THE TARIFF WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES BY S. E. MOFFETT Washington Correspondent San Francisco Examiner JJork CHARLES L. WEBSTER & CO. 1802 zr COPYRIGHT, 1803, BY S. E. MOFFETT. CONTENTS. CHAPTER. PAGE. I. What the Tariff Is 5 II. Can a Nation Tax Itself Rich ?. . . 10 III. Who Profits by the Tariff ? 15 IV. The Tariff and Wages 20 V. The Tariff and California 25 VJ. The Tariff and Commerce 33 VII. The Hawaiian Object Lesson 40 VIII. The Balance of Trade 47 IX. The Tariff an^Shipping 53 X. The Tariff and the Foreigner 60 XI. Local and Tariff Taxes 66 XII. Wages and Labor Cost 72 XIII . How Many Are Protected ? 78 XIV. American Tariff s Part First 83 XV. American Tariff s Part Second. . . 88 XVI. American Tariff s Part Third .... 93 XVII. The McKinley Bill Part First. . . 97 XVIII. The McKinley Bill Part Second. . 104 PEEFAOE These chapters were originally published in serial form in the San Francisco Examiner. This explains their local Californian color, which it has not been thought necessary to change. Headers in other sections can easily supply home illustrations of the workings of the tariff for themselves. ^ n trv\ THE TARIFF. WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES. CHAPTER I. WHAT THE TARIFF IS. A tariff is a system of taxes levied upon goods brought into a country from abroad. In this country at the present time the tariff is general- ly treated as a device for forcing our people to buy American goods instead of foreign ones. But before considering it in this light it will be well to examine it in its original aspect as a tax. The idea of raising money by import duties is exceedingly ancient. The Athenians levied a tax of two per cent on all foreign merchandise entering their territory. The Romans had im- port and export duties of two and a half per cent. How the modern word tariff commemo- rates the name of that fine old Moorish econo- mist, Tarif ibn Malek, who used to blackmail all the vessels sailing past his stronghold on the Straits of Gibraltar, is too well known to need repetition. The Venetians in the Middle Ages had discriminating duties and navigation laws almost as ingeniously meddlesome as our own. The modern world has refined and extended the mediaeval and ancient examples. 5 6 THE TARIFF. As a tax the tariff has always been a favorite device of governments, especially of such as were not sure of their popularity. It is easily collected, it is indirect and attacks the final payer in disguise. The merchant who first pays it does not object greatly, for he simply makes the price of his goods enough higher to cover the duty and a profit on the capital advanced in meeting it. The retailer passes the tax with another profit on the consumer. When the last victim, unable to shift his burden upon any one else, has paid two or three prices for his goods, he may possibly grumble at the extortion of the merchants, but it does not usually occur to him to blame the Government or to consider his high prices in the light of a tax. From the point of view of the rulers, therefore, a tariff affords an ideal means of raising money. But how is it with the people ? The tariff as a tax is not equal. It is well enough for the rich, but hard on the poor. A direct tax, honestly as- sessed, falls on men in proportion to their wealth. A tax on consumption falls almost as heavily on the poor man as on the rich one. A laborer earning $50 a month may spend $200 a year on clothes for himself and family, and of this at least $80 represents the tariff tax. A rich bachelor with an income of a million dol- lars a year may get along with $500 worth of clothes, of which the tariff duties represent about $200. The laborer's contribution to the tariff may amount to twenty per cent of his total income, the millionaire's may not exceed a quarter of one per cent of his. The tariff may WHAT THE TARIFF IS. 7 thus absorb the whole of the poor man's little margin for saving, keep him forever living from hand to mouth, and leave him with no prospect for his old age. The rich man's sur- plus is scarcely touched by such taxation and he can go on adding to his wealth from year to year. We may assume, therefore, that a tariff con- sidered merely as a tax is not a good thing. If we were looking at it solely in that light all would agree that it should be kept as low as possible. In other words, if we could not think of any better way of raising money, we should keep the duties strictly within the limits requir- ed to supply "the needs of the Government eco- nomically administered." We should not be looking for ways of spending our superfluous revenues, but when we found a surplus we should promptly reduce the taxes. That there are several million people who favor just the oppo- site course, and who wish to see the taxes raised whether the money be needed or not, is due to another view of the tariff not as a tax, but as a device for compelling people to buy homemade instead of foreign-made goods. It is in this aspect that the tariff is now a political issue in the United States, and it is in this that it will be discussed in these chapters. The way in which the duties are supposed to "protect" American industries is by raising the price of foreign merchandise and thereby enabling American producers to charge more for their goods. The early protectionists in this country believed that a few years of this nur- 8 THE TARIFF. sing of home industries would be enough. They thought that protection was necessary to enable our manufacturers to get on their feet. They had much to say of " infant industries," and they said that they would welcome free trade as soon as we had accumulated enough capital and skilled labor to enable us to fight on fair terms. But all these ideas have been outgrown. The infant industries have become giant monopo- lies. What we have to consider now is, not whether we shall give protection for a few years to struggling young industries, but whether we shall adopt it as a permanent policy. One thing more remains to be mentioned, be- fore completing this chapter of definitions. Pro- tectionists often deny that their object is to increase the price of American goods. They say that they expect, by stimulating home com- petition, to bring prices even below the foreign rates. When they are asked what in that case would be the objection to removing the duties, they say that but for the tariff the foreigner could pour his goods into this country at less than cost until he had closed up all the Ameri- can factories, after which he could make up his losses by charging monopoly prices. But whether that argument ever had any substance or not it has none now. No establishments in the world are better able to carry on a tempo- rary war of rates than our own. Nowhere are there such masses of capital that can be so ruth- lessly handled for such an end. The English steelmaker who should try to freeze out Mr. Carnegie by selling goods at a loss would be an WHAT THE TARIFF IS. 9 object of sympathy. He would find that a game that two could play at, and while he was dump- ing his surplus on the American market, the American surplus would be demoralizing the home market of England. Moreover the devel- opment of trusts has taught our manufacturers how to furl their sails in stormy weather and wait till the clouds roll by. Temporary stop- pages of work for the sake of raising prices are every-day incidents of business. Therefore, to make the protectionist assumption true it would not be sufficient for the foreigner to close our factories temporarily. He would have to keep them closed. To do this he would have to sell permanently at a loss, a thing which even a person as malignant as the foreign manufac- turer is popularly supposed to be would hesitate about doing. We come back, then, to ordinary business competition. Our protective tariff is based on the theory that foreigners can produce things and sell them more cheaply than Americans can, and it aims to equalize the difference by increasing the cost of foreign goods to the consumer and so enabling the American pro- ducer to get higher prices for his own than he otherwise could. That is the sole object of pro- tection. A duty that does not raise prices is not protective. The ground now being clear, let us see what effect the tariff has on the prosperity and comfort of the American people. CHAPTER II. CAN A NATION TAX ITSELF RICH? Those who believe in a tariff for protection say that it improves the condition of the people by giving higher wages to workmen and greater profits to capitalists. Before we consider that point it will be well to see what effect it has on the nation as a whole. If the United States can produce more wealth with a protective tariff than without one, then it will be possible for each citizen to get more in the general division; but if less be produced, there is less to divide, and any person who may get more must do so at the expense of the rest. Suppose only one person lived in the United States. If he were left to himself he would engage in the occupation that seemed likely to bring him the greatest returns with the least exertion. Perhaps he would wash out gold in the bed of some California stream. Once a year he would come down to the bay and buy what goods he needed from some passing trader. The United States would be exporting gold and importing commodities a highly danger- ous, if not ruinous, process, according to our domestic school of political economy. But if it were suggested to this sole American citizen that wisdom required him to make everything for himself, and that he should prevent himself 10 CAN A NATION TAX ITSELF RICH? 11 from buying anything abroad, by artificially rais- ing the price of his imports so that he would have to give more of his gold for the same amount of commodities, he would probably fail to appre. ciate the value of the advice. He would say that he could make more and better clothes, hats, books, guns, powder, shot, fiddles, coffee, tea and sugar by panning out gold and trading it for these things than by trying laboriously to make each article for himself. In other words, the United States could acquire more wealth by letting trade flow in its natural channels than by attempting to confine it to the home market. Suppose, now, the population of the Union to be doubled. Another man comes in and settles down by the gold miner. Instead of going to work with a pan it may occur to him that he can accomplish more by putting in crops of grain and vegetables and keeping a cow and some chickens. Part of his produce will give him enough to eat and the rest he can sell to the miner. Both will then have gold to send abroad for such other things as they may need. In other words, the United States will continue to export gold, but it will import more manufac- tured goods and less agricultural produce. The course of trade is still perfectly free, and if it were suggested to the newcomer that he suffered by being able to buy foreign goods so cheaply, that he was engaged in a degrading competition with the pauper labor of Europe, and that he could never be prosperous until he and the miner were compelled to cobble up their own guns and shoes and do all their trading 12 THE TARIFF. with each other, he would be incredulous. He would say : "I can raise enough on my farm in a part of the year to trade for everything I need and I have the rest of the time to myself. If the miner and I were to try to make everything we use, we should have to work all day and every day in putting together rawhide clothes, ham- mering out fishhooks without barbs, and botch- ing up guns that would blow our heads off the first time we tried to fire them, and a good many things we should have to go without altogether." It would be hard to convince either inhabitant of the United States that he needed any inter- ference to make him work to the best advant- age, or that he had anything to fear from a possible "flood of cheap foreign goods." But now let us imagine the population of the country to be still further increased. A third man joins the farmer and the miner, and looks about him for something to do. He suggests that weaving woolen cloth would suit him very well. But as cloth is woven in large quantities in Europe by cheap labor and improved machin- ery, and as he would have to do his work slowly with a hand loom, he could not undertake to sell at foreign prices. To do that, he might say, would be to bring American wages down to the European standard. " Bind yourselves to pay me three times as much for my cloth as you do the foreign trader for his and I will establish this new industry among you, which will diversify American CAN A NATION TAX ITSELF RICH? 13 labor, furnish a home market for your products, and keep up the standard of living." The farmer and miner would probably reply : "Where do we come in? If we are to get only a third as much cloth for the same amount of labor, our wages and standard of living will be reduced. If you take three parts of our pro- duce and return us one part of its value your home market is worth exactly as much to us as that of a tramp who should take two parts and return us nothing at all. The country is open to you just as it was to us. Find something to do that is worth doing." Thus admonished, the newcomer might think a little harder and perhaps might see an open- ing for success as a blacksmith, carpenter and general tinker. He could make and mend tools, furniture and the like for the old settlers, and thus save them much valuable time, besides do- ing better work than they could. And so the process would go on. Each new arrival would fit into the place where he could work to the best advantage. Industries would gradually become more diversified. When a town of 500 people had grown up there would probably be a mill by the stream, a tannery, a shoemaker, a tailor, a baker, a physician, a teacher, a number of woodcutters, herders and other workers in lines that had to be conducted on the spot. As 1,000, 10,000, 100,000 people came in, the industries would constantly broaden. Many things that it was formerly cheaper to import could now be produced more cheaply at home, and as each new opportunity arose there 14 THE TARIFF. would be somebody to take advantage of it. But in the whole time, from the appearance of the first settler to that of the seventy-millionth, it would be impossible to find a single stage at which the national wealth could be increased by interfering with the natural course of trade and compelling citizens to deal with each other when they could deal to better advantage with some- body else. The profit of the whole nation is the sum of the individual profits of the persons who compose it. If each of these persons be trading to advantage the nation is trading to advantage. The absurdity of trying to turn this trade into unnatural channels, which is so palpable when we are dealing with one man or two men or three, is equally flagrant when we are dealing with a million. The nation as a whole cannot be enriched by such methods. CHAPTER III. WHO PROFITS BY THE TARIFF ? If the country as a whole does not profit by a protective tariff, who does? This question must be answered by the examination of particular cases. Let us consider the United States. It is clear that the producers of such things as are freely exported and sold in the world's market are not helped by the tariff. In this class are included farmers, millers, cattle-raisers, gold and silver miners and the like. A second un- protected class, equally large, is composed of persons engaged in personal services, in trade and transportation, and in essentially local in- dustries, such as building trades, carpentry, blacksmithing, teaching, roadmaking, tailoring and printing. Considering now the compara- tively few industries directly protected, let us look first at the effect of the tariff on the iron trades. For the cheap production of iron certain conditions must exist together. There must be rich beds of ore easily worked and situated within convenient distance of mines of good smelting coal. These conditions have existed in the past in Scotland and the north of England, although they are now becoming less favorable. They are found to perfection in Alabama and other Southern States. They are found in a less per- fect degree in Pennsylvania and other parts of 15 16 THE TARIFF. America. In California there are no coal or iron mines to speak of, but there is a consider- able manufacture of finished iron products. Situated as he is, on the ocean, with an immense wheat fleet coming to his doors in ballast every year, the Californian manufacturer might have pig and scrap iron brought to him from abroad at a trifling expense. But the tariff prevents. It compels him to buy his materials in Pennsyl- vania and pay high freight charges for carrying them across the continent. The wheat-grower to whom he sells his machinery not only suffers directly from the increased cost, but indirectly through the high freight rates he is obliged to pay on his wheat, owing to the lack of return cargoes for the ships that carry it to foreign markets. Who gets the benefit of all this ? Nobody. The extra cost is absolutely thrown away and lost to the world. It is expended in working against nature instead of with her. It is absorbed in trying to make water flow up hill. Probably the larger part of the cost of the tariff can be accounted for in this way. It is simply a wanton burden laid on industry from which nobody derives any benefit. The wool duties, as will be shown later, are of this description. They cripple the American woolen manufacturer without helping the grower. Of the rest, almost all is absorbed by a few owners of rich natural opportunities. There is only one quicksilver mine of importance, for instance, in the United States. The owners of this mine pay the mar- ket rate of wages to their men and pocket what- ever may be added to the price of quicksilver WHO PROFITS BY THE TARIFF? 