OF TH^ UNIVERSITY /^, 4 Ml I ) '■:\r\ y 4 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from Microsoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/foundingofspanisOOchaprich THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO Antonio Maria Bucarely y Ursua, Viceroy of New Spain, 1771-1779. From M. Rivera Cambas, Los gobemantes de Mexico, Vol. I, opposite page 422. THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA THE NORTHWESTWARD EXPANSION OF NEW SPAIN, 1687-1783 BT CHARLES EDWARD CHAPMAN, Ph.D. ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Netn gorft THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1916 All rights reserved OOPTEIOHT, 1916, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and printed. Published June, 1916. NorfaootJ 5Preg8 J. 8. Gushing Co. — Berwick &. Smith Oo. Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 6V PREFACE The present study owes its form to two principal ideas, which seem at first sight only distantly related, but which in fact merge into one. In the first place, I have endeavored to trace those influences that were at work prior to the nineteenth century whose tendency was to preserve Alta (or American) California, perhaps also Oregon and Wash- ington, for ultimate acquisition by the United States. In the second place, I have aimed to give in detail an account of a Spanish experiment in colonization, although the narrative is limited to a comparatively brief span of years, and is still further narrowed in scope by treatment from the standpoint of governmental interest, rather than from that of events or experiences in the lands referred to. The problem of colonizing the Californias (considered as ex- tending from Cape San Lucas indefinitely northward) was one of such extreme difficulty that it was manifestly impos- sible of successful accomplishment without an extraordinary effort on the part of those attempting it. After permanent establishments had been formed by the Spaniards in Alta California, a still more extraordinary effort would have been required to develop them into a populous province. Nothing but a sequence of fortunate events — such as discoveries or inventions that would have helped to over- come the difficulties of communication, and the finding of gold, which would have made the region attractive to set- tlers — could have enabled Spain to achieve the establish- ment of strong colonies in Alta CaKfornia without great expenditure of treasure and of effort. Noteworthy inven- tions facilitating communication, and consequent growth of population, were not to come, however, until well into the nineteenth century, while the discovery of gold was MSi^'^'as Vi PREFACE almost certainly destined to come only as a result of an increased population, before it could become in turn a cause for yet further growth. Gold lay back from the coast, up the river valleys, whereas the early settlements were founded, as it was natural they should have been, in a narrow strip along the coast. Until population should become great enough to induce men to seek new lands in the interior, the gold was likely to remain undiscovered. These considera- tions make it clear that the two ideas above referred to are in reality, as stated, only different aspects of one idea : the difficulties of colonization from the Pacific were so great that in the absence of exceptional exertions by Spain, or in default of fortuitous events extraordinarily favorable to her, the era of populous settlement was inevitably post- poned until the way to CaHfornia was opened to colonists from across the continent. This will appear more clearly if we consider for a mo- ment the difficulties that lay in the way of colonization from .the Pacific. The Calif ornia^jyeraJifiB-rly the farthest from western Europe of any of the lands of the earth. Merely to reach^the Pacific'fequired'X'vo yarge o length. Once there, the storms of that ill-named ocean iiad to be encountered ; and especially ^as This" the case for the voy- age northward from Cape San Lucas. Furthermore, there was the danger of uncharted seas and little known shores ; nautical information was not at all what it is to-day ; ships' crews and officers were often of an inferior character; pirates not infrequently lay in wait ; and ships themselves were small and frail. Other difficulties, which arose from the nature of the land and inhabitants of the Californias, combined with the preceding to deprive these of communi- cation with the outer world by sea. The Indians of that region were on such a low plane of culture that they had almost nothing which could serve the needs of white men. The food products which California now yields in such abundance did not exist in any part of the Californias when the early voyagers came there. Not only were there no agricultural products capable of sustaining a white popu- PREFACE vii lation, but there were no domestic animals, and none of the utensils required by civilized men, wherefore every- thing that was needed had to be brought from without. Supplies inevitably dwindled, and this precluded a long stay by the early explorers. What was perhaps worse, was that the sailors contracted scurvy, owing to a lack of fresh supplies, and died in such numbers that it was rare indeed when a vessel could return to Europe from a voyage to the Pacific with as many as half its original crew. Even the short voyage along the peninsula of Baja California was in many cases equally fatal. Finally, although men could in some cases overcome extraordinary difficulties and reach the Cahfornias, they did not at first bring women with them, and therefore any establishments they formed lacked for a time a very necessary element of permanence. From this review it is evident that a base of supplies, near at hand, was required, if settlement of the Califomias under normal conditions, without the influence of unusual forces, was to be reaHzed. This meant that colonists who app roached by land, maintaining communication with well- settled communities behind them, would have the^ best chagce^of^axK^Qiiring the Califomias. This narrowed" the contest to the Spanish, English, French, and Russians. The French were ousted by the English in 1763, and the English advance towards the Pacific broke into two col- umns with the establishment of the independence of the United States. Curiously enough these four peoples suc- ceeded in acquiring portions of the Californias, although the Spanish part was cut down to Baja CaHfornia, after Mexico had succeeded to Spain^s claim, and the Russians voluntarily withdrew, after the sale of Alaska to the United States. It was thus that matters ultimately worked out ; but there was at least one diversion from the normal progress of events. That was due to an extraordinary effort on the part of Spain, as a result of which Alta California was oc- cupied by the Spaniards in 1769, and so developed, in the face of such difficulties as have been named, that by the vm PREFACE founding of San Francisco in 1776 the Spanish settlements were rescued from impending failure and placed on a per- manent basis. The leading names associated, respectively, with these great achievements are those of the visitador Gdlvez and the viceroy Bucarely. Their work proved to be a piece of extreme good fortune for the United States. At a time when the Russians and English, particularly the latter, were pressing onward with a prospect of setthng Alta California, it enabled the land to be held temporarily by Spain and Mexico, until the American movement ac- quired the impetus that carried it to the Pacific coast in the early forties of the nineteenth century. Spain's capacity for great effort in Alta California seemed likely to continue. Bucarely had plans under way, the successful accomplishment of which would have advanced the colonies far beyond the stage of mere permanence into that of populous development. And here, indeed, was danger to the future prospects of the United States; for a populous development of Alta CaUfornia must almost certainly have involved discovery of gold, and a consequent haste of settlement before the United States could have been ready to make good her interests in the region. It is well to bear in mind, too, that the Spaniards have been among the most expert seekers of precious metals in the history of modern times ; the rush of miners to Arizonac and Ciene- guilla, referred to in this volume, shows what might have happened if they had been the discoverers of Alta Cali- fornia's gold. It must be remembered, also, that the United States did not extend beyond the Mississippi until 1803, did not acquire frontage on the Pacific until 1819, and did not make great progress in colonizing the Oregon country until after 1840. Bucarely was not permitted to carry out his plans, how- ever. Through Gdlvez's agency the Calif ornias were taken from his command and placed under a new government of the frontier provinces of New Spain. Teodoro de Croix, whom Gdlvez chose to rule the new government, proved incompetent to carry out the projects for the development PREFACE IX of Alta California, which depended for their success on the maintenance of an overland route from Sonora, already opened by Bucarely. Croix founded some weak establish- ments on the California side of the Colorado River at its junction with the Gila, opposite Yuma, Arizona, but in other respects neglected the problems affecting the route. The result was that the Yuma Indians rose against the Spanish establishments in 1781 and destroyed them. The . Yuma massacre closed the overland route to Alta California, ^ and with it passed Alta California's chance for early popu- lous settlement. It meant that gold was reserved for dis- covery until 1848. That discovery at that particular time was yet another bit of good fortune for the United States, for it insured the development of the region when the United States had just become possessed of it. Four dates, then, in the history of California are of more \ \ than passing significance in the history of the United States, j to wit, 1769, 1776, 1781, and 1848; particularly the last 1 \ three. They had a bearing on the acquisition and, in the case of the last, on the retention of California by the United States. The effect on Oregon and Washington of the events marked by the first three dates may be gathered from that of the discovery of gold in 1848; after the first rush for the gold fields was over, Oregon and Washing- ton shared in the development that was transforming Cali- fornia. And the significance of the events connected with the dates just mentioned may be even greater in the future than now, if frontage on the Pacific becomes a vital factor in the history of the United States, as the interests of other peoples around that ocean continue to develop. For the reasons given, it would seem worth while to re- late the story of Spain's attempts during two centuries and a half to occupy the Californias. As a corollary the his- tory of Spain in its broadest aspects is of great import. If logical proportions alone were considered, a large share would be allotted in this study to that history. The space cannot be given, but its lack may in a measure be met by emphasis at this point. It was an important factor in X PREFACE American history that Spain followed an imperialistic pol- icy in Europe, seeking possessions in Italy and in the Low Countries, or their retention, once they had been gained. This involved her in almost continuous war, requiring troops and heavy expenditures. Spain herself being unable to provide enough funds, she resorted for them, after the discovery of America, in large measure to her c olonie s. Receipts never equalled the need, however, with the result that as little revenue as possible was expended by her in the colonies, whose affairs were regarded as less important than her policy in Europe. Had she been con- tent or able to restrict herself to the Iberian peninsula and her colonies, there might have been funds available for the benefit of the latter. If more funds had been applied to the founding of settlements in Alta California, an object which Spain so ardently desired that even as things were, she was willing to go to some expense to accomplish it, an early development of that province, with all the conse- quences above indicated, might well have been reahzed. It is perhaps, a far cry from the ItaHan conquests of Pedro III of Aragon (1276-85) to the acquisition of California and other territories by the United States, but there is ground for asserting that the connection exists. To treat in detail of the entire history of Spain's under- takings in the Californias would require many volumes, wherefore it has seemed best to put the greatest stress on the vital period in the history of Spanish settlement in Alta California from 1773 to 1776, when Bucarely was transforming the weak establishments of earlier years, and placing them on an enduring basis. It has further seemed necessary, since the tale is for the most part new, to introduce a vast amount of documentary detail, in or- der to drive home the conclusions that have been formed. The portion of this study most intensively treated is pre- ceded by a discussion in seven chapters of projects bearing on the advance of the Spanish conquest overland toward the Colorado and Gila rivers, from 1521 to 1773, with some reference also to the occupation of the two Californias PREFACE XI before the mainland conquest had reached those rivers.' This portion of the present volume was presented as a doc- toral thesis in May, 1915, at the University of California, in substantially the same form as it appears here, under the title Preliminaries of the Spanish advance from Sonora to California, 1687-1773. Then follows the principal part of the work, to which are added two concluding chapters, showing that Spain did not, after 1776, continue her ex- traordinary efforts to develop Alta California. In a subject like that treated in this work, it is impos- sible to avoid touching upon a variety of subjects that cannot be carried to a conclusion. Among topics of such a nature that appear in the present study are the following : Spanish colonial administration in its various phases ; the story of the Spanish advance from Mexico City to Sonora, and along another line to Nueva Viz cay a ; events taking place east of Sonora in Nueva Vizcaya, for they in fact had a bearing upon Sonora affairs, and northwestward advance ; the part played by the regular and secular clergy in the conquest ; the part played by military and civil authorities ; the importance of the civilian population, especially miners, involving discussion of the use and treatment of Indians by the whites ; the inter-relations of the elements just named, and, in particular, conflicts between them ; Spain's chronic fear of foreign encroachment on her dominions of the Pacific ; the occupation of Baja California and progress there ; the early voyages to Alta California ; the Manila galleon and Pacific commerce; the wars with the Seris, Apaches and other Indians in Sonora ; the internal develop- ment of Sonora ; the Department of San Bias ; the ex- peditions of 1769 to Alta California ; the reforms of Gdlvez in Baja California and Sonora ; the northwest voyages in the last quarter of the eighteenth century ; the internal development of Alta California ; the attempts to open a route between New Mexico and Alta California ; a detailed study of the Anza and other expeditions, in themselves, aside from external factors to which they were related ; the comandancia general of the frontier provinces ; life in xii PREFACE Alta California in the later Spanish period and under Mexico. Most of these topics, as far as they come within the period 1760 to 1786, may be studied with a fair degree of adequacy by use of materials included in my Catalogue (see biblio- graphical notes). An explanation may be made of some of the methods that I have adopted in the mechanical construction of the volume. The opening paragraphs of each chapter after the first con- sist of an interpretation and summary of that chapter. Thereafter comes a recital of details gleaned from the documents with but Httle accompanying comment. In names of persons modern spelling has been used for the Christian name, and the form employed by the in- dividual himself, when known, for the apellido, or family name of the father. Accents have been used, whether employed by the person in question or not. Thus, " Jos6^' for "Josef" or "Joseph," "Bautista" for "Baptista"; "Bucarely" for "Bucareli," "Roxas" for "Rojas"; "Car- ets" for "Garces," and "Galvez" for "Galvez." So many Indian tribes are mentioned for which I can find no present- day equivalent, that I have followed Spanish spelling of the eighteenth century in all cases, even when the tribe is easily identified now under another name. Thus, "Cocomari- copas" for "Maricopas," "Quiquimas," for "Quigyumas," and others. In the nomenclature of places difficulties arise owing to changes in names and boundaries of provinces, and to the practice of transferring the name of a particular place to another sitey although the last-named practice is not likely to cause confusion in the present work. In the case of provinces, the writer has usually employed the modern names designating states of the United States or Mexico, as for example "Sinaloa" and "Sonora," instead of one name for both, or either or both with Ostimuri, which was at times regarded as a separate district. The same rule is observed in such cases as the following: "Pacific Ocean" for "South Sea"; "Colorado River" for "Rio del Tiz6n" and other names; "El Paso" for "Paso del Norte." This PREFACE xiii rule has a number of exceptions. "Arizona ^^ does not appear, the region south of the Gila (the only one in Arizona which enters the account) being regarded as part of Sonora, usually under the name of its northernmost portion, "Pi- meria Alta/' "Moqui^' is retained because always referred to as separate from New Mexico. The terms " Calif ornias'' and "California" appear so frequently in the documents in connection with Pacific coast regions from Cape San Lucas northward, that a distinction has been made. "Baja California" has been used to denote the peninsula; "Alta California" for the modern American state; and "Cali- fornias" for both, also including in some cases the far northwest. "Nueva Vizcaya" has been employed rather than "Chihuahua" and "Durango," partially because those two states do not accurately describe the limits for- merly assigned to Nueva Vizcaya. Similarly, "Nueva GaHcia^' is used for Guzman^s conquests. "New Spain" is preferred to "Mexico," not so much because it was Nueva Espana to Spaniards, as to avoid confusion with Mexico City. It is a temptation to say "Provincias Internas," as do the documents, for the northern tier of provinces from Sonora to Texas. That phrase has been avoided, however, and "frontier provinces" used instead. The word "Gulf" often appears instead of "Gulf of California," there being no other gulf with which confusion is possible. The " Col- orado River" refers to the river of that name emptying into the Gulf of California, unless special notice is given that the Colorado of the east is meant. Accents have been employed where they would be used in modern Spanish, except where the place name is of very frequent usage in English, in which case the accent is dropped. Thus, "Que- r^taro" with the accent, and "Mexico" without; "San Jose" and "Santa Barbara" when referring to those places in Alta California, but "San Jose" and "Santa Barbara" when concerned with regions farther south. The accent is retained in "Panamd," although that case is near the line, and also in "Santa Fe," New Mexico, — possibly with some failure of consistency. XIV PREFACE The selection of maps for insertion in the text has been based only partially on their value for illustrating the narrative. If already published and easily accessible, they have been omitted. An attempt has also been made to include such maps as would indicate all, or nearly all, of the place names referred to in the text. Aside from these reasons the determining factor for inclusion or exclusion of maps has been their importance as affecting this account. In order that technical matter may not interrupt the nar- rative I have often used such phrases as "this letter,^^ where "a copy of this letter" would be the technically ac- curate phrase. Spanish terms have rarely been retained, but there are three notable exceptions. An expediente means all of the documents in an oflBicial file of papers on a given case. A testimonio is an expediente of a special type. It is a copy of an expediente, physically bound together by sewing, and usually with a title describing the contents. As used in this work it refers nearly always to certified copies of ori- ginal files, or expedientes, in Mexico, sent to Spain with a letter of the viceroy and perhaps other documents. It thus forms only part of the expediente as found in Spain. The term ministro general or ministro general de Indias is used to denote an office which was undergoing changes, in name as well as in functions, in the period covered by this work. Julian de Arriaga and Jose de Galvez, who held that post in the period most intensively covered, were cer- tainly officials of more consequence than was the Council of the Indies of their day. They dominated the Council, and were apart from it. Hence, it would not be proper to say "Council of the Indies," when ministro general is meant. Usually, it is possible to avoid use of the latter term by employing the official's name, but it seems worth while to call attention to an office which, so far as I know, has not yet been adequately treated in an historical work. To Professor H. Morse Stephens I am greatly indebted for instruction, advice, and encouragement during the past eight years. This volume is the first to be completed of PREFACE XV several in preparation as a direct result of his prescient leadership in promoting the study of the history of the Pacific coast. I wish in the second place to make acknowl- edgments to the patriotic Cahfornian order, the Native Sons of the Golden West. Acting under the inspiring leader- ship of its Grand Presidents this order is contributing lib- erally to the encouragement of historical study by sup- porting annually two TravelHng Fellowhips in Pacific Coast History. The very preponderant bulk in this vol- ume of materials from the Archivo General de Indias of Seville, Spain, selected, during two years while I was priv- ileged to hold one of these fellowships, measures my debt to this fraternity. My stay in Seville was made both more agreeable and more profitable than it might other- wise have been by the exceptionally kind treatment and efficient service that I received at the hands of the officials of the Archivo General de Indias. Especially do I thank the scholarly and courteous chief of that archive, Senor Don Pedro Torres Lanzas, and I acknowledge with gratitude the many favors accorded by Senores Verger and Jimenez Placer, both now deceased, and by Senores Llorens, Navas, and Lafita, all of them of the archive staff during the period of my residence in Seville. Since my return, Mr. Clarence M. Hunt, editor of the N. S. G. W. organ, the Grizzly Bear Magazine, has aided me in innumerable ways in connection with the publication of this volume. I wish in particular to acknowledge the aid and encour- agement of Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, chairman of my doc- toral committee, from whose vast knowledge of the entire field of North American colonization I have profited greatly. The first chapter and a half have had the advantage of his rigid criticism, and I have often consulted him with regard to the later portions of the volume. To him also I owe my access to the large body of materials discovered and procured by him in Mexican archives. To Mr. Herbert I. Priestley, Assistant Curator of the Academy of Pacific Coast History, I am deeply indebted for repeated favors and able criticism, rendered doubly valuable by his intensive knowl- Xvi PREFACE edge of Spanish colonial administration and of the field covered by my work. Many others have given me help, in some cases by valuable advice, in others by supplying me with materials that I desired, and in still others by criti- cism of different chapters. A few of those who have thus aided me are Dr. David P. Barrows, Dr. Francis S. Phil- brick, Dr. Eugene I. McCormac, Dr. Frank A. Golder, Dr. William L. Schurz, Mr. Champlin Burrage, Mr. Gordon C. Davidson, Mr. Karl C. Leebrick, Mr. Charles W. Hack- ett, Mr. CoHn B. Goodykoontz, Mr. Frederick J. Teggart, and Mr. George L. Albright, the last named a student in my seminar. Berkeley, January 5, 1916. CONTENTS Antonio Mari'a Bucarely y UrsuX, Viceroy of New Spain, 1771-1779 Frontispiece PAGB Preface v Introduction by H. Morse Stephens xix I. The Spanish Advance from Mexico City to Fimbria Alta, 1521-1687 1 11. Early Projects for Advance by Way of the Colorado AND Gila Rivers, 1687-1752 14 III. Obstacles in the Way of an Advance, 1752-1765 . . 45 IV. Achievements of Jose de Galvez, 1765-1771 . . . 68 >s V. The Need for an Overland Route to Alta California, — 1769-1773 92 vl. State of Affairs in the Frontier Provinces, 1771-1773 130 \^IL Garces and Anza, 1769-1773 145 VIII. Approaches of the Russians and the English to Span- ish Possessions of the Pacific Northwest . . 173 IX. Diplomacy of the Reign of Charles III (1759-1788) FROM War to War with England, 1763-1779 . . 187 Up] Activities of Spain against Foreign Aggressions in _^ THE Pacific Northwest, 1773-1775 .... 216 \fii Spanish Attention to Local Problems of the Califor- nias, 1773-1775 . 249 > XII. The First Anza Expedition, and Preparations for a ""*^ Second, 1774 273 <5^III^ Conditions in Sonora and Baja California, 1773-1776 . 301 ^XIV. Problems and Progress of Alta California, 1774-1775 314~^ XV. The Second Anza Expedition and Related Events, ""^ 1775-1776 337 xviii CONTENTS PAGE I XVI. Bucarely's Difficulties in Maintaining the Depart- i ment of San Blas, 1775-1777 368 XVII. The Incompetent Rule of Croix, 1776-1783 . . .386 \ XVIII. The Aftermath, 1783-1822 417 Bibliographical Notes 437 Appendix I. Table Showing Total Receipts and Disburse- ments OF the Real Caja of Guadalajara in Each Year from 1743 TO 1781 455 Appendix II. Specimen Tables of the Real Caja of Guada- lajara Showing Receipts and Disbursements, Item by Item, for Each op Two Years facing 456 Appendix III. Diaries of the Anza Expeditions . . . 457 Appendix IV. The Echeveste-Anza Calculation of the Prob- able Cost of the Second Anza Expedition . . . . 461 Appendix V. Resolution of the Junta of December 16, 1774, Concerning Authorization of a Second Expedition by Anza to Alta California 467 Appendix VI. Galvez's Order of March 6, 1779, Directing Croix to Give the Californias Preference in His Atten- tion 469 Appendix VII. Table Showing the Population by Districts of Sinaloa and Sonora in 1781 470 Index 471 MAPS FACING PAGB The Sanchez Map of PiMERfA Alta and the Colorado-Gila Country, 1751 36 Russian Map of 1773 of Siberia and the North Pacific . 224 The Crame Map of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 1774 . . 231 Map of 1777 of Garces' Travels, 1775-1777 364 Font's Map of 1778 of the Regions Visited by Garces . . 366 Spanish Settlements of Alta California 434 INTEODUCTION The peculiar fascination of the history of Alta Cahfornia, that is of the northern part of the two CaHfornias, which is now the State of Cahfornia, is to be found in the fact that in it, and in it to a greater extent than in the other States carved out of Spanish North America, can be traced a story of Spanish romance, Spanish exploration, and Spanish ad- ministration in a country where was later to be established a vigorous American State. While most of the older Ameri- can States boast of the romantic beginnings of settlement from England, while Louisiana grew out of the ambitious designs of great Frenchmen, a certain group of southwestern States, such as Texas, and Arizona, and New Mexico, as well as California, trace their origins to the Spaniards of New Spain. American civilization in the United States is so thoroughly an outgrowth of English individualism and English law that students and readers of the history of the United States are apt to forget the contributions made by the Dutch in the New Netherlands, now New York, by the French in Louisiana, and by the Spaniards in the larger area of the Louisiana Purchase and the Mexican Concession. Douglas Campbell made an attempt to estimate the in- fluence of Dutch institutions in North America, though it has generally been held that he considerably overshot the mark, and no doubt attempts have been made and will be made to estimate, and perhaps to exaggerate, the influence upon both local and general American civilization of the French in Louisiana, and of the Spaniards in Florida and the Louisiana Purchase. Whenever the time comes to work out in detail the extent of these influences, a serious contri- bution will be made to the history of institutions. It will xix XX INTRODUCTION probably be found that the actual influence of non-English institutions has not been very great, but that, on the other hand; the traditions of early exploration and settlement have helped to create a peculiar fund of local sentiment. If it be true, as seems to be generally held at the present time, that the spirit of nationality is not so much the out- come of identity of race, or language, as the product of historic traditions sung by poets and taught by historians, it can be asserted with equal probability that the enthusiasm of State loyalty in the United States is the result of the early history of each individual State. While New England is generally regarded from the outside as a historic unit, some modern scholars have tried to trace a distinct difference in the civilization of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, or of Rhode Island and Connecticut, from the particular condi- tions of their first settlement. To the outsider. New Eng- land is just New England, but to those who reside within the New England States, a sort of State loyalty, differing only in degree from the national spirit in the states of Europe, is clearly to be seen. The same thing is true with regard to the Southern States. A very short residence in Virginia or South Carolina will make manifest that in those two States is a marked State loyalty and State consciousness which sets them apart from the other Southern States, each of which, nevertheless, has its own sentiment of a distinct State civilization. Even in the Middle West, which has been more recently settled, and which cannot boast of any romantic colonial memories, there is yet a local historic pride which differentiates the citizens of Ohio from the citizens of Indiana, and the citizens of Wisconsin from the citizens of Minnesota. State pride, based upon State consciousness, has been the outcome in these modern States, not simply of different sources of population, not simply of different political traditions, but of the complex spiritual influences which make up in a nation or in a state, as in a family, the abiding and characteristic sentiment of a united community. Hitherto, the great tendency in the United States has been, consciously and unconsciously, towards the desire to create INTRODUCTION XXI a national spirit. The vehement behef in the unity and indivisibihty of an American nationahty, which was forged amidst much bloodshed in the great Civil War, or War between the States, has induced leading American historians to dwell upon the history of the United States as a united whole, and has led its most famous statesmen and orators to insist upon the unity of the nation. No one would be so foolish as to deny this prevailing trend of public sentiment in the United States, but, at the same time, there exists, so clearly that no one may ignore it, the local sentiment of State pride, based upon Sifate traditions, which runs side by side with the larger national spirit. The view set forth in the preceding paragraph is so obvious that it needs no further demonstration. Every one who Kves in the United States recognizes that there is a New England temperament and a Rhode Island temperament, as there is a New England pronunciation of words ; every one realizes that there is a Southern spirit as well as a Southern accent ; every one knows that in the Middle West there is a sharp contrast between Kansas and Illinois ; the charac- teristics of Louisiana and the charm of New Orleans differ from the characteristics of New England and the charm of Boston ; and the latest school of American historical writers, especially in the Middle West, has shown that it is necessary to go beyond Professor Turner's epoch-making Significance of the Frontier upon American History,^ and points out that every one of the States that has developed in the West has its own character and its own temperament.^ Who, that has lived in Utah, can have failed to observe the influence of the Mormon tradition ? And, to come at last to the pre- cise subject of this introduction, who that has ever visited California has failed to feel that the Californian differs from the people of other States ? It is usual, and not wholly untrue, to declare that the pe- culiar temperament of the people of California in their 1 American Historical Association, C. L. Becker in Essays in American Report, 1893. history, dedicated by F. J. Turner, * See, for instance, "Kansas" by New York, 1910, pp. 86-112. Xxii INTRODUCTION attitude towards life is due to their descent in large part in central California from the sturdy and adventurous pioneers who were led to that beautiful land by the rush for gold. Bret Harte has fixed in literature certain types of the first gold miners in California, and, though his idealistic treatment of these earliest settlers has been much criticised, there still remains the fact that in San Francisco and Sacra- mento and in the old mining counties the pioneers were men and women of a stri'kingly free, daring, and individual character. But, after all, the entire population of modern California is not descended trom the gold miners. The great territory of Southern Cahforria is just as conscious of California ideals and as proud of them as the descendants of the pioneers themselves. Whence comes, then, the charac- teristic California loyalty to a mode of living and a mode of thought that differs from that prevalent in other States? Disciples of Buckle would doubtless assert that environment due to climate has shaped the nature and the sentiments of the people of California. Disciples of the economic inter- pretation of history might declare that the difference is entirely due to economic conditions, in the old cattle ranches, the old grain ranches, and the orange groves of to-day. And yet these explanations are as inconclusive as the similar explanations of the characteristics of nationality in European countries. It is something more than climatic conditions, or economic development, or descendance from the gold seekers, that makes the people of modern California a dis- tinctive community with a distinctive civilization, with a creative aptitude for literature and art, and with a sort of personality that is everywhere recognized. Consciously, in these latter days, an effort has been made in California, as to a greater or less degree in the other States of the United States, to bring together a body of historical tradition to explain and create a California State pride and a Califor- nia State individuality. This spirit quickly invades the minds of new settlers in the State, whencesoever they come. If a brief residence in California is enough, as it is, to make a loyal Calif ornian, even though the vast majority of the INTRODUCTION xxiii people of California have no direct affiliation with either the early Spanish settlers or the enterprising gold-seeking American pioneers, it is clear that something is being done to create a California nationality. The California organiza- tion of the Native Sons of the Golden West was deliberately founded to maintain an interest in the history of California, and that part of the population which is immigrant and not native has shown itself ready to aid the Native Sons in their generous attempts to give life and truth to California history. There are two romances which lie at the back of the con- sciousness of California pride in the State of California; one is the romance of Spanish exploration and settlement, the other is the romance of the gold diggers. The first romance has been twined around the name of Father Junipero Serra and the history of the Franciscan missions in Alta Cahfornia. Mission architecture, mission furniture, the study of mission sites, and the restoration of mission buildings all bear witness to the sincere desire of the modern residents in California to seek a common interest in at least one side of the Spanish settlement of Alta California. For some years, one of the most popular demonstrations of the interest felt in the Franciscan missions has been the success of the San Gabriel Mission Play, which has been witnessed by thousands, and has stirred the sensibilities of the casual tourist as well as of the resident or the native son. Cele- brations in honor of Don Caspar de Portold, the Spanish captain of dragoons, who led the first expedition by land northward from San Diego, have been held in San Francisco. The study of California history, introduced into the Cali- fornia schools, among the new settlers of the south, as well as among the descendants of the pioneers in the north and central parts of the State, has, hitherto, always begun with the story of the Franciscan missionaries. And yet the es- tablishment of the missions is but an episode in the Spanish settlement of California, and a new school of California historians is arising, and is attempting to cover the story of the Spanish settlement in a more thorough fashion and to xxiv INTRODUCTION show the forces that lay behind the movement of New Spain into Alta Cahfornia. The pubHcation of Doctor Chapman's book is an evidence of the new spirit with regard to the foundation of Spanish Cahfornia, developed among younger historians. All earnest students of Cahfornia history acknowledge the enormous debt of gratitude they owe to Mr. Hubert Howe Bancroft, for the treasury of information with regard to California brought together in his colossal work. Mr. Bancroft under- took the task of writing California history upon a stupendous scale. He realized his opportunity. Seeing that California was first brought to civilization through New Spain, he collected sources of information, not only upon the history of Alta California, but also upon Central America and Mexico. The large way in which he conceived his work led to the gathering of the unequalled collection of primary sources which now forms the glory of the Library of the Uni- versity of California. All was grist that came to his mill, and he absorbed such great collections of material as the Squier Collection on Central America, and the library of the Emperor Maxmilian. Professor Langlois of Paris, the recognized master of historical bibliography, in an article published so long ago as 1891 in the Revue Universitaire^ under the title of H. H. Bancroft et C**,^ drew the at- tention of European scholars to the remarkable work ac- complished by Mr. H. H. Bancroift. Mr. Bancroft was not a native son of California, but came from Ohio, and yet it is to him that Cahfornia historians owe their greatest debt of gratitude. Professor Langlois wonders at the grandeur of the ideas of this bookseller and publisher, without academic training, who conceived the possibiHty of collecting all the accessible sources on the history of California civilization, and who then formed an organization not unhke that of the old Magdeburg Centuriators in the sixteenth century in Europe to collate and interpret them. "Mr. Bancroft and Company," to translate the title of Langlois' article, brought * This article is reprinted in Questions d'histoire et cf enseignement, par C. V. Langlois, Paris, 1902, pp. 243-274. INTRODUCTION XXV forth thirty-nine large volumes of Pacific coast history, based upon his own collection of original sources. This is not the place to criticise, even if the desire existed, the stupen- dous work of Mr. H. H. Bancroft, and, as the years go by, the value of his vast collection is being more and more appre- ciated. Every generation writes its own history of the past, and modern historians may not agree with all Mr. Bancroft's views, especially with regard to the attitude taken by him upon certain phases of Spanish and Mexican California, but the collection of sources that he made will be forever the mine in which future Cahfornia historians must dig for in- formation. To the same epoch of historical composition, belongs the History of California by Theodore H. Hittell, published in 1885, an admirable book composed upon a smaller scale than that of Bancroft's more elaborate work, and confined more strictly to the history of Alta California. These remarkable books were representative of the period in which they were written, and both of them laid a considerable amount of emphasis upon the Spanish settlement of Cali- fornia. But historians, Hke histories, get out of date, and new men arise to take up the task of interpreting the past where their predecessors left off. Among the more recent histories, especial weight should be laid upon the books of Mr. Irving B. Bichman, whose California under Spain and Mexico appeared in 1911, and of Mr. Zoeth S. Eldredge, whose Beginnings of San Francisco appeared in 1912. Both of these books, and especially that of Mr. Eldredge, are real contributions to a knowledge of the early history of Cah- fornia. But more remained to be done ; for however wide- reaching had been Mr. Bancroft's net, he had failed to gather in all the sources upon the romantic history of the Spanish settlement of California. It was known that vast quantities of material were preserved in the great collection of pubhc records known as the Archivo General de Indias at Seville in Spain. Here has been collected all the ojficial correspond- ence from Spanish America with Spain. Mr. Bancroft had obtained copies of some of the most necessary docu- ments, but it was quite certain that hidden away and un- XXvi INTRODUCTION , indexed among the masses of state papers there must be many more that would explain in detail the settlement of Spanish California. The difficulty that presented itself was how to prepare students of California history to work among these great stores of official documents, and how to maintain them during a residence at Seville. The University of California made ready to undertake the task by calling to its Faculty an acknowledged master of modern history. Professor Herbert E. Bolton, who had done admirable work in the University of Texas, who had made himself familiar with the treasure houses of Spanish documents in Mexico, and who had finished his well-known Guide to Materials for the History of the United States in the Principal Archives of Mexico,^ was the very man to train California historical scholars. His wealth of knowledge of Spanish American history, together with his practical experience in dealing with Spanish official documents, made it possible to deal adequately with the materials preserved in the Bancroft Collection, and to prepare for further investigation at the fountain head in Spain. At this moment, came providentially most generous aid from the local California society, devoted to the study of Cali- fornia history, and organized as the Order of the Native Sons of the Golden West. At the critical moment, when a school of young Cahf ornia historians was foreshadowed in the work of Professor Bolton, the Native Sons of the Golden West came forward with a subsidy of $3000 a year for the maintenance of Travelling Fellows, who were to reside in Spain and devote themselves to a search for documents on the history of Spanish California. The first fruits of their generosity are to be seen in Doctor Chapman's volume, to which this is a general introduction. Other volumes are now in hand, and during the next few years a series of mono- graphs on the early history of Spanish California may be expected which will supplement the historical work accom- plished by such pioneers as Bancroft and Hittell, and by such modern historians as Richman and Eldredge. 1 Published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington, D. C, in 1913. INTRODUCTION XXvii It is now time to turn to the actual contribution made by Doctor Chapman to the history of Spanish CaHfornia. It has already been said that the attention of the people of California with regard to their Spanish predecessors had been at first almost entirely devoted to the Franciscan missions. Not until the publication of Mr. Eldredge's book had suffi- cient weight been laid upon the fact that the Portola ex- pedition and the foundation of the missions would have had but little effect if this movement had not been followed up by the Anza expedition, which resulted ij^ the foundation of the Presidio of San Francisco in 1776. ^But behind the expe- ditions of both Portola and Anza, lay a long story of the development of the movement of New Spain towards CaH- fornia Alt a. With the story of this preliminary movement and its growth into the Anza expedition, Doctor Chapman's book deals. It is a sincere and valuable contribution to history, and it sets forth not only the facts of the north- westerly landward movement towards California from Mexico, but also the motives which underlay that movement, and the reasons which had delayed it until the latter part of the eighteenth centuryf The history of California becomes part of the general history of civihzation with the establishment of the Presidio of San Francisco in 1776. Up until the eighteenth century, the Pacific Ocean had been a Spanish lake, traversed by the Manila galleons carrying their annual freight between Manila and Acapulco. But in the eighteenth century other Euro- pean nations began to enter the Pacific Ocean. The Rus- sians, having moved across Siberia, crossed into Alaska and began to work their way down the northern Pacific coast of America. French traders, even before 1715, had made their way up the Pacific coast of South America. An English squadron, under Commodore Anson, broke into the Pacific Ocean in 1740 and captured one of the Manila galleons. The mystery of the Pacific Ocean attracted European public opinion ; possibilities for commercial expansion into the South Sea were widely discussed ; exploration of the ocean was undertaken, most conspicuously in the famous voyages XXviii INTRODUCTION of Captain Cook ; and Spain felt that she must protect the entire Pacific coast, if she was to maintain the monopoly of the Pacific Ocean itself. But could the coast of Alta Cali- fornia be occupied from the ocean ? Could the Pacific coast of Alta California be held through the command of the sea? This problem had long been in the minds of Spanish officials in New Spain. /Nothing is more interesting in Doctor Chapman^s book than the evidence he has gathered to show that the problem of the occupation of Alta California grew naturally out of the northward expansion of New Spain./ Just as the expan- sion of Rome was the natural and inevitable sequel of the history of the Roman RepubHc ; just as the conquest of each new Roman province, whether civilized or uncivilized, led inevitably to further advance^ just as the United States moved irresistibly westward across America, and Russia eastward across Siberia; just as the history of the British Empire in India bears witness to the, steady movement in search of a scientific military frontier ;/so the Spanish officials in Mexico City witnessed, sometimes almost with despair, the inevitable expansion of New Spain. A certain school of historians, like a certain school of statesmen, have lamented the expansion of the great empires of the past and of the present. Now and then, desperate efforts have been made to check an expanding movement and to declare that the final frontier has been reached. But the best intended efforts to check expansion from poHcy have been vain in the past, as in the present. Growth is a law of life. Stagnation means death. Although Spain, in the eighteenth century, was too exhausted at the heart to be capable of covering efficiently a further area in America, yet the demand for movement was felt in the extremities of Spanish America, and the Christian missionaries pressed onward and onward in their pious fervor. The viceroys of New Spain tried to hold back both missionaries and pioneers and to set limits to the irresistible advance. Augustus and Tiberius en- deavoured to check the growth of the Roman Empire, and to fix strategical boundaries, but in vain. English statesmen. INTRODUCTION XXIX in the middle of the nineteenth century, tried to stop the development of the British Empire, and furiously resented the onward movement of the Austrahans into New Guinea, of the Anglo-Indian statesmen into Afghanistan, and of the great empire builders, like Goldie, and MacKinnon, and Cecil Rhodes, in Africa. Spain, in America, could not stand still so long as the road was open, any more than Russia, in Siberia. It was forced into expansion. ^ The most valuable part of . Doctor Chapman's book is his development from the original sources, still buried at Seville, of the northward expansion of New Spain. He has done full justice to the hardships that faced the advancing missionaries and settlers, but he has also seen the difficulties that beset the Spanish officials, and has concentrated attention upon the importance of the views held by, and the work done by, the Viceroy Bucarely and the Visitor-General Galvez./'The importance of the work of Galvez has never been adequately recognized, but a most valuable and in- teresting monograph, based upon the original sources, has been written upon him by Mr. H. I. Priestley, which is about to be published by the University of California. Gdl- vez saw the danger presented by the incursion of other European states than Spain into the Pacific Ocean. He realized that the political and commercial situation in Europe was going to affect the Pacific Ocean, and would sooner or later press problems upon the Pacific coast. With feverish activity, he labored for an immediate advance, and since an overland advance was for the moment im- possible, for the reasons Doctor Chapman has set forth, the first movement to the northward to Alta California was undertaken along the coast line in the famous expedition under Don Caspar de Portola. But the missions and pre- sidios in Alta California could not be maintained by coast cmnmunication. An overland route had to be developed. '^^The middle chapters of Doctor Chapman's book deal with the problems that faced the officials of New Spain after the Portola expedition. The European situation in the Pacific Ocean was becoming more defined; the Russians XXX INTRODUCTION , and the English were particularly active. Eang Charles III of Spain developed a strong anti-English attitude, which, combined with the Family Compact made with the French king, induced him to take part in the American War of In- dependence upon the side of the American Colonies. The Viceroy Bucarely, with calmer judgment, but with less feverish activity than was displayed by Gdlvez, made ready for the Spanish occupation, through an overland route, of Alt a California. Doctor Chapman's hero in the third part of his book is Don Juan Bautista de Anza. Mr. Zoeth Eldredge, in the volumes more than once referred to, has brought out very clearly the momentous character in the history of Spanish Cahfornia of the great Anza expedition, which culminated in the establishment of the Presidio of San Francisco. From this point of view, Mr. Eldredge's book is excellent and con- clusive. But Doctor Chapman's book brings out a point that does not clearly appear in Mr. Eldredge's volumes, namely, the fact tliat Anza's expedition was the culminating feature of a long attempt at the northwest expansion of New Spain. The work of Anza did not suddenly leap into prominence ; it was the outcome of a long series of movements and of the natural development of frontier policy. Anza himself inherited his interest in the movement of expansion. Like certain officers on the northwest frontier of India, his entire life had been spent as an officer and an official upon the frontier. Like Colonel Warburton,^ his life had been a frontier life. His father had been killed in a fight with the Apache Indians upon the frontier. He knew the Pimas and the Yumas and the frontier tribes, whose territories he was to traverse, as Warburton knew the Afghan frontier tribes. It was with a full consciousness of the danger of his mission, and with a full experience as to the organization that was needed, that he set forth at last in 1775 upon his epoch- making expedition from Sonora to San Francisco. The de- tails of the great march can be read alike in Mr. Eldredge's 1 Eighteen years in the Khyber, by Colonel Sir Robert Warburton, London, 1900. INTRODUCTION XXxi Beginnings of San Francisco and in Doctor Chapman's volume. The two accounts supplement each other, though, as has been said, the point of view and of departure of the two authors differs greatly. This introduction, written at the request of Doctor Chap- man, is not intended to contain a summary of the result of his researches in the documents bearing upon the history of the Anza expedition, which he has discovered at Seville. /The truthfulness of his work, hia patient examination, analy- sis, and transcription of new documents, are made clear upon the pages of his book, in the carefulness of his citations and in the valuable appendices. His volume belongs to the class of historical works based upon the consultation of primary authorities, which is now forming so creditable a feature of modern historical work in the United States^ The careful reader need have no hesitation in accepting his conclusions, for he has shown what Gibbon, in his famous preface, de- clared to be the only merits which an historical writer may ascribe to himself, namely, "diligence and accuracy.'' That such a volume should be the first fruits of the generosity of the Order of the Native Sons of the Golden West gives hope of an even more valuable harvest to follow. Instead of giving a summary of Doctor Chapman's con- tribution to the knowledge of the preliminary steps towards the Spanish occupation of Alta California, it has seemed more fitting in this introduction to try to explain wherein its largest value lies. First and foremost, an attempt has been made in a few sentences to indicate wherein the occupation of Alta California is connected with the general situation in Europe with regard to the Pacific Ocean in the eighteenth century. The writer of a monograph is apt to be so in- terested in his particular field that it is most necessary that the effort should be made to show the connection of all studies of local history with the trend of general history. Some day, some historian of large vision, and with a grasp like that of Gibbon of a wide field of history, will bring out the general story of the expansion alike of states, of nations, and of civilizations. Local histories and specialized histories of all xxxii INTRODUCTION kinds are apt to be too specialized and not to pay sufficient attention to general considerations. But further, it seemed worth while in the opening paragraphs of this introduction to say something upon the importance of such detailed work as Doctor Chapman's as illustrating the growth of State loyalty and State consciousness. The people of California are very proud of the traditions of their State, even if the vast majority of them are either themselves recent immi- grants, or, at the most, only in the second or third generation from pioneer settlers. Yet all alike have absorbed and now express the traditions of the old Alta California under Spain and Mexico, and they feel that their State is no common land, but boasts of a romance and a charm that other States cannot rival. While some may boast of cHmate, and some of citrous fruit, far back in their consciousness, in their pro- nunciation of old Spanish names of places, in their love for the old mission buildings, and their pride in the picturesque careers of Franciscan missionaries and of Spanish hidalgos, of gold seekers from all parts of the world, and of a cour- ageous folk, who undauntedly built up the ruined city of San Francisco, the chief bond of that California loyalty which they instil into their children, and which they them- selves cherish with the enthusiasm that an Englishman or a Scotchman, a Frenchman or a German, feels for his historic nationahty, is based upon the historic traditions of the land in which they live. Doctor Chapman's book is, upon the one hand, a witness to the love that Californians feel for their historic traditions, and, on the other hand, a worthy contribution towards a broader view of the Spanish states- men and pioneers, and towards a better and more detailed understanding of that Spanish background against which is now reared one of the proudest and most self-conscious States of the United States of America. H. Morse Stephens. Berkeley, California, March 6, 1916. THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA CHAPTER I THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY TO PIMERIA ALTA, 1521-1687 The discovery of America in 1492 marked the beginning of a struggle, in which Spain was to play a leading part, for possession of the new worid. Spain acquired a base in the West Indies, and thence went forth to the conquest of the mainland. One line of effort led her to the Isthmus of Panamd, where the Spaniards established themselves by 1510. As their foothold there became more secure they began to extend their rule northward. Before they had gone very far, they met another stream of conquest coming south, for in 1519 Cortes had landed on the Atlantic coast of Mexico and had begun the war which in two years re- sulted in the overthrow of the Aztec power. The capture of Mexico City in 1521 gave Spain a new base of operations for conquest. By 1522, Cortes had reached the Pacific coast, establishing a settlement at the Port of Zacatula, and a few years later the lands south of Mexico to Panama were taken. There remained a vast ever-widening area to the north, not yet subjected to the Spanish crown. The sixteenth century was the era of the Spanish con- quistadores. U^These men led expeditions which made a permanent conquest of large areas, and developed a pre- liminary knowledge of nearly the whole field subsequently 2 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. I occupieov^They were followed, perhaps in the wake of other expeditions, by soldiers, missionaries, and civilians, all of Spanish blood. The civilians were for the most part miners, a smaller number engaging in stock-raising and other pursuits characteristic of frontier life.^ This was a second phase of the conquest. Eventually, in a portion of the field^Sthere came a third phase, when settled orderly government appeared, the military moving on, secular clergy replacing regular, and civilians entering in greater numbers and engaging in a greater variety of occupations. This was the final stage, when the particular region ceased to partake of the attributes of a frontier province. In all three stages the white people, although a very small minority, were the ruling class. As a rule the Indians were not driven away or killed, as in the English colonies, but, although strictly ruled and virtually enslaved, were allowed to remain. Northward expansion from Mexico City may be said to have followed three principal lines : northwestward to Sonora and the Calif ornias ; up the central plateau through Nueva Vizcaya to New Mexico ; similarly, but branching 1 Not much has been written con- by ships going to the Americas (ibid., ceming the, importance of the civilian ley VI), and government officials in element in Spanish conquests. Some the colonies were to do the same, small attention has been paid to the delivering forbidden books to the proper military, but the greatest space by religious authorities (ibid., ley VII). far has been assigned to the religious, Great care was also enjoined to avoid certainly after the era of early con- circulation of books by heretic pirates quests. This is because but little use (ibid., ley XIV). As Bancroft says, has thus far been made of any but "religious teachers guided public taste, printed sources, and because these are and strove to obtain a circulation for in most cases writings of the religious their own productions," and "Since themselves, who were bent upon tell- every work had to pass through the ing of the achievements of their order ; hands of censors, notably the rigid see the list of works cited in connection inquisition, it became almost necessary with this volume. The laws themselves to give a pious tinge to the pages in operated to discourage any but religious order to secure permission to publish, publications, from fear lest the subject and above all to suppress whatever population read anything which might savored of acquaintance with works tend to diminish their belief in Catholic not favored by the church." Bancroft, Christianity, and thus weaken the Literature of colonial Mexico, in Essays bonds by which Spain ruled them. No and miscellany, 486. books pertaining to the Americas could The story of the civilian is in large be printed unless previously approved measure gone beyond recall, but a rich by the Council of the Indies (Recop., harvest nevertheless awaits the in- lib. I, tit. XXIV, ley I). No books of vestigator who will use the unpublished romance of profane or fabulous sub- materials which exist in such stupendous ject-matter were allowed to be sent to quantity in the Archivo General de the colonies (ibid., ley IV). Religious Indias. in Spain were to inspect books carried 1521] THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY 3 off to run through Coahuila into Texas. A fourth Hne, basing in early days on Tampico, and, later, on Mexico City and Queretaro, ran to Nuevo Leon and Nuevo San- tander (Tamaulipas), and slightly into Texas. This was hardly so important as the others. It is the purpose of this work to direct attention to the first-named movement, and to only its latest phases with any degree of completeness. Yet, all four were closely related, — so much so, that we shall often be forced to take into account what was happen- ing to the east of Sonora. All went ahead at relatively the same rate of progress, except the much shorter fourth move- ment. Military and exploring expeditions made side trips that crossed different lines of advance. All were related by the problem of Indian warfare, especially against the Apaches, who were wont to appear in all sections, often going from one to another according as resistance to their raids was strong or weak. All were threatened by foreign aggressions from the northeast, for the Colorado River of the west was believed to be a route making the western provinces almost as accessible to the French or English as those in the east. Some or all of the regions along the four lines of advance were at different times under the same political rule, or served as a field for the same body of religious, or were part of the same diocese. Finally, all of these regions had much the same internal problems, political, economic, and social, and all were under the viceroy, or, in the latest period, under the comandante general. Despite these unifying factors, not much space can be given to the northward movement as a whole. Before proceeding to a consideration of northwestward advance, however, it is worth while to give an idea of the sweep of the other lines of conquest. Naturally, the line of advance through Nueva Viz cay a to New Mexico was most closely related, because nearest, to the movement through Sonora. The same Indian wars often affected both. The Jesuits were in western Nueva Vizcaya as well as in Sinaloa and Sonora until 1767. Sinaloa and Sonora were included in the government of Nueva Vizcaya 4 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. I until 1734, and formed part of the same diocese under the bishop of Durango until 1779, when a bishopric was created for Sinaloa, Sonora, and the CaUfornias. The first great name in the history of Nueva Vizcaya is that of Francisco de Ibarra, who set up a government there in the middle of the sixteeiith century. By the end of that century the line of settlement had reached southern Chihuahua. Next there was a gap, beyond which lay New Mexico, settled by the Oiiate expedition of 1598. By the close of the seventeenth century the line of settlement had approached or reached the Rio Grande ; for example, the presidios of Pasage, Gallo, Conchos, Janos, and Casas Grandes were already in existence. In the eighteenth century there were many changes in presidial sites, the general movement being to suppress the more southerly presidios, and establish new ones toward the Rio Grande. Similarly the missions ad- vanced, and the region behind them was gradually yielded over to the secular clergy. In 1767, according to statistics compiled by Bishop Tamaron, Nueva Vizcaya had a Chris- tian population of 120,000 divided evenly between Chihua- hua and Durango, its northern and southern divisions ; but while Durango had 46,000 civilized people, there were but 23j000 in Chihuahua.^ Meanwhile, New Mexico had en- joyed great prosperity until 1680, when all was destroyed by an Indian revolt, and the land was not reconquered until over a decade later.^ Thenceforth, the land was held, but little further advance was made. By the end of the eigh- teenth century there may have been 20,000 civilized people in the province, and 10,000 Christian Indians.^ Along the Coahuila line Parras and Saltillo in southern Coahuila were occupied by the end of the sixteenth century, although these two settlements were under the government 2 The term "civilized people" is Mexico in 1680, and the beginnings of used for what Spaniards called gente El Paso. de raz6n, including those of white * For a good summary of the Span- or mixed blood or even negroes. In ish advance through Nueva Vizcaya fine, all but Indians were included. to New Mexico until near the end of 3 Hackett, The revolt of the Pueblo the seventeenth century, see the Indians of New Mexico in 1680; and introductory part to Hughes, The Retreat of the Spaniards from New beginning of Spanish settlement in the El Paso district. 1521] THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY 5 of Nueva Vizcaya until 1785. Coahuila never enjoyed striking prosperity. By the close of the seventeenth century Monclova was the most northerly presidio, while the mis- sions had passed on to the Rio Grande. Early in the eighteenth century the presidios reached that river. The total Christian population of Coahuila in 1780 was about 8000, of whom 2000 were Indians. The addition of Sal- "tillo and Parras in 1785 doubled the population. The most interesting portion of this line is the Texas extremity. In the sixteenth century there were voyages along the coast, and overland incursions from New Mexico and even from Florida, but no settlements. Between 1685 and 1688 La ^all e made a disastrous attempt to found a French colony inMatagorda Bay. This incident, joined to tal^^oTTabu- lous wealth in the land of the Tejas in eastern Texas, in- duced the Spaniards to send an expedition in 1689 under Governor Leon of Coahuila, which led, in the next few years, to the establishing of missions east of the Trinity.^ These failed, but on the renewal of French activities, this time from New Orleans, several missions and a presidio were founded in eastern Texas in 1716. In 1718, establishments were made at San Antonio, not far from Coahuila. In 1721, a presidio was placed near the coast at Esplritu Santo, and the eastern settlements (which had been destroyed by the French) were reestablished and strengthened. Be- tween 1745 and 1763 several new posts were founded, notably in northern Texas, but the northernmost of these, on the San Gabriel and the San Sabd rivers, were soon abandoned. By the cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1762 the French peril, the dominating note in Texas history up to that time, was removed, and the eastern settlements were given up. In a few years, however, many of the Spanish settlers returned to eastern Texas.* In 1782 there were only 2600 civilized people in Texas, and 460 Christian Indians. The beginnings of Nuevo Leon date from its colonization * Bolton, The Spanish occupation of « Bolton, Texas in the middle eigh- Texas, 1619-1690. teenlh century. 6 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. I by Carabajal, late in the sixteenth century. Nothing else occurred that need be noted here until 1748 when Escandon, coming from Queretaro, achieved an almost bloodless con- quest of Nuevo Santander. His work was remarkable by reason of the number of settlements formed by him, render- ing the conquest as thorough as it had been quick and peaceful. Unruly Indians were soon conquered or went elsewhere, and this part of the frontier enjoyed unusual prosperity. The first great conqueror after Cort6s along the line lead- ing northwestward to Pimeria Alta was Nuno de Guzmdn. In 1529, he set out from Mexico City with an army of five hundred Spaniards and perhaps ten thousand native allies, and by 1531 he had passed through Jalisco to Sinaloa, reduc- ing the country along his line of march. At one stroke, over half the territory between Mexico City and Alta Cah- fornia had been traversed and made known to the Spaniards, and much of it remained definitely conquered. Contem- porary with this conquest were the first northwestward voyages, made under the authority of Cortes, one of whose ships reached Baja California, probably at La Paz, in 1533. Q9r+.^g liiTTisif^lf foiinded_a settlements-ther e in 1535 , but it dijijiaLefldure; beingwithdrawn in 1536. The romantic adventures of Alvar NlineT-^-Cabeza de Vaca became known at this time, and aroused enthusiasm anew for northward explorations. Nunez had been a member of the ill-fated Narvaez expedition to Florida in 1528. After several years of wandering and vicissitudes he had crossed the continent, going by way of Texas, Chihua- hua, and Sonora, to the Spanish settlement of Culiacan, Sinaloa, which he reached in 1536. He told of substantial cities to the north, of which he had heard, but which he had not seen. His story was confirmed by the Franciscan, Marcos de Niza, who crossed Sonora and Arizona to New Mexico in 1539. There, from a distance, he saw one of the seven cities of Cibola (Zuni), really a wretched native town, but which to his inflamed imagination seemed larger than Mexico City. Meanwhile, Cortes had equipped a sea 1521] THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY 7 expedition under JFrancisco de U Uoa^to seek the fabled wealth of the north! UUoa set sallfrom Acapulco iA 1539, following the coast of the mainland to the mouth of the Colorado River. Descending the gulf along the coast of Baja California, he came to Cape San Lucas, and went up the western shore to a few leagues beyond Cerros Island. He had rvrnyf^ T^gjg Qahfomia to be a peninsula ; pre- viously it was believed to be an island. Two centuries had to elapse, however, before its. peninsularity became defi- nitely recognized. In the next year, 1540, Coronado led an army by way of Sonora to New Mexico, and from there went on to Kansas in a vain search for the reputedly rich province of Quivira. The principal expedition returned to Mexico in 1542. Meanwhile, two supporting parties had made the first direct approaches to Alta CaHfornia by way of the Colorado River. A ^et under Hernando de Alar con left Acapulco in May, 154 0, to cooperate with^ UoroTi^^^^^ expedition. Alarc6n reach ed th e^mou tl i of th^ Colo ra do, and ascended the river in smalPboats, but seems to have stopped short of the Gila. Seeing nothing of Coronado 's expedition, he returned to his ships, and sailed back. Late in the same year,^Mej£horDiaz, with a part of Coronado's forces which had^i^en left behind in vSonora, set out to cooperate more difectly than Coronado with Alarc6n. He r eached the Q moradO; and crossed it, probably at some point south of the Gila. Finding that Alarcon had departed, the expedition returned. Interest in northwestward exploration now shifts to sea voyages up the coast of the CaHfornias. The most notable were the following: that of Cabrillo ^ an d Ferrelo, 1542- 43, to the vicinity of the present Oregon-CaHfomia line; Drake^s voyage of 1579, including a stay of several weeks at Drake's Bay, a voyage of which the Spaniards had informa- tion ; the annual voyages, after 1565, of the Manila galleons, ^ Cabrillo is referred to in L6pez, to call him Rodriguez, as L6pez did, 281, as the pilot Juan Rodriguez, that being the family name, and Ca- without mention of the name Cabrillo. brillo in all probability the name of his The full name being Juan Rodriguez mother. Cabrillo, it would seem more fitting 8 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. I which passed near the California coast, en route to Acapulco, in particular the voyage of Francisco £jSi]i , who in 1584 sighted Cape Mendocino ; that of Cermeno from Manila in 1595, resulting in shipwreck at Drake's Bay, named San Francisco by Cermeiio ; finally, the most famous of this series, that of General Sebastian Vizcain^_ijDLjL602;^3, from which dates the story of Monterey^s excellence as a port. This was the last notable voyage to Alta California until 1769. As a result of these voyages the general trend of the California coast became known, all ports of importance having been discovered, except the most important of all, that of San Francisco Bay, and all of them, Monterey in particular, being deemed worthy of eventual occupation, lest some other power seize them. The name " Calif ornias'^ was extended northward from the peninsula, no northern boundary being set, unless it were the vainly sought Strait of Anian (as it came to be called), an imaginary body of water through the continent uniting the Atlantic to the Pacific. Alta California was known to have a considerable native population ; but a more intensive knowledge of the land, its real wealth and productive possibilities had not in fact been obtained, although they had been guessed at by writers about the Californias, who added many tales of fabulous wealth. These factors, although not of equal weight, and of greatly varying interest at different times, were a standing incentive to further northwestward explora- tion, and to the settlement of Alta California, when the authorities at Mexico should find occasion to undertake such an enterprise.^ It is noteworthy that the natives of San Diego, 8 A detailed description of the that of the Manila galleon and off- California coast appears in Gonzalez shoots, even to Spain around South (or as writers have usually called him, America on the one hand, and to vari- Cabrera Bueno), Navegacidn especvla- ous parts of Asia on the other. The Hva y prdctica. Though not published route from Cape Mendocino south to until 1734 it may be taken to repre- Acapulco is described in eleven pages sent Spanish experience over a period (302-13). From this it appears that of nearly two centuries preceding that the Spaniards had a detailed and fairly date. It is a technical work on navi- accurate knowledge of the coast, gation, but one of its five parts is Gonzalez's language would imply that devoted to descriptions of sailing routes, the region between Cape Mendocino and of lands along these routes, though and Monterey must often have been always from the standpoint of the sighted by the galleon. According to navigator. The routes treated are him also, the galleon must usually 1521] THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY 9 Catalina Island, and Ventura told Cabrillo that there were other white men in the interior. The Indians of the Bay of San Quentin and of San Diego told like stories to Viz- caino. They probably were referring in the first instance to the Coronado expedition, possibly to its offshoots, the Alarcon and Diaz expeditions, and in the second, to Onate's expedition, then in New Mexico. These statements might well have induced belief in the existence of a practicable route to the Californias from Sonora. The Onate expedition^ 4ust referred to, set out from San Bartolome, Chihuahua, in 1598, to co nquer N ^W MpyiVo^ and achieved its object. In one of its ramifications this expedition extended Spanish knowledge of the lower Col- orado River country. In 1604-5, Onate marched west- ward along Bill Williams Fork t o the_i ?)o1oradn, descended the lat ter to its mouth, a nd then retraced his steps to New Mexico. According to Bancroft, this journey had been unknown to nineteenth century writers before himself.® There is no doubt, however, that this and other notable expeditions referred to in this chapter were well known to Spaniards of the eighteenth century.-^^ Hence, mention of them here is appropriate ; they were a factor affecting the question of a route from Sonora to the Californias. Onate reported that a strait existed between the Californias and the mainland. ^^ have seen the coast from Monterey route to the Californias by way of the south. After describing the bay and Colorado and Gila rivers. Nmnerous even the land at Monterey, Gonzalez other references might be given, says: "This port is in 37° north lati- "Renewal of the belief that Cali- tude and is a good port for relief of fornia was an island may not have been the ships from China (the galleon) on due to Oiiate so much as to certain account of its being the first land that memorials of Nicolds de Cardona. It they see (reconocen) when they come has been traced by Bancroft to Ascen- to New Spain." si6n, a friar on the Vizcaino expedition 9 Bancroft, Ariz, and New Mex., of 1602-3. The earliest writing now 157. extant of Ascension on the point is his ^0 Both the Coronado and Onate memorial of October 12, 1620, in which expeditions were referred to quite he implies that the Californias had casually, as if they were well-known recently been discovered to be an facts, in a letter to the viceroy in 1737 island. Referring to the Gulf of Cali- by Anza's father, a presidio captain fornia, Ascensi6n says : hasta agora in Sonora. C-178. This letter was se ha entendido que aquella era ensenada considered by the authorities in Mexico 6 seno grande que alii hiciese la mar, y and Spain at that time, and again in no mar corriente y seguida coma lo es. 1772, with relation to proposals of the In Coleccidn de documentos inSditos Anzas, father and son, for opening a relativos al descvhrimiento, conquista y 10 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. I From Ofiate's time until late in the century Spanish explorations northwestward seem to have been confined to Baja California and the Gulf, and very little was accom- pHshed. As far as memorials and governmental plans went, the Californias held a prominent place in the seventeenth century. Friars petitioned for a mission field there ; navi- gators and traders offered to get information about the Californias, cartographical and otherwise, and to found settlements, all at their own expense, in return for which they asked a license to fish for pearls, usually to the ex- clusion of others; and the government was continuously desirous of occupying the territory as a defensive measure. Many voyages were made to the eastern shore of the penin- sula, the greater number of which, it seems probable, have not thus far been made known. The real object of the voyagers was-aot-l g found settlements, bu t JjcLaefik-psarls ; the terms of the contract were butalufe to get the more remunerative advantage of the license. When at length it seemed clear that nothing of consequence would be organizacidn de las antiguaa posesiones Lucar la Mayor, Sumiller de Corps de su espaflolas de America y Oceania, VIII, Mag^ Gran Canciller de las Indias. 637-74 at 546. The recent discovery The document is dated June 24, 1^2, to which Ascension referred was prob- Madrid, and is signed with lli(i name ably that of Juan de Iturbe in 1615, and rubric of Nicolds de Cardona. and not Onate's of a decade before. Part of the document, the^'Ketdctdn," Iturbe was in charge of a vessel en- appears in Coleccidn de documentos gaged in the pearl-fisheries, in pursu- in4ditos relativos at, despuhrimiento, con- ance of a contract obtained from the quista y organizacidn de las cmtiguas king by Tomds de Cardona and others posesiones espanolas de America y in 1611 (not 1610, as Bancroft says). Oceania, IX, 30-42. The most signif- C-20. Iturbe went to the head of the icant part, however, namely fortj^-two Giilf» and believed he saw a strait to ^aags with individual descriptions, northward. This voyage led to a has not yet been published. These number of memorials by Nicolds de maps, which are most graphically Cardona, of which I have seen nine, represented, must have carried a between the years 1617 and 1643. The great deal of weight as affecting geo- earlier ones were probably known to graphical beliefs. Some of the docu- Ascensi6n, or at least the results of the ments noted in my Catalogue show that Iturbe voyage. But perhaps the most attention was paid to the Cardona important of the Cardona memorials memorials, e.g. a real cedula of March as affecting resumption of belief in the 15, 1635, adding one of the Cardona insularity of the Californias is a manu- memorials to the expediente arising script in the Biblioteca NacionaU out of the cedula of August 2, 1628 Madrid, entitled Descripciones, Geo- (cf. infra, note 12), so that the viceroy graphicas, E hydrographicas de muchas might inform himself about the Cali- tierras' y Mares del norte y sur, en las fornias, and call for memorials from Indias, en especial del descubrimiento others who might wish to discuss that del Reyno de la California . . . por d subject. C-37. Photographs of the Capp«n y Cabo Nicolds de Cardona . . . entire Cardona manuscript of June dirigidas al Ex^ S'^. D. Caspar de Guz- 24, 1632, are in the Academy of Pacific m^n, Conde de Olivares, Duque de S. Coast History. 1521] THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY 11 accomplished by private initiative, the government je- sol ved to assume the expense . The ^Otondo expedition resulted, a colony being founded in 1683, which failed, however, after an existence of two years. This was the most successful attempt until 1697, when, at length, a permanent settlement was made.-^^ The age of the conquistadores along the northwestward line had passed, but the work in its second and third phases had been steadily proceeding. -Guzman founded a settle- " Very little historical work has been done with regard to explorations and discoveries in the Calif ornias in the seventeenth century. Bancroft skimmed through a few documents, and nobody has added much to what he said. The following documents of my Catalogue might serve as a con- venient starting point for further investigations in this field : C-15, 17, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30-63, 65, 66. Ten of these are great testimonios, and the rest, for the most part, memorials of individuals, and royal decrees. As an example of the materials that go to make up a testimonio, the documents of C-27 may be cited, omitting oaths taken by notaries : 1. 1628. [Aug.] 2. The king, by Andres de Rocas, to the president and oidores of the Audiencia of Mexico. This recites Vizcaino's voyage of 1602-3 to Alta CaUfornia, and alludes to the slight knowledge that Spain still had of that land. The Audiencia is ordered to obtain reports about it from Fray Antonio de la Ascension and others, and to advise the king in ^reat detail as to the best manner of making further discoveries, in case it is deemed wise to make them. The other documents are the re- quested memorials, as follows : 2. 1629. May 20. Ascensi6n to the Audiencia. 3. 1629. June 8. May 5. Ascension. Juan Lopez de May 25. Juan Lopez de May 27. Gonzalo de Fran- 4. 1629. Vicufia. 5. 1629. Vicuna. 6. 1629. <5ia. 7. 1629. June 15. Martin de Lezama. 8. 1629. June 23. Lope de Ar- guelles Quinonel. 9. 1629. July 3. Juan de Iturbe. 10. 1629. July 30. Henrique Marti- nez. ^ 11. [1629.] — Sebastian Gutierrez. > 12. [1629(?).] — Alonso Ortiz de Sandoval. V 13. 1630. Dec. 22. Conde del Valle. . 14. 1632. Mar. 22. Ascension. V 15. 1632. Sept. 30. Esteban Car- bonel de Valenzuela. V 16. 1632. Nov. 19. Diego de la Naba. This is one of the smaller testimonios, aggregating 157 pages, but it must be remembered that the size of the page used (31 by 21| centimetres) and the practice of writing testimonios without leaving much margin or wide spacing enabled the scribe to get as much on a page as we might expect to-day on the average-sized page of print. Among noteworthy features of the testimony is the fact that Nicolds de Cardona is not referred to as commanding ex- peditions which he himself claimed to have led ; Juan de Itiirbe is named as commanding them, and Cardona is not even mentioned. As examples of the larger testimonios C-39-41 may be cited. The three aggregate 1888 pages, all concerning proceedings against Francisco de Ver- gara and Francisco Esteban Carbonel. Vergara had been authorized by the viceroy, the Marqu6s de Cadereita, to engage in pearl fishing, and make discoveries in the Californias, but he transferred his rights to Carbonel. The case arose over the following charges against Carbonel : that he was a Frenchman; that he had Frenchmen with him, some of them from New- France, who said that a strait through the continent existed ; and that he had secretly been building a very large boat on the Rio Santiago. It was thought that he planned to seek the strait, sail through to France, and thus open to that country a passage to the Spanish possessions of the Paci- fic. 12 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. I ment as far north as San Miguel de Culiacan, Sinaloa, in 1531. By 1550 an audiencia for the government of Nueva GaHcia, the name of Guzman's conquests, was estabHshed ; this was located for a time at Compostela, but soon after- ward moved to Guadalajara. Lopez, writing between 1571 and 1574, said that there were as many as 1500 Spaniards in Nueva Galicia, which at the time included most of New Spain north of Mexico City.^^ There were thirty-one or thirty-two settlements, of which fifteen or sixteen were mining camps. Guadalajara was the largest place, with a Spanish population of 150. The only settlement in what later became Sinaloa was San Miguel de Culiacan with about thirty Spaniards. There were no Spaniards in Sonora.^^ An increase in the population of Sinaloa came in 1596, when the presidio of San Felipe de Sinaloa, the first in that province, was estabhshed, with a garrison of twenty- five men. Meanwhile, the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits had been making converts, so that the region south of Sinaloa had become Christian, nominally at least, by the end of the sixteenth century, and, after futile revolts, was definitely reduced to the Spanish crown. The erection of a bishopric in Michoacdn in 1537 may be regarded as a first step in the third phase of the conquest. So, despite the scant white population of Nueva Galicia, that part of it lying south of Sinaloa was fast losing the characteristics of a frontier province. Up to 1591 not many conversions had been made in Sinaloa,^^ but in that year the Jesuits reached there, and the real work began. Father Zapata's report of 1678 shows that by that time Sinaloa had been thoroughly reduced. The province had been Christianized, and had a white population of 600. In addition, there were many more of part Spanish blood; at San Felipe de Sinaloa alone there w The provinces as he named them them. California was correctly de- were those of Guadalajara, Xalisco, scribed as a peninsula. Zacatecas, Chiametla, Culiacdn, Nueva " L6pez, 260-82. Vizcaya, Cinaloa, Cibola, Tuzdn, Pen6n " L6pez, 276, says that there were de Acuco, Llanos de las Vacas, Quivira, over 2000 peaceful Indians at San and California. Only the first six Miguel de Culiacdn, and these rep- named had Spanish settlements in resent, very likely, the number that had been converted. 1521] THE SPANISH ADVANCE FROM MEXICO CITY 13 were 1200 of Spanish or mixed blood. The missionaries and civihans were supported by two presidios, Fuerte de Mon- tesclaros having been added in 1610. The occupation of Sonora did not begin until early in the seventeenth century, the successful military campaigns of Diego Martinez de Hurdaide paving the way. The Jesuits took charge of mission work, and made rapid progress. By 1678 there were twenty-eight missions in Sonora, serving seventy-two villages with a combined papulation of about 40,000. There were perhaps 500 people of Spanish or part Spanish blood, a large proportion of them engaged in mining. The conquest had been carried almost to the limits of modern Sonora by way of the Sonora valley. This route led the Spaniards somewhat inland, leaving a large stretch of coast to the south and west as yet unoccupied. In this district were the Seri Indians, destined to cause trouble during the greater part of the eighteenth century. North- east of the Sonora valley was a little-known region whence was to come an even more terrible enemy — the savage Apaches. Due to the hostility of these two peoples, Sonora was destined to remain a frontier province. Until near the close of the seventeenth century another district of Sonora, offering less difficulties than the other two, though by no means an easy field for conquest, remained open. This was the region between the Altar and Gila rivers, known as Pimeria Alt a, beyond which to the northwest lay Alta California. A beginning was made there by the entrance of the Jesuits in 1687. Thenceforth, by comparison with earlier years, the Spanish advance overland was to be very slow and increasingly difficult. CHAPTER II EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE BY WAY OF THE COLORADO AND GILA RIVERS, 1687-1752 There is abundant evidence that an advance, at least as far as the Colorado and Gila rivers, was officially planned for three-quarters of a century before the Anza expedition of 1774. This raises the questions why such an advance should have been considered desirable by Spain, and why it was so long delayed. It is the purpose of this chapter to give evidence which shall answer both questions, although much will be said regarding them in later chapters as well. Causes for such an advance may be summarized, in inverted order of their importance, before proceeding to the proof, with an indication, also, of what was accomplished in the period covered by this chapter. Conquest in itself would not have induced such a move- ment. The most cursory examination of the documents would satisfy one as to that. Conquests involved ex- penditure, and it will appear clearly that Spain was often unwiUing to go to expense, even where prospects of a good return were promising. Mere vainglory of conquest was, therefore, no reason at all for an advance. Nor was the fabled wealth of the north any longer a sufficient lure, as in the past, to cause an expedition, certainly not in the eighteenth century. Too many times the marvels of the north had failed to materialize. Nevertheless, this in- centive plays a part in the documents,^ although not seriously considered by governmental authorities. Conversion of Indians to Christianity is constantly al- leged as an object of prime importance. Writers who have used but one or two documents are apt to be misled in 1 For example, in C-178. 14 /^ 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 15 consequence, and to assert that Spain's conquests were actuated primarily by Christian motives.^ Unquestionably this was the principal motive of the missionary orders, but was hardly at all a motive of the government.^ It was merely a means to an end, just as were pr^sidial troops and settlements, not itself an end ; the government did not undergo expense for missions, unless it had some other object in view. As an agency, missions were very im- portant; for example, to pave -the way for a proposed con- quest, to hold the more securely an already conquered territory, or to take steps toward providing a labor supply for existing or future Spanish ' colonies."* Much was ac- complished by the Jesuits in this era, notably the conversion of large parts of Baja California and Pimeria Alta, together with journeys of exploration and pastoral visitation to the Colorado and Gila. Definite discovery of wealth might induce governmental expenditure for a conquest. Stories of wealth had to be very convincing, however, before the government would take a hand, and save in the case of mineral wealth in gold or silver, it probably would not move even then. Gold and silver mining meant an increase in royal revenues; for example, by the royal fifth exacted oi;i products of pre- cious metals, or by the sale of quicksilver. An official advance might then follow an earlier one on the part of Spanish miners. Tales of mineral wealth were frequent in this era, and often the government displayed interest, but the only striking discovery was that of the Arizonac mine. A second cause for frontier advance was the fear lest some 2 For example, see Guppy, Solomon less, the object for which alone expenses Islands, lQ4i. In stating " the principal were incurred was political." Again, object" of the Mendana expedition II, 6: "The men who presumed to which discovered the Solozaoxu Islands guide the destinies of Spain then, and in 1567, Guppy says: "It was for the as a rule ever since, cared naught for propagation of the Christian faith the success of Religion or the welfare amongst the peoples of the unknown of its ministers, except in so far as both islands of the West that this expedi- could be used to promote political tion was dispatched from the shores of schemes." Peru." *Ibid., II, 4: "The experience of » Englehardt, I, 142-43, says: "The two centuries in Lower California had kings, indeed, desired the conversion demonstrated that, while soldiers might of the Indians to Christianity, and defend the country against foreign frequently declared this to be the enemies, they could not transform chief aim of the conquest ; neverthe- savages into loyal subjects." X 16 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II other European power might occupy lands that would threaten, those already possessed by Spain. Many docu- ments will be adduced, and more might be, to show that Spain^s fear of foreign enemies in the Pacific was constant. Whatever other countries did or planned to do, Spain was unceasingly distrustful. Mere unauthenticated reports of foreign aggression were enough to cause the government to go to considerable expense in this period, whereas the most exaggerated guesses at the wealth of unoccupied lands failed to induce the expenditure of a peso. There were many proj- ects of conquest on this account, but they got no farther at this time than foundation of presidios within territory already occupied, although this was a forward step by no means to be despised. What might have happened, if definite proof of foreign aggression had been received, is a question, but such proof was never obtained. Suspicion there was, always. In this period it was directed primarily against the French. It was necessary that the two last-named factors, but especially that of foreign aggression, should be combined with another, if they were to result in important action ; a man must be found of sufficient energy and ability to carry plans into execution. Leaders, like missions, may be re- garded as an agency of conquest, rather than a cause, but on them depended in more than usual degree whether under- takings should be executed, the causes being always exis- tent. Hindrances to conquest were such that none but an extraordinary leader, with such scant means as Spain was willing to supply, could hope to succeed. No such individual appeared at this time. Indian wars were a continual factor tending to check the Spanish northwestward advance. The Apaches began their raids into Sonora before the close of the seventeenth century, although Chihuahua to the east was their principal ob- ject of attack. The presidio of Corodeguache de Fronteras was established in northeastern Sonora as a check against them. Janos and Casas Grandes in Chihuahua were founded to cooperate with it. In 1695, there was a serious 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 17 revolt of the Pimas in Pimeria Alta. In 1696-97, Indians of the eastern Sonora missions were in revolt. The year 1699 saw the beginning of Seri wars in the region between the Yaqui and Sonora rivers. Yet, toward the close of the seventeenth century and in the early years of the eighteenth, not a little was done in the way of exploration and reports with regard to an advance to the Colorado and Gila rivers. These events were very closely related to the affairs of Baja California, some mention of which may first be given. After repeated failures a permanent settlement had been made in Baja California in 1697, success being attained by the Jesuit order under the leadership of Father Juan Maria Salva- tierra. By the terms of their contract the Jesuits were to have entire control over the province, spiritual, economic, civil, and even military. Through the institution of the pious fund,^ supplemented by government aid, Baja Cal- ifornia did not suffer greatly from lack of funds under Jesuit rule, although there were several occasions when abandon- ment of the missions was narrowly averted. Its develop- ment, however, was greatly hindered by three factors : opposition by the Jesuits to development of a sort that would bring in many Spanish settlers, or lessen their own authority ; sterility of the peninsula ; and difficulty of the voyage across the Gulf. The ground for Jesuit opposition was that Spanish settlements would interfere with conver- sions. Aside from that, however, the other two factors were enough in themselves to prevent a great development of the peninsula. For eight hundred miles it stretches out, a mountainous, arid waste, — unfit for mining, stock- raising, or agriculture, in Spanish colonial days, on any but a modest scale. Baja California could not serve as a base of supply for more northerly lands. Rather it stood in ' The pious fund had its origin in objects and mode of accumulation, i.e. 1697 in sums given by private individ- by gifts. For a summary of its history uals for propagation of the faith in down to the present day, for the Mexi- the Californias. It was managed by can government still owes an annual the Jesuits until their expulsion in sum of $43,050.99 to the Catholic 1767, after which it became a branch authorities of Alta California, see of the reaZ /laciendo, retaining, however, Englehardt, I, 595-99. Cf. chap. V, its original characteristics as regards n. 78. 18 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II need of aid, which had to come by sea, unless a land route could be found. The severity of storms in the Gulf, and the likelihood of shipwreck were such that, despite the short- ness of the voyage, a land route was desirable, even though involving a detour around the head of the Gulf .^ Father Eusebio Kino of the Jesuit order had served in Baja California diimig Dtondo's unsuccessful attempt of 1683-85 to found a colony there; and he never ceased, thereafter, to be interested in the Calif ornias. It was Kino who inspired Salvatierra to make the attempt which led to the Jesuit entry into Baja California in 1697. After exploring the Gila and Colorado valleys. Kino became interested in the northern lands as well, hoping to reach Monterey. He trusted that the Manila galleon might be ordered to stop there and send goods overland to Sonora ; and he grew to believe that a settlement should be founded on the Colorado River, to serve as a base for operations against the Apaches and Moquis, and for the conquest of the Calif ornias and the lands between Sonora and New Mexico. Yet, aside from his missionary zeal for conversions, the development of a supply-route from Sonora to Baja Cali- fornia may be regarded as his most immediate object, and this too was keenly desired by Salvatierra. This project was the result of Kino's explorations in Pimeria Alta. « In 1768 it took Gdlvez forty days going outside the cape, as the Philip- to go from San Bias to Baja California, pine galleon did without encountering a voyage of less than a hundred leagues. storms, and the return made by cross- In the same year the San Carlos and ing to the coast of Sinaloa and follow- the San Antonio required nearly three ing down the coast. C-1075. Gdlvez's months for the voyage, after which statement is borne out by the facts. they had to be careened and repaired. Instances need not be multiplied here ; Gdlvez felt that voyages to the Call- one has only to note voyages men- fornias should be made at particular tioned in Bancroft, N. M. St. & Tex., I. seasons so as to avoid dangerous Otondo's voyage of 1683 may be cited storms. After referring to difficulties as an illustration of what often hap- of Alta California voyages on this pened. Otondo spent over two months account, he said that it was worse yet trying to get across the Gulf, and then in the Gulf, owing to the added danger did it in one night, although it took of shipwreck, for there were many him three days more before he was islands there. Gdlvez, Informe, 141- able to approach the coast. The 47 ; also C-1834, Writing to the Jesuits lost five vessels between 1712 viceroy on this subject, September 8, and 1717, and yet another was wrecked 1768, Gdlvez said that voyages to the but saved. These are but a few in- peninsula had always been difficult on stances of the many mentioned in account of storms. He suggested that, the same volume of Bancroft. in future, they should be rnade by 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 19 In 1687 Kino had established the mission Dolores on one of the upper branches of the Sonora River, the initial step in the advance across Pimeria Alta. In the next quarter century he and his companions pushed the frontier of missionary work and exploration from this outpost to the Gila and lower Colorado rivers. By 1695 Kino had established a chain of missions up and down the valley of the Altar River, San Ignacio, Tubutama, Caborca, Coco- spera, Santa Maria Suamca, and others. In 1691, accom- panied by Father Salvatierra, he began his expeditions in the valley of the Gila, going as far as Tumacdcori, an Indian village on the Santa Cruz. Three years later he descended the Santa Cruz to Casa Grande. In 1697 he went again to Casa Grande, accompanied by a guard of soldiers from Front eras under Captain Bernal. In the following year he went to the Gila, and returned across Papagueria, by way of Sonoita, Caborca, and the Altar valley. In 1699 he went to Sonoita, continued northward east of the Gila Range, and reached the Gila River, which he ascended to Casa Grande. Kino had come to America in the belief that California was a peninsula, but, under the influence of current teach- ings, had accepted the doctrine that it was an island. Dur- ing his last journey to the Gila, however, he had been given some blue shells, such as he had seen on the western coast of Baja California, and nowhere else. He now reasoned that California must after all be a peninsula, and that it might be possible to find a land route Over which to send supplies to Salvatierra's struggling missions. To test this view was the principal object of his later explorations. In 1700 he for the first time descended the Gila to its junction with the Colorado. In the following year, accompanied by Salvatierra, he tried to reach the head of the Gulf by going up the coast from Sonoita. FaiHng in this, he went to the Gila junction, descended the Colorado nearly to its mouth, and crossed over on a raft. In 1702 he again descended the Colorado, this time reaching the Gulf. He had now proved, to his own satisfaction at least, that California no es ysla, 20 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II sino penisla. Meanwhile, Kino and his companions had pushed the missionary frontier to the Gila. In 1700 he founded the mission of San Javier del Bac, and within the next two years those of Tumacacori and Guebavi, all in the Santa Cruz valley and within modern Arizona. Kino's exploring tours were also itinerant missions, and in the course of them he baptized and taught in numerous villages, up and down the Gila and Colorado, and throughout Pimeria Alt a. Kino's work and his reports aroused new interest in northwestward expansion. The map which he made of his explorations, published in 1701, was not improved upon for more than a century. The principal writing of Father Kino was his Favores Celestiales, which constitutes a his- tory of his life-work on the frontier. It was written at the mission Dolores at different times within a period embracing more than a decade. The first part was finished in December, 1699, and was carried to Rome in 1701 by the Jesuit procurators Bernardo Rolandegui and Nicolas de Vera.7 It was just about at that time that governmental interest in the Californias began to reawaken. This cannot be traced directly to Kino, but the inference that his memorials were the moving cause of action is so strong that it cannot reasonably be doubted. Burriel says that no attention was paid in Madrid to the earliest reports of the settlement, but that affairs took a new turn on the accession of Philip V, who as a result of private advices brought the matter before the Council of the Indies. Royal orders followed, dated July 17, 1701, that all possible aid should be given the new establishments; that the royal treasury should pay 6000 7 The foregoing sketch of Kino's For an account of the discovery, work was written by Professor Bolton, identification, and contents of the who based it on Kino's Favores celes- work see Bolton, Father Kino's lost tiales, a manuscript volume which is history, its discovery, and its value, in still unpublished. After the middle Bibliographical Society of America, of the eighteenth century little ad- Papers, VI, 9-34. Richman, in his vance was made in the history of California under Spain and Mexico, Father Kino's achievements until a gives a chapter based on Bolton's few years ago, when Bolton discovered translation of the manuscript, and identified this rare manuscript. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 21 pesos a year toward their maintenance; that reports be called for, giving information as to the nature of the land, the means of advancing the conquest, communication with the mainland, the state of the missions of Sinaloa, Sonora, and Nueva Viz cay a, and whether these might aid the Jesuit establishments in the Californias.^ It will be noted that Kinoes project of a supply-route was prominently to the fore, and it is likely that Rolandegui and Vera furnished the "private advices/' They had just passed through Spain.^ Further action was taken in 1703. In that year, says Burriel, Fathers Rolandegui and Vera presented a memorial to the king about the Californias.-^^ This was reviewed by the Council of the Indies on June 16, the king himself being present. In consequence, there were enacted five decrees on September 28, 1703, the most important of which was one directed to the viceroy. Besides adding 7000 pesos to the annual charge of the missions against the royal treasury, ordering the purchase of a boat, and making other provision for the missions, the king called for a junta in Mexico in order to provide for establishing a presidio of thirty soldiers, to be placed as far north as possible oii^the Pacific coast of the peninsula, to serve as protection to the land, and as a way-station for the Manila galleon, the pre- sidio captain to be chosen by the viceroy. Pearl-fishing was to be encouraged, and settlers sent from New Spain.^^ A junta was held, June 6, 1704, at which all agreed that the royal wishes should be fulfilled, although the matter of the presidio was left to be discussed with the missionaries and others.^^ The Jesuits eventually got the additional sum of money, but the rest of the decree was blocked, largely by their own action. Their objections appear in a memorial of Salvatierra to the viceroy. May 25, 1705. "One ship, he 8 Burriel, Noticia, II, 62-64. a second visit the statement is in error. * The Kino manuscript carried by It is probable that the matter was Rolandegm and Vera was received at associated with their names by reason Rome in December, 1701. Favores of their former visit, and that they celestiales, part II, chap. 1. were not present on this occasion. >" Burriel says that they had just "Burriel, Noticia, II, 139-41. come from Mexico, but unless this was " Ibid., II, 141, 152. 22 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II said, could not adequately perform the service required, nor was the liberal allowance of 13,000 pesos sufficient to make ends meet. He did not wish pearl-fishing to be en- couraged, as it led to trouble with the natives. Nor did the Jesuits desire the presence of Spanish settlers to breed dissensions. As to a presidio on the western coast, it would be an unnecessary expense, as the missions would soon be extended there. The suggestion that the garrison officers should be appointed by the government was very ill- advised, since only by this power of appointment could the padres restrain the natives and soldiers.'^ ^^ In ensuing years there were a number of decrees which, like those already mentioned, evinced the royal will to develop the Californias. Especially notable is one of January 29, 1716, for which Alberoni, then dominant in Spanish politics, is said to have been responsible, although it is likely that he was influenced by the memorials of Kino, whose ideas appear in the decree. The decree itself was like many another, asking information as to the progress of conversions in the Californias, referring to the great im- portance of promoting spiritual conquest there, and order- ing the viceroy to fulfill a decree of July 26, 1708, requiring him to take steps in that regard. At the same time orders were given to promote the advancement of the Sonora missions ; and verbal instructions were issued to the viceroy to explore the Pacific coasts and to found colonies and presidios there. In addition to these colonies Alberoni planned ^4n like manner to advance the Spanish domain with new settlements in the vast unknown territories to the north of Sonora from the Gila and Colorado rivers on- ward." The last-named settlements might send their products to the new colonies on the coast, and receive in exchange what they needed. These regions were not to rely on New Spain and Europe for trade, but were to develop commerce with the Philippines, which islands he designed to be the centre of the trade of the orient. ^^ "Bancroft, N. M. St. & Tex., I, in Burriel, Noticia, II, 154-66.'*' 419. The memorial is inserted entire ^^TSmriel, Noticia, II, 287-94. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 23 Alberoni was not left in peace to work out his ideas. A few years later, after a stormy career in power, he found himself an exile from Spain. The viceroy called a juntaj however, to act upon the decree of 1716, announcing that he proposed to found at least one colony on the west coast of the Californias. All present approved, with one excep- tion. Father Romano, the Jesuit procurator, who asserted that the peninsula was too sterile to maintain such a colony. Other Jesuits were of the same opinion, and the matter was dropped for the time being. Another decree of 1719 urged furthering the conquest, holding as especially im- portant the occupation of west coast ports up to Monterey, and ordering the viceroy to take action. There was an- other decree to the same effect in 1723, and others of later date. These at least show a desire of the government for an advance to the northwest. The chief result in Baja California of the decrees, however, seems to have been the growth of the royal subsidy. This, at length, reached some 30,000 'pesos a year. The Jesuits remained in authority. From Kino's time on, the project of a settlement on the* ll Colorado plays a prominent part in memorials and govern- mental plans. Enough documents have been found to show that interest was continuous, although the event had to wait. This was one of the keynotes in the documents already referred to with relation to Baja California. The same idea appears in those concerning Sonora. Father Campos fell heir to Kino's ideas. In 1715 he wrote to Vice- roy Linares that Indians of the north w6re coming to his mission to have their children baptized, and suggested that he be sent to their country to administer the sacrament. He also proposed that the territory between Pimeria Alta and Moqui be taken from the Franciscans, to whose ju- risdiction it then belonged, and given to the Jesuits ; the latter, he said, were nearer than the former who were in New Mexico, and moreover the Indians did not like the Franciscans.^^ Campos seems to have made the visit that " Cited in ReboUedo to Vizarr6n, Apr. 11, 1737, in C-1872. 24. THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II he suggested, a number of times. -^^ Bancroft says that the Jesuits were not so much interested in getting to Moqui as they alleged ; that was merely a pretext to enable them to get missions and a presidio in the lower Gila valley. These obtained, they had in mind the ultimate occupation of the Californias or of the territory northeastward, accord- ing as events should decide. The Jesuits were partially successful in their petition ; in 1719 the king granted to them the Moqui field, but the missions and the presidio were not founded. In 1725 there was a royal order au- thorizing expeditions from Pimeria Alta to New Mexico, but none were made in consequence.^^ A few years later royal funds were forthcoming. Several Jesuits were sent from Europe and assisted to their stations at state expense. -^^ Three of them came to northern Sonora, and were escorted to their posts by the captain of Fronteras, Juan Bautista de Anza, father of that Anza who was later to discover the route from Sonora to Alta California. -^^ Abandoned mis- sions, such as Santa Maria Suamca, Guebavi, Tumacacori, and San Javier del Bac, were reestablished ; and Jesuit visits to the Gila were resumed. "" Shortly afterward occurred an event which seemed likely for a time to lead to vigorous governmental action in north- westward advance, and the papers in connection with it were also used, several decades later, when authority was given for the Anza expedition of 1774. In 1736 a most remarkable silver mine was discovered at or near a place called Arizonac, or Arizona, just south of the border of the present-day state of Arizona. The more usual name for the mine at that time was Bolas de Plata, or Planchas de Plata; because the precious metal was found in balls or nuggets of almost pure silver. These were on or near the surface, and were of immense size, some of them weighing a ton or more. Accounts differ, but there are several stating i« See infra note 85. is ReboUedo to Vizarron, Apr. 11, In 1723 Campos wrote to the 1737, in C-1872. viceroy describing the country as far i' For his work on this occasion as the Gila. Bolton, Guide. Anza won encomiums, not only from 1^ Stated in Bishop of Puebla to the Jesuit writers, but also from the king king, Apr. 16, 1737, C-182. of Spain. Alegre, 245-46. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 25 that the largest nugget weighed 3500 pounds ; one of the reputed finders, Fermin, spoke of a 4000-pound nugget, and said that there were many of about 500 pounds. There was an immediate rush of miners to the spot. Captain Anza of Fronteras interfered with them, claiming that the holas belonged properly to the king. According to law, one-fifth of the silver accrued to the king if the discovery were a mine, but if a hidden treasure, the king was entitled to all. Anza claimed that if not a hidden treasure, it was at least a criaderOj or growing-place of silver, and therefore belonged to the national treasury. The viceroy reversed Anza's decision, but the royal decree of 1741 sustained the Fronteras captain. It is doubtful whether Anza could have held back the miners, if the mines had proved to be exten- sive. Cavo intimates that Anza's interference was not very effective anyway, the greater part of the wealth going to the discoverers,^^ and Anza himself stated that he had difficulty in saving any for the king.^^ Although the region was rich in mineral wealth of the ordinary type, the bolas seem to have been but a superficial deposit,^^ and nothing is heard of them after 1741. Nevertheless the bolas incident did lead to an official consideration of northwestward con- quest by way of the Colorado and Gila rivers, and to some action by the government. The bolas de plata were a definitely proved item of wealth, which was infinitely more important than, for example, a fabled mountain of gold. Where so much silver had been found, there was good reason to expect that more existed. In a letter of January 7, 1737, to Benito Crespo, bishop of Puebla, Anza tells of the discovery of the bolas, and says that this should prove an impetus to further advance of the Spanish conquests. He urges Crespo to use his influence to bring about such action.^^ On January 13, 1737, Anza reported to Viceroy Vizarron what he had done MCavo, 271. (Mexico, 1850), 185-205. Portions of 21 C-177. the Velasco work were translated to 22 For a brief history of mining in English by William F. Nye under the Sonora, see Jos6 Francisco Velasco, title of Sonora (San Francisco, 1861). Noticias eatadisticas del estado de Sonora 23 C-177. 26 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II in relation to the holas}^ The next day he wrote again proposing an expedition to the north with himself as leader. He quoted a number of the reports of early explorers, and reviewed the evidence for belief in the wealth of the north. The vast ruin on the Gila known as the Casa Grande and an even greater one in Chihuahua; built, he thought, by Aztec kings in the course of their migration southward,^^ were mentioned by him in support of this belief. Indians of the Gila had told Jesuit visitors of the existence of quick- silver in the north.^^ Anza had something to say too of the island California, of the strait through the continent, and of the Seven Cities, Gran Teguayo, and Quivira, and as usual, the vast number of Indians awaiting conversion was adduced as an argument for an expedition. His project was to make discoveries toward the Colorado River, pay- ing visits to the tribes of that river and the Gila as a pre- liminary to founding a settlement on the Colorado, this to be a base for further discoveries. The expedition should consist of fifty or sixty soldiers and a hundred friendly Pjmg^. Funds might be obtained from pious persons, while he him- self was willing to provide horses, cattle, mules, and articles as gifts for the Indians. As the Apaches were a constant source of trouble, and Seri uprisings no inconsiderable dif- ficulty, most of the troops should be drawn elsewhere than from his presidio, Corodeguache de Fronteras, as this had to play a large part in meeting these dangers.^^ Anza's proposal was seriously considered by the govern- ments of Spain and New Spain, being discussed in connec- tion with the question whether the holas were mine or treas- ure. A few of the documents used may be considered here, and a reference given to the rest in a note.^^ On April 11, 24 He had first heard of them on 2^ C-178. November 13, 1736. Anza, Declaration, 28 The following that bear on the Nov. 15, 1736, in C-192. subject were not used by me : C-185, 26 For an account and bibliography 186, 191-93, 199-201, 203-5, 207-8, of the Casa Grande see Garces (Coues 212. Three of these would seem to ed.), I, 89-101. be of particular value in a detailed 26 Lack of quicksilver was one of study of this period. C-191 is the the prime causes for the slow develop- original of a communication from the ment of Sonora. The miners needed Council of the Indies to the king, it in order to extract precious metals October 5, 1737, giving its opinion on from ores. Cf. n. 63. the matters arising from the discovery 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 27 1737, the fiscal J Juan Olivar ReboUedo, to whom Anza's petition had been referred by the viceroy, dehvered his written opinion. He referred to various earher expeditions, among others to a voyage up the Gulf of Cahfornia by Guillermo Estrajort in 1730 or 1731.29 This had led to a doubt whether California were an island, as had been supposed. ReboUedo thought that an expedition such as Anza proposed would make that point clear, and give in- formation of the lands and peoples of the Colorado River and thence to Moqui. He therefore recomQiended that Anza be permitted to go, taking with him, besides the force proposed, a man skilled in the use of instruments for deter- mining latitudes, and Father Campos, if the latter wished to go, to instruct natives in the catechism.^^ Among papers received by the viceroy were certain memorials from one Jose de Messa, written from Guadalajara in July and Au- gust, 1737. Messa told of the mineral wealth of the Arizo- nac mine, which he claimed to have discovered. Stories of its wealth had not been exaggerated, he said. Moreover, Indians had told him of great riches in gold, silver, pearls, and quicksilver farther in the interior. He spoke oi the multitude of Indians ripe for conversion, naming especially the Pima, Pdpago, and Seri tribes. In his opinion an exten- sion of Spanish conquests beyond Sonora would be of great service to God and the king.^^ It was not until September 15, 1737, that the viceroy wrote to the king of the holas incident and Anza's project, his letter of that date^^ being based on the Messa memorials, which he enclosed. Meanwhile, the authorities in Spain had already heard of the matter from another source. Anza's letter to the bishop of Puebla had borne fruit, for the latter had written to the king on April 16, 1737. It of the holas and Anza's proposed ex- pilot on Ugarte's voyage of 1721 to pedition, a manuscript of^ 22 pages. the head of the Gulf. This may have C-192 and 193 are great testimonios been the individual to whom the of respectively 263 and 124 pages. fiscal was referring. Probably, too. Both are certified copies, dated 1738, the 1721 voyage was meant, and not of files of papers in Mexico on this 1731 as stated. Estrafort kept a subject matter. diary of the Ugarte voyage. » An Englishman called Guillermo ^ In C-1872. Estrafort (William Strafford?) was ^ C-184. « C-187. 28 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II seemed to the bishop a propitious moment for fresh con- quests. There was reason to believe that great mineral wealth would be found on the other side of the Gila and Colorado. Nobody. had yet gone beyond the above-named rivers.^^ The bishop's letter and the two of Anza, for the latter had sent to the bishop a copy of his letter to Vizarron, were considered by the Council of the Indies. The fiscal gave his opinion, September 18, 1737, that a junta should be called in Mexico to consider the advisability of the pro- posed conquests beyond the Colorado and Gila.^^ The Council concurred, embodying the recommendation of the fiscal in its decree of September 27, 1737.^^ Much the same procedure was ordered in a royal decree of June 13, 1738. The viceroy was reminded of a report made by Benito Crespo when, as bishop of Durango, he had just completed a dioce- san tour in 1731. Crespo had gone from Pimeria Alta by way of El Paso to New Mexico. He had stated that it was easy to get to the Colorado and Gila rivers, as had been proved by repeated trips there, but had regarded such jour- neys as a needless expense, believing that settlements there could not be maintained. He had thought that an advance to territories of the Pimas of the Gila was feasible, as these people, being natural enemies of the Apaches, might be expected to welcome them. Moqui probably was not far away, according to the bishop, but was on the other side of a very deep river which only an occasional Indian had been able to cross.^^ Proceeding, the royal decree ordered the viceroy to call a junta of practical, intelligent men to con- sider Anza's proposal, examining former projects and re- ports, and getting the advice of missionaries and others then in service. A full account was to be sent to the king for his decision in the matter.^^ The expedition was not in fact made, and no materials have yet come to light stating reasons for abandonment of the-^lan, but they may be inferred with a fair degree of certainty. A series of Indian wars had broken out in 33 C-182. 36 The Grand Canyon of the Colo- 34C-188. rado? 36 C-189. 37 C-202. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 29 Sonora. In 1737 the Pimas of the coast revolted and took refuge in the Cerro Prieto, an almost impregnable moun- tain stronghold in the vicinity oi Guaymas ; the Cerro Prieto was to play an important part in the history of Sonora from that time forth. On this occasion Anza subdued the Pimas. He was unsuccessful, however, with the Apaches, who continued to be troublesome, losing his life in a battle with them in 1739. In 1740-41 the Mayo and Yaqui In- dians were in revolt against the mission system. Probably quite as important as these events, even more than the death of Anza, was the fact that the bolas proved to be only a superficial deposit. They were at length adjudged to have been buried treasure. Yet, if no striking advance was made at this time, the bolas incident was not without result ; something was done to clear the way. Two presidios were established in 1741 ; Pitiqui as a protection against the Seris, Pimas, Yaquis, and Tepocas, at modern Hermosillo ; and Terrenate in the vicinity of the Arizonac mine as an outpost against the Apaches. In 1745 there were at these two pre- sidios and at Fronteras, with also a garrison at Buenavista, a total of 183 soldiers, not enough to overawe the Seris and Apaches who gave much trouble, but, as matters went in the frontier provinces, the establishing of two presidios must be regarded as a considerable step in northwestward advance. Meanwhile, the Jesuits of Sonora and Baja California were continually petitioning for the occupation of the Colorado-Gila country, and were displaying not a little activity in exploring that region. After 1736, frequent trips to the Gila and Colorado were made by Fathers Ignacio Keller and Jacobo Sedelmayr. Journeys of explora- tions became even more frequent after 174 Las a result of a royal decree in that year awarding the Moqui field to the Jesuits, — another step, it would seem, in the projected northwestward conquest. It now behooved the Jesuits to reach their charges, Moqui being regarded as not far beyond the Gila. In journeys made between 1743 and 1750 the most prominent name is that of Father Sedelmayr. On one occasion he seems to have gone up the Colorado as 30 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II far as Bill Williams Fork, and on another he descended the Colorado nearly to its mouth. These and other Jesuit expeditions failed of their purpose if they were intended to prove the nearness of Moqui, but if, as Bancroft asserts, the real object was to interest the king in founding estab- lishments on the Colorado and Gila rivers as a preliminary to a further advance, they were decidedly successful. One noteworthy statement of Sedelmayr, much quoted in later years, was that the Indians had told him that the Colorado flowed to the west, a little north of where he had gone. This led to conjectures that there might be a branch of the Colorado emptying into the Pacific, possibly the Carmelo. These Jesuit explorations also had some effect upon the much broached project of uniting the Sonora missions to those of Baja California by way of the Colorado River. An Indian, revolt occurred in Baja California in 1734, which was not suppressed until two years later. Questions arising out of this revolt have a bearing upon the proposed land route in the official correspondence of the next decade. Meanwhile, war broke out between Spain and England in 1739, which, coupled with Anson^s appearance off the Pacific coast of Mexico in 1742, tended still more to direct attention to the Californias and the Sonora coast. The Marques de Aysa, president of the Audiencia of Guadalajara, took steps to get information with regard to the islands and pearl - fisherie s off the coast of Sonora, and about the ports an3 mmeraT wealth of the coasb.^^ In a letter to the king of January 21, 1743, he proposed that these places be occupied, and settlements made, utilizing for that purpose criminals and other disturbers of the peace in Nueva Galicia.^® In the same year the matter of the Baja California revolt came before the Council of the Indies, which approved the steps taken by the viceroy, authorizing such expense as had been incurred."*^ The ministro general, Fernando Triviiio, began also to make inquiries with a view to forwarding the spir- itual and temporal conquest of the Californias.'^^ The » C-236. « C-243, 245M6. » C-242. « C-240, 24^-46, 253. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 31 Jesuits renewed their petitions, and the viceroy, the Conde de Fuenclara, recommended, June 25, 1744, that the king send as many Jesuits as possible for use both in their col- leges, and in converting the natives of Sinaloa, Sonora, and the Californias.'*^ All of these matters came to a head in the royal decree of November 13, 1744, directed by Tri- vino to the viceroy. The keynote of it is the necessity for occupying the Colorado River country. The gist of the decree follows : In considering questions arising from the Baja California revolt of 1734 the fiscal of the Council of the Indies had made a report. May 12, 1744, declaring that the retention of Baja California was a matter of great importance. The Council therefore recommended the founding of Spanish settle- ments, as well as the encouragement of the Jesuits in their work of conversion. It also proposed that Jesuit mission- aries should enter Baja California from the north, since it had been discovered that the Calif ornias were joined to the continent. In this way the reduction of the peninsula would be simplified, the Indians being hemmed in on both sides. There should be two missionaries in each of the frontier missions, one to travel among the heathen and to make converts, and the other to be in charge of the mission. This applied not only to the missions of Baja California, but also to those of Pimeria Alta. When on journeys to visit outlying tribes the missionaries should be furnished with a military escort. Thus, the Jesuits of Pimeria Alta could reduce the Cocomaricopas and Yumas of the Colorado, As these Indians were well disposed, it might be possible for the Jesuits from Pimeria Alta to found a mission on each bank of the Colorado, thus securing communications on both sides of the river. They might then proceed southward to the missions of the peninsula. The escort could be secured by dispensing with the presidio of Pitiqui. As these proposals were expected to produce many benefits to the royal dominions, among others the freedom of Philip- pine commerce, the viceroy was directed to take immediate « C-259. 32 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II steps to put them into effect. Furthermore; the viceroy was to consult with the Marques del Castillo de Aysa, who had proposed, January 21, 1743, that two ships of war should be maintained on the Pacific coast, both to protect that region, and to promote the pearl-fisheries of the Gulf ; and that the Islas Marias ^^ should be settled, so as to prevent some enemy's ship from hiding there to wait for the Manila galleon. The first proposal merited particular attention, said Trivino, but the second required more consideration.^^ Sixteen years later the Council stated that the decree of 1744 had been enacted with a view to checking foreign aggression from the direction of New Mexico.'*^ Develop- ments of the next few years following the 1744 decree make it probable that this was after all the most prominent factor in the minds of the authorities. Trivino asked reports of various individuals who might throw light on the matter. Of the replies received ^^ only one will be considered in any detail, that of the Jesuit Pro- vincial of New Spain, Father Escobar, November 30, 1745. Escobar was assisted in drawing up his memorial by the man who knew the Colorado River country better than any one else. Father Sedelmayr, who had just returned from his journey of 1744 to Bill Williams Fork. Escobar stated that the proposed colonization of Baja California was im- possible because of the sterility of the land.^^ As it was, the missions already occupied could not exist without the prod- ucts sent to them from Sinaloa. The region about Mon- terey was more fertile, but would be difficult to reduce by an advance from Baja California, owing to the [intervening] barrenness and the lack of laborers. Therefore, he pro- posed a conquest of Pimeria Alta, which was easy of access, <3 otherwise Tres Marias ; off the *' Among other replies not noted coast of Tepic at the mouth of the here was one by the bishop of Durango, Gulf. June 19, 1745, giving his opinion con- ** In Burriel, II, 502-17 ; Natural cerning the lands about Pimeria Alta, arid civil history, II, 165-73. Except and what Spain might do there. C-260. for page 513, the latter omits what *'' This was true, but it is probable appears from the bottom of page 511 that the traditional objection of the of the Noticia to the end of the docu- Jesmts to Spanish settlements near ment. their missions had something to do *^ C-1455. with Escobar's argmnent. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 33 and, in the region of the Colorado and Gila rivers, fertile ; for, just as the lower part o^Baja California could not exist without products from Sinaloa, the upper part would be unable to exist without those of Pimerla.*^ Such a con- quest would facilitate that of Moqui, in case it did not suc- ceed by way of New Mexico, and it would be a check upon the Apaches. To achieve it, the number of Jesuits would have to be increased, the Gulf explored again, as the au- thorities in Mexico were not yet certain that the Californias were joined to the mainland, and a presidio of a hundred men established on the Gila in Apache territories. It would not be safe to do away with the presidio of Pitiqui, as in that event the Indians of that vicinity, the Yaquis, Seris, and others, might rise in rebellion. Brilliant results were predicted by Escobar if his plan were adopted : the suppression of the Apaches ; the conquest of Moqui and intervening territories ; conquest of the tribes of the two rivers ; the opening of a field for conversions beyond them ; and, above all, the facilitation of a passage to the Cali- fornias.^^ Early in 1746 Sedelmayr himself wrote a report, but as it expressed much the same views as the Escobar memorial, it may be omitted here.^° The voyage of Father Fernando Consag in June and July, 1746, was one result of this renewed interest in the northwest. Consag went to the head of the Gulf, and defi- nitely proved the peninsularity of the Californias.^^ Moqui « There is hardly a doubt but that done, a full description of the country Escobar referred to the upper half of and its people as observed by himself the peninsula. The phrase is "Cali- and others and his own ideas respect- fornia alta" in Burriel, but the dis- ing the territory and tribes not yet tinction had not yet been made of seen. He presents as motives for the applying alta to the California now foundation of the missions the fertility part of the United States. Only the of the soil; the great numbers of In- lower part of the peninsula had been dians awaiting salvation ; the mineral occupied ; hence alta might well be wealth awaiting development ; and the upper part. Cf. notes 49, 54, and the desirability of a new base of opera- especially-^4. tions from which to protect the old siJ^^C-263) The above, however, was missions, to reduce the Moquis, to taken from Burriel, Noticia, II, 537- check the Apaches, to learn if California 42. It is probable that the last re- is an island, to push the reduction up to mark refers to the peninsula; the one Monterey, and to solve the great geo- preceding it doubtless refers in part graphical mysteries of the far north." to the American state of California. Bancroft, N. M. St. & Tex., I, 538. 60 Sedelmayr "gives a r6sum6," says " C-266, 272. Bancroft, "of what had already been \. 34 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II appearing to be much nearer to the Franciscans in New Mexico than to the Jesuits in Pimeria Alt a, the decree of 1741 was reversed in 17^, ^^^£21^^ being reawarded to the Franciscans. This did not lessen interest in the Colorado- Gila region, although the death of Philip V in 1746, and the arrival of a new viceroy, the elder Conde de Re villa Gigedo, in the same year may have tended to delay action. A junta had been held, prior to Revilla Gigedo^s arrival, about the general subject of conquering the Calif ornias. Its recommendations were considered by the Council of the Indies, along with the Escobar memorial and the re- ports of Consag's voyage,^^ leading to the royal decree of December 4, 1747. The decree of 1747 quoted in full that of November 13, 1744 ; stated that the preceding viceroy, Fuenclara, had begun to receive reports, and take other action in pursuance thereof; remarked that the king understood that Revilla Gigedo, because so recently installed in office, had been unable to give much attention to it ; and cited with ap- proval Father Escobar's memorial. Revilla Gigedo was to proceed, without awaiting fresh royal orders, to do what he thought advisable to carry out the decree of 1744, always bearing in mind, however, the state of the royal treasury, so that he might not cause needless expenditures. He was ordered to devote himself in particular to reducing the Seris, also the Pimas Altos and Pdpagos, and to check the hostilities of the Apaches. ^^ The d ocum ent is interesting in that it st^es the necessary, prehminaries to the discovery and use of a land route to the Calif ornias : the conquest 2^ of the Seris and allied tribes ; the repulse of the Apaches ; 3 and the occupation of the Colorado-Gila country. Thence, Spaniards might go to New Mexico, or to Alta or Baja Cali- fornia ; but the prime concern then was that the decree might bring about the reduction of the peninsula, Baja California.^* 5« For papers considered by the Coun- decree. The special recommendation oil of the Indies see C-274, 276-79, 335. to reduce the Seris and other tribes 63 C-283, The above account, how- was the principal suggestion of the ever, was taken from Burriel, Noticia, junta called by Fuenclara. II, 501-20. The Natural and civil " Richman, 59-60, says of this history does not contain the 1747 decree that it "sanctioned for the 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 35 The decree was not without results so far as Sonora was concerned. Jos6 Gallardo was sent there in 1748 as visi- tador,^^ having to deal primarily with the question of con- quering the Seris. Governor Vildosola had neglected work on the presidio of San Pedro (Pitiqui), and, as a result, that part of the province was in a defenceless state. Such, at least, was Gallardo's report. ^^ Vildosola was reheved from office, being succeeded by Diego Parrilla who arrived in 1749. He was instructed by Gallardo to attack the Seri strongholds of the Cerro Prieto and Tibur6n Island. The Seris were to be exterminated, or at least removed from Ti- buron Island to the mainland, where they might the more easily be punished. Gallardo himself removed the presidio of Pitiqui to San Miguel de Horcasitas, regarded as a more ef- fective site against the Seris. He also planned in 1749 to make explorations himself toward the Calif ornias by way of the Colorado River, doubtless hoping to reach Baja Cali- fornia, as ordered in the decree, but was prevented from so doing by Apache wars. He left orders, however, that pre- sidio captains should visit the more distant missions from time to time. In 1750 Governor Parrilla made his campaign against the Seris, and reported a complete success. Events were to prove, however, that the troublesome Seris were far from being conquered. Further action was soon taken by the authorities in Mexico and Spain. A junta was held in Mexico in 1751, and a meeting of the Council of the Indies in 1752 to con- sider the affairs of Sonora. The documents from which these bodies drew their conclusions throw great light upon reduction of the Californias the exact ^^ "Whenever unsatisfactory reports plan of Kino. Pimerla Alta (the came in concerning any governor or scene of Kino's labors) was to be magistrate, the India Council, or its occupied ; a presidio was to be es- higher representatives, at once des- tablished on the Gila river; and Alta patched a visitador to hold investi- California was to be entered by way of gation and submit the result, although the Arizona desert." This statement at times he had power to carry out seems intended to convey the idea reforms and penalties on the spot." that the present American state of Bancroft, Mex., Ill, 521. Employ- California was to be entered. The ment of the words " whenever, "" any, " word " California " or the " Alta Califor- and "at once" may be objected to, nia" of Burriel may have misled Mr. but otherwise the above definition of a Eichman. There is nothing about an visitador will serve, advance to Monterey in either decree. '« C-286-87, 290-91. 36 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II the history of Sonora and northwestward advance, and some of them will therefore be dealt with at length. The decisions were based primarily upon five representations written in Mexico City by Fernando Sanchez Salvador, a captain of cuirassiers in Sinaloa and Sonora. ^^ E!our of I*"} these memQxials are dated March 2, 1751, and are addressed ^ to the Eng;^^ the ^h, May 15, 1751, is addressed to the junta in Mexico.^^ On the latter date Sanchez directed G another letter to the king,^° enclosing documents tending to sustain his proposals. Most important of these is the map.®^ It was considered to be of sufficient moment to be called to the attention of the foreign office, due to Sanchez's re- marks about the proximity of the French, being forwarded October 5, 1751, to Jose Carbajal y Lancaster by the Mar- ques de la Ensenada.^^ Numerous other documents were used, both in Mexico and in Spain, but the Sdnchez memorials and the map tell most of the story. •• The first memorial urged that the same methods of govern- ment be employed in Sinaloa and Sonora as in other prov- inces, which could be brought about by secularizing the missions of Sinaloa where that step had not taken place already, and those of the Mayo and Yaqui districts of Sonora, putting religious instruction in charge of the secular clergy, and civil affairs in the hands of the government. The Jesuits might be used on the frontier. One of the principal reasons for this suggestion was that the Indians could then be taxed ; as matters were, those north of Culiacdn, Sinaloa, J . paid nothing. The second suggested that the unruly ele- ment of Sinaloa and Sonora be sent to the Tres Marias 5' His rank appears in C-292, Al- by its presence in the Sdnchez expe- though he is called Salvador in Ban- diente, but also by internal evidence, croft, it seems better to say Sdnchez, Neither Tubac not Altar appears, but that being his apellido, or father's San Miguel (Horcasitas) is entered, name. The documents usually refer The two former were founded in 1752, to him as Sdnchez, but occasionally as and the last named in 1751. Clearly, Salvador. therefore, the map is of the year 1751. M C-308. See also C-307, the re- Although drawn by Don N. N. Anbile. mitting letter. Sdnchez ought to be considered the 69 C-310. real author, for the map represents his ®'C-311. ideas, and was made, no doubt, under " The date is given as 1757 in Torres his direction. Lanzas, I, no. 206, but it should be 62 C-316. 1751. This may be proved, not only 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 37 Islands, and that a presidio be placed there to guard them. Unruly whites, as well as Indians, should be sent there, but Sdnchez referred more particularly to the latter. The Seris, Pimas, Apaches, and others were mentioned as possible malcontent tribes, but the Apaches deemed most i apt to merit removal to the islands. The third recommended O A4. better provision for bringing about agricultural develop- ment, and, even more, gold and silver mining. Missions should not be allowed to monopolize the best agricultural lands, and the price of quicksilver should be reduced, so that mining might become more profitable. ^^ Sanchez's chief interest was in his fourth memorial, to •4'W which the first three were but preliminaries. In this he advocated estabHshing strong settlements on the Colorado and Gila rivers, coming to this conclusion largely because the French were said to be extending their settlements west- ward. They were in the vicinity of northern New Mexico, he said, and did not need to advance much farther to reach the Carmelo River on the Pacific Ocean. The^^ppsed jSgttlements would serve tii£fi£s^|Ui^(pses : first, that of check- \ , ing penetration by France to the Pacific coast ; second, as a base of operations for conquering the Indians of the ^' Colorado-Gila region ; third, it would conduce to the occu- '^ pation of 'Hhe richest and most abundant land that this vast kingdom contains,'^ for whereas Baja California was lacking in water, the region to the north, according to [Gonzalez] Cabrera [Bueno], from the Carmelo to the south, had a luxuriant growth of trees, and good sites for settle- ment, the Indians, too, being most tractable. Sanchez referred to a westward branch of the Colorado flowing into the sea between Monterey and Point Concepcion which he believed to be the Carmelo. This should furnish an easy route to the coast. For the better execution of his project he recommended a new viceroyalty with its capital either at San Juan de Sonora, or at some point in Chihuahua, with jurisdiction over Sonora, New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, '*'"''^' and the regions of the Colorado River. -^w^.-«-----*j . •8 The government maintained a monopoly on the sale of quicksilver. Cf. n. 26. ^^ 38 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II &tR Sdnchez's fifth memorial, addressed to the junta at Mexico, was similar to the fourth one to the king, but with some additions. Two hundred soldiers should be located on the Colorado, he said, and families sent there for the formation of three or four strong villas. ^^ Sonora could not provide these settlers, as it needed all it had ; they should come from Sinaloa, Nueva Vizcaya, and Mexico. Climate, rich mineral wealth, and numerous Indians were mentioned as attractive features of the Colorado River region. Once established there, communication should be opened with New Mexico by way of Moqui. Just as soon as peace was secure in the Colorado settlements, a detachment should be sent to explore a route to the sea at the point where the Carmelo emptied, and it would not have far to go, for the \ \ Colorado emptied in 33° 30', and the Carmelo in a scant wa) ^^^^/#36°. A settlement on the Carmelo would be useful. The iLiA W*^ ' Manila galleon might have recourse to it in case of trouble, and news of its coming might be received much earlier than at the time. Such a settlement might also give information of the presence of foreign enemies in that neighborhood. Sdnchez regarded his proposal as of particular importance as a means to check French encroachments on Spanish territory. He referred to the crafty methods of French con- quest, as by sending to America their men and women of low morals to marry Indians. By such methods they had made the French language universal, and had conquered at such a rapid rate that they surrounded the Spanish pos- sessions from Texas on the east to New Mexico on the north. In course of time they hoped to possess themselves of the Spanish colonies; they were already very near the Sierra Madre,^^ and if they ascended that, they would find the ^ The villa in Spain was a town not defined in the laws of the Indies , having special privileges, especially but is merely distinguished from the as regards civil and criminal jurisdiction, ciudad, or city, by having fewer local as distinguished from the aldea or officials (Recop., lib. IV, tit. VII, unprivileged town. It goes back to ley II). Book four of the Recopila- the eleventh century, the villas or cion has several titles which deal concejos being in the frontier districts with the settlement and government facing the Moslems, privileges being of cities and towns in the Americas, granted as an inducement to settle- b* That is, the "mother range," a ment. Perhaps because the meaning descriptive term to indicate the princi- of the word was so well understood, it is pal mountain chain. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 39 Pacific before them. It was quite possible that they might come upon the sources of the Colorado or the Carmelo. In this connection it was well to bear in mind a suspicious French action in 1740, when ten Frenchmen with Indian guides arrived in New Mexico near Albuquerque, saying that they had come on foot from the lakes with the inten- tion of making a settlement. It was likely, said Sdnchez, that they were a scouting party from a much larger force, and that they hoped to discover where the Spanish were carrying on their conquests.^® Among other documents before the Council in its con- sideration of the Sdnchez memorials, were letters from the viceroy dated July 10," August,^^ and October 29,^^ 1751. Those of the first and third date treated of hostile Apaches, dealing for the most part with presidio and mission condi- tions in Nueva Viz cay a, but there were references to north- eastern Sonora as one of the regions where the Apaches committed depredations. The letter of August 6 pointed out the Seris and their neighbors as the disturbing factor that "for over a century" had proved a hindrance to further exploration of the Gila and Colorado rivers, and to establish- ing communications between the Californias and the main- land. This obstacle was now of less account, thought the viceroy, for by Governor Parrilla^s campaign of 1750, the Seris had been reduced in numbers to a thousand. In his first answer to the Council, January 16, 1752. the fiscal^^ " This may have been the event which verbatim, this being especially note- influenced the royal decree of 1744. worthy in the case of the fiscales of «7 C-313-14. the Council. The fiscal was a lawyer, •8 C-315. but did not confine his advice to legal » C-317. matters. It will be noticed that he 70 The fiscal was an exceedingly im- had become something quite different portant official of manifold functions in from what the laws originally in- Spanish administration. As referred tended. The fiscal of the Audiencias to in this work the fiscales of the of Lima or Mexico, for example, was Council of the Indies and Audiencia supposed to be a kind of prosecuting of Mexico were officials to whom attorney, having a special care for the matters were referred for a report. royal interests in financial and legal The fiscal would draw conclusions from matters as against possible usurpations documents bearing on the case, sum- by other officers of the king. By the marize their contents, and give an close of the eighteenth century he had opinion as to the course of action become in effect the first servant of to pursue. In most cases that the the viceroy. The same thing had writer has seen, although not in all, occurred in Spain, where the fiscales opinions of the fiscales were followed occupied a similar relation to the Coun- 40 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II Jose de Goyeneche stated that most of these projects had already been suggested by the Council on May 12, 1744, and approved by the king. Therefore no action ought to be taken until the decision of the junta in Mexico was re- ceived. But in view of the fertility of the Colorado-Gila country, the ease of reducing Indians there, and especially the danger from the French, he was of the opinion that Sanchez's proposal of conquest and settlement was of sufficient importance to demand the principal attention of the viceroy. The French seemed to be desirous of occupying a port on the Pacific, a contingency which must be averted. He approved of secularizijig the missions, because the Indians had been gathered into settlements and converted, in which case the laws provided that secularization should take place, and that the Indians should pay taxes to His Majesty. In conclusion, he approved of the proposal to lower the price of quicksilver as an aid to the miners of Sonora.^^ The fourth proposal of Sdnchez came before the Council again in its meeting of March 13, 1752, to consider Sonora affairs. The Council thought that it would be quite natural for the French in their westward advance to descend the Colorado to the Gulf, and by its branch, the Carmelo, pro- ceed to the Pacific. Once in possession of Monterey they would dominate all that coast of the Californias, and it must be remembered, said the Council, that Monterey was only 350 Spanish lea^ue3 from Acapulco.^^ On May 15, 1752, Goyeneche delivered his second answer to the Council. Referring to the proposed establishments on the Colorado, he said, ^^The conquest which has been made of Tibur6n Island, and the dislodgment of the Seri Indians ^^ are of great importance, for by occupying, as they were, the territory through which the route to the Colorado River lay, they rendered it difficult to make settlements there, as appears from the map of Don Fernando Sdnchez. cil of the Indies, For their functions ^^ C-325. as enacted by law, see Recop., lib. ^ C-335. II, tit. V, for the fiscales of the Council ; '^ The supposed conquests by Pa- and Recop., lib. II, tU. XVIII, for the rrilla in 1750. fiscales of the Audiencias. 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 41 These natives having been suppressed, the way remains without hindrance." This conquest, along with measures that the viceroy had taken in Nueva Vizcaya would result in catching the Apaches between two Spanish forces/^ thus not only checking them, but also making it possible to conquer, dislodge, or punish them. Thanks were due the viceroy for this achievement, but at the same time he should be requested to forward the determination of the junta with regard to Sdnchez's proposals. Of these projects Goyeneche said that they "seem to him to be so important, especially that of the prompt conquest and settlement of the Colorado River, because of the grave damage that may be occasioned to the kingdom of New Spain and its provinces by any post of vantage that may advance the French nation, that it will be fitting to charge the viceroy to devote his primary attention to the conquest and settle- ment which Don Fernando Sdnchez proposes, inasmuch as by the conquest and dislodgment of the Seri, Tiburon, Carrizo, and Salinero Indians the way to the Colorado and Gila rivers has become free."^^ After quoting the correspondence leading to the decree of December 4, 1747, and citing two royal decrees of August 19, 1606,^^ with regard to making a settlement at Monterey, the Council pointed out the dangers that would result from a French advance to that port by way of the Colorado and Carmelo rivers. The French would then dominate the Pacific, and threaten Spanish trade with the Philippines. The question whether Spain should occupy Monterey was then considered. If done, Monterey would serve as a place of refreshment for the galleon, for it had a good port, the lands were fertile for every kind of crop, and good for caUle, and the natives were docile. It would also be a place of refuge in case of storms."^^ While these de- liberations were going on, news was received from the viceroy which gave a new turn to affairs. On January 16, 1752, he wrote that the Pimas of Pimeria Alta had risen in ^*In that the Sens could no longer '» C-330. make a diversion. »• C-15, 16. t? C-335 . 42 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II serious revolt in the preceding November. A junta held in Mexico had decided to procure peace by despatching a squadron of fifty men to that region, but with instructions 'to deal gently with the Pimas, lest they form a pact with the Apaches and Seris. Peace established, this troop was to advance to the Colorado and Gila in order to open com- munication with the Californias."^^ This letter seems to have been received at the same time with another by the viceroy of February 10, 1752. The latter^* enclosed a testi- monio giving a full account of what had happened and of the measures taken. ^° Commenting on these events the fiscal recommended, June 26, 1752, that action on Sanchez's proposals be postponed until Sonora should be restored to peace,^^ and such was the decision of the Council.^^ Consideration of the subject went on in Mexico, however, another junta being held in 1752. Among the documents considered was a memorial of Father Sedelmayr, June 25, 1751, signed also by other Jesuits of Pimeria Alt a. The document recites that the Jesuits had become discouraged because of the lack of attention paid to their previous memo- rials, but they were taking fresh hopes, due to the peace ^^ and to "news of the zeal" of the viceroy. Consequently, they were urging an advance to the Gila and Colorado rivers, a region of vast lands, mighty rivers, great fertility, and withal, easy to govern. After reducing the peoples there, they could proceed to other important ends, such as the conversion of superior California}^ Moreover, the "0-324. Monterey." There is no warrant for " C-326. See also C-327. this statement except the phrase *• C-321. superior California, which, as has been 81 C-334. shown, referred to the upper part of 8* C-335. This document is a long the peninsula. Sedelmayr speaks of report by the Council of the Indies to superior California as a sterile land, the king, July 7, 1752, citing most of lack of provisions in which might be the documents mentioned above in remedied by sending them via the connection with the Sdnchez memorials, mouth of the Colorado River. This and stating the action of the Council. then was the oft-mentioned plan of For a summary of proceedings to June supplying Baja California by an over- 15, 1752, see C-332. land route. Besides, Alta California 83 Another reference to Parrilla's would not have been called a sterile campaign of 1750. land, because belief in its fertility was w Richman quotes this document general. Finally, why send provisions to show that Pimeria was to be "a from the Colorado-Gila country to base of operations" not only to Moqui Alta California by way of the mouth of but also "northwestward as far as the Colorado? 7 1687] EARLY PROJECTS FOR ADVANCE 43 first-named reduction would be necessary before Moqui could be reconquered, besides which the Colorado-Gila lands were better and more populous than those of Moqui* The natives of these rivers desired Christianity, as had been made clear to Sedelmayr during his visit of 1744, and if they had missions among them, the Spaniards would soon get to know of other peoples farther up the Colorado. Per- haps they were not far distant from the most westerly con- quests of the French, who were said to be seeking this same Colorado River. At least eleven or twelve missions would be necessary, because of the great number of Indians. There also should be a presidio of more than the usual number of soldiers, which should be located on the Gila, not far from Apacheria, as a check against the hostile Apaches. This done, it might be possible in a short time to transfer the presidio of San Miguel de Horcasitas to the Gila, provided the Seris should remain subjected.^^ On December 16, 1751, the Marques de Altamira, auditor.^ f of the Avdiencia of Mexico, addressed a voluminous memo- rial to the fiscal of that body with regard to this matter. It is especially noteworthy here as evidence that the atten- tion of the authorities had been focussed upon the Colorado- Gila country. Nearly one-third of the memorial is con- cerned with a review of the frontier situation from eastern " Sedelmayr and others to the vice- since 1694 Kino, Campos, Guilg, Keller, roy, June 25, 1751, Tubutama. The and he himself had known, explored, signers and their stations were : Jacobo managed, and dealt with [havlamoa Sedelmayr, visitador of Pimeria Alta, conocido, reconocido, manijado y tra- stationed at Tubutama ; Caspar Stiger tado]. Adam Guilg is the Adan Gil of [of San Ignacio] ; TomAs Tello of Bancroft. At probably about the Caborca : and Juan Nentuig of Saric. same time, although the letter is not It will be observed that the surnames dated, Father Felipe Segesser wrote to of these Jesuits are spelled differently the viceroy, the letter being signed than in Bancroft, with the single ex- also by Carlos de Roxas, Nicolas de ception of Tello. The above is the Perera, and Jos6 Fora, the last named way they themselves wrote them. not mentioned in Bancroft as among the Bancroft's surmise that Nentuig was Sonora Jesuits. This letter definitely located at Saric proves to have been includes Campos with those who made correct. journeys to the Gila and Colorado This letter contains an intimation rivers. The document, however, is that Fathers Campos and Adam Guilg little more than a transcript of the were among the Jesuits who engaged one written by Sedelmayr and the in northward exploration, a fact that Jesuits of Pimeria Alta, taking up the the writer had not seen mentioned else- same subject-matter in the same order, where. Cf. n 16, supra. Sedelmayr but in less detail. Both documents are refers to the Colorado and Gila regions in Arch, de la Secretaria de Gobierno, as places which by various journeys Chihuahua, Siglo XVIII, Legaj'o S. 44 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. II Texas to Pimeria Alta and Baja California. Concluding this part, Altamira said that it was necessary to consider this whole frontier as no less worthy of attention than the Calif ornias and the region of the Gila and Colorado rivers. By paying attention to one part of the j&eld as if there were no others equally worthy of consideration, or more so, would mean that such measures as might be taken in the matter of reductions would be defective, and that but little or no progress would be made. To the question of advance by way of the Colorado and Gila he devoted the remainder of the memorial. He recommended a number of missions and settlements, and a presidio in the Colorado-Gila re- gion. These establishments would result in the conquest of the natives, would serve as a nucleus for an advance to the Californias, and in time might lead to the opening of communication with Moqui and New Mexico.^^ The much planned advance to the Colorado and Gila did not come at this time. Much was done, however, which o tended toward it, such as the transfer of the presidio at /( . Pitiqui to Horcasitas in 1751, the founding of Tubac and Altar presidios in 1752, and the preparation of general cam- paigns against the Apaches along the whole northern fron- tier, all of which matters were related to the problems which produced the Sdnchez memorials. The way was not clear for expansion of the quiet, normal kind. Sonora was a seething hot-bed of Indian war and attendant evils. Thus the PiiaauXSyolt i^^y be regarded in a double light ; as causi ng \ » the postponement of an advance to the Colorado and Gila, and as hastening measures which would in fact conduce iL * to that end. As these events relate to the subject-matter of the next chapter, discussion of them will be reserved until then. Enough has been said here to indicate the contmuQus desire of the government for an advance to the^twoLriyers,.,. showing also that it was not great enough to bring about fulfillment of the project, unless there should be some powerful impelling cause, or the way of advance be easy. CHAPTER III OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE, 1752-1765 The revolt of the Pimas of Pimeria Alta broke out in November, 1751; headed by an Indian chief named Don Luis. All of the missions, villages, mining camps, and ranches in the northwest were speedily destroyed. Governor Parrilla and the presidio captains rushed troops to the scene in 1752, and the revolt died_ as suddenly as it had begun. Two missionaries and perhaps a hundred other whites had been killed. In the next twenty years, plans for an extension of the frontier by way of the Gila and Colorado rivers were secondary to the question of establish- ing good order in Sonora, a necessary preliminary to further permanent advance. The principal prerequisites to good order were : an adjustment of the differences between the religious and secular authorities ; the subjection or annihilation of the Seris, and the repulse of Apache raids; and a sufficiently great increase in the white population of Sonora to develop its resources, in order to render its reten- tion permanent, and to ensure a commensurate return to the central government for the expense of its reduction. One of the purposes of this chapter will be to show the status of these problems in the period elapsing between the suppression of the Pima revolt and the coming of Jose de Galvez as visitador of New Spain. A second object will be to account for Spain^s failure to cope with the situa- tion. Third, it will be shown that plans for northwestward advance were at no time given up, although they failed to result in great accomplishment, for the same reasons as those mentioned in the preceding chapter. Most of the missions of Pimeria Alta were reoccupied in 1752, after the Pima revolt had been suppressed, but pros- 45 46 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. Ill perity did not return. Decline was fostered by a bitter controversy that broke out between the Jesuits and Governor "ParriUa as to the causes of the outbreak. Father Keller said that Parrilla was at fault for flattering Don Luis, the revolt following as a natural consequence of the latter's conceit. Parrilla claimed that the Jesuits had ill-treated the Indians intolerably oppressing them with work and punishments. Many Indians and white settlers, probably the majority, supported Parrilla^s charges, although others took the Jesuit side, the arguments depending usually, perhaps, on the interests of those making them. Many of the Indians did not like the restraints of mission life; the whites wanted secularization, which would give them a chance to appropriate the mission lands, and virtually enslave the Indians; and secularization, if possible, was also in the interests of the government, as the Indians would then have to pay tribute. The dispute dragged on, re- sulting in many great testimonios that came before the Council of the Indies for consideration. Not until Sep- tember 27, 1759, was the case declared officially at an end,^ the Jesuits being exculpated.^ Whatever may have been the merfts of the controversy, the Jesuits became less and less influential in Sonora. Few neophytes were obtained from this time forth. Indian women and children, and old and infirm men resided at the missions, but others rarely came in, unless impelled by hunger or by fear of the Apaches. At other times they remained in the mountains, or aided the Seris in stirring up trouble.^ Meanwhile, complaints against the Jesuits continued. The Seris, as well as the Pimas, had given trouble in 1751, continuing from that time until 1771 in almost constant war with the Spaniards, taking refuge when hard pressed in the Cerro Prieto. Apache campaigns also occupied attention along the entire northern frontier from Sonora to Texas. 1 C-460. 324, 326-27, 334-40, 346, 348-53, 356- 2C-459. 65, 367-71, 379, 382, 384, 388, 393, 3 Among documents that bear on 398, 402-5, 438, 440-41, 450, 453, the dispute arising out of the Pima 458-60. revolt of 1751 are the following : C-322, 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 47 Expeditions against the Apaches accompHshed Httle, as they could never be brought to a general engagement. About the only result worth noting is the conclusion that Moqui might be reached by way of the upper Gila, if such a route were desired, a project considered in connection with the plans for conquest toward and beyond the Colorado and Gila. This conclusion was arrived at because the Apaches had blankets supposed to have been made by Moquis. Often the Apaches took advantage of expeditions against them to raid the country about the presidios, thus deprived of its usual guard. ^'It is impossible to estimate the damages suffered in Sonora," writes Burriel, '^especially since the death of the brave Captain Anza, in villages, settlements, farms, roads, pastures, woods, and mines, many of which have been abandoned on that account, although very- rich." ^ Even the mission Indians could no longer be controlled, the Jesuits fearing to discipline them, lest they provoke revolt. General lawlessness prevailed. Internal conditions of Sinaloa and Sonora are well illus- trated by the statistics of population obtained by Bishop Tamaron while on a diocesan tour from 1759 to 1763. At that time there were in the two provinces 32,000 of Spanish or mixed blood, and 31,000 Indians professing Christianity, of whom 25,000 lived in missions. There were fifty mis- sions, most of them in Sonora. The number of uncon- verted Indians was very large, but no estimate of them was made. The greater part of the white population lived in Sinaloa. White settlements ^ were the rule there, the exceptions being a few Indian villages along the coast, where there was not the inducement of mineral wealth to draw the Spanish settler. There were some considerable towns in Sinaloa. San Felipe de Sinaloa had a white population of 3500 ; Fuerte, otherwise San Juan de Montesclaros, 1886 ; Rosario 2459; San Sebastian 2500; Culiacdn 2216; and * Burriel, Noticia, II, 556. ment" of Mazatldn, for example, was ^ The term "white settlements" is composed of mulattoes. Of. chap. intended to include all elements of the I, n. 2. gente de razdn. The "white settle- 48 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. Ill Mazatlan 966. These places had nearly half the total white population of the two provinces. Secularization of missions had taken place in most of Sinaloa, although the Jesuits were more numerous than secular clergy, but they usually served as parish priests, the mission system pre- vailing but little. Much of this change came as a result of the Sanchez memorials, having occurred prior to the Tamaron visita} There were probably not many uncon- verted Indians in Sinaloa, or if there were, they caused no trouble. In Ostimuri, as that part of Sonora below the Yaqui was then called, conditions were almost as good as in Sinaloa. Alamos had a population of 3400 of white or mixed race ; Bayorca 1004; Rio Chico 1400; Trinidad de Plata 715; and Soyopa or San Antonio de la Huerta 300. All of these were mining towns. Farther north, in the mountain dis- tricts near the Sonora valley, there were a number of mining towns at considerable distances from a presidio, such as Arivechi, Sahuaripa, Nacori, and Arispe. In northeastern Sonora, where the Apaches were wont to make raids, most of the white population was grouped around presidios there and near by in Nueva Viz cay a, there being 484 at Front eras. Near the coast, where the Seris and their allies were numer- ous, and precious metals not plentiful, there were no whites. The case with Pimeria Alta was a little better, due to the existence of gold and silver. There were eight missions, Suamca, Guebavi, Bac, Saric, Tubutama, Ati, Caborca, and San Ignacio, and three presidios, Terrenate, Tubac, and Altar. Subsidiary to these were a number of visitas, villas, and reales de minas. In the mission districts there ' In addition to documents already to the mountains if deprived of their cited in connection with the Sdnchez missionaries. The government over- memorials the following may be re- ruled these objections, and the viceroy f erred to : C-341, 348, 355, 379, 381, 383, was able to write, March 9, 1755, that 397, These documents are for the the twenty-two missions had been years 1753 to 1755, dealing with the secularized. This relieved the govern- cession of twenty-two Jesuit missions ment of an annual expenditure of to the secular clergy under jurisdiction over 7000 pesos, the amount required of the bishop of Durango. The Jesuits by the missionaries for wine, oil, and objected to the cession, saying that other articles used in administering the Indians were opposed to it, and sacraments, and rendered the Indians that they had threatened to withdraw liable for tribute. 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 49 were 4223 Indians and 348 whites, the latter being at the mining camps of Guebavi, Santa Barbara, Buenavista, Arizonac, and Santa Ana. At the presidios there were no Indians, but there were 1117 whites, including garrisons of fifty men at each presidio. All of the white settlements of Pimeria Alta were within easy reach of presidios, without which they could not have existed. From the above it will appear that Sinaloa had undergone adjustment to white rule, removing it from the status of a frontier province ; that a great part of Sonora, including all prominent mining regions, except Pimeria Alta and the , northeast, was in a fair way to become adjusted; that northeastern Sonora, Pimeria Alta, and the coast regions were far from such adjustment ; that the line and progress iif conquest depended largely upon the existence of mineral wealth. Thus it seems that the situation in Sonora was not hopelessly bad, if only the government would exert itself to conquer the Seris and repulse the Apaches, but this it did not do for a long time. As a result Spanish settlements were abandoned, and to many it seemed that Sonora might be lost. The authorities in Mexico and Spain were memo- rialized by a vast horde of officials and priests as to the most effective methods for saving the province. In 1763 Father Lizazoin reported that it was in a fair way to become depopulated, and urged steps to prevent it, laying stress on the mineral wealth to be obtained there, should good order prevail. He suggested two new presidios as additional checks against the Indians : at Guaymas against the Seris and Pimas, and at Babispe against the Apaches. The anonymous author of the Descripcion Geogrdfica Natural y Curiosa de la Provincia de Sonora , writing in 1764, recom- mended that the Seris and Pimas Bajos be transported ; mining and agriculture might then revive. Pedro de Aragon, September 6, 1765, recommended concentrating on Ostimuri, and establishing a presidio south of the Yaqui River. These three memorials were only a few out of many, and although similar views were held in high quarters, they probably exhibited more pessimism than the facts war- 50 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA ICh. Ill ranted/ The official correspondence of the time shows that affairs were bad enough, but it was not so despondent in tone as were letters of the religious, and of private in- dividuals.^ It must be remembered that affairs were prob- ably as bad, or possibly worse, along the frontiers of Nueva Vizcaya, where the Apaches caused far more trouble than in Sonora, the problem of restoring peace being one of a long frontier, and not of a single province. As regards the matter of a permanent advance to the Colorado and Gila rivers, the situation was worse in 1765 than in 1752. The other two objects of this chapter involve a consideration of the general policy of the Spanish government for the period under review. The establishment of Bourbon rule in Spain in 1700, although carrjdng in its train a number of disastrous wars, was accompanied by sincere efforts for regeneration of the country. Spain^s object in this period was not primarily one of aggrandizement, but rather to make herself so strong that she could ensure retention of what she already had. Subordinate to this was the natural desire for the recovery of what had been taken from her, and for the removal of certain onerous restrictions upon her freedom of action, as, for example, those resulting from the Asiento treaty with England.^ At every turn in the accomplishment of these ^ Yet, at a later date, in a private years 1761 to 1765, of governors letter to his brother, May 29, 1767, Cuervo and Pineda, Viceroy Cruillas, Viceroy Croix wrote that Sinaloa and and Arriaga, the ministro general. Sonora were almost deserted by reason ' One of the results of the War of of Indian invasions. If the Indians the Spanish S^uccgssion was Spain's could be defeated, and the provinces grant of the Asiento treaty to England repopvilated, they would yield more in 1713. By its terms British subjects treasure than the rest of the kingdom, were allowed to sell 4800 slaves a year he said, for they were the richest prov- in the Spanish colonies for thirty years, inces in New Spain in gold and silver. They might also send one ship a year Croix, Correspondance, 207. Condi- of five hundred tons burden with goods tions in 1767 were not materially differ- ^; for the annual fairs at Vera Cruz and ent from what they were in the period ''^ Porto Bello. These privileges were covered in this chapter. used by the English as an entering * The three memorials quoted are wedge for smuggling. They were set cited from Bancroft. Among other aside on the outbreak of war in 1739, documents about internal conditions of and at the conclusion of peace, England Sonora are the following : C^95, 499, surrendered her rights for the unfinished 501-3, 511-13, 518-21, 524, 527-28, term of the treaty (the four years 530-31, 546, 549-50, 560, 564, 569, lost by war), upon Spain's payment of 690, 596. These are for the most an indemnity of £100,000. part official correspondence for the 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 51 policies Spain found herself confronted and threatened by- England. Five times, in little more than the first half century of Bourbon rule, Spain and England were oppo- nents in war.^^ Through violations of the Asiento treaty, ^''^f^'^^^;**^ England was breaking down Spain's monopoly of its colonial trade. English imperialism was a constant menace as against Spain's retention of her colonies. British subjects trespassed upon Spanish domains, as in the case of the ^ dye-wood cutters in Honduras, and were sustained by their ' own government. Gibraltar and Minorca were held by England, a standing affront to the national dignity of Spain, and a danger to the peninsula itself. The British govern- ment supported Portugal in the latter's claim to the Sacra- mento region of the Rio de la Plata in South America. British vessels claimed a right to search Spanish ships on the high seas, and even seized some of them. One obvious way to a successful issue of these contro- versies was the building up of a strong army and navy, but this required more money than Spain's revenues supplied. To get it Spain pursued two courses : the wise one of eco- / nomic regeneration at home, so that, by attainment of greater wealth, greater amounts in taxation might be levied ; and the unwise policy of bleeding the colonies, by exacting great «^' sums from them, without attempting in equal measure their development. The primary intention in the latter case seems to have been to get the greatest amount of revenue possible, not ultimately, but at once, at least so far as was commensurate with retention of the colonies. This is not the place to treat in detail of the results of this policy, temporary or ultimate. Suffice then to say that Spanish 1 \ revenues were increased, the economic wealth of Spain devel- 1 1 oped, and an army and navy created. But the need never ' ' caught up with the danger. The resources developed under Ferdinand VI were wasted by Spain's brief participation in the Seven Years' War. Whatever funds Spain got, she constantly needed more. It was for this reason that Jos6 de Gdlvez was sent to New Spain in 1765, for that vice- "To wit: 1701-13, 1718-21, 1727-29, 1739-48. 1762-63. 52 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. Ill royalty produced far more revenue than the other Spanish colonies. ^^ More yet was wanted. It is now time to consider how this policy affected the region of which Sonora forms a part. Materials have been found in the Archivo General de Indias by the writer show- ing the receipts and disbursements of the Real Caja (royal treasury) of Guadalajara for each year from 1743 to 1781. This was the principal real caja within the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Guadalajara, and until the arrival of Gdlvez the only one dealing with the region west of the central plateau of Mexico. Gdlvez founded a real caja at Alamos, June 1, 1769.-^^ Later there was another at Rosario. Figures of the Real Caja of Guadalajara may be used, although with reservations, owing to lack of informa- tion as to the extent of its jurisdiction and the inter-relations of different cajas realeSy as some evidence that Spain did not make a supreme effort to put down the Indian wars. The means for so doing were at hand, had the authorities not considered other matters as of more consequence. For the entire period, 1743 to 1781, an average of 86 per cent of the receipts at the Real Caja of Guadalajara were sent to the Real Caja of Mexico, or in later years, to that and other cajas reales of the viceroyalty. Not only is this the average for the entire period, but about the usual percentage for each year. From amounts remitted, however, should be deducted sums sent back for maintaining the presidios of Sonora. This in some cases was about half of the total remitted to Mexico, but certainly after 1761 was always less than that, falling to a general average of about one-third. ^^ Sums remitted to Mexico grew steadily greater. In the decade from 1743 to 1752 the average annual remission amounted to 222,663 pesos. In the next decade, ending 1762, remissions had jumped, despite disorder in Sonora, to " Wilhelm Roscher, The Spanish but was in most cases about 20,000 . colonial system (tr. ed. by Edward In 1771 the annual fund for each of Gaylord Bourne. New York. 1904), the six in Sonora was 20,665 pesos, p. 40. except Horcasitas which got 24,065, "C-1271. See also C-1290. the added amount being for the gov- " The annual cost of a presidio ernor's salary. C-1760. ranged from 18,000 to 25,000 pesos. 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 53 an annual average of 263,285 pesos. The very next year, 1763, the year of Lizazoin's despondent memorial, the amount sent to Mexico was higher than it had been in pre- vious years, certainly since 1743, no less than 372,497 pesos. In the years that Gdlvez was most prominent in his reforms of real hacienda j 1765 to 1769, it was more than that in each year, reaching the high-water mark of 477,209 pesos in 1766, a figure that was never surpassed in the thirty- nine year period considered here. From 1770 on, receipts were lower, though averaging well over 300,000 pesos a year, but Guadalajara was then sharing activities with Alamos and Rosario." Had these sums been applied for the protection and development of the regions from which they were collected, a stronger establishment or even additional conquests might have resulted. Probably, however, the greater part of the funds, after deducting the presidial situados, found their way to Europe. Certainly this was the case at a later time,^^ and it may confidently be assumed to have been so in the period under review. It is, therefore, a reason- ably safe conclusion that Spain failed to cope with the situation in Sonora, because it would not go to the expense, or rather reduce its profits, in order to apply a remedy. There being no definite foreign danger from the direction of Sonora, no discoveries of unusually rich mines, and no man of such exceptional ability as to be able with the means at hand to bring order to Sonora, it was left without great assistance from the government in its problems of development. Whether or not an advance to the Colorado and Gila " For financial operations of the Real amount of receipts a year for the entire Caja of Guadalajara outlined above viceroyalty of New Spain was 10,747,- see legajos 104-3-9 and 104-3-21, 878 pesos. The largest item of ex- Archivo de Indias, Seville. The writer pense was the amount devoted to has prepared a table showing results situados of presidios, 3,011,664 pesos. for the entire period from 1743 to Yet there remained for remission to 1781, which appears as Appendix I. Spain, after deducting costs of carriage. Sample estados or tables for a single "5,843,438 pesos, oyer half the total year, showing receipts and disburse- receipts. Fonseca and Urrutia, I, ments, item by item, will follow as Estados 1 and 2, between pp. XXXVIII Appendix II. and 1. " Between 1785 and 1790 the average 54 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. Ill rivers might have resulted, but for the Pima Revolt of 1751, this event did not cause the government to lose in- terest in the project. Investigations as to the causes of the outbreak were often linked with questions or proposals as to the advisability of an advance. The same subject came up in considering Indian diflSiculties along the frontiers of Nueva Viz cay a. Presidios were established in Sonora, primarily with a view to clearing the way to the Colorado and Gila ; for that reason mention of their establishment has been reserved for this part of the chapter. On June 18, 1751, the viceroy, urged to this course by Parrilla and Gallardo, authorized the transfer of the presidio of Pitiqui to San Miguel de Horcasitas. Lands were al- lotted to settlers in hopes that the region might ultimately be defended by its inhabitants, allowing the presidio to be moved to a more advantageous site for northward conquests,^^ but the hoped-for removal did not occur. In August of the same year steps were taken to clear the way of Apaches. The captains of San Felipe de Sinaloa, Fronteras, and Terrenate were ordered to make a general campaign against them.-^^ In 1752 the presidio of San Ignacio de Tu- bac was founded, and a garrison placed at Altar which soon became a presidio. Tubac, at least, was to aid against the Apaches, and bpth were intended to serve not only as a check against the Pimas Altos, but also as , bases for ex- tending the conquest to the Colorado and Gila, once the Seris and their allies should be suppressed.^* Campaigns were also made in Nueva Viz cay a, and presidios founded in accord with the general plan for crushing the Apaches.^' Even there, the ideas of Sanchez were operative, the object i« Referred to in Amarillas to Airiaga, partial list of the materials that might Jan. 13, 1758. C-444. See also the be used, over half of them being great voluminous testimonio, C-433. testimonios : C-372-75, 377, 394-95, "C-366. 399-401, 418, 420, 431, 437, 448, 451, «> Anza is authority for this state- 454-55, 477-78, 489, 493, 571-74, 597. ment. Anza to Bucarely, Mar. 7, These are dated 1754 to 1765, but refer 1773. In C-2113. Bancroft has a to campaigns begun in 1751, as well reference to a presidio at' Bayorca. as to those made between the above A'^. M. St. & Tex., I, 554, note 6. This dates. They do not include some docu- would seem to be an error. ments used in another connection in " The subject of these wars cannot this work, but which also refer to the be taken up here. The following is a Apache wars. 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 55 being to defend the frontier against the French. All of these activities seem to have grown out of the events which produced the Sanchez memorials. Sanchez's fear of a French approach to the Pacific by way of New Mexico, against which the Colorado-Gila es- tablishments were to be a check, seemed confirmed when two Frenchmen were apprehended in New Mexico in 1753. While this event was still being discussed, a French settle- ment on the Trinity River, Texas, was discovered in 1756. French deserters from New Orleans, and French traders from the same place were a source of worry. These events were not regarded lightly, but occupied the attention of the highest authorities in Spain, and were taken up diplo- matically with the court of France. The captured French- men were condemned to death, but had their sentence commuted to imprisonment. Strict orders were given to the viceroy not to permit Frenchmen or other foreigners to enter Spanish dominions, and the attention of the gov- ernors of New Mexico and Texas was especially directed to this injunction. The documents used on this subject run to the year 1761, when the Family Compact between France and Spain was signed. In 1762 France ceded its territories west of the Mississippi to Spain, and its other continental possessions, in the next year, to England. This, of course, meant an end of danger from the French. As regards northwestward advance it is significant that the Sdnchez memorials were used in dealing with these events ; if French- men were in New Mexico, that was regarded as threatening the Pacific, and Texas was considered but a step from New Mexico.^^ The direct heir of Sanchez's ideas was one Pedro de Labaquera, but as his memorials dealt with the whole question of northwestward advance, of which fear of the French was but a part, and as they were written a|^ a time when the French were no longer con- *> As to French aggressions, 1753 to French aggressions not only for the 1761, see C-344, 354, 380, 386, 389, region and period named, but also for 391, 411-13, 415, 421, 427-29, 434-35, the entire Texas-New Mexico frontier 468-69, 472, 492, 496. Bolton, French in the first half of the eighteenth c^- intrusions into New Mexico, 1749-1752 tury. (manuscript), gives a summary of 56 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. Ill sidered dangerous, it is more appropriate to take them up in another connection. One of the most important documents in the history of northwestward advance is the Noticia de la California of Father Andres Burriel, pubhshed anonymously in Madrid in 1757. The body of the Noticia was taken from the manuscript of Father Miguel Venegas, written in Mexico, 1739. Venegas in turn had been indebted largely to the unpublished work of Father Tarabal.^^ Burriel began his work at Toledo in 1750, employing additional materials as well as the manuscript of Venegas, writing the important appendices, and making the map, which, like the book, is usually ascribed to Venegas. Early in 1754 the work was completed. Then followed a period of two years before authorization to print was granted, not only that of the government being required, but also that of the Jesuit order. Burriel, writing May 3, 1754, to Father Pedro Alt amir ano, the Jesuit procurador general de Indias, enjoined that his own name was on no account to appear, saying that most of the work was Venegas', anyway. "Aside from that,'' he added, "affairs of considerable delicacy are touched upon, and it is well that I, an employe of the king,^^ do not appear, while we do not know how they will be re- ceived . " M any of these cosas bastante delicadas were stricken out in course of various official readings before publica- tion ; for example, remarks which seemed in any way to re- flect upon the government for its delays or failures to execute royal decrees were expunged, to the bitter regret of Father Burrial.23 The bpok is in a sense a defence of the Jesuits, and a plea for the extension of their missionary field. Before it was published, many Jesuit missions of Sinaloa and elsewhere " Tarabal came to Baja California Bancroft, N. M. St. & Tex., 1, 455. in 1730 when thirty years of age. He 22 As an archivist in Toledo, was charged by the provincial with the 's Yot the facts of this paragraph, duty of writing a history of the Jesuit see Real Academia de la Historia, missions of Baja California. That he Boletin,Lll, 396-438. Additional docu- did so is testified to, not only by Vene- ments, 1754 to 1756, haying to do with gas, but also by Clavigero, who saw the grant by the Council of the Indies over twelve volumes of his manuscripts of leave to print, are C-387, 409, at the Jesuit college of Guadalajara. 416-17, 419. 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 57 had been secularized, as already noted. Competition of other orders had to be met, and Jesuit mission work, just then much criticized, to be defended. Whatever the ulti- mate objects, the arguments of Burriel were convincing, and their effect upon northwestward advance was such, that the book merits considerable space here. The Noticia deals with Baja California, and is divided into four parts, as follows : a description, of Baja California and I 'J^"^^^ its people; a history of the peninsula up tp the coming oa^"'/N ADVANCE 65 might be made a source of profit, but they were even more a danger, serving to make Cape San Lucas a desirable con- quest for foreign powers. Yet, in all of the Calif ornias there were but sixty soldiers, few of whom were at the cape. Mineral wealth being there, it should be developed, if only to cause an increase in population to such a point that Cape San Lucas could be defended in case of a foreign attack.^® Of the Colorado River he told what was known as a result of explorations by Kino, Sedelmayr, and Consag, and said that further exploration was necessary, for three reasons- There was reason to believe that the source of the Colorado' was not far from French territory, and if the French should descend the Colorado, the possibility of further expansion by Spain in that promising region would end. In the second place, it should be ascertained whether the Colorado in fact connected with a certain Rio Amarillo, of which the Indians told Sedelmayr ; this might be an arm of the sea, or a strait, and if so, it was important to know it, as the English were reawakening to the idea of discovering a northwest passage to the Pacific ; precautions ought to be taken to avoid -dangers which were to be feared on that account. Finally, an exploration would prove whether it '^ were desirable to establish a settlement on the Colorado as a base for reduction and conversion of the Indians. The expedition should be made in boats, which ought to pro- ceed as far as possible, not only up the Colorado, but also along such rivers, bays, or straits as might be found.*° The remaining memorial is in some respects the most interesting of all, showing a keen knowledge of frontier conditions, in accounting for the failure to conquer the Apaches. The Apaches, when attacked, habitually retired to the mountains which were inaccessible to the presidial troops. This was due not merely to the fact that the latter were cavalrymen, but to the nature of the soldiers themselves. Most of them were mulattoes of very low character, without ambition, and unconquerably unwill- ing to travel on foot, as was necessary in a mountain 39 C^84. 40 C-485. 66 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. Ill attack. Moreover, their weapons carried so short a dis- tance that the Apaches were wont to get just out of range and make open jest of the Spaniards. Furthermore, some presidial captains were more interested in making a per- sonal profit out of their troops, arising from the fact that part of the latter's wages was paid in effects, than they were in subjecting the enemy, nor did the various captains work in harmony when on campaigns. Continuance of the Apaches in Apacheria was in the highest degree prejudicial. Not only were they a hindrance to conquests toward the Colorado, and in the direct route between Sonora and New Mexico, but also they endangered regions already held by Spain, leading subjected Indians, either from fear or from natural inclination, to abandon missions and villages, and, whether in alliance with the Apaches or by them- selves, to commit the same kind of atrocities as the Apaches did. Labaquera recommended that two hundred moun- tain fusileers of Spanish blood be recruited in Spain, equipped among other things with guns of long range, and despatched to New Spain for service against the Apaches. These men, under a disinterested leader, would quickly subject the Apaches, and might then be given lands in that region. Being of a higher stamp than the presidial soldiers they would be eager to develop their lands, and would be a permanent source of strength to that country.*^ It seems natural to expect that official attention to proj- ects of conquest in the Colorado-Gila region would be very slight after 1761 for a few years, despite Spain^s intention to develop communications ultimately by that route with the Calif ornias and New Mexico. From the time of signing the Family Compact in 1761 Spain was preparing to engage in the war against England, and in 1762 to 1763 she did take part. The alliance with France withdrew the pressure occasioned by the supposed nearness of the French to the sources of the Colorado ; no other definite situation arose to compel an advance ; and the actual, immediate interest of the war demanded all that Spain had. The same reasons « C-486. 1752] OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF AN ADVANCE 67 for an advance existed, but it could wait, as it already had done for so many years ; true, the French danger was gone, but, as Labaquera pointed out, Spain had now to consider the English. Governmental attention to Sonora until 1765, if the documents seen by the writer are a fair criterion, directed itself more to questions of defence against Indian outbreaks, which have already been considered, than with aggressive or indirectly defensive measures of conquest. Some straws show that the wind still blew in that direction, as, for example, the satisfaction with which the news was i received of the defeat of the Indians of San Luis Gonzaga, <^^ Baja California, in 1763, and the resultant progress in conversions ; ^^ similarly, the governmental inquiry of 1764 as to the status of the rental of pearl-fishing rights in the Calif ornias.'*^ In February, 1766, Father Wenceslao Link of San Francisco de Borja, Baja California, set out with a large party from Borja with the intention of going by land to the Colorado River. He came within some twenty or thirty leagues of the river, as he believed ; but the difficulties of the route, and the exhaustion of the animals forced him to turn back.^* These events were in line with Spain's ideas for protecting and developing the Californias. Of more con- sequence was the establishment, late in 1765, of the presidio of Buenavista, north of the Yaqui River, as an additional check against the Seris. At about this time, in August, 1765,^^ Jose de Gdlvez reached Mexico, and took up his work as visitador of New Spain. The effects of his visita were to be of tremendous import ; in one of its ramifications it led to real accomplishment in the long-planned northwestward advance. To the progress made in this matter under his influence, the next chapter will be devoted. « C-533, 542, 558. ** Bancroft, N. M. St. & Tex., I. « C-540, 54ft, 56^. 473 « Gdlvez, Informe, 118. C-1834. ■is l^•v^,.^X CHAPTER IV ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSE DE GALVEZ, 1765-1771 The coming of Jose de Gdlvez marks a turning-point in the history of northwestward advance. Prior to his arrival there had been nearly a century of memorials and plans, and something had been done to strengthen the line of advance already held, but beyond that not much had been accomplished. In Galvez the long-needed, forceful, ener- getic man had appeared, and he proceeded to put into effect a series of measures, touching every phase of northwestward conquest, that were fairly bewildering both in number and results. True, his work was in large measure not destined to endure, partly because of his own mismanagement after he became ministro general. Furthermore, if the occupa- tion of Alta California in 1769 be excepted, most that he did with relation to the proposed conquest was indirect, even though leading inevitably to direct action. Finally, his work most likely would have been in vain, had it not been for the exceptional ability of Viceroy Bucarely, the man who carried it on. For these reasons a detailed recital of his acts is unnecessary here ; they were rather of the nature of preliminaries to the real overland advance, although ex- ceedingly important.^ From the Pima revolt of 1751 to the suppression of the Seris, twenty years later, northwestward advance by way of Sonora trembled in the balance. For the greater part of this period it looked as if the frontier might recede toward ^ The need for detail is still less, in ley, Assistant Curator of the Academy view of the fact that a history of the of Pacific Coast History, is now in Gdlvez visita by Mr. Herbert I. Priest- press. 68 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 69 Mexico, rather than advance toward Alta Cahfornia, owing to the hostihty of the Indians, and to the government's inabihty, or unwiUingness, to spend enough to cope with the situation. That Sonora was not lost was due very largely to the efforts of the visitadoVj Jose de Gdlvez. He it was who organized the expedition under Elizondo which in 1771 restored peace to the greater part of Sonora, by suppressing the Seris and their allies. The royal order for expulsion of the Jesuits, L too, was carried out under his direction, in 1767, an event having important effects in Sonora. Galvez also instituted .^ a number of administrative reforms tending to the same -5- end, although he was cut short in this work by illness. In the closing years of the Elizondo campaign rich mines were discovered, notably Cieneguilla in Pimeria Alta, which meant a sudden increase in population. This gain in popula- tion seems to have been retained permanently and added to, because the mines continued to 3deld richly. Thus, Sonora, far from being a financial burden, was able to produce a surplus for the royal treasury. The result of all these things was the temporary establish- v ment of good order in Sonora, making possible a farther 1 advance of the frontier. Only one prominent disturbing I factor seemed to remain, — the Apaches had not been sub- dued. They affected but one part of the province, however, the northeast. Steps were taken, notably by the Marques de Rubl, which led, subsequently, to the reglamento of 1772, a measure calculated to prove effective against the Apaches, although it did not in fact do so. Meanwhile, plans for an advance of the frontier were not forgotten. The question of occupying the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers as a base for approaches to New Mexico, Moqui, Alta and Baja California, was several times discussed, but was invariably postponed until the disorders in Sonora might be overcome. In all of these plans the route of advance was to be by way of Sonora ; without aid from Sonora and the more populous provinces behind it, a per- manent advance on a large scale was regarded as difficult or impossible. 70 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV The history of Baja Cahfornia in this period does not indicate a change of base from Sonora to Baja California. The overland expeditions of 1769, and the use of the penin- sula by Galvez as a base of supplies for Alta Cahfornia, represent only temporary ideas, — exploration of the land, support of the sea expeditions, and aid to Alta California until such time as a Sonora route should become possible. Meanwhile, the real base for both Californias was on the mainland at San Bias, established by Gdlvez with that ob- ject in view. As noted before, the sterile peninsula rep- resented the end of one line of advance, rather than a fresh starting-point, and so too in the case of Alta California. In the meantime, until overland communication could be established, both were dependent upon the sea route from San Bias for certain things that they needed. The occupation of the Alta Cahfornia extremity in 1769 was due in a measure to a fear of the supposed aggressions of a foreign power, Russian activity in the Pacific having been reported. The danger was not greater, however, nor believed to be so, than on many previous occasions. More- over, Galvez seems already to have planned expeditions to Monterey, before he had heard of the Russian aggressions. Thus, it is to the initiative of the visitador, impelled by permanent rather than temporary motives for such expedi- tions, that we may ascribe the occupation of Alta California, although it is probable that his action was hastened by the re- ports of Russian action. The sea route from San Bias was em- ployed, because, for the moment, a land route was not avail- able, and in any event occupation by sea would be quicker. Meanwhile, important explorations bearing upon the selection of an overland route were undertaken by the Franciscan missionary of Bac, Father Francisco Garces, but as they seem rather to belong to the subject matter of a later chapter, their discussion will be postponed. This chapter will deal, therefore, with plans and measures bearing upon problems that were in their nature preliminary to an overland advance to and beyond the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 71 As the visita worked out, Gdlvez was practically ruler of New Spain during his stay, rather than the actual viceroys, Cruillas and Croix ; certainly was this true in the case of the latter.^ His primary object was to procure an increase of revenues to the government of Spain, but to accomplish this he employed constructive measures to develop the land, as well as the purely destructive ones of increased taxation. Until 1768 he was engaged primarily in matters of real hacienda in the central regions of the viceroyalty, although taking measures even then that affected the outlying prov- inces. In 1764, the king ordered the viceroy to devote himself to \ restoring peace in Sinaloa and Sonora. Thereafter, various i juntas were held in Mexico, resulting ultimately, in 1768, in the sending of an expedition under the command of Colonel Domingo Elizondo. In the work of preparation Gdlvez played a large and probably the most important part. He began as early as the close of 1765 to seek for funds other than those of the royal treasury, with which to finance the reduction of the disturbed provinces, the government being unable, or unwilling, to expend money on it. He wrote to Captain Lorenzo Cancio of Buenavista, saying that he could get nothing from the royal treasury, but that he ex- pected to obtain contributions from merchants. In this he was successful, the Consulado of Mexico and merchants of the Jalapa fair contributing considerable amounts. Gal- vez wrote again to Cancio, July 22, 1766, saying that he planned to conquer Sonora, and to establish thirty Spanish settlements in southern Sonora on the Yaqui. Replying, 2 As regards Croix this may be de- to see the time pass, bringing him nearer duced not merely from the official acts the end of his term. Croix, Corre- of Croix and Gdlvez, but also from the spondance, 218. In a letter of January former's private correspondence with 25, 1771, he spoke of asking permission his elder brother, the Marquis to retire from New Spain on account d'Heuchin of Pr6vot6, near Lille, of advanced age, ill-health, and the France. In this Croix appears as an immense work which he had to do. He amiable man, not fond of hard work, had heard news of the possibility of war nor markedly ambitious, although by between France and England, and fore- no means inefficient. His favorable saw, much to his regret, a terrible in- disposition to Gdlvez also appears in crease in labor (un terrible surcroU de several of these letters. In a letter travail). Ibid., 22^. Other citations to of May 20, 1769, he said that he had so the same work might be adduced in much to do as viceroy that he rejoiced support of this estimate of Croix. 72 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV October 31, Cancio stated that the Yaqui region was less in need oT settlers than other parts of Sonora. It would be better to reenforce old settlements or reoccupy abandoned ones. First, however, it was necessary to conquer the Seris and Pimas, who were the real stumbling-block in the way of progress. Since 1766, wars with the Seris and Pimas had not been prosecuted with much vigor by either side. Everybody was waiting for the coming of Elizondo's expedition. The Indians were somewhat in fear of what might happen to them if they continued to resist. The white population, settlers, religious, and military alike, looked forward to the expedition as the solution of their difficulties. One of these elements was suddenly removed from the scene before the arrival of Elizondo. In 1767 the Jesuits were expelled from all Spanish dominions. This action came so suddenly in Sonora that, for a time, there were no religious to take their places. In the following year the Franciscans of the college of Quer^taro took charge of the missions of Pimeria, the Jaliscan Franciscans were given the rest of Sonora, and Sinaloa was put in charge of secular clergy. Henceforth, the religious were to exercise only spiritual jurisdiction. This was limited in the case of the friars to the Indians, the white people being subject to secular clergy, no matter how far away from the parish of their spiritual advisers. The new arrangement seems to have been very unsatisfactory to the clergy, who complained that the Indians were no longer amenable to religious instruction, and that the whites were too free from moral restraints. Yet, whether due to this change or not, substantial advantages seem to have followed. For a while at least, there were no more revolts by Christianized Indians, a matter in no small degree con- ducive to ultimate good order in Sonora. Again, whatever may have been the motives of the settlers in checking the powers of the missionaries, one great element of discord that had divided Sonora for years, strife between the reli- gious and civil elements, was now tempered, though not removed. Whether the Indians themselves gained or lost 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 73 by the expulsion is not the concern of this work. There remained the hostile Indians and the need for settlers. Meanwhile, Gdlvez continued to manifest interest in the frontier provinces. He offered to go there himself, as soon as the military expedition should be successful, and found settlements.^ Arriaga asked Croix, July 20, 1767, to call a junta that it might consider Gdlvez's proposal."* The junta rendered its decision on January 21, 1768, holding that settlements were necessary, not only in Sonora, but also in Nueva Vizcaya and the Californias, if the best results from the Elizondo expedition were to be obtained and the frontiers extended. The work was too important to be in charge of anybody but Gdlvez.^ Croix was of the same opinion,^ and Gdlvez announced his willingness to undertake the task.^ Croix and Gdlvez had drawn up, independently of the junta, a most elaborate plan for a separate government of the frontier provinces. It was enclosed in Croix^s letter of January 26, 1768, to Arriaga, but although forwarded as his plan, was also signed by Gdlvez, who had shared with Croix in drawing it up,^ and was probably the one primarily re- sponsible for it. The idea was not a new one. Several times in the preced- ing three decades similar plans had been proposed, in some cases for the coast regions of Nueva Galicia, and in others for the provinces of the northern frontier. In such plans, foreign danger and the difficulty of administration from Mexico, owing to distance, were the moving factors. It came up in Nueva Galicia as a result of Anson^s expedition to the Pacific, 1740 to 1742, Anson having appeared off that coast. ^ The question was raised again in 1750. A ' Referred to in Croix to Gdlvez, of the Audiencia of Guadalajara, Jan. 23-24, 1768, A.G.I., 103-3-23. governor and captain-general of Nueva * C-842. Galicia, was very active in taking pre- ' Plan of the junta, Jan. 21, 1768, cautions against Anson. He pointed A.G.I. , 103-3-23. out the danger of leaving the Islas " Croix to Arriaga, Jan. 26, 1768, Marias unoccupied, as they might be A.G.I. , 103-3-23. taken by a foreign power, and serve ' G^lvez to Arriaga, Jan. 26, 1768, as a base of operations, or at least as C-940. shelter, in which foreign ships might ' Gdlvez, Informe, 150. C-1834. await the coming of the Manila gal- • The Marques de Aysa, president leon. Sdnchez and others later made 74 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV royal decree of October 31 in that year referred to the coming of two Dutch ships to Nueva Gahcia to trade in 1747, and stated that it had involved considerable expense to bring the matter to the attention of the viceroy. The decree ques- tioned whether the viceroy were not too far away from Pacific coasts to deal effectively with similar arrivals of foreign boats, and asked whether that part of Nueva Galicia should be put under a government by itself. ^^ A testimonio on the subject was made up at Guadalajara," but a new govern- ment was not formed. Sdnchez^s recommendation, in his fourth memorial of March 2, 1751, for a separate viceroyalty of the northern provinces has already been noted.^^ In December, 1760, a separate government of the frontier provinces under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Guadala- jara was planned,^^ but it did not go into operation. We may now consider the Croix-Gdlvez plan of January, 1768.^* The opening paragraphs (1-7) stated general reasons why the plan should be inaugurated. Although Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya were very rich, Spain had not preserved order in them, due to the excusable neglect of the viceroys, because of their distance from the city of Mexico, and the pressure of other business. The present viceroy, desirous of restoring prosperity to the distant provinces, as well as of enlarging the Spanish domain and extending the CathoHc faith, was proposing a comandancia general with exclusive jurisdiction over Sonora, Sinaloa, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Calif ornias, the visitador joining in this proposal. The latter had already been authorized to proceed to those the same point. Aysa's efforts were ^° C-295. not too greatly appreciated, the Mar- " C-343. qu6s de Ensenada writing him, June ^' Supra p. 37. 8, 1743, that the considerable expense " Referred to in the Croix-Gdlvez which he must have undergone ought plan. Cf. infra n. 14. not to be repeated, except in case of " Croix and Gdlvez, Jan. 23-24, extreme danger to those coasts, a 1768, A.G.I. , 103-3-23. Croix signed danger which no longer existed in on the 23d, and Gdlvez on the 24th. view of the retirement of Anson. In A translation made from a copy of fact, however, Aysa's expenses had a copy in the Mexican archives, or been met by private gifts, and not by from a copy of the draft, appears in sums taken from the royal treasury. Richman. It differs in arrangement For the correspondence on the entire from the plan as sent to Spain, the one affair, 1740 to 1744, see C-213, 217, followed here, but otherwise is sub- 219, 224-25, 228, 231-32, 239, 241, stantially the same. 249, 254, 256. 17651 ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 75 provinces and reorganize them, with a view to facilitating erection of such a government as the one here set forth, in which the comandante was to be practically independent of the viceroy. If the plan were adopted, these vast, naturally rich provinces might in a few years equal or even surpass those of New Spain. Next (8-11) came the inevitable plea for the project as a «L necessary safeguard against foreign attack. Such a govern^ ment would avert dangers from foreign powers who now had the opportunity and the keen desire to establish a colony at Monterey, or at some other port on that coast. France and England had for two centuries been trying to find a passage to the Pacific from their colonies on the Atlantic. Russia was penetrating Spanish coasts in the northwest. Besides, the Spanish government knew that England would not rest, now that it had taken the colonies of France, until it should push forward its discoveries as far as the Lake of the Woods, whence a great river flowed westward. If it reached the Pacific, or should prove to be the Colorado, then the English were near New Mexico, and not far from the Pacific. The Spanish court knew too, from books published in Europe, how the Russians were en- croaching upon Spanish coasts, they being already engaged in the fur trade on an island reckoned to be about eight hundred leagues west of the Californias. Again, since Anson's voyage in 1743, the English and Dutch from the East Indies had been acquiring knowledge of Pacific coast ports, especially those of the Californias. It would not be difficult for one of these three nations to plant a colony at Monterey, a port with excellent facilities for an establish- ment. Thus, Spain's possessions in the Pacific might be invaded and exploited as were those of the Atlantic. Regarding projects of conquest (12-13), the memorial ^^ stated that Spain should take precautions at once by des- patching vessels to Monterey to plant a colony there. Later, the government of the comandancia general could develop the settlement, and establish others on that coast, for there were good harbors there, and the soil was productive. A 76 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV comandante on the ground might also secure a considerable extension of the frontiers of Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya in other directions. Concerning the choice of a capital (14-16), the governor should not reside at Durango, as the plan of 1760 had sug- gested, because that was too far from Sonora, and farther still from the Californias, which at the time needed his presence ; even in Nueva Vizcaya the place for the governor was at San Felipe de Chihuahua on the frontier, an im- portant mining centre. The new capital should be in Sonora, and some central settlement ought to be established imme- diately on the Sonora frontier, at or near the Gila River. Meanwhile, the government should be set up at the mission of Caborca, that being farthest toward the frontier, or else at the junction of the Colorado and Gila rivers. It would then be almost equi-distant between the Cahfornias and Nueva Vizcaya, enabling the comandante to travel to either with equal faciHty. Then follow miscellaneous provisions (17-20). There j should be a mint at the new capital, to avoid the necessity of transporting ores to Mexico. There should also be a c3 bishopric there for Sinaloa, Sonora, and the Californias. That would advance the conversion of the natives, who were very numerous. The expense would not be great as the lands were fertile, and, if placed under cultivation, would yield abundantly. The royal treasury would be more than , repaid, because of the mineral wealth of those provinces. \ j Coming finally to questions of government (21-26), — \ I the comandante general should be independent of the ' Avdiencia of Guadalajara, and have a salary of 20,000 pesos. This and the salaries of the intendentes of separate provinces, proposed in another plan, would be more than repaid, especially by the royal fifths on gold and silver, for these metals abounded in Sonora and the Californias. There would be a great saving in presidios, for the frontier settle- ments would guard against the Indians. The present presidio system was ineffective ; for example, there were six presidios in Sonora which was invaded more often than 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 77 any other province. This was because they were nothing but settlements for the enrichment of the captains and their backers. A garrison of five hundred troops, stationed at the capital in Sonora and in frontier settlements, replacing the presidios, would save so much that the salaries of the comandante general and the three intendentes could be paid, the frontiers in fact protected, and the Spanish domain extended. If more troops should be required for the ad- vancement of conversions and discoveries, they would be easy to get, when the great advantages of these provinces should become known, for they were undoubtedly richer in mineral products than any that had been discovered in North America. The three intendentes of Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and the Californias were to be directly subordinate to the comandante general. It is worthy of note that the land route by way of Sonora was regarded as the permanent method of approach to the Californias, the sea route being a temporary expedient. Northward advance by way of Baja California was not even considered. Archbishop Lorenzana, to whom the Croix- Galvez plan had been submitted for an opinion, wrote to Croix, January 27, 1768, approving it. He reviewed fron- tier extension since the time of Cortes, and said that still more was possible, as nobody knew how long the Californias were. A comandancia general would certainly help to ad- vance the frontier.^^ A junta had also favored establishing the comandancia general}^ Upon receipt of the plan Arriaga forwarded it to the Duque de Alva, president of the Council of the Indies, asking his opinion.^^ Alva replied, July 13, 1768, approving it and calling attention to the importance of the provinces involved, ^^ Meanwhile, he had drawn up an elaborate report, June 4, 1768, discussing the plan in more detail. He approved generally of proposals which involved an extension of the faith, but advised modifications of this 1* Lorenzana to Croix, Jan. 27, " Croix to Arriaga, Jan. 26, 1768, 1768, A.G.I., 103-3-23. On the A.G.I., 103-3-23. following day the Bishop of Puebla, to ^^ Arriaga to Alva, Jan. 26, 1768, whom also the plan had been submitted, A.G.I. , 103-3-23. wrote to Croix saying that he agreed ^^ A.G.I. , 103-3-23. with Lorenzana. 78 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV particular plan. Settlements should be made in Sonora to overcome the lamentable conditions there, and Monterey should be occupied, but settlements on the Gila should not be made unless at its junction with the Colorado. He was somewhat sceptical of the wealth of the provinces, thought that the capital should be at Durango, and beheved that a bishopric of Sonora ought not to be established until the settlements had been founded. ^^ Although the plan did not go into effect until 1776, G^lvez's activities of 1768 and 1769 in Sonora and the Californias were directed with a view to its enactment, and but for his illness in 1769 more might have been accomplished at the time. Galvez's immediate object was to pacify the lands to be embraced by the comandancia general. It must be borne in mind that Elizondo's expedition and subse- quent campaigns were directed to the subjugation not merely of Sonora, but also of the entire frontier considered as an unit. This feature had been brought out in the deci- sion of a junta, January 8, 1767, although the war in Sonora had received primary attention.^^ Troops raised in accord- ance with that decision, those destined to accompany Elizondo, were enlisted for an expedition to Sonora and the frontiers of Nueva Vizcaya.^^ Gdlvez, writing to Arriaga, May 27, 1767, said he had received gifts of 300,000 pesos for the campaign, but as he had learned that the war against the Apaches in Nueva Vizcaya, Coahuila, and New Mexico was less pressing than that against the Seris and Pimas of Sonora, he would undertake to subjugate Sonora first.^^ Croix's letter of July 16, 1767, to Arriaga is even more specific. He said that the expedition was designed to bring peace not only to Sonora, but also to the other frontier provinces, and that as soon as the first-named object had been attained, it would proceed to New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya.^^ Such, indeed, had been the orders of Julidn de Arriaga three months before.^* Other documents to the M A.G.I., 103-3-23. " C-840. MC-735. «C-712. 2< Arriaga to Croix, Apr. 20, 1767. «C-811. Acknowledged by Ar- C-775. riaga, Oct. 21, 1767. C-880. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 79 same eifect have already been quoted in connection with the plans of the junta and of Croix and Galvez in January, 1768. In the following month plans were made for the journey which Gdlvez was to make to the Calif ornias, Sonora, and Nueva Viz cay a, he to visit them in the order named.^^ Such too is the tenor of Galvez's letter of February 26, 1768, to Arriaga, with regard to the mission with which he had been charged ; ^^ and, similarly, Croix's letter to Arriaga of February 29, 1768.2^ On May 18, 1768, the Audiencia of Guadalajara informed the king that the inhabitants of Guadalajara had made a free gift of 3000 pesos for the expedition to Sonora and Nueva Viz cay a, and an exploration of the Californias.^^ On the same day, Gdlvez ordered Diego Ferndndez to visit the silver mines of the Islas Marias, the Californias, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nueva Vizcaya, and to arrange their affairs in accordance with royal orders.^^ While this order does not relate to the expedition, it shows a tendency to treat the region involved as an unit. Squarely on the point are letters exchanged between Lope de Cuellar and Gdlvez in 1769. The former wrote, June 20, of his march to Janos, Nueva Vizcaya, and gave his opinion that no peace should be made with the Apaches, for as they occupied territories from the Gila River to Texas, a treaty with one group would not be recognized by the others.^^ Galvez replied, July 4, ordering Cuellar to continue the campaign against the Apaches, doing what he could until Colonel Elizondo, after suppressing the revolts in Sonora, might advance by way of the Gila to his assistance.^^ A summary for the Council of the Indies, September, 1769, of notices received from Mexico refers to what Gdlvez had done to subject the Apaches, and punish the Seris, Pimas, and other tribes in Sonora, Sinaloa, Pimeria Alta and Baja, and the frontiers of Nueva Vizcaya.^^ Other evidences might be adduced, " C-954. the plans resolved upon in February, " C-956. 1768 (cited supra n. 25). C-1167. 2'C-961. Acknowledged and ap- 2* C-993. «• C-994. proved by Arriaga, Sept. 20, 1768. so C-1305. C-1080. In reply, Jan. 3, 1769, Croix « C-1317. reiterated that he would put into effect ^2 C-1365. 80 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV but perhaps it will be sufficient to point out that in 1776 when accounts were made up, the expeditions to Sonora, the Californias (including the founding of San Bias and the occupation of Alta California), and Nueva Vizcaya, were treated as one general project, and not separately. ^^ The unity of the frontier had long been understood by the Spanish government, certainly since early in the eigh- teenth century. Between 1724 and 1728 the presidios of the entire frontier had been inspected by Pedro de Rivera, sent for that purpose as visitador. Teodoro de Croix's long memorial of October 30, 1781, cites a long list of documents from 1735 on, dealing with the question of placing frontier presidios with a view to the defence of the whole line.'* Something approximating real accomplishment, however, began to appear in the Galvez era, though independently of the visitador. In 1765, the Marques de Rubi was commis- sioned to make an inspection of the presidios of New Spain.'^ He took up his work in January, 1766,'^ and did not complete it until early in 1768. With the exception of the Califor- nias, he traversed the entire frontier from Texas to Sonora, even the New Mexico salient, making detailed investiga- tions of each post visited by him, and inspecting lands with a view to a new alignment of the presidios.^^ In his report to Arriaga, dated April 10, 1768, he made recommendations for the better location of the presidios from Sonora to Texas, urging that a line of seventeen be formed, dropping seven presidios and two provincial companies then in existence.'^ 33 C-3254, 3319. relating, most of them, to Rubi'a 3* C-4430, at paragraph 417. inspections of presidios, but including 35 The only establishments called some reports of a more general nature. "presidios" were those of the frontier These are by no means all of the Rub! provinces. documents in the Catalogue. Among 38 C-622. others the most important of a general 37 Abundant materials for a history nature, both sent direct to Arriaga, of the inspection by the Marques de are the one cited in note 38, and a Rubi appear in my Catalogue. See chart, dated April 3, 1768, sent by especially C-731, which refers to fifty- Rubi to Arriaga, specifying the number one subordinate entries. Of these, of officers and soldiers in the frontier one is Croix's instruction of July provinces, the number of horses, the 18, 1771, for the formation of a line of time when each presidio was founded, fifteen presidios ; another, a chart the annual expense for each presidio, of July 23, 1771, showing the forces of and the authority approving the com- the presidios at the time, and as they mission of each captain then in charge would be under Croix's reglamento; of a presidio. C-974. the other forty-nine are testimonios 38 C_977. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 81 This was eventually to bear fruit in the establishment of such a line, the decree coming in 1772, at which point the problems which occasioned the recommendation of a line of presidios will be discussed in greater detail. This is perhaps a good place to accord recognition to a,cu^t--f-y^>' man who has hardly received the credit that is due him. If '9>h,ov^^^ more was accomplished in northwestward advance in the period of Gdlvez and, later, of Bucarely than at other times in the eighteenth century, it was owing in no small measure to the man who was then ministro general de Indias, Julidn de Arriaga. He had been promoted to the post in 1750 or 1751.^* Gdlvez, Rubi, Bucarely, and others carried out his ideas, and while they often acted wisely on their own initiative, he sustained them in their measures. While it will require much further work to determine his place in history, negative evidence of his importance appears in the change for the worse that occurred, certainly as regards the problems of northwestward advance, after his death in 1776. Yet he was succeeded in that year by a man who had been one of his most efficient workers on that very problem, Galvez himself. -\<^Ao- Galvez's interest reached beyond the immediate problem of establishing order in the frontier provinces. It is prob- able that as early as 1767 he had made up his mind to occupy Monterey, before the occurrence of the events usually alleged as causing the expeditions of 1769. The determina- tion of this point is involved in another, the idea which lay back of the founding of the Department of San Bias. In the instruction which Viceroy Croix left to his successor, September 1, 1771, he said that Gdlvez had some ships built to facilitate transporting Elizondo^s troops to Sonora, and for that reason had established a shipyard at San Bias. The boats were used for the Sonora expedition, and later for the one which went to San Diego and Monterey.*^ Croix's instruction for a settlement at San Bias, January 11, 1768, stated that after having taken the measures necessary for 89 Bernard Moses, The Spanish de- London. 1914), II, 354. pendencies in South America (2 v. *^ Croix, Correapondance, 289. 82 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV S t ST /A the pacification of Sonora and the other frontier provinces, it had been deemed indispensable to found a port for the advan- tage of boats employed on such expeditions and in commerce with that region, and for the preservation and advancement of the Californias.'*^ Before this time, in December, 1767, we learn that Gdlvez was already ardently at work on plans for the department, having charged one Rivero with the duty of establishing a port there.^^ Gdlvez had come from Spain at a time when many books were being circulated concerning foreign interest in the Californias,*^ and the direction of his mind toward Monterey appears strongly in the Croix- Gdlvez plan of January 23-24, 1768, noticed above. The Audiencia of Guadalajara in reporting Gdlvez's passage through that city referred to his project of exploring the Californias,^* which would indicate that Gdlvez had spoken for such a project while there. It was not until the day after he left Guadalajara, namely, on May 5, 1768, while on his way to San Bias, that he received mail from Croix telling of Russian explorations in the Americas."*^ In a letter dated November 31 [sic], 1767, the Vizconde de la Herreria had written to the Marques de Grimaldi, Spanish minister of state, that the Russian empress was not desisting from her attempt to establish communications with the Pacific coasts of America, and was preparing expeditions."*^ The papers were forwarded to Julidn de Arriaga, who wrote to Croix, January 23, 1768, that the Russians were planning to found settlements on the North American coast, or had done so already, as some believed. He bade Croix order the governor of the Californias to exercise vigilance to ob- serve these attempts, frustrating them if possible."*^ This letter, it will be observed, did not order an expedition to Monterey, as has usually been stated, but it was sufficient to give an active man all the authority that he needed. «C-93i ract from a letter of Rada to Arriaga, Dec. 27, 1767, in C-908. «Cf. pp. 60-61. ** C-993. The phrase is Peninsula de California which was habitually- used interchangeably with the Cali- fornias to connote Baja and Alta California combined. *^ Juan Manuel de Viniegra, June 10, 1771, Madrid. A.H.N., Estado, Leg. 2845. « C-888. « C-938. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OE JOSfi DE GALVEZ 83 Gdlvez afterward said that Croix directed him to despatch an expedition to Monterey in the ships that had been con- structed to carry troops to Sonora/^ which statement is confirmed by Croix. Croix's letter is not at hand, but his instruction of 1771 to Bucarely tells the nature of it. He thought that the Russians might occupy Monterey, and directed Gdlvez to make an expedition by sea toward the threatened port. In view of the difficulties of a maritime expedition and because of his desire to explore the Califor- nias, Galvez sent two expeditions, one by sea, and the other by land.^^ Soon after receiving the news from Croix, Gdlvez on May 13, 1768, reached San Bias, where he busied himself for twelve days establishing that department. On May 16, he called a junta to discuss the details of an expedition to Monterey, such as the boats to be used, the best season for a voyage, and the route to be followed. ^^ On May 20, he wrote to Croix of his plans for the expedition. He had determined upon it as a result of the news of Russian en- croachments, he said, and in pursuance of discussions that he had formerly had with Croix. ^^ On the same day he recommended that care should be taken along the coasts of the Pacific, because of the pretensions of the Russians, ^^ and urged that settlements be made on the Islas Marias, lest that group serve as a place of refuge for enemies' ships, in which they might await the Manila galleon, or whence they might attack mainland ports.^^ Of Gdlvez's other acts at San Bias nothing need be said, beyond the fact that he put the establishment on its feet.^^ Croix heard from Gdlvez in time to write to Arriaga, May 28, 1768, of the proposed expedition, ^^ and the announcement met with favor, Arriaga writing to Croix, October 18, 1768, that the king was eagerly awaiting news of it.^^ ^ Gdlvez, Informe, 141. C-1834. Gdlvez's activities at San Bias, but ** Croix, Correspoiidance, 290. also for its history in detail to the end ^ C-990. of the eighteenth century, see my ^1 C-1002. Catalogue. Several hundred references ^2 C-1001. will be found there. S3 C-1000. " C-1014. " For materials not only concerning ^« C-1100. THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV It seems clear from these documents that Galvez intended, all along, at least to explore Alta California. It is equally clear that Croix did not contemplate anything more than a naval expedition at the time, and did not plan to occupy the province. The royal order did not even call for an ex- pedition. Finally, the Department of San Bias from its in- ception served primarily as a supply-depot for the Califor- nias, its relation with Sonora being of hardly any account in comparison. The Russian encroachments were simply in the long chain of permanent, continuing causes for an advance of the Spanish frontier, and were not reported as more pressing at this time than had been the foreign aggres- sion of other periods. The real cause of advance was that a man of energy had appeared, Jos6 de Gdlvez, who achieved what others had for a long time planned. Contemporary reports of aggressions, however, may have had the effect of accelerating his plans, but not more than that." The story of the occupation of Alta California need not be told, other than to review the outstanding facts. In 1769, five expeditions were despatched, two by land up the peninsula, and three by sea. A junction of four of them was effected at San Diego, one of the ships having been lost. From there the commander in chief, Caspar de Portold, proceeded northward in search of Monterey, and actually visited that port, but failed to recognize it from the descrip- tion of Gonzdlez Cabrera Bueno. Pushing on, he reached and discovered San Francisco Bay, after which he returned to San Diego. The year 1769 saw a mission established at San Diego, and a garrison was left there which eventually be- came a presidio. In 1770, PortoM again marched north from San Diego. This time he convinced himself of the identity of Monterey, and a mission and presidio were 5^ It may be wondered why such a wrote his 1771 report, that the Alta self-centred man as Gdlvez certainly California establishments would be a was should give so much credit to success. Gdlvez was capable of making Croix, They were friendly, to be sure. himself appear to be the instrument of Furthermore, he could not ignore or the viceroy in case of failure, while belittle the viceroy's part. Possibly sure at the same time of receiving the another reason for his generosity was major credit in case of success, as that it was not yet certain, when he actually happened. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 85 founded there. Great hardships had been endured in mak- ing these small beginnings, and but for the capable prepara- tions of Gdlvez, and the cgjaiageous Jeadership of PortoII, ably seconded by the efforts of the Franciscan missionary, Father Serra, and of others, it is doubtful if the result could have been other than failure. ^^ It had required a remark- able effort to gain a foothold at all, but even more striking endeavors were to be necessary if the new lands were to be held. The battle for permanent establishments had only begun. As the Indian wars of Sonora rendered communication w with Alta California from that province temporarily out of A the question, Baja California became important for a time, although in less degree than San Bias, as an aid to San Diego and Monterey. Events in the peninsula are also of inter- est on the old grounds of its defensive importance against ^Sl^iffl-^^i't^'^fe^ and of its own need of an overland sup;gly- routfe. Moreover, it is certain that at this time Baja California was believed to be very rich in precious metals, an opinion prevailing that the Jesuits had wilfully concealed the fact. We may therefore pay some attention to Gdlvez's activities in the peninsula. As regards its supposed wealth we may note a memorial by officials of the Real Caja oT Guadalajara, October 8, 1765, which stated that there were two mines in Baja California, and might be more, if quick- silver for extracting ores could be had, and if persons of expert mining knowledge might be sent there. The land was worth being developed. Gold mines were being dis- covered ; pearls were found in many places ; the soil was fertile ; and there were great numbers of cattle. Yet the inhabitants were for the most part Indians. Eight years before, in- 1757, they had made the same suggestions to Viceroy Amarillas, but got no reply. ^® On February 25, 1766, Arriaga forwarded this memorial to the Council of the Indies. ^^ Croix's letters to his brother show that reports " An idea of the difficulties attend- »• C-593. ing the Portold expedition is given in •» C-628. chapter five. 86 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV of this character were believed. In a letter of December 29, 1768, he remarked that the Calif ornias, which had always passed for a sterile country, would be able from 1769 on to maintain themselves without costing the king a sou. Judge what a profit the Jesuits must have had, he said, and yet they had drawn a subsidy from the king for many years on the pretext of the land's sterility.^^ Again, January 25, 1769, he mentioned Gdlvez's work in the peninsula, saying how pleased the king would be with that province, because of its Pg^S; gold, and silver, a wealth which the Jesuits had in great" part concealed. ^^ Galvez's characterization of Baja Calif ornia,^^ and the measures that he took while there show that he had Bur- rieFs idea of the importance of the peninsula from the stand- point of the defence of New Spain.^* He seems to have held the same opinion about occupying the entire coast, including Alta California, as appears from some correspondence con- cerning the Bay of San Bernabe near Cape San Lucas. Miguel Costanso was sent there, and made a careful ex- amination of the port in the bay, recommending measures for the protection of the site in a report of September 1, 1768,^^ accompanying it with a map of the bay.^® Writing to Croix, September 8, 1768, Galvez told of his own visit to Cape San Lucas, which he described as the key to Spanish possessions in that part of the Californias. He had decided to place a Spanish colony there, he said, arid added that there ought to be a colony and presidio in every good port of the lands about to be reduced to Spanish control.^^ Little need be said of his other measures in Baja California. Galvez found the peninsula in a very bad condition. Its population had fallen away, until it consisted of but 7888 of all races. This necessitated reducing the missions from fifteen to thirteen, but a new one was added in the north, San Fernando de Velicatd, to facilitate expeditions to Alta «i Croix, Correspondance, 216. by Burriel, though he later character- «2 Ibid., 217. ized the Noticia as grossly inaccurate. 63 Gdlvez, Informe, 139-40. C-1834. C-41 89-90. " In many respects, as, for example, ^ C-1066. in his desire to occupy Monterey, ^5 C-1068. Gdlvez seems to have been influenced ^" C-1076. ^/: 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 87 California. For the same reason he increased the garrison of the peninsula, and provided ships for northward voyages. ^^ Nor did the expected wealth of the peninsula materialize. In Croix's instruction of September 1, 1771, to his successor, Croix said that the Californias were not so rich as people had beheved. It would be necessary to encourage agri- culture, mining, and pearj-g^lyjig^ and would be well to employ men who could rouse the Indians from their habit- ual indolence.^^ In fine, Galyez did not, and could not, succeed in making Baja California a permanent storehouse for advancement of the settlements in Alta California ; I | the need for an overland connection with Sonora was, if I j | I | anything, made only more evident. In Galvez's mind, as ' appears from his plan of January, 1768, Sonora was the centre from which all lines of advance were to radiate. In his own words, one of his reasons for going to the peninsula ' /' was to occupy his time pending the advancement or con- X / elusion of the campaign in Sonora.^^ This view is confirmed , 1^ by one of his letters, written while he was yet in Baja Cali-\t-' fornia. Upon receiving notice of a royal order asking , -^ n . reports as to the advisability of establishing a mint in the i - '^ frontier provinces, he wrote to Croix, August 15, 1768, that he was in favor of it, but it should not be in Durango or Guadalajara, as had been proposed, but in Sonora, so as to be at the most convenient point of resort from the mines of Sonora, Sinaloa, and the Calif ornias.'^^ The great expedition under Colonel Elizondo had reached Sinaloa in February, 1768. In May headquarters were established at Guaymas, and Elizondo was ready to begin ,.,,s,..,_*.tc the campaign. The military details need not be mentioned.^^ ^. The war centred about the Cerro Prieto,^^ and it was three years before the conquest was complete, so vigorous was the resistance of the Seris and their allies, the Pimas and Sibubapas. The conquest was not as thorough, however ^ « Gdlvezj Informe, 142-46, C-1834. available in great quantity, but by ■^ly * In Croix, Correspondance, 291. use of documents cited in the Catalogue ^° Gdlvez, Informe, 140. C-1834. the story in detail may now be learned. 71 C-1051. " For maps of the Cerro Prieto see ^ Heretofore materials for the study C-1150, 1207. of the campaign itself have not been f 88 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV as it has been regarded."'^ Had it in fact brought lasting peace to Sonora, the history not only of that province, but of Alta California as well would have followed a very different course. But, taken with other events which will be mentioned presently, it seemed to be final at the time, and was followed [ by a few years of actual peace. An advance to the Colorado 1 and Gila now appeared to be possible; the way had been I ^1 1 cleared. Thus, the Elizondo campaign was of considerable ^^ \\ importance as affecting the problem of communication be- tween Alta California and Sonora. Other events had occurred in course of the campaign that tended toward the stability of Sonora, and therefore toward northwestward advance. Gdlvez came to Sonora in May, 1769. Two months later, he was stricken with a severe illness, but he had shown all his characteristic activity in the meantime. He established a royal treasury at Alamos, lowered the price of quicksilver, and did may other things calculated to improve mining, agricultural, and com- mercial conditions in Sinaloa and Sonora, as well as to provide revenue. He wished to secularize the missions of Sinaloa and many of those of Sonora, but, unable to obtain a sufficient number of parish priests, he gave over Sonora to the Franciscans of Jalisco and Queretaro, and Sinaloa alone to the secular clergy.^^ What he might have done, had he retained his health can only be conjectured, but it is likely that he would have taken steps looking to the long-planned advance to the Colorado and Gila. That the progress of the Alta California settlements was near to his heart is proved by the best of evidence. On August 22, 1769, he wrote to Croix about his illness, saying that he expected it to be his last, reiterating his feelings of personal friendship for Croix, and commending his subordinate officers to the latter's attention. Yet, the greater part of the letter concerns the expeditions to Alta California, Galvez urging Croix, in what he believed to be his death-bed message, 7* Bancroft, N. M. St.& Tez.,!, 680, parts of the country, the people entered says, "The danger of attacks from upon an indolent uneventful career." savages having been averted from most '* Gdlvez, Informe, 148-50. C-1834. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 89 to aid and protect the new establishments that were being founded there.^^ Over two months before, June 10, 1769, he had proposed to Croix that the Indians of Tibur6n Island be brought to the mainland, and reduced to a mission,^^ thus to remove another stumbling-block in the way of northwestward conquest, for the Indians had used this island, like the Cerro Prieto on the mainland, as a place of refuge, whence they might attack Spanish posts in Sonora. Gdlvez later said that he and Croix had taken steps after the former's return to Mexico City to promote measures looking to the exploration of routes from New Mexico and Sonora to the Californias, but that both returned to Spain before they found time to put their plans into execution.^^ Coincident with the termination of the military campaign occurred an event which served better than bullets to make tv^AX<^t for peace. While pursuing a band of Indians in 1771 a ~^^a^^ detachment of Elizondo's army discovered the rich gold » placers of Cieneguilla, near Altar. Vast quantities of gold """^^jl!^ were found near the surface. There was an immediate rush to the scene, over two thousand men reaching there within a few months of the discovery. Official reports were quite on a level with rumor in their enthusiasm. Between April 24 and May 13, 1771, EHzondo^^ and Pedro Corbaldn »<^ wrote to Croix, and Corbaldn ^^ and Father Manuel Gil Samaniego ^^ wrote to Gdlvez of the immense wealth? of Cieneguilla and of other mines discovered in the same neigh- borhood. Croix in turn, June 27, 1771, reported to Arriaga,^^ who gave orders to Croix's successor, Bucarely, November 23, 1771, that he should take measures to maintain the peace achieved by Galvez and Croix, and to facilitate' the successful operation of the newly discovered mines.^^ Un- like the Arizonac mine of other days, Cieneguilla continued to yield richly for a decade, and other mines in the neighbor- hood did so for the rest of the century and later. At about '6C-1356. 80C-1731. " C-1294. 81 C-1735. "Gdlvez to Arriaga, Mar. 8, 1774. « C-1738. C-2566. M C-1752. 79 C-1725. w C-1810. 90 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IV the same time, other mines were discovered elsewhere in Sonora, that of San Antonio de la Huerta on the Yaqui being especially rich. This was the most flourishing place in the province between 1772 and 1776. The royal revenues from Huerta and Cieneguilla were sufficient at this time to sup- port the province, according to Captain Anza.^^ Statistics are not at hand to show the exact effect of these discoveries upon the population of Sonora, but Bancroft furnishes some figures worth noting. In 1769 there was a white population of 970 in all Pimeria, exclusive of the soldiery, of whom but 178 were in Pimeria Alta, as compared with 1315 in Pimeria Alta alone at the time of Bishop Tamaron's diocesan tour of a few years before, showing how population had declined as a result of the wars. The dis- covery of the Cieneguilla mines in 1771 had brought a population to that one place of more than double the number for all Pimeria two years before, and fifty per cent more than for all of Pimeria Alta as it was in Tamaron's day. Even by 1770 Pimeria had become a paying investment to the government. In that year revenues exceeded expendi- tures by $77,277.^® Prosperity seems also to have come to the regions farther south, if amount of revenues is any criterion. The troubles of Sonora as regards Indian wars were not at an end, but from this time forth it seems to have had a sufficiently great population to ward off actual dangers, if not the fear of them. With the pacification of Sonora, Elizondo and most of his troops returned to Mexico, abandoning the original plan for a descent upon Nueva Vizcaya. This was not because there was no need for such a campaign ; on the contrary, 8* Between January 1, 1773, and that day must also be borne in mind. November 17, 1774, no less than 4832 As late as 1792 both Cieneguilla and marcos of gold from Cieneguilla were Huerta were yielding appreciable a,ccounted for at the royal treasury of amounts in excises collected for the Alamos, from which the royal revenues royal treasury, respectively 686 and amounted to 72,348 pesos 4 tomines. 4186 pesos in that year. Cavo, 317. Mayer, I, 248-49. This ^^ This probably means pesos. Ban- is not an exact indication of the wealth croft, Mayer, and others frequently of Cieneguilla. Fully a third part render pesos as dollars. A peso is had been removed by robbery or worth half a dollar, but if purchasing other unlawful act. Cavo, supra. The value at that time were considered, a greater purchasing power of money in dollar would be nearer the mark. 1765] ACHIEVEMENTS OF JOSfi DE GALVEZ 91 along the whole line from Sonora to Texas, the Apaches were as hostile and bold as ever. Although Apache attacks in Sonora were confined to the northeast, that was sufficient, however, to interfere seriously with the best of the north- westerly routes, — by way of Tubac to the Gila, and down that river to the Colorado. Of the obstacles impeding an advance in 1752 all but the Apaches had been cleared away. But for them, granted need for a route and a leader of energy, the long-planned advance might now have been expected. The need had long been felt, and with the occupa- tion of Alta California became more pressing. Moreover a man was to appear, a greater than Galvez in many respects, and certainly a more noble character, the new viceroy, Antonio Maria Bucarely y Ursiia. ^ O- .v^V.»-> -1 7 G. 1 CHAPTER V ALTA California's need for an overland route, 1769-1773 n The general, long-operative reasons for an advance of th e^Spanish fr ontier by way of the Colorado and Gila rivers Eave been discussed in preceding chapters, and in the last chapter it has been pointed out that by the establishment qf^jBomparative good order in Sonora, such an advance had become possible. On May 2, 1772, Juan Bautista de Aiiza, captain of the presidio of Tubac, proposed that he be allowed to seek an overland route from Sonora to Alta California. On September 13, 1773, he was authorized to make the expedition, and early in 1774 he did so. Before tracing the course of official action on this proposal, it is necessary to take into account several other contemporary factors. These were : the character of Bucarely, the new viceroy ; the condition of affairs in the Californias ; status of the other frontier provinces ; the events which led Anza to make his proposal; and the events tending to promote its favorable reception by the viceroy. The third and fourth factors will be reserved for the following two chap- ters. The fifth will be taken up in a measure in chapter seven, but so far as it related to danger of foreign aggres- sion, its discussion will be postponed until chapter ten, where the subject is treated in detail. In this chapter some idea will first be given of Bucarely's character, although it is expected that the documents used later in this work will more amply show him forth. Evidence will be sub- mitted also to show that Baja California could not be counted upon to sustain the new establishments, nor to serve as a fitting route for transmission of supplies brought 92 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 93 there from San Bias, having much ado to take care of it- self. Most of the chapter, however, will deal with condi- tions in Alta California. Alta Cahfo rnia^s greatest need, if it were to be retained or its full possibilities developed, was a ^ood overland rou te from New Spai n. It lacked manufactured articles, food even (for civilized people could not live on what sufficed for the Indians), and perhaps most important of all, per^ manent settlers and domestic animal^J There were no Spanish families, and no Spaniards, beyond an occasional straggler from San Bias, except the men of the garrison and the missionaries. There were few food animals, and fewer beasts of burden, not enough of either to supply needs. The province could be kept alive at great expense by receiv- ing what it required by sea direct or by way of the peninsula, but either route was a long one, at the mercy of an enemy's navy, and impracticable (unless at great expense, by in- crease of the marine department) for the sending of families and domestic animals in sufficient number to establish the settlements on a strong basis. As a result the^Diew estafe- I lish ments were maintained at a loss^ not with the idea of developing their wealth in great degree, but £.rimat'^rs as they were, but not checking S.M., con entrada, Temente General de others that I have seen "Bucarely." los Reales ex^rdtos, Vir'tei/ Gobernador y Coues holds that the "y" is a flourished Capitdn General del Reyno de Nueva "i," but as it certainly formed a perfect Espafia, Presidente de su Real Audiencia, eighteenth century " y," I have adopted Superintendente General de Real Ha- the form "Bucarely." Bucarely 's full cienda y Ramo del Tabaco, Juez Conser- signature included the "Urstia," after vador de este, Presidente de su Junta, y which he placed his rubric ; thus there Subdelegado General de la Renta de can be no confusion with the rubric in Correos en el mismo Reyno. Garc6s that case. (Coues ed.), I, 56. Although his name 2 Bancroft, Mex., Ill, 370-71. was written "Bucareli" in print, he ^ Ibid., Ill, 373. himself signed this document and all ^ Rivera, I, 422. 96 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V him, however, from taking measures to circumvent ills which to him did not appear greatly threatening. His letters show him to have been a simple, straightforward, unselfish, clear-thinking, sincerely religious man, without a shadow of conceit or pretence, and even without great personal ambition except to perform his duty to the full. Finally, he was keenly interested in the problems that he encountered and was an indefatigable worker, and these facts, joined to the rest, make clear why he achieved such success in the face of difficulties that would have proved insuperable to a less capable ruler. ^ Between 1771 and the close of 1773, he got acquainted with conditions in the Californias, made timely remissions of supplies, and de- cided upon the main lines of his policy. It is difficult for a Calif ornian of to-day to think that his state could ever have been lacking in food supplies. Yet that was the case for a number of years after the occupation of Alta California in 1769. The land and climate were suited to agricultural wealth, but the richest land cannot be developed without man, animals, or machinery to do the work, or without a market for its products. In all of these prerequisites Alta California was ill provided or entirely lacking. As for manufactured articles the province lacked everything from a plough or a smithy's forge to a piece of cloth or a nail. The only remedy for this condition was by importation of goods, which in this period had to come from New Spain by way of San Bias. ailure of the new settlements due to a lack of food supplies was narrowly averted at the outset. There is abun- dant evidence to this effect in the various official diaries and accounts of the 1769 expeditions.^ One of the best brief accounts, however, is a narrative by Portold several years after the event, being dated at Madrid, September 4, 1773. The official documents confirm the statements of the Por- 5 My opinion is based upon a read- tion have already been published both ing of several hundreds of his official in Spanish and in English translations letters, besides some private correspond- in volumes one and two of the Publica- ence with General O'Reilly. tions of the Academy of Pacific Coast ' Many of the diaries and contem- History, porary accounts of the Portola expedi- i SllDT 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 97 tola narrative, but the latter has the advantage of having been told without restraint. For that reason, perhaps, it gives a more graphic idea of the difficulties encountered than would be the case in the other documents, which, it must be remembered, would have been written in full knowledge that they might be read by Gdlvez, who had set his heart upon this conquest, and would not be pleased with remarks that seemed to disparage it. The Portold account is in the form of intimate remarks to a friend, the word amigo (friend) appearing several times in the docu- ment. Until they had passed the last peninsula mission, said Portold, the expedition experienced no hardships worthy of notice, but he found it necessary to make provision for the future by taking nearly all the supplies that the mis- sions had, just as Gdlvez had done in the south in order to stock the ships. Yet Portola lacked even sufficient pro- visions to reach San Diego, and had to resort to hunting and fishing. Furthermore, his party had to go without water for several days. Arrived at San Diego they learned of the horrors of the voyage experienced by those who had come by sea.^ Portola held a junta which decided to send back the San Antonio to San Bias for supplies and men, leaving the San Carlos and the sick, with a few others, at San Diego, while Portola marched on in search of Mon- terey. Portold took with him the small number of '^skel- etons'' whom the scurvy, thirst, and hunger had spared sufficiently for the march. Alt a California certainly made no appeal to these early explorers. All that there was to covet in that disagreeable country, said Portold, ironically, was rocks, underbrush, and rugged mountains covered with snow. Moreover, he and his men did not know where they were, and their food supplies had given out. Thus, al- though they could not feel certain that they had reached Monterey, they were checked, not by the Russians, but by hunger, and resolved to return to San Diego. Upon the return they would have perished, but for eating twelve of ^ Aside from delays from storms, the three ships reached San Diego ; the most of those on board got scurvy, and third was never heard from, over half of them died. Only two of H 98 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V the mules.^ Finally, they reached San Diego oliendo d Mulas. The San Antonio had not yet returned,^ but after almost nine months' absence it at length arrived. Most of the crew had died of scurvy, but despite that fact Por- told and his men received ^^very particular consolation '' from the cargo of maize, flour, and rice. During the ab- sence of the San Antonio they had had to subsist on geese, fish, and other food given to them by the Indians in ex- change for clothing, with the result that some of the Span- iards had hardly enough clothes left with which to cover themselves. Now that provisions had come Portold again decided to seek the port of Monterey. The San Antonio y was despatched by sea, and Portold led a force by land. A After erecting the establishments at Monterey, Port old took ship for San Bias. Referring to the hardships that he had endured in Alta California, he remarked that the unfortunate Spaniards who remained there were suffering as much as he had suf- 'iered. In his opinion it would be virtually impossible to send aid to them by sea, and even more difficult to do so by land,^° unless at the cost of thousands of men and Jmmense quantities of money. The Indians were docile enough, but as for mines or other kinds of wealth, he and his men had not seen them, their first care being to find meat to keep from dying of hunger. Finally, even if Mon- terey were moderately well fortified, and if through strange caprice the Californias were coveted by the Russians, there were many other ports where they might land and establish themselves without any opposition. ^^ The crucial moment in the Portold expeditions had come after Portold's return from San Francisco to San Diego, prior to the reappearance of the San Antonio^ from Jan- 8 Without salt or other condiment, or the as yet undiscovered route from says Portold, we closed our eyes and Sonora. assailed the filthy mule (oh misery !) " The document appears in the Juan like hungry lions. Manuel de Viniegra screed concerning • It had sailed for San Bias in July, Gdlvez's acts as visitador in New Spain. 1769, and was again at San Diego late A.H.N. , Estado, lejago 2845. Both in March, 1770. Portold had returned Viniegra and Portold call it a conversa- from the north two months before. tion, and the former said that he wrote 10 It is not clear whether Portold was it at the order of Pedro Rada, a high referring to the Baja California route, official of the Indies department. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 99 uaiy to March, 1770. A story has sprung up that PortoU might have abandoned Alta CaHfornia but for Father Serra. The latter is said to have prevailed upon the commander to delay his departure, with the result that the San Antonio was sighted the very day before Portold planned to leave. If this is true, then Serra is to be credited with having saved the Alta California establishments in their first hour of need. It seems probable, however, that this is an injustice to Portola. There is no doubt that Serra wanted to stay,^ and that Portold was not enthusiastic ove/^he new coun- try, but the commander in chief was a soldier whose every action in 1769-70 seems to show an intention to carry out his orders and hold the country to the last moment com- patible with the safety of the forces under his command. In his diary sent back from San Diego in February, 1770, he tells of the lack of provisions, on which account he held a junta which resolved ^4n order to make it possible to hold this port longer^' that Rivera should take a strong force and go back to Baja California, whence he was to return with the cattle intended for San Diego mission. ^^The remainder of the expedition," decided the junta, which must almost certainly have expressed Portold's views, "was to hold this important port." ^^ It is even more clear from Costanso's narrative that Pprtold did not wisk_±a abandon Alta California, except as a last resort. Speaking of the possibility of abandonment because supplies were so low, Costanso says: "lest he should incur such discredit, the commander gave orders that the captain of the presidio in California with forty men, should continue the march to the peninsula, to obtain from its missions all provisions he could, and to bring the cattle, which, as was said in the be- ginning, had been left at Velicatd, being too weak to con- tinue the journey. This wise measure [not only] aimed at the present conservation of what had been acquired by reducing the increased number of consumers of the avail- able provisions, [but also] provided for the future subsist- ence, even if the relief by sea — so important for the suc- "PortoU (Smith and Teggaxt, ed.), Diary, in A.P.C.H., Publications, I, 81. 100 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V cess of the desired enterprise of Monterey — should fail to arrive. This detachment set out for the purpose men- tioned on February 10, 1770." ^^ Both accounts are confirmed by a writing which would certainly have insisted upon Serra's claim to the principal credit, if it had been regarded by anybody at that time as his due, namely, a long memorial of February 26, 1776, to the king by the religious of the Franciscan college of San Fernando, Mexico, telling of the achievements of the Fernandinos in Alta California from 1769 to 1776. The San Diego crisis is described in sub- stantially the same terms that Costanso employed.-^* Finally, ;.Palou's life of Serra, a work published in 1787, from which comes the story of Serra's part in saving Alta California from abandonment, is not in fact inconsistent with the accounts just mentioned, except perhaps by literary em- phasis. A letter by Serra to Palou, February 10, 1770, is inserted in which nothing is said about Portold's having an intention of abandoning the conquest, although aban- donment is mentioned by Serra, without complaint, as a possible contingency. To be sure, he remarked that he and Father Crespi intended to remain in any event. ^^ Then follows Palou^s chapter telling what Serra did to prevent the abandonment of San Diego. Reduced to its essentials it amounts to this. Portola set March 20 as the date for a return to Baja California in case provisions should not arrive beforehand, and from the date of Portola's announce- ment all were talking of the expected departure. These words were like arrows in the heart of Serra, who not only was determined to remain himself, but is said to have persuaded Vila, commander of the San Carlos, to under- take a voyage to Monterey after the withdrawal of Portold. On March 19, however, the long-absent San Antonio was sighted, and although it did not make port until four days later, all thought of abandoning San Diego was at once given up}^ It comes to no more than that Serra himself M Costans6 (Engert and Teggart, i^ Palou, Vida, 90-94. ed.), Narrative, in A.P.C.H., Publica- ^^ Ibid., 94-97. Substantially the tions, 1, 149. same account appears in Palou, Noticias. i« C-3156. II, 254-55. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 101 intended to stay whether the expedition should depart or not. Other than this the chapter is mainly psychological as to what was passing in Serra's mind, except for the Vila incident. In any event/ what Serra and Vila or Portold might have done is swallowed up in the fact that Portold did remain. In fine, there seems to be no just reason for depriving Port ola_ of the credit that by common consent is assigned to the commander of an enterprise, unless there are circumstances which compel a different attribution. Serra and others played their parts with abundant courage — their fame is secure — but to Portold goes the credit^ for holding Alta California in 1770, — and indeed, the province was saved by a very narrow margin. The early settlements consisted of the garrison at San Diego, the presidio of Monterey, founded in 1770, and the missions, founded respectively at San Diego in 1769, Mon- terey in 1770 (moved to Carmelo in the following year), and San Antonio and San Gabriel in 1771. Conversions carne very slowly, the friars assigning as one of the prin- cipal reasons the lack of food supplies, which were regarded as a highly effective spiritual argument. In 1772 provisions got so low that the settlements were again in danger, Mon- terey and San Antonio being almost wholly dependent on gifts of the Indians, and much the same condition existed in the southern missions. Fages managed to relieve the necessity by engaging in a three months^ bear hunt. At length, two boats from San Bias reached San Diego. Mon- terey and San Antonio subsisted on bear meat for a time longer, but were presently relieved. The province had for a second time been saved by the timely arrival of supplies. The founding of the mission of San Luis Obispo, shortly after the arrival of the supply ships, in 1772, seems to have had some connection with the question of provisions, this being in the region of Fages' successful bear hunt. The natives were so grateful for the killing of the bears that they willingly aided the mission with their labor and their seeds, and on the latter the mission was frequently dependent for food. In a letter of December 2, 1772, to Fages, Bucarely 102 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V approved of the site selected, not only because the land was good, but also because of the plentifulness of game. As regards domestic animals, perhaps more emphasis was placed upon a need for beasts of burden, but Igod animals were also in demand. Some animals were ob- tained at the outset from Baja California ; in 1769, Rivera brought along two hundred head of cattle and nearly an equal number of horses and mules, but these were only for purposes of the expedition, and were to be restored to the Baja California missions. In the course of a year, more were taken, much against the objection of some of the Franciscans. On July 20, 1770, an official of the Franciscan college of San Fernando wrote to Croix that five hundred head of stock in all had been taken, and if they were not given back, the peninsula Indians could not be fed.^^ Two years later, the Franciscans gave up the peninsula to the Dominicans, but retained Alta California; so the animals were not returned. Enough of these animals survived the difficult northward marches to give hope for the future from their natural increase. ' The colony was far from being relieved of anxiety, however, and greater projects were hindered by the necessity of providing for bare subsistence. Under date of November 29, 1770, in his diary of an ex- pedition to San Francisco Bay, Fages explains that he turned back without reaching his goal [Drake^s Bay], because of his "anxiety . . . for the camp, the cultivation of the land, and the raising of stock. ^' ^^ For various reasons,^' increase in the number of stock was slow. Nor could Alta California depend upon San Bias or the penin- sula for its animals. The animals could not come by sea, because there were not boats enough, nor was there a sufficient marine establishment at San Bias to allow of that mode of shipment. ^^ P^j^ California could not supply the more northerly province, for despite the fact that it had been settled for three-quarters of a century, it could hardly " Richman, 400, n. 34. =» Some idea of the diflScultiea of the ^* A.P.C.H., Publications, II, 152-53. Department of San Bias in these respects i» For example, a lack of male ani- will be given in chapter XVI. mals. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 103 raise enough animals or agricultural products for its own subsistence. As the insufficiency of Baja California as a source of supply played a prominent part in the plan for opening a route from Sonora, it requires notice here. Detailed proof of the sterility of the peninsula is hardly necessary, as it is a well-known fact.^^ Diaries of the northward marches to Alta California show that even as a route, entirely aside from the difficult voyage across the Gulf, Baja California was not a satisfactory medium between Mexico and the new establishments. So barren and dry was this land that water was not to be had for days at a time on the marches, necessitating its carriage for both men and animals. Fur- thermore, the Indian s of n orthern, Baja California were ^2?^ii^-i2-i^i2-§£.^£i^l^^« ^^ ^® attested in various documents. One~such is the memorial of February 26, 1776, of the re- ligious of San Fernando. Some sites for missions between Velicata and San Diego might be found, they said, if the natives could be made to maintain peace. From the first they had had little affection for the Spaniards, and had re- peatedly shown hostility to parties passing that way. De- spite the Indians' audacity no Spaniard had lost his life, but many Indians had been killed.^^ For a general description of the peninsula a letter of Father Rafael Verger to Manuel Lanz de Casafonda, June '* One of the most notable works on sky, and that in the shade at least it the Californias from the standpoint of is not too hot but always very cool, criticism of the Baja California part, is California has pretty well nothing which the Nachrichten attributed to Jacob Bae- merits to be praised, valued, or envied gert, first published in 1772. Baegert by even the poorest inhabited country had spent many years in the peninsula on this globe." Putting it in positive as a Jesuit missionary, and was inspired form, he said, California solo est arido, to write his own work in order to correct sterili atque deserto. Baegert, Nach- what seemed to him the flagrant errors richten, 313-14. Although published of Burriel's Noticia, or rather the in 1772, it is doubtful if it had any im- French translation from the English mediate effect on Spanish opinion of translation, which was the only edition the peninsula, not only because it that he had seen. Baegert's criticisms might take some time for the contents are most strikingly portrayed in his of a German work to become known, first appendix entitled Falsche Nach- but also because the works of Jesuits richten von Californien und den Cali- at that time, so shortly after their ex- fomiern, 313-31. His opinion may be pulsion from Spain, would not be re- summed up in his own words, as fol- garded by Spanish officials as trust- lows: "Aside from its pearls, its worthy, three different species of fruit, the fact "(5-3156. that it nearly always has a clear, sunny 104 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V 30, 1771, may be quoted. The former as Father Superior of the College of San Fernando, Mexico, was the one to whom the Franciscans of the Calif ornias were subject. Casafonda was at that time fiscal of the Audiencia of Mexico. Sum- ming up the experience of his order in the peninsula, since entering there in 1768, Verger said that the Baja California missions never had been, were not, and never would be substantial foundations. Some, but for the impoverish- CM. ment occasioned by providing for the expeditions to Alta ^■^.^AC^^'wvCalifornia and other burdens placed upon them, might ^ r t^ have been able to clothe the Indians, badly to be sure, and ^^Sj*' A to give them food, but most of the missions never could have done so. The soil was fertile, yielding in some cases an hundredfold, on which account many had been led to be- lieve that Baja California was a terrestrial paradise, when in fact it was a wretched, unhappy land. This was because there was very little good land, and because the rain did not come at the right times for crops. Thus, only such crops were raised as could be produced by irrigation, and as hardly any water was to be had, not much land could be sown. In many years locusts ate the entire crop. Nor was Verger enthusiastic over the prospect in Alta California. The foundations there could on no account be approved, he said. They would result in the sacrifice of many lives, a loss of many ships, and the expenditure of an excessive amount of money, and perhaps nothing would be gained, despite what was said of the docility of the natives. The College of San Fernando had in no way agreed to found- ing so many missions at one time, and had sent missionaries only because compelled to do so. The whole undertaking was unsound, and unless God worked miracles, success could not be expected. ^^ In a long^^^ memorial to Casafonda of August 3, 1771, Verger took up, in more detail, matters concerning the missions of the Californias. As this is a good exposition of conditions, and as it tends to counterbalance the more optimistic (although not inaccurate) accounts of Father 23 B.M., Ms. vol. 13974, Sec. G. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 105 Serra, which will presently be quoted, it will be considered here in some detail. The memorial drew in most part for its facts on letters of Ortega, an officer at San Diego, and of Fathers Crespl, Palou, and Serra, then in the Calif ornias.^* When the Jesuits were expelled from Baja California, said Verger, their place was taken for a time by military commissaries who killed the mission animals and wrought havoc generally. The situation became worse as a result of the expeditions of 1769 to Alta California, many beasts being taken which were never replaced. The Franciscans of San Fernando had succeeded to the spiritual control of the missions, April 6, 1768, and to temporal authority over them by order of G^lvez, August 12, 1768. Gdlvez had also enacted other measures for the benefit of the missions and Indians, but had subsequently revoked some of them, and there was no certainty that others not revoked would be enforced. For example, Gdlvez had compelled Indians to serve the king in salt mines and in oth^r tasks without pay, which was worse treatment than was accorded to slaves ; the latter, at least, got food and clothing. Verger was telling these things so as to show that it would not be M The letters referred to, all in B.M., 13. 1770, June 30, Monterey, Serra Ms. vol. 13974, Sec. G, were the fol- to Antonia Valladolid. lowing: 14. 1770, July 5, Monterey, Serra 1. 1769, June 9, San Diego, Crespl to Antonia Valladolid (?). to Palou. 15. 1770, Aug. 15, Santa Ana, Palou 2. 1769, July 3, San Diego, Serra to Juan Andr6s. to Antonia Valladolid (?). 16. 1770, Oct. 10, Santa Ana, Palou 3. 1769, July 3, San Diego, Serra to Juan Andr6s. to Antonia Valladolid (?). Juan Andr6s was the Father Su- 4. 1769, Nov. 24, Loreto, Palou perior at San Fernando preceding to Juan Andres. Verger ; Antonia Valladolid was a nun. 5. 1770, Jan. 10, Loreto, Palou The letters of Serra to the latter, and to Juan Andr6s. the last two of Palou to Juan Andrfes 6. 1770, Jan. 23, Loreto, Palou are mere fragments. Crespl and Ortega to Juan Andres. treat of routes, places, Indians, and 7. 1770, Feb. 6, San Diego, Crespi conditions generally in Alta California, to Palou. Palou deals with mission affairs of 8. 1770, Feb. 9, San Diego, Ortega Baja California, and especially with to Palou. Gdlvez's measures. Serra discusses the 9. 1770, Feb. 10, San Diego, Serra expeditions to Monterey, conditions in to Antonia Valladolid (?). Alta California, and prospects for 10. 1770, Mar. 16, Loreto, Palou founding new missions, of which he to Juan Andres. was earnestly desirous. This did not 11. 1770, June 11, Monterey, Crespl accord well with the wishes of Verger to Juan Andr6s. who says of Serra in his memorial of 12. 1770, June 12, Monterey, Serra August 3, 1771, es preciso moderar aigo to Juan Andr6s. au ardiente Zelo. 106 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V the fault of the college, if the missions should fail altogether, or not advance. He then proceeded to complain of the scant funds as- signed to the Fernandinos in comparison with those granted to others, despite the greater present needs of the Cali- fornias. Each Jesuit had received five hundred pesos a year, whereas the Fernandinos were receiving from two hundred to three hundred and fifty, the higher amount going to those in Alta California, but Palou had written that the pay of the last named was to be cut to two hundred and seventy-five pesos. Gdlvez would claim to have founded many missions, and to have taken measures to insure their permanence. In a few years they would fail, and the missionaries would be blamed. The missions of Baja California were already as good as dead, and those of Alta California were missions in name only. The latter were assigned only a thousand pesos as the amount for their foundation, which was absurdly little (mds parece funcion de D^ Quijote) . Yet this had to serve for everything, — tools, pots, buildings, cattle, and other things for places two hundred to three hundred and fifty leagues from one an- other, and eight hundred from Mexico, whence most things had to come, unless a way should be opened from Sonora, for there was nothing in Baja California. Along the Gulf of Mexico, where the problems were much simpler, a great deal more was assigned for founding missions, including an allowance for presents to the Indians. Verger was opposed to the kind of establishments that were being made in Alta California, but made suggestions in case they were to be maintained. The good will of the Indians must be obtained, if they were to subject themselves to the Catholic faith, as, for example, by making promises to protect them against their enemies. This would re- quire enough troops to enable the Spaniards to fulfil such promises, and to provide adequate security against reduced Indians. These were dangerous because of their free type of life, the bad conduct of Spanish soldiers, and the in- citement of priests of native religions for whom the intro- 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 107 duction of Christianity meant loss of position. Thus, a sudden rebellion might put an end to everything. If the Indians should not receive Christianity, more troops would be required. With this in view, articles to attract the ^^ Indians should be sent, as, for example, tobacco. Agricul- c^ tural and pastoral laborers were needed, but this meant the -5 sending of yet more soldiers to guard animals and crops. It would be well not to attempt a too rapid development at one time, because of the correspondingly greater expense / and the greater number of soldiers and laborers required. "^1 ■ The latter class was quite essential for the continuance of the colonies, the only alternative being to transport food supplies from Sonora. Verger then gave instances showing the danger of revolt by the Indians, and made specific recommendations to meet that contingency. Between Velicata and San Diego, the Indians had threatened the Spanish march, 'he said, and in one instance there had been a fight in which ten Indians were killed. They were not peaceful, as Serra had re- ported, but had not molested a later expedition, because they had learned of the Spanish establishment at San Diego, and were awaiting a better chance. On August 15, 1770, a revolt occurred at San Diego resulting in the loss of sev- eral lives. Serra reported that no Indians were killed, but in fact three were, and two died later. Previous to this the San Diego Indians had tried to rob the Spaniards. At another place, at the lake of tar [the La Brea ranch], two Indians were killed in an encounter with Spanish soldiers. What the San Diego Indians had done, others might do, and perhaps they might be even more likely to do so, as elsewhere in Alta California they were more able and proud than the Indians of San Diego. It was noticeable that the Indians of Alta California had not promised to obey the church, and only one village between San Diego and Mon- terey, a village near the lake of tar, had offered lands. There was doubt, even in that case, it being probable that the Spaniards misunderstood the Indians, as neither peo- ple knew the other's language. Thus, a greatermilii5J5!Lfia=-_ 108 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V cort for the missions was necessary, the presidios of San Diego and Monterey should be maintained, and another in between would be eminently desirable. As it was, there were but eighteen soldiers at Monterey of whom only the seven soldados de cuera could take the field. There were twenty-eight soldados de cuera at San Diego, none too many because of the cows and mules there to be guarded. The mission of San Diego was already in its third year, but, as Father Paterna had written to Verger, it was not yet worthy of being called a mission. As for five missions that had been ordered erected between Velicatd and San Diego, nothing had been done, for, Igracias d Dios ! there were no soldiers, mules, or horses, for them, and Palou had written that there were no mules in Baja California to carry them provisions. Verger recognized that in accordance with the royal de- cree of October 15, 1733, founding the college, the College of San Fernando was obliged to send missionaries at com- mand. He was merely recording his opinion that the present settlements were injudicious, and that not so many, missionaries should be sent as Gdlvez had asked for, namely forty, because it was inadvisable to found so many missions at one time, in view of the unwillingness of the Indians to accept Christianity. He was opposed to wasting royal funds or pious gifts under the gilded title of propagating the faith and extending the king's domain. It was well enough to found missions, but it ought to be done with an understanding of the meaning of the verb to found, which did not mean to paint pretty pictures (pintar per- spectivas). It should not be said, however, that the col- lege did not want to spread the faith ; on the contrary, its missionaries had gone forth to their unspeakable labors rejoicing.^^ Several other letters of Verger to Casafonda may be cited as cumulative evidence of his point of view, based upon letters received from missionaries in the Calif ornias. On August 27, 1771, he laid renewed emphasis on the cost 28 B.M., Ms. vol. 13974, Sec. G. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 109 in boats and men for maintaining the Alta California es- tablishments. Voyages to San Diego and Monterey were exceedingly difficult because the winds were usually con- trary, and because of the danger of shipwreck on the many uncharted rocks and islets. Crews were wont to get sick, and skilled navigators were few ; if the pilot got sick, there might be no one to take his place. The short voyage to Baja California was also an exceedingly hard one, be- cause of the storms in the Gulf. In that same year a sloop and four launches had been lost, and the San Carlos, which left San Bias on February 2, had not reached Loreto by June 29, and might prove to have been lost. Unless the king had special reasons for establishments at San Diego and Monterey, it would be better to let the conquest pro- ceed at the normal pace.^^ Writing next day, Verger said that the missions in the Calif ornias were all "appearances" without solid founda- tion, the mere shadow of great works, and afterward, when by their failure the truth should become known, blame would be cast upon the missionaries, who would be charged with the responsibility therefor. The rest of this letter concerned Baja California, treating graphically of the / status of the missions, the wretchedness of the Indians, ^, the failure of crops due to locusts, the lack of animals, and ^ want of church utensils. Matters were better under the 1- Jesuits, he said, because the government supported them better than it was then supporting the Fernandinos}'^ On September 27, 1771, Verger wrote that, contrary to what had been alleged, his college would welcome a grant of missions in Baja California to the Dominicans, for the field was too large for the Fernandinos alone. All that he asked was that the division be made in such a way as not to hinder the communication of Fernandino missions with Sonora, and that a separate route for spiritual conques t be assigned to each order. Verger was beginning to believe, due to the continued docility of the natives, that the Alta California missions might be rendered p ermanent , although M B.M., Ms. vol. 13974, °" ^ - tm::':? 110 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V he was unwilling to put too mucli faith in Indian peaceful- ness. The land seemed to be good. Monterey, however, had proved to be, far from the excellent port it' had been reputed, hardly a port at all. Similarly, the wealth of Baja California in pearls had been greatly overrated.^^ In Palou's Noticias there is printed a memorial of De- cember, 1771, by Verger to Bucarely concerning the needs of Alta C alifornia. Its most notable suggestions were that the mule drove be increased, so that Alta California could be supplied mth provisions from Baja Cahfornia or Sonora in case of need, and that two^ boats with provisions for the presidios and missions for a year and a half should be sent forthwith. It also pointed out theJackj)f^k,borers, urging that converted Indians be sent to work on the lands, and to assist in tasks at the missions. Bucarely replied that he would take fitting action on Verger's requests.^^ In his letter of January 23, 1772, Verger spoke of deser- tions by soldiej^s of San Diego as threatening the contin- uance of that settlement, although in these instances the deserters had returned. The San Carlos had at length reached Loreto on August 23, after' a voyage of nearly seven months from San Bias. It had been blown nearly to Pan- amd by storms. The proper season for voyages was June to September, or at most May to October. He reiterated his support of the royal order for placing the Dominicans in the peninsula, saying that Gdlvez and Croix were the ones who objected to that course, not the college.^^ Such were the views of Verger, which may be regarded as accurately representing affairs in the Calif ornias. Even his pessimism was warranted by the conditions, despite the fact that he was to prove a false prophet. It should be noted that Baja California could not be looked to for supplies of any sort for the new establishments. On the other hand, Verger several times mentioned the possibility of a supply route from Sonora as a solution of the ills of the Calif ornias. Another feature worthy of emphasis is 28 B.M., Ms. vol. 13974, Sec. G. ^ B.M., Ms. vol. 13974, Sec. G. 29 Palou, Noticias, I, 127-31. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 111 his reference to the cost of maintaining Alta California, especially the c o&t_in^ jtoats . rt was this that held feack the advancement of the conquest to a permanent basis, mecessitatin^. the finding of land routes. Attention may also be called to his remarks reflecting upon the Indian rep- utation for docility and the consequent need for soldiers, an important factor calling for the opening of an overland route for a satisfactory solution. These remarks are strik- ingly confirmed in two documents of later date, a memorial by Pedro Fages, November 30, 1775,^^ and another by the religious of the College of San Fernando, February 26, 1776,^^ both of which will be taken up in more detail in a later chapter. Verger's opinions are borne out also by contemporary official reports. The two Californias were then under one government, the capital being at Loreto, Baja California, where the governor, Felipe Barry, resided. Pedro Fages, the lieutenant-governor, was stationed in Alta California at Monterey. In letters of July 21 and 23, August 27 and , / 30, 1771, Fages told Barry that he was about to found mis- V sions at San Gabriel and San Buenaventura, and conse-' quently needed more men and horses. Barry sent twenty- one soldiers, five mule-drivers, and sixty-three horses, which were all that he could spare, but Fages asked for yet more soldiers and horses. He was much troubled because of the f re guenc y^^^^of 4^^^^^^^^. On one occasion nine soldiers and a mule-driver had taken provisions and fifty horses, and started for Sonora, but later returned. Then five soldiers took forty-nine horses, and set out for Sonora. They, too, changed their minds, and took refuge in San Diego mis- sion, where they were protected by the missionaries from the wrath of Fages. He wrote that he had no confidence in any of his men. Commenting on these letters in his own to Bucarely of October 24, 1771, jBarry said that there were only eighty-two soldiers in all the Californias^ of whom fifty- one were with Fages. He asked that forty more be sent to him, as also four or five hundred mules and two hundred 31 C-3042. » C-3156. 112 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V horses, the animals being required to transport provisions, and as mounts for the troops. As things were, nothing was being done, for he lacked the means with which to work.^^ Bucarely informed Arriaga, November 26, 1771, that he would send eighteen more soldiers, enough to give the Californias a total of a hundred, and that he had ordered Barry to punish those soldiers who deserted repeatedly. These were temporary steps, as the Californias were about to be divided between the Franciscans and the Dominicans, when more enduring measures would be taken.^^ Fages continued to ask aid of Barry, especially in horses, mules, and cattle. The latter wrote Fages, January 7, T773, that he had forwarded thirty horses and forty mules, which were all that he could get together in the peninsula, but he sent no cattle. Prior to the cession of Baja Califor- nia by the Franciscans to the Dominicans, the latter agreed that the former might take some of their animals to Alta California. But when confronted with the actual condi- tions of the peninsula, they contended, as had certain Fran- ciscans in 1770, that the animals could not be spared, although acknowledging their previous agreement. Bu- carely at first inclined toward the Franciscans, ordering Rivera to take the animals to Alta California.^^ Later, he changed front, and the Dominicans were allowed to keep them. Clearly, no help in this respect was to come from Baja Calif ornia.^^ The Puerto of San Francisco had long been known to the Spaniards, but by that name they meant the modern Drake^s Bay. What we now call San Francisco Bay was discovered by PortoU in 1769, taking the name of the Ester o of San Francisco. For several years thereafter, expeditions in that direction aimed to get around the Estero in order to reach the Puerto. The distinction seems to have been lost sight of in Mexico, possibly because the name and location were wC-1792. SB Bucarely to Rivera, Nov. 3, 1773, « C-1813. For Arriaga's acknowl- A.G.P., Californias, 66. edgment see C-1915. C-1820 is an- ^ Late in 1776, after many animals other letter from Barry, much as before, had already been brought from Sonora, a reported by Bucarely to Arriaga in supplementary lot was ordered sent from C-1910. Baja California. C-3070, 3300, 3455. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 113 SO nearly the same. Very soon the name San Francisco became understood as connoting the site of the present city and bay of that name. Scarcity of provisions and the consequent necessity of returning to San Diego had pre- vented an exploration of the bay by Portold. Thence- forth, however, the project of exploring and occupying the new port was constantly in the minds of the authorities and missionaries, until it was achieved in 1776 by the found- ing of San Francisco. Rivera, who had accompanied the Portold expedition, wrote to Croix, March 2, 1770, that the newly discovered port, if deep enough, might prove better than that of San Diego. Moreover, it was a good site for settlement, as it had timber and firewood, running water, good lands, and numerous Indians.^^ Doubtless, he was considering the availability of the Indians as laborers, in referring to their numbers as an advantage. News of the achievements of the 1769 expeditions had hardly been received in Mexico, when orders were sent by Croix, November 12, 1770, to explore the port of San Fran- cisco and to found a mission there to secure it fr^pn , f f?rCf 1 S^ occupation. This order was not* received until May, 1771. Meanwhile, Fages had paid a brief visit to San Francisco Bay in November, 1770, but had made no extensive ex- ploration.^^ From the first, Serra was most eager to estab- lish a mission there, but Fages regarded it as impossible, owing to his lack of troops for mission guards. Serra would not be satisfied, and voiced his complaint in a long letter to the viceroy, June 18, 1771. He stated that Santa Clara mission ^® had not been founded because G^lvez had ob- jected, due to the lack of escort. As for San Francisco, the viceroy had ordered an exploration of its port before- hand, but Fages and Perez, the latter being captain of the San Antonio, had decided that there were not enough people for the attempt to be made by land, and that it would occasion too great a delay to the San Antonio, if made by sea. Serra wished to see the mission placed there ^ A.G.P., Californias, 66. ^9 This refers, not to the later mission ^ Fages, Diary, in A.P.C.H., Pub- of that name, but to a site south of lications, II, 141-59. Also C-1583. Santa Barbara. 114 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V as soon as possible ; there would be no delay on his part."*^ This letter must have reached Mexico at about the time that Bucarely became viceroy, or only shortly before. Its statements are confirmed by Fages, who wrote to Croix that he could not found the mission at San Francisco until he got more soldiers.'*^ Exploration of the port of San Francisco was also urged by Father Verger in his petition of December, 1771. ^^They say that Monterey is not a port, and that San Francisco may be a very good one ; but there is need of exploring its entrance and [ascertaining] its depth.'' *^ Knowing Verger's objections to making new settlements, we may conclude that he was recommending exploration rather than a too early attempt at settlement. At length, in March and April, 1772, Fages made an over- land expedition to explore the Puerto of San Francisco, but failing to get around the Ester Oj returned. He made no examination of San Francisco Bay, and its merits remained unknown. The aftermath of the San Gabriel revolt illustrates an- other problem that the viceroy had to consider. Serra asserted that the revolt was due to the mismanagement of Fages, charging that he had not taken steps to prevent outrages by soldiers against native women. In other words, the old feud between friars and soldiers was already in evi- dence in Alta California, the missionaries believing that they should have wider powers than the lay authorities were willing to give them. Thus, every untoward incident might be cause of mutual recriminations. Whatever may have been the merits of the case, these disputes were a factor to reckon with. A similar situation existed in Baja California. Writing to Arriaga, July 26, 1772, Bu- carely said that the discord between the governor and the missionaries was so great that it was difficult for him to learn the truth, as each side appeared to found its repre- sentations on a sound basis. He hesitated to take meas- ures, lest they prove mistaken and irremediable, but was seeking information from various sources. He had asked « A.G.P., Californias, 66. « Ibid. *^ Palou, Noticias, 1, 128. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 115 further reports from the Father Superior of San Fernando, and had inquired the amount of funds supphed to the CaHfornias by the royal treasury, what the pious fund paid, and the expense of the Department of San Bias, all with a view to ascertaining the exact cost of the Californias, and to enable him to take fitting measures."*^ The leading facts as regards the status of the Californias, and opinions concerning them have now been traced up to the time when Bucarely received Anza's petition to explore a route to Monterey from Sonora. The logic of events and conditions pointed to a need for such a communication, if the new settlements were to be maintained. Meanwhile, steps had been taken which emphasized that need. Meas- ures having to do with the grant of a mission field in the Californias to the Dominicans had also been taken which emphasized the importance of having a route to the Cali- fornias from Sonora. As far back as 1760 a royal decree of April 17 in that year, had granted Father Juan Pedro Iriarte's petition for a mission field in New Spain for twenty-five of the Domin- ican order. ^^ By another decree, February 18, 1768, more missionaires were granted, including ten who were to serve in missions from which the Jesuits had been expelled."*^ The necessity of filling places left vacant by the Jesuits imposed a demand upon other orders that they could not supply, and the Father Superior of San Fernando, the archbishop of Mexico, Viceroy Croix, and others joined in petitions for more missionaries, which resulted in a grant of forty-five to the College of San Fernando by a decree of September 2, 1768."*^ The same day the Council of the Indies reported to the king a new petition of Iriarte's, a proposal now being made for the first time that the Domin- icans be assigned a field in the Californias. Iriarte wished to go alone, or with others of his order, to the western coast of the peninsula, stating that there were many natives there and many good harbors. It was a known fact, he «C-1995. Acknowledged by Ar- « C-952. riaga, Nov. 11, 1772, C-2060. « C-1070. ** C-470. 116 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V said, that foreign enemies had taken shelter in them in times of war, a danger which he thought could be avoided, if he were allowed to convert the Indians of that coast be- tween 25° and 28°. The Council was uncertain about the proper course of action on this petition, suspecting that it was an entering wedge for an extension of Dominican rule to Cape Mendocino, stated to be in 41° 30/ All presidios and missions thus far erected in the Californias had been on the side of the Gulf, but the Council realized the im- portance of the spiritual and temporal conquest of other parts of the Californias as against the possibility of foreign establishments; if the latter were formed, it would be a mortal wound to the entire coast of New Spain, and "^^uld, cut off trade with the Philippines. The Council had planned to avoid this danger by its decrees of May 12, 1744, and August 22, 1747, when it proposed that the Jesuits should enter the Californias by way of the Colorado River, but nothing had been accomplished at that time. It recommended that Iriarte's petition be referred to the viceroy and the archbishop of Mexico,^^ and this was done in an order of November 4, 1768. Croix^s reply, April 22, 1769, stated that it would be impossible to assign a field in the Californias to the Dominicans, as it would lead to quarrels between them and the Fernandinos to whom that territory had been given upon expulsion of the Jesuits.^* The archbishop, however, writing May 22, 1769, said that such a great territory as the Californias ought not be given to the Franciscans alone, as they might resist measures that would be desired in future. So the Dominicans should be given a field there, and secular clergy placed in towns that were more advanced in a settled type of life.** Gdlvez opposed Iriarte^s petition. Not only was there no multi- tude of natives between 25° and 28° on the west coast of the *'' C-1069. This document contains the early period of settlement. More a definite statement as to the northern likely, however, this was merely an boundary of the Californias, placing it instance of careless phraseology in in 36** at the mouth of the Rio Carmelo. framing the document. A few years Thus Monterey was deemed beyond it. later the boundary was extended in- This may account for the name Mon- definitely northward. Cf. infra n. 59. terey (or Estahledmientos de Monterrey) ^ C-1237, often applied to Alta California during *» C-1253. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 117 Californias, he said, but there were not any at all between 31° and Cape San Lucas nor on the adjacent islands. As for danger from foreigners, permission had already been granted to establish nine new missions between Velicatd, the northernmost mission of Baja California, and Mon- terey, where a presidio was also to be placed. These would hold back foreign encroachments, especially those of the Russians who had lately been active in their designs. There was no room for the Dominicans, as the Franciscans had all the desirable territory. The former might be used on the Sonora frontier. ^° G41vez expressed the same views in his Informe of 1771 to Bucarely. Let the Dominicans be assigned missions in Sonora, he suggested, leaving the Fran- ciscans of the College of Quer^taro to found five missions farther on, among peoples of the Gila and those at the con- fluence of that river with the Colorado. ^^ Father Juan de Dios de Cordova, Dominican provincial in Madrid, recom- mended, January 17, 1770, that Iriarte's petition be granted, making a point of the necessity for conquests in the Califor- nias as a check against foreign encroachments, for which purpose decrees aiming to secure the peninsula had been passed in 1744, 1747, and 1752, without anything being done.^^ The fiscal on February 6, 1770, advised the Coun- cil to permit the Dominicans to enter the Californias, but in separate regions from those of the Franciscans,^^ and so it was proposed by the Council in its recommendation of March 2, 1770, to the king. Reference was made in this document to the decree of 1744 ordering the Jesuits to seek routes to the Californias by way of the Colorado River. This was still recommended as desirable on the part of their successors in Sonora. ^^ A royal decree in the terms suggested by the Council, was sent to the viceroy, dated April 8, 1770,^^ being modified later, November 16, 1770, by another stating that the viceroy might employ the Dominicans «> Gdlvez to Croix, June 10, 1769, « G&lvez, Informe, 145. C-1284. This was forwarded to Arri- w C-1441. aga by Croix, July 29, 1769, C-1348, " C-1447. and sent by the former to the Council " C-1455. of the Indies, January 1, 1770, C-1434. " C-1460. 118 ' THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V elsewhere, if he thought best.^^ Croix, however, made no use of the Dominicans who had already been sent to New Spain, which drew forth a protest from the archbishop of Mexico to the Council, dated February 28, 1771. He doubted if the Dominicans provided for by the recent decrees were going to be used in the Californias, because Gdlvez was opposed, but urged that the decrees be fulfilled. ^^ A new decree was enacted, September 21, 1771, expressly ordering that the Dominicans be given stations in the Californias.^^ Bucarely had called a junta to consider the matter, before the last-named order was received, but it had come prior to the determination of the matter. Vari- ous decrees and reports were examined, among them being a petition of the Franciscans of Queretaro that they be allowed to erect five missions along the Colorado and Gila rivers. A_decision was reached in May, 1772, that the Dominicans should have the peninsula, and the Fernandinos Alta California. The former were to have up to a point just short of San Diego, and thereafter proceed to the east or east-northeast toward the Gulf and the Colorado River, or yet farther in that direction, but without prejudice to such other orders as might precede them. This division was being made with the consent of the Father Superior of the Fernandinos. The latter were to have a field extending mdefinitely northward. ^^ Various consequences of this di- vision of the Californias will be taken up later in another connection. For the present only one may be noted, which was expressed by Galvez in criticizing the division. Was 5« C-1579. So the Council had ad- first case is that the Dominicans were vised, C-1514, upon advice of the fiscal, to proceed hasta llegar d los confines de C-1504. la Misidn de S^ Diego en su Puerto, *7 C-1712. poniendo la ultima en el Arroyo de Sv- " C-1782. Juan Bautista g? finalizaria cinco leguas ^' Proceedings of the junta, C-1602, mds adelante de una Punta que saliendo forwarded to Spain by Bucarely in a de la Sierra Madre, termina antes de letter of May 25, 1772, C-1959. The llegar d la Playa, donde podrian torcer boundaries named were accepted by al Leste con poca inclinacion at Les- the Council of the Indies in a consulta Nordeste con g? saltan al fin del Golfo of May 11, 1775, C-2906, and thus be- Calif drnico y Rio Colorado. As for came the first definite boundary be- the northern boundary the Fernandinos tween Alta and Baja California, and a were to go hasta donde pudiesen estender new expression as to the northern sus Conquistas Espirituales. Cf. supra boundary of the former. The Ian- n. 47. guage employed by the Council in the 17691 NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 119 it proper, he asked, to deprive Alta California establish- ments of the support which they needed from the penin- sula? Was it wise, in view of their importance, to force them to rely solely on the boats from San Bias ? ^^ Wise or not, it had been done. Clearly, however, the discovery of a good route from Sonora had bejcome all Hhe more desirable. ^^ The division having been made, some sort of modus vivendi had to be devised, and this could be done only with a knowl- edge of conditions. For several years the matter of a reglamento for governing the Californias, a temporary one to begin with, to be followed as soon as might be by a per- manent reglamento was a matter much in the minds of the authorities in Mexico and Spain, but what to do was a question. Prospects in the Californias were none too favor- able. In a letter to Arriaga, February 24, 1773, Bucarely wrote of the Alta California establishments that discord between Fages and the missionaries was so great, and de- sertions of soldiers so oft-repeated, that a deplorable situ- ation had resulted, and the early ruin of the settlements might be expected.^^ He had done all that he could to remedy matters, urging the religious and Fages and Barry, who also quarrelled with the missionaries, to greater harmony, and he had forwarded supplies, but without appreciable results. Affairs of San Bias also required attention, the port itself showing signs of filling in. Until matters there were arranged, and until such time as he could learn the causes of disputes in the Californias, there was not likely to be any good news from that province.^' Most important of the reports received from men who had been in the province were two from Father Junipero ^erra, president of the Alta California missions. Serra had reached Mexico in February, 1773, having made the trip *> G&lvez to Arriaga, Dec. 18, 1773, "Among other letters of Bucarely C-2454. bearing on desertions of the military w For a summary of the documents are three to Fages, Oct. 14 and Dec. 2, concerning division of the Californias, 1772, and May 26, 1773. A.P.C.H., with subsequent action to May 11, 1775, Prov. St. Pap., I, 75-85. see the recommendation of that date by «' C-2177. the Council of the Indies, C-2906. 120 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V from Alta California largely with a view to securing the removal of Fages. Bucarely asked him to prepare a memo-, rial setting forth his views as to the needs of Alta California. Serra's .,memorial of March 13, 1773, was the response to this request. In it he embodied thirty-two suggestions, most of which are worthy of record here, for the light they \ . throw upon conditions in the new settlements. A store ' ' should be established at_.Msaifi£fi3r? he said, so that the soldiers would not have to deal with the far distant one at Loreto ; in that case, they would be better satisfied, and others would be induced to go there. It would be well to 2« .send thirty to forty more soldiers, some of them married ; with but two families at each mission, other persons would soon begin to marry. Each mission ought to have from four -r to six men to serve as laborers, cowboys,, and mule-drivers, thus providing for the j^lanting of crop^ and the general advancement of the province. The men could be sent by . sea from San Bias. Indian families might also be sent from u Baj^a^jCalifornia to serve as laborers, and to show the Alta California Indians that the Christians approved of mar- riage; thus far there had been no Christians with wives >^ in Alta California. A fQjge and a smith were needed at San Diego and at Carmelo, Monterey being the only place . in the province thus far to have them, and ,iron was re- ^. quired for the forges. Two carpenters were wanted, one for the northern and the other for the southern missions. The commissary of San Bias should be instructed to be "7^ more careful about the cofld^Ltipn of proyisions sent to Alta California. All the missions were in very great need of Y. mules , especially the inland missions, with which to transr port provisions from the ports ; the only mules in the province were those of the presidio of Monterey, and they were likely to become extinct because they were being em- ployed in somewhat unnecessary labors, and because of thefts by deserters who took them away, and by natives 9^,»who ate them. Above all, asses and jnaares should be sent, for procreation of more mules, or the province would never be free from trouble because of its lack of pack- 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 121 animals. Cows destined for the proposed San Francisco / • and Santa Clara missions should in the meantime be kept at the existing missions, rather than at the presidios, so that there might be milk for Christian converts, the only aliment that the missionaries had been able, thus far, to give them. Since the departure of Pedro Prat, Alta California had been . without a doctor; it needed one. Some reward ought .to be given to soldiers who should marry native women, — for \>ri example, two cows and a mule, or whatever might be deemed best. The above shows the lagk in elements of permanence of the Alta California settlements at this time, and the need for families and animals. The memorial laid even greater stress upon the relations between missionaries and soldiery, Vn and sought that Fages be relieved of his command. ^^ Most \ of Serra's requests were granted, either at this time or not long afterward, but, for the present, discussion of the action taken may be postponed. The interest here is his descrip- tion of existing conditions. ^^ Serra's proposals formed an important document before Bucarely and the junta in their work of preparing a regla^ mento for the Californias and San Bias, but they did not contain all the information that Bucarely desired. In a letter to Arriaga of May 27, 1773, Bucarely said that the reports thus far received had not served to clarify the situation in the Californias ; so he had ordered steps taken to form a permanent reglamento. "No subject of the many that this very vast government produces has given me more to do than the regulation of the Department of San Bias and the Peninsula de Californias.'^ ^^ One of the docu- ■ w Serra's complaint against Fages Serra's request for the removal of came at a time when it was apt to be Fages was granted. heard favorably. Shortly before, De- s^ Yot the whole expediente, C-2103. cember 2, 1772, Bucarely had written Serra's memorial is in Palou, Noticias, to Fages remarking upon the latter's III, 37-66 ; also the resolution of the failure to give an account of conditions junta concerning his proposals. III, at the presidio and missions, and re- 67-82. questing him in future to report all «« C-2278. The term Peninsula de that occurred. A.P.C.H., Prov. St. Californias continued to be used to in- Papers, I, 76-77. Reference to "the elude both Californias, even after Alta presidio" meant Monterey, for San California had been settled. Diego was not so regarded at the time. 122 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V ments sought by Bucarely to help in that regard was another from Father Serra, who was asked to draw up a report on the state of the missions in his charge. This he did, basing the report; completed May 21, 1773, bn his recollection of conditions as they were when he left in September of the preceding year, together with such news as he had received since departure.^^ His opening paragraphs concerned the military needs of the missions. Because of the vast number of Indians, sentinels were necessary at night, four men and a corporal being required, each with a three-hour watch, except the corporal, who escaped duty. If there should be but five men, they would have that duty every night, and could not be counted upon to assist the missionaries during the day, as for example when they went to wash clothes, to seek a stray cow, or to do other similar tasks. The use of Chris- tian Indians for purposes of defence had been impossible thus far, because most of those baptized were children, and the few men converts had to absent themselves in order to get food by hunting. The missions j^e Jherefore at mercy of the Indians, if they should 6e tempted to make an end of them. He had previously suggested an establish- ment of a hundred soldiers, but now submitted that the number could be cut down to eighty, if the founding of the proposed new missions should be postponed, although he hoped that one of the two, San Buenaventura, might not be delayed. With the exception of fifteen soldiers at the presidio of Monterey, the soldiers should be distributed among the missions, the largest number, fifteen, to be at San Buenaventura, if that were founded. The greater part of the memorial dealt with mission conditions prop er. In this respect it agreed substantially with a later report drawn up by Father Francisco Palou on December 10, 1773, the latter constituting the first of a series of annual reports concerning the Alta California mis- sions. Both Serra and Palou covered the same ground, giving a history of each mission, stating the progress each ^ For the memorial, C-2108. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 123 had made in conversions, and in material welfare as regards site, domestic animals, crops, and other details. Palou^s report, being made on the ground, with the advantage of mission records, is the more complete and the more spe- cific, but is so nearly like that of Serra that the two may be treated together, despite the difference in date. Palou will be followed here, with some additional comment from Serra. The principal features of the situation may be presented by two tables, adapted from the two in Palou. The first covers the religious achievements of the missions from their foundation to December, 1773. Mission Baptisms LiVINO Marriages San Diego .... 83 73 12 158 165 76 71 11 150 154 12 San Gabriel San Luis Obispo San Antonio 18 San Carlos de Monterey 32 Totals 491 462 62 From this it appears that after nearly five years of mis- sion work, remarkably slight progress had been made in view of the great number of Indians in the vicinity of the missions, and in comparison with the rapidity of conver- sions by Spanish missionaries in other fields. Results, when analyzed, seem even more slender than the figures show. Serra stated in his March 13 memorial that most of those baptized were children. At San Luis Obispo there were as y^Fno adiilt converts. Such men as were baptized could not always be kept at the missions, going away oc- casionally for days and weeks at a time, said Serra. There had been only sixty-two Christian marriages in the whole period, which Bancroft regards as representing the total number of adult converts. The San Diego Indians had persistently resisted conversion, although the mission was already in its fifth year at the time of Palou^s report ; mat- ters there were showing signs of improvement, however. 124 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V It was almost as bad at San Gabriel, then in its third year, while San Luis Obispo, founded in September, 1772, had accomplished almost nothing in a populous field. Con- versions at San Carlos had come for the most part in its first year, after which there had been few, said Serra, but by the time of Palou's report they had become more numerous. The failure to win converts at San Diego and San Gabriel was' partly accounted for by the eariy revolts at those mis- sions, caused at the latter place, says Palou, by the im- proper conduct of a Spanish soldier, although Serra ascribed it to the excessive precautions of Fages. The most im- portant iveason for the lack of conversions, according to both Serra and Palou, was the scarcity of food with which to attract the natives to the missions. On that account, said Serra, they had abstained from making more converts at San Carlos until a more fitting time, for they had nothing but milk to give the Indians, and very little of that. Palou said that there was not enough to eat at San Carlos for those who were already Christians, because of the failure of the crops, and because the supply ship had not come. At San Antonio the Indians had rather to assist the missionaries with food than be supplied by them. Palou felt certain that conversions at San Antonio would be rapid, if the mis- sion might maintain and clothe its converts, for the Indians had been quite friendly. The difficulty at San Luis Obispo was the abundance of foods that the natives were able to procure, for which reason, said Palou, it would not be easy to reduce them to living at the mission. San Gabriel hoped to have large crops with which to make gifts to new Christians, and to attract other natives, having already obtained promising crops of grain, vegetables, and various kinds of melon. At the other missions agriculture had not thus far proved successful. It was almost impossible to grow grain because of the difficulties of irrigation. San Diego lacked a sufficient rainfall. Yet, Serra and Palou were optimistic as to the future of the missions. No estimates of the number of unconverted Indians were 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 125 made, but the number must have been very large, only a small proportion of the Indians having been converted.^^ The unconverted Indians had no agriculture, but Uved chiefly on acorns, pine nuts, and certain wild seeds ; they hunted for hare, rabbits, squirrels, and occasionally for deer, while those who lived near the sea caught fish.^^ The missionaries at San Diego had sent to San Bias for a canoe and net, that their Christian converts might assist the mis- sion by fishing. The second table in Palou gives an account of the hve stock at the missions, as follows : Cows Sheep Goats Pigs Asses Breed- ing Mares Colts Horses Saddle Mules Pack Mules San Diego San Gabriel San Luis San Antonio San Carlos 40 38 41 38 48 64 30 55 12 19 20 5 30 28 4 17 4 4 4 4 3 1 9 6 5 5 5 4 2 2 2 2 18 14 14 9 10 205 94 67 102 470 33 471 30 12 65 From this it appears that San Diego was best off in number and variety of animals, with San Gabriel a good second. The northern missions had a few cows and pigs, but little else. The explanation is that the original supply of animals came from Baja California, there being none in « Henry K. Norton, The story of California (Chicago, 1913), 1, in a chapter entitled "California in 1540," says: "The number of Indians at that time living within the boundaries of the present state has been estimated at 700,000." While this estimate is almost certainly too high, possibly ten times too much, Alta California cer- tainly had a considerable native popu- lation. When the Spaniards came in 1769, there may have been 15,000 Indians along the route that they took between San Diego and San Francisco. Fages said that there were more than twenty villages between San Diego and Monterey along or near the route followed by the Spaniards. They were particularly numerous along the Santa Barbara Channel, where there were some towns of over a thousand Indians, and, according to Fages, chiefs capable of mustering six hundred warriors. Memorial of Pedro Fages, Nov. 30, 1775, C-3042. The last statement makes one wonder if Fages' estimates were of the men alone. If so, then the total population would be much greater than the estimate just given and the danger to the Spanish establishments was correspondingly greater. <» Bancroft, Native races, I, 322-442, gives a most vivid, and far from flat- tering account of the California Indians. A more wretchedly bestial, lazy, or filthy race could scarce ever have existed than they. Among other things he shows that vermin and reptiles were among their articles of food. ™ Two were she-asses. " Three of the four were fillies. 126 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V Alta California, and none coming by sea ; so the southern missions got a start over those in the north, being nearer the source of supply. There had been scant increase in animals over the original number brought from the penin- sula, but this does not allow for those that had died or were eaten. In the case of San Diego, at least, there had been a noteworthy increase. That mission had obtained eighteen cows from Baja California, and the number had increased to forty. Included in the list of horses was a stallion apiece at each mission. San Diego had also one colt and one jack. At every mission there was excellent pasture. These figures, to be understood, must be considered in relation to other factors. Food-animals, while not numer- ous enough to serve as a material argument of the benefits of Christianity, might be expected in time to increase to jconsiderable proportions. Three things, however, might prevent : animals for breeding purposes were not plentiful ; there were not enough men to watch the herds and flocks ; ^ and the unconverted Indians showed a fondness for meat, and an inclination to indulge that appetite without per- mission of the Fathers. The same drawbacks applied also as regards pack animals, as may be seen from Serra's memo- rial of March 13, and over a year later from a letter of Palou, April 22, 1774, to Father Verger.'^^ In all Alta Cali- fornia there were less than one hundred and fifty such ani- mals. Serra laid particular stress on the need for them, and Palou's letter pointed out that more horses and mules and every kind of cattle for breeding purposes must be brought, if the missions were to become permanent. The princip al drsjiWbMk^ although not expressed in the Serra and Palou reports, which were dealing with mission conditions, was a lack of settlers with families. Laborers without families would tide over affairs only temporarily, leaving them at their departure or death as bad as before. Serra's memorial of March 13 had urged the sending of families, so that a permanent population might develop. « M.N., Doc. Rel. Mis. Cal., v. 2. 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 127 Thus far, there was not a white woman in Alta CaUfornia, but three soldiers at San Carlos and three more at San Antonio had married native women. The missions reported that they had farming, masons' and carpenters' tools, but a total lack of workmen. San Diego had acquired a forge, but had no smith. Architecture was of the simplest. A stock- ade enclosed the wooden mission building, and another sur- rounded the soldiers' barracks. Roofs were of mud, later changed to tule, when it was found that mud roofs were not proof against rain. At San Diego and San Antonio there were some adobe structures.''^ To the preceding facts but little need be added. To' support these distant establishments in a populous Indian country, covering approximately five hundred miles from Monterey to San Diego, there were but sixty soldie rs, eleven mission^,i^s, and an occasional mechanic in the service of {Eegovernment. Clearly, Alta California was not on a. very substantial basis. During the period that Verger was writing his pessimistic memorials of 1771-72 it is not likely that the government would have authorized such an ex- pedition as Anza wished to make, and not even as late as February, 1773, if we may judge from Bucarely's letter of the 24th, for it seemed more than likely that the establish- ments would have to be abandoned. In the course of the year 1773, however, a change occurred, for something, although little enough, had been accomplished. Even Verger's opinion seems to have become more favorable. On November 5, 1773, he wrote to Bucarely of news that he had received from Alta California, telling of good crops and numerous conversions.'* There was already a growing hope for the future. This summary of conditions in the Californias preceding the Anza expeditions may be brought to a close with a reference to the cost of the establishments from the found- ing of San Bias to the end of the year 1773. Complete figures are not at hand, but the most important of them, "For the Palou report, C-2446 ; 74C-2425; reported to Arriaga by also in Palou, Noticias, III, 228-54. Bucarely, Nov. 26, 1773, C-2441. 128 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. V those of the Department of San Bias, are available. The beginning of the department may be dated January 11, 1768, when Croix issued an instruction for the guidance of its commissary, or head/^ Operations to the end of 1773 are clearly presented in two reports of July 20, 1774, by Francisco Hijosa, the commissary. One of these deals with the history of San Bias both before and after its es- tablishment on a new basis in 1768, giving not only local items, but also much that bears upon its principal raison d^Ure, supplying the Californias.'^^ The other concerns the town of San Bias and the officers of the department.^^ They show that between March 1, 1768, and December 31, 1773, the department had given aid to Baja California to the extent of 207,006 pesos, 6 reales, and 10 granos, and to Alta California, 250,753 pesos. These figures did not include the cost of goods sent from Mexico to each of the Californias, nor such sums as were supplied from confiscated goods of the Jesuits and from the pious fund.^* Hijosa complained that the amounts supplied to Baja California should have come from the two last-named funds. The department itself had cost 112,542 pesos, 7 reales, 4 granos, resulting in a total expenditure of 570,302 pesos, 6 reales, 2 granos, an average of about 100,000 pesos a year. As an offset the salt mines of San Bias had yielded about 25,000 pesos a year. Bucarely forwarded these reports to Arriaga, De- cember 27, 1774, giving high praise to Hijosa for his manage- " C-930, allowances {sinodoa) to missionaries, ^' C-2679. troops, and ships of the same Peninsula, ''"' C-2680. and for the establishment of the mis- ™ The pious fund at this time was a sions of San Diego and Monterey, and special branch of real hacienda, con- not diverted to other objects." Quoted sisting of free gifts of individuals for in a decree of the Council of the Indies, furtherance of mission work in the Cal- Dec. 16, 1776, C-3394. Engelhardt, ifornias. It was managed, however, II, 655-60, has an appendix on the un- by government officials, and portions lawful use of the pious fund in connec- were occasionally diverted to other tion with the expeditions of 1769 to objects. Protests against such diver- Alta California. "San Diego and sions were made, leading to directions Monterey" was employed to indicate that they must not occur again, or that all of the establishments of Alta Cali- such an one was to be permitted "for fornia. "Monterey" alone was often this once only." In a decision by the used to connote Alta California, as Real Tribunal de Cuentas of Mexico, also were "the new establishments," July 27, 1773, it is stated "that the "northern California" and "new Cali- said pious fund of California . . . ought fornia." Cf. chap. II, n. 5. to be employed only in payment of 1769] NEED FOR OVERLAND ROUTE 129 ment of the department J® These figures help to explain the importance that was attached to the Californias. They were a drain on the treasury, but despite that and other burdens involved in their retention, the government never slackened in its desire to keep them, so great was their strategic importance as against foreign attack. t ^rt.--^ '•^■'^^'^'^^-*^^"<^ i^^zMuJM w C-2785. CUCii.^' ^^ a CHAPTER VI STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE FRONTIER PROVINCES, 1771-1773 The need for an overland route to Alta California has just been pointed out. As such a route must come from Sonora or New Mexico, we may now consider whether there was anything to prevent the opening of a route from one region or the other, bearing in mind the significant dates with regard to Anza's proposal. May 2, 1772, when he asked to be allowed to make an expedition, and September 13, 1773, when his petition was granted. As between New Mexico and Sonora, the latter was more likely to prove the better starting-point. That Anza was not authorized to go until late in 1773 was due in part to Bucarely's uncer- tainty concerning the affairs of the Californias, and partly to fear that Sonora was not entirely pacified, but also in great degree to the continuance of Apache wars along the frontier from northeastern Sonora to Texas ; these wars might have threatened communications with Alta California, had a route been open. New Mexico, like the Californias, was in a measure separated from the problems of the frontier line, but, aside from its distance from the Californias, affairs there were less favorable than in Sonora. Although the Apaches confined their attacks in Sonora to its north- eastern corner, that region was constantly exposed, because internal revolts might draw off attention from its defence. Moreover, Apache attacks interfered seriously with the best of the northwesterly routes, down the Santa Cruz to the Gila, and by way of the last-named river to the Col- orado. Steps were taken in accord with Rubi's suggestions to remedy the frontier situation, but with little effect in the period under review. They formed a basis, however, for hopes of the future. 130 17711 STATE OF AFFAIRS 131 Following Elizondo's conquest an effort was made to develop the wealth of Sonora, thus to insure retention of the province. Early in 1771 a proposal was made to form a stock company to exploit the mineral wealth of Sinaloa and Sonora, and the government showed interest in it, which is noteworthy, although the plan was soon given up.^ Nevertheless, rich discoveries were frequently reported. Governor-intendant Pedro Corbalan ^ wrote from Alamos, September 24, 1771, of the finding of new mines at Aygame,^ which occasioned correspondence between Bucarely and Arriaga, the latter suggesting appropriate methods of ex- amining into the truth of similar reports.'* Of most im- portance, however, were the already existing Cieneguilla mines, which were a matter of great concern to the govern- ment. Bucarely wrote to Arriaga, July 26, 1772, that he was taking steps to learn the true status of the Cieneguilla placers.^ Pedro Tueros, the officer in charge at Cieneguilla, reported, December 1, 1772, that the mines were producing scantily. He planned to induce the Indians to work an- other part of the camp in search of gold, for if no new placers were found, the Indians might desert, — a matter of moment, as they constituted three-fourths of the workers.^ Bucarely ordered the governor of Sonora to prevent the abandonment of the work and of the territory already settled."^ A little later, better news came from Cieneguilla. Tueros wrote to Pedro Corbaldn, January 14, 1773, that although gold was less abundant than formerly, more than 7000 men were engaged in mining it. Moreover, new placers had been found which promised extraordinary wealth. This information was passed on to Bucarely, and by him to Arriaga, March 27, 1773.^ Soon afterward, reports of an encouraging nature from the Real Caja of Alamos were received. For the year 1772 the royal fifth had been taken iC-1720, 1729, 1807, 1841, 1926^ <<^ Some persons said, continued Anza, that he had proposed this expedition in order to disturb the peace of the provinces.^® On the contrary, it would help them, as it might result in an extension of their trade to New Mexico, and there would also be trajfic with Indians, although of less account. Great good, temporal as well as spiritual, would come to the Indians by the establishment of missions, because they would have to live at peace, instead of destroying one an- other like wild beasts, as under existing conditions. The Indians along Anza's proposed route were lacking in arms and in courage, and were not apt to cause trouble any more *' This was only shortly after the been used in the deliberations leading expulsion of the Jesuits, when every- to the Anza expeditions, thing that they had done was repre- <* This probably referred to Sastre, sented in an unfriendly light. It who had opposed Anza's project on seems strange, however, that not a that ground. The "provinces" means single Jesuit document should have Sinaloa and Sonora. t 164 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VII than the P^pagos and Pimas Gilenos had done, when their territories were traversed. The last named were better armed and more warlike than the others, but they allowed Spaniards to live among them and render them [religious?] service at any time. Because of this docility of the Indians, missions and presidios were not yet necessary among them. Since the suppression of the Pimas [Bajos] and Seris, the presidio of Altar had had little to do, and could for a time supply all needs. Tubac was just then busily engaged with the Apaches, who might hinder an advance to the Colorado and Gila, but the campaign then being waged against them would lead to their suppression, it was hoped. Once the Apaches were conquered, the troops of Altar and Tubac could be used for more advanced estab- lishments, and the soldiers of Horcasitas and Buenavista might in Hke manner be employed, as the original reason for founding those presidios, to check the Seris and their allies, was no longer operative. Anza^s concluding paragraphs bring out the difficulties that he had to face in the way of jealous rivals, of whom, doubt- less, the most prominent was Sastre. His remarks, however, were couched in the usual diplomatic style that distinguished him in all his writings. He mentioned no names, but was probably aware that Sastre had belittled his plan. The data furnished by Garces and himself would be enough, he said, to enable Bucarely to make a decision. He him- self had no other concern in the undertaking than a desire to serve Their Majesties, for whom he -^ould meet death, if necessary. Difficulties might be expected through the efforts of rivals, who always opposed such undertakings when they did not propose them. If Bucarely should decide to authorize the expedition, Anza asked three favors : that he might be directly under Bucarely's orders, "the better to be understood,^' by which he probably meant that he did not want to be under Sastre ; that the governor be ordered to furnish such assistance as Anza should need, for all of which, with the exception of the troops, Anza would gladly pay out of his own pocket ; and that he 1769] GARCfiS AND ANZA 165 might go to Mexico upon his return, to deHver his report in person.^^ _ /. At about the same time, March 8, Garces wrote to Bucarely enclosing his diaries, which have already been treated elsewhere. A copy of the 1771 diary was sent to Arriaga by Bucarely with his letter of April 26, 1773.^° In ^ ^V^^ his letter Garces recited a number of reasons why Anza's ^ undertaking was worthy of approval. Inasmuch as Garces could not get his own projects carried out,^^ he was support- \ ing Anza^s, which seemed to be more favorably viewed.^ n^^^Aj Anza was the right type of man, for his "zeal in the service i7:_ In C-2113. « C-2388. 170 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VII and adding: ^^The king being informed of what has been referred to . . . has been pleased to approve everything done in this matter/' ^^ On that day Anza was nearly across the Colorado Desert ; by the time of its receipt in Mexico he must have been near Tubac on the return march.^^ « C-2567. «3 The facts recited in the last para- graph serve as a reminder of the in- adequacy of our knowledge of Spanish colonial institutions, which, indeed, is apparent to anybody making a study of the field or a portion of it, whether he deal with a narrative or an institu- tional subject. In the present instance the questions suggest themselves. Who was primarily responsible for the authorization of the Anza expedition, and What proportionate share in it did various oflficials or governmental agen- cies have? It is believed that enough documents will be cited in later chap- ters to leave no reasonable doubt as to the answer to the first question. But if the present work were to stop here, one could not answer that ques- tion with certainty, and in any event one could not answer the second query without a wider knowledge of Spanish colonial institutions than we now have. The trouble is that institutional studies have employed inadequate materials. The laws of the Indies have been the basis, supplemented by such other source material as exists in print. Only a small percentage of this material is helpful to show the actual workings of colonial administration. The Spanish have always been adept at making laws which they straightway proceed to disregard or use only when they fit the case in hand. Materials in print are an infinitesimal fraction and by no means a good selection of those which exist in manuscript. Better institu- tional studies might be written, if in- vestigators would use the oflficial materials to be found in the Archivo de Indias, tracing an institution, for example, through a given period, illustrating it by a definite piece of narrative. In that way we may learn eventually just what were the func- tions of the greater governing agencies, and of the lesser ones as well. The present study is not an institu- tional one, but some remarks may be ventm-ed in order to call attention to governmental procedure in a given instance. The method of transacting official business may be gathered from noting the course of documents referred to in this and succeeding chapters. For example, Anza's petition went to the viceroy, the fiscal, Costansd, Sastre, the junta, Arriaga, and the Council of the Indies. The expediente, or file of papers, for this one matter alone was so long that it could not be read care- fully in a single day. Nor is there anything exceptional in its length. Many other matters might come up the same day of equal voluminousness. Spanish officialdom encouraged long, fiill reports, often complaining because some document, which the reader may think verbose enough, was not suffi- ciently detailed in information. The number of reports that might be called for in a case involving the widest range of official connection is amazing. For example, Lacy's reports of Russian aggressions passed through the hands of Grimaldi, Arriaga, and Bucarely before action was taken, and would normally iiave gone to Areche and the junta, but for Bucarely's request for permission to dispense with the consent of the latter. Before action was com- pleted a series of letters, reports, instructions, and diaries would be written by captains of ships, governors of provinces, commissaries, religious, and others that would fill volumes. All of these would go into the expediente and might come up again in toto upon some similar occasion. The size of the expediente would be swollen to double or treble its proportions, because of the practice of making what almost amounted to a copy of the letter being answered and inserting that in the reply, that being required by law. If copies sent to different persons could be brought together, the papers would again be multiplied in volume. It becomes clear why the government had to rely on its bureaucracy. No one man could possibly read all the documents on a given matter without neglecting everything else. It was the usual rule for the viceroy to accept the decision of the fiscal or of the junta. Even then, execution depended very largely upon minor officials, especially in distant provinces, where the wishes 1769] GARCfiS AND ANZA 171 of the viceroy were often disregarded, under color of some plausible excuse. By law the greatest authority rested with the king, aided by agencies around him, such as the ministro general, Con- sejo de Indias, Casa de Contratacidn, and Contaduria General. A second stage of authority was that of the viceroy, having many aids, but also many checks, as by the audiencia, the junta, and others. Third came the vast horde of provincial and local officials, of which the central figure, though handicapped in turn, was the governor of a province. Such was the law, and such perhaps the practice as regards veto power or negation of action, but as regards positive acts the deciding factor in a given case might be, and usually was, perhaps, some official in the third grade of authority. The intent of the law would be carried out if men in the second and first ranks displayed exceptional industry and ability, and then only, as a rule, in matters of wide scope in the case of the vice-regal government, and of very wide scope in the case of the royal government. A capable viceroy was in a pecul- iarly good position to do effective work, being near enough to the thing to be done by the lower grade of officials, far enough away from the group above him, and able to dominate those around him. The Anza petition is a good test case. It was opposed unavailingly by Governor Sastre of Sonora. Arriaga might have interposed his veto, but could not have caused the expedition ; for many years he had backed the prin- ciple of such an overland advance, but no expedition had been made, although Arriaga was an exceptionally able ministro general. Of the group around Bucarely the Audiencia of Mexico con- tributed nothing as such, although the junta was in part composed of its mem- bers. They might also be members of the viceroy's council ; three members of the audiencia taking part in the junta of September 9, 1773, were also in the council ; another member of that junta was in the council, but not in the au- diencia. (Supra n. 58.) It is also well to remember that the fiscal of the audiencia had in fact become a servant of the viceroy. (Cf. chap. II, n. 70.) Credit for granting the petition lies either with the junta or with Bucarely for no other governmental agency, other than those mentioned and dis- posed of, intervened. The Junta de Guerra y Real Hacienda of the viceroyalty was a very important institution in the period covered by this work, one upon which little or no information can be obtained in clear form in printed works. Its consent was necessary for the expenditure of royal funds, and it was often called to deliberate whether a given project should be ordered or not. But it was not an insuperable legal obstacle to a viceroy. On November 26, 1773, Bu- carely wrote to Arriaga asking for per- mission to dispense with the junta's consent to expenditures undergone with a view to checking Russian aggressions, alleging the desirability of secrecy as the reason for his request. (C-2430.) He was permitted to expend money on his own responsibility. (Revilla Gigedo, Informe, par. 47, April 12, 1793, Mexico. C-5613.) The regla- mento of 1786 was put into effect with- out the previous assent of a junta. (Revilla Gigedo, par. 61.) A royal order of April 14, 1789, empowered Viceroy Flores to make expenditures with regard to the occupation of Nootka and the exploration of the Russian establishments in the northwest with- out the necessity of asking permission of a junta. . (Revilla Gigedo, par. 92-93.) Thus, viceroys dispensed with the junta's authority either with or without royal consent. More im- portant than the viceroys' legal rights, however, was the actual authority that they were able to exercise as a result of their relations with individuals of the junta. Members of the junta were, as a rule, men holding administrative positions under the viceroy, often be- ing, as already noted, members of his council. Moreover, membership in the junta was not always the same, men skilled in the subject discussed often being called, presumably by the viceroy. The number at a junta varied. At the Anza junta of 1772 there were eleven present, there were ten in 1773, and twelve in 1774. There seems to have been a difference, however, be- tween a junta de guerra y real hacienda, such as those called with relation to Anza's projects, and such a junta as that which on January 21, 1768, author- ized Gdlvez to proceed to the frontier provinces to carry out reforms. In the former case most of the members had offices having to do with financial administration ; in the latter, there might be few or none. Those at the above-mentioned 1768 iunta were : Viceroy Croix ; Archbishop Lorenzana ; Gdlvez himself ; Toro and Santaella of the audiencia; Cornide, a^esor general of the viceroyalty; Panes, a military 172 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VII officer; and Vasante, superintendent of the customs house of Mexico City. The junta de guerra y real hacienda which met in May, 1773, to consider Serra's petition had practically the same membership as the Anza junta of September 9, 1773. Especially note- worthy in this connection is the case of Fernando Mesia who was present at the junta of 1772 concerning Anza's request, absent in 1773, as also from the Serra junta of that year, and present again in 1774. {Infra, chap. XII, n. 70.) Anza's second* expedition was ordered by Bucarely on November 28, 1774, without consulting the junta, which was called, howevdt, on Decem- ber 16, when it recommended certain details, treating the expedition itself as one already decided upon. (In C-2496.) The day before, Bucarely had already written to Rivera that the expedition was coming. (A.P.C.H., Prov. St. Pap., Ben. Misc., II, 20-25.) In fine, it can hardly be doubted that a viceroy could dominate the junta if he so desired. Finally, Bucarely took a keen interest in Anza's project. This may be deduced, not only from his official correspondence, but also from private letters written by him to General O'Reilly. (A.G.I., legajo, 88- 5-17.) Therefore, it would seem that Bucarely is entitled to the chief credit for authorizing the first Anza expedi- tion. CHAPTER VIII APPROACHES OF THE RUSSIANS AND THE ENGLISH TO SPANISH POSSESSIONS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST Danger of_eafiEQ2jdime».ts by^ foreign powers has been giv^SETprominent notice in preceding chapters as a principal cause for frontier advance in New S^ain jn the eighteSath century. Keiween 1773 and 1776 this factor was to be more than usually operative, or certainly more than usually a cause of action, tinder the guiding hand of the great vice- roy, Bucarely. It affected every other phase of actwity related to northwestward advance, and in many cases, certainly as regards the Spanish voyages of discovery, it was the direct cause of what occurred. It seems worth while at this point, therefore, to treat of this factor by it- self. It may be viewed in three ways, considering: first, approaches through the centuries of nations who most threatened New Spain between 1773 and 1776, giving an idea of the actual danger^ second^ the foreign policy of Spain between 1763 and 1779, in an attempt to acquire a view in proper perspective of Spain's attitude concerning the problems of colonial defence, in particular her attitude concerning the defence of the indefinitely extending CaH- fornias ; third, a detailed account of what Spain Jhoiight 5vnrl r|jd l^^twppTi 1773 ^.and 1776 to^meet fo reign aggressions^ in th e "far aorthwest; without rfference to Spain's other concerns in that period. To this factor of foreign danger three chapters will now be devoted, one for each of the three viewpoints indicated. To appreciate the significance of any period in the history of our Pacific coast, it is well to review the age-long ap- proaches to this coast of the nations of the earth. The 173 174 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII full meaning of the past or of contemporary events was not fully understood at any given time, but in telling what oc- curred at a particular moment, some attempt should be made to indicate it. We find that it is not true that the course of empire lies ever toward the west; rather, this "old conception of a westward line of advance gives place to another view — that of civilization spreading east and west from some original seat in eastern Asia, traversing the world in opposite directions, and drawing at length to a new focus on this opposite side of the globe/' ^ Spain, England, France, and finally the United States of America made approaches by land from the Atlantic coast. Russia came by land, sea, and land again, east and south. Sailors from all of these countries, and the Portuguese and Dutch as well, made voyages at one time or another, whether around Africa and Asia or around South America, to the western coasts of the Americas prior to the close of the eighteenth century. Some say that Chinese had visited these coasts as early as the fifth century,^ and the Japanese government was certainly investigating possibilities of commerce with New Spain in the opening years of the seventeenth century, going so far as to send a commission to that kingdom.^ The Seven Years' War marks the beginning of a more determined advance upon the part of European powers. That war was fought in America and Asia as well as in Europe, being largely the result of colonial rivalries. Peace had hardly been made in 1763 when Europe set forth to seek new colonies, going naturally to the Pacific Ocean, where the possibilities seemed greatest. France and Eng- land sent out voyages to the south Pacific. In the far northwest of North America, however, Russia and England were the ones that threatened Spanish supremacy. There- fore, we may devote this chapter to their approaches to 1 Teggart, The approaches to the ^ Zelia Nuttall, The earliest hiatoriffd Pacific coast. relations between Mexico and Japan, * The principal exposition of this in University of California, Publica- view is Edward P. Vining, An inglorious tions, American Archceology and Eth- Columbtts, New York, 1885. nology, v. 4, no. 1 (Berkeley, 1906). 1650] APPROACHES OF RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH 175 the Pacific coast, remembering, however, that Spain had felt misgiving at the approach of other peoples in other days, if not in the time of principal interest here, in order that we may estimate the greatness of the problem with which she had to contend. The Russian approach was largely in the hands of Cos- sacks, the underlying causes being their yearning for new homes where they might enjoy personal freedom and the commercial stimulus of the fur trade."* The first step was taken in the reign of Ivan IV (1533-84), when the outlaw, Yermak Timofeief, led a band of Cossacks across the Ural Mountains in 1578, and conquered a Tartar kingdom on the Ob River. Thenceforth, the Cossacks made rapid strides across the continent. Ten men could conquer a kingdom, whether due to the superiority of their weapons or to other causes does not matter here. Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yenesseisk, Irkutsk, Yakutsk, and finally Okhotsk on the Pacific successively became centres of their endeavors and supply stations for the next point to the east. In fifty years they had reached Yakutsk, over half way, and eleven more years sufiiced to reach Okhotsk, where an establish- ment was made in 1639. From Yakutsk they went south- ward up the Lena River to Lake Baikal, where silver mines were found, but here their rush was checked, the Manchu Tartars being too powerful for them. In 1646 they reached the land of the Chukchis in the extreme northeastern part of Asia, and were rewarded by rich finds of mammoth ivory. The Chukchis, however, were not pleasant neighbors, and were able to maintain their independence of Russia to the close of the eighteenth century. In 1648-50 one Simeon Deshnef is said to have sailed along the northern coast of Asia and south through Bering Strait, but if the voyage was actually made, it had no great effect, and its geographical * Bancroft, Alaska, 14-15. Ban- ress to the middle of the eighteenth croft has as much as is required here century is Golder, Russian expansion for the principal events of the Russian on the Pacific. The spelling of Rus- advance, but the best and most recent sian names in this and succeeding account in English of the Russian prog- chapters follows Bancroft. 176 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII import remained unknown.^ By 1706 Kamchatka, the last Siberian land to be taken, had been overrun. Arrived at the Pacific the conquerors wondered what lay- beyond. There were evidences of a great land not far to the east; strange trees drifted ashore; the swell of the ocean was not great ; and the Chukchis told stories of a rich eastern continent, — and well may it have seemed rich to them, when the comparatively agreeable west coast of Alaska is contrasted with the bleak and stormy Siberian shore. The Russian government became interested in the "American Siberia '^ as early as 1710, and attempts were made to reach it by way of the Arctic Ocean along the north coast of Siberia, and surveys were made of the Kurile Islands. This, it may be noted, was during the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725). Peter also planned expedi- tions which were to proceed from Kamchatka to see whether America and Asia joined, and to make discoveries along Pacific shores from Japan to the American continent. It fell to the lot of Vitus Bering, a Dane, to execute the major part of his commands, and to the reigns of his successors to see them carried out. The expeditionaries had first to make the overland jour- ney across Siberia, which they started to do in 1725. Ar- rived at the Pacific, Bering left Okhotsk in 1727, and in the following year sailed through Bering Strait. He then re- turned to St. Petersburg, where he recommended further voyages to discover trade routes to America and Japan, and to explore the northern coast of Siberia. Plans were made on a large scale, and the expeditions were authorized in 1734, but it was six years before they got under way. Bering commanded one ship, and Alexei Chirikof the other, but the two at length became separated. On July 15, 1741, Chirikof discovered the American coast just above 55°. He then sailed northwest and west, passed the Aleutian Islands, and after much suffering reached Kamchatka in October, 1741. Chirikof made another voyage in 1742, but did not reach America. Bering, meanwhile, had 6 Golder, 67-95, doubts the authenticity of the Deshuef voyage. 1783] APPROACHES OF RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH 177 sighted the American mainland above 58° on July 16, 1741. The return voyage was one of terrible hardship. The voyagers were obliged to winter on Bering Island, where their commander died, and the survivors did not get back to Kamchatka until August, 1742. Incidentally, they brought back some furs of th e sea otter^ and this it was which pr oved the impulse for a fresh s eries of R ussian voyages. Between 1743 and 1767 a number of voyages by private individuals' were made as far as the Aleutian Islands in search of furs. The year 176JL,niarks the beginning of a new period of imperial interest, when plans were made which resulted in the Krenitzin and Levashef expedition. Secret instructions were given, but the object seems to have been to verify the reports already received from the fur- traders, and to obtain as much further information as pos- sible. The^JEJx£iiitzin-Levashef voyage took place during the yea(£_1766-69/) The expeditionaries encountered great hardships and g^ot no farther than the Aleutian Islands, not reaching the mainland. Levashef at length got back to St. Petersburg in 1771. Special notice should be taken of this voyage as the principal one under imperial direction in the period of most interest here. We have seen that the Spanish ambassador to Russia in 1764 reported that the Russians were engaged in projects affecting the northwest coasts of North America, and his letters were revived, nearly a decade later, and notice of them sent to Bucarely. This expedition may also have been the foundation of the exaggerated reports from St. Petersburg of the Conde de Lacy, which will be dealt with in a later chapter. In the same period came the books by Mtiller and others to which reference has already been made. Private expeditions continued, however, and it is impossible to say how much they entered into the rumors heard by the Spanish am- bassadors. These voyages, too, seem to have reached no farther than the Aleutian Islands. Not until 1783 did the Russians make a direct attempt to extend their fur trading operations to the Alaskan mainland, for the sea otter was X X 178 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII disappearing from the Aleutian Islands. In that year an expedition was made under Potap Zaikof, but was a failure. In the same year Grigor Shelikof organized a company to make a fur trading settlement, and this was made in 1784_ on the Island of Kadiak, the first Russian settlement in North America. This occurred several years later than cohc'erns us at present, but it is a proof o f the actual danger to Spain several years bef or^ """^ "English approaches to the Pacific coast were along a number of lines, but may be reduced roughly to two : from the Atlantic coast westward, in most part overland, but in some degree by sea, as represented by the attempts to find a northwest passage; the direct approach by sea in the Pacific itself, around South America, eastward from southern Asia, and even across the Isthmus of Panamd. The former was the earlier and more formidable movement, but the latter was first to arrive and the one which in fact gave more trouble to Spain down to the close of the eighteenth century. We may therefore take up the latter series of approaches first.® English entry of the Pacific by way of the Isthmus of Panamd passed through two principal phases. The first came in the latter half of the sixteenth century during the reign of Elizabeth, when English sailors plundered Spanish towns and ships, although their countries were nominally at peace. Drake and Hawkins are the typical names. The second phase came in the seventeenth century, when the men engaged tended to evolve from a shadowy British allegiance into unqualified pirates. Sir Henry Morgan is the outstanding figure of this period. Just at the close of the century, also, came the unsuccessful attempt to found a Scotch colony at Darien. This marks the end of English activity along this line of approach to the Pacific. Another line of advance to which little space need be * This portion of the chapter has by Bancroft's works. Mr Leebrick's been based in large measure upon a manuscript was the winner of the paper by Karl C. Leebrick entitled James Bryce Historical Essay prize English voyages to the Pacific coast dur- at the University of California in 1912. tng the eighteenth century, supplemented 1588] APPROACHES OF RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH 179 given, because it did not in fact get near the Americas, is the British advance around Africa to southern Asia. This may be said to have begun with the chartering of the Brit- ish East India Company in 1600, the EngHsh government granting to that company rights of trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan. A voyage to the East Indies was made in the very next year, and in little more than a decade the company had already established a post in India. As early as 1637 English ships had ap- peared on the coast of China and for the next century and a half they carried on an intermittent trade with China. Spain had little to fear from England in this period from the direction of the East Indies, because of the English con- flicts in India with the Portuguese, Dutch, and French, especially with the last named. Once t2ie__EngHsh over- came their opposition, however, they loomed up as a danggji to the Spanish colonie s. The capt -iirp of " Maniia in 1762 by fliiJKngjlTgh fi:?^peditiop f rom India was a significant i n- dication of the reality of this danger. We have seen that the Croix-Galvez plan of January, 1768, referred to the possibility of English and Dutch voyages from the East Indies to the Californias. Not until the last fifteen years of the eighteenth century, however, was this fear realized, when numerous English ships made the voyage from China to Nootka and the coasts of the far northwest. The pioneer of English voyagers around South America to the Pacific coast was Francis Drake. After plundering the^^pa^ish coasts he made a brief stay in Alta California m(l579jjSind then sailed across the Pacific, eventually get- ting"back to England. His voyage showed how^.weak -W-as the Spanish control of the T^acific, and it was never for- go^en by the Spaniards, who likewise realized how much they had to fear from the presence of an enemy's ship. A fresh lesson was not long in coming. In 1587-88 Thomas Cavendish repeated Drake's voyage, capturing a r ich Manila_ga;lleon near Cape San Lucas in 1588. The seve^n- teenth century was the age of buccaneers, whether virtual or real, and some of them seem to have rounded South 180 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII America. One expedition, with a semblance of govern- mental authority, left Virginia in 1683, turned South Amer- ica, and joining with buccaneers who had crossed the Isthmus of Panamd engaged in operations against the Spaniards, 1684-86. Cook, Eaton, Davis, Harris, Swan, Wafer, Cowley, Townley, Dampier, and the Frenchman Grogniet were among the leaders of this enterprise. Swan and Townley got as far north as Mazatldn. The first four decades of the eighteenth century were marked by English voyages in which commercial objects were most largely to the fore, the promoters getting clear- ance papers from the government. Once in the Pacific, these voyagers acted much as had their predecessors, the buccaneers, plundering the Spaniards. The voyages were different in that the government required records to be kept, many of which were published, and in the general endeavor to advance knowledge of the Pacific coasts, men of science often accompanying the expeditions. The first of this series of voyages was headed by Dampier, who left England in 1699 with a fleet of five ships. The expedition subse- quently split up into four separate voyages, owing to the inability of different ofl&cers and men to agree with Dam- pier. Dampier got as far north as the coast of New Spain in 1704-5 before pursuing his voyage around the world. Clipperton and Funnel got back to England by a similar voyage. The expedition had been a financial failure, but some Bristol merchants were persuaded to make another venture. The new expedition set sail in 1708 under the command of Woodes Rogers. Three years later it got back to England with an immense profit, largely the result of having captured the Manila galleon off Cape San Lucas in 1709. After this encounter Woodes Rogers took the usual route around the world. Many companies now sprang up, but they were unable to equal the success of Woodes Rogers. The Shelvocke-Clipperton voyages which were along the coast of New Spain in 1721 are the most noteworthy. The voyages, even when unprofitable to British merchants, cost the Spaniards enormous losses, both in property taken 17^91 APPROACHES OF RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH 181 or destroyed by the English, and in p rer.flytift^^T]^ TYig>Q«^- l^res. They also vastly jmvrpfl.sp.d Plngh'sh knnwIpHgp nf the Pacific, an d Jj^_§haJt:es- Spain's sense of danger may well have been enhanced by the vast literature about Eng- lish voyages, and the popular interest in them in England. A new era begins with the outbreak ^_warbets^.eaJEd&g- land and Spain in 17^^ The'~departure is marked by the fitting out of an expedition at government expense, a formal naval enterprise, under the command of George Anson.^ Anson took the customary route around the world, in the years 1740-44,.in the course of which he cruised the western shores of New Spain. Failing to encounter the Manila galleon he crossed to the Philippine Islands, and took one there. Although he did not make a profit, and lost most of his men, he had caused an immense expense and great loss to Spain. Furthermore, among the papers taken in the captured galleon were those which revealed the Spanish secrets of the Pacific. There were sailing directions for the South American coast and the trans-Pacific routes, with charts showing islands, shoals, landmarks, harbors, and the like. The Pacific was no longer a closed sea. After the Seven Years' War a new type of voyage begins. The semi-piratical voyages of the past were no longer in accord with public morals, nor was there the excuse of war. Voyages for scientific objects and discovery began there- fore to be sent out, with instructions not to interfere with the ships or territory of European peoples with whom England was at peace. The impetus came from France, who having lost her colonies by the peace of 1763, was eager to replace them by new discoveries. The English quickly followed the French lead by the voyages of Biron, 1764-66, and WaUis and Carteret, 1766-69. These voy- ages went around the world by way of South America and the south Pacific, and made no discoveries requiring notice. Then came the most important voyages of all, and es- pecially interesting here, as they fall within the period of principal interest in this work, the three voyages of Cap- tain James Cook. The first voyage occupied the years 182 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII 1768-71,J One object was to observe the transit of Venus, the Island of Tahiti being selected as the place at which to do it. Cook followed the path of Biron, Wallis, and Car- teret. After the observation had been taken at Tahiti, Cook proceeded westward and made extensive explorations in New Zealand and Australia. Upon his return to Eng- land he was commissioned to go again to the south Pacific to determine whether a great southern continent existed there, about which speculation had been rif^lor two cen- turies. The expedition took place in 1772-75, aiid the myth of the southern continent was exploded. Perhaps a more important fact here is that in all his voyage he lost but four men, and only one by sickness. This was the result of special preparations by Cook. Before his time it was usually the case that from forty to seventy-five per cent of the crew were lost. Cook's methods were published, and were followed by later voyagers. It meant that the terror of the seas had been banished, and in a very great degree made Spain's retention, of powerin.tihe Pacific aomufik^ik^ less secure. ^^,„ Cook's third voyage left England in the year 1776,^nd, as will be pointed out in a later chapter, caused the Span- ish government no little anxiety. One of its objects was to attack another long-standing myth, that of a practical water passage through or around North America. Cook was commissioned to' approach this problem from the Pacific side. He was also to get information of the coast, and was secretly instructed to take possession for England of all lands not hitherto discovered or visited by Europeans. En route he discovered the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, a group destined to occupy an important place in later voy- ages of the eighteenth century. He reached the North American coast in about 44°, and proceeded northward. Some furs were picked up from the natives for mere trifles, and were later disposed of in China at such good prices as to open the eyes of merchants to the possibilities of the fur trade. The result was a swarm of European vessels^ par- ticularly English ships, on the northwest coasts in the last 1776] APPROACHES OF RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH 183 fifteen years o f the cent ury. To return to Cook, he con- tinued ^TtTiward, and passed through Bering Strait, but was obUged by the ice to turn back. While wintering in the Hawaiian Islands in 1779 he was killed in an affray with the natives. The expedition proceeded under the com- mand of Captain Clerke. Clerke also passed through Bering Strait, but was forced back by the ice, as Cook had been, and, soon afterward, he made his way around the world to England. To sum up, it is clear that EngUsh exploration in the Pacific was g a thering momentum! Each new discove^ and each advance in thFscience ^Thavigation or other form of knowledge brought the Spanish empire of the Pacific just so much nearer a fall. To this must be added not only the activities of the Russians, but also the voyages oi the French, Dutch, and Portuguese.^ Furthermore, there were foes attacking fr om the Atlantic side, stripping Spain bit by bit of her colonies, and expanding into the unoccupied lands that brought them nearer to the Pacific coast. A little reflection on these factors will enable one to appreciate the problem which Spain had to face. One other factor remains to be considered, that of the En glish advance across the North America n continent. ^Tli^westwaH^pfogfess of what wasTcTEecome the United States had reached the Mississippi by 1776, but the Ameri- can movement did not represent a threatening element as regards Spain's possessions in the Pacific until after the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. ._IIntil then the political, and geographical barriers were too great for the United States to be a danger. The Spanish government did contemplate the possibility of Americans crossing the Mississippi and ^ The great volume and importance with additional matter, in the James of French voyages in the eighteenth Bryce Historical Essay of Mr. Tracy century is shown in Erick W. Dahlgren, B. Kittredge, French voyages to the Les relacions comerciales et maritimes Pacific cost during the eighteenth cen- entre la France et les cdtes d' Ocean Pad- tury, winner of the prize in 1913 at fique (Paris, 1909), and the same the University of California. Unfortu- author's Voyages frangais de la Mer nately no Dahlgren has yet appeared du Sud avant Bougainville in Nouvelles for Dutch or Portuguese voyages, nor Archives des Missions Scientifiques, have they yet been made the subject V. 14, 422-568 (Paris, 1907). These of a Bryce Essay contest, works were extensively used, along 184 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII encroaching on New Spain, but not on the Pacific northwest. The course of events in Canada, however, and particularly the activities of the Hudson's Bay Company, were factors which threatened the far-flung coast of the Californias, and were so regarded by Spain.^ One must think back to the voyages of the Cabots, followed by a procession of English mariners seeking a northwest passage, — Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, Baffin, James, and others, — if he is to get this subject in proper focus. France, however, was first to get a foothold in Canada, and soon afterward her colonists began to realize profits in the fur trade. Two Frenchmen, Groseilliers and Radisson, paved the way for England's sharing in this trade. Dissatisfied with the rewards ac- corded them by the French, they temporarily entered the service of some Englishmen who were interested in exploit- ing the fur trade of Hudson Bay, and in 1668 they started English fur trading operations in that region. The venture was a success, and led to the chartering of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1670. The company was granted a monop- oly and the proprietorship, with civil and criminal juris- diction, of all Hudson Bay lands not actually possessed by a Christian prince. Down to the Treaty of Utrecht the company was in almost continual war with the French, who did not recognize its right to the territory. The treaty of 1713, however, gave to England all lands embraced by the waters emptying into Hudson Bay and Strait. The region acquired was not definitely known, but, at all events, the attacks of the French now ceased. The trade in furs was a very profitable one. Perhaps for this reason the company decided to let well enough alone, and adopted a policy of secrecy and restriction. All but servants of the company were kept away from the terri- tory, and the founding of settlements and even the making of discoveries were discouraged. The discovery of a strait communicating with the Pacific had been one of their char- * The brief account given here is work on the North West Company is based on Bryce, Willson, Laut, and in course of preparation, gave me valu- Burpee. Mr. Gordon C. Davidson able aid in revising this part of the^ of the University of California, whose chapter. 1749] APPROACHES OF RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH 185 ter objects ; yet they were charged with opposing a search for it, until forced to make the attempt. Likewise, agri- culture and mining were not encouraged. As a result, after a century of existence the company had in 1770 but seven posts, all close to Hudson Bay, with a total population of about two hundred men, all company servants. This exclusive policy had not passed without criticism. The most notable critic was a certain Arthur Dobbs, who devoted a large part of his lite to attacking the company because of its failure to find a northwest passage. As a result, several expeditions were made under the auspices respectively of the company in self defence against Dobbs' charges, of the government, and of a private concern, the last-named being financed by popular subscription. This activity took place for the most part between 1737 and 1747. Parliament manifested interest by offering £20,000 as a re- ward to the discoverer of the passage, but the passage was not found. It is noteworthy that in the last of these ex- peditions one of the boats was named California, and the forming of a settlement in the Californias was contem- plated, if the strait should be found, to serve as the base for a vast Pacific trade. Failing to find a passage, Dobbs now sought a charter for a new corporation, charging the Hudson's Bay Company with failure to extend their settle- ments to the interior. The case came up in 1749, and Dobbs' petition was denied. The matter is of no small importance. A new company would undoubtedly have stimulated exploration, and might have resulted in much earlier penetration by a British enterprise to the Pacific coast, with consequences that stir the imagination. From another standpoint the Dobbs controversy is important. It attained considerable publicity, a number of books being written in the course of it. These came to the notice of Spain, and were a cause of forebodings on her part. Twenty years later the company at last awakened to the desirability of interior exploration. The great name is that of Samuel Hearne. Hearne's first journey came in the year 1769. He was sent out by the company to obtain infor- 186 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. VIII mation of the interior ; in particular, he was to reach a cer- tain river said to abound in copper ore and fur-bearing ani- mals. This journey was a failure, and in another of 1770 he again failed to reach the river of copper. In December of the same year, he started a third time, and on this occasion was successful, reaching the river since called the Copper- mine in July, 1771, and descending it to its mouth in the Arctic Ocean. NotuntilJune, 1772, did he get back to the company's posts on Hudson Bay. The Hearne explora- tions were followed by a new policy on the part of the company, which began thenceforth to push its trading op- erations inland. Not much progress had been made, how- ever, by the close of the year 1776, which marks the end of the period of principal interest dealt with here. That the Spanish government may well have been alarmed, however, is proved by the remarkable westward progress of the com- pany and its rivals in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. An important rival had sprung up in the Scottish mer- chants of Montreal, themselves the successors of the French since the Seven Years' War. Before that war had ended the Scottish merchants were pushing into the region of the Great Lakes, and not long afterward penetrated as far as the Saskatchewan River. Gradually these men drew to- gether, and in the winter of 1783-84 the North West Com- pany was formed, an organization which was to accomplish vast results in the way of exploration. These companies were yet another powerful force in motion against the tottering Spanish Empire. These, then, were some of the actual dangers to Spain's Pacific possessions. The Portuguese, Dutch, and French, however dangerous they may have been prior to 1763, were not a factor in the north Pacific between that date and 1776. They therefore have virtually been left out of this account. The Russians were a real danger, but the English, among whom should be included the American colonists, were in fact the most threatening force. It is now time to see how Spain viewed the situation. CHAPTER IX DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III (1759-1788) FROM WAR TO WAR WITH ENGLAND, 1763-1779 Having gained an idea of th^ actual danger that threat- ened Spain in the Pacific northwest, we may next attempt to acquire perspective by tracing the leading phases of Spanish diplomacy in the reign of Charles III, before taking up the more specialized topic of Spain's activities against foreign aggressions in or near the Calif ornias. The object is to show what Spanish ministers thought concerning Eng- land and Russia, and not so much what those countries did or did not do to merit Spain's opinion. This chapter, like the preceding, is intended as background material for the seven chapters following this. Events from 1763 to 1773, therefore, appear in less detail, although considerable space is given to the Falkland incident. The stress falls between 1773 and 1776, and the story is carried to 1779.^ It will be found that Spain's foreign policy in this period was primarily directed toward meeting the possibility of war with England. Russia, though a dangerous opponent in the Pacific, gave Spain hardly any concern in Europe. Troubles there were with Portugal and Morocco, but that which made them cogent factors, especially in the case of Portugal, was the relation which England bore to the situation. To oppose England tlie Family Compact be- tween the crowns of France and 6pain was brought into T^emg, and it continued to be the basis of Spain's foreign pt^ilicy throughout the period. Spain seems to have been faithful to the intent of this treaty, but France was in- 1 Danvila has been my principal with additional information based on source, with valuable supplementary English documentary materials. Oc- material from Doniol. Rousseau proved casional references to other writers useful as a convenient, although have also been made, often scant, summary of these two, 187 188 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX clined to be lukewarm when the compact did not serve her purposes, and enthusiastic when it did, using it also as a plea for specially favorable commercial treatment of France by Spain. At the time of the Falkland affair in 1770-71, and several times between 1773 and the close of 1776, Spain was ready and even eager to fight England, but France repeatedly declined. Late in 1775, however, a change in the Spanish attitude began to be perceptible, which became marked after 1776. This was due primarily, it would seem, to the American Revolution, which en- gendered a belief that Spain's participation in the war would be fatal, whatever the event; victory, which would also result in the independence of England's colonies, meant the presence of a dangerous neighbor in America, and the eventual loss, perhaps, of Spain's colonial empire; defeat meant the same danger at the hands of England. In all of this period one Spanish statesman was consistently for war, Aranda, who from 1773 on was ambassador to France. Grimaldi, minister of state, was favorable, but cautious, desiring to make sure that the time was ripe. Floridablanca, who succeeded him in 1777, believed in preparation for war, but in maintenance of peace, if possible. Charles III was successively of the opinion of his two ministers of state, al- though perhaps somewhat more inclined to peace than either. The ^an^er point marked by the diplomatic correspond- ence of the period, in case of war with England, was not the Pacific coast, but especially the We st In dies ^and the near-by coasts of the mainland. Down to the close of the Falkland affair, whatever anxiety there was for Pacific ports concerned South America. After 1773 affairs in the Pacific do not seem to have been important enough to oc- cupy a prominent place in diplomatic correspondence. That they should have done so, it is easy now to see, but that Spanish statesmen failed to note the inevitable danger resulting from the age-long approaches of European nations to the Pacific is not hard to understand in view of their more immediate concern for the West Indies. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 189 There are many reasons why Spain should have regarded England as her principal European opponent during the -TCign of Charles III (1759-88). Charles himself is said to have harbored a feehng of resentment against that country, dating from the time when he was king of Naples,^ although it is doubtful whether he allowed this feeling to dictate his political action. In any event there were reasons of state for an anti-England policy, irrespective of any personal spite that Charles may have -felt. These have already been reviewed in an earlier chapter.^ They come to this, that Engl and was en deavoring to break down the monopoly -^- 1 1 q iaintained by Spain in her colonial trade, and that througha-^^" out the middle of the eighteenth century England was markedly imperialistic, especially so after the advent to power of William Pitt. Enghshmen smuggled goods into various parts of Spanish America, and the English govern- ment added colonies to the British Empire at the expense of both France and Spain. Spain lost Florida in 1763, and might look back to a loss in earlier years of Gibraltar and Minorca, Jamaica and the Atlantic coast strip of North America, the southern part of which, at least, Spain had regarded as rightfully Spanish. It seemed perfectly clear that England would pick up more colonies when an op- portunity should present itself. Incidents of temporary import were continually occurring to accentuate the hos- tility engendered by these disputes of a permanent kind, often closely related to the latter. The basjjg of the fo reign policy of this period was the^^ J^amily Com^ the crowns of France and Spain, an offensive and defensive alliance directed pri^ marily against England. The first trial of arms had re- sulted in failure, England achieving a great triumph in 2 Addison, 26-27, refers Charles' the city unless the Neapolitan troops hatred of England to the following should return, and Charles was obliged incident. During the War of the Aus- to withdraw them. According to Ad- trian Succession, Charles got together dison he was not of the type to forget an army of 12,000 Neapolitans to fight or forgive such humiliation. Charles' on the side of Spain against Austria. hatred of the English is noted by other After his little army had departed for writers as well, e.g. Danvila, IV, ilO, the field, an English fleet appeared 157. off Naples and threatened to bombard ' In chap. III. 190 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX the Seven Years' War. Neither of the Bourbon monar- chies regarded the peace of 1763 as conclusive, however, but rather looked upon it as a truce until such time as their land and sea forces should be ready again."*- This idea was largely at the bottom of Charles' policy of economic re- generation, as already pointed out, in order that revenues, and hence the sinews of war, might be produced. This it was that lay back of the visita of Jose de Gdlvez in New Spain. Spain was particularly alarmed by the strength of Eng- land's position in the West Indies, the possession of Jamaica and Florida by England being looked upon as endangering not only Spain's hold of other islands of the West Indies, but even the security of New Spain and other mainland colonies.^ Pretexts for trouble were not lacking. Eng- lishmen had obtained a right to cut wood in Honduras, but did not observe the restrictions placed upon them. Spain refused to pay the ransom that had been exacted by the English at the capture of Manila in 1762.® ThaSac- ramgjiito^Mdfsputes went on. French settlers in Louisiana resisted the transfer to Spain, and it was believed that the English had instigated them to do it. Not only in Spain but also in America steps were taken with a view to the possibility of war. In 1764 Cruillas, viceroy of New Spain, complained that he had no troops with which to resist an invasion except one regiment at Vera Cruz and a few scat- tered companies of regular troops and militia elsewhere. He recommended that capable officials be sent from Spain and that recruiting be authorized.^ Tanucci, who had been Charles' principal adviser in Naples, and who continued to have an interest in his welfare after Charles became king of Spain, displayed deep interest in Spanish-American affairs in this period. Reforms in the Americas, he wrote, in December, 1764, were the most important question that the king had to confront. He repeated this opinion in several letters of the year 1765, saying that Spain ought to reor- * DanvHa, IV, 104 ; Addison. 51-52. « Rousseau, II, 55-59, 66, 81. 6 Danvila, IV, 82-86 ; Ferrer del Rio, ^ Zamacois, V, 596. I. 460-51. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 191 ganize its navy and fortify its ports in the Americas, for the EngHsh fanaticism for conquest was increasing. His let- ter of August 16, 1766, to Squillace speaks, however, of the greater need for reorganizing the fleet. Although the fortification and garrisons of America were too weak to with- stand a siege, they could nevertheless keep up a defensive war without great danger of being lost.^ Nor was the Spanish government unmindful of danger in the Americas, despite its preoccupation over the internal affairs of Spain.* The principal diplomatic interest down to 1771 concerns the events leading to the expulsion of the English from the Falkland Islands in 1770, and the subsequent warlike prep- arations of England and Spain. Peace was hardly estab- lished in 1763 when two English warships were prepared for a secret mission under Biron as commander. News of it was published in Holland in May, 1764, whence the Spaniards learned of it. Biron left England in July, 1764, and touched at one of the Falkland Islands in January, 1765, at a place called by him Port Egmont. He applied the name Falklands to the group, and took possession for England. He did not form a settlement, but went on around the world, reaching England again in 1766. His act cannot be said to have given England title to the Falklands, for the islands had been dis- covered as early as the sixteenth century by Spanish navi- gators and had been visited by Spaniards as recently as 1763.^^ A French expedition under Bougainville had pre- ceded the English in the Falklands, and had formed a settle- ment on one of the islands in 1764. The expedition seems to have been despatched without the knowledge of the Spanish court, which first got news of it from America, the French ships having put in at Montevideo. The news was not well received in Spain, and inquiry was made of the French court concerning the objects of the expedition. A reply was made that the ships had gone in search of a de- serted island, to facilitate passage of Cape Horn by French navigators. An accident had forced them to put in at «Danvila, IV, 92, 111. say that the islands were discovered 9 Ibid., IV, 111. in 1686 by the English captain Cowley, 10 Altamira, IV, 58. Other accounts e.g. Rousseau, II, 59. w 192 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX Montevideo; but they had no intention of trading with Spanish America. They had found an island to their pur- pose, one of the Maluinas or Falkland group. ^^ That the Falklands were regarded as strategically im- portant by Spain appears from a confidential letter of Gri- maldi to an intimate friend, August 6, 1764. Spain ought to prevent the French establishment, he said, as it might later prove an obstacle to the passage of Cape Horn. A Spanish settlement should be made at the Bay of San Ju- lian on the mainland [opposite the Falklands], for the Falklands and San Julian were the keys to Spain's kingdoms in that part of the world. If they were occupied, and if the viceroy of Peru would take action to cover the prin- cipal points of his kingdom and to fortify two or three essential ones, those kingdoms would be unconquerable by forces coming from Europe, and illicit trade could not be carried on. The French were soon asked to withdraw, lest the English be tempted to follow their example and settle there. Choiseul agreed, provided Spain herself wished to make a settlement. -^^ In April, 1762^ "the islands were fojmally delivered to Spain iDyTfeer rench. Sometime before, an English expe- dition had reached Port Egmont and had made a settle- ment. In December, 1766, the English governor had visited the French colony and protested against it, claiming that the islands belonged to England, and the dispute was renewed by the Spanish and English governors after the transfer by France to Spain. Each ordered the other to withdraw, the Englishman setting a time limit of six months. ^^ The af- fair was reported to the Spanish government, which sent an order to the captain general of Buenos Aires, February 23, 1768, to expel the English by force. At least one Span- ish minister was for war, the fiery Aragonese, Count Aranda, " Danvila, IV, 93-94. Some such would be greatly diminished, fresh place was believed to be necessary to vegetables all gone, and the crew in sad allow of a break in the voyage. Boats straits from scurvy, were so poorly constructed then and ^^ Danvila, IV, 94-96. so slow that they usually had to stop " Altamira, IV, 58 ; Rousseau, II, for repairs after making so long a 60-61; Danvila, 111-12. These ac- voyage as from Europe to Cape Horn. counts all vary somewhat in details. Moreover, food supplies by that time 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 193 president of the Council of Castile. The English govern- ment was informed of Spain^s proposed action in the Falk- lands, and France was sounded to see whether she would live up to the Family Compact.-^^ It was not until De- cember, 1769, that the Spanish were able to find Port Eg-,^,^ mont. A fleet was sent from Buenos Aires, and the port \ surrendered on June 10, 1770.^^ ^ 'Ihe news reached Europe at a time when the English government was irritated against Spain on other grounds. By a decree of June 24, 1770, Charles III had prohibited the importation and consumption of English muslins, thereby causing serious lost to Enghsh shippers.^ This and the FalMan^^cident were enough to cause Parliament to vote funds" in preparation for war. AranH^a^eade3"*the war paHjMiinL Spain, but Lord North and Grimaldi, respectively chief ministers of England and Spain, were at first less inclined to fight, but as the year 1770 drew to a close, Gri- maldi had changed his mind. The English were making excessive demands for satisfaction, as well as for the resti- tution of Port Egmont. Furthermore, it was believed that the leading French minister, Choiseul, stood ready to bring France in on Spain's side, although according to Rousseau that conclusion was unwarranted. So, expeditions were prepared, fleets united, and the respective ambassadors withdrew. War seemed inevitable, when an unforeseen event occurred, changing the whole aspect of affairs. This was the fall of Choiseul, who was succeeded in power by D'Aiguillon of the party of peace. It was on this occasion that Louis XV calmly disregarded the Family Compact, saying, "My minister wanted war, but I do not." Spain, therefore, had to yield as gracefully as possible, and on January 22, 1771, the Spanish ambassador signed a decla- ration at London disapproving the removal of the English colonists and promising to restore Port Egmont, without prejudice, however, to Spain's claim of sovereignty.^^ These events occurred during the time that the Marques " Danvila, IV, 112-17. w Ferrer del Rio, III, 67. « Ibid., IV, 96-97, 103. " Becker, 37-39 ; Rousseau, II, 55-81. 194 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX de Croix was viceroy of New Spain. His views are worth noting. Writing to his brother, April 28, 1771, Croix said that he did not yet know whether war had been declared, but he was putting the kingdom in a state of defence. He did not think that New Spain was in any great danger; any English attack on the Spanish colonies would be di- rected against Porto Rico or Campeche, he thought. ^^ His instruction to Bucarely, September 1, 1771, noted Vera Cruz as the most important port of New Spain, and the key to the kingdom.^^ Acapulco would be open to attack, but such an event was unlikely because of the length of the voyage necessary to reach there. The Manila galleon would be able to defend the port, and, moreover, the country was mountainous and thinly populated, not an inviting point to occupy .^^ A new factor was now to appear to affect the diplomatic relations of Spain and England^ the latter's jg^uarrel with^^ her American colonies. Tieorge Bancroft intimates that as early as 1769 Spain favored England rather than the col- onies, because of the danger that a near-by independent republic would represent, and his view has been followed by other writers, or else nothing has been said by them at all.^^ The first intimation of Spanish hostility to England comes when Spain began in 1776 to contribute funds to the Americans. In fact, Spain^s preparations for war were going on for a half decade preceding that year, although in the earlier years without reference to England's co- lonial troubles. Spain might justly have abandoned the Family Compact after the Falkland incident, but her hatred and fear of England were too great, although for a time, the compact suffered partial eclipse. Not only the Falkland affair, but also the fall of Choiseul, its proponent in France, weakened it. Charles III saw that in future he could count only upon his own forces, but he continued to increase and equip 18 Croix, Correspondance, 224. text, but the impression given is that 19 Ibid., 286. 20 ji^id., 287. the Spanish fear of America was ex- 21 Bancroft's remarks are on a page pressed as early as 1769. Bancroft, headed 1769. No date appears in the III, 337. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 195 them. Toward the close of the year 1772, we find him mak- ing inquiries as to the state of the EngHsh mihtary and naval forces. ^^ Furthermore, an apparent return to the Family Compact is noticeable by 1773. Late in that year we find the warlike Aranda become Spanish ambassador to France, and his influence at once began to make itself felt. In November, 1773, Aranda conferred with D'Aiguillon about the European situation, and reported the result to Grimaldi. Reference to the partition of Poland had been made, but this was of only passing interest to Aranda. But as regards England he told D'Aiguillon that that country was making exceptional naval preparations with a view to imposing its law upon all opponents, and he urged that France prepare for war, as Spain was doing. D'Aiguillon refused to see anything alarming in the situation, but later made plans in case war should break out, as for example to burn the Portsmouth navy yard. The French army and navy were in a fair state of readiness, so far as Aranda was able to learn. He recommended that the Bourbon kings garrison the principal points of the East and West Indies, in which case it would matter little if the English should occupy indefensible points, as the latter could not hold them without being much weakened. Be- sides, the English had to reckon on the need of protect- ing the British Isles, and would not send many men far away. D'Aiguillon was interested in the course of the Russo-Turkish War, and hoped it might continue long enough for Sweden to reorganize her forces. He suggested Sweden as a good base from which to attack the north of the British Isles, and also noted the value of Sweden as a check against Russia. Aranda reported this much, without noteworthy comment. Aranda's conversations with D'Ai- guillon were warmly approved by Charles III. Grimaldi's letter to Aranda of December 27, 1773, stated that Spain was continuing her naval preparations with the greatest ardor, and hoped to get the fleet in such shape that it could go to sea quickly ; it would be important in a war with 22 Danvila, IV, 377-78. 196 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX England to strike at once, for the English type of govern- ment did not permit of uniting its fleet with such rapidity as Spain could employ.^^ Warlike negotiations seem to have given way to other matters in the first half of the year 1774. Louis XV thought of marrying again, and the possibility of his choosing a Spanish princess for a time held the stage. Later, he gave up the idea, and talk of it had hardly come to an end when Louis was taken sick and, on May 10, he died. Matters were then halted until a new government could get under way. There was a change of ministry and a period of un- certainty as to its attitude. Vergennes succeeded D'Aiguil- lon as minister of foreign affairs, but as he was at the time ambassador to Sweden, it was not until July that he was ready to take up his duties at the French court. Indications in the meantime, however, were that France would stand by the Family Compact, or so at least the king and his min- isters said. This possibility gave England no small concern, according to the Spanish ambassador in London. Choiseul returned to the French court, and that, too, was regarded as a favorable symptom by Spain. ^^ In this period occurred an incident which might have precipitated a war if both Spain and England had not been uncertain as to France's attitude. An English ship took possession of Viegues or Crab Island, only two leagues from Porto Rico, despite the protest of the Spanish governor of Porto Rico. The issue remained in doubt for a time, but, on June 18, Grimaldi was able to inform Aranda that the English force had aban- doned the island. ^^ Vergennes was at his post by July, 1774. His early cor- respondence, both with the king and with French ambas- sadors at other courts, shows that he was an enthusiastic and ardent supporter of the Family Compact, although we shall see that this enthusiasm was tempered in mo- ments of crisis by a clear view of what most favored France, and at all times by a desire to see France profit commer- 23 Danvila, IV, 386-90. 25 Coxe, V, 7-8 ; Danvila, IV, 393, 2* Ibid., IV, 390-401. 399. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 197 cially. In his instructions of July 22, 1774, to Baron de Breteuil, ambassador to Vienna, Vergennes outlined the status of French foreign policy upon the accession of Louis XVI to the throne. Of France's engagements the most important was that of the Family Compact with Spain, he said. It was necessary, not only in case the situation in England's American colonies should offer a chance to at- tack England, but also for a more immediate object upon which the rest depended, that of giving France an oppor- tunity to build up her army and navy again. The com- pact rested on the strongest ties of blood, amity, and po- litical interest, and fulfilled admirably the double purpose of opposing superior forces to the English navy, and of tempering England's penchant for attacking France, be- cause of her unwillingness to break with Spain. Spain, how- ever, was not equally desirous of avoiding a break, because of England's profits, licit and illicit, in Spanish trade, and because Spain had in every way to dread the superiority of the British forces in North America. Thus, the common enemy, England, was the most dangerous and most powerful opponent of the two crowns. There were other objects of the pact, but Spain was not expected to enter into these any more than she might desire; it is noteworthy that these other objects included relations with Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, as against Russia. In fine, the E]amily Com- pact should be considered as the basis of Jjou\slC7mtfT^ eign policy.^^ To Ossun, the French ambassador at Ma- drid, Ve rgenne s wrote, the same day, that he was ready upon all occasions to give the most unequivocal proofs of his desire to maintain it.^^ Much to the same effect were his words to tKe kmgT^December 8, 1774, on which date he presented a memorial on the political situation of France with relation to the different powers. England, he said, was dangerous, because more jealous of the prosperity of her neighbors than solicitous for developing her own, and because the British ministry, despite friendly assurances, was ready to unite party sentiment in England by stirring 26 Doniol, I, 22-26 ^ Ibid., I, 13-14. 198 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX up a war against France. The Family Compact was the surest mea ns of holding England in check.^^ '^' Aranfia was favorably impressed by the situation at the French court. He wrote a long letter to Grimaldi, August 5, 1774, in which he discussed the king and queen and the leading ministers. Maurepas, then seventy- three years old, had reentered the Council of State, and was the king's principal adviser. He was a warm partisan of the agree- ment with Spain. Vergennes was a man of no party, think- ing only of the interests of the service. Turgot had become secretary of the navy, but would have a hard task as his predecessor, M. de Boines, had left that department in confusion. ^^ In another letter, the same day, Aranda re- ferred to the surprise caused by the unexpected peace con- cluded between Russia and Turkey, resulting in advantages to the former. There was some fear lest Russia might re- new its pretensions to Finland against Sweden. ^° It is worthy of remark that the Russo-Turkish War had endured from October 6, 1768, to July 21, 1774 ; also, that the fear of Russia in North America does not seem to have filled large enough place in the diplomatic correspondence to have caught the attention of Danvila, Rousseau, or others who have devoted their works to the diplomacy of Spain in this period. That such a fear existed will be shown in the next chapter, but it seems to have been comparatively unimpor- tant. The British ministry reached the same conclusion as Aranda with regard to the adherence of France and Spain to the Family Compact, and consequently planned to occupy Spain with other affairs, so as to separate her from France, or at least to turn her from following a common policy.^^ Two matters were at hand of which they might avail themselves, the disputes of Spain with the sultan of Morocco, and her quarrels with Portugal over boundaries in South America. By a treaty of the year 1767, satisfactory relations be- 28 Doniol, I, 19. 30 Ibid., IV, 404. » Danvila, IV, 401-^. « Doniol, I, 26. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 199 i i tween Spain and Moro cco had been established, including the recognition of Spain's right to her establishments on the North African coast. Late in 1774, however, the sultan announced that he could no longer tolerate Christian posts in his empire, and he commenced the siege of Melilla, a Spanish town there. The ensuing military operations need not be followed, except to note a battle before Algiers in July, 1775. On this occasion General O'Reilly, reformer of the Spanish army and a man of tremendous reputation, suffered a crushing defeat with a loss of nearly three thou- sand men in killed and wounded.^^ When the news came to Spain there was a great outcry against O'Reilly, as also against Grimaldi, who already had many opponents of the nationalist element, Grimaldi being an Italian. What is more to the point here is that England was beheved to have inspired the sultan of Morocco to attack Spain. This is the opinion of Ferndn-Nuiiez, himself a participator in the O'Reilly expedition.^^ O • ^^^-"^ There was a much stronger case against England on the l:^ . charge of inciting her""ally, Portugal, against Spain over {^xmth_^ American affairs . Certainly England^ "supported Portugal's exaggerated claims. ^^ Boundaries between the Portuguese and Spanish colonies of the Rio de la Plata had never been settled satisfactorily, resulting in perennial disputes in that region, especially concerning the province of Sacramento. One of the principal causes of trouble at this time was the policy of the Portuguese minister of state, Pombal, who was desirous of making conquests in South America, and who was willing to go to any length in bad faith to achieve his end, relying upon the support of England, in case Spain should declare war. The course of events may first be traced, after which, a discussion of their place in Spanish diplomacy may be resumed. Pombal secretly sent orders to Portuguese officials in the ^ Rousseau, II, 84-89. speaks as if Spain were the aggressor, 33 Ferndn-Niinez, I, 246-47. instigated by the French court, but " Ibid., I, 279 ; Ferrer del Rio, III, admits that the Portuguese minister, 138-39; Doniol, I, 26. Another view- Pombal, "was eager to extend the point appears in Coxe, V, 8-9. Coxe domains of Portugal in the new world." 200 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX Sacramento region to seize desirable Spanish territories. When news of the seizures came to Europe he would pre- tend that it was false, or that nothing more than inconse- quential affrays between Spanish and Portuguese soldiers had occurred. He promised to order his troops to desist from such actions, and asked Charles III to do the same. The latter did so, but Pombal, on the contrary, continued to order hostilities and to send reenforcements, hoping to secure posts from which it would be difficult to dislodge the Portuguese by the time that his duplicity could no longer be concealed. Not only did he deceive Charles III for awhile, but he misled the English ministers as well, pretend- ing that Portugal was a victim of Spanish ambition. A change in the situation came as a result of the American Revolution. By the close of the year 1775 England was so busily engaged with her colonies that she was far from desiring war in Europe, and restrained Portugal. The British Cabinet announced that it would take no part in the Spanish-Portuguese quarrel, provided Spain should make no attempts against Brazil or Portugal itself. Pombal now made peaceful overtures to Charles III, hoping to de- lay Spain's sending of troops to South America, as had been proposed, but the proofs of Pombal's perfidy were so clear, that he was no longer believed. An expedition set sail from Cddiz in November, 1776, the fleet being under the Marques de Casa Tilly, and the troops commanded by Pedro Ceballos. En route to Buenos Aires the Portuguese island of Santa Catherina, off the coast of Brazil, was captured. Then followed the seizure of the Portuguese fleet, and the reconquest of Sacramento. Meanwhile, fortune played into Spain's hands in another respect. On February 23, 1777, Jose I of Portugal died. His wife, Maria Victoria, who became regent, was a sister of Charles III and an opponent of Pombal, whose fall from power occurred immediately. In October of that year a treaty was signed between Spain and Portugal, entirely favorable to the former. The much-disputed Sacramento colony and the other lands occupied or claimed by Portugal 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 201 were recognized as belonging to Spain, while Santa Cathe- rina and other parts of Brazil recently conquered by Ceballos were restored to Portugal.^^ Ossun had reported to Vergennes, July 7, 1774, that war between Spain and Portugal was a possibility, due to the latter's aggressions in South America.^^ The situation was far from pleasing to Vergennes, who feared that Spain might desire to conquer Portugal, and thus bring on, not only war with England, but a general "European war, lest Spain's conquest result in too great Bourbon strength, upsetting the balance of power. Naturally, he was eager to learn the attitude of England, and asked Garnier, his ambassador in Lisbon, to learn what he could on that point. Vergennes believed that England would not openly come to Portugal's aid, but that she would do so surreptitiously.^^ At the same time he was not neglecting to use the Family Compact for France's commercial advantage. Writing to Ossun, September 13, 1774, he charged him to say that France was eager to reorganize her finances and her navy, as Charles III had suggested, but commercial prosperity was a necessary prerequisite, and that depended upon finding a market outside her own borders. Spain might, therefore, grant certain commercial favors to France, and at least put her on an equal basis with England, mentioning the case of prepared leathers on which the duty was twice as high against French goods as against those from England. ^^ England's attitude toward Spain in the affair with Por- tugal was not long in doubt. Lord Stormont, British am- bassador to France, told Vei'gennes that Spain was getting ready to attack Portugal, not only in America, but also in Portugal itself, and that England could not look upon such preparations with indifference. Writing of this to Gri- maldi, September 30, 1774, Aranda said that he was answer- ing other foreign ministers at Paris with regard to the alleged plans of Spain, saying truthfully that he knew ^ This account of the Sacramento '* Doniol, I, 27. dispute was taken from Rousseau, II, ^ Ibid., I, 28. 100-9. ^ Ibid., I, 36-37. 202 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX nothing of them.^^ Whereas Stormont^s manner with Ver- gennes had been brusque, in order to intimidate France, Lord Grantham at Madrid had made similar inquiries with poHteness, in order to keep Spain from coming too strongly to France^s support. Vergennes was not easily frightened, however. Stormont had demanded that France should check the hostile designs of Charles III, whereupon Ver- gennes replied that he could not intervene, not having heard from the two countries of their differences, and that he had no reason to believe that the intentions of the Catholic King were less sincerely pacific than those of Eng- land.^^ Similarly, Grimaldi expressed surprise at Grant- ham's representation, saying that it was not Spain but Por- tugal which was making warlike preparations. Writing of this to Aranda, October 15, 1774, Grimaldi remarked that England had said nothing while Portugal was sending troops, ships, and munitions to South America, but when there seemed a likelihood that Spain might do so, she affected astonishment, and was even bold enough to assert that Spain was forming an army on the Portuguese frontier. One might believe that England was in an agreement with Portugal to draw Spain into a war, if it were not that the British ministry sincerely desired and even needed peace. So, very, likely, Pombal was deceiving the English minis- ters."*^ Ossun's report to Vergennes, October 6, 1774, was in substantial agreement with this. He believed that Grimaldi and Charles III desired peace, but that they would fight in a just cause. If Spain should attempt to retake the posts in South America which the Portuguese had seized, it might lead to war."*^ Vergennes' reply shows that France might have abandoned the Family Compact again in case of a rupture. Vergennes believed that Por- tugal was the aggressor, and that Pombal was endeavoring to draw the English into it. He said that there was a pos- sibility of an English fleet's being sent to Brazil, which was as important to England as if it were her own, and as the » Danvila, IV, 404-5. « Danvila, IV, 405-6. « Doniol, I, 29. « Doniol, I, 29-30. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 203 British navy had a taste for plunder, such an event might cause war. He had told Stormont that peace might be maintained if England would cause Portugal to stop sending war material and troops. If England desired peace, he con- tinued to Ossun, France had no choice but to agree. Louis XVI was devoted to the Family Compact, but the finances were in disorder. They must be restored, and the navy put in shape, things which would take France sev- eral years, and until then France could give no effective aid to Spain. This much was told to Ossun in confidence, and he was not to let it be known to the Spanish ministry.*^ Meanwhile, Vergennes renewed his plea for commercial advantages with Spain, or at least that France be allowed j^rivileges equally with England, the common enemy of the two crowns.^^ To Aranda, however, the impression was given that France stood back of Spain, both in the affair with Morocco and in that with Portugal.*^ And so she did, — in sympathy. As the year 1774 drew to a close, England's dispute with her American colonies began to loom on the diplomatic horizon, although its importance was not yet grasped. In England it was looked upon as a Whig device against the Tories, and opinion at the French court naturally followed that of London, its advent being welcomed on the ground that England would be kept busy enough to prevent her attacking France. At least one British minister, however. Lord Rochford, saw early in 1774 that the matter was serious. The Boston rioters were descendants of Crom- well's Puritans, he said, implying by that, that they would fight. His remarks were duly quoted to the French court in Guines' report of June 13, 1774.'*^ Spain was preoccupied with the Portuguese difficulty, especially because of Eng- land's favorable attitude toward Portugal. Grimaldi wrote to Aranda, December 5, 1774, asking him to sound the French ministry to see if France would stand by the Family Compact in case of war ; the matter was urgent, as news " Ibid., I, 31-35. « Danvila, IV, 406-7. ** Ibid., I, 38. « Doniol, I, 38-40. 204 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX had come from Buenos Aires that the Portuguese were plan- ning an assault on the port of Santa Tecla. Aranda's reply, December 19, 1774, advised against open prepara- tion for war, but suggested that the Spaniards in America should be induced to resist the Portuguese. Then, if it came to war, the French would not "have the face'' (no tendrdn cara) to withhold their aid."*^ About at this time Pombal seemed to have relented, being advised, no doubt, of the difficulties in the way of England's sustaining Portu- gal. Vergennes, who wished to retain the Family Com- pact for an occasion when it might redound to France's advantage, wrote to Ossun, January 3, 1775, praising him for not having told Charles III of France's need for peace, and adding that the king of Spain must not be allowed to believe that France would not have come to his aid in case war had broken out.*^ By December, 1774, it became clear that England's Ameri- can troubles were something more than passing riots* Garnier, who had become chargS d'affaires in London, wrote Vergennes, December 19, 1774, that it was the most im- portant event since the English Revolution. He sug- gested that France help the Americans in secret, as America might withdraw her commerce from England and offer it to other nations, in the event of a quarrel with England. On January 27, 1775, he announced that England was pre- paring to send General Gage with 9000 men to put down the colonists, and sounded a warning that she might seize the Antilles in the flush of success, or as a recompense for defeat, if the colonists should be victorious. Her seemingly pacific intentions should not allow the French court to be caught unprepared. Vergennes was much impressed by Garnier's warning. Writing to Ossun, February 7, 1775, he urged him to rouse the Spanish court to the importance of England's despatch of troops to America. Although they might be intended solely for use against the colonials, un- foreseen events, such as a change of ministry in England, might bring about a new destination for them dangerous to « Danvila, IV, 408. « Doniol, I, 35. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 205 the establishments of France and Spain in that part of the world. France was taking, precautions against unforeseen attack, and hoped that Spain would do so, too. Writing again, February 14, he stated that England's difficulties would prevent her from assisting Portugal, but the danger of war with England was even greater, because of the magnitude of her efforts, and it behooved France and Spain to fortify themselves, lest the recoil fall upon their colonies when least expected. "I am not calm, I assure you, sir,^' he said, ^^in seeing the English carry such great land and sea forces to America. '^ Ossun's letter of February 20, 1775, said that Charles III and Grimaldi agreed with Vergennes, and had told him that Spain was doing everything possible to put the Americas in a state of defence. Spain now had a navy of forty-four vessels, and artillery and munitions were being prepared for ten or eleven thousand men who were to be ready to embark without delay. Havana, Porto Rico, and the kingdom of New Spain had been fortified ; there was a colonial militia with Spanish officers in those places and in Cumand, Caracas, and Buenos Aires, and there were Spanish regulars in all of the places named, except Cumand and Caracas, and also in Cartagena, Panama, and Portobello."*^ Meanwhile, Escarano in London had been impressed, much as Garnier had been, by the danger to Spain's colonies resulting from the presence of English troops in America. There were 11,736 British soldiers there, he wrote to Gri- maldi, March 6, 1775, and it would be easy to attack Spain's possessions, both because they were near, and because England had so many transports at hand. He was of the opinion that England could not defeat America with ita^ "three million souls guided by the enthusiasm of liberty, and accustomed to live in a kind of independence," a people "who had given so many proofs of valor." If the opposi- tion should overthrow the Tory ministry, it would mean war with Spain, as that would bring Chatham (Pitt), Rich- mond, and Shelburne into power. Even with a well-in- « Ibid., I, 40-46. 206 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX tentioned ministry, it was not certain that England would not seek a pretext for a rupture, and employ her forces without warning against some of the less well fortified Span- ish colonies. She could avail herself of Spain's quarrel with Portugal for a pretext. Escarano suggested that it might be well to intimate to England, that she must with- draw her troops and ships from the Americas, when her quarrel with the colonies should be adjusted. Lord North wanted peace, but his position in power was very precari- ous.^° In referring to Chatham, Escarano was mentioning the bugbear which disturbed the peace of mind of both' France and Spain, especially of the former. The great English imperialist was ever ready for war, and was re- garded at the French court as especially hostile to France. Danvila holds that France and Spain were by this time resolved to fight England. It was only necessary to in- crease their forces, and to seek an opportune occasion.^^ Aranda and the French ministry were making plans of cam- paign as early as March, 1775.^^ Writing to Grimaldi, March 30, 1775, Aranda advised that Spain take an atti- tude of open hostility to England. He had just seen Mau- repas, Vergennes, and Sartine, and they had informed him that the French fleet was in better shape than people thought. Aranda told them that he believed that France and Spain together could destroy England, and reminded them of the insecurity of treaties with England, because of her system of changing ministries, involving also the possibility of a change in policy. If the French and Spanish navies were ready, it would be better to break with England, he had said. By putting the essential points in the Americas in a state of defence beforehand, it would matter little if the English should make attacks elsewhere. The French min- isters had shown themselves agreeable to his proposals. Even the peace-loving Charles III and Grimaldi seemed ready to fight. The latter wrote to Aranda, April 25, 1775, applauding his warlike proposals, but suggesting M Danvila, IV, 378-80. « Ibid., IV, 447-48. " Ibid., IV, 412. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 207 that it would be well to ask England for an explanation with respect to her considerable forces in America, and to request that she disarm, as soon as peace should be made with her colonies. He enclosed a letter to Escarano to that effect, but it was not to be forwarded to him, unless the French court should approve. This would have meant war, perhaps, but Vergennes did not approve of presenting such a request. What is more surprising, Aranda agreed with him, although only because ha favored another pretext for a rupture. ^^ While this correspondence was being carried on, Spain's naval preparations were going on apace, the maritime expedition against the Barbary Coast peoples serving as an excuse.^* Grimaldi told Ossun, wrote the latter to Vergennes, April 24, 1775, that the British am- bassador had taken good care not to evince the least anxi- ety in that regard, and if he had done so, that he, Grimaldi, bearing in mind England's colonial troubles, would have been disposed to tell him that Spain was not obliged to ren- der an account of her conduct to England. Grimaldi was much impressed by the danger from England in America, and felt that the Bourbon crowns should spare no effort to maintain and improve their navies. Spain had made con- siderable progress, although much remained to be done, and she regretted that France was still behindhand, despite the application and good-will of her king and ministers.^^ That Grimaldi's fears of an attack on the French and Spanish colonies had some basis is confirmed by a remark of Lord Kochford of the British Foreign Office. Two campaigns would suffice to restore order in America, he said, and the spirits of both the English and the Americans could be appeased by an attack on the hereditary enemy, France.^® This remark seems to have been made in July, 1775. Aranda sensed such a possibihty, and said that England, knowing the real hostility of France and Spain, was already thinking of declaring war upon the House of Bourbon." At about this time, the Spanish authorities began to be w Ibid., IV, 409-11. w Rousseau, II, 111-12. M Doniol, I, 47 ; Danvila, IV, 409. " Aranda to Grimaldi, Aug, 7, 1775, " Doniol, I, 47. in Danvila, IV, 416. 208 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX impressed by an idea which may well have been a cause of their delay in declaring war. The idea seems to have been expressed first in Aranda^s letter of July 24, 1775, to Grimaldi. An attempt was being made, he said, to get the English ministry to concede as much as possible to the colonists. An independent America would be a menace, as her population was increasing and, consequently, she needed lands, and would be more apt to seek them in a region with a temperate climate like New Spain than by going north. So the Americans might eventually dominate North America, or might help Spain^s colonies to become "Independent too. There would also be danger if England should defeat the Americans, because the latter would probably join in England's wars as in the past. He urged a more firm control by Spain over Cuba, San Domingo, and Porto Rico, not alone because of their richness, but also because they were the key to the continent, and easier than other places to defend. Louisiana he regarded as exposed in any event, both because of America's expanding population and because it was the nearest of the temperate lands. Grimaldi replied, August 7, 1775, that the king realized the truth of Aranda's remarks, and the wisdom of his suggestions. Spain had too scant a population to settle all of the colonies, and the latter were too extensive to be defended equally well at all places. Grimaldi thought it might be desirable to invite French settlers to San Do- 1 mingo and Porto Rico. As for Louisiana, the king thought \ it best to leave it alone. The English would be able to I raise great armies against that section, and if Spain should I develop it, it might serve only as an inducement for the English to come and attack it.^^ At this time also the Portuguese question again raised its head, on account of the continued Portuguese aggres- sions in South America. As we have seen, Charles III was at length aroused to order an expeditionary force sent from Spain. Aranda was asked by Grimaldi in another letter of August 7 to request France to intervene at Lisbon w Danvila, IV, 414-17. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 209 to bring about an amicable end of the dispute by causing Portugal to withdraw her troops, and Aranda's reply, Au- gust 20, stated that France was willing to do as requested. Aranda and Vergennes proposed that the same plan be followed in England to get that country to check Portugal, but principally to discover by her answer the real intent of the ministry, for it was clear that England and Portugal were working in agreement. Meanwhile, said Aranda, let troops be sent to South America, and others stationed on the Portuguese frontier; England could not land an army, as she was having all she could do to find troops enough for her war with the colonies. Not long afterward the Portuguese question seemed to be approaching a favor- able stage. The Portuguese ambassador had shown a disposition to settle the matter amicably, wrote Grimaldi, September 15, 1775 ; so, French intervention would be unnecessary.^^ From the beginning of the year 1776 Vergennes was fully, decided on war with England..^^ Aranda, naturally, was as warlike as ever, and suggested an invasion of Ireland, and establishing an independent country there. This plan met with Vergennes' approval, but was less warmly received in Spain, on the ground that it might result in England's vast forces in America falling suddenly upon the Bourbon col- onies. Aranda recognized that England would probably attack Spain whether successful or defeated in the war with her colonies, either to satisfy her ambition, or to recover from her losses. Louisiana and San Domingo were most in danger, he said. Havana and Porto Rico could be de- fended. The best thing to do would be to make military preparations at once, despite what England might say.®^ Vergennes tried to frighten Charles III with these dangers, but the latter's reply asking ten or twelve thousand French troops to defend French San Domingo found Vergennes less impressed by the American danger. He declined to send the men, as it would amount to a declaration of war, which «• Ihid., IV, 417-21. « Danvila, IV, 447-53. » Rousseau, II, 113. 210 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX was inopportune. What better can we ask, he said, than what England is doing against herself? She was generous enough to spare the Bourbon courts the pains and expense of destroying her.^^ In June, 1776, Spain took a fresh step in the virtual war against England, making a beginning of contributions jt.Q the Americans. France had begun this practice shortly before. The reason for their doing so, despite the fear of an independent America, may be found in a letter of Aranda to Grimaldi of June 7. It was necessary to make such con- tributions so that the English and Americans might weaken each other, destroying the former, and putting the latter in a state where they would listen to reason, that is, as dictated by the Bourbons, at the beginning of their inde- pendence.^^ In September Vergennes presented a memorial to Aranda which was warlike enough in sound. The prin- cipal point seemed to be that war against England ought soon to be declared, before England should make an at- tack on France and Spain. Spain's attitude is expressed in Grimaldi's letter of October 8, 1776, to Aranda. The war was inevitable, and England herself would declare it as soon as she found a favorable occasion. It would there- fore be an indubitable advantage to begin several months before England planned to do so, especially if she were still occupied with her colonies. If she were about to make peace with them, the danger to the French and Spanish colonies would be great, especially to the latter. Spain was ready, however, to adopt the policy that France thought best, although, to be sure, it was uncertain whether the present was the most fitting time to begin the war. If undertaken, Spain hoped, among other things, to conquer all or part of Portugal. This frank statement found Vergennes less enthusiastic. Aranda's letter of November 9, 1776, called attention to the difference between Vergennes' words of September and those of November. Moreover, France was unwilling to have Spain conquer Portugal, as the other European powers would object. Charles III seems not to 62 Rousseau, II, 114-15. ^ Danvila, IV, 454-59. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 211 have been so disappointed as Aranda, saying that the de- cision for war ought to be one of free choice, and he himself believed that the right moment had not yet come. Aranda presented a paper to Vergennes and Maurepas in December, however, urging them to declare war. There was nothing to fear from Austria, Prussia, or Russia. On the other hand, there were the oft-mentioned dangers to the colonies of France, and especially of an English attack on San Do- mingo. Aranda was not successful in making France take a determined stand, but continued his efforts throughout the year 1777.^^ Still, as Danvila says, Spain and France were virtually at war with England from 1776 on. They were aiding the Americans with supplies and funds, were making plans for hostilities, and were carrying on their military and naval preparations.^^ . The diplomatic situation, as far as it affected Spain, has t ' now been given in some detail to the close of the year 1776. j 1 For the purposes of this work an equal amount of detail is not necessary after that year, because it marked the end j of the tremendous activities in New Spain in northwest- I \ ward exploration. A brief review down to the outbreak of ) j war with England in 1779 should therefore suffice. After war was declared, naturally it was the principal interest of Spain to 1783, when peace was concluded, a date beyond which the principal limits of this volume do not pass. Early in the year 1777 Grimaldi was succeeded by Flo- ridablanca, whose policy appears in a memorial by him dated March, 1777. The most immediate advantages that Spain could get from a war with England, he said, would be to expel her from Florida, and to destroy the British es- tablishments in Honduras. France might regain Canada, and the right to fish in Newfoundland, as well as a profitable trade with the insurgent colonies. But neither country ought to think of war until there were considerable forces of troops and ships in their islands of the West Indies, and Spain ought immediately to send as many naval vessels as possible to Havana. If the rebellious colonies should es- \\ M Ibid., IV, 463-73. « Ibid., IV, 445. i 1 212 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX d tablish their independence, Spain ought to contrive to keep them divided in interests, so that there might not grow up a formidable power near Spanish America.^^ Clearly there was no enthusiasm in Spanish governmental circles on be- half of the Americans. This appears also from the cold reception accorded Arthur Lee, the American representa- tive, who about this time appeared in Spain.^^ The surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga caused an en- tire change in the course of diplomatic procedure. The British government began to make offers with a view to conciliating the colonists. The French ministry acted quickly to prevent a reconciliation ; for reconciliation would mean a loss of the commercial favors which France hoped to obtain, and might also mean a war of England and the colonies against France. Therefore, on December 16, 1777, France declared herself ready to enter into a treaty of com- merce and alliance with the American revolutionaries, specifically stating that her willingness was due partially to a desire to diminish the power of England by separating her from her colonies. On February 6, 1778, a treaty was signed. ^^ All of this was done without any official notification to Spain. Aranda had soon learned of it unofficially, although he did not find out the terms of the agreement, and he sent word to Spain. Charles III immediately called for the opinions of his leading ministers. France should be asked to explain the nature of her pact, said Floridablanca, in his memorial of January 22, 1778. The first thing for Spain to do, however, was to assure the safety of the fleet coming from Vera Cruz, and that of the naval vessels and troops returning from Buenos Aires, while more troops should be sent to Havana and Porto Rico. War ought to be avoided if possible, in view of the inconstancy of Spain's allies. England seemed disposed to be on good terms with Spain, and even with France, were it not that the latter's imprudent actions and insatiable desire to get the ^ Danvila, IV, 494-96. 67 Rousseau, II, 118-19. « Danvila, IV, 502^. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 213 world's commerce for herself had caused England to be suspicious. In fine, he recommended continued prepara- tion, as if the war were inevitable, but that it be avoided as long as possible, as it could not be favorable to Spain under existing circumstances. This opinion of Florida- blanca's not only manifests his displeasure, which was j shared by Charles III and others, at France's proceeding 1/ to such important measures without consulting her ally, but Ji also shows that Spain was beginning to comprehend the selfish use that France was making of the Family Com- \\ pact ; France was striking for herseK, not for France and \ \ Spain. Not until March 4, 1778, did Vergennes give Aranda a copy of the treaties made with the Americans, and not until March 19 did the French government give an official notification to that of Spain. From this time forth Spain \\ felt at liberty to pursue her own policy irrespective of ' \ France. The Spanish ambassador in London was advised that Spain's attitude toward England would depend upon the latter ; Spain neither wished war nor feared it.^® Flo- ridablanca had several stormy interviews with Montmorin, i who had succeeded Ossun as French ambassador to Madrid, i ;' He accused France of compromising Spain when the fleet I / from Vera Cruz and the squadron from Buenos Aires were | at the mercy of the English, alluded to France's unwilling- ' ness to make war in October, 1776, when Spain was ready, . j and gave his opinion that the present, far from being the ' i best moment for the Bourbons to make war, was for Spain the most fatal. He recognized that Aranda was of the French opinion, but decidedly he himself was not. When, in April, Montmorin asked that D'Estaing's fleet be per- mitted to touch at Cddiz, Floridablanca replied that he thought it extraordinary that France should ask aid of Spain, after having acted contrary to Spain's advice. Did he take the Catholic King for a viceroy of the king of France? 7^ Charles III now began to attempt the part of mediator. He hoped to get Gibraltar and Minorca as the price for • Ibid., IV, 504-18. 'o Rousseau, II, 119-23. 214 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. IX bringing about peace. In May, Escarano suggested to one of the English ministry that Gibraltar would be a fair equivalent for Spain's services, but was told that the price was high, and that in any event affairs had probably gone beyond the point where mediation would serve; England wanted no more from Spain than that she remain neutral. This was the reply of Lord Weymouth, who rather brusquely thanked Charles III for the magnanimity of Ms offer. Such an answer was not calculated to be pleas- ing to the Spanish ear, as Floridablanca very plainly intimated to Lord Grantham. England had had a chance for peace, he said, and declined it ; the chance would not return. To add to Spain's displeasure England's conduct on the sea gave cause for complaint, and even the coasts of the Iberian Peninsula were plundered by some English- men. Nevertheless, Charles still hoped to fill the r61e of arbitrator, and all the more so when news came of French naval successes against the English. British replies, how- ever, were at no time more courteous than Weymouth's answer to Escarano had been. Charles got Louis XVI to submit terms upon which he would make peace. The lat- ter required an acknowledgment of American independence, the recall of England's land and naval forces, and other con- ditions of less note. Weymouth haughtily rejected them. On November 14, 1778, Grantham delivered a note saying that England could have no understanding with France until that country withdrew her support from the Ameri- cans. At the same time, a proposal by Spain for a twenty- five or thirty year truce between England and her colonies was rejected. However, Charles III still endeavored to mediate. He offered Weymouth an indefinite armistice, to be guaranteed by a general disarmament. He had not consulted Louis XVI before making this offer, but Ver- gennes did not disavow his act. Again, however, the Spanish king's proposals were arrogantly rejected.^^ To make matters worse England had delayed ker reply from January to March, 1779, and English ships had continued w Rousseau, II, 123-35. 1763] DIPLOMACY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES III 215 to attack those of Spain. Charles III renewed his offer of a suspension of hostihties, this time in the form of an ulti- matum, April 3, 1779. England again delay ed, and in the meantime planned attacks on Nicaragua and the Philip- pines. On May 28 the ultimatum was rejected. The Spanish ambassador left London, and on June 23 war was officially declared.^^ I t V^j ^ 72 Altamira, IV, 66-67. CHAPTER X ACTIVITIES OF SPAIN AGAINST FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, 1773-1775 Spain was more and more threatened by the activities of other European nations in the Pacific northwest, but, although she was not fully awake to the danger, if we may judge by the history of her diplomacy in the reign of Charles III, nevertheless she did not disregard it. On the con- trary, she played no small part in the discoveries, explora- tions, and conquests of the period, urged on, as usual, by the necessity of defending what she already possessed, and enjoying leadership of an exceptional character in accom- plishing these tasks. It has been pointed out that her policy of defence had led to plans for fortifying her American possessions, especially those in the West Indies and those bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. The Argentine coast, the Falkland Islands, and the coasts of the viceroy alty of Peru had also commanded attention. Thus far, Spanish efforts may be regarded as part of a conscious, general policy. A Spanish writer has implied, although he does not specifically state, that the northwest- ward expeditions, both by land and sea, were part of the same plan,^ but the conjecture does not accord with the facts. The Pacific shores of New Spain were on an indepen- dent footing. An European war would involve the other lands named, more particularly the West Indies, but was not regarded as greatly endangering Pacific North America. Of this the correspondence of Viceroy Croix, already quoted, is evidence. In this chapter it will appear that action was taken by Spain on the basis of foreign encroachments in 1 Fernandez Duro, VII, 153, 160-61. 216 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 217 the Pacific, as she understood them, irrespective of the state of European poHtics. Yet, there is a larger unity embracing all of Spain's colonies, even if there were no general plan, namely, the search of European nations for colonies^^and the counter-attempts of Spain in self-defence. England and Russia gave Spain concern in the Pacific ^ northwest between 1773 and 1776, the former much less'^ than the case merited. Even in the case of Russia, despite the great number of documer^ts about her encroachments, Spain was not much afraid. To a certain extent this period / is one of particular emergency as regards the Russians, but, ^ in the main, Spanish activities may be ascribed to permanent reasons for combating foreign danger, with the added fact of a capable man to direct the work. To the supposed*\ danger of Russian encroachment were due the P6rez voyage j of 1774, and the Heceta and Bodega voyages of 1775. r These were only the most direct manifestations proceeding I from the same cause. Among other steps taken, related in ar measure at least to the Russian peril, were the Crame ex- ploration of the Coatzacoalcos River in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, t he A n z a and Rivera expeditions to Alt^u California, and tlie^founding of San Francisco, the general endeavor to develop Alta California and keep it well supplied, and even the formation of a reglamento, or mode of govern- ment, for the Californias. Only the Crame expedition will be taken up conclusively in this chapter, but some of the other events will be alluded to because of their relation to the plans against the Russians. In this chapter, then, there appears not only a discussion of foreign approaches to Spain's Pacific colonies viewed from a third and concluding standpoint, but also a resumption of details concerning governmental attention to this region. In the latter sense it stands forth as the first to be treated of a group of activities from 1773 on, and is so placed because it is the key to the other events, — the impulse to action arising from foreign danger. The other events have to do with the government's interest in local problems of the Californias, and its attention to questions bearing upon 218 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X the opening and use of an overland route to Alta California. These have been reserved for later chapters, although con- temporary with the events related here. Because of their close historical connection, it will be well to note in advance some of the most significant dates, before proceeding to the matter of this chapter. On July 23, 1773, a provisional or temporary reglamento for the Calif ornias, to which Bucarely had devoted much time for several months, received official sanction by his decree. On August 17, instructions were issued to Fernando Rivera^ Moncada, who was to lead some soldier-settlers to Alta California up the peninsula, and succeed Pages in command of the new establishments. On September 13, tEe first Anza expedition was authorized, as we have seen. In January, 1774, Anza^s expedition left Tubac, Sonora, and discovered a route to Alta California, returning to Tubac in May. Rivera left Loreto, Baja Cahfornia, in March, 1774, and got to Monterey in May. A second Anza expedition was authorized in November, 1774. With this were to go settlers and domestic animals, both greatly needed in Alta California. Anza left Tubac in October, 1775, conducted the settlers and animals to Alta California, and was back in Sonora by June, 1776. In September, 1776, a settlement was made at San Francisco by some of the colonists who had accompanied Anza. Late in the same year Carets proved the existence of a route from Alta California to New Mexico. A turning point in Bucarely^s activities in behalf of the Califomias seems to have come at about the time when progress began to be made toward forming a provisional reglamento, in May, 1773. Up to that time he had been acquiring information, while attending as best he could to the needs of the province, although with slight expecta- tion of a successful issue of the Alta California establish- ments. To be sure, he continued to call for reports, and on May 27 wrote that he was as much in the dark as ever, but, from this time forth, his measures began to be effectual. There was no more talk of abandoning Alta California, 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 219 although that contingency was with difficulty avoided. Between 1773 and 1776^6 brought _.±hja.^ta establishments out o! tTie^realm of uncertainty, and placed them on_an enduring basis. Some indications of Spain's fear^ JEn^Hsh^^gress^^^^ in the northwest prior to 1773 have already been given, notably the Croix-Galvez plan of January, 1768, but in the period embraces by this chapter very little evidence on the point has come to light, as compared with the bulk of material concerning the Russians. Yet Bucarely's original con- sideration of the problem of foreign danger seems to have sprung from news of an English project. In a letter of June 26, 1776, he reviews his acts undertaken with a view to circumventing foreign encroachments, and says that his first measures were due to the king's apprehension, early in 1773, over reports that an Englishman named Bings was undertaking a voyage to the North Pole, with a view to reaching the Californias, if possible. This was responsible for instructions given by him at that time with the aim of safeguarding the^ Californias against the entry of foreign sMpsTJ TTiS Instructions referred to were those given to Hiy§j;:a, August 17, 1773, as follows: "The admission of foreign boats into the American ports of the king's dominions is absolutely prohibited by the laws of the Indies, and it is commanded in many royal decrees and orders that this prohibition be observed ; and there are also repeated de- crees that commerce is not to be permitted, even in Spanish ships, on the coasts comprised in this viceroyalty, exceptm the ship from the Philippines, which comes to Acapulco, and the boats in the ship-yard of San Bias for the support of old and new California." All other ships Rivera was to detain if his forces should permit, making prisoners of the expeditionaries, and giving an account to the government in Mexico. Then followed instructions for guarding against surprise, when the Philippine and San Bias boats entered Alta California ports, lest an enemy's ships might be mis- 2 A.G.P., Cor. Vir., series I, v. 12, No. 2296. 220 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X taken for them. In the same document it is stated that the settlers s hould have arms to aid in defending the Cali- fornias if necessary, and Rivera was to make a complete in- ventory of the artillery, munitions, and arms in the province. The exploratio n and occupation of the port of San Franciaca were also recommended^ " THe^^^ M historian, Rivera, says that the instructions -to his namesake were also related^ to reports of Russian aggressions;^ which was probably the case, since Bucarely had known of them for some time be- fore the date of his instruction to Rivera, and they were considered to be at least as pressing as the report about Bings. Rivera goes on to say that Bucarely was ordered to exercise great vigilance over Pacific coast ports, especially over Monterey, taking the action which the viceroy in fact embodied in his already mentioned instructions. He was to assert that this was done in accordance with provisions to that effect in the laws of the Indies, and not to mani- fest that it was done by express royal order. ^ The danger of English interference in the northwest seems not to have been taken very seriously. Writing to Arriaga, September 28, 1774, Bucarely characterized the fears on that account as absurd.^ Other references to the same effect appear in the correspondence about the Russians. True, this view of the matter underestimated the danger, — this was the period of Hearne's explorations for the Hudson's Bay Company, of activity by the Scottish merchants of Montreal, and of voyages by Cook to the south Pacific, — but nevertheless, it represented the Spanish attitude. Apprehension^ about the Russia ns at this time was due to the reports of the Conde de Lacy, Spanish ambassador to Russia, who, late in the year 1772, scented danger from the Russians. Writing to Grimaldi, on October 22, 1772, of Russian explorations toward North America from Kam- » C-2350. Other aspects of the in- that Bings was undertaking (emprendla) struction to Rivera are considered in it, and Rivera that he was arranging chap. XI, and to some extent in chap. (arreglaba) it. The only fact of im- XIV. portance here, however, is that Spain * Rivera, I, 428. felt some apprehension. ' I have found no reference to an « C-2732. actual Bings voyage. Bucarely said 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 221 chatka as a base/ he also enclosed an order of the Russian government of September 5, 1770, calculated to inspire mis- giving in Spain. The order stated that the Russian govern- ment had received notices that a foreign power [unnamed] was planning an attack on the port of St. Peter and St. Paul, Kamchatka, with a view to threatening Russia's hold on that country. The order called for precautions by the officials there, the gathering of powder and flour, and the use of an army of 15^000 men. If English ships should appear, however, they were to be received with honors and friendship, and be given such assistance as they might need.^ As regards the 15,000 men there was an ele- ment of absurdity in this document which makes one doubt its authenticity. Nor can it have frightened Grimaldi, for he does not appear to have forwarded a copy to Arriaga. On February 7, 1773, Lacy wrote again. He had learned, he said, that a Russian naval officer, Chirikof , had continued to make explorations in Kamchatka and North America between 1769 and 1771, and Chirikof and his secretary had visited St. Petersburg early in 1772. They were sworn to secrecy by the government, and the former had been sent back to make another voyage. Several Russians had said that very important discoveries had been made, but there had been so much secrecy that Lacy could learn nothing certain, beyond the fact of Chirikof's voyage.^ A copy of this letter was sent to Arriaga, who was instructed to ask Bucarely to take fitting measures.^° Arriaga acknowl- edged receipt of this letter on April 11,^^ and on the same day wrote to Bucarely, forwarding a copy of Lacy's letter, and ordering Bucarely to find out whether the Russians were in fact advancing their explorations.^^ Bucarely replied on July 27, showing no great anxiety, but stating that he had already taken action. He referred to a map printed at St. Petersburg in 1758 indicating that two ships under Bering had explored the North American coast between 55° and 60°, but he was inclined to doubt ^ C-2038. w Grimaldi to Arriaga. Apr. 6, 1773. 8 C-1543. C-2209. » C-2162. " C-2210. " C-2211. 222 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X whether the land discovered was really part of North America. Lacy's letter showed, however, that the Russians had designs upon America, although their difficulties would be great, because of the scant population and the scarcity of supplies in Kamchatka, and because of the distance from St. Petersburg. Precautionary measures must be taken however, as the Russians might overcome the difficulties.^^ Referring to the Spanish situation in the Pacific, Bucarely said that the region between Cape San Lucas and Monterey had been occupied. There were no foreign establishments in that stretch, and no boats had been seen in recent years other than the Manila galleon and the ships that went to Alta California. San Diego and Monterey were the only ports, and were the only places with force enough to hold in check the innumerable Indians of Alta California. For reasons of economy the Alta California establishments had not been increased. The Department of San Bias was not capable of accomplishing much; skilled officers and pilots, supplies, and other things were needed before anything of much consequence could be done. Russian ^estabhshments in No^}] AnripriVa. or those of any foreign country should be prevented ^ not that Spain did not have enough territory, for It had more than it could settle in centuries, but be- cause a ny neighbors other than the Indians might prove dangerous. Although it would be hard for the Russians to establish themselves, it was a possibility, and if it were done would be to the disadvantage of Spain. For Spain to prevent their establishment would be easier than it would be for the Russians to undertake it, but it would cost Spain a great deal. Spain had the advantage of known ports and fertile lands, where settlements might be made, from which voyages could be undertaken. The best time to sail from San Bias was from the last of November to the end of January, and probably the same held true, north of Monterey. As Juan P6rez had signified a desire to make an expedition to the_far nbff h,"'BircareTy "HaH given him secret instructions to draw up plans, and was now awaiting them. These ^8 For the map, cf . infra n. 34. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 223 operations would be expensive, and would cost less if con- ducted from Manila.-^* Despite the calm wi th which the viceroy viewed_the situation and his underesB manon"'^^ measures against the possibility of foreign aggressions were the key- note of his action from this time forth. In that same month a provisional reglamento for the Californias had been made. This will be taken up later in its local aspects, when it will appear that no goint was made of a specific foreign danger. Yet, Bucarely wrote to his friend. General O'Reilly, July 28, 1773, that in forming the reglamento he had proceeded principally with a view to avoiding the ideas of the Rus- sians.^^ Bucare ly 's l ack of anxi ety, however, is still further manifested in a letter to Arriaga one month later. Nothing further could be done about Perez's voyage, he said, as that official had left for Monterey on his customary annual voyage with provisions, before Bucarely's letter to him had reached San Bias. He would therefore await Perez's return.^® An accident to P6rez's ship occurred, however, obliging him to put back to shore, and thus Bucarely was able to report, September 26, 1773, that P6rez had received his orders concerning the northwestern explorations sooner than he had expected.-^^ In his letter of July 27 Bucarely had requested that some naval officers be sent from Spain for use in Pacific coast ex- plorations, and a royal order of August 24, 1773, informed him that six were being sent. Now that he was to have their assistance, Bucarely should be able to accomplish his purposes against the Russians, wrote Arriaga to the viceroy in a letter of December 23, 1773.^^ The order of August 24 had directed Bucarely to make settlements in ports south of San Diego, and to explore the whole coast and the neighboring islands in search of Russians, who were to be dislodged if found. Replying, November 26, 1773, Bucarely said that he had already taken steps for the de- ^ PO 'rture of P6rez , and not only that, but the Anza expedi - " C-2337. " C-2365. " C-2342. " C-2397. " C-2456. 224 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X tion, the new reglamento for the Calif ornias and San Bias, and certain orders given to Agustin Crame all bore on the question of .checking the Russians. Crame had been ordered to explore the Rio Coatzacoalcos, and report secretly to Bucarely. That river, being navigable up to Tehuantepec, had been used formerly for the transportation of artillery, and Bucarely wished to know whether it would still be easier and less expensive to send artillery to the Pacific by that route. Otherwise, the expense would be unendur- able, or there would be the long delays incident to recourse to Manila. Perez had been ordered to explore and take possession of only such lands as were not occupied by a foreign power, as he carried no force with which to dislodge an enemy. All of these matters must cost considerable sums that were not provided for by a fund, and would normally have to be granted by a junta de real hacienda, said Bucarely, but as these projects ought to be kept secret, he asked for authority to raise money by his own decree,^^ and his request was acceded to by the royal govern- ment.2o From March to May, 1773, Lacy in St. Petersburg was writing letters to Grimaldi about the Russian aggressions in North America. The dates of these letters, and those of Grimaldi^s and Arriaga^s letters in handling them are worthy of note, as they show a marked lack of anxiety on the part of those highest in authority, who often delayed action on Lacy's excited warnings. The Lacy letters re- ferred to were dated March 19, April 23, May 7 (two), and May 11, 1773. The April 23 letter was a long one, possibly the most startling of all, but was neglected by the Spanish government for a year. It will be taken up in its place from the standpoint of action on it. The other four were acted on at the same time, although one of Lacy^s May 7 letters may not have been forwarded to Bucarely. It had enclosed a map (in Russian) of Russian discoveries in Kamchatka, and a list of merchandise showing the kind of trade that the Russians were carrying on in that part MC-2430. aJRevilla Gigedo, I nforme, par. 47. C-5613 v^ I i U i In o !^ I i 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 225 of the world.^^ Grimaldi forwarded this letter and its enclosures to Arriaga, June 13, 1773,^^ and the latter sent them next day to Jorge Juan ^^ for an opinion.^^ Juan's reply does not appear, but the map at least was forwarded to Bucarely with Arriaga's letter of September 25, 1773, to be noticed presently. ^^ In his March 19 letter I^acy claimed to have made an important discovery. He had received a detailed report of the Russian expeditions between- Kamchatka and America obtained by one who had handled and read the papers, which were sealed and deposited in the Russian archives. The report said that Bering and Chirikof in their voyages of 1741-42 had reached land at 60°, but they could not tell whether it was the continent or an island. In 1764, two ships went from Archangel under Estehacowy and Panowba- few,^^ and one from Kamchatka under Krenitzin. They joined, and explored the land from a little above 40° up to 75°, and reported it as part of the mainland. Between 235° longitude and Kamchatka the sea was full of islands, the inhabitants of which traded with the people of Kam- chatka, wore the same kind of dress, and had the same manners and customs. They said that the land either joined Asia, or was not more than two hours away, as had been stated by Professor Steller who accompanied Bering. They believed the land to be the Calif ornias, which in that case extended to 75°. It was a region of high mountains, with an agreeable, moist climate ; it contained trees adapted for use as masts, for example, cedar ; it had an abundance of copper, and signs of other metals ; and it abounded in fur-bearing animals of the best quality of skins. In 1765- 66 the empress authorized a company of Kamchatka busi- ness men to form an establishment, which they did on the mainland at 64°. There were twenty-four men in the com- pany, employing two hundred Cossacks in hunting, making " C-2250. UUoa of the Notidas secretas concerning 22 C-2289. affairs in the viceroyalty of Peru. 23 Juan was the celebrated Spanish «< C-2290. mathematician, naval officer, and ac- " For the map, C-2126. ademician, who, however, is more '* I am unable to identify these famous to-day as joint author with names. Q 226 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X discoveries, guarding the establishment, and procuring the payment of tribute to Russia, and there were forty sailors and two ship-builders there. Members of the company were allowed to wear a gold medal with the bust of the empress, who had given to the company the privilege of trading in anything that it might see fit in that region. So far, they had traded mainly in furs, but also in walrus- teeth, whalebone, whale oil, and certain kinds of fish, and they planned to build up commerce with China and Japan. They imported from Russia such goods as cloth, canvas, shoes, leather, wrought copper, and tobacco. Gold and silver they expected to find, and they had already found pearls, but pearl fishing had been discontinued, because of a certain disease of the fingers which it caused to those employed in it ; a less harmful method of pearl fishing was being sought. Learned men of the Russian Academy were being sent out to discover mines.^^ Writing May 7 Lacy said that Russia had formed a proj- ect of forcing the Great Wall and invading China with 25,000 men. They were also planning a naval expedition from Kamchatka against Japan under command of an Englishman, General Lloyd, although it would doubtless be postponed until the conclusion of the war with Turkey. He mentioned this as evidence of Russia's vast oriental proj- ects.^^ In his May 11 letter he wrote that the empress had told Professor Haller of the Russian Academy about the discoveries in America, and that he had made a report to her, suggesting that part of the Russian fleet be sent around the Cape of Good Hope to Kamchatka, where it could refit and then go to America and make conquests. Haller said that Russia had more right to America than any other power, because the inhabitants of America came originally from Siberia, and had continued to trade with it ; also, because the Dutch had made themselves masters of the Moluccas. ^^ Lacy was sure that this report had been made, absurd as it might appear, and therefore thought it best to inform ^ C-2197. Moluccas had to do with it, unless on 28 C-2249. the modern doctrine of "compensation." 29 It is difficiilt to see what the 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 227 Grimaldi, for nothing was deemed impossible by the Rus- sians, however difficult or dangerous it might be.^^ Grimaldi sent these three letters of Lacy to Arriaga on June 20, 1773. He had delayed after receiving Lacy's March 19 letter in expectation of a more detailed report which Lacy had intimated that he was about to send, but which had not come.^^ A few days later Grimaldi again wrote to Arriaga, sending him two letters of the Vizconde de la Herreria of the year 1764, when the latter was in St. Petersburg.^^ The letters contained notices about the Cali- fornias and information about Russian expeditions.^^ With them was a map of the year 1758, in French, made by the Imperial Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, showing the Russian discoveries in North America. ^^ Arriaga was some- what slow to act. Not until September 25 did he write to Bucarely, when he forwarded the documents which have just been discussed, and gave instructions for Bucarely to do what he should think proper to find out whether the Russians were advancing.^^ From another letter of Arriaga to Bucarely, January 24^ 1774, we get a clear expression of the ministro generaVs views with regard to the Russian periL. "As for the Russian discoveries,'' he said, "they are still to me a very remote object of attention, and the present time seems much too early for them to be a cause for alarm. But as the preparations against them serve many other purposes, especially in that they conduce to the advance- ment of missionary work, and to the extension of the gospel, the more land we gain by discoveries, I am very well satis- fied with all that has been done, for in this manner, by sea and land, we may proceed with our conquests to one place after another.'' ^^ Meanwhile, Bucarely had been making preparations for the Perez expedition, his activity in this regard being in 3" C-2252. not seen) , and appeared also in English 31 C-2295. in the English translation from that work 32 Grimaldi to Arriaga, June 28, of 1761, and in French in a French 1773. C-2306. translation of 1766. 33 0-545,561. 35C-2380. 3< C-442, The map was pubHshed 36 A.G.I., 146-4-2. in Miiller's Sammlung (which I have 228 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X striking contrast to the delays of the administration in Spain. On July 18, 1773, Bucarely had ordered P6rez to draw up a plan for northward exploration, and Perez's accidental return from his proposed Monterey voyage had enabled him to receive this order earlier than otherwise would have been the case, so that the plans were taken up at once. On September 1, Perez completed his plan, which the viceroy approved in his order of September 29, making one change, — that Perez must go north to 60° rather than to 45° or 50°, as that officer had suggested. There is no evidence to show that the junta was consulted. Lcial instruction was not issued until December 1773) It begins by declaring that the king had imposed ipon the viceroy of extending his dominions, as well as of preserving them, in order to bring the Indians into vassal- age, and to spread the gospel among them. Therefore, the viceroy was ordering Juan Perez to make explorations north of Monterey, in the frigate Santiago, otherwise Nueva Galicia, which was to carry provisions for a year. Perez was also to take provisions to Monterey, but to stay there no longer than necessary to unload them, when he should again put to sea. He should reach at least 60° before start- ing back to Monterey, making a most minute examination of the coast upon his return, and landing, where possible without risk. He was to make no settlements, but might leave distinguishing marks at good sites, taking formal possession of them. If a foreign establishment should be discovered, he was to land north of it, and take possession, leaving evidences of his act. He must not communicate with such foreign establishment, but should view it from afar, getting in that way all the information that he could. He was to avoid ships that he might meet, or, if compelled to communicate with them, was to conceal his real objects. Indians were to be treated well, and their customs noted, especially in matters of government ; likewise he was to note the productivity of the lands in minerals and agricul- tural products, and get data as to the animals, plants, and trees. He was to find out Whether the Indians had ever 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 229 seen boats before or any foreigners, and if they had, was to inquire about their visit there. He might put into Monterey, if a storm or other accident should make it necessary, or if urgently in need of provisions, of which an extra supply had been ordered sent from San Bias. In entering Monterey or San Diego he was to hoist a certain signal, of which Rivera had been advised, so that he might know that Perez's was not a foreign ship. On no account was he to start hostilities with the Indians, remembering that his principal object was to explore the coast in search of foreign establishments, and to acquire information that might lead to a more thorough examination. Russian maps of 1758 and 1773 were being given to him, as possibly of some use, and, finally, he was assured that he would be rewarded according to his deeds.^^ In answering Arriaga^s letter of September 25, Bucarely wrote, December 27, 1773, enclosing a copy of the document just mentioned, and saying that the preparations for the voyage were already so far advanced that there had hardly been time to make a copy of the Russian map of 1773, and he had been obliged to send the map and Perez's instructions by special courier. The instructions were secret, and were not to be opened by Perez until after his departure from Monterey. He was to stop at Monterey to leave provisions, as the supply-ship Principe was laid up for repairs until February. P^rez himself had plenty of supplies, and a crew of his own choosing, and Bucarely hoped that some useful knowledge, at least, might result from the expedi- tion.^^ A month later Bucarely wrote that Perez and the Santiago had probably sailed already; he had heard that they were only awaiting a favorable wind in order to put to sea. Francisco Hijosa, the commissary of San Bias, had written, January 5, 1774, that the boat was provisioned for a year, besides carrying supplies for Monterey, and Bucarely had ordered the Principe promptly to San Diego and Monterey, so as to provide for every possible contin- gency that might cause Perez to need more supplies. ^^ 37 C-2457. 38 C-2464. 39 C-2521. 230 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X P6rez had in fact sailed on January 24, as Bucarely soon learned from Hijosa's letter of the 27th from San Bias. Up to the Islas Isabelas, wrote Bucarely; soon afterward, the voyage had gone very well, according to the letters sent back from there by Perez and by Serra, who was also on board. Nor had the repairing and the provisioning of the Principe for the voyage to Monterey been lost sight of by Bucarely, who expected to hear, every instant, that the boat had sailed. *° y p^V Reference has been made to a proposed exploration of the ^np Isthmus' of Tehuantepec by Agustin Crame. This affair was ^ undertaken without delay. Crame was at first unsuccess- ful in his quest, informing Bucarely on December 28, 1773, that he had not found a route across the isthmus suitable for the transportation gf artillery. Only a few days later, however, January 2, 1774, he wrote enthusiastically of his complete success. He had wandered in the hills, as if his plan were to open a new way, instead of exploring what he had been told was the old one, when by good luck he hit upon a route which not only was suitable for transport- ing artillery, but which had formerly been used for that purpose. The proof of this, which he regarded as incontest- able, was that a way had been cleared to make a wide road, something that would not have been done in this part of the world for any other reason. As a result of this dis- covery it was clear that an excellent route existed, especially if use were made of the rivers there ; it could be done wholly by land, but at considerable labor and expense, as a stretch I \ of five or six leagues would have to be cleared. Crame had a little more to do in order to complete his exploration, and was making a map, so that his description of the country might be more clearly understood. ^^ *^ Bucarely to Arriaga, Feb. 24, ports of that country, of the possibility 1774. C-2551. of commercial development, and of the *i C-2502. Crame referred also to advantages that would accrue, if trade the possibility of an interoceanic canal with Peru might avail itself of such across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. a canal, thus permitting the entire This could be made, he said, by cutting commerce of both Americas to centre a space only eight or nine leagues long, upon one point. Crame had in mind, and making one tunnel, thus joining no doubt, that, as things were, there two rivers flowing into opposite seas. were two centres of trade, Vera Cruz This led him to a consideration of the and Porto Bello, whereas the canal C wm(» l^t€can((0eme. y cutout • n, . „ , ^ .* /t. The Crame Map of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 1774. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 231 Evincing much pleasure over Cramers achievement, Bu- carely forwarded his statement to Arriaga, January 27, 1774, again remarking that it formed part of a plan, along with the P6rez and Anza expeditions, to oppose superior forces to those which the Russians might create in the Pacific.'*^ Writing again, March 27, 1774, Bucarely noted a new use that might be made of the Tehuantepec route, besides the one originally contemplated. Cramers map having been completed, he was forwarding it so as to show how easily goods might be carried that way both for use in Alta California and to assist in the explorations, or for other purposes, at less expense than the existing method by means of the Department of San Bias, and in less time than if reliance were placed on voyages from Manila. No authentic documents had been found to prove a former communication from sea to sea at Tehuantepec, but there were cannon at Vera Cruz which had been cast in Manila, Crame had found proofs of the use of the Tehuantepec route to transport cannon, and there was a tradition to the same effect in that country. Furthermore, Cortes had built ships there for voyages to the Californias, and he must have made use of the Crame route to transport his materials. All of these notices might be of some use in resolving what to do to check the Russians.'*^ Cramers map will explain Bucarely's interest in the Tehuantepec route better than anything else.^^ Between the departure of Perez for the north and his return, late in 1774, there was a long gap when Bucarely's interest in the affairs of Alta California and its retention against foreign foes was more directly concerned with matters affecting an overland route, and with the de- velopment of the province, as by his projected settlement of San Frdncisco. He seemed willing to await the re- sult of Perezes voyage before engaging further in naval ventures. The authorities in Spain, however, were in a measure roused to a fear of both the Russians and the Eng- would permit of there being one prin- <* C-2520. cipal port as a base for both New Spain " C-2597. and Peru. ** For the map, A.G.I. , vitrina. 232 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X lish by the resurrection of Lacy's April 23 letter of the pre- vious year. This came about as a result of another letter from Lacy; , January 25, 1774, which made references to the Russian discoveries in Kamchatka.^^ We may now take up the much neglected letter of April 23^ 1773. An emissary of Lacy'sKd come upon a civilized native of Kamchatka, then in St. Petersburg, and the latter had made the following statements : The Russians knew, as early as 1770, of the Spanish expeditions of 1769 to Alta California, and they were afraid lest Spain might threaten Russia's possessions. There was some talk of making an agreement with the English, who were also interested, to check Spain's advances, but when a report came that Spain had reached only 48° [sic], whereas the Russian possessions were in 64° and 65°, the Russians concluded that the Spaniards did not know of their settlements, and undertook no measures against them. The Russians had expected English help, because the Hudson's Bay Company was extending its possessions westward to the vicinity of the Russian settle- ments. The English company already had settlements all the way from Hudson and Baffin bays to the Pacific, and it was carrying on an extensive trade with the Indians. Its employes hindered everybody, even other Englishmen, from entering its territories, and the Russians had cause for complaint, because it won over tribes which had been disposed to join with the Russians, and overcame Russian efforts at winning the friendship of the natives, whenever they got too near the company's possessions. The Russians not only had a settlement on the American mainland, but also had several very large ones on different islands. The islands were part of a great archipelago extending south- ward to the equator, including the islands of Japan. This information, said Lacy, confirmed what he had said in his letter of March 19, 1773. C learly^ the Ru ssians were already in the Californias, not far from the Spanish settle- ments. and he believed that it was 'a "matter of the greatest importance to checK them. "^ On this point it might be well « C-2514. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 233 to know that the Russians had been obliged to abandon the land of the Yakutskis, because of the hostility of that people.^^ Not until April 30, 1774, did Grimaldi take action on this letter, when he wrote to Arriaga that he was in doubt whether he had sent him a copy before. But, " considering the importance of these notices,'' he felt that he need not apologize for sending a copy again, if he had previously done so. He also enclosed copies of two maps sent by Lacy, one of which had been forwarded before in Grimaldi's letter of June 13, 1773, and another, in German, sent by Lacy with his letter of January 25, 1774."*^ The latter showed the discovery by the Russians of a new archipelago in the Pacific.'*^ Arriaga acknowledged Grimaldi's letter of June 1,^^ and, two weeks later, forwarded copies of Lacy's letter and a translation of the German map to Bucarejy, with instructions that the latter was not to lose sight of the Rus- sian objects.^" By another letter, June^^SS/ 17747"Arrragar informed Bucarely that he still thought the danger of a Russian approach to the Spanish dominions in New Spain very distant* He had approved all of Bucarely's measures, but thought there would be time enough in which to check the Russians if Spain should proceed in the normal way. He specifically referred to the Crame and P6rez expeditions, however, as well adapted to procure the results for which they had been undertaken.^^ Bucarely 's reply of September 28, 1774, is further evi- dence to show in what estimation he held the reports of Russian and English aggressions, and shows also what he was doing to meet them. He was inclined to treat Lacy's report as absurd, as far as it dealt with the extension of the Hudson's Bay Company's possessions to proximity with ^«C-2221. More likely the Chukchis as the one already forwarded by him were meant, rather than the Yakutskis. September 25, 1773. Bucarely's letter "7 0-2615. Grimaldi said that the of September 28, 1774 (C-2732), re- first-mentioned map had been forwarded marks the failure to enclose the sup- in Lacy's letter of June 13, 1773. This posed Lacy map of June 13, 1773. seems to have been a slip for his own ^ The map is not in the file, letter of that date. It will be noted "^ C-2636. that Arriaga did not 'at this time send ^ C-2649. Bucarely a copy of the map referred " A.G.I., 146-4-2. to, probably because it was the same 234 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA^ [Ch. X those of Russia. This had the same appearances of in- vention as the pretended voyage from Hudson Bay to the Pacific about which so much had been pubhshed.^^ Referring to his own letters about conditions in Alta CaHfornia, the voyage of P6rez, Anza^s discovery of a route from Sonora and his return, and the explorations of the Rio Coatzacoalcos to Tehuantepec by Crame, he repeated that all of these activities had the same object. They were being executed at the same time, and were evidence that his sole intention was to prevent the possibility of foreign danger to Spain's possessions of the Pacific coast. He was building a new boat at San Bias, and planning a new expedition by way of the Anza route to occupy the port of San Francisco. First, however, it was necessary to consult with Anza, and to learn the results of Perez's voyage. He was also suspending the change in location of the Sonora presidios, until he could decide whether there should be one at the confluence of the Colorado and Gila, in which case Sonora would require six presidios instead of four.^^ Meanwhile, preparations for a second expedition by the Anza route to Alta California were going on, although not much was done until after Anza's arrival in Mexico early in November. At about the same time Bucarely got news of Perez's return, the Santiago having reached San Bias on November 3. We have seen that P6rez had sailed from San Bias on January 24, 1774, bound for Monterey. At the same time, Anza was making the first of his expeditions to Alta California. When Anza reached San Gabriel, March 22, 1774, he learned that Perez was at San Diego, and there- fore sent a force there to obtain provisions. One of the men in that party was a soldier named Juan Bautista Valdes, who, a httle later, was sent back over the Anza route to Mexico with Anza's despatches to Bucarely. Upon Valdes' arrival in June, Bucarely ordered Melchor de Peramas to take a dep- " This may refer to a voyage from and much was written, many English the Pacific by a transcontinental strait, writers believing that the voyage had supposed to have been made in 1640 been made. It is now utterly dis- by an Admiral Fonte. Much interest credited, was taken in England, in the eighteenth ^ C-2732. century, in accounts of this voyage, 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 235 osition from him. Vald^s stated that he had seen the Santiago at San Diego, and had gone on board. All were well. The boat had been there two weeks, having stopped at Serra's request, he said, in order that supplies might be left at the southern missions. Vald^s seemed ignorant of the pur- poses of the voyage, stating that the Santiago had come to bring provisions. New masts were being cut for the Santi- ago, the old ones being too high, although in other respects the frigate was a good one. He had seen Serra, who was well and had started overland for Monterey.^* Writing to Arriaga, June 26, 1774, Bucarely evinced displeasure at the news of Perezes stop at San Diego, because his orders were against doing so, unless in great necessity, and it was for that reason that he had caused the Valdes declaration to be taken. The Santiago seemed to have had an easy voy- age, and to have stopped either at Serra's request or because of the excessive length of the mast. Serra had been willing to be set down at Monterey when he started. Bucarely was waiting to hear further as to the cause for this stop.^^ By September 26, 1774, Bucarely had learned that P6rez had started north from Monterey, and he so informed Arriaga.^^ Perez had gone on to Monterey, reaching there May 9, and setting sail again on June 11. He did not reach 60° as instructed to do, but got to about 55° ;■ he did not land to take possession for Spain, nor was he able to make good observations of the coast, due to bad weather and fog; furthermore, he found no foreign establislwPafiBiiSt-^tim:..p]:^ thattheydid not exist. He turned south, July 22, 1774, reached Monterey on August 27, and left there for San Bias on October 9. While Bucarely had not learned what he had wished to learn, he considered that Perez had gained much useful information. Writing to Arriaga, November 26, 1774, he said that Perez had reached 55° 49', where he conversed and bartered with Indians who came to the ship in canoes, and the same thing occurred in 49°. He had " Vald^s, Declaration, June 14, 1774. "s C-2656. C-2648. B6 C-2719. 236 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X been obliged to return because of fogs and cold, a fear that the fresh water might give out, and his suspicion of an unknown coast, but he had accomplished much more than Bucarely had expected of a first expedition. The information obtained would help in future voyages, and was some evidence that there were no foreign establishments in the nineteen degrees that he had covered, north of the Spanish settle- ments. The Indians seemed to have been the same as those mentioned in the accounts of the Russian expedition of 1741. They were docile, but more advanced than those encountered hitherto by Spaniards ; for example, they wore clothes. He would immediately follow up this voyage by preparing others, and he had already ordered the Santiago to refit for another voyage. This time it was not to stop at San Diego or Monterey. Bruno de Heceta was to be in command, with P^rez as pilot and second in authority, and with the same crew. Heceta was to bear similar instruc- tions to those given to P6rez, particular stress being laid upon his reaching a higher latitude, examining as much of the coast as possible on his return, and taking possession for Spain wherever he might land. After unloading provisions at Monterey, Lieutenant Miguel Manrique, in the Principe^ was to explore the port of San Francisco, for, said Bucarely, ''I regard the occupation of this port as indispensable, and to facilitate it I intend that Anza, who is now at this capital, shall return to Sonora and make a second entradaJ^ ^^ With this letter Bucarely forwarded a copy of Perez's diary and other documents emanating from those who had taken part in the voyage.^^ In another letter of November 26, Bucarely was able to say that he had already appointed a chaplain for the new voyage, and he was about to call a junta to determine what fund should pay the expenses of maritime expeditions of discovery.^^ Replying to these letters, February 14, 1775, Arriaga gave his approval to Bucarely's plans for a new voyage.^" Bucarely wrote yet another letter on November 26, 1774, " C-2763. 69 C-2765. 6s C-2645, 2681, 2757. «o C-2848. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 237 one to General O'Reilly^ which merits particular attention. O^Reilly and Bucarely seem to have been warm personal friends. Evidence of this is to be found in two legajos of correspondence of the viceroy, now in the Archivo General de Indias (88-5-17 and 88-5-18). The first of these legajos is composed for the most part of the O'Reilly-Bucarely correspondence between 1769 and 1775, with scattering let- ters for other years. During this period each wrote to the other every month, and but few of their letters are missing. Bucarely's letters are horradores, or drafts, and O'Reilly's are signed with his name and rubric. In each case the body of the letter is in the hand of a clerk, with corrections by Bucarely or O'Reilly, but there are lengthy postscripts in their own hands and in some cases entire letters. Al- though intimately personal, they dealt mostly with the affairs in New Spain, O'Reilly's interest being explained by the fact that he himself wished to become viceroy, and Bucarely wished it no less. One of the most surprising disclosures of the correspondence, in view of Bucarely's re- markable activity and efficiency as viceroy, is the fact that he would have preferred to return to Spain from Havana instead of going to Mexico, and that he desired all along to retire, if his post could be obtained for O'Reilly. The correspondence is also of interest from the standpoint of the proportions given to the various affairs of the viceroyalty. From this we are able to see that Bucarely s poke the truth when he said that the matters having to do with checking the Russians were occupying his principal attention. Indeed events on the northern frontier and nortJiwest coast were almost the only affairs of the viceroyalty that he discussed, and especially the matters dealt with most largely in this volume. One oddity may be noticed. O'Reilly never failed to inquire concerning his friend Hugo Oconor, and to urge that special favor be shown to him. Thus Oconor and his work get more space than any other single factor. O'Reilly's defeat before Algiers may explain why he failed to become viceroy of New Spain. Bucarely 's letter to O'Reilly of November 26, 1774, aside 238 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X from its paragraph about Oconor, is almost wholly devoted to his own activities against the Russians. Here again lie speaks of having undertaken the Anza, Crame, and P^rez expeditions to counteract the Russian danger. Perez had reached the very place where the Russians were in 1741. He had discovered some new tribes of Indians, and had ascertained that for four hundred leagues north of Monterey there was no reason to suspect the existence of f preigA estab- lishments. The rest of the coast would presently be ex- plored, and Bucarely would lose no time in making fresh investigations which would make the path of glory easy for his successor.^^ Notwithstanding the pressure of arranging for the second Anza expedition, Bucarely did not delay the preparations for new voyages of discovery. On December 27, 1774, he wrote several letters about the course of maritime explora- tion. In one he advised Arriaga that he was sending some articles which P^rez had obtained in trade with the Indians of 55° 49', enclosing an inventory of these goods.^^ These showed the Indians to be far advanced from barbarism; for example, the list included blankets, a fur cap, a woven hat, and a purse. Bucarely recommended that Perez be promoted, as an incentive to others.^^ In another letter he wrote of his plan for the northward voyage of the Santiago. As in the CBse of Perez's voyage, extra supplies were to be forwarded to Alta California to provide for the possible need of the Santiago. Perez and Hijosa had suggested that it would be well for the Sonora to accompany the Santiago, and Bucarely had accepted the suggestion, asking Heceta of the Santiago to name a commander for the other boat from the naval officers sent from Spain. These officers were now in Mexico, but they would very soon be ready to start west. Bucarely was also hurrying forward a supply of arms and ammunition, by forced marches. Not only was Manrique to explore the port of San Francisco, but Heceta had also been ordered to do so upon his return, by « C-2771. O'Reilly was expected «« C-2784 is the inventory, to be his successor. es C-2783. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 239 which time Bucarely thought that it might already be occu- pied by the troops that Anza was to conduct there. Heceta carried the same instructions as Perez, except that he was not to stop at Monterey going north, unless in case of necessity. He was to reach 65°, if possible, before approach- ing the coast, and then explore as he came south. He was to avoid foreign settlements, if there were any, and to take formal possession elsewhere, when possible. Under no circumstances was he to make a settlement, but he was to get further information about the Indians found by Perez, in particular whether they had any commerce, and whether the goods they exchanged with Perez were of their own make or bought from others. Parties were to be sent ashore, but not inland --nor in any way exposed to the treachery of the Indians. AH that was desired was to accustom the Indians to good treatment by the Spaniards, and to get in- formation from them.^^ The same day Bucarely wrote to O'Reilly telling of preparations for the voyages of discovery, again remarking that the northern lands would thus be explored for the benefit of his successor, and the Spanish court reassured concerning the explorations of the Russians. ^^ Three months later, March 27/1775, Bucarely wrote that the Santia^ and Sonora had sailed for the north on March 16. With them went the San Carlos with provisions for "Monterey, charged also with the duty of exploring San Francisco Bay.^^ Another letter of the same date advised that Manrique had gone insane, and had had to be put, ashore, wherefore Ayala w as succeeding him in command of the San Carlos, his place on the Sonora being taken by Bodega y Cuadra. All six naval officers sent from Spain, including Manrique, had thus far manifested the greatest zeal.^^ Meanwhile, Arriaga seems to have become unusually excited over possible foreign establishments on the Pacific coast. Writing to Bucarely, December 23, 1774, he said that the king had directed him to give secret orders to the « C-2780. «« C-2874. 6s C-2782. « C-2875. 240 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X viceroy to dislodge any foreign enemies found on the coasts of the CaHfornias. Bucarely was to ask them to go, and if they refused, he was to drive them away by force.^^ In reply Bucarely wrote, April 26, 1775, that Perezes voyage had indicated that there were no settlements for twenty degrees north of Monterey, except of Indians who appeared less barbarous than those hitherto met with, but to make more sure, he had planned new expeditions. Anza had been directed to occupy San Francisco, and boats had been sent northward with provisions for Alta California, and to carry on explorations. He deemed it best to await the results of these expeditions, rather than engage in new ones which might be profitless without the information about to be gained, as well as expensive.^® Perez's voyage had aroused considerable interest in Spain. Upon receipt of Bucarely 's letter of November 26, 1774, Arriaga sent that and Perez's diary to Vicente Doz,^^ June 1, 1775, asking his opinion relative to future dis- coveries, and how far away he thought the Russians might be.'^^ Doz's answer shows a remarkable grasp of the situa- tion. He had read of all the Russian voyages of discovery to North America, he said, especially the last one, thatjiL Alexei Chirikof in 1741, which reached land in ^^^S^^Ti^' latituae and iJl8° longitude, reckoning from Pari^. Perez claimed to have reached 55° 40' latitude and 221^° longi-" tude. The difference in longitude stated was only forty leagues, and that might be due to an error in reckoning. Thus, they must have reached land at the same place. Perez's men saw Indians with half of a bayonet and a piece of sword ; doubtless these articles had belonged to some of the ten men sent ashore by Chirikof who did not return. Chirikof, being unable to land, had returned with the coast always in sight to a gulf in 51° 12', which was only twelve degrees of longitude from Kamchatka. His and P6rez's diaries together proved therefore that the Cali- 68 C-2777. 69 C-2893. to observe the transit of Venus from ™ Doz was a Spanish astronomer who San Jos6 del Cabo. Humboldt, Polit- accorapanied the Frenchman, Chappe ical essay, I, liii and 222. d'Auteroche, to Baja California in 1769 ^^ C-2928. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 241 fornias ran northwest by north up to 60° ; then west ; then south six hundred leagues to the said gulf, where America ended, one hundred fifty leagues from the Russian posses- sions ; then north and northeast, forming a channel with the eastern coast of Asia of not more than one hundred leagues in width in some places, according to some of the Russian voyagers. As to future discoveries, it would not be possible to pass 60°, unless a strait were found separating the land dis- covered by the Russians from the continent of America. The Russians had always been desirous of encroaching upon the Spanish domains in North America, but they had failed repeatedly in their attempts from Archangel, nor had their voyages from Kamchatka been altogether successful. Bering perished, and so did most of Chirikof^s crew and the astronomer, De L'Isle. These misfortunes, the sterility of Kamchatka, and the slight civilization of the inhabitants of Kamchatka would protect Spain for the present. The English were quite as eager in seeking a northwest passage, as the Russians in their designs, nor had they suffered fewer misfortunes. Hudson and Baffin had proved to the English the fruitlessness of their undertaking, but a way to the Pacific might possibly be found, not by a strait, but by way of the rivers. The violent currents that P^rez encountered might come from some great river, and it might even be the one which the French reported as having its source near the Missouri River. De LTsle thought that river might empty into the Pacific, and Mliller reckoned its mouth as in the vicinity of the place where P6rez encountered the currents. It would therefore be well to examine that bay to see whether there might prove to be a passage. Al- though Perez explored between Cape Mendocino and 50°, he had said nothing about the two entrances said to have been found by Aguilar and Fuca between 42° and 48°, which was some evidence that they did not exist, but as bad weather and fog had prevented Perez's seeing a great part of the coast, it would be well to make a second explora- tion to uproot this preoccupation of the geographers.^^ 7> Doz to Arriaga, June 21, 1775. C-2929. 242 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X On receiving this communication Arriaga wrote to Bu- carely, June 23, 1775, approving all that he had done for the second voyage of exploration.^^ A few days later, July 8, he acknowledged receipt of the news of departure of the two boats for the north 7^ On receiving Bucarely's letter of April 26, Arriaga seems to have forgotten the ap- proval recently given by him. Replying on August 26, he asked why the instructions to Heceta were at variance with his order of December 23, 1774, calling for the expulsion of foreigners from the coasts of the Calif ornias. He was ob- jecting to the paragraphs requiring Heceta to avoid com- ing in contact with foreign establishments or foreign ships other than to get information about them.^^ Bucarely's answer is not at hand, but he might have said that the order referred to did not reach Mexico until after the San- tiago and Sonora had sailed, to say nothing of Arriaga's approval of June 23. However, it could not have been an issue of importance, because the viceroy was able soon to report the return of the two ships and that they had come upon no foreign establishments. Before that time, however, Bucarely had made a report, August 27, 1775, as to the cost of the voyages. The P^rez voyage had cost 15,455 pesos y 4 reales, 11 granos, and the voyage then being made by Heceta and Bodega had called for 36,740 pesos, 2 granos, the total for the two being 52,195 pesos, 5 reales, 1 grano. San Bias had paid for all, although chargeable only with 20,000 pesos, wherefore Bucarely had ordered the additional sum returned to that department.^® Both the expense and the method of satisfy- ing it received the royal approval.^^ This matter is worthy of more than passing comment. Much has been said of the unwillingness or inability of the Spanish government to expend money. Yet for these voyages and the many other projects of Bucarely considerable sums jvere required. ^^ shows either a more pronounced fear than appears from the " C-2930. 78 C-2978. ">* C-2951. " Arriaga to Bucarely, Dec. 22, 1775. 75 C-2969. C-3050. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS ^ 243 documents, or else a reviyal_jof„energ^^^ ^P^^ ^9£?^ from theTii^ire" TEe latter view impresses the writer more strongly. Arriaga had found a maii w¥o "^co^^ done, things too that were worth doing, and he gave him free play. We have seen that the Santiago, Sonora, and San Carlos left San Bias for the north on March 16, 1775. The two former went in company until July 30, when they parted. Heceta_in_the__)San^i^^ about to 49°, usually keeping near the shore and anchoring often. In the course of his exploration he came upoii the„ mouth of the Columbia River. The sickness of many of the crew compelled his return, so that by August 29 he was already at Monterey. Bodega went nearly to 58°, made a thorough survey from the limit of P6rez's voyage, and landed twice to take posses- sion. As usual on such voyages many of the crew were now sick with scurvy, and besides, provisions were failing. So the Sonora was turned southward, and, exploring the coast as best it could, made for Monterey and reached there on October 7. Neither vessel had found any Russians. Ayala in the San Carlos had in the meantime „made_. a-,thorougIi exgloration of San Francisco Bay, and returned to San Bias shortly before the other two vessels, while Heceta and Bodega got there on November 20. The results of these voyages were set forth at length by Bucarely in four letters of November 26, 1775, to Arriaga, all written before he learned of the arrival of Heceta and Bodega at San Bias, but based on reports which they had forwarded by Ayala in the San Carlos, In the first he wrote generally of all three voyages, telling of the latitude reached by them, and of Ayala's exploration of San Francisco Bay.^^ His second letter dealt with the voyage of Ayala."^^ Among its enclosures was a letter to him from Ayala, November 9, 1775, also about San F rancisc o Bayj saying that it was the best port that he had.SfifiJX.from Cape Horn north.^^ The third letter treated of Heceta's 78 C-3032. 7, 1776, of the exploration of San,Fran- 7' C-3033. Cisco Bay, with a description of the bay. «» C-3028. The other enclosure was a C-2985. report by Josfe de Cafiizares, September 244 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X voyage,^^ and the fourth of Bodega^s.^^ A month later, on December 27, 1775, Bucarely informed Arriaga of the return of Heceta and Bodega, and recommended the commanders and pilots of all the vessels engaged in the recent explora- tions.^^ One of the pilots, whom Bucarely had also recom- mended in one of his November 26 letters, was no longer alive to benefit by the royal favor. On the second day out from Monterey, on the voyage back to San Bias, there had occurred the death of Juan P^rez, This news was conveyed by the same mail of December 27.^^ The promotions rec- ommended were shortly afterward authorized. ^^ To return to the status of opinion in Spain : Doz's able and complacent view of the situation in comparing the P6rez voyage with those of the Russians may well have lulled Arriaga into a feeling of security. Lacy in Russia was far from that state of mind, however, and now bombarded Grimaldi with a fresh series of letters about Russian activi- ties in the Pacific. No evidence has come to hand to show that his communications were ever forwarded to Bucarely, but they did reach Arriaga. They will therefore be re- corded here. In a letter dated April 31 [sic], 1775, Lacy wrote Grimaldi that Perez's voyage was causing some uneasiness at the Russian court. If the Spanish ships were approaching Kamchatka, he suggested that they get in touch with the Chukchis, a people whom the Russians had not been able to conquer, whose hatred for the Russians was so great that they would be likely to give information to the Span- iards.^^ In a communication dated May 1, 1775, Lacy enclosed a document tending to confirm what he had said previously concerning Russian commerce and discoveries 81 C-3034. This enclosed a number Heceta and Bodega in taking possession of documents forwarded by Heceta for Spain of places where they landed, from Monterey. C-2816, 2967, 3003-5. with maps of the ports entered. Most 8* C-3035. An account by Bodega of these documents enclosed in these was enclosed. Bodega to Bucarely, two letters are to be found in A.G.I. , Oct. 13, 1775. C-3006. Estado, Aud. Mex., legajo 19. 83 C-3057. With this letter he for- »* C-3062. warded the diaries kept by the com- ^ Gdlvez to Bucarely, Feb. 28, 1776. mander, pilot, and chaplain of each C-3157. ship. Another letter of the same date, »« C-2900. C-3058, forwarded the official acts of 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 245 in America. He had also verified it through the state- ments of merchants engaged in the commerce of which the document treated, and by the most secret methods. Being '^very much persuaded that these discoveries cannot do less than cause a notable revolution, in time, in the com- merce of Europe," he would continue to be vigilant. The Russian government had learned of the Perez voyage through an account in the Leyden Gazette of March 21, 1775.^^ The enclosed document stated that the Russians had discovered from the north of California to 67°. In 1 763 a company jQif jtwenty Russian merchants was f prrned for trade with Kamchatka and the islands already discovered and those to be discovered. This compaixy;-,had.i/WO^attle- ments in Kamchatk a, and had come upon many populous islands in 1764 and 1766 on the western coast of America. The company^s capital had increased from 10,000 rubles in 1763 to 60,000 in 1772,^^ and the furs and other products obtained by this company in 1773 ^® were valued at 300,000 rubles. Between 1768 and 1773 they sent seven frigates to the west coast of North America, one in 1768, two in 1770, one in 1772, and three in 1773 ; the boats of 1772 and 1773 had not yet returned. This company had no fixed settle- ment in America, but landed Cossacks there to hunt. The commerce of Kamchatka bore a considerable relation to that with America and neighboring islands, continued Lacy, and was therefore worthy of mention. In 1755 the Russian trade in Kamchatka did not exceed 10,000 rubles and it had already increased 300 per cent. They got cloth and other manufactured goods from Russia and Siberia. There were more than 3000 people in Kamchatka and dependent islands (exclusive of the newly discovered ones on the coast of North America), who paid tribute to the crown in furs of a total annual value of more than 20,000 rubles.^^ Two months later, June 26, 1775, Lacy forwarded a map of Russian discoveries in America, being a copy made ^ C-2901. posed of that year in Kamchatka, for 88 At present a ruble is worth about the boats of 1773 had not yet returned. 77 cents. m For the enclosure, C-2902. 8° Lacy probably meant those dis- 246 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X by Mtiller, to whom Lacy referred as the head of the archive of foreign affairs in Russia, and a celebrated geographer of that empire. At the same time he enclosed a document relative to those discoveries, translated from the Russian into French by Miiller, which gave information of all the islands of the archipelago in that part of the world.^^ Mul- ler^s note related to the Russian discoveries in the Pacific between 1764 and 1767. He commented upon the general awakening of European interest in the Pacific at that time, this being an important period for French and English discoveries farther south, while Russia was discovering new lands and inhabited islands in the north. The Russian 'discoveries began with Ivan IV (1533-84), who conquered Siberia, and sent an expedition to explore its northern and eastern frontiers, which returned in the next reign, having found the sea at both points. Mtiller had found documents in the Siberian archives showing that in a subsequent ex- ploration along the Arctic coasts, one man reached Kam- chatka. He must therefore have passed through Bering Strait.^^ Discoveries stopped during the troublous times of the usurpers, Boris and Demetrius, but were resumed in the reign of Peter I (1672-1725). He sent one body of explorers along the northern coast of Siberia, and others up the eastern coast of Kamchatka to see if they would meet, and to discover new lands and islands. It was not until 1728, however, that Danadisiki Bay in 66° was reached,®' this being accomplished by Captain Bering. Later, Chiri- kof reached the coast of America, and Spanberg discovered the Kurile Islands, a great archipelago north of Japan. It was reserved for Catherine II (1762-96) to charter a com- pany of Russian merchants to engage in commerce with the new islands and discover others. There were twelve in this company, to each of whom the empress had given a gold medal, while orders were given to her officers in Okhotsk to assist them in every way. Thus far, they had discovered a number of islands, from which came their »i C-2944. " That is to say, America and Asia 9* A reference, probably, to the were proved to be separated. Deshnef expedition, 1648-50. 1773] FOREIGN AGGRESSIONS 247 principal profits in furs. In 1764 the company sent out ships from Okhotsk under Lieutenant Lynd, who discovered a number of islands between 56° and 57°, returning late in 1767. As a result a new map was published in 1768, which appeared again in the publications of the Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg in 1773. Mtiller himself had made an even more striking map, showing all of the voyages and discoveries since the time of Bering, and the size, posi- tion, and in part the names of the islands. As regards products, dress, and speech, the islands and their inhabitants between 50° and 55° resembled those of the Kurile Islands ; between 55° and 60° the people almost exactly resembled the natives of Kamchatka ; between 60° and 70° they differed a little from the other sections. In all of these islands the people were very much like those discovered by the English and French in the middle of the Pacific. Beyond the islands discovered were others not yet occupied by the Rus- sian argonauts, but a number of ships sent out in recent years had not yet returned. The present commander in Kam- chatka, Timafey Tschemalow (Chemaloff) had 1120 men under his orders, as follows : 300 soldiers ; 706 natives of Kamchatka; and 114 men in some of the Kuriles. A certain major, of Polish origin, in the government mining service of Siberia had informed Mtiller that the Russians had no settlements on the American coasts, although they were sending some vessels there every year, as well as to the new archipelago .^^ These letters of Lacy were forwarded to Arriaga by Grimaldi in letters respectively of October 4,^^ and October 21, 1775.^^ It is strange if no copies were forwarded to Bucarely ; if they were not, it is evidence of a lack of anxiety on the part of the Spanish government ; if they were, Bu- carely seems not to have become excited, or otherwise, some hint would have appeared in his letters on kindred matters. With the return of Heceta and Bodega, whatever crisis there was had passed. Other voyages were planned, as will be pointed out, but they were not to be made until the . »*C-2945. '8C-3002. »• C-3014. 248 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. X situation had completely changed. In January^ 1776, Julidn de Arriaga died, and was succeeded as ministro general by Jos6 de Gdlvez. Great as the latter had been as visitddor, he was not to succeed equally well, in New Spain at any rate, as ministro general. His promotion meant the virtual removal of Bucarely from the direction of frontier affairs. Although this did not take effect until the end of 1776, that year marks a transition to a later period, as re- gards the northwest voyages, rather than the culmination of Bucarely's work. Discussion of such events for 1776, therefore, belongs more appropriately to that part of this work which introduces the new regime. CHAPTER XI SPANISH ATTENTION TO LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALiFORNiAs; 1773-1775 BucARELY^s work of a more local character concerning the Californias may be grouped under two principal heads : the remission of supplies; and the matter of forming a reglamento for the Californiag. As to the first, it will be shown that Bucarely's care and foresight narrowly averted a possible failure of the Alta California establishments. As to the second, a provisional reglamento was formed, which with some modifications was to endure a number of years, although at no time considered adequate. It was sufiicient, however, to bring order out of chaos. The matter of the reglamento occupied considerable attention of the Council of the Indies, being complicated by a consider- ation of Bucarely's division of the Californias between the Franciscans and the Dominicans. Most active in the discussion was Jos6 de Gdlvez, whose opinions were able to sway the Council. He opposed the division, and planned a most ambitious programme of northwestward advance, the central idea being the development and consequent strengthening of the Californias, so that they might serve as a secure bulwark for New Spain. In most respects he recom- mended sustaining Bucarely^s action, and this was the only practical result of his plans. The Californias remained di- vided, and Galvez's plans seem not to have been put into full effect. Bucarely's measures, however, were working toward the same end. One of the most important factors in the preservation of the j^lta California establishments was that of the annual^ 249 ' ^ 250 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI vis it of the supply-sh ips from San Bias. An overland route was necessary, for the use of animals and settlers, and was contemplated for the sending of food-supplies as well, but as regards goods and effects the San Bias boats were for many years practically the sole support of the province. In the period treated here they were also the chief resort for food-supplies. If the overland route was a vital neces- sity in order to establish the province on a permanent basis, so also were these ships, without which Alta California must certainly have been abandoned. As already noted, Alta California was barely saved in 1770, and again in 1772, by the timely arrival of supplies from San Bias. The same thing was to occur for the third time in 1774. Bucarely informed Arriaga, June 26, 1773, of the departure of the San Carlos with provisions for San Diego and Monterey. He planned to send another ship in November, although he understood that the Californias were already well provided with supplies.^ A month later, July 27, 1773, when he had already received some of the reports about the Californias that he had asked for, he wrote of new arrangements that he had made for the voy- ages, the difficulty of navigation from the mainland to both Alta and Baja California having caused him to seek a remedy. From reports made to him he had learned that December or the beginning of January was the best season for voyages to Monterey, all the year except April to the middle of June for the voyage to San Diego, and all the year, but especially January, for those to Loreto. San Bias was too hot and damp a place in which to store maize, which formed the principal part of the supplies for the Californias, without exposing it to risk of damage, where- fore as crops were gathered in January, it would be best to put them aboard direct. The rest of the cargo could be gathered beforehand. Bucarely had given orders in accord with these conclusions, making provision also that boats should leave San Bias in January, if possible, or early in February, at latest. This was to be not only for the year 1 C-2304. Approved in C-2405. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 251 1774, but also for ensuing years.^ For these reasons and also because of Bucarely's belief that the Californias had abundant supplies, the November ship was not sent. Writ- ing to Arriaga, September 26, 1773, he said that the San Carlos had been unable to make the voyage to Alta Cali- fornia on account of the storms that it encountered in at- tempting to round Cape San Lucas. Having lost its rud- der and sprung a leak, it put in at Loreto, discharged its cargo there, and returned to San Bias for repairs. This would have caused him anxiety over the needs of Alta Cali- fornia, had it not been that the pilots and the commissary, Campo, informed him that Governor Barry had offered to supply the northern establishments by land with as much as they needed. Moreover, he had heard from Fages that there was already enough to last for the rest of the year 1773.^ Shortly afterward, Bucarely was confirmed in his belief that all was going well by a letter from Father Verger announcing progress in Alta California, saying that crops were good, and that many converts were being obtained,^ which news Bucarely in turn transmitted to Arriaga, November 26, 1773.^ On January 27, 1774, Bucarely wrote to Arriaga that Perez in the Santiago had probably started already on his voyage of exploration to the northwest. Francisco Hijosa, who had become the commissary at San Bias, had written to him on January 5, that the boat was provisioned for a year, in addition to supplies that it was carrying to Monterey. In order to provide for every possible contin- gency, with Perez's needs particularly in mind, Bucarely had ordered the Principe to sail for San Diego and Mon- terey as soon as possible with more provisions,® and on April 26, 1774, he was able to announce that it had sailed on March 21. It had been delayed for repairs necessi- tated by the size of cargo that it was to carry ; for, not only was it to bear supplies for the missions and presidios of Alta California, but also a copious store for the Santiago, in case 2 C-2332. Approved in C-2447. * C-2425 » C-2396. 8 C-2441. « C-2521 . i 252 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI that boat should be obHged to put back from its northwest- ward voyage, or for its use when it should return. Bu- carely had ordered the repairs to be made promptly, so that the Frinci'pe might sail before the season of good weather should pass. Hijosa's letter of March 24 telling of its de- parture reported it to be laden with as much provisions as it could carry ; so Bucarely felt sure that there would be enough to supply Alta California for many months, and to help Perez's expedition, if needed.^ In forwarding Pa- lou's report of December 10, 1773, on the status of the Alta California missions, Bucarely wrote Arriaga, May 27, 1774, that he was much pleased with the progress of conversions, and manifested a belief that much more might be expected, since the natives were so numerous and the lands so fertile. The greatest obstacle had been a lack of provisions with which to maintain the Indians at the missions during the period of instruction. This lack should be remedied in a measure by the provisions in the Santiago and Principe^ as also by the crops of Alta California. The anxiety of the missionaries should be relieved by the arrival of Serra, for he had been told that the needs of the missions would be sup- plied.^ In another letter of the same date, Bucarely stated that he had ordered a new keel laid at San Bias, because it was too great a risk to rely on the frigate and two packet- boats for the Alta Cahfornia voyages.^ It may be ob- served that the Palou memorial had not spoken of the danger of famine, although emphasizing the need for supplies. While Bucarely rested secure in the belief that Barry would forward to Alta California the provisions which the San Carlos had left at Loreto, no such thing had in fact occurred, for lack of the means to convey them. As a result, the new establishments had to endure the_j£orgt famine of their history, lasting eight months, during which time milk had to serve as the principal aliment of the col- onies. ^° At length, the San tiago reached San Diego, March "> C-2608. 9 C-2624. 8 C-2625. 10 Palou, Vida, 153. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 253 .13, 1774, and was able to leave provisions enough to tide over the situation until the arrival of the Principe. Other missions had to wait several weeks longer, until the pro- visions could be distributed from San Diego and Monterey, to which latter port P6rez arrived on May 9. To make clear just how serious were the straits to which the settle- ments had been reduced it will be well to quote some docu- ments of the period. Writing from San Gabriel, April 10, 1774, Anza told Bucarely that he had found a shortage of rations at that mission, although it was accounted the richest site in Alta California. Herbs and three tortillas apiece daily were all that was to be had in the way of food at that time.^^ Anza was himself in great need of provi- sions, but he was able to get little at San Gabriel. -^^ He, therefore, sent to San Diego for some, and procured a supply, the Santiago being still at that port.^^ Equally bad were conditions as regards food supply at the other missions. ^^ Nor was the want in Alta California solely a matter of food. This appears, for example, in the letters of Father Lasu^n of San Gabriel to Franciscans at the College of San Fernando. Lasuen had hoped to return there, but was resigned to staying in Alta California, if required to do so. He begged to be relieved, however, from the great hardship that he was suffering for lack of wearing 'ff apparel, which had already reached the point of indecency. ^"^ His clothes had been in continuous use for more than five years. He had mended them, until they no longer ad- mitted of it, and moreover, he no longer had materials for sewing. ^^ In another letter of the same date, April 23, 1774, Lasuen repeated the story of his needs. Perhaps it was on that account, he said, that the Indians cared for him so much, on the principle that like attracts like, for he resembled them much in scantiness of wardrobe.^^ Writ- " C-2603. 148 ; correspondence and diaries of 1' Palou, Noticias, III, 158, says Anza, Diaz, and Garces. that an animal was killed to provide »5 Lasuen to the Father Superior of Anza with meat, but that the mission San Fernando, Apr. 23, 1774. M.N., could give him nothing else. Doc. Rel. Mis. CaL, v. II. 13 Vald6s, Declaration, C-2648 ; Anza, i« Lasuen to Pangua, Apr. 23, 1774. Diary, C-2602. Ibid. '» Palou, Vida, 158; Noticias, III, i. ii 254 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI ing a general letter to his brethren of San Fernando, May 2, 1774, Lasuen said that Fathers Garces and Diaz of the Anza expedition had given him clothing, which would cover his nudity for several months ; the former gave him a thin flannel undergarment and cowl, and the latter a tunic and a pair of sandals.^^ Two letters from Rivera (successor of Fages) to Bucarely, June 16, 1774, show a ladk.of„nnlitaij' equipment and other necessaries at the pre- sidios. In one oT these letters he wrote that the forces at San Diego were in need of thirty guns,^^ twenty small swords, twenty knives, two cases of powder, one case of balls, one case of munitions, and two packs of tobacco. Monterey required twenty small swords, twenty knives, two cases of balls, one case of munitions, two cases of powder, and thirty guns. He wanted the guns to be examined before sent, to make sure they were good.^^ In the other letter he complained that the things forwarded from San Bias were not suited to the needs of the province. Articles asked for were not sent, leaving the men entirely lacking in some things that they needed, for which they had no other re- course, for example, in the matter of clothes. No carduroy had been sent, although the soldiers liked to use it because of its durability; nor had there been sent a cake of soap or a handful of Jbob-aciSi^ There was a great need for guns and smjill_ swpjd^- Some soldiers entirely lacked arms ; others had the gun, but not the sword, or vice versa. ^° Rivera's requests were considered in connection with the authorizing of a second Anza expedition, and Lasu^n's were a matter between him and his college. The general scarcity, however, especially in food supplies, was met by the arrival of the Santiago, followed a little later by the Principe. Thenceforth, Alta California. did not again suf- fer in that respect.^^ Her relief had come not only from " Lasu6n to Franciscans of San cavalrymen employed, and it hardly Fernando, May 2, 1774. Ibid. seems likely that "shot-gun" would ^8 The word escopeta is equivalent be an accurate rendering, to-day to "shot-gun." In the latter i" In C-2496. eighteenth century it seems to have ^ In C-2496, been used generally for such guns as 21 Palou, Vida, 158-59. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 255 Bucarely's foresight in sending the well-filled Santiago and the Principej in the face of favorable reports as to the situation in Alta California, but also because Bucarely never allowed of a relapse once he got actual information of the state of affairs there. As already noted, Bucarely learned from Anza of the scarcity of provisions in Alta California. Writing to Arriaga, August 27, 1774, he expressed an opinion that the cargoes of the Santiago and the Principe would relieve the immediate need. He realized that tlie question of sup- plies was one of considerable importance, as the ports of Alta California might serve to shelter and assist the boats engaged in northward exploration. It would be of great advantage to the royal treasury if the inhabitants might be given the means of sustaining themselves by their own industry. Hijosa had been ordered repeatedly to gather provisions at San Bias for their aid, and to this end he was then repairing two boats, which were to sail within a short time, one after the other.^^ A month later, Bucarely was able to say that Alta California's extreme need had been successfully met. The provisions of the Santiago had reached Alta California in time to relieve the sufferings of the missions, but they would not have done so, had it not been for the successful voyage of the Principe, which reached Monterey June 8, three days before the Santiago sailed. These provisions and th e fertil ity of the soil would- thfiJice- forth Jnsure the permanence of the cofonies, and permit of furth er conquesl ^s. "Huch conquests would be easy, because of the docilitv of the Indi ans, if there were provisions enough to furnish them, for in that lay their attraction to vassalage and a knowledge of the faith. Rivera and Serra reported that all were content. The Principe got back to San Bias on August 30, and Bucarely had acquiesced in repairs proposed by Hijosa, tending to protect provisions from water ; Bucarely realized the importance of sending sup- plies to Alta California, not only for its own subsistence, but also as stores for P^rez, in case of accident. He « C-2706. 256 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI had therefore suggested to Hijosa that he repair another ship, and send the two with provisions in the coming January.^^ Bucarely's plans matured, so that by February 1, 1775, the Principe left San Bias with provisions for San Diego. Due to the severity of storms it took seventy days to make the voyage, whereas the return occupied but thirteen. May 9 to 22. Quiros, the commander, reported that he saw the Indians of a whole village who had come to San Diego to ask for baptism, but it was denied them because there were not provisions enough to maintain all. It was believed, however, that the crops would be sufficient for their main- tenance, despite the scant rainfall at San Diego. ^^ The San Carlos under Manrique had tried to leave with the Principe, being destined for Monterey with provisions, but it ran aground in the port of San Bias itself. After getting it free, the officials of San Bias wished to unload, in order to see what damage it had suffered, which would have held back the voyage until March, but Bucarely ordered that it be reloaded with provisions for the families who were to go with Anza to found a settlement at San Francisco. The rest were to be left for the Santiago, in case there should be room for them in addition to those to be carried for its own crew in the new voyage of discovery that it was about to make. On February 24, 1775, the date of his letter to Arriaga, Bucarely had not yet heard whether such an ar- rangement was possible.^^ The San Carlos was in fact de- layed until March 16, 1775, when it set sail, accompanied /by the Santiago and Sonora, which were to make further explorations in the far northwest. This time, the voyage of the San Carlos was a success, for it delivered the provisions consigned to Monterey, was employed in exploring San Francisco Bay, and at length returned to San Blas.^^ Early in 1776 Bucarely again sent two provision ships to Alta 23 C-2719. Bancroft, Cal., I, 241, says that the " Bucarely to Arriaga, June 26, San Antonio or Principe left San Bias 1775. C-2935. on March 16. This is an error. 25C-2857. This letter states that 2' Bucarely to Arriaga, Nov. 26, the Principe had left on January 31. 1775. C-3033. In C-2935 it is given as February 1. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 257 California, the San Carlos and the Principe?'^ In August of /"^V ^ that year Galvez, who had succeeded Arriaga, instituted the comandancia general placing all of the frontier prov- inces, "including the Californias, under a separate govern- ment from that of the viceroy, but he required that the viceroy should continue to handle the matter of the supply- ■ ships from San Bias to the Calif ornias,^^ a fortunate chance, very likely, as the comandancia general was not a glittering success in other respects. Thus, Bucarely informed Gdlvez, April 26, 1777, that the Santiago and Principe had set sail with an abundance of provisions and effects for Alta Cali- fornia, as also the San Carlos for Baja California.^* Further than this we need not pursue this matter at this point, al- though more will be said later,^^ nor has it been thought necessary to give in equal detail the measures for supplying Baja California. It seems reasonably clear that l^he CalLr fornias owed much to Bucarely for his a tt en t%| } %c) t hfi supply-ships, and that under a less painstaking and watchful viceroy disaster might have come to the new settlements before they had a fair chance to become firmly established. As will be pointed out hereafter, the material needs of Alta California were a matter that occupied a large share of the viceroy's attention, nothing in the affairs of the province being regarded by him as of equal importance.^^ Some of the action taken with a view to forming a regla- mentOj notably two memorials by Serra and the temporary arrangement dividing the Californias between the Do- minicans and Franciscans, has been discussed in another connection. ^^ A provisional recflamento was drawn up by Juan Jose de Echeveste, at that time purchasing agent for ^ — the Califojffiias^n Mexico City, the document being dated May 19,Q77jy This is the document which it became the 27 Bucarely to Arriaga, Mar. 27, 184-94), I covered substantially the 1776. C-3185. same ground as that given here. « The king (by G&lvez) to Teodoro " In chap, V. It should be remem- de Croix, Aug. 22, 1776. C-3293. bered that the Palou report, considered 29 C-3532, with one of Serra' s in chapter five, was 30 In chap. XVI. not before the junta at this time, but 31 In an article entitled The Alta was of later date, when conditions in California supply-ships, 1 773-76 (South- Alta California had improved. western historical quarterly, XIX, S 258 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI habit to call the reglamento provisional, being accompanied in later usage by the opinion of the junta and the decision of the viceroy, modifying it in some particulars. It is hardly what we would expect a formal instrument of government to be, having numerous paragraphs of a temporary char- acter, as well as the style of a recommendation for legis- lation. It begins with an estimate of the number of men and the cost each year of the Californias and San Bias. For the two presidios and five missions of Alt a California Echeveste figured an estabhshment of eighty-two military men and fourteen others, not including the missionaries.^^ The salary roll would amount to 38,985 pesos a year, but would in fact require an outlay of only 15,594 pesos, as all but the officers were to be paid in clothing and effects at an advance of 150 per cent, to cover the extra cost [especially of transportation] to the royal treasury. For Baja Califor- nia there were to be thirty-seven men, all military but one, the commissary, at an annual cost of 16,450 pesos. As all but the governor and commissary were to be paid in effects at an advance of 100 per cent, the actual sum required was to be 10,975 pesos.^^ The Department of San Bias was considered under three heads : the department proper, including the clerical, warehouse, and church officials ; the arsenal or ship-yard ; and the fleet. The first named should cost 8691 pesos, 4 tontines, 6 granos, including annual rations for 127 men in the Californias ; ^^ the second, 12,355 pesos, 2 tontines, 6 granos, mostly for repairs to ships ; the third, 34,037 pesos, 5 tomines.^^ In addition, 2000 pesos ^ The men required were the fol- mule-drivers at Monterey were left lowing : at Monterey, a captain, a out, this would account for the entire sergeant, two corporals, twenty-two Spanish establishment of the Cali- Boldiers, - two carpenters, two black- fomias. smiths, four mule-drivers, and a store- ^ The men required at San Bias keeper ; at San Diego, a lieutenant, a were the following : in the department sergeant, two corporals, twenty-two proper, a commissary, an accountant soldiers, two carpenters, two black- (contador), a paymaster and store- smiths, and a store-keeper ; at the keeper, three scribes, an amanuensis, five missions, five corporals, and twenty- a chaplain, and a sacristan ; at the five soldiers. arsenal, a master-workman (mcestro 34 The men required for Baja Cali- mayor), a cooper, a rope-maker (cor- fornia were the governor, a commis- chador), and a boatswain; in the sary, a lieutenant, a sergeant, three fleet: for the frigate, a captain and corporals, and thirty soldiers. pilot, a second pilot, a boatswain, a 3* If the missionaries and the four boatswain's mate, a steward, a car- 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 259 would be required for the purchasing agent in Mexico City. Thus the total annual cost of the Californias and San Bias would be 92,476 pesos, 3 tomines. To pay this there was the yearly subsidy, of 33,000 pesos, the product of the salt- mines near San Bias amounting to 25,000 pesos, and 10,000 pesos from the pious fund. The roy^al treasury would therefore have to make up the balance, 24,476 pesos, 3 tomines. Then came the reglamento proper in seventeen numbered paragraphs, from which the following are the principal points. Neither the royal treasury nor the pious fund could give more funds for Alta California at the time; therefore, nojurther missions could be provided for, but all persons who wished to go there should be allowed to do so in the boats from San Bias. Such settlers ought to be gr ant edj» rations for five years and a sailor's wages for two, and they could be used in raising crops, thus relieving the public treasury of expense. Each mission should get 800 pesos a year, with double rations to each missionary, includ- ing those awaiting assignment to new missions. These sums were in addition to those applied from the pious fund, but they were to stop in five years and were eventually to be repaid, for in five years the mission crops should be sufficient to maintain them. Salaries were to be discounted 50 per cent in Baja California, and 60 per cent in Alta Cali- fornia, and minute accounts of the cost of goods were to be kept.^^ The store-keepers of Monterey, San Diego, Loreto, and San Bias were to make an annual statement of the effects needed. San Bias was not to raise any crops, because it was difficult to do so there ; the provisions both for San Bias and the Californias were to be purchased, and at the proper season, so that they might not suffer such dam- age as had resulted on previous occasions. As San Bias was not suitable for beasts of burden, the animals there penter, a calker, two cabin-boys, six penter, a calker, two cabin-boys, six steersmen, twenty-seven ship's boys steersmen, ten ship's boys, and sixteen (gurumetes), and thirty sailors; for sailors. each of two packet-boats, a captain '^ Note that salaries were to be paid and pilot, a second pilot, a boatswain, in goods. a boatswain's mate, a steward, a car- 260 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI and their drivers should be sent to Baja Calif ornia; and if not needed there, to Alta California, while the cattle of San Bias should be sold. The salt industry should be managed by the commissary of San Bias, who should also keep detailed accounts of all the business of the depart- ment. Similarly, accounts of all effects received should be kept at Monterey, San Diego, and Loreto. The frigate Santiago and the packet-boats San Carlos and Principe should be used as provision-ships, and the packet-boats Concepcion and Lauretana, the sloop Pilar, and the schooner Sonora should be employed on various commissions be- tween San Bias and Baja California. The agent in Mexico and the commissary of San Bias should buy goods that were not only cheap but suitable, and after every remission of goods, accounts should be sent to Mexico. ^^ On Bucarely's decree. May 24, 1773, the Echeveste regla- mento was sent to the fiscal, Areche, for his opinion,^^ and he suggested, June 14, 1773, that the administrators of the pious fund be asked to pay more than the 10,000 pesos required of them. He noted that Echeveste had failed to provide for a surgeon, and had made no allowance for the cost of powder; clothing, trappings, and arms might be charged to the soldiers, but not powder. In other respects he approved of the reglamento, for it would end the obscure, improper methods employed at San Bias, Loreto, and Monterey, which had been the cause of the confusion in reports from the Calif ornias. In closing he recommended that the reglamento be sent to Mangino, director general of the pious fund, for his opinion, and that it then be brought before a junta for resolution.^^ On June 17, Bucarely or- dered the expediente sent to Mangino. ^^ Replying, June 19, Mangino stated that the pious fund was contributing 14,879 pesos, 3 tomines, 6 granos to the missions of the Calif ornias .^^ Moreover, there were extraordinary ex- 38 In C-2106. five Alta California missions, besides 39 Ihid. 1779 pesos, 3 tomines, 6 granos, for -w Ibid. their double rations, and 9100 pesos « Ibid. for the thirteen missions of Baja Cali- *^ To wit, 800 pesos to each of the fornia. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 261 penses; for example, it had cost 6139 pesos, 5 tomines, 9 granos to get the Dominicans for the peninsula from Vera Cruz to San Bias. Consequently, it was difficult to esti- mate how much the proceeds of the fund would exceed expenses, and therefore, concluded Mangino, no additional contributions should be asked from it.'*^ On receiving Mangino's report, Bucarely issued a decree, June 22, 1773, calling for a junta}^ Of other matters that were to come before it, besides those discussed already, letters of January 27 and February 14, ^773, from Campo of San Bias are alone worthy of note. Campo complained that there were not enough funds even to pay the wages of the men.^^ The decision of the junta is dated July 8, 1773. Taking the Echeveste reglamento as a basis it made the following recommendations. The beasts of burden at San Bias should be sold instead of being sent to the Californias, as the need of that province for such animals was not clearly known; and it would be best to sell the boats Concepcion, Lauretana, Pilar, and Sonora for account of the royal treasury. The annual sum provided by Echeveste was approved, and in addition the amount needed for the pay of a surgeon. Funds needed in San Bias should be sent six months in advance. The governor and the commissary of the Californias, both residents of Loreto, might receive their pay at Mexico, and therefore without discount. For the year 1774 only, the pious fund was to contribute 10,000 pesos toward the ex- penses of the Department of San Bias. Particular attention was devoted to the methods of making accounts, and special note was taken of the need for sending funds to San Bias to cover expenses for the rest of the year 1773. As thus amended the Echeveste reglamento should go into effect in January, 1774.^^ Bucarely 's decree of July 23 amounted to an agreement with the junta until the king should de- cide on a new reglamento. On July 27, 1773, Bucarely forwarded to Arriaga the five great testimonios to which references have been made bearing on San Bias and the « la C-2106. « In C-2109. ** Ibid. "6 75^. 262 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI Calif ornias, to which subject he said that he had devoted himself with the most painstaking care ever since he be- came viceroy.'*^ The Echeveste reglamento and the junta^s decision should be taken in connection with the instructions to Rivera, August 17, 1773, when that officer was about to depart for Monterey to succeed Fages. Several paragraphs treat of the precautions to be taken against the entry of any boats other than those from San Bias and the Manila galleon, and others deal with the advancement of spiritual conquest, especially toward San Francisco. These paragraphs are taken up in more detail in other chapters, to which their subject-matter is more closely related.'^* The others may be briefly summarized here. The provisional reglamento and the decision of the junta of July 8 were attached. Rivera was named comandante for Alta California, and enjoined Fo maintain harmonious relations with the religious. He was to help them to reduce the Indians to mission control, and was to see that the latter were brought into villages, so that they might be civilized. Then follow several para- graphs about the selection of sites for mission villages, and details with regard to the plan of such settlements. Rivera was to remember that these towns might ultimately become great cities [it is noteworthy that such a possibility was contemplated]. Such matters as water supply, trees, the laying out of streets and squares (plazas), the raising of cattle, and the planting of crops, he was reminded, should command great attention, for much depended on what was done at the beginning. Lands might be assigned to the Indians, but they were to live at the missions, and simi- larly in the case of Spanish settlers, who were to live in the towns (pueblos) f no scattering of habitations being per- mitted. In due season the missions might be converted into towns. In everything Rivera was to remember that the object of the Alta California establishments was to ad- v^pjce spiritual conquest, and, in consequence, to achieve an e xtension of the royal dominions, wherefore he was to « C-2331 . « In chapter X and XIV. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 263 propose from time to time such measures as he deemed of advantage to the colony. He was to maintain disciplin e, punishing infractions thereof, or sending incorrigibles to San Bias, where they should stay pending the viceroy's decision. This apphe d to other employ^ and to settlers, as well as to the soldiers. IRivera was to report to the gov- ernor of the CaHfornias [then stationed at Loreto], but the latter was^not io iiaye VJSW3T. to ch&nge his pleasures [thus the virtual independence of A|ta from Baja California was ^^1M§-41I Communications with the peninsula were to be kept open, and Rivera was not to wait for boats in all cases by which to forward his mail. Great care was to be exer- cised not to molest the Indians along the route up the peninsula, and similarly in Alta California, especially when on expeditions of discovery. The right to correct baptized Indians belonged to the missionaries, as to the father of a family, and such had been the decision of a junta of May 6, 1773. The pilots were to decide all matters affecting the packet-boats, even the date of sailing, but they were not to carry any passengers without the permission of the coman- dante which was only to be given in very urgent cases. An instruction to Fages of July 26, 1773, was mentioned as binding upon Rivera,^^ as also the new reglamento. Rivera was to keep a diary of all that occurred in Alta California, sending it periodically to Bucarely. He was also to make inventories of the artillery, munitions, arms, and other implements there, stating their condition, and was to keep all records and papers carefully.^^ Bucarely forwarded a copy of the instruction to Arriaga on September 26, 1773. Serra and Rivera had already started for the Californias, he said, and other officials were soon to follow, and with them Francisco Hijosa who was to succeed Campo Viergol at San Blas.^^ Arriaga sought the advice of Galvez on these policies *' I have not found this instruction, " C-2391. Bucarely enclosed a list, but it is probable that it had some drawn up by Melchor de Peramds, of relation to the reglamento, which Bu- individuals appointed to military and carely had decreed three days before. financial employments in the Califor- » C-2350. nias and San Bias. C-2392. X 264 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI that had been occupying the attention of Bucarely. Gdl- vez's memorials in reply form a complete review of the situation by one who -understood the conditions, and was keenly interested in them. They in part touch on matter that might properly have appeared in other chapters, but as they bear primarily on matters discussed here, and are so noteworthy in themselves, it seems best to take them up in detail at this point. The first matter brought to his attention was that concerning the division of the Calif omias between the Franciscans and the Dominicans. On No- vember 6, 1772, Fray Juan de Dios de Cordova wrote to the king saying that twenty-seven Dominicans had started for the Califomias. In expectation of an abundant har- vest of souls and to replace the missionaries who had died, he now asked for twelve more.^^ This petition was acted on by the Council of the Indies, February 6, 1773, and denied ; ^^ but the request was repeated, this time for twenty more, the initiative coming from New Spain, and being announced by Bucarely in a letter of May 27, 1773.^^ The entire expediente about the division of the Californias was thereupon sent to Gdlvez, Qatober 19, 1773.^^ Two months later, on Dec^niber J^S^l ^ In a preamble he gave an account of the missions of Alta and Baja California and Pimeria Alta, telling of the slow, expensive course by which they had been established in the past, and of the good opportunity now for the rapid prog- ress of conversions. He criticized the division of the Cali- fornias, which had been made, he said, with slight knowledge of conditions there, calling attention to the interruption of communications between Alta California and the peninsula which was necessarily entailed. ^^ He then proceeded to make his recommendations. A moderate settlement should be made on the largest of the Tres Marias Islands, the one to the northwest, as had »2 C-2056. M C-2161. criticism, Bucarely could not justly be " C-2279. blamed, because he had been ordered " In C-2906. by the king to grant a field in the Cali- w Whatever the merits of Gdlvez's fornias to the Dominicans. C-1782. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 265 been recommended in other years by Aysa" and Sdnchez.^* The garrison of Loreto might be placed there, for it was of no use where it was, Loreto being almost in the centre of Baja California, in a region long since reduced. Certain of the missions of Baja California ^^ should be given over to the secular clergy under the bishop of Guadalajara, to whose jurisdiction the Calif ornias belonged, and the same pro- cedure should be taken successively with the other penin- sula missions, thus freeing the pious funds now expended on them. The Dominicans should engage in active work of conversion ^° toward the north in the direction of the Col- orado River, leaving the coast of Alta California to the Fernandinos. Gdlvez called attention to the royal decree of August 19, 1606, requiring the A^ny^^galleon to stop at Monterey on its annual voyage to Acapulco,^^ and ^ug^ gesled.JlaadLiljmght^ cost than under the existing system. In 1769 Galvez had" caused fifteen Sonora missions to be made curacies, but secular clergy had not been placed in charge. This ought to be done, the priests being named by the bishop of Du- rango, in whose diocese the province lay. The viceroy should be ordered to establish without delay five missions on the Sonora frontier among the Nixores, Opas, Yumas, and others who lived at the junction of the Gila and Col- orado rivers and in its vicinity, and he should put them in charge of the Queretaranos under the direction of Father Garces, who had repeatedly visited those lands and tribes. Orders should be given to Bucarely to let Anza make his proposed journey to open a route from Sonora to the Cali- fornias,^^ and he should also arrange, whenever he might deem it opportune, for two parties of cavalry to set out at the same time, one from New Mexico and the other from Monterey, and approach each other along the same line of " Aysa to the king, Jan. 21, 1743. *° The phrase is en conversiones vivas* C-242. the implication being that missionary ^ Sdnchez to the king, Mar. 2, 1751. work in Baja California was not of an C-308. active or "live" nature. *|* Gdlvez says, those missions com- «i C-15, 16. prising the first class in the reglamento ^ Bucarely had already authorized de Hnodos of November 30, 1768. This it, over two months before, may refer to C-1118. 266 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI latitude until they should meet, exploring the intervening lands, and noting their inhabitants, products, rivers, and especially the course of the Colorado River. The leaders of these expeditions should make exact reports of their journeys, so that fitting measures might be based upon them. Since converting the Indians to the faith was of primary importance, the viceroy should be ordered to avail himself of the funds taken from the expelled Jesuits to establish missions amidst the numerous peoples of Alt a California, the Sonora frontier, and the other provinces of the frontier of New Spain. The royal treasury should not bear the cost, as it was already undergoing heavy expense to maintain the presidios and mission escorts, to the same end of advancing and sustaining conversions.^^ Long before the Council arrived at a decision on Galvez's plans, his opinions were sought with regard to the Cali- fornias' reglamento. Bucarely^s letter of July 27, 1773, with its enclosures, was forwarded to Galvez by Arriaga on December 22,^^ and that of September 26 on January 29, 1774.^^ Galvez prepared a memorial covering both renaia- sions, and sent it to Arriaga under date of March 8, 1774.- The memorial begins with a consideration of terra's rep- resentations of March 13, 1773, commenting only upon such paragraphs as were "worthy of some notice or remark." Gdlvez had not heard whether Bucarely had taken action on the proposed Anza expedition from Tubac to Monterey, or on Serra^s proposal of an expedition to Alta California from New Mexico. He and Croix had favored such proj- ects, and he thought that Bucarely should be charged to aid in bringing about the opening of communications from both Sonora and New Mexico, especially with the ports of Monterey and San Francisco, which ought to be made secure at all costs. The removal of Fages, without hearing from either Fages or Barry, he regarded as a mistake, but w For the whole memorial, C-2454. pointed out, conversions were desired Gdlvez's words implying that conver- when they served to promote mundane sions were the principal object of the ends, government must not be taken un- " C-2455. reservedly as he said them. As already <» C-2522. «« C-2566. 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 267 as it had in fact taken place, Fages might be promoted to the command of a frontier presidio. RiYera^„cQjald^ not compare with Fages in spirit, resolution^ and mihtary ^Q^j ^lj^^^gi- where! oreGdlvez f elt^ tEaF tlievery important Alta California establishments might be in grave danger, since they had to confront a vast native population, and were exposed to the repeated attempts of the Russians and the subjects of other powers who had upon various occa- sions made land in those seas. Rivera had been captain at Loreto in the time of the Jesuits, but the work there was not difficult. It would be better to let him return to Lo- reto, and to send Barry, an experienced and warHke vet- eran, to Monterey^ which was, t he principal military post and the most imp ortant ( j^PT^trp^ f)f the new conquest. G4I- vez did not favor certain of Serra's proposals relative to the military escorts of missions, as for example one that each missionary be allowed to choose a soldier to accompany him, free from other obligations of the service. This request had, very properly, been denied, and to have done other- wise would have meant that the soldiers would degenerate from their profession. He approved Serra's recommen- dation of mixed marriages, but only by whites or mestizos ®^ with Indians, not by mulattoes ; neither the reglamento nor the junta had dealt with that point. Of Serra's other memorials ^^ Galvez said nothing, except to refer slightingly to the Tribunal de Cuentas of Mexico for having proposed to abandon the Department of San Bias, adding that Bucarely had caused Echeveste to draw up the reglamento instead of the Tribunal because of the latter's lack of common sense and its incapacity in practical affairs. The Department of San Bias was indispensable, he said. Gdlvez now took up the provisional reglamento y which he felt should be ap- proved, except as to a few particulars. Monterey should have thirt y-one s oldiers instead of twenty-five since it was the most important,~The most advanced, and the most exposed point on the northern frontier of the Pacific. San ^ A mestizo is one whose blood is in the expedientes, but only two have part white and part Indian. been treated in this work, those of « Four memorials of Serra appear March 13 and May 21, 1773. 268 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI Diego's twenty-five could be reduced to nineteen. The presidio of Loreto was useless, and there would be no danger if it were left without a garrison ; at most seventeen sol- diers and Captain Rivera would be enough, instead of the thirty-four allotted. The other seventeen, with a lieuten- ant, should be placed at Cape San Lucas, which was the most exposed point of that region and the key to Baja California. There lay the Bay of San Bernab^, of good depth and shel- tered from all winds except those from the southeast. The Manila galleon came to San Jose del Cabo every year, and could have no protection unless a presidio were erected at that very important site. The salt-mines of San Bias, if well managed, would produce 30,000 pesos a year, and it might be worth while to offer the manager a percentage of the sales. Gdlvez was opposed to the sale of the four boats, which the junta had recommended. They were neces- sary for carrying provisions from Sinaloa and Sonora to the peninsula. Moreover, in view of a decree of January 17, 1774, allowing freedom of trade between the Spanish kingdoms of the Pacific, these smaller boats would be very useful for carrying Chinese wares from Acapulco to the Gulf of California. Other matters in the reglamento and the de- cision of the juntaj as well as Bucarely's instruction to Ri- vera, should be approved. One paragraph of the latter, however, would have to be amended as a result of the free trade decree, so as to permit other Spanish ships than those from San Bias and the galleons to receive help in Alta Cal- ifornia, if they should be driven there by storm. This left one other matter upon which Galvez wished to speak, the division of the Californias between the Dominicans and the Fernandinos. He and Croix had not wished to have the two orders in the Californias, but Bucarely had permitted the Fernandinos to be despoiled of Baja California, which cut them off from the peninsula as a base of suppliesT By this measure,' fob," inimsters with whom the Indians had already become satisfied were removed from their posts and supplanted by the Dominicans. On this matter, certainly, the decision should be reserved. As regarded all else 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 269 Buca relv should be thanke H fny hjj^ p!f> fl1, solicitude, and activity in f ome nting and aiding the useful establ ishments of^the Calif orniaS; for ffbat provinp.g--was a. Yffntfahlff>'^jJ- wark for New Spain on the Pacific. Gdlvez's recommenda- fion that the decision as to the"3ivision of the Calif ornias be reserved was adopted. Arriaga wrote Bucarely to that effect, March 21, 1775, saying that the matter was pend- ing in the Council of the Indies. As the provisional re- glamento had been made without the fullest information, the king ordered Bucarely to make a new one, when he should become sufficiently well informed, keeping specially in mind the situation which would result from Anza's expedition.^^ Because statements were made that the provisional reglamento was formed without a sufficient knowledge of conditions, it must not be taken to mean that any criticism of Bucarely was intended. The reglamento was only pro- visional or temporary by reason of that very lack of infor- mation, and nobody realized this uncertainty more than Bucarely himself. Almost a year before Arriaga wrote the letter just referred to, Bucarely had written to him, May 27, 1774, that a new reglamento would be necessary. The provisional one had been formed without the informa- tion embodied in Palou's report of December 10, 1773,^° and circumstances had changed as a result of the plans for northwestward voyages to verify the extent of Russian explorations, as also by the discovery of an overland route from Sonora to the Californias by Anza. In the same letter he said that he had informed the Dominicans of the abun- dant harvest [of souls] awaiting them along the Colorado River, hoping to inspire them with zeal to go there, and he had ordered Barry to lend aid to both orders in the Cali- fornias.^^ A year later, replying to Arriaga^s letter of March 21, 1775, Bucarely wrote that he would await the issue of certain events before forming a new reglamento. He re- ferred to the northwestward expeditions by land and sea, ® C-2872. The second expedition facts calling for a change of reglamento. of Anza is referred to. The discovery ^^ The Palou report has already been of a new route by the first expedi- considered in chapter five, tion was, however, one of the new ^^ C-2625. 270 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI and to the decision whether the Department of San Bias should be moved to another port, since the one at San Bias was gradually filling in.''^ It was not until May 11, 1775, that the Council of the Indies reached a decision concerning the division of the Californias^ In addition to Galvez's opinion of December 18, 1773, and other documents already cited, it had mean- while^ accumulated many more. On February 1, 1775, the Council decided to ask Arriaga for Anza's diary of the 1774 expedition to aid the Council in determining whether more Dominicans should be sent to Baja California/^ The re- quest was made ^^ and the diary forwarded 7^ The other documents consisted mainly of reports concerning the peninsula/^ At length, the Council proceeded to make its recommendation to the king. It began by claiming that Bucarely's division of the Californias was contrary to the royal orders, which had called for an establishment entirely separate from that of the Fernandinos, but had not con- templated depriving the latter of Baja California. The fiscal of the Council did not agree with this interpretation. Since the Father Superior of San Fernando had agreed to the division and no complaint had come from the Fernandi- nosj the division might be allowed to stand, although with- out approval, for it would cause inconvenience and ex- pense to do otherwise. "^^ The viceroy should be expressly directed, however, that the Dominicans were to make their establishments from San Fernando Velicata eastward toward the Colorado, leaving the whole west coast to the Fernan- dinos, so that the two orders might not disturb or embarrass one another. The viceroy must also be careful that Alta California should not suffer harm from having been de- " C-2934. applicable to the Californias ; the regla- w C-2839. mento of sinodos of November 30, 1768 ; a ''* San Martin Cuato to Arriaga, diary of the expeditions of 1769-70 to Feb. 4, 1775, C-2840. Alta California; a map of the Californias^ '5 Arriaga to San Martin Cuato, an opinion of the fiscal ; a former opinion Feb. 13, 1775, C-2845. of Manuel Lanz de Casafonda. ^* In C-2906 they are described as f ol- "" This, therefore, is an instance where lows: Gdlvez's statement of the number the viceroy's action prevailed in the of Indians in Baja California missions face of a contrary opinion of the Coun- when the Jesuits were expelled ; a state- cil. Cf . chap. VII, n. 63. ment of the amount of the pious fund 1773] LOCAL PROBLEMS OF THE CALIFORNIAS 271 priyed of support from the peninsula. Althougli it had formerly denied them, the Council now granted the Do- minican request for twenty missionaries, this decision being reached as a result of Anza's discovery of a route from Sonora. In order not to deplete the pious fund, the Coun- cil would authorize the viceroy to make curacies of all the Baja California missions ready for that step, giving them in charge of secular clergy, or in defect of these to religious, who should be subject to ecclesiastical visitation and to the rules of the royal patronage. The same might be done with the older missions of Sonora. The five missions along the Colorado and Gila rivers, repeatedly asked for by Gdlvez and the fiscal of Mexico, should be established, and later, others should be erected among the friendly peoples made known by Anza and the Queretaranos. The latter should have charge of the new missions, and the cost of estab- lishing them should be defrayed from Jesuit funds, the royal treasury supplying whatever might be lacking. The Council complained of the excessive allowance granted to the Dominicans from the pious fund. Thenceforth, Gdlvez's arrangement of November 30, 1768, should be followed, the amount allowed depending on relative distances and scarc- ity or abundance of provisions. For the greater security of the missions and presidios of Alta California such cattle and sheep as were needed should be sent, both from the peninsula and from Sonora ; there was an abundance of these animals in Sonora, and they could be sent by the Anza route. It would also be well to bpeh a 'route from New Mexico to Monterey, taking note of intervening lands and the course of rivers. The viceroy should give fitting orders to carry out these objects to the governors of the Calif ornias, Sonora, and New Mexico. The garrison of Loreto should soon be transferred to the largest of the Tres Marias, and Bucarely should call a junta to see about settling those islands, so that they might be securely held and serve to aid the Spanish ships obliged to put in there. For the greater comfort and security of the Manila galleons and to facilitate the development of Monterey, the king 272 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XI should enforce the decree of 1606 requiring the PhiHppine Boats to stop, there. In reciting the advantages the Coun- cil quoted the decree of 1606 to the effect that Monterey was in 37°, almost at the halfway point of the voyage, and with an excellent and capacious harbor. It added on its own account that the galleonmight bring su ch articles a s were needed to develop the new establishments/^ It will be noted that Galvez's recommendations had been adopted by the Council, substantially as he had made them. If th ese projects could have been exequted m^eojLi^^ tremendous advance would in all probability have followed, resulting in an increase of the white population of Alta California, and perhaps in the discovery of gold. What the effect would have been on the history of Alta California and of the United States is worthy of conjecture. If the Council's recommendation were embodied in a royal decree, no evidence to that effect has yet come to light, although shortly afterward, when Galvez became ministro general, he gave orders which aimed to put most of these projects into effect. By the institution of the comandancia general ^ however, lie prevented the successful achievement of the results desired. Until that time Bucarely was at work in harmony with the ideas of Galvez and the Council, for, aside from the ma.tter of the division of the Californias, he was in entire agreement with them. Had these projects been left in his hands they might have been brought to a successful issue, but Galvez 's appointee as comandante general, Teodoro de Croix, was not the man to carry them out. Great interest over the Californias had manifested it- self in Spain in this period, but the government had actually done little more than to confirm Bucarely's measures. He Xit was who had sayed_the new establishments, and had. j)laced the whole province on a sound basis. " C-2906. There are ten signatures la Zerda. This document amounts and rubrics attached to the document : to a history of Dominican preten- Felipe de Arco ; the Marques de Val- sions in New Spain, more especially delirios ; Marcos Ximeno ; Domingo de as regards the Californias, from 1760 Trespalacios ; Jos6 de Gdlvez ; Pedro to 1775. Numerous documents are Calder6n Henriquez ; Tom^s Ortiz quoted and summarized before the de Landazuri ; Felipe Santos Domin- part embodying the actual recommen- guez ; Manuel Diaz ; Jo86 Antonio de dation of the Council is reached. CHAPTER XII THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION, AND PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND, 1774 The story of this chapter ixi^y quickly be told. Leav- ing Tubac on January S, Q.77A ) Anza made a successful m arch to Alta Californi a without the loss of a iiian>. There were thirty-four in his party, including Fathers^ Garc6s and,JDiaz. The route led through Papagueria to the junc- tion of the Colorado and Gila rivers, and across the Colo- rado Desert. The party was well received by the Indians en route, and especially so by the Yumas, who were ex- ceedingly desirous of missions. On March 22 Anza reached San Gabriel, having proved the existence of a practicable route from Sonera, although not so good a one as could have been desired.^ The entire expedition soon returned to Sonora, where Anza was prevented from going immediately to Mexico by orders of a superior officer. By November, however, he was in Mexico, and at once got to work with Bucarely to plan a new expedition. It was agreed that Anza should lead thirty soldiers and their families to Alta California for a settlement at San Francisco. Many domes- tic animals were also to be taken, so that the province might be placed on a permanent basis in that regard. The de- tails of equipment, organization, expense, and minor parts of the plan were settled by Bucarely, Echeveste, and Anza, and the expedition was authorized by the first named, but ^ The correspondence of Anza is my of his return, and may eventually principal resort in this chapter for the publish it. In that case the additional details of the expedition, as that con- or varying details of the other diaries, tains nearly all that is needed. I have on which I have taken notes, will ac- made a preliminary translation, how- company the translation, A considera- ever, of two Anza diaries, the one sent tion of the diaries of both Anza ex- back from San Gabriel and the diary peditions is given in an appendix. T 273 274 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII a junta was called on December 16, 1774, to confirm what had in fact been arranged already. So much for the externals. The key to these events, how- ever, lies in the oft-discussed factor of orecautionary meas- ures against foreign aggression, particularly by the Rus- sians. The documents used in this chapter make little allusion to that factor, but they must be read in the light of others, already or later to be discussed, which did so when dealing with the same events. The events treated here were only part of the larger plan which Bucarely had in mind, but of which others in New Spain were not fully cog- nizant. Some indications of this appear in the Bucarely correspondence of this chapter. For example, a letter of May 27, 1774, treats of the Anza expedition, of the possi- bilities for missions among the Yumas, of Rivera^s expedi- tion to Alta California, of the Alta California supply-ships, of Palou's 1773 report of conditions there, and of the voy- ages of exploration, for all were part of the same idea. Other Bucarely letters will yield something of the same, if viewed from this standpoint. The letters of other men must be construed more narrowly. One of the principal ideas of the time was the need of Alta California for overland com- munication with~Kew Spain, a matter well understood by Alta Californians, and the principal import of the Anza expedition to them was that it seemed to supply this want. Palou^letier of ^pril 22, 1774, most clearly presents this view. As soon as he got word that his petition had been granted, Anza lost no time in making preparations for his expedition. On November 6, 1773, both he and Carets wrote to the viceroy, the purport of their letters being that the expedi- tion would start on December 15. They planned to take as northerly a route as possible, feeling sure that in case of need they could return to the Yuma country at the junction of the Colorado and Gila, and proceed from there to the Pacific without difficulty. This news was communicated to Arriaga by Bucarely on February 24, 1774, and was the 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 275 latest that he had been able to hear, owing to the great distance of Sonora from Mexico City, but he felt certain that the expedition had started.^ Anza did not in fact leave Tubac, the starting point of the expedition, until January 8, IT IA^ Meanwhile, the existencj^jplj^ rgTateJroDpL Son ora t o Alt a Califor nia was defi niteIyi,,jpLEX>ygd. An Indian, Sebastian Tarabal, by name, had escaped from the San G abriel mission^ and had reachedjVltar, Decem- ber 26, 1773. Four others who escaped with him. Including his wife and a brother, had died of thirst while lost in the Colorado Desert. Tarabal alone reached the junction of the Colorado and Gila, and came from there to Altar by way of Papagueria.^ Originally, Anza had intended to go by way of the Gila River to the Colorado junction, but he changed his plan, choosing a route by way of Altar and Papagueria to the junction of the rivers. Tarabal had said that that route was a good one. Furthermore, the Apaches had made a raid on January 2, stealing one hundred thirty horses, in- cluding many destined for the expedition. These could not be replaced in that vicinity, and he did not wish to wait for others to be sent, as the Apaches might capture some more. He hoped to get more horses at Altar, having notified the governor of Sonora of his need. Finally, he had decided that it was better to ascertain the direct route from Pimeria, as that would be the only one by which produce could be sent to sustain the Californias, as it was alone free from the Apaches.^ Garces added that the Yuma chief, Salvador Palma, who had accompanied Tarabal to Altar, said that the Papagueria route was a good one.^ It is probable that the Apache incident was the determining factor with Anza. 2 C-2550. to return with it. Afterwards, he at- 3 Noted in the diaries of Anza, tached himself to Garc6s, and there- Garc6s, and Diaz. Tarabal's career after accompanied him in his extensive of travel was a decidedly interesting travels. Eldredge, in Jour. Am. Hist., one. Originally he came from Baja II, 257. Diaries of both Anza ex- Cahfornia, and in 1769 accompanied peditions. Fages, memorial of Nov. 30, Portold. Later, he and his family 1775. C-3042. were brought to San Gabriel to live, * Anza, Diary, C-2503. but he ran away, as observed above. ' Garc6s, Diary, A.G.P., Historia, He accompanied Anza's first expedition v. 52. to Alta California, and was permitted 276 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XU The expedition left Tubac on January 8, 1774, reaching Altar a few days later. Writing to Bucarely from there, January 18, 1774, Anza said that Governor Crespo^ had arranged to supply him with what he needed at Caborca, the last village through which he would pass in that district, at which he expected to arrive the following day. Despite the difficulty of procuring pack animals he was carrying four months' provisions. They would last longer, but for the necessity of making gifts to Indians en route. He was also carrying a quantity of baubles for them. These were rather scarce in Sonora, but for that reason they would be all the more valued by the Indians. The Indians of the Colorado River maintained communication and friendship with the Spanish post of Altar, in consequence of which Anza planned to send back letters of his journey, on arrival at the Colo- rado.'' With this letter he enclosed a list showing the number of individuals and animals and the amount of pro- visions that he was carrying. Besides Anza himself, there were the two religious, Garc6s and Diaz ; twenty-one sol- diers, one of whom was Juan Valdes, the soldier from Alta California who was accompanying Anza in order to serve as guide when the expedition should reach that province; Sebastian Tarabal, as guide from the Yuma country to the Pacific ; a Pima interpreter ; and eight other Indians, five as muleteers, two as servants of Anza, and one a carpenter. In all there were thirty-four persons. There were thirty- five loads containing provisions, munitions, gifts for the Indians, pioneers' tools, and other things, and there were sixty-five head of cattle, and one hundred forty horses.^ Arrived at Caborca Anza did not find the expected number of horses promised by Governor Crespo, although he had included them in his count, and the few that he did get proved unfit to make the expedition.^ From Caborca Anza proceeded through sterile Papa- gueria to the junction, and crossed both rivers successfully. He wrote from San Dionisio at the junction, February 9, « Successor to Sastre, who had just ^ C-2506. » C-2507. died. 9 Anza, Diary, C-2503. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 277 1774, telling how joyfully he had been received by the Yumas, although a portion of them had originally planned to op- pose him. A Soyopa Indian had told him that there was a westward branch of the Colorado River, farther north, and the same Soyopa also said that the ridge to the north- west was impassible, because of its ruggedness and because of the lack of water and pasture. The Yumas must be very numerous, for Anza had seen about two thousand of them in the space of a league and U half, but they were not a people to be afraid of, even if they had been less friendly. He hoped to find more pasture during the rest of the march than he had encountered in crossing Papagueria. The Papagueria route was not a bad one, but he had had difficul- ties, due to his lack of acquaintance with it ; in seasons of rain it would be an easy route for a party, however large Except for the soldiers who accompanied the Jesuits, no Spanish troops had ever penetrated so far as he then was, and his next day^s journey would carry him beyond where they had gone.^^ Anza^s letter reached Altar in safety, and was forwarded by Captain Bernardo de Urrea of that presidio to Governor Francisco Crespo, and by the latter to Bucarely. Each of these officers added a letter to An- za's, having each received one from him. Urrea wrote, Feb- ruary 22, 1774, that a Yuma had brought Anza's letters so carefully that they appeared as if just written. He took occasion to praise Chief Palma of the Yumas, who had shown remarkable pro-Spanish proclivities on previous occasions, and who had now accorded Anza a good recep- tion at San Dionisio.^^ Crespo said little more than that Anza's march had fulfilled his own predictions.-^^ Bucarely forwarded copies of these three letters to Arriaga in his communication of May 27, 1774, calling attention to the parts that had impressed him. He took note of the larg ejumber of In dians, and their friend ly recep- tion of Anza ; of Anza's well-founded expeciaiion oi hndlUg 3- pra^icaBle route to Alta California; and of his report " C-2533. 12 Crespo to Bucarely, Feb. 25, 1774. 11 C-2543. C-2554. 278 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII of a westward branch of the Colorado, which Bucarely sur- mised might be the river flowing into San Francisco Bay, as there were intervening mountains elsewhere. Bucarely had been very greatly impressed by the success of Anza's march to date, and by the delivery of his letters from the rivers, which facts he considered not less remarkable than the discovery of a route to the Pacific would be. If the route were found, it might in future conduce to the sup- port of the new establishments of Alta California at slight cost, and might lead to a reduction to the church of vast numbers of Indians. Anza and Urrea had made presents to Chief Palma of the Yumas, of which Bucarely approved, and he had ordered Crespo to continue them to Palma and other Yumas at royal expense, but not to give them arms. He also referred to the Rivera expedition, the supply- ships, the voyages of exploration, and the Palou report of December, 1773, in this letter, showing that these events were connected in his mind with the Anza expedition.^^ In another of the same date he expressed a belief that Anza and Rivera might meet in Alta California, in which case there would be men enough to explore San Francisco and establish one or more missions there, something which Rivera had been ordered to do. Bucarely was hoping to hear that it had been done.^^ Two days before, in ac- knowledging receipt of the Palou report, he had expressed the same hope, and had asked for detailed information of everything tending toward such a result.^^ At this time also. May 27, 1774, Bucarely wrote to O'Reilly manifesting his satisfaction with the results achieved thus far by Anza.^^ Their importance appears from the prominent place that they occupied in the monthly extract of news from the ^ frontier provinces, which contained detailed references to the Anza expedition.^'^ This was forwarded to Arriaga in another Bucarely letter of May 27.^^ These letters show not only the broad standpoint from which Bucarely " C-2624. Spanish official corre- " In Palou, Noticias, III, 254-57. spondence treated of but one subject ^^ C-2634. in each letter. " C-2626. i^ C-2628. i8 C-2627. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 279 viewed the Anza expedition, but also his deep interest in it. Meanwhile, Anza had encountered serious difficulty in his first attempt to cross the Colorado Desert. After spending a terrible day in the desert on February 15 in search of San Jacome, a village which later turned out to have been abandoned, he had been obhged to return to Santa Olaya near the Colorado River, because of the lack of water in the desert, and the exhaustion and rapid death rate of his animals. ^^ He wrote to Bucarely on February 28 to forestall bad news, trusting to Chief Palma to at- tend to the delivery of his letter. He had descended the Colorado River, in order to go around the sands in which Tarabal got lost, when he crossed the desert. As a result of the failure of his first attempt, he had decided to leave be- hind a large part of his provisions and most of the animals, for the beasts were too weak to proceed. He would put all in charge of Chief Palma, in whom he had confidence, leaving also three soldiers and four muleteers, a proceeding which he regarded as safe, for the Yumas seemed to be even better disposed to the Spaniards than the Pimas and P4- pagos of the reductions. Members of the two latter tribes often visited the Yumas, and they would see to it that no harm resulted. Farther on, there might not be another such favorable opportunity ; yet, sooner or later, he would have had to leave some provisions behind, he said. On March 2 he would start with eleven packs, containing provisions for one month, enough at least until they should reach San Gabriel, according to Tarabal, who said that it would take only two weeks, or less, with good animals. After reaching the pass, at about a week^s journey, there would be plenty of water, and there was some before there. So Anza and his men were expecting to complete their undertaking, and they would do it on foot, if necessary. He anticipated no trouble from peoples yet to be en- countered, as he understood them to be as lacking in arms i> Diaries of Anza, Didz, and Garc6s. 280 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII and spirit as the Yumas and Cojats.^^ It might be two or three months before he returned.^^ Anza left Santa Olaya on March 2, traversed the desert by a circuitous route, entered the mountains by way of the San FeHpe Canyon,^^ and reached San Gabriel on March 22. His letter to Bucarely from there, April 10, 1774, gives the essential facts of his march after leaving Santa Olaya, and accords high praise to the route discovered, as a means of communication. His difl&culties had been due primarily to the weakness of his animals and his ignorance of the coimtry. Because of the former the soldiers had been obliged to march most of the way on foot, and because of the latter they had traveled more leagues than was necessary. Where it had taken two hundred seventy-nine leagues in coming, the return could be made in two hundred leagues.^^ Monterey should be about three hundred leagues from Tubac or Altar. There were no hostile peoples en route ; rather they were well disposed, and lacking in arms. In five days^ march from the Colorado River, Anza had reached fertile lands with plenty of water, and the lands thereafter were good. The route from Sonora was a very good one, even suitable for wagons. Likewise, he expected that that would be the case if a more direct route were taken to Monterey, as by way of San Luis Obispo, which he thought might prove to be the best route from Sonora to Monterey. Lower Sonora could then furnish the neces- sary aid to Alta California; Pimeria Alta could not, be- cause of the Apaches. Due to a lack of provisions and the exhaustion of his animals, he had not attempted to go di- rectly to Monterey, as originally planned, but had come first to San Gabriel, arriving there at the height of the great *o Diaz and Garc6s say Cajuenches of Am. Hist., II, 521-23, was the first for Cojats. Diaz, Diary, A.G.P., His- to pronounce for the route up the San toria, V. 396. Garc6s, Diary, A.G.P., Felipe Canyon. With more evidence Historia, v. 52. Garc6s adds that the at hand than was available for Mr. name Cajuenches extended as far as Eldredge, I have reached the same con- San Diego. elusion that he did. 21 C-2560. 23 Based on the estimates of Anza 2* Until recently it was believed that himself, the return was accomplished Anza went through the San Gorgonio in one hundred seventy-four leagues, Pass, the present route of the Southern San Gabriel to Tubac. Anza, Diary ^ Pacific Railroad. Mr. Eldredge, Jour. C-2503. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 281 famine. Being unable to get animals and supplies enough from there or San Diego, or even from the Santiago, then at San Diego, he had also been obliged to abandon his project of a direct return from Monterey. He had only sixteen days' rations for his troops, and had therefore directed most of his men to return to the Colorado by way of the route discovered, while he himself would go to Monterey before returning. He expected to be at Tubac by the end of May, whence he would proceed to Mexico in June to re- port there in person.^* With this letter Anza enclosed his diary as completed to April 5. Diaz also sent his diary, with a letter of April 8, to Bucarely.^^ Attention may be called to Anza's description of the route discovered as a good ,_orL^jEJitirely,,.praciij2^a]^ mission of s upplies. As regards that much of his account, af least, it would seem that Anza was undijQyen^^ even although he had just traversed this route without losing a man. At any rate, the enthusiasm of Anza's letter had due modification in the diaries of the expedition, those of Anza, Diaz, and Garces agreeing substantially with the facts and with each other. As regards the Lo:^ dians, those encountered between the Yuma countiy an^ Ban^ Gabriel ha3"^emed to be of a very low grade of cul- ture, and feeble in a military way. They were reported to be numerous, but along the route that Anza traveled, their numbers were not great. The Indians first encountered after passing the Colorado Desert, the Cajuenches, were of the Yuman family, and Anza records that they spoke the same language as the Yumas, although he also states that the Yumas were their enemies.^^ Next Anza came upon Indians of what we now call the Shoshonean family. Diaz remarked that the Indians met with in the mountains had a similar language to that of the San Gabriel Indians, bas- ing his opinion on his own observations and on the fact that Tarabal, who had a slight knowledge of the San Gabriel tongue, was able to make himself understood by the mountain 24 C-2603. 28 Anza, Diary, C-2503. 26 A.G.P., Historia, v. 396. 282 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII Indians.^^ These family relationships might have become a matter of importance as affecting the future use of the route, but in fact they seem to have had no marked effect at the time. None of these Indians were so cordial to the Spaniards as the Yumas had been, but none of them had endeavored to impede the march. Finally, they were not considered by the expeditionaries as a serious military obstacle in any event, nor did they prove to be so in the few years during which Spaniards went back and forth along this route.^^ The Yumas, however, were a serious problem. They were more numerous than the mountain Indians, there being several thousand of them, and they were much more advanced in type of life, having good crops and better weapons^ although not good enough to enable them to re- sist Spanish troops effectually. The remarkable cordiality of the Yumas seems rather to have deceived Anza at this time ; his opinion may be summed up in his remark that there would be no trouble between the Spaniards and Yumas as long as Palma lived, but rather he and all his tribe would be well disposed and faithful to the king.^^ A warning note was sounded by Diaz, however. Unless some establishments were formed along these rivers, he said, the march through these lands would not be easy, for the inconstancy of the Indians was well known, and the passage of the river was difficult. If the Indians should become dis- contented or unwilling to cooperate in the passage of the rivers, or if they should try to hinder it, a large armed force would be required to conquer so vast a number of Indians, despite their low grade of culture.^^ This was in effect a prophecy of the disaster of 1781. The difficulty lay not alone in the numbers of the Yumas, but also in the necessity for their aid in crossing the Colorado River. 27 Diaz, Diary, A.G.P., Historia, v. way of the San Gorgonio Pass he 396, would not have passed through tribes 28 For information about these In- of the Yuman family on entering the dians, see] Hodge, Handbook, under mountains, which is further evidence, "Cajuenche," "Serranos," "Shosho- therefore, in support of Mr. Eldredge's nean Family," and "Yuman Family," as contention for the canyon of the San also the map showing the linguistic Felipe. families of American Indians. It may ^ Anza, Diary, C-2602. be remarked that if Anza had gone by ^o Diaz, Diary, A.G.I., 88-1-22. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 283 While Anza was hastening to Monterey and back, most of the soldiers, in charge of Father Garces, made their way to the junction of the Colorado and Gila. On April 27 Garc^s wrote to Bucarely from that place, detailing what had occurred on his march from San Gabriel. The return had been made between April 13 and 26. Garces expressed much disappointment that Anza was to return by the same route, rather than seek a new one, as Garces had desired, although Anza might have been compelled to take that course. He also regretted that no observations of latitude had been taken ; the other religious had been ordered to accompany him to take observations, and not merely to give him counsel, but instruments and a knowledge of their use were lacking in Sonora. After Anza's departure for Mon- terey, Garces had wanted the soldiers under him to wait until he or Diaz could go to San Diego for an instrument and instruction in its use, but they would not do so. Indeed, he was far from content with the achievements of the expedi- tion, and his curiosity was still in many respects unsatis- fied. Yet, Anza was worthy of praise for having under- gone such great expense, and for the good conduct that he had shown ; besides, his example might lead others to pro- pose like undertakings. Reverting to his original com- plaint, he said that if he had gone to Monterey, he would have urged a direct return from Monterey, by a more northerly route. However, the conquests in Alta Califor- nia would in time be attended to, as well as the estabHsh- ment of less costly settlements on the Colorado and Gila. The latter was particularly important, he said, and it would be a matter for tears, if these numerous peoples, so well adapted for spiritual conquest, were lost sight of. With this letter he was forwarding his diary by the special courier who was also carrying the Anza and Diaz diaries and let- ters.^^ If Garces' letter seems to give Anza scant praise, the concluding paragraphs of his diary are more liberal, re- ferring specifically to Anza's good deportment toward the Indians, his kindly manner toward the soldiers, and his 31 A.G.P., Historia, v. 52. 284 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII good treatment of the Fathers, to whom he gave not only- necessaries, but also some luxuries. These good acts, thought Garc^s, might have moved God to sustain the expedition in peace. ^^ A letter from Palou to the Father Superior at San Fer- nando, April 22, 1774, shows how important Anza's dis- covery seemed to Alta Calif ornians. Anza had found that it was only one hundred seventy leagues from Tubac to SarrTjfabriel, said Palou, through a fertile land, inhabited by peaceful people. Thus, in case of necessity, Alta CaH- fornia could receive help from Sonora. Six Alta Cahfornia soldiers were to go as far as the Colorado with Anza to ac- quaint themselves with his route. Anza intended to pro- pose further projects of conquest to Bucarely, which Palou hoped that the Father Superior might support. One of these was the establishing of a chain of jnissions from Sonora to Alta California along the route discovered. Another was for a maiLservice_every two months, one courier to go from Alta California to the Colorado, receiving there the mail brought from Altar by another. A third project was that eight droves of mules, then idle in Sonora since the Cerro Prieto campaign, should be used for carrying grain and provisions to Alta California, four of them to go through Sonora to the Colorado, and the other four between there and San Gabriel. If that were done, Alta California would in a few years be able to maintain itself. A fourth Anza project was to bring settlers from Sonora by the new route, and he was quite certain that many would desire to come. Finally, he meant to propose that the Manila galleon be permitted to stop at Monterey or San Francisco, If the king might also permit it to land some of the goods that it brought from China, so that they might be used in trade with Sonora and New Mexico, that would cause this fertile Alta California to be settled, and would result in the re- duction of the natives. Palou suggested that it would be a good time to ask of Bucarely that the horses and mules intrusted to the intendente of Sonora be sent to Alta Cali- 32 Garc§s, Diary, A.G.P., Historia, v. 52. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 285 fornia; and likewise, every kind of cattle for breeding pur- poses. The missions might then reach a permanent basis, for with the good pasture, the abundant lands and waters, and the good climate of this country the animals would increase rapidly and aid greatly in the conquest. ^^ Reference has already been made to the arrival in Mexico in June, 1774, of Anza's courier, Valdes, and to the deposi- tion made by him before Melchor de Peramds on June 14. Such of his answers as have not already been considered may now be taken up. He was one of those sent by Anza to San Diego for provisions. That port was said to be forty leagues from San Gabriel, but Valdes believed that he must have gone sixty, for it took him two days. He was in San Diego three days, and returned wdth laden animals, re- quiring four days.^^ The route was a good one, there being many small streams and three fordable rivers with tree- lined banks. The lands were fertile, for anything that he knew to the contrary, and there was much game, bears and birds, in that region. Monterey was usually reckoned to be sixty leagues from San Gabriel, but it was fully a hun- dred, as Valdes knew, for he had travelled that route four times. Anza had started for Monterey on April 11,^^ taking four of his own soldiers and two others from San Gabriel as guides. Diaz and two soldiers waited for him at San Gabriel while the others, twelve soldiers and two mule- teers, left San Gabriel on April 18,^^ and returned to Sonora with Garc^s, Valdes being one of this party. They went back by the same route, except for two short cuts by means of which they saved five days, experiencing no trouble with the Indians on this march, except that some Indians of San Sebastidn killed a horse to get the meat. Palma received them joyfully, and ferried them across the Colorado on a raft that he had built for Anza^s party. He had also kept Anza^s provisions and animals without taking any, and the cows had even increased in number by the birth of some calves. The men whom Anza had left there had taken ^ M.N., Papeles de Lancaster- J ones, were of little account. Anza, Diary, V. 2. C-2602. M April 10, in fact. ** Anza stated that the provisions ^ In fact, April 13. 286 THE POUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII the horses and returned to Altar, on hearing a rumor that misfortune had befallen Anza^s party. Vald^s and two other soldiers had gone from the rivers to Altar, while Garces and the rest remained behind, and from Altar Valdes had pro- ceeded to Mexico.^^ Bucarely received the news of Anza's success with the greatest enthusiasm. He exhibits this in a long letter to Arriaga of June 26, 1774, announcing the discovery, and enclosing copies of Anza^s San Gabriel diary, his letters of February 28 and April 10, and the Vald6s declaration. Up to the Colorado the march had not been difficult, he said, but was so, afterward, although the mishaps encountered were only such as were natural when one was passing through unknown lands without guides who knew the way. So his animals became weak, and frequently he was unable to find good halting places with water and pasture. These great difficulties were overcome by Anza's good judgment, and by his own constancy and that of his troops. But for the failure of his horses, he would have reached San Gabriel with abundant provisions both for himself and the settle- ments there. His leaving some animals and provisions with Palma had involved some risk, but it had worked, and this appeared to Bucarely especially noteworthy, as also the courageous spirit with which Anza's soldiers had offered repeatedly to go on foot, if necessary. It was not strange that the march was not as direct as possible, since the route had never before been traversed by Spaniards. Anza's messenger said that five days had been saved on the return journey, and it was probable that more than a third of the distance would be eliminated when the route became better known. At any rate, there was no doubt but that it was better than the one from Baja California. The Indians along the route were reported by Anza as lacking in arms and peaceful. The Yumas were the most warlike, if any might be said to be so, and they were friends of the Span- iards. If they should retain this feeling, they might facili- tate the erecting of missions and the establishing of peace 37 C-2648. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 287 in that country, for the Yumas wanted both, according to Anza. Thus, there would be a secure route from Sonora to Alta Cahfornia. The sea route would always be neces- sary, but the new route would be a more important way for assisting that land in a contingency, especially if Sonora should prove able to grow all kinds of produce, and if cul- tivation continued to increase in Sonora as it was then doing, according to the reports of Governor Crespo. As further measures in connection with tjie new route required careful consideration, he would wait until Anza reached Mexico City, to which he contemplated coming upon his return. Meanwhile, in order to retain the friendship of the Yumas, Bucarely had ordered Crespo to keep on good terms with Palma, and to cause others to do so. Crespo was to tell Palma how pleased was Bucarely with his good faith, and was to give him presents, although no arms or ammunition. Thus he might be kept well disposed until such time as missions could be established in his country, to facilitate communication with the existing missions of Baja and Alta California, and with others to be erected there. Garces' return to the Colorado was due, no doubt, to Anza's lack of provisions, for Anza had left half of his with Chief Palma, and there was a scarcity at San Gabriel. Anza^s confidence in Palma had proved warranted. The latter had built a raft, thus fulfilling a promise to Anza, so as to enable Anza's force to cross the river. More particularly did his good faith show forth in the return of all the provisions, with an increase in cattle. The peaceful character of the various tribes, as appeared from Anza^s accounts, persuaded him of the importance of his discovery, and of the advantages that might accrue, when communication should be estab- lished. Bucarely suggested that Anza be made a lieu- tenant colonel, and that each soldier be given an escudo de ventaja entitling him to extra pay,^^ not only as a reward, but also as an incentive to others to make explorations that would bring the Spanish settlements into better communi- 38 The soldier with an escudo de ventaja received an extra ducado per month. Diccionario universal. 288 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII cation.^^ Bucarely evidently hoped that the Anza route would become the principal land route to Monterey, su- perseding the one from Loreto, while communication by sea would continue to be maintained. Nor did Arriaga fail to be impressed by Anza's achievements. He replied to Bucarely's letter of May 27, giving approval of what had been done, and making particular note of the attentions shown to Chief Palma.'*^ He also procured Anza's pro- motion to lieutenant colonel, the royal grant bearing date of October 4, 1774.^^ He informed Bucarely of this in his letter of October 8, stating also that the escudo de ventaja requested by the viceroy had been granted to those soldiers who had so loyally accompanied Anza."*^ The details of Anza^s return journey require but little mention here. He left Monterey on April 22, going by way of San Gabriel and the route that he had discovered, saving time by cutoffs, much as Garces had done. He reached the Colorado River on May 10, left there five days later, and proceeded by way of the Gila to Tubac, arriving May 26. From there he had intended to go at once to Mexico, but was prevented from so doing by orders of the assistant-inspector, Antonio Bonilla. Anza refers to Bonilla's act and tells of his return march to Sonora in a letter of June 8 to Bucarely. He would have gone immediately to Mexico, he said, but had been obliged to wait for a review of his presidio by Bonilla. Shortly after the latter^s departure he sent Anza a secret instruction to proceed to Terrenate. Anza went there, and was placed temporarily in charge of the presidio until a new commander could be brought from Janos, which Bonilla had promised to attend to promptly. Referring to the events of his stay in Alta California, he spoke of a strange wreck that had been found at Carmelo. He had bidden Fages to send it to San Bias at the first opportunity, so that it might be examined there to see if it were the lost San Jose, and if not, as was likely, because it was of a type of construction unknown to those who had seen it, to de- » C-2656. « C-2737. « Arriaga to Bucarely, Oct. 2, 1774. « C-2740. C-2735. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 289 termine to whom it had belonged. He remarked on the scarcity of provisions in Alta CaUfornia, but said that both the troops and the missionaries were expecting early relief through the coming of boats, and the opening of the Sonora route. All the tribes in that country were maintaining ab- solute peace.**^ Anza's detention in Sonora is more fully explained in a letter by Bonilla to Hugo Oconor, July 16, 1774. Cap- tain Jose de Vildosola of Terrenate had been arrested, fol- lowing a riot of his troops due to graft indulged in at their expense by the captain and habilitado. In this difficulty Bonilla hit upon Anza as temporary comjnander, because his ability and agreeable disposition, and his unusually great knowledge of the character of presidial troops fitted him to maintain order at Terrenate, and because he was the only officer then in Sonora, for Captains Bernardo de Urrea and Gabriel de Vildosola were habitually sick, and of the subalterns there was scarce one capable enough to act even as habilitado. Since Anza had the viceroy's per- mission to go to Mexico to report concerning his important and felicitous discovery, an officer should be sent from Nueva Vizcaya to relieve him, and Bonilla had taken it upon himself to ask Governor Crespo to appoint Lieutenant Pedro de Tueros.*^ This makes it clear that Bonilla's act was not due to petty spite, such as Anza had to confront on other Occasions. Bucarely, however, was much dis- pleased, although he may not have had full knowledge of the motives that had prompted Bonilla. Writing to Ar- riaga, August 27, 1774, he said that he was persuaded that nothing in the affairs of Sonora was more important than what Anza had just accompHshed, and as he had given clear orders to Bonilla to have Anza come to Mexico, there ought to have been no delay. Bucarely had notified the inspector, Hugo Oconor, how objectionable Bonilla's act was to him, and had ordered Governor Crespo to arrange immediately for the relief of Anza, so that he might start at once. By reason of this delay^ Bucarely was unable to « C-2642. 44 C-2676. 290 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII give further details of Anza's achievement, other than what Anza had said in his letter. He had spoken of the distance saved on the return march, and of the lack of incident in passing through the lands of the intervening tribes.*^ Shortly afterward Bucarely received Diaz's diary of the return march. In his remitting letter, June 12, 1774, Diaz explained that he was not coming to Mexico himself, as he had originally planned. Referring to the expedition, he said that the Indians of the Colorado and Gila were some- what addicted to stealing, but they were very devoted to the Spaniards, and, he believed, would gladly permit of Spanish establishments in their territory. This fact was due not a little to the Christian spirit, zeal, prudence, and singularly good conduct of Anza, whose peculiar talents rendered him deserving of the pious attention and patron- age of the viceroy."*^ Copies of both documents were for- warded to Arriaga in Bucarely's letter of September 26. Despite what Diaz had said, he had been ordered to come to Mexico to report in person.^^ Anza's diary of the events of his march from April 6 on was not received by the viceroy until November, when it was presented by Anza himself, for he had concluded it after arriving in Mexico. A copy was forwarded to Arriaga in Bucarely's letter of November 26. This letter was con- cerned largely with Anza's second expedition, which was on the point of being ordered, but it had much to say about matters related to the expedition just concluded. Bucarely called attention to the merits ofjChi^ Palma, and of the Yumas and their neigEbors ; ""he noted the fertile lands, hitherto unknown, which Anza had discovered ; he spoke of the opportunity for communication between Sonora and Alta California; and he remarked on the well-grounded hope that he had of extending the king's rule and the Cath- olic faith over the intervening tribes. Extension of the faith, which in Bucarely's words '^is the primary intention of His Majesty and the only real object in the expenditures « C-2706. « C-2644. « C-2721. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 291 that he makes/ ^ ^^ was to be achieved by estabUshing mis- sions, which would be easy, in view of the friendship of the Yumas, that tribe being the most powerful of those en route, and the one by whose aid yet greater projects might be undertaken. Gifts and good treatment were the neces- sary means of preserving this friendship. Of Anza, Bu- carely spoke in the highest terms. He thought that it would be a good occasion to stimulate other officers to like services if Anza were made a lieutenant colonel, and again suggested that an escvdo de ventaja be given to each of the soldiers who had displayed such constancy in accompanying him.'*^ Bucarely did not know that these last-nar|ied rec- ommendations had already been acted on favorably by Arriaga in pursuance of an earlier suggestion by the vice- roy. On learning of this Bucarely not only attended to the matter of Anza^s promotion, but also gave fitting orders to the treasury officials so that the soldiers might receive the extra pay to which they were henceforth entitled for the rest of their lives. In order that the presidial troops might understand how the king rewarded those who dis- tinguished themselves in the service, he had ordered the comandante-inspector to make this event known to all the troops, so that they too, inspired by this favor, might con- duct themselves with activity and zeal on such occasions as they should have an opportunity to do so.^° Seventeen men profited by this arrangement.^^ Preparations for a new expedition began at once upon Anza^s arrival in Mexico. Arriaga had announced the royal approval of the instructions given to Anza for his first expedition in his letter of March 9, 1774.^^ Bucarely ** It may again be insisted that Espinosa ; Jos6 Marcos Ramirez ; Juan statements of this kind are not to be Antonio Valencia ; Jo86 Toribio Corona ; taken seriously, although they might Juan Jos6 Rodriguez ; Jos6 Maria Mar- proceed from a pious motive, such as tinez ; Jos6 Pablo Corona ; Francisco Bucarely himself might be expected Figueroa ; Juan Martinez ; Jos6 An- to feel. tonio Acedo ; Isidro Martinez ; Jos6 *» C-2764. Antonio Romero ; Pascual Rivera ; Juan «• Bucarely to Arriaga, Feb. 24, 1775. Miguel Palomino ; Jos6 de Ayala; and C-2861. Juan Angel Castillo. One wonders "* The list, C-2862, was enclosed in what reward was accorded to that great Bucarely 's letter of Feb. 24, 1775, cited traveller and worthy soldier, Juan in the previous note. The men were : Bautista Valdea. Corporal Marcial Sdnchez ; Juan de « C-2567. Also in C-2496. 292 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII had already determined on a second expedition when he received this letter, and he ordered copies of it to be drawn up so that it might appear in the expediente on which the ultimate formal decision in favor of the new expedition should be based.^^ The expedition was virtually already ordered. The only remaining questions were : What prep- arations were necessary? What was the expedition to accomplish ? These matters were allowed to wait, however, until Anza reached Mexico to give his advice in person. To the first question Anza made answer in his report to Bucarely of November 17. Judging from his report, he had already discussed the expedition verbally with Bu- carely, for much appears without previous documentary warning. Regarding the forty soldiers, who were to go with him to occupy the Rio de San Francisco, men from Culiacdn, Sinaloa, and Fuerte, Sonora, would be the best adapted and the most easily obtained without causing harm to the region where they lived, he said, and they would also receive more benefit than persons of other places. These people, whom Anza had just seen, were in a state of very great poverty and misery. In order to instruct re- cruits in militaiy, discipline, Anza wanted five^residio_sol:i diers, to 6e chosen by him, to serve as sergeants and cor- porals. In order to equip his recruits with what they needed, he suggested that they be paid in clothing; if paid in money, they would waste it or lose it in gambling, a vice to which everybody in the frontier provinces was addicted. As the march to the Rio de San Francisco was to be by way of Anza's route of 1774, it was indispensable to take along soldiers who knew both the land and the people, so as to aid Anza and to bring about the consummation of the expedition in peace. He, therefore, asked permission to take ten soldiers from Tubac of those who had accompanied him in 1774, their places at Tubac to be filled by five vet- erans from Terrenate and five recruits. January would be the best time to start, as the 1774 march proved, but it would mean too great a delay to wait until January, 1776, in 63 Bucarely, Decree, June 30, 1774. In C-2496. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 293 view of Bucarely^s desire to advance this expedition with all possible speed ; so he thought that he might be able to start from Sonora by September, 1775. There would then have been some rain, which would result in there being enough pasture up to the Colorado, and Alta California would be entered at the beginning of the rainy season. To arrive much after the rain had set in would be harmful, because of the great number of mud-holes that they would encounter. Provisions and |^ack-mules could be reckoned on the basis of the 1774 expedition. They had enough then for four months for the number of persons on that expedition. The most difficult matter in the preparations for a new expedition would be to obtain useful horses at Culiacdn or Fuerte, and to get them to Tubac, which was about three hundred leagues from Culiacdn, This could be accomplished only by the viceroy^s order to the alcaldes requiring them to compel farmers to exhibit and sell their horses. If only those for sale were to be bought, it would take until July to get the necessary number. If Bucarely should agree to pay recruits _jnjgQuipJ3^eJ^V-t^6 necessary effects must be remitted without loss of time, so as to be in Culiacdn by the following March, when Anza expected to get there; Anza might then distribute them. Not only the recruits, but also their families would have to be sup- plied with everything, from shoes on their feet to ribbons in their hair. As there might be some desertions, and as Anza had found that judges rarely gave due assistance in such cases, he asked Bucarely to give him s pecial powers in this and like matters. He realized that Bucarely was very desirous that presents should be given to Indians, al- though this had rarely been done, and then only to some Indians of Chief Palma's villages, wherefore it might be well to grant Anza a supply of tobacco, and some blue, red, yellow, and green glass beads, as presents in Bucarely's name. That would make them attached to the Spaniards, whatever might occur. Chief Palma's services were par- ticularly deserving of reward by some mark of special favor, as, for example, by the gift of a long coat and a cap.^^ M In C-2496. 294 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII Plans for a second expedition now went on at a rapid rate. Bucarely was enthusiastic about it, expecting the most beneficial results for Alta California, as appears from the remarks already alluded to in his November 26 letter. Coming to his plans for a second expedition, Bucarely said in the same letter that it was advisable to explore the land about San Francisco, and to place a presidio there, for that site ought by all means to be occupied in order to advance the Spanish conquests. Therefore, he had planned a second expedition under Anza with a larger party, so that thirty men might be left as an escort and guard for two new missions that he planned to have there. Cows and horses would also be taken along, in order that, by their increase, the new establishments might be advanced. Re- ferring to Anza Bucarely said that his presence, good judg- ment, and talents, which he had now experienced in person, confirmed him in the opinion that he had formed of Anza from the time that he had first proposed an expedition. Bucarely believed him a competent, suitable person for carrying out what he hoped to accomplish by the new ex- pedition.^^ Two days later, Bucarely issued a decree au- thorizing the Anza expedition and settling many but not all of the details in connection with it. The authorization of the junta was not asked on this occasion. The following is a translation of the decree : "The enlistments, by which it is believed necessary to increase [the force of] the presidio of San Carlos de Mon- terey in Alta California ^^ are that of a lieutenant, a ser- geant, and twenty-eight soldiers, so as to be able to detach from them, without prejudice to the existing force by which the missions [already] established are sustained, the number that may be needed for the two new missions planned for the vicinity of the port of San Francisco, establishing a port there, which may be marked for occupation, to be a base or beginning for future explorations. The lieutenant and sergeant are to be chosen from the presidial troops of "^5 C-2764. " Called California Septentrional in the document. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 295 Sonora, and the soldiers who may wish to go voluntarily to that home are to be chosen from the same presidios, pro- vided that their number may not exceed eight, because of the shortage that they might cause in their present home [if more should go]. The other twenty are to be recruited by Captain Juan Bautista de Anza, for it is he who is to per- form this new service for the king, conducting them to Monterey by the route which, with so much glory, he dis- covered a few months ago ; [he is] to deliver them to the commandant of those establishments, Fernando de [Rivera y] Moncada ; [he is] to assist in the exploration of the Rio de San F£ancisco/so that he may inform me of what he shall Kave seen, and [is] to return by the same route with the ten soldiers, whom he is to take, chosen from [those of] his presidio ; besides [he is also to bring back] those that are permitted to come." In accordance with this resolution, Juan Bautista de Anza will arrange with Juan Jos6 de Echeveste to draw up as a continuation of this decree the estimate of expenses to which this measure will amount, so that whatever is most fitting to the service of the king may be determined, when this is considered in the junta de guerra y real hacienda. In addition to the estimate, they will make a note of what they beUeve conducive to sup- plying the stores that may have to be prepared. As minis- ters for the new missions to be established are in Monterey, there is no need to discuss taking missionaries or their sup- plies, but if it appear suitable that Father Garc^s and an- other [religious as a] companion go with the expedition to the Colorado River, and [if it] seem well that they await there the return of Juan Bautista de Anza, as he [Garces] did on the first expedition, this captain will set forth what shall appear most fitting to him on the point, etc."^« On December 1, in two communications to the viceroy, Anza nominated the men that he wished as lieutenant and sergeant. He proposed as his first choice for lieutenant, " Probably this refers to those in Alta California who might gain permission to return from there. » In C-2496. 296 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII Jos6 Joaquin Moraga/® who was in fact appointed,^° and served on the expedition. Anza^s first choice for sergeant was Jose Ignacio Espinosa ; second, Antonio Bravo ; and third, Pablo Grijalva.^^ Bucarely appointed Espinosa/^ but Grijalva in fact went on the expedition. On Decem- ber 5 Anza was ready with the suggestions that Bucarely had called for a week before, confining himself in his report to the statements in Bucarely's decree. He noted the num- ber of soldiers that he was to take with him, forty in all, and he had already proposed for lieutenant and sergeant the only men that were suitable. The objection to taking eight such presidial soldiers as might volunteer was that the sol- diers were so obedient to their captains that they would not volunteer without their consent, and the captains would not care to get rid of any but useless soldiers or those of bad habits, who would not assist Anza much in getting his recruits, and whose bad habits might defeat the objects for which they were intended in the new establishments. Anza, therefore, asked permission to choose these soldiers him- self. The command and the duties imposed on him he ac- cepted with the greatest pleasure. Echeveste and Anza had already conferred about expenses, and calculated them most minutely, estimating that they would amount to 21,927 pesos and 2 reales, of which the royal treasury had 6359 pesos and 4 reales in goods for the expedition and provisions for Monterey. That left a total of only 15,567 "In C-2496. Anza explained that ^o Bucarely, Decree, Dec. 30, 1774. Moraga was at the time alferez of Fronte- In C-2496. ras, and had seen eighteen years' service "^ In C-2496. Espinosa was a cor- as a private soldier and alferez. He had poral at Terrenate. He had been fulfilled his duties courageously, and seventeen years in the service, con- had the distinction of having a father ducting himself gallantly in action, who had been killed in action, while a and had been wounded twice. Bravo subaltern at the same presidio. Moraga of Buena vista had served ten years, was especially desired because of his Grijalva was another Terrenate cor- long service as an officer, his superior poral who had served about as long as abilities, and his intelligence in writing. Espinosa, and was of equal merit and Anza's second choice was Cayetano wounds. Espinosa's long service and Limon, alferez of Buenavista, who had greater intelligence in it made him seen over twenty years of service, work- Anza's choice, although Espinosa did ing his way up from the ranks, and had not know how to write and the other been wounded at least twice in military two did. actions. Moraga and Limon alone ** Bucarely, Decree, Dec. 30, 1774. would fulfill the requirements ; hence In C-2496. he made no further proposals. 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 297 pesos and 6 reales, even estimating the various items gen- erously.^^ As to the collecting of stores, most of these were mentioned in the itemized note of expense. As for the pro- visions to be obtained in Sonora ready and fresh at the time of the journey, Anza suggested that Bucarely order the governor of Sonora to see that they were supplied from Horcasitas and the missions of Pimeria Alta, those being the easiest places from which to get them. The missions could also sell cattle to the expedition. Anza would be too busy recruiting to attend to the collection of stores, and suggested the appointment of Miguel Gregorio de Echarri, who had served with credit in that capacity in Pitic dur- ing the military campaign in Sonora. Anza again requested that the lieutenant, sergeant, and eight presidial soldiers be chosen by him, this being an important preliminary step which would assist in recruiting. He suggested that Father Pedro Font go on the expedition instead of Garces. The former was at one of the Sonora missions, and was said to know how to take observations of latitude. In case he were designated to go, would Bucarely please send Anza the necessary instruments.^^ Matters were now nearly ready for presentation before a junta}^ For its consideration, Bucarely ordered a number of documents added to the file of papers, to wit : the resolu- tion of the junta in favor of the first Anza expedition ; the royal approval of that undertaking ; the diary of Anza for the expedition ; and four letters from Rivera.^® All of these documents except two of the letters of Rivera have already been considered. Rivera had reached Monterey on May 23, 1774, and soon afterward took over the command from Fages. His letters of June 16 showing the military weak- ness of the colony have already been used in another con- •3 A translation of the itemized less, he felt quite sure of the result of account appears in an appendix to its deliberations. Again, there being this work. no mention in the documents of this ^ In C-2496. file of the real relation of this expedi- •* The junta's consent in this instance tion to foreign danger, there was no was probably little more than a mere need for secrecy. formality. Bucarely had received per- «* Bucarely, Decree, Dec. 7, 1774. mission to dispense with it, and had In C-2496. already ordered the expedition. Doubt- 298 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII nection.®^ In one of them he stated that the founding of a presidio and missions at San Francisco, with which he had been charged, would be impossible without reinforcements. On October 8 Rivera again wrote two letters, even more to the point. In one of them he said that the families which he had left at Velicatd had not yet arrived, but that he was expecting them soon. Consequently, he was permit- ting five soldiers to return to San Bias. He was in doubt what to do with six deserters who had been captured, but he was inclined to give them their liberty, because the Indian women were very depraved, and they and the Indian men needed to be punished, Rivera's intimation being that that necessitated all the force that he could muster. He went on to say, that his troops were too few to found a mission at San Francisco unless the presidio were to be moved there ; but if that were done there would be too long a stretch of country to defend, and it would be difficult to succor the missions left behind, when occasion should de- mand. The Indians, however, were quiet. ^^ In his second letter he expressed a desire to see an advancement of the establishments under his command, and said that he had written repeatedly to Bucarely that there must be new buildings and more laborers if it were to occur. There were only nine laborers at the time.^^ On December 16, 1774, a junta considered the question of Anza's second expedition.^** After reciting the various documents before it, the junta proceeded to its resolution, which amounted to a complete acquiescence in the plans of Anza and Bucarely ."^^ On receipt of a royal order of September 22, 1774, ap- proving Bucarely's acts for establishing missions in Alta California, especially two at the port of San Francisco, «7 Supra, chap. XI. at the one of September 9, 1773. Two * In C-2496. new names appear : Antonio Villa- * Ibid. Urrutia, of the viceroy's council and 7" Of those in the junta of September subdecano in the Audiencia of Mexico ; 9, 1773, which had authorized Anza's and Ignacio Negreiros, gentleman of the first expedition, the following were order of Santiago. Jos6 de Gorrdez, present at this meeting : Bucarely ; the viceroy's secretary, also signed, Valcircel ; Areche ; Barroeta ; Abad ; although not a member of the junta. Toral or Vald6s ; Gutierrez ; Mangino ; ^^ In C-2496. A translation of the and Arce. Mesia had been present at document is given in an appendix, the junta of October 17, 1772, but not 1774] THE FIRST ANZA EXPEDITION 299 Bucarely replied, December 27, 1774, telling what he had done to bring that about. Recognizing its importance he had planned a second expedition under Anza by way of the Gila and Colorado rivers. Anza was to take as many soldiers as were necessary for an escort to the two new missions, and was to erect a monument to indicate that the land belonged to the king of Spain. This matter, which Bucarely deemed indispensable, was about to be accom- plished as a result of the resolutions of the junta, of which Bucarely enclosed a copy, that document showing that Anza was to get thirty recruits, marrie d men^ if p^^^ and to take them and their families^to the port of San Francisco, with a view to founding a goodly colony there, not only to guard the land, but also to serve as a base for future settlements. For that reason, Bucarely had granted to these settlers the utensils, clothing, and other things which Anza represented as necessary. Anza would also take ten soldiers from Tubac, who would return with him by the same route as before, after which Anza would re- port in detail. Fathers Garces and Font would go, — the former to the Colorado River, there to await Anza's re- turn, and the latter all the way, to observe latitudes. Bu- carely had left the erecting of missions at the port of San Francisco to Serra, and had instructed Rivera to lend his aid. He had also pointed out that a fort should be es- tablished at each of the new missions, not far from the coast."^^ The pious fund was to contribute 12,000 pesos to the Department of San Bias, of which 1000 each was for the two missions, and the treasury would have to pay the rest, which Bucarely had ordered. The ministers were to be taken from the supernumerary religious in Alta Cal- ifornia. Strict expense accounts would be kept of the cost of the expedition.^^ Apprised of this new project, Arriaga replied sustaining Bucarely, as usual in his plans of con- quest."^^ With the authorization of the expedition, and Anza's '2 In other documents Bucarely re- ''' C-2781. ferred to a single fort, which he planned ''*■ Arriaga to Bucarely, May 15, 1775. to establish between the two missions. C-2912. 300 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XII departure from Mexico City, little more could be done by Bucarely from the Sonora end relative to the objects to be accomplished by the expedition, for it would be nearly a year before it could start, and news of its departure would be several months more in reaching Mexico. Bucarely was able, therefore, to occupy himself in other ways con- ducing to the same end. This was the time when naval activities were especially prominent, some account of which was given in a previous chapter. Also there were affairs in the two Californias and in the frontier provinces, related more or less directly to northwestward advance, demanding his attention. CHAPTER XIII CONDITIONS IN SONORA AND BAJA CALIFORNIA, 1773-1776 Before proceeding to the details of the second Anza and other expeditions having to do with the estabHshing of overland communications between Alta California and So- nora or New Mexico, it seems necessary to give an account of affairs in the regions adjoining the new province, for they have a bearing on the objects to be achieved by the Anza expedition. A full statement will not be attempted ; rather, just enough will be given to indicate the course of events in those provinces which would tend to the disad- vantage of Alta California, unless circumvented or con- trolled. In Sonora, affairs were unsettled throughout this period, both because of Apache raids from the outside, and because of minor internal uprisings. While the evils were not eradicated, and even tended to become worse, the province never got beyond control under Bucarely's rule. The interest in Baja California is in its material develop- ment, in order to judge whether it might have become a source of supply for Alta California in provisions, domestic animals, and men, or even have been able to serve as a suitable route to the new province. There is nothing in the history of the period, however, to show that the penin- sula had changed. In fine, the need for an overland route, with all of the activity in Sonora and along the route, that its maintenance would involve, was as great as ever, if Alta California were to achieve a state of populous settle ment. Some mention has been made of the task assigned to Hugo Oconor to establish a line of frontier presidios, inspect \ (^ 301 302 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIII /I *^^^^ existing at the time, and combat the Apaches, mat- ![ ters which were the most important internal problem in I i the region from Sonora to Texas in the years 1773-76. It is not necessary to follow Oconor's course in detail. He began at the eastern end of his field and proceeded west- ward, although the whole frontier was under his rule. Con- tinually annoyed by attacks of the Apaches, it was natural that Oconor should desire to chastise them; so, early in 1774, he informed Bucarely that he was going to sally forth against them, enclosing a plan of campaign. Bu- carely replied, telHng Oconor that he should complete the line of presidios first, that task taking precedence over any other, and should dislodge the Indians from the land in- tervening between the line and the Spanish towns ; other- wise, Oconor's success on campaign would be doubtful, or if attained, might prejudice the results already achieved elsewhere by him. Moreover, if the enemy should cease to molest the provinces, a policy of kindliness and good treatment should be employed toward them, rather than offensive war. Nevertheless, Oconor went on with his preparations, and wrote to Bucarely on March 20 that he was going to Coahuila with fifty men, leaving Antonio Bonilla to inspect the presidios of Sonora. Afterward, they would meet at Carrizal, and agree on measures for a campaign, of the advantages of which he was unalterably convinced. Bucarely thereupon reiterated his commands, adding further reasons in support of them. After the Sonora presidios should be moved to the new sites that they were to occupy as part of the line, it would be well to await the results of Anza^s expedition (for Anza was at this time engaged on his first expedition), so as to avail them- selves of the information that he might supply, and so as not to put any obstacle in the way of his return, which might be the result, if the campaign were opened beforehand. Finally, Bucarely reminded Oconor that his commission had to do with all of the frontier provinces, and not merely with a small portion. A successful issue of the campaign would be more certain, if the line were occupied, when the pre- 1773] CONDITIONS IN SONORA 303 sidial garrisons, freed from other tasks, might not only defend their territory, but also take the offensive. Bu- carely was especially insistent on his opinion because of the expedition of Anza. He had learned of the coming^of Tarabal, which made it appear certain that Anza would succeed, and he did not wish a campaign started before his return, for fear that the enemy, by themselves or by stir- ring up others, might prevent the discoveries which seemed likely to be made. Such was the tenor of Bucarely's letter of April 26 to Arriaga, reviewing the whole matter,^ and the latter returned a specific approval of the instructions given to Oconor checking his desire to go on campaign.^ The Apaches continued their bold attacks, even in Sonora. A letter of Bonilla, May 3, 1774, said that large bands of Apaches had recently entered that province, and they had twice attacked a detachment of ten men going from Terre- nate to relieve the garrison of Tubac. The Spaniards had defended themselves in such a manner that they lost but two horses, and one soldier was slightly wounded. This account appeared in the report for June of news re- ceived from the frontier provinces,^ which was forwarded to Spain with the viceroy's letter of June 26.* The report for August contained better news. Bonilla had reviewed all of the presidios, and sites for the new line had been chosen. The Apaches were giving no trouble, having with- drawn from the province.^ Bucarely's letter of August 27 enclosed this report.^ The same day he wrote another letter in which he seemed now more ready to consider the idea of a campaign. Everything was quiet in the frontier provinces. Oconor was still running the line of presidios in Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya. If there were now no enemies south of the line, an offensive campaign beyond it might be considered in order to compel the submission or withdrawal of the Apaches far into the interior, so that they might not continue their assaults with such frequency. ^ C-2607. were summaries of the most prominent 2 Arriaga to Bucarelyi Aug. 13, happenings of the frontier. 1774. C-2705. * C-2658. 8C-2659. The monthly reports «* C-2708. •C-2707. 304 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIII Anza was coming to Mexico, and with the detailed account of his expedition Bucarely would know what changes were necessary in the reglamento of presidios, although Anza^s report of the peaceful character of the tribes along his line of march led the viceroy to believe that very little or no change would be required. The reviews made of the Sonora presidios should contribute much to the final ar- rangement to be made. Bucarely closed, saying that among the duties of his command those concerning the frontier provinces held first place in interest.^ Bucarely was mistaken as to the peaceful character of the Yumas, but he was not in error long, as is shown by his later recom- mendations for missions and presidios in that country. The never-ending ebb and flow of the Apaches brought fresh danger to Sonora, early in 1775. Writing to Arriaga, March 27, ,1775, Bucarely said that the Apaches of the Gila had merely pretended to make peace, and measures had been necessary requiring the troops to be on the watch to check their attacks.^ Meanwhile, Oconor had to com- bat an enemy every bit as powerful as the Apaches, — graft. In this period occurred the incidents connected with the names of Captains Vildosola ^ and Tovar ^° already mentioned. The Tovar case arose as a result of Oconor's review of the presidio of Terrenate,^^ proceedings against Tovar being held,^^ and, as we have seen, his dismissal from the service recommended. The report for November, 1775,^^ forwarded by the viceroy in a letter of the 26th,^* contained an account of the discovery of new mines at Cieneguilla. In another letter of November 26 Bucarely told of the measures taken by Pedro Tueros, in command at Cieneguilla, and by himself for the despatch of more troops to that place.^^ Gdlvez approved, and suggested as an encouragement to miners that the duty on gold be low- ered in Sonora and Sinaloa, and that a junta be called to consider granting this reduction.^^ 7 C-2709. 8 C-2878. " C-3038. 'Referred to in chapters VI and i* C-3037. "0-3039. XII. "> Referred to in chapter VI. i« Gdlvez to Bucarely, Mar. 22, 1776. "C-2904. \ "C-2933. C-3173. 1773] CONDITIONS IN SONORA 305 Indians living in Sonora caused some uneasiness in 1776. Writing, March 27, Bucarely said that Father Antonio Ramos of Saric thought that the Pimas were preparing an uprising, for they were having meetings and war dances. Governor Crespo was alarmed by these rumors, but neither Oconor nor Vildosola gave them credence, because no rob- beries or murders had been committed. Bucarely was persuaded by them that there was nothing to worry about.^^ Gdlvez was suspicious, however, and wrote Bucarely, July 8, 1776, to watch the conduct of the Pimas.^^ The report for April,^^ forwarded by Bucarely the 26th of that month,^^ showed that a number of robberies had been committed, but held that no serious uprising was likely to occur. Re- ferring to affairs at Cieneguilla in another letter of the same date Bucarely said that Tueros was clamoring for more troops. Oconor had promised to send twenty soldiers, and Bucarely had reiterated the necessity of so doing.^^ Gdlvez's reply of July 26 charged the viceroy to exercise the greatest care to guard those dwelling at the mines of Sonora. ^^ Tueros was continuing to call for more troops, wrote Bucarely, June 26, and as a royal order had required that he should have as many as he might ask for, Bucarely had given fresh orders to that effect to Oconor. Meanwhile, the presidios of Terrenate and Fronteras were being trans- ferred to their new sites at Santa Cruz and San Bernardino, and it was expected that the change would check the ex- cesses and robberies being committed, especially in the vicinity of Cieneguilla.^^ Galvez's reply, October 18, 1776, repeated the royal order to supply troops to Tueros.^* Tue- ros' apprehension seems not to have been shared by other officers on the frontier. Crespo wrote Oconor, July 3, 1776, that Tueros did not need the troops he was asking for, saying that the road from Cieneguilla to Horcasitas was entirely free from danger.^^ Oconor informed Bucarely, August 9, 1776, that he would send the troops asked for by Tueros, although he believed that they were not needed.^® " c-3180. » C-3205. 21 C-3206. 18 C-3268. so C-3204. 22 C-3280. ^ C-3346. 2»£;-3292. M C-3260. 25 C-3266. X 306 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIII This information was passed on to Gdlvez by Bucarely's letter of September 26,^^ but did not change the opinion of the ministro general, who in due course forwarded his ap- proval of what had been done in the matter.^^ The Indian question, however, was gradually becoming more serious. Tovar soon achieved further discredit. He had already been removed as useless and prejudicial to the service, but was still in command at Santa Cruz (the new site of Terrenate), not having been relieved. At- tacked by a band of Apaches, July 7, 1776, he ordered his troops to fight on foot, although the horses were in good condition. To this was ascribed the ensuing disaster, for Tovar and twenty-five others were killed, eight soldiers and one Opata alone escaping. An account appeared in the report for September,^® which was forwarded by Bucarely on the 26th.^^ G^lvez expressed great regret that the lack of skill and bad conduct of Tovar should have caused such loss of life.^^ In accord with Oconor's recommendation of July 6, 1775,^^ it had been decided to do away with Sonora's "flying company," but the Tovar disaster caused Bucarely to postpone such action for a time, lest the Indians might have become emboldened. Thirteen men had already been detached from it, and sent to Santa Cruz.^^ This decision received Gdlvez's approval, with the condition, however, that the company be disbanded, as soon as the present exigency should pass.^^ On receipt of Gdlvez^s letter of July 8, 1776, about the Pimas, Bucarely reasserted that there was slight foundation to expect an uprising at Saric. His chief concern in Sonora was to develop the province and to furnish it with pro- tection from the Apaches.^^ He was mistaken, however, as to the Pimas. The report for the next month, November, contained news that certain Pimas were in revolt, although there was favorable news to counterbalance the bad. The « C-3327. S3 Bucarely to Gdlvez, Sept. 26, 1776. M Gdlvez to Bucarely, Jan. 12, 1777. C-3328. C-3462. 34 Gdlvez to Bucarely, Jan. 9, 1777. » C-3326. C-3460. 30 C-3325. 36 Bucarely to Gdlvez, Oct. 27, 1776. 81 C-3403. 32 C-2949. C-3358. 1773] CONDITIONS IN SONORA 307 Seris had attacked the rebellious Pimas and had killed two, while the Indians of Pitic had attacked a small group of Apaches and killed one. This was caused in each case by the rebellious Indians who stole horses from those who later attacked them. Less pleasing was the note that 1000 pesos^ worth of damage had been caused by an Indian at- tack on the provision train going to Cieneguilla.^® Bucarely forwarded the report on November 26,^^ and in another letter of that date commented joyfully on the news of the counter-attacks by Sonora Indians.^^ Indeed, it was un- usual to find Seris fighting Spain's enemies. In the same month, November, the long-predicted outbreak in the vicinity of Saric occurred. A party of Seris, Pimas, and Apaches first wrought havoc at Magdalena mission and then at Saric, killing a number of persons, plundering and burning, and driving off cattle. The savages were pursued, but escaped. It does not seem worth while to go into equal detail with regard to the affairs of New Mexico and the other frontier provinces as in the case of Sonora. In the first named, conditions seem to have continued much as before. In Nueva Viz cay a and the more easterly provinces Apache warfare went on as it did in Sonora. Sonora had experi- enced difficulties during the period of the Anza expeditions, but Bucarely and Oconor had been able to keep matters in hand. In late 1776 the situation was getting worse, but in all probability they would have handled it as capably as on previous occasions, without giving up projects of fron- tier extension to the northwest. These disorders, however, were to be a legacy to the comandancia general, established by the royal order of August 22, 1776.^^ Teodoro de Croix, the first comandante general, arrived in Mexico on January 22, 1777.^^ By that time the immediate effects of the Anza expeditions had been achieved. The question whether they were to be followed up, and related matters, like the w C-3376. Reference to the legajo of the Archivo " C-3375. General de Indias has been lost. Bu- =« C-3377. 39 C-3293. carely wrote on January 27 that Croix *o Croix to Gdlvez, Jan. 26, 1777. was already in Mexico. C-3469. 308 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIII Indian wars of Sonora, were henceforth in the decision of Croix. Baja CaHfomia could not be other than the sterile penin- sula^ that it always had been; yet, some advance in its prosperity may be noted in this period, although not enough to change the situation as regards the needs of Alta Cali- fornia for a better supply-route. As for the events of the period there is Httle beyond the persistent quarrels of the governor with the rehgious, and the installation of the Dominican order, in May, 1773, as successor of the Francis- can in mission work. The Indians continued to be as tract- able as before, and very Httle show of miHtary force was re- quired. The principal interest in the province for our purposes consists in an indication of its material progress. At the time of the deUvery of the missions to the Domini- cans there were fourteen such establishments. With a letter of September 26, 1773,*^ Bucarely forwarded to Arriaga an estado showing the number of persons and domestic animals at eight of the missions at the time of the transfer to Dominican rule.** Two months later *^ he added like data for four other missions.** Not until September 26, 1774,*^ was he able to supply that information for the re- maining two missions.** Having by that date information of the fourteen missions given up by the Franciscans, he enclosed an estado embracing all of them.*^ The figures follow : From these figures it appears that there was a total of 4268 persons and 14,716 domestic animals in the Baja California missions in May, 1773. An estimate of the land under cultivation and the annual amount of the agri- cultural produce at the missions was not made at this time, but Bucarely 's September 26 letter stated that orders had been given to include such information in future. The figures of the estado give some idea of the relative importance of the missions. « C-2393. « C-2439. « C-2394. • C-2722. « C-2438. <• C-2724. «^ C-2723. 1773] CONDITIONS IN BAJA CALIFORNIA 309 Missions S. F. Javier Viaund6 N. S. de Guadalupe N. S. de Loreto . . Santa Gertrudis . . Santa Rosalia Mulege Purisima Concepci6n San Jos^ Comondti San Ignacio . . . S. F. de Borja . . San Jos^ del Cabo . Santiago de las Coxas . . N. S. del Pilar 6 Todos Santos S. F. de VeHeat^ Santa Maria de los Angeles Totals .... Men 139 96 103 462 82 89 155 173 533 34 47 93 176 167 2349 Women 140 73 84 338 83 71 127 141 467 17 28 80 120 150 1919 Cows 89 120 196 32 64 47 125 648 64 22 703 78 8 2196 AND MrriiES 115 178 170 253 47 117 292 165 387 143 257 600 13 55 2792 Sheep 396 110 232 243 1413 558 2343 63 90 153 71 6270 Goats 195 500 320 407 193 249 194 1003 51 75 131 3403 55 Pios 13 4 2 20 16 Before the end of 1773 Father Mora made a tour of the northern missions of his province/^ inspecting them and leaving instructions for their spiritual and temporal man- agement.^® In reporting this to Arriaga, June 26, 1774, Bucarely remarked that it was clear from Mora's narrative that the regions visited by him were not so fertile and well favored as was the case with Alta California, but the mis- sions were useful, for progress in conversions was being made. A new mission was planned by the Dominicans.^® Arriaga expressed the royal pleasure at hearing this news and approved the plan to found a mission. ^^ By the end of June, 1774, there were still fourteen missions. The total number of persons had increased in the course of a year, but that of domestic animals was less, the figures being 4340 and 14,558 respectively.^^ Bucarely announced this to Arriaga, Febru- ary 24, 1775.^^ In a letter of May 27, 1775,^^ Bucarely forwarded the monthly report, which in this case bore encouraging news of mission progress in Baja California. Before the end of the Nov. 4-Dec. 20, *» Diary, Nov. 4-Dec. 20, 1773. C-2424. « For the instructions, C-2501. w C-2657. " Arriaga to Bucarely, Oct. 12, 1774. C-2745. "From the estado, C-2859, and extracto, C-2860, of Melchor de Pera- m&a. Of the persons, 2428 were male and 1912 female. There were 2616 cows, 1896 horses, 839 mules, 6206 sheep, 2931 goats, and 77 pigs. M C-2858. " C-2919. 310 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIII year 1774 Mora had selected Vinadaco, because of its fer- tility, as a good site for the new mission, and one religious had been sent there. Neve's letter of March 23 stated that a crop of 200 fanegas (320 bushels) of grain had been raised and 150 Indians brought under mission rule, and yet fur- ther progress was expected. A triumph had been obtained at Velicata. The Indians of San Juan de Dios, near there, had always refused to receive the Christian faith, but re- cently the whole village of eighty persons had accepted con- version. Later, the chief of a coast village and fifty-two others had asked for baptism, and the chief had promised to bring in the rest of his following. ^^ The viceroy's letter of February 26, 1776,^^ contained an estado showing in de- tail the persons, animals, and this time the crops at fourteen of the fifteen missions in existence at the close of June, 1775. Despite optimistic reports the province had remained prac- tically stationary, although as before the number of persons had increased slightly, and that of the animals had fallen away. There were 4423 persons and 14,036 animals. Re- ports concerning agricultural wealth were received from only eleven of the missions. These had raised 2230 fanegas (3568 bushels) of wheat, while some of them had raised small quantities of other produce.^^ Bucarely's letters of May 27,^^ and July 27, 1777,^^ may be taken together for data as to fourteen of the fifteen mis- sions at the close of the year 1776. In the May 27 letter, which was the principal one, dealing with twelve missions, he complained of the lack of clearness in the answers re- ceived from the Dominicans. He was sending the infor- mation received to Comandante General Croix, to whose jurisdiction Baja California had been assigned. From the estados forwarded with each letter ®^ we find that there were ^ C-2920. although least of the eleven in yield of s* C-3154. wheat. San Francisco de Borja was 6^ C-3152. Among other commod- perhaps richest, agriculturally, not ities were barley, maize, kidney-beans, only producing the most wheat, 460 chick-peas, grapes, wine, cotton, and fanegas, but also having over twice as wool, but only a few missions produced much land under cultivation as any them, and then in small quantities, as other. a rule. San Ignacio was by far the ^ C-3563. « C-3624. most all-round productive mission, «> Respectively, C-3564 and C-3625. 1773] CONDITIONS IN BAJA CALIFORNIA 311 at the fourteen missions referred to 5424 persons and 15,641 animals. In eleven missions giving figures the crops of wheat amounted to 3034 /anegras (4^54 1^ bushels), and other crops had been raised in greater quantities than before, maize almost competing with wheat. At the same eleven missions there had been slightly more than 2250 fanegas (3600 bushels) of maize.®^ These figures show that some slight advance had been made by the Dominicans. In- crease in animals, however, had been remarkably slight, as compared with similar advances at a later time in Alta California, after the latter province became securely es- tablished. In number of horses and mules, perhaps the most important class, because of their use as pack animals, the province had declined. Some animals, although not an appreciable number, had been taken to Alta California, as will appear in the next chapter. Mention has already been made of the number of sol- diers in the military establishments. In addition to the Spaniards in them and at the missions there were some miners and cattlemen in the peninsula, but their num- bers were probably insignificant, and no statistics as to them or their possessions have come to hand. Barry's quarrelling with the Dominicans was one of the reasons why Bucarely supplanted him with Felipe de Neve. Writing of this matter to Arriaga, December 27, 1774, Bucarely said that he had come to this conclusion, par- tially because of the repeated petitions by Barry himself to be relieved and permitted to go to Mexico, but also be- cause the discord between him and the religious over ques- tions of jurisdiction and other matters had reached an extreme point. Bucarely had ordered Mora to refrain from giving the least motive for complaint or resentment, as it might put back the service and render of no account the vast sums that had been expended there ; this he did, he said, to prevent Mora from meddling in affairs of the royal •* Of the persons at the fourteen the missions there were 5651 sheep, missions 2990 were male and 2434 3754 goats, and 33 pigs, to which should female. There were 3537 cows, 1601 be added 329 sheep, goats, and pigs at horses, and 736 mules. At twelve of the other two missions. 312 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIII jurisdiction, which belonged to the governor. Moreover, he had written to the Dominican provincial, asking him to persuade Mora and the other rehgious to hve in peace with the royal officers. At the time of his appointment Neve was sergeant-major of the cavalry regiment of Queretaro. Bucarely referred to him as a man of mature wisdom and prudence, but he had not failed to enjoin him to avoid quar- rels with the religious. He had made him full governor {en propiedad), because he deserved it, both for his good qualities, and for his past services, especially for his han- dling of matters concerning the material wealth of the Za- catecas missions.^^ All of these acts of the viceroy were approved by Arriaga, April 26, 1775.^^ Neve departed at once for his province, and in March, 1775, relieved Barry, who, soon afterward, became governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Neve, too, had difficulties with the friars. They resisted his attempts to make the Indians self-dependent, as had been the aim of Galvez's regulation of 1768, whereupon Neve recommended that steps be taken with a view to secularization. This was not the only concern of the gov- ernor, for we find him complaining of want in ships, horses, clothing, and especially in arms. He also asked for more troops.^^ The last-named request was the subject of a letter by Bucarely to Arriaga, February 25, 1776. Both Barry and Neve had asked for additional troops, the latter for a sergeant and nine soldiers more. They were needed in part to escort the mails to and from San Diego and Monterey, and also because double escort was required when new missions were founded. On the authority of the royal decrees of September 6 and 16, 1775, requiring the Baja California establishments to be developed by all means possible, without sparing expense, Bucarely had acquiesced in Neve's request. ^^ Galvez appro ved.^^ In fine, not enough change had occurred in the peninsula to enable it to contribute materially to the development of 62 C-2792. 66 C-3142. 63 C-2896. w Gdlvez to Bucarely, June 12, 1776. 64 Bancroft, N. M. St. r the land and the people from San Diego to San Francisco, noting the progress made by the Spanish settlements and. the obstacles which they had to encounter. The natural features of the route traversed in 1769 are given in detail, that route being still in use in Fages' time for most of the way. He tells of the products of the soil supphed by nature, remarking that the land was much richer than it had seemed at first, being perhaps the most fertile of any that had been *" C-2841. M. Ternaux-Compans is in the NoU" *^ C-3162. velles annates des voyages et des sciences « C-3042. A free translation from giographiques (Paris, 1844), v. I (CI), a copy stated to be in the library of 145^82, 311-47. 1774] PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 329 conquered. He speaks of the animals of the province, but most important of all, perhaps, is his description of the Indians, their barbarous traits, notably their religious cus- toms, and their propensity to war, one village with anotheiu«« On Spain^s relations with the Indians depended the success of her establishments ; it is natural, therefore, that he de- votes to them the greater part of his account, dealing also with mission progress. Of the missionaries he speaks in terms of praise, a contrast to the way in which Serra was wont to speak of him. The most noticeable lack in the document is its failure to make any reference to affairs at the presidios, but the importance of the military appears frequently, showing that the oft-reported accounts of the\ docility of the Indians must not be overrated by us, just J because no great disaster to the Spanish establishments in > fact occurred. That none did, was due to the presence ! of soldiers, trained in frontier methods, and, it would seeiaj efficiently led. It is to this phase of the report that at- tention will now be directed. After the overland expedition had left San Diego for the north in 1769, the Indians attacked the Spania^ remain- ing at that port, T53revihg themselves sure of victory by reason of their superiority in numbers. Yet, although few Spaniards were able to bear arms, they killed three Indians, wounded others, and drove the enemy away. Thereafter, the Indians were not openly hostile, although at night they occasionally killed horses and other animals of the Span- iards, but more for the meat than as an act of hostility. In describing the traits of the Indians of San Diego and the region for thirty leagues north of it, Fages remarked upon their treacherous nature, saying also that they were The principal establishment of the next region described, embracing thirty-two leagues, was the mission San Gabriel. An impulse to mission progress there had been given by bringing five families of Christian Indians from Baja Cali- fornia.'*^ These were acquainted with agriculture, and as *> Among these were Sebastian Tarabal and his family. 330 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIV the site was good, they were able to grow sufficient crops to supply not only the Indians of the mission proper but the recent converts as well. The Indian problem, especially ^ in the forty leagues and more between San Gabriel and y San Diego, was no mean one. In that space the Indians were wont to show hostility whenever Spaniards passed without a numerous and formidable convoy. On that account Fages recommended establishing more missions with a due number of presidios, first making a thorough exploration of the region, however. As matters were, there was a great stretch of land in which nothing had been done to reduce it to the faith or to render it secure for whoever might pass that way. Every journey still had to be made with an armed force, just as on the occasion of Portold's first march ; the seeming docility of the Indians at such times was rather the result of their fear than of any feeling of friendship. ^^ The next region discussed ran a distance of thirty-seven J> leagues, in part along the Santa Barbara Channel. There were no missions in that space, but the Indians were nu- merous and very different from the others in the province. (They were of a good disposition and fond of work, but very < avaricious, and displayed an aptitude for trade, being as (Fages called them ^Hhe Chinamen of California.'' They were well disposed toward the Spaniards, but warlike with one another, an almost continuous state of war existing between the villages. They were too bold, however, for the Spaniards to count safely on their seeming affability and lack of good weapons. In fine, they were barbarians, and therefore capable of committing any kind of hostile act, if it should strike their fancy. It was for that reason that the mission of San Buenaventura, which the Mar- qu6s de Croix had decided to found there, had not been established. ^,^ The next region embraced thirty-three leagues and con- J^tained but one mission, San Luis Obispo. To this place also five families of Baja California Indians had been brought, for it too was a fertile site. San Luis Obispo and 1774] PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 331 San Gabriel together could in time supply all of the other missions without need of a recourse to San Bias for grain. The needJc^r^Spi^USh^^ is apparent from a new point of view when we note the attitude of the Indians of San Luis Obispo. According to Fages they regarded the Spaniards as exiles from their own land, for they had noted that the newcomers had no desire to attack them, nor did they seem to wish to settle the country, since only men came. Therefore, they had reached the above- named conclusion, and consequently were a bit disquieted and lacking in confidence. Some of the soldiers at San Luis Obispo had offered to bring their wives and families to Alta California, which would certainly help, said Fages, to up- root the singular idea held by the Indians of that neighbor- hood. The Indians there and for twelve leagues around were affable and, except as already noted, friendly to the Spaniards. Reverting to the region of the Santa Barbara Channel, Fages recommended the establishing of missions there, under guard of a presidio of fifty or sixty soldiers. Such a number was necessary, because of the populousness of that district. Between San Diego and Monterey the fine of march layTvT either directly through or at least within gunshot of twenty ^^ or more villages. Along the march also were cliffs and other bad places where the natives might dispute and im- pede a passage, and instances had occurred when they had done so. At a village called Rincon they had stoned a party under Fages himself in the year 1772, while he was passing through a difficult place. No soldiers were lost, but it had been necessary to kill one or two Indians. This was apt to occur whenever small parties passed, and the only remedy for it would be the establishing of a mission and a presidio. The fifth region taken up in Fages' report covered ninev^^^^ teen leagues, and contained one mission, San Antonio. ->^ The Indians were very friendly, being willing to give any- thing that they had to the Spaniards. From that region to'TTTT San Francisco had been thirty-six and a half leagues by^-^"^ 332 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIV Portold's march, leaving Monterey to one side. There were no missions except San Carlos at Carmelo, near Mon- terey. The Indians of the mission and its vicinity were peaceful, but at Zanjones, six leagues away on the route to San Diego, the Indians had dared to attack couriers and other passers-by. No Spaniards had lost their lives, but they had killed a number of the Indians. Most of the Indians in the region beyond the sphere of mission in- fluence were hostile both to the converted and unconverted of the mission region ; before the founding of Monterey presidio there had been continual war, and fights still con- tinued, especially in the groves where acorns were found, that article of food being the object in controversy. The presence of the Spaniards had served to check warfare, because of the fear on the part of outside Indians that the Spaniards would aid those who lived at or near the mission. This explained the great affection of the latter for the Spaniards, of whose aid and protection thev gi^Qp^ absolut(^)y in need,^ "^Qiiite a remarkable document of a different character is an account by the religious of the college of San Fernando of discoveries between 30° 26' and 57° 18' from 1769 to 1776. This was addressed to the king, although sent to Bucarely to be forwarded by him, and was dated February 26,j 1776\ The account was based on the diaries and other repbrts^sent by the Fernandinos of Alta California to the college, with the conclusions of the writers with regard to the discoveries. The San Fernando memorij,L lacks the precision of the Fages document, a number of subjects being discussed with no apparent attempt at orderliness of ar- rangement. Yet this account, although perhaps less im- portant than that of Fages, is not less interesting. After a few preliminary remarks it treats of the voyages of Heceta and Bodega is 1775. The principal point of this part of the document is an argument as to the probable existence of a strait through the continent, whether at Aguilar's ^ A copy of this memorial was sent to Gdlvez by Fages with his letter of March 25, 1776. C-3175. 1774] PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 333 River or at the Strait of Juan de Fuca, coming out pos- sibly in Hudson Bay.^^ The latter part of the memorial deals most largely with the expeditions to Alta California of 1769-70. The importance of San Francjssp, and es- pecially of the so-called Rio de San Francisco, is emphasized. According to Father Crespi, who had accompanied the expeditions of 1769, 1770, and 1772, to the vicinity of the bay, San Francisco was in the midst of a vast country, capable of maintaining many cities. The river was navi- gable for probably a hundred leagues, and might flow near Pimeria Alta and perhaps near New Mexico, and would have plenty of timber along its banks with which to construct boats. This made it appear how da,n ^erous to Spain it would be if another power should"^ possess the river and port of San Francisco ; not only would that check further northward conquest, but it would also mean a loss of the prospective wealth of Moqui, and the endanger- ing of the provinces already reduced. After speaking of the hostility of the Indians between VeHcatd and San Diego, the memoriahsts went on to say that from San Diego northward conditions were much better. The land was better for agriculture and grazing, there was an abundance of water and timber, and the Indians had received the Spaniards in peace. This last remark had to be qualified, however. A revolt at San Gabriel, when that mission was founded, illustrated one of "•^ The argument for a strait is sup- historian as Torquemada must have ported at great length, not merely by had authentic documents on which to the incidents of the Heceta and Bodega base his account, said the writers, voyages, but by a reference to the Would that he might be mistaken, for Monarqula Indiana of the Franciscan great harm would result to New Spain Torquemada (published 1615) and to and to religion, if a Protestant power the career of the Spanish mystic, Maria should discover the strait and possess de Jestis de Agreda, the celebrated itself of its mouths. The account of "Blue Lady" of the American South- Torquemada, however, had also the west. Torquemada had said that support of Maria de Jesiis de Agreda. Aguilar's River was understood to be This servant of God, said the writers, the Strait of Anian, joining the Atlantic was carried from Spain to the Indies to the Pacific, and passing by a great by the agency of the angels many times city which some Dutchmen had dis- between 1620 and 1631 to preach the covered when they went through the faith to the Indians, especially in the strait, and he had expressed an opinion provinces of New Mexico, Quivira, and that Quivira [at that time placed by Jumanas. These visits had the high some maps on the coast of Alta Cali- proof of Maria's own account, to doubt fornia] was in the vicinity of the river which was to doubt religion, discovered by Aguilar. Such a careful 334 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIV the causes of trouble with the Indians, for which the fault lay with the Spaniards. Soldiers were wont to assault Indian won^ien, a practice prevalent at all of the missions, and one which the rehgious had not been able to prevent in entirety. This was not only scandalous but it involved the province in very grave danger of being lost. The Fernandinos had been able to check the evil in a measure, and the Indians had remained at peace. Yet, such hos- tilities as had occurred showed that the missions could not exist without the protection of a competent escort, to de- fend them in case of need, and to keep the converts in proper subjection. Too much rehance should not be placed on Indian docility and affability, for this might be feigned, or more apparent than real, in proof of which an incident of the Heceta voyage [omitted here] was cited. After de- scribing native reHgions the memorial goes on to say that the Alta California Indians had their false ministers or priests, and the Spanish conquest meant depriving them of employment. This might cause them to be discontented, because of their loss of honor and profit, and might lead them to stir up rebellion. If insults by the soldiery, such as could not fail to occur, were added to the incitements of these men, there would be great danger of an outbreak. Moreover, the unconverted Indians near the missions had threatened the converts, unless they should make an end of the missionaries and soldiers. For these reasons it was essential that there be a competent number of soldiers at all missions, and that they be good Christians, in whicK case more could be accomplished with a few soldiers than with many whose manner of life was bad.*^ This is convincing evidence that the military were the backbone of conquest, at least until such time as a region became well settled by Spaniards ; missions were an effective and necessary agency, but they depended on military^md. What is more to the point here, this memorial helps to show how far Alta Cali- fornia was from being on a safe, well- settled basis.^^ « For the memorial, C-3156. a letter to Arriaga of the same date, *"> The memorial was enclosed with C-3155. Other enclosures were a 1774] PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 335 As the year 1775 drew to a close everything was ripe for the arrival of Anza's settlers, and the founding of the new missions at San Francisco. Until Anza should come, there would be delay because of Rivera's lack of troops. It was this which caused Rivera to write to Bucarely, August 8, 1775, that he intended to postpone exploring San Fran- cisco until Anza's arrival, when he would erect the two missions and the fort. For the latter he intended to install two of the four cannon at Monterey. Bucarely replied, January 20, 1776, signifying his approval, and suggesting that the two cannon be carried from Monterey to San Fran- cisco on the San Carlos when that boat should take the suppHes that were to be given to the new settlements.**^ Meanwhile, not only Serra, but also the other Fernandinos in Alta California were impatient for new missions, there being more missionaries at the time than the existing num- ber of missions required. Palou's letter of September 14, 1775, to Father Superior Pangua voices this eagerness of the Fernandinos. He wrote that he was only a super- numerary at San Carlos, but wished active service in this field of innumerable heathen awaiting conversion. Rivera was obdurate and immutable, however, being incapable of agreeing to anything that he had not first proposed, on which account Serra was not wont to insist very much, but gave Rivera mere hints, and said no more, if he got a nega- tive answer. This was not altogether pleasing to Palou, who was impatient for new missions, and grieved to see so many Indians dying without baptism. Serra had not in- sisted more, as he did not wish to break with Rivera, whose help was important."*^ An account of mission progress in Alta California during 1775 may now be given, although it was not until Decem- ber 27, 1776, that Bucarely was able to remit this infor- pamphlet of Father Alonso de Bena- of the 1774 Rivera expedition, C-2762 ; vides of New Mexico in 1631, in which and Campa's diary of the Heceta voyage the incident of Marfa de Jestis de of 1775, C-2870. Agreda is discussed, C-28; Crespl's «A.P.C.H., Prov. St. Papers, I, diary of the 1772 Fages expedition, 193-94. C-1925; Pefia's diary of the P6rez *> M.N. , Doc. Rel. Mis. Cal., II. voyage of 1774, C-2640 ; Palou's diary 336 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XIV mation to Spain.^^ The following tables show the totals at the end of both 1774 and 1775, and indicate the increase in the latter year. Progress op Conversion Baptisms Mabriaoes Deaths Living 1774 1775 833 1725 124 284 74 419 759 1280 Increase . . 892j 160 345 521 Domestic Animals Cows Sheep Goats Pigs Mares Horses Mules Asses 1774 1775 304 447 170 191 95 145 130 131 31 60 69 68 85 98 4 5 Increase 143 21 50 1 30 [sic] -1 13 1 Crops " Wheat Sown Crop Maize Sown Crop Kidney- beans Sown Crop Barley Sown Crop 1774 1775 22.5 34 475 1029 554 103 63.5 540 974 13.5 26 40 45.5 18 118 Increase . 11.5 40 [sic] 434 12.5 5.5 18 118 It will be seen that the year had been a good one from the standpoint of conversions. A striking feature was the pro- nounced increase in the number of deaths. Was the in- ferior race already giving way in the presence of civilization ? The most important set of figures is the one concerning domestic animals. They were still too few to insure the permanence of Alta California. Crops had about doubled as compared with the yield of the previous year. In that respect the province seemed well on the way to prosperity. ^^ There were still no settlers but the soldiers and friars and the few families that Rivera had brought. 50 C-3410. 61 The amounts given are in fanegas, a fanega being about 1.6 bushels. ' 82 For the estado, C-3411. CHAPTER XV THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION AND RELATED EVENTS, 1775-1776 Not content with the manifold activities that he had already set on foot to insure the preservation of Alta Cali- fornia, — by an increase in number and efficiency of the provision boats, by the voyages to the northwest coast, by projects in relation to the Anza route for faciUtating trans- mission of settlers and domestic animals and the occupation of San Francisco, and by the Crame expedition to find an easier route for the transportation of artillery from the Atlantic to the Pacific, — Bucarely was meditating yet other pro jects with the same object in view. One was the dis covery of new rou tes^ a more northerly and more direct route than Anza's from Sonora to Monterey, another from New Mexico to Alta California, and another from Sonora to New Mexico. Another project was to take the second step in closing the gap between Sonora, the Californias, and New Mexico by founding missions and presidios along the Gila and Colorado rivers ; this done, but little more would, be necessary bet ore Sonora would become an interior prov- ince, with the two Californias as one fairly accessible, natural frontier, and New Mexico another. Steps were taken in 1775-76 with a view to the discovery of routes. The New Mexico to Alta California route was in fact discovered through the separate explorations of Father Escalante from New Mexico and Father Garces from Alta California. Both reached Moqui. Escalante and Dominguez attempted without success to find a more northerly route from Santa Fe to Monterey. Proposals were made for opening a direct route from Sonora to New z 337 338 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV Mexico, but except for Garc^s' journey by way of the Colo- rado, nothing was accompHshed, and the same held true of the projected more northerly route from Sonora to Mon- terey. More was not done, because a second Anza expedi- tion and the occupation of the Gila and Colorado were necessary preliminaries. The first of these projects was fulfilled, Anza going overland to Alta California with so many families of settlers and domestic animals that the permanence of the new establishments, although not on a strong basis/ was assured. The expedition reached Alta California just in time to prevent the possible loss of the province as a result of a dangerous Indian uprising at San Diego. Furthermore, after Anza's departure, a settlement was made at San Francisco, an importantst^ep^in B^ programme ordefenceagainst foreign attack. Anza, Garces, Diaz, Oconor, and Bucarely himself were among those who favored placing Spanish establishments at the two rivers, especially in the Yuma country. Anza's march, Garces' stay at the junction and his explorations, Veldzquez's dis- covery of a route from Baja California to the mouth of the Colorado, the visit of the Yuma chief Palma to Mexico City, and th^^cMld-Jite f 9r.ji^i.ssipns were factors tending to bring the event closer. Just as Bucarely was about to act, however, the new government of the comandancia general was promulgated, placing these matters under the direction of Teodoro de Croix. Many proposals tending to the accomplishment of the projects which are the subject of this chapter had been made in years past, some of which have already been noticed. The success of Anza's first expedition led to a renewal of these suggestions. Anza is said to have proposed founding missions on the Colorado when he was at Mexico in 1774, but was opposed to such foundations on the Gila because of the danger from Apache raids. The establishing of missions on the Colorado, he had said, should be preceded by explorations, and a presidio should be placed there for their protection. A letter from Oconor to Garces at this 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 339 time indicates that official sanction had already been ob- tained for a transfer of the presidios of Horcasitas and Buenavista to the Gila and Colorado.^ Bucarely's letter of January 2, 1775, to Garc^s tended toward carrying out the suggestion attributed to Anza. Bucarely had just received the Garc^s diary of 1774, Garces having remained behind on the Gila, after Anza^s departure, to make further explorations. In his diary Garces had in- dicated a number of places where missions might be placed, the natives being ready for conversion. Bucarely said that he was particularly eager to found missions among the Yumas, who seemed so desirous of having them, and he informed Garces of the plans for a new expedition on a vast scale under Anza's leadership, with Font to take ob- servations of latitude. BeHeving that Garces would like to have a part in it, Bucarely had already asked the Father Superior at Queretaro to allow Garces to go. Bucarely desired him to go only to the junction of the Colorado and Gila, and there to await Anza's return. In the meantime he could explore that region, treat with the neighboring tribes, and find out their disposition for the catechism and vassalage to the king. He reminded Garces that this would be an important service, because it might be the basis of future measuresi^ Bucarely had written to Governor Crespo on September 21, 1774, asking his opinion with regard to the proposed Anza expedition. Crespo's reply, December 15, 1774, reached Mexico after the expedition had been authorized, and proved to have a more direct relation to the projects now being considered ; the influence of Garces' ideas is apparent throughout the letter. Crespo regarded himself as qualified to speak with some degree of authority, be- cause he had made an exploration of the Gila River in the vicinity of its junction with the San Pedro, and had talked with Garces. Such an expedition as Anza.'-S..was- necessary to accomplis h an extension of the faith, and for that pur- » Bancroft, Ariz. & New Mex., » A.G.P., Historia, v. 62. 390-91. 340 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV pose he would place missions, not only at San Francisco, but also among the docile natives of the Colorado and Gila. This likewise would insure the route, would aid in supplying the Californias (for these regions were adapted to agriculture and stock-raising), would serve as a check against the Apaches, partially through the aid of the In- dians of the two rivers, and would facilitate a passage to New_Mexii?o . and the reduction of Moqui. Coming more directly to the expedition, Crespo was inclined to disparage many of its projects. The presidio at San Francisco ought to be delayed until it could be learned where the best site for it would be, bearing in mind the possible establishing of communications with the east [New Mexico]. Much of the route discovered by Anza was a stretch of sand, im- passable for large parties, because of the scarcity of water, and there was a like scarcity between Caborca and the Yuma country, on which account the expedition ought to go by way of the Gila River, cross the Colorado in the land of the Jalchedunes above the junction of the rivers, and from there take a direct route to Monterey. The passage of the Colorado might present some difficulty, but the rest of the march ought to be easy. The mountains were a guarantee of the existence of water, and the distance should not be great ; Garces had said that the Jalchedunes were accustomed to trade, through the agency of inter- vening tribes, with the Indians of the coast, which was four days' journey away. At any rate, it would always be possible to descend the Colorado to the junction, and proceed from there. Unless in case of raids of the Apaches, the proposed route was easy, as far as the Colorado River. The Apache danger could be remedied by establishing three presidios, one of which might be at the Colorado River. There should be two missions among the Pimas Gilenos, who were eager for them, besides which their help against the Apaches could be counted upon. Following Anza's expedition the viceroy should await exact reports before taking further action, unless he should decide to establish the missions and presidios just mentioned, in which case, 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION ' 341 cattle and provisions might be sent there, but not settlers ; the latter should wait until it could be ascertained how many would be needed. Although the route to Monterey, thence- forth, would be farther north, a mission might be erected among the Yumas for the sake of harmony. Coming then to the plan which seemed to him the most important of all, the exploration of routes to Moqui and New Mexico, Crespo gave a number of reasons why he thought it feasible. Garc6s had obtained information from the Indians which seemed to indicate that Moqui was only about seven days distant from the Gila, and seven more from New Mexico. Further proof of a route to Moqui was that the Jalchedunes had dark woollen blankets of Moqui make. Above all, a Pima Gileno, captured by the Apaches three or four years before, had said that he was taken in five days to a place where he saw a religious say mass, and where there were Indians with Moqui blankets. He escaped, and got back to his tribe after seven days, travelling only by night. He must have been in New Mexico, thought Crespo. An expedition to New Mexico ought, therefore, to be attempted. In conclusion, Crespo remarked that he contemplated a dif- ferent commander for this expedition, for extended explo- rations would be necessary, requiring an officer of particu- larly good qualifications and conspicuous talents. With an attempt at modesty, Crespo then offered his own ser- vices.^ As immediately affecting the Anza expedition, Crespo's plans had no chance of adoption, even had they been received before that expedition was authorized. They involved considerable expense and delay in the Alta Cali- fornia settlements, which were at this time Bucarely's chief concern. Crespo, in Sonora, where foreign aggres- sion was inconceivable, could not grasp the importance of founding San Francisco. In spite of Crespo's cool conceit, however, Bucarely gave his plans serious consideration, for in many respects they accorded with Bucarely's policy of northwestward advance. Crespo's projects found support, as might have been expected, from Carets. The latte 8 A.G.P., Historia, v. 25. 342 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV was on his way to Mexico to report in person to Bucarely, when he received a letter from the Father Superior of the college at Queretaro, informing him of the decision for the new Anza expedition, and the part that he was to play in it. Being at the time at the mission of Ures, Garces got Father Diaz, who had accompanied him in the expedition of the previous year, to write a statement, March 21, 1775, of Garces^ opinions on the needs of the frontier. Diaz added that he too agreed with the recommendations of Garces. The new Anza expedition would serve a good purpose, they said, but they did not think that Anza, embarrassed as he would be by conducting families, could hope to make any new explorations. Yet, explorations were necessary, as the present route to Alta California had many difficul- ties, especially from lack of water. There ought, there- fore, to be a separate expedition, designed to explore a new route to Alta California, and not only that, but also a route to New Mexico. If decided upon, it would be advisable to intrust its execution to Governor Crespo, who was well fitted for an undertaking of this nature. As to Bucarely^s suggestion that Garces explore the Colorado River with a view to founding missions there, Garces was in full accord with the plan, but it was even more desirable to found them on the Gila, for the following reasons : the great desire of the Pimas Gilenos for missions, as evidenced by their re- peated petitions for missionaries ; the aid which they had given in the past against the Apaches; their intelligence, in which respect they were in advance of the other Indians of that region ; their ability to assure communication with both Monterey and New Mexico, better than the Yumas could ; and the great fertility of their lands. The only objection would be the increased expense necessitated by some additional troops for the new foundations. That led the two Fathers to make a suggestion which if adopted would aid the provinces, and not greatly increase expense. The presidios as then arranged were not able to keep out the Apaches, being too far apart. Moreover, there were so many presidios with duties that had nothing to do with 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 343 fighting the Apaches, that there was scarcely a soldier able to give his attention to punishing them, the time being taken up in guarding the horses of the presidio, escorting pre- sidial property from place to place, and in other like duties.* It was possible to aid the proposed missions, without greatly increasing the forces, they said, by a change in the regla- mento for the location of the presidios. Horcasitas and Buenavista might be suppressed, leaving detachments of ten and fifteen men respectively, as a check against the Pimas of Suaqui and the Seris. Altar might retain fifteen men, to attend to the Pimas Piatos and western Papa- gueria. San Bernardino, the site proposed for Fronteras in the reglamentOy was a good location. That might have eighty men for use against the Apaches. Terrenate, or- dered to Nutrias, would be better located at Santa Cruz, thirty-five leagues from San Bernardino ; that, too, should have eighty men, attending principally to the Apaches. Tubac might be moved to the junction of the San Pedro River and Santa Teresa Creek, twenty leagues from Santa Cruz, rather than to Arivaca, as it was planned to do. That should have ninety men, in order to protect the Gila mis- sions and punish the Apaches. Instead of placing Altar between Caborca and Bisani, as provided in the reglamentOy it was most important that it be placed about thirty leagues northeast of the junction of the Gila and Colorado, with a garrison of fifty or sixty soldiers, to sustain the projected Colorado missions. These changes would not add greatly to expense. A hundred more soldiers in Sonora might be advisable ; but they were needed anyway, if the effronteries of the Apaches were to be checked. The two Fathers men- tioned six prominent advantages of their proposal, only one of which need be noticed here, — that it would be most helpful in assuring routes to Monterey and New Mexico. As to the objection that the Marques de Rubi had studied the situation before suggesting the reglamentOj times had changed matters, the discovery of a route to Monterey, the * This seems to refer to the pre- another indication of the graft from aidios as a kind of military ranch, — which the frontier provinces suffered. 344 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV suppression of the Seris and Pimas Piatos, and the new missions proposed for the Colorado having presented a situation, which the marques himself would recognize as different, if he were present.^ Bucarely wrote to Arriaga of the plan at considerable length, May 27, 1775, sa3rLng that although he considered it well thought out, he had said in reply only that he was examining it to determine what was best to do. Oconor was just about to enter Sonora to review the presidios, and to treat of their changes of site ; so Bucarely had sent him a copy of the memorial with a request for his opinion, not to be given, however, until after receipt by him of opinions from Governors Crespo of Sonora and Mendinueta of New Mexico. Bucarely was especially desirous of Oconor^s opinion as to the expense that it would occasion, saying that although obhged to avoid superflous expenditure he would not fail to assent to a necessary amount, once an evil sit- uation demanded correction, until a remedy should be secured. Until he should hear from Oconor he would do nothing.^ Arriaga's approval came in due course, dated September 6, 1775.^ Thus it was that the Garc6s-Diaz representation was marked "Suspended until the reports of Oconor and Mendinueta come." The writer has not seen memorials of Crespo and Oconor concerning the Garc^s-Dlaz plan, but it is certain that Oconor favored it, and probable that Crespo did, if we may judge from his memorial already quoted. Oconor's report recommended transferring the presidios of Horcasitas and Buenavista to the Colorado and Gila rivers.^ Mendi- nueta's opinion was influenced by the explorations and re- ports of a New Mexican friar, Father Silvestre V61ez de Escalante. "In June 1775, or possibly 1774, he spent eight days in the Moqui towns, trying in vain to reach the Rio Grande de Cosninas beyond. In a report to the gov- ernor he gave a description of the pueblos . . . and his * A.G.P., Prov. Int., v. 88. a Bucarely letter of March 27, 1776 6C-2917. 7C-2984. (C-3180), and in Oconor's memorial 8 Bolton, Guide, 102. Additional evi- to Teodoro de Croix of July 22, 1777 dence of Oconor's opinion appears in (C-3606). 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 346 ideas of what should be done. He earnestly recommended . . . that the Moquis should be reduced by force of arms and a presidio established there. ... As to the routes, Esca- lante thought from what he could learn by Indian reports that the way from Terrenate by the Gila and thence north to Zuni would not be very difficult ; that the central route from the Colorado to Moqui would probably be found impracticable; but that the best of all was one leading from Monterey eastward in a nearly direct line to Santa Mendinu eta's report to Oconor, November 9, 1775, begins by giving a description of the province of Moqui, relying on Escalante's account. The(^Moqiii^ numbered about 7494 persons, and were prosperouiTTLaving good crops of grain and a number of domestic animals, particu- larly sheep. Their government was in the hands of a body of elders, who exercised absolute authority. They were a peaceful people, engaging somewhat in trade, but they were opposed to Christianity, and, moreover, were enemies of the Apaches. They could not be conquered by force of arms without endangering the Spanish foothold in New Mexico, for it would also be necessary to fight the Yutas and Navaj6s. The only practicable method of conquest was by sending missionaries with gifts for the chiefs, who might thus permit the Catholic faith to be taught. There were evidences of the existence of a route to Sonora. Ber- nardo Miera, who took part in a campaign of 1747, said that there was a route by way of the Rio de San Francisco ^^ to the Gila. In that campaign the Spaniards from New Mexico got within three days and a half of Terrenate, ac- cording to some Pimas whom they encountered. Marcial Barrera, commanding an expedition of Zunis against the Apaches in 1754, captured a Christian mestizo, Manuel Tomds, by name, who had been taken by the Apaches near Terrenate, and carried to the place where Barrera came upon him. Therefore, Sonora was not far away and communi- ^ Bancroft, Ariz. & New Mex., 260- lo Not to be confused with the great 61. river described as flowing into San Francisco Bay. 346 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV cations were not difficult, provided the Apaches might be pacified, but that was essential.^^ Meanwhile, the second Anza expedition had started. Contemporaneous with it was another of lesser note, but worthy of record. The leader was Jose Veldzquez, an al- ferez of Baja California. From a Bucarely letter of Feb- ruary 25, 1776, we learn that he was stationed along the northern frontier of the peninsula, and had been described by Neve as an useful officer.^^ An account of the Velazquez expedition appears in a letter written by him, December 8, 1775, to certain missionaries of the peninsula. Neve had ordered him to explore the northern coast of the Gulf, and a valley that had been observed near that coast, where- upon Veldzquez left Velicatd on November 17, proceeded through the valley mentioned without encountering any obstacle, not even a small hill, and eventually reached the mouth of the Colorado. The Colorado came flowing through beautiful valleys, he said, so level and pleasing that he thanked God at seeing them. Only on the Sonora coast were there any hills. The lands traversed were suited to mission work, being well wooded, and having many streams of running water, much pasture, and many Indian villages. Seeing that there were only four in his party, some Indians at the mouth of the Colorado had threatened them, but desisted when Veldzquez's men put hands to their weapons. The route had been north to east from Velicata, and west, coming back. Velazquez did not know where he would come out on the return march, but he came upon the Alta Cahfornia road between Santa Isabel and San Rafael, about sixteen leagues north of the new Dominican mission of Santo Domingo, reaching that mission on November 26.^^ The expedition is mentioned by Bucarely in a letter of March 27, 1776. He referred to Garces' reports from the Colorado River of the inclination of the natives there to receive the faith, and said that he was also sending news of Velazquez's expedition, because of its immediate connec- " A.G.P., Historia, v. 52. i3 A.G.P., Historia, v. 52. 12 C-3142. 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 347 tion with the accounts of Garces. He then described the journey in ahnost the same terms that Velazquez had used in the letter just described. Consag in 1746 could not have seen the valley through which Veldzquez travelled, said Bucarely, or he would not have described the land as lacking in inhabitants and full of sand-dunes, the con- trary being the fact. This expedition proved that missions on the Colorado could be assisted from Baja California, as well as from Sonora, thus assuring, so much the more, the route to Alta California. He was in favor of serious at- tempts for a thorough occupation of the Californias, mind- ful also of the discoveries that might afterward be made between New Mexico and Alta California, a matter to which he was devoting much attention. In conclusion, he told of the remarkable progress being made at the new Dominican mission of Rosario de ViJaiadaco, 172 Indians having been converted since his preceding report.^^ This letter is note- worthy evidence of Bucarely's plans. All it drew from Gdlvez, however, was an acknowledgement,^^ not that the new ministro general was not interested, but possibly be- cause the affair had by that time fallen within the authority of the comandante generalj replacing the viceroy. We may now take up the Anza expedition. ^^ The roster of the expedition as it left Tubac is worth quoting, as it bears directly on the objects which were intended to be accomplished : Lieutenant-Colonel Anza 1 Fathers Font, Garces, and Eixarch 3 The purveyor, Mariano Vidal 1 Lieutenant Jos6 Joaquin Moraga 1 Sergeant Juan Pablo Grijalva 1 Veteran soldiers from the presidios of Sonora ... 8 Recruits 20 Veterans from Tubac, Anza's escort 10 " C-3184. gards events, except so far as they are 1* C-3274. discussed in the official correspondence. " This, like the first expedition, will A consideration of the diaries of the be treated in summary fashion as re- expedition appears in an appendix. 348 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV Wives of the soldiers ^^ . 29 Persons of both sexes belonging to families of the said thirty soldiers ^^ 136 Muleteers 20 Herders of beef-cattle 3 Servants of the Fathers 4 Indian interpreters 3 Total 240 The vast total of 1050 domestic animals was taken, to wit: Mules with provisions, munitions, Anza's equipment, and gifts for the Indians 140 Mules carrying private effects of the soldiers ... 25 Horses, including also some saddle-mules .... 500 Mares, colts, and asses 30 Total of horses, mules, etc. . . . . . . 695 Cattle for subsistence en route and for the new settle- ments at San Francisco 325 Private cattle about 30 Total of cattle ^^355 Thus, not only was Alta California's population to be vastly increased, with the element of which it stood most in need, families of settlers, but its supply of domestic an- imals was to lie he^aHy''^^ The mules, most of the TiofSes and cattle, and the very wearing apparel of the set- tlers were paid for at government expense. Families of 1^ Of the thirty soldiers who were to states the number of horses as 340, of remain in Alta California, Moraga cattle 302, and does not mention the alone was not accompanied by his wife, 60 mares, etc., and private cattle, for she was ill at Terrenate. (Anza, Diary, A.G.P., Hiatoria, v. 396.) " Included in the group of 136 were Font's list was made after the expedi- some families of settlers, comprising, tion had started, for on October 22, the great and small, seventeen persons. day before the expedition left Tubac, This group also included three infants he writes that he did not set down the born during the march from Horca- numbers of persons and animals of the sitas to Tubac. Later, five more chQ- expedition because he had not ascer- dren were born, and the wife of one of tained them. (Font, Ures diary.) As the soldiers died in childbirth, the day regards number of persons Font and that the expedition left Tubac. Anza agree. !• Font, Tubutama diary. Anza 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 349 settlers, whether soldiers or not, were treated alike, "re- ceiving pay for two years and rations for five. The ex- pense of each family was about eight hundred dollars," ^° high evidence of the importance of the expedition, when we consider the state of the Spanish treasury. A large part of the expedition had left Horcasitas on September 29, 1775,' Anza did not consider himself as under way, however, until he left Tubac, on October 23, on which date he began his diary. The route led north to the Gila, and down that river to its junction with the Colo- rado, where the expedition arrived on November 28. It was everywhere well received, particularly by the Yumas and their principal chieftain, Salvador Palma. The more important facts of the march are presented in a series of letters to Bucarely by Anza, all dated December 8, at Santa Olaya, to which place Anza had proceeded shortly after arriving at the junction. In one of these letters he said that he had sent forward a party of soldiers before reaching the junction to see if they could find a better route across the Colorado Desert. They had rejoined him at the junction, and reported that they had found no water, and that conditions were not more favorable than those which had been known before. He would take the same route as before, therefore, but in three divisions, be- cause of the scarcity of water. The divisions would march a day apart, uniting again at San Gregorio on the other side of the desert. This was a difficult stretch, and would cause a loss of some animals, for they were already weak from their long journey, and would have to go with almost no food for two days in crossing the desert.^^ In a second letter he said that he had met with delays which might cause him to change his original plan of seeking a direct route to Monterey, and go first to San Gabriel, being forced to this measure by a possible failure of provisions, because he had planned for only a seventy days' march. He might have to push ahead himself, therefore, leaving his sick at *> Bancroft, Cod., I, 258. Cf. ap- ^ A.G.P., Historia, v. 396. pendix IV. 350 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV San Gabriel.^^ A third letter explained why he had been delayed, despite the viceroy's order to hurry to Alta Cali- fornia. It had been due to sickness of the expeditionaries. Usually about one-fourth of the expedition had been sick, and there were always two or three dangerously ill, as was the case at the moment of writing, but only one person, a woman, had died. The greatest delays had been caused by the birth of children, in which event it was not possible for the mother to ride on horseback for four or five days.^^ The fourth letter related to the Indians. So great was the docility and g:ood-will of the Yumas, that thanks were due the Almighty. In endeavors to please the Spaniards Sal- vador Palma had been and would always be, he thought, the model. Anza had given to Palma the present which Bucarely had sent to him in the name of the king. Palma had come out to meet Anza two days before his arrival. He wished Anza to reiterate his former re* The order to Croix was in much the same terms, except that the settlement of the Colorado-Gila was to occur "in its due time."^^ Thus Gdlvez undid the effect of his earlier order. With Bucarely in charge it would have made no difference, but Croix's interpretation of "due time" was apt to, and did, involve too great delay. In November, 1776, Bucarely learned that San Francisco had been founded. Rivera had flatly refused to help Anza to explore San Francisco or to found the settlements that Bucarely had ordered, but later he changed his mind. While in San Diego he sent an order on May 8, 1776, to Moraga to proceed to San Francisco, and erect a fort. Moraga's force of soldiers and settlers and their famihes, accompanied by Fathers Palou and Camb6n, reached San Francisco on June 27. They passed the first "Fourth of July" un- aware how near they had come to selecting a resounding date for their arrival. Meanwhile, the preparation of buildings went on, and on Septem ber 17, 177 6^ a formal ceremony took place to indicate that the presidio of San Francisco had definitely begun its official existence. On October 9 there was another solemn function, this time to signalize the founding of the mission San Francisco de Asis, now more commonly called Mission Dolores. Bu- carely had at length achieved one of the great objects for which he had been striving for more than three years. Al- though he could not have realized it at the time, he had also reached the culminating point in his achievements in be- half of the Calif ornias, for the coming of the settlers and doniegti c anima ls with Anza and the jucc<^ful founding of^ Sail Fran cisco mark the establishment of the Alta Calif or- nia settTements on a permanent basis. TBucarely's plans^ However, contemplated a much more pronounced development of the province, and it is to this part of Bucarely 's programme that Carets' activities of 1776 « C-3478. « C-3479. 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 361 belong. Bucarely^s instructions to Garces had contem- plated only the preparation of the Yuma and surrounding districts for the coming of missionaries, and subjection to the Spanish crown. On January 12, 1776, Garces wrote to the viceroy from the junction of the rivers about the lower Colorado country. He had just returned from a trip to the mouth of the river, having travelled among various tribes. They received him better than he had expected, and he had even bfeen able to end a war which the Yumas and two other tribes were waging against the Cucapds. All of these peoples were eager for the coming of Spanish missionaries and settlers. Their lands were suitable for every kind of seed, and in the main adapted to the raising of cattle and horses, especially along the river. There were not many sites for villages because of the floods of the Colorado, but there were some table-lands. Garces expected equal success with the tribes up the Colorado, whom he planned to visit in a short time.**^ A month later, on February 14, G arc6s started north. The idea occurred to him of attempting to reach Monterey by the northerly route, as he had wished to do at the time of the first Anza expedition, but he was unable to procure guides. He went instead to San Gabriel, finding guides for this route, which followed the line of the modern Santa Fe Railroad along the Mojave River and through Cajon Pass. He remained at San Gabriel from March 24 to April 9, when he set out in a fresh attem pt to reach Monterey by an interior rgjate. This carried him past modern Bakersfield to the vicinity of Tulare Lake, whence he turned back, and headed for the Colorado River at the point where he had left it. Not satis- fied with what he had done, he resolved to attempt another of his favorite projects, — to reach Moqui from the Colo- rado. This he accomplished by July 2. Thence he re- traced his steps to the Colorado, and proceeded to his mis- sion of San Javier del Bac, where he arrived on September 17.'*^ Thus another of Bucarely's great projects, although without his authorization, had been accomplished. It was *« A.G.P., Historia, v. 52. ^ Garc6s, Diary. 362 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV previously known that a route existed from New Mexico to Moqui ; Garces had proved that one might go on from Moqui to the Pacific coast. • Bucarely's first information of Garces' success seems to have come from New Mexico through a letter written from Moqui by Garc6s, July 3, 1776, to the religious at Zuni. He told of his arrival in Moqui, saying that the Moquis had not been pleased to see him ; troops, Christian Indians, and gifts would be necessary, if they were to be subjected. He announced that he had found a route which could be used, following the establishment of a presidio on the Colorado, for communication and commerce with Sonora.^^ Bu- carely commented on this letter in his communication of December 27, 1776, to Galvez.^^ Shortly after his return Garces gave a general report, in an undated letter to his Father Superior, Diego Ximenez, of the results of his trip. The Pimas Gilenos had never risen against Spain, he said, and they had recently asked for missions. Nothing would be more important in the service of God and the king than the founding of one or two establishments on the Gila, a comparatively simple task, too, because there were five villages in a distance of two leagues and a half, so that a few cattle and horses would suffice.^^ Garces described his journey to Moqui and back, dealing primarily with the character of the Indians along his route.^^ When he got back to the Colorado-Gila junc- tion the Yumas wished to detain him, believing that the missionaries and settlers were on the point of arriving, but he left them and returned by way of the Gila. He recom- mended missions among the Pdpagos, as well as others on the Gila, for a post on the Papagueria route to the Colorado would be of value in case of uprisings of the tribes between Sonora and the rivers. Even without such a line of com- « C-3265. " Moqui he described as the best <9 C-3416. Indian village that he had seen in New ^ Garc6s seems to have in mind Spain, because of its excellent site, the beasts of burden, of which a smaller height of the Indian houses, their number would be necessary because doorways (which were accessible only of the nearness of the villages to each by use of ladders), and the industrious other. character of the inhabitants. 1775] THE SECOND ANZA EXPEDITION 363 munications, however, the Colorado settlements could be maintained by sea, being very near San Diego. "I am of the opinion/^ said Garces, predicting in part what was later to occur, "that if the matter of missions on the Gila and Colorado is allowed to cool . . . there is danger that all will be lost, and that the Yumas may be the first to enter a league, and by their aid the Apaches can unite with the Pimas/^ Garces rejoiced that the Apaches, who had recently sought an alliance with the Pimas, had treach- erously killed some of the latter, for an Apache-Pima alli- ance would mean grave danger to the provinces, whereas Pima hostihty to the Apaches would secure the Gila mis- sions, if founded. After referring to the relation of the Yumas to the San Diego revolt in the terms already noted, Garces add ed that if establishments were not founded on the Colorado within a few years, the Alta California settle^ ments could not be maintained, even with two hundred more iheii than were there at the time. Settlers for the Colorado should not be taken from the frontier provinces, however, as these regions lacked a sufficient population. He had thought of recommending missions among the Jalchedunes, Jamajabes, and Yumas, but on second thought had de- cided for the Yumas, Cajuenches, and Cucapas, believing that if the Yumas were well secured, there would be no trouble with the settlements farther down the river. For the present, he did not recommend the use of routes from the Colorado to New Mexico or San Francisco and Mon- terey, because to march through tribes where there were no Spanish establishments would be pernicious in its effect, without any advantage whatsoever.^^ A copy of this letter soon reached Bucarely, who forwarded it to Spain with his communication of January 27, 1777. He regarded with favor the project for establishing presidios and missions on the Colorado, for not only did the security of the Alta California establishments, the route thereto, and perhaps the ability to send provisions there from Sonora depend on such establishments being made, but also the natives visited MC-3110. 364 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XV by Garc^s as far as Moqui might be attracted to the faith, in' which case it would not be difficult to effect their con- quest.^^ Acknowledging this letter, May 3, 1777, Gdlvez wrote that Garces^ account had given the king much satis- faction, and he directed Bucarely to extend to Garc6s the king's thanks, ^^ which the viceroy accordingly did.^^ A copy of Garc6s' diary was sent to Bucarely when com- pleted, and another forwarded direct to Gdlvez, April 18, 1777, by Father Xim^nez.^® Both Bucarely ^^ and Xim6nez ^* sent Gdlvez maps covering the second Anza expedition and Garces' wanderings of 1775-76 in entirety. They touch many phases of the subject-matter of this work, such as the prevailing ideas of geography and the names of places and people mentioned in written accounts.^^ Bucarelyalso sent a Font map covering the Anza march from Monterey to San Francisco.^^ Perhaps the most valuable part of Garc6s' diary is that which contains his reflections, or con- clusions. He begins with a list of the tribes he visited, giving in some cases, an estimate of their number, with other remarks concerning them. It need only be stated that the tribes were many, and that the total numbers of those along the Gila and Colorado in the regions that he visited were estimated as respectively 8000 and 16,500. Next, he takes up the question of their relations with one another. We may note that the Yumas were wont to be on good terms with the Jamajabes, Yabipais Tejuas, and Pdpagos, and at war with the Cocomaricopas, Pimas Gilenos, Jal- chedunes, Jequiches, Jalliquamais, and Cajuenches. It would be necessary to rule over the tribes of the Colorado, '3 C-3465. including Alta California, is also in- "C-3540. serted. This is in A.G.I., 95-7-21, " Bucarely to Gdlvez, Aug. 27, 1777. and is referred to in Torres Lanzas, II, C-3655. no. 349, at pp. 27-28. ^«C-3527. 60C-3430. This map is published "C-3431. in Pedro Font, . . . San Francisco ^ C-3432. Bay and California in 1776 ; three maps '9 C-3432 is inserted in the text. . . . with an explanation by Irving' A similar map appears in Garc6s (Coues Berdine Richman. Providence, 1911. ed.), I, frontispiece, apparently a The other two maps show respectively rather crude copy from this or from the route of the entire march by Anza's some other like map. For comparative expedition of 1775-76, and the entrance purposes a Font map of the northwest- to the Bay of San Francisco. ern portion of the frontier provinces. K i\ > "♦ 4 C-3185. 1776. C-3223. » C-3299. 1775] BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 371 two new frigates be built at Guayaquil. ^^ The junta con- cluded that the voyages of exploration should be postponed for a year. At least two boats were needed on such voy- ages, it held, but it was impossible to procure them, because of the necessity of getting Areche to Lima and supplies to Alta California." The boat situation did not improve. On November 26, Bucarely wrote that the Principe had just returned to San Bias. It had sailed from there in March, taking seventy days to reach Monterey. The San Carlos had sailed at the same time, requiring ninety-one days for the same voyage, and had not yet returned. Bucarely had hoped to send the Principe again, early in 1777, but as it was in need of repairs there was nothing to do but to wait for the San Carlos. Quir6s had planned to take it to San Francisco with provisions, and this additional voyage might account for its delay. Its absence was unfortunate, how- ever, because it was necessary to reckon on the San Carlos in deciding what steps could be taken.^^ Bucarely prepared to follow the advice of the junta. On December 7, 1776, he gave orders to Arteaga, then head of the Department of San Bias, to take command of the Santiago, in which he had decided to send Areche to Peru,^^ and on the same day he gave instructions to Heceta, who was to succeed Arteaga at San Bias, in accord with the decision of the junta}^ It was decided that a naval officer should go to Peru in order to solicit a frigate there for use in northwest explorations, Bodega being selected as the one to go, and measures were devised for hastening supplies to Alta California, for reports had come that the province did not have as much as it required. Bucarely purposed to send them first to San Francisco, for it was a new settle- ment, lacking in resources, and there were more soldiers and settlers at that port than elsewhere. He had feared, however, that he would be unable to send all of the supplies that Alta California needed, when the situation was changed 10 Bucarely to Gdlvez, Sept. 26, 1776. cio de Arteaga to Gdlvez. C-3370. C-3331. "C-3380. " C-3311. This was enclosed in a is C-3390. letter of November 23, 1776, by Igna- " C-3389. 372 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI by the chance arrival of a merchant ship at Acapulco, the Fenix, which had come from Guayaquil with a cargo of cacao. Writing of this event, December 27, Bucarely said that Areche could go to Peru in the Fenix, and the Santiago could be employed in carrying provisions to Alta California, enabling that province, he hoped, to receive a sufl&cient quantity. An extra frigate was still needed, however, and Bodega was to go to Peru to seek one. Only one more might now be required, instead of two, and it would still be possible to make the explorations of 1778, and to supply Alta California. If the Santiago and the Principe could not carry enough supplies, Bucarely would also send the San Carlos, thus enabling Alta California to be less em- barrassed in 1778, while the voyages of exploration were being carried on. At all events, it was more important to supply that province than to make the explorations, for, otherwise, all gains thus far made might be lost.^^ Bucarely 's letters about the projected voyages were approved by Gdlvez. A specific^ approval was given, December 24, 1776, to Bucarely 's suggestion that two boats be built in Peru for use in New Spain,^^ and, the same day, orders were directed to the viceroy of Peru to construct promptly at Guayaquil two good frigates for use in north- west explorations.^^ On March 19, 1777, Galvez approved Bucarely's letter of the preceding December,^^ and sent orders to the viceroy of Peru that only one frigate for Bu- carely needed to be built, if Bodega should succeed in pur- chasing another.^^ Not to pursue this matter further it may be said that one boat was procured in Peru, and an- other built at San Bias, and the two left San Bias for the northwest coast in February, 1779. It may be wondered why both ships were not built at San Bias. One reason was the inability of the department to procure the ordinary manufactured articles of which it stood in need, such as iron, tools, artillery, canvas, and tackle. In a letter of August 27, 1775, Bucarely asked of " C-3413. 17 C-3402. i« C-3401. 18 C-3521. 19 C-3522. 1775] BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 373 Arriaga that a supply of iron and tools be shipped from Spain to Vera Cruz for use at San Bias. He had already asked for a supply of the other effects from Havana, he said.^° In a letter of September 26 he asked for 2500 bind- ing plates (planchuelas) for use in making water-barrels for the San Bias ships. ^^ Grimaldi, acting for Arriaga, who was ill, gave orders that the iron and other effects from Spain be assembled at Cddiz for shipment to Vera Cruz,^^ and that the materials sought from Havana be shipped from there as soon as possible.^^ On the same day, December 22, 1775, he wrote to Bucarely reciting what he had done.^^ There was a comparatively prompt response to the orders as regards the effects sought in Spain. On April 9, 1776, Ruiz informed Gdlvez that they had been sent to Vera Cruz.^^ The articles sought in Havana, however, were not forthcoming. On October 21, 1776, Bonet the naval commander at Havana, wrote to Castej6n, of the ministry of marine in Spain, that it was in the interests of the service . that the effects desired for San Bias be procured in Peru rather than at Havana.^^ Castej6n addressed Gdlvez about the matter on December 31,^^ and the latter wrote to Bucarely ^^ and to the viceroy of Peru^^ on January 4, 1777, to see if they might arrange as Bonet had suggested. Bucarely replied, April 26, 1777, that he had written to the viceroy of Peru, remarking also that it would be less ex- pensive if the goods could be procured in that viceroyalty.^^ Nearly two years had passed since he first asked for them, and they seemed to be no nearer arrival than ever. Not only effects but also men were lacking at San Bias. A letter from two officers of San Bias, Diego Choquet de la Isla and Juan de la Bodega y Cuadra, to Andres Reggio of Isla de Le6n, Spain, dated February 13, 1775, recited some of the needs of San Bias in this respect, telling also of the 20 C-2976. He enclosed a detailed 24 C-3051. list of the effects needed. C-2977. 2b C-3191. 21 C-2998. 26 C-3351. 22 Grimaldi to FeUpe Ruiz, Dec. 22, ^ C-3423. 1775. C-3053. 28 C-3454. 23 Grimaldi to Macuriges, Dec. 22, » C-3453. 1775. C-3052. » C-3534. 374 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI unhealthfulness of the site and the disorderhness of ships' crews. ^^ The letter was forwarded to Arriaga,^^ who wrote to Bucarely on November 3, 1775, requiring him to provide San Bias with a surgeon and a chaplain, neither of which it had at the time, and to send enough soldiers to compel the crews to observe a proper respect for authority.^^ In a letter of February 25, 1776, Bucarely spoke of a need for carpenters, pilots, and a calker at San Blas.^* Galvez seems to have taken up the matter with Castejon, for the latter wrote to him on June 14 that two pilots, two car- penters, and one calker would be supplied for use at San Blas.^^ Francisco Manxon of the Casa de Contratacion wrote to Galvez from Cadiz on July 5 that he was awaiting orders to send the calker and the carpenters, but that the two pilots had not yet appeared. ^^ Gdlvez replied, July 12, that these men and the pilots should be sent at government expense on the first boat from Cddiz,^^ and on the same day he wrote to Bucarely of the orders that he had given. ^^ It had been contemplated that the boats for the depart- ment should be built in the shipyard of San Bias itself. However, if there were to be boats, there had to be men who knew how to build them. Bucarely wrote to Galvez, on November 26, 1776, that a ship-builder, boatswain, and other shipyard employes were needed at San Bias. He was seeking a builder in Havana, but wanted one from Spain if he could not get one in Cuba.^^ On December 27, he wrote that Goya of San Bias had asked for eighty sailors, two boatswains, twelve shipyard employes, four phlebotomists, two light-tenders (farolero^), and two armorers. Bucarely had ordered fifty sailors, a boatswain, and twelve shipyard employes sent there, and Jj^d told Goya to try in future to recruit men from the neighborhood. ^° By February 24, 1777, he was able to inform Gdlvez that he had procured twelve shipyard employes in Vera Cruz.*^ Bonet was un- 31 C-2846. 36 C-3267. 32 Reggio to Arriaga, Sept. 26, 1775. 37 C-3275. C-3000. 38 C-3276. 33 C-3026. 39 C-3382. 34 C-3143. « C-3418. 3* C-3252. « C-3496. 1775] BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 375 able to find a ship-builder in Havana,^ but Galvez wrote to Bucarely on February 15 that one would be supplied.'*^ He took the matter up with Castejon, who repHed on April 20 that Jose Chenard had been designated for the position,^ and Galvez sent a letter next day to Bucarely to that effect.'*^ Bucarely wrote at length, May 27, 1777, reiterating the need for a ship-builder/^ for it was not until July that he learned of the appointment of Chenard. ^^ The latter did not go to Mexico, however. On October 22, Castejon in- formed Galvez that Chenard was unable to go, and asked if there was still a need for a ship-builder at San Blas.^^ Galvez replied on October 27 that the king desired such a man to be sent,^^ whereupon Castejon notified Galvez on November 22 that Francisco Segurola had been appointed in place of Chenard.^^ Galvez sent word to Bucarely to that effect the following day,^^ giving orders at the same time to one Francisco Rdbago of Coruna to send Segurola by the next boat.^^ This arrangement did not please Segurola, who wrote to Galvez on the 30th that his precipitate de- parture would compel him to leave his family destitute. ^^ Segurola's wishes seem not> to have been considered, how- ever, for we find a petition of Antonio de la Cuesta, dated December 13, 1777, asking that Segurola's son Ilam6n be allowed to take the next boat to Havana, in order to join his father there, ^* a request which was granted through Gdlvez's letter of the 23d to Rabago.^^ The above review is enough to give an idea of the diffi- culties experienced by the Department of San Bias. Bu- carely did all that he could to repair the deficiencies, but delays were unavoidable, for the men or commodities wanted were not always at hand or readily assembled. Despite these handicaps he had been a>le to sustain and develop the CaHfornias, and to carry on the exploring voyages to the northwest coasts. «Bonet to Gdlvez, Jan 31, 1777. « C-3676. C-3470. « C-3678. « C-3481. « C-3529. » C-3687. « C-3530. « C-3565. " C-3688. « Bucarely to Gdlvez, July 27, 1777. 52 C-3689. w C-3693 C-3626. M C-3697. w C-3712 376 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI At this place we may refer to a new factor in northwest- ward exploration caused by the news of an EngHsh voyage to the Pacific under Captain Cook. An exceedingly im- portant letter of Bucarely^s, June 26, 1776, sets forth the situation. It begins by quoting in full the royal order of March 23, apprising the viceroy of this matter. The king had certain information from London, said the royal order, that two frigates, the Resolution and Discovery ^ were being equipped for a voyage to the Pacific under Captain Cook, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring to the island of Tahiti in the south Pacific an Indian whom Cook had taken from there on a previous voyage. The real objects seemed to be for Cook to go over the route of the next Spanish fleet, to explore the Ladrones Islands, going on from there to the Calif ornias with a view to establishing commerce with New Mexico, and to attempt to discover the famous northwest passage in order to gain the reward offered by the House of Commons. Although such a variety of ob- jects might cause a doubt of the authenticity of the in- formation, it was necessary, nevertheless, to exercise the greatest vigilance, lest the English should try any one of these projects. They had not lost hope of finding a passage, despite their repeated failures in attempts from the At- lantic side. The viceroy was ordered to take precautions requiring the officers in the CaHfornias to be on the watch, and to bring about a failure of these projects, if possible, but without employing force. The English ships were to be checked by furnishing them sparingly with supplies, or in some other like way. Moreover, if either boat should come to the Californias, the officials there were to make inquiries to learn their objects and the instructions which they bore, practising all the formalities required by law in such cases, giving notice thereof to the viceroy, who would in turn advise the king. In reply, Bucarely referred to an account of the voyages of Biron, Carteret, Wallis, and Cook, printed at Paris in 1774. There was nothing in that work about the coasts of New Spain, or concerning the recent Spanish explorations up to 1775] BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 377 58°. Nevertheless, it was clear that the English interest in discoveries was constant, and that the idea of finding a northwest passage had never been lost sight of by the Eng- lish. The Bodega and Heceta explorations, which had been very carefully executed, made it appear improbable that such a passage would be found. Furthermore, Anson's voyage around Cape Horn and north to Acapulco was evidence of the difficulties to be encountered in a voyage to the Pacific coast o'f New Spain, even with a knowledge of the places in which Anson contrived to refit. Even if Cook could keep his ship in repair, he would be far from likely to succeed in his search for a passage ; Spanish sailors had objected to transferring the Department of San Bias to Acapulco, because it was so far from Alta California, mak- ing it hard to send supplies there, and impossible to advance the work of exploration, but it was much more difficult in the case of Cook. Gdlvez knew what great efforts had been necessary in dealing with the problems of the northwest coast, both before and after the expeditions which occupied Alta California, at the cost too of considerable expenditure. Bucarely then referred to no less than forty-seven of his despatches to the ministro generalj showing the multitude of measures that he had taken to prevent possible Russian encroachments. It was for that reason that he had caused two expeditions to go from Sonora and one from Baja California to Alta California, brought about an exploration of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and despatched repeated expeditions by sea, all of these measures being intended to develop Alta California to the point which it had now reached.^® Those letters would show what he thought, he " The following are the serial num- 1258 (C-2520) ; 1259 (C-2521) bers of the forty seven letters men- 1280 (C-2551) ; 1353 (C-2597) tioned by Bucarely, followed in paren- 1364 (C-2608) ; 1608 (C-2763) thesis by my Catalogue number, in cases 1639 (C-2780) ; 1640 (C-2781) where they have been used in this work. 1641 (C-2783) ; 2031 (C-3032) Of letters sent via reservada, that is, 2032 (C-3033) ; 2033 (C-3034) to say, those about which there was 2034 (C-3035) ; 2073 (C-3057) more than ordinary secrecy as con- 2074 (C-3058). earned who should handle them, there Others sent in the ordinary course were the following: 1048 (C-2337) 1086 (C-2365); 1104 (C-2397) 1182 (C-2430); 1224 (C-2464) were: 738 (C-2152) ; 1097 (C-2388) 1279 (C-2550) ; 1365 ; 1389 (C-2624) 1489 (C-2706); 1519 (C-2719) 378 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI said. His measures had been successful, and now that the coast had been explored as far north as 58°, there was very slight cause for fear. There would now be time to develop Alta California, so that it might sustain itself and furnish supplies to such more northerly settlements as might be established in future, as for example at the port of Trinidad, of which Heceta took possession. Referring to the reports early in 1773 of a projected voy- age by the Englishman Bings to the North Pole with a view to reaching the Californias, Bucarely said that such a voy- age seemed to him less diificult than the one which Cook was undertaking. Cook was destined to suffer many dis- appointments, for even if he should reach Monterey and form a settlement (and in fact he could not sustain one if he did), the project of establishing commercial relations with New Mexico was fantastical. Bucarely had encoun- tered great difficulties in his attempts to open communication from New Mexico, and had labored not a little to become ac- quainted with the intermediate lands, and to arrange that Monterey might count on assistance from New Mexico, Sonora, and San Bias. He was awaiting the return of Anza to treat further of the matter, and might decide to make Anza temporary governor of New Mexico in order to bring about the estabHshment of communications with Alta California from there. Between the instructions of Bucarely for the treatment of boats arriving at the Spanish settlements and those given by Gdlvez for observance with Cook, there was a wide di- vergence, said Bucarely. Without a display of force against him. Cook would not show his instructions, but if he himself were powerfully equipped, there was no corresponding strength either in the Spanish settlements or in the boats 1520 (C-2720) ; 1521 (C-2721) ; valuable list of materials bearing on the 1539 ; 1609 (C-2764) : 1612 (C-2766) ; subject-matter of this work, but they 1642 (C-2785) ; 1682 ; 1691 ; 1718 do not include all that Bucarely wrote. (C-2857); 1738 (C-2861) ; 1752 (C- For example, no. 1562, Bucarely to 2874) ; 1753 (C-2875) ; 1823 (C-2916) ; Arriaga. Sept. 28, 1774 (C-2732, used 1848; 1856 (C-2935) ; 1937 (C-2975) ; in chap. X), is an important letter 1938 (C-2976); 1939 (C-2978); 1940 directly in point. A great number of (C-2979) ; 2008 (C-3025). others, many of which I have used, are These documents are an exceedingly also directly or indirectly pertinent. 17751 BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 379 of San Bias with which to confront him, nor indeed was there a suitable supply of arms. Ship-commanders were at the time under instructions to avoid communication with foreign ships, and steps ought to be taken to apprise them, in case a new rule were to obtain, so that they might know what to do, if obstacles were to be placed in Cook's way, after his passage of Cape Horn. If it were decided to use force, it would be well to find out the strength of Cook's expedition, so as to make proper provision at Acapulco, and do what was possible at San Diego, Monterey, and San Fran- cisco. Meanwhile, Bucarely would limit his measures to a literal obedience of the royal order, giving provisions spar- ingly, and indeed there would be few to give, and trying in a peaceful way to find out Cook's plans.^^ At about the same time, to wit, on July 14, 1776, another royal order was directed to the viceroy, informing him that Cook's two ships had left London, and were believed to be bound for the northern coasts of the Californias. Appro- priate orders should be given to the governors of coast prov- inces, especially to the governor of the Californias, to be on the watch for the English boats, and if the latter should ap- proach land, to deny them admittance to Spanish ports. Quoting this order in his reply of October 27, Bucarely said that he had communicated it to the authorities at Acapulco and San Bias and to the governor of the Californias, charg- ing them with exact fulfilment of the order, although he knew how slight a resistance could be opposed in the new settlements, and the port of Acapulco was hardly in a bet- ter state. ^^ On receipt of Bucarely's June 26 letter, Gdlvez replied with a royal order of October 18, requiring that measures be taken in accord with his directions of March 23. The latter had been given in full knowledge of the weakness of the Californias, but if there should be force enough, owing to the diminished strength of Cook on arrival or for other reasons, proceedings were to be taken to detain, imprison, " A.G.P., Cor. Vir., series I, v. 12, » Ibid., no. 2534. no. 2296. 380 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI and try him and his men as the laws directed. Following the usual custom, Bucarely incorporated this order in his reply, January 27, 1777, and announced that he would send orders by the first mail to San Bias and Acapulco, calling for an exact obedience to the royal mandate. As for the Calif ornias, he would send the royal order to the comandante general J together with the one of March 23.^^ This correspondence shows, in the first place, that Bu- carely was not greatly alarmed by the news of the Cook voyage, and secondly, that he saw no way of meeting a strong expedition with the means at command. Never- theless, although clearly out of sympathy with Gdlvez^s order, he took the necessary preliminary steps to carry it out, and might have done a great deal more, if the matter had remained within his jurisdiction. The tone of his letter of June 26, 1776, is almost identical with that of his letter of July 27, 1773, three years before, which dealt with measures as against possible English or Russian aggression. Bucarely was sceptical then, but we have seen how much he did, despite his own lack of worry. This time, however, the matter was out of his hands. The^esit significance of the second Anza expedition ha^ been that it had placed Alta California on a permanent basis, although it was not at once apparent, nor w^as it pos- sible to cease altogether to send aid. The situation as re- gards domestic animals had been greatly helped by Anza's "expedition, but tliere~still seemed to be a need of animals of the sort to provide for natural increase. In a letter of August 27, 1776, Bucarely said that the animals sent to Alta California had been bought in Sonora, and more were being purchased there at the time for the same purpose, but the cost of conducting them to Alta California was very great. He had decided, therefore, to get what he needed from the peninsula. Neve had written. May 9, 1776, that some an- imals could be furnished from San Jos6 Comondu, Guada- lupe, San Ignacio, and San Francisco Borja. Not only 69 A.G.P., Cor. Vir., series I, v. 13, no. 2702. 17751 BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 381 were these missions near Alta California, but also they had found it possible to raise domestic animals, wherefore Bucarely thought of sending a number with the twenty- five recruits who were going north in consequence of the San Diego revolt. Neve was to distribute the animals as he saw fit, giving San Francisco the preference, however.®^ Bucarely enclosed a list showing the number and kinds of animals to be taken. They had been selected with a view to the procreation of more in Alta California.®^ On October 27, Bucarely wrote that he had repeated his orders for Neve to transfer his residence to Monterev. ®^ In another letter he told of measures taken to develop both^ agriculture and stock-raising in Alta California, with a I view to providing the Manila galleon with supplies, that I ^ boat having been ordered, by a decree of May 16, 1776, to | stop, in future, either at Monterey or at San Francisco.®^ A Bucarely letter of November 26 enclosed documents con- cerning the progress of Alta California, and in particular two letters of Serra, one dated June 27, 1776, about the founding of San Francisco,®* and the other of October 8 about the work being done on the new mission at San Diego to replace the one destroyed by the Indians.®^ Bucarely complained of Rivera's letters, saying that they contained nothing but confused notices. He had learned, however, that San Diego was again at peace, and that the twenty- five soldiers recruited in Guadalajara and San Bias had arrived there. Serra said that ninety cattle and many provisions and effects had been taken along for the found- ing of San Francisco. With the San Francisco settlers, the twenty-five recruits just mentioned, and some sailors who had been left by the Principe, the province might be con- sidered as having advanced and become better guarded, *°C-3300. Gdlvez approved, C-3455. writer of the document, 11 more breed- «i C-3070. The animals were as ing-mares, 1 more stallion, 1 ass, and follows : 40 breeding mares ; 3 stal- 3 fillies. lions ; 17 colts (caballos orejanos) ; 16 ^ C-3357. mules ; 6 asses, 4 of them she-asses ; ^ C-3484. 60 cows for breeding purposes ; 4 bulls ; " C-3262. The date of this letter 8 rams and he-goats ; 60 lambs ; and is clearly wrong, possibly three months 60 goats. In all there were 274. There too early. ought also to be, according to the ^ C-3343. 382 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI but it had also made it necessar}^to_send gre of supplies, until such time as the soil should provide enough to free the royal treasury from this costly burden. If Rivera {Bad devoted himself more to developing agriculture, as he had been instructed to do, the province would be much further advanced, and already there would be crops, per- haps, with which to maintain the settlers. Bucarely ex- pected better results from Neve. As to new missions, Serra had convinced him that they were most needed along the Santa Barbara Channel ; if some were founded there, it might make possible the establishing of a monthly mail service from Alta California by way of the coast of Sonora.^^ On December 27, ifTe) Bucarely announced the return of the ISan TTarlos.^'^ It had sailed from San Francisco, and brought news of the rapid progress of the newly founded settlement, but great as its progress had been, wrote Bu- carely in another December 27 letter, he was taking no chance of a possible decline. He had ordered the purchasing agent of the Californias to seek a surgeon, a carpenter, a mason, and a smith in Mexico for San Francisco, and he was sending to San Bias by forced marches a quantity of clothing, tools, and other utensils and effects for San Fran- cisco, those for agricultural uses being especially abundant. He was also planning new missions in Alta California to i^^i^io^S^ommmxicd^iiori with Sonora and San Bias, and to permit, perhaps, of establishing a monthly mail service. Furthermore, cattle wer e being forwarded from Baja Cali- fornia. Having heard that' 'tHeFe was a scarcity of pro- visions at San Francisco, Bucarely had- ordered the Santiago to sail direct for that port, without a previous stop at San Diego or Monterey. With this letter he enclosed a copy of the instruction that he had given to Neve. Among other things, he had charged Neve to get on well with the mis^ sionaries, of whom he spoke in terms of the highest praise, for to them more than. to anybody else he ascribed the pres- ervation of the province, claiming that the governors had not developed the settlements under their command to the M C-3380. 67 C-3409. 1775] BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 383 extent that they should have. He expected good results from Neve, however, because of his good conduct, experi- "ence^ and moderation. ^^ The instruction to Neve was a document of twenty-seven paragraphs, dated December 25, 1776, and it contained orders of a temporary nature, as well as those of permanent application, a practice that seems to have been general at that time. [1] Bucarely acknowledged receipt of word from Neve that he was gathering cattle to take to Alta Califor- nia. [2] Rivera was then a^San_Diego being in fear of another uprising, but his fears were silly, as the land was at peace. [3] Bucarely announced the good news of the founding of San Francisc o. [4] Neve was to take measures to restore the mission of San Diego, and to reestablish a satislacEbry general situation there. [5] Punishment of the San Diego chiefs was to be suspended, although Neve was not to trust them, especially those who had rebelled. [6] Two missions should be established along the Santa Bar- bara Channel at an early date, for they would serve as stop- ping places for a mail service, which might be established from Alta, California either to Loreto, or, byway of the Colo- rado, to Alamos, Sonora, and thence by boat to San Bias. [7] Neve was to proceed with erecting a mission at San Juan^ Capistrano,^^ and there ought to be yet another between San Gabriel and San Diego, and another at San Francisco in addition to the one already there. [8] Bucarely praised the^ missionaries, especially Serra, and told Neve to main- tain proper harmony with him in extending the king^s domain. [9] There should be a mission between San Fran- cisco and Monterey, but not until after the erection of the others named. Santa Clara ^^ and San Juan Capistrano were to have the preference. [10] Instead of having nothing to do, as heretofore, Spanish settlers should be given lands, \/ and encouraged to take up agriculture , for the soil was rich. 'Z^ [Tl] i5ucarely had sent sonie plougE^hares and other uten- •* C-3412, '0 This migratory name referred in •8 This had previously been begun, this instance to the second San Fran- but had been suspended because of the cisco mission. San Diego revolt. 384 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVI jils of husbandry, not only those that had been asked for, f but others besides. [12] Neve was to distribute the utcix- /\ sils and cattle under a condition of ultimate repayment to ^ the royal treasury. [13] Soldiersjwere to share in distrj^^ > bution of lands, but they could also have a vegetable patch in common. [14] Then followed a paragraph about the salaries of officers and men. [15] Rations were not to be distributed equally, but according to whether a man were married and had children, the amounts given being in pro- portion to the number dependent on him, [16] a method that had been followed by Anza. [17] Not counting officers and sergeants. Neve had seventy-five soldiers, including the twenty-five sent in consequence of the San Diego revolt. This excess number was to be used in the new missions, with not less than six soldiers to a mission. [18] Reference was made to the Rivera instruction, which was to be obeyed as far as was consistent with later orders. [19] Bucarely had received petitions from San Diego and San Francisco for clothing and other effects, and had complied with these requests. The same amount as was allotted to San Diego was sent to Monterey, although no petition had been re- ceived from there. [20] Because of reports of scarcity, Bu- carely had ordered the Santiago to San Francisco with goods that were being sent from Mexico to San Bias by forced marches, and the Principe was to follow with effects for San Diego and Monterey. [21] An image of St. Francis was being sent for use in the chapel of the fort at San Francisco. A surgeon, a carpenter, and a smith from Mexico, and a mason from San Bias were also being sent to San Fran- cisco, both Moraga and Rivera having asked for them. [22] Church utensils desired for San Francisco would be forwarded as soon as possible. [23] Then followed a paragraph concerning the building of houses and a warehouse at San Francisco. [24] Bucarely doubted whether Her- menegildo Sal was competent to act as storekeeper at San Francisco, and Neve was to appoint another to replace him. [25] Bucarely insisted on ^steps_forjthe^ economic develop- ment of Alta California, and the general measures of the 1775] BUCARELY'S DIFFICULTIES 385 instruction to Rivera, little observed thus far, were to be put into effect. [26] The only way to win over Indians was )( by good treatment and gifts, which methods were pref- eFable to more rigorous ones. Care of Indians was t he s pecific w ork of the religious, and i t^ was the duty of tEe troops to protect and aid them in this work. \T7Y'AF'1ot the missionaries, Bucarely was so well content with the zeal and religious bearing of the Father-President and the other rehgious that he looked forward to happy results, if Neve should observe the instructions bearing on his re- lations with them.^^ With this instruction Bucarely's work for Alta CaHfornia was well-nigh done, except for the mat- ter of the supply-ships, which, fortunately, continued to be under his management. 71 C-3406. 2c CHAPTER XVII THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX, 1776-1783 The year 1776 marks the culminating point in the north- westward movement as an effective force. By that time the northwest coasts had been explored, Alta California had been placed on a permanent although not very strong basis by the success of Anza's second expedition and the founding of San Francisco, the Colorado and Gila region had become well known, a route to Moqui had been dis- covered, Sinaloa had achieved a well-settled state, and Sonora seemed likely soon to do so. Thereafter, the proj- ects undertaken resulted, for the most part, in failure, diie principally to the weakness of the Spanish Empire. Great rulers in New Spain had for a time achieved results out of all proportion to their resources, but Spain's need for funds now became so great that the government felt unable to incur more expense i n North^merica on^groj ects, of frontier advance. Able rulers might still have accomplished some- thing, but a fatal move was made when Teodoro de Croix was named comandante general of a new government of the frontier provinces. To be sure, he not only had to face the problem of economy, but he also had serious Indian wars with the Apaches and others, — wars, however, of the same character that the viceroys had always been obliged to contend with. The task was a great one ; but a Bu- carely could have managed it. ■--.. The comandancia general was established in August, 1776, and went into operation in the following January. Gdl- vez's idea in founding the new government was that the northwestward advance should continue, and the importance of the Californias stood forth as almost the principal con- 386 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 387 sideration in the document providing for the new govern- ment. But Teodoro de Croix^ the first comandante general , was,.infiapable of taking a broad view of aff airs^ neYficT-^Jiaap- ing the ideas of Gdlvez and Bucarely with regard to the significance of foreign danger and the consequent need for^ advancing the conquest. Sonora he regarded as the most serious of his problems, but only because of the internal dis« order there ; its importance as a link in the chain of con- quest seems not to have impressed him greatly. Yet, despite his solicitude for Sonora, he kept away from that province until late in 1779. He took little interest in the Calif ornias and the proposed Colorado-Gila establishments, and he never understood their needs or their importance. Fortunately, the former had an able ruler in Felipe de Neve, who was able to accomplish many of the things that had been ordered prior to Croix's accession to power. More- over, Croix approved anything that Neve actually did. The case of the Colorado-Gila establishments and the matter of routes from them to New Mexico, Sonora, and the Califor- nias did not end so happily. Were it not for the orders given to him, Croix might never have thought of these projects. After a fatal delay, he at length founded weak settlements at the junction of the two rivers. Having little interest in the matter himself, he made economy the keynote of his policy for the new foundations. He himself had other tilings on his mind, as instanced by his voluminous memo- rials on the internal affairs of his government ; one wonders if, after all, his mind were not primarily on the memorials themselves. The fai lure of the Colorado est^.hliRhTYipn ts wa s, under t he circumstances, inevitable. It,-.came. .mth the Yuma masgacre of 1781. On July 17 of that year the "SpanisITsettlements were wiped out, and in^ January, 1783^ a decision was reached to abandon the project of such es- tablishments, and as a consequence, to give up the idea of overland communication with the Calif ornias. Croix was at fault, but claimed falsely that Garces and Anza had de-"" ceived him. Garces having perished in the massacre, Anza was made the scapegoat. The achievements of Gdlvez 388 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII and Bucarely, ably supplemented by those of Neve, were not undone by the disaster, but their work suffered a per- manent check. They had placed Alta California on an en- during basis, but it was settled on July 17, 1781, that the province was not to develop at that time on a large scale. Thus gold was to remain undiscovered for over half a cen- tury,^ and the Pacific coast to be without sufficient allure- ment to induce to its conquest by a strong power, until at length the United States was in a position to be a decisive i factor. Had the Alta California settlements failed, Eng- land or Russia, presumably the former, might well have occupied the territory. That Spain^s establishments did not fail was the work of Bucarely. That they did not be- come rich and populous was in large measure the fault of Croix. x We have seen that the project of a separate g overnment for various portions of the vast kingdom of New Spain, particularly of the frontier provinces, had long been advo- cated. Gdlvez did not let much time pass, after he be- came ministro general^ before he put his ideas on that mat- ter into a royal order, dated August 22, 1776. The plan itself was not bad ; the only objection that can be made was to the man selected to carry it out. The entire northern frontier, including the outlying Californias, New Mexico, and Texas provinces, was included in the new government. Arispe, Sonora, was to be the capital, on the ground that it was midway between Nueva Viz cay a and the Cahfornias, although far west of the centre of the entire comandancia i general. The principal object of the government was to be the "defence, development, and extension" of the terri- tories comprised in it, but the most important of all (motivo principalisimo) was to achieve the reduction to the faith and to Spanish rule of the Indians to the north, to which Croix was directed to devote his first attentions. Frontier settlements were to be formed and explorations constantly 1 Some gold was found before 1848, but not in sufficient quantity to produce any marked effect. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 389 undertaken. The_^reservatio]g^^ mentjil^Alta^C^ service of God and the km^j wherefore Croix was ordered to visit that province as soon as possible and to secure its communication with Sonora. Moreover, a_ miite was to be opened between Alta CaHfornia and New Mexico by ex- peditions proceeding from both Monterey and Santa F6. More settlers and cattle and whatever else might be needed were to be sent to Alta California from Sinaloa and Sonora to aid in the development and protection of the province. The San Bias supply-ships were also to be retained.^ This document shows that Gdlvez had much the same ideas as those which Bucarely had been putting into prac- tice, including a tendency to regard the Alta California settlements as extremely important. Whole paragraphs dealt specifically with Alta California, while not a single line referred exclusively to Nueva Viz cay a and the eastern provinces. A good illustration of Gdlvez's attitude is shown in the concluding paragraph where he gives specific orders for Alta California officials to report anything of particular note, and then says generally that officials of other parts of the comandancia general are to do likewise. Quite as r emarkable as Gd lvez^s interest in Alta California \/ is Croix's lack of it and TnsTailure to obey tHe insitructJon ^^ promptly or at "all. Croix never visited Alta California, and his attention to the Sonora route was limited to the worse than useless attempt which was to provoke the dis- aster of 1781. Instead of proceeding to the northwest upon arrival, Croix went to Nueva Vizcaya and Texas, and did not reach Sonora until November, 1779. Further evi- dence that Galvez had in mind his earlier projects is con- tained in a royal order of September 24, 1776, to Croix. The latter was ordered to fulfil the arrangements made by Galvez in 1768-69, save such as time or other eventuality might have rendered undesirable, and in that case Croix was to write secretly to Gdlvez of the matter.^ 2 C-3293. A notice to Bucarely, substantially the same as the preceding, bears the same date, C-^294. » C-3323. 390 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII Teodoro de Croix was a nephew of the former viceroy, the Marques de Croix. He was employed by Gdlvez, dur- ing the latter's residence in New Spain, and seems to have been an efficient subordinate, but that appears to have been the Kmit of his capacity. Serious-minded and indus- trious he certainly was, as is attested by the many volumi- nous, well-ordered reports that he made on the state of the frontier provinces, and also by the very tone of his letters. As a first assistant to somebody else, or even as ruler in a realm where there were no serious difficulties to encounter, he would have been a marked success, but as a leader in the frontier provinces of New Spain he lacked the_bxoad vision to compass the whole range of his duties. While working hard to settle some one problem, he was apt to let the others take care of themselves, or try to have somebody else handle them, certainly as regards matters affecting northwestward advance. In fine, Croix was a hard-work- ing, painstaking, well-meaning, but rather stupid man. He remained in Mexico City from January to August, 1777, getting information about his government, and form- ing plans. The latter did not agree with those which Bu- carely had followed and which in fact were in acqcrd-wi^ the ideas of Gdlvez. On May 17 Croix askei^Oconor for information about the frontier provinces,^ and the latter replied, July 22, with a long memorial of 245 paragraphs, giving an account of his own work since his appointment as comandante inspector, September 10, 1771, and making a number of general recommendations. He began by ob- serving, in no friendly tone, that Croix^s plans were opposed in every respect to his own. Among other matters referred to by him, he favored transferring Horcasitas and Buena- vista presidios to the Colorado and Gila rivers, and main- taining routes to Alta California, provided the Yumas could be kept friendly. The Apaches he regarded as the only effective hostile force, and he made suggestions how to deal with them which showed that he had grasped the idea of the unity of the frontier^ He himself had found the * C-3547. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 391 provinces in a disturbed condition, but had left them in good shape for his successor.^ However Oconor may have left the provinces, there was certainly plenty to do in them at the time that he wrote his memorial, although perhaps no more than was usually the case. We may confine our attention to Sonora, remem- bering, however, that the Apache wars continued to be a factor embracing the whole frontier from Sonora to Texas. Late in 1776 the Seris with some Pima alHes began again to burn, plunder, and kill, the missions of Pimeria Alta being the particular object of their attacks. Writing of this to Bucarely, January 18, 1777, Governor Crespo ex- pressed a fear that Sonora might reach a worse state than in the previous Seri war, for now the Seris might expect an alliance with the Apaches, which formerly they had lacked. Pimeria Alta was in danger of destruction.® Croix appre- ciated the danger, he wrote to Gdlvez, March 24, 1777, and since Crespo was coming to Mexico, he was sending Anza to put down the insurrection.^ The Apaches, too, made sudden attacks in their customary manner, and one of them gave rise to a most spectacular incident in the military history of Sonora. On February 6, 1777, while at a place called Tinaja, four or five leagues from his presidio of San Bernardino, with his family, ten soldiers, and a few others, Captain Castillo was attacked by over four hundred Apaches. The battle lasted all day, every one of Castillo's party being wounded, but they at length escaped.^ Another seat of perennial trouble, the rich mining-camp of Cieneguilla, appears frequently in the correspondence of this period. Tueros' letter to Croix of June 8 gives an idea of the situ- ation. Cieneguilla was in a state of decline, not from any failure of its inexhaustible wealth, but because the miners were fleeing from the danger of Indian attack.* Four months later, Tueros wrote to Gdlvez that Indian affairs " C-3606. forwarded with a letter of April 26, «C-3464. C-3538. For his courage and skill ' C-3525. on this occasion Castillo was made a 8 The account appears in Croix's lieutenant-colonel, C-3638-39. monthly extract for April, 1777, C-3539, » C-3574. 392 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII were getting worse, expressing an opinion that Croix ought to come in person to punish the Indians as they deserved. -^^ With all this Indian trouble we also encounter the old difficulty of graft at the expense of the presidial troops.-^^ Anza had been appointed governor of New Mexico that he might bring about communication between Santa F6 and Monterey, but it is typical of Croix that he postponed Anza's departure for New Mexico, using him instead to combat the Indians of Sonora. By May 7, 1777, Anza was at Horcasitas.^^ During nearly a year thereafter he faced great difficulties and acquitted himself with credit. No less than forty-one paragraphs of Croix's voluminous memorial of October 30, 1781, treat of Anza's achievements as military governor of Sonora down to March, 177S, when Anza was succeeded by Tueros. Anza found the Seris in rebellion, and there was a danger that, others might rise, especially the Pimas Altos and the Opatas. Anza put down the Seris, and the others kept at peace. He had not been able to check Apache incursions, but that was ex- cusable, said Croix. The province was in a much better condition when he left it, but Tueros, his successor, was not equally successful.-^^ Croix himself waited many months before venturing to appear in person in the frontier provinces. In a long letter to Gdlvez, August 23, 1777, he sets forth his ideas. He had at first planned to do no'thing until he could visit the provinces and verify personally the truth of the re- ports about them, but the Indian situation seemed so bad, that he had decided to ask Bucarely for two thousand sol- diers, making a total force of four thousand troops for the frontier provinces. Sonora was then in the worst state of all, and needed fifteen hundred men.^* Croix had in fact asked Bucarely for two thousand men, the day be- fore,^^ but they were not granted to him. On October 16 " C-3671. 13 C-4430. " C-3558, 3613, 3705. ^* C-3650. 12 Croix to Gdlvez, July 26, 1777. » C-3641. C-3615. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 393 we find Croix asking Bucarely for the means with which to raise a thousand soldiers, at least, and meanwhile for the loan of a company of fusileers.^^ Commenting on this in a letter to Galvez of November 24, Croix said that he be- lieved that Bucarely would not give him more than two "flying companies," which he had already offered, but he hoped to get at least three such companies, which would serve the purpose until he could complete his tour of the provinces. He certainly was not going to Sonora until he might have enough troops to overcome the evils from which it was suffering. Yet that province was his most impor- tant consideration, and partly on that account he was going to Coahuila and Texas first, so that he might stay in Sonora, once arrived there. Meanwhile, Anza, to whom he took occasion to accord high praise, could keep things in hand until reenf or cements could come.^^ Croix was doomed to disappointment. Galvez wrote to him, December 29, 1777, that when he should obtain personal knowledge of the state of the frontier provinces, the king would determine the number of troops required. ^^ The decision was not at all surprising. When the addition of from twenty to a hundred soldiers to such important establishments as those of the Californias could be debated, there was small likelihood of Croix's obtaining thousands, which would have enormously increased expense. It is also possible to detect in Croix a^tendgacj;_J^_avoid responsibility, as witness his unwill- ingness to go to Sonora. On July 31, 1777, Bucarely sent Croix sixteen letters from Rivera, Serra, and Neve which embodied important suggestions concerning Alta California. Croix was at that time on the point of leaving Mexico City for his journey to Texas, and so returned them to Bucarely, asking him to attend to them, although recognizing their importance. This called forth a reply from Bucarely, dated August 27. It was not in the power of either Croix or himself, he re- minded the former, to change royal orders at will. Hence, since the Californias were in Croix's jurisdiction, he was i« C-3673. " C-3691. w C-3719. 394 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII sending back the papers. He went on, however, to give Croix information about the CaHfornias and to tell him what he himself would do, if still in charge. Neve's sug- gestions should be adopted, even although they involved additional troops and more expense, for these matters, in Bucarely's opinion, should take precedence of others in Croix's jurisdiction. There should be additional missions, too, in both Californias and along the Colorado and Gila rivers, so that there might be no gaps in the chain of com- munication with Sonora.^^ Neve wished to erect a fort and three missions along the Santa Barbara Channel, to form settlements on the Santa Ana, San Gabriel, and Guadalupe rivers, and to increase the forces at San Diego, Monterey, and San Francisco. He wanted fifty-seven fully equipped soldiers, to be recruited by Rivera in Sinaloa, their equipment (which would in- clude clothing, horses, and lesser effects) to be paid for by the Real Caja of Alamos. Many of the soldiers would be married men, and their families should come~l.oo. He also desired sixty families of laborers to be recruited, their num- bers to include artisans of various kinds. In making these requests he gave a detailed account of the pay and equip- ment that should be given to each family, as also an ac- count of things for general use at each settlement, including wages, rations, domestic animals, farming utensils, and weapons. The animals should come from Sonora, he said, and the other effects from Mexico by way of San Bias. In addition, he asked for more animals of a type likely to pro- vide for an increase at the settlements already in existence. The Neve requests are stated in letters by Croix to Anza, Pedro Corbaldn, and the oficiales reales of Alamos, all dated October 20, 1777, and all alike in phraseology.^"^ With each he enclosed a note of the men, animals, and effects asked for by Neve.^^ He asked whether it would be possible to grant Neve's requests, without damage to Sinaloa and Sonora. Corbaldn's reply, December 31, 1777, opposed Neve's proj- ects, on the ground that the men and animals were needed w C-3660. 20 C-3674. " C-3676. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 395 in Sonora.^^ Anza wrote, January 1, 1778, that the men and cattle should be obtained elsewhere than in Sonora, but he agreed with Neve's plan.^^ Norberto de Corres, answering for the Alamos officials, January 15, 1778, said that Sonora had need of any surplus of men that Sinaloa might have, but those wanted by Neve could be obtained in Mexico. The animals could be purchased in Sinaloa and Sonora.^^ It was some time before Croix gave this matter any fur- ther attention. He had left Mexico in August, 1777, going by way of Queretaro to Durango, which he reached in October. From there he proceeded to Coahuila and Texas, and did not receive the three letters just referred to until March, 1778, when he arrived at Chihuahua, on his return from Texas. It was not until September, 1778, that he took up Neve's proposals again. On the 23d of that month he wrote to Gdlvez, enclosing the correspondence that has thus far been cited, and exhibiting a degree of petulance and lack of sympathy with the subject. He complained of Bucarely's refusal to handle the CaHfornias, and yet he had not been prompt to authorize on his own responsibility what Bucarely had suggested. He incorrectly quoted the three Sonora officers as opposed to Neve's projects, and said that he had read other documents about the CaHfornias sent to him from the viceroyalty, with the result that his confusion had been only redoubled. No steps must be taken that would take people away from Sonora, he said. Nevertheless, he had approved Neve's projects, but would wait until he got to Arispe, Sonora, before attending to them. The animals and effects could be obtained from Sonora, and the men from Sinaloa. Meanwhile, he had asked Neve to make detailed reports of what was needed in the prov- ince, to take steps for the formation of a new reglamento, and to send Rivera to meet Croix in Arispe.^^ Gdlvez's reply, April 19, 1779, bade Croix to take careful note of Rivera's reports, when he should meet him.^^ « C-3723. 24 C-3743. 23 C-3741. 25 C-3880. «• C-3974. 396 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII Meanwhile, some advance in the affairs of Alt a California had occurred, based on the earlier authority granted by Bucarely. In November, 1776, the mission San Juan Ca-_ pistrano had been founded followed, in January, 1777, by tEeTounding of Santa Clara. Neva. was now in Alta Cali- fomia^liaving "leached Monterey in Februa ry,. 1 777 . ' In November of that year, he founded one of the settlements that he had proposed, apparently without any authority except that of his own initiative, San Jos6 de Guadalupe (modern San Jose), taking fifteen families from Monterey and San Francisco for this purpose. Neve told Croix about it in a letter of April 15, 1778,^^ and the latter replied, September 3, 1778, giving his appro val.^^ Apprised of the matter by a Croix letter of September 23,^® Galvez also approved.^^ In another letter of September 23, Croix had forwarded an estado showing in detail the state of the mis- sions and presidios of the Calif ornias.^^ Gdlvez^s reply, March 6, 1779, indicated clearly that he was still of the opinion that the affairs of the Californias were the most important in Croix's jurisdiction. He bade Croix to view them with the preference and attention which, in view of their importance, they deserved. ^^ Although it was not until after his arrival in Sonora in November, 1779, that Croix was ready to give attention to Neve's requests of over two years before. Neve had con- tinued to be busy. Before hearing from Croix on the mat- ter he had begun to prepare a new reglamento, basing his action on Arriaga's order to Bucarely of March Z^, 1775.^^ In a long report to Croix dated December 29, 1778, he showed what the existing reglamento provided, how con- ditions varied from it in fact, and what they would be if his recommendations were adopted. There was a vast difference between the amount stated as devoted annually to the Californias and the amount actually expended on them. Alta California soldiers were paid only forty per 27 C-3791. 31 C-3881. 28 C-3879. 32 C-3965. The whole document is 29 C-3882. given in an appendix. 30 C-3966. 33 C-2872. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OP CROIX 397 cent of the amount theoretically allotted to them, and those of Baja California and San Bias received fifty per cent only, paid wholly in clothing, effects, and provisions. Further- more, goods were charged to them at an advance of a hun- dred to a hundred and fifty per cent to allow for the costs of carriage.^* These goods were not sufficient to maintain a soldier in a fitting manner, and yet, the execution of the regla- rnento had been even worse than the law for in some years not even the meagre effects allotted had arrived in entirety. The men were often in deplorable need of both clothing and military equipment, for all necessities had to be brought at royal expense, there being no commerce with the Calif or- nias. If the present system of paying wholly in goods were employed, nobody would want to come there. Neve recommended that three-fourths of the pay be in goods and the rest in cash, and that the troops be paid more than at present, at least as much as those of the other frontier provinces. In that case they would be willing to remain, and others would be induced to come. Moreover, goods should be sold at their purchase price in Mexico, in which case salaries might be reduced twenty-five per cent. There was much else in this notable document, but it may suffice to recite Neve's claims that conditions would be bettered, if his plan were adopted, and that a saving of 4706 pesos a year would also be effected.^^ Meanwhile, Croix had written to Neve, September 30, 1778, asking him to draw up a reglamento. Neve rephed, March 31, 1779, saying that he would do so, making allow- ance for a new presidio, three missions, and a pueblo , to which Croix had consented in accord with Neve's suggestions.^® By June 1, 1779, Neve's reglamento was ready. Interest- ing and important as it is, we may pass it by here, with the remark that it embodied substantially the suggestions of his December report .^^ In his remitting letter of the same date he stated that in view of the delays incident to the ^ Thus, an Alta California soldier » Jq C-3917. was supposed to receive but sixteen ^ In ibid. per cent of what his full salary would ^ C-3997. Also in Arrillaga, Reco- have purchased in Mexico. pilacidn for 1828, 121-75. 398 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII return of approval he was putting the reglamento into effect at once, subject to such changes as Croix might make.^^ Procrastination seems not to have been a Neve trait. On April 23, 1780, Croix wrote to Gdlvez that he favored adopt- ing Neve's reglamento, but it would depend on certain arrangements to be made with Viceroy Mayorga.^® This referred to the preparations for the new establishments which Neve had recommended in 1777, Mayorga's cooper- ation being necessary, since many of the effects had to come from Mexico, as also the funds for administering the prov- ince."*^ Croix had written to Mayorga on February 9, 1780, that he proposed to found a presidio and three missions along the Santa Barbara Channel and a pueblo on the Porciun- cula [Los Angeles] ,^^ and he had written again on the fol- lowing day, telling of the help that he needed from the viceroy."*^ Croix reported this matter to Gdlvez in a letter of February 23, 1780."*^ The latter returned a rather late approval February 8, 1782,** and on the same day wrote to Mayorga that he had approved the new establishments and the Neve reglamento, and that Mayorga was to furnish the assistance which Croix had asked for.*^ Mayorga re- plied, May 23, 1782, that he would furnish such help as should be necessary.*^ Before that late date, even Croix had had time to act, taking some steps with relation to the long-proposed establishments of the Gila and Colorado, for it was by that route that the new settlers for Alta California were destined to go. Croix's intended policy with regard to settlements on the Colorado and Gila and related matters appears in his dis- cussion of the Domlnguez-Escalante expedition. He turned over the diary of that expedition *^ to Father Juan Morfi for an opinion. Morfi's memorial (undated but probably of July, 1777) is worth quoting in some detail. He began by comparing the diary with other accounts from Onate's 38InC-3917. «C-4492. 89 C-4131. Martin de Mayorga had « C-4493. succeeded Bucarely on the death of the *^ C-4633. latter in 1779. « For the diary, C-3291. Printed *> C-3293. *^ C-4095. in Documentos para la historia de <2 C-4097. « C-4103. Mexico, 2d series, I, 375-558. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 399 time on. Dominguez and Escalante did not reach San Francisco or Monterey, because they mistook the route, he said ; not knowing the situation of Monterey ; they imagined it to be northwest, when in fact it was almost due west from Santa Fe, and they would almost certainly have reached there, had they gone in that direction. They mer- ited thanks for their zeal, however, for they had made a journey of over 630 leagues in lands never before visited or known by Spaniards. Such missionary expeditions, made without due reflection, were rarelyjof^rearieri^^ because of the impossibility of sending aid to such advanced posts, if they should be occupied. They advanced knowledge very little, for dependence had to be placed on diaries, and second expeditions over the same route had rarely been able to recognize descriptions in diaries of the first. Such expeditions even worked harm, because the missionaries told the Indians of the wealth of the king, and gave prom- ises of Spanish friendship, when they themselves were almost nude and in need of Indian seeds. The Indians could not understand a Spaniard's descriptions of wealthy cities, never having seen any, and when nothing came of the promised gifts and friendship, serious consequences were apt to occur."^^ If the missionaries would confine their zeal for^ exploration to regions near or between the Spanish settlements, it would be better. For example, if the region between Pimeria, the Colorado River, Nueva Vizcaya, and New Mexico had been explored, the Spaniards would at least know the haunts of the Indians and where they got their water, thus enabling war to be waged with some hope of success. The only Indians really hostile to Spain were the Comanches, who gave trouble to New Mexico and the El Paso district, and the various branches of the Apaches, of whom those of the Gila were a menace to Sonora, Nueva Vizcaya, and New Mexico, and the Natajes and Lipanes to Nueva Vizcaya, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and even to Texas. The Seris, Suaquis, Piatos, Pdpagos, and Pimas would not ^ These words might have been used to describe the cause of the Yuma massacre of 1781. 400 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII rise, unless the Apaches of the Gila gave them aid or a pre- text, nor would the Taraumares, but for the Natajes and Lipanes. These hostile tribes ought, therefore, to be re- duced or exterminated, and missionary activities should contribute to that end. This was not the time for new establishments, embarrassing the arms and occupying the attention of the government, just when active and con- tinuous war was to be undertaken, because troops would be needed at such new missions and would have to conduct to the missionaries whatever they required. Money spent for the proposed missions among friendly Indians, such as the Yuma, Cucapa, Jalliquamay, Cajuenche, Jalchedun, Jamajab, Pima Gileno, Cocomaricopa, and Pdpago tribes, would be wasted, if on the basis that these peoples give aid in war, for only the old, the children, and the women would remain in the missions, and they would be full of misgiving and little inclined to conversion. Anza had also expressed an opinion, he said, that these establishments would be inopportune, when with a delay of one, two, or at most three years it would be possible to make solid foundations. If Croix should achieve the pacification of North America, the Colorado and Roxo [Red] rivers should be taken as boundaries for the royal dominions, for it would seem from Escalante's map that these two rivers and the Rio Grande had their sources within fifteen leagues of each other, and embraced a territory of great fertility. He then described the Colorado and spoke of the little known Roxo, or Colo- rado of the east, and of his project for settling the country between the boundaries that he had named, with all the lines of colonization centring on Chihuahua. Anza would soon have to go to his province, although his presence in Sonora might be more useful, and could be directed to go there by the northern bank of the Colorado to its junction with the Saguaguanas, which was the nearest point to tribes already annoyed by the establishments of Monterey. There he could meet Escalante, who should be sent there from New Mexico. Anza could then proceed by way of Moqui to New Mexico, taking note of good sites, and paying special 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 401 attention to the Moqui and Navajo lands,' with a view to their conquest, later. Escalante should explore the upper reaches of the Colorado, Roxo, and Rio Grande before joining Anza. A shorter route than this between Mon- terey and Santa Fe might be found, but it would pass through a mountainous country lacking in facilities for its defence, whereas a line of presidios could be built along the Colorado. Although the Comanches were hostile to Spain, their aid might be obtained, because they hated the Apaches, and a man like Anza, skilful in dealing with the Indians, might handle this affair with good effect. Furthermore, granted peace or an alliance with the Comanches, an exploration of the Roxo by some religious would be possible. These plans would require neither troops nor expense. It would be well, too, to send Garc6s and another religious to the Yumas, which would probably be enough for the present, since Palma and the warriors would have to join in the general campaign that Croix was planning ; thus, few men would be left. Moreover, the two religious might serve to keep the neighboring tribes at peace. If Croix should be successful in nis campaign, nothing would hinder the secu- larization of all of the missions of New Mexico, Nueva Viz- caya, Sonora, Pimeria, Chinipas, Taraumara, and Nuevo Leon, and many of Coahuila and Texas. The native parishioners might then pay tribute to the king and tithes to the church, effecting a saving of 50,000 pesos a year, enough to support 166 missionaries at 300 pesos a year, and one schoolmaster at 200 pesoSy besides the positive gain of the tribute and tithes. In conclusion, Morfi referred to the suggestion of Garc^s, that the Pacific Ocean and Colo- rado River be used as a supply-route for the presidios on the one side, and the Atlantic Ocean and Roxo River on the other. Anza might examine the mouth of the Colorado, to see if this were practicable. As for the Roxo, Morfi knew only that it was a large river near its source, and that some Louisiana deserters in New Mexico claimed to have sailed on it.*^ « C-3433. 2d 402 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII The Morfi memorial, brilliant as it was in many respects, represented, nevertheless, the new way of doing things. Whereas Bucarely saw the need for extending the frontier as a measure~~or^^ence, and unostentatiously got things done, Cfmx was given to brilliant plans, which failed, how- ever, t"o^grasp the essential point,_2uad^ere Jpllowed by de- lay of action. In a letter to Gdlvez, July 26, 1777, Croix stated that all of Morfi's reflections seemed to him very well founded, and especially the parts concerning Anza's pro- jected journey to New Mexico, the simultaneous explo- rations of Escalante, the proposed treaty- with the Co- manches, the exploring of the Roxo, and the sending of Garces and another to the Colorado. These were, for the present, the best and only measures that could be taken for the suc- cess of the proposed Colorado-Gila establishments, for freedom of communication between Sonora, the Californias, and New Mexico, and for reducing the numerous tribes discovered, and punishing the Apaches. These matters were of. such import, however, that he would not presume to give orders, without first consulting the viceroy, as also Anza, Mendinueta, Garces, Domlnguez, and Escalante.^^ Truly, the day of action had passed. Even those "best and only" measures of Croix were either not undertaken by him, or so long delayed that no advantage resulted. Something was attempted eventually toward establish- ing communications with Sonora from New Mexico. Anza, who had at length been allowed to proceed to his province, although not by way of the Colorado, was in charge of the project. On November 9, 1780, Anza left New Mexico with a force of 151 men, and on December 18 emerged in Nueva Vizcaya, near the Sonora line.^^ Referring to this expedition in one of his long memorials, October 30, 1781, Croix said that the aim had been to come out by the pre- sidio of Santa Cruz, Sonora, whereas Anza had appeared almost in front of Janos. It would therefore be necessary " C-3619. among other papers includes diaries " Croix to G^lvez, March 26, 1781. of the expedition written by Anza, C-4354. This is the principal docu- Jos6 de Vildosola, and Francisco Mar- ment of a considerable file, which tinez, all in C-4244. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 403 to repeat the expedition. ^^ Nothing further seems to have been done, however, during Croix's regime. Nothing was ac cgmj^lighed, - as -^-.xegards,,. Jhfe. San^^ despite Gdlvez's instructions. In the above-mentioned- Croix memorial of October 30, 1781, Croix said that the discovery of such a route remained to be made, and it would be well also to seek routes to San Antonio de Bejar, Texas, and to the presidio of the Rio Grande, Coahuila.^^ Croix does not appear to have considered making use of the Carets route to New Mexico, although, to be sure, there were steps taken at this time with a view to converting the Moquis. Not only had Gdlvez's instruction of August 22, 1776, called Croix's attention to the importance of founding es- tablishments on the Gila and Colorado, but Gdlvez had repeated the statement in a royal order of February 14, 1777,^* and Bucarely had turned over to Croix the file of papers bearing on that project. Croix decided, charac- teristically, to postpone action until he should reach Sonora. Until 1779 the matter was allowed to rest, although Chief Palma of the Yumas continued to petition for missionaries. On February 3, 1779, Pedro Tueros of the presidio of Altar, Sonora, wrote to Croix of Palma's solicitations, and told of the distinguished treatment which he himself had accorded the Yuma chief.^^ Croix, who had already heard of Palma's renewed petitions, now decided to take action. On Feb- ruary 5 he wrote to that effect to the Queretarano Father- President, Francisco Barbastro, but said that he could afford to send only two missionaries, of whom Carets should be one.^^ On the same day he wrote to Garc6s ^^ and Pedro Corbalan,^^ to the same effect, as also to Tueros on Feb- ruary 22.^^ Corbaldn replied that he would ^sist Garces,^^ and the other three announced their pleasure at Croix's decision.^^ A military escort had been promised to Garces, and the details left for Carets and Tueros to arrange. In a «C^430. »InC-3926. w76id. MInC-3924. " C-3478-79. « In C-3926. 65 In C-3924. « Tueros' reply is in C-3924 ; the 6« In C-3925. other two in C-3925. " In ibid. 404 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII communication to the latter of March 23 Garces made a number of suggestions. His escort should be twelve sol- diers, at least, and he named those that he wanted. There should also be a carpenter. The soldiers should be ac- companied by their wives, or everything might be lost. Provisions for three months and gifts for the Indians should be carried, the supplies to be furnished from Altar, the nearest presidio. The soldiers should be instructed not to hinder conversions, and especially to keep away from Indian women. Both the soldiers and the settlers should have domestic animals and crops of their own, and they should be under the missionaries in everything except in military affairs. Because of the danger from neighboring tribes, other settlers from Sonora should be permitted to go to the Colorado, if they should wish to, and some Nixoras Indians, then in Sonora, should be taken along as interpre- ters. The commander at Altar should be ordered to supply horses to transport the provisions and utensils. ^^ Tueros replied, April 14, granting Garc^s^ requests, or saying that he would try to arrange for them, — with two exceptions. He feared that the Indians might covet the soldiers^ wives, and so would not order that the latter go along, and he left Croix to decide whether more settlers should be allowed to go.^^ Both documents he forwarded to Croix in his letter of April 29.6* On May 15 Corbaldn wrote that a sum of 2000 pesos had been advanced to Father Diaz, who was^ to accompany Garc6s, and charged to the Real Caja of Alamos.^^ This sum did not last long. On July 8 Diaz rendered an account showing that all had been spent, gifts for the Yumas being prominent in the list, as well as mules and necessary effects.^^ It was not until August that the tiny force started, and by reason of the difficulties encountered, only Garces and two soldiers pushed on, at the time, for the Colorado. Shortly after his arrival Garces wrote to Corbalan, September 2, that nearly all of his provisions were gone, and that he 82 In C-3924. <» In C-3926. Approved by Croix «3 In ibid, on July 28, in ibid. « In ibid. w In C-3926. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 405 needed a supply of gifts for the chiefs. He asked for 300 pesos to be expended for beads, shoes, cloth, and other things that the Indians liked. ^^ Corbaldn forwarded Diaz's account and Garc6s' letter to Croix on September 30.^^ Croix, meanwhile, had changed his mind about the new settlements, and seems to have issued an order on May 14 to abandon the idea, but the order reached Sonora too late. Conditions at the Colorado River are amply described in three letters from Garces to Croix. In the first, September 2, 1779, he announced his arrival, after a journey of some difficulty through Papagueria. Because of the unusually light rainfall, Garces and two soldiers had pushed on alone, leaving the rest of the party at Sonoita. The Yumas were much scattered at the time, it being the season for planting, but Garces was in hopes that they would come together soon, so that houses might be built and agricultural lands made ready for the Spaniards. To avoid taking too much land from the Yumas he hoped that a mission might be es- tablished among the Cajuenches, and that there might also be missions among the Cucapds, Pimas Gileiios, and Papa- gos, all of whom were well disposed, although a bit jealous of the preference shown for the Yumas. With a stronger escort, missions might also be placed among the Jalchedunes and Jamajabes. The presidio for their protection might be postponed for a time, but certain expenditures, such as those involved in erecting houses, paying interpreters, and making gifts to the chiefs of the various tribes of the Col- orado, were absolutely necessary. Muleteers and carpen- ters were more necessary than soldiers at present. Palma was as cordial as ever. He had managed to keep the Yumas at peace, although with difficulty, for they had wished to make war, notably against the Jalchedunes.^^ Garces' second letter was dated November 6, 1779. Diaz had arrived on October 2 with the soldiers. Garces had learned that the Jalchedunes, Cajuenches, and Cucap^s wanted missions, although from motives of self-interest, be- "^ In ibid. M In ibid. • In C-4017. 406 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII lieving that they would receive all manner of material wealth from the Spaniards. The same was true of the Yumas, who had been spoiled by the good treatment accorded to them and Chief Palma in the past. When Garces arrived with so little in the way of presents, he had found it difficult to get even a little maize from the Yumas. In fine, the Yumas were no better than the other Indians of the Colorado, and it was not going to be so easy to convert them as Palma had said. Too much reliance should not be placed on Palma who was only one of many chiefs, and at the head of only one very small village. Moreover, the chiefs had no real authority, except in so far as the Indians wished to obey them. Palma was certainly well disposed and seemed to exercise much influence in matters of war. Presents were an essential to success. If Corbalan should grant the 300 pesos that Carets had asked for, the Indians might be per- suaded to build a dweUing and a chapel and with what was left a muleteer and two interpreters could be maintained. Artisans were another necessity. The present settlement of twelve men could not subsist by itself, wherefore there should be other settlements among the Cajuenches and Jalchedunes, thus allowing recourse to them in case of need, for Sonora and Alta California were too far away to render aid. Moreover, the Colorado-Gila establishment should be increased, another mission founded, and more settlers induced to come. In addition, if the soldiers were well chosen from the standpoint of good character, and if some financial aid were granted, success might be expected, for the land was favorable for grazing and agriculture. The Gila route was preferable to the one through Papagueria, but its use would necessitate an establishment among the Pimas Gilenos and a military escort for the region between Tucson and the Gila, because that section was much fre- quented by the Apaches. The soldiers at the Colorado should not be changed as Garces had heard it was proposed to do. Soldiers would not bring their families unless they were to remain, and it was essential that they should bring them, so that the wives could cook for the men and keep 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 407 them from such wrong-doing or desertion as had occurred in the case of the soldiers of Monterey J° In his third letter, December 27, 1779, Garces reported that affairs at the Colorado settlement were in a critical condition, and Diaz was leaving in order to see Croix to explain the situation to him. Corbalan had refused to grant the 300 pesos that Carets had wanted. Oarers had word of Croix's decision to suspend the estabhshment, and rejoiced that it had not come in time ; otherwise, Palma would have been murdered, both because the Yumas would have believed that he had deceived them and because he was hindering their going to war. Indeed, to keep the Indians at peace was a task requiring more abiUty than Garces believed himself to have; more funds and more troops would be required.^^ Arrived at Arispe, Diaz presented his petition to Croix on February 12, 1780. There should be missions among the Cajuenches and Jalchedunes, he said. The latter and the Yumas were bitter enemies, and if war should break out, the Spaniards might be obliged to help the Yumas, in which case the Cocomaricopas, the Pdpagos of the north, and the Pimas Gileiios would be estranged, for they were friends of the Jalchedunes. War between the Yumas and Cajuenches was also likely to occur. The two proposed missions could prevent these wars. Twenty soldiers should be added to the twelve now at the Colorado, to be under missionary authority as at present. For three years an allowance should be made to each mission for a good inter- preter, a carpenter, a mason, a muleteer, and a farm-laborer, the last named to instruct the Indians in cultivating the soil. Each mission should have two reHgious. A second mission among the Yumas would be of advantage, with an addi- tional ten men, in which case, although even then with difficulty, the Yumas could be made to keep the peace with their neighbors.*^^ Five days later Croix issued a decree providing for two '0 In C-4017. deserter, Jos6 Hermenegildo Flores. 71 In ibid. In this letter Garc6s " In C-4017. notes the arrival of a Monterey 408 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII Spanish settlements among the Yumas. There were to be twenty-one soldiers in all, eleven at one settlement, and ten at the other, and thirty-two civilian settlers evenly divided between the two. Among the latter were to be artisans and interpreters for each place. The soldiers were to be married men and were to bring their families. Lands were to be divided among the Spaniards as the laws of the Indies provided, one portion being reserved for usage in common, and another for the benefit of the church. Croix planned for the Yumas to share in the lands, as well as the Spaniards, but was undecided whether they should be given individual plots or a larger area in common. He also doubted whether it was wise for the religious to manage the material wealth (temporalidades) of missions; he had intended to put that in charge of the commandant, but, in view of Diaz's ob- jection, suspended his decision. The settlers were to re- ceive pay and such other aid as they needed. Finally, there were to be two religious at each mission.^^ Diaz was asked to comment on the decree and to add anything he thought necessary. He did so in a document dated February 19, showing that he was in substantial agree- ment with Croix. He called attention to the fact that the Yumas knew how to plant crops and were accustomed to individual property in land, wherefore those who wished to join the Spanish settlements could be assigned lands at an early date, for they would know how to manage them. He argued for missionary control of the mission wealth, be- cause of the many expenses, incidental to mission work, but it would be even better if an additional fund of 200 pesos for these expenses might be granted.^^ On February 29, Croix's asesor, Pedro Galindo Navarro, gave his opinion on Diaz's answer. It would be against law and equity to dis- possess the Indians of lands actually occupied by them, he said ; therefore, matters had best be left as they were, as concerned the division of lands among them, until the Spaniards should become better informed. The impor- tance of having Spanish establishments on the Colorado " In C-4017. 74 In Hyi^. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 409 had been urged in several royal decrees, wherefore he favored granting the extra 200 pesos that Diaz had asked, for it was necessary to treat the Yumas well in order to attract them to the faith, and this expense would conduce to that end. Funds advanced to the settlements should eventually be repaid, on which account it would be well to set aside a portion of land for that purpose in each settlement. Such lands should be managed by a council elected by the sol- diers and settlers from among their own numbers.^^ Croix gave orders, March 3, for the decree to be drawn up as modified by the asesor's reports,^^ and this was done, the final decree being dated March 7, 1780.^^ On April 23, Croix wrote at length to Gdlvez, reviewing his action concerning the Colorado-Gila establishments, since taking charge of his government. His plan differed from that of Bucarely, he said, and he proceeded to argue its advantages. The former viceroy had wished to transfer Horcasitas and Buenavista presidios to the Gila and Colo- rado, and that had in fact been ordered, but it would not be possible to effect the transfer for many years, because of the Apache and Seri wars. The chief advantage of Croix's plan was in its economy. Temporarily, it would cost more than the Bucarely project, but not so much as it would have, if the presidios had been transferred, and their places supplied by others, as would have been neces- sary. His two colonies at the Colorado would attain the objects that Galvez had desired. Croix's next task would be the matter of founding a presidio at the junction of the Gila and San Pedro with a view to securing the Gila route to the Californias."^^ With this letter Croix submitted two estados, one of which showed that the two settlements would cause an increase in expense of 4704 pesos a year,^^ and another showing that his plan would effect a saving of 9174 pesos, 6 reales, and eventually 13,878 pesos, 6 reales, over that of Bucarely.^^ " In ibid. ^« In ibid. Troops of the two villages 5120 " In ibid. 78 C-4128. Settlers ditto 2400 79 C^130. Twelve servants .... 2304 80 The figures in pesos were as follows : The two latter items were expected Annual expenses of Horca- to cease. These figures did not men- sitas 18,998-6 tion Buenavista presidio. 410 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII So much then for the preliminaries of the ill-fated Colo- rado colonies. In one respect the documents exonerate Croix from charges that were made against him by con- temporary writers who have been followed by later his- torians. The mixed character of his settlements resulting from the close association planned for missionaries, soldiers, settlers, and Indians was not against the wishes of the re- ligious, but resulted primarily from their suggestions. Similarly, Croix had adopted Diaz's recommendation as regarded the mission property. The real criticism of Croix is because of his long delay in approaching the problem, which had resulted in a loss of the moment when the Yumas were most kindly disposed, and his false economy, when once he had decided on the establishments. Perhaps some idea of his attitude may be obtained by considering his long memorials, documents of very great value to his- torical scholars for conditions in the frontier provinces, which show, however, Croix's neglect of the Colorado-Gila country. Croix seems to have acquired the taste for writing long memorials in one that he dated January 23, 1780, a document of 194 paragraphs or headings. This was wholly about his military policy, past, present, and future, but did not concern itself with the lands along the route to Alta Cali- fornia. He criticized the location of the line of presidios, and proposed a new line supported by a second line of set- tlements.^^ Croix now planned a monumental report in five parts, as follows : 1. the individual state of each prov- ince; 2. the most notable events during his rule; 3. his measures ; 4. their results ; 5. measures that should be taken in future. The first part was ready by October 30, 1781, a mighty document of 612 paragraphs, of which the affairs of Sonora formed the major part, and the Calif ornias but little.^^ For the Californias he took Neve's suggestions, and it was well that he did. He showed a complete mis- 81 C-4082. The copy that I used paragraphs ; New Mexico, 39 ; Nueva covered 248 pages of closely written Vizcaya, 66 ; Sonora, 335 ; the Cali- manuscript. fornias, 47. The document was 856 8* Texas and Coahuila required 120 pages long. 17761 THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 411 understanding of the Gila-Colorado situation on the eve of the calamity that was to happen there.^^ The most im- portant feature to him was the saving that he was efifecting. His concern for Sonora was indeed greatest of all, — possibly because he was then in that province. Yet his interest was entirely local, based primarily on the Apaches, and to a less extent on the Seris. His remedy was a fresh change of presidial sites so as to form something like a half circle around Janos, Nueva Vizcaya, as a centre. There was not a word in the entire document about the larger projects which had engaged the attention of Gdlvez and Bucarely — not a word about the possibility of foreign invasion of the Pacific coasts, at a time too when this was more than ever a probability.^^ In fine, if this document is a monu- ment to Croix^s painstaking thoroughness in matters of detail which were before his eyes, it also bears the record of his exceeding narrowness of vision. Croix's remarks about the Colorado-Gila settlements may be referred to a little more in detail. He approaches this matter by giving an invaluable summary of documents from 1735 on, concerning the location of frontier presidios. Anza's discovery of a route to Alta California had caused a change in the situation, as a result of which Bonilla, Oconor, Crespo, Anza, Diaz, Garc^s, and many others had recommended that one presidio be placed at the junction of the Colorado and Gila, and another at the confluence of the Gila and San Pedro, so as to secure communication with Monterey. Oconor had proposed that Horcasitas and Buena^dsta presidios be transferred respectively to those sites. Two of Croix's officers, Ugarte and Rocha, were unfavorable to the location of a presidio on the San Pedro, *3 The memorial is of later date than royal order of March 22, 1778, concern- the disaster, but clearly was written ing the movements of the English and before Croix had heard of it. Croix French. Croix replied that he had got the news in August, but did not on given instructions to the governors of that account change his memorial. Texas, Coahuila, Sonora, and the Cali- 8* No attempt has been made to fornias about these movements. This record Gdlvez's warnings to Croix con- shows that some danger was threaten- cerning foreign danger, although it is ing in the Pacific — possibly a reference certain that they were made. A Croix to Cook's voyage, letter of July 27, 1778, refers to a secret, 412 THE FOUNDING OP SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII and Croix was of their opinion. He had also decided to depend on his two settlements at the Colorado to hold the ground there. Horcasitas and Buenavista could not be moved, for the Seris were not sufficiently subjected, as shown by their outbreaks in 1777 and more recently in 1780. Croix spoke with enthusiasm of the brilliant prospects of his Colorado settlements, and dilated upon the saving of 14,000 pesos a year that he was effecting by not placing a presidio there.^^ By April 23, 1782, Croix's second part was ready. This filled 572 paragraphs, but was longer than the preceding.^^ This did not follow his original plan, but dealt with his miHtary measures in the frontier provinces. It was in- tended to be general, for the whole government, whereas the previous document was particular for each province, but it included much detail about the different provinces. The Californias alone were not considered, and were spe- cifically stated as being outside the plan. The keynote of the document, as might be expected, was the Apache wars.*^ If Croix wrote any more long memorials, they have not come to light. Events had occurred, meanwhile, which may well have tempered Croix's fondness for indulging in these reports, most prominent of which was the Yuma massacre of 1781. The two colonies on the Colorado were founded in the fall of 1780, both on the west bank, Purisima Concepcion near the junction, and San Pedro y San Pablo de Bicufier farther down the river. Trouble began almost at once. The Spanish paid small regard to the rights of the natives in allotting lands, and their cattle ruined the Yuma crops. In these and other respects the Spaniard of everyday life lacked the halo with which the Yumas had surrounded the transient gift-bearing visitors of other days. When pro- visions were exhausted, the Yumas refused to supply them, unless at exorbitant prices, and the chiefs of the Yumas, even Palma, began to incite their people against the set- 85 C-4430. in the document that I used. 86 There was an even thousand pages ^7 C-4568. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 413 tiers. The storm broke in July, 1781. Rivera had arrived in June with an expedition of forty recruits and their fam- ilies, bound for Alta California, in fulfilment of Neve^s plan for developing that province. Having seen them safely on their way, luckily for them, Rivera recrossed the Colorado with eleven or twelve soldiers, and encamped there in order to strengthen his animals before proceeding himself to Alta California. Rivera's arrival had only added to the discontent, for his cattle destroyed mesquite plants of the Yumas, and he had not been liberal with gifts. On July 17 the natives attacked San Pedro y San Pablo, killing the two religious and most of the men, holding the women and children as captives. The same thing occurred at about the same hour at Purisima Concepcion, although Fathers Garces and Barreneche were temporarily spared. Rivera and his men were attacked, next day, and all were killed, and the following day, Garces and Barreneche were put to death. ^^ Punitive campaigns were planned, and several expedi- tions made in 1781-82, but beyond ransoming the survivors they accomplished little. Croix was not the type of man to acknowledge blame. In casting about for a scapegoat he hit upon Garces and Anza, charging them with gross ex- aggerations in praise of the Yumas and their lands. This appears in his letter to Gdlvez of November 4, 1782, in which he announced that he was about to hold a junta to decide whether a presidio should be established at the Colorado River to keep communication open with the Cali- f ornias.^^ T he inju stice of jUroix's attack is .apparent to i!i5J_QJ>ie.-3dioTias Tea3 the Garces and^Artza memorials and diaries^ We^Tia^^"~seen nSGat^'Snzar had said that his roTifewould be impracticable, if the Yumas should be hos- tile, or even if no more than unfriendly, owing to the diffi- culty of crossing the Colorado in seasons of flood, at which time Indian help was necessary, and that Garces had re- peatedly recommended establishing a presidio at the Colo- ns A detailed account (85 pages long) 718 of February 28, 1782, 0^614. is to be found in Croix's letter number ^ C^727. 414 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII rado and Gila, while Croix's long memorial of October 30,. 1781, quoted Anza to the same effect. The trouble wa& that Croix had not adopted their recommendations. At the junta, held January 3, 1783, there appeared, be- sides Croix, Pedro Galindo Navarro, Pedro Tueros, Pedro Corbaldn, and Felipe Neve, the last named having been promoted to be inspector general of the comandancia general. Neve had recently come from Alta California by way of the Anza route. He condemned the Colorado country, saying that it was a region of salt marshes and sand, with slight rainfall and scant pasture. Settlers would have to get everything from Sonora, he said. Others referred to the Seri and Apache wars, which required all of the troops to be used elsewhere, and also to the fact that it would be pos- sible to use the route to Alta California in case of need, if thirty armed men were sent along, as the Yumas were weak foes. Therefore, as the settlements would cause heavy expense, and as in the junta^s opinion they would do no good, it was held to be best to abandon them. These proceedings were reported in Croix's letter of January 27, 1783^0 he Yuma disaster was a severe blow to the career of that capable explorer, Juan Bautista de Anza, for now that Garces was dead, Anza had to bear the brunt of the blame. Croix brought the matter up again in a letter of March 24, 1783, in which he described his military policy since enter- ing office. It seems that Oconor had prophesied the Yuma disaster, whereupon Croix asserted that Oconor probably knew that it had occurred when he claimed to foresee it; anyway, it was not his fault, said Croix, but Anza's. Anza had misrepresented the country, he said, and it was that which had caused its occupation and therefore the disaster.®^ Late in the same year Croix was promoted to be viceroy of Peru — possibly a gracious way of relieving him from a task that had proved too big for him — and Njeve became comandante general. The latter's bitterness against Anzajs surprisingly great, and a little displeasing to the investi- ""wCHlTe?. """^ wC-4793. 1776] THE INCOMPETENT RULE OF CROIX 415 gator who has formed a high opinion of both. For example, Neve tol d Anz a to omit in future in his annual service re- port {hoja We sermcwj to call himse lf the d iscoverer of the route to Alta California, for not he but the Indian Tarabal had discovered it. Similarly, Anza was not to lay claim tojiaving defeated the Comanche chief Cuernp Verde, for that victory was due to Azuela, Anza's subordinate in that fight. This and much else of the same character appear in Neve's letter to Gdlvez of January 26, 1784, and its enclosures.^^ Some of the reasonsjFor^Neve's animus may be conjectured with a fair degree of probability. It is not Hkely that Neve took pains to read over the Anza diaries and reports about the Colorado-Gila settlements, for the idea had been abandoned before he became comandante general, and naturally, he took the estimate of the em- JDiittered Croix, eager to exculpate himself. ~Th"e" Tatter, possibly by quoting certain portions of Anza's reports and omitting others, made it appear that Anza had painted the Colorado country as a kind of paradise and the Yumas as having an angelic character. Neve had seen for himself the falsity of such views, not realizing that if the whole truth were known Anza would be found to have represented the situation with substantial correctness. Moreover, the disast er had checked a very great work in Alta California that Neve had set on foot, and Neve seems not to have been a man to be patient with failure, for which in this case he wrongly blamed Anza. Finally, there seems to have been some misunderstanding between them with regard to affairs in New Mexico. Had Anza and Neve been per- sonally acquainted Neve might have better judged his man, but the evidence of their annual service reports would tend to show that they never met. Neve's successors tried to repair the injury done to Anza. Neve Tiad~asl:ed that Anza be relieved from the govern- ment of New Mexico, claiming that he was incompetent. A later comandante general, Jacobo Ugarte, wrote to Gdlvez, *2C-4938. The enclosures consist Reyes, C-4935, and four to Anza, of one letter from Neve to Bishop C-4915, 4932-34. 416 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVII December 21, 1786, that Neve^s opinion of Anza's admin- istration in New Mexico had been founded on the incorrect reports of Anza's opponents, and that Anza had merited praise for his government of New Mexico rather than re- moval.^^ This was a courageous letter, in view of the fact that Gdlvez had already appointed a new governor. In supporting Anza's petition for a province under the vice- roy,®* Ugarte warmly recommended him in a letter dated February 1, 1787.®^ Jose Antonio Rengel, who a little earlier had been temporary comandante general^ and was at the time inspector general and commander of the Nueva Vizcaya-New Mexico district, wrote across Anza^s petition that he too indorsed it. Yet again, July 15, 1787, Ugarte wrote to Gdlvez in behalf of Anza. This time he urged that he be made governor of Texas. ®^ The result of Ugarte's efforts has not thus far been revealed. Anza seems to have been succeeded as governor of New Mexico by Fernando de la Concha in 1788, after which no further record of his career has yet come to light.®'' Yet the career of Anza or of Croix is of slight account compared to the tremendous importance of the Yuma dis- astfiL. That event checked the development of Alta Cali- fornia just at the moment when a great forward move- ment was being made. If measures are to be judged by their results, perhaps, after all, Teodoro de Croix is de- serving of a monument — but it should be erected by the United States. And back of Croix lies Gdlvez, who was responsible for him. Investigation will likely prove that it was due to the fatal weakness in Galvez's character, which made him work for himself above his country, that he ch ose so inefficient an instrument as Teodoro de Croix to carry out the projects which he himself had brilliantly inaugurated. " C-5206. that Concha did not succeed Anza until " For Anza's petition, C-5204. late in 1789. It is clear, however, that 85 C-5227, Concha was referred to as governor »« C-5244. and was writing letters from Santa F6 97 Bancroft, Ariz, and New Mex., 268, in 1788. Twitchell, Spanish archives and Twitchell, Leading facts, 451, say of New Mexico, II, 303, 308-10. CHAPTER XVIII THE AFTERMATH, 1783-1822 The end ^f„the Spanish northwestward movement had come with the Yuma massacre of 1781, but there were a number of contributory factors. A Spanish voyage to the northwest coast in 1779 failed to discover any Europeans; a series of voyages from 1788 on found too many, for Eng- , lish fur traders, following in the wake of Cook, had begun to come from China to the North American coast in 1785. Spain considered engaging in the trade herself, which she might have done to far greater advantage than her competi- tors, but she let the opportunity slip. The attempt to oust the English led to the Nootka controversy, by which Spain J^ suffered a decisive check. Henceforth, the matter of ex- ^ — pense^ which had always been an important factor holding jj^ back the conquest, became a controlling element in con- sidering such projects^ The Anza route was officially aban-^^^,^ doiTedT internal disorder continued to be a problem in the 11] affairs of Sonora and New Mexico ; and changes in juris- -"'^ diction in the frontier provinces became so frequent that a ^ .y ^ consistent policy of northwestward advance would in any ^>-*" event have been difficult to follow. In fine, Sj)ain had taken t he def ensive, not the aggressive defensive of the time of Bucarely, but a waiting kind, the inevitable outcome of wEicFwas disintegration. Y'ei7need for a route still existed, if Alta California were to become rich and populous, and despite its Indian wars Sonora could have supplied the sinews of development. Foreign danger, too, had become more than ever a fact in the northwest. Although Alta California had obtained a sufficient quantity of domestic animals, other needs were 2e 417 418 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII unsupplied or at the mercy, of an enemy^s ships. Goods and effects could come from San Bias or be smuggled in on foreign ships, and a few settlers could cross the Gulf and come up the peninsula. But unless there_were some power- fully impelling motive, such as actually came with the dis- covery of gold in 1848, the province could only become pop- ulous by its own natural increase, which would have taken centuries, or by the use of an overland route. Fages, Borica, Arrillaga, and others favored reopening the Anza route or developing a route from New Mexico, but their proposals found scant response. Thus it was that Alta California settled down to an Acadian existence, able to hve happily and well, and to keep out the casual foreigner, but not populous enough to thrust back up the river val- leys where lay the magic gold, which, had it been discovered, would at once have changed everything. Meantime, the United States was pushing westward, not knowing that her advance was in fact a race with other powers for the Pacific before the discovery of gold. Unaware that they were doing an important work for an alien country, the Spanish Cali- fornians held the land, as it were in trust, for future de- livery to the United States. All along, the principal impulse for the Spanish advance had come from a fear of foreign encroachments, and here- tofore, the promise of danger in the far northwest had been greater than the fact, but that had been enough to stir G^lvez and Bucarely to action. Henceforth, the actual peril was to be greater than it ever had been before, but it was not to rouse Spain to equal efforts with those of the past. We have seen that preparations for a new voyage were made after the return of Heceta and Bodega in 1775, and that this did not take place until 1779. In that year Arteaga and Bodega in the Princesa and Favorita made a careful exploration of the Alaska coast, but found no Rus- sians, although at one time, near the actual Russian post on Kadiak Island. After their return a royal order was issued, May 10, 1780, calling for the discontinuance of 1783] THE AFTERMATH 419 such voyages. Events were soon to cause a fresh attempt however. Cook^s voyage has already been noted. When his ship brought some furs to China, a new force entered into the history of the northwest. Captain Hanna^ an Enghsh- man, was the first voyager to foTIow*up this phase of Cook's discoveries. He was on the northwest coast in 1785/ having come from China, and he took back a cargo of furs. In the next three year s numbers of En^hshmen followed Hanna's lead. Meares, Tripping, Lowrie, Guise, Strange, Portlock, Dixon, Barclay, Duncan, Colnett, and Douglas were leaders in these voyages, some of them coming more than once. Two American shij)s also came^ Kendrick and Gray being the commanders. Most of these boats came from China, and made Nootka Sound, off Vancouver Island, their rendezvous. In addition a French voyage of exploratioiw ujider La P6rouse passed alongthe northwest coast in 1786,y and reported that the Russians had several establishments in the far northwest. '""^The Spaniards seem not to have participated greatly in the rich fur trade of this period, but a very significant proj- ect for that purpose was broached from Manila by Ciriaco Gonzdlez Carvajal, intendant of the Philippines. He had heard of Hanna's voyage of 1785, and forwarded to Gdlvez a file of papers concerning it.^ His own letter, dated Feb- ruary 3, 1786, recommended the establishment of a fur trade by the Spaniards, who had the advantage of the ports of Manila in the Philippines and San Francisco in the Cali- fornias to facilitate the trade. His idea was that the furs obtained in the Californias (that is, the Californias con- sidered as extending from Cape San Lucas to the extreme northwest of North America) could be sold in China, and that quicksilver might be procured in China to develop gold mining in the Californias.^ In another letter, on June 20, he suggested utilization of the port of Lampon (on the eastern shore of Luzon, Philippine Islands) and one of the ports of the far northwest discovered by Arteaga in 1779, forming a settlement at the latter.^ In September, 1787, . 1 C-6160. « G-5161. « C-5176. 420 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIIl the matter was referred to the directors of the PhiHppine Company for an opinion/ and when they neglected to re- ply, an order was sent to them in July, 1788, to hasten their answer.^ The company replied on August 13 that Gonzalez's ideas were not practicable ; that there were not many furs in the Californias, or any knowledge of the way to catch the animals or cure the skins ; and that quicksilver was very scarce and expensive in China. They were awaiting further reports from the Philippines, however.^ The company feared, very Hkely, that this project might in some way in- jure its own trade. The Council of the Indies decided to await the reports referred to.^ The matter came up again, however, as a result of a letter from the viceroy, January 12, 1790, which referred to the project as a possible means of occupying the northwest coasts, to the exclusion of for- eigners, without incurring the great expenses hitherto un- dergone in the voyages of exploration.^ In reply, July 29, 1790, the ministro general reserved decision.^ As late as 1791, the matter was still being considered,^^ but at that point the evidence ceases. The interest in the file of papers is in the possibilities that might have resulted if the scheme had been tried. There certainly were furs and gold in the Californias. Whatever the Spanish ministry may have thought about the projects of Gonzdlez, the reports of La Perouse about the presence of Russians were not to be disregarded. Con- sequently, the Princesa and San Carlos were sent out in 1788 under Martinez and Haro. This time the Russians were found, and reports brought back that they intended to settle Nootka. Information of the English pretension to that port was also received. This caused Spain to take steps which brought on the Nootka controversy, of which little need be said here. Spain sent out an expedition which seized some English ships at Nootka in 1789, whereupon England threatened war. Spain appealed to France under * C-5258. . 8 C-5453. « C-5297. 9 C-5458. « C-5298. 10 C-5492. 7 C-5302. 1783] THE AFTERMATH 421 the terms of the Family Compact, but the Fre nch Nationa l Assembly, then in control of the government, refused to live'up to the treaty. Spain had to yield, acknowledging the right of English ships to trade and make settlements on the Pacific coast, north of the Spanish settlements, and^ even granting them a right to enter Spanish ports but not to trade.^^ A Spanish interpretation of these events appears in a memorial of 278 paragraphs by Viceroy Revilla Gigedo,^ April 12, 1793. This purports to be a history of the De- partment of San Bias and of the CaHfornias (in the largest geographic sense of the term) since 1769. The keynote of the document is the matter of expense. Some of Revilla Gigedo's remarks on that subject are worth noting. It had been hoped, he said, that the salt mines of Zapotillo under royal administration might meet all the expenses of the Department of San Bias, but such a result had never been attained ; rather, expense increased. He then showed how the projects of Bucarely had increased expenditure, such that the annual cost of the CaHfornias had become nearly 60,000 pesos greater than it had been at the outset, without including closely related expenses, such for example as those incurred in connection with the Colorado River settlements. He praised Bucarely, however, and said that he might have achieved even greater results, if he had been able to make larger expenditures. After 17g0 strict econom y- l)fi gan_to bejpractised, and in 1786 the salaries and gratuities of San Bias employes were cut down, but expenses soon became heavy again, because of a fresh series of explorations and the Nootka affair. Revilla Gigedo displayed some scepti- cism as to the existence of a passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but felt that the doubt should be settled, after which, voyages to the northwest should be abandoned. ^'From now on,'' he says, ^^ every project which coroDels u s to incur heavy expenses should be oppose d, even if the \i The best account of the Nootka viceroy from 1789 to 1794. He was affair is William Ray Manning, The a son of the former viceroy of that Nootka Sound controversy. name. 12 The Conde de Revilla Gigedo was 422 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII most positive assurances are made of brilliant results, be- cause it is always understood that these results will be in the future, whereas the expenditures have to come out in cash from a treasury full of urgent necessities, and whose debts are increasing. Once the treasury funds and those of its money lenders [are] exhausted, the projects cannot be sustained, their advantages will vanish, the recovery of the money expended will be difficult, and it even may be- come necessary to continue in other and larger outlays with the very nearly certain risk of obtaining still worse results. During the period of twenty-five years, many millions of dollars have been expended in estabhshing and maintaining the new settlements of Alta California; in repeated ex- plorations of its northern coasts ; and in the occupation of Nootka. But if we persist in other still more distant and adventurous enterprises, then there will be no funds left to carry these on.'' ^^ With a complacency that would have been strange, twenty years before, Revilla Gigedo remarked that the Russians had establishments on the continent reaching southward almost to the vicinity of Nootka, but Spain had too few troops and ships of war, and too scant funds to dislodge them. How- ever, there was plenty of time in which to perfect a de- fence both of the lands already possessed and of those that might be acquired in future, because it would be a long time before Russia could carry her intentions into effect. He saw more^to„feaijjBjhe_En^^ so much because of tte^luf trade, which he regarded as over-estimated or di- minishing, but because they wished to engage in illicit trade with the Spanish dominions, and thus destroy the com- merce between New Spain and the Philippines. This was why they disputed the ownership of Nootka, he thought, and why they claimed that San Francisco Bay should be the boundary of Spanish possessions, and that the region north of that be under joint English and Spanish occupation. The "From the translation in Land of word "these" in the last line of the sunshine: cf. n. 15. I have changed translation refers to the lands already "Upper California" and "Nutka" to occupied by Spain, in particular Alta "Alta California" and "Nootka." The California. 1783] THE AFTERMATH 423 same reason accounted for their desire to be allowed to fish at a distance of ten leagues from the Spanish coasts. He proposed that expense should be limited to forestalling the English, after the existence or non-existence of an in- teroceanic waterway had been proved. To check them he recommended the following projects : the occupation of the port of Bodega/^ and possibly the mouth of the Co- lumbia River; the fortification of those points and the( V presidios of San Francisco, Monterey, San Diego, and Loreto ; the transfer of the Department of San Bias to Acapulco ; the conservation and development of the pious, fund and the Zapotillo salt mines, so that fresh burdens of providing for missions in the Californias might not fall on the royal treasury. If the Columbia should prove to be an interoceanic strait, he would take possession and hold it for the king of Spain. If it were but a river, with its sources not far from its mouth, he would discontinue ex- ploration, perhaps establishing a post there, in order to get a better title, and to remove the territory held in common by Spain and England to a great distance ffom the actual Spanish settlements. But if the source of the Columbia were near New Mexico, it would be necessary to occupy the river and the intervening territory with presidios and mis- sions. The transfer from San Bias to Acapulco was rec- ommended because of the superiority of the latter port. He made a long plea for the better management of the pious fund. The total value of the fund was 715,500 pesos, which should yield an interest of 35,575 pesos. Thus there should be a surplus, as the missionaries required only 22,000 pesos a year. These advantages had not been accruing, and the estates making up the fund were going to ruin. Similarly, the salt mines of Zapotillo ought to be more productive. His projects were not based on problematical future ad- vantages, said Revilla Gigedo, but were merely to guard against the alienation of a territory which had cost Spain so much in life, hardship, and treasure. He was opposed to extending the Spanish dominion to the northern coasts, " Modern Bodega Bay, a few miles north of San Francisco. 424 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII as it involved a distant, adventurous, and costly enterprise. The retention of Nootka, or the occupation of any other distant locality would also be inadvisable because of the liability to foreign complications as well as the matter of expense. For his part, he would cede Nootka to the Eng- lish, who seemed to desire it in a spirit of vainglory, to uphold a claim which had been controverted.^^ Clearly the Spanish Empire was on the defensive. An attempt to occupy Bodega was made, but failed, and the affair was permanently postponed. If anything else of consequence was attempted in fulfilment of Revilla Gigedo's sugges- tions, the writer has seen no evidence of it. Other considerations contributed to check the Spanish advance, one of which was the failure to maintain overland ]]r communications between the Californias and New Spain. By a decree of 1786 even the punitive campaigns against the Yumas were ordered to be given up, until the Apaches should be conquered. The Indians of Sonora were peri- odically troublesome. Having re-acquired the habit of revolt in 1776, the Seris seem not to have lost it thereafter in the eighteenth century, for any great length of time. .They were regarded as incorrigible, and various plans were put forth for banishing them altogether, or for segregating them on Tibur6n Island. The Pimas and Papagos planned an outbreak in 1796, but the plot was discovered in time to avert evil consequiences. The Apaches gave trouble, of course, but in 178p a new^^dicy was inaugurated which proved successful ; incessant war was to be waged against them, unless they would consent to make peace, and good treatment was to be accorded them if they would, in which event they were to receive gifts of articles which they them- selves could not make, even guns and powder, although of inferior quality. They were also to be plied with Jiquor in order to demoralize them, and encouraged to make war on one another, the authorities hoping that inTthis way they might be exterminated. Furthermore, attempts to settle " Revilla Gigedo, Informe. Also C-5613. Translation in Land of sunshine for 1899. V. XI. 1783] THE AFTERMATH 425 Spaniards and friendly Ind ians on the frontiers were also to be made. This policy seems to have been successful. Between 1786 and 1797 peace with different groups of Apaches was established, and was maintained for about twenty years longer at an annual cost of 18,000 to 30,000 pesos. New Mexico, too, had the usual Indian troubles. There was scant hope of relief for the Calif ornias from that quarter. Yet, despite wars, and despite letters saying that no men could be spared from the province, the state of affairs in Sonora was not altogether unfavorable for a forward move- ment. . In 1780 Sonora actually returned a profit to the royal treasury, receipts in that year being 284,519 pesos and expenses 278,703 pesos ^ leaving a balance of 5816 pesos. The figures are more striking when it appears that Croix's salary of 20,000 pesos was charged against the province. The largest item was that of the six presidios, which accounted for 136,308 pesos. This information ap- pears in an estado of September 14, 1781/^ forwarded to Spain in Croix's letter of September 23.^^ A summary, of the same date, of receipts and disbursements in all of the provinces of Croix's government, omitting the Californias, showed 864,182 pesos received, as against 856,853 expended, a profit of 7329 pesos.^^ The provinces of the viceroyalty just back from the frontier were still yielding richly, how- ever, as is evident from the accounts of the Real Caja of Guadalajara. As for Sonora, full figures for other years have not come to hand, but it is known that the mines continued to yield richly. Further evidence of the well- settled character of Sonora may be obtained from the sta- tistics of population. Croix's great memorial of October 30, 1781, included a table of the population of Sinaloa and Sonora by districts. The two provinces contained 87,644 persons, of whom 25,928 were men. From Fuerte de Montesclaros northward, or about the equivalent of modern Sonora, there were 52,228 persons, including 15,323 men,^® the figures probably including all persons but i«C-4406. The figures probably in- " c^408. is C-4409. elude Sinaloa. "Sonora" was often 19^-4430, The whole table is given used for both Sinaloa and Sonora. as an appendix. 426 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII the unchristianized Indians. In 1793 the two provinces had advanced to a total of 93,396 persons. At that time the figures given for New Mexico were 30,953, and for the two Cahfornias 12,666. In 1803 Sinaloa and Sonora had reached a population of 121,400. It would seem, therefore, that Sonora could have furnished the sinews of advancement. ^ Another factor tending to check an advance was the j[^ rapid changes in government of the frontier provinces. In 1785 the comandancia general was split into three units only partially under the comandante general, who himself ruled Sinaloa, Sonora, and the Californias. The viceroy^s superior authority was at the same time restored. His power was at first supposed to be only a special case due to the peculiar abihty of Viceroy Bernardo de Gdlvez, a nephew of the ministro general. After his death, late in 1786, the coman- dante general resumed full authority, but in March, 1787, the power of the viceroy was in part given back. In the same year the three comandancias were consolidated to form two, one of the east, the other of the west, each ruled by a comandante general, to some extent under the viceroy. In 1788 the full authority of the viceroy was restored, although the two comandancias were retained for purposes of ad- ministration. A royal order of 1792 returned to the plan of 1776, except that Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, and the Californias were to be under the viceroy. This went into effect in 1793. In 1804 a decree called for the modifica- tion of this plan by dividing what then formed the coman- dancia general into two comandancias, respectively of the east and west. This did not go into effect until 1812, but remained thenceforth to the end of Spanish rule. It will be noted that the Cahfornias on the one side, and Sonora and New Mexico on the other were in different governments from 1793 on. This helps to account for the opposition of later comandantes generates to reopening the Anza route, It meant the making of an effort for the sake of regions be- yond their frontiers, and a divided authority over any route that might be opened. It must also have tended to make 1783] THE AFTERMATH 427 local concerns seem to them of more account than the pos- sibility of foreign danger. The need for an ^ .oxerland route to Alta California still existed, both from the standpoint of foreign danger and from that of local progress. Enough has been said on the first point. As to the second, one need had been successfully- met . The province could not well complain of want in domestic animals, henceforth. Rather, their numbers be- gan soon to outrun the requirements of the settlers. For the rest, there were the usual diflficulties with the old routes. Manufactured articles and perhaps some agri- cultural products had to come by sea from San Bias, although the need for food-supplies became less and less, and as time went on, the supp ly-sh ips came infrequently. Then it was that foreign traders were welcomed, despite the laws against tEem. ATta"California was also able to get all that it re- quired of goods and effects, although at the risk of inter- ruption of the trafl&c by the enemies of Spain. The greatest need for an overland route was that more settlers might come. A few persons came from Sinaloa in later years by way of the peninsula, but the g^reat majority of the settlers werq thos e Tyho had c oTT),fi bf^fnre 17S2 fiTiH thp^j- Hpfir endants. This could not permit of a growth in population great enough to induce the inhabitants to leave the coast and go up the river valleys where the gold lay in such abundance. On the other hand, enough sutlers had come to save the prov- ince from all likelihood of abahdohrhent~aiid to hold the land for Spain against any but a strong attacking force. The following table shows the state of the missions in 1790 and in 1800. Number OF Missions Crop Large Stock Small Stock Christiaw Indians 1790 1800 11 18 30,000 75,000 22,000 67,000 26,000 86,000 / 7,500 N 10,700 J Gain 7 45,000 45,000 60,000 3.200 ' 428 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII The crop represents the number of bushels, mostly wheat, for the particular year, an amount which varied greatly in different years, but on the whole undoubtedly increased over a long period of time. Large stock includes horses, mules, and horned cattle ; small stock, — goats, pigs, and sheep, although almost wholly the last named. These figures do not represent the total wealth of the province, although forming the greater part of it. The presidios and puehloSj particularly the latter, had considerable crops and large numbers of animals, but it is difficult to state figures with any degree of certainty. The number of presidios remained four, but the pueblos increased from two to three. The whites, including mestizos and mulattoes, may have numbered 970 in 1790, and 1200 in 1800, of whom most of the men were soldiers. The troops usually numbered 205, the quota allowed by the government. Most of the men were married, and their sons passed into the military forces, for no more troops were sent from New Spain. Alta Cali- fornia_,]ti^d^^lready_ outs^^ the peninsula in popula^ tion and produce^ the latter Temg retained7as~rn the pasl, for strategic reasons, and as a mail route to the northern province. Proposals to reestablish the overland route to the Cah- fornias were made several times in the closing years of the eighteenth century. For a time they were frowned upon, and in 1786 Viceroy Gdlvez's instruction to Ugarte pro- hibited the reopening of the route.^^ Shortly afterward, the Apaches began to give less trouble, which may account for the comparatively favorable reception accorded to cer- tain proposals by Pedro Fages in 1787.^^ The matter was explained in a letter of Viceroy Revilla Gigedo to the king, November 26, 1789. In 1784 the Dominicans had been ordered to add two missions to the three new ones that they had already built, the better to connect Baja with Alta California. San Miguel del Encino had been erected in 1787, but the other had been suspended on the ground that 20 Gdlvez, Instruccidn, par. 115. 1782. This was the same Fages of 21 Fages had been governor of the earlier days. CaJifornias since Neve's departure in 17831 THE AFTERMATH 429 it would have to be on a route toward the Colorado River in order to avoid encroaching on the territory of the Fer- nandinos. Consideration of this matter led Fages to make three proposals : that four new mis sions be erected between San Diego and Santa Clara to complete the chain in Alta California ; that carjent^yg, smith s^ Tnf^f=f07^ ^^ atiH ntVipr artisans b e^ sent to Alta California to instruct the Indians, for that was the way to civilize them ; that a presidio of a hundred men be established at Santa Olaya,^ from which number twenty might be detached and placed at Sonoita,^^ and twenty more in the valley of the San Felipe.^^ In this way Alta California could be more securely held and the 160 leagues between San Diego and Altar protected, bring- ing Sonora and Alta California into communication. Fages' plan was submitted to a number of persons for opinions. The comandante general, Ugarte, favored it in all respects. Miguel Costanso was not unfavorable, being especially impressed, it would seem, by the project for sending ar- tisans. The Father Superior of San Fernando discussed the plan for new missions. Soledad and Santa Cruz were the only sites that he knew of that would be suitable for missions, he said, but he was ready to provide as many missionaries as should be needed. If there were any in- tention of advancing northward from San Francisco to Nootka, he would like to cede the present Fernandino missions to the Dominicans, and take up the new territory. Revilla Gigedo favored Fages' first proposal. He had ordered two missions founded, he said, and a search for sites for two others between San Diego and San Buenaven- tura. He was also taking steps to erect two more in Baja California to fill the gaps there. He said nothing about Fages' second project, although he probably favored it, for the artisans were sent. He opposed the third. A mail service had been established from Guaymas to Baja Cali- fornia, in part supplying the need for an overland route, he said, and the advantages of the new presidio, he thought, ^ On the west bank of the Colorado, ^* In Baja California, but along the below the Gila junction. Anza route. *' In northwestern Sonora. 430 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII would not equal the cost. Furthermore, the multitude of Indians along the Colorado, whose power had been made evident in the massacre of 1781, was a factor making it advisable to suspend this project until a time of greater need.^^ Some action was taken, however, to found new missions, "^anta Cruz and Soledaxl were founded in 1791. In 1797 San Fernando Rey was erected, followed in 1798 by San Luis Rey. Several other missions also date from this period, as also a settlement at Santa Cruz called the villa of Branciforte. The matter of the Santa Olaya presidio came up a second time in 1792, and again objection was made on the ground that Santa Olaya was surrounded by natives disposed to be hostile.^^ In 1796 renewed proposals were made emanating from Borica and Arrillaga, respectively rulers of Alta and Baja California. Borica was influenced by a journey of explo- ration from Sonora to New Mexico by Jos6 Zuniga in 1795.^^ He had heard that the journey was related to the fact that there were 1500 white persons in New Mexico without lands or work. He therefore sent for Oarers' 1776 diary and map, with a view to exploring a route from New Mexico to Alta California, in the hope that the latter might obtain the former^s surplus of settlers. He urged his project in a report of October 2, 1796. It was received favorably by the viceroy and his fiscal, and the former proceeded to ask for reports. At about the same time, October 26, 1796, Arrillaga made his proposal, the same that had emanated from Fages several years before, of a presidio at Santa Olaya and garrisons at Sonoita and San Felipe. He suggested as an alternative measure a presidio at the mouth of the Col- orado. Arrillaga' s plan resulted from explorations by the Dominicans and himself toward the Colorado, the most im- portant of which had been conducted by himself. Between June, 1796, and January, 1797, he made two journeys of M C-5400. diary, April 9 to May 29, 1795, C-5712 ; 2« Borb6n, Parecer, in A.P.C.H., for the remitting letter from Chihuahua Prov. SL Papers, XVIII, 37-44. by Pedro de Rada to the Conde de 27 For the instructions to Ziifiiga, Campo de Alange in Spain, July 9, March 31, 1795, C-5711; for Ztiniga's 1795, C-5722. 1783] THE AFTERMATH 431 exploration, and on one of them, in October, 1796, he reached the Colorado, where he had a fight with the Indians, and later returned by way of San Diego to Loreto. Borica viewed Arrillaga's proposals with favor, although he wrote on September 4, 1797, that it would be unsafe for parties of less than thirty-five to follow Anza's route, for which reason he preferred Arrillaga's alternative proposal. Arrillaga did not make light of the Indian danger at Santa Olaya ; it was on that account that he had made his second proposal, which he designed to be only a temporary meas- ure. The presidio at the mouth should be on the western bank, he said, at a distance of twenty to twenty-five leagues from Santa Catalina, in northeastern Baja California, but he failed to point out a place for the location of the pre- sidio. Borica thought it would be sufficient for the present to think only of gathering the Indians between Santa Cata- lina and the Colorado into a mission, treating them well, and procuring the cultivation of the lands and the increase of herds ; the selection of a presidio site might come later, after careful explorations had been made.^^ An opinion was asked of the comandante general, Pedro de Nava, who wrote, on June 22, 1797, that he did not consider it difficult to open a route, but that its value for some time would be limited to traffic with the Indians. Even this would amount to little, unless the most detailed information were ob- tained of places, distances, and Indian customs. The set- tlers of the Californias and New Mexico were not in a position to carry on commerce with each other or to keep the route open, and they would not be so for many years. As to the proposal to take 1500 Spaniards from New Mexico to Alta California, it would be unwise to weaken New Mex- ico; these men could be used to good advantage, without removing them from their native soil.^^ Favorable action was taken by the viceroy despite Nava's disapproval and the difficulties raised by Borica and Arri- llaga themselves. The mission of Santa CataHna was 28Borb6ii, Parecer, in A.P.C.H., ^ Ibid. Prov. St. Papers, XVIII, 37-44. 432 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII founded in November, 1797, but there the project rested for several years. In 1801 it came up again in conjunction with another proposition, that of the pohtical separation of Baja from Alta Cahfornia. Both of these matters were referred by the viceroy to Borbon, his fiscal. The latter replied, March 4, 1801. On the matter of the separation Borb6n reported favorably. As to the establishing of communications between New Mexico and Alta Califor- nia by way of the Colorado River, he took the opposite side. He gave a history of plans to this end since the massacre of 1781, laying particular stress on the disadvantages, and said that a more careful exploration of the lands would be necessary. Arrillaga himself had not been satisfied with the one he had made, he said, despite the care that he had used. Borbon thought it best to await the opinion of the new governor of Alta California, and the royal decision with regard to dividing the Californias, which would enable them to understand the matter of communication better. Meanwhile, he suggested that a copy of the papers on the subject be sent to Nava, and another copy to Arrillaga, then ad interim governor of Alta California, pending the arrival of Borica's successor. They should read the papers and state their opinions. ^^ Arrillaga^s reply is lacking, but Nava's under date of July 20, 1801, is available. He adhered to the opinion ex- pressed by him in 1797. A single post would not be enough for the passage of so considerable a desert, he said, while to withdraw so many persons from New Mexico would harm that province. True, there were 1500 persons in New Mexico without work, but they ought to be used in rees- tablishing abandoned settlements between El Paso and Santa Fe; he had just arranged for that to be done. The ad- vantages of reopening the Colorado route, said Nava, were reduced to two ; the possibility of aiding the Californias, in case of a foreign invasion ; and the benefits of reciprocal trade between the Californias and New Mexico. As to the first, if the necessity should arise, it would be possible 30 Borb6n, Parecer, in A.P.C.H., Prov. St. Papers, XVIII, 37-44. 1783] THE AFTERMATH 433 to send aid by land, if a considerable force went along ; or by way of the Gulf, unless that route should have been in- tercepted by the enemy. In the absence of a foreign at- tack, there was no need to keep the route open. As for commerce, New Mexico was more advanced in settled life than the Californias, but did not yield so many products or manufactures that it required new outlets for its trade. It had been accustomed to send all its surplus products to Chihuahua, with an absolute certainty of being able to dis- pose of them, and to procure in return all that it needed. It would be inadvisable to expose its scant capital to spec- ulations of doubtful outcome, when because of distance the expense would be so great. Moreover, it would be neces- sary to defeat the Indians opposing the passage, thus making them hostile and increasing the burdens of the frontier. He was not in favor of extending the line of presidios ; not only would that increase expense, but it would also make it more difficult to defend the provinces, since they would embrace a vast territory, which, much of the time, would serve no good purpose.^^ The opinions of Nava and Borbon prevailed. The separation of the provinces was ordered in 1804, but the matter of the route was not acted upon favorably. The plan of developing Alta California by means of it had been given up. Therefore, why use the route any longer? It was there when the need should arise. A large body of troops would have to be employed if the route were not kept open, but in case of a foreign attack only a considerable force would be of any avail to Alta California. Other proposals to reopen the route may have been made, but no attempt has been made to follow them; certainly nothing came of these projects.^^ Fear of foreign agg ressions in '1 Nava, Informe, in A.P.C.H., Prov. and the possibility of their descending St. Papers, XVIII, 34-37. the Colorado was mentioned. The ^ One such proposal was made at Russian colony in Alta California, the very inception of independent formed in 1812, a little north of San Mexican rule. Danger to the Califor- Francisco, was the cause of misgiving nias from the Americans and the Rus- as to the Russians. A remedy was sians was alleged. The Americans suggested in convict colonization, free- were feared along the whole northern dom of trade, and the establishing of frontier from Texas to the Columbia, communication between the Califor- 2p 434 THE FOUNDING OF SPANISH CALIFORNIA [Ch. XVIII Spanish Settlements op Alta California. Alta Calif ol'nia certainly continued, with ever-increasing justifi cation^^^ butl ^he day of action haSTpa^sied. "The closing decades of Spanish rule in Alta California form one of those periods in the life of man which is the nias, Sonora, and New Mexico. Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala, Resumen de la esta- distica del imperio mexicano. For another proposal at the same time, see Richman, 237, 470. '8 With regard to foreign voyages on the Pacific coast of New Spain and. partictilarly, voyages to the Califor- nias the following thirteen legajos of the Archivo General de Indias are exceedingly rich in materials : Estado, Aitdiencia de Mexico, 1, 4-15. I found nearly two hundred such docu- ments in these legajos. 1783] THE AFTERMATH 435 delight of the poet and romancer. '^Life was one con- tinuous round of hospitality and social amenities, tempered with vigorous outdoor sport. There were no hotels in California. Every door was open, and food, lodging, a fresh horse, and money, even, were free to the guest, whether friend or stranger. No white man had to concern himself greatly with work, and even school books were a thing apart. Music, games, dancing, and sprightly conversation — these were the occupations of the time — these constituted educa- tion. Also, men and women were much in the open ; all were expert horsemen, could throw a lasso, and shoot un- erringly, even the women, accomplishments which fitted their type of life, and made hunting a general pastime. When foreign ships came, there were balls and the gayest of festivals, nor were these visits the only occasion for that type of entertainment. '^ ^^ In fine, here was an Acadia. Life was less stirring than in other days, but infinitely more agreeable. Yet, although the inhabitants could not pos- sibly have known it, they were playing a part in history, fraught with moment. They were holding Alta California safe from foreign occupation, with its vast mineral wealth undiscovered. Meanwhile, the United States was steadily preparing to succeed to the rich inheritance which awaited her on the shores of the Pacific. ^ Chapman, Spanish settlements on the Pacific coast. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES I. Printed Works The number of works which at some point touch the field embraced^by this volume is very great. A complete Ust would not only include very many narratives of the Spanish conquest, both by contemporaries, whether participants or not, and by writers of a later day, but would also give space to works on Spanish colonial institutions and Spanish colonization in general. Its value, however, in a work of this sort based primarily on manuscript materials, would be, at most, academic. Thus, a great number of works which I have actually employed in study surrounding my work will not be found in the hst that follows. My bases for inclusion of titles have been : first, actual reference in my text to the works in ques- tion ; or, secondly, in the case of a number of works not actually cited, a very intimate connection, nevertheless, with the field of this study. As for works in the first class, I have not included them where the reference has been incidental, without any necessary connection with the narrow limits of my field. As regards works of the second group, I havejncluded outstanding works concerning the advance of the Spanish conquest up the Pacific coast toward the Californias and general histories of California. I have omitted works dealing with the period of Cortes, however, not alone because of their number, but also because their references to northwest- ward advance form only a meagre conclusion, as a rule, to their tale of Cortes' earlier conquests. Popular histories and references to repeated editions are omitted, an indication being given only of the edition used, or, in the case of works not cited, the first editions of works contemporary with my narrative and the latest editions of modern general histories. Distinction between primary and secondary materials has been abandoned, but it is beheved that the object of that mode of arrangement has been attained by an index chronologically arranged according to the dates which the individual works represent as documents. Where pubUcation followed promptly on completion of the work, the earhest date of publication is assigned ; but where publication was delayed for many years a rough attempt is made to indicate the date when the writer completed his work. Comment on most of the items included in my list is unnecessary, but a few words may be said with regard to some of them. Hubert Howe Bancroft's works have been used more than other printed materials in preparing this volume, especially the first volume of the North Mexican States and Texas, but except in the first chapter they have not been employed to any considerable extent. Of late it has been the fashion to pick flaws in Bancroft. Nevertheless, all students of Pacific coast history must begin with his works; they are the indispensable starting point. 437 438 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Of early Spanish works treating of the progress of northwestward advance only those of Burriel and Palou have been drawn upon to any extent. It may be said of all works of this class that they are useful primarily for events of the religious conquest, but rarely provide a clue to the causes of governmental action. These works should eventually take their place, therefore, as supplementary material, and the official correspondence should be substituted as the principal source on which investigators should rely for secular history. Richman has been cited a number of times, usually, as it happens, in order to point out his errors. Nevertheless, there is much in Richman's work of value to the investigator, especially, perhaps, in his notes. Rich- man did not make adequate use of the materials that he cited, but unques- tionably his is the best brief history of Spanish and Mexican California that has yet been written. Father Engelhardt is doing valuable service in his work, not yet coni- pleted, in which he is bringing together a vast amount of data on the history of the Catholic missions of the CaUfornias. The Colecddn has been cited only once (chap. I, n. 11), but a few words about that set, based on my personal knowledge of some of the original documents from which the Colecddn was made up, and on general report current among workers at the Archivo General de Indias, may not be out of place. The Colecddn was compiled as a result of the Spanish govern- ment's desire to encourage the study of Spanish-American history, orders being given for the publication of documents. As an inducement to that end and to prevent delays a bonus was offered of so much for every printed page that should be published. The result in quantity was gratify- ing. To avoid slow, painstaking investigation the compilers drew very largely on legajos of the Patronato Real, a small group in the Archivo General de Indias which has been used more than others and was known to contain valuable materials about the early explorers and conquerors. From these legajos they selected documents which were easy to read, choosing one or two in some cases from an expediente that contained twenty, and giving the title of the whole group to the one or two that they copied. Such, at least, was the case with certain New Mexico materials appearing in volumes fifteen and sixteen of the Colecddn. Senor Torres Lanzas has contributed a valuable work, very well done, but it should be understood that it is by no means inclusive of all the maps in the Archivo General de Indias bearing on the regions named. Senor Torres Lanzas is gathering materials for a second and much amplified edition. The work by N.N. deals with the entire Spanish domain in the Americas, not merely with the region which we now call the West Indies ; indeed, that region gets very little attention. There are several chapters dealing with the northern frontier of New Spain, one of them being devoted wholly to the Califomias. Addison, Joseph. Charles III of Spain. Oxford. 1900. Alegre, Francisco Javier. Historia de la Compania de Jesus. 3 v. Mexico. 1842. Altamira y Crevea, Rafael. Historia de Espana y de la dvilizadon la. 3 ed. 4 v. Barcelona. 1913-14. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 439 Arlegui, Jos6. Chrdnica de la provinda de n. s. p. s. Francisco de Zacatecas. Mexico. 1737. Arricivita, Juan Domingo. Crdnica serdfica y apostolica del Colegio de Propaganda Fide de la Santa Cruz de Queretaro en la Nueva Espana. Mexico. 1792. Ascensidn, Antonio de la. Descuhrimiento y demarcacion de la California, in Colecdon de documentos ineditos, relativos al descuhrimiento, con- quista y organizacion de las antiguas posesiones espanolas de America y Oceania, VIII, 537-74. Madrid. 1867. Baegert, Jakob. Nachrichten von der amerikanischen halbinsel Calif arnien. Mannheim. 1772. Bancroft, George. History of the United States of America, v. III-V. New York. 1883-85. Bancroft, Hubert Howe. Works. San Francisco. 1883-91. V. I. The native rax^es, I. 1886. V. VI-VII. History of Central America. I-II. 1886. V. IX-XI. History of Mexico, I-III. 188&-87. V. XV. History of the north Mexican states and Texas, I. 1886. V. XVII. History of Arizona and New Mexico. 1889. V. XVIII. History of California, I. 1886. V. XXVI. History of Utah. 1889. V. XXVII. History of the northwest coast, I. 1886. V. XXXIII. History of Alaska. 1886. V. XXXVIII. Essays and miscellany. 1890. Beaumont, Pablo de la Purlsima Concepci6n. . . . Crdnica de la provinda de los Santos apdstolos S. Pedro y S. Pablo de Michoacdn. 5 v. Mexico. 1873-74. Bolton, Herbert Eugene. Guide to materials for the history of the United States in the principal archives of Mexico. (Carnegie institution of Washington. Publication no. 163. Papers of the Dept. of historical research). Washington. 1913. Bolton, Herbert Eugene. The Spanish occupation of Texas, 1619-1690, in Southwestern historical quart&rly, XVI, 1-26. Austin. 1912. Bolton, Herbert Eugene. Texas in the middle eighteenth century. (Uni- versity of California, Publications in history, v. III). Berkeley. 1915. Bryce, George. The remarkable history of the Hudson* s Bay company. London. 1900. Burpee, Lawrence Johnstone. The search for the western sea; the story of the exploration of north-western America. New York. 1908. Burriel, Andres Marcos. A natural and dvil history of California . . . Translated from the original Spanish. 2 v. London. 1759. Burriel, Andres Marcos. Notida de la California y de su conquista temporal y espiritual, hasta el tiempo presente. Sacada de la historia manuscrita, formada en Mexico ano de 1739. [ !] por el padre Miguel Venegas. 3v. Madrid. 1757. Bustamante, Carlos Maria de. See Cavo. Cardona, Nicolds. Reladon del descuhrimiento del reino de la California in Colecdon de documentos ineditos . . . Amirica y Oceania, IX, 30-42. Madrid. 1868. 440 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Cavo, Andres. Los ires siglos de Mexico durante el gobierno espanol . . . Pvblicada con notas y suplemento en 1836 por el licendado D. Carlos Maria de Bustamante. Jalapa. 1870. / Chapman, Charles Edward. The Alta California supply ships, 1773-76, in Southwestern historical quarterly, XIX, 184-94. Austin. 1915. Chapman, Charles Edward. Difficulties of maintaining the Department of San Bias, 1775-77, in Southwestern historical quarterly, XIX, 261-70. Austin. 1916. / Chapman, Charles Edward. The founding of San Francisco, in Grizzly bear magazine, XVIII, nos. 3 and 4. Los Angeles. 1916. Chapman, Charles Edward. Importance of the military in early Spanish settlements of California, in Grizzly bear magazine, XVIII, no. 2. Los Angeles. 1915. / Chapman, Charles Edward. Spanish settlements on the Pacific coast, in Nature and science on the Pacific coast. San Francisco. 1915. J Clavigero, Francisco Javier. Storia delta California. 2 v. in 1. Venezia. 1789. iCostans6, Miguel. . . . The narrative of the Portold expedition of 1769- 1770 . . . ed. by Adolph van Hemert-Engert . . . and Frederick John Teggart. (Academy of Pacific coast history, Publications, I, 91-159) . Berkeley. 1910. ' Costans6, Miguel. . . . The Portold expedition of 1769-1770; diary of Miguel Costansd, ed. by Frederick John Teggart. (Academy of Pacific coast history. Publications, II, 161-327). Berkeley. 1911. Coxe, William. Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the house of Bourbon, V. IV-V. London. 1815. Croix, Charles Fran9ois, marquis de Croix. Correspondance du marquis de Croix . . . 1737-1786, ed. by [a descendant,] the Marquis de Croix. Nantes. 1891. Danvila y Collado, Manuel. Reinado de Carlos III. 6 v. {Historia general de Espana escrita por individuos de numero de la Real academia de la historia bajo la direcdon del Excmo. Sr. D. Antonio Cdnovas del Castillo). Madrid. 1891-96. Dellenbaugh, Frederick Samuel. The romance of the Colorado River. 3ed. New York and London. 1909. Doniol, Jean Henri Antoine. Histoire de la partidpation de la France d Vetablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. v. I. Paris. 1885. Eldredge, Zoeth Skinner. The beginnings of San Frandsco from the expedi- tion of Anza, 1774, to the dty charter of April 15, 1850. 2 v. San Francisco. 1912. Eldredge, Zoeth Skinner. [Studies of the Anza routes], in Journal of Ameri- can history, II, 38-42, 255-61, 521-26, 696-701 ; III, 103-12, 171-79, 395-403. New York. 1908-09. Engelhardt, Charles Anthony, in religion Zephyrin. The Frandscans in Arizona. Harbor Springs, Mich. 1899. / Engelhardt, Charles Anthony, in religion Zephyrin. The Frandscans in California. Harbor Springs, Mich. 1897. Engelhardt, Charles Anthony, in religion Zephyrin. The missions and missionaries of California, v. I-II. San Francisco. 1908-12. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 441 Espinosa, Isidro F^lis de. Chronica apostdlica, y serdphica de todos los Colegios de Propaganda Fide de esta Nueva-Espana. Mexico. 1746. Fages, Pedro. . . . The Colorado River campaign, 1781-1782; diary of Pedro Fages, ed. by Herbert Ingram Priestley. (Academy of Pacific coast history, Publications, III, 132-233) . Berkeley, 1913. Fages, Pedro. . . . Expedition to San Francisco Bay in 1770; diary of Pedro Fages, ed. by Herbert Eugene Bolton. (Academy of Pacific coast history, Publications, II, 141-59). Berkeley, 1911. Ferndn-Nuiiez, Carlos Jos6 Gutierrez de los Rlos, conde de. Vida de Carlos III. 2 v. {Libros de antano, nuevamente dados a luz por varios aficionados, v. XIV-XV). Madrid. 1898. Fernandez Duro, Cesdreo. Armada espanola desde la unidn de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragdn. v. VII. Madrid. 1901. Ferrer del Rio, Antonio. Historia del reinado de Carlos III en Espana. 4v. Madrid. 1856. Fita y Colom^, Fidel. Notida de la California, obra andnima del P. Andres Marcos Burriel . . . Datos ineditos e ilustrativos de su com- posidon, aprobacion y edidon, in Real academia de la historia, Bole- tin, LII, 396-438. Madrid. 1908. Florencia, Francisco de. Historia de la provinda de la Compania de Jesvs. De Nveva-Espana. Mexico. 1694. Fonseca, Fabidn de, and Carlos de Urrutia. Historia general de real hadenda. v. 1. Mexico. 1845. Font, Pedro. . . . The Anza expedition of 1775-1776; diary of Pedro Font, ed. by Frederick John Teggart. (Academy of Pacific coast history. Publications, III, 1-131). Berkeley, 1913. Frejes, Francisco. Memoria histdrica de los sucesos mds notables de la conquista particular de Jalisco por los Espanoles. Guadalajara. 1879. Gdlvez, Bernardo, conde de. Instrucdon formada en virtud de real orden de S. M., que se dirige al senor comandante general de provindas internas Don Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola para gobierno y puntual observanda de este superior gefe y de sv^ inmediatos subalternos. Mexico. 1786. Gdlvez, Jos6 de, marques de Sonora. Informe general que . . . entregd al excmo sr. virrey . . . Antonio Bucarely y Urstia . . . 31 de didembre del771. Mexico. 1867. Garc^s, Francisco. Diario y derrotero que siguio el M. R. P. Fr. Frandsco Garces en su viaje hecho desde octubre de 1775 hasta 17 de setiembre de 1776, al Rio Colorado para reconocer las nadones que habitan sus mdr- genes, y d los pueblos del Moqui del Nuevo-Mexico, in Documentos para la historia de Mejico, 2 s^r., I, 225-374. M^jico. 1854. Carets, Francisco. On the trail of a Spanish pioneer; the diary and itiner- ary of Frandsco Carets . . . ed. by Elliott Coues. 2 v. New York. 1900. Colder, Frank Alfred. Russian expansion on the Padfic, 1641-1850. Cleveland. 1914. Gonzdlez Cabrera Bueno, Jos^. Navegaddn especvlativa, y prdctica. Manila. 1734. Greenhow, Robert. The history of Oregon and California, and the other territories of the northwest coast of North A merica . 4 ed . Boston . 1 847 . 442 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Hackett, Charles Wilson. Retreat of the Spaniads from New Mexico in 1680, and the beginnings of El Paso, in Southwestern historical quarterly, XVI, 137-68, 258-76. Austin. 1912-13. Hackett, Charles Wilson. The revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in 1680, in Texas state historical association. Quarterly, XV, 93-147. Austin. 1911. Herrera y Tordesillas, Antonio de. Historia general de los hechos caste- llanos en las islas i tierra firme del mar ocSano. 8 v. in 4. Madrid. 1601-15. History of California [by Clinton A. Snowden and others] ed. by Zoeth Skinner Eldredge. 5 v. New York. 1915. Hittell, Theodore Henry. History of California. 4 v. in 8. San Fran- cisco. 1898. Hodge, Frederick Webb. Handbook of American Indians north of Mexico. 2 V. (Smithsonian institution. Bureau of American ethnology. BuUetin 30). Washington. 1907-10. Hughes, Anne E. The beginnings of Spanish settlement in the El Paso district. (University of California, Publications in history, I, 295- 392). Berkeley. 1914. Humboldt, [Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich] Alexander, [freiherr von]. Essai politique sur le royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne. 5 v. Paris. 1811. Humboldt, [Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich] Alexander, [freiherr von]. Political essay on the kingdom of New Spain . . . Tr. from the original French by John Black. 2 ed. 4 v. London. 1814. Humboldt, [Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich] Alexander, [freiherr von]. Versuch uber den politischen zustand des Konigsreichs Neu-Spanien. 2 V. Tubingen. 1809-14. Lafuente y Zamalloa, Modesto. Historia general de Espana, desde los tiempos mds remotos hasta nvsstros dias. 30 v. Madrid. 1850-67. Laut, Agnes Christina. The conquest of the great Northwest; being the story of the adventurers of England known as the Hudson's Bay Com- pany. New York. 1911. L(3pez de Velasco, Juan. Geografia y descripcion universal de las Indias recopilada por el cosmografo-cronista Juan Lopez de Velasco desde el ano 1571 aide 1574. Madrid. 1894. Manning, William Ray. The Nootka Sound controversy, in American historical association. Annual report . . . for the year 1904, 279-478. Washington. 1905. Mayer, Brant z. Mexico, Aztec, Spanish and republican, v. I. Hartford. 1853. Mendieta, Geronimo de. Historia eclesidstica indiana. Mexico. 1870. Mota Padilla, Matfas Angel de la. Historia de la conquista de la provincia I de la Nueva-Galicia. Mexico. 1870. [1871-72]. In , N , gent. America: or An exact description of the West \ Indies : more especially of those provinces which are under the dominion of the king of Spain. 2 pts. in 1 v. London. 1655, Neve, Felipe de. Reglamento e instruccion para los presidios de la peninsula de Californias, erecdon de nuevas misiones, y f omenta del pueblo y estension de los establedmientos de Monterey, in Recopiladon de leyes . . . BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 443 de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos . . . formada . . . por el lie. Basilio Jose Arrillaga, {Comprende este tomo de Enero a Didembre de 1828. Mexico, 1838), pp. 121-75. Ortega, Jose de. Apostolicos afanes de la Compania de Jesiis. Barcelona. 1754. Ortiz de Ayala, Tadeo. Resumen de la estadistica del imperio mexicano. Mexico. 1822. The Pacific Ocean in history : papers and addresses presented at the Panama- Pacific historical congress . . .1915. New York. 1916. Palou, Francisco. Notidas de la Nueva California. 4 v. San Francisco. 1874. Palou, Francisco. Reladon historica de la vida y apostolicas tareas del venerable padre fray Junipero Serra. Mexico. 1787. P^rez de Ribas, Andres. Historia de los trivmphos de nvestra santa fee entre gentes las mas bdrbaras, y fieras del Nueuo orbe. Madrid. 1645. PortoM, Caspar de. ... Diary of Gaspar de Por told during the California expedition of 1769-1770, ed. by Donald Eugene Smith . . . and Frederick John Teggart. (Academy of Pacific coast history. Publi- cations, I, 31-89). Berkeley. 1909. Recopiladon de leyes de los reynos de la^ Indias. 9 lib. in 4 v. 3 ed. Madrid. 1774. Reglamento e instrucdon para los presidios que se han de formar en la linea de frontera de la Nueva Espana, in Recopiladon de leyes . . . de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos . . . formada . . . por el lie. Basilio Jose Arrillaga. {Comprende este tomo los meses de Enero d Didembre de 1834. Mexico. 1835), pp. 139-89. Revilla Cigedo, Juan Vicente Cii^mez Pacheco de Padilla Horcasitas y Aguayo, conde de. Early California. Unpublished documents — the viceroy's report, tr. in Land of sunshine, XI, 32-41, 105-12, 168-73, 225-33, 283-89. Los Angeles. 1899. Revilla Cigedo, Juan Vicente Gii^mez Pacheco de Padilla Horcasitas y Aguayo, conde de. Instrucdon reservada que el conde de Revilla Gigedo did d su suecesor en el mando . . . sobre el gobierno de este continente en el tiempo qvs fue su virey . Mexico. 1831. Richman, Irving Berdine. California under Spain and Mexico, 1535-1847. Boston and New York. 1911. Rivera Cambas, Manuel. Los gobernantes de Mexico, v. I. Mexico. [1873]. Rousseau, Frangois. . . . R^gne de Charles III d'Espagne (1759-1788). 2 V. Paris. 1907. Serra, Junfpero. Letter of Fray Junipero Serra . . . to . . . Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursiia . . . giving some account of the condition of the missions and complaining of the conduct of Captain Perez and of the governor — dated 7th October, 1774, Sp. and tr. in Documents from the Sutro collection, in Historical society of southern California, Publica- tions, II, 73-80. Los Angeles. 1891. Sudrez de Peralta, Juan. Notidas Historical de la Nueva Espana. Madrid. 1878. Teggart, Frederick John. The approaches to the Padfic coast, in Nature and science on the Pacific coast. San Francisco. 1915. 444 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Tello, Antonio. Crdnica misceldnea y conquista espiritual y temporal de la . Santa Provincia de Xalisco. 29 pts. in 1 v. Guadalajara. 1890-91. / Torquemada, Juan de. Primer a [segunda, tercera] parte de los veinte i vn ' libros rituales i monarchia Indiana. 3 v. Madrid. 1723. \ Torres Lanzas, Pedro. Reladdn descriptiva de los mapas, pianos, & [ !], I de Mexico y Floridas, existentes en el Archivo General de Indias. 2 v. » Sevilla. 1900. Twitchell, Ralph Emerson. The leading facts of New Mexican history. 2 V. Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 1911-12. Twitchell, Ralph Emerson. The Spanish archives of New Mexico. 2 v. Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 1914. Vetancurt, Augustin de. Teatro mexicano. Descripdon breve de los svcessos exemplares, historicos, politicos, militares, y religiosos del Nvevo mundo occidental de las Indias. 4 pts. in 1 v. Mexico. 1698 [1697]. ^ ViUa-Senor y Sdnchez, Jos6 Antonio de. Theatro americano, descripcidn general de los reynos, y provincias de la Nueva-Espana. 2 v. Mexico. 1746-48. Willson, Beckles, i.e. Henry Beckles. The great company : being a history of the honourable company of merchants-adventurers trading into Hudson's Bay. Toronto. 1899. Zamacois, Niceto de. Historia de Mejico. v. V. Barcelona and Mexico. 1878. Z^rate Salmer6n, Ger6nimo de. Relaciones de todas las cosas que en el Nuevo-Mexico se han visto y sabido . . . desde el ano de 1538 hasta el de 1626 in Documentos para la historia de Mexico, 3 s6r., (4 v. in 1), IV, 1-55. Mexico. 1856. Chronological Index of Printed Works, Arranged According to Approximate Date of Completion of the Work 1574 L6pez 1737-84 Croix 1775-77 Carets 1589 Sudrez 1742 Mota 1775-77 Carets 1596 Mendieta PadiUa 1779 Neve 11-15 Herrera 1746 Espinosa 1780 Beaumont 1615 Torque- 1746^8 ViUa-Senor 1781-82 Pages mada 1754 Ortega 1783 Palou 1620 Ascensi6n 1757 Burriel 1786 G^vez, B. 1626 Zdrate 1757 Burriel 1787 Palou 1632 Cardona 1767 Alegre 1789 Clavigero 1645 P6rez 1769-70 Costans6 1789 Ferndn- 1653 Tello 1769-70 Portold Nunez 1655 N.N. ^ 1770 Costans6 1791 Fonseca 1681 Recopila- 1770 Pages 1792 Arricivita ci6n 1771 Gdlvez, J. 1793 Revilla 1694 Florencia 1772 Baegert Gigedo 1697 Vetancurt 1772 Reglamento 1793 ReviUa 1734 Gonzalez 1774 Serra Gigedo 1737 Arlegui 1775-76 Font 1794 Cavo BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 445 1809-14 Humboldt 1891-96 Danvila 1911 Hackett 1809-14 Humboldt 1897 Engelhardt 1911 Laut 1809-14 Humboldt 1899 Engelhardt 1911 Richman 1815 Coxe 1899 Willson 1911-12 TwitcheU 1822 Ortiz 1900 Addison 1912 Bolton 1833 Frejes 1900 Bryce 1912 Eldredge 1836 Bustamante 1900 Torres 1912-13 Hackett 1844 Greenhow Lanzas 1913 Bolton 1850-67 Lafuente 1900-11 Altamira 1914 Golder 1852-74 Bancroft, 1901 Fernandez 1914 Hughes G. Duro 1914 Twitchell 1853 Mayer 1904 Manning 1915 Bolton 1856 Ferrer del 1907 Rousseau 1915 Chapman Rfo 1907-10 Hodge 1915 Chapman 1873 Rivera 1908 Burpee 1915 Chapman 1878 Zamacois 1908 Fita 1915 History 1883-90 Bancroft, 1908-09 Eldredge 1915 Pacific H. 1908-12 Engelhardt 1915 Teggart 1885 Doniol 1909 DeUen- 1916 Chapman 1885-97 Hittell baugh 1916 Chapman II. Manuscript Materials The bulk of the present work rests upon manuscript materials not hitherto used by historical writers . While a certain small proportion of the documents cited have been drawn on by others, notably by Bancroft, Richman, and Engelhardt, such materials, when employed here, have been utilized independently, and usually in a different way than in other works referring to them. Only a general description of manuscript material used by me can be given here. A. Documents in the Academy of Pacific Coast History, Berkeley, Cali- fornia. These include local records, and copies from various archives of Mexico and Spain. Except for the documents referred to in paragraphs B, C, and D, I have drawn wholly on the Academy collection for manu- script materials. As regards material from the Archivo General de Indias, I used the Academy copies in many cases, but was able later to verify the references by comparison with the originals in the Archivo General de Indias, in which event citations are made by my Catalogue number to docu- ments of the latter archive. In a few instances Academy copies from that .archive were used of material that does not appear in the Catalogue. In those cases citation has been made to the legajo number of the Archivo General de Indias preceded by A.G.I. , but it is to be understood that the Academy copies were used. The same practice has been followed with regard to copies acquired from Mexican and other Spanish archives by the Academy, that is, since the "Bancroft Collection" became the property of the University of California. A number of documents of the Archivo General y Publico de la Naci6n (A.G.P.) and Museo Nacional (M.N.) of the City of Mexico have been referred to, and a few citations have been made to Mexican archives outside of the capital. Bolton's Guide (in- 446 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES eluded in my list of printed works) wiU supply any information that may be lacking in my citations. Many of the copies thus far referred to were part of Professor Bolton's private collection when I used them. A few copies from the Archivo Hist6rico Nacional (A.H.N.) of Madrid, Spain, have also been used. Other documents of the Academy have been cited according to their location in volumes of the Bancroft Collection, preceded by A.P.C.H. Special notice should be accorded to the James Bryce Historical Essay manuscript of Mr. Karl C. Leebrick, used extensively in chapter eight. B. Documents in the Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain. These have been by far the principal source for this volume. Out of the immense mass of material in that archive bearing on the subject of this work I have listed 6257 items. These in fact represent a great many more documents, because testimonios, which often contain scores or even hundreds of separate documents, were entered as one item. Thousands of items might have been added had time permitted, but, as matters are, most of the documents fall between the years 1760 and 1786. The entire list has been arranged in chronological order with a view to possible publication, for the documents are of value for far more than has been undertaken in this work. The list alone would fill, if published, two or three octavo volumes. Reference to such of these items as I have used has been made by a number preceded by the letter C. The C stands for Catalogue, the first word of the title of a manuscript hst of the items in question ; the number is the serial number of the document cited in a chronological arrangement of the Hst. Publica- tion of the Catalogue is contemplated, but even if it shall not be published, it will be accessible in manuscript at the Academy of Pacific Coast History. It seems necessary, however, to supply information here regarding the location of the documents cited by me, and such information is provided at the end of this section. The material in Appendix I, referred to in chapter three, was used at the Archivo General de Indias, although not entered in my Catalogue. The same thing is true of the Crame map. Attention may be called to the extraordinary wealth for the historical investigator of the Archivo General de Indias. It is intended that all of the official cor- respondence of Spain's four centuries of over-seas administration shall eventually be gathered into that one archive, and possibly half of all materials on that subject now in Spain is already there. The advantages of pursuing studies at one point, instead of having to visit the hundreds of smaller archives in the Americas, are obvious. The materials are also of the highest authority, being the official documents on which the Council of the Indies and the ministros generates based their decisions. They con- sist chiefly of the following : originals (signed with the name and rubric of the writer) of colonial officials writing to Spain; copies, usually from originals and usually certified, enclosed with documents of the first-named class ; drafts,^ retained as the file copy, of replies, or orders sent from Spain to the colonies; similarly, origuials, copies, and drafts of inter-depart- mental correspondence in Spain ; and finally originals and drafts of intra- departmental correspondence, by means of which afi'airs were dealt with by the ministros generates and the Council themselves. Cf . chap. VII, n. 63. C. Documents in the British Museum, London. Considerable use has been made in chapter five of an expediente in manuscript volume BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 447 13,974, section G., of the British Museum. These papers are not tran- scripts, but must originally have been deposited in the archives of the viceroyalty or of the College of San Fernando, probably in the former. Father Superior Verger's letters are signed with his rubric and marked duplicate. Those from Palou and others in the Calif ornias to him are copies, often certified. In other words this is only the first remove from the technically best file, and lacks only the drafts of the fiscaVs replies to Verger (which would almost surely appear in the original file) to be as useful as the principal expediente. These papers were purchased by the British Museum of ''Tho. Rodd," March 11, 1843. How Mr. Rodd got them is not explained. A copy of the British Museum expediente now exists in the Academy of Pacific Coast History. D. The Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid. The only document used independently of copies in the Academy of Pacific Coast History is the Cardona memorial, with maps, cited in chapter one. In the list that follows of manuscript materials of the Archivo General de Indias used in preparation of this volume, the number at the left is the Catalogue (C-) number, followed by a reference to the location of the particular document in the archive at Seville. Where numbers are em- ployed they represent (from left to right) estante, cajon, and legajo numbers. Documents in the Papeles de Estado group are numbered on a different plan. The following abbreviations are employed in citing them: Est, Estado; Am. G, America en General; A. G, Avdiencia de Guadalajara; A. M, Audiencia de Mexico. 186 187 188 189 191 192 193 199 201 202 203 204 205 207 208 212 213 103-5-25 217 219 " 224 67-^^5 225 228 231 " 232 45 " 185 " 236 67-3-29 15 104-3-4 46 16 << 47 17 67-3-27 48 20 67-3-28 49 21 67-3-27 50 24 (< 51 26 <( 52 27 (( 53 28 104-6^17 54 30 67-3-27 55 31 (< 56 32 « 57 33 <• 68 34 tt 59 35 it 60 36 t( 61 37 a 62 38 n 63 39 67-3-28 65 40 67-3-27 66 41 <( 177 42 67-3-28 178 43 tt 182 44 It . 184 448 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 239 103-&-25 337 (( 395 u 240 67-3-29 338 {( 397 67-3-31 241 103-5-25 339 n 398 104-3-4 242 67-3-29 340 67-3-31 399 67-5-3 243 t( 341 li 400 u 244 a 343 103-6-23 401 CI 245 ii 344 11 402 104r-3-4 246 11 345 103-5-20 403 11 249 103-5-25 348 67-3-31 404 It 253 67-3-29 349 104-3-4 405 103-3-6 254 103-5-25 350 67-3-31 409 67-3-31 256 n 351 it 411 103-6-23 259 67-3-29 352 104-3-4 412 u 260 11 353 67-3-31 413 CI 263 « 354 103-3-6 415 l( 266 ti 355 67-3-31 416 67-3-31 272 11 356 104-3-4 417 (( 274 (( 357 li 418 67-5-3 276 (I 358 104-3-5 419 67-3-31 277 a 359 (( 420 67-5-3 278 <( 360 (( 421 103-6-23 279 (I 361 u 427 <( 283 104-3-4 362 (I 428 « 286 103-5-20 363 it 429 tt 287 (( 364 tt 431 67-3-31 290 (C 365 u 432 It 291 a 366 tt 433 tt 292 67-3-31 367 tt 434 103-fr-23 295 103-6-23 368 tt 435 tt 307 67-3-29 369 tt 437 67-3-31 308 (( 370 tt 438 104-3-4 310 67-3-31 371 tt 440 It 311 (( 372 67-5-3 441 tt 313 67-3-30 373 ti 442 Est, Am. G, 1 314 67-a-31 374 It 444 67-3-31 315 67-3-29 375 It 448 tt 316 67-3-31 377 (( 449 ft 317 67-3-29 379 103-3-6 450 104-3-4 321 67-3-31 380 103-6-23 451 103-3-6 322 a 381 67-3-31 453 104-3-4 324 103-5-20 382 104-3-4 454 103-6-21 325 67-3-31 383 67-3-31 455 tt 326 11 384 104-3-4 458 104-3-4 327 103-5-20 386 103-e-23 459 tt 330 67-3-31 387 67-3-31 460 It 331 a 388 104-3-4 461 103-a-6 332 a 389 103-6-23 468 103-6-27 334 104-3-4 391 (t 469 103-6-23 335 (( 393 104-3-5 470 104-3-4 336 11 394 67-5-3 472 103-6-24 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 449 477 103-4r-9 593 103-3-21 1271 104-3-2 478 (( 596 104-6-13 1284 104-1-7 483 14r-60-13 597 (( 1290 104-3-2 484 (( 598 (f 1294 it 485 Cl 622 tt 1305 it 486 n 628 103-3-21 1317 tt 489 n 705 104-6-13 1348 104^1-7 492 103-6-24 706 it 1356 89-3-22 493 104r-6-13 712 96-1-11 1365 Est, A. M, 19 494 Est, Am. G, 1 731 103-4-15 1384 89-3-22 495 103-6-24 735 96-1-11 1421 104-6-14 496 it 775 104-6-13 1434 104-1-7 499 104r-6-13 811 104^3-2 1441 it 501 ii 840 it 1447 104-3-4 502 it 842 it 1455 ii 503 ti 845 104-6-13 1460 a 511 {( 880 104-3-2 1468 104-3-2 512 ({ 888 Est, Am. G, 1 1473 104-6-14 513 (t 908 Est, A. M, 1 1504 104-3-4 518 u 930 104-6-15 1514 ti 519 ({ 938 Est, Am. G, 1 1543 Est, Am. G, 1 520 it 940 104-3-2 1549 104-6-14 521 it 952 104-3-4 1553 ii 524 (C 954 104-3-2 1579 104-3-4 527 (t 956 it 1583 104-6-14 528 104-1-6 961 It 1602 104-3-4 530 104-6-13 974 104-6-13 1712 103-7-1 531 88-5^25 977 a 1720 104-6-14 533 104-6-13 990 104-3-3 1725 104-3-2 540 104-5-19 993 104-2-13 1729 104^6-14 542 104-6-13 994 104-3-2 1731 104-3-2 544 104-5-19 1000 it 1735 it 545 Est,Am.G, 1 1001 tt 1738 it 546 104-6-13 1002 104-3-3 1752 tt 549 11 1014 11 1759 103-4-15 550 ii 1051 104-3-2 1760 If 555 tt 1066 it 1765 104-6-15 558 iC 1068 ti 1778 104-6-14 560 103-6-25 1069 103-3-12 1782 104-3^ 561 Est, Am. G, 1 1070 104-3-4 1783 104-6-14 562 104-5-19 1076 104-3-2 1792 11 564 104-6-13 1080 It 1799 it 569 a 1100 104-3-3 1802 if 571 (( 1118 104-3-4 1806 if 572 i( 1150 96-1-11 1807 it 573 tc 1167 104-3-2 1810 104-3-2 574 11 1207 it 1813 104-6-14 582 n 1237 104-1-7 1820 u 590 tt 1250 104-3-2 1821 it 591 (( 1253 104-1-7 1834 Est, A. M, 15 2a 450 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1841 104-6-14 2197 Est, Am. G, 1 2394 u 1843 104-6-24 2199 104-6-14 2396 104-6-15 1850 104-&-14 2203 104^6-15 2397 Est, A. M, 1 1872 104r-6-15 2204 (I 2405 104-6-14 1895 104r-6^14 2209 Est, A. M, 1 2424 104r-6-15 1908 i( 2210 Est, Am. G, 1 2425 104^-6-14 1909 n 2211 Est, A. M, 1 2430 Est, A. M, 1 1910 It 2218 104-6-15 2438 104r-6-14 1915 tl 2219 (( 2439 11 1922 u 2221 Est, Am. G, 1 2441 n 1925 104-6-17 2229 104-6-15 2446 10^6-15 1926 104r^l4 2230 2447 104-6-14 1931 11 2231 2454 104-3-4 1941 u 2233 2455 104^6-16 1959 i04r-a-4 2234 2456 Est, A. M, 1 1969 104-6-14 2237 2457 It 1983 (( 2244 2464 (( 1992 (< 2246 " 2489 103-^14 1993 u 2247 2496 104-6-16 1995 il 2249 Est, Am. G, 1 2501 104-6-15 2007 u 2250 2502 Est, A. M, 1 2010 11 2252 2503 104-3-4 2037 104-6-15 2254 104-6-15 2506 104-6-15 2038 Est, Am. G, 1 2270 104-6-14 2507 u 2045 104-6-15 2278 104-6-16 2508 104^6-16 2056 104-3-4 2279 104r-3-4 2509 tc 2058 104-6-14 2289 Est, A. M, 1 2514 Est, Am. G, 1 2060 il 2290 tt 2520 Est, A. M, 1 2074 104-6-15 2295 It 2521 tl 2077 « 2296 104-6-14 2522 104-6-16 2103 104-&-16 2304 (( 2533 10^6-15 2106 11 2306 Est, A. M, 1 2543 u 2108 tt 2324 104-6-14 2550 104-6-16 2109 n 2331 104-6-16 2551 Est, A. M, 1 2113 104-6-15 2332 104-6-14 2554 104-6-15 2126 Est, Am. G, 1 2334 104-6-15 2560 104-3^ 2137 104-6-15 2337 Est, A. M, 1 2566 104-6-16 2140 > it 2342 88-5-17 2567 104-6-15 2149 tt 2346 104-6-14 2597 Est, A. M, 1 2152 tt 2350 104-6-16 2602 104-3-4 2161 104-3-4 2352 104-6-14 2603 i( 2162 Est, Am. G, 1 2356 tl 2607 104-6-15 2175 104-6-15 2365 Est, A. M, 1 2608 tl 2177 104-6-16 2380 it 2615 Est, A. M, 1 2178 104-6-15 2388 104-6-15 2624 104-6-15 2180 104-6-14 2389 104-6-16 2625 u 2185 tt 2390 tt 2626 It 2186 it 2391 tt 2627 tt 2195 ft 2392 tl 2628 tl 2196 ft 2393 104-6-14 2634 88-5-17 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 451 2636 Est, Am. G, 1 2792 104-6-16 2976 It 2640 104-6-17 2816 Est, A. M, 1 2977 tt 2642 104-6-15 2826 104-6^16 2978 104-6-16 2644 104r-6^17 2837 104-6-17 2979 104-6-17 2645 Est, A. M, 1 2839 104r-3-4 2983 104-6-16 2648 104-6-15 2840 11 2984 tt 2649 Est, A. M, 1 2841 104r-6-17 2985 Est, A. M, 1 2653 104-6-17 2845 104r-3-4 2998 104-6-17 2654 t{ 2846 104-6-18 3000 104^6-16 2656 104-6-15 2848 Est, A. M, 1 3001 104r-6^18 2657 ii 2857 104-6-16 3002 Est, A. M, 19 2658 11 2858 11 3003 Est, A. M, 1 2659 (( 2859 (I 3004 It 2676 103-4-14 2860 (t 3005 tt 2679 104-&-15 2861 104-6-15 3006 tt 2680 (< 2862 a 3014 Est, A. M, 19 2681 Est, A. M, 1 2870 104r-6-17 3019 104r-6-17 2705 104-6^15 2872 104r-6-16 3025 tt 2706 (( 2874 Est, A. M, 1 3026 104-6-16 2707 (I 2875 u 3028 Est, A. M, 1 2708 i( 2878 104-6-16 3032 u 2709 11 2885 104-6-17 3033 tt 2716 Est, A. G, 1 2893 Est, A. M, 1 3034 u 2718 104-6-15 2896 104-6-16 3035 tt 2719 104-6-17 2900 Est, A. M, 19 3036 104-6-17 2720 << 2901 u 3037 tt 2721 « 2902 n 3038 tt 2722 104-^15 2904 104-6-17 3039 tt 2723 ii 2906 103-3-13 3042 ti 2724 a 2910 104-6-17 3044 tt 2732 Est, A. M, 1 2911 (( 3045 It 2735 104-6-15 2912 104-6-16 3050 104-6-16 2737 (< 2916 11 3051 104-6-17 2740 ii 2917 it 3052 It 2745 11 2919 u 3053 tt 2757 Est, A. M, 1 2920 tl 3067 Est, A. M, 1 2761 104-6-16 2923 (( 3058 tt 2762 ii 2928 Est, A. M, 1 3062 tt 2763 Est, A. M, 1 2929 u 3070 104-^18 2764 104-6-15 2930 it 3110 (( 2765 Est, A. M, 1 2933 104-6-17 3142 104-6-17 2766 104-6-16 2934 104r-6-16 3143 tt 2771 8^5-17 2935 (< 3152 tt 2777 Est, A. M, 1 2944 Est, A. M, 19 3154 tt 2780 ' « 2945 ({ 3155 tt 2781 104-6-16 2949 104-6-17 3156 tt 2782 88-5-17 2951 Est, A. M, 1 3157 Est, A. M, 1 2783 Est, A. M, 1 2967 a 3184 l( 3375 tc 3532 ti 3185 (( 3376 tl 3534 ft 3186 If 3377 (( 3538 ft 3191 tt 3379 tt 3539 ft 3193 tt 3380 t( 3540 tt 3204 tt 3382 11 3547 ft 3205 <( 3389 u 3558 (( 3206 it 3390 tt 3562 tt 3223 Est, A. M, 1 3394 103-1-13 3563 ft 3248 104r-6-17 3401 104-6-17 3564 ft 3252 (( 3402 (< 3565 ft 3254 96-1-12 3403 11 3574 a 3260 104-6-17 3404 (( 3606 if 3262 104r-6-18 3406 104-6-18 3613 ft 3265 ii 3409 ti 3615 it 3266 (( 3410 (( 3619 ti 3267 104r-6-17 3411 (I 3624 a 3268 n 3412 a 3625 It 3269 tt 3413 (( 3626 if 3270 tt 3416 It 3638 V << 3272 tt 3418 ti 3639 ft 3275 tt 3423 li 3641 104-6-17 3276 tt 3430 li 3650 « 3280 tt 3431 a 3655 104-6-18 3285 tt 3432 ii 3660 103-4-12 3288 104-5-24 3433 103-6-8 3671 104-6-18 3291 104r-6-18 3453 104-6-18 3673 li 3292 (( 3454 ii 3674 103-4-12 3293 103-3-13 3455 ii 3675 fi 3294 C( 3457 104-5-24 3676 104-6-18 3299 104-6-18 3460 104-6-18 3678 li 3300 (( 3462 a 3687 if 3301 104-6-17 3464 ii 3688 ft 3311 104-6-18 3465 it 3689 ft 3319 96-1-12 3469 a 3691 « 3323 104-7-33 3470 tt 3693 <( 3325 104-6-17 3474 if 3697 tf 3326 li 3475 ii 3705 ft 3327 104-6-18 3478 a 3712 tf 3328 It 3479 a 3719 104-6-17 3331 104-6-17 3481 if 3723 103-4-12 3343 104-6-18 3484 ft 3741 ft 3346 104-6-17 3494 ft 3743 ft 3351 104-6-18 3496 a 3791 103-4-9 3357 104-6-17 3521 if 3879 li 3358 104-6-18 3522 ft 3880 103-4-12 3360 (( 3525 ft 3881 103-4-17 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 453 3882 103-4-9 4330 n 5160 104^5-19 3917 103-^19 4354 tl 5161 tt 3924 104-fr-19 4406 103-4-24 5176 It 3925 tc 4408 « 5204 103-5-5 3926 tt 4409 it 5206 103-5-6 3965 103-^9 4430 ({ 5227 103-5-5 3966 u 4492 103-4-13 5244 103-5-6 3974 103-4-12 4493 (( 5258 104-5-19 3997 103-^19 4514 104-6-19 5297 (( 4017 104-6-19 4541 103-4-14 5298 104-5-24 4082 103-3-24 4568 103-3-24 5302 104-5-19 4095 103-^13 4633 103^-13 5399 105-1-25 4097 It 4727 103-5-2 5400 (( 4103 u 4767 104-6-20 5453 104-5-19 4128 104^6-19 4793 103-5-3 5458 It 4129 t( 4915 103-5-4 5492 ft 4130 a 4932 a 5613 Est, A. M, 2 4131 103-4-19 4933 ii 5711 103-5-11 4189 103-7-7 4934 tt 5712 (( 4190 (( 4935 tt 5722 tl 4244 103-4-14 4938 tt APPENDIX I Table Showing Total Receipts and Disbursements of the Real Caja of Guadalajara in Each Year from 1743 to 1781 The following table was prepared by the writer from materials in legajos 104-3-9 and 104r-3-21 in the Archivo General de Indias. The three sets of figures given in each column are for pesos, tomines or reales, and granos, respectively. Remissions were made to the caja real of the place named. Percentage is reckoned on the basis of the proportion of the amount remitted to the amount of receipts. These figures are commented upon in chapter three. Remissions Years Receipts Disbursements % Mexico Alamos 1743 255,183-2-4 37,119-4-10 218,063-5-6 85 1744 234,952-0-3 36,825-2-3^ 198,126-6-0 — 84 1745 227,650-1-8^ 31,082-6-6- 196,567-3-2 — 86 1746 200,050-0-91 33,621-5-6- 166,428-3-3 — 83 1747 213,648-5-5^ 35,775-5-5 177,873-0-0 — 83 1748 256,947-2-9 37,970-5-Of 2 18,976-5-8 J — 85 1749 244,502^-10 58,531-0-2 185,971-4-8 — 761 1750 346,357-^-0 32,513-6-8 313,843-5-4 — 90 1751 344,796-4-1 39,370-7-3 305,425-4r-10 — 88 1752 279,934-3-5 34,576-7-9 245,357-3-8 — 87 1753 381,447-3-1 36,755-5-7 344,691-5-6 — 90 1754 248,254-1-3^ 35,259-0^^ 212,995-0-11 — 85 1755 281,326-1-4 32,841-2-3^ 248,484-7-^ — 88 1756 253,962-1-10^ 34,430-0-7^ 219,532-1-3 — 86 1757 263,468-0-5^ 34,215-3-21 229,252-5-3 — 87 1758 302,522-1-9 34,001-0-U 268,521-1-7 — 88 1759 304,736-2-11 34,638^t-2 270,097-6-9 — 88 1760 277,108-1-3 35,630-2-6^ 241,477-6-8^ 4 87 1761 321,828-6-2^ 36,527-5-5^ 285,301-0-9 — 88 1762 348,568-1-21 36,074-6-8^ 312,493-2-6 — 89 1763 410,041-5-5 37,544-1-6 372,497-3-11 — 90 1764 354,940-3-8 42,299-3-0 312,641-0-8 — 88 1765 418,981-6-11 46,353-2-9 372,628-4-2 — 88 1766 514,073-7-0 36,864-3-11 477,209-3-1 — 92 1767 425,691-5-0 43,014-7-10 382,676-5-2 — 89 1768 453,036-5-1 53,756-5-7 399,279-7-6 — 88 1769 432,699-5-9^ 44,961-7-1^ 387,737-6-8 — 89 iThe amount remitted in 1749 if disbursements included the situado would have been eighty-four per cent, for a presidio, as seems likely. 45.5 456 APPENDIX I Table Showing Total Receipts and Disbursements of the Real Caja of Guadalajara in Each Year from 1743 to 1781. ; Continued Remissions Years Receipts Disbursements % Mexico Alamos 1770 344,667-6-9 43,322-7-8^ 301,344-6-1 _ 87 1771 344,608-6-10 49,148-0-4 295,460-6-6 — 85 1772 382,643-1-3 56,915-1-11 314,930-1-0 — 82 2 1773 540,986-6-4 58,086-1-4 376,940-1-7 91,995 86 2 1774 510,874-1-4 70,030-0-61 324,479-1-6^ 104,493-1-0 842 1775 524,422-5-91 64,553-0-lOi 316,991-4-2 132,991-2-0 852 1776 496,383-6-11 60,591-0-9 314,027-1-3^ 110,000 852 1777 450,317-7-6 92,883-6-81 290,486-1-0 50,000 752 1778 567,368-1-8 97,337-6-4 350,030-3-4 120,000 82 1779 628,338-7-51 15,668-4-21 312,670-3-3 200,000 813 4 1780 526,072-2-5 70,146-7-0 307,806-6-0 140,000 85« 1781 717,847-7-lOi 81,516-1-6 436,475-1-8^ 130,000 792 4 14,631,242-6-1 1,892,757-1-6^ 11,505,995-4-1 U 1,079,479-3-0 86 2 The discrepancy between totals for these years is due to the fact that small amounts were kept on hand, e.g. in 1772, 10,797-6-^. 3 The total receipts in 1779 were 948,338-7-53^, but of this amount 320,000 had been sent from Mexico. , * In the columns for remissions to Alamos, San Bias figured twice. In 1779, San Bias got 80,000 from Guada- lajara, and in 1781, the full 130,000. In fact, San Bias got 400,000 in 1779, but that sum included the 320,000 sent from Mexico (supra, n. 3). Of this amount 150,000 was for the Philippines. g ill II _5 : ^ ''i: '- 7. J a1 ^ % L' '' " 7" 5? • K P4 rrrr : ~ 1 z i ^ 1 -1 ■-?. '^ ! - ^ ^ i^ ' i C 1 ~ ' > ^ " C i "•' 1 < i ^ ^^J -~ 1 - - ~^ ' ! , ;^ ; " ? ■^ il ^ 2 « 2_v4 "r ~ ^ '.f 1 : - i ^'% ^^ -i'^/ I 1 , 1 "*^ 1-' ? - "~- Tj^ ' = t ' = ' J ~ ^ ^ 2 S 2Jcf Z 2 5- - 2 =£ -£ - ,:= ^^ - ' 1^1 ■ i'. ^ — _ - -,~ -^ g 'Z'Li J 1 w ^ ^ -~ •-r, fc > ?1 ■ r1 - ^•f 1 ' - c::; ^ ~: O g *m^ ^ -_ ^ ■- f'«! ^ ^ 1 -< 1— 1 '•^~, ~ i ~- 1 ~ 5 5 i _I.(J. 1 ^' Tj ._ X' ^ - ^ O . 'iM ^ : .; ^'^^ CO 'w w H •'.ii's ~ ^ Ci ~ - w 12; ^ !-;^~ - _^ r H^ w 51-. -- ; ■^ ~ -JE * pq a Jit •-- 1 ;^ 1 ; ^ __ .- - ,^ ; ? ^^^ -^ — w m 1 § ^ ^1J - o Q - w ;:X "5 3 llli lo _j _ i ^ rr r ''; |-^ ■ ' i"^ t— ( C - 1 l-*- 1 " -^ ^ M s <■ ^ 1 ~ -.' _ V-1 s d i:.'- r -= ^ -? '-5 'z. r^ w -2--; 2 1 - - i*" Ph Ph ^^ds:^k^i^d^m- O'iS APPENDIX III Diaries of the Anza Expeditions In recent years many copies of different diaries of the Anza expeditions have been procured by American Ubraries, and a number of them have been translated and published, so that most are accessible. It would not be worth while to attempt to make a list of all such copies, but there is a real value in pointing out the location of original diaries, or, where that is not known, of such contemporary copies as were used by the government at that time as a basis for action. It is still far from possible to provide a complete list, but I shall point out as many of the diaries as I have been able to get trace of, giving also a brief indication of their content and use. I shall eliminate variants, rough drafts, and extracts. All of the diaries mentioned, except the larger Font, exist in some form in the Academy of Pacific Coast History. 7. The Expedition of 1774 A. 1774. Jan. 8 to Apr. 5. San Gabriel. Juan Bautista de Anza. Diario de la Ruta y operadones que yo el infrascrito Capitdn . . . hdgo y practico en solicitud de abrir camino de dha Provincia [Sonora] d la California Setemptrional. Certified copy, June 26, 1774, Mexico. 120 pages, 21J by 31 cm. A.G.I., 104r-6^15 ; another, A.G.I., 104-3^. C-2503. B. 1774. Apr. 6 to May 27. Dated Nov. 13, Mexico. Juan Baup*.* de Anza. Continuacion del Diario del Capitdn . . . Anza . . . que . . . comprehende su regreso hasta . . . Tubac. Certified copy, Nov. 26, 1774, Mexico. 23 pages, 21^ by 31 cm. A.G.I., 104-6-15; another, A.G.I., 104^3-4. C-2602. C. 1774. Jan. 8 to May 27. Dated Nov. 13, Mexico. Juan Bap*» de Anza. Diario dela 1°. Expedicion q practico por Tierra el ano de 74 el Ten^.^ coronet . . . Ansa d los Nuevos estahlecim^"? de la California. Original. [A.P.C.H. copy, 92 pages, 21 by 27^ cm., typed.] A.G.P., Historia, v. 396. D. 1774. Jan. 8 to Mar. 22. San Gabriel. Juan Diaz. Diario, que forma el Padre Fr. Juan Diaz . . . en el viage . . . para abrir camino desde la Provincia de la Sonora d la California Septentrinal. Original. [A.P.C.H. copy, 33 pages, 21 by 27^ cm., typed.] A.G.P., Historia, V. 396. E. 1774. May 3 to May 26. Tubac. Juan Diaz. Diario que formd el P. Fr. Juan Diaz . . . en el Viage, que hizo desde . . . S^ Gabriel . . . hasta . . . Tubac. Certified copy, Sept. 26, 1774, Mexico. 19 pages, 21i by 31 cm. A.G.I., 104-6-17. 02616. 457 458 APPENDIX III F. 1774. Jan. 22 to Apr. 26. San Dionisio [near the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers]. Francisco Garc^s. Diario de la Entrada que se practica . . . para los nuevos Establecimientos de San Diego, y Mon- terrey. Original. [A.P.C.H. copy, from an unnamed source in Spain, 52 pages, 23 by 33 cm., typed]. A.G.P., Historia, v. 52. The latter part of C is the same as B, but the earlier part of C differs substantially from A. The paragraphing is the same, but in C remarks are added or left out and the Spanish phraseology is improved. A, D, and F were carried to Mexico by Anza's courier Valdes, being deUvered to Bucarely early in June. No continuation of Garc^s' diary has been found, nor any complete Diaz or Garc^s diary like the C of Anza. Garces prob- ably wrote a continuation, and this seems the more likely since he remained in one of the Cocomaricopa villages of the Gila, after Anza's expedition had departed.^ The signfccance of the opening and closing dates of the diaries is explained in a note.^ A, B, and C are fullest in details, and perhaps had most weight with governmental officials of the time. D and E are brief, and much like A, J5, and C in matters of route, but add something in other respects. F is strikingly original, good on matters of route, and teeming with Garces' ideas concerning the advancement of the conquest. D and E are in excellent Spanish ; the Spanish of F is so bad as to be at times almost unintelUgible ; ^ and A, B, and C are a readable medium between them. //. The Expedition of 1775-76 G. 1775, Oct. 23, to June 1, 1776. Horcasitas. Juan Bap*.* de Anza. Diario de la Rutta y Operadones que Yo el Infrascripto Theniente Coronet . . . practico segunda vez . , . d la California Setemptrional. Original. [A.P.C.H. copy, 142 pages, 21 by 27^ cm., typed]. A.G.P., .9ai,.osritY3QH H. 1775, Oct. 21, to Sept. 17, 1776. Dated Jan. 3, 1777. Tubutama. Francisco Garces. Diario que ha formado . . . en el triage hecho este ano de 1775 . . . con . . . Anza, y . . . Font . . . acompandndolos hasta el rlo Colorado. Certified copy. May 31, 1777, Mexico. 215 pages, 21| by 31 cm. A.G.I. , 104r-6-18 ; another copy, not certified, in the same legajo. C-3001. 1 Garc6s was desirous of finding out begins a new diary ; April 26, the party whether he could get a letter through sent back to the Colorado under Garc6s to New Mexico from that point. reaches San Dionisio, near the junction ; 2 January 8, the expedition leaves May 3, the remainder of Anza's forces Tubac ; January 22, the departure leaves San Gabriel for the return to from Caborca, after which point the Sonora ; May 26, Anza and Diaz reach march was to proceed through lands Tubac ahead of the expedition ; May not nearly so well known as those be- 27, the expedition reaches Tubac. tween Tubac and Caborca ; March 22, 3 1 am inclined to believe that Garc6s' the arrival at San Gabriel ; April 5, bad Spanish is in some measure the Anza decides to send back part of his fault of copyists. Garc6s refers to the forces to the Colorado River and ends illegible character of his penmanship diary A, in order to send that with the in Garc6s to Bucarely, Mar. 8, 1773 returning party, and thence to Mexico ; (In C-2113.) April 6, while still at San Gabriel, Anza APPENDIX III 459 /. 1775, Sept. 29, to June 2, 1776. Dated June 23, 1776, Ures. Pedro Font. Diario que forma . . . del viage que hizo d Monterey y Puerto de S^ Francisco. Original. 79 pages, 15f by 21 cm. A.P.C.H. /. 1775, Sept. 29, to June 2, 1776. Dated May 11, 1777, Tubutama. Pedro Font. Diario que formo . . . en el viage que hizo d Monterey. Original. 336 pages, 14f by 20 cm. John Carter Brown Library, Providence.'* Father Eixarch accompanied the expedition as far as the junction of the Gila and Colorado rivers, but no diary by him has been found. / is an expansion of /, the two being identical except for the extensive insertions in J.^ Although there are wide differences in the Garc^s diaries that have come to light, it is probable that they are but variants from the same original.^ The opening and closing dates of the diaries are explained in a note.^ F is an exceptionally important document, but not so valuable for the Anza expedition as the others, since Garc^s did not go on with Anza when the latter departed from the Gila and Colorado junction on December 4. Further references to the expedition appear, however, in entries of later date. H was accorded prominent attention by the governmental authori- ties, but more particularly for its testimony concerning the region of the Colorado and Gila and the route to Moqui. For the expedition proper, G was the most important diary from the standpoint of official use. The style and the Spanish of G and H are similar respectively to A,B, C, and F of the 1774 diaries. /, the official Font diary, is a meagre account, not comparable with G in value, except for information regarding the explora- tion of San Francisco Bay, in which case the story is given by it in detail. / seems not to have been written with a view to being submitted to the governmental authorities, nor have I seen any reference to it in official correspondence. For the facts of the expedition, however, it is a note- worthy supplement to G, and for information about the lands and peoples along the march it is very valuable, mentioning details not occurring in other diaries of the two expeditions, e.g. descriptions of flora. Although something of a pedant, Font perhaps had a greater fund of learning than * Mr. Champlin Burrage, librarian nal. Cf. n, 3. H was not known to of the John Carter Brown Library, Coues. It would seem to be nearest very graciously supplied me with the to the original, in point of date of certi- technical data concerning diary J. fication, of any Garc6s diary at present * The Font accounts are considered known. Coues translated into English in Pedro Font, The Anza expedition of one of the versions that he refers to. 1775-1776 ; diary of Pedro Font, edited Another appears in Spanish in Docu- by Frederick J. Teggart, in A.P.C.H., mentos para la historia de Mexico. 2d Publications, III, 3-5. Berkeley, 1913. series, I, 225-374. In the same work, pages 6 to 131, the ^September 29, 1775, the expedi- Spanish and an English translation of tion leaves Horcasitas; October 21, / appear. Of the four accounts men- Oarers goes from his mission of Bac to tioned there, one seems to have been Tubac, to join the expedition there ; a report by Font to his college, not a October 23, the expedition leaves diary, and another was the rough draft Tubac; June 1, 1776, arrival at Hor- that he made in course of the march. casitas on the return ; June 2, still at ' A consideration of three Oarers Horcasitas, where Font makes an diaries is given in Garc6s (Coues ed.), astronomical observation; September I, Introditction. Coues surmised that 17, Garc6s reaches Bac on his return, all three were based on the same origi- 460 APPENDIX III the other frontier missionaries whose diaries have come to my notice, and he does not fail to display his knowledge in diary J whenever occasion offers. Much space is devoted also to the expression of his petty and rather harmless spite against Anza. From the trivial details which he cites in this connection, however, and so too from other portions of his account, one gets such an intimate view of the march as rarely appears in official diaries. From the standpoint of interest as a story, I have never read a diary that compares with the J of Font. APPENDIX IV The Echeveste-Anza Calculation of the Probable Cost of the Second Anza Expedition In course of the preparations for Anza's second expedition Anza and Juan Jos6 de Echeveste were asked to draw up a minute calculation of the prob- able cost of the expedition. A translation of their calculation is given below, partly because it bears a relation to the northwestward movement, showing in one instance the expense which the government was ready to undergo, but more because of its interest from the standpoint of individual equipment, wages, and prices at that time. The estimates are in pesos and reales, eight reaks being worth one peso. The present value of a peso would be fifty cents. I have seen copies of this document in three testi- monios concerning the preparations for the second Anza expedition. The location and nature of the three testimonies are as follows : A. Certified copy, dated December 24, 1774, Mexico, in A.G.I., 104r-6- 16. (C-2496.) B. Copy in A.P.C.H, of a certified copy, dated January 18, 1775, Mexico, in A.G.P., California^, v. 72. C. Copy in A.P.C.H. of a certified copy, dated March 20, 1777, Mexico, in A.G.P., California^, v. 35. The original is probably in A.G.P., Provincias Internas, v. 134, a volume which contains the originals of other documents in the file of papers con- cerning the authorization of the second Anza expedition. Jos^ de Gorrdez certified that the copies mentioned in A and B conformed to the original, and Melchor de Peramds did so for the copy referred to in C. There are some differences in the three. B employs abbreviations of words, while the words appear in full in A and C. Certain obvious errors or omissions in some of the copies are corrected by use of the others. The translation is based on all three, with an indication in notes of some of their difficulties and differences. "Minute calculation of the cost that it may amount to : for the ward- robe of thirty recruits, their wives, and the garments adequate for one hundred and eighty children, six for each one, half for males and half for females ; for the arms, riding-horses, rations, and baggage for the service and transportation of all, from the province of Ostimuri to the presidio of San Carlos de Monterey, namely : 461 462 APPENDIX IV " Wardrobe jor a Man 3 shirts of good Silesian linen at 18 redks 6 pesos 6 3 pairs of underdrawers of Puebla cloth ^ of 4 varas,^ each one " 2 " 3 " 2 cloth coats which with their lining and trimmings are worth 9 " 3 2 pairs of trousers, ditto 5 " 3 2 pairs of stockings " 2 " " 4 2 pairs of chamois-skin boots " 10 " 2 " 4 3 pairs of gaiter shoes ^ '' 5 " 1 " 7 1 cloth cape lined with thick flannel 11 '' 1 hat " 6 2 Puebla powder-cloths * - " 2 " " 4 1 ribbon for the hat and hair " 4 " Ditto for a Woman 3 shirts i 3 pairs of white Puebla petticoats 2 pairs of petticoats, some of silk serge, others of thick flannel, and an underskirt, all at a cost of 2 varas of linen stuff for two linings 2 pairs of Brussels stockings 2 pairs of hose 2 pairs of shoes 2 women's shawls Ihat 6 varas of ribbon 41 pesos 3 For 30 wardrobes of men and women at 83 pesos, 4 reales 2505 pesos 42 pesos 1 it 4 pesos 12 pesos " 12 reales 4 u 4 16 " u 5 .. 1 " 2 " ^ " 1 " 1 u 2 « " 4 u g u 1 u 4 u 12 '< 3 " " 6 " 6 " Clothing for Ninety Boys 5 pieces of cloth containing 180 varas at 12 reales 270 pesos 12 pieces of Puebla cloth for linings and white trousers " 6 pesos 4 reales 78 " 270 varas of linen stuff for shirts of about S varas " 5 " 168 " 6 50 hats «* " 4 " 25 " 8 dozen shoes for children of various sizes " 4 '< 32 " * The Spanish is Manta de la Puebla. Manta is a coarse kind of cloth. 2 A vara is equivalent to 2.78 feet. 3J5 has zapatos ahotonad^ which might be rendered "button shoes." A and C have it zapatos abotinados (or avotinados in C) , which might mean black shoes or gaiter shoes as rendered above. * This is a doubtful translation for Pafioa de Polvos Poblanos. 8 Possibly the fifty hats were only a reserve supply, as the boys might be expected to have a hat apiece to begin with. Certainly fifty hats could not be divided among ninety boys. APPENDIX IV 463 " Clothing for an Equal Number of Girls 270 varas of linen stuff for shirts at 5 reales 168 pesos 6 4 pieces of Puebla cloth ^ for petticoats and linings " 6 pesos 4 26 " 90 cloths for women's shawls of all sizes " 10 reales 112 " 4 2 pieces of thick flannel for little petticoats " 45 pesos 90 " 4 pieces of cloth of about 34 vara^ for under- shirts ''12 reales a vara 204 " 12 pieces of ribbon for bands 20 " 16 ditto of fine rope 5 " 8 dozen shoes for girls of various sizes '* 4 pesos 32 " 120 blankets, single bed size for all " 15 reales 225 " 120 shepherds' 7 blankets " 5 " 75 " " Arms 20 saddle-tree guns * 20 cases of those that they call /undos ordi- narias ^^ of good timber 20 swords 20 lances 22 ^1 leather jackets ^^ of about 7 ases ^^ each a vara and a quarter in length 30 shoulder-belts with the name of San Carlos de Monterey 20 cartridge-boxes with 14 bullets 996 pesos 6 " Horses and Trapping for a Man ^* 60 horses, 2 for each recruit at 8 pesos 480 pesos 20 saddles " 9 " 4 reales 190 " 20 pairs of spurs " 7 " 17 " 4 20 fine mule-bits " 11 " 27 " 4 20 pairs of pads " 2 " 40 " * Mania is rendered "Puebla cloth," men, which are attached to the saddle- although de la Puebla does not appear tree. The word "guns" is used in- in this case. stead of "shot-gun" because escopetas ' For Pastoras, a word that does not was frequently used in documents of appear in the Spanish dictionaries. that time, as if it were the general Probably it was made from the noun word for "gun." Pasfor, meaning "shepherd." Blankets ^° Fundas ordinaries is equivalent worn to-day by shepherds in Mexico to "ordinary cases." have a hole in the centre through which ^^ Eight of the thirty soldiers were the wearer puts his head, leaving the to be veterans ; therefore but twenty- blanket to fall naturally about his two were necessary, shoulders. '^ B has cuerdas which would mean 'Thus it appears that the wardrobe "ropes," "cords," or "halters," clearly for each man in terms of American an error for cueras which A and C have, money, if a peso is reckoned as fifty " An as is a measure of weight cents, was to cost $21,03 ; each woman, amounting to eleven ounces. There- $20.59; each boy, $4.02; and each fore, these jackets would weigh four girl, $4.48. pounds and eleven ounces each. » Escopetas de Arzon means literally " This paragraph was omitted in A, "shot-guns of saddle-tree," probably an error of the copyist, for these esti- referring to the guns used by cavalry- mates of expense appear in the totals. 1532 pesos 08 at 12 pesos 240 pesos " 15 reales 37 " 4 85 " 40 " " 24 pesos 528 " " 11 reales 41 " 2 25 " 464 APPENDIX IV " Ditto for a Woman and Family 60 mares at 8 pesos 480 pesos 30 saddles " 9 " 4reales285 " 30 fine mule-bits " 11 " 41 '' 2 1561 pesos 2 By 60 rations, 3 ^^ each family at 1| reales in 40 days which is reckoned as the duration of the march, with the neces- sary delays, in the 200 leagues from Alamos ^^ to the pre- sidio of Tubac 450 pesos o "Baggage and Beasts of Burden 20 mules at 25 pesos 500 pesos 20 instruments and things in connec- tion with them « 4 « 2^ reales 8^ " 2 30 chamois-skin gripsacks for the soldiers and their families " 2 " 60 " 646 pesos 2 By 3 months' pay in advance to the lieutenant, sergeant, and 28 soldiers : the first at the rate of the enjoyment of 700 pesos a year ; 450 to the second ; and one peso daily to each soldier 2807 pesos 4 10,498 pesos 6 " Collection of stores at the presidio of Tubac necessary for the expedition, of useful articles necessary for it, of cattle, provisions, and their convey- ances, to ration all its people, reckoning 70 days' march, including rests, for 122 individuals, to which its number reaches, the expense of everything in detail and that of the aid [in useful articles] which it is bearing to the presidio of San Carlos de Monterey, namely : I flag with the royal coat of arms 12 pesos II tents for cavalry of bramant linen, with wooden frames from those that the factory of the royal estate ^^ possesses, and [of a kind] that shall be fit for use,^^ 10 for the 30 families and [the other] for the Father Chaplain 4 Biscayan hatchets well strengthened with iron 4 spades ditto 4 shovels ditto 1 small crow-bar 10 ball cartridges 40 sole-leather powder-flasks for blasting Carry forward " This should be two rations a day fact the vicinity where Anza intended for each family, because there were to recruit his force. thirty families, and, in fact, but two ^^ Real Hacienda, referring to the meals a day were taken during the board of finance in Mexico, march. It is written "3" in B and C, ^^ B and C omit the part of this sen- and 'Hrea" in A. , tence after "possesses" through "use." ^^ B has los hams. Alamos was in at 27 pesos 292 ' ' n 3 " 12 ' ' 11 9 reales 4 ' ' 4 (I 3 pesos 12 ' ' (f 5 ' ' ' ' (I 4 reales 20 ' ' 345 pe SOS 4 APPENDIX IV 465 Brought forward 345 pesos 4 8 iron pans ^* ' at 2 pesos 10 copper campaign kettles " 12 large chocolate-pots ditto " 1 case of iron pieces ^^ well adapted and arranged ; f for horses and ^ for mules ; with a duplicate key 1 tool-chest [with the instruments] for shoeing horses 10 2 blank-books for military registers " 2 " __4 550 pesos 4 " Cattle and Provisions to Ration the People of the Expedition 16 75 » 6 82 100 head of cattle, one for each day 30 loads of flour for tortillas ^2 60 fanegas ^ of pinole ^ 60 fanegas of kidney-beans 6 cases of ordinary chocolate 2 tercios ^ of white sugar with 6 ^ arrobas 12 pesos [worth] of soap 3 barrels of aguardiente ^ for necessities at 8 pesos 800 pesos 8 " 240 " 18 reales 135 5 pesos 300 225 12 12 213 2 71 1957 pesos "Table for the comandante and chaplain about which Echeveste is making a statement to His Excellency the viceroy against the objection of the party concerned [Anza]. 1 case of beans ^ with 7 arrobas at 5 pesos 35 pesos 25 pounds of pork-sausage " 1 " 25 " 6 cases of biscuit 96 " 1 ditto of fine chocolate with 7 arrobas at 3f reales ^ 82 " 1 barrel of wine 65 " 6 arrobas of cheese at 2 pesos 12 " 4 pounds of pepper "5^ reales 2 " 6 i pound of saffron 3 " 4 ounces of cloves at 6 pesos a pound 1 " 4 4 ditto of cinnamon " 9 " " " 2 " 2 Carry forward i» Comales, or flat pans, used in cook- ing corn-cakes. 20 B and C have 15 pesos, but the 75 of A is in accord with the totals and with the normal price. 21 The Spanish word is herreaje in A and errage in B and C, for what is now herraje. The literal translation has been preferred rather than "shoes" or "horseshoes," which the writers probably meant, that word being herradura. 22 A kind of pan-cake. 2' A fanega is equivalent to about 1.6 bushels. 223 pesos 4 2* A kind of cereal meal. 2s A tercio is one of the packages of a mule-load. 2« A has 16, but 6 seems to be right. ^ An arroba is equivalent to 25 pounds. 28 A spirituous liquor. 25 In A it is jamones, or hams. *> The extension for the amount and price stated is wrong, but some small measure seems to be contemplated. At SH reales a pound the extension would be correct and more in keeping with the price that we would expect. 2h 466 APPENDIX IV Brought forward 323 pesos 4 1 jug 31 of [olive] oil at 4 '' 2 1 ditto of vinegar 5 " For the freight of all the pieces reckoned at 500 arrobas " 28 reales 750 " For sleeping-mats,32 guangoches,^ large sacks and plaited bass-ropes 78 ^^^ 6 For 140 leathern sacks for the provisions "4 reales 70 " 2232 pesos 4 " Beasts of Burden for Carriage [of Freight] 4 divisions composed of 132 mules at 25 pesos 3300 pesos 100 complete harnesses for the 4 divisions " 6^ " 650 " 20 mule-drivers with their respective monthly sal- aries from 8 to 14 pesos, reckoned for a journey of only 2| months 540 " 4490 pesos " Provision and Aid for the New Establishments 200 head of cattle : bulls and cows at 6 pesos 1200 pesos 6 Indian cowboys at 1 real each day 52 " 4 1252 pesos 4 " Gifts far the Indians 6 cases of glass beads that contain no black and abound in red, with 600 war-clubs at 8| reales 637 pesos 4 1 sleeveless cloak of blue cloth lined with gold " 20 " 1 coat and trousers of chamois-skin " 13 " 2 shirts ^s ^ "4 pesos 8 " 1 cap with its coat of arms like that of dragons 5 " 2 terdos of highest grade tobacco containing 350 lbs. 262 " 4 946 pesos [Total] 21,927 pesos 2 " As appears in the margin, the calculation of the outfit of the 30 recruits with their families and wardrobe, the arms, horses and trappings, baggage and beasts of burden, and other expenses of the second expedition of Captain Juan Bautista de Anza, from his presidio of San Ignacio de Tubac to that of San Carlos de Monterey, [amounts to] 21,927 pesos, 2 reales, in which quantity is included the ^estimated value of the effects at present in the royal estate here and at Alamos, to the end that one may at once gain a clear knowledge of the total cost of the expedition." ^^ ^ Botija, a round, earthen, short- eluding it the total becomes a peso too necked jug. high, but without it would be 9 pesos ^ The word is petates, which might too much. The shirts, as also the also be rendered "luggage" or "bag- cloak, coat, and trousers, were for a gage." gift to Chief Palma of the Yumas. 83 Guangoches is the Mexican word ^s xhe signature of Juan Jos6 de for a certain kind of thick, coarse cloth. Echeveste alone appears on all three ^ B and C have 18 pesos, but the copies, but it is clear from other docu- 78 of A accords with the totals. ments that Anza helped Echeveste to ^ B and C omit this item. By in- draw up the document. APPENDIX V Resolution of the Junta of December 16, 1774, Concerning Authorization of a Second Expedition by Anza to Alta California The following literal translation was based on a copy in the Academy of Pacific Coast History from the original resolution, signed with the names and rubrics of the members of the junta, in A.G.P., Provindas Internas, V. 134. This was compared and found to agree substantially with copies B and C, referred to in Appendix IV. The document is also in copy A of Appendix IV (C-2496). It is referred to in the text in chapter XII, where the names of the signers are given, in note 70. " It was resolved by common agreement : that, for the new expedition or sally which Captain Don Juan Bautista de Anza is to make from his presidio of San Ignacio de Tubac to that of San Carlos de Monterey and to the two new missions which are to be estabhshed, everything be done as he has proposed for the accomplishment of so laudable an enterprise, to which effect and as regards enlistments of those [soldier-settlers] whom His Excellency deemed necessary to accompany him, let there be issued by the said Excellency the suitable decrees for appointments of a lieutenant and a sergeant from one of the subjects proposed for each position by Captain Anza, leaving to his [Anza's] judgment the choice of ten soldiers that he needs to accompany him [to Alta California and back], and granting that he himself may recruit the rest to his satisfaction. And to this end, and that such desertion as may occur may be checked, let His Excellency despatch the strictest orders to the respective courts of justice, that they on their part may aid Captain Don Juan Bautista de Anza on this and other matters which may present themselves in the accompUshment of this undertaking, until [he may go] by way of the same route that he discovered, deliver his people to Comandante Don Fernando de Rivera y Moncada, and assist in exploring the Rio de San Francisco, and thereupon be able to inform His Excellency of what he may see there, and return with the ten soldiers accompanying him. And let him be accompanied, as on the first expedition, by Father Carets who will wait for him on the banks of the Colorado until his return ; and besides the said Father, he shall be accompanied also by Fray Pedro Font on all the journey, so that [the latter] as one skilled in these matters may observe latitudes. And to this effect let there be sent to him by the hand of Captain Anza the instruments which he may need, and for this matter [about Font] let the fitting official letter of request and command be despatched by His Excellency to the Reverend Father Supe- rior [of Queretaro]. " And having noted the total of expense to which this expedition amounts, and that Don Jos6 de Echeveste and the captain himself took things into consideration in detail in order to form it,^ and as this royal junta has considered the matter with exceeding particularity, it was resolved with * This refers to the itemized list of expected expenditures. See Appendix IV. 467 468 APPENDIX V respect to these affairs, that from the pious funds employed for propaga- tion of the faith in the Californias there be spent 10,000 pesos of the treas- ure at present in the money chest assigned for its custody, to which end the director [of the pious fund] shall put at the disposal of the royal officials of this court 10,000 pesos for the expenses of the new expedition, which sum they shall deliver to the factor Don Manuel Ramon de Goya, and they shall do the same with whatever more may be required to be spent for it, and whatever it shall be, let it be charged to the account of the royal treasury. Let 2000 more pesos from the same funds [be delivered] to the syndic of the College of San Fernando, a thousand for each of the new missions which are going to be established at the Rio de San Francisco or in its vicinity, it likewise remaining in the duty of His Excellency to despatch the corresponding official letter to the Reverend Father Superior [requiring him] to put in them the missionary Fathers of his [college] who are now in Monterey. And [let] 10,000 pesos [be employed] to assist in expenses of the Department of San Bias, which amount, conformably to the royal junta of July 8 of last year, is due to be supplied with despatch for the first named [San Bias], and for this once only, from the pious funds of the treasure which is in the aforesaid chest, and still this amount has not been paid. And finally, as to what Don Juan Bautista de Anza set forth about not being able to gather by himself the things for provision of the individuals of the expedition, because he has to be occupied in recruiting the new troop in different places, to this effect His Excellency named a person who may do it, or rather let it be Don Miguel Gregorio de Echarri,^ whom the said captain proposes, and of whom he says that he managed these matters with credit in the barracks of Pitic during the military expedition in those provinces, or [let it be] another, whoever shall be to his will, as a favor that is due to him for his work, and let the person that he shall be pleased to appoint keep an account and explanation of what he shall spend so as to present it to the intendente or royal official of Alamos. " And for everything, let there be drawn up sworn copies [testimonios] of the explanation of costs and [of the proceedings] of this junta: one for Comandante Don Fernando [Rivera y] Moncada ; another for the factor, Manuel Ram6n de Goya ; another for the Tribunal y Real Audiencia de Cuentas [tribunal and royal court of accounts] ; another for the royal offi- cials of this count ; and another of the same and of his representations of the 17th ultimo and 5th instant, for Captain Don Juan Bautista de Anza, and let the latter, the factor Goya, and Comandante [Rivera y] Moncada, and in the same way the missionary Fathers make separately a formal and approved account of their respective expenses to remit to His Excellency, as soon as their distribution and employment have taken place. And finally, let it be drawn up in triplicate so as to give an account to His Majesty of everything new that has been done up to now since [the time of] the royal order with his approval, for he has already had a report of what happened before that. " Thus, this is agreed upon, and the gentlemen who composed it [the junta] signed." 2 This wording of the resolution is got its role of appearing to order the some evidence to show that Bucarely appointment, and then in language was the real ordering authority. It corrected itself. Cf. chap. VII, n. 63. looks as if the junta momentarily for- APPENDIX VI Galvez's Order op March 6, 1779, Directing Croix to Give the Californias Preference in His Attention This document is the draft, retained for the ministro generaFs file, and consequently not signed, of a letter of the date mentioned from Gdlvez to Teodoro de Croix. It is to be found in A.G.I., 103^r-9, (C-3965). The phrase For Dup^ indicated that both an original and a duplicate were to be presented to Gdlvez for his signature and both mailed to Croix. The document, used briefly in chapter XVII, is here inserted entire : Ha entendido el Rey los progresos que los PP^? Misioneros han con- seguido en las Misiones y Presidios de Californias, assi en la extension de la Religion Catolica, como en el beneficio y Cultivo de aquellos Terrenos : lo que ha sido mui del agrado de S.M. y me manda que reitere a V.S. el encargo de q mire p^. aquellos Establecimientos con la preferencia y esmero (f. merece Su importanda, como S.M. lo espera del zelo de V.S. cuya vida g^ Dios mt a? El Pardo d6de Marzo de 1779. S'. D? teodoro de Croix. Par Dup^ 469 APPENDIX VII Table Showing the Population by Districts of Sinaloa and Sonora IN 1781 The status of settlements in Sinaloa and Sonora was a fact of great importance at all times in its bearing on matters of northwestward ad- vance. In the table following there appears for the year 1781, an impor- tant date in the history of Spanish conquest in the direction of Alta Cali- fornia, more complete data than is usually available for the eighteenth century. The table shows not only the total population, but also its distribution by districts, distinguishing, too, according to sex, and as between adults and children. The figures may be taken to include the entire Christian population, without distinction as to blood, but they probably did not include unconverted Indians. The table appears in paragraph 227 of Teodoro de Croix's long memorial of October 30, 1781, (C-4430) of which the original is in A.G.I., 103-4-24. This table is re- ferred to in chapter XVIII. Districts Men Women Boys Girls Totals Real del Rosario . . . 1546 1868 1217 996 5627 S. Juan Bautista de Maloya 629 568 283 270 1750 S. Jos6 de Copald . . 2725 2274 1657 1715 8371 S. Miguel de Culiacdn . 3234 3254 2055 1947 10490 Sinaloa 2471 2531 2144 2032 9178 Fuerte 2376 2172 897 706 6151 Cosald 1184 1055 685 595 3519 Alamos 2055 2005 2107 1670 7837 Ostimuri 3477 3564 3058 3581 13680 Sonora 6231 6052 4495 4263 21041 Totals .... 25,928 25,343 18,598 17,775 87,644 470 INDEX Academy of Pacific Coast History, 445, 446. Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg, 247. Acapulco, 7, 8, 40, 58, 194, 265, 268, 370, 372, 377, 379, 380, 423. See Manila galleon. Africa, 174, 179. Agriculture. See Crops, Food supplies. Aguilar, 241. Aguilar's River, 58, 332, 333. Alamos, 48, 131, 383 ; Real Caja of, 52, 53, 88, 131, 132, 140, 394, 395, 404, 455, 456, 468. Alarcon, Hernando de, 7, 9. Alaska, 176, 177, 418. See Californias, North America, Russians. Alberoni, 22, 23. Albuquerque, 39. Aleutian Islands, 176-78. Algiers, 199, 237. Almodovar, Marqu6s de, 61. Alta California, VII-XII, 7, 8, 13, 24, 34, 57, 59, 60, 68-70, 80, 84-88, 91-94, 96-115, 118-30, 143, 145-47, 149, 151, 153-56, 158-61, 167, 179, 217-19, 222, 231, 232, 234, 238, 240, 244, 249-80, 283-90, 293, 294, 298-301, 308, 309, 311, 313-38, 341, 342, 346-48, 350, 352-57, 359, 360, 363-72, 377-90, 393, 396-98, 406, 410, 411, 413-15, 422, 427-35, 467, 470. See Baja California, Californias, Colonization, Crops, Deserters, Domestic animals. Expense, Food supplies. Foreign dan- ger, Gifts for Indians, Gila and Colo- rado, Gold, Goods and effects, Indians, Junction of the Gila and Colorado, Laborers, Land route, Mails, Manila galleon. Military, Military equipment. Northwestward conquest. Pious fund, San Bias, Sea route. Settlers, Supply ships. Altamira, Marques de, 43, 44. Altamirano, Pedro, 56, 61. Altar, 44, 48, 61, 89, 132, 134, 135, 137, 156, 164, 167, 275-77, 280, 284, 286, 343, 403, 404, 429. Altar River, 13, 19. Alva, Duque de, 77, 78. Amarillas, Marqu6s de, 62, 63, 85, 150. Amarillo, Rio, 65. America, 188, 190. See American colo- nies, Americans, Americas, Brazil, North America, South America, Span- ish America, United States. American colonies, 188, 194, 197, 2Q0, 203-15. American Revolution. See American colonies. Americans, 183, 186, 208, 419. See American colonies, United States. Americas, 82, 174, 179. See America, Spanish America. Anian, Strait of, 8, 26. Anson, George, 30, 60, 73, 75, 181, 377. Antilles, 204. Anza, Juan Bautista de, (Jr.), 14, 24, 90, 92, 115, 127, 130, 145-60, 162-70, 217, 218, 223, 231, 234, 236, 238-40, 253- 56, 265, 266, 269-71, 273-304, 307, 314-17, 319-22, 325-27, 335, 337-42, 346-61, 364, 365, 378, 380, 384, 386, 387, 391-95, 400-2, 411, 413-18, 426, 431, 457-68. Anza, Juan Bautista de, (St.), 24-29, 47, 157. Apacheria, 43, 64, 66, 135. Apaches, 3, 13, 16, 18, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41-50, 54, 61, 65, 66, 69, 78, 79, 91, 130, 132-37, 139, 140, 144, 147, 149-52, 156, 157, 162, 164, 275, 280, 301-4, 306, 307, 338, 340-43, 345, 346, 351, 363, 365, 367, 386, 390-92, 399- 402, 406, 409, 411, 412, 414, 424, 425, 428. Aragon, Pedro de, 49. Aranda, 188, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198, 201-4, 206-11, 213. Arce y Arroyo, 62. Archangel, 225, 241. Archivo General de Indias, 446. Arctic Ocean, 176, 186, 246. Areche, 155, 156, 159, 167, 168, 260, 370-72. Argentine, the, 216. 471 472 INDEX Arisivi, 150. Arispe, 48, 387, 395, 407. Arivaca, 343. Arivechi, 48. Arizona, 6, 20. See Arizonac, Pimeria Alta. . Arizonac, 4, 24-29, 49, 64, 89^ ^> Arriaga, JuMn de, 73, 77-83r85, 89, 112, 114, 119, 121, 128, 131-33, 136, 138, 140, 141, 144, 149, 152, 153, 157, 158, 165, 168, 169, 220, 221, 223-25, 227, 229, 231, 233-36, 238-40, 242-44, 247, 248, 250-52, 255-57, 263, 266, 269, 270, 272, 274, 277, 278, 286, 288-91, 298, 299, 303, 304, 308, 309, 311, 312, 317-20, 325-27, 344, 369, 373, 374, 396. Arrillaga, 418, 430-32. Arteaga, 371, 418, 419. Ascension, 9, Asia, 174-76, 178, 179, 225, 241. Asiento, 50, 51. Asumpcion, Juan de la, 366. Ati, 48. Atlantic coast, 75, 174, 178, 183, 189 337, 376. Atlantic Ocean, 75, 401, 421. Australia, 182. Austria, 211. Ayala, 239, 243, 314, 325-27. Ay game, 131. Aysa, Marques de, 30, 32, 264. Aztecs, 1, 26, 351. Azuela, 415. Babispe, 49. Bac, San Javier del, 20, 24, 48, 70, 146 154, 361. Baegert, Jacob, 103. Baffin, 184, 241. Baffin Bay, 232. Baikal, Lake, 175. Baja California, 7, 10, 11, 15, 17-20, 23, 29-35, 37, 44, 57-60, 62, 67, 69, 70, 77, 85-87, 92, 93, 97, 99, 100, 102-12, 114-20, 125, 128, 155, 156, 160, 161, 218, 219, 250, 257, 258, 260, 263-65, 268, 270, 286, 287, 301, 308-13, 317, 326, 329, 330, 338, 346, 347, 354, 368, 370, 377, 382, 397, 428-32. See Californias. Bakersfield, 361. Balthasar, Juan Antonio, 62. Barbary Coast, 207. Barbastro, Francisco, 403. Barclay, 419. Barreneche, 413. Barrera, Marcial, 345. Barry, Felipe, 111, 112, 119, 251, 252, 266, 267, 311, 312. Bayorca, 48. Beasts of burden. See Domestic ani- mals. Bejar. See San Antonio de Bejar. Bering, Vitus, 176, 177, 221, 225, 241, 246. Bering Island, 177. Bering Strait, 175, 176, 183, 246. Bernal, 19. Bicufier, San Pedro y San Pablo de, 412, 413. Bill Williams' Fork, 9, 30, 32. Bings, 219, 220, 378. Biron, 181, 182, 191, 376. Bisani, 343. "Blue Lady." See Maria de Jesus de Agreda. Bodega, port of, 423, 424. Bodega y Cuadra, Juan de la, 217, 239, 242-44, 247, 332, 369-73, 377, 418. Boines, 198. Bolas de plata. See Arizonac. Bolson de Mapiml. See Mapimf. Bonet, 373, 374. Bonilla, Antonio, 288, 289, 302, 303, 411. Borbon, 432, 433. Borica, 418, 430-32. Boris, 246. Borja, San Francisco de, 67, 309, 380. Boston, 203. Bougainville, 191. Bourbons, 50, 51, 189, 190, 195, 201, 207, 210, 213. Branciforte, Alta California, 430. Bravo, Antonio, 296. Brazil, 200-2. Breteuil, Baron de, 197. British East India Company, 179. British Isles, 195. See England. Bucarely y Ursiia, Antonio Maria, VIII- X, 68, 81, 83, 89, 91-96, 101, 110-12, 114, 115, 117-22, 127-46, 149, 150, 153-59, 162, 164, 165, 167-73, 177, 194, 218-25, 227-40, 242^5, 247-57, 260-74, 276-81, 283, 284, 286-312, 314-28, 332, 335, 337-39, 341, 342, 344, 346, 347, 349-51, 354, 356-64, 366-96, 402, 403, 409, 411, 417, 418, 421, 458. Buena, Mariano de, 149. Buenavista, mining camp, 49. Buenavista, presidio, 29, 67, 71, 132-34, 137, 139, 140, 164, 167, 339, 343, 344, 351, 359, 390, 409, 411, 412. INDEX 473 Buenos Aires, 192, 193, 200, 204, 205, 212, 213. Burgoyne, 212. Burriel, Andres, 56-61, 86. Cabeza de Vaca, Alvar Ntinez, 6. Caborca, 19, 48, 76, 276, 340, 343. Cabots, the, 184. Cabrillo. See Rodriguez. Cddiz, 200, 213, 373, 374. Cajon Pass, 361. Cajuenches, 281, 363, 364, 400, 405-7. California. See Alta California, Baja California, Californias, Gulf. California, 185. Californias, V, VII, 2, 4, 8-11, 18, 20-24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33-35, 39, 40, 42, 44, 58-60, 62, 65-67, 70, 73-80, 82-84, 86, 87, 89, 92, 96, 98, 104-6, 108-12, 115-19, 121, 127-30, 137, 141, 144, 145, 161, 173, 179, 184, 185, 187, 217- 20, 223-25, 227, 231, 232, 240-42, 245, 249-51, 257-72, 275, 300, 318, 326, 337, 340, 347, 360, 367, 368, 375, 376, 378-80, 382, 386-88, 393-96, 402, 409, 410, 412, 413, 419-26, 431-33, 468, 469. See Alta California, Baja Cali- fornia, San Bias. Camb6n, 360. Campa, 327. Campeche, 194. Campo Viergol, 251, 261, 263. Campos, 23, 24, 27. Canada, 184, 211. Cancio, Lorenzo, 71, 72. Canizares, 326. Carabajal, 6. Caracas, 205. Carbajal y Lancaster, Jos6, 36. Carbonel, Esteban, 11. Cardona, Nicolds de, 9, 10. Cardona, Tomds de, 10. Caribbean Sea, 216. Carmelo, 101, 120, 288, 324, 332, 335, 356. See Monterey. Carmelo River, 30, 37-41. Carpio, Jos6 Manuel Diaz del, 151. Carrizal, in western Sonora, 133, 140. Carrizal, on the northern frontier, 302. Carrizos, 41. Cartagena, 205. Carteret, 181, 182, 376. Casa de Contrataci&n, 374. Casa-Fuerte, Marques de, 139. Casa Grande, of Chihuahua, 26. Casa Grande, of the Gila, 19, 26, 351. Casa Tilly, Marqu6s de, 200. Casafonda, Manuel Lanz de, 103, 104, 108. Casas Grandes, 4, 16. Castejon, 373-75. Castillo, 391. Catalina Island, 9. Catherine II, 246. Cavendish, Thomas, 179. Ceballos, Pedro, 200, 201. Cermeno, 8. Cerro Prieto, 29, 35, 46, 87, 89, 138, 151, 153, 284. Cerros Island, 7. Chacala, 369. Charles III, 187-90, 193-95, 200-2, 204- 6, 208-10, 212-16. Chatham. See Pitt. Chemeguabas, 365. Chenard, J036, 375. Chihuahua, province of, 4, 6, 16, 37, 134, 135, 400, 433. See Nueva Vizcaya. Chihuahua, San Felipe de, 76, 395. China, 179, 182, 226, 366, 417, 419, 420. Chinese, 174. Chinipas, 401. "Chirikof," 221. Chirikof, Alexei, 176, 177, 225, 240, 241, 246, 247. Choiseul, 192-94, 196. Choquet de la Isla, Diego, 373. Chukchis, 175, 176, 233, 244. Cibola, 6. Cieneguilla, 69, 89, 90, 131, 132, 304, 305, 307, 391. Civilians, part played by, in Spanish con- quests, 2. See Settlers. "Civilized people," 4. Gierke, 183. Clipperton, 180. Coahuila, 3-5, 78, 136, 139, 140, 302, 303, 393, 395, 399, 401, 403. Coatzacoalcos River, 217, 224, 234. Cocomaricopas, 31, 350, 364, 400, 407. Cocospera, 19. Cojats, 280. Colnett, 419. Colonization, of the Californias, V-IX, 20-23; of Alta California, 38. See Alta California, Baja California, Cali- fornias, the Military, Religious con- quest, Settlers. Colorado Desert, 148, 170, 273, 275, 279, 281 349 352. Colorado River,' 3, 7, 9, 14, 18-20, 23, 26, 27, 29-31, 38-41, 43, 58, 65-67, 75, 91, 117, 118, 130, 148, 153-55, 157, 162, 163, 165, 166, 265, 266, 269, 270, 276, 474 INDEX 279-82, 284-88, 293, 295, 299, 345-47, 350, 353, 354, 356, 361-63, 383, 400, 401, 429-32, 467 ; passage of, 340, 351, 352, 357, 358, 413 ; westward branch of, 30, 37, 277, 378. See Amarillo, Car- melo River, Gila and Colorado, Junc- tion of the Gila and Colorado, Settle- ments on the Colorado, Yumas. Colorado River, of the east.