AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY : : . . . Crtiree lectures DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION OF GREAT BRITAIN IN MAY 1880 By JOHN FISKE Votci un fait entieretnerU nouveau dans le monde, tt dont Vimoffination eUe-mhne ne iaurait sairir la portee. TOOQCIYILUI NEW TORK AND LONDON HARPBR & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 1902 ■ €. cSft^ AC-Ma^ '^^^. ^ ^ '^ o I iSntered according to Att of Congress, in the year 1885, by HARPER & BROTHERS, Id the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. All righi* rtMtvtd.' EDWARD LIVINGSTON YOUMANS NOBLEST OF MEN AND DEAREST OF FRIENDS WHOSE UNSELFISH AND UNTIRING WORK IN EDUCATING THK AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE PRINCIPLES OF SOUND PHILOSOFHT DESERYES THE GRATITUDE OF ALL MEN J Irebicate ttjis Book 76iS44 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/americanpoliticaOOfiskrich PREFACE. lie the spring of 1879 I gave at the Old South Meeting-house in Boston a course of lectures on the discovery and colonization of America, and presently, through the kindness of my friend Pro- fessor Huxley, the course was repeated at Univer- sity College in London. The lectures there were attended by very large audiences, and awakened such an interest in American history that I was in- vited to return to England in the following year and treat of some of the philosophical aspects of my subject in a course of lectures at the Royal Institution. In the three lectures which were written in re- sponse to this invitation, and which are now pub- lished in this little volume, I have endeavoured to illustrate some of the fundamental ideas of Amer- ican politics by setting forth their relations to the general history of mankind. It is impossible thor 6 Preface. oughly to grasp the meaning of any group of facts, in any department of study, until we have duly compared them with allied groups of facts ; and the political history of the American people can be rightly understood only when it is studied in con- nection with that general process of political evolu- tion which has been going on from the earliest times, and of which it is itself one of the most important and remarkable phases. The government of the United States is not the result of special creation, but of evolution. As the town-meetings of New England are lineally descended from the village assemblies of the early Aryans ; as our huge federal union was long ago foreshadowed in the little leagues of Greek cities and Swiss cantons ; so the great po- litical problem which we are (thus far successfully) solving is the very same problem upon which all civilized peoples have been working ever since civil- ization began. How to insure peaceful concerted action throughout the Whole, without infringing upon local and individual freedom in the Parts, — this has ever been the chief aim of civilization, viewed on its political side ; and we rate the failure or success of nations politically according to their failure or success in attaining this supreme end. Preface. 7 When thus considered in the light of the compara- tive method, our American history acquires added dignity and interest, and a broad and rational basis is secured for the detailed treatment of political questions. When viewed in this light, moreover, not only does American history become especially interest- ing to Englishmen, but English history is clothed with fresh interest for Americans. Mr. Freeman has done well in insisting upon the fact that the history of the English people does not begin with the Norman Conquest. In the deepest and widest sense, our American history does not begin with the Declaration of Independence, or even with the settlements of Jamestown and Plymouth ; but it descends in unbroken continuity from the days ^hen stout Arminius in the forests of northern Germany successfully defied the might of imperial Rome. In a more restricted sense, the statesman- ship of Washington and Lincoln appears in the noblest light when regarded as the fruition of the various work of De Montfort and Cromwell and Chatham. The good fight begun at Lewes and continued at Naseby and Quebec was fitly crowned at Yorktown and at Appomattox. When we duly 8 Preface. realize this, and further come to see how the two great branches of the English race have the common { mission of establishing throughout the larger part / of the earth a higher civilization and more permanent \ political order than any that has gone before, we shall the better understand the true significance of the history which English-speaking men have so V magnificently wrought out upon American soil. In dealing concisely with a subject so vast, only brief hints and suggestions can be expected; and I have not thought it worth while, for the present at least, to change or amplify the manner of treat- ment. The lectures are printed exactly as they were delivered at the Royal Institution, more than four years ago. On one point of detail some change will very likely by and by be called for. In the lecture on the Town-meeting I have adopted the views of Sir Henry Maine as to the common holding of the arable land in the ancient German mark, and as to the primitive character of the peri- odical redistribution of land in the Russian village community. It now seems highly probable that these views will have to undergo serious modifica- tion in consequence of the valuable evidence lately brought forward by my friend Mr. Denman Ross, Preface. 9 in his learned and masterly treatise on " The Early History of Landholding among the Germans ;" but as I am not yet quite clear as to how far this modi- fication will go, and as it can in nowise affect the general drift of my argument, I have made no change in my incidental remarks on this difficult and disputed question. In describing some of the characteristic features of country life in New England, I had especially in mind the beautiful mountain village in which this preface is written, and in which for nearly a quarter of a century I have felt myself more at home than in any other spot in the world. In writing these lectures, designed as they were for a special occasion, no attempt was made to meet the ordinary requirements of popular audi- ences ; yet they have been received in many places with unlooked-for favour. The lecture on " Mani- fest Destiny " was three times repeated in London, and once in Edinburgh ; seven times in Boston ; four times in New York ; twice in Brooklyn, N. Y., Plainfield, N. J., and Madison, Wis. ; once in Wash- ington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis, and Milwaukee; in Applet on and Waukesha, Wis. ; Portland, Lewis* 10 Preface. ton, and Brunswick, Me.; Lowell, Concord, New- buryport, Peabody, Stoneham, Maiden, Newton Highlands, and Martha's Vineyard, Mass.; Middle- town and Stamford, Conn.; Newburg and Pough- keepsie, N. Y. ; Orange, N. J. ; and at Cornell Uni- versity and Haverford College. In several of these places the course was given. Pktebsham, Septemhw 13, 1884, CONTENTS. THE TOWN-MEBTINO. Differences in outward aspect between a village in England and a village in Massachusetts. Life in a typical New England mountain village. Tenure of land, domestic service, absence of poverty and crime, universality of labour and of culture, freedom of thought, complete democracy. This state of things is to some extent passing away. Remarkable characteristics of the Puritan settlers of New England, and extent to which their characters and aims have influenced American history. Town governments in New England. Different meanings of the word " city " in England and America. Importance of local self-government in the political life of the United States. Origin of the town-meet- ing. Mr. Freeman on the cantonal assemblies of Switzerland. The old Teutonic " mark," or dwelling-place of a clan. Political union originally based, not on territorial contiguity, but on blood- relationship. Divisions of the mark. Origin of the village Common. The mark-mote. Village communities in Russia and Hindustan. Difference between the despotism of Russia and that of France under the Old Regime. Elements of sound po- litical life fostered by the Russian village. Traces of the mark 12 Contents, in England. Feudalization of Europe, and partial metamor- phosis of the mark or township into the manor. Parallel trans- formation of the township, in some of its features, into the parish. The court leet and the vestry - meeting. The New England town-meeting a revival of the ancient mark-mote. Vicissitudes of local self-government in the various portions of the Aryan world illustrated in the contrasted cases of France and England. Significant contrast between the aristocracy of England and that of the Continent. Difference between the Teutonic conquests of Gaul and of Britain. Growth of centrali- zation in France. Why the English have always been more suc- cessful than the French in founding colonies. Struggle between France and England for the possession of North America, and prodigious significance of the victory of England. — pp. l'7-56. n. THE FEDERAL UNION. Wonderful greatness of ancient Athens. Causes of the political failure of Greek civilization. Early stages of political aggrega- tion, — the hundred, the sion of Hannibal half a century later, even with its stupendous victories of Thrasymene and Can- nae, effected nothing toward detaching the Italian subjects from their allegiance to Rome ; and herein we have a most instructive contrast to the conduct of the communities subject to Athens at several critical moments of the Peloponuesian War. With this consolidation of Italy, thus triumphantly de- monstrated, the whole problem of the conquering career of Rome was solved. All that came after- wards was simply a corollary from this. The con- centration of all the fighting power of the pen- insula into the hands of the ruling city formed a stronger political aggregate than anything the world had as yet seen. It was not only proof against the efforts of the greatest military genius of antiquity, but whenever it was brought into conflict with the looser organizations of Greece, Africa, and Asia, or with the semi-barbarous tribes of Spain and Gaul, the result of the struggle was virtually predetermined. The universal dominion of Rome was inevitable, so soon as the political union of Italy had been accomplished. Among the Romans themselves there were those who thor- oughly understood this point, as we may see from The Federal Union. 81 the interesting speech of the emperor Claudius in favour of admitting Gauls to the senate. The benefits conferred upon the world by the universal dominion of Rome were of quite inesti- mable value. First of these benefits, and (as it were) the material basis of the others, was the pro- longed peace that was enforced throughout large portions of the world where chronic warfare had hitherto prevailed. The jpax romcma has perhaps been sometimes depicted in exaggerated colours; but as compared with all that had preceded, and with all that followed, down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, it deserved the encomiums it has received. The second benefit was the min- gling and mutual destruction of the primitive tri- bal and municipal religions, thus clearing the way for Christianity, — a step which, regarded from a purely political point of view, was of immense im- portance for the further consolidation of society in Europe. The third benefit was the develop- ment of the Koman law into a great body of legal precepts and principles leavened throughout with ethical principles of universal applicability, and the gradual substitution of this Roman law for the in- numerable local usages of ancient communities. Thus arose the idea of a common Christendom, of a brotherhood of peoples associated both by com- 6 82 Americcm Political Ideas. mon beliefs regarding the unseen world and by common principles of action in the daily affairs of life. The common ethical and traditional basis thus established for the future development of the great nationalities of Europe is the most funda- mental characteristic distinguishing modern from ancient history. While, however, it secured these benefits for mankind for all time to come, the Koman political system in itself was one which could not possibly endure. That extension of the franchise which made Rome's conquests possible, was, after all, the extension of a franchise which could only be prac- tically enjoyed within the walls of the imperial city itself. From first to last the device of repre- sentation was never thought of, and from first to last the Roman comitia remained a primary assem- bly. The result was that, as the burgherhood en- larged, the assembly became a huge mob as little fitted for the transaction of public business as a town-meeting of all the inhabitants of New York would be. The functions which in Athens were performed by the assembly were accordingly in Rome performed largely by the aristocratic sen- ate; and for the conflicts consequently arising be- tween the senatorial and the popular parties it was difficult to find any adequate constitutional check. The Federal Union. 83 Outside of Italy, moreover, in the absence of a rep- resentative system, the Roman government was a despotism which, whether more or less oppres- sive, could in the nature of things be nothing else than a despotism. But nothing is more danger- ous for a free people than the attempt to govern a dependent people despotically. The bad govern- ment kills out the good government as surely as slave-labour destroys free-labour, or as a debased currency drives out a sound currency. The exist- ence of proconsuls in the provinces, with great ar- mies at their beck and call, brought about such results as might have been predicted, as soon as the growing anarchy at home furnished a valid ex- cuse for armed interference. In the case of the Roman world, however, the result is not to be de- plored, for it simply substituted a government that was practicable under the circumstances for one that had become demonstrably impracticable. As regards the provinces the change from sen- atorial to imperial government at Rome was a great gain, inasmuch as it substituted an orderly and responsible administration for irregular and irresponsible extortion. For a long time, too, it was no part of the imperial policy to interfere with local customs and privileges. But, in the absence of a representative system, the centralizing ten- 84 American Political Ideas. dency inseparable from the position of such a government proved to be irresistible. And the strength of this centralizing tendency was further enhanced by the military character of the govern- ment which was necessitated by perpetual fron- tier warfare against the barbarians. As year after year went by, the provincial towns and cities were governed less and less by their local magistrates, more and more by prefects responsible to the em- peror only. There were other co-operating causes, economical and social, for the decline of the em- pire ; but this change alone, which was consum- mated by the time of Diocletian, was quite enough to burn out the candle of Roman strength at both ends. "With the decrease in the power of the lo- cal governments came an increase in the burdens of taxation and conscription that were laid upon them."