17 by the tariff. There is only one important nickel mine in the country and that is owned by one man, who has represented, in his sole person, all the benefits of protection to American labor as applied to nickel. If all the iron mines in the country belonged to a single owner he would derive the entire benefit from the duty on iron. As it is, this benefit goes to the proprietors of the richest and most favorably situated mines. There are some deposits which barely pay the cost of working, even at the highest market price. There are others which would pay at lower prices. There are still others that would be profitable in competition with any in the world. Under free trade the first would have to remain closed until prices went up. With prices artificially raised by protection the pro- prietors of these unfavorably situated mines re- ceive simply the ordinary rates of profit on capi- tal, while the owners of the richer deposits, selling their goods at the same figure, are enabled to collect double and triple profits. It is hardly necessary to say that these differences in profits are not matched by any corresponding differences in wages. There is nothing in the tariff laws requiring the subsidized mine-owners to divide their profits with their men, and they do not do it. Where domestic competition is unchecked the American manufacturer does not usually gain by the tariff. He is more likely to lose. His profits may be temporarily increased, but as soon as it becomes evident that he is getting more than the usual rates competitors rush in 18 THE TARIFF. and the business is overdone. Of late, how- ever, a device has been invented which gives manufacturers some of the advantages pos- sessed by the holders of natural monopolies. This is the trust. When the bulk of the capital in a given industry is combined in one huge mass, it gains the power to shut out new competitors. No single adventurer can enter the field it has pre-empted with any hope of success. The combination can put up the prices of the articles it controls to a point just short of that at which it would be profitable to import them and pay the duties. Should the home market be overstocked, it can limit pro- duction until the demand at the highest possi- ble prices equals the supply. The entire benefit of the tariff, then, goes to the people who possess some form of monopoly, either natural or artificial. It cannot possibly go to anybody else. And since protection, by diverting industry from natural to unnatural channels, makes the total product of the na- tion less than it would otherwise be, it follows that if some people get more than they would have under natural conditions, others must have very much less. That this is, in fact, the effect of the tariff, we need only look about us to see. It is doubtful if the whole world com- bined can show as many overgrown millionaires as the United States, and it is certain that in no young and growing country can the working- man save as small a proportion of his wages as here. Great fortunes are piling up from genera- tion to generation, but the worker who con WHO PROFITS BY THE TARIFF? 19 gratulates himself upon his high wages and looks pityingly upon the pauper labor of Europe, finds that it takes every cent of his earnings to pay his living expenses, and when he dies his lodge has to bury him. CHAPTER IV. THE TARIFF AND WAGES. Wages are fixed by two considerations what the employer can pay and what he must. The average employer pays his men just as little as they will accept, but he cannot permanently pay them more than the business produces. If the owner of a farm should possess a borax deposit from which an able-bodied man could dig up a dollar's worth of borax a day, he could not afford as a steady business to hire a man to do the work at $2 a day. Neither could he reduce the market rate of wages in that locality from $2 to $1 or 75 cents. He would simply have to wait until the price of borax went up high enough to enable him to attract labor from other occupa- tions. On the other hand, if his deposit were so rich that one man could dig out fifty dollars' worth of borax a day, the owner would not pay $50 in wages. He might be able to afford to pay that much, better than he could have afforded in the former case to pay $2, but he would not do it. He would pay the market rate and pocket the difference. Of course it makes no difference to what cause the higher value of the bed of borax is due. Suppose it to be due to a tariff. Suppose it to be possible to levy duties that would raise the price of the borax one man can dig in a day from $1 to $10. The owner of 30 THE TARIFF AND WAGES. 21 the deposit would get the entire benefit. He would pay the standard rate of wages and no more. Just as no laborer would think of work- ing for him when his returns did not permit him to offer the market price, so no one would think of asking for a share in his profits when they went above that rate. The consumers of borax would pay more for what they used, but labor would gain nothing by the change. Since wages are paid out of products, the total amount paid in wages in any locality cannot permanently exceed the total amount produced by labor in that locality, and may be as much less as the employers can induce the laborers to take. How much this will be depends upon the number of men seeking employment compared with the opportunities for labor. With trade left free, it is clear that capital would first turn to those enterprises that are naturally most pro- ductive and would then take up other industries in the order of their advantages. The total pro- duction, and consequently the wage-paying capacity, would necessarily be at the highest possible point. Any interference by the Gov- ernment, by diverting industry to less pro- ductive employments, would inevitably reduce the amount available for the payment of wages. Unless, therefore, the workmen could force their employers to give them a larger share of this smaller product, they would have to submit to a reduction in their earnings. Could a tariff furnish any lever that would enable laborers to force such a division? Clearly not. No tariff law says anything about wages. It simply 22 THE TARIFF. authorizes people who have goods to sell to charge more for them than they otherwise could. It does not require them to pay any part of this higher price to their workmen. Labor is free, and we import as much of it every two years as is employed in all our protected industries put together. Under protection, as under free trade, em- ployers pay just as little to their workmen as they can. But protection gives them opportu- nities for beating their men down which they would not have under free trade. The Pennsylvania coal-mine combination, for in- stance, in order to keep up the price of coal, systematically reduces the output of its mines. If there were no duty on coal the trust would be compelled to keep the market supplied or see it taken by foreigners. Diminished production means the employment of fewer men, and that means more competition for the places that are open, and consequently a depressing effect upon wages. Moreover, the high price of coal tends to cripple manufacturing industries all over the country, and so injures the demand for labor in every direction. What we might naturally expect we find by experience to be true. It is a general rule that the protected industries pay the lowest wages. There are a few exceptions, as in the case of glass-blowers and iron-puddlers, but not many. It is the unprotected blacksmith, bricklayer, plasterer, carpenter, longshoreman, painter and engineer that keep up the rate of wages and THE TARIFF AND WAGES. 23 the protected spinner, weaver and coal miner that tend to press it down. For each article there is a certain price, above which it cannot be sold to advantage. When more is asked people will go without it. It is necessary, therefore, without any regard to foreign competition, that the price should be kept within this figure. To do this the manu- facturer must be able to keep down the cost of his materials or of his labor, or of both. If he pay more for one he must get the other for less. It follows, therefore, that dear materials mean cheap labor, and that to be able to pay well for labor, materials must be had cheaply. The re- cent researches of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics show that in many indus- tries of that State the cost of labor is less than one-fifth of the total cost of production. Sup- pose it to be even one-half, it is clear that if the materials which absorb the other half are taxed fifty or one hundred per cent there will have to be either a cut in wages or such an in- crease in the price of the finished product that many people will refuse to buy it, thus causing a restriction in the market which is certain to throw numbers of men out of employment. It is evident, therefore, that a tariff could not raise wages, even if it were applied evenly all round and everybody had a fair chance at its alleged benefits. Its depressing effect would not be as marked then as it is now, but it would exist nevertheless. The burden would press more evenly, but it would be a burden still. But, as a matter of fact, there is scarcely a pre- 24 THE TARIFF. tense of laying protective taxes evenly. The protected classes include only about one in twenty of the population. The other nineteen pay the cost of protection and receive none of its advantages, such as they are. This is a point that needs to be exhibited in detail, and it will receive fuller treatment in a later chapter. CHAPTER V. THE TARIFF AND CALIFORNIA. In every State the bulk of the people are in- jured by tariff taxes, but California is an es- pecial sufferer. This may not seem to fit in very well with the fact that protection is more strongly rooted among Californians than among the people of any other State, unless it be Penn- sylvania, but a little examination will show it to be the truth. There are very few products of this State which can be directly protected. When we have mentioned raisins, wine, oranges, lemons, prunes, sugar and wool we have named about all of importance. All of these combined do not equal in value the single item of wheat, which is entirely unprotected, or of gold, which the tariff expressly aims to depress. It may be said that lumber can be and is protected, but California has a monopoly of the world's supply of redwood, and has no competitor to fear from any quarter, while the pine of the Sierras has a local market cut off by high freight charges from the competition of the coast. Raisins can be produced in California more cheaply and abundantly than in any other part of the world. Our growers have already proved that they can compete with the Span- 25 26 THE TARIFF. iards in Australia, England and France, and it would not be surprising in time to see them ship raisins to Spain itself. Soil, climate, water and scientific curing and packing not the tariff- are what California has to depend upon in this line. One of the leading dealers in San Fran- cisco says "that the shipments of Spanish raisins are decreasing from year to year, so that the Malaga raisin scarcely enters into competi- tion with the California product." When the vineyards already planted in Fresno County are in full bearing we shall be producing more raisins than are produced in all the world at the present time, and then prices will be determined by the competition of Californians with each other, and not with foreigners. Viticultural Commissioner West asserts that within five years, without any further planting, we shall be raising 7,600,000 boxes of raisins a year, of which, at present prices, we .cannot hope to sell more than 4,000,000 boxes in the United States. The other 3,600,000 or, according to the census estimate, 6,000,000 boxes must be marketed abroad, or else a new American market must be built up among the poor. Tariff duties will not help our growers to do this the only thing that can help them will be the removal of the taxes they are now compelled to pay. Our oranges find their only serious competi- tors in Florida. The Mediterranean and Tahiti oranges come into market at a season in which none of our own are to be had. It is an advant- age to Californians themselves to be able to buy cheap fruit at these times. THE TARIFF AND CALIFORNIA. 27 As to our wine, the question is not one of price, but of taste. People drink French wine, or at least wine with French labels, because it is fashionable. They pay more for it than they would have to pay for the pure California arti- cle, and the fact that it is more expensive rather recommends it to them. However, it is need- less to consider the effect of a removal of the wine duties, because wine is one of the luxuries which both parties agree should be taxed, and therefore the duties will remain whether we have a tariff for protection or one for revenue. Our prunes fill a place of their own, and one that is comparatively little affected by foreign competition. The bulk of our imports in that line consists of cheap Turkish prunes, which are sold at two or three cents a pound and eaten by poor people who cannot afford to pay California prices. The duty of two cents a pound does not begin to bring this class of fruit up within sight of California prunes, and any duty that did would merely deprive the poor of the cheap food to which they are accustomed without helping the California grower. Our prunes stand on their own merits and command the trade of people who can afford to pay for a choice arti- cle. Sugar is one of the articles upon which a revenue tariff would have retained a moderate tax, but as the McKinley bill abolished the duty on it it is not likely that it can be restored. If our home production increases to anything like a sufficient extent to supply the home market the bounty S3 r stem will break down of its own 28 THE TARIFF. weight. The people will never consent to tax themselves $250,000,000 a year to be paid to private persons in the two items of pensions and sugar. The hollowness of the protection afforded by the duties on wool has been pretty well exposed. We send no wool to foreign countries, and con- sequently our growers must find their market at home, if anywhere. That market is furnished solely by the woolen mills. Unless we have a number of flourishing mills we can have no sale for wool. Now the wool tariff has destroyed our woolen mills. A few years ago there were three factories of the kind in San Francisco. Now there is one, and that is run at a loss. During the last Presidential campaign it was announced that if Cleveland were elected the Pioneer Mills would have to shut down. Har- rison was elected and the Pioneer Mills shut down. So did the Santa Rosa mill. The suc- cessful manufacture of woolen goods requires foreign wool to mix with the domestic article. When this can be had on good terms the manu- facturers can afford to pay a good price for domestic wool. When it cannot be obtained they cannot buy the domestic wool at all, except for limited classes of goods. The great bulk of Calif ornian industries receive nothing but injury from the tariff. Our wheat crop is worth from $20,000,000 to $50,000,000 a year. The wheat-growing districts are stand- ing still because farming does not pay. If this were the result of natural laws the rancher might bear his fate with resignation ; but it is THE TARIFF AND CALIFORNIA. 29 not natural. The Government takes a third of every crop, either for itself or for some favored monopoly. It does more. It demands money from the farmer whether he has a crop or not. He must have clothes, tools, harness, furniture and household goods, even if his failure to raise any grain relieves him from the necessity of buying taxed bags. There is no deduction from the taxes on these things on account of his mis- fortunes. So the farmer has to borrow, and then he worries about the interest and is ready to subscribe to wild schemes for having the Gov- ernment lend him some of the money of which it has robbed him and take a mortgage on his place for security. If he had been allowed to keep what he honestly earned he could have saved enough in good years to tide him over bad ones without going into debt. Taking one year with another, the California wheat-growers probably lose $10,000,000 through the tariff a sum that would easily support 50,000 people. The population of the mining counties has been steadily declining for the past thirty years. The production of gold, which was once $65,- 000,000 a year, has fallen off to a fifth of that amount, but it is still sufficient to make mining the second industry in importance in the State. The tariff is directly aimed at the miners. Its object is to make prices high that is, to make gold and silver buy less than they otherwise would. High prices for goods mean low prices for gold and silver. We saw what an effect the little flurry that followed the passage of the Sil- ver bill had in opening new mines. If the value 30 THE TARIFF. of the precious metals were advanced twenty or twenty-five per cent, as it would be by the re- moval of the taxes that keep it down, we should see the old deserted mining towns of California peopled again. Our manufactures will be weak and strug- gling as long as their materials are extrava- gantly taxed. We have hardly any coal or iron of our own, and to have successful manufac- tures we must be allowed to buy such things as cheaply as possible. Otherwise, these indus- tries will be driven to points that do not have to depend upon foreign supplies. But the most important thing to California, and especially to San Francisco, is commerce. This is a commercial city. It would not have been built where it is but for its advantages for foreign trade. And California is a commercial State. It is not one of those comfortable, easy- going districts that produce just about enough for their own people where every farmer has a potato patch and a bit of pasture and a wood lot where the miller grinds his neighbors' grist and the village shoemaker keeps his townsmen shod with leather turned out by the tanner up the creek, from the hides of the cattle raised just over the hill and killed by the butcher who peddles meat from a home made wagon. California does things on a large scale. With only 1,200,000 people it produces things enough, of some kinds, for 20,000,000 or more. It would take five million people to consume an average California wheat crop, ten million to consume a prune crop and fifteen million for an THE TARIFF AND CALIFORNIA, 31 orange crop. California now produces enough raisins for 50,000,000 people and will soon pro- duce enough for 100,000,000. Her ordinary vintage is equal to the wine-drinking capacity of 30,000,000 Americans, although it would not supply a million Frenchmen. She mines gold enough for the coinage demands of 20,000,000 people. It is necessary, therefore, to send off the sur- plus and get something in exchange for it. Now, it so happens that California is very con- veniently situated for selling to and buying from foreign countries, but very badly situated for dealing with the Eastern States. When fruit is sent East the profits are almost eaten up by freight charges, even with prices raised so high