i 
 
 GIFT OF 
 JANE K-SATHER 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
ELECTION BY LOT AT ATHENS. 
 
Sotttott: C. J. CLAY AND SONS, 
 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE, 
 AVE MARIA LANE. 
 
 Camfiriiflc: DEIGHTON, BELL, AND CO. 
 
 ILeipjifl: F. A. BROCKHAUS. 
 
 ^tia lorft : MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
Canibrflrgt ^fsitorical (Kstsfapst. Bo. IV. 
 
 ELECTION BY LOT AT ATHENS. 
 
 BY 
 
 JAMES WYCLIFFE HEADLAM, M.A, 
 
 FELLOW OF king's COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 PRINCE CONSORT DISSERTATION, 1890. 
 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 1891 
 
 [All Rights reserved.] 
 

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 PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AND SONS, 
 AT THB UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
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PATRI CARISSIMO. 
 
 62 
 
PKEFACE. 
 
 THE subject treated of in this Essay cannot be 
 entirely passed over in any book dealing with 
 Greek Political Antiquities or History. Whether it 
 be owing to the obscurity of the matter, or to some 
 other cause, the explanations given in the standard 
 works are neither sufficient nor convincing. I have 
 therefore attempted by devoting a more special study 
 to the subject than can be done in larger books, to 
 see how far the information we have is sufficient to 
 enable us to understand exactly what election by 
 lot was, how it was used, and what were its political 
 effects. 
 
 I am not aware of the existence of any article 
 specially devoted to the subject. So far as attention 
 has been paid to it, it has been confined to one, 
 and, as it seems to me, the least important part of 
 the matter. The date and occasion of the intro- 
 duction of the lot for elections to the archonship 
 is one of those questions which is at least referred 
 to in all books dealing with Athenian history. It 
 appears as though the exaggerated importance at- 
 tached to what is to a great extent an antiquarian 
 point, has distracted the attention of most writers 
 from what is at least of equal interest, the political 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 effects of the very much extended use of the lot in 
 later times. 
 
 This is the more to be regretted because it seems 
 as though the discussion of the first point could not 
 lead to any satisfactory conclusion. Our knowledge 
 of the end of the 6th and the beginning of the 5th 
 century is so fragmentary, that, unless some new 
 source of information is discovered, we can do nothing 
 but make clever guesses. On the other hand, an 
 understanding of the use of the lot from the middle 
 of the 5th century onwards is essential, if we are to 
 form any true conception of the nature of the 
 Athenian Democracy; and the great amount of 
 contemporary material which we possess, both in 
 books and inscriptions, ought to enable us at least 
 to get somewhere near the truth. 
 
 This limitation of view is found where we should 
 least expect it, — even in Grote, Curtius, and Busolt. 
 These and other historians almost completely neglect 
 to explain the application of the lot to the coirndl 
 and other ofiices; and yet some explanation is 
 surely wanted. The few monographs which touch 
 the matter at all are almost exclusively occupied 
 with the antiquarian question. The longest of these 
 is an article by Lugebil, who was formerly professor 
 at Petersburg University. The article was origin- 
 ally written in Russian, but has since appeared in 
 German*. The author has lately died, and so with- 
 out entering on any detailed criticism it will be 
 sufficient to say that little is to be gained by 
 reading it. The learning and research which it 
 
 1 In the Jahrbuch f. kl. Philologie, Suppl. Band, v. 1871. 
 
.PREFACE. Xi 
 
 contains are deprived of nearly all their value by 
 the disproportionate length given to inconclusive 
 discussions of unimportant points. 
 
 Fustel de Goulanges^ is another writer who has 
 paid special attention to one part of the subject. 
 As is so often the case he has with admirable 
 clearness put forward an explanation which if it 
 does not contain, as he seems to think, the whole 
 truth, is certainly an important part of the truth. 
 
 To Muller-Strubing^ belongs the merit of at- 
 tempting a thorough discussion of the political 
 question. It is unfortunate that his merit does not 
 go farther. As I shall attempt to show later, both 
 his method and conclusions are radically wrong. 
 His cleverness and ability belong rather to a poli- 
 tical pamphleteer than to a scholar. His work is 
 seriously marred by a deplorable absence of sound 
 judgment or power of self-criticism. This is made 
 more conspicuous by the very low estimate he 
 makes of the work of men in every way his 
 superior. 
 
 In attempting to find a satisfactory explanation 
 of the lot, I have necessarily been compelled to 
 form and state an opinion not only on various minor 
 points connected with it, but also on the political 
 working of the constitution as a whole. In doing 
 so I have constantly referred to the books of Gilherf 
 
 1 In La Cit^ antique, and an article in the Nouvelle Kevue 
 Historique de la Droit 1882. The article does not add much of 
 importance to the short statement made in the first-named work. 
 
 2 In Aristophanes und die historische Kritik. 
 
 3 Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Athens, and Griechische 
 Staatsalterthiimer. 
 
ill PREFACE. 
 
 and Beloch\ The first volume of Gilbert's "Staats- 
 alterthumer " I have found especially valuable. 
 They have both been extremely useful to me in the 
 discussion of many details ; even when I have 
 differed from them I have still learned from them 
 what is often of most importance, a clear perception 
 of the existence of a difficulty. It is the more 
 necessary for me to say this because I seldom refer 
 to them except when I differ from them: and in fact 
 the greater part of this essay would not have been 
 written, had I not found in their books theories on 
 the Athenian constitution maintained, which ap- 
 peared very misleading. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to acknowledge the debt 
 which in common with all classical students I owe 
 to Boeckh, Hermann, and Schomann. The more 
 one studies them the more apparent are not only 
 the accuracy and learning, but also the wisdom and 
 insight of these great scholars. They have that large 
 grasp and clear perception of the mode of Greek life 
 which gives to their work a permanent value, even 
 if their conclusions on numerous minor points have 
 been superseded, or corrected. Hence they are (as 
 it seems to me) even when they have to be corrected, 
 far safer guides than more modern authors, who 
 often make the mistake of exaggerating the import- 
 ance of some new discovery or hypothesis, and in 
 
 ^ Die Attische Politik seit Perikles. 
 
 I ought to add Mr Whibley's book ou "Political Parties at 
 Athens" published in this series, which drew my attention to 
 many interesting points. To it too I owe my first acquaintance 
 with much of the modem literature on the subject. 
 
PREFACE. XIU 
 
 doing so have missed or ignored some simple and 
 natural explanation which is to be found in Hermann 
 or Schomann. This characteristic of the modern 
 writers has at times obliged me to prove at some 
 length points which to those unacquainted with 
 their works would appear self-evident. The cause 
 of this decline (for this it must be called) appears to 
 be that while the older authors were willing to 
 learn from the Greeks, and were content to follow 
 Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, repeating and ex- 
 plaining their judgments, the modern writers aim 
 at criticising and correcting them. And yet, without 
 maintaining that those writers were infallible, it is 
 still true that the more we study Greek life the 
 more evident it is that not only in personal know- 
 ledge of the society in which they lived, but also in 
 the power of analysing its constitution and character- 
 istics, they are unsurpassed. Only those who have 
 had to read the modern literature on the subject know 
 how wearisome is the attempt of each new writer 
 to display his own acumen by finding fault with 
 them. One of the most common causes of much 
 of their criticism is a mistaken ingenuity in the 
 application of modern political experience to the 
 explanation of Greek politics. This method, which 
 was used with such admirable results by Grote, has 
 been a false guide to many who having neither his 
 practical experience, nor his quick intuition in deal- 
 ing with political matters, write as though the 
 phenomena of the Athenian ecclesia can at once be 
 explained by a second-hand acquaintance with the 
 proceedings of some German representative assembly. 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 As books of reference, besides Gilbert's Staats- 
 alterthiimer I have made special use of the article 
 by Busolt on Griechische Alterthiimer in Vol. iv. of 
 Iwan Muller's Handbuch der Klassischen Alterthums- 
 wissenschaft, and the volumes of his history. Both 
 are especially useful for their full bibliography. My 
 chief authorities are of course the ordinary classical 
 texts, especially the contemporary writers, such as 
 Aristophanes and the Orators. Important as is the 
 information preserved by second-hand authorities 
 such as Plutarch and the Lexicographers, these later 
 writers had only a very limited knowledge of the 
 Athenian constitution, and they had few opportu- 
 nities for becoming acquainted with the working of 
 free institutions. 
 
 The information gained from inscriptions on the 
 other hand is most valuable. They supplement 
 the literary tradition by exposing to us aspects of 
 political life which are not treated of in the books 
 at alL It is to be hoped that, using them, someone 
 will complete the work begun by Boeckh, and rewrite 
 the account of the Athenian constitution and ad- 
 ministration, thus doing for it what Mommsen has 
 done for Rome. In dealing with them, besides the 
 Corpus I have constantly used Boeckh 's Staatshaus- 
 haltung\ Hicks' Manual of Greek Historical Inscrip- 
 tions, and Dittenberger's Sylloge. The delay in the 
 appearance of the index to the second volume of the 
 Corpus has caused much inconvenience. 
 
 Other books and articles which I have used 
 
 1 I have used the new edition admirably edited by Frankel. 
 I may also mention Tape's Lexicon der Griechischen Eigennamen. 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 occasionally will be found referred to in the foot- 
 notes. 
 
 So far I had written before it became known 
 that the TroXiTeU rmv ^AOrjvaLoov of Aristotle had 
 been discovered. As however the whole of the essay 
 and introduction had been in type for some weeks, 
 and much of it was nearly ready for the press before 
 the new work was published, I have been obliged to 
 leave both unchanged. They appear therefore exactly 
 as they were written, and I have since then made no 
 alterations of any kind in the text or notes, except 
 linguistic corrections. I have added in an appendix 
 a few notes in which I have pointed out the places in 
 which the statement of the text will require alter- 
 ation, and also those in which the view I have taken 
 of doubtful matters is corroborated. In most cases 
 references to the appendix will be found inserted in 
 square brackets : as I had to insert many of them 
 before the appendix was written they must not be 
 taken as in any way a complete guide to it. I have 
 attempted in this way so far as possible to incorporate 
 the new information in this work : and the task has 
 been less difficult than I had anticipated, because the 
 7roXfcTe/a,so far as it touches on the matters with which 
 I am dealing, seems to confirm the view I have taken 
 of the working of the Athenian constitution. The 
 argument of the main body of the essay remains 
 therefore valid. Had the TroXtreta appeared a year 
 earlier, I should hardly have felt it necessary to give 
 such a lengthy discussion on a point which is now I 
 hope conclusively established by it. I should es- 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 pecially like to call attention to the passage quoted 
 in the appendix, in which for the first time we get a 
 definite statement of the principle for which I have 
 argued, that the lot was used to secure rotation in 
 office. 
 
 The iroXiTeia consists of two portions; one a 
 history of the constitution of Athens down to the 
 year 403, the other an account of the constitution 
 in the form known personally to the writer, written 
 between the years 327 and 322*. 
 
 The first of these two divisions is of particular 
 interest because it supplies just the information 
 which was wanting as to the early history of the lot. 
 This subject I have discussed in the appendix to 
 Ch. II. ; the new information will be found in the 
 notes at the end; it will be seen that we now 
 have an authoritative statement on a matter with 
 regard to which (as I said above, p. x) the absence 
 of evidence seemed to have brought all further 
 discussion to a stand-still. It is of course some 
 satisfaction to me that on the main point the view 
 I had supported is confirmed. 
 
 Next to this the most important part in the first 
 section is the full account given of the constitutional 
 policy of the party of Theramenes. This only in- 
 directly bears on my subject. 
 
 It is difficult at once to decide exactly how much 
 
 ^ The latter date is fixed because the book must have been 
 written before the change in the constitution made after the 
 Lamian war. 
 
 Mr Cecil Torr in the Athenccum for Feb. 7, attempts to fix the 
 latest date still more closely, because in ch. 46 there is no 
 mention of irevTrjpeTi, which were first used in 325. 
 
PREFACE. XVll 
 
 that is new we learn from the second statistical section. 
 The value of it is to some extent diminished because 
 we have to be very careful not to argue directly 
 from the statements contained in it, to the state of 
 things which prevailed in the earlier period of the 
 democracy. It is indeed a serious defect of the 
 book that it gives no account of the administration, 
 and little of the constitution, during the times of 
 Pericles and the Peloponnesian war. This is the 
 more serious for my purpose because T have attri- 
 buted great importance to the changes supposed to 
 have been made about the year 350, by the intro- 
 duction of new elective finance offices. Much that 
 is contained in this section was familiar to us before, 
 because it is from it that the Lexicographers have 
 borrowed — as appears often inaccurately. The defect 
 in the work to which I have already referred, 
 explains also how it is that these later writers tell 
 so little of the constitution of the 5th century. 
 They depended on Aristotle and the orators : and 
 we learn little more about the 5th century from the 
 former than we do from the latter. 
 
 One result of the discovery of this work will be, 
 I imagine, to add considerably to Plutarch's reputa- 
 tion. Where they go over the same ground, it will I 
 think be found that Plutarch has used his Aristotle 
 very intelligently, so much so that his life of Solon 
 may be used for determining the text ; and has also 
 at times used the same authorities as Aristotle in 
 such a way that he supplements and perhaps even 
 corrects him — but on this it is impossible yet to 
 give a decided opinion. 
 
XVUl PREFACE. 
 
 In conclusion I must express my thanks to Mr 
 A. A. Tilley, Fellow of King's College and University 
 Lecturer in Roman History, who has kindly read the 
 proofs of a considerable portion of the Essay; to 
 Professor Pelham, one of the adjudicators for the 
 Prince Consort Prize, for some useful criticisms on 
 the earlier portions ; and especially to my cousin Mr 
 C. E. S. Headlam, Fellow of Trinity Hall, who has 
 given me the most generous help in passing the 
 essay through the Press. But for his constant advice 
 and assistance it would be disfigured by defects even 
 more serious than those which remain. 
 
 King's College, Cambridge, 
 February 26, 1891. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction. Why the Lot was democratic ... 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Council 41 
 
 Appendix. On the Date of the Introduction of the Lot 78 
 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 The Officials 88 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Finance 
 
 (1) General Direction Ill 
 
 (2) Subordinate Administration . . . .121 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Judicial Officials 145 
 
XX CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Administrative Officials 154 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Administration of the Divisions of the State. Con- 
 clusion ... 165 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 On the TToXtreta rav ' AOripaiav of Aristotle . . .183 
 
 Index 191 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 There is no institution of ancient history which introduc- 
 is so difficult of comprehension as that of electing 
 officials by the lot. We have ourselves no experience 
 of the working of such a system ; any proposal to 
 introduce it now would appear so ludicrous that it 
 requires some effort for us to believe that it ever did 
 prevail in a civilised community. There can be few 
 people who, when they first hear that it existed at 
 Athens and in other Greek states, do not receive the 
 information with incredulity. The first impulse is 
 to doubt the fact and to suppose there is some 
 misunderstanding. And there have been scholars 
 who have attempted to show that election by lot did 
 not exist; that what is commonly known as such 
 was really secret voting by ballot. The attempt 
 fails; for the evidence of the authorities is over- 
 whelming \ 
 
 Other historians recognising the fact of election 
 by lot have treated it as a matter of no great im- 
 portance ; without explicitly saying so, they seem to 
 hold that its effects were not great because the chief 
 
 ^ See an article in the Philological Museum, vol. ii., apparently 
 by Sir G. C. Lewis, referring to an attempt of this kind. 
 
 H. 1 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 offices in the state were filled in some other way: 
 they point out truly enough that when an office such 
 as the-A-ic honshig which in earlier times was filled 
 by popular election came to be filled by lot, it ceased 
 to be of any political importance ; and hence they 
 conclude that if numerous minor administrative posts 
 were so filled, the custom is curious and rather 
 foolish, it is characteristic of the democratic jealousy, 
 but did not seriously affect the government of the 
 state. That was in the hands of men elected by the 
 Assembly. This view is natural and recommends 
 itself to our common sense : it contains this amount 
 of truth that of all the officials elected by lot there 
 is no single one who stands out above the others as 
 entrusted with especially weighty duties. But it 
 ignores, what is equally true, that, though no indi- 
 vidual office is of particular prominence, the work 
 done by all the officials elected by lot was together 
 of the greatest extent. It is scarcely too much to 
 say that the whole administration of the state was 
 in the hands of men appointed by lot : the serious 
 work of the law courts, of the execution of the laws, 
 of police, of public finance, in short of every depart- 
 ment (with the exception of actual commands in the 
 army) was done by officials so chosen. And, what is 
 still more surprising, the council before which all 
 public business passed ; the council which was the 
 only permanent governing body in the state, which 
 had superintendence of financial matters, through 
 which negotiations with foreign powers were con- 
 ducted, this too was chosen by the lot. The whole 
 business of the city, with the exception of that small 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 portion which could be directly decided on by the 
 Assembly, was in the hands of men selected by 
 *' chance." 
 
 The more closely we analyse the working of the 
 Athenian state, the more universal appears the 
 operation of the lot, and the greater appears the 
 anomaly. This has led other scholars to suggest 
 as a solution of the difficulty that election by lot 
 was not really what we should suppose ; names were 
 indeed put into an urn and drawn out by the Archon; 
 but this was only a convenient veil ; the result was 
 not really left to chance : many names might be put 
 in, but it was well known beforehand which name 
 would come out ; there were recognised conventions 
 by which the whole thing was worked. A returning 
 officer who did not use his discretion would have 
 failed in his duty. Unfortunately this view also, 
 attractive though it is, fails, as did that mentioned 
 above, from the complete absence of evidence. I 
 believe I am right in saying that there is not a 
 single particle of evidence in any classical writer 
 which justifies us in supposing that the result of the 
 lot was not really the verdict of chance ; still less 
 that the whole community was aware of the exist- 
 ence of any such understanding \ 
 
 Another method of explaining away the difficulty 
 is to suppose that although the lot did really decide 
 between the different candidates for any post, yet 
 there was not really much left to chance, because the 
 number of candidates was in one way or another 
 strictly limited; either we may suppose that each 
 ^ Of. infra, p. 54 n. 1 and 2. 
 
 1—2 
 

 4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 candidate must be nominated, or that public opinion 
 was strong enough to prevent unsuitable persons 
 becoming candidates. 
 
 I shall content myself with mentioning this 
 "^ view here ; I shall refer to it again later, when I 
 
 aJ believe I shall be able to show that there was (at 
 
 j least in the times after Pericles) no important 
 > j I restriction of this kind to the free action of the lot ; 
 ^ ' had such existed it would have been an effectual 
 check on the objects for which the lot was introduced. 
 I propose therefore to enquire what were the 
 reasons for which the Athenians adopted a custom 
 so strange, and also to examine what were the effects 
 of it on the political system of which it formed a 
 part. It is scarcely necessary to point out that, with- 
 out an explanation of this matter, we cannot hope 
 thoroughly to understand or appreciate the nature 
 of the Athenian Democracy; and I hope the enquiry^ 
 even if it is of no other use, will help to draw at- 
 tention to some peculiarities of the administrative 
 system and will thereby throw light on certain 
 tendencies which seem to be essential to democratic 
 government. 
 The con- But before I discuss the first question, what 
 
 r^'zoT political advantages were supposed to come from the 
 'With use of the lot, it is necessary to consider a sugges- 
 
 beliefs. tion which, if true, would greatly alter the character 
 of the enquiry. It is often maintained that the 
 essence of the lot was religious. If this were true 
 then we should have to consider it as we do omens 
 and oracles; it would be another case of an old 
 superstition interfering with the political life of the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 people ; its preservation would be another instance 
 of that deep-rooted conservatism in all that con- 
 cerned their worship which often reminds us that 
 the Athenians were not all philosophers or sceptics. 
 
 It is well established that in early stages-of. 
 jociety the lot is regarded as one among many ways 
 through which the Gods give counsel and advice to 
 men. This was the case both in Greece and Italy. 
 The Greek lived in constant intercourse with his 
 Gods; for every work which he began and every 
 decision which he made he looked to them for 
 advice and guidance. He required some hint as to 
 the result of his labours or some sanction for his 
 enterprise. And the drawing or casting of lots was 
 always one way in which this communication took 
 place. This is abundantly proved from the times of 
 Homer down to the latest days of the Roman 
 Empire: and, as might reasonably have been ex- 
 pected, the lot was chiefly used when the matter 
 on which the Gods were consulted was the choice 
 either of some man from a limited number to receive 
 certain honours or perform certain duties, or the 
 division among a few men of an equal number of 
 duties. 
 
 The best illustration of this is the fact that Priests 
 throughout Greece it was the regular custom to use ly^^iot^ ^ 
 the lot for the appointment of priests and others 
 who ministered in the temples \ There is no doubt 
 that this was done because it was held fitting that 
 the God himself should choose those who were to 
 
 ^ Cf. Jules Martha, Les Sacerdoces Ath^niens in the Bibl. des 
 6coles FraiK^aises, xxvi. 1882. pp. 30 — 35. 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 serve him. If he had not declared his pleasure by 
 an omen or a dream, an opinion could always be 
 secured by the use of the lot. This custom prevailed 
 till the latest times, and though it had probably 
 become a mere ritual observance, it is at least a sign 
 that the appointment of a priest had not the highest 
 validity unless it had received the express sanction 
 of the God. 
 
 It is easy then to assume that the lot which 
 was so essential a part of the religious ceremonial 
 retained its religious significance when used for 
 political purposes ; and even to draw the conclusion 
 that the religious belief was really the chief reason 
 why it was so extensively used. There is nothing 
 in what we know of Athenian habits of thought to 
 make this improbable ; whatever may have been the 
 opinions of a few educated men, there is no doubt 
 that the great mass of the people firmly believed 
 in the continual intervention of the Gods in the 
 affairs of men. They were not ashamed, nor were 
 they frightened, to allow affairs of the greatest 
 moment to be influenced by dreams, omens, portents 
 and oracles. They were guided by these in private 
 and public life alike \ We should therefore be quite 
 prepared to find that the use of the lot in state affairs 
 
 1 Perhaps the most remarkable illustration of this is con- 
 tained in one of the speeches of Hypereides. We there find the 
 Assembly solemnly ordering three men to go and sleep in a temple 
 in order that one of them might learn in a dream the opinion of 
 Amphiaraus on a disputed point of property (Or. iii pro Euxen- 
 ippo, xxvii — viii). It is only necessary to refer to the Anabasis and 
 Hellenica of Xenophon for instances of the readiness with which 
 men would incur the greatest dangers rather than neglect an omen. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 was, at least by the great mass of the people, upheld 
 because they wished thereby to get the sanction of 
 the Gods for the appointment of their officials. 
 
 This view becomes still more plausible when we 
 remember that the most conspicuous of the officials 
 so appointed were the nine Archons ; men who had 
 special religious duties and still represented in their 
 office the old union of priest and magistrate. And 
 the state worship at Athens was so closely connected 
 with the public functions that even though the 
 newer offices did not have the same religious im- 
 portance as the Archonship, it is easy to suppose 
 that the pious Athenians liked to have the same 
 divine sanction extended also to those who filled 
 them\ 
 
 This however will not really explain our difficulty. 
 The explanation has been put forward '"^ by those who 
 have confined their attention to the Archonship 
 and have not sufficiently appreciated the reality and 
 extent of the use of the lot. It may be true that 
 there was a religious sentiment which made the 
 
 1 Cf. LugebU, 1. c. p. 666 etc. 
 
 2 Fustel de Coulanges, Nouvelle Eevue Historique de Droit, ii. 
 1878, p. 617 — 643; and La Cite antique, p. 213. "Le caract^re 
 sacerdotal qui s'attachait au magistrat se montre surtout dans la 
 mani^re dont il 6tait 61u. Aux yeux des anciens, il ne semblait 
 pas que les suffrages des hommes fussent suffisants pour dtablir 
 le chef de la cit6. Les hommes paraissent avoir cherche, pour 
 supplier k la naissance, un mode d'61ection que les dieux 
 n'eussent pas a d6savouer. Les Ath6niens, comme beaucoup 
 de peuples grecs, n'en virent pas de meilleur que le tirage de 
 sort. Pour eux le sort n'6tait pas le hasard ; le sort 6tait la 
 r6v61ation de la volont6 divine." He gives no illustrations of 
 this except two passages from the Laws of Plato. Cf. p. 8 n. 1. 
 
8 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Use of the 
 lot at 
 Athens 
 cannot be 
 explained 
 by refer- 
 enx;e to 
 religious 
 beliefs. 
 
 common people cling to the lot, and it could have 
 happened that far-sighted statesmen used this to help 
 in carrying out their policy, but it will not explain 
 why statesmen who certainly were not influenced by 
 religious conservatism wished to extend the use of it, 
 nor how it was that the state which used it could 
 possibly exist and prosper. What evidence there is 
 for the view is, I believe, entirely confined to pas- 
 sages which speak of the Archonship, and, as I shall 
 show, the use of the lot for this was only a small and 
 scarcely the most important part of its application. 
 
 The fact is that at Athens where the use of 
 the lot was most common the evidence for its reli- 
 gious signification is smallest. This can be seen 
 by the small number of references put forward by 
 those who maintain this view. I believe the only 
 passages which expressly refer to the lot as giving 
 religious sanction to an appointment are two which 
 occur in the Laws of Plato ^; and it will be sufficient 
 to point out that the constitution of the ideal state 
 which the philosopher is describing is essentially 
 different from that of Athens, and that he is in 
 the second of the two passages expressly showing 
 how different is his ideal fi-om the "equality" of a 
 democracy. He is gravely reminding his readers of 
 what the lot ought to be. Everyone will agree that 
 the lot could be regarded as a religious institution, 
 and that it had been such in old times, but never- 
 theless after the beginning of the fifth century it 
 does not appear to have been so regarded at Athens. 
 
 This is shown even by the poets. In the Tra- 
 1 Plato, Leges iii. 690 «=; vi. 757*. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 gedians mention is often made of the lot; and 
 occasionally in such words that we are reminded it 
 had a religious origin. But this is only the case 
 when it is mentioned in direct connection with the 
 services of some temple \ In no other cases is it 
 spoken of as religious ; and never do we find at- 
 taching to its use the awe and mystery which 
 belongs to other more impressive means of divine 
 utterance. Even in ^Eschylus it has none of the 
 associations which belong to oracles and dreams. 
 Still more is this true of Euripides. We find in 
 the Heracleidae one striking instance of this " secvi- 
 larisation " of the lot. Macaria says she is willing 
 to be made a sacrifice to Demeter, who has demanded 
 the offering of a maiden. lolaus demurs. He 
 represents that it would be juster if she and her 
 sisters drew lots, and selected the victim in this way. 
 But Macaria will not hear of this; such a death 
 would not please her. 
 
 ovfc av Odvoifjui rfj TV')(r) \a')(ova iyca' 
 
 It would be wanting in the graciousness which 
 belongs to a voluntary sacrifice. And Euripides 
 does not think it necessary to put into the mouth 
 of either of his characters the suggestion that to 
 submit to the will of the goddess expressed in this 
 way would be even more gracious than self-willed 
 to force oneself upon her^. 
 
 This and similar passages do not go far: but 
 
 1 Eur. Ion, 415. iEsch. Eum. 33. 
 
 2 Eur. Heracleidae 547. 
 
 3 Mr Frazer in the Golden Bough gives an account of an old 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 they are some evidence that the religious feeling 
 connected with the lot was, even in a matter directly 
 connected with the gods, extremely weak, and point 
 to the fact, not that the political use of the lot 
 was a religious ceremony, but that the constant use 
 of it for secular purposes had almost completely 
 destroyed the old religious associations. 
 
 So when Socrates freely expressed contempt for 
 the lot, this was made the ground for a charge of 
 political discontent, but it is never referred to as 
 connected with the accusations of atheism. And 
 the speeches of the orators afford stronger testi- 
 mony to the same phenomenon. These clever men 
 who are so ready to use every fallacy likely to be 
 effective and appeal to every prejudice or common- 
 place likely to give them the appearance of right, 
 never once, in the speeches which are preserved, 
 allude to the lot as sacred ; and this though the 
 audience they were addressing was in nearly every 
 case selected by the lot. The absence of such a 
 reference is sometimes startling. There is a pas- 
 sage in Deinarchus where he makes a passionate 
 appeal to the dicasts to condemn Philocles. "The 
 people," he says, "have deprived this man of his 
 office; they did not think it right or safe that he 
 should longer have the care of their children, and 
 
 custom which used to prevail in many parts of Scotland ; pieces 
 of dough, one of which is blackened, are put into a hat ; the 
 inhabitants one after another take each one of the pieces blind- 
 folded out of the hat. The one who draws the black piece is 
 a victim. He is not now burnt, but part of the company make a 
 show of putting him into the fire. Vol. ii. p. 255 — 6. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 will you, you who are guardians of the democracy 
 and the laws, you whom chance and the lot have 
 appointed to give justice for the people, will you 
 spare him^?" If he could have done so without 
 being ridiculous would not Deinarchus have said 
 ^€09 not Tv^n ? It is scarcely too much to say that 
 not only did neither he nor his audience believe in 
 the religious connections of the lot, but that they 
 did not even pretend to do so. 
 
 For this is not a single case. We have for 
 instance a speech by Lysias written in defence of a 
 man who had been appointed ^ovXevrr]^, but had 
 been accused on his So/afjuaaia^. He had been ap- 
 pointed by the lot : his opponents wished to unseat 
 him on political grounds. Lysias never uses the 
 obvious topic, he never warns his hearers that the 
 man whom the lot has selected has acquired a 
 peculiar right, and that to undo his appointment 
 without due cause is a form of sacrilege. 
 
 The conclusion I draw from these facts is that Conclu- 
 the lot was religious in its origin, and that it was to *^ 
 the latest times throughout Greece used in the 
 ritual of the temples with a clear acknowledgment 
 that its decision gave a divine sanction ; but that at 
 Athens owing to its constant use for political pur- 
 poses it was secularised till almost all recollection 
 of its religious origin had disappeared; that the 
 statesmen who developed the system in which it 
 was used were not themselves guided by religious 
 beliefs, and that, even if they were to some extent 
 helped by a certain superstitious feeling among the 
 1 Deinarchus, in Philoclen 15 — 16. ^ Lysias, pro Mantitheo. 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 poorer people, this was in no way the decisive cause 
 of the success of their policy. Soon amidst all the 
 busy political and legal life at Athens what there 
 was of religious feeling about it died out. It was at 
 Rome where it was seldom used, not at Athens 
 ^7here it influenced the life of every citizen, that men 
 talked of the "religio sortis\" 
 
 We can then return to our original question: 
 What was the object and effect of the extended use 
 of the lot as it prevailed during the fifth and fourth 
 centuries ? and I shall attempt to show how the 
 Athenian statesmen used this relic of a dying super- 
 stition as the means of carrying out with remarkable 
 vigour their political ideals. 
 The lot For whatever may be our difficulties the Greeks 
 
 themselves seem to have had no doubt why the lot 
 was used at Athens, nor what its effect was. On 
 this they are explicit. Election by lot was a demo7 
 cratic institution ; more, it was necessary to a demo- 
 cracy. In this they are almost unanimous ; friends 
 and enemies of democracy all agree on this point 
 that in a perfectly democratic state magistrates will 
 
 1 It is only necessary to read Fustel de Coulanges' account of 
 the democracy (La Cite antique, iv. ch. 11) to see how impossible 
 his theory is. It leads him to a direct misstatement of fact 
 when he says "Les magistrats pretres ^taient choisis par le 
 sort. Les magistrats qui n'exer(;aient que des fanctions d'ordre 
 public dtaient 61us par le peuple." And jae is quite unable on his 
 hypothesis to give any clear explanation of the Council, This is 
 the more to be regretted as the mistake comes from exaggerating 
 the importance of what is within certain limits a most useful 
 suggestion, and one which has thrown much light on an obscure 
 matter. 
 
 demo- 
 cratic. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 be elected by lot\ I know nothing which makes us 
 feel so clearly our separation from the political world 
 of the Greeks as this. Here is an institution which 
 to us is almost incredible, and yet we find writer' 
 after writer assuming that a city cannot be a real 
 democracy without adopting it. ' ' The few adverse 
 criticisms on it which have been preserved to us 
 make this only more clear ; they are invariably the 
 criticisms of men opposed to democracy, and objection 
 to elections by lot is always accompanied by dislike 
 of democracy. We are told that Socrates used to 
 say that it was foolish to appoint the rulers of the 
 city by lot ; no one would have confidence in a pilot 
 or a carpenter or a musician who had been chosen 
 in this way; and yet which had most power to harm, 
 an incompetent magistrate or a bad artist ? But 
 then Socrates was an irreconcilable in politics; it 
 was not only election by lot but all the institutions 
 of the city which he criticised ; and we know that 
 not only did his objections appear to his contem- 
 poraries foolish and pedantic, but his opinions on 
 political matters and the free expression he gave to 
 them were among the reasons why he was put to 
 death as a bad citizen. Socrates thought the lot 
 wrong and foolish ; that he did so was a proof of his 
 anti-democratic bias I 
 
 Even more striking is the attitude of the author 
 
 1 Herod, iii. 80 ; Plato, Rep. 561 a— b ; Aristotle, Rhet. i. 8. 
 Muller-Striibing quotes Isocr. Areop. 20 — 27 as evidence that the 
 lot was not democratic. On a point of historical fact the witness 
 of Isocrates is of little value ; and he is here arguing from the 
 peculiar circumstances of his own time, cf. pp. 96 — 7 ; and p. 39. 
 
 2 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of the pamphlet " On the Constitution of the Athe- 
 nians \" He is a vigorous and confident oligarch: 
 for him life in a democratic state is scarcely worth 
 living; his ideal is that the nobles (ol xRV^^ol) should 
 rule: that the people should be their subjects, their 
 slaves (BovXooy. All the institutions of Athens, 
 election by lot included, are in his opinion causes 
 of unendurable license and disorder. And yet he 
 cannot refrain from expressing his admiration of the 
 Athenian constitution, for he acknowledges that it 
 completely secures what is desired ; it is democracy 
 and therefore hateful to him and to every other right- 
 minded man who loves order and good government ; 
 but it is at least a successful democracy'; it is 
 impossible to get a more perfect democracy than the 
 Athenian; the people know what they want and 
 they have got it ; election by lot, freedom of speech, 
 offices open to all however ignorant and however 
 uneducated — they are perfectly right he says when 
 they regard these as an essential part of a democracy. 
 He too is of opinion that democracy without its 
 extravagances would be no democracy at all*. 
 
 And this opinion was not peculiar to literary 
 men, to philosophers and historians; it was the 
 principle on which the practical men in Greece 
 
 ^ 'Adrjvaltov iroXiTeia, formerly attributed to Xenophon. Cf. 
 esp. i. 9, ei/vofjiia cannot be found in a democracy ; ii. 20, no good 
 man can live iv b-qfioKpaTovfihi^ -rrdXei. 
 
 2 ii. 9, dwb TOTjTwv roivvv tQv ayadQiv Tdx^(TT dv 6 5^/ios eh 
 dovkeiav KaTairiffOL. 
 
 ^ ii. 26, 8r)fjL0KpaTtav 5' iyoj /xh avTip ti^ 5^Mi^ avyycyu(Jba-K(ij 
 avrbv jxkv ycip eD irotelv Tract crvyyvcb/JLTj ecriv. 
 
 * ii. 19 ; i. 1—8. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 15 
 
 acted Our knowledge of the internal constitutions 
 of other states besides Athens is small, but it is 
 sufficient to show us that when a state took a demo- 
 cratic constitution election by lot was introduced along 
 with other changes. We are specially told that this 
 was the case at Syracuse* and at Tarentum^; and 
 when Athens obliged her allies to adopt a democratic 
 form of government, election by lot was as a matter 
 of course included ^ 
 
 Aristotle's account of the matter is very instruc- 
 tive* : he generally speaks of " election " (xeiporovla, 
 aipecn^) as either aristocratic or oligarchic ; for it 
 gives influence to birth money or ability ; he recog- 
 nises indeed that election by all the citizens is to 
 some extent democratic, but he regards it as a cha- 
 racteristic of the old moderate democracy {iraTpia 
 Brj/jLOKpaTLa) and he contrasts this with the new 
 {v€(0TaT7j Brj/jLOKpaTla) where offices are filled by 
 lot^ Popular election is that moderate concession to 
 democracy which is desirable in order to give the 
 state permanence by interesting all classes in the 
 government, but he consistently represents election 
 by lot as a sign of what he calls the extreme 
 democracy. 
 
 On this point there can be no doubt : election by Objections 
 lot was regarded by those who had experience of it H^idered. 
 as essentially democratic : if this is the case we may 
 
 1 Diodorus, xiii. 34. 
 
 2 Ar. Pol. vii. 5 (quoted by Gilbert, Gr. St. ii. p. 245, n. I). 
 
 3 C. I. A. i. 9. 
 
 4 Pol. ii. 11, 1273*; vi. 9, 1294^; vii. 2, 131?!^; vii. 2, 1318*. 
 
 5 Pol. viii. 5, 1305*. 
 
16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 add, it was democratic. It would require some very 
 strong proofs to justify us in putting aside the 
 almost unanimous verdict of the Greeks themselves 
 on a point on which they had complete experience 
 and of which we have no knowledge except what we 
 gain from them. 
 
 When then a modern historian^ informs us that 
 election by lot was not a democratic but an oli- 
 garchic institution, and that it was introduced at 
 Athens not to strengthen the democracy but to 
 temper it and make it less repugnant to the defeated 
 oligarchs, we look for some very weighty reasons to 
 justify the paradox. The paradox has been stated 
 lately and has met with a certain amount of fa- 
 vour. This is partly due to the interest which any 
 novelty must arouse in a subject which has been 
 so thoroughly discussed as Athenian constitutional 
 history; a new theory however paradoxical is sure 
 to command a hearing if promulgated with sufficient 
 confidence and at sufficient length ; a boldly stated 
 novelty will attract the reader who is wearied with 
 the study of innumerable discussions of minute 
 details. But this favourable reception is also due 
 to the fact that it has no rival: historians have 
 recognised that as a matter of fact election by lot^ 
 was democratic, but they have not clearly explained 
 the reason why it was so. Generally speaking it seems 
 clear that if any one could be elected to any office, 
 and if the poorest and most ignorant citizen had an 
 equal chance with an Alcmseonid or a pupil of 
 
 1 Miiller-Striibing, Aristophanes und die historische Kritik, 
 p. 206 etc. 
 
INTRODUCTION. l7 
 
 Gorgias, the state where this was the case was not 
 an aristocracy; but still the necessity and the ad- 
 vantage of the system are not obvious ; the orthodox 
 traditional view is vague and has no firm foundation, 
 so that one is naturally tempted to say there is 
 something in the new theory : and many who do not 
 accept it as a whole have altered their statement 
 of the older view, and tell us that, although the lot 
 was of course democratic, yet it was after all to a 
 certain extent aristocratic too\ 
 
 Our object must be then to try and understand 
 not only why election by lot was democratic, but why 
 the ancients considered it essential to a complete 
 democracy. 
 
