptness, and vigor, which a crisis demands. The difficulty of the situation was two-fold. In the first place, there was an immediate danger to be escaped. The combined Greeks and Scythians, who had defeated the Par- thian army and slain the monarch, might have been ex- pected to push their advantage to the utmost, and seek to establish themselves as conquerors in the country which lay apparently at their mercy. At any rate, the siege and sack of some of the chief towns was a probable contingency, if permanent occupation of the territory did not suit the views of the confederates. The new monarch had to rid Par- thia of her invaders at as little cost as possible, before he could allow himself to turn his attention to any other mat- ter whatsoever. Nor did this, under the circumstances, ap- pear to be an easy task. The flower of the Parthian troops had been destroyed in the late battle, and it was not easy to replace them by another native army. The subject-nations were at no time to be depended upon when Parthia was re- duced to straits, and at the present conjecture some of the most important were in a condition bordering upon rebellion. CH. V7il.} DANGER OF PARTEIA FROM THE SCTTHS. 63 Himerus, the viceroy left by Phraates in Babylonia, had fii'st driven the Babylonians and Seleucians to desperation by his tyranny,* and then plunged into a war with the people of Mesene,^ which must have made it difficult for him to send Artabanus any contingent. Fortunately for the Parthians, the folly or moderation of their enemies rendered any great effort on their part unnecessary. The Greeks, content with having revenged themselves, gave the new monarch no trouble at all : the Scythians were satisfied with plundering and wasting the open country, after which they returned quietly to their homes. ^ Artabanus found himself quit of the immediate dan- ger which had threatened him almost without exertion of his own, and could now bend his thoughts to the position of his country generally, and the proper policy to pursue under the circumstances. For there was a second and more formidable danger im- pending over the State — a danger not casual and temporary like the one just escaped, but arising out of a condition of things in neigboring regions which had come about slowly, and which promised to be permanent. To give the reader the means of estimating this danger aright, it will be necessary to take a somewhat wide view of the state of affairs on the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Parthia for some time previously to the accession of Artabanus, to trace out the causes which were at work, producing important changes in these regions, and to indicate the results which threatened, and those which were accomplished. Tlie opportunity will Also serve for giving such an account of the chief races which here bordered the empire as will show the nature of the peril to which Parthia was exposed at this pei'iod. In the wide plains of Northern Asia, extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Thian Chan mountains and the Jaxartes, there had been nurtured from a remote antiquity a nomadic population, at no time very numerous in proportion to the area over which it was spread, but liable on occasions to accu- mulate, owing to a combination of circumstances, in this or that portion of the region occupied, and at such times causing trouble to its neighbors. From about the close of the third century B.C. symptoms of such an accumulation had begiui to display themselves in the tract immediately north of the Jaxartes, and the inhabitants of the countries south of that rivsr had suffered from a succession of raids and inroads, Vhich -w^ere not regarded as dangerous, but which gave con- 64 THE SIXTH MONARCHY.] [ch. viii. slant annoyance. Crossing the great desert of Eharesm by forced marches, some of the hordes invaded the green valleys of Hyrcania and Parthia, and carried desolation over those fair and flourishing districts.' About the same time other tribes entered the Bactrian territory and caused alarm to the Greek kingdom recently established in that province.* It ap- pears that the Parthian monarchs, unable to save their country from incursions, consented to pay a sort of black-mail to their invaders, by allowing them the use of their pasture, grounds at certain fixed times — probably during some months of each year. ^ The Bactrian princes had to pay a heavier penalty. Province after j)rovince of their kingdom was swal- lowed up by the northorn hordes,'" who gi-adually occupied Sogdiana, or the tract between the lower Jaxartes and the lower Oxus, whence they proceeded to make ini'oads into Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, or Ak Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the highlands between the upper Jaxartes and upper Oxus, were permanently occupied by the invaders; and if the Bactrians had not compensated themselves for their losses by acquisitions of territory in Afghanistan and India, they woiild soon have had no king- dom left. The hordes were always increasing in strength through the influx of fresh immigrants, and in lieu of Bactria a power now stood arrayed on the north-eastern frontier of the Parthians, which was reasonably regarded with the most serious alarm and suspicion. The origin of the state of things here described is to be sought, according to the best authorities, in certain movements which took place about b. c. 200, " in a remote region of inner Asia. At that time a Turanian people called the Yue-chi were expelled from their territory on the west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu, whom some identified with the Huns. ' ' The Yue- chi separated into two bands; the smaller descended south- wards into Thibet; the larger passed westwards, and after a hard struggle dispossessed a people called ' Su' of the plains west of the river of Hi. These latter advanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes; and the Yue-chi not long afterwards re- treating from the U-siun, another nomadic race, passed the ' Su' on the noi'th and occupied the tracts between the Oxus and the Caspian. The Su were thus in the vicinity of the Bactrian Greeks ; the Yue-chi in the neighborhood of the Par- thians.""^ On the particulars of this account, which comes from the Chinese historians, we cannot perhaps altogether de- OH. vin.] CONqVESTS MADE BY THE 8CTTHS. 65 pend ; but there is no reason to doubt the main fact, attested by a writer who visited the Yue-chi in B.C. 139, '^ that they had migrated about the period mentioned from the interior of -Asia, and had established themselves sixty years later in the Cas- pian region. Such a movement wovild necessarily have thrown the entire previous population of those parts into commotion, and would probably have precipitated them upon their neigh- bors. It accounts satisfactorily for the pressure of the north- ern hordes at this period on the Parthians, Bactrians, and even the Indians ; and it completely explains the crisis in Par- thian history, which we have now reached, and the neces- sity which lay upon the nation of meeting and, if possible, overcoming, an entirely new danger. In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen, to which in ancient times the civilized world was always liable from an outburst of northern barbarism. Whether the peril has alto- gether passed away or not. we need not here inquire ; but cer- tainly in the old world there was always a chance that civili- zation, ai't, refinement, luxury, might suddenly and almost without warning be swept away by an overwhelming influx of savage hordes from the unpolished North. From the reign of Cyaxares, when the evil first snowed itself, '^ the danger was patent to all wise and far-seeing governors both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to time guarded against. The expe- ditions of Cyrus against the Massagetse, of Darius Hystaspis against the European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getse, of Trajan and Probus across the Danube, were designed to check and intimidate the northern nations, to break their power, and diminish the likelihood of their taking the offen- sive. It was now more than four centuries since in this part of Asia any such effort had been made;'^ and the northern barbarians might naturally have ceased to fear the arms and discipline of the South. Moreover the circumstances of the time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on continually more and more by the newly-arrived Su and Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the Transoxianian regions were under the necessity of seeking new settlements, and could only attempt to find them in the quarter towards which they were driven by the new-comers. Strengthened, probably, by daring spirits from among their conquerors themselves'" they crossed the rivers and the deserts by which they had been hitherto con- fined, and advancing against the Parthians, Bactrians, and Arians, tln-eatened to carry all before them. We have seen 66 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [cH. vuL how successful they were against the Bactrians." In Ariana, they passed the mountains, and, proceeding southwards, occu- pied the tract helow the great lake wherein the Helmend ter- minates, which took from them the name of Sacastane'^ ("land of the Saka," or Scyths) — a name still to be traced in the modern "Seistan."' Further to the east they effected a lodg- ment in Kabul, and another in the the southern portion of the Indus valley, which for a time bore the name of Indo- Scythia." They even crossed the Indus and attempted to penetrate into the interior of India, but here they were met and repulsed by a native monarch, about the year B.C. 56.^° The people engaged in this great movement are called, in a general way, by the classical writers, Sacae, or Scythse — i.e. Scyths. They consisted of a munber of tribes, similar for the most part in language, habits, and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to the other nomadic races of Central and Northern Asia. Of these tribes the principal were the Massagetee ("great Jits, or Jats"), who occupied the country on both sides of the lower course of the Oxus;" the Dahae, who bordered the Caspian above Hyrcania, and extended thence to the latitude of Herat;" the Tochari,^^ who settled in the mountains between the upper Jaxartes and the upper Oxus, where they gave name to the tract known as Tokhar- estan; the Asii, or Asiani, who were closely connected with the Tochari ;'^ and the Sakarauh (Saracucae?), who are found connected with both the Tochari and the Asiani." Some of these tribes contained within them further sub-divisions; e.g. the Dahae, who comprised the Parni (or Aparni), the Pissuri, and the Xanthii;'" and the Massagetae, who included among them Chorasmii, Attasii, and others." The general character of the barbarism in which these vari- ous races were involved may be best learnt from the descrip- tion given of one of them, the Massagetae, with but few differ- ences, by Herodotus^® and Strabo. ^'^ According to this descrip- tion, the Massagetae were nomads, who moved about in wagons or carts, accompanied by their flocks and herds, on whose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each man had only one wife, but all the wives were held in common They were good riders and excellent archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, and used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, knives, and battle-axes. They had little or no iron, but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their other weapons, of bronze. They had also bronze breast-plates ; but otherwise the Yo<: m. Plate. Fig- ?., rig. 2. com 01* VARDANES U.', Coin of Pacorua H. Fig. 3. Early Coin of VolngaBcs,!!. Coin of Mithridatca IV. Fig. 4 Volagasea II, ■g^~'^^«i U».J i .J I . I . J. --—I-I— »»——■-; J Irscetifffatf! FifT 3 Plan of Palace-Tcmplo at Hatra (after FergussoD and Kobb)/ 5'>Wlgg)t°>da rarthiaii vases, jugs, and l:unps (after Loftus). CH. X.] DEALINGS OF PURAATES III. WITH POMPET. 81 discharge his obhgations to the Romans by fomenting this family quarrel, and lending a moderate support to the younger Tigranes against his father. He marched an army into Ar- menia in the interest of the young prince, overran the open country, and advanced on Artaxata, the capital. Tigranes, the king, fled at his approach, and betook himself to the neighboring movmtains. Artaxata was invested; but as the siege promised to be long, the Parthian monarch after a time withdrew, leaving the pretender with as many troops as he thought necessary to press the siege to a successful issue. The result, however, disappointed his expectations. Scarcely was Phraates gone, when the old king fell upon his son, defeated him, and drove him beyond his borders.'^ He was forced, however, soon afterwards, to submit to Pompey,''^ who, while the civil war was raging in Armenia, had defeated Mithridates and driven him to take refuge in the Tauric Chersonese. Phraates, now, naturally expected the due reward of his services, according to the stipulations of his agreement with Pompey. But that general was either dissatisfied with the mode in which the Parthian had discharged his obhgations, or disinclined to strengthen the power which he saw to be the only one in these parts capable of disputing with Pome the headship of Asia. He could scarcely prevent, and he does not seem to have tried to prevent, the recovery of Adiabene by the Parthians ; but the nearer province of Gordyene to which they had an equal claim, he would by no means consent to their occupying. At first he destined it for the younger Ti- granes. '^ When the prince offended him, he made it over to Ariobarzanes, the Cappadocian monarch. ^^ That arrangement not taking effect, and the tract being disputed between Phraates and the elder Tigranes, he sent his legate, Afranius, to drive the Parthians out of the country, and delivered it over into the hands of the Armenians.'" At the same time he insulted the Parthian monarch by refusing him his generally recognized title of " King of Kings."" He thus entirely alienated his late ally, who remonstrated against the injustice with which he was treated, '** and was only deterred fi'om declaring war by the wholesome fear which he entertained of the Roman arms. Pompey, on his side, no doubt took the question into con- sideration whether or no he should declare the Parthian prince a Roman enemy, and proceed to direct against him the available forces of the Empire. He had purposely made him hostile, and compelled him to take steps which might have g2 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. X, furnished a plausible casus belli. But, on the whole, he found that he was not prepared to venture on the encounter. The war had not been formally committed to him ; and if he did not prosper in it, he dreaded the accusations of his enemies at Rome. He had seen, moreover, with his own eyes^ that the Parthians were an enemy far from despicable, and his knowl- edge of campaigning told him that success against them was not certain. He feared to risk the loss of all the glory which he had obtained by grasping greedily at more, and preferred enjoying the fruits of the good luck which had hitherto at- tended him to tempting fortune on a new field. '^ He therefore determined that he would not allow himself to be provoked into hostilities by the reproaches, the dictatorial words, or even the daring acts of the Parthian King. When Phraates demanded his lost provinces he replied, that the question of borders was one which lay, not between Parthia and Rome, but between Parthia and Armenia.*" When he laid it down that the Euphrates properly bounded the Roman territory, and charged Pompey not to cross it, the latter said he would keep to the just bounds, whatever thej^ were." When Ti- granes complained that after having been received into the Roman alliance he was still attacked by the Parthian armies, the reply of Pompey was that he was wilUng to appoint ar- bitrators who should decide all the disputes between the two nations." The moderation and caution of these ansAvers proved contagious. The monarchs addressed resolved to com- pose their differences, or at any rate to defer the settlement of them to a more convenient time. They accepted Pompey's proposal of an arbitration ; and in a short time an arrangement was effected by which relations of amity were re-established between the two countries." It would seem that not very long after the conclusion of this peace and the retirement of Pompey from Asia (b.c. 62), Phraates lost his life. He was assassinated by his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes;" for what cause we are not told, Mithridates, the elder of the two, succeeded him (about B.C. 60) ; and, as all fear of the Romans had now passed away in consequence of their apparently peaceful attitude, he returned soon after his accession to the policy of his namesake, Mithri- dates II., and resumed the struggle with Armenia from which his father had desisted." The object of the war was probably the recovery of the lost province of Gordyen^, which, having been dehvered to the elder Tigranes by Pompey, had remained m.x.'\ SIS CIVIL WAE WITH ORODES. 83 in the occupation of the Armenians, Mithridates seems to have succeeded in his enterprise. When we next obtain a dis- tinct view of the boundary line which divides Parthia from her neighbors towards the north and the north-west, which is within five years of the probable date of Mithridates 's accession, we fijid Gordyene once more a Parthian province." As the later years of this intermediate lustre are a time of civil strife, during which territorial gains can scarcely have been made, we are compelled to refer the conquest to about b.c. 59-57. But in this case it must have been due to Mithridates III., whose reign is fixed with much probability to the years B.C. 60-56. The credit which Mithridates had acquired by his conduct ot the Armenian war he lost soon afterwards by the severity of his home administration. There is reason to believe that he drove his brother, Orodes, into banishment." At any rate, he ruled so harshly and cruelly that within a few years of his ac- cession the Parthian nobles deposed him, "and, recalling Orodes from his place of exile, set him up as king in his brother's room. Mithridates was, it would seem, at first allowed to govern Media as a subject monarch; but after a while his brother grew jealous of him, and deprived him of this dignity.*^ UnwiUing to acquiesce in his disgrace, Mithridates fled to the Romans, and being favorably received by Gabinius, then pro- consul of Syria, endeavored to obtain his aid against his coun- trymen. Gabinius, who was at once weak and ambitious, lent a ready ear to his entreaties, and was upon the point of con- ducting an expedition into Parthia, when he received a still more tempting invitation from another quarter.^" Ptolemy Auletes, expelled from Egypt by his rebellious subjects, asked his aid, and having recommendations from Pompey, a*nd a fair sum of ready money to disburse, found little difficulty in per- suading the Syrian proconsul to reUnquish his Parthian plans and march the force at his disposal into Egypt. Mithridates, upon this, withdrew from Syria, and re-entering the Parthian territory, commenced a civil war against his brother, finding nmnerous partisans, especially in the region about Babylon. " It may be suspected that Seleucia, the second city in the Em- pire, embraced his cause. ^- Babylon, into which he had thrown himself, sustained a long siege on his behalf, and only yielded when compelled by famine." Mithridates might again have become a fugitive ; but he was weary of the disappointments and hardships which are the ordinary lot of a pretender, and g4 TSE SIXTH MONARCHY. [en. xt. preferred to cast himself on the mercy and affection of his brother. Accordingly he surrendered himself unconditionally to Orodes; but this prince, professing to place the claims of patriotism above those of relationship, "^ caused the traitor who had sought aid from Rome to be instantly executed. Thus perished Mithridates III. after a reign which cannot have ex- ceeded five years, in the winter of B.C. 56, or the early spring of B.C. 55. Orodes, on his death, was accepted as king by the whole nation. CHAPTER XL Accession of Orodes I. Expedition of Crassus. His fate. Retaliatory inroad of the Parthians into Syria under Pacorus, the son of Orodes. Defeat of Pacorus by Cassius. His recall. End of the first War with Rome. " Parthi ... a Romanis, bellis per maximos duces florentissimis temporibus laces- siti, soli ex omnibus gentibus non pares solum, sed etiam victores fuere." Justin, xli. 1, § 7. The complete triumph of Orodes over Mithridates, and his full estabhshment in his kingdom, cannot be placed earlier than B.C. 56, and most probably fell in B.C. 55.' In this latter year Crassus obtained the consulship at Rome, and, being ap- pelated at the same time to the command of the East,'' made no secret of his intention to march the Roman legions across the Euphrates, and engage in hostihties with the great Parthian kingdom. = According to some writers, his views extended even further. He spoke of the wars which LucuUus had waged against Tigranes and Pompey against Mithridates of Pontus as mere child's play, and announced his intention of carrying the Roman arms to Bactria, India, and the Eastern Ocean." The Parthian king was thus warned betimes of the impending dan- ger, and enabled to make all such preparations against it as he deemed necessary. More than a year elapsed between the as- signment to Crassus of Syria as his province, and his first overt act of hostility against Orodes. It cannot be doubted that this breathing-time was weU spent by the Parthian monarch. Besides forming his general plan of campaign at his leisure, and collecting, arming, and exer CH. XI.] EXPEDITION OF CRA8SU8. 85 cising his native forces, he was enabled to gain over certain chiefs upon his borders, who had hitherto held a semi-depend- ent position, and might have been expected to welcome the» Romans. One of these, Abgarus, ^ prince of Osrhoene, or the tract east of the Euphrates, about the city of Edessa, had been received into the Roman alliance by Pompey, but, with ths fickleness common among Orientals, he now readily changed sides, and undertook to play a double part for the advantage of the Parthians. " Another, Alchaudonius, an Arab sheikh of these parts, had made his submission to Rome even earlier;'' but having become convinced that Parthia was the stronger power of the two, he also went over to Orodes.* The impor- tance of these adhesions would depend greatly on the line of inarch which Crassus might determine to follow in making his attack. Three plans were open to him. He might either throw himself on the support of Artavasdes, the Armenian monarch, who had recently succeeded his father Tigranes, and entering Armenia, take the safe but circuitous route through the mountains into Adiabene, and so by the left bank of the Tigris to Ctesiphon ; or he might, like the younger Cyrus, fol- low the course of the Eviphrates to the latitude of Seleucia, and then cross the narrow tract of plain which there separates the two rivers ; or, finally, he might attempt the shortest but most dangerous line across the Belik and Khabour, and directly through the Mesopotamian desert. If the Armenian route were preferred, neither Abgarus nor Alchavidonius would be able to do the Parthians much service ; but if Crassus resolved on following either of the others, their alliance could not but be most valuable. Crassus, however, on reaching his province, seemed in no haste to make a decision. He must have arrived in Syria tol- erably eai'ly in the spring -^ bvit his operations during the first year of his proconsulship were imimportant. He seems at once to have made up his mind to attempt nothing more than a reconnaissance. Crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma, the modern Bir or Bireh-jik, he proceeded to ravage the open country, and to receive the submission of the Greek cities, which were numerous throughout the region between the Euphrates and the Belik.'" The country was defended by the Parthian satrap with a small force; but this was easily de- feated, the satrap himself receiving a wound. " One Greek city only, Zenodotium, offered resistance to the invader; its in- habitants, having requested and received a Roman garrison of gg m^ SIXTH MONAHCBT. [en. tl\ one hundred men^ rose upon them and put them barbarously to the sword ; whereupon Crassus besieged and took the place, gave it up to his army to plunder, and sold the entire popula- tion for slaves/^ He then, as winter drew near, determined to withdraw into Syria, leaving garrisons in the various towns. The entire force left behind is estimated at eight thousand men. " It is probable that Orodes had expected a more determined attack, and had retained his army near his capital until it should become evident by which route the enemy would ad- vance against him. Acting on an inner circle, he could readily have interposed his forces, on whichever line the assailants threw themselves. But the tardy proceedings of his antagonist made his caution superfluous. The first campaign was over, and there had scarcely been a collision between the troops of the two nations. Parthia had been insulted by a wanton at- tack, and had lost some disaffected cities ; but no attempt had been made to fulfil the grand boasts with which the war had been midertaken. It may be suspected that the Parthian monarch began now to despise his enemy. He would compare him with LucuUus and Pompey, and understand that a Roman army, like any other, was formidable, or the reverse, according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He would know that Crassus was a sexagenarian, and may have heard that he had never yet shown himself a captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubted whether the proconsul had any real intention of press- ing the contest to a decision, and might not rather be expected, when he had enriched himself and his troops with Mesopota- mian plunder, to withdraw his garrisons across the Euphrates. Crassus was at this time showing the worst side of his char- acter in Syria, despoihng temples of their treasures, " and ac- cepting money in lieu of contingents of troops from the dynasts of Syria and Palestine. '^ Orodes, under these circum- stances, sent an embassy to him, which was well calculated to Btir to action the most sluggish and poor-spirited of com- manders. "If the war," said his envoys, "was really waged by Rome, it must be fought out to the bitter end. But if, as they had good reason to believe, " Crassus, against the wish of his country, had attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his own private gain, Arsaces would be moderate. He would have pity on the advanced years of the proconsitl, and would give the Romans back those men of theirs, who were not so CH. XI.] SECOND INVASION OF CRASSVS, B.C. 53. 8t much keeping watch in Mesopotamia as having watch kept on them." Crassus, stung with the taunt, exclaimed, "He would return the ambassadors an answer at Seleucia." Wagises, the chief ambassador, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling, and, glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the palm of one hand with the fingers of the other : ' ' Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before you see Seleucia."" Still further to quicken the action of the Romans, before the wmter was well over, the offensive was taken against their ad- herents in Mesopotamia. The towns which held Roman garri- sons were attacked by the Parthians in force; and, though we do not hear of any being captured, all of them were menaced, and all suffered considerably. '* If Crassus needed to be stimulated, these stimulants were effective ; and he entered on his second campaign with a full determination to compel the Parthian monarch to an en- gagemert, and, if possible, to dictate peace to him at his capi- tal. He had not, however, in his second campaign, the same freedom with regard to his movements that he had enjoyed the year previous. The occupation of Western Mesopotamia cramped his choice. It had, in fact, compelled him before quitting Syria to decline, definitely and decidedly, the over- tures of Artavasdes, who strongly urged on him to advance by way of Armenia, and promised him in that case an important addition to his forces. '" Crassus felt hmiself compelled to sup- port his garrisons, and therefore to make Mesopotamia, and not Armenia, the basis of his operations. He crossed the Euphrates a second time at the same point as before,^" with an army composed of 35,000 heavy infantry, 4,000 Hght infan- try, and 4,000 horse.'" There was still open to him a certain choice of routes. The one preferred by his chief officers was the line of the Euphrates, known as that which the Ten Thou- sand had pursued in an expedition that would have been sue- oessful but for the death of its commander. Along this line water would be plentiful ; forage and other supplies might be counted on to a certain extent ; and the advancing army, rest- ing on the river, could not be surrounded." Another, but one that does not appear to have been suggested till too late," was that which Alexander had taken against Darius;"* the line along the foot of the Mens Masius, by Edessa, and Nisibis, to Nineveh. Here too waters and suppUes would have been readily procurable, and by cUnging to the skirts of the hOls the Roman infantry would have sot the Parthian cavalry at gg THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xi. defiance. Between these two extreme courses to the right and to the left were numerous slightly divergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, all shorter than either of the two above- mentioned, and none offering any great advantage over the remainder. It is uncertain what choice the proconsul would have made, had the decision been left simply to his own judgment. Prob- ably the Romans had a most dim and indistinct conception of the geographical character of the Mesopotamian region, and were ignorant of its great difficulties. They remained also, it must be remembered, up to this time, absolutely unacquainted with the Parthian tactics and accustomed as they Avei-e to triumph over every enemy against whom they fought, it Avould scarcely occur to them that in an open field they could suffer defeat. They were ready, like Alexander, to encounter any number of Asiatics, and only asked to be led against the foe as quickly as possible. When, therefore, Abgarus, the Osrhoene prince, soon after Crassus had crossed the Euphrates, rode into his camp, and declared that the Parthians did not in- tend to make a stand, but were quitting Mesopotamia and fly- ing with their treasure to the remote regions of Hyrcania and Scythia, leaving only a rear guard under a couple of generals to cover the retreat,^ it is not surprising that the resolution was taken to give up the circuitous route of the Euphrates, and to march directly across Mesopotamia in the hope of crushing the covering detachment, and coming upon the fly- ing multitude encumbered with baggage, which would furnish a rich spoil to the victors. In after times it was said that C. Cassius Longinus and some other officers were opposed to this movement,^" and foresaw its danger; but it must be questioned whether the whole army did not readily obey its leader's order, and commence without any forebodings its march through Upper Mesopotamia. That region has not really the character which the apologists for Eoman disaster in later times gave to it. It is a region of swelling hills, and somewhat dry gravelly plains. It possesses several streams and rivers, besides numerous springs. ^^ At intervals of a few miles it was studded with cities and villages ; '^ nor did the desert really begin until the Khabour was crossed. The army of Crassus had traversed it throughout its whole extent during the summer of the pre- ceding year, and must have been well acquainted with both its advantages and drawbacks. But it is time that we should consider what preparations the t cfl. XI.] UlS ABVEUSABT, TITS PAUTlItAN SVUENAfi. SO Parthian monarch had made against the threatened attack. He had, as already stated, come to terms with his outlying vassals, the prince of Osrhoene, and the sheikh of the Scenite Arabs, and had engaged especially tlie services of the former against his assailant. He had furthur, on considering the various possibilities of the campaign, come to the conclusion that it would be best to divide his forces, and, while himself attacking Artavasd es inthe mountain fastnesses of his own country, to commit the task of meeting and coping with th( Romans to a general of approved talents.^' It was of th( greatest importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a junction with the Romans, and strengthening them in thaf arm in which they were especially deficient, the cavalry. Perhaps nothing short of an invasion of his country by the Parthian king in person would have prevented Artavasdes from detaching a portion of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And no doubt it is also true that Orodes had great confidence in his general, whom he may even have felt to be a better commander than himself. Sui-enas, as we must call him, since his name has not been preserved to us, '" was in all respects a person of the highest consideration. He was the second man in the kingdom for birth, wealth, and reputation. In courage and ability ho excelled all his countrymen ; and he had the physical advantages of commanding height and great personal beauty. When he went to battle, he was accompanied by a train of a thousand camels, which carried his baggage; and the concubines in attendance on him required for their con- veyance two hundred chariots. A thousand horseman clad in mail, and a still greater number of light-armed, formed hij bodyguard. At the coronation of a Parthian monarch, it was his hereditary right to place the diadem on the brow of the now sovereign. When Orodes was driven into banishment it was he who brought him back to Parthia in triumph. When Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assault first mounted the breach and, striking terror into the defenders, took the city. Though less than thirty years of age at the time when he was appointed commander, he was believed to possess, besides these various qualifications, consummate prudence and sagacity." The force which Orodes committed to his brave and skilful lieutenant consisted entirely of horse. This was not the ordi- nary character of a Parthian army, which often comprised four or five times as many infantry as cavalry. It was, per- haps, rather fortunate accident than profound calculation that ^0 fim StXflT MO^AncItY. [en. xi caused the sole employment against the Eomans of this arm.' The foot soldiers were needed for the rough warfare of the Armenian mountains; the horse would, it was known, act with fair effect in the comparatively open and level Mesopo- tamia. As the king wanted the footmen he took them, and left to his general the troops which were not required for his own operations. The Parthian horse, like the Persian,'^ was of two kinds, standing in strong contrast the one to the other. The bulk ol their cavalry was of the Mghtest and most agUe description. Fleet and active coursers, with scarcely any caparison but a headstall and a single rein, were mounted by riders clad only in a tunic and trousers, °* and armed with nothing but a strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in early boyhood made the rider almost one with his steed; and he could use his weapons with equal ease and effect whether his horse was stationary or at full gallop, and whether he was ad- vancing towards or hurriedly retreating from his enemy. '^ His supply of missUes was almost inexhaustible, for when he found his quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance and replenish his stock from magazines, borne on the backs of camels, in the rear.^^ It was his ordinary plan to keep con- stantly in motion when in the presence of an enemy, to gallop backwards and forwards, or round and round his square or column, never charging it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen and barbed shafts ;'' which were driven by a practised hand from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of this light cavalry enveloped the advancing or the retreating foe, and inflicted grievous damage without, for the most part, suffering anything in return. But this was not the whole. In addition to these light Troops, a Parthian army comprised always a body of heavy cavalry,"* armed on an entirely different system. The strong horses selected for this service were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, neck, chest, even their sides and flanks, were protected by scale-armor of brass or iron, sewn, probably, upon leather.'' Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the same materials, and helmets of burnished iron.'" For an offen- sive weapon they carried a long and strong spear or pike.'' They formed a serried line in battle, bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom they charged, and standing firm as an iron wall against the charges that were made upon them. A cavalry answering to this in some i-espects had been CH. XI.] ADVANCE OF CRASS US. 91 employed by the later Persian monarchs," and was in use also among the Armenians at this period ; but the Parthian pike was apparently more formidable than the corresponding weap- ons of those nations, and the Hght spear carried at this time by the cavalry of a Roman army was no match for it. The force entrusted to Surenas comprised troops of both these classes. No estimate is given us of their number, but it was probably considerable." At any rate it was sufficient to induce him to make a movement in advance — to cross the Sin jar range and the river Khabour, and take up his position in the country between that stream and the Belik — instead of merely seeking to cover the capital. The presence of the traitor Abgarus in the camp of Crassus was now of the utmost importance to the Parthian commander. Abgarus, fully trusted, and at the head of a body of hght horse, admirably adapted for outpost service, was allowed, upon his own re- quest, to scour the country in front of the advancing Romans, and had thus the means of communicating freely with the Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the move- ments and intensions of Crassus, " while at the same time he suggested to Crassus such a line of route as suited the views and designs of his adversary. Our chief authority for the de- tails of the expedition tells us^^ that he led the Roman troops through an arid and trackless desert, across plains without tree, or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed of a light shifting sand, which the wind raised into a succession of hillocks that resembled the waves of an interminable sea. The soldiers, he says, fainted with the -heat and with the drought, while the audacious Osrhoene scoffed at their com- plaints and reproaches, asking them whether they expected to find the border-tract between Arabia and Assyria a country of cool streams and shady groves, of baths, and hostelries, like their own deUcious Campania. But our knowledge of the geographical character of the region through which the march lay makes it impossible for us to accept this account as true.*" The country between the Euphrates and the Belik, as already observed, is one of alternate hill and plain, neither destitute of trees nor ill-provided with water. The march through it could have presented no great difficulties. All that Abgarus could do to serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus to ti'ust himself to the open countiy, without clinging either to a river or to the mountains, and, secondly, to bring him, after a hasty march, and in the full heat of the day, into the pres- 92 THE SIXTH MON^iRCHY. [ch. x^ ence of the enemy. Both these things he contrived to effect, and Surenas was, no doubt, so far beholden to him. But the notion that he enticed the Eoman army into a trackless desert, and gave it over, when it was perishing through weariness, hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its enraged enemy," is in contradiction with the topographical facts, and is not even maintained consistently by the classical writers.'' It was probably on the third or fourth day after he had quitted the Euphrates'" that Crassus found himself approach- ing his enemy. After a hasty and hot march^" he had ap- proached the banks of the Belik, when his scouts brought him word that they had fallen in with the Parthian army, which was advancing in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarus had recently quitted him on the plea of doing him some undefined service, but really to range himself on the side of his real friends, the Parthians." His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon the river, and defer an engagement till the morrow ; but he had no fears ; his son, Publius, who had lately joined him with a body of Gallic horse sent by Julius Csesar, was anxious for the fray ; and accordingly the Eoman commander gave the order to Ms troops to take some refreshment as they stood, and then to push forward rapidly. " Surenas, on his side, had taken up a position on wooded and hilly ground, which concealed his numbers,^' and had even, we are told, made his troops cover their arms with cloths and skins,"' that the glitter might not betray them. But, as the Romans drew near, all concealment was cast aside ; the signal for battle was given ; the clang of the kettledrums arose on every side; the squadrons came forward in their brilliant array, and it seemed at first as if the heavy cavalry was about to charge the Roman host,"'^ which was formed in a hollow square with the Ught-armed in the middle, and with supporters of horse along the whole line, as well as upon the flanks."^ But, if this intention was ever entertained, it was altoi'ed almost as soon as formed, and the better plan was adopted of halting at a convenient distance and assailing the legionaries with flight after flight of arrows, delivered without a pause and with extraordinary force. The Roman en- deavored to meet this attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers; but they were quite unable to cope with the numbers and the superior weapons of the enemy, who forced them almost immediately to retreat, and take refuge behind the line of the heavy-armed." These were then once more en. XI.] BATTLE OF THE BELIK. 93 exposed to the deadly missiles, which pierced alike through shield and breast-plate and greaves, and inflicted the most fearful wounds. More than once the legionaries dashed for- ward, and sought to close with their assailants, but in vain. The Parthian squadrons retired as the Eoman infantry ad- vanced, maintaining the distance which they thought best between themselves and their foe, whom they plied with their shafts as incessantly while they fell back as when they rode forward. For a while the Romans entertained the hope that the missiles woiild at last be all spent ;"" but when they found that each archer constantly obtained a fresh supply from the rear, this expectation deserted them. It became evident to Ci'assus that some new movement must be attempted ; and, as a last resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom the Parthians were threatening to outflank, to take such troops as he thought proper, and charge. The gallant youth was only too glad to receive the order. Selecting his Gallic cav- alry, who numbered 1000, and adding to them 500 other horse- men, 500 archers, and about 4000 legionaries, ^ " he advanced at speed against the nearest squadrons of the enemy. The Parthians pretended to be afraid, and beat a hasty retreat. Publius followed with all the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out of the sight of his friends, pressing the flying foe, whom he believed to be panic-stricken. But when they had drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a stand, brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, and com- pletely enveloped him and his detachment with their light- armed. Publius made a desperate resistance. His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with their hands and dragged the encmnbered horsemen to the ground ; or dismounting, slipped beneath the horses of their opponents, and stabbing thena in the belly, brought steed and rider down upon themselves. His legionaries occupied a slight hillock, and endeavored to make a wall of their shields, but the Parthian archers closed around them, and slew them almost to a man. Of the whole detachment, nearly six thousand strong, no more than 500 were taken prisoners,'" and scarcely one escaped. The young Crassus might, possibly, had he chosen to make the attempt, have forced his way through the enemy to Ichnae, a Greek town not far distant;"' but he preferred to share the fate of his men. Rather than i'all into the hands of the enemy, he caused his shield-bearer to dispatch him; and his example was followed by his principal officers. The victors struck off 94 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xi his head, and elevating it on a pike, returned to resume their attack on the main body of the Eoman army. The main body, much relieved by the diminution of the pres- sure upon them, had waited patiently for Publius to return in triumph, regarding the battle as well-nigh over and success as certain. After a time the prolonged absence of the young captain aroused suspicions, which grew into alarms when mes- sengers arrived telling of his extreme danger."^ Crassus, almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the word to ad- vance, and the army had moved forward a short distance, -when the shouts of the returning enemy were heard, and the head of the unfortunate officer was seen displayed aloft, whUe the Parthian squadrons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on their remaining foes with increased vigor. The mailed horsemen approached close to the legionaries and thrust at them with the long pikes, " while the light-armed, galloping across the Eoman front, discharged their unerring arrows over the heads of their own men. The Eomans coiild neither suc- cessfully defend themselves nor effectively retaliate. Still time brought some relief. Bowstrings broke, spears were blunted or sphntered, arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax ;" and when night closed in both parties were almost equally glad of the cessation of arms which the darkness ren- dered compulsory. It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Persians,'^ to bivouac at a considerable distance from an enemy. Accor- dingly, at nightfall they drew off, having first shouted to the Eomans that they would grant the general one night in whicj to bewail his son ; on the morrow they would come and tak him prisoner, unless he preferred the better course of surreb dering himself to the mercy of Arsaces. ^^ A short breathing space was thus allowed the Eomans, who took advantag&of it to retire towards Carrhae, leaving behind them the greater part of their wounded, to the number of 4, 000. A small body of horse reached Carrhae about midnight, and gave the commandant such information as led him to put his men under arms and issue forth to the succor of the proconsul. The Parthians, though the cries of the wounded made them well aware of the Eoman retreat, adhered to their system of avoiding night com- bats, and attempted no pursuit till morning. " Even then they allowed themselves to be delayed by comparatively trivial matters— the capture of the Eoman camp, the massacre of the wounded, and the slaughter of the numerous stragglers scattered Vol Ui.' --> Plate. VIA Plate VI I L Vol. Ill Fartliian bos-rcliet (after Flandin and Coste). CH. XI.] FLIGHT OF CRASS US FROM CARRII^^. 95 along the line of march — and made no haste to overtake the retreating army. The bulk of the troops were thus enabled to effect their retreat in safety to Carrhse, where, having the pro- tection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time secure. It might have been expected that the Romans would here have made a stand. The siege of a fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if we understand by siege anything more than a very incomplete blockade. And the Parthians were notori- ously inefficient against walls. ^^ There was a chance, moreover, that Artavasdes might have been more successful than his ally, and, having repulsed the Parthian monarch, might march his troops to the relief of the Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughly dispirited, and would not listen to these sugges- tions."" Provisions no doubt ran short, since, as there had been no expectation of a disaster, no preparations had been made for standing a siege. The Greek inhabitants of the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to a falling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near ; and the Parthian system of ab- staining from action during the night seemed to render escape tolerably easy. It was resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to the protection of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to endeavor by a rapid night march to reach the Armenian hiUs. The various officers seem to have been allowed to arrange mat- ters for themselves. Cassius took his way towards the Euphrates, and succeeded in escaping with 500 horse. Octa- vius, with a division which is estimated at 5,000 men, reached the outskirts of the the hills at a place called Sinnaca, " and found himself in comparative security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made but poor progress during the night ; he had, however, ar- rived within little more than a mile of Octavius before the enemy, who woidd not stir till daybreak, overtook him. Pressed upon by their advancing squandrons, he, with his small band of 2,000 legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied a low hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with the position of Sinnaca. Here the Parthian host beset him ; and he would infallibly have been slain or captured at once, liad not Octavius, deserting his place of safety, descended to the aid of his commander. The united 7,000 held their own against the enemy, having the advantage of the ground, and having perhaps by the experience of some days learnt the weak points of Parthian warfare. Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure the person of the Roman commander. In the East an excessive impor- Qg THE SIXTH MONARCHY. ~Z' [ch. XI. tance is attached to this proof of success ; and there were reasons which made Crassiis particularly obnoxious to his antagonists. He was believed to have originated, and not merely conducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of gold." He had re- fused with the utmost haughtiness all discussion of terms, and had insulted the majesty of the Parthians by the declaration that he would treat nowhere but at their capital. If he escaped, he would be bound at some future time to repeat his attempt; if he were made prisoner, his fate would be a terrible warning to others. But now, as evening approached, it seemed to the Parthian that the prize which he so much desired was about to elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia would be gained by the fugitives during the night, and further pursuit of them would be hopeless. It remained that he should effect by craft what he could no longer hope to gain by the employ- ment of force ; and to this point all his efforts were now di- rected. He drew off his troops and left the Romans without further molestation. He allowed some of his prisoners to es- cape and rejoin their friends, having first contrived that they should overhear a conversation among his men, of which the theme was the Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to come to terms with the Romans. He then, having allowed time for the report of his pacific intentions to spread, rode with a few chief s towards the Roman camp, carrying his bow unstrung and his right hand stretched out in token of amity. ' ' Let the Roman General," he said, " come forward with an equal num- ber of attendants, and confer with me in the open spaoe be- tween the armies on terms of peace." The aged proconsul was disinclined to trust these overtures; but his men clamored and threatened, upon which he yielded, and went down into the plain, accompanied by Octavius and a few others. Here he was received with apparent honor, and terms were arranged ; but Surenas required that they should at once be reduced to writing, "since," he said, with pointed allusion to the bad faith of Pompey, "you Romans are not very apt to remember your engagements." A movement being requisite for the drawing up of the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers were induced to mount upon horses furnished by the Parthians, who had no sooner seated the proconsul on his steed, than he proceeded to hurry him forward, with the evident intention of carrying him off to their camp." The Roman officers took the alarm and resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a Par thian and killed one of the grooms who was hurrying CrassuS m XI.] Causes of his failure. 97 away. A blow from behind stretched him on the ground life- less. A general melee followed, and in the confusion Crassus Was killed, whether by one of his own side and with his own consent, or by the hand of a Parthian is uncertain. " The army, learning the fate of their general, with but few exceptions, sur- rendered. Such as sought to escape under cover of the ap- proaching night were hunted down by the Bedouins who served under the Parthian standard, and killed almost to a man. Of the entire army which had crossed the Euphrates, consisting of above 40,000 men, not more than one fourth re- turned. One half of the whole number perished.'* Nearly 10,000 prisoners were settled by the victors in the fertile oasis of Margiana," near the northern frontier of the empire, where they intermarried with native wives,'" and became submissive Parthian subjects." Such was the result of this great expedition, the first at- tempt of the grasping and ambitious Romans, not so much to conquer Parthia, as to strike terror into the heart of her peo- ple, and to degi'ade them to the condition of obsequious de- pendants on the will and pleasure of the "world's lords."'* The expedition failed so utterly, not from any want of bravery on the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from any abso- lute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman tactics, but partly from the incompetence of the commander, partly from the inexperience of the Romans, up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian warfare and in the best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose main arm is the cavalry with a body of foot-soldiers, supported by an insignificant number of horse, must be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct such an attack on the more open part of the country, where cav- alry could operate freely, was wantonly to aggravate the peril. After the first disaster, to quit the protection of walls, when it had been obtained, was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus taken care to obtain the support of some of the desert tribes,'^ if Armenia could not help him, and had he then advanced either by the way of the Mons Masius and the Tigris, or along the line of the Euphrates, the issue of his attack might have been different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Septimius Sev- erus, and might have taken and plundered those cities. He would no doubt have experienced difficixlties in his retreat; but ho might have come off no worse than Trajan, whose Par- thian expedition has been generally regarded as rather aug' 98 THE STXTii MONARCHY. [ch. xi. menting than detracting from his reputation. But an ignorant and inexperienced commander, venturing on a trial of arms with an enemy of whom he knew Httle or nothing, in their own country, without support or allies, and then neglecting every precaution suggested by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by a pretended friend, and marching straight into a net prepared for him, naturally suffered defeat. The credit of the Roman arms does not greatly suffer by the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly enhanced. The latter showed, as they had shown in their wars against the Syro-Macedonians, that there somewhat loose and irregular array was capable of acting with effect against the solid masses and well-ordered movements of disciplined troops. They acquired by their use of the bow a fame like that which the English archers ob- tained for the employment of the same weapon at Crecy and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans to respect them, and to allow that there was at least one nation in the world which could meet them on equal terms and not be worsted in the encounter.^" They henceforth obtained recognition from Grseco-Roman writers — albeit a grudging and covert recogni- tion—as the second Power in the world, the admitted rival of Rome,"' the only real counterpoise upon the earth to the power which ruled from the Euphrates to the Atlantic Ocean. While the general of King Orodes was thus successful against the Romans in Mesopotamia, the king himself had in Armenia obtained advantages of almost equal value, though of a different kind. Instead of contending with Artavasdes, he had come to terms with him, and had concluded a close alhance, which he had sought to confirm and secure by unit- ing his son, Pacorus, in marriage with a sister of the Arme- nian monarch.*^ A series of festivities was being held to cele- brate this auspicious event, when news came of Surenas's triumph, and of the fate of Crassus. According to the barbar- ous customs of the East, the head and hand of the slain pro- consul accompanied the intelligence. We are told that at the moment of the messenger's arrival the two sovereigns, with their attendants, were amusing themselves with a dramatic entertainment. Both monarchs had a good knowledge of the Greek literature and language, in which Artavasdes had him- self composed historical works and tragedies. The actors were representing the famous scene in the " Bacchse" of Euripides,^' where Agave and the Bacchanals come upon the stage with the mutilated remains of the murdered Pentheus, when the CH. xi.j CUASSl/S'S HEAD CARRIED TO OROBES. 9^ liead of Crassus was thrown in among them. Instantly the player who personated Agave seized the bloody trophy, and placing it on his thyrsus instead of the one he was carrying, paraded it before the delighted spectators, while he chanted the weU- known lines:"* From the mountain to the hall New-cut tendril, see, we bring — Blessed prey I The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please an Eastern audience : it was followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity and still more thoroughly Oriental."^ The Parthians, in deris- ion of the motive which was supposed to have led Crassvis to make his attack, had a quantity of gold melted and poured it into his mouth.*® Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious troops, and seeking to annoy the disaffected Seleucians, by the perform- ance of a farcical ceremony. He spread the report that Cras- sus was not killed but captured ; and, selecting from among the prisoners the Roman most like him in appearance, he dressed the man in woman's clothes, mounted him upon a horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of "Crassus" and "Im- pcrator," conducted him in triumph to the Grecian city. Be- fore him went, mounted on camels, a band, arrayed as trum- peters and lictors, the lictors' rods having purses suspended to them, and the axes in their midst being crowned with the bleeding heads of Romans. In the rear foUowed a train of Seleucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of the effemi- nacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After this pretended parade of his prisoner through the streets of the town, Surenas called a meeting of the Seleucian senate, and indignantly de- nounced to them the indecency of the literature which he had found in the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true ;"' but the Seleucians were not greatly impressed by the moral lesson read to them, when they remarked the train of concu- bines that had accompanied Surenas himself in the field, and thought of the loose crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes, that was commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army. The political consequences of the great triumph which the Parthians had achieved were less than might have been anti- cipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered to its extrena- est hmit, the Euphrates; Armenia was lost to the Roman alliance, and tlirown for the time into complete dependence ^00 I^HE SIXTH MONAncHt. [cH. xt upon Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited-, and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently aggrieved by the unprovoked spoiliation of their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms.*" But no general movement of the Oriental races took place. It might have been expected that the Syrians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising against their Western lords and driving the Eomans back upon Europe. It might have been thought that Parthia at least would have assumed the offensive in force, and have made a determined effoi't to rid herseK of neighbors who had proved so troublesome. But though the conjuncture of circumstances was most favorable, the man was wanting. Had Mithridates or Tigi-anes been Hving, or had Surenas been king of Parthia, instead of a mere general, advantage would probably have been taken of the occasion, and Eome might have suffered seriously. But Orodes seems to have been neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful as a commander ; he lacked at any rate the keen and all-embracing glance which could sweep the poUtical horizon and, comprehending the exact character of the situation, see at the same time how to make the most of it. He allowed the opportunity to shp by without putting forth his strength or making any considerable effort; and the occa- sion once lost never returned. In Parthia itself one immediate result of the expedition seems to have been the ruin of Surenas. His services to his sovereign had exceeded the measure which it is safe in the East for a subject to render to the crown. The jealousy of his royal master was aroused, and he had to pay the penalty of over-much success with liis life.«' Parthia was thus left with- out a general of approved merit, for SiUaces, the second in command during the war with Crassus,'" had in no way dis- tinguished himself through the campaign. This condition of things may account for the feebleness of the efforts made in B.C. 52 to retaliate on the Romans the damage done by their invasion. A few weak bands only passed the Euphrates, and began the work of plunder and ravage, in which they were speedUy disturbed by Cassius, who easOy drove them back over the river." The next year, however, a more determined attempt was made. Orodes sent his son, Pacorus, the young bridegroom, to win his spurs in Syria, at the head of a consid- erable force, and supported by the experience and authority of CH. xi.j lNVASI02f OF STRIA AND CILICIA. lOl an oflScer of ripe age, named Osaces."' The army crossed the Euphrates unresisted, for Cassius, the governor, had with him only the broken remains of Crassus's army, consisting of about two legions, and, deeming himself too weak to meet the enemy in the open field, was content to defend the towns. The open country was consequently overrun; and a thrill of mingled alarm and excitement passed through all the Roman provinces in Asia."^ The pi-ovinces were at the time most in- adequately supplied with Roman troops,"* through the desire of Caesar and Pompey to maintain large armies about their own persons. The natives were for the most part disaffected and inclined to hail the Parthians as brethren and deliverers."'' Excepting Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of Cappa- docia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) plain- tively declared, "° not a friend on the Asiatic continent. And Cappadocia was miserably weak,"' and open to attack on the side of Armenia. Had Orodes and Artavasdes acted in con- cert, and had the latter, while Orodes sent his armies into Syria, poured the Armenian forces into Cappadocia and then into Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do),"** there would have been the greatest danger to the Roman possessions. As it was, the excitement in Asia Minor Avas extreme. Cicero marched into Cappadocia with the bulk of the Roman troops, and summoned to his aid Deiotarus with his Galatians,"" at the same time writing to the Roman Senate to implore reinforce- ments.'"" Cassius shut himself up in Antioch, "" and allowed the Parthian cavalry to pass liim by, and even to proceed be- yond the bounds of Syria into Cilicia. '"'^ But the Parthians seem scarcely to have understood the situation of their adver- saries, or to have been aware of their own advantages. In- stead of spi'eading themselves wide, raising the natives, and leaving them to blockade the towns, while with their as yet unconquered squandrons they defied the enemy in the open coimtry, we find them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities, for which they were wholly unfit, and confining them- selves almost entirely to the narrow valley of the Orontes. '"' Under these circumstances we are not surprised to learn that Cassius, having first beat them back from Antioch,* * contrived to lead them into an ambush on the banks of the river, and se- verely handled their troops, even killing the general Osaces.'"" The Parthians withdrew from the neighborhood of the Syrian capita-1 after this defeat, which must have taken place about the end of September, and soon afterwards went into winter i02 THE SIXTH MONARCH t. [m. Xtt. quartere in Cyrrhestica, ""^ or the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. Here they remained during the winter months under Paconis, and it was expected that the war would breakout again with fresh fury in the spring;'"' but Bibulus, the new proconsul of Syria, conscious of his military deficien- cies, contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians them- selves, and to turn the thoughts of Pacorus in another direc- tion. He suggested to Ornodapantes, a Parthian noble, with whom he had managed to ojien a correspondence, that Pacorus would be a more worthy occupant of the Parthian throne than his father, and that he would consult well for his own interests if he were to proclaim the young prince, and lead the army of Syria against Orodes.