^ And as " the dislocation of commerce and industry caused by the barbarian inroads, and the increasing demands of the central adminis- tration for the payment of its countless officials and the maintenance of its troops, all went to- gether," the load at last became greater "than human nature could endure." By the time of the great invasions of the fifth century, local politi- * Arnold, "Roman Provincial Administration," 237. The Federal Union. 85 cal life had gone far towards extinction through- out Roman Europe, and the tribal organization of the Teutons prevailed in the struggle simply be- cause it had come to be politically stronger than any organization that was left to oppose it. We have now seen how the two great political systems that were founded upon the Ancient City both ended in failure, though both achieved enor- mous and lasting results. And we have seen how largely both these political failures were due to the absence of the principle of representation from the public life of Greece and Home. The chief problem of civilization, from the political point of view, has always been how to secure con- certed action among men on a great scale without sacrificing local independence. The ancient his- tory of Europe shows that it is not possible to solve this problem without the aid of the princi- ple of representation. Greece, until overcome by external force, sacredly maintained local self-gov- ernment, but in securing permanent concert of action it was conspicuously unsuccessful. Rome secured concert of action on a gigantic scale, and transformed the thousand unconnected tribes and cities it conquered into an organized European world, but in doing this it went far towards ex- tinguishing local self-government. The advent of 86 Americcm Political Ideas, the Teutons upon the scene seems therefore to have been necessary, if only to supply the indis- pensable element without which the dilemma of civilization could not be surmounted. The tur- bulence of Europe during the Teutonic migra- tions was so great and so long continued, that on a superficial view one might be excused for re- garding the good work of Rome as largely un- done. And in the feudal isolation of effort and apparent incapacity for combined action which characterized the different parts of Europe after the downfall of the Carolingian empire, it might well have seemed that political society had reverted towards a primitive type of structure. In truth, however, the retrogradation was much slighter than appeared on the surface. Feudalism itself, with its curious net-work of fealties and obliga- tions running through the fabric of society in every direction, was by no means purely disinte- grative in its tendencies. The mutual relations of rival baronies were by no means like those of rival clans or tribes in pre -Roman days. The central power of Rome, though no longer exert- ed politically through curators and prefects, was no less effective in the potent hands of the clergy and in the traditions of the imperial jurisprudence by which the legal ideas of mediaeval society were The Federal Union. 87 go strongly coloured. So powerful, indeed, was this twofold influence of Rome, that in the later Middle Ages, when the modern nationalities had fairly taken shape, it was the capacity for local self-government — in spite of all the Teutonic re- inforcement it had had — that had suffered much more than the capacity for national consolidation. Among the great modern nations it was only Eng- land — which in its political development had re- mained more independent of the Roman law and the Roman church than even the Teutonic father- land itself — it was only England that came out of the mediaeval crucible with its Teutonic self-gov- ernment substantially intact. On the main-land only two little spots, at the two extremities of the old Teutonic world, had fared equally well. At the mouth of the Rhine the little Dutch commu- nities were prepared to lead the attack in the ter- rible battle for freedom with which the drama of modern history was ushered in. In the impreg- nable mountain fastnesses of upper Germany the Swiss cantons had bid defiance alike to Austrian tyrant and to Burgundian invader, and had pre- served in its purest form the rustic democracy of their Aryan forefathers. By a curious coinci- dence, both these free peoples, in their efforts to- wards national unity^ were led to frame federal 88 Americcm Political Ideas. unions, and one of these political achievements is, from the stand-point of universal history, of very great significance. The old League of High Ger- many, which earned immortal renown at Morgarten and Sempach, consisted of German-speaking can- tons only. But in the fifteenth century the League won by force of arms a small bit of Italian terri- tory about Lake Lugano, and in the sixteenth the powerful city of Bern annexed the Burgundian bishopric of Lausanne and rescued the free city of Geneva from the clutches of the Duke of Savoy. Other Burgundian possessions of Savoy were seized by the canton of Freiburg ; and after awhile all these subjects and allies were admitted on equal terms into the confederation. The re- sult is that modern Switzerland is made up of what might seem to be most discordant and un- manageable elements. Four languages — German, French, Italian, and Ehsetian — are spoken within the limits of the confederacy ; and in point of i^e- ligion the cantons are sharply divided as Catholic and Protestant. Yet in spite of all this, Switzer- land is as thoroughly united in feeling as any nation in Europe. To the German-speaking Cath- olic of Altdorf the German Catholics of Bavaria are foreigners, while the French-speaking Protes- tants of Geneva are fellow-countrymen. Deeper The Federal Union. 89 down even than these deep-seated differences of speech and creed lies the feeling that comes from the common possession of a political freedom that is greater than that possessed by surrounding peo- ples. Such has been the happy outcome of the first attempt at federal union made by men of Teutonic descent. Complete independence in local affairs, when combined with adequate repre- sentation in the federal council, has effected such an intense cohesion of interests throughout the nation as no centralized government, however cun- ningly devised, could ever have secured. Until the nineteenth century, however, the fed- eral form of government had given no clear indi- cation of its capacity for holding together great bodies of men, spread over vast territorial areas, in orderly and peaceful relations with one anoth- er. The empire of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius still remained the greatest known example of polit- ical aggregation ; and men who argued from sim- ple historic precedent without that power of analy- zing precedents which the comparative method has supplied, came not unnaturally to the conclusions that great political aggregates have an inherent tendency towards breaking up, and that great po- litical aggregates cannot be maintained except by a strongly - centralized administration and at the 90 Americcm Political Ideas. sacrifice of local self-government. A century ago the very idea of a stable federation of forty power- ful states, covering a territory nearly equal in area to the whole of Europe, carried on by a republi- can government elected by universal suffrage, and guaranteeing to every tiniest village its full meed of local independence, — the very idea of all this would have been scouted as a thoroughly imprac- ticable Utopian dream. And such scepticism would have been quite justifiable, for European history did not seem to afford any precedents upon which such a forecast of the future could be logically based. Between the various nations of Europe there has certainly always existed an element of political community, bequeathed by the Koman em- pire, manifested during the Middle Ages in a com- mon relationship to the Church, and in modern times in a common adherence to certain uncodified rules of international law, more or less imperfectly de- fined and enforced. Between England and Spain, for example, or between France and Austria, there has never been such utter political severance as ex- isted normally between Greece and Persia, or Eome and Carthage. But this community of political inheritance in Europe, it is needless to say, falls very far short of the degree of community implied in a federal union; and so great is the diversity The Federal Union. 91 of language and of creed, and of local historic de- velopment with the deep-seated prejudices attend- ant thereupon, that the formation of a European federation could hardly be looked for except as the result of mighty though quiet and subtle in- fluences operating for a long time from without. From what direction, and in what manner, such an irresistible though perfectly pacific pressure is likely to be exerted in the future, I shall endeav- our to show in my next lecture. At present we have to observe that the experiment of federal union on a grand scale required as its conditions, firsty a vast extent of unoccupied country which could be settled without much warfare by men of the same race and speech, and secondly^ on the part of the settlers, a rich inheritance of political training such as is afforded by long ages of self- government. The Atlantic coast of North Amer- ica, easily accessible to Europe, yet remote enough to be freed from the political complications of the old world, furnished the first of these conditions : the history of the English people through fifty generations furnished the second. It was through English self-government, as I argued in my first lecture, that England alone, among the great na- tions of Europe, was able to found durable and self-supporting colonies. I have now to add that 92 American Political Ideas. it was only England, among all the great nations of Europe, that could send forth colonists capable of dealing successfully with the difficult problem of forming such a political aggregate as the Unit- ed States have become. For obviously the pres- ervation of local self-government is essential to the very idea of a federal union. Without the Town- Meeting, or its equivalent in some form or other, the Federal Union would become ijpso facto con- verted into a centralizing imperial government. Should anything of tliis sort ever happen — should American towns ever come to be ruled by prefects appointed at Washington, and should American States ever become like the administrative depart- ments of France, or even like the counties of England at the present day — then the time will have come when men may safely predict the break-up of the American political system by reason of its overgrown dimensions and the diver- sity of interests between its parts. States so un- like one another as Maine and Louisiana and Cal- ifornia cannot be held together by the stiff bonds of a centralizing government. The durableness of the federal union lies in its flexibility, and it is this flexibility which makes it the only kind of government, according to modern ideas, that is permanently applicable to a whole continent. If The Federal Union. 93 the United States were to-day a consolidated re- public like France, recent events in California might have disturbed the peace of the country. But in the federal union, if California, as a state sovereign within its own sphere, adopts a gro- tesque constitution that aims at infringing on the rights of capitalists, the other states are not di- rectly affected. They may disapprove, but they have neither the right nor the desire to interfere. Meanwhile the laws of nature quietly operate to repair the blunder. Capital flows away from Cal- ifornia, and the business of the state is damaged, until presently the ignorant demagogues lose fa- vour, the silly constitution becomes a dead-letter, and its formal repeal begins to be talked of. ISTot the smallest ripple of excitement disturbs the pro- found peace of the country at large. It is in this complete independence that is preserved by every state, in all matters save those in which the feder- al principle itself is concerned, that we find the surest guaranty of the permanence of the Ameri- can political system. Obviously no race of men, save the race to which habits of self-government and the skilful use of political representation had come to be as second nature, could ever have suc- ceeded in founding such a system. Yet even by men of English race, working with- 94 American Political Ideas. out let or hinderance from any foreign source, and with the better part of a continent at their dis- posal for a field to work in, so great a political problem as that of the American Union has not been solved without much toil and trouble. The great puzzle of civilization — how to secure perma- nent concert of action without sacrificing indepen- dence of action — is a puzzle which has taxed the ingenuity of Americans as well as of older Aryan peoples. In the year 1788 when our Federal Union was completed, the problem had already occupied the minds of American statesmen for a century and a half, — that is to say, ever since the English settlement of Massachusetts. In 1643 a New Eng- land confederation was formed between Massachu- setts and Connecticut, together with Plymouth since merged in Massachusetts and New Haven since merged in Connecticut. The confederation was formed for defence against the French in Can- ada, the Dutch on the Hudson river, and the In- dians. But owing simply to the inequality in the sizes of these colonies — Massachusetts more than outweighing the other three combined — the prac- tical working of this confederacy was never very successful. In 1754, just before the outbreak of the great war which drove the French from Amer- ica, a general Congress of the colonies was held at The Federal Union. 