 In order to do so, it will be necessary to recall What the 
 certain peculiarities of ancient democracy, which it „J^^/ 
 is easy for us to ignore. The fact that the word ^y Demo- ' 
 " democracy " is still in constant use among us, and 
 that we apply it to political phenomena of the 
 present day, is a great obstacle to our understanding 
 of Greek History. The danger is the greater that 
 the modern use of the word is so nearly akin to the 
 original meaning ; but none the less the word has not 
 now the same connotation as it had 2000 years ago ; 
 
 1 I do not mean to deny that the lot was often used in states 
 which were not democratic, and that in the period before the 
 Persian wars it was introduced in many oligarchies. As will be 
 seen below, I believe that it was. All I wish to make clear is that, 
 as used at Athens from the time of Persian wars, it was of the very 
 essence of the democracy. The importance of the experiment at 
 Athens caused the older use in oligarchic states to be forgotten 
 just as it destroyed the religious significance. Cf. Curtius, 
 Griechische Geschichte, i. 377 (3rd edition). [Cf. Appendix.] j 
 
 H. 2^ 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and it requires the greatest care when we are deal- 
 ing with Greek history and reading Greek books 
 to keep our minds free from modern associations, 
 and to preserve the idea which we connect with the 
 word as pure simple and clearly defined as was that 
 of the Greeks. We have a double difficulty to sur- 
 mount in achieving this, for not only do we use Greek 
 words when we speak of modern politics, but also our 
 method of education tempts us to think of modern 
 events under Greek forms. Our first acquaintance 
 with political thought comes through Thucydides 
 and Aristotle, and we try to fit the wisdom we have 
 learnt from them to the facts of modern life. By so 
 doing we not only lose the freedom of thought 
 necessary to comprehend new facts, but we uncon- 
 sciously spoil our apprehensions of Greek life. By 
 trusting too much to the fancied analogies of modem 
 times we lose in the vividness and niceness of our 
 conceptions of ancient politics \ 
 
 The assumption which in one form or another 
 seems to me to underlie most of the difficulties which 
 historians discover in understanding why the lot is 
 democratic, depends on a confusion of this kind. 
 
 1 Muller-Striibing is one of the worst offenders. He tries 
 <p. 205) to show that at Athens noble birth would have had no 
 influence on elections to administrative posts, because the Radical 
 party at Berlin returned all their candidates at the general election 
 to the North German Parliament in 1867, and even Moltke was 
 not successful when he became a candidate in 1871. Yet the 
 fundamental point is ignored that the Germans elect a legislative 
 assembly, the Athenians generals and judges ; in consequence 
 elections in Germany are purely party matters, at Athens they 
 were much more pergonal. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 We naturally feel a desire to fill up the parts of 
 Athenian history where our direct authorities fail 
 us ; and as the internal working of the constitution, 
 which is of all points the most interesting to us, is 
 that on which we have the least direct informa- 
 tion, much ingenuity has been expended in putting 
 together a whole from the small fragments of certain 
 knowledge which have been preserved. In this 
 praiseworthy endeavour, however, many writers have 
 been influenced by a tacit comparison with modern 
 societies. The result is much as if an architect tried 
 to work the fragments of a Greek Temple into a 
 Gothic Church. 
 
 The point in which the process is most misleading Elections 
 is that of elections. We find constantly mentioned ** ^^^^^' 
 in Greek history two parties, the Oligarchs and the 
 Democrats: the "good," the "many:" and we know 
 that in modern states where popular government pre- 
 vails there are always two or more parties continually 
 striving for the chief power in the state, and that 
 the crises of the struggle are always the periodical 
 elections. Hence the conclusion is drawn that at 
 Athens also, where (as we know) there were perio- 
 dical elections, these were as with us the centre of 
 political interest, and that by the result of them the 
 policy of the state was determined; and modern 
 work on the Athenian constitution has been directed 
 on these lines, so that all writers even if they have 
 not paid special attention to the subject assume the 
 existence of party elections with party organisations 
 to manage them. So long as we believe this, it is of 
 course impossible not to be puzzled by the use of 
 
 2—2 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the lot. It would obviously diminish the power of 
 the popular party, who in Athens at any rate were 
 decidedly in the majority. By losing control over the 
 elections it appears as though they deprived them- 
 selves of their chief weapon against their opponents. 
 Herr Muller-Strxibing has ingeniously seized on 
 this point and boldly carried it out to its logical 
 conclusions^. It leads him to the paradox that the 
 lot was introduced as a means of moderating the 
 democracy and allowing to the nobles a possibility 
 of attaining office. If however we examine the 
 assumption on which it is based we are met by 
 considerable difficulties. It would seem that, if 
 elections were fought on party lines, and if their 
 result had a serious influence on the direction of the 
 policy, we should be able to find some one or more 
 offices which were filled by the heads of the party, 
 who in consequence of their election would be for a 
 period the recognised leaders of the state. Many such 
 attempts have been made ; but they hardly seem to 
 have been successful. Miiller-Striibing^ tries to show 
 
 1 p. 206. That there may be no doubt as to his meaning, he 
 puts the position in the form of a thesis : — 
 
 "Die Einfiihrung des Looses bei der Besetzung der Aemter 
 war ein Zugestandniss an die Minoritat, war eine Massregel zur 
 Befriedigung der staatsbiirgerlichen Bediirfnisse und zur Gewahr- 
 leistung der Rechte der Minoritat " 
 
 and he then explains how the Athenian Demos is deserving of the 
 highest honour because it never, even in the times of greatest 
 bitterness against the Oligarchs, recalled this concession. 
 
 2 Op. cit. p. 192. "Care was taken that the whole population of 
 the country should at regularly recurring intervals decide on the 
 principles according to which the state should be governed. Just 
 as in modern constitutional states an appeal to the people must 
 
INTRODUCTION. 21 
 
 that it was in the chief finance minister that we 
 must look for the prime minister, but he has thereby 
 introduced in the fifth century an office which was 
 probably not instituted till the middle of the fourth \ 
 The board of generals are a more usual resource. 
 The high position which they held and the impor- 
 tant duties which they had to perform make it 
 reasonable to suppose that if any office was the. 
 centre of a party contest it was this, and that if any 
 elections decided the policy of the state it must have 
 been the election of the generals. 
 
 Several able writers have spent much ingenuity The 
 in explaining the history of Athens on this hypo- ^'^P^-'^'^^'- 
 thesis. They point out truly enough that the board 
 jof^nerals were much the most powerful body in- 
 the state beside the Assembly and Council. They 
 show that in the fifth century nearly every distin- 
 guished statesman was at some time or other a 
 member of this board, and they also bring many 
 facts and many arguments to prove that a man was 
 more likely to be elected at a time when he was 
 popular than when he was not. Pericles was year 
 after year elected general; the time came when his 
 influence was gone ; he fell ; he was not re-elected. 
 The people could in no way better show their 
 
 take place at regular periods, when the lawfully regulated time 
 has come for the parliamentary powers to expire. At Athens this 
 appeal to the people took place at the quadrennial election to the 
 more important and influential offices." 
 
 1 His view is the same as that of Boeckh (St. d. Ath. i. 201 
 (222)), but all later investigations point conclusively to the fact 
 that this office was not created till the time of Eubulus. Cf. 
 infra, pp. Ill — 2, n. 1. 
 
22 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 confidence in a man than by making him their 
 general. 
 
 And so the conclusion is drawn that the board of 
 generals had a position like that of our " ministry." 
 They were the "government" for the year. The 
 party to which they belonged had in their hands the 
 executive power; for a year their policy would 
 prevail. As a result it was the election of the 
 generals which was the annual trial of strength 
 between the two parties. It was then that the op- 
 posing factions met in an organised conflict. The 
 victory in this carried with it a right to the govern- 
 ment of the state for a whole year\ 
 TrptjTavLs I do not proposc in this place to discuss all 
 
 the difficulties which are involved in this theory ; 
 difficulties which to a great extent are connected 
 with our ignorance as to the mode in which generals 
 were elected. It will be sufficient to point out that 
 they are so great that some writers have found 
 themselves obliged to assume the existence of an 
 official whom they call irpvTavL<^ toov arrparrjycov. 
 While the other generals were elected each by one of 
 the tribes, this president of the generals was, we are 
 told, elected by the whole people ; his power and in- 
 fluence were supreme in the board, and it was by his 
 election that the policy of the year was determined. 
 
 Now of course among the <TTpaT7)yoL there must 
 always have been one who presided at meetings and 
 could act as representative of the whole board. It 
 is possible that he was called irpyTavt^; toov a-rpa- 
 
 1 Beloch, Att. Politik, who is followed by Whibley, Political 
 Parties at Athens, p. 121 etc. 
 
 TOJV 
 
 ffTpaTTjyCcv 
 
INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 Trryrev, though I believe there is no authority for the 
 expression. But that he was specially elected by 
 the people to the office and not selected by the other 
 generals, or that he was elected by a different consti- 
 tuency to the other generals, cannot be supported by 
 any certain evidence. It is not even clear that the 
 same man was irpvTavu^ during a whole year. Dif- 
 ferent again is the aTparrjyof; avroKparcop. In time 
 of war, whether the war was in Attica or elsewhere, 
 the Assembly appointed one or more of the generals 
 commander of the detachment of forces which was 
 engaged, and of these in such cases one was often 
 made " commander in chief ; " he on such an oc- 
 casion, either alone or with his colleagues, received 
 special powers ; he was, as it was called, made <npa- 
 r7jy6<; avroKparcop. But this power belonged to the 
 selected general in virtue of a responsibility which 
 was purely military; it had nothing to do with 
 political influence*. 
 
 It appears then that the supposed necessity of 
 finding some influential office to which the leading 
 men in the state could be periodically elected leads 
 to great difficulties. Three suggestions have been 
 made by those interested in the discovery of the 
 required office, namely, the rafjbla'i twv kolvwv irpoa-o- 
 Bcov, the board of generals, and the irpvTavL^ roov 
 arparrjiyoov or (rrpaTrjjo'i avTOKparcop. There is 
 hardly any evidence to support any one of these. 
 And the very uncertainty which exists as to what was 
 
 1 On the election of generals cf. Droysen, in Hermes, ix. j 
 Beloch, Die Attische Politik ; Gilbert, Beitrage ; Whibley, Political 
 Parties, p. 122, n. 2. 
 
24 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the office, possession of which gave its holder a power 
 
 in the state equal to that of our prime minister, 
 
 is sufficient to raise our suspicions as to the truth 
 
 of the theory of periodical elections which has led 
 
 scholars on this search. 
 
 Elections I have in fact only referred at all to these theo- 
 
 at Athens • -, ., •/> xi. • 
 
 ^^f. ries because it seems as it their very variety were 
 
 political, evidence that the basis common to all is unsound. 
 Instead of enquiring whether it was the ra^juia^ roov 
 KocvMV TTpocoBcov, OT the 7rpVTavt<i TOt)v (TTparijycov, 
 or the (TTpaT7}y6<; avroKparoyp who was "Prime 
 Minister " at Athens, it would be better perhaps to 
 enquire whether there is any reason for assuming 
 the existence of an elected prime minister at all. 
 All these views come from the supposed necessity 
 of finding some periodical election which determined 
 the course of politics for the ensuing year, or ensuing 
 four years. But the very doubt and uncertainty 
 which prevails as to what office it was which had 
 an importance of this kind perhaps justifies us 
 in doubting whether any such existed. 
 
 This uncertainty becomes more important when 
 we realise the absence of any evidence that there 
 were at Athens elections which had the importance 
 attributed to them on this hypothesis ; an absence 
 which is perfectly explicable if elections had no poli- 
 tical weight, but is quite irreconcilable with a theory 
 which would make them as important as they are 
 in England or America. The negative evidence is 
 irresistible : about the working of the Law Courts, 
 about the debates in the eKKkrja-ia and Brj/jLo<;, about 
 the military organisation we have a considerable 
 
INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 mass of information, but about elections scarcely 
 a word. We have no single reference to a speech 
 made in favour of either party or any candidate 
 at an election, we have no information about the 
 procedure at elections, we do not even know how 
 the voting took place. We cannot account for this 
 silence except on the supposition that elections^ 
 at Athens had not the importance we are ac- 
 customed to assign to them. Were the case other- 
 wise would not Aristophanes have more frequent 
 allusions to them ? Would there not be references in 
 the orators ? Yet they give no sign that the politi- 
 cal conflict was fought out at elections as well as in 
 debates in the i/cKXTjcrla and before the Law Courts*. 
 It is not, I think, saying too much if we conclude 
 that the evidence w^e possess does not justify us in 
 giving to elections at Athens the importance which 
 the analogy of modern states would lead us to 
 
 1 The most important allusion to electoral procedure in Aris- 
 tophanes is the scene at the beginning of the Ecclesiazusae, v. 
 260 etc.— 
 
 Cf. esp. 299 ^ireiTU irXrjffioL Kadedo^fied' ws av X'^'-porovCofiev airavd' 
 oirda' Slv 5^r/ ras ijfieT^pas (piXas, 
 
 Of. Xen. Mem. 4, 1. Plato Comicus, ap. Kock, fr. 186, Xa^oO 
 XajSou TTjs X"P^5 ws rdxio-rd /xov, fiiXXco dTpaTTjybv xetporoi'eti' 
 'Ayiu^l>iop. Thuc. ii. 65. 
 
 Aristotle in the Politics never speaks of elections as party 
 affairs, nor does he refer to party elections connected with them. 
 
 On the subject of the election of generals see Droysen, Hermes, 
 
 IX. 
 
 We hear most about the elections of exceptional officials such 
 as ambassadors. A curious fact is preserved about one of these 
 elections. Dem. de corona 149 (277) tells us that .^schines was 
 nominated {irpo^X-qdeLs) to the office of irvXaydpas, and elected rptuv 
 
26 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 expect. And I propose by a short examination of 
 certain aspects of the Athenian constitution to show 
 why this was so. When this point has been cleared 
 up, we shall be in a better position to understand 
 the Greek view of election by lot. 
 The reason It was impossible that at Athens elections should 
 of this. ]iave political importance; it was impossible just 
 because Athens was a complete democracy : for the 
 same reason that election by lot was introduced. 
 Elections can only be of political importance when 
 the elected magistrates have for some period con- 
 siderable independence of action, and when the sove- 
 reign power from which they derive their authority 
 is exercised only intermittently. In such cases the 
 people (supposing that the sovereign power and 
 ultimate appeal is with them) does not itself govern 
 the country; it delegates its powers to elected 
 representatives who within wide limits are free 
 Contrast to do just as they like. Hence the only way which 
 of ancient ^^le people have of directing the policy of the state 
 modern is to elect men pledged to follow certain lines. From 
 ^acv *^^^ necessity springs inevitably the whole system of 
 party elections. Where the country is governed by 
 an elected assembly, or an elected head of the state^ 
 the elections to these offices, in as much as they are 
 almost the only occasions when the people exercises 
 its sovereign power, must be events of the greatest 
 importance. 
 
 In a state like Athens just the reverse is the 
 case. It was the essence of the constitution that 
 the demos should itself rule : it did not, as do the 
 people in England or France, appoint its rulers ; it 
 
INTRODUCTION. 2T 
 
 did. -Hot delegate its power ; its sovereignty was not 
 intermittent, it was continually exercised. And in 
 consequence the magistrates at Athens had a posi- 
 tion quite other to that held by ministers in a 
 modern democracy. They were not the men to whose 
 wisdom and discretion the votes of the people for a 
 time entrusted the supreme management of affairs : 
 they were appointed to carry out the decrees of the 
 people and to obey its commands. The demos could 
 not bind itself by any election to follow any set 
 policy or to adhere to any plan, for the eKKXTja-la 
 met at least once a month and could at any time be 
 summoned, and at each meeting it was able to 
 discuss and alter the decisions of a previous meeting. 
 Suppose that in any year the aTpaTrjyoL were all 
 chosen from the war party, that these had won at 
 the elections ; the people did not thereby deprive 
 themselves of the power of making peace during the 
 year; a popular orator of the opposite party could 
 bring forward a motion and carry it. But if he did 
 so the position of the generals was unaltered ; they 
 did not resign, they had simply to carry out the 
 policy of which they disapproved \ In England -Oi:, 
 
 1 Beloch (Att. Politik, p. 15), "Die Geschafte des Landes aus 
 dem Bema der Pnyx auszufuhren war in Athen noch weniger 
 moglich als heute von der Tribune des Parlaments." 
 
 This is surely exactly wrong. The object of the whole 
 arrangement of the constitution was to enable orators to guide 
 the business of the state from the Assembly. If he refers to the 
 German Parliament the statement is absurd : a German parlia- 
 mentary leader has no influence at all on the conduct of 
 business. If the reference is to the English Parliament it is 
 wrong, because the Trpoo-rdrTjs rod di^fiov had without office just 
 as much power as an English parliamentary leader has with office. 
 
 Cf. infra, p. 112 etc. 
 
28 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 America the elections are of importance because 
 during the period which follows the people are 
 without any direct control over the fate of the 
 country : they have given their decision, and must 
 abide by it. In Athens, where the sovereign as- 
 sembly met constantly, the elections had in conse- 
 quence no political import; men were chosen not 
 for the policy which they advocated but for their 
 ability and character. The question between candi- 
 dates was always a personal not a party one. An 
 election might be a sign of the popularity and in- 
 fluence of men who supported different policies : it 
 could not bind the people to follow one or the 
 other. 
 
 If we remember this, we shall no longer be dis- 
 turbed by the small number of references to elections 
 which we find in ancient writers, nor wonder at the 
 small place which they filled in the political con- 
 troversies and passions of the time; and we shall 
 cease to enquire which official held the place of our 
 Prime Minister. And when we realise how this 
 direct, sovereignty of the people worked, we shall 
 see why election by lot was considered essential to 
 the maintenance of democracy. 
 Demo- Sir Henry Maine in his book on Popular Govem- 
 
 Tnverud ^^^^ reminds us that democracy is a form of 
 monarchy, government, and objects to modern incorrect uses 
 of the word. That the word should have changed 
 its meaning, and should be now used to describe 
 social tendencies is natural and harmless, so long as 
 we recognise the fact ; it is however of great import- 
 ance that we should remember that the Greeks who 
 
INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 invented the word did mean by it a definite simple 
 form of government. A Greek had no doubt what 
 he meant by a Democracy ; it was a city in which 
 the people gathered together at a definite place in 
 one large visible assembly governed the whole state. 
 When we speak of popular government we mean by 
 " people " a great mass of men living long distances 
 apart from one another who have never seen one 
 another and who never will. The Greeks meant a 
 very limited number of men who were accustomed to 
 come together in a definite place. People with us 
 is a vague idea: the demos to an Athenian was a 
 concrete thing which he had often seen and heard ; 
 it was the eKKXrjala. So too by " government " we 
 mean a vague ill-defined control of the government. 
 In no modern country does the people govern ; it is 
 incapable of doing so, it is not sufficiently organised ; 
 the work of government is too complicated. Parlia- 
 ment, or Ministers, or the President, govern : the 
 people appoint them and more or less control them. 
 But at Athens the 817/^09 did govern. It was not 
 primarily an elective body, that function fell into 
 secondary importance ; it was not a legislative body, 
 that was the only duty which was not directly 
 within its sphere ; it was a judicial, and above all an 
 executive body. 
 
 Sir Henry Maine expresses this by saying that 
 JDemocracy is inverted Monarchy. In a monarchy 
 the king governs ; he has servants, he has advisers ; 
 responsible ministers he has none : statesmen are 
 his servants, they do his bidding, they may offer 
 advice, but if their advice be not taken they must be 
 
30 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 prepared to obey none the less. A favourite may 
 become powerful, but his power depends on the 
 king's favour; there may be rivalry, there may be 
 antagonistic influences; round the bed-chamber of 
 the king, or the salon of his mistress ambitious men 
 contend for the privilege of executing his commands 
 and influencing his will. But great parties there 
 are none, and in a perfect monarchy there are no 
 great ministers: the king himself decides all ques- 
 tions, officials have only to prepare them for his 
 consideration ; he has not only the position of a 
 king, but the toil and labour of a ruler. 
 
 And so in a perfect democracy the people does 
 all which in a monarchy is the work of the king. 
 All questions of government, all the difficulties of 
 administration, every innovation in every depart- 
 ment comes directly before the people : the officials 
 do not decide anything, they only formulate the 
 questions which come before the sovereigu people. 
 They do not do the work for the people. They are not 
 appointed to represent it. They are there as clerks 
 or secretaries; their duty is to bring order and 
 arrangement into the mass of details ; they help the 
 people to govern, but they help as a freedman 
 helped the Roman Emperor. The people, like the 
 king, has its advisers and favourites, those who 
 know the art of influencing the royal will; these 
 .are the orators in the eK/cXTjcrla, and the first 
 favourite of the time is o 7rpoaTdTT}<; rov hrjfjbov. 
 But, like the power of the royal favourites, their 
 power does not come from office, and office is not 
 necessary to it; the people, like the king, prefers 
 
INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 often to appoint to ojffice men whose advice it would 
 never take; men who do not personally please it, 
 but whose ability and integrity it respects. And as 
 in a perfect monarchy we find no great ministers of 
 state, but the king surrounded by his satellites 
 and courtiers rules alone, — his ministers having no 
 part in the rule, nor any independence of action, — so 
 in a perfect democracy we shall not expect to find 
 great offices; the magistrates will have only to 
 prepare business for the Assembly ; they will make 
 ruling easier, but they will not take upon themselves 
 part of the duties of ruling ; they will be wheels in 
 the great machine, not separate machines. 
 
 Therefore, if the state is to be a democracy. Results of 
 there must be no powerful officials; for demo- 
 cracy means rule by the demos, government by 
 the eKK\7)(TLa ; and the demos or eKKXrjcrla, if it 
 is really to rule, cannot allow any other power 
 to exist in the state, not even if it is a body 
 which derives its authority from the demos. The 
 Greeks themselves were quite clear on this point \ 
 They saw well enough that the power of the 
 demos was like that of a monarch, and that a 
 "democracy" could allow no power in the state 
 independent of the Assembly. The " tyrant demos " 
 was a very stern reality to Thucydides and Plato 
 
 1 Cf. Aristotle, Pol. viii. (v.) 11, 1313»'— 1314 Kal rd. xepl tV 
 b-qfiOKparlav bk yipSfieva t^p reXevraLav rvpavviKk iravra, Kal yhp 
 6 dTjfios eXvai ^OTuXeTai fiovapxos, dib Kal 6 K6\a^ Trap' d./j.<poTipoLS 
 ivTifios, irapcL ixkv roh S-^fioLS 6 drj/xayuyos {^<TTt yap 6 drjpiayuyybs rod 
 drjfjLOv K6\a^) irapbi be toist vpdvpois ol raTret^cDs bp.i\ovpm, oirep iarlv 
 ^pyop KoXaKdas. Cf. also iii. 15, 1286* and vi. (iv.) 4, 1292*. 
 
32 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and Aristotle. Aristotle clearly recognises that in a 
 democracy all other parts of the state must be made 
 powerless. The demos, just like a t3rrant, must pre- 
 vent any individuals or institutions from acquiring 
 too great power ; it can allow neither men nor offices 
 to be independent of itself \ 
 
 Now what the JoJ did was just that at which 
 Aristotle says the democratic legislator ought to 
 aim. It prevented any individual gettingjnto such 
 a position as to enable him to have power or 
 influence in the state independent of the Assembly. 
 The lot was democratic because so long as officials 
 were elected by it the supremacy of the Assembly 
 was secured. It was introduced not only to preven t 
 rich men being elected (certainly not to give oli- 
 garchs a chance of being elected), but to prevent the 
 executive officials being too influential. It was not 
 a Bevrepof; ttXoi)? to keep down oligarchs, even at 
 the price of getting second-rate men in office ; 
 mediocrity in office was its object, because this was 
 the only means of ensuring that not only the name 
 but also the reality of power should be with the 
 Assembly. 
 Further Before however I proceed to analyse the working 
 
 pecuhan- £ -^ ^^ ^y[ be convenient to add a few words on the 
 
 ties result- ' ^ 
 
 ingfrom general subject of elections, because the peculiarities 
 nature of ^^ *^^ elections at Athens can only be understood 
 elections, "by an attention to the results of this principle, that 
 the demos must be supreme. 
 
 1 Ar. Pol. vi. 4, 1292* Irt 5' ol rah dpxcus iyKuXoOvres rov 
 Sijfwv (paai deiv Kplvetv' 6 5' dfffiivcas 5^x^^** '''^^ 'irp6aK\'ri<TLv^ uffre 
 KaroMovrai iraffai al apxoi* 
 
INTRODUCTION. ' 33 
 
 (1) Political associations. 
 
 The view I have taken of the relation of the 
 "Demos" to party politics is completely supported 
 by what we know of the political associations at 
 Athens. A real party organisation of the modern 
 kind did not exist. There was none of the elaborate 
 system which in modern states gives corporate 
 unity to a party and preserves a continuity of 
 tradition which makes it a permanent settled in- 
 fluence in the state; there was not, so far as we 
 know, any system by which Cleon or Agyrrhius kept 
 a register of the names of their followers and ar- 
 ranged how best to use their votes ; there were no 
 public meetings outside the Assembly, and even the 
 private coming together of political friends was 
 looked on with suspicion. Each distinguished man 
 would have a clique or party attached to him ; they 
 would profit by his success ; when he was influential 
 they would get appointments; when he was un- 
 popular they would be liable to oppression by the 
 courts and the council ; but any attempt to organise 
 such associations, to make them permanent and 
 efficient by federating the several cliques, was looked 
 on as contrary to the spirit of the constitution, as 
 " Oligarchic." And so we find that the real leaders ■, 
 of the people, the men who had most influence i 
 in the Assembly, depended least on private as- 
 sociations. 
 
 The eraLpelau at Athens were in fact the re- eraipeiai, 
 presentatives in a later stage of society of the 
 clientele which had formerly been attached to great 
 H. 3 
 
34 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 nobles, they were the remnant of a time when the 
 political interests of the people were confined to the 
 rivalry of two or more great families; they were 
 always attached to an individual, nearly always to a 
 Eupatrid; their mejnbers were chiefly young men 
 closely connected with their leader by birth and 
 similarity of habits. They were dining clubs, gam- 
 bling clubs, drinking clubs, and also political clubs ; 
 but they were private and secret ; they were small and 
 short-lived; they represented not a principle but a 
 person, not a party but a family. It was the great 
 sign of Antiphon's political sagacity that for a time 
 he joined these clubs and caused them to work 
 together for a definite political purpose. By so 
 doing he was able to overthrow the democracy. 
 
 But we cannot understand the strength of the 
 feeling at Athens against these clubs, nor see why 
 they should be always looked on as "Oligarchic," 
 unless we realise that everything was regarded as 
 "undemocratic" which gave political influence to 
 any organisation outside the Assembly, even one 
 which was avowedly composed of loyal democrats. 
 The prejudice against party organisations was a 
 necessary consequence of the principle that the 
 demos must govern. Had there been well-organised 
 political clubs they would have withdrawn some of 
 its importance from the meeting of all the citizens in 
 the Assembly. There would have been preliminary 
 meetings, a policy would have been drawn up, men 
 would have made up their minds how to vote, the 
 deliberations of the Assembly would have lost some- 
 thing of their reality. Men would have felt that the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 35 
 
 question had really been decided elsewhere. Hence, 
 although there was no law against it, there was a 
 reasonable prejudice against any meeting of citizens 
 outside the Assembly. And although of course con- 
 ferences among leaders must often have taken place, 
 and the immediate friends of any man would come 
 pledged to support him by vote and speech, yet 
 the great mass of those present at a given meeting 
 would come to hear the matter discussed with what 
 is called " an open mind ;" they would be free to 
 give their vote according to their own feelings after 
 listening to the speeches on either side. It is 
 possible that an elaborate party organisation would 
 have secured more prolonged deliberation and more 
 security for persistence in any plan; but it would 
 have been undemocratic \ 
 
 (2) Political importance of the law-courts. 
 
 This peculiar character of the elections may Political 
 afford a partial explanation of another fact inf^^^^^^"" 
 Athenian History which has been the cause of 
 considerable comment. It is well known that every 
 public man at Athens was liable to constant prose- 
 cutions. It is related of Aristophon that he was 
 accused and acquitted 70 times. We know that 
 Pericles Alcibiades Cleophon Callisthenes Demo- 
 sthenes were all condemned in the courts, and we 
 
 ^ Cf. Vischer, Kleine Schriften, vol. i. , who collects a number 
 of facts bearing on these eVatpetat. 
 
 They would give their support to a member whenever he was 
 candidate for an office, but it would be not as a member of a 
 political party but as personal friends ; though it is, of course, never 
 possible entirely to separate the two things. 
 
 3—2 
 
36 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 have every reason to suppose that some of them at 
 least were innocent of the charges brought against 
 them. Historians have been shocked by this. It 
 pains us to see the Athenians condemning their 
 greatest statesmen on a false charge of peculation. 
 But we ought to remember that this was a necessary 
 result of the Athenian system of appointment. 
 
 In a state where offices are filled by popular 
 election, personal pique and party prejudice con- 
 centrate at the elections ; it is then that men try to 
 injure their opponents and help their friends. At 
 Athens this was not the case. The passions which 
 with us find expression at elections could there find 
 no vent except in the law-courts. Popular election 
 produces the wire-puller: election by lot produces 
 the sycophant. Political prosecution was the recog- 
 nised way of injuring an opponent. If we remember 
 this we shall not feel inclined to attribute the over 
 litigiousness of the Athenians to pure perverseness of 
 disposition, and shall be still less disposed to believe 
 that the statesmen were guilty of all the charges on 
 which they were accused. 
 
 These political trials were really an opportunity 
 for the expression of popular favour or distrust. A 
 politician might fail to be elected general, and yet his 
 eloquence would still enable him to rule the state ; 
 but if he were condemned on a serious charge he 
 would for the time at least be in disgrace, he would 
 probably incur partial dri/jLLa, he might have to leave 
 the country, or might even lose his life. And so we 
 find that every decided change in Athenian policy is 
 marked, not by the election of a new finance- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 37 
 
 ininister, or a new board of generals, but by the 
 condemnation in the law courts of the former 
 
 WpOO-T(iT7}<i TOV Brj/JLOV. 
 
 This was of course only possible because the 
 verdict of the law courts was a direct expression of 
 popular feeling almost as much as was a vote in the 
 Assembly. Accordingly it did not much matter of 
 what a statesman was accused; that which the jurors 
 had to decide was whether the accused still deserved 
 the confidence of the people. Whether an orator were 
 accused of peculation like Pericles, or of darparca 
 like Cleophon, or of sacrilege like Alcibiades, or of 
 TTapavo/jila like Ctesiphon, his actual guilt or inno- 
 cence was often a very small part of the issue which 
 depended on the verdict. Such a trial was an 
 opportunity for all enemies of a prominent man to 
 join in procuring his downfall. The accusation was 
 simply an occasion for an attack. The verdict was not 
 on the accusation, it was on the whole life of the man; 
 it was a vote of confidence or non-confidence given 
 by the people as a result of their observation of his 
 political career ^ a vote of the same kind as that which 
 in England is given at a general election. 
 
 1 This is illustrated by the fact that bribery was so much more 
 common in the law courts than at elections. Beloch (Att. Politik, 
 p. 144) recognises it when he says of the trial of Timotheos: 
 *' Was die Anklage selbst angeht, so war sie juristisch eben so 
 wenig begriindet wie sie politisch gerechtfertigt war." He was 
 actually deposed from his office. 
 
 Deinarchus (iii. 11) tells the jury to estimate Demosthenes not 
 by the crimes he had committed, but by those he would have 
 committed had he had the opportunity. This would at any rate 
 be not quite such an immoral doctrine as at first appears, if on 
 
38 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 (3) Good result of absence of party elections. 
 
 This peculiarity of the constitution which to a 
 great extent deprived elections of their importance 
 had one good result. The violence of party conflicts 
 was mitigated, and faction and disorder were thereby 
 discouraged. Athens was free from the danger which 
 must arise when all the party jealousies and passions 
 are concentrated at annually recurring elections. Not 
 only was the danger entirely averted in the appoint- 
 ment to the greater number of offices, since they 
 were filled by lot; but even in the election of 
 generals, and what few other exceptions there were 
 to the rule, the results of the system are seen. 
 
 This result was so obviously beneficial that some 
 have considered it alone sufficient to explain and 
 justify the use of the lot; in fact in some Greek 
 states the lot was, we are told, simply used as a means 
 of securing internal peace ^ and it is even possible 
 that this was one of the chief reasons of its use at 
 Athens in the earlier days before the establishment 
 of the democracy'^. For this result was rightly con- 
 sidered as essential to the integrity and permanence 
 of the democracy, because, as I have pointed out, 
 the existence of crrao-t?, of violent compact parties, 
 
 the result of the trial depended the political power of the accused, 
 and it was not simply a question of punishing him for what he had 
 done. 
 
 1 Ar. Pol. viii. (v.) 3, 1303*. At Herasa it was introduced for 
 this reason. 
 
 2 It is an exaggeration however to say, as Lugebil does, that 
 this was the chief object of its later use at Athens. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 39 
 
 was an interference with the full independence of 
 the sovereign Assembly. It remains however true 
 that the prime reason for the maintenance of the 
 lot was that, so long as offices were filled by it, the 
 full supremacy of the Assembly over Council and 
 administration was secured. I propose now, by 
 examining the working of the different offices, to 
 illustrate and corroborate this principle ; and to dis- 
 cuss to what extent it was found compatible with 
 good government and efficient administration. 
 
 Additional note on p. 16. 
 
 [Miiller-Strubing, p. 208, supports his theory by a 
 reference to Isocrates, Areopagitica 20 — 27. With 
 reference to this it is only necessary to point out : — 
 
 (1) It is not clear whether Isocrates means that 
 "in the times of Solon and Cleisthenes" they did 
 not use the lot at all, or only that they used the lot 
 to decide the claims of selected candidates. 
 
 ovK i^ airavTcov Ta<; ap')(a^ KXrjpovvre^i dWa toi)? 
 pekrla-Tov^ koI tov<; cKavcordrovf; e<^' GKaarov twv 
 €p<ya)v TTpoKplvovre^, [See Appendix.] 
 
 (2) That when Isocrates says the old constitution 
 was more democratic (BTj/jbOTLKcorepa) he gives a reason 
 which is obviously derived from the peculiar circum- 
 stances of the time when he is writing and not of 
 the time of " Solon and Cleisthenes." For the whole 
 speech of which this passage is a part is a rhetorical 
 exercise on the faults of modern Athens. And the 
 allusions are thrown in without any care for their 
 historical accuracy. 
 
40 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 (3) § 17. He simply uses Brj/jbOTtKarepa as 
 synonymous with that which is profitable to the 
 city. He says the true democracy is that which is 
 just and wise. 
 
 (4) That even if Isocrates did mean what he 
 said and professed to be writing history and not a 
 political pamphlet, his opinion would be of no value 
 as against the testimony of Herodotus and Plato and 
 Aristotle.] 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 The maintenance of the democracy depended 
 on the condition that there should be no other body 
 in the state which, owing to wealth position birth, or 
 reputation, could act independently of the Assembly. 
 The Greeks saw clearly that power gained by one 
 department must be at the expense of another. 
 There was nothing to which they attached so much 
 importance as the preservation of a due balance of 
 power between the various institutions. This is 
 shown in the dread of men of conspicuous ability 
 which was so common. But in a democracy the true 
 balance, or proportion in the government was that 
 the Assembly should have all the power : anything 
 which could interfere with it was a distortion \ It 
 was as much the object of a good democrat to 
 
 1 That is in administration. The theory of Greek constitu- 
 tional law was that the Assembly should be free only within the 
 limits of the laws ; these were normally unchangeable (of. Wila- 
 mowitz-Mollendorff, Aus Kydathen)-, legislation was not one of the 
 regular functions of the people. But (this always excepted) in a 
 true democracy its power would not be impeded by the competition 
 of any other legally constituted body. 
 
/ 42 ) THE COUNCIL. 
 
 weaken all other assemblies and institutions as it 
 was of a tyrant to kill all other able men. And 
 this is what the lot did at Athens \ 
 
 For any state which is not governed by an as- 
 sembly of all the citizens must be governed either 
 by a smaller council, or by one or more magistrates. 
 This the Greeks saw clearly enough, just as they saw 
 that the power of one of these organs depended on 
 the weakness of the others. They themselves di- 
 vided the city states into three classes: Monarchy, 
 Aristocracy or Oligarchy, Democracy; and to these 
 added the state with a mixed constitution — the 
 iroXuTeia as Aristotle calls it. In all of these we 
 find existing more or less developed the three organs 
 of government, the iK/cXrjo-La or great assembly of 
 citizens; the ^ovXij or senate, a smaller select council; 
 and the executive magistrates. The power was 
 divided among these three, and what was gained by 
 one was lost by another ; and just as a Democracy 
 was a state where the eKickrjaia maintained its 
 power and held the government in its own hands, 
 so in an Aristocracy or Oligarchy we find the chief 
 power held by the ^ovXr) or smaller council. It 
 would be equally correct if we substituted for the 
 Greek words, " Rule of the Many," "Eule of the Few," 
 the expressions, " Rule by the Assembly," " Rule by 
 the Council." To preserve the Democracy it was 
 necessary to keep up the power of the eKKXija-La as 
 
 1 Aristotle expressly tells us that in a democracy all other 
 OJBfices {dpxo-'i) will lose power : Tirapros 8k rpdiroi rb wdvras irepl 
 TrdvTcop §ov\€TL)e<xdaL avvibvTas, rhs 5' dpxas irepi fXTjdevos Kpiveiv 
 dWd irpoavaKplv€Lv. Pol. vi. (iv.) 4, 1298*. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 48 
 
 against that of the ^ovXtj and the magistrates ; and 
 this is what the lot did. 
 
 Of course it seldom happened that there was a 
 state where any form of government was quite 
 perfect. Even a complete monarchy, where the 
 executive ruler was quite independent and irre- 
 sponsible, was rare ; though the Greek states under 
 the tyrants had had some experience of such an 
 arrangement. But this was a passing phase, and 
 Athens had never fallen under the despotism of a 
 constitutionally appointed executive body as Sparta 
 to some extent had, and the danger of this does not 
 seem at the beginning of the fifth century to have 
 been great. There was no tyrant, the continuation 
 of whose rule interfered with the independence of 
 the assembly : the more pressing danger to be met 
 by those who wished to establish a democracy was 
 the rule of the aristocratic council ; for it was round 
 a council that the power of the old nobles had 
 centred. 
 
