iHiiijifjidiHJlifffiHlHii-ilsi'^UI 
 
'* 
 
 
 LIBRARY 
 DIVERSITY OP 
 PAVJi 
 


 #'- 
 
 
* ' 
 
THE 
 
 WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 BY R. S. RIP LEY, 
 
 BREVET MAJOR IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, FIRST LIEUTENANT OP THE 
 SECOND REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY, ETC. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 VOL. I . 
 
 NEW YO RK: 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 
 82 CLIFF STREET. 
 
 1849. 
 
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand 
 eight hundred and forty -nine, by 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District 
 of New York. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A PERIOD of more than thirty years of peaceful 
 intercourse with the great nations of the earth had 
 left the recent history of the United States without 
 any great events of a military character at the 
 commencement of the war with Mexico. The gov 
 ernment of the republic commenced and prosecuted 
 the war, having had little experience in extended 
 military operations, and being at the outset in a 
 measure unprepared. In spite of those difficulties, 
 however, but little more than two years was re 
 quired to bring it to a termination, and during 
 that period American arms suffered no reverse. 
 
 The novelty and importance of the struggle 
 caused it to be regarded as the matter of chief in 
 terest during its continuance, and that which was 
 felt in it by the American people was in no ways 
 lessened by the glorious achievements of the army. 
 The many modern facilities for extending informa 
 tion were all employed to set forth the different 
 events as fast as they occurred, and the accounts 
 were published with a rapidity and a redundancy 
 almost unexampled. Various writers followed the 
 march of the American army, and wrote lengthy 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 epistles on the operations for the columns of news 
 papers at home. Others, remaining in the United 
 States, employed themselves from the first in col 
 lecting and embodying the material into the form 
 of extended narratives. Many of them have been 
 published ; some for political effect, some for the 
 purpose of making a ready sale during the first en 
 thusiasm of the public, and some, perhaps, with the 
 intention of giving a true record of the events of 
 the war. 
 
 With all of these before the public at the time, 
 it may be deemed that the subject has been ex- 
 f hausted for the present, and that another work is 
 | unnecessary. It can not be that the great end of 
 j history can be injuriously affected by too great a 
 number of works upon the subject, if they are all 
 written with a correct intention, and with truth 
 continually in view. It may well be a difficult 
 thing for a writer to keep in the strait and nar 
 row path when variety of information, national 
 pride, interest, and inclination, all tend to induce 
 him to chronicle those events which redound most 
 to the honor of his own country, and to perpetuate 
 the belief in the infallibility of the military and 
 political measures by which a great and glorious 
 success has been achieved. Without reference to 
 the many providential or fortunate circumstances 
 which may have assisted in bringing about the re 
 sult, it is perhaps too generally believed, as a mat 
 ter of course, that the end has been obtained prin 
 cipally by the exercise of skill or sagacity on the 
 
PREFACE. xy 
 
 part of one or a few. Such is the popular helief 
 soon after every military achievement, and for the 
 reason that it requires time and reflection to per 
 ceive the effect which various fortuitous circum 
 stances may have exercised upon the course of 
 events. 
 
 But it will not do to hase future action upon the 
 results of experience, unless, indeed, the part which 
 fortune has home has heen fairly considered, and 
 it therefore hecomes more than ever important that 
 the record should he exact ; for the continuance of 
 peace is always uncertain, and governments and 
 people are prone to adopt one course of policy in 
 wars, to a certain degree, regardless of the diverse 
 nature of their enemies. Different views of mili 
 tary matters, which may very truly and properly 
 be taken by writers viewing them from different 
 points, may assist in developing the truth. Cer 
 tainly many written with good intention are re 
 quired, when some are erroneous on account of in 
 accuracies purposely set forth for the furtherance 
 of partial interests. 
 
 The present work has been mainly prepared 
 during a period of respite from ordinary profes 
 sional duties. It is feared that the time has been 
 too short for the undertaking, in consideration of 
 its magnitude and the importance of the subject, 
 but the time at my disposal has nearly expired, 
 and it must be presented as it is. 
 
 It has been my intention to give a general and 
 impartial account of those events which, for a few 
 
xv j PREFACE. 
 
 past years, have "been of absorbing interest, and 
 which must necessarily be looked upon in future 
 years as the most prominent of any which have 
 occurred since the independence of the country. 
 
 My aim has been to be impartial, and to present 
 the different occurrences in their true light, stripped 
 of the show and ornament which have been hung 
 upon them in the exultation of the moment, and 
 for the undue gratification of national or personal 
 pride. It would be claiming more than any man 
 has a right to claim to say that I had been fully 
 successful; but, having had several advantages in 
 the collection of material, and having undertaken 
 the work with the end in view, I have felt some 
 confidence that, in the respect of impartiality, it 
 may not be without merit. A personal observa 
 tion of the country on both of the principal routes 
 of operation, an intimate acquaintance with many 
 American officers, and some intercourse with those 
 of the Mexican army, were among those advant 
 ages. The various official publications of the dif 
 ferent governments have afforded the correspond 
 ence and reports of the different civil and military 
 functionaries, and other documents, except those 
 of a nature of the papers appended to the work. 
 
 In the narrative of facts, the official papers have 
 been referred to and followed, except where they 
 contained known and obvious errors. The observ 
 ations upon the different events of the war have 
 been made with reference to the simplest and ap 
 proved maxims of great military men, and where, 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 on account of the novel nature of the operations, 
 they would not apply, I have tried to be guided by 
 the dictates of reason. The observations, however, 
 must be considered as being more exclusively my 
 own ; and that they should not interfere with the 
 narrative, they have generally been inserted after 
 that of the events to which they refer. They may, 
 and probably will be at variance with the opinions 
 of many officers of the American army; but as they 
 appeared to me to be correct, I have thought proper 
 to insert them, and to trust to the accompanying 
 arguments for their support. 
 
 I would gladly have endeavored to make the 
 account more thoroughly minute and circumstan 
 tial, that the deeds of very many brave officers and 
 soldiers might be well known and understood. In 
 military affairs especially, those in high position 
 are the principal objects of regard either for appro 
 bation or condemnation, while the efforts and ac 
 tions of those of subordinate rank, no less distin 
 guished by the characteristics' of good or evil, are 
 unknown, except to a small circle of those inti 
 mately acquainted with the facts. But to present 
 the acts of individuals would be a greater task than 
 the space or time of the present work will allow, 
 and, moreover, would increase the chances of doing 
 injustice to few or many. 
 L B 
 
CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Introduction Sketch of Mexican History in the early Periods of Independ 
 ence Settlement of Texas Texan War Treaty with Santa Anna-^-Rec- 
 ognition of Texan Independence by the United States and other Powers- 
 Mexican Action upon the Treaty Public Sentiment in the United States 
 Mexican Outrages on American Property American Action as recom 
 mended by Jackson Suspension of diplomatic Intercourse Action of 
 American Government on Recognition of Texan Independence Resump 
 tion of diplomatic Intercourse with Mexico, and partial Adjustment of 
 Claims French Claims, and Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa Mexican Claim 
 of Sovereignty in Texas Correspondence on Interference of American 
 Citizens On Annexation Negotiations for Annexation Conclusion of 
 Treaty Is rejected Mexican Action Public Sentiment in United States 
 Election of American President American Action on Annexation Brit 
 ish and French Policy Passage of Joint Resolution for Annexation Efforts 
 of British and French Agents to defeat the Measure Mexican Acknowl 
 edgment of Texan Independence Rejected Movement of American 
 Troops into Texas Location of Troops State of Mexico Downfall of 
 Santa Anna Herrera's Administration Mexican Action on Annexation 
 Informal Proposition to United States Mission of Slidell Disturbance in 
 Mexico Failure of Negotiations Paredes's Pronuuciamiento Fall of 
 Herrera Administration of Paredes Return of Slidell Motives of Pare- 
 des Review Monarchical Scheme Almonte's Intrigues with Abolition 
 ists Paredes's Order to Arista to commence the War Public Sentiment 
 in the United States March of the American Army to Matamoras Views 
 of Secretary Marcy of General Taylor Commencement of Hostilities 
 General Review Military State of Mexico Origin of her Army Nature 
 of the People for military Service Mexican Army Resources Military 
 Policy of the United States American Army Volunteers Marine Re 
 sources . Page 25 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Movement from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande Passage of the Colorado 
 Arrival of American Army opposite Matamoras Interview between Gen 
 erals Worth and La Vega Mexican Action Commencement of Fortifica- 
 
XX 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 tions Arrival of General Ampudia Correspondence with General Tay 
 lorBlockade of the Mouth of the Rio Grande Arrival of General Arista 
 Commencement of Hostilities Capture of Thornton's Squadron Call for 
 Volunteers March to Point Isabel "-Mexican Passage of the Rio Grande 
 Bombardment of Fort Brown Battle of Palo Alto Battle of Resaca 
 de la Palma Expedition against Burita American Passage of the Rio 
 Grande Observations Page 100 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 American' Preparation for War Difficulties of Executive Avowed Object 
 of War California New Mexico Plan of Operations General Gaines's 
 Action at New Orleans Term of Service of V.olunteers General Scott's 
 Dispute with the War Department (General Taylor assigned to Command 
 
 . Mr. Marcy's and General Scott's Letters to him on the Plan of Opera 
 tions General Taylor's Reply- Mr. Marcy's on the same Subject Gen 
 eral Taylor's Answer Want of settled Plan of Operations Observations 
 Difficulties in preparing Advance from Matamoras Occupation of Rey- 
 nosa and Camargo Arrival of Twelve Months' Volunteers, and Discharge 
 of Louisiana Troops Preparations for Movement Organization of Regu 
 lars Worth marches to Serralvo Establishment of Entrepot Organiza 
 tion of Field Division of Volunteers Concentration of active Force at Ser 
 ralvo March toward Monterey 142 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Delays in Mexican Preparation Intrigues of the Santanistas Action of San 
 ta Anna His Plan for a Pronunciamiento Immediate Effect Action of 
 the American Government Efforts of Paredes to retain Power His Diffi 
 culties Revolution of August, 1846 Downfall of Paredes Return of 
 Santa Anna His Manifesto, August the 16th Action of the Mexican 
 Government under Salas Attempted Issue of Prize .Letters American 
 Offer of Negotiations Arrival of Santa Anna at the Capital Measures of 
 the Mexican Government Preparation at Monterey General Mejia 
 Decrees and Proclamations of Ampudia 176 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Monterey Its Locality Defenses Garrison American Force Plan of 
 Attack Movement of Worth's Division to turn the Town Demonstration 
 on the East in Favor Operations of the 21st on the East of Monterey 
 on the West Inactivity on the East on the 22d Operations on the West 
 of the same Day Advance into the Town from the East on the 23d 
 Withdrawal of the Troops Advance into the Town from the West Offer 
 of Mexican General to Capitulate Negotiations Convention of Monterey 
 Observations.. 194 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 New Mexico. Object of Expedition against New Mexico Instructions to 
 Colonel Kearney His Movement Nature of the New Mexican Govern 
 ment of the People Preparations for Defense Flight of Amijo Kear 
 ney takes Possession of Santa Fe Establishes a civil Government March 
 es to California Observations. 
 
 California. Fremont's Expeditions Controversy with General Castro- 
 March to the North Return Affairs at Sonoma and with De la Tone- 
 Declaration of Californian Independence Instructions of Secretary of Na 
 vy to Commodore Sloat He takes Possession of Monterey and San Fran 
 cisco Proclamation Correspondence with Mexican Authorities Suc 
 ceeded by Commodore Stockton Organization of California Battalion 
 Expedition to the Ciudad de los Angeles Flight of Pico and Castro Es 
 tablishment of civil Government. 
 
 Chihuahua. Object and Organization of Chihuahua Expedition Progresses 
 to Monclova Is given up. 
 
 Naval Operations in Gulf of Mexico. Blockade Attempt upon Alvarado 
 Expedition to Tobasco Page 270 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Views of American Authorities at Washington Intended Expedition against 
 Tampico 111 Feeling of General Taylor toward the War Department- 
 Its Cause His Recommendation of taking up a defensive Line Observa 
 tions Termination of Armistice Advance to Saltillo Occupation of Tam 
 pico Action of General Patterson Movement on Victoria Taylor's Views 
 and Intentions Observations False Alarms at Saltillo Concentration of 
 Force at that Point Occupation of Victoria 311 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 General Scott proceeds to the Theater of War Expedition against Vera Cruz 
 Official Coi-reupondence Withdrawal of Troops from the Northern Line 
 of Operations Observations , 340 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Action of Mexican Authorities General Santa Anna His Difficulties His 
 Policy Efforts of the Mexican Government to raise Men, Material, and 
 Money State of Things in the Capital Scheme of sequestrating Church 
 Property Opposition of the Clergy Meeting of Mexican Congress Elec 
 tion of Santa Anna and Gomez Farias Consideration of American Pro 
 posal to negotiate Of Scheme of sequestrating Church Property Is 
 adopted Fails Movements of General Santa Anna upon receipt of in 
 tercepted American Dispatches Strength of his Army Advance to En- 
 carnacion.. 362 
 
XX11 
 
 * * ., - * 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 American Force about Saltillo Capture of Borland's, Gaines's, and Heady's 
 Commands Arrival of General Taylor Movement in Advance to Agua 
 Nueva Reconnaissances to La Hedionda and Encarnacion Retreat to 
 Buena Vista Advance of Santa Anna from Encarnacion Pass of Angos 
 tura Affair of the 22d of February Movement of Minon's Cavalry Sal 
 tillo BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA Mexican Retreat to Agua Nueva Com 
 munications Position of Santa Anna His Retreat toward San Luis Tay 
 lor's Advance to Agua Nueva Expedition to Encarnacion Urrea's Opera 
 tions on American Communications His Retreat Observations. Page 378 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Doniphan's Expedition into the Navajoe Country Insurrection in New Mex 
 icoAffair of Canada Affair of Embudo Affair of Pueblo de Taos Don 
 iphan's March toward Chihuahua Affair of Brazito of Sacramento- 
 American Occupation of Chihuahua State of Affairs at that Place Doni- 
 phan abandons it Marches to Saltillo 445 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Commodore Stockton's Action in California Insurrection Preparations to 
 suppress it General Kearney's Arrival Affair at San Pasqual At Hill 
 of San Bernardo Expedition from San Diego to Ciudad Los Angeles 
 Passage of the Rio San Gabriel Affairs at Los Angeles Fremont's Action 
 in the North Advance from Monterey Surprise of San Luis Obispo Ad 
 vance to the South Capitulation of Cowenga Dispute between Stockton 
 and Kearney Kearney and Fremont Arrival of Commodores Shubrick 
 and Biddle, and Colonel Mason Trial and Conviction of Fremont.. . 469 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Politics in the United States Avowed Policy and Recommendations of the 
 Administration at the Opening of the second Session of the twenty-ninth 
 Congress Action of Congress Attempt to create a Lieutenant General 
 Provisions made by the twenty-ninth Congress for the Prosecution of the 
 War Politics in Mexico Polka Rebellion Return of Santa Anna to the 
 Capital Reorganization of the Army 496 
 

 THE WAE WITH iYEXICO. 
 


 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Introduction Sketch of Mexican History in the early Periods of Independ 
 ence Settlement of Texas Texan War Treaty with Santa Anna Rec 
 ognition of Texan Independence by the United States and other Powers- 
 Mexican Action upon the Treaty Public Sentiment in the United States 
 Mexican Outrages on American Property American Action as recom 
 mended by Jackson Suspension of diplomatic Intercourse Action of 
 American Government on Recognition of Texan Independence Resump 
 tion of diplomatic Intercourse with Mexico, and partial Adjustment of 
 Claims French Claims, and Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa Mexican Claim 
 of Sovereignty in Texas Correspondence on Interference of American 
 Citizens On Annexation Negotiations for Annexation Conclusion of 
 Treaty Is rejected Mexican Action Public Sentiment in United States 
 Election of American President American Action on Annexation Brit 
 ish and French Policy Passage of Joint Resolution for Annexation Efforts 
 of British and French Agents to defeat the Measure Mexican Acknowl 
 edgment of Texan Independence Rejected Movement of American 
 Troops into Texas Location of Troops State of Mexico Downfall of 
 Santa Anna Herrera's Administration Mexican Action on Annexation 
 Informal Proposition to United States Mission of Slidell Disturbance in 
 Mexico Failure of Negotiations Paredes's Pronunciamiento Fall of 
 Herrera Administration of Paredes Return of Slidell Motives of Pare- 
 des Review Monarchical Scheme Almonte's Intrigues with Abolition 
 ists Paredes's Order to Arista to commence the War Public Sentiment in 
 United States March of American Army to Matamoras Views of Secre 
 tary Marcy of General Taylor Commencement of Hostilities General 
 Review Military State of Mexico Origin of her Army Nature of Peo 
 ple for military Service Mexican Army Resources Military Policy of 
 United States American Army Volunteers Marine Resources. 
 
 THE controversies in arms in which great nations 
 of modern times have engaged have almost invari 
 ably been brought about by a long series of circum- 
 
26 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 stances, so connected, that in their succession the 
 danger of the conflict could hardly be perceived un 
 til its occurrence was inevitable ; for the gradual 
 progress of free institutions of government has taken 
 the power from the hands of the governing authori 
 ties of nations, to plunge their subjects unadvisedly 
 into war, in pursuit of objects either of capricious 
 fancy or private interest. Although the sentiment 
 of the mass may be no less warlike than that of in 
 dividuals, yet there can never be found in the ac 
 tion of free governments the utter disregard of the 
 interests and wishes of different classes of the peo 
 ple upon a question of war which characterized 
 the conduct of sovereigns in many national dis 
 putes of more ancient date. There must be a di 
 versity of general national interest ; the nature of 
 the belligerent people must be adverse ; the general 
 course of national policy pursued by the authorities 
 of each must be antagonistic ; and it often happens 
 that the different steps of aggression and dispute 
 are taken for immediate partial effect, both at home 
 and abroad, without regard to the ultimate effect 
 upon the peace of the countries. But as, in the 
 accumulation of mistakes committed with such 
 end in view, the controversy draws nigh, the cause 
 of rupture is generally seen in some matter of re 
 cent date, instead of the course of events by which 
 an infinite Providence has caused the advance of 
 the world another degree in its progress to destiny, 
 so the origin of the conflict is laid at the door of 
 the authorities who hold power at the time of its 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 27 
 
 commencement, regardless of the entail, by the 
 acts of predecessors, in the course of national policy 
 on either side. 
 
 In the war with Mexico, the third great war in 
 which the United States of America have been en 
 gaged since the declaration of their independence, 
 this was especially the case. Different in origin, 
 different in progress, different in character, different 
 in religion, the two greatest republics of the earth 
 are different in all things save in their name of re 
 public. The United States are, and have been, the 
 model of republican greatness, while Mexico is the 
 type of republican anarchy. The one is the fruit 
 of a system progressing gradually, and from a re 
 publican root ; the other that of the hot-house graft 
 of freedom on the decayed trunk of despotism. The 
 founders of the first emigrated to the New World 
 from the love of liberty and a hardy spirit of ad 
 venture, and, in their progress to national grandeur, 
 they and their posterity watched, with jealous care, 
 the encroachments of the king, who assumed to be 
 their protector, upon their liberties. Of the rise of 
 the second, the ultimate cause is to be seen in an 
 unscrupulous love of gain; and bigotry, supersti 
 tion, and most arbitrary tyranny were the means, 
 in aid of physical force. The cause of controversy 
 between adjacent countries, which have risen by 
 such different means, and peopled, as they are, by 
 different races, might ultimately be found, did space 
 or time admit of following the thread of circum 
 stance, in the action of their rulers at a compara- 
 
28 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tively ancient period. But from the time of the 
 independence of Mexico, the question which was 
 the immediate cause of war was agitated in some 
 manner, and to relate so much of it as may be seen 
 in the course of Mexican action thereon, and in the 
 events of history of the same periods, reference must 
 be had to the time of the first separate existence of 
 Mexico as a nation.^ 
 
 On the 24th of August, 1821, the treaty of Cor 
 dova was signed, and the colonies of Mexico be 
 came de facto independent of Spanish dominion. 
 Prior to this the viceroyalty had been the theater 
 of a long, bloody, and devastating civil war, which, 
 commencing in the outbreak of Hidalgo, in 1810, 
 had been carried on, with no permanent success on 
 the part of the insurgents, until, on the 21st of Feb 
 ruary, 1821, the plan of Iguala was presented. Its 
 author, Augustin Iturbide, was a Creole officer, high 
 in rank and reputation with the Spaniards, and, un- 
 
 * For the facts of the early history of Mexico as an independent natiou, 
 and of her various early revolutions, the writer has consulted the works of 
 Ward, Poinsett, Bullock, Mayer, Gilliam, and others. The facts in relation 
 to the settlement of Texas, her straggle for independence, and the whole 
 question of dispute until action upon the question of annexation, have been 
 derived from documents made public from time to time in the discussion of 
 the question before the American Congress. All referred to in the text may 
 be found in the Congressional Globe of the periods of the discussion. As the 
 sketch thus far is exceedingly general, no attempt has been made to give 
 distinct references, except in the text ; and it may be proper to remark, that 
 several matters of controversy, which were no immediate cause of war (such 
 as the seizure of Monterey by Commodore Jones), have been left unnoticed. 
 It has only been endeavored to direct attention to the events which had u 
 general national effect, and those in relation to the dispute which were the 
 subject of continued correspondence on the part of the diplomatists of the 
 two countries. 
 
THE W4R WITH MEXICO. 9 
 
 til that time, had been one of the most formidable 
 opponents of the insurgent party. The movement 
 met with complete success ; for Iturbide controlled 
 the army, which had hitherto supported the vice 
 regal authority, and, although the principles set 
 forth in the plan of Iguala were not wholly accept 
 able to the old leaders of the rebellion, yet that plan 
 had for its primary object the independence of Mex 
 ico ; and, broken up as they were, powerless, and 
 incapable of supporting their own views/ in arms, 
 most of the chiefs who had escaped tie fate of Hi 
 dalgo and Morelos promptly gave their assistance 
 to Iturbide. 
 
 General O'Donoju, who had arrived in Mexico 
 with the commission of captain general, seeing all 
 efforts vain to oppose the revolution, proposed ne 
 gotiations, and the treaty of Cordova was the con 
 sequence. The Spanish Cortes, however, with the 
 peculiar obstinacy of their race, refused to acknowl 
 edge the independence of the colony,- and by a res 
 olution, which must be regarded as an exponent .of 
 their will rather than their intention, declared that 
 the Spanish sovereignty should be preserved by 
 force of arms, and that their troops in the country 
 should be re-enforced, when neither men nor money 
 'could be spared from Spain, then in a position but 
 little different from that which for ten years had 
 been occupied by Mexico. By this refusal the ad 
 vantages which might have resulted to Spain from 
 the occupation of the Mexican throne by a Bour 
 bon prince were given up, and no successful at- 
 
30 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tempt for the recovery of sovereignty was then or 
 has since been made. In consequence, the author 
 of the plan of Iguala was elevated to the throne of 
 the empire. 
 
 The new monarch soon found that his seat was 
 not one of idle repose nor of undisturbed possession. 
 The ancient chiefs of the insurgents, although will 
 ing to co-operate with one of their former enemies 
 for the attainment of Mexican independence, yet 
 could not with complacency witness his elevation 
 to supreme power. The manner in which the war 
 of independence had been carried on was inductive 
 of the revolts which soon took place, and of the un 
 settled state of public affairs which has ever since 
 existed in Mexico. Arising first in the insurrec 
 tionary movement of a small party, led on by a 
 man whose feelings were more of a personal than 
 of a patriotic character, it had been conducted for 
 much time by different adventurers on their own 
 responsibility, without the sanction of any thing 
 resembling a government, or of any body empow 
 ered, directly or indirectly, to act for the people. 
 Each particular chief considered himself supreme 
 in his own section of country ; and many, while 
 fighting for Mexican independence, free from all 
 responsibility to superior officers or a representa 
 tive body, forgot their object, and, in fact, warred 
 for the plunder to be obtained from the rich store 
 houses of the Europeans. The first Congress, 
 which had been assembled for the purpose of giv 
 ing something like nationality to the insurrection- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. gj 
 
 ary proceedings, was powerless, and one of its own 
 generals dissolved it in the darkest hour of the 
 cause. 
 
 Chiefs in such a war, the old guerilla leaders were 
 quite ready to revolt against the new emperor upon 
 any grounds, either personal or patriotic, and that 
 portion of the army which they had formerly led 
 was quite as ready to follow them in new enter 
 prises, while the troops whom Iturhide had seduced 
 from their former allegiance, it was fair to suppose, 
 could be easily induced to turn traitors to him. 
 The population of Mexico had been reared in igno 
 rance and slavery under the iron rule of the Span 
 iard, and, by the adoption of the plan of Iguala, had 
 been suddenly admitted to a freedom of which nei 
 ther the value nor the use was understood. Such 
 a population is at first easily imposed upon, and 
 will readily join for the time in any movement, no 
 matter how it arises, which is heralded by the cry 
 of liberty. 
 
 The storm soon came, and Santa Anna pro 
 nounced against the emperor at Vera Cruz. Itur- 
 bide was compelled to abdicate his throne, and a 
 republican form of government was introduced, un 
 der which the veteran insurgent, Guadalupe Vic 
 toria, was first chosen president. He maintained 
 his seat in the presidential chair until the expira 
 tion of his legal term of office ; but party strife was 
 violent during his administration, and the country 
 was shaken by its civil discords. The president 
 and vice-president, Bravo, were rivals, and, from 
 
32 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 their dispositions . and former habits, were each 
 ready to support the parties of which they were re 
 spectively the heads by an appeal to arms. Indeed, 
 on one occasion, in January, 1828, Bravo pronounced 
 against the government, but was defeated and made 
 prisoner. Nothing was effected during the admin 
 istration of Victoria which could settle the affairs 
 of the country, so long in a state of anarchy and 
 confusion. 
 
 Mr. Poinsett was, during a part of this time, the 
 resident minister of the United States near the Mex 
 ican government, and attempted to obtain the as 
 sent of Mexico to a boundary between the two 
 countries which would include the settled territory 
 west of the Sabine. This country had been ceded 
 to Spain in 1819, but the American settlers had 
 protested against the cession, and the government 
 of the United States had previously attempted to 
 recover it. 'But the Mexican minister of foreign af 
 fairs refused to negotiate on the point, although he 
 was willing to conclude a treaty of alliance and of 
 commerce, and such a one was negotiated, though 
 not at that time -ratified by the United States Sen 
 ate. In 1827, the United. States, through their min 
 ister, Mr. Butler, proposed to obtain the country de 
 sired by purchasing to' the Rio del Norte, but Mex 
 ico rejected the proposal. 
 
 Grants of land in Texas were, however, made to 
 foreigners, principally to citizens of the United 
 States, and the colonization went on. The induce 
 ment for making these grants consisted in the pro- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 33 
 
 tection hoped for from the settlers against the sav 
 age hordes who inhabited the northern Mexican 
 frontier; but, had the Mexicans known their own 
 character and that of their northern neighbors, they 
 must have regarded such a policy as exceeding 
 ly dangerous. Indeed, changes of administration 
 brought change of policy, and in 1830 the further 
 colonization of Texas was forbidden. 
 
 The election of a president to succeed Victoria 
 took place in 1828, and with it commenced the se 
 ries of revolutions which have ever since, with few 
 intervals of quiet, existed. Santa Anna pronounced 
 at Perote in favor of General Guerrero against Pe- 
 draza, the president elect, and though checked for 
 a time, yet the pronunciamento was successful, Lo 
 renzo de Zavala having moved in support of the 
 plan in the city of Mexico ; but Yucatan soon se 
 ceded from the republic, and Bustamente revolted 
 against the new president. The war lasted for 
 three years, when Guerrero was defeated, and, be 
 ing taken prisoner by treachery, was shot. Busta 
 mente assumed the presidency, and maintained it, 
 against all opposition, until Santa Anna declared 
 against him in 1832, when, after a few successes, 
 he was defeated and obliged to quit the country. 
 Santa Anna was, of course, elected president, and at 
 once set about remodeling the Constitution. While 
 the Congress was engaged in that work, the states 
 of Zacatecas, and Coahuila and Texas, pronounced 
 in opposition to the change, but were compelled by 
 force of arms to submit. This was the commence- 
 L C 
 
34 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ment of the Texan revolution, and led through a 
 series of events, until the war in Texas terminated 
 in one with the United States. 
 
 Under the grants of land made to citizens of the 
 United States hy the Spanish authorities, and the 
 Mexican government under Victoria, emigrants had 
 crowded into Texas until they had far outnumber 
 ed the Mexicans in that territory. The difference 
 of race and education gave a natural desire to the 
 settlers for their own form of government rather 
 than the Mexican, and the population of Texas 
 having increased sufficiently, a petition was sent 
 to Mexico praying for admission into the Union as 
 a separate state. The Mexican Congress paid no 
 attention to this petition, and the messenger who 
 bore it was imprisoned. Soon after, a Mexican mil 
 itary force appeared at Monclova, and its general 
 required the surrender of the governor of Coahuila 
 and Texas, and others. Failing to obtain them, he 
 dispersed the Legislature, and ordered the American 
 settlers to give up their arms. The natural conse 
 quence ensued, and in the first attempt to enforce 
 the order, the Mexican troops were beaten back. 
 The Texans, in convention, resolved to support the 
 Constitution of 1824, and called upon the remain 
 ing states of the republic to sustain them in defense 
 of the constitutional liberty of the country, over 
 thrown by Santa Anna and other military chief 
 tains. The appeal to the states of Mexico was dis 
 regarded, and the war continued. By the Mexi 
 cans it was prosecuted with savage ferocity, and 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 35 
 
 by the-Texans with desperate valor,' until, finally, 
 in the darkest hour of her fortunes, Texas declared 
 herself independent. The victory of San Jacinto 
 soon followed, and the Mexican president found 
 himself a prisoner in the hands of the insurgents. 
 
 His liberty was- obtained" by the conclusion of a* 
 treaty, in -which the independence of Texas- was ac 
 knowledged by him, as chief of the Mexican nation, 
 and by Filasola, Urrea, Ramirez de Lesma, and Ga- 
 ona as'chiefs of armies, and each and- all were pledg 
 ed, in their personal and official character, to pro 
 cure the confirmation of the treaty by the legitimate 
 government of Mexico. The southern and west 
 ern boundaries of Texas were then define^ to be 
 the Rio Grande from its mouth 'to ifs source, 'as' 
 such were acknowledged by the Mexican president 
 and his general officers, and their troops at once re 
 tired to the west bank of the river. 
 
 The independence of Texas being thus acknowl 
 edged by a treaty signed by -the President of Mex 
 ico, and she having shown herself fully equal to 
 its sustenance, its recognition was sought and ob 
 tained from the United States, and subsequently 
 from Great Britain, France, and other nations. The 
 grounds upon which this recognition was based 
 could hardly have been cause of complaint on the 
 part of Mexico, for the Texans were fully as capa 
 ble of maintaining a stable government as were the 
 Mexicans. Indeed, the conventions by which the 
 independence of each had been recognized by the 
 representatives of the mother country were made 
 
30 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 under nearly the same circumstances. It is true, 
 O'Donoju, when he negotiated the treaty of Cor 
 dova, was not an actual prisoner ; but without men 
 or means of carrying on the war, his accession to 
 the terms of Iturbide was compulsory. The Mex 
 ican government, however, made the analogy be 
 tween the fate of the two conventions still more 
 striking ; for, although Filasola was ordered to take 
 measures to procure the> liberation of the prisoners, 
 yet it refused to ratify the treaty, and numerous 
 resolutions were passed, setting forth that the sov 
 ereignty in Texas should be asserted and estab 
 lished by force of arms. v Thus, like Spain, Mexico 
 published to the world her pertinacity of dominion 
 when she was notoriously incompetent to main 
 tain it. 
 
 The struggle between Mexico and the revolted 
 state was one of deep interest to the citizens of the 
 United States, and its progress had been watched 
 with unceasing anxiety. The settlers in Texas 
 were of their own race, and engaged in a struggle 
 with the military government of Mexico, which had 
 overthrown the Constitution under which they had 
 emigrated, and attempted to fasten upon them a 
 despotism worse than that of absolute monarchy. 
 With the same spirit which animated those Amer 
 icans who had assisted Mexico in her efforts to gain 
 her independence, many gave their persons and for 
 tunes to the Texan cause. 
 
 Although cause of hostility to Mexico had exist 
 ed for a series of years, and notwithstanding the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. . 37 
 
 sympathy and assistance given by the people of the 
 United States, the government of that country took 
 no part in the operations. 
 
 From the first existence of the Mexican Repub 
 lic, outrages upon the persons and property of Amer 
 ican - citizens were frequently committed by the 
 Mexican authorities, and redress either positively 
 refused, or delayed until the- delay amounted to a 
 refusal. The subjects of other powers suffered in 
 a like manner, but to a less extent than those of 
 the United States, the contiguity of whose position 
 and the commercial character of whose people had 
 led naturally to a more extended intercourse. For 
 a long time the American government endured this 
 state of things, and patiently awaited the day when 
 domestic tranquillity would enable Mexico to at 
 tend properly to her relations with foreign powers, 
 To none, at the time of the commission of the out 
 rages alluded to, was Mexico under more obliga 
 tions for the early recognition of independence, and 
 the personal assistance of many citizens in its at 
 tainment, and by none was her progress watched 
 with more anxiety, or with a more ardent desire 
 for her success in the attempt at free government, 
 But in the face of treaties of amity and alliance 
 between the two countries, the outrages and spoli 
 ations continued ; and no redress having been ob 
 tained, nor any disposition to render it having been 
 manifested, on the 8th of February, 1837, General 
 Jackson, then President of the United States, de 
 clared, in a message to Congress, " that the length 
 
3g THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of time since some of the injuries had been com 
 mitted, the repeated and unavailing applications 
 for redress, the wanton character of some of the 
 outrages upon the persons and property of our citi 
 zens, upon the officers and flag of the United States, 
 independent of recent insults to this government 
 by the late extraordinary Mexican minister, would 
 justify, in the eyes of all nations,, immediate war." 
 In consideration of the state of Mexican domestic 
 affairs, he did not, however, recommend an imme 
 diate resort to it, but proposed that another demand 
 .should be- made for redress, to be followed up by 
 reprisals upon Mexican commerce if not complied 
 with. 
 
 The insults alluded to in the extract quoted 
 were contained in the correspondence and conduct 
 of Mr. Gorostiza, until a short time previous to the 
 date of the message envoy extraordinary of Mexi 
 co at Washington. That diplomatist had taken 
 umbrage at the spirit displayed by the American 
 people in favor of the Texan cause, and at an or 
 der given by the American government to General 
 Gaines for the protection of the southwestern fron 
 tier, then threatened with an Indian war, direct 
 ing him, under certain contingencies, to pass the 
 boundaries into Texas, then in a state which pre 
 vented any thing like a restraint of the Indians by 
 Mexican forces. - Upon the subj ect of the violation 
 of American neutrality, communications had passed 
 between the functionaries of the two governments, 
 commencing November the 19th, 1835 ; but at that 
 
THE WAR WLTH MEXICO. gg 
 
 time Mexico felt no apprehension for the result of 
 the struggle, and she did not request any thing 
 further to be done than the enforcement of the or 
 dinary laws. This had been directed by Mr. For- 
 syth, then secretary of state, prior to the reception 
 of the note of the acting minister of foreign rela 
 tions of Mexico, and was so stated in his reply of 
 January the 29th, 1836; but it was therein de 
 clared that the policy which the United States 
 would pursue would be the same which had gov 
 erned them during the various struggles between 
 Spain and her South American possessions, and 
 that the government could not be responsible for 
 the conduct of individuals over which it had no 
 control. Subsequently Mr. Gorostiza called the 
 attention of Mr. Forsyth to the infractions of neu 
 trality by certain citizens of the southwest, and 
 measures were at once taken for their prosecution 
 and punishment. But he insisted upon the with 
 drawal of the order to General Gaines ; and, in 
 consequence of the refusal of the American presi 
 dent to comply with the demand, on the 15th of 
 October, 1835, he asked for and obtained his pass 
 ports, terminated his mission, and published a pam 
 phlet containing a portion of his correspondence 
 with the governments of Mexico and the United 
 States, thereby appealing to the American people 
 against the acts of their own government. 
 
 Not only was his course approved by the Mexi 
 can government, but its action was delayed upon 
 the demand for indemnity for spoliations commit- 
 

 V*.' '( ' .,- 
 
 4Q. THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ted upon American commerce, and at the close of 
 the year 1836, Mr. Ellis, then envoy from the Unit 
 ed States to Mexico, demanded his passports. Dip 
 lomatic intercourse was thus suspended prior to the 
 message of February, 1837. 
 
 During the progress of these events, Texas had 
 asked for the recognition of her independence and 
 for admission into the Union. The subject was 
 spoken of by President Jackson in his message of 
 December 21st, 1836, in which the desire of a large 
 portion of the American people for the recovery of 
 the territory is admitted ; but, in submitting the 
 question of recognition to Congress, having in ulti 
 mate view the annexation of Texas to the United 
 States, he says, "It becomes us to beware of too 
 early a movement, as it might subject us, however 
 unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish 
 the claim -of our neighbors to territory with the view 
 to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves. Pru 
 dence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should 
 stand aloof and maintain our present position, if 
 not until Mexico herself, or one of the great for 
 eign powers, shall recognize the independence of 
 the new government, at least until the lapse of 
 time or the course of events shall have proved 
 beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people 
 of that country to maintain their separate sover 
 eignty, and to uphold the government constituted 
 by them." 
 
 The independence of Texas was acknowledged 
 in a resolution which passed the American Senate 
 
THE WAR WIT;H MEXICO. 41 
 
 on the first of March, 1837, hut no steps were tak 
 en at that time for its annexation. 
 
 Another demand was made upon the Mexican 
 government for redress, in accordance with the rec 
 ommendation of the president and resolutions of 
 the American Senate, before extreme measures 
 were resorted to. Negotiations were insisted on, 
 and a treaty of indemnity was concluded on the 
 llth of April, 1839, and duly ratified. By its terms, 
 the claims of American citizens were to he referred 
 to a commission, and that commission met in Wash 
 ington on the 25th of August, 1840. It expired in 
 February, 1842, and much of its time was fruitless 
 ly expended in unimportant discussions of minor 
 points, so frequent in the transaction of business 
 with Mexican functionaries, in consequence of 
 which a large amount of business was left un 
 touched. 
 
 \~- 
 
 The Mexican government, soon after, asked for 
 a postponement of the payment of the claims which 
 had been allowed by the judgment of the commis 
 sion, and the United States acceded to the request. 
 Only a small portion of the amount due was paid, 
 even with this extension, and the two governments 
 were not able to conclude terms upon which an 
 other commission should be appointed for the de 
 cision of those claims which had not been audited 
 at the time of the dissolution of the first. 
 
 In the mean while various revolutions had oc 
 curred in Mexico, and Texas was undisturbed save 
 by a predatory warfare upon her borders. Santa 
 
42 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Anna, upon his return from captivity, found Busta- 
 mente in the presidential chair, and remained some 
 time at his estate, taking no other part in public 
 affairs than to command the troops at the city of 
 Vera Cruz against the French. That power, tired 
 with the vexatious delays, on frivolous pretexts, of 
 the Mexicans, and having no particular sympathy 
 for their form of government, was resolved to en 
 force the payment of claims, arising from outrages 
 committed upon the persons and property of French 
 citizens during the various revolutions, hy some 
 thing more strenuous than the negotiation of trea 
 ties, made only to he disregarded, and in the spring 
 of 1838 proposed ultimata which the commander 
 of the French squadron in the Gulf of Mexico was 
 instructed to enforce. After much discussion, on 
 the 27th of Novemher the French made an attack 
 upon the Castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, then in a di 
 lapidated condition, which was captured. The 
 French were not so fortunate in their assault upon 
 the town, and the British minister interposed his 
 mediation. The French claims were nearly all al 
 lowed, and San Juan- d'Ulloa was delivered up. 
 The Mexican government soon after completely 
 repaired the castle, and placed in it the heavy arm 
 ament which renders it one of the strongest fortifi 
 cations in America. 
 
 In September, 1841, Bustamente was over 
 thrown, and Santa Anna became again the chief 
 of the republic, which station he held as provis 
 ional president, dictator, and president until 1844. 
 
THE WAH WI'TH MEXICO, 43 
 
 when he was overthrown in turn, and forced to 
 leave the country. 
 
 During this period the Mexican government arid 
 people insisted upon their right of sovereignty over 
 Texas, notwithstanding the independence of the 
 latter country had been recognized by most of the 
 European powers, and Mexico herself had been un 
 able to make any vigorous effort to re-establish her 
 authority. But while Santa Anna exercised the 
 supreme power the intention of making such an 
 effort was continually spoken of, and, had suffi 
 cient means been at his disposal, there is no doubt 
 that it would have been undertaken. ' The spirit 
 which pervaded the United States in favor of Tex 
 as was known by Mexico, as well as the probabil 
 ity that much assistance in men and means would 
 be privately furnished to Texas in case the quar 
 rel should be actually renewed. This assistance 
 was dreaded by the government of Mexico, and on 
 the 12th of May, 1842, Mr. Bocanegra, then min 
 ister of foreign relations, addressed to Mr. Webster, 
 the American minister of state, a paper, setting 
 forth the alleged aggressions of citizens of the Unit 
 ed States upon ftie soil of Mexico, declaring the 
 belief that the government of the United States 
 had the power, and was in duty bound to restrain 
 the passage of men vand munitions of war, under 
 any circumstances, into Texas, and that Mexico 
 " considered as a violation 'of the treaty of amity 
 the toleration of a course of conduct which pro 
 duced an incomprehensible state of things a state 
 
44 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of neither peace nor war but inflicting upon Mex 
 ico the same injuries and inconveniences as if war 
 had been declared between the two nations."^ 
 
 On the 31st of May a circular was addressed by 
 the same functionary to the members of the diplo 
 matic corps in Mexico, setting forth, in a recapitu 
 lation of the asserted wrongs in allowing men and 
 munitions to be sent to Texas, " the violation com 
 mitted and the wrong done by thus acting in op 
 position to the most sacred principles of national 
 law and the treaties of amity by which both coun 
 tries {the United States and Mexico) were strongly 
 bound." 
 
 Both these papers were answered ; the first, 
 which was, in effect, a demand upon the United 
 States to prohibit emigration to and trade with a 
 country whose independence had been officially 
 recognized by the great powers of Europe as well 
 as themselves, in a masterly document from the 
 pen of Mr. Webster, in which 'the power of the 
 United States to prevent emigration was denied, 
 and the right of their citizens to leave their own 
 country in a private capacity, under any circum 
 stances, was maintained ; while, with regard to 
 the alleged violation of treaty stipulations in per 
 mitting the export of arms or munitions of war to 
 Texas, it was shown that the doctrine that a gov 
 ernment was obliged to prevent the exportation of 
 such articles was novel and absurd. By a refer 
 ence to the sixteenth and eighteenth articles of the 
 
 * Appendix to Thompson's Recollections of Mexico, p. 285-304. 
 
THE WAJl WITH MEXICO. 45 
 
 treaty of the 5th of April, 1831, between the two 
 countries, it was demonstrated that such traffic 
 had been contemplated, that those articles which 
 were to be considered as contraband of war had 
 been denned, and were to be allowed to meet the 
 fate prescribed for them by the laws of nations, 
 without its being the duty of either government to 
 prevent the traffic in them by their citizens, in the 
 case of war between either and other powers. The 
 letter of Mr. Bocanegra was pronounced to be, in 
 the end, a complaint against the recognition of the 
 independence of Texas, and in that view was sum- 
 marily disposed of, as it was stated that the ac 
 knowledgment of it was not likely to be retracted. 
 
 Toward the conclusion of the reply of Mr. Web 
 ster, it was said, "Every provision of law, every 
 principle of neutral obligation, will be sedulously 
 enforced in relation to Mexico as in relation to 
 other powers, and to the same extent and with the 
 same integrity of purpose. All this belongs to the 
 constitutional power and duty of the government, 
 and it will all be fulfilled. But the continuance 
 of amity with Mexico can not be purchased, at a 
 higher rate. If the peace of the two countries be 
 disturbed, the .responsibility will devolve on Mex 
 ico." 
 
 The second, which appears to have been an in 
 quiry how far the other powers of the world could 
 be brought to interfere in behalf of Mexico in event 
 of the threatened rupture with the United States, 
 was answered in a circular addressed to the diplo- 
 
46 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 matic corps by. Mr. Thompson,' then American en 
 voy to Mexico, and contained, in effect,- the same 
 views which were expressed by Mr. Webster. . 
 
 Both of these papers, of Mr. Bocanegra failed to 
 effect their objects, and contributed only to foster 
 the prejudices existing in the one nation against 
 the other, and imbitter the tone of diplomatic in 
 tercourse. 
 
 The subject of the annexation of Texas to the 
 United States, which had before been spoken of, 
 became prominent soon after, and was openly dis 
 cussed in the public prints. The Mexican govern 
 ment became alarmed for the nominal sovereignty 
 to which, for seven years, it had pertinaciously 
 clung, and on the 23d of August, 1843, Mr. Boca- 
 negra addressed a note to Mr. Thompson, in which 
 his attention was called to ,the agitation of the 
 question, and the United States were warned that 
 Mexico would endeavor to prevent its consumma 
 tion by an appeal to arms.^ The note was couched 
 in terms so threatening, and was in its tone so in 
 sulting, that no other answer was given by Mr, 
 Thompson tjian to acknowledge its reception, and 
 to deprecate strongly the threats which had in that, 
 as well as in former communications, been put forth 
 by the Mexican government. Mr. Bocanegra's an 
 swer to this note was more conciliatory. But the 
 correspondence was dropped by the American min 
 ister, without speaking of the real dispositions of 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 2, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the twenty-eighth Congress, p, 26-30. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 47 
 
 his government ; and, perhaps, for the reason that 
 the lapse of time and the course of events had 
 proved, heyond cavil or dispute, the- ability of the 
 people of Texas to maintain their own sovereignty ; 
 and, as a natural consequence, the annexation of 
 that state to the Union was at that time contem 
 plated. 
 
 On the 6th of October, 1$43, the American sec 
 retary of state, Mr. Upshur, proposed a renewal of 
 negotiations, in the face of the Mexican threats of 
 war, and his proposal was accepted by Texas. 
 
 In the mean time the Mexican government is 
 sued two decrees,^ the one prohibiting foreigners 
 from the retail trade in Mexico, and the other shut-- 
 ting her northern custom-houses. Both seriously- 
 affected the interest of American citizens, and the 
 first was alleged to be a violation of treaty stipu 
 lations by Mr. Thompson. Mr. Bocanegra main 
 tained the contrary, and the Mexican government 
 refused to rescind the decrees. 
 
 In November,! correspondence on the subject of 
 the annexation of Texas was resumed between 
 General Almonte, the Mexican minister at Wash 
 ington, and the American secretary of state, in 
 much the same style and with much the same re 
 sult in which it had been carried on in Mexico. 
 The envoy threatened war in case of the consum 
 mation of the measure, while the American sec 
 retary did not avow the intention of his govern- 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 2, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the twenty-eighth Congress, p. 31-38. t Idem, p. 38-48. 
 
48 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ment, but stated that the United States considered 
 Texas as free and fully able to maintain her in 
 dependence, and that they were not obliged to 
 consult any other nation in their intercourse with 
 her. 
 
 The negotiation of the treaty for the annexation 
 went on, and on the 12th of April, 1844, it was 
 signed by Mr. Calhoun, who had succeeded Mr. Up- 
 shur, and the Texan , commissioners, Messrs. Van 
 Zandt and Henderson. It was submitted to the 
 American Senate, but was rejected by that body, 
 and the diplomatic relations between the United 
 States and Mexico continued. The tone of the 
 correspondence became still more unfriendly. The 
 United States began to demand of the Mexican 
 government the rescinding of the decrees before al 
 luded to, prohibiting foreigners from carrying on a 
 retail trade and shutting tjie northern custom 
 houses, while Santa Anna abruptly terminated the 
 armistice which had existed for some time with 
 Texas, prepared to renew the war with vigor, and 
 to carry it on with the utmost severity. No quar 
 ter was to have been given to any foreigner taken 
 fighting against the troops of Mexico, and it was 
 evident that it was intended to be a war of exterm 
 ination, if entered upon. 
 
 The American envoy at Mexico was instructed 
 to inform the Mexican government that the re 
 newal of the war with Texas while the question 
 of annexation was pending would not be looked 
 upon with indifference by the United States, and 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 49 
 
 to protest against it and the manner in which it 
 was proposed to be carried on.^ 
 
 But the Mexican government had compromised 
 itself by the answer of Mr. Bocanegra to Mr. Green, 
 American charge d'affaires ad interim, when the 
 latter informed him that the treaty of annexation 
 had been signed.f In that document, after run 
 ning over the arguments and protests which had 
 before been used on the Mexican side of the ques 
 tion, and combating the positions of the United 
 States as set forth in Mr. Green's note, he conclud 
 ed by reiterating the declaration that Mexico would 
 consider the ratification of the treaty as a declara 
 tion of war. 
 
 In thus committing themselves, the Mexican 
 authorities fell into an error which has since been 
 the cause of a foreign war, and of many and con 
 tinued misfortunes to their country. The meas 
 ures of public policy have been and are discussed 
 with great freedom in the prints of the United 
 States, and this was the case with the measure of 
 annexation in particular. While its friends claim 
 ed for it all the merit it deserved, and indulged in 
 anticipations of its success, its opponents were par 
 ticularly violent, especially the Northern abolition 
 prints, and its defeat was loudly predicted. In 
 judging of the fate of the measure, the wishes and 
 predictions of that party in the United States which 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 2, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-eighth Congress, p. 21-27. 
 t Idem, Correspondence, p. 52-76. 
 
 I. D 
 
50. THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 was most favorable to Mexican interests seem to 
 have had more weight than those of the opposite. 
 Convinced that the treaty would fail, and with a 
 true Mexican spirit of hravado, the government of 
 that country chose to indulge in a correspondence 
 the tone of which was exceedingly warlike, and, 
 to insure its publicity, not only sent copies of it to 
 the diplomatic corps, but had it inserted in the of 
 ficial journals. The treaty was rejected, and the 
 Mexican government received a short-lived popu 
 larity with its own people as the result of its war 
 like declarations. But the correspondence had fos 
 tered a spirit of animosity between the two coun 
 tries, which, perhaps, might have been allayed by 
 a different tone. 
 
 Upon the arrival of an American frigate off Vera 
 Cruz, the Mexican government became alarmed. 
 Mr. Bocanegra inquired of Mr. Green the meaning 
 of the appearance of this force, of certain articles 
 which had appeared in the American newspapers, 
 and whether the troops of Mexico would be opposed 
 by those of the United States in their attempt to 
 reconquer Texas. The answer from the American 
 charge d'affaires avowed an ignorance of the in 
 tentions of his government ; but he expressed his 
 belief that, if the force had actually been prepared, 
 as stated in the newspapers, it had been induced 
 by the oft-repeated threats of war on the part of 
 Mexico.^ 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 2, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-eighth Congress, Correspondence, p. 76-90. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. Q 
 
 The correspondence thus resumed upon the sub 
 ject was carried on with less bitterness than form 
 erly, and the Mexican government appeared will 
 ing, while insisting upon the deep injury which 
 had heen done them hy the United States, to avoid 
 the event so often threatened. It, however, was 
 premature, and before the facts ; for, although a 
 small brigade of United States' troops had previous 
 ly been ordered to concentrate near the frontier of 
 Texas, yet the object of the movement was con 
 jectured rather than known by the authors of the 
 newspaper articles alluded to by the Mexican min 
 ister, and it was not until some time after the cor 
 respondence,^ September 17th, 1844, that the com 
 manding officer was directed, under any contin 
 gency, to move into Texas. The ostensible pur 
 pose of the movement was to have been service 
 against the Indians, and it was to have been made 
 upon the requisition of the American charge d'af 
 faires at the Texan government. The ultimate 
 object of this order was no doubt to place a small 
 force near Texas, in readiness to repel a Mexican 
 invasion, should it actually take place, while an 
 nexation was undergoing discussion, as well as to 
 accomplish the object set forth in the order. But 
 no requisition for the troops was made by the 
 charge, and they remained in their cantonments. 
 
 During the fall of 1844 occurred the election for 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 2, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-eighth. Congress, Correspondence of the Assistant Adjutant 
 General with General Taylor, p. 37. 
 
52 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 President of the United States. In this contest 
 the question of the annexation of Texas was a 
 prominent one. The correspondence which had 
 taken place on the subject had been published, 
 and the American people were fully cognizant of 
 what had been done in the matter, as well as the 
 obstacles which had been thrown in the way of its 
 consummation by Mexico. It w r as discussed in 
 every town and hamlet in the nation. Naturally 
 anxious for the aggrandizement of their own re 
 public, and with the remembrance of the outrages 
 inflicted upon American citizens by Mexico, the 
 long-delayed and partial redress, the nature of the 
 Texan rebellion, as well as the barbarities which 
 had been perpetrated by the Mexican troops in the 
 prosecution of the war, the people entertained a 
 spirit of hostility toward Mexico which caused 
 them to look with little favor upon the position 
 she had assumed, and her claim to perpetual sov 
 ereignty was regarded as preposterous. They could 
 not believe that she could have any reasonable 
 ground of complaint in the annexation of a terri 
 tory to the American confederacy over which for 
 seven years she had exercised no authority, and 
 whose people were petitioning for the measure. 
 
 The United States had for thirty years enjoyed 
 a period of prosperous peace, during which their 
 resources had been more than doubled. No foreign 
 war had occurred other than with Indian tribes 
 along the frontiers, and the prospect of a collision 
 was looked upon by the generation which had in 
 
THE WA^R WITH MEXICO. 53 
 
 the mean time arisen with far more desire than 
 apprehension. Confident in themselves, and pant 
 ing for excitement, American citizens were perfect 
 ly willing to encounter the dangers and perils of 
 war in defense of any great question of national 
 right, and maintained their claim to another terri 
 tory whose boundary was in dispute with a far 
 more powerful and dangerous nation than Mexico 
 with equal pertinacity even at the risk of a war 
 with Great Britain. With such a spirit, had any 
 thing been needed to render their verdict upon the 
 question of annexation certainly an affirmative 
 one, nothing could have been found more effective 
 than the oft-repeated threats of Mexico. 
 
 These principles were held by the Democratic 
 party, and the speedy annexation of Texas and 
 settlement of the Oregon boundary were sustained 
 by it. The opposition conceded much of the ques 
 tion of right in both matters, but was more in fa 
 vor of delay, and desired to avoid a rupture with 
 either Mexico or Great Britain by the use of more 
 moderate and temporizing measures. A party in 
 the Northern States, actuated by a misjudged phi 
 lanthropy, advocated the abolition of black slavery, 
 and, on account of the existence of that institution 
 in Texas, was opposed to the measure. But oppo 
 sition to either the speedy settlement of boundary 
 or the annexation found but little favor in the eyes 
 of the people, and Mr. Polk, the democratic candi 
 date, was elected to the presidency by a majority 
 which could leave no doubt of the popular will. 
 
54 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 President Tyler brought the subject before Con 
 gress again in his message of 1844, and urged it 
 upon its attention, and immediately after the or 
 ganization of the two houses joint resolutions were 
 introduced for effecting the measure, and it contin 
 ued for some time to be the all-absorbing topic of 
 the session. 
 
 By the rejection of the treaty of April, 1844, the 
 question had not only been placed before the peo 
 ple of the United States, but before the world, and 
 European powers had had full and ample time for 
 considering the effect of the measure. By them it 
 was looked upon with no complacency. Negotia 
 tions had been carried on by Texas with France 
 and England, and the influence of both was used 
 against annexation with Texas and the United 
 States. 
 
 They were actuated, as is always the case in dip 
 lomatic affairs, by their own measures of policy. 
 Both were anxious to prevent the extension of sla 
 very, if they could not effect its entire abolition. 
 Great Britain, after many years of effort, had ac 
 complished the emancipation of the slaves in her 
 own colonies, and it became her settled policy to 
 effect it throughout the world. Had she foreseen 
 the injurious effect of the measure upon the colo 
 nies, it is fair to suppose she would not have been 
 so anxious for it; but the deed was done. She 
 had advised Texas to the abolition of slavery, and, 
 from the letters of Lord Aberdeen upon the subject, 
 
, 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 55 
 
 it was evident that whatever influence she possess 
 ed was to be exercised in its favor.^ 
 
 The citizen king of France looked with distrust 
 upon the growth of a nation which had once been, 
 and might again be, an example for his people to 
 hurl to the dust the throne around which he was 
 endeavoring to collect the support necessary for the 
 transmission of his power through his family to fu 
 turity, while his minister, G-uizot, openly avowed 
 the right of European nations to interfere in na 
 tional affairs upon the Western continent, to pre 
 serve the balance of power. 
 
 The representatives of both France and England 
 at Washington protested against the measure on 
 the .part of their governments ; but, although the 
 protests were made,_and the unfriendliness of the 
 powers which made them was manifested, yet nei 
 ther had any intention to carry the interference 
 further. Their commercial interests forbade an .ap 
 peal to arms ; and although their force was superior 
 to that of the American Union, yet the increasing 
 growth of a desire among their people for free in 
 stitutions, with the example of the United States 
 constantly before them, rendered such a collision 
 exceedingly hazardous to the continuance of the 
 power of their governments. But the same rea 
 sons made them extremely desirous, of seeing a pe 
 riod put to the rapid growth of a nation, whose in 
 stitutions, thus far firm and stable, were the result 
 
 * State Papers. Lord Aberdeen's letter, presented by Mr. Pakenham, 
 February 26, 1844. 
 
56 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the only successful experiment of a popular gov 
 ernment known to history. 
 
 But the American people and their government 
 had formed the determination of carrying the meas 
 ure through ; and the wishes of Texas having heen 
 long manifested, and recognizing her right to make 
 such treaties as she deemed most proper without 
 consulting Mexico, with the independence which 
 has ever characterized their action in foreign rela 
 tions, which has called forth the admiration of the 
 prominent men of the Old World, and, in the lan 
 guage of one of their greatest historians,^ " has set 
 an example to the crazy despotisms of Europe," the 
 measure was discussed in the American national 
 Legislature with no attention either to foreign pro 
 tests or interests. Finally, after a spirited opposi 
 tion, the joint resolution for the admission of Tex 
 as into the American Union passed hoth houses, 
 and on the 3d of March, 1845, the president an 
 nounced that he had given it his sanction, and that 
 it had hecome a law. 
 
 On the 6th of March, the Mexican minister, Al 
 monte, protested, renewed the declaration of the 
 right of Mexico to recover Texas by any means 
 which were in her power, and demanded his pass 
 ports. They were transmitted him on the 10th 
 by the Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, who, 
 while declining to reopen the discussion on the 
 question of right, yet expressed, in a conciliatory 
 manner, the wish of the president for an amicable 
 
 * Col. Napier. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 57 
 
 adjustment of every cause of complaint between 
 the two governments.^ 
 
 Although the joint resolution had passed the 
 American Congress, still the measure was not con 
 summated. The consent of the people of Texas 
 was required, and those opposed to the annexation 
 looked anxiously to that quarter. The executive 
 of Texas had hoped that the United States would 
 have offered her more liberal terms than were set 
 forth in the joint resolution, and was not indis 
 posed to listen to the representatives of France 
 and England, who endeavored to defeat the meas 
 ure. Knowing the terms which would be offered 
 by the discussion which had preceded the passage 
 of the resolution, the Texan government had sub 
 mitted to those envoys preliminary conditions for 
 a treaty of peace between Mexico and Texas, the 
 prominent features of which were, that the inde 
 pendence of Texas should be acknowledged by 
 Mexico, and that she should bind herself not to 
 annex herself, or become subject to any country 
 whatever.! These preliminaries were forwarded 
 to Mexico, and laid before the government, at that 
 time Herrera's, backed by French and British in 
 fluence. Alarmed at the near approach of the 
 crisis, the Mexican executive submitted them to 
 its Congress, and that body having given the nec 
 essary authority, they were agreed to, and Texas 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the twenty-ninth 
 Congress, p. 38-89. 
 
 t Idem, Mr. Donelson's Correspondence with Mr. Buchanan and with 
 Texan Officers, p. 40-105. 
 
58 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 was informed that Mexico was disposed to com 
 mence the negotiation as she might desire, and 
 that her commissioners would he received. But, 
 as usual in Mexican correspondence on the subject, 
 it was intimated that war would he a consequence 
 if the preliminaries were not at once ratified. 
 
 Nevertheless, this result was not attained with 
 out (in the words of the Baron de Cyprey, French 
 envoy in Mexico) "much management of suscepti 
 bilities," and the self-congratulation which was in 
 dulged in by that functionary in concluding his 
 note which transmitted the acceptance of the Mex 
 ican government to the Texan president showed 
 how / much foreign influence had been brought to 
 bear throughout the whole negotiation. 
 
 The attempt to defeat the measure signally fail 
 ed, for the preliminaries were at once unanimous 
 ly rejected by the Texan Senate, and its only ef 
 fect was to give the friends of annexation an ad 
 ditional argument in favor of the actual independ 
 ence of Texas, and her consequent right to make 
 such dispositions as she thought proper. 
 
 On the 23d of June, 1845, the existing govern 
 ment of Texas gave its consent to the measure by 
 the unanimous vote of both houses and the ap 
 proval of the executive. The Convention to which 
 the matter had been finally referred, by its ordi 
 nance of July 4th, 1845, assented to it, and an 
 nexation was concluded so far as Texas was con 
 cerned.^ 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the twenty-ninth 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 59 
 
 Mr. Donelson, the American charge d'affaires, 
 wrote on the 28th of June to General Taylor, then 
 in command of the United States forces on the 
 frontier of Texas, that the measure was about to be 
 consummated, and that, if reliance was to be placed 
 upon the threats of Mexico, an invasion of Texas 
 might be confidently anticipated. That the event 
 was so probable as to justify the removal of his 
 forces without delay to the western frontier of 
 Texas, in order that he might be ready to give the 
 protection which the president had felt himself au 
 thorized to offer.^ General Taylor had received 
 orders from Washington to hold himself in readi 
 ness to act upon the receipt of such information 
 from Mr, Donelson, and took immediate measures 
 for the removal of his troops to the position which 
 he had been advised to take up for the defense of 
 Texas. Seven companies of the second dragoons, 
 the cavalry of his command, marched by land to 
 San Antonio, while his infantry, the greater part 
 of two regiments (third and fourth), moved to New 
 Orleans, preparatory to taking transports for Aran- 
 sas Bay. 
 
 The question of the boundary between Texas 
 and Mexico rendered the proper position of the 
 troops a matter of some doubt, for the joint resolu 
 tion, as it finally passed, and under which Texas 
 
 Congress, Mr. Donelson's Correspondence with Mr. Buchanan and with 
 Texan Officers, p. 40-105. 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the twenty-ninth 
 Congress, Mr. Donelson's Correspondence with Mr. Buchanan and with 
 Texan Officers, p. 105-109. 
 
60 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 came into the Union, included explicitly that ter 
 ritory rightfully belonging to that country. Mex 
 ico had never positively ratified the treaty which 
 acknowledged any boundary whatever, and as the 
 United States had hitherto acted upon the state of 
 things de facto, without attention to Mexican the 
 ory, the government, in its instructions to its gen 
 eral, looked to what had actually been held by 
 Texas. By the treaty made by the Texans with 
 the Mexican generals in 1836, the Rio Grande had 
 been looked to as the boundary. In the proclama 
 tion of General Woll of June 25th, 1844, putting 
 an end to the armistice which had before existed, 
 every individual who might be found at the dis 
 tance of one league from the left bank of the Rio 
 Grande was regarded as an accomplice of the usurp 
 ers of the national territory.^ This was consid 
 ered as an admission that the country had been, 
 and .was at that time held by the Texans, and no 
 change in the dispositions of the forces of either 
 Texas or Mexico, which affected the occupation 
 of the. territory, had been made during the year 
 immediately following. The Mexican general as 
 sumed too much in his proclamation, however, and 
 gave an argument to the enemies of his country, 
 for Texas had never held undisputed or uninter 
 rupted possession of any post within the short dis 
 tance of the Rio Bravo, mentioned by him. Her 
 claim to the river was a matter of doubt, although, 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 2, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-eighth Congress, p. 34. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^ 
 
 perhaps, as far as the actual occupation or sover 
 eignty of the country could support it, it was, as 
 good as that of Mexico, for neither party had exer 
 cised much control over, or collected many revenues 
 from the scattered ranches on the eastern banks 
 of the stream. The claim of the country to the 
 northwest, and to the banks of the Rio Bravo, 
 rested entirely upon the treaty with Santa Anna 
 and his generals, for the Mexicans held possession 
 of it at the time, and the only effort which had 
 been made to disturb them, the Santa Fe Expedi 
 tion, had resulted in a total failure. No military 
 measures were immediately taken by the American 
 government to support the claim in that quarter. 
 But General Taylor was directed to occupy San 
 Antonio de Bexar, to take post west of the Nueces, 
 and to approach as near the boundary claimed as 
 prudence would dictate. But, while Taylor's forces 
 were directed to pass to the west of the Nueces, 
 the Mexicans had some small posts east of the 
 Rio Bravo, and those he was directed not to dis 
 turb.* 
 
 On the 25th of July, 1845, eight companies of 
 the third United States infantry arrived at Aran- 
 sas Bay, and were temporarily established on Saint 
 Joseph's Island. The difficulties of the coast were 
 found much greater than had been anticipated ei 
 ther by the government at Washington or by the 
 commanding general. Owing to the unsettled state 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, Correspondence, p. 68-72. 
 
62 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the country on the coast, it had been but little 
 reconnoitered, and time was spent in selecting a de 
 pot and a site for encampment. The bars were 
 found to be so shoal that the transport service was 
 one extremely troublesome and expensive. The 
 want of timber and good water rendered it imprac 
 ticable to select a good position for encampment 
 immediately on the coast, while the nature of the 
 service forbade, at that time, any distant move 
 ment into the interior. After much examination, 
 General Taylor selected Corpus Christi, a point im 
 mediately west of the mouth of the Nueces, and 
 which had long been in possession of Texas, as his 
 post. To that place, during the fall of 1845, was 
 dispatched the greater part of the small regular 
 force of the United States. 
 
 During the progress of these negotiations and 
 events, changes had taken place in Mexico, which, 
 however, did not change the policy of her govern 
 ment in relation to this subject. In December, 
 1844, the pronunciamiento broke out, by which San 
 ta Anna was deprived of power and banished from 
 the country. Although he was firmly opposed to 
 the annexation of Texas to the United States, and 
 anxious to defeat it, yet the tone of the American 
 press and the result of the presidential election told 
 too plainly that Mexican opposition would be use 
 less. His measures and actions indicated a dispo 
 sition to recede from the warlike ground which had 
 been assumed. They were received with marked 
 disfavor both by the army and the people, who, ig- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. gg 
 
 norant of the real strength of the United States, 
 had heen too long indulged in the hope and cry for 
 the reconquest of Texas and enmity to the Ameri 
 cans, to change it with the celerity which the -cri 
 sis demanded. Santa Anna's administration had 
 heen rigorous and arbitrary, and there was hut lit 
 tle wanting to turn the country against him. The 
 opportunity was favorable for his enemy, Paredes, 
 who placed himself at the head of the movement 
 for his overthrow. He pronounced and was com 
 pletely successful. Santa Anna was driven from 
 the presidency, taken prisoner, and became an hum 
 ble suppliant for his life at the mercy of the Mex 
 ican Congress. Herrera succeeded him, and, for a 
 time, maintained an unyielding position with ref 
 erence to the question of annexation. During the 
 progress of the joint resolution through the Ameri 
 can Congress, the Mexican was too much engaged 
 in the disposal of the former president, and too 
 much disturbed by the intrigues of his friends, to 
 attend seriously to foreign relations. But, finally, 
 that matter was disposed of, and Santa Anna ban 
 ished. Upon the receipt of the news of the pas 
 sage of the resolution, however, the American en 
 voy was denied communication with the Mexican 
 government, and, by permission of his own, soon 
 after returned hornet 
 
 The government, in the mean time, by the influ 
 ence of France and England, was^nduced to ac 
 cept the proposition offered by the Texan execu- 
 
 * President's Message, 1846- 
 
64 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tive ; but, as has been seen, it was rejected by the 
 Texan Senate. Mexico then found herself in the 
 alternative of abandoning her position or of going to 
 war. Had she possessed the means for immediate 
 action, there is no doubt what her course would 
 have been ; but those means were not at her dispo 
 sal. In effect, she was bankrupt. The government 
 of Herrera looked to the administration of affairs on 
 liberal principles, and, while following that course, 
 preparation for war was impossible in a country 
 where public credit was gone, and where the tariff 
 and taxes were already so high as to be extravagant 
 ly oppressive. Under these circumstances, Mexico 
 was obliged to take into consideration the settle 
 ment of affairs by negotiation. The pride of her au 
 thorities would not suffer them to take the initia 
 tive ; but informal intimations, through Mr. Black, 
 the American consul at Mexico, reached Washing 
 ton about the 17th of September, 1845, to the effect 
 that a negotiation might be opened with a pros 
 pect of success.^ The President of the United 
 States, anxious, if possible, to avoid a war, was will 
 ing to waive all ceremony, and to dispense with 
 the request of Mexico to recommence diplomatic 
 intercourse, which a strict observance of etiquette 
 would have required, and the American consul was 
 directed to ascertain confidentially whether an en 
 voy from the United States, empowered to settle 
 all questions in dispute between the two countries, 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 8-15. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 65 
 
 would be received. The response is contained in 
 the letter of Senor Pena y Pena, then Secretary of 
 Foreign Relations, of October 15th, '1845, to Mr. 
 Black, and, while reasserting the deep injury done 
 to Mexico by the United States, and the determ 
 ination of her government to demand ample rep 
 aration, yet accedes to the proposition, and agrees 
 to receive a commissioner empowered to settle the 
 controversy peaceably. The consent, however, was 
 literally confined to the reception of a commission 
 er for the settlement of the dispute on the Texas 
 Question, and did not apply to a plenipotentiary to 
 reside near the government of Mexico, and this 
 was afterward made the ground of refusing to re 
 ceive the envoy. The answer also insisted that 
 the naval force of the United States, then before 
 Vera Cruz, should be withdrawn prior to the recep 
 tion of a commissioner a point considered neces 
 sary for the honor of Mexico, which her govern 
 ment and people have ever shown themselves ready 
 to defend in words, although, in their acts, differ 
 ent successive governments have considered it of 
 minor consequence. 
 
 Upon the receipt of this letter at Washington, 
 Mr. Slidell was immediately accredited and sent 
 to Mexico as envoy extraordinary and minister 
 plenipotentiary, and his letter of credence inform 
 ed the Mexican president that he was aware of 
 the sincere desire of the President of the United 
 States to restore, cultivate, and strengthen friend- 
 L E 
 
66 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ship and good correspondence between the two 
 countries. ^ 
 
 In the mean time, the matter was placed before 
 the Mexican Congress, in secret session, and re 
 ceived its assent,! and the American squadron was 
 withdrawn from Vera Cruz. But the negotiation 
 was heard of by some of the opponents of the ad 
 ministration of Herrera, and at once became the 
 subject of much angry discussion. The presi 
 dent and his ministers were denounced as trai 
 tors, and the feeling ran so high in opposition to 
 the measure that, on the 4th of November, a revo 
 lution was openly talked of. Paredes, who had 
 headed the movement which had placed Herrera 
 in power, had his own ulterior purposes; and one 
 of his pretexts for pronouncing had been hostility 
 to the United States. He did not possess the con 
 fidence of the president and ministers, and, being 
 in command of a large body of troops at San Luis 
 Potosi, was dreaded by them. He was therefore 
 ordered to break up his cantonments and send his 
 troops to different parts of the republic ;$ an order 
 which he was not very ready to obey, as, in effect, 
 its execution would have deprived him of com 
 mand, and of the opportunity of overturning the 
 government whenever it was suitable to his pur 
 poses. 
 
 On the 29th of November, Mr. Slidell arrived at 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 22. 
 t Idem, Mr. Black to Mr. Buchanan, p. 13. t Idem ibidem, p. 13. 
 
_ 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 67 
 
 Vera Cruz, and soon after started on his way to the 
 city of Mexico. But on the announcement of his 
 arrival to the Mexican government, it manifested 
 more surprise than pleasure, and a dread lest the 
 occurrence should he the cause of its overthrow, 
 and the total defeat of any thing like peace. # In 
 truth, the Mexican authorities were about right, 
 for, at the very time they were consulting ahout 
 the matter, their opponents were organizing a rev 
 olution which had heen foreshadowed hy the agi 
 tation of November. They were powerless ; Pa- 
 redes held most of the troops under his command, 
 and their finances were prostrate. In the vain 
 hope of holding on until the opening of the Mexi 
 can Congress, they resolved to delay their commit 
 tal to actual measures, and accordingly convoked 
 the Council of Government (an irresponsible body, 
 and containing many members decidedly hostile 
 to the administration), and submitted to its con 
 sideration the credentials of Mr. Slidell and the 
 question of his reception.! Various and many 
 were the arguments there made use of against 
 opening the proposed negotiation. Perhaps no body 
 known in the civilized world can develop more 
 ingenuity in searching for objections to a measure, 
 at all inimical to its interests, prejudices, or fancies, 
 than a Mexican junta ; and, although the matter 
 was placed before the members several times, they 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, Mr. Black to Mr. Buchanan, p. 17. 
 t Idem, Mr. Slidell to Mr. Buchanan, p. 19. 
 
68 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 disapproved of the measure, and advised that the 
 American envoy should not be received. Fearful 
 of being compromised in the business while the 
 agitation on the subject continued, and having re 
 ceived such advice from the Council of Government, 
 the Mexican minister, on the 20th of December, 
 replied to Mr. Slidell, and, while reiterating pro 
 fessions of good faith in the negotiation, declared 
 the determination of his government not to receive 
 him, because he had been appointed, not solely for 
 the purpose of settling the dispute relative -to Tex 
 as, but came in the character of a plenipotentiary.^ 
 But on the 15th, Paredes, having his own ends 
 in view, not being particularly pleased with the 
 conduct of the government, especially that part of 
 it which ordered him to disperse his troops, had 
 pronounced at San Luis, and moved his columns 
 upon the capital. He was delayed a short time 
 on account of a disagreement with the chiefs of the 
 revolt in the city of Mexico. But, in the mean 
 time, the garrisons of San Juan d'Ulloa, Vera Cruz, 
 and Jalapa joined the insurgents, and, finally, on 
 the 29th of December, the greater portion of the 
 troops at the city of Mexico pronounced, and the 
 government was left without support. But this 
 had not been done without the manifestation of 
 strong opposition on the part of all the civil author 
 ities, and a show of resistance on the part of Con 
 gress, which denounced the plan of Paredes as an 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, Mr. Slidell to Mr. Buchanan, p. 19. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. gg 
 
 undisguised military . despotism, and declared its 
 abhorrence of his treachery.^ The explosion of 
 these paper missiles was harmless to the revolu 
 tionists, and on the 30th of December Herrera re 
 signed the presidency. Paredes entered the city 
 on the 2d of January, 1846, and being, in fact, 
 military dictator, set about organizing a govern 
 ment which suited his own purposes. It J was 
 made, and sanctioned by a junta of officers, and 
 he, of course, declared the president. 
 
 Upon the receipt of the news of this last revo 
 lution at Washington, the American government, 
 anticipating the refusal of the Mexican to receive 
 its envoy, and fatigued with the attempt at nego 
 tiation with an impracticable government, changed 
 by the word of a military chieftain, himself im 
 practicable, ordered the general in command of the 
 troops at Corpus Christi to prepare an advance to 
 the Rio Grande, and the squadron of the navy in 
 the Gulf of Mexico to be increased.! Neverthe 
 less, Mr. Slidell was directed not to leave Mexico 
 without making another attempt to obtain a hear 
 ing from the new government. He had removed 
 to Jalapa, and from thence addressed a note to the 
 new minister of foreign relations, representing his 
 credentials, and asking to be received. On the 
 12th of March, the answer of Mr. Castillo y Lanzas 
 was written, which, after setting forth in full the 
 
 ., t ' 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, Mr. Slidell to Mr. Buchanan, p. 27. 
 t Idem, Correspondence, p. 76-82. 
 
7Q THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 alleged wrongs and injustices committed by the 
 United States against Mexico, refused to receive 
 the American plenipotentiary as such, and ended 
 by intimating that his government was preparing 
 for war. It was asserted that the United States 
 had already commenced the war by the location 
 of their troops at Corpus Christi, and the station 
 of a squadron off Vera Cruz. Mr. Slidell replied 
 on the 17th, and, after denying the assertions and 
 refuting the arguments of the Mexican minister, 
 demanded his passports, and on the 1st of April 
 left Mexico.* 
 
 The motives which influenced the government 
 of Paredes were obvious. That personage, how 
 ever much he might have disguised his sentiments, 
 was strongly in favor of the establishment of a 
 monarchy in Mexico.! Ambitious, proud, and 
 poor, and possessing a talent for agitation, that 
 end by which he hoped for permanent personal 
 aggrandizement was the wish of his heart. The 
 disposal of Santa Anna was necessary to the suc 
 cess of the designs, opposed as he was to the estab 
 lishment of any other monarchy than his own dic 
 tatorship, and, whatever else may have been his 
 faults, devoted as he was to the maintenance of 
 Mexican nationality. His disposition to open ne 
 gotiations with the United States, and to recede 
 from a position, the maintenance of which could 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, Correspondence, p. 65-67. 
 -t Idem, p. 41-49. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 71 
 
 only bring misfortune on his country, was made, 
 with other pretexts, the cause of his overthrow. 
 The time for proposing the plan of monarchy had 
 not arrived when Santa Anna was hurled from 
 power and banished. Herrera was elected presi 
 dent a naturally good man, and with sufficient 
 energy to carry out the ordinary measures of good 
 government with any practicable nation, but with 
 not enough of energy or of head to control the el 
 ements of disorder ever at work in the Mexican 
 army and people. The distrust of Paredes in 
 duced the order to disperse his troops, and that oc 
 casioned Herr era's downfall. On finding himself 
 in power, Paredes, with the assistance of Don Lu 
 cas Alaman, prepared an edict calling together the 
 Congress, and prescribing the mode of its election. 
 By it the majority of the representatives was giv 
 en to that class of persons whom he believed to 
 be favorable to his own views, and it may have 
 been hoped that, could the Congress elected under 
 that convocataria be assembled, decided measures 
 would be taken for calling a foreign prince to the 
 throne of Mexico. That negotiations with the 
 King of the French, having that end in view, had 
 been carried on, was evident from the manner in 
 which the subject was discussed by the leading 
 government journals of France, in which it was 
 asserted that the good of humanity, and of Mexico 
 herself, demanded the interference of European 
 powers, and the erection of a monarchical govern 
 ment in that country. 
 
72 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 But, in the mean time, the government of Pare- 
 des, like that of its predecessors, was committed to 
 a war with the United States, and it could not hope 
 to sustain itself for any time unless its promises 
 Were carried out. To silence opposition while the 
 plans of the president progressed to maturity, it was 
 resolved to prosecute it, and that, too, with a fair 
 prospect of primary success. San Juan d'Ulloa was 
 in good defensible condition, with a powerful arm 
 ament, and could bid defiance to any fleet which 
 could he sent against it. The whole American force 
 on the northern frontier of Mexico amounted to but 
 little over three thousand men, and the result of the 
 conflicts in which American troops have astonished 
 the world by their success against overwhelming 
 numbers could not then have been anticipated. Be 
 ing successful, it would have been easy, under the 
 eclat which would have attended the military op 
 erations of the existing government, to have carried 
 out the proposed measure, and, before the United 
 States could have reorganized their forces for a re 
 newal of the war, interference on the part of the 
 European king, from whose family the prospective 
 Emperor of Mexico was to have been selected, could 
 have been looked for with confidence. Moreover, 
 the question of the Oregon Territory, which, during 
 the session of 1845-6, was agitated in the Ameri 
 can Congress, had assumed a troublesome aspect, 
 and rendered it highly probable that Great Britain 
 would be a party opposed to the United States ; 
 and, finally, the opposition party of the American 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 73 
 
 people was looked to to defeat the measures of 
 their government. Nor was reliance placed entire 
 ly upon the manifestation of their sentiments in 
 public prints. Almonte, after receiving his pass 
 ports from the United States government, had tar 
 ried long enough in the country to concoct, with 
 some abolitionists of black slavery, whose crazy 
 philanthropy enabled them to look upon high trea 
 son with Mexican eyes, schemes of action by which 
 they were to assist the Mexican against their own 
 government, should the war break .out, and the 
 hostilities be actually commenced.^ Upon his re 
 turn home he mixed in the intrigues resulting in 
 the accession of Paredes to power,, and took the 
 post of secretary of war and marine; one which, 
 under the circumstances, was congenial to his tem- 
 
 * The correspondence of citizens of the United States and members of the 
 opposition party with Mexican functionaries has been extensively believed. 
 And a sufficient cause to induce the belief among the supporters of the admin 
 istration of Mr. Polk was found in the course of action of many prominent 
 men during the war ; but the assertion in this place 'does not rest upon prob 
 ability. When the city of Mexico was occupied by the .American army in 
 1847, there were found in the Mexican post-office numerous letters from this 
 class of persons to officers of the Mexican government, principally to Almon 
 te, who had been, at the time, for some months in' prison by 'order of Santa 
 Anna. Two of these letters fell into the hands of the author. The first, over 
 the signature of Lewis H. Putnam (perhaps fictitious), went so far as to speak 
 of a movement in arms against the United States government. The object 
 of the letter may have been to obtain means in money from the Mexican 
 government to raise the riot, with the intention of ultimate fraud.. The sec 
 ond is, however, evidently written in good faith. The author had the good 
 sense to omit his name and the place of date ; yet he is evidently a man of 
 talent, information, and probably of high situation about the government at 
 some period. Certainly, whoever he may have been, he had access to au 
 thentic sources in studying the history, public and secret, of the Mexican 
 dispute. See Appendix, Nos. 1 and 2. 
 
74 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 per, though it is doubtful whether his talent would 
 have been sufficient to have managed his auxilia 
 ries with success had they made their movement 
 in any decided manner. 
 
 Money was accordingly raised by extraordinary 
 efforts. The army was paid, though the civil em 
 ployees were neglected, and the preparations for 
 the chastisement of the " barbarians of the north" 
 were pushed with all the vigor which Mexico pos 
 sessed. 
 
 Notwithstanding all this, however, the opposi 
 tion increased, and as early as March, 1846, a pro- 
 nunciamento against Paredes was agitated, while, 
 with the admirable inconsistency of the Mexicans, 
 Santa Anna, scarce one year banished, was spoken 
 of as the chosen leader of the movement. 
 
 To silence opposition, and incidentally to give 
 employment to a general officer who was the last 
 to give in his accession to the new administration, 
 and whose indefinite proposals for a revolt in the 
 north had not been received with great favor by 
 the American general to whom they had been 
 made, the Mexican army of the north was ordered 
 to advance on Matamoras, and, on the 4th of April, 
 General Arista was directed to cress the Rio Grrande, 
 and attack and destroy the American army by ev 
 ery means in his power. 
 
 The progress of events which were gradually 
 bringing the two nations into collision was watch 
 ed with great interest in the United States. The 
 movement of the small body of troops which had 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 75 
 
 entered Texas was particularly observed by the 
 public, and from time to time rumors of its danger 
 were put forth, and once of its actual defeat. These 
 induced General Gaines, who commanded at New 
 Orleans, to forward to Corpus Christi a small re- 
 enforcement of volunteer artillery ; nor were the 
 fears of the public for the safety of the troops al 
 layed until the arrival at Corpus Christi of such a 
 number as made the safety of the corps no longer 
 problematical in case of an attack by any force of 
 the Mexicans known to be in the vicinity of the 
 Rio Grande was announced. The Oregon Ques 
 tion, for a time, drew off public attention from the 
 affairs in Texas and with Mexico, but it soon be 
 came evident that that matter would be settled 
 without a resort to arms. The public attention 
 was again directed to the southwest, and the ne 
 gotiations pending in Mexico during the winter of 
 the years 1845-6 were chronicled by the press as 
 fast as they became public. The prevailing senti 
 ment in the public mind with regard to the con 
 duct of the Mexican government was disgust at 
 its inconstancy of purpose, and contempt for its 
 imbecility. 
 
 On the 8th of March the army marched from 
 Corpus Christi. The news of its progress toward 
 the Rio Grande, and its arrival on its banks with 
 out any physical opposition, became public in the 
 United States, and the general opinion with the 
 American people now was that, after having ex 
 hausted her spleen in threats, and after two or 
 
7 g THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 three more revolutions in her government, Mexico 
 would abandon her purpose of hostility and make 
 the best she could of circumstances. The most 
 that was apprehended was the continuance of the 
 non-intercourse which, under the name of a war, 
 she had maintained for such a number of years in 
 regard to Teas. This was also the prevailing 
 opinion with regard to the matter in the Amer 
 ican Congress, and the contingency of war was 
 deemed so remote that it was with the greatest 
 difficulty that an Increase of the army by one reg 
 iment of mounted rifles was pressed through, and 
 that for an object having no reference to Mexican 
 hostility. Both people and Legislature were un 
 prepared for the events which soon followed. 
 
 But, from the time of ordering the advance on 
 Matamoras, the American secretary of war appears 
 to have been aware of the danger to which Gen 
 eral Taylor's corps might be subjected in carrying 
 out the objects for which it had been sent, and in 
 the letter which ordered his forward movement, 
 that officer was directed to report to the depart 
 ment what means he might require, if any, beyond 
 those which he then possessed, to ejiforce and 
 maintain a common right to navigate the Rio del 
 Norte, together with his views as to its importance 
 for the defense of Texas. He was, however, di 
 rected not to enforce it without instructions, and 
 was reminded of the change in the relations of 
 Texas to the United States, which enabled him to 
 make a direct requisition upon the governor for aid, 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 77 
 
 should it be needed. Long prior to this, General 
 Taylor had been empowered to call upon the gov 
 ernors of the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
 Alabama for a similar purpose. General Taylor 
 answered on the 4th of February, 1846, and de 
 layed his report until he should ascertain the tem 
 per and disposition of the people on the Mexican 
 frontier to which he was approaching. That, he 
 had reason to believe, was favorable to the Ameri 
 cans ; and he stated his determination to call for 
 no more militia force in addition to the few com 
 panies which he then had until circumstances ren 
 dered it necessary. On the 16th of February he 
 wrote again, and warned the department against 
 paying attention to exaggerated accounts of the 
 Mexican preparations to oppose his advance and 
 for the invasion of Texas, and expressed the hope 
 that they would have, no effect. His belief was 
 that his advance would be unresisted, although he 
 stated that he should be prepared for a state -of 
 hostilities should they be provoked.^ 
 
 Still, the feeling of security so confidently ex 
 pressed by the general was not fully entertained 
 by the secretary, and in his letter of March the 
 2d he again reminded him of his power to call for 
 volunteers, and directed him to use it efficiently, 
 and suggested that his position, while it was near 
 er the enemy, was further from support, and that 
 it was necessary to take more than ordinary pre- 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 68-105. 
 
78 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 cautions. But, having confidence in his troops, and 
 no desire for increasing the expenditure of the 
 service or the excitement of the public by a call 
 for assistance upon an uncertain contingency, Gen 
 eral Taylor did not deem it necessary to act upon 
 the suggestions of the letter until some time sub 
 sequently ; and, in consequence of the want of in 
 formation and difficulty of communication, no fur 
 ther instructions were given him from the War 
 Department. 
 
 But in a short time news of a warlike character 
 arrived in the United States, and was soon con 
 firmed by that of the murder of Colonel Cross, as 
 sistant quarter-master general of the army, the de 
 feat of a party under Lieutenant Porter, and of the 
 capture of Captain Thornton's squadron of dra 
 goons. The greatest excitement prevailed through 
 out the nation, and the anxiety for the fate of the 
 little army was intense. Its imminent danger si 
 lenced opposition to hostility, and all looked with 
 eagerness for the action of the government. For 
 some days nothing wa& heard from the seat of war, 
 and rumors were rife of the defeat and annihilation 
 of Taylor's corps, while the cry for action became 
 daily stronger with the people. 
 
 On the llth of May, immediately after the re 
 ceipt of the news of Thornton's capture, the Pres 
 ident sent a message to Congress, calling upon it 
 to make provision for the support of the war with 
 Mexico, brought on by the act of Mexico herself. 
 The difficulties and disputes with that country for 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 79 
 
 a series of years, and the efforts of the United 
 States at conciliation, were enumerated. The cup 
 of forbearance was declared to have been exhaust 
 ed long previous to the reception of the intelligence 
 of the recent occurrences upon the frontier, and the 
 fact was announced that now, by the acts of her 
 generals, Mexico had proclaimed that hostilities 
 had commenced, and that, in pursuit of them, 
 American blood had been shed upon American 
 soil. In pursuance of the recommendation of the 
 commanding general, Congress was called upon 
 by the President to pass a law authorizing the em 
 ployment of a large body of volunteers for twelve 
 months, to make provision for sustaining the entire 
 military force, and furnishing it with the material 
 
 The act was passed on the 13th of May, and the 
 existence of a state of war was officially recognized. 
 
 In the above sketch, the principal events which 
 took place, bearing upon the dispute between the 
 United States and Mexico, from the existence of 
 the latter until the breaking out of hostilities, have 
 been marked. A short review of those occurrences 
 may not be misplaced. 
 
 The increase of the United States since the for 
 mation and adoption of the Federal Constitution, 
 in extent, power, and prosperity, has surpassed the 
 fondest anticipations of the framers of that wise 
 instrument, and has startled the world, which, in 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 
80 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the decay of ; ancient institutions, watches their 
 progress.' Under the free and popular government, 
 each man .is left to struggle with his fellow for 
 power and distinction, unshackled by the ordinary 
 restraints which have heen imposed hy the ancient 
 systems of the Old ,World, and the education and 
 temper of the people are such that their freedom 
 has hitherto been -enjoyed with moderation. In 
 the spirit of enterprise which is thus brought into 
 life and cherished, the American is constantly in 
 observation for some new opening for his exertions 
 and for his success. It caused the early settle 
 ment of Texas, -the obtainance of the Mexican 
 grants, and colonization of the country to the ex 
 tent which alarmed 'the Mexican government, and 
 induced it, too late, to repent of its primary policy, 
 and to forbid immigration. The revolutions of 
 Mexico and the central despotism of Santa Anna 
 aroused the resistance of the settlers, and the 
 means resorted to by that chief to support his au 
 thority, who, although aware and fearful of the 
 enterprise of -the colonists, was ignorant of their 
 warlike character, or, if aware of it, too vain to 
 dream of successful resistance by a handful of ad 
 venturers against the "Napoleon of the West," 
 were arbitrary and despotic in themselves, and en 
 forced, so far as they were enforced, with a cruel 
 ty and ferocity which drew upon the Mexicans the 
 indignation' of mankind. The signal defeat with 
 which the effort was attended rendered the revolt 
 ed state de facto independent, and the treaty made 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. gj 
 
 with the Mexican generals gave to it as much of 
 the sanction of law as could have been obtained 
 from a government so wedded to the maintenance 
 of false principles, and so treacherous in the course 
 of its policy as the Mexican has been. Seven years 
 elapsed before the government of the United States, 
 notwithstanding the applications which had been 
 made, and notwithstanding the desire early mani 
 fested and expressed until the commencement of 
 the Texan revolution, entered into negotiations for 
 annexation, and during that time none but abortive 
 attempts had been made by Mexico to repossess 
 herself of the territory. Its independence, and con 
 sequent right to make treaties and dispose of itself 
 in its own way, had been recognized by the world, 
 with the exception of Mexico, and not till then 
 was the proposition considered with a view to ac 
 tion. The treaty was made, but the Senate of the 
 United States, anxious for the opinion of the nation 
 upon a measure so important, and of so novel a 
 character, rejected it. Whatever may have been 
 the use made of the question by politicians for par 
 ty purposes, and how much soever it was made to 
 subserve them, the verdict of the people was deci 
 sive, and the same Senate which had rejected the 
 treaty gave its consent to a joint resolution with 
 the House of Representatives for the same end. 
 
 In the mean time, Mexico, tenacious of posses 
 sion in words, when, in fact, she had been forced to 
 relinquish it, and trusting to the loud-mouthed op- 
 position of a party in the American Union, had be- 
 L F 
 
82 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 come compromised in the event of the consumma 
 tion of. the measure even to the extent of a war 
 with a power to which, either in arts or in arms, 
 she was and had been hut as sounding hrass and 
 tinkling cymbal. Perhaps, had the measure been 
 then delayed, and negotiations for the purchase of 
 the claim of Mexico been offered by the United 
 States, the rupture might have been avoided. But 
 the speed with which those opposed to the meas 
 ure would have rushed to the support of the delay, 
 and the extreme publicity of the proceeding of re 
 publican assemblies, might again have deceived 
 Mexico into the fallacious hope that it was owing 
 to her oft-repeated threat of war, and that the fear 
 of its prosecution would, if the threat was persist 
 ed in, cause the total defeat of the measure, and 
 indulge her still in her asserted possession. The 
 pride, folly, and obstinacy of her people experience 
 has shown to be fully equal to such conclusion. 
 
 And, moreover, the independence of Texas Jiad 
 been recognized, and the attempt at purchasing a 
 territory from Mexico over which she had no rec 
 ognized right to authority would have placed the 
 United States in a position somewhat false. 
 
 But the measure passed the American Congress, 
 and the diplomatic intercourse between the two 
 countries was suspended. Mexican consuls were 
 directed to close their business and inform their 
 citizens that their functions had ceased. Their 
 Congress passed the necessary bills to enable the 
 government to prosecute the war and to raise 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 33 
 
 money for its support ; but the passage of the law 
 was easier than to effect a loan, and Mexico found 
 herself after all her declarations, protests, and at- 
 tempts to maintain an ohsolete principle of perpet 
 ual sovereignty, -which, had it heen ohserved hy 
 other nations, and sustained by her own mother 
 country, would have compromised her own nation 
 ality powerless, and compelled to yield to circum 
 stances. At this time the President of the United . 
 States, waiving all ordinary rules of diplomatic et 
 iquette, and sacrificing to his desire for peace the 
 regulating principles of national intercourse 
 which the condition of Mexico enabled him to do 
 without subjecting his government to the charge 
 of timidity took the initiative by sending an en 
 voy with full powers to treat on the subjects in 
 dispute. The Mexican government had looked 
 at first favorably upon the renewal of negotiations, 
 for at length it was fully aware of the difficulties 
 and dangers attending the execution of its threats. 
 But it was odious to the people and the army,, who 
 had too long been indulged in the cry for hostili 
 ties for sustaining the honor of their magnani 
 mous nation, and in a false belief in their own 
 strength,, to change the one into a tone of compro 
 mise and conciliation, or the other into a true and 
 unexaggerated estimate of their condition. By 
 them the frequent and strenuous efforts for peace 
 made by the Americans were mistaken for an ex 
 ponent of American weakness ; and for a proof of 
 it, they pointed to the small force on the frontier, 
 
84 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 which comprised the larger part of the army of the 
 United States, and asked whether the sons of Hi 
 dalgo and Morelos were to be vanquished by so 
 -small a number of the " barbarians of the North." 
 Their delusion was not dissipated by the American 
 general, who was necessarily ignorant of the state 
 of affairs, and who, while in the dark chaos of Mex 
 ican politics some glimmering of the light of peace 
 was seen, hesitated to avail himself of the means 
 which were at his disposal for an increase of his 
 force. 
 
 The Mexican government met the defeat which 
 awaits all governments attempting measures much 
 in advance or behind the spirit of their people. 
 Defeat with it is followed by a revolution; and 
 that came, notwithstanding the endeavor, by tem 
 porizing and bad faith with the United States, to 
 turn aside the storm. The power passed from the 
 hands of Herrera, and a military aspirant for the 
 position of a king-maker seized it for his own pur 
 poses. He found himself obliged to carry out the 
 measures of hostility, and all prospect of peace was 
 lost. Immediate action was necessary for primary 
 success, and his best and most disposable troops 
 were moved on Matamoras, crossed the Rio Bravo, 
 and commenced the war. And, notwithstanding 
 the peaceful policy of the government of the Unit 
 ed States, and the prevailing belief that hostilities 
 would be avoided, the mass of the American peo 
 ple was quite willing to accept it. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 85 
 
 The state of military preparation existing in the 
 two countries at the commencement of the war 
 was as different as their natures, their people, or 
 their policies. The government of Mexico had al 
 ways heen controlled hy the army ; and, as in all 
 cases where the proper subordinate agent becomes 
 the superior, injuries both to its own efficiency and 
 the welfare of the state had resulted. Springing 
 from the masses of the people, and actuated as 
 much by a spirit of revenge for private griefs as by 
 patriotic feeling, the various chiefs of the revolu 
 tionists had sustained themselves in the war of in 
 dependence in a manner which respected but little 
 the rights of peaceable citizens. One object which 
 they had in view in all their proceedings was to 
 hold perpetual military rank ; and, to obtain their 
 support, as well as that of the army under his com 
 mand, Iturbide declared, in articles sixteen and 
 seventeen of the plan of Iguala, " that this army 
 should be considered as of the line" as well as all 
 " the old partisans of independence" who should 
 immediately adhere to it. They were so consid 
 ered, and the incubus of a large standing army was 
 fastened upon the infant country, which only pass 
 ed from the dominion of Spain to come under the 
 changing military despotism of its own chieftains. 
 The composition of the army was such as to ren 
 der it an easy instrument to be worked by factious 
 chiefs, who sought to subvert the measures of the 
 government for their own ends. Various guerilla 
 leaders, whose irresponsible and predatory warfare 
 
8 6 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 had been carried on throughout the country as best 
 suited their purposes, were not likely to yield im 
 plicit obedience to a poor government, administer 
 ed by one of their own number, and no great gen 
 ius was immediately at hand, who, by the power 
 of his mind, could remedy the evil, and reduce the 
 discordant elements to discipline. The army re 
 mained as it was in the first days of Mexican in 
 dependence, and was employed from time to time 
 in fighting itself, on the side of one pronunciado or 
 another, all of whom were, like Iturbide, pledged 
 to its support. 
 
 But, after the lapse of years and a series of rev 
 olutions, the moral power which makes the great 
 strength of military bodies and renders them in 
 vincible was, in great measure, wanting to the 
 Mexican army. The cry of liberty, which had 
 aroused the first insurgents, and given them an en 
 thusiasm which bore them even to the muzzles of 
 the cannon, as at the battle of Las Graces, had lost 
 much of its force. The masses of Mexico found 
 that revolutions brought only change of masters ; 
 and so frequent had they become, that, like festal 
 days, they produced but temporary excitement. 
 Obedience to new authorities was yielded until 
 the next prbnunciamiento, which would produce no 
 more enthusiasm or interference on their part than 
 the former. The common people hated the mili 
 tary service, and, when forced into it, served me 
 chanically, upon compulsion, being perfectly will 
 ing to desert upon the first occasion which offered 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 87 
 
 impunity. Still, the material of the Mexican army 
 was characterized hy many of the necessary quali 
 ties of a good soldiery. Patient under suffering, 
 requiring hut little subsistence, with extraordinary 
 capacity for enduring fatigue, and with quite 
 enough of physical courage to enable them to en 
 counter danger without fear, the Mexican troops 
 might, if properly led, compare well with the troops 
 of other nations. But corruption existed among 
 their officers from the highest to the lowest grade, 
 and commissions were given from time to time hy 
 the functionaries of the government as rewards 
 for the most disgraceful private services, disgrace 
 ful alike to the doer and the recipient. The pros 
 pect of a foreign war was, however, new, and the 
 distant contingency had afforded means for arous 
 ing some enthusiasm of a national character. The 
 greater portion of the army was ignorant of the en 
 emy, and, in the pride of their race, overlooking 
 their own condition, the Mexican officers and sol 
 diers flattered themselves that they were invinci 
 ble. As they wished for laurels in a foreign war, 
 and as experience had not taught the greater por 
 tion the fallacy of their anticipations, they had 
 been induced to join in revolts against two suc 
 cessive governments, which, knowing the actual 
 situation of their country, strove to avoid the dan 
 ger. 
 
 The Mexican army included, besides the troops 
 of the 'line, the active battalions of the different 
 states and the local national guards of the cities. 
 
g3 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 The cavalry, principally of lancers, had a high 
 though factitious reputation both at home and 
 abroad. Many corps were fairly disciplined, and 
 the men were expert in all the feats of horseman 
 ship peculiar to Mexico, as well as the use of their 
 lances. The horses of the country, however, want 
 ed both speed and power, though endurance they 
 possessed in a remarkable degree. The carbines 
 with which the cavalry was armed were, for the 
 most part, of an ancient model and manufacture, 
 and, where accuracy of aim was necessary, were 
 useless. 
 
 The Mexican artillery numbered many foreign 
 ers among its officers, and most of the juniors were 
 eleves of the Military College of Chapultepec. 
 They had there acquired much of the theory of 
 their profession, and the nature of Mexican revolu 
 tions had given them much practice. As far as 
 the actual gunnery went, they were exceedingly 
 proficient. Their guns were fine, but clumsily 
 mounted, and, in consequence, had but little mo 
 bility. Light artillery, as practiced by modern 
 troops, was but little known or used by the Mexi 
 cans until it was taught them by their enemy. 
 
 The Mexican infantry was in many regiments 
 tolerably drilled, and a severe discipline was en 
 forced with the privates. All ceremonious points 
 and detail duties were strictly carried out. The 
 muskets of the infantry were inferior, and the men 
 were by no means proficient in their accurate use. 
 
 The organization of the staff of the army depend- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. gg 
 
 ed much upon the general who happened to "be in 
 command, and, from the nature of things, the civil 
 staff was filled in any convenient method. Of en 
 gineer officers, Mexico had many of talent and 
 skill, and the practice of their revolutions had made 
 them perfect in the hranch of field fortification. 
 
 Of general officers there existed an enormous 
 disproportion, and so great was their numher that 
 it was a common remark that they had rather a 
 brigade of generals than generals of hrigade. With 
 all of them, however, there were few who possessed 
 any other talent than for the pomp and circum 
 stance of war, and probably there was not one in 
 service combining the various attributes of a gen 
 eral. . 
 
 Mexico's whole military force of all arms was 
 stated variously between thirty and fifty thousand 
 men, both by foreigners and their own authorities. 
 And it was at least equal, at the commencement 
 of the war, to the lower of the numbers. Scatter 
 ed as it was under different chiefs, and consisting 
 of troops of different kinds, it would be difficult to 
 ascertain the precise number. It is hardly proba 
 ble that it was accurately known at Mexico. 
 
 The country was full of arms and munitions of 
 war, such as they were. They were of ancient 
 manufacture, and for replenishing the supply de 
 pendence was necessarily placed upon importa 
 tions. Mexico had but few resources in- her own 
 mechanics, certainly none beyond the repair of par 
 tial damages, and such an establishment as a na- 
 
90 TH E WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tional armory was unknown in the republic. At 
 the great fortifications and in some large cities 
 there were partial establishments, but, in com 
 parison to the. size of the armament, they were but 
 trifling. 
 
 Of maritime power Mexico was utterly desti 
 tute. She had attempted to organize something 
 of a navy, but, as in the various .revolutions the 
 navy could be made no instrument of success on 
 the side of either pronunciado, it had been lost 
 sight of, and died from want of sustenance. A 
 few steamers and sail vessels of small class were 
 on her list at the commencement of hostilities, but 
 the government lacked both money and energy to 
 fit them out. Indeed, it may well have been good 
 policy, for they would soon have been captured by 
 the enemy ; and as Mexican pride had never been 
 flattered by any maritime exploits, no boasting 
 pretensions were put forth in support of that arm 
 of national defense which could induce the attempt 
 at naval warfare. 
 
 In the numerical strength of regular soldiery 
 the United States were exceedingly deficient. It 
 has never been their policy to keep upon foot a 
 large standing army, against which species of force 
 a prejudice has existed since the days of the Rev 
 olution. Indeed, nothing but necessity, taught by 
 experience, induced the early Congress to substi 
 tute the continental line for the three and six 
 months' volunteers who first served the different 
 states in their rebellion. It was disbanded imine- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 91 
 
 diately after the war, and, true to their principles, 
 officers and soldiers of the army made no opposi 
 tion to/the action of a government which was pow 
 erless against their strength, and, without their ar 
 rears of pay, broke up and returned to their homes. 
 Under the first presidents, a small force was kept 
 up for protection upon the Indian frontiers, and in 
 cidental service upon the seaboard. ' But it was 
 never increased much beyond the actual and in 
 dispensable wants of the government, and, when, 
 necessity had passed away, was again reduced. 
 
 The limited permanent force which the adopted 
 policy of the government allowed, led different ad 
 ministrations to look to the improvement of such 
 as was in service. In 1812 the Military Academy 
 was established for the education of officers of the 
 army, and during subsequent years the course of 
 military instruction had been enlarged, until it be 
 came as perfect as the length of time allowed the 
 cadets would permit. The permanent establish 
 ment of the school had not been accomplished 
 without strong opposition on the part of state gov 
 ernments as well as of the people. The institution 
 was denounced as aristocratic in its tendency and 
 useless in effect. But the efforts for its suppression 
 were vain, and it has ever since furnished nearly 
 a sufficient number of graduates to fill the regi 
 ments and corps of the army. The course of in 
 struction there received, and the secluded life led 
 for four years, devoted entirely to military studies 
 and pursuits, it can not be denied, have a tendency 
 
92 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 to create an exclusive class, and cause the young 
 graduates to look upon an uneducated soldier with 
 but little sympathy or consideration, and to think 
 lightly of the policy of their country which places 
 her reliance upon her citizens rather than upon a 
 standing army. But the graduates of the Military 
 Academy have, upon entering the service, the full 
 theory of their profession, and when their deeds in 
 their country's service are remembered, it may well 
 be said, without incurring the charge of vanity, that 
 they form a body of officers which, in education, 
 talent, and bravery, has no superior in the world. 
 
 In 1845 the American army consisted of two 
 regiments of dragoons, four of artillery, and eight 
 of infantry, with the different departments of the 
 staff. The latter were larger than were actually 
 required for the troops of the line in service, but 
 the engineers and ordnance officers were employ 
 ed in carrying out the policy of the government 
 that of building all necessary fortifications, and 
 keeping on hand a large quantity of the imperish 
 able material of war, ready for defense and use by 
 the citizens, should the state of foreign relations 
 render it necessary. 
 
 The United States dragoons were well mount 
 ed, and well disciplined as light cavalry, to which 
 their duties were confined ; and although the short 
 term of service did not allow their officers to make 
 them, in bearing, equal to the finished cavalry sol 
 diers of Europe, yet they were highly efficient in 
 their proper arm. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 93 
 
 The artillery, for the most part, had been con 
 fined to the service of fortifications, and the men 
 had no instruction in their own arm, except in the 
 manual exercise of the heavy guns. The duties 
 of construction usually devolving upon the artil 
 lery in foreign services, in the American were as 
 signed to the ordnance, by which the artillery of 
 ficers and soldiers were deprived of the opportunity 
 of acquiring the most practical part of their prp r 
 fession. In the exigencies of the service, created 
 by the different Indian wars, the artillery men had 
 often been ordered to the field as infantry, and 
 kept for long periods in service as such, a pro 
 ceeding certainly not calculated to increase their 
 proficiency as artillerists. But, under the adminis 
 tration of the War Department by Mr. Poinsett, it 
 was noticed that the artillery of the United States 
 was far behind that of the nations of Europe, and 
 had not even a nucleus upon which to form an ef 
 ficient corps in one of its most important branches. 
 To remedy the evil, one company of each regiment 
 was organized as light artillery, and by the dili 
 gence of the officers were soon brought to a state 
 of discipline and efficiency which was rightly con 
 sidered a maximum. By the order of the general- 
 in-chief, the junior officers of the artillery had 
 served in these companies in succession, and near 
 ly all of them were proficient in practice as well 
 as theory of that branch of their duty. 
 
 Although the infantry of the American army 
 was much scattered from the nature of the service, 
 
94 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and, in consequence, the practice of military tac 
 tics upon a large scale was impossible ; yet a strict 
 discipline. had always been enforced in the differ 
 ent detachments, and nothing was wanting to ren 
 der the infantry as imposing a body of troops, for 
 its number, as any in the world, except reunion in 
 masses for a few weeks. 
 
 The rank and file contained many foreigners, but 
 nearly all were from Great Britain, Ireland, and 
 Germany, and the greater portion possessed the 
 warlike nature of their native -countries, with an 
 attachment for the land of their adoption. But the 
 mass > of the troops was American; and all banded 
 together by a salutary discipline, well and regular 
 ly paid, well fed and clothed, every desirable con 
 dition of efficiency was satisfied in the physical 
 state of the American regular army. 
 
 Under the spirit of retrenchment which pervad 
 ed the American Congress in 1842, the number of 
 privates in the companies of dragoons had been re 
 duced to fifty, and in those of artillery and infant 
 ry to forty-two, numbers far too small to keep those 
 corps up to a proper numerical strength ; for the 
 difficulty of supplying the remote posts with re 
 cruits was such that it was never practicable to 
 keep the regiments more than two thirds full, ac 
 cording to the legal' standard. The number of offi 
 cers was sufficient for the command of companies 
 of the full size, and, in the adoption of the skele 
 ton system, it had been believed that they could 
 be raised to that standard when the necessity be- 
 
THE WAR, WITH MEXICO. 95 
 
 came apparent. Many officers were, however, su 
 perannuated, and unfit for service except in the or 
 dinary duties of a garrison. This class was found, 
 of course, among the higher grades, and there was 
 hardly a regiment in service which could take the 
 field with its full number of field officers. This 
 evil had arisen from the want of a retired list ; and 
 as the different administrations of the government 
 had not wished to take the alternative of forcing 
 aged officers, whose life had been spent in the army, 
 unprovided from the service, their duties had been 
 performed by juniors, without either the proper 
 rank or pay of their commands, although most of 
 the seniors, with the customary pertinacity of old 
 soldiers, even when their incapacity was notorious, 
 insisted that they, and they alone, possessed the 
 skill and experience necessary for high command. 
 
 The general officers were also advanced in years, 
 and many of them too much so to be useful. But 
 few retained the ardent enthusiasm which creates 
 resources where there are none, and, when com 
 bined with warlike genius and. sound judgment, 
 accomplishes deeds looked upon as impracticable. 
 Such never has been the attribute of aged gener 
 als, and the Mexican war furnishes hardly an ex 
 ception to the rule. 
 
 The want of vacancies had induced the govern 
 ment of the United States to introduce into the 
 service the pernicious system of breveting officers 
 to higher grades than they held in the line of the 
 army, and their desire to exercise the command of 
 
gg THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 their brevet rank had often led to disputes benefi 
 cial neither to the service nor themselves. From 
 Corpus Christi, a petition was sent to the govern 
 ment in 1845, praying that the powers and privi 
 leges of brevet rank might be strictly defined, and 
 the question was decided. By the decision, brevet 
 rank conferred no authority except upon special 
 assignment, or upon detachments specially sent out. 
 This decision was in opposition to the views of the 
 general-in-chief, who supported brevet rank as be 
 ing, in the main, real rank, and gave offense to 
 many holding such commissions in the arniy. One 
 general officer was so much aggrieved that he threw 
 up his commission, and for a time left the service. 
 But, v at the close of the year 1845, the whole 
 number of bayonets and sabers allowed by the or 
 ganization of the army was but 7883 ; and, accord 
 ing to the return of the army for November of that 
 year,^ but 5304, including sergeants and corporals, 
 were present throughout the country. General 
 Taylor was then at Corpus Christi, and the strength 
 of his command, including sick, was but 3593 ; and 
 during the winter this number was much reduced 
 by ordinary casualties and expiration of service, and 
 hardly amounted, when he arrived opposite Mata- 
 moras, to 3000 men of all arms too small a force 
 for the position and circumstances and this the 
 Mexican authorities knew to be the greater portion 
 of the American army. 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the twenty-ninth 
 Congress, p. 221. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 97 
 
 Mexico did not count upon, nor could any one 
 unacquainted with the American people have 
 counted upon, the ease and celerity with which 
 any required number of volunteers can be called 
 into the field. In great measure, each man in the 
 United States considers that he has a direct inter 
 est in the government, and feels bound to support 
 it in a foreign war. It is a point of honor for each 
 state and county to furnish promptly the requisi 
 tions made upon it ; 'and, upon the call of the gov 
 ernment, it is often the dispute for the privilege 
 of serving rather than, for exemption from the fa 
 tigues and dangers of the duty. Party strife, which 
 is so prevalent, takes the form of emulation, for 
 military service is that which appears more dis 
 tinctly patriotic than any other, and it is the in 
 terest of politicians to give their support in actual 
 service, however much they may oppose the policy 
 of the administration. 
 
 Volunteer troops are necessarily undisciplined, 
 and, at the commencement of their military ca 
 reer, are but little better than when they practice 
 to display their ignorance at militia musters and 
 independent company parades. But nearly every 
 man is acquainted with the use of arms in his own 
 way ; and if the officers are well selected, and have 
 perseverance enough to learn their duties, with in 
 dependence enough to execute them, volunteer 
 regiments soon improve, and the infantry becomes 
 highly efficient. With the cavalry it is a different 
 matter, whenever it is attempted to use it as cav- 
 I. G 
 
98 THE WAR/WITH MEXICO, 
 
 airy proper, for it requires more time than can be 
 given by volunteer troops, to acquire the knowl 
 edge and practice the duties of that arm ; . and, va 
 riously equipped and mounted as they are upon 
 entering the service, the experiment of making a 
 respectable dragoon out of a volunteer must almost 
 necessarily fail. One species of mounted force, 
 peculiar to the western frontier of the United 
 States, is, however, efficient. The inhabitants of 
 that frontier, from their vicinity to hostile Indians, 
 are well practiced in partisan warfare, and, al 
 though they will not easily submit to discipline, 
 yet take the field in rough, uncouth habiliments, 
 and, following some leader chosen for his talent 
 and bravery, perform partisan duties in a manner 
 hardly to be surpassed. Their actual services on 
 the field are generally those of light infantry and 
 riflemen ; for, although mounted, of the duties of a 
 dragoon as such they know nothing, and almost in 
 variably dismount and act upon foot. 
 
 The greatest objection to a volunteer force is to 
 be found in the ignorance of the 'officers of the line, 
 and especially of the staff, in administrative duties. 
 Besides the want of discipline, which is a necessa 
 ry consequence, this renders such a force wasteful- 
 ly extravagant, and expensive until experience has 
 taught the rules and routine of service. The sys 
 tem of electing officers is also bad, for it can hard 
 ly be supposed that good military selections should 
 be generally made by men entirely ignorant of the 
 duties of the office. All these difficulties, howev- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 99 
 
 er, have been overlooked in the adoption of the 
 policy of the country, and utterly forgotten in the 
 good conduct which,, on many occasions, volunteer 
 troops have displayed. 
 
 The navy of the United States, like the army, 
 was not in proportion with the size and power of the 
 nation, although the disparity was not so marked. 
 It was sufficiently large, however, to blockade com 
 pletely every port of Mexico, and in efficiency and 
 discipline the American navy was considered a 
 model. 
 
 Though immediately deficient in numerical mil 
 itary strength, the United States were, neverthe 
 less, most powerful in all other things which make 
 a nation formidable in war. In variety and ex 
 tent of their climate, of resources, of revenue, in 
 the nature of their people, in the ingenuity and 
 industry of their mechanics, in the immense agri 
 cultural products of their soil, in facilities for in 
 ternal communication, in their large commercial 
 marine, and, in greater degree than in all others, 
 in the moral power and national pride with which 
 a free government .endows its citizens, would be 
 found the elements of warlike strength, even had 
 they not one armed man in service, or a single ves 
 sel in commission ; certainly when placed in com 
 parison with Mexico, deficient as the latter was, 
 and is still, in most of these results of continued 
 prosperity. 
 
100 THE WAR ,WITH MEXICO. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Movement from Corpus Christ! to the Rio Grande Passage of the Colorado 
 Arrival of American Army opposite Matamoras Interview between Gen 
 erals Worth and La Vega Mexican Action Commencement of Fortifica 
 tions Arrival of General Ampudia Correspondence with General Tay 
 lor Blockade of the Mouth of the Rio Grande Arrival of General Arista 
 Commencement of Hostilities Capture of Thornton's Squadron Call for 
 Volunteers March to Point Isabel Mexican Passage of the Rio Grande 
 Bombardment of Fort Brown Battle of Palo Alto Battle of Resaca 
 da la Palma Expedition against Burita American Passage of the Rio 
 Grande Observations. 
 
 ON the 8th of March, 1846, General Taylor broke 
 up his camp at Corpus Christi, and commenced 
 his march to take position on the left bank of the 
 Rio Grande, opposite Matamoras. He had already 
 determined upon Point Isabel as his depot, and to 
 that point the greater part of his stores were sent 
 by sea. The last detachment of the little army 
 marched from Corpus Christi on the llth of March, 
 with which was the commander. Taylor, how 
 ever, passed rapidly to the front, and took the ad 
 vance.^ 
 
 The first demonstration of Mexican hostility 
 was met at the passage of the Arroyo Colorado, a 
 point some thirty miles north of Matamoras. On 
 the 19th, the American advance encamped within 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, March 
 11, 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Ses- 
 aiou of the thirtieth Congress, p. 121. 
 
f*. 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. JQ^ 
 
 three miles of the ford, and reconnoitering officers 
 were sent forward to examine it. A party of Mex 
 ican rancheros occupied the right hank of the 
 stream ; hut, although it was signified to the Amer 
 ican officers that any attempt to pass would he 
 considered an act of hostility, and would he resist 
 ed, yet no ohstacle was thrown in the way of the 
 reconnaissance. In consequence of the Mexican 
 threats, Taylor made his dispositions to force the 
 passage, and early on the morning of the 20th, 
 the cavalry and Worth's hrigade of infantry were 
 in position at the ford, with two hatteries of field 
 artillery planted to sweep the opposite hank. A 
 shrill hlast of trumpets was sounded on the right 
 hank of the stream, and the same party which had 
 been met the previous day made its appearance. 
 The officer in command informed Captain Mans 
 field, who was sent to communicate with him, that 
 he had positive orders to open fire upon the Amer 
 ican troops should they attempt the passage. An 
 other, represented as a staff officer of the Mexican 
 general Mejia, then in command at Matamoras, 
 crossed to the left hank, and delivered a message 
 of a similar nature to General Taylor. He placed 
 in the hands of the American general a proclama 
 tion of Mejia, issued omthe 18th, in which hostil- 
 ty to the United States was advocated, and the 
 people of the country called to arms. In the face 
 of threats and proclamation, Taylor informed the 
 Mexican staff officer of his intention to cross, and 
 warned him of the consequences of resistance. 
 
102 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Four light companies under Captain C. F. Smith, 
 constituting the American advance, were ordered 
 forward, and, as they moved into the stream, Worth 
 and his staff dashed past and crossed at their head. 
 The resistance which had been so vauntingly 
 threatened hy the continued blasts of the trumpets 
 proved to he nothing, for no other force of Mexican 
 troops was found in the vicinity than* that which 
 had before been seen, and it, such as it was, made 
 a precipitate retreat to Matamoras.^ 
 
 Having remained near the Colorado until the 
 23d, awaiting the arrival of his supply train, on 
 that day Taylor advanced. On the 24th the army 
 was halted within eleven miles of Matamoras, 
 while the general proceeded with an empty train 
 and an escort of cavalry to Point Isabel, to com 
 municate with his transports and to establish his 
 depot. When near that place he was met by a 
 deputation, and presented with a formal protest 
 against American occupation of the country from 
 the prefect of the northern district of Tamaulipas. 
 But, at the moment of receiving it, the buildings 
 of the village at the Point were discovered to be 
 on fire, and deeming this fact to be a -demonstra 
 tion of hostility, the general pushed on with his 
 escort, while the deputation was hastily informed 
 that the protest would be answered from a point 
 opposite Matamoras.f 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, March 
 21, 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Se* 
 aion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 123. 
 
 t Idem, March 25. Idem, p. 129. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 103 
 
 The buildings, which were of little value, were 
 consumed by the time of the arrival of the Ameri 
 can party, and, the incendiaries bad effected their 
 escape. The transports, however, entered the port 
 at the moment, and, having made some arrange 
 ments for the defense of the depot, and laden his 
 train with supplies, the general returned to his 
 army. On the 28th he sat down opposite Mata- 
 moras, without, any attempt at retaliating hostility, 
 although two American dragoons had been seized 
 and carried across the river by the Mexicans. ^ 
 
 An immediate attempt was made to communi 
 cate with General Mejia, and, for the purpose, Gen 
 eral Worth and staff crossed the river. Mejia re 
 fused to hold personal communication with any 
 other American officer than General Taylor, but 
 sent his second in command, General de la Vega, 
 to confer with Worth. An interview of some length 
 took place. The Mexican officer received the com 
 munications borne by Worth for Mejia, the author 
 ities of Matamoras, and the American consul, but 
 would allow no personal communication with the 
 latter. Some discussion of the annexation of Tex 
 as and the American occupation of the left bank 
 of the Rio Grande was commenced by De la Vega, 
 but soon put a stop to by Worth, whose character 
 and temper were not at all suited by the discussion 
 in words of such a question, at that time and place, 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, March 
 29, 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Ses 
 sion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 132. 
 

 104 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 especially when he had just been refused an au 
 dience with the consul of his nation. The inter 
 view ended in nothing but in a confirmation of the 
 belief in Mexican hostility.^ 
 
 In the existence of this state of things, General 
 Taylor determined to .fortify himself; and his en 
 gineer officers were employed for several days in 
 reconnoitering the banks of the river, and selecting 
 the site for a field-work. The Mexican general 
 commenced his works on the right bank imme 
 diately, and, although he made no hostile move 
 ment, he kept up great displays of his force. In 
 the dispatches which he sent daily to the govern 
 ment of Mexico, the force and condition of the 
 American army were absurdly underrated. As 
 Mejia was soon to be superseded, he could in safety 
 indulge in anticipations of success ; and, mean 
 while, as he could give no evidence of military 
 prowess, he chose to congratulate himself on his 
 diplomatic talent and good management in sowing 
 discord among the American officers.! As the ba 
 sis of this .good opinion of himself, Mejia alluded 
 to the resignation of General Worth, which took 
 place about that time, not caused, however, by any 
 instrumentality of the Mexican general, as he well 
 knew, but on account of the decision of the presi 
 dent in relation to brevet rank, which just then 
 was received in the American camp. 
 
 * Minutes of Interview. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Represent 
 atives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 134. 
 t Mexican Official Correspondence. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 105 
 
 The American fort was commenced on the 5th 
 of April, and from that time the army was constant 
 ly employed to its completion. General Ampudia 
 arrived at Matamoras on the llth, and immediate 
 ly assumed command of the Mexicari forces. His 
 division, some three thousand strong, arrived on 
 the 12th. The forces under his command amount 
 ed to over six thousand hayonets and lances, and, 
 like Mejia, he assumed a hostile attitude. True 
 to the customs of his country, he commenced oper 
 ations on paper, and the demonstrations of this 
 character were, as usual, more vigorous than any 
 which he could actually put forth in reality. On 
 the 12th, General Taylor was required, in peremp 
 tory terms, to break up his camp within twen 
 ty-four hours, and retire heyond the Nueces until 
 the question of boundaries should he settled, and 
 war was threatened as the immediate alternative. 
 The answer to this demand was mild hut firm, and 
 the American general declined complying with it, 
 as he was there in a military capacity, and without 
 authority in relation to the question of boundary.^ 
 
 Both armies continued at work upon their forti 
 fications, and Ampudia made no immediate at 
 tempt to enforce his threatened alternative* But, 
 as a measure of precaution, and for the purpose of 
 demonstrating that the existing state of quasi hos 
 tility would not be without inconvenience to the 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, April 12, 
 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 139. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Mexican commander, General Taylor caused the 
 mouth of .the Rio Grande to be blockaded by the 
 small naval force which had accompanied his trans 
 ports from Corpus Christi. In consequence of this, 
 two vessels, laden with provisions for the Mexican 
 army, were warned off, and returned to sea. Not 
 withstanding his declaration of hostile purposes, 
 General Ampudia protested against the blockade, 
 and with a short but unfortunate argument on the 
 law of nations, demanded that the vessels which 
 he supposed had been seized, should be restored, 
 with their cargoes, to the owners, and allowed to 
 enter the river. Although the argument and de 
 mand were treated with some attention in the an 
 swer of General Taylor, yet he refused to raise the 
 blockade, and affairs continued in this state for sev 
 eral subsequent weeks.^ 
 
 On the 10th of April, Colonel Cross, assistant 
 quarter-master general of the American army, was 
 murdered at some distance from the camp by a 
 roving party of banditti. In the subsequent search 
 for him, a party of the fourth infantry, under com 
 mand of Lieutenant Porter, fell in with and drove 
 a body of Mexicans, taking possession of their camp 
 and horses. On the return to camp, the party was 
 ambuscaded and dispersed, the officer and one man 
 having been killed. 
 
 Arista, the general in chief of the Mexican army 
 
 'V 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, April 23, 
 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 142-147 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 107 
 
 of the North, assumed command of the forces inMat- 
 amoras on the 24th of April. With him arrived a 
 large re-enforcement, and he immediately announ 
 ced to General Taylor that he considered hostili 
 ties as having commenced, and that he should pros 
 ecute them. In the pursuit of his intention, he 
 at once sent General Torrejon, with a force some 
 2500 strong, across the river, some miles ahove the 
 American position. Rumors of this movement 
 reached Taylor on the 25th, and a squadron of dra 
 goons, under Captain Thornton, was sent out on 
 that day to obtain certain information of the num 
 ber and character, of the enemy. # 
 
 Thornton proceeded some sixteen miles up the 
 river ; hut, although he received certain informa 
 tion that the enemy had crossed, yet he could gain 
 nothing reliable in regard to the number or descrip 
 tion of his force. His guide refused to proceed fur 
 ther ; but Thornton, in his anxiety to execute his 
 orders, determined to proceed, though the nature 
 of the country rendered the operations of cavalry 
 extremely hazardous. 
 
 Some three miles in advance he arrived at a 
 rancho, and entered the surrounding corral with 
 the advanced guard. The squadron followed after 
 while Thornton was questioning a Mexican, and 
 hardly had the rearmost files entered when the 
 alarm was given. The squadron was in confusion ; 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, April 26, 
 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 288. 
 
108 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 but Thornton, taking the lead, dashed at once at 
 the only opening of the inclosure. That was al 
 ready shut and defended by a large body of Mexi 
 cans, and the passage was impracticable. In 
 searching for a passage to the right the dragoons 
 encountered a galling fire, which increased the 
 confusion, and Thornton's horse falling wounded 
 upon his rider, the whole party gave back to the 
 center of the corral. Captain Hardee, who succeed 
 ed to .the command, rallied the men, and, after a 
 vain endeavor to find an opening, surrendered. In 
 this affair Lieutenant Mason had been killed, and 
 sixteen non-commissioned officers and men had 
 fallen dead or wounded.^ 
 
 Hostilities having been thus positively com 
 menced, and General Taylor made aware of his 
 situation, he was at liberty, in the absence of any 
 prospect of peace, to throw off his purely defensive 
 policy. The 'state of things which had existed 
 since the 28th of March was at an end, and he 
 not only contemplated beating the enemy to his 
 own bank of the river, but intended to carry the 
 war as soon as possible into his territory. For this 
 purpose, on the 26th of April he addressed calls to 
 the Governors of Louisiana and Texas for an aux 
 iliary force of five thousand volunteers.! 
 
 The Mexican troops continued their partisan 
 
 * Proceedings of the Court Martial. Reports of Captains Thornton and 
 Hardee, and Captain Thornton's Defense. 
 
 t Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, April 26, 
 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 288. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 109 
 
 operations, and on the morning of the 28th fell in 
 with a small party of Texan Rangers, posted mid 
 way between Matamoras and Point Isabel, of which 
 nine were killed and taken prisoners. The main ef 
 forts of both armies, however, were put forth to fin 
 ish their different works,, and on the 30th of April 
 the American fort was in fair defensive condition. 
 The plan of immediate operations was meanwhile 
 considered by General Taylor, and although he 
 was strongly inclined to move at once in pursuit 
 of the enemy, and beat the force which had crossed 
 at once over the river, yet more defensive meas 
 ures were recommended by his elder officers. The 
 defensive policy prevailed for a time longer, and the 
 enemy was allowed to cross, with any force, at his 
 leisure, if he chose to do so. It was, however, nec 
 essary to communicate with Point Isabel, which de 
 pot was weakly defended. Such communication 
 was hazardous for any small body of troops, and 
 impracticable for a train under any ordinary es 
 cort. On the 30th the general took the resolution 
 to leave the fort garrisoned by two companies of ar 
 tillery and the seventh regiment of infantry, while 
 he moved the main body of his army in escort of 
 the train to Point Isabel, and opened the commu 
 nication. Accordingly, the garrison at once took 
 post in the works, and all the stores of the army 
 were moved within them. Every preparation 
 which time would admit was made to enable the 
 garrison to stand a siege, and at four o'clock on the 
 afternoon of the '1st of May the main body of the 
 

 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 army made a forced march in the direction of Point 
 Isahel. It arrived there on the following 1 day at 
 noon, having met no hinderance from the enemy. 
 
 During the interval between Thornton's capture 
 and the march to Point Isahel, Torrejon's command 
 had turned the American position, and occupied 
 the left hank of the Rio Grande, some miles below 
 Matamoras, in order to cover the passage of the 
 river by the main Mexican army. Of this a large 
 portion crossed on the 1st of May, with the avow 
 ed intention of intercepting, what was called by 
 the Mexican officers the American retreat.^ But 
 this stroke of military action was not attempted, 
 on account of the alleged want of time, and the 
 bulletins from Matamoras contained loud com 
 plaints of the conduct of General Taylor in avoid 
 ing a battle by the celerity of his flight. 
 
 The town of Matamoras is situated about one 
 thousand yards from the southern bank of the Rio 
 Grande. The course of the stream in the vicinity 
 is, as throughout its extent, exceedingly tortuous 
 and rapid to a degree. The usual points of pas 
 sage from the Texas shore had been, before Ameri 
 can occupation, at two ferries, of which the upper 
 was nearly opposite the west of the town. The 
 lower, which was less used, was at a distance and 
 below the city. 
 
 The Mexican works were in general a line of 
 detached batteries between the two. The most 
 considerable of their forts was a pentagonal redoubt 
 
 * Mexican bulletins published at Matamoras. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Ill 
 
 of considerable capacity and relief? called Fort Pa- 
 redes, at the upper ferry. The other fortifications 
 were open in the rear, and constructed with a 
 view to prevent the direct passage of the river and 
 to annoy the American works. Those directly op 
 posite to them were armed with guns of different 
 calibers, and the lower batteries with howitzers 
 and mortars, but none of them were heavy. , 
 
 The Americans had constructed various traverses 
 and intrenchments before the site for the principal 
 work had been selected, but they were of no use, 
 and the main work was the only one relied upon. 
 It was opposite Matamoras, some fifteen hundred 
 yards or more east of Fort Paredes, and within 
 good eighteen pound range of the right bank of the 
 Rio Grande. The work was a pentagon, with bas- 
 tioned fronts, having the southern fronts of greater 
 length than the others, and was of capacity to re 
 ceive a garrison of the whole strength of the army. 
 But all left in it, including ineffectives, did not 
 number over five hundred. The armament was 
 of four eighteen pounders, and a field battery of 
 four light sixes. 
 
 The ground about the fort was generally level 
 and clear for much distance, except toward the 
 rear. In that direction, within one thousand yards, 
 were various clumps of shrubbery, and a cluster of 
 Mexican huts, called by General Arista, in his 
 dispatches, the "Fanques del Raminero." They 
 were upon the road from Point Isabel to the upper 
 ferry at Matamoras. 
 
112 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Arista commenced his operations against the 
 garrison of the American fort on the 3d of May. 
 Early on the morning of that day seven guns open 
 ed from the Mexican batteries on the right bank 
 of the Rio Grande, to which the Americans replied 
 with their eighteen pounders and the guns of 
 Bragg's light field battery. The latter produced 
 little or no effect, for the range was too great, and 
 their fire was soon suspended ; but the eighteen 
 pounders told well, and in the course of thirty min 
 utes dismounted two Mexican guns. Upon this 
 the enemy ceased his direct fire, and commenced 
 a bombardment from his lower battery, which, with 
 some intermissions, was kept up throughout the 
 day. It had, however, little other effect than an 
 noyance upon the garrison, for the shells were of 
 brass, of small caliber, and the explosions, although 
 many fell inside the works, were by no means de 
 structive. While the bombardment continued the 
 American guns were turned upon the town of Mat- 
 amoras, though also without positive effect, for this 
 range was too great even for the eighteen pound 
 ers, and the hot shot were harmless. From the na 
 ture of Mexican buildings, the town could not be 
 fired, and, a few bullets having been expended in 
 the attempt, the American guns ceased altogether. 
 
 On the 4th the Mexicans continued the vertical 
 fire, but, as on the preceding day, it was harmless. 
 The bulletins from Matamoras, however, announ 
 ced, as the result of the cannonade of the 3d, a 
 complete success. It was said that the American 
 
1HE WAR WITH MEXICO. -^3 
 
 works were entirely destroyed, and that nothing 
 was required except to take possession of the ru 
 ins. This, it was stated, was to be accomplished 
 hy the troops under command of General Canales. 
 Notwithstanding the bold assertions put forth in 
 the bulletins, Canales entertained very different 
 views, and soon after wrote to the publisher, ex 
 pressing the hope that in his future accounts he 
 would confine himself to the truth ; that the works 
 were still exceedingly strong, and that he had no 
 such assault as had been represented in contem 
 plation.^ 
 
 The main Mexican army, having crossed the Rio 
 Grande, remained in camp, awaiting the move 
 ments of General Taylor, and meanwhile Arista's 
 efforts were continued against the American works. 
 A reconnaissance was made by Mexican officers 
 about nine o'clock on the morning of the 5th, from 
 the north of the position, and during that day and 
 night a mortar battery was constructed beyond the 
 huts of the " Fanques del Raminero." On the 
 morning of the 6th, this, together with the mortar 
 and howitzer batteries on the right bank of the 
 Rio Grande, opened and kept up a desultory fire. 
 The first serious loss to the American garrison was 
 the result, for Major Brown, its gallant command 
 er, was mortally wounded. The fort, which was 
 the scene of his devotion and his death, was sub 
 sequently named in his honor ; and, although not 
 known by the name of Fort Brown during the 
 
 * Mexican bulletins published at Matamoras. 
 
 I.-H 
 
 
 
 *- 
 
114 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 operations immediately succeeding, yet it may be 
 permitted so to call it in the continuation of the 
 narrative. 
 
 About ten o'clock on the morning of the 6th 
 Arista moved his troops forward, demonstrating an 
 assault upon the northern fronts of the fort ; but 
 the works in that quarter had been entirely finish 
 ed on the previous evening. The demonstration of 
 attack brought the Mexican troops within range 
 of the six pounders, which were opened with such 
 positive effect as to change the intention of assault, 
 if, indeed, such had been seriously entertained. 
 Whether it had been or not, the speedy retreat 
 of his troops so incensed Arista that he showered 
 a continued stream of shells upon the works for an 
 hour and a half. But his fire produced no great 
 damage; and when he summoned the garrison in 
 the afternoon of the day, every American officer 
 was in favor of continuing the resistance. A pos 
 itive refusal was, in consequence, returned to the 
 summons, and immediately after its receipt by the 
 Mexican commander all his batteries recommenced 
 the fire. It was kept up continually until night 
 fall, but, as before, it did little positive damage. 
 
 The Mexican fire was renewed and continued 
 throughout the 7th, wounding a sentinel and kill 
 ing one of the artillery horses. The garrison, as 
 during the greater, part of the cannonade, kept per 
 fectly quiet, in readiness for an assault, should one 
 be attempted by the enemy. Toward evening a 
 party made a sortie from the works, and leveled a 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 traverse thrown up at the position of the former 
 American camp, near the river, as it afforded pro 
 tection to small parties of Mexicans, which, creep 
 ing up under the hanks of the river, took position 
 under the traverse, and delivered thence an annoy 
 ing fire. 
 
 The same desultory and annoying, although in 
 effectual practice, was -continued hy the Mexicans 
 throughout the 8th and 9th, hut nothing more pos 
 itive was attempted against Fort Brown.^ 
 
 Meanwhile General Taylor was at Point Isahel, 
 completing the defenses of that depot, which he 
 had found in an unfinished state, and obtaining ad 
 ditional supplies and munitions preparatory to his 
 return. He had communicated with Fort Brown 
 on the 4th, through Captain Walker, of the Texan 
 Rangers, and the answer received during the night 
 of the 5th assured him of the safety of the gam- 
 son. The subsequent continued firing told that it 
 still held out, and it was not until all his arrange 
 ments were completed, on the evening of the 7th, 
 that he commenced his march from Point Isahel.f 
 His numerical force had "been in no way increased ; 
 for, although several hodies of recruits had arrived, 
 they were in no greater strength than was neces 
 sary to complete the garrison of Point Isahel, with 
 the addition of a hody of marines and sailors which 
 subsequently arrived. The column was accom- 
 
 * Reports of Major Hawkins. 
 
 t Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, May 5th 
 and 7th, 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 292, 293. 
 
. ..It ?,', ',. 
 
 * ' , ' * ' >/ f. 
 
 '* 
 
 Hg THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 panied by a train of three hundred wagons, lad 
 en with subsistence and munitions. Six twelve 
 pounders, intended to increase the armament of 
 Fort Brown, were packed in the wagons, and two 
 eighteens, intended for the same object, being 
 mounted, were an addition to the effective Ameri 
 can artillery. 
 
 Hearing of General Taylor's movement, on the 
 morning of the 8th General Arista broke up his 
 head-quarters at the " Fanques del Raminero," 
 with the determination of disputing the communi 
 cation with Fort Brown. The reputation which 
 the Americans enjoyed as skirmishers and in forest 
 warfare, with the justice of which the Mexicans 
 had become impressed in the course of their Texan 
 operations, induced Arista to believe that they 
 were only formidable as such, and that Taylor 
 would be easily crushed by his overwhelming force 
 in a conflict in the open field. His troops were 
 some of the best in Mexico, well equipped and 
 fairly disciplined. Leaving Ampudia for a time, to 
 make arrangements for the continued blockade and 
 bombardment of Fort Brown, he moved with his 
 main force to Palo Alto, some nine miles from Mat- 
 amoras, where he took up his position for battle.^ 
 
 The Mexican left was composed of the regular 
 cavalry, which occupied the road, and rested upon 
 a thicket of chaparral, while the infantry in line, 
 with the artillery, twelve pieces in number, posted 
 in the intervals, extended across the prairie. On 
 
 * Arista's Official Correspondence. 
 

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THE WAR WITH MEXICO. J17 
 
 its right was formed the ranchero cavalry, being 
 within a short distance of the chaparral south of 
 the road. The Mexican reserves were some dis 
 tance to the rear, behind an intervening thicket. 
 General Arista has stated that his force numbered 
 three thousand men of all arms ; but this was evi 
 dently erroneous. The line, as he occupied it, could 
 not have been covered by less than six thousand ; 
 and, in addition to this force, he had his reserves. 
 On the morning of the 8th, it was a matter of 
 some doubt with the American general whether 
 his march would be opposed, for his scouts had 
 been in advance, to a position on which the Mex 
 ican troops had been encamped some days previ 
 ous, without meeting an enemy ; but at twelve 
 o'clock his advanced guard came in sight of the 
 enemy's line, and preparations were at once made 
 for battle. The column was halted, and after a 
 short rest, in which the soldiers filled their can 
 teens, Taylor formed his line and advanced, leav 
 ing his train parked under guard of a squad 
 ron of dragoons. The fifth regiment of infantry 
 was on the right of his line, and, with Ringgold's 
 light battery, the third regiment of infantry, 
 Churchill's eighteen pounders, and the fourth 
 regiment of infantry, constituted the right wing, 
 under Colonel Twiggs. The left was the first 
 brigade, under Lieutenant. colonel Belknap, con 
 sisting of a battalion of artillery serving as infant 
 ry, Duncan's light battery, and the eighth regi 
 ment of infantry. 
 
118 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 At two o'clock the line moved in advance by 
 the heads of regiments. Before it came within 
 range of the Mexican positions, a single horseman, 
 Lieutenant Blake, of the Topographical Corps, gal 
 loped rapidly to the front, without drawing rein 
 until within close vicinity of the enemy. Dis 
 mounting, he commenced his reconnaissance ; but, 
 as two Mexican officers rode out to receive him, 
 Blake remounted his horse, and, after having rid 
 den along the extended Mexican front, returned 
 with an accurate report of the numbers and artil 
 lery of the enemy. 
 
 As the American troops came within seven 
 hundred yards of the enemy's line, his artillery 
 opened from the right, and, in quick succession, 
 all his batteries took up and continued the fire. 
 Taylor halted, at once advanced all his artillery, 
 and replied. The American guns soon told with 
 deadly effect upon the masses of the enemy ; but 
 the intervals were closed up as soon as they were 
 made, and the Mexican soldiers stood their ground 
 manfully. Their artillery was directed against 
 the American guns ; for the infantry, although in 
 supporting distance, was kept as far as possible 
 out of range. Against guns alone the Mexican 
 artillery fire was ineffectual, compared with that 
 of the American light pieces, and, after having 
 suffered the cannonade for more than an hour, 
 Arista commenced maneuvering for the victory. 
 He first sent Torrejon's cavalry, with a support of 
 infantry and two guns, to turn and attack the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. -j^g 
 
 American right. The cavalry moved at once ; but 
 it had been much cut up by the fire of Blnggold's 
 battery ; and being still under it and that of the 
 eighteen pounders, its pace was increased to a gal 
 lop, until, in some confusion, it disappeared from 
 view behind the chaparral. To oppose the move 
 ment, Taylor sent the fifth regiment to the right,- 
 where it took post in square, upon the edge of the 
 thicket, having a narrow lagoon immediately be 
 tween it and the enemy. Torrejon turned the la 
 goon, and, coming up from the right and rear, ap 
 proached within short musket range. His troop 
 ers, unslinging their escopetas, commenced a noisy 
 fire, which wounded two men of the square ; but, 
 on a closer approach, one front of it delivered so 
 effective a volley, that, with twenty empty sad 
 dles, the whole mass of cavalry gave back. A 
 portion passed to the rear in the direction of the 
 train, with the apparent intention of cutting it up. 
 To oppose it, Colonel Twiggs sent the third regi 
 ment of infantry, and, as it approached, the caval 
 ry gave it up, and retired beyond range. The 
 Mexican artillery, which had advanced to the fur 
 ther bank of the lagoon, to within easy range of 
 the fifth regiment, had not unlimbered, when 
 Lieutenant Bidgely, coming forward at a gallop 
 with two of Binggold's guns, threw them promptly 
 into battery, and poured in such a shower of can 
 ister that the enemy withdrew at once without 
 firing a shot. 
 
 While these movements and operations were 
 
120 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 progressing, the cannonade between the main cr 
 imes had continued, and the Mexican masses were 
 still suffering severely ; for Arista kept his infantry 
 close to his guns, and, in consequence, the Ameri 
 can artillery was turned in greater part upon it. 
 But, though wasted by every discharge, his men 
 held their ground with obstinacy, and, for a time, 
 showed no sign of fear or retreat. 
 
 During the action the dry grass of the prairie 
 took fire, and, under a gentle breeze, the sheet of 
 flame rolled away to the American left, partially 
 concealing the armies from each other, and inter 
 fering with the aim of the artillery. The firing 
 slackened, and meantime Arista drew back his 
 left wing, which had suffered most, and reformed 
 his whole line in front of the chaparral, changing 
 front to the left. Taylor made a corresponding 
 change, and advanced his eighteen pounders with 
 the fifth regiment near to the position which Tor- 
 rejon's cavalry had occupied at the commencement 
 of the action. Ringgold's and Duncan's guns, with 
 their supporting infantry, also advanced, and when, 
 after an hour's cessation, the cannonade was steadi 
 ly resumed, the Mexican ranks were again mowed 
 down by their sweeping fire. 
 
 The Mexican soldiers had stood their ground so 
 far with a constancy worthy a better fate ; but, un 
 der the continued destruction, many became restive, 
 and impatiently demanded to be led against their 
 enemy, or to be allowed to fall back.*? Yielding 
 
 * Arista's Official Report. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 to their importunities, Arista moved his whole right 
 wing to turn the American left, under cover of the 
 smoke and flame which rose from the burning prai 
 rie, ordered two squadrons of cavalry and a strong 
 battalion of infantry from the reserve for the same 
 purpose, and sent a body of cavalry against the 
 American right. 5 * His troops had hardly got in 
 motion when Duncan caught a glimpse of them 
 through the smoke, and seeing at once the necessi 
 ty of opposing the movement, he reported it to Bel- 
 knap. With Belknap's consent, without waiting for 
 support, he moved the two sections of his battery in 
 succession, at a gallop, to the left. His guns came 
 round the cloud of fire which had hidden his move 
 ment with a celerity which astonished the Mexi 
 cans. The cavalry which formed their right pull 
 ed up at once in apparent amazement, but the corps 
 from the reserve debouched from the chaparral, and 
 moved steadily down upon Duncan's left. One sec 
 tion of the battery opened upon this attack, while 
 with the other he cannonaded the force in his front, 
 which meantime remained in unaccountable inac 
 tivity. Ker's squadron of dragoons and the eighth 
 regiment of infantry had hastened to the support 
 of the battery, but before they came within sup 
 porting distance the Mexican attacking column 
 had fallen back under the steady fire of two guns. 
 The main body, however, held its ground, though 
 inactive, and the beaten force, having been rallied, 
 advanced again. It soon gave way a second time, 
 
 * Arista's Official Report. 
 
f ** " V * ^ ' : * ' 
 
 * ;^r-f .'::i*> 
 
 122 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and commenced its flight in earnest. The whole 
 battery was then turned upon the mass in front, 
 which stood for a time ; but much cut up, squadron 
 after squadron took the panic, the cavalry fell back 
 upon the infantry, and the whole fled out of range. # 
 
 Upon the American right the enemy had ad 
 vanced a corps of his cavalry in the while, which 
 persisted in its movements until within grape 
 range of the eighteen pounders. A close discharge 
 dispersed the mass ; but scattered parties advanced 
 and opened fire upon the artillery battalion, which, 
 formed in square, supported the guns. A volley 
 from one front of the square silenced their fire and 
 finished the battle of Palo Alto. By this time it 
 was quite dark, and further operations were dis 
 continued on either side. 
 
 The American force engaged on this day amount 
 ed to 2111 sabers and bayonets, and ten guns. Its 
 loss in the battle was nine killed and forty-seven 
 wounded. Of the latter class, three were commis 
 sioned officers, and two had mortal wounds. f One 
 was Major Binggold, much distinguished as an ar 
 tillery officer, and a favorite with the country; 
 the other, also distinguished and beloved among 
 his comrades, was Captain Page, of the fourth in 
 fantry. Victims in the first positive action of the 
 Mexican war, their services have been remember 
 ed, and. their names, from the first, cherished in 
 the memory of their countrymen. 
 
 * Official Reports of Lieutenant-colonel Belknap, Captain Duncan, and 
 General Taylor. t Official Returns. 
 
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 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 12 3 
 
 The loss of the Mexican army on this field was 
 officially stated as being, in all, 252 ;* but, from the 
 known effect of the American artillery, and the 
 masses of slain which encumbered the field, it is 
 probable that the loss was much greater. If the 
 return of killed and wounded was in the same 
 ratio with the Mexican field report, it must have 
 been at least double the stated number. 
 
 During the night both armies remained upon 
 and near the field of battle. The result of the ac 
 tion had, however, changed the opinion of the 
 Mexican general in regard to the capacity of the 
 American troops for battle in the open field, and, in 
 the continuation of the conflict, he determined to 
 avail himself of an advantageous defensive posi 
 tion, f Wherefore, collecting his scattered forces 
 during the night, at early dawn on the morning 
 of the 9th he moved in retreat to the position of 
 Resaca de la Palma. 
 
 The American general had not anticipated this 
 movement of the enemy, and although his troops 
 were drawn out for action so soon as it was ob 
 served that he was in motion, yet no attempt was 
 made to improve the opportunity for a close pursuit. J 
 It was even a question whether a forward move 
 ment should be made, and for obtaining an expres 
 sion of opinion a meeting of the senior officers of 
 brigades and regiments was called. It is an old 
 
 * Arista's Official Report. 
 
 t General Arista speaks of it as the American superiority in artillery. 
 Official Report. 
 t Campaign Sketches of Captain Henry, p. 94. 
 
124 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 remark among military men, "that a council of 
 war never fights." Experience has shown that 
 this is generally true, and in this case, had it been 
 left to the decision of the majority, the rule would 
 have been verified. Most of the officers, with a 
 prudence which was hardly prudent in the state 
 of affairs which existed, and since operations had 
 been commenced, advised defensive measures. 
 Some proposed that the army should intrench in 
 position ; others, that it should retire to Point Isa 
 bel, to await the arrival of strong re-enforcements, 
 and, in support of the advised delay, the remark 
 was made that the army then present could not be 
 expected to fight the whole strength of Mexico. 
 There was some foundation, apparently, for their 
 views, in the immense disparity of force ; but, al 
 though General Taylor had called the meeting, he 
 did not coincide in opinion with the greater por 
 tion of his officers. Two officers, Lieutenant-col 
 onel Belknap and Captain Duncan (who had come 
 unbidden to the meeting, and supported his views 
 with strong arguments and bold determination), 
 advised the advance, and when the meeting broke 
 up, General Taylor ordered preparations to be made 
 for the march. 
 
 The train was parked on the field of Palo Alto, 
 the first brigade, with the two eighteen pounders 
 and two twelves (newly mounted), was stationed 
 for its defense, and the wounded of the action of 
 the 8th were sent under an escort of cavalry to 
 Point Isabel. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 At one o'clock the army again advanced in the 
 direction of Fort Brown, preceded by a picked corps 
 of two hundred and twenty skirmishers, under Cap 
 tains M'Call and C. F. Smith, accompanied by 
 Walker's Rangers and a small party of dragoons. 
 This advanced guard, disposed on either side of the 
 road, and following the route of the Mexican army, 
 beat through the chaparral which covered the 
 ground in front of Resaca de la Palma, meeting 
 with but few of the enemy until it entered an open 
 space immediately in front of the ravine. A shot 
 from a battery posted to defend the passage in 
 duced a halt, and it becoming evident from a short 
 reconnaissance that the enemy was in force, the ar 
 rival of General Taylor was awaited. On coming 
 up, he ordered Captain M'Call to bring on the ac 
 tion and ascertain the position of the enemy, and 
 the skirmishers advanced. 
 
 Arista had been re-enforced during the morning 
 by near two thousand infantry and a strong body 
 of cavalry. His infantry occupied the northern 
 crest of Resaca de la Palma, which ravine is cross 
 ed by the main road from Point Isabel to Matamo- 
 ras at a point some four miles from the latter place. 
 The general outline of the ravine is an irregular 
 curve, of which the convexity is given to the south. 
 The road running toward the south crosses the ra 
 vine about the center of its length. Three guns 
 on the northern crest defended the point of passage, 
 and two on each side of the road south of the ra 
 vine supported the first battery with a flank and 
 
126 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 cross fire. Along the southern crest was posted a 
 second line of infantry, and the cavalry, which 
 were necessarily unahle to act, was in strong mass 
 es to the rear. The position and disposition of the 
 Mexican forces were exceedingly strong against an 
 enemy advancing by the road, and the thick growth 
 of chaparral rendered such an advance the one most 
 probable, if not absolutely necessary. But the same 
 cause rendered a complete view of the operations 
 impracticable, and made any action at the point 
 one of detail on both sides, with the advantage, 
 however, of a knowledge of locality on the part of 
 the Mexicans not possessed by their enemy. 
 
 M' Call's and Smith's skirmishers pressed forward 
 on the left and right, driving the Mexican troops 
 of the first line from their positions at the northern 
 extremities of the ravine. Bidgely's guns were 
 planted at a point on the right of the path, within 
 three hundred yards of the Mexican artillery, and 
 thence opened a lively fire ; it was briskly return 
 ed from the Mexican advanced battery ; but the 
 chaparral prevented accurate aim and the conse 
 quent full effect of artillery on either side. The 
 fifth regiment and the left wing of the fourth, de 
 ployed as skirmishers, were sent into action on the 
 left, while the third, with the right wing, displayed 
 on the right, and supported the advanced parties : 
 these troops pressed on through the thicket, and the 
 action became general. > The nature of the ground 
 prevented the use of any other artillery than Ridge- 
 ly's battery ; there was no position in which a 
 
. 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 12 T 
 
 line could be arrayed, nor was it attempted. The 
 enemy's shot fell thick and fast from his positions 
 on the crest of the ravine, and each captain and 
 subaltern led his command as an independent body. . 
 All was apparently in confusion ; but, confident in 
 the courage and discipline of those around them, 
 there was a general harmony in the attack ; none 
 thought of retreat ; and, with loud shouts, each 
 small party of the American troops pressed vigor 
 ously forward, and the fire of small arms was in 
 cessant. While the action continued in this man 
 ner, the Mexican artillery continued its fire upon 
 the advancing American troops, although that of 
 the advanced battery had slackened under the 
 quick discharges of Bldgely's guns. To finish the 
 action as soon as possible by its capture, General 
 Taylor sent Captain May's squadron of dragoons 
 directly against it.^ May started down the road 
 at a gallop in obedience to his order, and pulling 
 up for a moment as he passed Bldgely's position, 
 the latter poured in a discharge of canister, which 
 drew the Mexican fire in reply. May continued . 
 his course, and, though his command was in confu 
 sion, rode over the whole battery. The Mexican 
 infantry, however, from the second line, drove him, 
 and the six men whom he was able to rally from 
 his whole squadron, back under a severe fire ; but 
 he carried with him General de la Vega, who had 
 been entangled in the melee and taken prisoner.! 
 Eidgely had, meanwhile, followed at a gallop and 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. t Captain May's Official Report. 
 
128 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 unlimbered on the northern crest, ready to defend 
 the position without infantry support ; but, al 
 though much exposed, the fear of injuring the dra 
 goons prevented his firing. 
 
 When the action had fairly commenced, Gener 
 al Taylor had sent orders to Lieutenant -colonel 
 Belknap to advance one regiment from the guard 
 of the train, and at this time he led the eighth in 
 fantry into action. Moving down the road in col 
 umn at a charging pace, the eighth, joined by a 
 portion of the fifth, which had beat through to 
 the ravine on the left of the road, crossed the ra 
 vine, secured the guns, and, pushing into the chap 
 arral, after a severe struggle drove the enemy 
 from the vicinity. 
 
 The battle was won ; but still, in small parties, 
 the Mexicans disputed the American advance, un 
 til their last gun, which had been in position to 
 their left, was captured, and their camp entered 
 by the fourth infantry, and then the rout began. 
 
 Ker's squadron of dragoons, Duncan's and Kldge- 
 ly's batteries, the artillery battalion, and the light 
 companies under Captain C. F. Smith, were sent 
 on the track of the fugitives. Following closely 
 in pursuit, they dispersed the routed Mexican army, 
 driving its broken masses into the chaparral and 
 beyond the Bio Grande. As the advance of the 
 pursuing forces came in sight of the Mexican bat 
 teries at Matamoras, these opened fire. The Amer 
 ican guns of Fort Brown also commenced firing on 
 the upper ferry, at which the fugitives were cross- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^ 2 9 
 
 ing ; but night coming on, rendered it impossible to 
 distinguish friend from foe, and the cannonade 
 ceased on both sides. The pursuing forces occu 
 pied the former American camp on the banks of 
 the Rio Grande, but for the night the main army 
 remained on the field of battle. 
 
 The rout of the Mexicans was complete. Their 
 artillery (eight pieces), with its equipment and am 
 munition, their camp and camp furniture, and five 
 hundred pack-mules and saddles, remained in the 
 hands of the victors. General Arista lost his per 
 sonal baggage, plate, and public correspondence. 
 The loss of his army, in killed and wounded, it 
 was almost impossible to determine ; but it was 
 certainly heavy, and the American general was 
 not extravagant when he estimated it, in the two 
 days' action, at over one thousand men.^ 
 
 Of the Americans, thirty-nine were slain, includ 
 ing three subalterns of merit : Inge of the Dragoons, 
 Cochrane of the fourth, and Chadbourne of the 
 eighth infantry. Eighty-two were wounded, in 
 cluding two lieutenant colonels, two captains, arid 
 eight subalterns.! 
 
 On the following day the American army was 
 engaged in burying the dead, and Arista, without 
 further offensive demonstration, in collecting the 
 fragments of his beaten forces. An exchange of 
 prisoners took place on the llth, by which Thorn 
 ton's party was released, and returned to the Amer 
 ican camp. 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. t Official Return. 
 
 I. I 
 
130 THE WAR WITH' MEXICO. 
 
 With a view of preparing for the passage of the 
 Bio Grande and carrying the war into Mexican 
 territory, on the llth General Taylor repaired in 
 person to Point Isabel, where re-enforcements had 
 commenced arriving. To favor the passage of the 
 stream by the main force, he arranged an expedi 
 tion, in conjunction with the naval force which 
 was then off Brazos Santiago, against the little vil 
 lage of Burita, some twenty miles below Matamo- 
 ras, on the right bank of the river.^ No opposi 
 tion was made on the part of the Mexicans, and 
 the hamlet, which was entirely worthless in itself, 
 was taken possession of by the expedition. On 
 the 14th the general returned to Fort Brown, tak 
 ing with him two siege mortars, with their ammu 
 nition, and an increase of heavy ordnance stores. 
 The 15th, 16th, and 17th were spent in making 
 preparations and selecting points for the passage 
 of the river. The" notice of Arista being attracted 
 by the American movements, on the 17th he sent 
 General Requena to propose an armistice until the 
 boundaries of the two countries could be settled by 
 negotiation. General Taylor at once rejected the 
 offer, and on the following morning commenced 
 the passage two miles above Matamoras. 
 
 Three batteries of field artillery and two eighteen 
 pounders were posted on the left bank, to command 
 and protect the passage, and the light companies 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, May 12th, 
 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 297. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^ 3 ^ 
 
 of infantry and the cavalry were thrown across the 
 stream as rapidly as the few hoats which were in 
 the possession of the army would transport them. 
 But it was soon ascertained that the enemy had 
 evacuated the town ; and while the troops which 
 had already passed the river moved down on the 
 right bank and took possession of the Mexican 
 works, the main body of the army returned to 
 Fort Brown, and crossed at the upper ferry at 
 leisure.^ 
 
 Arista had left, early in the morning of the 18th, 
 with the remnant of his army and eleven guns, 
 having secreted and destroyed the remainder of the 
 artillery which had been in battery around Mata- 
 moras. On the 19th Lieutenant-colonel Garland, 
 with the whole mounted force of the American 
 army, pursued, and, twenty-seven miles from the 
 town, fell upon the Mexican rear guard, which was 
 dispersed, with the loss of twenty men taken pris 
 oners and a quantity of baggage. Garland's force 
 was, however, too small for continued operations, 
 and, having continued the pursuit for sixty miles, 
 he returned ;f and the short campaign of the Rio 
 Grande was finished. 
 
 .The position of the American army opposite 
 Matamoras, in the face of a Mexican force of more 
 
 * Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant General, May 18th, 
 1846. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 297. t Idem, May 24. Idem. 
 
132 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 than three times its numerical strength, and in 
 front of a town of several thousand inhabitants, 
 can not fail, even now, to be regarded as critical. 
 As a military position, it was false ; for not only 
 was the enemy in overwhelming numbers, but he 
 was in his own country, had good communication 
 with the interior, and his vicinity was, to a degree, 
 populated, and capable of supporting an army. 
 The American army had a long and hazardous 
 route of communication by land, which was, in 
 deed, never relied on, was twenty-seven miles from 
 its depot, which was in an unfinished and almost 
 defenseless condition, and the only communication 
 with New Orleans, which was the true base of 
 operations, was by the Gulf of Mexico. The ad 
 vantages on the Mexican side were fully demon 
 strated by the concentration of a large army at 
 Matamoras, before General Taylor deemed it nec 
 essary to call for a re-enforcement of a single 
 man. 
 
 The march of the army from Corpus Christi 
 must be regarded as an experiment on the part of 
 the United States government at Washington, un 
 dertaken for the purpose of inducing Mexico to 
 listen to the offer of negotiations made through 
 Mr. Slidell, and of demonstrating to her the con 
 sequences of a refusal in the forcible seizure of the 
 territory in dispute. Although the whole disposa 
 ble force of the American regular army was made 
 use of, yet the inadequacy of it to the effect de 
 sired appears to have been the subject of appre- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 133 
 
 hension at "Washington, from the letters of Mr. 
 Marcy to General Taylor.^ Indeed, it may well 
 have been ; for, where forcible possession is to be 
 taken of disputed territory, it is obvious that it 
 should be done in great strength, otherwise the 
 proceeding only invites resistance to what the en 
 emy denominates injustice, with a prospect of suc 
 cess, especially where every advantage of position 
 is with the enemy. 
 
 The reasons why General Taylor did not avail 
 himself of the means placed at his disposal have 
 been previously noticed. All of them had their 
 rise in the military policy of the United States, in 
 depending almost entirely upon a citizen soldiery. 
 By the laws under which the President is empow 
 ered to call upon the militia, the term of service is 
 fixed at three months ; and it was evidently a 
 measure of bad policy on the part of General Tay 
 lor to call for volunteers for that short period upon 
 a contingency which, however hazardous in case 
 it arose, was certainly, at the time of his move 
 ment from Corpus Christi, exceedingly doubtful. 
 As he did not call for them at the time, it was 
 natural that he should have delayed the call, after 
 his arrival opposite Matamoras, until the necessity 
 became palpable, and the whole term of service 
 could be employed with some prospect of advant 
 age. In consequence, he found himself in a po 
 sition which certainly was one of danger, and 
 
 * Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 196, House of Representa 
 tives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 
134 ( THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 which created, for the time, great anxiety for his 
 safety in the United States. 
 
 Had the regular force of the United States been 
 larger, the danger would not have been encoun 
 tered ; for the movement to the Rio Grande would 
 have been made in such force, that Mexico, torn 
 as she was by her domestic troubles, could never 
 have assembled a body of troops so superior in 
 number as that which Arista commanded. The 
 immediate cause of the weakness of the American 
 army is to be found in the reduction of 1842. Had 
 the authorized number of privates in each compa 
 ny been one hundred instead of forty-two, the force 
 under General Taylor's command opposite Mata- 
 moras would have been near seven thousand of all 
 arms. With this number of American troops, the 
 occupation of the disputed territory would have 
 been positive, and no Mexican force which could 
 be placed on the frontier would have dared to cross 
 the border. If it had, the result would have been 
 in no way problematical, and the anxiety, and 
 confusion, and hurry of subsequent preparation 
 would have been avoided. 
 
 The course of action to be adopted upon the 
 commencement of hostilities, when the capture of 
 Thornton's squadron demonstrated that they were 
 inevitable, was not only of the greatest importance, 
 but a matter upon which it may well have been 
 difficult to decide. 
 
 It was that of the commencement of military op 
 erations, and, like all others, they depend for sue- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 135 
 
 cess upon their commencement in a great degree. 
 It was, the commencement of the war, and the 
 moral effect which success or defeat would exer 
 cise on either party was of the most vital moment. 
 Unless General Taylor had heen assured of success, 
 his course of action would have been to have bro 
 ken up his camp opposite Matamoras, abandoned 
 his position, and withdrawn his army to Point Isa 
 bel ; for it is an approved maxim in war, " that a 
 battle should not be fought when the advantages 
 which may be gained by a victory are less than 
 the dangers to be apprehended from a defeat."* 
 In this case, the advantages to be gained by a vic 
 tory were the vindication of the position of the 
 United States and the supremacy of moral power, 
 which the victory would retain and increase, be 
 sides the safety of the army. The moral force of 
 the victory was the greatest advantage to be hoped 
 for in the commencement of a war, which, from the 
 policy of the United States, was necessarily to be 
 prosecuted in the main by new levies ; for the ex 
 ample of his veteran comrade exercises a most ben 
 eficial influence on a recruit, and hastens the time 
 when he, too, becomes a veteran. 
 
 The disadvantages to be apprehended in case of 
 defeat were no less than the total destruction of 
 the army, involving the loss of both positions at 
 Point Isabel and Fort Brown, and the consequent 
 loss of morale in the commencement of operations. 
 In a war with so impressionable a people as the 
 
 * Napoleon's Maxims of War. 
 
136 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Mexicans, this must have been most disastrous in 
 future conflict. Moreover, the annihilation of the 
 main force of the American regular army would 
 have gone far to increase the dependence of the 
 United States upon a volunteer force, and to have 
 deprived their future army of the proper elements 
 of organization. Therefore, had General Taylor 
 considered the result doubtful, he might well have 
 secured the safety of his army and saved himself 
 from the disasters of defeat by falling back with his 
 whole force to Point Isabel. That he could have 
 defended himself there, there can be no doubt ; and 
 for his operations, whatever they may have been, 
 he would have had his whole force. His commu 
 nication with New Orleans would have been direct, 
 and, upon the arrival of re-enforcements, he could 
 have taken the field in strength. A decided vic 
 tory would have had the immediate result of that 
 of Resaca, whether Fort Brown was occupied or 
 not ; and the Mexican army, if beaten, must have 
 retired beyond the Rio Grande, for the reason that 
 the country on the east of it was comparatively a 
 desert. 
 
 That General Taylor had at first no doubt of the 
 result of the action, is evident from his letters an 
 nouncing his call for volunteers, and his march 
 from Point Isabel ;# and his dependence must 
 
 * " This will constitute an auxiliary force of nearly 5000 men, which will 
 be necessary to prosecute the war with vigor, and carry it, as it should be, 
 into the enemy's country." Taylor's Letter to the Adjutant General, April 
 26, 1846. " If the enemy oppose my march, in whatever force, I shall fight 
 him." Taylor's Letter to the Adjutant General, May 7, 1846. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 have been upon the moral force of his army. This 
 he well knew, and that the prevailing sentiment 
 throughout the ranks was an anxiety for the bat 
 tle, without waiting the arrival of re-enforcements ; 
 for a strong desire to reap the full harvest of glory 
 pervaded both officers and men. The regular army 
 had long been the subject of animadversion by pop 
 ular orators ; and the officers and men, feeling con- 
 fident in their talent, bravery, and discipline, were 
 now anxious that their efficiency should be put to 
 the test, in the commencement of the war, against 
 overwhelming odds. No greater stimulus for exer 
 tion certainly could have been desired ; and, know 
 ing this sentiment, participating in it -to a degree, 
 and knowing the strength of his army, who can 
 doubt that the proper course was pursued by Gen 
 eral Taylor when he chose to retain both of his po 
 sitions and to force the communication ? 
 
 Having decided upon this point, the proper ac 
 tion was evidently to bring on a conflict with the 
 Mexican army in detail, or tq dispute the passage 
 of the Rio Grande, had either or both been possi 
 ble. To either of these, the nature of the country 
 and the winding course of the river presented diffi 
 culties, and the craft of the Mexican general was 
 such as to have rendered extreme celerity necessa 
 ry to insure success, which the first difficulties men 
 tioned in a measure forbade. 
 
 As no such operation was attempted, the move 
 ment to Point Isabel became one of imperative ne 
 cessity; and had it not been that the defensive 
 
138 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 works of that depot were in an unfinished state, 
 prudence would have dictated an immediate re 
 turn ; for certainly, with all these known charac 
 teristics of the enemy, it could hardly have been 
 believed that an army of ten thousand men, with 
 heavy fixed batteries, could have failed in an at 
 tack against a field work garrisoned by two skele 
 ton companies of artillery and a weak regiment of 
 infantry. Although delayed to the last moment, 
 and bold in itself, yet the march in return was en 
 tailed by the movement to the Point, and, being 
 opposed, the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca were 
 the consequence. 
 
 At Palo Alto, the American artillery, thrown, as 
 it was, frankly and fearlessly into action, had the 
 most powerful effect, and took advantage of the 
 false disposition of Arista's infantry. The Ameri 
 can infantry, located as far out of range as was 
 compatible with a position within supporting dis 
 tance, secured the artillery, and, while the latter 
 had such decided effect, it was certainly the part 
 of good policy to engage no other arm until the en 
 emy was in confusion ; but no advantage was tak 
 en of, this when it had been effected by the fire of 
 the artillery and the prompt action of Duncan's bat 
 tery on the left. Had the movement of the whole 
 American force in advance taken place at that time, 
 it has been the expressed opinion of many that the 
 field would have been swept and the conflict would 
 have been ended at once ;# and it is hardly doubt- 
 
 * This opinion is expressed in Campaign Sketches, p. 93. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 139 
 
 ful that such would have been the case; for a de 
 termined charge by the American infantry, which 
 had been almost intact, upon an enemy so cut up as 
 was the Mexican army, must have driven the lat 
 ter, dispersed, into the chaparral, where it is hardly 
 possible that Arista could have rallied his forces 
 during the night. The reason which has been as 
 signed that the charge was not ordered, that the 
 American general wished to protect his train, hard 
 ly has force, for there was no enemy in position to 
 attack it, and if encumbered by his train on the 
 8th, he was no less so on the 9th. He had to fin 
 ish the battle, and why it was not finished on the 
 8th, when the opportunity was offered for instan 
 taneous and decisive action, can not be accounted 
 for by any reasons of the policy which had been 
 adopted. 
 
 The indecision and hesitancy to attack display 
 ed on the morning of the 9th, when Arista moved 
 off, and the subsequent summons of a meeting of 
 officers to give opinions on the propriety of an ad 
 vance, were still less in keeping with this policy; 
 and the evil effect of the delay was demonstrated at 
 the strong position of Resaca de la Palma, by the 
 occupation of which Arista threw one half of his 
 enemy's most powerful arm, the artillery, out of 
 action, and rendered the fire of the other uncertain. 
 
 But the advance being resolved upon, it was 
 persisted in, and the bold and vigorous manner in 
 which the American troops fell on at Resaca de la 
 Palma can not be too much admired. Once in ac- 
 
140 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tion, however, the control of the general, except in 
 his timely advance of the cavalry and reserve, was 
 gone, and the bravery of subordinates and soldiers 
 did the work. Being accomplished, General Tay 
 lor did not allow his enemy again to retire at his 
 leisure ; though, from want of boats, and the full , 
 knowledge of the magnitude of the success, the vic 
 tory was not immediately followed by the passage 
 of the Rio Grande. Arista was therefore allowed 
 to draw off the remnant of his force. 
 
 But all these operations were, at the commence 
 ment of a war, prosecuted against greatly superior 
 forces, and without the full data in the character 
 and dispositions of the enemy which they afforded 
 for the future ; and this must be remembered in 
 forming a judgment upon their notice, as well as 
 that critical remarks upon military operations are 
 always after the fact. 
 
 The course of action so boldly pursued by Gen 
 eral Taylor placed every physical advantage in 
 Arista's hands ; and had he been equal to the cri 
 sis, and his troops properly maneuvered, the com 
 mencement of the war might possibly have been of 
 brighter augury to the Mexican nation. The Amer 
 ican army was allowed to pass the Mexican on the 
 night of the 1st of May, and, as Arista knew the 
 whole locality well, an excellent opportunity for 
 annoyance, at least, was lost. Then the opportu 
 nity for crushing the garrison of Fort Brown was 
 neglected; for the attack of a field work by bom 
 bardment, at long range, the experience of Mexican 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. J 41 
 
 revolutions might have shown to be useless when 
 not followed by a vigorous assault. 
 
 The greatest oversight of the Mexican command 
 er was on the field of Palo Alto, in awaiting the 
 American advance with his infantry in false posi 
 tion, and subsequently in sustaining a murderous 
 cannonade for an hour before attempting any of 
 fensive movement. In consequence, the moral 
 force of his troops was shaken, which had before 
 been excellent for Mexican soldiers. They had 
 been assured of the victory, and their imposing 
 array and overwhelming numbers might well have 
 induced confidence. If, instead of sustaining the 
 fire of the American artillery in line, Arista had 
 thrown his masses at once into the action in the 
 first enthusiasm of the battle, with such impression- 
 able soldiers as he commanded, certainly he had 
 the best chance of success ; and the full strength 
 of the moral power of the American army would 
 have been required to withstand the onset of such 
 overwhelming numbers in their first good order and 
 array. One success would haye achieved another ; 
 and though desperate fighting would have been 
 required to win the victory, yet the Mexican sol 
 diers would have been taught that it was possible. 
 
 As it was, they were beaten at Palo Alto by the 
 .artillery before a movement was commenced ; and 
 though the subsequent maneuvers of the field were 
 well calculated to restore the battle and achieve 
 success, the moral force to sustain a close conflict 
 and carry them out with vigor was gone. 
 
142 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Nor was it recovered at Resaca de la Palma, un 
 der the prestige of the preceding defeat, and the 
 vigorous charge of the victorious soldiers of Palo 
 Alto. 
 
 The total and complete overthrow, and the 
 speedy retreat into the interior, so different a re 
 sult from that which had heen anticipated, had its 
 full effect upon the Mexican army for future op 
 erations. The prowess of American soldiers, so 
 fully demonstrated, could never be forgotten in the 
 whole course of the war. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 American Preparation for War Difficulties of Executive Avowed Object 
 of War California New Mexico Plan of Operations General Games' s 
 Action at New Orleans Term of Service of Volunteers General Scott's 
 Dispute with the War Department General Taylor assigned to Command 
 Mr. Marcy's and General Scott's Letters to him on the Plan of Opera 
 tions General Taylor's Reply Mr. Marcy's on the same Subject Gen 
 eral Taylor's Answer Want of settled Plan of Operations Observations. 
 Difficulties in preparing Advance from Matamoras Occupation of Rey- 
 nosa and Camargo Arrival of Twelve Months' Volunteers, and Discharge 
 of Louisiana Troops Preparations for Movement Organization of Regu 
 lars Worth marches to Serralvo Establishment of Entrepdt Organiza 
 tion of Field Division of Volunteers Concentration of active Force at Ser 
 ralvo March toward Monterey. 
 
 THE news of the commencement of hostilities on 
 the Rio Grande having reached Washington, the 
 great labor of military preparation and arrange 
 ment was thrown at once upon the government. 
 This was a necessary consequence of the policy of 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^43 
 
 depending almost entirely upon a volunteer force, 
 and of keeping the regular army to the minimum 
 standard. In other cases of war, such policy might 
 lead to positive disastrous results in the outset, hy 
 allowing an enemy hetter prepared to use his means 
 of offense while the United States marshaled their 
 forces for the conflict. 
 
 But in the knowledge of the strength of the coun 
 try, and that, when the necessity hecame palpahle, 
 any sufficient numerical force could he raised, the 
 policy, such as it was, had heen persisted in. No 
 increase of the army, other than hy a single regi 
 ment of rifles for Oregon service, had been recom 
 mended by the President or advocated in Congress 
 until the existence of positive facts of war. It may 
 have been that the delay arose as much in reasons 
 of home policy as in a belief in the efficiency of the 
 system; for, with a strong and jealous opposition, 
 watching narrowly every act of the executive, it 
 was almost impossible to have provided for the 
 contingency. The attempt would have been de 
 nounced as one to increase executive patronage, 
 and in the fancied strength of the volunteer sys 
 tem would have been found an argument suffi 
 ciently strong to have insured its defeat. And it 
 would have been at once argued by the opposition 
 that the laws already in force, empowering the 
 President to call forth the militia to repel invasion, 
 were sufficient provision for the danger, and that 
 the endeavor to increase the army had therefore 
 its origin, not in a desire for the necessary defense 
 
144 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the country, but in the wish to 'enforce what had 
 already been termed the injustice designed and per 
 petrated against Mexico. 
 
 But the crisis had come ; overt acts of hostility 
 had been commenced on the part of Mexico, and 
 the country was, de facto, in war. The enthusi 
 asm of the American people was fairly aroused ; and 
 when the message of the President announced the 
 existence of war, and called upon Congress to make 
 provision for its prosecution, the fear of the resent 
 ment of a free people, whose first impulse is for the 
 defense of national right and national honor, si 
 lenced the opposition, if, indeed, its members were 
 not impressed with the necessities of the case. 
 
 They joined, therefore, with the supporters of the 
 administration, the state of war was officially recog 
 nized as being the consequence of the act of Mex 
 ico, and bills were passed providing men, money, 
 and munitions with an alacrity which, had all par 
 ty feeling been left out of the question, would have 
 been indicative of the desire of legislators to make 
 amends for past delay, and have left no doubt of 
 their opinion as to the necessity of the crisis and 
 the justice of the cause. 
 
 By the act of May 13th, 1846, the President was 
 authorized to call forth volunteers in any number 
 not exceeding fifty thousand, to serve for the peri 
 od of one year, or during the war, and to appoint 
 the requisite general and staff officers for their com 
 mand. The field and company officers were to be 
 appointed and commissioned according to the laws 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO: 
 
 145 
 
 of the states whence the volunteers were called. 
 Other acts, passed soon after, empowered him to 
 increase the number of privates in the companies 
 of the regular army to one hundred, should it he 
 necessary, and to appoint an additional number of 
 general officers iri the regular service.^ Money 
 was appropriated for carrying the provisions of the 
 several acts into effect, and every thing which the 
 government had asked for the cojmtmencement of 
 operations, thus far was promptly allowed and ap 
 propriated. The American Congress had done its 
 part, and the President and cabinet proceeded to 
 the execution of the difficult duty of carrying on a 
 foreign war : a duty which the various safeguards tp 
 popular liberty, protected and cherished by the free 
 institutions of the United States, render more diffi 
 cult of execution on the part of the American exec 
 utive than such duty is for that of any government 
 less dependent upon the will of the people. The 
 limitation of the power of executive officers, the fre 
 quent calls for information concerning measures 
 requiring secrecy for success, the thousand prying 
 eyes and brazen tongues attendant upon a free and 
 uncontrolled public press, which often publishes 
 false and exaggerated accounts of military move 
 ments before in propriety they should be discussed 
 at all, are a few of the elements of difficulty in the 
 military operations of the government which that 
 of the United States must encounter. In the jeal 
 ous watch of the opposition party, all these elements 
 
 * Congressional Globe, first Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 
 I. K 
 
146 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 are brought into play with the vigor of party ani 
 mosity ; for rieither orators nor editors" will scruple 
 to attach as much opprobrium as it is possible to 
 attach to the acts of the .executive. For the end 
 of their own argument and political effect, each 
 act will be spied out and remarked upon in the 
 attempt to prove the baseness of the party in power, 
 and that the incumbent chief magistrate of the na 
 tion is unworthy of his place and should be super 
 seded. It matters not to the reckless politicians 
 that indirect assistance is afforded to the enemy by 
 such a course of conduct. In their headlong rush 
 for power, this is a matter which does not imme 
 diately interfere with political prospects, and the 
 reverse of the course might strengthen the admin 
 istration ; and thus it is announced to the enemy 
 that he has a strong party, where, were the dictates 
 of patriotism observed by all, the whole strength 
 of the country would be displayed in the crisis of 
 war. Under more arbitrary governments, the strong 
 arm of power can be exerted to arrest the action of 
 such elements as these. But the government of 
 the United States, restricted as it is by constitu 
 tional principles, and providing rather for the pro 
 motion of the welfare of the community in time 
 of peace, depends upon public opinion for bringing 
 forth the strength of the nation in war, as well as 
 for all other support. This -opinion is the correct 
 ive for the difficulties alluded to, and the absolute 
 necessity of propitiating it may give rise to other 
 difficulties in the desire always existing in a peo- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 pie so enterprising as the American for action, of 
 which, in war, the great portion should be -at least 
 ignorant of the immediate object of military move 
 ments, and necessarily are of details and difficulties. 
 
 The general plan of operations, and the prelim 
 inary arrangements for its prosecution, were soon 
 determined upon by the executive, and the quan 
 tity of force which it was deemed necessary to em 
 ploy was, in a few days after the commencement 
 of preparations, required from the states nearest the 
 scene of action. 
 
 The avowed object of the United States in war 
 has been to obtain " indemnity for the past and se 
 curity for the future." This was especially set 
 forth in the war of 1812 with Great Britain; and 
 although the government then combated the vari 
 ous obstacles in its prosecution with but little suc 
 cess, and utterly failed in obtaining the first object, 
 yet the bold declaration of war, and the develop 
 ment of strength, however misapplied, which was 
 its consequence, drew the attention of the world, 
 and went far toward obtaining security from a rep 
 etition of the outrages which had led to the rupture. 
 
 The same object was avowed in the prosecution 
 of hostilities against Mexico, and it was determined 
 to seize upon her territory as indemnity for the 
 wrongs inflicted by the commencement of war, as 
 well as those of former date. California, compara 
 tively uninhabited and unknown, and at a distance 
 from the central and richer portions of Mexico, had 
 been explored by American travelers, who brought 
 
148 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 back reports of the salubrity of its climate, the fer 
 tility of its soil, and its mineral and other elements 
 of wealth, which, even .with estimates for exagger 
 ation to which travelers are prone, showed that it 
 was a territory of great value. British merchants 
 had made efforts to obtain possession of its lands, 
 and the harbors which were upon its coast were 
 known to be the only good ones upon the shore of 
 the northern Pacific Ocean. In the absence of any 
 such upon the coast of Oregon, and the desire of 
 the United States to possess a good and safe port 
 for that region of country, then beginning to at 
 tract the serious attention of the government, was 
 found a strong reason for its acquisition. Lying 
 immediately south of the territory of Oregon, with 
 no defined natural boundary between them, it was 
 early looked upon 'with a view to its acquisition 
 by individuals, and the measure had been discuss 
 ed in the public prints long previous to the com 
 mencement of hostilities. Many Americans, in 
 pursuit of wealth and adventure, had gone thither 
 and settled, and were in considerable numerical 
 strength in the northern part of the country. It 
 has often been charged that the acquisition of the 
 territory was the cause of war, both by Mexican 
 and American opponents of the administration of 
 the United States ; but, when taken in connection 
 with the oft-repeated offers of negotiation, such an 
 idea appears absurd. The tone of public opinion, 
 and the speedy adoption of the plan of seizing it, as 
 well as instructions previously given to naval com- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. j[ 4 9 
 
 manders,^ would go to show that its acquisition 
 had been looked to as a consequence of Mexican ob 
 stinacy, and as indemnity in case war was really 
 the event. And doubtless great efforts would have 
 been made to obtain it by purchase, had she ac 
 ceded to the offer of negotiations. 
 
 New Mexico, another department of the Mexican 
 republic, lying upon the direct route to California, 
 and in great part included in the boundaries claim 
 ed by Texas upon her admission to the American 
 Union, was also another territory which attracted 
 attention. 
 
 The general plan of operations was to seize and 
 occupy those territories, with a view to their re 
 tention as indemnity for the expenses of the war, 
 while the movements of the main army upon the 
 center of Mexican resources were to force an agree 
 ment to the terms of peace. f The only serious dif 
 ficulties which could be anticipated in the conquest 
 and occupation of the territories in question were 
 the distance of the route, and those presented by 
 the uninhabited and uncultivated country through 
 which it led. These operated as much against 
 Mexico as against the United States, for the routes 
 which troops from the populous portions of the 
 former would be forced to traverse were nearly as 
 difficult as those from the latter. 
 
 * Mr. Bancroft to Commodore Sloat. Executive Document, No. 62, House 
 of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 231. 
 
 t Collated from instructions to army and naval officers of the period of 
 the commencement of the war. 
 
150 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Another expedition was soon after planned, 
 which was to be sent against the city and state of 
 Chihuahua. The city was represented as the de 
 pot for trade in the north of Mexico, and it was 
 believed that, as the people were inimical to the 
 central government, they were therefore willing to 
 agree to American occupation. Another object of 
 this expedition was to operate in conjunction with 
 the main army. The instructions for each of these 
 will be noticed in another place. But the expedi 
 tions to California, New Mexico, and Chihuahua 
 were, from their nature, but partial operations of 
 the war, with the view of securing incidental ends, 
 and entirely separate from the great movements 
 of the conflict. 
 
 In preparing for the main operations of the army, 
 embarrassments were soon presented, arising in the 
 conduct of American general officers. The first of 
 these, and which was a partial cause of the second, 
 was the action of Brevet Major-general Gaines, a 
 gallant veteran of the war of 1812. Advanced in 
 years, he had nevertheless, under the system of 
 the American army, retained his commission, and, 
 at the commencement of hostilities, was in com 
 mand of the Western Geographical Division of the 
 United States. He was the second in rank in the 
 army ; but old age had shattered his judgment, al 
 though it had left all the enthusiasm of his nature. 
 In the anticipation of Mexican hostilities, he had 
 early requested to be assigned to the command of 
 the army which was to enter Mexico, according to 
 
THE WAR, WITH MEXICO. 
 
 151 
 
 his views, not so much for " conquering a peace" 
 as for a crusade against the " awful maladies of 
 alternate anarchy and despotism."^ Upon receiv 
 ing the news of the danger of the army on the 
 Rio Grande, he had taken measures for calling into 
 service a number of volunteers, far exceeding the 
 requisition of _ General Taylor, without the color of 
 authority, except in his own opinion of the neces* 
 sity of the case. From the vicinity of his head 
 quarters at New Orleans to the seat of war, in the 
 excited state of the public mind in the southwest, 
 and the apparent exigency of the crisis, the calls 
 were quickly responded to ; and with no other pro 
 vision than a hurried and incomplete armament, 
 volunteers for six months, in numhers unknown 
 either to the commanding general in the field or 
 the authorities at Washington, were soon put en 
 route for Brazos Santiago. Having thus com 
 menced the business, and with his enthusiasm fair 
 ly aroused, Gaines proceeded to appoint officers 
 in the line and staff, to call for an indefinite num 
 ber of troops,! and, in short, appeared about to 
 raise an army on his own responsibility, and to in- 
 vade Mexico without regard to the necessities of 
 his troops, or the action of the government, except 
 in so far as it was intended that payment of ex 
 penses should be made through it. To put a stop 
 to his embarrassing eccentricities, it was found 
 necessary to relieve him from command ; and, ac- 
 
 * Correspondence of General Gaines with the Adjutant General. Congres 
 sional Globe, first Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. t Idem ibidem. 
 
152 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 cordingly, on the 2d of June, the order relieving 
 him was sent from Washington.^ 
 
 In preparing for the operations of the main army, 
 the knowledge of American strength and of Mexi 
 can weakness led to action on the part of the gov 
 ernment which could not fail to entail difficulty 
 in the prosecution of hostilities. Without taking 
 into consideration the natural obstinacy of all peo 
 ple of Spanish descent, or the military topography 
 of the country of Mexico, or the difficulties to he 
 encountered at home, it had been believed that no 
 more than one year would be required to complete 
 the operations of the .war, and the volunteers were 
 therefore originally called upon to serve for that 
 short period. The consequence of this was, neces 
 sarily, the trouble of discharging them and raising 
 new troops if Mexico continued obstinate, and the 
 very measure was an encouragement for her to do 
 so ; for knowing, as she must, the short term of 
 service of the main force of the army, she might 
 well believe that the strife would be but tempora 
 ry, and that, in the accumulated difficulties attend 
 ing the prosecution of the war beyond the original 
 term of service, ghe could obtain more favorable 
 terms of peace in the end, even if unsuccessful in 
 the contest. It was hardly thought at Washing 
 ton that it would be requisite to carry the arms of 
 the United States to the city of Mexico. Deem 
 ing that a few more blows as vigorous as those of 
 
 * Correspondence of General Gaines with the Adjutant General. Congres 
 sional Globe, first Session of the twenty -ninth Congress, 
 
THE WAR WIT-H MEXICO. 15 g 
 
 Palo Alto and Resaca would convince Mexico of 
 the futility of resistance, attention was at first 
 turned, in the impracticability of operating on the 
 seaboard in summer, and in the anxiety of the 
 American public, toward the Rio Grande as the 
 base of operations. For conducting the great move 
 ments of the war, and the command of all troops, 
 both regular and volunteer, General Scott, the 
 commander-in-chief of the American army, was. 
 designated, and was ordered to hold himself in 
 readiness for the duty. Although he at first man 
 ifested no anxiety for the service, and treated the 
 matter with indifference, he at once entered upon 
 the duties of preparation, and upon an occupation 
 which might have served to amuse his leisure 
 for several previous months. " The study of the 
 routes of march and water conveyances for the 
 several bodies of troops to the best points on the 
 frontiers of Mexico, in the study of the northern, 
 interior, and southern routes of that republic, in 
 looking to the means of transportation on the Rio 
 Grande, to and beyond that river, and in deter 
 mining the depots of supplies of all sorts on the 
 American side," &c> 
 
 But circumstances and the character of the gen- 
 eral-in-chief soon produced an embarrassing rup 
 ture, and rendered his study of no immediate profit 
 to himself or the service. General Scott had for 
 a long period cherished political aspirations, and 
 
 * Correspondence of General Scott with the War Department. Congres 
 sional Globe, first Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 
154 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 from his position, his high reputation for bravery 
 and military skill, the Whig party leaders had fre 
 quently spoken of him as their candidate, and kept 
 alive hopes destined to be blasted either by the 
 selection of another or by the success of political 
 enemies. 
 
 The war with Mexico afforded a field for the ex 
 ercise of Scott's military knowledge, which might, 
 in reason, be expected to increase his reputation 
 with a people so adulous of military glory as are 
 the Americans, and ultimately raise him to the 
 presidency. Such were the anticipations of many 
 of both political parties ; and, in the crisis in which 
 the country then was, the movements of the gen- 
 eral-in-chief were watched with anxiety. Many 
 remarks were made by prominent men concerning 
 his delay in Washington, both on the part of his 
 friends and enemies. 
 
 To disprove the charge of inactivity which would, 
 in any interval of active operations, be brought 
 against the government, the President of the Unit 
 ed States was anxious for his departure, and espe 
 cially that the troops called out by General Gaines, 
 and already at the seat of war, should be employ 
 ed under direction of the general who was to con 
 duct the main operations. Of this wish, and the ex 
 isting state of opinion, General Scott was informed 
 by the Secretary of War in a personal interview. 
 
 The information was considered of so much im 
 portance, that, on the 21st of May, the general-in- 
 chief felt himself called upon to suspend his labors 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 
 
 of preparation, to explain his occupation and views, 
 to denounce those who differed from him in opin 
 ion, and to impress upon the executive officers of * 
 the government that it was necessary that the com 
 manding general of an invading army should have 
 the full confidence and support of his superiors at 
 home ; all of which was apparently considered re 
 quisite, on 'the part of General Scott, "to protect 
 himself from a fire in his rear from Washington."* 
 The requests, in many things, were sensible, and his 
 views upon the proposed military operations, had 
 they been based upon accurate data, might not have 
 been without merit ; unless, indeed, he was too confi 
 dent of success in preparing and organizing a force 
 in three months' time which was to conquer a peace 
 by " regular, incessant, and forward movements" 
 in the direction of Mexico, from the base of the Rio 
 Grande. But, whatever reason there was in his 
 requests or in his views, his manner of expressing 
 them was singularly unfortunate. His letter was 
 considered arrogant in its tone, reflecting strongly 
 upon the motives of the President and Secretary, 
 and the reasons alleged for its composition were 
 deemed to be of an exceedingly personal charac 
 ter. It was at once determined to relieve him from 
 the service proposed, and on the 25th the Secreta 
 ry of War informed General Scott that he would 
 remain in Washington. 
 
 In subsequent correspondence, the general-in- 
 
 * Correspondence of General Scott with the War Department. Congres 
 sional Globe, first Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 
 
 chief endeavored to explain the offensive portions 
 of his letter, to place his imputations of bad faith 
 at the door of the President's advisers, and express 
 ed his willingness to depart at such time as the 
 President might direct. 7 ^ The confidence which 
 may have been reposed in him up to that time was, 
 however, shaken, and no orders were given him 
 immediately to proceed to Mexico. The superse- 
 dure of the general-in-chief necessarily attracted 
 much attention, and would doubtless have been 
 made the subject of a charge of injustice had not 
 the correspondence been called for by Congress and 
 published. In consequence, the rebuke adminis 
 tered by refusing the command of the army to Gen 
 eral Scott was supported by the manifestations of 
 public opinion, called forth, however, as much by 
 the peculiarity of his style as by any just appreci 
 ation of his motives. 
 
 The geiieral-kuchief having been set aside in a 
 measure, General Taylor was soon after charged 
 with the direction of the movements of the main 
 army, and in the want of any well-understood 
 plan of operations, the consequence of his absence 
 from Washington, and other circumstances, was 
 soon found another element of difficulty. More 
 over, General Taylor had two superiors at Wash 
 ington, both of whom wrote to him, soon after his 
 assignment to command, in terms which, when the 
 two letters are compared, will be seen to have been 
 
 * Correspondence of General Scott with the War Department. Congres 
 sional Globe, first Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 157 
 
 calculated to impress him with the belief that the 
 authorities at home were not very decided as to 
 their own views of the necessary end of the opera 
 tions, and to induce a corresponding indecision on 
 his part. 
 
 Mr. Marcy wrote to General Taylor on the 8th 
 of June, informing him of his assignment to the 
 command, and of the amount of re-enforcement 
 which he might expect. In regard to the imme 
 diate operations of the army, the hope was express 
 ed that he would he ahle to place considerable 
 bodies of troops in healthy situations upon the Rio 
 Grande, and that, in the mean time, Monterey 
 should be taken and held. Much was left to the 
 discretion of the general. His views upon future 
 operations were requested, and he was directed to 
 inform the department of the requisite proportion 
 of the different arms of troops. The question of 
 most importance propounded was, " Shall the cam 
 paign be conducted with the view of striking at the 
 city of Mexico, or confined, so far as regards the 
 forces under your immediate command^ to the north 
 ern provinces of Mexico ?" And this was a ques 
 tion to which the answer of the commanding gener 
 al was necessary before any decision could be made 
 with regard to the proper course of operations.^ 
 . Four days after this question was proposed in 
 Mr. Marcy's letter, General Scott wrote to Gen- 
 
 * Correspondence of the War Department with General Taylor. Execu 
 tive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirti 
 eth Congress, p. 323. 
 
158 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 eral Taylor on the same subjects, giving him simi 
 lar information of the amount of re-enforcement 
 sent to him, and positively setting forth what was 
 called the wish of the President as follows : 
 
 " Without waiting for the arrival of that amount 
 of force (28,070), but before, and as soon as you shall 
 deem it safe in respect to the relative numbers and 
 position of the enemy, your knowledge of the coun 
 try, your supplies, and the means of transporta 
 tion, it is the wish and expectation of the Presi 
 dent that, with your accustomed energy, you take 
 up lines of march beyond the Rio Grande, and 
 press your operations toward the heart of the ene 
 my's country, that is, upon such important points 
 as you may deem it necessary to conquer and to 
 hold. The high road to the capital of Mexico will, 
 of course, be one of those lines ; and, if successful 
 in your advances, the establishment of posts in 
 your rear, well guarded, according to their distan 
 ces from each other and the dangers of recapture, 
 will be objects demanding your care. How far it 
 may be necessary for you to penetrate, if not, at 
 least, to the capital, and what halts you may find 
 it proper to make short of that mark; will, of course, 
 depend upon the events of the war. Should con 
 tinued success attend your operations, you may, 
 some time before, be met by the proposition to treat 
 for peace, with an intermediate armistice. No such 
 proposition will be entertained by you without 
 your being first satisfied that it is made in good 
 faith, and without your being in possession, or put 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 by stipulation into possession of such commanding 
 positions as will insure good faith on the part of 
 the enemy. Being satisfied on this point, you may 
 conclude an armistice for a limited time, and refer 
 the proposition to treat for peace to the govern 
 ment here."^ 
 
 The discrepancy between these two papers re 
 quires but little commentary. The first propound 
 ed a question to the commanding general in the 
 field, which must .have implied that it was yet 
 open, and that his views were necessary for its de 
 cision. The second, from General Scott, gave him 
 to understand that it was the wish and expecta 
 tion of the President that the high road to the city 
 of Mexico should be one of his lines of march ; and 
 if this had already been decided at Washington, 
 how could it be believed that General Taylor could 
 do otherwise than give his attention to move 
 ments upon it? What necessity was there of his 
 expressing an immediate opinion, if he had any, 
 upon other movements? Certainly having two 
 commanders at Washington was as absurd as it 
 was useless, especially when the state of feeling 
 existing between them was such as to render har 
 monious action impossible. If General Scott's let 
 ter were submitted to the Secretary of War .before 
 it was sent off, it must have been seen that it could 
 have none other than a pernicious effect. If Gen- 
 
 * Correspondence of General Scott with General Taylor. Executive Doc 
 ument, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 325. 
 
160 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 eral Scott, desirous of retaining the semblance of 
 command, wrote it without any authority other 
 than that which was gathered in incidental con 
 versation, it was a most unwarrantable interference, 
 and especially in the directions concerning the ar 
 mistice, which might better have come, under any 
 circumstances, direct from the secretary. A sup 
 plemental note on this subject was afterward sub 
 mitted to him, and received his sanction;^ but 
 whether the first letter had it or not, the attempt to 
 keep General Scott in imaginary command seems 
 to have been" soon after given up on the part of the 
 administration as well as his own ; for no further 
 instructions of the nature proceeded from him for 
 some subsequent time. 
 
 On the 2d of July General Taylor answered 
 both these letters, in a communication to the ad 
 jutant general of the army, from Matamoras; and 
 in the answer he confined himself to the considera 
 tion of the facilities of the advance by the northern 
 route from the base of the Rio Grande. After ex 
 plaining delays, and announcing his intention of 
 moving with a column of about 6000 men upon an 
 experimental expedition as far as Monterey, the 
 great object of which appeared to be to ascertain 
 the agricultural capacity of the route, and especial 
 ly the valley of the San Juan, he proceeded to give 
 his views in respect to that route, and to opera- 
 
 * Correspondence of General Scott with General Taylor. Executive Doc 
 ument, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 328. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 161 
 
 tions upon it, which were made to depend almost 
 entirely on the question of subsistence. It was 
 considered that 6000 men was the maximum force 
 which could be employed on the expedition, having 
 regard to their subsistence, and the " resources of 
 the country in 'pack mules and transportation gen 
 erally" His ulterior views, having advanced to 
 Saltillo, upon the movements of the war, as de 
 pendent upon the topography of the country and 
 the questions previously discussed, were set forth 
 in the following paragraphs : 
 
 "Supposing a column of the above strength 
 (6000 men) able to maintain itself at Saltillo, it 
 will become a question, depending for its solution 
 upon the elements above indicated, how far that 
 force may be increased, or what amount, of the 
 twelve months' volunteers may be safely and prof 
 itably thrown forward from the rear with a view 
 to future operations. 
 
 " From Camargo to the city of Mexico is a^line 
 little, if any, short of 1000 miles in length. The 
 resources of the country are, to say the best, not 
 superabundant, and over long spaces of the route 
 are known to be deficient. Although the road, as 
 we advance south, approaches both seas, yet the 
 topography of the country, and the consequent 
 character of the communications, forbid the taking 
 up a new line of supply from Tampico or the Pa 
 cific coast. Except in the case, deemed improba 
 ble, of the entire acquiescence, if not support, on 
 the part of the Mexican people, I consider it im- 
 I. L 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 practicable to keep open so long a line of commu 
 nication. It is therefore rny opinion that our op 
 erations from this frontier should not look to the 
 city of Mexico, but should be confined to cutting 
 off the northern provinces an undertaking of com 
 parative facility and asstirance of success."^ 
 
 The remainder of General Taylor's answer con 
 tained information relative to his arrangements; 
 but throughout there was no other decided recom 
 mendation of any military course, except that the 
 operations from the north should be confined to the 
 cutting off of the northern provinces, which it was 
 supposed at the time would be assisted by the 
 Chihuahua expedition. 
 
 Before this answer was received at Washington, 
 on the 9th of July Mr. Marcy addressed a confi 
 dential communication to General Taylor upon the 
 subject of the campaign. He was enjoined to con 
 tinue the peaceful policy which he had hitherto 
 adopted with the people of the country, and to take 
 every opportunity of disabusing them of the idea 
 that the war was to be one of rapine and plunder ; 
 to assist any of the northern states in their at 
 tempt to become independent of the central gov 
 ernment, or to remain neutral during the war, pro 
 vided such assistance did not interfere with his 
 military operations. These, it was said, must pro 
 ceed vigorously. " Policy and force are to be com- 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General. Executive Document, No. 
 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 bined, and the fruits of the former will "be prized as 
 highly as the latter."* 
 
 Such directions as the foregoing must have been 
 induced by the knowledge of the unstable nature 
 of Mexican authority, without a definite under 
 standing of the importance or the resources of the 
 states referred to, which could not be well ascer 
 tained at Washington. Being indefinite, they can 
 only be regarded as an expression of general policy, 
 to be made, if possible, an incidental aid in obtain 
 ing the end of the war. But in this letter of July 
 9th is found the first positive mention of any plan 
 for striking at the center of Mexican resources found 
 in any of the military correspondence on the Mexi 
 can war. It is set forth as follows : 
 
 *" If, from all the information which you may 
 communicate to the department, as well as that 
 derived from other sources, it should appear that 
 the difficulties and obstacles to the conducting of 
 a campaign from the Rio Grande, the present base 
 of your operations, for any considerable distance 
 into the interior of Mexico, will be very great, the 
 department will consider whether the main inva 
 sion should not ultimately take place from some 
 other point on the coast, say Tampico, or some 
 other point in the vicinity of Vera Cruz. This 
 suggestion is made with a view to call your atten 
 tion to it, and to obtain from you such information 
 as you may be able to impart. Should it be de- 
 
 * Mr. Marcy to General Taylor. Executive Document, No. 60, House of 
 Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 333. 
 
164 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 termined that the main army should invade Mex 
 ico at some other point than the Rio Grande say 
 the vicinity of Vera Cruz a large and sufficient 
 numher of transport vessels could he placed at the 
 mouth of the Rio Grande hy the time the healthy 
 season sets in say early in November. The main 
 army, with all its munitions, could he transported, 
 leaving a sufficient force behind to hold and occu 
 py the Rio Grande, and all the towns and prov 
 inces which you may have conquered before -that 
 time. In the event of such being the plan of oper 
 ations, your opinion is desired what increased 
 force, if any, will be required to carry it out with 
 success. We learn that the army could be disem 
 barked a few miles distant from Vera Cruz, and 
 readily invest the town in its rear, without coming 
 within range of the guns of the fortress of San 
 Juan d'Ulloa. The town could readily be taken 
 by land, while the fortress, being invested by land 
 and sea, and all communication cut off, must soon 
 fall. From Yera Cruz to the city of Mexico there 
 is a fine road, upon which the diligences or stage 
 coaches run daily. The distance from Vera Cruz 
 to the city of Mexico is not more than one third 
 of that from the Rio Grande to the city of Mexico. 
 Upon these important points, in addition to those 
 mentioned in my letter of the 8th of June, your 
 opinions and views are desired at the earliest pe 
 riod your duties will permit you to give them. In 
 the mean time, the department confidently relies 
 on you to press forward your operations vigorously 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^5 
 
 to the extent of your means, so as to occupy the 
 important points within your reach on the Rio 
 Grande and in the interior."^ The letter closed 
 by requesting a table of distances from Chihuahua 
 to the port of Guyamas, on the Pacific, as that 
 was necessary in order to determine the practica- 
 bility of completing a cordon across the continent. 
 To this General Taylor replied on the 1st of 
 August from Matamoras. The first and second 
 paragraphs of his letter were in answer to the por 
 tions of Mr. Marcy's dispatch which related to the 
 policy of the American government in treating the 
 inhabitants of the country with leniency, and 
 availing itself of the dissensions among the Mex 
 icans. His views on that subject were as indef 
 inite as his instructions, although he coincided, 
 in the main, with the Secretary of War, and 
 stated that he should fully comply with them 
 upon that point, should opportunity occur. The 
 third paragraph related to military operations, 
 and his views were thus expressed: "As to the 
 military operations best calculated to secure an 
 early and honorable peace, my report of the 2d of 
 July will have put the department in possession 
 of my views touching operations in this quarter, 
 and I have now little to add to that report. Wheth 
 er a large force can be subsisted beyond Monterey 
 must be determined by actual experiment, and will 
 depend much upon the. disposition of the enemy to- 
 
 * Mr. Marcy to General Taylor. Executive Document, No. 60, House of 
 Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 335. 
 
IQQ THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ward us. If a column (say 10,000 men) can be 
 sustained in provisions at Saltillo, it may advance 
 thence upon San Luis Potosi, and, I doubt not, 
 would speedily bring proposals for peace. If, on 
 the other hand, a column can not be sustained 
 beyond Monterey, it will be for the government to 
 determine, from considerations of state, whether a 
 simple occupation of the frontier departments (in 
 cluding Chihuahua and New Mexico), or, in addi 
 tion to such occupation, an expedition against the 
 capital (by way of Vera Cruz), would be most ex 
 pedient. I can not give a positive opinion as to 
 the practicability of an expedition against Vera 
 Cruz, or the amount of force that would probably 
 be required for it. The Department of War must 
 be much better informed than I am on that point. 
 From the impracticable character of the routes from 
 Tampico, particularly that leading to Mexico, I 
 should judge an expedition against the capital 
 from that point to be out of the question. The 
 simultaneous embarkation of a large body of troops 
 at Brazos Santiago, as proposed in the secretary's 
 communication, would be attended with great dif 
 ficulty, if we may judge from the delays and dan 
 ger which accompany the unloading of single 
 transports, owing to the almost perpetual rough 
 ness of the bar and boisterous character of the an 
 chorage. It may also well be questioned whether 
 a force of volunteers, without much instruction, 
 more than those now here can receive in season 
 for such an expedition, can prudently be allowed 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^57 
 
 to form the bulk of an army destined for so deli 
 cate an operation as a descent upon a foreign coast, 
 where it can have no proper base of operations or 
 supplies."^ 
 
 The remainder of the letter referred to his pres 
 ent operations, and he inclosed the required table 
 of distances, which spoke more forcibly concerning 
 the practicability of sending an expedition to Guy- 
 amas than could any opinions of the general. 
 
 The correspondence upon the plan of operations 
 ceased for a time, and the executive officers of the 
 United States were thrown upon their own resour 
 ces for the arrangement of the great movements 
 of the war ; and, in the mean time, such as were 
 undertaken progressed with but partial ends in 
 view, and without any regard to the great object 
 of the conflict, or that unity of action which is the 
 first requisite of military operations. 
 
 This was first neglected in the minor expedi 
 tions of New Mexico, and California, and Chihua 
 hua. But the two first were each for a definite 
 end, and all three were against separate states, dis 
 tant from the resources of Mexico, which could not, 
 from the nature of the country and the force of cir 
 cumstances, be brought to their support. They 
 could not interfere with, much less control, the op 
 eration of the main army. That could, in propri 
 ety, have but one object, which was to force Mexi 
 co to make peace on the terms^of the United States; 
 
 * General Taylor to the President. Executive Document, No. 60, House 
 of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 337. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and a determined and well-settled plan for obtain 
 ing this end was the first requisite for successful 
 operation. To obtain any concessions by treaty 
 through the means of force, it is necessary that the 
 demanding party should be in position to present 
 an alternative more disadvantageous than the de 
 manded concession, and the disparity must be in 
 creased with the obstinacy of the refusers. In 
 most nations it is even necessary to present the 
 alternative of a loss of nationality as the extreme 
 consequence of refusal, certainly of great national 
 calamity and distress. With a country so inde 
 pendent of commerce as Mexico, and of such pecu 
 liar characteristics, there was but one ultimate end 
 to seize upon the center of her resources and her 
 power, and present, as soon as possible, the last al 
 ternative, of submission or extinction. 
 , The capital of Mexico, like that of all other coun 
 tries without commerce and free communication, 
 was the center of her resources, and attention was 
 directed to its capture, should it become necessary, 
 and the route by which it was to be achieved. 
 Certainly, in the attainment of peace, it was the 
 part of good policy to threaten the great and final 
 military object as speedily as possible, and to waste 
 no more time upon partial operations than was ab 
 solutely necessary. While, therefore, it was well 
 to employ the troops, during the sickly season on 
 the Gulf coast, in the partial operations of the 
 north, both in reference to their instruction and 
 health, besides, by inflicting the lesser evils of the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 war upon Mexico, to increase her inducements to 
 make peace in a season of necessary inactivity, 
 yet to regard such employment as the great end 
 of the war would have heen folly. Certainly the 
 contemplated movement of troops in a distant 
 country, without any definite ohject other than 
 to ascertain the capacity of a certain region in 
 subsistence, when it was considered, and with 
 good reason, a question of much doubt whether 
 one step in advance should he taken after the ex 
 periment was verified, might have induced, on the 
 part of the general commanding- in the field, a sug 
 gestion of some other end than that which he had 
 immediately in view, and something more positive 
 upon the suggestion of Mr. Marcy, which was final 
 ly adopted at Washington, than the statement of 
 difficulties without any suggestion for overcoming 
 them. The effect of the want of arrangement of a 
 plan of operations in the outset will he seen in the 
 sequel ; hut, under all these circumstances, with, 
 an unfriendly general-in-chief, with a small regu 
 lar army, with a violent opposition party, and with 
 out positive advice or suggestion from the general 
 in the field, it can not he denied that the task of 
 the cabinet at Washington to arrange the outline 
 of attack, at a distance of near two thousand miles 
 from Mexico, was one of no small magnitude and 
 difficulty. 
 
 While the correspondence upon the plan of cam 
 paign was carried on, various circumstances delay 
 ed the preparations for movement in the partial op- 
 
170 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 erations which the general had determined upon. 
 The number of volunteers which had heen sent 
 out under the unauthorized requisitions of Gener 
 al Gaines exceeded by some three thousand the 
 number which had heen called for by General Tay 
 lor on the 26th of April, and the arrival of these 
 troops, without any corresponding increase of trans 
 portation, field equipment, or subsistence, necessa 
 rily embarrassed his movements.^ When the req 
 uisition had been made, it had been the intention 
 of General Taylor to employ the new troops, in con 
 junction with the regulars, for the purpose of clear 
 ing the river, and performing any other service 
 which might be ordered by the government. After 
 the arrival of the first detachments of the force, he 
 contemplated making the movement upon Monte 
 rey, to operate in the valley of the San Juan, f and 
 for this object it was deemed absolutely necessary 
 to use the Rio Grande as the channel of communi 
 cation as far up as Camargo. Some arrangements 
 for procuring a number of steamers to navigate the 
 Rio Grande had been early made, but it was not 
 until the 28th of May that an officer was sent to 
 the United States to purchase and send out steam 
 ers of sufficient number and suitable description for 
 the navigation of the river to the extent required 
 for any great operation.^ There was much delay 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, May 20th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. -60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 99. t Idem, May 21, 1846. Idem, p. 300. 
 
 t Major Bliss to Capt. Sanders, May 28th, 1846. Executive Document, No. 
 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 552. 
 
THE WAR, WITH MEXICO. ^^j 
 
 in the arrival of those purchased under the author 
 ity of the general, as well as of others dispatched 
 by the quarter-master's department from New Or 
 leans. The light draft required rendered it a mat 
 ter of much hazard for them to cross the Gulf, and 
 delays were a necessary consequence. In the 
 mean while, a battalion was pushed up the river 
 as far as Reynosa, and upon the arrival of steam 
 ers a regiment was sent at once to Camargo, which 
 town was looked to as the depot pending the op 
 erations on Monterey. These small towns were 
 occupied without any opposition whatever, for the 
 Mexican army had fallen back beyond them, on 
 the road to Monterey. As steamers continued to 
 arrive, additional troops and munitions were thrown 
 forward, but it was not until the 24th of July that 
 Worth's division was concentrated at Camargo. 
 
 In the mean time, the different quotas of twelve 
 months' volunteers commenced to arrive in the 
 country of operations. As no definite end of the 
 immediate movements of the army had been con 
 certed between the commanding general and the 
 officers of the executive departments, many things 
 necessary for the efficient equipment of the whole 
 number of troops, regulars and volunteers, were 
 wanting. But as the season advanced, and steam 
 ers continued to arrive, the difficulty, so far as oc 
 casioned by the want of water transportation, was 
 partially obviated. 
 
 The Louisiana volunteers, who had responded 
 to G-aines's call, were disposed of by discharging 
 
172 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 them, inasmuch as they had been mustered into 
 service for an illegal term, and the term of three 
 months, for which alone they could be held to 
 serve, was too short for the completion of any oper 
 ation of magnitude in which they might engage. 
 But one company out of the whole number would 
 consent to be mustered into service for twelve 
 months, and, with this exception, the Louisiana 
 volunteers were transported by return steamers to 
 the mouth of the river, and thence to New Orleans, 
 to be discharged.^ 
 
 By the 1st of August arrangements had been 
 made for throwing forward the main body of the 
 army (regulars, and twelve months' volunteers). 
 On the 4th General Taylor moved his head-quar 
 ters from Matamoras, and arrived on the 8th at 
 Camargo. The greater portion of his troops was 
 soon after concentrated at that point, and the ex 
 pedition to Monterey was organized. Competent 
 garrisons had been left at the various towns on 
 the river, a plentiful supply of water transportation 
 had arrived, and the means were at hand for keep 
 ing up a depot of any requisite size at Camargo, 
 filled from the valley of the Mississippi. The only 
 lack of means then felt was in the quantity of land 
 transportation. A considerable amount was at 
 hand, in the shape of pack mules of the country, 
 and the disposition of the inhabitants was such as 
 to render them available. Arrangements were im- 
 
 * Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, first Session of the 
 thirtieth Congress, House of Representatives, p. 307-320. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^ 7 3 
 
 mediately made for their procurement, and a suffi 
 cient number for the service of a column of about 
 6000 men, which General Taylor had contem 
 plated moving with, were soon engaged. Whether 
 'the country could have afforded more than were 
 furnished is perhaps questionable ; but as the want 
 of transport was subsequently made a subject of 
 serious complaint, it may be believed that it would 
 have been difficult to obtain them. 
 
 The regular troops of the army were, soon after 
 General Taylor's arrival at Camargo, organized into 
 two divisions, under Generals Twiggs and Worth, 
 and on the 19th of August the movement on Mon 
 terey commenced. On that day Worth's first bri 
 gade marched to establish an entrepot at Serralvo ; 
 for the two routes which led from Camargo to 
 Monterey, through Serralvo and China, had been 
 reconnoitered by parties under Colonels, Duncan 
 and Hays, and, in consequence, the most northerly, 
 by Serralvo, had been chosen. Serralvo was occu 
 pied without opposition, and the establishment of 
 the entrepot was at once commenced. Worth em 
 ployed himself in collecting additions to the sup 
 plies of bread-stuffs and forage with some success, 
 and also obtained considerable additional trans 
 portation.^ Spies were thrown out from his posi 
 tion toward Monterey, and one was so successful as 
 to enter that town and return, bringing information 
 
 * General Worth to Major Bliss, September 3d, 1846. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 60, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, House of Representa 
 tives, p. 419. 
 
174 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the amount of Mexican force, and the nature of 
 the defenses. But other accounts differed so wide 
 ly, that, in general, not much was known of the 
 condition of things at the city which was about to 
 be the object of attack. 
 
 On the 24th, Butler's second brigade moved from 
 Camargo, and advanced as far as Puntiaguda, 
 twelve miles in rear of Serralvo, to which place its 
 convoy was thrown forward. 
 
 Twiggs's troops marched by brigades subsequent 
 ly, each having under its escort a train of provis 
 ions for the entrepot, and thus, in succession, the 
 corps of the regular army were brought up to Ser 
 ralvo and its vicinity. 
 
 The troops of the twelve months' volunteers, 
 which were to form part of the column, were organ- 
 ized into a field division. The reasons for dispens 
 ing with a large force, which was at his disposal, 
 in the ensuing operations, were assigned by Gen 
 eral Taylor in the following paragraph of " Orders 
 No. 108," as follows : 
 
 " The limited means of transportation, and the 
 uncertainty in regard to the supplies that may be 
 drawn from the theater of operations, imposes upon 
 the commanding general the necessity of taking 
 into the field, in the first instance, only a moder 
 ate portion of the volunteer force now under his 
 orders."* 
 
 In consequence, four regiments constituted the 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 500. 
 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 175 
 
 field division, under the command of General But 
 ler, with Hamer and Quitman as his brigadiers. 
 The remainder of the volunteer force, amounting 
 in all, exclusive of strong garrisons for the different 
 posts in the rear, to over 6000 troops, were left in 
 camp and garrison at Camargo, and at the different 
 points along the river. 
 
 On the 5th of September General Taylor left 
 Camargo for the advance. Butler's division march 
 ed on the 6th. On the 9th General Taylor arrived 
 at Serralvo, and by the 13th the last brigade had 
 arrived at that point, and the column was in mo 
 tion for Monterey. 
 
 The order of march had been issued on the llth, 
 and on the 13th Twiggs's division moved in ad 
 vance, followed on the 14th and 15th by Worth's 
 and Butler's. Two regiments of Texan horse, 
 which completed the force of the column, had been 
 sent from Camargo by the southern route through 
 the town of China, under orders to join the main 
 force at Marin. 
 
 The progress of the column was unopposed by 
 any serious resistance, although several alertes took 
 place with Mexican cavalry pickets stationed at 
 different points on the route. They were first seen 
 at Papagayas on the 13th, but retired without re 
 sistance. On the 14th, a trifling affair took place 
 at Ramos between the advanced Texan Rangers 
 and another party of observation. On the 15th, as 
 the head of the column approached Marin, a force 
 of Mexican lancers was observed in the town, but 
 
176 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 it fell back immediately, and Twiggs's division 
 marching through the place, pitched its camp that 
 night on the banks of the Rio San Juan, three 
 miles beyond Marin, and twenty-four miles to the 
 northeast of Monterey. At this point the army 
 was concentrated on the following days, and on the 
 morning of the 18th the whole force advanced to 
 gether. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Delays in Mexican Preparation Intrigues of the Santanistas Action of San 
 ta Anna His Plan for a Pronunciamiento Immediate Effect Action of 
 the American Government Efforts of Paredes to retain Power His Diffi 
 culties Revolution of -August, 1846 Downfall of Paredes Return of 
 Santa Anna His Manifesto, August the 16th Action of the Mexican 
 Government under Salas Attempted Issue of Prize Letters American 
 Offer of Negotiations Arrival of Santa Anna at the Capital Measures of 
 the Mexican Government Preparation at Monterey General Mejia 
 Decrees and Proclamations of Ampudia. 
 
 WHILE the preparations of the United States for 
 the prosecution of hostilities progressed but slowly 
 in the cabinet and in the field, those of Mexico for 
 the same end were delayed by the political in 
 trigues of her different factions, all, as usual, pro 
 fessing deep devotion to the cause of their country, 
 and denouncing their political as well as their na 
 tional enemies in the same connection. To relate 
 the causes of changes in Mexican administration, 
 as well as the action of the government of the 
 United States as connected therewith, reference 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 5.77 
 
 must be had to the state of Mexico a short period 
 anterior to the commencement of hostilities. 
 
 The monarchical intentions of Paredes and his 
 party, well divined and understood by his oppo 
 nents, had called forth a violent opposition to his 
 administration. The partisans of Santa Anna at 
 once took advantage of it to intrigue for his reac- 
 cession to power and the overthrow of Paredes. 
 The ex-dictator was during the while at Havana, 
 apparently amusing himself, but anxiously watch 
 ing the turns of the political wheel in Mexico, in 
 the course of which he hoped again to be in the 
 ascendant. He had not been wanting in personal 
 agency in the endeavors to bring about such result, 
 and early in the year 1846 had proposed a plan 
 for a pronunciamiento, which provided in its first 
 article for the overthrow of the government of Pa 
 redes, in its second and third for the convocation 
 of a Congress, to be chosen according to the Con 
 stitution of 1824, in its fourth for the existence of 
 the army, and in its fifth for the punishment of its 
 opponents.^ In letters to his friends in Mexico, 
 Santa Anna declared himself in favor of the Con 
 stitution of 1824, because, in the existing state of 
 things, the plan which he had formerly advocated 
 of drawing the whole power of Mexico to a center 
 for the purpose of insuring unity of action was im 
 practicable. His first great purpose was, however, 
 the overthrow of Paxedes's government, and the de- 
 
 * General Santa Anna's plan. Executive Document, No. 4, House of 
 Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 35. , 
 
 I. M 
 
]_78 THE WAR WITH MEXICQ. 
 
 feat of the designs of that person and Don Lucas 
 Alaman, and their supporters.^ His friends in gen 
 eral being satisfied with his views ;and intentions, 
 the plan proposed by him was assiduously circula 
 ted in Mexico. It probably would have met with 
 early and complete success, had not dissensions 
 arisen among the Santanistas themselves, in con 
 sequence of which, at the instigation of Almonte, 
 who, although one of the ministry of^Piaredes, 
 was mixed up in the intrigues, various alterations 
 were introduced, which rendered the plan odious 
 to many parties.! Like all other plans which are 
 presented by Mexican chiefs when they wish to 
 ride into power on the wave of revolution, one of 
 its strongest features was the guarantee of the ex 
 istence of the army. In the reasons advised by 
 Santa Anna to be given for the pronunciamiento, 
 that body was declared to be in danger in case of 
 the accession of a foreign prince to power, who, it 
 was asserted, would confide in no other troops than 
 those which he should bring with him, and who 
 would exclude all Mexicans from public employ 
 ment in favor of his own countrymen and court 
 iers. Considerations such as these, once fully im 
 pressed upon the minds of the leeches who have 
 drained the" treasury of Mexico for their own bene 
 fit, would doubtless have caused the immediate 
 success of the revolt, the downfall of the despotism 
 of Paredes, and the renewal of that of Santa Anna. 
 
 * Letter of Santa Anna. Executive Document, No. 4, House of Repre 
 sentatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 36-38. 
 t Note to the same. Idem, p. 38. 
 
,THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^79 
 
 The effect of the movement, notwithstanding 
 the alteration of the plan proposed, was soon ap 
 parent. Pronunciamientos were rife early in the 
 spring of 1846, and in April, Don Juan Alvarez, 
 who, in a manner, controlled the south of Mexico, 
 pronounced against Paredes upon apian of his own, 
 and, so far as his influence extended in the south 
 ern departments, met with complete success.^ 
 
 Of the nature of these intrigues, and the designs 
 of either party, the government of the United States 
 was fully informed by Mr. Black, who remained 
 in the city of Mexico after the departure of Mr. 
 Slidell. The information appears to have heen 
 given, with the purpose that it should reach the 
 United States government, hy a leading Santanis- 
 ta ; for he not only communicated the original de 
 sign of the revolt to Mr. Black, hut furnished him 
 with a copy of Santa Anna's plan, and of a letter 
 which explained his position and intended course 
 of action.f The letter of Mr. Black, with the ac 
 companying papers, reached Washington ahout 
 the 12th of May, and the suhject was immediately 
 acted upon hy the executive of the United States. 
 
 The American government looked with no favor 
 upon the project of re-establishing a monarchy 
 upon the northern continent, and it had become 
 fully aware, from the intelligence just then re 
 ceived from the Rio Grande, as well as from the 
 
 * Mr. Black to Mr. Buchanan, April 26, 1846. . Executive Document, 
 No. 4, House of Representatives, first Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, 
 p. 34. t Correspondence. Idem, p. 38. 
 
180 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 failure of negotiations, that there existed no chance 
 of peace while Paredes remained in power.*? Its 
 action was therefore immediately taken to favor 
 his competitor, so far as it could he done incidental 
 ly, and- without any direct compromise of the United 
 States. On the 13th of May orders were issued to 
 Commodore Connor, commanding the hlockading 
 squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, to permit the en 
 trance of Santa Anna into' Vera 'Cruz, should he at 
 tempt to pass.f This order, given hefore the re 
 ceipt of .the intelligence of the battles of Palo Alto 
 and Resaca de la Palma, could have heen intend 
 ed for no other purpose than to intimate ^sympathy 
 for the liberal as opposed to the monarchical party 
 of Mexico, for it was given without any correspond 
 ence with Santa Anna, without pledge or promise 
 from him, and was in effect hut an intimation, for 
 no force could have hlockaded the coast of Mex 
 ico so effectually as to prevent his landing in the 
 country at some unfrequented point, if he felt dis 
 posed. 
 
 Had the leaders of the liberal party in Mexico 
 been guided by aught else than their own selfish 
 views, the measure of policy in allowing the pas 
 sage of Santa Anna would, probably have had its 
 effect; for. it was certainly the interest of their 
 country to make peace with the United States, and 
 the order referred to must have been taken by them 
 
 * President's Annual Message, 1846. 
 
 t , Mr. Bancroft to Commodore Connor, May 13th, 1846. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 775-777. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^g^ 
 
 as an exponent of friendly feeling in case they were 
 successful. But they looked only to the primary 
 objects of their own selfishness, and for prompting 
 these they enlarged upon the military talents of 
 Santa Anna, the necessity of employing them in the 
 war, and kept up the excitement against Paredes 
 by the continued cry of the danger in which the lib 
 erties and honor of the nation were placed in con 
 sequence of his maladministration while engaged 
 in his monarchical intrigues. Santa Anna's own 
 course was very, much of the same character. 
 Whether he hoped to be able to control public opin 
 ion, and to. turn its tide when he gained power, is a 
 question which he alone' can decide. But he. was 
 committed to a hostile course of action,, while lie 
 was at Havana, with his own people ; and, notwith 
 standing the repeated asseverations of American 
 newspapers that he had entered into engagements . 
 to make peace as soon as possible, it is very doubtful 
 whether he ever was committed on that side fur 
 ther than to declare that he would acquiesce in 
 the will of the Mexican people ; and this -not to 
 public functionaries nor in any positive manner, 
 but only in ordinary conversation. Whatever may 
 have been his intentions, if,, indeed, .he had any 
 idea of making peace, the publications referred to 
 were serious embarrassments, for they only gave 
 an argument to. his enemies at home, to meet 
 which he was obliged to commit himself still more 
 positively to measures of hostility. 
 
 The defeat of Arista on the Rio Grande had de- 
 
1Q2 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 prived the government of Paredes of the prestige 
 of military glory. For its recovery, and for the re 
 tention of power by a retention of popularity, all 
 the energy of the president and ministry was put 
 forth in raising men and money ; and it was daily 
 announced that Paredes would repair to the army, 
 to conduct operations against the invaders in per 
 son. But the progress of the different intrigues in 
 which he was a party, and those of his opponents, 
 tended to prevent his departure for a long time, if, 
 indeed, he seriously contemplated leaving the capi 
 tal. The revolt of Alvarez had not been suppress 
 ed, and the proceedings of the > Santanistas threat 
 ened a revolution the moment he was beyond the 
 limits of the city. A pronunciamiento had broken 
 out in Jalisco, and a portion of the troops destined 
 for the north were ordered thither for its suppres 
 sion. This was another cause of complaint against 
 Paredes on the part of the Santanistas, as it was 
 said that he deprived the army of the north, then 
 preparing to make good the national defense, of re- 
 enforcement, in order to sustain his personal pow 
 er. Early measures had been adopted by Paredes 
 to suppress the expression of opinion adverse to his 
 government, but, in spite of the penalties threaten 
 ed against editors, both opposition and its expres 
 sion increased. 
 
 In the mean while, a color of legality had been 
 given to his usurped authority by the Congress 
 assembled under his early convocataria, which, on 
 the 13th of June, elected him President of Mexi- 
 
THE WAR, WITH MEXICO. 133 
 
 co.^ On the following day he solicited and ob 
 tained its permission to take military command of 
 the army ; but he was in no haste to depart, and 
 leave political affairs in confusion. 
 
 He had to arrange many things preparatory to 
 active operations, as well as to secure his power. 
 The greatest difficulty was encountered in raising 
 money, and to, enable him to effect it, the Congress 
 passed bills giving to the President unlimited pow 
 er in that respect, as well as in the appointment of 
 officers. These were not, however, passed until 
 some time in July ; and when, with the security 
 afforded in the power conferred, Paredes prepared 
 to leave the city of Mexico, although the revolt in 
 Jalisco was still a cause of uneasiness and distrust, 
 the Santanistas, who watched the course of events 
 with eagerness, fearful of danger to their schemes 
 should he with this unlimited power assume com 
 mand of a large army in the field, arranged their 
 plans to insure his downfall. 
 
 It was announced that the President would leave 
 the capital on the 31st of July. On that day the 
 garrisons of Vera Cruz and San Juan d'Ulloa, head 
 ed by Generals Landero and Perez, pronounced in 
 favor of Santa Anna. Immediately on the recep 
 tion of the news in Mexico, the garrison of that city 
 joined in the pronunciamiento, and General Salas, 
 who proclaimed himself as the chief of the liberat 
 ing army, seized upon the citadel. 'Valentin Go 
 mez Farias, a leader of the liberal party, acted as 
 
 * Published proceedings of the Mexican Congress. 
 
14 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 his counselor, and lent all his influence to support 
 the rebellion. The vice-president, Bravo, and the 
 ministry, made some opposition on paper, hut it 
 was fruitless, and on the 5th of August the insur 
 gents were in full power, and Paredes was a pris 
 oner. Some intention was at first manifested of 
 inflicting upon him summary punishment as a trai 
 tor and a monarchist ; hut Salas chose to pursue 
 a different course of policy, and the only proceed 
 ings against him were to deprive him of his liber 
 ty. Soon after he left the country, and his inter 
 ference with Mexican affairs was for a time sus 
 pended. 
 
 During the progress of the scheme of revolution, 
 Santa Anna had remained at Havana, awaiting the 
 nioment when its successful execution would per 
 mit him to land in Mexico with safety. He was 
 surrounded by many political friends, and among 
 them was Almonte. In the spring of 1846, this 
 individual had been appointed minister to France 
 and England by Paredes, and had proceeded as 
 far as Havana on his route, when he was recalled. 
 He was there engaged in the various intrigues of 
 Santa Anna, as he had been in Mexico, and con 
 ducted a correspondence with some of his friends 
 in the United States,^ having for its object the em 
 barrassment of /that government at home while en 
 gaged in the Mexican war, showing plainly that, 
 whatever may have been the sentiments of Santa 
 
 * See Appendix, No. 1. Receipt of Havana letters acknowledged by 
 American correspondents. 
 
THE WAR WITH'MEXICO. 
 
 Anna at the time, that of one of his advisers, at 
 least, was of unmitigated hostility. 
 
 When news was received at Havana of the pro- 
 nunciamiento at Vera Cruz, Santa Anna and suite 
 sailed at once for Mexico. He landed at Vera Cruz 
 on the 16th of August, having passed the block 
 ading squadron without question or delay. On the 
 same day he issued a manifesto,^ denouncing the 
 monarchical schemes of Paredes and the ambitious 
 views of the United States, and vindicating his owri 
 conduct. The latter was a matter of some difficulty, 
 even upon paper, in so far as related to his assert 
 ed strong desire for . the prosperity of his country ; 
 for his tortuous course of puhlic action had render 
 ed it almost impossible to show any thing like a 
 governing principle, except for his own aggrandize : 
 ment, either for good or for evil. He ended by 
 again declaring himself in favor of the Constitution 
 of 1824, and that thenceforth he was the slave of 
 public opinion, and should yield implicit obedience 
 to its dictates. Having put forth this exponent of 
 his sentiments for effect upon the Mexican people, 
 he retired to his hacienda to await the course of 
 events, while Almonte and Rejon went to the cap 
 ital for the purpose of controlling them. They 
 proved to be successful in their action, and state 
 after state declared in favor of Santa Anna. 
 
 The nominal authority of the new government 
 
 * Commodore Connor to Mr. Bancroft, and Manifesto. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 775-777. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 remained in the hands of Salas ; for, although San 
 ta Anna had been invited by him, as general of the 
 " liberating army," to assume the exercise of pow 
 er, he chose to remain at his hacienda until the af 
 fairs of the new government were established, and 
 he could enter the capital without danger of inter 
 fering with the progress of his popularity or to^the 
 government. As every action of his at the time 
 was one of policy, the state of his wounded leg was 
 pleaded as an excuse for his remaining at Mango 
 del Clavo,^ by which Mexicans were again re 
 minded that "he had suffered in the cause of his 
 country. 
 
 Between the 6th of August and the 14th of Sep 
 tember, the Mexican government was straining ev 
 ery nerve to increase its power and to prepare for 
 the prosecution of the war. Salas, whose boast it 
 was that the chief end which he had in view, dur 
 ing his temporary exercise of the executive power, 
 was to assist the brave army about to fight the en 
 emy,! issued various proclamations, calling upon 
 the people to take part in the war, and to contrib 
 ute means in money and in kind for its support. 
 As a measure of hostility, an attempt was made to 
 put in execution the scheme of selling letters of 
 marque to foreigners, that they might attack and 
 prey upon American commerce. Blank prize let 
 ters and passports, with the signature of Salas, 
 countersigned by Almonte, and accompanied by 
 blank certificates of naturalization, were sent in 
 
 * Mexican Official Correspondence. t Idem. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 187 
 
 any required quantity to Havana, where they were 
 offered for sale to any who might have a piratical 
 inclination.^ The measure had doubtless been 
 thought of and agreed upon at Havana ; and as such 
 men as Almonte and Rej on were the active agents 
 in causing its adoption, it is fair to suppose that 
 they had taken some steps toward securing accept 
 ance and purchase of their permits to plunder on 
 the high seas with impunity while arranging mat 
 ters for Santa Anna's return. But the whole scheme 
 had been defeated, long previous to the attempt to 
 carry it into execution, by the provisions of trea 
 ties existing between the United States and Spain, 
 and other powers, and the early avowal on the part 
 of their government to treat all persons as pirates 
 who should, without proper authority and legal nat 
 uralization, engage in the business. The Spanish 
 authorities of Cuba at once avowed their intention 
 to enforce the treaty stipulations ;f and in the dan 
 ger of the business, if any letters were purchased or 
 accepted, not a single privateer sailed under them, 
 and the whole scheme ended in nothing. 
 
 During the administration of Salas, another prop 
 osition was received from the American govern 
 ment for opening negotiations for peace. The 
 American President, deeming that, after the result 
 of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, 
 the Mexicans could not attribute any such propo- 
 
 * Letter of Mr. Campbell, consul at Havana, with copies of blank pass 
 ports, prize letters, and certificates of naturalization. Executive Document, 
 No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Con 
 gress, p. 40-42. t Idem ibidem. 
 
188 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 sitipn to a consciousness of weakness, was will 
 ing to sacrifice again the ordinary rules of nation 
 al intercourse on the altar of Mexican pride, and, 
 by again taking the initiative, to afford her an op 
 portunity for ending the war.^ The measure may 
 have been one of policy with regard to the state 
 of parties in the United States ; for, by making the 
 offer, it was demonstrated to .those who had already 
 urged against the administration of Mr. Polk that 
 he had' plunged the country unnecessarily into war, 
 that its continuance was, as its commencement had 
 been, dependent upon the will of the Mexican gov 
 ernment. As the letfer of Mr. Buchanan, which 
 made the proposition, bore date on the 27th of July, 
 three days' before the pronunciamiento at Vera Cruz, 
 it can not be believed that any knowledge o'f the 
 immediate return of Santa Anna to Mexico was in 
 the possessidn of the American President and cab 
 inet, however much they might have hoped for a 
 favorable result from the downfall of Paredes's 
 administration and the return of the eX-dictator. 
 But, in. making the offer, there was no sacrifice of 
 the indemnity which it had. been intended from 
 the commencement of hostilities to demand from 
 Mexico ; for, by the 27th of July, the various expe 
 ditions against California and New Mexico had so 
 far advanced that it was certain that those territo 
 ries would be occupied by the troops of the United 
 States before a treaty could be concluded, which, 
 if upon the basis of UTI possidetis, would have giv- 
 
 * President's Annual Message, 1846. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 en them to the United States ; and that basis was 
 looked to, at the time, as one upon which to treat.^ 
 
 The letter was answered by Senor Rejon, who 
 was Minister of Relations under Salas, on the 31st 
 of August. The government, which had been for 
 so short a time established, and whose originators 
 had used the cry of enmity to the United States as 
 a means of gaining power, was then in no condi 
 tion of acceding to the proposition, even if it had 
 been desired. While, therefore, the answer of Mr. 
 Rejon was courteous and modest, it insisted upon 
 discussing the causes of the war, which had been 
 waived in the communication of the American sec 
 retary, and was, in fact, a refusal to enter upon ne 
 gotiations at the time.f It was said, however, that 
 the whole matter would be referred to the Mexican 
 Congress, which had been convoked to meet in the 
 following December, for its consideration and de 
 cision. The intercourse ended with this reply, and 
 the dispute was left to the arbitrament of arms. 
 
 Mexico continued her efforts to rajse men and 
 means of war, and, among other schemes which 
 were concocted for the injury of her adversary, was 
 one which bore so similar a character to that of 
 selling her letters of marque and blank certificates 
 of naturalization, that it may well be believed that 
 
 ' * Mr. Bancroft, to Commodore Sloat, July 12th, 1846. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 238. 
 
 t Correspondence between Mr. Buchanan and Seffor Eejon. Executive 
 Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, first Session of the twenty-ninth 
 Congress, p. 42, 43. 
 
190 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 they had their origin in the same head, although 
 something of the kind had heen attempted hy Gen 
 eral Arista, on the Rio Grande. It was no less 
 than a plan, officially and openly avowed hy the 
 Mexican government, for inducing desertion from 
 the American army, and a commission of five offi 
 cers was actually appointed^ to determine and re 
 port upon the rewards which were to be given to 
 traitors. Whether it was intended that the plan 
 should actually succeed, and that the government 
 should fulfill its promises to those who should prove 
 false to their sworn allegiance or no, the edict which 
 convoked the commission was published, setting 
 forth many intended benefits, in order that the con 
 templated proposition might be known to those 
 upon whose cupidity it was designed to operate : 
 perhaps the first instance known to history where 
 a government having any professed regard for its 
 character has publicly undertaken any thing so in 
 jurious to its dignity as the attempt at bribing 
 private, soldiers by wholesale, and by the act of its 
 chief authorities. 
 
 Santa Anna approached the capital in Septem 
 ber. When he reached Ayotla, eighteen miles 
 from Mexico, he was met by letters from Salas, as 
 head of the Provisional Government, again tender 
 ing him the supreme power. But the offer was 
 again declined, on the ground that the chief desire 
 of Santa Anna was to serve his country in the army. 
 He declared that; he would not abandon the post 
 
 * Mexican Official Publications. Diario del Gobeirno. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of danger for the post of power in the situation of 
 his country at the time, and closed his answer by 
 many assurances of his disinterested patriotism.^ 
 
 This correspondence, published and circulated 
 on the 14th of September, paved the way for his 
 reception in the capital. He entered on the 15th, 
 and was received with all the appearances of a tri 
 umph ; and, in the show of enthusiasm, it might 
 have been believed that he was looked upon as the 
 regenerator of Mexico. 
 
 Immediately after his arrival, the Provisional 
 Government ordered a levy of thirty thousand 
 men, and issued its requisitions upon the different 
 states. The contingents were ordered to be at San 
 Luis de Potosi or the capital within seventy days 
 from the date. This prompt action on the part of 
 the new government, as contrasted with the delays 
 of that of Paredes, was loudly proclaimed as the 
 benefit of the change, and the success of Mexico 
 in the struggle with the United States was fore 
 told with confidence. Santa Anna was, however, 
 in no haste to engage in the struggle, and intend 
 ed that he should be fully prepared and in strong 
 force before he met the American army. He had 
 sent orders to Ampudia, who had been assigned to 
 the command of the northern, army, to evacuate 
 Monterey, unless he was fully confident of a suc 
 cessful resistance, and to fall back upon San Luis, 
 where the new generalissimo was about to establish 
 
 * Santa Anna's letter from Ayotla, September 14th, 1846. Diario diel Go- 
 beirno. 
 
192 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 his head-quarters. On the 28th of September four 
 thousand soldiers marched from the capital to San 
 Luis, and in a short time Santa Anna proceeded 
 to the same place. 
 
 Throughout this period, while the central gov- 
 qrnment of Mexico had been torn by the intrigues 
 of the different factions, preparations had been 
 slowly progressing for resisting the American ad 
 vance at Monterey. As Arista and Ampudia had 
 both been summoned to Mexico to attend an in 
 vestigation of the affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca, 
 the command of the army had devolved upon Me- 
 jia. The defenses of the town had been com 
 menced shortly after the arrival of Arista's beaten 
 forces, and had been continued from time to time by 
 both citizens and soldiers, as the movements and in 
 tentions of the American general became apparent. 
 
 On the 20th of August, the force present in and 
 near the city amounted to over four thousand men, 
 exclusive of citizens. As it was known that Am 
 pudia was en route to 'assume the command, Me- 
 jia, upon whom the responsibility could not rest in 
 case of failure, pursued the same course which he 
 had at Matamoras. He indulged the authorities 
 at Mexico in many anticipations of success, and 
 assured them, in his official communications, of 
 the certainty of triumph.^ 
 
 He had excellent means of information, and 
 knew the number and description of the American 
 troops nearly as well as their own general. Of 
 
 * Mejia's Official Correspondence, published in Mexico. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 their movements he kept the Mexican government 
 well informed, as well as of his awn intentions ; but 
 he never hazarded any thing for the doubtful pros 
 pect of being able to announce a victory. When 
 he communicated intelligence of Worth's advance 
 to Serralvo, he asserted that he had contemplated 
 attacking him, but had been deterred by the con 
 sideration that Worth's troops were the veterans 
 of the American army, and that, although he could 
 crush them, the victory would leave him in no con 
 dition for the defense of Monterey.^ No other dem 
 onstration was therefore made than to keep Torre- 
 jon's cavalry in observation of the Americans. 
 
 Ampudia arrived with a large re-enforcement, 
 and assumed the command, on the 28th of Au 
 gust. His first steps were to issue decrees which 
 threatened every native and every foreigner with 
 death who should afford assistance to, or who should 
 in any manner correspond with, the enemy, f 
 Upon hearing of Taylor's advance from Serralvo, 
 on the 15th of September he issued another proc 
 lamation, calling upon the American soldiers to 
 desert, promising them good treatment and re 
 wards, and assistance for their march into the inte 
 rior of the country.$ All alcaldes and Mexican 
 citizens were ordered to assist the deserters, if as- 
 
 '* Mejia's Official Correspondence, published in Mexico. 
 
 t General Worth to Major Bliss, September 3, 1846, inclosing the procla 
 mation of Ampudia. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representa 
 tives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 420, 421. 
 
 t General Taylor to the Adjutant General, inclosing the circular and ad 
 dress of Ampudia. Idem, p. 422, 423. 
 
 L N 
 
!94 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 sured that they came in good faith ; but so much 
 discretion was allowed in the order that it would 
 have been a matter of extreme hazard for any to 
 have trusted themselves to Mexican clemency. 
 The inducements, such as they were, were set forth 
 in hand-bills, which were strewed along the line 
 of march of the American army. They had but 
 little effect, however, for there were few who chose 
 to leave their colors to engage in a service as pre 
 carious and thankless as that of Mexico. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Monterey Its Locality Defenses Garrison American Force Plan of 
 Attack Movement of Worth's Division to turn the Town Demonstration 
 on the East in Favor Operations of the 21st on the East of Monterey 
 On the West Inactivity on the East on the 22d Operations on the West 
 of the same Day Advance into the Town from the East on the 23d 
 Withdrawal of the Troops Advance into the 1 Town from the West Offer 
 of Mexican General to capitulate Negotiations Convention of Monterey 
 Observations. 
 
 MONTEREY, the capital of the state of Nueva 
 Leon, lies in a valley at the eastern base of the 
 Sierra Madre. The valley, though not large, is of 
 great fertility, and supports a considerable popula 
 tion. On its east rises the single elevation of the 
 Saddle Mountain, and the main chain of the Sierra 
 and its spurs are the boundaries on the southern, 
 western, and part of the northern limits. The 
 main road from the Rio Grande to the capital of 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. ^95 
 
 Mexico leads from the east, through a cultivated 
 country, some distance to the north of the Saddle 
 Mountain, and, passing through the city, continues 
 on hy a pass, varying from one to three miles in 
 width, through the Sierra, past Saltillo, and on to 
 the desert country between the latter place and San 
 Luis de Potosi. A rivulet, the Rio San Juan de 
 Monterey, rises in this pass, and, running eastward, 
 traverses the valley. 
 
 Monterey stands on the northern bank of this 
 rivulet, and extends in its length near a mile and 
 a half along the stream. It contains ordinarily 
 about ten thousand inhabitants, and that number 
 was probably within its limits at- the time of the 
 approach of the Americans, exclusive of the army 
 which had been assembled for its protection. 
 
 The defensive works around the city had accu 
 mulated during the period of American inactivity 
 succeeding the battles of the 8th and 9th of May 
 and the occupation of Matamoras, and, although 
 they were in great degree irregular, they had a for 
 midable strength. Directly to the north of the 
 town, at the junction of three roads, that from the 
 east by Marin, and two from Pesqueria Grande 
 and Monclova, was the citadel, a square bastioned 
 work, with dry ditches and embrasures for thirty- 
 four guns. It, however, mounted but ten or twelve 
 of all calibers, from fours to eighteens. Within it, 
 the walls of an unfinished Cathedral rose some 
 thirty feet from the ground, and were of sufficient 
 strength to protect troops from any distant fire. 
 
196 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Around the top of these walls was placed a para 
 pet of fascines, which afforded a good position 
 whence musketry could he delivered against an as 
 saulting force. The ditches of the citadel were not 
 completely finished in front of the curtains, nor 
 were they at any place more than twelve feet wide. 
 
 The distance from this work to the closely-huilt 
 part of the town was ahout one thousand yards, hut 
 within thkt the space was filled with squares con 
 taining gardens inclosed by hedges and irrigating 
 ditches, and built up with scattered huts. From 
 a point south of the citadel a branch of the Klo 
 San Juan ran through the suburb in a southeast 
 erly direction, and emptied into that rivulet be 
 yond the town. Its banks were in many places 
 steep and difficult, and deep irrigating ditches ex 
 tended for much of its length along the northern 
 side. The branch was crossed at a point near the 
 middle of its course through the suburb by the 
 bridge of La Purisima, which was defended by a 
 strong tete du pont. Two breast- works along its 
 southern bank opposed the passage of the lower 
 part of the stream. 
 
 The southeastern front of the town was defend 
 ed by a system of lunettes, well arranged for flank 
 ing purposes, and with ground between them al 
 most impracticable, on account of the hedges and 
 bramble by which it was covered. Fort Teneria, 
 the most advanced of these, covered by its fire the 
 roads from Marin and Cadereita, and mounted four 
 guns. Fort El Diablo, to its southwest, mounted 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. j g 7 
 
 three, and a third, still further toward the rivulet, 
 four. Each of these commanded the lunettes more 
 advanced, and the system terminated in a lunette 
 having a high command, and covering the fords 
 across the river. 
 
 The approaches to all of the fortifications on the 
 southeastern front of the city were so masked by 
 shrubhery that accurate reconnaissance was ex 
 ceedingly difficult. 
 
 From the most southern lunette a line of barri 
 cades extended along the northern bank of the San 
 Juan for many squares, and, turning at right angles, 
 encircled the strongest buildings, and connected 
 with the tete du pont of La Purisima. Each bar 
 ricade was strongly and regularly constructed, with 
 embrasures for one or more guns, and the tops of 
 the neighboring houses were covered by parapets 
 of sand-bags. The streets leading to the west were 
 barricaded beyond the main line, and the Campo 
 Santo, a strong stone inclosure in the Plaza de la 
 Capilla, which was traversed by these streets, was 
 prepared for defense. The walls had been fortified 
 to resist cannon shot, and were plentifully crenelled 
 for musketry, with embrasures for guns at the an 
 gles. 
 
 Immediately beyond the town and to the north 
 of the main road to Saltillo lay the Loma d'ln- 
 dependencia. Half way up the acclivity w r ere 
 the massive ruins of the Obispado, which had been 
 fortified with a view of covering a retreat from the 
 city, if it should be necessary. Its battlements 
 
198 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 were furnished with a sand-bag parapet, and the 
 city front was covered by a priest-cap work, with 
 platforms for four guns in barbette. A branch 
 road turned to the southwest as the main road left 
 the city, and, crossing the San Juan, traversed a 
 range of hills which lay along the southern bank 
 of the river. At the summit lay Fort Soldado, a 
 rudely- constructed square redoubt. The hills ex 
 tended northwest to the river, where they were 
 terminated by the Loma de Federacion, the steep 
 declivity of which reached to its banks, and to the 
 southeast beyond the town to the main chain of 
 the Sierra. Between the citadel and the Obispado 
 a system of redoubts had been commenced, but not 
 completed. The ground in that direction, however, 
 was difficult, on account of the many hedges and 
 irrigating ditches by which it was traversed. 
 
 For some distance around the citadel, the coun 
 try on the north and east of Monterey was open, 
 or covered with low chaparral. To the east the 
 ground was broken by quarry pits ; but beyond 
 the open ground, both on the north and east, there 
 extended large corn-fields and heavy shrubbery. 
 
 For the defense of the place, General Ampudia 
 had over 10,000 men, of which 7000 were of the 
 line. His precise numerical strength it is difficult 
 to ascertain. It was at one time announced in the 
 city of Mexico that he commanded 13,750 regular 
 troops ; but this was undoubtedly an exaggeration. 
 The accounts of the strength of the different corps 
 as they arrived at Monterey, published in Mexico, 
 
THE WAR, WITH MEXICO. ^99 
 
 made the aggregate of regulars over 7000, and that 
 was admitted to have been the number of his 
 troops at a subsequent period. Generals Mejia, 
 Ortega, and Garcia Conde each commanded brig 
 ades of infantry ; General Requena had a large 
 Corps of artillerists ; Torrejon had his strong force 
 of regular cavalry ; and to all these were added 
 many citizens and rancheros, which swelled the 
 numerical strength to, at the lowest estimate, 
 10,000 men. 
 
 The town was plentifully supplied with ammu 
 nition, and in the various batteries and positions 
 forty-two guns of different calibers were mounted. 
 Subsistence, beef cattle, and sheep, for some days, 
 had been introduced into the city, and the attack 
 ing force was known to be too small to invest it 
 so completely as to prevent the introduction of 
 more, or the foraging of the cavalry. 
 
 Under all these circumstances, with his superi 
 ority in numbers, his armament, and the strength 
 of his position, General Ampudia was confident of 
 success, and did not choose to avail himself of the 
 discretionary power with which Santa Anna's or 
 der had clothed him, to abandon the town and fall 
 back on Saltillo and San Luis de Potosi. 
 
 The American army which marched from Ma- 
 rin on the morning of the 18th of September num 
 bered 425 officers and 6220 men. Two regiments 
 of volunteers and a battalion of regulars were of 
 cavalry, and Twiggs's, Worth's, and Butler's divi 
 sions constituted the infantry of the command. 
 
J! 
 
 *i*- .. 
 
 '7:;;. 
 
 200 THE WAR WI TH MEXICO. 
 
 * ' ' ' *, ,^'~* f '*-'* 
 
 Of artillery there were four light batteries (each of 
 three six pounders and one twelve pounder howit 
 zer), one of two twenty-four pounder howitzers, 
 and, in addition, the ordnance officers had in charge 
 for transport a ten-inch mortar and one hundred 
 shells.* 
 
 The various contradictions in the accounts re 
 ceived of the state of things at Monterey had shak 
 en the confidence of General Taylor in even the 
 most authentic ; and, notwithstanding the evident 
 hostility of the Mexican cavalry pickets, their slow 
 retreat, and the proclamations of Ampudia found 
 along the road, he even doubted whether any re 
 sistance would be made to his occupation of the 
 city. He underrated the force of his enemy, and 
 on the 17th wrote to the Secretary of War from 
 Marin that his " regular force was small say 3000 
 eked out to perhaps 6000 by volunteers, many 
 of them forced. "f 
 
 But, at eight o'clock on the morning of the 19th, 
 General Taylor arrived, with the advanced guard, 
 within about fifteen hundred yards of the citadel 
 of Monterey. The display of the Mexican flag, a 
 large corps. of cavalry in the plain, and a few well- 
 directed shots, dispelled all doubts which had been 
 entertained concerning resistance, and the ad 
 vanced guard was at once withdrawn out of range, 
 while the general returned to the grove of San Do- 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 88. 
 
 t Letter to Secretary Marcy. Executive Document, No. 60, House of 
 Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 422. 
 
 
// C P. 20 1.~ VOL . / . 
 
 Q--. .. ; 
 
* 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 01 
 
 mingo, some three miles from the city, where the 
 army was halted and the attack was arranged. 
 
 During the afternoon reconnoitering parties were 
 sent to examine the direct approaches arid the de 
 fenses on the east, and one party over the country 
 to the north of the city, with a view of discovering 
 a route by which the obstacles presented by the 
 citadel and eastern fortifications could be turned, 
 and an attack be made directly against the com 
 manding elevations immediately to the south and 
 west. Of these, the Loma d'Independencia, with 
 the fortifications of the Obispado, were the most 
 prominent, as well as nearest the town ; and it 
 was evident that there was the key to the city and 
 fortifications of Monterey. The reconnoitering of 
 ficers returned in the evening, and from their re 
 ports it was deemed to be practicable to turn the 
 works in either direction, by the north or south. 
 But the northern reconnaissance had been conduct 
 ed so far by Major Mansfield that it was known 
 that the road was practicable in that direction, 
 and it was deemed probable that a position might 
 be gained whence to attack the Loma d'Indepen 
 dencia, if not one upon the Saltillo road in rear 
 of the city. On the morning of the 20th, the plan 
 of attack was determined upon and its execution 
 ordered. 
 
 General Worth was directed to move his divis 
 ion through the corn-fields to the north of the town, 
 to turn the positions of the enemy, to penetrate, if 
 possible, to the Saltillo road, to cut his line of re- 
 
202 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 treat, and intercept re-enforcements from the inte 
 rior, should any such appear, and to storm and car 
 ry every work and position on the west of Monte 
 rey which it was practicable to carry. Some in 
 tention was entertained of moving Butler's divis 
 ion to the south of the town ; but the order was 
 not issued, and, with Twiggs's division, Butler's 
 kept its camp at the wood of San Domingo. 
 
 Worth marched with his division and Colonel 
 Hays's regiment of Western Texan s at two o'clock 
 in the afternoon, and, turning to the right a short 
 distance from the wood, traversed the corn-fields to 
 the north of the town. His march was necessarily 
 slow, but he reached the Pesqueria Grande road 
 a short time before sundown, and halted his divis 
 ion on the west of it, while in person he proceeded 
 to reconnoiter further in the direction of the Saltil- 
 lo road. Supported by a squadron of Texans, his 
 party proceeded by a path leading from the road of 
 Pesqueria Grande to that of Saltillo, which wound 
 around the base of the mountains of the Sierra, ris 
 ing directly upon its right. On the left, cultivated 
 fields, covered with a dense growth of corn, and 
 divided by hedges and ditches, extended to the base 
 of the Loma d'Independencia, distant some twelve 
 hundred yards from the nearest point of the path. 
 By ascending the eminences on the right, Worth 
 obtained a view of the continuation of the path to 
 the j unction with the Saltillo road, of the positions 
 of the Loma de Federacion, and of Fort Soldado on 
 its extended crest. 
 
J t* 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 03 
 
 While he was engaged in the reconnaissance, the 
 enemy, who had early observed his whole move 
 ment, and had occupied the summit of the Loma 
 d'Independencia with a strong battalion, brought 
 up a howitzer from the Obispado to a sand-bag bat 
 tery upon the summit, and opened fire upon the 
 reconnoitering party. A strong corps of infantry 
 at the same time descended the hill, skirted its 
 base, and struck across the fields with the apparent 
 intention of cutting it off. Worth descended from 
 the eminence which he had occupied, and was re 
 turning to his division, when the Mexican skir 
 mishers, running forward, opened a rattling fire of 
 musketry and escopetas. The Texans, not very 
 well disciplined, were unused to receiving even a 
 distant discharge without reply, and soon became 
 restive. In spite of the orders of the general and 
 staff, they quickened their pace, passed the general, 
 and fell back upon the division at a gallop, in con 
 fusion, but without loss. 
 
 The main body of the troops wa,s moved a short 
 distance in advance from the road of Pesqueria 
 Grande, where it was halted and bivouacked. 
 The night set in dark and rainy, and in the diffi 
 cult positions any movement on either side was ap 
 parently impracticable. Nevertheless, a few Mex 
 ican skirmishers, attracted by the noise made by 
 the Texans, who were in front, crept up and deliv 
 ered their fire, which, though ineffectual, put a stop 
 to the shouting, and brought the Rangers to their 
 arms. But the skirmishers retired immediately, 
 
 
2Q4 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and for the rest of the night the division was un 
 disturbed. 
 
 "While these movements were progressing, recon- 
 noitering officers had been in observation of the 
 eastern front of the town, and observed the Mexi 
 can re-enforcements directed to the Obispado, and 
 the occupation of the Loma d'Independencia. To 
 prevent an accumulation of the Mexican force upon 
 Worth's command, Taylor drew out Butler's and 
 Twiggs's divisions, and displayed them in front of 
 the city until dark, at the same time sending word 
 to Worth that his movement was observed.^ The 
 enemy made no other demonstration than that 
 of re- enforcing his western positions, and although 
 Worth at the time was entirely detached, and some 
 five miles from the main army, no effort was made 
 to intercept the communication. The officer who 
 bore General Taylor's note reached him shortly aft 
 er dark with a small escort, and returned with his 
 answer, giving the result of his reconnaissance, 
 and of his determination to press on. Worth had 
 seen the action of the enemy before the receipt of 
 the dispatch, but, in answer to it, he stated that 
 he believed that his further advance would be dis 
 puted in force, and recommended that a strong 
 diversion should be made on the east of the city. 
 The suggestion was adopted by General Taylor.^ 
 
 To assist in the demonstration to be made on 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House of 
 Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 83. 
 t Idem ibidem. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 05 
 
 the following morning, the siege-mortar and twen 
 ty-four pounder howitzers were placed in position 
 upon the right of the main road, whence to annoy 
 the citadel.^ It could hardly have been expected 
 to effect any thing more than an annoyance, for 
 the distance selected was over twelve hundred 
 yards from the works, and so much had been said 
 about the want of transportation that the chief 
 ordnance officer had neglected to transport a plat 
 form for the mortar, and none charged with loca 
 ting it availed themselves of the timber in the 
 wood of San Domingo to construct one. The mor 
 tar was accordingly placed on tolerably firm soil 
 at the bottom of a quarry pit. The howitzers, for 
 which the range was too great for effect, were 
 planted in its vicinity; and in this manner every 
 thing in the shape of siege artillery which was 
 with the American army was disposed of. 
 
 On the following morning the dispositions for 
 the demonstration in favor of Worth's movement 
 were commenced at early dawn. Lieutenant- 
 colonel May was sent to re-enforce him with the 
 battalion of the second dragoons, and soon after 
 Governor Henderson, with the regiment of Eastern 
 Texans, marched for the same object. Twiggs's 
 division, under command of Lieutenant-colonel 
 Garland, was ordered forward to the position of 
 the batteries, leaving one company from each reg 
 iment as a camp guard. Upon its arrival, the fourth 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 83. 
 
206 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 regiment of infantry was detached to cover the bat 
 tery, and Garland was directed to move with his 
 remaining troops, the first and third regiments of 
 infantry, a battalion of Maryland and District of 
 Columbia volunteers, and Bragg's field battery, to 
 ward the lower part of the town, to make a strong 
 demonstration, and, if thought practicable, to carry 
 any of the small forts with which he might fall in.^ 
 Major Mansfield and other engineer officers accom 
 panied his column, and were charged with select 
 ing and designating points of attack. Butler's di 
 vision was, at the same time, ordered forward from 
 the camp to the batteries, which, as Garland moved 
 off, commenced their fire. They made no impres 
 sion upon the citadel whatever, for the range was 
 too great for the- howitzers, and the mortar, being 
 without a platform, was driven so far into the 
 ground by the recoil of two or three discharges, 
 that it became perfectly useless. After a few ex 
 periments at this novel kind of mortar practice, 
 the attempt was given up, and its fire ceased from 
 that direction altogether. The howitzers contin 
 ued a desultory cannonade, but the Mexicans re 
 plied from the citadel with heavier metal and bet 
 ter aim ; and although neither party did much dam 
 age to the other in this quarter, yet it was evident 
 that the American batteries were hardly effective 
 even for annoyance. 
 
 When Garland's division moved from the posi- 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the 29th Congress, p. 84. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 07 
 
 tion of the batteries, Major Mansfield, with Bother 
 reconnoitering officers, having two companies of 
 infantry as the immediate escort, advanced into 
 the suburbs of the town in search of a point of at 
 tack, and, after a short reconnaissance, sent a re 
 quest to Garland to come forward. Whether he 
 intended that he should come forward in person, 
 to examine the position, or that he should move 
 up his troops to engage them, Garland understood 
 him in the latter sense. While Mansfield had 
 been employed in reconnaissance, Garland had 
 halted the main body of his command out of range. 
 Upon receiving the message, he moved forward in 
 line, keeping to the left of the main road.^ By 
 following the route which Mansfield had pursued, 
 he gave his right flank to the citadel, while Fort 
 Teneria was upon his left and front. The latter 
 of these works soon opened heavily upon the com 
 mand, and the citadel followed its example with 
 a destructive enfilading fire. Still the Americans 
 moved steadily forward until reaching the scatter 
 ed buildings and inclosures of the suburb, which 
 broke their formation ; but, although in confusion, 
 the advance was rapidly continued, for it was 
 thought that Fort Teneria might be turned, and 
 taken in reverse. The Mexican fire from both cit 
 adel and Fort Teneria was kept up with vigor, and 
 as the command approached the rivulet through 
 the suburb, the masked breast- works on its south 
 ern bank received it with another destructive fire, 
 
 * Henry's Campaign Sketches, p. 194. 
 
208 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 which increased the confusion. Neither officers 
 nor men knew any thing of their position.^ Mans 
 field, who had led the assault when the troops had 
 reached him, although wounded, pressed on, point 
 ing out positions for attack, and there was no lack 
 of hrave officers to lead or brave men to follow ; 
 but from the gardens, from the neighboring house 
 tops, as well as from the masked breast- works, an 
 unseen foe pelted the troops with musketry, while 
 the heavy fire from Fort Teneria and the citadel 
 kept rolling in on their flanks. Movements against 
 a seemingly practicable point only brought a great 
 er slaughter, and after many officers and men had 
 fallen, still ignorant of their locality, the troops 
 paused, and finally took shelter in a neighboring 
 street, t' Although the mass of the command had 
 kept boldly to its work during the assault, the 
 greater portion of the battalion of Maryland and 
 District of Columbia volunteers had early left its 
 colors and fled beyond the range of fire. The lieu 
 tenant-colonel, Watson, three officers, and some 
 seventy men, remained to sustain the honor of their 
 corps ; and Watson fell. 
 
 In the mean while, Bragg's battery had been 
 advanced into the suburb, and had opened, but a 
 few discharges proved the inefficiency of his guns 
 in the position. His men and horses fell rapidly 
 under the fire of the unseen enemy, and against 
 the heavier metal of Fort Teneria in embrasure 
 he was powerless ; and, finally, this first attempt 
 
 * Henry's Campaign Sketches, p. 194. t Idem, p. 195. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 209 
 
 at a demonstration was consummated by the whole 
 command being ordered to fall back out of ranged 
 But this movement was not effected without fur 
 ther loss, for a body of lancers, of which many hov 
 ered about the field, came down on two detached 
 companies, killed two officers and many men, and 
 drove the remainder, in confusion, to the main body. 
 
 The fortunes of the day had thus far been en 
 tirely with the Mexicans ; but, in the confusion 
 of the assaults, two companies of the first infantry, 
 under Captains Backus and Lamotte, had extend 
 ed to the left, and seized a tannery, which shel 
 tered them from the enemy's fire, and in the yard 
 of which was a shed looking directly into the gorge 
 of Fort Teneria. A distillery in the vicinity had 
 been fortified with sand-bag parapets, and was 
 strongly garrisoned by the enemy, who opened 
 thence a heavy fire upon Backus's command. La 
 motte had fallen wounded, and as it was imprac 
 ticable to retire with any security while the ene 
 my held the distillery, attention was first given to 
 that point. After a sharp firing, the Mexicans re 
 tired from the azotea, and Backus was about to 
 retreat and rejoin the main body of the division, 
 for he had just learned that it had been ordered 
 back out of range. f 
 
 When the discharges of artillery and the rapid 
 fire of small arms about Fort Teneria had an- 
 
 * Henry's Campaign Sketches, p. 195. 
 
 t Idem, p. 195, 196, and Official Report of General Taylor. Executive 
 Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session of the twenty- 
 ninth Congress, p. 85. 
 
 I. O 
 
210 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 nounced to General Taylor that Garland had be 
 come warmly engaged, he ordered the fourth regi 
 ment of infantry and three regiments of Butler's 
 division to move at once by the left flank in the 
 direction of the conflict, and support the assault. 
 The first Kentucky regiment remained to guard the 
 battery.^ 
 
 In the confusion of affairs, but three companies 
 of the fourth received the order at first, and these 
 moved at once boldly to the assault, and direct 
 upon Fort Teneria. Coming rapidly forward, they 
 opened a fire of musketry upon that work; but 
 every gun was turned upon them, and one third 
 of the officers and men fell at the first discharge; 
 the remainder staggered and fell back for support.! 
 
 General Butler had meanwhile ordered forward 
 Quitman's brigade, and advanced with the Ohio 
 regiment of Hamer's in the direction of the con 
 flict. The movement of these troops was also un 
 der the flank fire of the citadel, from which they 
 suffered much annoyance ; but, feeling their way, 
 they gradually advanced. General Butler, follow 
 ing the route of Garland's command, entered the 
 suburb, and, having advanced several squares, met 
 Major Mansfield, who still lingered upon the field, 
 and from him learned of the failure of the attack 
 and the impracticable nature of the Mexican posi- 
 tion.$ Taylor in the mean while had come up, 
 
 * Official Report of General Taylor. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 85. 
 t Idem Idem, p. 85. t Gen. Butler's Official Report. Idem, p. 91. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 211 
 
 and, learning the state of affairs in that quarter, 
 ordered a retrograde movement; but it had not been 
 commenced when information of success about Fort 
 Teneria caused the order to be rescinded.^ 
 
 For when the fire of the fourth infantry had 
 opened in its front, Backus had determined to hold 
 on to his position. Occupying the roof of the shed, 
 his men poured a stream of musketry into the 
 gorge of the lunette, which told with effect upon 
 the crowded mass of the Mexican garrison, and 
 some portion of it commenced a precipitate retreat. 
 The companies of the fourth having fallen back, 
 there was for a time no assaulting force in front of 
 the work, and the greater number of the garrison 
 remained until Quitman's brigade, which, although 
 suffering severely from the fire of the citadel, ad 
 vanced rapidly against the position. When with 
 in one hundred yards the volunteers broke into a 
 run, rushed forward with loud shouts, and entered 
 the lunette over the parapet. The garrison, gall 
 ed by Backus's fire, fled before their assault, aban 
 doning the armament of five guns and their am 
 munition, and the volunteers followed so fast that 
 no time was afforded for resistance from the distil 
 lery, in which thirty persons were captured. 
 
 So soon as the event was known, fragments of 
 the different regiments, and Bragg's and Rldge- 
 ly's field batteries, were collected about the cap 
 tured work. General Taylor determined to hold 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 85. 
 
 . 
 
212 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Ms position in the town, and attempts were made 
 to advance. General Butler first led the Ohio regi 
 ment to the left of the former attack, with the in 
 tention of assaulting Fort Diablo ; but that work 
 was stoutly defended, and could not immediately 
 be taken. Butler accordingly fell back, but not 
 until he had been wounded and lost many men.^ 
 Meanwhile Taylor had ordered the main force 
 of the first division (still under Garland, although 
 General Twiggs had come up from the camp to 
 the captured work) to extend to the right and en 
 deavor to penetrate the town, with the idea of 
 making way by an extended circuit to the rear of 
 Fort Diablo. f This was attempted, and, although 
 severely cut up by the fire of the Mexicans as 
 they crossed the streets, especially from the tete 
 du pont of La Purisima, the troops passed beyond 
 the bridge head, and, although in confusion, enter 
 ed the yards of the street next the rivulet, driving 
 the Mexicans from the adjacent houses ; but fur 
 ther advance was impracticable. Directly in front- 
 lay a street swept by the fire of the tete du pont, 
 and beyond, the' deep ditches and high banks of 
 the rivulet; while the Mexicans occupied the para 
 pet of the bridge and a low wall which extended 
 on the southern bank, whence they plied their 
 musketry with unceasing vigor. But still the of 
 ficers, though falling with the men at every mo- 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 85. 
 t Idem. Idem, p. 85. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 2 13 
 
 ttient, called on them to maintain their ground, 
 while they searched in vain for a practicable point 
 to pass the stream. Captain Ridgely brought up 
 a section of his battery, but his fire was ineffectual 
 against that of the heavy metal of the enemy from 
 behind his parapets, and the battle in this quarter 
 continued without any advantage to the Ameri 
 cans. The Mexicans were nevertheless pressed 
 closely, and a heavy battalion of infantry, from the 
 interior of the town, was sent to support the garri 
 son of the tete du pont. It came down the street 
 leading to the bridge, but before it could gain 
 shelter it had to pass under the American fire from 
 the houses and yards on the northern bank of the 
 stream, which was delivered with so much effect 
 that the column was driven back into the town. 
 The Mexican artillery was then placed in position 
 to bear upon the Americans, and, opening from the 
 distance, beat through the walls of the houses and 
 yards, whence they delivered their fire, and render 
 ed the position untenable. After a continued oc 
 cupation of the exposed point, the attempt to pass 
 the rivulet was given up as impracticable, and the 
 troops were withdrawn to Fort Teneria. 
 
 While the various operations had taken place in 
 the suburbs, the Mexican lancers had made many 
 demonstrations of attacking the American troops 
 in rear and cutting up the camp guard at the wood 
 of San Domingo, though none of the demonstra 
 tions had been serious except that upon the detach 
 ed companies of Garland's retreating command. 
 
214 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 The main body of the lancers had coine down at 
 one time upon the Ohio and Mississippi regiments, 
 which had heen withdrawn from Fort Teneria, but 
 those regiments had fallen back against a chapar 
 ral fence, whence they had delivered a fire, and the 
 lancers had retreated. Bragg's battery was sent in 
 that direction from the captured work, and a few 
 discharges effectually dispersed them. The cap 
 tured guns of Fort Teneria were served from time to 
 time upon Fort Diablo, until one of the howitzers 
 was brought forward from the first position of the 
 batteries. But the principal operations of the day 
 upon the eastern front of Monterey were finished. 
 During the afternoon the main body of the troops 
 remained in and about the captured work, collect 
 ing the dead and wounded, and strengthening the 
 position. The enemy made no direct attempt to 
 dislodge them, but kept up a cannonade from Fort 
 Diablo whenever any were exposed, which was re 
 plied to from the howitzer and with musketry. A 
 movement of lancers on the southern bank of the 
 San Juan beyond the town was opposed by Bidge- 
 ly's battery, and a few shots drove them back. 
 When night fell, the first, third, and fourth infan 
 try and Bidgely's guns were detailed to guard the 
 captured work, and the remaining troops were or 
 dered to the camp at the wood of San Domingo. 
 
 The operations upon the eastern side of Monte 
 rey of the 20th of September had resulted in the 
 capture of Fort Teneria, and the repulse of the 
 American troops in their first attempt upon that 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 215 
 
 work, in the advance upon Fort Diablo, and in the 
 attempt to turn it by passing the rivulet to the 
 right of the bridge of La Purisima. The strong 
 demonstration had been effected, and one point of 
 Mexican defense had been gained. But 394 had 
 fallen, killed or wounded, including one general of 
 ficer, eight field officers, seven captains,- and eight 
 een subalterns. The effect of the operations, not 
 withstanding the partial success, had been to damp 
 en the spirits of both officers and men, and to weak 
 en their moral force. The confused nature of the 
 movements, the ground over which they extended, 
 and the necessity of passing and repassing under 
 the flank fire of the citadel, had made the duties 
 of the day not only severe in the actual conflict, 
 but harassing and fatiguing throughout. 
 
 The movement of the cavalry to the support of 
 General Worth had not been effected. Lieutenant- 
 colonel May arrived in the vicinity of the Loma 
 d'Independencia in the morning, but, from the fire 
 of the guns upon its summit, he judged that to pass 
 it with cavalry would be impracticable. Neither 
 did he conceive that he could with safety charge 
 through the streets of the suburbs west of the cita 
 del, as he had instructions to do from General Tay 
 lor ; and, when Governor Henderson came up with 
 the Eastern Texan regiment, May came under his 
 command. Henderson suspended any movement 
 until he could communicate with the command 
 ing general, and received orders soon after to re 
 turn to the main body of the army. But the cav- 
 
216 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 airy arrived too late to take any active part in the 
 operations of the day upon the east. 
 
 The Mexican reveille aroused Worth's division 
 at daylight on the morning of the 21st, and it was 
 immediately prepared for the advance. The small 
 train which accompanied it was parked in an in- 
 closure of adobe walls surrounding the scattered 
 huts in the vicinity of the bivouac, and the fifth 
 regiment of infantry, with one section of Mackall's 
 battery, was detailed as its guard. The remainder 
 of the division moved on by the path which had 
 been reconnoitered the previous evening. 
 
 Hays's regiment of mounted Texans marched in 
 advance, in close order, over the ground, which at 
 some places afforded room for the extension of cav 
 alry, and again narrowed down to a defile. In its 
 rear, Captain C. F. Smith's battalion of light in 
 fantry was deployed as skirmishers across the road 
 covering the front of the division, which marched 
 in close formation. 
 
 As the advanced Texans neared the Saltillo 
 road, upon turning a spur of the mountains they 
 came upon the Mexican regiment of Guanajuato 
 lancers, which, with its supporting infantry, occu 
 pied the junction of the roads, and was in readi 
 ness to dispute the passage. The Mexican force 
 numbered in all near 1500 men, and the cavalry 
 at once commenced forming for a charge. The 
 Texans halted, deployed, moved down to the left 
 of the pail:, and entered a corn-field, where two 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 17 
 
 companies dismounted, and took post in ambush 
 behind the thick fence of the field. Captain 
 M'Culloch's company, not having received the or 
 der for this movement, advanced in a scrambling 
 charge to meet the enemy, who by this time had 
 formed, and was coming down with lances in rest 
 at a sweeping gallop. A short conflict ensued, 
 and the Texans, having inflicted some loss upon 
 the enemy, fell back,, with two men severely 
 wounded. The lancers pursued, and, turning the 
 hill, came upon Smith's battalion, which was still 
 advancing in open order. The skirmishers opened 
 a scattering fire, but the lancers came on with ap 
 parent good will and determination until they had 
 presented their flank to the T elans in the corn 
 field, when the rifles were opened with deadly ef 
 fect. Thirty saddles were emptied at the instant. 
 Lieutenant Hays brought up a gun, with which 
 he poured in a fire of canister over the heads of the 
 skirmishers, the first brigade deployed across the 
 road and advanced, the Texans kept up their rifle 
 practice, and, finally, the lancers, sorely cut up, 
 gave back, and, in spite of the efforts of their offi 
 cers, were soon in full flight. The Texans, the 
 light battalion, and Duncan's guns pursued, and 
 prevented many fugitives from gaining the Saltillo 
 road. These attempted to escape over the mount 
 ain on the right, but were soon shot, with the ex 
 ception of the lieutenant colonel, Don Juan Na- 
 jira, who had led the charge. In spite of wounds, 
 he refused to surrender, and struggled on, until, at 
 
213 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 length, he too fell from his horse, and rolled, dead, 
 down the slope of the mountain. 
 
 The Mexican infantry fell back without firing, 
 and Worth continued his march to. the Saltillo 
 road. Here he halted, sent the light battalion 
 through the fields to the west of the Lo'ma de Fed- 
 eracion, advanced the artillery battalion and a par 
 ty of the Texans along the road to the west, located 
 a battery at the junction, and sent the remainder 
 of his force to the rear, to increase the escort of the 
 train which was ordered forward. 
 
 "While it was advancing, Duncan's battery was 
 planted on the slope of the mountain north of the 
 Saltillo road, and opened fire upon the Mexican 
 infantry, a portion of which had retreated up the 
 Loma de Federation. The enemy brought up two 
 nine pounders from Fort Soldado and replied, kill 
 ing one or two horses. The range was too great for 
 light six pounders, and the American battery was 
 withdrawn to the road. When there, the Mexican 
 fire against it was so depressed as to be. almost 
 harmless. But the train was exposed, in its ad 
 vance, to the fire from the Loma de Federacion 
 and from the Loma d'Independencia (the enemy 
 having increased his battery on the summit of the 
 latter by a twelve pounder), which killed an officer 
 and five men of the escort. To secure it, as well 
 as to take up a position which could be easily de 
 fended from an attack from front or rear, it was 
 advanced, when it came out on the Saltillo road, 
 to a sugar-house some hundred yards to the west, 
 
THE WAR-WITH MEXICO. 19 
 
 and beyond range. ^ The house was immediately 
 crenelled for musketry, and occupied by two com 
 panies. The field batteries, were drawn back to 
 the position, and planted to sweep both approach 
 es. The wagons and pack mules were parked in 
 a field below the road, covered by their fire, and 
 the second brigade, facing to the east, stretched up 
 the side of the mountain. The first brigade, which, 
 while this position had been taken, had been de 
 ployed, facing to the east, in a corn-field beneath 
 the Loma de Federacion, and the light battalion, 
 which had returned without meeting an enemy, 
 were drawn back. The artillery battalion was 
 posted in advance of the train, the eighth infant 
 ry, in column, along the road between the two bat 
 teries, and parties of Texans were thrown out in 
 front and reai^ while their main body took post in 
 rear of the second brigade. 
 
 The first object of the movement had been gain 
 ed, and the division was in strong, position on the 
 Saltillo road, in rear of Monterey. Worth's atten 
 tion was immediately directed to the assault of the 
 Loma de Federacion, and a select party was de 
 tailed for the service. Four companies of the ar 
 tillery battalion, under Captain Smith, with a like 
 number of Texans (who were dismounted for the 
 service), under Major Chevalier, in all 'number 
 ing three hundred effectives, composed the party. 
 Smith had the direction of the movement, as Chev- 
 
 * General Worth's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 103. 
 
220 
 
 WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 alier, at Worth's request, had waived his rank in 
 favor of the regular officer, and at twelve o'clock 
 the command left the position at the sugar-house. 
 It moved through the corn-fields, in the direction of 
 the hill, for some time without heing observed ; but 
 as it approached the River San Juan the enemy on 
 the summit discovered the movement, and at once 
 opened a plunging fire of grape and canister. The 
 elevation of the hill was, however, too great for 
 the effective use of artillery, and the shot, for the 
 most part, flew harmlessly over the heads of the 
 assailants, who moved on, crossed the San Juan, 
 and, having occupied the rocks around the base of 
 the hill, were halted to allow a reconnaissance. In 
 the mean time the enemy had advanced a strong 
 battalion from Fort Soldado, which commenced a 
 noisy fire from the summit, but the assailants were 
 protected by the rocks, and the fire was still harm 
 less. To obtain a more effective aim, a cloud of 
 skirmishers descended the slope, and the whole 
 hill- side was soon covered by the smoke of their 
 ftmsketry. Finding so large a force opposed to him, 
 Captain Smith delayed the assault, to allow time 
 for the approach of support. Worth had, from the 
 position at the sugar-house, observed the state of 
 affairs, and sent the seventh regiment of infantry 
 to sustain the assault, and soon after ordered Col 
 onel P. F. Smith to follow with the fifth regiment, 
 and, if practicable, to carry Fort Soldado. The sev 
 enth, keeping to the right of Captain Smith's route, 
 arrived on the west of the hill before that officer 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 knew of its approach, and a small party was thrown 
 in advance to divert the attention of the enemy. 
 A note directed to Captain Miles, who command 
 ed the seventh, fell into the hands of Smith, who, 
 being- thus informed of his vicinity, at once made 
 his dispositions, and commenced the ascent. 
 
 The hill- side was rocky and difficult, and the 
 Mexican skirmishers, still keeping up an uninter 
 rupted fire, occupied the crags and bushes of one 
 half the distance from the summit. The Ameri 
 can regulars advanced by the heads of companies, 
 and on either flank the Texans, in loose order, plied 
 their rifles with deadly effect. The Mexicans fell 
 back upon the hill before the advance, the regu 
 lars deployed and opened fire, the pace increased, 
 and as the Americans rushed with a shout over the 
 crest, the enemy was in full flight to Fort Soldado. 
 One gun had been removed from the position, arid 
 the other, which had been overturned in the rocky 
 path, was abandoned. The Americans, coming on 
 in pursuit, pelted the fugitives in their retreat, 
 seized and righted the abandoned gun, and direct 
 ed it against the redoubt. 
 
 Colonel Smith, having arrived with the fifth in 
 fantry at the base of the hill during the assault, 
 ordered the seventh regiment to advance. The 
 two regiments, moving along the western slope, 
 came up at a charging pace, and entered over 
 the low parapet of Fort Soldado before the Mexi 
 cans had recovered from the confusion of the re 
 treat from the Loma de Federacion. They fled 
 
222 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 with precipitation down the hill toward the city, 
 leaving their nine pounder in the work, and par- 
 ties of Americans, of different regiments, shouting 
 and firing, 'followed after. But the Mexican bat- 
 teries in front of the Obispado opened to cover the 
 retreat, and the pursuers were quickly recalled, 
 while the captured guns were turned on the Mexi 
 can works and replied. 
 
 The fifth regiment was extended along the ridge 
 to the southeast, the seventh remained at Fort 
 Soldado, and Captain Smith's command retained 
 the position .which it had carried on the summit 
 of the Loma de Federacion. So soon as the posi 
 tion had been captured, that at the sugar-house 
 was abandoned by the remaining troops of the di 
 vision, which, with the artillery and train, moved 
 up to the gorge at the foot of the captured hill, and 
 bivouacked for the night. 
 
 At that moment the scene was beautifully grand. 
 A heavy storm was just rising over the high peaks 
 of the Sierra Madre, while the cannonade between 
 the hills of Federacion and Independencia envel 
 oped each height in smoke ; the Mexican troops 
 crowned the summit of their hill above the cloud ; 
 Worth's : division, with its train, was taking posi 
 tion in the defile ; and, to heighten the effect, the 
 echoes of the artillery rolled in a thousand rever 
 berations through the valley. But the night soon 
 set in with a heavy rain, the cannonade ceased, 
 and the whole was shrouded in darkness. 
 
 The effect of the operations of the 20th on the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 23 
 
 west of Monterey had been to close the retreat of 
 the enemy, to heat him severely in two attacks, and 
 to secure an important position which looked into 
 the rear of the town. This had been accomplish 
 ed with but little loss to the American soldiers, and 
 their spirits rose with their uninterrupted success ; 
 while the Mexicans had seen their cavalry shame 
 fully beaten, and the positions on the Loma de Fed- 
 eracion wrested from them with comparative ease ; 
 and their confidence could have been in no way in 
 creased by the events of the day upon the west. 
 
 On the morning of the 22d the garrison of Fort 
 Diablo reopened a fire upon the American troops 
 about the captured work, which it kept up through 
 out the day, whenever any were exposed to view. 
 The fire was occasionally returned, but no offen 
 sive operation was undertaken on that day by the 
 American forces on the east of Monterey.^ At mid 
 day General Quitman's brigade marched from the 
 camp, under the flank fire of the citadel, to relieve 
 the guard of Fort Teneria. This, in its turn, was 
 exposed to the same fire, and, in its march to camp, 
 lost several men in killed and wounded. Dur 
 ing the afternoon it was reported that the enemy 
 was assembling in force upon the plain, and the 
 troops in camp were drawn out under arms ; but it 
 proved to be a false alarm. To oppose any demon 
 stration which might be made by the cavalry, 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 86. 
 
224 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Bragg's battery was put in position, where it re 
 mained until nightfall. 
 
 About the position of Fort Teneria, the occa 
 sional cannonade was kept up on both sides ; but, 
 in general, Mexicans as well as Americans were 
 quiet, and appeared to await the result of the op 
 erations upon the west, which had early in the day 
 been continued so successfully on the part of the 
 Americans that the fall of Monterey was no longer 
 problematical. 
 
 During the night of the 2 1st Worth had organ 
 ized a party of three companies of the artillery bat 
 talion and three companies of the eighth infantry 
 under Lieutenant-colonel Childs, and two hundred 
 Texans under Colonel Hays, for the assault of the 
 Loma d'Independencia. The direction of affairs 
 was given to Childs, as it had been to Smith in the 
 attack upon the opposite height ; and, to favor the 
 operation, Colonel Smith was directed to advance 
 a party from Fort Soldado in the direction of the 
 enemy at the commencement of the assault. At 
 three o'clock in the morning Childs marched from 
 the bivouac at the defile, and, having secured the 
 services of some Mexican guides, silently took po 
 sition at the northwestern base of the hill. There 
 three companies under Captain Vinton, and a 
 party of Texans, were detached to gain the north 
 eastern base, and to ascend from that direction. 
 The weather was rainy and dark, no pickets had 
 been posted by the Mexicans around the base, and 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 25 
 
 the positions were accordingly taken without ex 
 citing their attention. ( Childs waited until Vin- 
 ton's party had time to arrive at the northeast, and 
 at the first hreak of day commenced the ascent. 
 He met with no resistance until near the summit, 
 when the enemy, being aroused, delivered a volley 
 which cut down the leading files of his command; 
 hut the soldiers answered with a cheer, and deliv 
 ering their fire, directed by the Mexican flashes, 
 rushed on. Vinton's party, which on the other side 
 had nearly arrived at the summit, commenced the 
 charge with a shout, and the Mexicans, bewildered 
 and beaten, fled down the hill to the Obispado. 
 They carried with them the howitzer which had 
 been in battery upon the summit, and attempted 
 to secure the twelve pounder ; but, in the confusion 
 of the retreat, this was impracticable, and they 
 therefore cast it, down the declivity, breaking its 
 wheels, and rendering it for the time useless. While 
 the assault continued, the attention of the garrison 
 of the Obispado had been attracted by the noisy 
 cheers of three companies of the seventh infantry, 
 which descended from Fort Soldado, and in that 
 manner announced their advance. The Mexican 
 guns opened upon them with grape, but the fire, de 
 livered in the darkness, was harmless, and the object 
 having been gained, the party retired up the hill. 
 When the action about the Loma d'lndependen- 
 cia had fairly commenced, Worth sent Lieutenant- 
 colonel Staniford with three companies of the first 
 infantry to the support of Childs. Staniford ar- 
 L P 
 
226 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 rived at the base of the hill soon after the summit 
 had been gained, and made the ascent without 
 other opposition than the distant flank fire of the 
 Obispado. The dispositions for holding the posi 
 tion had already been made. Four companies, 
 under Captain Vinton, were posted in the advance, 
 among the rocks- on each declivity, each wing be 
 ing accompanied by a party of Texans. The re 
 maining troops occupied the summit of the hill 
 about the captured Mexican battery. 
 
 Although daylight had fairly broken, a mist 
 hung about the whole position, which rendered a 
 reconnaissance of the Obispado for a time imprac 
 ticable. A party of officers attempted it, and ap 
 proached in the obscurity to within a few yards, 
 when the mist suddenly rose and discovered them 
 to the enemy. He put a stop to the reconnaissance 
 by a heavy discharge of canister and musketry, 
 which sent the officers back to the position of the 
 advanced pickets. 
 
 In the mean while the fifth regiment had been 
 ordered down from the position near Fort Soldado, 
 and, ascending in the rear of the hill, had re-en 
 forced the troops upon the summit, making the 
 whole force present upon the Loma d'lndependen- 
 cia of near 1000 men. The imposing appearance 
 of the Obispado, when viewed from a distance, had 
 led to an exaggerated estimate of its strength, 
 and, in consequence, Worth ordered that its assault 
 should not be immediately attempted. The troops 
 therefore held their position during the morning 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 27 
 
 under the continued fire of the Mexican garrison, 
 from which they were partially sheltered, and sus 
 tained but little loss. The enemy made several 
 demonstrations of an intention of assaulting and 
 retaking the summit, but all of them were com 
 menced with but little vigor, and were quickly re 
 pulsed by the fire of the advanced companies. 
 
 To assist in the contemplated assault, Lieutenant 
 Roland was sent with a twelve pounder howitzer 
 to the base of the hill,^ and it having been raised 
 with much exertion to the. summit, an epaulement 
 was constructed with the sand-bags of the Mexican 
 work, and the howitzer placed in battery against 
 the Obispado. A few shots were sent into the win 
 dows and embrasures of the ruin, and the Mexican 
 garrison at once commenced preparations for retreat. 
 The cannonade was, however, continued, and a 
 straggling fire kept up between the American ad 
 vance and the enemy, until about one o'clock in the 
 afternoon. At that time a strong body of cavalry, 
 with an infantry support, took position, with the 
 apparent intention of charging up the ridge and 
 striking a vigorous blow for the victory. Its ad 
 vance was commenced at a brisk pace, but the ar 
 rangements had been made to receive it. Lieuten 
 ant Bradford's and Ayers's companies lay on either 
 side of the ridge, along which was the only prac 
 ticable ascent for cavalry. As the Mexicans ad 
 vanced, each closed to the left and right, faced 
 
 * General Worth's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House of 
 Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 105. 
 
228 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 quickly to the front, and delivered its fire. It was 
 without much physical effect, delivered as it was 
 in haste and at a depression, hut nevertheless the 
 lancers turned from it and fled. Ayers, springing 
 through his company, called upon the soldiers to 
 follow him, hut no general direction had heen given 
 for the advance, and for a moment they hesitated. 
 Vinton, however, soon ordered them forward, and 
 his command, with the Texans, ran down the hill. 
 As the movement progressed, Childs endeavored 
 to check it, as it was in direct violation of Worth's 
 order; hut the soldiers were too near the walls, 
 and Stamford, yielding to the requests of the offi 
 cers ahout him, sent from the summit, first a sup 
 port of four companies, and then gave the order for 
 the whole force to advance, and in a mass it poured 
 down the hill toward the Ohispado. 
 
 The advanced companies meanwhile had enter 
 ed. Ayers led through an emhrasure, while Brad 
 ford kept to the right, and, passing on the west side 
 of the ruin, entered the priest-cap. The main body 
 of the garrison had already left the position, and 
 those who remained made hut feeble resistance. 
 The guns had been spiked, but the vent of a how 
 itzer was soon cleared, and, before the fugitives had 
 reached the suburbs of the city at the foot of the 
 hill, its fire was directed on their rear ; and, as the 
 main body of the American force arrived, parties 
 of soldiers pushed down the hill in pursuit, using 
 their muskets and rifles until the enemy had gain 
 ed the shelter of the city. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 229 
 
 From the bivouac at the defile Worth had ob 
 served the fall of the Obispado, and having order 
 ed forward the troops still at that position, he came 
 up at speed, followed by Duncan's battery. The 
 guns came quickly up the hill, and were planted 
 at once in front of the priest-cap. Worth, after a 
 short observation of a flag upon the citadel, which 
 had been taken by some as one of truce, ordered 
 them to be opened, and the retreating enemy was 
 still further annoyed as he passed the Plaza de la 
 Capilla on his way to the citadel. So soon as he 
 had passed beyond range, the fifth infantry was or 
 dered to return to the heights of the opposite ridge, 
 the train of the division was brought up and park 
 ed beneath and to the west of the Obispado, and 
 the positions were taken for the night. 
 
 The Loma d'Independencia, with the Obispado, 
 completely commanded the western portion of 
 Monterey, and their possession insured the en 
 trance into the town. The important advantages, 
 like those of the preceding day, gained by Worth's 
 division, had cost comparatively but little. The 
 armament captured in the Obispado was of two 
 nine pounders, a six-inch howitzer, besides the 
 twelve pounder which had been thrown down the 
 declivity, all having a full supply of ammunition, 
 and quite sufficient for the defense of the position 
 against any ordinary attack from the town front, 
 in view of which the place had been originally 
 fortified. The importance of the capture was so 
 well appreciated by the Mexican general, that dur- 
 
230 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ing the night he withdrew his troops from the bat- 
 teries on the east of the city, and advanced a col 
 umn of four thousand men with a view to its re 
 covery. His reconnoitering officers, however, on 
 coming out of the town, fell in with the American 
 pickets and drew their fire. The first brigade, and 
 Duncan's and Mackall's artillery men, which were 
 posted ahout the Obispado, sprang to their arms 
 with a cheer, which was taken up and replied to 
 by the guard on the summit of the hill, as well as 
 the second brigade on the opposite height of Fed- 
 eracion. The preparation for battle being thus 
 sternly manifested, the Mexican general gave up 
 his intention of attack, if, indeed, he had ever seri 
 ously entertained it, and fell back with his troops 
 to the Grand Plaza of the city. 
 
 On the morning of the 23d active operations were 
 resumed upon the east, for at dawn of day Quit- 
 man, from Fort Teneria, observed the abandoned 
 works in his vicinity, and, having promptly seized 
 them, sent information to the commanding general. 
 Taylor at once ordered the troops in camp under 
 arms, and gave directions to Quitman to enter the 
 city at his discretion, making his way through the 
 houses and gardens, and sheltering his men as he 
 could.* 1 Quitman ordered Colonel Davis, with the 
 Mississippi regiment of rifles, to advance, who pro- 
 
 * General Quitman's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House 
 of Representatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 94, and 
 General Taylor's Official Report. Idem, p. 87. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 231 
 
 ceeded cautiously, and for some time without op 
 position. Having approached within short dis 
 tance of the interior barricades, the Mexicans open 
 ed a heavy fire of grape from the "barricades and 
 musketry from the house-tops, upon which the 
 troops were ordered under cover of the houses. 
 Quitman then brought forward such portion of the 
 Tennessee regiment as could he spared from the 
 guard of the captured works, and, spreading his 
 troops over several squares, commenced an advance 
 through and over the buildings. While this was 
 progressing, Captain Ridgely, from Fort Teneria, 
 served a captured gun upon the Cathedral, about 
 which the Mexicans were thickly posted, until the 
 advancing troops had gained a position which in 
 tercepted his fire. The regiment of Eastern Tex- 
 ans had been ordered up by General Taylor, and, 
 led by Governor Henderson, entered the city, dis 
 mounted, at eleven o'clock in the morning. Join 
 ing with Davis's riflemen, the two regiments used 
 their rifles with good effect, gradually driving back 
 the enemy in the direction of the Plaza ; and the 
 practicability of fighting in a town, which had been 
 before a matter of some doubt in the mind of Gen 
 eral Taylor,^ having been demonstrated, Bragg's 
 battery, with the third regiment of infantry in 
 support, was ordered from the camp to participate 
 in the battle. The enemy still held possession of 
 the citadel, whence he kept up his flank fire upon 
 
 * General Taylor's Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House of Rep 
 resentatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 87. 
 

 232 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the passing troops ; but this time, the road being 
 clear of obstruction, the battery passed the field of 
 fire at speed, without loss, while the infantry, mak 
 ing a wide circuit, kept out of range, and joined the 
 guns in the city. 
 
 The troops in the town had meantime gained 
 a street which led to the Cathedral, but it was bar 
 ricaded near that building ; the Mexicans were in 
 force, and defended the position so stoutly that a 
 speedy advance in that direction was impractica 
 ble. As soon as the guns came up, a light six 
 pounder was opened upon the barricade, but it 
 made little or no impression, although served with 
 great rapidity. But by this time the want of con 
 cert with Worth had become apparent to General 
 Taylor, and for that reason, and because Quitman's 
 command had been on duty the previous night, he 
 ordered the troops^ to abandon the town, and fall 
 back to the works upon its southeastern verge, 
 which they did, and, soon after, those which had 
 been engaged returned again to the camp. Ha- 
 mer's brigade and Webster's battery took post in 
 Forts Teneria and Diablo and the intervening 
 buildings, relieving the command of General Quit- 
 man, which had occupied them on the previous 
 night. Two shells, thrown from Webster's battery, 
 finished the demonstrations of hostility on the east 
 of Monterey, for no further conflict took place, as 
 the Mexicans made no attempt to occupy the por- 
 
 * General Taylor's Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House of Repre 
 sentatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 87. 
 
 

 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 33 
 
 tions of the town which had been won by the Amer 
 icans only to be abandoned. 
 
 Before the troops on the east of the city had be 
 come closely engaged, the twelve pounder, which 
 had been thrown down the hill-side on the previ 
 ous morning, was brought up to the priest-cap in 
 front of the Obispado. Its broken wheels were re 
 placed, and, with the captured howitzer, it was 
 served upon the town, of which the whole western 
 portion was apparently deserted. But, with the 
 Mexican ammunition, no elevation would give a 
 range to the Plaza, at which point the mass of the 
 Mexican force was concentrated, and the fire was 
 soon discontinued. A captured nine pounder had, 
 however, been dragged, by a party of the fifth in 
 fantry, along the ridge southeast from Fort Solda- 
 do to a position which looked into the square, and 
 from its high command the shot were sent directly 
 into the midst of the enemy. 
 
 During the cannonade a flag was displayed at 
 the foot of the Loma d'Independencia, the bearer 
 of which conveyed to General Worth a communi 
 cation from the governor of the city, asking per 
 mission for the women and children to leave the 
 town ; but as Worth had no authority to grant or 
 refuse the request, he transmitted it to General 
 Taylor. It was not received by him until late in 
 the day, and, made at the period of the operations 
 at which it was, was deemed inadmissible, and of 
 course refused. 
 
234 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 The heavy firing of the enemy from the vicinity 
 of the Cathedral first announced to the troops of 
 Worth's command the advance of their comrades 
 into the eastern portion of the city, and, believing 
 that it had heen intended by General Taylor that 
 he should co-operate,^ General Worth at once pre 
 pared to advance into the town from the west. He 
 first sent a select command of four companies and 
 two guns to the mills of Santa Catarina, a strong 
 position one league toward Saltillo, to obstruct the 
 approach of any re-enforcement to the enemy, of 
 which rumors were still frequent. A company of 
 the fifth infantry was left in position with the nine 
 pounder upon the ridge of Federacion, but the divi 
 sion, with these exceptions, was concentrated about 
 the Obispado. The different commands having 
 been furnished with picks and crows from a quan 
 tity captured in Fort Soldado, and the western por 
 tion of the town having been reconnoitered, the ad 
 vance was ordered, and the movement commenced. 
 
 Eight companies, under Lieutenant - colonel 
 Childs, deployed as skirmishers across the width of 
 the town, entered first, and, passing through the scat 
 tered houses, and climbing over the garden walls, 
 advanced, without opposition, as far as the Plaza de 
 la Capilla. Lieutenant Mackall followed with a 
 section of his battery, and, throwing the guns into 
 position at the angles of the square, drove back a 
 party of lancers which had come down, apparent- 
 
 * General Worth's Report. Executive Document, No. 4, House of Repre 
 sentatives, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 105. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ly in observation, to a barricade a short distance 
 from the Plazuela del Came, the market square 
 of the town. A portion of the seventh infantry 
 came lip under Captain Holmes, and, with some 
 companies of Childs's command and one of the 
 guns, moved along the street on the right, and 
 seized the barricade. The other gun of the sec 
 tion, the remainder of Childs's command, and the 
 main bodies of the third and seventh infantry, took 
 the parallel street on the left, and, under a rat 
 tling fire from the house-tops, gained the Plazuela 
 del Came. 
 
 In the mean time, the ten-inch mortar, which had 
 been so unfortunately served on the eastern side, 
 and had been sent to Worth's position, arrived at 
 the Obispado, and was at once sent forward to the 
 Campo Santo, and preparations were made to place, 
 it in battery. Two companies were located in the 
 position for its protection ; and, haying taken care 
 to secure his communication by breaking in the 
 doors of houses and the entrances to the inclosures 
 along the route through the city, with his staff and 
 Duncan's battery Worth came up to the barricade. 
 He directed thence a fire of artillery upon a sand 
 bag parapet which crowned a house some distance 
 in advance, which soon beat through it, and mo 
 mentarily stopped a fire which the Mexican troops 
 had delivered from that direction. 
 
 The attack upon the eastern side having been 
 suspended, General Ampudia was at liberty to 
 throw the strength of his force against Worth's ap- 
 
236 TUE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 proach, and, in a short time, the Mexican troops oc 
 cupied the harricades and houses which still inter 
 vened hetween the assailants and the Plaza, and 
 swept the streets with showers of grape and mus 
 ketry. But it was too late, for the assailants had 
 already gained a secure lodgment in the heart of 
 the city, and, when the Mexican fire hecame de 
 structive, they took to cover in the houses, and 
 commenced cutting their advance through the 
 walls. Hays's regiment was dismounted, and en 
 tered the town, where it was stationed in parties on 
 the house-tops in the front. The Texans used their 
 rifles with effect, while the troops of the line pressed 
 on slowly through the huildings ; and in this man 
 ner, as on the eastern side, the enemy was grad 
 ually driven back toward the Grand Plaza. 
 
 So soon as the Mexican fire had hecome heavy 
 in the streets, two of Duncan's guns, and one of 
 Mackall's, were withdrawn to the Campo Santo. 
 A section of the former hattery had meanwhile 
 been placed at the foot of a cross street, under cov 
 er, to command a ford across the San Juan, oppo 
 site the Plaza ; and a gun of the latter was left in 
 position in the Plazuela del Carne. During the 
 advance the troops had entered a yard inclosing the 
 beef cattle and sheep which formed part of the 
 commissariat of the Mexican army, and they were 
 at once secured and driven back to the Obispado. 
 
 When the action in the town had fairly com 
 menced, the command which had been sent to the 
 mills of Santa Catarina was ordered to return, and, 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 coming up toward evening, it took post in reserve 
 in the Plaza de la Capilla. The conflict had con 
 tinued in the front, with heavy rolling volleys 
 down the streets on the part of the Mexicans, 
 whenever a party of Americans or a single staff 
 officer was exposed ; but the fire of the assailants 
 was kept up in dropping shots of rifles and muskets 
 from house-tops and windows. As night closed in, 
 the mortar, which had been firmly planted in the 
 Campo Santo, opened, and the artillerists soon get 
 ting the range, dropped the shells into the Plaza. 
 The enemy replied from the citadel with a six-inch 
 howitzer ; but his aim was bad, and few shells fell 
 even within the Plaza de la Capilla. Neverthe 
 less, the light artillery was drawn back for security. 
 Having determined to hold his position in the 
 town, and to continue the advance through the 
 night, Worth, before returning in person to the 
 Obispado, stationed the four companies in reserve 
 at points along the road to keep open the commu 
 nication. But in the night the advance was neces 
 sarily slow in the darkness, and the mortar threw 
 but one shell into the Plaza each half hour to an 
 noy the enemy. The Mexican howitzer from the 
 citadel as regularly replied, though without any 
 effect upon the Americans. 
 
 At daylight on the morning of the 24th an aid- 
 de-camp of the Mexican commander presented him 
 self, with a flag, at Fort Diablo. He bore a letter 
 
238 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 to General Taylor, which had been written by 
 Ampudia on the previous evening, but of which 
 the danger of approaching the American lines had 
 prevented the delivery. In it the Mexican general 
 submitted propositions for evacuating the town, 
 taking with him all the arms and munitions of war 
 which it contained. General Taylor, who had 
 intended on the previous evening to proceed to 
 Worth's head-quarters to concert a combined at 
 tack, and had during the night sent orders to the 
 latter to suspend the^ advance until his arrival, 
 promptly refused the offer, and demanded the sur 
 render of the whole Mexican army as prisoners of 
 war, and of all the public property in the place. 
 He required an answer to his communication by 
 twelve o'clock on that day, to be delivered at Gen 
 eral Worth's head-quarters, whither he started in 
 person.^ 
 
 Having received the order of General Taylor, 
 and been informed by the Mexican general of the 
 proposed negotiations, Worth's attack had been 
 discontinued early in the morning ; but he did not 
 cease his preparations for battle. During the night 
 the troops had occupied a house upon the Plazuela 
 del Carne, the upper story of which was the high 
 est in the town, and from which all the azoteas 
 could be swept to the Grand Plaza. A six pound 
 er was dragged up the staircases, and placed in 
 battery at an embrasure cut through the walls ; the 
 
 * Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representa 
 tives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 348, 349. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 239 
 
 howitzer which had been captured in the Obispa- 
 do was brought down, with a full supply of am 
 munition, and planted in the yard of the same 
 building, whence it was directed likewise upon 
 the Plaza. The light guns were distributed at dif 
 ferent points of the city, commanding the fords of 
 the river and the approaches from the citadel, while 
 officers searched for advantageous positions for 
 the infantry, to be occupied upon the renewal of 
 the engagement. The commissaries traversed the 
 streets with wagons, seizing all articles of subsist 
 ence which could be found in that part of the town 
 already occupied, and transported them to Arista's 
 house, on the verge of the city, at the foot of the 
 Loma dTndependencia. 
 
 The activity in the American positions was no 
 ticed by General Ampudia, and he sent word to 
 Worth that he considered it as a violation of the 
 spirit of the existing truce, and required him to 
 desist from his preparations ; but Worth at once re 
 fused, and in a short time had every thing in readi 
 ness to renew the attack so far as his division was 
 concerned. Ampudia soon after requested an in 
 terview with the American general-in- chief, and, 
 when informed that it would be some time before 
 his arrival, desired to see General Worth. An in 
 terview took place, but every thing was delayed 
 until the arrival of General Taylor, who came at 
 about eleven o'clock, accompanied by his staff, and 
 many officers of the first and volunteer divisions. 
 At a preliminary interview, he refused to open a 
 
240 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 negotiation unless it was with a view to arrange 
 terms of capitulation. The Mexican general re 
 quested time for consideration, and he was allow 
 ed until one o'clock, at which hour General Tay 
 lor declared that, unless the basis demanded was 
 agreed to, he should renew the assault ; hut before 
 one General Ampudia signified his acceptance of 
 the basis, and a conference took place. 
 
 It was announced by the Mexican general that 
 he had received official information that the new 
 Mexican government had consented to receive com 
 missioners for th negotiation of peace, and had al 
 ready appointed commissioners on the Mexican 
 side ; and that, by the change of government, he 
 was released from obedience to his former orders 
 to defend the city. Under these circumstances, 
 and being actuated, as he said, by a desire to pre 
 vent the further effusion of blood, he renewed his 
 proposition for an arrangement upon the terms set 
 forth in his note of the previous evening. General 
 Taylor, as before, refused to entertain any such 
 proposition, which he might very well have con 
 sidered as a demonstration of bad faith, as the 
 negotiation had been opened upon the implied 
 promise of the Mexican general to capitulate ; and 
 he was upon the point of breaking off the confer 
 ence, when the governor of the city proposed the 
 appointment of a mixed commission for the con 
 sideration of the matter. To this, after some hesi 
 tation, General Taylor consented, and named Gen 
 eral Worth, Governor Henderson, and Colonel 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Davis on his part, and Ampudia designated Gen 
 erals Ortega, Requena, and the Governor Llano. . 
 
 Having been verbally instructed, the American 
 commissioners demanded the surrender of Monte 
 rey, all the arms and munitions of war, and all 
 other public property. Tfiey proposed to allow the 
 Mexican army to retire without parole, the officers 
 retaining their side arms, beyond a fine extending 
 through the pass of the Rinconada, the city of 
 Linares, and San Fernando on the coast ; and that 
 General Taylor should agree not- to advance, be 
 yond the line for eight weeks, or until the respect 
 ive governments could be heard from.- 
 
 The Mexican commissioners refused the proposi 
 tion, and insisted upon the retention of arms and 
 artillery. They declared" that they considered 'this 
 as necessary for their national 'honor; but, as the 
 American officers had gone^tothe limit of their In-, 
 stractions, the commission rose and reported the* 
 disagreement. 
 
 Upon this, General Ampudia (in the mean while* 
 insisting upon retaining the small arms, as a point 
 in which the honor of his nation was involved) 
 reiterated his great desire of .putting an end to the 
 bloodshed, and offered .to concede his artillery. 
 After some hesitation, General Taylor yielded the 
 point with reference to the small arms, and, with 
 modified instructions, the commission reassembled. 
 
 The Mexican commissioners, however, insisted 
 that it wajs a disgrace to their artillery arm to sur 
 render all the guns, inasmuch as the corps of their 
 I.-Q 
 
242 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 army retained their full equipment, and would not 
 consent to the terms which their general had offer 
 ed. The commission therefore rose again and re 
 ported. 
 
 General Taylor, upon receiving the report, an 
 nounced that the conference was at an end, and 
 rose to leave the room. He was stopped by one 
 of the Mexican commissioners, who entered into a 
 conversation with him, and, at the same time, by 
 Taylor's permission, Worth entered into conversa 
 tion with Ampudia. 
 
 The result was the reassembling of the commis 
 sion, and the final agreement upon terms of capit 
 ulation, by which the Mexican army was to be 
 allowed to retain one field battery. With the mod 
 ifications, the terms were, in general, that the Mex 
 ican army should evacuate the town, taking with 
 it aR the small arms, six field pieces with twenty- 
 one rounds of ammunition, and all the cavalry 
 horses. All other material of war and public prop 
 erty were to be surrendered to the United States 
 forces, and the armistice, first proposed on the part 
 of General Taylor, was agreed to> 
 
 The Mexican commissioners were, however, tar 
 dy, in executing the articles, and insisted strongly 
 upon such a wording of the instrument as should 
 induce the belief that their act was voluntary, and 
 one of policy, and not the legitimate result of the 
 operations before the town. Their wishes were 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 349, 350. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 2 43 
 
 negatived by the American commissioners, who 
 declined to alter the wording of their demands fur 
 ther than had already been done ; but they allow 
 ed three articles to be added, which prescribed the 
 method of turning over and receiving the pub 
 lic property to be surrendered, stipulated that all 
 doubts should be construed on principles of liber 
 ality to the retiring army, and that the Mexican 
 flag, when struck, should be saluted by its own 
 battery. Still the Mexican commissioners and gen 
 eral struggled for delay, and started many points 
 which had been either previously disposed of or 
 were entirely out of consideration. To allow room 
 for enlarging upon his good conduct in the oper 
 ations, Ampudia desired that the Spanish copy 
 should differ materially from the English; but this 
 was refused, and the English copy having been 
 left to be literally translated, the commission broke 
 up for the night. 
 
 The troops of both armies, meanwhile, remained 
 quiet in their respective positions. On the follow 
 ing morning the commission met again, and the 
 Mexican officers still endeavored to gain some new 
 concession ; but a peremptory demand was made 
 that the articles of both the English and Spanish 
 copies should be signed by the Mexican commis 
 sioners and general, which was at length complied 
 with, and the agreement was complete.^ 
 
 * The facts in relation to the negotiation of the convention are principally 
 derived from the letter of Colonel Davis and its accompanying memoranda, 
 of dates of January 6th, 1847, and October 7th, 1846, put forth originally in 
 defense of the measure, and published in the Washington Union. 
 
244 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 During the morning of the 25th the Mexican 
 garrison evacuated the citadel, and on successive 
 days the divisions of the army marched to Saltillo, 
 taking with them, however, six twelve pounder 
 guns, which, in accordance with article eighth of 
 the convention, were liberally construed into a 
 light field battery.' On the 28th the last Mexican 
 corps left the town, and Worth's division occupied 
 the principal points throughout its extent. The 
 remainder of the American army kept its camp in 
 the wood of San Domingo. 
 
 In the different operations which resulted in the 
 fall of . Monterey, . the American army had lost 
 twelve officers and one hundred and eight men 
 killed, and thirty-one officers and three hundred 
 and thirty-seven men ' wounded; Of this loss, by 
 fair trie greater. portion had Been incurred upon the 
 2 1st, -in the attack upon the eastern fronts of the. 
 city; ipr not more -than fifty-five of the whole num 
 ber w.ere included in Worth's divisibn, and the loss 
 in the street. fight on the 23d had been but small. 
 
 The number of Mexicans who fell can hardly be 
 estimated with a-ny thing like accuracy. The op 
 erations were so varied, and the points of attack so 
 numerous) that it is probable it was never accurate 
 ly 'known; and, moreover, the irregulars deserted, 
 when ill fortune befell the Mexican arms, in great 
 nunxbers ; but it can be safely set down at over one 
 thousand men. 
 
 When General Ampudia had arrived at Saltillo, 
 h6 issued a proclamation to the people of the three 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. . 245 
 
 departments under his command, which -was. TG- 
 iriafkable, not only for its peculiar style, but forcer- 
 tain declarations, which proved with how much, 
 good faith- he had acted when he had negotiated 
 the convention of Monterey. 
 
 He announced his defeat, arid made most hum-, 
 ble apologies foy his incapacity, a knowledge of 
 
 . which, he stated, had induced him to request Gen* 
 eral Almonte to relieve him. in the command. . Aft 
 er a, short hut false account 'of the operations, in 
 which the valor of his troops was highly extolled, 
 and his defeat attributed to unfortunate accidents, 
 he boasted of having compelled the enemy to grant 
 terms which saved the honor of the army and the 
 nation, as well as his troops, with their arms .and 
 
 equipments. He concluded by assuring his coun 
 trymen of the little importance of the loss of Mon 
 terey, inciting them to a continued hostility to the 
 invaders, and with a piece of flattery to Santa An 
 na, "the favorite general of the Mexicans," who, it 
 was announced, was on his way to take direction 
 of affairs in person. 
 
 Having thrown this forth to make his peace with 
 the new dictator and the people, he very soon re 
 ceived orders to march his command to San Luis, 
 and on the 18th of October he evacuated Saltillo, 
 leaving the country in that vicinity protected only 
 by the stipulations of the convention. Ampudia 
 was successful in conciliating Santa Anna, and 
 that being the case, the opinion of the Mexican 
 people was of small consequence. But the inflam- 
 
>'" V" -4 % 
 
 a ' ' . '> \ '*' ,* f. V ' 
 
 v> * " f - A- ' ^* f >^v '<<' 
 
 ** ,4 .f_ 
 
 246 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 matory nature of his proclamation, and the decla 
 rations of the hostile intentions of Santa Anna, did 
 not increase any friendly feeling which might have 
 been entertained for him personally by General 
 Taylor or other Americans^ when compared with 
 his statements made in conference at Monterey. 
 
 The desire of the President of the United States 
 for the movement on Monterey was made known 
 to General Taylor in the dispatches of Secretary 
 Marcy of the 1st of June and the 9th of July, hoth 
 written before the receipt at Washington of any 
 letters from General Taylor, which gave his views 
 in extcnso of the proper object of military opera 
 tions. In the first of these dispatches, however, 
 was propounded the question whether the opera 
 tions from the base of the Rio Grande should look 
 to the city of Mexico, or be confined to the under 
 taking of cutting off the northern provinces. And 
 in the second, the views of General Taylor were 
 requested concerning an expedition from another 
 base, which was to look to the capital as the neces 
 sary end of military movements, should Mexico 
 persist in her obstinacy. In both, much was nec 
 essarily left to the general commanding in the field ; 
 and the object of the movement upon Monterey, in 
 the opinion of the government, so far as can be 
 judged of from the written dispatches, was, first, 
 to seize an important point in the enemy's country 
 with a view to cutting off the northern provinces, 
 or of gaining some distance upon the high road to 
 
V - t 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 47 
 
 .. '/* 
 
 Mexico. But as doubts arose as to the practica 
 bility of the advance from that direction, and it 
 was contemplated on the 9th of July to move on 
 the capital from the hase of Vera Cruz, its object 
 must then have been considered simply to inflict 
 a blow upon the enemy, and to employ the force 
 then upon the Rio Grande in offensive operations 
 during the sickly season upon the Gulf coast ; for 
 in all the letters of Mr. Marcy, the wish of the 
 President was manifested that the war should be 
 vigorously prosecuted, which was a necessary pol 
 icy for effect both at home and abroad. The wish 
 es of the government, thus manifested, necessarily 
 had much weight with General Taylor; but, before 
 any communication on the subject had reached 
 him from Washington, he contemplated the same 
 movement. In the discretion which was allowed 
 him, as well as in the nature of the case, the origin 
 and responsibility of, as well as the greater share 
 of any merit which may attach to the general di 
 rection of the operations about Monterey, belongs 
 to him, and the object which he had in view is 
 the next subject for remark. 
 
 May 21st, he wrote to the adjutant general 
 that, with certain additional means, "operations 
 might be carried on in the valley of the San Juan 
 toward Monterey, the first city of importance in 
 that direction."* On the 3d of June he wrote 
 again to the adjutant general, and spoke of estab- 
 
 * Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representa 
 tives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 300. 
 
248 THE. WAR WITH'MEXICO. . 
 
 lishing depots in ad vance on the route to Monte 
 rey, which, he said, " I shall lose no time in doing, 
 as soon as proper transports arrive, unless I receive 
 counter instructions from the department."^ But 
 in none of his early letters is the movement upon 
 Monterey treated of as being a step in view of any 
 other end than its capture and occupation, and, as 
 it necessarily was, a blow upon the enemy, who 
 might have been expected to be more willing to 
 accede to terms of peace after having lost an im 
 portant town in the north of Mexico. The desire 
 of General Taylor, at the time of writing, like that 
 of the authorities at Washington, appears to have 
 been for immediate action of some sort, and Mon 
 terey, " the first city of importance in that direc 
 tion," was the object of his attention, so far as can 
 be ascertained from his communications to the ad 
 jutant general. 
 
 In his answers to the dispatches of Mr: Marcy of 
 the 8th of June and the 9th of July, the expedition 
 was treated of as one of experiment upon the agri 
 cultural capacity of the valley of the San Juan, 
 and future movements of the army in that direc 
 tion were made to depend very much upon the re 
 sult of that experiment. The force with which he 
 intended to move was distinctly stated to be of 
 about six thousand men ; and the manifest pur 
 pose of the expedition, so far as it related to future 
 operations, then was, to ascertain their practicabili- 
 
 * Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representa 
 tives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 305. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 49 
 
 ty. On the part of the general, then, the . moye- 
 ment was one of experiment. 
 
 War is of itself an experiment, but " the art of 
 war is not conjectural" However much may be 
 left to chance and to circumstances by authorities 
 at the distance of some thousand miles from the 
 scene of hostilities, yet it is never proper that the 
 same course of action should be adopted on the 
 part of the general in the field. But, since Gener 
 al Taylor moved from Camargo with about the 
 numerical force which he had contemplated .when 
 he wrote his answers to the letters of the 8th of 
 June and the 9th of July, and without any distinct 
 knowledge of the force or position of the enemy, as 
 is apparent from the information contained in his 
 letter to Mr. Marcy from Marin, it can not but be 
 deemed that, on his part, the whole operation was 
 an experiment, undertaken, it is true, with a force 
 determined upon important military considerations, 
 but without any reference to the strength of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In a subsequent letter to General Gaines,. which 
 that officer took the pains to have set forth in the 
 newspapers, General Taylor stated that, in moving 
 upon Monterey with inadequate means and a small 
 force, he was actuated by a desire of saving the 
 credit of the administration, which could not but 
 be benefited by his success, while he took the 
 whole responsibility of failure. How far the credit 
 of the administration would have been benefited 
 by the result of an illy organized and illy provided 
 
250 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 expedition, may well be considered questionable, 
 and certainly the general could hardly have hoped 
 to gain permanent reputation from it. But in giv 
 ing this as a reason for the advance, when his own 
 declarations and the circumstances under which it 
 took place are considered, it may well be believed 
 that General Taylor does scant justice to the per 
 tinacity of purpose, both in general and in detail, 
 which is one of his distinguishing characteristics. 
 He had early expressed his determination to ad 
 vance with a force of about six thousand men ; he 
 knew comparatively nothing of the strength and 
 position of the enemy, and progressed even to with 
 in fifteen hundred yards of Monterey before he had 
 made up his mind as to the certainty of a struggle 
 for its occupation. If there were to be no opposi 
 tion, certainly a column of about six thousand men 
 was one of quite sufficient strength to undertake 
 the expedition, and, inasmuch as it was success 
 ful, it may perhaps be considered that it was in 
 reality sufficient. Various comments have been 
 made upon the operations at Monterey, and espe 
 cially the convention which was entered into, all 
 of which have been met by the statement of diffi 
 culties arising in the want of force, of artillery, and 
 subsistence of the American army before the town ; 
 and, on the part of those defending the measures, 
 it 'has been admitted that the strength of the com 
 mand was inadequate to the task which it in a 
 inanner accomplished. It has been attempted to 
 lay whatever blame may attach to this inadequacy 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 at the door of the authorities of Washington, and 
 the secretary of war and the quarter-master general 
 have heen called upon to support a full share. But 
 if the force which moved upon Monterey was in 
 adequate to its capture, the responsibility must rest 
 with General Taylor, for it is a settled maxim in 
 war, "that a general has no right to shelter his 
 mistakes under cover of his government, the authori 
 ties of which are distant from the scene of opera 
 tions, and must consequently be ill informed or 
 wholly ignorant of the actual state of things."* 
 
 The principal difficulty which has been stated 
 in excuse for the inadequacy of the force was the 
 want of transportation, and the blame of this want 
 has been thrown upon the quarter-master general. 
 In reply to the accusation, he has stated that Gen 
 eral Taylor made but few, if any, requisitions upon 
 him ; that he was in ignorance of these wants ; and 
 that whatever was furnished, was furnished main 
 ly upon his own responsibility. But, whatever may 
 be said in extenuation of the error in moving upon 
 Monterey with a force of about six thousand men, 
 the facts that it was the number originally con 
 templated by General Taylor ; that it was determ 
 ined by the uncertainty of supporting a larger force 
 in the valley of the San Juan ; that, in addition to 
 the want of transportation, that uncertainty was 
 always previous to the operations assigned by Gen 
 eral Taylor as a reason, and that it was doubtful 
 in his mind whether there would be any opposition 
 
 * Napoleon. 
 
252 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. . 
 
 at the place 1 show that the responsibility of the 
 movement .rests upon himself;, certainly that of the 
 general operations abou't the city is his entirely. . 
 As the whole expedition had been experimental 
 from the commencement, so, also, were each of the 
 separate operations against the 'town oh the part 
 of General Taylor, and the- first of these, in point 
 of time as well as of importance, was of exceeding 
 delicacy. I speak of. Worth's movement -to gain 
 the Saltillo road, and to attack in rear of. Mon 
 terey; for " nothing is so rash or contrary to .prin 
 ciple as to make a flank marsh before an enemy in 
 position, especially when this army occupies heights 
 at the foot of which you are forced to defile"* This 
 was precisely the movement of Worth's division 'to 
 gain the rear of Monterey, and its delicacy and 
 danger were obvious to all. That General Taylor 
 appreciated them is apparent from the care which 
 he took to display his divisions on the east during 
 the afternoon of the 20th, and to infornl Worth of 
 the movements of the enemy in town, and from the 
 demonstration which he made on the morning of 
 the 21st to favor it. With this appreciation of the 
 dangef of the operation, the only reasons which can 
 be seen why it was ordered as it was are in the 
 character of the enemy. It is true that the road 
 was reconnoitered and the route discovered to be 
 practicable ; but the very reconnaissance might 
 have showed the danger of the movement, and the 
 fact that Worth, upon gaming the Saltillo road, 
 
 * Napoleon. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 253 
 
 would be isolated, if the enemy chose to make him 
 so, at a distance of more than five miles from the 
 main army. He occupied a defile in rear of the 
 town, but in the march he had left a defile in his 
 rear also, and the safety of his position could only 
 have depended upon the inactivity of the enemy, 
 his own genius, and the bravery of his troops. 
 Having marched from the wood of San Domingo 
 CHI the general object of his movement, Worth, 
 however, exercised an independent command, and 
 the subsequent operations upon the west were his. 
 That the attacks upon the east of Monterey on 
 the .morning of the. 21st were experimental entire 
 ly, v and intended to have -been demonstrations in 
 favor of "Worth, is .apparent from General Taylor's 
 official report, and from the nature of the opera 
 tions. To change a demonstration into a positive 
 attack upon the. discovery of an important advant 
 age is certainly an evidence of genius, but it cart 
 hfrrdly be said that the entanglement of a corps in 
 a position of which nothing is known, and for the 
 purpose of attacking an uncertain object, is demon 
 strative of aught else than heedless bravery. Upon 
 whomsoever the responsibility of, the engagement 
 of Garland's column about Fort Teneria may .rest, 
 .the movement from the first was one -which ex 
 posed it to imminent hazard, inasmuch as it was 
 placed under the flank fire of the citadel,, about' 
 which the enemy was in force, and who, with 
 ordinary good conduct, might have been expected 
 to interrupt the communications. The attack in 
 
254 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 town was in keeping with the commencement of 
 the movement; for, by passing Fort Teneria, the 
 left flank too was exposed ; and finally, having run 
 on to the masked breast- works, in spite of the ob 
 stinate bravery of officers and men, it resulted, as 
 such attacks generally do$ in a repulse. There 
 can be no doubt that the American general antici 
 pated nothing of this kind. Although he brought 
 up his remaining troops to restore the battle with 
 promptitude, he not only placed them in the same 
 predicament with Garland's column, and exposed 
 them to the flank fire of the citadel, but gave an 
 opportunity to the Mexican cavalry to cut up his 
 camp guard, which, had they been of good mate 
 rial, certainly would have been accomplished. The 
 nature of the whole movement on the morning of 
 the 21st, on the east of Monterey, is fully apparent, 
 from the fact that, after having brought up his 
 whole disposable force, the resources immediately 
 at the disposal of General Taylor failed him, and 
 he had ordered a retreat, when a fortuitous circum 
 stance gave him an advantage, and something to 
 show as the result of the attack. But, had not 
 Backus fortunately occupied the tannery in the 
 confusion of the assault, and had not his fire coin 
 cided in point of time with the advance of Quit- 
 man's brigade, it is more than probable that the re 
 sult of the operations on the east of Monterey would 
 have been told in few words that the American 
 troops had been beaten back at all points. 
 
 The future operations of the same day were very 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 255 
 
 much of the same nature as the first. They have 
 the recommendation of having heen made after the 
 partial success ; and, although unsuccessful in them 
 selves, and hazardous, they undoubtedly had great 
 effect upon the enemy, in keeping his attention 
 fixed upon the east of the town. The beneficial 
 effect of the operations of the 21st ceased there. 
 The demonstration had been made, though at great 
 cost, and a point of Mexican defense had been 
 gained. But its occupation entailed the necessity 
 of communicating with the camp under the flank 
 fire of the citadel, a distance of some three miles, 
 which was certainly hazardous during the continu 
 ance of the operations. 
 
 The movements on the west of Monterey, though 
 not less hazardous than those on the east, were 
 characterized by a caution in perfect keeping with 
 their importance and their delicacy. Moreover, 
 having been commenced, they had an end in view 
 which was worth some hazard the possession of 
 the keys to the whole position of the enemy. The 
 advance on the morning of the 21st was careful, 
 and the defile past the hills of Independencia and 
 of Federacion was cleared of the enemy before the 
 train was brought forward. A secure position was 
 obtained before any detachment was made for the 
 assault of any position ; and those assaults, when 
 made, were quickly followed up and supported. It 
 might have been practicable to carry the Loma de 
 Federacion immediately after the retreat of the 
 enemy from the junction of the roads, and its im- 
 
256 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 mediate assault was advised. But in the uncer 
 tainty which existed with regard to Mexican re- 
 enforcements from Saltillo, Worth refused to adopt 
 the suggestion, and, though he lost time, he gained 
 security. The same combination of prudence and 
 vigor was apparent throughout the operations of 
 the 22d ; and the chief evidence of the merit of the 
 whole course of action on the west is the fact that 
 the loss of the division was but trifling in compari 
 son, while the positions gained insured the fall of 
 Monterey. If not, why were the forts on the east 
 abandoned by the enemy on the night of the 22d ? 
 The American troops held no other point in that 
 vicinity than which they had occupied on the 
 previous night, and had made no other demonstra 
 tion of hostility than by a cannonade, which was 
 inferior to that of the enemy from Fort Diablo. 
 
 The evacuation of the forts gave an opportunity 
 for the attack through the streets on the 23d, but 
 on the part of General Taylor it was experimental, 
 as he states in his report ; and, after having been 
 pushed to close vicinity of the Plaza, its results 
 were given up, and, except in the moral effect upon 
 the enemy, the attack was useless. Worth's ad 
 vance was of an entirely different nature. He 
 guarded his communications, retained all the 
 ground which he gained, and continued his prep 
 arations for .battle with the ultimate end of the at 
 tack in view throughout. Indeed, it is hard to see 
 in what, during the whole series of his movements 
 upon the west, he neglected any thing which might 
 
) THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 57 
 
 conduce to the safety of his command in its deli 
 cate position, or the success of his enterprise ; and, 
 notwithstanding the rashness of the original move 
 ment, his success justified General Taylor in or 
 dering it, in his selection of the commander for the 
 hazardous enterprise, in his confidence in his own 
 troops, and in his appreciation of the Mexicans and 
 their commanders; and upon these must rest, 
 more than all else, the credit due General Taylor 
 in the operations about Monterey. 
 
 For in them the whole theory of war was disre 
 garded, the attack was made without knowledge, 
 and almost without consideration of the enemy's 
 position ; and, although boldly made and bravely 
 persisted in, yet was attended with reverses and 
 loss at the very points where they had been least 
 anticipated. It was ultimately successful ; and the 
 capture of Monterey, effected, as it was, by Gen 
 eral Taylor's army of scarcely 6500 effectives, in 
 creased the reputation of American troops for war 
 like prowess. And, whatever may be said of the 
 conduct of the operations on the part of the com 
 mander, certainly the mass of the army failed not 
 in its duty under any circumstances. And, in gen 
 eral, to this good conduct on the part of subordinate 
 officers and soldiers, and the errors of the Mexican 
 commanders (which have either been noticed or 
 are too obvious to require remark), the success of 
 the undertaking is attributable. 
 
 The final subject for remark in these operations 
 is the convention by which they were concluded ; 
 L R 
 
258 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and, although its nature renders it necessary that 
 reference should be made to communications of 
 later date, yet it is, perhaps, proper to speak of it 
 in the present connection. 
 
 Of all the military acts of General Taylor, none 
 were openly disapproved of by the authorities at 
 Washington, and none have been severely criticis 
 ed by the public press, with the exception of this 
 convention. The refusal of the new Mexican gov 
 ernment, under General Salas, to accept the offer 
 of negotiations, was received in Washington in 
 September, and on the 22d Mr. Marcy wrote to 
 General Taylor,^ informing him of the fact, and 
 of the wish of the President that the war should 
 be so prosecuted that the American army should 
 be in the most threatening position possible, in or 
 der to operate upon the Mexican Congress, which 
 was to meet on the 6th of December, and to which 
 the proposition for negotiation was to be submitted. 
 While these wishes were entertained at Washing 
 ton, the next news from the army brought intelli 
 gence of the convention of Monterey and the ac 
 knowledged suspension of hostilities for eight weeks, 
 a period which extended to very near the time fixed 
 upon for the meeting of the Congress. It was, 
 therefore, a disappointment; and that it should 
 have been regretted, and in a measure disapproved 
 of, was a consequence. Mr. Marcy's letter, which 
 informed General Taylor of the views of the Pres- 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 341. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 259 
 
 ident, bore date on the 13th of October, and treat 
 ed of the subject in the following paragraphs :# 
 
 " In relation to the terms of the capitulation of 
 Monterey, the President instructs me to say that 
 he regrets that it was not deemed advisable to in 
 sist upon the terms first proposed. The circum 
 stances which dictated it doubtless justified the 
 change. The President, uninformed of these cir 
 cumstances, does not know in what degree the re 
 cent change in the government of Mexico may have 
 contributed to the result. Certain it is, however, 
 that the present rulers of that country have not as 
 yet given any evidence that they ; are favorable to 
 the interests of peace.' Of this you will have been 
 informed by my dispatch of the 22d ultimo." 
 
 " The government did not contemplate, as you 
 will perceive by the tenor of the dispatches from 
 this department, that there probably would happen 
 any contingency in the prosecution of the war in 
 which it would be expedient to suspend hostilities 
 before the offer of acceptable terms of peace." 
 
 After stating the objections to the continuance 
 of the armistice, inasmuch as it interfered with 
 the plans of the government for a vigorous prose 
 cution of the war, with the view which was enter 
 tained of influencing the action of the Mexican 
 Congress, he continued : 
 
 " The government is fully persuaded that if you 
 had been aware of the special reasons disclosed in 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 355. 
 
260 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the dispatch of the 22d ultimo, and the intentions 
 of the government still entertained, you would not 
 have acceded to the suspension of hostilities for 
 even the limited period specified in the articles of 
 capitulation; but as its continuance depends upon 
 the orders of your government, you are instructed 
 to give the requisite notice that the armistice is to 
 cease at once, and that each party is at liberty to 
 resume and prosecute hostilities without restric 
 tion." 
 
 General Taylor replied on the 8th of November, 
 and defended the measure in the. following para 
 graphs : 
 
 " The force with which I advanced on Monterey 
 was limited by causes beyond my control to about 
 6000 men. With this force, as every military man 
 must admit who has seen the ground, it was en 
 tirely impossible to invest Monterey so closely as 
 to prevent the escape of the garrison. Although 
 the main communication with the interior was in 
 our possession, yet one route was open to the Mex 
 icans throughout the operations, and could not be 
 closed, as were also other minor tracks through the 
 mountains. Had we, therefore, insisted on more 
 rigorous terms than those granted, the result would 
 have been the escape of the body of the Mexican 
 force, with the destruction of its artillery and mag 
 azines, our only advantage being the capture of a 
 few prisoners of war at the expense of valuable 
 lives and much damage to the city. The consid 
 eration of humanity was present to my mind dur- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ing the conference which led to the convention, 
 and outweighed, in my judgment, the doubtful ad 
 vantages to he gained hy a resumption of the at 
 tack upon the town. This conclusion has heen 
 fully confirmed hy an inspection of the enemy's po 
 sition and means since the surrender. It was dis 
 covered that his principal magazine, containing an 
 immense amount of pdwder, was in the Cathedral, 
 completely exposed to our shells from two direc 
 tions. The explosion of this mass of powder, which 
 must have ultimately resulted from the continu 
 ance of the homhardrnent, would have heen infin 
 itely disastrous, involving the destruction not only 
 of the Mexican troops, hut of non-comhatants, and 
 even our own people, had we pressed the attack." 
 
 "In regard to the temporary suspension of hos 
 tilities, the fact that we are. not at this moment 
 (within eleven days of the termination of the pe 
 riod fixed hy the convention) prepared to move for 
 ward in force is a sufficient explanation of the mil 
 itary reasons which dictated this suspension of 
 arms. It ^paralyzed the enemy during a period 
 when, for the want of necessary means, we could 
 not possibly move." * # * 
 
 * # * " I have touched the prominent military 
 points involved in the convention of Monterey. 
 There were other considerations which weighed 
 with the commissioners in framing, and with my 
 self in approving, the articles of the convention. 
 In the conference with General Ampudia, I was 
 distinctly told hy him that he had invited it to 
 
262 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 spare the further effusion of blood, and because 
 General Santa Anna had declared himself favora 
 ble to peace. I knew that our government had 
 made 1 propositions to that of Mexico to negotiate, 
 and I deemed that the change of government in 
 that country since my last instructions fully war 
 ranted me in entertaining considerations of policy. 
 My grand motive in moving forward with very lim 
 ited supplies had been to increase the inducements 
 of the Mexican government to negotiate for peace. 
 Whatever may be the actual views or disposition 
 of the Mexican rulers, or of General Santa Anna, 
 it is not unknown to the government that I had 
 the very best reasons for believing the statement 
 of General Ampudia to be true. It was my opin 
 ion at the time of the convention, and it has not 
 been changed, that the liberal treatment of the Mex 
 ican army and the suspension of arms would exert 
 none but a favorable influence in our behalf."^ 
 
 In the quoted extracts are contained the only 
 official expressions of disapprobation of the terms 
 of the convention on the part of the President and 
 cabinet, and the only arguments in its defense of 
 ficially put forth by General Taylor. 
 
 The reasons of the regret of the authorities at 
 Washington that the convention had been agreed 
 to are obvious, and have been before mentioned. 
 Whatever may have been the diplomatic policy of 
 the country, the invariable wish of the President 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 359. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 63 
 
 had been expressed, that the war should be vigor 
 ously prosecuted ; and when this action had just 
 been particularly enjoined as a measure of policy, 
 to find that it was interrupted by the convention 
 of Monterey, not only in fact, but with that fact 
 published to Mexico, it certainly was cause of re 
 gret ; and regret was all which was expressed ; and 
 that, too, connected with an avowal of confidence 
 that, had the general been more fully informed of 
 the nature of things at the time, he would not have 
 agreed to the convention. It may well be ques 
 tioned whether this expression of regret called for 
 any defense of the measure. In that undertaken 
 by General Taylor, considerations are stated as hav 
 ing influenced his opinion in favor of it which might 
 well be deemed, by many, to have been considera 
 tions on the other side, and in neither criticism nor 
 defense has the state of affairs which existed at the 
 time when the convention was agreed to been fully 
 set forth. 
 
 It is true that the force with which General Tay 
 lor marched on Monterey was limited to about six 
 thousand five hundred men, and it is no less true 
 that any military man who has seen the ground 
 will promptly admit that it is impossible, with that 
 force, so completely to invest the whole town as to 
 preclude the escape of the garrison. But,, on the 
 23d of September, the Mexican force, having been 
 driven from the positions on the west and one upon 
 the east, and having abandoned the remainder, was 
 concentrated in the Grand Plaza and at the citadel, 
 
264 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the greater force being at the former position. On 
 that day Quitman's troops and others advanced to 
 within one block of the Plaza, and were withdrawn 
 at the very time Worth's advanced from the west 
 to within one block likewise. Had Quitman's 
 troops remained, the Mexican force in the Plaza 
 would have been nearly surrounded. That a junc 
 tion might have been effected between the two 
 commands in that case is most probable, for a dra 
 goon, who had been sent with a note to Bragg, 
 while he was returning, lost his route, and came 
 through the town to the position of Worth's troops. 
 Had they effected the junction, the main force of 
 the enemy would have been surrounded on three 
 sides ; Worth had two guns in position to command 
 the fords of the river, and if two more had been put 
 in position in the lunette at the southern angle of 
 the town, which was perfectly practicable, it is dif 
 ficult to see how the Mexican army could have ef 
 fected its escape intact during the day. Quitman's 
 troops were not, however, in position, nor could 
 they be placed in position, when the negotiation 
 was opened, without sending a staff officer a cir 
 cuit of seven miles, and then marching them three 
 miles from the camp to the city. And why ? Be 
 cause their operations of the 23d were an experi 
 ment, and on account of the want of concert of ac 
 tion ; a want which might well have been provid 
 ed against, for, when information reached General 
 Taylor of the abandonment of the works on the 
 east of Monterey, he knew that Worth held the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 2 65 
 
 Obispado, and was in position to at least threaten 
 the city. 
 
 Had operations been recommenced early on the 
 24th, even in the positions in which the troops 
 were, the affair would have been quickly decided ; 
 and a consideration which General Taylor and 
 others have urged in favor of the convention would 
 have hastened the result. As the Cathedral, con 
 taining the principal magazine of the enemy, was 
 exposed to the American shells, it is difficult to see 
 how a knowledge of this fact, and that himself and 
 his main force would have been involved in com 
 mon destruction, could have operated with the 
 Mexican general to induce him to hold out for bet 
 ter terms, if he had found all attempts at negotia 
 tion fruitless. 
 
 By the negotiation, however, time was consum 
 ed until it became near night; and then, indeed, 
 inasmuch as there was no force upon the east, the 
 probability of the escape of the garrison might 
 have been considered. 
 
 The immediate consideration of humanity in re 
 spect to an enemy is always secondary, whenever 
 the exercise of such humanity may tend to prolong 
 the war, for it never fails, in such case, to result 
 in a manner prejudicial to its own great interests. 
 Its. policy, in the present instance, may well be 
 doubted. General Taylor trusted, in some degree, 
 to the statement of Ampudia, that the new gov 
 ernment of Mexico had appointed commissioners 
 to treat for peace; a statement which he might 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 well have distrusted ; for, had Ampudia known 
 such to be the case, why did he choose to risk a 
 battle for nothing ? Why did he not seek to de 
 lay Taylor's advance by diplomacy and the an 
 nouncement of the fact ? But, even if it were true 
 that commissioners had been appointed, it can 
 hardly be seen why it was believed that the knowl 
 edge of the safety of 7000 men, organized and 
 equipped,. and their consequent availability in fu 
 ture operations, could have operated to increase the 
 inducements of the Mexican government to make 
 peace. 
 
 It has been urged by one of the commissioners 
 that the moral effect of the capitulation was great 
 er than if the enemy had made his escape, having 
 destroyed his magazines and artillery.^ It may 
 have been the case, but it certainly was not great 
 er than if the main force had been captured or de 
 stroyed, or driven in confusion before the assault 
 of the Americans, and dispersed. Besides, had not 
 the want of concert of action induced the with 
 drawal of Quitman's troops, and had the original 
 intentions of General Taylor been carried out in 
 respect to the negotiation of the convention, the 
 opportunity for the escape of Ampudia's troops 
 would never have been allowed. 
 
 General Taylor's original opinions were not in 
 favor of the terms as entered into. They were the 
 result of long discussions, and these, in military op 
 erations, almost invariably " terminate in the adop- 
 
 * Colonel Davis. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 67 
 
 tion of the worst course, which in war is the most 
 timid, or, if you will, the most prudent"* And the 
 discussions in this case had an additional feature 
 in their disfavor, that they were participated in by 
 the enemy. 
 
 The consideration which was urged in defense 
 of the armistice of eight weeks, that it tied the 
 hands of the enemy during a period when the 
 American army was unahle to move, was hardly 
 a consideration of any moment ; for it presupposed 
 that the Mexican army was able to act, and that a 
 Mexican general would be bound by the terms of 
 a military convention, when it might be his interest 
 to break them. If the Mexican army was in a con 
 dition to take the field, the policy of proclaiming 
 eight weeks of American inactivity may well be 
 doubted, and all history told the practice of Mexi 
 can commanders in regard to terms of a convention. 
 Nothing but a turn of affairs, which would have 
 rendered it a matter of policy on their part to act 
 with bad faith, was necessary to dispel any depend 
 ence which might be placed upon them ; and, more 
 over, Ampudia -could communicate with San Luis in 
 six days ; General Taylor could communicate with 
 Washington in six weeks ; wherefore, even if the 
 enemy acted in good faith, if he were in condition 
 to advance, the armistice availed nothing, while the 
 fact was published that, having taken Monterey aft 
 er a hard struggle, General Taylor was exhausted, 
 and that he would be inactive for eight weeks, dur- 
 
 * Napoleon. 
 
268 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ing which time Mexico had a respite from danger, 
 and could prepare at leisure for future operations. 
 
 That, in view of all these considerations, the 
 agreement to the convention of Monterey was the 
 cause of regret on the part of the authorities at 
 Washington, is not strange. Strange would it 
 have been if it had not. But, however much they 
 may have felt, their expressions, as put forth by 
 Mr. Marcy, were by no means so strong as those 
 of General Taylor, made before the receipt of Mr. 
 Marcy's letter, when he received Ampudia's procla 
 mations from Saltillo, and learned how completely 
 he had been imposed upon by the Mexican. 
 
 The operations at Monterey had nevertheless 
 an effect upon the progress of the war ; not in in 
 creasing the inducements to the Mexican govern 
 ment to make peace not in depriving the enemy 
 of resources by fulfilling the design of cutting off 
 the northern provinces, but in carrying the theater 
 of war from the frontiers of the United States, and, 
 as was afterward apparent, in gaining the strong 
 point for its defense against a Mexican incursion. 
 
 Another effect, and by no means, the least, was 
 that upon the American people. They gave them 
 news of a positive military character. The strug 
 gle had been severe, the captured positions were 
 strong, and the bravery of the troops was a subject 
 of national congratulation. The newspaper editors, 
 poets, and critics had full scope for the employment 
 of their genius, which they failed not to take ad 
 vantage of, and for a long time enlarged upon the 
 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 69 
 
 operations at Monterey in such a manner that they 
 could hardly be recognized. And, among other 
 tales of romantic character, there was one which 
 gave rise to many pretty sympathies on the part 
 of the friends of Mexico in the United States. 
 
 Although I can not positively deny the state 
 ment of a Mexican woman being slain while in 
 the act of administering succor to the wounded 
 on the field of battle, yet I may be permitted to 
 doubt its veracity, inasmuch as it was first heard 
 from the United States, and as the Mexican wom 
 en generally found about such scenes were much 
 more likely to have murdered and robbed the 
 wounded on either side than to have engaged in 
 any act of kindly ministry. And this is not only 
 the result of observation, but is in keeping with 
 the testimony of a Mexican general officer.^ 
 
 * General Requena. Campaign Sketches, p. 107. 
 
270 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 '^;, .l^*'^***-' 
 
 "> ' 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 New Mexico. Object of Expedition against New Mexico Instructions to 
 Colonel Kearney His Movement Nature of the New Mexican Govern 
 ment of the People Preparations for Defense Flight of Amijo Kear 
 ney takes Possession of Santa Fe Establishes a civil Government March 
 es to California Observations. 
 
 California. Fremont's Expeditions Controversy with General Castro 
 March to the North Return Affairs at Sonoma and with De la Tone 
 Declaration of Californian Independence Instructions of Secretary of Na 
 vy to Commodore Sloat He takes Possession of Monterey and San Fran 
 cisco Proclamation Correspondence with Mexican Authorities Suc 
 ceeded by Commodore Stockton Organization of California Battalion 
 Expedition to the Ciudad de los Angeles Flight of Pico and Castro Es 
 tablishment of civil Government. 
 
 Chihuahua. Object and Organization of Chihuahua Expedition Progresses 
 to Monclova Is given up. 
 
 Naval Operations in Gulf of Mexico. Blockade Attempt upon Alvarado 
 Expedition to Tobasco. 
 
 IN organizing an expedition against the depart 
 ment of New Mexico, the conquest and occupation 
 of that department was at first looked to as the 
 only object of the movement. Whether it was in 
 tended, at the time of the issue of the first orders 
 relative thereto, that the conquest and occupation 
 should be with a view to the permanent acquisition 
 of the department, or whether the movement was 
 to be one of simple attack on a portion of the Mex 
 ican republic, does not immediately appear from 
 the published correspondence of the War Depart 
 ment. From the nature of the instructions sub 
 sequently issued, it is probable that it was at first 
 intended to be for the latter object alone, which 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 271 
 
 it might very well have been, in consideration of 
 the represented importance of Santa Fe, the capi 
 tal of the department, as the place of entry in the 
 north of Mexico for a trade across the prairies from 
 the United States to the amount of one million of 
 dollars annually. 
 
 The orders for the organization of a column for 
 the service were issued on the 13th and 14th of 
 May, 1846, and arrangements made at that time 
 for calling forth the volunteers,. of which it was to 
 he principally composed, from the State of Missouri. 
 While the organization progressed, the policy of the 
 administration was definitely adopted and modi 
 fied, and additional instructions were given to Col 
 onel Kearney, of the first United States dragoons, 
 who had been selected for the command of the ex 
 pedition. 
 
 These instructions were written by Mr. Marcy 
 on the 3d of June, and the end of the expedition 
 was stated to be the occupation of Upper California. 
 Colonel Kearney was directed, after having taken 
 possession of New Mexico, to leave a garrison at 
 Santa Fe, and with the remainder of his force to 
 advance into that country. To enable him to take 
 the greater portion, an additional requisition was 
 made on the Governor of Missouri for 1000 mount 
 ed volunteers, to follow on his route; and he was 
 authorized to raise such number of Mormons, who 
 were preparing to emigrate to California, as he 
 might deem proper, provided this number did not 
 exceed one third of his entire force ; and also, upon 
 
272 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 his arrival in the proposed theater of his operations, 
 to accept the services of such American settlers as 
 might offer themselves. In regard to the civil gov 
 ernment of the conquered provinces, he was in 
 structed in the following words : 
 
 " Should you conquer and take possession of 
 New Mexico and Upper California, or considerable 
 places in either, you will establish temporary civil 
 governments therein, abolishing all arbitrary re 
 strictions that may exist, so far as it may be done 
 with safety. In performing this duty, it would be 
 wise and prudent to continue in their employment 
 all such of the existing officers as are known to be 
 friendly to the United States, and will take the 
 oath of allegiance to them. The duties at the cus 
 tom-houses ought at once to be reduced to such a 
 rate as may be barely sufficient to maintain the 
 necessary officers, without yielding any revenue to 
 the government. You may assure the people of 
 those provinces that it is the wish and design of 
 the United States to provide for them a free gov 
 ernment, with the least possible delay, similar to 
 that which exists in our territories. They will then 
 be called upon to exercise the rights of freemen in 
 electing their own representatives to the territorial 
 Legislature. It is foreseen that what relates to the 
 civil government will be a difficult and unpleasant 
 part of your duty, and much must necessarily be 
 left to your own discretion."^ 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 154. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 73 
 
 With these instructions, Colonel Kearney took 
 measures for insuring the organization of the addi 
 tional force of volunteers and Mormons, and sent 
 the original levy "by detachments on the Santa Fe 
 trail from Fort Leavenworth. By the last cff July 
 " the army of the West" was concentrated near 
 Bent's Fort, on the Arkansas River. It consisted, ' 
 in all, of ahout 1800 men eight companies of 
 United States dragoons, nine of volunteer cavalry, 
 two of volunteer artillery, and two of infantry. 
 
 On the 31st of July, preparatory to his advance 
 into the Mexican territory, Colonel Kearney issued 
 a proclamation, which was conciliatory in its tone, 
 but positively avowing the intentions of the gov 
 ernment of the United States. It was said, " The 
 undersigned enters New Mexico with a large mili 
 tary force for the purpose of seeking union with 
 and ameliorating the condition of its inhabitants.'^ 
 Though the effect which the proclamation might 
 have upon the inhabitants of the country was un 
 doubtedly the cause of its issue, and the further 
 ance of the policy of the United States was its first 
 object, as, indeed, policy is the first consideration 
 in the issue of all such papers, yet the condition of 
 the people of New Mexico needed amelioration, 
 and it could hardly have been worsted in any man 
 ner by its permanent occupation by the forces of 
 the United States. 
 
 The government of the department, such as it 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 168. 
 
 I. S 
 
274 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 was, was administered by Armijo, the comman- 
 dante general who was, in reality, nearly absolute, 
 although his authority was nominally derived from 
 the central government of the republic. He made 
 use of -his power for the exclusive benefit of him 
 self and the few ricos of the province who support 
 ed him. For that benefit the proceeds of the 
 enormous duties of the custom-house were in great 
 part appropriated. The character of Armijo was 
 a compound of cunning, cowardice, and rapacity, 
 and he developed these elements not only in his 
 government, but in his business transactions ; for, 
 besides being both a civil and military officer, he 
 was also a merchant. Law of a certain kind ex 
 isted in New Mexico, but it was of little or no avail 
 if its enforcement prejudiced in any degree the in 
 terests of the governor or of his adherents. 
 
 The population was a medley of Indians, New 
 Mexicans, some few of Spanish blood, and of Amer 
 icans. The New Mexicans, a mixed race of Span 
 iards and Indians, were perhaps the most worth 
 less of all the population of the republic. They 
 were hardly half civilized, and lived with but few 
 restraints of morality or honor. The example 
 which for a long series of years had been set them 
 by their chiefs, they had not failed to follow, and 
 duplicity and villainy were apparent in most of 
 their dealings. Notwithstanding their isolated 
 and dangerous situation, in the vicinity of hostile 
 Indian tribes, they had none of the courageous and 
 warlike characteristics which in general belong to 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 75 
 
 borderers of all nations. They were abject cow 
 ards, and, like all cowards, were cruel and treach 
 erous. To induce them to commit any deed, no 
 matter how nefarious, there was only wanting the 
 prospect of impunity and the hope of a slight re 
 ward.^ 
 
 The Indians of the Pueblos, who were quite as 
 numerous as the New Mexicans, were fully as 
 civilized, and far braver, although, as far as hon 
 esty and respectability were concerned, they might 
 be included in the same class. The mass of the 
 inhabitants professed the established religion of 
 Mexico, the Roman Catholic. But the best of 
 them were profoundly ignorant and superstitious, 
 and the Indians clung to many of the idolatrous 
 fancies of the ancient Aztecs, which could hardly 
 have had any beneficial effect upon the supersti 
 tions of the recognized Church. The priests, who 
 were as villainous as the worst of the population, 
 exercised an extensive influence over the mass of 
 the people, and did not fail to enforce, so far as in 
 them lay, a blind obedience to their dictates. 
 
 When Kearney's approach was first announced, 
 many ridiculous stories were circulated among the 
 people of the country, which represented his troops 
 to be barbarians of the nature of their ordinary ene 
 mies of the Eutaw and Navajoe Indians, except 
 that they were perhaps more refined in cruelty. 
 Endeavors were made to make preparations to op 
 pose the American advance, and with partial suc- 
 
 * Mr. Ruxton's wort. 
 
276 THE WAR WITH 
 
 cess. Armijo circulated reports of the speedy com 
 ing of re-enforcements, and it was said and believed 
 that General Urrea, with many thousand men, was 
 on his march, and that more were in his rear. 
 
 Whether the central government of Mexico had 
 ever promised to send re-enforcements is questiona 
 ble ; for, at the time of the latest communication 
 with the capital, Paredes was in no condition to 
 spare troops from the protection of his own authori 
 ty and the defense of the frontier against General 
 Taylor for the purpose of guarding a country so 
 distant and unimportant as New Mexico. But, if 
 it were so, none ever arrived. Armijo, however, 
 collected a few soldiers of the Mexican army, a 
 body of militia, New Mexicans and Indians, which 
 made up a force of between three and four thou 
 sand men, with six pieces of artillery, and took 
 post in a canon, some fifteen miles distant from 
 Santa Fe, to dispute the advance of the invaders. 
 
 Exact data upon which to rest an account of his 
 proceedings are difficult to obtain, but they are not 
 at all necessary ; for upon Kearney's near approach 
 he called a council of war, at which, it is said, his 
 second in command and other officers, all worthy 
 of their chief, advised a retreat. He adopted the 
 advice, broke up his force, collected his property, 
 all the merchandise which he had in the town, 
 and struck with his caravan to the southward, to 
 render ari account of his disgrace, and find a mark 
 et for his wares, leaving the country perfectly open 
 and the advance of the enemy unopposed. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 2 77 
 
 In the mean time General Kearney had advanc 
 ed into the Mexican settlements, and on the 14th 
 of August reached the town of Vegas. On the 
 morning of the 15th he took the first step in estab 
 lishing the civil authority of the United States by 
 assembling the people in the plaza of the village, 
 and declaring them absolved from allegiance to the 
 Mexican government, and all obedience to Gov 
 ernor Armijo. He caused the alcalde and two cap 
 tains of militia to take the oath of allegiance, which 
 they did without demur, although with no good 
 grace. The people submitted in quiet, and, so far 
 as the oaths of allegiance could effect it, the vil 
 lage of Vegas was under the government of the 
 United States.* 
 
 On the following morning the same scene was 
 enacted at the village of San Miguel, of which the 
 alcalde and civil officers took the oath of allegiance 
 after stipulating that their religion should be re 
 spected. 
 
 During the 15th and 16th information of Armi- 
 jo's position in the canon was received, but on the 
 17th it was learned that he had broken up Jiis force 
 and fled. On the 18th the American command 
 er entered and took possession of Santa Fe, being 
 courteously received by the lieutenant governor, 
 Vigil, who had remained after Armijo's flight, f 
 
 General Kearney addressed the people in the 
 
 * Lieutenant-colonel Emory's Notes of Reconnaissance in New Mexico 
 and California. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of the thir 
 tieth Congress, p. 27. t Idem. Idem, p. 31. 
 
278 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 plaza of the town on the following day, and repeat 
 ed the conciliatory expressions w r hich he had be 
 fore used at Vegas and San Miguel, and which had 
 been put forth in his proclamation of the 3d of Au 
 gust. The mass of the population professed to be 
 satisfied with the change of government, and the 
 chiefs and head men of the Pueblo Indians came 
 in soon after to give in their adhesion and express 
 their satisfaction at the arrival of the Americans.^ 
 
 On the 22d, the American commander issued a 
 second proclamation, in which he declared his in 
 tention of occupying and holding the department, 
 with its original boundaries, on both sides of the 
 Rio Grande ; set forth the military force which en 
 abled him to do it, and his intention to protect the 
 inhabitants against the incursions of hostile In 
 dians ; called upon all who had taken up arms to 
 return to their homes, under penalty of being con 
 sidered enemies and traitors ; announced the inten 
 tion of the United States to provide a free govern 
 ment for New Mexico with the least possible delay, 
 and concluded by absolving all persons residing 
 within its boundaries from allegiance to the cen 
 tral Mexican government, and claiming them as 
 citizens of the United States. f 
 
 Changes in the government of the newly-occu 
 pied territory were soon introduced. The high and 
 
 * Lieutenant-colonel Emory's Notes of Reconnaissance in New Mexico 
 and California. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of the thir 
 tieth Congress, p. 33. 
 
 t Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 170. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 279 
 
 exorbitant taxes were abolished or very much re 
 duced, many infirm and corrupt officers were re 
 moved, and others, principally of the inhabitants, 
 were appointed in their stead.^ 
 
 Immediately after his arrival, Kearney had or 
 dered a site to be selected for the erection of a fort, 
 for the protection and secure occupation of Santa 
 Fe. On the 23d ground was broken on a work 
 computed for a garrison of 280 men, at a point upon 
 a commanding eminence within six hundred yards 
 of the heart of the town. While the work was in 
 progress, intelligence was received that re-enforce 
 ments had met Armijo on his flight to the south 
 ward ; that he had turned back, and, having arous 
 ed the entire population of the southern portion of 
 the department, was marching at the head of a 
 large force in the direction of Santa Fe.f 
 
 Before the rumors became well authenticated, it 
 had been intended to send an expedition to quiet 
 any disturbance in that quarter, and upon the re 
 ceipt of this intelligence, the strength of it was in 
 creased to 700 men.$ On the 3d of September it 
 marched, under Kearney's own command. The 
 greater southern portion of the province was visit 
 ed ; the rumors proved to be false ; and, having pro 
 ceeded as far as Tome, some one hundred and fifty 
 miles south of Santa Fe, the command returned. 
 So quiet and so well satisfied with the change had 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 172-175. 
 
 t Emory. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first session of the thirti 
 eth Congress, p. 32. t Idem. Idem, p. 33, 36- 
 
280 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the inhabitants appeared, that upon his return on 
 the 16th of September, Kearney announced to the 
 government that there could no longer be appre 
 hended any organized resistance to the troops in 
 that territory, and that the commander of them, 
 whoever he might be, would have nothing to do 
 but to secure the inhabitants from the depredations 
 of the Navajoe and Eutaw Indians.* 
 
 Believing thus, he determined to leave soon for 
 California, taking with him a portion of the troops, 
 leaving orders for the Mormon battalion to follow, 
 and for any surplus force which might be present 
 after the arrival of re-enforcements to proceed south 
 to Chihuahua, to join "the army of the Center," 
 which, under General Wool, was expected to be 
 at that point, f 
 
 Previous to his departure, however, he establish 
 ed a civil government for the territory, resembling 
 that of the territories of the United States. The 
 organic law was the same which had been that of 
 the Territory of Missouri. Th,e laws for the gov 
 ernment of the territory were compiled from those 
 of Mexico, of Texas, of Texas and Coahuila, and 
 from the statutes of the State of Missouri. Hav 
 ing proclaimed these laws, and appointed the civil 
 governor, Bent, and executive officers, he marched 
 on the 25th of September en route for California, 
 fully believing that the authority of the United 
 States was firmly established on a secure basis.! 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 174. t Idem. t Idem, p. 176-229. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 281 
 
 His command consisted, at the outset, of but 300 
 dragoons, as the Mormon battalion had not arrived 
 at the time of his departure from Santa Fe ; but 
 on the 6th of October, having left the Rio Grande 
 and struck west for the ^Gila, he fell in with a mes 
 senger, from ,whom he learned the events which 
 had meanwhile taken place in California, and 
 that the country had been subdued. He therefore 
 sent back two companies of dragoons under Major 
 Sumner, and continued on with the remainder of 
 his force. 
 
 The occupation of New Mexico having been ef 
 fected without opposition, the military operations 
 lack the luster which well-contested battles give 
 to any achievement. They bear but little resem 
 blance to the regular movements of masses in war; 
 for the column was small, and the preparations and 
 marches were regulated by the nature of the route 
 and of the territory against which it was directed. 
 The expedition had little to do with the great ques 
 tion of the war, as was fully proved in the result. 
 It was at first, and so far, against New Mexico 
 alone, and neither at the time nor subsequently 
 was any -physical opposition offered on the part of 
 the central government; but the speedy organiza 
 tion of the force and the celerity of the march from 
 Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe are remarkable. In 
 but little more than three months, the orders had 
 been issued from Washington, the force, in great 
 
282 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 part, raised and organized; a march of near one 
 thousand miles had been accomplished, and the 
 designated territory occupied ; and, within one 
 month subsequently, a civil government, on new 
 principles, had been established upon an apparent 
 ly sure foundation. 
 
 The conduct of General Kearney and the in 
 structions of the War Department, which, in a 
 measure, authorized his action in civil policy, have 
 been severely commented upon, and it has been 
 asserted that such action was in violation of the 
 principles of the Constitution of the United States. 
 It is hardly to be believed that the framers of that 
 instrument could have foreseen such a contingen 
 cy, or that they should have deemed themselves 
 called upon to provide for it, even if they had ; for 
 the right of any power to establish a civil govern 
 ment in a conquered country can not be doubted. 
 Indeed, as the course of action of the United States 
 had been determined upon by the executive, and 
 the permanent acquisition of New Mexico was de 
 signed, it was a duty which, according to learned 
 writers, devolved upon the agents of their govern 
 ment. Many inconveniences arise in the consum 
 mation of conquests by republics, which are in 
 some degree modified, it is true, in the case of the 
 United States ; but, in view of them, high authori 
 ty has said, that " when a republic keeps a nation 
 in subjection, it should endeavor to repair the in 
 conveniences arising from the nature of its situa 
 tion by giving it good laws both for the political 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 83 
 
 and civil government of the people."* This was 
 the end of the intention of the President of the 
 United States, set forth in the instructions of the 
 Secretary of War to General Kearney in reference 
 to the government to be established in New Mex 
 ico, and it was the end of General Kearney's action. 
 There is but one thing in which it can be seen that 
 he overstepped the limit of his instructions or of 
 the strictest legality. In establishing the govern 
 ment, he claimed the inhabitants as citizens of the 
 United States, and gave to them rights, as such, 
 which could be legally given only after the ac 
 knowledged acquisition of territory, under sanction 
 of the treaty-making power, or of the Congress of 
 the United States. In this particular he exceeded 
 his instructions ; but much had been left to his dis 
 cretion, and it might well have been a measure of 
 policy so to do, as he knew the ultimate designs 
 of the President. Certainly, if those designs were 
 to be carried out, it could not have been expected 
 to exercise a beneficial effect upon the state of the 
 country or upon American interest to announce to 
 the inhabitants that the occupation was merely 
 contingent, and that every thing was in an unset 
 tled state. The people, having in view the evac 
 uation of the territory and the return of Mexican 
 dominion, could have been expected to do nothing 
 more in favor of the American cause, certainly, than 
 to hold aloof, if, indeed, they did not take a position 
 of positive hostility. It can not be wondered at 
 
 * Spirit of Laws. Montesquieu, book x., chap. viii. 
 
284 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 that, when the mass of the people and their leaders 
 expressed themselves satisfied with the change, and 
 hoped that the occupation of the American army 
 would he permanent, General Kearney endeavored 
 to conciliate their good will hy declaring them to 
 he citizens of the United States, unmindful of the 
 argument which might be brought against his pro 
 ceedings, in the violation of the strict letter of le 
 gality, at home. 
 
 But the attempt to establish a free civil govern 
 ment in New Mexico had in it several elements of 
 failure, and the first and most important was in 
 the nature of the population. With a half-civil 
 ized, vicious, and superstitious people, a free gov 
 ernment can hardly ever be successfully adminis 
 tered. The superstition must first be eradicated ; 
 for of all the difficulties in the advancement of 
 mankind, experience has shown it to be the most 
 serious. To attempt to eradicate it by force is al 
 most useless certainly useless with a view to the 
 establishment of free institutions ; for the people 
 will cling to it with all the pertinacity of martyrs, 
 and though it may be gone in outward seeming, 
 yet it remains in the heart, and only wants an op 
 portunity to show its effect in hostility to the new 
 government, however beneficial it may be, for the 
 sake of the tyranny by which it has been establish 
 ed. The means by which the object can be safely 
 accomplished are to be found in civilization and in 
 the extension of knowledge, and these require time 
 for development and results. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 285 
 
 The change from the tyrannical and feeble gov 
 ernment of Armijo to that introduced by General 
 Kearney was too sudden for the people, and the 
 extension of the elective franchise to the various 
 leperos and Indians who composed the mass of 
 the population might well have been considered 
 dangerous, inasmuch as, in their vicious ignorance, 
 and led as they were by their priests, they could 
 know neither the value nor the use of liberty in its 
 extended sense. 
 
 Another element of difficulty is to be found in 
 the nature of the troops left to occupy the territory. 
 They were nearly all volunteers, and without much 
 discipline. Some had accompanied General Kear 
 ney in his march across the prairies, and what they 
 had had been there acquired. But the body of the 
 troops were the new levies who marched in his 
 rear. Had circumstances been such as to have 
 caused General Kearney to remain at Santa Fe, to 
 have watched the development of the government 
 which he had established, and to have controlled 
 both the inhabitants and the American troops in 
 his military capacity, the subsequent disorders 
 might have been prevented ; but the troops were 
 left under officers of their own choice, with no su 
 perior of independent rank and experience over 
 them, and what discipline they had, as is usually 
 the case with volunteers in garrison, soon became 
 comparatively nothing. Santa Fe abounded with 
 gambling houses, grog-shops, and the like,^ and 
 
 * Mr. Buxton's work. 
 
28(3 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the licentious conduct of the volunteer soldiery 
 could hardly have set an example of good behavior 
 to the half-civilized inhabitants of the country ; 
 and, although in perfect keeping with their own 
 ordinary practices, may well have given deep cause 
 of offense, and generated a hatred toward the Amer 
 icans. 
 
 In the mean time, by the force of circumstances, 
 and through the action of persons unprepared for 
 the attempt, and that of the American naval squad 
 ron in the Pacific, the conquest and occupation of 
 California had been effected with a rapidity which 
 could in no way have been anticipated. 
 
 John C. Fremont, second lieutenant of Topo 
 graphical Engineers, had made two exploring ex 
 peditions to the west of the Rocky Mountains, and 
 for his services on those occasions had been brevet 
 ed a captain. In the autumn of 1845 he started 
 again, for the purpose of continuing his explora 
 tions, and of discovering, if possible, a new route 
 to Oregon, to the south of the one usually traversed 
 by emigrants. His operations were not of a war 
 like nature, although his party was necessarily 
 armed for protection against the Indians who in 
 fested those regions, and for hunting purposes. In 
 the latter part of January, 1846, he arrived within 
 one hundred miles of Monterey, in California. As 
 his animals needed recruiting, he determined to 
 halt in the valley of the San Joaquin, which he 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 287 
 
 had previously explored, and which afforded game 
 and grass, the great requisites for the encampment 
 of western travelers. To avoid collision and the 
 compromise of his government, knowing the rela 
 tions which existed with Mexico when he had left 
 the United States, which might cause his move 
 ments to he looked upon with suspicion, he left his 
 party and proceeded in person to Monterey. There 
 he applied to the commandante, General De Castro, 
 for permission to remain in the valley of the San 
 Joaquin during the winter. After explanation of 
 his objects, and some demur on the part of De Cas 
 tro, it was granted, and Fremont rejoined his party 
 with the intention of moving it to the desired posi 
 tion. De Castro, however, took immediate steps to 
 raise the province against him; and hardly had Fre 
 mont arrived in the valley with his party, when he 
 received information of his proceedings. Mr. Lar- 
 kin, the United States consul at Monterey, sent to 
 warn him of his danger, and a number of Amer 
 icans, who had settled in the country, offered to as 
 sist him in his defense. Fearful of compromising, 
 them and his government, Fremont declined their 
 aid, and, with rare determination and bravery, he 
 marched his small party of sixty-two backwoods 
 men to within thirty miles of Monterey, took a 
 position on the Sierra Nevada, whence he had a 
 fair prospect over much of the surrounding coun 
 try, hoisted the American flag, and prepared for re 
 sistance. But an approach was all that De Castro 
 attempted ; and, having remained some time, and 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 finding no probability of an attack, Fremont start 
 ed in the month of March for Oregon.^ 
 
 Of Fremont's proceedings De Castro complained 
 in a letter to the Mexican Secretary of War and 
 Marine, and in the spring of 1846 the Mexican 
 journals of the capital proclaimed the arrival of his 
 small party as an irruption of Northern barbarians 
 into the department of California. The news came 
 to that city in time to increase, with the aid of the 
 exaggerations of the Mexican comnlandante gen 
 eral and the fervid imaginations of the journalists, 
 the feeling of hostility to the Americans, which was 
 then causing the revolutions in the Mexican gov 
 ernment. 
 
 The great objection to Fremont's movement was 
 stated to be the fact of his taking up a defensive 
 position and hoisting the American flag. These 
 were used in arguments to prove the designs of the 
 United States upon the territory, and declared to be 
 a cause of war, by which the Mexicans hoped to 
 vindicate the integrity of their soil, but which, in 
 fact, only afforded an opportunity to their adversa 
 ries to carry out their views, if, indeed, they had 
 been seriously entertained at that time. 
 
 It is difficult to perceive in what Fremont's ac 
 tion can be deemed unjustifiable. The uninhabit 
 ed state of the country in the north of California, 
 and the permission given by the commandante gen 
 eral, gave and confirmed his right to winter in the 
 valley of the San Joaquin ; and the taking up of 
 
 * Colonel Benton's letter to the President. Union, Nov. 9th, 1846. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 289 
 
 
 position and the raising of the national standard 
 were the consequences, and not the cause of De 
 Castro's action. The first was a necessary meas 
 ure of self-defense, justifiable under any circum 
 stances; and the second, if not of defense, of an 
 honorahle pride in making that defense under the 
 banner of his country. 
 
 Upon Fremont's departure, De Castro occupied 
 his camp, and, picking up his leavings, proclaimed 
 a victory, boasted of his spoils, and of having sti 
 fled a dangerous conspiracy; all of which he duly set 
 forth in his dispatches to the Mexican government 
 Meanwhile Fremont pursued his way unmolested. 
 But his progress to the north was interrupted by 
 natural obstacles and the hostility of the Tlamath 
 Indians, who killed and wounded five of his men.* 
 
 On the 9th of May he was overtaken by Lieu 
 tenant Gillespie, of the marines, who bore a letter 
 of introduction from the secretary of state, Mr. 
 Buchanan, and private letters from Senator Ben- 
 ton. In none were contained any explicit instruc 
 tions for his course of action, but from certain enig 
 matical passages in a letter from Senator Benton, 
 Fremont inferred that the government desired that 
 he should ascertain and counteract any schemes 
 which foreigners might have in relation to the Cal- 
 ifornias. As Gillespie had crossed the continent 
 from Vera Cruz to Mazatlan, Fremont considered 
 the intimation of moment, and was at no loss to 
 account for the obscurity of the passages in the 
 
 * Colonel Benton's letter to the President. 
 
 I. T 
 
290 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 danger which had existed of the letters falling into 
 Mexican hands. In connection with verbal in 
 formation from Gillespie, the intimation had a pow 
 erful influence on his future action, and he at once 
 determined to return to the settled vicinity of the 
 Sacramento.^ 
 
 Whether it had been intended by Senator Ben- 
 ton that any thing should be so construed as to in 
 duce the attempt to subvert Mexican authority in 
 California, or whether the whole object of Lieuten 
 ant Gillespie's mission was to cause precautionary 
 measures to be taken against British schemes for the 
 acquisition of the territory, is a question of doubt. 
 But, in either case, that Fremont's action was un 
 premeditated, up to the time of the receipt of the 
 letters, there can be no question ; for, had he pre 
 viously contemplated the subversion of Mexican 
 authority, he would hardly have given himself the 
 fatigue and danger of his march to the north. 
 
 Upon arriving at the Bay of San Francisco, he 
 learned that, after his retreat from the position on 
 the Sierra Nevada, Be Castro had taken steps for 
 expelling the American settlers from the territory, 
 and that he was then at Sonoma, on the opposite 
 side of the bay, preparing an expedition. Under 
 all these circumstances, hemmed in himself, in no 
 immediate condition to return to the United States, 
 the settlers compromised and about to become the 
 objects of hostility to a barbarous people, and be- 
 
 * Lieutenant-colonel Fremont's Defense. Executive Document, No. 53, 
 Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 376. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 91 
 
 ing disgusted with the conduct of the Mexican 
 authorities, early in June Fremont determined to 
 act, and put a stop to their proceedings by over 
 throwing Mexican authority in California. 
 
 On the llth he commenced by seizing a drove 
 of two hundred horses on the way to De Castro's 
 camp, setting free the party which conducted them. 
 On the 15th he surprised Sonoma, the rendezvous 
 of the Mexican forces, captured General Vallejo 
 and other officers, nine pieces of brass cannon, two 
 hundred and fifty stand of muskets, and a quan 
 tity of ammunition and military stores. Leaving 
 fourteen men to garrison the point, he proceeded 
 to the settlements on the Rio de los Americanos, 
 some distance in the interior. There he increased 
 his force from the settlers, and, having heard that 
 De Castro meditated an attack upon Sonoma, he 
 started with ninety men on the 23d of June to re 
 turn. By rapid traveling, he reached Sonoma on 
 the 25th, at two o'clock in the morning. De Cas 
 tro's advance of eighty dragoons, under a Captain 
 de la Torre, had already crossed the bay, but it was 
 soon attacked by twenty Americans, and fled after 
 a short conflict. Fremont captured all the boats 
 in which the crossing had been effected. Three 
 of De la Torre's men were shot in retaliation for 
 the butchery of two Americans, who had been 
 taken prisoners by the Mexican troops and cut to 
 pieces with their knives. Having suffered these 
 losses, De Castro retreated to the south. 
 
 On the 4th of July Fremont called the Ameri- 
 
292 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 can settlers together at Sonoma, and advised them, 
 as their only safety, to declare independence of 
 Mexico, and to prosecute the war. His advice met 
 with a ready response, and the revolutionary flag 
 was at once displayed.^ But, meanwhile, the 
 events of the war, of the existence of which Fre 
 mont had heen ignorant, had hecome known to 
 Commodore Sloat, the commander of the Pacific 
 squadron, and that officer had commenced taking 
 possession of the towns upon the coast. 
 
 The instructions under which Sloat commenced 
 action had heen given with a view to the contin 
 gency of war, and were written as early as the 24th 
 of June, 1845. In a letter of Mr. Bancroft, secre 
 tary of the navy, of that date, to Commodore Sloat, 
 is the following : " It is the earnest desire of the 
 President to pursue the policy of peace, and he is 
 anxious that you, and every part of your squadron, 
 should he assiduously careful to avoid any act 
 which could "be construed into an act of aggression. 
 
 " Should Mexico, however, be resolutely bent on 
 hostilities, you will be mindful to protect the per 
 sons and interests of citizens of the United States 
 near your station; and should you ascertain be 
 yond a doubt that the Mexican government has 
 declared war against us, you will employ the force 
 under your command to the best advantage. The 
 Mexican ports on the Pacific are said to be open 
 and defenseless. If you ascertain with certainty 
 that Mexico has declared war against the United 
 
 * Colonel Benton's letter to the President. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 293 
 
 States, you will at once possess yourself of the port 
 of San Francisco, and blockade or occupy such oth 
 er ports as your force may permit."^ 
 
 At Mazatlan, on the 7th of June, 1846, the com 
 modore learned of the commencement of hostili 
 ties, and, leaving a sloop of war at that port, he 
 sailed at once for the coast of California. He ar 
 rived at Monterey on the 2d of July, and, after hav 
 ing examined the defenses and localities of the 
 town, summoned it on the 7th. The Mexican cap 
 tain of artillery who commanded it evacuated the 
 place, with the few soldiers which constituted the 
 garrison, having declined to go through the formal 
 ities of a surrender, inasmuch as he had no orders 
 to do so.f On the same day, 250 seamen and ma 
 rines landed and took possession, and hoisted the 
 American flag. 
 
 In the proclamation which the commodore pub 
 lished, the intention of the United States to take 
 and hold possession of the territory was distinctly 
 declared, and the privileges and benefits which 
 might be expected from the change of governments 
 were prominently set forth. $ Such an avowal of 
 policy on the part of the naval commander was, to 
 say the least, premature, for the letter of instruc 
 tions of the 24th of June was all his authority. 
 Time had not elapsed to allow the transmission of 
 dispatches from Washington to his squadron since 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 231. 
 
 t Executive Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 643. t Idem, p. 644, 645. 
 
294 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the commencement of hostilities, and he must, 
 therefore, have believed such to have been the de 
 termination of the government, instead of knowing 
 it from positive instructions. But the course of con 
 duct was calculated to facilitate the occupation of 
 the country, which he was directed to accomplish, 
 and, as he avowed, in the absence of explicit in 
 structions, he chose rather to be blamed for doing 
 too much than too little. ^ 
 
 Captain Montgomery, in obedience to instruc 
 tions from the commodore, took possession of Yer- 
 ba Buena, on the Bay of San Francisco, on the 9th. 
 He immediately commenced preparations for secur 
 ing the bay by planting the cannon which were 
 found in the country, erecting temporary forts, and 
 organizing volunteer guards. In these proceedings 
 some distrust was felt of English action, and it was 
 to a degree anticipated that the British squadron 
 might interfere to prevent the consummation of the 
 measures of occupation ; but the British admiral ar 
 rived at the newly-captured ports, and sailed with 
 out interference or remonstrance! a disappoint 
 ment to the Mexican party in the country, which 
 had anticipated the speedy and effective aid of his 
 naval force. 
 
 The news of the acts of the naval commander, 
 and of the seizure of Monterey, Yerba Buena, and 
 other small places, was received by the revolution- 
 
 * Correspondence of Commodore Sloat and Captain Montgomery. Ex 
 ecutive Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session of the 
 twenty-ninth Congress, p. 648. t Idem. Idem, p. 641, 677. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 95 
 
 ists soon after their declaration of independence. 
 The American flag was at once substituted for the 
 standard of revolt, and Fremont proceeded with his 
 party to Monterey. 
 
 When Commodore Sloat commenced his opera 
 tions, he had sent a summons to both the governor, 
 Pico, and General De Castro, calling upon them to 
 surrender their authority, and inviting them to meet 
 him at Monterey for the purpose of arranging terms. 
 De Castro's reply was to the effect that he would 
 submit the demand to the governor and assembly of 
 the department ; .but added, that if the matter rest 
 ed on his responsibility, he should not fail to main 
 tain the Mexican sovereignty to the last.^ Nev 
 ertheless, upon the approach of Fremont and his 
 party, he retreated to the capital of California, the 
 Ciudad de los Angeles. 
 
 During the progress of these events Commodore 
 Stockton had arrived from the United States, and 
 in consequence of ill health, Commodore Sloat re 
 linquished to him the command of the Pacific 
 squadron about the 29th of July. Previous to this 
 Fremont had arrived with his volunteer force at 
 Monterey, and communicated with Sloat in regard 
 to future movements. The commodore did not con 
 template any active operations on shore, notwith 
 standing his summons to Pico and De Castro, but 
 limited himself to holding the sea-ports already oc- 
 
 * Correspondence of Commodore Sloat with Pico and Castro. Executive 
 Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session of the twenty- 
 ninth Congress, p. 646-649. 
 
296 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 cupied, and he announced to the commander at 
 San Francisco that the campaign would he consid 
 ered at an end whenever Captain Fremont and his 
 party should leave for the United States. The sub 
 ject of the intended course of action was spoken of 
 hy Fremont and Lieutenant Gillespie of the ma 
 rines to Commodore Stockton hefore he succeeded 
 to the command of the squadron. He declined giv 
 ing any opinion at the time, hut as Fremont had 
 in consideration the propriety of returning to the 
 United States, it was suggested that he should de 
 lay his departure for a few days, when Stockton 
 would prohahly succeed to the command.^ 
 
 Being in anticipation of resistance on the part 
 of the armed Californians, and fearful lest they 
 should gain strength and confidence hy American 
 inactivity, Stockton urged upon Commodore Sloat 
 that if he intended to relinquish the duty on 
 account of ill health, he should do so at once. 
 Though the latter did not immediately comply, he 
 placed under Stockton's command the sloop of 
 war Cyane, from which had heen drawn the great 
 er part of the force on shore. Upon this Stockton 
 communicated with Fremont and Gillespie, and 
 under his authority the volunteer force which they 
 had raised was organized into a hattalion, of which 
 Fremont was appointed the major and Gillespie a 
 captain, f 
 
 * Testimony of Commodore Stockton. Trial of Lieutenant-colonel Fre 
 mont. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 178. t Idem. Idem, p. 180. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 2 97 
 
 In the mean time, information had heen receiv 
 ed at Monterey of the junction of De Castro with 
 the governor, Pico, and that they were at the time 
 in the vicinity of Ciudad de los Angeles, at the 
 head of a force of about 700 men. In consequence, 
 the newly-organized battalion was embarked-upon 
 the sloop of war Cyane, and on the 24th sailed 
 for San Diego, where it was to land, procure a re 
 mount, and to intercept the communications of the 
 Mexican force with Sonora. 
 
 A few days after, Sloat having left for the Unit 
 ed States, Stockton sailed down the coast as far as 
 San Pedro, taking possession, as he passed, of the 
 small town of Santa Barbara. Upon his arrival at 
 San Pedro, he landed a party of sailors and ma 
 rines, and, having mounted a few ship guns on 
 cart wheels, prepared to advance on Ciudad de los 
 Angeles. While at San Pedro, commissioners ar 
 rived from De Castro, offering negotiations, which 
 Stockton declined. In return for the refusal, De 
 Castro announced to hinij in extravagant language, 
 that he meant to defend the territory.^ Commu 
 nications having been opened with Fremont, that 
 officer was ordered to join the advance en route, 
 and the little column was directed on Los Angeles. 
 The same day information was received that the 
 enemy had abandoned his camp, which had been 
 intrenched, distant three miles from the town ; 
 
 * Testimony of Commodore Stockton. Trial of Lieutenant-colonel Fre 
 mont, Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 181. 
 
298 THE WAK WITH MEXICO. 
 
 that his troops had dispersed over the country, 
 while the governor and commandante general had 
 taken the route to Sonera. 
 
 Having heen joined by Fremont, on the 13th of 
 August Stockton entered the capital of California, 
 and took possession of the government house, with 
 out a show of opposition. 
 
 On the 17th he issued a proclamation announc 
 ing his conquest of the department and the milita 
 ry possession of the United States, and promising 
 a government similar to that of the American ter 
 ritories as soon as it could be established.^ 
 
 Soon after, he ordered the establishment of a gov 
 ernment, of which he constituted himself the chief. 
 It could hardly be called a free government, for 
 the legislative power was vested in the governor 
 and a legislative council of seven members, to be 
 appointed by himself for the first two years, after 
 which the members were to be elected 'by the peo 
 ple. But the government was only temporary in 
 its nature, and the decree by which it was estab 
 lished bore upon its face that it was to continue 
 only until changed by authority of the government 
 of the United States, f Such as it was, it was, for 
 a tune, quietly submitted to, and, to all appear 
 ance, the occupation of the territory was firmly es 
 tablished. 
 
 In the mean time, with a view to the prosecu 
 tion of the adopted policy, though necessarily in 
 
 * Executive Document. No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session of 
 the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 669. t Idem. Idem, p. 271, 272. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 99 
 
 ignorance of the events which had transpired, the 
 authorities at Washington had dispatched a com 
 pany of artillery hy sea, around Cape Horn, to Cal 
 ifornia. Its transport conveyed full supplies of 
 arms and munitions of war, and implements for 
 engineer service. Soon after, a regiment of volun 
 teers was raised in the city of New York, especial 
 ly for California service, of which the men were to 
 serve during the war, and to receive their discharge 
 at such point as the regiment might be found at its 
 termination, provided it was within the limits of 
 the territory of the United States. But neither of 
 these corps arrived in California in time to partici 
 pate in the active measures of conquest or occu 
 pation. 
 
 The expedition against Chihuahua was contem 
 plated at Washington soon after the first news of 
 the commencement of hostilities on the Rio Grande 
 was received. The end of the expedition, although 
 not explicitly set forth in any published official 
 correspondence of the government of the United 
 States, could hardly have been other than to fur 
 ther the scheme of cutting off the northern prov 
 inces of Mexico, the population of which various 
 persons then in Washington represented as being 
 exceedingly dissatisfied with the central govern 
 ment, and ripe for revolt. The country was not 
 well known, the only direct route by which trav 
 elers and merchants from the United States usual- 
 
300 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ly proceeded being that from Fort Leavenworth, 
 by Santa Fe, to Chihuahua. That presented many 
 difficulties, besides the length of the march from 
 Fort Leavenworth ; and Port Lavaca, in Texas, 
 was early selected as the point of starting for the 
 expedition. 
 
 That it was for some time contemplated at Wash- 
 ington to continue the cordon across the continent, 
 and to cut off the northern provinces, and that it 
 was deemed that this expedition was in part to 
 effect such object, is evident from the inquiries 
 made of General Taylor concerning the route from 
 Chihuahua to the port of Guyamas, on the Pacific. 
 But the whole expedition was an experiment on 
 the part of the government, as, indeed, isolated op- 
 erations of war generally are, and General Wool, 
 who was to command it, was placed under the or 
 ders of General Taylor, in order that such disposi 
 tions might be made as the service should require, 
 either for the furtherance of his own movements 
 or for the continuation of the cordon across the 
 continent.^ 
 
 The point of concentration of the troops of Wool's 
 command was San Antonio de Bexar, in Texas. 
 Taylor's instructions to Wool were not issued un 
 til the 14th of August, and, from the nature of 
 things, they were exceedingly indefinite. Taylor 
 considered him, although nominally under his or- 
 . 
 
 * The Adjutant General to General Wool. Executive Document. No. GO, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 328, and 
 the Secretaiy of War to General Taylor. Idem,- p. 324. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3 Q ^ 
 
 ders, as being charged with the conduct of a sep 
 arate expedition;^ and the letter of Major Bliss, 
 assistant adjutant general to General Wool, of the 
 14th of August, contained nothing positive but an 
 order to march on Chihuahua, with such portion 
 of his force as could be subsisted en route. The 
 remainder of the letter was filled with suggestions, 
 and with such information of the proposed route as 
 General Taylor possessed ; but all things save the 
 destination were left to the discretion of General 
 Wool.f 
 
 Having made arrangements for the concentra 
 tion of his command at San Antonio, on the 8th of 
 August, Wool, in person, left Port Lavaca. His 
 forces consisted of five companies of United States 
 dragoons, one of light artillery (six pieces), three 
 of the sixth infantry, one regiment of Arkansas 
 cavalry, two of Illinois infantry, and one company 
 of Kentucky infantry in all, about 3000 men. Of 
 these different corps, two companies of dragoons 
 had been stationed at San Antonio from the time 
 of the occupation of Texas, and their commander, 
 Colonel Hartley, growing restive in the inactivity 
 of the station, had raised a volunteer force of Tex- 
 ans and Indians, and made an abortive attempt to 
 pass the border and foray in Mexico ; but it had 
 been a failure, and his regular troops returned to 
 San Antonio. The Arkansas troops, the companies 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, October 15th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No 60., House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 351. t Major Bliss to General Wool. Idem, p. 410. 
 
302 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the sixth infantry, and the remaining regular dra 
 goons, had made the march hy land from the Ar 
 kansas frontier. Washington's battery had march 
 ed through the country from Carlisle harracks in 
 Pennsylvania. The volunteer infantry and the ma 
 terial of the train had heen brought by water trans 
 port from the mouth of the Mississippi to Port La- 
 vaca, whence they were brought up to San Antonio. 
 The train which had been organized for the expe 
 dition was immense, in comparison with the num 
 ber of troops which were to compose it; and the 
 appropriation of the means of land transport for it, 
 under the direction of General Wool, while he was 
 in person at New Orleans, doubtless caused some 
 of the embarrassment so grievously complained of 
 at a subsequent period by General Taylor. 
 
 On the 8th of October Wool arrived with his ad 
 vanced division at the Presidio Rio Grande. On 
 the llth he passed the river by a flying bridge, 
 and, having thrown up a temporary tete du pont 
 and redoubt to protect the passage of the rear, col 
 umn, which was following with additional sup 
 plies, he garrisoned the works with two companies, 
 and moved in advance. There were but few Mex 
 ican troops in his front, and what there were of 
 militia and cavalry of the Presidio fled rapidly be 
 fore him or dispersed. On the 24th he reached 
 Santa Rosa, a point whence three routes led to 
 Chihuahua. Of the three, however, two were but 
 mule trails, impassable for wagons or artillery, and, 
 from the scarcity of water and subsistence, were 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 393 
 
 impracticable for any kind of military movement. 
 The third led southward, through Monclova and 
 Parras, turned to the north in the State of Durango, 
 and thence continued to Chihuahua. It was an 
 immense circuit, hut the only route by which the 
 destination of the column could be reached from 
 the east, and it was therefore chosen. . 
 
 On the 29th the column arrived at Monclova, 
 the former . capital of the State of Coahuila and 
 Texas, and immediate measures were taken to es 
 tablish a depot, for the reason, as it was said, and 
 a very evident one, that it was out of the question 
 to depend longer for supplies upon the United 
 States by the route from Fort Lavaca or the Rio 
 Grande. From this point a communication was 
 opened with Monterey ; and with a view of obtain 
 ing authority to penetrate further to the south, 
 General Wool asked of General Taylor what was 
 to be gained by going to Chihuahua. General 
 Taylor's opinion and action were set forth in his let 
 ter to Mr. Maircy of November 9th, three days be 
 fore the receipt of the secretary's dispatch of Octo 
 ber 22d, in which he stated that he was free to 
 answer " nothing at all commensurate with the 
 excessive length of his line of operations," and also 
 that he had ordered General Wool to remain at 
 Monclova, where he could obtain subsistence, until 
 the disposition of his column could be determined 
 upon.^ 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General. Executive Document, No. 60, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 361. 
 
. 4 , g V 
 
 3Q4 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 In the mean while, however, doubts as to the 
 anticipated benefit to the American cause in the 
 prosecution of the war through the expedition to 
 Chihuahua had arisen at Washington, and in the 
 letter of Mr.'Marcy of the 22d (before referred to), 
 it was suggested that the column should be united 
 with the forces on the Rio Grande or at Monterey, 
 where it would be available for other and more 
 active operations, either on the Gulf coast or on 
 the line already pursued ; but the matter was left 
 entirely to the discretion of the general.^ 
 
 As Taylor had already taken action so far as to 
 order the suspension of the movement, and these 
 views coincided with his own, the receipt of the dis 
 patch decided the matter, and soon after Wool was 
 ordered to locate himself at Parras. On the 24th of 
 November he broke up from Monclova and march 
 ed, leaving a guard of 250 men over the newly- 
 established depot. On the 5th of December he 
 reached his designated post, and the Chihuahua 
 expedition was abandoned the so-called " army of 
 the center" became merged in that of occupation. 
 
 The expedition, undertaken as it was upon in 
 accurate data, and without any proper knowledge 
 of the proposed theater of operations, was without 
 any benefit to the American cause. Indeed, so far 
 as it wasted material and money in the expedition, 
 it was a positive injury, for the country through 
 which it marched was comparatively worthless. 
 
 * The Secretary of War to General Taylor. Executive Document, No 
 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 365. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 305 
 
 In that fact was the cause of the failure of the 
 scheme of cutting off the northern provinces of 
 Mexico ; for, detached and worthless to the central 
 government as they were, to attempt to reduce its 
 power or to conquer its obstinacy by their isolation 
 was like lopping the decayed and topmost branch 
 es of a tree to bring it to the ground. 
 
 The operations of the American naval squadron 
 in the Gulf of Mexico for some time after the com 
 mencement of the war were confined to keeping up 
 a blockade, which had been established immediate 
 ly after . the first acts of positive hostility. The 
 duty was one which, although it afforded but lit 
 tle opportunity for the display of that action which 
 is alone popular in war, and which gives fame to 
 those engaged, yet required no small degree of 
 vigilance and activity. 
 
 The United States having no part in the great 
 European contests of the period of the French rev 
 olutions, had, almost from the first, contended for 
 a liberal construction .of the law of blockade, for 
 the advantage, at the time, of their own commerce. 
 In order to establish the precedent and custom of 
 the law, and to act in consistency with their former 
 demands upon other nations, they were obliged, now 
 that for the first time they were called upon to en 
 force a blockade, to allow their demanded construc 
 tion, which they did. According to this, it was 
 necessary, to render a vessel subject to seizure and 
 L U 
 
306 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 condemnation, that she should first be warned off 
 by one of the vessels of the blockading squadron 
 before the port which she attempted to enter. 
 Should she effect an entrance without such warn 
 ing, she was free to depart without molestation or 
 hinder ance. 
 
 The nature of the Mexican ports, especially of 
 the principal one, Vera Cruz, was such as to ren 
 der the enforcement of such a blockade a matter 
 of exceeding difficulty. Heavy north winds pre 
 vail in the Mexican Gulf throughout the year to a 
 greater or less extent, though their particular vio 
 lence is during the winter months. In these, a 
 neutral vessel could enter the harbor of Vera Cruz 
 by the northern channel, and cast anchor in the 
 port or fasten to rings in the Castle of San Juan 
 d'Ulloa, while the vessels of the blockading squad 
 ron were forced to take shelter under the islands to 
 the southward. Under such circumstances, several 
 neutral vessels ran the blockade with impunity, 
 notwithstanding the exertions of the naval officers. 
 
 But upon a country like Mexico, where the or 
 dinary articles of foreign commerce are in a great 
 measure prohibited, and where most, if not all, the 
 resources for subsistence are entirely interior, the 
 blockade could have been effective only so far as it 
 deprived her of the moral aid which she would 
 have derived from an unrestricted intercourse with 
 foreign nations, and prevented the introduction of 
 arms and munitions of war ; for the revenue which 
 Mexico had at any time derived from her imports 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 307 
 
 had been trifling in comparison with her expenses, 
 and it was hardly equal to the expense of keeping 
 up the blockading squadron. 
 
 In effect upon Mexican military power, the naval 
 operations were not very positive, for at no time 
 did Commodore Connor deem his squadron of suf 
 ficient strength to attack the Castle of San Juan 
 d'Ulloa. From its ramparts the Mexican garrison, 
 confident in the strength of the repaired works, 
 looked with but little apprehension of the issue. 
 Indeed, had the garrison consisted of good and 
 brave artillerists, it is doubtful whether any naval 
 force could have accomplished its capture, armed 
 as it was at that time. 
 
 In the months of July and August, the attention 
 of Commodore Connor was directed to the port of 
 Alvarado, sixty miles to the south' of Yera Cruz, 
 as several small Mexican vessels of war had taken 
 shelter in the river which there emptied into the 
 Gulf of Mexico, and as a small commerce was oc 
 casionally carried on through it. 
 
 A few days of settled weather having occurred 
 in the early part of August, he proceeded thither 
 with the small vessels of his squadron. Arriv 
 ing off the port on the 7th of August, he threw a 
 few shot from his flag ship at the fort which com 
 manded the entrance. The crew of a launch, sent 
 in to reconnoiter, also exchanged musketry with a 
 party of Mexicans, which had taken position to op 
 pose a landing, but the firing had little effect on 
 either side. The demonstration, however, aroused 
 
308 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the Mexican population of the vicinity, and mili 
 tia from Tlacotalpam and other villages flocked in 
 to resist the invasion in the course of the following 
 days. But, in the mean time, the attempt was 
 given up by the American commodore, on account 
 of the swollen state of the river, and the return of 
 bad weather in the night.^ 
 
 Another attempt to effect an entrance was made 
 on the 15th of October, with no better success. 
 Some small vessels entered the river and engaged 
 the batteries at its mouth, but the steamer, hav 
 ing the second division in tow, grounded on the 
 bank, and left them without support. The Mis 
 sissippi steamship, which it had been intended 
 should cannonade the batteries, was unable to ap 
 proach near enough to do any injury to the enemy, 
 and, under all these circumstances, the flotilla was 
 withdrawn. 
 
 The same disposition which had been manifest 
 ed by the Mexicans in the neighborhood on the 
 former occasion was manifested on this, and, as the 
 American force withdrew, they congratulated them 
 selves upon a most brilliant victory. The event 
 was the subject of special congratulation in the 
 city of Mexico, for it was almost the only sem 
 blance of success which had resulted from any 
 Mexican operations, either in offense or defense. 
 The officers who had been in command were es 
 pecially extolled for bravery and good conduct, and 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 630, 631. 
 
:.* 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 309 
 
 it was proposed to confer upon the town of Alva- 
 rado the title of Heroic. 
 
 The result could not have been other than mor 
 tifying to the American commodore, though he sus 
 tained no loss, and the object of the expedition, was 
 of but little importance. Certainly, if he had been 
 successful, at that immediate period his success 
 could have had no effect upon the operations of 
 the war. 
 
 Having returned to Anton Lizardo, on the 16th 
 Commodore Connor sent an expedition, composed 
 of the Mississippi steamer and all the small vessels 
 of the squadron, under command of Commodore 
 Perry, against the towns on the River Tobasco. 
 
 The flotilla arrived off the mouth of the river on 
 the 23d, and, having left the Mississippi at anchor 
 outside, the commodore entered with the small ves 
 sels, seized the town of Frontera, and captured two 
 Mexican steamers and a schooner. On the next 
 morning he proceeded up the river with the great 
 er portion of his force, and reached Tobasco with 
 out opposition on the 25th. Five merchant ves 
 sels in the port were captured, and the town was 
 summoned to surrender. But the Mexican author 
 ities were stubborn, and replied to the summons 
 that the American commander might open fire 
 whenever he pleased. He accordingly did, and 
 soon after sent a party of sailors and marines ashore, 
 between whom and the townspeople an irregular, 
 spattering fire was exchanged for some time, with 
 but little effect. The guns of the flotilla were, dur- 
 
J. ... 
 
 310 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ing its continuance, worked upon the town until 
 near night, when the firing ceased, and the party 
 ashore was re-embarked. 
 
 On the following morning the Mexicans opened 
 a fire of musketry from the shore, which was re 
 turned from the flotilla by a cannonade. In the 
 midst of the fire a white flag was shown, and a 
 communication from the foreign merchants was 
 presented to the commodore, praying for a suspen 
 sion of hostilities, as most of the property in the 
 town which was subject to damage belonged to 
 them. In consideration of their representations, 
 Perry agreed to take no further hostile action, pro 
 vided he was not attacked from the shore as he 
 was leaving the place. But, while he was mak 
 ing preparations for dropping down the stream, one 
 of his prizes grounded, and the Mexicans, having 
 occupied two houses on the hank in its vicinity, 
 commenced a fire which mortally wounded Lieu 
 tenant Morris, and wounded three seamen. The 
 guns of the flotilla were, in consequence, reopen 
 ed, and their fire continued until that of the Mex 
 icans was silenced. 
 
 No further opposition was experienced, and, hav 
 ing cleared the river, the whole flotilla, with all 
 the prizes of any value, arrived in safety at Anton 
 Lizardo.^ 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 632, 633. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Views of American Authorities at Washington Intended Expedition against 
 Tampico 111 Feeling of General Taylor toward the War Department- 
 Its Cause His Recommendation of taking up a defensive Line Observa 
 tions Termination of Armistice Advance to Saltillo Occupation of Tam 
 pico Action of General Patterson Movement on Victoria Taylor's Views 
 and Intentions Observations False Alarms at Saltillo Concentration of 
 Force at that Point Occupation of Victoria. 
 
 WHILE the army of occupation was slowly pro 
 gressing toward Monterey, and in the absence of 
 any concerted plan of operations, the attention of 
 the war department was given to the prosecution 
 of the war upon the Gulf coast. The immediate 
 subject under consideration was the propriety of an 
 expedition against Tampico, with a view to its 
 seizure for use in future operations. On the 2d of 
 September Mr. Marcy addressed a letter to Gener 
 al Taylor, in which the views which he then en 
 tertained were expressed, and various advantages 
 to be hoped from the expedition were suggested.^ 
 The letter, however, contained no positive direc 
 tions, and General Taylor's views upon the practi 
 cability and advantage of the expedition were re 
 quested. This dispatch was intercepted by the 
 enemy, and had effect, although not in the manner 
 which might have been anticipated. 
 
 In his dispatch of the 22d of September, which 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 339. 
 
312 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 communicated the refusal of the new Mexican 
 government to enter upon negotiations, Mr. Marcy 
 again wrote on the subject, and the instructions set 
 forth were of a more positive character. Having 
 stated the course of action which had been determ 
 ined upon at Washington (that of vigorously prose 
 cuting the war), the propriety of discontinuing the 
 policy of conciliation of the inhabitants, which had 
 so far been persisted in, and of raising contribu 
 tions for the support of the war, was presented to 
 the consideration of the general, and he was in 
 structed to raise them, if in that method he could 
 obtain supplies for his army. But, in regard to the 
 expedition against Tampico, it was stated that the 
 determination of the war department was fixed, 
 unless the organization and force of the expedition 
 should interfere with General Taylor's arrange 
 ments, and weaken his effectual strength. The 
 officers for its command were designated, and, in 
 order to prevent delay, instructions were sent di 
 rect to General Patterson, then at Camargo, to pre 
 pare as far as possible for the movement.^ 
 
 This dispatch was received by General Taylor 
 on the 10th of October, while he was at Monterey 
 making arrangements for the supply of his army, 
 and determining plans for future operations and 
 action. The subject matter was the cause of in 
 dignation against the war department, inasmuch as 
 direct instructions had been given to an officer un- 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 341-343. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3^3 
 
 der his command to prepare for an expedition to be 
 composed in great part of his troops. In the viola 
 tion of a general rule, the cause was undoubtedly 
 a. just one ; for " nothing is so important in war 
 as an undivided command"* and, under all or 
 dinary circumstances, any thing which militates 
 against the principle can produce nothing but evil. 
 The meddling on the part of the war department 
 had no good effect in this case, inasmuch as it 
 created ill feeling on the part of the commanding 
 general, and the proposed expedition was delayed 
 by his orders. But it had its origin in the want 
 of an understanding with the general, and of a set 
 tled plan of operations ; and as the general had 
 been unable to extend his views beyond the ex 
 perimental march to Monterey, had postponed 
 every thing until his arrival at that place, had ex 
 pressed serious doubts as to the practicability of 
 advancing beyond, and had, moreover, stated that 
 he had a surplus force at his disposal, some portion 
 of the blame of the interference might well have 
 been laid to the force of circumstances and the 
 nature of his own dispatches. In the reply to Mr. 
 Marcy's letter of July 9th, written on the 1st of 
 August, after having suggested the various diffi 
 culties and doubts which occurred to his mind in 
 the adoption of the course suggested by the secre 
 tary, General Taylor had written as follows : " I 
 have already had occasion to represent to the de 
 partment that the volunteer force ordered to report 
 
 * Napoleon. 
 
314 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 to me here is much greater than I can possibly em 
 ploy at any rate, in the first instance : the influx 
 of twelve months' volunteers has even impeded my 
 operations, by engrossing all the resources of the 
 quarter-master's department to land them and 
 transport them to healthy positions. This circum 
 stance, in connection with the possibility of an ex 
 pedition against : , leads me to regret that one 
 division of volunteers had not been encamped, say 
 at Pass Christian, where it could have been in 
 structed until its services were required in the 
 field."* 
 
 From the usual time required for communica 
 tion, this letter must have reached Washington 
 between the 15th and 20th of August, and no other 
 correspondence was received from General Taylor 
 on the subject of the general operations of the war 
 for some months. Wherefore, it is not surprising 
 that the war department, having been informed of 
 its error in sending out too large a number of troops, 
 should have sought to give employment to the sur 
 plus, and relieve the commanding general and his 
 quarter-master's department of some portion of their 
 burden. Suggested as the movement had been in 
 the dispatch of September 2d, it can hardly be 
 wondered at that, when the refusal to negotiate 
 had been received from the new Mexican govern 
 ment, and it had been determined to prosecute the 
 war with vigor, as a measure of policy, positive in- 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 337. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3^5 
 
 stmctions were given for the preparations to, be 
 made. The violation of the rules of war and of 
 the service, in communicating directly with the 
 commander of troops which were lying idle in de 
 pot, could not have been considered very flagrant. 
 
 But when the dispatch reached General Taylor's 
 head-quarters, his views had undergone a decided 
 change. He had marched upon Monterey with 
 the force with which he had originally intended, 
 had driven the enemy from many of his positions, 
 had negotiated a convention, agreed to an armis 
 tice of eight weeks, and had enjoyed two weeks' 
 observation upon the agricultural capacity of the 
 country. But the bloody struggle which had tak 
 en place on the eastern side of Monterey, the va 
 rious checks which had there been encountered, 
 and the fortuitous circumstances which had in so 
 great a measure contributed to the success in fact, 
 the whole course of the operations, so different from 
 that which had been anticipated, while they had 
 changed his position, must have exercised no small 
 influence upon his intentions and views. In three 
 letters, which contained replies to the subjects al 
 luded to in the secretary's letter, he said nothing 
 definite about the capacity of the country around 
 Monterey to support 6000, or any other number of 
 troops, to ascertain which the movement had been 
 made, and much less did he say any thing about 
 a surplus force on the Rio Grande. 
 
 The first of these three letters was written on the 
 12th of October, and contained only a reason for 
 
316 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 not at once proceeding with the Tampico expedi 
 tion, on account of the terms of the convention of 
 Monterey.^ 
 
 The second bore date on the 15th, and was writ 
 ten for the purpose of giving other and' more de 
 tailed views in relation to the same subject, for the 
 information of the general-in-chief and the secreta 
 ry of war. It was said, " Such a point has been 
 reached in the conduct of the war and the progress 
 of our arms as to make it proper to place my im 
 pressions and convictions very fully before the gov 
 ernment.''! In pursuance of this design, the letter 
 set forth that he considered General Wool to be 
 virtually independent of his command, and that 
 the force under that officer formed no part of the 
 estimate for future operations. After a statement 
 of the facts as regarded the topography of the coun 
 try, General Taylor treated of the movement upon 
 San Luis, and stated that the column which, in his 
 belief, would be requisite to enable him to advance, 
 should consist of at least 20,000 men, of which one 
 half should be regulars. The forces under his com 
 mand were rapidly enumerated with a view to the 
 contingency, and, according to the enumeration, he 
 could command no more than 10,000 after having 
 left 3000 to cover his communications. With this 
 statement of requisite and present force, he pro 
 ceeded to give his views in relation to the proper 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 350. 
 t Idem. Idem, p. 351. 
 
1 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3^7 
 
 future operations of the war, which will be best un 
 derstood from his own language. 
 
 " The department maybe assured that the above 
 views have not been given without mature reflec 
 tion, and have been the result of experience and 
 careful inquiry. It will be for the government to 
 determine whether the war shall be prosecuted. by 
 directing an active campaign against San Luis and 
 the capital, or whether the country already gained 
 shall be held and a defensive attitude assumed. 
 In the latter case, the general line of the Sierra 
 Madre might very well be taken ; but even then, 
 with the enemy in force in my front, it might be im 
 prudent to detach to Tampico sa large a force as 
 three or four thousand men, particularly of the de 
 scription required, for that operation. If the co-op 
 eration of the army, therefore, be deemed essential 
 to the success of the expedition against Tampico, 
 I trust that it will be -postponed for the present." 
 
 * * * "It may be expected that I should give 
 my views as to the policy of occupying-a defensive 
 line, to which I have above alluded. I am free to 
 confess that, in view of the difficulties and expense 
 attending a movement into the heart of the coun 
 try, and particularly in view of the unsettled and 
 revolutionary character of the Mexican govern 
 ment, the occupation of such a line seems to me to 
 be the best course that can be adopted. The line 
 taken might either be that on which we propose to 
 insist as the boundary between the republics say 
 
318 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the Eio Grande or the line to which we have ad 
 vanced, viz., the Sierra Madre, including Chihua 
 hua and Santa Fe. The former line could be held 
 with a much smaller force than the latter ; but even 
 the line of the Sierra Madre could be held with a 
 much smaller force than would be required for an 
 active campaign. Monterey controls the great out 
 let from the interior. A strong garrison at this 
 point, with an advance at Saltillo, and small corps 
 atMonclova, Linares, Victoria, and Tampico, would 
 effectually cover the line."^ 
 
 The contemplated movement upon the Mexican 
 capital by the southern route was briefly noticed, 
 and 25,000 men, of which 10,000 should be regu 
 lar troops, was, in his opinion, the minimum force 
 with which it should be undertaken. The letter 
 concluded with a severe animadversion upon the 
 conduct of the Secretary of War, in corresponding 
 directly with General Patterson, and against it 
 General Taylor earnestly protested. 
 
 The third letter in reply was written on the 26th, 
 and informed the department that the project of 
 raising contributions upon the country was imprac 
 ticable.! 
 
 These communications were not received at 
 Washington until late in the month of November. 
 During the interval several letters were sent from 
 the War Department to General Taylor, including 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 353. 
 t Idem. Idem, p. 354. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 that of October 13th, disapproving of the armistice, 
 and ordering its close. Nearly all of them had 
 reference to the movement upon Tampico, or a de 
 tached expedition to Vera Cruz, the organization 
 of which at Washington was the subject of Gen 
 eral Taylor's animadversion. General Taylor's 
 letters in the following months were in explana 
 tion of his movements, and in deprecation of the 
 interference with his command, which was in some 
 degree continued. The different ' papers will be 
 noticed in other places, and in their order* 
 
 But, before the receipt of General Taylor's dis 
 patch of October 15th, important changes had been 
 made at Washington, and General Scott had been 
 ordered to the field. In consequence, the views of 
 none of the correspondents were carried out in full, 
 and the papers are in themselves more interesting, 
 as showing the opinions of the different authorities 
 upon military operations, and in regard to each 
 other, than as having any positive effect upon the 
 movements of the war. They are, besides, demon 
 strative of the difficulties which attend the prosecu 
 tion of military operations by the authorities of any 
 nation, when the fundamental principles of the art 
 are disregarded by either government or generals. 
 
 The reasons for the action of the authorities at 
 Washington, which caused the main object of the 
 war to be neglected, while attention was given to 
 partial operations, and the latest of these in con 
 ception to be ordered independent of the general 
 
320 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 commanding in the field, have been noticed from 
 time to time. They are to be attributed to the ar 
 dent desire for the vigorous prosecution of the war, 
 and the want of concert with General Taylor, and 
 to the views set forth in the letters of that officer. 
 However much energy of thought or talent was 
 displayed in the plans, and in the celerity with 
 which they were proposed as fast as they were ob 
 jected to, and laid aside on account of the want of 
 coincidence in General Taylor's views, yet the at 
 tempt to direct detailed operations from a distance 
 of over one thousand miles could have been suc 
 cessful under hardly any circumstances, and the 
 result proved it. The absence of ulterior object in 
 the views -of military operations presented by Gen 
 eral Taylor prior to the capture of Monterey, is 
 fully apparent in the extracts from his correspond 
 ence which have been quoted. But, at the time of 
 writing his letter of October 15th, he had been suc 
 cessful in the operations which he had previously 
 undertaken; he had conquered the Mexican army 
 in strong defensive positions, in force one half 
 greater than his own, in a manner which, inas 
 much, as the struggle had been severe, and the 
 bravery of his troops had been conspicuously dis 
 played, had reflected glory on the American arms, 
 and to a degree enhanced his reputation as a mili 
 tary commander ; he had enjoyed time for observa 
 tion, and in that letter was presented the first def 
 inite recommendation of future policy. 
 
 The considerations of the length of the route to 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 32! 
 
 San Luis de Potosi, stated in that letter, had been 
 in great part known, and in a degree considered, 
 before the march on Monterey. And if the topog 
 raphy of the country and the length of the route 
 were to be reasons for abandoning the project of 
 moving upon Mexico by that route, why were they 
 not considered at an earlier date ? The other con 
 sideration presented was the small amount of force 
 which General Taylor had at his disposal. Al 
 though in his previous letters he had stated that it 
 would be sufficient,^ October 15th it was deemed 
 to be too small by half, inasmuch as he was in pos 
 session of information that General Santa Anna 
 was concentrating a force at San Luis, Unless 
 General Taylor had based his military plans upon 
 anticipated results of doubtful diplomatic action, 
 and believed that, in consequence of Santa Anna's 
 return to Mexico, of which he had been informed, 
 his advance would be entirely unopposed, it is dif 
 ficult to see any reason for the difference in the 
 views which he expressed on the 1st of August and 
 on the 15th of October. Whoever exercised the 
 chief Mexican authority, it might have been ex 
 pected, so long as the war, continued, that a force 
 would be concentrated at San Luis. But, what 
 ever reasons may have been found in the latter 
 consideration for halting near Monterey, much 
 
 * " If a column (say 10,000 men) can be sustained in provisions at Saltillo, 
 it may advance thence upon San Luis de Potosi, and, I doubt not, would 
 speedily bring proposals for peace." General Taylor to the President. Ex- 
 eoutive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thir 
 tieth Congress, p. 337. 
 
 I. X 
 
322 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 more cogent had been presented in the length of 
 the route and the difficulties of the country ; and 
 when the subject was resumed on the 15th of Oc 
 tober, with but little additional information, ex- 
 cept that derived from experience at Monterey, 
 General Taylor recommended the abandonment 
 of the idea of moving on the capital of Mexico 
 from the northern base of operations. 
 
 The requisite conditions necessary for the move 
 ment by Vera Cruz, proposed by him, rendered such 
 an expedition impracticable at the time . Ten thou 
 sand regulars were stated to be requisite. The Uni 
 ted States hardly had that number in service, and 
 General Taylor had then no intention of dispensing 
 with any large body of that description of force 
 from his own command. 
 
 The recommendation which he made of taking 
 up a defensive line was considered by many distin 
 guished men as having merit. If it were intended 
 to appropriate the soil of the country between the 
 Rio Grande and the Sierra Madre, and hold it as 
 the property of the United States until increased 
 population should render it valuable, it would then 
 have been a question how large an amount of force 
 should have been employed for the purpose. r 
 
 If it were intended that the army should retire to 
 the Rio Grande, it would have been as well to have 
 published to Mexico and to the world that, notwith 
 standing American preparations and the bravery of 
 American soldiers, the United States gave up the 
 contest, and were confessedly unable to carry on a 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 323 
 
 foreign war. It would have been a retreat without 
 military cause and without honor, and the com 
 parison between the preparations and the action 
 of the American government would have been a 
 lasting subject for the ridicule of other nations. 
 
 If by holding a defensive line it were expected 
 to force Mexico to make peace, a slight reference 
 to her action in regard to Texas might have shown 
 how fallacious was the anticipation. And if the 
 line of the Sierra Madre were taken, the question 
 arose, In what manner would the occupation injure 
 the resources of the central government ? Certain 
 ly they could not have been effected by the occu 
 pation of the line of the Rio Grande. At the time 
 of making the recommendation, General Taylor 
 knew that the Mexican general-in-chief had order 
 ed the complete abandonment of the country ; for 
 he stated that, on the date of his letter, the last de 
 tachment of Ampudia's force was to leave Saltil- 
 lo.^ If the Mexican general thought no exertion 
 necessary to defend the country, he could hardly 
 have deemed it valuable. If he could have collect 
 ed any resources from it, wherefore did he abandon 
 it six weeks before the termination of the armistice, 
 until which time he was at liberty to hold undis 
 turbed possession of a great portion ? 
 
 The next question for consideration was whether 
 the occupation of the country was a benefit to the 
 United States in a military point of view. If it 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 351. 
 
324 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 were of none to Mexico, it would have been fair to 
 suppose that it would be of none to them, and, as 
 if to furnish a conclusive argument against his own 
 recommendation, eleven days after it was made, 
 General Taylor wrote that this same country was 
 "poor"* and that it was impracticable to obtain 
 any subsistence or material without purchasing at 
 the prices of the country. 
 
 The dispatch of the Secretary of War of October 
 13th having been received, which ordered the term 
 ination of the armistice, the execution of the scheme 
 of taking up a defensive line was nevertheless com 
 menced. On the 6th of November an officer was 
 dispatched to Saltillo with a note addressed to Gen 
 eral Santa Anna, then at San Luis de Potosi, inform 
 ing him that, by the order of the United States gov 
 ernment, the armistice would be at an end on the 
 13th of the month. In the mean time, preparations 
 were made for throwing forward a corps to Saltillo, 
 which it had been intended should march from 
 Monterey on the 12th. But, having learned that a 
 bearer of dispatches was on the way to his head 
 quarters, General Taylor postponed the movement 
 for a day, and received a communication from the 
 'Secretary of War, dated October 22d.f 
 
 It related to an expedition against Vera Cruz, 
 and made known the intention of the President 
 to send a force of four thousand men to that place, 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 354. 
 t Idem. Idem, p. 375. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 325 
 
 which was deemed to be sufficient for success, 
 with the co-operation, of the navy, provided the 
 expedition could he kept secret until the descent 
 was made. It was helieved that of the four thou 
 sand troops, fifteen hundred or two thousand ought 
 to be regulars, and these were to be drawn from 
 General Taylor's command. 
 
 The other portions of the letter were extensive, 
 but related to matters which were either unim 
 portant in themselves or had been in a measure 
 settled at a previous period, either by the force of 
 circumstances or the action of the general. In re 
 gard to the Yera Cruz expedition, views and in 
 tentions were given in detail and extent, arid it 
 was intended that the expedition should be an 
 nounced as destined for Tampico.^ Events, how 
 ever, prevented the adoption of this plan. In re 
 ply to the letter, General Taylor wrote on the 12th 
 of November, and with reason, that the force pro 
 posed to be sent was in his opinion entirely too 
 small for the object. Ten thousand men he con 
 ceived to be the minimum with wjiich to invest 
 and hold Vera Cruz, .with a view to holding the 
 position. At this time, having settled his plans 
 for occupying a line, he believed that, after com 
 pleting his dispositions, he could spare four thou 
 sand troops, of which three thousand might be 
 regulars, from his force. He proposed to make the 
 movement upon Tampico after securing the posi- 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 363-366. 
 
326 THE WAR, WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tions immediately in advance of Monterey, by the 
 route through the interior of the country, and it 
 was believed that no delay would be produced by 
 it if his views were adopted.^ But his views were 
 not adopted, more than were the plans proposed in 
 the secretary's letter fulfilled. 
 
 On the 13th of November General Taylor march 
 ed, with two squadrons of dragoons and General 
 Worth's command (Duncan's battery, artillery bat 
 talion, and fifth and eighth regiments of infantry), 
 for Saltillo. While en route, he received General 
 Santa Anna's answer to the communication which 
 he had addressed, announcing the termination of 
 'the armistice. Its remarkable point was that which 
 replied to the hope which General Taylor had ex 
 pressed of a speedy restoration of peace, and he 
 was informed that he "ought to discard all ideas 
 of peace while a single North American treads, in 
 arms, the territory of this republic, or while hostile 
 squadrons remain in front of her ports." This avow 
 al of the policy and determination of his govern 
 ment was, however, closed by General Santa An 
 na, as it usually had been in other cases, by shift 
 ing the responsibility upon the extraordinary Mex 
 ican Congress which was to meet on the 6th of 
 December.! 
 
 On the morning of the 16th, as the column ap 
 proached Saltillo, and within a few miles of the 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 375. 
 t General Santa Anna to General Taylor. Idem, p. 438. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 327 
 
 town, a messenger placed a protest against the occu 
 pation of the State of Coahuila in the hands of Gen 
 eral Taylor. It was signed by the governor, who 
 had been elected on the previous day, and had but 
 time to perform this one official act. He stated 
 that his intentions were good for resistance, but, 
 inasmuch as he possessed no means of supporting 
 them in arms, he had fled early in the morning, 
 leaving behind him this exponent of his ill tem 
 per.^ No attention was paid to the protest, and 
 Worth's troops at once occupied the city. 
 
 Having made arrangements for subsistence, and, 
 from Saltillo, issued the order for General Wool to 
 take post at Parras, Taylor returned to Monterey 
 to complete his arrangements for taking up his de 
 fensive line. 
 
 About this time possession of TampTco, which 
 was to have been one of the objects of his movement, 
 had been gained. The dispatch of the Secretary of 
 War of September 2d, and which had been inter 
 cepted by the Mexicans, had announced to Santa 
 Anna that Tampico was about to become a point of 
 attack. In the pursuit of his policy, he ordered its 
 abandonment ; and, having destroyed and secreted 
 the guns and public stores in the place, the garri 
 son retreated beyond the mountains. In the mean 
 time, Commodore Connor, at Anton Lizardo, had 
 been preparing to attack the place with his flotilla. 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General. Jose Maria d'Aguirre to Gen 
 eral Taylor. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 377, 378. 
 

 328 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 It arrived off the bar of the Panuco on the 14th, 
 arid on the following morning entered the river in 
 safety. Qn approaching the town, a deputation 
 from the Ayuntamiento came on hoard with pro 
 posals for its surrender.'* The town was at once 
 occupied, and the news having been communicated 
 to General Patterson, then at Camargo, employed 
 in preparing for the expedition, under the direc 
 tions of the Secretary of War, that officer immedi 
 ately dispatched six companies of artillery, under 
 Lieutenant-xolonel Belton, to hold it. These were 
 quickly followed by a regiment of Alabama volun 
 teers, and Patterson soon after ordered the Illinois 
 brigade, then at Matamoras, to take transpdrt for 
 Tampico, intending to proceed thither in person, 
 and assume the command.! 
 
 His movements were, however, soon checked, 
 for Taylor, having received information of his in 
 tentions, at once' sent counter orders, as far as re 
 lated to the Illinois brigade and himself. The 
 movement of the six companies of artillery was ap 
 proved, and that of the Alabama regiment was per 
 mitted. With a rebuke for his unauthorized ac 
 tion to so full an extent, Patterson was ordered to 
 march, with a regiment of Tennessee horse and the 
 Illinois brigade, from Matamoras, to join General 
 
 * Commodore Connor to the Secretary of the Navy. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. ,1, House of Representatives, second Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 1172. 
 
 t Official Correspondence. General Patterson and Major Bliss. Execu 
 tive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirti 
 eth Congress, p. 383-385. 
 
fl 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. .329 
 
 Taylor at Victoria, whither he was about to pro 
 ceed from Monterey.^ The arrangements for that 
 movement had been completed before General Tay 
 lor had learned- of the occupation of Tampico, but 
 that occasioned little modification of his plans. 
 
 On the 8th of December he -wrote to the adju 
 tant general that in a few days he expected to 
 leave for Victoria, and proceeded to give at length 
 the dispositions which he had made, and whiqh he 
 contemplated, for the occupation and defense of 
 the line. These were, in general, to stretch his 
 forces from Parras to Tampico, a line of over six 
 hundred miles, occupying Saltillo and Victoria as 
 intermediate positions, and keeping a reserve at 
 Monterey. He proposed to continue the use of the 
 Rio Grande as the channel of communication and 
 supply for the western portion of his line, but to 
 establish a depot at Soto la Marina whence to 
 supply Victoria. After having distributed his for 
 ces along the cordon, and placed any surplus which 
 he might have in position to receive the orders of 
 the government, and completed his examination 
 of the passes of the mountains, he intended, unless 
 otherwise instructed, to return with a portion of 
 the regular troops, and establish his head-quarters 
 in advance of Saltillo, ^hich, he wrote, " after all, 
 I consider to be, our most important point." 
 
 This disposition had many disadvantages in a 
 
 * Official Correspondence. General Patterson and Major Bliss. Execu 
 tive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirti 
 eth Congress, p. 383-385. 
 
330 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 strictly military point of view, which did not alto 
 gether escape the notice of General Taylor. In 
 his letter of the 8th, he wrote concerning them in 
 the following language : 
 
 "It will be seen at once that San Luis Potosi is 
 a position almost equally distant from the points 
 of this line. ' This would give a force at San Luis 
 a very great advantage over us, were it not for the 
 nature of the country and the communications ; 
 the region between San Luis and the mountains 
 being scantily supplied with water and subsistence, 
 and the road by Saltillo and Monterey being the 
 only practicable route for artillery across the mount 
 ains. Without artillery, the Mexican troops are 
 not at all formidable, and I think have but little 
 confidence in themselves. I therefore consider the 
 positions of Saltillo and Parras as of prime import 
 ance. With an intermediate post at Patos, and the 
 means, by a good road, of rapidly uniting, if neces 
 sary, I deem the columns of Brigadiers General 
 Wool and Worth quite equal to hold that flank of 
 the line." * * * 
 
 %%%" Tampico is now garrisoned by eight 
 strong companies of artillery and the Alabama re 
 giment of volunteers, say 1000 effectives. I con 
 sider this force quite sufficient to hold the place, 
 controlling, as we do, the harbor. Between Tam 
 pico and this place (Monterey) Victoria offers itself 
 as an important position to be held by us. It is 
 the capital of the State of Tarnaulipas ; it is situat 
 ed at the debouchee of the pass of the mountains, 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 331 
 
 arid it has a post, Soto la Marina, where we shall 
 probably be able to establish a convenient depot. 
 It also threatens the flank of the Mexican army, 
 should it advance from San Luis. These consid 
 erations attracted my attention to Victoria before 
 the surrender of Tampico ; but I now deem it more 
 than ever important, for I have every reason to 
 believe that a corps of observation is in that quar 
 ter, under the orders of General Urrea, having its 
 head-quarters, perhaps, at Tula, and sending for 
 ward advanced parties as far as Victoria. I have 
 therefore changed nothing in my original purpose 
 of moving on Victoria, believing it important to oc 
 cupy that point, and knowing that any surplus 
 force would then be in position for the ulterior views 
 of the government, should any further operations 
 on the Gulf coast be ordered."^ 
 
 This disposition, by which the American army 
 was stationed at points equidistant from San Luis, 
 certainly gave a force at that point an advantage, 
 unless it was neutralized by the nature of the coun 
 try, and it is questionable whether it was. Gen 
 eral Taylor had said, on the 15th of October, in ref 
 erence to the dispositions which he was about to 
 make, that it was enough for his argument in favor 
 of the views then presented to know that a heavy 
 force was collecting in his front. With this in view, 
 as that force certainly had not been diminished 
 during the interval, and the declaration made on 
 
 * Official Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Rep 
 resentatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 379. 
 
332 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the 8th of Decemher that he considered Saltillo, 
 after all, the most important point of the line, a 
 glance at the nature of the country about that point 
 and of the dispositions which he had made may 
 not he misplaced. Worth, with a force of 1200 men 
 and eight guns, for his artillery had been increased 
 by Captain Taylor's field battery, was located at 
 Saltillo, and Wool, with near 3000 men and six 
 guns, at Parras, to his southwest. The only com 
 munication between these points which was prac 
 ticable for trains or artillery, led from Saltillo along 
 the road to San Luis de Potosi, as far as the haci- 
 encja of La Encantada, and thence by the road to 
 Zacatecas to San Juan de la Vaqueria, whence 
 there was a direct route to Parras. It was one 
 day's march for infantry from Saltillo to La Encan 
 tada, and full four days from that point to. Parras. 
 For the two corps to effect a junction in case of 
 threatened attack by a superior force, that junction 
 must have been made at La Encantada, or Wool 
 would be obliged to pass it en route to Saltillo. 
 Now the whole country in advance of La Encanta 
 da, in the direction of San Luis, was open to the 
 enemy, and traversed by parties of his cavalry. At 
 any time he could advance within one day's long 
 march of that point without the possibility of the 
 commander at Saltillo being informed of his move 
 ment, as was afterward fully demonstrated. If this 
 were the case with reference to Saltillo, it was cer 
 tainly so with reference to Parras, even had there 
 been an intermediate post at Patos, a point some 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 333 
 
 distance from San Juan de la Vaqueria. Where 
 fore, in case Santa Anna did choose to advance and 
 attempt to seize the salient point of concentration, 
 Worth would have been obliged to move up to La 
 Encantada, and maintain himself at that point, or 
 in advance of it, with his small force against the 
 Mexican army for at least three days, or Wool was 
 cut off beyond the possibility of succor. > The first 
 of these was a hazardous undertaking, to, say the 
 least if I do not say impracticable, it is because of 
 the remembrance of the deeds of American soldiers. 
 The second speaks for itself; and if Wool had been 
 able to maintain himself, it would have been by 
 the hard fighting of his troops and through his own 
 efforts, certainly not on account of any merit in the 
 general dispositions. Monterey, three days' march 
 in rear of Saltillo, was four from La Encantada, 
 wherefore re-enforcement could arrive- from that 
 point no sooner than from Parras. 
 
 It was known by General Taylor that Gener 
 al Santa Anna would have many difficulties to 
 overcome before he could prepare an expedition. 
 While, therefore, if he wished to draw resources 
 from the country about Parras, it might have been 
 safe to have allowed this disposition to remain for 
 a short period, each succeeding day made the situ 
 ation of the force at either point more precarious. 
 He depended to a degree upon the scarcity of wa 
 ter along the line of his enemy's march. If this 
 were sufficient to check a movement, certainly Sal 
 tillo was not the most important point in the line, 
 
33 4 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 As was afterward apparent, the whole nature of 
 that route was not understood. But whatever re 
 sources it had were in the hands of the enemy. 
 
 While this state of things existed along the 
 western portion of the line, General Taylor, having 
 tarried some twenty days at Monterey, a period of 
 just ahout sufficient length for General Santa Anna 
 to have heen accurately informed of the disposition, 
 and to have prepared to take advantage of it, com 
 menced his movement upon Victoria ; and the pro 
 priety of that may he remarked upon. 
 
 If a permanent garrison were located at Victoria, 
 it -would have been isolated, for it was at least 
 nine days' march from Monterey and Camargo, 
 twelve from Matamoras, and ten from Tampico. 
 The only object which could have in reality been 
 accomplished by the occupation was to cover the 
 passes in the mountains, which were not practica 
 ble for artillery, without which it was considered 
 that Mexican troops were not at all formidable, 
 and to secure the communications from the Rio 
 Grande to Monterey from the annoyance of parties 
 of Mexican cavalry coming through the passes. To 
 have been effective, these parties must have passed 
 unsupported and far from support in close prox 
 imity to permanent American garrisons in any 
 case ; for it was out of the question to keep up the 
 land communication between Monterey and Tam 
 pico. Whether, therefore, the advantage to be 
 gained by occupying Victoria, and keeping open 
 communications with it from any other point, and 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 335 
 
 establishing a new depot at Soto la Marina, was 
 at all commensurate with the trouble of the under 
 taking, even if Saltillo and Parras had been secure, 
 is very questionable. As for the proposed threat 
 on the Mexican flank should Santa Anna advance, 
 it was without reason. If the Mexican troops 
 could not pass the mountains with artillery, the 
 Americans could not. If the contingency had aris 
 en, and the attempt been made, the small body 
 of American troops would have presented itself 
 upon the Mexican line, close to its base, having 
 first been obliged to force the Tula pass, which, if 
 Santa Anna had any prudence, would have been 
 found guarded. If successful, it could have ac 
 complished nothing ; for if Santa Anna beat the 
 American army about Saltillo, it was gone ; if 
 Santa Anna was beaten, it was exposed to be run 
 over in the retreat, unless it retired precipitately 
 beyond the mountains. In either case, had the 
 event happened, it Could have been much better 
 employed with the army near Saltillo. The threat 
 of such an impracticability certainly could have 
 had little effect in any event. 
 
 The force with which General Taylor proposed 
 to move from his head-quarters at Monterey upon 
 Victoria consisted of Twiggs's division of regulars, 
 increased by the seventh regiment of infantry, 
 Quitman's brigade of volunteers, and Bragg's and 
 Sherman's field batteries. The second regiment of 
 
336 THE WAR WI TH MEXICO. 
 
 United States infantry, and the second Tennessee 
 volunteers, were prdered to march from Camargo 
 to join the main column at Mo'ntemorelos ; and all 
 these, with Patterson's command, composed the en 
 tire strength of the force to be concentrated at the 
 capital of Tamaulipas. 
 
 Twiggs. moved from Monterey on the 12th, and 
 on the 13th Quitman's brigade followed. On the 
 17th the advance reached Montemorelos, and ef 
 fected the junction with the two regiments from 
 Camargo. Taylor arrived with Quitman's force 
 on the following day, and intended to move on the 
 19th with the whole corps for Victoria; but that 
 evening information was received which delayed 
 the contemplated advance in force. 
 
 Worth had employed himself at Saltillo in col 
 lecting subsistence and iii making reconnaissances 
 during the interval between his occupation of the 
 point and Taylor's movement on Victoria. Becom 
 ing acquainted with the country, he became aware 
 of his situation, totally exposed, with a force of but 
 1200 men and eight guns, and he knew that an 
 advanced' corps of Mexican cavalry was within 
 sixty miles of him. Under these circumstances, 
 his pickets intercepted a courier bearing a com 
 munication, supposed to be from the acting govern 
 or of Coahuila to the commander of the Mexican 
 advance, in which it was suggested that, could he 
 appear at Saltillo in the course of a few days after 
 the receipt of the note, he would encounter but 
 900 American effectives, and that in his opera- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 337 
 
 tions he might count upon the assistance of the 
 townspeople. Information of this was at once sent 
 to Wool at Parras, and to Butler at Monterey. 
 
 Wool, who had heen marching from Port Lava- 
 ca to Parras in search of a battle, and who, in his 
 desire of adventure and fame, had only wished to 
 abandon the Chihuahua expedition in order to 
 penetrate with his single corps still further south 
 in direction of Durango and Zacatecas,^ hailed the 
 news as the harbinger of glory to be acquired, as 
 he was senior to Worth. He at once broke up his 
 camp at Parras, and marched with the greatest 
 celerity toward Saltillo, pushing his artillery and 
 cavalry at the rate of forty miles a day. Butler, 
 too, of whose information Wool knew nothing, hav 
 ing ordered forward two regiments of volunteers 
 from Monterey, and having sent the information 
 to General Taylor, started in person for the ex 
 pected scene of action. 
 
 General Taylor, also wishing to be in at the bat 
 tle, turned back at once from Montemorelos with 
 Twiggs's division. On the 29th he arrived in per 
 son at Monterey, and started for Saltillo on the 
 following morning. Having proceeded a few miles 
 on his route, he met a messenger with the intelli 
 gence that the stampede was over, that Wool and 
 Butler were close to Saltillo, and believing that 
 the force then about that point was quite sufficient 
 for security, he again countermarched Twiggs's di 
 vision, and returned upon the Victoria expedition. 
 
 * Appendix to Capt. Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 174. 
 
 L Y 
 
338 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 The alarm had had the beneficial effect of break 
 ing up the false disposition of the troops about the 
 right flank of the proposed line, and, if it had been 
 got up for that very purpose, would have been a 
 good stroke of policy. The hurried movements, the 
 vexations and annoyances which were its conse 
 quences, might have demonstrated some of the in 
 conveniences, if not the dangers, of the contem 
 plated defense of the line, by detached garrisons, at 
 great distances. 
 
 Meanwhile Wool had come down toward the 
 valley of La Encantada, where he arrived on the 
 21st. Hearing that Butler was at Saltillo, he at 
 once turned to the soutlr and encamped at Agua 
 Nueva, but he did not by this maneuver escape from 
 Butler's command. While he was at Agua Nueva 
 another alarm arose, and on the morning of the 
 25th he sent information to Butler that it was re 
 ported that Santa Anna's advance of ten thousand 
 cavalry was in sight beyond the pass in his front, 
 that a large force of infantry was within supporting 
 distance, and that an attack might be expected on 
 that day or the following morning. This informa 
 tion threw the garrison of Saltillo into immediate 
 activity, and a field of battle on the plains south of 
 and above the town was selected, to which Wool 
 was ordered to fall back. But it was soon ascer 
 tained that the rumor had its origin in the move 
 ment of the regiment of Arkansas cavalry, which 
 had been sent out from Agua Nueva, and had rais 
 ed such a cloud of dust that some frightened em- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 339 
 
 ployees of the subsistence department had mistaken 
 it for the reported Mexican advance, and the alarm 
 was over. 
 
 Soon after Wool was ordered to fall back to a 
 position nearer Saltijlo, and to break up his large 
 train for the use of the main army. In obedience 
 to the first, he chose his encampment at a point 
 near the hacienda of San Juan de la Buena Vista, 
 on account of its advantages, it being in rear and 
 in close vicinity of a strong position for defense.^ 
 He was then within four miles of Saltillo, which 
 was considered too near, and on the following day 
 he was ordered to advance again to the position 
 of La Encantada. 
 
 The movement to Victoria was accomplished. 
 On the 29th of December, Quitman, who had con 
 tinued the march when Taylor countermarched at 
 Montemorelos, occupied the town without resist 
 ance, as Urrea's cavalry corps fell back on Tula 
 upon his approach. General Taylor arrived with 
 Twiggs's division on the 4th of January, and Patter 
 son joined on the same day. The expedition had 
 been made throughout without any encounter with 
 the enemy, except that of a detachment of dragoons, 
 under Lieutenant-colonel May, which had its rear 
 guard and baggage cut off by a mob of peons, while 
 engaged in examining the mountain passes. The 
 whole force concentrated at Victoria was of over 
 five thousand men. But nothing had been accom 
 plished except the concentration, and it was not 
 
 * Appendix to Capt. Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 178. 
 
340 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 long before " the state of supplies"^ rendered a 
 movement from the newly-occupied town neces 
 sary. 
 
 By this time, however, General Taylor had 
 learned that General Scott was in the country, and 
 he proposed waiting his instructions. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 General Scott proceeds to the Theater of War Expedition against Vera Cruz 
 Official Correspondence Withdrawal of Troops from the Northern Line 
 of Operations Observations. 
 
 IN the month of November Major-general Scott 
 sailed for Brazos San Jago, for the purpose of su 
 perintending the organization and embarkation of 
 the forces which were to compose the strength of 
 the expedition against Vera Cruz, which he was 
 to command.. Prior to his departure from Wash 
 ington, the President had made (under the provis 
 ions of the act of May 13, 1846) requisitions for 
 nine new regiments of volunteers, including one 
 of Texas horse. The particular arrangements and 
 preparations of the expedition belong to another 
 portion of this work, and will only be spoken of in 
 
 * " But, owing to the state of supplies, it became necessary to move the 
 command, and a movement was accordingly ordered in the direction of Tarn- 
 pico." General Taylor to Lieutenant Scott, A. D. C., Victoria, July I5tk, 
 1847. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 861. 
 
THE WAR WITH,MEXICO. , 
 
 this place so far as they affected the disposition of 
 forces and the operations on the northern line. 
 
 In a letter to General Taylor, written at New 
 York on the 25th of November, General Scott in 
 formed that officer of his approach, and of the ne 
 cessity of drawing from his command large bodies 
 of troops, which would reduce him to the necessity 
 of acting on the defensive.^ On the 20th of De 
 cember he again wrote, from New Orleans, at 
 greater length, upon the subject of the proposed 
 expedition ; and, although his letter failed of effect, 
 as it miscarried, it is yet interesting in those para 
 graphs which set forth the views which the gener- 
 al-in-chief then entertained. They are, in greater 
 part, the following : 
 
 "The particular expedition I am to conduct is 
 destined against Vera Cruz, and, through it, the 
 castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, so as to open, if we are 
 successful, a new and shorter line of operations 
 upon the capital of Mexico." 
 
 "The first great difficulty is to get together in 
 time, and afloat, off the Brazos, a sufficient force to 
 give us a reasonable prospect of success before the 
 usual period, say the end of March, for the return of 
 the black vomit on the coast of Mexico." * ^ # 
 
 * * % "To make up the force for the new ex 
 pedition, I foresee that I shall, as I intimated in 
 my letter, of which I inclose a copy, be obliged to 
 
 * General Scott to General Taylor, November 25th, 1846. Executive Doc 
 ument, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 373. 
 
342 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 reduce you to the defensive at the moment when 
 it would he of the greatest importance to the suc 
 cess of my expedition that you should he in strength 
 to maneuver offensively in the direction of San Luis 
 Potosi," &c. *'* * 
 
 # # # "Including the regulars and volunteers 
 at Tampico, or on their way thither, I may now 
 say that I shall want from you, say Worth's divis 
 ion of regulars, made up to 4000 men; two field 
 hatteries, say Duncan's and Taylor's, and 500 reg 
 ular cavalry, hesides 500 volunteer cavalry, and as 
 many volunteer foot as you can possibly spare, 
 leaving you a sufficient force to defend Monterey 
 and maintain your communications with Camar- 
 go, the mouth of the Rio Grande, and Point Isabel. 
 The whole of this force will be needed at the lat 
 ter points by the middle of January."^ 
 
 Upon arriving at Brazos San Jago, General Scott 
 heard of the rumor of a menaced attack upon Sal- 
 tillo, and of General Taylor's return to Monterey. 
 In consequence, he proceeded up the Rio Grande 
 to Camargo, with the intention of joining the army, 
 should the rumored advance of Santa Anna be true, 
 and, in any event, to be within easy communicat 
 ing distance.! Before he arrived at Camargo, he 
 learned that the alarm. had been false, and that 
 General Taylor had returned to Victoria. He there 
 fore addressed a communication to General Butler, 
 
 * General Scott to General Taylor, November 25th, 1846. Executive Doc 
 ument, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 839. t General Scott to Mr. Marcy. Idem, p. 844. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 343 
 
 the second in command, on the 3d of January, in 
 which he stated his intention of \embarking troops 
 from Tampico and Brazos San Jagb for Vera Cruz, 
 explained his object, and communicated his esti 
 mates and orders as follows : 
 
 "Of the number of troops at Tampico, and as 
 sembled at or in march for Victoria regulars and 
 volunteers I can form only a very imperfect esti 
 mate, having seen ho returns of a late date. My 
 information as to the forces at Saltillo, Monterey, 
 &c., &c., is not much better. I estimate, howev 
 er, the whole force now under Major-general Tay 
 lor's orders to be about 17,000 seven of regulars 
 and ten of volunteers. Two thousand regulars and 
 five of volunteers I suppose the whole standing 
 on the defensive to be necessary to hold Monte 
 rey, Serralvo, Camargo, Reynosa, Matamoras, Point 
 Isabel, the Brazos, the mouth of the Rib Grande, 
 and Tampico. I do not enumerate Saltillo and 
 Victoria, because I suppose they may be abandon 
 ed or held without hurting or improving the line 
 of defense I have indicated. I wish to give no def 
 inite opinion as to either, or as to the other smaller 
 points mentioned above, but to leave them open to 
 the consideration of Major-general Taylor, or, in 
 the first instance, in his absence, to yourself, as 
 you are, no doubt, in possession of his more recent 
 views." # # * 
 
 * * * You will therefore, without waiting to 
 hear from Major-general Taylor, and without the 
 least unnecessary delay, in order that they may 
 

 344 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 be in time as above, put in movement for the mouth 
 of the Rio Grande the following troops : 
 
 "About 500 regular cavalry of the first and 
 second regiments of dragoons, including Lieutenant 
 Kearney's troop." 
 
 " About 500 volunteer cavalry I rely upon you 
 to select the best." 
 
 " Two field batteries of regular light artillery, 
 (say) Duncan's and Taylor's," and 
 
 " Four thousand regulars on foot, including ar 
 tillery acting as infantry the whole under Brevet 
 Brigadier-general Worth ;" * #. * 
 
 "In addition^ put in movement for the same 
 point of embarkation (the Brazos), and to be there 
 as above, 4000 volunteer infantry." 
 
 " Deduct from the above numbers, of regulars 
 and volunteers, as follows : 
 
 " The troops at Victoria and at Tampico, less 
 the garrison (say 500) for the latter place, and the 
 escort that Major-general Taylor may need back 
 to Monterey ; and also one of the volunteer regi 
 ments at Matamoras, I having ordered Colonel 
 Curtis's -regiment to remain there, notwithstand 
 ing the arrival of Colonel Drake's to relieve him. 
 Make no other deductions, unless pressed by the 
 enemy in great force." * * # 
 
 "P.S. I expect to be personally at Tampico, to 
 superintend that part of my expedition which is to 
 embark there, toward the end. of this month." 
 
 " The whole of the eight regiments of new foot 
 volunteers will be up with the Brazos, I hope, by 
 

 THE WAR WITH -MEXICO. 345 
 
 that time. Major-general Taylor may rely upon 
 threej if not four of them, for his immediate com 
 mand, and make your calculations now for him 
 accordingly."^ 
 
 A copy of this letter was sent, with one to the 
 same effect directed immediately to General Taylor, 
 to Victoria, through Monterey, and on the 6th other 
 copies were sent to that general from Matamoras. 
 
 Butler received his dispatches on the 8th at Sal- 
 tillo, and at once took steps for carrying the orders 
 into effect. Worth's command, with the addition 
 of five companies of dragoons, and three companies 
 of the sixth infantry from General Wool's column, 
 then at Agua Nueva and Encantada, was put in 
 motion for the mouth of the Rio Grande. The ad 
 vance left Saltillo on the following morning, and 
 Worth, with the rear guard, on the 10th. The 
 fourth regiment of infantry joined en route at 
 Monterey, and, hy rapid movement, on the 22d the 
 advanced corps had arrived at the mouth of the 
 river, f 
 
 The dispatches for General Taylor, being sent 
 through Butler, were carried to Saltillo ; from 
 thence, on the evening of their receipt, they were 
 sent by Lieutenant Eichey, with an escort of ten 
 dragoons, toward Victoria. But, having passed 
 Monterey, and arrived on the llth at the small 
 town of Villa Gran, Bichey separated himself from 
 
 * General Scott to General Butler. Executive Document, No. 60, House 
 of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 849. 
 t Generals Butler and Worth to Scott. Idem, p. 858-861. 
 
346 THE WAR' WITH MEXICO. 
 
 his escort and entered the town for the purpose of 
 purchasing provisions. He was lassoed, murder 
 ed, his dispatches were seized, and at once trans 
 mitted to General Santa Anna. 
 
 On the 14th General Taylor received those sent 
 by Matamoras, and, having already ordered forward 
 Twiggs's division in the direction of Tampico, on the 
 15th and 16th. Patterson's division marched for the 
 same placet General Taylor returned to Monte 
 rey with May's squadron of dragoons, Bragg's and 
 Sherman's field batteries, and the Mississippi regi 
 ment of volunteers. Victoria was abandoned, and 
 the defensive position which General Taylor had 
 been preparing to occupy since the capture of Mon 
 terey was restricted to the Hue from the mouth of 
 the Rio Grande to Monterey and Saltillo. 
 
 To be deprived of so large a number of his troops 
 was a severe blow to General Taylor. Having re 
 ceived no other intimation of the intended action 
 than that contained in the letter of General Scott 
 from New York, and as he was left to defend his 
 position with a force so much inferior to that which 
 he had stated to be in his opinion sufficient for the 
 purpose, he was led to believe that there were mo 
 tives of a personal nature which had influenced 
 the government and the general-in-chief in making 
 so complete a change in his dispositions. In his 
 reply of the 15th (directed to General Scott in per 
 son) to the letters which ordered the withdrawal 
 
 * General Taylor to Lieutenant Scott. Executive Document, No. 60, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 861. ' 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 347 
 
 of the troops from his command, he commented 
 bitterly upon the action. 
 
 " Had you, general, relieved me at once from the 
 whole command, and assigned me to duty under 
 your order, or allowed me to retire from the field, 
 he assured that no complaint would have heen 
 heard from me ; hut while almost every man of 
 the regular force, and half the volunteers (now in 
 respectable discipline), are withdrawn for distant 
 service, it seems that I am expected, with less 
 than a thousand regulars, and a volunteer force 
 partly of new levies, to hold a defensive line while 
 a large army of twenty thousand men is in my 
 front" 
 
 * * * " I can not misunderstand the object 
 of the arrangements indicated in your letters. I 
 feel that I have lost the confidence of the govern 
 ment, or it would not have suffered me to remain 
 up to this time ignorant of its intentions, with so 
 vitally affecting interests committed to my charge. 
 But, however much I may feel personally mortified 
 and outraged by the course pursued, unprecedent 
 ed, at least, in our own history, I will carry out in 
 good faith, while I may remain in Mexico, the 
 views of my government, though I may be sacri 
 ficed in the effort."* 
 
 General Scott replied on the 26th of January 
 from Brazos Santiago, and in explanation of his 
 measures, and in giving his views of the proper 
 
 * General Taylor to General Scott. Executive Document, No. 60, House 
 of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 863. 
 
348 THE WAR W I TH MEXICO. 
 
 course to be adopted for the defense of the line, 
 wrote as follows : 
 
 " If I had been within easy reach of you at the 
 time I called for troops from your line of operations, 
 I should, as I had previously assured you, have con 
 sulted you fully on all points, and probably might 
 have modified my call both as to number and 
 description of the forces to be taken from or to be 
 left with you. As it was, I had to act promptly, 
 and to a considerable extent in the dark. All this, 
 I think, will be apparent to you when you shall 
 review my letters. 
 
 " I hope I have left, or shall leave you, including 
 the new volunteers who will soon be up, a com 
 petent force to defend the head of your line (Mon 
 terey), and its communications with the depot in 
 the neighborhood. To enable you to do this more 
 certainly, I must ask you to abandon Saltillo, and 
 to make no detachments, except for reconnaissances 
 and immediate defense, much beyond Monterey. 
 I know this to be the wish of the government, 
 founded on reasons in which I concur ; among 
 them, that the enemy intends to operate against 
 small detachments and posts."^ 
 
 This suggestion, to retire from Saltillo and con 
 fine the defense to the line from the Rio Grande 
 to Monterey, had been made at the instance of the 
 Secretary of War, who had some anxiety in respect 
 to the state in which the northern line would be 
 
 * General Scott to General Taylor. Executive Document, No. 60, House 
 of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 864. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 349 
 
 left by the withdrawal of the troops from it, and 
 had written on the 4th of January to General Scott, 
 recommending the subject to his consideration, and 
 that care should be taken to guard against any 
 surprise or disaster in that quarter.^ But, having 
 dispatched the letter, from which the above quoted 
 extract is taken, to General Taylor, on the 4th of 
 February General Scott wrote to Mr. Marcy con 
 cerning the progress of his preparations, and his 
 views of the course which would be pursued by 
 Santa Anna. These were entirely at variance 
 with the anticipations of the secretary, as is ap 
 parent from the course of action recommended for 
 General Taylor. 
 
 " It is now believed, on the authority of a letter 
 not official, that my dispatches to the same gen 
 erals, Taylor and Butler (of the 3d ultimo), being 
 sent off by the latter, at Saltillo, to the former, then 
 marching toward Victoria, by Second Lieutenant 
 Rlchey, fifth infantry, and ten mounted men, 
 were met by a party of the enemy, and all captured 
 or killed. If Lieutenant Eichey (reported as being 
 slain) had not time to destroy the dispatches about 
 his person, which is highly improbable, General 
 Santa Anna, at San Luis de Potosi, had them, no 
 doubt, in four days after their capture. It is con 
 sequently more than possible that before this time 
 the greater part of the Mexican army lately assem 
 bled at San Luis de Potosi has reached Vera Cruz 
 
 * Mr. Marcy to General Scott. Executive Document, No. 60, House of 
 Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 389, 391, and 872. 
 
350 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 or its vicinity. Major-general Taylor's mind has, 
 no doubt, ere this, arrived at the same conclusion, 
 and I shall write to suggest to him, at his own dis 
 cretion, the advantage of maneuvering offensively 
 in the direction of San Luis de Potosi, after being 
 partially re-enforced with some of the new regi 
 ments of volunteers,. The suggestion would be un 
 necessary but for j;he intimations he has received 
 to stand on the defensive.^ 
 
 " Another painful rumor, generally credited, 
 reached me yesterday; the capture, at Encarna- 
 cion, some sixty miles in advance, of Saltillo, of 
 Majors Borland and Gaines, and about eighty men 
 of the Arkansas and Kentucky mounted volunteers. 
 The private letter, from a highly intelligent officer 
 at Saltillo, represents that not a shot was fired by 
 either party." 
 
 The future correspondence of G-eneral Scott has 
 no important reference to the operations or the 
 state of affairs in the north of Mexico, and, with 
 out any further intelligence from General Taylor, 
 on the 15th of February he sailed for Vera Cruz, 
 by way of Tampico and Lobos Island. 
 
 When General Taylor arrived at Monterey, he 
 addressed a communication to the adjutant gen 
 eral, in which he complained of the conduct of the 
 War Department in not having at least notified 
 him of the intended changes. The letter, which 
 bore date January 27th, was lengthy, but referred 
 
 * General Scott to Mr. Marcy. Executive Document, No. 60, House of 
 Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 876. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 35^ 
 
 principally to his personal relations. The only 
 paragraph in the whole which spoke of the state 
 of aifairs with reference to present security, and 
 which was important, as it expressed his opinion, 
 was that in which he said, " the force with which 
 I am left in this quarter will doubtless enable me 
 to hold the positions now occupied."^ Nor was 
 this expression of opinion changed or modified in 
 the subsequent dispatches of General Taylor. On 
 the 30th he received news of the capture of the 
 scouting parties in advance of Saltillo, and even 
 then he experienced no apprehension of serious dan 
 ger, f But on the 31st he marched for that point 
 with May's squadron of dragoons, Bragg' s and Sher 
 man's hatteries, and the Mississippi volunteers. 
 
 In the sketch of the correspondence, and in the 
 extracts from official letters which have been quot 
 ed, are contained the orders and the expressions of 
 then existing opinions of Generals Scott and Tay 
 lor with reference to the change in the dispositions 
 of the troops and the withdrawal of the greater 
 force from the north of Mexico. The subject has 
 been much discussed, has been the cause of much 
 personal ill feeling, and the action has received, at 
 least, its due share of public censure. General Tay 
 lor's idea that he was about to be sacrificed or com 
 pelled to resign has been entertained by many since 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General. Executive Document, No. 60, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1102. 
 t Idem. Idem, p. 1106, 1110. 
 
352 THE WAR WIT H MEXICO. 
 
 the result of the operation has been made known, 
 and the conduct of General Scott and the War De 
 partment has been reprobated without scruple by 
 many persons not very capable of forming an opin 
 ion upon the subject, and who, if General Taylor 
 had been sacrificed, would hardly have considered 
 him a needless victim. 
 
 The policy of holding a defensive line, by station 
 ing a large force, in detachments, along the Sierra 
 Madre, has been spoken of, and certainly it did not 
 meet the views of the President of the United 
 States. General Taylor considered an advance 
 upon San Luis, through Monterey and Saltillo, 
 nearly, if not quite, impracticable ;* and although 
 General Jessup and others had surmised that San 
 ta Anna might be led to believe that an expedition 
 was on foot to attack San Luis from Tampicof (no 
 very great compliment to the Mexican's sagacity), 
 yet two hundred miles of mule paths, impractica 
 ble for artillery, prevented such a movement. As 
 movement from Monterey or Tampico was imprac 
 ticable, or required such immense preparation as to 
 render it inexpedient, and as the alternative pro 
 posed by General Taylor, of holding an unproduct 
 ive country, at great expense, until by some freak 
 the Mexican government should make peace, met 
 with no approbation, it is difficult to see what 
 course could have been adopted, in reason, other 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, October 15, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 351-354. 
 
 t General Jessup to the Secretary of War. Idem, p. 568. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 353 
 
 than to have withdrawn a large portion of the 
 troops, and commenced operations from a new 
 base, whence a practicable route led to the .capital 
 of Mexico. As the old line led to; nothing, and as 
 active operations might be discontinued upon it, at 
 least for a time, the want of troops induced the ne 
 cessity of reducing the force upon it to that abso 
 lutely required for defense ; for, whatever force 
 General Scott might have required in his first op 
 eration of establishing the new base, it was certain 
 that the masses could be more advantageously em 
 ployed in advancing upon the capital by the short 
 er line than in looking at it from Monterey, Victo 
 ria, or Saltillo. 
 
 In his anxiety concerning his own expedition, 
 and in his haste, General Scott made an incorrect 
 estimate of General Taylor's strength, and, in num 
 bers and description of force, drew, perhaps, rather 
 more than was prudent; but, whether his action 
 was prudent or not, General Taylor stated a short 
 time subsequently that " the force with which he 
 was left would doubtlqss enable him to hold the 
 positions then occupied."^ If it were sufficient for 
 that end, it was sufficient for ajl which could have 
 been desired. 
 
 It was sufficient for every important object which 
 General Taylor had in view, for every point which 
 he had taken possession of was occupied at the time 
 of his writing the opinion, except Parras and Vic- 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General. Executive Document, No. 60, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1102. 
 
 I. Z 
 
354 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 toria. The alarms about Saltillo had long before 
 caused the evacuation of Parras, and he had acqui 
 esced in the evacuation. And before the receipt 
 of General Scott's order, the "state of supplies"* 
 had compelled him to commence moving his com 
 mand from Victoria, if that place were of any im 
 portance to the American occupation, which is very 
 questionable. 
 
 It was sufficient for .all which General Scott de 
 sired, for the forces in the north of Mexico were in 
 secure position, and as for the diversion on that 
 flank, which he considered of "the greatest im 
 portance,"^ it followed as a natural consequence 
 of the disposition, as he might have foreseen, though 
 he did not. 
 
 Both generals kept their views fixed upon their 
 own positions, with but little reference to the effect 
 of the failure or disasters which might befall the 
 one upon the public service, and neither the one 
 nor the other made his arrangements with any 
 proper anticipation of the movements of the enemy. 
 
 "Nothing is of more consequence to a general 
 than the gift of penetrating the designs of his ene- 
 mie$r\ If either of the American generals pos 
 sessed this gift, they certainly failed to make any 
 proper use of it at this juncture. General Taylor 
 never had professed to be guided in any great de 
 gree by the proposed movements of Mexican com- 
 
 * General Taylor to Lieutenant Scott. Executive Document, No. 60, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 861. 
 t General .Scott to General Taylor. Idem, p. 839. \ Folard. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 355 
 
 manders, and he had paid but little attention to 
 the strength of their armies prior to the capture of 
 Monterey, Information respecting the capacity of 
 the country to support 6000 men or more had been 
 his .avowed object in marching upon that town. 
 After he had occupied it, he announced as a prin 
 ciple of his operations, " that the task of beating 
 the enemy is among the least difficult which we en 
 counter , the great question of supplies necessarily 
 controls all the operations in a country like this"* 
 though twenty-four days before he had stated that 
 it was sufficient for his argument in favor of a de 
 fensive line " to know that a heavy force is assem 
 bling in our front"^ With these views, he had 
 taken possession of a poor country, and scattered his 
 troops so as to leave at Saltillo, " the most import 
 ant point," a force much less than that which re 
 mained there even after the withdrawal of the 
 troops by General Scott. And, notwithstanding 
 his subsequent complaints, he expressed the opin 
 ion that he could hold the points "at present occu 
 pied,'^ and soon after, in reference to Santa Anna's 
 movement in the direction of Saltillo, that he con 
 sidered it ." improbable." 
 
 General Scott did profess to pay attention to the 
 position and movements of the enemy, and when 
 he .learned the disclosure of his intentions to Santa 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, November 8, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 360. t Idem, October 15, 1846. Idem, p. 351. 
 
 t Idem, January 27, 1847. Idem, p. 1102. 
 
 Idem, February 14, 1847. Idem, p. 1113. 
 
356 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Anna, he came to an erroneous conclusion, that the 
 Mexican was going to oppose him. Both com 
 manders were wrong ; though, entertaining the 
 opinions which they did, if any blame for desiring 
 a larger portion of the army attaches to either, it 
 must in some measure to General Taylor ; for he 
 believed 25,000 men to be necessary for an advance 
 on Mexico by way of Vera Cruz ;# he knew that 
 Scott had not half that number ; and if Santa 
 Anna's advance on Saltillo was improbable, as he 
 said, what use had he for a greater force than was 
 necessary for him to hold the positions at present 
 occupied, other than to guard against a doubtful 
 contingency, while Scott incurred the greater and 
 positive danger ? 
 
 There were certain facts and circumstances 
 which did control Santa Anna's action, and which 
 might well have been considered by the American 
 generals, although their written conclusions were 
 in no way based upon them. The Mexicans are 
 the most impressionable people in the world, un 
 less their Spanish progenitors may be considered 
 their equals. Certainly, in that national character 
 istic, there exists a strong resemblance. The morale 
 of the Mexican army was at the lowest degree, and 
 had a corresponding influence on the people. As 
 the first object was to gain confidence, Mexico's 
 first want was a victory. Every thing might be 
 
 *' General Taylor to the Adjutant General, October 15, 1846. Executive 
 Document^ No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 353. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 357 
 
 hoped from such an event on the part of Mexico, 
 and all which could be feared was to have been 
 anticipated on the part of the United 7 States. Had 
 the Mexican army once beaten an American army, 
 the result would have been such as followed the 
 battle of Baylen ; the only important one where 
 Spaniards were successful in the war with the 
 French in their peninsula, and then only through 
 the surprising errors of the French general. But 
 from that time Spanish energy was aroused.^ 
 Spaniards had conquered at Baylen, and that one 
 victory flattered their obstinate pride and induced 
 them to continue the struggle. Their country, 
 mountain and valley, swarmed with guerillas; ar 
 mies were raised with the most surprising rapidity ; 
 and, though beaten again and again, were only dis 
 persed to reappear in stronger force. Baylen was 
 and still is the cry of Spaniards in their remem 
 brance of former and hope of future -success. 
 
 Such might have been the anticipated effect of 
 a victory of the Mexican general over either Tay 
 lor, who had been thus far the terror of Mexico, or 
 Scott, the general-in-chief of the American army. 
 When the immense importance of the victory is 
 considered, it can not be doubted that, when it 
 had once been gained, and the nation fairly arous 
 ed by the cheering news, then, and not till then, 
 would geographical points of defense have formed 
 principal topics for the consideration of Santa Anna. 
 
 * Napier's Peninsular War, chap, viii., book i., p. 77, rol. i., Carey & 
 Hart's edition, 1842. 
 
358 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Had these been remembered by the American 
 commanders, there would have been no difficulty 
 in deciding whether the Mexican president would 
 have marched to Vera Cruz to oppose the landing 
 of a large force, composed in great part of the vet 
 erans of the line of the American army, or moved 
 in the direction which he had long observed, espe 
 cially when the American troops were reduced to 
 one third of fcheir former strength, and the regular 
 force of all arms to less than a thousand men. So 
 long as the prospect of success was brighter in the 
 north than the south, so long was it certain that 
 Santa Anna (unless his genius was underrated) 
 would attack there ; and the diversion which Gen 
 eral Scott considered of so much importance, was 
 made on General Taylor's part the moment his po 
 sition oifeied more probabilities of successful attack 
 than that which Scott was about to take ; unless, 
 indeed, it were believed that the Mexican general 
 would refrain from attacking either, in which case 
 it made small difference about the strength of ei 
 ther division. 
 
 Had General Scott intended to detain Santa 
 Anna in the north by offensive operations toward 
 San Luis, he should have left with Taylor a force 
 at least as formidable as his own. Had he intend 
 ed to induce Santa Anna to march from San Luis 
 across a difficult country, and to attack strong posi 
 tions with a view to his effectual defeat, the dis 
 positions which were made were those best calcu 
 lated for such an effect, with but few exceptions. 
 
r - 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 359 
 
 But General Scott intended the former course to 
 be pursued by General Taylor, and made the prop 
 er, dispositions for the latter, as the result fully 
 proved. The only question of doubt which can 
 arise is as to whether the force which he. left with 
 General Taylor was in reason sufficient to enable 
 him to maintain himself. Reference might be made 
 to results ; but, as I am speaking of what should 
 and might have been considered, I must refer to 
 facts known to exist at the time when the orders 
 and suggestions for the dispositions were issued. 
 
 " Moral force is to physical force as three to one 
 in war."* A maxim which has guided the move 
 ments of Napoleon and Wellington might well 
 have entered into the calculations of the necessary 
 force for the defense of the northern line in Mexi 
 co. The Mexican war had thus far fully exempli 
 fied the truth of the maxim, had increased the mor 
 al force of American soldiers, and corresponding 
 ly decreased that of Mexican generals and troops. 
 Santa Anna's army was known to consist of be 
 tween 20,000 and 30,000 men; but it was hardly 
 possible that he could bring many more than 20,000 
 into the field after a long march from San Luis to 
 Saltillo or Monterey. 
 
 To oppose this army, General Taylor had some 
 7500 men of all arms, stretched from Agua Nueva 
 to Matamoras. All the larger positions in the rear 
 were fortified in a manner, and so long as the main 
 
 * Napier's Peninsular War, chapter vi., book ix., p. 113, vol. ii., Carey 
 & Hart's edition, 1842. 
 
360 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 body of the force was at or in advance of Monte 
 rey, " which controlled the great outlet from the in 
 terior,"^ they were accessible only to corps coming 
 through the Tula pass without artillery, without 
 which Mexican troops were considered " not at all 
 formidable." At Agua Nueva, at Angostura, at the 
 pass of Los Muertes, at the pass of the Klnconada, 
 at the gorge near the Loma de Federacion, and at 
 Monterey, were defensive positions in defiles strong 
 enough to compensate for any ordinary numerical 
 deficiency. But few of them could be turned, and 
 those only by difficult and circuitous movements. 
 With 5000 men at or in advance of Monterey, 
 what more could have been desired to insure the 
 successful defense of the northern line, except say 
 two regiments of the veterans of the army, to give 
 steadiness to the volunteers composing the princi 
 pal part of the force ? 
 
 If this view be correct, then, in spite of the par 
 tial views of the American generals, confined, as 
 they were, to their own particular operations, and 
 of their erroneous conclusions in regard to Santa 
 Anna's actions, arrived at after a knowledge of his 
 full information of their movements, and still en- 
 tertained after his advanced corps of cavalry had 
 carried off two parties of American troops, the force 
 of circumstances, and the conduct about which 
 there has been so much complaint, had made the 
 disposition of the American forces nearly that which 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General. Executive Document, No. 60, 
 House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 353. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3 g J, 
 
 was most proper and most effective. If there were 
 any thing to regret, it would appear to be that the 
 force of circumstances, or some other agent, had not 
 brought it about sooner. In that case, some three 
 months of inactivity would have been cut off, and 
 any augmentation of Santa Anna's army at San 
 Luis during that period would have been prevent 
 ed. But, as it was, Scott was on his way to Vera 
 Cruz to open a practicable line of operations, while 
 Taylor held Saltillo, Monterey, and the posts on 
 the Rio Grande, with a force which was, as the 
 result showed, and as he declared in his letter to 
 the adjutant general of January 27th, competent. 
 
 As for the belief of General Taylor that he was 
 to be intentionally sacrificed, which he has ex 
 pressed in various private letters, and which have 
 been set out in the newspapers, it was the same as 
 to believe that the government was about to sacri 
 fice itself by sacrificing him, 7000 men, all the 
 public property on the line, and letting any Mex 
 ican force, which must have been large if capable 
 of beating him, without hinderance over the fron 
 tiers of Texas into the United States. 
 
 That he had lost in a measure " the confidence 
 of his government" is more than probable. Let 
 reference be made to the correspondence of General 
 Taylor with the War Department, and it will be 
 seen that from the very commencement of hostili 
 ties to the time when General Scott was ordered 
 to the field, a period of more than five months, not 
 one plan of operations or suggested course of action, 
 
362 
 
 THE WAR WlfH MEXICO. 
 
 having in direct view the object of the war, had 
 been received from General Taylor, and that all 
 which had been made by the Secretary of War, 
 which were necessarily liable to objections, made 
 as they were at more than a thousand miles from 
 the scene of operations, had been met by state 
 ments of difficulties and delays, unaccompanied 
 by any suggestions for overcoming them. Under 
 such circumstances, it is not surprising that he 
 should have lost some portion of the confidence 
 which, after his surprising victories of Palo Alto 
 and Resaca de la Palma, may have been 'reposed 
 in him as a great commander, and that the govern 
 ment, tired of proceeding upon false principles of 
 action, should have done the best it could, by send 
 ing General Scott to the field to control the opera 
 tions as general-iii-chief of the army. 
 
 CHAPTER DL 
 
 Action of Mexican Authorities General Santa Anna His Difficulties His 
 Policy Efforts of the Mexican Government to raise Men, Material, and 
 Money State of Things in the Capital Scheme of sequestrating Church 
 Property Opposition of the Clergy Meeting of Mexican Congress Elec 
 tion of Santa Anna and Gomez Farias Consideration of American Proposal 
 to negotiate Of Scheme of sequestrating Church Property Is adopted 
 Fails Movements of General Santa Anna upon receipt of intercepted 
 American Dispatches Strength of his Army Advance to Encarnacion. 
 
 THE action of Mexican authorities for a long 
 period subsequent to the fall of Monterey was pure 
 ly preparatory. On the 8th of October General 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3^3 
 
 Santa Anna arrived at San Luis de Potosi with 
 the troops which had marched from Mexico, and 
 at once set about the task of organizing. the large 
 army, of which the levy had been ordered. His 
 great difficulty was in the want of money, but he 
 obviated it temporarily by a forced loan and the 
 pledge of a portion of his private property. His- 
 communications to the Mexican government, writ 
 ten while on his way to San Luis and soon after 
 his arrival, all professed a fixed determination to 
 prosecute the war with vigor and energy. In them 
 he congratulated his countrymen on the increase 
 of moral force which the Mexican troops had ac 
 quired by their good conduct at Monterey, which 
 had compelled General Taylor to grant such favor 
 able terms of capitulation. But while he did this, 
 he did not lose the opportunity of publishing his 
 own sagacity, and, admitting that the loss of Mon 
 terey was a disaster, he regretted that his advice 
 had not been followed by Ampudia, and the place 
 given up without a conflict.^ Not without reason 
 did he regret it, and the reasons which induced the 
 advice and for his subsequent course are obvious. 
 No man knew his own countrymen better than 
 Santa Anna. In his long schooling of military 
 and political intrigue, he had studied them under 
 all circumstances. He knew the capacity of Mexi 
 can troops for successful action against their north 
 ern adversaries from bitter experience in Texas, 
 
 * Official Correspondence of Santa Anna with the Secretary of War and 
 Marine, published in Diario del Gobeirno. ' 
 
304 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and as their moral force had not been increased by 
 the result of the battles on the Rio Grande, it was 
 his policy not to hazard a battle until his numeri 
 cal strength was sufficient to compensate the de 
 ficiency ; which was much more evident after the 
 result of the operations of Monterey, his published 
 congratulations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 With a people of the impressionable character of 
 the Mexicans, a victory was of the highest im 
 portance if the war were continued, and it might 
 have been hoped that it would arouse the spirit of 
 the nation to resistance, while at the same time it 
 would increase the power and popularity of the 
 general. In pursuance of this policy, it was use 
 less to attempt any partial operation of defense, 
 and he therefore drew Ampudia's corps from Sal- 
 tillo to San Luis, which was nearer the center of 
 resources. Upon learning of the contemplated at 
 tack upon Tampico, he ordered its evacuation, 
 which was in keeping with his former action. By 
 these movements he had given up the whole coun 
 try north and east of the Sierra Madre without a 
 struggle. But he had put three hundred miles of 
 comparatively desert country, on the direct route 
 from Saltillo to San Luis, between himself and 
 General Taylor, of which the water tanks could 
 be destroyed to impede the advance of his enemy, 
 and. which, for that purpose as well as to secure 
 his own movement, should he choose to make one, 
 were guarded by strong corps of his cavalry. As 
 for Tampico, it was an isolated position, with only 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 355 
 
 one road to the capital, which led through the Tula 
 pass, which was rocky and difficult in the extreme, 
 and it was of hut little importance in the blockaded 
 state of the Gulf coast. Having withdrawn the 
 garrison, he placed - strong corps of infantry and 
 cavalry, under Valencia and Urrea, to guard the 
 pass, the advance of the latter general being at its 
 eastern extremity. Santa Anna was then safe from 
 immediate molestation, and could complete the or 
 ganization of his army at his leisure, and at the 
 same time pay attention to affairs at the capital. 
 The course which he adopted may have been in 
 duced by political reasons, but in view of all cir 
 cumstances it can hardjy be doubted that it was 
 wise in a military point of view. Whether Santa 
 Anna designed to control, if possible, the various 
 discordant elements of Mexican action, and direct 
 them in such a manner as to bring about a peace, 
 is a question which he alone possesses the power 
 of answering, and his reputation for veracity, when 
 declaring his motives or intentions,, is not so un 
 doubted as to render his explanation, even at this 
 time, reliable. 
 
 It has been surmised by some that it was his 
 policy to remain upon the defensive at San Luis, 
 and await the action of the Mexican Congress, 
 which, in the accumulated difficulties to be over^ 
 come in the prosecution of the war, might take into 
 consideration the proposals of the American govern 
 ment ; while, in order to shield himself from the 
 charges to which the varied speculations of Ameri- 
 
366 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 can editors had given rise, of wanting patriotism 
 and of being in league with the American govern 
 ment, he should give his parole support to the war, 
 .and with seeming reluctance assent to the meas 
 ures of Congress, as being those which had been 
 decreed in its wisdom, and with which he had 
 nothing to do but to acquiesce. In support of this 
 surmise there was, his knowledge of American 
 strength, his opposition to proposed schemes for 
 raising money, and his invariable practice of in 
 trigue in every political or military matter in which 
 he was engaged. But if he entertained such views 
 and he may have done so, notwithstanding his 
 loudly proclaimed desire for war he neglected 
 nothing by which he might prepare for the altern 
 ative. 
 
 The exertions of the acting president, Salas, and 
 his cabinet were strenuously put forth for raising 
 men and material of war. Men could be had by 
 forced enlistments. The amount of material, such 
 as it was, which was in the country, was large, and 
 both, being collected with rapidity, were thrown in 
 advance to San Luis. According to Mexican ac 
 counts,, the force at that point in the month of No 
 vember numbered 25,000 bayonets and lances, and 
 fifty-two pieces of artillery, with immense stores 
 of ammunition, and 5000 men were on the march 
 thither. ' 
 
 In view of this preparation, many Mexicans in 
 dulged the hope of a signal triumph. At that 
 period the advance of the Mexican army was not 
 
THE WAR V^ITH MEXICO. 357 
 
 contemplated, and it was predicted that at San 
 Luis would be the last great battle, and that it 
 would result in the complete overthrow of the 
 North Americans. But in the midst of all their 
 strength, and in the fullness of their preparations, 
 there were some who feared that the fortunes of 
 war would be against them even there. The of 
 ficers who had gained experience at Palo Alto, 
 Resaca, and Monterey, had but little confidence, 
 and imparted their spirit in some degree to their 
 comrades. Santa Anna strove to check the spread 
 of the demoralization ; and in December, for open 
 ly expressing his opinion of the superiority of the 
 American troops, General Requena was disgraced 
 and ordered away from the army. 
 
 Notwithstanding the large army which had been 
 collected, the government of Mexico was still em 
 barrassed by the want of money, and to raise it 
 was the greatest difficulty to be overcome. Vari 
 ous shifts were resorted to for the purpose. Calls 
 were made upon different states and upon individ 
 uals. The government journals adopted the motto 
 of " Ser o no ser" and were filled with articles 
 exhorting Mexicans to give their contributions, in 
 hearty support to the war for the defense of their 
 country's nationality. Some means in money and 
 in kind were contributed, but in comparison with 
 the expenses they were trifling ; and while other 
 plans were under consideration, by which the sup 
 ply could be increased, the political strife between 
 the Puros and Moderados kept the capital in a state 
 of ferment. 
 
368 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 As early as the 14th of October, the insane and 
 inconsistent populace were openly crying for a pro- 
 nunciamiejito, on the ground that Salas wished to 
 perpetuate his power. Successive attempts at in 
 surrection were made, but were quelled by the ap 
 pearance and protestations of Salas, backed by his 
 adviser and sponsor, Valencia Gomez Farias, the 
 great Puro of Mexico. 
 
 Among the various projects for raising money, 
 the most popular and apparently the most feasible 
 was the sequestration of the property of the Church 
 for the benefit of the nation and the support of the 
 war. It was not long considered before the clergy 
 became alarmed, and its members used their pow 
 erful influence to defeat it. For this action they 
 were accused in the government journals of a want 
 of patriotism, of aiding and abetting the monarch 
 ists, and of fomenting the discords which were 
 daily becoming more evident and dangerous ; and 
 not without some reason; for, although the Mexi 
 can priests entertained no good feeling toward 
 the northern heretics, yet they entertained still less 
 for those who would attempt all which Americans 
 could do, the sequestration of their property, and 
 when the measure was proposed, of course they 
 fomented an opposition. As for the monarchical 
 preferences of the great dignitaries of the Church, 
 they were too well known to admit of a denial. 
 
 An attempt was soon made to carry the plan 
 partially into effect. The government required a 
 contribution from the property of the secular and 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 359 
 
 regular clergy to the amount of two millions of dol 
 lars, and issued drafts, in all amounting to that 
 sum, on the different bishops of the country. The 
 prelates were not able to pay immediately, even 
 had they been willing ; for, although the Church 
 was possessed of immense estates, yet they afford 
 ed no great moneyed revenue in proportion to their 
 value. Their answers, therefore, pleaded their in 
 ability and desired delay, and, in the mean while, 
 the mass of the clergy continued exertions for the 
 defeat of the measure in the Congress which was 
 about to assemble. 
 
 It met on the 6th of December, and to it were 
 referred the various questions affecting the nation. 
 The great question, of course, was that of the war, 
 and upon it the message of General Salas and the 
 speeches of the ministers all spoke strongly, and 
 all advocated its continuance. Salas was loud in 
 his arguments in favor of its justice, and the abso 
 lute necessity of carrying it on. The different min 
 isters all seconded his views, but all agreed that its 
 continuance depended upon the speedy procure 
 ment of the money necessary for supplying and 
 paying the army, and all referred to the Minister 
 of Finance. He applauded his colleagues, and 
 agreed with them in their views ; but, when he 
 came to dwell upon the state of the treasury, con 
 fessed that the nation was utterly bankrupt, and 
 that he was without means of raising a dollar. 
 The matter having been thus placed before the 
 Congress, that body proceeded to the election of a 
 
 I A A 
 
370 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 president and vice-president, and the choice fell 
 upon Santa Anna and Gomez Farias. The man 
 agement of executive business devolved upon Fa 
 rias, Santa Anna being allowed, by decree, to re 
 main in command of the army. 
 
 The next business before the body was the con 
 sideration of the propriety of carrying on the war. 
 The feeling, originally strong in favor of it, had 
 been cherished in the political intrigues of the 
 Santanistas, and any effect which the successes 
 of American arms might have had was completely 
 neutralized. 
 
 As, through circumstances, the intended policy 
 of the United States, of placing their troops in a 
 threatening attitude, to operate upon the Congress, 
 had utterly failed, the only thing which was to be 
 feared at the moment of consideration was poverty. 
 The American troops were in detached positions ; 
 no preparations were, to the knowledge of the Mex 
 ican functionaries, in progress for an attack upon 
 any vital point of the body of their republic, and 
 the American general was at the time engaged in 
 an expedition against an unimportant and unde 
 fended town, in order to complete his arrangements 
 for, defending a line. Santa Anna's large army 
 occupied San Luis ; his cavalry occupied the di 
 rect road thence to Saltillo ; Valencia's and Urrea's 
 corps, numbering near five thousand men, guarded 
 the Tula pass ; and, even if apprehensions then ex 
 isted of an advance upon the capital by way of 
 Veia Cruz or Alvarado, confident reliance was 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 37^ 
 
 placed upon the strength of the fortifications of the 
 ports and of the passes along the road. Moreover, 
 such a contingency was distant, and it was Mexi 
 can nature not to provide for it until it arose. Cal 
 ifornia, New Mexico, Nueva Leon, Coahuila, and 
 Tamaulipas had been lost ; hut they had never af 
 forded many resources to the central government, 
 and it was hoped that the loss would he only tem 
 porary, for the Whig party in the United States 
 had come forth in hold opposition to the measures 
 of their government. Its prominent men had de 
 nounced the war as unjustifiable and wicked; and 
 although the intention to require territory from 
 Mexico as indemnity for the expenses of the war 
 had not been openly avowed by the administra 
 tion, yet much opposition had been proclaimed in 
 anticipation of such avowal by the Whigs, and es 
 pecially by the Abolitionists. The elections in the 
 fall of 1846 had been favorable to the Whig party, 
 and showed that the war was unpopular with a 
 large portion of the American people. All these 
 circumstances were fully known in Mexico, and 
 the results of the elections and the speeches of the 
 prominent opposition leaders were published as in 
 centives to the Mexicans to continue hostilities. 
 It was not considered by their great men prepos 
 terous to hope, that when the American Congress 
 elect commenced its functions, all the conquered 
 territory would be returned to them. Under all 
 these considerations, with no immediate danger 
 threatening their capital, the great center of their 
 
372 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 resources, and when the surprising avidity with 
 which Mexicans seize upon data which may serve 
 as a foundation for judgments favorable to them 
 selves is remembered, it is not strange that the 
 Mexican Congress should have determined to pros 
 ecute the war. Accordingly, it was decreed that 
 no 'proposition for peace should be entertained un 
 til every hostile foot had cleared the Mexican soil, 
 and every vessel of war which lined her coast 
 should be withdrawn.^ 
 
 Having taken this ground, the next thing to be 
 done was -to raise money, and with this in view, 
 the question of the sequestration of the Church 
 property to a large amount was brought before the 
 Congress, It there met powerful opposition, how 
 ever, as the priesthood had exerted all its influence 
 against it in anticipation. Santa Anna was not in 
 favor of the measure ; nevertheless, from time to 
 time, he kept up his importunities for money ; and 
 while asserting his patriotism, and his desire of 
 presenting trophies, won from the American army 
 in the struggle for maintaining Mexican independ 
 ence, to his government, yet he urged the want of 
 funds as his excuse for not moving forward, and 
 asserted the utter impracticability of continuing 
 the war without speedy and efficient assistance 
 from Congress. If it be true that at this period he 
 was at heart in favor of peace, his opposition must 
 have had its origin in a reluctance to have the- last 
 impediment to his active advance removed, and 
 
 * Diario Official del Gobierno, December, 1846. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 373 
 
 the fear lest popular opinion should force him to 
 offensive operations before he was fully. prepared, 
 and which must indefinitely postpone any negoti 
 ation. In his published and official correspondence 
 it does not appear that he strongly expressed a be 
 lief that the measure would not answer the purpose 
 proposed, and was therefore impolitic. 
 
 But, although not supported by him, and in spite 
 of opposition, the project was taken up on the 7th 
 of January, 1847,^ and, after a short but fiery dis 
 cussion, it became a law by a .decided vote. The 
 government was empowered, "in order to raise fif 
 teen millions for the support of the national war 
 against the United States, to hypothecate or sell in 
 mortmain the CJiurch property which might be 
 necessary to obtain that sum." During the debate 
 upon the measure, it was asserted by the function 
 aries of the administration that the fate of the na 
 tion depended upon the prompt action of Congress,, 
 and that, if the project were not speedily adopted, 
 the army would at once disband and march to the 
 capital, to light up the blaze of civil war.f 
 
 Whether this_ apprehension was at. that particu 
 lar time well founded was doubted by many, but 
 it was certainly a fact that the .army wag. suffering 
 from the want of money, and the assertion of its 
 contemplated action shows that the measure was 
 favorably looked upon by a large number of the 
 troops. It was, moreover, a powerful argument 
 
 * Monitor Republicano, January 9th, 1847. 
 
 t Diario Official del Gobierno, January 9th, 1847. 
 
*' 
 
 374 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 in favor of this first blow at the priesthood ; and as 
 the Puros and their leader, Farias, entertained the 
 most determined hostility against that class, the 
 argument was quickly seized and made use of. 
 But, having obtained the power, it was by no means 
 an easy thing to carry the proposed sale into effect. 
 The whole body of the clergy protested against it 
 as sacrilegious, and large masses of the lower class, 
 who, while it had been under consideration, were 
 most clamorous in favor of the measure, supported 
 the protest. Santa Anna gave his consent with 
 great reluctance. In a letter to Rejon, Minister 
 of Relations, he stated that he had uniformly op 
 posed the measure, and now only assented to it on 
 account of the urgent necessities of the country.^ 
 The matter was at once discussed in the different 
 states, and but one, and that one Oajaca (in 
 fact, the principality of Don Juan Alvarez), gave, 
 through its government, a decided declaration in 
 its favor. 
 
 But, in spite of difficulties, the government ap 
 peared determined to carry the measure through, 
 and took the first step by seizing a factious priest, 
 who 'was stirring up an insurrection in the capital, 
 and easting him into prison. A few more exam 
 ples stifled the outcry in that city, and the clergy 
 were compelled to work in secret. Few purchasers, 
 however, could be found for the property, even 
 when seized or mortgaged under the law. It con 
 sisted almost entirely of real estate, and, where the 
 
 * Diario Official del Gobierno. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 375 
 
 clergy exercised so powerful an influence, it was 
 manifestly unsafe for any capitalist to advance 
 money upon it, much more to purchase it, notwith 
 standing the repeated concessions of the govern 
 ment. The law authorized the disposal of scrip, 
 secured hy the property, at the rate of 77 per cent, 
 cash, no paper or credit being allowed. But the 
 government, being unable to find purchasers, re 
 duced the price, remitting 60 per cent, to them, 
 taking pay at once, one half in paper and one half 
 in specie, and even proposed to make contracts for 
 the sale of the property on more ruinous terms, 
 losing '75 per cent, of the actual value. The at 
 tempts at sale were nevertheless fruitless, and no 
 great quantity of money was raised either by the 
 issue of scrip or the sale of the property ; and, on 
 account of the immediate failure of the project, and 
 the manifested opposition, the Congress was in 
 duced to consider modifications of the law which 
 might render it less obnoxious. But nothing was 
 effected by their deliberations, and the members 
 proposed to break up early in February, leaving the 
 government to obtain resources as best it might. 
 
 Santa Anna had, meanwhile, remained in his 
 defensive positions at San Luis de Potosi and Tula, 
 until, by the receipt of the intercepted dispatch of 
 General Scott to General Taylor, he was informed 
 of the plans and movements of the enemy. Victo 
 ry, which, since the war was to be prosecuted, was 
 the first great want of the Mexican nation, and 
 consequently the great object of his desires, he be- 
 
376 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 lieved to be within his grasp ; and, contrary to all 
 the anticipations of General Scott, he acted the 
 wiser part, and attempted to seize it in that direc 
 tion where it was immediately presented. Leav 
 ing the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa and the city of 
 Vera Cruz to the care of the government and the 
 exertions of their garrisons, and trusting to the spir 
 it of the nation, which, aroused by his anticipated 
 victory, would induce energy in the prosecution of 
 the war for future defense, he at once directed all 
 his energies upon the task of preparation for an ad 
 vance. It was one of great difficulty, for he was 
 without money. All the funds which had been 
 raised, and many of his private resources, by which 
 he had supported many expenses, were exhausted, 
 and it was useless to anticipate relief from the gov 
 ernment at the capital. In his difficulty, the state 
 government of San Luis de Potosi came to his aid, 
 and its Congress authorized the governor to raise 
 a forced loan on forty-eight hours' notice, the pro 
 ceeds of which were to be applied to the commis 
 sariat of the army.^ This loan was in a measure 
 successful, and, being thus relieved, Santa Anna 
 commenced his movement. 
 
 Upon the receipt of the information of the de 
 signs of General Scott, he had re-enforced General 
 Mtnon's corps of cavalry, which was in advance to 
 ward Saltillo ; and, as the execution of those de 
 signs would cause Taylor to evacuate the country 
 about Victoria, he ordered Urrea to proceed with his 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report of the Battle of Angostura. 
 
THE WAR WITH. MEXICO. 377 
 
 cavalry through the Tula pass, and operate upon 
 the line of American communications. With Va 
 lencia, who had commanded at Tula, he had had a 
 quarrel, and that officer had temporarily retired from 
 the army. The infantry and artillery of the com 
 mand, which had been stationed at that point, were 
 withdrawn and incorporated with the main army. 
 On the 26th of January; 1847, Santa Anna issued 
 his order of march for his whole force, which was 
 stated in the Mexican accounts as follows : 
 
 Men. 
 
 Sappers and artillerists, with 19 guns and 1 howitzer . . . 650 
 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 10th, and llth regiments of the line, 1st 
 
 and 3d light troops 6240 
 
 4th light troops, mixed, of Santa Anna ; 1st, active, of Celaya, 
 
 of Guadalaxara, of Lagos, of Queretaro, and of Mexico . 3200 
 
 General Parrodi's command from Tula 1000 
 
 Artillery 250 
 
 Mejia's division 4000 
 
 Adding to this Minon's cavalry, about 2000, his 
 whole strength, exclusive of. Urrea's command, 
 amounted to 23,340 bayonets and lances, with 
 twenty pieces of artillery. 
 
 The artillery moved on the 27th, and was fol 
 lowed by the infantry on the -2 8th, 29th, and 30th. 
 By easy marches the Mexican army progressed in 
 the direction of Saltillo, and on the 19th of Febru 
 ary was concentrated at Encarnacion, a hacienda 
 some sixty miles to the south of Saltillo, and here 
 Santa Anna prepared for battle. 
 
378 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 American Force about Saltillo Capture of Borland's, Gaines's, and Heady's 
 Commands Arrival of General Taylor Movement in Advance to Agua 
 Nueva Reconnaissances to La Hedionda and Encarnacion Retreat to 
 Buena Vista Advance of Santa Anna from Encarnacion Pass of Angos 
 tura Affair of the 22d of February Movement of Minon's Cavalry Sal 
 tillo BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA Mexican Retreat to Agua Nueva Com 
 munications Position of Santa Anna His Retreat toward San Luis Tay 
 lor's Advance to Agua Nueva Expedition to Encarnacion-^-Urrea's Oper 
 ations on American Communications His Retreat Observations. 
 
 FOR some days after the departure of Worth's 
 command, affairs remained quiet about Saltillo. 
 The force there present consisted of Lane's brigade 
 of Indiana troops, M'Kee's regiment of Kentuckians, 
 a battalion of Kentucky horse, and General Wool's 
 original command, diminished by the five compa 
 nies of dragoons and three companies of the sixth 
 infantry which had marched with Worth for the 
 mouth of the Rio Grande. 
 
 General Butler retained his head-quarters at Sal 
 tillo. Wool, however, was drawn back from La En- 
 cant ada to Buena Vista, and, some rumors having 
 arisen that the Mexican army was on the advance 
 from San Luis de Potosi, on the 18th of January 
 he sent Major Borland, with thirty-three men of the 
 Arkansas cavalry, to reconnoiter as far as Encarna 
 cion, where the enemy was reported to be in force. 3 * 
 
 * General Wool to Major Bliss, January 27th, 1847. Executive Document, 
 No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, 
 p. 1106. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 3,79 
 
 Upon arriving at Encarnacion on the 19th, Bor 
 land found no enemy. He halted, and sent back 
 to his colonel for a re-enforcement, in order to con 
 tinue his reconnaissance to Salado; but, having 
 been joined by Major Gaines and Captain Clay, 
 with a party of thirty-five of the Kentucky caval 
 ry, he decided to continue it, without further or 
 ders or other re-enforcement, on the next morn 
 ing.^ Having no fear of an enemy, even ordinary 
 precautions to guard against surprise were neglect 
 ed, and during the night a heavy mist hung over 
 the plain which surrounded the hacienda, com 
 pletely concealing the movements of any approach 
 ing force. 
 
 The position of the party had been communi 
 cated by inhabitants of the country, or advanced 
 Mexican scouts, to General Minon, who command 
 ed the advanced corps of Mexican cavalry, and that 
 officer made his arrangements to insure its capture. 
 Making a rapid movement with more than one 
 thousand men from Matehuala, he arrived before 
 day, on the morning of the 20th, at Encarnacion. 
 His force was disposed about the hacienda in such 
 a manner as to intercept every avenue of escape, 
 and, when the morning revealed their situation, the 
 American officers deemed it impracticable to cut 
 their way through. They accordingly surrendered, 
 and the whole number, two majors, two captains, 
 
 * General Wool to Major Bliss, January 27th, 1847. Executive Document, 
 No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, 
 p. 1106. 
 
380 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 one subaltern, and sixty-six non-commissioned of 
 ficers and privates, became prisoners of war with 
 out firing a shot. Minon at once retired with his 
 prisoners in the direction of San Luis de Potosi, 
 and thence they were sent to the city of Mexico. 
 
 This Mexican success .was soon followed by an 
 other. On the morning of the 2 6th, C aptain Heady, 
 of the Kentucky cavalry, who had been sent with 
 seventeen troopers to examine the pass of Paloinas 
 Adentro, which entered the valley from the east, 
 some five miles to the north of Saltillo, fell in with 
 a large force of irregular Mexican cavalry, under 
 Lieutenant-colonel Cruz> He too surrendered 
 without resistance, and his party was likewise sent 
 off to San Luis. 
 
 But one man of all those made prisoners return 
 ed. Captain Henrie, of Texas, who had accom 
 panied Borland as a volunteer, believed, as he had 
 been a prisoner in Mexican hands during the Texan 
 war and had effected his escape, that he would be 
 put to death upon recognition. He attempted and 
 made good his flight from the guards which sur 
 rounded the prisoners. Mounted on a thorough 
 bred, he broke from their midst, and, notwithstand 
 ing the fire which was poured after him, escaped 
 unhurt to the rear. . But, keeping to the right of 
 the main road to avoid detached parties, the greater 
 distance and the want of water broke down his 
 
 * General Wool to General Taylor, January 29th, 1847. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 1107. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 33^ 
 
 mare, and left him on foot many miles from the 
 American advanced pickets at Agua Nueva. With 
 out arms, without food or drink, and in danger of 
 being murdered by the people of the country should 
 he approach their ranches to obtain then}, he nev 
 ertheless made his way to the neighborhood of the 
 advanced American positions, and, after three days 
 of suffering, fell in with a reconnoitering party from 
 Agua Nueva. 
 
 These were the occurrences which induced Gen 
 eral Taylor to change his head-quarters to Saltillo. 
 He arrived there on the 2d of February, and find 
 ing every thing quiet in his immediate front, and 
 that Minon had fallen back to his old position at 
 Matehuala, he still believed that there would be 
 no advance in force, on the part of the enemy, in 
 that direction.^ Under this impression, he per 
 mitted General Butler to leave the field and re 
 turn to the United States. But, finding that the 
 confidence of the volunteers had been in some de 
 gree affected by the recent captures, and that the 
 inhabitants of Saltillo, in anticipation of an attack 
 by the Mexican army, had in many cases fled 
 from their homes, he determined to leave a select 
 garrison at Saltillo, and to take post with his main 
 force at Agua Nueva, eighteen miles in advance. 
 Accordingly, on the 5th, he moved to that point 
 with the force which had accompanied him from 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, February 4th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 1108. 
 
382 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Monterey. He also had military reasons for the 
 measure ; for, although he had neither anticipation 
 nor positive information of Santa Anna's intention 
 to advance, he believed it to be the best policy to 
 hold the southern extremity of the defile through 
 the Sierra Madre, rather than the northern at Mon 
 terey, as had been recommended by General Scott ; 
 for at that point, it was considered, the enemy, 
 should he approach, must fight in the field against 
 strong natural positions, or starve, while, if Monte 
 rey were held as the advanced post of the Ameri 
 can army, he could establish himself at Saltillo 
 and maneuver at his leisure.^ The main force 
 was, therefore, soon after drawn out to Agua Nue^ 
 va, and encamped near strong defensive positions. 
 There a depot was established, and filled as rap 
 idly as possible from the rear and the country 
 around Parras. The different volunteer corps of 
 the army were put under instruction, and, in the 
 short time which remained to them, made some im 
 provement in their drill. Although nothing was 
 ascertained by the reconnoitering officers which 
 could corroborate the various flying rumors of 
 the Mexican advance, the troops were kept in con 
 stant readiness to meet the enemy. By the 20th 
 of February, however, it was ascertained that Mi- 
 non's cavalry had advanced, and was then some 
 where to the left of Agua Nueva. This informa- 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, February 7th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 1109. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 333 
 
 tion, in connection with the various rumors, in 
 duced General Taylor to turn his attention to that 
 quarter; for on that flank were roads hy which his 
 position at Agua Nueva could be turned, leading 
 from Encarnacion through the rancho of La Hedi- 
 onda, and to the main road to Saltillo at La Eii- 
 cantada,^ and through the pass of Palomas Aden- 
 tro to the north of the town. 
 
 On the 20th he sent a strong party > consisting 
 of a squadron of the first and one of the second 
 dragoons, a section of light artillery, and a corps 
 of volunteer cavalry, making up, in all, a force of 
 over four hundred men, under Lieutenant-colonel 
 May, with orders to reconnoiter the country in that 
 direction, and to ascertain whether the enemy might 
 not be advancing in force by La Hedionda, with, a 
 view of striking the main road at La Encantada, 
 or of penetrating by the pass of Palomas Adentro. 
 
 On the same day he sent a small party, under 
 Major M'Culloch, a partisan officer of great expe 
 rience, to the front, to observe the road leading di 
 rect from Encarnacion.t 
 
 May's command arrived at La Hedionda about 
 three o'clock in the afternoon, and thence small 
 parties were sent out in different directions, to scour 
 the country in its vicinity. Signal fires were soon 
 after lit up on the different neighboring hills, and 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report, March 6th, 1846. Executive Document, 
 No. 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 132, and Carleton's 
 History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 12. 
 
 t General Taylor's Official Report, March 6th, 1846. Executive Document, 
 No. 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 132. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 far to the east clouds of dust arose, which indicat 
 ed a movement of troops in that direction. To ob 
 tain a better view, Lieutenant Sturgis and an or 
 derly dragoon were sent to the summit of a range 
 of hills which rose to the north of the rancho ; but 
 they fell in with a picket of the enemy, by which 
 they were fired upon and captured. The reports 
 of the escopetas, the various signal fires which had 
 been lit up, and the heavy clouds of dust, were con 
 clusive proofs of the vicinity of the enemy ; but, 
 as several of his parties had not returned when 
 night came on, May determined to remain in his 
 position. Having made dispositions for defense 
 by barricading the little street of the rancho with 
 cotton bags, he lingered until about ten o'clock, 
 when a man, dressed like a common peon, gave 
 him information that Minon was within a short dis 
 tance beyond the ridge; that Santa Anna, with 
 20,000 men, had been at Encarnacion on that 
 morning, and would attack General Taylor on the 
 following day.^ By this time all parties had come 
 in but one, and without any delay the signal was 
 given to mount. As the detachment took the road 
 to Agua Nueva, from all the different peaks occu 
 pied by Mexican sentinels the signal fires blazed 
 up again to announce the movement. Marching 
 in expectation and in readiness for instant action, 
 the 1 command kept in the saddle throughout the 
 night, and before day-break joined the army at 
 Agua Nueva. The party which had failed to join 
 
 * Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 16. 
 
THE .WAR WITH -MEXIpO. 335 
 
 at. La Hedionda came in soon after. The intelli 
 gence which the Mexican had communicated at 
 the rancho was soon confirmed. 
 . M'Culloch.had left the camp at Agua- Nueva 
 with only his second lieutenant, Alston, four pri 
 vates, and Lieutenant' Clark, of the Kentucky 
 troops, who volunteered, at four .o'clock in the aft- 
 ernopn. Six miles in .advance of Agua Nueva, at 
 the station of a picket guard, lie fell in. with a Mex 
 ican .deserter, whom he sent in to General Taylor, 
 and proceeded on,- Keeping off the .main road, he 
 arrived- at midnight in sight of Kncarnaciori, and, 
 in fact, the enemy was there in large force. After . 
 a close reconnaissance, he sent back his. whole par 
 ty except one man, and with him .awaited the- dawn 
 of day, to ascertain with more accuracy the num 
 bers of the enemy. He passed, by night, inside 
 the Mexican pickets, arid, keeping on the side of . 
 the mountain, to the east, when day broke he fin 
 ished his daring reconnaissance, made -his escape 
 through the lines, and arrived at Agua Nueva dur 
 ing the 'afternoon of the 21st, without hinderance 
 or disaster.^ 
 
 , < Upon the receipt of certain information that 
 Santa Anna was in force at Encarnacion, on. the 
 morning of that day General Taylor had determ 
 ined, to fallback at once toihe hacienda ofBuena 
 Vista; for he feared being turned by, his left, and 
 that- the enemy might gain his r^ar'at La Encarita- 
 da if he remained at Agua Nueva, while the strong 
 
 * Scouting\Expeditions of M'Culloch's Rangers, p.. 235. 
 
 I. BB 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 position in vicinity of Buena Vista could be turned 
 only by the difficult and almost impracticable pass 
 of Palomas Adentro. He had, therefore, on the 
 morning of the 21st, broken up his camp at Agua 
 Nueva, and moved the main body of his force at 
 once to the new position. His depot of stores was 
 removed as far as practicable during the afternoon 
 and evening. The regiment of Arkansas cavalry 
 was left to protect the trains and the transporta 
 tion until the last moment, when Colonel Yell had 
 orders to fire the hacienda and all the stores which 
 he was unable to remove. During the night, two 
 companies of dragoons and a battalion of Kentucky 
 horse were sent back from Buena Vista to re-enforce 
 the Arkansas volunteers, which arrived at Agua 
 Nueva near midnight. Soon after, the advanced 
 pickets in the pass were driven in in such haste 
 that they waited not to see whether their enemy, 
 who had approached and delivered a scattering 
 fire, was of horse or foot. The alarm being given, 
 the torch was at once applied to the buildings, the 
 stores, and several large stacks of unthreshed grain, 
 and the whole train of wagons started-at once with 
 extreme haste to Buena Vista. The troopers re 
 mained until the stores had been consumed, when 
 they also retired, and arrived at dawn of day at the 
 selected field of battle.* 
 
 Upon arriving at Encarnacion, Santa Anna had 
 reorganized his army and settled his plan for at 
 tack. Believing that General Taylor was at Agua 
 
 * Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 25. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 337 
 
 Nueva, he had three roads upon which to operate : 
 the direct route through the denies, the road to the 
 right by La Hedionda, through Guachuchil to La 
 Encantada, or to the left by the Punta de Santa 
 Elena, through San Juan de la Vaqueria to the 
 same point. Either of the two last turned the po 
 sition of Agua Nueva, but were considered imprac 
 ticable, as they would increase the march by two 
 or three days, through a country destitute of provi 
 sions and forage, and, to a great degree, of water ; 
 wherefore he decided to move by the direct route, 
 and made his arrangements to surprise General 
 Taylor in his position at Agua Nueva. His orders 
 were issued on the 20th for the march to be con 
 tinued on the following day. 
 
 General Ampudia, with four light battalions, 
 was placed in the advance, supported by a bat 
 talion of sappers. A company of marksmen and 
 three sixteen pounders, with their ammunition, 
 marched next, followed by General Pacheco's di 
 vision of the van. Lombardini's division of the 
 center followed, accompanied by five twelve pound 
 ers, with their ammunition. Five eight pounders 
 and Ortega's division marched in the rear. Each 
 division of infantry took with it an extra supply 
 of 688,000 rounds of musket ammunition. The 
 cavalry, in escort of the general ammunition train 
 and the baggage of the army, followed in the 
 rear.* 
 
 * Mexican General Orders, 20th and 21st of February. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 156. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 & * ' " , K-' ' " 
 
 In this order the Mexican army began its march 
 about noon to traverse the thirty-six miles of desert 
 between Encarnacion and Agua Nueva. Every 
 precaution was taken that the troops should be 
 supplied with water for the long night march, for 
 it was intended to halt during the night in the 
 desert, and to continue the movement without 
 noise, signal, or beat of drum, so as to arrive and 
 fall on General Taylor at Agua Nueva at early 
 dawn on the 22d.^ 
 
 The whole disposition was deemed by General 
 Santa Anna to be excellent,! but it had one ele 
 ment of failure ; it was based on the anticipation 
 of error in the action of his adversary, which can 
 never be relied upon with security. His intentions 
 were, so far as related to his own movements, en 
 tirely fulfilled, except in the firing of the advanced 
 skirmishers of Ampudia's corps, which that gener 
 al excused by stating that he believed the Amer 
 icans to have mistaken his for Minon's troops. 
 Upon arriving at Agua Nueva on the morning of the 
 21st, instead of coming upon Taylor by surprise 
 as he had anticipated, Santa Anna found that place 
 abandoned, and the battle ground changed to an 
 unknown spot. But as he believed that General 
 Taylor's movement from Agua Nueva was a flight 
 frpm his overwhelming force, and, as he had ordered 
 Minon to penetrate by a route over the mountains 
 
 * Mexican General Orders, 20th and 21st of February. Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 1, Senate, first Sessipn of the thirtieth Congress, p. 156. 
 t Santa Anna's Official Report of the Battle of Angostura. 
 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 339 
 
 or that of Palomas Adentro to the rear of the Amer 
 ican position, and occupy the hacienda of Buena 
 Vista, he hoped that his cavalry would arrest the 
 march in retreat, or make such diversion as would 
 allow time for him to come up and fall on with the 
 main body of the Mexican army, and he resolved 
 to proceed.^ 
 
 Wherefore he ordered the cavalry from rear to 
 front, and, having halted at Agua Nueva only long 
 enough to allow his soldiers time to supply them 
 selves with water, he pushed the whole force for 
 ward in pursuit. During the morning of the 22d 
 his cavalry came in sight of Taylor's army, though 
 not in disorderly retreat, as had been anticipated, 
 for it was just then taking up position for battle in 
 the pass of La Angostura. 
 
 This position, which General Wool had select 
 ed,! and General Taylor had adopted for his bat 
 tle ground, was indeed of remarkable strength. 
 The whole distance from Saltillo to La Encantada 
 is through a valley ranging from one and a half to 
 four miles in width. On either side rugged mount 
 ains, inaccessible for any but light troops, rise from 
 two to three thousand feet, confining operations of 
 masses to the narrow plain. From La Encantada 
 a small stream runs northward toward Saltillo, 
 keeping its course nearest the western side of the 
 valley, but leaving room for wide cultivated fields 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report of the Battle of Angostura, 
 t Correspondence. Appendix to Carleton's History of the Battle of Bue 
 na Vista, p. 176-183. 
 
4.-. tt^.5 
 ,-**. I 
 
 ~v 
 
 39Q THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 on the slopes of the mountains. The road runs 
 along its eastern bank, and the ground between it 
 and the eastern barrier is cut up by deep and wide 
 ravines, which set into the high ground, extending 
 from its vicinity toward the steep ascents. At La 
 Angostura, one and a half miles from Buena Vista, 
 and eight from Saltillo, the high lands extend so 
 far toward the rivulet that room is barely left for 
 the passage of the road- way. On the east of the 
 road are high and rugged banks, and on the west 
 is the perpendicular bank of the rivulet. The de 
 file was protected from being turned on the right 
 by a net- work of impassable ravines, which the 
 stream had worn in the soil. These crossed each 
 other in various directions, and south of the defile 
 some hundred yards the system branched, one 
 branch running to the west toward the mountains, 
 while the other continued along the road. As the 
 ravines extended to the mountains on the west, the 
 right was nearly secure (though perhaps it might 
 have been turned near the mountain), and the bat 
 tle would most probably be fought by an enemy 
 approaching from the south on the left. There the 
 high land, which in a narrow ridge extended to the 
 road, opened into a broad plateau which reached 
 to the mountains. On the southwest the plateau 
 was bounded by a ravine of sufficient width to be 
 called a narrow valley, which reached from the 
 road nearly to the mountains on the east. Toward 
 the mountains this valley ended in narrow and dif 
 ficult ravines, and beyond it, on the south, an ele- 
 
TO rACE P. 391 -VOL . /. ( 
 
w. 
 
 t-.' 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 i. / jC * ^ -v ' . 
 
 yated ridge extended from them to the road. On 
 the western side of the plateau toward the road, in 
 front of La Angostura, three barrancas, with steep 
 banks of loose soil and pebbles, cut in, dividing it 
 for nearly half the distance toward the mountains 
 into three narrow ridges salient to the west, the 
 breadth being north and south. Upon its north 
 eastern side it was bounded by a ravine extending 
 from the mountains to the road, and the country 
 still further in rear was cut up by three main ra 
 vines, which, with many branches, divided the % 
 ground into smaller plains of different capacities. 
 The mountains which bounded it upon the south 
 east rose abruptly, except in two ridges, which, 
 with a sharp ravine in the angle, united near the 
 summit. 
 
 When General Taylor had arrived at Buena Vis- . 
 ta, after drawing back his main force from Agua 
 Nueva, he left the troops under Wool's tempora 
 ry command, and proceeded with an escort to Sal- 
 tillo to make arrangements for the defense of that 
 place. Before his return on the following morn 
 ing, the clouds of dust arising from the direction 
 of La Encantada announced the approach of the 
 Mexican army. The long roll sounded at eight 
 o'clock. The American troops, at the encampment 
 at Buena Vista, fell into their ranks with three 
 hearty cheers, and, under Wool's command, march 
 ed to the chosen field of battle. It was the birth 
 day of Washington, and the remembrance was not 
 lost upon the soldiers. They 'were volunteers, most 
 
 
 ..a. .j.-v 
 
392 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 * '-'- f \ * 
 
 of them for the first time about to engage in battle ; 
 but, for the greater part, tfrey were strong in con 
 fidence in their position, strong in their* national 
 pride, strong in their personal bravery, and, for the 
 most important point for imperfectly-disciplined 
 troops^ strong they had confidence in their gener 
 al; for the name of the successful commander of 
 Palo Alto, Resaea, and Monterey was in high re 
 pute with Americans and Mexicans, and .was in it 
 self a tower of strength. 
 
 Upon arriving at the position, Wool posted Wash 
 ington's battery in the road at La Angostura, with 
 .Colonel Hardin's first Illinois regiment in support 
 upon the ridge of high land immediately to its 
 left, and Colonel M'Kee's second Kentucky on an 
 elevation in its rear. On Hardin's left Bissel's sec 
 ond-Illinois was formed, -and. far to the left, under 
 the mouijtain, Yell's and Marshall's' battalions of 
 Arkansas and Kentucky mounted volunteers were 
 stationed in observation. The remaining. force, con 
 sisting of Lane's Indiana brigade, the Mississippi 
 regiment, two squadrons of dragoons, and six guns 
 of Sherman's and Bragg's batteries, were kept, in 
 ' reserve to the rear of the plateau.^ 
 
 In this order the advance of the enemy was 
 aWaited. Upon finding the American troops in po 
 sition, his cavalry pulled up and' suspended move 
 ment until the arrival of the infantry and artille 
 ry. During the delay, General Santa Anna sent 
 
 * General Wool's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 145. 
 
.THE WAR WITH MEXICO. . 393 
 
 to General Taylor, who had meanwhile return 
 ed from Saltillo, a. summons to surrender at dis 
 cretion, inasmuch as he was surrounded', by an 
 army of twenty thousand men; and. must, in the 
 e^ent of a hattle, he inevitably destroyed ;# an act 
 of courtesy which he might very well have dis 
 pensed with, had he considered the American char 
 acter, and especially the stern bravery of the .Amer 
 ican general. The answer was short, courteous, 
 and a decided negative. 
 
 The Mexican main army having arrived, Santa. 
 Anna commenced his dispositions fojr the conflict. 
 His observations had made 'him acquainted with 
 the impracticable nature of the ground upon his 
 left, and of the, unguarded state of the mountains 
 upon, the east, and, as the battle must 'be fought in 
 that direction, he ordered Ampudia to seize q,nd hold 
 the heights with his light division without delay, f- 
 Ampudia, who had arrived at one o'clock, soon aft 
 er marched to the mountains, and commenced the 
 ascent by the southernmpst ridge. Wheri this 
 movement had been observed, Colonel Marshall, 
 who was re-enforced by a battalion of Indiana ri 
 flemen under Major Gorman, dismounted the rifle 
 companies of his command, and, taking post on the 
 northern ridge of the ascent with them and Gor 
 man's party, prepared to engage the enemy. T,he 
 lines on either crest gradually approached, as, in 
 
 * Taylor's Official Report and Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 
 1, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 97, 98. 
 t Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
394 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the endeavor to outflank, the soldiers climbed up 
 toward the angle, and while their efforts were con 
 tinued for this purpose the Mexican army was tak 
 ing up position out of range of the American artil 
 lery. 
 
 Its right, a battery of sixteen pounders, support 
 ed by the regiment of engineers, rested on the 
 mountains, whence Pacheco's and Lombardini's 
 divisions stretched in two lines, toward the west, 
 to the road. Two batteries of twelves and eights 
 were posted on the left, and the battalion of Leon 
 occupied an eminence in advance of the main line, 
 directly opposite to La Angostura. The cavalry 
 was stationed in reserve in rear of either flank, and 
 the general baggage train, under the protection of 
 a strong brigade of infantry, was parked far to the 
 south of the field of battle.^ 
 
 Upon a movement by Santa Anna in observa 
 tion toward the mountains on the west, Taylor 
 threw two guns of Bragg' s battery, supported by the 
 second Kentucky regiment, across the ravine, at a 
 point some distance to his rear, whence they ad 
 vanced beyond and to the right of La Angostura. 
 To prevent the enemy from coming around by the 
 base of the mountains, and to keep up communi 
 cation with the skirmishers on the left, General 
 Lane was stationed on the left of the plateau with 
 the second regiment of Indiana troops, and three 
 guns of Washington's battery, under Lieutenant 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 395 
 
 O'Brien. While the troops were in these positions, 
 the Mexicans opened the battle.* 
 
 A shell thrown from the Mexican howitzer was 
 the signal, and immediately Ampudia's light troops 
 commenced a heavy fire, in continued rolling vol 
 leys, upon the American skirmishers on the oppo 
 site ridge of the mountain ; but they lay close in 
 the rocks, whence the rattling clang of their rifles 
 announced a resistance less noisy but far more effi 
 cient than the stream of shot which was poured 
 from the opposite ridge. In this quarter the en 
 gagement continued during the afternoon, each 
 party climbing higher and higher upon their re 
 spective ridges, until two lines of skirmishers ex 
 tended from the base n.early to the summit of the 
 mountain. An occasional shot at long range was 
 thrown from the Mexican batteries, but the Amer 
 icans upon the plateau awaited the main move 
 ments for closer conflict in stern silence, and would 
 not reply. About La Angostura the time had been 
 taken advantage of to strengthen the position. 
 Hardin's regiment had completed a parapet along 
 its front, and an epaulement had been constructed 
 across the road for the protection of Washington's 
 battery. A ditch and parapet on the right, among 
 the ravines, had been made and occupied by the 
 immediate supporting force of the battery, two 
 companies of Illinois infantry, and, with this forti 
 fication, the attack of the enemy was anticipated, 
 
 * Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 133. 
 
396 '* THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 at the position deemed most important, in perfect 
 confidence. 
 
 , At dark the contest ceased upon the mountain, 
 and the -Americans were recalled to the plain for 
 the night.^ The Mexicans had succeeded in out 
 flanking them (though the position had not as yet 
 been turned), and held on to the ground which 
 they had gained. In the affairs in that direction, 
 hpwever, hut four Americans had been wounded, 
 while, many Mexicans had fallen before the prac 
 tice of the riflemen. 
 
 The night passed quietly off about the position 
 .of the hostile armies, a few straggling shots be- 
 tw.een the pickets being all which disturbed the 
 silence. 
 
 General Minon, had made good his passage 
 through the defile of Palomas Adentro, and, while 
 the armies were in position about La Angostura, 
 had appeared with his strong brigade of cavalry 
 upon the plains of the valley north of Saltillo. 
 Santa Anna's orders to him at this period were to 
 remain in position, and to fall upon the American 
 forces in their retreat, which he counted upon com 
 pelling on the following day.f For this duty also, 
 1000 mounted rancheros, raised in the country 
 about Parras, had been sent by a mule path from 
 Patos to the village of Capellania, to harass the re- 
 
 * Colonel Humphrey Marshall's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, 
 Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 165. 
 t Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 43. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 397 
 
 treat from the opposite flank ;# but, if. they ever 
 arrived at their destination, they never showed 
 themselves in the operations. Mmon's appearance 
 caused Taylor to feel some anxiety for the security 
 of his depot at Saltillo, and at evening he proceed 
 ed thither, with a squadron of dragoons and the 
 Mississippi regiment, to complete" his arrangements 
 for defense, as he was convinced that the battle 
 would not take place before' the following morn- 
 ing.f 
 
 Saltillo was garrisoned by four companies of Il 
 linois infantry, under Major Warren, who, upon 
 the appearance of the Mexican cavalry, had bar 
 ricaded the streets, and- taken possession of the 'Ca 
 thedral with three companies of Iris' force. A re 
 doubt on the heights south of the town, which 
 commanded several approaches, was garrisoned by 
 the other, and armed with Webster's twenty-four 
 pounder howitzers. General .Taylor's train and 
 head- quarters camp was located upon the brow of 
 the hill to the west, guarded by two companies of 
 Mississippi riflemen and a six poun'der gun.J Hav 
 ing remained during the night at Saltillo, and ver- . 
 ified these dispositions for defense,- General Taylor 
 returned, on the morning of the 23d, with the body 
 of the force which had accompanied him and a 
 piece of artillery, to the field of Angostura. 
 
 Before his arrival General Santa Anna recom- 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
 t General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate., 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 133. t Idem ibidem. 
 
398 THE WAR W I TH MEXICO. 
 
 menced the action. He had re-enforced Ampudia's 
 light division during the night with 2000 men 
 from Pacheco's and Lomhardini's corps, and, with 
 that re-enforcement, Ampudia had stretched his 
 right still further, to secure the advantage which 
 he had gained on the preceding evening.^ At 
 the first dawn of day his troops renewed their fire ; 
 for the American skirmishers, which had heen 
 withdrawn during the night, having been re-en 
 forced hy a battalion of Illinois troops, under Ma 
 jor Trail, were again ordered into action. Al 
 though the enemy showed himself in great force, 
 and occupied many points which the Americans 
 had held on the preceding evening, yet, from the 
 rocks which covered the ridge, they maintained 
 the fight in spite of his numbers and noisy fire. 
 At sunrise the Mexican skirmishers poured down 
 into the ravine from the southern ridge in great 
 strength, with the apparent intention of climbing 
 the opposite steep, and carrying the position by di 
 rect assault. They were, however, soon checked, 
 for Lieutenant O'Brien brought forward a twelve 
 pounder howitzer, and, although the distance and 
 elevation were great, he tore up the ravine for 
 much of its length with shrapnel shot, and so ef 
 fectually that the Mexican fire in the vicinity ceas 
 ed at once, and their skirmishers clambered up the 
 mountain out of range, amid the continued shouts 
 of the American skirmishers and line.f 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
 t Carleton's History of tfce Battle of Buena Vista, p. 51. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 399 
 
 While this was transpiring, General Michelto- 
 rena, chief of Santa Anna's staff, succeeded in plant 
 ing a battery of eight pounders near the hase of 
 the mountains, on the ridge south of the plateau, 
 whence a fire was opened upon O'Brien's gun, but 
 at so long a range that it was ineffectual, and no 
 reply was attempted. From the activity apparent 
 in the Mexican positions, it was evident that San 
 ta Anna was making his dispositions to advance, 
 and Wool, therefore, prepared to receive him. 
 Bragg's guns and M'Kee's regiment were allowed 
 to remain on the extreme right. Washington's 
 battery, with Hardin's first Illinois regiment in 
 support, kept the pass of Angostura, and Colonel 
 Lane's third Indiana occupied the high ground in 
 its rear. Bissel's second Illinois regiment occupied 
 the center of the plateau, with a piece of artillery 
 on either flank, opposite to the head of the second 
 ravine, which cut into the high ground from the 
 west. Between this position and La Angostura 
 Steen's squadron of the first dragoons and a com 
 pany of Texas horse were posted. To the left of 
 the plain General Lane had the second Indiana 
 regiment and O'Brien's guns, and next the mount 
 ain, in the broad ravine to the north of the plateau, 
 were portions of the Kentucky and Arkansas cav 
 alry, covered on their left by the skirmishers on the 
 mountain.* By this disposition the mass of force 
 
 * Wool's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Ses 
 sion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 146, and Carleton's History of the Battle 
 of Buena Vista, p. 53. 
 
400 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 . was Collected, .about La .Angostura, "the point of 
 greatest strength, ami. deemed to be that of greatest 
 importance,' while the left, the direction iri which 
 the line could, be most easily turned, was defended 
 by corps^.with wide intervals, and three .pieces of 
 artillery. 
 
 In the morning General Santa Anna observed 
 the position of Bragg's guns and M'Kee's regiment 
 upon 'the extreme American right, but the same 
 reasons which induced him to attempt to force the 
 passage by his own right induced him to neglect 
 that force, and make his battle entirely toward the 
 east. He therefore brought forward his- twelve 
 . pounder battery, and planted it on the western ex 
 tremity of -the ridge iri front of the plateau, within 
 , *' range of La. Angostura, and organized three pow 
 erful columns 'of attack.. The first, under his chief 
 ejigiiieer, General Mora y Villamil, was made up 
 
 of the regiment of engineers, the- twelfth of the 
 , ' line, the fixed battalion of Mexico, the battalion 
 
 ' of Puebla, and the guarda, costa of Tampico. The 
 second was to consist of the remainder of Lombar- 
 dini's and Pacheco's divisions, which were to con- 
 . centrate on the. plateau at the base of the mount 
 ain, and move* on the American left. . It was to ef 
 fect al junction with the third* column, Ampudia's 
 light division, r.e-enforced as it was, which was to 
 sweep down the mountain, when the whole great 
 er force was to pass on to 'the American rear. Mo 
 ra ^Villamil and Pacheco each had powerful sup 
 porting corps of cavalry, and the infantry force about 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 401 
 
 the baggage train, under General Ortega, was still 
 in reserve.^ 
 
 The heavy rolling volleys of Mexican musketry 
 and the sharp crack of American rifles kept up the 
 noise of battle on the left while the troops of the 
 main armies were taking up position. General 
 Mora y Villamil formed his column along the road, 
 in front of Washington's battery, out of range. Pa- 
 checo collected his troops in the valley south of the 
 plateau, and halted out of sight, while Lombard! - 
 ni's corps, from the highest part of the ridge beyond 
 it, poured down in splendid array to join him. 
 
 The Mexican columns soon advanced, Mora y 
 Villamil's directly upon La Angostura, while Pa- 
 checo's commenced the ascent of the plateau at a 
 point near the western extremity of the southern 
 most ridge. When the advance of this column 
 was discovered, Wool was at La Angostura; but 
 Lane, as had been directed,! ordered forward 
 O'Brien's guns, supported by x the second Indiana 
 regiment, to meet and check it. The guns were 
 thrown into battery to fire to the west, upon the 
 southern ridge, near its base, and the infantry dis 
 played on the left and rear. The line, thus dis 
 posed, stretched across the ridge and defended the 
 passage, but it presented its flank to the Mexi 
 can eight pounder battery. As soon as it was 
 formed, Pacheco's division came over the western 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
 t Wool's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Ses 
 sion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 147. 
 
 L Cc 
 
402 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 crest in close column of regiments, and its advance 
 opened a fire. It was at once returned with spirit 
 and effect. O'Brien's shot tore through the thick 
 ranks from front to rear, and, although the Mexi 
 can masses were crowding up in haste from the 
 valley, the head of the column was checked and 
 thrown repeatedly into confusion. Its advanced 
 corps, the new regiment of Guanajuato, was killed, 
 wounded, or dispersed. The Mexican eight pound 
 er battery, however, had opened fire upon the flank 
 of the Indiana troops. To get beyond its range 
 and to continue to defend the ridge, Lane^ intend 
 ed to advance the line, and O'Brien had already 
 thrown forward his guns fifty yards nearer the 
 Mexican column, when Colonel Bowles gave an 
 order to " cease firing and retreat."! His men, in 
 front of overwhelming odds, much cut up by the 
 fire of the Mexican battery, and badly disciplined, 
 were in this instance but too glad to obey him. 
 They broke, and, in spite of all efforts made by 
 other officers to restrain them, their retreat soon 
 became a rout. The greater number of the men 
 of that regiment fled beyond the range of fire; 
 many continued their flight to Buena Vista, and 
 some even to Saltillo.J O'Brien, with his guns, 
 held on to his position for some moments ; but the 
 whole fire of the Mexican battery and of the head 
 
 * General Lane's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 182-185. 
 
 t Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 60. 
 
 t Wool's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Ses 
 sion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 147. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 493 
 
 of Pacheco's column was concentrated upon him, 
 and he was compelled to retire. His horses and 
 cannoneers being much cut up, he was obliged to 
 sacrifice one of his guns, and, upon arriving at the 
 position of the main force at La Angostura, he had 
 not a single man unhurt to serve the two remain 
 ing pieces*^ 
 
 Pacheco's masses, being relieved in front, came 
 over the crest of the plateau and effected a junction 
 with Lombardini's corps, which, had advanced un 
 opposed across the head of the, valley arid ascend 
 ed near the mountains. The attention of the com 
 bined forces 'was first directed to the American 
 troops upon the plateau, and a heavy fire was open 
 ed upon Bissel's second Illinois regiment, and the 
 two pieces of artillery under Lieutenants Thomas 
 and French. Four companies of Arkansas volun 
 teers had been ordered to dismount and move up 
 when the battle commenced, but, upon reaching 
 the plain, they fled at the first fire, and, with few 
 exceptions, those companies were heard of no more 
 during the action, f 
 
 When the Indiana regiment fled, Colonel Mar 
 shall recalled his dismounted Kentuckians from the 
 slope of the mountain, and advanced his remaining 
 mounted companies of Kentucky and Arkansas 
 troops to cover the retreat 4 His skirmishers, and 
 
 * Captain O'Brien's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 160. 
 
 t Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 67. 
 
 t Colonel Marshall's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 167. 
 
404 THE W AR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Gorman's and Trail's battalions, fell away from 
 their positions, and retreated along the base of the 
 mountains north of the plateau, and by degrees to 
 the hacienda of Buena Vista, followed by the cav 
 alry of the command, for direct communication with 
 the main American force about La Angostura was 
 cut off. Ampudia's light division pressed on down 
 the slope in pursuit, and the American position was 
 completely turned. 
 
 Mora y Villamil's column had meanwhile ad 
 vanced against La Angostura. As it came within 
 close range, Washington opened his battery with 
 terrific rapidity and effect. His shot tore and 
 crashed through the dense mass of Mexican troops 
 in its entire depth. They advanced but little after 
 the fire had opened, and in a few minutes, the head 
 of the column being completely crushed and shat 
 tered, the whole mass heaved in confusion, broke, 
 and the soldiers fled for shelter into the ravines 
 and gorges which set into the plateau, leaving the 
 road encumbered with a multitude of dead and 
 dying. 
 
 As this fire opened from La Angostura, Pache- 
 co's troops pressed heavily on the small American 
 force upon the plateau. But the two guns and the 
 second Illinois regiment held their ground with 
 wonderful pertinacity, falling back only as the 
 masses of the enemy extended to the north and 
 threatened to outflank them, and halting and de 
 livering well-directed fires of canister and musket 
 ry so soon as the temporary danger had passed. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Upon the flight of the second Indiana regiment, 
 Bragg's guns and M'Kee's regiment had been with 
 drawn from their position on the extreme right, 
 Sherman's remaining section ordered to advance, 
 and these forces hurried at once to restore the hat- 
 tie on the left. Sherman came first into battery, 
 and Bragg, arriving immediately after, took up the 
 cannonade. Six pieces of light artillery were then 
 in play upon the Mexican troops in flank ; for Pa- 
 checo's, LombardinFs, and Ampudia's divisions, be 
 ing joined by a heavy support of cavalry, and giv 
 ing up the attempt to force the Americans from 
 the plateau, were, as had been ordered by Santa 
 Anna, moving on around the base of the mountain 
 to the American rear. The American artillery 
 soon told, and the column was divided on the plain, 
 many Mexican troops falling back to the valley to 
 .the south. Bragg advanced his section to get a 
 closer range, with four companies of Hardin's regi 
 ment in support, which had been brought up by 
 the colonel from La Angostura _so soon as Mora's 
 column had been repulsed. A mass of Mexican 
 troops were in position close to the mountains, and 
 on it Bragg directed his fire ; but, during the pre 
 vious movements, Santa Anna had posted there a 
 battery of heavy guns, which were unmasked by 
 the supporting cavalry and infantry, and replied 
 with successive discharges of heavy grape. Bragg, 
 unable to oppose the fire with that of his light 
 pieces, withdrew beyond ranged 
 
 * Captain Bragg's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress p. 201. 
 
406 THE WAR W I TH MEXICO. 
 
 While these affairs were transpiring, General 
 Taylor arrived in the vicinity of the battle field, 
 with May's squadron of dragoons, Pike's of Arkan 
 sas cavalry, a piece of artillery under Lieutenant 
 Kilburn of Bragg's battery, and the Mississippi reg 
 iment. The general, with the cavalry, proceeded 
 at once to the plateau, leaving the Mississippi reg 
 iment at Buena Vista for sufficient time to ^ allow 
 the men to fill their canteens. It was high time 
 for his arrival, for the natural advantages of the po 
 sition had been in a degree lost, and the result of 
 the battle then depended more than ever upon the 
 hard fighting of the troops. Many officers and 
 men had already fallen, and among them Wool's 
 assistant adjutant general, Captain Lincoln, a gal 
 lant gentleman, who was killed while vainly en 
 deavoring to check the fugitives from the field. 
 Of these, a much greater number than was credit 
 able, of both horse and foot volunteers, passed in a 
 stream to the rear. 
 
 All the Mexican force which had turned the left 
 was on the advance. Marshall's Kentuckians, 
 Yell's battalions of Arkansas cavalry, and Trail's 
 and Gorman's battalions of rifles, had retreated, and 
 were approaching the hacienda of Buena Vista. 
 The fugitives from the field were flocking thither 
 in great numbers; and although General Wool, Col 
 onel Davis, and many other officers strove to check 
 them, their appeals were unheeded. The enemy's 
 advance of infantry was, in the mean time, coming 
 rapidly on, and but a single ravine intervened be- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 4 Q 7 
 
 tween him and the road. In the crisis of the mo 
 ment, Davis, who had ridden forward through the 
 fugitives to examine the ground upon which he 
 was to operate, without wasting more time in the 
 attempt to rally them, resolved to attack the en 
 emy in front.^ Wool approved of his movement, 
 promised support, and started in person to order 
 forward the third Indiana regiment from JL,a An 
 gostura. Davis, with his own regiment and a few 
 men of the second Indiana who had rallied under 
 Colonel Bowles, moved forward unsupported against 
 the Mexican advance. He deployed out of range, 
 and advanced at double quick time until his troops 
 had gained their distance, when they opened " fire 
 advancing."! The third Indiana regiment had 
 not come up, and the Mexican masses, flanked by 
 cavalry, with portions of Pacheco's and Lombardi- 
 ni's divisions in close^ support, were moving on ; 
 but, without counting the overwhelming odds, the 
 riflemen still kept on their advance. The flanking 
 cavalry of the enemy took cover in a ravine upon 
 the American right, with the apparent intention 
 of endeavoring to gain the rear of the regiment ; 
 but, still keeping up their storm of shot, the gal 
 lant, troops gained the crest of the only ravine 
 which intervened between them and the enemy. 
 The Mexicans halted and replied with heavy roll 
 ing volleys of musketry, but the ratio of loss was 
 fearfully against them. In a few moments, the reg- 
 
 * Colonel Davis's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 192. t Idem ibidem. 
 
403 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 iment, with a shout which rang high and loud 
 ahove the roar of battle, plunged into the ravine, 
 and in an instant reappeared in front of the enemy 
 on his own side, and continued to advance.^ A 
 closer distance brought greater destruction, hut the 
 ratio was yet against the Mexicans. The Missis- 
 sippians would not yield or halt, and, still advanc 
 ing, poured in their shot with additional rapidity, 
 until the Mexican advance, cut up and disorgan 
 ized, lost its formation, and rolled back, a disorder 
 ed multitude, upon the supporting forces. 
 
 The flanking cavalry was in the mean while per 
 sisting in the attempt to gain the rear ; but when 
 the Mexican infantry gave way, Davis brought 
 up a party to the brink of the ravine, and fell upon 
 the cavalry as it was ascending the bank, killed 
 the commander, and dispersed the command.! 
 Having accomplished this, he retired beyond the 
 ravine which he had crossed, where he was soon 
 after joined by Lane's third Indiana regiment and 
 Kilburn's gun. The last was thrown into battery 
 and served upon the Mexican infantry, then far in 
 the front, near the mountains, which continued its 
 retreat. The two regiments and piece of artillery 
 advanced to the position where the Mississippians 
 had first met the enemy, when a gun from the 
 heavy battery which Santa Anna had established 
 on the plateau opened a fire which drove the In- 
 
 * Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 77. 
 t Colonel Davis's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 193. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 499 
 
 diana regiment, the most exposed, to cover in the 
 ravine, and silenced the American six pounder, 
 which rejoined its battery.^ 
 
 While a check had been given to the Mexican 
 infantry, the cavalry, with Torrejon's brigade in 
 advance, had skirted the mountains, and, as Mar 
 shall's and Yell's commands fell back, approached 
 within striking distance of Buena Vista, where the 
 train of the main army was parked. From his po 
 sition on the plateau, General Taylor ordered all 
 the cavalry near him to re-enforce the point. The 
 Mexican cavalry was on the advance, when four 
 companies of regular dragoons and two of Arkansas 
 volunteers, all under May, came down to the ha 
 cienda; but, seeing the re-enforcement, Torrejon 
 pulled up, and, after a short pause, fell back. May 
 returned to the plateau, and the Arkansas and 
 Kentucky men being left unsupported, Torrejon 
 again advanced, and came down upon them with 
 his whole brigade in column of squadrons. The 
 charge was received by the volunteers in line near 
 the hacienda, and, as the Mexicans approached, 
 they threw in a scattering fire. Before they could 
 drop their carbines and draw their sabers, the mass 
 of the enemy, over one thousand strong, was upon 
 them. The volunteers numbered not more than 
 five hundred. In an instant the melee became 
 general, and the whole crowd, in confusion, en 
 veloped in a cloud of dust, drove on with loud 
 
 * Colonel Davis's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 193. 
 
410 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 shouts toward the, hacienda. There a number of 
 men who had fled from the field had taken shelter, 
 and there Trail's and Gorman's battalions had 
 taken post after their retreat from the mountains. 
 They occupied the azoteas of the hacienda, and 
 the adobe walls of its inclosures, whence a rattling 
 fire was directed on the Mexican brigade. As the 
 mass approached it divided, one half following the 
 volunteers into the street of the hacienda, while 
 the other swerved to the right and returned. The 
 Kentuokians. and Arkansas troops disentagled 
 themselves, and. the Mexicans gave up the pursuit 
 of their advantage, and continued their course 
 through and beyond , the buildings ; for May's 
 command had been re-sent to support the volun 
 teers with two pieces of artillery, and he was close 
 at hand, IJpon his arrival, Lieutenant Reynolds 
 opened his guns upon the retreating parties, and 
 continued his fire' until they were under cover and 
 out of ranged In this affair General Torrejon was 
 wounded, and left thirty-five men dead upon the 
 field. On. the American side, Colonel Yell, Cap 
 tain Porter, and Lieutenant Vaughn died in the 
 melee, with many of tjieir best and bravest men. 
 
 Upon the failure of the attempt upon the ha 
 cienda, and the retrograde movement of Dayis's 
 and Lane's regiments, a fresh brigade of Mexican 
 cavalry advanced to gain the road along the broad 
 ridge in which the Mississippians had first engaged 
 the enemy. It numbered about one thousand 
 
 - * Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 77. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 4^ 
 
 lancers, and protected by infantry in its passage 
 of the different ravines, came on in gallant style. 
 Davis formed his regiment across the ridge, and the 
 third Indiana regiment, with a large portion of the 
 second (which had been rallied by the exertions of 
 Major Dix, Captain Linnard, and other staff offi 
 cers), stretched to the right and front, closing up 
 the ground between the ravines. Captain Sher 
 man, who had been firing at the enemy's infantry 
 near the mountains, brought up a twelve pound 
 howitzer, and took post on Davis's left. Both flanks 
 of the line rested on the ravines, and it presented 
 a re-entering angle, giving a cross fire to the ene 
 my, who was rapidly approaching. But, although 
 the lancers had started at speed upon the charge, 
 they lacked the moral force with which to continue 
 it. They gradually diminished their pace, and 
 pulled up to a walk within eighty yards of the 
 American line. The commanding officers there, 
 being confident of success in receiving them, hatd 
 ordered the fire to be withheld, and the troops 
 awaited the word with shouldered arms ; but,- one 
 or two pieces being fired, the whole line of muskets 
 and rifles was brought down upon the enemy. The 
 aim was settled in a momentary pause, and the next 
 instant the whole head of the Mexican column was 
 destroyed by the well-directed volley.^ Captain 
 Sherman commenced firing from his howitzer, and 
 
 * General Lane's, Colonel Davis's, and Colonel Lane's Official Reports. 
 Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 
 182, 193, 188. 
 
412 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the mass of cavalry, without any further demon 
 stration of attack, fled from the field. 
 
 The affair at the hacienda having been decided 
 by Torrejon's retreat, General Taylor ordered the 
 dragoons, with the volunteer cavalry andReynolds's 
 section of artillery, to move against the enemy's 
 right flank, near the eastern side of the valley. 
 Bragg, who had heard the uproar at Buena Vista 
 while replenishing his ammunition, had proceeded 
 from the vicinity of the plateau in that direction at 
 a gallop. He arrived after the affair had been de 
 cided, and Kilburn having joined him in the mean 
 while, he opened his three pieces at long range 
 upon the retreating cavalry, which had advanced 
 against the Mississippi and Indiana troops.* He 
 afterward took post to the left between them and 
 the dragoons, and regulated his movements by 
 those of the enemy, without support, until Wool, 
 at his request, ordered May to move his cavalry to 
 the vicinity. Reynolds had meanwhile worked his 
 guns with rapidity, and, as the commands united, 
 the artillery was advanced with confidence toward 
 the enemy, who was at once driven back against 
 the mountain in the direction of the plateau. 
 
 There the battle had raged in a continual can 
 nonade. The American artillery played upon the 
 Mexican troops as they passed and repassed on the 
 east, and although only three pieces (O'Brien's sec 
 tion and Thomas's gun) were in battery at the 
 
 * Captain Bragg's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 201. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 point, they were served with such skill and rapidity 
 that the passage across the hase of the plateau was 
 insecure, in spite of the Mexican eighteen and 
 twenty-four pounders, which were occasionally di 
 rected to silence their fire. The American infantry 
 kept in shelter in the ravines, except when a body 
 of Mexican cavalry or infantry would venture with 
 in musket range ; then a short roll of musketry 
 would vary the cannonade ; but the main effort of 
 the Mexican general was at this time on the Ameri 
 can left, and his advancing parties on the plateau 
 were easily driven back. 
 
 When the American forces on the left advanced 
 and drove the routed masses of the enemy back 
 upon the mountain, his heavy artillery opened 
 upon them from the plateau, but it had little effect. 
 Bragg, Sherman, and Reynolds kept pouring in 
 their well-directed discharges, and Thomas and 
 O'Brien swept the line of retreat. Bragg, still ad 
 vancing his pieces, obtained a closer range, and 
 also intercepted the route to the Mexican rear. 
 The situation of all the Mexican force which had 
 turned the American left was at this time critical 
 in the extreme. For a time endeavors were made 
 to return the artillery fire with musketry ; but, losing 
 courage, the whole body of troops became mingled 
 in utter confusion. Bragg pressed on to within 
 close canister range, and worked his guns with 
 surprising rapidity. The Mexican mass cowered 
 under each stern stroke, as the shot swept through 
 the disordered multitude, and while some vainly 
 
414 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 endeavored to escape by climbing up the side of 
 the mountain, the greater portion stood in bewilder- 
 ed confusion, a chaos of men and horses, and every 
 succeeding discharge added fearfully to the num 
 ber of dead and wounded. In fact, .the whole body, 
 of over five thousand men, of different arms, was 
 cut off, and its destruction, which, had not the fire 
 of the artillery been interrupted, was inevitable, 
 would have at once decided the fate of the day. 
 Bragg was following, up his advantage, and con 
 tinued' to pour in his canister ; but, while his pieces 
 were in full play, a white flag approached from 
 General Taylor's position, passed rapidly in his 
 front toward the enemy,. and .he ceased.^ 
 
 At about this period of the action three Mexican 
 officers approached the position- of the American 
 troops upon the plateau . without a flag, but at 
 speed, and. with the evident intention of opening a 
 parley. They were received and conducted to 
 General Taylor, and inquired of Him, from Gen 
 eral Santa Anna, " what he wanted." The in 
 quiry was received with some surprise, but was re- 
 plied to by demanding the surrender of the Mexi- 
 c^ army, and time was allowed for consideration. 
 Under the idea that the corps on/the right would 
 surrender^ General Taylor sent a volunteer aid-de 
 camp in that direction to carry a summons and 
 order a cessation of fire from the American bat 
 teries. Upon the arrival of the envoy at the Mex- 
 
 * Captain Bragg's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 202. 
 
THIS WAR WITH MEXICO/ 
 
 ican position, the mass closed round him, and he 
 was led blindfolded to Santa Anna. The .whole 
 Mexican force .which had been compromised moved 
 with him, under protection of the flag,, to the se 
 cure position south of the plateau. 
 
 Whether the scheme had been intended to effect 
 that object is doubtful. Santa Anna makes no 
 mention of the matter in his reports ; and it can 
 hardly be believed that a man of his talent for in 
 trigue would have sent so silly and impudent a 
 message, had it originated with .him ; but certain 
 it is that advantage was taken of the flag to with 
 draw the compromised troops from their perilous 
 position. 
 
 Upon the return of the Mexican officers, General 
 Wool accompanied them in thje direction of the 
 heavy battery on the plateau, to communicate with 
 Santa Anna on the part of General Taylor. Ak 
 though the American batteries had .ceased firing, 
 the Mexican had not, but kept playing upon the 
 infantry near the guns under, which their troops 
 had just passed without hinderance. - Wool, find 
 ing that they would not cease their fire, declared 
 the parley at an end, and returned without having 
 seen or communicated with Santa Anna.^ 
 
 Mr. Crittenden, who had borne General Taylor's 
 message to the Mexican right wing, reached the 
 Mexican general after it had escaped, : and received, 
 in answer to his demand, a demand, fox the sur- 
 
 * Wool's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1 /Senate, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 149. 
 
416 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 render of General Taylor. The communications, 
 of course, resulted in nothing, so far as the subject 
 of conversation was concerned, but the whole affair 
 had the effect of allowing, through General Tay 
 lor's humanity, the escape of the Mexican right 
 wing, and of annulling the advantages which had 
 been recovered, in some degree, on the part of the 
 Americans. But while the American envoy was 
 blindfolded in his passage to Santa Anna, the Mex 
 ican officers had reached General Taylor, who was 
 then on the plateau, with only three regiments of 
 infantry and three guns, and had enjoyed a full 
 opportunity of observing the amount of force which 
 defended the key to the pass of Angostura. 
 
 The Mexican force, with the exception of the 
 three heavy guns near the base of the mountain, 
 and their supporting infantry, was, soon after the 
 passage of the flags, clear of the plain. Six Amer 
 ican guns, the Mississippi and Indiana regiments, 
 all the cavalry, and the small battalions of rifle 
 men, were then far to the left, where they had 
 forced back the Mexican right wing. 
 
 In the interval of American action caused by 
 the passage of the flags, and before the entire Mex 
 ican right wing had rejoined the main body, Santa 
 Anna brought up his reserves, re-enforced them by 
 the remnants of Mora y Villamil's column, the 
 eleventh regiment of the line, and the battalion of 
 Leon, all of which he formed in the valley to the 
 south, in column of attack, which, under General 
 Perez, was to make a final struggle for the victory; 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 4^7 
 
 for, notwithstanding the successes which he had 
 gained in the early part of the day, and the escape 
 of the right wing, he had been driven, by the hard 
 fighting of the American troops, and the splendid 
 service of their artillery, from many important 
 points, and had only the plateau upon which he 
 could operate. To the strong mass which he had 
 thus formed he added the remnants of his right 
 wing as they came up, and, under General Perez, 
 the whole, in solid column, climbed the ascent from 
 the valley.^ 
 
 Wool had directed O'Brien to advance his guns 
 against the Mexican troops while in retreat, and his 
 section, with Thomas's six pounder, had been run 
 forward and commenced firing. Colonels M'Kee, 
 Hardin, and Bissel, whose regiments had as yet 
 suffered but little, led them forward in pursuit, and 
 had advanced near to the southern crest as Petez's 
 column of full 12,000 men came over in a blaze 
 of musketry. Surprised by the appearance in such 
 force, and in such good array, of an enemy who 
 had just relinquished the field, and being some 
 what scattered, one regiment in line,t another de 
 ploying from column of di visions, $ another in col 
 umn of companies, and in advance of and without 
 the assistance of the artillery, the American infant 
 ry delivered a fire, and the greater portion sought 
 shelter in the center barranca of the western side 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
 t Lieutenant-colonel Weatherford's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, 
 Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 174. 
 t Colonel Bissel's and Major Fry's Reports. Idem, p. 176, 170. 
 
 I DD 
 
418 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the plateau. Some continued firing from its 
 crests, but they did not retard the advance of the 
 Mexican column. All which opposed that was the 
 rapid and continued discharges of artillery with 
 which O'Brien and Thomas tore its ranks ; but, al 
 though they swept through the column with ter 
 rific effect, and masses went down at every round, 
 yet the range became palpably shorter each instant. 
 Canister was substituted for round shot ; but still, 
 although momentarily checked, the mass came on, 
 and before it O'Brien and Thomas retreated by the 
 recoil of their pieces. At that time not an efficient 
 infantry soldier was in the plain. 
 
 The volunteer regiments, mixed in confusion, 
 were crowded in the deep barranca, and rolled 
 down its steep and shelving banks to the bottom, 
 while the Mexican infantry enveloped its crest 
 and pelted them with musketry, to which they 
 had no chance to reply. # To insure their destruc 
 tion, a strong battalion of lancers, from the caval 
 ry reserves along the road, came over the salient 
 crest of the southern ridge, and, passing the sec 
 ond, were about to close the mouth of the barranca, 
 the only avenue of escape which was left. Under 
 the fearful storm of shot, Colonels M'Kee and Har- 
 din, Lieutenant-colonel Clay, and numbers, brave 
 and gallant men, of inferior rank, were slain and 
 wounded, and all appeared to be lost, when the 
 movement of the lancers brought them in range of 
 Washington's battery at La Angostura. He open- 
 
 * Carletou's History of the Battle of Buena Viata, p. 110. 
 > 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 4^9 
 
 ed his guns at once with accuracy and effect, cut 
 ting up and driving back the horsemen from the 
 mouth of the barranca, through which the volun 
 teers issued in a stream, and fled for shelter toward 
 the battery, while Washington and his subalterns, 
 Brent and Whiting, kept the guns in play, over 
 their heads, upon the retreating cavalry. The 
 Mexican infantry, being unopposed, descended into 
 the barranca, and murdered every wounded man 
 who had been unable to escape.^ 
 
 On the plateau affairs were at the crisis. After 
 the escape of the Mexican right wing, Bragg, be 
 ing fearful that the enemy would concentrate his 
 force and attack on the American right, had start 
 ed with all speed in that direction.! When the 
 struggle there had fairly commenced, officers were 
 sent to hasten forward Sherman's battery, the dra 
 goons, and the Mississippi and Indiana regiments. 
 The heavy fire about the position soon told of the 
 necessity of their presence, and Bragg and Sher 
 man urged on their jaded horses with whip and 
 spur. Davis and Lane led their regiments at a run 
 across the ravines and ridges ; and Bragg, in ad 
 vance, gained the plateau just as the Mexican 
 masses had closed upon and captured O'Brien's 
 guns ; not, however, until that officer and all his 
 cannoneers had been wounded. Bragg threw his 
 three pieces at once into battery, and, with Thom- 
 
 * Carleton's History of the Battle of Buena Vista, p. 111. 
 t Bragg's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Ses 
 sion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 202. 
 
420 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 as's, they were worked with all the energy which 
 the crisis demanded. The first discharge caused the 
 advancing multitude to waver, the second threw it 
 into confusion, and the third insured its retreat ; 
 for Sherman had come up and taken up the fire, 
 Washington at that instant opened upon the lanc 
 ers, Davis and Lane had approached and opened 
 fire upon the Mexican right flank, and the battle 
 was won. 
 
 The artillery was advanced in pursuit, with Da- 
 vis's regiment in support, and kept up a fire on the 
 retreating masses until it came within range of 
 the heavy guns of the enemy, when it fell back 
 again to the north of the plateau. The after ef 
 forts of the Mexican troops were confined to an at 
 tempt to remove a disabled caisson, which had 
 been left in the advance ; but they were driven 
 from its vicinity with loss. The stream of their 
 fugitives had borne with them O'Brien's two guns, 
 and no attempt was made on the part of the Amer 
 icans to recover them. 
 
 When night fell, the noise of battle, which had 
 died away since the repulse of the Mexican re 
 serves, ceased entirely, and both armies occupied, 
 in the main, the same positions whence they had 
 moved in the morning. 
 
 When the battle had commenced at Angostura, 
 General Minon moved his cavalry from the valley 
 north of Saltillo, along the eastern base of the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 421 
 
 mountains, with the apparent intention of cutting 
 the communication of the main body of the Amer 
 ican army with Saltillo. A few shells were direct 
 ed upon his column from the redoubt south of the 
 town ; but the range was too great for effect, and 
 the cavalry gained the plain without loss. There 
 it intercepted and took prisoners a few fugitives 
 from the field ; but, while it remained in position, 
 Captain Shover brought forward his gun from Gen 
 eral Taylor's camp, followed by a promiscuous 
 crowd of about one hundred mounted and foot vol 
 unteers, teamsters, citizens, and servants, all shout 
 ing to the top of their bent, but of no other use 
 than to make a show of a supporting force. Sho 
 ver, keeping in advance of this crew, opened his 
 gun upon the cavalry, which fell back before his 
 well-directed fire. Minon had, however, left a 
 strong corps in ambush in a ravine, whence it 
 could charge upon the gun if it were advanced to 
 annoy the retreat. Shover observed a single horse 
 man who watched his movements, and, reconnoi- 
 tering in person, he discovered the position of the de 
 tachment ;# wherefore, neglecting the main body, 
 he brought up his piece to an enfilading position, 
 and raked the ravine with a single shot at long 
 range, which drove the detachment out, and it hast 
 ened to j oin the retreat. C aptain Webster had sent 
 a twenty-four pounder howitzer from the redoubt, 
 with a company of infantry in support, which Lieu- 
 
 * Captain Shover's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 208. 
 
422 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 tenant Donaldson brought up at the moment, and, 
 both pieces being advanced, cannonaded the caval 
 ry until it reached a position out of range, north of 
 Saltillo ; and, the communication being thus clear 
 ed to the city, no further attempts were made by 
 the enemy to interrupt it. 
 
 During the night, every preparation was made 
 on the American side to receive a renewed attack 
 on the following morning. The front was covered 
 by a strong chain of sentinels, and strong pickets 
 were posted to the right and left to guard against 
 being turned during the darkness. The troops 
 were supplied with rations on the field, and the 
 wounded were sent in wagons to Saltillo. 
 
 The remnant of those companies of the Missis 
 sippi regiment which had been engaged were sent 
 to garrison the town, and were replaced by the fresh 
 companies of Illinois and Mississippi troops which 
 had held it during the battle. 
 
 In the uncertainty of Santa Anna's advance and 
 of his field of battle, General Taylor had stationed 
 General Marshall, with a battalion of Kentucky 
 horse, and Captain Prentiss's heavy battery of two 
 twenty-four pounders and two eight-inch howitzers, 
 at the pass of La Rinconada. On the night of the 
 22d, he sent orders to Marshall to move up to Bue- 
 na Vista. Marshall started so soon as he received 
 the order, and by strenuous exertions and perse 
 verance, brought his command, with all the mate- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 423 
 
 rial, to within striking distance of Buena Vista on 
 the night of the 23d, through the country which 
 was at the time occupied hy the thousand mount 
 ed rancheros on the right, and Miiion's cavalry bri 
 gade on the left. With this re-enforcement, and 
 the fresh companies from Saltillo, General Taylor 
 was enabled to present on the field of battle a force 
 in numbers slightly superior to that with which 
 the action had been opened on the 22d, and with 
 one piece of artillery more,^ besides having the ad 
 vantages of the superior weight of metal for a bat 
 tery in fixed position. 
 
 When daylight broke on the morning of the 24th 
 the preparations had not been completed, but the 
 position which the Mexican army had occupied on 
 the previous day was clear of an enemy. Santa 
 Anna had fallen back during the night to Agua 
 Nueva, leaving his dead unburied and his wound 
 ed uncared for. In all, these amounted in number 
 to over two thousand, including several officers of 
 high rank. 
 
 The American scouts were pushed on after him 
 to observe his movements, and by seven o'clock re 
 turned with positive information of his retreat. 
 Upon receiving it, Taylor, with Wool and the staff, 
 moved up to La Encantada with an escort of dra 
 goons. Thence he dispatched his assistant adju 
 tant general, Major Bliss, to Agua Nueva, with a 
 proposition to Santa Anna for an exchange of pris- 
 
 * General Taylor's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 137. 
 
424 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 oners, a request that he would 'send in for his 
 wounded, and a conciliatory message, expressing 
 the desire of the American government for peace. 
 The exchange of prisoners was effected, and the 
 release of the prisoners taken at Encarnacion and 
 the Palomas pass was agreed upon. As the Mex 
 ican general had no means of transporting his 
 wounded, he left them in the hands of General 
 Taylor, to be treated as humanity might dictate. 
 But he was just then in no humor to assent to the 
 indirect proposals for peace which were contained 
 in the message of the American commander, and 
 his reply expressed a determination to prosecute 
 the war, and to say nothing of peace so long as the 
 Americans were west of the Rio Bravo, or occupied 
 any part of the Mexican territory, or continued to 
 blockade the ports of the republic.^ 
 
 Santa Anna was in a position of great difficulty. 
 His attempt to force the pass of Angostura, in spite 
 of all his arrangements and of his overwhelming 
 numbers, had proved a total failure, however much 
 he may have tried to disguise the fact to his coun 
 trymen and even to himself. 
 
 With his army beaten, weakened by over two 
 thousand killed and wounded, and by more than 
 three thousand desertions, he was in position with 
 out hospitals, without depots, and without money, 
 and, worse than all, a revolution was springing up 
 in the capital of Mexico. He had still eighteen 
 thousand men left; and when his energy is con- 
 
 * Santa Anna's Official Report. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 425 
 
 sidered, as displayed in the rapidity with which he 
 attempted to seize the advantages promised by 
 Taylor's weakness about Saltillo, it may be deem 
 ed strange that, in the situation in which he found 
 himself, he did not make another effort to gain 
 what might be called, with more reason, a victory. 
 But, with all his energy and talent, Santa Anna 
 had not that steady, stern perseverance which, in 
 a general, often repairs his faults and makes amends 
 for a host of errors. And, indeed, if he had failed 
 in carrying his point with his whole force, even 
 when his troops were inspired by his partial suc 
 cess, when the advantages of position had been in 
 great measure taken from Taylor, when the con 
 test depended upon the bravery and hard fighting 
 of the troops alone, and the American soldiers, al 
 though in numbers but one to three and four, had 
 wrested from him point after point r and when the 
 American artillery, with a few steadfast regiments, 
 had met the advance of his overwhelming masses 
 in the last effort for victory, and driven them, dis 
 comfited and broken, from the plateau, it might 
 well have been considered doubtful whether suc 
 cess could be gained by a further continuation of 
 the struggle. 
 
 He was in a region of country where he could not 
 easily obtain supplies without interruption from the 
 enemy, and this, his alleged reason for his indecis 
 ion, operated to induce his retreat ; wherefore, on 
 the 25th, he called a council of war, only necessa 
 ry when a general wishes an excuse for such a 
 
426 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 movement. All of his general officers coincided 
 with him in opinion, and on the 26th he com- 
 menced his retreat toward San Luis, with a view 
 of occupying the first peopled localities on the 
 route. Miiion, who had returned through the pass 
 of Palomas Adentro, had joined the main army, 
 and was directed to follow as the rear guard. 
 
 On the 27th, General Taylor moved his force 
 again in advance to Agua Nueva. The road from 
 Buena Vista to that point was strewed with dead 
 and dying Mexicans, and numerous wounded were 
 found in the ruins of the hacienda. These, as well 
 as those left upon the hattle field, were transport 
 ed to Saltillo and treated hy American surgeons. 
 
 Nothing prevented General Taylor from heating 
 up Santa Anna's head-quarters on the morning of 
 the 27th hut the jaded state of the dragoon horses, 
 and the want of water on the route. But, having 
 cared for the wounded, on the 1st of March he dis 
 patched Colonel Belknap, with all the cavalry; two 
 pieces of artillery, and a regiment of infantry, in 
 wagons, to Encarnacioh, for the purpose of cutting 
 up the Mexican rear guard, reported as being 1 still 
 at that point. The command left Agua Nueva at 
 three o'clock in the afternoon, and made the dis 
 tance in the night. The same appearances of hur 
 ried and disordered retreat were visible which had 
 been met with on the route to Agua Nueva. Mul 
 titudes of dead and dying, from wounds, fatigue, 
 and hunger, encumbered the road ; and, upon ar 
 riving at Encarnacion, that hacienda was found 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 427 
 
 unoccupied, except by a small party of the enemy, 
 and 220 wounded men in an almost utter state of 
 destitution. The party of Mexican cavalry endeav 
 ored to escape, but were all captured and made 
 prisoners. Belknap returned to Agua Nueva on 
 the afternoon of the 2d; and, having informed Gen 
 eral Taylor of the state of the Mexican wounded, 
 with characteristic humanity, he sent thither a 
 quantity of provision, and caused such as could be 
 transported to be moved to Saltillo. 
 
 In the battle of Buena Vista the American force 
 upon the field numbered 4425 bayonets and sabers, 
 exclusive of officers, and fifteen light field guns. 
 In the achievement of the victory and the effects 
 which have been narrated, the loss was 267 kill 
 ed, 456 wounded, 23 missing, and three guns cap 
 tured.^ 
 
 During the continuance of the operations of the 
 main armies about Saltillo, Generals Urrea and 
 Romero, with their corps of cavalry, had reached 
 the American line of communications through the 
 Tula pass, Victoria, and Montemorelos. The road 
 between Monterey and Camargo had been guard 
 ed by a regiment of Ohio volunteers, of which one 
 detachment, under the lieutenant colonel, was at 
 Marin, the colonel, with the head-quarters, at Ser- 
 ralvo, and a third detachment, under the major, at 
 Puntiaguda. When General Taylor had become 
 
 * General Taylor's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 137. 
 
428 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 satisfied of Santa Anna's approach on the 21st, he 
 had sent orders for the regiment to concentrate, 
 and move with all speed to Monterey. These or 
 ders were received on the 23d at Serralvo, and Col 
 onel Morgan, having Drought up his detachment 
 from Puntiaguda during the night, and destroyed 
 the stores which he was unahle to transport, march 
 ed on the morning of the 24th. 
 
 On that day Urrea made his appearance near 
 Ramos, and cut up an upward-hound train, killed 
 some forty or fifty wagoners, captured the weak 
 escort, and in the afternoon appeared before Marin, 
 where his troops skirmished with the American 
 garrison. 
 
 A detachment from Monterey having arrived and 
 re-enforced the garrison, Lieutenant-colonel Irvin 
 abandoned Marin, and marched on the 25th, with 
 out further communication with Morgan, who ar 
 rived the same afternoon, and quartered for the 
 night in the town. Irvin continued his march 
 without interruption, but on the following morn 
 ing Morgan fell in with Urrea at Agua Frio. A 
 continual skirmish ensued for some miles along the 
 road, as far as San Francisco. The Mexican cav 
 alry hovered about the column, threatening an at 
 tack for the whole distance. To oppose it, Mor 
 gan disposed his troops in square, with his wagons 
 in the center, and in this order, without a close en 
 counter with the enemy, he reached San Francisco. 
 From that point he sent forward an officer to com 
 municate with Irvin, who was by this time near 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 429 
 
 Monterey. Irvin returned with two field pieces, 
 which, when he came in sight of the enemy, then 
 in advance of Morgan's position, were at once open 
 ed, and the Mexican cavalry fell hack immediately 
 to the rear. Immediately after, a heavy fire of 
 escopetas was opened upon Morgan's command, 
 which killed one captain and four soldiers and 
 wagoners. Irvin's troops were then moved to the 
 right, and, from a general discharge from the whole 
 force, Urrea fled. The column continued its march 
 to Monterey without molestation. 
 
 On the 7th of March Urrea was at Serralvo, and 
 near that place fell upon an empty train of one 
 hundred and fifty wagons, which had heen sent to 
 the rear immediately after the hattle of Buena Vis 
 ta, under the escort of six companies of infantry 
 and two guns, commanded hy Major Giddings. 
 Urrea's force at once attacked it, killed two pri 
 vates, cut the train, hurned forty wagons, killed 
 fifteen teamsters, and, having surrounded the rear 
 guard some two miles from the advance, he sum 
 moned it to surrender; hut the captain in com 
 mand was, singularly enough, allowed an hour to 
 communicate with his chief in the advance. The 
 reply was, of course, a refusal, and immediately 
 after it had heen dispatched a re-enforcement was 
 -sent to the rear. The Mexicans gave up the at 
 tempt to consummate their success and enforce the 
 summons. The whole command, with the remain 
 ing wagons, was concentrated in the advance, and 
 on the following morning entered Serralvo without 
 
430 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 opposition. There it met an advancing convoy, 
 from which it was supplied with ammunition, and 
 proceeded on to Camargo. 
 
 Urrea then turned his attention to the advancing 
 train under escort of Colonel Curtis's regiment of 
 Ohio volunteers; but, in the mean while, General 
 Taylor had leisure to clear his communications. 
 
 He marched, with a force of cavalry and light 
 artillery, from Saltillo on the 8th. On the I "th 
 he sent Colonel Marshall, with the Kentucky cav 
 alry and a piece of light artillery, on the road to 
 Marin, to search for the enemy; but, hearing of 
 Urrea in the vicinity of Marin, near Curtis's con 
 voy, he joined Marshall with his escort, and, as 
 Urrea fell back before his advance, effected a junc 
 tion with Curtis, who was sent to Monterey. Tay 
 lor, with the cavalry and artillery, pushed on after 
 the enemy, who fled before him to Montemorelos, 
 and thence to Victoria, through the pass of Tula, 
 and out of the valley of the Rio Grande. Taylor, 
 not having a sufficient cavalry force to pursue him, 
 returned to Monterey.* 
 
 Communication! being thus re-established, oper 
 ations upon the northern line were thenceforth 
 confined to simple occupation, and active war in 
 that quarter was at an end. 
 
 * Report* of Colonel Morgan, Major Shepherd, and Major Giddingi. Ex- 
 'cutivo Document, No. 1, Senate, finrt Smrion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 
 210-217, and Correspondence of General Taylor with the Adjutant Gen 
 eral. Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representative*, first Sewon 
 of the thirtieth CongreM, p. 1123. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 The want of communication with General Tay 
 lor during the operations about Saltillo, and the 
 knowledge that General Urrea was in force upon 
 the line of Communications, induced a state of 
 alarm at all the posts on the Rio Grande from the 
 time of the first rumor of Santa Anna's advance 
 until the receipt of the intelligence of the battle 
 of Buena Vista. In consequence, rumors of the 
 complete dcslruHion of Taylor's corps, ninl Hie re- 
 conquest of the valley of the Rio Grande by the 
 Mexican troops, were transmitted to the United 
 States ; and the excitement and anxiety there were 
 by no means allayed by the requisition of a vol. 
 unteer colonel who commanded at Camargo, for 
 50,000 men to be sent instantly to the country 
 which had just been abandoned as the seat of act 
 ive operations. The effect of all this anxiety was 
 to increase the appreciation of the battle of Buena 
 Vista, and to give it, in the estimation of the pub 
 lic, the first place in the record of achievements 
 of American arms. And truly it was a glorious 
 achievement. 
 
 In one month Santa Anna had made his march 
 from San Luis to Angostura ; had fought the battle 
 which it had been hoped would arouse the national 
 spirit of Mexico to continued and energetic resist 
 ance in deeds as well as in words. At the end of 
 I he moiilh he \v;is in rHivjil, with his army heatcn, 
 cut ii|), mid dispirited, and with the trophies of 
 three guns and two company markers to show as 
 thn IVuiis of the victory, lor the achievement of 
 
432 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 which he had made such preparations. And this 
 was the result of a hattle fought by an army of 
 over 20,000 Mexicans, of whom one half, at least, 
 were counted as the veteran soldiers of their re 
 public, against one of less than 5000 Americans, 
 the greater number of whom were badly disci 
 plined and had no experience in war. 
 
 The effect of the victory was to prevent an in 
 crease of moral power on the Mexican side, to force 
 Santa Anna to organize, in a great measure, an 
 entirely new army for future operations, to secure 
 possession of the north of Mexico and safety for 
 the American frontier, and to afford time for the 
 advance of the main operations of the war by the 
 southern line from Vera Cruz. 
 
 These results could hardly have been more favor 
 able to the American cause had the operations been 
 planned and executed in accordance with the views 
 of the most enlightened military chieftain, having 
 for his object the furtherance of the operations of 
 the war, to the end set forth as that most anxious 
 ly desired, " the conquest of peace" And yet the 
 battle took place, as has been seen, contrary to the 
 anticipations and judgment of both General Tay 
 lor and General Scott. As it did occur, and was 
 a successful action, attended with great results, it 
 increased the reputation of the former, and as it 
 was undoubtedly a dangerous and hard-contested 
 one, his friends and himself have continued their 
 complaints of the action of the latter and the War 
 Department for placing him in a position where he 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 433 
 
 gained the glory of the battle, regardless of his own 
 expressed coincident opinions as to the probability 
 of an attack in that direction. And in judging of 
 the military acts of .General Taylor in these oper 
 ations, those expressed opinions should be remem 
 bered, although, nevertheless, he did display all 
 those sterling qualities of a commander which have 
 established his popularity, and caused his errors of 
 judgment and inefficient policy to be overlooked. 
 
 " To be ready at a moment to devote himself, if 
 necessary, for the welfare of the state,"^ is enu 
 merated by a great military writer as among the 
 qualities which acquire for a general distinction 
 and renown. It is a quality of the heart rather 
 than the head, it is true, but in the demonstration 
 of devoted patriotism lies the surest road to popu 
 lar affection ; and the rare quality appears in Gen 
 eral Taylor's reply to General Scott of January 
 15th, in which he says, " I will carry out in good 
 faith, while I remain in Mexico, the views of the 
 government, though I may be sacrificed in the ef 
 fort" His erroneous impression that he was to 
 be sacrificed, and his conclu'sions with regard to 
 Santa Anna's action, do not affect the merit of his 
 patriotic intentions and devotion. Had General 
 Scott, in his answer, treated the subject as one af 
 fecting the interests of the service rather than as 
 a division of troops between two commanders for 
 personal advantages in their positions, in which 
 light, it appears from their correspondence, both of 
 
 * Montecuculli. 
 
 I EE 
 
434 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the generals regarded the resources of their coun 
 try, which were the hone of contention, the ques 
 tion of the desire of sacrificing General Taylor, on 
 the part of the government or of General Scott, 
 would hardly have arisen. He and his friends 
 would have heen forced to have considered any er 
 ror, if error there were, one of head rather than 
 of heart, especially as General Taylor's anticipa 
 tions of Mexican action were the' same as Gen 
 eral Scott's. All the had feeling and discussion 
 of the subject might have heen saved, though 
 probably General Taylor would not have received 
 so much applause as he has, since it has been made 
 to appear that he was the object of persecution. 
 
 In moving in advance to Agua Nueva, after he 
 had found that the moral force of the volunteers 
 of his command had been somewhat impaired hy 
 the capture of the scouting parties, General Tay 
 lor acted the part of a great commander, having in 
 view the restoration of confidence ; but he entail 
 ed upon himself the necessity of fighting at the 
 southern extremity of the pass, which, inasmuch 
 as he helieved an advance of the main Mexican 
 army toward him to be " improbable," he was not 
 at the time prepared for. Believing, as he did, that 
 "it was not likely that a serious demonstration 
 would be made in that direction,"^ it was easy to 
 speculate on the advantages of his position at the 
 
 * General Taylor to the Adjutant General, February 7th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 1110. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 435 
 
 southern extremity of the pass. There were ad 
 vantages, as he stated, and, inasmuch as the posi 
 tion was strong, the victory, if the battle ensued, 
 was, in fact, comparatively secure. As it was 
 the boldest, there is no doubt that offering battle 
 to Santa Anna at that extremity was the proper 
 course of action. But it certainly would not have 
 been had the danger been so great as has since 
 been represented, for General Taylor was obliged 
 by neither his instructions nor immediate necessi 
 ties to take up the position, and, saving the moral 
 effect a retreat would have had upon his soldiers, 
 the result of the operation would have been the 
 same upon the general progress of the War had he 
 immediately withdrawn his stores and troops from 
 Saltillo to Monterey. The morale of his volun 
 teers might have been in a degree restored when 
 they found themselves in greater strength nearer 
 the base of operations, and behind fortifications. 
 At Monterey General Taylor could have withstood 
 Santa Anna's attack with an increased force of 
 two regiments, fixed artillery, and ammunition in 
 abundance, and with provisions for some months. 
 His objections to falling back to that place he has 
 said to be, that he could not forage his cavalry and 
 light artillery.^ If he were to stand a siege he 
 wanted but a small force of either, and the greater 
 portion might in safety have been se,nt to re-enforce 
 the posts on the lower Rio Grande, and join a re 
 lieving army. The physical effect of detaining 
 
 * General Taylor's Speech at Pass Christian. 
 
436 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Santa Anna in the north would have been accom 
 plished, unless he refused to proceed to Monterey, 
 and retraced his steps to quell the revolution in 
 the capital, in which ease General Taylor would 
 have failed to acquire the glory of victory, but 
 would have saved his troops. < If Santa Anna be 
 sieged him, he certainly could have held out, and 
 the Mexican would hardly have attempted to turn 
 him in force and proceed to the lower Rio Grande, 
 leaving five thousand enemies in his rear. Had he 
 left a portion of his army to blockade the Ameri 
 cans, Taylor could have fought the blockading di 
 vision with more certainty of success than, as it ap 
 pears from his own statements, he fought the bat 
 tle of Buena Vista ; and, the blockading force being 
 beaten, the Mexican army would have been cut 
 up in detail. In any event, the operations in the 
 north would have, been continued for some months 
 certainly, if Santa Anna hoped to achieve any 
 thing, until the 18th of April, for even General 
 Taylor would hardly admit that Santa Anna could 
 have captured him by that time ; and, in the mean 
 while, the road to Mexico from Vera Cruz would 
 have been open to General Scott. 
 
 But when General Taylor first became positive 
 ly informed of Santa Anna's advance on the 21st, 
 then, indeed, had he retired, he would have made 
 a hurried retreat, which would have had a most per 
 nicious effect upon his volunteer troops. Although, 
 by falling, back to La Angostura, he gave up the 
 advantages of making the enemy fight in the desert, 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 437 
 
 while he held a strong position in front of the, first 
 supply of water, and also permitted Santa Anna, if 
 he chose to run the risk, to halt at Agua Nueva 
 and replenish his supplies from the country about 
 Parras, then sixty miles to his left, yet the pass 
 opposite the defile at La Angostura was but a mile 
 and a half wide, the position was strong, he had 
 4500 troops and fifteen light guns, and, inasmuch 
 as there was a possibility of being turned at Agua 
 Nueva by the roads through La Hedionda and La 
 Punta de Santa Elena, the victory was compara 
 tively secure even then, with good dispositions 
 upon the battle, field. Nevertheless, , as appears 
 from a letter from General Taylor, written on the 
 night before the battle, which his friends have pub 
 lished, it was a subject of great anxiety on his 
 part at the time, and it was not until then that he 
 made up his mind to make his last stand at La 
 Angostura, which, it is true, he then did with all 
 the determination which characterized his greater 
 actions. It was not until that time that he or 
 dered up Marshall, with the heavy guns and the 
 battalion of horse, from the pass of the Binconada, 
 where they were useless. Then it was a matter 
 of great hazard to bring them through the valley, 
 for Minon in force had already taken position to 
 the north of Saltillo. By leaving that force at 
 such a point, when it might as well have been 
 at Buena Vista on the 22d as on the 24th, Gener 
 al Taylor neglected an evident principle of war: 
 " When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect 
 
438 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A sin 
 gle battalion sometimes decides the day"* By that 
 neglect he was deprived of four heavy guns during 
 the action, which, without consideration of the su 
 perior weight of metal, would have guarded the 
 defile at La Angostura, and afforded four light 
 pieces more for the general hattle. Four pieces on 
 the plateau (Bragg' s and Thomas's) held the whole 
 mass of the Mexican attacking column in check, 
 and " saved the day." Had four more heen on the 
 plateau at the commencement of the action, there 
 would have heen nine pieces in play, leaving 
 Bragg with two on the right, and Sherman with 
 two in reserve. In that case, it is difficult to see, 
 since four pieces drove hack the most desperate at 
 tack, how the Mexican troops could have gained 
 their first advantages ; no loss of magnitude would 
 then have occurred, as there did toward the close 
 of the action in retrieving the battle. 
 
 General Taylor was absent when the disposi 
 tions for battle were first made by General Wool 
 on the 22d. But, if he had determined to fight in 
 advance of Saltillo, his arrangements for the de 
 fense of that point might have been earlier made ; 
 and, in any case, as it certainly was the point of 
 least importance, so long as he blocked the passage 
 of the main Mexican army at La Angostura, it 
 would appear that he might have sent his direc 
 tions for the dispositions by staff officers. But he 
 approved of General Wool's dispositions, and these 
 may be the subject of remark. 
 
 * Napoleon. 
 

 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 439 
 
 As they were first made, the heights on the left 
 were unoccupied, inviting Santa Anna's movement 
 to the direction in which the position could he most 
 easily turned. If the heights were of any conse 
 quence, it would appear that they should have 
 heen occupied in advance of the enemy ; and that 
 they were considered so, is evident from the opposi 
 tion which was made to Ampudia's movement hy 
 the American skirmishers. But why the positions 
 which they occupied were given up during the 
 night, if they had heen worth fighting for, and the 
 attempt was made to recover them on the follow 
 ing morning, is a question. 
 
 General Taylor was again ahsent at Saltillo 
 when the hattle recommenced on the 23d, and the 
 dispositions were again made hy General Wool, 
 hut prohahly with his knowledge and approbation. 
 In these, the key of the position was considered to 
 he " the eminence immediately on the left of Wash 
 ington's battery"^ at La Angostura, and the great 
 er portion of the force xwas concentrated about it, 
 notwithstanding the enemy evidently showed an 
 intention to turn the left in order to get possession 
 of it. 
 
 Now the eminence immediately to the left of 
 Washington's battery would most certainly, in pos 
 session of the enemy, have given him the victory 
 and " a free passage to Saltillo." But, before, he 
 could get it, he had either to force the pass of An- 
 
 * Wool's Keport. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the 
 thirtieth Congress, p. 146. 
 
440 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 gostura, or sweep the American troops from the 
 plateau. The possession of the pass without the 
 plateau would have availed him nothing, for if he 
 endeavored to penetrate it he would have exposed 
 his flank ; and, moreover, to attempt to force it di 
 rectly in the face of four pieces of modern artillery, 
 served hy such gunners as those of the American 
 army, with the protection of a parapet, was useless, 
 as the event soon proved to the Mexican general. 
 But two full regiments, which did not fire a shot in 
 defense of the pass when Mora y VillaimTs column 
 was repulsed, were stationed about it, while, to op 
 pose the advance of the main Mexican army, at a 
 point where the American troops were without pro 
 tection, a single regiment of undisciplined troops 
 and three guns were thrown, unsupported, far to 
 the front, and, as if that was not sufficient, were 
 disposed so as to present the left flank to the Mexi 
 can batteries. Under such circumstances, it could 
 hardly be expected of volunteer troops, in their first 
 fight, to stand. 
 
 That they did maintain their position when, as 
 was afterward proven, they had but little instruc 
 tion or discipline, speaks much for the personal 
 bravery of the men. Had the troops been proper 
 ly disposed and the fight been well supported there, 
 the testimony of Mexican engineers would show 
 that the victory would have been early won, so 
 great was the execution of the light artillery which 
 the second Indiana regiment supported.^ 
 
 * " About 3000 infantry and a supporting force of cavalry, under General 
 

 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 When it fled, the flight of the skirmishers on the 
 mountain was a matter of consequence, and, as the 
 Mexicans had a footing in force on the plain whence 
 they could operate directly against the " key of the 
 position," so called, "the eminence immediately to 
 the left of Washington's hattery," the advantages 
 of position were in a great degree neutralized, espe 
 cially after the Mexican general had hrought up 
 his artillery. But that the whole plateau was not 
 swept immediately after the flight of the Indian- 
 ians, and that the masses of the enemy were de 
 layed hy the steady front of the second Illinois 
 regiment, and the fire of two guns until re-enforce 
 ment arrived, speaks volumes for the hravery of 
 American soldiers, and for the splendid efficiency 
 of their artillery. From the moment the Mexi 
 cans gained the plateau, the hattle was hetween 
 the soldiers as well as the generals ; and the great 
 quality of a soldier, and perhaps the only one which 
 is indispensahle to a general after the commence 
 ment of a battle, General Taylor possessed, not 
 only in greater degree than Santa Anna, but than 
 most of those mentioned in American history. 
 The stern determination in a crisis of battle was 
 never more conspicuously displayed by General 
 Taylor on any field, and that, when combined with 
 
 Pacheco, moved up to take this height, and at nine a heavy fire was opened. 
 The cavalry charged at the same moment. Many of our corps acted badly ; 
 but much havoc, nevertheless, was made among the enemy, and the heights 
 were carried by force of arms. If at that juncture we had been attacked 
 with vigor, we should probably have been defeated. 11 Mexican Engineers' 
 Report. 
 
442 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the moral effect of his reputation as a successful 
 general, could hardly have failed to impart the 
 same spirit to his soldiers. His presence, and bold, 
 determined hearing, had much to do with restoring 
 the battle ; but his entertainment of Santa Anna's 
 message to ask " what he wanted," and his mis 
 sion to the Mexican right wing, had the effect of 
 placing it in jeopardy after it had once been won, 
 and again his steady firmness of purpose had much 
 effect in its second restoration. 
 
 But the fortunes of that day twice hung in the 
 balance. That they were immediately saved once 
 by the brilliant courage and hard fighting of Da- 
 vis's Mississippi regiment, and again by the timely 
 arrival and splendid execution of Bragg's battery, 
 and that Davis first suggested his own movement,^ 
 and that Bragg moved without orders in the direc 
 tion of the plateau,! and that both came in at the 
 proper time and were both successful these facts, 
 while they render any comment upon the conduct 
 of those officers or their commands unnecessary, 
 yet add examples to the many of the supremacy 
 of fortune in war. 
 
 * " General Wool was upon the ground, making great efforts to rally the 
 men who had given way. I approached him, and asked if he would send 
 another regiment to support me in an attack upon the enemy before us. He 
 was alone, and, after promising the support, went in person to send it." 
 Colonel Dams' s Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 192. 
 
 t " As they were retiring by the very route they had advanced, I feared 
 they would avail themselves of our weakness at that point, and renew the 
 attack, regardless of our flag. I accordingly reversed my battery, and urged 
 my horses to the utmost." Captain Bragg's Official Report. Executive 
 Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 202. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO-. 443 
 
 In the movements of General Santa Anna, and 
 in the progress of the battle, were developed all the 
 energy of that officer in preparation, all his talent 
 for strategy and for operating upon the minds of 
 his countrymen, and all the good qualities of the 
 Mexican troops ; but, at the same time, all their 
 want of moral power, and the inconstancy of pur 
 pose in a great crisis, characteristic of Mexican ar 
 mies and leaders ; which, in strange contradiction 
 to the general national policy of their country, has 
 rendered her efforts in arms against a powerful or 
 determined adversary entirely fruitless. 
 
 The celerity and secrecy of the march from San 
 Luis are almost unsurpassed. The movement from 
 Encarnacion upon Agua Nueva, and the continued 
 march to La Angostura, making nearly fifty miles 
 in twenty-four hours, and the immediate com 
 mencement of the battle, when it is remembered 
 that thirty-six of those miles were without water, 
 and that the men 'had scanty subsistence, prove 
 how terrible a Mexican army might be, had the 
 troops of which it is composed only the moral force 
 to prosecute the advantages which such qualifica 
 tions for undergoing fatigue and privation place 
 within its reach. 
 
 In the battle, however, although General Santa 
 Anna immediately seized the point which offered 
 advantage, and gained the point which he first de 
 sired, yet, as has since been asserted by one of his 
 
444 THE WAR'WITH MEXICO. 
 
 generals,^ there was a want of combination, and a 
 failure to prosecute advantages when gained, while 
 he kept his attention fixed upon the movements 
 of one corps rather than the whole hattle. There 
 fore he delayed bringing forward his reserves, and 
 throwing the greatest mass in action upon the de 
 cisive point, which was, indeed, the plateau, and 
 over it to the eminence to the left of Angostura, un 
 til his right wing had heen beaten, and the Amer 
 ican artillery and troops could concentrate upon 
 the second point of attack. Had he made a pow 
 erful stroke at an earlier period of the hattle, and 
 strove to clear the plateau, it is possible that he 
 might have gained the victory; certainly he would 
 have stood a better chance for it. But, as he would 
 then have met the three regiments, which, isolated 
 and in advance, were overthrown at once by the 
 rush of his masses, in position and near their artil 
 lery, and since four light guns held him in check, 
 it is still a question of doubt even under the sup 
 position. 
 
 * General Minon. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 445 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Doniphan's Expedition into the Navajoe Country Insurrection in New Mex 
 icoAffair of Canada Affair of Embudo Affair of Pueblo de Taos Don 
 iphan's March toward Chihuahua Affair of Brazito of Sacramento 
 American Occupation of Chihuahua State of Affairs at that Place Doni- 
 phan abandons it Marches to Saltillo. 
 
 IN order to fulfill the promises made in his vari 
 ous proclamations to the inhabitants of New Mex 
 ico, of protecting them from the depredations of the 
 Indians in their vicinity, General Kearney had left 
 orders for Colonel Doniphan to enter the country 
 of the Navajoes, west of Santa Fe, and, if possible, 
 to make a treaty with the chiefs of that warlike 
 tribe. Upon the arrival of the re-enforcements 
 from Fort Leavenworth, Doniphan moved his reg 
 iment, in three detachments, by different routes, 
 into the country, which was traversed, for most of 
 its extent, without opposition. He was successful 
 in concluding a treaty of peace and amity with the 
 Navajoes, and the different detachments returned 
 to the Rio Grande, on which they were concen 
 trated, at Socorro, on the 12th of September. The 
 march was one of remarkable interest, having been 
 made in the winter, over snow-capped mountains, 
 through a country previously but little known, and 
 inhabited only by the barbarous tribes with which 
 the .treaty was made. But its story is more that 
 of Western travelers than of the war with Mexico. 
 
446 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Having finished the duty, Doniphan prepared to 
 move south, to join General Wool at Chihuahua, 
 where it was expected that officer was or soon 
 would be. At Valverde he found a large caravan 
 of American merchants awaiting his movements, 
 and on the 14th of December his advance marched 
 from that place, followed on the 16th and 18th by 
 the remainder of the regiment and convoy.^ 
 
 The civil government which General Kearney 
 had established in New Mexico was successfully 
 administered, without the manifestation of any in 
 tention to oppose American authority on the part 
 of the inhabitants, until the month of December, 
 on the 15th day of which the authorities at Santa 
 Fe received information of a contemplated insur 
 rection. 
 
 The ricos of the country had found themselves 
 of comparatively small importance since the occu 
 pation by the American army. They had all been 
 in league with Armijo, and, during his administra 
 tion, had enjoyed full opportunity of exercising of 
 ficial power for extortion and gain. Finding them 
 selves, in many instances, thrust from office, and 
 in all treated by the Americans with but little of 
 the respect which they had exacted from their own 
 people, they were, of course, hostile to the new gov 
 ernment. 
 
 The great number of the inhabitants had been 
 accustomed, from long habit, to pay attention to 
 
 * Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Sen 
 ate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 496. 
 

 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 447 
 
 their chiefs, and to obey their priests without ques 
 tion. They appreciated none of the advantages 
 which the new form of government gave to them, 
 and entertained the hostility to foreigners common 
 in all half- civilized countries ; and this hostility 
 was doubtless increased by the rough and careless 
 manner of the Western volunteers. 
 
 The rebellion had been for some time contem 
 plated at the time of the discovery of the conspir 
 acy, and the names of two principal instigators, 
 who immediately fled and escaped. Several ar 
 rests were nevertheless made at Santa Fe, and it 
 was believed that the insurrection had been crush 
 ed at its commencement.^ No further danger was 
 anticipated, precautionary measures were aban 
 doned, and small parties of Americans traversed 
 the country without fear of molestation. 
 
 The principal military force was, at the time, at 
 Santa Fe, under command of Colonel Price, of the 
 second Missouri regiment of mounted volunteers, 
 which had followed Kearney's movement from Fort 
 Leavenworth. But various detachments were post 
 ed at the different villages of the territory, and most 
 of the horses belonging to the troops were grazing 
 in the plains, under charge of small parties. 
 
 While affairs were in a state of apparent secu 
 rity, on the 14th of January the insurrection broke 
 out. On that day the governor, Charles Bent, a 
 man who had been selected for the position by Gen- 
 
 * Colonel Price's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 520. 
 
448 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 eral Kearney on account of his long intercourse 
 with the New Mexicans and deservedly high char- 
 acter, was brutally murdered, with five others, civil 
 officers of the territory, at San Fernando de Taos, 
 a pueblo some fifty miles to the north of Santa Fe.* 
 On the same day a crowd of Indians and New Mex 
 icans attacked the buildings of a Mr. Turley, at 
 Arroyo Honda, in the same valley. He had been 
 for a long time a resident of the country, and it was 
 believed that he was deservedly popular with the 
 inhabitants. After a gallant resistance, in which 
 the assailants suffered severely, the buildings were 
 forced, and all the occupants except one man, who 
 had succeeded in making his escape, were killed. 
 Throughout the northern part of the province the 
 insurgents murdered every American upon whom 
 they could lay hands, and administered a like fate 
 to all Mexicans who had accepted office under the 
 new government. 
 
 The news of the rebellion reached Santa Fe on 
 the 20th of January, by which time it was fully 
 organized and in progress. The principal force, 
 consisting in greater part of Pueblo Indians, led by 
 their chiefs and the principal New Mexicans of the 
 department, soon marched toward Santa Fe, while, 
 in obedience to the missives of the leaders, the in 
 habitants of different villages joined in the rebel 
 lion, which daily became more formidable. Col 
 onel Price became informed of the movements of 
 
 * Colonel Price's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 520. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 449 
 
 ,the enemy by intercepted letters, and immediately 
 took steps to meet the danger.^ 
 
 He first ordered up the garrison of Albuquerque 
 from the, south, with directions for a portion of it 
 to re-enforce Santa Fe, and the remainder to follow 
 his movement. On the 23d he marched for the val 
 ley of Taos with 350 men (most of them dismount 
 ed), and four twelve pounder mountain howitzers. 
 
 At noon, on the following day, he fell in with 
 the main force of the insurgents near Canada, a 
 small village north of Santa Fe. The enemy num 
 bered near 1500, and had possession of highlands 
 and buildings which commanded the road. Fear 
 ing that he might escape or take up a new posi 
 tion, upon receiving intelligence of his presence, 
 Price quickened the march of his main force, leav 
 ing the train to follow as it might. Upon coming 
 to Canada, he sent his howitzers at once^ across a 
 creek which intervened, and opened fire upon the 
 houses and heights. While the American wagons 
 were yet some distance in the rear, a party of Mex 
 icans and Indians strove to turn the main force and 
 cut them off, but were prevented by a threatened 
 attack from the small number of mounted men be 
 longing to the command. When the wagons ar 
 rived, a battalion of infantry thrust the enemy from 
 a house upon the American right, and soon after 
 the whole force was ordered to advance. The me 
 lee became general, and, in a short time, the enemy 
 
 * Colonel Price's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 521. 
 
 I. FF 
 
450 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 was routed and dispersed, with a loss of thirty-six 
 killed and a large number of wounded. The Amer 
 icans had lost two killed and six wounded.^ 
 
 The march was continued up the valley of the 
 Rio del Norte, and on the morning of the 28th the 
 command was re-enforced by the arrival of Captain 
 Burg win of the United States first dragoons ,. with 
 his own and a company of Missouri volunteers, 
 and one six pounder gun. Burgwin had been at 
 Albuquerque, and, although his troops were most 
 ly dismounted, he had made the march to overtake 
 the main body with great rapidity. The com 
 mand, thus augmented, amounted in all to 479 
 men and five pieces of artillery. 
 
 At La Joya, on the following day, it was learned 
 that a party of insurgents occupied a pass on the 
 road leading from the practicable wagon route to 
 Taos, to the village of Embudo. The pass of Em- 
 budo was impracticable for either artillery or wag 
 ons, and at its narrowest point was barely wide 
 enough for three men to pass abreast. The mount 
 ains rose sharp and rugged on either side, with 
 clumps of cedars growing in the crevices of the rocks, 
 which, with the irregularities of the surface, afford 
 ed excellent cover for a defensive party. The in 
 surgents we.re posted about this point in strength ; 
 for, although they were badly armed and equipped, 
 they numbered between six and seven hundred. 
 
 To force this pass, Captain Burgwin was detach- 
 
 * Colonel Price'8 Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 522, 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 45^ 
 
 ed with a party of 180 men. Upon coming within 
 range, he sent parties up the slopes on either side 
 of the pass, whose fire soon told upon the enemy. 
 The insurgents hroke, and bounded away over the 
 steep and rugged mountains with a speed which 
 defied pursuit from the Americans. Burgwin's 
 command proceeded on through the pass, and oc 
 cupied the village without resistance, having lost 
 one man killed and one wounded during the affair, 
 and inflicted a loss of nearly eighty in all upon 
 the enemy.^ 
 
 On the 30th the detachment rejoined the main 
 body at Trampas, and on the 1st of February the 
 march was continued over the Taos mountain. 
 Throughout that and the following day the rugged 
 route lay through deep snow, and the severity of 
 the weather and difficulty of the road tried the pa 
 tience and hardihood of the troops. On the 3d the 
 command reached San Fernando de Taos, the scene 
 of the massacre of Governor Bent and his compan 
 ions. San Fernando was occupied without resist 
 ance, for the insurgents had fortified themselves in 
 their principal place, Pueblo de Taos, and were 
 awaiting an. attack. Colonel Price rode forward 
 to reconnoiter the " pueblo," which, for an irregular 
 Indian position, was one of great strength. 
 
 The buildings of the "pueblo" were two large 
 houses, rising some seven or eight stories in an ir 
 regular pyramidal form, each capable of containing 
 
 * Colonel Price's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 523. 
 
452 THE WA & WITH MEXICO. 
 
 some five or six hundred men, and a strongly-built 
 church, besides several others of smaller capacity. 
 They were inclosed hy a wall of adobes and pick 
 ets, of an irregular, pentagonal trace, flanked by 
 small bastions at the angles. The walls, houses, 
 and church were all creneled for musketry. 
 
 After reconnaissance, Price determined to attack 
 the church, which was at the northwestern angle 
 of the inclosure. He accordingly brought up his 
 howitzers, and cannonaded it for about two hours 
 without any positive effect, when he withdrew his 
 troops for the night to San Fernando. 
 
 On the morning of the 4th he advanced his 
 whole force and took up position. The mounted 
 men of the command were stationed on the east of 
 the inclosure to intercept a retreat. The main 
 body of the footmen, the six pounder, and two 
 mountain howitzers were posted on the north, and 
 two companies and two howitzers on the west. 
 The artillery opened fire upon the town at nine 
 o'clock, and continued playing until eleven, by 
 which time it was considered impracticable to break 
 the walls with such light pieces, and Price determ 
 ined to carry the "pueblo" by assault. 
 
 Captain Burgwin moved forward the two com 
 panies on the west, and at the same time four oth 
 ers advanced from the north, against the north 
 western angle of the inclosure. 
 
 The assailants were received with a heavy fire, 
 but nevertheless they rushed on and gained shel 
 ter on the western side of the church. The thick 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 453 
 
 walls of the building were then attacked with axes, 
 and while parties on that side endeavored to make 
 a practicable breach, others, leaving their shelter, 
 strove ineffectually to force the door. In this at 
 tempt Burgwin was mortally wounded. In the 
 mean time small holes had been cut, through which 
 the assailants pitched in shells upon the occupants, 
 and some, having climbed up to the roof, fired it. 
 The Indians defended themselves stubbornly, and 
 fired fast and heavily in the direction of the Amer 
 icans. The six pounder was brought round to the 
 vicinity of the occupied point, and opened upon the 
 town with grape, which drove the Indians hanging 
 about the smaller houses to cover. The gun was 
 then advanced to within sixty yards of the church, 
 and the holes which had been cut through the 
 walls with axes were soon increased to a practica 
 ble breach. A few shell and stands of grape were 
 thrown in, and the assailants rushed through the 
 opening. The church was found to be nearly de 
 serted, and the Indians soon after abandoned the 
 western portion of the village. The main body 
 took shelter with their women and children in the 
 large houses of the " pueblo." Some endeavored 
 to escape to the mountains, but the cavalry posted 
 to intercept a retreat cut them off almost to a man. 
 The Americans occupied the abandoned houses 
 during the night, and early on the following morn 
 ing the enemy sued for peace. Colonel Price, think 
 ing that the severe loss which had been inflicted 
 would prevent further outbreaks, granted it on con- 
 
454 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 dition that the instigators of the rebellion should 
 he delivered up to him. , The condition was com- 
 plied with, and on the 7th of January several of 
 them were hung at San Fernando. Of the five 
 principal leaders of the insurrection, hut one escaped 
 the fate of battle or of execution, and he was not 
 present in any principal affair. 
 
 At Pueblo de Taos the insurgents lost one hund 
 red and fifty killed, besides a large number of 
 wounded. The Americans had seven killed and 
 forty-six wounded, of which many died. 
 
 While these events took place, minor encoun 
 ters occurred in different parts of the valley. The 
 insurgents were busy in stampeding and stealing 
 the American horses, and cutting off small parties 
 of grazers. In breaking up a gang which had col 
 lected in the valley of the Mora, Captain Hendley, 
 of the Missouri volunteers, was killed and his par 
 ty repulsed.^ But the insurrection had been ef 
 fectually checked, so far as operations in large bod 
 ies were concerned, by the result of the affair at 
 the Pueblo de Taos, although deep-rooted hostility 
 to the Americans was manifested in the predatory 
 warfare which was carried on for some subsequent 
 time by detached parties. 
 
 The civil government which had been establish 
 ed by General Kearney became almost a dead let 
 ter from the time of the rebellion, and thencefor- 
 
 * Captain Heudley and Lieutenant Fitzpatrick to Colonel Price. Ex 
 ecutive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, 
 p. 531-533. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 455 
 
 ward to the close of the war military power was 
 necessary to vindicate the supremacy of the laws. 
 
 Colonel Doniphan's command passed the Jorna 
 da del Muerto, a distance of ninety miles, over a 
 dry, arid desert, by detachments, in safety. The 
 passage of this desert by so large a body, accompa 
 nied as it was by the large convoy of merchant 
 wagons, was in itself a remarkable achievement ; 
 and that the command was able to concentrate, in 
 any condition for service, immediately afterward, 
 is indeed a matter of wonder. At one time, how 
 ever, a portion of the command was providentially 
 relieved by the fall of a heavy shower of rain, when 
 men and animals had nearly given out from thirst : 
 an occurrence remarkable in itself, for at that sea- 
 son of the year rain seldom falls in that region. 
 
 Upon arriving at Dona Ana; information was re 
 ceived that a corps of 700 Mexicans, with six pieces 
 of artillery, was at El Paso, in readiness to oppose 
 the advance. In consequence of rumors .to the 
 same effect which had reached him at Valverde, 
 Doniphan had sent back orders to Major Clarke 
 to join him with a battery of four sixes and two 
 twelve pounder howitzers.^ Clarke received the 
 order, and marched from Santa Fe a short time 
 previous to the insurrection. 
 
 The northwestern departments of Mexico, be 
 sides New Mexico and California, had been left to 
 
 * Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Sen 
 ate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 497. 
 
456 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 their own resources for defense by the central gov 
 ernment. The only regiment of regular Mexican 
 troops in that quarter was that of the Vera Cruz 
 dragoons, which had been stationed at Santa Fe, 
 but had fled with Governor Armijo to Chihuahua 
 upon Kearney's approach. The men were no bet 
 ter than ordinary Mexican troopers, and much 
 worse mounted and equipped. 
 
 General Heredia, who commanded the north 
 western departments of Mexico, and Don Angel 
 Trias, governor of Chihuahua, had received inform 
 ation of the intended march of General Wool to 
 that city, as well as of the occupation of New Mex 
 ico by Kearney, and had been for some time act 
 ively engaged in preparing for defense. The mili 
 tia of the neighboring departments had been called 
 out, and at the time of Doniphan's approach there 
 were under arms, in the State of Chihuahua, near 
 ly 4000 men, besides an indefinite number of ran- 
 cheros, armed with " machetes" and other ordinary 
 weapons of the country. A fair proportion of artil 
 lery was at hand, and it was deemed that a good 
 defense might be made against an attack either 
 from the east or the north. 
 
 On the 23d of December Doniphan continued 
 his march from Dona Ana in the direction of Chi 
 huahua. His force, including the merchants, num 
 bered 856 effective men, all mounted and armed 
 with rifles.^ They were nearly all hardy back- 
 
 * Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Sen 
 ate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 497. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 woodsmen, excellent marksmen, and full of r cour 
 age, but what discipline they were possessed of 
 amounted to nothing.^ On the 25th the command 
 arrived at Brazito, an encampment one day's march 
 from El Paso. The advanced battalion of 500 v had 
 halted, dismounted, parked the baggage, and, while 
 the rear detachment was yet at a distance of some 
 miles, the men were scattered over the country in 
 search of wood and water. At this juncture, some 
 most in advance returned and reported the ap 
 proach of an enemy. The rally was sounded at 
 once, and the force was formed for battle' as fast as 
 it could be collected. 
 
 To those acquainted with American volunteers, 
 especially the rangers of the West, the scene will 
 readily present itself;, but to military men, accus 
 tomed only to the maneuvers of regular troops, or 
 to civilians, whose knowledge of the operations of 
 war is derived from reading, hardly any descrip 
 tion would suffice to give an idea of the forming 
 of American volunteers when taken by surprise. 
 The hurry, bustle, confusion, want of method, 
 shouting, discharging of rifles, reloading, and un 
 couth formations, and the bravery, nonchalance, 
 and hearty good- will with which the men take 
 whatever place they happen to for battle, altogeth 
 er form a scene rarely to be met with in the mili 
 tary operations of any other nation. 
 
 With all these, however, a line was quickly 
 formed, but not before the enemy had approached 
 
 * Mr. Ruxton's work. 
 
458 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 within half a mile and halted. His force consisted 
 of 1220 men, of whom 500 were mounted. Of ar 
 tillery, he had one small howitzer. His line was 
 formed with the active hattalion of Chihuahua 
 cavalry on the right, the infantry (national guards) 
 in the center, and the Vera Cruz dragoons on the 
 left. While forming his line, and before the Amer 
 icans were in any thing like array, a Mexican offi 
 cer was sent with a black flag to demand that the 
 American commander should proceed to the Mexi 
 can lines for a conference, and with a threat, in 
 case of refusal, that the Mexican troops would 
 charge and capture him, giving no quarter. He 
 executed his singular mission in good style ; but 
 Doniphan's answer, characteristic of his troops, 
 was, " to charge and be d rf."# 
 
 The Mexican line advanced and opened fire 
 with the howitzer, and with muskets and escopetas, 
 at a distance of four hundred yards. The cavalry, 
 extending to the right and left, threatened an at 
 tack on the American flanks. But, after deliver 
 ing three rounds, the infantry approached to with 
 in long rifle range, and the volunteers commenced 
 an effective practice, which threw their enemy into 
 confusion, and completely checked his advance. 
 In the mean time twenty volunteers mounted and 
 made at the Vera Cruz dragoons, which, although 
 numbering thrice the American force at the point 
 of attack, were soon overthrown. The whole body 
 
 * Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Sen 
 ate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 497. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 459 
 
 of Mexicans fled to the mountains in the vicinity, 
 having lost forty -three killed, and near one hundred 
 and fifty wounded ; of the Americans hut seven 
 were wounded, and those hut slightly.^ 
 
 On the 27th Doniphan entered the village of El 
 Paso without opposition. Having ascertained 
 there that General Wool had not advanced upon 
 Chihuahua, and that his advance upon that town 
 would he unassisted, he was ohliged to await the 
 arrival of his artillery. He remained in inactivity 
 at El Paso during the following month, hut the ar 
 tillery finally came up in the early part of Februa 
 ry, 1847, and on the 8th the advance upon Chihua 
 hua was resumed. The Mexican forces, after the 
 affair at Brazito, had kept at a respectful distance, 
 and it was not until the 25th that any thing like 
 a demonstration of opposition was manifested. In 
 formation was then received that a large force was 
 at Encinillas, a hacienda belonging to Governor 
 Trias, but upon the arrival of the Americans on 
 the 26th it was found to have retreated. On the 
 following day, however, upon arriving at the en 
 campment of El Sauz, it was learned that the ene 
 my was in position at the pass of the Sacramento, 
 fifteen miles in advance. 
 
 The road south from El Sauz leads through an 
 open prairie valley between two sterile mountains. 
 The pass of the Sacramento is about one and a 
 half miles wide, and is formed by a spur which 
 
 * Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Sen 
 ate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 498. 
 
460 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 juts from the mountain on the west. Along the 
 northern hase of the spur was the Rio Sacramento, 
 which turns to the south near the hase of the 
 eastern mountain. Some two -miles to the north 
 the main valley is traversed by the bed of the Ar 
 royo Seco, in a general direction from northwest 
 to southeast, until, near the base of the eastern 
 mountain, it turns to the south and empties into 
 the Rio Sacramento. Between these two streams 
 the ground is elevated, and divided into two tables. 
 The western is nearly level, and of the greatest ex 
 tent. The eastern is more elevated, and more di 
 versified in its topography. 
 
 The road to Chihuahua from the north crosses 
 the Arroyo Seco, rises upon the elevated land, and, 
 passing to the west of the dividing line between 
 the two tables, descends, and, turning to the south 
 east, crosses the Sacramento at a ford at the base 
 of the spur from the west. 
 
 The Mexican authorities, both civil and military, 
 had been for some time engaged in fortifying the 
 positions about the pass, and had expended much 
 labor in the endeavor to make it defensible. The 
 whole northern crest of the elevation was covered 
 by intrenchments, though most of them were but 
 simple breast- works for infantry. The main forti 
 fications were upon the eastern table. At its north 
 eastern angle was a rugged hill, the Cerro Frijoles, 
 some hundred and fifty feet in height, which was 
 crowned with a round battery. Two other bat- 
 teries were along the northern crest. Along the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 dividing ridge between the tables, a line of in- 
 trenchments, consisting of round batteries, con 
 nected by breast-works for infantry, extended south 
 across the whole plateau. The whole system on 
 this front looked upon the flank of the road. High 
 up on the Cerro Sacramento, south of the river, a 
 round battery, similar to that on the Cerro Frijoles, 
 commanded the other positions at long range. 
 Upon the east the position was protected by in- 
 trenchments placed at convenient positions, but 
 the deep bed of the Arroyo Seco was the strongest 
 defense in that quarter. 
 
 These defenses, such as they were, completely 
 blocked the direct passage of the road, but the sys 
 tem of works on the north could be easily turned 
 on the west, and the western table could be gained 
 without exposure to any fire. There, indeed, the 
 main line of works upon the west of the Mexican 
 position was presented directly in the front of an 
 enemy, which if he refused in his advance, he must 
 pass under the fire from the line and from the Cerro 
 Sacramento. 
 
 To maintain this position, General Heredia had 
 a force of near 4000 men of all arms ; 1200 cavalry 
 from Durango and Chihuahua, under General Gar 
 cia Conde, 1200 infantry, 1420 rancheros, and 300 
 artillerists, with ten guns, of nine, eight, six, and four 
 pounders. The cavalry was composed of the active 
 regiments of the departments, with the exception 
 of the Vera Cruz dragoons. The infantry was the 
 ordinary militia of the country, enrolled for the emer- 
 
462 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 gency, and the rancheros were but rancheros, armed 
 with lassos, corn knives, lances, and old-fashioned 
 escopetas.^ As for the proficiency of the artille 
 rists, their performances on the field told hut little. 
 
 When Doniphan approached on the 28th, the 
 Mexican forces took position in their works, and 
 manned and armed their batteries. Finding the 
 direct road obstructed, and that the route to the 
 western side of the plateau was practicable for 
 wagons, Doniphan inclined the head of his column 
 from the road while out of range, and moved rapid 
 ly in that direction. He gained the plateau with 
 out opposition, and parked the wagons, 315 in 
 number, on the western verge. 
 
 The enemy, in the mean time, advanced his 
 cavalry and a battery of artillery from the intrench- 
 ments. Doniphan formed a line to oppose him, 
 and before the Mexican guns were unmasked, the 
 American artillery, which was in the center of the 
 line, opened a heavy fire. The Mexican cavalry 
 fell away from their artillery, and soon after gave 
 way and retreated. The artillery replied to the 
 American fire, but had little effect ; the shot were 
 nearly all aimed too high, and passed over the 
 American line, doing no damage other than killing 
 a few mules and oxen of the train. The cavalry 
 having retreated beyond the intrenehments, the 
 guns were also soon after drawn back. The efforts 
 of the Mexicans were then, for a time, directed to 
 
 * Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Sen 
 ate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 560. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 4(53 
 
 removing their wounded, of which there were many, 
 and a gun which had heen dismounted, and, so soon 
 as these were accomplished, all the cavalry retired 
 slowly, crossed the Rio Sacramento, and halted out 
 of range. 
 
 During these movements on the part of the ene 
 my, the American line had heen advanced to the 
 right and front, nearly within range of the guns on 
 the Cerro Sacramento, whence three mounted com 
 panies and two twelve pounder howitzers were ad 
 vanced against the line of intrenchments. The 
 movement, although over rough ground, was exe 
 cuted at speed, and the howitzers were thrown into 
 battery within short distance of the works, while 
 the troopers, without any order or combination 
 other than that all were attacking in some sort, 
 rode along the lines seeking an entrance, and dis 
 charging their carbines at the enemy. The Mex 
 ican resistance, though noisy while it lasted, was 
 short and inefficient. Hardly waiting to notice 
 whether their fire was effective or not, the infantry 
 soldiers immediately in front of the attack broke 
 and fled, leaving a clear field for the assailants. The 
 remaining American troops, meanwhile, had ad 
 vanced, and dismounted upon nearing the intrench 
 ments. Moving forward on foot, they obtained 
 good rifle range, and the enemy at once fled along 
 the whole line. The six pounders, during this af 
 fair, had cannonaded the works on the northern 
 crest, over the western line, in reverse, and when 
 the volunteers rushed in they carried these also, 
 
464 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 and, continuing the advance, got possession of the 
 Cerro Frijoles. The Mexicans fled in every direc 
 tion, pursued by the mounted volunteers, who cut 
 down great numbers of them. But one attempt 
 was made to rally. A crowd of lancers came up, 
 and endeavored to turn the American right to at 
 tack the train, which had followed the movement 
 of the troops, but they fled before the fire of the 
 six pounders. 
 
 The battery on the Cerro Sacramento "had, dur 
 ing the engagement, kept up its distant cannonade 
 upon the Americans ; but it did no damage, for the 
 range and angle of depression were both too great. 
 When the positions upon the plateau had been car 
 ried, the American artillery was directed upon it, 
 and a party of mounted volunteers crossed the riv 
 er to storm the height on horseback ;# another bat 
 talion crossed on foot ; but the whole Mexican force 
 in that direction fled without resistance, and the 
 rout and victory were complete. 
 
 In this affair the Mexican forces lost three hund 
 red in killed, nearly the same number in wound 
 ed, forty prisoners, all their artillery, ammunition, 
 and stores of subsistence, such as they were (beans 
 and pinola). 
 
 The Americans lost but one man killed, one mor 
 tally and seven others slightly wounded. 
 
 On the following day the column entered Chi- 
 
 * "I immediately ordered the men to remount and charge the battery on 
 our right." Lieutenant-colonel Mitchell's Report. Executive Document, No. 
 1, Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p.' 503. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 455 
 
 huahua without opposition, for the force which had 
 been dispersed at Sacramento had not rallied. 
 Governor, generals, colonels, and other officers 
 were all in full flight to the south, and the common 
 soldiers had taken refuge in the mountains. But, 
 having entered the city, Doniphan found himself 
 in a position of some embarrassment. His horses 
 were broken down by the length of the march, and 
 his whole command had been without pay from 
 the time of leaving Missouri. The backwoodsmen 
 of whom it was composed, having little or no idea 
 of discipline, after entering the city, indulged in all 
 kinds of license. The officers were unable to im 
 pose any restraint upon the men, and, in the lan 
 guage of the colonel, the state of things was " con 
 fusion worse confounded."^ 
 
 Rumor had informed Doniphan that General 
 Wool had been cut off near Saltillo, which, although 
 he did not believe, prevented him from sending a 
 messenger. On the 20th of March, however, he 
 learned that Santa Anna had fallen back on San 
 Luis, and that communication was practicable with 
 Wool's head-quarters. On that day he sent a re 
 port of his position and an application for orders. 
 He had previously contemplated moving toward 
 Saltillo for the purpose of forming a junction at all 
 hazards, and had only been prevented by the ur 
 gent solicitations of the American merchants to re- 
 
 * ' Colonel Doniphan to General Wool, March 20th, 1847. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 1128. 
 
 I. G G 
 
466 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 main for their protection. Doniphan refused to re 
 main for any length of time, and prepared to ad 
 vance to Saltillo. 
 
 When General Taylor received information of 
 his position, he sent orders for the movement, and 
 on the 26th and 27th of April detachments of the 
 command marched from Chihuahua. Moving 
 through Parras, on the route by which Wool had 
 contemplated to advance, it arrived at Saltillo on 
 the 22d of May, without other hostile adventure 
 than a skirmish of a small party with some In 
 dians near Parras. 
 
 From Saltillo it proceeded at once to the Rio 
 Grande, and thence to the United States, and was 
 discharged at New Orleans. 
 
 By itself, the expedition of Doniphan's command 
 is most remarkable. That a corps should have 
 been raised, marched three thousand miles through 
 an almost unknown and uncultivated country, 
 have fought its way against overwhelming num 
 bers, and returned to its point of departure, and all 
 within the space of one year, and that, too, with 
 out the aid of modern locomotion for the active 
 part of its route, is indeed an event to which it is 
 in vain to search for a recorded parallel. The ac 
 count of the various adventures, and of the differ 
 ent regions which were visited, would form alto 
 gether a most interesting narrative. 
 
 As a military movement, too, the march was re 
 markable. It is, without exception, the greatest 
 distance ever traversed in so short a period bv any 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 457 
 
 body of troops ; and accomplished, as it was, over 
 many of the greatest obstacles encountered in mil 
 itary operations, the display of energy and perse 
 verance was creditable to both officers and men of 
 the command. 
 
 But as for the effect upon the war, the expedi 
 tion was almost, if not entirely useless ; for it nei 
 ther furthered the prosecution of the policy of the 
 United States in seizing upon the territories of 
 Mexico as indemnity, nor did it increase the in 
 ducements of the government of the latter to make 
 peace. Chihuahua, as a region for resources, was 
 worthless to both parties. Its possession or its loss 
 gave or took nothing from the central government 
 which might conduce to the support of the war. 
 Certainly it was not on the route by which the 
 heart of the country could be reached by the Amer 
 icans. 
 
 The only furtherance of the public interest which 
 was accomplished by this expedition was the dis 
 play of force in the Navajoe country ; and, as the 
 treaty concluded with the chiefs of that tribe was 
 doubtless the most useful, the march through that 
 country was the most difficult and remarkable of 
 all the achievements of the command. 
 
 American bravery and Mexican cowardice were 
 both most signally displayed in the affairs at Bra- 
 zito and the pass of the Sacramento. Of skill there 
 was but little demonstration on either side. That 
 4000 men in intrenchments, although indifferently 
 armed, should fly, after a short cannonade, before 
 
4(38 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the wild rush of less than one fourth their number 
 of undisciplined backwoodsmen, having nothing to 
 aid them but their personal courage and their good 
 rifles, is indeed remarkable, and proves conclusive 
 ly the cowardice of the first and the bravery of the 
 second. 
 
 It is difficult to see any reason why General He- 
 redia should have advanced his cavalry and artil 
 lery alone to the action, when his enemy must 
 necessarily have been obliged to attack him in his 
 intrenchments, or why these should have been 
 masked, while he commenced the battle with one 
 third of his force against the full strength of the 
 Americans. By attempting it, his cavalry was 
 beaten at once, and, had any thing been wanting 
 to insure the flight of the infantry, it was found in 
 the rapid retreat of the advanced forces. Had the 
 infantry stood at all, it is hard to perceive how the 
 Americans could have conquered with so little loss. 
 
 The American volunteer officers who were in 
 this battle have made reports which, for inflation 
 of style, will compare well with those of Mexi 
 can commanders ; and some have seemed to think 
 that they have discovered new important princi 
 ples in the military art.^ Nevertheless, it would 
 not be safe to trust to their experience, or to act 
 upon the fruit of it, their recommendations. It 
 will be difficult to convince thinking men that cav- 
 
 * " It is abundantly shown, in the charge made by Captain Weightman 
 with the section of howitzers, that they can be used in any charge with great 
 effect" Colonel Doniphan's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, 
 Senate, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 501. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 459 
 
 airy is the proper arm for storming intrenchments, 
 or that twelve pounder howitzers are particularly 
 efficient in such a charge, even if unlimbered with 
 in fifty yards of the enemy, unless, indeed, he is in 
 flight at the time of the advance. 
 
 Such folly, if perpetrated in operations against 
 men who would stand at all, and who were armed 
 with any kind of fire-arms which they knew how 
 to use, would only insure the destruction of hoth 
 howitzers and cavalry ; and yet the idea has heen 
 thrust forth in official reports, and newspaper edit 
 ors and critics have given it their sanction. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Commodore Stockton's Action in California Insurrection Preparations to 
 suppress it General Kearney's Arrival Affair at San Pasqual At Hill 
 of San Bernardo Expedition from San Diego to Ciudad los Angeles 
 Passage of the Rio San Gabriel Affairs at Los Angeles Fremont's Action 
 in the North Advance from Monterey Surprise of San Luis Objspo 
 Advance to the South Capitulation of Cowenga Dispute between Stock 
 ton and Kearney Kearney and Fremont Arrival of Commodores Shu- 
 brick and Biddle, and Colonel Mason Trial and Conviction of Fremont. 
 
 SOON after Commodore Stockton had established 
 the civil government of the territory of California, 
 in what he believed to be " successful operation," 
 .and had restored apparent " peace and harmony" 
 to the people,^ he received intelligence, through 
 
 * Commodore Stockton to Mr. Bancroft, August 24th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth 
 Congress, p. 265. 
 
470 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the Mexican newspapers, of the official declarations 
 of war, and the energetic preparation for its prose 
 cution on both sides. # 
 
 He had established a tariff, and issued orders for 
 the elections of different officers soon after the oc 
 cupation of the Ciudad de los Angeles. Various 
 officials of the territory under the Mexican govern 
 ment had come in, or had been taken prisoners, 
 who were liberated upon parole of honor not to 
 serve against the United States during the war, 
 without exchange. This they readily gave, and 
 professed themselves satisfied with the new state 
 of things. Believing that the American authority 
 was firmly established, the commodore intended to 
 relinquish his civil and military duties, and on the 
 24th of August commenced preparations for leaving 
 the country under the government of Lieutenant- 
 colonel Fremont. On that day Fremont was noti 
 fied of his ulterior intentions, and soon after, on the 
 2d of September,! commissioned as military com 
 mandant of California. He was ordered to increase 
 his battalion of volunteers to 300 men, of which 
 50 were to be stationed at Ciudad de los Angeles, 50 
 at Monterey, 50 at San Francisco, and 25 at each 
 Santa Barbara and San Diego, leaving the remain 
 ing 100 for active service in the field. Of the pres 
 ent force of the battalion, he was ordered to locate 
 
 * Commodore Stockton to Major Fremont, August 24th, 1846. Executive 
 Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session of the twenty- 
 ninth Congress, p. 675. 
 
 t Colonel Fremont's Trial. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 110. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 471 
 
 50 men, under Captain Gillespie, at Ciudad de los 
 Angeles, 25 at Santa Barbara, 50 at Monterey, and 
 50 at San Francisco, and to proceed in person to 
 recruit his battalion to the required number, 300. 
 
 At this time the commodore intended, after he 
 had completed his arrangements, and delivered up 
 his newly-acquired civil and military honors, to 
 sail with the squadron under his command to the 
 south of Mexico, capture Acapulco, land a force, 
 and advance on the capital to co-operate with Gen 
 eral Taylor, or, at least, to make a powerful dem 
 onstration in his favor.^ Unfortunately for 'the 
 demonstration of its impracticability, this scheme 
 was not allowed an opportunity for development 
 or execution. 
 
 Fremont soon after proceeded to the Rio Sacra 
 mento to recruit, having disposed of his California 
 battalion as ordered. The commodore returned to 
 his squadron, and sailed for Monterey, taking on 
 board a small detachment which had been left at 
 Santa Barbara. Soon after he received a rumor 
 that a thousand Wallawalla Indians were about 
 to attack Sutter's Fort on the Sacramento, and 
 proceeded to San Francisco. 
 
 There, on the 30th of December, a courier arrived 
 from Gillespie, with the information that an insur 
 rection had broken out at Ciudad de los Angeles 
 soon after the departure of the commodore, and 
 that his command was besieged in the government 
 
 * Commodore Stockton's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, House of 
 Representatives, second Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1045. 
 
472 T ~ HE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 house. Stockton at once directed Captain Mervine 
 to proceed to San Pedro in the frigate Savannah, 
 and from that point to relieve Gillespie ; sent or 
 ders to Fremont to join him at San Francisco with 
 all the equipment which he could ohtain, and de 
 tached officers in various directions to recruit vol 
 unteers for the battalion.'* 
 
 On the 12th of Octoher Fremont arrived at San 
 Francisco, and emharked on board the merchant 
 ship " Sterling" for San Pedro. Stockton sailed 
 the same day in the Congress ; hut, as he received 
 dispatches by a merchant vessel from Monterey 
 that that town was in danger of being attacked, he 
 put in there and landed re-enforcements. On the 
 23d he reached San Pedro, where he found the 
 Savannah frigate, with Gillespie's volunteers on 
 board. They had retired from the Ciudad de los 
 Angeles under the terms of a convention which 
 Gillespie had signed with General Flores, chief of 
 the insurgents, who, at the time of the outbreak, 
 was a prisoner of war on parole, f 
 
 Two weeks previous to Stockton's arrival, Cap 
 tain Mervine had landed his seamen and marines, 
 for the purpose of marching,, in conjunction with 
 Gillespie's party, on Ciudad de los Angeles. Twelve 
 miles out of San Pedro he had fallen in with a 
 strong force of Californians, with one piece of ar 
 tillery. A skirmish ensued, in which, as the Amer- 
 
 * Commodore Stockton's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, House of 
 Representatives, second Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1045. 
 t Idem ibidem, and Colonel Fremont's Defense. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 473 
 
 leans had no artillery, they were worsted, and the 
 party fell back, with some loss, to San Pedro, where 
 they embarked on board the frigate. 
 
 Stockton landed a strong force on the day after 
 his arrival, and San Pedro was reoccupied ; but, 
 after waiting some time without receiving any in 
 formation of Fremont or his movements, he re-em 
 barked, and proceeded to San Diego. At this place 
 he received letters, in which Fremont informed him 
 that, as he had learned that it would be impractica 
 ble to obtain a mount for his command in the south 
 under existing circumstances, he had put in at 
 Monterey, where he could make all preparations 
 to force a passage to the Ciudad de los Angeles by 
 land. Upon this Stockton ordered Captain Mervine 
 to proceed in his vessel to Monterey, to aid Fremont 
 in his preparations, and sent instructions to Lieu 
 tenant Minor, who commanded at San Diego, to 
 make endeavors to procure horses for transporting 
 an expedition of 250 men, which the commodore 
 proposed to lead from San Diego.^ 
 
 San Diego had been in a state of siege, and the 
 garrison straitened for want of provisions, for some 
 time before Stockton's arrival. While preparations 
 were going on, the place was attacked by a strong 
 party of insurgents. The Congress had been run 
 over the bar, and grounded inside in such a man 
 ner that there was danger of her tumbling over; 
 but, notwithstanding the necessity of their presence 
 on board, a strong party of men was landed under 
 
 * Stockton's Report. 
 
474 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Captain Gillespie, who, in connection with the 
 garrison, soon repulsed the assailants. 
 
 The efforts which had been made to procure 
 horses and subsistence resulted in obtaining about 
 ninety horses and two hundred head of beef cattle ; 
 but the horses were so much broken down that it 
 was judged to be impracticable to advance before 
 a fortnight. During the interval the force about 
 San Diego was employed in constructing a fort for 
 the more complete protection of the town, and in 
 making up the necessary articles of equipment. 
 
 About the 3d of December Stockton received a 
 letter from General Kearney, informing him of his 
 approach, and requesting information concerning 
 the state of affairs in California. He immediately 
 sent Captain Gillespie with a detachment of thirty- 
 five men and a nine pounder to open a communi 
 cation. 
 
 General Kearney, after having sent back Major 
 Sumner with 200 dragoons on receipt of the intel 
 ligence of Stockton's and Fremont's apparent con 
 quest, continued his march, without any interrup 
 tion, through the Indian country into the settle 
 ments of California. The first intimation of any 
 thing like hostility to be apprehended was obtain- 
 ed on the 22d of November, when a camp was dis 
 covered, which, from the trail, appeared to have 
 been left that morning by a large mounted force. 
 It was at first believed that General Castro had 
 reunited his forces in Sonora, and was returning ; 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 475 
 
 but, upon close reconnaissance of the party, which 
 was fallen in with, in camp, during the day, it 
 proved to be a drove of horses, under charge of a 
 man who represented himself as a poor employee 
 of several ricos, on his way with the drove to the 
 Sonora market. The chief men of the party were 
 sent in by Lieutenant Emory, who conducted the 
 reconnaissance, to General Kearney, and the drove 
 was detained, in order to remount the dragoons, 
 whose horses had nearly all given out, and whose 
 mules were in but little better condition.^ 
 
 On the following day, a Mexican, well mounted 
 and muffled, and with evident preparation for a 
 journey, was intercepted, brought in, and searched, 
 and proved to be the bearer of several important 
 letters. They were addressed to General Castro, 
 his brother, and different men of note in Sonora, 
 and gave an account of the insurrectionary move 
 ments in California up to the time of their date, 
 October 15th. It was ascertained that the drove 
 of horses which had^beeii captured on the previous 
 evening was intended, in part, for General Castro, 
 and, being their legal prize, the dragoons were or 
 dered to be remounted. The horses were, however, 
 all wild, and but little fitted for immediate service. 
 
 The march was continued over a most difficult 
 and desert country for several following days, dur 
 ing which the rations were consumed, and horse 
 flesh was used for food. On the 3d, however, the 
 
 * Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 95. 
 
476 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 command arrived at Warner's rancheria, in the val 
 ley of Agua Caliente, on the road to San Diego. 
 At this point information was received that the 
 American forces were in possession of San Diego, 
 Monterey, and San Francisco, hut that the insur 
 gents held all other parts of the country. On the 
 3d another capture of horses was effected hy Lieu 
 tenant Davidson, hut, like those previously taken, 
 they were wild and unbroken. 1 * 
 
 On the 5th of December the command was join 
 ed hy Captain Gillespie's party from San Diego, 
 who hrought information that the enemy w^as in 
 force at San Pasqual, three leagues distant, as was 
 afterward ascertained, under Don Andreas Pico. 
 A party was sent forward from the rancheria of 
 Santa Maria, under Lieutenant Hammond, of the 
 first dragoons, who returned at two o'clock on the 
 following morning with information that he had 
 found the enemy and had heen observed. As he 
 was then on the direct road to San Diego, all hy- 
 ways having heen passed, Kearney determined to 
 move forward and attack the enemy hefore day- 
 hreak on the following morning. 
 
 Twelve dragoons, under Captain Johnston, con 
 stituted the advance guard, with which marched 
 the general and staff. Fifty dragoons, mounted, 
 in greater part, on the mules which had heen rid 
 den from New Mexico, under Captain Moore, and 
 Captain Gillespie's volunteers, followed next, and 
 
 * Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 107. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 477 
 
 two mountain howitzers, under Lieutenant David- 
 son, brought up the rear. The remaining troops 
 and all the baggage were left in the rear, to follow 
 at daylight. 
 
 At dawn on the 6th of May the American force 
 arrived within sight of the enemy, near the In 
 dian village of San Pasqual. Kearney, with his 
 staif, was in the advance, preceded only by the 
 advanced guard under Captain Johnston. He or 
 dered a trot, then a charge, and the engagement 
 was commenced.^ Pico received the charge with 
 a continued fire, and his men gave way. The 
 dragoons followed in pursuit, but the Californians 
 soon rallied and returned, while the dragoons were 
 scattered. They killed Captains Johnston and 
 Moore, and sixteen non-commissioned officers and 
 privates, mortally wounded Lieutenant Hammond, 
 wounded General Kearney, Lieutenant Warner, 
 of the topographical engineers, Captains Gillespie 
 and Gibson, of the volunteers, and eleven soldiers 
 and employees, and^ in the melee, carried off one 
 of the mountain howitzers, neither of which was 
 opened during the affair. Having inflicted this 
 loss, they retired, taking with them their wound 
 ed, f A large body soon after showed itself in the 
 American rear, which occasioned fears for the safe- 
 ty of the train, and a party was sent to bring it up. 
 This was accomplished without opposition, and the 
 
 * 'Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of the 
 thirtieth Congress, p. 108. 
 
 t General Kearney's Official Report. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 515. 
 
478 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Americans remained for the night in the vicinity 
 of the village. 
 
 Captain Turner succeeded to the command dur 
 ing the temporary disability of the general, and on 
 that evening sent a communication to Commodore 
 Stockton reporting the engagement, and suggest- 
 ing the propriety of his sending a considerable force 
 to meet him on the road or at San Pasqual. The 
 prospect, as stated in his note, would appear to 
 have been gloomy, for the command was without 
 provisions, and it was deemed that it might be im 
 practicable to obtain cattle from the ranch in the 
 vicinity.^ 
 
 The night was spent in burying the dead and 
 preparing ambulances for the wounded. But the 
 position of the force, among the rocks on the side 
 of the road, although defensible, was one which al 
 lowed few resting places. 
 
 On the following morning General Kearney re 
 sumed the command, and marched, in escort of his 
 wounded and baggage, to the rancheria of San Ber 
 nardo. At this place he collected a large number 
 of cattle ; but, as there was no grass in the imme 
 diate vicinity of the rancheria, the column moved 
 toward the dry bed of the Rio San Bernardo, which 
 had been left some miles to the left in the march, 
 the captured cattle being driven with the command. 
 
 Pico's troops had fallen back along the road to 
 a position beyond the rancheria, and soon after the 
 
 * Fremont's Trial. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 188. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 479 
 
 Americans moved off the main body of the enemy 
 advanced upon the rear, while a party dashed at 
 speed toward a hill immediately on the left of the 
 route which Kearney was following. The Ameri 
 cans moved rapidly in that direction also, but the 
 Californians reached it first. They were attacked 
 by the American advance of some ten or twelve 
 men, and driven back, with the loss of several 
 wounded. The main force came up and occupied 
 a defensive position, but in the race Pico had suc 
 ceeded in carrying off all the cattle.^ 
 
 The situation of Kearney's party was desperate. 
 The provisions were all gone, the horses dead, the 
 mules knocked up, and the rapid movement to gain 
 the defensive position on the hill had convinced 
 the general that it was out of the question to move 
 with his sick and baggage in the face of Pico's cav 
 alry. He therefore determined to halt for the night. 
 On the following morning, the messenger, Lieuten 
 ant Godey, of the volunteers, who had been sent 
 with Captain Turner's note to San Diego, was cap 
 tured, with his party, within sight of the American 
 position.! Pico immediately sent in a flag of truce, 
 with an offer to exchange the prisoners, four in num 
 ber, for a like number of Californians. Kearney 
 had but one to exchange, which he did for one of 
 the party, and thus received information of the safe 
 arrival of the letter at San Diego. The answer 
 
 * Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 110. 
 
 t Colonel Benton's Speech. Appendix to Congressional Globe, first Ses 
 sion of the thirtieth Congress, p. 982 . 
 
4QO THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 which Stockton had transmitted had been cached 
 by Godey just previous to his capture, but was 
 found by the enemy. 
 
 It being impracticable to move with the wound- 
 ed, although out of provisions and distant from wa 
 ter, it was determined to remain on the hill. 
 
 The fattest mule was killed for meat, and holes 
 bored for water, and, with the supply thus obtained, 
 a shift was made for two days. On the night of 
 the eighth, three persons, Kit Carson, Acting-lieu 
 tenant Beale, of the navy, and an Indian servant, 
 volunteered to go to San Diego, from which San 
 Bernardo is distant twenty-nine miles. The expe 
 dition was one of extreme peril, for the enemy had 
 all the roads, and was in force within striking dis 
 tance, on the opposite side of the river bed ; but, 
 after a night of suffering adventure and a day in 
 concealment, all three succeeded in reaching San 
 Diego on the morning of the 9th, with the intelli 
 gence of the dangerous situation of the party on 
 the hill.* 
 
 On the morning of the 10th Pico attacked the 
 camp, driving in advance of his troops a number 
 of wild horses, which were driven back by the 
 Americans, and the attack was discontinued. A 
 few horses, killed in the encounter, were used for 
 food. As many of the wounded were able to trav 
 el, it was determined to attempt a movement on 
 
 * Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. Ill, and Colonel Benton's Speech. Appendix to 
 Congressional Globe, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 982. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 43^ 
 
 the following morning, without awaiting re-en 
 forcement ; but, during the night, the party was re 
 lieved by the arrival of some two hundred sailors 
 and marines, under Lieutenant Gray, of the navy, 
 who had been sent by Commodore Stockton from 
 San Diego. 
 
 The position of the troops on the hill of San Ber 
 nardo was, at the time, nearly in extremis. Out 
 of provisions, without baggage for much of it had 
 been burned in the preparations for the movement 
 without animals for most of them had been turn 
 ed loose on account of the want of forage and with 
 a large number of wounded for the strength of the 
 party, it is difficult to see how the escape could 
 have been made good unless the re-enforcement 
 had arrived ; and, unless a move had been attempt 
 ed, the whole party must have been captured or 
 starved. 
 
 Upon the arrival of Godey at San Diego, Stock 
 ton had made preparations to send a re-enforce 
 ment. While they were in progress, Beale, Car 
 son, arid the Indian had come in, and, in the urg 
 ency of the case, Stockton increased the strength 
 of the party to over 200 men, with one piece of ar 
 tillery, and sent it off at ten o'clock at night, under 
 orders to march only at night. # 
 
 Pico retired on the junction of Gray's party with 
 Kearney's, and on the llth the whole American 
 
 * Commodore Stockton-'s Report. Executive Document, No. 1, House 
 of Representatives, second. Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1051, and 
 Testimony before Court Martial. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first 
 Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 189. 
 
 I HH 
 
482 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 force marched for San Diego, where it arrived on 
 the 12th. Pico's force, in his affairs with General 
 Kearney, has been variously stated at from 80 to 
 160 men, and his loss as variously from 11 to high 
 er numbers. 
 
 During the month of December an expedition 
 was organized at San Diego against Ciudad de los 
 Angeles. Stockton meanwhile continued to exer 
 cise his assumed functions as governor and com 
 mander of the territory, with at least the tacit con 
 sent of General Kearney, for he had made an in 
 formal offer to the general to turn over the func 
 tions of the office to him, which had been ' de 
 clined.^ Upon the morning of the 29th Kearney 
 volunteered to take the command of the troops 
 which were about to march against the enemy, 
 which Stockton assented to. The force consisted 
 of the dragoons serving on foot, a battalion of sailors 
 and marines, a company of volunteers in all, 
 about 500 men, and six pieces of artillery of vari 
 ous calibers. 
 
 On the 4th of January, when past the deserted 
 mission of Flores, on the road to Ciudad de los 
 Angeles, a flag of truce was received from Gen 
 eral Flores, the chief of the insurgents, proposing a 
 suspension of hostilities in California, and to leave 
 the sovereignty of the territory to be decided by 
 the general result of the war between the United 
 States and Mexico. Stockton, who accompanied 
 
 * Testimony before Court Martial. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, 
 first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 189. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the expedition in the character of governor and 
 oommander-m-chief, at once refused to accede to 
 the proposition, and the march was continued.^ 
 
 Approaching the Rio San Gabriel on the 8th of 
 January, the enemy was discovered upon the op 
 posite bank. The river was about one hundred 
 yards wide, knee deep, and flowing over quick 
 sand. On the American side, the approach was 
 nearly level ; but, a short distance from the oppo 
 site shore, a bank fifty feet in height afforded a 
 commanding position for the Mexican artillery. 
 The American bank was fringed with a thick un 
 dergrowth, and the space on the opposite side, be 
 tween the river and the height, was also partially 
 covered. 
 
 As the Americans approached the thicket, they 
 were received with a scattering fire from the ene 
 my's skirmishers. In the mean while a battery 
 was being planted upon the height on the opposite 
 side of the river, supported on either flank by a 
 heavy squadron of cavalry. 
 
 A battalion of sailors was ordered to deploy and 
 cross the stream, which was effected under fire 
 without serious loss. The American artillery was 
 then dragged over, and opened a lively fire upon 
 the height, which rendered that of the enemy wild 
 and inefficient. The train and cattle passed with 
 out hinderance, although a party of cavalry at 
 tempted to charge upon the rear guard; it fell 
 
 * Stockton's Report. Executive Document, No. 1, House of Representa 
 tives, second Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1051. 
 
484 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 back in haste "before a few volleys. By the time 
 the whole baggage train was brought over, the ene 
 my ceased his fire. He soon after made a charge 
 upon the American left, which was received in 
 square and repulsed, and at the same time threat 
 ened the right with no better success. The Ameri 
 cans soon after made a rush for the height, sup 
 posing that would be the contested point, but the 
 enemy had abandoned it and retreated from the 
 field.* 
 
 On the following morning the command ad 
 vanced upon the Ciudad de los Angeles over the 
 broad plain of the Mesa. Scattered parties of the 
 enemy hung about its flanks during the march, and, 
 after moving five or six miles, his main body was 
 discovered in position upon the right of the road, 
 under the crest of a depression in the plain. The 
 American forces inclined to the left over the plain 
 to avoid giving him advantage in posting his artil 
 lery. As they arrived opposite the enemy's posi 
 tion, Flores's guns opened at long range, without 
 much effect at first, but in the mean time he de 
 ployed his force and took position with two small 
 pieces of artillery directly in front, leaving two 
 nine pounders to play upon the American flank. 
 The fire from the nine pounders became annoying 
 as the Americans advanced, and their artillery was 
 opened in reply, which silenced them in a few 
 
 * Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 119, and Stockton's Report, Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 1, House of Representatives, second Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 1052. 
 
. THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 435 
 
 minutes. The command again advanced, and the 
 enemy came down upon the left and rear in a 
 charge, hut he was speedily repulsed, and retreat 
 ed with his dead and wounded (which were picked 
 up hy his horsemen without dismounting) to the 
 mountains. 
 
 In these two affairs the Americans lost one kill 
 ed and fourteen wounded, including two officers. 
 
 On the 10th a flag of truce arrived with propo 
 sals for the surrender of the town, which was dis 
 tant hut a few miles, upon guarantee of respect to 
 persons and property, which was given. The com 
 mand entered during the morning, and, after hav 
 ing quelled a riot, secured possession of the capital 
 of Upper California. General Flores retreated to 
 Sonora.^ 
 
 While these events were transpiring, Lieutenant- 
 colonel Fremont had heen engaged in organizing 
 a volunteer force in the northern part of the coun 
 try, and during the month of Decemher he com 
 menced his march for the south, with a force of 
 300 mounted men and three pieces of artillery. 
 His first movement was upon the mission of San 
 Luis Ohispo, which he took hy surprise, after a 
 secret march of one hundred and fifty miles, and 
 captured the commandant, Don Jesus Pico, with 
 thirty -five others. Don Jesus was the head of the 
 insurgents at the time, and also a prisoner upon 
 
 * Emory's Journal. Executive Document, No. 7, Senate, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 120, and Stockton's Report, Executive Docu 
 ment, No. 1, House of Representatives, second Session of the thirtieth Con 
 gress, p. 1052. 
 
486 THE WAR WITH MEXICO, 
 
 parole. He was sentenced to death "by a court 
 martial, but the sentence was remitted by Fremont, 
 who thus secured his influence in future attempts 
 to tranquilize the country. Having this object in 
 view, in his future movements Fremont abstained 
 from any hostile action against the inhabitants of 
 the towns through which he passed, or against the 
 small parties of the enemy which hovered in his 
 vicinity. After a long and tedious march over a 
 mountainous country, in the month of January he 
 arrived with his force in the vicinity of the Ciudad 
 de los Angeles. The main Mexican force in arms 
 in California, under Don Andreas Pico, was then 
 encamped in the plains of Cowenga. Fremont 
 sent a peremptory summons, to which he received 
 an answer requesting a parley.^ 
 
 The result was a convention, by which the Cal- 
 ifornians delivered up their artillery and public 
 arms, agreed to retire peaceably to their homes, and 
 to aid and assist in tranquilizing the country. 
 On the part of Lieutenant-colonel Fremont it was 
 agreed that life and property should be guaran 
 teed, that no Mexican citizen should be bound to 
 take the oath of allegiance until the conclusion of 
 a treaty of peace between Mexico and the United 
 States, and equal rights and privileges were vouch 
 safed to every citizen of California as enjoyed by 
 citizens of the United States of North America. 
 The convention, of which the above were the prin- 
 
 * Fremont's Defense. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 378, 379. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 437 
 
 cipal features, was entered into on the 13th of Jan 
 uary, and signed and approved by Fremont, in his 
 character of military commandant of California un 
 der Stockton's commission, on the 16th, at Ciudad 
 de los Angeles.^ 
 
 Agreed upon as it had been without any express 
 authority on his part, Stockton nevertheless ap 
 proved of it, and it doubtless had great effect in se 
 curing the tranquillity of the country. But about 
 this period a difficulty arose about the exercise of 
 the chief authority in the new territory, which was 
 the cause of much subsequent annoyance. 
 
 Stockton had offered the management of affairs to 
 Kearney soon after his arrival at San Diego, which 
 Kearney had at the time refused. During the stay 
 at that place, however, he had reconsidered the 
 matter, and expressed to Stockton the opinion that 
 he ought to be the governor of California, which 
 Stockton then declined to permit. Kearney, by 
 Stockton's permission, commanded the troops on 
 the expedition to the Ciudad- de los Angeles, and 
 during that expedition the question of rank or com 
 mand was raised by neither. But, after the occupa 
 tion of the town, the capitulation of Cowenga', and 
 the arrival of Fremont at Ciudad de los Angeles, 
 Stockton commenced preparations for organizing a 
 civil government, which he conceived he had done 
 in the previous month of August. 
 
 This duty Kearney claimed to have been devolv- 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 1, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1067. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ed upon him by the President of the United States, 
 and on the 16th of January he made a formal 
 demand upon Stockton to " cease all further pro 
 ceedings relating to the formation of a civil govern 
 ment* in the country" 
 
 Stockton replied on the same day, and refused to 
 comply, and, in the mean time, suspended Kearney 
 from the command of the force then in Ciudad de 
 los Angeles, with the exception of the dragoons. 
 Kearney replied on the 17th, and stated that, for 
 the purpose of preventing a collision, he would re 
 main silent for the time, but that the responsibil 
 ity of doing that for which he had no authority, 
 and for preventing the execution of the President's 
 orders, must remain with Stockton. And, in a 
 note of the same date, he informed the commodore 
 of his purpose to leave Ciudad de los Angeles, with 
 the escort which had accompanied him into the 
 country, on the following morning. 
 
 Prior to this, however, he had addressed Lieu 
 tenant-colonel Fremont without reference to the 
 commodore, and on the 16th had sent to that offi 
 cer certain instructions and orders concerning the 
 organization of the California battalion. Fremont, 
 although he had reported to Kearney as command 
 ing the forces upon his arrival, finding the ques 
 tion thus thrust upon him, decided to continue his 
 obedience to Stockton until the question of com 
 mand between the two was decided. 
 
 * Fremont's Trial. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 90, 118, 195. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 On the 16th Stockton issued his commission to 
 Fremont as governor and commander-in-chief over 
 California, and soon after left Ciudad de los An 
 geles.^ Fremont at once entered upon the exer 
 cise of the duties, and, contrary to the orders of Gen 
 eral Kearney, soon after issued orders for the in 
 crease of the hattalion of volunteers under his com 
 mand. He apparently considered himself supreme 
 in the territory, and decided questions of civil, mil 
 itary, and fiscal matters upon his own responsibil 
 ity, without reference to either military or naval 
 officers of superior rank. 
 
 On the 20th of January Lieutenant-colonel 
 Cooke arrived at San Diego with the Mormon hat 
 talion, raised in Missouri after Kearney's departure, 
 which had followed him from Santa Fe hy another 
 and more favorahle route. Leaving him in com 
 mand, Kearney sailed from that place on the 31st. 
 He arrived at Monterey on the 8th of February, 
 where he found the store-ship Lexington with a 
 company of United States artillery on board, under 
 Captain Tompkins, and Commodore Shubrick, who 
 had arrived in the Independence razee to take com 
 mand of the squadron. 
 
 Upon exhibiting his instructions from the "War 
 Department of June 3d, Kearney was recognized as 
 the commander of the military forces in California 
 by the commodore, but in relation to affairs of a civil 
 nature Shubrick had instructions of a later date. 
 
 * Fremont's Trial. Executive Document, No. 33, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 176. 
 
490 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 In this regard, the Secretary of the Navy had 
 written on the 12th of July to Commodore Sloat, 
 supposed to he in command, to the effect that he 
 was expected to take possession of California. 
 " This," it was said, " will "bring with it the neces 
 sity of a civil administration." " Such a govern 
 ment should be established under your* protection, 
 and, in selecting persons to hold offices, 5 * &c., &c. 
 
 Shubrick had received the letter containing the 
 ahove extract hy the Lexington at Valparaiso on 
 the 2d of December, and, in view of its explicit in 
 structions, Kearney acquiesced in the civil author 
 ity of the naval commander. On the 13th of Feb- 
 ruary, Colonel Mason, of the first dragoons, who 
 had heen sent from the United States subsequent 
 to the departure of Stevenson's regiment of New- 
 York volunteers, to take command of the land 
 forces, and to exercise the functions of civil gov 
 ernor, in case of Kearney's departure, arrived at the 
 Bay of San Francisco, where Kearney then was en 
 gaged in selecting sites for fortifications and other 
 military reconnaissance. 
 
 Mason hore communications from hoth the war 
 and navy departments to the commanders of the 
 different hranches of the service. To Commodore 
 Stockton, Mr. Mason, Secretary of the Navy, had 
 written on the 5th of November, ordering him to 
 relinquish all control over civil matters in the fol 
 lowing language : 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 238. 
 
THE 'WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 " The President has deemed it best for the pub 
 lic interests to invest the military officer command 
 ing with the direction of the operations on land, 
 and with the administrative functions of govern 
 ment over the people and territory occupied by us. 
 You will relinquish to Colonel Mason, or to Gen 
 eral Kearney, if the latter shall arrive before you 
 have done so, the entire control over these matters, 
 and turn over to him all papers necessary to the 
 performance of his duties."^ 
 
 Kearney, after receiving the communications and 
 informations borne by Mason, returned to Monte 
 rey and consulted with Shubrick. On the 1st of 
 March they issued a joint circular proclamation, 
 setting forth the intentions of the United States 
 government, and the different duties which de 
 volved upon the naval and military commanders, 
 according to their latest instructions, and Kearney 
 at once assumed the title and duties of governor 
 of the territory. 
 
 Prior to this, Fremont had opened a correspond 
 ence with Shubrick ; but, soon after receiving his 
 instructions, the commodore informed him that he 
 considered Kearney in command of the troops, and 
 in the exercise of the civil authority, by order of the 
 President. 
 
 On the 1st of March Captain Turner was dis 
 patched to Los Angeles with a copy of the joint 
 proclamation, and orders for Lieutenant-colonel 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 247. 
 
492 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 Fremont. By the orders he was directed to muster 
 his battalion into service under existing laws, and 
 to turn over the command of the southern military 
 district to Lieutenant-colonel Cooke, and to con 
 duct such men of the battalion as would not en 
 gage in service under the law to Yerba Buena, by 
 Monterey, where they would be discharged. 
 
 Fremont, however, refused to turn over the com 
 mand to Cooke, ordered the second in command 
 of the battalion to hold his position, to obey no 
 orders which did not emanate from him, and soon 
 after started express for Monterey. The reason al 
 leged for the disobedience of orders was the ap 
 prehended danger of an insurrection among the 
 Californians, incited by the vicinity of the Mor 
 mons, of whose barbarity they had received many 
 accounts. 
 
 On the 25th of March Fremont arrived at Mon 
 terey, and had an interview with Kearney. Com 
 modore Biddle had meantime arrived in the Colum 
 bus seventy-four, and, like Shubrick, had acknowl 
 edged the authority of the general. Fremont's in-/ 
 terview was not satisfactory to either party. Kear 
 ney did not communicate to him the last instruc 
 tions which had been received from Washington, 
 but insisted, before having any conversation with 
 him, upon obedience to his orders of March 1st. 
 Fremont offered to resign his commission and re 
 turn to the United States. Kearney refused it; 
 and, finally, Fremont promised obedience, and re 
 turned to Los Angeles. Soon after his departure 
 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 493 
 
 Colonel Mason was sent thither, charged with the 
 direction of affairs in the southern district. 
 
 An altercation took place between him and Fre 
 mont, which resulted in a challenge, accepted by 
 Mason, and subsequently postponed by him. He 
 returned to Monterey, and orders from Kearney put 
 a stop to the intended duel. The general proceed 
 ed south to Los Angeles, where he found Fremont, 
 who was relieved from duty, and prepared to join 
 his regiment (mounted rifles) in Mexico by pro 
 ceeding overland to the Vera Cruz routed 
 
 By the time he arrived at Monterey, however, 
 he was directed to accompany Kearney to the 
 United States ; for, during the interval, a portion 
 of Stevenson's regiment of New York volunteers 
 had arrived, and Kearney turned over the direction 
 of affairs in the country to Mason. 
 
 California was in a manner quiet, and a force 
 then present and at hand which was quite suffi 
 cient to maintain the supremacy of the United 
 States. 
 
 The controversy between the principal agents in 
 effecting the occupation of the territory of California 
 attracted much attention, and is well known to the 
 people of the United States. The facts of the case 
 on either side have been developed in the trial of 
 Lieutenant-colonel Fremont, and in the speech of 
 Senator Benton against the confirmation of General 
 Kearney's brevet appointment. 
 
 The difficulties were the natural consequence 
 
 * Testimony before the Court Martial, and Colonel Benton's Speech. 
 
494 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 of the irregular, and, in a measure, unauthorized 
 course of action on the part of Stockton and Fre 
 mont, and the nature of the service performed. 
 This action proved to be for the same end which 
 was desired by the President of the United States, 
 but undoubtedly was undertaken as much for per 
 sonal aggrandizement and distinction as for any 
 well-defined intention of carrying out the wishes 
 of the authorities at Washington. This never-fail 
 ing source of personal enmity caused the contro 
 versy between Stockton and Kearney; and in a 
 stickling for prerogative which he had no right to 
 assume, and which he was immediately to relin 
 quish, Stockton was the. originator of serious diffi 
 culty. The consequences of the difficulty fell upon 
 Fremont ; and although there is no question of the 
 illegality of his disobedience to the officer of the 
 army in favor of one who had no legal right to com 
 mand him, yet he certainly was in a delicate posi 
 tion when appealed to by two officials, one his su 
 perior in army rank, and who had yielded a tacit 
 obedience to the other, and that other the officer 
 under whose authority Fremont had voluntarily 
 raised his battalion and served up to the time. 
 
 How far he was justified by circumstances in 
 continuing his disobedience was the question, and 
 that question was decided against Fremont by a 
 court martial. He was found guilty of " mutiny," 
 " disobedience of orders," and of " conduct prejudi 
 cial to good order and military discipline," and 
 sentenced to be dismissed the service. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 495 
 
 The President remitted the sentence in consider 
 ation of his previous valuable and meritorious serv 
 ices, but Fremont refused to acquiesce in the de 
 cision of the court by accepting the executive clem 
 ency, and resigned his commission. 
 
 The early action in California which brought 
 about the nondescript partisan war, though suc 
 cessful in effecting the occupation of the country, 
 had many other evil effects than that of causing 
 the difficulty between the officers, aspirants for 
 military or civic honors. A great waste of public 
 property, and the contraction of an infinite number 
 of debts, which could not be legally settled, and 
 which are not settled to this day, were among 
 them. The civil government established was a 
 nonentity, and the various mockeries of adminis 
 trations, for they were but little else, of Stockton, 
 Fremont, and Kearney, had effect hardly outside 
 of cannon range. A species of military superin 
 tendence was the consequence, which was all the 
 government which existed in California to the 
 close of the war, except the remnant of the old 
 Mexican organization. 
 
496 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Politics in the United States Avowed Policy and Recommendations of the 
 Administration at the Opening of the second Session of the twenty-ninth 
 Congress Action of Congress Attempt to create a Lieutenant General 
 Provisions made by the twenty-ninth Congress for the Prosecution of the 
 War Politics in Mexico Polka Rebellion Return of Santa Anna to the 
 Capital Reorganization of the Army. 
 
 THE flood of enthusiasm which had been raised 
 in the United States by the occurrence of hostili 
 ties, and which, for a time, seemed to have set the 
 whole current of public opinion in favor of their 
 vigorous prosecution, soon found vent through the 
 usual channels of political controversy. The exi 
 gencies of the case in the state of affairs upon the 
 Rio Grande, as understood at Washington, at first 
 silenced the opposition party in the American Con 
 gress, and drove its members, almost without ex 
 ception, to acquiesce in the vote by which the 
 state of war was officially recognized, and the im 
 mediate provision made for its support. But when 
 the crisis was past, and the danger of implicating 
 the party in a positive declaration against the meas 
 ures of defense was over, there was time for rest 
 and reflection. To the people of the United States 
 the war did not appeal directly; for the scene of 
 operations was distant, the taxes were indirect, and 
 the war was commenced with an overflowing treas 
 ury. In the interval of active operations, and the 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 497 
 
 consequent dearth of news, the conduct of the gov 
 ernment was closely criticised. The opposition par 
 ty, repenting of the vote by which its members had 
 become implicated in the measure, took the ground 
 that the war was unjust, and returned to its former 
 position, that the conduct of the President and his 
 advisers, in the public transactions which preceded 
 it, was reprehensible. Warring against the admin 
 istration from these bases, its prominent men, re 
 gardless of the effect upon the enemy and the in 
 terest of their own country, lost but few opportuni 
 ties of publishing the principles of action. The in 
 creased expenditure of money was freely comment 
 ed upon, and economy, the usual cry of those anx 
 ious to get the management of a public treasury 
 for their own benefit, was set forth as an argument 
 against maintaining the national honor. The na 
 tional interest was made to appear incompatible 
 with the war, and the policy of the administration, 
 so far as known, was bitterly denounced. What 
 was not known did not escape criticism before the 
 fact ; for the various newspaper editors, anxious for 
 articles on the interesting subject, put forth their 
 speculations on policy and plans of operations, of 
 which few knew any thing, and a less number un 
 derstood. The Whig and neutral presses, during 
 the interval of action in Mexico, were especially 
 noisy in condemning the administration, and the 
 abolition prints in the North came out in bold de 
 nunciation. Had all these succeeded in bewilder 
 ing the Mexican government as completely as they 
 I 1 1 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ' .^ . ;"--* 
 
 ' ' . '' 
 
 did themselves, they might have done the state 
 some service. But the Mexican functionaries were 
 nearer the .scene of action, and had better sources 
 . of information than their editorial allies ; and, while 
 they took the speculations for what they were 
 worth, eagerly seized upon the demonstration of 
 domestic hostility to the American government, and 
 drew thence inferences favorable to themselves. 
 
 The Democratic presses,' meanwhile, strove to 
 keep up the war excitement, and to bring the peo 
 ple to the support of the administration by appeals 
 to patriotism. But they had no capital of late suc 
 cessful military action. Palo Alto, Resaca de la 
 Palma, and the bombardment of Fort Brown had 
 lasted for a few months long enough to fill up the 
 first call for volunteers with surprising rapidity. 
 By that time every real incident had been narrat 
 ed, besides an infinite number which never occur 
 red, arid -the unsatisfied public turned anxiously 
 for excitement to politics. 
 
 The elections for members of Congress occurred, 
 for the most part, before the receipt of the news of 
 the battle of Monterey, and the dilatory action 
 of the government, the enormous expenditure of 
 money, the injustice of the cause, the encourage 
 ment given to slave-holders, and various other top 
 ics, were urged by the opposition candidates, who, 
 in the absence of military news, managed to se 
 cure a majority in the House of Representatives 
 of the thirtieth Congress. 
 
 Notwithstanding this effect of the opposition to 
 
THE WAR WITfl MEXICO. 499 
 
 the war, the avowed policy -of the administration 
 underwent no change. The message of President 
 Polk to the twenty-ninth Congress, at the opening 
 of the second session, set forth that "the war will 
 continue to be prosecuted with vigor, as the best 
 means of securing peace. It is hoped that the de 
 cision of the Mexican Congress, to which our last 
 overture was referred, may result in a speedy and 
 honorable peace. With our experience, however, 
 of the unreasonable course of the Mexican authori 
 ties, it is the part of wisdom not to relax in the 
 energy of our military operations until the result 
 is made known. In this view, it is deemed import 
 ant to hold military possession of all the provinces 
 which have been taken, until a definite treaty of 
 peace shall have been concluded and ratified by 
 the two countries." 
 
 The policy in reference to holding the territory 
 of Mexico, as indemnity, though not explicitly 
 avowed, was treated of. 
 
 " The war has not been waged with a view to 
 conquest; but, having been commenced by Mexico, 
 it has been carried into the enemy's country, and 
 will be vigorously prosecuted there, with a view to 
 obtain an honorable peace, and thereby secure am 
 ple indemnity for the expenses of the war, as well 
 as to our much-injured citizens, who hold large 
 pecuniary demands against Mexico."^ 
 
 For the different recommendations of action to 
 
 * Executive Document. No, 4,' House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 22. 
 
500 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 furnish requisite means for the vigorous prosecu 
 tion of hostilities, reference was made to the reports 
 of the secretaries. 
 
 The principal one, in the report of Mr. Marcy, 
 was that of authorizing an increase of the regular 
 army. The various embarrassments and incon 
 veniences resulting from the employment of volun 
 teer troops had heen experienced, and the admin 
 istration had become aware of its error in calling 
 upon them to serve for only one year ; for, by the 
 time that the organization had been completed, 
 and the most serious embarrassments had been 
 overcome in reference to the troops originally call 
 ed out, the term of service had half expired. The 
 obstinacy of Mexico was not half subdued, and the 
 result of the operations then in course of prepara 
 tion, and how far they were to be carried before 
 the enemy would sue for or agree to negotiations, 
 remained to be seen. The error was not again 
 committed, and those volunteers which were call 
 ed forth in the fall of the year 1846 were to serve 
 during the war. Still, Mr. Marcy recommended 
 the employment of regulars rather than volunteers ; 
 for, while the bravery of the volunteers was ac 
 knowledged, he wrote, " It is no disparagement to 
 them to say that a regular force is to be preferred 
 in a war to be prosecuted in a foreign country. 
 Besides, considerations of economy are decidedly 
 in favor of troops engaged to serve during the war. 
 I am most solicitous that this subject should re 
 ceive the early attention of Congress, and a body 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 501 
 
 of troops to serve for the war may be raised to take 
 the place of those volunteers who will claim a dis 
 charge at the end of their year's service."^ He 
 therefore recommended that ten additional regi 
 ments for the regular army should be raised. 
 
 It was further recommended to Congress to make 
 provision for the retirement of aged and infirm of 
 ficers of the army, to appoint an additional major 
 to _each regiment, and to make some few additions 
 to the staff corps ; the two first of which were of 
 crying necessity, as a glance at the condition of 
 the army for a long previous period sufficed to 
 show. 
 
 Another provision which was requisite, and 
 which, in despite of recommendations, Congress 
 had failed to act upon, was again urged upon them 
 that of granting authority to courts martial set 
 ting in foreign countries to take cognizance of 
 crimes of a civil nature committed by any persons, 
 whether enlisted men of the army or not, which, 
 under the existing American Articles of War, they 
 had no power to do. 
 
 The methods recommended for providing for the 
 deficiency in the revenue to meet the expenses of 
 the government were by loan, the graduation and 
 reduction of the price of public lands which had 
 been long in market, and the imposition of a war 
 revenue upon articles of import on the free list of 
 the American tariff. 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 4, House of Representatives, second Session 
 of the twenty-ninth Congress, p. 54. 
 
02 TI *E WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 To enable the President to proceed immediately 
 with negotiations, should opportunity occur, soon 
 after the commencement of hostilities during the 
 previous session he had asked for -an appropriation 
 of three millions of dollars, which application was 
 renewed in his message. . 
 
 The various subjects were soon taken, up and 
 discussed in the different houses of the American 
 Congress; but, although the administration party 
 was in the majority in both branches at the time, 
 the opposition was strong enough to delay action, 
 in the view which was taken of the particular 
 benefit which each party might derive in the 
 course of the legislation. Looking to their own 
 interest, and in fear lest the Democratic party 
 should gain popularity, the Whigs' took good care 
 to debate every proposition as it came up, although 
 they were of obvious propriety, and had been urged 
 upon the attention . of Congress as of immediate 
 necessity, as they indeed were ; for, in keeping 
 with the previous policy of -the government, no 
 more troops were called for than were deemed ab 
 solutely necessary for present purposes, leaving but 
 a small margin for contingencies. While action 
 upon the recommendations was delayed, and the 
 different bills introduced were slowly passing the 
 ordeal of legislative criticism, other propositions 
 were brought before Congress. 
 
 WKen the session opened, if there were any def 
 inite plan of operations having the great end of 
 the war in view, it had not been agreed upon be- 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 5-93 
 
 tween the administration and either of the gen 
 erals then in command, in the field, As matters 
 then stood, the military operations were in prog 
 ress in some way, hut neither of the^ command 
 ers possessed the confidence of the President, or 
 was fully aware of his wishes or intentions. Gen 
 eral Taylor's plan, which, after his experiment at 
 Monterey, he had given as his view of proper fu 
 ture action, had heen received, hut was not ap 
 proved. General Scott was organizing the expe 
 dition against Vera Cruz, with a view, as he said, 
 of marching thence upon the city of Mexico ;# and 
 it was undoubtedly the intention of the President 
 that the march should he made, if peace were not 
 accepted hy the enemy; but it nowhere appears 
 that General Scott was assigned, at that time, to 
 any thing else than the command of the particular 
 expedition. It may very naturally have heen a 
 matter of inference, on his part, that he was to con 
 tinue in the command. Whether he were or not, 
 it would not have heen good policy on the part of 
 the administration to excite his suspicion or ill tem- 
 .per, when he was about entering upon his duties, 
 by informing him that he -was not ; and.it does not 
 appear that, at the time of leaving Washington, he 
 had any knowledge of an intention to supersede 
 him. His inferences and the recommendations of 
 the President were entirely antagonistic, and the 
 charge of bad faith, in permitting him to depart 
 
 * General Scott to General Taylor. Executive Document, No. 60, House 
 of. Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 839. 
 
504 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 under the impression that he was to continue in 
 command, might with justice have heen brought 
 against Mr. Polk, had it not heen for the previous 
 conduct of the general-in-chief ; hut, in view of 
 his early correspondence and course of conduct, his 
 extreme anxiety at the time for employment in 
 the active duties of his station, and his complete 
 dependence upon Mr. Polk for any assignment of 
 the kind, it may well he a question how far the 
 latter was called upon to sacrifice his policy or his 
 wishes to benefit a man who was notoriously hos 
 tile to his administration, and who, it was helieved, 
 on former occasions had returned the honor offer 
 ed to him first hy coolness, and then hy positive 
 insult. He did assign him to the command of the 
 expedition against Vera Cruz, hut the main ques 
 tion of the operations to he pushed to the conquest 
 of a peace was in great measure undetermined. 
 Whether General Scott had heen asked for, or had 
 given his opinion on the subject in extenso, does 
 not appear in official correspondence which has 
 heen published ; hut in neither the projet of in 
 structions which he submitted to the Secretary of 
 War for his signature, nor in the memoranda on 
 Vera Cruz and its castle, nor in the instructions 
 which were actually written out hy Mr. Marcy, 
 does it positively appear that he was ordered to ex 
 ecute any other duty than that of taking the fort 
 ress of San Juan d'Ulloa and the city of Vera Cruz.^ 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 1276, 1268-1272, and 836. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 505 
 
 The great question of the method of obtaining a 
 peace from the enemy, when viewed in connection 
 with those of home policy, was one of exceeding 
 difficulty. Had the United States been a mon 
 archy, and, as they are, the most powerful nation 
 on the continent, it would have been of easy solu 
 tion. It would have at once been attempted to 
 force Mexico to the alternative of sueing for peace 
 or of losing her nationality, without the sacrifice 
 of etiquette, moral advantages, or national pride 
 in making the different offers of negotiation which 
 were made. But in the United States, neither 
 government nor people were prepared for such a 
 course of action. Various interests, prejudices, and 
 sympathies were opposed to it ; and while it was 
 wished to force Mexico to terms and to obtain in 
 demnity, it was desirable to leave her in an inde 
 pendent and prosperous condition. 
 
 The first great thing to be done was to make 
 the governing power in Mexico sensible of these 
 desired ends, and the consequences which must 
 follow if they could not be accomplished a task 
 of some magnitude ; for, while so great a diversity 
 of opinion existed at home, and so many discus 
 sions as to the policy, avowed and secret, of the 
 administration were being published in the Amer 
 ican prints, it could be no very easy matter to con- 
 vince the Mexicans that any thing like a spirit of 
 good feeling existed on the part of the government 
 of the United States. It can hardly be believed 
 that there did, except so far as was advised by in- 
 
506 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 terest ; and when the administration was forced 
 hy the outcries of the opposition to make the very 
 many concessions to the enemy, it was forced to 
 commit an error in diplomatic action. The peace 
 which the United States had the right and power 
 to demand, was begged. " In politics, it is a griev 
 ous fault to be too generous ; gratitude in state af 
 fairs is unknown, and as the appearance of disin 
 terested kindness never deceives, it should never be 
 assumed."* The appearance of kindness in the 
 various offers which had heen made, although, for 
 reasons of interest, they would have been carried 
 out in good faith, certainly had no effect to induce 
 Mexico to accept them. On the contrary, after 
 each one, she had heen as, if not more, obstinate 
 than before, and indulged the hope that, as the 
 United States were so desirous for peace, they 
 would soon give up the war of their own accord. 
 
 The second which was considered necessary 
 was to present an imposing force, to threaten while 
 the future friendly propositions were made, and to 
 inflict the evils of war, step by step, until the terms 
 were acceded to a military task, but containing, 
 in combination with the first, many elements of 
 difficulty ; and they were increased when it was 
 proposed to make the burden of the war fall upon 
 Mexico by raising military contributions. 
 
 To combine all these in harmonious action re- 
 quired a plan, and one which had in it more talent 
 than is usually found in even those which have 
 
 * Napier, chapter i., book ii., vol. i., Carey & Hart's edition, 1842, p. 79. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 597 
 
 been, successfully executed. A plan was proposed 
 by Mr.'Benton, chairman of the Military Commit 
 tee of the Senate, arid met the approbation of the 
 President. What its details were, or whether it 
 was practicable, can not be told, for it has not seen 
 the light, and, moreover, would lack the great test 
 of experience. But it was not in keeping with the 
 ideas of either Generals Taylor or Scott, and as the 
 President did not wish to take the responsibility 
 of removing them, or of intrusting them with the 
 execution of the plan, a proposition was placed be 
 fore Congress to the effect that a new grade should 
 be created in the army, for the period of the war, 
 senior to any known in the American service. If 
 created, it was to have been filled by the appoint 
 ment of Mr. Benton.^- 
 
 In this proposition the opposition members saw 
 the attempt to appoint the succeeding president ;f 
 for both of the commanding generals then in the 
 field were upon their side of politics ; and while they 
 denounced the war as unjust, they praised its mili 
 tary achievements, attributed great talent to the 
 generals, and claimed all the credit of successful 
 management for their own. A rival on the other 
 side of superior rank, and, if of talent and with 
 good fortune, of superior success, for he would bring 
 the war to a glorious termination, was greatly to 
 be feared. The proposition was therefore virulent- 
 
 * Colonel Benton's Speech on the Lieutenant Generalship. . Appendix to 
 Congressional Globe, second Session of the twenty-ninth Congress. 
 t Mr. Mangum's Speech on the Lieutenant Generalship. Idem. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 ly opposed, and all the arguments which could be 
 urged against it were urged. Among others, it was 
 loudly proclaimed that it was a slight and an in 
 sult to the regular army, which had done so much 
 for the honor of the country an argument of some 
 reason, and proper enough, had it not been that 
 the fixed policy of the country, and the action of 
 both parties, had been a continual slight, not to 
 say insult. Brought in, as it was at the time, to 
 oppose the administration and save the general-in- 
 chief, who was wanted as a presidential candidate, 
 the " appearance of disinterested kindness" could 
 hardly deceive any into the belief that the Whig 
 party was more particularly patriotic or grateful to 
 the army than the Democratic. 
 
 The proposition to create a lieutenant general 
 was rejected, and, as it was, had a pernicious tend 
 ency, instead of simplifying the operations and in 
 suring a good understanding between the executive 
 and the commanding generals. It had the effect 
 of souring the feelings of General Scott, who, by 
 the failure of the attempt, was left in command, 
 and of diverting his attention from the operations 
 of war to politics and personal position, which 
 already occupied quite a sufficient share of his 
 thoughts. In his own words, he was forced to at 
 tend " to the fire in his rear from Washington." 
 
 A second attempt was made to obtain the same 
 end by ingrafting a provision to a bill for the in 
 crease of the number of general officers of the army, 
 that the President should be authorized to place 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 5 Q 9 
 
 any one of them, without regard to rank, in com 
 mand of the army in Mexico. But this met with 
 the same opposition, and was likewise defeated. 
 
 The discussion of bills for the increase of the 
 army and for provisions for the war was protract 
 ed until near the close of the session. The oppor 
 tunity was seized in this connection, by persons 
 desirous of sectional popularity, to ingraft on some 
 of these bills a proviso affecting the abstract, though 
 dangerous question of slavery. It was fixed upon 
 that which made the appropriation of three millions 
 for negotiating purposes. The proviso, known as 
 Mr. Wilmot's, made much excitement in the North 
 and South, and the continued and fiery discussions 
 between the members of Congress from the differ 
 ent sections were another element of delay. 
 
 But, finally, bills were passed providing the mon 
 ey required, authorizing the President to raise ten 
 additional regiments for the regular army, and to 
 appoint an additional number of general and staff 
 officers ; but he was denied the authority of Con 
 gress to select the general to be intrusted with the 
 command of the army and the prosecution of the 
 war, irrespective of the rank of those already in 
 the field. 
 
 The effect of the delay in legislative action will 
 be apparent in a future chapter. But, in the mean 
 time, and while the preparations for inflicting an 
 other blow with the sword were in progress, the 
 olive branch was again thrust at Mexico. Mr. 
 Buchanan wrote on the 18th of January, 1847, to 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, offer 
 ing peace, and proposing that commissioners should 
 be appointed, to meet at Havana or at Jalapa, to 
 negotiate a treaty. The letter reached Mexico just 
 on the eve of a revolution, and the government of 
 Mexico, whose minister answered it, was power 
 less in any event. - The answer, so far as it went, 
 was but a repetition of former answers to similar 
 offers, that Mexico would on no account appoint 
 commissioners without the previous acceptance of 
 the preliminary condition, that the American troops 
 should evacuate the Mexican territory, and that 
 the blockade of Mexican ports should be raised.^ 
 
 While political controversy delayed the action 
 of the American government in furnishing the nec 
 essary support to the war, by causing legislative 
 discussions, in Mexico it produced more direct op 
 position to the measures of the administration of 
 Farias. The news of the contemplated attack 
 upon Vera Cruz and the Castle of San Juan d'Ul- 
 loa produced new exertions to raise money, the im 
 mediate want of Mexico in carrying on the war. 
 As it was believed that the Castle of San Juan 
 d'Ulloa was of great importance to the defense of 
 the country, the vice-president, and those of his 
 cabinet who remained, pressed the negotiations for 
 the sale of the Church property on more ruinous 
 
 * Correspondence. Executive Document, No. 1, Senate, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 36-38. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 5 j ^ 
 
 terms than ever. In the exigencies of the moment 
 the Congress gave its assent to the sales, and upon 
 this the opposition, which had suhsided during the 
 inability of the government to effect a. sale, broke 
 out again. 
 
 The priests used all their influence with the pop 
 ulace, families, and even the women, to foment dis 
 cord and create a revolt. Their efforts. soon had 
 effect in the city of Mexico among the better class 
 of inhabitants, and loud denunciations of the policy 
 of the government were daily put forth. The bat 
 talions of Victoria, Bravo, and Hidalgo, of the Na 
 tional Guard, were principally composed of men 
 of that class, and were in consequence, and because 
 of their opposition to the government, special ob 
 jects of the enmity of Farias and the Puros. The 
 first step to be taken was either to get rid of them 
 or to render them harmless. Those battalions were 
 therefore ordered to march to Vera Cruz officers 
 and men at once refused to obey ; then to deliver 
 up their arms and accouterments, that they might 
 be sent to the threatened point, and obedience to 
 this order was likewise refused. 
 
 Upon the demonstration of an intention on the 
 part of the government to employ certain battalions 
 of the regular army which had been retained in 
 the city to enforce the latter order, a pronuncia- 
 miento was issued, and preparations made for sup 
 porting it in arms. The citadel was seized and 
 held by the Polkas, for so the insurgents called 
 themselves, and a choice was made of a leader. 
 
512 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 General Pena y Barragan was spoken of, but he 
 was absent from the city, at his country house at 
 Mixcoac, and did not at first countenance the use 
 of his name. Upon learning the selection, Farias 
 sent an escort of cavalry to arrest and bring him to 
 the palace ; but it arrived while he was absent from 
 home. Having learned of the intention of the gov 
 ernment, without returning to his house, he repair 
 ed at once to the city, and placed himself at the 
 head of the rebellion. 
 
 Having seized and garrisoned several convents 
 in the most thickly-populated quarters of the cap 
 ital, Pena y Barragan issued a proclamation against 
 the government of Farias, in which he declared all 
 contracts made for the sale of Church property null 
 and void, and all commissions conferred by the ex 
 isting authorities to be of no effect. He acknowl 
 edged Santa Anna as President of Mexico, although 
 the acknowledgment was in contradiction to the 
 original plan of the Polkas, which was based upon 
 the asserted illegality of the last election of public 
 officers. 
 
 When taken together, the publications of the in 
 surgents were ridiculous, and the inconsistency of 
 the different objects of the movement was well ex 
 pressed by the name given to the revolt in the cap 
 ital, " El pronunciamiento de las mugeres" 
 
 The government party occupied the palace and 
 the Grand Plaza, to which the principal approaches 
 were strongly barricaded. The Polkas remained 
 in their convents, and the contest of the factions 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 5^3 
 
 was principally at long range. Several advances 
 were made by the government troops on the con 
 vent of La Profesa, the head-quarters of the insur 
 gents ; but they always retired without serious loss, 
 and without having inflicted any. The principal 
 damage done by either of the parties was upon a 
 few old market-women and citizens, who traversed 
 the streets in pursuit of business, and were some 
 times overtaken by a random shot. But in the 
 state of turmoil which existed, a third party ap 
 peared indirectly in the contest, in the shape of 
 the robber bands which. usually infested the high 
 roads. These, taking advantage of the suspension 
 of the police government, flocked into the city in 
 great numbers, and, by their plundering, did as 
 much damage as either Puros or Polkas. 
 
 That all this disturbance, and the ridiculous 
 mimicry of a civil war, should be going on in the 
 capital while the main army was engaged in fight 
 ing the enemy, and when a serious attack by a 
 new and dangerous line of operations was antici 
 pated, affords a sufficient commentary upon the 
 waywardness of the Mexican people, and makes it 
 a matter of wonder that, out of such material, any 
 man, however great his genius, could have collect 
 ed and controlled any formidable means of defense. 
 
 The news of the outbreak reached Santa Anna 
 while on his retreat from La Angostura. In his 
 report of the battle, he had made the best possible 
 account of the operations, and claimed that he had 
 gained the victory, which, however, he admitted, 
 L KK 
 
514 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 was not complete. In proof of his claim, he enu 
 merated the partial success of his attacks, and the 
 trophies of guns and colors captured in the conflict. 
 But the main feature which was apparent in the 
 document was the statement of the difficulties 
 which he had encountered, and the blame of which 
 he laid at the door of the government. These 
 were asserted to he the cause of the indecisive na 
 ture of the so-called victory, and the government 
 and people were strongly urged to rally in support 
 of the war. 
 
 Whatever may have been Santa Anna's policy 
 before the battle of La Angostura, it was now nec 
 essary for his own safety that he should assert 
 that he had gained a victory, and proclaim louder 
 than ever his warlike intentions. He needed all 
 the personal popularity of which he was possessed 
 to quell the revolution in the capital, and that was 
 hardly to be increased by an acknowledgment of 
 disaster on his part, especially when some of his 
 generals were accusing him of incapacity. His va 
 rious bulletins preceded him in his retreat, and 
 caused the belief that he had gained a victory hon 
 orable alike to himself and his country. Under 
 this impression, he was received, as he passed 
 through different cities, with every demonstration 
 of joy and congratulation. 
 
 Upon reaching San Luis, he wrote to the chiefs 
 of factions in the capital, recommending a cessation 
 of hostilities until his arrival. On the 14th of 
 March he issued a proclamation, announcing his 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 departure to assume the reins of government, in or 
 der to put a stop to the civil war which then exist 
 ed, and to concentrate the whole energy of the na 
 tion upon the prosecution of hostilities against the 
 Americans.^ 
 
 Two brigades of infantry, one of cavalry, and the 
 accompanying artillery, were ordered to march for 
 Vera Cruz upon their arrival at San Luis, which 
 place was to he garrisoned by the remaining troops 
 of the army as they came up. Santa Anna soon 
 after proceeded to the capital. 
 
 Upon his arrival he negotiated with the insur 
 gents, and succeeded in quieting the rebellion, but 
 not until Farias had been sacrificed and expelled 
 the capital, and the sale of Church property, as a 
 measure of the policy of the government, had been 
 abandoned. 
 
 Having accomplished this, Santa Anna set him 
 self about reorganizing an army, to make another 
 attempt at stemming the tide of invasion. And, 
 truly, it was a work of magnitude. The want of 
 money still existed, the jealousies of the parties in 
 the late disturbances were only half allayed, many 
 of the states of the confederacy were dissatisfied, 
 and some even manifested an intention of declaring 
 independence of the central government. Agita 
 tors of all parties were at work, as usual, foment 
 ing discords on any pretexts, regardless of the state 
 of the country ; and while all professed hostility to 
 
 * Executive Document, No. 60, House of Representatives, first Session of 
 the thirtieth Congress, p. 1126. 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 the invaders, most opposed any means which might 
 be taken to organize a defense. To all of these 
 were added the demoralizing effect of three great 
 defeats, not counterbalanced by the factitious sem 
 blance of a victory, which, in despite of proclama 
 tions and rejoicings, began to take its legitimate 
 place in the opinion of even Mexi cans . These were 
 a few of the difficulties presented to Santa Anna, 
 and they can only be appreciated by those acquaint 
 ed with Mexican character. 
 
 The Congress had, however, hailed his return 
 with high-sounding declarations of patriotism, and 
 professions of immediate and energetic action un 
 der his government. Its active course was pro 
 ductive of no more than had been previously ac 
 complished. Every thing for the support of the 
 war was left to be provided by the genius and en 
 ergy of Santa Anna, while the miserable political 
 intrigues progressed among the members of the 
 legislative body. 
 
 Santa Anna wished soon to absent himself from 
 the capital, to take command of the army in the 
 field ; but, at first, that was legally impossible, with 
 out leaving the executive power again in the hands 
 of Farias an event which would have at once 
 aroused the Polkas, and, in the mean time, that 
 party had acquired the ascendency in the Congress. 
 Santa Anna professed that he would consent to 
 none but legal measures, and it was for some time 
 doubtful how the matter could be arranged. At 
 length the fertile inventive genius of the Mexican 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 legislators hit upon the expedient of abolishing the 
 office of vice-president, and with it the incumbent, 
 Farias. To replace him, and to provide for the ex 
 ercise of the executive power during Santa Anna's 
 absence, it was decreed that a "president substi 
 tute" should be appointed by the Congress, and the 
 choice fell upon General Don Pedro Anaya, who 
 assumed power, and Santa Anna was at liberty to 
 join the army. 
 
 On the 31st of March he issued a proclamation 
 announcing the fall of Vera Cruz, and the proba 
 ble advance of the American army upon the capi 
 tal. The disaster was attributed to the fatal dis 
 cords which had existed, and Mexicans were urged 
 to wipe out the disgrace by renewed and harmoni 
 ous action. 
 
 Although open strife had ceased, the various ca 
 bals and intrigues were still objects of Santa An 
 na's attention, and, before his departure, he took 
 good care to arrange schemes by which they were 
 to be kept in check, for the election of a president 
 was soon to take placet But, having made his 
 arrangements, on the 2d of April he left the capi 
 tal, to join the army in the vicinity of Vera Cruz. 
 
 * J. P. de Mora to Santa Anna. Executive Document, No. 60, House of 
 Representatives, first Session of the thirtieth Congress, p. 1087. 
 
APPENDIX TO VOL. I. 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH GENERAL 
 
 ALMONTE. 
 
 No, I, 
 
 "New-York, Feby. 19th, 1847. 
 " To Gen. Almonte. 
 
 " DEAR SIR, On the receipt of this letter, you will be inform 
 ed that yours of the 28th of Novr. was duly received by me, and 
 I am very much obliged to you for the kind and expressive man 
 ner with which you write it to me. Although I am not a Mexi 
 can by birth, yet in feelings I am a Mexican, and as such, with 
 your kind invitation, I will write to you from time to time, and I 
 hope that the interchange of our views will be as a.greeable to you 
 as it will be pleasing to me. The communication which you 
 promise to transmit to me ' through some friend,' I will wait for 
 it with the greatest anxiety, hopeing that it will enable us to make 
 a countermove in this country, while the energy of the government 
 will be employed in Mexico. I have carefully examined the sub 
 ject that I submitted to you in my last letter, and beg leave to 
 say that my views have not been changed by time ; and I assure 
 you, sir, that I am ready to confront our enemy as soon as I hear 
 from you, and the necessary arrangement can .be made for that 
 purpose. My dear Gen., I hope that you will be able to see that 
 the plan can be arranged without communicating its contents to 
 more than two or three persons, and the vigorous manner with 
 which I design to prosecute it would enable me to paralize the 
 energy of the government on the outset of the operation. The 
 most of the troops of the line are in Mexico, or soon will be, and 
 the arms that I designed to use would enable me to cope success 
 fully with any irregular troops that could be brought against me. 
 But whether I succeed in obtaining the means necessary to enable 
 me to take a part in the contest or not, I hope the result of the 
 war will be advantageous to the Mexican arms. The subject that 
 
THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 is paramount with me is to see a union, a union among the people 
 and the people's leaders, which will enable you to present a solid 
 front to the enemy of your country. I feel some solicitude about 
 the financial affairs of the country, and I hope that you may suc 
 ceed in adopting some plan that will prove equal to the exegency 
 of the war. I am convinced, however, that you will be obliged 
 to issue bills of the denomination of $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100, 
 for the use of the army and for the general purposes of the govern 
 ment. If the annual expenses is greater than the income, you 
 must be able to make up the deficiency ; and if you fail in doing 
 so, it will prove desastrous to the army. The emition of paper 
 money, we are told that it originated with the Spanish army in 
 Spain, and I think that if you refer to war in Europe with Napo 
 leon, you will see that England depended mainly upon the Bank 
 of England, which for thirty years did not pay any specie, and I 
 hope that it will be possible for your government to issue paper 
 that would be received as a currency of the country in all the de 
 partments in Mexico. If each department would guarantee the 
 redemption of a certain amount in so many years, and the clergy 
 would assume a part of the amount, and if the government would 
 receive the same for dues, I think you would be able to issue about 
 $25,000,000 every year for three or four years. But, if I should 
 be able to take the field, the war would not last four years between 
 Mexico and the United States. To enable you to meet your en 
 gagements for the purchase of military stores, &c., if the amount 
 contributed by the clergy and the departments should be in part 
 gold and silver, I think that you would be enabled to manage 
 your financial affair with more facility than you ever will be able 
 to do under the present system. Your annual income must be 
 equal to your annual expenses, and if not, you must provide for the 
 deficiency ; and how will you do it, unless you could obtain money 
 upon the credit of the government ? The idea of the respective 
 states in Mexico paying a sufficient sum, or the church, as a mode 
 to furnish the government with the means for conducting the war, 
 will, in my opinion, fail, unless it could be done in such a way as 
 to make it work with harmony. If the churches would pay over 
 to the government the annual income over their expenses, and 
 
 
APPENDIX. 521 
 
 charge 5 or 6 per cent, for the use of it, and would consolidate 
 the interest with the lone during the war, I think it would add 
 much to the vigor of the nation in conducting the war against her 
 enemy. I would like to finish these views upon this financial 
 question, but I must forbear unless desired by you. I hope, sir, 
 you will appreciate my motive for adverting to this subject, and 
 attribute it only to my anxiety for you as the financial agent of 
 your country, and for her prosperity. I will expect to hear from 
 you soon, and, in the mean time, you will hear from me again. I 
 am, dear, your obd't serv't, and a devoted friend of your country, 
 (Signed), " LEWIS H. PUTNAM." 
 
 No, 2. 
 
 "No. 1. 
 
 " Deer. 21, 1846. 
 " MY DEAR FRIEND, 
 
 " The false, partial, exaggerated, and inflammatory statements 
 in Folk's Message, of supposed or pretended wrongs done by Mex 
 ico to the United States, is producing its effect upon the ignorant 
 and superficial, even among Whigs and opponents of the war. We 
 may be able, in some measure, to do away this impression, by giv 
 ing the facts as to our claims, and details of the wrongs and in 
 sults which Mexico can array as an offset; but you are aware 
 that it takes a long time for truth told by a private citizen to over 
 take falsehood flying on the four winds from the President's lips. 
 Now it does appear to me that a counter document, issued with 
 equal solemnity, and from an equally conspicuous source in Mex 
 ico, is demanded. Permit me to suggest some points as proper to 
 be treated of. 
 
 " 1. The real nature of the pretended injuries, as being to pri 
 vate persons and private property, and not public wrongs or na- 
 . tional indignities, and as being also the results of mistakes of sub 
 ordinate officers in applying your laws, or the ordinary case of tak 
 ing private property for public use, as in the impressment of vessels 
 and forced loans, for which Mexico has never refused a due indem 
 nity, nor, indeed, in any case where it should be found to be due. 
 "2. The wrongs and outrages committed by smuggling, and by 
 
522 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 national vessels of the United States, involving most palpable na 
 tional insults, as the elopement of vessels from your harbors when in 
 custody of officers of the government, and the carrying off to sea, in 
 one instance, if no more, of one of those officers. Also the capture 
 of your public vessels by ours, merely because they were engaged 
 in executing your revenue laws against smugglers, and endeavor 
 ing to enforce and maintain the authority of the nation in Texas 
 and on its coasts. 
 
 " 3. The outrage of Com. Jones (probably the result of secret 
 orders) at Monterey. You know Jones says that he aimed to do 
 in the new state of things (which he pretends to suppose) what 
 the government would order were they to communicate with him. 
 Also, the outrage committed by the Alert (I think the vessel was 
 called) at San Diego ; and the pre-eminent outrage (under pre 
 texts insulting to common sense) of Gaines's invasion of Mexican 
 territory in 1836. 
 
 " 4. The utter neglect and refusal of our government to make 
 any satisfaction, or give any indemnity for pecuniary damage in 
 any of these cases. They did not even bring Jones to a court of 
 inquiry, a thing never before omitted in such a case, though the ex 
 cuse were far more plausible than Jones's. Why should they not 
 have inquired into the matter ? Jones was not within the juris 
 diction of Mexico, and, in fact, none but our government could pro 
 ceed against him, and elicit the facts which the two nations had a 
 right to have spread before them. They were, in my opinion, 
 afraid of the defense which Jones could make. 
 
 "5. The repeated attempts to obtain Texas by negotiation 
 under Jefferson, in 1805-6, as stated by Mr. Gorostiza ; the mil 
 itary irruptions, with the connivance of the government, as stated 
 by Wilkinson ; the final application for a grant of a district as an 
 asylum for Catholics persecuted in the United States; the perjury 
 by which others obtained land, and their frauds thereupon ; the per 
 tinacious and insolent attempts to make Mexico the slave catcher 
 of the United States ; the audacious threat (repeatedly used for ob 
 taining such a stipulation) that the American slave-holders would 
 come and take them by force, and the government demand an in 
 demnity for them ! the attempts of Poinsett to get Texas, his inter- 
 
APPENDIX. 523 
 
 ference for that purpose in the domestic dissensions of Mexico, and 
 his agency in setting up a military usurper, giving thereby the first 
 example of disorder and anarchy ; the conduct of Butler, his suc 
 cessor ; the infamous pretensions brought forward to a boundary at 
 the Nueces as the Sabine, and then of a Sabine emptying itself 
 into the Rio Grande ; the insolent demands and dirty intrigues of 
 that fellow under the private instructions of the President of the 
 United States, and his final attempt to bribe to the amount of half 
 a million to obtain the cession of Texas. Mr. Adams saw in the 
 department of state Butler's letter, in which he proposed direct 
 bribery and asked for the money, and the instructions of the Presi 
 dent indorsed on the letter to this effect, viz., that this government 
 would have nothing to do with designating persons to whom money 
 should be paid, but that if half a million more were required to 
 effect the purchase, the money should be ready, and be added to 
 the five millions previously offered. You know that Forsyth, in 
 an official letter, while he affects to disapprove in the name of 
 the President of Butler's proposed means, nevertheless tells him 
 that the President is willing that he should try. There must be 
 men in the city of Mexico who know whether Butler did try. 
 
 "6. The whole affair of the conspiracy disclosed by Mayo, and 
 other evidence, doubtless, in possession of your government. But 
 ler's ' precious collection' may be bought cheap, if you want it. 
 Many other points I might mention, such as the insulting and out 
 rageous conduct of Americans to officers of the law, .to the citizens, 
 government, and judicial tribunals, all in the overbearing and in 
 solent spirit caught from their government. 
 
 " God bless you, my friend, and your righteous cause. It is 
 time that the people of Mexico and the friends of justice every 
 where were cheered by some hard and vengeful blow. Now is the 
 time (when our troops are bloated with an overweening confidence 
 'of their invincibleness and contempt for their enemies) to strike a 
 terrible blow. Such a blow would bring a storm of indignation 
 about Polk's ears which would make him quail. You know what 
 the elections already indicate ; but let me tell you candidly, un 
 less your countrymen fight longer and harder unless the tide of 
 success is turned, or, at least, checked millions of souls here who 
 
524 
 
 THE WAR WITH MEXICO. 
 
 would be loud against the slavemongers and murderers will settle 
 down into resignation to what will seem to them destiny ! In 
 the name of the God of justice, in the name of liberty and human 
 ity, let Santa Anna strike. Don't forget, if you do make a man 
 ifesto, the confessions of Upshur and Calhoun, that annexation was 
 to secure the existence and safety of the institution of slavery in 
 the United States, and the declaration of the latter that it was 
 from no hostility to Mexico, conclusive proof that at that time our 
 government did not dream of making the claims on Mexico a pre 
 text for war. There is an idea current among the people that the 
 Mexicans do not know how to take aim. It has doubtless been 
 derived from the correspondence of the army. If this defect exist, 
 it must be fatal. An army of Julius Ccesars would be used up 
 in short time, firing at random themselves and taking the fire of 
 Americans, who universally learn to shoot from their boyhood. It 
 is a tradition of the country that the troops of the United States 
 had the advantage of the British in the war of the Revolution, be 
 cause ours took aim as they would to kill game, while the British 
 did not take aim, but only fired in the general direction of their 
 adversary. 
 
 " FarewelL God bless you and your cause is the prayer of your 
 affectionate FRIEND. 
 
 " The fate of the admirable Mexican woman who was killed 
 while administering succor to the wounded has excited universal 
 sympathy. Should you write me, please number your letters. I 
 have written you twice since" the receipt of your Havana letter, 
 the last I have received. 
 
 " Two more points I must barely hint at. The embezzlement 
 of full power sent to Mr. Obregon by the hands of Poinsett and his 
 messenger, and the charge of falsehood made against the Mexican 
 secretary of foreign affairs on the evidence of Greenhow."* 
 
 * The continuation of the letter is written across the first page in the orig 
 inal. The postscript is written across the second page. 
 
 The original letter is directed on the back to " General Almonte, city of 
 Mexico," and bears the postmark of Habana, an indistinct postmark of the 
 British steam packet, and the figure 1, all in blue ink. 
 
 END OF VOL. I. 
 
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