95 Albany, and a comprehensive scheme of union was proposed by Benjamin Franklin, but nothing came of the project at that time. The commercial rivalry between the colonies, and their disputes over boundary lines, were then quite like the sim- ilar phenomena with which Europe had so long been familiar. In 1756 Georgia and South Caro- lina actually came to blows over the navigation of the Savannah river. The idea that the thirteen colonies could ever overcome their mutual jeal- ousies so far as to unite in a single political body, was received at that time in England with a deri- sion like that which a proposal for a permanent federation of European States would excite in many minds to-day. It was confidently predicted that if the common allegiance to the British crown were once withdrawn, the colonies would forth- with proceed to destroy themselves with interne- cine war. In fact, however, it was the shaking off of allegiance to the British crown, and the com- mon trials and sufferings of the war of indepen- dence, that at last welded the colonies together and made a federal union possible. As it was, the union was consummated only by degrees. By the Articles of Confederation, agreed on by Con- gress in 1777 but not adopted by all the States until 1781, the federal government acted only upon 96 American Political Ideas. the several state governments and not directly upon individuals; there was no federal judiciary for the decision of constitutional questions aris- ing out of the relations between the states; and the Congress was not provided with any eflScient means of raising a revenue or of enforcing its leg- islative decrees. Under such a government the difficulty of insuring concerted action was so great that, but for the transcendent personal qualities of Washington, the bungling mismanagement of the British ministry, and the timely aid of the French fleet, the war of independence would most likely have ended in failure. After the indepen- dence of the colonies was acknowledged, the for- mation of a more perfect union was seen to be the only method of securing peace and making a na- tion which should be respected by foreign powers ; and so in 1788, after much discussion, the present Constitution of the United States was adopted, — a constitution which satisfied very few people at the time, and which was from beginning to end a series of compromises, yet which has proved in its working a masterpiece of political wisdom. The first great compromise answered to the ini- tial difficulty of securing approximate equality of weight in the federal councils between states of unequal size. The simple device by which this The Federal Union. 97 difficulty was at last surmounted has proved effect- ual, although the inequalities between the states have greatly increased. To-day the population of New York is more than eighty times that of Ne- vada. In area the state of Ehode Island is small- er than Montenegro, while the state of Texas is larger than the Austrian empire with Bavaria and Wurtemberg thrown in. Yet New York and Ne- vada, Rhode Island and Texas, each send two sen- ators to Washington, while on the other hand in the lower house each state has a number of rep- resentatives proportioned to its population. The upper house of Congress is therefore a federal while the lower house is a national body, and the government is brought into direct contact with the people without endangering the equal rights of the several states. The second great compromise of the American constitution consists in the series of arrangements by which sovereignty is divided between the states and the federal government. In all domestic leg- islation and jurisdiction, civil and criminal, in all matters relating to tenure of property, marriage and divorce, the fulfilment of contracts and the punishment of malefactors, each separate state is as completely a sovereign state as France or Great Britain. In speaking to a British audience a cod ^8 American Political Ideas. Crete illustration may not be superfluous. If a criminal is condemned to death in Pennsylvania, the royal prerogative of pardon resides in the Governor of Pennsylvania : the President of the United States has no more authority in the case than the Czar of Russia. Nor in civil cases can an appeal lie from the state courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, save where express provision has been made in the Constitution. Within its own sphere the state is supreme. The chief attributes of sovereignty with which the sev- eral states have parted are the coining of money, the carrying of mails, the imposition of tariff dues, the granting of patents and copyrights, the dec- laration of war, and the maintenance of a navy. The regular army is supported and controlled by the federal government, but each state maintains its own militia which it is bound to use in case of internal disturbance before calling upon the cen- tral government for aid. In time of war, however, these militias come under the control of the cen- tral government. Thus every American citizen lives under two governments, the functions of which are clearly and intelligibly distinct. To insure the stability of the federal union thus formed, the Constitution created a "system of United States courts extending throughout the The Federal Union. 99 states, empowered to define the boundaries of federal authority, and to enforce its decisions by federal power." This omnipresent federal judi- ciary was undoubtedly the most important creation of the statesmen who framed the Constitution. The closely-knit relations which it established be- tween the states contributed powerfully to the growth of a feeling of national solidarity through- out the whole country. The United States to- day cling together with a coherency far greater than the coherency of any ordinary federation or league. Yet the primary aspect of the federal Constitution was undoubtedly that of a perma- nent league, in which each state, while retaining its domestic sovereignty intact, renounced forever its right to make war upon its neighbours and relegated its international interests to the care of a central council in which all the states were alike represented and a central tribunal endowed with purely judicial functions of interpretation. It was the first attempt in the history of the world to apply on a grand scale to the relations between states the same legal methods of procedure which, as long applied in all civilized countries to the re- lations between individuals, have rendered private warfare obsolete. And it was so far successful tliat, during a period of seventy-two years in which 100 Americcm Political Ideas. the United States increased fourfold in extent, tenfold in population, and more than tenfold in wealth and power, the federal union maintained a state of peace more profound than the j[)ax ro- mana. Twenty years ago this unexampled state of peace was suddenly interrupted by a tremendous war, which in its results, however, has served only to bring out with fresh emphasis the pacific implica- tions of federalism. With the eleven revolted states at first completely conquered and then re- instated with full rights "and privileges in the fed- eral union, with their people accepting in good faith the results of the contest, with their leaders not executed as traitors but admitted again to seats in Congress and in the Cabinet, and with all this accomplished without any violent constitutional changes, — I think we may fairly claim that the strength of the pacific implications of federalism has been more strikingly demonstrated than if there had been no war at all. Certainly the world never beheld such a spectacle before. In my next and concluding lecture I shall return to this point while summing up the argument and illustrating the part played by the English race in the general history of civilization. m. ''MANIFEST destiny:' Among the legends of our late Civil War there is a story of a dinner-party given by the Ameri- cans residing in Paris, at which were propounded sundry toasts concerning not so much the past and present as the expected glories of the great Amer- ican nation. In the general character of these toasts geographical considerations were very prom- inent, and the principal fact which seemed to oc- cupy the minds of the speakers was the unprece- dented bigness of onr country. "Here's to the United States," said the first speaker, "bounded on the north by British America, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico, on the east by the Atlantic, and on the west by the Pacific, Ocean." " But," said the second speaker, " this is far too limited a view of the subject : in assigning our boundaries we must look to the great and glorious future which is prescribed for us by the Manifest Destiny of the Anglo-Saxon Race. Here's to the United States, — bounded on the north by the North Pole, 102 American Political Ideas. on the south hj t]ie South Pole, on the east bj the dsing an-dl Q;ii.tii0 west by the setting sun." Em- phatic appjause- greeted tliis aspiring prophecy. Bu>ibpre'ar-o^e the third speaker — a very serious gentleman from the Far West. " If we are going," said this truly patriotic American, " to leave the historic past and present, and take our manifest destiny into the account, why restrict ourselves within the narrow limits assigned by our fellow- countryman who has just sat down ? I give you the United States, — bounded on the north by the Aurora Borealis, on the south by the precession of the equinoxes, on the east by the primeval chaos, and on the west by the Day of Judgment !" I offer this anecdote at the outset by way of self-defence, inasmuch as I shall by and by have myself to introduce some considerations concern- ing the future of our country, and of what some people, without the fear of Mr. Freeman before their eyes, call the "Anglo-Saxon" race; and if it should happen to strike you that my calculations are unreasonably large, I hope you will remember that they are quite modest after all, when com- pared with some others. The " manifest destiny " of the " Anglo-Saxon " race and the huge dimensions of our country are favourite topics with Fourth-of-July orators, but ''Manifest Destiny:'' 103 they are Done the less interesting on that account when considered from the point of view of the his- torian. To be a citizen of a great and growing state, or to belong to one of the dominant races of the world, is no doubt a legitimate source of patriotic pride, though there is perhaps an equal justification for such a feeling in being a citizen of a tiny state like Holland, which, in spite of its small dimensions, has nevertheless achieved so much, — fighting at one time the battle of freedom for the world, producing statesmen like William and Barneveldt, generals like Maurice, scholars like Erasmus and Grotius, and thinkers like Spi- noza, and taking the lead even to-day in the study of Christianity and in the interpretation of the Bible. But my course in the present lecture is determined by historical or. philosophical rather than by patriotic interest, and I shall endeavour to characterize and group events as impartiallj^ as if my home were at Leyden in the Old World in- stead of Cambridge in the N^ew. First of all, I shall take sides with Mr. Freeman in eschewing altogether the word "Anglo-Saxon." The term is sufficiently absurd and misleading as applied in England to the Old-English speech of our forefathers, or to that portion of English his- tory which is included between the fifth and the 104 American Political Ideas. eleventh centuries. But in America it is frequent- ly used, not indeed by scholars, but by popular writers and speakers, in a still more loose and slov- enly way. In the war of independence our great- great-grandfathers, not yet having ceased to think of themselves as Englishmen, used to distinguish themselves as "Continentals," while the king's troops were known as the "British." The quaint term " Continental " long ago fell into disuse, ex- cept in the slang phrase " not worth a Continen- tal" which referred to the debased condition of our currency at the close of the Kevolutionary War ; but " American " and " British " might still serve the purpose sufficiently whenever it is nec- essary to distinguish between the two great Eng- lish nationalities. The term " English," however, is so often used with sole reference to people and things in England as to have become in some meas- ure antithetical to "American;" and when it is found desirable to include the two in a general expression, one often hears in America the term "Anglo-Saxon " colloquially employed for this pur- pose. A more slovenly use of language can hard- ly be imagined. Such a compound term as "An- glo-American " might perhaps be logically defensi- ble, but that has already become restricted to the English-descended inhabitants of tlie United States ''Manifest Destiny P 105 and Canada alone, in distinction from Spanish Americans and red Indians. It is never so used as to include Englishmen. Refraining from all such barbarisms, I prefer to call the English race by the name which it has always applied to itself, from the time when it inhabited the little district of Angel n on the Baltic coast of Sleswick down to the time when it had begun to spread itself over three great continents. It is a race which has shown a rare capacity for absorbing slightly for- eign elements and moulding them into conformity with a political type that was first wrought out through centuries of effort on British soil; and this capacity it has shown perhaps in a heightened degree in the peculiar circumstances in which it has been placed in America. The American has-^ absorbed considerable quantities of closely kindred European blood, but he is rapidly assimilating it all, and in his political habits and aptitudes he re- mains as thoroughly English as his forefathers in the days of De Montfort, or Hampden, or Wash- ington. Premising this, we may go on to consider some aspects of the work which the English race has done and is doing in the world, and we need not feel discouraged if, in order to do justice to the subject, we have to take our start far back in ancient history. We shall begin, it may be said, 106 American Political Ideas. •A somewhere near the primeval chaos, and though we shall indeed stop short of the day of judgment, we shall hope at all events to reach the millen- nium. ' Our eloquent friends of the Paris dinner-party seem to have been strongly impressed with the excellence of enormous political aggregates. We, too, approaching the subject from a different point of view, have been led to see how desirable it is that self-governing groups of men should be en- abled to work together in permanent harmony and on a great scale. In this kind of political integra- tion the work of civilization very largely consists. We have seen how in its most primitive form po- litical society is made up of small self-governing groups that are perpetually at war with one an- other. Now the process of change which we call civilization means quite a number of things. But there is no doubt that on its political side it means primarily the gradual substitution of a state of peace for a state of war. This change is the con- dition precedent for all the other kinds of improve- ment that are connoted by such a term as " civili- zation." Manifestly the development of industry is largely dependent upon the cessation or restric- tion of warfare ; and furthermore, as the industrial phase of civilization slowly supplants the military ^'Mcmifest Destiny?^ 107 phase, men's characters undergo, though very slow- ly, a corresponding change. Men become less in- clined to destroy life or to inflict pain ; or — to use the popular terminology which happens here to coincide precisely with that of the Doctrine of Evolution — they become less brutal and more humane. Obviously then the prime feature of the process called civilization is the general diminu- tion of warfare. But we have seen that a general diminution of warfare is rendered possible only by the union of small political groups into larger groups that are kept together by community of interests, and that can adjust their mutual rela- tions by legal discussion without coming to blows. In the preceding lecture we considered this proc- ess of political integration as variously exempli- fied by communities of Hellenic, of Roman, and of Teutonic race, and we saw how manifold were the difficulties which the process had to encoun- ter. We saw how the Teutons — at least in Switzer- land, England, and America — had succeeded best through the retention of local self-government com- bined with central representation. We saw how the Romans failed of ultimate success because by weakening self-government they weakened that community of interest which is essential to the permanence of a great political aggregate. We 108 AmeriGcm Political Ideas. saw how the Greeks, after passing through theii most glorious period in a state of chronic warfare, had begun to achieve considerable success in form- ing a pacific federation when their independent career was suddenly cut short by the Koman con- queror. This last example introduces us to a fresh con- sideration, of very great importance. It is not only that every progressive community has had to solve, in one way or another, the problem of se- curing permanent concert of action without sacri- ficing local independence of action ; but while en- gaged in this difficult work the community has had to defend itself against the attacks of other communities. In the case just cited, of the con- quest of Greece by Rome, little harm was done perhaps. But under different circumstances im- mense damage may have been done in this way, and the nearer we go to the beginnings of civiliza- tion the greater the danger. At the dawn of his- tory we see a few brilliant points of civilization surrounded on every side by a midnight blackness of barbarism. In order that the pacific communi- ty may be able to go on doing its work, it must be strong enough and warlike enough to overcome its barbaric neighbours who have no notion what- ever of keeping peace. This is another of the ^''Manifest Destmy.^^ 109 seeming paradoxes of the history of civih'zation, that for a very long time the possibility of peace can be guaranteed only through war. Obviously the permanent peace of the world can be secured only through the gradual concentration of the pre- ponderant military strength into the hands of the most pacific communities. With infinite toil and trouble this point has been slowly gained by man- kind, through the circumstance that the very same political aggregation of small primitive communi- ties which makes them less disposed to quarrel among themselves tends also to make them more than a match for the less coherent groups of their more barbarous neighbours. The same concert of action which tends towards internal harmony tends also towards external victory, and both ends are promoted by the co-operation of the same sets of causes. But for a long time all the political prob- lems of the civilized world were complicated by the fact that the community had to fight for its life. We seldom stop to reflect upon the immi- nent danger from outside attacks, whether from surrounding barbarism or from neighbouring civ- ilizations of lower type, amid which the rich and high-toned civilizations of Greece and Rome were developed. When the king of Persia undertook to reduce Greece to the condition of a Persian sat- no American Political Ideas. rapy, there was imminent danger that all the enor- mous fruition of Greek thought in the intellectual life of the European world might have been nipped in the bud. And who can tell how often, in pre- historic times, some little gleam of civilization, less bright and steady than this one had become, may have been quenched in slavery or massacre ? The greatest work which the Romans performed in the world was to assume the aggressive against menacing barbarism, to subdue it, to tame it, and to enlist its brute force on the side of law and or- der. This was a murderous work, and in doing it the Romans became excessively cruel, but it had to be done by some one before you could expect to have great and peaceful civilizations like our own. The warfare of Rome is by no means ade- y^ quately explained by the theory of a deliberate im- moral policy of aggression, — "infernal," I believe, is the stronger adjective which Dr. Draper uses. The aggressive wars of Rome were largely dictated by just such considerations as those which a cen- tury ago made it necessary for the English to put down the raids of the Scotch Highlanders, and which have since made it necessary for Russia to subdue the Caucasus. It is not easy for a turbu- lent community to live next to an orderly one without continually stirring up frontier disturb- ^'Manifest Destiny.''^ Ill ances which call for stern repression from the or- derly community. Such considerations go far to- wards explaining the military history of the Eo- mans, and it is a history with which, on the whole, we ought to sympathize. In its European relations that history is the history of the moving of the civilized frontier northward and eastward against the disastrous encroachments of barbarous peoples. This great movement has, on the whole, been stead- ily kept up, in spite of some apparent fluctuation in the fifth and sixth centuries of the Christian era, and it is still going on to-day. It was a great gain for civilization when the Romans overcame the Keltiberians of Spain, and taught them good man- ners and the Latin language, and made it for their interest hereafter to fight against barbarians. The third European peninsula was thus won over to the side of law and order. Danger now remained on the north. The Gauls had once sacked the city of Rome ; hordes of Teutons had lately menaced the very heart of civilization, but had been over- thrown in murderous combat by Caius Marius; another great Teutonic movement, led by Ariovis- tus, now threatened to precipitate the whole bar- baric force of south-eastern Gaul upon the civil- ized world; and so it occurred to the prescient genius of Caesar to be beforehand and conquer 112 American Political Ideas. Gaal, and enlist all its giant barbaric force on the side of civilization. This great work was as thor- oughly done as anything that was ever done in human history, and we ought to be thankful to Caesar for it every day that we live. The frontier to be defended against barbarism was now moved away up to the Rhine, and was very much short- ened ; but above all, the Gauls were made to feel themselves to be Romans. Their country became one of the chief strongholds of civilization and of Christianity ; and when the frightful shock of bar- barism came — the most formidable blow that has ever been directed by barbaric brute force against European civilization — it was in Gaul that it was repelled and that its force was spent. At the be- ginning of the fifth century an enormous horde of yellow Mongolians, known as Huns, poured down into Europe with avowed intent to burn and de- stroy all the good work which Rome had wrought in the world ; and terrible was the havoc they ef- fected in the course of fifty years. If At til a had carried his point, it has been thought that the work of European civilization might have had to be begun over again. But near Chalons-on-the- Marne, in the year 451, in one of the most obsti- nate struggles of which history preserves the rec- ord, the career of the " Scourge of God " was ar- "Manifest Destiny:' 113 rested, and mainly by the prowess of Gauls and of Yisigoths whom the genius of Rome had tamed. That was the last day on which barbarism was able to contend with civilization on equal terms. It was no doubt a critical day for all future history ; and for its favourable issue we must largely thank the policy adopted by Caesar five centuries before. By the end of the eighth century the great power of the Franks had become enlisted in behalf of law and order, and the Roman throne was occu- pied by a Frank, — the ablest man who had appear- ed in the world since Caesar's death ; and one of the worthiest achievements of Charles the Great was the conquest and conversion of pagan Ger- many, which threw the frontier against barbarism eastward as far as the Oder, and made it so much the easier to defend Europe. In the thirteenth century this frontier was permanently carried for- ward to the Vistula by the Teutonic Knights who, under commission from the emperor Frederick II., overcame the heathen Prussians and Lithuanians; and now it began to be shown how greatly the military strength of Europe had increased. In this same century Batu, the grandson of Jinghis Khan, came down into Europe with a horde of more than a million Mongols, and tried to repeat the experi- ment of Attila. Batu penetrated as far as Silesia, 114 Atiwrica/rh Political Ideas. and won a great battle at Liegnitz in 1241, but in spite of his victor}^ he had to desist from the task of conquering Europe. Since the fifth century the physical power of the civilized world had grown immensely ; and the impetus of this barbaric in- vasion was mainly spent upon Russia, the growth of which it succeeded in retarding for more than two centuries. Finally since the sixteenth century we have seen the Russians, redeemed from their Mongolian oppressors, and rich in many of the elements of a vigorous national life, — we have seen the Russians resume the aggressive in this conflict of ages, beginning to do for Central Asia in some sort what the Romans did for Europe. The frontier against barbarism, which Caesar left at the Rhine, has been carried eastward to the Vol- ga, and is now advancing even to the Oxus. Tlie question has sometimes been raised whether it would be possible for European civilization to be seriously threatened by any future invasion of bar- barism or of some lower type of civilization. By barbarism certainly not: all the nomad strength of Mongolian Asia would throw itself in vain against the insuperable barrier constituted by Rus- sia. But I have heard it quite seriously suggested that if some future Attila or Jinghis were to wield as a unit the entire military strength of the four ^^ Manifest DestinyP 115 hundred millions of Chinese, possessed with some suddenly-conceived idea of conquering the world, even as Omar and Abderrahman wielded as a unit the newly-welded power of the Saracens in the seventh and eighth centuries, then perhaps a stag- gering blow might yet be dealt against European civilization. I will not waste precious time in con- sidering this imaginary case, further than to re- mark that if the Chinese are ever going to try any- thing of this sort, they cannot afford to wait very long ; for within another century, as we shall pres- ently see, their very numbers will be surpassed by those of the English race alone. By that time all the elements of military predominance on the earth, including that of simple numerical superi- ority, will have been gathered into the hands not merely of men of European descent in general, but more specifically into the hands of the off- spring of the Teutonic tribes who conquered Brit- ain in the fifth century. So far as the relations of civilization with barbarism are concerned to-day, the only serious question is by what process of modification the barbarous races are to maintain their foothold upon the earth at all. While once such people threatened the very continuance of civilization, they now exist only on sufferance. In this brief survey of the advancing frontier of 116 Americcm Political Ideas. European civilization, I have said nothing about the danger that has from time to time been threat- ened by the followers of Mohammed, — of the over- throw of the Saracens in Gaul by the grandfather of Charles the Great, or their overthrow at Con- stantinople by the image-breaking Leo, of the great mediaeval Crusades, or of the mischievous but fu- tile career of the Turks. For if I were to attempt to draw this outline with anything like complete- ness, I should have no room left for the conclusion of my argument. Considering my position thus far as sufficiently illustrated, let us go on to con- template for a moment some of the effects of all this secular turmoil upon the political develop- ment of the progressive nations of Europe. I think we may safely lay it down, as a large and general rule, that all this prodigious warfare re- quired to free the civilized world from peril of barbarian attack served greatly to increase the dif- ficulty of solving the great initial problem of civ- ilization. In the first place, the turbulence thus arising was a serious obstacle to the formation of closely-coherent political aggregates ; as we see ex- emplified in the terrible convulsions of the fiftli and sixth centuries, and again in the ascendency acquired by the isolating features of feudalism be- tween the time of Charles the Great and the time ^'Manifest Destiny,''^ 117 of Louis VI. of France. In the second place, this perpetual turbulence was a serious obstacle to the preservation of popular liberties. It is a very dif- ficult thing for a free people to maintain its free constitution if it has to keep perpetually fighting for its life. The "one-man-power," less fit for' carrying on the peaceful pursuits of life, is sure to be brought into the foreground in a state of end- less warfare. It is a still more diflScult thing for| a free people to maintain its free constitution when it undertakes to govern a dependent people des- potically, as has been wont to happen when a por- tion of the barbaric world has been overcome and annexed to the civilized world. Under the weight of these two diflSculties combined, the free institu- tions of the ancient Eomans succumbed, and their government gradually passed into the hands of a kind of close corporation more despotic than any- thing else of the sort that Europe has ever seen. This despotic character — this tendency, if you will pardon the phrase, towards the Asiaticization of European life — was continued by inheritance in the Koman Church, the influence of which was beneficent so long as it constituted a wholesome check to the isolating tendencies of feudalism, but began to become noxious the moment these ten- dencies yielded to the centralizing monarchical ten- 118 American Political Ideas, dency in nearly all parts of Europe. The asiati- cizing tendency of Eoman political life had be- come so powerful by the fourth century, and has since been so powerfully propagated through the Church, that we ought to be glad that the Teu- tons came into the empire as masters rather than as subjects. As the Germanic tribes got posses- sion of the government in one part of Europe after another, they brought with them free institutions again. The political ideas of the Goths in Spain, of the Lombards in Italy, and of the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul, were as distinctly free as those of the Angles in Britain. But as the out- come of the long and uninterrupted turmoil of the Middle Ages, society throughout the continent of Europe remained predominantly military in type, and this fact greatly increased the tendency to- wards despotism which was bequeathed by Rome. After the close of the thirteenth century the whole power of the Church was finally thrown into the scale against the liberties of the people ; and as the result of all these forces combined, we find that at the time when America was discovered govern- ment was hardening into despotism in all the great countries of Europe except England. Even in England the tendency towards despotism had be- gun to become quite conspicuous after the whole- ^'Mcmifest DestinyP 119 sale slaughter of the great barons and the confis- cation of their estates which took place in the Wars of the Roses. The constitutional history of England during the Tudor and Stuart periods is mainly the history of the persistent effort of the English sovereign to free himself from constitu- tional checks, as his brother sovereigns on the con- tinent were doing. But how different the result ! How enormous the political difference between William III. and Louis XIY., compared with the difference between Henry YIII. and Francis I. ! The close of the seventeenth century, which marks the culmination of the asiaticizing tendency in Europe, saw despotism both political and religious firmly established in France and Spain and Italy, and in half of Germany ; while the rest of Ger- many seemed to have exhausted itself in the at- tempt to throw off the incubus. But in England this same epoch saw freedom both political and re- ligious established on so firm a foundation as never again to be shaken, never again with impunity to be threatened, so long as the language of Locke and Milton and Sydney shall remain a living speech on the lips of men. Now this wonderful difference between the career of popular liberty in England and on the Continent was due no doubt to a complicated variety of causes, one or two of 120 Americcm Political Ideas. which I have already sought to point out. In my first lecture I alluded to the curious combination of' circumstances which prevented anything like a severance of interests between the upper and the lower ranks of society; and something was also said about the feebleness of the grasp of imperial Kome upon Britain compared with its grasp upon the continent of Europe. But what I wish now to point out — since we are looking at the military aspect of the subject — is the enormous advantage of what we may call the si/rategic position of Eng- land in the long mediaeval struggle between civ- ilization and barbarism. In Professor Stubbs's ad- mirable collection of charters and documents illus- trative of English history, we read that " on the 6th of July [1264] the whole force of the country was summoned to London for the 3d of August, to resist the army which was coming from France under the queen and her son Edmund. The in- vading fleet was prevented hy the weather from sailing until too late in the season. . . . The papal legate, Guy Foulquois, who soon after became Clement lY., threatened the barons with excom- munication, but the bull containing the sentence was taken by the men of Dover as soon as it ar- rived, and was thrown into the sea."* As I read * Stubbs, " Select Charters." 401. ^^ Manifest Destiny^ 121 this, I think of the sturdy men of Connecticut beating the drum to prevent the reading of the royal order of James II. depriving the colony of the control of its own militia, and feel with pride that the indomitable spirit of English liberty is alike indomitable in every land where men of English race have set their feet as masters. But as the success of Americans in withstanding the unconstitutional pretensions of the crown was greatly favoured by the barrier of the ocean, so tlie success of Englishmen in defying the enemies of their freedom has no doubt been greatly favoured by the barrier of the British channel. The war between Henry III. and the barons was an event in English history no less critical than the war be- tween Charles I. and the parliament four centu- ries later; and British and Americans alike have every reason to be thankful that a great French army was not able to get across the channel in August, 1264. Nor was this the only time when the insular position of England did goodly service in maintaining its liberties and its internal peace. We cannot forget how Lord Howard of Effingham, aided also by the weather, defeated the armada that boasted itself " invincible," sent to strangle free- dom in its chosen home by the most execrable and ruthless tyrant that Europe has ever seen, a tyrant 122 American Political Ideas. whose victory would have meant not simply the usurpation of the English crown but the establish- ment of the Spanish Inquisition at Westminster Hall. Nor can we forget with what longing eyes the Corsican barbarian who wielded for mischief the forces of France in 1806 looked across from Boulogne at the shores of the one European land that never in word or deed granted him homage. But in these latter days England has had no need of stormy weather to aid the prowess of the sea- kings who are her natural defenders. It is impos- sible for the thoughtful student of history to walk across Trafalgar Square, and gaze on the image of the mightiest naval hero that ever lived, on the summit of his lofty column and guarded by the royal lions, looking down towards the government- house of the land that he freed from the dread of Napoleonic invasion and towards that ancient church wherein the most sacred memories of Eng- lish talent and English toil are clustered together, — it is impossible, I say, to look at this, and not admire both the artistic instinct that devised so happy a symbolism, and the rare good -fortune of our Teutonic ancestors in securing a territorial position so readily defensible against the assaults of despotic powers. But it was not merely in the simple facility of warding off external attack that ''Momifest Destiny:' 123 the insular position of England was so serviceable. This ease in warding off external attack had its most niarked effect upon the internal polity of the nation. It never became necessary for the English government to keep up a great standing army. For purposes of external defence a navy was all-suflBcient; and there is this practical differ- ence between a permanent army and a permanent navy. Both are originally designed for purposes of external defence; but the one can readily be used for purposes of internal oppression, and the other cannot. Nobody ever heard of a navy put- ting up an empire at auction and knocking down the throne of the world to a Didius Julianus. When, therefore, a country is effectually screened by water from external attack, it is screened in a way that permits its normal political development to go on internally without those manifold mili- tary hinderances that have ordinarily been so ob- structive in the history of civilization. Hence we not only see why, after the Norman Conquest had operated to increase its unity and its strength, England enjoyed a far greater amount of security and was far more peaceful than any other country in Europe; but we also see why society never assumed the military type in England which it assumed upon the continent; we see how it was r-^ 124 Americmi Political Ideas. that the bonds of feudalism were far looser here than elsewhere, and therefore how it happened that nowhere else was the condition of the com- mon people so good politically. We now begin to see, moreover, how thoroughly Professor Stubbs and Mr. Freeman are justified in insisting upon the fact that the political institutions of the Ger- mans of Tacitus have had a more normal and un- interrupted development in England than any- where else. Nowhere, indeed, in the whole history of the human race, can we point to such a well- rounded and unbroken continuity of political life as we find in the thousand years of English his- tory that have elapsed since the victory of William the ]N"orman at Senlac. In England the free gov- ernment of the primitive Aryans has been to this day uninterruptedly maintained, though every- where lost or seriously impaired on the continent of Europe, except in remote Scandinavia and im- pregnable Switzerland. But obviously, if in the conflict of ages between civilization and barbarism England had occupied such an inferior strategic position as that occupied by Hungary or Poland or Spain, if her territory had been liable once or twice in a century to be overrun by fanatical Sar- acens or beastly Mongols, no such remarkable and quite exceptional result could have been achieved. ^'Manifest DestinyP 125 Having duly fathomed the significance of this stra- tegic position of the English race while confined within the limits of the British islands, we are now prepared to consider the significance of the stupendous expansion of the English race which first became possible through the discovery and settlement of North America. I said, at the close of my first lecture, that the victory of Wolfe at Quebec marks the greatest turning-point as yet discernible in all modern history. At the first blush such an unqualified statement may have sounded as if an American student of history were inclined to attach an undue value to events that have happened upon his own soil. After the survey of universal history which we have now taken, however, I am fully prepared to show that the conquest of the North American continent by men of English race was unquestionably the most prodigious event in the political annals of man- kind. Let us consider, for a moment, the cardinal facts which this English conquest and settlement of North America involved. Chronologically the discovery of America coin- cides precisely with the close of the Middle Ages, and with the opening of the drama of what is called modern history. The coincidence is in many ways significant. The close of the Middle 126 American Political Ideas. Ages — as we have seen — was characterized by the increasing power of the crown in all the great countries of Europe, and by strong symptoms of popular restlessness in view of this increasing pow- er. It was characterized also by the great Prot- estant outbreak against the despotic pretensions of the Church, which once, in its antagonism to the rival temporal power, had befriended the lib- erties of the people, but now (especially since the death of Boniface YIII.) sought to enthrall them with a tyranny far worse than that of irresponsible king or emperor. As we have seen Aryan civili- zation in Europe struggling for many centuries to prove itself superior to the assaults of outer bar- barism, so here we find a decisive struggle begin- ning between the antagonist tendencies which had grown up in the midst of this civilization. Hav- ing at length won the privilege of living without risk of slaughter and pillage at the hands of Sara- cens or Mongols, the question now arose whether the people of Europe should go on and apply their intelligence freely to the problem of making life as rich and fruitful as possible in varied material and spiritual achievement, or should fall forever into the barren and monotonous way of living and think- ing which has always distinguished the half-civil- ' ized populations of Asia. This — and nothing less "Manifest Destiny:^ 127 than this, I think — was the practical political ques- tion really at stake in the sixteenth century between Protestantism and Catholicism. Holland and Eng- land entered the lists in behalf of the one solution of this question, while Spain and the Pope defended the other, and the issue was fought out on European soil, as we have seen, with varying success. But the discovery of America now came to open up an enormous region in which whatever seed of civilization should be planted was sure to grow to such enormous dimensions as by and by to exert a controlling influence upon all such controver- sies. It was for Spain, France, and England to contend for the possession of this vast region, and to prove by the result of the struggle which kind of civilization was endowed with the higher and sturdier political life. The race which here should gain the victory was clearly destined hereafter to take the lead in the world, though the rival pow- ers could not in those days fully appreciate this fact. They who founded colonies in America as trading-stations or military outposts probably did not foresee that these colonies must by and by become imperial states far greater in physical mass than the states which planted them. It is not likely that they were philosophers enough to foresee that this prodigious physical development 128 Americcm Political Ideas. would mean that the political ideas of the parent state should acquire a hundred-fold power and sem- inal influence in the future work of the world. It was not until the American Revolution that this began to be dimly realized by a few prescient thinkers. It is by no means so fully realized even now that a clear and thorough - going statement of it has not somewhat an air of novelty. When the highly-civilized community, representing the ripest political ideas of England, was planted in America, removed from the manifold and com- plicated checks we have just been studying in the history of the Old World, the growth was porten- tously rapid and steady. There were no Attilas now to stand in the way, — only a Philip or a Pon- tiac. The assaults of barbarism constituted only a petty annoyance as compared with the conflict of ages which had gone on in Europe. There was no occasion for society to assume a military as- pect. Principles of self-government were at once put into operation, and no one thought of calling them in question. When the neighbouring civili- zation of inferior type — I allude to the French in Canada — began to become seriously troublesome, it was struck down at a blow. When the mother- country, under the guidance of an ignorant king and short-sighted ministers, undertook to act upon ''Manifest DestmyP 129 the antiquated theory that the new ^.ommunities were merely groups of trading-stations, the politi- cal bond of connection was severed ; yet the war which ensued was not like the war which had but just now been so gloriously ended by the victory of Wolfe. It was not a struggle between two dif- ferent peoples, like the French of the Old Regime and the English, each representing antagonistic theories of how political life ought to be conduct- ed. But, like the Barons' War of the thirteenth century and the Parliament's War of the seven- teenth, it was a struggle sustained by a part of the English people in behalf of principles that time has shown to be equally dear to all. And so the is- sue only made it apparent to an astonished world tliat instead of one there were now two Engla/nds^ alike prepared to work with might and main to- ward the political regeneration of mankind. Let us consider now to what conclusions the rapidity and unabated steadiness of the increase of the English race in America must lead us as we go on to forecast the future. Carlyle somewhere speaks slightingly of the fact that the Americans double their numbers every twenty years, as if to have forty million dollar-hunters in the world were any better than to have twenty million dol- lar-hunters ! The implication that Americans are 9 130 American Political Ideas. nothing but dollar-hunters, and are thereby dis- tinguishable from the rest of mankind, would not perhaps bear too elaborate scrutiny. But during the present lecture we have been considering the gradual transfer of the preponderance of physical strength from the hands of the war-loving portion of the human race into the hands of the peace- loving portion, — into the hands of the dollar-hunt- ers, if you please, but out of the hands of the scalp-hunters. Obviously to double the numbers of a pre-eminently industrious, peaceful, orderly, and free-thinking community, is somewhat to in- crease the weight in the world of the tendencies that go towards making communities free and or- derly and peaceful and industrious. So that, from this point of view, the fact we are speaking of is well worth considering, even for its physical di- mensions. I do not know whether the United States could support a population everywhere as dense as that of Belgium ; so I will suppose that, with ordinary improvement in cultivation and in the industrial arts, we might support a population half as dense as that of Belgium, — and this is no doubt an extremely moderate supposition. Now a very simple operation in arithmetic will show that this means a population of fifteen hundred millions, or more than the population of the whole ''^Manifest Destiny^'* 131 world at the present date. Another very simple operation in arithmetic will show that if we were to go on doubling our numbers, even once in ev- ery twenty -five years, we should reach that stu- pendous figure at about the close of the twentieth century, — that is, in the days of our great-great- grandchildren. I do not predict any such result, for there are discernible economic reasons for be- lieving that there will be a diminution in the rate of increase. The rate must nevertheless continue to be very great, in the absence of such causes as formerly retarded the growth of population in Europe. Our modern wars are hideous enough, no doubt, but they are short. They are settled with a few heavy blows, and the loss of life and property occasioned by them is but trifling when compared with the awful ruin and desolation wrought by the perpetual and protracted contests of antiquity and of the Middle Ages. Chronic warfare, both private and public, periodic famines, and sweeping pestilences like the Black Death, — these were the things which formerly shortened human life and kept down population. In the ab- sence of such causes, and with the abundant capac- ity of our country for feeding its people, I think it an extremely moderate statement if we say that by the end of the next century the English race in 132 American Political Ideas. the United States will number at least six or seven hundred millions. It used to be said that so huge a people as this could not be kept together as a single national ag- gregate, — or, if kept together at all, could only be so by means of a powerful centralized government, like that of ancient Rome under the emperors. I think we are now prepared to see that this is a great mistake. If the Roman Empire could have possessed that political vitality in all its parts which is secured to the United States by the prin- ciples of equal representation and of limited state sovereignty, it might well have defied all the shocks which tribally-organized barbarism could ever have directed against it. As it was, its strong central- ized government did not save it from political dis- integration. One of its weakest political features was precisely this, — that its "strong centralized government " was a kind of close corporation, gov- erning a score of provinces in its own interest rather than in the interest of the provincials. In contrast with such a system as that of the Roman Empire, the skilfully elaborated American system of federalism appears as one of the most impor- tant contributions that the English race has made to the general work of civilization. The working out of this feature in our national constitution, by "Manifest Bestinyy 133 Hamilton aud Madison and their associates, was the finest specimen of constructive statesmanship that the world has ever seen. Not that these states- men originated the principle, but they gave form and expression to the principle which was latent in the circumstances under which the group of American colonies had grown up, and which sug- gested itself so forcibly that the clear vision of these thinkers did not fail to seize upon it as the fundamental principle upon which alone could the affairs of a great people, spreading over a vast con- tinent, be kept in a condition approaching to some- thing like permanent peace. Stated broadly, so as to acquire somewhat the force of a universal proposition, the principle of federalism is just this: — that the people of a state shall have full and entire control of their own domestic affairs, which directly concern them only, and which they will naturally manage with more intelligence and with more zeal than any distant governing body could possibly exercise ; but that, as regards mat- ters of common concern between a group of states, a decision shall in every case be reached, not by brutal warfare or by weary diplomacy, but by the systematic legislation of a central government which represents both states and people, and whose decisions can always be enforced, if neces- 134 Americcm Political Ideas. sarj, by the combined physical power of all the states. This principle, in various practical appli- cations, is so familiar to Americans to-day that we seldom pause to admire it, any more than we stop to admire the air which we breathe or the sun which gives us light and life. Yet I believe that if no other political result than this could to-day be pointed out as coming from the colonization of America by Englishmen, we should still be justi- fied in regarding that event as one of the most im- portant in the history of mankind. For obviously the principle of federalism, as thus broadly stated, contains within itself the seeds of permanent peace between nations; and to this glorious end I be- lieve it will come in the fulness of time. And now we may begin to see distinctly what it was that the American government fought for in the late civil war, — a point which at the time was by no means clearly apprehended outside the United States. We used to hear it often said, while that war was going on, that we were fight- ing not so much for the emancipation of the ne- gro as for the maintenance of our federal union ; and I well remember that to many who were burning to see our country purged of the folly and iniquity of negro slavery this used to seem like taking a low and unrighteous view of the ''Ma/tiifest DestinyP 135 case. From the stand-point of universal history it was nevertheless the correct and proper view. The emancipation of the negro, as an incidental result of the struggle, was a priceless gain which was greeted warmly by all right-minded people. But deeper down than this question, far more subtly interwoven with the innermost fibres of our national well-being, far heavier laden too with weighty consequences for the future weal of all mankind, was the question whether this great pacific principle of union joined with inde- pendence should be overthrown by the first deep- seated social difficulty it had to encounter, or should stand as an example of priceless value to other ages and to other lands. The solution was well worth the effort it cost. There have been many useless wars, but this was not one of them, for more than most wars that have been, it was fought in the direct interest of peace, and the vic- tory so dearly purchased and so humanely used was an earnest of future peace and happiness for the world. The object, therefore, for which the American government fought, was the perpetual maintenance of that peculiar state of things which the federal union had created, — a state of things in which, throughout the whole vast territory over which 136 American Political Ideas. the Union holds sway, questions between states, like questions between individuals, must be settled by legal argument and judicial decisions and not by wager of battle. Far better to demonstrate this point once for all, at whatever cost, than to be burdened hereafter, like the states of Europe, with frontier fortresses and standing armies and all the barbaric apparatus of mutual suspicion! For so great an end did this most pacific people engage in an obstinate war, and never did any war so thoroughly illustrate how military power may be wielded, when necessary, by a people that has passed entirely from the military into the in- dustrial stage of civilization. The events falsified all the predictions that were drawn from the con- templation of societies less advanced politically. It was thought that so peaceful a people could not raise a great army on demand ; yet within a twelvemonth the government had raised five hun- dred thousand men by voluntary enlistment. It was thought that a territory involving military operations at points as far apart as Paris and Mos- cow could never be thoroughly conquered; yet in April 1865 the federal armies might have marched from end to end of the Gulf States with-^ out meeting any force to oppose them. It was thought that the maintenance of a great army ''Manifest Destiny:' 137 would beget a military temper in the Americans and lead to manifestations of Bonapartism, — do- mestic usurpation and foreign aggression ; yet the moment the work was done the great army van- ished, and a force of twenty-five thousand men was found sufficient for the military needs of the whole country. It was thought that eleven states which had struggled so hard to escape from the federal tie could not be re-admitted to voluntary co-operation in the general government, but must henceforth be held as conquered territory, — a most dangerous experiment for any free people to try. Yet within a dozen years we find the old federal relations resumed in all their completeness, and the disunion party powerless and discredited in the very states where once it had wrought such mischief. Kay more, we even see a curiously disputed presidential election, in which the votes of the southern states were given almost with unanimity to one of the candidates, decided quiet- ly by a court of arbitration ; and we see a univer- sal acquiescence in the decision, even in spite of a general belief that an extraordinary combina- tion of legal subtleties resulted in adjudging the presidency to the candidate who was not really elected. Such has been the result of the first great at- 138 American Political Ideas. tempt to break up the federal union in America. It is not probable that another attempt can ever be made with anything like an equal chance of success. Here were eleven states, geographically contiguous, governed by groups of men who for half a century had pursued a well-defined