 The power of this council is the most striking The 
 fact in the history of all city states ; in mediaeval l^^^ciW^ 
 Germany and in Italy just as much as in all the state. 
 ancient cities, Greek Latin and Phoenician, which 
 were scattered round the shores of the Mediterra- 
 nean. It does not matter whether a seat in the 
 council be hereditary, whether the appointment be 
 by cooptation, or even by direct or indirect popular 
 election ; with the council rests the real power of 
 the state, and to become a senator is the object of 
 ambition for all who themselves aim at power. It 
 is the councillors, the senators, the rathsherm who 
 
THE COUNCIL. 
 
 are looked up to by their fellow-citizens as their 
 rulers: it is they who have a monopoly of the 
 •distinctions and rewards of government ; it is on 
 their decision that the welfare of the town depends ; 
 to be one of them is to be admitted to the arcana 
 of government. There may be a sovereign popular 
 assembly to which certain rights are reserved; but 
 its power is uncertain and its practical importance 
 small, compared with that of the council. And 
 though there are of course magistrates with special 
 duties who have a formal precedency over all other 
 members of the council, yet as a matter of fact we 
 generally find that the magistrates have little inde- 
 pendence. They act not as individuals, but as 
 members of the greater body to which they belong ; 
 the man who is consul or hilrgermeister for a year 
 is hardly distinguished from his associates in the 
 council who have held office or will succeed him in 
 it. When the common man meets a senator or 
 ■councilman in the street, he looks on him with the 
 respect or envy which is due to one who has by his 
 office an authority which no ability nor experience 
 can counterbalance ; he is before one who is politi- 
 cally his better. Whether the council is filled by 
 men of good birth and great wealth, or whether men 
 are elected to it for their merit, those who belong to 
 it are an exclusive body; they are a ruling clique 
 within the state ; between them and all other citizens 
 there is a great gulf fixed. 
 
 The government in an Aristocratic or Oligarchic 
 state is then government by a council: and all 
 experience shows that a small body is likely to get 
 
THE COUNCIL. 45 
 
 into its hands more power than legally belongs to it. 
 But a council of some kind is necessary. A large 
 assembly of many thousands cannot alone govern a 
 state. The problem of ancient democracy was there- 
 fore to find a form of council which would help the 
 assembly in the work of government, but would not 
 usurp further power. There must be a council 
 which would be efficient, but not exclusive ; which 
 would help the eKKXrjG-la, but not lead or oppose it. 
 
 Now at Athens there had been in the old days 
 an aristocratic government which was centred round 
 a council. The founders of the Athenian democracy 
 had therefore a double task: they had to destroy, 
 and to build up. They had to take away the power 
 of the old council, and invent a new one which would 
 do the work without making for itself an indepen- 
 dent place. For both tasks they used the same 
 instrument, election by lot. By it they broke down 
 the influence of the old council, and by it they made 
 a new one which answered all the requirements of a 
 complete democracy. 
 
 Our knowledge of the history of the change is 
 unfortunately very small; for the most important 
 facts we are reduced to guess-work : we have there- 
 fore to be content with relating what happened. 
 How events happened, what brought them about, 
 what the immediate causes were, we cannot know. 
 
 (1) How election by lot was used to deprive The 
 the old aristocratic council of its power is so well ^^^P^^^^' 
 known that I need not dwell on the subject. Grote 
 has pointed out how when once it was decided that 
 the Areopagus should consist of all ex-archons, and 
 
46 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 that the archons should be chosen by lot from all 
 citizens \ the power and influence of the Council of 
 the Areopagus was gone^. Some religious mystery 
 still attended it, its meetings still had some of the 
 dignity which comes from old associations, but its 
 political importance was over, and it remained a 
 harmless and picturesque relic to tell of a past which 
 was gone for ever. 
 
 Whatever may have been the time and occasion 
 of this reform, there is no doubt that the object and 
 the result of causing the Archons, — and so, indirectly, 
 the members of the Council of the Areopagus, — to be 
 elected by lot from all the citizens, was once for all 
 to do away with the influence of the old nobility, 
 and give the new institutions free play. Most 
 investigations into the subject do not go further 
 than this point. I propose now to proceed to 
 examine how election by lot was used in the 
 creation of the new democracy ; for it might easily 
 have happened that at Athens the old regime was 
 succeeded as at Rome by a new aristocracy, or by a 
 mixed constitution. That this did not happen was 
 due above all to the fact that the new offices were in 
 most cases filled by lot. 
 The (2) Just as the centre of the old constitution 
 
 ^^^^ 0/ ^^^ ^j^g Council of the Areopagus, so the key to the 
 new system is to be found in the Council of 500. 
 We are told that this was instituted by Solon as the 
 Council of 400 ^ and enlarged by Cleisthenes to 500; 
 
 ^ I reserve a discussion on the question when the lot was 
 introduced for election of archons. Cf. infra, p. 78 etc. 
 
 2 [See the Appendix for the new light lately thrown on this.] 
 
THE COUNCIL. 47 
 
 but we have no further knowledge of it in the 
 pre-Periclean period; we do not know what it did, 
 nor how it was filled ; we do not know why Solon 
 founded it, nor whether Cleisthenes enlarged its 
 powers. There is scarcely a single mention of it 
 until the time when we find it in the complete 
 democracy existing as the great committee of the as- 
 sembly, through which nearly all business had to 
 pass\ Without attempting to reconstruct its previous 
 history we must be content to show what were the 
 peculiarities which distinguished it from similar 
 bodies in other states, and how these were connected 
 with the manner in which its members were chosen. 
 A council of some kind there must be. However 
 much power was given to the assembly, and however 
 active it was, it was obviously impossible that it 
 should alone transact all the work of government. 
 The problem was to find some form of council which 
 would be strong enough to relieve the assembly of 
 the multitudinous details of business, and yet would 
 not gather round itself authority, or influence, so as 
 to become in any way independent of the assembly. 
 A council of men elected for life was of course 
 out of the question ; it would have been merely the 
 Areopagus again under a new form. But there were 
 grave objections against having a council filled by 
 popular election at all. For, firstly, the influence of 
 the nobles was still so great that they would un- 
 
 1 Unless it is referred to in Herodotus, v. 83 ; ix. 5. There seems 
 no proof of the supposition of Fustel de Coulanges that the council 
 was appointed by lot because the original duty of the Prytanies 
 was care of the sacred fire. (La Cit6 antique, p. 390.) 
 
48 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 doubtedly have occupied nearly all the places. 
 Owners of nearly all the land, the inheritors of all 
 the traditions of the state, hereditary priests, judges, 
 generals, statesmen, they still had an influence which 
 would have been little weakened by popular election. 
 And, secondly, there was another reason why any 
 council elected by the people would fail to do what 
 was required, even if the influence of the nobles were 
 broken. It would inevitably be too good. The 
 power of any assembly does not depend only on the 
 privileges given it by law, but on the character and 
 antecedents of the men who form it. Had there been 
 at Athens a council elected (even if annually elected), 
 though its duties had been nominally exactly the 
 same as those of the Council of 500, it would con- 
 stantly have gained in power at the expense of the 
 Assembly. The smaller a body the better it works. 
 If in a state there are two bodies, one of many thou- 
 sands meeting four times a month, another say of a 
 hundred meeting daily, whose members are chosen 
 from all their fellow-citizens, at the end of a hundred 
 years the whole business will really be transacted in 
 the smaller body, and the larger will have little to 
 do but to ratify the decrees passed by it. And, 
 in consequence, any citizen who is not a member 
 of the smaller body will be in a position of disad- 
 vantage; he will be without the influence and 
 experience which only councillors possess. The 
 government may be a very good government; it 
 will be what Aristotle would have held to be the 
 best ; but it will not be a democracy ; it will not be 
 government by the Assembly. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 49 
 
 The requirements at first seem impossible ; a 
 council which shall be efficient and strong but shall 
 never acquire independent authority ; a council 
 which shall do the work for the assembly and never 
 put itself in opposition to the assembly. The 
 Athenian solution was as simple as it was ingenious. 
 The council is there to do the work which the 
 assembly has not time to do, work which the 
 assembly would do if there were not so much of it ; 
 but if the work of the council is of the same kind as 
 the work of the assembly it can be done by the same 
 people. The work of the assembly is done by all 
 Athenian citizens together, the work of the council 
 shall be done by all Athenian citizens in rotation. 
 500 one year shall be selected by lot ; when they '7 
 
 have had their term of office they shall select again 
 by lot 500 to succeed them. In this way the 
 council will be an exact image of the iKKX7)cria. We 
 shall gain additional working power, and we shall 
 not create an unruly servant. 
 
 The great point of this invention was that it Method of 
 gave practically to nearly every Athenian citizen a ^^^" 
 seat on the council. Men were eligible to the council 
 so soon as they reached the age of thirty; the number 
 of Athenian citizens above the age of seventeen was 
 at the greatest not more than about 30,000, and about 
 460 B.C. it was probably much smaller than this. A 
 simple calculation will show that, unless re-election 
 was frequent, considerably more than half the citizens 
 must at some period of their life have been members 
 of the council. If with some authorities we reckon 
 the number of citizens at from 15,000 to 20,000, 
 H. 4 
 
50 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 there would not have been enough citizens to fill the 
 council without re-election \ 
 
 The enormous importance of this will be evident 
 at once. It made all the difference whether any 
 citizen might be elected, or whether nearly every 
 citizen must be elected I We can well understand 
 how anyone who had had experience of it would 
 look on election by lot as essential to a democracy. 
 Most important among the results would be its 
 educational value. In speaking of the Oligarchic 
 council I remarked how much the influence it had was 
 due to the fact that its members had a monopoly of 
 certain kinds of experience. They alone understood 
 the secret ways of statesmanship ; they were behind 
 the scenes; they had experience which if not so 
 peculiar as that of a cabinet minister is greater than 
 that of a member of Parliament. Now of course the 
 Athenian council was not such a good school of 
 politics as the Roman senate ; but still it was before 
 the council that the government of the city day by 
 
 ^ For the population of Attica cf. Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung, 
 i. p. 42, etc.; Beloch, Zur Bevolkerungslehre ; Thuc. ii. 13. 
 According to his account of the number of Athenians available for 
 military service, the total number of citizens above 17 years of 
 age must have been about 30,000. Dem. Aristogeiton, 51, puts 
 the population lower, elal irov dLfffi^pioL iravres 'AdrjvcuoL. 
 
 1 do not know that we have any means of finding the average 
 length of life at Athens, so that we must be content to say that 
 when the population was at its highest the number of citizens 
 who reached the age of 30 each year must have been something 
 less than 1000. 
 
 2 On the question of re-election to the council cf. infra, p. 56. 
 Although it was possible and sometimes occurred, what evidence 
 there is seems to show that it was not frequent. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 51 
 
 day passed, its members were directly responsible for 
 the safety of the city, they had to interview foreign 
 ambassadors, they had often in private session to 
 receive information concerning the welfare of the 
 city. Membership of the council thus gave a 
 practical insight into all that went on in Athens, 
 and it must have been of the very greatest import- 
 ance that this practical experience was not confined 
 to a few but that every one had an equal share in it. 
 Professor Freeman has remarked with justice on the 
 political experience possessed by an average Athe- 
 nian citizen ; but if he had only sat in the Assembly, 
 it would have lost much of its value ; if he had 
 never sat in the council, if none of his relatives had 
 ever done so, if he had never spoken familiarly to 
 anyone who had been a councillor, his experience, 
 although considerable, would yet have been one-sided 
 and imperfect. 
 
 The principle of rotation is even more strikingly 
 illustrated if we look at the internal arrangements of 
 the council. As the council was to the Assembly 
 so were the irpyrdvei^ to the council. The council 
 was a committee of the assembly, to which each 
 member was appointed in rotation ; its duty was to 
 clear the ground for the action of the assembly by 
 disposing of and arranging all the details. The 
 Prytanies were a committee of the council on which 
 each member served in turn; it was a permanent 
 sub-committee in almost permanent session ; but 
 the members of it continually changed, and thus by 
 means of it the council was able to transact a mass 
 of business without unduly taxing the energies of 
 
 4—2 
 
62 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 any individual member. And if we pass from the 
 Prytanies to the i7rt,(7TdTr]<;^ we find the same system 
 of rotation carried even further. For one day of the 
 year, if not every councillor, at least the great 
 majority of them were in turn formal presidents of 
 the whole state. In turn each presided in the 
 meetings of the council, and (if there happened to 
 be one on that day) of the assembly; he took the 
 chief place in any public dinner in the Prytaneum : 
 he took the first place in any public procession ; he 
 had the key of the state treasury. Could equality, 
 could democracy go further ? 
 Were the There can, I think, be no doubt that election by 
 
 politicians ^^^ ^^^ ^ democratic institution, but the original 
 members? difficulty with which we started is not yet solved. 
 'How was it possible to govern the city even passably 
 with such a constitution ? What after all had this 
 council to do, and how did it do it ? It is difficult 
 not to believe that if the council was really an 
 important body, and if the government of the state 
 was really managed by it, the leading men and 
 great politicians must in some way have become 
 members. The influence which would belong to 
 membership is just what an ambitious man would 
 prize ; a seat must have been an object of desire ; 
 and it would surely be of great importance that a 
 body on which such responsibilities rested should 
 number among its members men with special know- 
 ledge of affairs, and men who in virtue of their 
 well-known character and position would feel their 
 
 1 The change made in the arrangements in the 4th century 
 does not materially affect this point. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 53 
 
 responsibility, and exercise more discretion than 
 would men of no experience. Nothing is so dan- 
 gerous as a body entrusted with public duties, the 
 members of which have not learnt the caution which 
 comes from experience. 
 
 It has therefore been generally assumed that in 
 some way or another leading politicians did manage 
 frequently to get a seat in the council ; and that 
 the popular orators of the time were as conspicuous 
 in the debates of the council as in those of the 
 larger assembly. 
 
 There is however some difficulty in understanding 
 how this was possible; a difficulty which is much 
 increased by our ignorance of the manner in which 
 the election was managed. If, as is generally held, 
 the lots were drawn only among the men who were 
 nominated or came forward as candidates, then of 
 course by constantly coming forward, any single 
 individual would be able to ensure a considerable 
 probability that he would be not unfrequently among 
 those chosen. But even this point is uncertain \ 
 
 1 The only passage which I know as directly bearing on it is 
 Lysias, xxxi. 33, where speaking of a man who had been elected a 
 senator the orator says, Trpodv/xws KK-qpoiabiievos rjkde. Making 
 allowance for the desire of a rhetorical contrast, these words at 
 the most do not imply more than that Philo had taken care that 
 his name was entered on the lists of those eligible to the council. 
 Such a list there must have been. If anyone's name was omitted 
 he would claim to have it put on. The justice of his claim would not 
 be tried unless he were actually chosen. In the parallel speech, pro 
 Mantitheo, of Lysias, there is no reference to any special Candida- \ 
 
 ture. The fact alsojhat Socrates was once a member of the council ^ j 
 
 is evidence"EHarthe lots were not drawn only among men who came ' / 
 forward. It is improbable that he at his age would have volun- ^ 
 
64 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 It is perhaps equally probable that the election was 
 managed by drawing lots, not among the names of 
 special candidates, but from an official list of all who 
 were eligible and not during that year otherwise 
 occupied on the state service ; this list being made 
 out by demes, and a certain number drawn from 
 each deme. 
 Was the Some historians have felt the difficulty so strongly 
 
 ]wnestlv ^^^^ ^^®y ^^^^ supposed there was some underhand 
 worked? means by which a public man might procure his 
 election \ The chief support for this is a passage 
 where ^schines refers to Demosthenes as one who 
 had got himself appointed councillor, not by any 
 regular means, but by bribery and intrigued It is 
 however hardly safe to depend much on a casual 
 accusation of dishonesty brought by ^schines against 
 Demosthenes. Had there been any foundation for 
 
 tarily made an exception to his ordinary mode of life, and come 
 forward as candidate for a seat in the council. Neither Xenophon 
 nor Plato says anything which would lead us to suppose that this 
 was the case (Xen. Hist. i. 7, 13 ; Plato, Apol. 32). [See Appendix.} 
 
 1 Gilbert (Beitrage, p. 80 etc.) suggests that there was some 
 way of getting elected as substitute [eirikaxfiv) to another man^ 
 and then getting him ejected on doKifxaaia. There is absolutely 
 no evidence for this, for the passage quoted from Plato Comicus 
 (ap. Meineke, 2, 670) tells us nothing. 
 
 2 iEschines in Ctesiphontem, 62, ou5^ Xaxwi* ov8^ ^TriXaxcbi^ 
 aW iK irapacTKevTJs TrpiafMevos, and again ib. 73, ^oyXeur^s wv e/c 
 irapaffKevrjs. 
 
 There is a similar expression used of appointment to a priest- 
 hood. Demosthenes in Theocrinem, Iviii. 29, Kal rV fJ-^" dpxw 
 rjv iKecPOS apx^v ireXevTrjirev, lepoirotbs (Jov, rraph roi/s po/xovs rjpx^v 
 o5to^ ovt€ Xaxojp ovt ^7rtXaxt6j', and JEschines in Timarchum, 
 106 (125), ovK icTip TjPTtpa 7rc67ror' ovk rjp^ep dpxW) ovSe/jXap Xaxwj^ 
 oiS^ X^f-poroPTjOels, aXXA irdaas irapk Toi>s vS/xovs irpid/ievos. 
 
THE COUNCrL. 
 
 55 
 
 the charge it would hardly have been passed over so 
 lightly. It is probably nothing but a characteristic 
 method of expressing annoyance that Demosthenes 
 had been fortunate enough to get elected. 
 
 The reference is, however, of some interest as 
 being one of the clearest cases in which we find that 
 a politician was to some extent helped in his measures 
 by the fact that he was a member of the council. 
 Others do occur, but on the whole hardly with 
 sufficient frequency to justify us in supposing that a 
 seat was necessary for a politician, or that he could 
 in any way reckon upon being a member. It seems as 
 though most well-known men were in the council at 
 least once (though this cannot be proved for nearly 
 all); but, as we must remember, to have a seat 
 once was not more than any citizen might hope for\ 
 
 The only other evidence on the matter comes Evidence 
 from some lists which have been preserved of Pry- 
 tanies, belonging to the fourth century I Of these 
 three give about the full number of councillors 
 belonging to one tribe. An examination of them 
 gives the following results : 
 
 (1) The number of members belonging to each 
 deme appears to vary with the size of the deme, and 
 the number elected for the same deme in different 
 
 1 In a great number of cases in which men are mentioned in 
 connection with the council, the man was not necessarily himself a 
 member, but was present either as an oiBflcial of some kind, or simply 
 as a private man there on business. Cf. Lysias, v. 33. When we 
 are told that Pericles was regular in his attendance at the council, 
 it does not follow that he was a member. He went in his capacity 
 of general. 
 
 2 C. I. A. II. 864 etc. q ( 
 
 of inscrip- 
 tions. 
 
 
56 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 i years seems to be constant. From this we may 
 ' gather that at the election a certain number were 
 / chosen from each deme, and that the members were 
 / not chosen from the whole tribe indiscriminately. 
 
 (2) There are a few cases where the names of 
 the same deme are preserved for more than one 
 year. Among these only one case of re-election is 
 to be found. This perhaps shows that re-election 
 was not very frequent. 
 
 (3) No names of distinguished politicians occur; 
 but on the other hand there are a large number of 
 names which can be identified as occurring, (a) in 
 the private speeches of the orators, (/3) in lists of 
 trierarchs, (7) as members of distinguished families. 
 However, a very large proportion of the names 
 are completely unknown, many being names which 
 occur nowhere else in Greek history and must there- 
 fore belong to families of no distinction or wealth. 
 
 On the whole, so far as we can see, the different 
 strata of Athenian society are each fairly represented. 
 There is no evidence that wealthy and distinguished 
 men abstained from sitting in the council, nor is there 
 a larger number of them in these lists than would be 
 a fair proportion. 
 
 (4) It is remarkable that three times near 
 relatives (twice two brothers, and once father and 
 son) sit together. This can hardly be a coincidence. 
 
 Leading The conclusion from this evidence is that we 
 
 statesmen j^^^^ ^^ reason for supposing that public men could 
 
 necessarily in any way command a seat in the council, and it 
 
 would, I think, be difficult to find the record of any 
 
 events in Athenian history which would justify the 
 
THE COUNCIL. 57 
 
 assertion that a place in it was necessary to an 
 ambitious man. It was possible to rule the whole 
 state without having a seat in it. How this was so 
 will be seen if we examine more minutely what the 
 duties of the council were\ 
 
 The council was not, as we are apt to think, a Duties of 
 dignified deliberative body, where men met together council. 
 quietly in order to discuss and prepare schemes for 
 the public welfare, which should afterwards be laid 
 before the Assembly and receive its sanction. Had 
 the council had to initiate and decide upon policy, 
 the leading orators must have been members of it ; 
 and had they been members it would doubtless have 
 acquired this function. But, as it was, its duties 
 though no less important were far less impos- 
 ing. It was not a deliberative, but an executive 
 body; it was concerned not with policy, but with 
 business. It had to carry out the decrees of the 
 Assembly ; it was occupied with innumerable points 
 of detail ; it had to make decisions, not on matters of 
 peace and war or internal reforms, but on the appoint- 
 ment of subordinate officials, on the amount of tribute 
 to be paid by some ally, the necessity for rebuilding 
 warehouses, or restoring triremes. Its time was 
 occupied with the inspection of accounts, the mak- 
 ing of contracts, the paying of money, the hearing of 
 
 1 If I am right in supposing that the method of appointment 
 prevented the leading politicians sitting regularly in the council, 
 it will also follow that no one else could procure his election or 
 re-election, and therefore that re-election did not prevail to such 
 an extent as to interfere with the truth of the principle which 
 I stated above, pp. 49 — 50. 
 
Xevfia. 
 
 58 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 petitions from individuals, the reception of informa- 
 tion about the position of the enemy's fleet, or the 
 price of corn in the Euxine; in fact, with the innu- 
 merable matters of administration which in a modern 
 state are brought before the permanent officials \ A 
 reference to its most prominent duties will make this 
 clear. 
 (1) irpo^oTU' vXJtrhe most important of its duties was perhaps 
 the preparation of business for the Assembly; 
 it is well known that no decree could be passed 
 
 1 Of. [Xenophon] 'Ad-qvaiwv UoXirela, iii. 2, etc. for the duties 
 of the council ; — the chief are, the appointment of 400 trierarchs 
 every year, the assessment of the tribute every four years, to 
 decide judicial questions, et tls rrjv vavv ixt] eiria-Kevd^ei t] kutolko- 
 dofxeX TL 8r)fx6(nou. It is difficult to understand to what the ttoXXo, 
 irepl vofiiov 64(rews in iii. 2 refers. 
 
 Boeckh, p. 187 (208), gives an account of the financial activity 
 of the council, which shows well the kind of work it had to do : — 
 
 " It had, according to the pamphlet on the Athenian Constitu- 
 tion, to occupy itself with provision of money, with reception of 
 the tribute, and as we can conclude from another source, with 
 other matters connected with the tribute, with the administration 
 of the marine and the sanctuaries ; the leasing of the customs 
 was conducted under its supervision, those who had public money 
 or sacred money from the state had to pay it in the presence of 
 the council, or it had to exact payment according to the contracts, 
 so that it was entitled to arrest and imprison the farmers or their 
 sureties and collectors, if they did not pay ; in the council chamber 
 the Apodectai gave their report on the receipts and the money 
 which was due ; in the presence of the council the treasurers of 
 the goddess handed over and took over the treasure and received 
 the fines ; it determined the administration of the money, even in 
 small matters, such as the pay of the poets ; we have especial 
 mention of its superintendence over the cavalry which was main- 
 tained by the city, and the examination of the invalids who were 
 supported at the public expense, as part of its duties ; the public 
 debts are paid under its guidance." 
 
THE COUNCIL. 59 
 
 which had not been introduced officially by the 
 council. The object of this rule is simple ; it was 
 not desired to give the council a special influence, 
 nor to restrict the freedom of debate in the As- 
 sembly; it was not in any way a law which as at 
 Kome gave the magistrates alone the right of 
 introducing business. This rule did not weaken the 
 Assembly, but strengthened it, because it provided 
 for the proper arrangement of debates. The Pry- 
 tanies summoned the Assembly, and, as the chief 
 committee, the council had to prepare business for it. 
 ^. It was then only natural that they should have 
 notice beforehand of all measures which would be in- 
 troduced, since they would have to make public the 
 matters to be discussed, and to arrange the order of 
 business. 
 
 And, again, anyone who has had experience of 
 public debates will know how difficult it is to get 
 business done, and especially what trouble is caused 
 by inaccuracy in the wording of motions. Now we 
 know that the Athenians were very particular on 
 this point; they took great care to provide that there 
 were no verbal discrepancies in their laws, and no 
 discrepancy between the laws and decrees; it was 
 the duty of the council to see that all motions 
 brought before the Assembly were properly worded. 
 If an orator wished to propose a motion, he had first 
 to move that the council introduce a Trpo^ovXevfia 
 on the subject ; they had to consider the matter of 
 the proposal he wished to make, and then embody 
 it in a motion in such a way as seemed to them 
 most convenient ; in this way provision was made 
 
60 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 for a consideration of the form of a Psephism 
 before the motion itself came before the Assembly. 
 As a rule the orator would doubtless be consulted 
 by the council, and if he were a man of position we 
 may imagine they would propose the Trpo^ovXev/jua 
 in the very words which he suggested. 
 
 There would be another reason for this law. 
 When a motion was proposed it would often be diffi- 
 cult, to tell at first what would be its result if passed, 
 and questions would be raised to which the answers 
 would only be found by special enquiry. This it 
 would be the duty of the council to make. They as 
 the centre of the executive government, in constant 
 communication with all the officers, and with powers 
 to summon and examine all witnesses, would be able 
 to collect the evidence to be laid before the Assembly. 
 
 This work of the drafting and preparing motions 
 is really part of the subordinate work of the execu- 
 tive officers, for it is a way of helping to the attain- 
 ment of an end which is proposed by someone else\ 
 The council in doing this was not directing the 
 state, it was only helping other people to do so, and 
 giving effect to their wishes'^. And it is an im- 
 portant confirmation of this view that in the last few 
 years inscriptions have been discovered from which it 
 
 1 The fact that an orator was always held responsible for any 
 motion proposed by him shows that the council had not power 
 seriously to alter the matter of a decree, and that in the exercise 
 of its Probouleutic duties it did not in any way concern itself with 
 the wisdom of the policy proposed. 
 
 2 This is shown too by Aristotle's distinction between ij j8ou\^ 
 and rrpo^ovXoL. Cf. infra, p. 74. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 61 
 
 appears that there was at Athens a body of men 
 called avyypa(f)eLf; whose special duty it was to help avyypa- 
 in drafting decrees \ We are not able to say with *^"^' 
 confidence whether they were members of a perma- 
 nent bureau, or whether the men were appointed, as 
 in the case of the other exceptional officials, only 
 when their help was specially wanted, but we have 
 the record of their existence and activity in the text 
 of decrees which had been drawn up by them. In 
 these cases, though the draft of the bill, as on all 
 other occasions, was introduced to the Assembly by the 
 Prytanies, the council had not really performed any 
 probouleutic duties at all ; they simply brought for- 
 ward what the o-vyypa(f>€U had proposed. We find 
 another instance of a similar procedure in the case 
 where a single individual is commissioned by the 
 Assembly to draw up the text of a decree, and then 
 the council is ordered^ to bring his proposal before 
 the people. 
 
 In matters of foreign policy also the duty of 
 the council was limited to the introduction of a 
 treaty proposed either by Athenians who as am- 
 bassadors had been empowered to conduct nego- 
 ciations, or by the ambassadors of other states, or, 
 
 1 Cf . Schoell, Commentationes in honorem Mommsennii ; 
 Foucart, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique, 1880, p. 225; 
 Sauppe, Index lect. Acad. Gottingen, 1880 — 81 ; also C. I. A. 
 i. 58; iv. 27^. They are mentioned before the end of the fifth 
 century. 
 
 2 C. I. A. 27^ w. 57—61. ire pi 5^ tov eXalov tt}s airapxm 
 ^vyypdxf/O'as Adfnrup iiridet^aTd} ttj ^ovXrj iirl rijs ivdrrjs irpvravelas, 
 7] 5e jSoyXrj es top hrniov e^eveyK^ro) iirdvayKes. The decree of which 
 this is a clause is proposed by Lampon himself. 
 
62 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 finally, of proposals made by the council of the 
 allies \ 
 
 It seems then as though the duties of the council 
 in preparing decrees varied greatly. As it had to 
 arrange the order of business in the Assembly, all 
 decrees had to be brought before it for preliminary 
 consideration ; but it does not follow that it had full 
 power of discussing and altering them. If, as some- 
 times was the case, a proposal was to be made of such 
 a nature that exceptional skill and judgement was 
 necessary in drawing up the text, the matter was 
 generally entrusted by the Assembly to an excep- 
 tional commission of one or more men. In the case 
 of a large number of motions which were introduced 
 by the enterprise of a single orator, the council 
 would simply adopt the words proposed by the 
 author of the decree, making perhaps such al- 
 terations as were necessary to render it formally 
 correct. The decrees introduced by the council on 
 its own initiative would in number probably far 
 
 1 C. I. A. ii. 52 = Hicks, Greek H. Ins. 84. 
 C. I. A. ii. 57^= ,, „ 94. 
 
 From the year 378 there were present in Athens representatives 
 of all the allied states. They had power to meet and discuss 
 matters which concerned the alliance, but the ultimate decision 
 was always reserved for the Athenian assembly. The council 
 however could ask for their opinion on any matter. In the first 
 of the cases quoted the council asks the allies to consider the 
 matter, and give their opinion to the Assembly, {roi/s avfi/xdxovs 
 Soy/xa i^epeyKcTv els rbv drj/j-ov, 6ti om ai/Tois ^ovXevofihois doKy apicrrov 
 elvai.) In the second the allies have communicated their opinion 
 to the council, and the council incorporates it in a TrpoPo^Xev/xa. 
 {iirei8r] dk ol ffifxixaxoi 86y/xa elaTjvwyKav els tt)v ^ovXtjv 5^xe(r^ai ttjv 
 avfilJLaxia-v...Kal i] jSouXi; irpov^offKevaev /caret ra^rci.) Cf. also p. 66. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 63 
 
 exceed these other classes, but theh^ separate im- 
 portance would not be so great. The council would 
 be responsible for all the decrees connected with the 
 ordinary management of the state, constantly re- 
 curring votes of money, permission to repair public 
 buildings, grants of citizenship, votes of thanks; 
 matters which required a vote of the Assembly, but 
 which would as a rule be passed without opposition, 
 and often without discussion \ 
 
 In these purely administrative matters the coun- 
 cil took the initiative, and its proposals were doubt- 
 less generally adopted, for it was the representative 
 of the permanent administrative offices. Had the 
 council been a strong body, one which had a spirit 
 and desires of its own, its Probouleutic duties would 
 have been a danger to the freedom of the Assembly, 
 for the power of initiative not only in subordinate 
 points of administration but in great questions of 
 policy might easily have been lost to the larger body. 
 The Assembly would have existed only to discuss, to 
 adopt, or reject the proposals of the council. It was 
 a result of the method of appointment by lot to the 
 council that this did not happen, and that, while it 
 performed the duties of preparing and arranging 
 business, it did not put any check on the complete 
 freedom of discussion in the Assembly''. 
 
 1 A great number of the decrees which we possess are of this 
 nature, as they record votes of thanks and honours to foreign 
 envoys ; they would be part of the ordinary international 
 courtesy, and were naturally proposed by the council on its own 
 authority. 
 
 2 We hear of a board called o-vXXoyeTs toO brjixov, but are not 
 
64 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 (2) Ad- The administrative duties were so various that 
 
 vnnistra- ^^ ^.^^^ Qjjly ioke, a few typical instances of cases 
 duties. where we are well informed concerning them. The 
 extent of these duties will be more apparent when 
 we come to deal with the other magistrates with 
 whom the council was intimately connected. For 
 my present purpose it is sufficient to point out that 
 the administrative duties of the council were always 
 connected with matters of detail ; there is no sign 
 that it could form decisions of any political moment. 
 It could only carry out the policy of the Assembly. 
 This is very clearly shewn by a decree which is 
 preserved to us of the latter part of the 4th century, 
 and is worth quoting. 
 
 In 325 B.C. an expedition was to be sent out to 
 carry into execution a plan for settling colonies in the 
 Adriatic. A decree was brought before the people 
 to give the orders necessary to the proper fitting out 
 of the expedition \ After various orders to the in- 
 spectors of the dockyards, and other officials specially 
 concerned, come the following clauses : — " And the 
 Council of 500 shall superintend the fitting out of 
 the expedition, and punish according to the laws any 
 of the trierarchs who are unruly. And the Prytanies 
 shall provide that the council be in constant session 
 on the quay till the Expedition has sailed. And the 
 
 told what they had to do. Cf. Boeckh, vol. ii. p. 115 (3rd Ed.) ; 
 C. I. A. ii. 607, 741, 1174. It is difficult to see what scope there 
 was for the activity of a special board in summoning the Assembly. 
 They are apparently different from an elected officer of the same 
 name mentioned by Harpocration. 
 1 C. I. A. ii. 809 b. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 65 
 
 Athenian people shall choose* ten men from all the 
 Athenians, and they shall superintend the fitting out 
 of the expedition in the same way as the council 
 is ordered to do. And the council and the Prytanies 
 after superintending the outfit shall be crowned by 
 the people v/ith a golden crown to the value of 1000 
 drachmas. And if anything is necessary to supple- 
 ment this decree, the council shall have power to 
 pass a decree, so long as it does not invalidate 
 anything which has been decreed by the people." 
 
 This we may consider as the regular form of 
 procedure ; it is an excellent illustration of the posi- 
 tion which the council held. The Assembly declares 
 for a policy, arranges the general principles on which 
 it shall be carried out, and then leaves the manage- 
 ment of all details, within certain limits, to the 
 council. When we are told that the council was 
 responsible for keeping up the number of the tri- 
 remes, the case is precisely similar ; the Assembly 
 made the decree or law which determined the size of 
 the fleet ; the council was responsible for its execu- 
 tion. 
 
 It was moreover especially the duty of the council Financial 
 to watch over the public finances. Of this I shall ^^*^^* 
 have more to say later, for, as I shall point out, the 
 management of the finances is more difficult to under- 
 stand than any other part of the system. It will 
 be sufficient here to recall the fact that the council 
 had no power alone to levy any tax, or spend any 
 
 1 That these dTroo-ToXets, being exceptional officials, should be 
 chosen by popular election is, as I shall afterwards show, in ac- 
 cordance with the invariable custom. 
 
 H. 5 
 
66 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 money without authority. What it had to do was to 
 see that the regular taxes were properly collected or 
 sold, and that the money was paid in by the separate 
 officials ; to decide questions in disputed cases about 
 the assessment of the tax ; and to pay money as 
 required to the various officials. 
 
 The council was in financial matters of special im- 
 portance, and for the following reason. All the money 
 of the state passed through its hands, and it was in 
 constant communication with all the other officials ; 
 the control of the finances therefore depended on 
 the information which was to be found either in the 
 council chamber itself, or in the offices of the various 
 boards which were grouped round it. And more- 
 over the council had the duty of calling the attention 
 of the Assembly to any deficit. For as it was re- 
 sponsible for the management of all the various 
 public services, and as these could not be maintained 
 without supplies, if when the officials applied to 
 the council there was no money to give them, the 
 council would have to ask the Assembly for more 
 money; it would have to state what the deficiency 
 was, and would perhaps accompany the statement 
 by a recommendation of some way of raising the 
 sum. There was however no constitutional custom 
 which compelled the Assembly to accept the sug- 
 gestion made by the council. 
 Foreign It might be thought that there was one duty of 
 
 relations, ^j^^ council which formed an obvious exception to 
 the principle I have laid down. It had to receive 
 foreign envoys, and consider the terms of any treaty 
 or agreement which was to be proposed. This was 
 
THE COUNCIL. 67 
 
 not however different from other occasions on which 
 it prepared business for the Assembly. The council 
 could not in any way influence the decision of the 
 Assembly; all that it had to do was to learn from the 
 strangers the business on which they had come, the 
 powers which they had, and the terms which they 
 were ready to propose. In accordance with this 
 information a Probouleuma would then be draw^n 
 up introducing the subject to the Assembly. In 
 this as in other cases the object of the Probouleuma 
 was not in any way to influence the decision on the 
 question to be debated, but to make clear what that 
 question was. This is abundantly evident from the 
 inscriptions, and in those cases where our other 
 authorities give an account of the reception of 
 ambassadors there is nothing inconsistent with it. 
 
 For instance, Thucydides in the 5th book^ gives 
 an account of the reception of a Spartan embassy 
 at Athens in connection with the diplomatic com- 
 plication which resulted on the peace of Nicias. 
 We find that it was first, as was of course necessary, 
 brought before the council, and the next day it was 
 introduced by the Prytanies to the Assembly. In 
 the preliminary hearing before the council there 
 <loes not appear to have been any discussion of the 
 proposals which the envoys were empowered to 
 make. They simply explained what their powers 
 were. The confusion which resulted arose from 
 their denial in the Assembly that they had full 
 power to treat, after the Prytanies had formally 
 introduced them as plenipotentiaries, 
 
 1 V. 45. 
 
 5—2 
 
68 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 This preliminary meeting was of course necessary 
 
 merely for formal purposes, as the Prytanies had 
 
 to summon the Assembly and determine the order 
 
 of the business ; they could not do so till they had 
 
 had an interview with the ambassadors and learnt 
 
 what they had come about. This is illustrated by 
 
 the scene in the Acharnians where the ambassadors 
 
 from Persia are introduced by the Prytanies. But 
 
 in this as in the other cases of Probouleuma the 
 
 peculiar constitution of the council averted the 
 
 danger of the matter being practically settled before 
 
 it came to the Assembly. Had all the leading 
 
 statesmen and orators been members of the council 
 
 this would surely have been the case. 
 
 Character I think then that I have said enough to show 
 
 fmncii ^^^^ ^^® ^ovXt) was almost entirely a business body. 
 
 Its duty was not to discuss questions of policy, nor to 
 
 decide on momentous matters ; it had to dispose of 
 
 the enormous mass of detailed business which was 
 
 necessarily connected with the government of the 
 
 state. Its meetings were not like those of the 
 
 House of Commons; they would be more like the 
 
 meeting of a municipal council, a school board, or a 
 
 committee of a County Council. There would be a 
 
 great deal of business to be got through, there 
 
 would probably as a rule be very few members 
 
 present \ the matters to be settled would each 
 
 severally be of very small importance, there would be 
 
 a good deal of opening for personal favour but very 
 
 little for political influence. A jSovXevrri^; might 
 
 1 Cf. Dem. in Androtionem, 604, 36, where he speaks of 
 a povXevT-fis as " hardly ever entering the council chamber." 
 
THE COUNCIL. 69 
 
 help a friend or injure an enemy \ He could not 
 direct the policy of the city. What was important 
 was that the council should as a rule be without 
 bias, that it should not represent any party or 
 interest, that it should get through its work 
 quickly, and that there should be as little bribery 
 as possible. 
 
 There was obviously then no reason at all why Relation 
 orators or statesmen should be members of it ; they % ^l^ ^^^ 
 would be able to give their opinions on any question council, 
 which directly interested them, their influence would 
 be as great in the council as in the Assembly or in 
 the law-courts, but it would be great not because 
 they had a vote, but because they had the power of 
 persuading other people. Now this removes one of 
 our great difiiculties. So long as we speak vaguely 
 of the ^ovXr/ as responsible for the safety of the 
 state, and as director of the finances, it is difficult to 
 see how it was possible to exclude the leading men 
 in the state. When we see exactly in what the 
 duties consisted the answer is clear. 
 
 Two points to be noticed result from this. The 
 first is the publicity of the meetings. 
 
 The meetings of a deliberative assembly may be Publicity 
 public and yet the result be little influenced by the ^^^^ of the 
 opinions of people outside, at any rate by those oi council. 
 individuals. But the meetings of a business body 
 are public in a very different sense ; for it must be 
 constantly in communication with people who are not 
 
 1 The case given in Aesch. in Timarchum, 109 etc. (127, 28) is 
 an instance where a /3ov\eur?7s used his position to help a rafxlas 
 in peculation ; how he was enabled to do so we are not informed. 
 
70 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 members. There can seldom have been any business 
 brought before the council which did not require the 
 presence of someone who was a stranger, who would 
 have to be interrogated, to give information, or to 
 explain his wishes. Whether it was an official who 
 wanted money for some public purpose, or the repre- 
 sentatives of a town which claimed an alleviation of 
 tribute, or Persian ambassadors who had to be intro- 
 duced to the Assembly, or a trierarch who had lost 
 his ship, or the farmer of a tax, or some man who had 
 discovered an oligarchic conspiracy, or an orator who 
 wished to propose a motion in the Assembly, — all 
 would have to come in person before the council to 
 explain their plan and justify their request \ And 
 moreover the council would always be able to 
 summon to their assistance anyone whose special 
 knowledge would be of use. This they would 
 especially do when they wanted the help of skilled 
 advice, and we have frequent references to orators 
 and others who were present in the council without 
 being members of it. 
 
 But not only was the council in this way 
 constantly brought into communication with men 
 of all classes in the state, but its sittings were 
 themselves public. This was necessary. The powers 
 of the council were of such a kind as could not 
 be safely entrusted to a body sitting privately. 
 That would have been as dangerous to personal 
 
 1 This is shown by the fact recorded in the work ah-eady 
 quoted, where the author says that many people had to wait 
 a whole year before they could get the council to attend tO' 
 their business. [Xenophon] 'Adrjvaiujv UoXireia, iii. 1, etc. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 71 
 
 liberty as are law-courts where the hearing is not 
 public. 
 
 Had the council been a small body which sat 
 privately, it would have had an almost unlimited 
 power over the whole state. As it was, it sat in 
 public ; the citizens could stand round and listen to" 
 the proceedings. These proceedings would often be 
 really judicial, sometimes judicial in form. The 
 great numbers of the council would, in important 
 cases, give to its meetings the appearance of one of 
 the jury courts. A case would be brought up for 
 decision : an appeal, for instance, from the assessment 
 of the raKTal, or the confirmation of the appointment 
 of an official. The different parties would plead, they 
 would have speeches written for them by orators; 
 the councillors would sit and listen. There would 
 be a difference from a jury court, because the council 
 would consult together, but the work which they 
 had to do would be of the same kind. 
 
 It will appear then that there would be constant 
 opportunities for any orator, who wished to do so, to 
 bring any proposal which fell within its province 
 before the council, to address it himself, to use his 
 eloquence and his influence in the task of persuading 
 the members, and to report to them his view of any 
 matter. He would be able to guide their de- 
 cisions. We have, in fact, in our records continual 
 reference to the presence of men and orators before 
 the council at a time when they were not members of 
 it\ The council often sat as a court of justice, and 
 
 1 Lysias xiii. 21, xxii. Andoc. de myst. 154 ; de reditu, 21. 
 
72 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 then an orator could accuse an enemy before it as 
 before any other court ; when, on the other hand, it 
 sat as an administrative body, it would be subject to 
 just the same kind of terrorism which a popular 
 orator could bring to bear on any other magistrates ; 
 he would bully them^ and make them do what he 
 wanted without, being a member, just as much as he 
 would any other board. 
 
 Moreover, the other magistrates, though not 
 members of the council, were in constant communi- 
 cation with it. This was especially the case with 
 the generals. All communications to the Assembly 
 had to be made first to the Prytanies, and the 
 Prytanies would constantly apply to the generals 
 and other magistrates for advice and information; 
 so that in this way the council chamber was the 
 centre of all public life, it was the connecting link 
 between all branches of the public service. Not only 
 was nearly every citizen in turn a member of it, 
 but each year all the public officials and innumer- 
 able other citizens were brought by business affairs 
 into close connection with it. 
 Exception- If however we would properly understand how it 
 ai offices. ^^^^ ^^^^ ^j^^ Athenians could afford to dispense 
 with "ability" in the council, there is another set 
 of institutions which we must take into account ; 
 the exceptional offices. These opened to any able or 
 pushing men an opportunity for action. A man who 
 was without military ability and had not been chosen 
 
 1 Ar. Equites, 166 ^ov\t]v iraT-^aeis /cat (TTpaTrjyovs KXaard^eis. 
 Here the Tr/soo-rdrr;? too d-nfwv is spoken of as being without any 
 connection with either council or generals. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 73 
 
 for any civil duty by the lot, was not thereby deprived 
 of all means of showing his usefulness in office. 
 Suppose he had special knowledge of some public 
 matters — that he took a strong interest in finance, or 
 foreign politics, or the navy, or the improvement of 
 the city. He could not use the regular offices as the 
 sphere of his endeavours, but he could do better ; he 
 could have an office created for him. Again, if any 
 branch of the state was in difficulties, or if particular 
 attention was required for the proper working of 
 some department, it was always possible to appoint 
 a special commission to take the matter in hand, and 
 to place on it those citizens who had most knowledge 
 and ability. So, when the financial difficulties be- 
 came pressing, ^rjrrjTal or iropiarai were appointed 
 to devise new sources of income; foreign affairs 
 were entrusted to ambassadors ; were there temples 
 to be built or fortifications to be repaired, a spec*''! 
 board of eTnaraTaL or reixo'TTOioi was appointed. 
 When Demosthenes was at the height of his power 
 he had no regular office, but was one of a commission 
 of Te^%o7rotot, because the defence of the state was a 
 matter with which he was peculiarly concerned. In 
 B.C. 346 iEschines was made special ambassador to the 
 Peloponnesian states in order to try and negociate 
 an alliance against Philip. The building of the Par- 
 thenon and Erechtheion, the rebuilding of the long 
 walls in B.C. 395 were entrusted to commissions of this 
 kind. The (Tvyypa<l)€L<;, who were appointed to super- 
 intend the drawing up of a new code of laws, the 
 crvvTjyopoc, who represented the state in public trials, 
 the d7ro<7To\€i<; who superintended the fitting out of 
 
74 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 an expedition, — all these are instances of such excep- 
 tional offices \ 
 
 And these were an essential part of the system : 
 they supplied just what was wanted in the council 
 and the ordinary boards; they enabled the Assembly 
 to appoint men of special ability whenever it seemed 
 desirable; but, just because they were exceptional, 
 they did not, as a rule, open the same dangers to the 
 supremacy of the Assembly as would have resulted 
 from regularly elected magistrates. At times indeed 
 they did get so much power as to be a danger to the 
 constitution. The most striking instance of this is 
 the appointment of the irpo^ovKot in B.C. 413, with 
 the special duty of advising the state as regards its 
 whole policy; the circumstances made it desirable 
 to have, what hitherto had been wanting, a council 
 which had wisdom. The Thirty again were originally 
 appointed as a small and exceptional commission 
 in order to revise the laws. 
 
 In cases such as these the appointment of an 
 exceptional commission changed the whole working 
 of the constitution. Generally it was otherwise ; 
 these exceptional offices were simply a means of 
 making the constitution rather more elastic. 
 A seat in In this way it was that the council was able to 
 
 TilwaTof ^^ its work, although it was filled by the lot, and 
 
 1 For these cf. infra, p. 103 etc. A good instance of the 
 opening they gave to a determined person is contained in 
 Demosthenes' speech against Androtion, 47. We are told how 
 Androtion got himself appointed as an extraordinary officer to 
 do work generally done by KXripwral apxai. Cf. also 69, where we 
 find that he was appointed on a special commission to look after 
 the treasures of the Parthenon. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 75 
 
 although it had not the advantage of the regular little use 
 presence among its members of the leading men in l^tatesman. 
 the city. Indeed it will be evident that, after all, 
 a seat in the council would be not only not indis- 
 pensable to a statesman, but scarcely even desirable. 
 A member of the council would indeed have great 
 power ; but it would be power like that exercised by 
 a vestryman. He would be able to influence for 
 good or bad the lives of many individuals ; he could 
 help a friend, or revenge himself on an enemy ; he 
 could even use his position to procure advantages 
 for other cities, or to oppress them unjustly. He 
 could perpetrate innumerable jobs. Power of this 
 kind is always pleasant and desirable, and it was 
 the advantage of the democratic constitution that 
 it gave a share in it to all the citizens ; but after all 
 it was not essential to a great career; a politician 
 who had made his name and won his reputation 
 could scarcely add to his influence by a seat in 
 the council. And the work must have been very 
 laborious. The position must have been chiefly 
 grateful to small people ; to men who enjoyed the 
 importance, the bustle, the dignity which attended 
 the Prytanies. To men of wide ambition and high 
 position it must have been burdensome. 
 
 The peculiar kind of duties performed by the Dangerous 
 council will also give a very good reason for tl^Q^iumsted 
 particular method of appointment. The council had ^^ *''^ 
 
 council.. 
 
 a very wide power over the lives and fortunes of the 
 citizens ; it could interfere in their private life, it 
 could act at times almost like an inquisition, it ha.d 
 every opportunity for exercising the greatest op- 
 
7^ THE COUNCIL. 
 
 pression over individuals. There is no doubt that at 
 times it did act oppressively and unjustly. It could 
 easily have become most dangerous to the public 
 liberty; constituted as it was, the council was still in 
 times of panic and distress the instrument by which 
 the power of the state became the instrument of 
 oppression. The accounts we have of the events 
 which followed the mutilation of the Hermes show 
 how real this danger was. It becomes still plainer 
 when we are told that in times of depression it was 
 the duty of the council to restore the finances by 
 discovering people who were in debt to the state \ 
 What a possibility of wrong does this open ! 
 
 That the injustice seldom reached any serious 
 degree is probably due to the method of appoint- 
 ment ; so long as the office was held for a year, so 
 long as responsibility was strictly enforced, and so 
 long as all classes were fairly represented in it, the 
 results would not be very serious. Had the council 
 been appointed otherwise than by lot the danger 
 would have been much greater. As it was, the 
 council was a fjuiKpoirdXi^ ; it represented no class ; 
 therefore systematic oppression of one class by an- 
 other, which is the most dangerous form of injustice, 
 could not be very serious I Also the lot prevented 
 organised oppression ; so long as no efforts could 
 
 1 Demosthenes, Androtion, 607, 47 etc. Ar. Equites, 474, 
 774—5. Ach. 378, 
 
 e^(reXAci/<ras yap fx els to povXevri^piov 
 5i^j8aX\e Kal \l/€v5i] KareyXibrrL^i /xov. 
 
 2 There was of course always a tendency to act harshly towards 
 rich people ; but this was not stronger in the council than in the 
 
THE COUNCIL. 77 
 
 ensure election, the members would not have the 
 community of feeling necessary to successful wrong- 
 doing. Lastly, it was of great importance that the 
 members of the council were in no way members of 
 an official class ; a private man was not hampered in 
 his relation to them by his own ignorance of public 
 procedure, or their acquaintance with official forms ; 
 this knowledge was spread over the whole city, 
 because every one was at some time an official, and 
 so the worst kind of legal cruelty, which results 
 when the forms of law are used to give to oppression 
 the appearance of justice, was prevented. Injustice 
 there was of course ; but it was usually unorganised; 
 a few criminals were left unexecuted, a few innocent 
 men were punished, a few paid too heavy taxes, a 
 few made a little money out of their public duties ; 
 but systematic oppression and organised fraud were 
 impossible. 
 
 Assembly. All I wish to show is that the council had no opinion 
 or motive of its own, different from that of the citizens as a body, 
 which would make it an instrument of official oppression. 
 
ADDITIONAL NOTE TO CHAPTER II. 
 
 On the date of the Introduction of the Lot^, 
 
 It is remarkable that we have no information in any- 
 classical author as to the date and occasion of the 
 introduction of the lot. The matter has in consequence 
 become the subject of a controversy ^. Herodotus in his 
 account of the battle of Marathon refers to Callimachus, 
 who was Polemarch, as "selected by lot" to that office^; 
 and Plutarch quotes a statement of Demetrius of 
 Phaleron that Aristeides when he was archon, just 
 after the Persian wars, was " selected by lot from the 
 families who had the greatest possessions*." It used 
 therefore to be generally held that the use of the lot 
 was older than the Persian wars. And the general 
 opinion of the ancients that the lot was a democratic 
 institution seemed to imply that it was introduced 
 by someone who wished to develope the democracy. 
 Thus, as the reforms of Cleisthenes are recognised 
 as the most important epoch in the growth of the 
 democracy, it was the obvious conclusion to attribute 
 the introduction of the lot to him, or at least to regard 
 it as a result of the movement which he began. 
 
 1 [In the Appendix will be found a discussion of the additional 
 information supplied by the discovery of the UoXireia tQv 'Mrjva'nav 
 of Aristotle.] 
 
 2 A full history of the controversy is given by Lugebil m the 
 Jahrbuch fiir Classische Philologie, Suppl. Bd. v. 
 
 3 Her. vi. 109. 
 
 ■* Plut. Arist. V. Kvdfjup Xaxwi' iK tGjv yevCov to. fxiyiffra TifXT^fMara 
 
 K€KTr]fl4v(i}V. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 79 
 
 Grote and other historians have, however, pointed Grote's 
 out that this theory is not without difficulties . For it ^*^^* 
 is argued first, that if the archons were appointed by lot 
 at a tinie when only the richer citizens were eligible, the 
 people would lose the power even of electing their rulers ; 
 and thus the introduction of the lot, far from being 
 a democratic measure, would be one of the strongest 
 defences of the aristocracy \ We must therefore believe 
 that the lot was not applied to the appointment of the 
 archons till the office had been thrown open to all by 
 Aristeides. Further, it is argued in support of this 
 view that the history of the Persian wars is not con- 
 sistent with the belief that the chief magistrates were 
 appointed by lot. For the two leading men in the 
 state, Themistocles and Aristeides, were both archons 
 just at the time of a great crisis; this, it is urged, 
 cannot have been the result of chance ; they must have 
 been elected ^ The statement of Herodotus about 
 Callimachus must be then simply a mistake ; he has 
 applied to a previous generation a custom which pre- 
 vailed when he was writing. As to Aristeides the 
 tradition as a matter of fact was doubtful even in 
 ancient times. For Plutarch quotes also a passage from 
 Idomeneus to the effect that Aristeides was not chosen 
 by lot, but by popular election^. The lot then was 
 introduced sometime after the year 477, and it was 
 
 Mt is a parody of this argument when Miiller-Striibing 
 maintains that the lot was therefore introduced as a means of 
 tempering the democracy. 
 
 2 Lugebil adds Xanthippus, the father of Pericles and Galli- 
 machos. The latter we are asked to believe was elected because 
 of his fortunate name. I show below that the " coincidence " 
 does not really exist. 
 
 ^ Plut. Arist. i. Kal ij.t)v ap^at ye tov ^ ApiffTeldrjv 6 ^IBofieveiis od 
 Kvafievrbv, dXX' eXo/n^vuv ^Adrjvaicou (prjalu. 
 
80 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 one of the steps by which the democratic party did 
 away with the power of the archonship and the 
 Areopagus, and were able to develope the influence 
 of the popular jury courts. 
 Difficulties In a matter of this kind it seems however as though 
 we ought not to refuse to accept the distinct assertion 
 of our two best authorities without very strong reasons. 
 The evidence of Idomeneus is of no weight in the matter, 
 because Plutarch certainly understood him to mean 
 that a special exception was made in favour of Aris- 
 teides ; the evidence of the popular enthusiasm was that 
 the ordinary rule of election by lot was set aside in his 
 case. Of the other considerations on which Grote and 
 those who follow him rely, the first will, I think, lose 
 its force, if we remember that, when the Greek authors 
 speak of the lot as democratic, they are always referring 
 to the system as it existed at Athens after about 450 B.C. 
 They were acquainted with the lot as an essential part 
 of the complete democratic constitution, and this is 
 what is in their minds. The use of the lot was so much 
 more conspicuous at Athens than elsewhere, that, when 
 men talked of the lot, they meant the lot as used at 
 Athens. But they never assert that the lot could not 
 exist in some form in a state which is not democratic ; 
 in fact we are especially told that it was found in some 
 aristocracies \ What made the lot at Athens demo- 
 cratic was that all citizens were eligible, and that the 
 number of offices to be filled was very large. It is 
 
 1 Cf. Schomann, Alt. p. 154. " In manchen Staaten aber und 
 zwar wie ausdriicklich bezeugt wird (Anax. Khetor. ad Alex. c. 2, p. 
 14), auch in Oligarchien wurde statt der Wahl das Loos angewandt. 
 Ja, es ist nicht unwahrscheinlich, dass gerade in den altereu 
 Zeiten diese Besetzungsart am meisten beliebt gewesen sei, und 
 zwar eben in den Oligarchien. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 81 
 
 absurd to discuss a political institution apart from its 
 surroundings as if it were an abstract expression. Nor 
 is there anything in the fact that what 1 may call the 
 extended use of the lot was one of the foundations of 
 the democracy, to prevent us believing that the lot itself 
 existed at an earlier period in the old aristocracy. (2) 
 And the other argument is equally unconvincing, for the 
 simple reason that we know so little about the matter. 
 Of course if the archon had been really at that time 
 chosen by lot from all the pentecosioimedimnoi and not 
 from a few candidates, it would have been remarkable 
 that Themistocles was successful; but we have no 
 reason to suppose that this was the case \ 
 
 There is then every reason to believe that the lot Was the 
 was part of the formalities by which the archons were ^j^^^^ qi^^_ 
 chosen before the Persian wars. Have we any reason sthenes ? 
 for fixing the introduction of it as late as the time of 
 Cleisthenes *? The chief reason for doing so is the recog- 
 nition of the fact that the lot was democratic ; but if 
 we remember that what was democratic was not the 
 selection of nine men among the aristocracy to hold the 
 archonships, but the selection of hundreds — almost thou- 
 sands of men from all classes, to fill the council and also 
 other offices, this argument will fail to convince us that 
 the lot could not have been used before. And there are 
 reasons of some strength for believing that it was used. 
 It was the merit of Fustel de Coulanges^ to be the first 
 to point out that, as the lot was religious in its origin, 
 it must have been in some form or other a custom of 
 very great antiquity. Also he appealed to some rather 
 
 1 Cf. infra, pp. 83—4. 
 
 2 La Cit6 antique, p. 213. Nouvelle Eevue Historique de Droit, 
 ii. 1878. Cf. for a criticism of this view Revue de Philologie, 1880, 
 pp. 52 etc. 
 
 H. 6 
 
82 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 vague language of Plutarch^ and Pausanias^ as proof 
 that the Greeks knew that the archons had from the 
 earliest times been chosen by lot. His view has not 
 met with favour; and it is in our present state of 
 knowledge difficult to see how it can be reconciled with 
 the statements of the fact that Solon gave to the people 
 the power of choosing their rulers ^. Apart from this it 
 seems as though his explanation were that which gives 
 the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty. We 
 know that in Greece where there was hereditary king- 
 ship, as at Sparta, the order of succession was not 
 accurately predetermined ; disputed successions often oc- 
 curred, and to settle them the advice of the gods was 
 generally taken ^. We are certainly justified in assuming 
 that if ever there were hereditary rulers at Athens, 
 similar disputes took place, and that both sides appealed 
 to oracles, omens, or the lot for a decision. The rulers 
 were afterwards taken from a limited number of fami- 
 lies instead of from one, they became a college of nine, 
 and they held office for a limited period; but we can- 
 not imagine that at first the procedure at elections 
 was clearly determined. Disputed elections would often 
 occur, and the lot would be naturally appealed to as one 
 among other ways by which the dispute could be settled^. 
 Moreover the analogy of other states makes it prob- 
 able that the archons had themselves the right if not of 
 appointing, at least of nominating their successors; and, 
 
 1 Plut. Pericles, 9. 
 
 * Pausanias, iv. 5; cf. also Dem. in Lept. 90. 
 
 * Ar. polit. ii. 12, 1273^ 4. 
 
 ■* This is worked out by Lugebil, 1. c. 
 
 ^ I have stated the argument in my own words; it differs 
 to some extent from the way in which Fustel de Coulauges 
 expresses it. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 83 
 
 in later times, as we know, it was the Thesmothetae 
 who drew the lots among the candidates. And though 
 we have no express information it is easy to see how some 
 combination of nomination and the lot could grow up, 
 if the magistrates who had the right of nomination were 
 also the men who in case of a dispute would have to 
 refer the matter to the gods ; whether it was that the 
 lot was drawn among the candidates nominated by the 
 different Thesmothetae, or whether the Thesmothetae 
 decided whom they should nominate by drawing lots 
 among possible candidates. For, however it was ar- 
 ranged, the candidates must have been limited in 
 number. 
 
 Let us take any period, say in the 7th century, 
 when there were undoubtedly nine annual archons, who 
 were chosen from among the Eupatrids alone. I do not 
 know that we have any means of telling how large this 
 class was, but all our records point to the fact that they 
 were only a small portion of the population existing at 
 that time. But if it be remembered that the number of 
 male citizens of full age in Athens at the time of 
 Pericles was according to one account only 14,000, and 
 certainly not more than 30,000, I think I may safely 
 assume that in early times the number of male Eupa- 
 trids above the age of 17 was considerably less than 1000, 
 not probably more than 200 or 300. But if this was 
 the case, and if from these the nine archons had every 
 year to be elected, it will result that, unless re-election 
 was common, nearly every Eupatrid would in his turn 
 be archon. The members of great families would each 
 one after another as he came of full age hold office for 
 a year. To each in rotation would come his year for the 
 archonship ; and in a small body such as I am imagin- 
 ing the rules which determined at what age, or under 
 
 6—2 
 
84 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 what circumstances it was proper for each to have his 
 archonship would be carefully handed down by tradition, 
 and strictly enforced by the spirit of the order. Those 
 who were in touch with the feeling of the leading men 
 would know quite well who was marked out each year as 
 the next person on the roll. Therefore we may imagine 
 that each year the number of candidates would be very 
 little, if at all greater than the number of offices to be 
 filled; and a candidate who was passed over one year 
 would only have to wait till the next, when he would be 
 able to come forward with a double claim to be elected. 
 And we can well understand how the decision might in 
 such cases be best left to the lot ; the question to be 
 decided was not one of ability nor of party, but simply 
 of precedence) of two candidates the doubt was not 
 which ought to be archon and which not, but which 
 ought to be archon this year and which next year, and, 
 perhaps, which of the different archonships should be 
 held by each candidate. Thus it would be that a custom 
 which had originated as a rude way of settling the 
 claims of rival competitors for kingly power, would 
 continue as a convenient method of settling the order 
 in which the nobles should hold the one great office in 
 the state. When the qualification for election was 
 made one of property and not of birth, the custom 
 would still be useful, for so long as property was 
 measured in land there would be few of the first class 
 who were not of Eupatrid family, while the practical 
 supremacy of the nobles would doubtless render it 
 almost impossible for such an interloper to be a 
 candidate. 
 
 This is no more than an hypothesis ; I cannot offer 
 any proof of it ; but it is interesting to make an hypo- 
 thesis, which at least does not oblige us to contradict 
 
THE COUNCIL. 85 
 
 our best authorities. If we adopt it, the difficulties 
 about Themistocles and Aristeides are not so great as 
 they appear. Both were members of Eupatrid families ; 
 both would, as a matter of course, succeed in proper 
 course to the archonship ; and that Themistocles was 
 archon in one year between the battles of Marathon 
 and Salamis is no great coincidence; had he been 
 archon in 492, or 491, or in any year to 477, it would 
 have been possible to comment upon the remarkable fact 
 that the most able man in the state was chosen just 
 in this year — with no less plausibility than we can 
 now. In whatever year Themistocles had been archon 
 he would doubtless have made his tenure of office re- 
 markable. At any rate, knowing as little as we do of 
 the institutions we are discussing, it hardly seems as 
 though we were justified in using an a priori argument 
 to put aside the express statement of Herodotus. 
 
 The conclusion I come to then is, that in some 
 form or other the lot had always been used in the 
 selection of the archons, though the method of applica- 
 tion doubtless varied. When Aristeides had thrown 
 open the archonship to all citizens and either he, 
 Cleisthenes, or Pericles, had done away with the re- 
 strictions upon nominations, the result was that, though 
 the archons were still Kva/xevrot, the process had never- 
 theless completely changed its character. The institu- 
 tion on which the power of the nobles depended was 
 broken down. 
 
 It is always more probable that a use like the lot 
 was the growth or relic of some old custom than that it 
 was suddenly introduced. But this applies only to the 
 archonship. The historical difference between it and 
 the other offices is enormous. It was old. They were 
 new. Men were chosen to be archons by lot, because 
 
86 THE COUNCIL. 
 
 that had always been the custom ; for the council \ for 
 the Apodectai, for the Logistai, for all the other offices, 
 the lot must have been deliberately introduced for poli- 
 tical purposes. Whether this was done when these offices 
 were themselves created we do not know; we do not 
 even know when they were created; though it cannot well 
 have been before Cleisthenes, nor after 450 b.c.^ It is 
 in its application to all these offices that the essentially 
 democratic nature of the lot consists, much more even 
 than in its later use for the archonship. It is a 
 neglect of this truth which has made Eustel de Cou- 
 langes overestimate the continued importance of the 
 religious associations ^ ; and a similar omission to recog- 
 nise the essential differences between the two has made 
 Grote and others, who have rightly estimated the politi- 
 cal use in later times, ignore the truth that it could 
 have had a quite different value when applied only to 
 the archonship. The discussion on the whole matter 
 is instructive because it shows how easy it is to go 
 wrong by "abstraction," and to look on a custom like 
 "election by lot" as though it had an absolute value, 
 
 1 Fustel de Coulanges suggests that the Prytanies were elected 
 by lot because their duties were originally religious (p. 390). This 
 is very improbable. 
 
 2 The earliest mention of the lot for the council is in an 
 inscription of about 450, which, though it applies to Erythrae, 
 is evidence for the use of the lot at Athens then. 
 
 It is still possible that the discovery of some early inscription 
 will give us certain knowledge on the matter. 
 
 2 After showing rightly enough that the lot was originally 
 religious and must have existed before the democracy, he goes 
 on to say that it never was democratic. "II n'etait pas d'ailleurs 
 un proc6de ddmocratique," 1. c, n. 1. Even if, as he and Curtius 
 suggest, the institution of the generals by Cleisthenes was a 
 democratic measure, that does not in the least affect the point that 
 the lot as afterwards used was still more democratic. 
 
THE COUNCIL. 87 
 
 which would be the same at all times and in all circum- 
 stances \ 
 
 1 It does not seem possible to discover with any certainty when 
 election by lot was abandoned. 
 
 Bergk, N. Ehein. Museum, xix. 605, refers to an inscription 
 published in the Ephemeris Archseologeia, 3793, which contains a 
 Ust of archons. This is of the time of Mithradates, and in it one 
 man M?^5etos is mentioned as holding the office three years run- 
 ning. This shows that by this time the constitution had been 
 modified, and the archonship was now filled by election from 
 among the richer citizens. The change is generally supposed 
 to have taken place in 146. (Cf. Hertzfeld ' Griechenland unter 
 den Eomern,' 310. C. I. A. iii. 87.) For a minor office we find it 
 existing after this. (Cf. C. I. A. iii. 81. Wachsmuth, die Stadt 
 Athen, i. 651.) 
 
 I should however expect to find that the alteration was made 
 before this. Whatever the forms may have been, it is impossible 
 that the reality of the democratic constitution can have been 
 maintained so long as this. It is disappointing that nothing 
 is said about the matter in the accounts of the change of 
 constitution in 322 B.C. Cf. Droysen, Hellenismus, ii. 80 — 81 ; 
 Diod. xviii. 65. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 We must now turn from the council to a con- 
 sideration of the other offices to which men were 
 appointed by lot; and in regard to these also, if we 
 would understand the lot, we must consider it in 
 connection with the other parts of the constitution 
 to which it belonged. The lot might be used in 
 other states with other results : at Athens, of which 
 we alone have knowledge, it was only one (though 
 an essential) part of the democratic system. It 
 helped to secure perfect equality among all citizens, 
 a regular rotation in office, and the undisputed 
 authority of the assembly. 
 Rotation The system is really the extension of an oli- 
 
 garchic principle to the whole body of citizens. In 
 a strictly oligarchic state the council is supreme, not 
 the assembly; but the council is chosen only from 
 the members of certain families, and all magisterial 
 appointments and all administrative posts of in- 
 fluence are reserved for members of the oligarchic 
 clique. But in such a state, though a seat in the 
 council is for life, the tenure of all other offices is 
 short, and every member of the ruling order has a 
 right to succeed to office in his turn. By this means 
 
 in Office. 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 89 
 
 the supremacy of the council over all offices is se- 
 cured as well as equality among those who are 
 eligible. The lot might have been used to secure 
 this end, just as it was used at Athens ; probably 
 indeed it was in operation in some states. However 
 this may be, the principle of rotation in office was not 
 peculiar to Athens, nor was it essentially democratic. 
 Aristotle especially recommends it for his TroXcTela, 
 and he makes it an objection to the state proposed 
 in the Republic of Plato that there the same men 
 will always hold office. He maintains repeatedly that 
 within the select circle of the governing class in any 
 state it is undesirable to make distinctions, and that 
 all "peers" ought to have a share in office \ What 
 was done at Athens was to apply the principle which 
 is found in every oligarchy to a much larger class. 
 There were to be no half- citizens ; a man if he 
 was a citizen at all was to have his share in the 
 pleasures and responsibilities of magisterial autho- 
 rity. Here, as in an oligarchy, the Senate consisted 
 of past or future magistrates : but the past and 
 future magistrates included all the citizens. The 
 garland of office came to an Athenian by right of 
 birth, just as did the fasces to a Metellus, or his 
 uniform to a Hohenzollern^ 
 
 1 Ar. polit. ii. 2, 1261. Aristotle maintains that, where it is 
 impossible for the best men always to remain in office, whether 
 office be good or bad, it is right that all should take part in it. 
 
 Cf . ii. 5, 1264^. And again viii. 8, 1308* he specially recommends 
 that in a iroKiTela the offices should all be made of short duration, 
 so that all qualified persons may be admitted. 
 
 Cf. also vii. 2, 1317^ 
 
 2 At Borne the principle was practically maintained that all 
 
90 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 Character- There are however important differences between 
 ^Oligarchy *^® working of the principle of rotation in an Oli- 
 «J*d garchy and a Democracy, since in an oligarchy the 
 
 <yracy, officers are few in number, and their duties are in 
 consequence complicated. Accumulation of offices is 
 common; and re-election is practised, if the offices 
 are not held for some considerable period. This is 
 necessary, since the men from whom officials are 
 chosen are few in number. Further, though public 
 responsibility is recognised, and an account can be 
 demanded of the conduct of each official, yet this is 
 generally of but little avail. Account is to be ren- 
 dered to the same body from whom the magistrates 
 are chosen ; the individual is protected by the order 
 to which he belongs, because the interests of all are 
 identical. Each member of the order feels an attack 
 on one of his fellows as a possible curtailment of his 
 own privileges, and the supremacy of the order is 
 endangered when the right of popular criticism is 
 allowed. 
 
 At Athens the offices were numerous ; all offices 
 were collegiate, and the colleagues were seldom less 
 than ten in number; re-election was almost un- 
 known^; accumulation of office rare; office was 
 
 members of the senatorial families should succeed in turn to the 
 great offices. Had Rome been governed by a pure oligarchy this 
 could have been done by the lot ; as it was, this result was practi- 
 cally secured notwithstanding the nominal existence of popular 
 election. 
 , 1 As we have seen, re-election to the jSouXtJ was possible if not 
 
 common. For other offices however the matter was different. So 
 far as I am aware, there is no definite statement on the matter in 
 any contemporary authority : but 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 91 
 
 almost without exception annual \ By this means 
 office was opened to the greatest possible number of 
 men : and as a result the work of the office could be 
 greatly simplified, and the duties strictly defined by 
 law. As a result of this, one of the characteristics 
 of the Democracy was a careful organisation and a 
 consequent high standard of administrative efficiency, 
 and this was accompanied by a greater freedom from 
 fraud or dishonesty than was possible in an oli- 
 
 (A) It is impossible to find a single case occurring of re- 
 election to any office which was filled by the lot. We know the 
 names of a large number of officials, especially ra/xlai, eWrjuoTa/jdai 
 and ivLfjieXrjTal, and among them we never find one man twice 
 holding the same office. 
 
 (B) In one of the irpooifxia dr}fjt,7]yopiKd, printed in Demosthenes' 
 works, we find the statement iravTCLTraa-i tov avrbv rpoTrov, c5 dvdpes 
 'Adrjvatoi ovirep roi/s lepets, ovtoj KaOiaraTe /cat Toi/s dpxovras. deivo- 
 raroi yap ia-r d^eX^adat pikv Scr' vpuu virapx^i-, Kal yofiovs irepl to^tuv 
 deipaif dv TLS dcTTvvo/xi^arj Sis 'q rd roLaOra, crTpaTrjyeLu 8' del toi)s 
 avToiis edv. Also in one of the documents inserted in the speeches 
 of Demosthenes we find a similar statement: —ou5^ 5ts t7]v avrijv 
 dpxw T^" avrbv &v5pa {KaTaffTrja-o}), — a clause in the oath of the 
 Heliasts. Dem. in Timocraten, 149. 
 
 These passages though of late origin were probably written by 
 men who could easily find out the truth on this point, and, as 
 they are supported by evidence from our lists, we are justified by 
 them in stating that re-election was absolutely forbidden. 
 
 Aristotle polit. vii. 2, 1317**, tells us that in a democracy re- 
 election will not be allowed : t6 jxt] 81s rdv avrbv dpx^tv firjSe/jiLav 
 T7 dXiyaKis rj dXiyas ^'^w roiv Kard irdXefiov. 
 
 1 Aristotle specially recommends that office be not held for any 
 long period : — 
 
 polit. vii. 2, 1317^ to dXtyoxpoviovs rds dpxds rj irdaas rj 6aas 
 iv8^€Taiy and viii. 8, 1308* ov ydp ofjLolojs pq,8iov KaKovpyijcrai, dXLyov 
 XP^vov dpxovras /cat iroXiJv. 
 
 Eevolutions, he adds, come from long tenure of office. 
 
92 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 garchy^; and the publicity which was secured to all 
 public action enabled the state to enforce in the 
 most stringent manner an enquiry into the whole 
 conduct of its magistrates : each official had to 
 submit to a general criticism of his conduct, and in 
 .particular to a detailed examination of all his ex- 
 penditure. 
 
 In some states a magistrate has power direct 
 and underived; in others he gains influence as the 
 member of a ruling class whose interest it is to 
 protect and support each individual. In Athens the 
 magistrate was unprotected; he was surrounded by 
 no veil of mystery ; he was simply the man chosen 
 from the people to do certain things. Whilst his 
 commission lasted he was backed by all the authority 
 which he derived from the people ; the moment it 
 was over he became again an ordinary citizen, with 
 nothing to protect him but his integrity or ability. 
 The Athenians are the only people where the magis- 
 trates always remained the servants of the state. 
 Con- It will I think be evident how natural and 
 
 of the Lot. convenient an arrangement the lot was, as a means 
 of attaining these ends. Let us try to imagine 
 the Athenian democracy without the lot. Here is 
 a state of between 20,000 and 30,000 citizens ; there 
 are hundreds of offices to be filled every year. These 
 offices are all annual; no two may be held at the 
 same time, and to most of them re-election is for- 
 bidden. If we remember too that the richer citizens 
 were constantly occupied with onerous public services, 
 and that the poorer were constantly required to serve 
 
 ^ On the morality of public officials at Athens of. infra, p. 174. 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 93 
 
 in the army, we shall find that the scope for choice 
 among those willing to serve cannot have been very 
 large. If the system was to be kept up, the services 
 of every one would be wanted ; it would have been 
 absurd and futile to try and pick out men for their 
 ability or character. For the question which had 
 always to be decided was not "Shall this man be 
 a magistrate, or not?" but "Shall he be a magistrate 
 this year, or next," or " Shall he have this office, or 
 some other ? " and as this was a matter of extremely 
 little importance, it showed good practical common 
 sense on the part of the Athenians that they an- 
 swered it in the easiest and most direct manner by 
 casting lots. 
 
 There is one important difference between the 
 council and the other offices. In the council men of Different 
 all ranks and classes sat together ; in the other magis- 
 offices a certain distinction of rank was maintained. *^^*^«- 
 Some offices, as the archonship, entailed a con- 
 siderable expenditure, and moreover the preliminary 
 examination was very strict; we may therefore 
 reasonably believe that the candidates for it were 
 drawn almost entirely from the well-to-do old- 
 established families. For some offices, as that of 
 treasurer to the goddess and Hellenotamias, no one 
 could be chosen except members of the first class ; 
 the duties being of such a kind that they could not 
 be safely entrusted to anyone who had not a con- 
 siderable property, which would be a pledge to the 
 city for his honesty \ The duties to be performed by 
 other officials were both disagreeable and laborious ; 
 [1 See Appendix. This law it appears was not really observed.] 
 
94 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 it is probable that they were paid for undertaking 
 them, and we may therefore reasonably suppose that 
 men of birth and position would willingly give up 
 these to others who were glad to get the money and 
 did not find the work repulsive. The eleven, the 
 agoranomoi, the astunomoi, may probably be counted 
 among these inferior offices. Of course in a perfect 
 democracy there would have been no distinctions of 
 this kind ; but the Athenians did not allow respect 
 for a word or an idea to lead them beyond what was 
 practicable and prudent. 
 
 The use of the lot is then explained as being the 
 simplest method of attaining the desired end, that 
 all citizens should take their turn in office. The 
 people deliberately did not exercise the right of 
 selection. To do so would have been to interfere 
 with the principle of rotation. 
 Was office It might be objected that the complete estab- 
 ^sorvT lishment of this principle would require that men 
 should be compelled to serve whether they applied 
 or not. Whether this was the case, or not, we cannot 
 tell : our information as to the proceedings is unfor- 
 tunately so small that we do not know what the 
 method of nomination was. However, though we 
 have no proof of the matter, it would, I imagine, 
 hardly be too rash to assert that the state did 
 reserve to itself the right of compelling men to hold 
 office, and that the retiring magistrates or others 
 who directed the election could, if necessary, nomi- 
 nate without their consent the candidates among 
 whom the lots should be drawn. If this was not 
 commonly done, it was because there was no re- 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 95 
 
 luctance to take office, and no deficiency in the 
 number of voluntary candidates. We may still 
 discover that for some of the more arduous and less 
 profitable offices it was the regular procedure. In 
 the absence of all information, it seems just as 
 probable that the inspectors of the dockyards were 
 selected by the lot from among a certain number 
 of men nominated according to some recognised rule 
 by the iTrt/jieXrjTal t7J<; c^uXt;?, as from candidates 
 who were nominated at their own request. 
 