^"* These intrigues seem to have first caused the war to languish, and then produced the recall of the expedition. Orodes summoned Pacorus to return to Parthia before the plot contrived between him and the Romans was ripe for execution ; and Pacorus felt that no course was open to him but to obey.'"^ The Parthian legions recrossed the Eu- phrates in July, B.C. 50; and the First Roman War, which had lasted a little more than four years, terminated without any real recovery by the Romans of the laurels that they had lost at Carrhae. CHAPTER XII. Relations of Orodes ivith Pompey, and ivith Brutus and Cassius. Second War icith Rome. Great Partliian Ex- pedition against Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor. De- feat of Saxa. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem. Parthians driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death oj Pacorus. Death of Orodes. ' Jam bis Monseses et Pacori manus Non auspicates contudit impetus Nostros, et adjecisse prasdam Torquibus exiguis renldet."— Hor. Od. iii. 6, 10-13. The civil troubles that had seemed to threaten Parthia from the ambition of the youthful Pacorus passed away without any explosion. The son showed his obedience by returning home submissively when he miglit have flown to arms; and the father accepted the act of obedience as a sufficient indica- CH. xn.] RELATIONS OF ORODES WITH POMPEf. lO:"} tion that no rebellion had been seriously meant. We find Pacorus not only allowed to live, but again entrusted a few years later with high office by the Parthian monarch;' and on this occasion we find him showing no signs of disaffection or discontent. Nine years, however, elapsed between the recall of the young prince and his reappointment to the supreme com- mand against the Romans. Of the internal condition of Parthia during this interval we have no account. Appar- ently, Orodes ruled quietly and peaceably, contenting him- self with the glory which he had gained, and not anxious to tempt fortune by engaging in any fresh enterprise. It was no doubt a satisfaction to him to see the arms of the Romans, instead of being directed upon Asia, employed in intestine strife; and we can well understand that he might even deem it for his interest to foment and encourage the quarrels which, at any rate for the time, secured his own empire from attack. It appears that communications took place in the year B.C. 49 or 48 between him and Pompey, a request for alliance being made by the latter, and an answer being sent by Orodes, con- taining the terms upon which he would consent to give Pom- pey effective aid in the war.^ If the Roman leader would deliver into his hands the province of Syria and make it wholly over to the Parthians, Orodes would conclude an alliance with him and send help ; but not otherwise. It is to the credit of Pompey that he rejected these terms, and declined to secure his own private gain by depriving his country of a province. Notwithstanding the failure of these negotiations and the im- prisonment of his envoy Hirrus,^ when a few months later, having lost the battle of Pharsalia, the unhappy Roman was in need of a refuge from his great enemy, he is said to have proposed throwing himself on the friendship, or mercy, of Orodes.^ He had hopes, perhaps, of enlisting the Parthian battalions in his cause, and of recovering power by means of this foreign aid. But his friends combated his design, and persuaded him that the risk, both to himself and to his wife, Cornelia, was too great to be compatible with prudence. Pompey yielded to their representations ; and Orodes escaped the difficulty of having to elect between repulsing a suppliant, and provoking the hostility of the most powerful chieftain and the greatest general of the age. Caesar quitted the East in B. c. 47 without entering into any communication with Orodes. He had plenty of work upon 104 ^^^^ SIXTS MONARCSt. [ctt. im. his hands; and whatever designs he may have even then entertained of punishing the Parthian inroad into Syria, or avenging the defeat of Carrhse/ he was wise enough to keep his projects to liimself and to leave Asia without ex- asperating by threats or hostile movements the Power on which the peace of the East principally depended. It was not until he had brought the African and Spanish wars to an end that he allowed his intention of leading an expedition against Parthia to be openly talked about. In B.C. 34, four years after Pharsalia, having put down aU his domestic enemies, and arranged matters, as he thought, satisfactorily at Rome, he let a decree be passed formally assigning to him ' ' the Par- thian War,'"' and sent the legions across the Adriatic on their way to Asia. What plan of campaign he may have contem- plated is uncertain;' but there cannot be a doubt that an ex- pedition under his auspices would have been a most serious danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her sub- jection. The mihtary talents of the Great Dictator were of the most splendid description ; his powers of organization and consohdation enormous; his prudence and caution equal to his ambition and his courage. Once launched on a career of conquest in the East, it is impossible to say whither he might not have carried the Roman eagles, or what countries he might not have added to the Empii-e. But Parthia was saved from the imminent peril without any effort of her own. The daggers of "the Liberators " struck down on the 15th of March, B.C. 44, the only man whom she had seriously to fear ; and with the removal of Julius passed away even from Roman thought for many a year' the design which he had entertained, and which he alone could have accomplished. In the civil war that followed on the murder of Julius the Parthians are declared to have actually taken a part. It ap- pears that— about B.C. 46— a small body of Parthian horse- archers had been sent to the assistance of a certain Bassus,' a Roman who amid the trovibles of the times was seeking to obtain for himself something like an independent principality in Syria. The soldiers of Bassus, after a while (b.c. 43), went over in a body to Cassius, who was in the East collecting troops for his great struggle with Antony and Octavian ; and thus a handful of Parthians came into his power.'" Of this circumstance he determmed to take advantage, in order to obtain, if possible, a considerable body of troops from Orodes. He presented each of the Parthian soldiers with a sum of CH. XII.] SECOND PARTHIAN ATTACK ON ROME. 105 money, and dismissed them all to their homes, at the same time seizing the opportunity to send some of his own officers, as ambassadors, to Orodes, with a request for substantial aid.'' On receiving this application the Parthian monarch appears to have come to the conclusion that it was to his interest to comply with it. Whether he made conditions, or no, is un- certain; but he seems to have sent a pretty numerous body of horse to the support of the "Liberators" against their an- tagonists. '^ Perhaps he trusted to obtain from the gi-atitude of Cassius what he had failed to extort from the fears of Pompey. Or, perhaps, he was only anxious to prolong the period of civil disturbance in the Roman State, which secured his own territory from attack, and might ultimately give liim an opportimity of helping himself to some portion of the Eoman dominions in Asia. The opportunity seemed to him to have arrived in B.C. 40. Philippi had been fought and lost. The "Liberators" were crushed. The struggle between the Republicans and the Mon- archists had come to an end. But, instead of being united, the Roman world was more than ever divided ; and the chance of making an actual territorial gain at the expense of the tiyant power appeared fairer than it had ever been before. Three rivals now held divided sway in the Roman State;'' each of them jealous of the other two, and anxious for his own ag- grandizement. The two chief pretenders to the first place were bitterly hostile ; and while the one was detained in Italy by insurrection against his authority, the other was plunged in luxury and dissipation, enjoying the first delights of a lawless passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the East were, moreover, alienated by the recent exactions of the profligate Triumvir, '^ who, to reward his parasites and favor- ites, had laid upon them a burden that they were scarcely able to bear. Further, the Parthians enjoyed at this time the advantage of having a Roman officer of good position in their service,"' whose knowledge of the Roman tactics, and influence in Roman provinces, might be expected to turn to their ad- vantage. Under these circumstances, when the spring of the year arrived, Antony being still in Egypt, and Octavian (as far as was known) occupied in the siege of Perusia,'" the Parthian hordes, under Labienus and Pacorus, burst upon Syria in greater force than on any previous occasion. Over- running with their numerous cavalry the country betAveen the Euphrates and Antioch, and thence the valley of tli^j IQQ THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xn Orontes, they had (as usual) some difficulty with the towns. From Apamsea, placed (like Durham) on a rocky peninsula almost surrotmded by the river/' they were at first repulsed;'' but, having shortly afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa, the governor of Syria, in the open field, they received the sub- mission of Apamaea and Antioch, which latter city Saxa aban- doned at their approach, flying precipitately into Cilicia." Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and Pacorus agreed to divide their troops, and to engage simultaneously in two great expeditions. Pacorus undertook to carry the Parthian standard throughout the entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, while Labienus determined to invade Asia Minor, and to see if he could not wrest some of its more fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditions were crowned with suc- cess. Pacorus reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia, except the single city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want of a naval force. ■'° He then advanced into Palestine, which he found in its normal condition of intestine commotion.'^' Hyr- canus and Antigonus, two princes of the Asmoua^'an house, were rivals for the Jewish crown ; and the latter, whom Hyr- canus had expelled, was content to make common cause with the invader, and to be indebted to a rude foreigner for the possession of the kingdom whoreto he aspired. He offered Pacorus a thousand talents, and five hundred Jetvish women, if he would espouse his cause and seat him upon his uncle's throne.^- The offer was readily embraced, and by the irresti- ble help of the Parthians a revolution was effected at Jerusa- lem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. A new priest- king was set up in the person of Antigonus, the last Asmo- nsean prince, who held the capital for three years — B.C. 40-37 — as a Parthian satrap, the creature and dependant of the great monarchy on the further side of the Euphrates. Mean- while in Asia Minor Labienus carried all before him. Deci- dius Saxa, having once more (in Cilicia) ventured upon a battle, was not only defeated, but slain." Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria were overrun. Stratonicea was besieged; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken. ^* According to some writers the Parthians even pillaged Lydia and Ionia, and were in possess- ion of Asia to the shores of the Hellespont.^' It may be said that for a full year Western Asia changed masters ; the rule and authority of Rome disappeared ; and the Parthians were recognized as the dominant power. But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the autumn CH. XII.] VICTORIES OF VENTIDIUS. 107 of B.C. 39 Antony, having set out from Italy to resume his command in the East, despatched his lieutenant, Publius Ventidius, into Asia, with orders to act against Labienus and the triumphant Parthians.'" Ventidius landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia Minor, and so alarmed Labienus, who had no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell back hur- riedly towards Cilicia, evacuating all the more western pro- vinces, and at the same time sending urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succor. Pacorus sent a body of horse to his aid ; but these troops, instead of putting themselves under his command, acted independently, and, in a rash attempt to sur prise the Roman camp, were defeated by Ventidius, whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, leaving Labienus to his fate."' The self-styled " Imperator, " '^'' upon this, deserted his men, and sought safety in flight ; but his retreat was soon discov- ered, and he was pursued, captured, and put to death. '''' The Parthians, meanwhile, alarmed at the turn which affairs had taken, left Antigonus to maintain their interests in Pales- tine, and concentrated themselves in Northern Syria and Commagene, where they awaited the advance of the Romans. A strong detachment, under Pharnapates, was appointed to guard the Syrian Gates, or narrow pass over Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria. ^° Here Ventidius gained ano- ther victory. He had sent forward an officer named Pompse- dius Silo with some cavalry to endeavor to seize this post, and Pompaedius had found himself compelled to an engagement with Pharnapates, in which he was on the point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, who had probably feared for his subordinate's safety, appeared on the scene, and turned the scale in favor of the Romans. The detachment under Pharna- I)ates was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was among the slain.-" When news of this defeat reached Pacorus, he re- solved to retreat, and withdrew his troops across the Euphrates. This movement he appears to have executed with- out being molested by Ventidius, who thus recovered Syria to the Romans towards the close of B.C. 39, or early in B.C. 38. But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish the con- test. He had made himself popular among the Syi'ians by his mild and just administration,-'' and knew that they preferred his government to that of the Romans. He had many allies among the petty princes and dynasts," who occupied a semi- independent position on the borders of the Parthian and Roman empires. Antigonus, whom he had established as king of the 508 THE SIXTH MONARCnr. [ch. xit. Jews, still maintained himself in Judaea against the efforts of Herod, " to whom Augustus and Antony had assigned the throne. Pacorus therefore arranged during the remainder of the win- ter for a fresh invasion of Syria in the spring, and, taking the field earher than his adversary expected, made ready to recross the Euphrates. We are told that if he had crossed at the usual point, he would have found the Eomans unprepared, the legions heing still in their winter quarters, some north and some south of the range of Taurus.'^ Ventidius, however, contrived by a stratagem to induce him to effect the passage at a different point, considerably lower down the stream, and in this way to waste some valuable time, which he himself em- ployed in collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when the Par- thians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, the Roman general was prepared to engage them, and was not even loath to decide the fate of the war by a single battle. He had taken care to provide himself with a strong force of slingers, and had entrenched himself in a position on high ground at some dis- tance from the river. ^^ The Parthians, finding their passage of the Euphrates unopposed, and, when they fell in with the enemy, seeing him entrenched, as though resolved to' act only on the defensive, became overbold ; they thought the force op- posed to them must be weak or cowardly, and might yield its position without a blow, if briskly attacked. Accordingly, as on a former occasion," they charged up the hill on which the Roman camp was placed, hoping to take it by sheer audacity. But the troops inside were held ready, and at the proper mo- ment issued forth; the assailants found themselves in their turn assailed, and, fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were soon driven down the declivity. The battle was renewed in plain below, where the mailed horse of the Parthians made a brave resistance; but the slingers galled them severely, and in the midst of the struggle it happened that by ill-fortune Pacorus was slain. The result followed which is almost in- variable with an Oriental army : having lost their leader, the soldiers every where gave way ; flight became universal, and the Romans gained a complete victory. '« The Parthian army fled in two directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by which it hod crossed the Euphrates, but was intercepted by the Romans and destroyed. Part turned northwards into Com- magene, and there took refuge with the king, Antiochus, who refused to surrender them to the demand of Ventidius, and no doubt allowed them to return to their own coimtry. Cfl. xil] ROMANS AND PABTHIANS COMPARED. IQQ Thus ended the great Parthian invasion of Syria, and with it ended the prospect of any further spread of the Arsacid do- minion towards the west. When the two great powers, Rome and Parthia, first came into collision — when the first blow struck by the latter, the destruction of the army of Crassus, was followed up by the advance of their clouds of horse into Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor — when Apameea, Antioch, and Jerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius Saxa was defeated and slain, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Caria, Lydia, and Ionia occupied — it seemed as if Rome had found, not so much an equal as a superior ; it looked as if the power heretofore pre- dominant would be compelled to contract her frontier, and as if Parthia would advance hers to the Egean or the Mediterra- nean. The history of the contest between the East and the West, between Asia and Europe, is a history of reactions. At one time one of the continents, at another time the other, is in the ascendant. The time appeared to have come when the Asiatics were once more to recover their own, and to beat back the European aggressor to his proper shores and islands. The triumphs achieved by the Seljukian Turks between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries would in that case have been anticipated by above a thousand years through the efforts of a kindred, and not dissimilar people. '^ But it turned out that the effort made was premature. While the Parthian war- fare was admirably adapted for the national defence on the broad plains of inner Asia, it was ill suited for conquest, and, comparatively speaking, ineffective in more contracted and difiicult regions. The Parthian military system had not the elasticity of the Roman — it did not in the same way adapt it- self to circvimstances, or admit of the addition of new arms, or the indefinite expansion of an old one. However loose and seemingly flexible, it was rigid in its uniformity ; it never al- tered ; it remained under the thirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under the first, improved in details, perhaps, but essen- tially the same system. The Romans, on the contrary, were ever modifying their system, ever learning new combinations or new manoeuvres or new modes of warfare from their enemies. They met the Parthian tactics of loose array, continuous dis- tant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of cavalry, with an increase in the number of their own horse, a larger employ- ment of auxiliary irregulars, and a gi'eater use of the sUng. "' At the same time they learnt to takefull advantage of the Parthian inefficiency against Avails, and to practice against them the arts of pretended retreat and ambush. The result was. that 110 TEE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xil Parthia found she could make no impression upon the domin- ions of Rome, and, having become persuaded of this by the experience of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever the idea of attempting Western conquests. She took up, in fact, from this time, a new attitude. Hitherto she had been consistently aggressive. She had labored constantly to extend herself at the expense successively of the Bactrians, the Scy= thians, the Syro-Macedonians, and the Armenians. She had proceeded from one aggression to another, leaving only short intervals between her wars, and had always been looking out for some fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, comparatively speaking, pacific. She was content for the most part, to main- tain her limits. She sought no new foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated into a struggle for influence over the king- dom of Armenia : and her hopes were limited to the reduction of that kingdom into a subject position. The death of Pacorus is said to have caused Orodes intense grief." For many days he would neither eat nor speak; then his sorrow took another turn. He imagined that his son had returned ; he thought continually that he heard or saw him ; he could do nothing but repeat his name. Every now and then, however, he awoke to a sense of the actual fact, and mourned the death of his favorite with tears. After a while this ex- treme grief wore itself out, and the aged king began to direct his attention once more to public affairs. He grew anxious about the succession."^ Of the thirty sons who still remained to him there was not one who had made himself a name, or was in any way distinguished above the remainder. In the absence of any personal ground of preference, Orodes — who seems to have regarded himself as possessing a right to nominate the son who should succeed him— thought the claims of primogeniture deserved to be considered, and selected as his successor, Phraa- tes, the eldest of the thirty." Not content with nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether the nomination would be ac- cepted by the Megistanes, he proceeded further to abdicate in his favor, whereupon Phraates became king. The transaction proved a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of his brothers, who were the sons of a princess married to Orodes,'* whereas his own mother was only a concubine, removed them by assassination, and when the ex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the act added the crime of parricide to fratri- cide by putting to death his aged father."' Thus perished Orodos. after a reign of eighteen years— the most memorable in the Parthian annals. CH. xiii] REIGN OF PHRAATES IV. HI CHAPTER Xin. Reign of Phraates IV. His cruelties. Flight of Monceses to Antony. Antonyms great Parthian Expedition, or Invasion of Media Atropatene. Its Comjjlete Failure. Subsequent Alliance of the Median King ivith Antony. War between Parthia and Media. Rebellion raised against Phraates by Tiridates. Phraates expelled. He recovers his Throne with the help of the Scythians. His dealings with Augus- tus. His death and Character. " Redditum Cyri solio Phraatem Dissidens plebi numero beatorum Eximit Virtus."— Hor. Od. ii. 2. 16-18. The shedding of blood is like "the letting out of water." When it once begins, none can say where it will stop. The ab- solute monarch who, for his own fancied security, commences a system of executions, is led on step by step to wholesale atro- cities from which he would have shrunk with horror at the outset. Phraates had removed brothers whose superior advan- tages of birth made them formidable rivals. He had punished with death a father who ventured to blame his act, and to for- get that by abdication he had sunk himself to the position of a subject. Could he have stopped here, it might have seemed that his severities proceeded not so much from cruelty of dis- position as from political necessity; and historians, always tender in the judgments which they pass on kings under such circumstances, would probably have condoned or justified his conduct. But the taste for bloodshed grows with the indul- gence of it. In a short time the young king had killed all his remaining brothers, ' although their birth was no better than his own, and there was no valid ground for his fearing them ; and soon afterwards, not content with the murder of his own relations, he began to vent his fury upon the Parthian nobles. Many of these suffered death;- and such a panic seized the order that numbers quitted the country, and dispersed in dif- ferent directions, content to remain in exile until the danger which threatened them should have passed by. There were others, however, who were not so patient. A body of chiefs had fled to Antony, among whom was a certain Monseses, a 119 TllM SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xnt nobleman of the highest rank,' who seems to have distinguished himself previously in the Syrian wars." This person repre- sented to Antony that Phraates had by his tyrannical and bloody conduct made himself hateful to his subjects, and that a revolution could easily be effected. If the Romans would support him, he offered to invade Parthia; and he made no doubt of wresting the greater portion of it from the hands of the tyrant, and of being himself accepted as king. In that case he would consent to hold his crown of the Romans, who might depend upon his fidelity and gratitude. Antony is said to have listened to these overtures, and to have been induced by them to turn his thoughts to an invasion of the Parthian king- dom.' He began to collect troops and to obtain allies with this object. He entered into negotiations with Artavasdes, the Ar- menian king, " who seems at this time to have been more afraid of Rome than of Parthia, and engaged him to take a part in his projected campaign. He spoke of employing Monseses in a separate expedition. Under these circumstances Phraates be- came alarmed. He sent a message to Monaeses with promises of pardon and favor, which that chief thought worthy of ac- ceptance. Hereupon Monaeses represented to Antony that by a peaceful return he might perhaps do him as much service as by having recourse to arms ; and though Antony was not per- suaded, he thought it prudent to profess himself weU satisfied, and to allow Monaeses to quit liim. His relations with Parthia, he said, might perhaps be placed on a proper footing without a war, and he was quite willing to try negotiation. His ambas- sadors should accompany Monaeses. They would be instructed to demand nothing of Phraates but the restoration of the Roman standards taken from Crassus, and the liberation of such of the captive soldiers as were still living.'' But Antony had really determined on war. It may be doubted whether it had required the overtures of Monaeses to put a Parthian expedition into his thoughts. He must have been either more or less than a man if the successes of his lieutenants had not stirred in his mind some feeling of jealousy, and some desire to throw their victories into the shade by a grand and noble achievement. Especially the glory of Venti- dius, who had been allowed the much-coveted honor of a triumph at Rome on account of his defeats of the Parthians in Cilicia and Syria,^ must have moved him to emulation, and have caused him to cast about for some means of exalting his own military reputation above that of his subordinates. For CH. xm.] PARTHIAN EXPEDITION OE ANTONY. 113 this purpose nothing, he must have known, would be so ef- fectual as a real Parthian success, the inflicting on this hated and dreaded foe of an unmistakable humiliation, the dictating to them terms of peace on their own soil after some crushing and overwhelming disaster. And, after the victories of Venti- dius, this did not appear to be so very diflBcult. The prestige of the Parthian name was gone. Eoman soldiers could be trusted to meet them without alarm, and to contend with them without undue excitement or flurry. The weakness, as well as the strength, of their military system had come to be known ; and expedients had been devised by which its strong points were met and counterbalanced.'' At the head of six- teen legions, '" Antony might well think that he could invade Parthia successfully, and not only avoid the fate of Crassus, but gather laurels which might serve him in good stead in hia contest with his great political rival. Nor can the Roman general be taxed with undue precipita- tion or with attacking in insufiicient force. He had begun, as already noticed, with securing the co-operation of the Arme- nian king, Artavasdes, who promised him a contingent of 7000 foot and 6000 horse. His Roman infantry is estimated at 60,000; besides which he had 10,000 Gallic and Iberian horse, and 30,000 light armed and cavalry of the Asiatic allies." His own army thus amounted to 100,000 men; and, with the Armenian contingent, his entire force would have been 113,000. It seems that it was his original intention to cross the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and thus to advance almost in the footsteps of Crassus:'- but when he reached the banks of the river (about midsummer B.C. 37) he found such prepara- tions made to resist him that he abandoned his first design, and, turning northwards, entered Armenia, determined to take advantage of his alliance with Artavasdes, and to attack Parthia with Armenia as the basis of his operations. Arta- vasdes gladly received him, and persuaded him, instead of penetrating into Parthia itself, to direct his arms against the territory of a Parthian subject-ally,'' the king of Media Atro- patene, whose territories adjoined Armenia on the southeast. Artavasdes pointed out that the Median monarch was absent from his own country, having joined his troops to those which Phraates had collected for the defence of Parthia. His terri- tory therefore would be open to ravage, and even Praaspa, hia capital, might prove an easy prey. The prospect excited An- tony, who at once divided his troops, and ha\'ing given orders ;II4 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xin. to Oppiiis Statianus to follow him leisurely with the more un- wieldy part of the army, the baggage-train, and the siege batteries, proceeded himself by forced marches to Praaspa with all the calvary and the infantry of the better class.** This town was situated at the distance of nearly three hun- dred miles from the Armenian frontier;'^ but the way to it lay through well-cultivated plains, where food and water were abundant. Antony performed the march without diffi- culty and at once invested the place. The walls were strong, and the defenders numerous, so that he made little impression; and when the Median king returned, accom- panied by his Parthian suzerain, to the defence of his coun- try, the capital seemed in so little danger that it was re- solved to direct the first attack on Statianus, who had not yet joined his chief. A most successful onslaught was made on this officer, who was surprised, defeated, and slain. '° Ten thousand Romans fell in the battle," and all the baggage- wagons and engines of war were taken. A still worse result of the defeat was the desertion of Artavasdes, who, regarding the case of the Romans as desperate, drew off his troops, and left Antony to his own resources. '' The Roman general now found himself in great difficulties. He had exhausted the immediate neighborhood of Praaspa, and was obliged to send his foraging-parties on distant expedi- tions, where, being beyond the reach of his protection, they were attacked and cut to pieces by the enemy. '" He had lost his siege-train, and found it impossible to construct another. Such works as he attempted suffered through the sallies of the besieged ; and in some of these his soldiers behaved so ill that he was forced to punish their cowardice by decimation.^" His supplies failed, and he had to feed his troops on barley instead of wheat. Meantime the autumnal equinox was approaching, and the weather was becoming cold. The Medes and Par- tihians, under their respective monarchs, hung about him, im- peded his movements, and cut off his stragglers, but carefully avoided engaging him in a pitched battle. If he could have forced the city to a surrender, he would have been in compara- tive safety, for he might have gone into winter quarters there and have renewed the war in the ensuing spring. But all his assaults, with whatever desperation they were made, failed; and it became necessary to relinquish the siege and retire into Armenia before the rigors of winter should set in. He could, however, with difficulty bring himself to make a confession of CH. xiil] ANTONY IS FOHCED TO liBTlRE. 115 failure, and flattered himself for a while that the Parthians would consent to purchase his retirement by the surrender of the Crassian captives and standards. Having lost some valu- able time in negotiations, at which the Parthians laughed,^' at length, when the equinox was passed, he broke up from before Praaspa, and commenced the work of retreat. There were two roads" by which he might reach the Araxes at the usual point of passage, One lay towards the left, throvigh a plain and open country,'^ probably that through which he had come ; the other, which was shorter, but more diflBcult, lay to the right, leading across a mountain-tract, but one fairly sup- plied with water, and in which there were inhabited villages. Antony was advised that the Parthians had occupied the easier route, ^* expecting that he would follow it, and intended to overwhelm him with their cavalry in the plains. He there- fore took the road to the right through a rugged and inclement country— probably that between Tahkt-i-Suleiman and Tabriz" —and, guided by a Mardian who knew the region weU, pro- ceeded to make his way back to the Araxes. His decision took the Parthians by surprise, and for two days he was un- molested. But by the third day they had thrown themselves across his path ; and thenceforward, for nineteen consecutive days, they disputed with Antony every inch of his retreat, and inflicted on him the most serious damage. The sufl:ei'ings of the Roman army during this time, says a modern historian of Rome,^* were unparalleled in their military annals. The intense cold, the blinding snow and driving sleet, the want sometimes of provisions, sometimes of water, the use of poison- ous herbs, and the harassing attacks of the enemy's cavalry and bowmen, which could only be repelled by maintaining the dense array of the phalanx or the tortoise, reduced the retreat- ing army by one-third of its numbers. At length, after a march of 300 Roman, or 277 British, miles, they reached the river Araxes, probably at the Julfa ferry, and, crossing it, found themselves in Armenia. But the calamities of the return were not yet ended. Though it was arranged with Artavasdes that the bulk of the army should winter in Armenia," yet, before the various detachments could reach their quarters in difi'erent parts of the country, eight thousand more had perished through the effects of past sufferings or the severity of the weather.^* Altogether, out of the hundred thousand men whom Antony led into Media Atropatene, less than seventy thousand''' remained to commence the campaign 21(5 THE SIXTH MONABCnr. [ch xni which was threatened for the ensuing year. Well may the unfortunate commander have exclaimed as he compared his own heavy losses with the light ones of Xenophon and his Greeks in these same regions, "Oh, those Ten Thousand! those Ten Thousand !" =" On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia a quarrel broke out between Phraates and his Median vassal. The latter re- garded himself as wronged in the division made of the Eoman spoils,^' and expressed himself with so much freedom on the subject as to offend his suzerain. He then began to fear that he had gone too far, and that Phraates would punish him by depriving him of his sovereignty. Accordingly, he was anxious to obtain a powerful alliance, and on turning over in his mind all feasible pohtical combinations it seems to have occurred to him that his late enemy, Antony, might be disposed to take him under his protection. He doubtless knew that Artavasdes of Armenia had offended the Roman leader by deserting him in the hour of his greatest peril, and felt that, if Antony was intending to revenge himself on the traitor, he would be glad to have a friend on the Armenian border. He therefore sent an ambassador of rank^- to Alexandria, where Antony was passing the winter, and boldly proposed the alhance. Antony readily accepted it ; he was intensely angered by the conduct of the Armenian monarch, and determined on punishing his defection ; he viewed the Median alliance as of the utmost im- portance in connection with the design, which he still enter- tained, of invading Parthia itself;'^ and he saw in the powerful descendant of Atropates a prince whom it would be well worth his while to bind to his cause indissolubly. He therefore em- braced the overtures made to him with joy, and even rewarded the messenger who had brought them with a principality.'* After sundry efforts to entice Artavasdes into his power, which occupied him dtiring most of B.C. 35, in the spring of B.C. 34 he suddenly appeared in Armenia. His army, which had re- mained there from the previous campaign, held all the more impoi-tant positions, and, as he professed the most friendly feelings towards Artavasdes, even proposing an alliance be- tween their famihes,'' that prince, after some hesitation, at length ventured into his presence. He was immediately seized and put in chains. '' Annenia was rapidly overrun. Artaxias, whom the Armenians made king in the room of his father, was defeated and forced to take refuge with the Parthians. Antony then arranged a marriage between the daughter of the CH. XIII.] ANTONY PUNISHES ARMENIA. \YI Median monarch'' and his own son by Cleopatra, Alexander, and, leaving garrisons in Armenia, carried off Artavasdes and a rich booty into Egypt. Phraates, during these transactions, stood wholly upon the defensive. It may not have been vm pleasing to him to see Artavasdes punished. It must have gratified him to observe how Antony was injuring his own cause by exasperating the Armenians, and teaching them to hate Eorae even more than they hated Parthia.'^ But while Antony's troops held both Syria and Armenia, and the alliance between Media Atropatene and Rome continued, he could not venture to take any ag- gressive step or do aught but protect his own frontier. He was obliged even to look on with patience, when, early in B.C. 33, Antony appeared once more in these parts, '" and advanc- ing to the Araxes, had a conference with the Median monarch, whereat their aUiance was confirmed, troops exchanged, part of Armenia made over to the Median king, and Jotapa, his daughter, given as a bride to the young Alexander, whom Antony designed to make satrap of the East." But no sooner had Antony withdrawn into Asia Minor in preparation for his contest with Octavian than Phraates took the offensive. In combination with Artaxias, the new Armenian king, he at- tacked Antony's ally ; but the latter repulsed bun by the help of his Roman troops. Soon afterwards, however, Antony re- called these troops without restoring to the Median king his own contingent; upon which the two confederates renewed their attack, and were successful. The Median prmce was de- feated and taken prisoner."' Artaxias recovered Armenia and massacred all the Roman garrisons which he found in it." Both countries became once more wholly independent of Rome, and it is probable that Media returned to its old al- legiance. But the successes of Phraates abroad produced ill conse- quences at home. Elated by his victories, and regarding his position in Parthia as thereby secured, he resumed the series of cruelties towards his subjects which the Roman war had in- terrupted, and pushed them so far that an insurrection broke out against his authority (B.C. 33), and he was compelled to quit the country." The revolt was headed by a certain Tiri- dates, who, upon its success, was made king by the insurgents. Phraates fled into Scythia, and persuaded the Scythians to em- brace his cause. These nomads, nothing loth, took up arms, and without any great difficulty restored Phraates to the 118 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xin. throne from which his people had expelled him. Tiridates fled at their approach, and, having contrived to carry off in his flight the youngest son of Phraates, presented himself be- fore Octavian, who was in Syria at the time on his return from Egypt (B.C. 30)," surrendered the young prince into his hands, and requested his aid against the tyrant."^ Octavian accepted the valuable hostage, but with his usual caution, de- * clined to pledge himself to furnish any help to the pretender ; he might remain, he said, in Ssrria, if he so wished, and while he continued under Eoman protection, a suitable provision shoidd be made for his support, but, he must not expect armed resistance against the Parthian monarch. To that monarch, when some years afterwards (B.C. 23) he demanded the sur- render of his subject and the restoration of his young son, Octavian answered^" that he could not give Tiridates up to him, but he would restore him his son without a ransOm. He should expect, however, that in return for this kindness the Parthian king would on his part deliver to the Romans the standards taken from Crassus and Antony, together with all who survived of the Roman captives. It does not appear that Phraates was much moved by the Emperor's generosity. He gladly received his son ; but he took no steps towards the resto- ration of those proofs of Parthian victory which the Romans were so anxious to recover. It was not until B.C. 20, when Octavian (now become Augustus) visited the East, and war seemed the probable alternative if he continued obstinate, that the Parthian monarch brought himself to relinquish the tro- phies which were as much prized by the victors as the van- quished." In extenuation of his act we must remember that he was unpopular with his subjects, and that Augustus could at any moment have produced a pretender, who had once oc- cupied, and with Roman help might easily have movmted for a second time, the throne of the Arsacidae. The remaining years of Phraates— and he reigned for nearly twenty years after restoring the standards— are almost un- broken by any event of importance. The result of the twenty years' struggle between Rome and Parthia had been to impress either nation with a wholesome dread of the other. Both had triumphed on their own ground; both had failed when they ventured on sending expeditions into the enemy's territory. Each now stood on its guard, watching the movements of its adversary across the Euphrates. Both had become pacific. It is a well-known fact that Augustus left it as a principle of CH. xiii.] PHRAATES SENDS HIS SONS TO HOME. 119 policy to his successors that the Eoman Empire had reached its proper Hmits, and could not with advantage be extended further."" This principle, followed with the utmost strictness by Tiberius, was accepted as a rule by all the earlier Caesars, and only regarded as admitting of rare and shght exceptions. Trajan was the first who, a hundred and thirty years after the accession of Augustus, made light of it and set it at de- fiance. With him re-awoke the spirit of conquest, the aspira- tion after universal dominion. But in the meantime there was peace — peace indeed not absolutely unbroken, for border wars occurred, and Rome was tempted sometimes to interfere by arms in the internal quarrels of her neighbor"'' — but a gen- eral state of peace and amity prevailed — neither state made any grand attack on the other's dominions— no change occurred in the frontier, no great battle tested the relative strength of the two peoples. Such rivalry as remained was exhibited less in arms than in diplomacy and showed itself mainly in en- deavors on either side to obtain a predominant influence in Armenia. There alone during the century and a half that in- tervened between Antony and Trajan did the interests of Rome and Parthia come into collision, and in connection with this kingdom alone did any struggle between the two countries continue. Phraates, after yielding to Augustus in the matter of the standards and prisoners, appears for many years to have studiously cultivated his good graces. In the interval between B.C. 11 and B.C. 7,^° distrustful of his subjects, and fearful of their removing him in order to place one of his sons upon the Parthian throne, he resolved to send these possible rivals out of the country; and on this occasion he paid Augustus the compliment af selecting Rome for his children's residence." The youths were four in number, Vonones, Seraspadanes, Rhodaspes, and Phraates;" two of them were married and had children ; they resided at Rome during the remainder of their father's lifetime, and were treated as became their rank, being supported at the pubhc charge and in a magnificent manner." The Roman writers speak of these as "hostages" given by Phraates to the Roman Emperor;" but this was certainly not the intention of the Parthian monarch; nor could the idea well be entertained by the Romans at the time of their residence. These amicable relations between the two sovereigns would probably have continued undisturbed till the death of one or 120 THE SIXTH MONAllCHY. [ch. xnt the other, had not a revolution occured in Armenia, which tempted the Parthian king beyond his powers of resistance. On the death of Artaxias (B.C. 20), Augiistus, who was then in the East, had sent Tiberius into Armenia to arrange matters, and Tiberius had placed upon the throne a brother of Artaxias, named Tigranes." Tigranes died in B.C. 6, and the Armenians, without waiting to know the will of the Roman Emperor, con- ferred the royal title on his sons, for whose succession he had before his death paved the way by associating them with him in the government. ^"^ Enraged at this assumption of inde- pendence, Augustus sent an expedition into Armenia (B.C. 5), deposed the sons of Tigranes, and established on the throne a certain Artavasdes, whose birth and parentage are not known to us. " But the Armenians were not now inclined to submit to foreign dictation; they rose in revolt against Artavasdes (ab. B.C. 3), defeated his Eoman supporters, and expelled him from the kingdom.^* Another Tigranes was made king;^' and, as it was pretty certain that the Romans woiild interfere with this new display of the spirit of independence, the Parthians were called in to resist the Roman oppressors. Armenia, was, in fact, too weak to stand alone, and was obliged to lean upon one or other of the two great empires upon her borders. Her people had no clear political foresight, and allowed them- selves to veer and fluctuate between the two influences ac- cording as the feelings of the hour dictated. Rome had now angered them beyond their very limited powers of endurance, and they flew to Parthia for help, just as on other occasions we shall find them flying to Rome. Phraates could not bring himself to reject the Armenian overtures. Ever since the time of the second Mithridates it had been a settled maxim of Parthian pohcy to make Armenia dependent ; and, even at the cost of a rupture with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he must respond to the appeal made to him. The rupture might not come. Augustus was now aged, and might submit to the affront without resenting it. He had lately lost the services of his best general, Tiberius, who, indignant at slights put upon him, had gone into retirement at Rhodes. He had no one that he could employ but his grandsons, youths who had not yet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates probably hoped that Augustus would draw back before the terrors of a Parthian war under such circumstances, and would allow without remonstrance the imssing of Armenia into the position of a subject-ally of Parthia. CH. XIII.] DEATH OF PIIRAATES IV. 121 But if these were his thoughts, he had miscalculated. Au- gustus, from the time that he heard of the Armenian troubles, and of the support given to them by Parthia, seems never to have wavered in his determination to vindicate the claims of Rome to paramount influence in Armenia, and to have only- hesitated as to the person whose services he should employ in the business. He would have been glad to employ Tiberius ; but that morose prince had deserted him and, declining pub- lic life, had betaken himself to Rhodes, where he was living in a self-chosen retirement. Caius, the eldest of his grandsons, was, in B.C. 2, only eighteen years of age; and, though the thoughts of Augustus at once turned in this direction, the ex- treme youth of the prince caused him to hesitate somewhat ; and the consequence was that Caius did not start for the East till late in B.C. 1. Meanwhile a change had occured in Parthia. Phraates, who had filled the throne for above thirty-five years, ceased to exist, ""and was succeeded by a young son, Phraataces, who reigned in conjunction with the queen-mother, Thermusa, or Musa." The circumstances which brought about this change were the following. Phraates IV. had married, late in life, an Italian slave-girl, sent him as a present by Augustus; and she had borne him a son for whom she was naturally anxious to secure the succession. According to some, it was under her influence that the monarch had sent his four elder boys to Rome, there to receive their education. ^'^ At any rate, in the absence of these youths, Phraataces, the child of the slave-girl, became the chief support of Phraates in the administration of affairs, and obtained a position in Parthia which led him to regard himself as entitled to the throne so soon as it should become vacant. Doubtful, however, of his father^s goodwill, or fear- ful of the rival claims of his brothers, if he waited till the throne was vacated in the natural covirse of events, Phraataces resolved to anticipate the hand of time, and, in conjunction with his mother, administered poison to the old monarch," from the effects of which he died. A just Nemesis for once showed itself in that portion of human affairs which passes be- fore our eyes. Phraates IV., the parricide and fratricide, was, after a reign of thirty-five years, himself assassinated (b. c. 2) by a wife whom he loved only too fondly and a son whom he esteemed and ti'usted. Phraates cannot but bo roc^nrded as one of the ablest of the Parthian monarchs. His conduct of the campaign against 122 TEE SIXTH monarchy: [ch. xtii. Antony— one of the best soldiers that Eome ever produced— was admirable, and showed him a master of guerilla warfare. His success in maintaining himself upon the throne for five and thirty years, in spite of rivals, and notwithstanding the character which he obtained for cruelty, implies, in such a state as Parthia, considerable powers of management. His dealings with Augustus indicate much suppleness and dex- terity. If he did not in the course of his long reign advance the Parthian frontier, at any rate he was not obliged to retract it. Apparently, he ceded nothing to the Scyths as the price of their assistance. He maintained the Partliian supremacy over Northern Media. He lost no inch of territory to the Eomans. It was undoubtedly a prudent step on his part to soothe the irritated vanity of Rome by a surrender of useless trophies, and scarcely more useful prisoners ; and, we may doubt if this concession was not as effective as the dread of the Parthian arms in producing that peace between the two countries which continued unbroken for above ninety years from the campaign of Antony, "and without serious interruption for yet another half century. " If Phraates felt, as he might well feel after the campaigns of Pacorus, that on the whole Rome was a more powerful state than Parthia, and that consequently Parthia had nothing to gain but much to lose in the contest with her western neighbor, he did well to allow no sentiment of foolish pride to stand in the way of a concession that made a pro- longed peace between the two countries possible. It is some- times more honorable to yield to a demand than to meet it with defiance ; and the prince who removed a cause of war arising out of mere national vanity, while at the same time he maintained in all essential points the interests and dignity of his kingdom, deserved well of his subjects, and merits the ap- proval of the historian. As a man, Phraates has left behind him a bad name: he was cruel, selfish, and ungrateful, a fratricide and a parricide; but as a king he is worthy oi respect, and, in certain points, of admiration. CH. XIV. J ACCESSION OF PHBAATACES. 123 CHAPTER XIV. ShoH reigns of Phraataces, Orodes 11. , and Vonones I. Ac- cession of Artabanus III. His relations with Germanicus and Tiberius. His War ivith Pharasmanes of Iberia. His First Expulsion from his Kingdom, and return to it. His peace with Rome. Internal troubles of the Parthian King- dom. Second Expulsion and return of Artabanus. His Death. "Mota Orientis regna, provinciasque Romanae, initio apud Parthos orto." Tacit. Ann. ii. 1. The accession of Phraataces made no difference in the atti- tude of Parthia towards Armenia. The young prince was as anxious as his father had been to maintain the Parthian claims to that country, and at first perhaps as inclined to believe that Augustus would not dispute them. Immediately upon his accession he sent ambassadors to Rome announcing the fact, apologizing for the circumstances under which it had taken place, and proposing a renewal of the peace which had sub- sisted between Augustus and his father. ' Apparently, he said nothing about Armenia, but preferred a demand for the sur- render of his four brothers, whom no doubt he designed to destroy. The answer of Augustus was severe in the extreme. Addressing Phraataces by his bare name, without adding the title of king, he required him to lay aside the royal appella- tion, which he had arrogantly and without any warrant as- sumed, and at the same time to withdraw his forces from Armenia.'^ On the surrender of the Parthian princes he kept silence, ignoring a demand which he had no intention of ac- cording. It was clearly his design to set up one of the elder brothers as a rival claimant to Phraataces, or at any rate to alarm him with the notion that, unless he made concessions, this policy would be adopted. But Phraataces was not to be frightened by a mere message. He responded to Augustus after his own fashion, dispatching to liim a letter wherein he took to himself the favorite Parthian title of " king of kings," and addressed the Roman Emperor simply as " Csesar." ' The attitude of defiance would no doubt have been maintained, had Augustus confined himself to menaces; when, however, it 124 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xiY appeared that active measures would be taken, when Augus- tus, in B.C. 1, sent his grandson, Caius, to the East with orders to re-estabhsh the Roman influence in Armenia even at the cost of a Parthian war, and that prince showed himself in Syria with all the magnificent surroundings of the Imperial dignity, the Parthian monarch became alarmed. He had an interview with Caius in the spring of a.d. 1, upon an island in the Euphrates ;* where the terms of an arrangement between the two Empires were discussed and settled. The armies of the two chiefs were drawn up on the opposite banks of the river, facing one another; and the chiefs themselves, accom- panied by an equal number of attendants, proceeded to deUb- erate in the sight of both hosts. Satisfactory pledges having been given by the Parthian monarch, the prince and king in turn entertained each other on the borders of their respective dominions;^ and Caius returned into Syria, having obtained an engagement from the Parthians to abstain from any further interference with Armenian affairs. " The engagement appears to have been honorably kept; for when, shortly afterward, fresh compUcations occurred, and Caius in endeavoring to settle them received his death-wound before the walls of an Armenian tower,' we do not hear of Parthia as in any way involved in the unfortunate occurrence. The Eomans and their partisans in the country were left to settle the Armenian succession as they pleased; and Parthia kept herself wholly aloof from the matters transacted upon her borders. One cause — perhaps the main cause — of this abstinence, and of the engagement to abstain entered into by Phraataces, was doubtless the unsettled state of things in Parthia itself.^ The circumstances under which that prince had made himself king, though not unparalleled in the Parthian annals, were such as naturally tended towards civil strife, and as were apt to pro- duce in Parthia internal difficulties, if not disorders or com- motions. Phraataces soon found that he would have a hard task to establish his rule. The nobles objected to him, not only for the murder of his father, but his descent from an Italian concubine, and the incestuous commerce which he was supposed to maintain vsdth her.* They had perhaps grounds for this last charge. At any rate Phraataces provoked sus- ^Dicion by the singular favors and honors which he granted to a woman whose origin was mean and extraction foreign. Not content with ])rivate marks of esteem and love, he departed from the practice of all former Parthian sovereigns'" in placing CH. XTV.] DEATH OF PlIR A AT ACES. 125 her eflfigy upon Ms coins ; and he accompanied this act with fulsome and absurd titles. Musa was styled, not merely "Queen," but "Heavenly Goddess,"" as if the realities of slave origin and concubinage could be covered by the fiction of an apotheosis. It is not surprising that the proud Parthian nobles were offended by these proceedings, and determined to rid themselves of a monarch whom they at once hated and despised. Within a few years of his obtaining the throne an insurrection broke out against his authority ; and after a brief struggle he was deprived of his crown and put to death. '^ The nobles then elected an Arsacid, named Orodes, whose residence at the time and relationship to the former monarchs are un- certain. It seems probable'" that, like most princes of the blood royal, he had taken refuge in a foreign country from the suspicions and dangers that beset all possible pretenders to the royal dignity in Parthia, and was living in retirement, unex- pectant of any such offer, when a deputation of Parthian nobles arrived and brought him the intelligence of his election. It might have been expected that, obtaining the crown under these circumstances, he would have ruled weU ; but, according to Josephus (who is here, unfortunately, our sole authority), he very soon displayed so much violence and cruelty of dispo- sition that his rule was felt to be intolerable; and the Par- thians, again breaking into insurrection, rid themselves of him, killing hun either at a banquet or on a hunting excursion."'' This done, they sent to Eome, and requested Augustus to allow Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV., to return to Parthia in order that he might receive his father's kingdom. '^ The Emperor complied readily enough, since he regarded his own dignity as advanced by the transaction; and the Par- thians at first welcomed the object of their choice with rejoic- ings. But after a little time their sentiments altered. The young prince, bred up in Rome, and accustomed to the refine- ments of Western civilization, neglected the occupations which seemed to his subjects alone worthy of a monarch's regard, absented himself from the hunting-field, took small pleasure in riding, when he passed through the streets indulged in the foreign luxury of a litter, shrank with disgust from the rude and coarse feastings which formed a portion of the national manners. He had, moreover, brought with him from the place of his exile a number of Greek companions, whom the Parthians despised and ridiculed ; and the favors bestowed on these foi-eign interlopers were seen with jealousy and rage, l!; 126 TEE SIXTH MONARCET. ■ i.cH. xrv. ■was in vain that he endeavored to conciliate his offended sub- jects by the openness of his manners and the facihty with which he allowed access to his person. In their prejudiced eyes virtues and graces unknown to the nation hitherto were not merits but defects, ' " and rather increased than diminished their aversion. Having conceived a dislike for the monarch personally, they began to look back with dissatisfaction on their own act in sending for him. "Parthia," they said, "had indeed degenerated from her former self to have re- quested a king to be sent her who belonged to another world and had had a hostile civilization ingrained into him. All the glory gained by destroying Crassus and repulsing Antony was utterly lost and gone, if the country was to be ruled by Caesar's bond-slave, and the throne of the Arsacidse to be treated like a Roman province. It would have been bad enough to have had a prince imposed on them by the will of a superior, if they had been conquered; it was worse, in all respects worse, to suffer such an insult, when they had not even had war made on them." Under the influence of such feelings as these, the Parthians, after tolerating Vonones for a few years, rose against him (ab. a.d. 16), and summoned Artabanus, an Arsa- cid who had grown to manhood among the Dahae of the Cas- pian region, but was at this time king of Media Atropatene, to rule over them." It was seldom that a crown was declined in the ancient world ; and Artabanus, on receiving the overture, at once ex- pressed his willingness to accept the proffered dignity. He in- vaded Parthia at the head of an army consisting of his own subjects, and engaged Vonones, to whom in his difiiculties the bulk of the Parthian people had rallied. The engagement re- sulted in the defeat of the Median monarch, '* who returned to his own country, and, having collected a larger army, made a second invasion. This time he was successful. "Vonones fled on horseback to Seleucia with a small body of followers ; while his defeated army, following in his track, was pressed upon by the victorious Mede, and suffered great losses. Artabanus, hav- ing entered Ctesiphon in triumph, was immediately proclaimed king. '" Vonones, escaping from Seleucia, took refuge among the Armenians; and, as it happened that just at this time the Armenian throne was vacant, not only was an asylum granted him, but he was made king of the country.'" It was impossible that Artabanus should tamely submit to an arrangement which would have placed his deadly enemy in a position to cause him CH. XIV.] REIQN OF ARTABANCTS III 127 constant annoyance. He, therefore, at once remonstrated, both in Armenia and at Rome. As Rome now claimed the investi- ture of the Armenian monarchs, he sent an embassy to Tiberius, and threatened war if Vonones were acknowledged ; while at the same time he applied to Armenia and required the surrender of the refugee. An important section of the Armenian nation was inchned to grant his demand;^' Tiberius, who would will- ingly have supported Vonones, drew back before the Parthian threats ;^^ Vonones found himself in imminent danger, and, imder the circumstances, determined on quitting Armenia and betaking himself to the protection of the Roman governor of Syria. This was Creticus Silanus, who received liim gladly, gave him a guard, and allowed him the state and title of king." Meanwhile Artabanus laid claim to Armenia, and suggested as a candidate for the throne one of his own sons, Orodes.^^ Under these circumstances, the Roman Emperor, Tiberius, who had recently succeeded Augustus, resolved to despatch to the East a personage of importance, who should command the respect and attention of the Oriental powers by his dignity, and impose upon them by the pomp and splendor with which he was surrounded. He selected for this office Germanicus, his nephew, the eldest son of his deceased brother, Drusus, a prince of much promise, amiable in his disposition, courteous and affa- ble in his manners, a good soldier, and a man generally popu- lar. The more to strike the minds of the Orientals, he gave Germanicus no usual title or province, but invested him with an extraordinary command over all the Roman dominions to the east of the Hellespont, ^'^ thus rendering him a sort of mon- arch of Roman Asia. Full powers were granted him for mak- ing peace or war, for levying troops, annexing provinces, ap- pointing subject kings, and performing other sovereign acts, without referring back to Rome for instructions. A train of unusual magnificence accompanied him to his charge, calcu- lated to impress the Orientals with the conviction that this was no common negotiator, Germanicus arrived in Asia early in A.D. 18, and applied himself at once to his task. Entering Ar- menia at the head of his troops, he proceeded to the capital, Artaxata,^" and, having ascertained the wishes of the Arme- nians themselves, determined on his course of conduct. To have insisted on the restoration of Vonones woidd have been grievously to offend the Armenians who had expelled him, and at the same time to provoke the Parthians, who could not have tolerated a pretender in a position of power upon their borders j 128 THE SIXTH MONARCIIT. [CH. xrv. to have allowed the pretensions of the Partliian monarch, and accepted the candidature of his son, Orodes, would have lowered Home in the opinion of all the surrounding nations, and been equivalent to an abdication of all influence in the affairs of Western Asia. Germanicus avoided either extreme, and found happily a middle course. It happened that there was a foreign prince settled in Armenia, who having grown up there had as- similated himself in all respects to the Armenian ideas and habits, and had thereby won golden opinions from both the nobles and the people. This was Zeno, the son of Polemo, once king of the curtailed Pontus, and afterwards of the Lesser Ar- menia," an outlying Eoman dependency. The Armenians themselves suggested that Zeno should be their monarch ; and Grermanicus saw a way out of his difficulties in the suggestion. At the seat of government, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast multitude of the people, with the consent and approval of the principal nobles, he placed with his own hand the diadem on the brow of the favored prince, and saluted him as king under the new name of " Artaxias." " He then returned into Syria, where he was shortly afterwards visited by ambassadors from the Parthian monarch. "^ Artabanus reminded him of the peace concluded between Rome and Parthia in the reign of Augustus, and assumed that the circumstances of his own appointment to the throne had in no way interfered Avith it. He would be glad, he said, to renew with Germanicus the interchange of friendly assurances wliich had passed between his predecessor, Phraataces, and Caius; and to accommodate the Roman general, he would willingly come to meet him as far as the Eu- phrates; meanwhile, until the meeting could take place, he must request that Vonones should be removed to a greater dis- tance from the Parthian frontier, and that he should not be al- lowed to continue the correspondence in which he was engaged with many of the Parthian nobles for the purpose of raising fresh troubles. Germanicus replied politely, but indefinitely, to the proposal of an interview, which he may have thought unnecessary, and open to misconstruction. To the request for the removal of Vonones he consented.'" Vonones was trans- ferred from Syria to the neighboring province of Cihcia ; and the city of Pompeiopolis, built by the great Pompey on the site of the ancient Soli, was assigned to him as his residence With this arrangeir.ent the Parthian monarch appears to have been contented. Vonones on the other hand was so dissatisfied with the change that in the course of the next year (a.d. 19) he CH. XIV.] ATtTABAms QtlARRJSLS mm ROME. 1«29 endeavored to ixiake his escape; his flight was, however, dis covered, and, pursuit being made, he was overtaken and slaiu on the banks of the Pyramus." Thus perished mgloriously one of the least blamable and most unfortunate of the Parthian princes. After the death of Germanicus, in a.d. 19, the details of the Parthian history are for some years unknown to us. It ap- pears that during this interval Artabanus [PI. II. Fig. 5.] was engaged in wars with several of the nations upon his borders, ^^ and met with so much success that he came after a while to desire, rather than fear, a rupture with Rome. He knew that Tiberius was now an old man,^^ and that he was disinclined to engage in distant wars ; he was aware that Germanicus was dead ; and he was probably not much afraid of L. Vitellius, the governor of Syria, who had been recently deputed by Tiberius to administer that province.'^ Accordingly in a.d. 34, the Ar- menian throne being once more vacant by the death of Artaxias (Zeno), he suddenly seized the country, and appointed his eldest son, whom Dio and Tacitus call simply Arsaces,'^ to be king. At the same time he sent ambassadors to require the restora- tion of the treasure which Vonones had carried off from Par- thia and had left behind him in Syria or Cilicia. To this plain and definite demand were added certain vague threats, or boasts, to the effect that he was the rightful master of all the territory that had belonged of old to Macedonia or Persia, and that it was his intention to resume possession of the provinces, whereto, as the representative of Cyrus and Alexander, he was entitled.'" He is said to have even commenced operations against Cappadocia," which was an actual portion of the Eoman Empire, when he found that Tiberius, so far from re- senting the seizure of Armenia, had sent instructions to Vitel- lius, that he was to cultivate peaceful relations with Parthia. "' Apparently he thought that a good opportunity had arisen for picking a quarrel with his Western neighbor, and was deter- mined to take advantage of it. The aged despot, hidden in his retreat of Capreae, seemed to him a pure object of contempt ; and he entertained the confident hope of defeating his armies and annexing portions of his territory. But Tiberius was under no circumstances a man to be wholly despised. Simultaneouslj^ with the Parthian demands and threats intelligence reached him that the subjects of Artabanus were greatly dissatisfied with his rule, and that it would be easy by fomenting the discontent to bring about a 130 THE SIXTH MONAUCHY. [ch. xiv. revolution." Some of the nobles even went in person to Rome (a.d. 35), and suggested that if Phraates, one of the surviv- ing sons of Phraates IV., were to appear under Eoman protection upon the banks of the Euphrates, an insurrection would immediately break out. Artabanus, they said, among his other cruelties had put to death almost all the adult males of the Arsacid family; a successful revolution could not be hoped for without an Ai^sacid leader; if Tiberius, however, would dehver to them the prince for whom they asked, this difficulty woidd be removed, and there was then every reason to expect a happy issue to the rebeUion. The Emperor was not hard to persuade ; he no doubt argued that, whatever became of the attempt and those engaged in it, one result at least was certain — Artabanus would find plenty of work to occupy him at home, and would desist from his foreign aggressions. He therefore let Phraates take his de- parture and proceed to Syria, glad to meet the danger which had threatened him by craft and policy rather than by force of arms. ^^ Artabanus soon became aware of the intrigue. He found that the chief conspirators in Parthia were a certain Sinnaces, || a nobleman distinguished alike for his high bii'th and his great riches, and a eunuch named Abdus, who held a position about the court, and was otherwise a personage of imi^ortance. it would have been easy to seize these two men, and execute them ; but Artabanus was uncertain how far the conspiracy extended, and thought *it most prudent to defer bringing matters to a crisis. He therefore dissembled, and was content to cause a delay, first by administering to Abdus a slow poison, and then by engaging Sinnaces so constantly in affairs of state that he had little or no time to devote to plotting. Successful thus far by his own cunning and dexterity, he was further helped by a stroke of good fortune, on which he could not have calculated. Phraates, who thought that after forty years of residence in Pome it was necessary to fit himself for the position of Parthian king by resuming the long-disused habits of his nation, was carried off, after a short residence in Syria, by a disease which he was supposed to have contracted through the change in his mode of hfe."' His death must for the time have paralyzed the conspirators, and have greatly relieved Artabanus. It was perhaps now, under the stimulus of a sudden change from feehngs of extreme alarm to fancied aecm-ity, that he wrote the famous letter to Tiberius, in which Vol. IIL Plate iX. Parthian baa jreJief of a Mngus (after Flandiu and Co?te). Plate X yol. 3 5 o s *^ s o o CH, XIV.] TIBEnrUS SUPrOETS PnETENDERS. \^\ he reproached him for his cruelty, cowardice, and hixiirious- ness of hving, and recommended him to satisfy the just desires of the subjects who hated him by an immediate suicide/^ This letter, if genuine, must be pronounced under any cir- cumstances a folly ; and if really sent at this tinae, it may have had tragical consequences. It is remarkable that Tiberius, on learning the death of Phraates, instead of relaxing, intensified his efforts. Not only did he at once send out to Syria another pretender, Tiridates, a nephew of the deceased prince/' in order to replace him, but he made endeavors, such as we do not hear of before, to engage other nations in the struggle ;" and further, he enlarged the commission of Vitellius, giving him a general superintendence over the affairs of the East. Thus Artabanus found himself in greater peril than ever, and if he had really indulged in the silly effusion ascribed to him was rightly punished. Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, a portion of the modern Georgia, incited by Tiberius, took the field (a.d. 35), and proclaimed his intention of placing his brother, Mith- ridates, on the Armenian throne.''^ Having by corrupticm succeeded in bringing about the murder of Arsaces by his attendants," he marched into Armenia, and became master of the capital without meeting any resistance. Artabanus, upon this, sent his son Orodes to maintain tbe Parthian cause in the disputed province ; but he proved no match for the Iberian, who was superior in numbers, in the variety of his troops, and in familiarity with the localities. Pharasmanes had obtained the assistance of his neighbors, the Albaniims, and, opening the passes of the Caucasus, had admitted thi-ough them a number of the Scythic or Sarmatian hordes," who were always ready, when their swords were hired, to take a part in the quarrels of the south. Orodes was unable to procure either mercenaries or allies,^* and had to contend unassisted against the three enemies who had joined their forces to oppose him. For some time he prvidently declined an engage- ment ; but it was difficult to restrain the ardor of his troops, whom the enemy exasperated by their reproaches." After a while he was compelled to accept the battle which Pharas- manes incessantly offered. His force consisted entirely of cavalry, while Pharasmanes had besides his horse a powerful body of infantry. The battle was nevertheless stoutly con- tested ; and the victory might have been doubtful, had it not happened that in a hand-to-hand combat between the two 132 'PilE SIXTB MONARCHY. [en. xiv. commanders Orodes was strack to the ground by his antago- nist, and thought by most of his own men to be killed.'" As usual under such circumstances in the East, a rout followed. If we may believe Josephus," " many tens of thousands" were slain. Armenia was wholly lost ; and Artabanus found him- self left with diminished resources and tarnished fame to meet the intrigues of his domestic enemies. Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In the spring of a.d. 36, having levied the whole force of the Em- pire, he took tne field and marched northwards, determined, if possible, to revenge himself on the Iberians and recover his lost province. ^^ But his first efforts were unsuccessful ; and before he could renew them ViteUius put himself at the head of his legions, and marching towards the Euphrates threatened Mesopotamia with invasion. Placed thus between two fires, the Parthian monarch felt that he had no choice but to with- draw from Armenia and return to the defence of his own proper territories, which in his absence must have lain tempt- ingly open to an enemy. His return caused ViteUius to change his tactics. Instead of measuring his strength against that which still remained to Artabanus, he resumed the weapon of intrigue so dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish ex- penditure of money ^^ to excite disaffection once more among the Parthian nobles. This time conspiracy was successful. The military disasters of the last two years had alienated from Artabanus the affections of those whom his previous cruelties had failed to disgust or alarm ; and he found himself without any armed force whereon he could rely, beyond a small body of foreign guards which he maintained about his person. It seemed to him that his only safety was ia flight; and ac- cordingly he quitted his capital and removed himself hastily into Hyrcania, which was in the immediate vicinity of the Scythian Dahse, among whom he had been brought up. Here the natives were friendly to him, and he lived a retired life, waiting (as he said) until the Parthians, who could judge an absent prince with equity, though they could not long continue faithful to a present one, should repent of their behavior to him." Upon learning the flight of Artabanus, ViteUius advanced to the banks of the Euphrates, and introduced Tiridates into his kingdom." Fortunate omens were said to have accompanied the passage of the river; and these were foUowed by adhesions of greater importance. Ornospades, satrap of Mesopotamia, was CH. XIV.] Tim DATES It BECOMES KING. 133 the first to join the standard of the pretender with a large •body of horse. He was followed by the conspirator Sinnaces, his father Abdageses, the keeper of the king's treasures, and other personages of high position. The Greek cities in Meso- potamia readily opened their gates to a monarch long domiciled at Rome, from whom they expected a politeness and refine- ment that would harmonize better with their feelings than the manners of the late king, bred up among the uncivilized Scyths. Parthian towns, like Halus and Artemita, ^^ followed their ex- ample. Seleucia, the second city in the Empire, received the new monarch with an obsequiousness that bordered on adula- tion." Not content with paying him all customary royal honors, they appended to their acclamations disparaging re- marks upon his predecessor, whom they affected to regard as the issue of an adulterous intrignie, and as no true Arsacid. Tiridates was pleased to reward the unseemly flattery of these degenerate Greeks by a new arrangement of their constitution. Hitherto they had lived under the government of a Senate of Three Hundred members, the wisest and wealthiest of the citizens, a certain control being, however, secured to the people. Artabanus had recently modified the constitution in an aristocratic sense ; and therefore Tiridates pursued the con- trary course, and established an unbridled democracy in the place of a mixed government. He then entered Ctesiphon, the capital, and after waiting some days for certain noblemen, who had expressed a wish to attend his coronation but continually put off their coming, he was crowned in the ordinary manner by the Surena of the time being, in the sight and amid the ac- clamations of a vast multitude. The pretender now regarded his work as completed, and forbore any further efforts. The example of the Western provinces would, he assumed, be followed by the Eastern, and the monarch approved by Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and the capital would carry, as a matter of course, the rest of the nation. Policy required that the general acquiescence should not have been taken for granted. Tiridates should have made a military progress through the East, no less than the West, " and have sought out his rival in the distant Hyrcania, and slain him, or driven him beyond the borders. Instead of thus occupying himself, he was content to besiege a stronghold where Artabanus had left his treasure and his harem. This conduct was imprudent; and the imprudence cost him his crown. That fickle temper which Artabanus had noted in 134 TBB SIXTH MONAnCTTT. [ch. xnr. his countrymen began to work so soon as the new king was well installed in his office; the coveted post of chief vizier- could but be assigned to one, and the selection of the fortunate individual was the disappointment of a host of expectants; nobles absent from the coronation, whether by choice or necessity, began to be afraid that their absence would cost them dear, when Tiridates had time to reflect upon it and to listen to their detractors. The thoughts of the malcontents turned towards their dethroned monarch ; and emissaries were despatched to seek him out, and put before him the project of a restoration. He was found in Hyrcania, in a miserable dress and plight, living on the produce of his bow. At first he suspected the messengers, beheving that their intention was to seize him and deliver him up to Tiridates; but it was not long ere they persuaded him that, whether their affection for him- self were true or feigned, their enmity to Tiridates was real.'" They had indeed no worse charges to bring against this prince than his youth, and the softness of his Roman breeding; but they were evidently in earnest, and had committed themselves too deeply to make it possible for them to retract. Artabanus, therefore, accepted their offers, and having obtained the ser- vices of a body of Daha3 and other Scyths,'" proceeded west- ward, retaining the miserable garb and plight in which he had been found, in order to draw men to his side by pity; and making all haste, in order that his enemies might have less opportunity to prepare obstructions and his friends less time to change their minds. He reached the neighborhood of Ctesiphon while Tiridates was still doubting what he should do, distracted between the counsels of some who recommended an immediate engagement with the rebels before they recov- ered from the fatigues of their long march or grew accustomed to act together, and of others who advised a retreat into Meso- potamia, reUance upon the Armenians and other tribes of the north," and a union ^vith the Eoman troops, which ViteUius, on the first news of what had happened, had thrown across the Euphrates. The more timid counsel had the support of Ab- dageses, whom Tiridates had made his vizier, and therefore naturally prevailed, the prince himself being moreover of an unwarlike temper. It had, in appearance, much to recommend it ; and if its execution had been in the hands of Occidentals might have succeeded. But, in the East, the first movement in retreat is taken as a confession of weakness and almost as an act of despair : an order to retire is regarded as a direction CH. XIV.] ARTABANU8 RECOVERS THE THRONE. 135 to fly. No sooner was the Tigris crossed and the march through Mesopotamia began, than the host of Tiridates melted away hke an iceberg in the Gulf Stream. The tribes of the Desert set the example of flight;"^ and in a little time almost the whole army had dispersed, drawing off either to the camp of the enemy or to their homes. Tiridates reached the Eu- phrates with a mere handful of followers, and crossing into Syria found himself once more safe under the protection of the Eomans. The flight of Tiridates gave Parthia back into the hands of its former ruler. Artabanus reoccupied the throne, apparently without having to fight a battle. "^ He seems, however, not to have felt himself strong enough either to resume his designs upon Armenia, or to retaliate in any way upon the Romans for their support of Tiridates. Mithridates, the Iberian, was left in quiet possession of the Armenian kingdom, and VitelHus found himself unmolested on the Euphrates. Tiberius, how- ever, was anxious that the war with Parthia should be formally terminated, and, having failed in his attempts to fill the Par- thian throne with a Roman nominee, was ready to acknowl- edge Artabanus, and eager to enter into a treaty with him. He instructed Vitellius to this effect;" and that officer (late in A.D. 36 or early in a.d. 37), having invited Artabanus to an in- terview on the Euphrates," persuaded him to terms which were regarded by the Romans as highly honorable to them- selves, though Artabanus probably did not feel them to be de- grading to Parthia. Peace and amity were re-established be- tween the two nations. Rome, it may be assumed, undertook to withhold her countenance from all pretenders to the Par- thian throne, and Parthia withdrew her claims upon Armenia. Artabanus was persuaded to send his son, Darius, with some other Parthians of rank, to Rome, and was thus regarded by the Romans as having given hostages for his good behavior.^' He was also induced to throw a few grains of frankincense on the sacrificial fire which burnt in front of the Roman standards and the Imperial images, an act which was accepted at Rome as one of submission and homage." The terms and circum- stances of the peace did not become known in Italy till Tibe- rius had been succeeded by Caligula (March, a.d. 37)."* When known, they gave gi-eat satisfaction, and were regarded as glorious alike to the negotiator, Vitellius, and to the prince whom he represented. The false report was spread that the Parthian monarch had granted to the new Caesar what hi« j3g THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xiv. contempt and hatred would have caused him to refuse to Ti- berius ; and the inchnation of the Romans towards their young sovereign was intensified by the ascription to him of a diplo- matic triumph which belonged of right to his predecessor. Contemporaneously with the troubles which have been above described, but reaching down, it would seem, a few years be- yond them, were other disturbances of a peculiar character in one of the Western provinces of the Empire. The Jewish ele- ment in the population of Western Asia had been one of im- portance from a date anterior to the rise, not only of the Par- thian, but even of the Persian Empire. Dispersed colonies of Jews were to be found in Babylonia, Armenia, Media, Susiana, Mesopotamia, and probably in other Parthian provinces." These colonies dated from the time of Nebuchadnezzar's cap- tivity, and exhibited everywhere the remarkable tendency of the Jewish race to an increase disproportionate to that of the population among which they are settled. The Jewish ele- ment became perpetually larger and more important in Baby- lonia and Mesopotamia, in spite of the draughts which were made upon it by Seleucus and other Syrian princes."' Under the Parthians, it would seem that the Mesopotamian Jews en- joyed generally the same sort of toleration, and the same per- mission to exercise a species of self-government, which Jews and Christians enjoy now in many parts of Turkey. They formed a recognized community, had some cities which were entirely their own, possessed a common treasury, and from time to time sent up to Jerusalem the offerings of the people under the protection of a convoy of 30,000 or 40,000 men.'" The Parthian kings treated them well, and no doubt valued them as a counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and Syrians of this part of their Empire. They had no grievance of which to complain, and it might have been thought very unlikely that any troubles would arise in connection with them; but cir- cumstances seemingly trivial threw the whole community into commotion, and led on to disasters of a very lamentable character. Two young Jews, Asinai and Anilai, brothers, natives of Nearda, the city in which the treasury of the community was established, upon suffering some ill-treatment at the hands of the manufacturer who employed them, gave up their trade, and, withdrawing to a marshy district between tw^oarms of the Euphrates, made up their minds to live by robbery." A band of needy youths soon gathered about them, and they became CH. xiY.] ASINAI AND ANILAL 137 the terror of the entire neighborhood. They exacted a black- mail from the peaceable population of shepherds and others who lived near them, made occasional plundering raids to a distance, and required an acknowledgment (bakhshish) from travellers. Their doings having become notorious, the satrap of Babylonia marched against them with an army, intending to surprise them on the Sabbath, when it was supposed that they would not fight ; but his approach was discovered, it was determined to disregard the obligation of Sabbatical rest, and the satrap was himself surprised and completely defeated, Artabanus, having heard of the disaster, made overtures to the brothers, and, after receiving a visit from them at his court, assigned to Asinai, the elder of the two, the entire government of the Babylonian satrapy. The experiment appeared at first to have completely succeeded. Asinai governed the province with prudence and zeal, and for fifteen years" no complaint was made against his administration. But at the end of this time the lawless temper, held in restraint for so long, reasserted Itself, not, indeed, in Asinai, but in his brother. Anilai fell in rove with the wife of a Parthian magnate, commander (appar- fintly) of the Parthian troops stationed in Babylonia, and, seeing no other way of obtaining his wishes, made war upon the chief- tain and killed him. He then married the object of his affec- tions, and might perhaps have been content; but the Jews under Asinai's government remonstrated against the idolatries which the Parthian woman had introduced into a Jewish household, and prevailed on Asinai to require that she should be divorced. His compliance with their wishes proved fatal to him, for the woman, fearing the consequences, contrived to poison Asinai ; and the authority which he had wielded passed into the hands of Anilai, without (so far as we hear) any fresh appointment from the Parthian monarch. Anilai had, it ap- . pears, no instincts but those of a freebooter, and he was no -; sooner settlea in the government than he proceeded to indulge them by attacking the territory of a neighboring satrap, Mith- ridates, who was not only a Partliian of high rank, but had married one of the daughters of Artabanus. Mithridates flew to arms to defend his province ; but Anilai fell upon his encamp- ment in the night, completely routed his troops, and took Mithridates himself prisoner. Having subjected him to a gross indignity.'* he was nevertheless afraid to put him to death, lest the Parthian king should avenge the slaughter of his relative on ohe Jews of Babylon, Mithridates was conse- 13S THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xiv quently released, and returned to his wife, who was so indig- nant at the insult whereto he had been subjected that she left him no peace till he collected a second army and resumed the war. Analai was no ways daunted. Quitting his stronghold in the marshes, he led his troops a distance of ten miles through a hot and dry plain to meet the enemy, thus unnecessarily ex- hausting them, and exposing them to the attack of their ene- mies under the most unfavorable circumstances. He was of course defeated with loss ; but he himself escaped and revenged himself by carrying fire and sword over the lands of the Baby- lonians, who had hitherto lived peaceably under his protection. The Babylonians sent to Nearda and demanded his surrender ; but the Jews of Nearda, even if they had had the will, had no power to comply. A pretence was then made of arranging matters by negotiation ; but the Babylonians, having in this way obtained a knowledge of the position which Anilai and his troops occupied, fell upon them in the night, when they were all either drunk or asleep, and at one stroke exterminated the whole band. Thus far no great calamity had occurred. Two Jewish rob- ber-chiefs had been elevated into the position of Parthian sa- traps ; and the result had been, first, fifteen years of peace, and then a short civil war, ending in the destruction of the surviv- ing chief and the annihilation of the band of marauders. But the lamentable consequences of the commotion were now to show themselves. The native Babylonians had always looked ■with dislike on the Jewish colony, and occasions of actual collision between the two bodies had not been wholly wa t- ing." The circumstances of the existing time seemed to fur- nish a good excuse for an outbreak; and scarcely were Anilai and his followers destroyed, when the Jews of Babylon were set upon by their native fellow-citizens. Unable to make an effectual resistance, they resolved to retire from the place, and, at the immense loss which such a migration necessarOy costs, they quitted Babylon and transferred themselves in great num- bers to Seleucia. Here they lived quietly for five years (about A.D. 34-39), but in the sixth year (a.d. 40) fresh troubles broke out. The remnant of the Jews at Babylon were assailed, either by their old enemies or by a pestilence, '" and took refuge at Seleucia with their brethren. It happened that at Seleucia there was a feud of long standing between the Syrian popula- tion and the Greeks. The Jews naturally joined the Syrians, who were a kindred race, and the two together brought the CH. XIV.] REFLECTIONS ON THE TROUBLES. 139 Greeks under ; whereupon these last contrived to come to terms with the Syrians, and persuaded them to join in an attack on the late allies. Against the combined Greeks and Syrians the Jews were powerless, and in the massacre which ensued they lost above 50,000 men. The remnant withdrew to Ctesiphon; but even there the malice of their enemies pursued them, and the persecution was only brought to an end by their quitting the metropoUtan cities altogether, and withdrawing to the provincial towns of which they were the sole occupants." The narrative of these events derives its interest, not so much from any sympathy that we can feel with any of the ac- tors in it as from the light which it throws upon the character of the Parthian rule, and the condition of the countries under Parthian government. In the details given we seem once more to trace a near resemblance between the Parthian system and that of the Turks ; we seem to see thrown back into the mirror of the past an image of those terrible conflicts and dis- orders which have passed before our own eyes in Syria and the Lebanon while under acknowledged Turkish sovereignty. The picture has the same features of antipathies of race unsof- tened by time and contact, of perpetual feud bursting out into occasional conflict, of undying religious animosities, of strange combinations, of fearful massacres, and of a government look- ing tamely on, and aUowing things for the most part to take their course. We see how utterly the Parthian system failed to blend together or amalgamate the conquered peoples ; and not only so, but how impotent it was even to effect the first object of a government, the securing of peace and ti-anquillity within its borders. If indeed it were necessary to believe that the picture brought before us represented truthfully the normal condition of the people and countries with which it is con- cerned, we should be forced to conclude that Parthian govern- ment was merely another name for anarchy, and that it was only good fortune that preserved the empire from falling to pieces at this early date, within two centuries of its establish- ment But there is reason to believe that the reign of Arta- banus III. represents, not the normal, but an exceptional state of things —a state of things which could only arise in Parthia when the powers of government were relaxed in consequence of rebellion and civil war.'" We must remember that Arta- banus was actually twice driven from his kingdom, and that during the greater part of his reign he lived in pei'petual fear of revolt and insurrection. It is not improbable that the cul* 140 '^^SE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xiv. minating atrocities of the struggle above described synchro- nized Avith the second expulsion of the Parthian monarch/" and are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary weakness of the Parthian rule as of the terrible strength of the forces which that rule for the most part kept under control. The causes which led to the second expulsion of Artabanus *' are not distinctly stated, but they were probably not very differ- ent from those that brought about the first. Artabanus was undoubtedly a harsh ruler; and those who fell under his dis- pleasure, naturally fearing his severity, and seeing no way of meeting it but by a revolution, were driven to adopt extreme measures. Something like a general combination of the nobles against him seems to have taken place about the year a.d. 40; and it appears that he, on becoming aware of it, determined to quit the capital and throw himself on the protection of one of the tributary monarchs. This was Izates, the sovereign of Adiabene, or the tract between the Zab rivers, who is said to have been a convert to Judaism.*'^ On the flight of Artabanus to Izates it would seem that the Megistanes formally deposed him, and elected m his place a certain Kinnam, or Kinnamus, an Arsacid who had been brought up by the king. Izates, when he interfered on behalf of the deposed monarch, was met by the objection that the newly-elected prince had rights which could not be set aside. The difficulty appeared ir.superable ; but it was overcome by the voluntary act of Kinnamus, who wrote to Artabanus and offered to retire in his favor. Here- upon Artabanus returned and remounted his throne, Kinnamus carrying his magnanimity so far as to strip the diadem from his own brow and replace it on the head of the old monarch. A condition of the restoration was a complete amnesty for all political offences, wliich was not only promised by Artabanus, but likewise guaranteed by Izates. It was very shortly after his second restoration to the throne that Artabanus died. One further calamity must, how- ever, be noticed as having fallen within the 1 units of his reign. The great city of Seleucia, the second in the Empire, shortly after it had experienced the troubles above narrated," revolted absolutely from the Parthian power, and declared it- self independent. No account has reached us of the circum- i'tances which caused this revolt ; but it was indicative of a feeling that Parthia was beginning to decline, and that the dis- integration of the Empire was a thing that might be expected. The Seleucians had at no time been contented with their position CH. XV.] SUCCESSOR OF ARTABANUS ILL DOUBTFUL. 141 as Parthian subjects. Whether they supposed that they could stand alone, or whether they looked to enjoying under Eoman protection a greater degree of independence than had been allowed them by the Parthians, is uncertain. They revolted, however, in a. d. 40, and declared themselves a self-governing community. It does not appear that the Romans lent them, any assistance, or broke for their sake the peace established with Parthia in A. D. 37. The Seleucians had to depend upon themselves alone, and to maintain their rebellion by means of their own resources. No doubt Artabanus proceeded at once to attack them, but his arms made no impression. They were successful in defending their independence during his reign, and for some time afterwards, although compelled in the end to succumb and resume a subject position under their own masters. Artabanus seems to have died in August or Septem- ber A. D. 42, '^ the year after the death of Caligula. His checkered reign had covered a space which cannot have fallen much short of thirty years. CHAPTER XV. Douhts as to the successor of Artabanus III. First short reign of Gotarzes. He is expelled and Vardanes made king. Reign of Vardanes. His icar icith Izates. His Death. Second reign of Gotarzes. His Contest with his Nephew, Meherdates. His Death. Short and inglorious reign of Vonones II. " Turbatae Parthorum res, inter arabiguos, quis in regnura acciperetur." Tacit. Ann xi. 10. There is considerable doubt as to the immediate successor of Artabanus. According to Josephus' he left his kingdom to his son, Bardanes or Vardanes, and this prince entered without difficulty and at once upon the enjoyment of his sovereignty. According to Tacitus,^ the person who obtained the throne directly upon the death of Artabanus was his son, Gotarzes, who was generally accepted for king, and might have reigned without having his title disputed, had he not given indications of a harsh and cruel temper. Among other atrocities whereof J42 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xv. he was guilty was the murder of his brother, Artabanus,' whom he put to death, together with his wife and son, appar- ently upon mere suspicion. This bloody initiation of his reign spread alarm among the nobles, who thereupon determined tq exert their constitutional privilege of deposing an obnoxious monarch and supplying his place with a new one. Their choioe fell upon Vardanes, brother of Gotarzes, who was resid- ing in a distant province, 350 miles from the Court. [PI. II. Fig. 5.] Having entered into communications with this prince, they easily induced him to quit his retirement, and to take up arms against the tyrant. Vardanes was ambitious, bold and prompt : he had no sooner received the invitation of the Megis- tanes than he set out, and, having accomphshed his journey to the Court in the space of two days,* found Gotarzes whoUy unprepared to offer resistance. Thus Vardanes became king \vithout fighting a battle. Gotarzes fled, and escaped iato the country of the Dahse, which lay east of the Caspian Sea, and north of the Parthian province of Hyrcania. Here he was allowed to reign for some time unmolested by his brother, and to form plans and make preparations for the recovery of his lost power. The statements of Tacitus are so circumstantial, and his authority as an historian is so great, that we can scarcely hesitate to accept the history as he delivers it, rather than as it is related by the Jewish writer. It is, however, remarkable that the series of Parthian coins presents an appearance of accordance rather with the latter than the former, since it affords no trace of the supposed first reign of Gotarzes in a.d. 42, while it shows Vardanes to have held the throne from Sept. A.D. 42 to at least a.d. 46.^ Still this does not absolutely contradict Tacitus, It only proves that the first reign of Gotarzes was comprised within a few weeks, and that before two months had passed from the death of Artabanus, the kingdom was established in the hands of Vardanes. That pi'ince, after the flight of his brother, applied himseK for some time to the reduction of the Seleucians," whose continued inde- pendence in the midst of a Parthian province he regarded as a disgrace to the Empire. His efforts to take the town failed, however, of success. Being abundantly provisioned and strongly fortified, it was well able to stand a siege ; and the high spirit of its inhabitants made them determined to resist to the uttermost. While they still held out, Vardanes was called away to the East, where his brother had been gathering Cfl. XV.] .. EEiQN OF VARDANES i. 143 strength, and was once more advancing his pretensions. The Hyrcanians, as well as the Dahae, had embi-aced Ms cause, and Parthia was threatened with dismemberment. Vardanes, hav- ing collected his troops, occupied a position in the plain region of Bactria,^ and there prepared to give battle to his brother, who was likewise at the head of a considerable army. Before, however, an engagement took place, Gotarzes discovered that there was a design among the nobles on either side to rid them- selves of both the brothers, and to set up a wholly new king. Apprehensive of the consequences, he communicated his dis covery to Vardanes ; and the result was that the two brothers made up their differences and agreed upon terms of peace. Gotarzes yielded his claim to the crown, and was assigned a residence in Hyrcania, which was, probably, made over to his government. Vardanes then returned to the west, and, resum- ing the siege of Seleucia, compelled the rebel city to a sur- render in the seventh year after it had revolted (a.d. 46.)^ Successful thus far, and regarding his quarrel with his brother as finally arranged, Vardanes proceeded to contem- plate a mihtary expedition of the highest importance. The time, he thought, was favorable for reviving the Parthian claim to Armenia," and disputing- once more with Rome the possession of a paramount influence over that country. The Eoman government of the dependency, since Artabanus for- mally rehnquished it to them, had been far from proving satisfactory. Mithridates, their protege, '° had displeased them, and had been smnmoned to Rome by CaUgula, " who kept him there a prisoner until his death." Armenia, left without a king, had asserted her independence; and when, after an absence of several years, Mithridates was authorized by Claudius to return to his kingdom, the natives resisted him in arms, and were only brought under his rule by the combined help of the Romans and the Iberians. Forced upon a reluctant people by foreign arms, Mithridates felt himself insecure, and this feeling made him rule his subjects with imprudent severity." Under these circumstances it seemed to Vardanes that it would not be very difficult to recover Armenia, and thus gain a signal triumph over the Romans. But to engage in so great a matter with a good prospect of success it was necessary that the war should be approved^ not only by himsself , but by his principal feudatories. " The most important of these was now Izates, king of Adiabene and Gordyene," who m the last reign had restored Artabanus to J44 ^-ff^ SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xv. his lost throne. " Vardanes, before committing himself by any overt act, appears to have taken this prince into his counsels, and to have requested his opinion on affronting the Romans by an interference with Armenian affairs. Izates strenuously opposed the project. He had a personal interest in the matter, since he had sent five of his boys to Rome, to receive there a polite education, and he had also a profound respect for the Roman power and military system. He endeavored, both by persuasion and reasoning, to induce Vardanes to abandon his design. His arguments may have been cogent, but they were not thought by Vardanes to have much force,, and the result of the conference was that the Great King declared war against his feudatory." The war had, apparently, but just begun, when fresh trou- bles broke out in the north-east. Gotarzes had never ceased to regret his renunciation of his claims, and was now, on the in- vitation of the Parthian nobility, prepared to came forward again and contest the kingdom with his brother. Vardanes had to relinquish his attempt to coerce Izates, and to hasten to Hyrcania in order to engage the troops which Gotarzes had col- lected in that distant region. These he met and defeated more than once in the country between the Caspian and Herat;'" but the success of his military operations failed to strengthen his hold upon the affections of his subjects. Like the gener- ality of the Parthian princes, he showed himself harsh and cruel in the hour of victory, and in conquering an opposition roused an opposition that was fiercer and more formidable. A conspiracy was formed against him shortly after his return from Hyrcania, and he was assassinated while indulging in the national amusement of the chase. '^ The murder of Vardanes was immediately followed by the restoration of Gotarzes to the throne. There may have been some who doubted his fitness for the regal office,"' and inclined to keep the throne vacant till they could send to Rome and ob- tain from thence one of the younger and more civihzed Par- thian princes. But we may be sure that the general desire was not for a Romanized sovereign, but for a truly national king, one bom and bred in the country. Gotarzes was proclaimed by common consent, and without any interval, after the death of Vardanes, and ascended the Parthian throne before the end of the year a.d. 46." It is not likely that his rule would have been resisted had he conducted himself well; but the cruelty of his temper, which had already once cost him his crown, Vol Fig Plate XI EAKLIEB COINS OF ARTAXEKXES I. Fie. 2. ANCIENT TERSiANs (from a bas-relief at Perscpolis). /... — '^ ■MMM^HiMMiaiMAB Plata XII. VqL III. y^ £n. XV. j GOTARZES ANtf MEHEBDATESi 145 again displayed itself after his restoration, and to this defect was added a slothful indulgence yet more distasteful to his subjects." Some military expeditions which he undertook, moreover, failed of success, and the crime of defeat caused the cup of his offences to brim over. The discontented portion of liis people, who were a strong party, sent envoys to the Roman Emperor, Claudius (a.d. 49), and begged that he would surren- der to them Meherdates, the grandson of Phraates IV. and son of Vonones, who still remained at Rome in a position between that of a guest and a hostage. "They were not ignorant," they said, "of the treaty which bound the Romans to Parthia, nor did they ask Claudius to infringe it. Their desire was not to throw off the authority of the Arsacidse, but only to ex- change one Arsacid for another. The rule of Gotarzes had be- came intolerable, alike to the nobility and the common people. He had mvirdered all his male relatives, or at least all that were within his reach— first his brothers, then his near kins- men, finally even those whose relationship was remote ; nor had he stopped there ; he had proceeded to put to death their young children and their pregnant wives. He was sluggish in his habits, unfortunate in his wars, and had betaken himself to cruelty, that men might not despise him for his want of manliness. The friendship between Rome and Parthia was a public matter ; it bound the Romans to help the nation allied to them — a nation which, though equal to them in strength, was content on account of its respect for Rome to yield her precedence. Parthian princes were allowed to be hostages in foreign lands for the very reason that then it was always possi- ble, if their own monarch displeased them, for the peoi)lfi to obtain a king from abroad, brought up under milder in- fluences." ^^ This harangue was made before the Emperor Claudius and the assembled Senate, Meherdates himself being also present. Claudius responded to it favorably. "He would follow the example of the Divine Augustus, and allow the Partliians to take from Rome the monarch whom they requested. That prince, bred up in the city, had always been remarkable for his moderation. He would (it was to be hoped) regard himself in his new position, not as a master of slaves, but as a ruler of citizens. He would find that clemency and justice were the more appreciated by a barbarous nation, the less they had had experience of them Meherdates might accompany the Par- thian envoys ; and a Roman of rank, Caius Cassius, the prefect l46 ^^^ SIXTH MONARCRt. [cH. xY oi Syria, should be instructed to receive them on their arrival m Asia, and to see them safely across the Euphrates. ""* The young prince accordingly set out, and reached the city of Zeugma in safety. Here he was joined, not only by a number of the Parthian nobles, but also by the reigning king of Osrhoene, who bore the usual name of Abgarus."* The Parthians were anxious that he should advance at his best speed and by the shortest route on Ctesiphon, and the Roman governor, Cassius, strongly advised the same course; but Meherdates fell under the influence of the Osrhoene monarch, who is thought by Tacitus to have been a false friend, and to have determined from the first to do his best for Gotarzes. Abgarus induced Meherdates to proceed from Zeugma to his own capital, Edessa, and there detained him for several days by means of a series of festivities. He then persuaded him, though the winter was approaching, to enter Armenia, and to proceed against his antagonist by the circuitous route of the Upper Tigris, instead of the more direct one through Meso- potamia. In this way much valuable time was lost. The rough mountain-routes and snows of Armenia harassed and fatigued the pretender's troops, while Gotarzes was given an interval during which to collect a tolerably large body of soldiers. Still, the delay was not very great. Meherdates marched probably by Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh, or in other words, followed the course of the Tigris, which he crossed in the neigborhood of Mosul, after taking the small town which represented the ancient Nineveh. His line of march had now brought him into Adiabene ; and it seemed a good omen for the success of his cause that Izates, the powerful monarch of that tract, declared in his favor, and brought a body of troops to his assistance." Gotarzes was in the neighborhood, but was distrustful of his strength, and desirous of collecting a larger force before committing himself to the hazard of an en- gagement. He had taken up a strong position with the river Corma in his front, =" and, remaining on the defensive, con- tented himself with trjang by his emissaries the fidelity of his rival's troops and alHes. The plan succeeded. After a Uttle time, the army of Meherdates began to melt away. Izates of Adiabene and Abgarus of Edessa drew off their contingents, and left the pretender to depend wholly on his Parthian sup- porters. Even their fidelity was doubtful, and might have given way on further trial; Meherdates therefore resolved, before being wholly deserted, to try the chance of a battle! CH. XV.] ROCK SCULPTtJUB OP GOTAliZKS. 147 His adversary was now as willing to engage as himself, since he felt that he was no longer outnumbered. The rivals met, and a fierce and bloody action was fouglit between the two armies, no important advantage being f(jr a long time gained by either. At length Carrhenes, the chief general on the side of Meherdates, having routed the troops opposed to him and pursued them too hotly, was intercepted by the enemy on his return and either killed or made prisoner. This event proved decisive. The loss of their leader caused the army of Meher- dates to fly; and he himself, being induced to intrust his safety to a certain Parrhaces, a dependent of his father's, was betrayed by this miscreant, loaded with chains, and given up to his rival. Gotarzes now proved less unmerciful than might have been expected from his general character. Instead of punishing Meherdates with death, he thought it sufficient to insult him with the names of "foreigner" and " Eoman," and to render it impossible that he should be again put forward as monarch by subjecting him to mutilation." The Roman historian supposes that this was done to cast a slur upon Rome ;'* but it was a natural measure of precaution under the circumstances, and had probably no more recondite motive than compassion for the youth and inexperience of the pre- tender. Gotarzes, having triumphed over his rival, appears to have resolved on commemorating his victory in a novel manner. Instead of striking a new coin, like Vonones," he determined to place his achievement on record by making it the subject of a rock-tablet, which he caused to be engraved on the sacred mountain of Baghistan, adorned already with sculptures and inscriptions by the greatest of the Achsemenian monarchs. The bas-relief and its inscription have been much damaged, both by the waste of ages and the rude hand of man; but enough remains to show that the conqueror was represented as pursuing his enemies in the field, on horseback, while a winged Victory, flying in the air, Avas on the point of placing a diadem on his head.^" In the Greek legend which accom- panied the sculpture he was termed "Satrap of Satraps"— an equivalent of the ordinary title " Kmgof Kings"; and his con- quered rival was mentioned under the name of Mithrates, a cor- rupt form of the more common or Mithridates or Meherdates." Very shortly after his \dctory Gotarzes died. His last year seems to have been a.d. 51.'^ According to Tacitus, he died a natvu'al death, from the effects of disease f'' but, according to 148 THE SIXTH MONAUCHY. [ctt. XV. Josephiis, he was the victim of a conspiracy. ^^ The authority of Tacitus, here as elsewhere generally, is to be preferred; and we may regard Gotarzes as ending peacefully his unquiet reign, which had begun in a.d. 42, immediately after the death of his father, had been interrupted for four years— from a.d. 42 to A.D. 46 — and had then been renewed and lasted from a.d. 46 to A.D. 51. Gotarzes was not a prince of any remarkable talents, or of a character differing in any important respects from the ordinary Parthian type. He was perhaps even moi'e cruel than the bvdk of the Arsacidse, though his treatment of Meherdates showed that he could be lenient xx^on occasion. He was more prudent than daring, more politic than brave, more bent on maintaining his own position than on advancing the power or dignity of his country. Parthia owed little or nothing to him. The internal organization of the country must have suffered from his long wars with his brother and his nephew ; its external reputation was not increased by one whose foreign expeditions were uniformly unfortunate. The successor of Gotarzes was a certain Vonones. His rela- tionship to previous monarchs is doubtful— and may be sus- pected to have been remote. ^^ Gotarzes had murdered or mutilated all the Arsacidse on whom he could lay his hands ; and the Parthians had to send to Media^" upon his disease in order to obtain a sovereign of the required blood. The coins of Vonones II. are scarce, and have a peculiar rudeness. The only date" found upon them is one equivalent to a.d. 51-52; and it would seem that his entire reign was comprised within the space of a few months. Tacitus tells us that his rule was brief and inglorious, marked by no important events, either prosperous or adverse. He was succeeded by his son, Vola- gases I., who appears to have ascended the throne before the year a.d. 51 had expired.'* CH. XYi.] ACCESSION OF VOLAOASES I. 149 CHAPTER XVI. Beign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails. His quarrel with Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by the DahcB and Sacce. Second attack of Volagases on Ar- menia. Tiridates established as King. First expedition of Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of Vardanes. Second expedition of Corbulo. Armenia given to Tigranes. Revolt of Hyrcania. Third attack of Vola- gases on Armenia. Defeat of Pcetus, and re-establishment of Tiridates. Last expedition of Corbtdo, and arrange- ment of Terms of Peace. Tiridates at Rome. Probable time of the Death of Volagases. "Qenti Parthorum Vologeses imperitabat, materna origine ex pellice Graeca." Tac. Ann. xii. 44. VoNONES the Second left behind him three sons, Volagases, Tiridates, and Pacorus. It is doiibtfvil which of them was the eldest, but, on the whole, most probable that that position be- longed to Paconxs. We are told that Volagases obtained the crown by his brothers' yielding up their claim to him, ' from which we must draw the conclusion that both of them were his elders. These circumstances of his accession will account for much of lais subsequent conduct. It happened that he was able at once to bestow a principality upon Pacorus,^ to whom he felt specially indebted ; but in order adequately to reward his other benefactor, he found it necessary to conquer a prov- ince and then make its government over to him. Hence his frequent attacks upon Armenia, and his numerous wars with Rome for its possession, which led ultimately to an arrange- ment by which the quiet enjoyment of the Armenian throne was secured to Tiridates. The circumstances under which Volagases made his first attack upon Armenia were the following. Pharasmanes of Iberia,' whose brother, Mithridates, the Romans had (in A.D. 47) replaced upon the Armenian throne, had a son named Rhadamistus, whose lust of power was so great that to pre- vent his making an attempt on his own crown Pharasmanes fourul it necessary to divert his thoughts to another fjuarter* 150 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xvl Armenia, he suggested, lay near, and was a prize worth win ning; Khadamistus had only to ingratiate himself with the people, and then craftily remove his uncle, and he would probably step with ease into the vacant place. The son took the advice of his father, and in a little time succeeded in get- ting Mithridates into his power, when he ruthlessly put him to death, together with his wife and children.^ Rhadamistus then, supported by his father, obtained the object of his ambi- tion, and became king. It was known, however, that a con- siderable number of the Armenians were adverse to a rule which had been brought about by treachery and murder ; and it was suspected that, if an attack were made upon him, ho would not be supported with much zeal by his subjects. This was the condition of things when Volagases ascended the Par thian throne, and found himself in want of a principality with which he might reward the services of Tiridates, his brother. It at once occurred to him that a happy chance presented him with an excellent opportunity of acquiring Armenia, and he accordingly proceeded, in the very year of his accession, to make an expedition against it. " At first he carried all before him. The Iberian supporters of Ehadamistus fled without risking a battle ; his Armenian subjects resisted weakly ; Ar- taxata and Tigranocerta opened their gates ; and the country generally submitted. Tiridates enjoyed his kingdom for a few months ; but a terrible pestilence, brought about by a severe winter and a want of proper provisions, decimated the Par- thian force left in garrison; and Volagases found himself obliged, after a short occupation, to relinquish his conquest. Rhadamistus returned, and, although the Armenians opposed him in arms, contrived to re-establish himself. The Parthians did not renew their efforts, and for three years — from a.d. 51 to A.D. 54 — Rhadamistus was left in quiet possession of the Armenian kingdom.' It appears to have been in this interval that the arms of Volagases were directed against one of his great feudatories, Izates. As in Europe during the prevalence of the feudal sys- tem, so under the Parthian government, it was always possible that the sovei-eign might be forced to contend with one of the princes who owed him fealty. Volagases seems to have thought that the position of the Adiabenian monarch was bo- coming too independent, and that it was necessary to recall him, by a sharp mandate, to his proper position of subordinate and tributary. Accordingly, he sent him a demand that he 1 CH. XVI.] niS WAE WITH IZATES. 151 should surrender the special privileges wliich had been con- ferred upon him by Artabanus III.,^ and resume the ordinary- status of a Parthian feudatory. Izates, who feared that if he yielded he would find that this demand was only a prelude to others more intolerable, i-eplied by a positive refusal, and im- mediately prepared to resist an invasion. He sent his wives and children to the strongest fortress within his dominions, col- lected all the grain that his subjects possessed into fortified places, and laid waste the whole of the open country, so that it should afford no sustenance to an invading army. He then took up a position on the lower Zab, or Caprius, and stood prepared to resist an attack upon his territory. Volagascs advanced to the opposite bank of the river, and was preparing to invade Adiabene, when news reached him of an important attack upon his eastern provinces. A horde of barbarians, consisting of Dahse and other Scythians, had poured into Par- thia Proper, knoAving that he was engaged elsewhere, and threatened to carry fire and sword through the entire prov- ince. The Parthian monarch considered that it was his first duty to meet these aggressors ; and leaving Izates unchastised, he marched away to the north-east to repel the external enemy." Volagases, after defeating this foe, would no dovibt have re- turned to Adiabene, and resumed the war with Izates, but in his absence that prince died." Monobazus, his brother, who inherited his crown, could have no claim to the privileges which had been conferred for personal services upon Izates ; and conseqviontly there was no necessity for the war to be re- newed. The bones of Izates were conveyed to the holy soil of Palestine and buried in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Monobazus was accepted by Volagases as his brother's successor without any apparent reluctance, and proved a faithful tributary, on whom his suzerain could place complete dependence. The quarrel with Izates, and the war with the Dahse and Sacse, may have occupied the years a.d. 52 and 53. At any rate it was not till a.d. 54, his fourth year, that Volagases re- sumed liis designs against Armenia." Rhadamistus, though he had more than once had to fly the country, Avas found in possession as king, and for some time he opposed the progress of tlie Parthian ai-iiis; but, before the year was out, despairing of success, he again fled, and left Volagases to arrange the af- fairs of Armenia at his pleasure. Tiridates was at once estab* liBhed as king, and Armenia brought into the position of a 152 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xvl regular Parthian dependency. The claims of Rome were ig- nored. Volagases was probably aware that the Imperial throne was occupied by a mere youth, not eighteen years old, one destitute of all warlike tastes, a lover of music and of the arts, who might be expected to submit to the loss of a remote prov- ince without much difficulty. He therefore acted as if Rome had no rights in this part of Asia, estabhshed his brother at Artaxata, and did not so much as send an embassy to Nero to excuse or explain his acts. These proceedings caused much uneasiness in Italy. If Nero himself cannot be regarded as likely to have felt very keenly the blow struck at the prestige of the Empire, yet there were those among his advisers who could well understand and appreciate the situation. The ministers of the young prince resolved that efforts on the largest scale should be made. Orders were at once issued for recruiting the Oriental legions, and moving them nearer to Armenia; preparations were set on foot for bridging the Eu- phrates; Antiochus of Commagene, and Herod Agrippa II., were required to collect troops and hold themselves in readiness to invade Parthia; the Roman provinces bordering upon Ar- menia were placed under new governors;'' above aU, Corbulo, regarded as the best general of the time, was summoned from Germany, and assigned the provinces of Cappadocia and Gala- tia, together with the general superintendence of the war " for retaining possession of Armenia." " At the same tune instruc- tions were sent oiit to Ummidius, proconsul of Syria, requiring him to co-operate with Corbulo ; and arrangements were made to obviate the clashing of authority which was to be feared be- tween two equal commanders. In the spring of a.d. 55 the Roman armies were ready to take the field, and a struggle seemed impending which would recall the times of Antony and Phraates. But, at the moment when expectation was at its height, and the clang of arms appeared about to resound throughout Western Asia, suddenly a disposition for peace manifested it- self. Both Corbulo and Ummidius sent embassies to Volagases, exhorting him to make concessions, and apparently giving him to understand that something less was reqviired of him than the restoration of Armenia to the Romans. '* Volagases listened favorably to the overtures, and agreed to put into the hands of the Roinan commanders the most distinguished members of the royal family as hostages. At the same time he withdrew his troops from Armenia;" which the Romans, however, did not CH. xvi.] REBELLION OF VARDANES IL 153 occupy, and which continued, as it would seem, to be governed by Tiridates. The motive of the Parthian king in acting as he did is obvious. A revolt against his authority had broken out in Parthia, headed by his son, Vardanes ; and, until this inter- nal trouble should be suppressed, he could not engage with ad- vantage in a foreign war.'" [PI. III. Fig. 1.] The reasons which actuated the Roman generals aro far more obscure. It is difficult to understand their omission to press upon Volagases in his difficulties, or their readiness to accept the persons of a few hostages, however high their rank, as an equivalent for the Roman claim to a province. Perhaps the jealousy which sub- sequently showed itself in regard to the custody of the hostages" may have previously existed between the two com- manders, and they may have each consented to a peace disad- vantageous to Rome through fear of the other's obtaining the chief laurels if war were entered on. The struggle for power between Volagases and his son Var- danes seems to have lasted for three years'' — from a.d. 55 to A.D. 58. Its details are unknown to us; but Volagases must have been successful ; and we may assume that the pretender, of whom we hear no more, was put to death. No sooner was the contest terminated than Volagases, feeling that he was now free to act, took a high tone in his communications with Cor- bulo and Ummidius, and declared that not only must his brother, Tiridates, be left in the undisturbed possession of Ar- menia, but it must be distinctly understood that he held it as a Parthian, and not as a Roman, feudatory. '" At the same time Tiridates began to exercise his authority over the Armenians with severity, and especially to persecute those whom he sus- pected of inclining towards the Romans."" Corbulo appears to have felt that it was necessary to atone for his three years of inaction by at length prosecuting the war in earnest. He tightened the discipline of the legions, while he recruited them to their fuU strength,'^' made fresh friends among the hardy races of the neighborhood,"- renewed the Roman alhance with Pharasmanes of Iberia, urged Antiochus of Commagene to cross the Armenian frontier, and taking the field himself, carried fire and sword over a large portion of the Armenian territory. Volagases sent a contingent of troops to the assist- ance of his feudatory, but was unable to i:)roceed to his relief in person, owing to the occurrence of a revolt in Hyrcania," which broke out, fortunately for the Romans, in the very year that the rebellion of Vardanes was suppressed. Under these J54 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xvi circumstances it is not surprising that Tiridates had recourse to treachery,''* or that on his treachery failing he continually lost ground, and was at last compelled to evacuate the country and yield the possession of it to the Romans. It is more remarka- ble that he prolonged his resistance into the third year than that he was unable to continue the struggle to a later date. He lost his capital, Artaxata, in a.d. 58, and Tigranocerta, the second city of Armenia, in a.d. 60. After this he made one further effort from the side of Media," but the attempt was un- availing; and on suffering a fresh defeat he withdrew alto- gether from the struggle, whereupon Armenia reverted to the Romans. They entrusted the government to a certain Tigranes, a grandson of Archelaiis, king of Cappadocia, but at the same time greatly diminished the extent of the kingdom by granting portions of it to neighboring princes. Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemo of Pontus, Aristobulus of the Lesser Armenia, and An- tiochus of Commagene, received an augmentation of their terri- tories at the expense of the rebel state, which had shown itself incapable of appreciating the blessings of Roman rule and had manifested a decided preference for the Parthians.^" But the fate of Armenia, and the position which she was to hold in i-espect of the two great rivals, Rome and Parthia, were not yet decided. Hitherto Volagases, engaged in a contest with the Hyrcanians and with other neighboring nations, whereto the flames of war had spread," had found himself unable to take any personal part in the struggle in which his brother and vassal had been engaged in the west. Now mat- ters in Hyrcania admitted of arrangment, and he was at lib- erty to give his main attention to Armenian affairs. His pres- ence in the West had become absolutely necessary. Not only was Armenia lost to him, but it had been made a centre from which his other provinces in this quarter might be attacked and harassed. Tigranes, proud of his newly-won crown, and anxious to show himself worthy of it, made constant incursions into Adiabene, ravaging and harrying the fertile covintry far and wide.^* Monobazus, unable to resist him in the field, was beginning to contemplate the transfer of his allegiance to Rome, as the only means of escaping from the evils of a perpetual border war.'" Tiridates, discontented with the position whereto he found himself reduced, and angry that his brother had not given him more effective support, was loud in his com- plaints, and openly taxed Volagases with an inertness that bordered on cowardice. '" Public opinion was incliiied to accept CH. XVI.] TIURD EXPEDITION OF VOLAOASES. 155 and approve the charge ; and in Parthia pubhc opinion could not be safely contemned. Volagases found it necessary to win hack his subjects' good-will by calling a council of the nobility, and making them a formal address:" "Parthians," he said, "when I obtained the first place among you by my brothers ceding their claims, I endeavored to substitute for the old sys- tem of fraternal hatred and contention a new one of domestic affection and agreement ; my brother Pacorus received Media from my hands at once ; Tiridates, whom you see now before you, I inducted shortly afterwards into the sovereignty of Armenia, a dignity reckoned the third in the Parthian king- dom. Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful and satisfac- tory footing. But these arrangements are now disturbed by the Eomans, who have never hitherto broken their treaties with us to their profit, and who will now find that they have done 80 to their ruin. I will not deny that hitherto I have preferred to maintain my right to the territories, which have come to me from my ancestors, by fair dealing rather than by shedding of blood— by negotiation rather than by arms; if, however, I have erred in this and have been weak to delay so long, I will now correct my fault by showing the more zeal. You at any rate have lost nothing by my abstinence ; your strength is in- tact, your glory undiminished ; you have added, moreover, to your reputation for valor the credit of moderation — a virtue which not even the highest among men can afford to despise, and which the Gods view with special favor." Having con- cluded his speech, he placed a diadem on the brow of Tiridates, proclaiming by this significant act his determination to restore liim to the Armenian throne. At the same time he ordered Monaeses, a Parthian general, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian monarch, to take the field and enter Armenia, while he him- self with the main strength of the empire advanced towards the Euphrates and theatened Syria with invasion. ^^ The results of the campaign which followed (a.d. 62) scarcely answered to this magnificent opening. Monseses indeed, in conjunction with Monobazus, invaded Armenia, and, advanc- ing to Tigranocerta, besieged Tigranes in that city," which, upon the destruction of Artaxata by Corbulo,'* had become the seat of government. Volagases himself proceeded as far as Nisibis,'-' whence he could threaten at the same time Armenia and Syria. The Parthian arms proved, however, powerless to effect any serious impression upon Tigranocerta; and Vola- gases, being met at Nisibis by envoys from Corbulo, who 156 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. '■'" [ch. xvi. threatened an invasion of Parthia in retaliation of the Parthian attack upon Armenia, consented to an arrangement. A plague of locusts had spread itself over Upper Mesopotamia, and the consequent scarcity of forage completely paralyzed a force which consisted almost entirely of cavalry.'* Volagases was glad under the circumstances to delay the conflict which had seemed impending, and readily agreed that his troops should suspend the siege of Tigranocerta and withdraw from Armenia on condition that the Eoman should at the same time evacuate the province." He would send, he said, ambassadors to Rome who should arrange with Nero the footing upon which Armenia was to be placed. Meanwhile, until the embassy returned, there should be peace— the Armenians should be left to themselves — neither Rome nor Parthia should maintain a soldier within the limits of the province, and any collision between the armies of the two countries should be avoided. A pause, apparently of some months' duration, followed. Towards the close of autumn, however, a new general came upon the scene ; and a new factor was introduced into the poHtical and military combinations of the period. L. Caesennius Psetus, a favorite of the Roman Emperor, but a man of no capacity, was appointed by Nero to take the main direction of affairs in Armenia, while Corbulo confined himself to the care of Syria, his special province. Corbulo had requested a coadjutor,'* probably not so much from an opinion that the war would be better conducted by two commanders than by one, as from fear of provoking the jealousy of Nero, if he continued any longer to administer the whole of the East. On the arrival of Peetus, who brought one legion with him, an equitable division of the Roman forces was made between the generals. Each had three legions ; and while Corbulo retained the Syrian aux- iharies, those of Pontus. Galatia, and Cappadocia were attached to the army of Psetus. But no friendly feeling united the leaders. Corbulo was jealous of the rival whom he knew to have been sent out as a check upon him rather than as a help ; and Psetus was inclined to despise the slow and temporizing policy of the elder chief. The war, according to his views, re- quired to be carried on with more dash and vigor than had hitherto appeared in its conduct— cities shotdd be stormed, he said— the whole country plundered — severe examples made of the guilty. The object of the war also should be changed— in- stead of setting up shadowy kings, his own aim would be tQ reduce Armenia into the form of a province/* CH. xvi.j CAMPAIGN AGAINST PyETUS. 157 The truce established in the early summer, when Volagases sent his envoys to Nero, expired in the autumn, on their re- turn without a definite reply ;*" and the Eoman commanders at once took the offensive and entered upon an autumn cam- paign, the second within the space of a year. Corbulo crossed the Euphrates in the face of a large Parthian army, which he forced to retire from the eastern bank of the river by means of military engines worked from ships anchored in mid-stream. He then advanced and occupied a strong position in the hills at a httle distance from the river, where he caused his legions to construct an entrenched camp." Psetus, on his part, en- tered Armenia from Cappadocia with two legions, and, passing the Taurus range, ravaged a large extent of country ; winter, however, approaching, and the enemy nowhere appearing in force, he led back his troops across the mountains, and, re- garding the campaign as finished, wrote a despatch to Nero boasting of his successes, sent one of his three legions to winter in Pontus, and placed the other two in quarters between the Taurus and the Euphrates, at the same time granting furloughs to as many of the soldiers as chose to apply for them. A large number took advantage of his liberality, preferring no doubt the pleasures and amusements of the Syrian and Cap- padocian cities to the hardships of a winter in the Armenian highlands. While matters were in this position Paetus sud- denly heard that Volagases was advancing against him. As once before at an important crisis,*' so now with the prospect of Armenia as the prize of victory, the Parthians defied the severities of winter and commenced a compaign when their enemy regarded the season for war as over. In this crisis Peetus exhibited an entire unfitness for command. First, he resolved to remain on the defensive in his camp ; then, affect- ing to despise the protection of ramparts and ditches, he gave the order to advance and meet the enemy ; finally, after losing a few scouts whom he had sent forward, he hastily retreated and resumed his old position, but at the same time unwisely detached three thousand of his best foot to block the pass of Taurus, through which Volagases Avas advancing.*' After some hesitation he was induced to make Corbulo acquainted with his position ; but the message which he sent merely stated that he was expecting to be attacked." Corbulo was in no hurry to proceed to his relief, preferring to appear upon the scene at the last moment, when he would be hailed as a savior. 1^8 ^^^ SIXTH MOi^AUCUf. [cH. xvL Volagases, meanwhile, continued his march. The small force ieft by Psetus to block his progress was easily overpowered, and for the most part destroyed.'' The castle of Ai-samosata," where Paetus had placed liis wife and child, and the fortified camp of the legions, were besieged."' The Eomans were chal- lenged to a battle, but dared not show themselves outside their entrenchments. Having no confidence in their leader, the legionaries despaired and began openly to talk of a surrender. As the danger drew nearer, fresh messengers had been des- patched to Corbulo, and he had been implored to come at his best speed in order to save the poor remnant of a defeated army.** That commander was on his march, by way of Com- magene and Cappadocia ; it could not be very long before he would arrive; and the supplies in the camp of Psetus were sufficient to have enabled him to hold out for weeks and months."^ But an unworthy terror had seized both Psetus and his soldiers. Instead of holding out to the last, the alarmed chief proposed negotiations, apd the result was that he con- sented to capitulate. His troops were to be allowed to quit their entrenchments and withdraw from the country, but were to surrender their strongholds and their stores. Armenia was to be completely evacuated by the Eomans ; and a truce was to be observed and Armenia not again invaded, until a fresh em- bassy, which Volagases proposed to send to Rome, returned. Moreover, a bridge was to be made by the Romans over the Arsanias, a tributary of the Euphrates, which, as it was of no immediate service to the Parthians, could only be intended as a monument of the Roman defeat. '" Psetus assented to these terms, and they were carried out ; not, however, without some further ignominy to the Romans. The Parthians entered the Roman entrenchments before the legionaries had left them, and laid their hands on anything which they recognized as Armenian spoil. They even seized the soldiers' clothes and arms, which were relinquished to them without a struggle, lest resistance should provoke an outbreak. '' Psetus, once more at liberty, proceeded vnth. unseemly haste to the Eu- phrates, deserting his wounded and his stragglers, "'^ whom he left to the tender mercies of the Armenians. At the Euphrates lie effected a junction with Corbulo, who was but three days' march distant when Psetus so gracefully capitulated. The chiefs, when they met, exchanged no cordial greeting. Corbulo complained that he had been induced to make a use- less journey, and to weary his troops to no purpose, since Vol. 111. Plate XIII Plate 'XIV Vol. HI. "-^ Oii. xvi.] WAIi COMMITTED TO CORBULO. \^Q without any aid from him the legions might have escaped from their difficulties by simply waiting until the Parthians had exhausted their stores, when they must have retired, Psetus, anxious to obliterate the memory of his failure, pro- posed that the combined armies should at once enter Armenia and overrun it, since Volagases and his Parthians had with- drawn. Corbtdo replied coldly — that ' ' he had no such orders from the Emperor. He had quitted his province to rescue the threatened legions from their peril; now that the peril was past, he must return to Syria, since it was quite uncertain what the enemy might next attempt. It would be hard work for his infantry, tired with the long marches it had made, to keep pace with the Parthian cavalry, which was fresh and would pass rapidly through the plains. The generals upon this parted. Psetus wintered in Cappadocia ; Corbulo returned into Syria, where a demand reached him from Volagases that he would evacuate Mesopotamia. He agreed to do so on the condition that Armenia should be evacuated by the Parthians. ^' To this Volagases consented; since he had re-established Tiri- dates as king, and the Armenians might be trusted, if left to themselves, to prefer Parthian to Eoman ascendancy. There was now, again, a pause in the war for some months. The envoys sent by Volagases after the capitulation of Psetus reached Eome at the commencement of spring^* (a.d. 63), and were there at once admitted to an audience. They proposed peace on the terms that Tiridates should be recognized as king of Armenia, but that he should go either to Rome, or to the head-quarters of the Roman legions in the East, in order to re- ceive investiture, either from the Emperor or his representa- tive. It was with some difficulty that Nero was brought to believe in the success of Volagases, so entirely had he trusted the despatches of Psetus, which represented the Romans as triumphant. " When the state of affairs was fully understood from the letters of Corbulo and the accounts given by a Roman officer who had accompanied the Parthian envoys, there was no doubt or hesitation as to the course which should be pur- sued. The Parthian proposals must be rejected. Rome must not make peace immediately upon a disaster, or until she had retrieved her reputation and shown her power by again taking the offensive. Psetus was at once recalled, and the whole di- rection of the war given to Corbulo, who was intrusted with a wide-spreading and extraordinary authority.^" The Parthian envoys were dismissed, but with gifts, wliich seemed to shovr 1^0 ^'^^^ SIXTH MONARCIlT. [en. xvt that it was not so much their proposals as the circumstances under which they had been made that were unpalatable/' Another legion was sent to the East ; and the semi-independent princes and dynasts were exhorted to support Corbulo with zeal. That commander used his extraordinary powers to draw together, not so much a very large force, as one that could be thoroughly trusted;"* and, collecting his troops at Melitene (Malatiyeh), made his arrangements for a fresh invasion. Penetrating into Armenia by the road formerly followed by Lucullus, Corbulo, with three legions, and probably the usual proportion of allies — an army of about 30,000 men— advanced against the combined Armenians and Parthians under Tiri- dates and Volagases, freely offering battle, and at the same time taking vengeance, as he proceeded, on the Armenian nobles who had been especially active in opposing Tigranes, the late Roman puppet-king. "^ His march led him near the spot where the capitulation of Pa?tus had occurred in the pre- ceding winter ; and it was while he was in this neighborhood that envoys from the enemy met him with proposals for an accommodation. Corbulo, who had never shown himself anxious to push matters to an extremity, readily accepted the overtures. The site of the camp of Psetus was chosen for the place of meeting ; and there, accompanied by twenty horsemen each, Tiridates and the Roman general held an interview/" The terms proposed and agreed upon were the same that Nero had rejected ; and thus the Parthians could not but be satisfied, since they obtained all for which they had asked, Corbulo, on the other hand, was content to have made the arrangement on Armenian soU, while he was at the head of an intact and unblemished army, and held possession of an Armenian dis- trict ; so that the terms could not seem to have been extorted by fear, but rather to have been allowed as equitable. He also secured the immediate performance of a ceremony at which Tiridates divested himself of the regal ensigns and placed them at the foot of the statue of Nero ; and he took se- curity for the performance of the promise that Tiridates should go to Rome and receive his crown from the hands of Nero, by reqiiiring and obtaining one of his daughters as a hostage. In return, he readily imdertook that Tiridates should be treated with all proper honor during his stay at Rome, and on his journeys to and from Italy, assuring Volagases, who was anxious on these points, that Rome regarded only the sub- stance, and made no account of the mere show and trappings of power." ca. XVI.] PEACE BETWEEN PARTHIA AND ROME. 161 The arrangement thus made was honestly executed. After a delay of about two years, "" for which it is difficult to account, Tiridates set out upon his journey. He was accompanied by his wife, by a number of noble youths, among whom were sons of Volagases and of Monobazus, and by an escort of three thousand Parthian cavalry. ''^ The long cavalcade passed, like a magnificent triumphal procession, through two thirds of the Empire, and was everywhere warmly welcomed and sumptu- ously entertained. Each city which lay upon its route was decorated to receive it ; and the loud acclaims of the multitudes expressed their satisfaction at the novel spectacle. The riders made the whole journey, except the passage of the Hellespont, by land, proceeding through Thrace and Illyricum to the head of the Adriatic," and then descending the peninsula. Their entertainment was furnished at the expense of the state, and Is said to have cost the treasury 800,000 sesterces (about 6250Z.) a day:"" this outlay was continued for nine months, and must have amounted in the aggi*egate to above a million and a half of our money. The first interview of the Parthian prince with his nominal sovereign was at Naples, where Nero happened to be staying. According to the ordinary etiquette of the Roman court, Tiridates was requested to lay aside his sword before approaching the Emperor ; but this he declined to do ; and the difficulty seemed serious until a compromise was suggested, and he was allowed to approach wearing his weapon, after it had first been carefully fastened to the scabbard by nails. He then drew near, bent one knee to the gi^ound. interlaced his hands, and made obeisance, at the same time saluting the Em- peror as his "lord.""" The ceremony of the investiture was performed afterwards at Rome. On the night preceding, the whole city was illumi- nated and decorated with garlands; the Forum, as morning approached, was filled with "the people," arranged in their several tribes, clothed in white robes and bearing boughs of laurel ; the Praetorians, in their splendid arms, were drawn up in two lines from the further extremity of the Forum to the Rostra, to maintain the avenue of approach clear ; all the roofs of the buildings on every side were thronged with crowds of spectators ; at break of day Nero arrived in the attire appro- priated to triumphs, accompanied by the members of the Senate and his body-g:uard, and took his seat on the Rostra in a curule ehair. Tiridates and his suite were then introduced between the two long lines of soldiers ; and the prince, advanc 162 WE SIXTH MONARCHY. ^ [cii. xVi ing to the Rostra, made an oration, "which (as reported by Dio) was of a sufficiently abject character. " Nero responded proudly •, and then the Armenian prince, ascending the Rostra by a way constructed for the purpose, and sitting at the feet of the Roman Emperor, received from his hand, after his speech had been interpreted to the assembled Romans, the coveted diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty. ^* After a stay of some weeks, or possibly months, at Rome, during which he was entertained by Nero with extreme mag- nificence, Tiridates returned, across the Adriatic and through Greece and Asia Minor, ''•' to his own land. The circumstances of his journey and his reception involved a concession to Rome of all that could be desired in the way of formal and verbal acknowledgment. The substantial advantage, however, re- mained with the Parthians. The Romans, both in the East and at the capital, were flattered by a show of submission ; but the Orientals must have concluded that the long struggle had terminated in an acknowledgment by Rome of Parthia as the stronger power. Ever since the time of Lucullus, Armenia had been the object of contention between the two states, both of which had sought, as occasion served, to place upon the throne its own nominees. Recently the rival powers had at one and the same time brought forward rival claimants ; and the very tangible issue had been raised, Was Tigranes or Tiridates to be king? When the claims of Tigranes were finally, with the consent of Rome, set aside, and those of Tiridates al- lowed, the real point in dispute was yielded by the Romans. A Parthian, the actual brother of the reigning Parthian king, was permitted to rule the country which Rome had long deemed her own. It could not be doubted that he would rule it in accord- ance with Parthian interests. His Roman investiture was a form which he had been forced to go through; what effect could it have on him in the future, except to create a feeling of soreness? The arms of Volagases had beeen the real force which had placed him upon the throne ; and to those arms he must have looked to support him in case of an emer- gency. Thus Armenia was in point of fact relinqmshed to Parthia at the very time when it was nominally replaced under the sovereignty of the Romans,'"' There is much doubt as to the time at which Volagases I. ceased to reign. The classical writers give no indication of the death of any Parthian king between the year a.d. 51, when they record the demise of Vonones II., and about the year A.Df CH. xYi.] LENGTH OF THE REIGN OF VOLAGASES. 163 90, -when they speak of a certain Pacorus as occupying the throne." Moreover, during tiiis interval, whenever they have occasion to mention the reigning Partliian monarch, they al- ways give him the name of Volagases." Hence it has been customary among writers on Partliian history to assign to Volagases I. the entire period between A.D. 51 and A.D. 90 — a space of thirty-nine years." Eecently, however, the study of the Parthian coins has shown absolutely that Pacorus began to reign at least as early as a.d. 78,'^ while it has raised a suspicion that the space between a.d. 51 and a.d. 78 was shared between two kings," one of whom reigned from a.d. 51 to about A.D. Q2, and the other from about a.d. 62 to a.d. 78. It has been proposed to call these kings respectively Volagases I. and Artabanus IV." or Volagases I. and Volagases II.," and Partliian liistory has been written on this basis;'"* but it is con- fessed that the entire absence of any intimation by the clas- sical writers that there was any change of monarch in this space, or that the Volagases of whom they speak as a contem- porary of Vespasian was any other than the adversary of Corbulo, is a very great difficulty in the way of this view being accepted ; and it is suggested that the two kings which the coins indicate rnay have been contemporary monarchs reigning in different parts of Parthia." To such a theory there can be no objection. The Parthian coins distinctly show the existence under the later Arsacidae of numerous pretenders, or rivals to the true monarch, of whom we have no other trace. In the time of Volagases I. there was (we know) a revolt in Hyrcania,'" which was certainly not suppressed as late as A.D. 75. The king who has been called Artabanus IV. or Volagases II. may have maintained himself in this region, while Volagases I. continued to rule in the Western provinces and to be the only monarch known to the Romans and the Jews. If this be the true account of the matter, we may regard Volagases T. as having most probably reigned from * D. 51 to about A.D. 78 — a space of twenty -seven years. 164 TUE SIXTH MONARCllY. [en. xviL CHAPTER XVII. Results of the Establishment of Tiridates in Armenia. Long period of Peace betiveen Parthia and Rome. Obscurity of Parthian History at this time. Relations of Volagases I. with Vespasian. Invasion of Western Asia by Alani. Death of Volagases I. and Character of his Reign. Acces- sion and Long Reign of Pacorus. Relations of Pacorus icith Decebalus of Dacia. Internal Condition of Parthia during his Reign. Death of Pacorus and Accession of Chosroes. " Longa Concordia quietus Oriens. . . tantura adversus Parthos minae." Tacit. Hist. ii. 6. The establishment of Tiridates as king of Armenia, with the joint consent of Volagases and Nero, inaugurated a period of peace between the two Empires of Rome and Parthia, which exceeded half a century.' This result was no doubt a fortunate one for the inhabitants of Western Asia; but it places the modern historian of the Parthians at a disadvantage. Hitherto the classical writers, in relating the wars of the Syro-Macedo- nians and the Romans, have furnished materials for Parthian history, which, if not as complete as we might wish, have been at any rate fairly copious and satisfactory. Now, for the space of half a century, we are left without anything like a consecu- tive narrative, and are thrown upon scattered and isolated notices, which can form only a most incomplete and disjointed narrative. The reign of Volagases I. appears to have continued for about twelve years after the visit of Tiridates to Rome ;^ and no more than three or four events are known as having faUen into this interval. Oui- knowledge of the reign of Pacorus is yet more scanty. But as the business of the workman is simply to make the best use that he can of his materials, such a sketch of this dark period as the notices which have come down to us allow will now be attempted. When the troubles which followed upon the death of Nero shook the Roman world, and after the violent ends of Galba and Otho, the governor of Judaea, Vespasian, resolved to be- come a candidate for the imperial power (a.d. 69), Volagases CH. XVII.] TROUBLES IN COMMAOENE. 166 ■was at once informed by envoys of the event, and was exhorted to maintain towards the new monarch the same peaceful atti- tude which he had now for seven ysars observed towards his predecessors.' Volagases not only comphed with the request, but sent ambassadors in return to Vespasian, while he was still at Alexandria (a.d. 70), and offered to put at his disposal a body of forty thousand Parthian cavalry. " The circmnstances of his position allowed Vespasian to decline this magnificent proposal, and to escape the odium which would have attached to the employment of foreign troops against his countrymen. Hijs generals in Italy had by this time carried all before them ; and he was able, after thanking the Parthian monarch, to inform him that peace was restored to the Roman world, and that he had therefore no need of auxiliaries.'' In the same friendly spirit in which he had made this offer, Volagases, in the next year (a.d. 71), sent envoys to Titus at ZeugTia, who presented to him the Parthian king's congratulations on his victorious conclusion of the Jewish war, and begged his acceptance of a crown of gold. The polite attention was courteously received ; and before allowing them to return to their master the young prince hospitably entertained the Parthian messengers at a banquet. " Soon after this, circumstances occurred in the border state of Conunagene which tlireatened a rupture of the friendly rela- tions that had hitherto subsisted between Volagases and Ves- pasian.' Caesennius Pastus, proconsul of Syria, the unsuc- cessful general in the late Armenian war, informed Vespasian, early in a.d. 73, that he had discovered a plot, by which Com- niagejie, one of the Roman subject kingdoms, was to be de- tached from the Roman alliance, and made over to the Pai'- thians. Antiochus, the aged monarch, and his son Epiphanes were, according to Paetus, both concerned in the treason ; and the arrangement with the Parthians was, he said, actually con- cluded. It would be well to nip the evil in the bud. If the transfer of territory once took place, a most serious disturbance of the Roman power would follow. Commagene lay west of the Euphrates; and its capital city, Samosata (the modern Sumeisat), conmianded one of the points where the great river was most easily crossed ; so that, if the Parthians held it, they would have a ready access at all times to the Roman provinces of Cajipadocia, Cilicia, and Syria, with a perfectly safe retreat. These arguments had weight with Vespasian, who seems to have had entire confidence in Psetus, and induced him to give IQQ THE SIXTH MONARCIIT. [ch. xvn. the proconsul full liberty to act as he thought best. ThuB em- powered, Psetus at once invaded Commagene in force, and meeting at first with no resistance (for the Commagenians were either innocent or unprepared), succeeded in occupying Samo- sata by a coup de main. The aged king wished to yield every- thing without a blow ; but his two sons, Epiphanes and Cal- linicus, were not to be restrained. They took arms, and, at the head of such a force as they could hastily muster, met Psetus in the field, and fought a battle with him which lasted the whole day, and ended without advantage to either side. But the decision of Antiochus was not to be shaken ; he refused to countenance his sons' resistance, and, quitting Commagene, passed with his wife and daughters into the Roman province of Cilicia, where he took up his abode at Tarsus. The spirit of the Commagenians could not hold out against this defection ; the force collected began to disperse ; and the young princes found themselves forced to fly, and to seek a rofuge in Parthia, which they reached with only ten horsemen.* Volagases re- ceived them with the courtesy and hospitality due to their royal rank ; but as he had given them no help in the struggle, so now he made no effort to reinstate them. All the exertion to which he could be brought was to write a letter on their behalf to Ves- pasian,' in which he probably declared them guiltless of the charges that had been brought against them by Psetus. "Ves- pasian, at any rate, seems to have become convinced of their innocence; for though he allowed Commagene to remain a Roman province, he ijermitted the two princes with their father to reside at Rome, assigned the ex- monarch an ample reve- nue, and gave the family an honorable status. It was probably not more than two or three years after the events above narrated, '" that Volagases found himself in cir- cumstances which impelled him to send a petition to the Ro- man Emperor for help. The Alani, a Scythian people, who had once dwelt near the Tanais" and the Lake Mseotis, or Sea of Azof, but who must now have lived further to the East, had determined on a great predatory invasion of the coimtries west of the Caspian Gates, and having made alliance with the Hyrcanians, who were in possession of that important pass, '" had poured into Media through it, driven King Pacorus to the mountains, and overrun the whole of the open country. From hence they had passed on into Armenia, defeated Tiri- dates, in a battle, and almost succeeded in capturing him by means of a lasso." Volagases, whose subject-kings were thus CH. XVII.] DEATH AND CHARACTER OF V0LAGASE8. 167 rudely treated, and who might naturally expect his own pro- per territories to be next attacked, sent in this emergency a request to Vespasian for aid. He asked moreover that the forces put at his disposal should be placed under the command of either Titus or Domitian,'* probably not so much from any value that he set on their military talents as from a convic- tion that if a member of the Imperial family was sent, the force which accompanied him would be considerable. We are told that the question, whether help be given or no, was seri- ously discussed at Rome, and that Domitian was exceedingly anxious that the troops should go, and begged that he might be their commander. But Vespasian was disinclined for any expenditure of which he did not recognize the necessity, and disliked all perilous adventure. His own refusal of extraneous support, when offered by his rival, rendered it impossible for him to reject Volagases's request without incurring the charge of ingratitude. The Parthians were therefore left to their own resources; and the result seems to have been that the inva- ders, after ravaging and harrying Media and Armenia at their pleasure, carried off a vast number of prisoners and an enormous booty into their ovsm country.'^ Soon after this, Volagases must have died. The coins of his successor'" com- mence in June, a.d. 78, and thus he cannot have outhved by more than three years the irruption of the Alani. If he died, as is most probable, in the spring of A.D. 78, his reign would have covered the space of twenty-seven years. It was an eventful one for Parthia. It brought the second period of struggle with the Romans to an end" by compromise which gave to Rome the shadow and to Parthia the substance of vic- tory. And it saw the first completed disintegration of the Empire in the successful revolt of Hyrcania— an event of evil portent. Volagases was undoubtedly a monarch of consider- able ability. He conducted with combined prudence and firm- ness the several campaigns against Corbulo; he proved him- self far superior to Psetus ; exposed to attacks in various quar- ters from many different enemies, he repulsed all foreign in- vaders and, as against them, maintained intact the ancient dominions of the Arsacidae. He practically added Arminia to the Empire. Everywhere success attended him, except against a domestic foe. Hyrcania seceded during his reign, and it may be doubted whether Parthia ever afterwards recovered it. An example was thus sot of successful Arian revolt against the hitherto irresistible Turanians, which may have tended in no 168 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xvil slight degree to produce the insurrection Avhich eventually subverted the Parthian Empire. The successor of Volagases I. was Pacorus, whom most writers on Parthian history have regarded as his son.'* There is, however, no evidence of this relationship ; and the chief reason for regarding Pacorus as belonging even to the same branch of the Arsacidse with Volagases I. is his youth at his accession, indicated by the beardless head upon his early coins, which is no doubt in favor of his having been a near re- lation of the preceding king. PL III., Fig 1. The Parthian coins show that his reign continued at least till a.d. 93; it may have lasted considerably longer, for the earliest date on any coin of Chosroes is ^r. Seleuc. 421, or a.d. 110. The accession of Chosroes has been conjecturally assigned to a.d. 108, which would allow to Pacorus the long reign of thirty years. Of this interval it can only be said that, so far as our knowledge goes, it was almost wholly uneventful. We know absolutely noth- ing of this Pacorus except that he gave encouragement to a person who pretended to be Nero ; that he enlarged and beau- tified Ctesiphon;'" that he held friendly communications with Decebalus, the great Dacian chief, who was successively the adversary of Domitian and Trajan ; and that he sold the sovereignty of Osrhoene at a high price to the Edessene prince who was cotemporary with him. The Pseudo-Nero in question appears to have taken refuge with the Parthians in the year A.D.' 89. and to have been demanded as an impostor by Domi- tian. ^° Pacorus was at first inclined to protect and to even assist him, but after a while was induced to give him up, probably by a threat of hostilities. The communication with the Dacian chief was most likely earlier. The Dacians, in one of those in- cursions into Moesia which they made during the first years of Domitian, took captive a certain Callidromus,^' a Greek, if we may judge by his name, slave to a Roman of some rank, named Liberius Maximus. This prisoner Decebalus (we are told) sent as a present to Pacorus, in whose service and favor he remained for a number of years. This circumstance, insig- 7iificant enough in itself, acquires an interest from the indica- tion which it gives of intercommunication between the enemies of Rome, even when they were separated by vast spaces, and might have been thought to have been wholly ignorant of each other's existence. Decebalus can scarcely have been drawn to Pacorus by any other attraction than that which always sub- sists between enemies of any great dominant power. He must CH. xvu.] REIGN OF PACORUS II. 169 have looked to the Parthian monarch as a friend who might make a diversion on his behalf upon occasion ; and that mon- arch, by accepting his gift, must be considered to have shown a wilUngness to accept this kind of relation. The sale of the Osrhoene territory to Abganis by Pacorus^' was not a fact of much consequence. It may indicate an ex- haustion of his treasury, resulting from the expenditure of vast sums on the enlargement and adornment of the capital, but otherwise it has no bearing on the general condition of the Empire. Perhaps the Parthian feudatories generally paid a price for their investiture. If they did not, and the case of Abgarus was peculiar, still it does not appear that his pur- chase at all altered his position as a Parthian subject. It was not until they transferred their allegiance to Rome that the Osrhoene princes struck coins, or otherwise assumed the status of kings. Up to the time of M. Aurelius they continued just as much subject to Parthia as before, and were far from ac- quiring a position of independence. There is reason to believe that the reign of Pacorus was a good deal disturbed by internal contentions. We hear of an Artabanus" as king of Parthia in a.d. 79; and the Parthian coins of about this period present us with two very marked types of head, both of them quite unlike that of Pacorus,'^* which must be those of monarchs who either contended with Pacorus for the crown, or ruled contemporaneously with him over other portions of the Parthian Empire. [PI. III., Fig. 2.] Again, towards the close of Pacorus's reign, and early in that of his recognized successor, Chosroes, a monarch called Mith- ridates is shown by the coins to have borne sway for at least six years — from a.d. 107 to 113. This monarch commenced the practice of placing a Semitic legend vipon his coins, ^'^ which would seem to imply that he ruled in the western rather than the eastern provinces. The probability appears, on the whole, to be that the disintegi*ation which has been already noticed as having commenced under Volagases I. was upon the increase. Three or four monarchs were ruling together in different por- tions of the Parthian world, each claiming to be the true Ar- saces, and using the full titles of Parthian sovereignty upon his coins. The Romans knew but little of these divisions and contentions,'^'' their dealings being only with the Arsacid who reigned at Ctesiphon and bore sway over Mesopotamia and A-diabene. Pacorus must have died about a.d. 108 or a little later. I'-^Q TEE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xvnt He le^ behind him two sons, Exedares and Parthamasiris,** but neither of these two princes was allowed to succeed him. The Parthian Megistanes assigned the crown to Chosroes, the brother of their late monarch, perhaps regarding Exedares and Parthamasiris as too young to administer the government of Parthia satisfactorily. If they knew, as perhaps they did,'* that the long period of peace with Rome was coming to an end, and that they might expect shortly to be once more at- tacked by their old enemy, they might well desire to have upon the throne a prince of ripe years and approved judg- ment. A raw youth would certainly have been unfit to cope with the age, the experience, and the military genius of Trajan. CHAPTER XVin. Reign of Chosroes. General condition of Oriental Affairs gives a handle to Trajan. Trajan's Schemes of Conquest. Embassy of Chosroes to Trajan fails. Great Expedition of Trajan. Campaign of A. D. 115. Campaign of A. D. IW. Death of Trajan, and relinquishment of his Parthian Conquests by Hadrian. Interview of Chosroes tvith Hadrian. Its Consequences. Death of Chosroes and Accession of Volagases II. " Ad ortum solis, cunctae gentes quae inter Indum et Euphratem amnes inclytos sunt, concussse bello."— Aurel. Vict. Hist. § 13. The general state of Oriental affairs at the accession of Chosroes seems to have been the following. Upon the demise of Tiridates (about a.d. 100)' Pacorus had established upon the Annenian throne one of his sons, named Exedares, or Axidares, and tbis prince had thenceforth reigned as king of Armenia without making any application to Rome for investiture, or acknowledging in any way the right of the Romans to interfere with the Armenian succession." Trajan, sufficiently occupied in the West,' had borne this insult. When, however, in a.d. 114, the subjugation of Dacia was completed, and the Roman Emperor found his hands free, he resolved to turn his arms towards Asia, and to make the Armenian difiiculty a pretext for a gi'eat military expedition, designed to establish unmis- *H. xviii.j PLANS OF TRAJAN. l7l takably the supremacy of Rome throughout the Eaet. The condition of the East at once called for the attention of Rome, and was eminently favorable for the extension of her influence at this period. Disintegrating forces were everywhere at ■work, tending to produce a confusion and anarchy which invited the interposition of a gi'eat power, and rendered resist- ance to such a power difficult. Christianity, which was daily spreading itself more and more widely, acted as a dissolvent upon the previously-existing forms of society, loosening the old ties, dividing man from man by an irreconcilable division, and not giving much indication as yet of its power to combine and unite. Judaism, embittered by persecution, had from a nationality become a conspiracy ; and the disaffected adherents of the Mosaic system, dispersed through aU the countries of the East, formed an explosive element in the population w^hich involved the constant danger of a catastrophe.^ The Parthian political system was also, as already remarked, giving symp- toms of breaking up. Those bonds which for two centuries and a half had sufficed to hold together a heterogeneous king- dom extending from the Euphrates to the Indus, and from the Oxus to the Southern Ocean, were beginning to grow weak, and the Parthian Empire appeared to be falling to pieces. There seemed to be at once a call and an opportunity for a fresh arrangement of the East, for the introduction of a uni- fying power, such as Rome recognized in her own administra- tive system, which should compel the crumbling atoms of the Oriental world once more into cohesion. To this call Trajan responded. His vast ambition had been whetted, rather than satiated, by the conquest of a barbarous nation, and a single, not very valuable, province. In the East he might hope to add to the Roman State half a dozen countries of world-wide repute, the seats of ancient empires, the old homes of Asiatic civilization, countries associated with the immortal names of Sennacherib and Sardanapalus, Cyrus, Darius, and Alexander. The career of Alexander had an attraction for him, which he was fain to confess ; ^ and he pleased himself by imitating, though he could not hope at his age to equal it. His Eastern expedition was conceived very much in the same spirit as that of Crassus ; " but he possessed the mihtary ability in which the Triumvir was deficient, and the enemy whom he had to attack was groAvn less formidable. Trajan commenced his Eastern expedition in a.d. 114, seven years after the close of the Dacian War. He was met a< 272 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxm Athens in the autumn of that year by envoys trom Chosroes, who brought him presents, and made representations which, it was hoped, would induce him to consent to peace.' Chosroes stated that he had deposed his nephew, Exedares, the Armenian prince whose conduct had been offensive to Rome ; and pro- posed that, as the Armenian throne was thereby vacant, it should be filled by the appointment of Parthamasiris, Exedares's bi'other. This prince would be willing, he said, to receive investiture at the hands of Rome ; and he requested that Trajan would transmit to him the symbol of sovereignty. The accommodation suggested would have re-established the re- lations of the two countries towards Armenia on the basis on which they had been placed by the agreement between Volagases and Nero. It would have saved the credit of Rome, while it secured to Parthia the substantial advantage of re- taining Armenia under her authority and protection. Trajan might well have consented to it, had his sole object been to reclaim the rights or to vindicate the honor of his covtntry. But he had distinctly made up his mind to aim, not at the re- establishment of any former condition of things, but at the placing of matters in the East on an entirely new footing.* He therefore gave the ambassadors of Chosroes a cold reception, declined the gifts offered him, and replied to the proposals of accommodation that the friendship of kings was to be meas- m^ed by deeds rather than by words— he would therefore say nothing, but when he reached Syria would act in a becoming manner. ^ The envoys of the Parthian monarch were obliged to return with this unsatisfactory answer ; and Chosroes had to wait and see what interpretation it would receive from the course of events. During the later months of autumn, Trajan advanced from Athens to Antioch. " At that luxurious capital, he mvistered his forces and prepared for the campaign of the ensuing year. Abgarus, the Osrhoene prince who had lately purchased his sovereignty from Pacorus, " sent an embassy to him in the course of the winter, with presents and an offer of friendship.''* Parthamasiris also entered into communications with him, first assuming the royal title, and then, when his letter received no answer, dropping it, and addressing the Roman Emperor as a mere private person.'^ Upon this act of self-humiliation, nego- tiations were commenced. Parthamasiris was encouraged to present himself at the Roman cnmp, and was given to under- stand that he would there receive from Trajan, as Tiridates had CH. xviii.] TRAJAN ENTRAPS PARTlUMASIRrs^. 173 received from Nero, the emblein of sovereiji:nty and permission to rule Armenia. The mihtary preparations were, however, continued. Vigorous measures were taken to restore the dis- ciphne of the Syrian legions, which had suffered through the long tranquillity of the East and the enervating influence of the climate.'* With the spring Trajan commenced his march. Ascending the Euphrates, to Samosata, and receiving as he ad- vanced the submission of various semi-independent dynasts and princes, he took possession of Satala and Elegeia, Armeni- an cities on or near the Euphrates, and establishing himself at the last-named place, waited for the arrival of Parthamasiris. That prince shortly rode into the Roman camp, attended by a small retinue ; and a meeting was arranged, at which the Par- thian, in the sight of the whole Roman array, took the diadem from his brows and laid it at the feet of the Roman Emperor, expecting to have it at once restored to him. But Trajan had determined otherwise. He made no movement ; and the army, prepared no doubt for the occasion, shouted with all their might, sahiting him anew as Imperator, and congratvdating him on his "bloodless victory." '" Parthamasiris felt that he had fallen into a trap, and would gladly have turned and fled ; but he found himself surrounded by the Roman troops and virtually a prisoner. Upon this he demanded a private audi- ence, and was conducted to the Emperor's tent, where he made proposals which were coldly rejected, and he was given to understand that he must regard his crown as forfeited. It was further required of him that, to prevent false rumors, he should present himself a second time at the Emperor's tribunal, prefer his requests openly, and hear the Imperial decision. The Parthian consented. With a boldness worthy of his high descent, he affirmed that he had neither been defeated nor made prisoner, but had come of his own free will to hold a con- ference with the Roman chief, in the full expectation of receiv- ing from him, as Tiridates had received from Nero, the crown of Armenia, confident, moreover, that in any case he would suffer no wrong, but be allowed to depart in safety. Trajan answered that he did not intend to give the crown of Armenia to any one— the country belonged to the Romans, and should have a Roman governor. As for Parthamasiris, he was free to go whithersoever he pleased, and his Parthian attendants might accompany him. The Armenians, however, must re- main. They were Roman subjects, and owed no allegiance to Parthia.'* ^74 THE SIXTH MONAUCHY. [ch. xvin. The tale thus told, with no appearance of shame, by the Eoman historian, Dio Cassius, is sufficiently disgraceful to Trajan, but it does not reveal to us the entire baseness of his conduct. We learn from other writers, " two of them contem- porary with the events, that the pompous dismissal of Partha- masiris, with leave to go wherever he chose, was a mere pre- tence. Trajan had coine to the conclusion, if not before the interview, at any rate in the course of it, that the youth was dangerous, and covQd not be allowed to live. He therefore gent troops to arrest him as he rode off from the camp, and when he offered resistance caused him to be set upon and slain. This conduct he afterwards strove to justify by accusing the young prince of having violated the agreement made at the in- terview ;'« but even the debased moral sense of his age was re- volted by this act, and declared the grounds whereon he ex- cused it insufficient. Good faith and honor had been sacrificed (it was said) to expediency— the reputation of Rome had been tarnished— it would have been better, even if Parthamasii'is were guilty, to have let him escape, than to have punished him at the cost of a pubhc scandal. '' So strongly was the disgi-ace felt that some (it seems) endeavored to exonerate Trajan from the responsibility of having contrived the deed, and to throw the blame of it on Exedares, the ex-king of Armenia and brother of Parthamasiris. But Trajan had not sunk so low as to shift his fault on another. He declared openly that the act was his own, and that Exedares had had no part in it." The death of Parthamasiris was followed by the complete submisson of Armenia." Chosroes made no attempt to avenge the murder of his nephew, or to contest with Trajan the pos- session of the long-disputed territory. A Httle doubt seems for a short time to have been entertained by the Romans as to its disposal. The right of Exedares to be reinstated in his former kingdom"- was declared by some to be clear; and it was prob- ably urged that the injuries which he had suffered at the hands of Chosroes would make him a sure Roman ally. But these ar- guments had no weight with Ti'ajan. He had resolved upon his coui'se. An end should be put, at once and forever, to the perpetual intrigues and troubles inseparable from such rela- tions as had hitherto subsisted between Rome and the Arme- nian kingdom. The Greater and the Lesser Armenia should be aaanexed to the Empire, and should form a single Roman province." This settled, attention was turned to the neigh- boring countries. Alliance was made with Anchialus, king CH. xvm.] ARMENIA AND MESOPOTAMIA CONQUERED. 175 of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and presents were sent to him in return for those which his envo\-s had brought to Tra- jan.^* A new king was given to the Albanians. Friendly re- lations were established with the chiefs of the Iberi, Sauro- matse, Colchi, and even with the tribes settled on the Cimme- rian Bosphorus." The nations of these parts were taught that Rome was the power which the inhabitants even of the remote East and North had most to fear ; and a wholesome awe was instilled into them which would, it was hoped, conduce to the general tranquillity of the Empire. But the objects thus accomphshed^ considerable as they were, did not seem to the indefatigable Emperor sufficient for one year. Having settled the affairs of the North-east, and left garrisons in the chief Armenian strongholds,"" Trajan marched southwards to Edessa, the capital of the province of Gsrhoene, and there received the humble submission of Ab- ganis, who had hitherto wavei*ed between the two contending powers. ^' Manisares, a satrap of these parts, who had a quar- rel of his own with Chosroes, also embraced his cause,*** while other chiefs wavered in their allegiance to Parthia, but feared to trust the invader. Hostilities were commenced by attacks in two directions— southward against the tract known as An- themusia, between the Euphrates and the Khabour;"" and east- ward against Batnae, Nisibis, and the mountain region known as Gordyene, or the Mons Masius.^" Success attended both these movements ; and, before winter set in, the Romans had made themselves masters of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, and had even pushed southwards as far as Singara,^' a town on the skirts of the modern Sin jar mountain-range. Mesopotamia was at once, like Armenia, " reduced into the form of a Roman province." Medals were issued representing the conqueror with these subject countries at his foot ;^" and the obsequious Senate conferred the title of "Parthicus" upon the Imperator,^^ who had thus robbed the Parthians of two provinces. According to some, the headquarters of Trajan during the ensuing winter were at Nisibis or Edessa,'^ but the nexus of the narrative in Dio seems rather to require, and the other ancient notices to allow, the behef that he returned to Syria and wintered at Antioch," leaving his generals in possession of the conquered regions, with orders to make every preparation for the campaign of the next year. Among other instructions which they received was the command to build a large fleet at J^isibis, where good timber was abundant,"" and to prepare for 176 "PSE SIXTH MONARCHT. [ch. xvm. its transport to the Tigris, at the point where that stream quits the mountains and enters on the open country. '' Meanwhile, in the month of December,'* the magnificent Syrian capital, where Trajan had liis headquarters, was visited by a calamity of a most appalling character. An earthquake, of a violence and duration unexampled in ancient times, destroyed the greater part of its edifices, and buried in their ruins vast multi- tudes of the inhabitants and of the strangers that had flocked into the town in consequence of the Imperial presence. Many Romans of the highest rank perished, and among them M. Virgilianus Pedo, one of the consuls for the year. The Emperor himself was in danger, and only escaped by creeping through a window of the house in which he resided ; nor was his person quite unscathed. Some falling fragments struck him ; but for- tunately the injuries that he received were slight, and had no permanent consequence. The bulk of the surviving inhabitants, finding themselves houseless, or afraid to enter their houses if they still stood, bivouacked during the height of the winter in the open air, in the Circus, and elsewhere about the city. The terror which legitimately followed from the actual perils was heightened by imaginary fears. It was thought that the Mons Casius, which towers above Antioch to the south-west, was abovit to be shattered by the violence of the shocks, and to pre- cipitate itself upon the ruined town.''' Nor were the horrors of the catastrophe confined to Antioch. The earthquake was one of a series which carried destruction and devastation through the greater part of tlie East. In the Roman province of Asia, four cities were completely destroyed — Eleia, Myrina, Pitane, and Cyme. In Greece two towns were reduced to ruins, namely. Opus in Locris, and Oritus. In Galatia three cities, unnamed, suffered the same fate.*"" It seemed as if Providence had determined that the new glories which Rome was gaining by the triumphs of her arms should be obscured by calamities of a kind that no human power could avert or control, and that despite the efforts of Trajan to make his reign a time of success and splendor, it should go down to posterity as one of gloom, suffering, and disaster. Trajan, however, did not allow himself to be diverted from the objects that he had set before him by such trifling matters as the sufferings of a certain number of provincial towns. With the approach of spring (a.d. 116) he was up and doing.*' His officers had obeyed his orders, and a fleet had been built at Nisibis during the winter amply suflQcient for the purpose en. XVIII.] CAMPAIGN OP A.D. Il6. 177 for which it was wanted. The ships were so constructed that they could he easily taken to pieces and put together again. Trajan had them conveyed on wagons to the Tigris at Jezireh/' and there proceeded to make preparations for passing the river and attacking Adiabene. By embarking on board some of his ships companies of heavy-armed and archers, who protected his working parties, and at the same time threatening with other ships to cross at many different points, he was able, though with much difficulty, to bridge the stream in the face of a powerful body of the enemy, and to land his troops safely on the opposite bank. This done, his work was more than half accomplished. Chosroes remained aloof from the war, either husbanding his resources, or perhaps occupied by civil feuds," and left the defence of his outlying provinces to their respective governors. Mebarsapes, the Adiabenian monarch, had set his hopes on keeping the invader out of his kingdom by defending the line of the Tigris, and when that was forced he seems to have despaired, and to have made no further effort. His towns and strongholds were taken one after another, without their offering any serious resistance. Nineveh, Arbela, and Gauga- mala fell into the enemy's hands. Adenystrae, a place of great strength, was captured by a small knot of Roman prisoners, who, when they found their friends near, rose upon the garri- son, killed the commandant, and opened the gates to their countrymen."^ In a short time the whole tract between the Tigris and the Zagros mountains was overrun; resistance ceased ; and the invader was able to proceed to further con- quests. It might have been expected that an advance would have at once been directed on Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital; but Trajan, for some reason which is not made clear to us. deter- mined otherwise. He repassed the Tigris into Mesopotamia, took Hatra'' (now el-Hadhr), at that time one of the most con- siderable places in those parts, and then, crossing to the Eu- phrates, descended its course to Hit""' and Babylon. No re- sistance was offered him, and he became master of the mighty Babylon without a blow. Seleucia seems also to have sub- mitted ;" and it remained only to attack and take the capital in order to have complete possession of the entire region watered by the two great rivers. For this purpose a fleet was again necessary, and, as the ships used on the upper Tigris had, it would seem, been abandoned,"" Trajan conveyed a flotilla, which had descended the Euphrates, across Meso 178 Tni! SIXTH laONAttCET. \cR. xna potamia oii rollers, and launching it upon the Tigris, proceeded to the attack of the great metropolis."^ Here again the resist- ance that he encountered was trivial. Like Bahylon and Se- leucia, Ctesiphon at once opened its gates. The monarch had departed with his family and his chief treasures,^" and had placed a vast space hetween himself and his antagonist. He was prepared to contend with his Roman foe, not in battle array, but by means of distance, natural obstacles, and guerilla warfare. He had evidently determined neither to risk a battle nor stand a siege. As Trajan advanced, he retreated, seeming to yield all, but no doubt intending, if it should be necessary, to turn to bay at last, and in the meantime diligently foment- ing that spirit of discontent and disaffection which was shortly to render the further advance of the Imperial troops impos- sible. But, for the moment, all appeared to go well with the in- vaders. The surrender of Ctesiphon brought with it the sub- mission of the whole region on the lower courses of the great rivers, and gave the conqueror access to the waters of a new sea. Trajan may be excused if he overrated his successes, re- garded himself as another Alexander, and deemed that the great monarchy, so long the rival of Rome, was now at last swept away, and that the entire East was on the point of being absorbed into the Roman Empire. The capture by his lieuten- ants of the golden throne of the Parthian kings may well have seemed to him emblematic of this change ; and the flight of Chosroes into the remote and barbarous regions of the far East may have helped to lull his adversary into a feeling of com- plete security. Such a feeling is implied in the pleasure voy- age of the conqueror down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf, in his embarkation on the waters of the Southern Sea, in the in- quiries which he instituted with respect to Indian affairs, and in the regret to which he gave utterance, that his advanced years prevented hina from making India the term of his labors.^' No shadow of his coming troubles seems to have flitted before the eyes of the Emperor during the weeks that he was thus occupied — weeks which he passed in self-com- placent contemplation of the past and dreams of an impossible future. Suddenly, tidings of a most alarming kind dispelled his pleasing visions, and roused him to renewed exertions. Re- volt, he found, had broken out everywhere in his rear. At Seleucia, at Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa,""" the natives had CH. XVIII.] TRAJAN REPULSED FROM HATRA. 179 flown to arms; his entire line of retreat was beset by foes, and he ran a risk of having his return cut off, and of perishing in the land which he had invaded. Trajan had hastily to retrace his steps, and to send his generals in aU directions to check the spread of insurrection. Seleucia was recovered by Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander, who punished its rebellion by dehvering it to the flames. Lucius Quietus retook Nisibis, and plundered and biu-nt Edessa. Maximus, on the contrary, was defeated and slain by the rebels," who completely de- stroyed the Roman army under his orders. ^* Trajan, perceiv- ing how slight his hold Avas upon the conquered populations, felt compelled to change his policy, and, as the only mode of pacifying, even temporarily, the growing discontent, instead of making Lower Mesopotamia into a Roman province, as he had made Armenia, Upper Mesopotamia, and Adiabene (or Assyria), he proceeded with much pomp and display to set up a native king. The prince selected was a certain Partha- maspates, a member of the royal family of the Arsacidae, who had previously sided Avith Rome against the reigning mon- arch. '•' In a plain near Ctesiphon, where he had had his tri- bunal erected, Trajan, after a speech wherein he extolled the greatness of his own exploits, presented to the assembled Romans and natives this youth as King of Parthia, and with his own hand placed the diadem upon his brow. ^'^ Under cover of the popularity acquired by this act the aged Emperor now commenced his retreat. The line of the Tigris was no doubt open to him, and along this he might have marched in peace to Upper Mesopotamia or Armenia; but either he preferred the direct route to Syria by way of Hatra and Singara, or the insult offered to the Roman name by the independent attitude which the people of the former place still maintained induced him to diverge from the general hne of his course, and to enter the desert in order to chastise their pre- sumption. Hatra was a small town, but strongly fortified. The inhabitants at this time belonged" to that Arabian immi- gi"ation which was always more and more encroaching upon Mesopotamia. They were Parthian subjects, but appear to have had their own native kings."* On the approach of Tra- jan, nothing daunted, they closed their gates, and prepared themselves for resistance. Though he battered down a por- tion of the wall, they repulsed all the attempts of his soldiers to enter through the breach, and when he himself came near to reconnoitre, they drove him off with their arrows. His troops 180 THE SIXTH MONARGIIT. [ch. xviil suffered from the heat, from the want of provisions and fodder, from the swarms of flies which disputed with them every mor- sel of their food and every drop of their drink, and finally from violent hail and thunderstorms. Trajan was forced to withdraw after a time without effecting anytliing, and to own himself baffled and defeated by the garrison of a petty for- tress/' The year, a.d. 116, seems to have closed with this memo- rable failure. In the following spring, Chosroes, learning the retreat of the Romans, returned to Ctesiphon, expelled Par- thamaspates, who retired into Roman territory, and re-estab Hshed his authority in Susiana and Southern Mesopotamia."" The Romans, however, still held Assyria (Adiabene) and Upper Mesopotamia, as well as Armenia, and had the strength of the Empire been exerted to maintain these possessions, they might have continued in all probability to be Roman provinces, despite any efforts that Parthia could have made to recover them. But in August, a.d. 117, Trajan died; and his succes- sor, Hadrian, was deeply impressed with the opinion that Trajan's conquests had been impolitic, and that it was unsafe for Rome to attempt under the circumstances of the time any extension of the Eastern frontier. The first act of Hadrian was to relinquish the three provinces which Trajan's Parthian war had added to the Empire, and to withdraw the legions within the Euphrates." Assyria and Mesopotamia were at once re-occupied by the Parthians. Armenia appears to have been made over by Hadrian to Parthamaspates, "^ and to have thus returned to its former condition of a semi-independent kingdom, leaning alternately on Rome and Parthia. It has been asserted that Osrhoene was placed Ukewise upon the same footing;" but the numismatic evidence adduced in favor of this view is weak ;*"* and upon the whole it appears most probable that, like the other Mesopotamian countries, Os- rhoene again fell under the dominion of the Arsacidae. Rome therefore gained nothing by the great exertions which she had made," unless it were a partial recovery of her lost influence in Armenia, and a knowledge of the growing weakness of her Eastern rival— a knowledge which, though it produced no im- mediate fruit, was of importance, and was borne in mind when, after another half -century of peace, the relations of the two empires became once more unsatisfactory. The voluntary withdrawal of Hadrian from Assyria and Mesopotamia placed him on amicable terms with Parthia dur- CH. xvin.] HADRIAN GIVES UP TRAJAN'S CONQUESTS. 181 ing the whole of his reign. Chosroes and his successor could not but feel themselves under obligations to the monarch who, without being forced to it by a defeat, had restored to Parthia the most valuable of her provinces. On one occasion alone do we hear of any, even threatened, interruption of the friendly relations subsisting between the two powers; and then the misunderstanding, whatever it may have been, was easily rec- tified and peace maintained, Hadrian, in a.d. 122, had an interview with Chosroes on his eastern frontier, and by per- sonal explanations and assurances averted, we are told,"" an impending outbreak. Not long afterwards (a.d. 130, probably) he returned to Chosroes the daughter who had been captured by Trajan, and at the same time promised the restoration of the golden throne, " on which the Parthians appear to have set a special value. It must have been soon after he received back his daughter that Chosroes died. His latest coins bear a date equivalent to A.D. 128;"* and the Roman historians give Volagases II. as king of Parthia in a.d. 133."^ It has been generally supposed that this prince was Chosroes' son, and succeeded him in the natural course;'" but the evidence of the Parthian coins is strong against these suppositions. According to them, Vola- gases had been a pretender to the Parthian throne as early as A.D. 78, and had struck coins both in that year and the follow- ing one, about the date of the accession of Pacorus. His at- tempt had, however, at that time failed, and for forty-one years he kept his pretensions in abeyance; but about a.d. 119 or 120 he appears to have again come forward, and to have disputed the crown with Chosroes, or reigned contemporane- ously with him over some portion of the Parthian kingdom, till about A.D. 130, when— pi'obably on the death of Chosroes — he was acknowledged as sole king by the entire nation. Such is the evidence of the coins, which in this case are very pecu- liar, and bear the name of Volagases from first to last."' It seems to follow from them that Chosroes was succeeded, not by a son, but by a rival, an old claimant of the crown, who cannot have been much younger than Chosroes himself. X82 THE SIXTH M02iARCH7. [cH. xix. CHAPTER XIX. Reign of Volagases II. Invasion of the Alani. Communica' tions between Volagases and Antoninus Pius. Death of Vola' gases II. and Accession of Volagases III. Aggressive War of Volagases III. on Rome. Campaign of a.d. 162. Verus sent to the East. Sequel of the War. Losses suffered by Parthia. Death of Volagases III. " Parthicum bellum, quod Volagessus . . . indixit." Jul. Capit. M. Antonin. § 8. Volagases II. appears to have occupied the Parthian throne, after the death of Chosroes, for the space of nineteen years. His reign has a general character of tranquiUity, which agrees well with the advanced period of hfe at which, according to the coins, he first became actual king of Parthia. ' It was dis- turbed by only one actual outbreak of hostilities, an occasion upon which Volagases stood upon the defensive ; and on one other occasion was for a brief period threatened with disturb- ance. Otherwise it seems to have been wholly peaceful. So far as appears, no pretenders troubled it. The coins show, for the years between a.d. 130 and a.d. 149, the head of but one monarch, a head of a marked type, which is impossible to be mistaken. = [PI. III., Fig. 4.] The occasion upon which actual hostilities disturbed the re- pose of Volagases was in a.d. 133, when, by the intrigues of Pharasmanes, king of the Iberians, a great horde of Alani from the tract beyond the Caucasus was induced to pour itself through the passes of that mountain chain upon the territories of both the Parthians and the Romans.' Pharasmanes had previously shown contempt for the power of Rome by refusing to pay court to Hadrian, when, in a.d. 130, he invited the mon- archs of Western Asia generally to a conference. " He bad also, it would seem, been insulted by Hadrian, who, when Pharas- manes sent him a number of cloaks made of cloth-of-gold, em- ployed them in the adornment of three hundred convicts con^ demned to furnish sport to the Romans in the amphitheatre. ' What quarrel he had with the Parthians we are not told ; but it is related that at his instigation the savage Alani, introduced CH. XIX.] INROAD OF THE ALANI. 183 ■within the mountain barrier, poured at one and the same time into Media Atropatene, which was a dependency of Parthia; into Armenia, which was under Parthamaspates ; and into the Roman province of Cappadocia. Volagases sent an embassy to Rome complaining of the conduct of Pharasmanes, ' who ap- pears to have been regarded as ruHng under Roman protection ; and that prince was summoned to Rome in order to answer for his conduct. But the Alanian inroad had to be dealt with at once. The Roman governor of Cappadocia, who was Arrian, the historian of Alexander, by a mere display of force drove the barbarians from his province. Volagases showed a tamer spirit ; he was content to follow an example, often set in the East, and already in one instance imitated by Rome,' but never adopted by any nation as a settled policy without fatal conse- quences, and to buy at a high price the retreat of the invaders. It was to have been expected that Rome would have punished severely the guilt of Pharasmanes in exposing the Empire and its allies to horrors such as always accompany the inroads of a barbarous people. But though the Iberian monarch was com- pelled to travel to Rome and make his appearance before the Emperor's tribunal," yet Hadrian, so far from punishing him, was induced to load him with benefits and honors. He per- mitted him to sacrifice in the Capitol, placed his equestrian statue in the temple of BeUona, and granted Mm an augmenta- tion of territory." Volagases can scarcely have been pleased at these results of his complaints ; he bore them, however, with- out murmuring, and, when (in a.d. 138) Hadrian died and was succeeded by his adopted son, T. Am-elius, better known aa Antoninus Pius, Volagases sent to Rome an embassy of con- gratvdation, and presented the new monarch with a crown of gold.'" It was probably at this same time that he ventured to make an unpleasant demand. Hadrian had promised that the golden throne which Trajan had captured in his expedition, and by which the Parthians set so much store, should be surrendered to them; " but this promise he had failed to perform. Volagases appears to have thought that his successor might be more facile, and accordingly instructed his envoys to re-open the subject, to remind Antoninus of the pledged faith of his adopted father, and to make a formal request for the delivery of the valued relic." Antoninus, however, proved as obdurate as Hadrian He was not to be persuaded by any argiunent to give back the trophy •, and the envoys had to return with the Ig4 THE SIXTH IIONARCHY. [ch. xix report that their representations upon the point had been in vain, and had wholly failed to move the new Emperor. The history of Volagases II. ends with this transaction. No events are assignable to the last ten years of his reign, which was probably a season of profound repose, in the East as it was in the West— a period having (as our greatest historian observes of it) "the rare advantage of furnishing very few materials for history," which is, indeed (as he says), "little more than the register of the crunes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind." '^ The influence of Rome extended beyond his borders. As in modern times it has become a proverb that when a particular European nation is satisfied the peace of the world is assured, so in the days whereof we are treating it would seem that Rome had only to desire repose, for the surrounding nations to find themselves tranquil. The inference appears to be that not only were the wars which occurred between Rome and her neighbors for the most part stirred up by herself, but that even the civil commotions which disturbed States upon her borders had very generally their origin in Roman intrigues, which, skilfully concealed from view, nevertheless directed the course of afliairs in surrounding States, and roused in them, when Rome thought her interests required it, civil differences, disor- ders, and contentions. The successor of Volagases II. was Volagases III. , who was most probably his son, although of this there is no direct evi- dence. The Parthian coins show " that Volagases III. ascended the throne in a.d. 148 or 149, and reigned till a.d. 190 or 191 — a space of forty -two years. We m.ay assume that he was a tolerably young man at his accession, though the effigy upon his earhest coins is weU bearded, and that he was somewhat tired of the long inactivity which had characterized the period of his father's rule. He seems very early to have meditated a war with Rome,'^ and to have taken certain steps which be- trayed his intentions ; but, upon their coming to the knowledge of Antoninus, and that prince writing to him on the subject, Volagases altered his plans, '^ and resolved to wait, at any rate, until a change of Emperor at Rome should give him a chance of taking the enemy at a disadvantage. Thus it was not till A.D. 161 — twelve years after his accession — that his original de- sign was carried out, and the flames of war were once more lighted in the Ea^t to the ruin and desolation of the fairest por- tion of Western Asia. The good Antoninus was succeeded in the spring of a.d. 161 CH. XIX.] VOLAGASES III. INVADES SYRIA. 185 by his adopted son, Marcus Aurelius, who at once associated with him in the government the other adopted son of Antoni- nus, Lucius Verus. Upon this, thinking that the opportunity for which he had been so long waiting had at last arrived, Vo- lagases marched his troops suddenly into Armenia, expelled Soeemus, the king protected by the Eomans," and established in his place a certain Tigranes, a scion of the old royal stock, whom the Armenians regarded as their rightful monarch.'* News of this bold stroke soon reached the governors of the adjacent Roman provinces, and Severianus, praefect of Cap- padocia, a Gaul by birth, incited by the predictions of a pseudo- prophet of those parts, named Alexander,'" proceeded at the head of a legion into the adjoining kingdom, in the hope of crushing the nascent insurrection and punishing at once the Armenian rebels and their Parthian supporters. Scarcely, however, had he crossed the Euphrates, when he found him- self confronted by an overwhelming force, commanded by a Parthian called Chosroes,^" and was compelled to throw himself into the city of Elegeia, where he was immediately surrounded and besieged. ' Various tales were told of his conduct under these circumstances, and of the fate which overtook him ;" the most probable account being that after holding out for three days he and his troops were assailed on all sides, and, after a brave resistance, were shot down almost to a man. The Par- thians then crossed the Euphrates, and carried fire and sword through Syria.--' Attidius Cornelianus, the proconsul, having ventured to oppose them, was repulsed. ^^ Vague thoughts of flying to arms and shaking off the Roman yoke possessed the minds of the Syrians, ^^ and threatened to lead to some overt act. The Parthians passed through Syria into Palestine, and almost the whole East seemed to lie open to their incursions. When these facts were reported at Rome, it was resolved to send Lucius Verus to the East. He was of an age to undergo the hardships of campaigning, and therefore better fitted than Marcus Aurelius to undertake the conduct of a great war. But, as his military talent was distrusted, tt was considered neces- sary to place at his disposal a number of the best Roman gen- erals of the time, whose services he might use while he claimed as liis own their successes. Statins Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and Martins Verus, were the most important of these officers ; and it was by them, and not by Verus himself, that the military operations were, in fact, conducted. Jt was not till late in the year a.d. 162 that Verus, having 186 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. \ [ch. xix. I with reluctance torn himself from Italy," appeared, with his lieutenants, upon the scene in Syria, and, after vainly offering them terms of peace," commenced hostihties against the trium- phant Parthians. The young Emperor did not adventure his own person in the field, but stationed himself at Antioch,'* where he coidd enjoy the pleasures and amusements of a luxu- rious capital, while he committed to his lieutenants the task of recovering Syria and Armenia, and of chastising the in- vaders. Avidius Cassius, to whom the Syrian legions were entrusted, had a hard task to bring them into proper disciphne after their long period of inaction, ^^ but succeeded after a while by the use of almost unexampled severities. Attacked by Vo- lagases within the limits of his province, he made a successful defence,'" and in a short time was able to take the offensive, to defeat Volagases in a great battle near Europus," and (a.d. 163) to drive the Parthians across the Euphrates. The Armenian war was at the same time being pressed by Statins Priscus, who advanced without a check from the frontier to the capital, Ar- taxata, which he took and (as it seems) destroyed.'' He then built a new city, which he strongly garrisoned with Roman troops, and sent intelligence of his successes to Rome, whither Sosemus, the expelled monarch, had betaken himself. Sosemus was upon this replaced on the Armenian throne, the task of settling him in the government being deputed to a certain Thucydides, by whose efforts, together with those of Martins Verus, all opposition to the restored monarch was suppressed, and the entire country tranquillized. '^ Rome had thus in the space of two years recovered her losses, and shown Parthia that she was still well able to maintain the position in Western Asia which she had acquired by the vic- tories of Trajan. But such a measure of success did not con- tent the ambitious generals into whose hands the incompetence of Verus had thrown the real direction of the war. Military distinction at this time offered to a Roman a path to the very highest honors, each successful general becoming at once by force of his position a candidate for the Imperial dignity. Of the various able officers employed under Verus, the most dis- tinguished and the most ambitious was Cassius— a chief who ultimately raised the standard of revolt against Aurelius, and lost his life in consequence.'' Cassius, after he had succeeded in clearing Syria of the invaders, was made by Aurelius a sort of generalissimo :" and being thus free to act as he chose, determined to carry the war into the enemy's country, and to CH. XIX. 3 DESTRUCTIVE PESTILENCE. l8t try if he could not rival, or outdo, the exploits of Trajan fifty years previously. Though we have no continuous narrative of liis expedition, we may trace its course with tolerable accuracy in the various fragmentary writings which bear upon the his- tory of the time — from Zeugma, when he crossed the Euphra- tes into Mesopotamia,^" to Nicephorium, " near the junction of the Belik with the Euphrates ; and thence down the course of the stream to Sura^* (Sippara?) and Babylon.^" At Sura a battle was fought, in which the Romans were victorious ; and then the final efforts were made, which covered Cassius with glory. The great city of Seleucia, upon the Tigris, which had a population of 400,000 souls, was besieged, taken, and burnt, to punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants." Ctesiphon, upon the opposite side of the stream, was occupied, and the summer palace of Volagases there situated was levelled with the ground."' The various temples were plundered; secret places, where it was thought treasure might be hid, were ex- amined, and a rich booty was carried off by the invaders. The Parthians, worsted in every encounter, ceased to resist ; and all the conquests made by Trajan were recovered. Nor was this all. The Roman general, after conquering the Mesopotamian plain, advanced into the Zagros mountams, and occupied, at any rate, a portion of Media, thereby entithng his Imperial masters to add to the titles of " Armeniacus, " and " Parthicus," which they had already assumed, the further and wholly novel title of "Medicus.""' But Rome was not to escape the Nemesis which is wont to pursue the over -fortunate. During the stay of the army in Babylonia a disease was contracted of a strange and terrible character, whereto the superstitious fears of the soldiers as- signed a supernatural origin. The pestilence, they said, had crept forth from a subterranean cell in the temple of Comeean Apollo at Seleucia," which those who were plundering the town rashly opened in the hope of its containing treasure, but which held nothing except this fearful scourge, placed there in primeval times by the spells of the Chaldeans. Such a belief, however fanciful, was calculated to increase the destructive power of the malady, and so to multiply its victims. Vaslj numbers of the soldiers perished, we are told, from its effects during the march homeward; their sufferings being further aggravated by the failure of supplies, which was such that many died of famine.''* The stricken army, upon entering the Roman territory, communicated the infection to the iiinabt' j^8 ^^^ SIXTH MONARCHY. \p^. xtx. tants, and the return of Verus and his troops to Rome was a inarch of Death through the provinces. The pestilence raged with special force throughout Italy, and spread as far as the Khine and the Atlantic Ocean."' According to one writer" more than one half of the entire population, and almost the whole Roman army, was carried off by it. But though Rome suffered in consequence of the war, its gen- eral result was undoubtedly disadvantageous to the Parthians. The expedition of Cassius was the first invasion of Parthia in wlaich Rome had been altogether triumphant. Trajan's cam- paign had brought about the submission of Armenia to the Romans ; but it did not permanently de prive Parthia of any portion of her actual territory. And the successes of the Em- peror in his advance were almost balanced by the disasters which accompanied his retreat — disasters so serious as to cause a general behef that Hadrian's concessions sprang more from prudence than from generosity. The war of Verus produced the actual cession to Rome of a Parthian province, which con- tinued thenceforth for centuries to be an integral portion of the Roman Empire." Western Mesopotamia, or the tract be- tween the Euphrates and the Khabour, passed under the domin- ion of Rome at this time ; and, though not reduced to the con- dition of a province, was none the less lost to Parthia, and ab- sorbed by Rome into her territory. Parthia, moreover, was penetrated by the Roman arms more deeply at this time than she had ever been previously, and was made to feel, as she had never felt before, that in contending with Rome she was fight- ing a losing battle. It added to the disgrace of her defeats, and to her own sense of their decisive character, that they were inflicted by a mere general, a man of no very great emi- nence, and one who was far from possessing the free command of those immense resources which Rome had at her disposal. Parthia had now. in fact, entered upon the third stage of her decline. The first was reached when she ceased to be an aggressive and was content to become a stationary power ;■** the second set in when she began to lose territory by the revolt of her own subjects:" the third— which commences at this point— is marked by her inability to protect herself from the attacks of a foreign assailant. The causes of her decline were various. Luxury had no doubt done its ordinary work upon the conquerors of rich and highly-civilized regions, softening down their original ferocity, and rendering them at once less robust in frame and less bold and venturesome in character, CK. xix.i MARKED DECLINE OF PAtlflifA. 189 The natural law of exhaustion, which sooner or later affects all races of any distinction, may also not improbably have come into play, rendering the Parthians of the age of Verus very degenerate descendants of those who displayed such brilliant qualities when they contended with Crassus and Mark Antony. Loyalty towards the monarch, and the absolute de- votion of every energy to his service, which characterized the earlier times, dwindled and disappeared as the succession be- came more and more disputed, and the kings less worthy of their subjects' admiration. The strength needed against for- eign enemies was, moreover, frequently expended in civil broils ; the spirit of patriotism declined ; and tameness under insult and indignity took the place of that fierce pride and fiery self-assertion which had once characterized the people. The Avar with Rome terminated in the year a.d. 165. Vola- gases survived its close for at least twenty-five years ; but he did not venture at any time to renew the struggle, or to make any effort for the recovery of his lost territory. Once only does he appear to have contemplated an outbreak. When, about the year a.d. 174 or 175, Aurelius being occupied in the west with repelling the attacks of the wild tribes upon the Danube, Avidius Cassius assumed the purple in Syria, '■"' and a civil war seemed to be imminent, Volagases appears to have shown an intention of once more taking arms and trying his fortune. A Parthian war was at this time expected to break out by the Romans." But the crisis passed without an actual explosion. The promptness of Aurelius, who, on hearing the news, at once quitted the Danube and marched into Syria, together with the rapid collapse of the Cassian revolt, rendered it imprudent for Volagases to persist in his project. He therefore laid aside all thought of renewing hostilities with Rome ; and, on the ar- rival of Aurelius in Syria, sent ambassadors to him with friendly assurances, who were received favorably by the philo- sophic Emperor.'*^ Four years after this Marcus Aurelius died, " and was suc- ceeded in the purple by his youthful son, Lucius Aurelius Corn- modus. It might have been expected that the accession of this weak and inexperienced prince would have induced Volagases to resume his warlike projects, and attempt the recovery of Mesopotamia. But the scanty history of the time which has come down to us^^ shows no trace of his having entertained any such design. He had probably reached the age at which repose becomes a distinct object of desire, and is infinitely preferred 190 THE SIXTH MONARCH f. [ctt. xt to active exertion. At any rate, it is clear that he made no effort. The reign of Commodus was from first to last un- troubled by Oriental disturbance. Volgases III. was for ten years contemporary with this mean and un warlike prince ; but Eome was allowed to retain her Parthian conquests unmolest- ed. At length, in a.d. 190 or 191, Volagases died, " and the des- tinies of Parthia passed into the hands of a new monarch. CHAPTER XX. Accession of Volagases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescen- nius Niger. Part taken by Parthia in the Contest between Niger and Severus. Mesopotamia revolts from Rome. First Eastern Expedition of Severus. Its Residts. Sec- ond Expedition. Successes of Severus. His Failure at Hatra. General Results of the War. Death of Volagases IV. Mera Se raura 6 Se^^pos eKiTTparevei Kara rCiV JldpOutv . . . Jip\e 8' avTwi' OvoAdyouro?. — . Dio Cass. Ixxv. 9. On the death of Volagases III., in a.d. 190 or 191, the Parthian crown fell to another prince of the same name, who was prob- ably the eldest son of the late monarch.' This prince was scarcely settled upon the throne when the whole of Western Asia was violently disturbed by the commotions which shook the Roman Empire after the murder of Commodus. The virtuous Pertinax was allowed to reign but three months (a.d. 193, January — March) . His successor was scarcely proclaimed when in three different quarters the legionaries rose in arms, and, saluting their commanders as "Emperors," invested them with the purple. Clodius Albinus, in Britain; Severus, in Pannonia; and Pescennius Niger, in Syria, at one and the same time claimed the place which the wretched Julianus had bought, and prepared themselves to maintain their rights against all who should impugn them. It seems that, on the first proclamation of Niger, and before it had become evident that he would have to establish his authority by force of arms, either the Parthian monarch, or at any rate princes who were among his dependants,'^ sent to congratulate the new Emperor CH. XX.] VOLAGASES IV. LENDS AID TO NIGER. 191 on his accession and to offei* him contingents of troops, if he required them. These spontaneous proposals were at the first poHtely declined, since Niger expected to find himself accepted joyfully as sovereign, and did not look to have to engage in war. When, however, the news reached him that he had formidable competitors, and that Severus, acknowledged Em- peror at Rome, was about to set out for the East, at the head of vast forces, he saw that it would be necessary for him, if he were to make head against his powerful rival, to draw together troops from all quarters. Accordingly, towards the close of A.D. 193, he sent envoys to the princes beyond the Euphrates, and especially to the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Hatra, entreating them to send their troops at once to his aid.' Vo- lagases, under these circumstances, appears to have hesitated. He sent an answer that he would issue orders to his satraps for the collection of a force, but made no haste to redeem his pro- mise, and in fact refrained from despatching any body of dis- tinctly Parthian troops to the assistance of Niger in the im- pending struggle. While, however, thus abstaining from direct interference in the contest between the two Roman pretenders, Volagases appears to have allowed one of his dependent monarchs to mix himself up in the quarrel. Hatra, at this time the capital of an Arabian community," and the chief city of central Mesopotamia (or the tract between the Sin jar and the Babylonian alluvium), was a dependency of Parthia, and though, like so many other Parthian dependencies, it possessed its native kings,"* cannot have been in a position to engage in a great war without per- mission from the Court of Ctesiphon. When, therefore, we find that Barsemius, the King of Hatra, not only received the envoys of Niger favorably, but actually sent to his aid a body of archers, " we must understand that Volagases sanctioned the measure. Probably he thought it prudent to secure the friend- ship of the pretender whom he expected to be successful, but sought to effect this in the way that would compromise him least if the result of the struggle should be other than he looked for. The sending of liis own troops to the camp of Niger would have committed him irretrievably ; but the actions of a vassal monarch might with some plausibility be disclaimed. As the struggle between the two pretenders progressed in the early months of a.d. 194, the nations beyond the Euphrates grew bolder, and allowed themselves to indulge their natural feelings of hostility towards the Romans. The newly subjected j92 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [cH. 3tx Mesopotamians flew to arms, massacred most of the Eoman detachments stationed about their country, and laid siege to Nisibis,' which since the cession Rome had made her head-quar- ters. The natives of the region were assisted by their kindred races across the Tigris, particularly by the people of Adiabene,' who, like the Arabs of Hatra, were Parthian vassals. Severus had no sooner overcome his rival and slain him, than he hastened eastward with the object of relieving the troops shut up in Nisibis, and of chastising the rebels and their abettors. It was in vain that the Mesopotamians sought to disarm his resentment by declaring that they had taken up arms in his cause, and had been only anxious to distress and injure the partisans of his antagonist. Though they sent ambassadors 10 him with presents, and offered to make restitution of the lEloman spoil still in their hands, and of the Roman prisoners, it was observed that they said nothing about restoring the strong- holds which they had taken, or resiuningthe position of Roman tributaries. On the contrary, they required that all Roman soldiers still in their country should be withdrawn from it, and that their independence should henceforth be respected.' As Severus was not inclined to surrender Roman territory without a contest, war was at once declared. His immediate adversa- ries were of no great account, being, as they were, the petty kings of Osrhoene, Adiabene, and Hatra; but behind them loomed the massive form of the Parthian State, which was attacked through them, and could not be indifferent to their fortunes. In the spring of a.d. 195, Severus, at the head of his troops, crossed the Euphrates in person, and taking up his own quarters at Nisibis, which the Mesopotamians had been un- able to capture, proceeded to employ his generals in the re- duction of the rebels and the castigation of their aiders and ' abettors. Though his men suffered considerably from the scarcity and badness of the water,'" yet he seems to have found no great difficulty in reducing Mesopotamia once more into subjection. Having brought it completely under, and formally made Nisibis the capital, at the same tune raising it to the dignified position of a Roman colony," he caused his troops to cross the Tigris into Adiabene, and, though the in- habitants offered a stout resistance, succeeded in making him- self master of the country. '^ The Parthian monarch seems to have made no effort to prevent the occupation of this province. He stood probably on the defensive, expecting to be attacked, Ch. XX.] SECOND EASTERN ElXPEDITION OF SEVERUS. 193 in or near his capital. But Seveinis could not afford to remain in these remote regions. He had still a rival in the West in the person of Clodius Albinus, who might be expected to descend upon Italy, if it were left exposed to his attacks much longer. He therefore quitted the East early in a.d. 196, and returned to Rome with all speed, leaving Parthia very insuf- ficiently chastised, and his new conquests very incompletely settled. Scarcely was he gone when the war broke out with greater violence than ever. Volagases took the offensive, recovered Adiabene, and crossing the Tigris into Mesopotamia, swept the Romans from the open country. Nisibis alone, which two years before had defied all the efforts of the Mesopotamians, held out against him, and even this stronghold was within a Uttle of being taken. '^ According to one writer,'* the trium- phant Parthians even crossed the Euphrates, and once more spread themselves over the fertile plains of Syria. Severus was forced in a.d. 197 to make a second Eastern expedition, to recover his lost glory and justify the titles which he had taken. On his first arrival in Syria, he contented himself with ex- pelling the Parthians from the province, nor was it till late in the year, '^ that, having first made ample preparation, he crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia. The success of any expedition against Parthia depended greatly on the dispositions of the semi-dependent princes, who possessed territories bordering upon those of the two great em- pires. Among these the most important were at this time the kings of Armenia and Osrhoene. Armenia had at the period of Niger's attempt been solicited by his emissaries ; but its mon- arch had then refused to take any part in the civU conflict.'" Subsequently, however, 'he in some way offended Severus, who, when he reached the East, regarded Armenia as a hos- tile State requiring instant subjugation." It seems to have been in the summer of a.d. 197, soon after his first arrival in Syria, that Severus despatched a force against the Armenian prince, who was named (like the Parthian monarch of the time) Volagases. That prince mustered his troops and met the invaders at the frontier of his kingdom. A battle seemed imminent ; but ere the fortune of war was tried the Armenian made an application for a truce, which was granted by the Ro- man leaders. A breathing-space being thus gained, Volagases sent ambassadors Avith presents and hostages to the Roman emperor in Syria, professed to be animated by friendly feehngs 194 ^tlE SIXTH MOMAncnt. [ca. %)L towards Rome, and entreated Severus to allow him terms of peace. Severus permitted himself to be persuaded ; a formal treaty was made, and the Armenian prince even received an enlargement of his previous territory at the hands of his molli- fied suzerain.'* The Osrhoenian monarch, who bore the usual name of Ab- ganis, made a more comjDlete and absolute submission. He came in person into the emperor's camp, accompanied by a numerous body of archers, and bringing with him his sons as hostages. '^ Severus must have hailed with especial satisfac- tion the adhesion of this chieftain, which secured him the un- disturbed possession of Western Mesopotamia as far as the junction of the Khabour with the Euphrates. It was his de- sign to proceed himself by the Euphrates route, ^° while he sent detachments imder other leaders to ravage Eastern Mesopo- tamia and Adiabene,^' which had evidently been re-occupied by the Parthians. To secure his army from want, he deter- mined, like Trajan," to build a fleet of ships in Upper Mesopo- tamia, where suitable timber abotmded, and to march his army down the left bank of the Euphrates into Babylonia, while his transports, laden with stores, descended the course of the river." In this way he reached the neighborhood of Ctesiphon without suffering any loss, and easily captured the two great cities of Babylon and Seleucia, which on his ap- proach were evacuated by their garrisons. He then proceeded to the attack of Ctesiphon itself, passing his ships probably through one of the canals which united the Tigris with the Euphrates, or else (like Ti-ajan) conveying them on rollers across the neck of land which separates the two rivers, Volagases had taken up his own position at Ctesiphon, bent on defending his capital. It is possible that the approach of Severus by the line of march which he pursued was unex- pected,-' and that the sudden presence of the Romans before the waUs of Ctesiphon came upon the Parthian monarch as a surprise. He seems, at any rate, to have made but a poor re- sistance. It may be gathered, indeed, from one author"' that he met the invaders in the open field, and fought a battle in defence of Ctesiphon before allowing himself to be shut up within its walls. But after the city was once invested it ap- pears to have been quickly taken. We hear of no such resist- ance as that which was soon afterwards offered by Hatra. The soldiers of Severus succeeded in storming Ctesiphon on the first assault; the Parthian monarch betook himself to Vol. I If. Fig. 1- Fig. 3. Plate XV. LATEE COINS OF AETAXEEXES I. COIN OF HOEMISDAS i. Fig 2. COINS OF SAPOE I. COIN OF YAEAIIRAN I COIN OF VAEAHEA2f II. HEAD OF SAFOE I. (&om a gem). Fig. 7. COIN OP SAPOR I. CH. XX.] CTESIPHON TAKEN BY THE ROMANS. 195 flight, accompanied by a few horsemen ;''* and the seat of em- pire thus fell easily — a second time within the space of eighty- two 3'ears — into the hands of a foreign invader. The treat- ment of the city was such as we might expect from the ordi- nary character of Roman warfare. A general massacre of the male population was made. The soldiers were allowed to plun der both the public and the private buildings at their pleasure. The precious metals accumulated in the royal treasury were seized, and the chief ornaments of the palace were taken and carried off. Nor did blood and plunder content the victors. After slaughtering the adult males they made prize of the wo- men and children, who were torn from their homes without compunction and led into captivity, to the number of a hun- dred thousand.^' Not^vithstanding the precautions which he had taken, Seve- rus appears to have become straitened for supplies about the time that he captured Ctesiphon. His soldiers were compelled for some days to exist on i*oots, which produced a dangerous dysentery.'"' He found himself unable to pursue Volagases,"* and recognized the necessity of retreating before disaster over- took him. He could not, however, return by the route of the Euphrates, since his army had upon its advance completely exhausted the resources of the Euphrates region. ^^ The line of the Tigris was therefore preferred for the retreat ; and while the ships with difficulty made their way up the course of the stream, the army pursued its naarch upon the banks, without, so far as appeal's, any molestation. Tt happened, however, that the route selected led Severus near to the small state of Hatra, which had given liim special offence by supporting the cause of his rival, Niger ; and it seemed to him of importance that the inhabitants should receive condign punishment for this act of audacity. He may also have hoped to eclipse the fame of Trajan by the capture of a town which had success- fully resisted that hero."' He therefore stopped his march in order to lay siege to the place, which he attacked with military engines, and with aU the other offensive means known at the time to the Romans. His first attempt was, however, easily repulsed.'- The walls of the town were strong, its defenders brave and full of enterprise. They burnt the siege-macliinea brought against them, and committed great havoc among the soldiers. Under these circumstances disorders broke out among the besiegers ; mutinous words were heard ; and the emperor thought himself compelled to have recourse to jgg THE SIXTH MONABCHT. [CH. SX severe measures of repression. Having put to death two of liis chief officers," and then found it necessary to deny that he had given orders for the execution of one of them, he broke up from before the place and removed his camp to a distance. He had not, however, as yet rehnquished the hope of bring- ing liis enterprise to a successful issue. In the security of his distant camp he constructed fresh engines in increased num- bers, collected an abundant supply of provisions, and made every preparation for renewing the siege with effect at no re- mote period.'^ The treasures stored up in the city were re- ported to be great, especially those which the piety of succes- sive generations had acciunulated in the Temple of the Sun." This rich booty appealed forcibly to the cupidity of the em- peror, while his honor seemed to require that he should not sufiEer a comparatively petty town to defy his arms with im- punity. He, therefore, after a short absence retraced his steps, and appeared a second time before Hatra with a stronger siege-train and a better appointed army than before. But the Hatreni met his attack with a resolution equal to his own. They were excellent archers ; they possessed a powerful force of cavalry ; they knew their walls to be strong ; and they were masters of a peculiar kind of fire, which was calculated to ter- rify and alarm, if not greatly to injure, an enemy unacquainted with its qualities. ^^ Severus once more lost almost all liis ma- chines ; the Hatrene cavalry severely handled his foragers ; his men for a long time made but little impression upon the waUs, while they suffered grievously from the enemy's shngers^' and archers, from his warlike engines, and especially, we are told, from the fiery darts which were rained upon them incessantly. " However, after enduring these various calamities for a length of time, the perseverance of the Romans was rewarded by the formation of a practicable breach in the outer wall ; and the soldiers demanded to be led to the assault, confident m their power to force an entrance and carry the place. ^^ But the emperor resisted their inclination. He did not wish that the city should be stormed, since in that case it must have been given up to indiscriminate pillage, and the treasures which he coveted would have become the prey of the soldiery. The Hatreni, he thought, would make their submission, if he only gave them a little time, now that they must see further resist- ance to be hopeless. He waited therefore a day, expecting an ofiEer of surrender. But the Hatreni made no sign, and in the night restored their wall where it had been broken down. CH. XX.] INACTION OF VOLAGASES. 197 Severus then made up his mind to sacrifice the treasures on which his heart had been set, and, albeit with reluctance, gave the word for the assault. But now the legionaries refused. They had been forbidden to attack when success was certain and the danger trivial — they were now required to imperil their lives while the result coiild not but be doubtful. Perhaps they divined the emperor's motive in withholding them from the assault, and resented it ; at any rate they openly declined to execute his orders. After a vain attempt to force an en- trance by means of his Asiatic allies, Severus desisted from his undertaking. The summer was far advanced ;" the heat was great ; disease had broken out among his troops ; above all, they had become demoralized, and their obedience could no longer be depended on."' Severus broke up from before Hatra a second time, after having besieged it for twenty days,"^ and returned— by what route we are not told — into Syria. Nothing is more surprising in the history of this campaign than the inaction and apparent apathy of the Parthians. Vo- lagases, after quitting his capital, seems to have made no effort at all to hamper or harass his adversary. The prolonged re- sistance of Hatra, the sufferings of the Romans, their increas- ing difficulties with respect to provisions, the injurious effect of the summer heats upon their unacclimatized constitutions, would have been irresistible temptations to a prince of any spirit or energy, inducing him to advance as the Romans re- tired, to hang upon their rear, to cut off their supplies, and to render their retreat difficult, if not disastrous. Volagases ap- pears to have remained wholly inert and passive. His conduct is only explicable by the consideration of the rapid decline which Parthia was now undergoing, of the general decay of patriotic spirit, and the sea of difficulties into which a mon- arch was plunged who had to retreat before an invader. The expedition of Severus was on the whole glorious for) Rome, and disastrous for Parthia, though the glory of the- victor was tarnished at the close by his failure before Hatra. It cost Parthia a second province. The Roman emperor not only recovered his previous position in Mesopotamia, but over- stepping the Tigris, established the Roman dominion firmly in the fertile tract between that stream and the Zagros mountain- range. The title of " Adiabenicus" became no empty boast. Adiabene, or the tract betAveen the Zab rivers— probably in- cluding at this time the entire low region at the foot of Zagroi i9S THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. :xx. from the eastern Khabour on the north to the Adhem towards the south— passed under the dominion of Rome, the monarch of the country, hitherto a Parthian vassal, becoming her tribu- tary/^ Thus the imperial standards were planted permanently at a distance less than a degree from the Parthian capital, which, with the great cities of Seleucia and Babylon in its neighborhood, was exposed to be captured almost at any mo- ment by a sudden and rapid inroad. Volagases survived his defeat by Severus about ten or eleven years. For this space Parthian history is once more a blank, our authorities containing no notice that directly touches Par- thia during the period in question. The stay of Severus in the East" during the years a.d. 200 and 201, would seem to indi cate that the condition of the Oriental provinces was imsettled and required the presence of the Imperator. But we hear of no effort made by Parthia at this time to recover her losses— of no further collision between her troops and those of Rome : and we may assume therefore that peace was preserved, and that the Parthian monarch acquiesced, however unwilUngly, in the curtailment of his territory. Probably internal, no less than external, diflaculties pressed upon him. The diminution of Parthian prestige which had been brought abovit by the suc- cessive victories of Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Severus must have loosened the ties which bovmd to Parthia the several vas- sal kingdoms. Her suzerainty had been accepted as that of the Asiatic nation most competent to make head against Eu- ropean intruders, and secure the native races in continued in- dependence of a wholly alien power." It may well have ap- peared at this time to the various vassal states that the Par- thian vigor had become effete, that the qualities which had advanced the race to the leadership of Western Asia were gone, and that luiless some new power could be raised up to act energetically against Rome, the West would obtain com- plete dominion over the East, and Asia be absorbed into Eu- rope. Thoughts of this kind, fermenting among the subject populations, would produce a general debility, a want both of power and of incUnation to make any combined effort, a desire to wait untU an opportunity of acting with effect should offer. Hence probably the deadness and apathy which characterize this period, and which seem at first sight so astonishing. Dis- trust of their actual leader paralyzed the nations of Western Asia, and they did not as yet see their way clearly towards placing themselves under any other guidance. CH. XXI.] VOLAGASES V. AND AliTABANUS IV. 1&9 Volagases IV, reigned till a.d, 208-9, dying thus about two years before his great adversary, who expired" at York, February 4, a.d. 311. CHAPTER XXI. Struggle behveen the two Sons of Volagases IV., Volagases V. and Artabamis. Continued Sovereignty of both Princes. Ambition of Caracallus. His Proceedings in the East. His Resolve to quarrel with Parthia. First Proposal made by him to Artabamis. Perplexity of Artabanus. Caracallus invades Parthia. His Successes, and Death. Macrinus, defeated by Artabanus, consents to Terms of Peace. Revolt of the Persians under Artaxerxes. Pro- longed Struggle. Death of Artabanus, and Downfall of the Parthian Empire. TeAeuTaios ■ye'yocei' o 'ApTafiavoi. — Dio CflSS. Ixxx. 3. On the death of Volagases IV., the Parthian crown was disputed between his two sons, Artabanus and Volagases. According to the classical writers, the contest resulted in favor of the former, whom they regard as undisputed sov- ereign of the Parthians, at any rate from the year a.d. 216.' It api^ears, however, from the Parthian coins, that both the brothers claimed and exercised sovereignty during the entire term of seventeen or eighteen years which intervened between the death of Volagases IV. and the revolt of the Persians. - Artabanus must beyond all doubt have acquired the sole rule in the western portions of the empire, since (from a.d. 216 to A.D. 22Q) he was the only monarch known to the Romans. But Volagases may at the same time have been recognized in the more eastern provinces, and may have maintained hunself in power in those remote regions without interfering with his brother's dominion in the West. Still this division of the empire must naturally have tended to weaken it; and the position of Volagases has to be taken into accoimt in esti- mating the difficulties under which the last monarch of the Arsacid series found himself placed— difficulties to which, after a struggle, he was at last forced to succumb. Domestic 200 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [en. xxi dissension, wars with a powerful neighbor (Rome), and in- ternal disaffection and rebellion formed a combination, against which the last Parthian monarch, albeit a man of considerable energy, strove in vain. But he strove bravely; and the closing scenes of the empire, in which he bore the chief part, are not unworthy of its best and palmiest days. An actual civU war appears to have raged between the two brothers for some years. Caracallus, who in a.d. 311 suc- ceeded his father, Severus, as Emperor of Eome, congratulated the Senate in a.d. 212 on the strife still going on in Parthia, which could not fad (he said) to inflict serious injury on that hostile state.' The balance of advantage seems at first to have inchned towards Volagases, whom Caracallus acknowledged as monarch of Parthia^ in the year a.d. 215. But soon after this the fortune of war must have turned; for subsequently to the year a.d. 215, we hear nothing more of Volagases, but find Caracallus negotiating with Artabanus instead, and treat- ing with htm as undisputed monarch of the entire Parthian empire. ^ That this was not his real position, appears from the coins ; but the classical evidence may be accepted as showing that from the year a.d. 216, Volagases ceased to have much power, sinking from the rank of a rival monarch into that of a mere pretender, who may have caused some trouble to the established sovereign, but did not inspire serious alarm. Artabanus, having succeeded in reducing his brother to this condition, and obtained a general acknowledgment of his claims, found himself almost immediately in circumstances of much difficulty. From the moment of his accession, Cara- callus had exhibited an inordinate ambition ; and this ambition had early taken the shape of a special desire for the glory of Oriental conquests. The weak and dissolute son of Severus fancied himself , and called himself, a second Alexander;" and thus he was in honor bound to imitate that hero's marvellous exploits. The extension of the Roman territory towards the East became very soon his great object, and he shrank from no steps, however base and dishonorable, which promised to conduce towards the accomplishment of his wishes. As early as A.D. 212 he summoned Abgarus, the tributary king of Osrhoene, into liis presence, and when he unsuspectingly com- plied, seized him, threw him into prison, and declaring his territories forfeited, reduced them into the form of a Roman province.' Successful in this bold proceeding, he attempted to deal with Armenia in the c;ame way; but, though the Ctt. XXI.] ENVOYS TO ARTABANUS. gOl monarch fell foolishly into the trap set for him, the nation was not so easily managed. The Armenians flew to arms on learning the imprisonment of their king and royal family f and when, three year afterwards (a.d. 215), Caracallus sent a Roman army under Theocritus, one of his favorites, to chastise them, they inflicted a severe defeat on their assailant.* But the desire of Caracallus to effect Oriental conquests was in- creased, rather than diminished, by this occurrence. He had sought a quarrel with Parthia as early as a.d. 214, when he demanded of Volagases the surrender of two refugees of dis- tinction.^" The rupture, which he courted, was deferred by the discreditable compliance of the Great King with his requisition. '^ Volagases surrendered the two unfortunates ; and the Roman Emperor was compelled to declare himself satisfied with the concession. But a year had not elapsed before he had devised a new plan of attack and proceeded to put it in execution. Volagases V. was about this time compelled to yield the western capital to his brother ; and Ai^tabanus IV. became the representative of Parthian power in the eyes of the Romans. Caracallus in the summer of a.d. 215, having transferred his residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, sent ambassadors from the last-named place to Artabanus, who were to present the Parthian monarch with presents of unusual magnificence, "* and to make him an unheard-of proposition. ' ' The Roman Emperor," said the despatch with which they were intrusted, "could not fitly wed the daughter of a subject or accept the position of son-in-law to a private person. No one could be a suitable wife to him who was not a princess. He therefore asked the Parthian monarch for the hand of his daughter. Rome and Parthia divided between them the sovereignty of the world; united, as they would be by this marriage, no longer recognizing any boundary as separating them, they would constitute a power that could not but be irresistible It would be easy for them to reduce under their sway all the bar- barous races on the skirts of their empires, and to hold them in subjection by a flexible system of administration and gov- ernment. The Roman infantry was the best in the world, and in steady hand-to-hand fighting must be allowed to be un- rivaUed. The Parthians surpassed aU nations in the number of their cavalry and in the excellency of their archers. If these advantages, instead of being separated, were combined, and the various elements on which success in war depends 202 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxr. were thvis brought into harmonious union, there could be no difficulty in establishing and maintaining a universal mon- archy. Were that done, the Parthian spices and rare stuffs, as also the Roman metals and manufactures, would no longer need to be imported secretly and in small quantities by mer- chants, but, as the two countries would form together but one nation and one state, there would be a free interchange among all the citizens of their various products and commodities."*' The recital of this despatch threw the Parthian monarch into extreme perplexity. He did not believe that the propo- sals made to him w^ere serious, or intended to have an honor- able issue. The project broached appeared to him altogether extravagant, and such as no one in Ms senses could entertain for a moment. Yet he was anxious not to offend the master of two-and-thirty legions,'* nor even to give him a pretext for a rupture of amicable relations. Accordingly he temporized, contenting himself with setting forth some objections to the request of Caracallus, and asking to be excused comphance with it.''* "Such a union, as Caracallus proposed, could scarcely," he said, "j^rove a happy one. The wife and hus- band, differing in lang-uage, habits, and mode of life, could not but become estranged from one another. There was no lack of patricians at Rome, possessing daughters with whom the emperor might wed as suitably as the Parthian kings did with the females of their own royal house. It was not fit that either family should sully its blood by mixture with the other." There is some doubt whether Caracallus construed this re- sponse as an absolute refusal, and thereupon undertook his expedition, or whether he regarded it as inviting further nego- tiation, and sent a second embassy, whose arguments and per- suasions induced Artabanus to consent to the proposed alli- ance. The contemporary historian, Dio, states positively that Artabanus refused to give his daughter to the Roman monarch, and that Caracallus undertook his expedition to avenge this insult;'" but Herodian, another contemporary, declares exactly the reverse. According to him, the Roman Emperor, on re- ceiving the reply of Artabanus, sent a new embassy to urge his suit, and to protest with oaths that he was in earnest and had the most friendly intentions. Artabanus upon this yielded, addressed Caracallus as his son-in-law, and invited him to come and fetch home his bride." Herodian describes with much minuteness, and with a good deal of picturesque effect, the stately march of the Imperial prince through the Parthian CH. XXI.J TREACHEROUS ATTACK OF CAR A CALLUS. 203 territory, the magnificent welcome which he received, and the peaceful meeting of the two kings in the plain before Ctesi- phon, which was suddenly interrupted by the meditated trea- son of the crafty Roman. Taken at disadvantage, the Parthian monarch with ditficulty escaped, while his soldiers and other subjects, incapable of making any resistance, were slaughtered like sheep by their assailants, who then plundered and ravaged the Parthian territory at their ^vill, and returned laden with spoil into Mesopotamia. In general, Dio is a more trustworthy authority than Herodian, and most moderns have therefore preferred his version of the story.'* But it may be ques- tioned whether in this particular case the truth has not been best preserved by the historian on whom under ordinary cir- cumstances we place less dependence. If so disgraceful an outrage as that described by Herodian was, indeed, committed by the head of the Roman State on a foi'eign potentate, Dio, as a great State official, would naturally be anxious to gloss it over. There are, moreover, internal difficulties in his narra- tive ; '^ and on more than one point of importance he contra- dicts not only Herodian, but also Spartianus.-" It is therefore not improbable that Herodian has given with most truth the general outline of the expedition of Caracallus, though, with that love of effect which characterizes him, he may have un- duly embeUished the narrative. The advance of CaracaUus was, if Spartianus is to be beheved, through Babylonia.''' The return may have been (as Dio seems to indicate that it was") by the way of the Tigris, through Adiabene and Upper Mesopotamia. It was doubtless on the return that Caracallus committed a second and wholly wanton outrage upon the feelings of his adversary, by violating the sanctity of the Parthian royal sepulchres, and dispersing their contents to the four winds. These tombs were situated at Arbela, in Adiabene, a place which seems to have been always regarded as in some sort a City of the Dead." The useless in- sult and impiety were worthy of one who, like Caracallus, was "equally devoid of judgment and humanity," and who has been pronounced by the most unimpassioned of historians to have been ' ' the common enemy of mankind. " "* A severe reck- oning was afterwards exacted for the indignity, which was felt by the Parthians with all the keenness wherewith Orientals are wont to regard any infringement of the sanctity of tha gi'ave. Caracallus appears to have passed the winter at Edessa, 004 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [en. xx-l amusing himself with hunting and charioteering after the fatigues of his campaign. " " In the spring he threatened another advance into Parthian territory, and threw the Medes and Parthians into great alarm." He had not, however, the oppor- tunity of renewing his attack. On April 8, a.d. 217, having quitted Edessa with a small retinue for the purpose of visiting a famous temple of the Moon-G-od near Carrhae, he was sur- prised and murdered on the way by Julius Martialis, one of his guards." His successor, Macrinus, though a Praetorian prefect, was no soldier, and would willingly have retired at once from the war. But the passions of the Parthians had been roused. Artabanus possessed the energy and spii'it which most of the recent monarchs had lacked ; and though defeated when taken at disadvantage, and unable for some months to obtain any re- venge, had employed the winter in the collection of a vast army, and was determined to exact a heavy retribution for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the wanton impiety of Arbela. He had already taken the field and conducted his troops to the neighborhood of the Roman frontier when Cara- callus lost his life. Macrinus was scarcely acknowledged em- peror when he found that the Parthians were close at hand, that the frontier was crossed, and that unless a treaty could be concluded he must risk a battle. " Under these circumstances the unwarlike emperor hurriedly sent ambassadors to the Parthian camp, with an offer to restore all the prisoners made in the late campaign as the price of jjeace. Artabanus unhesitatingly rejected the overture, but at the same time informed his adversary of the terms on which he was willing to treat. Macrinus, he said, must not only re- store the prisoners, but must also consent to rebuild all the towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, must make compensation for the injury done to the tombs of the kings, and further must cede Mesopotamia to the Parthians.^" It was impossible for a Roman Emperor to consent to such de- mands Avithout first trying the fortune of war, and Macrinus accordingly made up his mind to fight a battle. The Parthian prince had by this time advanced as far as Nisibis, and it was in the neighborhood of that city that the great struggle took place. The battle of Nisibis, which terminated the long contest be- tween Rome and Parthia, was the fiercest and best-contested which was ever fought between the rival powers. It lasted for the space of three days. ^^ The army of Artabanus was numer I en. XXI.] GREAT BATTLE OF NISIBIS. 205 ous and well-appointed: like almost every Parthian force, it was strong in cavalry and archers; and it had moreover a novel addition of considerable importance, consisting of a corps of picked soldiers, clad in complete armor, and carrying long spears or lances, who were mounted on camels.^' The Roman legionaries were supported by numerous hght-armed troops, and a powerful body of Mauritanian cavalry.^' According to Dio, the first engagement was brought on accidentally by a contest which arose among the soldiers for the possession of a watering-place. ^^ Herodian tells us that it commenced with a fierce assault of the Parthian cavalry, who chai'ged the Romans with loud shouts, and poured into their ranks flight after flight of arrows. A long struggle followed. The Romans suffered greatly from the bows of the horse-archers, and from the lances of the corps mounted on camels ; and though, when they could reach their enemy, they had always the superiority in close combat, yet after a wliile their losses from the cavalry and camels forced them to retreat. As they retired they strewed the ground with spiked balls and other contrivances for injur- ing the feet of animals ; and this stratagem was so far success- ful that the pursuers soon found themselves in difficulties, and the armies respectively retired, without any decisive result, to their camps. The next day there was again a combat from morning to night, of which we have no description, but which equally ter- minated without any clear advantage to either side.^^ The fight was then renewed for the third time on the third day, Avith the difference that the Parthians now directed all their efforts towards surrounding the enemy, and thus capturing their entire force. ^^ As tliey gi'eatly outnumbered the Romans, these last found themselves compelled to extend their line un- duly, in order to meet the Parthian tactics ; and the weakness of the extended line seems to have given the Parthians an op- portunity of throwing it into confusion, and thus causing the Roman defeat.'" Macrinus took to flight among the first; and his hasty retreat discouraged his troops," who soon afterwards acknowledged themselves beaten, and retired within the lines of their camp. Both armies had suffered severely. Herodian describes the heaps of dead as piled to such a height that the manoeuvres of the troops were impeded by them, and at last the two contending hosts could scarcely see one another ! Both armies, therefore, desired peace.'* The soldiers of Macrinus, who had never had much confidence in their leader, were de- 206 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxi. moralized by ill success, and showed themselves inclined to throw off the restraints of discipline. Those of Artabanus, a militia rather than a standing force, were unaccustomed to sustained efforts ; and having been now for some months in the field, had grown weary, and wished to return home. Macrinus under these circumstances re-opened negotiations with liis ad- versary. He was prepared to concede something more than he ,* had proposed originally, and he had reason to believe that the t Parthian monarch, having found the Roman resistance so stubborn, would be content to insist on less. The event justi- fied his expectations. Artabanus relinquished his demand for the cession of Mesopotamia, and accepted a pecuniary compen- sation for his wrongs. Besides restoring the captives and the booty carried off by Caracallus in his raid, Macrinus had to pay a sum exceeding a milhon and a half of our money. Eome thus concluded her transactions with Parthia, after nearly three centuries of struggle, by ignominiously purchasing a peace. ^^ It might have been expected that the glory of this achieve- ment woidd have brought the troubles of Artabanus to a close; and if they did not cause the pretender who still disputed his possession of the throne to submit, would at any rate have put an end to any disaffection on the part of the subject nations that the previous ill-success of Parthia in her Roman wars might have provoked. But in the histories of nations and em- pires we constantly find that noble and gallant efforts to re- trieve disaster and prevent the ruin consequent upon it come too late. When matters have gathered to a head, when steps that commit important persons have been taken, when classes or races have been encouraged to cherish hopes, when plans have been formed and advanced to a certain point, the course of action that has been contemplated and ari^anged for cannot suddenly be given up. The cause of discontent is removed, but the effects remain. Affections have been alienated, and the alienation still continues. A certain additional resentment is even felt at the tardy repentance, or revival, which seems to cheat the discontented of that general sympathy whereof with- out it they would have been secure. In default of their original grievance, it is easy for them to discover minor ones, to exag- gerate these into importance, and to find in them a sufficien reason for persistence in the intended course. Hence revolu tions often take place just when the necessity for them seems to be past, and kingdoms perish at a time when they have be- gun to show themselves deserving of a longer term of Ufa. CH. XXI.] GRIEVANCES OF THE PERSIANS. 207 It is impossible at the present day to form any trustworthy estimate of the real value of those grounds of compMnt which the Persians, in common doubtless with other subject races, thought that they had against the Parthian rule. We can well understand that the supremacy of any dominant race is irksome to the ahens who have to submit to it ; but such information as we possess fails to show us either any- thing seriously oppressive in the general system of the Par- thian government, or any special grievance whereof the Per- sians had to complain. The Parthians were tolerant; they did not interfere with the religious prejudices of their subjects, or attempt to enforce uniformity of creed or worship. Their military system did not press over-heavily on the subject peoples, nor is there any reason to believe that the scale of their taxation was excessive. Such tyranny as is charged upon certain Parthian monarchs is not of a kind that would have been sensibly felt by the conquered nations, for it was exercised upon none who were not Parthians. If we endeavor to form a distinct notion of the grievances under wlaich the Persians suffered, they seem to have amounted to no more than this: 1. That high offices, whether military or civil, were for the most part confined to those of Parthian blood, and not thrown open to Parthian subjects generally; 2. That the priests of the Persian religion were not held in any special honor," but placed merely on a par with the religious min- isters of the other subject races ; 3. That no advantage in any respect was allowed' to the Persians over the rest of the con- quered peoples, notwithstanding that they had for so many years exercised supremacy over Western Asia, and given to the list of Asiatic worthies such names as those of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis. It must, however, be confessed that the account which has come down to us of the times in question is exceedingly meagre and incomplete; that we cannot say whether the Persians had not also other grounds of complaint besides those that are known to us ; and, more especially, that we have no means of determining what the actual pressure of the grievances complained of was, or whether it did not reach to that degree of severity which moderns mostly hold to justify disaffection and rebellion. On the whole, perhaps, our conclusion must be, that the best justification of the out- break is to be found in its success. The Parthians had no right to their position but such as arose out of the law of the 6t]"onger — 208 ^-^^ SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxi. The ancient rule, the good old plan, That those shall take who have the power, And those shall keep who can — when the time came that they had lost this pre-eminence, superiority in strength having passed from them to a nation liitherto counted among their subjects, it was natural and right that the seat of authority should shift with the shift in the balance of power, and that the leadership of the Persians shovild be once more recognized. If the motives which actuated the nation of the Persians in rising against their masters are thus obscure and difficult to be estimated, still less can we form any decided judgment upon those which caused their leader, Artaxerxes, to attempt his perilous enterprise. Could we trust imphcitly the state- ment of Agathias, that Artaxerxes was himself a Magus, initiated in the deepest mysteries of the Order,*' we should have grounds for considering that rehgious zeal was, at any rate, a leading motive of his conduct. It is certain that among the principal changes consequent upon his success was a religious revolution— the substitution for Parthian tolerance of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly enforced uniformity in religion, the establishment of the Magi in power, and the bloody persecution of all such as declined obedience to the precepts of Zoroaster." But the conjecture has been made, and cannot be refuted, that the proceedings of Artaxerxes in this matter should be ascribed to policy rather than to bigotry," and in that case we could not regard him as origi- nally inspired by a religious sentiment. Perhaps it is best to suppose that, like most founders of empires, he was mainly prompted by ambition ; that he saw in the distracted state of Parthia and in the awakening of hope among the subject races, an occasion of which he determined to avail himself as far as he could, and that he was gradually led on to enlarge his views and to effect the great revolution, which he brought about, by the force of circumstances, the wishes of others, and the occurrence of opportunities which at first he neither fore- saw nor desired. It has been observed," that Parthia was, during the whole reign of Artaxerxes, distracted by the claims of a pretender, Volagases V. According to Moses of Chorene, two branches of the Arsacid family, both of them settled in Bactria, were at feud with the reigning prince; and these offended relatives carried their enmitv to such a length as to consider sub- Vol. I! Plate XVii. o S ■< Plate XVII *« should fall, and the new Persian kingdam succeed into its place. Artabanus had left sons;" and there were not wanting those among the feudatories of the empire, and even among the neighboring potentates, who were well inclined to embrace their cause. A certain Artavasdes seems to have claimed the throne, and to have been accepted as king, at least by a por- tion of the Parthians, in the year following the death of Ar- tabanus (a.d. 227), when he certainly issued coins. ''^ The Armenian monarch, who had been set on his throne by Arta- banus, and was uncle to the young princes,^' was especially anxious to maintain the Arsacids in power ; he gave them a refuge in Armenia,*" collected an army on their behalf, and engaging Artaxerxes, is even said to have defeated him in a battle."' But his efforts, and those of Artavasdes, were un- availing. The arms of Artaxerxes in the end everywhere prevailed. After a strviggle, which cannot have lasted more than a few years, the provinces of the old Parthian empire submitted ; the last Arsacid prince f eU into the hands of the Persian king;''" and the founder of the new dynasty sought to give legitimacy to his rule by taking to wife an Arsacid princess. " Thus perished the great Parthian monarchy after an ex- istence of nearly five centuries. Its end must be attributed in the main to internal decay, working itself out especially in two directions. The Arsacid race, with which the idea of the empire was bound up,"* instead of clinging together with that close "union" which is "strength," allowed itself to be torn to pieces by dissensions, to waste its force in quarrels, and to be made a handle of by every foreign invader, or domestic rebel, who chose to use its name in order to cloak his own selfish projects. The race itself does not seem to have become exhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the throne, nG\'Ter sank into mere weaklings or faineants, never shut themselves up in their seraglios, or ceased to take a leading II CH. XXI.] END OF THE PARTHIAN MONARCHY. 21-1 part, alike in civil broils, and in struggles with foreign rivals. But the hold which the race had on the population, native and foreign, was gradually weakened by the feuds which raged within it, by the profusion with which the sacred blood was shed by those in whose veins it ran, and the difficulty of knowing which living member of it was its tru^e head, and so entitled to the allegiance of those who wished to be faithful Parthian subjects. Further, the vigor of tlie Parthian soldiery must have gradually declined, and their superiority over the mass of the nations under their dominion have diminished. We found reasons for believing that, as early as a.d. 58, Hyrcania succeeded in throwing off the Parthian yoke,'' and thus setting an example of successful rebellion to the subject peoples. The example may have been followed in cases of which we hear nothing; for the condition of the more remote portions of the empire was for the most part unknown to the Romans. When Persia, about a.d. 220, revolted from Arta- banus, it was no doubt with a con viction that the Parthians were no longer the terrible warriors who under Mithridates I. had driven all the armies of the East before them like chaff, or who under Orodes and Phraates IV. had gained signal victories over the Romans. It is true that Artabanus had contended not unsuccessfully with Macrinus. But the prestige of Parthia was far from being re-established by the result of his three days' battle. Rome retained as her own, notwith- standing his success, the old Parthian province of Mesopotamia, and was thus, even in the moment of her weakness, acknow- ledged by Parthia to be the stronger. The Persians are not likely to have been braver or more warlike at the time of their revolt from Artabanus than in the days when they were sub- jected by Mithridates. Any alteration, therefore, in the rela- tive strength of the two peoples must be ascribed to Parthian dechne, since it cannot have been owing to Persian advance and improvement. To conclude, we may perhaps allow some- thing to the personal qualities of Artaxerxes, who appears to have possessed all the merits of the typical Oriental conqueror. Artabanus was among the most able of the later Parthian monarchs ; but his antagonist was more than this, possessing true military genius. It is quite possible that, if the leaders on the two sides had changed places, the victory might have rested, not with the Persians, but with the Parthians. 213 THE SIXTH MONARCUr. [ch. xxii. CHAPTER XXII. On the Architecture and Ornamental Art of the Parthians. The modern historian of Architecture observes/ when he reaches the period witli which we have had to deal in this volume, that, with the advent of Alexander, Oriental arclii- tecture disappears, and that its history is an absolute blank from the downfall of the Achsemenians in B.C. 331 to the rise of the Sassanians, about a.d. 226. The statement made in- volves a certain amount of exaggeration ; but still it expresses, roughly and strongly, a curious and important fact. The Par- thians were not, in any full or pregnant sense of the word, builders. They did not aim at leaving a material mark upon the world by means of edifices or other great works. They lacked the spirit which had impelled successively the Assy- rians, the Babylonians, and the Persians to cover Western Asia with architectural monuments, proofs at once of the wealth, and the grand ideas, of those who raised them. Par- thia, compared to these pretentious empires, was retiring and modest. The monarchs, however rich they may have been, affected something of primitive rudeness and simplicity in their habits and style of Ufe, their dwellings and temples, their palaces and tombs. It is difficult indeed to draw the line in every case between pure Parthian work and Sassanian ; but on the whole there is. no doubt, reason to believe that the architectural remains in Mesopotamia and Persia which be- long to the period between Alexander and the Arab conquest, are mainly the work of the Sassanian or New Persian king- dom, and that comparatively few of them can be ascribed with confidence to a time anterior to a.d. 227. Still a certain number, which have about them indications of greater an- tiquity than the rest, or which belong to sites famous in Par- thian rather than in Persian times, may reasonably be re- garded as in all probabiHty structures of the Arsacid period ; and from these we may gather at least the leading character- istics of the Parthian architecture, its aims and resources, its style and general effect, while from other remains — scanty indeed, and often mutilated — we may obtain a tolerable notion of their sculpture and other ornamental art. CH. XXII.] WALL OF HATBA. 213 The most imposing remains which seem certainly assignable to the Parthian period are those of Hatra, or El-Hadhr, visited hy Mr. Layard in 1846, and described at length by Mr. Eoss in the ninth volume of the "Journal of the Eoyal Geographi- cal Society," - as well as by Mr. Fergusson, in his " History of Architecture."^ Hatra became known as a place of import- ance in the early part of the second century after Christ.* It successfully resisted Trajan in a.d. 116, and Severus in a.d. 198.' It is then described as a large and populous city, de- fended by strong and extensive walls, '' and containing within it a temple of the Sun, celebrated for the great value of its offerings.' It enjoyed its own kings at this time,' who were regarded as of Arabian stock, and were among the more impor- tant of the Parthian tributary monarchs. By the year a.d. 363 Hatra had gone to ruin, and is then described as "long since deserted."' Its flourishing period thus belongs to the space between a.d. 100 and a.d. BOO; and its remains, to which Mr. Fergusson assigns the date a.d. 250, must be regarded as probably at least a century earher, and consequently as indi- cating the character of the architecture which prevailed under ihe later Parthians, and which, if Sassanian improvements iiad not obUterated them, we should have found upon the site of Ctesiphon. The city of Hatra'" was enclosed by a circular wall of great thickness, " built of large sqviare-cut stones, and strengthened at intervals of about 170 yards by square towers or bastions. [PI. IV. Fig. 1.] Its circumference considerably exceeded three miles. Outside the wall was a broad and very deep ditch, and on the further side of the ditch was an earthen rampart of considerable height and thickness. Two detached forts, situated on eminences, commanded the approaches to the place, one towards the east, and the other towards the north. The wall was pierced by four gateways, of which the principal one faced the east.'" The circular space within the walls was divided into two portions by a water-course" passing across it from north to south, and running somewhat east of the centre, which thus divided the circle into two unequal parts. The eastern por- tion was left comparatively clear of buildings, and seems to have been used mainly as a burial-ground; in the western were the public edifices and the more important houses of the inhabitants. Of the former by far the most remarkable was one which stood nearly in the centre of the city, and which 214 THE SIXTU MONARCni [ch. xxil has been called by some a palace, by others a temple, but which may best be regarded as combming both uses." [PI. IV. Fig. 2.] This building stood within a walled enclosure of an oblong square shape, aboiit 800 feet long by 700 broad. '^ The wall surrounding it was strengthened with bastions, like the wall around the city. The enclosure comprised two courts, an inner and an outer. The outer court, which lay towards the east, and was first entered, was entirely clear of buildings, while the inner court contained two considerable edifices. Of these the less important was one which stretched from north to south across the entire inclosure, and abutted upon the outer court ; this was confused in plan, and consisted chiefly of a number of small apartments, which have been regarded as guard-rooms.'" The other was a building of gi-eater preten- sions. It was composed mainly of seven vaulted halls, all of them parallel one to another, and all facing eastward, three being of superior and four of inferior size. The smaller haUs (Nos. I., III., IV., and VI., on the plan) were about thirty feet long by twenty wide, and had a height of thirty feet;'' the larger ones measured ninety feet in length,'* and were from thirty-five to forty feet broad, "* with a height of sixty feet." All were upon the same plan. They had semicircular vaulted roofs, no windows, and received their fight from the archway at the east end, which was either left entfi-ely open, or perhaps closed with curtains. Externally, the eastern fagade of the building, which was evidently its main front, had for ornament, besides the row of seven arches, a series of pillars, or rather pilasters, from which the arches sprang, some sculptures on the stones com- posing the arches, and one or two emblematic figures in the spaces left between the pilasters. The sculptures on the stones of the arches consisted either of human heads, or of representations of a female form, apparently floating in air.-' [PI. IV. Fig. 3.] An emblematic sculpture between the fourth and fifth arch represented a griffin with twisted tail, raised about 5 feet above the ground. The entire length of the fagade was about 300 feet. The interior of the smaller halls had no ornament ; but the larger ones were decorated somewhat elaborately. Here the side walls were broken by three squared pilasters, rising to the commencement of the vaulting, and terminated by a quasi- capital of ornamental work, consisting of a series of ovals, each oval containing in its centre a round ball of dark stone. CTi. XXII.] PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA. 215 Underneath these quasi-capitals, at the distance of from two to three feet, ran a cornice, which crossed the pilasters, and extended the whole length of the apartment, consisting of flowers and half -ovals, each oval containing a half -ball of the same dark stone as the capitals. [PI. IV. Fig. 4.] Finally, on the pilasters, immediately below the cornice, were sculptm*ed commonly either two or three human heads, ^'' the length of each head being about two feet, and the faces representing diverse types of humanity, some old and some young, some male and some female, some apparently realistic, some ideal- ized and more or less grotesque in their accompaniments. The drawing of the heads is said to have been full of spirit, and their general effect is pronounced hfe-like and striking. The seven halls, which have been described, were divided into two groups, of three and four respectively, by a low fence, which ran from east to west across the inner court, from the partition wall separating the third and fourth halls to the buildings which divided the inner court from the outer. It is probable that this division separated the male and female apartments. The female ornamentation" of the large hall (No. II.) belonging to the southern group is perhaps an indica- tion of the sex of its inmates; and another sign that these were the female quarters is to be found in the direct commu- nication existing between this portion of the building and "the Temple" (No. VIII.), which could not be reached from the male apartments except by a long circuit round the building. The " Temple" itself was an apartment of a square shape, each side being about forty feet. It was completely sur- rounded by a vaulted passage, into which light came from two windows at its south-west and north-west corners. The Tem- ple was entered by a single doorway, the position of which was directly opposite an opening leading into the passage from Hall No. II. Above this doorway was a magnificent frieze, the character of which is thought to indicate the religious pur- pose of the structure. [PL V. Fig. 1.] The interior of the Temple was without ornamentation, vaulted, and except for the feeble light which entered by the single doorway, dark. On the west side a portal led into the passage from the outer air. Besides these main apartments, the edifice which we a.re describing contained a cei-tain number of small rooms, lying behind the halls, and entered by doorways opening from them. One or two such rooms are found behind each of the sniaU^ gl6 THE SIXTH MONiiUCET. [ch. xxii. halls ; and another of somewhat larger dimensions lay behind the great hall (numbered VII. in the plan), forming the extreme north-western corner of the building. These rooms were vaulted and had no windows, receiving their only Hght from the small doorways by which they were entered. It is believed that the entire edifice, or at any rate the greater portion of it, had an upper story. Traces of such a structure appear over the halls numbered I and VI. ; and it is thought that the story extended over the entire range of halls. One traveller,-* on conjectural grounds, even assigns to the building an elevation of three stories, and ventures to restore the second and third in the mode represented in the woodcut. [PI. V. Fig. 2.] According to this author the upper portion ot the edifice resembled in many respects the great palace of the Sassanian monarchs, of which splendid remains still exist on the site of Ctesiphon, where they are known as the Takht-i- Khuzroo, or Palace of Chosroes. That palace was, however, on a very different plan from the Hatra one, comprising as it did one hall only, but of a size vastly superior to any of those at Hatra, and two wings, one on either side of the hall, made up of dwelling and sleeping apartments.'' The few windows which exist at Hatra are oblong square in shape,'' as in general are the doorways connecting one apart- ment with another. In one case there is an arched doorway, or niche, which has been blocked up. There are no passages except the one which surrounds " the Temple," the apartments generally leading directly one into another. In some cases the Untel of a doorway is formed of a single stone, and orna- mented with very delicate carving. '' The doorways are for the most part towards the comers of anartments; that of tho , Temple, however, is in the centre of its eastern wall. : ^ The general style of the buildings at Hatra has been said to be • I Roman or Byzantine;" audit has even been supposed that " m the style of the ornaments and sculptured figures may be traced the corrupt taste and feeble outline ot the artists of Constantinople."'^ But there is abundant reason to beheve that the Hatra Palace was built nearly two centuries before Constantinople came into existence; and, although the large use of the round arch in vaulting may be due to the spread of Roman architectural ideas, yet there are no grounds for sup- posmg that any but native artists, Parthian subjects, were employed m the work, or that it is other than a fair specimen of what \va^ achieved by tho Pr.rthian builders during tho CH. xxii.] RESERVOIRS AND TOMBS AT HATRA. 217 later period of the empire. The palace of Volagases III. at Ctesiphon, which Avidius Cassius destroyed in his invasion,^* was most likely of the same general character— a combination of lofty halls suitable for ceremonies and audiences with small and dark sleeping or living rooms, opening out of them, the whole placed in the middle of a paved court, and the male apartments carefully divided from those of the women. The remains at Hatra are further remarkable for a consider- able number of reservoirs and tombs. The open space between the town proper and the eastern wall and gate is dotted with edifices of a square shape, standing apart from one another, which are reasonably regarded as sepulchres.'" These are built in a solid way, of hewn stone, and consist either of one or two chambers. They vary in size from twenty feet square to forty, and are generally of about the same height. Some are perfectly plain, but the exteriors of others are ornamented with pilasters. The reservoirs occur in the paved court which surrounds the main building ; they have narrow apertures, but expand below the aperture into the shape of a bell, and are carefully constructed of well-cut stones closely fitted together. The material used at Hatra is uniformly a brownish gray lime- stone ; and the cutting is so clean and smooth that it is doubted whether the stones have needed any cement. If cement has been employed, at any rate it cannot now be seen, the stones everywhere appearing to touch one another. There are several buildings remaining in Persia, the date of which cannot be much later than that of the Hati-a edifice;" but, as it is on the whole more probable that they belong to the Sassanian than to the Parthian period, no account of them will be given here. It will be sufiicient to observe that their architecture grows naturally out of that which was in use at Hatra, and that thus we are entitled to ascribe to Parthian times and to subjects of the Parthian Empire that impulse to Oriental architecture which awoke it to renewed life after a sleep of ages, and which in a short time produced such impos- ing results as the Takht-i-Khuzroo at Ctesiphon, the rums of Shapur, and the triumphal arch at Takht-i-Bostan. The decorative and fictile art of the Parthians has received no inconsiderable amount of illustration from remains discov- ered, in the years 1850-1852, in Babylonia. In combination with a series of Parthian coins were found by Mr. Loftus, on the site of the ancient Erech (nowWarka), a number of objects in clay, plaster, and metal," enabUng us to form a fair idea of 218 THE SIXTH MONAncnr. [en. xxn the mode in which purely Parthian edifices were decorated during the best times of the empire, and of the style that then prevailed in respect of personal ornaments, domestic utensils, and other objects capable, more or less, of aesthetic handling. The remains discovered comprised numerous archi- tectural fragments in plaster and brick ; a large number of or- namental coffins ; several statuettes in terra-cotta ; jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in earthenware; some small glass bottles; and various personal decorations, such as beads, rings, and ear- rings. The architectural fragments consisted of capitals of pillars [PI. V. Fig. 3], portions of cornices, and specimens of a sort of diapering which seems to have been applied to screens or thin partitions. The capitals were somewhat heavy in design, and at first sight struck the spectator as barbarous ; but they ex- hibited a good deal of ingenious boldness, an absence of con- ventionality, and an occasional quaintness of design not unworthy of a Gothic decorator. One especially, which com- bines the upper portion of a human figure, wearing the pufted- out hair or wig, which the Parthians affected, with an elegant leaf rising from the neck of the capital, and curving gracefully under the abacus, has decided merit, and is ' ' suggestive of the later Byzantine style. " '^ The cornices occasionally reminded the discoverer of the remarkable frieze at El-Hadhr, ^■' and were characterized by the same freedom and boldness of invention as the capitals. But the most curious remains were the frag- ments of a sort of screen work, pieces of plaster covered with geometric designs upon both sides, the patterns on the two sides differing. [PI. V. Fig. 4.] These designs, though unlike in many respects the arabesques of the Mohammedans, yet seemed on the whole to be their precursors, the "geometric curves and tracery" appearing to "shadow forth the beauty and richness of a style which afterwards followed the tide of Mohammedan conquest to the remotest corners of the known world." ^^ The ornamental coffins were of a coarse glazed earthenware, bluish-green in hue, and belonged to the kind which has been called "sKpper-shaped."'" [PI. VI. Fig. 1.] They varied in length from three feet to six, and had a large aperture at their upper end, by means of which the body was placed in them, and a flat lid to close this aperture, ornamented like the coffin, and fixed in its place by a fine lime cement. A second aperture at the lower extremity of the coffin allowed for the escape of en. \-xn.] PAnrnlAy- VASJ^S AKD LAMPS. glS the gases disengaged during decomposition. The ornamenta tion of the coiHns varied, but consisted generally of small figures of men, about six or seven inches in length, the most usual figure being a warrior with his arms akimbo and his leg astride, wearing on his head a coiffure, like that which is seen on the Parthian coins, and having a sword hanging from the belt. [PI. VI. Fig. 2.] Of the statuettes in terra-cotta, one of the most curious rep- resented a Parthian warrior, recumbent, and apparently about to drink out of a cup held in the left hand." [PI. VI. Fig. 3.] The figure was clad in a long coat of mail, with greaves on the legs and a helmet upon the head. Others represented females; these had lofty head-dresses, which sometimes rose into two peaks or horns, recalling the costume of English ladies in the time of Henry IV. These figures were veiled and carefully draped about the upper part of the person, but showed the face, and had the legs bare from the knee downwards. ^'^ The jars, jugs, vases, and lamps greatly resembled those of the Assyrian and Babylonian periods, but were on the whole more elegant and artistic. The forms appended will give a tolerable idea of the general character of these vessels. [PI. VI. Fig. 4.] They were of various sizes, and appear to have been placed in the tombs, partly as the offerings of friends and well- wishers, partly with the more superstitious object of actually supplying the deceased with the drink and light needful for him on his passage from earth to the realms of the dead. '" The glass bottles were, perhaps, lachrymatories."" They had no peculiar characteristics, but were almost exactly similar to objects of the same kind belonging to the times of the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires."' They exhibited the same lovely prismatic colors, which have been so admired in the glass of those kingdoms, an effect of decomposition, which, elsewhere generally disfiguring, in the case of this material enhances the original beauty of the object tenfold by clothmg it in hues of the utmost brilliance and delicacy."- The personal decorations consisted chiefly of armlets, bangles, beads, rings, and ear-rings."^ They were in gold, silver, copper, and brass. Some of the smaller gold ornanaents, such as ear- rings, and small plates or beads for necklaces and fillets, were "of a tasteful and elegant design.""" The finger-rings were coarser, while the toe-rings, armlets, and bangles, were for the most part exceedingly rude and barbarous. Head-dresses in gold, tall and pointed are said to liave been found occasionally; 220 TEE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxil but the museums of Europe have not yet been able to secure any, as they are usually melted dovni by the finders. Broad ribbons of gold, which may have depended hke strings from a cap, are commoner, and were seen by Mr, Loftus. Altogether, the ornaments indicated a strong love of personal display, and the possession of considerable wealth, but no general diffusion of a correct taste, nor any very advanced skill in design or metallurgy. Of purely aesthetic art— art, that is, into which the idea of the useful does not enter at all — the Parthians appear scarcely to have had an idea. During the five centuries of their sway, they seem to have set up no more than some half dozen bas-re- liefs. There is, indeed, only one such work which can be posi- tively identified as belonging to the Parthian period by the in- scription which accompanies it.*^ The other presumedly Par- thian rehefs are adjudged to the people by art critics merely from tlieir style and their locality, occurring as they do within the hmits of the Parthian kingdom, and lacking the character- istics which attach to the art of those who preceded and of those who followed the Parthians in these countries. The one certainly Parthian bas-relief is that which still exists on the great rock of Behistun, at the foot of the moun- tain, raised but shghtly above the plain. '"' It seems to have contained a series of tall figures, looking towards the right, and apparently engaged in a march or procession, while above and between them were smaller figures on horseback, armed with lances, and galloping in the same direction. One of these was attended by a figure of Fame or Victory, flying in the air, and about to place a diadem around his broAv. The present con- dition of the sculpture is extremely bad. Atmospheric in- fluences have worn away the larger figures to such an extent that they are discerned with difficulty ; and a recent Governor of Kirmanshah has barbarously inserted into the middle of the reUef an arched niche, in which he has placed a worthless Ai'abic inscription. It is with difficulty that we form any judgment of the original artistic merit of a work which jsre- sents itself to us in such a worn and mutilated form ; but, on the whole, we are perhaps justified in pronouncing that it must at its best have been one of inferior quality, even when com- pared only with the similar productions of Asiatics. The general character is rather that of the Sassanian than of the Assyrian or Persian period. The human figures have a heavy clumsiness about them that is vmpleasant to contemplate ; the CH. xxn ] BAS-BELIEFS. 221 horses are rudely outlined, and are too small for the men ; the figure of Fame is out of all proportion to the hero whom she crowns, and the diadem which she places on his head is ridicu- lous, being nearly as large as herself! On the other hand, there is spirit in the attitudes of both men and horses ; the Fame floats well in air ; and the relief is free from that coarse grotesqueness which offends us in the productions of the Sas- sanian artists. Another bas-relief, probably, b\it not quite certainly Par- thian, exists in the gorge of Sir-pul-i-zohab, and has been recently published in the great work of M. Flandin."' (PI. VIII.) The inscription on this monument, though it has not yet been deciphered,^* appears to be written in the alphabet found upon the Parthian coins. The monument seems to rep- resent a Parthian king, mounted on horseback, and receiving a chaplet at the hand of a subject. The king wears a cap bound round with the diadem, the long ends of which depend over his shoulder. He is clothed in a close-fitting tunic and loose trowsers, which hang down upon his boots, and wears also a short cloak fastened under the chin, and reaching nearly to the knee. The horse which he bestrides is small, but sti'ongly made; the tail is long, and the mane seems to be plaited. Thus far the representation, though somewhat heavy and clumsy, is not ill-drawn; but the remaining figure— that of the Parthian subject— is wholly without merit. The back of the man is turned, but the legs are in profile ; one arm is ridiculously short, and the head is placed too near the left shoulder. It would seem that the artist, while he took pains with the representation of the monarch, did not care how ill he rendered the subox'dinate figure, which he left in the unsatis- factory condition that may be seen in the preceding woodcut. A set of reliefs,^" discovered by the Baron de Bode in the year 1841, are also thought by the best judges to be Parthian. The most important of them represents a personage of conse- quence, apparently a Magus, who seems to be in the act of consecrating a sacred cippus, round which have been placed wreaths or chaplets. (PI. IX.) Fifteen spectators are present, arranged in two rows, one above the other, all except the fii-st of them standing. The first sits upon a rude chair or stool. The figures generally are in an advanced stage of decay ; but that of the Magus is tolerably well preserved, and probably indi- cates with suflficicnt accuracy the costume and appearance of the great hierarchs under the Parthians. The conical cap de- §02 flits SiXTit MONAncnT. [CH. xxrr. scribed by Strabo"" is very conspicuous. BeloAv this the hair is worn in the puffed-out fashion of the later Parthian period. The upper hp is oi-namented by moustaches, and the chin covered by a straight beard. The fi^re is dressed in a long sleeved tunic, over which is worn a cloak, fastened at the neck by a round brooch, and descending a Httle below the knees. The legs are encased in a longer and shorter pair of trowsers, the former plain, the latter striped perpendicularly. Round the neck is worn a collar or necklace ; and on the right arm are three armlets and three bracelets. The conical cap appears to be striped or fluted. On the same rock, but in no very evident connection with the main representation, is a second reMef, in which a Parthian cavalier, armed with a bow and arrows, and a spear, contends with a wild animal, seemingly a bear." (PI. X. Fig. 1.) A long flowing robe here takes the place of the more ordinary tunic and trowsers. On the head is worn a rounded cap or tiara. The hair has the usual puffed -out appearance. The bow is carried in the left hand, and the quiver hangs from the saddle behind the rider, "^ while with his right hand he thrusts his spear into the beast's neck. The execution of the whole tablet seems to have been rude ; but it has suffered so much from time and weather, that no very decided judgment can be passed upon it. Another still rvider representation occurs also on another face of the same rock. This consists of a female figure reclining upon a couch, and gviarded by three male attendants, one at the head of the couch unanned, and the remaining two at its foot, seated, and armed with spears. The female has puffed- out hair, and carries in her right hand, which is outstretched, a wreath or chaplet. One of the spearmen has a curious rayed head-dress ; and the other has a short streamer attached to the head of his spear. Below the main tablet are three rudely carved standing figures, representing probably other attend- ants. This set of reliefs may perhaps be best regarded as forming a single series, the Parthian king being represented as engaged in hunting the bear, while the queen awaits his return upon her couch, and the chief Magus attached to the court makes prayer for the monarch's safety. Such are the chief remains of Parthian aesthetic art. They convey an idea of decline below the standard reached by the Persians of the Achaemenian times, which was itself a decline Vol. 111. COINS OF SAPOR II. Fig 2. Pig. 3. COIN OF AKTAXERXES II. Fig. 5. LATER SEAL OF VARAUEAN IV. Fig 4. COIN OF VAUAIIUAN IV. Fig. 6. CONIS OF SAPOR III. PORTRAIT or VARAHRAN IV. (from a sr;il). CH. xxm.] RELIGION OF THE PARTUIANS. 223 from the earlier art of the Assyrians. Had they been the efforts of a race devoid of models, they might fairly have been regarded as not altogether without promise. But, considered as the work of a nation which possessed the Achsemenian sculptures, and which had moreover, to a certain extent, access to Greek examples, " they must be pronounced clumsy, coarse, and wanting in all the higher qualities of Fine Art. It is no wonder that they are scanty and exceptional. The nation which could produce nothing better must have felt that its vocation was not towards the artistic, and that its powers had better be employed in other directions, e.g. in conquest and in organization. It would seem that the Parthians perceived this, and therefore devoted slight attention to the Fine Arts, pre- ferring to occupy themselves mainly with those pursuits in which they excelled ; viz. war, hunting, and government. CHAPTER XXIII. Customs of the Parthians — in Religion ; in War ; in their Em- bassies and Dealings with Foreign Nations ; at the Court ; in Private Life. Extent of the Refinement to ivhich they reached. Their gradual Decline in Taste and Knowledge. 'Efiij Ix""''''* foAii fifv TO pdpPapov /cat to ^kvOikov, nkiov /oieVToi to xprjaifi-ov Trpbs rjyi)j.oviar KoX Tiji' kv TOis TToAe'fiot! KaTopflutnv — Strab. xi. 9, § 2. Very little is known as to the religion of the Parthians. It seems probable that during th» Persian period they submitted to the Zoroastrian system,' which was generally maintained by the Achaemenian kings, acquiescing, like the great bulk of the conquered nations, in the religious views of their conquer- ors ; but as this was not their own religion, we may conclude that they were at no time very zealous followers of the Bactrian prophet," and that as age succeeded age they became continually more lukewarm in their feelings, and more lax in their reli- gious practice. The essence of Zoroastrian belief was dualism — recognition of Ormazd as the great Principle of Good, and of Ahriman as the Principle of Evil. We need not doubt that, in word, the Parthians from first to last admitted this antagonism, and professed a belief in Ormazd as the' supi'eme god, and a 224 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxm. dread of Ahriman and his ministers. But practically, their religious aspirations rested, not on these dim abstractions, but on beings whose existence they could better realize, and whom they could feel to be less remote from themselves. The actual devotion of the Parthians was offered to the Sun and Moon, to deities who were supposed to preside over the royal house, and to ancestral idols which each family possessed, and conveyed with it from place to place with every change of habitation. The Sun was saluted at his rising,' was worshipped in temples, under the name of Mithra, with sacrifices and offerings •* had statues erected in his honor, and was usually associated with the lesser luminary.' The deities of the royal house were probably either genii, ministers of Ormazd, to whom was com- mitted the special protection of the monarchs and their fami- lies, like the bagdha vithiyd of the Persians,' or else the ances- tors of the reigning monarch, to whom a qualified divinity seems to have been assigned in the later times of the empire.' The Parthians kings usually swore by these deities on solemn occasions f and other members of the royal family made use of the same oath.' The main worship, however, of the great mass of the people, even when they were of the royal stock, was concentrated upon ancestral images, '" which had a place sacred to them in each house, and received the constant adoration of the household. In the early times of the empire the Magi were held in high repute, and most of the peculiar tenets and rites of the Magian religion were professed and followed by the Parthians. Ele- mental worship was practised. Fire was, no doubt, held sacred, and there was an especial reverence for rivers. " Dead bodies were not burned, but were exposed to be devoured by birds and beasts of prey, after which the dry bones were col- lected and placed in tombs. '" The Magi formed a large portion of the great national council, which elected and, if need were, deposed the kings. " But in course of time much laxity was introduced. The Arsacid monarchs of Armenia allowed the Sacred Fire of Ormazd, which ought to have been kept con- tinually burning, to go out;'* and we can scarcely suppose but that the Parthian Arsacidse shared their negligence. Respect for the element of fire so entirely passed away, that we hear of the later Parthians burning their dead.'' The Magi fell into disrepute, and, if not expelled from their place in the council, at any rate found themselves despised and deprived of in- fluence. " The later Parthian religion can have been little morQ CH. xxiii.] PARTHIAN TOLERANCE. 225 than a worship of the Sun and Moon, and of the teraphim, or sacred images, which were the most precious possession of each household. While thus lax and changeful in their own religious practice, the Parthians were, naturally, tolerant of a variety of creeds among their subjects. Fire altars were maintained, and Zo- roastrian zeal was allowed to flourish in the dependent king- dom of Persia.'' In the Greek cities the Olympian gods were permitted to receive the veneration of thousands,'* while in Babylon, Nearda, and Nisibis the Jews enjoyed the free exer- cise of their comparatively pure and elevated religion." No restrictions seem to have been placed on proselytism, and Judaism certainly boasted many converts from the heathen in Adiabene, Charax Spasini, and elsewhere.^" Christianity also penetrated the Parthian provinces to a considerable extent, and in one Parthian country, at any rate, seems to have be- come the state religion. The kings of Osrhoene are thought to have been Christians from the time of the Antonines,^' if not from that of our Lord ;" and a flourishing church was certainly estabUshed at Edessa befoi'e the end of the second century." The Parthian Jews who were witnesses of the miraculous events which signalized the day of Pentecost"^ may have, in some cases, taken with them the new religion to the land where they had their residence ; or the Apostle, St. Thomas, may (as Eusebius declares"') have carried the Gospel into the regions beyond the Euphrates, and have planted the Christian Church in the countries out of which the Jewish Church sprang. Be- sides the flourishing community of Edessa, which was pre- dominantly, if not wholly, Chi-istian from the middle of the second century, many converts were, we ai'e told, to be found among the inhabitants of Persia, Media, Parthia Proper, and even Bactria."* The infusion, however, was not sufficient to leaven to any serious extent the corrupt mass of heathenism into A\-hich it was projected ; and we cannot say that the gene- I'al character of the Parthian empire, or of the manners and customs of its subjects, was importantly affected by the new religion, though it had an extraordinary influence over indi- viduals. The Parthians were essentially a warlike people; and the chief interest which attaches to them is connected with their military vigor and ability. It is worth while to consider at some length the peculiarities of that military system which proved itself superior to the organization of the Macedonians, 226 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxni. and able to maintain for nearly three hundred years a doubt- ful contest with the otherwise irresistible Romans. We are told that the Parthians had no standing army.^' Wlien war was proclaimed and the monarch needed a force, he made his immediate vassals acquainted with the fact, and requested each of them to marshal their troops, and bring them to a fixed rendezvous by a certain day. "^^ The troops thus sum- moned were of two kinds, Parthian and foreign. The gover- nors of the provinces, whether tributary kings or satraps, called out the military strength of their respective districts, saw to their arming and provisioning, and, marching each at the head of his contingent, brought a foreign auxiliary force to the as- sistance of the Great King.-' But the back-bone of the army, its main strength, the portion on which alone much reliance was placed, consisted of Parthians. Each Parthian noble was bound to call out his slaves and his retainers, to arm and equip them at his own expense, and bring them to the rendezvous by the time named.'" The number of troops furnished by each noble varied according to his position and his means ; we hear in one instance of their amounting to as many as 10,000," while in another recorded case'- the average number which each furnished was no more than 125. The various contingents had their own baggage-trains, consisting ordinarily of camels, in the proportion (as it would seem) of one to every ten fighting- men.'' A Parthian army consisted usually of both horse and foot, but in proportions unusual elsewhere. The foot soldiers were comparatively few in number, and were re^ i,rded as of small account. '^ Every effort was made to incref ,e the amount and improve the equipment of the horsemen, wluo bore the brunt of every fight, and from whose exertions alone victory was hoped. Sometimes armies consisted of horsemen only, '^ or rather of horsemen followed by a baggage train composed of camels and chariots. The horse were of two kinds, heavy and light. The heavy horsemen {nardq^paHroi) wore coats of mail, reaching to their knees, composed of raw hide covered with scales of iron or steel," very bright," and capable of resisting a strong blow." They had on their heads burnished helmets of Margian steel, whose glitter dazzled the spectator. '" Their legs seem not to have been greaved, but encased in a loose trouser, which hung about the ankles and embarrassed the feet, if by any chance the horseman was forced to dismount." They carried no en. xxiii.] CUSTOMS OF TUB PARTHIANS IN WAR. 227 shield/' being siifficiently defended by their coats of mail. Their offensive arms were a long spear {xovroi)^ which was of great strength and thickness, *° and a bow and arrows of un- usual size." They likewise carried in their girdle a short sword" or knife (i-idxaipa), which might be used in close com- bat. Their horses were, like themselves, protected by a defence of scale armor, "'^ which was either of steel or bronze." The Hght horse was armed with the same sort of bows and arrows as the heavy, but carried no spear and wore no armor. It was carefully trained to the management of the horse and the bow,^' and was unequalled in the rapidity and dexterity of its movements. The archer delivered his arrows with as much precision and force in retreat as in advance, and was almost more feared when he retired than when he charged his foe."* Besides his arrows, the light horseman seems to have carried a sword,"' and he no doubt wore also the customary knife in his belt. We are told by one writer'" that it was a practice of the Par- thians to bring into battle a number of led horses, and that the riders from time to time exchanged their tired steeds for fresh ones, thus obtaining a great advantage over enemies who had no such practice. But the accounts which we have of Parthian engagements make no reference to this usage, which we can therefore scarcely suppose to have been adopted to any large extent. It may be doubted, also, if the practice could ever be one of much value, since the diflficulty of managing led horses amid the tumult of a battle would probably more than counter- balance the advantage derivable from relays of fresh steeds. During the later period of the monarchy, the Parthians, who had always employed camels largely in the conveyance of stores and baggage," are said to have introduced a camel corps into the army itself, and to have derived considerable advan- tage from the new arm. " The camels could bear the weight of the mailed warrior and of their own armor better than horses, and their riders were at once more safe in their elevated posi- tion and more capable of dealing effective blows upon the enemy. As a set-off, however, against these advantages, the spongy feet of the camel were found to be more readily injured by the fribidus, or caltrop, than the harder feet of the horse, and the corps was thus more easily disabled than an equal force of cavalry, if it could be tempted to pass over gi-ound on which caltrops had been previously scattered. '^ The Parthian tactics were of a simple kind, and differed little 228 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [en. xxiit from those of other nations in the same region, which have de- pended mainly on their cavalry. To surround their foe, to in- volve him in difficulties, to cut off his supplies and his strag- glers, and ultimately to bring him into a position where he might be overwhelmed by missiles, was the aim of all Parthian commanders of any military capacity. Their warfare was suited for defence rather than for attack, unless against con- temptible enemies."* They were bad hands at sieges,"" and sel- dom ventured to engage in them, though they would do so if circumstances required it."" They wearied of long campaigns, and if they did not find victory tolerably easy, were apt to retire and allow their foe to escape, "' or baffle him by withdrawing their forces into a distant and inaccessible region. After their early victories over Crassus and Antony, they never succeeded in preventing the steady advance of a Roman army into their territory, or in repulsing a determined attack upon their capi- tal. Still they generally had their revenge after a short time. It was easy for the Romans to overrun Mesopotamia, but it was not so easy for them to hold it ; and it was scarcely possi- ble for them to retire from it after an occupation without dis- aster. The clouds of Parthian horse hung upon their retreat- ing columns, straitened them for provisions, galled them with missiles, and destroyed those who could not keep up with the main body. The towns upon the line of their retreat re- volted and shut their gates, defying even such commanders as Severus and Trajan. Of the six great expeditions of Rome against Parthia, one only, that of Avidius Cassius, was entirely successful. In every other case either the failure of the ex- pedition was complete, or the glory of the advance was tarnished by disaster and suffering during the retreat. The results of invading Parthia would have been even more calamitous to an assailant but for one weak point in the mili- tary system of the Parthians. They were excessively unwill- ing to venture near an enemy at night, and as a general rule abstained from all military movements during the hours of darkness."^ As evening approached, they drew off to a con- siderable distance from their foe, and left him unmolested to retreat in any direction that he pleased. The reason of this probably was, not merely that they did not fortify their camps;"' but that, depending wholly on their horses, and be- ing forced to hobble or tether them at night, they could not readily get into fighting order on a sudden during darkness. Once or twice in the course of their history, we find them de- CH. xxiii.] pABfntAK USE OF CffAniOT^. . 22& parting from their policy of extreme precaution, and recom- mencing the pursuit of a flying foe before dawn; but it is noted as an unusual occurrence. "" It was also a general principle of Parthian warfare to abstain from campaigning during the winter/' So much depended upon the tension of their bow-strings, which any dampness re- laxed, that their rule was to make all their expeditions in the dry time of their year, which lasted from early in the spring until late in the autumn. The rule was, however, transgressed upon occasions. Phraates II. made his attack upon Antiochus Sidetes, while the snow was still upon the ground f'^ and Vola- gases I. fell upon Psetus after the latter had sent his troops into winter quarters. '^ The Parthians could bear cold no less than heat ; though it was perhaps rather in the endurance of the latter than of the former that they surpassed the Romans. The sun's rays were never too hot for them ;'"' and they did not need water frequently or in large quantities. The Romans believed that they increased their abihty of bearing thirst by means of certain drugs which they consumed ;" but it may be questioned whether they really employed any other remedies than habit and resolution. We find no use of chariots among the Parthians, except for the conveyance of the females, who accompanied the nobles upon their expeditions. The waves and concubines of the chiefs followed the camp in great numbers ;** and women of a less reputable class, singers, dancers, and musicians, swelled the ranks of the supernumeraries." Many of these were Greeks from Seleucia and other Macedonian towns.** The com- missariat and transport departments are said to have been badly organized f but some thousands of baggage camels al- ways accompanied an army," carrying stores and provisions. Of these a considerable portion were laden with arrows," of which the supply was in this way rendered inexhaustible. The use of the elephant in war was still more rare in Parthia than that of the chariot. While the Seleucid kings employed the animal to a large extent,'" and its use was also probably known to the Greek princes of Bactria," the Arsacidse appear to have almost entirely neglected it. On one occasion alone do we find their employment of it mentioned,'^ and then we hear of only a single animal, which is ridden by the monarch. Probably the unwieldy creature was regarded by the Parthians as too heavy and clumsy for the light and rapid movements of their armies, and was thus disused during the period of their ■* 230 '^SE SIXTH MONARCHT. [ch. xxni. supremacy, though again employed, after Parthia had fallen, by the Sassanidae.'^ The Partliians entered into battle with much noise and shout- mg.'" They made no use of trumpets or horns, but employed instead the kettledrum, which resounded from all parts of the field when they made their onset." Their attack was furious. The mailed horsemen charged at speed, and often drove their spears through the bodies of two enemies at a blow.'^ The light horse and the foot, when any was present, delivered their arrows with precision and with extraordinary force. But if the assailants were met with a stout resistance, the first vigor of the attack was rarely long maintained. The Parthian warriors grew quickly weary of an equal contest, and, if they coiild not force their enemy to give way, soon changed their tactics. Pretending panic, dispersing, and beating a hasty re- treat, they endeavored to induce their foe to pursue hurriedly and in disorder, being ready at any moment to turn and take advantage of the least appearance of confusion. If these tac- tics failed, as they commonly did after they came to be known, the simulated flight was generally converted into a real one ; further conflict was avoided, or at any rate deferred to another occasion." When the Parthians wished to parley with an enemy, they unstrung their bows, ^° and advancing with the right hand out- stretched,^' asked for a conference. They are accused by the Romans of sometimes using treachery on such occasions, but, except in the single case of Crassus, the charge of bad faith cannot be sustained against them. On solemn occasions, when the intention was to discuss grounds of complaint or to bring a war to an end by the arrangement of terms of peace, a formal meeting was arranged between their representatives and those of their enemy, generally on neutral ground, as on an island in the Euphrates, or on a bridge constructed across it. *^ Here the chiefs of the respective nations met, accompanied by an equal number of guards, while the remainder of their forces occupied the opposite banks of the river. Matters were dis- cussed in friendly fashion, the Greek language being commonly employed as the vehicle of communication f^ after which fes- tivities usually took place, the two chiefs mutually entertain- ing each other, or accepting in common the hospitalities of a third party." The terms of peace agreed upon were reduced to writing;'' hands were grasped as a sign that faith was pledged;" and oaths having beeu interchanged," the confer- CH. xxiii.] EMBASSIES ANi) HOSTAGES §31 ence broke up, and the chiefs returned to their respective resi- dences. Besides negotiating by means of conferences, the Parthian monarchs often sent out to neighboring states, and in return received from them formal embassies. The ambassadors in every case conveyed, as a matter of course, gifts to the prince to whom they were accredited, *"* which might consist of articles of value, or of persons. Augustus included an Italian slave- girl ^^ among the presents which he ti"ansmitted to Phraates IV. : and Ai'tabanus III. sent a Jewish giant to Tiberius.'" The object of an embassy was sometimes simply to congi-atulate; but more often the ambassadors were instructed to convey certain demands, or proposals, from their own piince to the head of the other nation, whereto his assent was required, or requested. These proposals were commonly formulated in a letter from the one prince to the other," which it was the chief duty of the ambassadors to convey safely. Free powers to conclude a treaty at their discretion were rarely, or never, en- trusted to them. Their task was merely to deliver the royal letter, to explain its terms, if they were ambiguous, and to carry back to their own monarch the reply of the foreign sovereign. The sanctity of the ambassadorial character was invariably re- spected by the Parthians, who are never even taxed with a violation of it. As a security for the performance of engagements, or for the permanent maintenance of a friendly attitude, it was usual in the East during the Parthian period to require, and give, hos- tages. The princes who occupied the position of Parthian feu- datories gave hostages to their suzerain, who were frequently their near relations, as sons or brothers. "'^ And a practice grew up of the Parthian monarchs themselves depositing their own sons or brothers with the Roman Emperor, at first perhaps merely for their own security,"' but afterwards as pledges for their good behavior." Such hostages lived at the expense of the Roman court, and were usually treated with distinction. In the event of a rupture between their country and Rome, they had little to fear. Rome found her advantage in employ- ing them as rivals to a monarch with whom she had quarrelled, and did not think it necessary to punish them for his treachery or inconstancy. The magnificence of the Parthian court is celebrated in gen- eral terms by various writers, but not very many particulars have come down to us respecting it. We know that it was g32 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. fcH. xxiH. migratory, moving from one of the chief cities of the empire to another at different seasons of the year,"^ and that owing to the vast number of the persons composing it, there was a diflB- culty sometimes in pi-oviding for their subsistence upon the road/" The court comprised the usual extensive harem of an Oriental prince, consisting of a single recognized queen, and a multitude of secondary wives or concubines. The legitimate wife of the prince was commonly a native, and in most cases was selected from the royal race of the Arsacidae;" but some- times she was the daughter of a dependent monarch,"" and she might even be a slave raised by royal favor from that humble position."'-' The concubines were frequently Greeks.'"" Both wives and concubines remained ordinarily in close -seclusion, and we have little mention of them in the Parthian annals. But in one instance, at any rate, a queen, brought up in the notions of the West, succeeded in setting Oriental etiquette at defiance, took the direction of affairs out of the hands of her husband, and subsequently ruled the empire in conjunction with her son. '" Generally, however, the Parthian kings were remarkably free from the weakness of subservience to women, and managed their kingdom with a firm hand, without allow- ing either wives or ministers to obtain any undue ascendency over them. In particular, we may note that they never, so far as appears, fell under the baleful influence of eunuchs, who, from first to last, play a very subordinate part in the Parthian history.'"'^ The dress of the monarch was commonly the loose Median robe, which had been adopted from the Medes by the Persians. This flowed down to the feet in numerous folds, enveloping and concealing the entire figure.'"^ Trousers and a. tunic were probably worn beneath it, the latter of linen, the former of silk or wool. As head-dress, the king wore either the mere diadem, wliich was a band or ribbon, passed once or oftener round the head, and terminating in two long ends which fell down behind, "^ or else a more pretentious cap, which in the earlier times was a sort of Scythian pointed helmet,'"' and in the later a rounded tiara, sometimes adorned with pearls or gems. "" His neck appears to have been generally encircled with two or three collars or necklaces, and he frequently wore ear-rings in his ears. The beard was almost alway s cultivated, and, with the hair, was worn variously. Generally both hair and beard were carefully curled ; but sometimes they depended in long straight locks. Mostly the beard was pointed, but oc« m. xxm.] PEESS of the MONARCH. 233 casionally it was worn square. In later times a fashion arose of puffing out the hair at either side extravagantly, so as to give it the appearance of a large bushy wig. *" In war the monarch seems to have exchanged his Median robe for a short cloak, reaching half way down the thigh. '°* His head was protected by a helmet, and he carried the national arm of offence, the bow. He usually took the field on horseback, but was sometimes mounted on an elephant, '°^ trained to encounter the shock of battle. Gold and silver were abundantly used in the trappings of his steed and in his arms. He generally took the command, and mingled freely in the fight, though he might sometimes shrink without re- proach from adventuring his own person."" His guards fought about him; and he was accompanied by attendants, whose duty it was to assist him in mounting on horseback and dismounting.'" The status of the queen was not much below that of her royal consort. She wore a tiara far more elaborate than his, and, like him, exhibited the diadem. Her neck was encircled with several necklaces."" As the title of Theos, "God," was often assumed by her husband, so she was allowed the title of "Goddess" (©£«'), or "Heavenly Goddess" {Osd ovpavia). Separate apartments were of course assigned to the queen, and to the royal concubines in the various palaces. These were buildings on a magnificent scale, and adorned with the utmost richness. Philostratus, who wrote in Parthian times, "' thus describes the royal palace at Babylon. "The palace is roofed with brass, and a bright light flashes from it. It has chambers for the women, and chambers for the men, and porticos, partly glittering with silver, partly with cloth-of- gold embroideries, partly with solid slabs of gold, let into the walls, like pictures. The subjects of the embroideries are taken from the Greek mythology, and include representations of Andromeda, of Amymone, and of Orpheus, who is frequently repeated .... Datis is moreover represented, destroying Naxos with his fleet, and Artaphernes besieging Eretria, and Xerxes gaining his famous victories. You behold the occu- pation of Athens, and the battle of Thermopylae, and other points still more characteristic of the gi^eat Persian war, rivers drunk up and disappearing from the face of the earth, and a bridge stretched across the sea, and a canal cut through Athos . . . One chamber for the men has a roof fashioned into a vavilt Mke the heaven, composed entirely of sapphires, which g34 'i'SE SIXTH MONAnCBY. [cis.. xxiiL are the bluest of stones, and resemble the sky in color. Gold- en images of the gods whom they worship, are set up about the vault, and show like stars in the firmament. This is the chamber in which the king delivers his judgments. Four golden magic-wheels hang from its roof, and threaten the monarch with the Divine Nemesis, if he exalts himself above the condition of man. These wheels are called ' the tongues of the gods,' and are set in their places by the Magi who frequent the palace." "* The state and pomp which sm^rounded the monarch seem scarcely to have fallen short of the Achaemenian standard. Regarded as in some sort divine during his Hfe, and always an object of national worship after his death, the "Brother of the Sun and Moon" "' occupied a position far above that of the most exalted of his subjects. Tributary monarchs were shocked, when, in times of misfortune, the "Great King" stooped to solicit their aid, and appeared before them in the character of a suppliant, shorn of his customary splendor.'" Nobles coveted the dignity of " King's Friend," and were con- tent to submit to blows and buffets at the caprice of their royal master, before whom they prostrated themselves in ado- ration after each castigation.'" The Parthian monarch dined in solitary grandeur, extended on his own special couch, and eating from his own special table, which was placed at a greater elevation than those of his guests."' His "friend" sat on the ground at his feet, and was fed like a dog by scraps from his master's board. Guards, ministers, and attendants of various kinds surrounded liim, and were ready at the slightest sign to do his bidding. Throughout the country he had numerous "Eyes" and "Ears""" — officers who watched his interests and sent him word of whatever touched liis safety. The bed on which the monarch slept was of gold, and subjects were forbidden to take their repose on couches of this rich material.'^" No stranger could obtain access to him unless introduced by the proper officer ; and it was expected that all who asked an audience would be prepared with some present of high value.'" For the gifts received the monarch made a suitable return, allowing those whom he especially favored to choose the presents that they preferred.'" The power and dignity of the Parthian nobles was greater than that usually enjoyed by any subjects of an Oriental king. Rank in Parthia being hereditary and not simply official, the "naegistanes" were no mere creatures of the monarch, but a ca. xxni.] POWSJR OP THE MEQISTANES. 235 class which stood upon its own indefeasible rights. As they had the privilege of electing to the throne upon a vacancy, and even that of deposing a duly elected monarch,'-^ the king could not but stand in wholesome awe of them, and feel compelled to treat them with considerable respect and deference. Moreover , they were not without a material force calculated to give pow- erful support to their constitutional privileges. Each stood at the head of a body of retainers accustomed to bear arms and to serve in the wars of the Empire. Together these bodies consti- tuted the strength of the army; and though the royal body- guard might perhaps have been capable of dealing successfully with each group of retainers separately, yet such an esprit de corps was sure to animate the nobles generally, that they would make common cause in case one of their number were attacked, and would support him against the crown with the zeal in- spired by self-interest. Thus the Parthian nobility were far more powerful and independent than any similar class under the Achaemenian, Sassanian, Modern Persian, or Turkish sov- ereigns. They exercised a real control over the monarch, and had a voice in the direction of the Empire. Like the great feudal vassals of the Middle Ages, they from time to time quar- relled with their liege lord, and disturbed the tranquillity of the kingdom by prolonged and dangerous civil wars; but these contentions served to keep alive a vigor, a life, and a spirit of sturdy independence very unusual in the East, and gave a stubborn strength to the Parthian monarchy, in which Oriental governments have for the most part been wanting. There were probably several grades of rank among the nobles. The highest dignity in the kingdom, next to the Crown, was that of Surena, or ' ' Field-Marshal ;" and this position was heredi- tary in a particular family, '-* which can have stood but a little below the royal house in wealth and consequence. The head of this noble house is stated to have at one time brought into the field as many as 10,000 retainers and slaves, of whom a thousand were heavy-armed. '" It was his right to place the diadem on the king's brovv at his coronation. The other nobles lived for the most part on their domains, but took the field at the head of their retainers in case of war, and in peace some- times served the offices of satrap, vizier, or royal councillor. The wealth of the class was great ;'■" its members were inclined to be turbulent, and, like the barons of the European kingdoms, acted as a constant check and counterpoise to the royal dignity. Next to war, the favorite employment of the king and of thg 236 Tim SIXTli MONAncBY. [CH. XXIII. ^Vl nobles was hunting.'-' The lion continued in the wild state an occupant of the Mesopotamian river-banks and marshes ;'-« and in other parts of the empire bears, leopards, and even tigers abounded.'-' Thus the higher kinds of sport were readily ob- tainable. The ordinary practice, however, of the monarch and his courtiers seems to have fallen short of the true sportsman's ideal. Instead of seeking the more dangerous kinds of wild beasts in their native haunts, and engaging with them under the conditions designed by nature, the Parthians were generally content with a poorer and tamer method. They kept lions, leopards, and bears in enclosed parks, or "paradises," and found pleasure in the pursuit and slaughter of these denatural- ized and half -domesticated animals."" The employment may still, even under these circumstances, have contained an ele- ment of danger which rendered it exciting ; but it was a poor substitute for the true sport which the "mighty Hunter before the Lord " '" had first practised in these regions. The ordinary dress of the Parthian noble was a long loose robe reaching to the feet,'"' under which he wore a vest and trousers."' Bright and varied colors were affected, and some- times dresses were interwoven or embroidered with gold. "' In seasons of festivity garlands of fresh flowers were worn upon the head."' A long knife or dagger was carried at all times,"" which might be used either as an implement or as a weapon. In the earlier period of the empire the Parthian was noted as a spare liver;"' but, as time went on, he aped the vices of more civihzed peoples, and became an indiscriminate eater"' and a hard drinker."' Game formed a main portion of his diet;'*" but he occasionally indulged in pork,"' and probably in other sorts of butcher's meat. He ate leavened bread with his meat, and various kinds of vegetables. ''' The bread, which was par- ticularly light and porous, seems to have been imported some- times by the Eomans, who knew it as panis aquaticus or pams PartJiicus. '*■' Dates were also consumed largely by the Par- thians, '" and in some parts of the country grew to an extraor- dinary size. A kind of wine was made from them ; and this seems to have been the intoxicating drink in which the nation generally indulged too freely. "' That made from the dates of Babylon was the most highly esteemed, and was reserved for the use of the king and the higher order of satraps.'" Of the Parthian feasts, music was commonly an accompani- ment. The flute, the pipe, the drum, and the instrument called sambuca, appear to have been known to them; '*' and they un- CB. XXIII.] DEGREE OF PARTHIAN REFINEMENT. 237 derstood how to combine these instruments in concerted har- mony. They are said to have closed their feasts with dancing — an amusement of which they were inordinately fond '" — but this was probably the case only wdth the lower class of people. Dancing in the East, if not associated with religion, is viewed as degrading, and, except as a religious exercise, is not indulged in by respectable persons. The separation of the sexes was very decided in Parthia. The women took their meals, and passed the greater portion of theii- life, apart from the men. '^^ Veils were commonly worn, as in modern Mohammedan countries ; and it was regarded as essential to female delicacy that women, whether married or single, should converse freely with no males but either their near relations or eunuchs. Adultery was punished with gi-eat severity;"" but divorce was not difficult, and women of rank released themselves from the nuptial bond on light grounds of complaint, without much trouble.'" Polygamy was the estab- lished law ; and every Parthian was entitled, besides his chief wife, to maintain as many concubines as he thought desirable. '^' Some of the nobles supported an excessive number :'"■' but the exi)enses of the seraglio prevented the generality from taking much advantage of the indulgence which the law permitted. The degree of refinement and civilization which the Parthians reached is difficult to determine with accuracy. In mimetic art their remains certainly do not show much taste or sense of beauty. '''^ There is some ground to believe that their architec- ture had merit ; but the existing monuments can scarcely be taken as representations of pure Parthian work, and may have owed their excellence (in some measure, at any rate) to foreign influence. Still, the following particulars, for which there is good evidence, seem to imply that the nation had risen in re- ality far above that "barbarism" which it was the fashion of the Greek and Roman writers to ascribe to it. In the first place, the Parthians had a considerable knowledge of foreign languages. Plutarch tells us that Orodes, the opponent of Crassus, was acquainted with the Greek language and litera- ture, and could enjoy the representation of a play of Euri- pides.'" The general possession of such knowledge, at any rate by the kings and the upper classes, seems to be implied by the use of the Greek letters and language in the legends upon coins and in inscriptions. Other languages were also to some extent cultivated. The later kings almost invai'iably placed a Semitic legend upon their coins ; and there is one instance of ek 238 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxih Parthian prince adopting an Aryan legend of the type known as Bactrian.'" Josephus, moreover, regarded the Parthians as familiar with Hebrew, or Syro-Chaldaic, and wrote his history of the Jewish War in his own native tongue, before he put out his Greek version, for the benefit especially of the Parthians, among whom he declares that he had many readers.'" Though the Parthians had, so far as we can tell, no native literature, yet writing was familiar to them, and v/as widely used in matters of business. Not only were negotiations car- ried on with foreign powers by means of despatches,"^* but the affairs of the empire generally were conducted by writing. A custom-house system was established along the frontier, and all commodities liable to duty that entered the country were registered in a book'^" at the time of entry by the custom-house officer. In the great cities where the Court passed a portion of the year, account was kept of the arrival of strangers, whose names and descriptions were placed upon record by the keep- ers of the gates. "^^'' The orders of the Crown were signified in writing to the satraps;'" and they doubtless corresponded with the Court in the same way. In the earlier times the writing material commonly used was linen; but shortly before the time of Pliny, the Parthians began to make paper from the papyrus, which grew in the neighborhood of Babylon, though they still employed in preference the old material. "'^ There was a considerable trade between Parthia and Rome, carried on by means of a class of merchants. '" Parthia im- ported from Rome various metals, and numerous manufactured articles of a high class. Her principal exports were textile fabrics and spices.'"^ The textOe fabrics seem to have been produced chiefly in Babylonia, and to have consisted of silks, carpets, and coverlets.'" The silks were largely used by the Roman ladies.""" The coverlets, which were patterned with various colors, fetched enormous prices, and were regarded as fit adornments of the Imperial palace.'" Among the spices exported, the most celebrated were bdellium, and ihejtmcus odoratus or odoriferous bulrush.'^* The Partliians had many liberal usages which imply a fairly advanced civilization. Their tolerance of varieties in religion has been already mentioned.'"" Even in political matters they seem to have been free from the narrowness which generally characterizes barbarous nations. They behaved well to pris- oners, "° admitted foreigners freely to offices of high trust,'" gave an asylum to refugees, and treated them with respect and CH. xxiii.] THE PARTHIANS LIKE TEE TURKS. 239 kindness, '" were scrupulous observers of their pledged word,'"' and eminently faithful to their treaty obligations."* On the other hand, it must be admitted that they had some customs which indicate a tinge of barbarism. They used torture for the extraction of answers from reluctant persons,'" employed the scourge to punish trifling offences,'"" and, in certain cases, condescended to mutilate the bodies of their dead enemies.'" Their addiction to intemperance is also a barbaric trait. They were, no doubt, on the whole, less civilized than either the Greeks or Romans ; but the difference does not seem to have been so great as represented by the classical writers. Speaking broadly, the position that they occupied was some- what similar to that which the Turks hold in the system of modern Europe. They had a military strength which caused them to be feared and respected, a vigor of administration"" which was felt to imply many sterling qualities. A certain coarseness and rudeness attached to them which they found it impossible to shake off ; and this drawback was exaggerated by their rivals into an indication of irreclaimable barbarity. Except in respect of their military prowess, it may be doubtful if justice is done them by any classical writer. They were not merely the sole rival which dared to stand up against Rome in the interval between B.C. 65 and a.d. 22riiph). Plate, XXX. Vol. m ELABOnATK OliNAMENTATIOK OK pAI.ACK AT MaSHITA. -J. ra. rx.] LETTER OF SAPOR TO G0N8TANTIU8. 331 fair, having learned by experience that inordinate greed is oft- times punished by defeat and disaster. As then the voice of truth ought to speak with all openness, and the more illustrious of mankind should make their words mirror their thoughts, I will briefly declare to thee what I propose, not forgetting that I have often said the same things before. Your own authors are witness that the entire tract within the river Strymon and the borders of Macedon was once held by my ancestors ; if 1 required you to restore all this, it would not ill become me (ex- cuse the boast) , inasmuch as I excel in virtue and in the splen- dor of my achievements the whole line of our ancient monarchs. But as moderation delights me, and has always been the rule of my conduct — wherefore from my youth up I have had no occasion to repent of any action — I will be content to receive Mesopotamia and Armenia, which was fraudulently extorted from my grandfather. We Persians have never admitted the principle, which you proclaim with such effrontery, that success in war is always glorious, whether it be the fruit of courage or trickery. In conclusion, if you will take the advice of one who speaks for your good, sacrifice a small tract of territory, one always in dispute and causing continual bloodshed, in order that you may rule the remainder securely. Physicians, re- member, often cut and burn, and even amputate portions of the body, that the patient may have the healthy use of what is left to him ; and there are animals which, understanding why the himters chase them, deprive themselves of the thing coveted, to live thenceforth without fear. I warn you, that, if my am- bassador returns in vain, I will take the field against you, so soon as the winter is past, with all my forces, confiding in my good fortune and in the fairness of the conditions which I have now offered." It must have been a severe blow to Imperial pride to receive such a letter : and the sense of insult can scarcely have been much mitigated by the fact that the missive was enveloped in a silken covering, '* or by the circumstance that the bearer, Narses, endeavored by his conciliating manners to atone for his master's rudeness. '" Constantius replied, however, in a digni- fied and calm tone."" "The Roman emperor," he said, " victo- rious by land and sea, saluted his brother. King Sapor. Hi» lieutenant in Mesopotamia had meant well in opening a nego- tiation Avith a Persian governor; but he had acted without orders, and could not bind his master. Nevertheless, he (Con- stantius) would not disclaim what had been done, since he did 332 'J'ilE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. ix, not object to a peace, provided it were fair and honorable. But to ask the master of the whole Roman world to surrender ter- ritories which he had successfully defended when he ruled only over the provinces of the East was plainly indecent and ab- surd. He must add that the employment of threats was futile, and too common an artifice ; more especially as the Persians themselves must know that Rome always defended herself when attacked, and that, if occasionaUy she Avas vanquished in a battle, yet she never failed to have the advantage in the event of every war." Three envoys were entrusted with the delivery of tliis reply"' — Prosper, a count of the empire; Spec- tatus, a tribune and notary; and Eustathius, an orator and philosopher, a pupU of the celebrated Neo-Platonist, Jam- blichus,"^ and a friend of St. Basil." Constantius was most anxious for peace, as a dangerous war threatened with the Alemanni, one of the most powerful tribes of Germany. °* He seems to have hoped that, if the unadorned language of the two statesmen failed to move Sapor, he might be won over by the persuasive eloquence of the professor of rhetoric. But Sapor was bent on war. He had concluded arrange- ments with the natives so long his adversaries in the East, by which they had pledged themselves to join liis standard with all their forces in the ensuing spring." He was well aware of the position of Constantius in the West, of the internal cor- ruption of his court, and of the perils constantly threatening him from external enemies. A Roman official of importance, bearing the once honored name of Antoninus, had recently taken refuge Avith him from the claims of pretended creditors, and had been received into high favor on account of the infor- mation which he was able to communicate with respect to the disposition of the Roman forces and the condition of their magazines. "^ This individual, ennobled by the royal authority, and given a place at the royal table, gained great influence over his new master, w^liom he stimulated by alternately re- proaching him with his backwardness in the past, and putting before him the prospect of easy triumphs over Rome in the fu- ture. He pointed out that the emperor, with the bulk of his troops and treasures, was detained in the regions adjoining the Danube, and that the East was left almost undefended; he magnified the services which he was himself competent to ren- der;" he exhorted Sapor to bestir hirrself, and to put confidence in his good fortune. He recommended that the old plan of sitting down before walled towns should be given up, and that CH. IX.] GREAT INVASION OF SAPOR 333 the Persian monarch, leaving the strongholds of Mesopotamia in his rear, should press forward to the Euphrates, ^^ pour hig troops across it, and overrun the rich province of Syria, which he would find unguarded, and which had not been invaded by an enemy for nearly a century. The views of Antoninus were adopted ; but, in practice, they were overruled by the exigen- cies of the situation. A Eoman army occupied Mesopotamia, and advanced to the baiaks of the Tigris. When the Persians in full force crossed the river, accompanied by Chionite and Albanian allies,"" they found a considerable body of troops pre- pared to resist them. Their opponents did not, indeed offer battle, but they laid waste the country as the Persians took possession of it ; they destroyed the forage, evacuated the in- defensible towns^" (which fell, of course, into the enemy's hands), and fortified the line of the Euphrates with castles, military engines, and palisades.'' Still the programme of An- toninus would probably have been carried out, had not the swell of the Euphrates exceeded the average, and rendered it impossible for the Persian troops to ford the river at the usual point of passage into Syria. On discovering this obstacle, An- toninus suggested that, by a march to the north-east through a fertile coimtry, the Upper Euphrates might be reached, and easily crossed, before its waters had attained any considerable volume. Sapor agreed to adopt this suggestion. He marched from Zeugma across the Mons Masius towards the Upper Eu- phrates, defeated the Romans in an imj)ortant battle near Amida,'^ took, by a sudden assault, two castles which defended the town," and then somewhat hastily resolved that he would attack the place, which he did not imagine capable of making much resistance. Amida, now Diarbekr, was situated on the right bank of the Upper Tigris, in a fertile plain, and was Avashed along the whole of its western side by a semi-circular bend of the river. ^^ It had been a place of considerable importance from a very an- cient date," and had recently been much sti-engthened by Con- stantius, who had made it an arsenal for military engines, and had repaired its towers and walls. ^^ The town contained within it a copious fountain of water, which was liable, hoAvever, to acquire a disagi'eeable odor in the summer time. Seven le- gions, of the moderate strength to which legions had been re- duced by Constantine,^' defended it; and the garrison included also a body of horse-archers, composed chiefly or entirely of noble foreigners.'" Sapor hoped in ths first instance to terrify m 334 TEE SEVENTH MONARCUY. [ch. ix. it into submission by his mere appearance, and boldly rode up to the gates with a small body of his followers, expecting that they would be opened to him. But the defenders were more courageous than he had imagined. They received him with a shower of darts and arrows that were directed specially against his person, which was conspicuous from its ornaments; and they aimed their weapons so well that one of them passed through a portion of his dress and was nearly wounding him.'' Persuaded by his followers, Sapor upon this withdrew, and committed the further prosecution of the attack to Grumbates, the king of the Chionites, who assaulted the walls on the next day with a body of picked troops, but was repulsed with great loss, his only son, a youth of great promise, being killed at his side by a dart from a balista/" The death of this prince spread dismay through the camp, and was followed by a general mourning; but it now became a point of honor to take the town which had so injured one of the great king's royal aUies ; and Grumbates was promised that Amida should become the funeral pile of his lost darhng.*' The town was now regiQarly invested. Each nation was as- signed its place. The Chionites, burning with the desire to avenge their late defeat, were on the east ; the Vertae on the south ; the Albanians, warriors from the Caspian region, on the north; the Segestans,*^ who were reckoned the bravest soldiers of all, and who brought into the field a large body of elephants, held the west. A continuous line of Persians, five ranks deep, surrounded the entire city, and supported the auxiliary detach- ments. The entire besieging army was estimated at a hundred thousand men ;^' the besieged, including the unarmed multitude, were under 30,000.^^ After the pause of an entire day, the first general attack was made. Grumbates gave the signal for the assault by hurling a bloody spear into the space before the walls, after the fashion of a Ttouian fetialis.^^ A cloud of darts and arrows from every side followed the flight of this .weapon, and did severe damage to the besieged, who were at the same time galled with discharges from Roman military engines, taken by the Persians in some capture of Singara, and now em- ployed against their former owners." Still a vigorous resist- ance continued to be made, and the besiegers, in their exposed positions, suffered even more than the garrison; so that after two days the attempt to carry the city by general assault was abandoned, and the slow process of a regular siege was adopted. Trenches were opened at the usual distance from the walla. en. IX.] SIEGE OF AMIDA. 335 along which the troops advanced under the cover of hurdles towards the ditch, which they proceeded to fill up in places. Mounds were then thrown up against the walls ; and movable towers were constructed and brought into play, guarded exter- nally with iron, and each mounting a balista.*' It was impos- sible long to withstand these various weapons of attack. The hopes of the besieged lay, primarily, in their receiving relief from without by the advance of an army capable of engaging their assailants and harassing them or driving them off ; sec- ondardy, in successful sallies, by means of which they might destroy the enemy's works and induce him to retire from be- fore the place. There existed, in the neighborhood of Amida, the elements of a relieving army, under the command of the new prefect of the East, Sabinianus. Had this officer possessed an energetic and enterprising character, he might, without much difficulty, have collected a force of light and active soldiers, which might have hung upon the rear of the Persians, intercepted their convoys, cut off their stragglers, and have even made an occasional dash upon their lines. Such was the course of conduct recommend- ed by Ursicinus, the second in command, whom Sabinianus had recently superseded ; but the latter was jealous of liis subordi- nate, and had orders from the Byzantine court to keep him un- employed."* He was himself old and rich, alike disinclined to and unfit for military enterprise ;"" he therefore absolutely re- jected the advice of Ursicinus, and determined on making no effort. He had positive orders, he said, from the court to keep on the defensive and not endanger his troops by engaging them in hazardous adventures. Amida must protect itself, or at any rate not look to him for succor. Ursicinus chafed terribly, it it said, against this decision, ^" but was forced to submit to it. His messengers conveyed the dispiriting intelligence to the de- voted city, which learned thereby that it must rely wholly upon its own exertions. Nothing now remained but to organize sallies on a large scale and attack the besieger's works. Such attempts were made from time to time with some success ; and on one occasion two Gaulish legions, banished to the East for their adherence to the cause of Magnentius, penetrated, by night, into the heart of the besieging camp, and brought the person of the monarch into danger. This peril was, however, escaped; the legions vere repulsed with the loss of a sixth of their number;" and nothing was gained by tlie audacious enterprise beyond atinice 386 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. ix of three days, during which each side mourned its dead, and sought to repair its losses. The fate of the doomed city drew on. Pestilence was added to the calamities which the besieged had to endure. " Desertion and treachery were arrayed against them. One of the natives of Amida, going over to the Persians, informed them that on. the southern side of the city a neglected staircase led up froni the margin of the Tigris through underground corridors to one of the principal bastions ; and under his guidance seventy archers of the Persian guard, picked men, ascended the dark passage at dead of night, occupied the tower, and when morning broke dis- played from it a scarlet flag, as a sign to their countrymen that a portion of the wall was taken. The Persians were upon the alert, and an instant assault was made. But the garrison, by extraordinary efforts, succeeded in recapturing the tower be- fore any support reached its occupants; and then, directing their artillery and missiles against the assailing columns, in- flicted on them tremendous losses, and soon compelled them to return hastily to the shelter of their camp. The Vertae, who maintained the siege on the south side of the city, were the chief sufferers in this abortive attempt. ^^ Sapor had now spent seventy days before the place, and had made no perceptible impression. Autumn was already far ad- vanced, ^* and the season for military operations would soon be over. It was necessary, therefore, either to take the city speedily or to give up the siege and retire. Under these circum- stances Sapor resolved on a last effort. He had constructed towers of such a height that they overtopped the wall, and poured their discharges on the defenders from a superior elevation. He had brought his mounds in places to a level with the ramparts, and had compelled the garrison to raise countermounds within the walls for their protection. He now determined on pressing the assault day after day, until he either carried the town or found all his resources exhausted. His artillery, his foot, and his elephants were all employed in turn or together; he allowed the garrison no rest.^^ Not con- tent with directing the operations, he himself took part in the supreme struggle, exposing his own person freely to the enemy's weapons, and losing many of liis attendants. "" After the con- test had lasted three continuous days from morn to night, for- tune at last favored him. One of the inner mounds, raised by the besieged behind their wall, suddenly gave way, involving its defenders in its fall, and at the same time fiUing up the OH. DC] FALL OF AMIDA. 337 entire space between the wall and the mound "raised outside ] by the Persians. A way into the town was thus laid open," and the besiegers instantly occupied it. It was in vain that the flower of the garrison threw itself across the path of the entering columns — nothing could withstand the ardor of the Persian troops. In a little time all resistance was at an end ; those who could quitted the city and fled — the remainder, whatever their sex, age, or calling, whether armed or un- armed, were slaughtered like sheep by the conquerors. ^* Thus fell Amida after a siege of seventy-three days.^" Sapor, who on other occasions showed hunself not deficient in clem- ency,"" was exasperated by the prolonged resistance and the losses which he had sustained in the course of it. Thirty thousand of his best soldiers had fallen ; "' the son of his chiefly ally had perished ;°' he himself had been brought into im- minent danger. Such audacity on the part of a petty town seemed no doubt to him to deserve a severe retribution. The place was therefore given over to the infuriated soldiery, who were allowed to slay and plunder at their pleasure. Of the captives taken, all belonging to the five provinces across the Tigris, claimed as his own by Sapor, though ceded to Rome by his grandfather, were massacred in cold blood. The Count ^lian, aiul the commanders of the legions who had conducted the gallant defence, were barbarously crucified. Many other Eomans of high rank were subjected to the indignity of being manacled, and were dragged into Persia as slaves rather than as prisoners. "^ The campaign of a.d. 359 terminated with this dearly bought victory. The season was too far advanced for any fresh enter- prise of importance ; and Sapor was probably glad to give his army a rest after the toils and perils of the last three months. Accordingly he retired across the Tigris, without leaving (so far as appears) any garrisons in Mesopotamia, and began pre- parations for the campaign of a.d. 360. Stores of all kinds were accumulated during the winter; and, when the spring came, the indefatigable monarch once more invaded the enemy's country, poiiring into Mesopotamia an army even more numerous and better appointed than that which he had led against Amida in the preceding year."' His first object now was to capture Singara, a town of some consequence, which was, however, defended by only two Roman legions and a cei'tain number of native soldiers. After a vain attempt to persuade the garrison to a surrender, the attack was made in 338 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. ix; the usual way, chiefly by scaling parties with ladders, and by battering parties which shook the walls with the ram. The defenders kept the scalers at bay by a constant discharge of stones and darts from their artillery, arrows from their bows, and leaden bullets ^^ from their slings. They met the assaults of the ram by attempts to fire the wooden covering which pro- tected it and those who worked it. For some days these eiforts sufficed ; but after a while the besiegers found a weak point in the defences of the place — a tower so recently built that the mortar in which the stones were laid was still moist, and which consequently crumbled rapidly before the blows of a strong and heavy battering-ram, and in a short time fell to the ground. The Persians povired in through the gap, and were at once masters of the entire town, which ceased to re- sist after the catastrophe. This easy victory allowed Sapor to exhibit the better side of his character ; he forbade the further shedding of blood, and ordered that as many as possible of the garrisons and citizens should be taken alive. Reviving a favorite policy of Oriental rulers from very remote times,"" he transported these captives to the extreme eastern parts of his empu-e," where they might be of the greatest service to him in defending his frontier against the Scythians and Indians. It is not really surprising, though the historian of the war regards it as needing explanation, "" that no attempt was made to relieve Singara by the Romans. The siege was short ; th-e place was considered strong; the nearest point held by a powerful Roman force was Nisibis, which was at least sixty miles distant from Singara. The neighborhood of Singara was, moreover, ill supplied with water ; and a relieving army would probably have soon found itself in difficulties. Singara, on the verge of the desert, was always perilously situated. Rome valued it as an outpost from which her enemy might be watched, and which might advertise her of a sudden danger, but could not venture to undertake its defence in case of an attack in force, and was prepared to hear of its capture with equanimity. From Singara Sapor directed his march almost due north- wards, and, leaving Nisibis unassailed upon his left, proceeded to attack the strong fort known indifferently as Phoenica or Bezabde." This was a position on the east bank of the Tigris, near the point where that river quits the mountains and de bouches upon the yjlain; '° though not on the site," it may be considered the representative of the modern Jezireh, which tn. ix.j Jf*ALL OF BEZABDE. 339 commands the passes from the low country into the Kurdish mountains. Bezabde was the chief city of the province, called after it Zabdicene, one of the five ceded by Narses and greatly coveted by his gi'andson. It was much valued by Rome, was fortified in places with a double wall, and was guarded by three legions and a large body of Kurdish archers.''^ Sapor, having reconnoitred the place, and, with his usual hardi- hood, exposed himself to danger in doing so, sent a flag of truce to demand a surrender, joining with the messengers some prisoners of high rank taken at Singara, lest the enemy should open fire upon his envoys. The device was successful ; but the garrison proved stanch, and determined on resisting to the last. Once more all the known resources of attack and de- fence were brought into play ; and after a long siege, of which the most important incident was an attempt made by the bishop of the place to induce Sapor to withdraw," the wall was at last breached, the city taken, and its defenders indiscrimi- nately massacred. Regarding the position as one of first-rate importance, Sapor, who had destroyed Singara, carefully re- ptared the defences of Bezabde, provisioned it abundantly, and gari'isoned it with some of his best troops. He was well aware that the Romans would feel keenly the loss of so important a post, and expected that it would not be long before they made an effort to recover possession of it. The winter was now approaching, but the Persian monarch still kept the field. The capture of Bezabde was followed by that of many other less important strongholds,'^ which offered little resistance. At last, towards the close of the year, an at- tack was made upon a place called Virta, said to have been a fortress of great strength, and by some moderns" identified with Tekrit, an important city upon the Tigris betweeen Mosul and Bagdad. Here the career of the conqueror was at last arrested. Persuasion and force proved alike unavailing to in- duce or compel a surrender ; and, after wasting the small re- mainder of the year, and suffering considerable loss, the Per- sian monarch reluctantly gave up the siege, and returned to his own country.'' Meanwhile the movements of the Roman emperor had been slow and uncertain. Distracted between a jealous fear of his cousin Julian's proceedings in the West, and a desire of check- ing the advance of his rival Sapor in the East, he had left Constantinople in the early spring, " but had journeyed leisurely through Cappadocia and Armenia Minor to Samosata, whence^ S40 ^^^ SEVENTH MONARCHY. [tu. ix. after crossing the Euphrates, he had proceeded to Edessa, and there fixed himself.'* While in Cappadocia he had suni- nioned to his presence Arsaces, the tributary king of Armenia, had reminded him of his engagements, and had endeavored to quicken his gratitude by bestowing on him liberal presents." At Edessa he employed hmiself during the whole of the sum- mer in collecting troops and stores ; nor was it till the autum- nal equinox was past"" that he took the field, and, after weep- ing over the smoking ruins of Amida, marched to Bezabde, and, when the defenders rejected his overtures of peace, formed the siege of the place. Sapor was, we must suppose, now engaged before Virta, and it is probable that he thought Bezabde strong enough to defend itself. At any rate, he made no effort to afford it any relief ; and the Roman emperor was allowed to employ all the resources at his disposal in reiterated assaults upon the walls. The defence, however, proved stronger than the attack. Time after time the bold sallies of the besieged destroyed the Roman works. At last the rainy season set in, and the low ground outside the town became a glutinous and adhesive marsh.*' It was no longer possible to continue the siege ; and the disappointed emperor reluctantly drew off his troops, recrossed the Euphrates, and retired into winter quarters at Antioch. The successes of Sapor in the campaigns of a.d. 359 and 360, his captures of Amida, Singara, and Bezabde, together with the unfortunate issue of the expedition made by Constantius against the last-named place, had a tendency to shake the fidelity of the Roman vassal-kings, Arsaces*'' of Armenia, and Meribanes of Iberia. Constantius, therefore, during the win- ter of A.D. 360-1, which he passed at Antioch, sent emissaries to the courts of these monarchs, and endeavored to secure their fidelity by loading them with costly presents.*' His policy seems to have been so far successfid that no revolt of these kingdoms took place ; they did not as yet desert the Romans or make their submission to Sapor. Their monarchs seem to have simply watched events, prepared to declare themselves distinctly on the winning side so soon as fortune should incline unmistakably to one or the other combatant. Meanwhile they maintained the fiction of a nominal dependence upon Rome.** It might have been exjDected that the year a.d. 361 would "have been a turning-point in the war, and that, if Rome did not by a great effort assert herself and recover her prestige, the advance of Persia would have been marked and rapid. But 1 ea. IX. 5 INACTION OF SAPOlt IN A.DA^i. S4l the actual course of events was far different. Hesitation and diffidence characterize the movements of both parties to the I contest, and the year is signahzed by no important enterprise on the part of either monarch. Constantius reoccupied Edessa/^ and had (we are told)**" some thoughts of renewing the siege of Bezabde ; actually, however, he did not advance further, but contented himself with sending a part of his army to watch Sapor, giving them strict orders not to risk an en- gagement." Sapor, on his side, began the year with demon- strations which were taken to mean that he was about to pass the Euphrates;'*'* but in reality he never even brought his troops across the Tigris, or once set foot in Mesopotamia. After wasting weeks or months in a futile display of his armed strength upon the eastern bank of the river, and violently alarming the officers sent by Constantius to observe his move- ments,'*'' he suddenly, towards autumn, withdrew his ti'oops, having attempted nothing, and quietly returned to his capital ! It is by no means difficult to understand the motives which actuated Constantius. He was, month after month, receiving intelligence from the West of stejDS taken by Julian which amounted to open rebellion, and challenged him to engage in civil war."" So long as Sapor threatened invasion he did not like to quit Mesopotamia, lest he might appear to have sacri- ficed the interests of his country to his own private quarrels; but he must have been anxious to return to the seat of empire from the first moment that intelligence reached him of Julian's assumption of the imperial name and dignity; and when Sapor's retreat was announced he naturally made all haste to reach his capital. Meanwhile the desire of keeping his army intact caused him to refrain from any movement which in- volved the slightest risk of bringing on a battle, and, in fact, reduced him to inaction. So much is readily intelligible. But what at this tiuie withheld Sapor, when he had so grand an opportunity of making an impression upon Rome — what par- alyzed his arm when it might have struck with such effect it is far from easy to understand, though perhaps not impossible to conjecture. The historian of the war ascribes his absti- nence to a religious motive, teUing us that the auguries were not favorable for the Persians crossing the Tigris."' But there is no other evidence that the Persians of this period were the slaves of any such superstition as that noted by Ammianus, nor any probability that a monarch of Sapor's force of char- acter would have suffered his military policy to be affected by 342 "Ttll^ 8EVmm MONABOHT. [ch. ix omens. "We must therefore ascribe the conduct of the Persian king to some cause not recorded by the historian— same failure of healtli. or some peril from, internal or external enemies which called him away from the scene of his recent exploits, just at the time when his continued presence there was most important. Once before in his lifetime, an invasion of his eastern provinces had required his immediate presence, and allowed his adversary to quit Mesopotamia and march against Magnentius."" It is not improbable that a fresh attack of the same or some other barbarians now again happened oppor- tunely for the Eomans, calling Sapor away, and thus enabling Constantius to turn his back upon the East, and set out for Europe in order to meet Julian. The meeting, however, was not destined to take place. On his way from Antioch to Constantinople the unfortunate Con- stantius, anxious and perhaps over-fatigued, fell sick at Mop- sucrene, in Cilicia, and died there, after a short illness,"^ to- wards the close of a.d. 361. Julian the Apostate succeeded peacefully to the empire whereto he was about to assert his right by force of arms ; and Sapor found that the war which he had provoked with Rome, in reliance upon his adversary's weakness and incapacity, had to be carried on with a prince of far greater natural powers and of much superior military training. CH. X. JULIAN iSUGCEEDH C0JS8TAJSTIUS. 343 CHAPTER X. Julian becomes Emperor of Rome. His Resolution to invade Persia. His Vieics and Motives. His Proceedings. Pro- posals of Sapor rejected. Other Embassies. Relations of Julian 2vith Armenia. Strength of his Army. His inva- sion of Mesopotamia. His Line of March. Siege of Peri- sabor ; of Maogamalcha. Battle of the Tigris. Further Progress of Julian checked by his Inability to invest Ctesi- phon. His Retreat. His Death. Retreat continued by Jovian. Sapor offers Terms of Peace. Peace made by Jovian. Its Conditions. Reflections on the Peace and on the Termination of the Second Period of Struggle between Rome and Persia. " Julianus, redacta ad unum se orbis Romani curatione, gloriae nimis cupidus, in Persas proflciscitur." — Aurel. Vict. Epit. § 43. The prince on whom the government of the Roman empire, and consequently the direction of the Persian war, devolved by the death of Constantius, was in the flower of his age,' proud, self-confident, and full of energy. He had been en- gaged for a period of four years" in a struggle with the rude and warlike tribes of Germany, had freed the whole country west of the Rhine from the presence of those terrible warriors, and had even carried fire and sword far into the wild and savage districts on the right bank of the river, and compelled the Alemanni and other powerful German tribes to make their submission to the majesty of Rome. Personally brave, by temperament restless, and inspired with an ardent desire to rival or eclipse the glorious deeds of those heroes of former times who had made themselves a name in history, he viewed the disturbed condition of the East at the time of his accession not as a trouble, not as a drawback upon the delights of em- pire, but as a happy circumstance, a fortunate opportunity for distinguishing himself by some great achievement. Of all the Greeks, Alexander appeared to him the most illustrious;' of all his predecessors on the imperial thone, Trajan and Mar' cus Aurelius were those whom he most wished to emulate.* But all these princes had either led or sent^ expeditions inta 344 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. x. the far East, and had aimed at uniting in one the fairest prov- inces of Europe and Asia. Julian appears, from the first mo- ment that he found himself peaceably established upon the throne,^ to have resolved on undertaking in person a great ex- pedition against Sapor, with the object of avenging upon Persia the ravages and defeats of the last sixty years, or at any rate of obtaining such successes as might justify his as- stuning the title of "Persicus."' Whether he really enter- tained any hope of rivalling Alexander, or supposed it possible that he should effect "the final conquest of Persia, "" may be doubted. Acquainted, as he must have been," with the entire course of Roman warfare in these parts from the attack of Crassus to the last defeat of his own immediate predecessor, he can scarcely have regarded the subjugation of Persia as an easy matter, or have expected to do much more than strike terror into the "barbarians" of the East, or perhaps obtain from them the cession of another province. The sensible officer, who, after accompanying him in his expedition, wrote the history of the campaign, regarded his actuating motives as the delight that he took in war, and the desire of a new title. '" Confident in his own mUitary talent, in his training, and in his Si power to inspire enthusiasm in an army, he no doubt looked to reap laurels sufficient to justify him in making his attack ; but the wild schemes ascribed to him, the conquest of the Sas- sanian kingdom, and the subjugation of Hyrcania and India," are figments (probably) of the imagination of his historians. Julian entered Constantinople on the 11th of December, a.d. 361; he quitted it towards the end of May,'^ a.d. 362, after re- 1|j siding there less than six months. During this period, not- withstanding the various important matters in which he was engaged, the purifying of the court, the depression of the Chris- tians, the restoration and revivification of Paganism, he found time to form plans and make preparations for his intended eastern expedition, in which he was anxious to engage as soon as possible. Having designated for the war such troops as could be spared from the West, he committed them and their officers to the charge of two generals, carefully chosen, Victor, a Roman of distinction, and the Persian refugee, Prince Hor- misdas,'^ who conducted the legions without difficulty to Antioch. There Julian himself arrived in June or July, ^ after having made a stately progress through Asia Minor; and it would seem that he would at once have marched against the enemy, had not his counsellors strongly urged the necessity of CH. X.] PROPOSALS MADE BY SAPOR. 345 a short delay, '^ during which the European troops might be rested, and adequate preparations made for the intended inva- sion. It was especially necessary to provide stores and ships, '* since the new emperor had resolved not to content himself with an ordinary campaign upon the frontier, but rather to imitate the examples of Trajan and Severus, who had carried the Eoman eagles to the extreme south of Mesopotamia." Ships, accordingly, were collected, and probably built, '^ during the winter of a.d. 362-3 ; provisions were laid in ; warlike stores, military engines, and the like accumulated; while the impa- tient monarch, galled hj the wit and raillery of the gay Antio- chenes, ''' chafed at his compelled inaction, and longed to ex- change the war of words in which he was engaged with his subjects for the ruder contests of arms wherewith use had made him more familiar. It m.ust have been during the emperor's stay at Antioch that he received an embassy from the court of Persia, com- missioned to sound his inclinations with regard to the conclu- sion of a peace. Sapor had seen, with some disquiet, the sceptre of the Roman world assumed by an enterprising and courageous youth, inured to warfare and ambitious of military glory. He was probably very well informed as to the general condition of the Roman State"" and the personal character of its administrator ; and the tidings which he received concern- ing the intentions and preparations of the new prince were such as caused him some apprehension, if not actual alarm. Under these circumstance she sent an embassy with over- tures, the exact nature of which is not known, but which, it is probable, took for their basis the existing territorial limits of the two countries. At least, we hear of no offer of sur- render or submission on Sapor's part; and we can scarcely suppose that, had such offers been made, the Roman writers would have passed them over in silence. It is not surprising that Julian lent no favorable ear to the envoys, if these were their instructions ; but it woidd have been better for his repu- tation had he replied to them with less of haughtiness and rudeness. According to one authority, '' he tore up before their faces the autograph letter of their master ; while, accord- ing to another," he responded, with a contemptuous smile, that "there was no occasion for an exchange of thought be- tween him and the Persian king by messengers, since he in- tended very shortly to treat with him in person." Having received this rebuff, the envoys of Sapor took their departure, 346 THE SEVENTH MONABCHT. [ch. x. and conveyed to their sovereign the intelligence that he must prepare himseK to resist a serious invasion. About the same time various offers of assistance reached the Eoman emperor from the independent or semi-independent princes and chieftains of the regions adjacent to Mesopotamia." Such overtures were sure to be made by the heads of the plun- dering desert tribes to any powerful mvader, since it would be hoped that a share in the booty might be obtained without much participation in the danger. We are told that Juhan promptly rejected these offers, grandly saying that it was for Rome rather to give aid to her aUies than to receive assistance from them.^^ It appears, however, that at least two excep- tions were made to the general principle thus magniloquently asserted. Julian had taken into his service, ere he quitted Europe, a strong body of Gothic auxiliaries;" and, while at Antioch, he sent to the Saracens, reminding them of theu' promise to lend him troops, and calling upon them to fulfil it." If the advance on Persia was to be made by the line of the Euphrates, an alliance with these agile sons of the desert was of first-rate importance, since the assistance which they could render as friends was considerable, and the injury which they could inflict as enemies was almost beyond calculation. It is among the faults of Juhan in this campaign that he did not set more store by the Saracen aUiance, and make greater efforts to maintain it; we shall find that after a while he allowed the brave nomads to become disaffected, and to ex- change their friendship with him for hostihty.^' Had he taken more care to attach them cordially to the side of Eome, it is quite possible that his expedition might have had a prosperous issue. There was another ally, whose services Julian regarded him- self as entitled not to request, but to command. Arsaces, king of Armenia, though placed on his throne by Sapor, had (as we have seen) transferred his allegiance to Constantius, and volun- tarily taken up the position of a Roman feudatory.'^' Constan- tius had of late suspected his fidelity ; but Arsaces had not as yet, by any overt act, justified these suspicions, and Jidian seems to have regarded him as an assured friend and ally. Early in A. D. 363 he addressed a letter to the Armenian mon- arch, requiring him to levy a considerable force, and hold him- self in readiness to execute such orders as he would receive within a short time," The style, address, and purport of thi:s letter were equally distasteful to Arsaces, whose pride was ou.t I CH. X.] JULIAN MARCHES TUROUOH MESOPOTAMIA. 347 raged, and whose indolence was disturbed, by the call thus suddenly made upon him. His own desire was probably to re- main neutral; he felt no interest in the standing quarrel be- tween his two powerful neighbors ; he was under obligations to both of them ; and it was for his advantage that they should remain evenly balanced. We cannot ascribe to him any earnest religious feeling;^" but, as one who kept up the profession of Christianity, he could not but regard with aversion the Apos- tate, who had given no obscure intimation of his intention to use his power to the utmost in order to sweep the Christian religion from the face of the earth. The disinchnation of their monarch to observe the designs of Julian was shared, or rathei" surpassed, by his people, the more educated portion of whom were strongly attached to the new faith and worship." If the great historian of Ai'menia is right in stating that Julian at this time offered an open insult to the Armenian religion, ^'^ wo must pronounce him strangely imprudent. The alliance of Armenia was always of the utmost importance to Rome m any attack upon the East. Julian seems to have gone out of his way to ci'eate offence in this quarter," where his interests re- quired that he should exercise all his powers of conciliation. The forces which the emperor regarded as at his disposal, and with which he expected to take the field, were the following. His own troops amounted to 83,000 or (according to another account) to 95,000 men.^* They consisted chiefly of Roman legionaries, horse and foot, but included a strong body of Gothic auxiliaries. Armenia was expected to furnish a considerable force, probably not less than 20,000 men;''^ and the light horse of the Saracens would, it was thought, be tolerably numerous. Altogether, an army of above a hundred thousand men was about to be launched on the devoted Persia, wliich was believed imhkely to offer any effectual, if even any serious, resistance. The impatience of Julian scarcely allowed him to await the* conclusion of the winter. With the first breath of spring he put his forces in motion,-"' and, quitting Antioch, marched with all speed to the Euphrates. Passing Litarbi, and thea Hie^ap- olis, he crossed the I'iver by a bridge of boats in the vicinity ol that place, and proceeded by Batnpe to the important city of Carrhee,'' once the home of Abraham.^" Here he halted for a few days and finally fixed his plans. It was by this time well known to the Romans that there were two, and two only, con- venient roads whereby Southern Mesopotamia was to be reached, one along tlw line of the Mons Masius t* f.Iie Tigris, 348 TEE SEVENTH MONAUCIIT. [ch. x. and then along the banks of that stream, the other down the valley of the Euphrates to the great alluvial plain on the lower course of the rivers. Juhan had, perhaps, hitherto doubted which line he should follow in person."^ The first had been pre- ferred by Alexander and by Trajan, the second by the younger Cyrus, by Avidius Cassius, and by Severus. Both lines were fairly practicable ; but that of the Tigris was circuitous, and its free employment was only possible under the condition of Ar- menia being certainly friendly. If Julian had cause to suspect, as it is probable that he had, the fidehty of the Armenians, he may have felt that there was one line only which he could with prudence pursue. He might send a subsidiary force by the doubtful route which could advance to his aid if matters went favorably, or remain on the defensive if they assumed a threat- ening aspect ; but his own grand attack must be by the other. Accordingly he divided his forces. Committing a body of troops, which is variously estimated at from 18,000 to 30,000," into the hands of Procopius, a connection of his own, and Se- bastian, Duke of Egypt, with orders that they should proceed by way of the Mons Masius to Armenia, and, uniting themselves with the forces of Arsaces, invade Northern Media, ravage it, and then join him before Ctesiphon by the line of the Tigris,^' he reserved for himself and for his main army the shorter and more open route down the vaUey of the Eu^Dhrates. Leaving Carrhse on the 26th of March, after about a week's stay, he marched southward, at the head of 65,000 men, by Davana and along the course of the Behk. to Callinicus or Nicephorium, near the junction of the BeUk with the Euphrates. Here the Saracen chiefs came and made theii* submission, and were gra- ciously received by the emperor, to whom they presented a crown of gold.^^ At the same time the fleet made its appear- ance, numbering at least 1100 vessels," of which fifty were ships of war, fifty prepared to serve as pontoons, and the re- maining thousand transports laden with provisions, weapons, and mihtary engines. From Calhnicus the emperor marched along the course of the Euphi-ates to Circusium, or Circesium," at the junction of \he Khabour with the Euphrates, arriving at this place early In April. ■•^ Thus far he had been marching through his own dominions, and had had no hostility to dread. Being now about to enter the enemy's country, he made arrangements for the march which seem to have been extremely judicious. The cavalry was placed under the command of Arintheeus and CH. X.] SURRENDER OF AN ATE AN. 349 Prince Honnisdas, and was stationed at the extreme left, with orders to advance on a line parallel with the general course of f the river. Some picked legions under the command of Nevitta formed the right wing, and, resting on the Euphrates, main- ' tained communication with the fleet. Julian, with the main part of his troops, occupied the space intermediate between these two extremes, marching in a loose column which from front to rear covered a distance of above nine miles. A fly- ing corps of fifteen hundred men acted as an avant-guard under Count LuciHanus, and explored the country in advance, feeling on all sides for the enemy. The rear was covered by a detachment undex" Secundinus, Duke of Osrhoene, Dagalai- phus, and Victor." Having made his dispositions, and crossed the broad stream of the Khabour, on the 7th of April, by a bridge of boats, which he immediately broke up,*' Julian continued his advance along the course of the Euphrates, supported by his fleet, which was not allowed either to outstrip or to lag behind the army.''* The first halt was at Zaitha,"'' famous as the scene of the murder of Gordian, whose tomb was in its vicinity.^" Here Julian encoui-aged his soldiers by an eloquent speech,^' in which he recounted the past successes of the Roman arms, and promised them an easy victory over their present adver- sary. He then, in a two days' march, reached Dura,'*" a ruined city, destitute of inhabitants, on the banks of the river ; from which a march of four days more brought him to Anathan, '"^ the modern Anah, a strong fortress on an island in the mid-stream, which was held by a Persian garrison. An attempt to surprise the place by a night attack having failed, Julian had recourse to persuasion, and by the representations of Prince Hormisdas induced its defenders to surrender the fort and place themselves at his mercy. ^* It was, perha])S, to gall the Antiochenes with an indication of his victorious progress that he sent his prisonei's under escort into Syria, and settled them in the territory of Chalcis, at no great dis- tance from the city of his aversion. Unwilling further to weaken his army by detaching a garrison to hold his conquest, he committed Anathan to the flames before proceeding further down the river. " About eight miles below Anathan, another island and ano- ther fortress were held by the enemy. Thilutha is described as stronger than Anathan, and indeed as almost impregna- ble. ^'' Julian felt that he could not attack it with any hope 350 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. x of success, and therefore once more submitted to use persua- sion. But the garrison, feehng themselves secure, rejected his overtures; they would wait, they said, and see which party was superior in the approaching conflict, and would then attach themselves to the victors. Meanwhile, if unmo- lested by the invader, they would not interfere with his advance, but would maintain a neutral attitude. Julian had to determine whether he would act in the spirit of an Alexan- der," and, rejecting with disdain all compromise, compel by force of arms an entire submission, or whether he would take lower ground, accept the offer made to him, and be content to leave in his rear a certain number of unconquered fortresses- He decided that prudence required him to take the latter course, and left Thilutha unassailed. It is not surprising that, having admitted the assumption of a neutral position by one town, he was forced to extend the permission to others, ^^ and so to allow the Euphrates route to remain, practically, in the hands of the Persians. A five days' march from Thilutha brought the army to a point opposite Diacira, or Hit,^" a town of ancient repute,"" and one which happened to be well provided with stores and provisions. Though the place lay on the right bank of the river, it was still exposed to attack, as the fleet could convey any number of troops from one shore to the other. Being considered untenable, it was deserted by the male inhabitants, who, however, left some of their women behind them. We obtain an unpleasant idea of the state of discipline which the philosophic empei'or allowed to prevail, when we find that his soldiers, "without remorse and without punishment, massa- cred these defenceless persons." " The historian of the war records this act without any appearance of shame, as if it were a usual occurrence, and no more important than the burning of the plundered city which followed. '^ From Hit the army pursued its march, through Sitha and Megia," to Zaragardia or Ozogardana, where the memory of Trajan's expedition still lingered, a certain pedestal or pulpit of stone being known to the natives as "Trajan's tribunal." Up to this time nothing had been seen or heard of any Per- sian opposing army,"* one man only on the Roman side, so far as we hear, had been killed."^ No systematic method of checking the advance had been adopted ; the corn was every- where found standing ; forage was plentiful ; and there were magazines of grain in the towns. No difficulties had delayed Vol III. 'Plate X-XXI AECiiivourE AT Takht-i-Uostan- (afrLTriamliii). Fig. 2. FtdWEiiED Tanel at Takht-i-Bosias (after Flandin). I Plate. XXXII. Vol. 111.. / Sassakuh. jDAPiTAis'(»fterFlanaiH)> CH. X.] TUE ROMANS ENTER HABTIONIA. 351 the invaders but such as Nature had interposed to thwart them, as when a violent storm on one occasion shattered the tents, and on another a sudden swell of the Euphrates wrecked some of the corn transports, and interrupted the right wing's hne of march/" But this pleasant condition of tilings was not to continue. At Hit the rolling Assyrian plain had come to an end, and the invading army had entei ed upon the low alluvium of Babylonia," a region of great fertUity, intersected by numerous canals, which in some places were carried the entire distance from the one river to the other. "* The change in the character of the country encouraged the Persians to make a change in their tactics. Hitherto they had been absolutely passive ; now at last they showed them- selves, and commenced the active system of perpetual harass- ing warfare in which they were adepts. A surena, or general of the first rank,"* appeared in the field, at the head of a strong body of Persian horse, and accompanied by a sheikh o^f the Saracenic Arabs,'" known as Malik (or "King") Eodosaces. Retreating as Julian advanced, but continually delaying liis progress, hanging on the skirts of his army, cutting ofi: his stragglers, and threatening every unsupported detachment, this active force changed all the conditions of the march, rendering it slow and pamfiU, and sometimes stopping it altogether. We are told that on one occasion Prince Hormis- das narrowly escaped falling into the surena's hands." On another, the Persian force, having allowed the Roman van- guard to proceed unmolested, suddenly showed itself on the southern bank of one of the great canals connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris, and forbade the passage of Julian's main army."- It was only after a day and a night's delay that the emperor, by detaching troops under Victor to make a long circuit, cross the canal far to the east, recall Lucihanus with the vanguard, and then attack the surena's troops in the i"ear, was able to overcome the resistance in his front, and carry his army across the cutting. Having in this way effected the passage, Juhan continued his march along the Euphrates, and in a short time came to the city of Perisabor" (Firuz Shapur), the most important that he had yet reached, and reckoned not much inferior to Ctesi- phon.'^ As the inhabitants steadily refused all accommoda- tion, and insulted Hormisdas, who was sent to treat with them, by the reproach that he was a deserter and a traitor, the em- peror determined to form the siege of the place and see if he 352 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. X. could not compel it to a surrender. Situated between the Eu- pln-ates and one of the numerous canals derived from it, and further protected by a trench drawn across from the canal to the river, Perisabor occupied a sort of island, while at the same time it was completely surrounded with a double wall. The citadel, which lay towards the north, and overhung the Eu- phrates, was especially strong; and the garrison was brave, numerous, and full of confidence. The walls, however, com- posed in part of brick laid in bitumen, were not of much strength ;" and the Roman soldiers found Uttle difficulty in shattering with the ram one of the corner towei-s, and so mak- ing an entrance into the place. But the real struggle now began. The brave defenders retreated into the citadal, which was of imposing height, and from this vantage-ground gallei the Romans in the town with an incessant shower of arrows, darts, and stones. The ordinary catapults an d bahstse of tho Romans were no match for such a storm descending from such a height ; and it was plainly necessary, if the place was to be taken, to have recourse to some other device. Julian, there- fore, who was never sparing of his own person, took the reso- lution, on the second day of the siege, of attempting to burst open one of the gates. Accompanied by a small band, who formed a roof over his head with theii^ shields, and by a few sappers with their tools, he approached the gate-tower, and made his men commence their operations. The doors, how- ever, were found to be protected with iron, and the fastenings to be so strong that no immediate impression could be made ; while the alarmed garrison, concentrating its attention on the threatened spot, kept up a furious discharge of missiles on their daring assailants. Prudence counselled retreat from the dangerous position which had been taken up ; and the emperor, though he felt acutely the shame of having faUed,'^ retired. But his mind, fertile in resource, soon foi-med a new plan. He remembered that Demetrius Poliorcetes had acquired his svirname by the invention and use of the " Helepolis," a mova- ble tower of vast height, which placed the assailants on a level with the defenders even of the loftiest ramparts. He at once ordered the constraction of such a machine ; and, the abUity of his engineers being equal to the task, it rapidly grew before his eyes. The garrison saw its growth with feehngs very opposite to those of theii* assailant ; they felt that they could not resist the new creation, and anticipated its employment by a surrender." JuUan agreed to sj^are their lives, and allowed CH. X.] MARCH ALO^'O THE NAUR-MA LCII A. 353 them to withdraw and join their countrymen, each man taking with him a spare garment and a certain sum of money. The other stores contained within the walls fell to the conquerors, who found them to comprise a vast quantity of com, arms, and other valuables. Julian distributed among his troops whatever was likely to be serviceable ; the remainder, of which he could make no use, was either burned or thrown into the Euphrates. The latitude of Ctesiphon was now nearly reached, but JuHan still continued to descend the Euphrates, while the Persian cavalry made occasional dashes upon his extended line, and sometimes caused him a sensible loss.'® At length he came to the point where the Nahr-Malcha, or "Eoyal river," the chief of the canals connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris, branched off from the more western stream, and ran nearly due east to the vicinity of the capital. The canal was navigable by his ships, and he therefore at this point quitted the Euphrates, and directed his march eastward along the course of the cutting, following in the footsteps of Severus, and no doubt expecting, like hmi, to capture easily the great metropoUtan city. But his advance across the neck of land which here separates the Tigris from the Euphrates'" was painful and difficult, since the enemy laid the coimtry under water, and at every favorable point disputed his progress. Julian, however, still pressed forward, and advanced, though slowly. By felling the palms which grew abundantly in this region, and forming with them rafts supported by inflated skins, he was able to pass the inun- dated district, and to approach within about eleven miles of Ctesiphon. Here his further march was obstructed by a fortress, built (as it would seem) to defend the capital, and fortified with especial care. Ammianus calls this place Maoga- malcha,*" while Zosimus gives it the name of Besuchis;" but both agree that it was a large town, commanded by a strong citadel, and held by a brave and numerous gan-ison. Julian might perhaps have left it unassailed, as he had left already several towns upon his line of march ; but a daring attempt made against himself by a portion of the garrison caused him to feel his honor concerned in taking the place ; and the result was that he once more arrested his steps, and, sitting down before the walls, commenced a formal siege. All the usual arts of attack and defence were employed on either side for several days, the chief nov(^l feature in the warfare being the use by the besieged of blazing balls of bitumen,'' which they 354 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. x. shot from their lofty towers against the besiegers' works and persons. Julian, however, met this novelty by a device on his side which was uncommon ; he continued openly to assault the walls and gates with his battering rams, but he secretly gave orders that the chief efforts of his men should be directed to the formation of a mine," which should be carried under both the walls that defended the place, and enable him to introduce suddenly a body of troops into the very heart of the city. His orders were successfully executed; and while a general attack upon the defences occupied the attention of the besieged, three corps" introduced through the mine suddenly showed them- selves in the town itself, and rendered further resistance hope- less. Maogamalcha, which a Httle before had boasted of being impregnable, and had laughed to scorn the vain efforts of the emperor, ^^ suddenly found itself taken by assault and under- going the extremities of sack and pillage. Julian made no efforts to prevent a general massacre, *" and the entire popula- tion, without distinction of age or sex, seems to have been put to the sword." The commandant of the fortress, though he was at first spared, suffered death shortly after on a frivolous charge." Even a miserable remnant, which had concealed itself in caves and cellars, was hunted out, smoke and fire being used to force the fugitives from their hiding-places, or else cause them to perish in the darksome dens by suffocation.*^ Thus there was no extremity of savage warfare which was not used, the fourth century anticipating some of the horrors which have most disgraced the nineteenth."" Notliing now but the river Tigi'is intervened between JuHan and the great city of Ctesiphon, which was plainly the special object of the expedition. Ctesiphon, indeed, was not to Persia what it had been to Parthia ; but still it might fairly be looked upon as a prize of considerable importance. Of Parthia it had been the main, in later times perhaps the sole, capital ; to Per- sia it was a secondary rather than a primary city, the ordinary residence of the court being Istakr, or Persepolis. StiU the Persian kings seem occasionally to have resided at Ctesiphon; and among the secondary cities of the empire it undoubtedly held a high rank. In the neighborhood were various royal hunting-seats, surrounded by shady gardens, and adorned with paintings or bas-reliefs;'" while near them were parks or "para- dises," containing the game kept for the prince's sport, which included lions, wOd boars, and bears of remarkable fierce- ness. '° As Julian advanced, these pleasaunces fell, one after i I CH. X.] JULIAN REACHES COCH&. 355 another, into his hands, and were delivered over to the rude soldiery, who trampled the flowers and shrubs under foot, destroyed the wild beasts, and burned the residences. No serious resistance was as yet made by any Persian force to the progress of the Romans, who pressed steadily forward, occasion- ally losing a few men or a few baggage animals," but drawing daily nearer to the great city, and on their way spreading ruin and desolation over a most fertile district, from which they drew abundant supplies as they passed through it, while they left it behind them blackened, wasted, and almost without in- habitant. The Persians seem to have had orders not to make, as yet, any firm stand. One of the sons of Sapor was now at their head, but no change of tactics occurred. As Julian drew near, this prince indeed quitted the shelter of Ctesiphon, and made a reconnaissance in force ; but when he fell in with the Roman advanced guard under Victor, and saw its strength, he declined an engagement, and retired without coming to blows. '^ Juhan had noAv reached the western suburb of Ctesiphon, which had lost its old namie of Seleucia and was known as Coche."^ The capture of this place would, perhaps, not have been difficult ; but, as the broad and deep stream of the Tigris flowed between it and the main town, little would have been gained by the occupation. Julian felt that, to attack Ctesiphon with success, he must, hke Trajan and Severus, transport his army to the left bank of the Tigris, and deliver liis assault upon the defences that lay beyond that river. For the safe transport of his army he trusted to his fleet, which he had there- fore caused to enter the Nahr-Malcha, and to accompany his troops thus far. But at Coche he found that the Nahr-Malcha, instead of joining the Tigins, as he had expected, above Cte- siphon, ran into it at some distance below."" To have pursued this line with both fleet and army would have carried him too far into the enemy's country, have endangered his communi- cations, and especially have cut him off from the Armenian army under Procopius and Sebastian, with which he was at this time looking to effect a junction. To have sent the fleet into the Tigris below Coche, while the army occupied the right bank of the river above it, would, in the first place, have sep- arated the two, and would further have been useless, un- less the fleet could force its way against the strong current through the whole length of the hostile city. In this difficulty Julian's book-knowledge was found of service. He had studied 356 THE SEVENTH MOyARCHY. [ch. x. ■with care the campaigns of his predecessors in these regions, and recollected that one of them" at any rate had made a cut- ting from the Nahr-Malcha, by which he had brought his fleet into the Tigris above Ctesiphon. If this work could be dis- covered, it might, he thought, in all probability be restored. Some of the country people were therefore seized, and, inquiry being made of them, the hne of the canal was pointed out, and the place shown at which it had been derived from the Nahr- Malcha. Here the Persians had erected a strong dam, with sluices, by means of which a portion of the water could occa- sionally be turned into the Roman cutting."* Julian had the cutting cleared out, and the dam torn down; whereupon the main portion of the stream rushed at once into the old channel, which rapidly filled, and was found to be navigable by the Roman vessels. The fleet was thus brought into the Tigris above Coche ; and the army advancing with it encamped upon the right bank of the river. The Persians now for the first time appeared in force. "" As Julian drew near the great stream, he perceived that his pas- sage of it would not be unopposed. Along the left bank, which was at tliis point naturally higher than the right, and which was further crowned by a wall built originally to fence in one of the royal parks, "" could be seen the dense masses of the enemy's horse and foot, stretching away to right and left, the former encased in glittering armor, "' the latter protected by huge Avattled shields.'"^ Behind these troops were dis- cernible the vast forms of elephants, looking (says the his- torian) like moving mountains, '"'^ and regarded by the legion- aries with extreme dread. Julian felt that he could not ask his army to cross the stream openly in the face of a foe thus advantageously posted. He therefore waited the approach of night. When darkness had closed in, he made his dispositions ; divided his fleet into portions; embarked a number of his troops ; and, despite the dissuasions of his oflicers, '"* gave the signal for the passage to commence. Five ships, each of them conveying eighty soldiers, led the way, and reached the op- posite shore without accident. Here, however, the enemy received them with a sharp fire of burning darts, and the two foremost were soon in flames.'"^ At the ominous sight the rest of the fleet wavered, and might have refused to proceed further, had not Julian, with admirable presence of mind, ex- claimed aloud—" Our men have crossed and are masters of the bank — that fire is the signal which I bade them make if they CH. X.] PASSAGE OF THE TIGRIS. 357 were victorious." Thus encouraged, the crews plied their oars with vigor, and impelled the remaining vessels rapidly across the stream. At the same time, some of the soldiers who had not been put on board, impatient to assist their comrades, plunged into the stream, and swam across supported by their shields.'"* Though a stout resistance was offered by the Per- sians, it was found impossible to withstand the impetuosity of the Roman attack. Not only were the half-burned vessels saved, the flames extinguished, and the men on board rescued from their perilous position, but everywhere the Roman troops made good their landing, fought their way up the bank against a storm of missile weapons, and drew up in good order upon its summit. A pause probably now occurred, as the armies could not see each other in the darkness; but, at dawn of day, "" Julian, having made a fresh arrangement of his troops, led them against the dense array of the enemy, and engaged in a hand-to-hand combat, which lasted from morning to mid- day, when it was terminated by the flight of the Persians. Their leaders, Tigranes, Narseus, and the Surena, '°* are said'"" to have been the first to quit the field and take refuge within the defences of Ctesiphon. The example thus set was univer- sally followed; and the entire Persian army, abandoning its camp and baggage, rushed in the wildest confusion across the plain to the nearest of the city gates, closely pursued by its active foe up to the very foot of the walls. The Roman writers assert that Ctesiphon might have been entered and taken, had not the general, Victor, who was wounded by a dart from a catapult, recalled his men as they were about to rush in through the open gateway."" It is perhaps doubtful whether success would really have crowned such audacity. At any rate the opportunity passed — the runaways entered the town— the gate closed upon them ; and Ctesiphon was safe unless it were reduced by the operations of a regular siege. But the fruits of the victory were still considerable. The entire Persian army collected hitherto for the defence of Ctesiphon had been defeated by one-thii-d of the Roman force under Julian.'" The vanquished had left 2,500 men dead upon the field, while the victors had lost no more than seventy- five."' A rich spoil had fallen into the hands of the Romans, who found in the abandoned camp couches and tables of mas- sive silver, and on the bodies of the slain, both men and horses, a profiision of gold and silver ornaments, besides trap- pings and apparel of great magnificence. "' A welcome supply 358 THE SEVENTH MONAliCllT. [CH. x; of provisions Avas also furnished by the lands and houses in the neighborhood of Ctesiphon ; and the troops passed from a state of privation to one of extreme abundance, so that it was feared lest they might suffer from excess. "* Affairs had now reached a point when it was necessary to form a definite resolution as to what should be the further aim and course of the expedition. Hitherto all had indicated an intention on the part of Julian to occupy Ctesiphon, and thence dictate a peace. His long march, his toilsome canal- cutting, his orders to his second army, "^ his crossing of the Tigris, his engagement with the Persians in the plain before Ctesiphon, were the natural steps conducting to such a result, and are explicable on one hypothesis and one hypothesis only. He must up to this time have designed to make liimself master of the great city, which had been the goal of so many previous invasions, and had always fallen whenever Rome attacked it. But, having overcome all the obstacles in his path, and having it in his power at once to commence the siege, a sudden doubt appears to have assaUed him as to the practicability of the undertaking. It can scarcely be supposed that the city was really stronger now than it had been imder the Parthians;'" much less can it be argued that Julian's army was insufficient for the investment of such a place. It was probably the most powerful army with which the Romans had as yet invaded Southern Mesopotamia; and it was amply provided with all the appurtenances of war. If Julian did not venture to at- tempt what Trajan and Avidius Cassius and Septimius Severus had achieved without difficulty, it must have been because the circumstances under which he would have had to make the attack were different from those under which they had ven- tured and succeeded. And the difference — a most momentous one — was this. They besieged and captured the place after defeating the greatest force that Parthia could bring into the field against them. Julian found liimself in front of Ctesiphon before he had crossed swords with the Persian king, or so much as set eyes on the grand army which Sapor was known to have collected. To have sat down before Ctesiphon under such circumstances would have been to expose himself to great peril; while he was intent upon the siege, he might at any time have been attacked by a relieving army under the Great Eang, have been placed between two fires, and compelled to engage at extreme disadvantage.'" It was a consideration of this danger that impelled the council of war, whereto he sub- CH. X,] JULIAN DETERMINES ON RETREAT. 359 mitted the question, to pronounce the siege of Ctesiphon too hazardous an operation, and to dissuade the emperor from. attempting it. But, if the city were not to be besieged, what course could with any prudence be adopted? It would have been madness to leave Ctesiphon unassailed, and to press forward against Susa and Persepohs. It would have been futile to remain en- camped before the walls without commencing a siege. The heats of summer had arrived,"^ and the malaria of autumn was not far off. The stores brought by the fleet were exhausted;"* and there was a great risk in the army's depending wholly for its subsistence on the supplies that it might be able to obtain from the enemy's country. Julian and his advisers must have seen at a glance that if the Romans were not to attack Ctesi- phon, they must retreat. And accordingly retreat seems to have been at once determined on. As a first step, the whole fleet, except some dozen vessels, '" was burned, since twelve was a sufficient number to serve as pontoons, and it was not worth the army's while to encumber itself with the remainder. They could only have been tracked up the strong stream of the Tigris by devoting to the work some 20,000 men ;'^' thus greatly weakening the strength of the armed force, and at the same time hampering its movements. Julian, in sacrificing his ships, suffered simply a pecuniary loss — they could not possibly have been of any further service to him in the cam- paign. Retreat being resolved upon, it only remained to determine what route should be followed, and on what portion of the Roman territory the march should be directed. The soldiers clamored for a return by the way whereby they had come;'" but many vaUd objections to this course presented themselves to their commanders. The country along the Hue of the Eu- phrates had been exhausted of its stores by the troops in their advance ; the forage had been consumed, the towns and vil- lages desolated. There would be neither food nor shelter for the men along this route ; the season was also unsuitable for it, since the Eupliratcs was in full flood, and the moist atmos- phere would be sure to breed swarms of flies and mosquitoes. Jiflian saw that by far the best line of retreat was along the Tigris, which had higher banks than the Euphrates, which was no longer in flood, '-^ and which ran through a tract that was highly productive and that had for many years not been visited by an enemy. The army, therefore, was ordered to 360 THE SEVENTH MONAliCUY. [ch. x. • commence its retreat through the country lying on ihe left bank of the Tigris, and to spread itself over the fertile region, in the hope of obtaining ample supplies. The march was im- derstood to be directed on Cordyene (Kurdistan), a province now in the possession of Rome, a rich tract, and not more than about 250 miles distant from Ctesiphon. '-" Before, however, the retreat commenced, while Juhan and his victorious army were still encamped in sight of Ctesiphon, the Persian king, according to some writers,'" sent an em- bassy proposing terms of peace. Juhan's successes are repre- sented as having driven Sapor to despair — ''the pride of his royalty was humbled in the dust ; he took his repasts on the ground ; and the grief and anxiety of his mind were expressed by the disorder of his hair." '-'' He would, it is suggested, have been willing ' ' to purchase, with one half of his kingdom, the safety of the remainder, and would have gladly subscribed himself, in a treaty of peace, the faithful and dependent ally of the Roman conqueror.'""'' Such are the pleasing fictions Wherewith the rhetorician of Antioch, faithful to the memory of his friend and master, consoled himself and his readers after Julian's death. It is difficult to decide whether there underlies them any substratum of truth. Neither Ammianus nor Zosimus makes the shghtest allusion to any negotiations at all at tliis period ; and it is thus open to doubt whether the entire story told by Libanius is not the product of his imagina- tion. But at any rate it is quite impossible that the Persian king can have made any abject offers of submission, or have been in a state of mind at all akin to despair. His great army, collected from all quarters, '"** was intact ; he had not yet con- descended to take the field in person ; he had lost no unportant town, and his adversary had tacitly confessed his inability to form the siege of a city which was far from being the greatest in the empire. If Sapor, therefore, really made at this time overtures of peace, it must have been either with the intention of amusing Julian, and increasing his difficulties by delaying his retreat, or because he thought that Julian's consciousness of his difficulties would induce him to offer terms which he might accept. The retreat commenced on June 16.'" Scarcely were the troops set in motion, when an ominous cloud of dust appeared on the southern horizon, which grew larger as the day ad- vanced; and, though some suggested that the appearance was produced by a herd of wild asses, and others ventured the con- CH. X.] JULIAN m DIFFICULTIES. 361 JGcture that it was caused by the approach of a body of Julian's Saracenic allies, the emperor himself was not deceived, bvit, understanding that the Persians had set out in pursuit, he called in his stragglers, massed his troops, and pitched his camp in a strong position.'^" Day-dawn showed that he had judged aright, for the earliest rays of the sun were reflected from the polished breastplates and cuirasses of the Persians, who had drawn up at no great distance during the night. '^' A combat followed in which the Persian and Saracenic horse at- tacked the Romans vigorously, and especially threatened the baggage, but were repulsed by the firmness and valor of the Roman foot. Julian was able to continue his retreat after a whOe, but found himself surrounded by enemies, some of whom, keeping in advance of his troops, or hanging upon his flanks, destroyed the corn and forage that his men so much needed; while others, pressing upon his rear, retarded his march, and caused him from time to time no inconsiderable losses."^ The retreat under these circumstances was slow; the army had to be rested and recruited when it fell in with any accumulation of provisions; and the average progress made seems to have been not much more than ten miles a day.'" This tardy advance allowed the more slow-moving portion of the Persian army to close in upon the retiring Ro- mans; and Julian soon found himself closely followed by dense masses of the enemy's troops, by the heavy cavalry clad m steel panoplies, and armed with long spears, by large bodies of archers, and even by a powerful corps of elephants. ''^ This grand army was under the command of a general whom the Roman writers call Meranes,'''* and of two sons of Sapor. It pressed heavily upon the Roman rearguard ; and Julian, after a little while, found it necessary to stop his march, confront his pursuers, and offer them battle. The offer was accepted, and an engagement took place in a tract called Maranga. '" The enemy advanced in two lines— the first composed of the maUed horsemen and the archers intermixed, the second of the elephants. Julian prepared his army to receive the attack by disposing it in the form of a ci'esent, with the centre dra\\'Ti back considerably ; but as the Persians advanced into the hol- low space, he suddenly led his troops forward at speed, allow- ing the archers scarcely time to discharge their arrows before he engaged them and the horse in close combat. A long and bloody struggle followed ; but the Persians were unaccustomed to hand-to-hand fighting and disliked it ; they gradually gave 369 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [cH. x ground, and at last broke up and fled, covering their letreat, however, with the clouds of arrows which they knew well how to discharge as they retired. The weight of their arms, and the fiery heat of the summer sun, prevented the Eomans from carrying the pursuit very far. Juhan recalled them quickly to the protection of the camp, and suspended his march for some days''' while the wounded had their hurts attended to. The Persian troops, having suffered heavily in the battle, made no attempt to storm the Roman camp. They were con- tent to spread themselves on all sides, to destroy or carry off all the forage and provisions, and to make the country, through which the Roman army must retire, a desert. Juhan's forces were already suffering severely from scarcity of food •, and the general want was but very slightly relieved by a dis- tribution of the stores set apart for the oflBcers and for the members of the imperial household. Under these circum- stances it is not surprising that Julian's firmness deserted him, and that he began to give way to melancholy forebodings, and to see visions and omens which portended disaster and death. In the silence of his tent, as he studied a favorite philosopher during the dead of night, he thought he saw the Genius of the State, with veiled head and cornucopia, stealing away through the hangings slowly and sadly. "^ Soon afterwards, when he had just gone forth into the open air to perform averting sacri- fices, the faU of a shooting star seemed to him a direct threat from Mars, with whom he had recently quarrelled."" The soothsayers were consulted, and counselled abstinence from all military movement ; but the exigencies of the situation caused their advice to be for once contemned. It was only by change of place that there was any chance of obtaining supplies of food ; and ultimate extrication from the perils that surrounded the army depended on a steady persistence in retreat. At dawn of day, "" therefore, on the memorable 26th of June, A.D. 3G3, the tents were struck, and the Roman army continued its march across the wasted plain, having the Tigris at some little distance on its left, and some low hills upon its right. " ' The enemy did not anywhere appear ; and the troops advanced for a time without encountering opposition. But, as they drew near the skirts of the hills, not far from Samarah, suddenly an attack was made upon them. The rearguard found itself vio- lently assailed ; and when Julian hastened to its relief, news came that the van was also engaged with the enemy, and was CH. X.] BATTLE OF SAMARAH. 363 already in difficulties. The active commander now hurried towards the front, and had accomplished half the distance, when the main Persian attack was delivered upon his right centre, '*'■' and to his dismay he found himself entangled amid the masses of heavy horse and elephants, which had thrown his columns into confusion. The suddenness of the enemy's appearance had prevented him from donning his complete armor ; and as he fought without a breastplate, and with the aid of his light-armed troops restored the day, falling on the \ foe from behind and striking the backs and houghs of the horses and elephants, the javelin of a horseman, after grazing the flesh of his arm, fixed itself in his right side, penetrating through the ribs to the liver. '" Julian, grasping the head of the weapon, attempted to draw it forth, but in vain — the sharp steel cut his fingers, and the pain and loss of blood caused him to fall fainting from his steed. His guards, who had closed around him, carefully raised him up, and conveyed him to the camp, where the surgeons at once declared the wound mortal. The sad news spread rapidly among the soldiery, and nerved them to desperate efforts — if they must lose their general, he should, they determined, be avenged. Striking their shields with their spears, '" they everywhere rushed upon the enemy with incredible ardor, careless whether they Hved or died, and only seeking to inflict the greatest possible loss on those op- posed to them. But the Persians, who had regarded the day as theirs, resisted strenuously, and maintained the fight with obstinacy till evening closed in and darkness put a stop to the engagement. The losses were large on both sides ; the Roman right wing had suffered greatly; its commander, Anatolius, master of the offices, was among the slain, and the prefect Sal- lust was with difficulty saved by an attendant. '^'^ The Per- sians, too, lost their generals Meranes and Nohodares ; and with them no fewer than fifty satraps and great nobles are said to have perished. '" The rank and file no doubt suffered in pro- portion; and the Romans were perhaps justified in claiming that the balance of advantage upon the day rested with them. But such advantage as they coifld reasonably assert was far more than counterbalanced by the loss of their commander, who died in his tent towards midnight on the day of the battle. '*' Wliatever we may think of the general character of Julian, or of the degree of his intellectual capacity, there can be no question as to his excellence as a soldier, or his ability as a commander in the field. If the expedition wliich he had led 364 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. x. into Persia was to some extent rash— if his preparations for it had been insufficient, and his conduct of it not wholly faultless —if consequently he had brought the army of the East into a situation of great peril and difficulty— yet candor requires us to acknowledge that of all the men collected in the Roman camp he was the fittest to have extricated the army from its embarrassments, and have conducted it, without serious disas- ter or loss of honor, into a position of safety. No one, Uke Ju- lian, possessed the confidence of the troops; no one so com- bined experience in command with the personal activity and vigor that was needed under the circumstances. When the leaders met to consult about the appointment of a successor to the dead prince, it was at once apparent how irreparable was their loss. The prefect Sallust, whose superior rank and length of service pointed him out for promotion to the vacant post, excused himself on account of his age aiid infirmities. '*' The generals of the second grade ~ Arintheeus, Victor, Nevitta, Dagalaiphus— had each their party among the soldiers, but were unacceptable to the army generally. None could claim any superior merit which might clearly place him above the rest ; and a discord that might have led to open strife seemed impending, when a casual voice pronounced the name of Jovian, and, some applause following the suggestion, the rival generals acquiesced in the choice ; and this hitherto insignificant officer was suddenly invested with the purple and saluted as "Augus- tus" and " Emperor." "" Had there been any one really fit to take the command, such an appointment could not have been made; but, in the evident dearth of warhke genius, it was thought best that one whose rank was civil rather than mih- tary"'" should be preferred, for the avoidance of jealousies and contentions, A deserter carried the news to Sapor, who was not now very far distant, and described the new emperor to him as effeminate and slothful. "' A fresh impulse was given to the pursuit by the intelligence thus conveyed ; the army engaged in disputing the Eoman retreat was reinforced by a strong body of cavalry ; and Sapor himself pressed forward with all haste, resolved to hurl his main force on the rear of the re- treating columns. ''- It was with reluctance that Jovian, on the day of his eleva- tion to the supreme power (June 27, a.d. 363), quitted the protection of the camp,'" and proceeded to conduct liis army over the open plain, where the Persians were now collected in great force, prepared to dispute the ground with him inch by CH. X.] DIFFICULTIES OF THE nOMAX RETRJUAT. 365 inch. Their horse and elephants again fell upon the right wing of the Eomans, where the Jovians and Herculians were now posted, and, throwing those renowned corps'^* into disorder, pressed on, driving them across the plain in headlong flight and slaying vast numbers of them. The corps would probably have been annihilated, had they not in their flight ]-eached a hill occupied by the baggage train, which gallantly came to their aid, and, attacking the horse and elephants from higher ground, gained a signal success.'" The elephants, wounded by the javelins hurled down upon them from above, and mad- f dened with the pain, turned upon their own side, and, roaring frightfully, '^^ carried confusion among the ranks of the horse, which broke up and fled. Many of the frantic animals were kiUed by their own riders or by the Persians on whom they were tramphng, while others succumbed to the blows dealt them by the enemy. There was a frightful carnage, ending in the repulse of the Persians and the resumption of the Roman march. Shortly before night fell, Jovian and his army reached Samarah,'" then a fort of no groat size upon the Tigris,"** and, encamping in its vicinity, passed the hours of rest unmolested. The retreat now continued for four days along the left bank of the Tigris, '"^ the progress made each day being small, '"" since the enemy incessantly obstructed the march, pressing on the columns as they retired, but when they stopped drawing off, and declining an engagement at close quarters. On one occa- sion they even attacked the Roman camp, and, after insulting the legions with their cries, forced their way through the prae- torian gate, and had nearly penetrated to the royal tent, when they were met and defeated by the legionaries. "" The Sara- cenic Arabs were especially troublesome. Offended by the re- fusal of Julian to continue their subsidies, '"" they had trans- ferred their services wholly to the other side, and pursued the Romans with a hostility that was sharpened by indignation and resentment. It was with difficulty that tlie Roman army, at the close of the fourth day, reached Dura, a small place upon the Tigris, about eighteen mfles north of Samarah.'"^ Here a new idea seized the soldiers. As the Persian forces were massed chiefly on the left bank of the Tigi-is, and might find it difficult to transfer themselves to the other side, it seemed to the legionaries that they would escape half their difficulties if they could themselves cross the river, and place it between them and their foes. They had also a notion that on the west side of the stream the Roman frontier was not far distant, but (^GQ THE SEVENTH MONAIiCirY. [ch. x. might be reached by forced marches in a few days."* They therefore begged Jovian to allow them to swim the stream. It was in vain that he and his officers opposed the project ; muti- nous cries arose ; and, to avoid worse evils, he was compelled to consent that five hundred Gauls and Sarmatians, known to be expert swimmers, should make the attempt. It succeeded beyond his hopes. The corps crossed at night, surprised the Persians who held the opposite bank, and established them- selves in a safe position before the dawn of day. By this bold exploit the passage of the other troops, many of whom could not swim, was rendered feasible, and Jovian proceeded to col- lect timber, brushwood, and skins for the formation of large rafts on which he might transport the rest of his army.'" These movements were seen with no small disquietude by the Persian king. The army which he had* regarded as almost a certain prey seemed about to escape him. He knew that his troops coidd not pass the Tigris by swimming ; he had, it is probable, brought with him no boats, and the country about Dura could not supply many ; to follow the Romans, if they crossed the stream, he must construct a bridge, and the con- struction of a bridge was, to such unskilful engineers as the Persians, a work of time. Before it was finished the legions might be beyond his reach, and so the campaign would end, and he would have gained no advantage from it. Under these circumstances he determined to open negotiations with the Romans, and to see if he could not extract from their fears some important concessions. They were still in a position of great peril, since they could not expect to embark and cross the stream without suffering tremendous loss from the enemy before whom they would be flying. And it was uncertain what perils they might not encounter beyond the river in traversing the two hundred miles that still separated them from Roman territory. ""' The Saracenic allies of Persia were in force on the further side of the stream;'" and a portion of Sapor's army might be conveyed across in time to hang on the rear of the le- gions and add largely to their difficvdties. At any rate, it was worth while to make overtures and see what answer would be returned. If the idea of negotiating were entertained at aU, something would be gained ; for each additional day of suffer- ing and privation diminished the Roman strength, and brought nearer the moment of absolute and complete exhaustion. Moreover, a bridge might be at once commenced at some little distance, "" and might be pushed forward, so that, if the nego- Cfl. X.] THE TERMS OF PEACE. 367 tiatioiis failed, there shoiild be no great delay in following the Romans across the river. Such were probably the considerations"'" which led Sapor to send as envoys to the Roman camp at Dura the Surena and another great noble, who announced that they came to offer terms of peace."" The great king, they said, having respect to the mutabihty of human affairs, was desirous of dealing , mercifully with the Romans, and would allow the escape of the . remnant which was left of their army, if the Caesar and his i advisers accepted the conditions that he required.'" These conditions would be explained to any envoys whom Jovian might empower to discuss them with the Persian plenipoten- tiaries. The Roman emperor and his councU gladly caught at the offer ; and two officers of high rank, the general Arinthseus and the prefect Sallust, were at once appointed to confer with Sapor's envoys, and ascertain the terms on which peace would be granted. They proved to be such as Roman pride felt to be almost intolerable; and great efforts were made to induce Sapor to be content with less. The negotiations lasted for four days;'" but the Persian monarch was inexorable; each day di- minished his adversary's strength and bettered his own posi- tion ; there was no reason why he should make any concession at all ; and he seems, in fact, to have yielded nothing of his original demands, except points of such exceedingly slight mo- ment that to insist on them would have been folly.'" The following were the terms of peace to which Jovian con- sented. First, the five provinces east of the Tigris, which had been ceded to Rome by Narses, the grandfather of Sapor, after his defeat by Galerius,"* were to be given back to Persia, with their fortifications, their inhabitants, and all that they con- ' tauied of value. The Romans in the territory were, however, to be allowed to withdraw and join their countrymen. Sec- ondly, three places in Eastern Mesopotamia, Nisibis, Singara, and a fort called " the Camp of the Moors," were to be surren- dered, but with the condition that not only the Romans, but the inhabitants generally, might retire ere the Persians took possession, and carry with them such of their effects as were movable. "'" The surrender of these places necessarily involved that of the country which they commanded, and can scarcely imply lees than the withdrawal of Rome from any claim to do- minion over the region between the Tigris and the Khabour. "" Tliirdly, all connection between Armenia and Rome was to be broken off ; Arsaces was to be left to his own resources ; and in TlIE SEVl^NTH MOXAUCnY. [ch. s. any quai*rcl between him and Persia Roino was precluded from lending him aid. On these conditions a peace was concluded for thirty years-/" oaths to observe it faithfully were inter^ changed ; and hostages were given and received on either side, to be retained until the stipulations of the treaty were executed. The Roman historian who exclaims that it would have been better to have fought ten battles than to have conceded a single one of these shameful terms,'" commands the sympathy of every reader, who cannot fail to recognize in his utterance the natural feeling of a patriot. And it is possible that Julian, had ho hved, would have rejected so inglorious a peace, and have preferred to run all risks rather than sign it. But in that case there is every reason to believe that the army would have been absolutely destroyed, and a few stragglers only have returned to tell the tale of disaster. '" The alternative which Ammianus suggests — that Jovian, instead of negotiating, should have pushed on to Cordyene, which he might have reached in four days — is absiu'd;'**" for Cordyene was at least a hundred and fifty miles distant from Dura, and, at the rate of retreat which Jovian had found possible (four and a half miles a day), would have been reached in three days over a month ! The judgment of Eutropius, who, like Ammianus, shared in the expedition, is probably correct— that the peace, though disgraceful, was necessary. ^®' Unless Jovian was prepared to risk not only his own life, but the lives of all his soldiers, it was essential that he should come to terms ; and the best terms that he could ob- tain were those which he has been blamed for accepting. It is creditable to both parties that the peace, once made, was faithfully observed, all its stipulations being honestly and speedily executed. The Romans were allowed to pass the river without molestation from Sapor's army, '*'^ and, though they suffered somewhat from the Saracens when landing on the other side, ^^^ were unpursued in their retreat, '^^ and were perhaps even, at first, supplied to some extent with pro- visions.'^^ Afterwards, no doubt, they endured for some days great privations; but a convoy with stores was allowed to advance from Roman Mesopotamia into Persian territory, '"' which met the famished soldiers at a Persian military post, called Ur or Adur, '" and relieved their most pressing necessi- ties. On the Roman side, the ceded provinces and towns were quietly surrendered ; offers on the part of the inhabitants to hold their own against the Persians without Roman aid were refused;"" the Roman troops were withdrawn from the CH. X.] GE:NERAL results of the war. 369 fortresses; and the Armenians were told that they must henceforth rely upon themselves, and not look to Eome for help or protection. Thus Jovian, though strongly urged to follow ancient precedent,'^" and refuse to fulfil the engage- ments contracted under the pressure of imminent perU, stood firm, and honorably performed all the conditions of the treaty. The second period of struggle between Rome and Persia had thus a termination exactly the reverse of the first. Eome ended the first period by a great victory and a great diplomatic success. '•"' At the close of the second she had to relinquish all her gains, and to draw back even behind the line which she occupied when hostilities first broke out. Nisibis, the great stronghold of Eastern Mesopotamia, had been in her posses- sion ever since the time of Verus."" Repeatedly attacked by Parthia and Persia, it had never fallen ; but once, after which it had been soon recovered ; and now for many years it had come to be regarded as the bulwark of the Roman power in the East, and as carrying with it the dominion of Western Asia. '"^ A fatal blow was dealt to Roman prestige when a city held for near two hundred years, and one honored with the name of "colony," was wrested from the empire and occupied by the most powerful of its adversaries. Not only Amida and Carrhae, but Antioch itself, trembled at a loss which was felt to lay open the whole eastern frontier to attack,'" and which seemed ominous of further retrogression. Although the fear generally felt proved to be groundless, and the Roman possessions in the East were not, for 200 years, further curtailed by the Persians, yet Roman influence in "Western Asia from this time steadily declined, and Persia came to be regarded as the first power in these regions. Much credit is due to Sapor II. for his entire conduct of the war with Constantius, Julian, and Jo^aan. He knew when to attack and when to remain upon the defensive, when to press on the enemy and when to hold hmiself in reserve and let the enemy follow his own devices. He rightly conceived from the first the importance of Nisibis, and resolutely per- sisted in his determination to acquire possession of it, until at last he succeeded. When, in B.C. 837, he challenged Rome to a trial of strength, he might have seemed rash and presimiptu- ous. But the event justified him. In a war which lasted twenty-seven years, he fought numerous pitched battles with the R(imans, and was never once defeated. Ho proved him- self greatly superior as a general to Constantius and Jovian^ 370 " THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ' [ch. il and not unequal to Julian. By a combination of courage, perseverance, and promptness, he brought the entire contest to a favoi-able issue, and restored Persia, in a.d. 363, to a higher position than that from which she had descended two generations earlier. If he had done nothing more than has already come under our notice, he would still have amply deserved that epithet of ' ' G-reat " which, by the general con- sent of historians, has been assigned to him. He was un- doubtedly among the greatest of the Sassanian monarchs, and may properly be placed above all his predecessors, and above all but one'"* of those who succeeded him. CHAPTER XI. Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor^s Ti^eacliery towards Arsaces. Sapor con- quers Armenia. He attacks Iberia, deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of Arto- gerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia betimen the Roman and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostili- ties between Rome and Persia. Peace made with Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins. "Rex Persidis, longgsvus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Jullani excessum et pudendee pacis icta fcedera . . . injectabat ArmeniaB manum." — Amm. Marc. xxvii. 13. The successful issue of Sapor's war with Julian and Jovian resulted in no small degree from the attitude which was assumed by Armenia soon after Julian commenced his inva- sion. We have seen that the emperor, when he set out upon « his expedition, regarded Armenia as an ally, and in forming * his plans placed considerable dependence on the contingent which he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch. ' It was his intention to attack Ctesiphon with two separate armies, acting upon two converging lines. While he himself advanced with his main force by way of the Euphrates valley and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two generals, Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of Media, make their way towards the great city, through ^ CH. XL] SAPORS PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ABSACES 371 Assyria and Adiabene,' along the left bank of the Tigris. It was a bitter disappointment to him when, on nearmg Ctesi- phon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings of the northern army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at tliis crisis of the campaign. ' We have now to consider how this failure came about, what circumstances induced that hesitation and delay on the part of Sebastian and Procopius which had at any rate a large share in frustrating Juhan's plans and causing the ill-success of his expedition. It appears that the Roman generals, in pursuance of the orders given them, marched across Northern Mesopotamia to the Armenian borders, and were there joined by an Armenian contingent which Arsaces sent to their assistance.^ The aUies marched together into Media, and carried fire and sword through the fruitful district known as Chiliacomus, or "the district of the Thousand Villages. " ^ They might easily have advanced further; but the Armenians suddenly and without warning drew off and fell back towards theii* own country. According to Moses of Chorene, their general, Zureeus, was actuated by a religious motive; it seemed to him monstrous that Armenia, a Christian countrj^, should embrace the cause of an apostate, and he was prepared to risk offending his own sovereign rather than lend help to one whom he regarded as the enemy of his faith." The Roman generals, thus deserted by their alhes, differed as to the proper course to pursue. While one was still desirous of descending the course of the Tigris, and making at least an attempt to effect a junction with Juhan, the other forbade his soldiers to join in the march, and insisted on falling back and re-entering Mesopo- tamia.' As usual in such cases, the difference of opinion re- sulted in a policy of inaction. The attempt to join Julian was given up ; and the second army, from which he had hoped so much, played no further part in the campaign of a.d. 363. We are told® that Juhan heard of the defection of the Arme- nians while he was still on his way to Ctesiphon, and immedi- ately sent a letter to Ai-saces, complaining of his general's con- duct, and threatening to exact a heavy retribution on his re- turn from the Persian war, if the offence of Zurseus were not visited at once with condign punishment. Arsaces was great- ly alarmed at the message; and, though he made no effort to supply the shortcomings of his officer by leadmg or sending fresh troops to Julian's assistance, yet he hastened to acquit himself of complicity in the misconduct of Zurseus by execut- 372 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. xi. ing him, together with his whole family." Having thus, as he supposed, secured himself against Julian's anger, he took no further steps, but indulged his love of ease and his distaste for the Roman alliance by remaining wholly passive during the rest of the year. But though the attitude taken by Armenia was thus, on the whole, favorable to the Persians, and undoubtedly contributed to Sapor's success, he was himself so far from satisfied with the conduct of Arsaces that he resolved at once to invade his country and endeavor to strip him of his crown. As Rome had by the recent treaty relinquished her protectorate over Armenia, and bound herself not to interfere in any quarrel be- tween the Armenians and the Persians, an opportunity was afforded for bringing Armenia* into subjection which an ambi- tious monarch like Sapor was not hkely to let slip. He had only to consider whether he would employ art or violence, or whether he would rather prefer a judicious admixture of the two. Adopting the last-named course as the most prudent, he proceeded to intrigue with a portion of the Armenian satraps, while he made armed incursions on the territories of others, and so harassed the country that after a wliile the satraps generally went over to his side, and represented to Arsaces that no course was open to him but to make his submission. Having brought matters to this point. Sapor had only further to persuade Arsaces to surrender himself, in order to obtain the province which he coveted, almost without striking a blow. He therefore addressed Arsaces a letter which, according to the only waiter who professes to give its terms, "" was expressed as follows : "Sapor, the offspring of Ormazd, comrade of the sun, king of kings, sends greeting to his dear brother, Arsaces, king of Armenia, whom he holds in affectionate remembrance. It has come to our knowledge that thou hast approved thyself our faithful friend, since not only didst thou decline to invade Per- sia with Caesar, but when he took a contingent from thee thou didst send messengers and withdraw it.'' Moreover, we have not forgotten how thou actedst at the first, when thou didst prevent him from passing through thy territories, as he wished. Our soldiers, indeed, who quitted their post, sought to cast on thee the blame due to their own cow^ardice. But we have not listened to them: their leader we punished with death, and to thy realm, I swear by Mithra, we have done no hurt. Arrange matters then so that thou mayest come to us with all speed, ! en. XI.] ABSACES SEIZED AND BLINDED. 873 and consult with us concerning our common advantage. Then thou canst return home." Arsaces, on receiving this missive, whatever suspicions he may have felt, saw no course open to him but to accept the in- vitation. He accordingly quitted Armenia and made his way to the court of Sapor, where he was immediately seized and blinded. " He was then fettered with chains of silver, accord- ing to a common practice of the Persians with prisoners of dis- tinction, '^ and was placed in strict confinement in a place called "the Castle of Oblivion." '* But the removal of their head did not at once produce the submission of the people. A national party declared itself un- der Pharandzem, the wife, and Bab (or Para), the son of Arsaces, who threw themselves into the strong fortress of Artogerassa (Ardakers), and there offered to Sapor a de- termined resistance. '^ Sapor committed the siege of this place to two renegade Armenians, Cy laces and Artabannes, whUe at the same time he proceeded to extend his influence beyond the hmits of Armenia into the neighboring country of Iberia, which was closely connected with Armenia, and for the most part followed its fortunes. Iberia was at this time under the government of a king bear- ing the name of Sauromaces, who had received his investiture from Eome, and was consequently likely to uphold Eoman interests. Sapor invaded Iberia, drove Sauromaces from his kingdom, and set up a new monarch in the person of a certain Aspacures, on whose brow he placed the coveted diadem.'" He then withdrew to his own country, leaving the complete subjection of Armenia to be accomplished by his oflScers, Cylaces and Artabannes, or, as the Armenian historians call them, Zig and Garen. " Cylaces and Artabannes commenced the siege of Artogerassa, and for a time pressed it with vigor, while they strongly urged the garrison to make their submission. But, having entered within the walls to negotiate, they were won over by the oppo- site side, and joined in planning a treachorous attack on the besieging force, which was surprised at night and compelled to retire. Para took advantage of their retreat to quit the toAvn and throw himself on the protection of Valens, the Eoman emperor, who permitted him to reside in regal state at Neocae- sarea. Shortly afterwards, however, by the advice of Cylaces and Artabannes, he returned into Armenia, and was accepted by the patriotic party as their king, Eome secretly countcnanc- 874 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xt ing his proceedings." Under these circumstances the Persian monarch once more took the field, and, entering Armenia at the head of a large army, drove Para, with his counsellors Cylaces and Artabannes, to the mountains, renewed the siege of Artogerassa, and forced it to submit, captured the queen Pharandzem, together with the treasure of Arsaces, '' and finally induced Para to come to terms, and to send him the heads of the two arch-traitors. The resistance of Armenia would probably now have ceased, had Rome been content to see her old enemy so aggrandized, or felt her hands absolutely tied by the terms of the treaty of Dura. But the success of Sapor thus far only brought him into greater difficulties. The Armenians and Iberians, who desired above all things liberty and independence, were always especi- ally hostile to the power from which they felt that they had for the time being most to fear. As Christian nations, they had also at this period an additional ground of sympathy with Rome, and of aversion from the Persians, who were at once heathens and intolerant.^" The patriotic party in both coun- tries was thus violently opposed to the establishment of Sapor's authority over them, and cared little for the artifices by which he sought to make it appear that they still enjoyed freedom and autonomy. Above all, Rome, being ruled by monarchs" who had had no hand in making the disgraceful peace of a.d. 3()3, and who had no strong feehng of honor or religious obliga- tion in the matter of treaties with hai'harians, was preparing herself to fly in the face of her engagements, and, regarding her own interest as her highest law, to interfere effectually in order to check the progress of Persia in North- Western Asia. Rome's first open interference was in Ibera. Iberia had per- haps not been expressly named in the treaty, and support might consequently be given to the expelled Sauromaces with- out any clear infi-action of its conditions. The duke Terentius was ordered, therefore, towards the close of a.d. 370, to enter Tberia with twelve legions and replace upon his throne the old Roinan feudatory. '^^ Accordingly he invaded the country from Lazica, which bordered it upon the north, and found no diffi- culty in conquering it as far as the river Cyrus. On the Cj^rus, however, he was met by Aspacures, the king of Sapor's choice, who made proposals for an accommodation. Representing himself as really well-inchned to Rome, and only prevented from declaring himself by the fact that Sapor held his son as a hostage, he asked Terentius' consent to a division of Iberia be- OH. XI.] WAE BETWEEN SAPOR AND VALEN8. 375 tween himself and his rival, the tract north of the Cyrus being assigned to the Roman claimant, and that south of the river remaining under his own government. Terentius, to escape further trouble, consented to the arrangement ; and the double kingdom was established. The northern and western portions of Iberia were made over to Sauromaces ; the southern and eastern continued to be ruled by Aspacures. When the Persian king received inteUigence of these trans- actions he was greatly excited.'^' To him it appeared clear that by the spirit, if not by the letter, of the treaty of Dura, Rome had rehnquished Iberia equally with Armenia ;-^ and he com- plained bitterly of the division which had been made of the Iberian territory, not only without his consent, but without his knowledge. He was no doubt aware that Rome had not really confined her interference to the region with which she had .some excuse for intermeddling, but had already secretly in- tervened in Armenia, and Avas intending further intervention. The count Arinthaeus had been sent with an army to the Arme- nian frontier about the same time that Terentius had invaded Iberia, and had received positive instructions to help the Armenians if Sapor molested them. It was in vain that the Persian monarch appealed to the terms of the treaty of Dura — Rome dismissed his ambassadors witli contempt, and made no change in her line of procedure. Upon this Sapor saw that war was unavoidable; and accordingly he wasted no more time in embassies, but employed himself during the winter, which had now begun, in collecting as large a force as he could, in part from his allies, in part from his own subjects, resolving to take the field in the spring, and to do his best to punish Rome for her faithlessness. ^^ Rome on her part made ready to resist the invasion which she knew to be impending. A powerful army was sent to guard the East under count Trajan, and Vadomair, ex-king of the Alemanni ; ^^ but so much regard for the terms of the re- cent treaty was still felt, or pretended, that the generals re- ceived orders to be careful not to commence hostilities, but to wait till an attack was made on them. They Avere not kept long in expectation. As soon as winter was over, Sapor cross- ed the frontier (a.d. 371) with a large force of native cavalry and archers, supported by numerous auxiliaries, " and attacked the Romans near a place called Vagabanta. The Roman com- mander gave his troops the order to retire ; and accordingly they fell back under a shower of Persian arrows, until, several 376 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. Tt. having been wounded, they felt that they could with a good face declare that the rupture of the peace was the act of the Persians. The retreat was then exchanged for an advance, and after a brief engagement the Romans were victorious, and inflicted a severe loss upon their adversaries.^* But the suc- cess was not followed by results of any importance. Neither side seems to have been anxious for another general encounter; and the season for hostilities was occupied by a sort of guerilla warfare, in which the advantage rested alternately with the Persians and the Romans.^' At length, when the summer was ended, the commanders on either side entered into negotia- tions ; and a truce was made which allowed Sapor to retire to Ctesiphon, and the Roman emperor, who was now personally directing the war, to go into winter quarters at Antioch.'" After this the war languished for two or three years. ^' Va- lens was wholly deficient in military genius, and was quite con- tent if he cotdd maintain a certain amount of Roman influence in Armenia and Iberia, while at the same time he protected the Roman frontier against Persian invasion. Sapor was ad- vanced in years, and might naturally desire repose, having been almost constantly engaged in military expeditions since he reached the age of sixteen. Negotiations seem to have alternated with hostilities'' during the interval between a. D. 371 and 376 ; but they resulted in nothing, until, in this last- named year, a peace was made,'' which gave tranquillity to the East during the remainder of the reign of Sapor, The terms upon which this peace was concluded are obscure. It is perhaps most probable that the two contracting powers agreed to abstain from further interference with Iberia and Armenia, and to leave those countries to follow their own in- chnations. Armenia seems by the native accounts to have gravitated towards Rome under these circumstances," and Iberia is likely to have followed her example. The tie of Christianity attached these countries to the great power of the West ; and, except under compulsion, they were not likely at tliis time to tolerate the yoke of Persia for a day. When Jovian withdrew the Roman protection from them, they were forced for a while to submit to the power which they disliked ; but no sooner did his successors reverse his policy, and show themselves ready to uphold the Armenians and Iberians against Persia, than they naturally reverted to the Roman side, and formed an important support to the empire against its Eastern rival. t!H. XI.] COINS OF SAPOR If. 377 The death of Sapor followed the peace of a.d. 376 within a few years. He died^^ a.d. 379 or 380, after having reigned seventy years. It is curious that, although possessing the crown for so long a term, and enjoying a more brilUant reign than any preceding monarch, he neither left behind him any inscriptions, nor any sculptured memorials. The only material evidences that we possess of his reign are his coins, which are exceedingly numerous. According to Mordtmann, '" they may be divided into three classes, corresponding to three periods in his life. The earhest have on the reverse the fire-altar, with two priests, or guards, looking towards the altar, and with the flame rising from the altar in the usual way. The head on the obverse is archaic in type, and very much resembles that of Sapor I. The crown has attached to it, in many cases, that "cheek-piece" which is otherwise confined to the first three monarchs of the Hne. These coins are the best from an artistic point of view ; they greatly resemble those of the first Sapor, but are distinguishable from them, first, by the guards looking towards the altar instead of away from it ; and, secondly, by a greater profusion of pearls about the king's person. The coins of the second period lack the " cheek-piece, " and have on the reverse the fire-altar without supporters ; they are inferior as works of art to those of the first period, but much superior to those of the third. These last, which exhibit a marked degeneracy," are especially distinguished by having a human head in the middle of the flames that rise from the altar. Otherwise they much resemble in their emblems the early coins, only differing from them in being artistically inferior. The ordinary legends upon the coins are in no respect remark- able ; '* but occasionally we find the inonarch taking the new and expressive epithet of Toham, " the Strong. " '' [PI. XIX., Fig. 1.] 378 ^^-^ SEVENTH MONAUGllt. [cH. xtt CHAPTER Xn. Short Reigns of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Obscurity of their History. Their Relations icith Armenia. Monu- ment of Sajyor III. at Takht-i-Bostan. Coins of Arta- xerxes II. and Sapor III. Reign of Varahran IV. His Signets. His D&alings with Armenia. His Death. 'Apraf rjp erij &' • Xa^uip, vios 'Apra^rip, exj) e • Ovapapavrj? errj la. Syncellus, Chronographia, p. 360, C. The glorious reign of Sapor II. , which carried the New Per- sian Empire to the highest point whereto it had yet attained, is folloAved by a time which offers to that remarkable reign a most complete contrast. Sapor had occupied the Persian throne for a space approaching nearly to three-quarters of a century ; the reigns of his next three successors amounted to no more than twenty years in the aggregate. ' Sapor had been engaged in perpetual wars, had spread the terror of the Per- sian arms on all sides, and ruled more gloriously than any of his predecessors. The kings who followed him were pacific and unenterprising; they were almost unknown to their neighbors,^ and are among the least distinguished of the Sas- sanian monarchs. More especially does this character attach to the two immediate successors of Sapor II., viz. Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Thoy reigned respectively four and five years ;' and their annals during this period are almost a blank. Ai'taxerxes II., who is called by some the brother of Sapor II., was more probably his son.^ He succeeded liis father in a.d, 879, and died at Ctesiphon^ in a.d. 383. He left a character for kindness and amiabUity behind him, and is known to the Persians as NiTcoukar,^ or "the Beneficent," and to the Arabs as Al Djemil,'' "the Virtuous." According to the " Modjmel- al-Tewarikh," he took no taxes from his subjects during the four years of his reign, and thereby secured to himself their affection and gratitude. He seems to have received overtures from the Armenians soon after his accession, " and for a time to have been acknowledged by tlie turbulent mountaineers as their sovereign. After the murder of Bab, or Para, the Ro- mans had set up, as king over Armenia, a certain Varaztad I