policy in common, united among themselves and marked off from most of the other states by a difference far more deeply rooted in the groundwork of society than any mere economic difference, — the differ- ence between slave-labour and free-labour. These eleven states, moreover, held such an economic re- lationship with England that they counted upon compelling the naval power of England to be used in their behalf. And finally it had not yet been demonstrated that the maintenance of the federal union was something for which the great mass of the' people would cheerfully fight. Never could the experiment of secession be tried, apparently, under fairer auspices; yet how tremendous the defeat ! It was a defeat that wrought conviction, — the conviction that no matter how grave the political questions that may arise hereafter, they must be settled in accordance with the legal meth- ods the Constitution has provided, and that no state can be allowed to break the peace. It is the thoroughness of this conviction that has so greatly ''Manifest DestinyP , 139 facilitated the reinstatement of the reyolted states in their old federal relations ; and the good sense and good faith with which the southern people, in spite of the chagrin of defeat, have accepted the situation and acted upon it, is something un- precedented in history, and calls for the warmest sympathy and admiration on the part of their brethren of the north. The federal principle in America has passed through this fearful ordeal and come out stronger than ever ; and we trust it will not again be put to so severe a test. But with this principle unimpaired, there is no reason , why any further increase of territory or of popu- / lation should overtask the resources of our gov- ernment. In the United States of America a century hence we shall therefore doubtless have a political aggre- gation immeasurably surpassing in power and in dimensions any empire that has as yet existed, j But we must now consider for a moment the prob- able future career of the English race in other parts of the world. The colonization of North America by Englishmen had its direct effects upon the east- ern as well as upon the western side of the Atlan- tic. The immense growth of the commercial and naval strength of England between the time of Cromwell and the time of the elder Pitt was iuti- 140 American Political Ideals, matelj connected with the colonization of Korth America and the establishment of plantations in the "West Indies. These circumstances reacted powerfully upon the material development of Eng- land, multiplying manifold the dimensions of her foreign trade, increasing proportionately her com- mercial marine, and giving her in the eighteenth century the dominion over the seas. Endowed with this maritime supremacy, she has with an un- erring instinct proceeded to seize upon the keys of empire in all parts of the world, — Gibraltar, Mal- ta, the isthmus of Suez, Aden, Ceylon, the coasts of Australia, island after island in the Pacific, — every station, in short, that commands the path- ways of maritime commerce, or guards the ap- proaches to the barbarous countries which she is beginning to regard as in some way her natural heritage. Any well-filled album of postage-stamps is an eloquent commentary on this maritime su- premacy of England. It is enough to turn one's head to look over her colonial blue-books. The natural outcome of all this overflowing vitality it is not difficult to foresee. No one can carefully watch what is going on in Africa to-day without recognizing it as the same sort of thing which was going on in North America in the seventeenth century ; and it cannot fail to bring forth similar ^^ Manifest Destiny P 141 results in course of time. Here is a vast country, rich in beautiful scenery and in resources of tim- ber and minerals, with a sahibrious climate and fertile soil, with great navigable rivers and inland lakes, which will not much longer be left in con- trol of tawny lions and long-eared elephants and negro fetich-worshippers. Already live flourishing English states have been established in the south, besides the settlements on the Gold Coast and those at Aden commanding the Ked Sea. English explorers work their way, with infinite hardship, through its untra veiled wilds, and track the courses of the Congo and the Nile as their forefathers tracked the Potomac and the Hudson. The work of La Salle and Smith is finding its counterpart in the labours of Baker and Livingstone. Who can doubt that within two or three centuries the Afri- can continent will be occupied by a mighty nation of English descent, and covered with populous cit- ies and flourishing farms, with railroads and tele- graphs and other devices of civilization as yet un- dreamed of ? If we look next to Australia, we find a country of more than two-thirds the area of the United States, with a temperate climate and immense resources, agricultural and mineral, — a country sparsely peopled by a race of irredeemable savages 142 Americcm Political Ideas. hardly above the level of brutes. Here England within the present century has planted six great- ly thriving states, concerning which I have not time to say much, but one fact will serve as a speci- men. When in America we wish to illustrate in one word the wonderful growth of our so-called north-western states, we refer to Chicago, — a city of half-a-million inhabitants standing on a spot which fifty years ago was an uninhabited marsh. In Australia the city of Melbourne was founded in 1837, the year when the present queen of England began to reign, and the state of which it is the capital was hence called Victoria. This city, now'^ just forty-three years old, has a population half as great as that of Chicago, has a public library of 200,000 volumes, and has a university with at least one professor of world-wide renown. When we see, by the way, within a period of five years and at such remote points upon the earth's surface, such erudite and ponderous works in the English language issuing from the press as those of Pro- fessor Hearn of Melbourne, of Bishop Colenso of Natal, and of Mr. Hubert Bancroft of San Fran- cisco, — even such a little commonplace fact as this is fraught with wonderful significance when we * In 1880. ''Manifest Destiny, ^^ 143 think of all that it implies. Then there is New Zealand, with its climate of perpetual spring, where the English race is now multiplying faster than anywhere else in the world unless it be in Texas and Minnesota. And there are in the Pacific Ocean many rich and fertile spots where we shall very soon see the same things going on. It is not necessary to dwell upon such consider- ations as these. It is enough to point to the gen- eral conclusiorij'that the work which tHe English race began when it colonized North America is r destined to go on until every land on the earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civil- ization shall become English in its language, in its V political habits and traditions, and to a predomi- nant extent in the blood of its people. The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race will trace its pedigree to English forefathers, as four- fifths of the white people in the United States trace their pedigree to-day. The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and from the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it began to acquire when England first stretched its arm across the Atlantic to the shores of Vir- ginia and Massachusetts. The language spoken by these great communities will not be sundered into 144 American Political Ideas. dialects like the language of the ancient Koraans, but perpetual intercommunication and the univer- sal habit of reading and writing will preserve its integrity ; and the world's business will be trans- acted by English-speaking people to so great an extent, that whatever language any man may have learned in his infancy he will find it necessary sooner or later to learn to express his thoughts in English. And in this way it is by no means im- probable that, as Grimm the German and CandoUe the Frenchman long since foretold, the language of Shakespeare may ultimately become the lan- guage of mankind. In view of these considerations as to the stupen- dous future of the English race, does it not seem very probable that in due course of time Europe — which has learned some valuable lessons from America already — will find it worth while to adopt the lesson of federalism ? Probably the European states, in order to preserve their nelative weight in the general polity of the world, will find it nec- essary to do so. In that most critical period of American history between the winning of inde- pendence and the framing of the Constitution, one of the strongest of the motives which led the confederated states to sacrifice part of their sov- ereignty by entering into a federal union was their ''^Manifest l)estiny.^^ 145 keen sense of their weakness when taken severally. In physical strength such a state as Massachusetts at that time amounted to little more than Ham- burg or Bremen ; but the thirteen states taken to- gether made a nation of respectable power. Even the wonderful progress we have made in a century has not essentially changed this relation of things. Our greatest state, New York, taken singly, is about the equivalent of Belgium; our weakest state, Nevada, would scarcely be a match for the county of Dorset ; yet the United States, taken to- gether, are probably at this moment the strongest nation in the world. Now a century hence, with a population of six hundred millions in the United States, and a hun- dred and fifty millions in Australia and New Zea- land, to say nothing of the increase of power in other parts of the English-speaking world, the rel- ative weights will be very diflFerent from what they were in 1788. The population of Europe will not increase in anything like the same proportion, and a very considerable part of the increase will be transferred by emigration to the English-speaking world outside of Europe. By the end of the twen- tieth century such nations as France and Germany can only claim such a relative position in the po- litical world as Holland and Switzerland now oc- 10 146 American Political Ideas, cupy. Their greatness in thou g ht and schol^fship, in industrial and aesthetic art, will doubtless con- tinue unabated. But their political weights will severally have come to be insignificant ; and as we now look back, with historic curiosity, to the days when Holland was navally and commercially the rival of England, so people will then need to be reminded that there was actually once a time when little France was the most powerful nation on the earth. It will then become as desirable for the states of Europe to enter into a federal union as it was for the states of North America a century ago. It is only by thus adopting the lesson of feder- alism that Europe can do away with the chances of useless warfare which remain so long as its dif- ferent states own no allegiance to any common authority. War, as we have seen, is with barbar- ous races both a necessity and a favourite occupa- tion. As long as civilization comes into contact with barbarism, it remains a too frequent neces- sity. But as between civilized and Christian na- tions it is a wretched absurdity. One sympathizes keenly with wars such as that which Russia has lately concluded, for setting free a kindred race endowed with capacity for progress, and for hum- bling the worthless barbarian who during four cen- ^^Momifest Destiny. ^^ 147 turies has wrought such incalculable damage to the European world. But a sanguinary struggle for the Rhine frontier, between two civilized Chris- tian nations who have each enough work to do in the world without engaging in such a strife as this, will, I am sure, be by and by condemned by the general opinion of mankind. Such questions will have to be settled by discussion in some sort of federal council or parliament, if Europe would keep pace with America in the advance towards universal law and order. All will admit that such a state of things is a great desideratum : let us see if it is really quite so Utopian as it may seem at the first glance. No doubt the lord who dwelt in Haddon Hall in the fifteenth century would have thought it very absurd if you had told him that within four hundred years it would not be neces- sary for country gentlemen to live in great stone dungeons with little cross-barred windows and loop- holes from which to shoot at people going by. Yet to-day a country gentleman in some parts of Mas- sachusetts may sleep securely without locking his front-door. We have not yet done away with rob- bery and murder, but we have at least made pri- vate warfare illegal ; we have arrayed public opin- ion against it to such an extent that the police- court usually makes short shrift for the misguided 148 American Political Ideas. man who tries to wreak vengeance on his enemy. Is it too much to hope that by and by we may sim- ilarly put public warfare under the ban ? I think not. Already in America, as we have seen, it has become customary to deal with questions between states just as we would deal with questions be- tween individuals. This we have seen to be the real purport of American federalism. To have established such a system over one great continent is to have made a very good beginning towards establishing it over the world. To establish such a system in Europe will no doubt be difficult, for here we have to deal with an immense complica- tion of prejudices, intensified by linguistic and eth- nological differences. Nevertheless the pacific press- ure exerted upon Europe by America is becoming so great that it will doubtless before long over- come all these obstacles. I refer to the industrial competition between the old and the new worlds, which has become so conspicuous within the last ten years. Agriculturally Minnesota, Nebraska, and Kansas are already formidable competitors with England, France, and Germany ; but this is but the beginning. It is but the first spray from the tremendous wave of economic competition that is gathering in the Mississippi valley. By and by, when our shameful tariff — falsely called ^'Manifest DestinyP 149 "protective" — shall have been done awaj with, and onr manufacturers shall produce superior arti- cles at less cost of raw material, we shall begin to compete with European countries in all the mar- kets of the world; and the competition in manu- factures will become as keen as it is now begin- ning to be in agriculture. This time will not be long in coming, for our tariff-system has already begun to be discussed, and in the light of our present knowledge discussion means its doom. Born of crass ignorance and self-defeating greed, it cannot bear the light. When this curse to American labour — scarcely less blighting than the curse of negro slavery — shall have been once re- moved, the economic pressure exerted upon Eu- rope by the United States will soon become very great indeed.^ It will not be long before this economic pressure will make it simply impossible for the states of Europe to keep up such military armaments as they are now maintaining. The disparity between the United States, with a stand- ing army of only twenty-five thousand men with- drawn from industrial pursuits, and the states of Europe, with their standing armies amounting to four millions of men, is something that cannot possibly be kept up. The economic competition will become so keen that European armies will 150 AmeriGom Political Ideas. have to be disbanded, the swords will have to be turned into ploughshares, and thus the victory of the industrial over the military type of civilization will at last become complete. But to disband the great armies of Europe will necessarily involve the forcing of the great states of Europe into some sort of federal relation, in which Congresses — al- ready held on rare occasions — will become more frequent, in which the principles of international law will acquire a more definite sanction, and in which the combined physical power of all the states will constitute (as it now does in America) a permanent threat against any state that dares to wish for selfish reasons to break the peace. In some such way as this, I believe, the industrial de- velopment of the English race outside of Europe will by and by enforce federalism upon Europe. As regards the serious difficulties that grow out of prejudices attendant upon differences in lan- guage, race, and creed, a most valuable lesson is furnished us by the history of Switzerland. I am inclined to think that the greatest contribution which Switzerland has made to the general prog- ress of civilization has been to show us how such obstacles can be surmounted, even on a small scale. To surmount them on a great scale will soon be- come the political problem of Europe; and it is ^^Mcmifest DestinyP 151 America which has set the example and indicated the method. Thus we may foresee in general outline how, through the gradual concentration of the prepon- derance of physical power into the hands of the most pacific communities, the wretched business of warfare must finally become obsolete all over the globe. The element of distance is now fast becoming eliminated from political problems, and the history of human progress politically will con- tinue in the future to be what it has been in the past, — the history of the successive union of groups of men into larger and more complex ag- gregates. As this process goes on, it may after many more ages of political experience become apparent that' there is really no reason, in the na- ture of things, why the whole of mankind should not constitute politically one huge federation, — each little group managing its local affairs in en- tire independence, but relegating all questions of international interest to the decision of one cen- tral tribunal supported by the public opinion of the entire human race. I believe that the time will come when such a state of things will exist upon the earth, when it will be possible (with our friends of the Paris dinner-party) to speak of the United States as stretching from pole to pole, — 152 American Political Ideas. or, with Tennyson, to celebrate the " parliament of man and the federation of the world." In- deed, only when such a state of things has begun to be realized, can Civilization, as sharply demar- cated from Barbarism, be said to have fairly be- gun. Only then can the world be said to have become truly Christian. Many ages of toil and doubt and perplexity will no doubt pass by before such a desideratum is reached. Meanwhile it is pleasant to feel that the dispassionate contempla- tion of great masses of historical facts goes far towards confirming our faith in this ultimate tri- umph of good over evil. Our survey began with pictures of horrid slaughter and desolation : it ends with the picture of a world covered with cheerful homesteads, blessed with a sabbath of perpetual peace. INDEX, Abderrahman, 115. Achaian league, 76. Aden, 140. Adoption, 38. ^tolian league, 76. Africa, English colonies in, 141. Albany Congress, 95. Amphiktyonic Council, 72. Angeln, 105. Angles, 118. Anglo-American, 104. Anglo-Saxon, 104. Appomattox, 7. Arable mark, 39. Ariovistus, 111. Armada, the Invincible, 121. Armies of Europe will be dis- banded, 150. Arminius, 7. Arnold, M., 27. Asiaticization, 117, 126. Athens, grandeur of, 57 ; in- corporated demes of Attika, 68 ; old tribal divisions mod- ified, 68 ; school of political training, 72; maritime em- pire of, 75. Attila, 112, 114, 128. Australia, 142. Austria, 97. Baker, Sir S., 141. Bancroft, Hubert, 142. Barons, war of the, 120, 121, 129. Basileus, 67. Batu, 113. Belgium, 145. Benefices, 46. Bern, 88. Bonaparte, N., 122. Bonapartism, 137. Boroughs, special privileges of, 66. Boston, growth of, 31, 64; its Common, 40. Boundaries of United States, 101. Burgundians, 118. By-laws, 46. C^SAR, J., Ill, 118. California, social experiments in, 93. Canada under Old Regime, 56. 154 Index. CandoUe, A. de, 140. Canton, 61. Carlyle on dollar-hunters, 129. Centralized government,weak- ness of, 132. Century, 61. Ceylon, 140. CMlons, battle of, 112. Charles I., 121. Charles the Bold, 51. Charles Martel, 116. Charles the Great, 113, 116. Chatham, Lord, 7. Chester, 64. Chicago, 142. Chinese, 115. Christianity, 81. Church, mediaeval, 118, 126. Cities in England and Amer- ica, 34; origin of, 64. City, the ancient, 59, 64-69, 85. Civilization, its primary phase, 106 ; long threatened by neighbouring barbarism, 108. Clan-system of political union, 38, 60. Claudius, emperor, 81. Clement IV., 120. Cleveland, city of. 22. Colenso,J.W.,142. Colonies, how founded, 27. Comitia, 67, 82. Commendation, 47. Commons, House of, 51. Commons, origin of, 39. Communal farming in Eng- land, 46. Communal landholding, 8, 39. Competition, industrial, be- tween Europe and Amer- ica, 148. Confederation, articles of, 96. Connecticut, men of, defy James II., 121. Constitution of the United States, 96. Continentals and British, 104. Cromwell, O., 7, 29. Curia, 61. Delian confederacy, 75. Deme, 62. Departments of France, 63. Dependencies, danger of gov- erning them despotically, 83, 117, 137. Didius Julianus, 123. Diocletian, 84. Domestic service in a New England village, 23. Dorset, 145. Dover, men of, throw papal bull into sea, 120. Duke, 63. Dutch republic, 87. Ealdorman, 63, 67. Ecclesia, 67. Eden, Chuzzlewit's, 65. Electoral commission, 137. Emancipation of slaves, 135. Index. 165 England, maritime supremacy of, 140. English colonization, 56, 91; language, future of, 144; self-government, how pre- served, 50, 87, 120-124 ; vil- Famines, 131. Federal union on great scale, conditions of, 91 ; its dura- bleness lies in its flexibility, 92. Federalism, pacific implica- tions of, 99, 134; will be adopted by Europe, 144. Federation and conquest, 74. Federations in Greece, 76. Feudal system, origin of, 46. Fick, A., 38. France, political development of, 52 ; contrasted with Eng- land as a colonizer, 54, 127. France and Germany, their late war, 147 ; their political weight a century hence, 146. Francis I., 119. Franklin, B., 95. Franks, 113, 118. Freeman, E. A., 7, 28, 36, 102, 103, 124. Freiburg, 88. French villages, 20. Gau, 62. Gaul, Roman conquest of, 112. Geneva, 88. Gens, 37. Georgia, 95. Germany conquered and con- verted by Charles the Great, 113. Gibraltar, 140. Goths, 118. Great states, method of form- ing, 74; notion of their hav- ing an inherent tendency to break up, 89 ; difficulty of forming, 107. Grimm, J. , 144. Haddon Hall, 147. Hamburg, 145. Hamilton, A., 133. Hampden, J., 29, 105. Hannibal's invasion of Italy, 80. Hearn, Professor, 142. Henry Vm., 119. Heretoga, 63. Hindustan, village communi- ties in, 42 ; cities in, 64. Holland, 103, 146. Howard of Effingham, 121. Hundred, 61. Himgary, 124. Hunnish invasion of Europe, 112. Incorporation, 59, 78. Iroquois tribes, 38. James II., 121. 156 Index. Jinghis Khan, 113. Judiciary, federal, 99. Kansas, 148. Kemble, J.,39,45. Kingship among ancient Teu- tons, 42. La Salle, R., 141. Lausanne, 88. Leo's defeat of the Saracens, 116. Lewes, battle of, 7. Liegnitz, battle of, 114. Lincoln, A. , 7. Lincoln, city of, 64. Livingstone, Dr., 141. Lombards, 118. London, growth of, 31. Louis VL, 117. Louis XIV., 119. Madison, J., 133. Maine, Sir H., 8, 43. Maintz, 64. Malta, 140. Manorial courts, 48. Manors, origin of, 46. March meetings in New Eng- land, 31. - Marius, C, 111. Mark, 37-41, 61 ; in England, 44r-49; meaning of the word, 47. Mark-mote, 41. Massachusetts, 20-36. 145. May assemblies in Switzev land, 36. Melbourne, city of, 142. Middle Ages, turbulence of, 47, 86. Military strength of civilized world, its increase, 109-115. Minnesota, 143, 148. Mir, or Russian village, 42-44. Mongolian Khans in Russia, 43. Mongols, 124, 126. Montenegro, 97. Montfort, S. de, 7, 51, 71, 105. Naseby, battle of, 7. Navies less dangerous than standing armies, 123. Nebraska, 148. Nelson's statue in Trafalgar Square, 122. Nevada, 97, 145. New England confederacy, 94. New York, 97, 145. New Zealand, 143. Norman conquest, 123. North America, struggle for possession of, 127. Omab, 115. Pagus, 62. Paris, American dinner-party in, 101, 106, 151. Parish, its relation to town- ship, 48. Index. 157 Parkman, F., 55, 73. Pax romana, 81. Peace of the world, how se- cured, 109, 150. Peerage of England, 28, 50. Peloponnesian war, 76, 80. Persian war against Greece,110. Pestilences, 131. Petersham, 9. Philip, King, 128. Phratries, 61. Pictet, A.,38. Poland, 124. Pontiac, 128. Population of United States a century hence, 131. Private property in land, 39. Problem of political civiliza- tion, 6, 35, 85, 108. Protestantism and Catholi- cism, political question at stake between, 126. Prussia conquered by Teuton- ic knights, 113. Puritanism, 26. Puritans of New England, their origin, 28. Quebec, Wolfe's victory at, 7, 56, 125. Rebellion against Charles I., 121, 129. Redivision of arable lands, 40. Re-election of town officers, 33. Representation unknown to Greeks and Romans, 59, 71- 77; origin of, 70 ; federal, in United States, 97. Rex, 67. Rhode Island, 97. Roman law, 81. Rome, plebeian revolution at, 69 ; early stages of, 78 ; se- cret of its power, 79 ; advan- tages of its dominion, 81; causes of its political fail- ure, 82-85, 117, 132 ; power- ful influence of, in Middle Ages, 87, 118; meaning of its great wars, 110. Roses, wars of the, 119. Ross, D., 8, 39. Russia, Mongolian conquest of, 114; village communi- ties in, 40 ; its late war against the Turks, 146; its despotic government con- trasted with that of France under Old Regime, 43. Saracens, 115, 124, 126. Scandinavia, 124. Secession, war of, 100,134-139. Selectmen, 32. Self-government preserved in England, 50, 87, 120 ; lost in France, 52. Shakespeare, 21. Shires, 62. Shottery, cottage at, 21. 168 Index. Smith, J., 141. Social war, 79. South Carolina, 95. Spain, Roman conquest of, 111. Sparta, 68, 71, 75. State sovereignty in America, 95. Strasburg, 64. Strategic position of England, 120-124. Stubbs,W.,45,48,120,124. Suez, 140. Swiss cantonal assemblies, 36. Switzerland, lesson of its his- tory, 88, 150 ; self - govern- ment preserved in, 124. Tacitus, 37, 41, 124. Tariff in America, 149. Tax-taking despotisms, 43. Tennyson, A., 152. Teutonic civilization contrast- ed with Graeco-Roman, 60, 63,65,69,86. Teutonic knights, 113. Teutonic viUage communities, 37. Texas, 97, 143. Thegnhood, 28. Thirty Years' War, 119. Thukydides, 57. Tocqueville, 35. Tourist in United States, 17. Town, meaning of the word, 47. THE Town-meetings, origin of, 36- 49. Town-names formed from pat- ronymics, 45. Township in New England, 31 ; in western states, 34. Tribe and shire, 62. Turks, 116, 146. Versailles, 21. Vestry-meetings, 48. Victoria, Australia, 142. Village-mark, 39. Villages of New England, 18- 25. Virginia, parishes in, 34. Visigoths, 113. Wallace, D. M., 18, 43, War of independence, 95, 129. Warfare, universal in early times, 73 ; how diminished, 109; interferes with politi- cal development, 116 ; less destructive now than in an- cient times, 131 ; how effec- tively waged by the most pacific of peoples, 136. Washington, city of, 65. Washington, G., 7, 96, 105. William III., 119. Witenagemote, 50, 63. Wolfe's victory at Quebec, 7, 56, 125. YORKTOWN, 7. END. By POULTNEY BIGELOW WHITE MAN'S AFRICA. Illustrated by R. Caton WooDviLLE and Frederic Remington, and from Photographs. Post 8vo, Cloth, Uncut Edges and Gilt Top, $2 60. We very much doubt if a better or truer idea can be gotten from any source of the real situation of affairs, social and political, in South Africa than in these pages. Certain it is nowhere will one find the information presented more interestingly or attrac- tively. — Christian Intelligencer, N. Y. Mr. Bigelow has a keen eye and a practical judgment, which makes his always readable story better worth the reading than so many travel books, which are only superficially interesting. It abounds in facts large and small, in simple but valuable statistics, and in touches which throw passing gleams of light on many points of great interest. — 2he American, Philadelphia. HISTORY OF THE GERMAN STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY. Copiously Illustrated with Drawings by R. Caton Woodville, and with Portraits and Maps. Two Volumes. Crown 8vo, Cloth, Ornamental, Uncut Edges and Gilt Tops, |5 00. (In a Box.) Sound scholarship, ample research, a patriotic purpose, and the command of a graceful and vigorous literary style have gone to the making of the "History of the German Struggle for Liberty."— Boston Beacon. THE BORDERLAND OF CZAR AND KAISER. Notes from Both Sides of the Russian Frontier. Illus- trated by Frederic Remington. Post 8vo, Cloth,Or- namentai, $2 00. 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