 We do, in fact, once find the office of treasurer to 
 the goddess spoken of as a XyrovpyLa^ ; and the 
 principle of compulsory service was so clearly recog- 
 nised that there would be no scruples about applying 
 it if necessary. Office among the Athenians was a 
 position of such danger that we may be surprised 
 that we do not hear more directly of compulsion. If 
 it was found necessary, it would however be only for 
 the higher offices, which required a large outlay of 
 money and were not paid, and in which also any 
 real or fancied neglect of duty was most severely 
 punished ^ We have evidence on the other hand 
 that many of the offices were much coveted ; chiefly, 
 apparently, because of the gain they brought. 
 • It is necessary, if we would understand the 
 
 ^ Andocides, de mysteriis, 132, dXXd rovvavrlov XrjTovpyeiv ovtol 
 irpov^dWoPTO, trpcoTop fxkv yv/xvacriapxov 'li(pat(TTeloLS, ^ireira dpxi-- 
 deupbu els 'ladphv kuI 'OXuyUTrtd^e, elra 5^ rafxiav iv 7r6Xet roou lepQiv 
 XP'r}P'<^Ti>}v. 
 
 2 Antiphon, de morte Herodis, 69, tells a story of how one year 
 all the Hellenotamiai but one were put to death on a charge of 
 peculation ; and how afterwards it was discovered that they were 
 innocent. 
 
96 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 Athenian system, to get rid entirely of the natural 
 prejudice we feel against the lot. This prejudice is 
 so strong that we are always inclined to think the 
 Athenians must have shared our distrust of it ; and 
 attempts have often been made to show that this 
 was the case. Historians have appealed to two facts 
 to prove this: — to the institution of the SoKL/mao-ia, 
 and to the fact that a large number of officials were 
 appointed by popular election, and not by the lot. 
 I think, however, that a short examination of these 
 two points will help to prove my position, (1) that the 
 Athenians felt no distrust of the lot, but regarded 
 it as the most natural and the simplest way of 
 appointment ; (2) that, in consequence, the general 
 rule was that all magistrates were appointed by the 
 lot: the only exceptions (in the first period of the 
 democracy) being those who had military or semi- 
 military duties, and those who held exceptional ap- 
 pointments which were outside the ordinary routine 
 administration of the state. 
 The Doki- The popular account of the SoKi/juaala is that it 
 was an institution invented to check the worst 
 results of the lot^ : men, we are told, felt so much 
 distrust of its working that they prepared a means 
 of interfering with its action. It was an opportunity 
 given to the people to prevent someone, who had been 
 legally appointed, from holding office, on no other 
 grounds than that they held him unfit to do so. This 
 
 - Busolt, Gr. Gesch. vol. ii. p. 469. Gegen die schlimmsten 
 Zufalligkeiten des Looses schiitzte man sich durch die Priifung 
 Oder Dokimasie. Gilbert, St. i. 208 — 10, takes the same view 
 though less decidedly. 
 
 masia. 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 97 
 
 view is founded on the statements of the orators : 
 and there is no doubt that, in the 4th century, the 
 hoKL^iaala was used as a means of preventing men 
 who were suspected of oligarchic sentiments from 
 holding an office which they had won by the lot or 
 otherwise*. It is, as I have elsewhere pointed out, 
 from the observation of this fact that a great deal of 
 the difficulty about the lot has arisen. If however 
 my view of the lot is correct, it will be necessary 
 to some extent to restate our account of this pheno- 
 menon. It was, I believe, an abuse which had 
 grown up at the end of the Peloponnesian war, and 
 was a direct result of the shock given to the whole 
 state by the two oligarchic revolutions. If we 
 look below the speeches of the orators to the 
 constitution of the court, it is obvious that the 
 BoKtfiaala was not introduced simply to rectify the 
 verdict of the lot : men chosen by popular elections 
 were just as much subject to it. It was not the 
 intention to allow the popular voice a veto on any 
 appointment by means of an accusation of "incivism." 
 The object of the Bofci/juacrLa was simply to keep out 
 of office men who were legally incapacitated. Men 
 who were not complete citizens by birth, who were 
 not of a certain age, who were in debt to the state 
 or who had incurred drcfiia by committing certain 
 offences, were by the laws excluded from office; 
 
 1 Cf. Lysias, Or. 26. 16 passim ; esp. 26, § 9, 6 ^ets rbv -rrepl 
 tQv boKLfxacn.Q3v vbfiov oiix rJKicTTa irepl rQ>v kv dXiyapxiq. dp^dvrup 'iveKO. 
 edrjKep. This cannot be true unless the boKLfxaala was a quite new 
 institution : but if it was we should expect some more special 
 reference to its introduction. 
 
98 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 and some offices could only be held by men pos- 
 sessed of a certain property. Now it was one of the 
 characteristics of the Athenian constitution that it 
 provided a definite regular way of doing everything 
 however unimportant: nothing was left uncertain. 
 Supposing anyone were chosen by lot or by popular 
 election whose qualification was doubtful, consider- 
 able inconvenience might arise if there were no 
 regular procedure for dealing with the matter. To 
 guard against this, the hoicL^aa-ia was introduced. 
 The proceedings were as a rule almost formal : they 
 consisted in putting to the newly elected magistrate 
 certain questions ; if they were satisfactorily answered 
 the matter was at an end: if it appeared that the 
 man did not possess some of the qualifications he 
 was excluded. The BoKc/jLao-la answered the same 
 sort of purpose as when a candidate for a scholarship 
 at a school or university is required to produce a 
 certificate of birth. It was the opportunity which 
 the official had of proving his legal qualifications : 
 an opportunity which there must be somehow in 
 every state ; and it is chiefly interesting as showing 
 the great care taken by the builders of the consti- 
 tution to procure efficiency by providing beforehand 
 a means of settling all points \' 
 
 1 The best account of the matter is given by Hermann, 
 Staatsalterthiimer, 149. Schoroann's account is also good: he 
 says, " the doKifiaaia had nothing to do with the knowledge and 
 abiHty requisite for the administration of the office, but only 
 with the question whether the birth of the man fulfilled the 
 conditions required, and whether his Ufe had been free from 
 crime. Those offices for which a special capacity was necessary 
 which could not be expected of every citizen were filled by popular 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 99 
 
 It was however possible that the candidate was 
 not satisfied with the justice or validity of the verdict 
 of the revising court ; this would especially be the 
 case when, as often happened, private or political 
 enemies had by their evidence procured his rejection. 
 In a case of this kind there would be a dispute either 
 of fact or law to be decided^: a dispute which might 
 turn on the status of the mother of the candidate, 
 or on the interpretation of some law disqualifying a 
 particular class of persons. This dispute would 
 have to be decided before a law-court, but the 
 question would still be not, "Is it wise to let this 
 man be elected ? " but, " Is this man legally dis- 
 qualified?" 
 
 The orators of course in these as in all other 
 cases tried to bias the minds of the jury, and where 
 it was convenient to do so did not shrink from boldly 
 stating that the hoKi^aarla ought to take the form 
 of an enquiry into the whole career of a citizen to 
 
 election, and it was assumed that the people would not choose 
 anyone of whose capacity it was not sufficiently convinced. On 
 the other hand the people willingly had confidence that everyone 
 who decided to become a candidate for any of the other offices 
 which were filled by lot, would have the requisite capacity, and 
 in fact was not so far wrong in this as may appear at first sight." 
 This is one of the cases where it seems to me that the new school 
 of historians have not improved on their predecessors. 
 
 1 So in Lysias, Or. 26, de Evandro. The real case is that 
 Evajider has committed certain acts which disqualify for office : 
 the defence is that he is defended by the amnesty (§ 16) : the 
 speaker tries to create a prejudice against Evander and to 
 make the case turn on what is best for the city ; and so far as 
 he can makes it seem a question of the personal character of 
 himself and his opponents. 
 
 7—2 
 
100 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 see if he were fit to bear office*; but this was just as 
 much an abuse as when in any ordinary civil suit 
 they introduced extraneous matter in order to in- 
 fluence the minds of the jury. No doubt they often 
 succeeded. Many men, probably, were excluded from 
 office on account of their oligarchic opinions, but this 
 was a development caused by peculiar circumstances. 
 Owing to the political struggles of the time a con- 
 siderable number of men had become anfioL and 
 disqualified for office : so far as the BoKifiaala 
 excluded them it was not (except in cases where it 
 was abused) an original expression of popular feeling, 
 it was only the method of putting into execution a 
 principle already established ^ We might find the 
 nearest English parallel to it in the laws respecting 
 the Roman Catholics. When they were disqualified 
 by their religion from being elected or appointed to 
 any post, the law was enforced by requiring every 
 person who was elected or appointed to take the 
 Sacrament. This was the hoKLfjuaala. By taking 
 the Sacrament a man declared that he was not a 
 Roman Catholic. At the same time it was open 
 to anyone to give information that the man was 
 really a secret Romanist, and thereby still get him 
 excluded. Now no one would say that the ex- 
 
 ^ e. g. Lysias, pro Mantitheo, 9, SoKd 54 ixol iv rats doKifiaa-iais 
 diKacov elvuL iravrbs tov ^iov \6yov diddvaL. 
 
 2 So in Lysias, Or. 26, § 10, the argument seems to be : — a man 
 who served as knight under the Thirty may not be a /SouXeur-^s, 
 much more must a man who has done what this man has done 
 be ineligible for the archonship: the speaker appeals to the law 
 and says any reasonable interpretation of it will exclude him. 
 
THE OFFiciAik f : ; > '' ' '. ■ '.} : \WV 
 
 istence of this and similar laws implied distrust of 
 popular elections, or of appointment by govern- 
 ment. But it is just what happened at Athens : 
 only at Athens no one was excluded because of 
 his opinions, only because he had committed certain 
 actions. 
 
 The inconveniences which may result from any 
 uncertainty as to the legal qualifications of a man 
 who has been appointed to a public office are so 
 great that no further explanation is required why 
 the Athenians should have taken care that the 
 validity of the appointment should be thoroughly 
 tested before the new officer entered upon his 
 duties. Such a test there must always be. The 
 only peculiarity of the Athenian system was that 
 the name of the procedure, and (to a great extent) 
 the procedure itself, was identical for all offices and 
 all appointments. We disguise the similarity under 
 difference of name ; we talk of the registration of 
 voters, the .confirmation of bishops, election petitions ; 
 but these are all only more cumbrous methods of 
 doing what the Athenians did simply and in the 
 same way for all offices by the SoKLfxaala. 
 
 The fact that the Athenian courts did not 
 always give an impartial verdict, and in fact did 
 not even profess to do so, was a result of the 
 whole constitution of the judicial system ; but 
 it need not affect our judgment of the initial 
 advantages of having some such procedure. At 
 any rate the Athenian dicasteria were not more 
 open in their disregard of the legal aspect of 
 a case than was the House of Commons in 
 
W9. 
 
 7IJE OFFICIALS. 
 
 Elected 
 Officials. 
 
 Military 
 posts. 
 
 the days when it used to hear election peti- 
 tions\ 
 
 If we turn now to the second point, the considera- 
 tion of those offices which were not filled by lot, we 
 shall not I think find any reason to suppose that the 
 Athenians looked on the lot with distrust, or re- 
 garded it as anything exceptional. 
 
 There are always certain things which can only 
 be done by men of special ability ; there must be 
 cases in which the dangers which arise from possible 
 incompetence are greater than any which come from 
 the possibility that the magistrate will gain undue 
 influence or misuse his power. This even the 
 Athenians recognised ; election by lot was with 
 them the rule, but they never attempted to make 
 it a rule without an exception. The exceptions 
 were however as few as possible. Of the regular 
 magistrates only those were elected who were 
 occupied with the actual command of men in war, 
 or in the half-military establishments connected 
 with the public education of the citizens. Much 
 has been said about the aTparijyol: it has been truly 
 
 1 A curious contrast to the simplicity of the Athenian constitu- 
 tion might be found in the difiiculty experienced in England of 
 getting an authoritative decision on the qualifications for voting 
 in any representative body. The uncertainty about the right of 
 women to sit in a county council could not have occurred there, 
 because the matter would at once have been brought before a 
 special court which had to decide all such cases: and it would 
 have been impossible that such a state of things should result 
 as has been seen in England, when someone continues to exercise 
 an oJBfice to which he has no claim because it is no one's duty 
 to take steps in order to deprive him of it. 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 103 
 
 pointed out that at one period their power was very 
 great, and the office to some extent an object of 
 ambition for those who wished to direct the politics 
 of the city; but the board of the arparTjyol were 
 never other than generals \ Their duties were 
 always, primarily, the management of naval and 
 military matters ; secondarily, they at times repre- 
 sented the state in its intercourse with other states 
 and had jurisdiction over foreigners residing in the 
 city. Political power they sometimes had: but it 
 was chiefly because they were men who had influence 
 as speakers and statesmen in the assembly. They 
 were men of ability, and their experience was 
 valuable : hence they were consulted by the govern- 
 ing assemblies. They were, as generals, responsible 
 for the safety of the state : hence any request which 
 came from them, or any warning which they might 
 give, was attended to at once. If they represented to 
 the TTpvTaveL'i that there was business of urgent 
 importance to be discussed, it was matter of tra- 
 dition if not of law that the assembly should be 
 summoned I They had the right of bringing all 
 matters before the council, and with the council 
 they were often chosen to represent the people in 
 its intercourse with foreign powers; like all Athe- 
 nian magistrates, even the lowest, they had extensive 
 judicial duties, and they had as a necessary result of 
 
 ^ This is shown clearly by the references to them in the 
 Memorabilia of Xenophon. Socrates always speaks of the power 
 of commanding an army as the first requisite of a general. Cf. 
 iii. 1, 6 ; iii. 4. 
 
 2 C. I. A. i. 40, ad finem. 
 
10^: ; ; •/ : , ' •/ ; ; ; •tbe piIjficials. 
 
 their military power a large authority in financial 
 matters. But it was their military duties which 
 were the foundation of their power; and it was 
 because of them that their appointment was never 
 made by the lot. I do not know anything so 
 remarkable as the fact that, notwithstanding the 
 exceptional position which they occupied, these 
 generals never did win a position independent of 
 the assembly. It is not the extent but the limit of 
 their authority which astonishes us. 
 
 If we add to the generals the subordinate military 
 officials, the tTTTra/o^o? and <f>v\ap'y^o<^ and ra^iap'^o^, 
 and certain other men who, like the (7a)(f>povLa-Tai or 
 iTri/xeXrjTal rdciv i<f>7]fi(ov, superintended the education 
 of the young men, we shall, with the doubtful ex- 
 ception of a few unimportant religious officials, find 
 no regular officials who were not appointed by lot\ 
 In all other cases where we are told that a man 
 Excep- was elected to an official position we find that the 
 OMces. office itself was an exceptional institution. I have 
 already to some extent explained the importance of 
 these offices, and shown how useful they were in 
 supplementing the more established procedure. The 
 
 1 There are many offices concerning which our information is 
 defective, e.g. the Tpi-qpoiroLoL and the eWrjvoTafdai. The eKXoyeis 
 mentioned in C. I. A. i. 38 (of. Harpocr. sub voc. -Qp^drjaav yb.p 
 iKXoyeis Trap' i^fup oh TrXeiara iddKci, xpT^/iara etvai) were men chosen 
 to collect arrears of tribute from the allies. They were exceptional 
 officers and their duties were partly military, as they had command 
 over one or more triremes. Cf. Boeckh, Staats. d. A. p. 190. 
 The same is true of the ra/crat, who were probably identical with 
 ol iirl TOLS iroXeis whose election (xeLporovla) is mentioned C. I. A. 
 i. 37. 
 
^ THE OFFICIALS. 105 
 
 most important of them are the numerous appoint- 
 ments for exceptional service as legate to a foreign 
 power, or as representative of the state at some re- 
 ligious festival. If an embassy had to be sent to treat 
 with a foreign king, if the help of Dionysius was 
 sought against Thebes or the help of Thebes against 
 Philip, or if it was desired to break up an alliance be- 
 tween Sparta and Persia, or to send a representative 
 to the Amphiktyonic council, for this purpose men 
 of ability and knowledge, leaders in the political 
 world, must be chosen; and so the lot could not 
 be used. Also those who were elected to these 
 offices were temporarily surrounded with a pomp 
 and importance which marked them out from their 
 fellow citizens. These appointments had a dignity 
 of their own, they were highly paid, they gave 
 opportunities for gaining exceptional experience 
 and knowledge, they gave to those who held them 
 peculiar advantages of a kind which democracy 
 sought to make common to all citizens. Hence 
 we find that such offices were looked on with 
 suspicion, and that their holders were the object of 
 envy. They were oligarchical in their nature ; not 
 because they were filled with oligarchs, but because 
 a state where such offices abounded would be oli- 
 garchic \ But oligarchic as they were, they were 
 not in the least party posts. Election to them was 
 not conducted on party lines. There were private 
 societies which would support those of their members 
 who were candidates ; but there was no organisation 
 to support candidates of particular opinions. If 
 ^ Cf. the first scene in the Acharnians, also ih. vv. 595 etc. 
 
106 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 an embassy was to be chosen, the people did not 
 take trouble to choose ambassadors committed to 
 one line of policy. They did not attempt to bind 
 themselves to a particular line by electing men 
 pledged to support it. They elected men who took 
 interest in, or had knowledge of the question; 
 but they elected men of the most opposite opinions \ 
 We see how in the case of offices to which elec- 
 tion was by vote the influence of the lot ex- 
 tended; the same strictness of account, the same 
 complete obedience to the Assembly, the same colle- 
 giateness, the same absence of party organisation is 
 found in the one as in the other: but it was only 
 because elected officials were the exception that elec- 
 tions were so quiet, so business-like, and elected 
 officials so obedient. 
 Commis- Another class of men who were certainly in most 
 
 public cases appointed by the people were the "Commis- 
 works. sioners of Public Works" (iTrco-Tarat twu Brjfioamv 
 epycov) including the special boards appointed to 
 superintend the building of fortifications and triremes ^ 
 These, however, do not really form an exception to 
 
 ^ E.g. Xen. Hell. vi. Ill in the embassy to Sparta we find men 
 of different parties, including those of the anti-Laconian party. 
 So too in the famous embassy to Philip the leaders of the opposing 
 parties both took part. 
 
 2 Aesch. in Ctesiphontem, 9. 31. Demosthenes was appointed 
 T€ixoTroi6s by his own tribe Pandion. There is a distinction 
 between KkqpwToL dpx*^ and eirtffTaTai tcSv dTjfioa-icov ipyiov : and 
 though Aeschines contends that these latter are apxa-i; he certainly 
 implies that they were never KXi^porraL (13 — 14, 28 — 30). C. I. A. 
 ii. 830 TeixoTTotol aipeOhre^. Cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, 
 vol. ii. p. 13, n. 1 ; ih. p. iv — v. 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 107 
 
 the rule, because, certainly in the greater number of 
 cases of which we have record, these Commissioners 
 are not members of a permanent bureau. The office 
 is created for a special and exceptional purpose, and 
 expires when the building or repairs with which it 
 is concerned is completed. There is one commission 
 for the building of the Propylsea*; one for the building 
 of the Erechtheum^; another for the restoration of a 
 temple which had been destroyed by fire'\ A board 
 of TetxoTrocol is appointed to superintend the re- 
 building of the walls in 395*; another, of which 
 Demosthenes is a member, in 338 ^ These appoint- 
 ments no more belong to the ordinary constant 
 system of the administration than do the posts of 
 ambassador; or the special commissions of enquiry 
 appointed at times of panic; or the crvvTjyopeh 
 appointed to represent the state in public prosecu- 
 tions. This is shown by other signs. The regular 
 Athenian boards have almost invariably 10 members; 
 the numbers of these commissions vary, we find 
 sometimes two^ sometimes three ^, at times five^, or 
 
 1 C. I. A. i. 314. 2 c. I. A. i. 322. 
 
 3 C. I, A. ii. 829. 
 
 * C. I. A. ii. 830—32. Cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, ii. 
 p. 5, and p. 13, n. 1. 
 
 ^ Aeschines, 1. c. We also find a commission of ten men to 
 investigate the gifts given to the temple of Aesculapius (C. I. A. ii. 
 836), one for the restoration of the temple of Zeus Soter (C. I. A. 
 ii. 834) and for the building of the Skeuotheke (C. I. A. ii. 1054), 
 and one to superintend the making of two statues eTnardrai racv 
 NUaiv (C. I. A. iv. 331« and C. I. A. i. 318.) 
 
 8 C. I. A. ii. 187. 7 c. I. A. i. 318, 322. 
 
 8 C. I. A. ii. 834 : C. I. A. iv. 331«. 
 
108 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 ten\ The regular appointments are, nearly invari- 
 ably, for a year ; in some cases at least, these commis- 
 sioners hold office for longer^; and it is probable that 
 the appointment was generally made to continue till 
 the work entrusted to them was finished ^ 
 
 It is certain therefore that many of these com- 
 missions must be classed among the exceptional 
 offices, and in consequence it is probable that their 
 members were allowed more power and fi:"eedom than 
 could have belonged to men appointed by lot, and 
 that the direct responsibility for the plan and 
 method of building rested with them ; also, that the 
 people entrusted to them the right of controlling the 
 architect. Thus they would not only propose in 
 the assembly the general plan of the building, but 
 would be empowered to use their own discretion in 
 the arrangement of details. 
 
 The actual charge of the work of course be- 
 longed to a professional architect ; who was ap- 
 pointed sometimes, if not always, by the people*. 
 The chief duties of the commissioners were to 
 examine the plan prepared by him, to see that it 
 would answer the purpose of the building required, 
 to draw up a formal document and sign it. They 
 also had to watch over the progress of the work, 
 and, especially, all payments were made by them 
 to the contractors and workmen. The sale of the 
 
 1 Aesch. 1. c. In C. I. A. ii. 1054 one only is mentioned as 
 signing the contract, but he possibly acts on behalf of his colleagues. 
 
 2 C. I. A. i. 301 (p. 160), 318. 
 
 3 This was not however always the case. C. I. A. i. 303 — 309. 
 
 4 C. I. A. ii. 187, V. 6. 
 
THE OFFICIALS. 109 
 
 contract seems to have belonged not to them but to 
 the Poletai. 
 
 The question, however, suggests itself whether, 
 besides these exceptional commissions appointed to 
 conduct large and important building operations, 
 there were not other and more permanent officials 
 entrusted with the care and preservation of the 
 fabric of the buildings and fortifications already made. 
 I am not aware of any record of such officials, and 
 it is more probable that, so far as this duty did not 
 belong to the province of the priests, treasurers and 
 generals, it was included in the general supervision 
 over all public matters which belonged to the council. 
 This seems to be borne out by the fragment of a 
 decree \ either of the council or assembly, which pro- 
 vides for building some additional wall on the Acro- 
 polis. In the portions preserved we find mention of 
 the Poletai, and of a man who is apparently the archi- 
 tect, but none of any commissioners; and the probable 
 explanation is that where only some small piece of 
 work was to be done the matter was left to the 
 discretion of the architect, and it was not held to be 
 necessary to have a special committee appointed to 
 control him. The payments could of course always 
 be made by one of the regular boards of officials, and 
 the contract as usual would be made by the Poletai. 
 The iiria-TaTaL were only appointed when a special 
 work of some magnitude was to be taken in hand^ 
 
 1 Bulletin de Corr. Hell. 1890, p. 177. It seems to belong to 
 the middle of the fifth century. 
 
 In another we find that the control over the architect is given 
 to the iepoTToiol. C. I. A. iv. 37*', 1. 10. ^ j-geg Appendix.] 
 
110 THE OFFICIALS. 
 
 With these the exceptions end. There were no 
 other duties which it did not seem to the Athenian 
 statesman that any of his fellow citizens could 
 perfectly well fulfil. For the two great depart- 
 ments of finance and justice, there were in the great 
 days of the Athenian Democracy no elected ofiicers. 
 What taxes were to be raised ; what money was to 
 be spent; that the demos in its sovereign power 
 decided. How much money was necessary for one 
 department; how much could be afforded for another; 
 that the council reported. But to raise money, and 
 spend it ; to collect taxes, and proceed against 
 defaulters; to sell confiscated property, and let public 
 land ; to pay the bills, and audit the accounts ; — for 
 all this there were none but KXijpcoTal dp'x^aL 
 
 Therefore we shall be justified in saying that 
 neither the institution of the hoKUfiacrla nor the ex- 
 istence of these exceptional offices shows any distrust 
 of the lot. This was the ordinary system of appoint- 
 ment, and was deliberately maintained as the wisest 
 means of preserving the democratic constitution. But 
 if we are prepared to recognise that election by lot 
 was the rule and not the exception, we have still 
 to enquire how it was that the state could exist 
 and prosper with it, and what the results of the 
 system were. I propose therefore to explain, so 
 far as is possible, the manner in which the system 
 worked, so that we may see what the effects of this 
 peculiar arrangement were. I shall begin by dis- 
 cussing the financial administration. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 Finance. 
 
 § 1. General Direction. 
 
 In a modern state the most important political 
 event of the year is the budget. The chief duty of 
 the Government is to estimate the expenses of the 
 coming year, and to propose some method of raising 
 sufficient money to meet the expenses. The question 
 has often been asked how it happened that in anti- 
 quity, and especially in Athens, matters of finance 
 had not the same importance \ 
 
 The difference is however more in appearance 
 than in fact. It arises to a great extent from the 
 character of the records. Historians occupy them- 
 selves much more with the moral than the economic 
 side of history. Writing with a view to artistic effect, 
 they pass over matters of finance which are supposed 
 to be dull. But the speeches of the orators, and the 
 great mass of inscriptions which have been dis- 
 covered, show conclusively — what we might have 
 guessed — that, even in the fifth century, finance was 
 almost as important a part of public business as it 
 
 1 Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung, Bk. ii. § 1. 
 
112 FINANCE. 
 
 is now. Athens had no exemption in this matter. 
 She was subject to the ordinary laws which govern 
 the life of states. Then, as now, it was supply which 
 occupied the minds of leaders of the state ; for money 
 meant food for the citizens, good pay for the fleet, 
 new triremes, new fortifications. It meant comfort 
 at home, and supremacy abroad. Then, as now, no 
 leader of the state could keep his position without 
 meeting the financial problem ; and the administra- 
 tion of Pericles, of Cleon, of Aristophon, and of 
 Eubulus was then, as it would be now, chiefly judged 
 by their financial policy \ 
 
 There is, however, a point in the constitution of 
 
 Athens, resulting from the peculiar character of 
 
 the relations between the officials and the assembly, 
 
 which tends to obscure this fact. 
 
 Absence of The first question we naturally ask is: — "Who 
 
 financT^^ was the responsible financial adviser ; whose duty was 
 
 official. it to frame plans for providing money ? " It is of the 
 
 very elements of business that there should be some 
 
 one whose special duty it is to survey the whole 
 
 income and expenditure. Without this what would 
 
 all the care and prudence in details avail ? 
 
 But at Athens there is great difficulty in dis- 
 covering with whom this responsibility lay. We 
 can trace the course of a sum of money from one 
 department to another. We can find out how pay- 
 ments were made, where money was kept, who paid 
 it, and who spent it ; but where was the central 
 control ? All taxes were indeed imposed by the 
 
 ^ Cf. Lysias, Karbi '^irLKpdrovs xxvii. 3, oirdrav iv XP'^P^'^"' V 
 Koi audrjvai tt}v irbXiv koX fi-fj. 
 
FINANCE. 113 
 
 assembly, and all expenses sanctioned by them. But 
 who advised the assembly, and how did it learn 
 exactly what money was wanted ? There must surely 
 have been someone who had a special knowledge of 
 the matter, who could put forward an authoritative 
 statement, and with whom the responsibility of mis- 
 management would rest. 
 
 In the latter half of the 4th century there was ra/A/as ttjs 
 such an official : the Ta^la<; Trj<; Koivrj<; irpoaoSov, or ^po^f^^Qy, 
 6 eirl TTj ScoLKTjaec. And it has been maintained 
 that this office was in existence at least from the 
 times of the Persian wars. Boeckh and others 
 have supposed that it was held by Aristeides and 
 Pericles and Cleon; and that by holding it they 
 gained their official position, and their right to 
 speak with authority and advise the people. There 
 seems however to be no good authority for the 
 existence of this office before the middle of the 
 4th century, and it was probably introduced by 
 Eubulus about 35 2 \ 
 
 It appears indeed, strange as it may seem, that 
 during the 5th century there was no finance minister. 
 There was no one who was officially responsible for 
 
 1 Plutarch, it is true, speaks of Aristeides as iinfieXTjTT]^ tQp 
 KOLvQv Trpoo-68(au, and there are expressions in the Knights of 
 Aristophanes (v. 948) which have been supposed to imply that 
 Cleon was officially "ra^t'as" of the city. Against this is to be 
 put the complete absence of any reference at all to such an office in 
 inscriptions, and any certain reference in contemporary literature. 
 Cf. infra, p. 117, n. 1, the passages quoted from the Memorabilia. 
 Even in the Knights, the prize for which Cleon and the sausage- 
 seller contend is represented as the ascendency in the assembly 
 {ttjs TlvKi/os rhi 7)vlas, v. 1109), not election to any office. 
 
 H. 8 
 
114 FINANCE. 
 
 these matters. There were numerous subordinate 
 officials ; but they were all appointed by lot, and had 
 thereby neither claim nor power to direct the policy 
 of the city. There was the council, which with its 
 important duties was the centre and pivot of the 
 whole system ; but it was after all a body of 500 
 men taken by lot ; it could scarcely be that the 
 Athenians would look to it for wisdom and ad- 
 vice. 
 Financial The constitutional advisers of the assembly were 
 the^^^ ^^^ ^^® officials, nor the council, nor even necessarily 
 orators. the generals. They were the orators \ It was on their 
 energy and ambition that the direction of the finances 
 depended, as did the supreme control of all depart- 
 ments. And the Athenians could affi)rd to trust to 
 them for advice, for, so long as political ambition 
 was keen, and success in public life the great desire 
 of every able man, the people knew that these 
 matters would not be neglected. The competition 
 was too vigorous. If a young man wished to dis- 
 tinguish himself, he must do so by winning the ear 
 of the assembly. To do this, he must be able to 
 criticise the plans of others, or formulate plans of 
 his own ; to show how money could be saved, or how 
 it could be better spent. Whether he dealt with 
 naval matters, the relations to the allies, the adorn- 
 ment of the city, or the celebration of public festi- 
 vals ; if he wished to make an effect, and win repu- 
 tation, he must have command of the question of 
 supply. No one could hope to win a permanent 
 
 1 Dem. xiv. (Trept avfi/Mpiwv) 2. 
 
FINANCE. 115 
 
 place who did not show a thorough acquaintance 
 with the finance of the city\ 
 
 There is an admirable illustration of this in 
 the Memorabilia of Xenophon^ Socrates is repre- 
 sented as conversing with Glaucon, a young man 
 who without adequate knowledge and experience is 
 trying to push himself forward. He wishes irpoara- 
 T€V€LV T179 TToXeo)?, and Socrates shows him how 
 many things he must know if he wishes to do this ; 
 he must understand all about the income of the 
 state and the expenditure ; he must know the rela- 
 tive strength of Athens and other states; he must 
 know whence the food supply of the city comes. 
 Now Glaucon is not coming forward to stand 
 for any office; he does not aim at being "public 
 treasurer," or " general ;" he is much too young to be 
 eligible : but he wishes to become popular with the 
 assembly, and to do what he likes in the city. He, 
 if he becomes irpoardTT^f; rov hrjfiov, will also " ad- 
 minister the afifairs of the city." Now what this and 
 other conversations show is that numbers of young 
 
 1 We are told of almost every well-known man, that he 
 occupied himself with finance. I have collected a few in- 
 stances for which I am chiefly indebted to Beloch (Att. Politik). 
 
 Cleophon, Lysias xix. 48. Aesch. ii. 76. 
 
 Agyrrhios, Ar. Ranaa, 367, Schol. ad Arist. Eccl. 102. rbv 
 fxiffdov 5e tQv ttoitjtQv (TvviTejxe koL irpOros eKKXrjataaTiKbv 5^du}K€v. 
 
 Archedemos, Xen. Hell. 1. vii. 2. 'Apx^^Vf^os 6 too drj/xov t6t€ 
 vpo€<rTr)K(hs Kal rijs SiwjSeXfas €7rifxe\6/x€vos. This probably refers to 
 an exceptional office created at the time. Cf. supra p. 72; cf. 
 Boeckh, St. p. 282. 
 
 Kallistratos, Theop. Fr. 95. KaWiffTparos 6 KaWiKpdrovs 
 drjfjiayijybs , . .TUiv 8^ ttoXitlkwv Tpay/xdruv rjv iTri/j.cX'^s. 
 
 2 Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 
 
 8—2 
 
116 FINANCE. 
 
 men would try to enter on a political career without 
 requisite knowledge, but that anyone who wished to 
 succeed would be obliged, at least to some extent, to 
 acquire it. The system did not ensure that the best 
 advice would be taken, nor the wisest man successful, 
 but it did ensure that there would be plenty of 
 people doing as much as they could to learn about 
 finance, and other matters. 
 
 And though there was no official responsible to 
 the assembly, every Athenian would always know 
 whose duty it was to give advice in financial and 
 other matters. He did not feel the want of a public 
 treasurer. If he wished to know the state of public 
 affairs, he listened to the TrpoaraTrj^i rov Br/fjuov : 
 for anyone who had become TrpoaraTrjf; could only 
 keep his position by constantly being able to give 
 on every point what seemed to be the wisest 
 counsel. Thus, when Pericles advised the people to 
 go to war with Sparta, he had to make to them a 
 full statement of all the resources of the state, and 
 showed how by following his advice they had ac- 
 quired a treasure equal to any demands likely to be 
 made on it. Again, when Cleon was leader of the 
 people, he used and strengthened his power by his 
 financial innovations: it is this which makes his 
 policy, and gives character to his rule. It was not 
 in consequence of any official post that he could do 
 this, but because he had won for himself a position of 
 recognised supremacy in the assembly. A Trpoo-rd- 
 TT/? who failed, who had no advice to give, who could 
 not make a plausible speech, would thereby lose his 
 position. He would not have to be ejected, he would 
 
FINANCE. 117 
 
 not lose it at an election ; it would be ipso facto 
 forfeited to some successful rival \ 
 
 This system had nothing irregular or informal Constitu- 
 about it. The orators when they undertook this ^^^J^^^^ 
 duty were perfectly aware that they were fulfilling of the 
 a public function, and had a full sense of the re- 
 sponsibility attaching to it. What else is the 
 meaning of the law that a man shall be subject 
 to impeachment (elaayyeXla) because he has given 
 bad advice to the city'^? In most states the respon- 
 sibility for the mistakes of government belongs to 
 some official. At Athens it belonged to the man who 
 proposed the decrees which gave effect to the policy. 
 It was right and necessary that it should. A man 
 who proposed to enter on a war, or to found a colony, 
 or to remit a tax, was quite fairly held to be re- 
 sponsible for the result of his proposal, though he 
 had no official position. The law was no doubt often 
 abused: but it was none the less wise to establish 
 the principle that a man who of his own accord, to 
 justify his own ambition, put himself forward to 
 recommend a course of action should be held himself 
 
 1 It is only necessary to read the Memorabilia to see how 
 futile is the attempt to find some elected official. The object of 
 political ambition is always represented as ' * irpoaraTeieLv tov^ixov,^^ 
 '* iirifxeXeiadaL tui/ ST/jaocr/wi'." The two terms are used as identical 
 (ii. 8. 4, iii. 7. 1, iii. 6), and in connection with them Socrates never 
 makes any reference to elections. The prize is always attained by 
 coming forward as a speaker in the Assembly. But whenever he 
 mentions the generals he always has some reference to election 
 (iii. 1. 3, iii. 4. 1). Had there been any finance office which was 
 an object of ambition, we must have had constant references 
 to it. 
 
 2 Hypereides iii. 45 — 6. 
 
118 FINANCE. 
 
 responsible for the result of his advice \ The advice 
 of the orators was not always good: it was often 
 very bad ; the fact that the position of a irpoardrr)^ 
 was so powerful while it lasted, and yet so precarious, 
 was a great source of temptation ; but at any rate 
 the state did not suffer from want of advice : the 
 absence of a financial Secretary did not mean neg- 
 lect of the finance, or the absence of proper control. 
 
 Result of How did this system work ? Was it successful ? 
 
 sijstem. I^id not the Athenian state suffer from the absence 
 of a single head to the financial system ? The answer 
 is generally unfavourable. The eventual ruin of 
 Athens is represented as due to financial misman- 
 agement. That it was to a great extent due to 
 pecuniary embarrassment, is certainly true. The 
 facts indeed seem to be as follows. The complete 
 Athenian system grew up at a time when the 
 population of Athens was small ; when the amount 
 of personal property was moderate, and the difference 
 between the wealth of rich and poor in consequence 
 slight ; while, at the same time, the wealth of the 
 city itself, owing to the large tribute of the allies, 
 was, in proportion to the wealth of other cities, very 
 great. There was therefore no difficulty in getting 
 the money necessary for carrying on the govern- 
 ment; the ordinary expenses were small, and of 
 these the greater part was met by the system of 
 
 1 Dinarchus in Dem. 35 illustrates the duties of a leading 
 orator; he puts a series of questions, " ^ypai/'ds Vi — <rvv€^oO\€v<ras — 
 iiropLaas xMAta^a." A man who had once come forward was 
 expected and required to continue his activity just as much as if 
 he were an official. 
 
FINANCE. 119 
 
 XyTovpylac. Under these circumstances finance ad- 
 ministration was easy. It was not difficult to provide 
 the necessary money, and there was no need, for the 
 exercise of particular ingenuity in the levying of 
 taxes. 
 
 In the 4i;h century the circumstances had altered. Financial 
 The chief sources of the income of the state were ^^^^ ^^ 
 gone ; and at the same time the expenses had 
 greatly increased. The use of mercenary soldiers 
 w^as a constant drain on the resources of the state. 
 At the same time the increasing commercial pros- 
 perity of Athens, which does not seem to have been 
 permanently affected by her political disasters, pro- 
 duced a complete change in her social conditions. 
 The old hereditary landed aristocracy was extinct : 
 their place was taken by wealthy capitalists, mer- 
 chants, and shipowners ; and with the capitalist 
 appears the pauper ; there are found a considerable 
 number of citizens who have not sufficient to support 
 themselves \ The result of this was that financial 
 questions assumed a difficulty from which they had * 
 before been free. It became now a serious question 
 how sufficient money could be raised for public 
 purposes in such a way as to cause least discontent. 
 The incidence of taxation was an important point : 
 if a war was imminent, the first question to be 
 decided was whether the money to carry it on was 
 available, and whence it was to be obtained. On 
 the decision of this question depended the safety of 
 
 1 Cf. Isocrates, Areopagitikos, 83 vxiv TrXefous e/trij/ 61 (Tiravi' 
 Cf. also xepl elpifivTjs 127 — 8. 
 
120 FINANCE. 
 
 the state, and the maimer in which the money was 
 raised might cause the ruin of a whole class of 
 citizens. Hence arose the necessity for having a 
 specialist at the head of the finances : altered condi- 
 tions required a change in the constitution; the 
 democratic institutions had suited the conditions of 
 which the democracy was itself a product, but they 
 were no longer equal to the strain when a large 
 mercantile city which carried on its wars by mer- 
 cenaries, in which all expenses had to be met by 
 direct taxation, was pitted against a king who had 
 behind him all the resources of a continental nation, 
 and possessed the richest gold mines of the, ancient 
 world. 
 
 The change in the constitution had begun. 
 The institution of the o iirl ry BtotKijarec, and the 
 position held by the 6 iirl ro OewpiKov, are a sign 
 that the council and orators were no longer equal 
 to the work which they had formerly done ; and a 
 change had almost imperceptibly come over the 
 administration, which, had Athens been victorious 
 in the war with Philip, would have led as surely 
 to an overthrow of the old constitution as did 
 the victory of the Macedonians. With the increase 
 of education and the increase of wealth, the govern- 
 ment would have tended to pass into the hands of 
 the wealthy merchant ; the new elective offices would 
 have overshadowed the old which were filled by 
 lot ; the council of 500 would have lost its power, or 
 changed the mode of election; Athens would have 
 become a democracy after the tjrpe of Rhodes. The 
 assembly might have kept its sovereign power, but 
 
FINANCE. 121 
 
 the direct government of the city must have passed 
 out of its hands. This would have been so because 
 the circumstances which rendered the complete de- 
 mocracy possible were unique. A successful govern- 
 ment always expresses the social condition of the 
 people. The use of the lot was only possible owing 
 to the compactness and homogeneity of the Athenian 
 population. When the increase of wealth had divided 
 Athens into two cities, the city of the rich and city 
 of the poor, it became an anachronism. 
 
 § 2. Subordinate Administration. 
 
 The supreme control of the finance was then the 
 duty of the orators acting as advisers to the assembly; 
 but if all questions were there debated, and if all 
 speakers had to be acquainted with these matters, 
 the detailed administration must have been of such 
 a kind as to make it easy to get an insight into the 
 financial condition of the city. How this was done 
 we must now enquire. 
 
 The administration was the function of the Duties of 
 council and the subordinate offices. The relation of ^council 
 the council and assembly was in this the same as in 
 all other matters. The council had no independent 
 power ; it was only the committee of the assembly, 
 whose duty was to bring into order the mass of de- 
 tails which would otherwise have interfered with its 
 freedom of action. In finance, inasmuch as here 
 so much depends on accuracy of detail, the duties of 
 the council were more extended, and those of the 
 assembly smaller than in other departments. The 
 
122 FINANCE. 
 
 ordinary income of the state came from the sale of 
 taxes, the letting of public lands and mines, and a 
 number of smaller dues, fines, etc. These having been 
 in the first instance paid to the KXrjpcoTol officials (of 
 whom more presently), they, as soon as the money 
 was received, paid it in to the diroBefCTal, who received 
 it in the ^ovXevTrjpLov in the presence of the council, 
 or more strictly of the 7rpvTdvei<;. The money thus 
 passed into the possession of the state ; but the 
 central bureau was not presided over by a single 
 man, but by the 500 councillors. If the money were 
 wanted for immediate use it would then probably be 
 at once paid out by the aTroBetcTal to the heads of 
 the departments which required it; to the Oea/jLo- 
 Oerai, or to the arparrjyoL and dOXoderai. Once a 
 month the Trpyrdvet'^ had to deliver before the 
 eKfc\7)aia an exact account of all moneys received 
 and expended by them during this period \ It is in 
 this monthly account given by the TrpvrdveL^ to the 
 eKKKrjcria that we must first look for the basis of the 
 supreme finance administration, because in it would 
 be apparent whether the receipts exceeded the 
 necessities of the time, or whether there was a 
 deficit. It was by a comparison of these published 
 accounts, month by month, and year by year, that 
 politicians would get the information they desired. 
 It was there that the summary of the expenses of 
 the time was to be found. It was by means of 
 these accounts that surplus or deficit became appa- 
 rent. This, therefore, was the mode in which the 
 
 1 Cf. Gilbert, St. i. p. 323. 
 
FINANCE. 123 
 
 people were kept informed as to the condition of the 
 public exchequer. 
 
 The council was moreover the intermediate body 
 which tabulated the requirements of each depart- 
 ment, in order that they might be easily explained 
 to the assembly, and it was the council who were 
 responsible for calling attention to any necessary 
 changes. Suppose on any occasion the income did 
 not suffice for the expenditure — that the proceeds of 
 the mines were not sufficient to pay for the building 
 of new triremes, or the other taxes did not bring in 
 enough to pay for the Bcco^eXia. The TpuripoTTOLol or 
 OeafioOerat would as usual apply to the council for 
 the money which they required to build the ships, 
 or give the two obols at the festival ; but the council 
 had not the money: either the expenses had in- 
 creased, or owing to disasters at sea the income had 
 diminished. It rested with the council to meet 
 the difficulty, for they were responsible to the as- 
 sembly, and would be called to account if the 
 triremes were left unbuilt, or the two obols not 
 paid. But they had- no power themselves to raise 
 new taxes, and there was no large reserve fund of 
 which they had the disposal. Their only method of 
 action would be to come before the assembly, and 
 there announce the deficit. The orators would there- 
 upon propose means of relief Many suggestions 
 would be made ; a full discussion might take place 
 on the financial condition of the city; but if the irpo- 
 o-raTT)^ of the time had a strong position, the assembly 
 would accept his advice and act on his policy. This 
 was doubtless the procedure in the case of the 
 
124 FINANCE. 
 
 loans from the sacred treasure of which we have 
 record. During the rule of Pericles, and throughout 
 the Peloponnesian war, the tribute was often not 
 sufficient to meet the extraordinary expenses. The 
 arpanjyocy the dOXoOerai, the Oea/jLoOeraL found 
 themselves without the necessary supplies; they 
 gave notice to the council ; the Trpyrdvecf;, probably 
 after enquiry, brought the matter before the assembly, 
 and the proposal was made to raise the money by 
 borrowing from the sacred treasures. During the 
 Peloponnesian war of course this was often necessary. 
 It had become customary to meet a great number 
 of the regular expenses of the state by charging 
 them on the 'proceeds of the tribute paid by the 
 allies, which were under the charge of the Helleno- 
 tamiai. When owing to the revolt or poverty of the 
 allies the tribute failed, either the Generals or the 
 Hellenotamiai would report to the council that there 
 was no longer money to make the usual payments. 
 The council reported to the assembly. The as- 
 sembly decided (probably by the advice of the leading 
 orator of the time) that money should be paid in to 
 the Hellenotamiai from the treasure stored in the 
 temples. 
 
 The council chamber thus formed the central 
 bureau, from which direction and control could be 
 exercised over all departments ; and all pajnnents 
 were made by the Prytanies, sitting as the repre- 
 sentatives of the people, through their clerks the 
 aTroSeKTal, a body of men appointed annually by 
 lot. 
 
 The monthly accounts which had to be laid 
 
FINANCE. 125 
 
 before the assembly were probably drawn up by the 
 Prytanies themselves or their '* secretary" {^pa\x- 
 ixarev^), unless — as is possible — this was one of the 
 duties of the Logistai. 
 
 These Logistai were a board of 30 men, who were Logistai. 
 appointed by lot. They were the public accountants 
 of the state. The monthly accounts of the Prytanies, 
 though they afforded a means of comparing the total 
 income and expenditure for the month, and would 
 ordinarily prevent any extensive fraud on the part 
 of the members of the council, would yet have to be 
 much supplemented if the orators and politicians 
 were to possess the information necessary for pre- 
 paring financial schemes, and getting a grasp of 
 the condition of affairs. It was the duty of the 
 Logistai, at the command of the council or assembly, 
 to supplement these, as often as was desired, by 
 preparing tables of statistics. Whenever a state- 
 ment was required of the total expenses of any 
 department, or of the debts of the state, or the 
 produce of a tax, application would be made to the 
 Logistai, who had then to produce the information. 
 
 This duty was of most consequence at the annual 
 examination of the retiring magistrates, and at the 
 quadrennial examination of all the public accounts. 
 Every magistrate, before he retired from office, had to 
 produce an account of all the public money of which 
 he had had charge. It was the duty of the Logistai, 
 as public accountants, to examine these accounts; 
 and to test their accuracy by comparing them with 
 one another. If in the accounts of the Treasurers of 
 the Goddess, or the Hellenotamiai, a sum was entered 
 
126 FINANCE. 
 
 as paid to the Generals, the Logistai would have to 
 turn to the accounts published by the Generals to 
 see whether this sum was properly entered there. 
 Similarly, the accounts of the Poletai would be 
 checked by a comparison with those of the Practores, 
 from whom they had received the confiscated 
 property of public debtors, and of the various 
 companies who had bought from them any tax. 
 Supposing any inaccuracy were discovered, this could 
 be made the ground for legal proceedings; and, 
 according to the regular Attic custom, the case 
 would be tried by a jury court presided over by 
 the Logistai. 
 
 The duties of the Logistai were however in no 
 way confined to this audit. Whenever any statisti- 
 cal information concerning the finances was desired, 
 the council or assembly would require the Logistai 
 to produce it. Hence the Logisterion was a kind 
 of archive house, where were kept not only the ac- 
 counts of each board of magistrates, but financial 
 statements of all kinds which had been drawn up 
 by the Logistai. Some of these have been preserved 
 to us. 
 
 During the Peloponnesian war, the ra/nlat t^9 
 Oeov were ordered to pay from the treasure under 
 their charge certain sums of money to the Generals 
 and other ofiicials, in order to meet the deficit caused 
 by the failure of the tribute and the expenses of the 
 war. In order simply to test the correctness of the 
 accounts, it would have been sufficient to see that 
 the sum entered by the rafilac as paid corresponded 
 to that which the Generals and other officials 
 
FINANCE. 127 
 
 professed to have received. But the money was 
 only borrowed from the temples: it would have to be 
 repaid, and repaid with interest ; but as it would be 
 repaid not by the separate boards to which it had 
 been lent, but by the council from the general fund 
 at their disposal, it was necessary to have a record of 
 the whole sum borrowed, together with the interest 
 on it. The treasurers, as representatives of the God- 
 dess to whom the money was owed, would doubtless 
 keep such a record; but the state which owed the 
 money would also have to do so. We have the 
 fragments of a table of this kind, which has been 
 drawn up by the Logistai as a record of the money 
 owed to the Goddess by the state \ 
 
 If the supposition be correct, according to which 
 the lists of the firstfruits of tribute due to Athene 
 were drawn up by the 30 Logistai, we get in these 
 another instance of the same kind^ The tribute 
 paid each year varied to some extent, and so oi 
 course the sum received by the temple treasure also 
 varied : in order therefore to be able at any time to 
 know what sum had been paid, the XoycaraL them- 
 selves kept a full list of the amount of the firstfruits. 
 Each successive board of Xoytarai as they came into 
 office would find a full statement of what money had 
 been paid into the Treasury. This they would use 
 for reference in the quadrennial examination of the 
 temple accounts; and it would also be available 
 
 1 C. I. A. i. 273. 
 
 2 C. I. A. i. 226—254. These lists are put up viro rQv rpid- 
 Kovra, who are probably the same as ol Xoyicrral oi rpidKovra of C. 
 I. A. i. 32. 
 
128 FINANCE. 
 
 whenever, for the discussion of financial matters, a 
 statement of the money in the temples and the 
 probable income for future years was necessary. 
 Similarly, when the council was occupied with the 
 question of the assessment of the allies, the help of 
 the Logistai would be required. The total sum to 
 be exacted from the allies having been fixed by the 
 assembly, it was the duty of the council to determine 
 each year the quota to be paid by each city. It is 
 surely not unreasonable to suppose that the help of 
 the Logistai, and the tables drawn up by them, would 
 be used in order to make the necessary calculations. 
 
 Anothei^ instance is preserved in an inscription, 
 which records the repayment of a certain sum of 
 money that was owed to the sacred treasures. In 
 it we find that the council is ordered to summon 
 the Logistai, who are to calculate the sum which 
 is to be repaid, and make a report to the council \ 
 
 In all these cases we see that, though the exis- 
 tence of these documents would make fraud by the 
 officials very difficult, this was not their only value. 
 They would make it possible for anyone to acquire 
 with very little difficulty an accurate knowledge of 
 the financial condition of the city. By going to the 
 Logisterion, any citizen could in a short time at first 
 hand get the information which Socrates warned 
 Glaucon was necessary for all who wished to give the 
 city useful advice. The people would learn that 
 without which they could not manage their own 
 affairs. The publicity of business was secured. 
 
 It is surprising to us that the Athenians should 
 1 C. I. A. i. 32. 
 
FINANCE. 129 
 
 have considered this to be work which did not 
 require special skill, and could be entrusted to 
 men selected by lot. With regard to them we should 
 especially like to know from what class of the popu- 
 lation they were generally taken ; also whether 
 they always sat and worked all together, or were 
 divided into several separate divisions each of which 
 took part of the work. We can at least be sure 
 that the fact that so many men were together 
 responsible for the work, and that they were ap- 
 pointed only for one year by lot would completely 
 avert what is for such a body the most serious 
 danger, that of collusion. Appointed as they were, 
 any deliberate agreement with the other magistrates, 
 whether treasurers or executive, would be almost 
 impossible; and the remains which we possess are 
 sufficient to show that their work was thoroughly 
 done\ 
 
 We can now pass on to the consideration of ^TrodeKraL 
 the duties of others of the officials. The aiToheKTai 
 I have already mentioned. They appear to have 
 been little more than clerks. They sat in the 
 council chamber, received money when it was paid 
 in, counted it, gave receipts, paid it out, and took 
 receipts. The only question concerning them which 
 presents much difficulty is whether they had a 
 treasury of their own where money was kept. Sup- 
 posing money were paid in to the airoheicTai which 
 
 ^ For a case where the work was dishonestly done, cf. Aesch. 
 in Tim. 107 (126), Xo^LffT^s yhp yevd/xepos irXeiffra /xev rrju Tr6\iv 
 ipXaxpe dupa Xa/x^dvuv irapa tup ov 5i/ca/ws dp^dvTUP, frnXiffra S' 
 i(rvKo<pdpT7)ae roi)s fxrjSh rjdiKijKOTas. 
 
 H. 9 
 
TOU 
 
 130 FINANCE. 
 
 was not at once wanted by some other office, but 
 would be wanted for the current expenses, and so 
 could not be added permanently to the reserve fund, 
 what would be done with it ? where was it kept ? 
 would it even for one night be added to the sums 
 kept in the 67ria66^ofjLo<;, or was there some treasure- 
 house under the immediate control of the council? 
 We must, I think, assume that there was, but, so far 
 as I know, no record of it has been preserved \ 
 K(a\aKp4- A point of some interest is the relation of the 
 
 airoheKTal to the KwXaKperaL^. All we are able to 
 make out .is, that the latter was a very old office ; 
 while the airoheKrai were most likely introduced 
 either by Cleisthenes, or later, for they are closely 
 connected with the council of the 500, and were 
 probably first created when it acquired its adminis- 
 trative duties. The KooXaKperai, were however re- 
 tained for some time, and money for certain purposes 
 was paid by them till the end of the 5th century, 
 after which they seem to disappear. They are said 
 generally to have paid money for sacred and ritual 
 purposes, but in the inscriptions this is not ex- 
 
 1 We hear of a rafilas rijs /SouX^s, but probably his duties were 
 quite unconnected with the control exercised by the ^ovXrj over the 
 expenses of the State. He had charge of the fund which the 
 council required for its own expenses, — to pay its messengers 
 and slaves, to provide for the setting up of decrees, etc. This must 
 be clearly distinguished from the administration of the unappro- 
 priated public money. 
 
 2 Harpocr. ad voc. dirodeKTai says : — otl 5^ avri tQv KuXaKperuv 
 ol dirodeKTai virb KXeiad^vovs direbdxd'qaav ^ ' Avdporiojv iv rcf bevTip(^. 
 The KoiKaKpiTaL are however constantly mentioned in inscriptions 
 throughout the 5th century. 
 
FINANCE. 131 
 
 clusively the case\ It is disappointing that we 
 are not told how the KcoXaKperai, were appointed: 
 it would be a considerable help to know in what 
 way the Athenians dealt with an old-established 
 semi-religious office of this kind. 
 
 The Logistai and Apodectai were both closely 
 connected with the council. They belonged to the 
 central administration of the finances. We must 
 now turn our attention to other officials who were 
 occupied with the work of the various departments. 
 
 And of these it will be convenient first to take eW'npoTa- 
 the Hellenotamiai, because at one time their duties ^ °'^' 
 became so extensive as to make them really trea- 
 surers of almost all the public money. We are 
 unfortunately however left in ignorance on many 
 points connected with them. There is even no re- 
 cord as to the manner and conditions of their ap- 
 pointment. This is due to the fact that, as they 
 ceased to exist after the 5th century, the lexico- 
 graphers tell us nothing of them. From the lists of 
 them which are preserved we find however that they 
 were probably 10 in number ; that they were taken 
 apparently from the wealthier classes ; that the office 
 was an annual one ; and that re-election was not 
 practised. Whether they were appointed by lot we 
 do not know. The probability seems to be that they 
 were : at least their duties do not seem to have been 
 
 1 C. I. A. i. 25, iv. lib, 27, 35^, 53». Schol. ad Aristoph. Vespas 
 695, Aves 1541. It seems as if they gradually lost their functions, 
 since in some of the inscriptions quoted they pay money which in 
 later times would be paid by the dirodeKraL In the last they and 
 the dirodeKTai are both mentioned. 
 
 9—2 
 
132 FINANCE. 
 
 of a different kind from those generally entrusted to 
 the magistrates who were so elected. They were 
 responsible for the custody of the tribute paid by the 
 allies; they had to receive it from the collectors, 
 acknowledge the receipt, and take care of it, till they 
 received an order from the Assembly to pay it away. 
 This work is exactly similar to that done by the 
 Treasurers of the Goddess who, we know, were chosen 
 by lot from among the members of the first class \ 
 
 At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war the 
 office of the Hellenotamiai had become the centre 
 of the "^hole financial administration. The reason 
 of this was that as the tribute of the allies was by 
 far the largest sum which was at the disposal of 
 the Assembly, it had become customary to defray 
 from it expenses which ought really to have been 
 charged to other funds, and thus it happened that 
 during the war, when the Treasurers of the Goddess 
 advanced money to the state, they generally paid it 
 to the Hellenotamiai. This was simply for con- 
 venience of management. The Generals, the Thesmo- 
 thetai, and the Priests had been accustomed to draw 
 their supplies from the Hellenotamiai. When their 
 treasure was exhausted, the question how to provide 
 money again came before the council and the As- 
 sembly. It was decided to have recourse to the 
 sacred treasure, and the Treasurers were simply 
 ordered to pay the money to the Hellenotamiai. 
 The executive magistrates continued as before to 
 
 ^ It is common to say that the Hellenotamiai were elected, but 
 I find no authority for this. Cf. Busolt in Miiller's Handbuch, iv. 
 1. § 178. 
 
FINANCE. 133 
 
 draw upon them : and it was much easier to keep a 
 record of the public state if this money was paid 
 first into the treasure, and not direct to the several 
 departments. 
 
 Next in importance are the " Treasurers of the rafiiai rrjs 
 Goddess." Our information about these is consider- 
 able and of such a kind as to enable us to realise 
 with some detail the workings of the system of which 
 they formed a part. It is necessary to say however 
 that they stood on rather a different footing from 
 the other officials who were elected by lot, because, 
 according to an authority^ whom there is no reason 
 for rejecting, they were not chosen from all citizens 
 but only from those who possessed sufficient property 
 to be classed among the irevTaKoa-iofiehi^voi. The 
 reason of this was, apparently, that, supposing any of 
 the money entrusted to them disappeared, it might 
 be possible to recover it from the private property of 
 the treasurers. With this exception they seem to 
 have held a position similar to that of other KXrjpcoral 
 apxal, and their duties appear to have been strictly 
 defined in the way which was necessary for officials 
 so chosen ^ 
 
 Their actual business was the custody of the 
 money and treasure deposited in the temple on the 
 Acropolis. They had to take care that it was not 
 stolen I The state had to see that the treasurers 
 
 1 Pollux 8. 97 ; and Suidas referred to by Gilbert, St. i. p. 234. 
 [But see Appendix.] 
 
 2 The first mention of them is in Herodot. viii. 51. 
 
 3 Cf. Dem. in Timocratem 136 for a case where the rafxiai were 
 accused of criminal negligence because the temple had caught fire. 
 
134 FINANCE. 
 
 themselves did not steal it. We find that ample means 
 were taken to ensure the attainment of both these 
 ends. Each board when it came into office had to 
 make a full inventory of all the treasures contained 
 in the temple, which on their retirement was handed 
 over to their successors. These after making their 
 own inventory would proceed to compare the 
 list of treasure actually present in the temple with 
 the list they had received. The treasurers might not 
 spend any money, nor part with any treasure (except 
 perhaps small sums) without the sanction of a special 
 vote of the assembly^; a special record of all such 
 authorised expenditure was made out by the trea- 
 surers. At the end of every four years the accounts 
 for that period were examined by the XoyccrTal : and 
 had any of the ra/jblac for any year abstracted aught 
 of the treasure, or owing to carelessness allowed it 
 to be taken, it would be impossible to avoid detec- 
 tion. If he had taken something away and omitted 
 it on the list he handed over to his successors, the 
 fraud would at once be discovered by a comparison 
 of his list with that of his predecessor : and, unless 
 he could show some decree authorising him to take 
 it away, or some other public body to whom he had 
 paid the money (in which case the receipt of it 
 would have been entered in the accounts of that 
 body in the possession of the Xoyto-ral), he would 
 have to make good the loss to the state, and be 
 liable to a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, 
 supposing he abstracted something, but entered the 
 
 1 Cf. C. I. A. i. 188, V. 3, xl/7](l>i(raiuLhov tov d-Zifiov. In 1. c. 183—4 
 we find the formula \J/'r}<pia-afi4vov tov drifiov ttju ddelav. 
 
FINANCE. 135 
 
 money or treasure in his list as though it were still 
 there, the loss would be discovered by his successors 
 when they made up their list. The advantage of 
 the collegiate system, annual office, and election by 
 lot will be clear. Peculation or fraud could only 
 be successful if the officials several years together 
 entered into a conspiracy, for it was the officials of 
 one year who in self-defence were obliged to point 
 out any mistakes in the accounts of their prede- 
 cessors. But a conspiracy of the extent which would 
 have been necessary must have been almost im- 
 possible, just because the officials of each year were 
 bound together by no tie ; that they served together 
 was pure chance ; and no board could foresee by 
 whom it would be succeeded. Had there been one 
 or two rafiiai, had they been elected, had re-election 
 been allowed, or had the office been held for many 
 years, then peculation would have been possible and 
 comparatively easy ; because there would have been 
 fewer persons involved, and there would have been 
 more time. Had the Xoycaral been few in number, 
 had they been elected, there might have been a hope 
 of bribing them and giving them a share of the 
 profits, or of getting suitable people elected. To 
 admit 30 men chosen by chance into a conspiracy 
 of the kind would only have been possible where 
 public morality and public spirit were very low. Had 
 that been the case, the democracy could not have 
 existed \ What it required was a good deal of public 
 
 1 Aeschines in Timarchum 109 etc. (127 — 28) relates an 
 instance where a rafuas was enabled to steal money from the 
 temple by the collusion of a /SouXeunys, but he does not say any- 
 
136 FINANCE. 
 
 activity, and a moderate standard of honesty ; what 
 the constitution ensured was that the officials should 
 not have any temptation to fall below the average of 
 honesty — a temptation which is often present, and 
 perhaps seldom resisted. The object of all such 
 machinery must be not to raise the standard of 
 probity, but to make use of it, and to apply it to 
 the public administration. 
 
 The inscriptions which have been discovered are 
 sufficient to convince us of the reality of the pre- 
 cautions taken, and of the care devoted to the 
 arrangement of all the details of the system. The 
 most interesting is one^ which records a vote of the 
 eKKKr^aia concerning the creation of a new board of 
 treasurers, apparently those which were known as the 
 ra/jLLat toov aXkcov 6eoov. This shows us clearly the 
 working of the system. The whole arrangements 
 are made by a decree of the Assembly; it is the 
 BrjfjLOf; which decides that the money shall be repaid 
 to the gods, and sets apart a certain revenue to meet 
 the expenditure. The work is entirely carried out 
 by men elected by lot: first of all, the XoytaraL 
 calculate exactly what the sum due is ; then, when 
 they have done so, the money has to be paid back to 
 the priests and other officials, from whom it had 
 been borrowed, by the Prytanies in the council ; and 
 all the documents in possession of the priests re- 
 cording the debt are to be destroyed. By this 
 
 thing which enables one to see how he did it. The difficulty in 
 this and similar cases is that we do not know how much members 
 of the board could do alone without their colleagues. 
 1 C. I. A. i. 32. Hicks N. 38. 
 
FINANCE. 187 
 
 means the account with the priests and curators 
 will be closed. The decree then proceeds to make 
 arrangements for the custody of the money in the 
 future. Treasurers are to be chosen by lot, the 
 priests and curators (who have just received the 
 money) are then to pay it to the new board in the 
 presence of the council. The new treasurers are 
 then to count it, and publish a list of what they 
 have in their possession ; and every year the board 
 has similarly to publish a list of the money in the 
 treasury, with an account of all which they have 
 received or spent. 
 
 This decree is in many ways very remarkable. 
 It was made in the year 435. Pericles' influence 
 was then at its height, and we may naturally sup- 
 pose, even if the actual wording be not his, that it 
 expresses his policy. It was passed after the full 
 democratic constitution had been introduced; all 
 the officials mentioned in it are elected by lot. A 
 careful examination of it will, I think, bear out the 
 position I am defending, that efficiency of adminis- 
 tration was one of the chief characteristics of the 
 Democratic constitution of which election by lot 
 was a part. The framers of the decree have a 
 distinct end in view, and they have an ample 
 machinery to attain it ; the wording of the decree 
 is simple and straightforward, it is not burdened 
 with circumlocutions, there is no parade of legal 
 accuracy, but at the same time the meaning of each 
 clause is quite clear \ For the execution of the 
 
 1 There is an almost pedantic adherence to the proper forms: 
 the money is to be paid by the irpvTdvecs to the old lepels, i.e. the 
 
138 FINANCE. 
 
 decree a number of officials are required, but the 
 duties of each are carefully defined, and every pre- 
 caution is taken to make it clear that each board 
 has one definite thing to do, which it must do, and 
 no more. The execution of the whole depends on 
 the efficient co-operation of a number of men, but 
 their duties do not overlap. The duties assigned to 
 each are in fact so simple only because they belong 
 to a highly organised system. Election by lot ap- 
 pears here not as the result of democratic jealousy, 
 but as part of a clearly thought-out system, which 
 has been carefully elaborated so as to exclude as far 
 as possible serious mismanagement, or fraud. The 
 Athenian intellect applying itself to financial organi- 
 sation has produced a system which shows admirable 
 clearness of conception and thoroughness of execu- 
 tion. It is possible that the system was not so 
 perfect in its working as it appears to be on paper : 
 but this decree at least justifies us in maintaining 
 that the statesmen who introduced the lot did not 
 do so recklessly; one is tempted to think that one 
 of the chief reasons why Pericles made his democratic 
 changes was that he saw in them the only means of 
 getting a pure and efficient administration. 
 TuArrral. Among other officials who were connected with 
 
 finance were the Poletai : that they were appointed 
 by lot illustrates the remarkable nature of the system. 
 They had to transact on the part of the state all the 
 business connected with the sale of any public 
 
 officials from whom it was borrowed : and then is paid by them to 
 the new rafjiiat : not paid direct by the irpvToi/eis to the new 
 rafuaL. Cf. vv. 10 and 18. 
 
FINANCE. 1 39 
 
 property, and the reception of tenders from con- 
 tractors for the execution of public works. Their 
 office was of particular importance because among 
 their duties was the sale of the taxes to the men 
 who farmed them. From this alone it follows that a 
 very large part of the permanent income of the State 
 must have passed through their hands. Besides this, 
 they dealt with all the money which came from the 
 sale of property which had been confiscated. Now 
 this, especially in times of distress, was no in- 
 considerable sum, and the proceeds of such sales 
 were looked on as an important part of the public 
 income. 
 
 The duties would be the registration and publi- 
 cation of all taxes, contracts, and property which was 
 to be sold. The publication took place by notices 
 put up outside the office of the Poletai in the 
 Agora \ Here too the actual sale would generally 
 take place. In the case however of important 
 taxes, it appears that the sale took place before the 
 counciF; and it is not improbable that the members 
 of the council actually voted as to who should be 
 allowed to buy the tax ; a procedure analogous to 
 that which sometimes took place in the lease of the 
 property of a minor by the Archons in a law-court. 
 In less important matters where this did not happen, 
 the sale was by public auction. Probably the ten 
 Poletai sat on raised seats and presided; the pro- 
 clamations would be made by a Herald, and the 
 Secretary of the board would take notes of the 
 
 * Cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, ii. 357. 
 
 2 Andoc. de mysteriis, 132 — 134. [See Appendix.] 
 
140 FINANCE. 
 
 proceedings. The Poletai would be responsible that 
 all was done with proper formality; they would 
 determine on the time, see that due notice was 
 served, give the necessary orders to the public slaves, 
 and formally assign the purchase to the highest 
 bidder \ For the preservation of order there would 
 be one or more police (To^orai) at their disposal. 
 The purchaser would then have to pay the money 
 to the Poletai in their office ; after which, they would 
 personally hand over the property, or in some form 
 give a certificate of purchase. Finally, they had at 
 once to pay the money which they had received to 
 the Apodectai in the Bouleuterion ; and, when the 
 year was over, to draw up and publish accounts of 
 all they had received by sales. These would at the 
 end of their office be examined by the Logistai, and 
 would afterwards be preserved among the other 
 archives ^ 
 irpdKTopis. It is not possible to get quite as clear a picture 
 of the duties of the Practores. They had to exact 
 the money from men who had been fined by a 
 magistrate, or by a law-court. The magistrate who 
 had inflicted the fine, or the president of the court, 
 sent a record of it to the 7rpa/cTope<?, who, we must 
 suppose, had also a regular office. They would then 
 either by means of a public slave, or in person, 
 request payment. If the fine were paid at once, 
 the record of the debt would be destroyed, and 
 the Practores would hand over the money to the 
 
 ^ Plutarch, Ale. v. 
 
 2 There are preserved several fragments of inscriptions which 
 appear to belong to these accounts of the Poletai. C. I. A. i. 274, etc. 
 
FINANCE. 141 
 
 Apodectai. If payment were delayed, the name of 
 the defaulter would be entered in the list of public 
 debtors, the supervision of which was the chief 
 duty of these officials, and until his name was 
 erased the defaulting debtor would be deprived of 
 his political privileges. If the debt were in any way 
 disputed, the matter could be made the subject of a 
 fresh trial ; and in that case the Practores would 
 empanel a jury, and themselves preside in the court. 
 If however a debtor from want of money did not pay 
 the debt, he seems generally to have been left at 
 large, but was liable to a criminal prosecution sup- 
 posing he attempted to use his rights as a citizen. 
 If for any reason rigorous measures were to be 
 adopted, the Practores would order the confiscation of 
 his property; which would then be handed over to the 
 Poletai to be sold. If it were movable, the Practores 
 would request the Eleven to go and seize it. In some 
 cases the person of the debtor would be seized, and he 
 would be kept in prison. The names of men who 
 had not paid the taxes would also be given to the 
 Practores as public debtors, but probably only after 
 they had been convicted in court. The duties of the 
 office seem however to have been chiefly the collec- 
 tion of debts in consequence of the decision of a 
 court, and the care of the list. Their duties, im- 
 portant as they were, were only a single part in 
 the procedure by which money from condemned 
 criminals was safely conveyed to the public treasury. 
 The principle of division of labour is here also 
 carried out. This careful limitation of the duties of 
 each office, which in a modern bureaucracy is often 
 
The 
 
 Eleven. 
 
 142 FINANCE. 
 
 SO deadening, was necessary when the officials were 
 changed each year. 
 
 These -npaKrope^ were closely connected in their 
 duties with the Eleven. 
 
 The Eleven seems to have been an euphemistic 
 name for officials who in later times and in other 
 states were called 8€cr/iio<f)v\aK6^\ They had not only 
 the charge and control of the prisons, with the duty 
 of superintending and being present at public execu- 
 tions, but they had also to seize the persons of men 
 who were to be imprisoned and the property which 
 had been confiscated. The actual taking into custody 
 and execution was of course performed either by 
 slaves or servants. 
 
 From the account of the death of Socrates given 
 by Plato, we learn that the whole college of the 
 Eleven announced to him personally the approach of 
 his death. It is probable that a distinguished prisoner 
 like Socrates would be treated with more respect 
 than an ordinary man who was to be executed; 
 but this narrative will remind us that the dignity 
 of these offices, which might easily have suffered 
 from the mode of appointment, would be preserved 
 by the number of members of which they consisted. 
 They would give countenance and authority to one 
 another : whether it were the Poletai presiding at a 
 sale, the Eleven at an execution, or the Practores in 
 court, an ordinary citizen who would have no respect 
 
 ^ It was probably from a similar feeling that the prison was 
 generally called to oUrifia. Cf. Wachsmuth, 1. c. ii. p. 383, n. 2. 
 They are also called iTrifieXrjTai rQv KaKoijpyuv. Antiphon, de 
 morte Herodis, § 17. 
 
FINANCE. ' 143 
 
 for one of these men individually would be quicker 
 to recognise in them the authority of the laws when 
 he saw them moving about together and acting in 
 company. This is not necessary when the magi- 
 strates are members of one class in the state; or when, 
 being appointed for their ability and holding office 
 for many years, they can gather around their own 
 persons the mystery and dignity of office. The cor- 
 porate and collective action of many men, however 
 foolish and insignificant as individuals, would form 
 some substitute for this. 
 
 The ela(l)opd, or direct property tax, which was other 
 only levied in times of war, or other great necessity, ^^*^^*- 
 was not sold as were the indirect taxes. It was 
 collected directly by the state. For the collections 
 there were special officers appointed. We hear of 
 Siaypacj^eU, who had apparently to superintend the 
 assessment, and iKXayel^;, who actually collected it. 
 These latter are said by the lexicographers to have 
 been chosen by lot, and this statement is supported 
 by a passage in Demosthenes \ If this be the case, 
 they are an exception to the rule that men were 
 never chosen by lot for any but continuous offices ; 
 unless indeed, as is possible, they were appointed 
 annually, so that all the machinery might be ready 
 for the levying of a tax should one be required. We 
 have no information about them, and it is probable 
 that both in the formation of the register and the 
 collection of the money, the officials of the Demes 
 and other divisions did the greater part of the 
 
 1 Androtion 48. The iTnypatfyeh, however, mentioned by Iso- 
 crates xvii, 41 were elected. 
 
144 FINANCE. 
 
 work, which would otherwise have been far more 
 than could have been managed by a single board. 
 The BcaypacfyeU and €/c\oy€L<; must have superin- 
 tended the action of the local officials on behalf 
 of the central government. 
 
 This list of officials will give some conception of 
 the wealth of labour spent by the Athenians on a 
 single* part of their administration ; and it illustrates 
 the chief characteristics of the system. The work 
 was so much divided, that the duties of each office 
 were very simple. In consequence, it was possible 
 to fix the responsibility for any neglect of duty, 
 or dishonesty, upon the board in whose jurisdiction 
 the matter was ; and an elaborate system of accoun- 
 tability resulted, by which it was the interest of any 
 one office to point out the dishonesty of another, and 
 w^hereby it became difficult to organise any fraud 
 without the certainty of detection. It does not 
 sound a great deal to say that the Athenian system 
 rendered it difficult for its officials to cheat, and made 
 it clear with whom the responsibility for doing any 
 particular thing rested ; but a very slight knowledge 
 of the administration of ancient and modern states 
 will remind us that most governments have not 
 been able to attain what seems at first so easy. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 
 
 The extension of the custom of election by lot 
 to judicial offices is more remarkable than any 
 other use of it. It will be necessary to examine the 
 object and result of this shortly. It will also be 
 interesting to see to what extent the method of 
 election caused the peculiarities of the Athenian 
 legal system. 
 
 It is unnecessary to dwell on the effect which the Absence 
 existence of a class of trained lawyers has had on trained 
 the constitutional development of various countries. ^«^2/^'*«- 
 Both in England and in Rome their decisions have 
 had a great part in the creation of the laws ; and in 
 America it is the lawyers alone who are now to some 
 extent removed from the influence of the popular 
 will, and can even stop the execution of the laws 
 passed by the representative assemblies. In these 
 and in other cases we find a complicated system of 
 law, administered by a class of men who have had 
 a special training, and are strongly influenced by 
 professional feeling. The complex system of law 
 and the great influence of lawyers go together ; one 
 cannot exist without the other, and both are clearly 
 H. 10 
 
146 
 
 JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 
 
 Compari- 
 
 Archon 
 and the 
 Prcetor. 
 
 Opposed to the influence of Democracy. Both of 
 these were completely unknown at Athens. This 
 is so obvious that it perhaps seems superfluous to 
 call attention to itj and yet it is worth while to 
 ask the reason of it, the more so as their absence 
 was essential to the existence of the Democracy. 
 
 *At first sight there is very great resemblance 
 between the duties of a Roman Praetor and an 
 Athenian Archon. The great influence which the 
 Praetor had on the development of the Roman law 
 ^Arclwn ^^ Came from duties which were nearly akin to those of 
 the Athenian Archons. In both cases the chief duty 
 of the magistrate was not to try the case, but to 
 prepare it for trial; in both cases the actual trial 
 was before jurors: with this important distinction, 
 that at Rome civil cases were generally tried before 
 a single judex, at Athens before a large BiKacrTrjpLov. 
 At Athens as at Rome this arrangement was the 
 result of a historical development: the original 
 Archons like the original Praetors had themselves 
 heard and settled all cases, and it was only by a 
 later development that their duties were limited 
 as they were. 
 
 Schomann explains clearly what were the duties 
 of the Archon, or other official, under the system as 
 we know it\ It was before him that the plaintiff 
 and defendant in a suit had to appear : they had to 
 explain the grounds of the action, and had to collect 
 evidence and lay it before him. The duties of the 
 
 1 Meier u. Schomann Attischer Process, ed. by Lipsius. Cp. 
 ). 11. 41, etc. 
 
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 147 
 
 magistrate were to a great extent formal, and would 
 have been performed perfectly well by a clerk*. He 
 made no comment, and gave no opinion. He simply 
 entered the case on the lists of those to be tried, 
 and decided on which day it should be heard. 
 He was also responsible for summoning the jury. 
 It was indeed possible that the plaintiff had come 
 before the wrong court : he might have summoned an 
 alien to appear before the Thesmothetai, instead of 
 before the Polemarch. In this case the magistrate 
 could point out the error, and dismiss the case. But 
 his influence did not extend beyond this. He did 
 not use his position to declare, or interpret the law. 
 And it is in this that he differs from a Roman 
 Praetor. When a case was brought forward in Rome, 
 the Praetor listened to the evidence on both sides 
 and himself formulated the plea, and he did so in 
 such a manner as thereby to declare the law. He 
 exercised moreover very wide discretion in accepting 
 or rejecting a case. He could, and often did refuse 
 to grant a trial either because the plea had no real 
 legal basis, or — a more remarkable stretch of his 
 authority — because it seemed to him that the legal 
 
 ^ The account of the duties of the magistrate, ch. ii. pp. 42 — 44 
 compared with the account of the av^Kpicns p. 790 etc. makes it clear 
 that the only matters which in any case were left to his decision 
 were (1) whether he should receive the suit, (2) on what day the 
 case should be tried. Of these, as to (1), he had little latitude 
 allowed him ; he could only refuse to receive a suit in cases where 
 to do so would be an obvious contravention of a law. His other 
 duties were to receive the evidence on both sides, hear the oaths 
 taken, and put the case in proper order: but all as a clerk 
 might do it. 
 
 10—2 
 
148 JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 
 
 claims on which it was founded conflicted with 
 
 equity. 
 
 Small But the Archon never used his personal judgment 
 
 o/TS* in this way : he took on himself no responsibility of 
 
 Archon, this kind: it was inconceivable to an Athenian 
 
 that he should. All he could do was, when the 
 
 law 'clearly said that causes of a certain kind should 
 
 be brought before a certain magistrate and not 
 
 before him, to refuse to receive them. Suppose 
 
 there were a dispute as to the interpretation of this 
 
 law, even that the Archon or Thesmothetes did not 
 
 himself decide. It was made the ground of a separate 
 
 action and referred to a jury — in some cases referred 
 
 to the same jury who tried the whole case, so that 
 
 the same court had at the same time to consider the 
 
 merits of the plea, and its own competence to try it\ 
 
 What is the cause of this difference ? Clearly 
 
 this : that the Archons were chosen by lot, and the 
 
 Praetors elected. The Praetor was chosen to fill his 
 
 office either because of personal ability or because of 
 
 his birth. But if he was chosen because of his rank, 
 
 he was a member of a close body of men among 
 
 whom a great knowledge of law was common. The 
 
 leading lawyers were all Senators ; a Senator did not 
 
 act independently, he acted as a member of his 
 
 order. A Praetor in his legal decisions would not 
 
 only be giving his own opinion, he would be the 
 
 mouthpiece of a body which contained all the legal 
 
 1 Cf. Schomann 1. c. p. 841 etc. In all the different forms 
 which he describes, diafiapTvpia — '7rapaypa(f)7i — i^oofwffia, we find 
 that the question of jurisdiction is brought before a jury, and 
 not decided by a magistrate. 
 
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 149 
 
 traditions and wisdom of the state. Hence his de- 
 cisions would have authority; if the Praetor told a 
 plaintiff that he had no case, and refused to grant an 
 action, the plaintiff would feel that the law had 
 spoken: he would know that the Praetor had con- 
 sulted other men before giving his decision. And 
 the decision of the Praetor in consequence formed a 
 precedent ; it would be incorporated in the Edict of 
 his successor, and would become a substantive part 
 of the law as administered. 
 
 But an Athenian Archon had no power to take 
 upon himself to grant or refuse a suit. He repre- 
 sented no one, he was of no special ability or 
 knowledge. Had he done so, his act would have been 
 purely arbitrary ; he would not himself have been 
 bound to act in the same way in other cases, much 
 less would his colleagues and successors have been 
 influenced by it. He had therefore none of that 
 power of indirect legislation which at Rome was 
 in the hands of the legal profession. And so the 
 duties which the Roman Praetor carried out with 
 intelligence the Archon performed mechanically. 
 
 A single case will help to make this clear. After imtarice 
 the revolution of 403 an amnesty was passed, one ^^j^^^^ ^. 
 clause of which decreed that (with certain excep- ypa(pri. 
 tions) political acts done before that date should not 
 be made the ground of a criminal prosecution. Of 
 course, as could have been foreseen, attempts were 
 made to evade this law, and difficulties arose as to 
 the interpretation of it\ In consequence it often 
 
 ^ Cf. Isocrates, irpbs KaWlfxaxov § 1—3. 
 
150 JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 
 
 happened that someone was accused of murder, and 
 pleaded in his defence not only that he was innocent, 
 but also that he was protected by the Amnesty. It 
 was obviously inconvenient that these two com- 
 pletely different questions should be tried at the 
 same time by the same court : how then was a plea 
 of this kind to be met ? It was as a rule one not of 
 fact, but of law : " If the defendant has committed 
 the murder, is it one of those crimes which come 
 under the Amnesty, or not ?" Had a similar case 
 arisen in Home, or in any other state where the 
 magistrate had authority and influence as a man 
 learned in the law, the Praetor himself would have 
 decided it. He would have granted or refused an 
 action, according as he thought the defendant was 
 protected or not by the Amnesty. But at Athens 
 the Archons never attempted to take this responsi- 
 bility on themselves. The only way of escape was 
 a Law. Hence a law was passed through the 
 eKKXrjaia instituting a new form of procedure to 
 meet this special case — the well-known 7rapa<ypa(j>ij^. 
 A difficulty which at Rome would have been settled 
 by the Praetor could at Athens not be solved without 
 an appeal to the Assembly. We see at once how the 
 power of the BrjfjLOf; was a direct result of the absence 
 of ability and influence among the magistrates; in 
 other words, how election by lot was necessary to the 
 perfection of the democracy. 
 Charac- We can now see to what was due the chief 
 
 'J^***?* °-^ characteristic of the Athenian law, its great sim- 
 
 Law. 
 
 1 Cf. Schomann p. 850, n. 234. 
 
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 151 
 
 plicity. This did not come from any peculiarities 
 of the Greek mind. The Athenians were not inferior 
 to the Romans in their power of framing a system, 
 nor were they wanting in ability to analyse the basis 
 of law; yet the Athenian law never got beyond 
 the rudimentary state : it remained merely a list of 
 rules or precepts for conduct, with apparently little 
 attempt at scientific arrangement. The Athenian 
 courts were active, the number of cases tried was 
 immense, and the complexity of the issues often 
 considerable, and yet there was no authoritative 
 interpretation of the law ; no glosses were collected 
 round the rules; the laws remained short simple 
 and straightforward. This is of course due partly 
 to the peculiar constitution of the law-courts; but 
 it is still more due to the absence of authority of the 
 magistrates. Owing to this, there was no attempt 
 made to distinguish between questions of law and 
 questions of fact. The same men decided both to- 
 gether. Each case came before the court in its 
 entirety, and when the verdict was given no one 
 could tell on what grounds it had been given. Hence 
 there could be no precedent. A precedent is only 
 possible when an authoritative exposition can be 
 given of the law, in such a way that it is applic- 
 able to other cases, apart from the particular circum- 
 stances which were the occasion of it. This could not 
 be done at Athens; for there was no authoritative 
 ruling of the Judge, or formula of the Praetor, and the 
 very nature of the courts prevented their decision 
 becoming a precedent. Again, there was no custom- 
 ary law: there was nothing to which an advocate could 
 
152 JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 
 
 appeal but the written laws, "the laws of Solon."^ 
 The speechmakers were the only people who were 
 professionally connected with the law, and advocates- 
 are only of use in developing a system of law when 
 the court before which they plead is itself composed 
 of professional lawyers. 
 
 One result of this again is the peculiar nature of 
 the Athenian laws. They are as a rule the concise 
 statement of some general principle. They are put in 
 such a form that they can be understood and applied 
 by a court of laymen. Elaborately drawn up law& 
 full of technical phraseology which aim at covering 
 every possible case, are really much easier to apply 
 than the apparently simpler rules; but they can 
 only be used by trained minds and memories. At 
 Athens no one was specially trained. It was more- 
 over the absence of any authoritative explanation of 
 the law which caused the Athenians to be so par- 
 ticular about their laws. Inconsistencies in the law 
 and obscurities of expression are not of great impor- 
 tance where the interpretation of the laws is the 
 professed occupation of a large and organised 
 body of able men. The law will eventually be 
 hidden and superseded by the interpretation, and 
 the goodness or badness of the law be of little 
 moment. At Athens, where each case had to be 
 decided by inexperienced people, any inconsistency 
 in the laws would destroy all confidence in the 
 justice of the courts, and so the activity which in 
 other countries is devoted to elaborating the law 
 and making it more complete, at Athens was spent 
 in simplifying and shortening it. 
 
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATES. 153 
 
 This department shows, I think, more clearly Relation 
 
 than any other, how true it is that the power of the ^{^^ 
 
 Assembly depended on the absence of special ability systevi 
 • ^i. • ^ ^ ^ oi • 1 ^ u -^ to the de- 
 
 in the magistrates and othcials ; and why it mocracy. 
 
 was that election by lot was so essential to the 
 
 democracy. A consideration of this will convince us 
 
 how far all modern states are from being what a 
 
 Greek would have called a democracy. It will be 
 
 an interesting problem in the futvire to see to what 
 
 extent consistent democrats will succeed in doing 
 
 away with what they ought to consider their most 
 
 formidable enemy — a class of trained lawyers. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 
 
 Com- The principles which prevailed in the finance 
 
 mittees of j • • , . • ' .^ • i i • n 
 
 the As- administration were consistently carried out m ail 
 
 sembiyand other parts of the public service. The immediate 
 
 council. ^ ^ 
 
 control over each department of the state and the 
 responsibility for the proper management of every 
 separate public institution was placed in the hands 
 of a special board of 10 men annually appointed by 
 lot. Each of these was constitutionally a committee 
 of the Assembly, or the council, and it was by means 
 of these committees that the larger bodies kept up 
 their control over the innumerable details of public 
 business. The actual work was done by public 
 slaves and by contractors ; the duties of these com- 
 mittees were normally to inspect and control the 
 work, so as to ensure that it was properly done. 
 
 It is impossible to give an account of all of these 
 committees. The system will be best explained by 
 investigating a single department which may be 
 taken as typical of the others. 
 iTTi/xeXTrrai Among them, those of whom we have most 
 ^^^ ^ J, knowledge, are the inspectors of the dockyards. 
 I propose therefore to give a short account of their 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 155 
 
 duties. This will show better than anything else the 
 sort of work which these committees had to do ; for 
 the duties of the iirifJieXrjTal roov iiiiropicov, and even 
 of the cnTo<f)v\a/ce<;, or the fjuerpovofjiot, and other 
 boards must have been to some extent like theirs. 
 That is, as I shall explain, they had to see that the 
 wishes and decrees of the people were carried out ; 
 they had to exercise for the people the control and 
 superintendence over its servants and workmen ; and 
 they had to report and bring to trial all who were 
 guilty of neglect of duty\ 
 
 Each year there was appointed a board of men, 
 €7n/jU€\7)Tal T(ov vecopLcoi/j as superintendents and 
 inspectors of the dockyards. We have no direct 
 information as to the method of their appointment, 
 but I think that we shall be justified in assuming 
 with Boeckh^ on the analogy of all similar offices that 
 they were appointed by lot'. An examination of the 
 duties they had to perform will show that this is in 
 itself not improbable. Apart from this, we find by 
 the lists which we possess that they were ten in 
 number, and were chosen one from each tribe, and 
 that re-election if not impossible at least was very 
 
 1 I am entirely indebted to Boeckh for my account of these 
 inspectors. His edition of the inscriptions containing their 
 reports and accounts, pubHshed as an appendix to his Staats- 
 haushaltung der Athener, contains a great mass of information. 
 The inscriptions discovered since he wrote, which are now 
 published in the 2nd volume of the Corpus, add little to our 
 knowledge. I refer to Boeckh's edition by Roman numbers, but 
 always add the reference to the Corpus. 
 
 2 p. 48. 
 
 3 C. I. A. i. 77 shows us that they existed in the 6th century. 
 
156 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 
 
 rare. Not a single case occurs of which we have 
 knowledge; and, though our lists are very frag- 
 mentary, they contain at least enough names to 
 show that re-election, if it ever occurred, was a 
 great exception. I should incline to believe that it 
 was unknown. 
 Annual In- The duties of these iTnfieXrjTal, as appears from 
 spection. ^Yie inscriptions, were during their year of office to 
 make a full inspection of the dockyards, and draw up 
 a complete list of all the ships and fittings which 
 they contained; as well as to enter in it all ships 
 which were at sea, and any articles which were miss- 
 ing, together with the name of the person who was 
 responsible for replacing them. When the board 
 came into office at the beginning of the official year, 
 they received a list from the retiring board. It would 
 then be their duty to make a careful inspection of 
 the dockyards, and see whether the list was correct. 
 If anything which was entered in the o-rrfKr] was not 
 forthcoming, the retiring iinixeX'qTai with their secre- 
 tary (ypafifjuaTev^) were responsible, and had to re- 
 place it ; and it was the duty of the new board to 
 institute proceedings for the recovery of this as of 
 all other debts*. This inspection was probably a 
 work of considerable length: it went into great 
 detail ; and all the fittings of each several ship had 
 to be examined. Besides the inspection, the chief 
 duty of the eirLfjuekr^Tai was the collection of out- 
 
 1 C. I. A. ii. 811 (xv. xvi.) c. 166, rdSe 6(f)€l\ov(Tiv oi t(2v 
 peupitov iTri/jLe\r]Tal ol iw' ^Avtlk\4ovs apxovTOS /cat 6 ypafi/jLarei/s 
 ain-Qv tQv (r/ceuwv, uv ypd^J/avres els tt)v ffr-qX-qv ov irapidoffav oura iv 
 Tots petopiois. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 157 
 
 standing debts. In all cases where anyone was in 
 debt to the dockyards, the iirifieXj^TaL had to insti- 
 tute proceedings, and if the debt were disputed they 
 were the presiding officers in the jury court which 
 tried the case. 
 
 Debts to the dockyards might arise in three ways: DeUs. 
 either (1) the preceding iTrcfieXrjTaL had not handed 
 over everything which according to the accounts 
 ought to have been forthcoming \ (2) The trierarchs 
 returned a ship not in proper condition, or with 
 some of her furniture missing. (3) New materials 
 had not been delivered by the builders, or the 
 materials delivered were bad^ Of these two latter 
 cases I shall speak presently, but for the present it 
 is sufficient to point out that normally all debts of 
 which the eV^/^eX^ra/ had cognisance were for the 
 non-delivery of certain goods ; and the suit was 
 properly for the recovery of the goods, or an equiva- 
 lent. The inspectors were responsible to the state. 
 They had at the end of their year of office either 
 to deliver over all goods to their successors in 
 good condition, or show that the state had received 
 a substitute. If in such a suit the defendant paid 
 the money, the sum was not paid to the inspectors, 
 but to the Apodectai. This is at any rate expressly 
 stated in many cases, and when it was paid to the 
 inspectors, they did not keep it in a fund of their own, 
 
 1 1. c. 803, (x.) d. 4—13. Also Dem. in Androt. 63, where 
 Sarvpos, an iTnfieXTjTi^s, has to collect a large number of such 
 debts. 
 
 2 1. c. 803 (x.) 0. 128, ECdwos had delivered oars which were 
 useless (ddSKifioi). Gf. also 811 (xvi.) b. 164 etc. 
 
158 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 
 
 but at once paid it into the state chest \ Hence 
 they had no direct responsibility for money, and in 
 drawing up a list of what was handed over to their 
 successors they had no money to enter. 
 
 The general inspection and the recovery of debts 
 were then the ordinary duties of the inspectors ; but 
 if, as of course must have happened every year, any 
 triremes were to be put into commission, the in- 
 spectors had to take special account of these. 
 
 The proceedings were as follows. The Assembly 
 would decide to send an expedition of one or more 
 ships if not for actual warfare, then perhaps to 
 raise tribute, found a colony, protect the corn ships, 
 escort an embassy. The vote of the Assembly would 
 generally determine the number of vessels required, 
 and according to circumstances would go more or 
 less into details as to the fittings which were neces- 
 sary '^ Generally however the decree which ordered 
 the expedition to be sent out would commission the 
 council to look after all details^. The appointment 
 of the trierarchs rested with the generals, and then 
 it was the duty of the inspectors to hand over the 
 required number of ships to the trierarchs. They 
 had to see that each ship was fully fitted out, and 
 take a careful list of all which it contained. When 
 the expedition was over, the trierarchs had to deliver 
 
 1 1. c. 803 (x.) d. 133, p. 212. ^s rb povXevr'/ipiov—Tols dvo- 
 ^eKTOLs. 809 (xiv.), d. 62 etc. 
 
 2 1. c. 809 (xiv.) a. A special ^ij^tcryua orders that certain ships 
 should be provided with two additional iiro^ibfiara. They were as 
 Boeckh points out "bound for the stormy Adriatic." 
 
 3 Also elected officials (dTrotrroXeis) could be appointed to help 
 in the work and supplement the inspectors. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 159 
 
 up the ships again to the inspectors, and to make 
 good all loss and damage, except such as was due to 
 storms, or fighting. The published accounts contain 
 the record of a great number of debts, varying from 
 a whole ship to an oar, or a sail. If however the 
 ship had been damaged in battle, or during a storm, 
 {Kara TroXefiov, Kara ')(ei^(ova) the trierarch had not 
 to make good the loss. When this had happened, he 
 would report the matter to the inspectors ; if they 
 accepted the statement, it would be so entered in the 
 annual account of their inspection ; if not, the matter 
 might eventually be brought before a law-court, since 
 the inspectors would have to sue the trierarchs for 
 the debt. In one case*, we find that a dispute of 
 this kind was brought before the Assembly, and a 
 special decree passed declaring that in a particular 
 case damage which had been done to certain ships 
 should be considered to be Kara irokcfiov, and that 
 in consequence the trierarchs should not be held 
 liable for the loss. The payments of the debts by 
 the trierarchs seem to have been very tardy ^; they 
 were often allowed to run on for years. In a few 
 cases the debts were doubled. 
 
 These inspectors were thus a committee of the Character 
 people, whose duty it was to control the administra- %^^^g^ 
 tion of the dockyards: they did not do anything 
 themselves, and they had no power to order anything 
 to be done, but they had to see that all orders of the 
 
 1 1. c. 809, d. 138 etc. 
 
 2 1. c. 803, X. contains records of old debts paid by trierarchs; in 
 several cases the debt was not paid till after the death of the man 
 who had incurred it, when it was paid by his heirs. 
 
160 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 
 
 Assembly and council were properly executed, and 
 they had to keep a constant record of all which 
 happened in the dockyards, so that information 
 might be easily accessible when required. To take 
 a special instance. If new triremes were required, 
 'the council would have to send to the office of the 
 inspectors for information as to the exact number 
 and condition of the triremes ; they would ask what 
 number were at sea, how many were seaworthy, and 
 which would be likely soon to want repairs. Then, 
 acting on the information given by the inspectors, 
 the council or the Assembly would order new triremes 
 to be built. This would be the work of the Tptrjpo- 
 iroLoi^. When the triremes had been built, they 
 would be handed over by the rpirjpoTrotoi to the 
 inspectors; who would then make a complete in- 
 spection in order to see whether they had been built 
 in accordance with the orders of the council, and 
 whether the work was properly done. The result 
 of this inspection would be entered in their annual 
 report. If the work were badly done they would 
 institute proceedings against the TpLripoiroioi, or, if 
 anything were missing, against their ra/i-ta?. If, as 
 would sometimes happen, the inspectors failed to call 
 attention to any defect in the execution of the order, 
 they would themselves be responsible, and proceed- 
 ings would be instituted against them by the next 
 board. 
 
 The inspectors, then, were appointed by the people 
 to act as stewards or bailiffs. The people was the 
 
 ^ It is unfortunate that our knowledge of these officials is very 
 small. [See Appendix.] 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 161 
 
 owner of a large business establishment ; the inspec- 
 tors had to do the work of superintendence over the 
 workmen which the owner had not time to do him- 
 self. They were a committee of the Assembly, or 
 council, who were appointed by lot because they re- 
 presented the whole people. The whole of the demos 
 could not go together to the dockyards to see that 
 the new^ ships which had been ordered were properly 
 built, so they deputed a few of their number to do 
 so, and as a matter of course, as in all such com- 
 mittees, made the appointment by lot. 
 
 The duties of the iTrifieXrfTal toov vecoplcov were 
 indeed such as could be perfectly well performed by 
 any intelligent citizen. They presupposed, it is true, 
 a certain knowledge of naval matters. The inspectors 
 must know the difference between rappoc, TrTjBdXca, 
 and KXifjbaKihe^. They must be able to judge 
 whether a trireme was returned by the trierarch in 
 proper repair ; and, at times, had to decide whether 
 the oars supplied by the builders were in proper con- 
 dition, or not. But knowledge of this kind was just 
 the sort of knowledge which an ordinary Athenian 
 citizen would possess, or at least could easily acquire. 
 If he had never himself been to sea, he must have 
 constantly been to the Piraeus ; the condition of the 
 navy, improvements in the triremes, the conduct of 
 trierarchs were among the subjects which would 
 constantly come up for discussion in society, in the 
 law-courts, and in the iKKkr^crla. And a man who was 
 not a judge of the comparative merits of two triremes 
 could still count how many holes there were in a 
 sail, and see whether any ropes were wanting in the 
 H. 11 
 
162 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 
 
 rigging. An inspection of the kind which was re- 
 quired from them could perfectly well be carried out 
 in this way. 
 
 If then we can allow this, the advantages of 
 making the appointment annual and choosing the 
 inspectors by lot are obvious. It was the best 
 guarantee against fraud. If the appointment had 
 been for a number of years, there would have been a 
 great temptation to connivance by the inspectors 
 with the people whom they had to look after. And 
 had the office been elective, the rich trierarchs 
 and rich contractors by using their influence at an 
 election might, as has often been done since, have 
 managed to procure the election of men who, they 
 could be sure, would not interpret their duties too 
 strictly. With a board of ten inspectors, appointed 
 annually by lot, to whom re-election was forbidden,, 
 there was at least every chance of avoiding fraud, or 
 culpable negligence. 
 
 We are unfortunately without any information 
 which will help us to decide from what class of 
 people the inspectors as a matter of fact came, 
 Boeckh* supposes that they were generally men who 
 in their private life had to do with ship-building 
 and ships. He employs this conjecture to account 
 for the fact that in some cases they seem to have 
 appropriated material which could otherwise be of 
 no use to them; and in one case the brother of a 
 rafiia^ toov vecoplcov possesses KcoTre2<;, i.e. wood for 
 oars. The conjecture is probable in itself; but apart 
 from this one case, which may be exceptional, there 
 
 1 p. 48. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 163 
 
 is nothing to prove it. Of the names which have 
 been preserved there are few of which we know 
 anything. Among them it is interesting to notice 
 that the name of Plato occurs ; if, as is probable, this 
 is the philosopher, it will show that men of high 
 birth were at least sometimes appointed to this 
 office ; and probably implies that men were appointed 
 to it not with their own consent, but as nominees of 
 the officials of the tribe or by the council. 
 
 In these inspectors we have one instance of the Other com- 
 application of the lot to administration. There were ^'"^^*- 
 many such boards ; every department of the internal 
 government was presided over by a similar com- 
 mittee. Of the work of most of these committees we 
 have little knowledge ; but what we are told points 
 to the fact that, like the inspectors of the dockyards, 
 their duties were primarily those of inspectors or 
 superintendents, though to these were added in most 
 cases judicial functions. The city police, the markets, 
 the corn market, were each under such a board, who 
 had to see that the laws were carried out, and whose 
 office was the place where all information concerning 
 the particular matter was brought, all complaints 
 made, and, to some extent, disputes considered. 
 
 Each of these boards or committees had subject 
 to it a number of slaves, and had the control over 
 them as well as over the paid workmen and con- 
 tractors. The boards themselves were not neces- 
 sarily composed of specialists; and it was the 
 principle of the democratic state that every citizen 
 should, at some time, be a member of some such 
 committee. That this should be so, was ensured by 
 
 11—2 
 
164 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. 
 
 the method of appointment, combined with the 
 large number of men required, and the absence of 
 re-election. It is the most striking feature of the 
 Athenian state that each citizen had in this way 
 his share in the individual responsibility which 
 attends office. This was a necessary addition to the 
 irresponsible power which they enjoyed as members 
 of the Assembly and the Law-courts. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DIVISIONS OF 
 THE STATE. 
 
 If we are to realise the working of this system as 
 a whole, it is important also to take into account the 
 officials connected with the administration of the 
 tribes and domes. For even though in many cases 
 they were not elected by lot, yet the principle of 
 annual office was maintained here also almost with- 
 out exception. And if we are to appreciate the 
 demands which the administration of the state made 
 on the time of a private citizen, we must pay proper 
 regard to them. For the democratic constitution of 
 the demes exhibits more clearly than any other part 
 of the administration the two cardinal principles of 
 the democracy to which the lot was subservient : — 
 that all important questions should be decided by 
 the direct vote of all members of the community : 
 and that every member should, besides taking his 
 part in this Assembly, also bear his share in the 
 separate administrations by holding, at least for a 
 year, one of the numerous offices. 
 
 The Athenian state was divided into consider- Officials 
 ably over 100 demes. All the citizens of full age Demes. 
 
166 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 in a deme formed a body to which was entrusted 
 duties of considerable importance. As is well known, 
 they in the first instance decided on the claim of 
 any individual to be enrolled a member of the deme 
 and so of the city, and they to some extent had to 
 arrange for many XyrovpyLat. The deme was also 
 possessed of public property, and had considerable 
 expenses, chiefly of a religious nature, connected 
 with the sacrifices and other common celebrations. 
 The business of the deme was generally transacted 
 in a meeting which all members had the right to 
 attend*. Each deme had however a considerable 
 number of offices. The most dignified of these 
 was that of Demarch, an annual office^: unfortu- 
 nately we have no information as to how he was 
 chosen. Beside him we find ra/jblai, who are asso- 
 ciated with the Demarch in several decrees^ and 
 opta-rai, the nature of whose duties is not very clear. 
 One account tells us that they had to mark the 
 boundaries of public and private possessions; this 
 would make us suppose they were officers of the city, 
 not of the deme*. With regard to evdvvou who are 
 mentioned ^ we cannot tell whether they were regular 
 or exceptional officers ; we find in one inscription a 
 €v6vvo<;, a \oyL<rT')j(; and ten avvr/yopoi, and in an- 
 other ten aipeOevre^i whom we may perhaps identify 
 
 1 For a description of this, cf. Dem. in Eubuliden. 
 
 2 C. I. A. ii. 585, 579. 
 
 3 C. I. A. ii. 570. 
 
 4 C. I. A. ii. 573»', Bekker, Anecdota, 287, 17. We know from 
 other cases that there were officials called opia-rai, appointed by 
 the city. 
 
 5 C. I. A. ii. 371. 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 167 
 
 with the avvriyopoL^: in one case at least we have 
 mention of irdpeBpoL In one inscription we find it 
 determined to choose by lot certain officers appar- 
 ently for financial purposes. An avnypacpev^ who is 
 mentioned was probably a servant, not an dp'xayv^. 
 Once i7nTifjb7)Tacdi.re mentioned as elected (aipedevre^), 
 but probably for a special purposed These are all 
 the administrative officials of whom we have record ; 
 but many of the decrees which are preserved record 
 votes of thanks to religious functionaries who have 
 performed their duties honourably. Among them we 
 find fiepapxci't, UpoTTOLOL^, four in number, who had 
 been elected by lot, crco(f)povLcrTal, several Upel^i and 
 priestesses. 
 
 These demes with their Assembly, their property, 
 their elections, their officers, their priests, their 
 festivals, their solemn votes of thanks, their privi- 
 leges {irpoehpia, aTeXeia), and their public records, 
 ^re a sort of mimicry of the eKKXrjala at Athens ; 
 but, petty as in many cases their duties were, we 
 must not pass them by, for their democratic con- 
 stitution was an essential element in the democracy 
 of the state. It had no doubt been introduced by 
 Cleisthenes, and it is easy to believe that this was 
 the most important part of his innovations. By it 
 he effectually broke the influence of the nobles. In 
 •early times it was doubtless the priest-nobles who 
 held the register of the citizens, it was they who 
 
 1 C. I. A. ii. 578, 571. 
 
 2 C. I. A. ii. 571. 
 
 3 C. I. A. ii. 575. 
 
 ^ C. I. A. ii. 580, 581. 61 \ax6vT€s lepoiroiol. 
 
168 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 performed the public sacrifices, and did justice in the 
 villages. When all which was formerly done by the 
 evirdrpLhe^ according to old mysterious usages was 
 done by a meeting of the Demotes assembled at 
 Athens, the democracy was established in the place 
 of the hereditary aristocracy. The reality of the 
 democracy depended on whether the assembly of the 
 Demotes could keep affairs in its own power, or 
 whether officials, permanent or otherwise, should 
 gradually encroach upon it. Disorderly and excited 
 meetings such as Demosthenes describes were neces- 
 sary to the continuance of the democracy. The 
 keeping of the registers and the management of the 
 Xyrovpyuai were too important for the people to let 
 them escape out of their own hands, even if the power 
 thus lost were gained by elected officials. We should 
 have been glad therefore to know whether it was 
 considered necessary to appoint the Demarch, and 
 other local officials by the lot ; but unfortunately on 
 this point we have (so far as I can find) no direct 
 evidence. The very existence of these offices is how- 
 ever of considerable importance, because they would 
 every year put a very large number of citizens into 
 a position in which they would have to deal with 
 public money, and take a leading part in public cere- 
 monial ; they would be an important part of the 
 system which aimed at giving to every citizen a 
 share however small in the government, so that he 
 should not only have the power to criticise, but 
 himself have a part of the responsibility. 
 The tribes. The officials of the tribes were fewer in number ; 
 for the tribe had not the unity of a deme and its 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 169 
 
 administrative duties, though not less important, 
 were different in kind. The most important were 
 electoral; the tribe was in many cases used as an 
 electoral division, but, as I have before pointed out, 
 the absence of any record concerning elections is one 
 of the most remarkable facts about Athenian his- 
 tory. The iTTL/jLeXijTal rwv <l>vXwv were doubtless 
 the officials who had to manage the election of many 
 of the officers, but of the way in which it was done 
 we know nothing\ A passage in Demosthenes*'* 
 shows us that they were responsible for bringing to 
 the Archons the Choregi from the tribe, but it tells 
 us nothing further. 
 
 These iTnfjbeXrjral were the chief officials of the 
 tribe; the office was annual, but we do not know 
 either their number or how they were elected. Their 
 chief duty was doubtless to act as returning officer 
 at the various elections; but we find from an in- 
 scription that they were also responsible for the 
 proper management of the property of the tribe; 
 they are here ordered to go round and make an 
 inspection, to see if it is cultivated according to 
 the inscriptions, and if the boundaries are properly 
 kept, and they are especially warned not to show 
 favour to any individual, nor to put anything before 
 the interest of the tribe, nor to take bribes I The 
 duties of presiding at meetings, keeping accounts, 
 inspection of property, are precisely those to which 
 according to all analogy we should expect to find 
 
 ^ C. I. A. ii. 554. 
 
 ^ Dem. in Midiam, 13. 
 
 » C. I. A. ii. 564. 
 
170 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 officials appointed by lot. More than this we 
 cannot say. 
 
 Of ra/jLLat, who are mentioned, we know nothing \ 
 The <f>v\'rj had as had every other corporation its 
 lepeU: it is an interesting coincidence that almost 
 the only one mentioned appears to have been an 
 uncle of Demosthenes I 
 Private When we pass from the administrative divisions 
 
 societies. ^£ ^j^^ state to societies which have no direct con- 
 nection with the government, we find that the ad- 
 ministrative officers are (where we have information) 
 invariably elected, whiLe the religious, — the UpeU, 
 lepoTTOLoi — , are generally elected by lot ; and I am 
 told that the same is true of similar corporations in 
 other parts of Greece. 
 
 It seems then as if among them we meet with 
 the religious use of the lot, and it is reasonable to 
 suppose that where the priest was chosen by lot it was 
 that the god might himself select his own minister. 
 We notice moreover two other facts. In these so- 
 cieties the administrative officials were certainly not 
 in all cases annually elected, while the leponroLoi are 
 always spoken of as ol ael \a'y')(avovTe^y which, 
 though it does not necessarily mean annual appoint- 
 ment, suggests that the office was never held for 
 long; in some cases we find mention of annual 
 appointment^. 
 Religimts With regard to the religious officials of the 
 
 officials. Athenian state, it does not seem possible to lay 
 
 1 C. I. A. ii. 564. 
 
 2 C. I. A. ii. 554». 
 
 3 C. I. A. ii. 611, 613, 619. 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 171 
 
 down any certain principle. Some were hereditary 
 in certain families, some were elected and were 
 officers of much dignity but little importance, others 
 were chosen by lot. The reason was doubtless in 
 each case an historical one. I think however it is 
 not out of accordance with the recorded facts to say 
 that, with the exception of the hereditary offices, all 
 religious officials whose duties were continuous were 
 chosen by lot\ while those who were appointed only 
 to perform a single act on one day in the year, or 
 one day in four years were elected by the people. 
 This fact, if true, will show how much the Athenians 
 were in the matter guided by convenience, and how 
 little by religious tradition. Knowing how much the 
 power of the old aristocracy had depended upon 
 their religious privileges, we can understand that 
 the establishment of other functionaries, whether 
 chosen by lot or by election, would be important as 
 securing to the democracy freedom from aristocratic 
 influence in its public acts of worship. 
 
 I began this essay by pointing out that the Great 
 democracy meant the undisputed supremacy of the^^"^^^^. 
 Assembly in all matters. This survey of the different cemedin 
 offices in the state draws our attention to another tration, 
 and not less important aspect of it. The complete 
 democracy meant not only that the people assembled 
 together should govern the state, but that each 
 individual should also take his part in the work of 
 administration. There was to be no class from 
 which alone magistrates were chosen, nor were the 
 
 1 Dem. in Eubuliden, 46, the priest of Heracles is chosen by 
 lot from among men who are nominated by popular election. 
 
172 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 officials to form a class of themselves. Democracy 
 meant self-government in the fullest sense of the 
 word: each nian had his share in the general de- 
 liberations, he had his turn for a seat in the council, 
 which was the central office of the whole, and he had 
 also to take his part in different offices. Besides these 
 city offices, each man belonged also to the smaller 
 corporations of the tribe, the deme and the phratria, 
 each of which made large demands on his time : he 
 had to attend meetings of the whole corporation, and 
 had moreover from time to time to fill one of the 
 numerous offices connected with it, or serve on some 
 committee appointed by it. It is no exaggeration to 
 say that most Athenians must have spent a large 
 part of their life in the performance of public duties ^ 
 And if we look at the democracy from either 
 aspect: whether we regard the supremacy of the 
 Assembly, or the share which each citizen took in all 
 public business, we shall find that election by lot 
 was an important and essential part of the system. 
 It broke down and weakened all bodies so as to 
 make of every office nothing more than a committee 
 of the Assembly; and it also supplied a simple means 
 of overcoming the difficulty of appointment, so as to 
 ensure in a rough way that all citizens should have 
 a share in the work of the state. 
 Criticism The common criticism made on this system is 
 Astern. ^^^^ ^^ aimed at an equality where no equality was, 
 
 1 In order rightly to appreciate the number of men occupied in 
 public business we must remember that the Archons, Thesmothetai, 
 and many other magistrates were helped by assessors {Trdpedpoi) 
 who during their terms of office acted with them. 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 173 
 
 for it put men of character and ability on the same 
 level with those who had neither. Now if this is 
 said of the high office of governing the city, it is not 
 true, because there has never been a state where 
 power was so exclusively made the prize of ability : 
 ability not always of the best kind it may be. 
 But if free competition is the best way of finding 
 ability, Athens honestly tried to find it. The orators 
 might be wanting in many qualities, but at least 
 they must have had the appearance of wisdom and 
 character. Power belonged to that man who in 
 perfectly free and open competition could win and 
 keep for himself the most influence. The test might 
 not be a perfect one. I do not know that a better 
 has yet been devised. And though Athens may 
 have suffered from unscrupulous politicians and un- 
 wise ones, we cannot say of her that she was governed 
 by incompetent or insignificant men. If again it is 
 objected that it is abilities of a humbler kind which 
 were neglected, and that in the appointment of sub- 
 ordinate officials a difference should be made between 
 men ; it will be sufficient to answer that at any rate 
 the work at Athens was well done. So far as we can 
 see the administration of the state was more regular, 
 more honest, more successful in every way than that 
 of any other city in the ancient world, and (though 
 where the work is so different, the comparison is hardly 
 fair) than that of most states in modern times. The 
 Athenians obliged every one to take his share in the 
 work, they made the work of every one individually 
 easy, and if he did not do it they killed him. The 
 result was that the work was done. The most 
 
174 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 potent attempts to obtain and secure able officials 
 do not always succeed; the Athenians were sure 
 that the men they appointed were not generally 
 below the average in ability and character, and that 
 they would not deteriorate in office. There are per- 
 haps not many states of which the same could be 
 said. 
 
 Injustice is often done to the Athenian consti- 
 tution because we try it by too high a standard. 
 Thucydides and Plato have left us their criticisms 
 on it. These criticisms are I believe completely 
 true: but when we recognise the truths of the 
 picture of the " democrat " drawn by Plato, and read 
 the account which he and others have given of the 
 gradual demoralisation of the Athenian people, we 
 ought to remember that everything with which 
 they charge Athens would mutatis mutandis apply 
 with equal force to any other society which has 
 ever existed. The gi*eatest complaint brought 
 against the democracy was that it was short lived. 
 The Greeks were apt to reckon the excellence of 
 institutions by their permanence : in this matter we 
 have had more experience than they had, and are 
 prepared to recognise the fact that the more efficient 
 a constitution is the more likely it is to generate 
 economic changes which will soon make it anti- 
 quated and useless. That the democratic consti- 
 tution lost its peculiar effectiveness by the middle 
 of the 4th century is no reason for refusing to 
 recognise its merit. We do not question that the 
 government of Elizabeth was wise and strong be- 
 cause the system was destroyed in the next genera- 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 175 
 
 tion. So long as a state has political life, every form 
 of government must bear in itself the seeds of its 
 own destruction. 
 
 And with regard to the other charges brought Prevalence 
 against it, all I ask is that besides comparing it at Athens 
 with the ideal state of Plato we should also compare '"^gf^^^ted, 
 it with other states which have existed in this 
 world. The most constant accusation brought against 
 the Athenians is dishonesty. We constantly hear of 
 fraud at Athens; it was a frequent charge in the 
 law-courts, and historians, led by the speeches of the 
 orators, have concluded that the Athenian govern- 
 ment was exceptionally corrupt. This corruption is 
 then laid to the charge of democratic government and 
 especially of the lot. 
 
 But it is surely dangerous to accept as literally 
 true the statements of the orators ; we know that in 
 many cases the accusations were false, and, even 
 apart from this, frequent trials for peculation are not 
 necessarily a sign of an exceptionally corrupt ad- 
 ministration. Where corruption is worst, it will 
 not be found that convictions are frequent. The 
 sign of organised and habitual fraud is a general 
 repose and outward quiet, interrupted occasionally 
 by some great exposure and outburst of indignation. 
 The constant activity and watchfulness which is 
 necessary to procure convictions, is in itself a suffi- 
 cient guarantee against peculations being the estab- 
 lished thing. Fraud is easy where affairs are secret, 
 confined to a few persons, complicated, and where each 
 individual is allowed much freedom of action. But at 
 Athens every obol which was received by any official 
 
176 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 was entered, and the records made public : how he 
 had to use the money was clearly laid down: he had 
 little freedom of action, so that it was impossible to 
 hide the disappearance of any sum. But I imagine 
 the most efficient guarantee against the prevalence 
 of serious fraud was to be found just in the fact that 
 the officials were so numerous and that they were 
 elected by lot for a short period. Whenever a 
 certain class of people hold office and others are 
 positively excluded, it is easy for the officials to 
 exact overdue sums, and appropriate the surplus. 
 The outside public cannot defend itself: it is igno- 
 rant and intimidated. This was made impossible 
 at Athens because there were no secrets of office. 
 Fraud arises when any individual holds the same 
 office for long, or is often re-elected ; in such cases the 
 perquisites of office grow, and the permanent official 
 has a position of advantage against all unofficial 
 men: at Athens in the democratic state this was 
 not the case. Fraud is especially liable to occur 
 when officials are elected, because those who are 
 likely to gain by the fraud will use all their influence 
 to elect men who will give them an opportunity of 
 winning. This happens constantly in America and 
 other democratic states of modern times, and, 
 under slightly different forms, happened constantly 
 in the later Roman Republic. It was rendered 
 impossible by the lot ; the more so because the lot 
 might associate men who had no acquaintance with 
 one another and who could not, during the short 
 period they were in office, acquire the mutual self- 
 confidence which is necessary to community in fraud. 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 177 
 
 The Greeks no doubt were not an honest race, 
 but it was not the democracy which made the 
 Athenians untrustworthy. So far as we can see 
 the framers of the constitution had recognised the 
 national vice, and took every pains they could to 
 counteract it ; it was one of the merits of the 
 democratic system that it made fraud so difficult. 
 It was a noble attempt, and it was to a great 
 extent successful. There was a good deal of petty 
 dishonesty at Athens, many men made a little 
 money out of the public service. But we know of 
 no instance in which we can say that the public 
 welfare was seriously injured by extensive frauds or 
 official incompetence as was constantly the case in 
 aristocratic Rome and England. The Athenian 
 people perhaps wasted their money — but they did it 
 themselves; it was not lost and squandered by the 
 officers of the state \ 
 
 I have tried to analyse one of the most remark- Character- 
 able and most characteristic features of the Athenian ^Athenian ^ 
 constitution. If the view which I have taken be ^^^'^• 
 correct, election by lot Avas of the very essence of the 
 democracy. And the investigations which lead to a 
 recognition of this fact throw light on a peculiarity 
 of the democracy which distinguishes it from most 
 other political systems. Whether the democracy 
 was good or bad, is a question which has been 
 
 1 It is very doubtful whether the administration of local 
 matters in many English towns would stand a comparison with 
 that at Athens. It may I think be safely said that the gigantic 
 corruption which is said to prevail in Eussia, Italy and America 
 now, and which was common in England not so long ago, would 
 there have been quite impossible. 
 
 H. 12 
 
178 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 sufficiently debated. It probably developed the ener- 
 gies and activities of the Athenians more fully than 
 any other system could have done : so far as it did 
 this we must approve of it, though for this, as for 
 every other system, there came a time when altered 
 circumstances rendered it no longer so efficient. 
 But what is most striking in it is the clearness of 
 thought with which certain principles of government 
 are apprehended, and the boldness of execution with 
 which they are put into effect. Living constitutions 
 are generally a compromise between various prin- 
 ciples. Attempts to frame a constitution in accor- 
 dance with some single general principle have nearly 
 always failed. But in describing the Athenian ad- 
 ministration, one often feels as though one were 
 describing the typical state of a political thinker. It 
 is difficult to conceive of a state in which political 
 equality could be more completely attained. And yet 
 notwithstanding this obedience to an idea, which we 
 can trace in the most important branches of the 
 administration, there is a prudence and sobriety 
 in the arrangements which is wanting in most 
 polities. So far as human foresight could, the 
 builders of the constitution had guarded against the 
 internal dangers which might arise. The Athenian 
 democracy is as a work of art unsurpassed : it has 
 the great characteristic of all good work, in every 
 detail we find laborious endeavour to express a 
 clear and definite idea: and the result is so simple 
 and so harmonious that it is only after a somewhat 
 minute examination that we discover the labour 
 expended on it. The conditions which made this 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 179 
 
 possible will probably never occur again; but the 
 scientific value of the experiment is great: it was 
 the first democracy: the word Democracy was in- 
 vented as a name for it: all other democracies in 
 Greece were a more or less successful imitation of it, 
 and if we want to know what a complete democracy 
 is we can do nothing better than analyse it. If we do 
 this we shall understand how far any modern country 
 is from being a true democracy, and we shall also 
 see how as states become more democratic they 
 develope the most characteristic features of Athens. 
 It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that a Ancient 
 state begins to be democratic when the objects for ^^^^lem de- 
 which election by lot was introduced first become a mocracies. 
 conscious object of desire. We see this clearly in 
 America. Elective assemblies are essentially un- 
 democratic. In America, where the feeling is more 
 democratic than the machinery, we are told that a 
 recognition of this is growing, and it is becoming 
 unusual to re-elect Congress men; it is only fair, 
 as men say, that each of the local politicians should 
 have a chance; it is unfair and undesirable that a 
 few men, because they are a little cleverer or a little 
 more fortunate than others, should have a monopoly 
 of the most valuable political instruction. The 
 Athenians felt this, and gave complete expression to 
 the feeling by allowing to every citizen in turn a seat 
 in the ^ovXrj. The great movement which is causing 
 the break-down of representative institutions in the 
 most democratic countries is due to the desire felt by 
 the mass of the people to give their verdict on each 
 important act, and to make of the assemblies a com- 
 
 12—2 
 
180 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
 
 mittee in which business should be arranged so as to 
 be brought directly before the people. The English 
 are in a confused way aiming at this. In the states 
 of North America a closer approach is made to it by 
 restricting very closely the powers of the state 
 governments. In Switzerland this is still more 
 openly done by the institution of the Referendum. 
 If we want to see the real end at which this ten- 
 dency is directed, we need only look to Athens. 
 There the desired end was attained by purposely 
 weakening the smaller assembly which would other- 
 wise have governed the state : this was done by 
 means of the lot ; and it is not easy to see how else 
 it could have been done. It is a curious confir- 
 mation of the reasons I have given why there was 
 no party government at Athens, that in Switzerland, 
 where direct government by the people is less re- 
 mote than in any other country, the Executive 
 Council is in no way a party body. 
 
 But if in some modern states the peoples are in 
 the way to win for themselves the full and direct 
 sovereignty, they are still far from imitating the 
 other characteristic of the Athenian Democracy. 
 There, as we have seen, not only did the people col- 
 lectively rule the state, but also these same men 
 individually had, each in his turn, a share in the 
 experience and responsibility of office. The central- 
 ised bureaucracy of the modern democratic state is 
 far distant from what the Greeks called democracy. 
 There if a man was a full citizen, he had not merely 
 from time to time to give a silent and irresponsible 
 vote in the Assembly or the law courts ; he had to 
 
DIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 181 
 
 experience the honours and dangers of office. This 
 could only be because the Athenian democracy 
 was an aristocracy. It had all the characteristics of 
 an aristocracy. It made the assumption that each 
 citizen had the time and ability to undertake public 
 duties. It was there held true that no man could 
 be a good citizen whose life was fully occupied in 
 earning the bare necessities of life. The Athenians 
 had in fact that respect for leisure which is so 
 characteristic of an aristocracy. Hard work was 
 with them a disqualification. Men did not believe in 
 the dignity of labour. The existence of the demo- 
 cracy depended on slavery. Slavery is now impossible. 
 Our modern democracies are no more aristocratic. 
 If they ever become so, it will be when the use of 
 machinery is so far developed and society reorganised 
 in such a way that the greater part of the popu- 
 lation will be able, as the wealthy classes now do, 
 to devote a portion of their ample leisure, not only 
 to the discussion of political questions but also to 
 the management of public business. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 On the UoXiTcia Twv ^Adrjvaicov. 
 
 It has generally been maintained that the lot was Early 
 not used at Athens before Cleisthenes (so Grote, Her- ^^f^'J^^^-^ 
 mann, Busolt, Gilbert, Dunker, Lugebil, Miiller- p. 88 etc. 
 Strubing). Schomann recognised that this could not 
 be considered in any way certain ; and Fustel de 
 Coulanges, by reasoning which had never been answered, 
 contended that it was probably an institution of very 
 great antiquity. This view is supported by Aristotle. 
 In ch. 4 he describes a constitution attributed to Draco: 
 in it all officials are chosen by lot. ySovXcvctv 8c Tcrpa/co- 
 (TLOVs KOL eva Tovs Xa)(ovTa<s e/c -7-175 TroXtrctas * KXrjpovcrOaL Se 
 KOL ravTTjv KOL Tcts oA-Xtts aip)(a<s tovs vTrep rpLaKOVTO. €T7] 
 yeyovoras. It would, however, be very unwise to build 
 any argument on this : for, as I hope to show elsewhere, 
 there are serious reasons for doubting the authority of 
 the whole passage. Even, however, if this statement 
 be not genuine it does not much affect the particular 
 matter; for in ch. 8 we are told that Solon ras 
 ap^as iiroLrjcre KXiypcura? ck irpoKpLTiav, ovs eKoiaTr) irpoKpivcL 
 Twv <f>v\<2vy and in Ar. polit. 11. 1 2 we are told that Solon 
 made no change in the manner of electing the magistrates. 
 So, whether ch. 4 be genuine or not, we have considerable 
 authority that the lot is older than Solon. Fustel de 
 
184 APPENDIX. 
 
 Coulanges had argued that this must be the case, for 
 the lot being an institution of religious origin must be 
 of great antiquity. This is an interesting and valuable 
 confirmation of his whole method. 
 
 As to the details of the constitution before Draco, 
 there is of course no authentic tradition. In the times 
 of Solon the lot does not appear to have had much 
 political importance, and during the following period it 
 seems almost to have fallen out of use so far as the 
 Archonship is concerned. It appears that in the 
 contests for the Archonship after Solon direct election 
 must have been practised, and for the 26 years after the 
 expulsion of the Peisistratidae the lot was not used 
 (ch. 22). The method of statement seems, however, to 
 imply that during the tyranny Archons were chosen by 
 the lot. If this be the case Cleisthenes did away with 
 the lot, and it was reintroduced later. The opinion of 
 Grote, and others, that Herodotus was mistaken when he 
 says that Callimachus was chosen Polemarch by lot, is 
 then supported : on the other hand, it was reintroduced 
 before the Archonship of Themistocles and Aristeides. 
 The argument therefore that the lot cannot have been 
 introduced till later, for otherwise Themistocles would not 
 have been archon, must be dismissed. At this time the 
 lot was only used to decide which of a limited number 
 of men nominated by the tribes should be appointed. 
 Under Solon each of the 4 tribes nominated (TrpoKpLveiv) 
 1 ; and from these 40 the 9 Archons were chosen by 
 lot\ Cleisthenes altered the number of the tribes to ten, 
 and when the lot was reintroduced, each tribe nominated 
 either 50 or, more probably, 10 (ch. 22 with Mr Kenyon's 
 note). 
 
 ^ We can now understand to what Isocrates was referring in 
 the passage quoted on p. 39. 
 
APPENDIX. 185 
 
 Originally only rrevTaKoo-LOfxeSLixvoL were eligible to 
 the Archonship ; at some unknown period LTrireU were 
 admitted \ It was not till 457 that ^evy trat could hold 
 this office. Apparently the law which required this 
 qualification was never repealed, but practically it was 
 not put into force (ch. 7). 
 
 What is of greatest importance, however, Aristotle 
 never tells us: i.e. when the lot was first used for the 
 previous nomination by the tribes instead of popular 
 election. In ch. 8 he tells us that the change was made, 
 but gives nowhere any information as to the date. 
 
 The account of the Areopagus in ch. 23 is valuable, Areojm- 
 f or it shows that although the council consisted of men ^"^' ^' ' 
 who had been Archons, and the lot was used in the 
 election of Archons, the Areopagus during the Persian 
 wars still showed more energy than the a-TparrjyoL. It 
 ought to be remembered however, that at this time most 
 of those who sat in the Areopagus must have been 
 Archons before the year 487. The fall of the Areo- 
 pagus would coincide with the time when the last of 
 this generation had died out. 
 
 From ch. 55 we learn that the 6 Thesmothetai with 
 their ypafifxarevs and the 3 other Archons were chosen as 
 a college of 10, one from each tribe. 
 
 The statement of chapter 18, rds 8' dpxois kiroC-qae 
 Kkrjpuyrds €k TrpoKptTwv, seems to apply not only to 
 the Archonship. The other offices which existed at that 
 time must also have been filled in the same way. These 
 were, as we learn from ch. 7, the ra/Atat, the iroiXrjTaLy the 
 
 1 This was perhaps in the time of Cleisthenes. It is possible 
 however that the word TrevTaKoaiuv in ch. 22 is a corruption, and 
 the sentence gave the property qualification. I have suggested 
 
 iK TWV irpOKpidivTUiV Vir6 TOV dtj/XQV TWV IT €VT aKOaiO fl€ 5 IfJLV bJV. 
 
 Classical Review, March, 1891. 
 
186 APPENDIX. 
 
 IvScKtt, and the KoyXaKperaL. It was not, I believe, known 
 before that the first three of these offices were of such 
 antiquity. The early use of the lot for them is remarkable. 
 It appears also that the members of the povXij of 400 
 were selected by lot from the commencement, though 
 probably with the same precautions as were provided in 
 
 p. 47, 11. 1. the case of the Archons. I must therefore withdraw 
 the statement on the subject which I made in the text. 
 Fustel de Coulanges' suggestion which I have rejected 
 will now require careful consideration. 
 
 The main thesis contained in the text of the essay is 
 supported by this new work. I will only call attention 
 to the following points : 
 
 p. 21 etc. (1) There is nothing to support the attempt to 
 
 show that the government of Athens was in the hands of 
 an elected official, whether o-TpaxTyyos or ra/xias. It is 
 however only fair to say that in many parts the work is 
 extremely defective. It contains practically no account 
 of the constitutions between the years 457 and 412 ; 
 for the continuous narrative ceases with the former 
 year, and the constitution described at the end of the 
 work is the constitution of the latter half of the 4th 
 century, which was in many ways a very diffisrent thing. 
 It is very strange that no mention is made of the 
 rafxCas t^s KOLvrj<s TrpoaoBov. For this work was ap- 
 parently written at the very time when this office 
 was of its greatest importance, during the time of Ly- 
 curgus. It is not improbable that in ch. 43 for rov 
 TUiv Kprjv<j)v iTTLfxeXriTov we should read T<av Koivuiv. It is 
 true that the title oi twv Kprjvoiv kTnjXiXyjTai does occur in 
 the Politics; nor do I know of any direct authority 
 for the expression o twv koivwv cTrt/AcXi/r)/'?. This official 
 would however be much more naturally coupled with 
 the Ttt/xtas Tojv cTTpaTKOTtKwv and the ol liri rov OeaypLKov 
 
APPENDIX. 187 
 
 than a merely subordinate official who looked after the 
 water-supply. Besides, the water-supply was no part 
 of the StoiKiyort?. 
 
 (2) The account of the ^ovXrj represents it as Council, 
 chiefly occupied with the 8ok t/xacrta and trial of magis- ^' '^ ^ ^' 
 trates, i.e. with judicial duties and with administration, 
 (rvvSiOLKeZ Se kol rats aAXais app^ats ra TrXctcrTa. Its 
 probouleutic functions are not treated as of any great 
 importance (ch. 45). At one time it was Kvpta kol 
 XptjP'CLO'LV t,r}fjLL(i}orat kol aTroKTctvat. This power was taken 
 
 away from it. 
 
 (3) "We are told that originally nearly all officials Demes. 
 were chosen by the demes : but, owing to corruption, 
 later all were chosen by the tribes except the povXevrat 
 
 and the <f>povpoL. For these offices the preliminary 
 election was always by demes. This confirms the 
 suggestion, which was I believe originally made by 
 Kirchoff, that I have adopted in the text. PP- ^4— 
 
 The establishment of this point is of some importance. 
 It would be much easier to maintain the principle of 
 rotation when the elections were managed by small 
 societies, where every individual was known. As the 
 final decision between the candidates was by lot, the 
 elections could not have any party importance. What 
 each deme had to do therefore was to nominate each year 
 at least twice the number of men that would eventually be 
 chosen from that deme. Now if the principle of rotation 
 were really maintained it would probably as a rule scarcely 
 be necessary to have recourse to the lot ; men would be 
 elected more or less in order of seniority ; the lot would 
 not be more important than it was when used at Rome 
 under the Empire to decide which of two men of equal 
 standing should have his province first. In many cases 
 the Demarch would probably nominate 6 or 8 or 10 of 
 
188 APPENDIX. 
 
 the members next on the list, and there would be no 
 competition. This will explain how it happens that 
 p. 56. father and son, or two brothers serve together. Twice 
 
 as many must have been nominated as there were 
 members, so as to leave plenty for the iTriKaxqa-L^. 
 Perhaps the arrangement was that each deme nomi- 
 nated twice the required number : half were chosen, 
 and the other half were ready to serve if necessary. 
 Rotation, (4) In ch. 4 we have a statement of the principle 
 
 ^' * of rotation clearer than anything hitherto known. 
 
 KkyjpovaOai Sc /cat ravrqv koX ras oAAas dp)(as rovs 
 VTrep TptotKOvra err] yeyovorais, kol Sts tov avTov jxrj apx^LV 
 irpo Tov 7rdvT\a<s TrepL^eXOeiv' Tore Sc TraXtv e^ vnapyyj^ 
 KXrjpovv. 
 
 This is not the less valuable if, as is probable, it is 
 only by an anachronism that it is attributed to Draco. 
 It ought finally to set at rest any doubt as to what the 
 object of the lot was. 
 
 Ch. 24. Aristotle dwells on the great number of 
 public officers there were at Athens ; besides the guards, 
 and the Council of 500, there were in all at one time 
 1400 officials. This again supports the view that every 
 Athenian citizen must have held office in turn. 
 
 The passage is such a valuable illustration of the 
 principle laid down in the text that it will be well to 
 quote it : 
 
 crvvipaLvev yap aTro twi/ cfiopuiv Koi t<3v tcXwv kol twv 
 a-vfxpidxoiv TrXctovs 17 BLO-fJivpLovq dvSpa^ Tp€<^€cr^at, SiKaaToi 
 /xev yap -^aav €^aKt(r;(tA.tot, To^orat 8' c^afcoo-tot Koi ^tXtot, kol 
 Trpos TovTOts tTTTTCts xtXtot KOL Sia/cooTioi, ^ovXrj Sc TTcvra- 
 
 KOO-tOt, KOL (fipOVpol VeOipLWV TTCVraKOO-LOL, KOL TTpoS TOVTOLS 
 
 €V ry TToXei <l>povpoL TrevTyJKovra, ap^at 8* evSrjfjLOL /xev €t? 
 CTrraKoa-Lovs avSpa?, virepopioL 8* els lTrraKO(rCovs. 
 
APPENDIX. 189 
 
 It is impossible at once to estimate the value of the 
 new account given of the different offices. 1 will only 
 point out : 
 
 (1) With regard to the Xoyiarai These were of 
 two kinds : 
 
 (a) 10 elected from members of the council, who Xoyiffral, 
 had to draw up the accounts of each office {KXrjpovo-L Se ^^' 
 Kol XoyKTTcts €^ avTwv ol /BovXevToi ScKa toi)s Xoyiovixevovs 
 T[aLS ap];(at9 Kara ttqv Trpvraveiav €Ka(rTr)v). 
 
 (6) There were besides 10 evOvvoi with 10 irdpeSpoL, 
 and 10 XoyiaraL with 10 a-uinjyopoi who were occupied 
 with the €v6vva of the magistrates (ch. 54). 
 
 This supports the view I have taken that the Xoytcr- 
 Tttt had other duties besides those immediately connected 
 with the evOvva. The actual arrangements are however 
 different from what they were in the 5th century. 
 
 (2) The plans of the temples were originally )Sou\^, 
 criticised by the povX-q : but, as their decision was not ^' 
 impartial, the matter was afterwards handed over to a 
 
 hLKa.(TTrjpLOV. 
 
 The council exercised also a general superintendence 
 over all public buildings (i^era^ev Se /cat to, oiKoSiy/xaTa 
 Tct Srjixocna Travra, ch. 46). 
 
 The architects for the ships, as for the public 
 buildings, were elected by the people (ch. 46), and the 
 TptiypoTTotot were elected by the council (ib.). p. 159. 
 
 (3) The accounts of the TrcoX^rat, aTroSeKrai, and 
 cvScKtt, though rather fuller than what we possessed, 
 agree with what was known before. 
 
 It is however definitely stated that the council had p. 139. 
 to decide to whom the taxes should be leased (KaraKv- 
 powTLV oT<i) av rj povX-rj x€LpoTOvrj<rrj, ch. 48). He adds 
 a full account of the different documents to be drawn 
 up by the TrwXrjTaL. 
 
190 APPENDIX. 
 
 Doki- (4) Ch. 55. The account given of the hoKi^atrta is 
 
 pp. 96 etc. remarkable. It seems to point to a very great increase 
 of the arbitrary power of the Dicastes to reject a man 
 without reason, even if he were not accused. We are, 
 however, especially told that this was not the former 
 practice. This implies a greater use of the freedom of 
 rejection on indefinite grounds than I had supposed. It 
 supports, however, my contention that this use was a 
 late development. 
 
 After describing the formal question and answer 
 lireihav 8c 7rapa<T)(rJTaL tov? fxapTvpas cTrcpwTa, tovtov 
 (SovXcrai rts Kanyyopctv ; Kav /u,€v rj rts KaTTjyopos, Sovs 
 KaTTj-yoplav kol dTroXoyiav, ovtoj StSwcrti/ iv fxkv rrj /BovXrj 
 TTJv eTTLx^ipoTov tav, iv Se T<a StKaor-nypto), rrjv \l/rj<f)ov' iav Be 
 firjSels jSovXrp-at Kavqyopeiv^ evOv^ StSoxrt rrjv \J/rj<f>ov kol 
 nporepov pXv cts ive/SaWe tqv {jnJKJiov, vvv 8* avdyK-q Trai/ras 
 co-Tt SLa*ij/r)<f)Lt,€cr9aL Trepl avTOiv, tva dv rts Trovrjpois utv 
 diraWdto tov<s KaTYjyopovs, ctti rots St/cacrrats yevrjTai 
 TOVTOV aTToSoKi/xcuxat. 
 p. 133. (5) The law that only TrcvTafcocrto/xcSi/Avot were eligible 
 
 as Ta/>ttat, though never repealed, was, we are told, not 
 really enforced. 
 
 ot Ttt/xtat n7s *A6r)voi<s elal /xcv Sexa KXrjpoiTOL, els eK r^s 
 <f>vXrj<;j €K TrevTaKoaioixeSLfJivtDV Kara tov ^oAwvos vofi^oVj 
 €Tt yap o v]o/xos xvpios eaTLv, dp^et 8* o Xa;((oi/ Kav irdvv 
 Trevrjs rj (ch. 47). 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Acropolis, treasure preserved in, 
 133, 169 
 
 Adriatic, 64, 158 
 
 uEschines, elected irvKaydpai, 25 n. 
 1 ; accuses Demosthenes, 54 ; 
 ambassador, 73 
 
 ay opd, 139 
 
 dyopapd/jLoi, 94 
 
 Agyrrhio.s, 115 n. 1 
 
 deXod^rai, 122, 124 
 
 Alcibiades, 35, 37 
 
 Alcmceonid, 16 
 
 Allies, V. cr{>/jt.fjiaxoL 
 
 America, democracy in, 145, 179 
 
 Amnesty, 151 
 
 dpaKpiais, 147 n. 1 
 
 Andocides, quoted, 95 
 
 Androtion, 74 
 
 avTiypatpevs, 167 
 
 Antiphon, 34 
 
 dTToSe/cra^, 86, 122, 124, 129, 131 
 n. 1, 157, 189 
 
 diroa-ToXecs, 65 n. 1, 73, 185 n. 3 
 
 Archedemos, 115 n. 1 
 
 'ApxiTiKTcov, 108—9, 189 
 
 Archons, use of lot in election of, 
 IX., 7, 78 sq. ; a sacred office, 7 ; 
 early history of, 78 sq., 184; 
 judicial duties of, 146 sq.; com- 
 pared with the Prffitor, ib. 
 
 Areopagus, Council of, v. ^ovkq 
 Artsteides, archon, 78, 184; Tafiias, 
 
 113 
 Aristophanes, quoted, 25, 113 
 Aristophon, 35, 112 
 Aristotle, xiii., xv., 15, 31, 42, 89, 
 
 {iroXiTela tQp 'AdrjvaiQv) xv. sq. 
 
 183 sq. 
 daTvvofxoi, 94 
 ctrAeia, 167 
 aVi/xta, 97, 100 
 
 Ballot, to be distinguished from 
 
 the lot, 1 
 Beloch, XII., 22 n. 1, 23 n. 1 
 Boeckh, xii., 21 n. 1, 58 n. 1, 63 n. 
 
 1, 113, 155 n. 1, 162 
 ^ov\evT7}pLOv, 122, 140 
 ^ovKevTiq^, power of, 68, 75 sq. 
 PovKt) tCov 'ApeoirayiTuv, fall of, 
 46; in the Persian wars, 80, 
 185 
 
 — Tuv irevTaKoaiiav, history of, 
 46 ; appointment to, 49 ; member- 
 ship of, 51, 56; duties of, 51, 57 
 sq., 187; in foreign affairs, 61 
 sq. ; in administration, 64, 109 ; 
 in finance, 65, 121 sq. ; great 
 powers of, 75; relations to iK- 
 KXrjala, 64 (v. iKKXrjcia) ; orators 
 
192 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 in the, 69; judicial duties, 71; 
 publicity of, 69 
 
 CallistheneSj 35 
 
 Callistratos, 115 n. 1 
 
 Xopvyoi, 169 
 
 Cleisthenes, reforms of, 46, 78, 86, 
 
 167, 184 
 CUon, 112, 113, 116 
 Cleophon, 35, 37, 115 n. 1 
 Committees, of the Assembly, 154, 
 
 163 
 Compulsory office, 94 
 Council, government by a, 42; in 
 
 city states, 43; at Athens, 45; 
 
 V. jSouXiJ 
 CtesipJwn, 37 
 
 Deinarchus, 10, 37 n. 1, 118 n. 1 
 
 Demetrius of Phaleron, 78 
 
 dijfiapxos, 166 sq., 187 
 
 Demes, used for electoral purposes, 
 54 — 5j 187; for financial pur- 
 poses, 143; officials of, 164 sq.; 
 property of, 165 ; meetings of, ib. 
 
 dvfJ^rai, 56, 168, 187 
 
 Democracy, what the Greeks meant 
 by, 17; ancient and modern 
 compared, 18, 26, 179 ; inverted 
 monarchy, 28; officials in the, 
 30; contrasted with oligarchy, 
 90 ; characteristics of, 42, 135, 
 137, 171; and lawyers, 145 sq., 
 153 ; Isocrates on the, 39 ; in 
 America, 145, 179; in England, 
 26, 180; in Switzerland, 180 
 
 Demos, rule of the, 26; tyrant- 
 demos, 31 ; relation to parties, 
 33; V. iKKXrjaia 
 
 Demosthenes, condemned, 35; ret- 
 XOTToids, 73, 107; uncle of, 170; 
 
 in the Council, 54 ; quoted, 54 
 
 n. 2, 91, 168 
 diaypa<p€U, 143 
 SiKaffTT^pta, political importance of, 
 
 35, 101, 145 
 dioiKT^crci, 6 iwl T^ V. rafdas 
 diupeXla, 123 
 
 8oKifM(ria, 54 n. 1, 96 sq., 190 
 Draco, constitution ascribed to, 
 
 183 
 
 eiffayyeXla, 117 
 
 eiff^opd, 143 
 
 eKKXrjffia, 29 ; relation to the ^ovXr„ 
 39, 45, 49, 57, 59, 64—9, 110, 
 124, 158; supremacy of, 30—2, 
 41 — 2 ; business of, 58 sq. ; ora- 
 tors in the, 114 
 
 €KXoy€ts, 104 n. 1, 143 
 
 Elections, in Athens and modern 
 states, 19, 27 — 8; aristocratic, 
 15 ; not party contests, 20 sq. ; 
 smaU evidence about, 25 ; of 
 finance minister, 21, 113 ; of 
 generals, 21, 102 sq. ; to excep- 
 tional offices, 104, 25 n. 1 
 
 eXXTjvorafJiiai, 93, 95 n. 1, 104 n. 1, 
 124, 131 
 
 hdcKa, 94, 141 sq., 185 
 
 England and Athens compared, 177 
 
 iiriypatpeis, 143 n. 1 
 
 ^TriXdx*?^:?, 54 
 
 €infl€XT}TT]S T(JJV iip-q^oju, 104 
 
 Kprjvujv, 186 
 
 vecaplojv, 154 sq., 64 
 
 (pvXuv v. 0i;\i7 
 
 iiTKTTaTTjs tQv dTjfioffluv ^pycjv, 73 ; 
 not chosen by lot, 105 sq. 
 
 kraipeiai, 33 sq. 
 
 Eubulus, 21 n. 1, 112, 113 
 
 eiirarpides, 83, 168 
 
INDEX. 
 
 193 
 
 Euripides, quoted, 9 
 
 eifOvva, 125, 189 
 
 eifdvvoiy 189 ; in the demes, 166 
 
 Exceptional offices, 72, 104 sq. 
 
 k\7}p<jot6s, v. Lot 
 KXifiaKldes, 161 
 KvafMeOeiv, V. Lot 
 KdjiXaKpirai, 130 
 
 Finance, 111 sq. ; ministers, 113; 
 
 and the orators, 114; growing 
 
 difficulties, 119; the Council, 
 
 121 
 Fraud, prevalence of at Athens, 
 
 91, 129, 135, 144, 177 
 Frazer, The Golden Bough quoted, 
 
 9n. 3 
 Freeman, Professor quoted, 51 
 Fustel de Coulanges, xi., 7 n. 2, 12 
 
 n. 1, 47 n. 1, 81, 183, 186 
 
 Generals, v. arpaTTfyol 
 
 Gilbert, xi., xii., 23 n. 1 
 
 Glaucon, 115 
 
 Gorgias, 17 
 
 ypa/x/iare^s twv cinixeKriTUV , 156 
 
 6e<Tfio6€T(ji}p, 185 
 
 Grote, X., xiii., 79, 153 
 Guards, 188 
 
 Heraea, lot used at, 38 n. 1 
 Herald, 139 
 Hermann, xiii., 98 
 Herodotus, quoted, 13 n. 1, 78 
 Hypereides, quoted, 6 n. 1 
 
 Idomeneus, 79 
 
 Upetj, 167; chosen by lot, 5, 170; 
 
 in charge of money, 136; tuv 
 
 <pv\(av, 170 
 UpoiroLoL, 109 n. 1, 167, 170 
 Imrapxoi, 104 
 iirireis, 185 
 Isocrates, quoted, 16, 39, 119 n. 1, 
 
 184 
 
 H. 
 
 Law, Athenian system of, 151 
 Lawyers, absence of at Athens, 145 ; 
 
 influence of, ib. 
 XriTovpyiai, 95, 118, 166, 168 
 Xoyiffral, 125 sq., 129 n. 1, 134, 
 
 189 ; in the Demes, 166 
 Lot, treatment of the subject, ix., 
 1; various explanations, 3; his- 
 tory and origin of, ix., 4 sq., 78 
 sq., 183; religious origin of, 4; 
 used in appointment of priests, 
 5, 170; in the poets, 9; in the 
 orators, 10 ; at Rome, 12 ; at 
 Syracuse and Tarentum, 15; at 
 Heraea, 38 n. 1 ; political use of, 
 IK. ; democratic, 12 ; opinion of 
 Socrates on, 10, 13; of Aristotle, 
 15; used also in other constitu- 
 tions, 17 n. 1, 80 n. 1; other 
 theories, 16, 20 n. 1; why it was 
 democratic, 32 sq., 88, 171 sq.; 
 used to prevent faction, 38; for 
 the Areopagus, 45 ; for the Coun- 
 cil, 47 sq. ; date of introduction 
 of, 78 sq., 183; for the archon- 
 ship, 79, 184; for other offices, 
 85, 185; and rotation in office, 
 88; advantages of, 92 sq., 161 
 sq. ; and compulsory nomination, 
 94; and the doKifiaala, 96; ex- 
 ceptions to use of, 102 sq.; when 
 abandoned, 87 n. 1 
 Lugebil, x., 7 n. 1, 38 n. 2, 183 
 Lysias, quoted, 11, 53 n. 1, 97 n. 1 
 
 Maine, Sir H., 28, 29 
 
 13 
 
194 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Marathon, battle of, 78, 85 
 fxepdpxai, 167 
 fierpovo/Moi, 155 
 
 MUller-Strubing, xi., 13 n. 1, 16, 
 20, 79 n. 1, 183 
 
 Nicias, peace of, 67 
 
 Nomination of candidates, 4, 25 
 n. 1; for the Council, 53, 184; 
 for the Archonship, 82; for iin- 
 /iieXrjTal tCov vewpiup, 163 ; com- 
 pulsory, 195 
 
 OTriffOodofMos, 130 
 
 Orators, position of, 30, 114 sq. ; in 
 the Council, 53, 59; responsi- 
 bility of, 60 n. 1, 117; their 
 evidence on the lot, 10; on the 
 doKLfiaaia, 97, 99 
 
 6pL<TTai, 166 
 
 Population of Attica, 50, 83 
 
 iropiaral, 73 
 
 Praetor, compared with the Ar- 
 
 chons, 145 
 TrpdKTopes, 126, 140 
 TT/oecr/Sets, 67, 73, 105 
 Priests, v. iepeis 
 
 Prime Minister at Athens, 24, 28 
 wpo^oijXevfxa, 58 sq., 67 
 vpo^ovXoi, 60 n. 2, 74 
 irpoedpla, 167 
 Propylaea, 107 
 Prosecutions, political, 36 
 irpoa-TdTrjs tov b-qfiov, 27 n. 1, 30, 37, 
 
 115 sq., 123 
 irpvTapeU, 47 n. 1, 51, 64, 67, 103, 
 
 122, 124, 136; lists of, 55; iirt- 
 
 (TTdTTjs tCov, 52 
 Prytaneum, 52 
 irvXayopas, 25 n. 1 
 
 Trapaypaip-q, 149 
 
 wdpedpoi, 172 n. 1, 189 
 
 Parthenon, building of the, 73 
 
 Pausanias, 82 
 
 TnySdXia, 161 
 
 Peirceus, 161 
 
 Peisistratidae, 184 
 
 irepraKOffio/i^difxvoi, 81, 185, 190 
 
 Pericles, 21, 35, 55 n. 1, 112—3, 137 
 
 (pparpla, 172 
 
 4>povpol, 188 
 
 ^vXal, 168 sq. ; officials of, ib. ; iiri- 
 
 ficXrjToX Tuv, 95, 169 
 <p{>\apxoi, 104 
 Plato, iTnp.eXriT'i^i, 163; quoted, 8, 
 
 88, 174—5 
 
 Comicus, 25 n. 1, 54 n. 1 
 
 Plutarch, xvii., 78, 82, 113 
 
 TToX^fiapxos, 78, 147 
 
 iruiX-nral, 109, 126, 138 sq., 185, 189 
 
 Re-election, to the Council, 50, 56, 
 
 57 n. 2 ; to other offices, 90 and 
 
 n. 1, 155 
 Referendum, 180 
 Revolutions, 91 
 Rhodes, 120 
 
 Rome, 46, 89, 145, 176, 187 
 Rotation in office, xvi., 88 sq., 
 
 188; for the Council, 49, 187; 
 
 for the Archonship, 83 
 
 Salamis, battle of, 85 
 
 Schumann, xii., 80 n. 1, 146, 183 
 
 (Tiro^iJXaKes, 155 
 
 Slaves, 163, 181 
 
 Socrates, his opinions about the 
 lot, 10, 13 ; member of the Coun- 
 cil, 53 n. 1 
 
 Solon, 46, 83, 183 
 
 o-rdo-is, undemocratic, 38 
 
INDEX. 
 
 195 
 
 (TTpaTTjyoi, position of, 21; com- 
 pared to the Ministry, 22; the 
 extent of their power, 28, 103; 
 102 sq., 122, 124; irpCravis tuv, 
 22 — 3; avTOKpdrupj 23 
 
 ffvyypa<p€is, 61, 73 
 
 avWoyeis tov d-qfioVy 63 n. 2 
 
 a^fifiaxoi, 62 n. 1 
 
 (Tvvrjyopoi, 73, 189; in the Demes, 
 166 
 
 ffuxppoviffTai, 104, 167 
 
 Switzerland, democracy in, 180 
 
 Syracuse, lot used at, 15 
 
 raKral, 71, 104 n. 1 
 rafdas ttjs jSouXt/s, 130 
 
 in the demes, 166 
 
 Tijs eeoO, 69 n. 1, 93, 125, 126, 
 
 132 sq., 185, 189 
 
 rwv KOivujv irpoffodbjv, 23, 113, 
 
 120, 186 
 
 Tuiv pewplwv, 162 
 
 rrjs (pvXijs, 170 
 
 Tuv arparLUTLKiSv, 186 
 
 Tuv TpvqpoiroLtjjv, 160 
 
 Tarentum, the lot at, 15 
 
 rappoly 161 
 
 Taxes, how levied, 110—2, 119 
 
 Ta^iapxot, 104' 
 
 reixoTTOiol, 73, 107 
 
 Temples, building of, 107; plans of, 
 
 108, 189 
 Themistocles, Archonship of, 79, 
 
 184 
 defffioe^rat, 83, 122, 124, 147, 185 
 OecopLKdv, 6 iirl to, 120, 186 
 Thucydides, quoted, 67, 174 
 To^raL, 140 
 
 rpiTjpdpxai., 56, 58 n. 1, 66, 158 sq. 
 rpi-npoTTOLol, 104 n. 1, 123—4, 159— 
 
 60, 189 
 Tnremes, 106, 161 
 
 i&Trofw/iara, 158 
 
 Xanthippus, 79 n. 1 
 
 Xenophon, quoted, 6 n. 1, 13 n. 2, 
 
 14, 58 n. 1, 103 n. 1, 106 n. 1, 
 
 115, 117 n. 1 
 
 ^evylrai, 185 
 ^TITTjral, 73 
 
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