with the help of duties that the masses of the people cannot buy, and the market is consequently limited to the well-to-do, while wheat cannot be shipped East at all. Our gold would buy more in almost any market of the civilized world than it can in New York or Pennsylvania, and the things it bought could be shipped here with less loss from freight charges. The laws that seek to confine us to the American market cut us both ways on what we sell and on what we buy. Besides, there are some things that we practically can- not sell in the so-called home market at all. The Eastern States do not want our wheat. They raise more than they need themselves. We must ship the bulk of our crop abroad and take our pay in goods. Even if it were pos- sible, as a general rule, for a community to sell 32 THE TARIFF. without buying, which it is not, it would not be possible in our case, because gold is one of the commodities we produce and export. We have to sell our surplus, both of gold and of goods, for other goods. But before we can get the benefit of the things we have paid for, Mr. Mc- Kinley makes us give up to the Government over half their value as a fine for not having bought them of Pennsylvanian manufacturers, who do not buy from us and with whom natural obstacles forbid us to make a profitable trade. But we have had the satisfaction for a few years, and may possibly have for a year or two longer, until our new trees and vines are in bearing, of depriving the poor in the East of the privilege of eating raisins, prunes and oranges, in order that the well-to-do might be made to pay a fraction of a cent a pound above the market price to our growers and two or three cents to middlemen. That is all we get in return for the millions of dollars the tariff costs us every year. CHAPTER VI. THE TARIFF AND COMMERCE. In all ages one of the most profitable pursuits in which a nation could engage has been that of foreign trade. The trading countries have always been the richest countries. The Phoe- nicians, Carthaginians and Athenians were the great traders of ancient times and the great gatherers of wealth. Sparta discouraged trade and remained poor. In the Middle Ages, Ven- ice, Genoa and the Hanse towns were built on commerce, and heaped up vast riches. The Netherlands followed, and then England. We ourselves have had a share in the profits of for- eign exchanges. In the first half of the present century the Yankee merchant was the most dar- ing, enterprising and successful trader of the world. If we ask how commerce may be encouraged there may be various answers. Some may say that we should pay bounties to ship-owners, or spend money in dredging out harbors and build- ing light-houses. But if we ask how commerce may be discouraged there can be no disagree- ment about the answer. Everybody will say that whatever hampers commerce and makes it harder to carry on is a discouragement to it. Now this is exactly what the tariff is meant to do, and does do. Suppose the Government 34 THE TARIFF. should build a wall across New York harbor, so that every ship entering would have to stop in the lower bay and transfer its cargo to another vessel. Or suppose it should pass a law requir- ing every cargo landed to be loaded into wag- ons and hauled three times around the city be- fore being offered for sale. These things would certainly be a hindrance to commerce, and no- body in his senses would propose them; yet they would act precisely as the tariff does, and could be defended by precisely the same arguments. They would make foreign goods cost more, and that is what duties do and are intended to do. They would give employment to American labor, not only in the manufacture of the things that compete with foreign goods, but in the construc- tion and repair of the wall, the loading and un- loading of the ships, and the driving of the wag- ons. In fact, this plan would carry out the idea of protection so much better than the method of duties that every sincere protectionist ought to favor it. Now, let us see what the actual amount of tariff obstruction to commerce is. In the year 1881 our imports amounted to $642,664,628, and our exports to $902,377,346. In the year 1891 our imports were $844,916,196, and our exports $884,480,810. Thus, while our population in- creased from 51,000,000 to 63,000,000, our for- eign trade scarcely increased at all, and what growth there was was entirely in imports. We sold less in 1891 than in 1881. For the last ten years we have been standing still in the matter THE TARIFF A.ND COMMERCE. 35 of commerce while other countries have been leaping ahead. How is it in England ? While we buy and sell on an average $25 worth of goods per head of our population Great Britain buys and sells $92 worth. With only 39,000,000 inhabitants her foreign trade amounted to $3,616,558,513 in 1889 against $1,729,397,006 for our 63,- 000,000 people in 1891. Little Holland with 4,500,000 inhabitants about as many as are in the States of Missouri and Iowa has a com- merce more than half as great as that of the United States. Her foreign trade amounts to $940,000,000 a year, or $209 per head. New South Wales, with 1,000,000 people, has a foreign trade reaching $225,000,000 a year, or $225 per capita nine times that of the United States. Belgium, with the population of New York and less than the area of Maryland, has imports and exports amounting annually to $582,000,000, or more than a third as much as those of the whole American Union. Austria. Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Spain, and a few Spanish American re- publics are the only civilized countries in the world which do not surpass the United States in the proportion of commerce to population. But it may be asked why duties on imports should interfere with exports. If we can pro- duce anything well and cheaply, why should we not be able to send it abroad and sell it for cash, whether we buy anything or not ? '.There are several reasons why we cannot. In the first place the ships which take our goods away 36 THE TARIFF. have to come here to get them. If they can bring cargoes that will pay the cost of sailing one way, they need charge only enough freight on the outward cargoes to pay for the outward voyage. If they are obliged to come here empty they must charge enough on the things they carry away to pay their expenses both ways. This would make our goods cost so much when they reached the foreign markets that there would not be much chance of selling them in competition with others that had only ordinary freights to pay. In the next place the duties on imports raise the cost of almost everything we produce. Without them at least a hundred bushels of wheat could be raised for what it takes to raise eighty bushels now. Machinery, canned goods, watches, agricultural implements practically all the things, in fact, that we might offer for sale are burdened at the start with a heavy load of taxation on which interest and profits must be paid. The foreign competitor who is not so burdened has a long start of us in the race for a customer. Lastly, and most important of all, if we refused to buy from the rest of the world we could not sell even if we had no extra freight to pay and if our goods were as cheap in the beginning as those of any other country. The total foreign trade of the world is about $18,000,000,000 a year. The domestic trade is many times greater. To carry on this vast commerce the world makes use of about $7,600,000,000 in gold and silver. It is plain that this would give out in six months if coin had actually to be sent from one country THE TARIFF AND COMMERCE. 37 to another to pay for the imports. The entire fabric of modern commerce is built on the fact that, on the whole, things bought are paid for by things sold. Gold and silver are used only for settling the small balances that may be left. The transfer of even so small an amount as $20,000,000 at one time in actual gold or silver from one country to another is thought so seri- ous an event in the commercial world that bank directors meet to consider it and the mercantile journals devote their space to discussing its cause. When gold is flowing from London in unusual quantity the Bank of England raises its rate of discount to check it. Whenever the trade of any country appears one-sided the fact is due to some peculiar cir- cumstance which makes an apparent uneven- ness necessary to preserve a real balance and prevent a flow of coin. Thus the imports of England always greatly exceed the exports. This is due to the fact that almost all the rest of the world is in debt to England for money Jent or for freight charges on British ships. ^These debts are paid in goods instead of in money. India, on the other hand, always ex- ports vastly more than she imports. This does not mean that she is growing rich, as protec- tionists might claim. It means exactly the re- verse. It means that she is called on every year to send about $70,000,000 to England in the way of official salaries and interest on bonds, and that she sends it in commodities because she could not possibly continue for any length of time to send it in gold or silver. In the United 38 THE TARIFF. States, during the war and for some time after, our imports exceeded our exports. That meant that we were borrowing money in Europe, which came over here in the form of goods. Since then our exports have been greater than our imports. That means that we have been paying our debts. The excess of exports is less now than it was a few years ago. That means that the debts are nearly paid and that we are approaching a natural balance of trade. Now, if we can imagine it possible to carry out the protectionist idea of selling everything and buying nothing we could produce ourselves, what would be the effect ? If we imported su- gar and tropical products to the value of $300,- 000,000 a year and exported manufactures, breadstuffs and provisions to the value of $1,000,000,000, there would be a balance of $700,000,000 coming to us in cash. If this pro- cess could be kept up for six months the whole outside world would be wrecked in the most tre- mendous financial crash known to history. Every country outside of the United States would be drained of money, there would be universal bankruptcy, the bottom would drop out of prices and there would be no market for anything. Meanwhile the United States would have enjoyed a few months of wild speculation, like that which follows an unlimited issue of paper money. Then with the sudden loss of the for- eign markets there would be a glut of products here, our gold would leave us as quickly as it had come, and we should be plunged into a THE TARIFF AND COMMERCE. 39 common ruin with the rest of the world. When things finally began to pick up again we should settle down to a modest little trade in which we should sell about enough to pay for our $300,- 000,000 worth of sugar, bananas and dye stuffs. Our farmers would have lost their vast foreign market, and our shipping would be even deader than it is now. Of course, things could not proceed to such an extremity as this. If the experiment of cut- ting off imports were actually tried, the sensi- tive foreign exchanges would respond before everything had gone to wreck. Our exports would dry up and disappear along with the im- ports, and there would be no sudden surge of the world's supply of money across the Atlantic and back again. Protection, carried to its logi- cal end, would simply wither up commerce and force the men engaged in that industry into other occupations, which is what it is designed to do. CHAPTER VII. THE HAWAIIAN OBJECT LESSON. Sixteen years ago our trade with the Ha- waiian Islands was small and sickly. In the fiscal year 1876, the last before the reciprocity treaty went into effect, we sold the Hawaiians goods to the amount of $809,257, which was less than we had sold them three or four years before. The trade of the islands was gradually drifting toward Melbourne and Sydney. We bought Hawaiian goods to the extent of $1,382,- 592. Of this trade $1,126,630 worth of imports and $641,743 worth of exports went through San Francisco. Twenty-two American vessels in the Hawaiian trade, of a tonnage of 7,448, entered at this port, and thirty, of 12,123 tons, cleared. The total American tonnage in the foreign trade at the port of San Francisco in that year was 342,318 entered and 430,862 cleared, so that Hawaiian commerce gave em- ployment to about one-fortieth of the American ships trading from this port to foreign coun- tries. The next year the principal Hawaiian prod- ucts were admitted free into the United States and the principal American products into Ha- waii. Instantly our trade with the islands leaped up. The American exports to the group rose in the first year from $809.257 to $1,460,- 40 THE HAWAIIAN OBJECT LESSON. 41 462, and the imports from $1,382,592 to $2,631,- 763. San Francisco's share increased from $641,743 of exports to $1,183,556, and from $1,- 126,630 of imports to $2,268,003. The Ameri- can tonnage engaged in the trade between this port and Hawaii grew from 19,571 to 27,441. From that day to this the island trade has been steadily growing more important to the United States, and to San Francisco in particu- lar. In 1890 our exports to Hawaii amounted to $5,259,154.36 more than six times as much as they had been in 1876 while our imports from the same country were $13,021,907.34, or over nine times their former amount. San Francisco's benefits from this trade increased in still more striking proportion. In 1890 this port sent to Hawaii $4,806,360.13 worth of goods and received from it everything it sold to the United States. One-fifth of the entire foreign commerce of San Francisco was carried on with this little group of islands. In 1890, 224 American vessels of 153,098 tons cleared from Hawaiian ports. In reality the American tonnage in that trade was much greater than that, for some of the principal vessels of the fleet, American in ownership and management, sailed under the Hawaiian flag, and others sailing under the American flag and taking passengers and mails to Hono- lulu were credited to the Australian Colonies. But even on the face of the returns the tonnage under our flag in the Hawaiian trade, under the effects of the reciprocity treaty, had enormously increased. This, while American 42 THE TARIFF. merchant shipping in general had been steadily declining. While free trade with Hawaii has given employment to about ten times as many American vessels in 1890 as the fettered Ha- waiian commerce did in 1876, the total foreign carrying trade in American ships has fallen off two-thirds. In 1876 the Hawaiian trade gave employ- ment to only one-fortieth of the American ves- sels sailing out of San Francisco. In 1889, thirteen years later, it employed more than one-seventh. It supported in 1888 a fleet of 174 American vessels, of which 54 were built on this Coast. It distributed $4,000,000 a year among our merchants, sailors and workingmen, and kept up such vast industrial establishments in San Francisco as the California and American sugar-refineries. Ninety per cent of the trade of Hawaii is carried on with San Francisco. While the American flag has been so nearly driven out of the general commerce of the United States that it covers only about one- eighth of our shipments to and from all countries, it flies over three-fourths of the total commerce of Hawaii. In 1890, 227 American vessels of 150,676 tons entered at Hawaiian ports, against 68 vessels of 79,444 tons of all other nationalities. Of the 68 craft not on our register, 34 of 42,229 tons were nominally Hawaiian, but really American in everything but the flag. In 1889 Hawaii sent 99.77 per cent of her total exports to the Pacific ports of the United States and only .23 of 1 per cent to all the rest of the THE HAWAIIAN OBJECT LESSON. 43 world. In 1890 the fraction sent to the outside world was too small to figure. In 1889 she bought 72.62 per cent of her total imports from our Pacific ports, 6.55 per cent from our Atlantic ports and 20.83 per cent from the out- side world. In 1890, 75.55 per cent of her im- ports came from the United States and 24.65 per cent from other countries. It may be said that we are making a bad bar- gain in this trade, because we buy more from the Hawaiians than they buy from us. But the very figures that are supposed to show this prove the immense profit we gain from the trade. Our imports from Hawaii exceed our exports to that country by $7,764,753. As the Hawaiians have practically no trade with any country but the United States, this balance, if it were really against us, would have to be set- tled in coin. But in 1890 our net shipments of coin and bullion to Hawaii were only about $800,000. What became of the other $7,000,000 ? It represented the profits made by Americans out of Haivaiian industries. We have an ordinary balanced trade of about $5,000,000 a year with the islands, and over and above this Hawaii sends us every year about $6,000,000 or $7,000,000 worth of goods for which she receives no returns at all. It is exactly the position in which India is in regard to England. England draws $70,000,000 a year from India in the form of official salaries, mer- cantile profits and interest on capital. This trib- ute has to be paid in goods. In the same way the American planters and merchants in Hawaii 44 THE TARIFF. ship sugar and rice to this country, where it is sold and the money invested in American enter- prises. The trade is one-sided, but the discrep- ancy is all in our favor. San Francisco profits to the extent of millions of dollars a year by the money poured into circulation here through the constant influx of Hawaiian products. Our experience with Hawaii proves several things. It proves, in the first place, that a 50 per cent tariff like that under the McKinley bill, a 47 per cent tariff like that of 1883, or even a 42 per cent tariff like that proposed by the Mills bill, is not necessary to enable us to hold our home market. We sell the Hawaiians practi- cally everything they buy. They get nothing to speak of from the English, the Germans, the French or anybody else. We ship our things 1,800 miles and drive our rivals out of that market. Now how much protection do we have to enable us to do that? Ten per cent. Our goods are admitted into Hawaii free and those of other countries pay 10 per cent duty. That is all the advantage we have, and it is ample. This is where we have to pay freight both by land and sea, and yet we are told that 40 per cent of protection would not be enough to save our manufactures from being driven out of their own country, where all the advantage of freight is on their side. In the next place we can get some idea from this experiment of the possibilities of trade in other directions. The Hawaiian Kingdom is smaller than Fresno County, California, and THE HAWAIIAN OBJECT LESSON. 45 still supplies one-seventh of the entire foreign commerce of San Francisco. It has fewer people white, Kanaka and Chinese than live in Alameda County. It has only one-fortieth of the population and one-five-hundredth part the area of Australasia, but furnishes a larger part of the commerce of the United States than that whole enormous group of colonies. It buys almost as much from us as the whole of India, and nearly twice as much as the whole of China. It furnishes more trade to the port of San Fran- cisco than the whole of Mexico, Central and South America. Its commerce with the United States is greater than that of the Kussian Em- pire, and more than twice as great as that of the entire continent of Africa. Without this trade it is probable that the cen- sus would have shown hardly any increase in population in San Francisco during the past ten years. We have been losing the traffic of the Pacific Coast, outside of northern and central California, and if we had not had the sugar re- fineries with their 1,500 men, the 200 vessels in the Hawaiian fleet, with the men employed in building, sailing, repairing, loading and unload- ing them, and the merchants and their employ- es engaged in handling Hawaiian products, it is doubtful whether we should even have held our own. Moreover, without the profits of the stop at Honolulu it is probable that the Austra- lian line would not have paid expenses, even with the Colonial subsidy, and so we should have lost still another profitable branch of busi- ness. 46 THE TARIFF. Almost all of this commerce was literally cre- ated by limited free trade. It was not merely turned in this direction it was absolutely called into existence by the reciprocity treaty. The commerce of Hawaii with countries outside of the United States has not declined since the re- ciprocity treaty went into effect it has simply been dwarfed and overshadowed by the enor- mous American trade that reciprocity has cre- ated out of nothing. The same thing can be repeated with Austra- lia, New Zealand, Samoa, Fiji, Java, Japan, Mexico, Central America, South America and British Columbia. There is trade enough in sight in the Pacific to make San Francisco a greater port than New York. All we have to do is to let it come here. CHAPTER VIII. THE BALANCE OF TRADE. Up to about a hundred years ago the rulers of all nations acted on what was called the mercantile theory of commerce. Their idea was that the object of trade was to get gold and silver. If a nation sold more than it bought they took it for granted that it was getting gold and silver for the difference, and so they said that it had a " favorable balance of trade." If it bought more than it sold they thought it was losing its gold and silver, and so they said that it had an " unfavorable balance of trade." Statesmen plotted and soldiers fought to keep the balance of trade on their own side. Thence came the notion that commerce was a game in which one side or the other must lose. It was plainly impossible for all countries to be importing gold and silver at once. If some got more than their share, others must get less. Hence there was a constant struggle on the part of each country to be among the winners and keep its neighbors among the losers. This was the prime cause of high tariffs and tariff wars. Each country laid taxes on goods com- ing in from other countries, so that fewer goods might come in and its own exports might be paid for in gold and silver. This theory of the balance of trade, which is 47 48 THE TARIFF. quoted in modern books on political economy as a curious specimen of old delusions, like the be- lief in witchcraft, is at the bottom of the pres- ent policy of the United States, and is held by American protectionists as a part of their politi- cal Bible When we sell a great deal more than we buy, they say that we are doing a profitable business. Their chief argument against free trade is that if it were not for the tariff foreign- ers would sell us more than we could sell to them. Now to understand fully what this argument is worth we must get a clear view of this fact, that what we buy is the pay we get for what we sell. In the light of this principle what is a favor- able balance of trade ? Is it not one in which we sell our goods for as much as possible? Whether we get gold or other goods in ex- change is a minor matter. The main thing is to get the greatest possible value for what we sell. If a farmer can ship 1,000 worth of wheat to England and receive $1 ,200 worth of English products for it he is making a profitable bargain. If a hundred thousand farmers can do the same thing they are all making profitable bargains. But the extra amount which these farmers receive over what they give the very thing that constitutes their profits would be said by protectionists to form an " unfavorable balance of trade" for the country. Our im- ports would be exceeding our exports, and so we should be losing money. Suppose an American merchant should send THE BALANCE OF TRADE. 49 a shipload of American goods to England and get a shipload of English goods in return. If he made a shrewd deal, so that he brought back a cargo worth more than the one he sent out, he would be contributing toward an "unfavor- able balance of trade." But now suppose the ship sank on her way home with no insurance on the cargo. The merchant would be poorer, and his distress would be felt among his credi- tors, employees, and all with whom he had deal- ings. And yet, on the protectionist principle, the nation would be richer. There would be a favorable instead of an unfavorable balance of trade. The custom-house returns would show a shipload of goods exported with no imports to set against them. Take the case of a country that conquers an- other and exacts a huge indemnity, as Germany did with France. The only way in which the conquered country can pay the fine is by export- ing goods for which she gets no return. As a matter of fact, the figures show that up to the war the imports of France, both in her general trade and in that with Germany, exceeded her exports, while when the payment of the indem- nity began the balance turned the other way and France sent out more than she took in. Protectionists would say that before the war France was losing money, and that after it she was prosperous On the same principle Germany, while the savings of the French peas- ants were being poured into her treasury, was being steadily ruined by her excess of imports. The balance of trade between England and this 50 THE TARIFF. country is made up partly on this principle. Of course England has not conquered us, but Eng- lishmen own a large part of the United States. The Scully estates in Illinois, the Schenley es- tates in Pittsburg, the Dunraven estates in the far West, and dozens of other valuable tracts of American land are worked for the benefit of the British landlords. The produce of the land is sent to England and sold, the money is kept in London as rent ; nothing is returned to Amer- ica in its place, and we have a " favorable bal- ance of trade" because we send more to Eng- land than she sends to us. Of course there are times when an " unfavor- able balance of trade " is dangerous. When the excess of goods imported represents, not profits, but debt, there is trouble ahead. When we were borrowing money from Europe to carry on our war we were getting ready for a pinch when the time came to pay it back. When the peo- ple of the Argentine Eepublic, in the height of the late boom, imported all sorts of useless lux- uries on credit, discounting the future growth of the country, they were laying the train for a financial explosion. But even in these cases there was prosperity so long as the "unfavorable balance" could be kept. There were no com- plaints while the United States and the Argen- tine Republic were being "flooded with foreign goods." Everybody was making money then, and it was only when the time for settlement came and the balance had to turn the other way that the hard times began. On the other hand England always has a THE BALANCE OF TRADE. 51 heavy balance of trade "against '' her, and she is being steadily enriched by it. In 1890 her imports were greater than her exports by $462,- 000,000. This means that the whole world is paying her tribute, and not being able to pay it in money, is paying in goods. About $100,000,- 000 of this stands for freights collected by British shipowners. Another $70,000,000 comes from India, in the form of salaries of British officials and interest on bonds. The rest represents the profits on British investments in foreign rail- roads, telegraphs, ranches, mines, government loans and other enterprises all over the world. According to the balance-of -trade theory, Great Britain should have sent out $462,000,000 in cash in 1890 to pay for her excess of imports. But the actual fact was that in addition to send- ing her $462,000,000 worth of goods more than she sent them, foreign nations paid her a bal- ance of $43,900,000 in gold and silver. On the other hand let us take a look at Hawaii. There is a country that ought to be piling up gold and silver if there be any truth in the balance-of-trade theory. Last year Ha- waii sold goods to the value of $13,023,304, and bought only $6,962,201 worth. That leaves a balance of $6,061,103 that should have been sent to the islands in coin. But it happens that the net imports of gold and silver into Hawaii for the year amounted to only $815,554.30. What became of the extra $5,245,548.70? It mostly stayed in San Francisco. The owners of a large part of the Hawaiian sugar lived in this city, and when they sold their crops they spent 52 THE TARIFF. the money here instead of sending it to the islands. The balance of trade that seemed so favorable to Hawaii was really all in favor of the United States. The truth is that it is to the interest of every nation to get just as much as it can for what it has to sell, just as much as it is the interest of every private merchant to do the same. If we can get a ton of English coal for three bushels of American wheat we are making a better trade than we should be if the same amount of coal cost us four bushels of wheat. As long as our imports consist of useful things that come to us without making us mortgage the future we have no reason to be afraid of getting too much of them. The more the better. Of course if we buy luxuries we are unable to pay for we shall suffer for it when the time to settle comes round. CHAPTER IX. THE TARIFF AND SHIPPING. It is pretty generally known that our shipping industry is in a bad way. Instead of keeping pace with the progress of the country in other directions, it has been declining for more than thirty years. The following table shows in a graphic form the extent of the decline. It exhib- its the percentage of our foreign trade carried on in American vessels at different times: 1855 1861 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 65.2 27.7 35.6 17.6 17.2 12.3 53 54 THE TARIFF. Plainly our merchant marine is rapidly ap- proaching a vanishing point. And yet a gen- eration ago America seemed certain to be the greatest sea power in the world. It was gain- ing on England as rapidly in ships as in rail- roads.. It possessed practically as much ton- nage as Great Britain and more than all the rest of the world put together. When the Brit- ish navigation laws were repealed and ships of all nations were allowed to share the English trade it was predicted in Parliament that the Stars and Stripes would soon drive the Union Jack from the ocean. In 1837 our tonnage in the foreign trade was only 810,000. Twenty years later it had increased to 2,463,000, and in 1861 it had reached 2,642,000 more than two and a half times its amount to-day. In 1861 the United States owned 5,539,813 tons of ship- ping of all kinds, the entire British Empire 5,895,- 369 and all the rest of the world 5,800,767. The American tonnage exceeded that of the United Kingdom, not counting the British colonies. In 1890 we had only 928,062 tons in the foreign trade and 4,424,497.44 tons in all. Not only had our ships trading over seas almost entirely disappeared, but even our tonnage in the coast- ing trade, carefully protected as it was from all foreign competition, remained almost station- ary. At the same time Great Britain, which had thrown even her coasting trade open to the free competition of the world, had leaped ahead at a rate never witnessed before. Her net ton- nage, which was 4,658,687 in 1860, had jumped to 7,759,008 in 1889, and her builders turned THE TARIFF AND SHIPPING. 55 out more tons of new shipping in a single year than we have on our whole registry. In 1890 the gross tonnage of British vessels of over 100 tons each was 10,585,747 for Great Britain, and 1,342,877 for the Colonies, or 11,928,624 for the whole empire, against 3,515,552.80 for the United States. In steamers the difference was even more remarkable. There were 6,595 Brit- ish steam vessels, of 8,653,543 gross tons, against 2,766 American vessels of 1,722,481.25 tons. Now what was the cause of all this ? It was very simple. Up to the year 1855 or there- abouts the commerce of the world was carried on in wooden ships, and the cheapest and best wooden ships in existence were built in the United States, as they still are. To this day our builders can turn out wooden vessels 30 per cent cheaper than those of England can. But about 1855 iron began to force its way into use as a shipbuilding material, and in this direction the English had as great an advantage over us as we had over them in wood. They had great deposits of coal and iron close by each other and close to tide-water, with ample supplies of skilled labor to work them. The result was that they could build iron ships 30 per cent cheaper than we could* Now, an iron vessel is lighter than a wooden one of the same size ; it can carry more freight, it lasts longer and com- mands better rates of insurance. Consequently, it has an advantage that cannot be overcome in competing for business. After the repeal of the British navigation acts in 1849 Englishmen 56 THE TARIFF. were allowed to buy the cheap American wooden ships, and so kept themselves from be- ing driven from the sea. but when the condi- tions changed and the English ships became cheaper we were forbidden to profit by their ex- ample. Our merchants were compelled to use American ships or none at all, and as they could not compete with their foreign rivals with American ships they used none. If Congress, immediately after the change in the methods of shipbuilding, had admitted all the materials for the construction of iron ships free of duty something might have been done to check the decay of our merchant marine. But it not only did not do this, but piled new bur- dens upon the struggling industry. Between 1855 and 1861 our shipping was just trembling in the balance. Sharp eyes could see that it was about to go down, but to the casual observer it seemed as flourishing as ever. Our flag still flew on every sea. But in 1861 and after came a series of stunning blows. The Morrill Tariff cut down cargoes and increased the cost of ma- terials for building and repair. The Confeder- ate cruisers swept our flag from the ocean, and under the thoughtful provisions of our naviga- tion laws an American vessel once transferred to a foreign flag could never again be registered in the American merchant marine. If our ship- building industry had been in a healthy condi- tion these losses would soon have been made up, but as it was, the vessels burned or sold were not replaced. After the war our shipping kept on going steadily down hill, and it has THE TARIFF AND SHIPPING. 57 never yet shown signs of recovery. The lowest point it ever reached is indicated in the reports for 1890. The palmy days of the American shipping industry were during the low tariff period from 1846 to 1861. At that time we not only did three-quarters of our own foreign carrying trade, but we did a large part of the carrying for other nations. We had a greater tonnage of vessels sailing from one foreign port to another and never visiting an American port except for repairs than we have now in our entire foreign trade. We collected enough in freight charges from foreigners to make up for a consider- able excess of imports. At present the balance is on the other side. We pay to British ship- owners more than enough to wipe out the al- leged benefits of our " favorable balance of trade" or rather this so-called favorable bal- ance is caused largely by the necessity of selling more goods than we buy in order to pay these British freight charges. The only cure protectionists have to offer for the wretched condition of our shipping industry is subsidies. In other words, after having made the business unprofitable by law they propose to hire people to carry it on in spite of the laws. There is no doubt that we can acquire a mer- chant marine in this way, although no nation has ever done it, if we are willing to pay enough for it. But the best and cheapest way to go about it, if we are determined to tax the people in one direction to overcome the effects of taxes in another, would be to have the Government 58 THE TARIFF. build the ships and own them itself. Then it would be sure of getting its money's worth. To support a merchant marine like that of Great Britain, on the plan proposed by the Tonnage Bounty Bill defeated in the last Congress, would cost the Treasury at least $140,000,000 a year. We could match every vessel that England owns for $1,000,000,000. The interest on that would be $30,000,000 a year, and $40,000,000 more would provide a fund to replace the ships when they wore out or ran aground. The Govern- ment could own its own merchant marine, there- fore, for half what it would cost on the bounty plan to encourage private speculators to invest in one. But the question is, whether it is a good policy to spend the taxpayers' money in that way. If we are going to adopt socialistic principles throughout there is nothing more to be said. If the Government is to own all the factories and butcher-shops, and farms and grocery stores, there is no reason why it should not own the ships. Certainly it would be better for it to own these things than to hire people to carry on business at a loss. But so long as we stick to the old way of having people earn their own living on their own hook the best thing the Gov- ernment can do for the shipping industry is to keep its hands off. In the days when our shipping thrived and grew we paid no subsidies. Our merchants and seamen took care of themselves. Our ships were better, faster and cheaper than those of other nations ; they had better crews and were THE TARIFF AND SHIPPING. 59 more smartly sailed; they commanded better rates of freight and insurance, and they took the cream of the business. .At the present day England pays no subsidies, except in very ex- ceptional cases, like the line from Vancouver to China, which is considered a link in the chain that binds the empire together. She spends something less than $3,500,000 a year on her entire foreign mail service, and $210,000 a year to retain certain specially constructed steamers in the naval reserve. This is all the British Government pays toward the support of a mer- chant marine that now includes half the shipping of the globe, and she pays that, not for the bene- fit of the ships, but for certain definite public services. We can get all the ships we need just as soon as we are ready to go about it in the right way. As soon as we stop tying up our merchants with all sorts of absurd rules and weighing them down with all sorts of unnecessary fines the ships will come of themselves. But as long as we not only forbid American citizens to buy ships where they can get them on the best terms, but even compel an American-built ves- sel to haul down her flag if the owner of a single fraction of her goes to live abroad for his health we must expect to pay pretty high before we can get the ocean covered with American keels hired at public expense. CHAPTER X. THE TARIFF AND THE FOREIGNER. Mr. McKinley claims more for his great bill than the mere protection of American labor. He says that it is making foreigners pay our taxes, so that as far as the duties go we are running our Government at the expense of other countries. This is important, if true. The only drawback is that there is no patent on the in- vention. Almost every nation in the world raises money by a tariff, so that on the McKin- ley theory every nation is helping to support its neighbor's governments instead of its own. If this be true the people of Europe are all on the wrong tack. Instead of complaining of the ex- travagance of their rulers they should be anxious to have their own governments spend as much money and foreign governments as little as possible. But these people have the idea that they pay their own taxes. The Ital- ians are not worrying about the amount of money spent by the French, although on Mr. McKinley's principle they are paying their share of it ; but they grumble all the time at the money spent by their own rulers, although it comes largely from duties, which Mr. McKinley says the foreigners pay. Which is right ? Tariff taxes are divided into two parts that paid to the Government and that paid to pro- THE TARIFF AND THE FOREIGNER. 61 tected private capitalists. Nobody pretends that foreigners pay the second part, which in this country is about three times as great as the other. When an American woolen manufacturer charges an American buyer a dollar for a yard of cloth which could be bought in England for fifty cents there is no foreigner in the case at all. An American collects the tax and an American pays it. It is estimated that Ameri- can railroads that is to say, American ship- pers and passengers paid, within twelve years, about $180,000,000 more for steel rails than they were worth. The prices of rails have gone down in this country, but at almost any given time they have been higher than the prices in England by nearly the amount of the duties. If the new tin-plate combination can succeed in supplying the American market it will collect about $15,000,000 a year from the American people in taxes above the market value of its goods. If any of our taxes are paid by foreigners, therefore, they must be those levied on things we import. Have we anything that throws light on this point ? We have, and fortunately one of the best tests that could be asked has been furnished by Mr. McKinley. In 1890 we bought $87,602,907.72 worth of foreign sugar, and somebody paid the Government $55,166,- 703.40 in duties. If that somebody were the foreigner it could make no difference to Ameri- can buyers whether the tax were taken off or left on. But as soon as the duty was removed the price in all the Eastern markets fell by the 62 THE TARIFF. full amount that had formerly been collected. Clearly, the duties had come out of American pockets. There are plenty of other cases in which it is plain on its face that the foreigner does not and cannot pay the tax. For instance, the lowest tax imposed by the McKinley bill on imported horses is $30 apiece. Now, on the Mexican frontier there is an abundance of mustangs that can be bought at $15 or $20 each. It will hardly be said that when a Mexican sells a horse for $15 to be taken across the line into Texas he pays $30 to our Government for the pleasure of making the trade. The $30 is paid by the Texan buyer, and when he gets his horse home he has a $45 animal. Anybody that has ever lived near a frontier knows how such things go without being told. The merchants of San Diego know who pays the Mexican duties on the flour they sell in Lower California. If they had to deduct those duties from the price of the flour the Sheriff would be running their business inside of a week. Merchants in general, if they have any dealings with foreign countries, understand the subject equally well. Whenever one of them buys a bill of goods abroad he pays the market price in the place of sale, and then pays the duty besides. If this were not so there could be no such thing as a market price anywhere. There would be as many different prices as there were tariffs in the world. If you pick up an English paper devoted to the iron trade you will find steel rails of a cer- THE TARIFF AND THE FOREIGNER. 63 tain grade quoted at a certain figure. You can go to Lancashire and buy them at that rate, and when you have bought them they are yours and you can do what you please with them. You can send them to the United States and pay a duty of $13.44 per ton, or to Hawaii and pay 10 per cent, or to Chile and pay 15 per cent, or to Mexico and pay nothing at all. If you saw rails quoted at 4 per ton and told the manu- facturer that you wanted to buy 5,000 tons for the United States, for which you would pay 1 6s; 1,000 tons for Hawaii, for which you would give 3 7s 6d ; 2,000 tons for Chile, for which you would give 3 5s, and 2,000 tons for Mexico, for which you would give 4, he would edge off behind a clerk until a policeman could search you for a possible dynamite bomb. Yet you would be doing precisely what protectionists say is always done in such cases. You would be deducting the duties in each country from the foreign price. That is not the way business is carried on. When we cannot pay the full market price for English steel rails, add freight, duty and profits, and still sell them as cheap as the American article, we do not buy them. There are many years in which scarcely a ton of foreign rails is sold in the United States. The way the tariff works in this respect is to pinch the American buyer when he most feels the squeeze. We put a heavy duty on rails. In ordinary years, when railroad building is slack, there is not enough trade to keep our own mills busy, and no rails are imported. Then 64 THE TARIFF. comes a sudden excitement. Railroads race with each other to extend their lines. The American mills cannot fill their orders, prices go up, rails must be had at any figure ; we send abroad for them, and our shippers have to pay the taxes. We put a duty of twenty-five cents a bushel on potatoes. It is to "protect the farmer." The farmer has a good crop ; he raises more potatoes than he can sell, and the price goes down in spite of the duty. Then comes a bad year ; the crop is a failure, and the people along the border have to import from Canada or go with- out. Now would be the time for the American farmer to profit by the tax, but he has no pota- toes to sell. The consumer has to pay double prices, and nobody gets any benefit from them. The wheat growers of California have a good chance to see who pays the duties by looking at their grain bags. Almost all that are used are imported. The price in San Francisco is the price in Calcutta with freight, duties and other expenses added. Any farmer can buy his bags two cents a pound cheaper by agreeing to pay the duties himself, but he will find that what- ever form of figuring he may adopt the tax comes out of his pocket in the end. The fact was openly avowed by the late Republican Leg- islature, which asked Congress to remove these duties on the ground that the farmers had to pay them while nobody gained any benefit from them. If the McKinley idea were correct, it is safe to say that there would not be a tax in the world THE TARIFF AND THE FOREIGNER. 65 except tariff taxes. Every nation would be so eager to make its neighbors pay its expenses that it would pile on duties until it had money enough not only to keep its government running, but to divide among its people. The nations with the highest tariffs would be the most pros- perous, for they would be drawing in the most money from abroad. Guatemala, Russia and Italy would be getting rich faster than England, Holland and New South Wales. Until we see a state of things something like this we may as well stick to the old doctrine that the only way one nation can make another foot its bills is to collect its taxes with an army. CHAPTER XI. LOCAL AND TARIFF TAXES. One of the worst points in the plan of collect- ing taxes by means of a tariff is the fact that people under such a system do not realize how much they pay and so do not check extrava- gance in their servants. If the taxpayers could measure exactly what the National Government costs them, as they can with State and local governments, the late Congress would never have been allowed to spend a billion dollars. The people were quick enough to make them- selves heard when the California Legislature in 1889 appropriated $12,000,000 for two years' ex- penses, because that money could be traced. But the average citizen does not realize that every time he buys a hat, or a suit of clothes, or a cigar, or a codfish, he is paying taxes to the General Government, or to somebody to whom that Government gives the privilege of taxing the community for his private profit. Let us compare the amounts which the masses pay on account of tariff and local taxes. Let us take a workingman, with an average family, living in a rented house as- sessed at $1,500. That there may be no dis- pute, we will assume that the landlord adds all the taxes to the rent, which as a general thing he does not and cannot do. The personal prop- LOCAL AND TARIFF TAXES. 67 erty of the family may be assessed at $200. We have, then : Real estate $1,500 Personal property 200 Total $1,700 On which the State and local taxes, at, say, $1.50 per $100, would amount to $25.50 a year, or not quite 50 cents a week. That is a good deal of money, and worth cutting down as much as possible. But how does it compare with what the same family pays on account of the tariff? To say that a father, mother and five children spend $150 a year for clothes is cer- tainly a low estimate. Some articles can be bought as cheaply, or almost as cheaply, in this country as abroad. Others cost our people twice, and even three times as much as for- eigners pay for things of the same kind. Tak- ing everything together, it is safe to say that but for the tariff the clothes for which our fam- ily now pays $150 would not cost over $100. We have, then, a tax of $50 on that single item. For crockery, glassware, cutlery and furni- ture it would be a very careful or a very poor workingman's family that did not spend at least $25 in a year. Of this about $15 would go for the goods and $10 for the tariff taxes. Since the removal of the duties on raw sugar the American consumer has been let off more easily in the matter of food than in anything else. His tea and coffee are free, and his sugar 68 THE TARIFF. nearly so, and of course his bread and meat are not affected by the tariff, nor his butter, eggs, cheese, milk and vegetables, except in certain localities. On rice he has to pay a tax of 2 cents a pound, on sardines 5 cents per half box, on salted and smoked fish from half a cent to a cent a pound, on macaroni and vermicelli 2 cents a pound, on chocolate and cocoa the same, on salt 12 cents per hundred pounds, on mustard 10 cents a pound and on spices 4 cents a pound. Taking all the small imported items together the family may get off with a tax of $5 a year. The use of tobacco is a bad habit, but still it is one that is quite commonly indulged in. It costs the victims from 40 cents to $5 a pound in bare tariff taxes in addition to the internal reve- nue taxes and the profits of dealers on their advance of the duties. Whether the tobacco be imported or domestic the taxes are paid just the same, the only difference being that in the for- mer case they are paid to the Government and in the latter they are collected by private producers. If our workingman be anything of a tobacco user at all, his contributions to the tariff under that head can hardly be less than 5 cents a day, or say $18 a year. If he have a son old enough to help him smoke, the family expenses for this item will be at least doubled. If this family lived in the East it would have to keep two or three coal fires burning all winter for warmth. But as it lives in San Francisco, we will assume that it has no fire except the one in the kitchen stove, which is used for heating the water for washing as well as for cooking. LOCAL AND TARIFF TAXES. 69 It will take at least eight tons of coal a year to keep this stove going. Directly and indirectly, taking into account the effect of the tariff in keeping away cargoes and causing coal famines, the tax on coal keeps the San Francisco price on an average fully $5 per ton higher than it ought to be. But we will say nothing about that. We will simply take the direct cost of the tax and the necessary commissions, amounting to about $1 per ton. That makes $8 a year added to one family's coal bill. Here we have tariff taxes for one poor family footing up $91 a year. There are all sorts of odds and ends, such as paper, brushes, toys, matches, medicines, pictures, paint, nails, soap, candles, pins, tinware and the like, which would certainly bring the figures up to an even $100. State and local taxes take $25.50 tariff taxes take $100. For the $25.50 the workman has a school for the education of his children, streets such as they are to walk over to his work, sewers of a kind to prevent disease, a park for his family to breathe in, a library of 60,000 volumes, courts and policemen to protect him against robbery or violence, hospitals to care for him if he should be sick, and asylums to receive him if he should be stricken with affliction. For the $100 he has Congress, a supply of great buildings at Washington which he can never see, a skeleton army, a sample of a navy, a mil- lion pensioners, a number of Indian agents, some very good geological, topographical and hydrographic maps, and several Andrew Carne- gies worth $20,000,000 apiece. The Post Office 70 THE TARIFF. does not count, because it supports itself for the most part out of its sales of stamps. The San Francisco workman pays his $100 without a murmur, or if he grumbles at anybody it is at the storekeeper. But when the State and city call on him for $25. 50 he is hit hard. He talks about the extravagance of local politicians and the burdens of taxation, and he is willing to support any party that will agree to take $2 off of the annual bill. And yet when its nature is understood, the tariff tax is more galling, dollar for dollar, than the direct tax. It comes out of a man's private earnings and is measured by his private expen- ses. The local tax, which is based principally upon land, is the price of a special privilege en- joyed by the one who pays for it. That land gains its value from the presence of the com- munity, and it is only fair that the community should get some benefit from it. The tax is not really a tax at all, but rent. Moreover, what- ever is spent in this way is spent for the public benefit, unless it is stolen. But three dollars collected in tariff taxes go into private pockets for every dollar that goes into the public treas- ury. Some things protected by duties are not imported at all, but the prices of the American articles are just as high as those of foreign ar- ticles would be with the duty added. In these cases the Government does not get a cent the whole tax is a dead loss to the people who pay the money. Consider what it means to a working family to have $100 or even 50 taken out of its yearly LOCAL AND TARIFF TAXES. 71 income without any return and you may have some measure of the hardships of tariff taxa- tion. If this amount of money were taken directly by the tax-gatherer no government could live through the storm that would follow. But until the tariff question began to be dis- cussed a few years ago few people realized that they were being taxed by customs duties at all. They thought it was natural to pay high prices for goods in America, and it never occurred to them that every working family was deprived of from $50 to $100 a year through the fault of the Government. Still less did they realize that three-fourths of this money went, not to support the Government, but to pay for castles in Scot- land and coaching tours through England for rich manufacturers and mine owners. This is why they looked so closely after the trifle of local taxes, which most of them were not called upon to pay at all, and allowed Congress to build up the tariff as if it were making laws for the moon. CHAPTER XII. WAGES AND LABOR COST. In the early days of the tariff the principal protectionist argument used to be that we needed duties because European countries had so much more capital than we that they could freeze us out of business if we allowed them to compete with us. Now that the United States has become the richest country in the world this idea has been dropped. It is not American capital, but American labor that is now said to need protection. European manufacturers hire their workmen at low wages, while American manufacturers have to pay high wages. This makes American goods cost more, so that if people were allowed to buy where they pleased they would buy of foreigners. At the bottom of this idea, of course, is the belief that everything is made by labor. In a sense this is true, but let us see in what sense. If you go into the Union Iron Works you will see an army of huge machines grinding, plan- ing, polishing and boring the great pieces of metal that are about to be turned into ships and engines. A man turns a handle and an immense cast- ing slides into place under a drill. The drill begins to eat into the iron and the man leaves it and feeds another machine. At the proper WAGES AND LABOR COST. 73 time he comes back and slides the casting into a new position. This man is paid, perhaps, $4 a day. An English workman in his position might get $2 a day, and a German workman $1. But the machines which he has attended may do $100 worth of work in a day, and one mistaken turn of a lever might do $1,000 worth of damage. It is not muscle work this man is doing, but head- work. The muscle work is done by the power of steam. The slightest difference in the qual- ity of the head work would amount to more than the whole of the man's wages. If the factory were run on the easy-going German plan, by which one man looks after one machine and knocks off half a dozen times a day to fill his pipe and commune with his beer glass, there might be a saving in wages, but the interest on capital would be running on, rents, taxes and insurance would have to be paid, fuel would be burning, machinery would be wearing out and the returns would not be coming in to meet the expenses. It is a safe rule that that labor is the cheapest which keeps the plant of a factory worked up to its fullest capacity and makes the fewest mistakes. A weaver who could turn out a lot of cloth without a flaw would be cheap at the highest wages paid in the trade, while one who had to be constantly fined for imperfect work would be dear if he worked for nothing. The cheapest wheat in the world is raised in California, where wages are higher than almost anywhere else. It is so for the very reason that 74 THE TAEIFF. wages are high, and therefore every care is taken to make labor go as far as possible. It is true that harvest hands are paid $2 or S3 a day in this State, while they can be had in Russia for fifty cents, but in California five men and a dozen horses will harvest thirty acres of grain a day with a header a job that would take the same number of Russian peasants two weeks to get through with their sickles. The California!! farmer can make money raising twenty bushels of wheat to the acre at a dollar a bushel the English farmer loses money when he raises thirty bushels to the acre at $1.50. The differ- ence is principally due to the fact that in Cali- fornia the laborer is not really a laborer at all, but a superintendent of horses and steam en- gines. That is what new inventions are tending to make the laborer everywhere. We can easily imagine a time when every bit of actual work in the world will be done by machinery, and men will have nothing to do but to see that the machines work right. When that time comes the fortunate employer will be the one who has the most intelligent and faithful men, not the one who pays the lowest wages. Everybody understands even now that the poorest economy is to hire a cheap manager. The infant insur- ance companies of California do not complain that their great rivals of New York are able to hire Presidents at $15 a week and actuaries at $l.f)0 per day. There are factories in New Eng- land which paid less for common labor in 1880 than they had paid in 1860, but their Superin- WAGES AND LABOR COST. 75 teiidents were getting three times as much. And the more brains can be mixed in with labor of all kinds the higher wages can employ- ers afford to pay. Americans have a peculiar knack of getting the benefit of natural forces, of organizing in- dustry and of doing things on a large scale. Wherever this quality has room to make itself felt Americans can undersell the world, while paying the highest rates of wages. But where there is no chance to bring this genius for man- agement into play Americans have no business to be wasting their time. Our great factories can turn out cheaper watches than can be made anywhere else in the world, because one of them can make ten thousand timepieces while the old- fashioned hand-worker of Europe is pottering over one. But it would not pay us to try to raise tea, because the tedious work of picking the leaves can be done about as well by the cheap labor of China as by the high-grade labor of America. Hitherto we have not made tin plates, because the process of dipping has been too slow and given too poor returns for our style of work. American labor can be used to better purpose in other directions. This is why Welsh- men have been imported to set the industry go- ing here. But if we find that new inventions enable the dipping to be done by machinery, then American workmen will take the lead in this enterprise, as they have in others. As a general rule it will be found that when working people of one country are paid more than in another it is because they earn more. 76 THE TARIFF. The rule holds good even in so simple a matter as house service. In England servants can be hired for $5 a month, while in California they expect $20 to $25. But one servant in Califor- nia will do all the work of an ordinary family, while an English family in a corresponding position would have to hire one to cook, another to wait on the table, another to an- swer the bell, another to wash the dishes and another to clean up the rooms, and any one of the lot would leave if asked to do anything that belonged to the duties of another. Lord Bras- sey found that in building a railroad a given amount of money could be made to go further in hiring English workmen than in hiring twice the number of Italians at half the wages, and in the same proportion it is cheaper to hire Americans than Englishmen. While railroads on the Pacific Coast are fond of hiring Chinese section-hands on account of the convenience of dealing with them in gangs, everybody who has watched their tender way of handling their shovels knows that, as far as actual work is con- cerned, they are dearer at $1 a day than white men at $2. Secretary Blaine once called attention to the fact that while cotton operatives in Massachu- setts were generally paid a few cents more per week than in England they worked up more than twice as much cotton per hand, and turned out fifty per cent greater value of finished goods. Labor Commissioner Carroll D. Wright, in his latest report, shows that while wages are higher in Northern than in Southern iron-works, the WAGES AND LABOR COST. 77 actual cost of labor is higher in the South than in the North. It is safe to say that in the long run workmen do not receive more pay than they earn. Wages are not a gift from employers they are a share of the products of labor. If they are high it is because much has been produced. When Amer- ican workmen understand that their high wa^es are honestly earned and are independent of any pretended help from politicians at Washington, they will insist upon getting their money's worth for what they spend instead of supporting a tariff system that purports to mean high wages for workers and really means high prices for capitalists. CHAPTER XIII. HOW MANY ARE PROTECTED ? The benefits of protection are something like the sea-serpent they are always somewhere else. The average protectionist believes that the tariff raises wages. If you ask him how it raises his wages he will reply that it does so in an indirect way by improving the condition of some other person. Now, there is a widely accepted principle to the effect that the tail can- not wag the dog. If the persons whose wages are directly affected by the tariff very greatly outnumber those who have nothing to do with tariff taxes except to pay them, they may set the standard for the whole community. But if the directly protected classes form an insignifi- cant minority of the total population, it is clear- ly impossible for them to fix the rate of wages for the majority. It is of the first importance, therefore, to know how many people are en- gaged in producing the things that are supposed to be protected by the tariff, as compared to the number of people whom the tariff does not and cannot affect except to their injury. Unfortunately, the census returns for 1890 have not yet been published with sufficient com- pleteness to enable a calculation to be made for that year. The census of 1880 showed that about one person in twenty might be considered 78 HOW MANY ARE PROTECTED? 79 to be protected. The other nineteen, on the McKinley theory, have their wages sustained above the pauper level of Europe solely by the lifting power of the one. This would seem cal- culated to strain any man's strength, even if the wages of the one were higher at the start than those of the nineteen, but when we consider the fact that the protected industries almost inva- riably pay lower wages than the unprotected, the exploit, if it be really accomplished, proves conclusively that Kobert Elsmere was mistaken in denying the existence of miracles. Some of the greatest unprotected industries have come into existence since 1880, and others have been developed out of all proportion to the general increase of population. Almost all the vast industries dependent upon electricity, for instance, are the growth of the past few years. No protection is possible here, but the taxes on copper and other necessary materials have con- stantly tended to stunt the expansion of electri- cal enterprises. The single unprotected indus- try of railroad transportation employs about a million men nearly if not quite as many as are engaged in all the directly protected industries combined and the number of railroad em- ployees in the little group of Middle States, com- prising New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and part of West Virginia, in 1889, was almost as great as in the whole United States in 1880. If all the manufactures of the country were protected, as they are often assumed to be, only about one person in five would be within the 80 THE TARIFF. circle of tariff bounties, even if the employers conscientiously divided the profits of taxation among their workers. But what is not gener- ally understood is the fact that of the manufac- turing industries themselves only a small frac- tion are protected. Although the returns of the last census have not been published for the whole country, we can form an idea of the gen- eral state of things by examining the statistics of a typical manufacturing city, such as St. Louis. The manufacturing establishments of St. Louis in 1890 employed 93,610 hands. Of these 55,507 were engaged in industries employing over a thousand hands each. The list of about two hundred minor occupations is too long to be examined here, but the proportions of pro- tected and unprotected workers remain about the same throughout. Of the greater industries the following may be called protected : HANDS Boots and shoes, factory product 2,592 Men's clothing 5,003 Malt liquors 2,870 Saddlery and harness 1,202 Tobacco working 4,058 15,735 Concerning this table, it may be remarked that there is not one of these industries that would not flourish at least as well if there were no tariff at all. American boots and shoes are sold all over the world, American clothing man- ufacturers would profit more by free wool than HOW MANY ARE PROTECTED? 81 they would lose by the abolition of the duties on clothes, the St. Louis breweries are in no danger of being washed away by a freshet of foreign beer, and the cowboy who sends to St. Louis for his riding outfit would not bestride an English saddle for half the money. But waiv- ing all this, we find 15,735 protected workers out of 55,507. There are 8,9:23 other workers engaged in making things of which some are sheltered by the tariff and some are not. These things are : HANDS Foundry and machine-shop products 6,345 Furniture factory products 1,563 Iron work, architectural and ornamental. 1,015 8,923 Some of the products of the foundries and furniture factories of St. Louis might conceiv- ably be imported; the rest would have to be made on the spot, whether we had protection or free trade. The rest of the great industries of St. Louis, classed by the census as manufacturing, are totally unprotected. Here is the list : HANDS Bread and other bakery products 1,434 Brick and tile 1,952 Carpentering 3,396 Carriages and wagons 2,283 Steam railroad cars 1,406 Men's clothing custom work and repair- ing 2,299 82 THE TARIFF. Dressmaking 1,047 Confectionery 1,242 Cooperage 1,008 Planing mill products 1,587 Masonry 4,606 Painting and paper-hanging 2,183 Plumbing and gas-fitting 1,047 Printing and publishing 5,153 Tin-smithing, copper-smithing and sheet- iron working 1,166 30,849 It thus appears that a large majority of the men employed in the manufacturing industries of a manufacturing city are entirely unprotected. If we should look at the other industries of the same city at the clerks, the day laborers, the drivers, the teachers, the lawyers, the merchants, the bouse servants and all the thousands of per- sons whose occupations cannot possiby be con- nected with foreign imports we should find the proportions enormously increased. But it is when we go into the country, among the farm- ers, that the real insignificance of protection as a factor in promoting prosperity is most appar- ent. There are whole States in which a search warrant would scarcely bring to light a single person gaining any direct advantage from the tariff. And yet in these very States the voters have insisted upon taxing themselves year after year, upon the theory that somebody somewhere else would profit by their sacrifices and give them a share of the returns. CHAPTER XIV. AMERICAN TARIFFS PART FIRST. In the early days, before the United States had been heard of, each American colony had its own tariff, not only against foreign countries, but against its neighbor colonies. In some, as in Pennsylvania, the duties were protective in others, as in Massachusetts, they were merely for revenue. In all they were very low com- pared with the present national rates. In Massachusetts the tax was only one quarter of 1 per cent on everything. In Virginia it was 1 per cent. In Pennsylvania it was assessed somewhat on the plan of our present tariffs so much a pound on some things, so much a yard on others, so much per cent on others but the duties were very much lower than the Pennsyl- vanian mill-owners insist upon having now. They generally amounted to about 7 or 8 per cent. That was all the really "infant" indus- tries were thought to need then, although now that they are full grown they demand ten times as much. We did a good deal of manufacturing in those days. We made iron and sold it in England. We spun and wove the home-grown wool for our homemade clothes. But most Americans were farmers. This was not because they could not carry on manufactures, but because they 84 THE TARIFF. liked farming better and could make more money at it. There was plenty of land and anybody could be independent. Wages were higher than anywhere else in the world. There was no need for labor unions, for if a man did not like the way his employer treated him he could leave and take up a piece of land of his own. Manufacturers complained loudly of this independence of labor, and insisted that some- thing ought to be done to balance the attrac- tions of the farms. And as all the countries of Europe were trying to protect their manufac- tures by high duties it was easy to make people think that we ought to do the same. The new Federal Government was greatly in need of money and the only way it could raise it was by a tariff. So when the Constitution was formed the States agreed to give up their right to lay duties and turn it over to Congress. The first United States Tariff law was passed in 1789. The duties under it ranged from 5 to 15 per cent, averaging about 8-J. The principal object of the bill was to raise money, but the taxes were so arranged as to put something in the pockets of the manufacturers at the same time. But people were modest in those days. They did not ask for 50, 100 and 200 per cent for their infant industries, as their great-grand- children did a hundred years later. They were satisfied with 7 or 8, and even that was con- sidered so high that there was much discontent. The New England people were especially sore about the tax on molasses. They used to build ships and sail them to the West Indies, bring AMERICAN TARIFFS PART FIRST. 85 home cargoes of molasses, turn them into Med- ford rum, carry that to the coast of Africa, trade it for slaves, sell them in the West Indies, buy more molasses, make more rum, and so keep swinging round the circle indefinitely. Their great industries were commerce and fishing, and they objected to any taxes that interfered with them. But Pennsylvania and the other Middle States succeeded in getting their little protective tariff through. In reality, however, the formation of the new government was the greatest advance for free trade that has ever been known in the world. It destroyed all the tariffs that had interfered with trade among Americans and made a constantly growing ter- ritory entirely free. But after the modest little 8 per cent tariff of 1789 was secured the manufacturers were not satisfied. As the infant industries grew older and stronger they seemed to be in need of more and more nursing. Between 1789 and 1816 seventeen tariff acts were passed, most of them increasing the duties. Besides, the duties in- creased themselves in many cases without any change in the law. Manufactured goods gener- ally tend to become cheaper as improved ways of making them are introduced. But when taxes are laid by the pound or the yard, instead of by the dollar's worth, they become higher in proportion as the price falls. For instance, if we could buy steel rails in England at a certain time for $100 a ton, a duty of $28 per ton would have amounted to 28 per cent. But later when the price abroad went down to $50 86 THE TARIFF. per ton, the same duty would have amounted to twice as much as before, or 56 per cent. By all these means together our early duties were pushed up until by 1802 they averaged 19.45 per cent. The item of hats will do for a sample of the general course of things. In 1789 the duty on hats was fixed at 7 per cent. In 1792 it was raised to 10, in 1794 to 15, in 1804 to 17i, in 1812 to 35, and in 1824 straw hats were taxed at 50 per cent. Boots started in 1789 at 50 cents a pair, and in 1816 they were paying $1.50, in spite of the improvement in manufac- ture. Loaf sugar was pushed up from 3 cents a pound in 1789 to 12 cents in 1816. Unwrought steel began at 56 cents per hundred pounds in 1789, and climbed up to 75 cents in 1790, $1 in 1792 and $1.50 in 1828. In 1807 the United States reached that condi- tion which, on protectionist ideas, ought to be the happiest a nation can find. Its foreign com- merce was destroyed. To resent the injuries inflicted on us by England and France our ports were closed, and ships in the foreign trade were forbidden either to come in or to go out. Then home industry should have leaped forward, and the country should have thrilled with prosper- ity. But things turned out differently. The chill of death settled on the nation, and not un- til the embargo was raised did prosperity revive. In 1812 the duties were doubled all round. This was done to raise money for the war with England, and was not meant to last, and more- over it was balanced by internal revenue taxes on home manufactures. But between the war AMERICAN TARIFFS PART FIRST. 87 and the taxes our foreign trade was so nearly cut off that our people got to making a good many things at home which they had formerly bought abroad. When peace came again in 1815 commerce of course revived. Merchant ships were no longer captured, the duties were lowered to the old rates, and we bought and sold as before. This annoyed the manufactur- ers, who had enjoyed a monopoly of the Ameri- can market, and they demanded a new tariff. They got it in 1816. CHAPTER XV. AMERICAN TARIFFS PART SECOND. The tariff of 1816 is commonly considered the beginning of our modern protective system, although a mild one. It was supported by Calhoun and other Southern leaders, who after- ward became free traders. They favored it because they wanted a better market for cotton, which was still one of the industrial infants, protected by a duty of 3 cents a pound, and also because they had the idea, very common at that time, that protection was necessary to give a nation commercial independence. Soon after the passage of the new Tariff bill times became very hard, but it would be a mis- take to lay this either to the protective system or to the removal of the war taxes. It was caused principally by the trouble in getting down from an inflated paper currency to a coin basis, although the loss of the foreign markets for grain and provisions had much to do with it. In 1824 there was another large raise in the duties. The leader in the new protective move- ment was Henry Clay, who christened his scheme the "American System," apparently because there was nothing American about it. Up to this time the trade of the United States had been freer than that of any other great country in the world, and one of Clay's principal arguments AMERICAN TARIFFS PART SECOND. 89 was that as England was rich and had a high tariff we ought to follow her example. He still held to the infant industry idea, and said, as Garfield did later, that the kind of protection he wanted was the kind that would lead to free trade. Massachusetts and South Carolina were united in opposing this tariff Massachusetts because she knew it would damage her shipping interest, and South Carolina because the cotton planters had come to see that they were depend- ent upon a foreign market. The bill was passed by the almost solid vote of the manufacturing and grain-growing States, and was opposed by the navigating, fishing, tobacco, cotton and sugar States. The grain-growers were uneasy at that time about their foreign markets, and believed the protectionist promises that a high tariff would enable them to sell everything they raised at home. That was nearly seventy years ago. Two generations of farmers have lived and died since then and we still sell a third of our wheat crop abroad. In 1825-26 there was a panic. The hard times bore particularly upon the woolen manu- facturers. Protection is like opium it has to be taken in continually larger doses. The woolen men clamored for more protection. They called a convention, which expanded their demands into a complete new tariff. Owing to the approach of a Presidential elec- tion and the supposed strength of the protec- tionist feeling in the doubtful States, no party liked to go on record as opposing protection, but the Jacksonians in Congress loaded the 90 THE TARIFF. proposed new tariff bill with all sorts of absurd provisions, especially disagreeable to New England, in the hope that the members from that section would defeat it. But enough New Englanders voted for the bill, with all its de- formities, to put it through. By this time Web- ster had come round to the support of a high tariff, explaining that it was not because he believed in the principle, but because the former course of the Government had forced Massachusetts to turn her attention from com- merce and shipping to manufactures, and her capital had now been invested in that quarter. Nobody was pleased with the new law, and its oppressive features gave it the name of " Tariff of Abominations." This tariff served its political purpose, but it almost plunged the country into civil war. The cotton States, led by South Carolina, angrily protested against it, and although the "abomi- nations" began to be cleared out as early as 1830, and were almost entirely removed in 1832, the Southerners would not be pacified. South Carolina refused to allow the duties to be collected within her limits, and while Con- gress passed a bill to enforce the laws it saw that the taxes must be still further reduced. So in 1833, Henry Clay introduced a bill provid- ing for a steady reduction of duties until there were none higher than 20 per cent. This point was to be reached in nine years, and Clay said that by that time our manufactures ought to be strong enough to stand alone. In 1837 there was a general panic all over AMERICAN TARIFFS PART SECOND. 91 the world. It was caused by over-speculation and the abuse of credit. In this country it was made worse by the collection of money through the tariff, greatly in excess of the needs of the Government, and its distribution among the States, by which extravagance and reckless borrowing were promoted the people having the idea that the National Treasury was going to make them all rich. In 1842 the duties under the Compromise tariff had reached their lowest point, but two months later Congress raised them again. The tariff of 1842 was the last protective tariff we had before the war and it lasted only four years. Its rates were generally much lower than those of the Mills bill. Wool blankets were taxed at 25 per cent, mohair blankets 15, carpets in general 30, cotton manufactures 30, sheetings 25, and woolen manufactures 40 per cent. Many of the taxes which would seem high now were low then on account of the higher prices of the things on which they were levied. For instance, bar iron was taxed at $25 per ton, against from $15.68 to $22.40 in the Mills bill. But when bar iron was selling at $100 a ton a duty of $25 was only 25 per cent, while with iron worth $45 a tax of $20 would be nearly 45 per cent. This tariff was the work of the Whig party, the high protectionist party of that day. When the Democrats came into power they lowered it to the rates they thought would bring in most revenue, without regard to protection. For the first time since 1789 raw cotton 92 THE TARIFF. was put on the free list, and cotton goods were taxed at from 20 to 30 per cent. No manufac- tures of wool, leather, copper, lead, iron or steel were made to pay more than 30 per cent. These duties brought in so much money that the Government was soon richer than it had ever been before. The income from customs steadily rose from $23,747,864.66 in 1847 to $64,224,190.27 in 1854. Trade grew in pro- portion. Our exports tripled in ten years, and our imports almost, but not quite, kept up with them. Times were good and everybody was satisfied. The protectionist sentiment gradu- ally died out, until by 1856 there was practically none of it left. CHAPTER XVI. AMERICAN TARIFFS PART THIRD. The first Republican National Convention, held in 1856, did not mention the tariff. The Democratic Convention appealed to our "suc- cessful example" as an argument in favor of "progressive free trade throughout the world." A Pennsylvanian stood on this platform and Pennsylvania gave him her votes. Protec- tion seemed finally dead. The next year, so well had the low duties worked, it seemed time to make them still lower. The first House controlled by the Republican party passed the Tariff of 1857, under which the duties were lower than they had ever been before since the beginning of the century. The Republicans were divided on the question. Mas- sachusetts cast her solid vote in favor of this tariff. So did Maine. In the Senate Charles Sumner, Henry Wilson, Hamilton Fish and other Republican Senators voted for it. It was called the "Manufacturers' Tariff," because it was asked for by the cotton and woolen manu- facturers, who had decided that wide markets were better for them than high protection. It reduced the duties on manufactures of iron and steel to 24 per cent, on those of cotton and wool to from 15 to 24 per cent, and on steel ingots to 12 per cent. Under it the 94 THE TARIFF. duties on all the goods we imported in 1860 averaged 15.67, and on the dutiable goods alone 19.67 per cent. In the fall of 1857, before the new tariff had begun to produce any effects, there was a sharp financial panic caused by over-speculation, and extending all over the world. It was felt much more severely in Europe than here. In England wages were reduced about 25 per cent, but in America wages and general busi- ness hardly suffered at all. The speculators soon straightened out their books, and in a few months the country was more prosperous than ever. But the Government was in trouble. It had been supposed that when the duties were reduced enough more foreign goods would be bought to keep up the income at the custom- houses. But things did not turn out that way. Our people bought less than ever abroad, and consequently less duties were collected and the Government ran short of money. It seemed necessary to increase the rates, not for protec- tion, but to raise more money, and the resigna- tion of most of the Southern Senators and Rep- resentatives after the secession of their States in the winter of 1860, left Congress under the control of men who took advantage of the oppor- tunity to make the increase on protective lines. The Morrill tariff was passed the first of that long series of war tariffs that has lasted to the present day. Although the Morrill tariff is commonly spo- ken of as an example of extreme protection, it was low compared to that under which we are AMERICAN TARIFFS PART THIRD. 95 living now. It fixed the duties on raw wool at from 5 per cent to 9 cents a pound, against from 32 per cent to 36 cents a pound in the Mc- Kinley bill. Cheap woolen blankets were taxed at 6 cents per pound and 10 per cent, while the McKinley bill charges them 16| cents a pound and 30 per cent. The duties on manufactures of iron averaged about 25 per cent, against from 45 to over 100 per cent at present. As the war made constantly new demands for money these taxes were steadily increased. The country had its eyes fixed on the soldiers, and all it cared about the tariff was to have it high enough to bring in all the revenue possible. But the high duties were balanced by internal revenue taxes on American manufactures. It was understood that as soon as the war was over these taxes would be removed and the duties would go down with them. The first part of this promise was kept. The internal rev- enue taxes on manufactures were taken off as soon as the money they brought in was no longer needed, but the manufacturers were able to keep the duties as high as ever. Thus their protection was immensely increased with- out the public generally finding it out. Slight changes were made from time to time, but usually in the direction of taking off revenue duties while leaving those for protection about as high as ever, or higher. From 1864 to 1867 the wool duties were greatly increased. In 1872 tea and coffee were put on the free list. In the same year the duties on many manufac- tured articles were reduced by 10 per cent, but Ub THE TARIFF. in 1874 the old rates were restored. In 1882 there was a general demand for lower duties, and a Tariff Commission of ardent protectionists was appointed to study the question and report a bill that would satisfy the people without really giving up anything. But when the com- mission had looked into the matter it proposed greater reductions than the Republican Congress had any idea of allowing. So a bill was patched up, making some very slight reductions, and in some cases increasing the taxes. For instance, the duty on works of art was raised from 10 to 30 per cent against the protests of all the ar- tists in the country, and a conference commit- tee fixed the tax on iron ore at 75 cents per ton to please Senator Mahone of Virginia, after both Houses had voted to make it 50 cents. Nobody was satisfied with this tariff, and the agitation for a real reform continued. Bills bringing the taxes nearer to a peace-footing, although still leaving them higher than the old protectionists, from Hamilton to Clay, would have put them, were proposed by Morrison and Mills, but failed to become laws. At last, in 1890, the protectionists took advantage of their control of Congress and the Presidency to pass the highest tariff in American history the Me Kinley bill, which deserves a chapter to itself. CHAPTER XVII. THE M'KINLEY BILL PART FIRST. The McKinley law is the highest form of pro- tection yet tried in this country. It must be carefully studied to be well understood, for it does not carry its full meaning on its face. It is full of little tricks and surprises. One of the tools it finds most useful is the change from "ad valorem" to "specific" duties that is, from duties figured by the dollar's worth to those figured by the pound, yard or barrel. When Congress lays a tax of 40 per cent on any article we know that we must pay 40 cents on the dollar's worth of goods, whether they be dear or cheap. Such a tax is less on the coarse things used by the poor than it is on the fine things used by the rich, and if people learn to make things more cheaply than before, so that the prices go down, the tax goes down too. But when Congress says that a certain kind of cloth shall pay 40 cents per square yard, the tax is the same whether the quality be fine or coarse. On cloth worth a dollar a yard the tax would be 40 per cent, just as in the other case, but if the price abroad went down to 40 cents it would be 100 per cent, while on cloth worth $2 it would be only 20 per cent. Another favorite trick of the McKinley bill is to leave out certain articles altogether, so that 97 98 THE TARIFF. they will be taxed higher than before under some general heading. Another is to reduce the rates on things of which we buy very little and raise them on things of which we buy a great deal. This was probably borrowed from contractors, who, when they make bids for fur- nishing public supplies, often make the average of their bids seem low by offering mustard and pepper at prices far below the market rates while they charge extra prices for beef and flour. The McKinley law contains 472 paragraphs, beside the free list and the general provisions. It raises duties directly in 233 cases and reduces them in 219. In addition it changes the taxes from ad valorem to specific in 186 cases, and the worst impositions of the whole bill are found in these changes, which almost always mean large increases. The first schedule deals with chemicals, oils and paints. We find that Mr. McKinley has reduced the taxes on acetic acid, tannic acid, sulphate of copper, refined camphor and various other things of which we hardly import any from one year to another. On almost all the important items he has either left the war duties as they were or has increased them. For instance, he has put a tax of one-fourth of a cent a pound on sulphuric acid, which was free before. This acid is used by thousands of tons in making commercial fertilizers for farmers; it is made very cheaply, and the least increase in its price means a heavy addition to the cost of raising crops by such means. When THE M'KINLEY BILL PART FIRST. 99 the importance of this item to farmers was pointed out, Mr. McKinley inserted an amend- ment putting on the free list certain low grades of sulphuric acid, avowedly for use in the manu- facture of fertilizers, but which experts say are of no value at all for that purpose. A cent a pound has been added to the duty on commercial boracic acid, for the benefit of the Borax Trust, which is able to sell borax all over the world cheaper than it can be furnished by anybody else. There is a large increase in the tax on linseed oil, by which another trust is helped at the expense of everybody that uses paint or putty. The duties on all lead products are left as high as before, and on one of them orange mineral are increased. All of. these things are controlled by one of the most power- ful trusts in the country. The owner of one of the factories in the Lead Trust said that he could furnish another plant exactly like his for $200,000, In the trust that factory is valued at $1,000,000 and dividends on that amount are paid by increasing the price of the product. These are only samples of the chemical duties, almost every one of which conceals a job for the benefit of some firm or combination. The cost of the labor employed in making these articles usually ranges from 8 to 12 per cent. The taxes go from 10 to 1,000 per cent. Passing to the next section, e ' earths, earthen- ware and glassware," we find that out of thirty- five changes in the old rates there is only one single reduction. That is a cut in the duty on millstones from 20 to 15 per cent. Anj 100 THE TARIFF. who finds the regular use of millstones neces- sary to his comfort may get some benefit from this part of the McKinley bill. The taxes are raised on firebrick, cement, lime, plaster, small glass bottles, pressed and cut glassware, lamp chimneys, porcelain and opal glassware, large window glass, small looking-glass plates, spec- tacles, eyeglasses and almost everything else un- der this heading. Imported Portland cement is often required by architects for the sake of safety. Under the McKinley bill contractors must either pay heavy fines for using it or they must get along with a cheaper and more dangerous article bought at home. The new tax on lime is for the benefit of a trust in Maine that con- trols the entire American supply. On common lamp-chimneys, opal glassware, etc., on which the duties used to be 40 and 45 per cent, Mr. McKinley first fixed taxes of 200 to 400 per cent, but after his bill had been discussed in the Senate for some months he agreed to let them go at 60. But as people who buy foreign glass- ware under the new law get no allowance for things that are broken on the way, the duties really amount to at least 75 per cent. One of the leading manufacturers of Pitts- burg, making over a hundred different kinds of glassware, explained that he would not need a particle of protection in his business if he could get his raw materials free. He said that he would be willing to take free trade all around and pay higher wages than before. Labor, he declared, cost him less than European manufac- turers had to pay, because it was so efficient THE M'KINLEY BILL PART FIRST. 101 and so well organized. In his mill each branch of the trade was carried on by somebody especi- ally fitted for it. Cheap boys did cheap work, and high-class work was done by highly paid men. In Germany a skilled laborer earning about half as much as an American skilled laborer wastes part of his time in doing boys' work, and so is more expensive to his employer than the American workman. The next schedule of the McKinley bill, deal- ing with metals, is very artfully drawn. It makes a number of reductions. For instance, the rate on steel rails is cut down from $17 to $13.44 per ton ; that on heavy forgings for ves- sels and engines from $44.80 to $40.32, and that on iron and steel axles from $56 to $44.80. But these reductions were carefully arranged so as not to cut into the prices of the home manufac- turers. American prices of steel rails usually run about $10 a ton higher than English prices. That almost covers the entire cost of all the labor used in the manufacture, from the time the miners begin to dig out the coal and iron ore until the finished rails are turned out of the roll- ing mill. The difference in cost between Eng- lish and American labor in many establishments is not over 25 cents a ton. The new duty of 813.44 a ton allows the manufacturers to charge just as much as they could get without killing their market, even if the tax were doubled. These reductions, that count for so little, have been made to cover a number of increases that count for a good deal. One of them is that on tin plates, from 1 cent to 2.2 cents per pound. 102 THE TARIFF. We import about 700,000,000 or 800,000,000 pounds of tin plate a year, and the tax at the new rate will amount to $15,000,000 or $20,- 000,000. If we keep on importing, this money will go into the Treasury, which may not be so very bad. But if the Welsh makers are induced to move their factories over here it will go into their pockets. It is said that if we made all our tin plates in this country 30,000 men would be employed in the work. Twenty million dol- lars a year in new taxes would support more than that number of men in idleness and leave us the money we have formerly spent for our tin plates besides. The Southern planter raises cotton and sells it at free-trade prices. There is no duty on it. But the cotton has to be baled with iron ties, and the McKinley bill has about doubled the taxes on those. The duties on cheap pocket- knives have been raised in some cases to 150 per cent. Cheap shotguns, such as farmers' boys use to shoot squirrels, have been taxed at about twice or three times the former rates. Aluminium used to be free. Now that cheap methods of producing it are being discovered and it seems likely to come into general use, Mr. McKinley makes it pay a duty of 15 cents a pound. Silver ore is taxed a cent and a half a pound on the lead it contains. This has already ruined a large part of our Mexican trade, built up several large smelters in Mexico and greatly damaged American smelters employing thou- sands of men. PART FIRST. 103 The changes in the wood schedule are few and not important. When we come to sugar we find the only really great reduction of taxes in the entire bill. Raw sugar is put on the free list and refined sugar is taxed at half a cent a pound. The Sugar Trust buys raw sugar and refines it at a cost about equal to the duty. Thus, even if for- eign refiners did not have to pay a cent for labor, fuel or any other working expenses, the tax would be enough to keep them out of the American market. Under the old tariff we im- ported in 1890 2,606,996,509 pounds of raw sugar and raised 371,378,560 pounds at home. The Government collected over $55,000,000 in duties, and the growers received $6,000,000 or $7,000,000 in increased prices. Thus nine- tenths of all the sugar taxes collected from the people went into the public treasury. The new law cuts off all the Government's income from that source and nearly doubles the amount to be paid to private parties. It provides for a bounty of two cents a pound on all the sugar produced in the country, including maple su- gar, which is made by simply boring holes in trees and boiling down the sap, and this bounty, which amounts to about $10,000,000 this year, must be raised by other taxes. One man in Louisiana has received a check for about $200,- 000 of it. If we should raise all the sugar we used the bounty would amount to over $70,000,000 a year. CHAPTER XVIII. THE M'KINLEY BILL PART SECOND. Next, the McKinley bill deals with tobacco. It raises the duties on leaf tobacco suitable for cigar wrappers from 75 cents and $1 to $2 and $2.75 a pound. The reason for this is that there is a peculiar kind of leaf grown in Sumatra so convenient for wrapping cigars that it seems almost to have been created for that purpose. It is thin, tough and flexible and can be handled as easily as paper. When cigar makers, especi- ally in San Francisco, could get this material they had no use for the stuff raised in Connecti- cut ; so Mr. McKinley provided that if they did not patronize the Connecticut growers, and pay the railroads for bringing the inferior wrappers across the continent, they should be fined three times the former rates for buying in Sumatra. Moreover, if a bale of common tobacco, dutiable at 35 to 50 cents a pound, should happen to con- tain a single leaf that might be used for a wrap- per, the entire bale is to be taxed at $2 a pound if unstemmed or $2.75 if stemmed. This was aimed particularly at the Sumatra wrappers, but it hit cigar makers everywhere, especially those of Key West, who live almost within sight of Havana, and who would as soon think of get- ting pineapples from Minnesota as of sending to Connecticut for their tobacco. The injustice 104 THE M'KINLEY BILL PART SECOND. 105 of this provision was so glaring that the General Appraisers have taken the responsibility of nul- lifying the law. The next schedule, "Agricultural Products and Provisions," was meant to show the farm- ers that there was something in the new tariff for them. The duties on almost all farm prod- ucts are increased. In most cases this has no effect at all, since the things taxed are not im- ported and never have been. But where the new duties are felt the farmers usually suffer by them. For instance, horses and mules, which used to pay 20 per cent, are now taxed 30 per cent if they are worth over $150, and $30 per head if they are worth less. The stock- raisers along the Mexican border have found it very convenient in the past to be able to supply themselves with Mexican mustangs costing only $10 or SI 5 apiece. On a $10 horse the old duty would have been only $2. The McKinley tax of $30 is 300 per cent, and it has completely broken up the business of the American farmers and stockmen, who have found it more profitable to use cheap Mexican mustangs than to go to the trouble of raising horses for themselves. Mr. McKinley has also raised the duty on cattle from 20 per cent to $10 per head. This has de- stroyed the trade of the Chicago packers who used to buy Mexican cattle, ship the meat to England and send American goods to Mexico, but it has not helped the American cattle men. The Chicago packers have simply moved to Mex- ico, where the government allows them to im port their supplies free of duty, and they ship 106 THE TARIFF. their canned meat from there direct to England where it cuts under the taxed American meat. The duties on wheat, flour, corn, cornmeal, oats and rye have been raised, but as we do not im- port any of those things the prices are not af- fected. Mr. McKinley might just as well have made the rates 1,000 percent if that would have been any satisfaction to the American farmer. Nobody would have had to pay a cent more for wheat or corn in consequence. But there is one item in which the new tariff does affect trade, and it is worth while to see how it works. The United States both buys and sells barley, but it is one part of the coun- try that buys and another part that sells. Al- most all the barley we import comes into the State of New York across the Canadian border, and is used in the large brewing and milling establishments in that immediate neighborhood. Almost all we export goes out of the port of San Francisco and is sent to Great Britain. Now, the McKinley bill raises the duty on barley from 10 to 30 cents per bushel, and the effect is this : The Canadians have lost the greater part of the local market in New York, and so they must ship to England. There they compete directly with the Californian barley, which has to sail five times as far to get to market. We must either meet them there or we must stop ship- ping to England and send our barley across the continent to Oswego, paying the railroad com- panies enough for freights to eat up all the profits on the sales. The old way was convenient for everybody ; the new way puts all concerned THE M'KINLEY BILL PART SECOND. 107 to the greatest possible amount of trouble and loss. The duties on spirits and on some kinds of wines are increased by the McKinley bill, and to this of course there can be no objection. The taxes on many kinds of cotton manufac- tures are enormously increased in spite of the fact that raw cotton is on the free list and that the manufacturers have been steadily prosper- ous. Ever since the passage of the bill the own- ers of the New England cotton mills have been trying to cut down wages. These wages were already lower in some cases by the hour than in England and very much lower by the piece. On cheap cotton shirts worth $1.50 a dozen the new taxes are $1 a dozen and 35 per cent, or 101.66 per cent in all. The women who make these things work in sweaters' shops in New York for a few cents a dozen. Mr. McKinley's hemp, jute and flax schedule is a queer mixture of good and bad. It puts raw jute, manila and similar fibers on the free list, but it leaves bags and burlaps highly taxed, so that the farmers get no benefit from the re- moval of the taxes on the raw material. It reduces the duties on cables and cordage, but it raises the rates on most manufactures of hemp and flax from 35 to 50 and 60 per cent, and even more. But it is when we come to wool that the new tariff does its best work. The wool schedules show very greatly increased taxes on their face, and they are full of little tricks to make the 108 THE TARIFF. rates still higher. For instance, one section of the old tariff ran thus : " Class two, combing wools That is to say, Leicester, Cotswold, Lincolnshire, Down comb- ing wools, Canada long wools, or other like combing wools of English blood and usually known by the terms herein used, and also all hair of the alpaca, goat and other like animals." It was held that common goats' hair, not fit for combing, did not come in this class, and so it was admitted free. The McKinley bill has changed the section to read thus : "Class two, that is to say, Leicester, Cots- wold, Lincolnshire, Down combing wools, Can- ada long wools, or other like combing wools of English blood and usually known by the terms herein used, and also hair of the camel, goat alpaca, and other like animals." Nobody noticed anything out of the way in this when it was before Congress, except, of course, that it took camel's hair off the free list, but after the bill had become law it was found that by dropping the general heading "Comb- ing wools," common goats' hair had become subject to a tax amounting to about 300 per cent. Another trick is the change in the definitions of " washed" and " scoured" wool, by which some of the duties were quietly doubled. Under the old tariff washed wools were those washed in clear water at about 70 degrees and then rinsed in water of the same kind, while scoured wools were cleaned with soap, alkalies and hot water usually by machinery. Under the Me- THE M'KINLEY BILL PART SECOND. 109 Kinley bill washed wools are merely those that have been washed with water on the sheep's back. Wool washed in any other way than on the sheep's back is called scoured wool and taxed a three times as much as wool imported dirty. Still another trick is the "sorting clause." The new tariff provides that wool which has been "sorted or increased in value by the rejec- tion of any part of the original fleece" shall be taxed at twice the ordinary rate. This means that if the packer happens to see a burr in a fleece and picks it out, along with a little of the wool, the entire bale in which that fleece is packed shall pay double taxes 22 or 24 cents a pound instead of 11 or 12 cents. In spite of all these traps for the importers we have bought more foreign wool since the Mc- Kinley bill was passed than we did before. Our manufacturers must have it to mix in their bet- ter grades of goods, and they have made up for the higher cost by paying less for their Ameri- can wool, which has no other market. They have been able, too, to charge what they pleased for their goods, for the taxes on woolen manu- factures have been piled up, tax on tax, until it is as much as an American citizen's life is worth to buy a suit of clothes abroad, unless he is rich enough to go to Europe and fill his trunks with "personal effects." On a worsted shawl worth 41 cents a pound the old duty would have amounted to 32.25 cents a pound, or 78.9 per cent. Under the McKinley bill it has to pay 64.5 cents a pound, or 157.31 per cent. The 110 THE TARIFF. taxes on ready-made clothing have oeen about doubled. Cheap ingrain carpets pay more than their entire cost at the factory. Mr. McKinley has made a general increase in the duties on silk goods, while leaving the raw material free. This might be thought to con- cern nobody but the rich, if it were not that every working girl likes to decorate herself with bits of silk ribbon, and that silk linings for capes, velvet collars and silk dresses for parties are not beyond the ambition of poor men's fam- ilies. The rich can easily pay the extra tax ; the poor must give up their little luxuries if the price rises too high. Besides, the American silk mills were doing very well indeed before the tariff was changed, and had no need for more protection. Under the head of pulp, papers and books, there are several little items that help to wor- ry American buyers. Even the babies in this country take photographs now, and everybody that presses the button knows that the best sensitized paper comes from Germany. Un- der the old tariff this paid a duty of 25 per cent. Mr. McKinley tells American photogra- phers that they must pay 35 per cent or use a poorer quality of paper made in this coun- try. The old tariff taxed playing cards at 100 per cent. The McKinley tax is fifty cents a pack. This amounts to only 25 or 50 per cent on the fine cards that might be imported by a millionaires' club, but it is about 500 per cent on the cheap pasteboards with which a poor family passes away the winter evening. THE M'KINLEY BILL PART SECOND. Ill Then all the odds and ends of paper goods slate books, music paper, covers for candy boxes, embossed paper, paper bags, lace pa- per, asbestos paper, emery paper, paper filters, solar printing paper, and such things, which used to pay 15 per cent, now pay 25. Under "Sundries" the McKinley bill has in- creased a number of taxes and reduced a few. Every sewing woman in the United States feels the raise in the duty on pearl buttons from 25 to 200 or 300 per cent. The cheapest ladies' and children's kid gloves, such as work- ing girls wear, must pay $3.25 per dozen, or over 100 per cent on the foreign wholesale price. Fur hats, which used to be let off with 30 per cent, are now taxed at 55 per cent. The duties on works of art are reduced from 30 to 15 per cent, and this is one of the few good points of the bill. It must not be supposed that Mr. McKinley raises taxes all the time. He may make it harder to buy woolen and cotton clothes, tin- ware, paper and crockery, but he lets us get unstrung glass beads at 10 per cent, instead of 50. The duty on cleaned human hair is re- duced from 30 to 20 per cent, and that on col- ored feathers from 25 to 10. The free list shows this liberality still more clearly. The McKinley bill removes the taxes from all the following important necessaries of life : Unground acorns, wild animals for exhibition, art educational stops, beeswax, books and pamphlets in foreign languages, books and music for the blind, alizarine, crude opium, 112 THE TARIFF. sour orange juice, several salts of potash, dan- delion root, chlorate of soda, unground chicory root, common blue clay, engravers' diamonds, watch jewels, uncleaned human hair, currants, dates, hat material of straw and other vegetable fiber, india rubber scraps, hand-sewing and darning needles, forged shot-gun barrels, straw matting, nut oil, olive oil for mechanical pur- poses, nickel ore, sulphur ore, bulbs and bulb- ous roots not edible, orchids, lily of the valley and other hothouse plants, raw sugar, molasses, coal and wood tar, jute, jute butts, manila, sisal grass, sunn and other grasses, tinsel wire, to- bacco stems, spirits of turpentine, briar root and briar wood cut into blocks. All we have to do to escape taxation is to live on sugar, currants, dates and crude opium, ride on wild animals, confine our reading to foreign languages, build our houses of blue clay and make our clothes of uncleaned human hair. 2 ' 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. t2)o'60r>B ftec-c. Mftp 9 4 2001 Ju "i3m I8Mr'63MF REC'D LD MAR1819K LD 21A-50m-4,'60 (A9562slO)476B General Library Uuirersity of California Berkeley YC 15379 THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY