U A ^CdfRLF, $B 71 fi b For Official use only. [8.S. 537] la/24495 SUMMARY OF EECENT INFORMATION REGARDING THE ARMY AND ITS METHODS GENERAL STAFF, -(INTELLIGENCE), QUAR January , GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. (B16/70) ROCK) 1 17 H&S 4174wo For Official use only. [S,S. 537J la/24495 SUMMAEY OF RECENT INFORMATION .. REGARDING THE GERMAN ARMY AND ITS METHODS. GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE), GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. January, 1917, (B16/760) 6000 1/17 H&S 4174wo .*. : :.*: .:* .: : : :. " * WW* U./H12- CONTENTS. J.-DEFENCES- 1 . General organization of a German position . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. Trace of trenches . . . . . . , . . . . . . . 11 3. Design of trenches .. ..^ .. .. .. .. .. .. ..11 4. Wire 11 5. Saps .. ... .. ,. ,. .. .. ., ., tt tt 12 6. Revetments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..12 7. Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ..12 8. Observation posts and sentry posts .. .. .. .. .. .. ..13 9. Dug-outs ' 13 10. Battle headquarters 13 11. Machine gun emplacements .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..14 12. Trench mortar emplacements .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..14 13. Gun emplacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 14 14. Snipers' posts . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 15. Communication trenches .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..16 16. Strong points , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17. Concealment of defences .. .. .. .. ,. .. . . ..17 18. System of construction of defences 18 II.-MINE WARFARE- 1. Inception of mine warfare .. .. .'. .. .. .. .. ..20 2. Influence of soil.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..20 3. Detection of mining activity .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..20 4. Hostile tactics prior to blowing a mine . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Ciaters for tactical purposes .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..21 6. Commanding observation .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..21 7. Significance of the enemy's mining .... .. .. .. .. ..21 8. Organization of craters for defence . . . . . , , , , . , , , . 22 III. -MEANS OF COMMUNICATION- A. THE TELEPHONE 1. In normal trench warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2. During a battle 24 B. WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY 1. Methods of employment 25 2. High-power field stations ..25 3. Trench gets 25 4. Aeroplane sets . . . . . . . . . . , , . , . . 25 C. LIGHT SIGNALS 1. Types employed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 26 2. Light-pistols 26 3. Rockets 26 4. Lamp signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 D.-FLAG SIGNALS " ., ., 27 (4174) A 3 PAGE III, Means of Communication continued E. CAHRIER PIGEONS .. 27 F. AEROPL A.NES 1. Allotment of "Infantry Aeroplanes ".. .. .. .. ..27 2. Method of work 27 3. Use of signalling lamps.. .. .. .. .. .. ..27 4. Tactical information . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5. Distinguishing marlcs of "Infantry Aeroplanes" 28 G. MESSENGER DOGS 28 H. RUNNERS .. 28 IV.- ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT-- A. ARTILLERY 1. Guns in common use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2. Long range guns . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 29 3. Firld artillery ammunition .. .. .. .. .. .. ..30 4. Expenditure of ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5. Supply of ammunition . . , . . . . . . . %. . . . 31 6. Deterioration of German guns ... . . . . . . . . 32 B. TRENCH MORTARS 1. Trench, mortars in common use . . . . . . . . . . 33 2. Flash reducers and fuze caps .. .. .. .. .. .. ..33 3. Increased angle of traverse .. .. .. .. .. .. ..33 4. Pneumatic trench mortars . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 C. MACHINE GUNS AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES 1. The German machine gun .. .. .. .. .. .. ..34 2. Methods of mounting , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. Shield 34 4. Flash reducer 34 5. Automatic rifles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..34 D. RIFLE , 1. The '98 pattern rifle , 34 2. Ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. Extra detachable magazine . . . . . . , . . . . . 35 4. Special sights 35 E. RIFLE GRENADES .. ..35 F HAND GRENADES 1 . Types in common use .. . . .. .. .. .. .. ..35 2. Developments . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. Gas grenades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 G. STEEL HELMETS 1. Description 36 2, Value ,, ,, ., ., .. ., .. ., ?f .. 36 5 1'AGE IV. Armament and Equipment continued. H. " FLAMMENWERFER "- 1. Types -.36 2. Troops equipped. . .. .. . ..37 3. Methods of dealing with a flame attack . . . . . . 37 I. LISTENING- SETS 1. Use by enemy -37 2. Enemy's precautions .. .. .. ..37 3. Enemy's methods . . .. 38 V.-GAS WARFARE- A. OFFENSIVE 1. Cloud gas 39 2. Gas shell.'. 39 3. Gras grenades 4. Protection afforded by British helmets, &c 39 5. Organization . . . . . . . . 40 B. DEFENSIVE 1. Individual protection .. 2. Collective protection .... 3. Alarm arrangements . . . . . . . . 41 4. Organization . . . . . . ' . . 41 C. CASUALTIES CAUSED BY OUR GAS 41 VI.-TACTICS- A. OFFENSIVE 1. General preparations for the attack 42 2. The objective 42 3. The artillery preparation . . . . 4. The assembly 6. The approach inarch . . . . . . . 6. The moment for the assault . . . . . . . . 43 7. The assault 8. Consolidation of a captured position . . . . 44 9. Attacks in woods . . . . . . . . 4o 10. Raids 11. Fla-mmenwerfer. . .. .. .. fb 12. Assault detachments . . . . . . 47 13. Trench mortars . . . . . . . . . 47 B. DEFENSIVE - 1. Method of holding the position .. .. ..49 Distribution of the infantry .. .. ..49 Divisional reserve . . . . . . c.) Battle headquarters ..49 (> VI, Tactics continued. i'AGE B . DEFENSIVE continued. 2. Security 49 (a.) Observation . . . . . . . . . . . 50 (:) Alarm 50 3. Action of the infantry during the enemy's bombardment -. . . . . . 50 4. Machine guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 (.) Employment .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..50 (b.) Action of machine guns during the enemy's bombardment . . . . 52 5. Co-operation between infantry and artillery. , . . . . . . . 52 6. Artillery tactics 53 (a.) Barrage fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 (b.) Counter-battery work . . . . . . . . . , .< 53 7. Trench mortars . . . . . . . . . . . . * > . . , 54 8. Hand grenades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (a.) General 54 (b.) Training .. .. 54 (c.) Bombing squads . . . . . . . . , , , . . , . . 55 9. Counter-attacks 55 a.) The immediate counter-attack . . . , . . . . . . 55 i.) The methodical counter-attack .. .. .. .. .. ..56 10. Ruses and sniping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 (.) Dummy figures .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..56 (b.) Mechanical devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 (c.) Camouflage .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..56 ( 70 E. -AVIATION 1. Higher organization .. .. .. . . /O 2. Aviation units .. .. , 70 3. Organization of the Air Service on the Western Front . . . . . . 71 F. ENGINEERS 1. Pioneer field companies .. . .. .. .. ..71 2. Mining companies *.. .. .. .. .. ..71 3. Special troops . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4. Infantry pioneer companies . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 a. TRENCH MORTAR UNITS , .. ..72 H. SURVEY UNITS J. Vermessungs-Abteilung .. .. .. .. .. .. ..72 2. Artillerie-Mess-Trupp 72 3. Schall-Mess-Trupp - ..72 XI. -HIGHER COMMAND . - 74 PAGE ill.-GERMAN MAN-POWER- 1. Army in the Field 75 2. Reserves in depots . . . . . . . . . 75 8. The 1916 Class ..75 4. 'I he 191 7 Class 75 6. The 1918 Class 75 6. " Combed " men 75 7. Returned wounded . . . . . . . . . 75 8. Permanently unfit . . . . . . . . 76 9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . ' 76 XIII.-ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN MEDICAL SERVICES- 1. General .. . . .. .. .. .. ,,17 2. Regimental medical service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 3. Bearer company .. .. .. .. .. .. ..^ .. .. ..77 (a.) Wagon rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 (A.) Main dressing station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 (c.) Collecting station for slightly wounded .. .. .. .. ..79 4. Field hospitals ' 'I 9 6. Motor ambulance convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 5. War hospitals 80 T. Ambulance convoy detachment .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..80 *. Ambulance trains. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 80 "9, Advanced dep6ts of medical stores . . . . . . . , . . . . 81 LIST OF PLATES. PLATE I. PLATE II.- PLATB III.- PLATE IV.- PLATE V.- PLATE VI.- PLATB VII. -Fig. 1. -Fig. 2. Fig. 3. -Fig. 4. -Fig. 5. -Fig. 6. Fig. 7. -Fig. 8. Fig. 9. -Fig. 10. Fig. 11. -Fig. 12. Fig. 13. Portion of German front line position . . . . . . . . 82 Wire entanglement . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Concrete observation post . . . . . . . . . . 83 Subterranean observation post . . . . . . . . . . 84 Dug-out for live groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Two-storey dug-out . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 86 Concealed machine gun in flank . . . . . . . . . . 87 Machine gun behind parados . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Machine gun emplacement . . . . . . . . . . 89 Reinforced concrete shelter for machine gun . . . . . . 99 Trench mortar emplacement . . . . . . . . . . 91 Sketch plan of part of a battery . . . . . . . . 92 Artillery observation post .. ., .. .. .. ..93 PLATE VIII. PLATE IX. Conventional eigns commonly used on German inapt* 96 SUMMARY OF RECENT INFORMATION REGARDING THE GERMAN ARMY AND ITS METHODS. I.-DEPENCES. 1. General organization of a German position. The general principles underlying the German "defensive organization in trench warfare vary in no way from our own. Such differences of practice as are apparent, when, for instance, the trenches of the opposing forces shown on a trench map are compared, are mainly due to the greater amount of work which the enemy exacts from his troops. To ensure a stubborn defence, several successive positions, or systems of defence, are prepared at least two, but more often three* ; and, to prevent an enemy extending his success should he carry part of the first position, numerous switches or diagonal lines are provided. * Called Erste Stellung, Ziceite Stellunfl, Dritfe Sfelfang, and generally translated as- Front Line Position, Second Line 'Position, Third Line Position, . .. 10 , -Tlidsfc e biily form lateral retrenchments, but, should an enemy break in, they constitute, in combination with the back line to which they are connected, a new line of defence. . Moreover, this new line is a " pocket " in which the successful enemy is exposed to heavy converging fire (see sketch on page 9). Thus the dangers of a break through, unless the enemy is on a very broad front and has taken measures to deal with the switches, are very much reduced. The distance between successive positions must, in theory, be sufficient to entail fresh preparations and oblige an enemy to push forward his observation posts, and at least a portion of his batteries, before venturing to attack the second position after capturing 1he first. This distance naturally varies with the form of the ground, but is at least 1 kilometre. This principle does not, however, prevent the Germans from constructing minor intermediate lines and posts* on suitable ground between positions. Hitherto each position (see Fig 1) has consisted of at least two continuous lines, but generally of threef front line, support line, and reserve line, the distance between the two first being roughly from 50 to 100 yards. These lines include strong points, such as villages or woods which may happen to be situated in the forward area (see "Strong Points" on page 16). The present tendency is to construct not more than two lines at an increased interval of 150 to 200 yards. This interval is determined by the factor that the support line shall be far enough away not to be exposed to artillery fire directed on the front line, but yet near enough to allow the men in it to get up quickly to the latter to repel an assault or to make a counter-attack. A circulation trench similar to our supervision or traffic trench is sometimes made behind the front line. The distance between the support and reserve lines depends on the ground, but is not likely to exceed 800 yards. The preparation of a support line has been advocated, even if the available forces are insufficient to admit of its occupation, as it encourages an enemy to scatter his artillery fire over a wide area. It would be, in fact, a dummy trench. In the same way as between successive positions, switches or diagonal lines are provided between the various lines. These may be sited so as to serve as communication trenches also. The ordinary communication trenches are, however, generally organized for defence ; so that wherever an enemy breaks through the front or support trench, he finds himself in a " pocket " exposed to converging fire from three sides. * Called " ZwiscJien-Slelluny " and generally translated as Intermediate Position. f Erster Graben, Ziveiter Graben, Drifter Graben, and generally translated ns First Trench Second Trench, Third Trench. 11 An endeavour is made to site support lines, but not front lines, on reverse slopes, so that they may be screened from hostile ground reconnaissance and observation, and consequently be less liable to accurate artillery fire. Rear lines of defence constructed during the operations on the Somme, however, when the Germans were being gradually pressed back, were generally constructed on reverse slopes. When driven back from one line of defences to another, the German is an adept at contesting every inch of the ground by making use of shell holes to form irregular advanced lines of defence. Should the further advance of the attackers be delayed for any time, the shell holes are joined up and a fire trench is gradually established. 2. Trace of trenches. The first line is traced so as to utilize the ground to the fullest extent, and is never straight, but suitably broken with salients and re-entrants, so as to secure plenty of flanks. It is considered that the best means of holding a position is by effective flanking fire. A long field of fire is irot sought for. The general trace of the support and reserve lines, while similarly utilizing the ground, is usually straighter than that of the front line, but never lacks numerous short flanks. Care is taken not to make the support trench parallel to the front line, in order to save it from being ' destroyed at the same time. 3. Design Of trenches. The actual design of trenches in plan is similar to our own, except that the passages round the traverses are more rounded. The distance between traverses is put at 24 to 30 feet, they are made 6'5 to 13 feet thick, and project l> to 12 feet into the trench. The profile of the trenches is generally similar to our own, except that an elbow rest is provided, and the trench behind the fire step is usually deeper and wider. It is considered that narrow trenches with steep sides are more disadvantageous and cause more casualties men being buried than wide trenches, even if the latter have to be made shallow. 4. Wire. One of the most distinctive features of the German defences is the labour expended on constructing thoroughly good and effective wire entanglements. Every defensive line, switch and strong point, is protected by a strong wire entanglement on iron or wooden posts, sited, if possible, so as not to be parallel to the trenches behind it. Endeavours are made to provide two or three belts, each 10 to 15 feet or more deep, with an interval between the belts of 15 to 30 feet. These intervals are filled, if possible, with trip wires, pointed iron stakes, &c., and blocked by occasional bands of entanglement connecting the belts (see Fig. 2). Four different lengths of iron screw pickets are supplied, the longest, which has five loops, giving a height of 4 feet above ground. The distance apart of the pickets in an entanglement is intentionally irregular, but averages about 6'5 feet. Knife-rests, expanding cylinders of wire, and other portable obstacles are used when it is impossible to erect posts. A special portable obstacle, called the Lochmann entanglement, has sometimes been used. It consists of a net of barbed wire, about 13 feet wide and 180 feet long, which is unrolled and then erected on two-legged iron pickets, placed by men who crawl under the wire and peg it down at the sides. If possible, entanglements are protected from the enemy's artillery fire by placing them in natural depressions or in sheltered trenches dug for the purpose. This is to be expected in the second and third positions, rather than in the front system. 5. Saps. One special feature of the German trench system is the large number of listening " saps " (see Fig. 1) run out in front of the line. They are often executed by actual sapping. After a number of them have been pushed forward a certain distance, cross heads may be made. These are then extended towards each other, and a new trench is in time formed closer to the enemy. Listening posts are also formed in shell craters and specially constructed holes, reached by tunnels and situated beyond the wire. 6. Revetments. Although a great deal of timber is seen in revet- ments, it is laid down that, if possible, planks, baulks and other material which is likely to block a trench and interfere with traffic if a trench is shelled, should not be employed for this purpose. Hurdles are permissible, but the most suitable revetments are considered to be well-built sods or thin brush- wood laid loose behind stout well-anchored pickets ; rabbit wire is, however, used to a considerable extent. Sandbags, as with us, are only to be used for rapid work and urgent repairs, or in localities where the ground necessitates the employment of breastworks. 7. Drainage. Great attention is paid to the drainage of trenches, as on the success or non-success of the measures taken may depend whether the position can or cannot be held in the wet season. It is laid down that the drainage must be done on a definite plan which must be carried out in good time. Drainage engineers and geologists are to be consulted, and use made of existing maps and plans. Whenever possible, the drainage water is to be led in the direction of the enemy, pipes being put through the parapet for this purpose. On high ground, when drainage is simple, keeping the trenches in good order, gutters in the sole of the trench, sump holes and keeping the ordinary ditches and water channels clear are considered the usual measures to be taken. In low ground, it may be necessary to lower the water level of the whole sector by elaborate pumping installations at a distance from the trenches. Otherwise, the water in the trenches is pumped or baled into pipes leading towards the enemy. Special care is taken to keep surface water out of the trenches by cutting 13 channels to divert it or by running it over the trenches, towards the enemy, in pipes. 8. Observation posts and sentry posts. The German bullet- proof shield can be used either as a loophole, or for observation, the loophole cover being designed so that, if desired, only a narrow slit of the opening can be exposed. It is laid down that shields are only necessary for sentries ; to meet an attack, all firing must be over the parapet. Observation posts are of various patterns : for direct vision (with or without overhead cover), for mirror observation, and for periscope observa- tion. In the last case, the emplacements may be entirely of ferro-concrete with only a small hole in the roof for the instrument to pass through (see Fig. 3), or the observation post may be merely a timbered shaft (see Fig. 4). Steps leading to dug-outs below may be found even in substantial concrete observation posts. With mirror observation, the observer stands to one side of the loophole with the mirror placed in the same horizontal plane as the eye so as to reflect what is outside tho loophole. Single rifles and rifle batteries are fired from cover in a similar way by means of a mirror attached to the rifle or rifle stand. 9. Dug-outs. Immense energy has been shown by the Germans in the construction of shell-proof dug-outs and in the protection of their weakest point, viz., the entrances. Except in breastworks, when they are inevitable, shelters under the parapet are seldom used. When they are employed it is suggested that they should be of ferro-concrete, so that there is little chance of their collapsing and bringing down the parapet. Entrances to deep dug-outs are, however, almost invariably found under the parapet, opening into the fire trench, so that the entrance may be as little as possible exposed to fire, and the passage down and the dug-out itself may have the benefit of the extra earth cover offered by the parapet. This cover is supplemented by a layer of concrete or rails. Fig. 5 shows the usual plan of a deep mined dug-out. The tendency is to construct these dug-outs on a uniform pattern in order to ensure economy of time and material, and to make it easier for new troops to find their way about them. In many cases the dug-out has two floors, the upper one, being better ventilated, serves as living quarters, the lower one as a secure refuge in case of intense bombardment (see Fig. 6). The entrance to the steps leading down to the lower floor has been found carefully disguised by cloth coloured to imitate earth. 10. Battle headquarters. Battle headquarters are often in a very elaborate series of dug-outs, with observation posts of various kinds, telephone rooms and every convenience. 14 11. Machine gun emplacements. Drawings of a luvg* of concrete machine gun emplacements have been captured, but few of them have actually been seen. The regulation type has solid walls of ferro- concrete, 2 feet 8 inches thick, and overhead cover of 1 foot of ferro-coucrete and two layers of 8-inch joists. This, not allowing for earth used as conceal- ment, only exposes 3 feet 4 inches of the emplacement above ground when the sill of the loophole is at ground level. The interior dimensions are about 7 feet by 8-J feet. The gun requires a platform 3J feet wide and 5^ feet long. Theoretically, concrete emplacements are only built in back lines and where they can be concealed in woods or behind a rise of ground. They are sometimes hidden in a flank, behind a continuation of the main parapet which covers them from view from the front (see Fig. 7). It is recognised that in regular trench systems, the accurate trace of which is known to the enemy by aeroplane photographs, it is useless to build emplace- ments in the front and even the support trenches, and that the machine guns can only be kept in a serviceable condition if protected in deep dug-outs with several exits, whence it is possible to get them quickly to the parapet. These dug-outs are placed under the front parapet and sometimes have passages leading under the trench to open emplacements behind the parados, or, in some instances, well to the front of the parapet (see Fig. 8 and 9). When the ground permits, emplacements are made on commanding points in the support and reserve line, which have a view over the front line. Such emplacements may be merely holes in the ground without any parapet (as illustrated in *' Nofceafor Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare "). it may be noted that when a machine gun emplacement is sited in a flank and fires over the entanglement, the wire immediately in front of the gun will usually be lower than in the rest of the belt (xee Fig. 7). In some cases, a ferro-concrete u funkhole " under the parapet of the trench, in which crew and gun can take shelter, has been provided (see Fig. 10). 12. Trench mortar emplacements. These differ little from our own patterns (see Fig. 11). Alternative emplacements and observation posts, together with good cover for the gun crew, men resting, and ammunition, are provided in connection with them. The Germans frequently site their trench mortar emplacements close to light railway or trolley lines, with a view to moving the mortars rapidly from one emplacement to another, 13. Gun emplacements. In theory, concealment of the guns is sought rather than their protection by covered emplacements (for methods adopted, see under "Concealment," on page 17). In one document it is stated that the overhead cover is merely harmful unless it is sufficiently thick to keep out a 9*2-inch shell, for the collapse of the roof may damage the gun, and cover ? if destroyed, takes a long time to repair. It is better, therefore. 15 to trust to splinter-proof cover or concealment. If a covered emplacement is built, a wide arc of fire cannot be expected. In any case, very little timber should be used in emplacements in order to avoid danger of fire. Batteries are sometimes sited in the open without any emplacement and close to an existing road or path (in order to avoid making tracks to the guns). In practice, at any rate on some parts of the front, the tendency is to provide cover, and as tar as can be judged from aeroplane photographs, this cover is being made heavier and heavier. Thick ferro-concrete or other cover, sufficient to resist a 6-irich howitzer is provided in the usual forms for observation posts, gun crews and ammunition. The order of work is : observation posts, cover for gunners and ammunition, and lastly for the gun itself. Special cover for men resting and reserve ammunition, is built at a little distance from the batter}-. In a few instances a gun has been kept under cover in a tunnel or a hill side, and run out on rails to fire. If the guns are in open pits, as much cover as possible is got without tin-owing up a high parapet. It is laid down that gun pits should be at irregular intervals, but they seldom are. A plan of a battery and section of an observation post are given in Figs. 12 and 13. 14. Snipers' posts. The ordinary German system of sniping is to detail a sniper to a certain section of trench rather than to station him at a definite post or particular loophole. On the beat thus allotted, a number of loopholes are prepared, any or all of which may be used by a sniper during his tour of duty. This multiplication of loopholes is favoured as it gives an enemy a large number to keep under observation, without requiring many snipers to man them. The normal German sniper's post is merely a stoutly framed, rectangular, wooden sentry box, about 6 feet high and 4 feet square inside, placed in a recess in a parapet. It has a roof of planks, corrugated iron, steel rails or plates, with earth on top. On the enemy's side of the sentry box there is no boarding immediately under the roof, and a steel box-loophole projects. The sides of this box are set at about 45 degrees, and the top slopes down from about 21 inches to 7 inches at the front, leaving a loophole about 7 5 inches high by 2 inches wide. Leathern padded clamps to hold a rifle, capable of adjustment in both a vertical and a horizontal direction, are pro- vided in the box. If they cannot be concealed in the parapet or in a saphead, the boxes are covered with earth so as look like small mounds. In summer they are not difficult to detect, as a shot from them disturbs the? dust near. Other posts are formed by using the ordinary steel loophole plate lodged among sandbags in the parapet, and by crude loopholes built up of two 16 heaps o sandbags with a board or steel plate across them and a few more bags on top of it. Loopholes are also cut in trees and stumps. Sometimes they are single, sometimes double, the upper one being used in summer when the grass is high in No Man's Land. Some ingenuity is shown in concealing looph >les in a parapet by throwing casually on to it any object, from a tin to a ploughshare, that will hide or cast a shadow over the orifices. Coils of wire in particular have been employed for this purpose. Coloured sandbags are freely used to confuse observers. As regards sniping during a battle, the Germans on the Somme occa- sionally left regular snipers behind when the garrison of a trench was withdrawn. Cases also occurred, after a trench had been overrun, of individuals taking up positions in shell holes and doing as much damage as possible before surrendering. When an advance on our part was checked, regular snipers usually made their appearance in front of the enemy's lines, e.g., in shell holes, in some of which steel plates and rations were afterwards found. Trained snipers were quick at recognising an officer if dressed as such. 15. Communication trenches. Communication trenches are very numerous. In plan they are generally curved, sometimes zig-zagged, less often traversed or elbowed. In theory, there should be two in each company sector, from the reserve to the front line, but usually there are fewer between the reserve and support lines, than from the support line to the front line. The points where they cross the support line must not be opposite to each other. The points where they enter a trench from in front are arranged for defence, the junction often being prepared as a strong point with wire all round, and loopholed traverses and bombing trenches. Wire blocks and pitfalls are placed in the trench itself. The communication trenches are usually broader and deeper than our own, and the sides are more sloping. As they are so frequently destroyed, they are not revetted unless absolutely necessary. Blinded communication trenches are rarely used, as splinter-proof material is no protection from heavy shells, and only serves to increase the block in the trenches if it is struck. In some situations, very exposed to enfilade fire, a series of cover trenches have been made instead of a communication trench, the troops moving above ground by specified beaconed-out routes, and taking refuge in the trenches if shelling is commenced. 16. Strong points. Great use has been made by the Germans of natural strong points, such as villages, farms, and woods. In the case of villages, the borders and interior have been strongly organized, generally for all round defence, and a particularly desperate resistance has been 17 offered in them. The normal procedure now, when taking up a new position, is to fix on a general line of natural strong points, and to prepare these for defence first and then to join them up by fire trenches, without much regard to the field of fire of the latter. The first indication that a new line is being constructed usually is the appearance of trenches covering villages and woods. The system adopted by the Germans in defending villages is of the greatest importance from the point of view of the attacker. Captured orders show that they rely, firstly, on the .garrison of the trenches situated in front of the villages, and secondly, on a garrison specially told off and stationed in rear of the locality. The latter garrison may be employed either for counter- attack or to occupy the defences of the village itself when the attacker has approached so near that it is impossible for him to use his artillery against it any longer. Artificial strong points are made by joining up existing trenches m suitable ways for ail round defence. Isolated strong points are very rare, though well wired gun emplacements not in use by the artillery are sometimes utilized by infantry and machine guns for defensive purposes. 17. Concealment of defences. Great trouble is taken by the Germans to conceal their gun positions, trench mortar emplacements, tracks, &c., whenever this is possible, in order to prevent them being conspicuous on aeroplane photographs or visible to aeroplane observers. (a.) Concrete works. To conceal concrete works, mortar is plastered on the surface before the cement has set, and on this, moss or roots and weeds are thrown and stamped in on the chance of their growing. In some cases the concrete has merely been painted with large irregular patches of different colours: unless this is skilfully done, however, the results are not very successful, judging by aeroplane photographs. (b.) Trenches and excavations. Sharp angles, steep slopes, straight lines in parapets, digging on conspicuous points, and exposure of spoil from excavations are avoided if possible. (c.) Communication trenches. When it is necessary to conceal communi- cation trenches in order to escape bombardment, they are either tunnelled at 15 to 20 feet below the surface, or are merely disguised by covering them with netting on which straw, branches, &c., are placed, the whole being covered with sods or a sprinkling of earth. (d.) Roads and approaches. The approaches to observation posts, machine gun and trench mortar emplacements are covered or concealed, while conspicuous tracks are made to dummy emplacements. When roads visible to the enemy have to be masked by erecting screens, other screens are erected at various distances from the road, on the enemy's side, so as to deceive artillery observers. (e.) Gun emplacements. It is laid down that guns should bo sited in gun pits at irregular intervals. They should be connected by trenches (4174) B 18 which should be continued well out on either flank, not only for the sake of defence by rifle fire, but to give them, as far as possible, the appearance of an ordinary trench. It is laid down that great care must be taken to conceal gun pits from aircraft during construction, when it is very likely that the newly thrown up earth may disclose their position. If no screen or matting is erected over the gun, plenty of brushwood is kept handy to throw over it on the approach of an aeroplane. When gun pits are made in woods, only the absolutely necessary amount of clearing is done, and wires with branches or small fir trees attached, &c., are hung over the gun. The tracks leading to the gun pits are similarly concealed. (/.) Dummy gun positions.- -The Germans make considerable use of dummy gun positions near the occupied emplacements, and employ dummy flashes in them. (g.) Dummy trenches. It has been found unnecessary to dig dummy trenches more than 20 inches deep ; provided the edges are kept sharp, it is said that they throw sufficient shadow to appear like real ones in aeroplane photographs. (h.) Dummy saps. In chalky ground dummy saps are sometimes made by turning ever the top soil and exposing the chalk, a small T-head being constructed at the end of the " sap " and lightly wired. 18. System of construction of defences. During the battle of the Somme, the Germans prepared fortified lines of defence behind successive gaps made in their line w4th notable rapidity. This rapidity appears to have been due to the following chief causes : (a.) Methodical work. (b.) Practical designs. (c.) Full use made of specialists. (d.) Continuous hard work of the troops. The method of distribution of work followed certain definite rules. The front to be defended was divided into sectors approximately the equivalent of a. regimental sector. A complete regiment echelonned in depth was allotted for the work. By this means the troops worked on trenches which they would probably have to hold. The dislocation caused by reliefs was minimized by the reliefs all coming from the same unit. This dislocation was still further reduced by the supervision of a specially selected officer from the regiment, who was responsible for the execution of the whole of the defences. In the case of rear lines of defence, the supervising officer was an engineer officer. At each relief a detailed statement showing work done, work out- 19 standing, tools available, material available, &c., was handed to the incoming unit. Engineer stores were always dumped at the refilling places for ammu- nition and rations. Xhe troops thus always knew where to go for these stores. Carriers were found by forming a 4th platoon in each company, which was exclusively employed on carrying stores and rations. For specialized work, specialists were grouped together into squads or groups, e.g., Betontrupps for the- construction of concrete machine gun emplacements and observation posts, and Stollenbaukommandos for the con- struction of deep dug-outs. All work was allotted to the troops as tasks which they had to complete before being relieved. Works in rear of the front line of defence were constructed by pioneers, Landsturm, Russian prisoners, and also by civil labour under military super- vision. (4174) B 2 20 II. MINE WARFARE. 1. Inception of mine warfare. Since the end of 1914, when underground activity, which plays an inevitable part in all phases of " fortress warfare," was first marked by the firing of offensive mines by the enemy, German mining policy has generally been aggressive. The development of our own tunnelling operations, however, enabled us to give the most important sectors of our line underground defence and upon several occasions to adopt offensive measures against strong points on the enemy's front. This activity eventually dominated the enemy's policy and force^ him to adopt systematic defensive mining, especially round his salients, wherever the lines were close; but he has always kept in view the possibilities of driving an offensive mine under our trenches, even when not associated with infantry operations. 2. Influence of soil. The enemy's mining policy and methods, like our own, are governed by the class of soil or rock encountered. North of the La Bassee Canal, work is entirely in sand and clay, and is generally so silently performed that it can only be identified when galleries are in close proximity. To the south of the canal, work is almost wholly in chalk and is comparatively noisy, the sound of picking being audible, at times up to 100 yards, with a mine-listening instrument. 3. Detection Of mining activity. Valuable data may occasion- ally be obtained by surface observations. In the clay areas, evidence of blue clay, in dumps or disclosed in torn sandbags, and, similarly, in the chalk areas, significant enemy chalk dumps may be taken as signs of mining. Observation of working parties carrying timber or wooden cases to certain points, at certain intervals of time, indicating periods of mining reliefs, observation of fumes arising from mine entrances after a mine is fired, and the sound of pumps or windlasses heard by patrols, have afforded useful guidance to the detection of mining operations. The enemy frequently attempts to advance by mining from the near lip of a crater ; such opportunities can be denied to him by the watchfulness of our patrols and advanced posts. In order to obtain information regarding our mining, the enemy may raid trenches where he suspects that mining is in progress, the raiding party being accompanied by tunnelling personnel. Mine shafts sometimes have signboards, marked Schacht or Stollen. Their entrances are similar to those of dug-outs, but are usually distinguished by ventilating apparatus or some device to assist in the evacuation of spoil 21 being fixed to the timbers. A German mine usually commences with an incline, which terminates i:i a chamber from which a vertical, or almost vertical, shaft is sunk. The depth of the system will vary with the nature of the ground and the scheme in hand. The enemy, like ourselves, locates the entrances to his mine system in the support trenches, or even further back. 4. Hostile tactics prior to blowing a mine. Prior to an attempt to destroy a sector of- our trenches, the enemy will endeavour to induce our troops to concentrate in the danger area, either by the use of decoy patrols or by bombardments on either flank of the mine area. 5. Craters for tactical purposes. Mines blown by the enemy near, or even within his own lines, are at times attributed to nervousness when, in reality, they form a deliberate factor in his scheme of defence. The enemy, especially in chalk areas, has indeed frequently shown great enterprise in co-ordinating his mining policy with the demands of the tactical situation. Although the majority of his mines are tired for destructive reasons, to damage our defensive mines or to check our offensive, many are fired for " constructive '' reasons. His craters may be formed to provide dominating observation over our lines, to give defilading protection to his own, or to form screened machine gun emplacements for enfilade fire. He has taken advantage of the fact that while, in the early days of mine fighting, mine craters were rare and intense artillery fire was generally concentrated upon them, they are to-day very common occurrences and may be converted, without particular danger, into valuable assets as strong points, observation posts, sites for deep dug-outs, and even assembly places for raids and minor attacks. 6.. Commanding observation. The enemy's offensive mines have occasionally been employed to blow back, step by step, the near lips of a crater system, from which we hold commanding observation, on high ground. This aim involves the enemy in a very active mining policy, which can only be checked by vigorous counter-mining perhaps at two levels. When the underground fighting becomes particularly vigorous and when our miners appear to have gained a decided advantage, the enemy will sometimes raid our mine heads with a view to destroying them or throwing back work, by firing mobile charges. If the raiders are only in brief occupa- tion, the damage effected is usually insignificant, but if, on the other hand, the enemy is not evicted before he has had time to explore our mining system and destroy selected points, our loss may be serious. 7. Significance of the enemy's mining. During 1916 the enemy has fired 700 mines, but, owing to our defensive systems, only a very small percentage of these, through the element of surprise, inflicted serious casualties on our infantry or occasioned any marked change in the tactical situation. 22 8. Organization of craters for defence. The German method of organizing craters for defence depends largely upon their situation with regard to the existing defences of both sides. Speaking generally, however, it appears to be as follows : Starting from the nearest point in his line, or rather the point from which, having regard to the tactical situation, the crater can be most conveniently absorbed into the existing defences, the enemy saps towards the crater he intends to organize, digging a trench behind the near* lip. This gives him a commanding situation and makes good the interior of the crater. From here he gradually carries the trench round the crater, keeping, however, on the inside of the far* lip in order to avail himself of the natural parapet which it provides. Having thus seized the crater, if the position is considered of value he may elaborate the defensive organization by constructing " mined dug-outs, 5 ' &c.. near the bottom of the crater below the far* lip. Tn the case of a group of craters, he usually organizes the most convenient crater in the manner described above, and then, sapping from the point nearest to the next crater, he continues the trench inside the far* lip of the latter, and so on (see sketch). * The terms " near " and the one nearest to that line. far" have reference to the German line, the near lip being 23 He thus forms a continuous trench inside the far* lips of the craters, : and eventually joins it to the front line system. Direct communication is then provided by constructing communication trenches from the craters to the existing front line. In some cases, the defensive organization is further elaborated by the construction of a tunnel connecting the craters and roughly parallel to the trench inside the far* lips, but nearer to the German line. The trench is then connected to the tunnel by passages. When the front line has been destroyed by mine explosions, a new trench is dug in rear of the craters and joined up to the nearest communi- cation trench or trenches. Short connecting trenches are then made from the new trench to the craters, to provide easy access. The new trench is organized for defence and is available as a support line should the craters be retaken. * The terms " near " and " far " have reference tcrthe German line, the near lip being one nearest to that line. 24 III. MEANS OP COMMUNICATION. A. THE TELEPHONE. 1. In. normal trench warfare. Owing to the introduction of " listening sets " (see page ), the use of the telephone for important messages -from the front has been considerably reduced, at all events as regards messages which are sent " in clear," but the telephone systems have nevertheless been largely extended during the later phases of trench warfare. The main points 011 which the Germans lay stress are : (a.) The use of metallic circuits near the front. [b.) The duplication of routes whenever possible. (c.) Cables should be buried at a considerable depth, viz., 10 feet across open country and 6 feet beneath the sole of a trench. (d.) Large stocks of spare parts should be kept in dug-outs. (e.) A system of linemen to carry out repairs should be organized. (/.) The necessity for frequent tests; every half hour by day arid every 13 15 minutes by night, for lines which are used for calls for barrage fire. (.) Small Flammenwerfer, which are easily carried on a man's back the range of the jet is 16-19 .yards. (c.) New type of small portable Flammenwerfer, which is 3 to 4 feet long, made of iron and provided with two handles. It is filled with an inflammable liquid and is intended to be carried up to the entrance of a dug-out, c., lighted and thrown in. 2. Troops equipped. At ^the beginning of 1916, the 3rd Guard Pioneer Battalion* (6 companies) was equipped with Flammemverfer and had. been trained in their use. Each company is equipped with 20-22 large and 18 small Flammenwerfer, and is able .to cover a front of 1,100-1,640 yards. 3. Methods of dealing with a flame attack. The Germans lay down that the large built-in Flammeuwerfer must be destroyed as soon as possible by concentrated artillery fire, and that an endeavour should be made to shoot the men carrying the small apparatus, which will then con- stitute a danger to the enemy's own troops. I. LISTENING SETS (called by the enemy Moritz."). 1. Use by enemy. The enemy has derived much information by overhearing messages sent on our telephone lines. Captured documents show that, whereas in November, 1915, practically no identifications had been made by this means, by the 5th March, 1916, the identifications from this source alone equalled the total obtained by all other means. There is no doubt that the system has been improved and extended since the latter date. Copies of our orders were found in a "listening set " dug-out in La Boisselle at the beginning of July, and it is known that as recently as August information of intended operations was being obtained from this source by the enemy in the Loos salient. 2. Enemy's precautions. The Germans have adopted elaborate precautions to prevent leakage over their own wires, amongst which the principal are : (a.) Prohibition of any but the most urgent messages from or to the front line by telephone, and an extended use of visual signals. (b.) Replacement of the telephone in forward trench systems by speaking tubes. (c.) Careful maintenance and insulation of telephone circuits. (d.) Use of codes to conceal the important portions of messages. * The 4th Guard Pioneer Battalion is probably also equipped with Flammenwerfer, but the number of companies is nofc known. 38 3. Enemy's methods. Speech is more difficult to overhear than are buzzer signals. The radius of action of a listening set depends on various factors, but under favourable conditions there is every reason to believe that the Germans can read buzzer signals up to a distance of at least 3,000 yards from the listening set earths. The enemy endeavours to get these latter as far forward as possible by utilizing mine shafts, connecting wires to our entanglements or to earths close under our parapet, <&c. When evacuating positions, it is believed that he makes arrangements to utilize the abandoned telephone connections as earths. All old wires must, therefore, be cut, a considerable length removed, and the ends placed clear of the earth and, if possible, insulated. 39 V. GAS WARFARE. A._ OFFENSIVE. 1. Cloud gas. For making cloud gas attacks the enemy uses cylinders of compressed gas, weighing about 90 Ibs. when full, and con- taining about 45 Ibs. of gas compressed to a liquid. The cylinders are built in at the bottom of the trench underneath the parapet; when a discharge is to be made, each cylinder is fitted with a lead pipe which is bent over the top of the parapet. In recent attacks, the enemy has .used gas composed of a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, and cylinders have been installed at the rate of two per yard of front. In recent gas attacks, the Germans have used gas clouds of very higli concentrations. This has been attained by employing as many cylinders as possible on a restricted front and by reducing the time of discharge. The duration of an attack may now be as short as 10-15 minutes, although in earlier operations the emissions lasted for hours. Gas attacks are generally made at night, and several clouds may be Bent over at intervals varying from a few minutes up to several hours. 2. Gas Shell. The Germans use two types of gas shell, viz., lachry- matory, which primarily attack the eyes (tear-shell), and asphyxiating, which chiefly attack the lungs (poison-shell), though some of the latter also affect the eyes. These are principally fired from the 15-cm. heavy field howitzer, the 10'5-cm. light field howitzer, the 10-cm. gun, and the 7-7-cm. field gun, as well as from light arid medium Mimnwerfer. The lachrymator hangs about for many hours, and is used chiefly for barrage purposes and counter-battery work. Asphyxiating shell are used either against positions which it is hoped to occupy immediately, or solely for the purpose of causing casualties. Documents have been captured showing the methods to be adopted in using gas shell, and explaining the need for employing them in very large quantities if they are to have any effect. The Germans lay down that gas shell should be used on a calm day, and that damp weather, but not heavy rain, favours their employment. The temperature, too, affects their use, and they are not likely to be employed if it is below freezing-point. 3. Gas grenades. The various types of gas grenade employed by the 1'iiemy are referred to on page 36 ; they are chiefly used against dug-outs. 4. Protection afforded by British helmets, &c. The British Box Respirator and the P.H. Helmet afford complete protection against al 40 the enemy's poison gases. The box respirator also gives complete protection against lachrymators, but, in very high concentrations, the P.H. helmet may allow enough lachrymator through to make the eyes water. 5. Organization. Gas operations are undertaken by the 35th and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each of which is composed of two battalions of three companies and a park company. Each regiment has 78 officers, including chemists, meteorologists and other specialists. Two pioneers are detailed to each battery of 20 cylinders. B.- DEFENSIVE. 1. Individual protection. Each German soldier is supplied witn a respirator which consists of an impermeable face-piece, into which is screwed a drum (Einsatz) packed with chemicals. The apparatus is carried in a tin box ana ea-cn man is supplied with a spare drum. The drum has three layers of chemicals and the most recent type is termed the " Leichtatmtr" to dis- tinguish it from the previous 3-layer drum which was more difficult to breathe through. The windows of the mask are made of a celluloid type of material, which does not dim readily when breathed upon. The masks are made in three sizes. Great stress is laid upon the correct fitting of masks, and the fit of each man's respirator is tested in a chamber containing lachrymatory gas. This test is supposed to be repeated once a month/ An oxygen breathing apparatus (Selbstretter) is also used throughout the German Army, but though available as an anti-gas device, it is more of a< rescue apparatus and is chiefly used in mine work. 2. Collective protection. No special design for protecting shelters against gas is laid down in the German Army. The use of doors, curtains, ,&c., is frequently recommended, but very little has actually been done in* carrying out the suggestions. For clearing gas from dug-outs, ve'ntilation by fires is chiefly relied on. The use of sprayers has been abandoned, and no special type of anti-gas fan has been adopted. On the other hand, cartridges containing chemicals are supplied for clearing gas from dug-outs in obstinate cases. The cartridges are fired from an illuminating pistol, but they do not appear to be altogether satisfactory and are not supplied in large quantities. Lachrymatory substances in the neighbourhood of shell holes are destroyed by spraying with pyridine. This substance has a very offensive smell and only small quantities are available. It is not very effective. Very special attention is paid by the Germans to the protection against gas of all arms, artillery ammunition, telephone instruments, &c. Emphasis is laid on the need for keeping them well covered, coating all bright parts 41 with oil, and cleaning and re-oiling after an attack. Artillery ammunition which has been exposed to gas is expended as soon as possible after cleaning. 3. Alarm arrangements. " Gas Alarm " is given in the trenches by means of gongs, bells, sirens, &c. No special long-distance sound signal device appears to have been adopted. Coloured lights are much used for spreading the alarm to the rear. In the area behind the lines, the ringing of church bells appears to be the chief alarm arrangement. 4. Organization. A special anti-gas officer is attached to each Army Corps, Division and regimental headquarters, Each battalion and company details an officer to deal with matters of gas defence ; medical officers are no longer used for this purpose. Anti-gas officers are trained at gas defence courses either behind the lines or in Germany. Wind observations are made at forward stations on each battalion front and communicated to the Field Meteorological Station at Army Headquarters, which, in turn, communicates every evening with Corps and Divisional head- quarters stating the possibility or otherwise of a gas attack. Local wind observations are supposed to be made all along the front by the troops themselves for the guidance of unit commanders. C. CASUALTIES CAUSED BY OUH GAS. Documents and prisoners' statements show that the enemy has suffered very severely from our gas attacks. Thus, in one case, a regiment lost nearly half the effectives of the two battalions in front line and, in another, about 150 casualties were caused in a battalion the strength of which was 440. Cloud attacks have been effective to a depth of at least 5,000 yards. At this distance, 60 men were killed in one company through not having their masks with them. Gas from large trench mortar bombs has caused particularly heavy local casualties and is much feared. 42 VI. TACTICS. A. OFFENSIVE. 1. General preparations for the attack. Captured documents show the following to be the principal points which, the Germans consider, demand the careful consideration of a commander before undertaking an offensive operation : (i.) An exact determination of the objective, (ii.) A minute reconnaissance of the enemy's position by every available means (patrols, ground and air observation), (iii.) An estimate of the infantry force necessary to achieve the object in view, (iv.) An estimate ot the necessary allotment of artillery ammunition, based on the duration of the bombardment, (v.) The distribution of targets to the artillery, (vi.) The preparation of a point of departure for the infantry, (vii.) The zones of attack and the objectives must be clearly defined (every officer, non-commissioned officer and man should know exactly what his task is), (viii.) Detailed arrangements for the distribution of the infantry in depth. 2. The objective. "TJie objective of each infantry formation must be limited in both width and depth. As a rule, the task will be to capture a portion of the enemy's front system, i.e., three trenches situated one behind the other. " Occasionally, it may be necessary to capture important natural features at some distance behind the front system, in order to secure points for artillery observation. " It is out of the question to go on and attack the enemy's next position Avithout any pause. For this, a /res/i and most careful preparation is necessary. " The objective must be reached at all costs. The tendency to establish oneself in the first trench captured must be resisted, for this is not the main feature of the enemy's defence. " it is possible that the conditions in the enemy's lines may be such that a continuation of the attack beyond the prescribed line is feasible. It must be borne in mind, however, that artillery support for this cannot be available for some little time. The decision of a subordinate commander to advance beyond the prescribed objective is a very momentous one, and must be exceptional." The above extract from a captured document 8]iows the general principles laid down. These principles were followed by the Germans in 43 their last big offensive (at Verdun), and there is no reason to suppose that they do not still hold good. 3. The artillery preparation. Captured German documents show the following to be the principal objects of the artillery preparation : (i.) To inflict as many casualties as possible, (ii.) To destroy the enemy's obstacles and trenches, especially his front line. (iii.) To destroy or silence the enemy's artillery, trench mortars and machine guns. (iv."> To keep under fire and " muzzle " the enemy's neighbouring trenches during an attack. (v.) To shell the approaches by which hostile reserves and supplies come up. The zone covered by the bombardment is always extended beyond the limits of the zone of attack, in order to prevent the enemy from switching batteries from sectors which are not threatened on to those which are being intensely bombarded. During the bombardment, close liaison is maintained between infantry commanders in the front line and the artillery observers. The German infantry itself is held to blame if parts of the enemy's position are not sufficiently effectively bombarded. 4. The assembly. The Germans do not advocate the construction .of special assembly trenches, as they consider that these only attract attention and do not usually give effective protection against artillery fire. The preparation of additional dug-outs in the first and second line trenches is, however, recommended. These are considered necessary, as a postponement of the attack is always possible and the troops maybe exposed to hostile artillery fire for several days. 5. The approach inarch. Before bringing up troops into the zone of the enemy's artillery fire, German commanders are directed to make a personal reconnaissance, not only of the ground itself, but of the distribution of the enemy's artillery fire over the ground to be crossed. It is not considered advisable to make use of depressions and sunken roads which are invisible to the enemy, as these are usually under a heavy barrage. Villages which lie in the enemy's zone of fire are avoided on principle. 6. The moment for the assault. Gorman instructions in this matter are very definite. Surprise is considered essential to success, as it cannot be expected that all the enemy's machine guns will be put out of action by the artillery bombardment. The assaulting' waves, therefore, start the moment the artillery fire is lifted or even before, and follow close behind the artillery barrage. The 44 Germans consider it better to suffer a few casualties from their own* artillery than to give the enemy time to get his machine guns out of their shelters. It is held that the ideal moment for the infantry to reach the enemy's- trenches is before the dust and smoke caused by the artillery fire have cleared away. 7. The assault. The method of assault usually employed by the Germans is a succession of infantry waves in fairly open formation. The assaulting troops are allotted the three distinct tasks of " clearing," " blocking," and * consolidating." These tasks may be briefly described as follows : Clearing. The destruction of the garrison., The destruction of machine gun emplacements. The clearing of dug-outs. Blocking. The protection of the flanks and rear of the assaulting waves by bombers posted to block all approaches. Consolidating. -The preparation of the captured position for defence,. and the construction of communication trenches up to that position. The Germans usually attack in three waves. Each of the three waves may comprise both clearing and blocking parties, closely followed by carry- ing parties with the material necessary for consolidating. An alternative method is for the first wave to be allotted the task of clearing, the second wave that of blocking, and foV the third wave to consist of a reinforcing party, either accompanied or closely followed by the carrying parties for consolidating. 8. Consolidation Of a captured position. The Germans make every effort to construct cover and prepare a captured position for defence, during the short period that elapses before the opposing artillery opens on, their new position. The steps taken may be summarized as follows: (i.) The trenches are reversed or new trenches are dug (it is often con- sidered better to dig new trenches than to attempt to repair old ones). (ii.) Obstacles (wire entanglements) are put up. (iii.) Cover is constructed with the material for dug-outs which has been, carried up. (iv.) Barricades are built against portions of the trench which are still in possession of the enemy. These barricades are usually held by bombers and machine guns, (v.) Machine guns are placed in position. (vi.) Communication trenches are constructed leading up to the captured position. 45 9. Attacks in WOOds. When attacking in a wood, the Germans usually employ small assaulting columns following a single assaulting wave, in preference to the usual lines of skirmishers. 10. Raids. The Germans attach, in theory, considerable importance to trench raids, with the object of obtaining identifications, harassing the *memy and lowering his moral. Actually, few raids are carried out by the Germans. The trench raid is regarded as an operation requiring the' most careful and detailed preparation. A captured report on, and the orders for, a raid made on the British trenches in April, 1916, is probably typical of the German methods as regards the execution of raids. The most noticeable features of this docu- ment are the minute and detailed instructions given for every phase of the operation and the close co-operation between all arms, which resulted in ..the complete success of the enterprise. The operation comprised : (i.) Preliminary artillery registration, which was spread over several days previous to the raid and during which every effort was made not to attract our attention to the real point of attack, (ii.) A feint bombardment, which was carried out on the day preceding the raid, in order to distract our attention from the registration that was being carried out by new batteries brought up for the operation. (iii.) A feint attack, which was carried out immediately prior to the real attack, with the object of drawing our artillery fire away from the actual raiding point. The feint attack comprised : (a.) Conspicuous registration by artillery and trench mortars of the trenches and wire about 800 yards north of the real raiding point. (b.} The explosion of a mine. (c.) An intense bombardment of about a quarter of an hour. (d.) The lifting of the artillery on to our rear trenches. (e.) The exposure of groups of dummy figures in the German trenches, presenting the appearance of assaulting parties leaving their trenches to charge. (/.) Resumption of artillery and trench mortar fire on the original targets. (iv.) The Raid itself was preceded by an intense artillery preparation, during which our trenches were bombarded, principally with gas shell, and the Avire entanglements in front of the point of entry destroyed by trench mortar fire. 46 At 25 minutes after zero time, the artillery lifted and placed a barrage on our rear and neighbouring trenches,* while machine guns opened on our rearward positions and the communication trenches leading to the objective from both sides. At the same time, the raiding party, which consisted of 5 officers and 55 men, divided into 4 patrols, entered our trenches. At 50 minutes after zero time, the last man of the raiding party returned to the German trenches. 11. " Flammenwerfer." (i.) Allotment. Flammenwerfer detachments are under the direct orders of the Higher Command, and are placed at the disposal of particular formations for a particular purpose. They may be ' employed either as a complete unit or by sections or squads, and are placed under the orders of the infantry commander responsible for the tactical execution of the operation in view. This commander must allot a general objective to the Flammenwerfer detachment, but he should leave the execution of the task to the Flammenwerfer commanders. (ii.) Method of employment. There are two types of Flammenwerfer, the large and the small (for details, see page 36). The method of their employ- ment differs considerably though their general object is the same, namely, to master isolated hostile defences which continue to resist, thus preventing the infantry from advancing. They are regarded as offensive weapons only, and their use in the defence is prohibited except in very special circumstances. Captured documents indicate that the employment of small Flammenwerfer had some measure of success during the Verdun fighting, whereas it was generally found difficult to bring large Flammenwerfer up into the forward trenches. The method of employment of both types may be briefly summarized as follows : Large Flammenwerfer are heavy and cumbersome, and their employment requires considerable preparation. They are intended to be built in in trenches or sapheads pushed forward to within 27 yards from the enemy's position. They are used preparatory to an infantry attack, their object being to destroy or demoralize the hostile garrison. The flame attack (which only lasts one minute) should be in the nature of a surprise ; it is closely followed up by an assault made by a special assaulting party. Small Flammenwerfer are principally used against concrete machine gun emplacements and, in combination with bombers, for clearing trenches. They are also used against bombing blocks and forward machine gun * This protective barrage, behind and on either side of the short length of trench which is to ba raided, has been employed on several occasions. 47 positions, in cases where the German line has been penetrated and only a portion of a trench is held by the attackers. In these cases, the Flammen- werfer squads can usually advance to within a short distance of their objectives without being seen, and can even work their apparatus from behind cover afforded by traverses or angles in the trench. A method employed by the Germans with some success in the Verdun battle was for Flammenwerfer squads to crawl forward to their objective, making every use of shell holes and other cover, and surprise the garrison. Smoke screens have also been usedjx) cover their advance. In village fighting they have been used for clearing cellars and the upper stories of houses. 12. Assault detachments. The assault detachments are reserved for purely offensive operations of a special and difficult nature. They are only used when their employment offers a better prospect of success than would an ordinary infantry attack. The following extract from a captured order outlines their employ- ment : " The assault detachments, supported by picked squads of infantry, will form the first wave of the attack. They must not be used to stiffen the infantry by being distributed amongst the latter. The individual assault detachments will attack definite objectives and have definite tasks allotted." Assault detachments are sometimes employed for local counter-attacks. On these occasions, the detachment is brought up a few days before the date of the counter-attack, in order to make a thorough reconnaissance of the ground. The detachments are generally employed independently. Their special training makes it difficult to replace casualties, and it is considered that any closer tactical formation would involve undue wastage. 13.* Trench mortars. (a.) Employment. The Germans consider that, in the attack, rifled Minenwerfer (see page 33) of all calibres should be employed in large numbers distributed over a wide front. These weapons support the artillery, and are specially useful against targets which are too close to one's own trenches to be shelled by the heavy artillery. Heavy Minenwerfer (9'8-inch) are intended for use against the most important targets which are capable of offering resistance, e.g., parapets, dug-outs, observation posts, trench mortar and machine gun emplacements, &c., and wire. Medium Minenwerfer (6'7-inch) are used against overhead cover and wire, when no heavy Minenwerfer are available or when the targets are beyond the range of the latter. Light Minenwerfer (3-inch) are essentially intended for use against living targets, such as the garrisons of trenches and concentration of troops. During the assault they fire on the communication trenches. A certain 48 number are kept ready on the flanks of the attack to engage any machine guns, &c., which may open with flanking fire. Light Minenwerfer are con- sidered suitable for delivering barrage fire. " The demoralization of the enemy is best attained by a bombardment of a few hours duration and of the utmost intensity consistent with accurate fire control." Heavy and medium Minenwerfer, it is considered, should be employed for deliberate, well-aimed fire. The target sectors allotted to Minenwerfer should not exceed 110 yards in width, except when using gas shell. At the moment of the assault, all Minenwerfer are ordered to lengthen their range to the maximum. (b.) Siting. Since trench mortars attract fire and involve a considerable amount of traffic, it is considered that they should be sited away from the infantry trenches and be approached by independent communication trenches. The choice of positions demands considerable care and foresight, and will depend on the targets which are allotted; a detailed study of aero- plane photographs will be of great assistance. In selecting positions, the possibility of delivering flanking fire should always be aimed at. All emplacements for heavy and medium Minenwerfer should be shell- proof. Light Minenwerfer need not not necessarily be placed in shell-proof emplacements, in which case there must be an ample choice of alternative positions. (c.) Observation and fire control. The necessity for good observation is specially emphasized. Observation posts should, if possible, be in the foremost trenches and should be situated in pairs, one being in the line of fire and the other to a flank, the former being the more important. Observation posts should have good command: heavy Minenwerfer should be allotted one each, while one post is sufficient for two medium or six light, Stress is laid on the necessity of multiple telephone lines, lateral communication between observers and central fire control exercised by the Minenwerfer commander, whose dug-out should adjoin that of the infantry commander under whose orders he is placed. Registration should be masked by means of artillery fire delivered at the same time. (d.) Ammunition expenditure. A document issued in January, 1916, states that for the destruction of trenches the expenditure may amount to two medium and one heavy H.E. shell per yard of trench. The light Minenwerfer require a very liberal supply of ammunition in order to fulfil their tasks. 49 B. DEFENSIVE, 1. Method of holding the position. (.) Distribution of the- infantry. The experience of the Somme battle has taught the Germans the necessity of holding the first trench* lightly and of distributing the bulk of the garrison of the First Line Position* in support and reserve, as close as possible in rear. The general principle adopted has been a maximum dis- tribution of formations in depth, but the employment of units side by side. The first trench* is thinly hejd by a small but reliable garrison, supported by machine guns. This garrison is intended to be strong enough to repulse an attack, assuming that the men reach the parapet in time, but no stronger. The machine guns are disposed so as to provide flanking fire. The second trench* is garrisoned by the supports or sub-sector (battalion) reserve. A portion of the garrison is detailed to defend the trench itself and, in particular, the entrances to communication trenches. The second portion consists of special bombing parties, which are held in readiness t> rush forward to the support of the first trench, if the latter is threatened. The action of these bombing parties should be prompt and vigorous and they should not wait for orders. The third trench* is usually occupied by the whole or a portion of the Sector (regimental) Reserve. In the event of an attack, the Sector Reserve is sometimes moved forward into the second trench, to replace the supports which have gone forward to reinforce the first trench. (b.) Ihe Divisional Reserve is usually brought up to reserve trenches on the battle-field as soon as the direction of a hostile attack is ascertained! In some captured documents it is recommended that the Second LinB Position should be prepared for this purpose, the Division being responsible for the construction of sufficient dug-outs to accommodate the reserves for several days. The Germans strongly deprecate the quartering of reserves during a battle in villages immediately behind the front. It was found almost impossible to assemble troops quickly when scattered in numerous cellars, dug-outs, &c., in a village which was being heavily shelled. (c.) Regimental and battalion battle headquarters are usually in the immediate vicinity of regimental and battalion reserves. 2. Security. German commanders constantly impress upon their men that their entire system of defence depends on the measures of security adopted by the troops in the line. Such measures entail : (a.) Good and constant observation. (b.) An efficient system of alarm. * For an explanation of these terms, see pages 9 and 10. (4174) D 50 (a.) Observation. In addition to the sentries in the fire trenches, special listening posts are organized in advance of these trenches, to guard against a surprise attack. It is considered necessary for the sentries to remain in these listening posts even during a heavy bombardment. Whenever possible, therefore, the listening posts are made shell-proof. During a hostile artillery preparation, it is usually only possible for sentries to observe from shell-proof posts ; the remaining sentries are instructed to take shelter, either standing or lying down, in the entrance to the nearest dug-out. (b.) Alarm. Every groupf commander and individual man is made to realize that the success or failure of the defence depends entirely on the timely manning of the parapet. The troops are warned that the moment the enemy enters' the German trendies he will begin bombing the dug-outs. Either the group f commanders or the sentries at the entrances to the dug-outs are held responsible for watching for the moment when the enemy's artillery fire lengthens, and for giving the alarm when the enemy's attack is seen or heard. The Germans consider it advisable for the sentries posted at the entrances to dug-outs to be armed with hand grenades, so as to deny approach to the enemy and to facilitate the task of ejecting him. The alarm is constantly practised in the form of a regular drill. 3. Action of the infantry during the enemy's bombard- ment. The action of sentries has been dealt with in the previous paragraphs, the action of the remainder of the infantry in front line is briefly as follows : In trenches where there are no deep dug-outs, the garrisons of sectors of trench which are being most heavily shelled either withdraw to a flank or move forward into the open and lie down about 150 yards in front of the position. Trenches which are thus vacated are kept under observation from a flank or commanding position in rear, and are covered by flanking fire from the garrisons of neighbouring trenches. It is considered safer to lie down flat in the bottom of a trench or shell hole than to crouch in a " funk-hole '' or badly built dug-out. Troops are warned against all leaving their dug-outs immediately the enemy's artillery fire ceases, as this may be done in order to induce the garrison to man the parapet, whereupon fire is reopened. 4. Machine guns. (a.) Employment. "The battle of the Somme has again shown the decisive value of machine guns in defence. If they can be kept in a serviceable condition until the enemy's infantry attacks, and f A group = 8 men uiider a non-commissioned officer. 51 are then brought up into the firing position in time, every attack must fail. The greater the efforts the enemy makes in the future to destroy our trenches before his assault by an increased expenditure of ammunition, tlio greater the extent to which we must rely on the employment of machine guns for repulsing attacks. These should be brought into action un- expectedly and continue the fight when the greater part of the garrison of the front line trenches is out of action, and the enemy's barrage fire renders it difficult to bring up reinforcements." The above quotation from . a captured document gives a brief definition of the principles which govern the employment of machine guns in the German Army. The substitution of machine power for man power, whenever possible, has been one of the principal features of German trench tactics. It has resulted in the allotment of machine guns to a regiment being increased from (j to 18 (3 machine gun. companies) ; in addition to which, a Division has a machine gun marksman detachment of 3 companies (IS guns) as Divisional troops. Thus, it may be expected that a regimental sector will have at least is guns at its disposal, the Divisional machine gun troops being usually employed either as a reserve or for special enterprises. The object to be fulfilled in the disposition of machine guns in a defensive position is twofold : (i.) To repel an attack on the front line trench. (ii.) To hold up an advance from the front line trench in the event of the attack breaking through. In either of the above circumstances, the principal factor which governs the problem of siting machine guns is the necessity of protecting the guns and crews from artillery fire, and of being able to bring them into action in time. For further details as to the German practice in the matter of siting machine guns, see page 14. While every care and consideration is paid to the most suitable dis- position of the machine guns of a sector, it is a great mistake to imagine that the Germans will bind themselves to any pre-arranged plan of action. -On the contrary, they are adepts at the art of bringing their machine guns into action in unexpected places and at unexpected moments. Prompt advantage is taken of the lip of a crater, a natural rise in the ground, or a commanding point in a parapet, from which a machine gun may be brought into action, particularly on a flank, after an attack has commenced. On ground where corn or rough grass gives concealment, machine guns are sometimes pushed boldly forward in advance of the line and concealed in shell holes. It is noteworthy that in some parts of the front, the Germans have (4174) D 2 52 lately been heightening short portions of their parapet, possibly with a view to using them for machine guns. The horizontal barrage fire of machine guns is held to give good results on ground where there is no field of view, and at night or in misty weather. It appears that machine guns are allotted definite barrage zones on which they register. (6.) Action of machine guns during the enemy s bombardment. German instructions regarding the action of machine guns during the enemy's bombardment may be summarized as follows : During a heavy bombardment, machine guns and crews must of necessity remain sheltered in dug-outs. Everything, therefore, depends on the gun commander being able to bring his gun into action on the parapet at the right moment and in time. To enable him to do so, the following measures are prescribed : (a.) The exits to the dug-out must be kept clear of debris. (b.) The gun itself must be kept loaded and ready. Both gun and ammunition must be kept clean and free from dust and grit. (c.) A constant look-out must be kept for any change in the enemy's artillery fire. (d.) Not a moment is to be lost in getting the gun out on to the parapet at the first indication of a hostile assault. (e.) Every gun commander is to be taught to realize that the safety of his comrades depends on his skill and initiative. 5. Co-operation between infantry and artillery. " The essential conditions for successful co-operation between infantry and artillery are reliable communications and constant mutual touch between the commanders of both arms," The two principles contained in the above quotation from a captured document are constantly being impressed upon German commanders. As regards the first principle, the question of communications has been dealt with under " III. Means of Communication " on pages 24 to 28. As regards the second, the following procedure seems to be adopted : (.) The command posts of Artillery Group Commanders arid Infantry Sector (regimental) Commanders are either together or as close together as circumstances permit. Liaison officers for artillery are permanently attached to infantry regiments, and sometimes to battalions. These liaison officers, who are not necessarily trained artillery officers, are in addition to the forward artillery observers in the front line and, normally, the actual observation of fire is not part of their duties. 53 The liaison officer acts as the intermediary between the infantry (regimental or battalion) Commander and the Artillery Group Commander. He transmits the wishes and intentions of the Infantry Commander and, in turn, communicates to him the details of all undertakings planned or ordered by the Artillery Group Commander. In addition, he keeps the latter constantly informed regarding the situation in the front line. (c.) It has been found useful to establish artillery information centres (Artillerie-Nachrichten-Sapimelstellen) as far forward as possible. Battalions and companies are informed of the positions of these centres so that they may communicate their requirements and observations. 6. Artillery tactics. During the Somme fighting the action of the German artillery has been almost exclusively defensive. It may be considered under two headings : (a.) Barrage fire. (b.) Counter-battery work. (a.) Barrage fire. Although assault detachments have been trained in following up a barrage, the actual employment of barrage fire during the operations has been purely defensive. The German experience was that a field battery could not maintain an effective barrage over a zone more than 220 yards in width. Light-pistols formed the normal method of calling for barrage fire, and it was found that the barrage could be established far more rapidly and effectively if there "were forward observation officers. Experience was, however, to the effect that the German barrage was relatively slow in opening. Numerous orders had to be given to prevent the waste of ammunition which resulted from the frequent calls for barrage fire. Thus in August orders were issued that when barrage was called for, rapid fire was to be maintained for 5 minutes, followed by deliberate fire until counter-ordered. In October and November this was changed to 3 minutes' rapid fire followed by 5 minutes' deliberate fire, which then ceased unless the call was repeated. All field batteries and most of the 15 cm. howitzer batteries take part in the barrage. (b.) Counter-battery work. Special groupings of heavy artillery are usually formed in each Army for the purpose of counter-battery work. These groupings are separate from the field and medium batteries which are placed under the Divisional Artillery Commanders for barrage fire. The counter-battery groups consist almost entirely of 21 cm. mortars. 54 15 cm. howitzers and long range 15 cm. guns. They work in conjunction with aeroplane and balloon observation. 7. Trench mortars. The principles already discussed on page 48 as regards siting, observation and fire control apply equally to trench mortars in defence. As regards their employment in defence, it is considered that they should not be held in reserve for fear of possible losses. "As soon, however, as a hostile attack is imminent, it is advisable to withdraw the Minenwerfer from the first trench and place them in prepared positions in the second or third trenches." As regards the employment of light Minenwerfer. the following extracts from a publication issued by the Chief of the General Staff -summarize the German view : u Light Minenwerfer in particular will be sited in such a manner that by making full use of their range and mobility, all points where the enemy may be expected to concentrate his infantry can be brought under fire, which should be flanking fire whenever possible." " The main object will be to place a barrage on the enemy's starting point at the moment when the assaulting troops are being formed up." One German Division reported in September, 1916, that only the light Minenwerfer could be used with advantage in the battle of the Somme ; the medium and heavy were mounted in positions in rear, at points where the enemy was liable to break through. The Granatenwerfer^ or " stick " bomb thrower, referred to on page 33, is considered a very valuable weapon, and captured documents show that it is intended to organize a Granatemverfer detachment in every infantry regiment, each equipped with 12 Granatenwerfer. 8. Hand grenades. (a.) General. The hand grenade (see page 35) is regarded by the Germans as an indispensable weapon in trench warfare, both for offensive and defensive use. The importance attached to bombing lias been fully justified by the experiences of the Germans in the Somme battle and it is considered essential that every officer, non- commissioned officer and man, not only of the infantry but of the artillery, should be trained. While emphasizing the great importance of the hand grenade as a weapon for close fighting, the Germans are careful to remind their troops that the rifle is the principal weapon of the infantry. (b.) Training. Captured instructions for the training and employment of bombers call for no particular comment, except that special stress is laid on the importance of working round the enemy and attacking his flanks with hand grenades should he effect a lodgment in the line of defence. That there is still room for improvement, however, as regards training .55 in bombing 1 , is shown by a recently captured order issued by von Hindenburg which calls for further efforts in this respect. The principal object of the training seems to be to give men confidence in the handling of this weapon and to convince them of its great effect when properly used. Much time is spent in grenade training when troops are oat of the line and every battalion is supposed to have its own bombing ground laid out close to its rest billets. (c.) Bombing squads. It is usjial to have a special bombing squad (liaiuhjranatentrupp) in each platoon. This squad is composed of a non- commissioned officer and six to eight picked men. Bombing squads are generally employed independently, though company commanders sometimes combine their three squads for some special operation. Men belonging to the bombing squads do not usually carry rifles or bayonets, but are armed Avith revolvers, trench daggers and either short spades with sharpened edges or knobkerries. 9. Counter-attacks. *' When the enemy has succeeded in pene- trating portions of our position, the counter-stroke which affords the best chance of success is that which is at once initiated by subordinate commanders on their own responsibility. *-' If, for any reason, an immediate counter-attack cannot be carried out oh the spot, a counter-attack carefully and methodically prepared down to the last detail can alone succeed." The above extract from an order issued by a German Army Group Commander on the Somme lays down the principles which the Germans have-always followed. The application of these principles may be briefly summarized as follows : (a.) The immediate counter-attack. The object of an immediate counter- attack is to prevent the enemy consolidating his newly- won position and, in particular, bringing his machine guns into action. The counter-attack must be launched immediately, before the enemy's attack is entirely completed. The decision to counter-attack must, therefore, come from the front line, and can only be made on the initiative of the subordinate commander on the spot. The forces employed must be ready to hand and can only consist of the reserves at the immediate disposal of the commander. It is often advisable to move local reserves forward as soon as a hostile attack* is anticipated, so as to launch a counter-attack with the least possible delay. Vigorous counter-attacks delivered by bombing parties from a flank offer the best prospects of success. 56 (b.) The methodical counter-attack involves considerable organization and preparation. It should only be undertaken by the order of a higher commander and by employing the reserves at his disposal. A thorough artillery preparation is necessary. An insuffi- ciently prepared counter-attack almost invariably fails through being too hurried. The execution of a counter-attack of this nature does not materially differ from that of any other form of attack. This is described under " VI. A. Offensive Tactics." 10. Ruses and sniping. For remarks on snipers' posts and sniping, see under " k Snipers' posts," on page 15. The following are examples o ruses which have been employed by German troops : (a.) Dummy figures. Dummy placed some 60 yards in front of the German trench ; on moving the dummy, it exploded. Upright dummy in a shell hole ; small electric battery on the dummy, connected with an explosive charge in contact with an unexploded shell. Slightest movement of dummy caused contact to be made and exploded the shell. Dummy in German uniform, apparently a corpse, placed in No Man's Land. Patrol going out to secure identification, found a strong German patrol near the dummy. In another instance, the dummy was made to move tftxd beckon, as if for assistance. Dummy moved along German trench to make our men expose themselves when firing at it ; fire at once opened on our men from a machine gun. Dummies placed in 'empty trench to give it the appearance of being occupied. (b.) Mechanical devices. Bomb buried in a listening post, with the handle exposed, giving the appearance of a half-buried pick. Bomb exploded when picked up or could be exploded by a wire running to a German observation post. Bomb placed in sandbag on the ground ; friction-lighter fastened to the ground ; bomb exploded when sandbag was lifted. Small flag stuck in the ground with bomb attached to pole. A small rope was connected to the flag ; on pulling this the bomb exploded. A patrol found a wire attached to a tree 100 yards from our trench.. When the wire was touched, machine gun fire was opened on the patrol. Small flag found in No Man's Land connected by two wires to a shell hole 10 yards away. On the flag being pulled up* an alarm sounded in the -shell hole. (c.) Camouflage. Snipers have been discovered wearing uniforms made ., it is responsible for trigonometrical and topographical work, the preparation of artillery maps and boards, and the fixing of aiming points, survey posts, &c., for photo- graphy (including panoramas), printing (maps and letterpress;, and the supply and issue of maps. 2. The Artillerie-Mess-Trupp (Artillery Survey Section) is an artillery unit. Thee sections are normally attached to a Division, but do not move with it. There is probably one per Divisional sector. The Artilterie-Mess-Trupp consists of the headquarters (Mess-Zentrale or Haupt-Messtelle) and a number, not exceeding four, of survey posts (Messtellen). The posts are occupied with the intersection of gun flashes and of all important targets, and with observation of fire arid registration of their own guns. (NOTE. The name Mess-Plan- Abteilung was formerly used, but it is probable that it was merely an early name for the unit now known as Artillerie-. \Jess- Trupp.) 3. The Schalt-Mess-Trupp (Sound Ranging Section) is an artillery unit, usually attached to a Divisional sector. It works in close conjunction with the Artillerie-Mess-Trupp. The above organization is extremely like our own. The Artillerie-Mes*- Trupp and Sckall- Mess- Trupp are artillery units, and not apparently part of 73 :the Army Survey Section, as with us. Information obtained by Artillerie- Mess-Jrupps is sent first to the troops, and then to the Vermessungs-Abteilung for accurate compilation. It is the duty of the Vermessungs-AUeilung to print and distribute all information gained from various sources, and this probably includes information about hostile batteries. It seems likely, however, that most of the work done by the compiling officers of our Field Survey Companies is done in the German Army by the Mess-Zentrale of the Artillt>ric-Mess-Trupp, though there is no definite information on this point. The whole of the Survey Department in the German (as in the French) Army .is classified as " Artillery " for pay. The prefix Artillerie does not, therefore, .mean that these are artillery units in our sense of the term. 74 XL HIGHER COMMAND. The tactical unit, which at the beginning of the war was the Army- Corps, has now become the Division, which has been reorganized on a more mobile basis than before (see page 67). A great number of independent Divisions now exist. The Corps staffs have been retained, although not always with their original Divisions. The necessity for the rapid relief of a large number of Divisions in the Somme battle, and the consequent continual change of Corps staffs, soon led to the adoption by the Germans of the system of Group Sectors (similar to our Corps Sectors), each having 3 or 4 Divisions in front line. Thus the 1st Army (North of the Somme) is divided into four Groups : A, B, C, D. Normally an Army consists of 8 to 12 Divisions, though this number is- greatly increased during severe fighting as at Verdun and on the Somme, where an. Army may have as many as 30 Divisions temporarily under its command. There are now 10 Armies on the Western Front. A new one (the 1st) was formed in July, owing to the operations on both banks of the Somme becoming too large tu be handled by a single Army Command. Since von Hindenburg was appointed Chief of the General Staff, the system of Groups of Armies has been extended to the Western Front. The German forces between the sea and the Moselle are now divided into three- main Groups of Armies under the Duke of Wiirttemberg, the Crown Prince- of Bavaria, and the Imperial Crown Prince, respectively. 75 XII. GERMAN MAN-POWER. 1. Army in the Field. Germany's effort to raise her man-power to- the highest pitch of strength, both in effectives and reserves, culminated early in 1916, when the Verdun battle commenced. In June, 1916, although the Army in the Field was composed of men of considerable training and, so far as 75 per cent, were concerned, seasoned fighters, there were no reserves of the same quality of man in the depots in Germany or behind the front. The losses at Verdun accounted for the balance of the 1915 Class, and caused the great majority of the 1916 Class to be drafted into the line. The 1916 Class had received the most prolonged and careful training given to any recruits since the outbreak of war, so that the incorporation of these 19-year old boys did not mean any weakness in the fighting ability of the troops. 2. Reserves in depots. In the depots, in Germany in June, 1916,. there were : (1.) The remainder of the 1916 Class. (2.) Healed wounded from Verdun. (3.) The whole of the 1917 Class. (4.) Men " combed" from reserved occupations. 3. The 1916 Class. The men of this class were called up for training- in the various Army Corps Districts of Germany between March and September, 1915. They were required for drafting purposes from March, 1916, onwards, and by the middle of July, 1916, they were completely incorporated in the field units. 4. The 1917 Class. The earliest of the 1917 Class were recruited in December, 1915, the majority being called up in March, 1916, and by the end of May the whole of this class was in training in every Army Corps District in Germany. These men formed a considerable portion of the drafts sent to the Western Front in October and November, 1916. 5. The 1918 Class. This class has now been called up for training in every Army Corps District in Germany, replacing the 1917 Class in the depots. 6. "Combed" men. The system of replacing men in reserved, occupations by woman labour, Poles, and prisoners of war has been steadily going on since July, 1915. The farmer class was combed out thoroughly in the Autumn of 1915. In March, 1916, the mines, munition factories, railways and civil service were combed, and a remarkable number of the drafts to the line since [September, 1916, consisted of men from these occupations. 7. Returned Wounded. The troops holding the line in June, 1916, contained a comparatively high percentage of active soldiers and reservists. 7ti (about 20 per cent, of the whole forces on the Somme on the 1st July were of this class), a condition obtained by the return of recovered wounded from the hospitals. The return of wounded men to the front line is becoming more marked as the shortage of suitably trained recruits is felt. Men are now being sent to the front with physical defects which, a year ago, would have secured their discharge from military duty. How much this affects the class of the drafts is shown by prisoners of the 55th Res. Inf. Regt. taken 011 the 13th November, 1916. Out of 545 examined, 35 per cent, were men returned from hospital. 8. Permanently unfit. In the spring of 1915 Germany, anticipating a shortage of man-power, made arrangements to call up and train men who, previous to the war, had been rejected by the doctors at the annual recruiting musters as being " Permanently unfit for any military service." Men were also called up who, as a result of wounds received during the first six months of the war, had been discharged as unfit for all further duty. These men were called up, examined, and classified in the following categories : (1.) Fit for active service. (2.) Fit for garrison duty. (3.) Fit for labour employment. (4.) To come up for further examination. The process of calling up and selecting men for service from this class went on during the last six months of 1915, as many as three and four successive musterings being held in each district. 9. Conclusions. When the battle of the Somme began, the German Army on the Western Front was composed of well-trained and experienced soldiers, and despite all efforts made to maintain the quality of the troops by a special system of selection, by transferring men from garrison units and labour companies to regiments at the front, and by taking partially recovered men from hospitals, it has not been possible to replace the losses on the Somme without drawing very heavily on the practically raw recruits of the 1917 Class. In sending drafts to the Western Front, men combed from reserved occupations, and called up for training with the 1917 Class, have been selected in preference to employing the youths of that class, although the combed men had had less training. The battle of the Somme has, therefore, accounted for the 1916 Class, 75 per cent, of the 1917 Class, and a very considerable number of men who, during 2% years of war, were considered indispensable. This leaves the German Army with reserves of lower quality than ever before, namely, boys born in 1898, and such further " indispensables " as may be obtainable when the scheme of reorganization of the civilian forces is complete. 77 XIII. ORGANIZATION OP GERMAN MEDICAL SERVICES. (With special reference to the arrangements during the Somme Battle.) 1. General. The German medical organization for battle consisted of the following echelons from the firing line to the back areas: Regi- mental Medical Service ; Bearer Companies (Field Ambulances) ; Field Hospitals ; Motor Ambulance Convoy or Column ; War Hospitals ; Ambu- lance Trains and Temporary Ambulance Trains ; Advanced Depots of Medical Stores. 2. Regimental medical service. Normally there are with each battalion 2 medical officers, 4 medical non-commissioned officers (I with each company), and 16 stretcher bearers; with a senior medical officer for the regiment. At the end of May, 19 16, a fifth medical non-commissioned officer was added to each battalion. The stretcher bearers are borne on the establishment as non-combatants arid wear the Reel Cross brassard. In the trenches, each company formed a medical dug-out or aid post just behind the fire trench, but owing to the large number of casualties amongst the medical officers, it was considered inadvisable to let the battalion medical officers go forward to the fire trencrf. A large regimental aid post or dresing station (Truppenverbandplatz) i established further back, usually in or near the second support trench. The accommodation is in well constructed dug-outs or in cellars. A warning was issued against the use of buildings on account of danger from our artillery fire. The. dug-outs are constructed to hold 30 wounded. A tele- phone is provided and supplies of lighting materials, extra rations, dressings and medical comforts to cover periods of 5 days or more are maintained in the aid post. Similar aid posts are formed for groups of four batteries of artillery, if they are not too far apart. The personnel on duty in a regimental aid post appears to have been at least 3 battalion medical officers, and a detachment of 8 stretcher bearers with 2 stretchers from the bearer company. Wounded are brought, to the regimental aid post by the battalion stretcher bearers, and are kept there as short a time as possible, being evacuated from them by the bearer company. In back areas the regimental medical service opens a local medical inspection room and ward for detained cases ( Ortskrankenstube), where patients may be kept up to 5 days. 3. The Bearer Company (Sanitdtskompagni*) or Field Ambulance consists of elements equivalent to the bearer division and the tent division of 78 our Field Ambulance. There are 208 stretcher bearers in two sections with non-commissioned officers and other ranks under officers who are not medical officers, and with a medical officer in medical charge of the sections ; and there is also a main dressing station detachment of 8 medical officers including the senior medical officer in command. There are 3 of these companies in each Corps. During the battle of the Somme this was not found sufficient, and there was a demand for 2 bearer companies for a Division in the fighting line. The bearers of the one company became exhausted, and it was necessary to establish a relief ^company to cope with, the work of collecting and bringing back wounded. The posts established in action by the bearer company were : (a.) A wagon rendezvous (Wagenhalteplatz\ (b.) A main dressing station (Hauptverbandplatz). (c.) A collecting station for slightly wounded (Leichtverwundeten- sammelplatz). (a.) Ihe wagon rendezvous is placed in advance of the main dressing station and about 4,000 yards behind the regimental aid post. Dug-outs are constructed at this post, and arrangements are made for giving hot food and drink to wounded coming back. A dump for the issue of medical and surgical material to the regimental medical service 'has also to be maintained by the bearer company at or near the wagon rendezvous. The post is provided with a telephone. The personnel consists of a small detachment -of the stretcher bearers under a non-commissioned officer, and a medical officer is placed on duty there from time to time by order of the Divisional Assistant Director ot Medical Services. One or more of the ambulance wagons of the company are kept constantly at the wagon rendezvous, and go forward at night to meet the bearers bringing back wounded. The wagon rendezvous performs much the same function as our advanced dressing station. (b.) The main dressing station is established in a shell-proof shelter in some village 6 or 7 miles from the front line. The personnel may be reinforced from the regimental medical services or from field hospitals ; but it is not to be used for reinforcing or replacing medical officers of either of these echelons. All wounded coming back from the regimental medical service must pass through this post. Two or more motor ambulance earn -are allotted to it, and one motor omnibus. The walking cases are sent back to the main dressing station, after being collected at the wagon rendezvous, in small groups and in march formation. Every wounded man must have two diagnosis tallies (field medical cards) attached. These talli^ have two red perforated margins. If a man is able to walk, both margins are torn off; if classed as fit for. transport, one 79 margin is torn off; if unfit for transport, the card is left intact. A man coming back to the main dressing station or wagon rendezvous without a field medical card, or without authority, is sent back to his unit, unless he in found to be suffering from sickness or wound, in which case the card is attached at the main dressing station and the unit informed. This procedure is adopted to prevent men straggling back from the front who have nothing the matter with them. Amongst the special equipment attached to one of the main dressing 1 stations in a Corps area is a water sterilizing wagon. (c.) 7/w collecting station for slightly wounded is established further back, -at or near an entraining station. The walking cases are sent on from the main dressing station either in march formation, as before, or in the motor - omnibus or other vehicles. The following were the positions of these echelons of the bearer -company allotted to the 4th Infantry Division when it held a front line at ihe Bois des Foureaux : WAGON RENDEZVOUS. Dug-outs on the unmetalled road about mile south of Ligny-Thilloy (1/100,000 map), with dug-outs for refreshment post, and surgical and medical dump somewhat further forward. MAIN DRESSING STATION. At Villers-au-Flos. SLIGHTLY WOUNDED COLLECTING STATION. At Velu. 4. Field hospitals, normally 12 per Corps, are under the control of the Corps D.D.M.S. They were used in the same way as we use casualty clearing stations for the retention of cases unfit for transport and for special cases. The number of medical officers in each is six. Normally equipped for 200 beds they are expected to expand to any extent. They are opened in various villages in the back area. Field hospitals were allotted for the following classes of sick and wounded from the 4th Division Bearer Company when the Division held the Bois des Foureaux : Advanced operating centre at Villers-au-Flos (near the main dressing -station). Severely wounded at Barastre. Dental cases at Ytres. Special surgical canes at Bertincourt. Gassed cases at Ruyaulcourt. Infectious cases at Vein. Rontgen ray examination at Velu. 5. Motor ambulance convoys. The composition of these has not been definitely ascertained. There Avas no war establishment laid down for them before the war. They appear to be a collection of motor ambulance 80 cars and omnibuses, parked under an officer at some village or locality in telephonic communication with medical units, and used for the conveyance of" sick arid wounded from the main dressing station to the entraining station or to field hospitals on demand. The number of these motor ambulance convoys appears to be one to each Army Group. There is a note in one document to the effect that it is better to keep the vehicles of a motor ambulance convoy parked together in one locality, rather than to distribute a number to medical units. They are thus available on demand where they are most wanted, and demands are sent direct from the unit concerned to the officer in charge of the column. 6. War hospitals (KriegslazareUe) are used in much the same way as we use stationary hospitals in advanced areas. The number is not fixed and depends on localities available for opening them. Their equipment and personnel are obtained, as required, to a great extent from local resources or depots of medical stores ; but there is a nucleus of the personnel in the form of a definite unit called the War Hospital Detachment (Kriegslazareltabtfiilung), mobilized in the proportion of one for each Corps. Each detachment has 19 medical officers, a dentist, 3 pharmacists, and subordinate ranks. They are intended for the more or less continuous treatment of special classes of wounds and injuries, which are not sent back to Germany. 7. The ambulance Convoy detachment (Kranhntransportabttilung) is a definite unit, divisible into three sections and allotted in the proportion of one to each Army. Its personnel consists of 7 medical officers with sub- ordinate ranks, and its function is to open reception shelters, dressing- stations and refreshment rooms at stations where sick and wounded entrain, and take care of the latter while waiting evacuation by railway. It is also a distributing centre for classifying patients for evacuation to various field hospitals or war hospitals, opened for the reception of special cases in the villages in Army and advanced Lines of Communication areas. It makes arrangements for the comfort of sick and wounded during the journey back, and, with the special equipment held for the purpose in advanced depots of medical stores, fits out empty returning trains as temporary ambulance trains. The unit is used for the same purpose as we use the evacuation section of our casualty clearing stations. In connection with the operations of the 4th Division, noted above, an ambulance convoy detachment was working at Velu. 8. Ambulance trains. In connection with the operations of the 1st Army dining the Sornme battle, ambulance trains ran to Epehey and temporary ambulance trains for sitting-up cases to Hermies. Empty return trains also took slightly wounded and sick from Croiselles and Queant to Cambrai, and, as far as possible, both slightly and severely wounded were- sent back on the narrow-gauge railway Bellicourt Caudry. 9. Advanced depdts of medical stores. These are on the Avmy Line of Communication. For the 1st Army, during the Sotnme operations, depots were opened at Cambrai and Valenciennes, with advanced issuing stores at Epehy and Futy-eu-Arfcois. The Divisional bearer company is responsible, as already noted, for bringing up stores to a dump for issue to regimental medical .services. s^ li 3 vtitfr) 83 PLATE II. FIG. 2. WIRE ENTANGLEMENT. FIG. 3. CONCRETE OBSERVATION |POST. 3-30 (4174) 84 PLATE III. FIG. 4. SUBTERRANEAN OBSERVATION POST. PLATE IV. FIG. 5. DUG-OUT FOR 5 GROUPS (5 N.C.O.'s AND 40 MEN), Groups Croups. I Croup FT. 39 a N.C.O? e N.C.O? CSi Beef for 2 men. 8(5 1 > H 3 I be o 87 V Continued. FIG. 7. CONCEALED MACHINE GUN IN FLANK. WIRE. fixe TKZNCH OO a g CQ 89 PLATE VI continued. FIG. 9. MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT. Gun Position ...,, __> Enemy Section. II Plan. Note the three exits from the dug-outs. PLATE VII. FIG. 10. REINFORCED CONCRETE SHELTER FOR MACHINE GUN, Scale : 1 : 50. ill PLATE VIII. FIG. 12. SKETCH PLAN OF PART OF A BATTERY. Gun ; /. Aid poet. b. Men's dug-out. y . Dug-out outside battery. c Shell store. h. Embrasure towards reference a, Cartridge store. point e. Orderly and telephone room. i. Front connecting trench. 7c. Rear connecting trench. 93 CO CONVENTIONAL SIGNS COMMONLY USED ON GERMAN MAPS. Fire and communication trenches! HGraben). prepared for defence. J Ordinary communication trenches (Weg). The'distinction between fire and other trenches is not always made. Wire entanglement. Trench railway (Feld-bahn). Battery fixed by photography. Heavy Minenwerfer. Light Minenwerfer. M.G. f (Occasionally). Grenade store (or shell magazine). Screen from view. Telephone station with cable. Searchlight. Pioneer dump. Dressing station. Well. Headquarters. Usually some form of circle with flag. The number of circles increases with the importance of the H.Q. but the signs vary largely. .F: Coy. Commander. Shaft of mine. Ullll Unsafe ground with mine shafts. I'lllllll" Ch.Hs. Turnpike. (6000 2/17 5102 ) (8760) 4174 wo. Barn. PLATE 13 Brick-kiln. Telegraph detachment. Field signalling detachment. Wireless telegraph station. Bhf. Bahnhof (Station) Hp. Haltepunkt (Stopping place). Blst. Blockstatlon (Block signal station). Let. Ladestelle (Loading platform). B.W. Bahnwarter (Plate layer's hut). 3'7 cm. Revolver Gun. 5 cm. Belgian Gun. 7'7 cm. Field Gun. Anti-Aircraft Gun. 9 cm. Field Gun. 10-5 cm. Light Field Howitzer. 10 cm. Gun. (newer pattern). 12 cm. Gun. 12 cm. Belgian Gun, 15 cm. " Ringkanone." 15 cm. Long Gun. 15 cm. Heavy Field Hcwitzer.(13). 21 cm. Mortar (old pattern). 21 cm. Mortar (newer pattern). 90 mm. and 95 mm. French Guns. 10 cm. Gun (older pattern). 13 cm. Gun. 15 cm. Gun (i.S.L,). 15 cm. Russian Gun. 15 cm. Heavy Field Howitzer (older pattern). > HH > 30-5 cm. Mortar. > or jl 42 cm. Mortar. RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT TO-* 202 Main Library LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE 2 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. Books may be Renewed by calling 642-3405 DUE AS STAMPED BELOW SENT ON ILL FFR 2 2 1895 U. C. BERKELEY FORM NO. DD6 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY, CA 94720 $ YC 62283 M301383 THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY