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THE 
 
 HISTORY OF THE NAVY 
 
 DURING THE REBELLION. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES B. BOYNTON, D.D., 
 
 CHAPLAIN OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND 
 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT THE U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY. 
 
 ILLUSTRATED WITH NUMEROUS ENGRAVINGS. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 
 443 & 445 BROADWAY. 
 
 1867. 
 
; <? f 
 
 ENTERED, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by 
 
 D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 In the Clerk s Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
 District of New York. 
 
TO THE PUBLIC. 
 
 THOSE who are asked to read a history have a right to 
 inquire "by what authority its statements are made, and what 
 claims the work has to authenticity and accuracy. 
 
 To such questions the author of this history replies, that the 
 whole material for the work has been drawn from documents 
 in possession of the Navy Department, so that its narrative 
 rests upon the highest possible authority. 
 
 The author feels that he can in no manner adequately repay 
 the kindness with which the honorable Secretary of the Navy, 
 the Assistant Secretary, and other officers of the Department, 
 placed at his disposal whatever could elucidate the part which 
 the Navy bore in our great national struggle ; and equal 
 thanks are due from him to the chief officers of the Navy for 
 the aid they have cheerfully rendered, enabling him to impart 
 a freshness and life to the work which, without their assistance, 
 would have been impossible. 
 
 Through the kindness of the Secretary of the Navy he has 
 had free access to the navy-yards and ships, and to the Ordnance 
 Department, and nothing has been withheld that could properly 
 be granted ; while the connection of the writer with the Naval 
 Academy, and his residence in Washington, have given him 
 
4 TO THE PUBLIC. 
 
 facilities for collecting the materials for such a history that 
 leave little or nothing to desire. This material has been 
 wrought into its present shape in the earnest hope that it may 
 aid in setting the work of the Navy in its true light before 
 the public, so as to convince the people how much the country 
 is indebted for its triumph and present security to those who 
 organized and directed its operations, and to those who so suc 
 cessfully guarded our long coast-line and the communications 
 of the Army, and who fought our battles on the rivers and 
 on the sea. 
 
 WASHINGTON, October, 1866. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 THE campaigns and battles of the Revolution did not gain 
 for the Americans a very brilliant military reputation ; not be 
 cause of any lack of courage or skill in our soldiers, but 
 because they were regarded merely as giving evidence of per 
 sonal bravery on the part of undisciplined militia, and not as 
 indicating any remarkable genius for the art of war. 
 
 Nor did any one then fear that the young Republic would 
 soon become a nation, capable of organizing war on a scale so 
 vast as to alarm all Western Europe, a military power second 
 to none in the world. Europe, and especially England, was 
 first startled by the operations of our Navy in our second war. 
 The ease with which some of their finest frigates and sloops 
 were sunk or captured by American vessels of the same rate, 
 filled England with amazement and alarm. The character of 
 our ships, the manner in which they were manoeuvred, the 
 havoc wrought by our guns, were all without precedent in 
 naval war ; and England and France saw in these victories the 
 first foreshadowings of a great naval power, which in a not 
 remote future might dispute with either or both, the supremacy 
 of the seas, and perhaps exclude them from the Western Con 
 tinent. 
 
 From that time the naval and commercial power of the 
 United States has attracted the attention of Europe more than 
 
PEEFACE. 
 
 any other feature of our growth, because they knew that how 
 ever large our fighting force on land might be, we should be 
 unable to check them in any designs upon this continent unless 
 our naval strength should become equal to their own. 
 
 With England and France, therefore, the most interesting 
 question connected with our affairs has been, whether we could 
 create a truly formidable Navy. Our naval strength was the 
 standard by which they measured their power to attack, and 
 ours to defend. They did not believe it possible for us to pro 
 duce a Navy in a few months which could both seal up our 
 long line of sea-coast and defy their own most formidable ships, 
 and this mistaken judgment was the main influence in deciding 
 their policy in regard to American affairs. A history of the 
 Navy, then, is a history of that power by which Europe gauges 
 our national importance, and by whicji our rank among nations 
 is assigned : because, until a true Christian civilization prevails, 
 the nobler attributes of a nation will be overlooked in view of 
 its ability to carry on a great war ; and because, if the United 
 States should ever wage a great European war, the battles 
 would be mainly upon the seas. 
 
 "While our Army has done a work beyond all praise, and 
 has settled the question of our ability to defend our territory 
 against any force which could be brought here, the Navy has 
 saved us from foreign intervention that could not have been 
 otherwise avoided, while at the same time its labors in putting 
 down the rebellion have been far greater than has been gener 
 ally supposed. 
 
 The glorious achievements of the Army have been set forth 
 by so many skilful writers, that they have become familiar, as 
 they should be, even to children. This is well. Let our soldiers 
 and their deeds be held in grateful remembrance while we re 
 main a nation. Their steadfast loyalty, their long-enduring 
 courage, their wonderful skill in all the arts of war, and the 
 facility with which a veteran and victorious army dissolved 
 
PREFACE. 7 
 
 itself and joined the mass of society in the peaceful works of 
 life, these are not likely to be overstated by the historian, or 
 overestimated by the people. 
 
 The calling into existence and maintaining in efficient con 
 dition a blockading fleet of six hundred vessels has been pro 
 nounced in Europe the great fact of the war, and this will be 
 the judgment of impartial history. And yet the energy, the 
 promptitude, the successful boldness, the comprehensive plan 
 ning, the skill in the choice of means evinced by the Navy De 
 partment during the w r hole war, have made but slight impres 
 sion upon the popular mind, because the people are in a great 
 degree ignorant of the facts, and the officers and sailors of our 
 six hundred ships so constantly and successfully employed, have 
 occupied but a small space in the public thought ; because so 
 little is known, except of the main incidents of some of the 
 more important battles. 
 
 By the pencil, the photograph, by letters from thousands of 
 soldiers to friends at home, by eloquent speakers, by countless 
 pens of " ready writers," every movement of our armies has 
 been made to pass as distinctly before the minds of millions as 
 if seen by the bodily eye. The people have been made to feel 
 almost as deep an interest in the scenes of the camp, the march, 
 the bivouac, the picket and skirmish line, the battle-field, and 
 hospital, as if they had been actual spectators of all. But with 
 the Navy it has been widely different. Few, comparatively, 
 have seen, and fewer still have attempted to describe the scenes 
 on board our ships the perils, the daring, the skill of our sea 
 men, whether in the exciting chase or in those battles that have 
 astonished Europe. The results of our great victories have been 
 given, but very few among us have any clear conception of the 
 scenes on board a ship, whether engaged in the usual duties of 
 the blockading squadron, or in the chase of a blockade-runner, 
 or during the progress of a fight. 
 
 The object of this history, therefore, is not only to prepare 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 a truthful record of some of the most important and least 
 known events of the war, but to present the work of the cre 
 ation of the Navy and its subsequent operations so clearly be 
 fore the public mind, that the people shall become familiar with 
 them as they now are with scenes in the Army ; and if this can 
 be successfully done, the writer believes that they will feel again 
 that enthusiasm for the Navy which thrilled all hearts when 
 Preble, and Hull, and Bainbridge, and Porter, and Stewart, 
 and Decatur, and Perry, and McDonough, won for themselves 
 and their country an undying renown. 
 
 Another topic demands a brief notice here. The political 
 agitations which moved the country so profoundly soon after 
 the close of the war, have made it difficult for a great majority 
 of the American people to judge impartially any man, how 
 ever great his services were during the war, who afterward ap 
 proved of the policy of President Johnson. Although the his 
 tory of the course of the Navy Department, and the operations 
 of the Navy during the rebellion, does not reach the political 
 struggle that succeeded the war, still the history of the actors 
 in it will be viewed now through the heated and distorting me 
 dium of party politics, and some will perhaps deem the praise 
 bestowed in this volume upon the management of the Navy 
 Department to be somewhat too decided and warm. Whatever 
 encomium is here found is, in the judgment of the author, de 
 manded by the undoubted facts in the case, and is abundantly 
 supported by official documents. 
 
 Future historians will assign to the politicians of the day 
 their proper positions. The object of this work is to present 
 the history of the Navy during the war, and to award praise or 
 censure to the actors in those scenes, without reference to their 
 subsequent political course. Only thus can impartial justice 
 be done, thus only can a reliable history of that period be 
 written. 
 
 During the continuance of the great struggle, the Navy De- 
 
PREFACE. 9 
 
 partment was in perfect sympathy with the Union party of the 
 country, and it is this period only which the present Yolume 
 covers. It is a part of the history of the war, and not of the 
 political conflicts that followed. 
 
 ~No candid history, based on official statements, will deny 
 that the Department was conducted during the war with emi 
 nent ability, energy, and success, with an integrity not to be 
 questioned, and that it was ever ready to assert the dignity of 
 the country and maintain her honor. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAP. I. INTRODUCTORY, 13 
 
 II. ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, 19 
 
 III. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. THE MENTAL FORCE 
 
 STORED WITH THE PEOPLE, AND EVER READY FOR USE. THE MlAN- 
 
 TONOMOH S VISIT TO EUROPE, 66 
 
 IV. FURTHER DETAILS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT, OFFICE 
 
 OF CHIEF CLERK, ETC., 70 
 
 V. THE CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 AT THE TIME OF MR. LINCOLN S INAUGURATION, . . . .75 
 
 VI. THE QUESTION OF THE BLOCKADE, 83 
 
 VII. THE WORK REQUIRED OF THE NAVY, 89 
 
 VIII. THE MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT WHEN THE 
 
 WAR BEGAN, 97 
 
 IX. THE FIRST MEASURES ADOPTED FOR THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY, . 107 
 X. THE IDEAS WHICH GOVERNED THE DEPARTMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION 
 
 OF NEW VESSELS, 117 
 
 XL THE IRON-CLAD NAVY, 141 
 
 XII. THE INVENTOR OF THE MONITOR, 169 
 
 XIIL THE MONITORS, 172 
 
 XIV. THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS, 185 
 
 XV. THE RELIEF OF FORT SUMTER, 244 
 
 XVI. AMERICAN ORDNANCE, 269 
 
 XVII. THE RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS, 296 
 
 XVIII. THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT. RESCUE OF THE FRIGATE CONSTI 
 TUTION, 305 
 
 XIX. OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC, 310 
 
 XX. FIRST IMPORTANT NAVAL EXPEDITION. CAPTURE OF THE HATTERAS 
 
 FORTS, 331 
 
 XXL THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMACK, 358 
 
 XXII. CAPTURE OF ROANOKE ISLAND. OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND AL- 
 
 BEMARLE SOUNDS, 377 
 
12 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XXIII. CAPTURE OF NEWBERN AND FORT MACON, 391 
 
 XXIV. DESTRUCTION OF THE REBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY, . . 405 
 
 XXV. EXPEDITIONS TO HAMILTON, WASHINGTON, AND FRANKLIN, . .418 
 
 XXVI. EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD, AND CAPTURE OF THE FORTS, . . 428 
 
 XXVII. CAPTURE OF FORT CLINCH, FERNANDINA, AND ST. MARY S, . . 451 
 
 XXVIII. MOVEMENTS OF THE REBELS. OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, 
 
 AND RIVERS, 464 
 
 XXIX. FALL OF FORT PULASKI, 487 
 
 XXX. THE NAVY OF THE WEST AND OUR INLAND WATERS IN ITS RELATIONS 
 
 TO OUR NAVAL POWER AND THE FUTURE POLICY OF OUR COUNTRY, 491 
 
 XXXI. THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, 495 
 
 XXXII. BEGINNING OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS, . 508 
 XXXIII. CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. EXPEDITION UP THE TENNESSEE, . .515 
 
 XXXIV. CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON, 528 
 
 XXXV. OPERATIONS AGAINST AND CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN, . . 534 
 XXXVI. THE BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING. THE WORK OF THE GUNBOATS 
 
 IN THAT ACTION, 558 
 
 XXXVII. FURTHER OPERATIONS ON THE TENNESSEE. MOVEMENTS ON THE MIS 
 SISSIPPI. ATTACK ON FORT PILLOW. FIGHT WITH THE GUNBOATS, 5G6 
 XXXVIII. BATTLE WITH THE REBEL FLEET AT MEMPHIS, AND CAPTURE OF THE 
 
 CITY, 574 
 
HISTORY OF THE NAVY 
 
 DURING THE GKEAT REBELLION 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 EACH true state has a distinctive, individual character. Its 
 political, religious, and social institutions, and all the forms 
 which its civilization assumes, are but the embodying of national 
 ideas. Every great nation, whether ancient or modern, stands 
 forth separate, and even peculiar, as if endowed with an actual 
 personality. Each one has shaped a form of religion, a style of 
 art, an architecture, and a literature of its own, different from all 
 others ; and even in the army and navy, in weapons and meth 
 ods of fighting, the national traits appear. 
 
 Colonies retain of course, for a long time, the peculiarities 
 of the mother country, and assume but slowly, if at all, any dis 
 tinctive features. It could not be expected, therefore, that an 
 American nation, with an individual character, should suddenly 
 appear upon this continent. Up to the present hour we have 
 no truly national literature, or architecture, or costume ; we have 
 no art, or oratory, or poetry, which can be called distinctively 
 American, and which have originated here. They are all mod 
 ifications or imitations of European, and principally of English 
 civilization. We are not, it is true, mere copyists. American 
 thought has moulded what we have adopted, and in the arts 
 which multiply man s power, and lessen the amount of labor to 
 
14: 2 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 obtain given results, in all that tends to lighten the burdens of 
 the people, and increase their comforts and intelligence, we 
 have far outstripped the rest of the world. 
 
 "We have at length, however, through the pressure of the war, 
 become in truth and in deed a nation. We are a consolidated 
 state, we are clothed with the attributes of a great national 
 power ; and, from this time, we may probably date the begin 
 nings of a distinctive American civilization. We have acquired 
 the consciousness of strength ; we have obtained, through the 
 war, the materials for a literature and a history. The war itself 
 had many distinctive and original features. It has been con 
 ducted as no other war has been. It was an American battle. 
 It was fought on such a scale, with such masses of men, with 
 such vast combinations, and with such weapons, as Europe never 
 had seen. It was, in fact, the first grand national American act ;. 
 and, more than all else, the Navy has been an original creation, 
 a true outgrowth of distinctive American thought. In fact, from 
 its beginning, the Navy has been the embodying of truly 
 American ideas; and whatever question there maybe in regard 
 to any other feature of our civilization, no one will deny that 
 there are American ships, American cannon, and an American 
 Navy. 
 
 In the Army, European methods have been made more 
 effective than ever before by the intelligence, the skill, and per 
 sistent courage of the American soldier ; yet in the system of 
 attack and defence, in tactics and strategy, there has been little 
 that is new and peculiar ; but the long, swift steamboat, the 
 clipper-ship, with its great spread of canvas, and its unequalled 
 speed, the heavy frigate, the frigate-like corvette, the armored 
 ship, adopted in Europe, and last the Monitor, these and our 
 " big guns " are original creations ; they are the fruits of Ameri 
 can thinking, the exponents of American character ; and these, 
 our thoughts, have had power to revolutionize the naval archi 
 tecture and naval warfare of the world. 
 
 It is believed, therefore, that the Navy, with the armament 
 of our war-vessels, and our ships of commerce, form the best ex 
 ponent of our power of invention which the nation has yet pro 
 duced ; the. highest proof yet given to the world that a new 
 national life-power is building here a state with characteristics 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 15 
 
 as marked and peculiar as any of the great nations of antiquity 
 a nation presenting new forms of civilization, and representing, 
 in many important features, the foremost thought of the age. 
 
 The maritime nations of Europe have employed all their in 
 ventive genius and skill, their science and mechanical art, in 
 perfecting their navies, and making them, as they hoped, irre 
 sistible. The Americans in a few months, and as the first re 
 sult of earnest effort, have produced ships and armaments, be 
 fore unknown, that have rendered useless, and virtually stricken 
 out of existence, the great navies of the world. Not only have 
 the most formidable wooden vessels been reduced to utter weak 
 ness and helplessness, but the proudest armored, broadside ship 
 of Europe, such as was deemed impregnable, would be de 
 stroyed in a fight with some of the new American vessels almost 
 as easily as the wooden walls themselves. Such results should 
 be studied by the people, because they show the originating arid 
 independent power of American mind, when operating on a 
 large scale, and competing with the whole of Europe. 
 
 The most remarkable successes of the war those which 
 startled Europe, which caused England and France to feel that 
 their naval supremacy had been stricken down by blows not 
 aimed at them were gained by means unknown before, by new 
 applications of principles, and by hitherto unheard-of uses of 
 machinery. 
 
 The new American artillery, the new war-ships, the changes 
 wrought in old vessels by a new armament, the almost instanta 
 neous transformation of a commercial marine into a blockading 
 squadron, that could seal up the sea-coast from the Potomac to 
 the Kio Grande, these are without any parallel in the history of 
 war. They have no relation to the old stereotyped naval and 
 military forms and methods ; they are the creations of fresh and 
 independent thinkers, who have been rudely criticised, ridiculed, 
 and condemned as visionary or imbecile, because their thoughts 
 were beyond, or outside, the common range of mind and of pro 
 fessional experience. 
 
 A mere narration, then, of the events of such a war can, in 
 no proper sense, be received as a history of that war. The men 
 who planned the methods of the battle, who contrived the new 
 instruments used, the ideas out of which the successful action 
 
16 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 sprung, the manner in which the new theories stood the test of 
 practice, the stern ordeal of the fight these should enter into 
 the history ; and those forces which lie back of events, and by 
 which events are produced, should, as far as possible, be re 
 vealed. 
 
 True history records the birth of ideas, the progress of 
 thought, and then relates the actions which are the results of 
 thought ; and if to these is added a proper setting forth of the 
 leading spirits of the age, the originators of thought, then the 
 movement of society, and the living forces which produced and 
 controlled the movement, are presented. 
 
 To relate the. mere fact that the Monitor, a small turreted 
 ship, armed with eleven-inch guns, engaged the Merrimac, a 
 large armored, broadside frigate, and that after a four hours 
 fight the frigate was compelled to withdraw, would add very 
 little to real history ; but the story becomes history when we 
 learn the perils of that solemn hour, when we are made ac 
 quainted with the men who organized the fight, and with those 
 who conducted it, and when we are taught to consider that the 
 conflict was not between the mailed ships, their guns and crews, 
 nor even between the North and the South, but between Eu 
 ropean and American thought ; for the South had adopted, in 
 the Merrimac, the European form of the iron-clad, with the ex 
 ception of the sloping side. The battle, therefore, was to decide 
 whether the American people had thinking power equal to 
 their great occasion, and the decision of that one question was 
 to determine whether Europe or America should control this 
 Western Continent. Yiewed in this light, the first battle of the 
 iron-clads, in Hampton Roads, becomes one of the most impor 
 tant events in the real history of our age. 
 
 Two main ideas, which will be dwelt upon more at large in 
 subsequent chapters, have shaped the American Navy, and they 
 are the exact opposite of those adopted by the maritime powers 
 of Europe. One is, to diminish the number of guns and increase 
 the weight of the shot, which has been carried put in the arma 
 ment of our wooden ships, almost from the beginning of the 
 Navy. The other, the Monitor idea, is, to reduce the exposed 
 surface of the iron-clad vessel so much, that on this small surface 
 it can carry an impregnable armor, while in the two guns of 
 
INTRODUCTORY. 17 
 
 the armament is concentrated the weight and force of a heavy- 
 broadside ; and the turret, by which the guns can be turned to 
 any point in the horizon, gives in part the advantage of a 
 greater number of cannon. 
 
 The European plan has been to increase the number and 
 penetrating power of comparatively small guns, and enlarge the 
 ship to carry them. The Americans have chosen for the attack 
 the smashing power of the heavy shot, and for the defence a 
 small surface of invulnerable armor. In the battle of Hampton 
 Roads, America sent forth her two national ideas, imperfectly 
 expressed in the original Monitor, to challenge, not only the 
 South, but Europe, to a contest for supremacy on the seas. The 
 event showed that, in the construction and armament of ships, 
 America had been thinking ahead of Europe, had indeed out- 
 thought the world. God was leading this nation to the posi 
 tion of the world s teacher in the application to political and so 
 cial life of those principles upon which the progress of the race 
 depends, and that four hours fight demonstrated that she has 
 the power needed for a great leader among the nations ; and 
 that Europe, so far from checking the progress of our Republic, 
 must herself yield to the force of American thought. 
 
 Those who expect to find in these pages a history similar to 
 those which have recorded the events of previous wars will, of 
 course, be disappointed. The ships, the armaments, the ma 
 noeuvres, the tactics and strategy of former battles have passed 
 away as completely as the catapult and battering-ram, the hel 
 met, and mail, and spear. 
 
 The old sailing ship, around which clusters all the former ro 
 mance of the sea, is now, in battle, only a useless incumbrance, 
 except as a floating battery, to be towed into and out of action. 
 The terrible shell has displaced the solid shot for most of the 
 ordinary operations of a fight. Fortifications that could defy 
 the mightiest squadrons of sailing ships that ever floated, are de 
 molished by steamers without serious injury to themselves ; and 
 narrow channels, where a sailing vessel would be perfectly help 
 less, are easily threaded by steam gunboats, sweeping away all 
 ]and forces that come within reach of their long-range guns. 
 
 It is not a record of sea fights between squadrons or single 
 ships, for few such took place, and none of them were similar to 
 2 
 
18 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 what the world had known ; and yet, beyond all previous wars 
 on the water, this was one of continual battle. In the ordinary 
 course of operations in former warfare, few vessels had more 
 than one battle in a long cruise. Many for months, and many 
 during a whole war, were not engaged in a single fight, roaming 
 the ocean in vain in search of a foe. 
 
 But in this rebellion it was, except with the blockading 
 squadrons, a scene of almost daily and even nightly battle not 
 often with ships, but with forts and earthwork batteries, with 
 ambushed riflemen and field batteries, taken from point to point, 
 on rivers where our steamers were passing, and with torpedoes 
 in the channels and harbors, and torpedo-boats by night. 
 
 It was a war which, with its new machinery and new 
 methods of operation, disproved all former theories, set at naught 
 all calculations of previous experience, and introduced the sailor 
 to new ships, to such cannon as he had never before handled, to 
 places where a war-ship had never floated before, and to such 
 fighting as had never been seen on the deck of a vessel. 
 
 While, therefore, the reader will meet with less of the usual 
 events of a -naval war, there will be found a greater variety of 
 new and stirring incident than has been known in any previous 
 naval conflict ; and the daily perils and labors of our seamen 
 were greater than any to which sailors had been exposed before. 
 They had none of the repose which is obtained by a long cruise, 
 in which the only labor is to sail the ship, but every day 
 brought its new dangers and its exhausting toil. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE NAYY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 THE conception which so many form of a department, as 
 composed of a secretary and his clerks, will convey no adequate 
 idea of the Navy Department. In some of its features it seems 
 more like an independant organization than a mere branch of 
 the General Government. Its relations and responsibilities to 
 the central power are, it is true, the same with those of the 
 other departments, yet it seems further removed than they from 
 general knowledge and observation. Its operations and its 
 wants are not so easily understood, because they are necessarily 
 less known ; and hence, perhaps, except when winning great vic 
 tories, it is apt to be regarded with indifference, and even with 
 suspicion. Its field of action and its whole work are peculiar, 
 and therefore its organization must be peculiar also. It com 
 bines in itself so many branches of knowledge and labor, that it 
 is quite impossible for one man, however great and wise, to be a 
 proficient in them all; and hence, the men who superintend 
 these different branches must hold to the chief, the relation, not 
 of clerks, but rather of cabinet officers. It is clear that the 
 head of such a Department should be a statesman, a constitu 
 tional lawyer, a judge of international law and national obliga 
 tions. He should be thoroughly acquainted with the political 
 movements of the country, and familiar with all its interests, 
 while at the same time he should be a man of sound judgment 
 in general business affairs and should possess executive ability 
 of the highest order. 
 
 But such a man would be very unlikely to know much of 
 many things belonging peculiarly to naval science, a knowledge 
 of which is indispensable to the proper conduct of the Depart 
 ment ; and hence the business which belongs to the naval pro- 
 
20 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 fession is divided into bureaus, the heads of which are skilled in 
 the particular branches committed to their care. 
 
 It was found, moreover, that the amount of business pressing 
 upon each of these bureaus was so great as to completely absorb 
 its head in the management of his own particular department, 
 giving him little time for the consideration of questions of gen 
 eral policy ; and as the Secretary could not be expected to study 
 in person the wants and operations of these bureaus, some 
 method was needed by which these could be arranged and com 
 bined, and presented in a general view for the consideration and 
 decision of the Secretary himself. 
 
 The vast operations of the Department itself during the war 
 were naturally divided into two great branches : one relating to 
 affairs belonging particularly to the Navy, and perhaps more spe 
 cifically to professional matters ; and the other embracing civil 
 transactions and the whole business machinery and operations of 
 the Department. At the head of the first named of these divi 
 sions was placed the Assistant Secretary, who, having been him 
 self an officer of the Navy of long experience and acknowledged 
 skill, was supposed to be a competent judge of whatever belonged 
 to ships, their outfit and armament, and of such plans as might 
 be proposed for increasing the efficiency of the Navy. At the 
 head of the other was one, called simply the Chief Clerk, a name 
 which does not adequately describe the importance of the office, 
 for upon him was laid not merely the superintendence of the 
 clerical force, but the direct management of a large portion of 
 the business operations of the Department. He was really a 
 confidential secretary placed over one branch of the affairs of 
 the Department, while the Assistant Secretary supervised that 
 which belonged specifically to the ships, their outfit, armament, 
 and operations the plans and suggestions of both these offi 
 cers being, of course, submitted to and decided upon by the Sec 
 retary himself. 
 
 Such, during the war, was the general organization and 
 movement of the Department ; but the dividing lines were not 
 always strictly observed, because all were working in harmony 
 and had confidence in each other. Each wrought in his own 
 department, giving aid and counsel elsewhere when needed, and 
 each strengthening as he could the hands of the Secretary. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. . 21 
 
 The ability of a man to direct a government, to command 
 an army, or to control a department, is often shown, more 
 clearly in the selection of his assistants than in the operations 
 in which they subsequently engage. 
 
 The reason of this is apparent. It implies, first, a clear con 
 ception of the nature of his office, and of the plans to be exe 
 cuted ; and then the rare sagacity to judge of the fitness of men 
 for special positions and particular work. The man who pos 
 sesses this power is able, as a general rule, to command success. 
 
 The Secretary of the ISTavy showed himself capable of so or 
 ganizing his Department, that each head of a bureau seemed 
 eminently suited to his place, and all worked harmoniously and 
 skilfully together for the common end. 
 
 The manner in which the Department was conducted affords, 
 however, the most convincing proof of the fitness of its officers 
 for the high positions to which they were called. Their friends 
 may proudly point to their administration of affairs as the best 
 possible evidence of their integrity, their patriotism, and ability. 
 It is idle to pretend that such results could have been reached 
 by men of ordinary capacity, or that the chief of so successful 
 an administration had no special adaptation to the grave duties 
 of his office. The papers which from time to time were ad 
 dressed to Congress direct, or to the various conimittees, present 
 very clearly the comprehensiveness of the views of this depart 
 ment of our Government. 
 
 Yery early in the struggle the real policy of France and 
 England was apparent to the members of the Government ; and 
 so soon as it was fully revealed in the Trent case, the Secretary, 
 as head of the Navy, felt it to be his peculiar duty to warn his 
 countrymen of the danger, and induce them, if possible, to avoid 
 a foreign war by such an exhibition of naval strength as would 
 forbid an attack. 
 
 Congress was urged to consider the fact that a foreign war 
 must be waged almost exclusively upon the ocean ; and that, in 
 view of the settled hostility of England and France, we ought 
 to prepare ourselves to cope with their navies, through which 
 alone they can strike us. It was urged that fear of our power, 
 and especially of our naval strength, must always be our best 
 security against foreign aggression. Competent persons were 
 
22 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ^ 
 
 sent to Europe to examine the dock-yards, machine-shops, and 
 other means and appliances for the construction and mainte 
 nance of the navies of the great powers ; and it was shown how 
 inadequate all our means were for maintaining a great war on 
 the sea, not because of any lack of inventive power, or mechan 
 ical skill, or of suitable material, but because our navy-yards, 
 our dock-yards, our machine-shops, and our founderies were all 
 on a contracted scale, and wholly inadequate to meet the de 
 mands of a great war, and especially a foreign war. The re 
 ports of the Department set in strong light the fact that such 
 vast establishments as the nation requires cannot be extempo 
 rized in an hour of need and peril; and that we should not sup 
 pose that because we could suddenly fit out an effective block 
 ading squadron from our merchant marine, we could also, from 
 the same source, provide ships capable of meeting on equal 
 terms the vessels which France and England have built espe 
 cially for war, with every improvement which modern science 
 can suggest. 
 
 The position of the Department in regard to the question 
 of blockade is set forth in a subsequent chapter devoted to that 
 point. The Secretary saw distinctly, and urged upon the at 
 tention of the Government, the essential point that the rebel 
 lion should be treated as a domestic question, with which 
 foreign powers had no concern; that the insurgents were 
 traitors, to be dealt with according to our own laws, and as 
 entitled to no belligerent rights and no public recognition of 
 any kind, and denying that they were in any sense a govern 
 ment among the nations. 
 
 It will doubtless be interesting to the reader to know some 
 thing of the life of the chief of the ]STavy Department previous 
 to the time when he was called to the head of this important 
 branch of the Government. A few facts on this point have 
 been collected, but the most important part of his life is em 
 braced in his official career, and that is exhibited by his acts as 
 they appear in the pages of this work.* 
 
 * GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, was born in Glastenbury, in the county 
 of Hartford, Conn., July 1, 1802. His parentage was of the primitive Puritan 
 Btock. Thomas Welles, the original emigrant of the family, settled in Hartford as 
 early as 1636. He was the first treasurer of the colony, and subsequently its Gov- 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 23 
 
 Had the policy proposed by the Department been adopted 
 by the Government, and if then England and France had 
 
 ernor. The estate in Glastenbury, where Mr. Welles was born, was purchased of 
 the Indians by Governor Welles in 1640, and has never been alienated from the 
 family, being now the property of his only surviving brother. Mr. Welles was 
 several years at the Episcopal Academy in Cheshire, Conn., and at a later period he 
 was with Captain Partridge, at Norwich University. Subsequently he read law with 
 the late Chief-Justice Williams, and afterward with the Hon. W. W. Ellsworth, since 
 a Judge of the Supreme Court of Connecticut. In January, 1826, he became editor 
 and one of the proprietors of the Hartford Times. Mr. Welles continued to edit 
 that paper until the close of Jackson s administration, and was one of its principal 
 contributors until the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. 
 
 In 1827 he was elected to the Legislature, and was the youngest member of that 
 body. He was repeatedly reflected until 1835, when he was appointed by the Legis 
 lature Comptroller of Public Accounts. 
 
 In the politics, legislative action, and important measures of the State, for more 
 than thirty years, Mr. Welles has borne a distinguished part, and the policy advocated 
 by him has ultimately been successful. 
 
 In 1835 Mr. Welles married Mary Jane Hale, of Lewistown, Pennsylvania, daugh 
 ter of Elias W. Hale, a distinguished lawyer of Central Pennsylvania. 
 
 Upon the election of Judge Niles to the Senate, Mr. Welles was, in 1836, ap 
 pointed postmaster at Hartford, then one of the largest and most important dis 
 tributing offices in the country. He remained in this office until 1841, when he was 
 removed by President Harrison. In 1842 he was elected by the people comptroller, 
 the constitution having been changed, making that office an elective one. His ad 
 ministration of the duties of the comptroller s office the chief financial office of 
 the State was marked by distinguished ability, and gave satisfaction to all parties. 
 
 In 1846 Mr. Polk, unsolicited and very unexpectedly, tendered him the office of 
 chief of one of the naval bureaus, which he retained until the summer of 1849. 
 
 On the adjustment of the financial question, during the administration of Mr. 
 Polk, Mr. Welles considered the mission of the old parties at an end nothing but 
 their organizations and the prejudices and antagonisms engendered by them remain 
 ing. In the mean time, new questions relating to the territorial policy of the Govern 
 ment as connected therewith arising, Mr. Welles, adhering to his original principles, 
 maintained the Jeffcrsonian doctrine that slavery was the creature of local law, 
 and should not be extended into the Territories through the agency or by the 
 instrumentality of the Federal Government. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise, 
 followed by the Kansas aggression, led to new party organizations. The Republican 
 party came into existence, and, sympathizing in this movement, Mr. Welles took an 
 early and active part in it, and was the candidate of that party for Governor in 1856. 
 From the day of its inception Mr. Welles threw his whole power and influence 
 into the Republican movement. He was appointed by the Convention in Philadelphia, 
 in 1856, a member of the Republican National Committee, and was one of its execu 
 tive members then and until after Mr. Lincoln s election. He was also chairman of 
 the Connecticut delegation to the Chicago Convention. On the formation of the Re 
 publican party, the establishment of a paper to sustain the views of that party in 
 Connecticut became necessary, and the Hartford Press, now one of the leading and 
 
24 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 declared as they did both parties equal belligerents, they 
 would have been bound by this concession of belligerent rights 
 
 most influential journals in the State, was commenced, and Mr. Welles was one of its 
 principal contributors. 
 
 When Mr. Lincoln took the Presidential chair, in March, 1861, Mr. Welles was 
 invited to a seat in the Cabinet, as Secretary of the Navy. The breaking out of the 
 rebellion soon made it evident that the post was one of the greatest responsibility. 
 In the language of the annual report of the Secretary, dated December 2, 1861, 
 " the Navy was called upon, at the same time, to prepare for and accomplish a triple 
 task, more arduous, it is believed, in some respects, than has before been demanded 
 of the maritime power of any government." This was 
 
 " 1. The closing of all the insurgent ports along a coast line of nearly three 
 thousand miles, in the form and under the exacting regulations of an international 
 blockade, including the naval occupation and defence of the Potomac River, from its 
 mouth to the Federal capital, as the boundary line between Maryland and Virginia, 
 and also the main commercial avenue to the principal base of our military operations. 
 
 " 2. The organization of combined naval and military expeditions to operate in 
 force against various points of the Southern coast, rendering efficient cooperation 
 with the position and movements of such expeditions when landed, and including 
 also all needful naval aid to the Army in cutting off intercommunication with the 
 rebels, and in its operations on the Mississippi and its tributaries ; and 
 
 " 3. The active pursuit of the piratical cruisers which might escape the vigilance 
 of the blockading force and put to sea from the rebel ports." 
 
 Some idea of the labor necessary effectually to enforce the blockade along a line 
 of coast, subsequently ascertained by official data to be three thousand five hundred 
 and forty-nine statute miles in length, may be formed from the fact that in this coast 
 are one hundred and eighty-nine openings, in one hundred and forty-four of which 
 vessels drawing at least six feet of water can enter. 
 
 The whole management of the Navy, under the administration of Mr. Welles, in 
 dicates successful administrative ability. It has been quiet and unobtrusive, but 
 firm and sagacious. No department of the Government has been more ungenerously 
 assailed, and sometimes from quarters unexpected, and where it might have antici 
 pated support ; but the results have evinced the wisdom and the grasp of the Secretary, 
 who was persistent and resolute under all discouragements, infusing a patriotic and 
 Union sentiment into the service, and animating it with a spirit which has made itself 
 felt in successful conflicts that have added to our naval renown. 
 
 In the performance of official duty, however arduous and important, Mr. Welles 
 always avoided all obtrusiveness and ostentation. He never sought to create a sen 
 sation. Clearness and sobriety of judgment, enlarged and accurate appreciation of 
 the wants of that arm of public defence which he has been called to strengthen 
 and to wield, indefatigable industry and perseverance in labor, and an unshaken 
 firmness of purpose, resulting from patient reflection upon which his conclusions 
 have been formed these are some of the qualities which characterized him as an ad 
 ministrative officer. 
 
 The character of Mr. Welles is better illustrated by the manner in which his 
 department was conducted, as will very clearly be shown in the course of the his 
 tory. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 25 
 
 to us as against themselves and their ships ; while our Govern 
 ment, in all its dealings with the insurgents themselves, would 
 still have been at liberty to treat the insurrection as a domestic 
 question, and the insurgents as guilty of treason. This is true, 
 because England could determine by proclamation only her own 
 relations to us and to them, but had no authority to decide in 
 what manner the rebels should be treated by the Government 
 of the United States. If we, then, chose to blockade the South 
 ern ports, England and France could not complain, because 
 they had proclaimed the rebels to be lawful belligerents. If we 
 had chosen, instead of a blockade, to close our ports, they had no 
 right to interfere with a question which we declared a domestic 
 one, with which other nations could have no concern. Had 
 these principles been clearly stated and firmly held in the be 
 ginning, the Government asserting its own unlimited sover 
 eignty over the rebels, exercising as against England and her 
 ships the belligerent rights she conceded to us, and dealing with 
 the rebels as a sovereign with subjects in revolt and guilty of 
 treason, then, at the close of the war, no one could have dis 
 puted that the insurgents were simply captured traitors, who 
 had forfeited every civil and political right, and the question 
 of their being readmitted to their former position and privileges 
 when they laid down their arms could never have been raised. 
 
 On the other hand, had the Government boldly stated and 
 firmly held the doctrine which was really implied in the man 
 ner of establishing the blockade, though not asserted, that the 
 Confederates had established a government and must be treated 
 according to international law, and as belligerents, which idea 
 was acted upon in establishing a system of exchanges of prison 
 ers, then their allegiance with the United States was really 
 severed, and at the close of the war they had only the rights of 
 conquered enemies, with no shadow of a claim to be admitted 
 to any share in the Government. 
 
 The influence of the Navy Department upon another impor 
 tant feature of national policy may be properly mentioned here. 
 It is not generally known that the very first blow struck by the 
 Government at the system of slavery came from the Navy De 
 partment. The very first step in the right direction was taken 
 by Secretary Welles. In this respect, the Navy was in advance 
 
26 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of every other department of the Government ; it was the true 
 pioneer in that policy which deprived the rebels of their 
 strength, and resulted in universal emancipation. The decks 
 of our ships were the places where first of all the manhood of 
 the slave was recognized, where first he felt himself protected 
 by the American flag. If nothing else had been done by the 
 Navy during the war, it should still be endeared to every true 
 patriot, to every true friend of Christian freedom, because, in ad 
 vance of all other movements, it struck the fetter from the slave 
 by authority of one of the departments of the Government. 
 
 Long before the Fugitive-Slave Law had been repealed, and 
 while the officers of the Army were returning to their masters 
 the slaves who were ready and anxious to fight our battles, as 
 well as to secure their own freedom, the deck of the national 
 ship furnished to them a secure asylum a spot not subjected 
 to the search of the master, and from which the fugitive could 
 not be forced away. 
 
 The Department took at first the bold and true position that 
 the Government, as such, knew nothing of slaves that it rec 
 ognized men only ; and that if a loyal man, from a rebel State, 
 came on board our ships, whether black or white, he was to 
 receive protection, and in no case was he to be returned to his 
 master. Nor did the measures of the Department cease with 
 bare protection. It was seen that the slaves were an element 
 of strength which should not only be subtracted from the rebels, 
 but that it should be added to our own power, and thus the 
 cause of the rebellion would receive a double detriment. The 
 Secretary, therefore, in advance of all movements, even in Con 
 gress, and as early as July 22, 1861, issued the following order, 
 occasioned by the letters which are here presented : 
 
 IT. S. STEAMER MINNESOTA, HAMPTON ROADS, July 18, 1861. 
 HON. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy : 
 
 SIR: I have the honor to enclose to the Department copies of 
 reports, July 15 and 17, of Commander 0. S. Glisson, of the Mount 
 Vernon, with a request by him to me that I shall instruct him what to 
 do with the negroes on board his vessel, and with others that may come. 
 
 If negroes are to be used in this contest, I have no hesitation in 
 saying they should be used to preserve the Government, not to destrov it. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 27 
 
 These men are destitute. Shall I ration them ? They may be ser 
 viceable on board our storeship. 
 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. H. STRINGHAM, 
 Flag-Officer, Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER MOUNT VERNON, RAPPAHAXNOCK, July 15, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I have to report that this morning at daylight we observed a 
 boat adrift near Stingaree light-house. We manned a boat, armed her, 
 and sent her with an officer to pick up the boat, and to ascertain who 
 was in the light-house. 
 
 At 8 h. 30 m. the boat returned, bringing with her six negroes who 
 had deserted from the shore during the night, and taken shelter in the 
 light-house, casting their boat adrift to avoid detection. 
 
 They appear to be very much frightened, and state that the people 
 on shore are about arming the negroes, with the intention of placing 
 them in the front of battle. Their taking this course has caused much 
 excitement amongst the negro population, who are deserting in every 
 direction. Two other boats made their escape last night, with hope of 
 being picked up by some vessel passing in the bay. 
 
 I have rationed these negroes on board of this vessel, until I receive 
 orders from you as to their disposal. Enclosed I forward you a list of 
 these slaves, together with a list of the names of their owners. 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 O. S. GLISSON, Commander U. S. Navy. 
 To Flag- Officer SILAS H. STRINGHAM, 
 
 Commanding the Atlantic Blockading Squadron, etc., etc. 
 
 U. S. STEADIER Morxi VERNON-, RAPPAHANNOCK, July 17, 1861. 
 SIR : I have to report that three more slaves, named respectively 
 Lewis Ransom, Robert Brooks, and Albert Hutchings, belonging to 
 John H. Dunlavey, of Matthews County, Virginia, gave themselves up 
 this morning. 
 
 "Will you please inform me how I shall dispose of these men, and 
 how I shall act in future when they come on board ? They say that, if 
 they should be returned, they would be murdered. 
 
 We are all well on board, and every thing is quiet off the Rappa- 
 hannock. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 O. S. GLISSON, Commander U. S. Navy. 
 To Flag-Officer SILAS H. STRINGHAM, 
 
 Commanding the Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
28 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, July 22, 1861. 
 
 SIB : Your dispatch No. 70, in relation to certain negroes who have 
 fled from Virginia and are on board the Mount Yernon asking what 
 disposition shall be made of them is received. 
 
 It is not the policy of the Government to invite or encourage this 
 class of desertions ; and yet, under the circumstances, no other course 
 than that pursued by Commander Glisson could be adopted without 
 violating every principle of humanity. To return them would be im 
 politic as well as cruel ; and, as you remark, " they may be made ser 
 viceable on board our storeship," you will do well to employ them. 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flay- Officer S. H. STRINGHAM, 
 
 Commanding Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 
 Hampton Roads, Va. 
 
 For this order the Secretary will not fail to receive from 
 every friend of freedom and from every true patriot the honor 
 due. It not only commands a right thing to be done, but it 
 asserts a motive worthy both of the statesman and the Christian. 
 To return them, he says, would be contrary to every principle 
 of humanity; a right noble assertion. The deck of an Ameri 
 can ship shall not become at the demand of a slave-master, a 
 spot where every principle of humanity shall be violated, in de 
 livering up the fugitive. The American sailor and the flag 
 shall not thus be disgraced. 
 
 And the Secretary further states that it would be impolitic 
 as well as cruel, to return these men to slavery. Thus early 
 he adopted the only statesmanlike policy of conducting the 
 war on the true principles of war. He never adopted himself, 
 nor sanctioned for others, the well-nigh fatal course of regarding 
 the conspirators as friends who had forfeited no rights, and 
 who must not be weakened or distressed by using or destroying 
 their property, or by freeing and employing their slaves. 
 
 Nor does this course subject him to any proper charge of 
 violating the laws of the Constitution, because the Fugitive- 
 Slave Law was not then repealed. 
 
 He saw from the beginning, what was afterward admitted 
 by all but rebels and their friends that the traitors had for 
 feited all rights by their act of war, and had, therefore, lost 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 29 
 
 whatever title they claimed before the war to control the ser 
 vices of a loyal man. The following order, dated September 
 25, 1861, will show how early the Department settled another 
 important question ; and all can now see that if it had been 
 treated firmly and steadily in the same manner, at the same 
 time, in the Army, the war would have been finished far sooner 
 than it actually was : 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, September 25, 1861. 
 
 SIR : The Department finds it necessary to adopt a regulation with 
 respect to the large and increasing number of persons of color, common 
 ly known as " contrabands," now subsisted at the navy-yards and on 
 board ships-of-war. 
 
 These can neither be expelled from the service, to which they have 
 resorted, nor can they be maintained unemployed, and it is not proper 
 that they should be compelled to render necessary and regular services, 
 without a stated compensation. You are therefore authorized, when 
 their services can be made useful, to enlist them for the naval service, 
 under the same forms and regulations as apply to other enlistments. 
 They will be allowed, however, no higher rating than "boys," at a com 
 pensation of ten dollars per month and one ration per day. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flay- Officer S. F. DuPoNT, 
 
 Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, and others. 
 
 This settled, so far as the Navy Department was concerned, 
 a policy which was not finally determined upon in the Army and 
 by Congress until 1863. The following letter, dated July 2, 
 1862, will show that the enlistment of negroes in the Navy was 
 carried on precisely as it was for others, and from the early part 
 of the war the true policy was adopted and steadily pursued : 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, July 2, 1862. 
 
 SIR: Among the persons known as "contrabands," who have sought 
 the protection of the United States, please ascertain if there are any men 
 physically competent to enlist in the Navy for service in the Pacific, at 
 landsmen s wages. 
 
 If so, a vessel will be sent to take one hundred and fifty of them 
 to the Isthmus. About the same number could be used advantageously 
 
30 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 in the vessels now fitting for sea, as shipping does not keep pace with 
 the naval wants. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag- Officer S. F. Du PONT, 
 
 Commanding S. A. B. Squadron, Port JRoyal, S. C. 
 
 In giving what is considered to be this just praise to the 
 Department, it is not forgotten that occasional and fitful efforts 
 were early made by some of the officers of the Army to establish 
 a similar policy, nor that Secretary Cameron recommended the 
 employment of the slaves ; but the policy for the Army was not 
 established, and, on the contrary, the main influence of that de 
 partment, in the first years of the war, was thrown in the oppo 
 site direction ; and the orders of leading generals, such as Hal- 
 leek, McClellan, Sherman, Hooker, and even the modifications 
 by the President of Secretary Cameron s report, all prove that 
 no cherishing, welcoming influence was extended by the Army, 
 as a whole, to the slave until his services became a military ne 
 cessity. 
 
 In the Navy, on the other hand, he was from the very first 
 kindly received, protected, and employed for wages ; and almost 
 from the first, the colored able-bodied loyal men were freely en 
 listed without any regard to what their previous condition had 
 been. The Navy really inaugurated the policy of emancipation, 
 which, when afterward made general, was the means of saving 
 the country. 
 
 Surrounded as the Government was by traitors on every 
 side in the beginning of the war, in every department, and in 
 every field of its operations, it was impossible to ferret them all 
 out, and rid the service of their dangerous and corrupting pres 
 ence ; but the intense hostility of the Secretary to every form of 
 disloyalty made him ever watchful to discover and prompt to 
 punish or reprove the least unfaithfulness which endangered our 
 cause. 
 
 The Department was not disposed to tolerate even apathy. 
 It especially and justly demanded, that every officer in the ser 
 vice of the Government should devote his best talents to his 
 country s interest ; and sometimes, as in the case mentioned in 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 31 
 
 one of the letters here quoted, it was willing to risk a possible 
 injustice rather than to peril the national cause. The result of 
 this vigilance was, that the Navy was very thoroughly purged of 
 the disloyal element, and very few remained whose hearts were 
 not in the work. The apathetic, the inefficient, the hesitating, 
 delaying ones were removed as fast and far as it was possible to 
 do it ; and no more unjust charge was ever made than that of 
 inactivity and inefficiency which some brought against the Navy. 
 The country during the war knew little of the labors, and perils, 
 and hardships of our seamen. The following letters will show 
 how anxiously the condition of the Navy was watched : 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 NAVY DEPART3IENT, Auffust &4, 1861. 
 
 SIR : There are complaints and rumors of unfaithful and disloyal offi 
 cers in the squadron under your command. Many, and it is to be hoped 
 most, of these complaints are without substantial foundation ; but it is 
 undeniable that the Navy has been sadly demoralized, and it is appre 
 hended there may be some tainted with infidelity to the Government 
 they profess to serve. Justice to the true and patriotic officers who are 
 nobly vindicating their own honor and that of the Navy in these days of 
 peril, as well as the first obligation which all owe to the Government 
 and the country, require the arrest and prompt dismissal of every officer 
 tainted with disloyal sentiments. 
 
 You will, therefore, be vigilant to scrutinize and detect any symp 
 toms of treason or infidelity, tempering decision with moderation, and 
 exercising a nice and calm discretion, avoiding giving offence that shall 
 touch the sensibilities of a faithful officer on points where he is most 
 sensitive. In these matters all of us have thankless but necessary duties 
 to perform. 
 
 I send herewith a copy of a letter received at the Department from 
 a gentleman of the first respectability. You will endeavor to investigate 
 the facts communicated, and if satisfied they are authentic, take imme 
 diate means to have the matter corrected. 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flay- Officer WM. MERVINE, 
 
 Commanding Gulf Blockading Squadron, 
 
 Key West, Florida. 
 
32 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, November 25, 1861. 
 
 SIR : Since the efficiency of the blockade depends ia a great measure 
 upon the professional skill of each individual commander, the Department 
 enjoins upon the flag-officers a vigilant supervision of the movements of 
 each vessel under their command. A large number of most efficient steam 
 ers are being pressed to completion, and the Department desires to assign 
 these, as far as the public service will admit, to those officers who have 
 performed at sea most faithfully the duties of the blockade. You will, 
 therefore, keep the Department advised of the relative merit of each and 
 every commander attached to your squadron, and take care that no case 
 of individual merit, or the reverse, occurs without a full investigation 
 and report to the Department. The Department also desires a particular 
 report relative to the officers formerly in the Navy and now serving un 
 der acting appointments, and those now attached to sea-going vessels 
 who are on the retired list. As full authority is given to the flag-officers 
 to send home the inefficient and apathetic, and make any changes in the 
 commanding officers that the public service demands, the Government 
 will hold them responsible for the efficiency of each single ship. Kank 
 has its merits, but no consideration will be given to it unless accompa 
 nied with earnest devotion to the suppression of this rebellion, and pro 
 fessional fidelity to the duties imposed. 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag- Officer S. F. Du PONT, 
 
 Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 
 
 Port Royal, S. C., and other flag-officers. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 30, 1862. 
 
 SIR : The Department addressed to you a letter, dated 23d ultimo, 
 the closing paragraph of which required a reply, rather than a simple 
 acknowledgment of its receipt. At a period like this, surrounded as 
 the Government has been by traitors and lukewarm supporters, it is the 
 duty of the Department to require of all its officers an acknowledgment 
 of their intentions, without equivocation or evasion. If you are on the 
 side of the Government in this unholy rebellion, you should have no hes 
 itation in writing the fact. If otherwise, you should vacate your com 
 mission at once. You will also explain the meaning of the sentence in 
 your letter to Captain Gardner, wherein you state your willingness to 
 abide by the oath while you remain in the service. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 
OEGANIZATION OF THE XAVY DEPARTMENT. 33 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, October 2, 1861. 
 
 SIR : * * * * At a time like this, the Department must insist 
 on its right and duty to make such selections as it deems will best pro 
 mote the public welfare, without regard to personal pretensions ; and 
 while it would treat with all tenderness and kindness every officer, and 
 especially veterans like yourself, it cannot permit individual considera 
 tions to influence and control its action. 
 
 That " the best energies of your mind and body have been assidu 
 ously and laboriously devoted to carrying out the instructions of the 
 Government " may be admitted without the formality of a court ; but all 
 men are not alike constituted, and other and different qualities, mental 
 or physical, than yours may be deemed requisite at this period, with 
 out the implication of crime or fault on your part. In selecting you to 
 command the no partiality was exercised, nor has any prejudice in 
 duced a change. Only the true and best interests of the country have 
 been consulted in what has been done, and the Department must judge 
 of men as well as means best adapted to carry into effect its views. 
 
 Neither the time nor the service in this crisis can be wasted in 
 courts of inquiry or courts-martial, growing out of the substitution of 
 one officer for another for any duty. Mere forms and rank cannot be 
 permitted to control efficient and necessary action in an emergency like 
 this, nor can officers be withdrawn from duty unless for reasons of great 
 public necessity. As no such necessity exists in consequence of substi 
 tuting one officer for another as , I must decline ordering a court of 
 
 inquiry or a court-martial in your case. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 
 So great was the peril of the country, in the Secretary s opin 
 ion, from disloyal officers, that the measures he felt compelled 
 to adopt to protect the interests of the Union, were thought by 
 some to be needless and unjust. But the life of the nation was 
 at stake, and it was thought better, even if temporary injustice 
 should be done to some, that at all hazards that life should be 
 guarded against treason. 
 
 At the breaking out of the rebellion, many officers from the 
 Southern States were on foreign stations, whose sentiments were 
 unknown, and in regard to whom, considering the example of 
 so many nearer home, there was much to fear. It could not be 
 doubted that they would be urged by every possible influence 
 3 
 
34: H1STOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 to unite with their States against the General Government ; and 
 should they do so, the national ships under their command could 
 be easily taken into Southern ports, and thus the traitors would 
 at once be supplied with a navy. 
 
 The Secretary took the precautionary measure of relieving 
 such officers from command, even when there was no special 
 reason to doubt their loyalty ; and thus the Navy was secured 
 against a possible peril. In some cases it w^as found that no 
 cause existed for such removals ; and then a prompt explanation 
 and the proper amend were made, and ample justice was done. 
 The following is one of the letters in regard to such cases, and 
 will serve to explain the Secretary s course : 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, October 14, 1861. 
 
 SIR : Your letter of July 10th, written before you were aware that the 
 Department had relieved you of your command, as well as subsequent 
 dispatches, and your personal report on Saturday last, the clay of your 
 return, have impressed me most favorably in regard to your loyalty and 
 patriotism as an officer, and your high sense of duty and honor as a man. 
 
 Among the most painful and trying duties that have devolved upon 
 me in administering the affairs of this Department, has been that of de 
 ciding what course of policy to pursue toward officers from the regions 
 that are in insurrection who were intrusted with positions of responsibil 
 ity on distant stations. Not knowing their opinions and feelings on 
 questions involving the integrity of the Union and the existence of the 
 Government, unable to ascertain them, except indirectly, and by infer 
 ence and conclusions drawn from their associations and other circum 
 stances, neither satisfactory nor reliable, I was compelled to act in some 
 instances with apparent harshness, and with a severity I did not feel tow 
 ard gentlemen sensitive as regarded their honor and professional obli 
 gations. Such was my action in sending an officer to relieve you against 
 whom there was not an imputation, and of whom I knew nothing derog 
 atory as an officer or a man. Others from the same section, who, until 
 the culmination of the conspiracy, had served long and apparently with 
 fidelity, and whom, until their disloyalty was disclosed, I had no reason 
 to distrust, assumed that their obligations to their State or section were 
 paramount to their allegiance to the country. Some who had been most 
 trusted had proved most faithless. Without any means in my posses 
 sion to discriminate between the faithful and the faithless, I was com 
 pelled to act, and in doing so I have done yourself and others injustice. 
 It was an unavoidable necessity, and it gives me pleasure, I assure you, 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 35 
 
 to atone so far as I can now, personally and officially, for tlie wrong in 
 flicted, by expressing to you, as I do most earnestly, my profound regret 
 that I had no means of knowing your sentiments as I now know them, 
 and to say, as I do in all sincerity, that had I known them in season, you 
 would not have been detached from your command. 
 
 Your letter the promptings of a generous mind satisfies me that 
 you have a right appreciation of my motives, and of the overruling ne 
 cessity by which I was compelled to act. 
 
 Wishing you every success, and hoping the Government will have an 
 opportunity of availing itself of your active services, 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 
 The standing charge which, without fail, comes from some 
 quarter against every administration and every department, is 
 extravagance and carelessness in the use of the public funds. 
 It would have been an unheard-of thing if no one had brought 
 such an accusation against the Secretary of the Navy. The 
 manner in which the Department first undertook to provide 
 itself with ships for a blockading squaolron is described in 
 another chapter. The purchase was committed, first of all, to 
 officers of the Navy, assisted by business men. The spirit and 
 intention of the Department are w r ell set forth in the following 
 letter, addressed to all the officers who had this business in 
 charge. Investigations made by those who, from personal feel 
 ings, endeavored to show mismanagement in the Navy, failed 
 to disclose any thing in the operations of the Department at 
 variance with the tone and policy of this letter of instructions. 
 Abuses of confidence, perhaps, can be shown, for all men are not 
 strictly upright ; but evidently the Secretary did what he could 
 to guard the public interests : 
 
 NAVY DEPAHTMENT, September 20, 1861. 
 
 SIR : Under the present exigencies of the service, the large pur 
 chases and repairs of vessels, and other expenditures, great power is del 
 egated to you, and with it great responsibility. In exercising the au 
 thority with which you are necessarily invested, and especially in all 
 that involves the expenditure of money, I feel it a duty to urge upon 
 you a strict regard to economy. 
 
 Let me also urge upon you the importance of promptness in prepar- 
 
36 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ing and equipping the vessels, and that you devote your whole time and 
 attention to the completion and discharge of the duties with which you 
 are intrusted. We are in the midst of a formidable rebellion, and every 
 man is required to use his best efforts in behalf of his country. 
 
 Promptitude, vigilance, and economy are urged upon you. Scruti 
 nize closely all bills that you approve, for you will be held to a close 
 accountability, not only for dispatch, but for expenditures. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS IN EEGAED TO THE BLOCKADE, URGING "WATCHFULNESS, AC 
 TIVITY, AND THE FIEM ASSERTION OF OUE EIGHTS. 
 
 It was thought by some, during the war, to be a proof of 
 remissness or incompetency in the management of the iN"avy, 
 that so many vessels were enabled to run the blockade ; and it 
 was believed that those whose success w r as known, were only a 
 part of a much larger number equally successful, of which the 
 public knew nothing. Two facts were overlooked : first, the 
 extreme difficulty of maintaining an efficient blockade along a 
 coast-line three thousand five hundred miles long, and this coast, 
 by its bays and sounds, presenting a double front to be guarded 
 for a large part of the entire distance, so that the wonder was 
 that any thing could be kept out, rather than that some escaped 
 the vigilance of our cruisers ; and second, it was the interest of 
 the rebels to publish every instance of success, so as to encour 
 age others, and show the inefficiency of the blockade, and induce 
 foreign powers to disregard it, if possible. The activity and 
 success of the blockading squadron is now clearly proved by the 
 great and acknowledged destitution throughout the South, and 
 by the significant fact that at the close of the war the cotton 
 which still remained in the South, and which could not be 
 shipped because of the stringency of the blockade, was worth in 
 currency $400,000,000, or in gold $300,000,000, which amount 
 came in various forms to the relief of the nation. The follow 
 ing letters will show the spirit of the Department, the principles 
 upon which the blockade was conducted, and especially the 
 firmness with which American rights were insisted upon in the 
 case of the French tobacco at Eichmond, when the State De 
 partment seemed inclined to grant the right of shipment : 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 37 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 10, 1862. 
 
 SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the reference to this Depart 
 ment of your letter of the 2d instant, addressed to the honorable Secretary 
 of War, communicating the request of M. Mercier, the minister of France, 
 for a permit for an agent to visit Richmond for the purpose of having 
 some tobacco, the property of French subjects, delivered into the hands 
 of the French consul there. The Secretary of War also furnishes me 
 with a copy of his letter to you, in which he considers the question in 
 volved as one affecting the blockade. 
 
 The "request" of M. Mercier, which you mention as being trans 
 mitted with your letter, did not accompany it, and the Department is 
 not therefore informed whether any step further than the mere delivery 
 of the tobacco into the hands of the consul is contemplated. If not, I 
 think the question of a permit is not a matter pertaining to the Navy 
 Department. 
 
 Under no circumstances, however, can the tobacco be permitted to 
 be exported during the existing blockade of Virginia. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Hon. WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, September 25, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have received your letter of the 24th instant, reporting the 
 proceedings of the flotilla, and in reference to trade with the Virginia 
 shore. 
 
 You will allow no vessel to import or export merchandise at any 
 port of the blockaded country. Alexandria is the only port open for 
 general traffic within the limits of your command. 
 
 You will not regard what are called " permits " from any officer ex 
 cept the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, or Navy, as authorizing the 
 ingress or egress of any vessel in violation of the blockade. 
 
 There must be no favoritism or license given to any one or more 
 of our countrymen to traffic within the blockaded region, or to import 
 or export merchandise. That would be justly considered as evasive of 
 the blockade, and in bad faith. 
 
 No officer of the Army or Navy is authorized to grant permits, and 
 you will seize all vessels engaged in illegal traffic. 
 
 Such vessels as, under the authority of the War or Navy Depart 
 ment, may be engaged to carry supplies to the Army or Navy, will take 
 no return cargo from the territory blockaded. The blockade is intended 
 
38 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 to interdict all trade whatever with the country blockaded, during its 
 continuance, and should be rigidly enforced. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Commodore A. A. HARWOOD, 
 
 Commanding Potomac Flotilla, etc., Washington, D. C. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 29, 1862. 
 
 SIR : Yours, No. 85, bearing date the 18th instant, inquiring of the 
 Department whether it is expedient to seize ships that are from Liver 
 pool, bound to Nassau, or from one British port to another, has been re 
 ceived. 
 
 In reply, the Department directs that yon visit, without regard to 
 their clearance or destination, all vessels not being public armed ships- 
 of-war of foreign powers, and that in the case of all vessels carrying cargo 
 or engaged in commerce, and not being regular mail steam-packets en 
 gaged in the regular and stated mail service of foreign governments, you 
 will, during the visit, exercise the unquestioned belligerent right of 
 search; and if upon strict search it shall appear that arms or contraband 
 of war constitute the cargo or such part thereof as would render aid to 
 the enemy, then you will exercise the no less unquestioned belligerent 
 right of seizing such cargo and vessel and sending in the same for adju 
 dication. 
 
 This being an ungracious task, it should be done in a spirit and 
 manner not offensive. Judgment and discretion must be exercised. To 
 seize does not necessarily involve condemnation ; the courts will adjudge 
 the whole question of prize or no prize. The more specitic and detailed 
 instructions, recently transmitted, will guide the officers in their duty. 
 
 The Department has made it a special object to obtain, and commu 
 nicate to the commanding officers of the squadrons enforcing the block 
 ade, information in regard to vessels which were preparing or believed 
 to be preparing to give aid to the insurgents. The information derived 
 in various ways may not always be authentic, and is of such a character 
 as should not be communicated to the captured parties. It is a mere 
 indication to our own officers to guide and assist them in their duties. 
 A search will corroborate and confirm the intelligence, if correct ; and 
 without a search that shall furnish reason to believe the vessel has con 
 traband of war, or is designed to violate the blockade, or in some way 
 aid the insurgents, she should not be seized. 
 
 I am thus particular on this point, because it has been intimated 
 that some officers construed the indication that is given them of a sus- 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 39 
 
 pected vessel, into an order for her seizure without a search. Others 
 appear not to have informed themselves of the belligerent right of 
 search, and, by a culpable omission of its enforcement, have permitted 
 vessels which it was their duty to have seized, to pass unmolested. 
 
 It is to avoid a repetition of these errors that this communication is 
 made in detail. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Commodore JAMES L. LARDNER, 
 
 Commanding East Gulf Blockading Squadron, 
 
 Key West, Florida. 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, September 3, 1861. 
 
 SIR : The condition of public affairs is such, that the country de 
 mands that the best men in the service should be called upon to command 
 her navies and armies. In the efforts of the Government to suppress 
 the causeless conspiracy that has been organized against it, high and re 
 sponsible duties devolve on the Navy, and especially on the squadron in 
 the Gulf. It is absolutely essential that the interdiction of commerce 
 with the insurgents should be rigidly enforced; and to that end the best 
 talents in the service are required at every point on the extended coast 
 guarded by our squadrons. The energy and promptitude displayed by 
 yourself on various occasions have impressed the Department with the 
 conviction that the country will be benefited by assigning you to a more 
 responsible position, and I have therefore intrusted to you the command 
 of the squadron in the Gulf. From the orders and instructions hereto 
 fore issued to your predecessor, and which he will transfer to you, the 
 general views and policy of the Department and the Government will 
 be obtained. But much, after all, must be committed to the judgment 
 and discretion of the flag-officer, who will make his own decisions and 
 act on his own responsibility, without waiting orders or receiving specific 
 instructions from the Department, in the emergencies that must necessa 
 rily arise. It is because I have confidence in your judgment, as well as 
 in your energy and force of character, that I have called you to this im 
 portant command. 
 
 You have a difficult duty to perform, but this you will meet with 
 alacrity, and I feel assured will surmount, to your own and the country s 
 satisfaction. 
 
 To lock up the outlets of the great central valley of the continent, so 
 that her products in that portion of the insurgent States shall not reach 
 
40 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the ocean, and so that the craving wants of her population for the prod 
 ucts of other lands shall not be supplied while their hands are raised 
 against the Government, will demand your special attention. 
 
 I need not enlarge upon its importance, and of the embarrassments 
 you will experience in closing the passes and numerous bayous and inlets 
 along the whole coast. These difficulties will present themselves to you ; 
 and on the resources of your own mind, with such assistance as the De 
 partment can send you, must you rely to remove them. Such informa 
 tion as we receive will be forwarded to you from time to time by the 
 first opportunity. 
 
 Some important suggestions in relation to closing the Mississippi by 
 fortifications as well as by vessels have been made, and will demand your 
 earnest and immediate attention. The batteries on Ship Island and at 
 other important points have perhaps become formidable, and may require 
 additional force to demolish or capture them. 
 
 But on these, and indeed all other questions, we shall rely on your 
 capacity, sound discretion, judgment, and decision. In these I have 
 great confidence, as well as in the rightfulness of our cause. 
 
 There are in our Navy ability and power which, if drawn out and 
 given scope, will do honor to the service and the country. The ambition 
 and energies of these men must not be repressed by mere forms ; and 
 times and exigencies like these will develop character and efficiency. 
 Such materials you will have opportunity to encourage and promote, and 
 I commend them to your consideration. 
 
 Report frequently and fully to the Department. Wishing you every 
 success, and in the belief that you will attain it, 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag-Officer W. W. McKsAN, 
 
 Commanding G-ulf Blockading Squadron, Key West, Fla. 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, September 18, 1861. 
 
 SIR : The conspiracy against the Government and the Union is of 
 so formidable a character, and has been so long persisted in, that more 
 vigorous and energetic action must be taken for its suppression. It is 
 essentially necessary that the Navy should at this time put forth all its 
 strength, and demonstrate to the country and to foreign powers its use 
 fulness and capability in protecting and supporting the Government and 
 the Union. There must be no commercial intercourse with the ports 
 that are in insurrection ; and our Navy must, by its power, energy, and 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 41 
 
 activity, enforce the views of the President and the Government on this 
 subject. Privateers to depredate on our commerce, and rob our country 
 men pursuing their peaceful avocations, must not be permitted. As an 
 important part of our operations, there are also to be demonstrations at 
 points upon the coast that will hereafter be indicated, in the prosecuti.on 
 of the policy adopted to quell the insurrection. 
 
 So far as is practicable, in the time and with the means and material 
 that could be made available, the Department has provided the vessels 
 and the force requisite to cany into effect the policy of the Government; 
 and on the ability of our naval officers, and their proper selection for 
 and adaptation to the duties committed to them, depend the faithful and 
 successful execution of the great work of enforcing national supremacy, 
 and maintaining our laws and our rights on our extended maritime fron 
 tier. In view of the great responsibility that devolves on our flag- 
 officers in this emergency, the necessity of constant supervision and at 
 tention, and the important movements projected, it is advisable there 
 should be a subdivision of the squadron on the Atlantic coast It is 
 also indispensable that the Department should avail itself of the best 
 talents in the service, and no Navy in the world has better, provided an 
 opportunity is afforded for its development. Rank has its merits and 
 claims, is always to be respected, and in peaceable times may be recog 
 nized and regarded ; but when difficulties like the present are impending, 
 the Department cannot permit its action to be restricted, and the welfare 
 of the country endangered, by this consideration merely. 
 
 I have made these general preliminary observations that you may be 
 possessed of the policy of the Department and the Government in carry 
 ing forward hostilities to the final consummation of the great work be 
 fore us. 
 
 The division of the Atlantic Squadron would probably have involved 
 the retirement of Flag-Officer Stringham ; but that gentleman having 
 tendered his resignation in advance of the consummation of the pro 
 posed arrangement, you will proceed forthwith to relieve him, and carry 
 into effect the orders which he will deliver to you. 
 
 Your ultimate command will embrace the waters of North Carolina 
 and Virginia, exclusive of the Potomac ; but until the arrival of Captain 
 Du Pont, who has been designated for the Southern division, you will 
 assume the command and direct the movements of the entire squadron 
 to Cape Florida. 
 
 It is the especial wish of the Department that the preparations made 
 at no inconsiderable labor and expense for the obstruction of the inlets 
 on the North Carolina coast, neglected since the capture of Ilatteras, 
 which was but a part of the original expedition, should be executed with 
 
42 IIISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 as little delay as possible. In the instructions of the 3d September, 
 directions are given not to sink vessels in Ocracoke Inlet ; but, on further 
 advisement, it is deemed necessary that it should be done on the inner 
 bulkhead. 
 
 Leaves of absence to the officers arriving at Hampton Roads cannot 
 be granted except in cases of sickness. 
 
 Whatever force you consider necessary to prevent the egress of the 
 armed steamers of the rebels from James River, you can keep in Hamp 
 ton Roads ; but you will notify General Wool that blockading is your 
 principal duty, and you will govern yourself accordingly. 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH, 
 
 Appointed to command Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 
 
 Hampton Roads, Va. 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 NAYT DEPARTMENT, October 12, 1861. 
 
 SIR : In order to suppress the present insurrection, and maintain 
 our Union and nationality, the Government cannot delay vigorous and 
 effective measures upon our Southern coast. By the proclamation of the 
 President on the 19th of April, a blockade has been declared, and com 
 mercial intercourse with the region of country that is in insurrection 
 interdicted. In order to carry into effect the measures of the Govern 
 ment, which are persistently sought to be evaded, and to extinguish the 
 rebellion, it is necessary to take possession of certain important points 
 upon our Southern coast where our squadrons may find shelter and have 
 a depot, and from which the loyal citizens of these quarters may be pro 
 tected. 
 
 In examining the various points upon the coast, it has been ascer 
 tained that Bull s Bay, St. Helena, Port Royal, and Fernandina, are each 
 and all accessible and desirable points for the purposes indicated, and 
 the Government has decided to take possession of at least two of them. 
 Wliich of the two shall be thus occupied will be committed to your dis 
 cretion after obtaining the best information you can in regard to them. 
 Much must necessarily be left to the combined wisdom and judgment of 
 yourself and the general in command, after you shall have obtained the 
 facts and details. 
 
 The long and elaborate investigation which you have given the sub 
 ject during the summer and fall as a member of the Board selected for 
 that especial object, enables you, with the free communication you have 
 had with the Department, to bring to the subject a very thorough 
 knowledge of the whole details and purposes of the Government. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 43 
 
 The men and means embarked in this expedition are of such magni 
 tude, that the country has reason to expect therefrom great and gratify 
 ing results. It is believed that no more effective blows can be inflicted 
 upon those who are engaged in this causeless and unnatural rebellion 
 than by naval expeditions and demonstrations on the coast. 
 
 Great power is necessarily intrusted to you, and with it great confi 
 dence in your discretion, courage, and ability to guide and direct the 
 energies of the brave and loyal men who gladly peril their lives under 
 your lead to vindicate the nationality of the flag, sustain the integrity 
 of the Union, maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and enforce 
 the execution of the laws. On your well-directed efforts and those of 
 your associates will depend in a great degree the speedy and successful 
 termination of this unhappy contest. 
 
 It is proper that I should enjoin upon you to improve every favorable 
 opportunity to cultivate friendly feelings with the people, and induce 
 them to return to their duty and their allegiance. Impress upon them 
 the desire of the Government and their fellow-citizens for a return of 
 those peaceful relations which once existed, and which ought never to 
 have been interrupted. Your acts and words, on all occasions, you will 
 make correspond with these declarations. 
 
 The military force, which, under the direction of the Secretary of 
 War, accompanies the naval expedition, will cooperate with you for the 
 purpose of taking possession and holding, as stated, at least two of the 
 places that have been enumerated, and, in concert with you, taking other 
 measures for maintaining the national authority and enforcing the execu 
 tion of the laws. 
 
 By a recent order of the President, a copy of which has been for 
 warded to you, flag-officers rank as major-generals; but no officer of 
 the Army or Navy, whatever may be his rank, can assume any direct 
 command, independent of consent, over an officer of the other service, 
 excepting only when land forces are expressly embarked in vessels-of- 
 war to do the duty of marines. 
 
 The President expects and requires, however, the most cordial and 
 effectual cooperation between the officers of the two services, in taking 
 possession of and holding the posts and positions on our Southern coast, 
 which are designated in these instructions, and will hold any commander 
 of either branch to a strict responsibility for any failure to procure har 
 mony and secure the objects proposed. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag- Officer S. F. Du PONT, 
 
 Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, etc., 
 
44 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, January 23, 1862. 
 
 SIR : The importance of a rigorous blockade at every point under 
 your command cannot be too strongly impressed or felt. By cutting 
 off all communication, we not only cripple and distress the States in in 
 surrection, but by an effective blockade we destroy any excuse or pre 
 text on the part of foreign governments to aid and relieve those who 
 are waging war upon the Government. 
 
 There is a manifest desire, if not determination, in certain quarters, 
 to break the blockade, and the apology therefor will be, if possible, a 
 want of vigilance or efficiency on the part of our squadrons in guarding 
 the coast in such a manner as to interdict communication. While con 
 fiding to your practical knowledge and judgment the disposition of the 
 vessels committed to you, I have felt it my duty to warn you of the dif 
 ficulty alluded to, and at the same time to suggest that, except when re 
 quired by pressing necessity, there should not be a concentration of 
 vessels at any given point, but that they should be spread so as to make 
 the blockade effective throughout the whole extent of coast under your 
 supervision. Most of the important posts are well guarded, though oc 
 casionally we hear that a vessel has run the blockade in bad weather or 
 in darkness, or at points least likely to attract attention. Every case of 
 this kind, I have reason to believe, is noted and laid up as evidence that 
 the blockade is not effective, and therefore is to be disregarded by those 
 governments whose subjects may become clamorous for supplies from 
 the States blockaded. 
 
 The Department is aware of the difficulties you are compelled, to 
 encounter ; it has been gratified with the ability and resources which 
 you have brought into requisition to carry out the policy of the Gov 
 ernment ; and I wish in this communication, warning you of what may 
 be apprehended from foreign interference, provided there is any want 
 of vigilance or effectiveness in any quarter in keeping up a rigid block 
 ade, to express my commendation, and also my confidence that you will, 
 even in this stormy season, with such force as is at your disposition, in 
 terdict communication at every point, and thus destroy any pretence for 
 breaking or attempting to break the blockade. 
 
 As fast as we can augment our force or spare vessels from other 
 points, we shall endeavor to reinforce your command ; in the mean 
 time our reliance must be on your own powers and capability in the 
 squadron that you have. 
 
 I am, respectfully, etc., 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag- Officer WM. W. MC!VEAN, 
 
 Commanding Gulf Squadron, etc., etc., and others. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 45 
 
 [CIRCULAR LETTER.] 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, August IS, 1862. 
 
 SIR : Some recent occurrences in the capture of vessels, and matters 
 pertaining to the blockade, render it necessary that there should be a 
 recapitulation of the instructions heretofore from time to time given, and 
 also of the restrictions and precautions to be observed by our squadrons 
 and cruisers. 
 
 It is essential, in .the remarkable contest now waging, that we should 
 exercise great forbearance with great firmness, and manifest to the world 
 that it is the intention of our Government, while asserting and main 
 taining our own rights, to respect and scrupulously regard the rights 
 of others. It is in this view that the following instructions are explicitly 
 given : 
 
 first. That you will exercise constant vigilance to prevent supplies 
 of arms, munitions, and contraband of war from being conveyed to the 
 insurgents ; but that under no circumstances will you seize any vessel 
 within the waters of a friendly nation. 
 
 Secondly. That, while diligently exercising the right of visitation on 
 all suspected vessels, you are in no case authorized to chase and fire at 
 a foreign vessel without showing your colors and giving her the cus 
 tomary preliminary notice of a desire to speak and visit her. 
 
 Thirdly. That, when that visit is made, the vessel is not then to be 
 seized without a search carefully made so far as to render it reasonable 
 to believe that she is engaged in carrying contraband of war for or to 
 the insurgents and to their ports, directly or indirectly by transshipment, 
 or otherwise violating the blockade ; and that, if after visitation and 
 search, it shall appear to your satisfaction that she is, in good faith and 
 without contraband, actually bound and passing from one friendly or 
 so-called neutral port to another, and not bound or proceeding to or 
 from a port in the possession of the insurgents, then she cannot be law 
 fully seized. 
 
 Fourthly. That, to avoid difficulty and error in relation to papers 
 which strictly belong to the captured vessel, and mails that are carried, 
 or parcels under official seals, you will, in the words of the law, " pre 
 serve all the papers and writings found on board, and transmit the 
 whole of the originals unmutilated to the judge of the district to which 
 such prize is ordered to proceed ; " but official seals, or locks, or fasten 
 ings of foreign authorities, are in no case, nor on any pretext, to be 
 broken, or parcels covered by them read by any naval authorities ; but 
 all bags or other things covering such parcels, and duly sealed or fast 
 ened by foreign authorities, will be, in the discretion of the United 
 States officer to whom they may come, delivered to the consul, com- 
 
46 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 manding naval officer, or legation of the foreign government, to be 
 opened, upon the understanding that whatever is contraband or im 
 portant as evidence concerning the character of a captured vessel, will 
 be remitted to the prize court or to the Secretary of State at Washing 
 ton ; or such sealed bags or parcels may be at once forwarded to this 
 Department, to the end that the proper authorities of the foreign gov 
 ernment may receive the same without delay. 
 
 You are specially informed that the fact that a suspicious vessel has 
 been indicated to you as cruising in any limit which has been pre 
 scribed by this Department, does not in way authorize you to depart 
 from the practice of the rules of visitation, search, and capture pre 
 scribed by the laws of nations. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 Rear-Admiral D. G. FARRAGUT, 
 
 Commanding Gulf Squadron, Shij) Island, and others. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, Apt^il 12, 1862. 
 
 SIR : It is of the greatest importance that the exportation of an 
 thracite coal from ports of the "United States to any and all foreign 
 ports should be absolutely prohibited. 
 
 The rebels obtain the coal for their steamers from Nassau and 
 Havana, and the fact that it burns without smoke enables them to ap 
 proach blockaded ports with greater security, as all other coals throw 
 out so much smoke as to render their presence visible a great distance 
 at sea. I am, most truly, sir, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 The President of the United States. 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, April 26, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 
 the 24th instant, enclosing a copy of a note of the 19th instant, ad 
 dressed to you by the charge d affaires of Denmark, who asks if the 
 Danish harbor of St. Thomas, in the West Indies, cannot be exempted 
 from the operation of the order prohibiting the exportation of anthracite 
 coal to foreign countries. The friendly feeling of the Danish Govern 
 ment is felt and appreciated, and there can be no other than reciprocal 
 kind feelings on our part in return. I do not doubt that it would be 
 the Disposition of the Danish authorities to prevent an abuse of the 
 privilege if an exception were made in their case, but on the other hand 
 I am not aware they could prevent it. Unless we can be permitted to 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 47 
 
 seize the rebel steamers which may resort to St. Thomas for coal and 
 other purposes, our true course is to prohibit it, and to treat that por 
 tion of the Danish dominions as we treat the rest of the world. If they 
 will make themselves an exception, and allow us a privilege which others 
 do not allow us, then I would most cordially reciprocate the act, and ex 
 tend to them a privilege that is denied to others. 
 
 Until St. Thomas stands in different relations to us from other parts 
 of the world, in the treatment of the rebels, I do not see how we can 
 favor them beyond others. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Hon. WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, May 27, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 
 the 22 d instant, enclosing a copy of a reply from the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, to whom you referred a communication of this Department 
 on the subject of permitting residents of certain counties in Virginia to 
 carry their grain to market. 
 
 You state that you do not perceive any objection to granting the 
 privilege asked, upon the conditions mentioned in the letter of the Sec 
 retary of the Treasury. 
 
 The Department would remark that authority to traffic, sell or buy, 
 within the region blockaded, is inconsistent with the blockade itself. 
 All special permits must be attended with difficulty by whatever power 
 granted. If trade or traffic is open to one, it should be open to all. In 
 other words, the blockade must continue to be enforced, modified, or 
 abandoned. In either case it should be a matter of governmental 
 policy, in which all should be allowed to participate. 
 
 I know not that there is any objection to exempting the counties in 
 Virginia where we have military possession from a further enforcement 
 of the blockade. On the contrary, it appears to me that if the inhabit 
 ants are passive, or not actually disloyal, that commerce, trade, and free 
 intercourse will promote friendly feelings. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Hon. WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State. 
 
 During the whole period of Mr. Welles s administration the 
 Department labored most earnestly to impress upon the country 
 and upon Congress the importance of creating and maintaining 
 
48 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 a Navy inferior to no other, as our only security against a foreign 
 war. In these efforts the Secretary was most cordially sup 
 ported by his associates in the Department. The first approach 
 of real danger from abroad will not fail to justify every demand 
 which the Secretary made upon the country for enlarged facili 
 ties for building and maintaining a formidable navy. It will 
 certainly be seen, at no remote period, that these earnest admo 
 nitions originated in true statesmanship, and that the economy 
 which was so strongly urged against spacious navy-yards, dock 
 yards, and machine-shops is only wastefulness in disguise. For 
 when a great emergency comes suddenly upon a nation unpre 
 pared, then every munition of war, if obtainable at all, can be 
 procured only by paying the greatest prices for the poorest 
 quality. Steam has brought America within the field of Euro 
 pean movement ; and if her power, especially upon the sea, is 
 less than that of the mightiest, she will be trodden down. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, June 9, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I had the honor to address the Naval Committee, under date 
 of the 25th March last, on the subject of armored ships, and the neces 
 sity of preliminary measures in the future construction of vessels for the 
 naval service. The fact that a radical change has commenced in the 
 construction and armament of ships, which change in effect dispenses 
 with the navies that have hitherto existed, is obvious, and it is a ques 
 tion for Congress to decide whether the Government will promptly take 
 the initiatory step to place our country in the front rank of maritime 
 powers. 
 
 It is unnecessary that I should recapitulate the suggestions contained 
 in my letter of the 25th of March, but I would again call your attention 
 to them, and state my earnest desire that Congress should take action 
 before its adjournment on the subject, not only of supplying itself with 
 the armature and heavy ordnance for ships, but the substitution by the 
 Government of iron for wood, in whole or in part, in the construction 
 of naval vessels. It has hitherto been supposed to be the true interest 
 of the Government to build its own ships-of-war, and to manufacture 
 the arms and most of the articles which are requisite for the naval ser 
 vice. This necessity has arisen chiefly from the fact that naval vessels 
 and naval purposes and objects are in many respects so essentially differ 
 ent from those of the mercantile marine, as to place them out of the 
 usual line of private enterprise. The Government has, consequently, to 
 pay an extra cost for extra and better work. In naval and niilitarv mat- 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 4:9 
 
 ters it is indispensable that vessels, guns, machinery, and every thing 
 pertaining to them should be of the best quality, reliable, and always 
 ready at any moment to meet the public necessities. 
 
 The Government has several large navy-yards for building ships, 
 and the introduction of steam, which is necessary for and made ap 
 plicable to all naval vessels now constructed, has compelled it to erect 
 extensive shops for making steam machinery. But these shops are in 
 adequate to the wants of the Navy, and for some years it will be neces 
 sary, under any circumstances, to contract for much the larger portion 
 of the work that will be required. 
 
 It is now generally conceded that vessels for fighting purposes must 
 be heavily plated with iron, if they are not built entirely of that mate 
 rial. In this, as in most costly fabrics, economy is reached through 
 durability. Iron ship-building is new in this country. But few persons 
 are engaged in it, and it is a novelty in our navy-yards. Heavy iron 
 beams, shafting, and thick iron plates can be procured from only two or 
 three parties, and then in limited quantities, and subject to great delay. 
 Individuals have little use for iron of such magnitude as the Navy must 
 have, and there must unavoidably be great outlay to prepare for the 
 execution of such work. With only the Navy for a purchaser, there 
 can be no competition ; and the Government will be compelled, under 
 such circumstances, to pay almost any price the mills and forges may 
 demand. No inconsiderable portions of an iron ship can be made and 
 procured at the ordinary mills, and so far as it can be done, it may 
 be the best policy to be so supplied; but the heavy and expensive 
 portions cannot be so procured, and unless the Government is prepared 
 to execute the work, it will be subject to imposition, and its vessels to 
 marked inferiority. 
 
 Other nations, whose wooden ships-of-war far exceed our own in 
 number, cannot afford to lay them aside, but are compelled to plate 
 them with iron at very heavy cost. They are not unaware of the dis 
 advantage of this proceeding , but it is a present necessity. It must be 
 borne in mind, however, that those governments which are striving for 
 naval supremacy are sparing no expense to strengthen themselves by 
 building iron vessels, and already their dock-yards are undergoing the 
 necessary preparation for this change in naval architecture, notwith 
 standing those governments have at their command the greatest expe 
 rience and the most extensive and complete iron and machine factories 
 that private enterprise can produce. These facts are suggestive to our 
 Government, and I desire to call your attention to the necessity of 
 making the necessary provision for ourselves by providing the means 
 
50 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 and conveniences for building and repairing a Navy, such as the 
 strength and character of our Government and country require, in 
 order to maintain its true position among maritime powers. 
 
 We have been engaged for years, and have spent millions in our 
 navy-yards and on our steam machine-shops for ship-building purposes, 
 and yet have not been able to keep up with the wants of the Navy and 
 the exigencies of the service. 
 
 It is not the part of wisdom to close our eyes to the progress of 
 events, nor to evade the responsibilities that properly belong to us. 
 The creation of a new and different Navy, such as the development of 
 science and art already demonstrate as a necessity, calls for vigorous 
 measures and prompt and energetic action. The Government should 
 not, in justice to itself, be dependent on private establishments for its 
 most important and expensive works, but should rely upon itself. Great 
 workfc, however, require time in their preparations, and lavish expen 
 ditures cannot hasten them. Congress has been liberal in its appro 
 priations for building vessels, but these appropriations cannot be made 
 available in obtaining the proper locations, and mills, forges, furnaces, 
 and shops, all of which are requisite, and, which to be secured properly, 
 need time and careful consideration. 
 
 If the money for these purposes be now appropriated, we shall com 
 mence, under as favorable circumstances as any nation, the construction 
 of a Navy adapted to the wants of our country and the times. No na 
 tion can have an advantage over us if we avail ourselves of our means 
 and opportunities, and it is no longer doubtful that our future safety and 
 welfare are dependent on our naval strength and efficiency. It is a duty 
 as well as a necessity that we make these United States a great naval 
 power. We owe it to ourselves to commence this work at once, and 
 the present Congress should, in my opinion, take the preliminary steps 
 for laying the foundation for the construction of a Navy commensurate 
 with the wants and magnitude of the country. The place or places, 
 and shops and tools and other appurtenances for this great work, must 
 be provided in season. The experience we have had admonishes us not 
 to permit a war to come upon us unprepared, yet such an event may 
 be pending, and the responsibilities and calamities that would follow 
 neglect should be a warning for us to be prepared. No amount of 
 money would repair the wrong that might be inflicted from present 
 neglect. A million or two of dollars judiciously expended at the pres 
 ent time may save hundreds of millions and the honor of the nation 
 after hostilities shall have commenced. 
 
 I have made these suggestions in consequence of the near termina- 
 
OKGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 51 
 
 tion of the session, without any movement as vet for establishing the 
 necessary works to produce the heavy iron and armature that will here 
 after enter into the construction of our naval vessels. It is doubtful 
 whether either of our present navy-yards is best adapted to the purpose 
 herein indicated ; but if so, they will require considerable enlargement. 
 The subject is one that should receive careful consideration, and I would 
 suggest that authority be given to designate and procure one or more 
 suitable locations. We are now constructing a number of gunboats by 
 contract on the Western waters, and I would suggest that recent expe 
 rience and the vast resources in iron and other capabilities of the West, 
 with the radical change in naval architecture, demonstrate the propriety 
 of establishing a navy-yard, foundery, and shops, at some point in the 
 valley of the Mississippi. Such a yard and its attendant establishments 
 would possess many advantages, and is becoming a necessity. I com 
 mend it to your attention, with the other subjects alluded to in this 
 communication. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, etc., 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Hon. JOHN P. HALE, 
 
 Chairman Naval Committee, U. S. Senate. 
 
 In December, 1864, Congress had failed to respond accord 
 ing to the wish, of the Secretary, and he returned to the sub 
 ject again in his report, in the following manner : 
 
 The introduction of steam as a motive power for naval vessels is 
 causing a revolution in maritime warfare which the ablest minds have 
 long predicted would be the result of this agency, but which is not yet 
 to its fullest extent appreciated. It changes the whole character of 
 blockade, and in iuture wars it will be found that a few fast privateers 
 by steam will harass or annihilate the commerce of the most powerful 
 belligerent nations. 
 
 Our country has been compelled by this civil war to take the initia 
 tive in organizing a vast steam navy with which to establish and enforce 
 the blockade of our whole coast from the Chesapeake Bay to the Eio 
 Grande; and also to suppress the depredations of semi-piratical pri 
 vateers, built by skilled English mechanics in English ship-yards, and 
 manned by Englishmen, which, under the rebel flag, have roved the ocean, 
 destroying our merchant shipping, and have found refuge and supplies 
 in English and neutral ports. 
 
 When hostilities commenced, our Government had provided no suit a- 
 
52 IIISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAYY. 
 
 ble nav} 7 -yard with machine-shops and founderies to manufacture the ne 
 cessary machinery for our rapidly increasing and expanding Navy ; but the 
 Department was compelled to rely on the few private establishments, 
 which it could divert from other engagements, for the immense work 
 that was calling out the resources of the nation. 
 
 Great embarrassment was experienced in consequence of this neglect 
 of the Government at the very commencement of the war ; and although 
 the naval service and the country are suffering constantly from this 
 neglect, measures for the establishment of a suitable navy-yard for the 
 construction and repair of iron vessels, their armature and steam ma 
 chinery, are still delayed. 
 
 As early as March, 1862, and on several occasions since, I have had 
 the honor to present my views to Congress on this subject. The ear 
 nestness and frequency with which it has been brought forward must find 
 an apology in its great importance. 
 
 It has never been the purpose of the Department, in any of its sug 
 gestions or recommendations, to increase the number of our navy-yards, 
 nor to alter their local distribution. The yard which we now have at 
 Philadelphia, is altogether inadequate to our present or future wants. 
 It was proposed, therefore, to substitute a new one on the Delaware, in 
 the vicinity of Philadelphia. League Island, within the limits of that 
 city, if adopted as a site, must gradually absorb the works at the present 
 yard, which would then be discontinued. 
 
 All of our present navy-yards, it will be remembered, were established 
 for the construction and repair of wooden sailing vessels. Steam and 
 armored vessels have superseded these, and the inability of our present 
 establishments for the work imposed by this war has been the source of 
 inexpressible anxiety, and often of great disappointment and public 
 injury. To relieve the navy-yards from work which they have but 
 limited means to execute, and to secure necessary repairs, the Depart 
 ment has been compelled to establish stations for machinery and means 
 of refitment at Mound City, Memphis, New Orleans, Ship Island, Pen- 
 sacola, Key West, Port Royal, Beaufort, Norfolk, and Baltimore. But 
 these and all the private establishments of the country, besides other 
 calls upon them, have been insufficient to keep the present Navy in neces 
 sary order; so that, if to the duty of blockading there were added ocean 
 conflicts with a naval power by which our ships would be often disabled, 
 the sad spectacle would be presented of our naval vessels laid up in time 
 of war for want of a proper establishment with the shops and means to 
 repair them. 
 
 Our country, whose strength and power among nations must ever be 
 
OKGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPAKTMENT. 53 
 
 identified with and maintained by its Navy, and which possesses in such 
 abundance the means of creating and sustaining one, has not, in all the 
 navy-yards combined, the appliances possessed by single establishments 
 in England and France. Were there outside of our navy-yards estab 
 lishments to perform promptly the requisite work in time of war, I should 
 not at this time again press the subject of a navy-yard for iron-work for 
 the construction of vessels upon the consideration of our authorities. 
 But although the Department has generally been ably and zealously 
 seconded in its efforts by private contractors, yet the fact that there is no 
 customer but the Government for much of this heavy class of iron-work, 
 forbids us to expect that individual enterprise will be prepared to 
 execute it without full remuneration for all the outlay for shops, tools, 
 and machinery which may be required in preparation. Besides this, 
 unlimited time is taken by them for the completion of the work. It 
 may be proper to mention, as an instance of the delay to which the 
 Government is subjected, that in October, 1862, contracts were made with 
 a manufacturer of reputation and ability for making and setting up the 
 turrets of the Tonawanda and Miantonomoh, which were to have been 
 completed in February, 1863, but they will probably not be finished until 
 February, 1865, two years after the expiration of the time specified in the 
 contract. At the commencement of hostilities this Department had 
 equipped, and at its immediate disposal, three vessels-of-war. Those 
 which were laid up, and those which were recalled from abroad, had to 
 undergo extensive repairs, for which no provision had been made. The 
 Government has not even at this time an establishment where a shaft can 
 be made for our steamers or a plate for our iron-clads. The frontage or 
 wharfage at all our navy-yards, so important for repairs, is less than is 
 required at each of them. 
 
 Our next contest may be with a naval power which will attempt to 
 direct upon our shores a course of operations similar to those which we 
 have applied to the Southern coast for suppressing the rebellion. One 
 yard, at least, where iron vessels, iron armor, and iron shafting can be 
 manufactured, is now imperatively necessary. Among the considerations 
 that should control the selection of a site for such a yard and establish 
 ment, which shall become the depot for the materials collected in years 
 of peace with which to build and repair our naval vessels, and where 
 will be aggregated machinery and tools such as at present are not to be 
 found in this country, and which, when once procured, could not, if de 
 stroyed, be easily or readily replaced, will be its absolute safety from at 
 tack by sea or land. So far as is possible, we should avail ourselves of 
 natural advantages in obtaining the indispensable security for such an 
 
54 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 establishment, without depending entirely on fortifications and artificial 
 means, which would be more costly than the navy-yard itself. 
 
 The additional military defences of Portsmouth, England, rendered 
 necessary by the proximity of that great naval station to the ocean, and 
 its consequent assailability by modern ordnance, are now being con 
 structed at an expense of $50,000,000. 
 
 These letters and extracts have been introduced not only to 
 illustrate the character of the Secretary, but to set forth the 
 policy which was adopted by the Department, and which was 
 steadily adhered to until the close of the war. The exhibition, 
 however, is necessarily a partial one, and much additional light 
 will be shed over the whole subject in the progress of the narra 
 tive. The following brief summary of his work, submitted in 
 December, 1864, when nothing important remained to be done, 
 except the capture of Fort Fisher, accomplished soon after, and 
 the cordial and graceful acknowledgment of his obligations to 
 his associates, may very properly close this notice of one whose 
 fame will increase in proportion as the administration of his De 
 partment is understood by the people. He and his associates 
 may trust with perfect confidence the impartial judgment of 
 the future. They will stand on the page of history as having 
 conducted triumphantly the grandest naval operations which the 
 world thus far has seen ; as having accomplished, both in the 
 blockade and in battle with forts, what Europe declared could 
 not be done, and as having inaugurated a new era in naval war : 
 
 In this, my fourth annual report, I have submitted somewhat in detail 
 the condition of the Department and the service. This report presents 
 the distribution and employment of a maritime force which, including 
 the additions to it now in progress and near completion, constitutes for all 
 the purposes of defence, if not of attack and conquest, the most power 
 ful national navy in the world. In four preceding similar communica 
 tions, including that submitted to you upon the assembling of Congress 
 in the extra session of 1861, it has been my duty to exhibit the methods 
 and measures of administration, by which, from a comparatively small 
 beginning, and under the pressure of an unexampled exigency, this vast 
 naval power has, since your accession to the Presidency, been brought 
 into existence ; to state the contributions which have been made to it 
 from our commercial marine ; to indicate the application of all the re 
 sources of our public naval establishments to its construction and prep- 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 55 
 
 aration for service ; to show how individual energy and skill and capital 
 have come successfully in aid of insufficient governmental provision for 
 the due prosecution of the work, and to trace in general outline the pro 
 cesses and results of inventive genius and scientific experiment which 
 have changed, to a great extent, the materials and forms of naval struc 
 ture and armor and armament, and have enabled our country, while in so 
 brief a period assuming a foremost place among maritime nations, to 
 create also a new era in the development and application of naval force. 
 
 In connection with such account of the sudden creation of a new 
 American naval power, it has been at the same time my privilege in these 
 communications to make official record of a series of naval enterprises 
 and achievements wholly without precedent or parallel. No previous 
 conception of efficient blockade ; no former endurance under the fire of 
 fortified batteries; no audacity and success heretofore known of naval at 
 tack upon such fortresses, through formidable submarine obstructions 
 spread for their defence ; no similar penetration by war-vessels of inter 
 nal waters through a reach of navigation almost continental ; no other 
 gigantic scale of cooperation of naval with army forces in expeditions 
 and combats hundreds of miles from the seaboard, and along the course 
 of rivers precarious and dangerous of navigation, can anywhere be found 
 of a character to compare with the triumphs in all these forms of naval 
 effort which it has been the duty of this Department during the past 
 three years to organize and to report. 
 
 If in the prosecution of duties so arduous, complicated, and exacting, 
 the trust confided to this Department shall appear to have been faithfully 
 and fitly discharged, then certainly my acknowledgments are still due, 
 as they have been heretofore expressed, to the gentlemen associated with 
 me in its management, to the whole clerical force, to the several chiefs 
 of bureaus, and especially to the invaluable services of the Assistant 
 Secretary and the Chief Clerk of the Department. 
 
 But it is to the officers and men of our naval service that the great 
 renown of what has thus been done, and is doing, justly belongs. The 
 best administration of this Department can do little more at any time 
 than to give them the adequate means and the right opportunity of action. 
 To them, therefore, first and always, be the honor, when their own coun 
 try and the world shall recognize in this expansion and these exploits of 
 our naval power a spectacle of patriotic and virtuous heroism worthy of 
 the cause in which it is displayed, and of the national life which it illus 
 trates and defends. GIDEON WELLES, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy. 
 To the President. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. THE MENTAL FORCE 
 STORED WITH THE PEOPLE, AND EVER READY FOR USE. THE 
 MIANTONOMOH S VISIT TO EUROPE. 
 
 ME. LINCOLN, emerging from poverty and obscurity, and as 
 cending to the highest position, drew after him a large number, 
 who, like himself, started from among the ranks of the laboring- 
 people, and proved themselves capable of filling and honoring 
 the highest station, without the education of the schools. 
 
 This suggests two facts, which have an important bearing 
 upon the future of our country. We have exhaustless resources 
 of mental power treasured up with the people, ready to be 
 brought forth and disciplined for use, in such measure as the 
 nation may require. 
 
 Thanks to our free institutions, the masses of this country 
 are already so far lifted above the brutalizing effects of in 
 feriority and toil, that the mental powers are not crushed or 
 dwarfed ; and it is found in our common schools and higher 
 seminaries that the children of the laboring poor are quite as 
 likely to exhibit intellectual force and capacity as those of the 
 wealthy. This would not be true, as the general rule, in the 
 first generation, at least, of the children of the laborers of Eng 
 land or Ireland, or even of our own freedmen ; and hence it 
 is, that we have generated here a thinking force, a brain-power, 
 through free institutions and education, far in advance of what 
 the nations of Europe can now command. We are far ahead of 
 them, and we shall maintain the advance position, if we pre 
 serve the rate of progress. We are already a nation of thinkers. 
 As the motive power of a steam-engine is estimated by horse- 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. 57 
 
 power, so the fighting force of a nation will hereafter be calcu 
 lated by its brain-power ; and as that depends upon the number 
 of educated minds, it is easy to see that a country of universal 
 freedom and universal education will have, in the future, an 
 overwhelming advantage over one where the masses are de 
 graded and ignorant. Battles are to be fought, not by muscles, 
 but by brains. Labor-saving and time-saving machinery will 
 be used in war as successfully as elsewhere. A single shot, fired 
 by one man handling his gun by steam, will sink a ship that 
 once hours of cannonading by a hundred guns, worked by a 
 thousand men, could scarcely accomplish. The Americans have 
 just entered upon this new field of invention. Labor-saving 
 slaughtering-machines, and Monitors, and twenty-inch guns, and 
 torpedoes, are impressive indicators of what they may accomplish 
 hereafter. 
 
 Hence the importance of the fact that such a reserve force 
 of mental power is stored up among the- people, ready for use 
 whenever the country has need. Another important fact is, that 
 men thus called out from the people, the working class, are often 
 found capable of the noblest achievements without the previous 
 training even of the schools devoted to their professions. This 
 certainly is no reason why the officers of the Army and Navy 
 should not receive a finished education, but it suggests the 
 question whether it is not true, that sometimes, in a critical mo 
 ment, officers are restrained by theories from attempting what a 
 bold man, unacquainted with all the possible scientific difficul 
 ties, might not only attempt, but perform. 
 
 It is known that some of the best-educated officers of the 
 English and French service declared it impossible to capture 
 New Orleans ; and it is nearly certain that such men would 
 have declined to make the attack, on the ground that theoreti 
 cally and scientifically considered, success was impossible. 
 Yet, according to Farragut s higher theory of dash and pluck, it 
 was possible ; and practical common sense and courage were 
 found to be wiser than the formulas of the schools. It is said 
 that one gallant old French admiral remained angry with Far- 
 ragut till the end of his life, because the Yankee admiral took 
 the forts when it was scientifically impossible ! 
 
 In like manner, it is said, military science declared Fort 
 
58 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Fisher impregnable ; but Porter s broadsides smashed both the 
 fort and the theory ; and Terry proved that a place theoreti 
 cally impregnable could be practically stormed and captured. 
 Thus the war has demonstrated more clearly than ever before, 
 that this country will be in advance of other nations in the 
 means of attack and defence, so long as it has the greatest num 
 ber of free, intelligent, independent thinkers. In Europe the 
 mind works in trammels, by rules and precedents, restrained on 
 all sides by fixed theories and customs. Here, thought travels 
 unhindered where it will, and therefore it brings us continually 
 fresh discoveries. It is said that Europe will soon have Moni 
 tors and 15-inch guns. Be it so. American genius has not 
 exhausted itself. When the nations have armed themselves as 
 we have now done, the ever-restless and ever-increasing brain 
 power of our thinking workers will devise some new and more 
 effective method of warfare. 
 
 The amount of mental wealth, more valuable than that of all 
 our mines, which popular education has created among the people, 
 and which is held as the reserved power of the nation, is in 
 dicated by such examples as that of the Assistant Secretary of 
 the JSTavy ; and some facts * in his life are herewith presented 
 
 *GUSTAVUS VASA Fox was born June 13, 1821, in Saugus, Essex County, Massa 
 chusetts. His father was a country physician, in moderate circumstances, and was, 
 therefore, unable to give his child the advantages of a classical education. He re 
 moved from Saugus to Lowell, when the son was two years old ; and there young 
 Fox received only such an education as was afforded by the common schools of that 
 town. 
 
 In January, 1838, he was appointed a midshipman; and made his first cruise to 
 the Mediterranean, in the Cyane, with Captain John Percival. His service at sea was 
 mostly in time of peace ; and though few incidents occurred worthy of a place in his 
 tory, yet his was not altogether a fair-weather experience. He was on the Saratoga 
 in that night of winter storms, when, after having passed out of the harbor of Ports 
 mouth, she was unable either to proceed or return, and, though anchored off shore, 
 could not furl her frozen sails. The ship could only be saved by cutting away her 
 masts, and after great exposure and suffering of the crew. Subsequently he was in 
 the Independence, a fifty-gun ship, then commanded by Commodore Stewart, when 
 she was struck by a white squall, whose very fury may be said to have saved the 
 vessel. Its first blast, while it laid the ship nearly on her beam-ends, tore away her 
 head sails, and then the main yard was broken, and thus she was partly relieved from 
 the pressure that was bearing her down. Still, as her head sails were gone, she could 
 not be brought round before the wind, and the situation, for a few minutes, was peril 
 ous indeed, for she was thrown so far over as to be filling with water. In this erner- 
 

 York I! Avr. aier 3- -3 v. 445 iln;, 
 
OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY ] 
 
 of 
 ,^L!FORH^ 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. 59 
 
 in order to show that, by the almost universal education of 
 our children, the country is preparing itself for any possible 
 emergency. 
 
 A glance at the principal events in this brief narrative will 
 show how well they were calculated to prepare Captain Fox for 
 the eminent position to which he was afterward called. 
 
 The strictly professional education, whatever the profession 
 may be, however it may tend to excellence in that special line 
 of action, often unfits a man for wide and liberal views. The 
 
 gcncy the crew were sent into the fore rigging, where the wind, acting upon them as 
 upon a sail, brought her slowly round, and she righted, and shook the waves from 
 her as she came before the wind. 
 
 In 1844 Fox passed his examination at Philadelphia, and was appointed a passed 
 midshipman ; and made a cruise on the coast of Africa and to the West Indies in the 
 Preble, with only the usual incidents belonging to such a service, though gathering an 
 experience in these varied scenes which was to be of use in future years. 
 
 In 1846 he was attached to the coast survey, and this also helped to prepare him 
 to judge of the important questions connected with the blockade. 
 
 1847 he joined Commodore Perry s squadron, in the brig Washington, and par 
 ticipated in the operations of that squadron against the Mexican coast and ports. 
 Then for the first time he learned, though on a small scale, something of the opera 
 tions of actual naval war. In comparison with what has been since done, those 
 things appear very insignificant now. In 1848 he went out to the coast of Brazil and 
 to the East Indies as acting master of the Plymouth ; and in 1850 he joined the Dol 
 phin as executive officer, and visited the islands of the Pacific, California, and the 
 west coast of South America, and returned by Cape Horn. 
 
 In 1851 he was appointed master, and in 1851 and 1852 was on board the mail- 
 steamer Baltic as chief executive officer, running between New York and Liverpool. 
 In December, 1852, he was commissioned as lieutenant, and ordered to the Princeton, 
 which was the flag-ship of the fishing squadron under Commodore Shubrick. In 
 August, 1853, he was detached and ordered to command the mail-steamer Ohio, run 
 ning between New York and Aspinwall. 1854 he was transferred to the command 
 of the new mail-steamer George Law. In 1855 he was detached and granted one 
 year s furlough. In July, 1856, he resigned, having been appointed agent of the Bay 
 State Mills, at Lawrence, Massachusetts. 
 
 In this school Captain Fox was trained until the breaking out of the rebellion, 
 when his spirit was so stirred, that he was impelled to seek for some active service 
 in his country s cause ; and was soon pointed out to Mr. Lincoln to lead the expedi 
 tion for the relief of Fort Sumter, a detailed account of which appears in another part 
 of this volume. 
 
 In May, 1861, after his return from the attempt to relieve Fort Sumter, Captain 
 Fox was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and entered upon the discharge 
 of those important duties in which, by cordial cooperation with the Secretary, and by 
 suggestions which his own previous experience enabled him to make, he contributed 
 largely to the success of the L nion cause. 
 
60 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 merely professional man is quite likely to view the whole world 
 from one stand-point, and in one set of relations only. This is far 
 from being a reproach to professional men ; for if a man would 
 perfect himself in any particular branch of study or business, 
 it is really necessary that he should devote himself particu 
 larly to that in which he would excel. A general education 
 forbids that special attention to any one subject by which alone 
 distinction is attained. Necessarily, however, confining the 
 mind to one sphere of action, causes this to assume an undue 
 importance in relation to other matters ; and one who feels con 
 scious that he has mastered the branch to which he has devoted 
 himself, is very reluctant to receive suggestions from other 
 quarters, or to believe that any other person could discover any 
 thing in his field that had escaped his own notice. 
 
 Hence the extreme difficulty with which professional men 
 can be induced to regard with favor, much less adopt, an im 
 provement, however valuable, which has been suggested by one 
 outside of their own professional circle. It is probable that no 
 class of men are more likely to be moulded by the peculiarities 
 of their profession than the officers of the Navy. Confined to 
 a great extent to their ships, often cut off for weeks and even 
 months from all direct intercourse with the world on shore, 
 they become of course very much absorbed in their special oc 
 cupation, and lose somewhat their interest in the general move 
 ments of society. This is well for the country, because thus its 
 flag on the sea is committed to those who have made its defence 
 their special study. 
 
 But if an officer of the Navy, or of the Army, were to be 
 called to administer affairs in a position demanding, not merely 
 professional skill, but general knowledge of public interests, then, 
 though perfectly competent to command fleets or armies, it would 
 be necessary that his mind should expand "beyond his special 
 sphere; and to study public matters, not merely from the 
 stand-point of the soldier or sailor, but from the position of the 
 statesman. 
 
 The long service of Captain Fox in the Navy was quite suf 
 ficient to make him a thorough seaman, to bring him into asso 
 ciation with its officers, and to identify him with its interests. 
 At the same time, an important part of this service, that in 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. 61 
 
 which lie commanded the mail and passenger steamers to Liver 
 pool and Aspinwall, brought him into intimate connection 
 with the two great currents of American travel, the European 
 and the Californian ; and thus to the experience of the seaman 
 was added that liberalizing knowledge which is derived both 
 from society and travel. It gave to his mind a very different 
 culture from that obtained on a vessel-of-war, and fitted him to 
 occupy a wider sphere. 
 
 His resignation of his place in the Navy, and the acceptance 
 of the position of agent of one of the great manufacturing estab 
 lishments of Lawrence, introduced him to an entirely new scene, 
 and a new class of duties. As this position demands business 
 capacity and executive power of the highest order, it shows the 
 estimate which keen-sighted business men then put upon his 
 character. To conduct successfully the operations of one of 
 these immense establishments requires important qualifications 
 in addition to those which form a skilful commander of a ship ; 
 and unless the owners of these mills had believed that Captain 
 Fox possessed these, the vast interests of the company would 
 never have been confided to his care. They are able to com 
 mand the best administrative and business talent of the country ; 
 and to be selected for this post is a very weighty testimony to 
 the ability of any man. 
 
 Here a new class of interests was brought before him, and 
 the world was viewed from still another point of view. He had 
 already an experience, gathered in almost every quarter of the 
 globe, and from all classes of society, and finally a lesson was 
 learned in one of those great establishments which are the joint 
 production of capital, skill, inventive genius of the highest order, 
 and well-rewarded labor. 
 
 Here the wonderful results of machinery were constantly 
 under his eye effects so marvellous, that a great factory, with 
 its cunning engines all in motion, and doing with such celerity 
 and certainty all their various work, seems as if itself were intel 
 ligent ; as if wheels and spindles and looms, shafts, belts, and 
 pulleys were only the limbs of one immense and curious body, 
 animated by a directing soul. Such a scene, where almost daily 
 some new device for saving labor or time, or for obtaining 
 greater results was brought forward, by the restless spirit of in- 
 
62 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 vention, would be very likely to bring any thoughtful man to 
 the conclusion that the old and beaten track might often be 
 abandoned for a new and better way. 
 
 A man who becomes acquainted with the progress of ma 
 chinery, both here and in Europe, will, unless he is a stereotyped 
 man, soon learn to expect that present methods, however ex 
 cellent they may seem, and however time-honored they may be, 
 are quite likely to be superseded by some far better and perhaps 
 unexpected contrivance. 
 
 The salient points of the Assistant Secretary s character are 
 easily described. His views of affairs are of the most compre 
 hensive character, and no one has seen more clearly than he the 
 necessity of creating and maintaining an American Navy strong 
 enough to protect us against Western Europe ; and he has ably 
 seconded the earnest and enlightened efforts of the Secretary 
 to awaken the country to a proper sense both of its need and of 
 dangers which lie in the not remote future. He has executive 
 ability of a high order, and promptness, energy, and decision 
 mark all his operations. 
 
 But that trait which has attracted more attention than 
 any other, is the boldness of his conceptions in regard to new 
 methods of naval war, and the courage with which he has de 
 fended and helped to introduce those inventions which, at first 
 distrusted and sneered at, have compelled now the attention 
 and respect of the world. He gave an earnest support to the 
 Secretary in introducing the Monitor, and this support was the 
 more valuable because the experiment was opposed by expe 
 rienced officers and constructors. To him also belongs much 
 of the credit of bringing into use the 15 -inch gun, without 
 which the Monitors would lose very much of their importance. 
 In fact, if the two inventions were to be viewed and estimated 
 separately, it would be deemed by many that the new ordnance 
 is likely to exert a more decided influence upon the future than 
 the armored ship. The 20-inch gun may demonstrate that 
 armor of any thickness or of any description is a vain defence 
 against the guns of the future. 
 
 Perhaps there was no measure adopted by the Navy Depart 
 ment during the war which more truly expressed the sagacity 
 and boldness of the American mind than the laving down at 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. 63 
 
 once a fleet of ocean cruisers of the Ammonoosuck class. So 
 soon as the real spirit and intentions of England were fully 
 disclosed in the affair of the Trent, it was determined to 
 prepare to meet our neutral enemy abroad as well as at home, 
 and be ready to kindle a flame which would burn before her 
 own doors as brightly as along our coasts. About thirty 
 steamers were immediately put upon the stocks, whose speed 
 and power would be sufficient to sweep the commerce of Eng 
 land from the seas, and able also to levy contributions, should it 
 be deemed proper, from any spot whose protections are not of 
 the most formidable character. The construction of these im 
 mense steamers went rapidly forward, and at the close of the 
 war England found herself confronted by ships nearly ready for 
 service, to which she had nothing to oppose, and which excited 
 a well-founded alarm. 
 
 This will appear by the following extracts from a letter ad 
 dressed to the Duke of Somerset, by Captain William Horton, 
 of the Royal Navy, and from a lecture by the same gentleman, 
 January 15, 1865 : " But I have more particularly been led to 
 consider the quality and equipment of the ships which have 
 latterly been constructed in America, and which are eminently 
 calculated to cut up and destroy our commerce in event of hos 
 tilities. The floating wealth of this country, incalculable in its 
 value, could not, with the naval resources we now possess, be 
 protected in any degree against the depredations of such cruisers 
 as now form a prominent feature in the Navy of the United 
 States. Before the war was at end, it was determined to estab 
 lish a class of vessels for foreign service possessing great speed, 
 and carrying heavy guns, while if they at all approach the idea 
 upon which they were designed, will have it in their power so 
 long as they continue unopposed by more numerous ships of a 
 superior, or at least of equal speed and armament, effectually to 
 sweep the seas of any commerce against which they may be 
 launched. Such ships will be fit to fight on favorable terms 
 when the occasion may arise, and able to flee beyond possibility 
 of capture from any description of vessels now existing else 
 where, and which might happen to carry a superior armament 
 or thicker sides." England has thus been compelled to admit 
 that she is overmatched upon the seas by our unarmed cruisers, 
 
64: HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 and that administration of the Navy Department, which has 
 thus suddenly surpassed England both in iron-clad and wooden 
 ships, merits the gratitude of the country. It detracts nothing 
 from the high reputation which the Secretary has nobly earned, 
 to state that his Assistant contributed largely to the influ 
 ence by w T hich not only the Monitors and guns of large calibre 
 were adopted, but also those new ocean cruisers which have so 
 suddenly startled Europe, and shown them, scarcely less than 
 by our iron-clads, that the United States would be a very dan 
 gerous enemy. 
 
 In the spring of 1866 Captain Fox having finished, as he 
 thought, the work which the war had imposed upon him, and 
 thinking that his services were no longer specially needed by 
 the Government, proposed to avail himself of an offer which, 
 while it opened to him a wide field of usefulness, w r ould give 
 him a much larger pecuniary reward than could be derived 
 from any official position in the Government. But before his 
 resignation was formally tendered, a proposition was made to 
 send one of our Monitors to Europe, and he sailed in her, hav 
 ing been selected to bear a letter from Congress to the Emperor 
 of Russia. It seemed peculiarly fitting that he should accept 
 this position. He had advocated earnestly, while yet an un 
 tried experiment, the Monitor iron-clad ; he had declared that 
 a properly constructed Monitor would not only be safe at 
 sea, but would be easier in her movements than a broadside 
 ship ; and when the opportunity was presented he showed 
 that his confidence in what he had advocated, would lead 
 him to embark in the first Monitor that attempted to cross the 
 Atlantic. 
 
 The enemies of Ericsson s invention, and those who ever as 
 sociated Captain Fox s name with the Monitors, as the man in 
 their judgment responsible for their introduction, rejoiced and 
 sneered when it was announced that he was to go to Europe in 
 the Miantonomoh, and said it was eminently fitting that the 
 man who had introduced these " iron coffins " into the Navy, 
 should himself be buried in one of them at the bottom of the 
 ocean. 
 
 When the performance of the Monadnock, reported from 
 time to time from points where she touched on her voyage to 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 6ECEETAEY. 65 
 
 San Francisco, made it probable that the Miantonomoh might 
 refuse to sink for the gratification of these men, they endeavored 
 to escape sinking themselves by declaring that Mr. Ericsson and 
 his friends had abandoned the Monitor form of ship, and were 
 deluding the public by a very different vessel under the old 
 name. The overhang, it was said, was abandoned, and that 
 was the essential idea and thing in an Ericsson Monitor. It 
 is so, only in the same sense that it was essential that all 
 steamboats should be built just as wide, just as long, and just 
 as high as the first one was with which Fulton started from the 
 dock in New York ; that is to say, the overhang has no neces 
 sary connection whatever with a Monitor ship. It has nothing 
 to do with the idea which distinguishes a Monitor from the 
 broadside ship. The Miantonomoh and the Monadnock are as 
 truly Monitors as the one which fought the Merrimack. And if 
 hereafter some quite different forms of hull shall be invented 
 if the low deck and revolving turret are retained the ship w^ill 
 still be a Monitor, just as the Roanoke is a Monitor, though a 
 very imperfect one, because in her transformation the high sides 
 of the broadside frigate are partially retained. 
 
 The Miantonomoh left St. John s on the 5th of June, and 
 arrived at Queenstown in safety, after a passage of ten days 
 and eighteen hours, thus settling for all time the question 
 whether a Monitor could cross the Atlantic. But the deter 
 mining of this - point carried with it many others that are still 
 more important. It was a double triumph for the inventor and 
 the friends of this novel form of war-ship, that the Monadnock 
 should have reached San Francisco at nearly the same time 
 when the Miantonomoh arrived at Queenstown, the one having 
 safely traversed both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and the 
 other crossing the Atlantic and appearing in a European port 
 with even less difficulty than an ordinary steamer. These two 
 trials left little or nothing to be settled by future experiment ; 
 the one vessel in the harbor of San Francisco, and the other in 
 Europe, were two facts which fully answered all the argu 
 ments which had been used against Monitors, and the inferences 
 to be drawn from the performances of these American creations 
 were at once clearly seen by all the nations of Europe. 
 
 Seldom has any greater mortification fallen upon a proud 
 5 
 
66 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 nation than was felt by England and France when the Mian- 
 tonomoh appeared in European waters. It was one of those 
 stern but most unexpected retributions by which God so often 
 abases human pride. Certainly a change that no human sa 
 gacity could have foreseen had been wrought in the relative 
 positions of Europe and America between the time when the 
 exulting cry went over England and France, " The great re 
 publican bubble has burst ! " and the hour when, after the rebel 
 lion had been crushed, and the Republic, more firmly compacted 
 than ever, it was represented in their ports by a ship which 
 none of their own iron-clads could meet without speedy destruc 
 tion, and which their fortifications could not shut out of their 
 harbors. 
 
 The threat of sending the Warrior to Washington to chastise 
 American pride was not far in the past, when an American 
 iron-clad was in English waters, against which neither Warriors 
 nor forts could have made their cities secure. When the 
 Times, after the iron-clad fight in Hampton Roads, declared 
 that wooden navies were virtually annihilated, the English 
 people little thought that the time was so near when they 
 would have in their own harbors, open to inspection, a ship of 
 the United States that would convince Europe that their broad 
 side iron-clad navies had been rendered as useless as the wooden 
 ships had been before, and that in naval construction and naval 
 war the European nations, Russia alone excepted, must begin 
 anew. Especially was this seen when it was understood that 
 such a ship as the Miantonomoh by no means exhibited the 
 limit of power for a Monitor war-ship. 
 
 From an inspection of the Miantonomoh, intelligent Eu 
 ropeans could easily perceive what sort of an antagonist a 
 Monitor like the Puritan would be with still thicker turrets 
 and plating, with greater speed, and with her 20-inch guns, one 
 blow from which would break the side of any broadside ship in 
 Europe. 
 
 But it was for no mere display of national pride or power 
 that the Navy Department ordered the Miantonomoh to Europe. 
 The purpose was to show to the people of Europe the power 
 of free institutions. It was to give them visible and tangible 
 proof that the thinking force of a free republic is greater than 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. 67 
 
 that of a monarchy when the masses are forced down and held 
 down, and mind is dwarfed and uneducated. It was to aid in 
 convincing the people that, in war as well as in peace, the simple, 
 cheaper methods and machinery of a free population and gov 
 ernment are more effective than the more costly and cumber 
 some establishments of a monarchy ; that, in short, a republic is 
 stronger as well as cheaper than the kingly throne. The visit 
 of the Miantonomoh, following so closely the putting down of 
 the rebellion, was well calculated to swell the tide of emigration 
 from Europe, adding another important fact to the accumulating 
 evidence that a government that could put down a conspiracy 
 to which France and England gave their sympathies and moral 
 and material aid, had a grand and inviting future before it, and 
 offered a secure home to the people of all nations. 
 
 When the Assistant Secretary stepped from the deck of the 
 Monitor upon the shore of Europe, and felt that the great revo 
 lution in naval construction and naval war for which some had 
 so earnestly contended, was now virtually complete, and nothing 
 then remained but to apply in th,e future facts and principles 
 already established, he must have felt that they were rewarded 
 in full for their labors and trials. When the Miantonomoh with 
 her 15-inch guns anchored in Queenstown harbor, it was set 
 tled that the name of Ericsson was to represent a new era in 
 war. Of course it was impossible to foresee what the science 
 and inventive genius of the world might next achieve ; but 
 when it was thus decided that a Monitor with 15-inch tur 
 rets and 20-inch guns could become a safe and swift ocean 
 cruiser, it demonstrated one all-important fact that the navies 
 of the nations, such as they then were, must speedily disappear. 
 Machines might be invented which would shatter even Monitors 
 at a blow, and this seemed even then not improbable ; still the 
 old navies were to be abandoned as nearly useless. Europe 
 might build Monitors and guns equal or superior to the Amer 
 ican ; still the fact remained that their navies were virtually an 
 nihilated, and in the race for power the United States had 
 placed itself far in advance of Europe. 
 
 The following is an extract from the first dispatch sent by 
 Captain Fox to the Navy Department, describing the working 
 of the Monitor at sea : 
 
68 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAM MONITOR MIANTONOMOH, ) 
 QUEEXSTOWN, IRELAND, June 16, 1866. [ 
 
 SIR : The United States side-wheel steamer Augusta (third-rate), 
 1,310 tons (old measurement), Commander A. Murray, senior officer ; 
 United States Monitor iron-clad Miantonomoh (third-rate), 1,225 tons, 
 Commander J. C. Beaumont ; and United States side-wheel steamer 
 Ashuelot (third-rate), double-ender, 786 tons, Commander J. C. Feb- 
 iger, left St. John s, Newfoundland, Tuesday, June 5th, at two p. M., and 
 the two fonner arrived at Queenstown, Ireland, Saturday, the 16th in 
 stant, at four p. M., after a pleasant trip across the Atlantic of ten days 
 and eighteen hours. The Ashuelot kept on to Portsmouth. The ma 
 terial facts of the passage are placed in the form of an abstract log, 
 attached to this letter. 
 
 There remains but one question to discuss concerning the Monitor 
 type of iron-clads invented by Captain Ericsson : Can they be con 
 structed so as to make them efficient fighting, sea-going cruisers ? If 
 not, then we must adopt the European models, abstain from any further 
 attempts at progress, and content ourselves with a naval force for de 
 fensive purposes only, or invite new schemes. The facts with regard to 
 the behavior of this vessel in a moderate gale of wind and heavy sea, 
 when a frigate would find it impossible to use her battery, are as fol 
 lows : Head to the sea, she takes over about four feet of solid water, 
 which is broken as it sweeps along the deck, and after reaching the 
 turret it is too much spent to prevent firing the 15-inch guns directly 
 ahead. Broadside to the sea, either moving along or stopped, her lee 
 guns can always be worked without difficulty ; the water which passes 
 across the deck from windward being divided by the turrets, and her 
 extreme roll so moderate as not to press her lee guns near the water. 
 Lying in the same position, the 15-inch guns can be fired directly astern 
 without interference from water ; and when stem to the sea, the water 
 which comes on board is broken up in the same manner as when going 
 head to it. In the trough of the sea her ports will be liable to be 
 flooded, if required to use her guns to windward. This, therefore, 
 would be the position selected by an antagonist who desired to fight a 
 Monitor in a seaway. An ordinary vessel, high out of water, and lying 
 in the trough of the sea broadside to, is attacked by a wave which 
 climbs up the side, heels her to leeward, and passing underneath, assists 
 in throwing her back to windward, when another wave is met, and the 
 heavy lee lurch repeated. A wave advancing upon a Monitor, in a simi 
 lar position, finds no side above the water to act against ; it therefore 
 climbs aboard without difficulty, heels the vessel a few degrees to wind 
 ward, and passes quickly to leeward, underneath. The water which has 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY. 69 
 
 got on board, having no support to push it on, and an inclined deck to 
 ascend, becomes broken water, a small portion going across the deck 
 and off to leeward, but the largest part tumbling back to windward, 
 overboard, without sending against the turret any thing like the quantity 
 which first got on deck. The turret guns thus occupy a central position, 
 where, notwithstanding the lowness of the vessel s hull, they are more 
 easily and safely handled in a seaway than guns of the same height 
 above the water in a broadside vessel. The axis of the bore of the 
 1 5-inch guns of this vessel is six and a half feet above the water, and 
 the extreme lurch observed, when lying broadside to a heavy sea and 
 moderate gale, was seven degrees to windward and four degrees to lee 
 ward, mean five and one-half degrees, while the average roll at the same 
 time of the Augusta a remarkably steady ship was eighteen degrees, 
 and the Ashuelot twenty-five degrees, both vessels being steadied by 
 sail. A vessel which attacks a Monitor in a seaway must approach very 
 close to have any chance of hitting such a low hull, and even then the 
 Monitor is half the time covered up by three or four feet of water, pro 
 tecting herself and disturbing her opponent s fire. From these facts, 
 not unknown to Monitor men, and the experience we have derived from 
 the use of such vessels during the war, we may safely conclude that the 
 Monitor type of iron-clads is superior to the broadside, not only for 
 fighting purposes at sea, but also for cruising. A properly constructed 
 Monitor, possessing all the requirements of a cruiser, ought to have but 
 one turret, armed with not less than 20-inch guns, two independent pro 
 pellers, the usual proportion of sail, and constructed of iron. The com 
 forts of this Monitor to the officers and men are superior to those of any 
 other class of vessels in the Navy, arising chiefly from her steadiness, 
 ample accommodations, artificial ventilation, and the great quantity of 
 light afforded by having the bull s-eye overhead instead of at the side. 
 The commander and lieutenant-commander, and several of the officers, 
 are old Monitor men, and acquired confidence in this form of vessel off 
 Charleston ; nevertheless the officers and men deserve to share with their 
 comrades in the Pacific the credit which attaches to extending the voy 
 ages of ships embracing so many novelties. 
 
 I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. V. Fox, 
 
 Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 ^V^ Jf^^^Q^Ui^r^^ , 
 ^jJ\f /rf v 
 
 SYWpt 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 FURTHER DETAILS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT, 
 OFFICE OF CHIEF CLERK, ETC. 
 
 IT lias already been suggested that the title of Chief Clerk 
 of the Department does not fully express the importance of his 
 position or the nature of his duties. It is sometimes spoken of 
 as the confidential clerk of the Secretary, but this name also 
 fails to convey a true idea of his relation to the business of the 
 Department. The duties and labors of the Navy Department 
 naturally separate into two divisions, one of which is very 
 properly supervised by one having nautical skill, while the man 
 agement of the other requires great business capacity and a 
 general knowledge of business affairs rather than the special at 
 tainments of the seaman. 
 
 On the Assistant Secretary devolved what more particularly 
 relates to nautical affairs, while the Chief Clerk was placed at 
 the head of the business branch of the service ; both of these 
 officers holding nearly the same general relation to the Secretary. 
 William Faxon* held this position during the war, and also 
 during a portion of Mr. Johnson s administration. 
 
 *Mr. FAXON was born in Hartford, Connecticut, on the 17th of April, 1822. He 
 connected himself early in life with a newspaper and printing office, and received thus 
 the advantages of a business which has produced more good scholars, and clear, vigor 
 ous writers than any other in this country, which does not include a classical education. 
 After having made himself acquainted with this business in the office of the Connec 
 ticut Courant, and having prepared himself not only to be a publisher, but a writer, 
 he obtained an interest in that paper and became one of its editors. 
 
 The Hartford Evening Press (daily), and the Connecticut Press (weekly), the first 
 Republican papers in Connecticut, were also established under the direction of Mr. 
 Faxon, in February, 1856. In this new and more extended sphere of action, and in the 
 daily discussion of those great questions which have since upturned the very founda- 
 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAW. 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK. 71 
 
 The position of the Chief Clerk makes him the medium of 
 communication between the Secretary and the business world in 
 all those matters which relate to the practical working and carry 
 ing out of the plans adopted. Others might decide upon the 
 form and size of a ship, but the actual building of the vessel, 
 the contracts, the payments, these must, of course, be committed 
 to the proper hands ; but for the general supervision of these 
 things, as well as for a condensed statement of all, the Secre 
 tary depends upon the Chief Clerk. The same is true of all 
 the other countless operations of the Department. He is the 
 engineer-in-chief of the operating force. He arranges the de 
 tails, and also sums up and generalizes results, that at a glance 
 the Secretary may survey the whole field and understand the 
 condition of affairs. 
 
 The amount of business which passed through this officer s 
 hands may be partially seen by considering that about six hun 
 dred ships were purchased, built, or hired during the war ; that 
 armaments, crews, and stores were to be provided for all these ; 
 that contracts for guns, for machinery, for stores, for timber and 
 materials of all descriptions were to be entered into, and for 
 all these payment was to be made in due time. These things 
 give only an inadequate idea of the amount and variety of 
 business that was constantly demanding attention, and which 
 required the utmost vigilance and unwearied care. To arrange 
 and systematize all this, to divide all aright among the ap 
 propriate bureaus, to conduct or supervise the correspondence 
 which did not require the Secretary s own hand, was particularly, 
 
 tions of society, and in both social and political relations with the leading men of the 
 State, Mr. Faxon acquired the influence, the breadth of view, the variety of information, 
 and the firmness of conviction which fitted him for the important part which he has since 
 performed iu our great national struggle. He was thus prepared to give his services 
 to his country not merely from a cool sense of duty, but with an ardent love for the 
 right and for the Union which stimulated all his powers. His knowledge of the po 
 litical interests and movements of the country enabled him to judge of the bearing 
 and probable effect of important measures, and his advice was often sought and ever 
 valued by the Secretary. 
 
 Scarcely had the brief sketch of the Chief Clerk been finished, when Captain Fox, 
 having been sent to Europe in the Miantonomoh, Mr. Faxon was nominated to the 
 Senate as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and was at once confirmed, without an op 
 posing voice. 
 
72 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 during the war, a task which demanded uncommon business ac 
 curacy and tact. 
 
 The quiet of the Navy Department has misled many a 
 bustling man, who has rushed in from the show and bustle and 
 noise of Wall Street or commercial circles, and finding himself 
 in a spot where all was hushed, no Babel of brokers boards or 
 auction-rooms, no steam-engine s roar and clatter, has concluded, 
 while the perspiration was drying on his own face, that all about 
 him were either asleep or unbearably dull. The writer has heard 
 very busy men say they disliked to visit the Navy Department, 
 it was such a sleepy place. Members of Congress going from 
 the activities and lively scenes of the House up to the Depart 
 ment, find all so still, no loud debate, or universal conversation 
 or stir, that they feel as if nothing were going on. 
 
 Correspondents and editors of some newspapers have thought 
 they were publishing a very profound observation when they 
 described the Secretary and his associates as dozing over the 
 perils of the country, and thousands really believed that dozing 
 inactivity reigned over all the operations of the Department. The 
 War Department had its camps, and forts, and waving banners 
 everywhere, its pomp of armies, its march of columns through 
 the streets, the tramp of its cavalry, its rumbling batteries, its 
 long army trains, its orderlies dashing swiftly about, and thou 
 sands of uniforms flashing on prancing steeds, and before the 
 eyes of the people daily were the gay pomp and circum 
 stance of war, and all could see that something was being 
 done. And great and glorious things were indeed done. But 
 the public made an egregious mistake when they concluded that 
 nothing important was going forward in the quiet rooms of the 
 Navy Department, because there was no bustle or noise. The stir 
 which they occasioned was up and down three thousand miles 
 of coast, along thousands of miles of Western rivers, and in the 
 harbors of the South, and on the ocean far removed from the 
 observation of the public, unheard in great degree, and there 
 fore unknown. Instead of dashing orderlies and messengers 
 rushing to and from the Navy Department, the unheard tele 
 graph brought and received its orders, and the public saw not 
 the fleets that these orders put in motion, and had no means of 
 estimating aright the work they were performing. A single 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK. 73 
 
 stroke upon a bell, tlie handing of a dispatch to a messenger, 
 would probably be all that an observer could hear or see of a 
 transaction upon which the most important interests depended, 
 and he might therefore suppose, as many did, that little or 
 nothing was being accomplished. The Chief Clerk obtained a re 
 markable knowledge of details. In collecting the materials for 
 this history, the writer seldom knew him to hesitate in regard to 
 any point respecting which information was needed. He either 
 knew himself what was sought for, or he could refer to the book, 
 or the record, or the person from which the knowledge could 
 be obtained ; and much that is valuable in the work is due to the 
 unwearied kindness with which all possible aid was afforded. 
 The amount of work which he was able to perform was owing 
 to the fact that all his means were orderly disposed and always 
 within his reach, and the machinery of his office wrought not 
 only with rapidity but with machine-like accuracy. By com 
 mon consent he was admirably fitted for the position he occu 
 pied, and he performed a work during the war much more im 
 portant than is generally supposed. 
 
 It is believed that such a difficult and gigantic task as was so 
 successfully performed by the Navy Department was never be 
 fore executed with so little of bustle, or surface agitation of any 
 kind. It was due very much to the fact that the Secretary 
 selected his subordinates with discrimination, so that the differ 
 ent branches of the work were committed to those who were 
 eminently the men for the station, and that all worked together 
 in harmony. In the working out of the plans of the Depart 
 ment, and in the supervision of the whole business machinery, 
 by which results were to be reached, the Chief Clerk found his 
 appropriate place, a wide and important sphere of action, which 
 could be well filled only by one of great business talent and 
 skill. The power, then, with which the Department was 
 worked, was, first of all, the combined force of these three 
 minds, each laboring in its own sphere, but unitedly to a com 
 mon end, and the quiet with which they wrought was indicative 
 not of inaction, but of order and of real power. 
 
 The war having been finished, a large proportion of the 
 business of the peace establishment came naturally within the 
 sphere which the Chief Clerk had formerly occupied, and Mr. 
 
74 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Faxon found himself already prepared for a position which was 
 new rather in name than in the character of its duties. He 
 brought to the office one important qualification, the faculty of 
 attending to a great variety of details without confusion, and 
 of turning easily from one subject to another and giving due 
 attention to each. Many men possessing every other quality 
 for business have failed from the lack of this. Having become 
 occupied with one affair, a sudden interruption is apt to disturb 
 them. They cannot readily call off the mind from what it is 
 considering and turn to the new question, and therefore busi 
 ness drags or gets into confusion, and those waiting for action 
 become impatient. In such an office as that of the Assistant 
 Secretary of the Navy, a single hour will sometimes bring what 
 would seem an almost impossible variety of affairs. Senators, 
 chairmen of House committees, contractors, mothers, wives, 
 sisters, to inquire where their friends are, men who seek ap 
 pointments for themselves or others, clerks with all kinds of 
 papers to be inspected or signed, men with every sort of com 
 plaints, friends to make a call, collectors of autographs, perhaps 
 a historian baffled in his hunt for a fact all these sometimes 
 crowd a morning hour, and each would feel insulted or grieved 
 if his case were not deemed to be of very special and peculiar 
 importance. 
 
CHAPTEE V. 
 
 THE CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPIN 
 ION AT THE TIME OF MR. LINCOLN S INAUGURATION. 
 
 THE bearing which this topic has upon the operations of the 
 Navy Department will be seen by considering that if the war 
 had been against a foreign power, the united loyalty and enthu 
 siasm of the people would have rendered the task of the Gov 
 ernment a comparatively easy one. Crippled though it was in 
 its resources, while a wide-spread sympathy with the rebellion 
 even in the States which did not secede, and a general dispo 
 sition to make concessions rather than resort to force, would 
 render any suitable preparation for war an almost impossible 
 thing. The difficulties of the situation would also be largely 
 increased if the proper resources of the Government were so 
 disposed, by previous treachery, as to be beyond control. 
 
 In order, therefore, to show aright the work actually per 
 formed by the Navy Department, the difficulties which beset, 
 and the obstacles which were surmounted, it is necessary to pre 
 sent a brief statement of the condition of the country at the 
 beginning of Mr. Lincoln s administration. 
 
 Probably no nation was ever more completely unprepared 
 for a great conflict than was our Government when the rebels 
 committed their first hostile acts by seizing forts, arsenals, and 
 ships. A dismantled ship without an armament, a fortress with 
 its guns dismounted and spiked, and the garrison gone, would 
 not adequately represent the utter impotency of the United 
 States for attack or defence, when it was first clearly seen that 
 there was no escape from war without yielding both the nation s 
 honor and life. 
 
76 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Many who were rebels in heart and purpose had a control 
 in the Government just previous to the war, and the most 
 powerful minds of the South, and some even at the North, were 
 conspiring w T ith these State officers, so to destroy the credit 
 of the Government, so to dispose of the ]STavy and Army, so to 
 scatter or destroy its resources or transfer them to the possession 
 of the South, as to render it impossible for it either to strike an 
 offensive blow, or to defend itself when the plan of the traitors 
 was mature. 
 
 The little Army was beyond reach on the frontier, under 
 command of General Twiggs, selected for his work ; the Navy 
 was chiefly in foreign seas, or remote from the spot where ships 
 would be needed most and soonest ; forts, arsenals, ships, navy- 
 yards were placed, so far as possible, in charge of the friends of 
 the South ; and in every one of the Departments of the Govern 
 ment were men, and some of them in important places, who 
 used their situations as far as possible to give information of 
 every plan and movement of the Government, and to aid the 
 plot of the conspirators. 
 
 In addition to these almost insuperable difficulties of a ma 
 terial nature, the country had lost much of its moral power. 
 The habit of yielding to Southern dictation seemed to have 
 sapped the manhood of the North. The life-force of the nation 
 was absorbed in the pursuits of peace, and peace was demanded 
 by every interest of the merchant, the manufacturer, the banker, 
 and the man of wealth. They were at first slow to put a higher 
 estimate upon principle, and national unity, and national honor, 
 than they did upon money. 
 
 Many, perhaps most of our leading statesmen, men who 
 largely controlled the opinions of the people, were entirely mis 
 taken in regard to the intentions of the Southern leaders. They 
 could not believe that it was really their settled purpose to or 
 ganize a separate government, even at the perils and cost of 
 war. It seemed to most an incredible thing that men who not 
 only had no just cause of complaint, but had freely enjoyed 
 more than their due share of the honors, the profits, and general 
 blessings of our common Government, whose every important 
 demand had been granted by the North, in a spirit which often 
 passed the bounds of proper concession, could plot the ruin of 
 
CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY. Y7 
 
 the country from whose protecting power and cherishing kind 
 ness they had received their all. 
 
 Men would not believe that Americans could be guilty of so 
 foul a crime, and therefore the very enormity of this iniquity, 
 by placing it beyond belief, gave the conspirators a temporary 
 security, and time to perfect their plot. They retained boldly 
 their places under the Government, using their positions to plan 
 and secure the success of their cause. This also was for a time 
 an effectual shield. Who could believe that Americans would 
 cast away fidelity to a trust, honor, manliness, and even the 
 solemnity of their official oaths, and remain in the Depart 
 ments, in the Senate and House, in the Army and Navy, the 
 recognized officers of the Government, receiving their proper 
 pay, while every thought and feeling of their hearts was false 
 to their trusts, and every act was that of a deliberate traitor ? 
 
 It is an honorable proof of the superior moral condition of 
 the North that it could form no conception of such a monstrous 
 crime, and refused at first to believe it even a possible thing. 
 Hence the leading thought of our foremost men at the time of 
 Mr. Lincoln s inauguration seemed to be, " The South intends in 
 this movement only to obtain some fresh concessions, some new 
 guaranties for her property and what she deems to be her 
 rights, and in view of the priceless value of the Union we must 
 concede to the utmost limits of safety and honor." What those 
 limits were it is well perhaps to consider, in order to show 
 what the state of the public mind was when the Navy Depart 
 ment began its operations. 
 
 At the close of Mr. Buchanan s administration the rebellion 
 had made such progress that from Pennsylvania to Key West 
 only three forts, Fortress Monroe, Sumter with its handful of 
 eighty men, and Pickens at Pensacola, remained to the Gov 
 ernment of all its property and defences on the Southern coast ; 
 and because this general statement gives no clear idea of the 
 loss, or the disadvantage at which it placed the Government, 
 the following account is presented in detail of the fortifications 
 and property which the insurgents seized : Fort Moultrie and 
 Castle Pinckney, in Charleston harbor ; Forts Fisher, Caswell, 
 and Macon, commanding the entrance to Beaufort and Wilming 
 ton ; Fort Pulaski, at Savannah ; Forts Morgan and Gaines, at 
 
78 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Mobile ; Forts Philip and Jackson, below New Orleans ; Fort 
 Pike, on Lake Pontchartrain ; Forts Barrancas and McKae, at 
 Pensacola ; and the Army and all the public property in Texas. 
 Add to this list the arsenals, custom-houses, mints, post-offices, 
 revenue cutters, and sub-treasuries, which were all seized 
 throughout the South, and it is estimated that the rebels had 
 taken from the Government thirty million dollars worth of 
 property, besides seizing nearly all the defences of the South, 
 before Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. 
 
 It is not surprising that the boldest and truest-hearted men 
 should have been startled at this first scene in the tragedy ; 
 and there is perhaps little room for censure, because their 
 first efforts were to avert the storm by hastening with various 
 offers of concession. True it is, that viewed in the light of 
 subsequent events, some of the propositions made seem almost 
 like a timid surrender of the very manhood of the North, like 
 the abandonment of essential principles ; but we must remem 
 ber that the light of this day had not then risen upon the 
 country. 
 
 A brief statement of the proffered concessions and various 
 efforts for peace, will show how opposed to war was the heart 
 of the country, how reluctant to begin violent resistance even 
 to treason ; and this will reveal some of the difficulties which 
 beset the Navy Department as well as other branches of the 
 Government. 
 
 They were called upon to inaugurate war on the most stu 
 pendous scale, while many of our most trusted leaders were 
 almost on their knees, desiring peace on terms that seem to us 
 humiliating now, and which demoralized, almost fatally, the 
 people of the country. Without ships or materiel and the whole 
 country averse to war, the Navy Department was called upon 
 to create a Navy equal to that of France or England ; and when 
 we remember that this work was actually done, let the country 
 consider whether any thing less than consummate business skill, 
 far-seeing sagacity, promptness, energy, and executive ability of 
 the highest order, could have performed the task. 
 
 Mr. Buchanan s administration closed with the declaration 
 that a State could not constitutionally be coerced, a sentiment 
 which would annihilate the national Government, and that gave 
 
CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY. 79 
 
 full sanction to every doctrine and act of the traitors. "When 
 we consider that this opinion went forth from the President 
 of the United States, clothed with all the official power of 
 that high position, and that it came from the chief of a great 
 Northern party, it is seen that it was an efficient instrument 
 for dividing the North, for misleading and corrupting the peo 
 ple, and for encouraging the hearts of the traitors. It was like 
 attempting the moral disarming of the North, the sapping of 
 the very truths and principles on which our Government 
 stands. 
 
 It is sufficient to state the main points of the propositions 
 which the leaders of the Republican party, including the Presi 
 dent, made to the insurgents after the inauguration of Mr. 
 Lincoln : 
 
 They offered additional guaranties for the prompt, faithful, 
 and unhindered operation of the Fugitive Slave Law. 
 
 They proposed to pay the full value of every slave not re 
 covered, through any assistance given in the Free States to the 
 fugitive. 
 
 They were willing to amend the Constitution so as to place 
 slavery beyond the control of Congress, and render it forever 
 secure as one of the recognized, rightful, and perpetual institu 
 tions of the country. 
 
 This last proposition was made by Mr. Corwin in the House, 
 and by Mr. Seward in the Peace Conference, and was passed as a 
 joint resolution by a two : thirds majority both in the House and 
 in the Senate. Is it possible to conceive of any measures better 
 calculated than these to blind and sear the conscience of the 
 North ? They reduced the country to a state of moral impo- 
 tency in regard to the great issues before it ; and how could the 
 Departments expect or even hope for a vigorous response when 
 the call was made for a war upon those who declared they had 
 seceded in order to build an empire on the corner-stone of 
 slavery ? 
 
 What was the crime in this, when the Northern leaders 
 had just offered to assume all the guilt of slavery, and make it, 
 by the Constitution itself, perpetual ? There was at first no 
 moral principle to which to appeal, and no moral basis for the 
 war to rest upon ; and the Navy Department felt the full force 
 
80 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of the difficulty. The whole service seemed for a time to be 
 demoralized, and disloyalty and treachery were on all sides 
 thwarting the plans of the Government. 
 
 The following is related as one only among the countless 
 phases of the treachery which the Navy Department was called 
 upon to meet and baffle : In the earlier stages of the conflict 
 the rebels were particularly anxious to obtain information con 
 cerning the movements of the Navy, and even the intentions of 
 the Secretary. They knew that if they could penetrate the 
 secrets of this Department, they could anticipate any attempt 
 to succor Sumter or recapture the other Southern forts. No 
 art which could be devised by men skilled in intrigue was left 
 untried to gain this coveted knowledge. 
 
 In the evening of the first of April, 1861, a package was 
 brought from the President by his private secretary, and hand 
 ed to the Secretary of the Navy, which contained a very re 
 markable order. At that time Commodore Stringham was per 
 forming the duties which belong to the chief of the Bureau of 
 Detail, a bureau not then created. These duties involve of 
 course the most intimate and confidential relations with the 
 Secretary of the Navy. The detailing officer would necessarily 
 know the whole personnel of the Navy, the position and duties 
 of every officer, and even every movement proposed or actual. 
 With this officer under rebel influences, almost the private 
 thoughts of the Secretary might be revealed to the conspirators. 
 The loyalty of Commodore Stringham was beyond suspicion ; 
 the conspirators knew he could not be approached. 
 
 The order already mentioned provided, first of all, for the 
 removal of Commodore Stringham to a distant station, to take 
 command of the Home Squadron ; and then directed the Sec 
 retary to appoint in his place Captain Samuel Barron, with spe 
 cial instructions to put him in possession of full information 
 concerning the Navy, its officers, and its movements. The 
 Secretary, knowing well the character and sentiments of Cap 
 tain Barron, -went immediately to the President. As it was 
 quite an unusual hour for such an interview, the President, as 
 the Secretary entered his room, exclaimed, pleasantly, " What 
 have I been doing wrong now ? " The Secretary showed him 
 the order, and explained to him that the sympathies of Barron 
 
CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY. 81 
 
 were all warmly with the conspirators, and that he could not 
 think of having a man thrust into his Department and in such 
 a position, especially one whom he had no reason to trust. The 
 President replied that he had signed many papers that day 
 which he had not examined, and that he knew nothing himself 
 of Barren ; that he had signed the order as he had other papers, 
 trusting to those in whom he thought he ought to confide, and 
 concluded by telling the Secretary to pay no attention to the 
 order and retain Commodore Stringham in his place, or select 
 for it any other man whom he approved. 
 
 It is unnecessary perhaps to inquire where or how this 
 dangerous paper originated, but it must have passed through 
 high places somewhere before it could reach the desk of the 
 President. Two facts will throw much light upon the designs 
 of the originator of this order, whoever he may have been. 
 
 This Captain Samuel Barron is the man who, on the 21st 
 of January preceding, had been selected by Secretary Toucey 
 to proceed to Pensacola and prevent any United States vessels 
 from entering the harbor ; the negotiator, as supposed, of an 
 armistice entered into by Mr. Buchanan and the leaders, to 
 which the commander of the Sabine refers in his letter to Sec 
 retary Welles, dated " Off Pensacola, April 1, 1861," in which 
 letter he states that he declined to land troops sent out by Gen 
 eral Scott, because he had previous orders from the Navy De 
 partment to the contrary. The orders to which he refers are 
 those from Secretary Toucey, carried out by this Samuel Bar 
 ron, and which forbade any United States vessels from entering 
 the harbor. Barron soon after deserted his flag and openly es 
 poused the rebel cause, and was one of the very first officers 
 captured after the war began. 
 
 It is not easy to mistake the design of an order which, 
 if carried out, would have placed a confidential tool of the 
 leaders where he would necessarily have known most of the se 
 crets and designs of the Navy Department ; where, aided by the 
 conspirators, he could seriously have embarrassed its operations, 
 and, at the same time, keep them advised of every movement 
 of the Government. 
 
 Such was the condition of the country and its resources, and 
 such the opinions and feelings which pervaded the land ; and 
 
82 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 such were the views and propositions of our leading politicians 
 and statesmen, when at length the North cast aside its wishes 
 for conciliation and peace to find itself betrayed, stripped of its 
 resources, disarmed, and demoralized, and in that state confront 
 ing a rebellion fully organized, perfectly united, armed with 
 the spoils of the Government, confident of success, enthusi 
 astically supported by France and England, and with active, 
 sympathizing friends spread over all the JSTorth. 
 
 Under such circumstances the ISTavy Department was called 
 upon to perform a work which most here and in Europe be 
 lieved to be an impossible task, even if it had the fleets of Eng 
 land or France at its disposal. The nature of this work, and 
 the means at the disposal of the Department for executing it, 
 will form the subject of another chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE QUESTION OF THE BLOCKADE. 
 
 IN the very beginning of the rebellion the Government was 
 called upon to decide one of the most important questions of 
 the war. Indeed, when viewed in the light of subsequent 
 events, it is seen to have been the point on which the policy 
 of foreign nations hinged, and which necessarily controlled our 
 own toward the insurgents. It was the main cause which 
 shaped the character of the contest both abroad and at home. 
 That question was, whether the Government should proclaim a 
 blockade, or declare the ports of the insurgent States to be 
 closed. The Cabinet was divided in opinion, and from the 
 first the Secretary of the Navy took decided ground in favor 
 of closing the ports, a position which he never abandoned, and 
 subsequent events have abundantly proved his sagacity and his 
 statesmanship. 
 
 On the 19th of April, 1861, the President issued his procla 
 mation establishing a " blockade " for the ports of South Caro 
 lina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
 Texas. A second proclamation, issued on the 27th of April, 
 extended this " blockade to the ports of Virginia and North 
 Carolina," and thus it was made to cover the whole coast of the 
 States in rebellion. 
 
 On the 13th of July, 1861, Congress evidently supposing 
 that the policy of the Government on this point was not per 
 manently settled, authorized the President to " close the ports " 
 of any States in insurrection, and the question thus presented 
 between this course and a " blockade " became the subject of 
 discussion in the Cabinet. 
 
84 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy adhering to his opinion that the 
 ports should be dosed instead of being blockaded, the President 
 requested him to make a more definite statement of his views 
 in writing. 
 
 In answer to this request, the Secretary presented a paper to 
 the President, on the 5th of August, 1861, of which the follow 
 ing is a synopsis ; and which shows how clearly Mr. Welles and 
 those who acted with him, at this early stage of the conflict, 
 saw all the main bearings of this grave question, upon .our rela 
 tions at home and abroad. 
 
 These arguments have since been thrown into much clearer 
 light and bolder relief, by the positions assumed by Lord Russell 
 in his correspondence with Mr. Adams, concerning the Alabama 
 and her piratical consorts. 
 
 The Secretary, in this paper, first assumes that the decision 
 must necessarily determine, so far as the act of our Government 
 could do it, whether the conflict should be regarded as a mere 
 insurrection on the part of the Southern States, and therefore a 
 domestic affair, or w r hether we should proclaim it a true war 
 between independent powers, to be governed by the rules and 
 practice of international law. 
 
 He urged this view from the generally conceded fact, that a 
 blockade can be established only against the ports of a foreign 
 power, and referred to the opinion of eminent jurists, that a na 
 tion cannot blockade its own ports ; but that commerce must 
 be excluded from them, if at all, by closing them. 
 
 Prom this principle of international law he argued, that to 
 establish a blockade of the Southern ports would be, in effect, 
 and according to the usages of the law of nations, to proclaim 
 them lawful belligerents, and invested with all the rights of an 
 independent power; remove from them the name and the 
 odium of a rebellion ; give to their cause, in the eyes of many, 
 the moral basis of justifiable revolution, and impart to it a 
 strength which it could not otherwise obtain. 
 
 That to be consistent, their collectors, revenue officers, 
 clearances, registers, etc., must be recognized as legitimate. 
 
 The Secretary reminded the President, that in all our pol 
 icy, both legislative and executive, we were treating the rebels, 
 as such, as mere insurgents, and that the Government could not 
 
THE QUESTION OF THE BLOCKADE. 85 
 
 occupy this position in its general policy, and then change its 
 ground to suit its convenience, and, by proclaiming a blockade, 
 admit them to be independent and lawful belligerents. They 
 could not be treated both as rebels, guilty of high treason, and 
 also as engaged in lawful war. 
 
 He proceeded to point out the difference between a blockade 
 and a closing of ports. The first carries with it the consequen 
 ces already mentioned ; the last removes the whole contest from 
 the sphere of international law, makes of it purely a domestic 
 question, and brings every one attempting to enter a port thus 
 closed, under our municipal laws, to be treated according to the 
 decision of our own courts ; while it would leave the rebels in 
 their proper position, and with their true name and character as 
 traitors. 
 
 The manly American spirit which has characterized the 
 Department and the Navy during the whole war is well exhib 
 ited in the following extract from the Secretary s paper. The 
 country may feel assured that the honor of the nation has ever 
 been safe in the hands of the Navy : 
 
 " Our right as a nation to close our own ports will not, I take it for 
 granted, be questioned, or be permitted to he questioned. They are 
 within our own jurisdiction and control, and the right cannot be sur 
 rendered to foreign dictation without a surrender of our nationality. 
 
 " I am aware that Lord John Russell has recently asserted a contrary 
 opinion, evidently intended as an admonition to us ; in which lie under 
 takes to maintain that the power and authority of a government over its 
 own ports is less in a period of insurrection or civil commotion than in 
 peaceful times. In other words, Great Britain declares that when a 
 country needs to exercise its authority most, it shall be dispossessed of 
 that authority by foreign interference ; that when the integrity of a 
 country is threatened by insurgents, foreign governments will interpose 
 and assert dismemberment to be a foregone conclusion ; that national 
 law is inoperative when its enforcement is essential to national existence ; 
 that we must rely upon the law of nations as expounded by the British 
 admirals, instead of our own laws and our own officers, for governing our 
 own country, and regulating its domestic affairs. I do not admit the 
 morality nor tlie legality of the reasoning of the British minister, nor 
 do I believe the British Government would tolerate such dictation or 
 interference in her domestic affairs. Were there no fear of Great 
 
86 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Britain, no threat or apprehension from foreign powers, should we hesi 
 tate for one moment on this question of closing our own ports ? If not, 
 shall we, in our misfortune, submit to the arrogance and dictation of 
 foreign governments in relation to our domestic affairs ? " 
 
 Again, the Secretary says, in regard to this measure of clos 
 ing the ports : 
 
 " It is one strictly national and rightful, attended with no doubts or 
 difficulties, except from foreign interference, which should not be per* 
 mitted to control our internal domestic affairs for a moment." 
 
 In these sentiments, the true American spirit speaks in 
 manly tones the same spirit that animated the Navy of 1812. 
 Whoever else may have hesitated or quailed at a foreign threat, 
 the Navy never did less than proudly and firmly defend the na 
 tional honor. 
 
 The Secretary next asserts his fear that the long coast-line 
 of more than three thousand miles could not be effectually 
 guarded by any force at our command. In this he but shared 
 the opinion of all Europe, who sneered at the idea of such a 
 blockade ; and it is not at all surprising that in common with 
 all his associates he should, at that early period of the rebellion, 
 have underrated the power and resources of the country, or was 
 not fully aware of the energy and executive ability of the De 
 partment of which he was the chief, and which he so signally 
 manifested in the hour of trial. 
 
 The advantages of the Secretary s plan are so great and so 
 manifest, as viewed in the light of what has since occurred, 
 that it seems marvellous they should not, even then, have been 
 clearly seen. Had that plan been adopted, it would have been 
 a clear, decided, and continual proclamation to the world, that 
 the United States considered those in arms against the Govern 
 ment to be rebels and traitors ; and that it claimed the right to 
 treat them as such, and not as lawful belligerents. Nor would 
 this position have precluded the Government from making an 
 arrangement for the exchange of prisoners, for such an agreement 
 could be made even with a band of robbers, without acknowl 
 edging them to be engaged in a lawful occupation. 
 
 There could have been no fitting out from British or other 
 
THE QUESTION OF THE BLOCKADE. 87 
 
 ports of such piratical cruisers as the Alabama, because there 
 would have been no belligerents at the South, and consequently 
 no neutrals abroad. The Government, after it had declared, 
 through Mr. Seward s dispatch to Mr. Adams, May 21, 1861, 
 that it would treat privateers in the insurgent service as pirates, 
 would not have been compelled to abandon its position, and 
 receive and treat them as prisoners of war, because the block 
 ade had virtually recognized them as belligerents. 
 
 It is true that Jefferson Davis threatened to retaliate, and 
 take life for life, if the Government should execute as pirates 
 any whom it might capture at sea ; but to assert the right and 
 maintain the principle would have been no more difficult or 
 dangerous than to declare them rebels on the land, and guilty 
 of treason, and then exchange them as prisoners of war. 
 
 Had the insurgents been sternly held, from first to last, to 
 all the just consequences of rebellion and treason, our first de 
 cided successes would have thrown the moral influence of the 
 world against them ; the proper stigma would have been at 
 tached to their cause, and they would have been shorn of their 
 strength and confidence together. At the very worst, could any 
 conceivable form of retaliation have equalled the horrors of 
 murdering our brave, true-hearted men, as they did by thou 
 sands and thousands, in those Southern prisons ? 
 
 In the South were many scenes of fatal violence to soldiers 
 and Union men ; and it can scarcely be doubted now, that 
 had the Government closed the ports, and had it treated, from 
 first to last, all captured on the sea as pirates, and all on the 
 land as guilty of treason, and then punished or showed mercy 
 according to its own discretion, it would have saved at least a 
 hundred thousand Northern lives. Had the ports been closed, 
 the Government would not have sanctioned the doctrine, that 
 the States, by seceding and commencing hostilities, gained the 
 status of an independent or foreign power, a position virtually 
 conceded to them by the blockade, nor would it have incurred 
 the charge of inconsistency, since so freely made, in demanding 
 that the Southern leaders should sue for pardon, as rebels, guilty 
 of treason, when by the blockade they had been presented to all 
 the world as having belligerent rights. The establishment of the 
 blockade strengthened the insurgents cause, both at home and 
 
88 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 abroad, because, in their opinion, and in the estimation of Eu 
 rope, it conceded to the Confederates a separate national existence. 
 If there was fear of England, will not every true American re 
 spond to the sentiment of the Secretary of the Navy, when he 
 said that no menace from a foreign power should deter us from 
 asserting our rights and maintaining our honor ? 
 
 Had the policy of closing the ports been adopted, England 
 would have been deprived of the main shelter, from behind 
 which she has carried on against us a covert war ; nor would 
 she, when charged with precipitancy in declaring the rebels 
 belligerents, have been able to reply, as she has done : " Your 
 Government was the first to acknowledge them, by proclaiming 
 a blockade." 
 
 Such is a brief statement of the facts concerning this impor 
 tant question ; and the country will not fail to appreciate the 
 high sense of national honor, the true American spirit, and the 
 true statesmanship, that marked the course of the Navy De 
 partment in that trying hour. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE WORK REQUIRED OF THE NAVY, 
 
 WHEN it was decided to blockade our ports, instead of 
 closing them, a work was laid upon the Navy, the magnitude of 
 which is entirely unknown to most of the people, because very 
 few are acquainted with the facts, and fewer still at the begin 
 ning of the war had any clear idea of what was necessary to be 
 done. 
 
 The conflict was so novel in its character, that there were no 
 precedents to consult, and no old landmarks to guide. A sin 
 gle example will show how far many of our foremost men were 
 from understanding the real nature of the war, and of the task 
 which had been committed to the Navy. The Navy Depart 
 ment, at first, selected some of the most prominent and trusted 
 shipping merchants in New York, and consulted with them, as 
 an informal board of advisers, in regard to the purchase and fit 
 ting out of vessels; and when twenty had been obtained, one of 
 the most eminent of these advisers gave it, as his opinion, that 
 it would require thirty more sailing vessels to complete the 
 blockade. The idea of maintaining a blockade with a steam- 
 fleet, had then entered the minds of few outside of the Depart 
 ment and its officers. 
 
 Take this proposition from an experienced shipping mer 
 chant, to obtain thirty more sailing vessels to complete the 
 blockade, and place it by the side of the fact that it actually re 
 quired nearly six hundred vessels most of them steamers to 
 seal up our coast-line, and it will be seen that, before the Navy 
 Department could take any very important steps, it was ne 
 cessary to convince even well-informed men of the greatness 
 
90 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of the work to be done. In order to understand the diffi 
 culty of maintaining on our shores an effective blockade, one 
 must consider the peculiar formation of the coast. The true outer 
 coast-line, from the northern boundary of Virginia to Mexico, is 
 more than three thousand miles in length ; and had it been ne 
 cessary merely to guard imports of the principal cities of the 
 South, the task would have been comparatively easy. But this 
 external coast-line is merely the outer edge of what may almost 
 be called a series of islands some long, some short, some wide, 
 and others very narrow stretching along the whole Atlantic 
 shore, behind which there are sounds and connecting channels, 
 forming an almost continuous line of water, navigable for small 
 vessels, from Norfolk to Florida. This outer coast-line is cut 
 through by almost countless navigable inlets, communicating 
 with the bays and channels within, and also with an inner coast 
 line, even more extensive than the outer one. So that, al 
 though the main port of a city might be effectually guarded, 
 the small, swift blockade-runner might pass through some inlet, 
 far above or below, and glide securely to her destination, along 
 these inner sounds and channels. 
 
 Along all this internal coast, and up and down the rivers 
 and bays, an active commerce might be carried on while the 
 blockading fleet was guarding the sea entrances to the main 
 harbors of important towns. What rendered the work still 
 more difficult was, that these inlets, opening often through shift 
 ing sands, are constantly changing, so that the channel of to 
 day may be closed to-morrow ; and w r here to-day no ship can 
 pass, perhaps the winds and waves will to-morrow plough a 
 channel through. The blockade-runners were guided by a 
 perfect system of shore signals, which were kindly supplied to 
 all needing them, as is said, by the British consul at Havana ; 
 while the vessels were taken in by pilots perfectly acquainted 
 with every mile of the coast. Add to this the fact, that the mo 
 ment the policy of the two countries was announced, and the 
 blockade was proclaimed, the science, the wealth, the mechani 
 cal skill, and the ingenuity of England were largely employed 
 to devise and execute the most promising plans for violating 
 the blockade, and for supplying the rebels with munitions of 
 war and whatever they might need beside. 
 
THE WORK REQUIRED OF THE NAVY. 91 
 
 It is believed that tlie keen, icy, degrading selfishness of 
 England, as shown in her conduct then, is without a parallel in 
 the history of nations. It reached that pitch of shamelessness 
 where there was not even a pretence of any regard for justice, 
 or any moral principle whatever ; not even a reference to any 
 noble impulse, or a generous sentiment ; no feeling of sympathy 
 or pity for a people of their own kindred, struggling to maintain 
 a lawful government against a formidable rebellion, to maintain 
 law, and order, and human rights, and free institutions, against 
 traitors leagued for the overthrow of all these, and whose suc 
 cess would have stopped the progress of American civilization, 
 and have given a new lease of power to the worst despotisms of 
 Europe. 
 
 The course of England was the most complete vindication of 
 her own writers who charge her with having become insensible 
 to any great moral principle, to every great idea, and alive only 
 to the one degrading purpose of heaping up wealth, careless 
 alike whether she feeds her greed upon the blood and tears of 
 her own children, or upon the weakness or misfortunes of other 
 nations. Whatever may be thought of this, one fact is beyond 
 dispute : Great Britain, by her American policy, has corrupted 
 her own public sentiment, has diminished the moral force of 
 the nation, and has thus inflicted upon herself a wrong which 
 she cannot soon repair. She is incapable, for the present, either 
 of a great enterprise or of an heroic defence. She will need the 
 furnace of affliction to purge this mammon dross away. She 
 will require the pressure and the inspiration of trial before she 
 will regain what was once noble in her character. She cannot 
 reply to such statements, that other nations have done similar 
 things. 
 
 Doubtless individuals of other lands have been guilty of 
 acts like hers. But where else shall we find an example of the 
 leading classes of a whole nation cheering on the manifest 
 wrong, casting all true convictions and all former professions 
 alike away, giving themselves to the impossible task of proving 
 the truth a lie, and making falsehood their watchword ? Where 
 else do we find a nation becoming hot and enthusiastic in evil 
 merely to make herself richer, and to gratify a low jealousy of 
 her own offspring, because they were too prosperous to suit her 
 
92 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ambition and her pride ? America came forth from the war far 
 nobler and stronger than ever, because she fought for a great 
 idea; but when England finished her experiment she was 
 weaker and more demoralized than ever before, and more com 
 pletely the slave of mammon, and low and selfish aims. 
 
 It should not, however, be supposed that England wrought 
 sluggishly because she was moved by no great or noble idea. 
 She worked under an evil inspiration, that aroused her, so far 
 as one can be, in the service of the wrong. She was in true 
 sympathy with the rebellion ; she was fired with the corrupting 
 enthusiasm of the traitors ; and she desired, with an earnestness 
 not exceeded by that of Jefferson Davis himself, the humbling 
 of the North, and the separation of the Union. If any one 
 doubts this, let him read the comments of the British press upon 
 the sinking of the Alabama. With a few noble exceptions, the 
 English treated that as if it were a personal disgrace, a hum 
 bling of their own flag. The capture of the Guerriere by the 
 Constitution scarcely produced a deeper mortification. The 
 important fact in this connection is, that this exhibition of in 
 tense feeling was natural and even inevitable, for England had 
 made the Confederate cause her own, and it was her ship, her 
 men, her guns, her courage and skill, her national honor, that 
 were that day on trial. It was, by representative vessels, a bat 
 tle between the wooden Navy of England and that of America, 
 and it was really the flag of Britain which was lowered to the 
 stripes and stars. 
 
 Such was the spirit and such the conduct of England, that 
 the Navy Department was called in the outset to a contest, with 
 abundant capital and with the most daring enterprise, with the 
 skill and ingenuity of the English commercial marine. This 
 hostile and selfish policy of Great Britain was directed toward 
 a double purpose. The piratical cruisers fitted out in her har 
 bors were to destroy, so far as possible, American commerce, 
 while the terror of their operations would drive much of the re 
 mainder into English bottoms, and through the blockade-run 
 ners she hoped to monopolize the commerce of the South. 
 
 These remarks will show some of the main difficulties which 
 beset the Navy Department in the first weeks of the rebellion. 
 No time was lost by our eminently neutral friends after the es- 
 
THE WOKK REQUIRED OF THE NAVY. 93 
 
 tablishment of the blockade. The swiftest steamers in the mer 
 chant service of England were selected, and with cargoes suited 
 to the wants of the rebels were started for Southern ports ; and 
 the uselessness of sailing vessels for a coast-guard was seen at 
 once, when the blockade was to be tested by steamers which 
 could make fourteen knots per hour. 
 
 "Not satisfied with the injury which could be inflicted by the 
 vessels already afloat, Englishmen prepared, as rapidly as pos 
 sible, a fleet of new steamers, built especially for this rebel trade, 
 adapted to the shallow inlets and sounds and inner channels of 
 the outh ; and these new steamers combined every excellence 
 suited to their work which the skill and science and capital of 
 England could command. 
 
 These English steamers, the latest triumph of British art and 
 naval science, were to be watched, and met, and foiled, along all 
 the three thousand miles of outer coast-line, along the corre 
 sponding inner coast, the inlets and sounds and interior channels 
 of the South. Hence it was necessary, not only to have an out 
 side blockading fleet, but also to command those inner waters 
 where rebel commerce was sheltered, and where the conspira 
 tors were busy in building a navy of their own. 
 
 The following extract from a letter, dated on board the 
 United States steamer Eoanoke, will illustrate the difficulty of 
 blockading the Southern coast : 
 
 It is well known that the rebels have had, with but few exceptions, 
 full and undisputed possession of those countless inland seas which dot 
 the whole range of the Southern coast, and which are only separated 
 from the great ocean by narrow necks of land. These places, since the 
 commencement of the rebellion, have been the rendezvous for the 
 greater portion of the privateers and pirates that owe their existence to 
 the Confederate Government. 
 
 Too many places of the above character, it is feared, have been too 
 insecurely blockaded, there being so many inlets into them which are 
 wholly unknown to the officers and men of our Navy, and the chances 
 thus offered enable the rebels to cany on a very extensive commerce, 
 and thus supply their army and themselves with the articles essentially 
 necessary in such times. 
 
 The Hoanoke was powerless to interfere or stop this alarming state 
 of things, owing to the reasons above given. "We could not go into the 
 
94: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 inlets and ferret them out, which is all that is required to effectually kill 
 this smuggling business. What we require immediately to check this 
 great evil are gunboats of little draught of water, which can dart with 
 ease in and around the passes alluded to, without the fear of getting 
 aground and being blown to atoms by the merciless storms that rage 
 there. 
 
 Tf the Government would place at the disposal of able and efficient 
 mariners a fleet of twelve or fifteen such gunboats as the Resolute, Reli 
 ance, or Thomas Freeborn, drawing not over six and a half feet of water, 
 all well armed with rifle-cannon, and manned by experienced seamen, 
 we could at once take possession of all their inland waters, and suddenly 
 and satisfactorily stop the smuggling business now so extensively carried 
 on by the enemy. More than this, we could undoubtedly also capture 
 many of their privateers, which now make the waters boil as they glide 
 so swiftly over them in perfect security, with their welcome and valuable 
 cargoes for the traitors composing the rebel army. I repeat it, such a 
 monstrosity as our ship is valueless to impede the progress of these fleet 
 little craft, whose crews are intimately acquainted with every hole, cor 
 ner, and hiding-place which that mysterious coast affords. It seems that 
 every new storm makes a new inlet, and in the face of such facts how 
 can it be expected that a few large steamers should be able to guard 
 them ? There are many instances similar to our own, where vessels 
 blockading cannot come within miles of these small inlets, all of which 
 are open to these little privateers. 
 
 This necessity of controlling the interior waters will explain 
 some of the earlier naval expeditions of the war. 
 
 But the closing of the Southern ports against this British 
 commerce was, by no means, all that was required of the Navy, 
 even along the coast. It was quite as important to seal every 
 harbor, inlet, and river s mouth against the coining out of the 
 ships of the rebels. The nature and the peril of this duty may 
 be known by calling to mind the Merrimack, the Albemarle, 
 the Atlanta, the Tennessee, the Louisiana, and the Mississippi, 
 each one of which was at least a match for any iron-clad in the 
 French or English navy, armed as they were at the beginning 
 of the war. 
 
 Had any one of these vessels reached the ocean in safety in 
 the earlier part of the war, she could have entered any North 
 ern harbor, and laid under contribution or destroyed any of our 
 seaboard cities. 
 
THE WORK REQUIRED OF THE NAVY. 95 
 
 In addition to all that has been already stated, it was expected 
 of the Navy Department that naval expeditions, of a far more 
 formidable character than any before fitted out in the United 
 States, should be prepared to cooperate with land forces in re 
 capturing the forts of the Southern coast, and on the lower Mis 
 sissippi ; and the character and magnitude of this work will be 
 understood from what was done at Hilton Head, and New 
 Orleans, and Mobile, and Charleston, and Wilmington, and also 
 from the lesser countless fights with batteries on the Potomac, 
 on the James, in the vicinity of Newbern, on the Ogeechee, and 
 on Albemarle Sound, and indeed on almost every mile of navi 
 gable water in the South. Add to this the task of keeping open 
 the Potomac, which required almost daily battle with the bat 
 teries on shore batteries which were shifted from point to point, 
 and which our small wooden ships could fight only at great dis 
 advantage, but which it was absolutely necessary to fight and 
 silence, or permit Washington and our army to be cut off from 
 all communication with the sea. It is evident, then, that a force 
 which could exclude the swift blockade-runners and shut in the 
 formidable rebel iron-clads, must combine numbers, speed, and 
 power to an extent before unknown in naval war. It is true 
 that the Navy Department was not called upon to meet all these 
 demands at once and at the very opening of the contest, but it 
 is known now that the rebels, in the construction of their new 
 navy, were in advance of our own Government ; and it is a 
 triumphant proof of the energy, the promptness, and sagacity, as 
 well as of the boldness of those who controlled our naval affairs, 
 that a new war engine was conceived and made ready, and 
 brought to the spot just in time to save our navy, our cities, and 
 our cause, and, by the defeat of the Merrimack, render impossible 
 from that hour the construction of a rebel navy which we could 
 not readily destroy. In addition to this service, it devolved upon 
 the Navy Department to transport and protect the supplies for 
 the armies operating along the seaboard, as well as the main 
 body that at length marched under McClellan to Eichmond. 
 
 Turning from this scene westward, another gigantic task for 
 the Navy is revealed. The rebels had closed the Mississippi at 
 Columbus, at Island No. 10, at Memphis, at Yicksburg, and 
 Port Hudson, and not a throb of commercial life beat along the 
 
96 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 great artery of the "West. Forts Henry and Donelson closed 
 the Tennessee and the Cumberland, so that no troops could be 
 sent into Tennessee by water, nor could supplies readily reach 
 them if they were marched by land. No wooden vessel could 
 pass these batteries, unless it might at such peril as neither sup 
 plies nor men could be exposed to, and no land force unaided 
 could capture and hold these strongholds of our foe. The prob 
 lem presented to the Department then, was, how to prepare a 
 naval force which, cooperating with an army, could capture 
 these river forts, and open and hold open the Mississippi, and 
 by clearing the Cumberland and Tennessee, prepare a highway 
 by which our armies could establish themselves in the very cita 
 del of the Confederacy, and assault the whole western line of the 
 rebel defences. In addition to this, it was necessary to patrol 
 the Ohio for its whole length of a thousand miles, to prevent 
 raids into the border States and the burning of the river cities. 
 To meet this problem of the West, some new form of iron-clad 
 was needed, differing alike from the broadside ship and the tur- 
 reted Monitor ; and in another chapter this new product of 
 American ingenuity will be particularly described. 
 
 Such were some of the more obvious difficulties at the begin 
 ning of the war, and such in its main features was the work 
 which the Navy was called upon to do. It may be safely said that 
 no such task was ever laid on any other Government. It would 
 have taxed severely all the power of the French or English navy ; 
 in fact, we could not have fully met the exigency with one of 
 these great navies at our command, because so few of the ships 
 are adapted to our peculiar wants. It is very doubtful, to say 
 the least, whether such a vessel as the Warrior could have 
 stopped the Merrimack, much less the Tennessee, and such a 
 navy would have supplied almost nothing suited to our river 
 service. It was well, perhaps, that we had no E"avy ; but that 
 throws into bolder relief the skill, the energy, the audacity, 
 which some called rashness, that created the fleets by which the 
 work was done. 
 
 The next chapter will treat of the means at the disposal of 
 the Department in the beginning of the war. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT WHEN 
 THE WAR BEGAN. 
 
 HAVING presented, in the last chapter, the main features of 
 the great and varied work demanded of the Navy, it is proper 
 to show also the resources which were at hand for performing 
 this task ; for only by comparing what was to be done with the 
 means which the Navy Department could, in the outset, com 
 mand, can the country judge whether its affairs were conducted 
 with energy and skill. 
 
 It must be remembered that the line of battle stretched al 
 most at once from Washington, down the Potomac, and along 
 the whole Southern coast, and the banks of our "Western rivers ; 
 and the demand was immediate and urgent for a Navy to 
 watch the long line of attack. What were the available means ? 
 At the beginning of the war, the Navy consisted of twenty-six 
 steamers, as follows : 
 
 Five screw frigates, of a little more than 3,000 tons each : the Mer- 
 rimack, Wabasb, Minnesota, Roanoke, and Colorado. 
 
 One large screw-sloop, the Niagara, of 4,582 tons. 
 
 Six first-class screw-sloops, the Richmond, Brooklyn, San Jacinto, 
 Hartford, Pensacola, and Lancaster, of about 2,000 tons each ; five 
 second-class sloops, the Pawnee, Iroquois, Wyoming, Mohican, and Da 
 kota, of about 1,000 tons each ; and of the third-class sloops, the Narra 
 ganset and Seminole, of about 850 tons each. 
 
 Four first-class side-wheel sloops : the Susquehanna and Powhatan, 
 of about 2,400 tons each, the Mississippi, of about 1,700 tons, and the 
 Saranac, of about 1,450 tons; and of the small side-wheel steamers, the 
 Michigan, Saginaw, and Water- Witch, of about 470 tons each. In all, 
 twenty-six steamers. 
 7 
 
98 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 As the Navy Department lias been most fiercely and per 
 sistently attacked in regard to the speed of the vessels which 
 have been constructed or purchased during the war, the follow 
 ing statement is given of the speed of the steamers which, were 
 built before the war ; and in another chapter this will be com 
 pared with the rate of the vessels which have been built since 
 the war began. 
 
 The statement of the speed of the vessels of the old Navy is 
 quoted from a letter of the eminent ship-builder Donald McKay, 
 adopted and sanctioned in the report of the Secretary of the 
 Navy for 1864. It is as follows : 
 
 The maximum speeds of those vessels in smooth water, and for a 
 short time, were as follows, in knots per hour, namely: Niagara, 10.9; 
 Merrimack, Wabash, Minnesota, Roanoke, and Colorado, 9 ; Brooklyn, 
 9.2 ; San Jacinto, 8.8 ; Hartford and Lancaster, 9.5 ; Richmond, 9.5 ; 
 Pawnee, 8; Iroquois, "Wyoming, Mohican, and Dakota, 11.7; Narra- 
 ganset and Seminole, 8; Susquehanna and Powhatan, 11; Mississippi, 
 8.7; Saranac, 9.2; Saginaw, 9; Water- Witch, 9; Michigan, 10.5. 
 The Pcnsacola proved a total failure, and the machinery had to be re 
 moved. 
 
 Such was the steam Navy with which the Administration began the 
 task of vigorously blockading three thousand six hundred miles of the 
 most difficult coast in the world, against the fastest and best steamers 
 that the shops of England could produce, built exclusively for speed and 
 blockade- running at the particular localities. /In addition to which, the 
 oceans of the world were to be kept free of the steamers called Confed 
 erate cruisers, but which were in reality English pirates, being built in 
 England, equipped with English guns, and manned by English crews, 
 whose purpose was, not to fight our cruisers as war-vessels, but to plun 
 der our sailing merchant-ships, and to keep out of the paths of our war- 
 steamers. With the enormous advantage of having all the ports of the 
 world, except those of the country they pretended to belong to, open to 
 them for coaling, repair, refuge when closely pursued, and sale of the 
 most valuable and less bulky portion of their plunder; and with the 
 sympathy and active cooperation of the officials of those ports, and with 
 the strong incentive of the free plunder of a large, rich, and defenceless 
 commerce, without the slightest personal danger, even if captured it is 
 indeed miraculous they should have been able to do us the little injury 
 thev have. 
 
MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 99 
 
 Had all these vessels "been in commission, and at the com 
 mand of the Secretary, they would have constituted quite a for 
 midable force for the commencement of operations. But as 
 has already been stated in previous chapters, this small fleet 
 was so disposed that but one efficient vessel was on our North 
 ern coast when the conflict began. The natural effect of such 
 circumstances would be to give the insurgents ample time to 
 seize and establish themselves in the strongholds of the coast 
 before any naval force could be collected. The following 
 statement is from the report of the Secretary of the Xavy for 
 1861: 
 
 In order that the condition of the Navy on the 4th of March may 
 he rightly understood, it will be well to state the position and character 
 of each of the vessels at that date. The Home Squadron consisted of 
 twelve vessels, and of these only four were in Northern ports, and avail 
 able for service, viz. : 
 
 Xame. Class. No. of guns. "Where stationed. 
 
 Pawnee Screw-sloop 8 At Washington. 
 
 Crusader Steamer 8 At Xew York. 
 
 Mohawk Steamer 5 
 
 Supply Storeship 4 
 
 Four vessels 25 
 
 The remaining vessels of the squadron were stationed as follows : 
 
 Name. Class. No. of guns. "Where stationed 
 
 Sabine Frigate 50 Ponsacola. 
 
 St. Louis Sloop 20 
 
 Brooklyn Steamer 25 
 
 Wyandot Steamer 5 
 
 Macedonia Sloop 22 Vera Cruz. 
 
 Cumberland Sloop 24 \ Returning 
 
 Pocahontas Steamer 5 > from 
 
 Powhatan Steamer 11 ) Vera Cruz. 
 
 Eight vessels 162 
 
 The Powhatan arrived at, New York on the 12th of March, and sailed 
 early in April for Fort Pickens. The Pocahontas reached Hampton 
 Roads on the 12th of March, and the Cumberland on the 23d of the 
 same month. 
 
 Of vessels on foreign stations, the following have returned in obedi 
 ence to orders from the Department : 
 
100 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
 
 
 
 Name. Class. No. of guns. Date of arrival. 
 
 Richmond Steam-sloop 16 July 3. 
 
 Susquehanna Steam-sloop 15 June 6. 
 
 Iroquois Steam-sloop 6 June 15. 
 
 FROM COAST OF AFRICA. 
 
 Name. Class. No. of guns. Date of arrival. 
 
 Constellation Sloop 22 September 28. 
 
 Portsmouth Sloop 22 September 23. 
 
 Mohican Steam-sloop 6 September 27. 
 
 Mystic Steamer 5 October 7. 
 
 Sumter .Steamer 5 September 15. 
 
 San Jacinto Steam-sloop 13 November 15. 
 
 Relief Storeship 2 October 12. 
 
 FROM COAST OF BRAZIL. 
 
 Name. Class. No. of guns. Date of arrival. 
 
 Congress Frigate 50 August 12. 
 
 Seminole Steam-sloop 5 July 6. 
 
 The following have not yet arrived : 
 
 FROM THE EAST INDIES. 
 
 Name. Class. No. of guns. Date of arrival 
 
 John Adams Sloop. 
 
 Hartford Steam-sloop. 
 
 Dakota Steam-sloop. 
 
 The following are to remain abroad : 
 
 Name. Class. No. of guns. Where stationed. 
 
 Sa toga Sloop 18 Coast of Africa. 
 
 Pulaski Steamer 1 Coast of Brazil. 
 
 Saginaw Steamer 3 East Indies. 
 
 Add to these the vessels on the Pacific coast, the frigate Niagara, 
 which was returning from Japan, and four tenders and storeships, and 
 there was a total, as stated in the last report, of 42 vessels, carrying 555 
 guns, and about 7,600 men, in commission on the 4th of March last. 
 
 These official statements are a sufficient answer to all the 
 charges of slowness and inefficiency, so thoughtlessly made by 
 those totally ignorant of the facts, and who, in their impatience, 
 demanded what nothing short of creative power could possibly 
 accomplish. 
 
MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 101 
 
 The means at the disposal of the Government for the con 
 struction of such vessels as were needed were so limited as to 
 present a very serious difficulty. There was not found at the 
 navy-yards any adequate supply of suitable timber. 
 
 It had generally been supposed that large amounts of timber 
 had been accumulated at the several yards, and that the stock 
 was yearly increasing. The exact contrary was true, as if this 
 insurrection had not only been contemplated for years, but as if 
 steps had been actually taken long ago to cripple the naval 
 power. It was found on investigation that not only had no addi 
 tions been made to the stocks of timber on hand so as to increase 
 the amount, but that these stocks had been diminished by neglect, 
 and by omitting to purchase, until very little material remained 
 from which new vessels could be constructed. 
 
 Obstacles scarcely less formidable were found in the condi 
 tion of the workshops. These difficulties are well presented by 
 Donald McKay in the following statement : 
 
 The means at the command of the Administration for building a 
 steam navy to achieve the herculean task just indicated, were about two 
 dozen machine-shops, great and small, distributed from Maine to Mary 
 land, many of them very small, and without the tools, workmen, or skill 
 requisite for the production of marine machinery. The first-class shops 
 did not exceed eight in number. But the entire force of those shops 
 could not be commanded by the Navy Department for the construction 
 of new machinery. The War Department also drew largely on their 
 resources for transport steamers, while the locomotive and tool-making 
 shops found it utterly impossible to meet the demand upon them. 
 Neither was there sufficient raw material in the country for the large and 
 sudden demand ; the iron, copper, tin, and coal had to bo mined and 
 manufactured. Hundreds of steamers, hundreds of locomotives, shops 
 full of tools, tens of thousands of tons of metal were called for instantly, 
 and there was nothing on hand to answer the call. 
 
 War-steamers cannot be built in a day. Inexperienced labor cannot 
 be converted into skilled mechanics in a day. The prices of machinery 
 rose immensely, the pay of the mechanics and the cost of material reached 
 a point far above what they were worth, except from the factitious cause 
 of the suddenness of the demand. The result was felt in the poor mate 
 rials and poorer workmanship with which the machinery was made. 
 Any kind of material, and the most unskilled labor, had to be brought 
 
102 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 into use, and all this time the amount of even that labor was conse 
 quently diminishing by the absorption of men into the military 
 service. 
 
 In view of these startling facts, it becomes evident that our national 
 fleet ought to be immediately and largely increased, so as to be prepared 
 for any emergency. Such as our Navy is at the present moment, it 
 ranks hardly with second-rate European powers, and it is entirely insuffi 
 cient to protect our trade and to uphold the dignity of our flag. There 
 is no reason why we should not have a fleet as powerful as that of Eng 
 land or France. We have the money, the materials and artisans neces 
 sary to build a first-class fleet, and the best sailors to man it. 
 
 It would be easy for us to build in one year a fleet of five hundred 
 to six hundred men-of-war ships, from a gunboat up to the largest class 
 of iron-cased frigates. It is a well-known fact that we built in one year 
 the astonishing number of two thousand and thirty-four vessels and 
 steamers of all classes, measuring together 583,450 tons. A large number 
 of these vessels were as large as the biggest class of frigates hitherto 
 constructed. What we have done once, we may do over again; and 
 working at the same rate, we would be able, alone in our merchants 
 yards, to turn out in one year five hundred and eighty-three ships, of 
 one thousand tons each. In our six navy-yards, where the choicest 
 materials are stocked for building a fleet of one hundred ships, sixty 
 more men-of-war ships might be built in one year, making a total of six 
 hundred and forty-three men-of-war ships of all classes, varying in their 
 armament from three to sixty guns. More than a hundred of our great 
 est engineering firms would complete all the machinery necessary to be 
 put in these ships in less than a year. Our capabilities and facilities of 
 building ships have not in the least suffered by the loss of the seceded 
 States. They never were ship-building States, and as late as 1860 they 
 only built (combined) one full-rigged ship, while the Northern States 
 built one hundred and ten ships of the same description. That is to 
 say, in plain words, all the seceded States combined did not build even 
 one per cent, of the sea-going ships built in the United States. 
 
 It is true on a very urgent occasion, in a great emergency, our coun 
 try could largely increase her Navy, in a very few months, with very 
 powerful descriptions of vessels, if they would proceed as follows : Cut 
 down all our line-of-battle ships one or two decks, case them with five- 
 inch iron plates, put a battery of thirty to forty guns of the heaviest 
 calibre on board of them, and moor them across the entrance of our 
 harbors. Plate our heavy frigates with shell-proof iron plates, and, to 
 make up for the additional weight put into them, do away with their 
 armament on the upper deck. Transform one hundred of our best sea- 
 
MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 103 
 
 going merchant steamers into so many frigates, sloops, dispatch and 
 gunboats, of a speed superior to any men-of-war ships yet produced. 
 
 Among our large clipper-ships and traders more than five hundred 
 may be found that are capable to be transformed into so many efficient 
 sailing sloops and frigates. Their length varies from two hundred to 
 three hundred feet, their breadth from forty to fifty-two feet ; and when 
 ever they are cut one deck, or their decks are lowered, will be found 
 capable of carrying an armament varying from twenty to fifty heavy 
 guns, according to their respective capacity. Twenty or thirty of our 
 largest clipper-ships might very well be transformed into powerful screw- 
 frigates; as, for instance, the Great Republic, which exceeds in her 
 dimensions the largest English 50-gun frigates, while her shape for speed 
 is incomparably superior. The scantling of all these ships is well known 
 to be larger than that of the best and strongest men-of-war ships of our 
 Navy. 
 
 Among the barks and brigs there are certainly four hundred to five 
 hundred capable of receiving an armament of from eight to twenty guns, 
 and more than a thousand of our large coasting schooners that have a 
 breadth of twenty-eight to thirty feet and over, and a form never sur 
 passed for speed, can, in a few weeks, be transformed into men-of-war 
 schooners, armed with one pivot gun of the heaviest description in the 
 middle, and two to four 32-pounders at the ends. These vessels have a 
 very large stability, and the scantling of their timbers, etc., is by twenty 
 per cent, heavier than that of the common men-of-war schooners. 
 
 This fleet, of about two thousand vessels-of-war, can (working with 
 all the natural energy of our nation) be turned out in less time than four 
 to six months, and it would be sufficient to protect our coast and meet 
 the first storm. Time would so be gained to build a fleet fit to repre 
 sent our great nation, and to make our flag once more respected in all 
 seas of the globe. 
 
 But the time is pressing, our country is surrounded by dangers on 
 all sides, and it becomes the imperative duty of our Government and 
 people to act with the greatest energy without delay. The times are 
 gone when Europe could be frightened by thundering newspaper articles 
 and the hollow brag of ambitious politicians ; we have to show now that 
 we know how to handle engines of war, and to stand a hail of shells 
 and balls. 
 
 A powerful fleet is the best guaranty of peace for a great maritime 
 nation ; of the truth of this principle England, whose motto is "Free trade 
 and peace with all nations," is the most striking example. 
 
 Yours trulv, DONALD McKAY. 
 
104 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 In addition to all this, the Department was still further per 
 plexed and endangered by the disloyalty of so many officers of 
 the Navy, that it knew not whom it could safely trust. In his 
 first report, July 4, 1861, the Secretary uses the following lan 
 guage : 
 
 Demoralization prevailed among the officers, many of whom, occu 
 pying the most responsible positions, betrayed symptoms of that infi 
 delity which has dishonored the service. But while so many officers were 
 unfaithful, the crews, to their honor be it recorded, were true and reliable, 
 and have maintained, through every trial and under all circumstances, 
 their devotion to the Union and the flag. Unfortunately, however, few 
 comparatively of these gallant men were within the call of the Depart 
 ment at tLat eventful period. They, as well as the ships, were abroad. 
 
 From the 4th of March, 1861, to the 4th of July of the same 
 year, the Secretary states that two hundred and fifty-nine offi 
 cers of the Navy either resigned or were dismissed from the 
 service, and on this account many vessels were sent to sea with 
 out a full complement of officers. The spirit of the Department 
 on this subject is well set forth in the following letter, which 
 explains itself: 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, July 15, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I duly received the letter of Midshipman Watson, requesting 
 an " order to some foreign station, or any place where I [he] will not be 
 brought in conflict with my friends and relations in the South ; " and also 
 the letter of J. L. Harrison, requesting that he " may be relieved from 
 duty on board this ship [the Richmond], and ordered where I [he] will 
 not be called upon to act against my personal feelings." Each of these 
 letters is forwarded by you with the recommendation that " the applica 
 tion be complied with for the reasons assigned, and that another mid 
 shipman be ordered." As I do not doubt your own loyalty and fidelity, 
 I cannot permit the opportunity to pass without expressing my disap 
 proval of such recommendations and indorsements. I especially object 
 to your reasons as incompatible with a profession that is national, and 
 in conflict with the enduring welfare of the country. In the request of 
 these young gentlemen may be seen the germinating element of that de 
 nationalizing sentiment which has wrought incalculable evil to our 
 country. 
 
 A great conspiracy has been formed against that Government which 
 it is the duty of all to support., and which naval officers have avowedly 
 
MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 105 
 
 dedicated their lives to sustain ; but because some of their relatives or 
 friends are complicated, or from personal feelings, there is a reluctance 
 on the part of some of the profession to stand by their country when 
 their services are most required. These young gentlemen have been 
 inspired with these sectional and erroneous opinions by false theories, 
 and it is not perhaps strange when their commanding officer encourages 
 them in the error, by recommending the Department to yield to it, and 
 asking the Secretary to provide a substitute to execute these duties which 
 they are unwilling to discharge. 
 
 Why should there be a discrimination between these young gentle 
 men and other midshipmen in the performance of a national and profes 
 sional duty ? Those whom they would substitute belong, like them 
 selves, to a common country, and are to meet and suppress an insurrec 
 tion against a Government to which every man of the profession owes a 
 common allegiance. 
 
 Were your recommendation to be a principle of action, only the offi 
 cers of one portion of the Union would be required to sustain the Gov 
 ernment and country against a great conspiracy, while another section 
 would be exempted. The effects of such a rule would be to generate 
 and perpetuate sectional difficulty and animosity, whereas we should all 
 be united in suppressing hostility or resistance to the Government and 
 the flag. None should shrink from this duty ; none should be en 
 couraged to shrink from it ; none should receive recommendations to 
 evade the high obligations which all, and especially all naval officers, 
 owe to that Government which has educated and nourished them, and 
 to whose support they have pledged their fidelity. 
 
 It is the duty of all to encourage a more devoted nationality, and 
 to discountenance the prevalent error among a sectional class, that there 
 is a higher political allegiance than that which is due to their country. 
 A naval officer can have no higher duty in the line of his profession than 
 to oppose the enemies of his country, whether foreign or domestic. He 
 should never seek to avoid or evade that duty from sectional or personal 
 considerations, nor should he, by recommendations or example, be en 
 couraged to evade it. The lessons of history, which teach that love of 
 country should be superior to selfish considerations, will have been lost 
 upon young American officers, if their superiors recommend that, from 
 "personal feeling" or a contingent apprehension of encountering dis 
 loyal relatives, they be relieved from their obligations to abide by their 
 country in the hour of peril in any post that may be assigned them. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Capt. JOHN POPE, Commanding U. S. ship Richmond, Nciv York. 
 
106 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Such, in general, was the condition of affairs in the Navy 
 and in the country when Secretary "Welles was placed at the 
 head of the Navy Department. In July, 1861, the office of 
 Assistant Secretary of the Navy was created. To this office 
 Captain G. V. Fox was soon after appointed. And now if the 
 country will take the insignificant force at command when the 
 war began, and compare that with the vast and various work 
 performed, and with the nearly seven hundred ships at the close 
 of the war, it cannot fail to see that such a grand result could 
 only have been reached by untiring industry and by a wide 
 and clear comprehension of the whole field of action, and by 
 consummate sagacity and skill. The work actually done is an 
 impossible achievement, except by talent and executive ability 
 of the very highest order. The first step was to increase the 
 power of the Navy, and the measures adopted for this purpose 
 will form the subject of the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE FIRST MEASURES ADOPTED FOR THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY. 
 
 THE facts already presented in regard to our navy-yards and 
 machine-shops show very clearly that the Department could 
 not depend upon them to supply its immediate wants. Even 
 had suitable materials and machinery been at hand, they would 
 have availed nothing for the first emergency. It is not the 
 work of a few weeks, or a few months even, to construct an 
 efficient war-ship, and the safety of the country demanded a 
 fleet in the very first weeks of the rebellion. 
 
 Evidently there was but one course even possible for the De 
 partment. It was necessary either to purchase vessels wherever 
 they could be obtained, or to fight the battle without ships. 
 Nor did the case admit of any delay. Then, for the first time, 
 was clearly seen the true national importance of that great com 
 mercial navy which private enterprise had created. The fleet 
 which had been built for peace was found to be also efficient for 
 war. In that squadron of commerce were some of the fastest 
 steamers in the world stanch, sea-going vessels, and capable 
 of bearing a formidable armament. Measures were immediately 
 taken to purchase such of these steamers as were adapted to the 
 service required. 
 
 As was perfectly natural, the Secretary turned first of all to 
 the officers of the Navy as the most suitable persons to judge 
 of the character of these ships, and whether they could be suc 
 cessfully used as vessels-of-war. The step was taken when all 
 direct communication was cut off between "Washington and the 
 Northern cities. A naval officer was dispatched to New York 
 with orders to make the needed arrangements. It was hoped 
 
108 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 that lie would find a passage through the enemy s lines ; but 
 twenty-four hours after his departure a telegram was received 
 from him dated at "Wheeling, he having been compelled to cross 
 the mountains and go round by the Ohio River and one of the 
 Northern routes, in order to reach New York. This is only an 
 example of the countless embarrassments under which the Gov 
 ernment labored during the first months of the rebellion, and 
 which should be duly considered in judging of the efficiency of 
 the Administration. 
 
 As this purchase of vessels involved the expenditure of a 
 very large amount of money, justice to the Navy Department 
 requires that these negotiations and the measures that were 
 adopted to protect the interests of the Government should be 
 presented somewhat in detail. The following orders, addressed 
 to the officers in command of the navy-yards at Boston, New 
 York, and Philadelphia, will explain themselves, and show how 
 the Secretary proceeded in this important matter : 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 21, 1861. 
 Commodore SAMUEL L. BEEESE, Navy- Yard, New York : 
 
 SIR : By order of the President of the United States you will forth 
 with procure ten steamers capable of mounting a 9-inch pivot-gun, with 
 light draught, about nine or twelve feet, having particular reference to 
 strength and speed. You will consult with Commodore Foote, the 
 naval constructor, and such other persons as are capable of giving infor 
 mation and advice. Charter on the best terms possible for three months, 
 with the option of the Government purchasing them within that time 
 at a stipulated price ; these vessels to be immediately removed to the 
 navy or private yards, with the necessary alterations and equipments to 
 render them efficient for the service required. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 Captain SAMUEL F. Du POXT, Navy -Yard, Philadelphia: 
 
 SIR : By order of the President of the United States you will forth 
 with procure five steamers capable of mounting a 9-inch pivot-gun, with 
 light draught, about nine or twelve feet, having particular reference to 
 strength and speed. You will consult with the naval constructor and 
 such other officers and persons as are capable of giving information and 
 advice. Charter on the best terms possible for three months, with the 
 
MEASURES ADOPTED FOR THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY. 109 
 
 option of the Government purchasing them within that time at a stipu 
 lated price. These vessels to be immediately removed to the navy or 
 private yards, with the necessary alterations and equipments to render 
 them efficient for the service required. 
 
 I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEOX WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 A similar order was addressed to Commander William L. 
 Hudson, in charge of the navy-yard at Boston. 
 
 These orders, as will be seen, authorized the chartering of 
 twenty steamers for three months, with the privilege of purchas 
 ing at a stipulated price. The matter was intrusted to expe 
 rienced officers, and the Government was protected by the 
 privilege of purchase at a price stipulated beforehand. This, 
 at first, seemed to be the best possible arrangement for the Gov 
 ernment, because it was necessary to submit every vessel to the 
 inspection and judgment of a naval officer. These officers, how 
 ever, soon felt that such duties lay without the sphere of their 
 profession ; that however skilful they might be in perceiving the 
 good or bad qualities of a ship, they were not merchants, and 
 they desired that the purchase of vessels might be committed to 
 men better acquainted with the customs and laws of traffic. It 
 was thought that experts in the market might obtain more fa 
 vorable terms for the Government than men unskilled in trade. 
 
 On the 22d of April it was thought best so to modify the 
 original orders for purchase as to place no restrictions upon the 
 size of the vessels, and directing that any steamers should be 
 obtained adapted to the purpose, but that special reference must 
 be had to efficiency, speed, and sea qualifications, adding, that 
 these qualities are indispensable. 
 
 Such orders, placed for execution in the hands of naval offi 
 cers of experience and skill, show how prompt the action of the 
 Department was in securing the best and fastest vessels in our 
 commercial navy. 
 
 Soon after, on the 23d of April, the commander of the navy- 
 yard at Xew York was directed to consult with " Governor E. 
 D. Morgan, or, in his absence, with Mr. Geo. D. Morgan, and 
 with Messrs Wm. Evarts, E. M. Blatchford, and M. H. Grin- 
 nell, a committee of the citizens of New York, who are hereby 
 
110 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 empowered to act for this Department in this crisis." By this 
 order the K"avy Department brought to its aid, in procuring 
 ships, some of the most eminent and trusted business men of 
 New York. 
 
 At this time the most intense anxiety prevailed in the large 
 cities in regard to the increase of the Navy, and the protection 
 of our commerce. The following letters will show what meas 
 ures leading men desired to adopt, and how the Department 
 proposed to meet the necessities of the time : 
 
 OFFICE BOAKD OF TKADE, BOSTON, April 20, 1861. 
 Hon. GIDEOX WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. G. : 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to transmit a copy of resolutions unanimously 
 passed at a special meeting of the government of this Board, on the 
 18th inst. I am, sir, with sentiments of high consideration, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 JAMES SABIXE, Secretary. 
 
 Resolved, That this Body regard this proposition, published by a 
 member of this Board, Mr. R. B. Forbes, in the papers of the day, and 
 hereunto appended, as necessary and practicable, and that this association 
 will give the merchants and master mariners of Massachusetts every aid 
 in its power in the contemplated organization ; and that the aid and the 
 countenance of the State is hereby earnestly invoked. 
 
 Resolved, That this Association forward herewith a copy of these 
 resolutions to the Executive of the State, and to the Secretary of the 
 Navy and the Secretary of State, at Washington. 
 
 BOSTON, Api il 25, 1861. 
 Ron. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 Whereas, The system of building ships-of-war by private contract has 
 suffered by being made subservient to jobbing and to partisan favorit 
 ism ; but under proper guards is probably cheapest and most conducive 
 to progress in the course of naval construction ; and 
 
 Whereas, It is believed that Boston can, in this emergency, turn out 
 just such steamers as the Government want, in half the time, and at less 
 cost, than those built in the navy-yards ; and 
 
 Whereas, It is now proposed to build a model light-draught sloop-of- 
 war, ready for her armament, or one or two steam gunboats, and to offer 
 the same to the Government at actual cost, with six per cent, interest 
 
 Therefore, The undersigned, a committee of Boston merchants, em 
 powered so to do, at a meeting held at the Boston Merchants Exchange, 
 
MEASURES ADOPTED FOE THE DECREASE OF THE NAVY. Ill 
 
 April 22, 1861, do hereby respectfully invite the attention of the Hon. 
 Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, to the above consideration, and 
 solicit his sanction to the undertaking proposed. 
 Your obedient servants, 
 (Signed) R. B. FORBES, 
 
 WM. ROPES, 
 
 LEWIS W. TAPPAN, Committee. 
 
 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, 
 
 NAYY DEPARTMENT, April 27, 1861 . 
 
 Captain WM. L. HUDSON, Commandant Nmy-yard, Boston, Mass. : 
 
 SIR : The Department has not had the pleasure of hearing from you 
 since it authorized the procurement of five steamers for immediate ser 
 vice, and, of course, is uninformed as to the progress you have made. 
 It is hoped, however, that there has been a vigorous and efficient re 
 sponse. 
 
 The Department has information from ex-Governor Boutwell, who 
 has been deputed by Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, that there is 
 a disposition in Boston to raise an auxiliary navy or coast guard, for 
 the protection of commerce, and to assist in carrying into effect the 
 blockade of the ports of those States that are waging war on the Fed 
 eral Government. Although this project has not been communicated by 
 his excellency Governor Andrew, nor by ex-Governor Boutwell to this 
 Department, it has been submitted by a gentleman who has been au 
 thorized by the latter to communicate it. It has also received a letter 
 from the Board of Trade, and also from a committee of Boston gentle 
 men, of which. Mr. R. B. Forbes is chairman, having in view this object, 
 and with it the construction of one or more vessels. 
 
 Whatever may be the capabilities of the ship-yards, and the efforts 
 of the enterprising merchants and builders of Boston, they will bear in 
 mind that our immediate wants do not allow us to wait for vessels to be 
 constructed. If the gentlemen have confidence that they can build vessels 
 of a superior class, it is hoped they also have sufficient confidence and 
 reliance in themselves to go forward, and trust to their being purchased 
 by the Government after they are built. We now desire to obtain and 
 equip, at the earliest moment, good and efficient steamers, having in 
 view speed and strength, to meet the existing emergency. 
 
 I communicate these views now, in detail, to you, in the pressure of 
 business, to save time and numerous answers. Any suggestions you 
 may make, or propositions receive from Mr. Forbes, you will please 
 communicate. Their efforts and patriotic zeal, and that of Governor 
 
112 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Andrew, are highly appreciated, and it is gratifying to the Department 
 to have their active cooperation in this emergency, so interesting to the 
 whole country. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 (Signed) GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 While the Secretary intimates his willingness to purchase 
 vessels -when finished, he states that the exigencies of the Gov 
 ernment require that vessels should be obtained at once, and 
 that this could be done only by purchasing ships already built, 
 and which could be promptly fitted for service. 
 
 Time has shown that the Department availed itself prompt 
 ly of the only means by which the country could have been 
 saved. By the well-known system of trade in the great mar 
 kets, negotiations for the transfer of important property are not 
 carried on directly between the holder of the property and 
 those who wish to buy, but between a broker, acting for the 
 parties, and this broker receives a stipulated commission from 
 the seller. It was found that the business of purchasing vessels 
 for the United States was so managed, that the Government 
 sometimes paid two commissions, and that, in some cases, these 
 commissions had also been above the market rates. After con 
 sultation with those qualified to advise, and with the express 
 sanction of the President, it was determined to procure the 
 services of some competent and reliable man, who would agree 
 to devote his whole time to the procuring and fitting out of 
 ships, and who should receive nothing from the Government, 
 and from the seller only the regular commission established by 
 the New York Board of Trade. This would bring the whole 
 transaction within the common and recognized laws of trade, 
 and would relieve the Department from the liability of any im 
 proper charge for commissions, and of extravagant prices for 
 vessels which might be bought. 
 
 In pursuance of this plan, the Department applied to Mr. 
 George D. Morgan, of New York, a gentleman of well-known 
 character and ability, and of large experience as a merchant. 
 He acceded to the wishes of the Department, and relinquishing 
 a lucrative business which would have yielded him more profit 
 than the amount of his commissions, entered upon his work. 
 
MEASURES ADOPTED FOE THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY. 113 
 
 The naval constructor and an experienced engineer were then 
 associated with Mr. Morgan. These two officers examined be 
 forehand every vessel which it was proposed to buy. The naval 
 constructor could judge of the character of the vessel, the engi 
 neer formed an opinion of the engine, and together they made 
 an appraisal of the ship, which was submitted confidentially to 
 Mr. Morgan, who was not permitted to pay more for any vessel 
 than the price set upon her by the examiners and appraisers of 
 the Government. 
 
 Through this arrangement the Department was enabled to 
 obtain many of the fastest and best steamers in the mercantile 
 navy, and on terms rather within than exceeding the usual rates 
 of the market. From this source the Department derived the 
 means both of establishing the blockade and of meeting the 
 vast demand of the Army for transportation of troops and sup 
 plies. Many of these steamers, when armed, were very formi 
 dable war-ships. Some of them could carry with safety eight 
 9-inch guns, while small, swift vessels armed with a 100-pounder 
 rifle, were the terror of the blockade-runners of England. 
 
 The efficiency of this Navy, thus extemporized from mer 
 chant-ships, has been largely underrated, because opinions have 
 been formed without considering that the method of arming our 
 ships is both American and peculiar. No correct idea can be 
 formed of the actual force of an American ship from the num 
 ber of guns she mounts. It is by no means certain that a vessel 
 with one gun would be overmatched by another merely because 
 she is armed with ten. At the commencement of the war a 
 50-pounder rifle was the heaviest cannon mounted on any 
 French war-ship, and the English relied upon the smooth 
 bore 68-pounder as their most efficient gun; while our own 
 small gunboats carried a 100-pounder rifle, and some of our 
 second-rate sloops mounted a 150-pounder rifle or an 11-inch 
 gun, and sometimes both. 
 
 The character of the armament of our ships is an original 
 American idea, and is a distinguishing and most important fea 
 ture of the Navy. A merchant- vessel that could carry one 11- 
 inch pivot-gun, or a heavy rifle, would not be a pleasant antag 
 onist for a ship mounting a whole broadside of the light cannon 
 of the old style of armament. 
 8 
 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 As to the discrimination and care used, and the efficiency of 
 the vessels purchased, the statement is made on the direct au 
 thority of Admiral Porter, that the twenty-one mortar-vessels 
 under his command endured the severe service with almost 
 no apparent injury. The number of discharges from these 
 heavy mortars averaged fifteen hundred to each vessel, and 
 yet none of them were shaken so as to leak, and at the close 
 of the war they were sold for nearly as much as they origi 
 nally cost. 
 
 The following extract from the Secretary s report for 1861 
 presents his own account of this important matter : 
 
 The public vessels and the public yards, in their capacity of con 
 struction and repair, were, however, totally inadequate to the demands 
 that are now pressing on this branch of the Government, and the De 
 partment was compelled to resort to the commercial marine to make 
 good the deficiency. Vessels of every class and description were 
 promptly tendered by sellers and their agents, who, in many instances, 
 became dissatisfied when their offers were not accepted. 
 
 This new necessity of the Government, involving a large expenditure, 
 and the purchase of suitable vessels, imposed an important responsi 
 bility ; and the task of making suitable arrangements to insure the 
 prompt and systematic purchase, on the best and most reasonable terms 
 for the Government, of a large number of vessels most suitable for its 
 use, was attended by peculiar difficulties, and received mature consider 
 ation. The purchase might be made directly by the Department, or by 
 boards of officers under its control at the principal ports where the ves 
 sels were to be bought, and especially at the great central point of sup 
 ply for such a demand, the port of New York. 
 
 But to both these methods of procedure the briefest trial disclosed 
 serious objections. It was manifest from the first that the Department, 
 charged suddenly with the organization and superintendence of new and 
 arduous naval operations on a large scale, in addition to its current busi 
 ness, could not possibly itself devote to the numerous details of each 
 case of purchase, the time and attention needful fully to protect the in 
 terests of the Government. It was equally clear that boards of officers, 
 acting in a mere mercantile capacity, new to them, and for which they 
 had neither been practically trained nor professionally commissioned, 
 would be subjected to great embarrassment and disadvantage in their 
 dealings with sellers of ships and professional ship-brokers, in a market 
 suddenly pressed by a heavy and peremptory demand. Yet the Depart- 
 
MEASURES ADOPTED FOR THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY. 115 
 
 ment could rely, and it did rely, with the fullest confidence upon the 
 professional judgment and ability of its ordnance officers, naval con 
 structors, and engineers, all acting under the responsibility of their com 
 missions, to investigate and determine the whole question of the adap 
 tation, in all respects, of each ship offered, and of its capacity to be by 
 alteration fully adapted to perform the particular service required by the 
 Government. This work, with the corresponding authority of selection 
 and rejection of all vessels, was therefore exclusively committed to 
 boards consisting each of an experienced naval constructor and engi 
 neer and an ordnance officer, convened and stationed for the purpose at 
 New York, and the other principal cities. The mere mercantile part 
 of the business the making of the best bargains possible for the Gov 
 ernment in each case, with the care of averting all intervention of third 
 parties, which might embarrass the attainment of that result was con 
 sidered by the Government to be placed most properly in the hands of 
 a mercantile agency of a high and established character for integrity, 
 experience, and capacity. Obvious reasons, including the consideration 
 that it is individual responsibility which is always felt most keenly, and 
 that several agents, all acting separately for the Government at the same 
 places, would necessarily compete with each other to its disadvantage 
 in the market, indicated that this agency should be tendered to a single, 
 properly qualified individual, upon the distinct understanding that he 
 should devote his whole time, attention, and ability to the work ; that 
 he should in no case make any charge against the Government for his 
 service ; that he should deal always directly and exclusively with the 
 owners of the vessels purchased, thus permitting no brokerage fees, or 
 agents commissions, between himself and the owners ; and that, finally, 
 his own commission, payable always by the seller, should in no case ex 
 ceed the regular mercantile percentage fixed by the Chamber of Com 
 merce of New York, and established by the custom of merchants in 
 that city as the rightful and legal rate of remuneration for such services 
 rendered by any person acting between the sellers and purchasers of 
 vessels. 
 
 The experiment thus made by the Navy Department was 
 one of great national importance, and every American has rea 
 son to rejoice at the result. It lias shown what abundant re 
 sources we have ever at hand in our merchant steamers to meet 
 such an emergency as the rebellion created, and that under an 
 efficient administration these can be called to the aid of the 
 Government almost as quickly as if they belonged to the na- 
 
116 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 tional Navy. They were admirably fitted for the intended pur 
 pose ; they were more efficient blockaders than our regular war- 
 vessels ; they were formidable antagonists because of their heavy 
 armament ; but notwithstanding this, the nation should not de 
 ceive itself with the idea that it would be equally safe to depend 
 upon this class of vessels in case of a foreign war. This subject 
 will be discussed in another chapter. 
 
CHAPTEE X. 
 
 THE IDEAS WHICH GOVERNED THE DEPARTMENT IN THE CONSTRUC 
 TION OF NEW VESSELS. 
 
 IN order to judge aright the policy of the Department in the 
 construction of new vessels, it is necessary not only to inquire 
 what the precise want of the country then was, but whether this 
 policy was shaped by a definite American idea concerning ships 
 and guns, and naval war. This subject was touched upon in 
 an opening chapter, with the intention of returning to it again. 
 
 It is an important thought, and one which, in estimating the 
 value of the Navy, has not received due attention, that previous 
 to the rebellion it was the best exponent of our national power, 
 the expression of a true national thought and feeling. With 
 the exception of the little standing Army, that attracted no at 
 tention, we had only State troops, where we had any soldiers, 
 who expected to answer any call from the General Government 
 only through the State authority ; but in the Navy there were 
 no State ships, nor sailors, nor State flags ; it was " the Ameri 
 can Navy." There the true national feeling was cherished in 
 its strength, when it was weak or discarded elsewhere ; and par 
 ticularly was this true of the seamen, a fact to be remembered 
 to their eternal honor. When the officers of Southern birth 
 or proclivities, who had come under the influence of their 
 leaders, abandoned in large numbers the cause of their country, 
 the common seamen, with very few exceptions, were true to the 
 national sentiment, and faithful to the national flag. The 
 Navy not only centred upon itself the national feeling, but it 
 embodied the national thought. 
 
 When the American mind came to express itself in the 
 
118 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 form of ships and guns, it was seen that it had not followed ex 
 isting models, but had thought out some peculiar and original 
 forms. Soon, when men spoke of an American ship, it was un 
 derstood to be a vessel of distinctive character, and different 
 from an English or any other ship. It was regarded as bear 
 ing the stamp of American character. 
 
 The American mind, however, from the first, was not work 
 ing at random ; it was not making experiments here and there, 
 which tended to no result, but, from first to last, it was gov 
 erned by a few definite ideas and well-settled principles ; and 
 the Department, in the construction of the new Navy, followed 
 the traditional policy of the nation, but made some novel and 
 very startling applications of leading principles and ideas. 
 
 A very brief sketch of the rise and progress of the ISTavy will 
 place the action of the Department in its proper light. A lead 
 ing characteristic of the American mind is its impatience of 
 many successive operations to produce a given effect. It aims 
 to reach its object by a single step. It seeks to concentrate 
 power upon a single point, to combine many forces in one, and 
 by a single blow produce the effect of all. It brings the 
 greatest possible force to bear on a single purpose, and reaches 
 that purpose in the shortest possible time. In every branch of 
 our industry we find examples of the manner in which this cen 
 tral idea has given direction to American thought. Instead of 
 the slow process of hand-work, the American will have a ma 
 chine to gin his cotton, and with it he changes the aspect and 
 relations of the world. He will not only have a printing-press 
 worked by steam, instead of the hand, but he constructs a cyl 
 inder press ; and, not content with that, he invents a Hoe press, 
 a lightning press, that throws off its thousands of sheets per 
 hour. He not only uses the ship that sails with the wind and 
 tide, but he will construct a steamship, that goes with equal 
 speed against the wind and tide. He cannot wait for the slow 
 processes of scythe and sickle, but concentrates the power of 
 twenty men into a single machine. He cannot endure that his 
 message should travel only forty miles per hour, and so he in 
 vents the telegraph, and flashes on his thought hundreds of miles 
 in a moment. Instead of waiting for the slow stitching of 
 weary hands, he condenses the power and speed of fifty needles 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 119 
 
 into one, and drives that one by steam. When he builds a war 
 ship, he aims to give her the highest speed consistent with his 
 purpose, and for her armament he concentrates the force of a 
 broadside into one big gun ; and, instead of making fifty small 
 holes or indentations, he crushes in the side of his enemy by 
 one smashing shot, and compels him to surrender or sends him 
 to the bottom. The Navy, therefore, is the creation of a lead 
 ing thought in the American mind, and it will be interesting to 
 trace the influence of this thought in the various stages of con 
 struction. 
 
 At the time of the Revolution, we had, of course, no Navy, 
 and the few small commercial vessels of the colonies presented 
 nothing peculiar. The thought of the people had been occupied 
 with the grave political and moral questions connected with the 
 separation from England. The American mind had not yet been 
 directed to the importance of manufactures or commerce. In 
 fact, both were purposely made impossible for the colonists by 
 the restrictive laws of England. But in the very first war-ves 
 sels built after the close of the war, the true distinctive Ameri 
 can idea began to be manifested. The idea was, to bring the 
 power of a line-of-battle ship within the dimensions of a 
 frigate. This was nearly accomplished by slightly increasing 
 the size of the common frigate, and arming her witli heavier 
 guns, without changing her nominal rate. The manner in 
 which this was carried out is shown in the size and armament 
 of the frigates Constitution and United States. The frigate 
 Constitution was launched in 1T9T; her length was 175 feet, 
 her breadth of beam 43.6 in., and her tonnage, according to the 
 old rates, 1,530 tons. The United States was launched in 1797 ; 
 her length was 175 feet, her breadth of beam 43.6 in., and her 
 tonnage 1,530. 
 
 In order to compare the American with the British ship of 
 the same rate, it is only necessary to state the weight of their 
 broadsides, which were as follows : 
 
 American frigate United States 864 Ibs. 
 
 American frigate Constitution 768 Ibs. 
 
 British frigate Macedonian 528 Ibs. 
 
 British frigate Guerriere 617 Ibs. 
 
 It will be seen at a glance, from these statements, that the 
 
120 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 registered rates of our ships gave no indication of their compar 
 ative force. The Americans had so far carried out their idea 
 of the concentration of power, that their frigate rated as a forty- 
 four was very nearly the equal of a British line-of-battle ship ; 
 and the result was, that when the Guerriere, a forty-four, was 
 laid alongside the American forty-four, the Constitution, the 
 British ship was demolished in fifteen minutes. Similar results 
 followed, as is well known, in other actions ; and though it was 
 conceded that the rapidity of the American fire was generally 
 greater than that of the English, still our almost unbroken 
 success was mainly due to the superior weight of the American 
 broadside. 
 
 The English historians have dwelt with great satisfaction 
 upon the disparity of force. They declare that it removes all 
 the sting of defeat. They insist that it was perfectly natural, 
 even inevitable, that, under such circumstances, the British 
 ships should be captured or sunk. This was, and is, precisely 
 the American opinion. This was just the result they antici 
 pated, and they built their frigates with this very object in 
 view. There are two aspects to this subject, one of which all 
 English writers seem to have overlooked. In one view, it was 
 a battle between ship and ship, and it was no disgrace to the 
 English commanders to yield to superior force. But it was also 
 a fight between the two nations, and certainly it was a remark 
 able fact, and highly honorable to the Americans, that their 
 young nation, in the first hours of its life, should have produced 
 ships that carried dismay to every English heart, and conquered, 
 on her own element, the haughty mistress of the seas. In the 
 battle between the nations, England was met by superior 
 weapons, and was ingloriously defeated. 
 
 Should such a ship as our Miantonomoh meet an English 
 broadside iron-clad, and crush in her sides with 15-inch shot, 
 as she easily could, it would be quite natural, even necessary, 
 that the British ship should surrender or sink. There might be 
 no occasion to charge the English commander with want of 
 courage or skill, but it would be discreditable and humbling to 
 Great Britain that her boasted national ships, to which she had 
 trusted her safety and honor, should be easily demolished by an 
 American Monitor. It would not lessen the national shame to 
 
CONSTEUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 121 
 
 assert and prove that the British iron-clad was no match for the 
 Yankee ship. That is the precise result at which we are aiming. 
 To present more fully the difference between the English 
 and American armament, the following table is extracted from 
 James s " Naval History," showing the weight of the broadside 
 of the classes of ships named : 
 
 Gun ship. French. English. 
 
 120 1,268 1,373. 
 
 110 1,180 1,278. 
 
 80 996 1,079. 
 
 74 838 907. 
 
 64 510 552. 
 
 The heaviest guns in these armaments were 36-pounders, on 
 the main deck. 
 
 James s history was published in 1822. His rates have been 
 quoted by authorities since as correct, and yet we find that he 
 states that the weight of the Macedonian s broadside was 549 
 pounds at the time of her capture in 1812, and that the broad 
 side of the Guerriere was 517 pounds. It will be seen that the 
 United States frigate, rated as a forty-four, threw very nearly 
 the same weight of metal at a broadside as the Ttt-gun ship 
 of the English Navy, if James s figures are correct. 
 
 A second era in the construction of the American Navy be 
 gan after the War of 1812, when the Government built several 
 line-of-battle ships, follpwing in the main the European model, 
 retaining still, however, the heavy armament ; and the vessels 
 thus constructed were as much superior to the British vessels 
 of the same rates as were our frigates to those of the same rate 
 in the English Navy. In James s history is the following com 
 parison between the English 80-gun ship and the American 
 ship Franklin, rated as a seventy-four, and also carrying eighty 
 guns: 
 
 ALBION. FRANKLIN. 
 
 Weight Weight 
 
 Guns. Pounders. per gun. Guns. Pounders, per gun. 
 
 First deck 28 long 32 55 30 long 32 63 
 
 Second" 28 " 18 42 32 " 32 . . . . 52 
 
 Quarter deck ... 6 " 12 34 2 " 32 53 
 
 Forecastle 12 carronades 32 17f 18 carronades 32 .... 19 
 
 Poop 6 carronadas 18 10^ 
 
 80 82 
 
122 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ALBION. FRANKLIN. 
 
 Weight of broadside. . 982 Ibs. Weight of broadside. . . 1,312 Ibs. 
 
 Crew 593 Crew 786 
 
 Size, tons 1,743 Size, tons 2,124 
 
 Length of the Franklin, as stated by James 197 feet. 
 
 Extreme breadth 50 " 
 
 First deck ports apart. 8.6 " 
 
 Height of " from water 4.7" 
 
 Draught of water abaft 24 " 
 
 To these tables may properly be added the following state 
 ment of the battery of the Ohio. The Ohio rates as a 74-gun 
 ship. Her length is 198 feet, and her breadth of beam 54 feet, 
 6 inches. The battery of this ship is shown by the following 
 tables : 
 
 BATTERY OF THE OHIO 1846. 
 
 Weight of broadside. 
 
 Spar deck, < 
 
 Twelve 
 
 Four 
 Six 
 
 32-pounders of 
 32 " of 
 32 " of 
 
 42 cwt. 
 
 57 " 
 61 " 
 
 1480 Ibs. 
 
 
 Four 
 
 8-inch 
 
 of 
 
 53 " 
 
 
 
 Main deck, 
 
 Twenty-eight 
 : Four 
 
 32-pounders 
 8-inch 
 
 of 
 of 
 
 61 " 
 63 " 
 
 j-576 
 
 Ibs. 
 
 Lower deck J Twenty-eight 
 ( Four 
 
 Total. . 
 
 4 2-p ounders 
 8-inch 
 
 of 
 of 
 
 71 " 
 63 " 
 
 . | 716 
 
 , ,1,772. 
 
 Ibs. 
 
 The armament of an English 120-gun ship is stated by 
 James (volume i., published in 1822) as follows : 
 
 32 36-pounders. ") 
 
 34 24-pounders. 
 
 34 12-pounders. \ Wei S ht of broadside 1,373 Ibs. 
 
 20 8-pounders. J 
 
 120 
 
 In round numbers, then, the broadside of the American 90- 
 gun ship was heavier by 400 pounds than that of the English 
 ship of 120 guns. Nor was this the only superiority. The lar 
 gest gun then mounted on the English three-decker was a 36- 
 pounder, while the Ohio carried 28 42-pounders and 8 8-inch 
 guns, whose shot weighs 65 pounds. 
 
 In the form of the American line-of-battle ship there was 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 123 
 
 little or nothing peculiar ; but the armament was distinctively 
 American. The 8-inch guns, the 42-pounders, and the superior 
 weight of the broadside, gave the Ohio so great an advantage 
 as to make it almost certain that a 100-gun ship of the old 
 style, in a combat with her, would have been demolished as the 
 Guerriere was by the Constitution. These line-of-battle ships, 
 six in number, were, however, upon the whole, the most unsat 
 isfactory vessels which have been constructed. They followed 
 very closely in form the European model ; and the American 
 mind does not, in such matters, work well in foreign harness. 
 They were the first and the last of their class in our Navy, and 
 are now useful only as storeships. 
 
 The next distinctive era in the progress of our Navy was 
 that in w^hich a new class of frigates was produced, which, more 
 clearly than any thing which had preceded them, presented the 
 distinctive American idea. They were such war-ships as the 
 world had not seen before, and were destined, within their 
 sphere, to revolutionize the naval architecture of the world. 
 Already, indeed, the Americans, in their endeavor to produce 
 ships of greater speed, had greatly modified the forms of our 
 commercial vessels. The hull was much longer in proportion 
 to breadth, the bow was sharper, and the stern was rounded, 
 while the length of spars, and consequently the spread of 
 canvas, was largely increased. With these modifications our 
 sailing vessels, as well as our steamboats, had become the fastest 
 in the world. These changes, so far as they were available, 
 were adopted in the construction of the new American frigates. 
 
 In order to place the character of these vessels more clearly 
 before the reader, the dimensions, tonnage, and weight of broad 
 side, as stated by James, of a French lOtt-gun ship, and an 
 English 90-gun ship, about the time of our Revolution, are here 
 presented : 
 
 Length of deck. Breadth. Weight of broadside. 
 
 French 104 guns 187 ft., 7 in 53 ft., 8 in 1,170 pounds. 
 
 English 90 guns 175 ft. 48 ft., 7^ in. ... 842 pounds. 
 
 The French ship measured 2,347 tons. 
 
 The English " " 1,814 " 
 
 By referring to tables previously given, it will be seen that 
 the American frigates Constitution and United States, built just 
 
124 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 after the war of the Revolution, were as large as the English 
 90-gun ship, and that the United States threw a heavier broad 
 side. 
 
 In the light of these facts the change wrought in naval con 
 struction by the new American frigates will be clearly seen. 
 They were the first built after the war of 1812- 15. The Minne 
 sota may be regarded as a type of this class of ships, and her 
 dimensions are as follows : length 269 feet ; breadth 51 feet, 4 
 inches ; tonnage 3,307 tons. She is, then, nearly 1,600 tons 
 heavier than the English 90-gun ship was about the beginning 
 of this century ; she is 94 feet longer, and her weight of broad 
 side is 2,406 pounds, or nearly three times that of the old 
 British 90-gun ship, while she is also nearly 70* feet longer than 
 our own line-of-battle ships built after the War of 1812. 
 
 The important points to be noticed here are the greater 
 length of the ship in proportion to her breadth, the increase 
 of the weight of the broadside in proportion to the tonnage, and 
 the greater size of the shot. According to James, the largest 
 gun on the English 120-gun ship of the old form was a 36- 
 pounder. Our own line-of-battle ship, the Franklin, carried, as 
 is stated, nothing heavier than 32-pounders. Our 90-gun ship, 
 the Ohio, in 1845 was armed partly with 42-pounders, but they 
 were carronades, and the idea of the heavy armament will ap 
 pear very distinctly if, with these figures before us, we look at 
 the size of the Minnesota s guns, as they were in 1863 : 
 
 "Weight of shot. 
 
 1 150-pounder, rifle 150 Ibs. 
 
 4 100-pounders, " 100 " 
 
 111-inch " 166 " 
 
 42 9-inch " ; 90 " 
 
 These statements show very clearly the direction in which 
 the American mind was working. The object aimed at is 
 plain ; and the result was, a class of frigates more formidable 
 than any other ships afloat. The manner in which the heavy 
 guns of the Kearsarge shattered and sunk the Alabama shows 
 how quickly the Minnesota could crush any wooden ship armed 
 only with 32-pounder or 42-pounder guns, or even with a few 
 68-pounders, in addition to the general armament. A war with 
 England, previous to the rebellion, would necessarily have re- 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 125 
 
 peated, on a larger scale and with more decisive effects, the tri 
 umphs of our first battles on the sea. The little Navy of the 
 United States, as a w r hole, was doubtless no match for the im 
 mense fleets of England ; but the Minnesota, or any other ship 
 of her class and armament, would have captured any single 
 wooden ship then in the British Navy. She would so far have 
 overmatched an English line-of-battle ship as to have made the 
 battle a useless waste of life. 
 
 This point had been reached by the United States in the 
 construction of a Navy previous to the breaking out of the re 
 bellion. Intent only on the pursuits of peace, the country felt 
 no anxiety in regard to the increase of its naval power. For 
 almost fifty years the Navy had had no opportunity of attract 
 ing attention by brilliant achievements. A generation had 
 come upon the stage to whom its former renown was only a 
 matter of history. Very little was known of its character, or 
 the nature of its service, or of the stations of the ships ; and it 
 was perfectly easy, therefore, for the conspirators who controlled 
 the Navy to scatter it abroad, and disarm the nation without 
 exciting remark or suspicion. The condition of affairs in this 
 respect has been already described, and mention has been made 
 of the first measures adopted by the Department to extricate 
 itself from its perilous position, through the extensive pur 
 chase of private vessels. This, as has been stated, was the only 
 possible step which the Secretary could take with any reason 
 able hope of success ; and it was accomplished, as has been 
 shown, with remarkable promptitude, business tact, and econ 
 omy for the Government. A blockade had been proclaimed, 
 and a mere paper blockade would only have invited the trad,e 
 of all nations to the rebel ports. These purchased vessels were 
 stationed, as rapidly as possible, along the Southern coast. But 
 these purchased ships, well suited as they were to the general 
 purpose, by no means met the whole want of the country. It 
 was not alone the outer, the sea-coast line, which was to be 
 guarded, but the inner coast, the sounds, the inlets, and rivers. 
 To complete and maintain this blockade, and thus cut off the 
 rebel supplies, was evidently the first thing to be done. The 
 operations of the Navy Department cannot be rightly judged 
 without holding in view, not alone what it was desirable to do, 
 
126 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 but what, at the time, it was possible to get done. It must also 
 be remembered, that while many things pressed at once upon 
 the Secretary, and all perhaps important, yet from his stand 
 point, and knowing what the public did not, he could see that 
 some one thing should take precedence of all the rest, and the 
 Department aimed ever to do the first thing first. 
 
 Having made his first purchases of vessels for the blocka 
 ding squadron, the Secretary knew that the heavy frigates 
 already named, and some steam-sloops, might be used to re 
 duce some of the less formidable forts guarding the inlets and 
 sounds, so soon as these ships could be collected from the distant 
 points to which they had been scattered ; and the first w r ork of 
 construction was the building of a fleet of small gunboats, of 
 about five hundred tons burden, to operate in the shallow wa 
 ters of the Southern coast. Such was the necessity for these 
 vessels, and such the foresight and decision of the Secretary, that 
 twenty-three of this class were ordered in advance of the action 
 of Congress ; and when that body met in December, 1861, the 
 Department was able to report that many of these gunboats 
 were already in commission, and doing good service on the 
 Southern coast. A brief statement of the character of these 
 vessels w T ill present once more very clearly the American idea 
 of ships and their armament. Their dimensions were as fol 
 lows : length, 165 ft., 6 in. ; breadth, 28 feet ; depth, 12 feet. 
 They were schooner-rigged, and their maximum and contract 
 speed was nine knots. Their armament consisted of one 11- 
 inch pivot-gun ; two 24-pounder howitzers, and one 20-pounder 
 howitzer. Their measurement was, in round numbers, five hun 
 dred (500) tons. 
 
 The first point worthy of note, as illustrating the change 
 which the Americans were working in naval architecture, is 
 their length in proportion to their tonnage and diminished 
 breadth. Our first frigates, as has been shown, were about the 
 length of the old 80-gun ship, and their measurement about fif 
 teen hundred (1,500) tons. The breadth of the frigates was a 
 little more than fifty feet. But these small gunboats of only 
 five hundred tons are only ten feet shorter than such frigates as 
 the Constitution and the United States, while their breadth is 
 only twenty-eight feet. They are nearly as long as the frigates 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 127 
 
 of 1812 with only one-third their tonnage, while they have only 
 a trine more than one-half their breadth. 
 
 This shows an entire change in the model of war-ships ; but 
 we see also that it is in conformity to a general idea that is a 
 prevailing one in the construction of the Navy, and indeed of 
 all American ships, the lengthening of the hull in proportion 
 to the breadth. The next American characteristic is shown in 
 the style of the armament. These small gunboats carry one 
 pivot-gun, whose shot weighs 160 pounds. A comparison will 
 show the practical effect of this new arrangement. This single 
 11-inch gun, and one of the 2i-pounder howitzers, carry a 
 weight of metal equal to the broadside of a 20-gun ship armed 
 with 18-pounders. Nor is this all. While the gunboat might 
 receive many broadsides from the 18-pounders without being 
 sunk, a single shot from the 11-inch gun would be very 
 likely to disable or sink a 20-gun ship of the old construction 
 and armament. These little gunboats were really formidable 
 vessels. 
 
 The country in its first alarm, and having then no clear con 
 ceptions of what was needed, or of what could be done, was anx 
 ious for many things, and also anxious that these many things 
 should be immediately provided. The people demanded pow 
 erful, swift ocean cruisers, which should sweep the seas, forgetful 
 of the important fact that such ships would require three years 
 in the building, and even if already built they would not meet 
 the exact want which was pressing the Government most se 
 verely then. Its first need was for blockading vessels, which 
 were procured, as far as possible, by purchase ; and its next, of 
 gunboats for the shallow waters and rivers of the South, was 
 provided for by the fleet of twenty-three, which were put in 
 commission a few months only after the contracts were made. 
 
 To illustrate the object which American builders have held 
 steadily in view, let it be supposed that such a gunboat as has 
 been described, with her speed increased to fourteen knots (if 
 that is possible), should meet even a line-of-battle ship armed 
 only with 32-pounders and 32-pounder carronades to say 
 the very least, it is by no means certain that the large ship 
 would be the victor. It is probably not practicable to give to 
 a vessel of this small gunboat class the requisite speed ; but a 
 
128 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 small, swift vessel, carrying one heavy gun, can be built, and 
 she would prove a very formidable foe to a ship much larger 
 than herself if armed only with lighter guns. 
 
 By the promptness and energy with which the Department 
 moved in carrying out these measures, before the close of the 
 first year of its administration, it had placed on the Southern 
 coast a fleet quite sufficient to establish a blockade which Euro 
 pean Governments were compelled to recognize as valid. Of 
 course it was very difficult, at first, so to close that long and 
 double coast-line, that the vigilance, and skill, and persevering 
 energy of neutral England could find no entrance, stimulated 
 as she was by the hope of gain, and the desire to aid in our 
 ruin ; but every new ship we commissioned lessened somewhat 
 her chances of success, and cut off some portion of the resources 
 of the rebels. The fleet of English steamers supplying them 
 with arms, clothing, food, and whatever else was required, 
 and other English vessels floating the secession flag, destroy 
 ing our peaceful ships, will appear in the future as the 
 most disgraceful chapter of all her history. Nor do all the 
 pleasant speeches which individual Englishmen or Americans 
 have made, or may make, alter the smallest feature of the case. 
 These pleasant-spoken gentlemen do not represent the real 
 England with which we have to deal. Lord Palmerston was 
 the true exponent of England. 
 
 The next step was to produce some new steamers of the Iro- 
 quois class, vessels of about one thousand tons burden, and which 
 were efficient ocean cruisers. Of these were the Kearsarge, the 
 Oneida, the Wachusett, and Tuscarora. The value of these 
 ships was triumphantly shown in the destruction of the Ala 
 bama, a battle which, in its influence upon European opinion 
 and policy, was second only to the Monitor fight with the Mer- 
 rimack. The dimensions of this class were as follows, omitting 
 fractions, and taking the Kearsarge as a type : length, 200 feet ; 
 breadth, 33 feet ; measurement, 1,031 tons ; battery, two 11-inch 
 guns, one 30-pounder rifle, four 32-pounders smooth bore. 
 These vessels, for the purpose of saving time, were built from 
 drawings and patterns already in the hands of the builders of 
 those from which they were copied ships that had been con 
 structed previous to the war, and yet they exhibit very clearly 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 129 
 
 the direction in which the American mind was working. 
 These gunboats are a few feet longer than our old Y4- 
 gun ship, the Franklin, while they are also twenty-two feet 
 narrower. The destruction of the Alabama is proof positive of 
 the terrible efficiency of their armament, and it is more than 
 probable that the Kearsarge with her 11-inch guns would de 
 stroy any wooden ship, however large, if armed only with 32- 
 pounder and 42-pounder guns, and provided her speed were 
 only equal to that of the Kearsarge. 
 
 These vessels were intended, not only for the service of the 
 blockade, but for the pursuit and capture of the armed vessels 
 which neutral England 1 fitted out in her harbors, and manned 
 with seamen and gunners from her own practice-ships ; and 
 while many Americans were denouncing the Department be 
 cause it had furnished, as was said, no swift, efficient ships, the 
 English papers ascribed the capture of their boasted Alabama 
 to the superior speed and general efficiency of the Kearsarge 
 a very conclusive answer to the censure at home. 
 
 Some experiments which were made in the crooked and 
 narrow channels of the Southern rivers showed conclusively 
 that the screw-steamers were not the most efficient vessels for 
 such a service, because they cannot run backward they cannot 
 advance and retire on the same line. They must turn round in 
 order to withdraw; and to say nothing of the difficulty of doing 
 this in a narrow channel, it is often very dangerous ; as, for in 
 stance, when a vessel attacks a fort, and it becomes necessary to 
 withdraw. In turning, the entire broadside would be exposed 
 to the enemy s fire. The same would be true when a vessel, in 
 the bend of a stream, comes unexpectedly upon a battery or 
 fort. 
 
 In the early part of the war one of our screw-steamers was 
 lost in this manner. She found herself suddenly under the fire 
 of a battery in the bend of a river, and in endeavoring to turn 
 she ran aground and was lost. If she could have backed out, 
 she would have been saved. The Department next decided 
 upon the construction of some side-wheel steamers ; and the 
 following were built : the Maratanza, Mali ask a, Sebago, Octa- 
 rora, Sonoma, Conemaugh, Tioga, Genesee, Miami, Paul Jones, 
 Port Royal, and Cimarron, twelve in number, of about 850 
 9 
 
130 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 tons each, and having a maximum speed of eleven knots per 
 hour. 
 
 But even these did not meet all the requirements of the 
 case, and another style of vessel was devised, still better adapted 
 to the shallow and tortuous channels of the Southern waters. 
 Both ends of these vessels were built alike, and their wheels 
 and engines were so constructed that they could move back 
 ward or forward with equal facility. These were twenty- 
 seven in number. They were of 974 tons burden, and have a 
 maximum speed of 14J knots per hour. Their names were, the 
 Eutaw, the Sassacus, Wateree, Pawtuxet, Tallapoosa, Winoo- 
 ski, Mackinaw, Shamrock, Tallahoma, Tacony, losco, Aga- 
 wam, Pontoosuc, Massasoit, Osceola, Mattobosett, Chickopee, 
 Ascutney, Otsego, Metacomet, Chenango, Lenapee, Mendota, 
 Mingo, Wyalusing, Pontiac, and Peoria. These were the 
 gunboats known as " double-enders." To this class seven other 
 larger and faster were added, the Winnipec, Ashuelot, Muscoo- 
 ta, Suwanee, Shamokin, Mohongo, and Monocacy, all of 1,030 
 tons each. These paddle-wheel gunboats have the light draught 
 of eight feet, and were very heavily armed. 
 
 These were followed by another class, larger still, and de 
 signed for ocean cruisers, and it was intended to give them a 
 speed equal to that of the neutral blockade-runners. The Lack- 
 awanna may perhaps be taken as a representative of this class, 
 although she is a trine larger than some of them. Her length 
 is 237 feet ; her breadth, 38 feet ; her tonnage, 1,533 tons. 
 
 It will be seen that the change in model was still going on 
 in the same direction, as appears by an example. The now his 
 toric flag-ship of Admiral Farragut, the Hartford, was of the 
 following dimensions : length, 229 feet 9 inches ; breadth, 44 
 feet ; tonnage, in round numbers, 2,000 tons. With a tonnage 
 of only 1,533 tons, the Lackawanna is 7 feet 3 inches longer 
 than the Hartford, while at the same time she is six feet nar 
 rower. 
 
 The armament of this class of ships was as follows. The 
 list, however, gives only a general idea of their guns, for they 
 were not precisely the same on every vessel, and changes were 
 made from time to time that were indicated by experience. 
 The armament of the Lackawanna was as follows : 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 131 
 
 Weight of shell. Weight of shot. 
 
 One 150-pounder rifle, pivot 146 pounds 150 pounds. 
 
 One 50 " " " 40 " 50 " 
 
 Two 11-inch " " each 136 " each 166 " 
 
 Four 9 " broadside " 73 " " 90 " 
 
 Weight of broadside shell 622 " . . shot 712 " 
 
 If this battery is compared with that of vessels of an earlier 
 date, it will be seen to be a very formidable one ; and such an 
 American war-ship, armed with such guns, placed alongside a 
 frigate or line-of-battle ship built in the early part of the eigh 
 teenth century, is shown to be a new creation, the product of a 
 new idea. The progress of what may be called American ideas 
 in the form and armament of vessels is very clearly shown by 
 a comparison between the old frigate Constitution and the 
 Lackawanna. In two points they admit of this comparison, their 
 tonnage and the weight of their broadside. The Constitution 
 measured about 1,500 tons, the Lackawanna 1,533 tons. The 
 broadside of the Constitution weighed Y68 pounds, while that 
 of the Lackawanna weighs 712 pounds. In burden and broad 
 side, therefore, the two ships are nearly the same. But here 
 the resemblance ends. The length of the old frigate was 175 
 feet, that of the new steam-sloop 237 feet ; the breadth of the 
 Constitution was 43 feet, 6 inches, that of the Lackawanna is 38 
 feet. So that while the modern vessel is 5 feet narrower than 
 the pride of the old Navy (" Old Ironsides ") was, she is, at the 
 same time, 62 feet longer. These facts exhibit with great 
 clearness the direction in which American thought has been 
 working, and it will soon be shown that the limit was not 
 reached with the Lackawanna class of steamers. 
 
 But it is in the armament that the American peculiarity is 
 presented with greatest boldness. Scarcely a trace remains of the 
 old ideas in the battery of the Lackawanna. Europe had never 
 before seen such an armament. The new steam-sloop, with 
 only eight guns, throws about the same weight of metal that 
 the Constitution did with her fifty guns. The heaviest guns of 
 the Constitution were 32-pounders, the lightest gun of the 
 Lackawanna was in 1863 a 50-pounder; the broadside guns 
 were 90-pounders ; then there was one 150-pounder rifle, and 
 last, two 166-pounder pivot-guns. To this must be added the 
 
132 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 important fact that these were also shell-guns. Such a ship 
 would demolish an old 100-gun ship almost at a broadside. 
 The speed of these new ships was such as to vindicate both the 
 wisdom of the Department in deciding upon their model and 
 the skill and faithfulness of those by whom the hulls and the 
 engines were built. The swiftest steamers that England could 
 produce, when aiming only at speed, and carrying no battery, 
 could seldom escape these new war-steamers, if the blockade- 
 runner could be seen early enough in the day to permit a few 
 hours chase before it was dark. 
 
 The idea so prevalent, that our war-vessels were slow com 
 pared with the ships of England and France, had no foundation 
 in fact. The contrary, indeed, was true. As an illustration of 
 this, the writer was informed by Admiral Farragut that the 
 main difficulty was, not that the English steamers were faster 
 than our own, but to get sight of a blockade-runner long 
 enough before night or far enough from a port to allow a chase. 
 In confirmation of this fact, he related the following incident : 
 A new blockade-runner had been built by Englishmen and sent 
 out, which was said to have uncommon speed. An English 
 officer said to Admiral Farragut that she could make twenty 
 miles per hour. The admiral expressed his doubts of this, and 
 also his belief that he would capture this British racer. 
 
 Shortly after, it was ascertained that this new neutral trader 
 would soon be on our coast, and the captain of one of our gun 
 boats asked permission of the admiral to take two guns out of 
 his ship and go in pursuit of her. He was told to take ouifour 
 guns. He did so, and stationed himself in her supposed track. 
 He was soon fortunate enough to get sight of her under favor 
 able circumstances, and after a chase of a few hours this 
 pride and hope of the English builders and merchants was over 
 hauled and captured by a Yankee gunboat. 
 
 At the very time when the impression was spread through 
 the country that our Navy consisted only of slow and almost 
 worthless ships, we had some of the fastest war-vessels afloat. 
 In order fully to present the main features of the policy of the 
 Department, it is necessary so far to anticipate the history of the 
 iron-clads as to mention the attempt to construct a fleet of light- 
 draught Monitors for service on the Southern rivers, inlets, and 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 133 
 
 sounds. After our Navy began its operations in the bays and 
 estuaries of the South, and in the narrow and extremely crooked 
 channels of its rivers, it was soon found that the light gunboats, 
 which alone could navigate those waters, were unable to resist 
 the forts and even the heavy field-batteries so easily planted 
 along the shores, and which could also be readily transferred 
 from point to point. How to meet this difficulty was a very 
 serious question, for unless the Government could command 
 these inlets, bays, and rivers, the rebellion could not be sub 
 dued, for the communications of the Army could not be kept 
 open, and the country, therefore, could not be occupied. 
 
 After much anxious deliberation in regard to experiments 
 in an unknown field, it was decided to try a class of vessels 
 which had never been used, the light-draught Monitors. It was 
 very clearly seen that if they should prove a success, they would 
 meet the exact want of the Government, and it was thought 
 
 O 
 
 wise that the trial should be made. The result of this experi 
 ment will be stated hereafter. It has been mentioned here 
 merely to show that the Navy Department kept a watchful eye 
 upon every feature of the contest, and was ever on the alert, 
 anxiously considering what means were best adapted to meet 
 the wants of the hour. It was constantly called upon to meet 
 exigencies before unknown in naval war. New weapons were 
 employed by the rebels, and new methods of attack. These 
 novelties of war the Department was obliged to meet with new 
 inventions of its own, and it would be passing strange if no 
 mistakes had been made. But the difficulties and dangers which 
 pressed upon the Department through the conspiracy at home, 
 various and formidable as these were, were by no means the 
 only ones against which it was necessary to guard. The un 
 friendly and threatening attitude assumed and held by England, 
 the presence of France in Mexico, and the intentions avowed by 
 the emperor, showed conclusively that our only security against 
 foreign war would be not alone the power to defend our coast, 
 but to make a successful attack upon a foe. It was evident that 
 in case of a war with France, or England, or both, though we 
 might with our iron-clads defend our coast from the combined 
 attack, yet, if we had no powerful ocean cruisers with which to 
 destroy their commerce or threaten them at home, that our 
 
134 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 coast might be virtually blockaded by their fleets and our com 
 merce destroyed, while their own merchant-ships would be 
 safely employed on every sea. 
 
 In attempting to provide against this danger, a very serious 
 obstacle presented itself. It was evident that such cruisers as 
 would be needed must be steamers with the highest possible 
 rate of speed. This would of course require a large consump 
 tion of coal, so large as to make it impossible to carry a supply 
 for a long cruise. But the United States had not a single coal 
 ing station outside of their own home territory. England, on 
 the contrary, has such stations on almost every coast, in nearly 
 every sea. In extending, perfecting, and securing her commer 
 cial system and a secure basis for her naval operations, she has 
 shown a matchless sagacity and statesmanship ; and so far as 
 human wisdom could do it, she has provided in this respect 
 against every exigency of the future. In every part of the 
 world her steam-cruisers are within proper distance of the 
 needed supplies, and, making .only short voyages, they can 
 traverse every sea. In every naval contest, therefore, she would 
 have facilities which would give her immense advantages over 
 every other nation, but especially over one like ourselves, having 
 no depots for coal except at home. It was clear that in a war 
 with England and France they might exclude us from all or 
 nearly all the coal stations in the world, outside of our own 
 territory, and confine us at home as effectually as if we had 
 no Navy. 
 
 The enterprise and energy which characterized the Depart 
 ment during the whole war enabled it to provide for these new 
 dangers, while sorely pressed by the difficulties and burdens of 
 the rebellion. It decided to lay down an entirely new class of 
 ships, of which the Wampanoag may be regarded as a type. 
 This vessel is 335 feet long and 45 feet in breadth, and her 
 measurement is 3,200 tons. It was not intended that these ves 
 sels should be overloaded with a battery. Their armament 
 consists of a few heavy guns. They are full ship-rigged, their 
 capacity for carrying coal is great in proportion to their size, 
 and under either sail or steam they were expected to make at 
 least fifteen knots per hour. Up to the time of the close of the 
 war, these ships were the latest expression of American thought 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 135 
 
 for an ocean cruise, to meet our difficulties and our wants in 
 case of a foreign war. 
 
 There are several features of these steamers which are 
 worthy of attention, as showing how the minds of our naval 
 constructors were still working in the same general direction 
 already indicated, with only such variations as special circum 
 stances required. The "YVampanoag is nearly twice the length 
 of the frigates of 1812, such as the Constitution, while her 
 breadth is about the same, a very remarkable change in model. 
 Again, she is fifteen feet longer than the Niagara, and ten feet 
 narrower ; and although she is longer than the Niagara, yet her 
 burden is less by 1,380 tons, according to the old measurement. 
 
 The peculiarities of these ships are obvious ; their spread of 
 canvas is enormous, and this, with their great length and com 
 parative narrowness of beam, gives them the utmost speed at 
 tainable by vessels under sail. At the same time, instead of 
 the weight of a full battery, they carry the most powerful en 
 gines that even their immense hulls can bear, and have there 
 fore the maximum speed which any ocean steamer has yet at 
 tained. Their few heavy guns and the rapidity of their move 
 ment enable them to cope with any wooden ship, if they choose 
 to risk a battle, and they are fleet enough to avoid a conflict 
 when they do not desire a fight. 
 
 In case of a war with England it is quite easy to see what 
 the proper work of such cruisers would be. It would not be to 
 fight the British Navy, for we have other ships better fitted for 
 that work. It would not be their province to defend our coast 
 and seaboard cities, for that can be done effectually by our iron 
 clads. But let one of these enormous sea-racers take in a full 
 supply of coal, and then using her engines only when abso 
 lutely necessary, cross the ocean under sail and place herself on 
 one of the highways of British commerce, prepared there to use 
 steam or sails as might best suit her purpose, who can measure 
 the havoc she would make. Suppose thirty such were scattered 
 over the seas, how long would the merchant marine of England 
 remain afloat ? Such are the formidable weapons which Great 
 Britain by her unfriendly and deceitful course has prepared 
 against herself whenever the occasion comes. Compared with 
 what these new American steamers are able to do, her Ala- 
 
136 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 bamas, and Floridas, and Shenandoahs are very harmless ships, 
 and in a war with America now, any foreign nation would meet 
 such powers for destruction as Europe has never yet encountered. 
 Thus in the midst of the pressing demands of the war at home, 
 the nation was also prepared for a foreign war, if that also 
 should come. 
 
 Leaving the discussion of the question of the iron-clads, 
 whether of the Monitor class or those peculiar ones designed for 
 the Mississippi and its tributaries, for future consideration, it 
 will be useful to review very briefly the measures adopted by 
 the Navy Department for the defence of the country and the 
 suppression of the rebellion. Without ships, or guns, or seamen, 
 or even suitable materials, or workshops for building, the Secre 
 tary, in the first weeks even of his administration, was called 
 upon to make effectual a blockade declared for a coast-line three 
 thousand five hundred miles in extent, besides inner coast-lines 
 and inlets, a task which neither England nor France, with their 
 immense navies, had ever thought of attempting, which they 
 declared impossible, the very idea of which was laughed to 
 scorn by many of those who were thought to be the best judges 
 of maritime affairs. The Department was required to execute 
 without means the boldest conception of modern warfare. 
 
 To accomplish this it was necessary, first of all, to use the 
 Secretary s own language, " to make available every naval ves 
 sel, to recall our foreign squadron, to increase our force by build 
 ing new vessels and by procuring for naval purposes from the 
 merchant service every steamer which could be made a fighting 
 vessel, to enlarge at once the capacity of the navy-yards, to put 
 in requisition the founderies and the workshops of the country 
 for supplies of ordnance and steam machinery, to augment the 
 number of seamen, and to supply the deficiency of officers by se 
 lecting experienced and able shipmasters and others from the 
 commercial marine." After providing for the purchase of every 
 available ship, it was found that the peculiar character of the 
 Southern coast required a new class of steamers : and accordino*- 
 
 1 * "U 
 
 ly, without even waiting for the action of Congress, such was 
 the emergency, that the twenty-three small vessels were con 
 tracted for which were intended for service on the Southern 
 rivers, inlets, and sounds, to search out and break up the secret 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 137 
 
 depots of trade with the blockade-runners, which new centres 
 of business had been established on the shallow waters within 
 the outer coast-line. To give the reader an idea of these con 
 cealed but busy spots, and to show the need of light-draught 
 gunboats to discover them, the following extract from the letter 
 of an Englishman is inserted, giving an account of his visit to 
 such an inland post in the vicinity of Charleston : " Embarking 
 with the mystery of a conspirator on board a small steam-tug 
 laden with the most explosive and combustible goods, this wit 
 ness for the press is carried down the dreary estuary of the 
 Ashley and Cooper Rivers, passing a few dark and rakish pri 
 vateers, and one or two unfinished ships intended for the Con 
 federate Navy. Steaming boldly for the open sea, he and liis 
 friend glide by Forts Sumter and Moultrie, which, together with 
 the new earthworks and batteries on shore, appear to make of 
 Charleston a miniature Cronstadt. Creeping along the coast 
 with their hearts ill at ease, for the lights of the blockading 
 frigate shine at no great distance, and the breakers are unpleas 
 antly near, the adventurous voyagers at length get into quiet 
 water in a narrow sound between a low, reedy islet and the 
 mainland. They make but slow progress, for the tug has a 
 couple of scows in tow, with heavy cargoes of cotton and tur 
 pentine, and the channel being of no great depth, these are 
 sticking constantly hard and fast upon sand-banks. There shoot 
 forth, however, from secluded creeks and inlets, lurking boats, 
 by the aid of which the tug is sent forward before the unfriend 
 ly dawn can reveal her position to the Federal man-of-war. 
 The little expedition thus reaches in safety the secluded spot 
 where the unconquerable genius of trade has opened a new out 
 let for the produce of the South." 
 
 The scene is thus described : " It was broad daylight when 
 we emerged from this reed-fringed creek upon a space of open 
 water, skirted by broad rice-fields, dotted here and there with 
 square, antiquated houses and contiguous collections of negro 
 huts. But rebellion had made this quiet bay a busy focus of 
 industry ; and as we panted up to a new wharf, along and near 
 which twenty-six vessels were lying, and I saw the desperate 
 traffic carried on in utter defiance of the blockade, I gave the 
 Southerners credit for greater energy than I had believed pos- 
 
138 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 sible. Among the ships I observed the notorious privateer 
 Sumter, which had arrived the day before with a prize laden 
 with valuable silks and wines, two other privateers, and a cap 
 tured Boston clipper, which was being cut down and pierced 
 for guns. The other vessels were either prizes or merchantmen, 
 owned in Liverpool or New York, which, having brought in 
 cargoes of foreign goods and munitions of war, were being load 
 ed with rice, cotton, and turpentine. Nearly all the cotton, it 
 was stated, would find its way to New England. Five ships, I 
 was told, had sailed through the night. It was from this har 
 bor that Mr. Slidell and his friends sailed for Cuba, on their 
 way to Europe, and until its whereabouts is discovered, and the 
 mouths of these inlets effectually closed with stones and sunken 
 lighters, the blockade is a mere sham, and the trade with 
 Charleston virtually opened." 
 
 In the course of a tour through the adjoining States, the 
 special correspondent found other ports where a thriving import 
 and export business appeared to be carried on without the slight 
 est concealment or chance of interruption. At Wilmington, 
 North Carolina, no hostile squadron had ever troubled the re 
 pose of the prosperous and contented merchants, the embou 
 chure of Cape Fear River having apparently been overlooked 
 by the official geographers of Washington. 
 
 This work provided for, the next step was to increase the 
 number of steamers which could keep the open sea as block- 
 aders, and which should be equal in speed to the illicit traders 
 of England, and be able to follow the pirates which she had 
 fitted out in her ports. The wisdom and success of this move 
 ment were both shown by the result. By these new vessels the 
 swiftest steamers that England could produce were caught, and 
 by one of them the Alabama was destroyed. 
 
 The next difficulty was the one encountered by the screw 
 gunboats in attacking forts and batteries in the narrow, winding 
 channels of the inlets and rivers, in positions where they could 
 not turn, and not being able to back, were sometimes exposed, 
 almost helpless, to the enemy s fire. To obviate this the De 
 partment contrived the novel ships called the " double-enders," 
 side-wheel steamers, built with both ends alike, and therefore 
 capable of going either way ; vessels of great speed, and an- 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW VESSELS. 139 
 
 swering in every essential particular the original purpose. 
 Still it was found impracticable to command those shallow 
 waters and narrow channels by wooden vessels only, because 
 they were constantly exposed to the fire of forts and batteries at 
 so short range as greatly to endanger them. For this exposure 
 the light-draught Monitors were designed ; and but for a mis 
 take in the drawings, which the Department certainly could not 
 foresee, and for which it is only indirectly responsible, they 
 would have proved a most valuable addition to the Navy at 
 that time. The plan devised was a proper one, the principal 
 drawings were correct ; but in the details a mistake was made 
 which could not be detected until too late to be remedied. 
 
 Having thus provided for the dangers of the rebellion, the 
 Department, as has just been shown, began the construc 
 tion of those immense and swift steamers which, in case of a 
 foreign war, could sweep the commerce of an enemy from the 
 sea. Add to these statements the actual increase of the Navy 
 as exhibited by the Secretary s reports, and together they pre 
 sent in the most convincing manner the skill, enterprise, and 
 power with which this branch of the Government was con 
 ducted. In no case was the honor of the nation compromised, 
 and Europe has not withheld its praise of its boldness of con 
 ception and the energy of its execution. 
 
 In the commencement of the struggle the number of seamen 
 available at all our naval stations was about two hundred, ac 
 cording to the Secretary s report, and the ships then in com 
 mission, including the sailing vessels, were 42 ; on July 4, 1861, 
 82 ; December, 1861, 264 ; December 1, 1862, 42T ; December 
 7, 1863, 588 ; December, 1864, 671. 
 
 The increase of the number of seamen was of course in pro 
 portion to the growth of the Navy, and it was a matter of no 
 small difficulty to procure promptly crews for so large a number 
 of ships, when the land service was making such frequent 
 and sweeping requisitions upon the able-bodied men of the 
 country. 
 
 In this short review only a single feature of the work of 
 the Navy Department has been presented the increase of our 
 wooden ships. These, however, formed only a part of the forces 
 which were almost literally created for the service of the coun- 
 
140 HISTORY OF THE UKITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 try. The iron-clad Navy, both for the eastern waters and for 
 the Mississippi and its tributaries, upon which the contest 
 actually hinged, and the new heavy guns, without which even 
 the invulnerable ship is comparatively of small value, these are 
 yet to be considered as a most important work undertaken and 
 performed, amid difficulties and doubts and serious opposition, 
 not from the ignorant alone, but from scientific and experienced 
 men. And when these mighty and novel instruments were all 
 ready, then began a labor still more difficult than the purchase 
 or construction of ships or the casting of cannon. It certainly 
 required administrative ability of the very highest order so to 
 employ the various enginery of war on all the wide and diver 
 sified field of action, demanding at once such different labors as 
 to insure success in each important movement, and at the same 
 time cause all to tend steadily toward the one important end. 
 The history, as it proceeds, will show whether this was done. 
 
CHAPTEK XL 
 
 THE IRON-CLAD NAVY. 
 
 IN order to complete, in one view, the general policy and 
 chief measures of the Navy Department, it is necessary to pre 
 sent the important subject of armored vessels, and the various 
 forms of iron-clad ships prepared or adopted here and in Eu 
 rope. There are no means of judging whether the interests of 
 the country were committed to proper hands, whether the De 
 partment was prudently bold or rashly adventurous, except by 
 studying first the exigencies of the case, and then the question 
 of armored ships as it was viewed by men of science and nauti 
 cal skill both here and in Europe. 
 
 The main features of the country s necessity are easily un 
 derstood. It is well known that the rebels, by European credit, 
 sympathy, and aid, and by the sale of large amounts of cotton 
 which at first they could ship in spite of the blockade, were 
 enabled to begin very early in the contest a navy on a formi 
 dable scale, and in this movement they acted under the best 
 advice that England and France were able to give. They 
 turned their attention exclusively to iron-clad ships. They rea 
 soned in this manner : " There is no fortification on the North 
 ern seaboard which a well-constructed armored ship may not 
 pass with impunity, and if we can got one such vessel afloat be 
 fore the North can build one, the Northern cities, Washington 
 included, will be at our mercy ; we can break the blockade at 
 any point, and we can drive oft , or capture, or destroy the whole 
 Union fleet. At the worst, with the help of our English and 
 French friends, we can build such ships as rapidly as the North 
 can, and we shall at least be upon an equality with them even 
 
142 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 upon the sea." Arguing from all the facts then known the rea 
 soning was correct, and they acted upon it w r ith promptitude 
 and energy. They availed themselves of all the experience and 
 skill of Europe, and adopted the latest new suggestion, which 
 in the opinion of many in England promised important results ; 
 which idea was to cover the deck with a roof of shot-proof 
 armor, and extend it downward so far into the water as to pro 
 tect the hull below. Such armor forms an angle at or near 
 the water-line, so that a shot striking above the angle would 
 glance upward, and would be turned downward should it hit 
 below. 
 
 Unfortunately for the Union cause, the pusillanimous burn 
 ing and desertion of the navy-yard at Norfolk placed in the 
 hands of the rebel Government a ship admirably fitted for the 
 purpose. Without entering here into details which belong 
 properly to another place, it is sufficient to state that one of our 
 largest and finest frigates, the Merrimack, a ship of about three 
 thousand two hundred tons burden, was so sunk when the yard 
 was abandoned that the rebels raised her with very little dif 
 ficulty, and found her almost uninjured. 
 
 They immediately began to prepare her to receive the roof- 
 shaped armor, and supplied by their English friends with all 
 necessary material, they soon had the vessel in such a state of 
 forwardness as rendered it quite probable that she would be 
 ready for service before any thing could be prepared to meet 
 her. It was well known that the Merrimack was one of the very 
 best ships in the Navy, and it was but too evident that if she 
 should come out cased in shot-proof mail, when there would be 
 nothing to meet her but wooden vessels, that the effect upon 
 our cause would be well nigh, if not entirely, fatal. No one 
 could presume to measure aright the havoc which such an ar 
 mored frigate would make with our Navy or our seaboard 
 cities. The danger was great and pressing, requiring not only 
 prompt and decisive action, but it was essential that no mistake 
 should be made, for failure would give almost certain success 
 to the rebel cause. 
 
 The plan of the enemy had been matured earlier than 
 our own, and they were ready for action the moment the navy- 
 yard was in their possession. With the English workshops at 
 
THE IKON-CLAD NAVY. 143 
 
 their service, and with a power at their head that worked di 
 rectly when necessary, and without much incumbrance from 
 legal formalities, their preparations were urged on with far 
 greater rapidity than was possible in our own Navy Depart 
 ment, where every step was very properly subjected to Congres 
 sional scrutiny and authority, at a time too when the country 
 could not know its peril, and when little or no interest was 
 generally felt in armored ships because so little was known. 
 
 It was evidently of vital importance either to destroy the 
 Merrimack where she was, or capture her before she could leave 
 Hampton Roads, but to recapture the navy-yard was at that 
 time beyond the power of the Government ; it had not an iron 
 clad ship, and to construct one of any form then known, of 
 sufficient size and force to cope with the rebel frigate, was the 
 work not of months but of years. Two very perplexing ques 
 tions were then presented : Is the Merrimack too formidable to 
 be captured or crippled by wooden ships ? and if she can be 
 met only by an iron- clad, then how is the suitably armored ves 
 sel to be obtained in season ? Upon these points very little satis 
 factory information could be obtained. England and France had 
 each constructed one or more armored ships, and others were in 
 process of building, but these were all broadside vessels, and the 
 question whether such ships were really available for naval war 
 was still being warmly discussed in Europe. The following ex 
 tracts from a work on " Iron Defences," by General Sir Howard 
 Douglas, published in 1861, will show how the subject of iron 
 clad vessels was viewed by some distinguished thinkers in 
 Europe : " A very able and distinguished French officer, M. 
 Richild Grivel, a great admirer and advocate of the Emperor 
 Louis Napoleon s floating batteries, constructed for the attack 
 of forts and fortresses and other special purposes in inland seas, 
 condemns, in no measured terms, the notion of the possibility 
 of using them in ocean fleets as substitutes for line-of-battle 
 ships. Admitting fully the advantage of floating batteries, 
 gunboats, and other vessels of light draught of water for the 
 special service above stated, he has well said that to dominant 
 fleets of line-of-battle ships, the true representatives of naval 
 power for service in the open sea, will always belong the sov 
 ereignty of the ocean ; and that the nation that would renounce 
 
144 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 these true representatives of naval power by constituting their 
 fleets of comparatively small ships adapted only to services 
 purely special, would be infallibly erased from the category of 
 first-rate naval powers." 
 
 It will be seen that this distinguished French officer assumed it 
 as a conceded fact that it was impossible to construct an armored 
 battery that should answer the double purpose of a shot-proof 
 vessel and an ocean cruiser. This was also the opinion of many 
 in England. In remarking upon this opinion of the French officer, 
 Sir Howard Douglas goes on to say: "If we should be so infat 
 uated as to commence forthwith the construction of our Navy on 
 such a principle, England would surely ere long be erased from the 
 category of first-rate maritime powers, and lose the empire of 
 the seas. Such really has been the delusion in the case of La 
 Gloire ; such the panic upon the mere appearance on the sea 
 of that solitary frigate, and she a failure, that I should not be 
 surprised when that delusion shall have been dispelled, and it is 
 passing now, if it were spoken of as in the days of the Warner 
 hoax. I am quite sure that as much nonsense, deceit, decep 
 tion, and credulity are exhibited in the one as there were in the 
 other. But though I know that La Gloire is a failure in speed, 
 and in all the qualities required in a sea-going ship, yet the public 
 mind has been brought to such a state of fever and delusion on 
 this subject, that I will allow that the Government is perhaps 
 right in laying down other such monsters before the Warrior, 
 the Black Prince, and the Defiance are launched, and have been 
 tried." 
 
 In another part of the same work, Sir Howard Douglas 
 thus refers to opinions then prevailing in the United States : 
 " Although the naval force of the United States has been in 
 creased by the addition of twenty screw-steamers, a still further 
 increase in the Navy has been recommended in the report of 
 the Secretary of the ISTavy but no iron-cased vessel is built or 
 being built, nor even alluded to in the very able report on the 
 increase of the Navy, nor in the miscellaneous observations and 
 contemplated changes. The experiments tried in the United 
 States in endeavoring to render ships proof against shot by 
 covering their sides with iron plates of adequate thickness 
 having proved that nothing less than six inches will suffice, and 
 
THE IRON-CLAD NAVY. 145 
 
 a commission of naval officers having deprecated the proposi 
 tion to apply naval resources to coast defences in the form of 
 floating batteries, the Government of the United States are sat 
 isfied as to the futility of all such expedients, and probably con 
 sider all these questions definitely settled." 
 
 Another extract from the same writer will show another 
 opinion then prevailing among scientific naval officers in regard 
 to the question whether a wooden vessel of high speed could 
 contend successfully with a slower iron-clad : " Metallic protec 
 tion and power of speed are antagonistic qualities. One or 
 other of these must be sacrificed. Which of them should be 
 given up is a question which I propose to examine hereafter. 
 In the mean time it may be remarked that it does not appear, 
 upon a careful review of improvements and changes in the art 
 of war, that the best way of opposing new modes or means in 
 the practice of war is to imitate those innovations. If this were 
 so, the practice of war would not have altered, as we see in a 
 review of its history. It would rather appear that improved 
 science seeks to counteract, rather than to imitate, and the 
 question arises whether this might not be successfully done in 
 the case of iron-sided vessels, which must necessarily lose speed. 
 It is, therefore, a question, whether by superior speed, and a 
 judicious mixture of armament, 68-pounder guns on the main- 
 deck, and Armstrong s long-range 40-pounders on the upper 
 deck, a vessel like our Mersey might not be capable of contend 
 ing with such a ship as La Gloire with her speed reduced to in 
 feriority by the heavy armor under which she labors." 
 
 Another question of great importance is thus discussed by the 
 same distinguished officer, the effect of shells upon wooden ships : 
 " Reviewing the effects produced by shells on the ships of the 
 allied fleet in the bombardment of the 17th of October, 1854, at 
 Sevastopol, it does not appear that the effect of shells was so 
 fatal or so destructive as had been previously imagined, and I 
 confess that I partook of the belief that a shell, and particularly 
 a time-fuse shell lodged, and then exploding in a ship, could 
 scarcely fail to set her on fire, or destroy her. But from the 
 account given it appears that all the ships of the allied fleet 
 were struck and penetrated by numerous shells, yet no ship 
 was destroyed, none l converted into lucifer matches. Four or 
 10 
 
146 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 five times fuse-shells burst on board the Albion, and set her on 
 fire several times. The Sanspareil, London, Albion, and several 
 other ships were penetrated by shells, and suffered considerably 
 in their hulls from shells from the Telegraph and Wasp bat 
 teries. The London was three times on fire ; the Queen forced 
 to retire, having been set on fire by red-hot shot. The Aga 
 memnon suffered severely from the enemies shells. One shell 
 burst on the main-deck of the Arethusa, and carried off nearly 
 the whole of two guns crews ; another committed great injury 
 on the lower deck. The Yille de Paris received a shell which 
 blew away a part of her poop-deck, killing and wounding a 
 great number of men. She received forty-one shot and shell 
 in her hull, and nearly as many in her masts and rigging ; but 
 was not put hors du combat, though she was set on fire several 
 times, the fire being promptly extinguished." 
 
 These extracts serve to show the views of a large class of in 
 fluential men in Europe upon three important points : the value 
 of armored ships, the effects of shells upon vessels, and the 
 question whether a swift wooden ship might not capture a slow 
 iron-clad battery by using 68-pounder smooth-bore guns and 40- 
 pounder rifles. Sir Howard and his friends evidently thought 
 it could be done. His treatise was published about the time of 
 the beginning of the rebellion, and it is a remarkable example 
 of the tenacity with which men cling to opinions which have 
 long swayed the public thought, of the stubbornness with which 
 innovation is resisted, and of the blindness which prevents men 
 from discerning the signs of the times. When a theory in re 
 gard to any important subject has become embedded in the 
 thought of the time, and when it shapes some important depart 
 ment of public action, so that any change involves the pride of 
 opinion, and would affect the interest of capital and industry, 
 such a theory will often long maintain its authority after it has 
 been proved false both by reasoning and by experiment. The 
 old rulers of thought and practice distrust, or perhaps scorn and 
 ridicule, the new men and their speculations, and truth, how 
 ever plain, cannot, for a time, get herself recognized ; and the 
 established opinions, and all the related interests, struggle hard 
 to maintain their position, and fact and reason are often alike 
 discarded. It was not to be expected that an institution so vast 
 
THE IKON-CLAD NAVY. 
 
 as the British Navy, whose glory and interest and wide-reach 
 ing operations were interwoven with every fibre of the national 
 life, could be suddenly revolutionized without violent and pro 
 tracted opposition. As a class the members of the Government, 
 committed to things as they were, and following the footsteps of 
 " illustrious predecessors," the designers and builders of ships, 
 the inventors and makers of guns, the officers who had sailed and 
 fought the old vessels, and won renown and station on their 
 decks, all these would naturally oppose all changes which 
 seemed to throw any discredit upon a Navy that had made 
 England the mistress of the seas. 
 
 Had not prejudices and interests, such as have been men 
 tioned, interposed to prevent a rational conclusion, Sir Howard 
 Douglas would probably have seen that the effects of shell-firing 
 upon the French and British ships at Sevastopol, almost equally 
 with the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, proved that 
 no wooden vessel can long resist those fearful weapons, es 
 pecially in close-range fighting. He did not think proper to 
 state whether, in his opinion, those ships of the allies could have 
 endured another day s fire from the Kussian fleet. The fact 
 was, that the attack was not renewed. 
 
 The action between the Kearsarge and the Alabama was a 
 much more decisive test of the destructive power of shells than 
 that at Sinope or Sevastopol. The Alabama was an English 
 ship, armed with English guns, and manned by British sea 
 men ; and in a brief battle, not fought at short- range, she was 
 demolished and sunk by shells from our 11-inch guns. 
 
 Had the Alabama been a line-of-battle ship, firing only solid 
 shot from 32-pounder or 42-pounder guns, she would have met 
 the same fate. In regard to the question whether a swift 
 wooden ship could capture a slower iron-clad, we need only the 
 experience of our American battles to settle it in the most con 
 clusive manner. It would have required but a few minutes for 
 the Merrimack to destroy the most powerful wooden ship in the 
 world. She would have sunk any other frigate, or even a 100- 
 gun ship, as readily as she did the Congress and Cumber 
 land, and that without any aid from her prow. A swift wooden 
 ship might escape from a slow iron-clad, but to engage her, if 
 armed with heavy shell-guns, would be only to court destruc- 
 
148 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 tion. How long could any wooden ship endure the explosion 
 of 15-inch shells? 
 
 But these questions will all be fully answered in the discus 
 sions in another chapter. They are introduced here merely to 
 show the state of the public mind in Europe when our war be 
 gan, and the Government was called upon to decide upon its 
 means of defence. When a large and influential class both in 
 France and England were clinging tenaciously to the wooden 
 ship, and rejecting the idea of cannon longer than those then in 
 use, it showed the boldness and independence of the American 
 mind that both parties turned at once to iron-clads as the chief 
 means of attack and defence. The rebels, as a matter of course, 
 from their strong sympathy with England, turned to and 
 adopted her ideas and plans, with such alterations as the latest 
 experiments had suggested. The Merrimack, which early in the 
 war they were pushing to a completion, was really an English 
 iron-clad, with the improvement of the sloping armor. The 
 problem presented to the ISTavy Department was how to capture 
 or destroy an iron-clad frigate, which represented the skill and 
 science of Europe, and in general how to prepare to meet the 
 iron-clad navy which the rebels were rapidly getting ready. 
 The true position of our own !N~avy Department cannot be 
 clearly seen ; the merit or demerit of its course cannot be justly 
 weighed without giving some account of the origin of the idea 
 of plating vessels with iron, and the progress which the inven 
 tion had made about the time of the beginning of the rebellion, 
 and then, also, the peculiar and original character of the new 
 American iron-clads will distinctly appear. The following ex 
 tract from Sir Howard Douglas s work (page 392) will give the 
 English account of the origin of this invention : " The project 
 of covering ships with iron plates, in order to render them shot- 
 proof, was suggested many years since by Colonel (the late 
 General) Paixhans. The Comite Consultatif de la Marine at 
 that time having caused the weight of an iron covering, and the 
 capability of ships to bear the load to be calculated, found that 
 such armor could not be applied to line-of-battle ships of the 
 lowest class, to frigates, nor to smaller vessels. , With respect to 
 ships of three decks, the Comite stated in its report that the 
 great displacement of these would enable them to bear the re- 
 
THE IRON-CLAD NAVY. 149 
 
 quisite weight, provided the quantity of artillery on the upper 
 decks were diminished. This inquiry led however, to no at 
 tempt in France to cuirass ships-of-war, and the project was 
 at that time abandoned, apparently as impracticable. A pro 
 posal for constructing floating batteries, so thick as to be shot- 
 proof, was entertained by the Government of the United States, 
 in or before the year 1852, and the feasibility of the proposition 
 was made the object of an experiment ; the result of this being 
 unfavorable, the project fell to the ground." 
 
 The subjoined extract from the Scientific American, Feb 
 ruary 7, 1863, presents an American account of the same inven 
 tion : " On the 22d ult, Senator Cowan, of Pennsylvania, pre 
 sented a petition in the Senate from A. Stewart, and others, 
 asking for a pension to the widow of Thomas Gregg it being 
 claimed that he was the original inventor and patentee of iron 
 clad vessels. This is a new phase of this subject, and a brief 
 history of the invention, according to the information we pos 
 sess, will therefore be of some public interest just now. It is 
 generally admitted by European engineers that although iron 
 clad gunboats were first brought practically into use in the 
 Crimean War, the late Kobert L. Stevens and E. A. Stevens, of 
 Hoboken, ~N. J., were the inventors of these vessels protected 
 with angulated iron plates, and were proposed by them as early 
 as 1816, for coast and harbor defence. A description of such 
 vessels was afterward submitted to a Government board, con 
 sisting of Commodores Stewart and Perry, and Colonels Thair 
 and Totten, in 1841. It was stated in the document proposing 
 the construction of such a vessel for the defence of ^N"ew York, 
 that plates of iron four inches in thickness were equal to five 
 feet four inches of oak in resisting a ball at point-blank distance, 
 and with the guns then in use, it was supposed that none of their 
 shot could penetrate a vessel clad with such an armor. In 1843 
 a contract was formed between our Government and Messrs. 
 Stevens for the construction of such a floating battery, and 
 $500,000 was furnished by Government, and expended on the 
 battery now at Hoboken. During the Crimean War, in 1855, it 
 was found that wooden steam-frigates were totally useless in at 
 tacking granite casemated forts defended by big guns firing 
 shells. An application of Stevens s invention was suggested, 
 
150 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 and several iron-clad gunboats were then built for the French 
 and English navies. A few of these were employed at the siege 
 of Kinburn, and were decidedly successful. This led the Em 
 peror of France to extend the application of iron plates to one 
 of his large frigates, La Gloire, which was completed three 
 years ago, and was the first regular iron-clad war-ship ever 
 built. Since then several have been constructed for the French 
 and English navies ; the American invention having thus been 
 first carried into practical use in Europe." 
 
 It will be seen that the British and American authorities 
 differ essentially in regard to the effect of shells upon wooden 
 vessels, and also in regard to the success of the iron-clad gun 
 boats at the siege of Kinburn. The events of our war have 
 shown that Sir Howard Douglas had materially underrated 
 both the eifect of shells on wooden ships and the measure of re 
 sistance which iron armor oiFers to a shot. In this, as in some 
 other respects, the experience of the United States has revolu 
 tionized the opinions of the world. 
 
 It is important to trace here the progress of the building of 
 iron-clad ships in Europe up to the time when our own Govern 
 ment began the construction of these new weapons of war. 
 Passing by the small gunboats which fought at Kinburn, the 
 first important trial of the iron mail was by the French em 
 peror on the frigate La Gloire, the construction of which was 
 ordered in 1858. She is simply a frigate of the common model, 
 cased with iron plates about four inches thick. The plates are 
 said to be three and a half inches thick at the stern and bow, 
 and four and a half inches in the centre, covering the ship s 
 battery. She is described from French authorities as about 257 
 feet long, carrying thirty-six 50-pounder rifles on a single pro 
 tected deck. Her engine is of 900 horse-power, and her crew 
 consists of 500 men. Her ports are only six feet above water. 
 Her width is fifty-six feet, and her speed is stated to be thirteen 
 and a quarter knots per hour. This statement, however, has 
 been denied by Sir Howard Douglas, who declares that on her 
 trial trip, without the full weight on board which she is ex 
 pected to carry, she made only a trifle more than eleven knots. 
 The French emperor ordered the construction of ten more frig 
 ates of this class. Besides these, France, at the beginning of our 
 
THE IKON-CLAD NAVY. 
 
 151 
 
 war, had nearly ready the Normandie, the Invincible, the Cou- 
 ronne, and two larger iron-clad rams, the Solferino and the Ma 
 genta. These last carry each fifty-two guns, and were intended 
 to have a speed of thirteen and a half knots per hour ; but it is 
 by no means probable that this speed can be maintained at sea. 
 
 The lower ports of these vessels are eight feet above the 
 water. It is stated in the North British Review (August, 1863), 
 that these largest French frigates are plated in the centre with 
 iron six inches thick. The Normandie has crossed the Atlantic, 
 but no very favorable account has as yet been given of the sea 
 going qualities of any of these French ships. They are said to 
 roll very heavily, and it is also stated that their batteries cannot 
 be used in a heavy sea, because the ports roll under. So far as 
 is yet known, all the broadside iron-plated ships roll heavily in 
 a rough sea, and the remedy for this is not at present known. 
 
 In the North British Review for August, 1863, is the fol 
 lowing table, presenting the French and English iron-clad 
 Navies as they then were, and as these vessels were either fin 
 ished or being built at the beginning of our war, it will show 
 with sufficient accuracy what had been done in Europe when 
 the question of an iron-clad navy was first presented by our 
 Government. The account, we are informed by the writer, is 
 copied from official papers. It includes vessels afloat and build 
 ing, and is as follows : 
 
 
 d 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 g 
 
 . 
 
 tc 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 o 
 
 g . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 > 
 
 w" . 
 
 ! 
 
 ^&? 
 
 r^ 
 
 -a ^ 
 %. % 
 
 ^a 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 
 I 
 
 fc 5 
 
 C! O 
 
 ^ 
 
 1* 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 1" 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 England . . . 
 
 21 
 
 59 
 
 44 
 
 16 
 
 30 
 
 
 9 
 
 380 
 
 566 
 
 102 
 
 France 
 
 16 
 
 37 
 
 29 
 
 18 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 
 244 
 
 360 
 
 122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 At Kinburn the French emperor proved that iron-clad batteries 
 could, without injury, sustain a fire which would be utterly destructive 
 to wooden vessels. He pursued the conclusions thus arrived at, and 
 finally, in 1858, ordered the construction of four iron-plated frigates 
 La Gloire, L lnvinciblc, La Normandie, and La Couronne. The first 
 three arc on wood frames; the latter is iron throughout. They are 
 about two hundred and thirty-one feet in length, carrying thirty-six 50- 
 pounders on a single protected deck, with two more on an upper deck, 
 
152 
 
 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 unprotected. Their engines are of nine hundred horse-power, and the 
 crew five hundred and seventy men. All these are at sea, and have been 
 found successful ; but the ports being only about six feet above the water 
 when at load draught, they are placed at a certain disadvantage in bad 
 weather. Subsequently two others, the Solferino and Magenta, were 
 ordered, which have been launched, but are not yet completed. They 
 are armed with a " spur " projecting from the bow, carry their guns in 
 two tiers in the centre of the ship, and the lower ports are eight feet 
 from the water-line. Their length is two hundred and eighty-two 
 feet ; draught, twenty-five feet ; and horse-power, one thousand. 
 
 In November, 1860, ten more were ordered, which are still on the 
 stocks, and are being slowly proceeded with. They are to be of the 
 Gloire type, and all of wood frames, except the Heroine, which is of 
 iron ; but the thickness of the plates has been increased from three and 
 a half to four inches of the Gloire, to four and a half to six inches. All 
 the other iron-plated vessels under construction in France at the present 
 moment are merely floating batteries for harbor defence. Our own armor 
 fleet, though more tardily commenced, now stands thus : 
 
 
 Hull. 
 
 Armor- 
 plated. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Horse 
 Power. 
 
 Length 
 
 Draught. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Men. 
 
 At Sea. 
 Warrior.. 
 
 Iron 
 
 Partially 
 
 6 109 
 
 1 250 
 
 feet. 
 
 380 
 
 feet. in. 
 22 9 
 
 40 
 
 704 
 
 Black Prince 
 
 
 
 6 109 
 
 1 250 
 
 380 
 
 26 31 
 
 40 
 
 704 
 
 Defence . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 720 
 
 600 
 
 280 
 
 24 11 
 
 16 
 
 445 
 
 Resistance ... . . . 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 3 710 
 
 600 
 
 280 
 
 24 10 
 
 16 
 
 455 
 
 Royal Oak 
 
 Wood 
 
 Wholly 
 
 4 056 
 
 800 
 
 273 
 
 25 lOt 
 
 35 
 
 600 
 
 Launched. 
 Caledonia 
 
 Wood 
 
 Wholly 
 
 4,125 
 
 1,000 
 
 273 
 
 25 10* 
 
 35 
 
 fiOO 
 
 Ocean 
 
 
 
 4 047 
 
 1 000 
 
 273 
 
 25 lOt 
 
 35 
 
 600 
 
 Prince Consort 
 
 
 
 
 
 4,045 
 
 1,000 
 
 273 
 
 25 lOt 
 
 35 
 
 600 
 
 Hector 
 
 Iron 
 
 Partially 
 
 4 089 
 
 800 
 
 280 
 
 24 8 
 
 32 
 
 600 
 
 Valiant 
 
 
 
 
 
 4*063 
 
 800 
 
 280 
 
 24 8 
 
 32 
 
 600 
 
 To le Launched, 1863. 
 Minotaur 
 
 Iron 
 
 Wholly 
 
 6 6^1 
 
 1 350 
 
 400 
 
 25 8 
 
 37 
 
 704 
 
 Achilles.. 
 
 
 
 6 079 
 
 1 250 
 
 380 
 
 26 3t 
 
 30 
 
 704 
 
 Roval Alfred. 
 
 Wood 
 
 
 
 4 045 
 
 800 
 
 273 
 
 25 lOt 
 
 35 
 
 600 
 
 Zealous 
 
 
 Partially 
 
 3 716 
 
 800 
 
 2o2 
 
 25 3 
 
 16 
 
 
 Royal Sovereign 
 
 
 
 Wholly 
 
 3 963 
 
 800 
 
 240 
 
 22 11 
 
 5 
 
 900 
 
 Prince Albert 
 
 Iron 
 
 
 2 529 
 
 500 
 
 240 
 
 20 
 
 5 
 
 160 
 
 Research 
 
 Wood 
 
 Partially 
 
 *1 253 
 
 200 
 
 195 
 
 14 
 
 4 
 
 
 Enterprise 
 
 
 
 990 
 
 160 
 
 180 
 
 14 4t 
 
 4. 
 
 80 
 
 To le Launched, 1864. 
 Agincourt . 
 
 
 Wholly 
 
 6 621 
 
 1 350 
 
 400 
 
 25 8 
 
 37 
 
 fiOO 
 
 N orthumberland. . 
 
 iC 
 
 
 6 6 Q 1 
 
 1 350 
 
 400 
 
 25 8 
 
 37 
 
 600 
 
 Favorite 
 
 Wood 
 
 " 
 
 2,186 
 
 400 
 
 225 
 
 20 5 
 
 8 
 
 160 
 
 Other authorities state the number of iron-elads in the 
 French. Navy at ninety-four ; but, as the English reviewer re- 
 
THE IRON-CLAD NAVY. 153 
 
 marks, all but those enumerated are merely swimming batteries 
 for harbor defence, and small gunboats, such as were used at 
 Kinburn, in the Crimean War. Of these swimming batteries 
 and gunboats, the National Almanac for 1863 enumerates sev 
 enty-seven, leaving, of the ninety-four iron-clads, only seventeen 
 for the ocean-going ships, which corresponds very nearly to the 
 statement of the Review. 
 
 In addition to these tables and the description of La Gloire, 
 the following account of three of the most formidable iron-clads 
 of England will show more clearly the exact form in which the 
 subject was first presented to our own ]STavy Department. It 
 was necessary to consider how we could best meet the armored 
 ships of France and England, as well as those which the rebels 
 might construct, because, in the early part of the contest, it 
 seemed as if these powers needed only an occasion to become 
 active parties in the war. 
 
 The Warrior and the Black Prince are regarded as the model ships 
 of the iron navy of England, and they may be considered as embodying 
 the utmost skill and science of Great Britain at the present time. These 
 ships are 380 feet long; their tonnage is 6,000 tons; their draught is, 
 of the one, 22 feet 9 inches, and of the Black Prince, 26 feet 3 inches. 
 They each carry forty guns: twenty-eight 68-pounder, and twelve 100- 
 pounder Armstrong guns. Their crew is 704 men. Their armor-plates 
 are four and a half inches thick ; and the Warrior, on her trial trip, had 
 a speed of fourteen knots, and the Black Prince ran from twelve to thir 
 teen knots per hour. Their engines are of 1,250 horse-power. 
 
 These ships are only plated with iron for two-thirds of their length, 
 the bow and stern being, as English writers affirm, more vulnerable than 
 a common wooden ship. The battery only is protected by the iron 
 mail, while about sixty feet of the stern and bow are like a common 
 vessel. 
 
 The Minotaur is 400 feet long; her tonnage is 6,621 tons; her en 
 gines are of 1,350 horse-power ; her draught is 25 feet 8 inches, and she 
 is to carry thirty-seven guns. Her speed has not been ascertained. 
 Portions of the armor of this ship arc said to be six inches thick. The 
 Bellerophon is a newly-devised iron-clad, now being built, whose coming 
 is thus heralded by the London Times : She will be " as terrible an as 
 sailant to iron-clads as an iron-clad would be to wooden ships. The 
 object for winch this vessel is designed is, in case of another great 
 war, to avoid repetition of the long, dreary process of blockading an ene- 
 
154: HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 my s fleet, by wearisome and dangerous cruising off the mouth of har 
 bors. The Bellerophon is, in short, to a fleet of iron-clads what a fox- 
 terrier is to a pack of hounds. In case of an enemy s iron fleet running 
 into port, she can follow them with impunity." 
 
 But in the description which the Times gives of what it calls 
 " this monster," one fails to discover the immense superiority which is 
 claimed. 
 
 She is 300 feet long, 56 feet beam, has a draught of 25 feet, and 
 her tonnage is 4,246 tons. "It is hoped," if certain improvements 
 work well, that she will make fifteen knots per hour ; but she is on the 
 stocks as yet, and her speed is yet to be determined. Her armor-plates 
 are six inches thick, but they reach to the upper deck for only ninety 
 feet of the ship s length ; for the remaining distance of two hundred and 
 ten feet, the plating reaches only six feet above the water, and all above 
 this line and both ends of the vessel are unprotected. She is to be 
 armed with ten broadside guns, of what size we are not informed, and 
 probably that is not yet determined. 
 
 Of iron-mailed vessels, of the general character described most of 
 them, however, somewhat smaller England has between twenty and 
 thirty built, or in process of construction. Like those of France, they 
 are all broadside ships, and, of course, expose an immense surface to an 
 enemy s fire. The importance of this will appear, when they are com 
 pared with the American Monitor form of war-ship. 
 
 The objections made to the French ships are, that they cannot use 
 their batteries except when the sea is smooth, and that, in rough weather, 
 they roll so as to render them not only uncomfortable, but dangerous. 
 The English ships require from twenty-five to twenty-six feet of water, 
 and are, therefore, unable to enter our principal harbors. From their 
 great size, they are unwieldy ; the joints of their armor-plates work in a 
 sea, and leak; they do not steer safely ; and, from the general tone of 
 English criticisms, one is led to infer that they are by no means satisfied 
 with the performance of the iron fleet. But, as neither the French nor 
 English ships have been, as yet, tested in battle, no very definite opinion 
 of their qualities can be formed. 
 
 We know, however, exactly the effect which certain kinds of- artil 
 lery will produce upon iron plates, such as those which form their 
 armor ; and as the American ships have been exposed, at short range, 
 to the heaviest cannon and the most destructive shot which England 
 could furnish to the rebels, while at the same time our guns have been 
 tried upon armor-plates in action, we have the means of forming a very 
 accurate opinion of our power for attack or defence, as compared with 
 other nations. 
 
THE IRON-CLAD NAYY. 155 
 
 Such was the condition of the question of iron-clad vessels 
 when first the Navy Department was called to its serious consid 
 eration. The problem of their usefulness was by no means con 
 sidered as settled by scientific men and naval officers ; and there 
 was, to say the least, a very strong array of talent, experience, 
 and science that adhered firmly to the idea that wooden ships 
 without armor were the only proper vessels-of-war. Still, 
 France had built a mailed frigate, and this, according to British 
 testimony, spread such a panic through England as compelled 
 the admiralty to begin at once the construction of plated 
 frigates, more formidable as was thought than the French one. 
 Upon this, the French emperor took measures to increase at once 
 his own iron-clad fleet ; and to match this, England laid down 
 still more enormous monsters, till at the time of the breaking 
 out of the rebellion the account of vessels built or projected 
 stood as quoted in the tables presented. These, it should be 
 remembered, were all broadside vessels. No idea of any dif 
 ferent form of ship had then found any favor in Europe. Other 
 plans had been suggested, but they had been rejected as worth 
 less, and no government had ventured a departure from the 
 obvious and simple contrivance of covering with iron plates the 
 sides of a wooden ship. In the mean time the rebels were 
 pushing rapidly to completion the first American iron-clad, the 
 Merrimack, with her sloping sides and formidable battery; and 
 the indications were that she might be ready for sea before any 
 thing could be prepared to stop her. 
 
 It was evidently a perilous hour for the Government. In a 
 short time, how short could not certainly be known, the rebel 
 frigate would be ready for the work of destruction, and it was 
 evident that a very slight thing might bring the French and 
 English vessels to our shores. 
 
 This perilous crisis the Navy Department was expected to 
 meet, and it was met with a boldness, and skill, and decision, 
 not surpassed by any of the other operations of the war ; and it 
 should not be forgotten that this new danger was in addition to 
 the nearly impossible task of sealing by blockade three thousand 
 five hundred miles of our most difficult coast, with almost 
 nothing with which to begin the work. Nor can the reader 
 rightly judge of the difficulties of the situation unless he 
 
156 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 remembers that nearly all that we now know of iron-clads was 
 then unknown. Not one decisive experiment had been made 
 by which the Department could be guided. A few ships, or 
 perhaps only one, had been finished at the beginning of Mr. 
 Lincoln s administration ; some others had been begun, but, as 
 has been already shown, it was by no means settled whether 
 they were really formidable or utterly worthless, for public 
 opinion both in England and France vibrated to either extreme, 
 and each found earnest supporters. The only important fact was, 
 England and France were building huge broadside iron-clads, 
 for the building of which not months but years were needed, 
 with all the appliances of their national workshops ; while the 
 rebels were hastening to completion a similar one, within a few 
 hours sail of Washington. Early in May the subject came up for 
 discussion in the Navy Department, and so little was then known 
 in regard to this novel mode of warfare, such the unwillingness 
 suddenly to abandon what were considered settled theories and 
 long-tried practice, that, except with the Secretary, the plan 
 found but little favor. It is supposed that when the subject 
 was first considered, one or two only among the officers of 
 higher rank in the Navy were willing to give their counte 
 nance to the new form of a war-ship, which few now would 
 dare to condemn. 
 
 There was nothing unusual in this ; nor is it cause for cen 
 sure that naval constructors who had devoted their lives to cer 
 tain methods of operation, sanctioned by the science and expe 
 rience of the world, could not in a moment abandon all they 
 had learned or done as of little worth, and adopt the dark con 
 clusions which would contradict all their own experience and 
 reverse the decisions of the world. Nor was it to be expected 
 that naval officers should at once agree to sanction a novelty of 
 which they could form no clear conception, and which had 
 never been tested in battle. 
 
 It was well that the Secretary and his immediate advisers 
 were somewhat more free from the trammels of previous educa 
 tion than some of their associates, and were ready to assume a 
 responsibility from which others, and perhaps not unwisely, 
 were disposed to shrink. 
 
 The convictions of the Secretarv and the few who sustained 
 
THE IRON-CLAD NAVY. 157 
 
 him were so strong, that it was decided to begin the construc 
 tion of some iron-plated vessels, provided the money for such a 
 purpose couH be obtained; for then the Department was 
 entirely destitute of means for such a work. Mr. Chase, then 
 Secretary of the Treasury, was consulted, and he undertook to 
 provide the means if an appropriation could be obtained. At 
 the extra session of Congress, in July, 1861, the Secretary pre 
 sented the subject in the following guarded language, showing 
 how little preparation for it there was, either in Congress or 
 the country at large, and giving no idea of the extended and 
 earnest discussions which had long been going on. Whatever 
 merit there was in first adopting iron-clads in the Navy belongs 
 to the Department ; the Monitor form is due to the genius of 
 Ericsson. The following is the Secretary s language : 
 
 Much attention has been given within the last few years to the sub 
 ject of floating batteries, or iron-clad steamers. Other governments, 
 and particularly France and England, have made it a special object in 
 connection with naval improvements ; and the ingenuity and inventive 
 faculties of our own countrymen have also been stimulated by recent 
 occurrences toward the construction of this class of vessels. The 
 period is perhaps not one best adapted to heavy expenditures by way 
 of experiment, and the time and attention of some of those who are most 
 competent to investigate and form correct conclusions on this subject 
 are otherwise employed. I would, however, recommend the appoint 
 ment of a proper and competent board to inquire into and report in 
 regard to a measure so important ; and it is for Congress to decide 
 whether, on a favorable report, they will order one or more iron-clad 
 steamers, or floating batteries, to be constructed, with a view to perfect 
 protection from the effects of present ordnance at short range, and make 
 an appropriation for that purpose. 
 
 It is nearly twenty years since a gentleman of New Jersey, possess 
 ing wealth and talent, projected the construction of a floating battery, 
 and the Government aided the work by a liberal appropriation. The 
 death of this gentleman a few years since interrupted the prosecution 
 of this experiment, and application has been recently made by his sur 
 viving brother, the authorities of New Jersey, and others, for additional 
 means to carry it forward to completion. The amount asked is of such 
 magnitude as to require special investigation by a competent board, 
 who shall report as to the expediency and practicability of the experi 
 ment before so large an expenditure should be authorized. 
 
158 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Very early in the session of this Congress a resolution of in 
 quiry was introduced by Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, calling 
 upon the Secretary for information concerning all the transac 
 tions of his Department, and especially in reference to the pur 
 chase and construction of vessels. As heretofore stated, the 
 Secretary had felt compelled, in order to meet the great need 
 and peril of the country, to purchase as many suitable vessels as 
 could be obtained, and contract for the immediate building of 
 a fleet of light-draught steamers in advance of the action of 
 Congress. It was understood that this resolution covered an 
 implied censure of the Department, assuming that some wrong 
 had been done, for which the Secretary should give an account 
 at the bar of the Senate. Mr. Hale was chairman of the Naval 
 Committee, and therefore had been one whose counsel the Sec 
 retary had sought in the beginning of his administration, and 
 upon whose support he thought he could rely for any proper 
 measure ; and the hostility foreshadowed by this resolution was, 
 therefore, more keenly felt than if it had come from the open 
 opposers of the Government. The charges of extravagance, 
 recklessness, and corruption which followed this beginning were 
 exceedingly relished by the opposition members, who were very 
 happy to agree with all who would attack any Department of 
 Mr. Lincoln s Government. It added greatly to the difficulties 
 with which the Navy Department had to contend, that a move 
 ment should have originated in a body so respected and trusted 
 as the Senate of the United States, and with a distinguished 
 member of that body, and one of the leaders in the Republican 
 ranks. 
 
 As a matter of course it awakened suspicion all over the 
 country. It was seized upon by every opposition leader and 
 journal as proof positive of the incompetency and corruption in 
 the Department, and the public mind was prepared, far and 
 wide, not only for jealous watchfulness, but for an unfriendly 
 judgment in regard to all that the Secretary or the Navy might 
 do. To say the least, it was an ill-considered and causeless 
 attack, and the consequences were such as every lover of his 
 country, and of the right and true, has since had occasion 
 to regret. Those who originated and supported it, found 
 themselves obliged to strengthen their position in order to jus- 
 
THE IKON-CLAD NAVY. 159 
 
 tify their course; and so, while the operations of the Army 
 passed unquestioned, or with such a generous confidence as gave 
 the "War Department strength and courage, the Secretary of 
 the Navy and his associates, and all their movements were sub 
 jected to the hostile scrutiny of those whom the people knew 
 only as prominent and influential friends of the Administration, 
 and who were supposed to speak thus of the Navy, because, as 
 honest men and guardians of the public weal and treasure, they 
 could not withhold their condemnation. With very few excep 
 tions, there was probably little or no personal ill-will toward 
 the Secretary or his associates, or any officers of the Navy. 
 Senators and Representatives, and conductors of the press, who 
 had not particularly studied this subject, came honestly to 
 wrong conclusions. The country, at that time, had no proper 
 conception of the magnitude of the struggle ; and preparations 
 made by the Navy Department, which a little time showed to 
 be inadequate, were at first thought extravagant and uncalled 
 for; and when an iron-clad navy was proposed, and particu 
 larly the Monitor form, and then the new heavy ordnance, men 
 who by no previous training or education were fitted to pro 
 nounce a judgment in such matters, condemned and sneered at 
 the whole thing ; nor can it be said that they received no coun 
 tenance in this from any of the older officers of the Navy. The 
 opinions of some of these were quoted in the House and in the 
 Senate ; and when Senators of the Administration party, and 
 some of the most experienced of the constructors and officers 
 were known to disapprove the new ideas, the country was more 
 than half inclined to think that the Navy Department was 
 conducted by those who were dozing over the country s perils, 
 or wasting time and money upon useless novelties and impracti 
 cable projects. The consequence was, that the men who, above 
 all others, at that time, were devising and executing plans 
 without which the country would have been lost, met little but 
 censure and discouragement ; a distrust of the whole naval ser 
 vice was created, and every gallant officer and seaman felt that 
 a shadow was thrown over his reputation and his prospects. 
 They felt keenly the fact, which was apparent to all, that the 
 people had been taught not to honor or love the Navy as they 
 did in former years. There were those in the Navy Depart- 
 
1GO HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ment who had the genius to devise and the courage to adopt 
 the true method of meeting the public danger ; they had gone 
 beyond the general thinking of their age, and met the usual re 
 ward, censure and ridicule, until they were justified by success. 
 Notwithstanding all this opposition and this attempt to cen 
 sure the Department, Congress gave the authority to appoint a 
 special board to examine and report upon the subject of iron 
 clads, and made an appropriation of $1,500,000 to be used by 
 the Secretary for the construction of one or more armored ships. 
 The following report of the board, dated September 16, 1861, 
 shows that though some progress had been made toward right 
 opinions, the truth was, as yet, but dimly seen. The Depart 
 ment, with its novel ships and new ordnance, was doomed to 
 remain under a shadow until near the close of the war : 
 
 EEPOET ON IRON-CLAD VESSELS. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, i 
 
 BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS, September 16, 1861. \ 
 
 SIR : The undersigned, constituting a board appointed by your or 
 der of the 8th ultimo, proceeded to the duty assigned to them, in ac 
 cordance with the first section of an act of Congress, approved 3d of 
 August, 1861, directing the Secretary of the Navy "to appoint a board 
 of three skilful naval officers to investigate the plans and specifications 
 that may be submitted for the construction or completing of iron-clad 
 steamships or steam-batteries, and on their report, should it be favora 
 ble, the Secretary of the Navy will cause one or more armored or iron 
 or steel clad steamships, or floating steam-batteries to be built ; and 
 there is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not 
 otherwise appropriated, the sum of one million five hundred thousand 
 dollars." 
 
 Distrustful of our ability to discharge this duty, which the law re 
 quires should be performed by three skilful naval officers, we approach 
 the subject with diffidence, having no experience, and but scanty knowl 
 edge in this branch of naval architecture. 
 
 The plans submitted are so various, and, in many respects, so en 
 tirely dissimilar, that, without a more thorough knowledge of this mode 
 of construction and the resisting properties of iron than we possess, it is 
 very likely that some of our connclsions may prove erroneous. 
 
 Application was made to the Department for a naval constructor, to 
 be placed under our orders, with whom we might consult ; but it ap- 
 
THE IRON-CLAD NAVY. 161 
 
 pears, that they are all so employed on important service that none 
 could be assigned to this duty. The construction of iron-clad steam- 
 ships-of-war is now zealously claiming the attention of foreign naval 
 powers. France led off; England followed, and is now somewhat ex 
 tensively engaged in the system ; and other powers seem to emulate 
 their example, though on a smaller scale. 
 
 Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of 
 adopting the iron armature for ships-of-war. For coast and harbor de 
 fence they are undoubtedly formidable adjuncts to fortifications on land. 
 As cruising vessels, however, we are skeptical as to their advantages 
 and ultimate adoption. But whilst other nations are endeavoring to 
 perfect them, we must not remain idle. 
 
 The enormous load of iron, as so much additional weight to the 
 vessel ; the great breadth of beam necessary to give her stability ; the 
 short supply of coal she will be able to store in bunkers ; the greater 
 power required to propel her, and the largely increased cost of construc 
 tion, are objections to this class of vessels as cruisers which we believe 
 it is difficult successfully to overcome. For river and harbor service 
 we consider iron-clad vessels of light draught, or floating batteries thus 
 shielded, as very important ; and we feel, at this moment, the necessity 
 of them on some of our rivers and inlets, to enforce obedience to the 
 laws. We, however, do not hesitate to express the opinion, notwith 
 standing all we have heard or seen written on the subject, that no ship 
 or floating battery, however heavily she may be plated, can cope suc 
 cessfully with a properly constructed fortification of masonry. The one 
 is fixed and immovable, and, though constructed of a material which 
 may be shattered by shot, can be covered, if need be, by the same, or 
 much heavier armor than a floating vessel can bear, whilst the other is 
 subject to disturbance by winds and waves, and to the powerful effects 
 of tides and currents. 
 
 Armored ships or batteries may be employed advantageously to pass 
 fortifications on land for ulterior objects of attack, to run a blockade, or 
 to reduce temporary batteries on the shores of rivers and the approaches 
 to our harbors. 
 
 From what we know of the comparative advantages and disadvan 
 tages of ships constructed of wood over those of iron, we are clearly of 
 opinion that no iron-clad vessel of equal displacement can be made to 
 obtain the same speed as one not thus encumbered, because her form 
 would be better adapted to speed. Her form and dimensions, and the 
 unyielding nature of the shield, detract materially in a heavy sea from 
 the life, buoyancy, and spring which a ship built of wood possesses. 
 
 Wooden ships may be said to be but coffins for their crews when 
 11 
 
162 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 brought in conflict with iron-clad vessels ; but the speed of the former, 
 we take for granted, being greater than that of the latter, they can 
 readily choose their position, and keep out of harm s way entirely. 
 
 Recent improvements in the form and preparation of projectiles, 
 and their increased capacity for destruction, have enlisted a large 
 amount of ingenuity and skill to devise means for resisting them, in 
 the construction of ships-of-war. As yet we know of nothing superior 
 to the large and heavy spherical shot in its destructive effects on 
 vessels, whether plated or not. Rifle-guns have greater range, but 
 the conical shot does not produce the crushing effect of spherical 
 shot. 
 
 It is assumed that 4-J-incli plates are the heaviest armor a sea-going 
 vessel can safely carry. These plates should be of tough iron, and rolled 
 in large, long pieces. This thickness of armor, it is believed, will resist 
 all projectiles now in general use at a distance of five hundred yards, 
 especially if the ship s sides are angular. 
 
 Plates hammered in large masses are less fibrous and tough than 
 when rolled. The question whether wooden backing, or any elastic 
 substance behind the iron plating, will tend to relieve at all the frame of 
 the ships from the crushing effect of a heavy projectile, is not yet de 
 cided. Major Barnard says : " To put an elastic material behind the 
 iron is to insure its destruction." With all deference to such creditable 
 authority, we may suggest that it is possible a backing of some elastic 
 substance (soft wood, perhaps, is the best) might relieve the frame of 
 the ship somewhat from the terrible shock of a heavy projectile, though 
 the plate should not be fractured. 
 
 With respect to a comparison between ships of iron and those of 
 wood, without plating, high authorities in England differ as to which is 
 the best. The tops of ships built of iron, we are told, wear out three 
 bottoms ; whilst the bottoms of those built of wood will outwear three 
 tops. In deciding upon the relative merits of iron and wooden framed 
 vessels, for each of which we have offers, the board is of opinion, that it 
 would be well to try a specimen of each, as both have distinguished ad 
 vocates. One strong objection to iron vessels, which, so far as we know, 
 has not yet been overcome, is the oxidation or rust in salt water, and 
 their liability of becoming foul under water by the attachment of sea- 
 grass and animalcules to their bottoms. The best preventive we know 
 of is a coating of pure zinc paint, which, so long as it lasts, is believed 
 to be an antidote to this cause of evil. 
 
 After these brief remarks on the subject generally, we proceed to no 
 tice the plans and offers referred to us for the construction of plated ves 
 sels and floating batteries. 
 
THE IKON-CLAD NAVY. 163 
 
 It has been suggested that the most ready mode of obtaining an 
 iron-clad ship-of-war would be to contract with responsible parties in 
 England for its complete construction ; and we are assured that parties 
 there are ready to engage in such an enterprise on terms more reason 
 able, perhaps, than such vessels could be built in this country, having 
 much greater experience and facilities than we possess. Indeed, we .are 
 informed there are no mills and machinery in this country capable of 
 rolling iron 4J- inches thick, though plates might be hammered to that 
 thickness in many of our workshops. As before observed, rolled iron 
 is considered much the best, and the difficulty of rolling it. increases rap 
 idly with the increase of thickness. It has, however, occurred to us that 
 a difficulty might arise with the British Government, in case we should 
 undertake to construct ships-of-war in that country, which might compli 
 cate their delivery ; and, moreover, we are of opinion that every people 
 or nation who can maintain a navy should be capable of constructing it 
 themselves. 
 
 Our immediate demands seem to require, first, so far as practicable, 
 vessels invulnerable to shot, of light draught of water, to penetrate our 
 shoal harbors, rivers, and bayous. We, therefore, favor the construction 
 of this class of vessels before going into a more perfect system of large 
 iron-clad sea-going vessels-of-war. We are here met with the difficulty 
 of encumbering small vessels with armor, which, from their size, they 
 are unable to bear. We, nevertheless, recommend that contracts be 
 made with responsible parties for the construction of one or more iron 
 clad vessels or batteries, of as light a draught of water as practicable 
 consistent with their weight of armor. Meanwhile, availing ourselves of 
 the experience thus obtained, and the improvements which we believe 
 are yet to be made by other naval powers in building iron-clad ships, 
 we would advise the construction, in our own dock-yards, of one or more 
 of these vessels, and upon a larger and more perfect scale, when Con 
 gress shall see fit to authorize it. The amount now appropriated is not 
 sufficient to build both classes of vessels to any great extent. 
 
 We have made a synopsis of the propositions and specifications 
 submitted, which we annex, and now proceed to state, in brief, the re 
 sult of our decisions upon the offers presented to us : 
 
 J. ERICSSON, New York, page 19. His plan of a floating battery is 
 novel, but seems to be based upon a plan which will render the battery 
 shot and shell proof. We are somewhat apprehensive that her proper 
 ties for sea are not such as a sea-going vessel should possess. But she 
 may be moved from one place to another on the coast in smooth water. 
 We recommend that an experiment be made with one battery of this 
 description on the terms proposed, with a guaranty and forfeiture in 
 
164 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 case of failure in any of the properties and points of the vessel as pro 
 posed. Price, $275,000 ; length of vessel, 172 feet; breadth of beam, 
 41 feet; depth of hold, 11-j- feet; time, 100 days; draught of water, 
 10 feet; displacement, 1,255 tons; speed, per hour, nine statute miles. 
 
 JOHN W. NYSTROM, Philadelphia, 1216 Chestnut Street, page 1. 
 The plan of (quadruple) guns is not known, and cannot be considered. 
 The dimensions would not float the vessel without the guards, which 
 we are not satisfied would repel shot. We do not recommend the plan. 
 Price, about $175,000; length of vessel, 175 feet; breadth of beam, 27 
 feet; depth of hold, 13 feet; time, 4 months; draught of water, 10 
 feet; displacement, 875 tons; speed, per hour, 12 knots. 
 
 WILLIAM PERINE, New York, 2777 post-office box, presents three 
 plans. The specifications and drawings are not full. The last proposal. 
 (No. 3, page 2), for the heavy plating is the only one we have consid 
 ered ; but there is neither drawing nor model, and the capacity of the 
 vessel, we think, will not bear the armor and armament proposed. 
 Price, $621,000; length of vessel, 225 feet; breadth of beam, 45J feet; 
 depth of hold, 15^- feet; time, 9 months; draught of water, 13 feet; 
 displacement, 2,454 tons ; speed, per hour, 10 knots. 
 
 JOHN C. LE FERRE, Boston, page 9. Description deficient. Not 
 recommended. Sent a model ; but neither price, time, nor dimensions 
 stated. 
 
 E. S. RENWICK, New York, 335 Broadway, presents drawings, spe 
 cification, and model of an iron-clad vessel of large capacity and power 
 ful engines, with great speed, capable of carrying a heavy battery, and 
 stated to be shot-proof and a good sea-boat. The form and manner of 
 construction and proportions of this vessel are novel, and will attract 
 the attention of scientific and practical men. She is of very light 
 draught of water ; and on the question whether she will prove to be a 
 safe and comfortable sea-boat we do not express a decided opinion. 
 Vessels of somewhat similar form, in that part of vessels which is im 
 mersed, of light draught of water, on our Western lakes, have, we be 
 lieve, proved entirely satisfactory in all weathers. To counteract the 
 effect of the waves, when disturbed by the winds, by producing a jerk or 
 sudden rolling motion of flat, shoal vessels, it is proposed to carry a 
 sufficient weight above the centre of gravity to counterpoise the heavy 
 weight below, which is done in this ship by the immense iron armor. 
 If, after a full discussion and examination by experts on this plan, it 
 should be decided that she is a safe vessel for sea service, we would recom 
 mend the construction upon it of one ship, at one of our dock-yards. 
 The estimated cost of this ship, $1,500,000, precludes action upon the 
 plan until further appropriations shall be made bv Congress for such ob- 
 
THE IKON-CLAD NAVY. 165 
 
 jects. Time not stated; draught of water, 16 feet; displacement, 6,520 
 tons; speed per hour, at least 18 miles. 
 
 WHITNEY & ROWLAND, Brooklyn, Greenpoint, page 13, propose 
 an iron gunboat, armor of bars of iron and thin plate over it. JVb price 
 stated. Dimensions of vessel, we think, will not bear the weight and 
 possess stability. Time, 5 months. Not recommended. Length of 
 vessel, 140 feet; breadth of beam, 28 feet; depth of hold, 13 feet; 
 draught of water, 8 feet. 
 
 DONALD McKAY, Boston, page 16. Vessel, in general dimensions 
 and armor, approved. The speed estimated slow. The cost precludes 
 the consideration of construction by the board. Price, $1,000,000; 
 length of vessel 227 feet; breadth of beam, 50 feet; depth of hold, 26 J 
 feet; time, 9 to 10 months; draught of water, 14 feet; displacement, 
 3,200 tons ; speed per hour, 6 to 7 knots. 
 
 WILLIAM H. WOOD, Jersey City, N. J., page 14. Dimensions will 
 not float the guns high enough. Not recommended. Price, $255,000 ; 
 length of vessel, 160 feet; breadth of beam, 34 feet; depth of hold, 22 
 feet; time, 4 months; draught of water, 13 feet; displacement, 1,215 
 tons ; speed not stated. 
 
 MERRICK AND SONS, Philadelphia, pages 7 and 8. Vessel of wood 
 and iron combined, This proposition we consider the most practicable 
 for heavy armor. We recommend that a contract be made with that 
 party under a guaranty, with forfeiture in case of failure to comply 
 with the specifications ; and that the contract require the plates to be 
 15 feet long and 36 inches wide, with a reservation of some modifica 
 tions, which may occur as the work progresses, not to affect the cost. 
 Price, $780,000 ; length of vessel, 220 feet; breadth of beam, 60 feet; 
 depth of hold, 23 feet; time, 9 months; draught of water, 13 feet; dis 
 placement, 3,296 tons ; speed per hour, 9^ knots. 
 
 BENJAMIN RATHBURN, page 20. We do not recommend the plan 
 for adoption. Price not stated ; length of vessel not stated ; breadth 
 of beam, 80 feet ; depth of hold, 74 feet ; time not stated ; draught of 
 water, 25 feet; displacement, 15,000 tons; speed not stated. Specifi 
 cations incomplete. 
 
 HENRY R. DUNHAM, New York, page 11. Vessel too costly for the 
 appropriation ; no drawings or specifications ; not recommended. 
 Price, $1,200,000 ; length of vessel, 325 feet ; breadth of beam, 60 feet; 
 depth of hold not stated ; time, 15 to 18 months ; draught of water, 16 
 feet ; displacement not stated ; speed per hour, 12 miles. 
 
 C. S. BUSHNELL & Co., New Haven, Conn., page 121, propose a 
 vessel to be iron-clad on the rail and plate principle, and to obtain high 
 speed. The objection to this vessel is the fear that she will not float her 
 
166 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 armor and load sufficiently high, and have stability enough for a sea 
 vessel. With a guaranty that she shall do these, we recommend on that 
 basis a contract. Price, $235,250 ; length of vessel, 180 feet ; breadth 
 of beam, feet ; depth of hold, 12| feet ; time, 4 months ; draught of 
 water, 10 feet; displacement, tons; speed per hour, 12 knots. 
 
 JOHN WESTWOOD, Cincinnati, Ohio, page 17. Vessel of wood with 
 iron armor ; plan good enough, but the breadth not enough to bear the 
 armor. No detailed specifications ; no price or time stated ; only a gen 
 eral drawing. Not recommended. 
 
 NEAFIE & LEVY, Philadelphia, page 5. No plans or drawings, there 
 fore not considered. Neither price nor time stated. Length of vessel, 
 200 feet; breadth of beam, 40 feet; depth of hold, 15 feet: draught 
 of water, 13 feet; displacement, 1,748 tons; speed per hour, 10 knots. 
 
 WM. NORRIS, New York, 26 Cedar Street, page 6. Iron boat with 
 out armor. Too small, and not received. Price, $32 ,000 ; length of 
 vessel, 83 feet; breadth of beam, 25 feet; depth of hold, 14 feet; 
 draught of water, 3 feet ; displacement, 90 tons ; speed not stated. 
 
 WM. KINGSLEY, Washington, D. C., page 10, proposes a rubber-clad 
 vessel, which we cannot recommend. No price or dimension stated. 
 
 A. BEEBE, New York, 82 Broadway, page 18. Specifications and 
 sketch defective. Plan not approved. Price, $50,000 ; length of ves 
 sel, 120 feet; breadth of beam, 55 feet; depth not stated; time, 100 
 days; draught of water, 6 feet; displacement, 1,000 tons; speed per 
 hour, 8 knots. 
 
 These three propositions recommended, viz. : Bushnell & Co., New 
 Haven, Connecticut ; Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia ; and J. Ericsson, 
 New York, will absorb $1,290,250, of the appropriation of $1,500,000, 
 leaving $209,750 yet unexpended. 
 
 The board recommends that armor with heavy guns be placed on 
 one of our river craft, or, if none will bear it, to construct a scow, which 
 will answer to plate and shield the guns, for the river service on the 
 Potomac, to be constructed, or prepared by the Government at the 
 navy-yard here, for immediate use. 
 
 We would further recommend that the Department ask of Congress 
 at its next session, an appropriation, for experimenting on iron plates of 
 different kinds, of $10,000. 
 
 All of which is respectfully submitted, 
 
 JOSEPH SMITH, 
 H. PAULDING, 
 C. H. DAVIS. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
THE EBON-CLAD NAVY. 167 
 
 The report of this board was followed by contracts for the 
 building of three iron-clad vessels. One was a small corvette 
 called the Galena, another was the New Ironsides, and the 
 third the first Monitor. The Galena was plated with iron about 
 three inches thick, and this armor was found to be nearly use 
 less as a defence against heavy guns, for the vessel was nearly 
 ruined in a single attack upon Fort Darling, 10-inch shot break 
 ing through her armor and shattering her hull almost beyond 
 repair. The frigate New Ironsides, built at Philadelphia by 
 Merrick & Sons, has proved to be one of the most efficient, if 
 not the most formidable broadside iron-clad in the world at the 
 time she went into service. Her superior power, however, con 
 sisted not in the structure of her hull or in any peculiarity of 
 her armor, but in her truly American battery of 11-inch guns. 
 This battery was almost irresistible in an attack upon a fort in 
 this respect ; the men could not stand to their guns under the 
 terrible hail of her shot, but she has never been tested by such 
 a fire as the Monitors have endured. She has seldom, if ever, 
 engaged a battery at a less distance than a mile. A more par 
 ticular description of this ship will be given hereafter. 
 
 But by far the most important contract, as events have 
 shown, was that for the building of the vessel afterward named 
 " The Monitor." In that curious, insignificant looking craft, 
 which bore no resemblance to what men had been taught to call 
 a ship, was the germ of that American thought which virtually 
 annihilated the old navies of the world. As no invention of 
 modern times has created a greater sensation than this Monitor- 
 ship of Ericsson, as no one is likely to exert so wide an influence 
 upon the art of war, and consequently upon the relative power 
 of nations, and as no one has met with a severer criticism or 
 harsher censure, it is thought proper to devote a chapter to a 
 discussion of the peculiarities and the advantages of this new 
 American war-ship before entering upon the general narrative 
 of the operations of the Navy during the war. 
 
 If the country is called upon to decide whether the Navy 
 Department was reckless and visionary, or prudent and far- 
 seeing in adopting the Monitor-ship, it is right to consider 
 what they have done and what the Monitor now is, because the 
 original and essential idea of the invention remains the same 
 
168 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 through all the modifications and every improvement since 
 made, and these were all involved in the original conception. 
 The capabilities, the grand scope of the germ-thought of the 
 Monitor plan induced the Department to adopt it, and events 
 have justified the decision. 
 
 The original " cheese-box on a raft," as it was called, the 
 Dictator and the Puritan, the Monadnock and the Miantonomoh, 
 the Kalamazoo and her sister ships, though differing widely 
 from each other, yet all are Monitors, modifications of the one 
 central thought. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE INVENTOR OF THE MONITOR. 
 
 THE forces employed in a great war are not often estimated 
 according to their real importance ; and this is particularly so 
 in a country like our own, where the originating and sustaining 
 power is not with the rulers hut the people. The great under 
 lying force of our struggle was with the people themselves. 
 They supplied the wealth, the mechanical force and skill, the 
 thinking power that created the instruments ; and, ahove all, 
 the moral force that gave not only impulse but steadiness to the 
 Government. The people have received their reward in the 
 common glory of success, in the ennobling of the national 
 character, and in the increased stability and security of our 
 institutions. 
 
 The common soldiers and sailors, and the subordinate 
 officers form another great power of war, and in no nation as 
 yet have they obtained their proper reward. The superior 
 and successful officers are in the main duly honored, and this 
 is well ; such men should not lose the full reward. The states 
 men who, at the head of affairs, direct unseen these national 
 forces, do not often receive from the men of their own times 
 the honor really due. When subsequent history discloses the 
 secrets of cabinet councils, then the statesmen of a previous 
 age are weighed and assigned to their proper place. 
 
 In this age, when war is not only a science, but when bat 
 tles, especially on the water, are decided by the use of scientific 
 machinery, the man who invents a weapon which both for of 
 fensive or defensive war is decidedly superior to any known 
 before, becomes himself a great war power, one of the forces 
 
170 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 which, shape the character of an age. And inasmuch as the 
 inventor of an art or a machine which revolutionizes the opin 
 ions and practice of a nation, seldom has the wealth by which 
 its value can be tested on the large scale, they who by patron 
 age and capital supply the needed means and share the risks 
 and the odium of the novelty, deserve also an honorable place 
 by the side of the inventor himself. 
 
 Ericsson* will be recognized by impartial history as one of 
 the great powers of the American w r ar ; and they who, like 
 Griswold and his associates, stood by the inventors of the coun 
 try and enabled them to bring their new weapons to the prac 
 tical test of battle, should receive the honor due to them as 
 among the causes which, lying back of the battle and concealed 
 from the public, contributed largely to the victory. This is 
 equally true of those who in the West brought to the aid of 
 their country their skill, their capital, and their genius. 
 
 It is as the inventor of the Monitor that Captain Erics- 
 eon will be remembered and placed among those whose genius 
 has revolutionized the opinions and practice of the world. 
 Valuable as the caloric engine may be, it has not superseded 
 Bteam as a motive power ; and important as the screw-propeller 
 undoubtedly is, it is only one of the methods by which steamers 
 are driven, and the side paddle-wheel still maintains its place ; 
 
 * JOHN ERICSSON was born in the province of Wermeland, Sweden, in 1803. The 
 son of a mining proprietor, his earliest impressions were derived from the engines 
 and machinery of the mines. 
 
 His extraordinary inventive genius developed itself very early in life. When 
 only twenty-three years old he obtained leave of absence from the Swedish army for 
 the purpose of introducing in England a flame-engine, which he had already exhibited 
 in his native country. He was the inventor and constructor of the novelty engine, 
 which was one of those which competed for the prize offered for the best locomotive 
 by the directors of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1829. An artificial 
 draught was the distinguishing feature of this machine. . This feature is still retained 
 in all locomotives. He next produced a stearn fire-engine, and then soon after 
 brought out his famous caloric engine, some 2,000 of which are now in operation. 
 
 He was the inventor of the propeller, and of that new arrangement of steam ma 
 chinery in war-vessels which has revolutionized the navies of the world. The first 
 steamship built with the new propelling machinery was the Princeton, and America 
 thus became the leader in the great change. He received almost countless testimo 
 nials to his genius and the value of his inventions, in the form of medals and mem 
 berships in the most important societies in Europe, and was most widely and favora 
 bly known before his name became connected with our iron-clad navy. 
 
. Holly* 
 
UN 
 
THE INVENTOR OF THE MONITOR. 171 
 
 but the essential features of the Monitor ship seem destined to 
 modify or displace all other forms of war-vessels intended for 
 heavy ordnance. Every experiment thus far made, either here 
 or in Europe, tends toward this result. It is conceded that no 
 broadside ship now known can float armor thick enough to resist 
 the 15-inch or 20-inch smooth-bore, or the 12-inch rifle, while 
 no effort yet has succeeded in devising a casemate which is 
 equal to the circular one. Unless the progress of events is soon 
 arrested by some new discovery, the sailing ship as a war-ship, 
 the wooden ship, for fighting, and the broadside iron-clad, will 
 all disappear among the rubbish of the past ; and the Monitors, 
 for a time at least, will form the world s weapon for naval war. 
 
 What new form of engines of destruction the wonder-work 
 ing modern mind may yet produce none now can tell. Monitors 
 may be and probably will be displaced by some new weapon 
 which may better ward off or deal the death-blow, but this 
 would not dim the fame of Ericsson. It is sufficient to secure 
 his renown that he met the want of the age in which he lives, 
 and gave to this young nation in its hour of peril an instrument 
 which not only shielded her from the blow meditated in Europe, 
 but annihilated that naval power with which France and Eng 
 land were holding the rest of the world in subjection. 
 
 The Monitor and her immense guns have broken the right 
 arm of despotism both here and in Europe. They may be 
 classed among the great levelling and emancipating forces of 
 the world. They have made, at least for a time, the weaker 
 nations equal in some important respects upon the sea to the 
 strongest ; and once delivered from the pressure and the fear of 
 the great navies, they will gain confidence and moral power. 
 A nation owning a single first-class Monitor is above being de 
 spised, even by England. 
 
 It is doubtless true that the powerful and wealthy nation 
 may in time restore the former inequality by the number of 
 its new ships and the power of its guns ; still the lesson of the 
 Monitor will not be forgotten, and perhaps the torpedo or 
 some still more terrific agent may once more place the squad 
 rons of the strong at the mercy of the weak ; and it seems 
 unlikely now that any one great naval power will hereafter 
 dominate the seas as England heretofore has done. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE MONITORS. 
 
 THE Monitor form of a war-ship is an original invention, 
 the embodiment of a before unknown idea. It seems to stand 
 unconnected with all the previous thinking of the world in re 
 gard to naval architecture. Instead of adopting or imitating 
 any form then known, it rejected them all. It is scarcely too 
 much to say that it is the opposite of them all. A ship that 
 could fly through the air would be scarcely more removed from 
 the general idea of the world than is the almost submarine 
 Monitor ploughing through or diving under the waves. The 
 contrast is not less between the hundred guns of the common 
 line-of-battle ship and the two guns of the revolving battery. 
 It marks an era in the world s history. It belongs to the high 
 est order of genius ; and they were men of genius, or in pro 
 found sympathy with genius, who had the boldness to adopt 
 the plan. 
 
 In order both to weigh properly the objections which have 
 been made against these new engines of war, and to estimate 
 aright their advantages, it is necessary first of all to obtain a 
 clear idea of what a Monitor is. "What are its distinctive and 
 essential features, without which it would not be a Monitor, and 
 retaining which it still remains a Monitor, though modified in 
 many unessential particulars ? First and most important is the 
 revolving turret, which shields the battery ; and second, the 
 submerging of the hull until the deck is brought within a few 
 inches of the surface of the water, this distance varying some 
 what according to the size of the vessel, but presenting in all 
 only a narrow line instead of the lofty broadside to an enemy s 
 
THE MONITORS. 173 
 
 fire. The advantage of this will be more particularly shown 
 hereafter. 
 
 In mentioning the submerging of the hull as a feature of the 
 Monitor, it is not intended to state that this is peculiar to this 
 form of war-ship ; but the true idea of a Monitor cannot be 
 carried out except where the deck lies nearly level with the 
 water. A broadside ship might carry a revolving turret, and 
 to that extent might be called a Monitor, but the true Monitor 
 has her hull nearly all below the water-line, and therefore be 
 yond the reach of shot. 
 
 The Monitor idea then admits of any change or improve 
 ment w T hich leaves the hull nearly submerged and retains the 
 revolving turret. This shows at once how entirely irrelevant 
 much of the criticism has been by which Ericsson s invention 
 has been condemned. This criticism has overlooked almost 
 entirely the essential idea of the invention, and attacked the 
 minor defects and mistakes which are unavoidable in carrying 
 out so novel a conception. It was unreasonable to suppose that 
 an idea which set aside all the previous thinking of the world 
 in regard to ships, and rejected all known forms of construction, 
 should assume at the first trial a practical form so complete as 
 to require no improvement ; and especially when new ma 
 chinery was to be devised for almost every operation of the 
 ship and her guns. 
 
 Upon the appearance of the first Monitor her form was 
 ridiculed and condemned, and the whole Monitor idea cast con 
 temptuously aside, as if the peculiarities spoken of were the es 
 sential features in the plan. Her armor was so arranged as to 
 project on all sides, so as to protect both her propeller and the 
 hull for some distance below the water-line. This was seized 
 upon, all its disadvantages enumerated and exaggerated, and 
 then the invention was condemned as if this "overhang" con 
 stituted a Monitor. But this was not an essential part of the 
 plan, and has been dispensed with in the more recently con 
 structed ships. The criticisms were valid against the " over 
 hang," but not against a Monitor. The Miantonomoli, without 
 the projecting armor-shelf, is a far better expression of the 
 true Monitor idea than was the little craft that defeated the 
 Merrimack. 
 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 It was declared that the Monitors were all slow and un 
 wieldy, that they were worthless as sea-boats, and especially as 
 cruisers. But the first Monitors were only a special application 
 of the general idea. The want of the Government just then 
 was some invulnerable floating batteries, and such these Mon 
 itors were. They were floating revolving forts ; and they not 
 only answered this special purpose as no other form of ship 
 could have done, but they proved themselves to be admirable 
 sea-boats, and their speed was fully equal to that of the New 
 Ironsides. It was all that was needed for the service required 
 of them. But the Monitor is not necessarily a slow ship. The 
 Monadnock and the Miantonomoh are among the fastest vessels 
 in the Navy, and are quite equal, as is believed, in this respect, 
 to the average speed of the iron-clads of Europe. They are also 
 first-class sea-boats, many officers and men preferring them at sea 
 to a broadside ship of any kind. They were condemned as un 
 healthy, but the latest medical reports would indicate that they 
 are even more healthy than other ships. Because the first one 
 was lost, it was said they were good for nothing except to go to 
 the bottom, as if no vessel but a Monitor had ever foundered 
 at sea. 
 
 When the fleet of iron-clads failed to capture Charleston, 
 and some of them w^ere temporarily disabled, their worthlessness 
 was again proclaimed through the land, and nearly all seemed 
 to forget the fact that these vessels were the next day in good 
 fighting trim, after having endured a fire that would have sunk 
 the whole broadside fleet of Europe, and this with only trifling 
 injuries to the ships, and with no loss of life. The first attack in 
 Congress, followed by the censures of an influential press, had 
 unfitted the country for forming a candid judgment. In all 
 their condemnation of the Monitors, and censures of those who 
 adopted them as a part of our national defences, men seemed 
 to forget that it was a Monitor, and a very imperfect and 
 hastily constructed one, which arrested the ruin of our fleet, and 
 at a most perilous moment decided the contest in our favor. 
 
 The country did not know at the time, and perhaps will 
 never fully understand how much it owed to those Senators and 
 members of the House of Representatives by whom this current 
 of wrong opinions and causeless prejudice was first arrested at 
 
THE MONITORS. 175 
 
 the capitol, and through whom the truth, against determined 
 opposition, was gradually brought to the knowledge of the 
 people. 
 
 Such was the well-spread distrust, and even hostility to the 
 Navy Department and its plans, that it required the most posi 
 tive convictions, and a willingness to risk personal popularity 
 for the country s safety, to induce any man, at that time, to 
 stand up and defend the Navy from the persistent attack of 
 some of the most trusted and influential members of the Senate 
 and the House. Had this attack succeeded, and success at one 
 moment seemed almost certain ; had the policy of the Depart 
 ment been repudiated ; had its plans for iron-clads and ordnance 
 been rejected, so far as human wisdom can judge, looking back 
 on the past, the rebellion must have succeeded. 
 
 Fortunately for the country, God raised up men whose 
 statesmanship was .equal to the hour, and who had the sagacity 
 to perceive the real exigency of the country, and who saw that 
 the plans of the Department were the only available ones which 
 promised success. Foremost in this contest for the right and 
 the safety of the country were Hon. J. W. Grimes, Senator from 
 Iowa, and Hon. A. II. Rice, member of the House from Massa 
 chusetts ; and with them, and perhaps equally entitled to the 
 country s grateful remembrance, were Hon. Messrs. F. A. Pike, 
 of Maine, II. T. Blow, of Missouri, and Hon. J. A. Griswold, of 
 New York, who, by their public speeches and labors in Commit 
 tee, both shielded the Department, began the creation of a true 
 public sentiment in regard to the Navy, and materially aided in 
 saving the country from disaster in one of the most critical peri 
 ods of the war. It has been said, that when Cervantes " smiled 
 Spain s chivalry away, he broke the right arm of his own 
 country." Had Mr. Hale and his associates succeeded in their 
 ridicule, they would have demolished with a sneer the main de 
 fence of the nation. 
 
 Having shown what the essential characteristics of a Moni- 
 
 O 
 
 tor are, it is but just to state, that while the original conception 
 and a part of the improvements are due solely to the genius of 
 Ericsson, so that his name holds the same relation to the Moni 
 tor that "Watt does to the steam-engine, and Fulton to the 
 steamboat, very important changes were suggested by men of 
 
176 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 nautical experience in the Navy Department ; and it is probable 
 that, next to Ericsson, the Assistant Secretary has done more 
 than any other man in bringing this class of ships to their 
 present form and efficiency, while Admiral Smith has also 
 contributed to the same great national end. Nor do these gen 
 tlemen believe that Ericsson s idea has been even yet fully de 
 veloped. They think that it involves more than as yet has been 
 exhibited in practice, and that from it a far more formidable 
 war-ship than any now afloat will hereafter be produced. 
 
 These statements show that much of the hostile criticism of 
 the Ericsson invention had no relation to the real merits of the 
 plan, but were rather directed to errors in construction, after 
 ward remedied, while much also arose from a misunderstanding 
 of the facts. The reader will now be prepared to consider the 
 advantages of this new war-engine which, like the steamboat, 
 the locomotive, and the telegraph, has come forth to revolution 
 ize the opinions of the world. 
 
 The first and principal one, upon which the rest depend, is 
 the revolving turret, containing the battery by which the guns 
 and their shot-proof shield turn together, and so that the guns 
 can be trained to any point in the horizon without regard to the 
 position of the ship. 
 
 This feature alone distinguishes the Ericsson vessel from 
 every other known invention. It has been claimed that Captain 
 Coles, of the British Navy, was the original inventor of the tur- 
 reted ship. Even if this were so, it would detract nothing from 
 the fame of the American inventor, or from the merits or origi 
 nality of his plan. A Monitor is indeed a turreted ship, but a 
 ship with a stationary turret is by no means a Monitor. The 
 turreted ship of Captain Coles, of the British Navy, is simply a 
 broadside vessel with stationary turrets upon the deck, and these 
 might perhaps better be named circular casements in order the 
 more readily to distinguish them from the revolving turrets of 
 Ericsson. Captain Coles s ship possesses neither of the chief 
 characteristics of a Monitor. Neither is a vessel a Monitor 
 which has a stationary circular shield for the battery while the 
 guns are mounted upon a turn-table within. This form was 
 proposed to avoid the danger of having a revolving turret 
 jammed by shot, as was the case with one or more at Charles- 
 
THE MONITORS. 177 
 
 ton. But this difficulty lias been provided for by the addition 
 of an outer ring enclosing the base of the turret, by which it is 
 effectually guarded. Neither in the stationary turret of Captain 
 Coles, nor in the turret with the revolving table, can the guns be 
 trained to any point without shifting the position of the ship. 
 The gun can be varied only to the extent allowed by the trav 
 erse circle, and the port must be enlarged to correspond, so as 
 to admit the different positions of the gun, thus increasing the 
 exposure of the men ; while the Monitor port is but little larger 
 than the muzzle of the gun. If the expedient is adopted of 
 mounting the guns so as to be fired through three ports as in 
 the Stonewall and some of our Western iron-clads, then not only 
 is the exposure increased by the three ports, but it is a clumsy 
 contrivance compared with the revolving turret. 
 
 In the Monitor, whatever the position of the ship, the guns 
 revolving with the turret can be trained instantly to any point 
 of the horizon, sweeping round the entire circle. Even were 
 the Monitor hard aground, it would scarcely diminish her defen 
 sive power, for from whatever quarter her adversary might ap 
 proach she would be equally under her guns. A Monitor 
 aground is a revolving foil of the most effective character. The 
 advantage of this feature will appear in a subsequent chapter, 
 describing an attack upon a Monitor aground by some land 
 forces on Ked Kiver. The importance of this feature of the in 
 vention cannot be easily overrated. It distinguishes it as clearly 
 from every other form of turreted ship as it does from a broad 
 side vessel. A second advantage is gained from mounting the 
 guns in the centre of the vessel. This alone renders it possible 
 to use at sea the new heavy American guns. Guns mounted 
 on broadside act with their weight upon a lever, the length of 
 which is equal to the distance from the centre of the ship to the 
 line 011 which the guns stand, and the tendency of this immense 
 weight is either to roll the ship under or wrench her timbers 
 apart. It is easy, therefore, to see that no vessel yet built could 
 bear the strain of fifteen-inch guns mounted on her side twenty- 
 five or thirty feet outward from the line of her keel. They 
 would roll her under, or tear her in pieces. But in a Monitor 
 the guns are mounted directly over the keel, and therefore the 
 ship has only to bear their weight. Besides, the Monitor, as 
 12 
 
178 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 will be more particularly shown hereafter, scarcely pitches at all, 
 and rolls but slightly, and the guns rest comparatively quiet 
 over the ship s centre of gravity. This steadiness of the Moni 
 tor at sea offers another very great advantage in the training of 
 her guns. 
 
 One of the objections strenuously urged against them was 
 that because the gunners are enclosed in the turret, and the 
 port-holes are scarcely larger than the muzzles of the guns, that 
 therefore no accuracy of aim can be obtained. But the exact 
 contrary of this is true, for officers who have commanded Moni 
 tors in action inform us that, owing to the steadiness of the 
 ship, the accuracy of fire is nearly the same as if the guns were 
 in battery on shore. Nor is this all. The Monitor form of 
 war-ship, by the mounting of the guns over the keel of the ves 
 sel, gives unlimited opportunity to carry out the American idea 
 of condensing the weight of a broadside into a few heavy shot, 
 substituting the smashing blow for greater penetration by the 
 swifter and smaller shot. 
 
 Another and essential feature of a perfect Monitor is that 
 the deck lies so near the water-line that a narrow strip only of 
 her hull is above the surface. This enables such a ship to carry 
 a perfectly shot-proof armor on every part exposed to an enemy s 
 guns, while such a thickness of iron over the whole side of a 
 broadside ship would send her to the bottom the moment she 
 was launched. Again, the Monitor form presents a mark so 
 exceedingly small compared with the huge broadside, as to give 
 her a very decided advantage in battle. These two features, the 
 ability to carry an invulnerable armor on the part exposed, and 
 the small target offered to an enemy, are so important as to re 
 quire particular consideration. The most formidable iron-clads 
 of the British Navy are in size and general construction repre 
 sented by the Warrior. England has more efficient vessels than 
 she is, but the Warrior may properly be used to show the dif 
 ference of exposed surface in a first-class broadside frigate, and 
 a Monitor able to cope with her. The "Warrior is three hun 
 dred and eighty (380) feet long, and she floats, according to the 
 scale of an official drawing, twenty feet out of the water. The 
 area of her broadside exposed to shot is, therefore, seven thou 
 sand six hundred (7,600) square feet. The length of the first 
 
THE MONITOES. 179 
 
 Monitor was one hundred and eighty-five (185) feet, of the sec 
 ond class two hundred (200) feet, of the third class two hundred 
 and twenty-five (225) feet, of the Monadnock class two hundred 
 and fifty-seven (257) feet, and of the Dictator three hundred 
 and fourteen (314) feet. These ships, upon the average, do not 
 float much more than one foot above the water when in fighting 
 trim ; and the immense advantage which they have over a 
 broadside antagonist is readily seen. But the comparison can 
 be made with perfect accuracy between such a ship as the War 
 rior and one of our double-turreted Monitors of the Monad- 
 nock class. The Miantonomoh is of this pattern. She is, in 
 round numbers, two hundred and fifty-seven (257) feet long, 
 and her deck, when prepared for action, rises only twenty-four 
 inches above the water. Hence the surface exposed in her broad 
 side is only five hundred and fourteen (514) square feet. Add 
 to this the turrets, each twenty-two feet in diameter and nine 
 feet high, equal to one hundred and ninety (190) square feet 
 each more, and it is seen that a Monitor of this size presents in all 
 only eight hundred and ninety-four (894) square feet as a target 
 to the enemy s fire, while the Warrior offers seven thousand six 
 hundred square feet. Besides this, it must be remembered that 
 a surface two hundred feet long and only two feet wide, if visi 
 ble at all at the distance of a mile, or even a thousand yards, 
 appears only as a line of that length, while, unless a shot 
 strikes a turret exactly in the centre, it is almost certain to be 
 turned aside. The chances then of hitting a Monitor with a 
 damaging shot from a high broadside vessel in motion, and 
 rolling or pitching with the sea, are very few. Nor must it be 
 forgotten that the reason why our Monitors have been struck so 
 often is, that they have fought against forts and batteries whose 
 guns were stationary, and had been previously trained with the 
 utmost possible precision upon points where the vessels were de 
 tained by obstructions placed for this purpose. This will be 
 fully shown in the description of the obstructions in Charleston 
 harbor. It has been said that the greater number of guns of 
 the broadside ship will more than compensate for the inequal 
 ity of size. But no shot from guns yet mounted in broadside 
 would harm either the turret or the sides of the Miantono 
 moh, though every one of a broadside should strike at point- 
 
180 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 blank range. Her side armor is equal to nearly eleven inches 
 of solid iron ; and then, inasmuch as her deck is solid wood and 
 iron down to the water-line, the backing of her side armor is 
 really fifty-two feet thick, or the whole width of the ship. !N"o 
 shot yet fired from a broadside ship would injure her turret, 
 while at a thousand yards such a Monitor, from her great stead 
 iness in the water, should strike a ship like the "Warrior with 
 four 15-inch shot at every discharge of her guns at the distance 
 of fifteen hundred yards. The effect of these shot upon any 
 armor which a broadside vessel can float will be shown here 
 after, and the proof will be presented that any one of our Moni 
 tors mounting 15-inch guns would sink any ship of the War 
 rior pattern. 
 
 In this comparison of surfaces exposed in a broadside ship 
 and a Monitor, it should be stated, that while it was assumed in 
 the calculation that the Miantonomoh rises two feet out of the 
 water, many of our turreted ships have their decks only about 
 twelve inches above the water-line, and that the Dictator, the 
 largest yet finished (February, 1866), is very little higher than 
 this. 
 
 To place this subject in a still clearer light, let it, for the 
 sake of a comparison, be supposed, though it is not true, that 
 the broadside frigate with her greater number of guns would 
 strike the small target as often as the Monitor could the large 
 broadside with her four guns, let the reader consider what kind 
 of a ship it must be, and what guns she must carry, in order to 
 match the turreted vessel. The broadside of the Warrior pre 
 sents a surface to fire eight and a half or nine times as large as 
 the Miantonomoh. To equal this Monitor, the English frigate 
 should carry on a side eight and a half times the number of 15-^ 
 inch guns which the Monitor mounts. This would require thirty- 
 four on a side, or sixty-four 15-inch guns in all. In addition to 
 this she must be covered all around with armor eleven inches 
 thick. It is not possible to comply with either of these condi 
 tions, and hence the difficulty, in the present state of science 
 and invention, of constructing a broadside ship that can cope 
 with our double-turreted Monitors. No English or French ship 
 yet launched can carry our 15-inch gun in broadside. 
 
 Another very decided advantage afforded by Ericsson s in- 
 
THE MONITORS. 181 
 
 vention is the small number of men required for the working of 
 the ship and her guns. The crew of the Warrior is stated by 
 English authorities to be seven hundred men, while the Mian- 
 tonomoh requires but two hundred, and the single turrets are 
 worked by one hundred men. 
 
 Add to this the almost entire safety of the men, and it will 
 be seen that this is not the least recommendation of the Ameri 
 can war-ship. Such are the chief features of Ericsson s inven 
 tion, clearly marking it as a new thought, which, by changes in 
 the application of its principle that experience has suggested, 
 is now embodied in the most formidable war-vessels of the 
 world. 
 
 So clear and decided were the convictions of the Secretary 
 and his associates that they persevered through opposition, mis 
 representation, and ridicule, until their policy was triumphantly 
 vindicated by results. Perhaps the noblest triumph of the Navy 
 has been announced while this paragraph was being written 
 (February, 1866), the official announcement that the French 
 emperor is preparing to withdraw his troops from Mexico. If 
 this is true, then one of the main reasons for this course beyond 
 all doubt is the power of the American Navy, and the well- 
 known fact that our iron-clad fleet cannot be safely attacked. 
 Besides, all Europe knows that we have nearly ready for sea at 
 this date the most powerful steam-cruisers in the world. May 
 the nation learn from this a lesson in regard to the importance 
 of the Navy, for on it must depend hereafter the peaceful solu 
 tion of foreign complications ! If we maintain a Navy suited 
 to the power and resources of the country, no foreign nation 
 will dare attack us, and therefore we shall have peace. 
 
 No American statesman should be deluded by the idea that 
 peace can be long maintained between this republic and Europe 
 except by a Navy that is able to defend us against the united 
 attack of every Latin power in Europe, aided by England. 
 This will seem to many perhaps a reckless assertion, but it is 
 not made without careful consideration. France controls every 
 one of these Latin powers ; and the principal ones, as Spain and 
 Italy, are rapidly increasing their navies iron-clad navies. 
 France will be able to combine against us, whenever she 
 chooses, Spain, Italy, and England. 
 
182 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 "We should not forget how recently the fleets of France, 
 Spain, and England, appeared on American shores, leagued in 
 a conspiracy against the United States, which has failed only 
 because of our new war weapons, our sudden development of 
 our military power, and our success in putting down the rebel 
 lion. The antagonisms between this republic and the powers 
 of Western Europe are sharp, active, irreconcilable, and endur 
 ing. There is a religious antagonism, and one of races also. 
 Louis ]STapoleon, in an unguarded moment, declared these to be 
 the powers that originated the attack on Mexico. He went, he 
 said, to restore on this continent the prestige of the Latin race, 
 and, of course, the Latin Church. For the very same reasons 
 he produced the war against Russia, to restore in the East the 
 prestige of the Latin race. 
 
 This intention to restore both in Europe and here the old 
 control of the Latin race over the Anglo-Saxon, and of the 
 Latin Church over the Protestant, will not be abandoned until 
 a decision has been reached either by a great war or by such 
 an exhibition of power on our part as would forbid all hope of 
 a successful attack. This involves also a political antagonism. 
 The religious sentiment of the Latin race clothes itself in de 
 spotic forms in Church and State alike. It knows no other form 
 of civilization, it rejects all else. The American religious senti 
 ment embodies itself in free institutions political, social, and 
 religious. It is a direct, ever-acting antagonism to the systems 
 and sentiment of Western Europe. The forces on both sides 
 therefore are aggressive, and sooner or later the conflict must 
 come, unless it is warded off by the manifest strength of our 
 Navy. 
 
 Again, the commercial and manufacturing antagonism is 
 also very strong and very active ; and England, whose very exist 
 ence is wrapped up in these interests, will attack us whenever 
 she dares to do so, in the hope of crushing a rival. It is not 
 necessary to build in advance a thousand ships, but our home 
 manufactures should be cherished. Yards should be provided, 
 materials accumulated, and machinery erected, which will en 
 able us to compete with Europe in the production of ships. We 
 must become a great naval power, or be at the mercy of Europe. 
 Those who have introduced the Monitors not only indorse all 
 
THE MONITORS. 183 
 
 that has thus far been stated here, but they are fully prepared 
 to go much further. After having tested such vessels as the 
 Monadnock and Miantonomoh, especially after their perform 
 ance at sea has been watched and reported by experienced 
 naval officers, those in whose judgment we have reason to con 
 fide, are perfectly willing to commit themselves to the opin 
 ion that the Monitor idea is destined to work a revolution not 
 only in regard to coast and harbor defences, but in the whole 
 system of naval architecture in the world. 
 
 Taking this general view of the subject, the submerged or 
 nearly submerged hull is the central thought. In the severest 
 gale the agitation of the water reaches but a few feet below the 
 surface, and it therefore is quite evident that if a vessel could 
 be moved beneath the waves instead of upon them, that her 
 path would be through calm water, however rough it might be 
 above her. In proportion as the hull of a vessel is thus sunk 
 into the calmer water, while a diminished surface is exposed to 
 the stroke of the surface-wave, will be her steadiness and safety. 
 This principle has been illustrated by reference to the elephant, 
 who swims beneath the surface, sinking his huge bulk until it 
 floats in comparatively calm water, and communicating through 
 his uplifted trunk with the upper air. 
 
 A properly constructed Monitor therefore might be called, 
 not inaptly, an iron sea-elephant, communicating with the 
 upper air through its turret and pilot-house, while the hull is 
 mostly beneath the water. Holding for a moment the idea of 
 the submerged hull separate from all others, the inquiry is sug 
 gested, why the merchant-ship and even the sailing vessel should 
 not also be constructed upon the same principle ? Sails or steam 
 will propel a vessel whose deck lies level with the water, to say 
 the least, as rapidly as when her sides rise twenty feet above, 
 while her steadiness would of course be greatly increased by 
 sinking her hull into the calm water below. As a matter of 
 fact, it is well known that the Monitors in a gale are the stead 
 iest vessels afloat. The wear and tear of a large, high, broad 
 side ship, by the strokes of the sea upon her lofty sides, and by 
 the strain of her pitching and rolling, is of course very great. 
 But this smiting of the waves upon the sides, and most of the 
 injurious motion of a ship, would be avoided by leaving only the 
 
184 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 deck above water. If the principle here assumed is correct, 
 then perhaps it may be expected that the time will come when 
 the submarine ship, or one nearly so, will supersede all other 
 forms. "What particular shape the principle may in practice 
 assume cannot now perhaps be foreseen ; but experiments al 
 ready made have, in the opinion of good judges, shown con 
 clusively not only that the Monitor can live in a heavy sea, but 
 that the Monitor principle will secure the best sea-boat yet de 
 vised by man. 
 
 There need be no fear in reference to such a ship of the 
 most appropriate form. The fact is already established that a 
 vessel with her deck at the surface of the water has buoyancy 
 enough to carry guns and stores, or a cargo ; that she will go 
 through the waves or under them far more easily and steadily 
 than she could ride over them, and the ingenuity of man will 
 soon devise the means of giving speed and comfort to the novel 
 ship. Indeed, as has been already stated, our latest-built Mon 
 itors are among our fastest war-ships, and many officers and men 
 prefer them to any other ship, because there is in them far less 
 of discomfort and exposure. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 
 
 THE next step in this history will be to present a general 
 description of the different classes of Monitors, and what they 
 have performed daring the war will be set forth hereafter in the 
 narrative. 
 
 In the perilous hour which has been described, when the 
 Merrimack was being hastened on to completion in the hope of 
 destroying our Navy, laying waste our cities, and ending the 
 war, God brought the genius of Ericsson to the aid of the na 
 tion ; but genius without money could avail nothing. The 
 Government, through a mistaken trust that war had ceased, 
 had no means of its own for constructing an iron-clad. It had 
 neither the proper yards nor suitable machinery. It was in 
 precisely the condition in which the next great war will find us, 
 if a narrow policy in regard to the Navy should rule the coun 
 cils of the nation instead of a generous and cordial support. It 
 was the state in which the nation will be ere long if we forget 
 that in a foreign war a navy, and not an array, must fight the 
 battles. 
 
 In this emergency individuals were found willing to risk 
 their capital and their business reputation in constructing, at 
 their own risk, the nondescript vessel. Such was the state of 
 public opinion that the Department felt compelled to guard the 
 contract with some stringent conditions. The report of the 
 board of officers bound the Secretary to this course so far as its 
 authority went. "While in the contract for the New Ironsides 
 the contractors were required simply to comply with the speci 
 fications furnished, and while her plan was proposed by the 
 
186 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 board as "the most practicable one for heavy armor," thus 
 throwing some distrust at the outset upon the turreted battery, 
 the contractors for the Monitor were bound under forfeiture to 
 guarantee against " failure in any of the properties and points 
 of the vessel as proposed." For these restrictions the Navy De 
 partment has been censured, and the Secretary has been re 
 proached with permitting a great national battle to be fought 
 by a ship which at the time was the property of individuals. 
 But these conditions were imposed by the report of the board, 
 and with the, well-known feelings and opinions in and out of 
 Congress the Secretary perhaps was not inclined to assume a 
 responsibility not properly his. Manifestly, he could do no less 
 than to require that the novel battery should perform what the 
 inventor and contractor promised ; there was no time for any 
 experiments with her after she was ready for sea, and, in fact, 
 it was only by a trial in battle that conclusive proof could be 
 given that the contract was really fulfilled. As a matter of 
 course, therefore, she was not fully paid for until after her trial 
 in the fight with the Merrimack. 
 
 It is always interesting to learn how great inventions have 
 originated ; under what circumstances, by what influences, and 
 by what men they have been introduced among the forces of the 
 world. The birthplace and early history of a great idea are at 
 least as important as those of a great man. In order to present 
 these facts in regard to the Monitor, it is necessary to go a little 
 back of some statements already made. In September, 1861, 
 C. S. Bushnell, of ISTew Haven, the gentleman who contracted 
 to build the corvette Galena, was conversing with Ericsson in 
 regard to iron-clad batteries, when he took from a drawer a 
 plan of one which he at some former period had conceived and 
 sketched for future reference. It was substantially the plan of 
 the original Monitor. Mr. Bushnell was most favorably im 
 pressed with the novel idea, and urged Ericsson to go to "Wash 
 ington and present the plan to the Secretary of the Navy. For 
 some reason this proposition was declined, and at length Mr. 
 Bushnell asked and obtained permission to take the drawing 
 himself to the Secretary. Mr. "Welles was pleased with the 
 idea, but few of the naval officers and constructors at that time 
 regarded the plan with favor. Naturally enough they felt un- 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 1ST 
 
 willing to risk a reputation honorably earned, and which was 
 their all, upon this novel weapon entirely untried, and which, 
 however perfect it might be in theory, they feared might fail in 
 the stern practice of a fight. From the first, however, Admiral 
 Joseph Smith gave to the Monitor battery his sanction and 
 earnest support, and aided the Secretary in his effort to bring 
 out the new invention to the extent of his influence. Among 
 many that doubted, he stands conspicuous as the early and 
 steadfast friend of the iron-clad navy. He presents one of the 
 few examples where men rise above the trammels of early edu 
 cation and even of professional training, and embrace late in 
 life entirely new ideas. A few facts in regard to Admiral 
 Smith* will doubtless be interesting to the reader, inasmuch as 
 he has been an actor in both our great naval wars. 
 
 * Rear-Admiral JOSEPH SMITH was bora in 1791, in Hanover Old Colony, Massa 
 chusetts. He entered the Navy as a midshipman, in January, 1809. He has served 
 in the several grades of midshipman, master, commandant, captain, commodore, and 
 rear-admiral, in all of which grades he sustained the character of an intelligent and 
 efficient officer. During a period when active service in the Navy was not available, 
 in order to perfect himself in the duties of seamanship, he entered the merchant ser 
 vice, and made several voyages to Europe and the East Indies. 
 
 During the War of 1812 he was ordered to Lake Champlain, and served as a lieu 
 tenant under McDonough. In the battle of Plattsburg he was second in command 
 of the brig Eagle, which carried twenty guns. In that bloody fight he received a 
 wound, the effects of which he will carry with him to his grave. One incident of that 
 battle which Admiral Smith relates is worth recording. Among those on board the 
 Eagle was one who had his wife with him. This man was killed during the action, 
 and his body laid down on the berth-deck. Several of the powder-boys were soon 
 killed or wounded, and this woman volunteered to take the place of one of them, and 
 carried cartridges from the magazine to the guns, stepping each time over the man 
 gled corpse of her husband. The name of that woman should be known. 
 
 For his gallantry on that occasion Lieutenant Smith received a medal from the 
 Government. He was in the frigate Constitution in the war with Algiers, then in the 
 Guerriere, as first lieutenant under McDonough, and subsequently commanded that 
 ship in the Pacific. He atone time commanded the line-of-battle -ship Ohio in the 
 Mediterranean, and afterward the Mediterranean squadron in the flag-ship Cumber 
 land. 
 
 In 1846 he was appointed chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the fact 
 that he has retained that place up to this time (1867), is sufficient evidence of the 
 ability with which his department of the service has been conducted. It was his son 
 who so gallantly defended the Congress when attacked by the Merrimack, and who 
 was killed in that action. 
 
 His connection with the board appointed to examine and report upon the proposed 
 construction of iron-clad vessels, and the support which he gave to Ericsson s inven 
 
188 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Notwithstanding the manifest hazards of an untried experi 
 ment, involving so large an amount as the construction of a 
 Monitor, men were found who had the sagacity to perceive the 
 excellences of the plan of Ericsson, and who had the courage 
 and patriotism to take all the risks which the enterprise re 
 quired. The names of such men should be handed down in 
 history equally with those who fought our battles, or those who 
 distinguished themselves as statesmen and legislators. 
 
 The genius that conceived the Monitor, and the patriotic 
 manufacturers who perilled reputation and money in her con 
 struction, were as truly among the heroes and saviors of the 
 country as the President and his Cabinet, or our legislators, or 
 the generals at the head of our armies, or our naval officers on 
 their victorious ships. 
 
 Such men were those who associated themselves for the pur 
 pose of building and bringing out the Monitor. These men 
 were, the Hon. John A. Griswold, of Troy, K Y. ; C. S. Bush- 
 nell, of New Haven, who first brought Ericsson s drawing to 
 the notice of the Secretary of the Navy, and who, being also 
 the contractor for the building of the Galena, was willing to 
 take the additional risk of the Monitor. "With these two was 
 associated John F. "Winslow. 
 
 Conspicuous among these as the man whose capital, general 
 influence, and business resources were relied upon to carry out 
 the enterprise was John A. Griswold, whose extensive iron 
 mills and acquaintance with manufacturers enabled him to push 
 forward the work, so that the Monitor was not too late in reach 
 ing the scene of her trial and her triumph. As Mr. Griswold 
 
 tion have already been mentioned. The New Ironsides, however, was Admiral Smith s 
 favorite ship ; and he was in favor of constructing other casemated broadside vessels. 
 At his suggestion the original dimensions and form of the New Ironsides were some 
 what changed, so as to lessen her draught to enable her to enter the Southern har 
 bors. This ship was undoubtedly one of the finest broadside frigates in the world, 
 and reflects great credit on the good judgment of Admiral Smith. 
 
 He made several suggestions to Mr. Webb in the construction of the Dunderberg, 
 some of which were adopted. 
 
 He was entirely opposed to ignoring wood in the construction of iron vessels ; 
 and neither approved nor recommended the building of the iron vessels Dictator and 
 Puritan. The man who was a friend of the Monitor and New Ironsides deserves to 
 be remembered. 
 
ved iy 
 
^ 
 
 UNIVERSITY ) 
 
 \ OF / 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 189 
 
 occupies a prominent position before the country, as one of her 
 leading and trusted public men, in addition to his connection 
 with the Monitor, it may be well that the friends of the Navy 
 should know something of his history.* 
 
 Such were the circumstances in which the Monitor took her 
 place in the American Navy. 
 
 Ericsson was the undisputed inventor of the new battery. 
 He had conceived the idea several years before the war. C. S. 
 
 * JOHN A. GRISWOLD was born at Nassau, Rensselaer County, New York. His 
 ancestors were among those who fought in the war of the Eevolution, and one of 
 them was confined in the Jersey prison-ship, suffering as well as fighting for his 
 country. He was educated for commercial pursuits ; and when about seventeen 
 years of age he entered the iron and hardware house of Hart, Seeley & Warren, in 
 Troy, New York. About one year after, he accepted the position of book-keeper in 
 the house of C. H. & I. J. Merrick, cotton manufacturers. With this firm he remained 
 for some time, living in the family of his uncle, Major-General J. E. Wool. Soon 
 after engaging in businesss for himself, he became interested in the iron manufacture, 
 and that and banking have formed his principal occupations. He entered political 
 life as a member of the Democratic party, and in 1855 was elected Mayor of the city 
 of Troy. His Democracy, however, never led him into opposition to the Government, 
 and upon the breaking out of the rebellion he at once placed himself firmly on 
 the side of the country. He presided at a public meeting in Troy, on the 15th of 
 April, and urged a speedy response to the demands of the Government. The Second 
 regiment of New York volunteers was largely aided by him in preparing for the 
 field. His assistance was also liberally given to several other regiments, one of which 
 was known as the Griswold Light Cavalry. 
 
 Soon after, in connection with C. S. Bushnell, of New Haven, and John F. Wins- 
 low, the contract for building the Monitor was entered into, the model having been 
 shown to Mr. Lincoln, who expressed much interest in the matter. The building of 
 the Monitor was begun in October, 1861, the contractors advancing for the work 
 $275,000. On the 30th of January, 1862, one hundred days from her commence 
 ment, she was launched at Greenpoint. Thus Mr. Griswold and his associates were 
 instrumental in saving the reputation of the Government at a very critical hour, and 
 such men deserve to be gratefully remembered as public benefactors. 
 
 Subsequently Mr. Griswold employed his capital and influence in the construction 
 of the Dictator ; and when the Navy Department was attacked in the Senate by Mr. 
 Hale, and in the House by Mr. Davis, he made a very effective speech in defence of 
 its policy, and especially in the construction of the Monitors. As a politician Mr. 
 Griswold has enjoyed in a high degree the confidence of the Union party. Elected 
 for three successive terms to Congress, and in the very period when the country was 
 passing through its severest trials, he proved himself true to the great principles on 
 which the war was fought ; and was, in consequence of his faithfulness and high- 
 toned patriotism reflected for the Fortieth Congress by the largest majority ever 
 given for a candidate in his district. Not only by his construction of the Monitors, 
 but by long service as an efficient member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, he 
 identified himself with the interests of the Navy. 
 
190 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Bushnell, by permission of Ericsson, brought it to the notice of 
 the Secretary of the Navy while at Hartford. Mr. Welles was 
 pleased with it, and referred it to the board which had been 
 appointed by Congress to investigate the subject of iron-clad 
 vessels. It met, at first, with little support, except from 
 Admiral Smith. Early in the discussion, the plan was ap 
 proved by the Assistant Secretary, Captain Fox, who has since 
 so fully identified himself with the Monitor fleet. The rapid 
 construction of the Monitor, so that she was ready to meet 
 the Merrimack, was mainly due to the capital, the energy, and 
 patriotism of John A. Griswold, and his partners, Bushnell and 
 "Winslow. 
 
 The iron- clad navy was first discussed and designed in ref 
 erence to the retaking the forts and harbors of the South ; but 
 the known progress which the rebels were making with their 
 frigate at Norfolk made it necessary to devise the means of 
 meeting that meditated attack ; and it may therefore be said 
 that the first Monitor was extemporized for the purpose of stop 
 ping the Merrimack ; and all criticism and all censure are com 
 pletely answered by the one fact that she did completely the 
 very work for which she was mainly designed. 
 
 It has been said she was not a sea-boat, yet she encountered 
 rough weather on her passage to Hampton Roads, and went 
 through safely. It was said she was so slow, yet she was there 
 in time to save the Minnesota and the country s honor. But 
 she had that awkward overhang : yes, but in. spite of that, she 
 repulsed the rebel frigate and saved the Navy and our cities. 
 Yet the men were all shut up below water : yes, and they all 
 came out alive after a four hours fight with the most formida 
 ble vessel then afloat, except her small antagonist. 
 
 The following is a brief description of the original Monitor : 
 
 Extreme length on deck over the armor 173 feet. 
 
 Extreme beam on deck over the armor 41 6 inches. 
 
 Depth 12 
 
 Length of iron hull 127 
 
 Width of iron hull 36 2 inches. 
 
 Projection of armor-shelf forward 14 
 
 Projection of armor-shelf aft 32 . 
 
 The thickness of the side armor was five inches above the 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITOES. 191 
 
 water-line, diminishing, first to four inches, and then to three 
 inches, below the water. The whole armor above the water 
 was two feet three inches of wood, and five inches of iron. 
 The turret was made of eight thicknesses of one-inch iron 
 plates. Its inside diameter was twenty feet, and its height nine 
 feet. Her armament was two 11-inch guns laid side by side, 
 and they revolved with the turret. 
 
 Such was the diminutive aifair which repulsed and drove 
 back to harbor a first-class iron-clad broadside frigate. Her 
 success was manifestly due to her peculiar structure, the invul 
 nerable turret which shielded her guns and her crew, the great 
 weight of her shot, and the extremely small surface (little more 
 than her turret) which was exposed to the enemy s fire. She 
 was slow ; but the Monitors lately constructed are fast. She 
 had many defects, inseparable from the hasty carrying out a 
 new idea. But, notwithstanding her faults, she settled the 
 value of the principle of her construction ; and the Government 
 at once determined to build nine more according to the general 
 plan, with such changes as experience had suggested. The nine 
 vessels of this new Monitor fleet were modelled alike, and their 
 dimensions were as follows : 
 
 Length on deck 200 feet. 
 
 Width on deck 45 " 
 
 Depth 12 " 
 
 Length of hull proper 159 u 
 
 Width of hull proper 37 " 8 inches. 
 
 Overhang of armor-shelf forward , 16 " 
 
 Overhang of armor-shelf aft 25 " 
 
 Tonnage 844 tons. 
 
 Draught of water 10 feet. 
 
 It will be seen by these dimensions that there was, even so 
 early, a tendency to diminish the overhang in proportion to the 
 size of the vessel, and this idea has been acted upon in vessels 
 lately constructed. The side armor of these vessels is five one- 
 inch plates ; the wood backing three feet three inches ; and 
 the deck is plated with two thicknesses of half-inch iron. The 
 turret is eleven inches thick, made of eleven one-inch plates. 
 It is nine feet high y and the inside diameter is twenty feet. 
 The armament was originally intended to be two 15-inch guns ; 
 but this varies, some carrying one 15-inch and one 11-inch gun, 
 
192 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 and others one 15-inch smooth-bore and one Parrott rifle, a 150- 
 pounder or a 200-pounder. These are the ships that were 
 engaged at Charleston. 
 
 The so-called light-draught Monitors need not be particu 
 larly described, as they were failures. They were intended for 
 operations against Fort Fisher, and for service on the Southern 
 rivers ; but from an error in calculation, instead of floating at 
 the proper height, they were, when launched, BO low in the 
 water as to be unserviceable without a change in plan. Great 
 complaints were made against the Department on account of 
 these vessels. The mistake was one which could not be fore 
 seen ; and the only fault was, that somebody did not make it 
 certain that the calculations were in proper hands, and also un 
 der proper supervision. The error has nothing whatever to do 
 with the principle of Monitor construction. 
 
 The next class of Monitors ordered consisted of vessels of 
 one thousand tons burden. They are about 225 feet long ; the 
 overhang is less, and sponsons extend from its outer edge to the 
 hull, and this increases their speed and their safety as sea-boats. 
 Their turrets are composed of eleven one-inch plates, and their 
 side armor is so constructed as to be practically equal to eleven 
 inches of solid iron, besides the wooden backing. These are 
 more formidable vessels than any that preceded them, and it 
 is easy to see that they are absolutely invulnerable to any artil 
 lery that has yet been mounted on board a ship, except in our 
 own Navy ; and that no broadside ship now afloat could main 
 tain a close action with one of these with the slightest prospect 
 of success, unless it were possible for the large ship to run the 
 small one down, a thing which the Merrimack was by no means 
 able to do in her battle in Hampton Roads. 
 
 The next effort of the Government was to construct some 
 swift ocean cruisers on the Monitor plan, and the Puritan and 
 the Dictator were begun. The Puritan is a double-turreted 
 ship, while the Dictator has but one turret, and is some twenty 
 feet shorter than the Puritan, and the armament of this latter 
 ship is by far the more formidable one. In other respects they 
 are so similar, that the following description of the Dictator 
 will answer very well for both. It was published originally 
 in the New York Tribune, and has been revised by Mr. 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 193 
 
 Ericsson himself. Some comments of the editor are also 
 included, as forming a part of the history of the opinions of 
 the day : 
 
 It having been frequently stated that the Dictator is an ocean iron 
 clad, the impression prevails that she resembles the New Ironsides and 
 other vessels built for the purpose of going to sea. This is not so. The 
 Dictator has none of the paraphernalia of such ocean-vessels as we are 
 in the habit of looking at in our harbors. She has none of the tall bul 
 warks, no masts, no rigging, no capstan on deck nothing, in fact, that, 
 looks like an ordinary ship. A long-armed man could dip his hands 
 into the water from her deck. 
 
 The dimensions of the hull of the vessel are as follows : Extreme 
 length over all, 314 feet. The aft overhang being thirty-one feet, and 
 forward overhang thirteen, it leaves 270 feet between perpendiculars- 
 extreme breadth fifty, and depth twenty-two and a half feet. Like the 
 original Monitor, and the Monitors that are now in course of con 
 struction, the Dictator is almost exclusively iron her frames, keelsons, 
 and plating being of that metal. A person looking at her in the river 
 can form no idea of her appearance when she is completely out of the 
 water. If an ordinary ship were lifted up, and an immense shelf of 
 eleven inches of iron placed on the top of her deck, overhanging for a 
 space of some four feet on each side, she would resemble the Dictator. 
 Taking into account the curvature of the sea, the Dictator could not be 
 seen four miles off. 
 
 The armor of the original Monitor consisted of five inches of iron, 
 laid on in single plates, each one inch thick. That of the Warrior con 
 sisted of four and a half inches of iron, laid on in a solid slab like our 
 own iron-clad frigate Roanoke. The French frigate La Gloire had also 
 four and a half inches of iron laid on in a solid slab. Now, the Dicta 
 tor has on her sides eleven inches of iron, and five inches of this is in 
 solid beams, somewhat like the Warrior, the La Gloire, and the Roa 
 noke, except that the plates of the latter were in very large slabs, while 
 those of the Dictator are in beams five by eight inches. Over these 
 5-inch blocks of iron are six 1-inch plates of iron ; making alto 
 gether an armor of eleven inches of iron, the same dimensions as the 
 armor of a turret of the Passaic, Montauk, etc. The armor begins at 
 the deck and goes down six feet, which takes it about four feet below 
 the water ; so that the deck of the ocean iron-clad Dictator will only be 
 about two feet over water. Below this armor there are sixteen feet of 
 the ship, composed of plating 13-16ths of an inch thick. The weight of 
 13 
 
194 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the armor is about five hundred tons the burden of a pretty large-sized 
 steamer. There will be but one turret, of an improved pattern. It was 
 originally intended to cover it with twenty-four inches of iron, but the 
 perfection to which its construction has now been brought will render 
 fifteen inches sufficient. This is four inches more than the armor of the 
 Passaic class of turret, and ten inches more than the armored sides of 
 those vessels. The apparatus for working the guns will be more perfect 
 than any yet earned out. The revolution in naval artillery, caused by 
 the facility with which four or five men can work the 15-inch gun, will 
 be made still more startling when one or two men can handle such im 
 mense pieces of ordnance. The gear of the turret is different from that 
 of the other vessels only in point of size. The turret complete will 
 weigh almost five hundred tons, or thereabouts, being almost as heavy 
 as the entire armor of the vessel. 
 
 The ram is perhaps the finest piece of work aboard the ship. The 
 ram proper is twenty-two feet of solid oak and iron ; unlike the Keokuk, 
 which protruded from the bottom of the hull near the keel, this extends 
 from the top of the deck, being, as it were, an extension of the entire 
 armor of the ship. Another advantage in this ram is, that it could be 
 carried away without any material damage or injury to the vessel, and 
 without her making water. 
 
 The decks are perfectly clear of all incumbrances except the turret. 
 The same objection made to the other Monitors, relative to their liabil 
 ity to be injured by plunging shot from forts, is valid in the Dictator s 
 case ; but it is only just to say, that, of the iron-clad vessels engaged in 
 the attack on Charleston, none has suffered any serious inconvenience 
 from injuries done to the deck. It seems almost impossible, and has 
 proved so, that a projectile fired from a ship could enter the deck. The 
 armor of the deck consists of one and a half inches of iron, laid on in 
 two plates, in the same manner as in the other vessels. 
 
 The berth-deck that on which the crew and officers are to live is 
 a very commodious one, the head-room being equal to that of any first- 
 class sailing frigate in the Navy. A man six feet high, with his hat on, 
 can walk, without stooping, from end to end of it. 
 
 The ship is ventilated by three immense blowers ; two for the use of 
 the vessel generally, and one for the express purpose of ventilating the 
 engine-room. These blowers are of immense size, about seventy-two 
 inches by forty-eight inches. An air-trunk, supplying a blower eight 
 feet in diameter, is placed thirty-five feet from the stern. The air to 
 supply the other blowers is drawn from the top of the turret and dis 
 tributed through the ship. 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 195 
 
 The machinery of the Dictator is of greater power than that of any 
 man-of-war built in this country or in Europe. The cylinders are one 
 hundred inches in diameter. Cylinders of these dimensions have never 
 been built in this city, except for side-wheel steamboats. The cylinders 
 are bolted to massive wrought-iron keelsons, ten feet deep, and some 
 twenty-four inches in width. They are both in line, athwart ships, and 
 have large slide and expansive valves, the latter working over the for 
 mer. A peculiar feature of the machinery is the absence of guides, 
 cross-heads, and other cumbrous parts. The piston, four feet stroke, 
 has a trunk attached to it. The boilers are immense, six in number, 
 and have fifty-six furnaces, and an aggregate grate-surface of 1,100 feet; 
 allowing twelve pounds of coal per square foot of grate-surface, the ves 
 sel will require at least one hundred and forty tons of coal per day of 
 twenty-four hours steaming at full speed, which will never be requisite 
 excepting when chasing an enemy. The weight of these boilers will be 
 almost seventy tons each, that is, four hundred and twenty tons alto 
 gether, without water; so that when they are completed they will weigh 
 over seven hundred tons. The propeller shaft is a gigantic piece of 
 forge-work ; it weighs something like thirty-six tons, the burden of an 
 average sloop. The propeller is a right-handed true-screw, twenty-one 
 and a half feet in diameter; has thirty-four feet pitch, and weighs 
 39,000 pounds. There is no outboard bearing for the shaft. What 
 piston-speed will be obtained from the engines remains to be seen. The 
 propeller cannot be injured by any projectile, as a shot would have 
 to pass through twenty-six feet of water to strike it. The engines are 
 calculated to be something in the neighborhood of 5,000 horse-power. 
 
 One of the greatest difficulties in the way of making the iron-clads 
 permanently useful was that of protecting the bottoms from the filth 
 which concentrated there and prevented them from moving. The ori 
 ginal Monitor had to be towed from Fortress Monroe to Washington, 
 on account of her bottom being so foul. The English frigate Warrior 
 also experienced a similar inconvenience. All sorts of paints have been 
 tried, and all with want of success. The most popular was a sort of 
 English "peacock" paint, which was used in some of the mail-steamers; 
 but it did very little good. On the bottom of the Dictator, however, and 
 on all of our iron-clads to be built henceforward, and most of the naval- 
 built vessels, a successful remedy has been devised, which will keep the 
 bottoms perfectly clear of all filth. It is called " ship-zinc" paint, and 
 is perfectly white in color. Some thirty years since a vessel was coated 
 with it in England ; she arrived here a few weeks ago, and her bottom 
 was found in perfect order. The Government has responsible parties 
 
196 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 furnishing the paint, and its purity can be relied on. It is confidently 
 expected that a vessel so complete, with eleven inches of armor and 
 such a heavy battery, will prove herself the Dictator of the ocean. 
 
 Captain Tyler, of the Royal Engineers, in a lecture before the 
 United Service Institution, January 18th, delighted his hearers by as 
 suring them that " the turrets of the Monitors and their port-stoppers 
 were effective principally in preventing the guns from being worked." 
 He further stated that the report of Secretary Welles " confirmed the 
 worst estimate that we (the English) had formed of them." The un 
 prejudiced lecturer further told his hearers that the only Federal vessel 
 that had ventured within YOO yards of Fort Sumter, the Keokuk, had 
 to be withdrawn in a sinking condition, and afterward sunk. " The 
 11-inch guns proved too much for the 11-inch turrets of the Mon 
 itors," added the lecturer, leaving his hearers to infer that the Keokuk 
 was a Monitor whose turret and hull had been riddled by Confederate 
 balls. Our readers will bear in mind that this statement was made on 
 the 18th of January, 1864, on an occasion of more than ordinary grav 
 ity, the subject under consideration being the great national question of 
 harbor defence and the fortifications at Spithead. Captain Tyler pro 
 duced charts showing that there were three distinct channels, varying 
 from 1,000 to 3,000 yards in width, open to an enemy s vessels, and 
 which channels he said could not be obstructed ; yet, as the Keokuk 
 had been sunk at a distance of 700 yards, these channels could not be 
 entered by our iron-clads. 
 
 We will not attempt to dispel Captain Tyler s delusion, nor question 
 the soundness of his argument in proof of England s security. Our ob 
 ject is simply to point out that he has grossly misrepresented our naval 
 achievements. The fact is, the Eoyal Engineers have been forced to 
 admit the impregnability of our turrets and port-stoppers hence their 
 annoyance. The brevity of the action with the Confederate iron-clad 
 Atlanta has shown that the " cheese-box on a raft " is something more 
 than a mere Yankee notion. The English artillerists are surprised to 
 find that while they require twenty men to handle a 10-inch gun on 
 land, our enormous pieces of 15-inch calibre are handled on board of 
 the Monitors with half a dozen hands a single man only being required 
 to point these guns. But more surprising still, the turrets and the 
 port-stoppers offer absolute protection to guns and gunners. 
 
 The lecturer of the 18th of January knew that the Monitors had 
 been repeatedly engaged with the Confederate batteries at short ranges, 
 since the first conflict at Charleston, and he well knew, at the time 
 when he addressed his audience, that upward of 2,000 shot had hit the 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITOES. 197 
 
 Monitor fleet. The Patapsco, it was well known at the time, had been 
 in twenty-eight engagements, yet nothing had been destroyed within 
 her turret, and not the slightest derangement caused to her machinery. 
 These stubborn facts Captain Tyler cannot grapple with, and therefore 
 tells his hearers what happened during the first brief trial of the new 
 system, under fire at Charleston, in April, 1863. A port-stopper which 
 had been placed too near the turret in one of the vessels, stuck. The 
 application of hammer and chisel for half an hour removed the diffi 
 cult} 7 . Not a single accident of the kind occurred during the whole 
 siege, not a pound of Confederate metal entered through plates or 
 port-stoppers ; and yet an officer in her Majesty s service, before an 
 audience composed of distinguished persons, ventures to state that ". the 
 turrets of the Monitors, and their port-stoppers, were effective princi 
 pally in preventing the guns from being worked," and that the Con 
 federate guns "proved too much for the 11-inch plates which composed 
 the turrets of the Monitors." 
 
 We forbear comment, but advise the English people not to be lulled 
 into security by assurances based on professional conceit and ignorance. 
 Their neighbors over the Channel have fully proved that iron-clads, 
 of the European type, are unfit to fight at sea, and that notwithstanding 
 M. Xavier Raymond s splendid account of their success, written to order 
 for the Revue des Deux Mondes, just published, something better must be 
 contrived. Accordingly, the Emperor of the French, through his 
 agents, is taking a very careful look into our turrets. England will do 
 well to do the same ; for with a single opponent at Cherbourg, such as 
 our large turret vessels, with their 15-inch thick iron protection to their 
 enormous guns, and 10|~inch side armor, backed by four feet of oak, 
 the Warriors, Black Princes, and Prince Consorts could not hold the 
 Channel for a single day. The experiments at the Washington Navy- 
 Yard established the fact long ago, that the 4J inch plating of the Eu 
 ropean iron-clads with its thin wood backing, affords no protection 
 against the enormous weight of ordnance which is part of the Monitor 
 system. The result of the recent trials of armor-plate instituted by the 
 Navy Department, which we alluded to a few days ago, will amaze our 
 Transatlantic rivals. The news of the fate of the famous 6-inch solid 
 armor-plates, considered by the French as impregnable, wall be most 
 unwelcome. The utter demolition of Messrs. Petin and Gaudit s 6-inch 
 plate at the first shot from a 15-inch gun at Washington Navy-Yard, 
 on the 10th of February, 1864, will form an epoch in the history of 
 iron-clads. The small-bore and high-velocity theory has received its 
 quietus by this last practical mode adopted by the Navy Department 
 
198 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 for settling the question. Much credit is due to the Assistant Secretary 
 of the Navy for his persistent course in adhering to the large smooth 
 bore principle, the successful application of which now enables us to 
 defy all European iron-clads. 
 
 It would appear that the great problem is nearer to solution than 
 has been supposed. We have guns that can tear to fragments 6-inch 
 solid armor-plates at a single shot, and therefore fully adequate to crush 
 in the sides of any European iron-clad. We operate these guns within 
 impregnable iron cylinders 15-inches thick, which at the will of the 
 gunner turn to any point of the compass. These cylinders again we 
 place on vessels, which, while they present a very small target to the 
 enemy s fire, are protected by 10-inch side armor, backed by timber 
 from three to four feet in thickness. In regard to speed, those who are 
 best informed expect that our large turret-ships will be very fast. We 
 abstain from all speculation on this point, since the Dictator will be un 
 der steam by the end of April. It will be proper to add, that our rivals 
 have frequently asserted that our small Monitor vessels would be useless 
 for defensive purposes, notwithstanding their heavy and well-protected 
 guns. They have boasted of their superior speed, and told us that their 
 Warriors would run down the small Monitors, pass our forts, and come 
 up to our wharves. 
 
 It has just occurred to them that their armored ships draw twenty- 
 five feet water, while the Monitors only draw ten and a half feet ; and 
 that the gunner in a Monitor turret, safe on the shoals along the main 
 channels, can unmolested and at short range put his 15-inch shot 
 through the insufficient armor of the intruder. 
 
 In the Dunderberg the Government has undertaken to com 
 bine some of the advantages of a tnrreted ship with a broadside 
 vessel. A description of this novel ship, as she was before launch 
 ing, is copied from the Scientific American for March 14, 1863 : 
 
 The formidable ram-frigate Dunderberg, now building for the Gov 
 ernment by W. H. Webb, at his yard at the foot of Sixth Street, in 
 this city, is in a very forward state, and being completed as fast as pos 
 sible. We lately visited this vessel, and are able to furnish a few de 
 tails of her construction, which we think will prove acceptable to our 
 readers. 
 
 The hull of the Dunderberg is massive, being solid from stem to 
 stern. It is 378 feet long, 68 feet wide, and 32 feet deep. The frames 
 are twelve inches thick, and are built of oak, firmly bolted and fastened 
 together. 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 199 
 
 The model of the ship is very peculiar. The floor is dead flat for 
 the whole length, and the sides rise from it at an angle everywhere savft 
 forward, where they are very nearly vertical. The bow is as sharp and 
 has as fine lines as it is possible to give it ; and the stern and run aft 
 are very clean and handsomely modelled. The hull is divided by sev 
 eral water-tight compartments, both longitudinally and transversely n, 
 precaution common to nearly all modern sea-going ships, which has 
 been found indispensable. The frames are strapped diagonally with 
 heavy irons, five inches wide by seven-eighths of an inch thick, blunt 
 bolted to them. There is a slight sheer on deck, but it is almost in 
 visible to the casual observer at a short distance. There is but one 
 rudder : provision is made, however, for steering by an auxiliary appa 
 ratus of a peculiar nature, should the main steering-gear be shot away. 
 The frame-timbers, twelve inches thick, are ceiled inside five inches 
 thick, planked outside five inches thick, and over the planking two 
 courses of heavy oak beams, twelve inches thick, are again laid, making 
 in all an aggregate amount of nearly five feet of solid timber on the 
 ram s sides. The planking is all caulked, and the seams payed, before 
 the last protection is applied, and the entire mass is as firmly bolted to 
 gether as it is possible to do it 
 
 The ram on the Dunderberg is about as formidable a looking object 
 as one can conceive. The entire forefoot of the vessel is prolonged 
 thirty feet from the hull proper, and, rising easily upward from the keel 
 about half the distance from the water-line, is there rounded, presenting 
 a blunt end in shape like the profile of an axe-edge ; it then runs back 
 toward the stem again. The mass of wood which forms this rain pro 
 jects inside the hull almost as far as it does outboard, and is there sub 
 stantially secured to the main timbers. The sides and edge of the ram 
 will be iron-plated ; and even should the whole of it be knocked oft* in 
 an affray, the builders say that the hull will be water-tight. 
 
 The Dunderberg has, on top of the main-deck, casemated quarters 
 for the guns and crew. This casemate slopes at an acute angle from 
 the sides to the top. It takes up a large portion of the vessel amid 
 ships, and is an elongated octagon in shape. It is made of heavy tim 
 ber, plated with iron four and a half inches thick. It is pierced on each 
 side for three broadside guns, and has one port forward and another aft, 
 in the casemate, for bow and stern firing. The hull of the ship is built 
 out from a distance below the water-line to meet the edge of the case 
 mate above, so that the broadside of the Dunderberg will present an 
 acute angle to the line of the enemy s fire. We do not know what the 
 inclination of the casemate and side is, but it cannot be less than 45. 
 
200 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 The mass of wood and iron presenting a resistance to the enemy s rams 
 or projectiles at this point amounts in all to seven feet. There are to 
 be two turrets on the top of this casemate. The thickness of the turret- 
 walls will be much greater than those of the Monitor batteries, and 
 strong enough to resist the heaviest ordnance. 
 
 The armament of the Dunderberg has been variously guessed at by 
 parties. As it is not publicly known what it will be, we are not able to 
 inform our readers, further than that rumor assigns the 20-inch guns 
 to the broadside, while each turret will also contain two heavy guns. 
 The deck of the casemate, and also the main-deck, will be plated bomb 
 proof ; and the quarters for the officers and crew, being in the fortress 
 on deck, will be thoroughly ventilated and open to the light and air : 
 there will then be none of that depressing influence which is so marked 
 in the departments assigned to the crews on the other batteries. 
 
 One great and overwhelming advantage that this splendid vessel 
 has, is that she is built of wood. She may leak, become water-logged, 
 roll, pitch, and toss, but there will still be some hope for the crew as 
 long as they stick to her. Iron batteries fill and plunge out of sight 
 with very little warning. The efiect of this fact upon sailors morally is 
 not the least important one. Although no men could have behaved 
 better than the crew of the Monitor did in their peril, yet they all felt 
 that their case was hopeless ; and if they were saved, it would be more 
 the result of good fortune than any aid which their ship could afford 
 them. The Dunderberg will draw about twenty feet of water. Her 
 speed is not stated. Her engines are estimated at 6,000 horse-power. 
 We are not able at present to give particulars of them. 
 
 The next class of Monitors planned by the Department is 
 represented by the Monadnock and Miantonomoh. The inten 
 tion was to produce a double-turreted ocean cruiser. These 
 ships are of the usual Monitor type in general, but without the 
 side projection or overhang of the armor, by which omission it 
 was expected that the speed of the vessel would be increased. 
 In this there has been no disappointment. 
 
 These Monitors have a speed of eleven knots, and therefore 
 rank among the fastest war-ships afloat. Doubtless there are 
 some swifter ships than these in the French and English Navies, 
 and we have faster wooden vessels ; but it must be remembered, 
 that ships that are reported to make fourteen or sixteen knots 
 on their trial trip, and in smooth water, fall very much below 
 


THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 201 
 
 this at sea ; and an iron-clad making eleven knots at sea, as 
 these Monitors have done, deserves the name of fast. 
 
 They are two hundred and fifty-seven (257) feet long, with 
 two turrets of the usual size. The side armor is equal to eleven 
 inches of solid iron, besides the wood backing, and the turrets 
 are twelve inches thick. The armament is four 15-inch guns, 
 and consequently the weight of a broadside of solid shot is 
 eighteen hundred (1,800) pounds. 
 
 These Monitors, as has been said, float about two feet out of 
 the water, and the size of the target which they present to an 
 enemy s fire has been shown already. No one can visit one of 
 these wonderful vessels without feeling that art and skill have 
 overcome every x serious objection which has been made against 
 the Monitor form. The writer has visited the Miantonomoh in 
 weather when ventilation was needed ; and found the air fresh 
 and pure throughout the ship, though lying at anchor; and 
 again in the cold, damp days of winter, and then there was no 
 sense of dampness or chill in any part of the vessel. The per 
 fection of the machinery, the beautiful adaptation of new ma 
 chinery to meet the new wants of such a novel war-ship, are 
 worthy of all admiration. A sense of almost perfect security 
 against shot, and the consciousness of wielding a power that 
 nothing yet invented can resist, produce that frame of mind in 
 which men can do their utmost. Such a sense of security, and 
 confidence in weapons, is an almost certain guaranty of success 
 in a combat where in other respects the parties are equal. 
 
 In addition to these, the Department had nearly completed, 
 at the close of the rebellion, a still more formidable class of 
 Monitors. Excepting, perhaps, only the Puritan, they surpass 
 in defensive and offensive power any vessels which have yet 
 been constructed, whether here or in Europe. 
 
 The dimensions of this class, of which the Kalamazoo is a 
 representative, are as follows : 
 
 Length 342 feet. 
 
 Breadth 66 " 8 inches. 
 
 Depth on the side 21 " 6 " 
 
 Outside iron plating 6 inches. ) 
 
 Thickness of iron stringers 8 j" 14 inches of iron. 
 
 Whole thickness of wooden backing. 30 inches. 
 
 Whole thickness of side, wood and iron 3 feet 8 " 
 
202 HISTOBT OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 THICKNESS OF DECK. 
 
 Wood deck-plank 6 inches. 
 
 Iron plating 3 " 
 
 Wood on top of plating 3 " 
 
 Whole thickness 12 inches. 
 
 Below this twelve inches of wood and iron are the heavy 
 transverse beams which support the deck, and between these 
 timbers large iron braces, so that practically, the deck, as before 
 stated in regard to the Miantonomoh, is solid to the water-line, 
 or nearly so, and therefore the whole width of the deck is the 
 actual backing of the side armor. The turrets of these Moni 
 tors are fifteen inches thick, and are constructed upon a new prin 
 ciple, which it is supposed will greatly increase their power of 
 resistance. The outer circle of the turret is composed of five one- 
 inch plates. The inner circle is also formed of five one-inch 
 plates, while the space between these, of five inches, is filled in 
 with solid iron rings or bands, five inches thick, of solid iron. 
 These vessels are thirty-two hundred tons burden. 
 
 Nothing, perhaps, will show more impressively the firm con 
 victions upon which the Department has acted in the construc 
 tion of the Monitors, than the statement made by one high in 
 office, who has a reputation at stake, and who knows, as well as 
 any man can, the merits of this national question. He said he 
 was quite willing to have the American Navy subjected to the 
 following test : He would anchor one of these new Monitors, and 
 around her, at a distance of fifteen hundred yards, should be 
 anchored as many of the broadside iron-clads of France and 
 England as they might choose to place there, more or less, with 
 their present armament, and each of these ships should be per 
 mitted to fire one broadside at the Monitor; then, if at the close 
 of this the Monitor should be disabled, or unable to return fire, 
 America should be considered beaten. But if not, then the 
 Monitor should fire her guns, once at each ship ; and the contest 
 for superiority in ships and guns should be decided by the -result. 
 
 It is very easy to throw ridicule upon such a proposition as 
 vain and empty boasting ; but the result of such a trial is as 
 easy to be calculated beforehand as the effect of known physi 
 cal laws. What effect would any ordnance yet mounted on 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITOES. 203 
 
 shipboard by France and England have on fourteen inches of 
 solid iron in side armor, or fifteen inches in the turret at a dis 
 tance of fifteen hundred yards ? How often would the best gun 
 ners strike the narrow strip of hull above the water ? and how 
 often the centre of the turret ? for a shot aside from the centre 
 would glance aside. And should the shot strike, what harm 
 would be done ? None whatever, or, at most, a damage not 
 essential. But the Monitor can return that fire with 15-inch 
 smooth bores, or with 12-inch rifles ; and it requires no long 
 thought to determine the effect of such projectiles upon any 
 broadside iron-clads which are yet afloat. Nothing could more 
 completely show the superiority of the American Navy than 
 such an experiment as this. 
 
 This superiority may or may not be temporary. No man 
 will pretend to set bounds to the inventive genius of the nations. 
 England, France, all Europe indeed, are intent upon new dis 
 coveries in the art of slaughter and defence ; and no man can 
 foresee what new forms the science of war may next assume. 
 Something as far removed from our present thought as was a 
 Monitor from the thought of the past, may be produced here or 
 elsewhere. All that is now claimed is, that when the war 
 closed the American Navy was the most formidable one in the 
 world, and that for the future we may safely rely upon the ge 
 nius and skill of our countrymen, if the Government will only 
 give them suitable means wherewith to work. It will be all in 
 vain that we have inventive power or skilful mechanics, if we 
 have no suitable navy-yards, or docks, or machinery with which 
 ships can be built or repaired, while our enemies are abun 
 dantly provided with all that anxious thought can suggest or 
 the wealth of nations supply. 
 
 As a proper addition to the arguments and statements al 
 ready made, the following opinions of eminent men in regard 
 to the Monitors and iron-clads in general are presented here : 
 
 EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO B. F. WADE, 
 CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 
 
 The necessity of light-draught iron-clads to operate in the bays, 
 sounds, and rivers, as well as for defensive purposes, was forced upon the 
 Department at an early period of the present struggle. Not only was 
 
204: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the contest in Avhich we were engaged peculiar, but the means and meas 
 ures to meet and suppress it, particularly those of the Navy, were novel 
 and without precedent. Most of the lines of army communication were 
 by water, and the . Navy was expected to protect them and render 
 them secure. A brief experience and a few engagements made it evi 
 dent that light-draught, unprotected, wooden boats, with magazines, ma 
 chinery, and boilers exposed, could be driven off by field artillery behind 
 earthworks. Light-draught iron-clads became, therefore, an imperious 
 necessity, and the convictions of the Department, and of all indeed who 
 gave the subject intelligent consideration, w r ere irresistibly in favor of 
 such vessels ; but we were without models, and the wants of the country 
 w T ere pressing. Neither of the maritime powers of Europe had built, or 
 attempted to build, a light-draught iron-clad. 
 
 The Navy Department, in this emergency, was compelled to feel its 
 way, without experience or precedent in any quarter to guide it. Ap 
 peals had been made in vain to Congress to provide a proper establish 
 ment for the construction of iron and armored vessels, where plans and 
 models might have been developed and matured with studied delibera 
 tion and skill. When the contracts for these vessels were entered into, 
 delays were inadmissible. Difficulties with foreign powers seemed im 
 minent, and in the absence of any national establishment immediate con 
 tracts for the construction of armored vessels were called for on every 
 hand. The authorities of the States and cities on the seaboard were 
 appealing to the Department and the Government for iron-clad vessels 
 to defend their harbors from the two or three rovers that were then al 
 ready abroad, and great apprehensions were entertained that certain for 
 midable ships in the process of construction in Frarice and England for 
 the rebels would soon visit our coast. Many who may now be forward 
 to criticise and censure the enlarged and energetic action that was taken, 
 were at that time profuse in censuring the Department for delays in not 
 more promptly providing whatever vessels were necessary for the service. 
 
 Congress having omitted to provide an establishment for the con 
 struction of an iron navy, where this class of armored vessels of light 
 draught could be constructed, the Department has been compelled to 
 rely on contractors and outside parties in different sections of the 
 country for the work. 
 
 The parties contracting have generally exerted themselves to meet 
 in good faith the requirements of the Government, and it is a subject of 
 just congratulation that, in this great emergency, when the Department 
 was compelled to act without precedents to guide it, and when the 
 Government had omitted to furnish a suitable establishment, private 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 205 
 
 enterprise and our skilled mechanics have so well met the difficulties 
 presented. 
 
 Mr. J. B. Eades, of St. Louis, furnished the light-draught river-boats 
 which have been so successful on the Mississippi and also in the bay of 
 Mobile. Captain Ericsson, the inventor of the Monitor class of vessels, 
 furnished the idea which is now near practical consummation. Although 
 as yet untried, these vessels differ so little from the original Monitor, that 
 there is every reason to anticipate their success. To predict otherwise 
 would be presumption ; yet it has been the misfortune of the Depart 
 ment to encounter hostility and forebodings of failure with every im 
 provement which has been made during the war, and often from those 
 of whom encouragement and support might reasonably have been 
 expected. Some of the best engineers and constructors in the service 
 of the Government, as well as others, expressed their want of confidence 
 in the first Monitor, and declared it would prove a failure. It was 
 represented that she could not float, that she would plunge to the bottom 
 when launched, and that to send her to Hampton Roads would be reck 
 lessness amounting to crime. A constant succession of struggles against 
 prejudices, ignorance, and fixed habits and opinions, has been the fate 
 of the Department at every step which the extraordinary exigencies of 
 this war have compelled it to take. While it is not difficult to criticise 
 and point out mistakes in a new description of vessels which the change 
 in naval warfare has suddenly called into existence, and to suggest altera 
 tions and improvements on what has already transpired, it is a satisfac 
 tion to the Department which was compelled to encounter this opposition 
 to know that this class of vessels, subjected at the beginning to ridicule, 
 and subsequently to obloquy and denunciation, has been successfully 
 tried in battle and in storm that these vessels have equalled the expec 
 tations of the country in periods of peril, and have been extensively 
 copied abroad. Other Governments are adopting them, while many of 
 the discontented of our own country still question the wisdom of build 
 ing vessels of the class which has at a critical moment rendered 
 unequalled service to the Union, and saved the capital of the nation. 
 
 In encouraging contrast with the illiberal and prejudiced opinions 
 which have opposed all improvements, denounced them in advance as fail 
 ures, and been dissatisfied even with successful results, are the observations 
 and reflections of the sagacious and sensible author of the recent valua 
 ble work on " English and French Neutrality," who, appreciating the 
 difficulties of the Department, remarks, at page 458 of his instructive 
 volume : 
 
 " It is no small proof of ability in the management of the Navy, that 
 
206 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 there was skill enough to provide, and independence enough to use, a 
 form of war-ship and a kind of cannon before untried, but which time 
 and experience have shown were alone of all ships and weapons then 
 known capable of meeting the emergency." 
 
 At the present time the call for light-draught iron-clads comes from 
 every squadron engaged in this struggle. Acting Rear-Admiral Lee 
 says that within the limits of his command there must be a large increase 
 of light-draught iron-clads. Vice-Admiral Farragut, before he left the 
 scene of his great exploits, asked for additional iron-clads, especially 
 those of lio-ht drauo-ht, and declared that the coast could not be held 
 
 O O 7 
 
 unless he had them. In each of the blockading and river squadrons 
 they are required. 
 
 Nearly two years have elapsed since any contracts have been entered 
 into for this class of vessels, and it is hoped the present war is so near 
 its close that no further expenditures for additional ones will be neces 
 sary ; but should the war continue a year longer, more will be wanted. 
 
 My acknowledgments are due to the committee for this opportunity 
 to express my views. I shall feel under obligations to them or others, 
 as will the whole country, for any improvements or suggestions which 
 they may propose in consequence of their investigations, or for any un 
 detected errors or mistakes which they may discover, in order that their 
 conclusions and recommendations in this great emergency may be 
 brought to the aid of the Department on this most interesting and im 
 portant subject. 
 
 REPOET OF EEAE-ADMIEAL J. A. DAIILGREN. 
 
 FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIA, ) 
 OFF MOEBIS ISLAND, January 28, 1864. f 
 
 SIR : Conformably to the wishes of the Department, I submit the 
 following review of the services of the Monitors while under my com 
 mand ; and as some knowledge of the circumstances under which they 
 have been tested may afford a better appreciation of their qualities, I 
 shall briefly narrate some of the leading events in which they have par 
 ticipated during the operations at this place. 
 
 On the 6th July Rear-Admiral Du Pont delivered to me the com 
 mand of the naval forces occupying the coast of South Carolina, 
 Georgia, and part of Florida ; they embraced seventy (70) vessels of all 
 classes, and were distributed at various points along an extent of more 
 than three hundred miles. There was no concentration, the purpose 
 being rather to distribute the vessels in order to enforce an efficient 
 blockade. 
 
THE DIFFEKENT CLASSES OF MONITOKS. 207 
 
 Of the iron-clads, the Ironsides was off Charleston bar, two Monitors 
 were at Edisto, one at Stono, three at Port Royal, and one at Ossabaw. 
 
 The orders of the Department (June 24, 1863) only directed me to 
 assume the command; they went no further, nor was there need that 
 they should. There was an enemy in front, and it was my duty to 
 compel him to obedience, so far as my means permitted. On the day 
 that I arrived, an interview occurred with General Gillmoro, in which 
 the details for a descent on Morris Island were arranged to commence 
 on the Wednesday following, but which were postponed first to Thurs 
 day and then to Friday, in order to allow General Gillmore to perfect 
 his arrangements. 
 
 - In the absence of specific instructions, I was obliged to assume the 
 responsibility of action which the Department was advised of. 
 
 The naval part of the operations consisted of 
 
 1. In assembling the iron-clads at the Charleston bar, so as to cross 
 at early daylight on the day named, to cover the attack of the troops, to 
 prevent the arrival of reinforcements during that attack, and to engage 
 the rebel batteries, particularly Fort Wagner. 
 
 2. To furnish a convoy for the column that was to ascend to Stono, 
 cover its landing, and shell James s Island. 
 
 3. To guard the depots of the army at Hilton Head and at Seabrook 
 during the withdrawal of the troops concentrated on Folly Island. 
 
 I should here state that Mr. Ericsson had decided to increase the 
 thicknesses of the pilot-houses of all the Monitors, and add heavy circles 
 of metal to the bases of the turrets and pilot-houses. 
 
 The three at Port Royal were already in hand for this purpose, and 
 some progress had been made. A part of my preparation consisted in 
 putting a stop to the work, and having the vessels fitted temporarily for 
 service. 
 
 This was effected in season, and before daylight of the 9th of July 
 the Monitors were off the bar, ready to pass in at the first sign of move 
 ment by the United States batteries on Folly Island. 
 
 The plan was to open from the masked batteries on the north end 
 of Folly Island, cross the bar with the Monitors, and enfilade the rebel 
 position on the eminences of Morris Island, while the troops were to 
 cross the narrow inlet which divides Morris Island from Folly Island 
 when the proper moment arrived. The obscurity of the night still 
 rested on land and sea when I went, on board the Catskill (July 10), 
 and not a symptom of preparation on shore was visible to us. 
 
 It was important that the Monitors should not by their appearance 
 give any intimation of what was meditated by being seen on the bar 
 
208 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 until the details ashore were completed ; so I waited the first fire of the 
 batteries. This was not long coming, and I led with my flag in the 
 Catsldll, followed by Captains Fairfax, Downes, and Colhoun, in the 
 Montauk, Nahant, and Weehawken. Steering for the wreck of the 
 Keokuk, and passing it, the Monitors were laid in line about parallel to 
 the land, opposite the southern eminences of Morris Island, and poured 
 in a steady fire among the rebel garrison, who were there posted, mak 
 ing a feeble and ineffectual return to the storm of shot and shell that 
 came upon their front and flank. I could see plainly the great confusion 
 into which they were thrown by this sudden and overwhelming 
 onslaught. It was a complete surprise, both as to time and to power 
 developed. 
 
 The Monitors were run in as close as the shoal waters permitted, so 
 that the shells from our own batteries on Folly Island passed close 
 ahead of and at times over some of them. 
 
 About 8 o clock a body of men were seen coming over the low sand- 
 beach of Morris Island, and while hesitating whether to treat them to 
 some volleys of grape, the sight of the Union flag * told who they were. 
 They composed the brigade which had been brought from the Folly 
 River by ..the boats of the squadron under Lieutenant-Commander Bunce, 
 and Lieutenant Mackenzie. 
 
 I paused for a moment to observe the gradual accumulation of our 
 men in masses, and their advancing movement ; then pushed forward to 
 accelerate with our enfilading fire the retreat of the rebels. 
 
 The sight was now of great interest. Our own troops could be seen 
 taking possession of the sand-hills where the enemy had rested the sole 
 defence of this end of the island, while some battalions were moving along 
 the beach. The defeated rebels were hurriedly making their way along 
 the low, flat land north of their position, and some two or three detached 
 dwellings were in flames, while the Monitors skirting the shore main 
 tained a steady fire on the retreat. Presently they reached Fort Wag 
 ner, and here we were advised that our advance was checked, at least 
 for the day, though it was but nine o clock. The discomfited rebels were 
 safe in the work, and our own men halted at a reasonable distance 
 from it. 
 
 The Monitor with my flag w r as now anchored as near the beach as 
 the depth of water permitted (twelve hundred yards), and the other 
 Monitors in line to the southward. A steady fire was begun about 9.30 
 the fort replying briskly and maintained through the day, except 
 
 * The first planted on Morris Island by Lieutenant Robeson. 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 209 
 
 the dinner hour, until six in the evening ; then I retired and anchored 
 lower down. 
 
 Next morning before six o clock the flag-lieutenant reported to me 
 that an assault had been made at daybreak by our troops and failed, 
 and about nine o clock I had a note in pencil from the general, saying : 
 " We attempted to carry Fort Wagner by assault this morning and 
 reached the parapet, but the men recoiled and fell back with slight loss." 
 
 It is known now that reinforcements had been hurried to the island 
 by the rebels, and had entered the work about midnight. 
 
 I had no notice whatever of the general s intent, and could, there 
 fore, render no aid in time. 
 
 Here ended the first part of the enterprise against Morris Island. It 
 had been in all respects a surprise, and so complete that the rebels do not 
 seem to have had any idea of it until the clay before ; and it is not cer 
 tain they were then aware of the scale on which it was to be conducted. 
 
 Had a work like Wagner crowned the sand-hills of the south end, 
 we could not have established our position on the island even a sur 
 prise would probably have been out of the question. But there were to 
 be no more surprises the undertaking was to be completed only by hard 
 work patiently endured in the trenches, and by batteries ashore and afloat. 
 
 The general now decided to make a second assault in force, and to 
 cover it by some light batteries established at distances varying from 
 one thousand to seventeen hundred yards. 
 
 While the preparations for this design were going on, the Monitors 
 were daily at work to occupy the attention of Wagner and keep down 
 its fire the gunboats assisting at long range. 
 
 On the 18th July, all being ready, about noon I led up in the Mon- 
 tauk, followed by four Monitors and the Ironsides, anchored at twelve 
 hundred yards, as near as the state of the tide would permit, and opened 
 fire the gunboats firing at a greater distance, and the shore batteries also 
 in action. 
 
 As the tide rose the Montauk gradually closed in, until at seven 
 o clock she was about three hundred yards from Wagner, when I ordered 
 grape to be used. Unable to endure the fire of the vessels, the guns 
 of the fort were now silent, and not a man was to be seen. 
 
 About sunset a note in pencil from General Gillmore announced his 
 intention to assault, but it was quite dark before the column reached the 
 work. The fire of the vessels was continued so long as it was safe for 
 our own men ashore, but ceased when the darkness made it impossible 
 to distinguish friend and foe. The rattle of musketry soon made 
 known the commencement of the assault, and continued with little in- 
 
 14 
 
210 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 termission until 9.30, when it ceased, and then came the painful tidings 
 of our defeat. 
 
 This was the end of the second part of the operation, and proved that 
 the work was too strong and too pertinaciously defended to be taken by 
 any off-hand blow. The slow and laborious operation by trench and 
 cannon only were capable of reducing it. 
 
 And here I may remark, that in this necessity is to be found a prin 
 cipal cause for the delay in reaching Charleston that subsequently 
 ensued. It was no doubt unavoidable, for it is to be presumed that no 
 more troops could then be spared from the main armies. If there had 
 been sufficient to make such an assault as would have overpowered all 
 opposition, Wagner might have been carried at the first assault, Gregg 
 would have yielded immediately, Sumter would soon have followed as a 
 matter of course, and the iron-clads, untouched by severe and continued 
 battering, would have been in condition to come quickly in contact 
 with the then imperfect interior defences. 
 
 The rebel movements clearly indicate that they admitted the imprac 
 ticability of defending Morris Island, and consequently Sumter, after 
 our position on it was fully established and covered by the iron-clads. 
 They only sought to hold the island long enough to replace Sumter by 
 an interior position ; hence, every day of defence by Wagner was vital 
 to that of Charleston. 
 
 This policy was successful for two months (10th July to 7th Sep 
 tember), and gave time to convert Fort Johnson from a forlorn old fort 
 into a powerful earthwork improved by the experiences of Wagner. 
 Moultrie received similar advantages, and most of the cannon of Sumter 
 were divided between Johnson and Moultrie. Batteries were established 
 along the south shore of the channel from Johnson toward the city ; 
 and thus an interior defence was completed which, though it separated 
 more widely the salient and principal works of the defence, by substitu 
 ting Johnson for Surnter, yet rendered access to the upper harbor far 
 more difficult, because a more powerful fire was concentrated from 
 additional batteries upon vessels attempting to enter. 
 
 And thus it was that, even after Morris Island was evacuated and 
 Sumter dismantled, the fleet must still pass the fire of Moultrie and Bee 
 to find itself in presence of a formidable earthwork, supported by con 
 tmuous batteries, and commanding obstructions more difficult than any 
 between Sumter and Moultrie. 
 
 The real nature of these obstructions was not suspected until the 
 Avinter freshets had broken away and floated into our hands a fair 
 specimen of them, which were certainly far more formidable than had 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MOKETOES. 211 
 
 been anticipated. So well do the rebels keep their counsel, that the 
 best-informed refugees, who Lad been constantly engaged about the har 
 bor, appeared to know as little about them as we did. 
 
 During the progress of the engineers toward Wagner the iron-clads 
 played an important part, using their guns whenever an opportunity 
 offered, as shown in the instances quoted on page 213. It may be 
 readily conceived that, all things being equal, it was just as easy for the 
 rebels to have worked toward our position as it was for our troops to 
 work toward theirs. But there was a serious difference in the fact that 
 the cannon of the iron-clads, and also of the gunboats, completely enfi 
 laded the entire width of the narrow island, and absolutely interdicted 
 any operation of the kind on the part of the rebels. In addition, when 
 ever their fire was bearing severely on our own workmen, a request from 
 the general always drew the fire of the vessels ; and I do not know that 
 it failed to be effective in any instance. As a consequence, the rebels 
 were restricted to Wagner, and were powerless to hinder the progress of 
 the trenches that were at last carried into the very ditch of the work, 
 and decided its evacuation without assault. 
 
 The day before the contemplated assault, I led in the iron-clads in 
 force, as agreed on, and battered the fort all day, tearing it into a sand- 
 heap. The next morning it was to have been stormed, but the enemy 
 had fled : they foresaw the inevitable result. 
 
 The vessels thus shared fully with the army in the operation that 
 led to the abandonment of the works on Morris Island, and besides 
 what is already mentioned, prevented the access of reenforcements or 
 their accumulation between Wagner and Gregg. The boats of the 
 squadron were also engaged on picket duty by night along the sea 
 shore of Morris Island, and the little stream on its inner border. 
 
 A detachment of seamen and marines, under Captain Parker, par 
 ticipated in the practice of the batteries on Fort Sumter, by working four 
 navy rifle-cannon, landed for the purpose. 
 
 The duties of the iron-clads were not performed under idle batteries. 
 The guns of Wagner never failed to open on them, and fired until their 
 crews were driven, by those of our iron-clads, to take shelter in the 
 bomb-proofs. One of these cannon, a 10-inch, left deep dents on every 
 turret, that will not easily be effaced. 
 
 The operations. of the iron-clads against Morris Island were appro 
 priately closed by a severe contest with Fort Moultrie, Batteries Bee, 
 Beauregard, etc., to relieve the Weehavvken, which had grounded under 
 their fire, and was finally got off with some severe injuries, owing to the 
 falling tide having exposed the hull under the overhang. 
 
212 
 
 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 There were other occasions when severe conflicts occurred with the 
 rebel works on Sullivan s Island. 
 
 And besides the principal attacks in force, there were few days from 
 the first attack on Morris Island (July 10th) to its evacuation (Septem 
 ber 7th) that some iron-clads or gunboats were not engaged in firing at 
 the enemy s works, so as to facilitate the labor of our troops ashore, as 
 will be perceived by the following sample from the record : 
 
 Object. 
 
 Vessels engaged. 
 
 1863. 
 
 July 18 
 
 22 
 
 Assault on Wagner. 
 
 Wagner 
 
 24 Wagner, to cover advance. 
 
 25 Wagner . . . 
 28 j Wagner ... 
 
 29 Wagner... 
 
 30 Wagner . . . 
 
 " 31 
 Aug. 1 
 
 Rebel batteries on Morris Island 
 Wagner 
 
 2 Wagner 
 
 4| Wagner 
 
 6 Wagner 
 
 8j Wagner 
 
 11 j Wagner and vicinity 
 
 13 Rebel batteries on Morris Island. 
 
 14 Rebel batteries on Morris Island . 
 
 15 Wagner 
 
 17 Rebel batteries on Morris Island, 
 to direct fire from our batteries 
 which opened on Sumter. 
 
 18 
 
 Wagner, to prevent assault 
 
 19 Wagner 
 
 20 Rebel batteries on Morris Island. 
 
 21 j Sumter and Wagner 
 
 22jWagner 
 23 Sumter. 
 
 Sept. 1 Sumter and obstructions. 
 
 5 Between Sumter and Gregg 
 
 6 j Wagner and Gregg 
 
 ^Batteries on Sullivan s Island... 
 S.Batteries on Sullivan s Island... 
 
 Montauk (flag), Ironsides, Catskill, Nan- 
 tucket, Weehawken, Patapsco ; gun 
 boats Paul Jones, Ottawa, Seneca, Chip- 
 pewa, Wissahickon. 
 
 Nantucket, Ottawa (gunboat). 
 
 Weebawken (flag), Ironsides, Catskill, 
 Montauk, Patapsco, Nantucket ; gun 
 boats Paul Jones, Seneca, Ottawa, Dai- 
 Cbing. 
 
 Gunboats Ottawa, Dai-Ching, Paul Jones. 
 
 Weehawken, Catskill, Ottawa (gunboat). 
 
 Ironsides, Patapsco. 
 
 Ironsides, Catskill, Patapsco, Ottawa (gun 
 boat). 
 
 Ottawa (gunboat). 
 
 Montauk, Patapsco, Catskill, Weehawken, 
 Passaic, Nahant, Marblehead (gunboat). 
 
 Ottawa, Marblehead (gunboats). 
 
 Montauk, Marblehead (gunboat). 
 
 Marblehead (gunboat). 
 
 Ottawa, Marblehead, Mahaska (gunboats). 
 
 Patapsco, Catskill. 
 
 Gunboats Dai-Ching, Ottawa, Mahaska, 
 Wissahickon, Racer. 
 
 Gunboats Wissahickon, Mahaska, Ottawa, 
 Dai-Ching, Racer, Dan. Smith. 
 
 Mortar-boats Racer, Dan. Smith. 
 
 Weehawken, Ironsides, Montauk, Nahant, 
 Catskill, Passaic, Patapsco ; gunboats 
 Canandaigua, Mahaska, Ottawa, Cimar- 
 ron, Wissahickon, Dai-Ching, Lodona. 
 
 Ironsides, Passaic, Weehawken; gunboats 
 Wissahickon, Mahaska, Dai-Ching, Ot 
 tawa, Lodona. 
 
 Ironsides. 
 
 Ironsides ; gunboats Mahaska, Ottawa, 
 Dai-Ching, Lodona. 
 
 Ironsides, Patapsco ; gunboats Mahaska, 
 Dai-Ching. 
 
 Weehawken, Ironsides : gunboat Mon 
 tauk. 
 
 Weehawken, Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, 
 Nahant. 
 
 Weehawken, Montauk, Passaic, Patapsco, 
 Nahant, Lehigh. 
 
 Lehigh, Nahant. 
 
 Ironsides, Weehawken, Montauk, Passaic, 
 Patapsco, Nahant, Lehigh. 
 
 Ironsides, Patapsco, Lehigh, Nahant, Mon 
 tauk, Weehawken (ashore). 
 
 Ironsides, Patapsco, Lehigh, Nahant, Mon 
 tauk, Weehawken (ashore). 
 
THE DUTEKENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 
 
 213 
 
 I shall now briefly comment on the various qualities of the Monitors : 
 1st Capacity for resistance. 2d. Power of ordnance. 3d. Draught of 
 water. 4th. Speed. 5th. Number of crew. 
 
 Endurance. During the operations against Morris Island the 
 nine iron-clads fired eight thousand projectiles, and received eight hun 
 dred and eighty-two (882) hits. Including the service at Sumter in 
 April and the Ogeechee, the total number was eleven hundred and 
 ninety-four (1,194,) distributed as follows: 
 
 Service of iron-dads. South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Shots fired and 
 hits received by them during operations against Morris Island. 
 
 VESSELS. 
 
 JTo. OF SHOTS FIEED. 
 
 3 
 
 t-T 
 
 tg 
 <co 
 
 Exj 
 
 HJ 
 
 "i 
 
 
 
 -2 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 g 
 
 15-in. 
 
 11-in. 
 
 Catskill 
 
 138 
 301 
 41 
 119 
 170 
 178 
 264 
 44 
 
 425 
 478 
 28 
 107 
 276 
 230 
 633 
 155 
 4,439 
 
 86 
 154 
 36 
 90 
 69 
 96 
 134 
 53 
 164 
 
 20 
 14 
 
 "35 
 
 36 
 47 
 53 
 51 
 
 "4(3 
 
 ""9 
 i 
 
 106 
 214 
 36 
 134 
 105 
 144 
 187 
 304 
 164 
 
 Montauk 
 
 Lehio h 
 
 Passaic 
 
 Nahant 
 
 Patapsco 
 
 \Veehawken 
 
 Nantucket 
 
 Ironsides 
 
 Total... 
 
 
 1,255 
 
 6,771 
 
 882 
 
 256 
 
 56 
 
 1,194 
 
 
 No. of shots fired. 
 
 Weight of projec 
 tiles fired, in tons. 
 
 By Ironsides 
 
 4 439 
 
 288i 
 
 11-inch by Monitors 
 
 2,332 
 
 15H 
 
 15-inch by Monitors 
 
 1,255 
 
 218* 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 8,026 
 
 653i 
 
 Additional list of actions in which the new Ironsides was engaged with the 
 rebel latteries in Charleston harbor while reducing Morris Island. 
 
 DATE. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Rounds 
 fired. 
 
 Hits by 
 enemy. 
 
 Distance. 
 
 Object 
 
 Eemarks. 
 
 1863. 
 
 July 18 
 " 20 
 Aug. 23 
 
 Sept. 2 
 
 " 2 
 
 " 5 
 " 5 
 
 New Ironsides. 
 
 
 
 805 
 168 
 90 
 
 41 
 
 9 
 488 
 32 
 
 4 
 13 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 Yards. 
 1,400 
 1,300 
 
 Fort "Wagner 
 
 Ship was under way; 
 distance varied from 
 1,100 to 1,300 yds. 
 Hits from Gregg and 
 Moultrie ; shfp at 
 anchor. 
 
 Hit from Gregg. 
 
 
 
 it 
 
 
 1,000 
 
 1,500 
 1,300 
 1,800 
 
 Fort Gregg.. 
 
 Fort Sumter 
 Fort Wagner 
 Fort Gregg. . 
 
 n 
 
 it 
 
 
 1 
 
 On July 29th the Passaic engaged Wagner, and on August 31st 
 
214: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Moultrie. On September 8th the Passaic (in a disabled condition), 
 Patapsco, Weehawken, and Nahant engaged Moultrie. 
 
 Of the eight Monitors, one was always absent at Warsaw (Nahant or 
 Nantucket), to blockade the rebel ram. The Lehigh did not arrive until 
 August 30th, therefore was only able to participate in the operations of 
 the remaining seven days, but did good work. 
 
 For some time only five Monitors were available for general attack, 
 and then six, which was the greatest number disposable at any one time. 
 
 The consequences of the protracted firing and hard usage to which 
 the Monitors were exposed during these two months of incessant ser 
 vice, were unavoidably very considerable in the aggregate ; and the 
 greater, also, that all repair which could possibly be dispensed with was 
 postponed to the conclusion. It was therefore necessarily extensive 
 when entered upon. The battering received was without precedent. 
 The Montauk had been struck two hundred and fourteen (214) times ; 
 the Weehawken one hundred and eighty-seven (187) times, and almost 
 entirely by 10-inch shot. What vessels have ever been subjected to such 
 a test ? It is not surprising that they should need considerable repair after 
 sustaining such severe pounding for so long a time, but only that they 
 could be restored at ah 1 to serviceable condition. The force of the 10- 
 inch shot must be experienced to be appreciated. Any one in contact 
 with the part of the turret struck falls senseless, and I have been nearly 
 shaken oft* my feet in the pilot-house when engaging Moultrie. 
 
 All the little defects of detail were marked by such a searching pro 
 cess. Decks were cut through ; cannon were worn out ; side armor 
 shaken ; tops of pilot-houses crushed, etc. But all these were reparable, 
 and no vital principle was seriously touched. 
 
 With such workshops and means as a Northern navy-yard includes, 
 the repair of all Monitors would have been speedily executed ; but 
 when machinery, tools, labor, and material have all to be obtained, as 
 they were here, from a great distance, there was of necessity consid 
 erable delay ; and, moreover, it was not admissible to withdraw but a 
 portion of the Monitors at a time from the blockade. 
 
 The additions that were deemed advisable for strengthening the 
 pilot-houses and turrets were also put on at this time, and the bottoms 
 cleaned, for they had now^ became so foul with oysters and grass that 
 the speed was reduced to three or three and a half knots, and, with the 
 strong tide of this harbor, added considerably to the difficulties of work 
 ing the vessels properly under fire. 
 
 On one night I was caught by heavy weather from the southeast 
 while close up to Sumter, when I had gone to attack it ; and it was well 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 215 
 
 that the darkness of the night prevented the slowness of our motion 
 from being perceived while extricating the Monitors from their position. 
 
 Power of Ordnance. Each turret contains two guns, and from the 
 peculiar facility which it has for giving direction to the heaviest ord 
 nance, no doubt, arises the desire to make these of the heaviest descrip 
 tion. How far other considerations should control the character of the 
 ordnance is necessarily an unsettled question. 
 
 To strike an armored ship, it may be best to use a gun capable of 
 the greatest power ; but whether this shall be derived from a projectile 
 of great weight, driven by low velocity, or of less weight, and high ve 
 locity ; whether it shall be a 15-inch gun, fired with thirty-five or forty 
 pounds, or a 13-inch, fired with fifty pounds of powder, is not here ma 
 terial : the weight of the gun for either purpose will not vary to any 
 important degree. But in operations against earthworks, whose mate 
 rial cannot be damaged permanently, but only disturbed, and which are 
 only to be dealt with by keeping down their fire, a much lighter projec 
 tile would be preferable, in order that the practice may be as rapid as 
 possible. Hence a piece of sixteen thousand pounds for 10-inch or 11- 
 inch shot and shell. 
 
 When a number of Monitors are brought together it would be better 
 also to have guns of like kind in each turret, and bring into action 
 whichever might be preferable. Each of the Monitors of this squadron 
 had a 15-inch and a smaller gun (11-inch or 8-inch rifle), and hence 
 the rapidity of fire, which was most desirable, was not attained. That 
 this was due to the calibre of the gun, and not to its being located in a 
 turret, may be shown by one notable instance. 
 
 November 9, 1863, the Montauk, Captain Davis, was engaged in 
 battering Sumter. In so doing, the 1 1-inch gun fired twenty-five shells 
 successively in one hour, of which twenty-one hit the wall of the fort 
 aimed at distance sixteen hundred yards. This is at the rate of one 
 shell in 2.4 minutes, which is not only rapid but also exceedingly accu 
 rate practice. There is no reason why another 11-inch, if placed in the 
 adjoining carriage (instead of the 15-inch), could not have been fired in 
 the same time, at which rate that Monitor would have delivered an 11- 
 inch shell every 1.2 minute. The rates of fire reported for the Iron 
 sides, by Captain Rowan, are 
 
 
 Time. 
 
 No. fired. 
 
 Time for each fire. 
 
 Most rapid 
 
 h. m. 
 
 50 
 
 25 
 
 m. 
 
 I 74 
 
 Continuous 
 
 2 55 
 
 490 
 
 2 86 
 
 
 1 00 
 
 360 
 
 1 33 
 
 
 1 00 
 
 25 
 
 2 40 
 
 
 
 
 
216 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 It will be perceived, that for a short space of time the frigate deliv 
 ered a shell from each gun in 1.74 minute, for three hours in 2.86 min 
 utes, and it is believed that a fire could be sustained at the rate of 1.33 
 minute. The last rate is therefore possible, but I am sure it would be 
 difficult to sustain it long with much regard to good aim and consider 
 able distances ; and I believe, on the whole, that for every practicable 
 purpose there would be all desirable rapidity of fire from the 11-inch in 
 turret. Thus it is not to be presumed that there will be equality of 
 ordnance power in the same number of 11-inch guns as to rapidity of 
 fire, whether in a turret or broadside. 
 
 Draught of Water. The Monitors of the Passaic class draw about 
 eleven and a half (llj) feet of water when properly trimmed. On this 
 coast ten and eleven feet is the most convenient draught of water for 
 penetrating all the principal sounds and rivers and navigating them to 
 any extent. A greater draught restricts a vessel in movement, and in 
 many instances excludes her from several ports, except under very fa 
 vorable circumstances. 
 
 Speed. The speed of the Monitors is not great (seven knots), but 
 it is quite respectable with a clean bottom, and is fully equal to that of 
 the Ironsides. Their steerage is peculiar, but when understood and 
 rightfully managed, not difficult to control. They pivot with celerity 
 and in less space than almost any other class of vessel. 
 
 Number of Men.- The number of men required to work them and 
 the guns is only eighty, which is very moderate. 
 
 In common with all iron-clads, the scope of vision is much restricted, 
 for the plain reason that in such vessels apertures of any size must be 
 avoided. There are some other defects, but they are not inherent, and 
 it is believed are susceptible of being remedied wholly or in part. So 
 much for the Monitors. 
 
 The Ironsides is a fine, powerful ship. Her armor has stood heavy 
 battering very well, and her broadside of seven 11-inch guns and one 
 8-inch rifle has always told with signal effect when opened on the 
 enemy. Draught of water about 15% to 16 feet. Speed six to seven 
 knots, and crew about four hundred and forty men. 
 
 The defects of the vessel are the unplated ends, which are conse 
 quently easily damaged by a raking fire, and involve the rudder and 
 screw more or less, while she can return no fire in either direction. 
 This was particularly and frequently inconvenient in attacking the works 
 on Morris Island, for at certain stages of the tide vessels tail nearly 
 across the channel, and present bow and stern to the beach of Morris 
 Island, so that sometimes it was necessary to delay placing the vessel in 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 217 
 
 position, and at others she would swing around very awkwardly when 
 engaged. 
 
 The Monitors, on the other hand, were almost equally well defended 
 on all sides, and could fire in any direction. The Ironsides was also 
 open to descending shot, and her scope of fire too much restricted by 
 badly-placed ports. 
 
 The desire for comparison which rages just now can easily be satis 
 fied by bringing the above data into juxtaposition. 
 
 Just as they are, the Ironsides is capable of a more rapid and con 
 centrated fire, which, under the circumstances, made her guns more 
 effective than the 15-inch of the Monitors. On the other hand, she was 
 restricted by draught to the mid-channel, was very vulnerable to a ra 
 king fire, and the direction of her own guns was very limited laterally. 
 
 The Monitors could operate in most of the channels could direct 
 their fire around the whole circle and were almost equally well de 
 fended on all sides. 
 
 The defects in both classes of vessels are susceptible of being reme 
 died partially or entirely. The defence of the Ironsides could be made 
 complete, and that of the Monitors equally so. The armament of 
 the Monitors could be perfected so as to give all desirable rapidity of 
 fire, but by no contrivance could the Ironsides be enabled to use much 
 heavier guns than those mounted. Yet when such changes were made 
 as experience has suggested, there still would remain to the Monitors 
 the lighter draught, choice of guns from the heaviest to the lightest, de- 
 fensibility, and direction of fire around the whole circle ; consequently 
 the ability to carry a heavy battery into the least depth of water, with 
 equal power of offence and defence in any direction, and that with half 
 the number of guns carried in broadside by another vessel. 
 
 The comparison now made is to be understood as having relation to 
 existing circumstances, and not at all intended as conclusive in regard 
 to the general merits of iron-clads. 
 
 It is in this sense that the action of the Navy Department is to be 
 considered with reference to the selection of one class of vessels over 
 another. 
 
 It is evident that it was not designed to adopt any one style exclu 
 sively, for of the three vessels first ordered two were of the ordinary 
 broadside class the Ironsides and the Galena. The latter was quickly 
 proved to be absolutely inefficient, and so must any armored steamer of 
 that size. It is universally admitted that plates of less than four and a 
 half (4|-) inches cannot stand the shock of heavy projectiles, and vessels 
 so armored must be of considerable tonnage. 
 
218 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 I presume the Department only intended to build such vessels as 
 were best adapted to the service at the scene of war. 
 
 Keeping in view the peculiar exigencies of the case, which required 
 light draught and great ordnance power, it appears that the selection of 
 the Department could not have been more judicious in preferring a 
 number of Monitors to operate from a heavy frigate as a base ; and if 
 the intent of the Department could have been carried out in regard to 
 numbers, we should now have been in entire possession of the coast 
 from the capes of Virginia to New Orleans, including Wilmington, 
 Charleston, Mobile, etc. 
 
 Many defects of both classes are easily remediable, but some of those 
 in the Monitors could only be determined by the test of battle ; before 
 that, approximation only was possible. 
 
 What other style of vessel could the Department have chosen ? 
 Certainly none that has been built by English or French naval authori 
 ties. The Warrior and her class are exceedingly powerful, but could 
 not get within gunshot here.* 
 
 On the other hand, there is very little navigable water on this coast 
 which is not accessible to the Monitors. They command supremely all 
 that is near the shore, and cannot themselves be reached by vessels of 
 heavier draught. So that, when there was some reason to apprehend the 
 appearance of certain rams in this quarter, I assured the Department 
 that the iron-clads could maintain position so long as coal and provi 
 sions lasted. 
 
 It may appear that I speak too positively on the subject, but some 
 experience with them certainly gives a right to do so. With a single 
 exception, I have been on board a Monitor in all the principal actions, 
 and the recurrence of casualties to the fleet-captains f near me shows 
 that I was in a situation to judge. I was once in the Ironsides in an 
 attack on Moultrie and Sumter. I have also watched the behavior of the 
 Monitors at anchor through all the phases of winter weather in this ex 
 posed situation. 
 
 The completeness with which four little Monitors, supported by an 
 iron-clad frigate, have closed this port, is well worth noting. 
 
 * According to Rear-Admiral Paris, the French Gloire draws 28 feet ; the British 
 Warrior 26 feet ; the Black Prince 23 feet ; even those of inferior class, Defence 
 and Resistance, draw 24 feet. Not one of these vessels could cross the Charleston 
 bar, and would be perfectly impotent to render the least service in any of the opera 
 tions now being carried on. 
 
 f Captain George W. Rodgers was next ahead when killed off Wagner, and his 
 successor, Captain Badger, had his leg broken by an iron splinter in the attack on 
 Sumter. 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 219 
 
 Very soon after entering the roads I advanced one Monitor well up 
 toward the inner debouches of the northern channels, supported by 
 another. On the night of the 19th of July an English steamer at 
 tempted to run in, and having eluded the hot pursuit of the outside 
 blockade, no doubt indulged in the belief that all danger was past. But 
 the gallant Captain Rodgers was in advance that night with the Cat- 
 skill, and a shell sent suddenly by him ahead of the culprit steamer sig 
 nified no escape. In despair or alarm the latter grounded on a shoal, 
 and her wreck has since served as a warning to like evil-doers. Two or 
 three steamers that were in, managed to get out immediately after, and 
 one or two may have gotten in, for the crews of the Monitors were often 
 too fatigued then with a day s battle to keep watch at night ; but there 
 ended the business as such, and for several months not a vessel has 
 passed in or out. 
 
 These four Monitors, who thus keep watch and ward, muster eight 
 (8) guns and three hundred and twenty (320) men, which is almost in 
 significant in contrast with the work done. 
 
 I have thus put on paper the general impressions now uppermost, 
 but very hastily and under great pressure of business, which will, I hope, 
 excuse such imperfections as may have inadvertently occurred. With 
 more leisure I could do full justice to this interesting subject. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JOHN A. DAHLGREN, 
 
 Rear- Admiral, Commanding S. A. B. Squadron. 
 Hon. GIDEOX WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER ? S VIEWS UPON IRON-CLADS. 
 
 FLAG-SHIP BLACK HAWK, MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, 1 
 CAIRO, February 16, 1864. f 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to report that I have made a visit to Cincin 
 nati to examine the iron-clads there, and see what prospect there was 
 of getting some of these vessels into immediate service 
 
 It is much to be regretted that the boats at Cincinnati are not 
 finished, as I am certain they would accomplish all that can be done by 
 Monitors. No complaint, however, can be justly made against the con 
 tractors for want of activity in the performance of the work on these boats. 
 
 When I visited Cincinnati a little over a year ago, no preparations 
 were then made to commence these vessels. Now they are in a fair 
 way of being completed, and I think can all be put in the water and 
 ready to operate against an enemy by the first of June. 
 
 When the Government do get these boats, they may rest assured of 
 
220 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 receiving as good Monitor-built vessels as have yet been contracted for ; 
 for though I have not seen many to which I can compare them, I am 
 glad to say that in workmanship, model, and probably in speed, these 
 vessels will be equal, if not superior, to any Monitors yet built, at least 
 of those that I have seen. I can only draw comparison between these 
 and the first Ericsson Monitor, which I was sent by order of the De 
 partment to examine. I remember pronouncing that vessel " a perfect 
 success," " and capable of defeating any thing that then floated." I 
 was looked upon at that time as something of an enthusiast, as my 
 opinions were widely at variance with those of some scientific gentle 
 men. The results have justified me in forming a high estimate of the 
 Monitor principle, and I was pleased to see that on our Western waters 
 we can build them as well, if not better, than in the workshops of the 
 North. No better proof is wanted of the ability of the West to supply 
 all demands of the Government for iron-clad vessels than is given in 
 those building at Cincinnati. The work is perfect in every respect, and 
 put together so well that it may be compared to joiner s work. The 
 hulls are as strong as can possibly be desired, the speed will be good, 
 and the only fault in the vessels, if they have any, is the " overhang " 
 aft, which is of no consequence in a smooth sea, but must be injurious 
 when the Monitors have to go from port to port. 
 
 The nearest to completion of these Monitors is one of those in the 
 Greenwood building ; she can be launched in a month, and I am of 
 opinion, when finished, could commence at Cairo, and, going down the 
 river, could destroy every vessel we have on these waters, unless they 
 took advantage of their greater speed and run away. The heaviest and 
 best vessel we have, the Benton, would stand a poor chance against the 
 Monitor alluded to. If she failed to sink the Benton with shot, she 
 could surely do it with her beak or ram, which is not the least formi 
 dable thing about her ; this is saying a great deal, for the Benton is a 
 very formidable vessel, and since she has been under my command has 
 been struck 130 times in the hull, without any apparent damage. Three 
 of the Monitors at Cincinnati are on the improved Ericsson plan, while 
 the two light-draughts building at the Hamilton Works are to be sub 
 merged when going into action. I do not like that as well as the 
 Ericsson model, as there is more machinery about them than is desir 
 able ; simplicity of arrangement being the object to be aimed at in ves- 
 sels-of-war. The plan of these latter-mentioned vessels is a good one, 
 provided their armor and backing is strong enough to stand heavy shot, 
 which I think will be the case if they only encounter the ordinary rifle 
 projectile. 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 221 
 
 From the information received from the different officers I have sent 
 on duty at various times to the points where these iron vessels are build 
 ing, the same favorable report is made of their efficiency, and the good 
 work that is being put on them ; and in six months we will have a fleet 
 of vessels that will keep this river against the fleets of the world, and be 
 enabled to carry the war into the enemy s quarters, where there is any 
 thing like an equality in guns. I think too much has been expected of 
 Monitors heretofore, and the fact that two or three of them were not 
 able to overcome obstacles formidable enough to keep out a large fleet 
 of three-deckers has, in a measure, weakened the confidence of the pub 
 lic (who generally know little or nothing about such matters) in them. 
 
 But the Monitors, for harbor defence, are just as valuable as they 
 were on the day when the first one drove the leviathan "Merrimack" 
 back to her hole, and saved the honor of the nation. I am sure that 
 Monitors would have done much better on this river than the old Pook 
 gunboats did, which were built for temporary purposes only, or until 
 Monitors could take their places. Earthworks on elevated positions are 
 difficult to silence, it is true, except by a concentrated fire of many guns, 
 and Monitors are not well provided in numbers. No vessels have been 
 more successful than the Mississippi gunboats, whenever they have been 
 called on to attack such works. Still they were very deficient in one 
 respect, as they were very vulnerable, suffered a good deal, and proved 
 that in the end the Monitor principle, from its invulnerability, was the 
 only thing that could be safely depended on. For this reason I often 
 wished that I had been provided with one good Monitor, with which, at 
 certain times, I could have accomplished more than with a fleet of such 
 boats as we have here. 
 
 A new boat, the Ozark, has just arrived here. As far as her turret 
 is concerned she is all right, but her hull is too high out of water, and 
 she lacks more than three inches of iron on fifteen inches of oak. I 
 have, moreover, noticed that where there is a backing of wood covered 
 with 3-inch iron, and that iron with wood again, the resistance of the 
 latter will prevent balls of heavy size from entering the iron. In fact, it 
 is hardly indented. This was particularly demonstrated in the passage 
 of the fleet past Yicksburg, when it was necessary to take every precau 
 tion to insure success and prevent injury to the steamers. Heavy logs, 
 twenty inches in diameter, were hung perpendicularly on the sides of 
 the vessel, close together, and so secured that no shot could strike the 
 side without passing through the logs. Bales of hay were also packed 
 over the decks and sterns in sufficient thickness (it was supposed) to 
 prevent the passage of any shot. Suffice it to say, the pressed hay was 
 
222 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 no protection whatever against shot or shell. They passed through four 
 or five bales, and very much endangered the vessels by setting the hay 
 on fire. Wherever the projectiles of the enemy struck the logs, they 
 did no further damage ; they would pass through the logs, strike the 
 iron without leaving more than an indentation, and glance oft*. Many 
 instances of narrow escapes could be mentioned, where the vessels were 
 saved by the intervention of the wood, and in no instance were the ves 
 sels damaged where the logs were properly placed. The incidents of 
 that night the passing of the Vicksburg batteries suggested to me 
 the idea of first having a heavy backing of wood, then a layer of iron, 
 and then a covering of wood over the iron, which will, I am convinced, 
 make a vessel perfectly shot-proof. I notice that the idea is not an ori 
 ginal one, but has been discovered and recommended by several persons. 
 There are two vessels in this squadron, the Lafayette and Choctaw, 
 which give proof of the value of heavy backing to iron. These vessels 
 were built with heavy frames, covered on the outside with gutta-percha, 
 and then with a light thickness of iron. "Whenever these vessels have 
 been struck on the iron where the wood backing was heavy, they re 
 sisted the shot of heaviest calibre ; but where the backing was light, shot 
 went in at one side and out at the other. The defence of gutta-percha 
 was not of the slightest use ; on the contrary, it was a detriment and 
 aided very much in destroying the vessels by rot. It is so much extra 
 weight that the vessels have to carry, without deriving the slightest 
 benefit from it. The money that built the Lafayette and Choctaw 
 would have built three Monitors of such a model ; that one Monitor 
 would have destroyed both of the first. I would here state that these 
 two vessels will only be serviceable for a short time, as they are already 
 showing signs of weakness. They are not very serviceable, have not 
 speed enough, and are too unwieldy for rams, and in some pails are 
 very vulnerable. They have, however, fine machinery, and when they 
 wear out it can be fitted to better hulls. I consider these vessels only 
 as temporary expedients, to give way to the Monitor class, when there 
 is a sufficient number built. 
 
 Another class of vessels in this squadron deserves mention, as show 
 ing the different expedients resorted to to open and defend the Missis 
 sippi River. I allude to the Tuscumbia, Chillicothe, and Indianola. 
 Two of these have been tried under batteries, and the Indianola in 
 battle against vessels, and have shown that the Monitor principle only 
 was the right one. Their turrets were in no instance found impenetra 
 ble to the heavy rifled shot, and besides they were soon damaged in 
 their wheels, which afforded fine targets for the enemy to fire at. Still, 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 223 
 
 two of these vessels remained under fire as long as any Monitors have 
 been known to remain at one time, and if they did not come up to the 
 Monitors in invulnerability, they accomplished all that was required at 
 the time, viz., the capture of the enemy s stronghold. The builders 
 never claimed that they should be considered more than temporary ex 
 pedients with which to harass the enemy ; and, taken in that sense, 
 they certainly may be considered very good vessels, and have fairly re 
 paid all the money spent on them, taking into consideration the work 
 they have done. 
 
 As to approving of any of the above-mentioned styles of gunboat, 
 as part of a permanent system of national defence to be adopted in this 
 country, that I cannot do. Any professional man who will lay aside 
 his prejudices caused by the discomforts incident to the Monitors, must 
 admit that, as a harbor defence, they are the best and only vessels to be 
 built ; and I hope we shall see every harbor in the United States, where 
 there is a chance of an enemy penetrating, supplied with two or three 
 of these floating batteries. If they have not been able to penetrate the 
 harbor of Charleston, where fifty guns to one was opposed to them, 
 and where they had to contend with obstructions placed in their way 
 impossible to be removed, it in no way detracts from their well-earned 
 reputation for efficiency. They have done at Charleston what no other 
 vessels ever built could possibly have accomplished ; and though the 
 Army, as usual when combined operations are carried on, has monopo 
 lized all the honors, it is a very certain fact that the Monitors held their 
 own as no other vessels could have done, and under their shelter the 
 Army was enabled to perform its work successfully. 
 
 I hope, sir, you will excuse the unreasonable length of this commu 
 nication on the subject of the Monitors ; but I know their value when 
 properly used, have felt the want of them so much at times, that I would 
 have exchanged several even of the best of my vessels for one of them, 
 properly fitted. I have seen a whole army kept at bay for the want of 
 one of these little " shot-proofs," and have, now and then, been tempted 
 to do foolish things, in hopes of accomplishing what I deemed imprac 
 ticable. The Cincinnati was sunk when my own judgment told me it 
 was wrong to place her where I was called upon to order her. With a 
 single Monitor results would have been very different ; and on that day, 
 instead of having a vessel sunk, the right wing of our army would have 
 gained a position commanding the most important works in and about 
 Vicksburg. Vulnerable as this vessel was, it would not have done for 
 the Navy to hesitate, when the Army thought there was a prospect of 
 success. 
 
224: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 In conclusion, sir, permit me to express the hope that the West may 
 be converted into a large workshop for the building of future Monitors 
 of all sizes. I know of no part of the Union where the work can be 
 done better or quicker. 
 
 I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 DAVID D. PORTER, Rear- Admiral. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 ARCHITECTUEE. 
 
 Mr. Kussell says of "the modern American fleet:" It is a creation 
 altogether original, peculiarly American, and admirably adapted to the 
 special purpose which gave it birth. Like most American inventions, 
 use has been allowed to dictate terms of construction; and purpose, 
 not prejudice, has been allowed to rule invention. 
 
 The ruling conditions of construction for the inventors of the Ameri 
 can fleet were these: the vessels must be perfectly shot-proof they 
 must fight in shallow water they must be able to endure a heavy sea, 
 and pass through it, if not fight in it. 
 
 The American iron-clad Navy is a child of these conditions. Mini 
 mum draft of water means minimum extent of surface, protected by 
 armor; perfect protection means thickness to resist the heaviest shot, 
 and protection for the whole length of the ship ; it also means perfect 
 protection to guns and gunners. Had they added what our legislators 
 exact, that the ports shall lie in the ship s side, nine feet above the 
 water, the problem might at once have become impossible and absurd; 
 but they wanted the work done as it could be done, and allowed the 
 conditions of success to rule the methods of construction. 
 
 The conditions of success in the given circumstances were these : 
 that you should not require the sides of the ship to rise much above the 
 water s edge ; that you should not require more protection to the guns 
 than would contain guns and gunners ; that you should be content with 
 as many guns as the ship could carry, and no more. 
 
 To do the work, therefore, the full thickness of armor required to 
 keep out the enemy s shot was taken, but the ship was made to rise a 
 few inches above water, and no more ; and so a narrow strip of thick 
 armor, all along the upper edge of the ship s side, gave her complete 
 protection. Thus the least quantity of thickest armor did most work in 
 protecting the ship, engines, boilers, and magazine. Next, to protect the 
 guns, a small circular fortress, shield, or tower, encircled a couple of 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 225 
 
 guns ; and if four guns were to be carried, two such turrets earned the 
 armament and contained the gunners. Thus, again, weight of armor 
 was spared to the utmost, and so both ship and armament were com 
 pletely protected. 
 
 But the consequences of these conditions are such as we, at least for 
 sea-going ships, would reluctantly accept. The low ship s side will, in 
 a sea-way, allow the sea to sweep over the ship, and the waves, not the 
 sailors, will have possession of the deck. The American accepts the 
 conditions, removes the sailors from the deck, allows the sea to have its 
 way, and drives his vessel through, not over the sea, to her fighting des 
 tination by steam, abandoning sails. The American also cheerfully 
 accepts the small round turret as protection for guns and men; and 
 pivots them on a central turn-table in the middle of his ship, raising his 
 port high enough to be out of the water, and then fighting his gun 
 through an aperture little larger than its muzzle. 
 
 By thus frankly accepting the conditions he could not control, the 
 American did his work and built his fleet. It is beyond doubt that the 
 American Monitor class, with two turrets in each ship, and two guns in 
 each turret, is a kind of vessel that can be made fast, shot-proof, and sea- 
 proof. It may be uncomfortable, but it can be made secure. The sea 
 may possess its deck, but in the air, above the sea, the American raises a 
 platform on the level of the top of his turrets, which he calls his hurricane 
 deck, whence he can look down with in difference at the waves fruitless 
 ly foaming and breaking themselves on the abandoned deck below. His 
 vessel, too, has the advantage, as he thinks it, of not rolling with the 
 waves ; so that he can take his aim steadily and throw his shot surely. 
 Thus, if he abandons much that we value, he secures what he values 
 more. 
 
 I think I have reason to know that the American turret-ships, of the 
 larger class, with two turrets and four guns, are successful vessels suc 
 cessful beyond the measure of our English estimate of their success. 
 Like so many American inventions, they are severely subject to the 
 conditions of use, and successful by the rigidity and precision with 
 which they fit the end and fulfil the purpose which was their aim. 
 
 Plate 138 contains longitudinal section, deck plans, and cross section 
 of the original American Monitor of Captain Ericsson the first turret- 
 ship that distinguished herself in action, having to engage with her 
 single turret and pair of guns a large broadside ship of much heavier 
 tonnage and armament, which she thoroughly defeated. 
 
 Captain Ericsson, the builder of the Monitor, has long been distin 
 guished equally in England and America. He was known as the builder 
 
 15 
 
226 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 and designer of one of the most remarkable engines, in the original 
 competition, preliminary to the opening of the Liverpool and Manches 
 ter Railroad ; he was afterward distinguished in the introduction of the 
 screw propeller in steam navigation, and lie Las crowned his career by 
 the successful construction of the class of turret-ships, which appear to 
 have been taken up with avidity and prosecuted with energy by the Amer 
 ican Government; and during the course of their sad civil war, the 
 Monitors appear to have rendered to the Federal side very important 
 services. The design of these vessels has about it all the characteristics 
 of American audacity. Every conventionality of the ship has been de 
 spised and discarded ; in the sailor s sense of the word there is nothing 
 " ship-shape " about this original Monitor ; every thing is unusual. She 
 has neither keel, nor bilges, nor bulwarks. She is very nearly a London 
 bridge, covered by a great horizontal platform of timber, projecting 
 beyond her deck, and descending below the water-line. This great 
 upper platform in no way conforms to the shape of the under-ship which 
 carries it ; it is obviously meant to shelter the rudder and the stern from 
 every attempt to damage them by collision. At the bow the entire 
 hull is equally protected by the overhanging platform of the deck, and 
 the whole upper works of the ship are covered with thick iron armor on 
 both sides, and the wooden deck is protected by iron plates. The rud 
 der is a balanced rudder, and the ship is propelled by a single screw ; 
 the boilers are the double-tier boilers, of the ordinary construction, with 
 four sets of flues. It will be noticed that the arrangements of the turret 
 are very different from Captain Coles s arrangements. The whole turret 
 is on the upper deck, exposed to shot ; it is not carried on a revolving 
 set of rollers, but is pivoted on the centre, which seems to carry most of 
 its weight by means of an iron trussing, from which it is, as it were, sus 
 pended, and it slides on a smooth metal plate lying on the deck. The 
 turret is worked by a small pair of donkey-engines, working on tooth- 
 gear, and the ports are covered by hanging blocks. Like our turret, 
 the Monitor shield has two guns worked parallel to each other on slides. 
 The manner in which these turrets were afterward improved and 
 matured by experience, is shown in plate 139, and it is certain that 
 Captain Ericsson rendered great service to his country by inventing at 
 once, and successfully introducing, a class of vessels peculiarly suited to 
 action in their inland waters and shallow navigations ; and when we 
 consider the extreme rapidity which attended the execution of the pro 
 ject, we must say that the original Monitor was a remarkable success, 
 and that she was a type of an entirely new class of war-ship. It is curi 
 ous and instructive to observe how differently the system has been 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 227 
 
 developed in America and in England: in the one case the sudden 
 abandonment of all the conventionalities of a ship, and in the other 
 the studious retention of old forms and ways, admitting the innovation 
 with the greatest possible amount of reluctance and seeming aversion. 
 But it is almost always so with the Americans, who love a thing because 
 it is new, even without any other recommendation ; and with the English, 
 who begin by hating a novelty, whatever be its merits. 
 
 LETTER OF DONALD MACKAY. 
 
 CURTIS GUILD, Esq., Editor Commercial Bulletin, Boston, Mass. : 
 
 DEAR SIR : According to my promise, I herewith furnish you with 
 a few facts relating to the English and French iron-clad fleets, which I 
 have recently inspected, and find many vessels completed which during 
 previous visits were in process of construction, the names and particu 
 lars of which I gave you in former letters several years ago. I also saw 
 several new iron-clads in progress, differing materially in construction 
 and armor from the first. I am more convinced than ever that those 
 iron-clad fleets fully meet my views as to efficiency and sea service, as 
 stated in my previous communications to you. 
 
 While viewing these, their style of construction, equipment, etc., I 
 felt proud that our Navy Department, since 1861, have constructed, 
 built, and equipped an iron-clad fleet, both for home defence and sea 
 going service, more powerful than all the iron-clad navies of the world ; 
 and I strongly recommend to the Government, as a profitable and judi 
 cious expenditure, and one which will prove to be the strongest guar 
 anty of peace and just neutrality, a continuance of building and adding 
 to our iron-clad sea-going fleet, thus keeping pace with other nations. 
 
 I can allude with pride to that wonderful production of human ge 
 nius, the Dunderberg, now in the process of construction by Mr. William 
 H. Webb, of New York. I have personally inspected all the iron-clads 
 of England and France, but I have not seen one of them which in origi 
 nality of design, power, and completeness of detail, begins to compare 
 with her. She combines the impregnability of the turret system with 
 the advantages of the broadsides and ends. In short, she can bring 
 guns to bear from every point of the compass without changing her po 
 sition. From the appearance of her model it is evident to me that she 
 must be an excellent sea-boat, of superior speed, and, notwithstanding 
 her great size, easily managed. It is said she will cost over $2,000,000 ; 
 but this is not high when compared with the sums lavished upon the 
 large iron-clads of the Old World, which are far inferior to her as a ves- 
 
228 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 sel-of-war. I consider her a match for a fleet of such vessels as some of 
 the best produced in France. 
 
 I am pleased to find that the Honorable Secretary, in his report, has 
 recommended the enlargement of our navy-yards, work-shops, dry-docks, 
 etc. ; also a building-yard of proper size for the construction and fitting 
 complete of the largest iron-clad ships ; for the machinery and furnaces, 
 for forging and rolling plates equal in size and thickness to those used 
 by the English Navy. In this way we would get the finest qualities of 
 iron, so essential for armored ships. A plate of the best quality of lami 
 nated iron, four inches thick, will protect a ship s side, and resist solid 
 shot equal to the common manufactured plates of six inches in thick 
 ness. This test was made in England. Large quantities of iron for 
 both hull and armor, made by different contractors, which did not come 
 up to the standard quality, I have seen condemned in England. I be 
 lieve that the means and facilities for the manufacturing of iron plates 
 and armor should be owned by and under the control of the Govern 
 ment. 
 
 Over forty large wooden screw-ships without armor are under con 
 struction now in the Government yards, and many are well advanced 
 toward completion. The hulls were designed by Mr. John Lenthall, 
 chief of the bureau of construction and repairs, on the Alabama principle 
 for speed, and the motive power by Mr. B. F. Isherwood, chief of 
 bureau of steam engineering. Having inspected those ships and their 
 machinery, I have no hesitation in saying they will be the fastest war 
 ships in the world. The class carrying the two 100-inch cylinders will 
 attain a regular sea-going speed of upward of fifteen knots. 
 
 With all that we have done and are doing in the increasing of our 
 Navy, I see, with our Honorable Secretary, one fearful deficiency in basins 
 or dry-docks. Supposing that we had a hard naval engagement, resulting 
 in the damaging of many vessels, we have only dry-docks enough to re 
 pair a few ships, and for this reason we would at once become compara 
 tively weak at sea ; and this is a matter which should receive our early 
 attention. Both France and England, while adding to the strength and 
 number of their ships, keep pace with the increase of their dry-docks 
 and basins. Unless we adopt this system, the additions to our Navy so 
 liberally appropriated for by Congress will avail but little. The French 
 diy-docks contain space sufficient for fifty of the largest class ships at 
 one time, and England is fast approaching this also. 
 
 On Mr. E. J. Reed s accession to the chief constructorship of the 
 British Navy, the Board of Admiralty authorized him to alter some of 
 the small classes of wooden ships (partially built, still on the stocks) 
 
THE DIFFEBENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 229 
 
 for armor plating, on a plan proposed by himself for new vessels of 2,000 
 tons. The conversion of these into iron-clads by the new constructor 
 was rather a difficult task, and should not be -expected to equal new 
 designs, yet they proved to be very successful sea-going ships. The 
 Enterpiise was the first taken in hand. She carries her armament and 
 armor at somewhat less than the contemplated draught (sixteen feet), 
 and steaming only one-fourth of a knot less than other vessels of her 
 class carrying no armor at all. Her armor is four and a half inches 
 thick, and extends over the whole length of the hull at the water-line, 
 and over a battery of four heavy guns carried amidships. A year ago 
 she was ordered on general service to the Mediterranean, and was the 
 first British man-of-war that passed the Straits of Gibraltar with the 
 new broadside six and a half ton naval guns, firing 100-pound round 
 shot with twenty-five pounds of powder, having previously been pro 
 nounced by Admiral Sidney Dacres, the commander-in-chief of the 
 Channel squadron, after many sea trials, the best iron-clad in the navy, 
 as regarded sea-going qualities, accommodation, ventilation, etc. 
 
 The conversion of the Research followed the Enterprise, and differing 
 from the latter chiefly in the fact that the upper deck was lowered in 
 the former, and the armor continued up to it instead of the armor at 
 the ends being a mere narrow belt. This would no doubt make the Re 
 search a stronger, more enduring ship in action, but it has made her a 
 comparatively wet vesssel in a sea-way, although many officers of our own 
 Navy who have had experience in our Monitors, would perhaps consider 
 her efficient when they learn that her upper deck is four and a half feet 
 above the water at its lowest point ; that the whole length of the deck 
 is protected by bulwarks six feet high, and that in the central thirty-six 
 feet of the ship s length she carries a fixed solid battery up to a height 
 of eleven and a half feet, at which height it is decked over with sheet 
 iron, covered with four-inch planking. 
 
 The Favorite, a ship of 2,000 tons, and the Zealous, of nearly 4,000, 
 were next taken in hand and converted by plans of the chief con 
 structor, both being wooden ships and answering well so far as they 
 have yet been tried ; although in the case of the Zealous, as in that of 
 the French ships Magenta and Solferino, there is a large exposed portion 
 of the wooden hull before and abaft the battery which would no doubt 
 be speedily set on fire in action. Still, there is no comparison between 
 the offensive and defensive powers of these vessels as at present con 
 structed, and what they would have been if completed on their original 
 designs as mere unprotected wooden hulls. 
 
 A great improvement over the first iron-clads was a plan of Rear- 
 
230 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Admiral R. S. Robinson, Comptroller of the British Navy, in securing 
 the rudder-head and steering apparatus from the direct impact of shot. 
 The confidence which Admiral Robinson had in the soundness of the 
 views of the new constructor led the Admiralty to call upon him to de 
 sign two powerful frigates, Lord Warden and Lord Clyde, of a new 
 class, and of 4,000 tons. These ships are each pierced with gun-ports 
 on the main deck from stern to stern, and are armor-plated throughout, 
 the plates being carried up over a topgallant forecastle, to protect two 
 guns firing ahead on the upper deck, in addition to others firing forward 
 and aft on the main deck. Unlike all the other armor-clad ships of the 
 British Navy, therefore, these two carry four powerful guns firing ahead 
 in the line of their keel, which would no doubt render them most for 
 midable examples of what is known in England as the " end-on" sys 
 tem. The armor of these ships is five and a half inches thick at the 
 water-line, and six inches (in two thicknesses of four and a half and one 
 and a half inches) over the battery deck. These ships, however, being 
 of wood, and armed with a large number of guns, not of the largest 
 class, did not fully represent the views of the chief constructor, and ac 
 cordingly he handed in at the same time the design of another ship, to 
 be built of iron and to carry a less number of very powerful guns under 
 the protection of armor of unusual thickness. This design was also 
 adopted by the Admiralty, and the ship to be built called the Beller- 
 ophon a name which has already become identified with the finest 
 specimen of an iron-clad frigate yet produced in Great Britain. 
 
 So great was the. simplification introduced into the design of this 
 ship, that she was floated out of dock within twelve months from the 
 laying of the keel, with several hundreds of tons of armor already upon 
 her sides, and in five or six months after she was taken down the Med- 
 way to the Nore, for a preliminary trial of her engines and screw, with 
 her armor plating entirely completed, and many of her fittings well in 
 hand. In addition to 6-inch armor, this ship is formed with a double 
 iron skin, which has been found to add very much to the resisting 
 power of her hull. She is armed with 12-ton guns, is to steam 14 knots, 
 and turns under the action of her balanced rudder, which is of the 
 American plan, more handily than any other ship in the navy. Next, 
 the Pallas was commenced for the purpose of protecting British com 
 merce from the American " Alabamas " and " Floridas." She was built 
 of wood, at Woolwich, and is a short, fast, handy ship, and, like the 
 Bellerophon, is full rigged for sea-going purposes. The armor plating 
 is, of course, much inferior in strength to the Bellerophon, and her guns 
 much fewer in number. The whole of these ships (Lord Clyde, Lord 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 231 
 
 Warden, Bellerophon, and Pallas) are rapidly approaching completion, 
 and will speedily proceed on their sea trials. 
 
 Soon after the commencement of these ships, Mr. E. J. Reed received 
 his official appointment of chief constructor of the Navy he being at 
 the time about thirty-three years of age attaining this position solely 
 by the merit of the plans submitted by him to the Admiralty, and 
 highly approved by them. After his official appointment, his first ves 
 sels were the two iron-clad gunboats, Viper and Vixen, which being of 
 a very light draught of water, afforded but little scope for obtaining 
 superior qualities. The water-line and the engines of these vessels are 
 protected, but the only cover given to the guns is a transverse bulkhead, 
 through which the guns fire over a forecastle deck. Each vessel is fitted 
 with two screw propellers, supported by separate dead woods, so that 
 the stern is double. The Viper is built wholly of iron, and the Vixen 
 with iron frames and wood planking outside, to enable the bottom to be 
 coppered. 
 
 The Penelope is also a double-screw ship of iron, but of much larger 
 dimensions, being nearly 3,000 tons. Her armor will be similar to the 
 Bellerophon s, but of less extent, and she is to draw but 16 feet of water. 
 Her cabins are to accommodate an admiral and his staff, and she is in 
 tended for service in any part of the world. This ship is but just begun 
 at the Pembroke Dock-Yard, South Wales. 
 
 The Hercules will succeed the Bellerophon at Chatham, differing 
 from her but little, except that her armor is to be of a more ponderous 
 character. The outside armor plates are 9 inches thick ; then come 
 12-inch teak-logs, then a double iron skin 1J inches thick, then 10-inch 
 iron frames, filled in solid with teak, then 18 inches of teak-logs; next 
 to these and supporting them, another iron skin, three-quarters inch 
 thick, this skin being finally supported by iron frames 8 inches deep. 
 A target, constructed in this manner, has been fired at with the most 
 powerful 12-ton guns, with extreme charges of powder and steel pro 
 jectiles, but even the first iron skin was not penetrated. It is thought 
 that even the 20-ton^ 600-pounder gun, will not penetrate it; but this 
 is about to be tried. 
 
 A very powerful iron-clad, designed by Mr. Reed, for the Sultan of 
 Turkey, with the sanction of the British Government, to be named the 
 "Turkestan," completed the list of iron-clad ships designed by him 
 during two and a half years that he has been associated with the Admi 
 ralty. 
 
 In addition to the iron-clads, however, a fleet of 1,000-ton wooden 
 ships, to steam thirteen knots and cany a couple of heavy and a couple 
 
232 
 
 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of light guns, have been designed by the chief constructor and built by 
 the Admiralty, the remarkable feature about them being that they are 
 only about one half of the length of fleet wooden sloops now build 
 ing by the United States Government. These sloops, known as the 
 " Amazon " class, are single screw-vessels ; and in addition to them a 
 small double-screw vessel, named the Plover, of only 660 tons, and 
 without armor, has been laid down at Deptford. A paddle steamer, 
 called the Helicon, has also been built from plans of the constructor, 
 and has given good results steaming a knot an hour faster in smooth 
 water than a similar ship constructed by private parties, and nearly a 
 knot and a half faster in a sea-way. 
 
 The latest work of the chief constructor of the British Navy has 
 been to design a fleet of iron transports for conveying troops. These 
 will be noble ships, 360 feet long, 49 broad, drawing 20 feet of water, 
 and to steam at 14 knots, carry 1,250 troops, women, and children, and 
 200 officers and seamen on board. These ships will cost about 200,- 
 000 each, or one million pounds sterling for the five. They are build 
 ing in private yards, and will be completed in the coming year. The 
 following table will show the progress of the British Navy within two 
 and a half years : 
 
 ENGLISH AEMOE-PLATED SHIPS. 
 
 SHIP S NAME. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 H. P. 
 
 DRAUGHT OF WATER. 
 
 LENGTH. 
 
 BESADTH. 
 
 Forward. 
 
 Aft. 
 
 Between 
 Perpen 
 diculars. 
 
 of 
 
 Keel. 
 
 Extreme. 
 
 For 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Enterprise 
 Research. . 
 
 933 
 1,253 
 2,094 
 2,126 
 3,716 
 4,067 
 4,080 
 4,270 
 737 
 754 
 2,947 
 4,813 
 5,938 
 
 160 
 200 
 400 
 600 
 800 
 1,000 
 1,000 
 1,000 
 160 
 160 
 600 
 1,100 
 1,150 
 
 ft. in. 
 12 4 
 
 12 3 
 19 3 
 18 3 
 24 6 
 24 
 24 
 21 
 9 6 
 9 9 
 15 9 
 22 
 24 6 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 15 10 
 15 3 
 22 3 
 24 3 
 26 
 26 6 
 26 6 
 26 
 10 6 
 10 9 
 16 9 
 26 
 26 6 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 180 
 195 
 225 
 225 
 252 
 280 
 280 
 300 
 160 
 160 
 260 .0 
 305 
 35510 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 15211 
 168 3 
 195 6 
 187 8 
 213 9 
 233 11 
 233 9 
 255 3 
 135 4 
 13410 
 221 7 
 55911 
 310 1 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 36 
 38 6 
 46 9 
 50 
 58 7 
 58 11 
 59 
 56 1 
 32 
 32 5 
 50 
 59 
 60 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 35 
 
 37 5 
 4410 
 48 9 
 57 2 
 57 2 
 57 3 
 56 1 
 32 
 32 5 
 50 
 59 
 60 
 
 Favorite 
 
 Pallas.. . 
 
 Zealous 
 
 Lord Clyde. . 
 
 Lord Warden 
 Bellerophon 
 
 Viper 
 
 Vixen. . 
 
 Penelope 
 
 Hercules 
 
 Turkestan 
 
 ENTERPRISE. Wooden hull; plating 4 inches thick ; 195 tons used. Nature of 
 backing a wooden ship with side 19| inches thick ; has 4 6^-ton guns on main 
 deck. No. of crew, 129 ; measured mile, trial speed, in smooth sea, 9.9 knots. 
 
 RESEARCH. Plating 4^ inches thick ; 352 tons used. Wooden ship, with side 19 
 inches thick ; 4 6^-ton guns on main deck. Number of crew, 135. 10.4 knots 
 measured trial speed in a smooth sea. 
 
 FAVORITE. Plating 4| inches thick ; 560 tons used. Wooden ship, with side 26 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 
 
 233 
 
 inches thick; 8 6^-ton rifled guns, and 2 110-pounder Armstrongs on main deck. 
 Number of crew, 200. Trial speed, measured mile in smooth sea, 11.7 knots. 
 
 PALLAS. Plating 4^ inches thick ; 560 tons used. Wooden ship, with side 22 
 inches thick. Armed with 4 6^-ton rifled, and 2 110-pounder Armstrongs. Number 
 of crew, 225. In smooth sea, trial speed, per measured mile, 13^ knots. 
 
 ZEALOUS. Plating 4 inches thick; 791 tons used. Wooden ship, with side 30 
 inches thick. Armament, 16 6^-ton rifled guns on main deck, and 4 110-pounder 
 Armstrongs on upper deck. Number of crew, 455. Trial speed, per measured mile, 
 in smooth sea, 12 knots. 
 
 LORD CLYDE. Plating, part 4^, part 5, inches thick ; 1,379 tons used. A wooden 
 ship, with side 31|- inches thick. Armed with 20 6^-ton rifled guns on main deck, 
 and 4 110-pounder Armstrongs on upper deck. Number of crew, 605. Trial speed, 
 per measured mile, in smooth sea, 13.7 knots. 
 
 LORD WARDEN. Plating, and the other particulars, same as the "Lord Clyde." 
 
 BELLEROPHON. Iron hull ; plating 6 inches thick ; 1,089 tons used ; backing of 
 10-inch teak. Armament, 10 300-pounders, 12 tons; 2 110-pounders, bow; 3 do. 
 aft making 15 guns on main deck, and in addition, 1 40-pounder Armstrong on 
 upper deck. Number of crew, 525. In smooth sea, trial speed per measured mile, 
 14.2 knots. 
 
 YIPER. Iron hull; 4^ inch plating; 180 tons used; backing 10-inch teak. Arm 
 ament, 2 100-pounders, 6J tons, and 2 howitzers, all on main deck. Number of crew, 
 80. Trial speed in smooth sea, 9.2 knots. 
 
 VIXEN. Hull both of wood and iron ; thickness of plating, etc., all same as the Viper. 
 
 PENELOPE. Iron hull ; plating part 5 and part 6 inches thick. Number of tons, 
 680. Backing, part 10 and part 11 inches thick, of teak. Armament, on main deck, 
 2 100-pounders, 6J tons, and 2 howitzers ; on upper deck, 1 40-pounder Armstrong. 
 Number of crew, 350. Trial speed, per measured mile, in smooth sea, 13.2 knots. 
 
 HERCULES. Iron hull; plating of 6, 8, and 9 inches thickness ; 1,425 tons of do. 
 used; teak backing, both 10 and 12 inches thickness. Armament, 10 300-pounders, 
 12 tons, on main deck, and 2 64-pounders on upper deck. Number of crew, 550. 
 Trial speed in smooth sea, by measured mile, 16.2 knots. 
 
 TURKESTAN. For the Turkish Government. Iron hull ; plating 8 inches thick, 
 with both 10 and 11-inch teak backing; 2,095 tons of plating used. Main deck 
 armament, 29 7-ton guns ; upper deck do., 4 7-ton guns. Number of crew, 650. 
 Trial speed in smooth sea, 15 knots. 
 
 WOODEN SHIPS, NOT PLATED. 
 
 SHIP S NAME. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 H. P. 
 
 DRAUGHT OF WATEB. 
 
 LENGTH. 
 
 BREADTH. 
 
 Forward. 
 
 Aft. 
 
 Between 
 Perpen 
 diculars. 
 
 of 
 KeeL 
 
 Extreme. 
 
 For 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Helicon 
 
 835 
 
 1,081 
 
 n 
 u 
 it 
 u 
 u 
 
 663 
 
 21 
 
 ;;< 
 
 1 
 
 JO 
 )0 
 
 50 
 
 ft 
 
 10 
 13 
 
 9 
 
 to. 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 ft. 
 
 10 
 16 
 
 i 
 9 
 
 in. 
 
 9 
 
 ( 
 
 6 
 
 fe 
 
 2 
 
 1! 
 I 1 
 
 et. 
 
 20 
 J7 
 
 ro 
 
 ft. 
 20( 
 15! 
 
 151 
 
 in. 
 ) 
 
 J 3 
 
 L 7 
 
 ft. 
 28 
 
 36 
 
 29 
 
 in. 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 ft. 
 
 28 
 35 
 
 t 
 
 28 
 
 in. 
 
 
 10 
 
 i 
 
 8 
 
 
 Niobe 
 
 Vestal 
 
 Nymphe 
 
 
 Dryad 
 
 Daphne 
 
 Plover 
 
234: 
 
 H1STOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 The Helicon has 2 20-pounder Armstrong guns on main deck. Number of crew, 
 65. Speed, 144; knots. 
 
 The Plover has 1 100-pounder 64-ton gun, and 2 40-pounder Armstrongs on the 
 upper deck. Number of crew, 80. Speed, 11 knots. 
 
 The others have for armament 2 100-pounder 6J tons, and 2 64-pounders, all on 
 
 main deck. 
 
 IEON TEANSPOETS. 
 
 SHIP S NAME. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 H. P. 
 
 700 
 
 u 
 11 
 
 li 
 
 DRAUGHT OF WATER. 
 
 LENGTH 
 
 BREADTH 
 
 Forward. 
 
 Aft. 
 
 Between 
 Perpen 
 diculars. 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 360 
 
 u 
 (( 
 
 a 
 (( 
 
 of 
 Keel. 
 
 Extreme. 
 
 for 
 Tonnage. 
 
 Crocodile 
 
 4,173 
 
 a 
 
 a 
 u 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 19 
 
 u 
 u 
 u 
 (( 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 tt 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 326 9 
 
 a 
 u 
 a 
 (( 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 49 
 
 tt 
 a 
 u 
 it 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 49 
 
 (( 
 
 a 
 a 
 
 Serapis 
 
 Euphrates 
 
 Jumna. . .... 
 
 Malabar. . 
 
 Their armament consists each of 2 40-pounder Armstrong guns on upper deck. 
 Number of crew to each, 200. Speed, 14 knots. 
 
 In the foregoing tables the speed is per measured mile in smooth 
 sea, without armament or stores on board. The following is a table of 
 the French Iron-clad Navy at the present time : 
 
 IEON-CASED SHIPS OF FEANCE. 
 
 SHIP S NAME. 
 
 Displace 
 ment. 
 
 Horse- 
 Power. 
 
 Mean 
 Draught. 
 
 Length 
 on Load 
 Line. 
 
 Breadth. 
 
 Kind 
 Hull 
 
 Armor 
 Plating. 
 
 Weight 
 of 
 Armor. 
 
 Speed in 
 Smooth 
 Water. 
 
 Magenta 
 Solferino 
 Couronne. . . . 
 Gloire 
 
 Tons. 
 
 6,750 
 6,700 
 6,000 
 5,650 
 
 1,000 
 1,000 
 900 
 900 
 
 Feet. 
 
 26 
 26 
 25 
 
 254- 
 
 Feet. 
 280 
 280 
 
 260 
 255 
 
 Feet. 
 57 
 
 57 
 55 
 56 
 
 Wood. 
 
 tt 
 
 Iron. 
 Wood. 
 
 Inches. 
 
 4* 
 
 a 
 
 44; & 3 
 44- 
 
 Tons. 
 
 900 
 
 900 
 700 
 800 
 
 Knots. 
 134; 
 
 14 
 13 
 134- 
 
 Invincible 
 Normandie . . . 
 Flandre . 
 
 5,525 
 5,650 
 5 700 
 
 900 
 900 
 1 000 
 
 254; 
 26 
 25 
 
 255 
 255 
 260 
 
 56 
 56 
 56 
 
 u 
 It 
 
 11 
 
 a 
 
 6 
 
 800 
 800 
 1 000 
 
 134- 
 13* 
 
 Gauloise 
 
 5,700 
 
 1 000 
 
 25 
 
 260 
 
 56 
 
 tt 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 Guyenne 
 Heroine 
 
 5,700 
 5 700 
 
 1,000 
 1 000 
 
 25 
 25 
 
 260 
 260 
 
 56 
 56 
 
 tt 
 
 Iron. 
 
 (( 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 Magnanime. . . 
 Provence .... 
 Eevanche. 
 Savoie . 
 
 5,700 
 5,700 
 5,700 
 5 700 
 
 1,000 
 1,000 
 1,000 
 1 000 
 
 25 
 25 
 25 
 25 
 
 260 
 260 
 260 
 260 
 
 56 
 56 
 56 
 56 
 
 Wood. 
 
 a 
 n 
 n 
 
 <( 
 u 
 a 
 a 
 
 
 14 
 
 Surveillante . . 
 Valeureuse. . . 
 Belliqueuse . . 
 Taureau 
 Paixhans .... 
 Palestro 
 Peiho 
 
 5,700 
 5,700 
 3,350 
 2,450 
 1,540 
 1,540 
 1 500 
 
 1,000 
 1,000 
 900 
 900 
 150 
 150 
 150 
 
 25 
 25 
 19* 
 16 
 8* 
 8i 
 
 io| 
 
 260 
 260 
 230 
 200 
 156 
 156 
 150 
 
 56 
 56 
 46 
 47i 
 46 
 46 
 45 
 
 it 
 it 
 n 
 n 
 u 
 
 a 
 (( 
 
 u 
 
 v( 
 it 
 
 
 4| 
 
 
 a 
 
 800 
 
 275 
 
 a 
 it 
 
 7 
 tt 
 
 
 
 Saigon 
 
 1 500 
 
 150 
 
 10 
 
 156 
 
 46 
 
 tt 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 Embuscade. . . 
 Impregnable. . 
 Protectrice. . . 
 Refuge 
 
 1,225 
 1,225 
 1,225 
 1 225 
 
 150 
 150 
 150 
 150 
 
 9* 
 H 
 
 94- 
 
 01 
 
 130 
 130 
 130 
 130 
 
 51 
 51 
 51 
 51 
 
 Iron, 
 u 
 
 (( 
 tl 
 
 Bi 
 
 t< 
 
 a 
 u 
 
 
 
 E 
 
 Arrogante... . 
 Implacable. . . 
 Opiniatre .... 
 
 1,340 
 1,340 
 1,340 
 
 150 
 150 
 150 
 
 8f 
 8f 
 84 
 
 145 
 145 
 145 
 
 48 
 48 
 48 
 
 It 
 tt 
 
 it 
 
 ti 
 a 
 
 
 ~~ 
 
 n 
 
 8 
 
! \-\ ~ 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 235 
 
 OPINION OF THE RUSSIAN ADMIRAL. 
 
 Rejecting the high sides of vessels, to cover which thousands of 
 pounds of iron would be required, the inventor of the Monitor has 
 gained, in comparison with other armored vessels, the following advan 
 tages : 
 
 First. A comparative cheapness in construction. 
 Second. The insignificance of target presented to the enemy s fire. 
 Third. The safety of the submerged part of the vessel from shots. 
 Fourth. The possibility of using guns of the heaviest calibres, and 
 capability to give great thickness to the turrets and side armor easier 
 than it could be done on armored vessels of other systems. 
 
 The system of Captain Ericsson must not be confounded with the 
 turreted system of Captain Coles. The latter places his turret on a com 
 mon vessel with pretty high sides, for the protection of which by armor, 
 as was mentioned before, an enormous weight of iron is required. 
 Those are the advantages presented by Captain Ericsson s system. In 
 relation to the execution of details, the first Monitor presented an exten 
 sive field for improvement. The famous action in Hampton Roads at 
 the beginning of 1862 compelled the Government of the United States 
 to choose this system of vessels for coast defence in preference to others. 
 Five large vessels-of-war very nearly became victims to the Merri- 
 mack, but were rescued by the timely arrival of the small Monitor, 
 which forced the Merrimack to leave the field of battle. 
 
 In reference to artillery, the choice of the American Government fell 
 on the 15-inch Rodman gun. Up to that time the largest guns used in 
 the Navy were 11 -inch Dahlgren guns, but the Monitor system is able to 
 use the largest guns, the defeating force of which is more effectual than 
 that of the 11-inch guns. 
 
 From that time it may be said that this class of vessels is sufficiently 
 tried in America. We will briefly bring forth some of the most noted 
 occasions in which their merits were exhibited. In order of time the 
 following favorable news concerning Monitors transpired : First was the 
 report by Commodore Rodgers of the storm encountered by him on the 
 Atlantic Ocean on board the Monitor Weehawken. This renowned 
 naval officer went to sea in tow of a steamer in the same way as all 
 Monitors generally make their sea voyages. Near the capes of the Del 
 aware, perceiving the approach of a storm, Commodore Rodgers sent 
 his companion to the nearest port, determined to remain at sea himself 
 to test the Monitor under these circumstances. 
 
 In his report he praises the qualities of the Weehawken observed by 
 
236 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 him during the storm. The other Monitors have repeatedly made sea 
 passages during the tempestuous winter time. Out of their number only 
 the first Monitor was lost, and that from causes more or less accessory. 
 
 After this we have the intelligence of the action on the Ogeechee 
 against sand-batteries ; the distance was from 400 to 600 fathoms, im 
 pediments preventing a nearer approach; several other vessels armed 
 partly with mortars participated in the action. The fortifications were 
 completely demolished, though repaired during the night. The absence 
 of land forces prevented the driving of the enemy out of the forts, as 
 the execution of the artillery alone at a distance of 400 fathoms was 
 insufficient for that purpose. One of the enemy s cruisers, the Nashville, 
 attempted to break through the Monitors, but a 15-inch shell decided 
 her fate. 
 
 Thereupon follows the attack on Fort Sumter. A careful study of 
 this affair shows that the injuries sustained by the Monitors were more 
 or less of a light character. Many weak points were discovered, also 
 many defects requiring alterations on the vessels already built, and some 
 changes in those that were in process of building ; but the main princi 
 ple on which the system of building these vessels was founded came out 
 of this effective trial with a complete triumph. 
 
 The next trial was of a real naval character a combat between two 
 iron-clads, the Monitor Weehawken against the Atlanta. On both sides 
 much was expected from the issue of this battle, but almost the first 
 shot from the 15-inch gun of the Weehawken decided the affair in her 
 favor. 
 
 The Monitors continue to play, if not the principal, still, however, an 
 important part at the siege of Charleston. Continually exposed to the 
 fire of the enemy for several months, they obstinately occupy their posi 
 tion in an almost open roadstead, maintaining a successful blockade ot 
 Charleston. All these circumstances certainly speak a great deal more 
 for the usefulness of the Monitors than against them. The last accident 
 to the Weehawken, which unexpectedly foundered in the midst of a 
 whole squadron of similar vessels, while at an anchorage at which those 
 vessels have remained so long a time with impunity, is not investigated, 
 and it may be will only show that these vessels require particular 
 precautions and care, and that it is impossible to treat them as common 
 vessels. 
 
 Such, in short, is the substance of the knowledge we have of the 
 Monitors. 
 
 In Russia, the Navy Department, in the person of his highness the 
 General Admiral and his nearest assistants, did not cease to follow from 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 237 
 
 the beginning the trials of armored ship-building in other States, but 
 with prudent caution it was decided not to do any thing until the new 
 vessels had been sufficiently tested. In consequence, after the first 
 battle between iron-clad vessels in America, the Navy Department im 
 mediately sent out there several officers belonging to different branches 
 of the naval service to study those new vessels on the spot. Those per 
 sons fulfilled the commission with which they were charged in the most 
 successful manner. Their reports confirmed the Navy Department in 
 its conclusions that out of all known systems of iron-clads the Monitor 
 was preferred for our coast defences, especially in our shallow waters. 
 The protection of Cronstadt, our principal naval port, an object of con 
 stant and particular solicitude of our Navy Department, presents besides 
 such local conveniences for the use of those vessels as cannot be found 
 everywhere. In consequence of all this, several vessels were commenced 
 on the exact model of the American Monitors. These vessels, destined 
 exclusively for the protection of Cronstadt, rapidly and successfully 
 move to completion. All the improvements, the necessity of which has 
 been proved by experience in America, will be introduced on our vessels, 
 and it is expected that those vessels will be a very effective and neces 
 sary addition to our land defences of Cronstadt. 
 
 At the same time the Navy Department did not neglect to adopt all 
 measures to provide the new vessels with the most perfect artillery ; and 
 we hope that our single-turreted vessels, representing the exact copy of 
 the American Monitors, will be armored with formidable artillery, com 
 bine all the new improvements, and give satisfaction to all the demands 
 of contemporary military science. 
 
 In addition to this, we did not stop on one system exclusively. 
 "With prudent calculation, concentrating all our efforts on means exclu 
 sively defensive, we shall have at the same time, besides the Monitors, a 
 few iron-clad vessels representing models of all the principal systems 
 now in use, and which could be adapted to our exclusive and local con 
 dition. 
 
 In conclusion, we may say we have before us an extensive and vast 
 road for the further study of this question, and investigation of those 
 improvements which are called forth by numerous imperfections of all 
 the systems of iron- clad vessels known at the present time. 
 
 In examining the reports of the captains of the Monitors which partici 
 pated in the bombardment of Fort Sumter, knowing exactly the kind of 
 battle the Monitors were engaged in, the injuries received by them, and 
 remembering that, notwithstanding a severe concentrated fire from the 
 numerous Southern forts, the Federal fleet had only one man killed and 
 
238 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 two wounded, we come inevitably to the conclusion that the attack on 
 Charleston positively proves the Monitors capable to compete, and prob 
 ably with chances of success, with the best iron-clad vessels of the 
 French and English Navies. 
 
 It is true that, from injuries received in this battle, the Keokuk was 
 sunk ; but it must not be forgotten that, having been constructed on a 
 different system, she was fastened imperfectly in comparison with her 
 companions, the injuries to which, though important, were for the most 
 part of such a character as will be easily provided against on the Moni 
 tors that are now being built in our yards and factories. 
 
 For instance, on board the vessels that participated in the action of 
 the 7th April, 1863, a great many bolts that fastened the turret-plates 
 were broken. In the pilot-houses and turrets, where there was no inside 
 iron sheathing, the captains and the men at the guns were exposed to 
 great danger from the nuts and ends of bolts rebounding inside. Those 
 nuts and pieces of bolts, falling between the foundations of turrets and 
 decks, prevented the turret from revolving. The fire of the Monitors also 
 was not so very effective, from continual stoppages of the guns. Finally, 
 there were some few more or less important defects and errors. 
 
 A well-considered new system of fastening iron plates in turrets, 
 taken from experience, a large iron ring covering the space between the 
 lower part of the turret and the deck, and the 9-inch cast-steel gun, are 
 the means from which we expect a great deal. 
 
 Notwithstanding the defects of the American Monitors, the strength 
 shown by them during the bombardment is truly astonishing. The 
 Southerners were firing from guns of the heaviest calibres at distances 
 which probably were carefully measured before the commencement of 
 the action these distances being smaller than half the distance of an 
 ordinary pointing fire and yet not one of the monster charges penetra 
 ted the turrets. The strongest experience of this kind was sustained 
 by the Passaic, and what was the result ? A shot from a gun of a heavy 
 calibre struck the upper edge of the turret, broke eleven plates, but did 
 not penetrate the turret, though the strength of the shock was such that 
 the projectile, rebounding upward, made an indentation of 2|- inches in 
 the pilot-house and bent it on one side; and notwithstanding all this, in 
 the turret proper of the Passaic, as well as in the turrets of the other 
 Monitors, there was no one killed or wounded ; a result certainly very 
 important, and which confirms the great superiority of the Monitor 
 system over all other systems of armor-plated vessels. 
 
 The fighting test through which the Monitors have passed is cer 
 tainly more effectual and decisive than the experiments made on plates 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 239 
 
 representing the sides of a " Warrior " or a " La Gloire ; " 4J inch 
 plates of those were fractured by occasional shots. 
 
 We may well ask what would have become of the vessels covered 
 by such plates, and their sides presenting a large target, and if (as it 
 happened with the Nahant) they would be exposed for some time to a 
 concentrated fire of 100 guns at a distance less than 1,500 feet? It is 
 not difficult to answer. Not only the " Warrior," with the " La Gloire," 
 but all those Minotaurs, Northumberlands, Magentas, and Solferinos, 
 constructed on improved models, would be sunk in such circumstances ; 
 while the Nahant got out of the action with injuries comparatively not 
 very important. 
 
 In examining the reports of the captains, we find several other places 
 confirming the solidity of the Monitors. With the exception of the 
 Keokuk and Passaic, all the vessels of the squadron were in a condition 
 to continue the fight, and it was only the signal of the admiral (to stop 
 the battle) that made them stop the attack. The Monitors Weehawken, 
 Montauk, Patapsco, and Catskill, after a hot action of 40 minutes, had 
 no serious injuries, not only in their turrets, but in any other parts of the 
 vessels. In" one word, from whatever side you look upon the results of 
 the battle, they are positively favorable to the Monitor system of con 
 structing vessels, inasmuch as the same is subject to improvements which 
 can be partly adopted on the Monitors building at the present time, and 
 unconditionally on those that are to be built. Passing to the reproach 
 of slowness of fire from the Monitors, it is easy to prove that, taking 
 into consideration the present state of artillery, the number of projectiles 
 fired within a certain specified time is not so very important as is the 
 degree of destruction they produce. Five shots from the Weehawken 
 were quite sufficient to force the Atlanta, a beautiful iron-clad corvette 
 which cost the Southerners a million of dollars, to strike her flag. 
 
 And it is certain that nine shots from a 15-inch gun fired by the Pas 
 saic in forty-five minutes would do a great deal of harm to the Warrior 
 or Black Prince. In three-quarters of an hour the Federal squadron let 
 out 139 projectiles, excluding 3 shots that the Keokuk made; and 
 remembering that the admiral s ship, the new Ironsides, scarcely partici 
 pated in the fight, it appears that the mean number of shots fired from 
 the 14 guns of the remaining seven Monitors during the action was nine, 
 or one shot for every five minntes ; a result, if not particularly brilliant, 
 still very satisfactory, if we remember that the continual stoppages in 
 firing are partly explained by inevitable accidents in first experiments, 
 and for the most part are set aside by another system of artillery, possi 
 ble improvements in loading guns, and port-stoppers. 
 
240 
 
 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 To these statements would be added parts of a very impor 
 tant report made by the Committee on Naval Affairs in the 
 House of Representatives, January 30, 1865, which presents 
 facts that are perfectly conclusive in regard to the speed of our 
 ships-of-war, facts which completely vindicate the Department 
 from the attacks which have been made in reference to this 
 particular subject. The first of these extracts will show the 
 average speed of vessels constructed before the war : 
 
 Names, tonnage, maximum and average speed of the Screw Vessels of the 
 Navy T)uilt ~before the War. 
 
 NAME. 
 
 Tons 1 burden. 
 
 Maximum speed 
 in knots per 
 hour under 
 steam alone in 
 smooth water. 
 
 Average speed at 
 sea in knots per 
 hour with steam 
 and sail. 
 
 
 4,582 
 
 10.9 
 
 8.5 
 
 Minnesota, Merrirnack, Wabash, Roa- 
 
 3,774 
 
 9.0 
 
 6.5 
 
 Brooklyn ... 
 
 2,070 
 
 9.2 
 
 8.1 
 
 San Jacinto 
 
 1,446 
 
 8.8 
 
 7.2 
 
 Hartford 
 
 1,990 
 
 9.5 
 
 7.3 
 
 
 2,362 
 
 9.5 
 
 7.3 
 
 
 1,929 
 
 7.5 
 
 6.5 
 
 
 1,289 
 
 8.0 
 
 6.5 
 
 Iroquois, Wyoming, Dakota, and Mo- 
 
 1,016 
 
 11.7 
 
 8.0 
 
 Narragansett and Seminole 
 
 809 
 
 8.0 
 
 6.5 
 
 Names, tonnage, maximum and average speed of the Side or Paddle-wheel 
 Vessels of the Navy "built before the War. 
 
 NAME. 
 
 Tons burden. 
 
 Maximum speed 
 under steam 
 alone in knots 
 per hour in 
 smooth water. 
 
 Average speed at 
 sea in knots per 
 hour with steam 
 and sail. 
 
 
 2,450 
 
 11.0 
 
 9.0 
 
 
 2415 
 
 11.0 
 
 9.0 
 
 
 1,692 
 
 8.7 
 
 7.5 
 
 Saranac 
 
 1,446 
 
 9.2 
 
 8.0 
 
 Saginaw 
 
 453 
 
 9.0 
 
 
 The following statements and tables from the same report 
 will enable the reader to compare the ships built since the 
 war began with those constructed before, and also with other 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 
 
 NAME OF VESSEL. 
 
 S-8 
 
 > 
 
 55 N 
 ^ E, 
 
 WJ 
 
 Number of voyages 
 from Liverpool to 
 New York. 
 
 Mean length of all 
 the voyages in days 
 and hours. 
 
 Average speed of all 
 the voyages in knots 
 per hour. 
 
 Paddle-wheel steamers Cunard line : 
 Asia .. . . 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 12.15f 
 
 10 04 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 14.7i 
 
 8 88 
 
 Africa .. . 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 13.0 
 
 9 78 
 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 11.3 
 
 11 42 
 
 Scotia . 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 10.184, 
 
 11 80 
 
 Mean of all five 
 
 
 
 
 10 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Screw steamers Cunard line : 
 China . 
 
 I 
 
 3 
 
 12.2 
 
 10.52 
 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 ll.Oi 
 
 11.54 
 
 Mean of the two 
 
 
 
 
 11.03 
 
 Screw steamers Liverpool, New York, and Phil 
 adelphia Steamship Company : 
 ^Etna .... .... 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 12 4*- 
 
 1043 
 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 14.1 If 
 
 8.78 
 
 Edinburgh .. .. 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 13 5 
 
 9 62 
 
 City of Washington 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 11.21 
 
 10.70 
 
 City of Baltimore . . 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 12 8 
 
 1030 
 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 12 23 
 
 9.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SPEED OF THE FASTEST MERCHANT TRANSATLANTIC STEAMERS. 
 
 As a very exaggerated idea is generally had of the speed of the 
 ocean merchant steamers, the following table is given with a view to 
 correct erroneous impressions. It shows the average speed made dur 
 ing the year 1862 by the screw and side- wheel steamers of the Cunard 
 line, and of the screw steamers of the Liverpool, New York, and Phil 
 adelphia line, plying between the cities of New York and Liverpool. 
 In computing the speed per hour, the distance is taken at 3,050 geo 
 graphical miles. 
 
 These vessels run at their best speed ; they burn all the coal they 
 can from their departure to their arrival, and use their canvas (with 
 which they are well provided) whenever it can be advantageously set. 
 The average of so many voyages in both directions must be very nearly 
 the correct speed that can be permanently sustained under steam alone 
 at sea, uninfluenced by weather, which is neutralized during so long a 
 course of steaming, and in opposite directions ; nor should it be over- 
 
 16 
 
24:2 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 looked that this speed corresponds to the vessel s draught of water when 
 her coal and stores are half expended, and not to the deep-load draught 
 of water. The maximum and minimum passages are due purely to fa 
 vorable or unfavorable weather. 
 
 The average speed of the Collins steamers was 13f knots per hour; 
 that of the Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Company is llf knots 
 per hour. All of these vessels, it will be remembered, are of large ton 
 nage, and have models as sharp as it is possible to construct them. On 
 the whole, it may be considered that a medium-sized screw vessel, of 
 the best model, which can permanently sustain 10-|- knots per hour at 
 sea, uninfluenced by weather, is a fast merchant steamer. 
 
 Principal Screw War-steamers of the United States Navy. 
 
 *" of Vessel. 
 
 Lackawanna ............................................... 12 . 00 
 
 Ticonderoga ............................................... 12.00 
 
 Sacramento ................................................ 12.00 
 
 Shenandoah ............................................... 12.00 
 
 Monongahela ............................................... 12.00 
 
 Adirondack and Juniata ..................................... 12 .00 
 
 Ossipee and Housatonic ...................................... 12 . 00 
 
 Canandaigua ............................................... 12.00 
 
 Nipsic, Shawmut, and Nyack. . . . , ............................ 12 . 50 
 
 Sagamore, Huron, Cayuga, Chippewa, Aroostook, Chocura, Itasca, 
 Kanawha, Katahdin, Kennebec, Kineo, Marblehead, Owasco, Pe- 
 
 nobscot, Pinola, Scioto, Tahoma, Wissahickon, Winona ........ 10.00 
 
 Iroquois ................................................... 11.70 
 
 Wyoming ................................................. 11.20 
 
 Mohican .................................................. 11.80 
 
 Kearsarge ................................................. 11.20 
 
 Oneida .................... . ............................... 11.70 
 
 Wachusett ................................................. 11.20 
 
 Dakota .................................................... 12 . 00 
 
 Tuscarora ................................................. 11.20 
 
 Lancaster ................................................. 9.50 
 
 Hartford .................................................. 9.50 
 
 Richmond ................................................. 7.50 
 
 San Jacinto ........... , .................................... 8 . 50 
 
 Wabash ................................................... 9.11 
 
 Minnesota ................................................. 8.87 
 
 Roanoke .................................................. 8.83 
 
 Colorado .................................................. 8.83 
 
 Brooklyn ........................ .................... 9.19 
 
THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF MONITORS. 243 
 
 Principal Paddle-wheel Steamers of the United States Naxy. 
 
 Name of Vessel. Speed per hour in 
 
 nautical miles. 
 
 Conemaugh 11 . 30 
 
 Cimarrou 11.60 
 
 Haratanza 10.00 
 
 Mahaska 11 .00 
 
 Port Royal 11.10 
 
 PaulJones 11.11 
 
 Genesee 10.90 
 
 Sonoma 11.30 
 
 Tioga 10.90 
 
 Sebago 11.00 
 
 Octorora 11.30 
 
 Ascutney, Agawam, Chenango, Chicopee, Eutaw, lasco, Lenapee, 
 Pontiac, Patuxet, Mattabeset, Mingoe, Massasoit, Metacomet, 
 Mendota, Mackinaw, Otsego, Pontoosuc, Tacony, Sassacus, Sham 
 rock, Tallapoosa, Wateree, Wyalusing, Osceola 13 .07 
 
 Powhatan 1 1 . 00 
 
 Mississippi 8.70 
 
 Saranac 9 . 20 
 
 Susquehanna 11.00 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE RELIEF OF FORT SUMTER. 
 
 ONE of the most important of all the early enterprises of 
 the war has devoted to it only the two following sentences in 
 one of the trusted and widely circulated histories of the rebel 
 lion : " The fleet from New York laden with provisions for 
 the garrison had appeared off the bar by noon of the day on 
 which fire was opened, but made no effort to fulfil its errand ; 
 to have attempted to supply the fort would have at best in- 
 yolved a heavy cost of life, probably to no purpose. Its com 
 mander communicated by signal with Major Anderson, but re 
 mained out of range of the enemy s fire till after the surrender, 
 when he returned as he came." * 
 
 History is supposed by many to be a revealer as well as a 
 recorder of truth ; but it is doubtful whether any paragraph so 
 small as the above has ever before concealed as many important 
 facts. Of course, no intention of concealment is charged upon 
 the writer ; but the fact shows that often when the historian 
 thinks he has searched the whole field many very important 
 things may still lie beyond the range of his vision. How much 
 lay hidden in the shadow of these few lines will appear by a 
 relation of facts. 
 
 The most perplexing, and probably the most dangerous of 
 the questions first presented to Mr. Lincoln and his advisers, 
 was in regard to the relief of Fort Sumter. Either through 
 the weakness or the complicity, or both, of the preceding ad 
 ministration, an armed insurrection against the Government 
 was treated as if it required no serious intervention, and the 
 
 * Greeley, " The American Conflict," vol. i., page 447 
 
THE BELIEF OF FORT SUMTEE. 245 
 
 seizure of forts, arsenals, mints, and custom-houses, was passed 
 over as if it were merely an innocent amusement. Mr. Bu 
 chanan and his counsellors had constrained the little garrison 
 of Fort Sumter to remain without supplies or reinforcements, 
 and to permit the rebels to encircle them with batteries, not 
 only without resistance but without even a protest, while the 
 guns of the fort bore on every point which the conspirators 
 were fortifying ; and when Mr. Lincoln came into power Sum 
 ter was surrounded by a line of guns to which the little garrison 
 could offer no effectual resistance. 
 
 At the time when Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, the mere 
 relief of the garrison by provisions or troops, difficult as that 
 was, by no means formed the most perplexing part of the prob 
 lem. The new Government began its contest at almost fatal 
 disadvantage. The plan of the rebel leaders was clearly de 
 fined and settled. All understood the common purpose, and 
 all were perfectly united. They were fully determined from 
 the beginning upon separation and independence, and nothing 
 less than this ; and were ready to try the issue by war, if that 
 should be needed. At the same time, while making every pos 
 sible preparation for an armed conflict, they strengthened their 
 accomplices in the North and in Europe by declaring that they 
 desired only peace, only to be left in quiet to manage their own 
 concerns. By adding to this the deceitful doctrine that the citi 
 zen owes primary allegiance to his State, and pressing loudly 
 the sovereignty of the States and the sacredness of their soil as 
 against any " invasion " by the General Government, they be 
 wildered a portion even of the loyal JSTorth and caused it to be 
 widely assumed as a conceded fact, that they were already in 
 fact and by right an independent people, and were seeking only 
 the things that belong to peace ; and should the Federal Gov 
 ernment attack them, it would be a causeless assault upon an 
 unoffending party. They had thus secured beforehand the 
 sympathies of England and France, who welcomed and made 
 use of the argument without being deceived by the reasoning. 
 The " peace Democrats " of the North made these statements the 
 staple of their warfare against the Government, and a multitude 
 of loyal men for a time were puzzled. 
 
 While the peaceable intentions and the sacred State rights 
 
246 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of the conspirators were tlius widely proclaimed and echoed by 
 every friend of their cause at home and abroad, they worked 
 with boldness and untiring energy to possess themselves of 
 every strategic point and every fortification both on the coast 
 and inland, and with almost complete success. They were ex 
 ceedingly anxious to obtain possession of Fort Sumter, either by 
 inducing the Government to evacuate it or to attack them, in 
 order that they might appear to capture it in self-defence. They 
 were, however, as the result proved, fully determined to attack 
 and reduce the fort at all hazards, provided other methods 
 should fail. 
 
 Some of the chief perils which beset the new Administration 
 in that dark hour are therefore easily seen. Southern commis 
 sioners were in "Washington ostensibly seeking terms of peace 
 able separation, and though not officially received they were 
 nevertheless in communication with one department of the 
 Government ; and as the result has shown, they managed, by 
 busy and ingenious friends, of whom they had so many, to pos 
 sess themselves of secrets which it was supposed none but the 
 chief officers of the Government knew. If they could obtain a 
 peaceable evacuation of Fort Sumter, they could properly claim 
 it as an acknowledgment of their rights, and virtually of their 
 independence ; and they urged this step with so much power as 
 to obtain, as they affirm, an assurance which they received as 
 from due authority, that within a certain number of days Fort 
 Sumter should be evacuated. Of course, Southern evidence 
 must be received only for what it is worth. If, on the other 
 hand, they could provoke the Government to attack them at 
 Charleston, they would, in self-defence, capture the fort in a 
 few hours, and Europe could thus cry out, Shame on a Govern 
 ment that attempts to crush a weaker and independent people 
 merely wishing peaceably to govern themselves ; and they could 
 glorify the skill and courage of the Southern army in reducing 
 so quickly a strong casemated fort. Every sympathizer in the 
 North would be ready to echo the cry, and use it for the over 
 throw of the party in power. 
 
 It would seem that these two horns of a dilemma were quite 
 enough to present to Mr. Lincoln and his advisers, but there 
 was a third which also demanded serious attention. The 
 
THE EELIEF OF FOKT SUMTEK. 247 
 
 cowardly or treacherous yielding of the preceding Adminis 
 tration, and the prospect of what many thought would be a 
 tame submission by the new one, had so far destroyed the con 
 fidence of the North that the credit of the Government was 
 seriously injured. The loyal people were fast losing confidence 
 in the courage of their leaders, and consequently in the success 
 of their cause, and money therefore was not to be obtained. 
 
 These statements will serve perhaps to throw some light 
 upon that mysterious and silent pause which occurred between 
 the 4th of March, 1861, and the early days of April. 
 
 Surrounded on all sides by perils, each of which seemed 
 almost equally formidable, pressed by questions for the decision 
 of which there were no precedents, and which involved the life 
 of the nation, time for mature deliberation was absolutely ne 
 cessary time to consult the wisest in the land before a step was 
 taken which could not be retraced. At the same time the situa 
 tion was becoming more dangerous with every hour of delay. 
 
 The truly loyal portion of the North was, being weakened 
 both by impatience and inaction, and by loss of confidence in 
 the Administration ; public credit was sinking, and there was a 
 growing disposition to concede the right of secession, and to say 
 to the conspirators, Go in peace. It is in the light of these facts 
 only that the true history of the attempt to relieve Fort Sum- 
 ter can be made to appear. 
 
 As has been stated in a previous chapter, an armistice had 
 been secretly entered into between the former Administration 
 and the secessionists, and Commodore Barron had been sent out 
 to Pensacola on the 20th of January to prevent any government 
 vessel from entering the harbor, by which order not only were 
 the conspirators left in quiet possession of Pensacola, but Fort 
 Pickens was cut off from receiving any supplies, and would, as 
 a consequence, in due time fall into the hands of the secession 
 ists. Troops sent out by General Scott had already been pre 
 vented from landing, in obedience to Toucey s orders, and in ac 
 cordance with Mr. Buchanan s armistice, of whose existence Mr. 
 Lincoln and his Cabinet at the time knew nothing. 
 
 It is quite evident, therefore, that the discussion in regard to 
 the relief of Fort Sumter began in Mr. Lincoln s Cabinet under 
 exceedingly embarrassing circumstances. To add to the com- 
 
24:8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 plication of affairs, John Forsyth, Martin J. Crawford, and A. 
 B. Roman, styling themselves " Commissioners from the Con 
 federate States," were in "Washington to negotiate, according to 
 their own statement, the terms of a peaceable separation ; and 
 though not officially received, they were, nevertheless, through 
 Judge Campbell, in official communication with the Govern 
 ment through the State Department. Conversations were there 
 held in the presence of Judge Nelson, of the Supreme Court, 
 who, on the 15th of March, 1861, sanctioned the following note 
 from Judge Campbell to Judge Crawford as the proper infer 
 ence to be drawn from the assurances which were given : " / 
 feel entire confidence that Fort Sumter will ~be evacuated in the 
 next five days" 
 
 Judge Campbell subsequently declared that he felt author 
 ized to make the following statement in a letter to Jefferson 
 Davis : " Before this letter reaches you, Sumter will have been 
 evacuated." 
 
 In addition to this, Mr. Buchanan s policy was sustained by 
 a large party in the North, constituting a power which could 
 not be wholly disregarded. Not only had his Administration 
 decided that a State could not be compelled by force to obey 
 the G-eneral Government, but, after much consultation, had 
 determined that no attempt should be made to relieve the gar 
 rison of Sumter. Captain "Ward, a brave officer of the Navy, 
 who was killed early in the war, on the Potomac, proposed a 
 plan to Mr. Buchanan for relieving the fort, which plan was 
 then deemed practicable by both naval and military men ; but 
 it was rejected, and Major Anderson and his men abandoned. 
 
 In spite of this dangerous and complicated condition of 
 affairs, the majority of Mr. Lincoln s Cabinet were, at first, in 
 favor of holding and reenforcing the fort. Those who from the 
 first desired to evacuate it, urged that the Government could 
 make its stand at Fort Pickens f with far greater probability of 
 success, and with equal moral effect ; and when to this was 
 added afterward the influence of the opinion of General Scott, 
 General Totten, and other distinguished military men, that the 
 completion of the rebel batteries had rendered an approach to 
 the fort impossible, except by an unwarrantable loss of life, it is 
 not strange that the Cabinet should have wavered, or that they 
 
THE BELIEF OF FOKT SUMTEK. 249 
 
 should, at one time, have deemed it wise to evacuate the fort. 
 But it was soon seen that the eyes and hearts of the whole 
 country were so fixed upon Fort Sumter and its beleaguered 
 garrison, that it would be dangerous for the Administration to 
 appear indifferent to its fate. There, in the opinion of the peo 
 ple, the honor of the country was at stake. There the rebels 
 had made their first hostile demonstration. Charleston was 
 regarded as the head and heart of the conspiracy. There the 
 Government was defied and scorned. And the loyal people felt 
 that if the fort was tamely surrendered, it would be a disgrace 
 to the national name. Some in high places declared that the 
 evacuation of Sumter would be treason, and advised the Presi 
 dent to make the attempt to relieve it, even if he believed that 
 every ship and man of the expedition would be lost. 
 
 Under this pressure from without, the President decided, 
 late in March, 1861, to attempt to succor the fort. Previous to 
 this, Captain G-. Y. Fox, who was soon afterward appointed As 
 sistant Secretary of the Navy, a gallant officer, of great nautical 
 skill and experience, had laid before the President and Cabinet a 
 plan for the relief of the fort, and offered to lead the expedition 
 himself. The spirit and determination of this officer were 
 shown by the fact that he proposed this, though General Scott, 
 having now declared the scheme impracticable, threw his influ 
 ence against it ; while some tried and loyal officers felt unwilling 
 to risk their reputation in an enterprise which seemed to them 
 to promise little but failure. It was thought, however, by Mr. 
 Lincoln, that an earnest and gallant attempt to relieve that 
 starving garrison, even though a failure, would maintain the 
 honor of our flag, and raise the spirits of the people. 
 
 The determination of the President, and the precise plan 
 of Captain Fox were, of course, known to each member of the 
 Cabinet, and to any others, if such they were, who were in their 
 confidence. If, therefore, a disposition existed anywhere to de 
 feat the expedition, a fair opportunity was presented. JSTo in 
 tention of this kind is charged upon any one ; but by one of 
 those curious coincidences which sometimes occur, the only 
 thing which could have prevented the success of the plan was 
 actually done. 
 
 The method of relief proposed by Captain Fox required one 
 
250 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 steam-frigate for carrying three hundred (300) sailors, to be 
 landed, if necessary, in boats, and a full complement of armed 
 launches, two smaller steamers, and three tugs. "Without the 
 frigate, and the sailors and launches she was to carry, the exe 
 cution of the plan was impossible. It was well known to the 
 Cabinet that only a single frigate suitable for this service was 
 then on the Atlantic coast the Powhatan, at New York. 
 
 On the 28th of March the President wrote to the Secretary 
 of the Navy, directing him to fit out an expedition as soon as 
 practicable, for the relief of Fort Sumter. The expedition was 
 under the orders of the War Department, and the Navy was to 
 cooperate. Of course, this order covered the use of all vessels 
 and means at the Secretary s disposal, which the execution of 
 the order required. It included, from necessity, the Powhatan, 
 because without that frigate nothing could be done. Moreover, 
 the Powhatan was actually included in formal orders, as will 
 appear from the following telegrams. The first orders the 
 Powhatan to be held in readiness for sea, and is as follows : 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1, 1861 Received at Brooklyn 4.10 P. M. 
 To Commodore S. L. BEEESE, Navy- Yard: 
 
 The Department revokes its orders for the detachment of the officers 
 of the Powhatan, and the transfer and discharge of her crew. Hold 
 her in readiness for sea service. 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 The second is from Mr. Lincoln himself, and is as follows : 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1, 1861 Received at Brooklyn, 6.50 P. M. 
 To the Commandant of the Navy-Yard: 
 
 Fit out the Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment, 
 under sealed orders. Orders by a confidential messenger go forward to 
 morrow. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 The third is from the Secretary of the Navy, and, as it ap 
 pears, was sent at the same time with the one from the Presi 
 dent, for both were received at Brooklyn at the same time, 6.50 
 p. M. It is as follows : 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1, 1861 Received at Brooklyn 6.50 P. M. 
 To Commandant of Navy-Yard : 
 
 Fit out Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment. 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
THE BELIEF OF FORT SUHTEE. 251 
 
 These telegrams show, either that the President was acting 
 in concert with the Secretary in regard to the Powhatan, and 
 that he gave the order for detaching her without knowing its 
 import, or, if he knew that the order which he signed related to 
 the Powhatan, he did not know that to take her would interfere 
 with the expedition to Sumter, for he afterward expressly disa 
 vowed any intention to do so, and ordered, when too late, that 
 the frigate should proceed to Sumter, and that the Secretary s 
 orders should be carried out. Whatever, then, may have been 
 the design, if any, in interfering with the expedition, the Presi 
 dent was not a party to the plan. 
 
 The Secretary acted with the utmost promptness. Orders 
 were immediately issued to have the sailors ready, and to pre 
 pare the Pawnee, the Harriet Lane, the Pocahontas, and the 
 Powhatan for the expedition. 
 
 On the 30th of March the President sent Captain Fox to 
 New York with verbal instructions to prepare for the execution 
 of his plan. These preparations were duly made. The Pow 
 hatan, the Pawnee, the Pocahontas, and the Harriet Lane were 
 got ready for sea, and on the 6th of April the Powhatan sailed. 
 On that day her commander, Captain Mercer, received an order, 
 signed by the President, detaching the Powhatan from the ser 
 vice to which she had been assigned, and placing her under the 
 command of Lieutenant D. D. Porter. The President after 
 ward declared that he signed this order without the least idea 
 that it was to deprive Captain Fox of one of his ships, and he 
 probably did not remember the names of the vessels which had 
 been designated for Fort Sumter. Captain Fox did not sail un 
 til two days after the Powhatan, but he received no intimation 
 that her destination had been changed, and supposed she had 
 gone on to Charleston in obedience to orders. There was a 
 very good reason for this. The order to change her course did 
 not pass through the Navy Department at all. Secretary 
 Welles knew nothing of the matter until it was too late to in 
 terfere. The manner in which it came to his knowledge is also 
 worthy of being recorded. When the officers who were sent to 
 take the Powhatan out of the hands of her commander found 
 that their orders conflicted with those of the Secretary of the 
 Navy, they telegraphed to the Secretary of State, by whom 
 
252 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 their order had been procured from the President. Mr. Seward 
 called upon the Secretary of the Navy, at Willard s, at about 
 eleven o clock p. M. on the day that the Powhatan sailed from 
 NQW York, and said there was some trouble in New York about 
 the Powhatan. Mr. Welles, upon learning the facts, informed the 
 Secretary of State that the Powhatan had been ordered by the 
 ISTavy Department, and by direction of the President, to the re 
 lief of Fort Sumter. It was proposed that they should call on 
 the President in order that the question might be settled. Mr. 
 Lincoln had forgotten that the Powhatan had been ordered to 
 go on the Fort Sumter expedition ; and, although it was then 
 midnight, Secretary "Welles went to the Navy Department, and 
 procured and showed him the original order. 
 
 The President then declared that the orders of the Secretary 
 of the Navy must not be interfered with, and ordered the Pow 
 hatan to be restored to her original destination. A telegram 
 was sent by the Secretary of State to New York, but because it 
 was too late, or for some other reason, the Powhatan was not 
 stopped, and in consequence the expedition to Fort Sumter 
 failed. At about the same time an operator in a telegraph 
 office brought to Secretary Welles a telegram which had been 
 forwarded to Charleston, and which he deemed of too much 
 public importance to remain unknown. It informed the Con 
 federates that an attempt was being made to relieve Fort Sum 
 ter, and on the receipt of this message at Charleston, the Con 
 federates opened their fire, and the fort was soon surrendered. 
 
 The details of the expedition, and the failure in consequence 
 of the absence of the Powhatan, are fully set forth in the fol 
 lowing statement of Captain Fox, which is an important part 
 of the history : 
 
 MEMORANDUM OF FACTS CONCERNING THE ATTEMPT TO SEND 
 SUPPLIES TO FOKT SUMTEE IN 1861. 
 
 January 5, 1861, whilst in New York, I heard that a steamer, be 
 longing to M. O. Roberts, was about to leave, to earn 7 supplies to the 
 garrison of Fort Sumter. When an officer in the Navy, I had com 
 manded one of the United States mail steamers belonging to the line of 
 which Mr. -Roberts was president, and therefore I believed it possible 
 for me to obtain command of the vessel designated to take supplies and 
 
THE BELIEF OF FOET SUMTEE. 253 
 
 troops to that fort. Upon visiting the office of the company, in West 
 Street, I found that Captain McGowan had been appointed to the com 
 mand, and that this steamer, named the Star of the West, had returned 
 from her voyage, having been turned back by the rebel batteries of Morris 
 Island. On the 9th of January, I called upon my friend George W. Blunt, 
 Esq., of New York, and expressed to him my views as to the possibility 
 of relieving the garrison, and the dishonor which would be justly merited 
 by the Government, unless immediate measures were taken to fulfil this 
 sacred duty. 
 
 Mr. Blunt asked me to explain my plan to him, which I did, as fol 
 lows : 
 
 From the outer edge of the Charleston bar, in a straight line to 
 Sumter, through the Swash Channel, the distance is four miles, with no 
 shoal spots having less than nine feet at high water. The batteries on 
 Morris and Sullivan s Islands are about two thousand six hundred yards 
 apart, and between these troops and supplies must pass. I proposed to 
 anchor three small men-of-war off the entrance to the Swash Channel, 
 as a safe base of operations against any naval attack from the enemy. 
 
 The soldiers and provisions to be carried to the Charleston bar in 
 the Collins steamer Baltic ; all the provisions and munitions to be put 
 up in portable packages, easily handled by one man. The Baltic to 
 carry three hundred extra sailors, and a sufficient number of armed 
 launches, to land all the troops at Fort Sumter in one night. 
 
 Three steam-tugs, of not more than six feet draught of water, such as 
 are employed for towing purposes, were to form part of the expedition, 
 to be used for carrying in the troops and provisions, in case the weather 
 should be too rough for boats. 
 
 With the exception of the men-of-war and tugs, the whole expedi 
 tion was to be complete on board the steamer Baltic, and its success de 
 pended upon the possibility of running past batteries at night, which 
 were distant from the centre of the channel one thousand three hundred 
 yards. I depended upon the barbette guns of Sumter to keep the 
 channel between Morris and Sullivan s Islands clear of rebel vessels at 
 the time of entering. 
 
 Mr. Blunt and myself discussed the plan over a chart, and he com 
 municated it to Charles H. Marshall and Russell Sturges, and they all 
 approved it, and Mr. Marshall agreed to furnish and provision the ves 
 sels without exciting suspicion. 
 
 February 4th, Mr. Blunt came to my hotel with a telegram from 
 Lieutenant-General Scott, requesting my attendance at Washington. I 
 left the next day, and breakfasted with the General on the J3th instant 
 
254: HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 At 1 1 A. M. I met at his office, by arrangement, Lieutenant Hall, who 
 had been sent from Surnter by Major Anderson. In the General s pres 
 ence we discussed the question of relieving Fort Surnter. Lieutenant 
 Hall s plan was to go in with a steamer, protected by a vessel on each 
 side loaded with hay. I objected to it for the following reasons : first, 
 a steamer could not carry vessels lashed alongside in rough water ; and 
 second, in running up the channel, she would be bows on to Fort Moul- 
 trie, and, presenting a large fixed mark without protection ahead, would 
 certainly be disabled. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Scott approved my plan, and, on the 7th of Feb 
 ruary, introduced me to Mr. Holt, the Secretary of War, to whom I 
 explained the project, and offered my services to conduct the party to 
 the fort. Mr. Holt agreed to present the matter to President Buchanan 
 that evening. 
 
 The next day, the 8th of February, news was received of the election 
 of Jefferson Davis by the Montgomery Convention. I called upon Gen 
 eral Scott, and he intimated to me that probably no effort would be 
 made to relieve Fort Sumter. He seemed much disappointed and as 
 tonished ; I therefore returned to New York on the 9th of February. 
 
 On the 12th of March I received a telegram from Postmaster-Gen 
 eral Blair to come to Washington, and I arrived there on the 13th. 
 Mr. Blair having been acquainted with the proposition I presented to 
 General Scott under Mr. Buchanan s administration, sent for me to ten 
 der the same to Mr. Lincoln, informing me that Lieuten ant-General 
 Scott had advised the President that the fort could not be relieved, and 
 must be given up. Mr. Blair took me at once to the White House, 
 and I explained the plan to the President; thence we adjourned to 
 Lieutenant-General Scott s office, where a renewed discussion of the sub 
 ject took place. 
 
 The General informed the President that my plan was practicable in 
 February, but that the increased number of batteries erected at the 
 mouth of the harbor since that time, rendered it impossible in March. 
 
 Finding there was great opposition to any attempt at relieving Fort 
 Sumter, and that Mr. Blair alone sustained the President in his policy 
 of refusing to yield, I judged that my arguments in favor of the practi 
 cability of sending in supplies would be strengthened by a visit to 
 Charleston and the fort. 
 
 The President readily agreed to my visit, if the Secretary of War 
 and General Scott raised no objections. Both of these gentlemen con 
 senting, I left Washington on the 19th of March, and passing through 
 Richmond and Wilmington, reached Charleston the 21st. I travelled 
 
THE BELIEF OF FOKT SUMTEE. 255 
 
 the latter part of the way with Mr. Holmes, of California, formerly a 
 member of Congress from South Carolina, in the days of Calhoun. At 
 Florence Station we met Mr. Keitt, a member of Congress from South 
 Carolina when that State attempted to secede. He welcomed Mr. 
 Holmes very warmly, and inquired, with great anxiety, whether Sumter 
 was to be given up. Mr. Holmes said, " Yes, I know it ; " which seemed 
 to give Mr. Keitt much satisfaction, but he insisted upon knowing his 
 authority. Mr. Holmes said, " I have the highest authority for what I 
 say ; " and upon Mr. Keitt again asking who, he leaned toward him, and 
 at that moment the engine-whistle gave a screech for starting, so that 
 the conversation closed, and I lost the name. 
 
 At a station near Charleston, Mr. Huger, formerly postmaster under 
 President Buchanan, got into the cars, and had an interview with Mr. 
 Holmes, during which the same assurances were repeated, relative to 
 the certainty of the evacuation of Fort Surater. Mr. Huger seemed 
 much depressed with the condition of affairs. At Charleston, I sought 
 an interview with Captain Hartstein, formerly of the United States 
 Navy, and to him I stated my desire to visit Major Anderson ; not find 
 ing General Beauregard, he introduced me to Governor Pickens, to 
 whom I showed the order under which I acted. After considerable 
 delay, he directed Captain Hartstein to take me to Fort Sumter ; and 
 whilst the boat was preparing, I had an interview with General Beaure 
 gard. We reached Fort Sumter after dark, and remained about two 
 hours. 
 
 Major Anderson seemed to think it was too late to relieve the fort 
 by any other means than by landing an army on Morris Island. He 
 agreed with General Scott that an entrance from the sea was impossible ; 
 but as we looked out upon the water from the parapet, it seemed very 
 feasible, more especially as we heard the oars of a boat near the fort, 
 which the sentry hailed, but we could not see her through the darkness 
 until she almost touched the landing. 
 
 I found the garrison getting short of supplies, and it was agreed that 
 I might report that the 15th of April, at noon, would be the period be 
 yond which he could not hold the fort unless supplies were furnished. 
 
 I made no arrangements with Major Anderson for reenforcing or 
 supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my plan. 
 
 Upon my return, I had the honor to be called frequently before the 
 President, and, in the presence of different members of his Cabinet, to 
 answer the objections presented by Lieutenant-General Scott and the 
 military authorities ; but as my project simply involved passing batteries, 
 with steamers or boats, at night, at right-angles to their line of fire, and 
 
256 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 one thousand three hundred yards distant, a feat of which the Crimean 
 War furnished many safe examples, I maintained the proposition, and 
 suggested that it was a naval plan, and should be decided by naval 
 officers. 
 
 The President asked me if there was any naval officer of high au 
 thority in Washington who would sustain me, and if so to bring him to 
 the White House. I knew that Commodore Stringham was at that 
 time filling the position of detailing officer in the Navy Department, 
 and I took him to the President, where, in the presence of Lieutenant- 
 General Scott, he not only confirmed my views, but said that he had 
 that morning held a conversation with Commodore Stewart, who de 
 clared that Fort Sumter could easily be reenforced and provisioned with 
 boats at night. 
 
 As valuable time was being lost by discussions, which form no part 
 of this narrative, I represented that so important an expedition required 
 time for its preparation, and that I ought to be allowed to take the pre 
 paratory steps, if there was any possibility of sending it out. 
 
 On the 13th of March, the President sent me to New York with 
 verbal instructions to prepare for the voyage, but to make no binding- 
 engagements. 
 
 After consultation with George W. Blunt, Esq., who throughout had 
 been of great assistance to me with his advice and active cooperation, I 
 met, by previous arrangement, Messrs. William H. Aspinwall and Charles 
 H. Marshall, for the purpose of making with them preliminary arrange 
 ments for the voyage. 
 
 Mr. Marshall declined to aid me, upon the ground that the attempt 
 to relieve Fort Sumter would kill the proposed loan and bring on civil 
 war, and that the people had made up their minds to abandon Sumter, 
 and make the stand upon Fort Pickens. 
 
 On the 2d of April I had not received the written authority 
 which I expected from the Government, therefore I returned to Wash 
 ington. 
 
 Delays, which belong to the secret history of this period, prevented 
 a decision until the afternoon of the 4th of April, when the President 
 sent for me, and said that he had decided to let the expedition go, and 
 that a messenger from himself would be sent to the authorities of 
 Charleston, before I could possibly get there, to notify them that no 
 troops would be thrown into Sumter if provisions were allowed peace 
 fully to be sent to the garrison. I mentioned to the President that, by 
 the time I should arrive at New York, I would have but nine days in 
 which to charter and provision the vessels, and reach the destined 
 
THE BELIEF OF FOET SUMTEE. 257 
 
 point, six hundred and thirty-two miles distant. He answered, I 
 should best fulfil uiy duty to my country to make the attempt. The 
 Secretary of the Navy had in commission, in the Atlantic waters of the 
 United States, only the Powhatan, the Pocahontas, and the Pawnee ; all 
 these he placed at my disposal, as well as the revenue steamer Harriet 
 Lane, and directed me to give all the necessary orders. The Powhatan, 
 which had recently returned and gone out of commission, was added to 
 the force I designated, to enable me to have her fine boats and crew for 
 landing the supplies. 
 
 I suggested to the Secretary of the Navy to place Commodore 
 Stringham in command of the naval force ; but upon consulting with that 
 distinguished officer, he considered it to be too late to be successful, and 
 likely to ruin the reputation of the officer who undertook it then. 
 
 I arrived at New York on the 5th of April, engaged the steamer 
 Baltic of Mr. Aspinwall, who used every possible exertion to get her 
 ready for sea, and delivered confidential orders, embracing all my wants, 
 to Colonel H. L. Scott, aide to the General-in-chief, and Colonel D. D. 
 Tompkins, quartermaster. 
 
 Colonel Scott ridiculed the idea of Government relieving Fort Sum- 
 ter, and, by his indifference and delay, half a day of precious time was 
 lost. The recruits that he finally furnished to me were totally unfit to 
 be thrown into a fort likely to be attacked by the rebels. 
 
 I placed the hiring of three tugs in the hands of Russell Sturges, 
 who labored very energetically, but he found great difficulty in obtain 
 ing from the owners, tugs to go to sea. Finally, three were promised at 
 exorbitant rates namely, the Yankee, which I fitted to throw hot 
 water, the Uncle Ben, and the Freeborn. The question of supplies in 
 troduced me to Major Eaton, of the Commissary Department, who 
 thanked God that an attempt was to be made to relieve Major Ander 
 son s command, and, from the energetic and enthusiastic cooperation 
 of this officer, the expedition was immediately provisioned for all con 
 tingencies. 
 
 The frigate Powhatan, Captain Mercer, sailed on the 6th of April, 
 1861 ; the Pawnee, Commander Rowan, on the 9th; the Pocahontas, 
 Captain Gillis, on the 10th ; the Harriet Lane, Captain Faunce, on the 
 8th ; the tug Uncle Ben on the 7th ; the tug Yankee on the 8th ; and 
 the Baltic, Captain Fletcher, dropped down to Sandy Hook on the 
 evening of the 8th, and went to sea at 8 A. M. of the 9th. 
 
 The officers of the army who accompanied the military force were, 
 First-Lieutenant Edward McK. Hudson, First-Lieutenant Robert 0. Ty 
 ler, and First-Lieutenant C. "W. Thomas. 
 
 17 
 
258 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Soon after leaving Sandy Hook, a heavy gale of wind set in, which 
 continued during the whole passage. At 3 A. M. of the 12th, we 
 reached the rendezvous off Charleston, and communicated with the Har 
 riet Lane, the only vessel which had arrived. At 6 A. M. the Pawnee 
 was seen standing in. I boarded her, and informed her commander of 
 my orders to offer to send in provisions, and asked him to stand in to 
 the bar with me. He replied that his orders required him to remain 
 ten miles east of the light, and await the Powhatan, and that he was not 
 going in there to inaugurate civil war. I then stood in toward the bar, 
 followed by the Harriet Lane, Captain Faunce, who cheerfully accompa 
 nied me. 
 
 As we neared the land, heavy guns were heard, and the smoke and 
 shells from the batteries, which had just opened fire upon Sumter, were 
 distinctly visible. 
 
 I immediately stood out to inform Captain Eowan, of the Pawnee, 
 but met him coming in. He hailed me, and asked for a pilot, declaring 
 his intention of standing into the harbor, and sharing the fate of his 
 brethren of the army. I went on board, and informed him that I would 
 answer for it ; that the Government did not expect any such gallant sac 
 rifice, having settled maturely upon the policy indicated in the instruc 
 tions to Captain Mercer and myself. No other naval vessels arrived 
 during this day ; but the steamer Nashville, from New York, and a 
 number of merchant vessels, reached the bar, and awaited the result of 
 the bombardment, giving indications to those inside of a large naval 
 fleet off the harbor. The weather continued very bad, with a heavy sea; 
 neither the Pawnee nor Harriet Lane had boats or men to carry in sup 
 plies. Feeling sure that the Powhatan would arrive during the night, as 
 she had sailed from New York two days before us, I stood out to the 
 appointed rendezvous, and made signals all night. * The morning of the 
 13 tli was thick and foggy, with a very heavy ground-swell. The Baltic, 
 feeling her way in, ran ashore on Rattlesnake Shoal, but soon got off 
 without damage. On account of the very heavy swell, she was obliged 
 to anchor in deep water, several miles outside of the Pawnee and Harriet 
 Lane. 
 
 Lieutenant Robert 0. Tyler, an officer of very great zeal and fidelity, 
 though suffering from sea-sickness, as were most of the recruits, organ 
 ized a boat s crew, and exercised them, notwithstanding the heavy sea, 
 for the purpose of having at least one boat, in the absence of the Pow- 
 hatan s, to reach Fort Sumter. At 8 A. M. I took this boat, and in 
 company with Lieutenant Hudson pulled in to the Pawnee. As we 
 approached that vessel, a great volume of black smoke issued from Fort 
 
THE RELIEF OF FOKT SUMTEK. 259 
 
 Sumter, through which the flash of Major Anderson s guns still re 
 plied to the rebel fire. The quarters of the fort were on fire, and most 
 of our military and naval officers believed the smoke to proceed from an 
 attempt to smote out the garrison with fire-rafts. 
 
 As it was the opinion of the officers that no boats with any load in 
 them could have reached Sumter in this heavy sea, and no tug-boats 
 had arrived, it was proposed to capture a schooner near us, loaded with 
 ice, which was done, and preparations were at once commenced to fit her 
 out, and load her for entering the harbor the following night. I now 
 learned, for the first time, that Captain Rowan had received a note from 
 Captain Mercer, of the Powhatan, dated at New York, the 6th, the day 
 he sailed, stating that the Powhatan was detached, by order of superior 
 authority, from the duty to which she was assigned off Charleston, and 
 had sailed for another destination. I left New York two days afterward, 
 without any intimation of this change. 
 
 At 2 p. M. the Pocahontas arrived, and at half-past two the flag of 
 Sumter was shot away, and not again raised. A flag of truce was sent 
 in by Captain Gillis, and arrangements made to place Major Anderson 
 and his command on board the Baltic to return North. 
 
 The fort was evacuated Sunday, the 14th of April. Monday, the 
 15th, the steamer Isabel took the garrison outside to the steamer Baltic, 
 which left that evening direct for New York, where she arrived the fore 
 noon of the 18th instant. 
 
 My plan for supplying Fort Sumter required three hundred sailors, a 
 full supply of armed launches, and three tugs. 
 
 The Powhatan carried the sailors and launches, and when this vessel 
 was about to leave, in obedience to the orders of the Secretary of the 
 Navy, two officers, Lieutenant D. D. Porter, United States Navy, and 
 Captain M. C. Meigs, TJnited States Engineers, presented themselves on 
 board with an order from the President of the United States, authorizing 
 the former to take any vessel whatever in commission, and proceed imme 
 diately to the Gulf of Mexico. This order did not pass through the 
 Navy Department, and was unknown to the Secretary of the Navy, and, 
 when signed by the President, he was not conscious that his signature 
 would deprive me of the means to accomplish -an object which he held 
 to be of vital importance. 
 
 In a letter from him, which is annexed, he hastened to affirm that 
 "the attempt" to provision Fort Sumter had advanced the cause of the 
 country. 
 
 The tug Freeborn was not permitted to leave New York. The tug 
 Uncle Ben was driven into Wilmington by the violence of the gale, and 
 
260 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 subsequently captured by the rebels. The tug Yankee reached Charles 
 ton bar a few hours after the Baltic had left with Major Anderson s com 
 mand on board. 
 
 The communications between New York and Washington having 
 been severed, I applied to Mr. Aspinwall to obtain for me a small 
 steamer with arms and ammunition to enable me to reach the Chesa 
 peake Bay, where I judged that armed steamers were very essential. 
 This gentleman applied to Mr. William B. Astor, who very generously 
 gave him a check for five thousand dollars. With this he procured the 
 tug Yankee, and persuaded Commodore Breese, commandant of the 
 New York Navy- Yard, to arm and fit her out ; and having received from 
 that officer an appointment as acting lieutenant in the Navy, I left on 
 the 26th for Hampton Roads, where I reported to Commodore Pender- 
 grast, of the Cumberland. 
 
 The services of the Yankee not being required at this point, I pro 
 ceeded to Annapolis, and offered my vessel to General Butler, who was 
 about opening communications with Washington. The General grate 
 fully received the steamer, and sent me through to the capital to report 
 to the President, and immediately afterward I received an appointment 
 in the Navy Department. 
 
 Annexed are copies of orders and letters relating to the narrative 
 which I have submitted. Very respectfully yours, 
 
 G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 February 8, 1861. 
 Lieutenant- General "WINFIELD SCOTT, United States Army : 
 
 SIR, The proposition which I had the honor to submit to you fully, 
 in person, is herewith presented in writing. Lieutenant Hall and myself 
 have had several free conferences, and if he is permitted by the South 
 Carolina authorities to reenter Fort Sumter, Major Anderson will 
 comprehend the plan for his relief. I consider myself very fortunate in 
 having proposed a project which meets the approval of the General-in- 
 chief, and I ask no reward but the entire conduct of the plan, exclusive 
 of the armed vessels. The commander of these should be ordered to 
 cooperate with me by affording protection and destroying their naval 
 preparations near the bar, leaving to me, as the author of the plan, the 
 actual operations of relief. 
 
 I suggest that the Pawnee be immediately sent to the Delaware 
 breakwater to await orders, the Harriet Lane to be ready for sea, and 
 some arrangement entered into by which the requisite steamer and tugs 
 should be engaged, at least so far as not to excite suspicion. I should 
 prefer one of the Collins steamers. They are now being prepared for 
 
THE EELIEF OF FOKT SUMTEE. 261 
 
 sea, and are of such a size and power as to be able fearlessly to run 
 down any vessels which might attempt to capture us outside by coup de 
 main. I could quietly engage one, and have her ready to start on 
 twenty-four hours notice, without exciting suspicion. I shall leave for 
 New York at 3 p. M., and any communications previous will find me at 
 Judge Blair s. Tf the Pawnee s pivot-gun is landed, it should certainly 
 be remounted. Very respectfully, etc., G. V. Fox. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, March 19, 18G1. 
 DEAR SIR : In accordance with the request contained in a note from 
 the Secretary of War to me, of which I annex a copy, I request that 
 you will have the goodness to proceed to Charleston, S. C., and obtain 
 permission, " if necessary," to \isit Fort Sumter, in order to enable you 
 to comply with the wish expressed in the Secretary s note. Please, on 
 your return, to report accordingly. I remain yours, etc., 
 
 G. Y. Fox, Esq. WINFIELD SCOTT. 
 
 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April 1, 1861. 
 
 Lieutenant D. D. Porter will take command of the steamer Pow- 
 hatan, or any other United States steamer ready for sea which he may 
 deem most fit for the service to which he has been assigned by confiden 
 tial instructions of this date. 
 
 All officers are commanded to afford him all such facilities as he 
 may deem necessary for getting to sea as soon as possible. 
 
 He will select the officers to accompany him. 
 
 Recommended : ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 
 
 EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1SG1. 
 
 Lieutenant D. D. PORTER, United States Navy : 
 
 SIR, You will proceed to New York, and, with the least possible 
 delay, assuming command of any naval steamer available, proceed to 
 Pensacola harbor, and at any cost or risk prevent any expedition from 
 the mainland reaching Fort Pickens or Santa Rosa Island. 
 
 You will exhibit this order to any naval officer at Pensacola, if you 
 deem it necessary, after you have established yourself within the harbor, 
 and will request cooperation by the entrance of at least one other 
 steamer. 
 
 This order, its object, and your destination will be communicated to 
 no person whatever until you reach the harbor of Peusacola, 
 Recommended : ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 
 
262 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 WASHINGTON, EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861. 
 
 All officers of the Army and Navy to whom this order may be ex 
 hibited will aid by every means in their power the expedition under the 
 command of Colonel Harvey Brown, supplying him with men and ma 
 terial, and cooperating with him as he may desire. 
 A true copy : ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 
 M. C. MEIGS, Captain of Engineers, 
 
 Chief Engineer of said Expedition. 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 
 WASHINGTON CITY, April 2, 1861. 
 
 SIR: Circumstances render it necessary to place in command of 
 your ship (and for a special purpose) an officer who is fully informed 
 and instructed in relation to the wishes of the Government, and you 
 will therefore consider yourself detached. But in taking this step, the 
 Government does not in the least reflect upon your efficiency or patriot 
 ism ; on the contrary, have the fullest confidence in your ability to per 
 form any duty required of you. Hoping soon to be able to give you a 
 better command than the one you now enjoy, and trusting that you will 
 have full confidence in the disposition of the Government toward you, 
 
 I remain, etc., ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 Captain S. MERCER, United States Navy. 
 A true copy : 
 
 M. C. MEIGS, Captain of Engineers, 
 
 Chief Engineer of Expedition of Colonel Brown. 
 
 WAE DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL S OFFICE, ) 
 Wednesday, April 4, 1861. J 
 
 SIR : By direction of the War Department, you will charter such 
 vessels as Captain G. V. Fox, the bearer of this, may designate, for such 
 times and with such supplies as he may indicate. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General. 
 Colonel D. D. TOMPKINS, 
 
 Assistant Quartermaster- General, New York, N. Y. 
 
 [CONFIDENTIAL.] 
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON. April 4, 1861. 
 
 SIR : This letter will be handed to you by Captain G. V. Fox, ex- 
 officer of the Navy, and a gentleman of high standing, as well as possessed 
 of extraordinary nautical ability. He is charged by high authority 
 here with the command of an expedition (undei cover of certain ships- 
 
THE RELIEF OF FOET SUMTEE. 263 
 
 of-war) whose object is to reenforce Fort Sumter. To embark with 
 Captain Fox, you will cause a detachment of recruits, say about two 
 hundred, to be immediately organized at Fort Columbus, with a compe 
 tent number of officers, army ammunition, and subsistence ; a large sur 
 plus of the latter, indeed, as great as the vessels of the expedition will 
 take, with other necessaries, will be needed for the augmented garrison 
 of Fort Sumter. The subsistence and other supplies should be assorted 
 like those which were provided by you and Captain Ward, of the Navy, 
 for a former expedition. Consult Captain Fox and Major Eaton on the 
 subject, and give all necessary orders, in my name, to fit out the expe 
 dition, except that the hiring the vessels will be left to others. 
 
 Some fuel must be shipped. Oil, artillery implements, fuses, cor 
 dage, slow match, mechanical levers, and guns, etc., etc., should also be 
 put on board. Consult also, if necessary (confidentially), Colonel 
 Tompkins and Major Thornton. Respectfully yours, 
 
 WINFIELD SCOTT. 
 Lieutenant- Colonel H. L. SCOTT, Aide-de-Camp, etc., etc. 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 4, 1861. 
 
 SIR : It having been decided to succor Fort Sumter, you have been 
 selected for this important duty. Accordingly, you will take charge of 
 the transports in New York having the troops and supplies on board to 
 the entrance of Charleston harbor, and endeavor, in the first instance, to 
 deliver the subsistence. If you are opposed in this, you are directed to 
 report the fact to the senior naval officer off the harbor, who will be in 
 structed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force to open a 
 passage, when you will, if possible, effect an entrance and place both the 
 troops and supplies in Fort Sumter. 
 
 I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War. 
 Captain G. V. Fox, Washington, D. C. 
 
 NAVT DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1361. 
 Captain SAMUEL MEECER, commanding U. 8. Steamer Powhatan, N". Y. : 
 
 The United States steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and 
 Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under your command, to be 
 sent to the vicinity of Charleston, S. C., for the purpose of aiding in 
 carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department 
 has charge. 
 
 The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, 
 for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary trans- 
 
264: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ports. Should the authorities of Charleston permit the fort to be sup 
 plied, no farther particular service will be required of the force under 
 your command; and after being satisfied that supplies have been re 
 ceived at the fort, the Powhatan, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will 
 return to New York, and the Pawnee to Washington. 
 
 Should the authorities at Charleston, however, refuse to permit, or 
 attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from 
 entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you 
 will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of 
 their mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open the way 
 for their ingress, and afford, so far as practicable, security to the men 
 and boats, and repelling by force, if necessary, all obstructions toward 
 provisioning the fort and reenforcing it ; for in case of a resistance to 
 the peaceable primary object of the expedition, a reenforcement of the 
 garrison will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the 
 supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. 
 The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you 
 will put yourself in communication, and cooperate with him to accom 
 plish and carry into effect its object. 
 
 You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off 
 Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the light-house, on 
 the morning of the llth instant, there to await the arrival of the 
 transport or transports with troops and stores. The Pawnee and Poca 
 hontas will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also 
 the Harriet Lane, which latter vessel has been placed under the control 
 of this Department for this service. 
 
 On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or 
 otherwise, the several vessels under your command will return to the 
 respective ports, as above directed, unless some unforeseen circumstance 
 should prevent. I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1S6L 
 Commander J. P. GILLIS, commanding U. S. Steamer Pocahontas, Norfolk, Va. : 
 
 SIR, You will proceed to sea with the Pocahontas, and on the morn 
 ing of the llth instant appear off Charleston bar, ten miles distant 
 from and due east of the light-house, where you will report to Captain 
 Samuel Mercer, of the Powhatan, for special service. Should he not be 
 there, you will await his arrival. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
THE BELIEF OF FORT BrMTEE. 265 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1861. 
 
 Commander S. C. KOWAN, commanding U. 8. Steamer Pawnee, Norfolk, Va. : 
 SIR, After the Pawnee shall have been provisioned at Norfolk, you 
 will proceed with her to sea, and on the morning of the llth instant 
 appear off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the 
 light-house, where you will report to Captain Samuel Mercer, of the Pow- 
 hatan, for special service. Should he not be there, you will await his 
 arrival. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1S61. 
 Captain FAUXCE, Commander of U. S. Revenue Steamer Harriet Lane, N. T. : 
 
 SIR, The revenue steamer Harriet Lane having been temporarily 
 placed under the orders of this Department, you will proceed with her 
 from New York in time to appear off Charleston bar, ten miles distant 
 from and due east of the light-house, on the morning of the llth 
 instant, where you will report to Captain Samuel Mercer, of the Pow- 
 hatan, for special service. Should he not be there, you will await his 
 arrival. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 5, 1861. 
 
 Captain JOHN FAUNCE. Commander of Steamer Harriet Lane : 
 
 SIR, The Harriet Lane, under your command, having been detached 
 from the collection district of New York, and assigned to duty under 
 the Navy Department, you are hereby instructed to proceed to within 
 ten miles due east from and off Charleston light-house, where you will 
 report to Captain Mercer, of the Powhatan, for duty, on the morning of 
 the llth instant; and should he not be there, you will wait a rea 
 sonable time for his arrival. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C., May 1, 1861. 
 
 Captain Gr. Y. Fox : 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, I sincerely regret that the failure of the late attempt 
 to provision Fort Sumter should be the source of any annoyance to you. 
 The practicability of your plan was not, in fact, brought to a test. 
 
 By reason of a gale well known in advance to be possible, and not 
 improbable, the tugs, an essential part of the plan, never reached the 
 
266 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ground ; while, by an accident, for which you were in no wise responsi 
 ble, and possibly /, to some extent, was, you were deprived of a war- 
 vessel, with her men, which you deemed of great importance to the en 
 terprise. 
 
 I most cheerfully and truly declare that the failure of the underta 
 king has not lowered you a particle, while the qualities you developed in 
 the effort have greatly heightened you in my estimation. 
 
 For a daring and dangerous enterprise of a similar character, you 
 would, to-day, be the man, of all my acquaintances, whom I would 
 select. You and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would 
 be advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, even if 
 it should fail; and it is no small consolation now to feel that our antici 
 pation is justified by the result. 
 
 Very truly your friend, A. LINCOLN. 
 
 These statements and facts place in the clearest light the in 
 justice of the complaints made against the Government during 
 the apparent inaction between the 4th of March and April, 
 1861. Any movement would have been rash then, before a de 
 liberate survey of all the perils by which the new Administra 
 tion was beset. Particularly do these facts show how ill-con 
 sidered and ungenerous were the charges of inefficiency brought 
 by some against the Navy Department and the spirited and 
 skilful officer who conducted the enterprise, because Sumter 
 was not relieved. The Secretary of the Navy acted with the 
 utmost promptitude. The letter of the President directing the 
 expedition to be got ready was dated March 28th, and before 
 the first of April every vessel needed was being prepared, and 
 every one was ready in season to reach the appointed rendezvous 
 on the llth of April, four days before the time up to which 
 Major Anderson had informed the Government that he could 
 hold the fort. 
 
 Certainly the Secretary of the Navy could not foresee that 
 the most important ship of the little squadron, the one without 
 which failure was inevitable, would be detached without any 
 consultation with him, and sent contrary to his orders in another 
 direction ; and to hold Captain Fox responsible for the failure 
 after the vessel upon which he mainly relied, and which carried 
 the three hundred sailors and the launches, had been sent to 
 
THE BELIEF OF FORT SDMTEE. 267 
 
 Fort Pickens by a secret order, was such glaring injustice that 
 President Lincoln would not suffer it to pass : but with the 
 characteristic manliness of his nature, in a letter to Captain 
 Fox, took the responsibility upon himself, through what he calls 
 the " accident " of sending away the Powhatan. The expedi 
 tion for the relief of Fort Pickens, for which the Powhatan, not 
 only without orders from the Secretary of the Navy, but con 
 trary to his orders, was secretly withdrawn from Captain Fox, 
 proved to be a useless one, for the Navy Department and the 
 Secretary of War had abundantly provided for its safety, and it 
 was in fact reenforced before the Powhatan arrived. 
 
 Fort Sumter was not relieved, not because the President did 
 not decide to do it, nor because there was any remissness in the 
 Secretary of the Navy or any defect in the plan of Captain Fox, 
 but because both orders and plan were secretly interfered with 
 in a manner that could neither be foreseen nor avoided. Presi 
 dent Lincoln was doubtless right in expressing to Captain Fox 
 the following sentiment in the letter already quoted : " You 
 and I both anticipated that the cause of the country would be 
 advanced by making the attempt to provision Fort Sumter, 
 even if it should fail, and it is no small consolation now to feel 
 that our anticipation is justified by the result." In a very im 
 portant sense the expedition was no failure, even though it did 
 not reach the fort. It was the decision to do it, the moral 
 courage and patriotism exhibited in the bold and perilous at 
 tempt which reinspired the country. The spirit of the North 
 was drooping, it had reached well nigh the point of fatal col 
 lapse ; and the noble determination that the country s honor 
 should not be stained by a timid surrender, that our flag should 
 not be lowered without one brave blow struck in its defence, 
 this reinspired the fainting heart of the people ; it imparted to 
 them a fresh moral power that rendered them capable of that 
 magnificent outburst of patriotism and holy wrath which fol 
 lowed the capture of the fort. It was one among the many 
 severe trials which the Secretary endured in silence, that after 
 every needed preparation had "been promptly made to execute 
 this most important order of the President ; when a trusted and 
 skilful officer had volunteered to hazard both life and reputa 
 tion, dearer than life ; when the Department had done its whole 
 
268 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 duty, and failure was due alone to secret interference from with 
 out, that its whole action should be made the subject of reproach 
 and sneers by those who might easily have known the facts. 
 But time, the avenger of injured reputation as well as other 
 wrongs, has fully vindicated both the Secretary and the officer 
 who commanded the expedition. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 
 
 THE facts already stated present but one part of that com 
 prehensive plan devised and executed by the Navy Department, 
 by which, in the short space of four years, and under the pres 
 sure of a great war, the United States was raised to a first-class 
 naval power, and a force created which more effectually than 
 our armies shielded us from foreign intervention. Our soldiers 
 were a perfect protection on the land an equally powerful one 
 was needed on the sea. 
 
 The other part of the general plan was to increase the power 
 of our guns. The fitting out of ships purchased, the construc 
 tion of new ones, in short, every step in the creation of the 
 Navy had more or less reference to changes already made or 
 contemplated in the character of our naval ordnance. The idea 
 of the heavy, smashing shot, instead of the smaller, swifter one, 
 has, from the beginning of our national career, been a control 
 ling one in the American mind. 
 
 Although referred to more than once already, it is necessary 
 to present it once more in this discussion of the character and 
 efficiency of the heavy American guns which were first used 
 during the rebellion, and which have already greatly modified 
 both the theories and the practice of all naval powers. It is 
 not supposed by any that the perfect gun has as yet been 
 reached. The whole question in regard to ordnance is yet in 
 an unsettled state. ISTo scientific professional man would under 
 take to say what may be done or what cannot be done. Results 
 already reached are in such startling contradiction to most pre 
 vious theories and expectations, that the boldest are disposed to 
 wait for additional facts before forming a decided opinion. 
 
270 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 England and France are very unwilling to admit that the 
 American experiments have shown that their science, skill, and 
 experience are all at fault. They are naturally enough quite 
 slow to believe that a young nation which through all its life 
 had made peace and not war a study, has, in a sudden emer 
 gency, discovered a principle in gunnery which proves all their 
 wisdom to be folly in comparison. It will be only by the strong 
 compulsion of facts that they will be convinced that they must 
 abandon the present armament for their ships, and adopt the 
 * plans of a nation which they have held as so far inferior to 
 themselves in all the arts of war. ]S r or is it surprising that 
 there are many here, as well as in Europe, who are not yet pre 
 pared to think that American thought in regard to guns is so 
 far in advance of the rest of the world. The ordnance problem 
 then is by no means considered to be solved, but England and 
 France were probably ready to admit, at the close of our war, 
 that it would be wise to pause and reconsider their theories ; 
 while here and in Russia, to say the least, the facts are believed 
 to be very decidedly, if not conclusively, in favor of the large 
 gun and the smashing shot. The Navy Department has 
 adopted and acted upon this idea, and its success has more than 
 justified its early expectations ; and the opposition and ridicule 
 with which the new guns were met at first has been silenced by 
 the results. The introduction of larger cannon for our ships 
 was not only a part of the plan, but it was an essential part, 
 and especially when iron-clad vessels were to be attacked. A 
 single illustration, which will be brought forward hereafter, 
 may be glanced at here. In the action between the Monitor 
 and Merrimack the two vessels fought for four hours at short 
 range, sometimes at a distance of only a few yards, and yet 
 neither was sunk, captured, nor essentially injured. Yet they 
 used the most powerful guns then known, except in theory, to 
 England or America. It was evident then that different can 
 non were needed, and how this thought was worked out will be 
 explained hereafter. 
 
 In order that the reader may understand the progress which 
 has been made in American gunnery, and the direction that 
 the American mind has taken in this department of war, it is 
 necessary to dwell more at length upon a subject already 
 
AMERICAN OKDNANCE. 271 
 
 touched upon in a previous chapter, the batteries of French 
 and English ships. No proper comparison can be made be 
 tween the guns in use on American ships at the close of the 
 war and the previous armaments of war-vessels, without going 
 back as far at least as Lord Nelson s time, and showing the 
 character of the batteries of those world-renowned ships with 
 which England made herself the mistress of the seas ; while the 
 progress in English gunnery must also be noted, from a time 
 still more remote. The following statements, collected from 
 English authorities, will show the main changes which have 
 been made in naval guns for more than two hundred years : 
 
 The first frigate built in England, according to Mr. James, 
 was the Constant "Warwick, constructed in 1646. She was a 
 ship of about 400 tons burden and mounted 26 guns. Eighteen 
 of these were short 9-pounders, six were short 6-pounders, and 
 two minions on the roof of the officers cabin. Such a frigate 
 would not be considered a very formidable adversary for any 
 thing which now we would dignify with the name of vessel-of- 
 war. 
 
 In 1740 two new classes were added to the British Navy, 
 one a 44-gun ship of about 700 tons. The heaviest guns of 
 this class were 18-pounders, the lighter were 9-pounders and 
 6-pounders. The other class was a 24-gun ship, of about 450 
 tons, armed mainly with 9-pounders. Up to 1779 it appears 
 that the 18-pounder was the largest gun in use either in the 
 English or French Navies. In one hundred and thirty-three 
 years from the building of the Constant Warwick, England had 
 advanced from a 9-pounder to an 18-pounder gun for the arma 
 ment of her largest vessels. In 1779 the gun now called a 
 carronade was cast for the first time at the works of the Carron 
 Company, on the banks of the river Carron, in Scotland a short, 
 light gun with a large calibre in proportion to other cannon. 
 One of those first cast was an 8-inch gun, and the shot weighed 
 about 68 pounds. In December, 1781, it was recommended 
 that 68-pounder carronades should be used on the forecastle of 
 large ships, and 42-pounders and 32-pounders 011 the same deck 
 of smaller rates. In 1793 we find the following statement of 
 the batteries of a French and an English frigate, the Semillonte 
 and the Yenus, that fought with no decisive result : 
 
272 HISTOET OF THE IGNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 VENUS. SEMILLONTE. 
 
 24 long 12-pounders , 26 long 12-pounders. 
 
 8 long 6-pounders 10 long 6-pounders. 
 
 6 carronades, 18-pounders 4 carronades, 36-pounders. 
 
 38 40 
 
 Lord Howe s squadron, in 1794, was armed with 32-pound- 
 ers, 24-pounders, 18-pounders, 12-pounders, and 9-pounders, and 
 in the w T hole fleet were only two 68-pounder carronades. These 
 statements are sufficient to show the character of the guns used 
 in the French and English Navies down to the time of Lord 
 Nelson. 
 
 The carronade, after having been received for a time with 
 great favor, gradually fell into disuse as science was more and 
 more applied to the art of gunnery, and it disappeared from 
 the service both in England, France, and America upon the 
 introduction of shell-guns. Two ideas were connected with the 
 first use of shell-guns one, the firing of hollow shot of larger 
 calibre than a solid shot of the same weight, on the supposition 
 that the smashing power would be greater ; and the other was, 
 to employ a shell with a bursting charge. Through a long 
 course of experiments, both in England and America, conclu 
 sions were reached unfavorable to the use of hollow shot, and 
 shell-guns were more and more restricted to their appropriate 
 use, with shells designed to explode. The changes which were 
 made in the guns of Europe between the close of the wars with 
 Bonaparte and 1860, will appear from the following tables 
 quoted from Sir Howard Douglas s work on " Naval Gunnery." 
 These, of course, will exhibit the armaments of European navies 
 in general at the commencement of the rebellion, and in this 
 light the position of the American mind upon the subject of 
 naval guns will clearly appear, as will also the distinction be 
 tween the American and European theories. In studying these 
 tables the reader will perceive that two kinds of 8-inch guns 
 are mentioned, one weighing 65 cwt., and 9 feet long, and the 
 other weighing 95 cwt., and 10 feet long. The lighter and 
 shorter gun is a shell-gun, and the larger for firing solid 68- 
 pound shot ; and up to the time of the commencement of our 
 rebellion, to say the least, it was considered by the English to 
 be the most powerful and reliable gun in the world. 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 273 
 
 AEMAMENT OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 
 
 SCEEW STEAM SHIPS. 
 First Rates " Victoria" Class, 1,000 horse-power. 
 
 Lower Deck 32 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Middle Deck 30 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Main Deck 32 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt, 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 Upper Deck \ 26 32 -P ounders > 42 cwt > 8 feet - 
 
 ( 1 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 121 guns. Total complement, 1,150 men. 
 
 First Rates Duke of Wellington Class, 700 horse-power. 
 
 ( 10 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 | 26 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt, 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 Middle Deck \ 6 8 inch guns > 65 cwt 9 feet 
 
 ( 30 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 Main Deck 38 32-pounders, 42 cwt., 8 feet. 
 
 TJ T) k (20 32-pounders, 25 cwt, 6 feet. 
 
 \ I 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt, 10 feet. 
 
 131 guns. Total complement, 1,120 men 
 
 First Rates "Royal Albert" Class, 500 horse-power. 
 
 Lower Deck 32 8-inch guns, 65 cwt, 9 feet. 
 
 Middle Deck 32 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt, 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 Main Deck 32 32-pounders, 42 cwt, 8 feet. 
 
 Upper Deck. . \ 24 32 -P ounder8 > 42 cwt > 8 feet 
 
 "1 1 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 121 guns. Total complement, 1,070 men. 
 
 Second Rates " Conqueror " Class, 800 horse-power. 
 
 Lower Deck 36 8-inch guns, 65 cwt, 9 feet. 
 
 Main Deck 36 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 Upper Deck \ 28 32 -P unders > 42 cwt > 8 feet - 
 
 " ( 1 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 101 gnns. Total complement, 950 men. 
 Third Rates " Colossus " Class, 200 horse-power. 
 
 Lower Deck I 10 8 inch gun8 65 CWt 9 feet 
 
 ( 18 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 j 4 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 * ] 24 32-pounders, 50 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Upper Deck 24 32-pounders, 42 cwt, 8 feet 
 
 80 guns. Total complement, 770 men. 
 18 
 
274 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 SCREW STEAM FRIGATES. 
 
 Fourth Rates " Emerald " Class, 600 horse-power. 
 
 Main Deck 30 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 ( 20 32-pounders, 58 or 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 GC ( 1 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 51 guns. Total complement, 570 men. 
 
 fifth Rates " Tribune " Class, 300 horse-power. 
 Main Deck 20 32-pounders, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 UDner Deck \ 10 32 -P ounders > 42 cwt > 8 feet - 
 
 ) 1 10-inch pivot, 84 cwt., 9 feet 4 inches. 
 
 31 guns. Total complement, 350 men. 
 
 SCREW STEAM CORVETTES. 
 
 Sixth Rates " Pearl " Class, 400 horse-power. 
 
 Upper Deck $ 2 8 inch guns 60 cwt 8 feet 10 inche8 
 
 "( I 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt, 10 feet. 
 
 21 guns. Total complement, 350 men. 
 
 MORTAR FRIGATES. 
 
 Sixth Rates. "JEurotas " Class, 200 horse-power. 
 
 ( 2 13-inch mortars, 100 cwt. 
 Mam Deck . . -< 
 
 ( 8 32-pounders, 42 cwt, 8 feet. 
 
 Upper Deck 2 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 12 guns. Total complement, 200 men. 
 
 FLOATING BATTERIES. 
 
 Sixth Rates "^Etna " Class, 200 horse-power. 
 
 Main Deck 16 68-pounders, 95 cwt, 10 feet. 
 
 16 guns. Total complement, 210 men. 
 
 SCREW STEAM SLOOPS. 
 
 " Chameleon " Class, 200 horse-power. 
 
 16 32-pounders, 32 cwt., 6 feet 6 inches (on rear 
 
 Mam Deck ^ chock carriages). 
 
 1 32-pounder pivot, 58 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 17 guns. Total complement, 70 men. 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 275 
 
 SCREW STEAM GUN-VESSELS. 
 
 " Arrow " Class, 160 horse-power. 
 
 ( 2 68-pounder pivots, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 Main Deck j 2 12 _ poun( j er howitzers, 10 cwt. 
 
 4 guns. Total complement, 65 men. 
 
 SCREW STEAM GUNBOATS FIRST CLASS. 
 
 " Charon " Class, 60 horse-power. 
 
 3-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 Main Deck \ 1 32-pounder pivot, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches, on 
 
 slides available for the 95-cwt. gun. 
 
 t 1 68- 
 : ! 1 32- 
 
 2 guns. Total complement, 36 men. 
 
 " Cheerful " Class, 20 horse-power. 
 Main Deck. . . .- 2 32-pounder pivots, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 2 guns. Total complement, 30 men. 
 
 SCREW STEAM-VESSELS. 
 
 " Rifleman " Class, 100 horse-power. 
 
 ( 2 32-pounders, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 Main Deck j 6 32 .pounders, 25 cwt., 6 feet. 
 
 8 guns. Total complement, 90 men. 
 
 SAILING SHIPS. 
 
 First Rates " Caledonia " Class. 
 
 ( 8 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Lower Deck j 24 32_ p0 unders, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 ( 4 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Middle Deck | 3Q 32 .p OU nders, 50 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Main Deck 34 32-pounders, 42 cwt., 8 feet. 
 
 < 6 32-pounders, 42 cwt., 8 feet. 
 
 Quarter Deck and Forecastle, -j ^ 32 _ pounder ca rronades, 17 cwt., 4 feet. 
 
 120 guns. Total complement, 970 men. 
 
276 H1STOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Second Rates " Princess Charlotte " Class. 
 
 C 4 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 Lower Deck | 24 32 . pouI1( j erS) 55 cwt ^ 9 f ee t 6 inches. 
 
 ( 2 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 Mlddle Deck ] 28 32-pounders, 48 cwt., 8 feet. 
 
 ( 30 32-pounders, rear chock carriage, 32 cwt., 6 feet 
 
 Mam Deck. < 
 
 ( 6 uiches. 
 
 ( 6 32-pounders, 45 cwt., 8 feet 6 inches. 
 
 Quarter Deck and Forecastle. < . c . 
 
 ( 10 32-pounder carronades, 17 cwt., 4 feet. 
 
 104 guns. Total complement, 850 men. 
 
 Third Rates " Bellerophon " Class. 
 
 ( 4 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 "\ 22 32-pounders, 56 cwt., 9 feet, 6 inches. 
 
 Main Deck J 2 8 - inch guns > 65 Cwt > 9 feet 
 
 / 26 32-pounders, 50 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 Quarter Deck and Forecastle. 16 32-pounders, 42 cwt., 8 feet. 
 
 70 guns. Total complement, 650 men. 
 
 Fourth Rates" Indefatigable " 
 
 Main Deck 28 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 3 feet. 
 
 Quarter Deck and Forecastle. 22 32-pounders, 45 cwt., 8 feet 6 inches. 
 
 50 guns. Total complement, 500 men. 
 
 Fifth Rates" Pique " Class. 
 
 j 6 8-inch guns, 60 cwt., 8 feet 10 inches. 
 5 " \ 18 32-pounders, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 
 ( 14 32-pounders, 25 cwt., 6 feet. 
 Quarter Deck and Forecastle. -< 
 
 ( 2 32-pounders, 50 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 40 guns. Total complement, 375 men. 
 
 Main Deck < 
 
 Sixth Rates " Trincomalee " Class. 
 
 8 32-pounders, 56 cwt., 9 feet 6 inches. 
 10 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 ( 6 32-pounders, 40 cwt., 7 feet 6 inches. 
 Quarter Deck and Forecastle. -J ... 
 
 ( 1 10-inch gun, 84 cwt., 9 feet 4 inches. 
 
 25 guns. Total complement, 275 men. 
 
 SLOOPS. 
 
 "Arachne" Class. 
 
 2 32-pounders, 39 cwt., 7 feet 6 inches. 
 16 32-pounders, 25 cwt., 6 feet. 
 
 18 guns. Total complement, 145 men. 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 277 
 
 PADDLE STEAM-FRIGATES. 
 
 Fifth Pates " Terrible " Class, 800 horse-power. 
 
 ( 10 8-inch guns, 65 cwt., 9 feet. 
 Mam Deck < 
 
 / 4 68-pounders, 95 cwt, 10 feet 
 
 Upper Deck \ 4 10-inch guns, 84 cwt, 9 feet 4 inches. 
 
 " ( 3 68-pounder pivots, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 21 guns. Total complement, 310 men. 
 
 Sixth Rates "Furious" Class, 400 horse-power. 
 Main Deck 10 32-pounders, 50 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 TJppe Deck $ 2 10 - incl1 P ivots 84 cwi > 9 feefc 4 hlches - 
 
 "\ 4 32-pounders, 50 cwt, 9 feet. 
 
 16 guns. Total complement, 230 men. 
 
 PADDLE STEAM-SLOOPS. 
 
 " Bulldog " Class, 500 horse-power. 
 
 1 68-pounder pivot, 95 cwt., 10 feet. 
 
 Upper Deck ^ 1 10-inch pivot, 94 cwt., 9 feet 4 inches. 
 
 4 32-pounders, 80 cwt., 8 feet. 
 
 6 guns. Total complement, 170 men. 
 
 PADDLE STEAM-VESSELS. 
 
 "Medina" Class, 312 horse-power. 
 
 Upper Deck 4 32-pounders, 50 cwt., 9 feet. 
 
 4 guns. Total complement, 65 men. 
 
 These tables and statements present a general view of the 
 batteries of the English ISTavy from the building of the first 
 frigate down to the time of the beginning of the rebellion. 
 They do not exhibit the exact armament of every ship, nor do 
 they notice the experimental guns which were continually 
 brought to the notice of the British Government, but they show 
 what was deemed sufficiently trustworthy to enter into the per- 
 mament armament of these ships. It is seen that at the time 
 when Sir Howard Douglas published his work (1860), the 8-inch 
 shell-gun was the main reliance, while the 8-inch 68-pounder 
 for solid shot was considered the heaviest and most powerful 
 gun that could be safely used even as a pivot-gun on board a 
 
278 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ship. It was not thought that such guns could be carried in 
 broadside. Up to that date the English and French adhered 
 to the idea of long range and penetration, rather than the 
 smashing power and lower velocity of the larger shot. The 
 latter idea was entertained for a short time when the carronade 
 was first introduced, but it was gradually abandoned when it 
 was found that a ship was liable to be disabled by the long 
 guns of an adversary before the shot from a carronade would 
 reach her, and it remained for the Americans to increase the 
 calibre of the gun without diminishing its range. 
 
 Leaving the English Navy at the point reached in 1860 
 with the 8-inch shell-gun for the broadside, and the 68-pounder 
 8-inch gun as a pivot-gun, the reader will be ready to compare 
 with this the progress of the American idea. Going back to 
 the true starting-point of the American Navy, just before the 
 War of 1812, we find a point of comparison between British and 
 American batteries in the following note in Admiral Dahlgren s 
 " Shells and Shell-Guns:" 
 
 " It may be noted here that, as a means of comparison with 
 ships of a past date, that the Britannia, three-decker, on being 
 laid up in 1806, after the battle of Trafalgar, in which she bore 
 a part, returned 102 guns to store at Davenport ; showing a 
 broadside weight of metal equal to 1,160 pounds." * Referring 
 once more to what was stated in a previous chapter, it will be 
 seen that the weight of metal thrown at a broadside by one 
 of the new American frigates of that period was 864 pounds, 
 while she mounted only fifty-four guns. Considering the greater 
 weight of the frigate s shot, and the longer range of her guns, 
 it may be safely presumed that, under favorable circumstances, 
 she would have been an equal match for this English three- 
 decker, the pride of the British Navy. 
 
 The victories won by the Americans in the War of 1812, 
 which so astonished the world, and humbled the pride of Eng 
 land, and dealt a blow to her naval supremacy, from which she 
 will never recover, were due in great degree to the manner in 
 which the national idea of heavy guns had been carried out in 
 the armament of our ships, especially our frigates. 
 
 While the main batteries of the English 44-gun ship con- 
 
 * Official Report to Committee of Parliament. 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 279 
 
 sisted of long 18-pounders, our frigates of the same rate carried 
 long 24-pounders ; and where the British ship mounted 32- 
 pound er carronades, ours in many instances were armed with 
 42-pounder guns of this description, so that there was an impor 
 tant preponderance in our favor in the weight of the broadside, 
 and this told with such fearful effect upon the more lightly 
 armed adversary, that only one of the three frigates captured 
 by us could be brought into port. 
 
 It is indeed true that this was not entirely due to the supe 
 riority of our guns, and the greater weight of our shot. Our 
 gunners were undoubtedly superior to the English in the rapid 
 ity and accuracy of their fire, and hence the deadly effect 
 of their broadside. Misrepresentation, spiteful abuse of the 
 American people, improper, personal attacks upon our officers, 
 and downright inaccuracy, were all persistently employed to 
 break the force of the blow thus given to British pride and 
 boastfulness, but it was all in vain. Even James s labored effort, 
 which is beneath the name of history so far as America is con 
 cerned, and which can scarcely be said to be founded on fact, 
 could not conceal the real state of the case. Through the 
 thick veil of his misrepresentations the main truths still ap 
 pear. The British were met with better ships, a more powerful 
 armament, with better gunners and more skilful seamen than 
 their own, and therefore they were beaten ; and the fate of the 
 Alabama, that English pet, under the fire of the Kearsarge, 
 is prophetic of results when next these two nations meet. 
 
 After the close of the "War of 1812, our new line-of-battle 
 ships, such as the Ohio, were armed with still larger guns. 
 They carried long 42-pounders on the main deck, and were as 
 much superior to the English vessels of the same class as our 
 frigates of 1812 had been. The results of experiments, which 
 were continually made under the direction of Government, 
 tended constantly to the adoption of heavier ordnance. -The 
 gun called the columbiad was introduced, and then the gun 
 which bears the name of the distinguished inventor, Dahlgren, 
 who has contributed so largely to give to American ordnance 
 its present superiority. The experiments made under the di 
 rection of Admiral Dahlgren were so decisive that the six new 
 frigates fitted out in 1856 were armed with much heavier guns 
 
280 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 than had been before used on board a ship as composing a regu 
 lar battery. They were 9-inch, 10-inch, and 11-inch shell-guns. 
 The following comparison between one of these frigates, the 
 Merrimack, since become so famous, and two of the finest Eng 
 lish frigates of that date, will show the reader the character of 
 the armaments of the two nations at the beginning of the re 
 bellion, by which it will also appear that the American frigates 
 still retained their former superiority in guns and weight both 
 of the single shot and the broadside. The statement is copied 
 from Admiral Dahlgren s " Shells and Shell-Guns," published 
 in 1856 : 
 
 The remarks that have been made in relation to the comparative 
 force of the United States ship Merrimack, and the British ships Shan 
 non and Euryalus, induce me to offer a few words on the subject : 
 
 The batteries of these ships may be stated thus from the best sources 
 that are accessible to us : 
 
 GUN-DECK. SPAR-DECK. 
 
 Euryalus, 28 of 8-inch, of 65 cwt 22 32-pdrs., of 45 cwt. 
 
 Shannon, 30 of 8-inch, of 65 cwt. 20 32-pdrs, of 56 cwt, and 1 68 pdr., of 95 cwt. 
 
 Merrimack, 24 of 9-inch. 14 8-inch, of 63 cwt., and 2 10-inch, of 107 cwt 
 
 Taking the main weight of iron that goes out of the guns to any 
 one point, the ships will discharge Euryalus, 1,066 pounds; Shannon, 
 1,167 pounds ; Merrimack, 1,424 pounds ; so that even by this standard, 
 the Merrimack would have the superiority in offensive capacity by a 
 ratio of 100 to 82. 
 
 But such a mode of estimating the power of ordnance is only ad 
 missible when the description of gun is the same in both ships, or if dif 
 ferent, when the distances are so short that the hastiest shot will neither 
 miss the mark nor fail to perforate. "When, as now, it is expected to 
 use the advantages of heavy calibres for superior accuracy and force be 
 yond mere point blanks, the amount of metal that issues from the 
 broadside does not supply the criterion of power, but that which strikes 
 the object and with due force. 
 
 Relative accuracy and penetration are, therefore, to be considered in 
 estimating the value of ships batteries like those now spoken of. There 
 is no difficulty in deciding between the Shannon and the Euryalus, be 
 cause both have similar calibres, 8-inch on the gun-deck and 32-pounders 
 above. But the Shannon has more of the 8-inch shell-guns and heavier 
 32-pounders than the Euryalus, and hence has unquestionably the more 
 powerful armament, whether far or near, in a ratio somewhat greater 
 
I UN1VEK 
 
 \ OF 
 
 AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 281 
 
 than the absolute weight of broadside. Besides which, she has a 68- 
 pounder on the forecastle. 
 
 Now, as regards the Shannon and Merrimaek, the 772 pounds of 
 8-inch shells from the gun-deck of the former are inferior, not only in 
 mere weight to the 864 pounds of 9-inch from the gun-deck of the latter, 
 but also in accuracy and power, so that a distant object will be struck 
 by less of that weight and with less force. The accuracy of the 8-inch 
 to 9-inch being about as 5 to 7, the penetration as 9 to 10, and the 
 content of powder as 5 to 6, with the further advantage to the 9-inch 
 of greater effect by reason of the superior content of the individual 
 shells larger orifice and greater shock of impact. 
 
 Then, on the spar-deck, we have for the Merrimack 360 pounds of 
 8-inch shells to oppose the 325 pounds of shot from the Shannon ; the 
 accuracy of the 8-inch shells to the 32-pounder shot being as 5 to 3 
 the shock and orifice greater, with the addition of the explosive force 
 of 14 pounds of powder. 
 
 The Merrimack has also 2 pivot 10-inch to meet the one 68-pounder ; 
 that is, 200 pounds in heavy shells to meet the one 68-pounder shot, or 
 one 8-inch shell. 
 
 It is of course impossible, nor is it necessary, to deduce the exact 
 value of the combined results, but we think that a glance at the facts 
 will convince that the Merrimack, not only has the advantage in abso 
 lute weight of projectile, supposing all strike, but that the greater accu 
 racy and power beyond point blank will increase this difference very 
 much in favor of the Merrimack. 
 
 The United States ship has also the capacity to bear more battery 
 than now carried. Her tonnage is one-fifth greater than that of the 
 Shannon, and according to the ratio of armament to burden in the latter 
 ship (1 : 16J), the Merrimack should (other things being equal) bear 
 with equal ease about 196 tons of ordnance, while in reality she only 
 carries 153 tons, which is absolutely 7 tons less than the weight of the 
 Shannon s guns. The addition would give 10 more 9-inch guns, for 
 which the Merrimack has at this time unoccupied ports on the gun-deck, 
 and would raise the power of the Merrimack s broadside to 1,780 
 pounds placing it, not only overpoweringly above that of the Shannon, 
 but also on an equality with the broadside of the heaviest two-decker 
 line-of-battle ship in the British or any other navy. 
 
 It appears by this that the ordinary battery of the Merri 
 mack bore nearly the same ratio of superiority to that of the 
 Shannon that the armament of the Constitution did to that of 
 
282 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the Guerriere, while the full battery of the American frigate 
 was, at the beginning of the rebellion, overwhelmingly superior 
 to the first-class British frigates as they were then armed. 
 These facts and statements exhibit the comparative state of 
 English and American ordnance at about the period when our 
 war of the rebellion began. Our vessels were then using, as 
 their heaviest guns, the 10-inch Dahlgren, a shell-gun, and 9- 
 inch, 10-inch, and 11-inch shell-guns of the same pattern. This 
 last-named gun varies from the columbiad mainly in its shape, 
 which is more nearly in conformity with scientific principles, 
 and experience has shown it to be more reliable and stronger 
 than the columbiad. Soon after the commencement of the war, 
 two new guns were introduced into the service, one bearing the 
 name of its inventor, Parrott, a rifled gun, and the other a 
 smooth-bore, called also after its inventor, the Rodman gun. The 
 Parrott gun consists of a solid casting, which is bored out and 
 rifled, and then strengthened by a band of wrought iron around 
 the breech, which band is shrunk on. These guns are very 
 highly esteemed both for land service and the Navy, and the 
 inventor has succeeded in producing a 300-pounder rifle of this 
 pattern, which was found very serviceable at Charleston. 
 
 The peculiar character of the Rodman gun consists in the 
 method by which it is cast. This method is thus described 
 by Commander Henry A. Wise, United States Navy, and 
 chief of the Ordnance Bureau, in his testimony before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the "War (1865) : The Eod 
 man gun, as it is termed, is cast upon a peculiar princi 
 ple. There is a core of iron in the centre of the mould, and 
 a stream of water is introduced from a hydrant into that 
 core. The metal is poured into the mould around that core, 
 and it is cooled interiorly and exteriorly at the same time. It 
 is assumed that very great strength is obtained for the gun so 
 cast. The water is introduced at the bore of the core, and the 
 head of water from the hydrant causes it to rise in the core to 
 the top, whence it is carried off by a pipe. This process goes 
 on during the process of pouring in and cooling the metal. 
 The guns made by that method are much stronger than if 
 made by the method of solid casting. The casting in a cylin 
 drical form is generally supposed to give more uniform strength. 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 283 
 
 This method has gained ground only within the last three 
 years. One 15-inch smooth-bore gun and one 12-inch rifle had 
 been cast on the Rodman plan before the beginning of the re 
 bellion, but no use had been made of them beyond a partial 
 test, and they lay dismounted and forgotten at Fortress Monroe. 
 The terrible accident occasioned by the bursting of a wrought- 
 iron gun on board of one of our steamships had brought big 
 guns into discredit, and the Rodman experimental guns were 
 cast aside as so much useless rubbish. These two large guns, 
 lying thus neglected in the sand at Fortress Monroe, were 
 brought into notice again by one of those apparently trivial 
 things on which great events so often depend, one of the so- 
 called chance occurrences which the Christian regards as taking 
 place under the direction of Him who notices the sparrow s fall. 
 The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Captain Fox, and the 
 head of the Ordnance Bureau, Captain Wise, were at Fortress 
 Monroe at the time of the fight between the Monitor and the 
 Merrimack, and in a small tug were near spectators of that now 
 famous battle. As the reputation of the Department, as well 
 as the country s safety, depended very much upon the success 
 of the novel ship, the contest was watched with intense anxiety 
 as well as interest. For four hours these two vessels used 
 against each other, at short range, the most powerful artillery 
 then adopted by England and America ; and at its close, though 
 the Merrimack was compelled to withdraw, partially disabled, 
 yet the armor had not been penetrated. On both sides the 
 armor had been victorious over the guns. The Assistant Secre 
 tary, in describing his own reflections, while yet upon the spot, 
 said : " The first thing to suggest itself was the necessity of 
 larger guns." It seemed to be demonstrated that, while the 
 Merrimack had inflicted no important injury upon the Monitor, 
 neither had the rebel frigate received a fatal blow from the 11- 
 inch guns. To insure the destruction of such a ship, it was 
 necessary to have guns of greater smashing power. 
 
 While these thoughts were in his mind, the party landed at 
 Fortress Monroe, at the very spot where the neglected and for 
 gotten Rodman guns were lying. They at once attracted his 
 attention, and the question arose, Why is not this 15-inch gun 
 the very thing we want ? The question led to inquiries, and 
 
284: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 these to the adoption of such measures as secured a trial of this 
 formidable weapon. Upon a fact which seemed at the moment 
 to have no importance, the issue of the national conflict was, as 
 we now see, depending ; for success, to say the least, would have 
 been very doubtful, if not impossible, without the Monitors and 
 the 15-inch guns, which alone gave them sufficient offensive 
 power. 
 
 The 15-inch gun was destined to meet with nearly the same 
 opposition as the Monitor itself. Those who had won a reputa 
 tion in the Department of Ordnance were naturally unwilling to 
 risk it upon an untried experiment, and when experience seemed 
 not to promise success. The necessity was urgent, and would 
 not admit of such experimental test of the gun as would demon 
 strate both its safety and efficiency. Admiral Dahlgren, whose 
 opinions were entitled to great weight, and who was the direct 
 ing head of the Ordnance Department, was willing to proceed 
 to manufacture such a gun under directions from the Depart 
 ment, and prepared the plan, but expressed doubts of its success, 
 and preferred a 13-inch gun, believing that it would bear a 
 larger charge of powder, that the shot driven with greater force 
 would be more effective ; and thus the Secretary was constrained 
 to adopt the new gun without the express sanction of those to 
 whom he would most naturally go for an opinion. As in the 
 case of the Monitors, the newspapers were drawn into discus 
 sion of the question, and many articles appeared condemning 
 the guns and censuring the Naval Ordnance Bureau for intro 
 ducing them into the service. In order to relieve that bureau 
 from charges to which it was not amenable, and to assume his 
 own proper share of responsibility, the Assistant Secretary ad 
 dressed the following note to The New York Times : 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, Thursday, May 28, 1862. 
 
 Several days since an article appeared in your paper (and similar 
 articles have appeared in other papers), censuring the Naval Ordnance 
 Bureau for introducing the 15-inch calibre into the Navy. I cannot 
 say what influenced the Secretary of the Navy to adopt this heavy 
 calibre, but I know that the distinguished chief of the Bureau of Ord 
 nance, Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, did not advise it. Whatever respon 
 sibility attaches to those who strenuously urged it belongs to me and 
 not to the admiral. Very respectfully, 
 
 G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary. 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 285 
 
 The following letter from Captain Ericsson will help the 
 public to determine to whom belongs the responsibility, and as 
 is now seen the honor of bringing into the service the 15-inch 
 guns : 
 
 NETV YOEK, April 20, 1864. 
 
 To Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy : 
 
 SIR : I enclose copy of the plan of a twenty-feet diameter turret, 
 with two 15-inch guns, which I forwarded to you on the 22d March, 
 1862. With reference to these guns I have to state that the calibre 
 was determined by yourself, and that the outline and proportions were 
 made to correspond as nearly as possible with the 11-inch Dahlgren 
 gun. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. ERICSSON. 
 
 The 15-inch gun was a Hodman gun, so far as the method 
 of casting was concerned ; externally it was shaped after the 
 Dahlgren pattern, and it therefore combined the excellences of 
 the plan of both these distinguished inventors, while the calibre 
 of the gun, and the weight of the shot, the essential points, were 
 determined by the Department, and by the advice of the Assist 
 ant Secretary. The first trial of the new ordnance against an 
 armored vessel, the Atlanta, ended all doubt in the minds of all 
 candid persons in regard to its efficiency ; and in Europe, even 
 more quickly than at home, it was conceded that the American 
 guns had introduced a new era in naval war a concession not 
 made so much in words as in the experiments for the manufac 
 ture of heavier ordnance for their own ships. 
 
 From these statements it will be seen that from the time of 
 the building of our first frigates, after the War of the Revolu 
 tion to the close of the "War of the Rebellion, the Americans 
 steadily maintained a superiority in the weight of the battery 
 and of the single shot, and that these have been the main causes 
 by which success and renown have been won. True, they are 
 not the only causes. In general, the scantling of our ships has 
 been larger than that of other nations, and therefore they were 
 not so easily cut up by shot ; and, in addition, our vessels have 
 been handled with more skill, our firing has been more rapid, 
 and the aim of our gunners more accurate. All these points 
 were made clear in the fight with the Alabama. The Ameri- 
 
286 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 can ship was more stoutly built than the English ship, she was 
 managed with superior skill, her heavy shells tore the Alabama 
 in pieces, and converted her deck into a slaughter-house, while 
 the greater accuracy of the aim of the Americans was apparent 
 to all who saw the battle ; and yet the Alabama s guns were 
 served by picked gunners trained on the practice-ship of the 
 British ISTavy. It was probably the most conclusive answer yet 
 given to the false and foolish statement so persistently made in 
 England, that our naval victories have been won by English 
 seamen. Still, with all other advantages, it would be unreason 
 able to suppose that the same results would have been reached 
 in all cases in the "War of 1812 had our ships mounted no 
 heavier batteries than those of the English frigates ; and it is 
 quite clear that the Alabama was demolished by our 11-inch 
 shells, and equally so that the Atlanta would not have been 
 captured, as she was, except by the 15-inch guns. Other na 
 tions will doubtless manufacture guns equal to those we now 
 have, but we may safely trust for the future to that inventive 
 genius and thinking power which have given us our past tri 
 umphs and our present superiority. 
 
 The country will not be prepared to give proper credit to 
 the Navy Department, and especially to the energy ot the Chief 
 of the Ordnance Bureau, unless it understands how deficient the 
 country was in guns, as well as in ships, at the commencement 
 of the rebellion. 
 
 That scientific and accomplished officer, Admiral Dahlgren, 
 had rendered a great service to his country, and had attracted 
 the attention of Europe by his investigations and experiments in 
 gunnery previous to the beginning of the war. lie wrought 
 out the American idea, and produced an American gun. His 
 influence upon our ordnance will be more fully set forth in a 
 future chapter. The gun which bears his name is justly ad 
 mired as a truly scientific weapon, more reliable than any so- 
 called " built-up " guns yet produced. Even the 15-inch guns 
 were shaped after the Dahlgren pattern ; and yet, at the break 
 ing out of the rebellion, but few of these excellent guns of large 
 calibre had been manufactured. Most readers will be surprised 
 to learn how few efficient cannon the Government had at com 
 mand when the rebels attacked Fort Sumter. A few facts will 
 
AMERICAN OEDNANCE. 287 
 
 present the actual state of things, and show the great difficul 
 ties against which the Ordnance Department had to contend in 
 the first year of the conflict. There were on hand in March, 
 1861, 2,468 heavy guns. Of this number 1,872 pieces were 32- 
 pounders, of an obsolete pattern, and 557 of the remainder were 
 light 8-inch shell-guns, also of the old pattern. There were 
 305 9-inch Dahlgren guns, and 32 11-inch guns, of the same 
 pattern. But many of these 9-inch and 11-inch pieces were at 
 the Norfolk Navy- Yard, and were seized by the rebels, while 
 most of the remainder were on board of our cruisers, which the 
 Secretary of the Navy (Toucey) had scattered in distant seas, 
 so that actually the Navy Department had at its disposal little 
 more than fifty really efficient guns when the great battle be 
 gan. The condition of our ordnance then may be also inferred 
 from the fact that only two classes of guns then on hand the 
 9-inch and the 11-inch Dahlgren were the only pieces which 
 were duplicated after the beginning of the war. It is seen, 
 then, that the Department was called upon to create not only 
 its ships, but their armaments also. " Not a gun belonging to 
 the Navy was to be found upon the Mississippi or its tribu 
 taries," where, before the close of the war, were a hundred 
 steamers armed with the new American guns. 
 
 The difficulties were increased by the desertion of many, 
 who, by their knowledge and long experience, were well fitted 
 to conduct the affairs of the Ordnance Bureau, and this laid a 
 double burden upon Commander H. A. Wise, the new chief 
 of this department of the Navy, whose efficiency has been abun 
 dantly proved by the whole history of the struggle. 
 
 The efficiency of this bureau, and the immense resources of 
 our country, are very forcibly exhibited by the fact that, in No 
 vember, 1863, it had procured 2,811 guns, of the most approved 
 modern patterns, about eight hundred of which were 9-inch and 
 11-inch Dahlgrens; about seven hundred were heavy rifles, 
 and thirty-six 15-inch guns had already been finished. 
 
 The extensive Tredegar works in Richmond were from the 
 first in the hands of the rebels, and, with the exception of the 
 works at Pittsburg, few founderies in the country were at all 
 prepared for the making of cannon ; and from these facts 
 may be seen, not only the difficulties whicli beset the Govern- 
 
288 HISTORY OF THE HOTTED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ment, but the astonishing facility and skill of our countrymen 
 in changing so suddenly these workshops of peace into factories 
 that produced the most formidable weapons of modern war 
 with a rapidity equal to the enormous demand, and of a quality 
 that stood the ordeal of battle. 
 
 The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance pays the following 
 well-merited tribute to the manufacturers who came so promptly 
 to the aid of the Government : 
 
 In the report which I have now the honor to present, I shall en 
 deavor to show briefly, yet as clearly as possible, how much this branch 
 of the public service was unprepared for the great crisis of 1861, and in 
 what manner and to what extent the existing difficulties have been 
 overcome, and our ordnance of the Navy increased in numbers and im 
 proved in character. In doing so I shall not fail to give full credit to 
 those of our citizens who have so ably and unhesitatingly assisted the 
 bureau in all its efforts to meet the urgent necessities of the country, 
 and who still continue to answer promptly and well the heavy requisi 
 tions made upon them. For, although the very best energies of the offi 
 cers on ordnance duty everywhere, and the zealous cooperation of 
 its employes at the several navy-yards have always been exerted to the 
 utmost in carrying out the bureau s instructions, the great results which 
 are shown by the records could never have been obtained without the 
 assistance and support derived from the manufacturers, founders, and me 
 chanics of the private establishments throughout the loyal States. 
 
 Thus it is a matter of no little importance, especially in view of 
 future contingencies, to know that, independent of the resources imme 
 diately within the control of the Government, the Navy can safely rely 
 upon the patriotism, zeal, and ability of the loyal citizens of our coun 
 try at all times and under all emergencies. 
 
 Not only has this been the case among the people of our great cities 
 on the Atlantic border, but whenever and wherever a demand was made 
 for ordnance supplies of a kind which could not be conveniently and 
 promptly furnished from the ordinary depots at the East and North, the 
 manufacturers of the interior and the West have been found ready and 
 competent to do the work in the most efficient manner. 
 
 These facts are most clearly demonstrated by the history of all the 
 operations of our Navy since the outbreak of the rebellion. Not a 
 single ship or squadron has ever been delayed in its movements for the 
 want of ordnance or ordnance supplies 
 
 The only establishments in the country which were prepared for the 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 289 
 
 work of founding heavy cannon when the rebellion took place were the 
 South Boston, Fort Pitt, and the West Point founderies ; the Tredegar 
 Works, at Richmond, Va., having passed into the hands of the rebels. 
 No government establishment of the kind existed, and consequently the 
 sole reliance of both Army aud Navy at the commencement of our diffi 
 culties was upon these three founderies. Eight nobly, however, did they 
 come to the rescue in the hour of need, and thus afforded time for the 
 bureau to seek other manufacturers who might be willing to undertake 
 the work of supplying the Navy with cannon. Although such opera 
 tions are always attended with great risk to those who are unaccustomed 
 to the casting of heavy guns, it was not long before several other estab 
 lishments were ready to cooperate, and the work of producing the guns 
 of various calibres required was commenced, and, I am happy to say, 
 has been most successfully prosecuted. In addition to the above-named 
 founderies, the bureau has now, as sources of supply, the establishment 
 at Providence, Rhode Island, known as the Builders Iron Foundery ; 
 the founderies of Messrs. Hinkley, Williams & Co., of Boston ; and the 
 Portland Company, of Portland, Maine ; and at Reading, Pennsylvania, 
 the Scott Foundery of Messrs. Seyfert, McManus & Co. From all these 
 establishments, except the West Point Foundery, the Navy is furnished 
 with 9-inch, 10-inch, and 11-inch guns, none of the old system being 
 now manufactured. 
 
 From the Fort Pitt Foundery, in addition to the above classes of 
 guns, it obtains the heavy 15-inch ; and from the West Point Foundery 
 it receives the Parrott rifles, of all calibres, which now constitute a part 
 of the battery of nearly every vessel afloat, and the great effectiveness 
 of which has been so strikingly manifest during the recent battles at 
 Charleston. In procuring cannon for the Navy the same conditions 
 have been exacted from all these founderies, as regards the character of 
 metal and every other element necessary to constitute good and reliable 
 guns. No gun has been accepted, as a standard, which has not been 
 subjected to the ordeal of 1,000 rounds of service charges. With this 
 standard thus established, all the guns of a contract must coincide in 
 their composite elements. 
 
 The only exception to this rule has been in the case of the 15-inch 
 guns cast upon the plan of Major Rodman, of the United States Army. 
 Time did not permit of this proof being applied, and the guns were 
 necessarily accepted and put into service, after having endured, however, 
 somewhat more than the tests prescribed by the army regulations. 
 
 It is most gratifying to know that the judgment of the Navy De 
 partment has been sustained by the result of the further test which has 
 
 19 
 
290 IIISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 been applied to the first gun of this class made for the Navy, and which 
 is still undergoing a series of experimental firing after being modified in 
 form. All doubt is thus removed of the ability of the Fort Pitt Foundery 
 to produce guns of this great size which can safely be relied upon, and 
 the power thereby added to the fire of our Monitors has been most fully 
 exemplified in the capture of the Atlanta. 
 
 Before dismissing this branch of its report, it is just that the bureau 
 should bear special testimony to the prompt and efficient manner in 
 which the West Point Foundery has also done its share in supplying the 
 need of the service for a new style of ordnance. The introduction of a 
 few rifled guns of heavy calibre into the batteries of ships had al 
 ready taken place in foreign navies prior to the date of our present re 
 bellion ; and in our own service experiments were being conducted at the 
 Washington Navy- Yard, under the direction of Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, 
 for the purpose of devising a system of rifled ordnance. Nothing de 
 cisive, however, had been accomplished, except with the rifled howitzer, 
 and the experiments were rudely interrupted in the spring of 1861. At 
 the same time Mr. Parrott was engaged in perfecting his present system, 
 and the results obtained by him were so satisfactory, that in the summer 
 of 1862 the bureau, in conjunction with the army ordnance, directed a 
 100-pounder to be subjected to a series of 1,000 service rounds. The 
 gun stood the test without bursting, and its accuracy and range were 
 considered sufficiently good to warrant the adoption of these rifled guns 
 as a permament part of our naval armament. Since then the demand 
 for the several calibres has been unceasing ; and, as before stated, they 
 are to be found on board nearly every vessel now in service, and will 
 continue to be supplied until some better system is established. 
 
 Finally, from personal inspection, and witnessing the firing of over 
 one hundred rounds from these guns at the West Point Foundery re 
 cently, the bureau is satisfied that whenever attention is paid to details, 
 and even moderate skill in the manner of loading and firing is attained, 
 they will prove the most serviceable rifled guns that have ever been in 
 troduced into any service. It should be remarked also that the average 
 cost of these guns is much below that of any others which have been 
 offered to the Government. 
 
 The following extract from Commander Wise s Report for 
 1864 will snow in general the new armament of the American 
 Navy, and affords the basis of a comparison between this and 
 that of the snips of Europe, and exhibits the manner in which 
 the American idea was wrought out in practice : 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 291 
 
 The governing rule, in arming our ships-of-war, lias been to place on 
 board of them the very heaviest and most effective guns they can bear 
 with safety. In general, it may be stated that the 9-inch are used for 
 broadside, the 10-inch and 11-inch and the Parrott rifles in pivot, the 
 15-inch for the Monitor turrets, and the bronze howitzers and rifles for 
 boat and deck service inshore. A few of our ships continue to be 
 armed with the 32-pounder and 8-inch guns of the old system ; but 
 these will probably give way to the modified guns of similar classes 
 above alluded to. 
 
 As no special changes have been made in the general arrangement 
 of batteries since my last report, the same vessels mentioned therein, as 
 types of their rate, may be again taken to illustrate the system of arma 
 ment still in vogue. 
 
 Thus, the battery of a first rate is presented by the Minnesota, car 
 rying: 
 
 1 150-pounder rifled . . , . ) T 
 
 > In pivot. 
 
 1 11-inch smooth f 
 
 42 9-inch smooth ) T 
 
 . . _ , > In broadside, and 
 
 4 100-pounder rifled \ 
 
 4 howitzers. 
 
 Of a second rate, by the Brooklyn, carrying : 
 
 2 100-pounders rifled In pivot. 
 
 20 9-inch smooth ) T 
 
 _ .. } In broadside, and 
 
 2 60-pounders rifled ) 
 
 2 howitzers. 
 
 Of a third rate, by the Eutaw, carrying : 
 
 2 100-pounders ruled In pivot. 
 
 4 9-inch smooth ^ 
 
 2 24-pounders smooth (. In broadside. 
 
 2 24-pounders rifled ) 
 
 Of the fourth rates, by the Owasco, carrying : 
 
 1 11-inch smooth ) , 
 
 1 20-pounder rifled J 
 
 2 24-pounders howitzers In broadside. 
 
 And by the Nipsic, carrying : 
 
 1 150-pounder rifled ) T 
 
 1 30-pounder rifled [ In 
 
 2 9-inch smooth . . . In broadside, and 
 
 4 howitzers. 
 
292 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Of the Monitors, by 
 
 The Tonawanda, carrying 4 15-inch. 
 
 The Onondaga, carrying 2 15-indh. 
 
 2 150-pounders. 
 The Montauk carrying 1 15-inch. 
 
 1 150-pounder. 
 
 Of the iron-plated gunboats of the Western rivers, by the Carondelet, 
 
 carrying : 
 
 3 9-inch. 
 
 4 8-inch. 
 
 2 100-pounder rifles. 
 1 50-pounder " 
 1 30-pounder " 
 
 The development of the power of each individual ship named as 
 representatives of the several rates, is : 
 
 In shot. In shells. 
 
 Ibs. Ibs. 
 
 First rate 2,606 2,123 
 
 Second rate 1,220 990 
 
 Third rate 424 343 
 
 Fourth rate 210 183 
 
 and 294 255 
 
 In the Monitors : 
 
 Tonawanda 1,764 1,320 
 
 Onondaga 1,180 930 
 
 Montauk 606 465 
 
 In the Western gunboat : 
 
 Carondelet. . 588 480 
 
 These figures express the weight of metal thrown for breaching pur 
 poses by the guns at a single broadside in solid shot or shells. Con 
 joined with these, however, are the destructive and terrible agencies of 
 grape, canister, and shrapnel, available at all times in the general course 
 of naval warfare, but most especially and signally so when used against 
 uncovered masses of men. The effective power of a ship is therefore 
 increased in a very great degree by these auxiliaries, which are common 
 to both rifled and smooth-bores, excepting grape, which is not used in 
 the rifles. 
 
 It will be noticed that in each of the four rates of vessels above 
 mentioned, pivot-guns are associated with those of broadside, so as to 
 meet more fully the necessity for long range at high elevations in chasing 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 293 
 
 or bombardment, and at the same time to maintain a direct fire -without 
 materially altering the course of the vessel. The mechanical arrange 
 ment of the pivot-carriage also enables the mounting and working with 
 ease a much heavier gun than could possibly be handled in an ordinary 
 broadside carriage. 
 
 These pivot-guns are always placed near the ends of the vessel, and, 
 therefore, do not interfere in the least with the working of the broad 
 side.* The rapidity of fire from them is of course not so great as from 
 an individual gun of broadside, but it is fully sufficient for the purpose 
 of accuracy at ranges beyond the reach of the lesser calibres. No ship 
 can, therefore, be considered properly armed that has not a pivot-gun 
 of greater power and range than the guns of broadside. But whether 
 a battery consisting entirely of heavy pivot-guns would be more formi 
 dable than one of broadside alone, the aggregate weights being equal, 
 has not yet been tried, the only effort of the kind being that of the 
 Niagara, which has a battery of twelve 150-pounder rifles mounted in 
 pivot, and no regular broadside guns. It is not worth while, however, 
 to speculate on the probable results of a battery so constituted. No 
 doubt under certain circumstances the peculiar merits of the plan would 
 be fully developed ; but whether its excellence would ever be made so 
 manifest as to cause its adoption in lieu of tho present mixed system of 
 pivot and broadside, is a question which cottld only be decided under 
 all the varying conditions of an engagement t sea. 
 
 The decisive power of the heavy gun in pivot is, however, most 
 strikingly exemplified in the recent fight between the Kearsarge and 
 the Alabama, although the distance at which the action was fought was 
 fully within the scope of the broadside 32-pounders of either vessel, be 
 ing only about 700 yards. The water also was smooth, and both ships 
 moved steadily under steam in a continuous circle around a common 
 centre. Every condition was therefore most favorable for the full exer 
 cise of the offensive power of each class and description of gun used ; 
 but it does not appear from the official reports, or the published state 
 ments of the affair, that much damage was inflicted on either vessel by 
 the guns of broadside, the decisive work having been performed only 
 by the pivot-guns of the Kearsarge. These were the two 11-inch guns 
 mounted at either end of the ship, the light 30-pounder being too feeble 
 to have had any bearing whatever upon the results. 
 
 There does not appear to have been the slightest difficulty in ma 
 noeuvring these pivots, and although their fire was much slower than that 
 of the broadside, yet the weight and explosive power of their shells fully 
 
 * An exception to this rule is found in the New Ironsides and Niagara. 
 
294: HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 compensated for any want of rapidity. For it is stated in the official 
 reports that the total number of rounds fired by the Kearsarge in this 
 action of one hour and two minutes, was, exclusive of those from the 
 12-pounder bronze rifle, one hundred and sixty- three. That is, from 
 the 11-inch, 55 ; from the 30-pounder, 48 ; and from the broadside 32- 
 pounders, 60=163. 
 
 Throwing out the rounds fired from the 30-pounder, we have nearly 
 an equal number from the pivot and broadside guns ; but the prepon 
 derance of power is decidedly in favor of the 55 11-inch shells, weighing 
 in the aggregate 7,425 pounds of iron, with an explosive charge in each 
 shell of six pounds of powder, while the total weight of metal thrown 
 from the 32-pounders of broadside in the 60 rounds is in solid shot 
 1,920 pounds and in shells only 832 pounds of iron, with an explosive 
 charge of not quite one pound in each shell. 
 
 We gather from the official report of Captain Semmes of the Ala 
 bama that the effect of the 11 -inch shells of the Kearsarge was most dis 
 astrous. For he states that " after the lapse of about one hour and ten 
 minutes our [his] ship was ascertained to be in a sinking condition, 
 the enemy s shell having exploded in our sides and between decks, open 
 ing large apertures, through which the water rushed with great rapid 
 ity." This part of his report is most certainly true, if all the rest is 
 questionable. 
 
 On the other hand, the Alabama opposed to this fire one Blakely 
 Y-inch, or 120-pounder rifle, one 68-pounder both in pivot, and the 
 especial favorites of the English Navy and six 32-pounders, in broad 
 side. The weight of metal thrown from these guns, assuming that all 
 were used, is about equal to that from the Kearsarge ; but it is also 
 stated that the tiring of the Alabama was much more rapid than that of 
 the Kearsarge. This, however, together with great precision and concen 
 tration of blows, was to have been expected from a crew trained in the 
 gunnery exercises of a navy whose boasted superiority over all others 
 was never before so signally disproved. It does not appear that cor 
 rectness of aim was much attended to by the crew of the .Alabama, 
 whilst thus delivering their rapid fire ; for the Kearsarge w r as only hit 
 twenty-eight times in all, and in no instance was she badly injured. 
 Singularly enough, not a man was killed outright on board of her, and 
 only three were wounded. 
 
 There can be no question with regard to the superiority of the 11- 
 inch guns over the Blakely 120-pounder, and the 68-pounder of the 
 English pivot system, either in penetration, smashing effect of the shot, 
 or explosive power of the shells. Hence, although the vessels were 
 
AMERICAN ORDNANCE. 295 
 
 nearly equally matched as to tonnage, motive power, and number of 
 men and guns, yet the preponderating influence of calibre, properly dis 
 posed in pivot, and coolly and deliberately handled by American sea 
 men, was sufficient to settle the question briefly, and most conclusively. 
 
 In addition to the improvements in heavy ordnance referred 
 to, a corresponding advance was made in the construction of 
 carriages for mounting and manoeuvring them in broadsides 
 and in pivot. This question was one of very grave importance, 
 and not easily disposed of, as will appear, when we reflect upon 
 the violent rolling and pitching motion of a ship at sea, even in 
 the ordinary weather, when the batteries may be cast adrift for 
 fighting with safety. 
 
 A series of well-conducted experiments at the experimental 
 battery of the Washington Navy- Yard and on board the ordnance 
 practice-ship Plymouth, under the command of Rear- Admiral 
 (then Captain) Dahlgren, resulted in the complete solution of 
 the difficulties so far as the 9 and 11 inch guns were concerned : 
 that is to say, a broadside carriage for the 9-inch, and a pivot 
 carriage for the 11-inch, both of wood, were designed and con 
 structed for our frigates of the Merrimack class, and were found 
 to be as perfect in their operation as could be expected. 
 
 The difficulty, however, of obtaining seasoned timber dur 
 ing the war led the attention of the present Chief of the Bureau 
 of Ordnance to the question of substituting iron for wood in the 
 construction of these carriages, and the first trial of iron was 
 made in the carriages of the New Ironsides. These were found 
 to be better than those made of wood, and it is believed by 
 many that the days of wooden carriages are numbered. 
 
 Iron was an indispensable necessity in the carriages of the 
 Monitors, and the genius of Ericsson soon overcame all me 
 chanical difficulties in the methods of movement and compres 
 sion. Since then he has also designed and successfully tried in 
 practice a carriage upon which the 15-inch guns can be mounted 
 and worked in broadside without difficulty or danger the mo 
 mentum of these heavy guns being easily controlled by means 
 of a rotary compressor. The advance herein made over the 
 slow and expensive trials of the English may be inferred from 
 the fact that they have hitherto failed in controlling even a 12- 
 ton gun in a sea-way. 
 
CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 THE RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS. 
 
 IT lias been truly said that the determination to relieve Fort 
 Sumter was the turning-point, and the decisive one, in Mr. Lin 
 coln s administration. The doctrine of State rights as held and 
 acted upon by the Southern leaders, and as enunciated in an 
 other form by Mr. Buchanan, that the General Government has 
 no power to coerce a State, had so far influenced public thought 
 as nearly to paralyze the sovereign power by which the whole 
 nation was represented. General Scott, then in command of 
 the Army, and whose influence at that time was very great, 
 almost controlling, hesitated in regard to the policy, and the 
 right even, of invading, as the term then was, the soil of a 
 " sovereign State," and wavered in reference to the question of 
 relieving Sumter on that account. 
 
 On this question, as on that of slavery, there was a direct 
 antagonism between the North and the South. From the ear 
 liest period of our history the Northern idea of liberty was of 
 freedom for each individual to act within his sphere as a part of 
 the political body, under the due restraints of government and 
 law. Thus the citizen, the township, the county, the State were 
 all regarded as free and independent, each in the proper sphere, 
 but each also subordinate to the higher authority ; and when the 
 State was reached, it too was regarded as an integral and insep 
 arable portion of the supreme body, the nation, " The United 
 States." However individuals may at times have declared, 
 under local and temporary excitements, another theory, it can 
 not be denied that the "ore vailing sentiment of the North has 
 
THE RELIEF OF FOKT PICKEXS. 297 
 
 been and still is opposed to the doctrine of sovereignty for the 
 States. 
 
 On the other hand, that impatience of all control which has 
 been and is the characteristic of those who have been moulded 
 by the influences of the slave system, that disregard of all law 
 and authority which interferes with the individual will, mani 
 fested itself even in political institutions ; and stimulated as these 
 feelings were, by a jealousy of the growing power of the North, 
 they exhibited themselves, first in the assertion of sovereign in 
 dependence of the central Government, and then, when they 
 saw that this Government must, from necessity, be controlled 
 by the JSTorth, they endeavored to secure this asserted indepen 
 dence by force of arms. It was virtually the old question be 
 tween a loose, uncertain confederacy of independent States, allied 
 during pleasure, as States, and the better and more perfect 
 union, not of States but of the people, which was contemplated 
 by the Constitution. When Mr. Lincoln, therefore, decided to 
 relieve Fort Sumter and send troops into Virginia, he determined 
 that, so far as in him lay, the United States should be a nation, 
 and not a mere confederacy. 
 
 This State sovereignty and no coercion policy, was the con 
 trolling one of Mr. Buchanan s administration, on which he 
 seems to have been guided entirely by members of his Cabinet 
 and their outside sympathizers. As the result of this, after 
 long apparent halting between two opinions, Mr. Buchanan 
 refused to reenforce Fort Sumter, and on the 29th of January, 
 1861, the following telegram was forwarded to Fort Pickens : 
 
 WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861. ) 
 Eeceived at PENSACOLA, January 29, 1861, at 9 P. M. \ 
 
 To Captain JAMES GLTXN, commanding the Macedonian; Captain W. S. 
 WALKER, commanding the Brooklyn; or other naval officers in com 
 mand; and Lieutenant ADAM j. SLEMMER, First Regiment Artillery, 
 U. 8. A, commanding Fort Pickens: 
 
 In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mallory, in a tele 
 gram of yesterday to Messrs. Bigler, Hunter, and Slidell, with a request 
 that it should be laid before the President, that Fort Pickens would not 
 be assaulted ; and an offer of such an assurance to the same effect from 
 Colonel Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon re 
 ceiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that 
 
298 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Fort Pickens will not be attacked ; yon are instructed not to land the 
 company on board the Brooklyn, unless said fort shall be attacked, or 
 preparations shall be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for 
 the supply of the fort you will land. The Brooklyn and the other ves- 
 sels-of-war on the station will remain, and you will exercise the utmost 
 vigilance, and be prepared at a moment s warning to land the company 
 at Fort Pickens ; and you and they will instantly repel any attack on 
 the fort. 
 
 The President yesterday sent a special message to Congress commend 
 ing the Virginia resolutions of compromise. The commissioners of 
 different States are to meet here on Monday, fourth (4th) of February, 
 and it is important that, during their session, a collision of arms should 
 be avoided, unless an attack should be made, or there should be prep 
 arations for such an attack. In either event, the Brooklyn and the 
 other vessels will act promptly. Your right, and that of other offi 
 cers in command at Pensacola, freely to communicate with the Govern 
 ment, by special messenger, and its right, in the same manner, to 
 communicate with yourselves and them, will remain intact, as the 
 basis of the present instructions. 
 
 J. HOLT, Secretary of War. 
 
 I. TOUCEY, Secretary of Navy. 
 
 This message explains itself. Its object was to leave the 
 rebels at Pensacola, as they were also at Charleston, to complete, 
 at their leisure and without interruption, the batteries by which 
 they could not only defend themselves, but could batter down 
 Sumter and Pickens so soon as they were prepared. "When 
 afterward, subsequent to Mr. Lincoln s inauguration, General 
 Scott sent an order to land the troops in the Brooklyn, knowing 
 nothing of the secret compact, Captain Adams, commanding 
 the squadron there, refused to obey, and justified himself by 
 stating that it would violate the armistice which had been en 
 tered into with the rebel leaders. 
 
 At this point in the history, Fort Sumter becomes connected 
 with Fort Pickens in the movements of the Government ; and 
 in order to set in a clear light the relief of Fort Pickens, it is 
 necessary to refer to some facts, related in another chapter, con 
 cerning Sumter. The policy of Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet 
 in reference to the Southern forts very naturally had some in 
 fluence at first upon Mr. Lincoln s administration. For some 
 
THE BELIEF OF FOKT PICKETS. 299 
 
 weeks there was apparent hesitancy, and some real division of 
 opinion in his Cabinet as to sending troops and provisions to 
 Major Anderson and his beleaguered garrison. The Secretary 
 of State was understood to have been decidedly in favor of 
 leaving Sumter without assistance, and even of giving it up into 
 the hands of the rebels. His earnest wishes, and the well- 
 known opinions of General Scott and most of the Cabinet, may 
 have induced Mr. Seward to suppose that it was perfectly 
 safe to make the promise that the fort should be evacuated, 
 which promise Judge Campbell declares was made. Mr. 
 Seward may have considered it already decided upon, and as 
 lacking only the formal action. Unexpectedly, however, Mr. 
 Lincoln, in the latter part of March, decided to assume the re 
 sponsibility himself, and to send an expedition to Sumter. This 
 decision was promptly acted upon ; and selecting Captain IJox, 
 then in private life, to command the relieving squadron, he 
 was sent to New York to get it ready for sea. 
 
 At this time it seemed as if nothing could be concealed 
 from the conspirators. In some manner they often penetrated 
 even Cabinet secrets, and a knowledge or a suspicion of what 
 was being done having reached the self-styled rebel commis 
 sioners, they asked from the State Department, indirectly and 
 unofficially, of course, an explanation. "What was meant by the 
 reply, " Faith Jcept in regard to Sumter, wait and see" each one 
 must judge for himself and in the light of subsequent events. 
 It was charged at the time, or as soon as the facts were known, 
 that the Secretary of State, having committed himself, unoffici 
 ally , to the rebel commissioners, determined to thwart the 
 purpose of the President, and prevent the relief of the fort. To 
 decide such questions is not the province of the historian, but 
 he has no right to conceal the facts, and upon them the country 
 will make up its verdict. 
 
 It was well known, of course, to the members of the Cabinet 
 that the expedition under Captain Fox was being rapidly fitted 
 out in ]STew York, and it was also known that the Government 
 had at command but a single vessel whose size and battery 
 were sufficient for the main force of the proposed squadron, the 
 Powhatan, commanded by Captain Samuel Mercer. This ship 
 and other smaller ones and a few transports were placed by the 
 
300 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Secretary of the Navy at the control of Captain Fox, to carry 
 out the intentions of the President. All who knew any thing 
 of the matter also knew that without the Powhatan the expedi 
 tion must necessarily fail. 
 
 The following facts will show what was actually done. An 
 order was procured from the President, without his understand 
 ing its real import, as he afterward declared, which order 
 authorized the employment of the Powhatan for another service. 
 The existence of this order and its object were carefully con 
 cealed from the Secretary of the Navy and from Captain Fox, 
 under whose eye the Powhatan was being fitted out for Sumter. 
 The Secretary, and Captain Mercer, who commanded the Pow 
 hatan, supposed all was going smoothly on. 
 
 "When the Powhatan was ready she started down the bay 
 under orders for Sumter. "When off Staten Island the ship was 
 boarded, and an order produced from the President transferring 
 the ship from the command of Captain Mercer to Lieutenant 
 D. D. Porter, who took charge of her, and she went on her way, 
 not to Sumter, but to Fort Pickens, neither Captain Fox nor the 
 Secretary of the Navy having been notified of any change. 
 Captain Mercer left the vessel and went ashore. Thus, as is 
 detailed more at length in another chapter, the expedition to 
 Fort Sumter was defeated, while the Harvey telegram, giving 
 information to the rebels that an attempt would be made to re 
 lieve Sumter, induced them to order an immediate attack, and 
 the fort was captured. 
 
 When these facts became known, it was seen that they bore 
 somewhat heavily upon the Secretary of State, and an explana 
 tory statement was made by General (then Captain) Meigs. 
 He states in substance that he and the Secretary of State 
 planned an expedition for the relief of Fort Pickens, so impor 
 tant that it was necessary to keep it entirely secret even from the 
 Secretary of the Navy himself, although his ships were abso 
 lutely necessary in carrying out their plan. The manner in 
 which the Powhatan was obtained is thus very frankly stated 
 by General Meigs : " An order," he says, " was extracted " (per 
 haps a well-chosen word) "on the recommendation of Sec 
 retary Seward, detaching the Powhatan from the Sumter ex 
 pedition and sending her to Fort Pickens." At the close of his 
 
THE RELIEF OF FOET PICKETS. 301 
 
 statement General Meigs says : " In conclusion, permit me to 
 remark that this, the first successful military expedition of the 
 war, originated with Mr. Seward. Until it sailed, the United 
 States had declined everywhere." 
 
 The brilliancy of this exploit will be tested by the following 
 facts. In January, 1861, the Brooklyn had been sent out to 
 Fort Pickens with troops to reenforce the garrison. On the 
 29th January the telegram quoted before was sent, forbidding 
 the landing of the troops. General Scott sent out an order, dated 
 March. 12th, directing that the troops should be landed from the 
 Brooklyn. This Captain Adams, commanding the squadron, 
 declined to do, justifying himself by the armistice which had 
 been entered into between Secretary Holt and Secretary Toucey 
 and the rebel leaders. The following is the letter of Captain 
 Adams to the Secretary of the Navy, to which is added the re 
 ply of Mr. Welles : 
 
 U. S. FRIGATE SABINE, OFF PENSACOLA, April 1, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter addressed to me 
 by Captain Vodges, U. S. A., who is here in command of some troops 
 sent out in January last, to reenforce the garrison of Fort Pickens. I 
 have declined to land the men as Captain Vodges requests, as it would 
 be in direct violation of the orders of the Navy Department under which 
 I am acting. The instructions from General Scott to Captain Vodges 
 are of old date (March 12th), and may have been given without a full 
 knowledge of the condition of affairs here they would be no justifica 
 tion. Such a step is too important to be taken without the clearest 
 orders from proper authority. It would certainly be viewed as a hos 
 tile act, and would be resisted to the utmost. No one acquainted 
 with the feelings of the military assembled under General Bragg can 
 doubt that it would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war. 
 It would be a serious thing to bring on by any precipitation a collision 
 which may be entirely against the wishes of the Administration. At 
 present both sides are faithfully observing the agreement entered into by 
 the United States Government with Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase. 
 This agreement binds us not to reenforce Fort Pickens unless it shall be 
 attacked or threatened. It binds them not to attack it unless we should 
 attempt to reenforce it. I saw General Bragg on the 30th ult., who re 
 assured me the conditions on their part should not be violated. While 
 I cannot take on myself, under such insufficient authority as General 
 Scott s order, the fearful responsibility of an act which seems to render 
 
302 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 civil war inevitable, I am ready at all times to carry out whatever 
 orders I may receive from the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 In conclusion, I beg you will please to send me instructions as soon 
 as possible, that I may be relieved from a painful embarrassment. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 H. A. ADAMS, Captain, Senior Officer present. 
 To the Hon. GIDEON WELLES, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 6, 1861. 
 Captain HENRY A. ADAMS, commanding Naval Force off Pemacola : 
 
 SIR : Your dispatch of April 1st is received. The Department re 
 grets that you did not comply with the request of Captain Vodges to 
 carry into effect the orders of General Scott, sent out by the Crusader 
 under the orders of this Department. 
 
 You will immediately, on the first favorable opportunity after the 
 receipt of this order, afford every facility to Captain Vodges, by boats 
 and other means, to enable him to land the troops under his command, 
 it being the wish and intention of the Navy Department to cooperate 
 with the War Department in that object. 
 
 I am, sir, respectfully, etc., 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 In order to a full understanding of this whole matter, it is 
 well that the reader should also have before him the following 
 letters : 
 
 HEADQUARTERS or THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, March 12, 1861. 
 SIR : At the first favorable moment you will land with your com 
 pany, reenforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same until further notice. 
 
 Eeport frequently, if opportunities present themselves, on the condi 
 tion of the fort and the circumstances around you. I write by com 
 mand of Lieutenant-General Scott. 
 
 I am. sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant- General. 
 Captain I. VODGES, U. S. A., on board U. S. Sloop-of-War 
 
 the Brooklyn, off Fort Piclcens, Pensacola Harbor, Fla. 
 
 U. S. FRIGATE SABINE, OFF PENSACOLA, FLA., April 1, 1861. 
 To Captain H. A. ADAMS, commanding Naval Forces off Pensacola: 
 
 SIR : Herewith I send you a copy of an order received by me last 
 night You will see by it that I am directed to land my command at 
 
THE BELIEF OF FOET PICKETS. 303 
 
 the earliest opportunity. I have, therefore, to request that you will 
 place at my disposal such boats and other means as will enable me to 
 carry into effect the enclosed order. Yours, etc., 
 
 I. VODGES, Captain First Artillery, commanding. 
 
 So soon as Captain Adams s letter, which was sent by a spe 
 cial messenger through the insurgent States, was received at 
 the Navy Department on the afternoon of the 6th of April, and 
 on the evening of that day Lieutenant Worden, who after 
 ward commanded the Monitor in her fight with the Merri- 
 mack, was sent, under orders from the Secretary of the 
 Navy, across the country with an order directing Captain 
 Adams to land at once the troops from the Brooklyn. Lieu 
 tenant Worden committed this to memory on his way and de 
 stroyed the paper, lest he might be arrested and the order be 
 found upon him. Not without difficulty Worden made his way 
 to Pensacola and proceeded to the fort on the 12th of April. 
 That evening the fort was reenforced and made secure by the 
 landing of the troops from the Brooklyn. 
 
 Lieutenant Worden returned to Pensacola and commenced 
 his homeward journey, but the news of the reinforcement of the 
 fort preceded him through the telegraph, and it was also sug 
 gested that he had undoubtedly borne the order for landing the 
 troops. He had carried it in his memory, and reproducing it 
 from memory and certifying, as a naval officer, to its correctness, 
 it became a valid order to Captain Adams. The result was, 
 that Worden was arrested as a spy at Montgomery and kept 
 there, in close confinement, for six months, and was, as is be 
 lieved, the first person seized as a prisoner in the war ; and it 
 was a fitting retribution that afterward in the Monitor he 
 struck the fatal blow at the rebel navy. 
 
 Thus, on the 12th of April, Fort Pickens was relieved and 
 made secure by the promptness and energy of the Secretary of 
 the Navy, and at the great and personal risk and suffering of 
 one of its officers. After all had been accomplished, so that the 
 fort for the present was secure, the Powhatan, on the 17th of 
 April, appeared off the harbor. The Atlantic, one of the trans 
 ports, arrived on the 16th of April, and landed her troops before 
 the Powhatan came, and consequently without her help. Some 
 days afterward the Illinois, another transport, reached the harbor. 
 
304 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Let it now be borne in mind that there were already four 
 vessels-of-war at Fort Pickens or off the harbor the Sabine, 
 the Brooklyn, and two others. The Powhatan was not needed 
 to cover the landing of troops. The vessels already there 
 were not only able to do it, but did do it, with no assistance 
 from the Powhatan. Nor was the Powhatan needed to con 
 voy the transports, for she did not sail in company with them ; 
 and, moreover, the Navy Department had provided for the 
 relief of the fort independently of the new expedition, and it 
 had already been done. What, then, was the mission of the 
 Powhatan to Pensacola ? If the object was simply to relieve the 
 fort, was it not quite sufficient to send the transports on, and let 
 the vessels already there receive them and protect their landing, 
 as they actually did ? The Powhatan was not needed either to 
 convoy the transports or to land the troops, and she did neither 
 of these things. Besides, if there was so great an anxiety in re 
 gard to Fort Pickens, what more natural than to have stepped 
 into the office of the Secretary of the ]STavy to ascertain the 
 actual condition of things ? A single inquiry would have dis 
 closed the fact that all needed measures had already been 
 taken, and no second expedition was required. 
 
 These facts seem to indicate that however necessary it 
 might have been to detach the Powhatan from Captain Fox s 
 squadron and secure the failure of his expedition, in order to 
 " keep faith in regard to Sumter," in spite of the President 
 there was no exigency in the public service that required that 
 she should be sent to Pickens. Whatever was intended, the re 
 sult was that Sumter was delivered into the hands of the rebels. 
 
CHAPTEE 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT RESCUE OF THE FRIGATE 
 CONSTITUTION. 
 
 SHOULD the history of the " Great Rebellion" be written 
 from the same stand-point which was occupied by the historian 
 of the Jews, the interpositions of God, except those by miracle, 
 would perhaps be as frequent and as manifest as those which 
 marked the exodus of the Hebrews and their settlement in 
 Canaan. 
 
 Every believer in the Christian s God a God who has not 
 only created, but who superintends and directs the affairs of His 
 universe, so that not a sparrow falls without His knowledge will 
 not fail to perceive a guiding and protecting power controlling 
 the great conflict throughout all its course, saving the North 
 from the natural consequences of mistakes and folly ; turning 
 apparent disaster into actual triumph ; educating the public 
 mind, alike by defeat and victory, until the real nature of the 
 conflict was clearly seen and the country was prepared to adopt 
 the only means through which God would grant us success. 
 
 The grand battle in all its essential features, its duration, its 
 range, its magnitude, the forces and weapons on either side, the 
 influence abroad and at home, all lay without the field of ordi 
 nary human calculation. 
 
 Some, then regarded as among the most sagacious statesmen, 
 predicted that the course of the rebellion would be limited to 
 ninety days ; the President thought it quite sufficient to ask for 
 seventy-five thousand men ; shrewd men, as they were thought 
 to be, talked of the necessity of thirty or forty sailing vessels for 
 the blockade ; most were fully determined that slavery should 
 20 
 
306 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 by no means have any place in the struggle, and statesmen and 
 politicians in Europe viewed the cause of the North as abso 
 lutely hopeless ; they even regarded the whole question as settled 
 before the battle began. 
 
 The events of the war, as it went on, baffled all human fore 
 sight. That which all men expected did not come to pass, that 
 which all declared could never be accomplished was actually 
 done ; and our leaders were compelled to adopt measures which 
 they had rejected not only as unwise but impossible. 
 
 Both parties triumphed where they expected defeat, and 
 were defeated where they counted upon certain and easy vic 
 tory. Both were borne on by a force which they could not 
 resist, the one to ultimate success, and the other to ruin ; and 
 that force was the directing power of God. 
 
 In the latter part of April, 1861, and soon after the firing 
 upon Fort Sumter, the rebels were rapidly completing a battle- 
 line that stretched across the territory of the United States, from 
 Southwestern Missouri to Chesapeake Bay. It is not intended 
 to state that this was one unbroken chain of military posts within 
 supporting distance of each other, but that main positions were 
 occupied, and there was a general movement to establish and 
 maintain this as the chief line of defence. 
 
 This line was stretched far to the north of the city of "Wash 
 ington; and as Maryland was expected to hold securely the 
 northeastern point, and so cut off all direct communication with 
 the North, it was thought by the rebels that the capital would 
 be speedily and easily captured, and as easily held, because it 
 would be at least forty miles within their lines. On the evening 
 of April 19, 1861, a mob from Baltimore lay in w^ait for the 
 train from Philadelphia at Canton, fired at the engineer, who 
 stopped the train, when the ruffians drove the passengers from 
 the cars and took the train back to Gunpowder Creek, where 
 they burned the draw of the bridge ; then came back to Bush 
 River, and burned the draw of the bridge at that point, thus 
 cutting off all railroad communication between Baltimore and 
 the North, and preventing the sending of troops by rail. At 
 the same time the Government was informed that no more 
 troops from the North could pass through Baltimore unless they 
 could fight their way through. 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT. 307 
 
 Thus, as was thought, Washington was effectually cut off 
 from the North in that direction. At the same time the shores 
 of the Potomac were occupied with rebel batteries, which, as 
 was supposed, would prevent troops or provisions from reaching 
 the capital by w r ater. The boast that the rebel flag would 
 float from the dome of the capitol before the end of May 
 seemed not entirely unreasonable, when Washington was thus 
 hemmed in on both sides, when a formidable army was being 
 rapidly organized in Virginia for its capture, and when, as it 
 would seem, the one thought of the rebels was to rush upon the 
 city while thus isolated and comparatively defenceless. 
 
 Why it was not done is one of those mysteries of human 
 conduct which are not to be explained by any of the ordinary 
 motives that govern men, and must probably be referred to in 
 fluences exerted upon the mind by a superior power. That 
 Washington might have been captured in the early days of the 
 contest, with the means at the disposal of the rebel chief, no one 
 now probably doubts. Why it was not done it may be impossi 
 ble to say. It was one of the great opportunities which, once 
 lost, never return. While Washington was in this condition, and 
 Baltimore and its railroads on the one hand and the Potomac 
 on the other were held by the rebels, a plan was conceived for 
 capturing the frigate Constitution, then lying in the harbor of 
 Annapolis as a school-ship connected with the United States 
 Naval Academy. 
 
 The conspirators were inspired with the thought that this 
 historic ship, the pride and favorite of the country, and so well 
 known in Europe, might be the first to bear their traitor flag, 
 and thus a rebel navy would be born in a manner that would 
 kindle enthusiasm at the South in proportion as it would hum 
 ble and depress the North. Immediately after the secession of 
 Virginia, the intentions of the rebels were so plainly manifested 
 that it was thought to be of the utmost importance to get the 
 frigate over the bar. She was nearly defenceless where she lay, 
 having only a crew of twenty-five men, and a class of seventy-six 
 midshipmen from the academy, who slept at their quarters, and 
 she was therefore liable at any time to be attacked by board 
 ing. Troops were constantly drilling on shore and exchanging 
 signals, while large parties were around the ship, apparently 
 
308 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 seeking the most assailable point. She had four anchors out 
 when the order came to get her over the bar. One anchor was 
 raised, and the other cables were slipped. By one of those 
 curious coincidences which impart great interest to what would 
 otherwise be unimportant facts, the Eighth Massachusetts regi 
 ment, under the command of General Butler, had just reached 
 Annapolis. They were hastening to the relief of Washington, 
 and when they arrived at Havre de Grace found that the rail 
 road bridges between that point and Baltimore had been burned, 
 and their further progress by rail was stopped. General Butler 
 was not a man to be easily thwarted, and the soldiers shared 
 his spirit. He procured a steamboat and proceeded with his 
 regiment to Annapolis, with the intention of marching from 
 that point to "Washington. He reached Annapolis in season to 
 render the country an important service, in connection with the 
 United States officers who had the old frigate in charge. At 
 the request of the superintendent of the Naval Academy, he 
 placed a detachment of his troops, who had been seamen, on 
 board the ship, to assist the crew, and then the steamer Mary 
 land, which the general had seized, was brought alongside for 
 the purpose of towing her out, having first received the frigate s 
 guns in order to lighten her. The officers and engineer of the 
 Maryland w^ere so averse to the duty, that it was necessary to 
 put them under a guard with revolvers, to compel them to work 
 and proceed with the vessel. The frigate, by great exertions, 
 was at length dragged over the bar, but grounded on the outer 
 spit. She was still in a perilous position. At 10 p. M. word 
 was brought that an attempt was about to be made to obstruct 
 the channel outside of the ship. 
 
 It was seen that what was to be done must be done quickly. 
 Kedges were laid out, and an attempt was made to warp the 
 frigate over the spit, while a part of the crew stood by the guns 
 which had been replaced after passing the bar. The ship was 
 started, but the traitor officers of the Maryland took advantage 
 of the occasion to run the steamer aground, and, a squall com 
 ing up, the Constitution was driven ashore again. Not knowing 
 how soon they might be attacked, nor by what numbers, or 
 whether escape might not be effectually prevented by the ob 
 structing of the channel, the officers and crew passed the re- 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT. 309 
 
 maining hours of the night in great anxiety. Greatly to their 
 relief, at daylight a steam-tug from Havre de Grace was seen 
 approaching, and by its aid the noble old frigate was towed 
 out. The Constitution w r as originally manned by men from 
 Massachusetts when she was being prepared to win the first 
 great triumph of the American Navy, and it was a fitting coin 
 cidence that Massachusetts men, long after, should be permitted 
 to aid in saving her from the dishonor of carrying at her mast 
 head the flag of the traitors. She was immediately taken 
 round to New York by the steamer R. R. Cuyler. Next to 
 the occupation of Washington, few things could have given the 
 rebels greater satisfaction, or obtained for them more eclat in 
 England, than the capture of Old Ironsides. Thanks to Com 
 modore Blake and his assistant officers, and to General Butler 
 and his boys from the Old Bay State, they missed the coveted 
 prize. 
 
 It is, perhaps, impossible to say where a proper, authorized 
 faith in the Providence of God ends, and what we call super 
 stition begins ; but it doubtless had some influence upon both par 
 ties that the attack upon this historic frigate, the representa 
 tive of the days of our naval renown, should have utterly failed, 
 and that she came unscathed to the North, bringing her na 
 tional honors and national name, and bearing that same national 
 flag which long ago she had so nobly defended. 
 
 It is probably the last peril that Old Ironsides will ever en 
 counter. She has far outlived her age, and, comparatively use 
 less in our modern war, like a worn-out veteran, she is honored 
 and loved for what she has been, and the glorious achievements 
 of her youth, when not merely from her actual power, but from 
 enthusiastic faith in her invincibility, she was the most formi 
 dable frigate of the world. She has fitly bequeathed her pet 
 name to one far more powerful than herself; for a whole squad 
 ron of frigates, such as the Constitution was in the day of her 
 pride, would be no match for the terrible battery of our New 
 Ironsides, which was the queen of broadside iron-clads. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 
 
 IF we may judge of the designs of the rebels by their opera 
 tions, we may believe that the plan of their first campaign was 
 to isolate Washington on the north by stretching their battle- 
 line to Baltimore, and holding all the railroads leading from 
 that city north, west, and south, so as to shut off from the 
 capital both reinforcements and supplies, and then so to block 
 ade the Potomac that nothing could reach it from the south. 
 In this way, as they thought, it would fall an easy prey to the 
 army which they were then massing in Yirginia. "When this was 
 partially unfolded, and in part successfully executed, when sym 
 pathizers controlled Baltimore, when her railroads were seized, 
 when Northern troops were forbidden to march across the soil 
 of Maryland, and batteries were established on the Potomac, and 
 the rebel flag was flying so near as Alexandria, in sight of the 
 capitol, it was thought by men of good military judgment that 
 the success of the conspirators was nearly certain. They and 
 all their friends believed it, and throughout the South the occu 
 pation of "Washington was regarded as a thing already accom 
 plished, and this unbounded confidence was, in all probability, 
 one chief cause of their failure. 
 
 When troops from the North, overcoming all obstacles, be 
 gan to pour into Washington, and it became apparent that the 
 North would keep its highways across Maryland open at all 
 hazards, then, as there was but one line of railroad between the 
 capital and Baltimore, it was believed that this would prove 
 insufficient to transport both troops and supplies, and therefore 
 more strenuous efforts were made by the conspirators to close 
 the Potomac. 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 311 
 
 From Alexandria southward the commanding points were 
 occupied, and batteries were established and mounted with 
 guns, which, as was soon seen, were of longer range than most 
 on board our vessels. After the burning and seizure of the 
 navy-yard at Norfolk, batteries were also planted at all the 
 strategic points in the neighboring waters. 
 
 It is easily seen that "Washington would be in constant peril, 
 if it could be shut up to the single line of railroad ; and, as 
 these batteries could not be approached by land by any force 
 then at command, the Government was compelled to turn to 
 the JS r avy Department for the needed assistance. Indeed, with 
 out a naval force to engage these batteries, and keep the Poto 
 mac open, our cause would, at the first, have been nearly hope 
 less. Could the insurgents have succeeded in closing the Poto 
 mac, it would have been impossible to collect at Washington 
 an army sufficient for the defence of the city, and even if the 
 troops could have been brought on, they could not have been 
 supplied with provisions and munitions of war without the aid 
 of the river. 
 
 The very first operations of the Navy were vital to the suc 
 cess of the cause, and yet from their very nature were almost 
 unknown to the public. Every movement of the Army was 
 made known in all quarters of the land, and it was right that it 
 should be so ; but if the people could have known what another 
 class of men on the ships were doing and suffering for the 
 common cause, and what sleepless vigilance and untiring activ 
 ity were necessary both for seamen and officers to render success 
 possible for the Army, then the Navy would have also received 
 from the first its due proportion of honor. 
 
 The first business of the Navy on the Potomac was to pa 
 trol the river from Washington to its mouth, to inspect both 
 shores daily so far as possible, and to observe whether any prep 
 arations for batteries were being made at any point, and watch 
 for any transports with troops or provisions, and convoy them 
 to Washington. 
 
 Every effort was made by the rebels to keep up a constant 
 and active communication between the two shores of the Poto 
 mac ; mails from Washington and from Northern sympathizers 
 and their friends generally, and supplies of all kinds, were con- 
 
312 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 veyed across the river by night, and a night-patrol or picket- 
 guard, composed of the boats of the ships, was among the ardu 
 ous duties which were constantly performed. They destroyed all 
 the row-boats they could find, and all visible means of crossing 
 the river ; they intercepted a large number of rebel mails and 
 smugglers ; but with all their watchfulness, many an enterpris 
 ing rebel escaped their scrutiny, and quite a regular interchange 
 of letters was kept up between the conspirators and their North 
 ern accomplices. 
 
 The Potomac flotilla was composed of small vessels, which 
 at first carried only a light armament, and were therefore not 
 very formidable antagonists of land batteries armed with heav 
 ier guns than their own, and this must be considered when esti 
 mating the work they performed. The Pawnee was the largest 
 among them, and she was a sloop of less than 1,300 tons, with 
 a battery of fifteen guns, none of which, at first, were of large 
 calibre or long range. The following quotation from Sir How 
 ard Douglas is applicable to the circumstances under which 
 these small wooden vessels fought the shore batteries on the 
 Potomac : " The attack of fortresses and powerful land batteries 
 with a naval force only, must ever be a hazardous, anS perhaps 
 desperate undertaking." 
 
 The first report of the establishment of any batteries on the 
 upper Potomac was from the commander of the steamer Poca- 
 hontas, May 14, 1861. He states, from information derived 
 from another, that a battery, an earthwork, with four embra 
 sures, had been erected at the railroad terminus at Aquia 
 Creek, about forty-five miles from Washington. The Govern 
 ment at that moment seemed indisposed to precipitate hostili 
 ties ; and for some days our vessels, not being attacked, confined 
 themselves to watching, and reporting the progress of the works. 
 
 In the mean time it had been determined that Alexandria 
 should be occupied, preparatory to a general movement into Vir 
 ginia. On the 23d of May the Pawnee was lying off the town, 
 commanding it completely with her batteries. She remained in 
 this position until the 24th, having it in her power at any time 
 to capture or destroy the city, but there was no cooperating 
 land force by which it could be held. On the morning of the 
 24th two steamers were seen coming down from the navy-yard, 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 313 
 
 with troops on board ; and, as they approached the town, the 
 commander of the Pawnee, seeing that the men necessary to 
 hold the place were at hand, sent a boat with a lieutenant on 
 shore to demand the surrender of the city. The lieutenant 
 held a consultation with the insurgent officer commanding the 
 rebel force, who refused to surrender, but agreed to evacuate 
 the place by 8 o clock A. M. Lieutenant Lowry, in returning 
 to his ship, reached the wharf just in season to meet Colonel Ells 
 worth landing with his regiment of Zouaves. He informed him 
 of the arrangement made for the evacuation of the city. After 
 reaching the Pawnee, Lieutenant Lowry was again sent on 
 shore to cooperate with the troops. Not finding Colonel Ells 
 worth at the head of his regiment, for he was shot about 
 that time, Lieutenant Lowry hoisted the American flag over 
 the custom-house and upon a flag-staff in the street. He also 
 took possession of a train of freight-cars just starting, but the lo 
 comotive escaped. At this time a detachment of troops arrived, 
 that had marched from Washington by land, under Colonel 
 Wilcox, and the commander of the Pawnee, S. C. Rowan, sur 
 rendered his jurisdiction to the Army. As the work of the 
 Navy in this early movement has been little known, if at all, 
 the official reports of Commander S. C. Rowan and Lieutenant 
 Lowry are subjoined : 
 
 U. S. STEAMER PAWNEE, OFF ALEXANDRIA, May 29, 1861. 
 
 SIR : In obedience to your order of yesterday s date, to " furnish the 
 Department with a minute report of your [my] proceedings during the 
 night and morning of the 23d and 24th instant, communicating any 
 thing of interest or importance that came under your [my] observation" 
 in reply, I have the honor to state that during the night of the 23d 
 nothing of interest or importance occurred. On the morning of the 
 24th, about daylight, two steamers containing the Zouave regiment 
 approached Alexandria from the navy-yard, for the purpose of landing 
 and occupying that city. As soon as the steamer came in full view of 
 the city, and so near as not to expose the secresy of the expedition, I 
 sent Lieutenant Lowry on shore to demand the surrender of the town. 
 Lieutenant Lowry returned to the wharf in time to meet Colonel Ells 
 worth as he landed, and informed him that no resistance would be made 
 that the town would be evacuated. Shortly after Lieutenant Lowry 
 left the ship, I sent Lieutenant Chaplin in the first cutter to lie off the 
 
314 HISTORY OF THE UNTIED STATES NAVY. 
 
 starting-point of the railroad cars, and to jump on shore immediately 
 tlie steamers touched the wharf, and cut oft the departure of the early 
 morning train then at that point. The engine escaped, but the burden- 
 cars laden with railroad iron were captured. 
 
 I sent a cutter, in charge of the master, to bring out two steamers, 
 the Collyer and Gypsy, that had been seized by the secessionists; the 
 former belonged to parties in Washington, and the latter to parties in 
 Maryland. Both these vessels have been turned over to their respec 
 tive commanders by the authority of the Department, and are now on 
 their routes the first between Washington and Alexandria, and the 
 other between Alexandria and Fort Washington. I directed Lieuten 
 ant Lowry to return to the town and cooperate with the troops, under 
 the impression that Colonel Ellsworth s command was the only force then 
 moving on Alexandria, and that his knowledge of the localities, together 
 with this additional force, would, in case of resistance, be valuable. 
 
 In demanding the surrender of Alexandria I was actuated solely by 
 motives of humanity. I knew the town to be full of helpless women 
 and children, mostly of the middle and poorer classes, whom I saw run 
 ning frantically through the streets in search of protection as the troops 
 landed. 
 
 A detailed account of what took place on shore, connected with this 
 ship, will be found in the accompanying report made by Lieutenant 
 Lowry. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. C. ROWAN, Commander. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 U. S. STEAMEB PAWNEE, OFF ALEXANDRIA, VA., May 24, 1861, 10.30 A. M. 
 
 SIR : In obedience to your verbal order, given this morning about 
 4.20 A. M., I proceeded on shore at this place and communicated with 
 Major Jewett, commanding the Virginian secession forces at Alexandria. 
 In your name I demanded the surrender of the place, stating that, as we 
 were prepared to seize the place, it would be useless to resist, and that 
 you were actuated simply by a desire to spare the shedding the blood 
 of women and children. 
 
 The interview was held in the open street, surrounded by excited 
 soldiers. Major Jewett said he would not surrender, that he would 
 evacuate, or was about evacuating ; that if hostilities were not opened 
 upon him, he would not use any. He wanted to know how much time 
 he could have ; I told him I did not know ; I would return to the 
 Pawnee ; that no time was to be lost. He said he would require till 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 315 
 
 8 A. M. to get such women, children, and property out as he would re 
 quire. 
 
 I said: "Very well; I will go at once to the Pawnee. Should the 
 troops land and you make no resistance I have no doubt that no harm 
 will be done to the town and its inhabitants; should the Pawnee be 
 obliged to open her batteries, no one knows better than yourself what 
 would be the result." 
 
 I hastened to the river-side, and reached the wharf just in time to 
 witness the first approach of the Zouaves under Colonel Ellsworth ; the 
 sentries on the wharf fired their muskets, which was returned by a scat 
 tering fire from the troops on board the transports. 
 
 As the troops commenced to land I sought out Colonel Ellsworth ; 
 told him in these words : " Sir, I am an officer of the Pawnee ; I have 
 been on shore with a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of the 
 town ; the commanding officer is already evacuating ; he promises to 
 make no resistance ; the town is full of women and children." Colonel 
 Ellsworth replied: "All right, sir; I will harm no one." I then pro 
 ceeded with a detachment of men from the Pawnee under Lieutenant 
 Chaplin, and took possession of the railroad and some burden-cars. 
 
 I informed Colonel Ellsworth of the whereabouts of the telegraph 
 and other places. He landed his regiment with great rapidity. I pro 
 ceeded to the Pawnee and reported to you, when you sent me back at 
 once to cooperate with the troops, and to say that, as they had landed, 
 you had no further jurisdiction, and that I should accompany the troops 
 with the Pawnee s force, and take part in what should occur. I did so ; 
 found that Colonel Ellsworth was not at the head of his regiment, which 
 had marched some distance up the street. After waiting some time, I 
 advanced through the upper part of the town, hoisted the American 
 ensign on a street flag-staff and also upon the custom-house, where I left 
 a small guard, and after a rapid march through the town reached the depot, 
 where I found troops of the United States in possession ; these troops had 
 advanced by land from Washington, and were under command of 
 Colonel Wilcox. I stated to him the substance of the above report 
 subsequently, as Colonel Wilcox called on board this ship for a better 
 explanation of our position. It is proper to state that your order to me 
 was simply " to demand the surrender of the town." 
 
 Any misunderstanding which the rebels may have had was owing 
 to their excited condition, and exhibited by the rapidity in which they 
 evacuated, not even waiting for the time for which they stipulated. The 
 spirit of my language was intended to apply only for the "protection of 
 helpless women and children," and I so distinctly stated to Major Jewett. 
 
316 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 In passing to and from the interview with Major Je wett, I observed 
 small bodies of men in marchino* order hastening out of the town. 
 
 O O 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant; 
 
 K. B. LOWRY, Lieutenant U. S. Navy. 
 To Commander S. C. ROWAN, 
 
 commanding U. S. Steam Sloop Pawnee. 
 
 These reports present, it is true, no very important achieve 
 ment ; they only show what accurate history should record, 
 that the officers of the Potomac flotilla were with their ships 
 where they should have been, at the past of duty, and even took 
 the initiative in a work which, though small in itself, created 
 at the time a profound sensation on account of the death of the 
 lamented Ellsworth, and because it was the advance of the 
 movement into Virginia. 
 
 It has been said, that if Commander Rowan had not sent 
 his boat on shore, the rebel troops in Alexandria would have 
 been captured ; but it appears by these letters, that when Lieu 
 tenant Lowry returned to his boat, the troops were landing, 
 and that they were in full view of the city before the boat left 
 the Pawnee. 
 
 As this was an Army expedition in which the Navy was 
 expected to cooperate, the commander of the Pawnee had 
 probably no authority to demand the surrender; but, as has 
 been stated, the Pawnee had been lying off Alexandria for 
 some time, and what orders he had received, or what relation 
 he sustained to the expedition from the navy-yard, the records 
 do not show. 
 
 As a matter of course, the few vessels which at first could be 
 spared for service on the Potomac, and mounting as they did 
 in the beginning of the contest, no guns heavier than 32-pound- 
 ers, and with no cooperating land force, could do no more than 
 hold in check such batteries as the rebels constructed on shore, 
 so as to prevent transports with troops and stores from being 
 destroyed. If they engaged and silenced a battery in the day 
 time, it might be repaired again during the night, and therefore 
 the river service was one of endless activity, watchfulness, and 
 fatigue, while there was almost no possibility of any such re 
 sult as excites and cheers brave men in the performance of duty. 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 317 
 
 The danger, the weariness, and the apparent fruitlessness of the 
 work, were like that of the picket and skirmish line on land, 
 in which the glory and the reward by no means equal the labor 
 and the peril. 
 
 The Navy Department constantly urged the importance of 
 a cooperating land force, by whose aid the Potomac batteries 
 could at any time have been destroyed ; the Secretary of War 
 and the President w r ere anxious to have this national disgrace 
 of the Potomac blockade wiped away ; but General McClellan, 
 on one pretence and another, refused to furnish any men, and 
 could not be induced to consent that even four thousand troops 
 should be spared for this purpose from the magnificent Army 
 of the Potomac, which he persistently, and against all remon 
 strances of the President, kept month after month in disgrace 
 ful inaction, instead of aiding the Navy with a small body for 
 which he had no use except to exhibit them in reviews. 
 
 Under such circumstances, the service of the Potomac flotilla 
 was probably among the most fatiguing and discouraging of 
 the war. The crews of the vessels spent a great portion of their 
 nights in rowing up and down the river on picket duty, watch 
 ing for rebel mail-carriers and smugglers, and spies of all kinds ; 
 and in the daytime the ships were often aground on the bars 
 and shoals in spite of all precaution. They were in hourly 
 danger of being opened upon by masked batteries, which could 
 be constructed unseen in the thick undergrowth of the shores ; 
 their quarters in the little steamers were exceedingly uncom 
 fortable ; their prizes were row-boats, and small, worthless river 
 craft used by the rebels in smuggling, in carrying the traitors 
 mails, and ferrying over the spies which were constantly pass 
 ing between the rebel capital and armies and their Northern 
 abetters. For their reward, these hard-working, much-endur 
 ing men received too often only the complaints of the country 
 that nothing was done, and sneers at the inefficiency of the 
 Navy Department, and especially of the Potomac flotilla. 
 
 By the last of May, 1861, the rebels had completed three 
 batteries at the railroad terminus at Aquia Creek, and some 
 other batteries had also been placed on the heights back of the 
 landing. Up to this time, the Government had refrained from 
 any hostile act except the occupation of Alexandria on the 24th 
 
318 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of May. These batteries, as the reports state, were mounted 
 with rifled guns, and the rebels consequently had a great advan 
 tage in range over the guns of the ships. On the 29th of May 
 Commander J. H. Ward, in command of the flotilla, engaged 
 these batteries with the Thomas Freeborn, a paddle-wheel 
 steamer of about 250 tons and three guns; the Anacostia, a 
 small screw steamer of about 200 tons ; and the Resolute, a lit 
 tle craft of 90 tons and two guns. The largest gun on board 
 this not very formidable squadron was a 32-pounder; the 
 smaller ones were howitzers. On this day the tide was out, and 
 no harm was apparently done on either side. 
 
 The reader will readily perceive w r hat probability there was 
 of any important result from these little vessels, armed with 
 32-pounders and howitzers, in a fight with land batteries 
 armed with rifled cannon. After a fight of two hours, the 
 lower batteries were silenced by the ships, but the men with 
 drew to the earthworks on the hill and recommenced their fire. 
 These proved to be too high for the elevation of the guns of the 
 flotilla, while the shot from the batteries fell all around the 
 little steamers, and they were hauled out of range. Little 
 damage was done. On the 1st of June a second engagement 
 was had with the same batteries, with somewhat more serious 
 results. The following is the account of the action given by 
 Captain J. H. Ward : 
 
 FLOTILLA STEAMER FREEBOKN, POTOMAC RIVER, June 1, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to report a renewal of the bombardment at 
 Aquia Creek, commencing at 11.30 A. M., this day, and terminating, 
 from fatigue of the men, the day being very warm and the firing on our 
 side incessant, at 4.30 p. M., making a duration of five hours. 
 
 The firing on shore was scarcely as spirited at any time as yesterday. 
 The heights were abandoned, the guns having been transferred ap 
 parently to the earthworks at the railroad terminus, in replacement of 
 the battery silenced there by us yesterday. 
 
 During the last hour of the engagement only two or three shots 
 were thrown from the shore by a few individuals, seen stealthily now 
 and then to emerge from concealment, and hastily load and fire a single 
 gun. The bulk of the party had left a half hour before, and squads 
 were seen from time to time taking to their heels, along the beach, with 
 a speed and bottom truly commendable for its prudence, and highly 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 319 
 
 amusing to the seamen. It did not seem advisable to permit so feeble 
 a fire to wear out my men ; I therefore discontinued the engagement. 
 
 Several shots came on board of us, causing the vessel to leak badly, 
 and, besides other injuries, crippling the port-wheel, the wrought-iron 
 shaft being gouged by a shot which would have shattered it if of cast 
 iron a point considered by me in selecting this vessel for purchase. 
 
 Fortunately, I have again neither killed nor wounded, though the shot 
 at times fell thick about us, testing the gallantry and steadiness of my 
 people, which I consider of standard proof for any emergency. 
 
 I proceed to Washington to repair damages and refill my exhausted 
 magazines. The Pawnee remains below in the mean time, to supply my 
 place in the blockade. Captain Rowan, of that ship, joined me last 
 night, replenishing my exhausted stores, and most gallantly opened the 
 fire this morning, having followed my lead inshore toward the batter 
 ies. His ship received numerous wounds, both below and aloft, inflicted 
 by the enemy s shot, appearing from her size, therefore, most easily hit, 
 to be their favorite mark, and was herself often a sheet of flame, owing 
 to the rapidity of her discharges. I have instructed Captain Rowan to 
 report circumstances direct to the Department. 
 
 The enemy set fire to the large passenger and freight depot on the 
 end of the long pier as we were approaching, probably to remove it as 
 an obstruction to their aim, but were not permitted to extinguish the 
 flames during the whole five hours cannonade ; consequently nearly the 
 whole pier was destroyed, only the charred piles remaining above the 
 water to mark its former position. 
 
 My gun-carriage endures its continued test admirably. The pivot 
 ing arrangement of the after one gave out in the last hour of the action, 
 when the gun was fought on its trucks, which had neither been removed 
 nor in any manner interfered with in the construction. The recoil, 
 however, became severely racking to the vessel; the gun was served 
 slower and with less accuracy, and with greatly increased awkwardness, 
 as well as fatigue to the men. 
 
 Though not assuming to be the proper judge of my own invention, it 
 is possible the officers and men, especially the guns crews, are competent 
 to speak after the severe cannonade in which we have been engaged, 
 amounting altogether, in the two weeks we are commissioned, to ten 
 hours, nine of it under fire returned upon us with more or less vigor and 
 eft ect. 
 
 More than one hundred shots have fallen aboard and around us, any 
 one of which would have struck a frigate. We had more than o 
 thousand shots discharged at us within range, and we have ourselves 
 
320 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 fired upward of three hundred shots and shells, with seventeen hundred 
 pounds of powder. What damage we inflicted remains to be seen. 
 That we have received none not easily repaired is truly remarkable. 
 
 The Anacostia and Reliance were not permitted to come under 
 damaging fire, their support having been necessary to embolden those 
 engaged by given them confidence that, if disabled in the machinery 
 .assistance was at hand to drag them out. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. H. WARD, 
 
 Commander, Senior Officer on the Potomac. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 The next day the Pawnee, Commander S. C. Rowan, was 
 brought to Aquia Creek, and the batteries were once more 
 attacked, and the results are set forth in the following report of 
 Commander Ho wan : 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER PAWNEE, OFF AQXTIA CEEEK, VA., June 2, 1861. 
 
 SIR: In obedience to an order received on the evening of the 31st 
 ultimo, I proceeded immediately to join Captain Ward. 
 
 In passing down the river, I was informed by Lieutenant Mygatt, of 
 the steamer Reliance, that Captain Ward had gone ten miles below 
 Aquia Creek for the night. I continued down the river, passing the 
 creek about 3 o clock A. M. of the 1st of June. At 6 o clock I joined 
 Commodore Ward. At 9 I stood for Aquia Creek, in company with the 
 Freeborn, for the purpose of attacking the batteries. We arrived oft the 
 creek at 11 o clock, and at half-past 11 we ran in, the Freeborn leading, 
 being of a lighter draught than the Pawnee, while this ship kept just 
 outside on her starboard quarter to avoid grounding. 
 
 As we ranged up, the enemy set fire to the buildings on the end of 
 the railroad wharf, and then opened his fire, which was promptly re 
 turned by us. 
 
 Finding my 15-second shell fell short, with all the elevation the ports 
 admitted of, I ranged ahead of the Freeborn, and edged in as near as I 
 could, feeling the way with the lead till I got within range of the forts 
 with the 15-second shell, when we opened a heavy fire. I held this 
 position as long as possible, when the ship fell off against our exertions 
 to keep her steady, and it became necessary to round out into the 
 river, and approach a second time on the same tack. Having got the 
 ship nearer than the first position, and as near as was safe, with but two 
 feet of water to spare, and to the northward and westward of the Free- 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 321 
 
 born, we opened a terrible fire from five 9-inch guns. The batteries 
 were twice silenced under the weight of our fire, but resumed again 
 when our fire had ceased. The houses near the tort were destroyed, and 
 the southern end of the bridge set on fire by the shells. 
 
 The wind being from the southward, the bridge was destroyed. The 
 enemy s fire was almost exclusively directed at this ship, his rifled shot 
 passing constantly over and around us. This ship was struck nine times 
 during the bombardment, four of the shot in the hull ; one of them, pass 
 ing through the bulwarks, tore up the deck, and was glanced overboard 
 by one of the iron straps. Of the shots that hit the ship above the hull, 
 one passed through the main topsail yard ; another shattered the mizzen 
 masthead and topmast, and another passed through the smoke-stack. 
 
 The cool and gallant bearing of the officers and crew excited my 
 warmest admiration. Every man of the divisions performed his duties 
 coolly, and promptly, and intelligently, showing the ship in a high state 
 of training to attain this end. I have been ably seconded by the divi 
 sional officers, Lieutenant Chaplin and Master Blue ; but, above all, by 
 my able executive officer, Lieutenant R. B. Lowry, whose fine bearing 
 on the occasion was every thing I could wish. 
 
 I am happy to inform you that I have no casualties to report. The 
 only scratch was one shot I received on the face from a small splinter. 
 
 At 4J p. M., having expended all my 10-second and 15-second shell, 
 and the thirty-eight rounds of ammunition for the rifle d-cann on, and one 
 hundred and fifty-five hollow shot, I hauled off out of range. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. C. ROWAN, Commander. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 Three days after this tlie Harriet Lane, Captain John 
 Faunce, attacked the batteries at Pig s Point, in the vicinity of 
 Hampton Roads. The following is his account of the action : 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER HARRIET LANE, HAMPTON KOADS, June 5, 1861. 
 
 SIR: In obedience to orders from General Butler to make "a recon- 
 
 noissance of Pig s Point and vicinity," etc., I this morning at 4.50 got 
 
 underway with my ship from off Newport News, and stood toward 
 
 Craney Island, steaming close in and along the shore. When off Pig s 
 
 Point I observed, near the beach, a number of men, apparently engaged 
 
 in transporting guns by means of ox-teams and wheel-carriages, while 
 
 others were seen near the embrasures of the battery with the secession 
 
 flag flyiog over them. At 8.30 A. M. approached as close to the battery 
 
 21 
 
322 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 as the flats would allow, a distance of about eight hundred yards, and 
 opened fire, which was promptly returned by the rebels from, I judge, 
 seven guns, four of which were either 42 or 32-pounders, and the others 
 appeared to be 24-pound howitzers. Two of the shot took effect on the 
 vessel one passing through the plank-sheer, forward of the fore rigging, 
 on port side, and out through the starboard bulwarks ; the other, through 
 the fore rigging, grazing the foremast. Several of their heavy shot 
 passed over the vessel and struck some distance beyond. The shell 
 from their howitzers all fell short. Thirty rounds of shot and shell 
 were thrown by us, nearly all of which fell short ; some few, however, 
 were observed to strike within the embrasures. The rebels fired about 
 fifty shot and shell. 
 
 Having accomplished my object of drawing the fire of the enemy, 
 and thereby discovering the strength of their battery, and finding the 
 range of my guns less than theirs, after an engagement oi lorry-five 
 minutes I drew off out of range. 
 
 From the enclosed report of the surgeon you will perceive that five 
 of our men were wounded. It affords me much pleasure to bear testi 
 mony to the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my com 
 mand. Respectfully submitted, 
 
 JOHST FAUNCE, Captain. 
 Flag-Officer G-. J. PENDERGRAST, 
 
 commanding West India Squadron, 
 
 Flag-Ship Cumberland, off Fortress Monroe, Virginia. 
 
 On the 27th of June that unfortunate affair occurred at 
 Matthias Point in which the much-lamented Commander "Ward 
 lost his life, of which the following are the official reports : 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER PAWNEE, POTOMAC RIVER, June 27, 1861. 
 SIR : About sundown, the evening of the 26th instant, while at an 
 chor off Aquia creek, I received an order from Commander Ward (a 
 copy of which is herewith enclosed) to send him two boats armed and 
 equipped, in command of Lieutenant Chaplin. This order was immedi 
 ately complied with in all its details, and the party left the ship in tow 
 of the Resolute at 9 o clock A. M. To-day, about noon, the Resolute re 
 turned, with a request from Captain Ward that I should send her back 
 if I had no more important service for her. I immediately dispatched 
 the Reliance to Captain Ward, knowing the danger to which our people 
 would be exposed if he contemplated a landing at Matthias Point, as I 
 feared was his intention, judging from the nature of the order he gave 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 323 
 
 me, to furnish him with such equipments as were necessary to cut down 
 the trees on the point and burn them. 
 
 At 9 o clock this morning the Freeborn and Reliance came up, hav 
 ing been repulsed by the rebels at Matthias Point, in which Lieutenant 
 Chaplain and his command escaped utter destruction by a miracle. 
 
 It becomes my painful duty to announce to the Department the 
 death of Commander J. H. Ward, of the Freeborn. He was shot in the 
 abdomen while in the act of sighting his bow gun. 
 
 I beg leave to call the attention of the Department to the gallantry, 
 coolness, and presence of mind of Lieutenant Chaplin, of the Pawnee, 
 commanding the party on shore. He remained steady and cool amongst 
 a perfect hail of musketry from hundreds of men, while he collected his 
 own people and made good his retreat without leaving the enemy a 
 trophy beyond a few sand-bags and some axes, and, so far as I can ascer 
 tain, the muskets of the wounded men. The last man left the shore 
 with him, and, not being able to swim to the boat with his musket, 
 Lieutenant Chaplain took him on his shoulders, musket and all, and 
 safely reached the boat without a scratch, save a musket-hole through 
 the top of his cap. 
 
 In consequence of the want of ordinary comforts in the Freeborn 
 for wounded men, I brought the two wounded men belonging to that 
 vessel with those two of this ship, with the remains of the late Com 
 mander J. H. Ward, to the navy-yard, Washington, where now I await 
 orders. 
 
 I must also call the attention of the Department to the bravery of 
 John Williams, captain maintop, of the Pawnee, who told his men, 
 while lying oft in the boat, that every man must die on his thwart sooner 
 than leave a man behind ; and when the flag-staff of his boat was shot 
 away, and the ensign fell, he (although suffering from a gunshot wound 
 in the thigh) seized it in his hand and bravely waved it over his head. 
 
 A copy of the surgeon s report of casualties is herewith enclosed. 
 The wounded have been removed to the hospital. I also enclose copies 
 of orders addressed to Lieutenant Lowry. 
 
 Lieutenant Chaplin s report of the affair is not yet ready. When it 
 is presented, I shall forward a copy for the information of the Departr 
 ment. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. C. ROWAN, 
 
 Commander and Senior Officer of the Potomac. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, 
 
 Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
324 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 The following order from the lamented Ward, probably the 
 last he ever wrote, will explain, in part, the nature of the expe 
 dition : 
 
 FLOTILLA STEAMER FREEBORN, LOWER POTOMAC, June 26, 1861. 
 
 SIR : On receipt of this order you will be pleased to send your 
 second launch, by which I mean your second-sized boat, also your 
 smallest boat, not estimating your gig, which need not be sent, with 
 their crews armed with muskets having bayonets, or, if without bayonets, 
 their cutlass with each musket, and a suitable amount of ammunition, 
 also provisions for three or four days, in charge of Lieutenant Chaplin, 
 down to Nanjemoy, alongside the schooner Dana there, and await my 
 arrival in the Freeborn, when Lieutenant Chaplin will report to me with 
 the boats so armed and provisioned. 
 
 You will further be pleased to send in the boats all the tar you have 
 on board the Pawnee, a gallon of spirits of turpentine in a can, all the 
 shovels, and all the coal-bags you have except twelve retained to handle 
 coal with ; all the oakum you have, not exceeding one bale in quantity ; 
 a quantity of old canvas, all you can possibly spare, and your gunner s 
 dark-lantern. Send also every axe and hatchet you have, except the 
 corks. The launch and boat you will see are provided with their 
 kedges, and all other expeditionary outfits as prescribed in the Ordinance 
 Regulations, including howitzer for the large boat, if you have two, and 
 one is fitted to sail-boat. 
 
 You will, whilst your boat expedition ordered down to Nanjemoy is 
 serving as I intended at Matthias Point, let the Reliance visit me at least 
 once every day or oftener, if convenient with other duties you may need 
 her for. I am, sir, respectfully, 
 
 J. H. WARD, Commander U. S. N., 
 commanding Flotilla of the Potomac River. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, U. S. Navy, 
 
 commanding U. S. Steamer Pawnee, Potomac River. 
 
 The object was to cut the undergrowth and trees from Mat 
 thias Point and burn the brush, in order to destroy the cover 
 from which the rebels fired into passing vessels, while they were 
 themselves unseen. 
 
 As the event proved, it was an unfortunate undertaking; 
 but all criticism is disarmed by the fact that he who planned it 
 sacrificed his own life with that of others, and that lie was a 
 brave and enterprising officer. It shows also in a very clear 
 light the harassing and very perilous nature of the work which 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 325 
 
 these brave men were called upon to perform. The shores of 
 the Potomac were almost one continuous ambush, from whence 
 fire was opened upon every vessel which came within gunshot ; 
 and as Matthias Point was one of the principal lurking-places 
 for these river highwaymen, and it was daily expected that the 
 secessionists would erect powerful batteries under cover of the 
 thickets, by which the river might be closed, Commander 
 Ward thought to prevent this by stripping the point of its 
 trees and undergrowth. The result was a surprise and a bloody 
 repulse. 
 
 On the 16th of August this point was the scene of a very 
 similar sacrifice of life, as will be seen by the following reports : 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER YANKEE, OFF AQUIA CREEK, August 15. 1861. 
 SIR: This morning at about 11 o clock I dispatched the steamers 
 Resolute and Reliance to make a reconnoissance of Matthias Point. At 
 about 3 P. M. the Resolute, Acting Master Budcl, returned to this anchor 
 age, and made this report, which is herewith enclosed. 
 
 I have ordered Mr. Budd to proceed with his dead and wounded to 
 the navy-yard. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 THOMAS T. CRAVEN, Commander, 
 
 commanding Potomac Flotilla. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER EESOLUTE, August 16, 1861. 
 
 SIR : In obedience to your order, I proceeded down the river to make 
 an examination of Matthias Point and the immediate vicinity. Nothing 
 indicating a hostile movement could be discovered at or about the 
 point. Hearing that a schooner was ashore at Lower Cedar Point, I 
 thought it advisable to go down to her and get her off if possible. A 
 boat was seen on the Virginia shore, a short distance this side of Per 
 simmon Point, and I dispatched an officer and five men in a boat to 
 capture her. They had just reached her and were in the act of making 
 fast, when a volley of musketry was fired from the adjoining bushes, not 
 more than five or six yards distant, instantly killing three of the boat s 
 crew and wounding another. 
 
 I immediately opened fire, throwing shell into the cover that shel 
 tered the enemy. After four or five rounds they were driven out, run 
 ning in parties of three and four in different directions, some of them 
 running into some dwelling-houses on the right. The survivors of the 
 
326 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 boat s crew succeeded in getting her off from the shore while I was 
 firing. The Reliance coming up at this moment, commenced firing 
 shell at the flying enemy, and also sent a boat to assist in getting my 
 boat off. Nothing was left behind. My boat is completely riddled, 
 particularly in the after part. The attacking party numbered about 
 thirty, Lieutenant Mygatt remained with his vessel in the vicinity until 
 I could report to you. 
 
 The following persons were killed and wounded : Killed John 
 Fuller, master s mate ; George Seymour, seaman ; Thomas Tally, sea 
 man. Wounded Ernest Walton, seaman. 
 
 The men that escaped state that the boat on shore had two casks in 
 in her ; we were unable to secure her. Very respectfully, 
 
 WILLIAM BUDD, commanding Resolute. 
 Captain CRAVEN, commanding Potomac Flotilla. 
 
 Dangerous, and apparently fruitless for good as these little 
 expeditions were, they were, nevertheless, necessary parts of the 
 service. Such insignificant boats as these men endeavored to 
 capture were actively employed in every work of mischief of 
 which they were capable, and it was important that every one, 
 if possible, should be destroyed. !Nbt one of them but was en 
 gaged in carrying intelligence or supplies, or both. 
 
 On the llth of October the commander of the steamer 
 Union, Lieutenant A. D. Harrill, was informed that a large 
 schooner was lying in Quantico Creek, and that a large number 
 of troops were collected there for the purpose of crossing the 
 Potomac, and he determined to make an attempt to destroy 
 her. Accordingly, he manned three boats at half-past two in 
 the morning, and, under cover of the darkness, proceeded 
 silently toward the mouth of the creek. The entrance to the 
 creek is quite narrow, and some difficulty was experienced in 
 finding it. Once in the creek, they pulled quietly along within 
 pistol-shot of the shore, until they discovered the schooner. She 
 was guarded by a single sentry, who fled as they drew near, 
 and spread the alarm in the neighboring camp. They sprang 
 on board and hastily collected whatever combustible matter 
 they could find, including a new set of sails and furniture in 
 the cabin, and set her on fire. The conflagration spread rapidly, 
 and it soon lighted up the creek and shores, revealing the posi 
 tion and course of the retreating boats, and a rapid fire was 
 
OPEKATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 327 
 
 opened on them from both banks. The glare of the burning 
 schooner, the reflection on the water, the flash of musketry from 
 the shores and the boats, and the occasional flash and boom 
 of a big gun from the steamers, made a wild, exciting night 
 scene, attended with no casualties to mar the success, although 
 the garments of the men and the boats showed many a shot- 
 hole. The schooner was entirely consumed, and soon darkness 
 and silence succeeded to the glare and flash and shoutings of 
 the fight. Another secessionist channel of communication had 
 been cut off. 
 
 On the Potomac the secessionists made their first experi 
 ments with the torpedo, a weapon which they afterward used 
 so extensively, and sometimes with fatal effect. Considering 
 the vast amount of labor which they expended on these ma 
 chines, the variety and number of them, the untiring zeal and 
 ingenuity displayed, it is almost miraculous that so few of our 
 vessels were injured. They may be considered as pioneers in 
 a method of warfare which will hereafter be studied by all, and 
 which, in the opinion of many, is likely to prove more effective 
 than all others for the defence of rivers and harbors. 
 
 On the 8th of July, 1861, as the Pawnee was lying not far 
 from Aquia Creek, two large casks were discovered floating 
 down the river, and passing about two hundred yards from the 
 ship. A boat was sent out to secure and examine it. Holes 
 had been bored in the tops of the casks, suggesting the idea of 
 supplying air to the fuse within. Water was immediately 
 poured into these holes, and then the machine was towed where 
 it could be examined. It was formed by connecting two eighty- 
 gallon oil-casks with about twenty-five fathoms of manila-rope, 
 the line being buoyed up by cork floats. Underneath each 
 cask, and about six feet below, was slung a torpedo made of 
 boiler-iron, four feet six inches long and about eighteen inches 
 in diameter, and filled with powder. On the top of each cask 
 was a wooden box prepared to secure a fuse leading into the 
 cask. Through the centre of this cask, horizontally, ran a 
 platform on which the fuse was coiled, and then it passed down 
 ward through water-tight tubes to the torpedo below. The in 
 tention evidently was to start the machine in such a manner 
 that the connecting rope would strike the cable of a ship, and 
 
328 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 thus swing the corks around under her bows, where, the fuses 
 having been lighted at starting, in due time the torpedoes would 
 explode. It was found on examination that the fuses had been 
 on fire ; but whether they had gone out of themselves, or had 
 been extinguished by the water poured into the casks, is not 
 known. Could the torpedoes have been exploded at the suit 
 able time and place, doubtless they would have destroyed a 
 vessel ; but considering how few the chances were that this 
 would take place, it appeared like the bungling experiment of 
 men little acquainted with mechanical contrivances. 
 
 In all this river- work there was abundance of toil by night 
 and day, of all forms of exposure to death by disease and by 
 shot, of discomfort and hard fare, but very little of profit or 
 glory. The public saw no result, and therefore bestowed no 
 praises. The value of this service, however, will appear, if we 
 remember that the Potomac and the connected waters formed 
 the great channel of communication between the secessionists 
 and their Northern supporters ; that in every creek and little 
 bay, and in all possible places of concealment, spies and smug 
 glers were watching night and day for their opportunity, and 
 that these people were carrying to the traitors exactly that 
 which they needed most goods, medicines, percussion caps, 
 and other light munitions of war which females could conceal 
 in their dresses, or which could be transported in small row- 
 boats ; and that well-filled mails of the secessionists and North 
 ern accomplices were constantly crossing, or spies were attempt 
 ing to cross with them. In spite of all vigilance, this intercourse 
 could not be entirely prevented, but it was so far interrupted 
 that Virginia felt very severely the pressure of this river block 
 ade. The amount of supplies through this source was largely 
 diminished, spies were arrested, smugglers with their vessels 
 were seized, boats were destroyed, letters and entire mails were 
 interrupted. Finally, the secessionists, notwithstanding the suc 
 cess of their efforts hitherto, finding that they could neither 
 close the river against the Government nor keep it open for 
 their friends, abandoned their batteries and retired from the 
 line of the river. This, however, was not done until 1862. 
 The giving up of the batteries, although it diminished the peril 
 somewhat of this service, did not lessen the fatigue or the gen- 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 329 
 
 eral exposure. The necessity of patrolling the river day and 
 night by constant watchfulness continued during the most of 
 the war. 
 
 Nearly all that the public in general knows of war are the 
 accounts of the principal battles. These are the luminous 
 points which conceal all else ; and generally in the bright pic 
 ture of victory one figure only, that of the successful chief, oc 
 cupies the foreground ; and little is known or thought of the 
 workers and sufferers in such a fight except of a confused mass 
 of men, so many killed, so many wounded, so many yet alive. 
 Few indeed think of all the wearying preparations for such a 
 battle ; the exhausting march, the comfortless bivouac, the peril 
 ous picket and skirmish lines, the wasting toil and watchings in 
 the trenches, in the camp and field, without which a successful 
 battle is not even possible : nor, while the glare of victory dazzles 
 and blinds to all else, do they dwell much on the thousands who, 
 to secure this glory, yielded to the deadly miasma or exposure, 
 and gave up their young lives in hospitals their last thought 
 on the homes of their childhood. 
 
 For similar reasons the country will never fully know, and 
 therefore will never properly appreciate the labors of the sub 
 ordinate officers and seamen, who, by constant toil, suffering, 
 and exposure, made possible the great successes whose brilliancy 
 blinds the eye to all lesser achievements. The officers and 
 seamen, whose names have seldom if ever been heard of, who 
 passed sleepless nights and vigilant days on the long line of the 
 blockade, preventing the secessionists from obtaining those sup 
 plies, by the want of which they were finally exhausted, these 
 men and their labors made victory certain in the end. Let our 
 successful leaders enjoy their well-earned renown and rewards ; 
 but the country should not forget those who, without fame or 
 any adequate reward, bore cheerfully the hardships of the hum 
 bler but necessary service. 
 
 So it is also with the officers and men to whom was intrust 
 ed the very important but by no means brilliant task of guard 
 ing and searching the Potomac and other Southern rivers. The 
 little steamers which alone were suited to the work were too 
 contracted to admit of any comfort even for the well, while the 
 sick and wounded absolutely suffered from the lack of proper 
 
330 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 accommodation, and they were so slightly built as to afford 
 almost no protection against shot. Every day brought nearly 
 the same monotonous scene and task, and the only new thing 
 which they might expect a day would bring was, that they might 
 be fired into from an ambush, or blown up by a torpedo. How- 
 ing guard at night amid swarms of millions of insects ; breath 
 ing miasma almost certain to bring on disease ; ploughing over 
 or sticking fast upon the soft bars and flats ; creeping up and 
 down the tortuous channels of muddy creeks, with ever and 
 anon rifle-balls whizzing out from the tall grass or thickets ; 
 rounding a point to find themselves close upon a battery just 
 unmasked, the channel too narrow to turn in, and the propeller 
 forbidding all sternway at the same time men half hidden on 
 shore evidently trying to explode a torpedo these were the 
 common incidents, the every day and night work of a service 
 of which the country has known but little. 
 
 Insignificant as it seemed to the casual observer, it was a 
 work which the Government could by no means dispense with. 
 It interfered continually with the secession operations, prevented 
 the execution of many a well-laid plot, aided in exhausting the 
 enemy by cutting off supplies, prevented the disclosure of the 
 plans of the Government, convoyed troops and supplies; and 
 when the operations against Richmond by way of the Peninsula 
 were begun, the work of this little flotilla became more im 
 portant and more arduous still, as will appear as the story of 
 the war goes on. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 FIRST IMPORTANT NAVAL EXPEDITION CAPTURE OF THE HAT- 
 TERAS FORTS. 
 
 IN the latter part of August, 1861, the secessionists held one 
 unbroken line of defence from just beloAV Alexandria on the 
 Potomac, down that river to its mouth, thence to Norfolk, then 
 southward to Florida, thence along the Gulf to the mouth of 
 the Mississippi, then up that river to Columbus, a few miles 
 below Cairo. The Cumberland and Tennessee were also guarded 
 by Forts Henry and Donelson, so as to prevent any advance 
 into Kentucky and Tennessee. Strong positions in Kentucky 
 were fortified, East Tennessee was occupied, while the main 
 army of the secessionists confronted the North in Virginia and 
 menaced the capital. At the same time the spirit and courage 
 of the country began to call for action on the part of the Army 
 of the Potomac, which originally consisting of raw volunteers, 
 had been disciplined and equipped to a condition of veterans, 
 and subsequently proved itself to be in every way worthy to be 
 intrusted with the preservation of its country s honor. 
 
 It was thought quite time for the Government to begin to 
 execute the purpose which Mr. Lincoln boldly avowed at his 
 inauguration to repossess himself, in the name of the country, 
 of the forts and harbors which the secessionists had seized. In 
 order to observe all due precaution, and to secure success, a 
 board had been convened under the auspices of the Navy De 
 partment as early as June, consisting of Captain Samuel F. Du 
 Pont and Charles H. Davis of the Navy, Major John G. Bar 
 nard of the Army, and Professor Alexander Bache of the Coast 
 Survey, who were instructed to make a thorough investigation 
 
332 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of the coast and harbors, their defences, and the means by 
 which they could be approached, The Department could 
 not well have chosen a measure which would have shown 
 more clearly its caution and the careful preparation of its 
 measures. 
 
 These officers had at command all the charts, plans, and 
 statements of the " Coast Survey," and, guided by these, they 
 presented several elaborate and valuable reports, which enabled 
 the Department to decide upon a definite plan of operations for 
 obtaining possession of the Southern ports and coast. The 
 officers composing this board were eminently qualified for the 
 work committed to them. None knew better than they the pe 
 culiar topography and hydrography of the Southern coast line, 
 and, therefore, they were qualified to judge of the points toward 
 which an attack should be directed. The secessionists had indi 
 cated their own opinions of the strategic points by the location 
 of their forts. Two of the most important of these were 
 established at Hatteras Inlet, and against these the first im 
 portant naval expedition was directed. 
 
 At the commencement of the war very few had any partic 
 ular and accurate knowledge of the hydrography and topogra 
 phy of the Southern coast. Most had only such a general idea 
 of it as they had of the coast of France, or Spain, or Africa ; 
 and when the country read the account of the bombardment of 
 the forts on the barren, shifting sands of Hatteras, it is not sur 
 prising that many should have thought it an uncalled-for and 
 fruitless expedition, and that the Department had undertaken 
 to make much out of little in its published reports of the battle* 
 Had they known the character of the men under whose advice 
 the attack was planned, and the reasons which induced the De 
 partment to undertake the work, very different opinions would 
 have been formed of the plan, and its execution would have 
 received the proper praise. The case may be illustrated by a 
 supposition easily understood. If the position of the two 
 parties in the war had been reversed, and a Southern navy had 
 attempted to blockade the coast of the North, and the North 
 had held possession of Long Island Sound, the Hudson Biver, 
 the bays of New Jersey, and the bays at the east end of 
 the sound, and the entrances to the ocean from these were 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTERAS FORTS. 333 
 
 guarded by suitable forts, all can see that it would liave been 
 very difficult to cut us off from obtaining sufficient supplies, 
 while our internal trade would not have been in any manner 
 interrupted. If, then, an expedition had been fitted out to 
 capture the forts, either at the Narrows or at the eastern end of 
 the sound (supposing that could be fortified), all can easily see 
 that such an expedition would have been a very important one. 
 To apply this illustration, let any one turn to the map of North 
 Carolina and observe the network of sounds, bays, and navi 
 gable rivers which cover the eastern part of that State, and also 
 the connecting railroads leading into the interior and joining 
 the great trunk lines of the South. 
 
 It will be seen that there are in Pamlico and Albemarle 
 Sounds, and the connected waters, more internal navigation 
 than is afforded by Long Island Sound and its rivers. The 
 Neuse, the Chowan, and the Eoanoke supply channels leading 
 far into the country, and, at suitable points, railroads branch off 
 to the main routes, while the Dismal Swamp Canal afforded a 
 communication with Norfolk. There were numerous channels 
 between these sounds and the ocean, inlets running across the 
 narrow coast-line, and through which small vessels could pass 
 without much fear of discovery, where a blockader could not 
 follow, because of shallow water; while the main channel, 
 through which our vessels might enter the sounds, was guarded 
 by the Hatteras forts. Once safe within the sounds, the rebel 
 traders had the whole country open to their operations. 
 
 There are many facts which indicate but too plainly that 
 Europe, and especially England, was fully instructed before 
 hand in regard to the coming rebellion, and that the question 
 how she could most effectually aid the secessionists, in order to 
 cripple the Republic and enrich herself, had been carefully 
 studied in all its aspects. Her plans were precisely such as 
 secret hostility would naturally devise, with too little regard 
 for justice or national comity. She declared the conspirators 
 belligerents, and the ink of the proclamation was not dry before 
 privateers were being fitted out in her yards, by which our 
 commerce was to be driven into British bottoms or our ships 
 destroyed. 
 
 The nature of the Southern coast seems to have been fully 
 
334: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 explained in England, and she had almost at once a fleet of 
 blockade-runners exactly fitted to hover in the shallow waters, 
 and thread the small inlets, where our heavy ships could not 
 follow ; and by them she expected to supply the enemy with 
 whatever was needed, and receive their cotton in return. Her 
 success at first was gratifying. The main inlets, as has been 
 stated, were guarded by forts, and through these and every 
 smaller one through which only the light blockade-runner 
 could pass these English smugglers glided, laden one way with 
 the produce of the British workshops, and the other with cotton. 
 
 In this manner they supplied the enemy with thousands of 
 rifled muskets, with the best rifled cannon which England could 
 produce, with sabres and every description of equipments for 
 cavalry, with gunpowder, with cartridges, with percussion caps, 
 with plates for iron-clad ships, with army hats, blankets, boots 
 and shoes, and with every description of goods for common 
 family use, so that the South was virtually a province hired by 
 England and furnished by her to carry on war against the 
 United States. They were in the employ of the British Govern 
 ment as practically, except in name, as were the Hessians which 
 she sent here during the war of the Eevolution. 
 
 There were two points on the coast of North Carolina 
 toward which this hostile traffic was directed. One was Wil 
 mington, and the other the various entrances to Pamlico and 
 Albemarle Sounds. Upon these points the rebels depended 
 more than upon Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile for their 
 supplies for the Army of Virginia. Supplies entering at these 
 points were easily distributed by the various railroads and along 
 the rivers, which were navigable for small craft far into the 
 interior. At first, the importance of this traffic was not fully 
 understood. Naturally the mind turned toward Charleston, 
 Savannah, and Mobile, as the main points where the smugglers 
 would attempt to enter, and the topography of the more north 
 ern coast was not particularly known. Wilmington had been 
 an unimportant city, and not many Northern vessels were in 
 the habit of visiting the sounds. 
 
 It was not, therefore, until the board of officers already 
 mentioned had made their report that the Department was 
 made fully acquainted with the great importance of the forts at 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTEEAS FOETS. 335 
 
 Hatteras Inlet. In consequence of this report, and under the 
 advice of these officers, a squadron was fitted out and placed 
 under the command of Commodore Stringham. On the 26th 
 August, 1861, this first important fleet of the war sailed from 
 Hampton Roads. The following ships composed this squadron : 
 
 Guns. 
 
 Minnesota, Captain G. J. Van Brunt (flag-ship) 46 
 
 Wabash, Captain Samuel Mercer 45 
 
 Monticello, Commander J. P. Gillis 6 
 
 Susquehanna, Captain J. Chauncey 17 
 
 Pawnee, Commander S. C. Rowan 15 
 
 Harriet Lane, Captain John Faunce 5 
 
 Cumberland, Captain Marston 24 
 
 158 
 
 United States chartered steamers Adelaide, Commander H. 
 S. Stellwagen ; George Peabody, Lieutenant K. K. Lowry ; 
 tug Fanny, Lieutenant Pierce Crosby. In addition to these, 
 some schooners and surf-boats were towed by the steamers. 
 
 On board the transports was a body of troops (about 900) 
 under the command of Major-General Butler. The forts against 
 which the squadron was sent are situated upon Hatteras Island 
 and command the main inlet to the sounds. A brief de 
 scription of the island and the forts is necessary to a proper un 
 derstanding of the conflict of which they were the theatre. 
 
 Beginning at Hatteras Inlet, the island runs in a northeast 
 erly direction about thirteen miles to Hatteras light-house. 
 Here it turns almost at a right angle northward, and extends 
 twenty-seven miles farther to Loggerhead Inlet, making its 
 whole length about forty miles. At this northern point of the 
 island is Chicamacomico, a spot which became somewhat im 
 portant in the operations of our forces. The average width of 
 this island is about one mile. At some points it is probably 
 two miles wide, while at other places it is not more than one- 
 third of a mile in breadth. It is mostly a strip of barren sand. 
 Here and there are scattered clumps of dwarf oaks, and then a 
 few little marshes covered with coarse marsh-grass. The rest is 
 composed of bare sand-heaps, at one time wet with the waves 
 and the spray, at others glaring in the sun and drifting with 
 the winds. Besides the dwarf oaks and patches of marsh-grass 
 
336 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 there is nothing green, nothing that indicates cultivation, or the 
 presence of civilized life. The population at the beginning of 
 the war was said to be about five hundred. Fishing, oystering, 
 piloting, wrecking, make the sum of their industrial pursuits, a 
 race of beings mostly born on the island, and knowing very 
 little of the world beyond their sand-spit home. A portion of 
 these people, to their honor be it remembered, were loyal to 
 their Government, and were driven from their homes in conse 
 quence by the rebel troops. 
 
 Forts Clark and Hatteras are situated on the extreme south 
 western point of Hatteras Island, with a shallow bay of water 
 about half a mile wide between them. Fort Clark, the smaller 
 work, was merely a square redoubt, or water battery, with its 
 guns bearing upon the northern approach to the inlet from the 
 ocean ; while the larger fort, Hatteras, defended the inlet itself, 
 and at the same time covered the smaller water battery with a 
 part of its guns. These works were constructed by the rebels in 
 the summer of 1861, and were laid out and finished with much 
 skill and at considerable expense, under the direction of Colonel 
 William B. Thompson, of Yirginia. The works were not en 
 tirely completed when attacked, some of the heavy guns in 
 Fort Hatteras not having been mounted. Fort Hatteras cov 
 ered an area of between one and two acres, and was provided 
 with a bomb-proof, which, however, was not sufficient protec 
 tion against our heavy shells. The forts were so situated that 
 the attack was to be made, not from the inlet, but from the 
 open sea to the southeast, and the direction of the fire of the 
 ships was to the north and northwest, both forts being in the 
 line of fire, but the battery Clark being half a mile nearer than 
 the larger work. 
 
 It was to be the first important experiment of the war in 
 engaging earthworks with ships, and the result was awaited 
 with no small anxiety by those who had planned the expedition. 
 In the afternoon of the 26th, the squadron passed Cape Henry, 
 and the pilot of the flag-ship Minnesota was discharged. On 
 the morning of the 27th, at 9.30 A. M., Cape Hatteras light 
 was in sight, the ships encountering a heavy ground-swell. The 
 squadron rounded the shoals off Hatteras, and at 5 p. M. an 
 chored at the southward of the cape. During the evening the 
 
CAPTURE OF THE IIATTERAS FORTS. 337 
 
 surf-boats were hoisted, and all preparations were made for 
 landing troops in the morning. 
 
 On Wednesday morning the wind was blowing fresh from 
 the south, and the long lines of foam showed that a heavy surf 
 was rolling 011 the beach, which might make the landing of the 
 troops a somewhat difficult and perilous operation. The men. 
 however, were called at 4 A. M., and they partook of an early 
 breakfast. The marines of the Minnesota, under the command 
 of Captain William L. Shuttle worth, were sent on board the 
 Harriet Lane, accompanied by Major-General Butler. At 6.40 
 A. M., all being ready, the signal was made to disembark the 
 troops, and the Pawnee, Harriet Lane, and Monticello were or 
 dered to cover and assist in landing them. 
 
 From the inlet to Hatteras light-house, a distance of about 
 thirteen miles, the surf rolls in continually, and in almost un 
 broken lines of foam, varying only as it is more or less fearful 
 according to the state of the weather, and to land through this 
 is at all times a difficult and dangerous work a task which it 
 was necessary for the troops to undertake. The point selected 
 for the attempt was about three miles from the inlet. The surf 
 at the time was very high, and it was evident that the landing 
 would be attended with extreme danger. Iron surf-boats had 
 been provided for this work, each of which was intended to 
 carry about one company of soldiers. Two dismasted schooners 
 which had been brought down for the purpose were filled with 
 men, towed as near as possible to the shore, and there an 
 chored. From these they were embarked 011 the iron surf-boats 
 and the boats of the squadron, to the number of three hundred. 
 When they entered the surf it was only with the utmost diffi 
 culty that they were kept from capsizing, and they were hurled 
 on the beach, the w r aves sweeping over them, and the men strug 
 gling through the water waist-deep to shore. One boat, a cut 
 ter from the Pawnee, landed safely, and returned for another 
 load of soldiers, but on entering the surf a second time it was 
 swamped, and all on board very narrowly escaped drowning. 
 It was found impossible to get the surf-boats out again, and they 
 were swamped and crushed by the surf. !Nb further attempts 
 were made at landing the troops, and this left about three hun 
 dred of our men on shore in a most uncomfortable and perilous 
 22 
 
338 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 condition. They had taken with them two howitzers, but the 
 carriage of one had been damaged in landing so as to render 
 the gun useless, and one rifled howitzer was all they had left 
 for their protection. Much of the ammunition had been wet, 
 and they had brought neither provisions nor water, as it was 
 the intention to send these later in the day. But the sea mo 
 mentarily became rougher, and ere long, not only had commu 
 nication with the fleet been cut off, but the ships were com 
 pelled to haul off and get an offing in order to pass the night 
 safely. The manner in which the three hundred passed the 
 night will be described hereafter. At 8.45 the Wabash got 
 under way, and, with the Cumberland in tow, led in toward 
 Fort Clark, the Minnesota following them. The heavy frigates 
 were watched with intense interest as they steamed on toward 
 positions within range of the forts, and at 10 A. M. the jets of 
 smoke leaping from every port of the broadside, and the deep 
 roar that came rolling over the waves announced that the fight 
 had begun. Ten minutes later the Minnesota, having passed in 
 side the Wabash, took a position nearer to the forts, and opened 
 upon them her mighty battery. The Susquehanna also gained 
 her allotted place, and added the weight of her broadside. 
 
 These vessels passed and repassed Fort Clark, pouring upon 
 it a continuous storm of shot and shell ; while the firing of the 
 rebel gunners was wild and irregular, the shot sometimes falling 
 short and again passing quite over the ships. It has been often 
 asked how it was possible that the twenty-five guns of these 
 forts, described as being of heavy calibre, could have been used 
 upon the large ships engaged in this battle for many hours with 
 out producing greater effect ; and from the little damage done 
 the inference has been that it was really an insignificant affair, 
 magnified in order to glorify the Navy and encourage the coun 
 try. Especially does it seem remarkable that these huge frigates 
 were not injured, when it is stated that the shot from the forts 
 either fell short or passed over the ships. But the whole is 
 easily explained when the facts are known. Commodore 
 Stringham fought his ships under the peculiar advantages 
 which steam affords, and on the same plan for which such 
 warm praise was bestowed soon after upon Commodore Du Pont 
 at Hilton Head, when he used it on a somewhat larger scale. 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTEEAS FOETS. 339 
 
 Instead of anchoring his ships, in which case the gunners of the 
 forts would soon have obtained their range, he steamed past 
 the enemy s batteries, delivering his fire as he came in range. 
 Of course the motion of the steamers made it more difficult to 
 strike them, but this was not all. The ships did not follow in 
 each other s wake, nor pursue the same path a second time, so 
 that even if the range were right for the headward vessel, it 
 was wrong for the next, because she did not pass at the same 
 distance ; and when the fleet passed the second time, all the dis 
 tances were different from what they were at first, and so every 
 shot from the fort was really an experimental one, a mere trial- 
 shot, and this accounts for the fact, stated in the report, that the 
 shot from the fort either fell short or passed over the ships. 
 
 So far as is known, this was the first trial in our Navy of 
 this movement, and the honor of introducing it belongs to 
 Commodore Stringham. The little that was known of the real 
 character of the Hatteras expedition prevented the public from 
 paying any attention to the commodore s strategy, but when it 
 was repeated soon after by Commodore Du Pont in a more bril 
 liant affair, its merit was duly recognized. This scientific 
 officer saw its advantages, and for the splendid use which he 
 made of it deserved the praise which he received. 
 
 Nine-inch, 10-inch, and 11-inch shells burst over, around, and 
 in the fort so thickly that the gunners could take no steady aim, 
 and were often driven from their guns. At 12.25 p. M. the 
 flags were down on both forts, and the rebels were evidently 
 abandoning Fort Clark. Some were seen running toward Fort 
 Hatteras, and others were leaving the shore in boats. As Fort 
 Clark was evidently abandoned, the signal was made to cease 
 firing at 12.30 P. M. At 1.10 p. M. the troops began to move up 
 the beach toward the fort, and at 2 p. M. the pickets took pos 
 session of the deserted battery and hoisted over it the American 
 flag. At 4 o clock Captain Gillis, of the Monticello, was or 
 dered to feel his way into the inlet and take possession of the 
 fort; but he had advanced only a short distance when Fort 
 Hatteras opened upon him a heavy fire, and at the same time a 
 steam-tug, towing a schooner filled with men for the relief of 
 the forts, were seen approaching from the south. It was found 
 that this was quite a large body of reinforcements, but they 
 
340 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 were soon driven back, and the Minnesota, Susquehanna, and 
 Pawnee at once reopened fire upon Fort Hatteras ; the Wabash 
 having gone to tow the Cumberland into the offing, where, 
 being only a sailing vessel, she could be safe, as the weather 
 was looking squally. 
 
 The Monticello, for a short time, was in an exposed and 
 even dangerous position. She had scarcely entered the inlet 
 when she grounded frequently, striking both bow and stern. It 
 was found that the water was shoaling, the ship could not be 
 worked on account of the narrowness of the channel, and she 
 was likely to get hard aground. 
 
 The following report, from Commander John P. Gillis, will 
 show the severity of this portion of the fight : 
 
 U. S. STEAMER MONTICELLO, OFF HATTERAS INLET, N. C., August 31, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to report to you that, in obedience to the 
 order of Flag-Officer S. H. Stringham, the transport steamers, with 
 troops on board, were conveyed safely to the position off this inlet indi 
 cated by him. 
 
 I communicated with the United States ship Cumberland ; the Har 
 riet Lane took her in tow. Boarded schooner Equator, from Nassau, 
 with fruit for New York. 
 
 On the arrival of the frigates Minnesota and Wabash (27th), received 
 further instructions from the flag-officer, and proceeded to carry them 
 out. Stood in and made a reconnoissance of the shore, discovering two 
 forts on north side of Hatteras Inlet, and a suitable place for landing 
 troops on the beach about two and a half miles to the north. 
 
 On the 28th received the marines from the Minnesota and Wabash; 
 also a lighter or scow with two howitzers, which we landed, and assisted 
 in landing some of the other troops, about 300 in all, I believe. 
 
 The Minnesota, Wabash, and Cumberland took positions and com 
 menced shelling the forts on the point, which promptly returned the 
 fire, and the Harriet Lane, Pawnee, and Monticello covered our troops 
 on shore with their shell. Wind freshening and surf increasing, could 
 not land more troops. Steamed down along the beach, extending our 
 firing to the forts, one of which ceased to fire, and hauled down the Con 
 federate flag. We were feeling our way in through the inlet, when 
 signalled to come alongside of flag-ship ; received a pilot for the inlet 
 from flag-ship, and proceeded to attempt the passage, no rebel flag fly 
 ing on shore ; entered between the breakers, feeling our way carefully 
 with the lead for the deepest water. The vessel struck heavily fre- 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTERAS FORTS. 3il 
 
 quently. Continued on, in hopes of getting into deeper water, and be 
 enabled to enter the sound ; the large fort, of fifteen guns, still showing no 
 colors, and our own troops in possession of the other, of five guns. As 
 we turned the point or spithead, finding so little water that we would be 
 compelled to turn and work the vessel out again, if possible, the large fort 
 opened a brisk fire upon us, which we promptly returned with our pivot- 
 gun and port battery (two 32-pounders abaft), ship striking often as we 
 backed and filled to turn her head seaward. By keeping the engine in 
 motion we succeeded, with the aid of the swell, in getting out of the 
 inlet, firing five-second shell rapidly and with precision at the battery. 
 We were about fifteen minutes in this " tight place" during which time 
 we fired thirty shell. The fort fired slow as we came out, and did not re 
 turn our last three shot, owing, no doubt, to the promptness with which 
 the flag-officer and the other vessels opened upon them for our relief. 
 
 We were struck by eight-inch shot and shell ; once amidships, on 
 port side, shot lodged in knee ; another amidships, on port side, which car 
 ried away boat-davit, and drove the fragments of shell and davit through 
 the armory, pantry, and galley; another shot carried away part of fore- 
 topsail yard and sail on the port yard-arm ; another on the starboard 
 bow. This shot lodged in the knee, at forward end of shell-locker. 
 Another shot amidships, on the starboard side, passed through, across 
 berth-deck, paint-locker, and bulkhead, across fire-room, and lodged in 
 the port coal-bunker, ripping up the deck in the gangway over it; 
 whale-boat s bottom shot away and gig injured. Received carpenters 
 from the flag-ship to make temporary repairs, plug shot-holes, etc., and 
 stood in toward the batteries, firing several guns. 
 
 Expended the following ammunition : 
 
 17 five-second 10-inch shell. 9 five-second 32-pound shell. 
 
 18 ten-second 10-inch shell. 20 ten-second 32-pound shell. 
 
 11 fifteen-second 10-inch shell. 11 fifteen-second 32-pound shell. 
 
 46 ten-inch shell. 40 32-pound shell. 
 
 46 
 
 86 
 ShrapneU 3 
 
 Total 89 
 
 Powder. 46 ten-pound charges, 28 six-pound charges, 15 four- 
 pound charges ; total, 89 charges. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JOHN P. GILLIS, Commander. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington. 
 
342 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 At 6.15 the signal was made to cease firing, and the squad 
 ron hauled off for the night, with the exception of the Monti- 
 cello, Pawnee, and Harriet Lane ; which were ordered to go 
 inshore and protect the troops during the night. The roar of 
 the battle died away as one after another of the ships drew out 
 of range, the fire of Fort liatteras ceased, and those not par 
 tially deafened by the guns heard again the dash of the surf on 
 the sandy beach and a seaward murmur as from a coming 
 storm; while the blows of the carpenters repairing damages 
 on board the Monticello rang out sharply over the waters. The 
 main body of troops remained during the night near where they 
 were landed, with no very pleasant prospects of comfort on 
 that bare sand-spit, with the promise of a squally night. 
 
 About three hundred men had been landed in the manner 
 already stated, and were left without food or shelter, or fresh 
 water, or support from the fleet, on a hostile shore, but a short 
 distance from the forts whose garrisons outnumbered them, and 
 with a fleet of light steamers near that could bring other troops 
 for a night attack. In this state of things scouts were sent out to 
 reconnoitre. They brought back the report that Fort Clark was 
 evacuated, the troops having been withdrawn to Fort liatteras. 
 A small body of the troops thereupon marched up and took pos 
 session, hoisting on the ramparts the Union flag. For some 
 unexplained reason the fire from the ships was kept up after 
 the little band had entered Fort Clark, and, as a consequence, 
 they were speedily shelled out again, and that before they could 
 take possession of some commissary stores that the enemy had 
 abandoned, and which the soldiers greatly needed, for they had 
 eaten nothing since 5 o clock in the morning, and their labors 
 during the day had been severe. They had also been thorough 
 ly drenched, and had marched to the fort in their wet clothing, 
 and were not yet accustomed to the hardships which veteran 
 soldiers are so often called upon to endure. Under such circum 
 stances they were compelled to march back to the place where 
 they had landed, nearly three miles. On their retreat they 
 captured some stragglers from the forts, and from them and 
 some negroes they learned that the rebel forces outnumbered 
 ours, and that they were expecting reinforcements during the 
 night. The prospect was certainly not very encouraging. 
 
CAPTUEE OF THE HATTEEAS FOETS. 343 
 
 The soldiers, however, were disposed to put upon the matter 
 as cheerful a face as possible. They discovered a few sheep 
 and some geese, which, in army phrase, were "appropriated" 
 or " acquired." Camp-fires were lighted, and a process, which 
 they were obliged to regard as cooking, was gone through with. 
 Bayonets and cutlasses made very serviceable spits, and this 
 meat alone, thus cooked, made the only supper, and breakfast 
 also, of men who had been used to the comforts of Northern 
 homes and the luxuries of cities. 
 
 They had no tents or shelter of any kind, and the night was 
 rainy. Their garments were yet wet from the drenching of the 
 landing, and so with the wet sand for a bed, with wet clothing 
 for a covering, the rain falling upon them, and the surge lashed 
 by the rising gale howling in their very ears, these weary de 
 fenders of our flag tried hard to sleep. During the night, as 
 was afterward known, the enemy were busy throwing troops 
 into Hatteras, and organizing to attack the little band, but their 
 own pickets made a false report that the Union troops in large 
 numbers were advancing to attack the forts, and thus they were 
 held back from an assault in which our troops would probably 
 have been captured. Thus the three hundred passed a safe but 
 watchful and anxious night. 
 
 On Thursday morning, the 29th, the weather was pleasant, 
 and the sea not so rough. At 5.30 A. M. the general signal was 
 made, " Prepare to engage batteries." All weighed anchor, stood 
 in toward the shore, and " discovered," says Commodore String- 
 ham, " the main body of our troops near where they landed." 
 A small guard had taken possession of Fort Clark after it had 
 been deserted under the fire of the fleet. The commander of 
 the Monticello was instructed to bring off the troops if they 
 wished to reembark, or to supply them with provisions if they 
 desired to remain. At Y.30 the signal to attack was given, with 
 a precaution against firing too near the battery already won. 
 At 8 A. M. the side-wheel steamer Susquehanna being ahead 
 opened her broadside upon Fort Hatteras, the "VVabash. followed, 
 and then the Minnesota, with their enormous batteries, and soon 
 after the Cumberland came in under sail from the offing, and 
 joined again in the fight. The enemy had now five guns less 
 than yesterday, and they used the remainder with very little 
 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 effect. Commodore Stringham, observing that some of our shot 
 fell short, signalled to use 15-second fuses only and with 10-inch 
 guns. This change made the tiring much more effectual, shot 
 and shell fell thick in and around the fort, and it was enveloped 
 with smoke and clouds of dust. The Harriet Lane also came 
 up and joined in the firing with her rifled guns. 
 
 During the last day s fight the fire of the ships was very accu 
 rate. The range was two miles, and the 15-second fuses explod 
 ed the shells at exactly that distance. Considering the heavy 
 batteries of the ships engaged, and the number of their guns, it 
 is not surprising that sometimes three shells would burst at once 
 in the fort. It was almost a matter of co urse that the garrison 
 became demoralized. They could not stand to their guns, every 
 thing which shot and shells could destroy in the fort was being 
 smashed in pieces, and, in spite of remonstrance or commands, 
 they took refuge in the bomb-proof, leaving their stations at the 
 puff of smoke from the guns of the ships. For the last hour 
 and a half of the bombardment, as stated by the commanding 
 officer of the fort, the shells fell mostly in the centre of his 
 works, and so thickly as to force his men to shelter. At length 
 a shell struck a ventilator in the top of the bomb-proof, and 
 went through, and, though it did not explodej it spread conster 
 nation among the three hundred men that were packed within. 
 The shell filled the bomb-proof with dust and smoke, and the 
 men supposing that the magazine was on fire, a great panic en 
 sued, and they were beyond control. Not long after, another ex 
 ploded on the bomb-proof, and it was quite evident that, not 
 only would it soon be destroyed, but the magazine would itself 
 be exploded. It was deemed folly to protract the defence, and 
 a white flag was run up over the fort, and the victory was won. 
 Prolonged cheers from the fleet rose louder than the roar of 
 the surge, and the firing ceased. 
 
 Commodore Barron refused to surrender the forts to the 
 troops who had now come up, the number being so small, and 
 they having taken no part in the battle. He was therefore 
 taken on board the flag-ship, and there he gave up his sword to 
 his former friend, Commodore Stringham. The second day s 
 bombardment continued a little more than three hours. 
 
 "When the white flag was raised on the fort the troops 
 
CAPTUEE OF THE HATTEKAS FORTS. 345 
 
 marched up, and at 11.30 Major-General Butler, in the tug 
 Fanny, went into the inlet to the rear of the forts to take pos 
 session. Three steamers and several schooners with rebel troops 
 on board were in the sound watching the engagement, but they 
 left after the surrender of the fort, the Fanny sending some shot 
 after them from her rifled gun. The chartered steamers, with 
 the remainder of the troops on board, then went into the inlet 
 to land them, and thus ended the first important naval engage 
 ment of the war. As the result, possession was obtained of the 
 key to the inland waters of North Carolina, and six hundred 
 and fifteen prisoners were captured, at the head of whom was 
 that Samuel Barron who, a short time before, by an order ob 
 tained from President Lincoln, in some unexplained manner, 
 was to have taken the charge of a most important office in the 
 Navy Department, which order was revoked upon the firm re 
 monstrance of Secretary Welles. The presence of this person 
 at these forts is a very instructive commentary upon the wisdom 
 of those who procured from Mr. Lincoln his appointment to a 
 position where he would have known all the intended operations 
 of the Navy, the location of every ship, and the station of every 
 officer, and could therefore have frustrated every movement of 
 the Department. The following are the articles of capitulation 
 as signed oif Hatteras Inlet : 
 
 OFF HATTEKAS INLET, | 
 
 UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP MINNESOTA, August 29, A. D. 1861. f 
 
 Articles of capitulation between Flag-Officer Stringham, commanding the "Atlantic 
 Blockading Squadron" and Benjamin F. Butler, United States Army, command 
 ing on behalf of the United States Government, and Samuel Barron, command 
 ing the naval force for the defence of North Carolina and Virginia, and Colonel 
 Martin, commanding the forces, and Major Andrews, commanding the same 
 forces, at Fort Hatteras. 
 
 It is stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties that the 
 forces under the command of the said Barron, Martin, and Andrews, 
 and all munitions of war, arms, men, and property, under the command 
 of said BaiTon, Martin, and Andrews, be unconditionally surrendered to 
 the Government of the United States in terms of full capitulation. 
 
 And it is stipulated and agreed by the contracting parties on the 
 part of the United States Government that the officers and men shall 
 receive the treatment due to prisoners of war. 
 
 In witness whereof, we, the said Stringham and Butler, on behalf of 
 the United States, and the said Barron, Martin, and Andrews, repre- 
 
34:6 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 senting the forces at Hatteras Inlet, hereunto interchangeably set our 
 hands this twenty-ninth day of August, A. D. 1861, and of the inde 
 pendence of the United States the eighty-fifth year. 
 
 S. H. STRINGHAM, 
 Flay- Officer Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
 BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, 
 Major-General United States Army, commanding. 
 
 S. BARRON, 
 
 Flag- Officer Confederate States Navy, 
 Commanding Naval Defences South and North Carolina. 
 
 WILLIAM F. MARTIN, 
 Colonel *lth Regiment Infantry North Carolina Volunteers. 
 
 W. S. G. ANDREWS, 
 Major, commanding Forts Hatteras and Clark. 
 
 The following papers will show the opinion of Commodore 
 Stringham and of Secretary "Welles in regard to the importance 
 of the enterprise : 
 
 U. S. FLAG-SHIP MINNESOTA, NEW YORK HARBOR, September 2, 1861. 
 
 SIR: I have the honor to enclose to the Department a correct list 
 of the prisoners captured by the Navy at Forts Hatteras and Clark on 
 the 29th day of August, A. D. 1861, amounting to a few more than the 
 number I gave in rny dispatch No. 133. 
 
 The three senior officers of the enemy surrendered their swords to 
 me on board the Minnesota. Will the Department please inform me 
 what disposition I can make of them ? 
 
 I am not able to get a correct list of the killed and wounded on the 
 part of the enemy. 
 
 I wish in this official manner to renew the opinion which I have here 
 tofore given as to the very great importance to the Government of re 
 taining in our possession the forts at Hatteras. This inlet I consider the 
 key to all the ports south of Hatteras, and only second in importance to 
 Fortress Monroe and Hampton Roads. From all I can learn, it was the 
 intention of the enemy to fortify this point as strongly as possible. 
 
 It will be of great service to our fleet in their blockading opera 
 tions, and most effectually, I trust, put an end to the pirating which 
 has been so successfully carried on there for some time past. 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. H. STRINGHAM, 
 
 Flag- Officer Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTERAS FORTS. 347 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, September 2, 1861. 
 
 SIR: The Department congratulates you and those of your com 
 mand, and also the officers and soldiers of the army who cooperated 
 with you on the reduction of Forts Hatteras and Clark, and the capture 
 of the forces employed in their defence. 
 
 The successful result, thus far, of an expedition projected with great 
 care, and the occupation of the position commanding the most impor 
 tant inlet on the coast of North Carolina will be attended with conse 
 quences that can scarcely be overestimated. 
 
 This brilliant achievement, accomplished without the loss of a man 
 on your part, or injury to any one in the Federal service, has carried 
 joy and gladness to the bosom of every friend of the Union. 
 
 It is, I trust, but the beginning of results that will soon eventuate in 
 suppressing the insurrection, and confirming more strongly than ever 
 the integrity of the Union. 
 
 Convey to the officers and men of the respective vessels under your 
 command the thanks of the Department for their gallant conduct, and 
 the assurance that is thus afforded that, in the great emergency now 
 upon us, the country may rely, as of old, upon the vigor the courage, 
 and the enthusiasm of its brave officers and sailors. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES. 
 Flag-Officer S. H. STRINGHAM, 
 
 Commanding Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
 This was really the first important success of the war, the 
 first event which revived the drooping spirits of the country 
 after the capture of Sumter and the disgrace of Bull Run. It 
 was not remarkable for the character of the fighting, though 
 our ships and their batteries were skilfully handled, and officers 
 and men performed their duties nobly. The rebel forts, though 
 mounting twenty-five guns, effected little, except w r hen the 
 Monticello was for a short time aground and unmanageable in 
 the inlet, because of the manner in which the ships were man 
 aged, and because they were overwhelmed by the shot and shell 
 from the ships. The important feature of the victory was, that 
 a foothold was gained upon the Southern coast which afforded 
 a point of support for our blockading squadrons ; that it gave us 
 command of the most important passage to the sounds on the 
 coast of North Carolina, and prevented the entrance of English 
 
348 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 smugglers, while it also stopped to a great extent the fitting out 
 of piratical expeditions on those interior waters. 
 
 The capture of the Hatteras forts was soon followed by 
 other operations along the coast and sounds, which were in 
 tended both to weaken the defences of the enemy, and to extend 
 and secure our control of the adjacent coast and waters. The 
 first of these was directed against Fort Ocracoke. Ocracoke 
 Inlet is some twenty miles south of Hatteras. Just inside of the 
 inlet is a small island called Beacon Island. On the seaward 
 face of this island, and so placed as to command the inlet, the 
 rebels had constructed a fort intended to mount twenty guns. 
 At Portsmouth, a small village on a point near by, four 8-inch 
 guns had also been placed, with the intention of constructing a 
 battery which would also command the channel of the inlet. The 
 capture of the Hatteras forts interrupted the rebel plans, and 
 they were compelled to evacuate both these points, and it was 
 thought important to fit out an expedition to destroy the guns 
 and other material, in order to prevent these points from being 
 reoccupied. The following is the official report of this opera 
 tion: 
 
 U. S. STEAMER PAWNEE, HATTERAS INLET, September 18, 1861. 
 
 SIR : On Saturday, the 14th instant, I gave a pass to one of the peo 
 ple on Hatteras Island to go to Ocracoke Inlet for the purpose of bring 
 ing his family from Portsmouth. I directed this person to examine the 
 forts on Beacon Island and Portsmouth Island, and bring me a true 
 report of the condition of things ; the number of guns mounted, if any , 
 and the number dismounted ; whether any troops were there, and 
 whether the gun-carriages had all been burnt or not, and to report the 
 result to me on his return. 
 
 On Sunday morning, the 15th instant, the boat came alongside with 
 the man and his wife and children in a destitute state. We gave them 
 food, and the surgeon prescribed and furnished medicine for the sick of 
 the family. 
 
 The man reported that there were twenty guns in Fort Beacon and 
 four 8-inch shell guns at Portsmouth ; that the guns were spiked and 
 the carriages burnt on the 1st instant, as already reported to you. 
 
 He also stated that a steamer came to Beacon Island, before he left 
 Portsmouth, for the purpose of carrying .off the guns. 
 
 I immediately determined to use all the means at my command to 
 prevent the removal of the guns, and forthwith got the steamer Fanny 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTER AS FORTS. 349 
 
 alongside to prepare her for this service, and had the launch armed and 
 equipped. I sent a request to Colonel Hawkins to give me as many of 
 the naval brigade as could be spared, which he cheerfully complied with. 
 When the Fanny was brought alongside, her iron rudder-perch was 
 found so much injured that it would be impossible to send her without 
 repairs, and so the forge was gotten up, and the clink of the hammers 
 soon succeeded the voices of the crew in their responses to oar usual 
 Sunday morning service. 
 
 I dispatched the information to Captain Chauncey, in the offing, who 
 promptly informed me that he would send in four boats and all his 
 marines. I sent him word that I would have great pleasure in cooperat 
 ing with him as senior officer, and would send him the Tempest to tow 
 his boats over Ocracoke bar. 
 
 At daylight on Monday morning the Fanny was towed alongside, and 
 her rudder temporarily fitted ; the naval brigade were taken on board 
 with four days provision and water, and the launch similarly provided 
 for. 
 
 The expedition being carefully organized and provided with sledge 
 hammers to break off the trunnions, and 32-pounder shot and twenty 
 7-pound cartridges to be used in firing one gun against the trunnion of 
 another, left this ship at half-past seven o clock. The launch com 
 manded by Lieutenant Eastman, in tow of the Fanny ; the expedition 
 under command of Lieutenant Maxwell, the executive officer of this 
 ship. 
 
 I dispatched the tug Tempest to Captain Chauncey, she drawing too 
 much water to enter the sound. At 10 o clock the Susquehanna and 
 tug started for the inlet ; on the evening of the same day the tug and 
 Susquehanna returned and anchored off Fort Clark. The tug came the 
 next morning, and the pilot informed me that the force from the Sus 
 quehanna did not enter Ocracoke in consequence of the surf. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 17th instant I felt much anxiety for our ex 
 pedition. 
 
 The Susquehanna remained at anchor in the offing, and our force 
 was left to take care of itself. 
 
 Early this morning the look-out at the masthead gave us the gratify 
 ing intelligence that our expedition was in sight, and it reached the ship 
 about 11 o clock. 
 
 Lieutenants Maxwell and Eastman performed the service with ability 
 and energy, and bore my thanks. 
 
 The destruction of the fort is complete, and twenty-two guns dis 
 abled ; these were all the guns that were there, with the exception of 
 
350 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 two taken off in the steamboat Albemarle on Sunday. The destruction 
 of the guns was with me a necessity. I had no means of transporting 
 them nor of defending them in their position. I therefore hope my 
 course will meet with your approval. 
 
 I enclose a copy of Lieutenant Maxwell s report, giving all the de 
 tails of this important service, which was performed without an accident 
 of any kind. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. C. ROWAN, Commander. 
 Flag-Officer S. H. STRINGHAM, commanding Atlantic Squadron. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER PAWNEE, HATTERAS INLET, September 18, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I have to report that, in compliance with your orders of the 
 16th, I started for Ocracoke on. that day in the steamer Fanny, towing 
 the Pawnee s launch. Lieutenant Eastman had charge of the latter with 
 twenty-two men and six marines from the ship, and the 12-pound 
 howitzer, and I had on board six men and sixty-one soldiers of the naval 
 brigade, under Lieutenants Tillotson and Rowe. 
 
 We arrived within two miles of the fort on Beacon Island at 11 A. M., 
 when the Fanny grounded. I sent Lieutenant Eastman in the launch to 
 sound for the channel. While he was so occupied, a sail-boat with two 
 men put off from Portsmouth to cross the sound. A shot from the 
 Fanny brought them alongside, and they piloted us to within a hun 
 dred yards of the fort. It is called Fort Ocracoke, and is situated on 
 the seaward face of Beacon Island ; it was entirely deserted ; it is octag 
 onal in shape, contains four shell-rooms about twenty -five feet square, 
 and in the centre a large bomb-proof one hundred feet square, with 
 the magazine within it. Directly above the magazine, on each side, 
 were four large tanks containing water. 
 
 The fort has been constructed with great care of sand in barrels cov 
 ered with earth and turf ; the inner framing of the bomb-proof was built 
 of heavy pine timber. There were platforms for twenty guns, which 
 had been partially destroyed by fire ; the gun-carriages had been all 
 burned. There were eighteen guns in the fort, viz. : four 8-inch navy 
 shell-guns and fourteen long 32-pounders. 
 
 The steamer Alberaarle left on Sunday afternoon, carrying off two 
 guns. I found 150 barrels also, many of them filled with water ; there 
 being no water in the fort, they had brought it from Washington and 
 Newbern. 
 
 I landed the men at half-past one o clock, and commenced breaking 
 off the trunnions of the guns. While a portion of our men and- the 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTERAS FORTS. 351 
 
 naval brigade were so employed, I sent Lieutenant Eastman in the 
 launch to Portsmouth, where he found three 8-inch navy shell-guns 
 lying on the beach, and one mounted on a carriage ; they had all been 
 spiked. There was no battery erected there, although we were informed 
 that one would have been built but for our coming. There had been a 
 camp at Portsmouth called Camp Washington, but a portion of the 
 troops were sent to Fort Hatteras when it was attacked on August 28, 
 and the remainder retired to the main-land. 
 
 Portsmouth, which formerly contained 450 inhabitants, was nearly 
 deserted, but the people are expected to return ; those remaining seem 
 to be Union men, and expressed satisfaction at our coming. Lieutenant 
 Eastman assured them that they would not be molested by the Govern 
 ment, and that they might return to their usual occupations. 
 
 There are no intrenchments nor guns at Ocracoke. The fishermen 
 and pilots who fled after our attack have generally returned. I tried to 
 destroy the guns by breaking the trunnions off with sledges, and by 
 dropping solid shot upon them from an elevation, with little success. I 
 then fired solid shot from a 64-pounder at them, and in this manner 
 disabled them. 
 
 Lieutenant Eastman disabled the guns at Portsmouth by knocking 
 off the cascables and leaving them in the salt water on the beach. After 
 destroying the guns I collected all the lumber, barrels, and wheelbarrows, 
 and placed them in and about the bomb proof, set fire to the pile, and 
 entirely destroyed it. A light-ship, which had been used as a store-ship, 
 and which was run upon the shore some distance from the fort, with the 
 intention of subsequently towing off and arming, I also set fire to. 
 
 At half-past six o clock this morning I started on our return ; we 
 met with no detention, and arrived safely with all hands at half-past 
 eleven o clock. 
 
 I am happy to report that the conduct of our men and the naval 
 brigade was excellent. Lieutenant Eastman and Lieutenants Tillotson 
 and Rowe, of the naval brigade, rendered me most efficient assistance. 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JAMES G. MAXWELL, Lieutenant, U. S. N. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, United States Steamer Pawnee. 
 
 This secured the entire possession of the coast from Hatteras 
 Inlet southward to Cape Lookout, and virtually to Cape Fear 
 River; because the inlets between Cape Lookout and Cape 
 Fear are small and shallow. Northward, the possession of 
 Hatteras gave control of the coast to Hampton Eoads. 
 
352 I1ISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Viewed simply as the bombardment and capture of two 
 small forts, and the spiking or destroying the guns of another 
 deserted one on the bare sands of that desolate coast, these 
 things appeared very insignificant, and as such were ridiculed 
 by some ; but their real importance is seen when they are re 
 garded as the first step, and that a necessary one, in the re 
 covery of the coast and harbors of the South, when it is known 
 that this was the first check put upon the illicit traffic by which 
 the rebels were supplied ; that it introduced our vessels into 
 those important interior waters, which the forts at the inlet 
 guarded, and prepared the way for the capture of the works on 
 Roanoke Island, and the destruction of the rebel fleet and com 
 merce. It is true that the blockade-runners sought other en 
 trances ; but, as channel after channel was closed, their chances 
 of escape were diminished and the task of our blockading 
 squadron, in watching the remainder, was easier. The subse 
 quent operations upon Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds and 
 their rivers, show how important a base these formed for the 
 rebels, and how difficult it would have been to crush the re 
 bellion had they remained in their possession. A garrison was 
 left at Fort Hatteras, which found it both a dangerous and 
 uncomfortable spot. In some of the severe storms they w r ere 
 driven from their quarters by the waves, subjecting them to 
 annoying privations and dangerous exposure ; while the rebels 
 gathered about them, watching an opportunity to attack, and 
 they succeeded in capturing a part of an Indiana regiment. To 
 watch and repel such attacks was a part of the duty of the Navy. 
 
 One of these fights, in which the steamer Monticello was 
 engaged, had some quite peculiar features. Colonel Hawkins, 
 who was placed in command of Fort Hatteras after its capture 
 having heard that the rebels had occupied Roanoke Island, with 
 the intention of fortifying it so as to protect both Albemarle 
 Sound and an inlet near the island thought it to be his duty 
 to send a body of men to seize and fortify Chicamacomico, the 
 extreme northern point of Hatteras Island, and about forty 
 miles from the forts. Accordingly, the small steamers Ceres 
 and Pallas were sent, with the Twentieth Indiana regiment, to 
 take possession of the place. They started on the 29th of .Sep 
 tember, and reached the designated point the same day ; but 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTEKAS FORTS. 353 
 
 the water was so shallow that even these light-draught boats 
 were obliged to anchor three miles from shore, and from that 
 point the troops were landed in small boats. They were, how 
 ever, but partially equipped and very scantily provided with 
 provisions, as these were to be forwarded the next day by the 
 steamer Fanny, an army transport not connected with the Navy 
 nor under its orders. The Fanny did not leave until the first of 
 October. She reached her destination the same afternoon. 
 Just as she arrived three rebel steamers made their appearance, 
 but their true character was not known until they opened fire 
 upon the Fanny. Had they been recognized when first seen all 
 on board the tug might have escaped, for one barge had already 
 been loaded with camp-equipage and some other articles, and 
 this barge with ten persons had time to leave and get out of 
 reach after the rebel gunboats came in sight ; as it was, twenty- 
 eight were captured with the Fanny. The rebels found the 
 Union steamer quite a valuable prize. She had on board sixty 
 barrels of flour, one thousand new overcoats, nine thousand 
 pounds of beef, the goods of the sutler of the regiment, and 
 two rifled cannon. The capture was not made without resist 
 ance. A gun-squad from Colonel Hawkins s regiment was on 
 board, and they used a gun of the Fanny with such effect as to 
 seriously injure two of the enemy s boats. But the Fanny was 
 aground before the battle began, and besides she had to contend 
 with twelve guns on the rebel boats. Her capture was seen to 
 be inevitable and the men on board destroyed what they could, 
 before she was surrendered. 
 
 So soon as the rebels learned the true condition of affairs, 
 they conceived the bold design not only of capturing the six 
 hundred men of the Indiana regiment, but of retaking the forts 
 at Hatteras. The plan was to land a large body of men above 
 the Union regiment and another below, between them and 
 Hatteras, and thus render retreat impossible and their capture 
 certain. Then, with a fleet of light steamers, they intended to 
 pass rapidly down the sound and make a sudden attack upon 
 the forts at the inlet. But for unforeseen events they might per 
 haps have succeeded. The rebel movement was attempted on the 
 4th of October. They had collected ten transports, six steamers, 
 besides the steamer Fanny, one cotton-barge, and two flatboats ; 
 23 
 
354: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 carrying in all about three thousand men. This force the 
 rebels divided, intending to land a part above and a part below 
 the Indiana encampment. Colonel Brown, commanding the 
 Union troops, divided his forces also, intending to fight the 
 enemy at the two points indicated. At this juncture Colonel 
 Brown received peremptory orders to retreat. Being at some 
 distance from his camp, he had no time to return for supplies, 
 and the regiment was compelled to begin a homeward march 
 of some forty miles, destitute of nearly every thing which could 
 sustain them on their journey. 
 
 The movement of the enemy s fleet revealed their intention, 
 which was to land one body of their troops about eighteen 
 miles below, and thus cut off the retreat ; and it seemed to be 
 reduced to a question of speed between steamers and men 
 wading through the loose and scorching sand. The rebel flo 
 tilla, however, was delayed by some of the boats getting 
 aground, and their troops were not landed until after dark; 
 and Colonel Brown passing the point where the rebel fleet lay 
 without being perceived, reached, after a day of intense suffer 
 ing and fatigue, Hatteras light-house ; where, early the next 
 morning, they were reenforced by Colonel Hawkins s regiment 
 sent up from the forts to relieve them. From them and the 
 Susquehanna the half-famished six hundred obtained a supply 
 of food and water. 
 
 Upon learning that the Indiana regiment had been reen 
 forced, the rebels began a retreat up the island, which proved 
 far more disastrous to them than that of the Union troops had 
 been ; for they were at once pursued not by marching troops but 
 by a steamer, following them on the outside of the island. This 
 steamer was the Monticello, commanded by Lieutenant D. L. 
 Braine. As has been stated, the island is a narrow and almost 
 bare sand-spit, not too wide to be swept by the shells of a light- 
 draught steamer at nearly every point. A more perilous position 
 could therefore scarcely be imagined for a body of troops than 
 to be placed under the guns of such a steamer on this almost 
 level sand-beach with no possibility of escape or shelter. Such 
 was precisely the situation of the rebel regiments that had 
 marched down toward Hatteras light-house, expecting to make 
 an easy prey of the retreating Indianians. 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTEKAS FORTS. 355 
 
 The Monticello overtook them at Kinekeet Inlet, some fifteen 
 miles above Hatteras light-house, and running in to within 
 three-fourths of a mile of the beach, opened upon the shelterless 
 mass with shells from her heavy guns. The precision of her 
 fire was so great that the shells burst in the midst of them, 
 causing both destruction and panic. Each shell, and they fol 
 lowed each other very rapidly, left great blanks in the masses 
 where they fell, and in the* utmost terror they scattered and ran. 
 But they could not fly beyond the range of the Monticello s 
 guns, for she easily kept them abreast of her, and fired into 
 groups of them as rapidly as the excited and exulting gunners 
 could load and point their pieces. Some of the rebels ran for 
 shelter to a little grove of dwarfed trees, where the shells 
 quickly followed making havoc among them again. As soon 
 as possible the rebel flotilla drew inshore, but they could not 
 get within range of the Monticello on the other side of the 
 island, and, therefore, devoted themselves to the rescue of the 
 regiments that were suffering so terribly from the Monticello s 
 fire. The soldiers rushed into the water as the boats ap 
 proached, and many were killed and wounded thus. Two 
 heavily loaded barges were struck by shell and sunk or blown 
 in pieces, thus adding terribly to the slaughter. It was one 
 of the most horrible scenes of the w T ar. For more than three 
 hours the Monticello kept up this destructive fire until her am 
 munition was nearly expended; she having fired nearly two 
 hundred shells, and night drawing on she hauled off leaving the 
 rebels scattered for four miles along the beach, and the dead 
 and wounded, and arms and accoutrements lying thick along a 
 still more extended line. It was a one-sided fight, and one of 
 the most deadly for the rebels in which they were engaged. 
 The following is the official report of the commander of the 
 Monticello, which will show that the preceding account is not 
 too highly colored : 
 
 U. S. STEAMER MONTICELLO, OFF HATTEBAS INLET, N. C., October 5, 1861. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform you that, in obedience to your 
 
 order of this morning, I stood through the inner channel of Hatteras 
 
 Shoals at 12.30 p. M., and stood close along-shore to the northward, 
 
 keeping a bright look-out from aloft. At 1.30 p. M. we discovered 
 
356 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 several vessels over the woodland Kinekeet, and at the same time a regi 
 ment marching to the northward, carrying a rebel flag in their midst, 
 with many stragglers in the rear ; also two tugs inside flying the same 
 flag. As they came out of the woods Kinekeet we ran close inshore 
 and opened a deliberate fire upon them at the distance of three-quarters 
 of a mile. At our first shell, which fell apparently in their midst, they 
 rolled up their flag and scattered, moving rapidly up the beach to the 
 northward. We followed upon them, firing rapidly from three guns, 
 driving them up to a clump of woods, in which they took refuge, and 
 abreast of which their steamers lay. We now shelled the woods and 
 could see them embarking in small boats for their vessels, evidently in 
 great confusion and suffering greatly from our fire. 
 
 Their steamers now opened upon us, firing, however, but three shots, 
 which fell short. Two boats, filled with men, were struck by our shells 
 and destroyed. Three more steamers came down the sound and took 
 position opposite the woods we were shelling ; also two sloops. We 
 continued firing deliberately upon them from one and a half p. M. until 
 three and a half p. M., when two men were discovered on the sea-beach 
 making signals to us. Supposing them to be two of the Indiana regi 
 ment, we sent an armed boat and crew to bring them off, covering them 
 at the same time with our fire. Upon the boat nearing the beach they 
 took to the water, and one of them was successful in reaching the boat 
 Private W. 0. Haver, company II, Twentieth regiment Indiana 
 troops. The other man, Private Charles White, company H, Twentieth 
 Indiana troops, was, unfortunately, drowned in the surf. Private Haver 
 informs me that he was taken prisoner on the morning of the 4th ; that 
 he witnessed our fire, which was very destructive ; he states that two of 
 our shells fell into two sloops loaded with men, blowing the vessels to 
 pieces and sinking them ; also that several of the officers were killed ; 
 their horses were seen running about the track. He had just escaped 
 from his captors after shooting the captain of one of the rebel companies. 
 He states that the enemy were in the greatest confusion, rushing wildly 
 into the water, striving to get oft* to their vessels. Private H. now 
 directed me to the point where the rebels were congregated, waiting an 
 opportunity to get off". I opened fire again with success, scattering 
 them. We were now very close, in three fathoms water, and five-second 
 shells told with effect. Six steamers were now off the point, one of 
 which I recognized as the Fanny. At 5.25 p. M. we ceased firing, leav 
 ing the enemy scattered along the beach for upward of four miles. 
 
 I fired repeatedly at the enemy s steamers with our rifled cannon, a 
 Parrott 30-pounder, and struck the Fanny, I think, once. I found the 
 
CAPTURE OF THE HATTEKAS FORTS. 357 
 
 range of this piece much short of what I had anticipated, many of the 
 shot turning end over end, and not exceeding much the range of the 
 smooth-bore 32-pounders. * * 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 D. L. BRAINE, 
 
 Lieutenant, commanding U. S. Steamship Monticello. 
 Captain J. L. LARDNER, 
 
 commanding U. S. Steamship Susquehanna, 
 
 off Cape Hatteras, N. C. 
 
CHAPTER XXL 
 
 THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMACK. 
 
 As already stated, the Secretary of the Navy took the 
 earliest opportunity of calling the attention of Congress to 
 the construction of iron-clad vessels, having primary reference 
 to their use in reducing the forts which the rebels had seized 
 upon the Southern coast, but with the ultimate purpose of em 
 ploying them in any service to which they might be adapted. 
 In answer to this request, Congress authorized him to build one 
 or more iron-clads, according to the recommendation of a board 
 of naval officers to be appointed by him to examine and report 
 in what manner- an appropriation made should in their opinion 
 be expended. That report is inserted in its proper place. It 
 recommended the contracts which resulted in the construction 
 of the Monitor, the New Ironsides, and the Galena. There 
 was nothing peculiar or original in the plan of the last-named 
 vessels. The one was intended to be an iron-clad corvette, and 
 the other a mailed frigate, both essentially after the English and 
 French pattern, and consequently the contractors ran no special 
 risk. They were simply required to follow the specifications, 
 and to construct a ship which would float the requisite weight 
 of armor and of battery. The risk of their being shot-proof lay 
 upon the Government itself. It was a very plain business, and 
 the builders had for their guide the experience of England and 
 France. 
 
 Here an important fact should be presented and considered 
 by all who have been led to suppose that the Department de 
 voted itself exclusively to the untried experiment of the Mon 
 itor plan, overlooking the experience of the world beside. So 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMACK. 359 
 
 far from this being true, the Secretary contracted almost at the 
 same time for every principal form of iron-clad then known, in 
 addition to the untried Monitor. The JSTew Ironsides and the 
 Galena represented the European broadside ship. The St. 
 Louis, the first iron-clad which went into actual service in 
 America, represented the class with roof-shaped or sloping armor 
 sides, adopted afterward uniformly by the rebels, and the Mon 
 itor, an original creation ; these present every form of mailed 
 vessel which was brought into use at home or abroad during 
 the period of the war. 
 
 The Secretary and his advisers, then, must receive credit, not 
 only for taking measures at once to try all forms of iron-clads 
 known, but for the boldness and courage to try a battery then 
 unknown, and which has more than verified since the most 
 sanguine expectations w r hich its projectors and friends had 
 formed. 
 
 For the encouragement of those w T ho may hereafter be called 
 upon to perform similar service, it is important that history 
 should give due credit to the men who came forward cheer 
 fully to the aid of the Government in the construction of the 
 original Monitor. It has been said, and truly, that there was 
 nothing unusual in the form of the contract into which they 
 entered, nor in its forfeitures and guaranties, and that the Gov 
 ernment retained in its hands merely the usual amount, and 
 upon terms common to all its contracts. But these statements, 
 though true, do not exhibit the real points of difference between 
 undertaking to build a Monitor at that time, and an agreement 
 to construct a common broadside iron-clad, or even one with 
 sloping side-armor. It was not the technical form of the con 
 tract, but what the parties contracted to do, which shows the 
 risk that patriotism was willing to take for the sake of the 
 country. They contracted to furnish in a given time, and that 
 a short time, a shot-proof battery such as had never before been 
 known, original not only in general design, but in the arrange 
 ment of parts, with new methods of mounting guns heavier 
 guns than had before been used on shipboard and they bound 
 themselves to cause this novel vessel, with all her untried ma 
 chinery, to work in all respects to the satisfaction of the De 
 partment, or forfeit the money advanced, and that twenty-five 
 
360 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 per cent, of the whole amount they were to receive should re 
 main unpaid until the Secretary should be satisfied with the 
 performance of the vessel. As a necessary consequence of the 
 contract, the vessel was not accepted by the Government until 
 after the fight at Hampton Roads. This fact has been fre 
 quently urged as if it were good ground for an accusation 
 against the Department for illiberal dealing with the contract 
 ors. Had the Secretary taken the responsibility of this untried 
 experiment, beyond the proper encouragement which he gave 
 for the construction of the battery, he would have exceeded in 
 the judgment of most the bounds of prudence, but this throws 
 into stronger relief the bold patriotic enterprise of the men 
 who were willing to stake capital and reputation upon an un 
 tried experiment. The Secretary took upon himself the share 
 of the burden which belonged to him, and the inventor and 
 contractors cheerfully accepted the rest ; and thus it came to 
 pass that, with no fault on the part of the Government, the 
 naval battle, upon which more depended than upon any 
 single combat of modern times, was fought by a ship not yet 
 accepted by the Navy Department, and the acceptance or re 
 jection of which depended upon the issue of the battle, for 
 there had been no opportunity for a trial-trip. 
 
 While the Secretary of the Navy was urging forward the 
 construction of the first iron-clads, it was known that the rebel 
 government was making great exertions in the same direction. 
 Iron -clad vessels were under way at New Orleans, Charleston, 
 and at some other points, while at Norfolk the Merrimack was 
 very near completion in the winter of 1861- 62. 
 
 The formidable character of this mailed frigate constrained 
 the Government to make every effort to complete the Monitor 
 in season to meet her whenever she should come out ; and it is 
 stated that information obtained by a rebel spy of the state of 
 forwardness in which the Monitor was, induced the rebels to 
 put a double force upon their frigate, so that she might be able 
 to attack our fleet in Hampton Roads before the Monitor s ar 
 rival, and, if possible, also to make a raid upon Washington or 
 the Northern cities. This extra labor, it is said, gained the one 
 day in which the Merrimack destroyed the Cumberland and 
 Congress. At the beginning of the rebellion it seemed impos- 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MERKIMACK. 361 
 
 sible to withhold from the rebels any thing that they desired to 
 know, while it was by no means easy at all times for the Gov 
 ernment to penetrate their plans. 
 
 The Monitor, commanded by Lieutenant John L. "Worden, 
 reached the scene of late disaster to our cause, and of her com 
 ing triumph, on the 8th of March, at 9 o clock p. M., and Lieu 
 tenant "Worden reported for orders to Captain Marston, the 
 commander of the Roanoke. The Minnesota, one of our noblest 
 frigates, the Roanoke of the same class, but partially disabled, 
 the frigate Congress, and the sloop Cumberland, had been sta 
 tioned at the mouth of the James River to watch for, to engage, 
 and, if possible, destroy, capture, or stop the expected rebel 
 iron-clad frigate then ready for sea at Norfolk. These vessels 
 carried very heavy batteries, and it was hoped that they would 
 be able to cope with the Merrimack. How vain snch an ex 
 pectation was, her first day s operations fully and sadly demon 
 strated. It is probably no exaggeration to say that she would 
 have destroyed easily, and without any material damage to her 
 self, every wooden ship then in our Navy, had they been within 
 her reach, and with none but themselves to oppose her. The 
 heaviest shot from the guns of our first-rate frigates produced 
 no serious impression upon her, and the futility of ramming 
 an iron-clad with wooden vessels was afterward shown at 
 Mobile. 
 
 The 8th of March, 1862, was probably the darkest day of 
 the war for the cause of the Union. The new and really splen 
 did Army of the Potomac had done nothing whatever to wipe 
 away the disgrace and disaster of Bull Run. The country had 
 sent forward its young men in almost uncounted thousands, it 
 almost idolized its new commander-in- chief, it placed all its 
 hopes for the future upon it, and the Government expressed a 
 purpose to spare nothing which could contribute to its comfort, 
 its safety, and its success. An impatience for immediate op 
 erations soon manifested itself, and clamors were loud for the 
 Potomac army to move against the enemy. At length Mr. 
 Lincoln s patience was exhausted, and a positive order was 
 issued for a general movement of all the forces of the Govern 
 ment on or before a certain day named, in February, and the 
 nature of the movement was prescribed for the Army of the 
 
362 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Potomac. McClellan strenuously opposed the plan of the 
 Government, and urged one of his own ; and the President 
 yielded to a council of generals, against his own judgment, 
 when it was found that the rebels, by a movement of their 
 own, had rendered his contemplated scheme impracticable, 
 and, as a consequence, a movement by the peninsula was deter 
 mined upon early in March, with Fortress Monroe as the base 
 of operations. 
 
 But the success of the new movement depended upon the 
 question whether our Navy could command Hampton Roads, 
 and the Potomac, Rappahannock, York, and James Rivers ; for 
 if this could not be done, then clearly an advance upon Rich 
 mond by way of Fortress Monroe was entirely out of the ques 
 tion. Even had it been possible to land the army on the pen 
 insula, it would have been impossible to supply them without 
 the entire control of the adjacent waters ; and in case of the 
 necessity of a retreat, such as actually occurred, if the rebels 
 had held those rivers, the Union army would have been anni 
 hilated. The Government knew well the formidable character 
 of the armed frigate which was nearly ready for sea at Norfolk, 
 and it had nothing wherewith to meet her except the untried 
 nondescript of Ericsson, and even that was not quite ready for 
 use. When the sun went down on the 8th of March, it ap 
 peared to those who were acquainted with the appalling facts 
 that the cause of the Union was w r ell-nigh, if not utterly, lost. 
 No victory with such decided results for tho present, or with 
 such bright hopes for the future, was gained by the rebels either 
 before or after. That night was one of exultation among the 
 conspirators wherever the telegraph could convey the news. 
 The easy and entire destruction of the Union Navy, the defeat 
 of the projected movement on Richmond, or the capture of the 
 army if it should move, the capture of Washington, the laying 
 of the Northern cities under contribution, the raising of the 
 blockade, recognition in Europe, in short, the complete triumph 
 of the rebel cause, seemed the natural consequence of that day s 
 work and triumph. The rebels knew of nothing between them 
 and entire success, -and our own Government had no means of 
 arresting this impending ruin, except an experimental and most 
 diminutive war-ship, in which experienced naval officers and 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MEEEIMACK. 363 
 
 scientific naval constructors had little or no confidence, and 
 even that had not reached the scene of action. 
 
 The attention of the public has been drawn so exclusively 
 to one feature of this battle at Hampton Roads, the fight be 
 tween the iron-clads, that the havoc w T hich the Merrimack made 
 with what was really a very formidable wooden squadron, has 
 not been duly considered ; and the real importance of the con 
 flict will not appear, until some facts which have been partially 
 lost sight of are set in their proper light. On the morning of 
 the 8th of March the following naval force was stationed at or 
 near Fortress Monroe and Newport News : 
 
 The Minnesota, 50 guns ; the Roanoke, 50 guns ; the Con 
 gress, 50 guns ; the St. Lawrence sailing frigate, 12 guns ; the 
 Cumberland sloop, 24 guns. 
 
 These vessels were armed mainly with 8-inch and 9-inch 
 guns, wkile some had, in addition to the broadside battery, a 
 10-inch pivot-gun. Outside of the American Navy there could 
 not have been found five ships of similar rate whose batteries 
 would compare with theirs. In the early part of that disas 
 trous day the Congress and Cumberland were anchored oft? 
 Newport News, the Minnesota and the Roanoke were some six 
 or eight miles distant, near Fortress Monroe, while the St. Law 
 rence was also near. 
 
 At 9 A. M. two steamers were discovered from the Cumber 
 land at anchor in the James River, about twelve miles distant. 
 As was afterward shown, they were intended to join those 
 which were expected to come out that morning from Norfolk. 
 Ere long, lines of black smoke, lying along the horizon over 
 Elizabeth River, indicated the approach of steamers from that 
 direction. At 12 M. three steamers were visible from the 
 Cumberland. They were standing down the Elizabeth River 
 .and toward Sewall s Point. At 12.45 these steamers rounded 
 Sewall s Point, so as to be visible from the decks of the Minne 
 sota, when it was at once seen that one was the expected Merri 
 mack, and that the other two were gunboats. 
 
 Preparations were instantly made on all sides to receive 
 this formidable attack. The Minnesota slipped her cable and 
 got under w r ay, and the Roanoke, whose machinery was dis 
 abled, was taken in tow by two steam-tugs, and proceeded as 
 
364 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 rapidly as possible toward Newport News, where the Cumber 
 land and Congress were, the vessels at which the rebel steamers 
 were aiming. A tug was also dispatched to bring up as speed 
 ily as possible the frigate St. Lawrence. The channel between 
 Fortress Monroe and Newport News runs within cannon-shot 
 of Sewall s Point, and on that the rebels had established a 
 battery of rifled cannon. This battery the Minnesota, the 
 Roanoke, and the St. Lawrence, towed by tugs, had to pass in 
 going to Newport News, and they suffered somewhat from its 
 fire, as will hereafter appear. In order to present more clearly 
 the events of this unequal battle, a brief description will be at 
 tempted of the scene on board each separate ship, although no 
 narrative can convey any adequate idea of the terrible reality. 
 The following facts are gathered in regard to the Cumberland : 
 she was a sloop, carrying twenty-four heavy guns, and was 
 nearly the size of the frigate Constitution, of some 1,700 tons 
 burden. As soon as the Merrimack, with her two consorts, was 
 discovered coming from Norfolk, at 12 M., the crew were sum 
 moned to quarters, the ship was cleared for action, and the guns 
 on the main-deck were double breeched. All the stern and sad 
 preparations for battle were duly made the guns all shotted, 
 the men in position, the magazines opened ; shot, shell, car 
 tridges, all in place ; the powder-boys at their stations ; swords, 
 pistols, boarding-pikes in the racks ; the surgeons tables gleam 
 ing with the instruments which made brave men shudder with 
 the thought of what a few moments would bring. 
 
 Three hundred and seventy-six men on the Cumberland, 
 and four hundred and thirty-four on the Congress, stood there, 
 one-third of them, as the event showed, within a step of eternity. 
 Never were brave men called upon to make a more hopeless 
 battle. It was martyrdom in the cause of country the sad 
 privilege of dying for their flag. For a few moments, it is true,, 
 this was not apparent. Yet there was a solemnity over all the 
 ships companies that no ordinary circumstances could inspire, 
 for they knew not what they were to meet. They could not 
 measure in any manner the power of their enemy, nor what en 
 gines of death he was about to wield. They knew they had to 
 face a terrible foe more fearful, because they knew not with 
 what weapons he would attack, nor what were his means of de- 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MERKEMACK. 365 
 
 fence. At a little past 2 P. M. the huge mailed frigate had 
 approached the Congress within grape-shot distance ; and then, 
 every man in his place, the guns trained to the proper eleva 
 tion, the lanyards in the gunner s hand, scarcely a sound was 
 heard throughout the devoted ship while they awaited the at 
 tack of their dreaded foe. A puff of smoke from one of her 
 bow-guns, and every breath stopped an instant till a storm of 
 grape swept over the deck and rattled on her sides. A long 
 breath of relief that it was no worse. Keeping on her course, 
 she was passing the Congress at less than one-fourth of a mile 
 distant, heading for the Cumberland. At that distance the 
 Congress delivered her broadside. Her heaviest shot glanced 
 harmless from the side of the mailed monster, and all felt that 
 the battle was already. decided, and that nothing remained but 
 to surrender or be destroyed with their ship. The return fire 
 of the Merrimack only confirmed their worst fears. Her shells 
 came crashing through the sides of their ship, spreading death 
 and ruin on every side. They knew that success was hopeless, 
 escape impossible, and resistance vain. Yet an American fifty- 
 gun ship could not be surrendered thus, and so the strong-hearted 
 martyrs stood by their flag and to their guns. But it was not 
 the intention of the rebel commander to finish his work then. 
 Passing the Congress at the distance of about three hundred 
 yards, he ran direct for the Cumberland. She, like her consort 
 a sailing ship, lay perfectly helpless so far as motion was con 
 cerned, and all awaited with silent dread the approach of the 
 rebel frigate, double her own size. With a desperate hope that 
 she might not prove invulnerable, they opened upon her w r hen 
 at short range with their heaviest guns. Breathlessly officers 
 and men watched the effect of their shot, and, as they glanced 
 away from her sloping sides, or fell smitten back into the water, 
 they turned on each other looks of mingled wonder and hope 
 lessness. 
 
 Still no one thought of surrender to that rebel flag. The 
 fire of the Cumberland was received silently by the Merrimack 
 as if with contempt, and she came straight on, and in a moment 
 more her iron prow smashed through the sides of the Cumber 
 land as easily it seemed, as an egg-shell could be crushed in the 
 hand, and at the same time a shell from every gun which could 
 
366 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 bear crashed through her timbers and exploded upon her decks, 
 piling splinters, gun-carriages, guns, and men in one confused 
 wreck. The slaughter was sickening. As if satisfied that her 
 work was done, the Merrimack hauled off and steered for the 
 Congress. The scene on the Cumberland was an awful one. 
 The dead and wounded strewed her decks and crowded the 
 cockpit ; while the roar of the water, as it rushed through her 
 shattered side, and the rapid settling of the ship, told that she 
 would float but a few minutes longer. But the guns were 
 loaded once more, and when the water had already reached the 
 gun -deck, the guns just above the water, the brave remainder 
 of the crew fired a last broadside, and as the ship settled to the 
 water s edge leaped into the waves. She heeled heavily to port 
 and went down, and when she touched bottom her flag was still 
 flying above the water, but it was over the grave of more than 
 one hundred men. There was time for the wounded in the 
 cockpit who were able to walk to go on deck ; but the berth- 
 deck and sick-bay were full of poor fellows so mangled by shells 
 and splinters that they could not be moved, and they went 
 down with the ship. 
 
 So soon as the fate of the Cumberland was seen from the 
 Congress, the jib and topsails were set, and with the aid of a 
 tug the frigate was run ashore under a heavy fire from the 
 smaller steamers which were enabled to fire with great pre 
 cision at so large and stationary a mark. Their guns were 
 rifles, and, as nearly every shell reached its object, the vessel 
 was rapidly cut up, and the men were swept away from their 
 guns with a fearful slaughter. The Merrimack then took a po 
 sition astern, about one hundred and fifty yards, and raked the 
 helpless frigate fore and aft with shells which crushed through 
 her sides and exploded on her decks, setting her on fire in sev 
 eral places. 
 
 The two steamers from the James now joined in the fight, 
 and soon the Congress had not a single broadside gun which 
 could be used, and in a few minutes more one of her stern-guns 
 was dismounted, and the muzzle of the other was knocked off. 
 The ship was now perfectly defenceless, her commander was 
 killed, and, as all further resistance was impossible, the flag of 
 the frigate was struck not disgraced, but borne down by an 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MEEREMACK. 367 
 
 overwhelming superiority of force. A tug from the enemy 
 came alongside, and the commander ordered the crew out of 
 the Congress as he intended to burn the ship. This tug was 
 driven off by the artillery and musketry of the troops 011 shore, 
 when the Merrimack again opened fire, and threw several shells 
 into the burning frigate, though a white flag was flying at the 
 peak. The ship had been set on fire in several places by hot 
 shot from the Merrimack, and as no hopes were entertained of 
 saving her, and as their enemy had hauled off to engage the 
 Minnesota, the boats were manned, and the wounded and crew 
 were removed. The fire soon after reached the magazine, and 
 the fragments of the mangled and bloody ship were scattered 
 over the waves. Thus, in a little more than two hours, the 
 rebel iron-clad had destroyed a heavy frigate and a large sloop, 
 mounting together seventy-four guns, and had slaughtered in 
 battle and drowned two hundred and fifty of their crews, a de 
 struction scarcely matched elsewhere in naval war, and settling 
 forever the question whether wooden vessels could contend suc 
 cessfully with an armored ship. 
 
 But the work of this new terror of the sea was not yet finished. 
 Leaving the sunken sloop with the remnant of her crew strug 
 gling in the water, and the burning frigate and her men to 
 their fate, the Merrimack headed once more for the Minnesota, 
 accompanied by the Jamestown and Patrick Henry. The 
 Minnesota was at this time hard aground, and incapable of 
 changing her position to meet or avoid an attack. Fortunately, 
 the shallow water prevented the iron-clad from approaching the 
 Minnesota nearer than a mile, and this alone prevented her in 
 stant destruction. She did not fire with accuracy, and only a 
 single shot from her battery at that time struck the Minnesota, 
 and that passed through her bow. Much greater damage, how 
 ever, was done by the small rebel steamers which were armed 
 with rifled guns. As the frigate was aground, they could choose 
 both position and distance. Their fire for a time was very de 
 structive ; but the one heavy gun which the Minnesota could 
 bring to bear finally drove them off. The 10-inch pivot-gun of 
 the frigate was used against the Merrimack, but officers and 
 men were not merely mortified to see the shot fall harmlessly 
 from her sicfes, but they were convinced that their own noble 
 
368 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 | 
 
 ship was as helpless before such an enemy as the Cumberland 
 and Congress had been. It was evident that the moment the 
 Merrimack could reach them their frigate would be destroyed. 
 After a three hours trial, the Minnesota keeping the small 
 steamers at a distance with her one large gun, and the Merri 
 mack vainly endeavoring to reach her, the rebel steamers 
 hauled off at 7 P. M., and all three steamed toward Norfolk. 
 
 Thus was closed up an era of naval war an era which 
 had been made memorable by the great sea-fights of more 
 than a hundred years, and in which the great navies of modern 
 Europe had been created. In a single day the foundations of 
 the great maritime powers had been shaken, the nations stood 
 in new relations to each other, and wooden navies, except for 
 certain specific purposes, were to pass away among the rubbish 
 of the past as the bow and the catapult and the mailed warrior 
 vanished at the introduction of fire-arms. It was the beginning 
 of a revolution in war whose ultimate results cannot even now 
 be calculated. 
 
 In the opinion of the rebel chiefs, nothing lay between them 
 that night and the ruin of the Republic and the establishment 
 of a slave empire that would control the continent. So far as 
 human wisdom could see, there was even in the view of the 
 most sanguine friends of the Union nothing to prevent the tri 
 umph of treason but an untried experiment, whose issue none 
 could tell. There was, however, one other obstacle to their suc 
 cess not then duly considered, and that was, the decision of God. 
 God was against the rebels, and He had decided that slavery 
 and the rebellion should go down together. He had provided 
 an instrument for their ruin at which, could the flushed and 
 confident traitors have seen it that night, they would only have 
 laughed. They little thought that, in two hours from the time 
 when they left Hampton Roads so exultingly, an avenger would 
 be there that would spoil the spoiler, and bring all their expec 
 tations to nothing. 
 
 At 9 P. M. the now famous little Monitor arrived from New 
 York, and about 2 o clock the next morning anchored alongside 
 the Minnesota. It certainly was a great relief to the officers 
 and crew of the frigate to know that an iron-clad of any kind 
 Was ready to help ; but after having seen how formidable the 
 

THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMACK. 369 
 
 rebel frigate was, invulnerable herself, but armed with, a power 
 of destruction really terrific, they could not have been very con 
 fident of their safety. 
 
 The Sabbath morning came clear and bright, and all on 
 land and water was so calm and peaceful that it seemed like a 
 preparation for the funeral of the two hundred and fifty brave 
 men who had just given up their lives in a vain defence of their 
 flag, and in a contest perfectly hopeless from the beginning. 
 The flag of the Cumberland was waving yet just above the 
 water, sadly marking the spot where the shattered wreck and 
 the dead were lying, and here and there the sea-birds were hov 
 ering over a floating corpse, or where some one had drifted to 
 the beach. The remainder of the crews of the lost ships w^ere 
 gathered in sad groups at Newport News. The straightened, 
 motionless forms among the wounded showed that some of the 
 wounded had died during the night, and the men of the Cum 
 berland missed the attention and consolations of their chaplain, 
 for he had gone down with the ship. All was gloom on the 
 ships and on shore. Sorrow for the past and dread of the fu 
 ture had laid a cloud on every brow and a weight on every 
 heart. The Minnesota, badly cut up already, was still hard 
 aground, immovable ; the Roanoke was unmanageable from the 
 breaking of her machinery ; and the St. Lawrence was a sailing 
 vessel : and it was evident that nothing but the Monitor lay be 
 tween them all and destruction, and certainly the queer-looking, 
 diminutive thing appeared to be a most ineffectual shield. The 
 old sailors looked at her with curiosity, but they shook their 
 heads. It was evident that they considered the case a hopeless 
 one. The Merrimack was not tardy in beginning her morning 
 work. At 6 A. M. she again appeared coming down from 
 Craney Island. The drums beat to quarters, on board the Min 
 nesota, breaking the morning stillness with less of hope than 
 that call ever occasioned before on the deck of an American 
 ship. It sounded in all ears more like a funeral knell than a 
 summons to triumphant battle. Contrary to expectation, the 
 rebel iron-clad passed the frigate and the Monitor, and headed 
 for Fortress Monroe, keeping out of range. The retreat was 
 beat on board the Minnesota for the purpose of giving the 
 crew their breakfast, that they might be better prepared for the 
 24 
 
370 HISTORY OF THE TOOTED STATES NAVY. 
 
 battle. After steaming down near the Kip Raps, the Merri- 
 mack turned into the channel by which the Minnesota had 
 come up, and was once more rapidly approaching. Again the 
 frigate s crew were hurried to their quarters. When within the 
 distance of a mile the Minnesota opened upon her with her 
 stern-guns, and at the same time signalled the Monitor to at 
 tack her. The confidence which Lieutenant Worden felt in the 
 Ericsson battery was then immediately shown. He placed the 
 Monitor exactly between the Minnesota and her enemy, cover 
 ing her so far as such a diminutive craft could do, and steered 
 directly for the rebel frigate. 
 
 The Merrimack slowed her engines, and paused as if to sur 
 vey her nondescript adversary, and ascertain if possible its char 
 acter. She was evidently startled by the audacity as well as 
 the strange appearance of this new Yankee creation. There was 
 no means of measuring its power, or of knowing what weapons 
 of destruction it carried. Evidently, however, those on board 
 of it had something at their disposal in which they trusted, for 
 it came right on as if there was no thought of danger. Some 
 uneasy glances were exchanged among the older officers, but 
 with most on board the iron-clad, the insignificant-looking 
 thing was a subject of merriment. Something, however, must 
 be speedily done, for it was seen that in a very few minutes 
 it would be directly alongside their frigate. 
 
 The Merrimack trained her forward guns upon what seemed 
 more like a large buoy floating toward her than a man-of-war, 
 but her gunners had not now a frigate s broadside to aim at. 
 Almost nothing rose above the water but the turret, presenting 
 to her fire a cross-section of not more than twenty feet by nine 
 feet, and from that a ball was certain to glance unless striking 
 exactly in the centre. It was not surprising that she missed 
 the mark, and the Monitor still went on untouched. Her an 
 swering gun was an admonition indeed. The solid 11-inch 
 shot smote the huge frigate with a blow that made her shudder 
 through every timber. Startled and maddened, the rebels de 
 livered a full broadside. Most of the shot went over the sub 
 merged little battery, but some struck the turret and fell back 
 or glanced off as harmlessly as, says an eye-witness, "pebbles 
 thrown from the hand of a child." It was now the turn of the 
 
THE MONITOR ASTD TIIE MERRTMACK. 371 
 
 rebels to be astonished. In vexation of spirit at the unexpected 
 rebuff, they fired still more rapidly broadside after broadside, 
 pausing till the smoke cleared off to see whether their little 
 enemy had not gone to the bottom ; but ever finding her still 
 afloat, unharmed and active as ever, bending and starting with 
 her immense shot the frigate s armor, and shaking her huge 
 frame in a manner that they knew must in due time be fatal to 
 their ship. The excitement was scarcely less on board of our 
 own ships and on the shore. The combat seemed so unequal 
 when the great frigate was compared with her little adversary, 
 and the Memmack had shown the day before such power both 
 of resistance and attack, that every movement was watched 
 with breathless interest, for they knew if the Monitor was de 
 stroyed or beaten all was lost. No wonder that the captain of 
 the Minnesota wrote in his official report that he was aston 
 ished to see Lieutenant Worden lay the Monitor right alongside 
 the Merrimack. It seemed not boldness, but recklessness. It 
 appeared impossible that she should not be destroyed at a blow, 
 scattered into fragments by a broadside, or run down and sunk 
 by the rebel ram. 
 
 Among the deeply interested spectators of the fight were 
 Captain Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Lieu 
 tenant Henry A. Wise, afterward Chief of the Ordnance Bu 
 reau. They had gone down from Washington in a tug with 
 ammunition for the Monitor, and they went out to view the re 
 sult of the experiment on which the war at that moment hinged, 
 and in which the reputation of the Department was so deeply 
 involved. When they landed, after the fight, the attention of 
 Captain Fox was drawn, providentially the Christian thinks, to 
 the 15-inch gun lying there, which circumstance led to discus 
 sion and finally to the adoption of that formidable weapon in 
 the armament of the Monitors. 
 
 After some time spent in close-range fighting, the Merrimack 
 firing broadsides with great rapidity, and the Monitor remaining 
 still uninjured, both vessels began to manoeuvre to obtain if pos 
 sible some advantage. Like two trained pugilists, they watched 
 each other s motions, prepared alike to strike or ward off a blow. 
 Now the Monitor was seen to dash straight at the frigate as if to 
 send a shot through a port, since she could not penetrate her ar- 
 
372 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 mor ; and then shooting past, would aim a blow at her stern, and 
 then the two would close broadside to broadside as if in a death- 
 wrestle. All effort on both sides seemed in vain. The little 
 battery was not harmed ; and, though the armor of the Mem- 
 mack appeared bent and loosened, her fighting power appeared 
 to be undiminished. Finding that she could make no impres 
 sion, she suddenly turned and headed for the Minnesota, hoping 
 to crush her before the Monitor could interfere. In the morn 
 ing, when she passed up, she had struck the frigate with a 
 heavy shot just above the water-line ; and she had good reason 
 to believe that, if she could first give her a broadside of shells, 
 and then strike her with her beak, she would be destroyed. As 
 she came within point-blank range, the Minnesota gave her a 
 full broadside, including the 10-inch pivot-gun a broadside, 
 says Captain Yan Brunt, " which would have blown out of the 
 water any timber-built ship in the world." But it produced no 
 effect upon the Merrimack. She returned the fire with her 
 rifled bow-gun, with a shell that spread havoc through the ship, 
 tearing four rooms into one, and exploding two charges of pow 
 der that set the ship on fire. Her second shell blew up the 
 tug-boat Dragon, lying alongside, causing for a few minutes 
 consternation aboard the frigate. 
 
 In the mean time the Monitor had not been idle ; and by the 
 time the rebel frigate had fired her third shell, the little craft 
 was down upon her, and threw herself between the two, com 
 pelling the Merrimack to change her position. The Minnesota 
 had concentrated a fire upon her from the gun-deck, the spar- 
 deck, and forecastle pivot-guns, but the shot all glanced off harm 
 less from her sloping sides. After the Monitor came between, 
 the Merrimack, in changing her position, grounded. While in 
 this position, the Minnesota again attacked her with every gun 
 she could bring to bear, but with no more effect than before. 
 
 When the Merrimack again floated clear, she steamed down 
 the bay pursued by the Monitor, the iron stripling chasing the 
 iron giant. It seemed as if the officers of the rebel craft felt 
 that this was beyond endurance, for the Merrimack suddenly 
 turned and ran full speed into the Monitor, as if determined to 
 crush her or force her under. She struck a glancing blow, and 
 the little battery glided out from beneath her, and then fired 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMACK. 373 
 
 while the vessels were almost in contact. The shot seemed to 
 crush in her armor, but exactly the extent of damage done was 
 never known. At this short range the frigate once more con 
 centrated her fire upon the Monitor s turret with a fury that 
 indicated a last, desperate effort. But it was all in vain. De 
 termined not to be defeated, the rebels started once more for 
 the Minnesota, the Monitor having hauled off a little, as was sup 
 posed, to cool her guns. The situation of the noble frigate was 
 for a few moments more perilous than ever. She was immov 
 ably aground, and the Merrimack and her two consorts could 
 choose both distance and position ; officers and crew were worn 
 out with fatigue, but still these noble men determined that they 
 would never give up their ship, terribly crippled though she 
 was, and nearly out of ammunition, and every preparation was 
 made to destroy her if the last extremity should come. Sud 
 denly, however, the rebel ships all changed their course once 
 more, and headed for Norfolk, the Merrimack appearing to be 
 in some manner disabled or severely injured. The rebels have 
 since declared that, in attempting to sink the Monitor, her iron 
 prow was broken, and she sprung a leak, so as to compel her to 
 put back into Norfolk. As she never ventured out again, ex 
 cept to be blown up, the more rational conclusion is that her 
 armor and frame were so much sliaken by the heavy shot de 
 livered, many of them at a distance of only a few yards, that 
 she was deemed not seaworthy, and was consequently de 
 stroyed. 
 
 Had the rebel authorities believed her capable of meeting 
 the Monitor again, she certainly would not have been destroyed. 
 The last shell fired by the rebel frigate exploded exactly oppo 
 site the eyehole in the pilot-house, where Lieutenant Worden 
 was at the moment looking out. His eyes were severely in 
 jured, his face filled with powder, and there was also a slight 
 concussion of the brain. The moment this brave officer recov 
 ered his consciousness, his first question was, " Have we saved 
 the Minnesota ? " When told she was safe, he answered, " I 
 am satisfied." He was taken at once to Washington, and an 
 incident connected with him there, illustrates the character of 
 Abraham Lincoln. A cabinet meeting was being held, when 
 it was told the President that the wounded commander of the 
 
374 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Monitor was in the city. He instantly rose, took his hat, say 
 ing : " Excuse me, gentlemen, I must see this fellow " went 
 immediately to his room. "Worden was on the sofa, his eyes 
 bandaged, his face swollen and bloody. The President was 
 announced, and he took his hand in silence. " Mr. President," 
 said the wounded officer, " you do me great honor by this visit." 
 " Sir," replied Mr. Lincoln, while the tears ran down his cheeks, 
 " I am the one who is honored in this interview." 
 
 Thus ended what was, at the time it was fought, undoubt 
 edly the most remarkable naval action of modern times, per 
 haps of any time, if regarded in connection with all its impor 
 tant consequences. Considered as a battle between an iron-clad 
 and wooden vessels the result was, one frigate and one sloop-of- 
 war and one steam-tug destroyed ; two hundred and fifty men 
 slaughtered in the fight or drowned ; another of our finest frig 
 ates nearly dismantled, with not one-fourth of her battery in a 
 condition to be used when she reached Fortress Monroe ; another 
 frigate still, injured, and the iron-clad apparently unharmed. 
 
 As between wooden ships contending with a broadside iron 
 clad frigate, and a Monitor fighting the same frigate for nearly 
 twice the time, the account stood thus : the killed, wounded, 
 and destruction of ships as just stated ; while the iron-clad frig 
 ate was completely victorious,- and herself uninjured, when fight 
 ing the wooden vessels. But in her four hours fight with the 
 same iron-clad, not a man was killed on board the Monitor, she 
 herself was unharmed, and the broadside iron-clad was defeated, 
 driven off, and so far injured, that soon after the rebels de 
 stroyed her. It would be impossible probably to set the ad 
 vantages of the Monitor battery in a clearer light than this by 
 any other experiment, and yet the public was slow to perceive 
 all the inevitable results which that experiment involved, espe 
 cially as the Monitors which were tried at Charleston did not 
 perform impossible things, and only endured with trifling in 
 jury a fire which would have sunk any other vessels in America 
 or Europe. 
 
 It w T as generally conceded that the great wooden navies of 
 the w^orld were useless in contending with iron-clads. It was 
 evident that such a frigate as the Merrimack could easily de 
 stroy a whole squadron of wooden first-rates should they dare 
 
THE MONITOR AND THE MEKETMACK. 375 
 
 to meet her, and that no fleet of such, however powerful, could 
 blockade a port, or occupy a harbor, against one such mail-clad 
 frigate. This of itself was an amazing revolution in naval war, 
 and in the relative power of nations. The supremacy of the 
 great naval powers was stricken down, for a small nation that 
 could obtain one first-class iron-clad could protect itself against 
 the wooden navies of the most powerful. But there was anoth 
 er fact whose significance at first was not so clearly seen. A 
 broadside iron-clad frigate which, to say the least, was as formi 
 dable as any other broadside vessel then afloat, was beaten and 
 seriously injured in a battle with a Monitor of scarcely one-fourth 
 her size and mounting only two guns. The country was some 
 what slow in drawing the proper inference from this. Nor 
 could it well be otherwise. Few understood the essential and 
 distinctive principles of the invention of Ericsson. Some leading 
 men in Congress unfortunately felt called upon to make an at 
 tack upon the Navy Department, and selected the Monitors, as, 
 in their opinion, the most vulnerable point. Some leading 
 papers united with them in the assault, and the public mind 
 was for a time confused and misled. The truth was, as events 
 have subsequently shown, that the fight at Hampton Roads de 
 cided the case as completely against broadside iron-clads, as it 
 did against wooden ships. Not only the wooden navies of Eu 
 rope, but also their iron-clads, such as they were then, were vir 
 tually set aside as things of the past. Before our Avar was over, 
 it would have been as useless to have sent the finest broadside 
 armored vessel of Europe to attack our best Monitors as to have 
 ordered a wooden vessel on the same errand. One would have 
 been destroyed as quickly as the other. 
 
 When the Monadnock made the voyage to San Francisco in 
 safety, and almost at the same time the Miantonomoh reached 
 a European harbor, having met no difficulty in crossing the 
 Atlantic ; when it was seen that there is scarcely a limit to the 
 size of the gun which a Monitor ship can carry ; that those al 
 ready built could mount and work 20-inch cannon, while even 
 15-inch guns could not be carried by any broadside ship then 
 known, it was then perceived that what was really settled at 
 Hampton Roads was this : that the navies of the world, both 
 wooden and iron-clad, must be laid aside, and the nations must 
 
376 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 begin anew. The time lias already gone by when Europe will 
 expend millions in constructing such iron-clads as she has built 
 already. Home questions of the greatest importance were also 
 decided there. It was settled that the rebels could not create a 
 navy which we could not destroy. They had formed all their 
 plans upon the idea of the broadside vessel with sloping ar 
 mored sides, and even had they desired, they could not change 
 them in season to meet the fleet of Monitors which were ready 
 so soon. But they had confidence in their method of construc 
 tion, and made no account of the fact that the Monitor ship 
 could carry safely a much heavier gun than those used against 
 the Merrimack. Owing to this mistake, when the Atlanta was 
 ready they did not hesitate to send her against two Monitors, 
 when her case was settled by the first 15-inch shot which struck 
 her. The fate of the whole rebel navy was sealed at Hampton 
 Roads. The fight with the Merrimack rendered it possible to 
 undertake the expedition to Richmond by the peninsula ; and 
 when McClellan s army was once near Richmond, its destruction 
 would have been certain if the rebels could have commanded 
 James River and the adjacent waters ; and although the Merri 
 mack continued at Norfolk until near the middle of May, and 
 though the rebels well knew the vital importance of holding 
 James River, they did not venture to encounter the Monitor 
 again. 
 
 There were many critical points in the progress of the war 
 which seemed so -clearly marked by the special interposition of 
 God as to impress the popular mind, and one of the important 
 results of the rebellion was to strengthen the belief that God, as 
 King of nations, watches over and directs their affairs, and con 
 trols even the issue of battle. The Christian cannot but believe 
 that the eye of God followed the little Monitor during the peril 
 ous passage from New York ; that He preserved her for the 
 purpose He had in view ; and we can see now that, if the Mer 
 rimack had not been permitted to destroy the Congress and 
 Cumberland, one important part of the problem would have 
 remained unsettled, and the battle of the iron-clads only would 
 have produced far less impression both at home and abroad. 
 It was that which was needed to produce the effect. That 
 startled Europe, and settled the question of intervention. 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 CAPTURE OF ROANOKE ISLAND OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND 
 ALBEMARLE SOUNDS. 
 
 ALTHOUGH the capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet in 
 August, 1861, had secured the principal entrance to the sounds 
 of North Carolina, the rebels had still the means of annoying 
 our coastwise commerce by sending out through the lesser in 
 lets, small craft, armed often with only a single gun, by which 
 they seized some vessels that were passing near the shore. 
 They had quite a fleet of light-draught steamers, many of which 
 were swift, and armed with rifled guns, with which they not 
 only commanded the sounds, but were also ready for any little 
 piratical expedition that promised either plunder or damage to 
 the Union cause. 
 
 Besides, these interior waters offered at several points facili 
 ties for constructing vessels for the rebel navy, and it was 
 known that some formidable iron-clads were under way. It 
 became, therefore, important for the Government, not only to 
 clear these sounds and their tributary waters of enemies, but to 
 hold possession of them by a suitable force of our ow r n. Early 
 in January a joint expedition of the Army and Navy was 
 fitted out for operation against the rebel works and steamers in 
 these inner waters of North Carolina. About seventeen thou 
 sand troops were placed under the command of Brigadier-Gen 
 eral A. E. Burnside, while the naval force was under the direc 
 tion of Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough. The following table 
 shows the character of the naval squadron that was prepared 
 for this service. They were all vessels of light draught, because 
 there is not, under the most favorable circumstances, more than 
 
378 
 
 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 seven and a half feet of water in the channel- way of the bulk 
 head, and this passage is also narrow and tortuous. In order, 
 however, that these small vessels might successfully contend 
 with the forts and rebel gunboats, they were armed with guns 
 of heavy calibre : 
 
 Names of Vessels. 
 
 Names of Commanders. 
 
 Armament. 
 
 Stars and Stripes Lieut. Com g Reed Werden. 
 Louisiana j Lieut. Com g Murray 
 
 Hetzel | Lieut. Com g Davenport. . . . 
 
 Underwriter. . . .Lieut. Com g Jeffers . . 
 
 Delaware 
 
 Lieut. Com g Quackenbush. 1 
 
 Valley City Lieut. Com g Chaplin 
 
 Southfield A. V. Lt. Com g Behm 
 
 Hunchback .... A. V. Lt. Com g Colhoun . . 
 
 Morse ........ ! Act g Master Hayes 
 
 Whitehead ! Act g Master French 
 
 Seymour Act g Master Wells 
 
 Shawsheen I Act g Master Woodward. . . 
 
 Lock wood Act g Master Graves 
 
 Ceres . . . 
 Putnam . 
 Brincker 
 Granite. . 
 
 Act g Master McDia,rmid . . . 
 Act g Master Hotchkiss. . . . 
 
 Act g Master Giddings 1 
 
 Act g Master s Mate Boomer! 1 
 
 8-in. of 55 cwt. ; 1 20-pdr. Parrott. 
 
 8-in. of 63 cwt.; 1 32-pdr. of 57 
 
 cwt; 2 32-pdrs. of 33 cwt. ; 1 12- 
 
 pdr. rifled Dahlgren. 
 
 9-in. of cwt. ; 1 80-pdr. rifled. 
 
 8-in. of 63 cwt. ; 1 80-pdr. rifled ; 1 
 
 12-pdr. rifled ; 1 12-pdr. smooth 
 
 bore. 
 
 9.in. of cwt. ; 1 32-pdr. of 57 
 
 cwt. ; 1 12-pdr. rifled. 
 
 32-pdrs. of 42 cwt. ; 1 12-pdr. rifled. 
 
 9-in. of cwt.; 1 100-pdr. rifled. 
 
 do. do. 
 
 9-in. of cwt. 
 9-in. of cwt. 
 
 30-pdr. rifled ; 1 12-pdr. rifled. 
 20-pdrs. rifled. 
 
 80-pdr. rifled; 1 12-pdr. rifled; 1 
 12-pdr. smooth bore. 
 30-pdr. rifled ; 1 32-pdr. of 33 cwt. 
 20-pdr. rifled. 
 30-pdr. rifled. 
 32-pdr. of 57 cwt. 
 
 These armaments, as is seen, are very heavy for vessels 
 drawing only eight feet of water, several of them carrying 
 9-inch guns, larger than the 68-pounder, which, at the beginning 
 of our war, was the heaviest broadside gun in the English Navy. 
 SoDie of these light steamers carried a 100-pounder rifle, and 
 several had SO-pounder rifles on board. This armament for 
 such small craft marked one of the many changes which were 
 so rapidly made in naval war. If only the size and tonnage 
 of the vessels of this squadron were stated, no indication would 
 be given of its actual force. Few would be led even to suspect 
 that it could make a successful attack upon a heavily-armed 
 fort. 
 
 In addition to the armed vessels belonging to the Navy, and 
 the coal schooners, a large number of army transports belonged 
 to the expedition ; and the whole number of the various kinds 
 of craft finally assembled at Hatteras Inlet, was stated in the 
 
OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND ALBEMARLE SOUNDS. 379 
 
 accounts of the day at one hundred and twenty. This hetero 
 geneous squadron of Navy steamers, tugs, sailing vessels, and 
 steam transports, was sent on a winter voyage to one of the 
 stormiest and most dangerous points upon our coast. It 
 reached Hatteras Inlet at the commencement of a furious 
 northeaster, during which great damage was done, and the 
 whole squadron was in imminent peril. Outside of the bar 
 there was no safe anchorage in such a gale, and an attempt to 
 enter the narrow, shallow, crooked Channel of the inlet would 
 only have invited destruction. 
 
 Some of the disasters, occasioned by the several storms 
 which the expedition encountered, are worthy of record, as 
 showing the perilous nature of the service. One of the craft 
 which, in derision, were named "floating batteries" large 
 barges or canal boats, loaded with hay, oats, and other stores 
 pitched and sheered so much in the heavy sea that she could 
 not be towed, and it was found necessary to rescue her crew 
 before she should go down. The boat which took these off 
 was swamped under the guards of the steamer, and all on 
 board were pitched into the sea, and with the greatest difficulty 
 were saved. The tow-line was then cut, and the Grapeshot 
 left to her fate. She -went ashore some fourteen miles above 
 Hatteras, and her cargo of hay and oats served to keep alive 
 some horses which got ashore there from the wreck of the Poca- 
 hontas. 
 
 For some reason the "War Department was not always as 
 fortunate in procuring vessels as the Navy Department. It 
 was sometimes impossible to obtain ships or steamers suited to 
 the service required, and too many were quite willing to deceive 
 the Government and to take advantage of its necessities. The 
 embarrassments and losses of the Government were very annoy 
 ing and expensive in this expedition ; men who had vessels for 
 rent or sale, in too many instances, seeming to care nothing 
 for the exposure of lives and property which must necessarily 
 occur on board their tmseawortliy boats. 
 
 The old steamer Pocahontas, which was chartered as a 
 horse-transport, was an illustration of some of these remarks. 
 She had 011 board one hundred and thirteen valuable horses. 
 During the gale her boilers first gave way, and they were 
 
380 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 patched up ; then the grates fell down ; then the steering-gear 
 was broken ; then the smoke-pipe came down ; and, finally, she 
 sprang a leak and was run ashore. By this shipwreck ninety 
 valuable horses were lost; some of them being thrown over 
 board ten miles from land, and others were left, as was said, to 
 perish because no one would go down to the lower deck and 
 untie them, that they might swim ashore. The gunboat Zouave 
 was driven in the shallow water upon her own anchor, staved, 
 and sunk. Her cargo was saved. A transport schooner went 
 ashore on the outer bar. Each day during the storm more or 
 less vessels of the fleet grounded, and every lull of the wind was 
 improved by the tugs in dragging them oif ; though often while 
 one set were being released others were driven into the mud, and 
 thus there was constant labor, anxiety, and peril. The City of 
 New York, a large transport screw steamer, with a cargo worth, 
 as was said, two hundred thousand dollars, mostly ordnance 
 stores, went ashore near the entrance to the inlet. Those on 
 board were in the greatest peril. She struck on Monday 
 afternoon, and swung around almost at once so as to lie nearly 
 broadside to the sea among the breakers; the waves making 
 a breach over her decks, and her officers and crew were 
 obliged to cling to her rigging to prevent being swept overboard. 
 Such was the violence of winds and waves that no assistance 
 could be given her. On Tuesday her foremast was cut away, 
 and when it fell it carried her pipes with it, and she became a 
 perfect wreck. Those on board now lashed themselves to bul 
 warks and rigging, to prevent being washed away ; and thus, 
 without food or aid, in this awful peril, and yet in sight of so 
 many friends, they passed another night. On Wednesday they 
 were rescued, but the steamer and cargo were lost. The cargo 
 consisted in part of some four hundred barrels of gunpowder, 
 fifteen hundred rifles, eight hundred shells, Sibley tents, and 
 hand-grenades. Communication between the ship and shore, 
 and even between ship and ship, was much of the time very 
 dangerous, and often impossible. A boat from the transport 
 Ann E. Thompson, containing twelve persons, was swamped 
 among the breakers, and Colonel Allen and Surgeon Weller, of 
 the Ninth New Jersey, were drowned. The death of these 
 much-esteemed officers cast a gloom over the whole fleet. 
 
OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND ALBEMARLE SOUNDS. 381 
 
 The harbor, as it was called, is nothing but the entrance to 
 the inlet between the seaward bar and the inner " bulkhead," 
 with only a narrow channel ; and when this became crowded 
 with vessels, as they came in from sea, it became a dangerous 
 position for all. Notwithstanding they were anchored with two 
 anchors, the violence of the tempest was such that they were 
 often dashed against each other ; and, although no vessel was 
 entirely disabled, yet bulwarks, and guards, and wheel-houses, 
 and light spars, were pretty generally smashed or injured. 
 Some of the transports drew more water than their owners had 
 represented, and this occasioned a fresh perplexity. How to 
 get them over the " bulkhead " was a very serious question. All 
 expedients of dragging, pushing, and lightening by throwing 
 ballast overboard, were resorted to day after day, and yet the 
 work went on very, very slowly indeed ; and, though a part of 
 the squadron reached the inlet by the middle of January, it was 
 not till the 5th of February that all the army transports were 
 safe across the " bulkhead " and ready to proceed up the sound. 
 This exhausting and perilous labor was performed in mid-winter 
 on a coast lashed, at that season, by continual storms ; and it 
 places in a most favorable light the courage and endurance of 
 the soldiers and sailors of the expedition, as well as the skill and 
 perseverance of the officers. 
 
 To understand the operations of the squadron and the diffi 
 culty of the work, something should be known of Roanoke 
 Island, and its defences and strategic value. By the capture of 
 the Hatteras forts, the Government obtained virtual control of 
 Pamlico Sound ; though some important points, such as New- 
 bern, were still held by the rebels. The first object of this ex 
 pedition, however, was to gain possession of Albemarle Sound 
 and the connected waters, for then the rebels were carrying on 
 an active trade, and through the shallow inlets on the north of 
 Hatteras the small piratical craft already mentioned went out 
 to prey upon our coastwise commerce. The rebels, therefore, 
 had guarded the entrance to this sound by works of considerable 
 strength. Between Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds there is a 
 shallow connecting strait in which lies Roanoke Island. The 
 sheet of water on the west of the island, between it and the 
 main-land of North Carolina, is called Croatan Sound ; that OIL 
 
382 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the east, between the island and the Atlantic, has the name of 
 Roanoke Sound. Croatan Sound alone is navigable for large 
 vessels. Roanoke Island, then, is the key to Albemarle and its 
 connecting waters, to all coming from the south, and with that 
 still in the hands of the rebels, the victory at Hatteras would 
 have been but a partial triumph. Holding this island, the 
 rebels could prevent Norfolk from being attacked from the rear ; 
 they could cover "Weldon and the North Carolina railroads, 
 and protect the communications of the army of Lee. All this 
 is true, although the final movement into the interior of North 
 Carolina was made from another point toward the close of the 
 war. 
 
 Soon after the capture of the Hatteras forts, the rebels occu 
 pied Roanoke Island with a large body of troops, and strength 
 ened, as much as possible, its defences ; the works on land being 
 assisted by a fleet of small sound-steamers armed with long- 
 range guns. 
 
 The defences of this point consisted of six distinct works. Five 
 of these guarded the water approaches and channel, and the sixth 
 a masked battery was intended to prevent a land force from 
 attacking the main works in the rear. This battery of three guns 
 was planted on the only road leading up the island and toward 
 Fort Bartow, the principal fort on the water at Pork Point. 
 This battery was flanked on either side by a dense cedar-swamp, 
 deemed impassable ; and, as the rebels supposed that the only 
 approach was over the narrow causeway in the face of the guns, 
 they thought their position impregnable. To render it quite 
 secure, they had felled the trees on either side of the road in a 
 manner that would compel an enemy, as they believed, to march 
 along the road, and under the short-range fire of the battery. 
 It was a formidable work, but the rebels underrated the re 
 source and pluck of Northern soldiers when they relied upon a 
 cedar-swamp and fallen trees as their sole flank defences. This 
 battery -was stormed and taken by the Ninth and Fifty-first 
 New York and Twenty-first Massachusetts, assisted by a six- 
 gun howitzer battery from the fleet. By the time this battery 
 was captured, the water forts and batteries had suffered so 
 severely from the fire of the vessels that they were surrendered 
 without much further resistance. In the assault upon this bat- 
 
OPEEATIONS IN PAMLICO AND ALBEMAELE SOUNDS. 383 
 
 tery young Stearns, son of the president of Amherst College, 
 was killed ; and O. Jennings Wise, son of him who hung John 
 Brown, was mortally wounded. 
 
 Going northward, Fort Bartow, on Pork Point, came next in 
 order. It was a heptagonal work with five sides armed, mount 
 ing eight 32-pounder smooth-bores and one 68-pounder rifled 
 gun. Fort Blanchard was situated a mile and a half farther 
 north, a smaller work, mounting only four 32-pounder smooth 
 bore guns. About a mile beyond was Fort Hnger, on Weir s 
 Point. It mounted twelve guns, two 68-pounder rifles and ten 
 32-pounder smooth-bores. It was quite a formidable work, and 
 constructed with very creditable engineering skill. Fort Ellis 
 was a four-gun battery on the eastern side of the island, and in 
 tended to prevent the landing of small boats on that side. On 
 the main-land, on the west side of Croatan Sound, and nearly 
 opposite Fort Bartow, the fort on Pork Point, was Fort Forrest. 
 It was composed of old hulks sunk in the sand, and merely in 
 tended as a flank defence to the line of obstructions which 
 stretched across Croatan Sound, made of a double row of piles 
 and sunken wrecks. A post-return found in Fort Bartow, 
 dated January 29, 1862, states the condition of the armament 
 as follows : " Forty long 32-pounders ready for action, and seven 
 rifled guns, and ammunition for five days action." 
 
 Behind the obstructions mentioned lay the rebel fleet of 
 eight gunboats, mounting some seventeen guns, under the rebel 
 Commander Lynch, who, like so many other Southern officers, 
 had deserted his Government and the flag which had given him 
 protection and honors. It will be seen that the number of guns 
 of the Union forces was less than that of the enemy ; while the 
 advantage of position was altogether on the side of the rebels. 
 Perhaps three-fifths of their cannon were in battery on shore, 
 placed so as not only to enfilade the barricade across the chan 
 nel, but accurately trained by measurement and experimental 
 shots on the very points where the Union vessels were compelled 
 to pass, and also where they must lie, at least for a time, arrested 
 by the obstructions. Under the most favorable circumstances, 
 it was necessary for our vessels to proceed very slowly, owing 
 to the narrow channels and shallow waters. In addition to this, 
 the vessels of the expedition were merchant steamers, slightly 
 
384 II1STOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 built, compared with those of the Navy, and instead of being 
 able to withstand the stroke of heavy shot, could not endure un 
 injured the firing of their own heavy guns. Yet this heavy 
 armament was absolutely necessary to enable them to contend 
 with the forts. The perils of the expedition were of course in 
 creased by the frail character of the ships, exposed as they were 
 to the storm, the strain of frequent grounding in the shallow 
 water, and the effect of their own guns. 
 
 These circumstances must all be considered in order to 
 estimate aright the skill and persistent courage by which the 
 obstacles were overcome, and victory in spite of them secured. 
 
 "When, after weeks of incessant toil and exposure to winter 
 storms on that most inclement coast,- the vessels had been 
 pushed or dragged through the crooked, narrow channels, or 
 buoyed up and so floated over the shallows, and when such 
 repairs as could be made on the spot, were finished on the boats 
 shattered by the storms and collisions with each other, prepara 
 tions were made to seek out and attack the enemy. Early on 
 the morning of the 5th of February the signals for a general 
 movement were displayed on board the flag-ship, the Philadel 
 phia, and as soon as possible the whole fleet was under way. 
 Two more boats, the Commodore Barney and Commodore 
 Perry, had joined the squadron of naval vessels, making nine 
 teen in all ; and these, with the army transports, made quite an 
 imposing appearance, as led by the naval division in three col 
 umns ; they w r ere headed toward Roanoke Island. Owing to the 
 character of the navigation in these shallow waters, great caution 
 was observed, and the progress of the squadron was necessarily 
 slow. The columns were commanded respectively by Lieu 
 tenants Werden, Murray, and Davenport. It was found need 
 ful to send picket-boats ahead, not only to search out the chan 
 nel, but to ascertain whether buoys had been removed, and 
 where batteries had been erected. 
 
 The squadron might be said to grope its way through 
 the sound, and especially through what is called the marshes, 
 where the channel-way was so narrow as to admit only two ves 
 sels abreast. At sundown, on the 5th, they had only reached 
 Stumpy Point, ten miles from the marshes; and there, like 
 travellers on the land, they anchored and rested for the night. 
 
OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND ALBEMAKLE SOUNDS. 385 
 
 k Here a family, residing on the main-land, found itself sub 
 jected to temporary inconvenience and alarm by one of those in 
 cidents which belong to a state of war. They had watched the 
 progress of the Yankee fleet during the day without feeling 
 that they had any special personal interest in the matter beyond 
 what every Southern felt in the success of their cause, and re 
 tired to rest thankful that so much water lay between them and 
 the nearest of the squadron a distance which they thought 
 every hour of the night was increasing. Toward midnight the 
 man was aroused, as he thought, by the call of some neighbor 
 or a passing traveller ; and, upon answering the summons, was 
 greatly astonished to find himself in the midst of armed men 
 who wore not the rebel gray, but the blue of the United States 
 ]S"avy, and whose weapons silently informed him that remon 
 strance or resistance would alike be in vain. The officer com 
 manding the party politely informed him that the flag-oificer of 
 the fleet was very anxious to have the honor of his company on 
 board his ship as soon as possible. This invitation, so strongly 
 supported as it was by men and arms, could not well be resisted, 
 and about midnight this guest was received on board the flag 
 ship, where he was given to understand that his knowledge of 
 the sound and the adjacent country would be very serviceable 
 to the fleet, and that it would be wise in him to communicate 
 w r hat he knew, and aid in conducting the squadron to its desti 
 nation. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 6th of February the fleet was 
 once more under way. Two light-draught steamers were kept 
 about one mile in advance, in order to give timely notice either 
 of the approach of the enemy s gunboats, or to discover con 
 cealed batteries or obstructions, if any existed. As the morn 
 ing advanced, clouds and haze obscured both land and water, 
 hiding all but objects near at hand, and rendering the advance 
 of the fleet both difficult and dangerous. At about 10.30 A. M. 
 the weather became so thick, and the wind was so fresh and 
 accompanied with rain, that it was deemed imprudent to pro 
 ceed, and the whole squadron was again anchored when about 
 two miles from the narrow channel of the marshes. On Friday 
 morning the weather was more favorable, and at 9 o clock the 
 fleet w T as once more under way, and headed for the marshes. 
 25 
 
386 HISTORY OF THE TJHITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Three steamers, the Ceres, the Putnam, and the Underwriter, 
 were sent ahead to reconnoitre, and particularly to ascertain 
 whether there was a battery on Sandy Point, near Ashby 
 Harbor, where it was intended to land the troops. At 10.30 
 A. M. the rebel fleet was in sight, drawn up behind the barri 
 cade already mentioned, formed of sunken vessels and a double 
 row of piles. This barricade was flanked on one side by a 
 fort on Pork Point, and on the other by a battery on Weir s 
 Point. The rebel fleet numbered eight vessels, and they were 
 supported by two other batteries. A signal-gun from one of 
 these gunboats announced to the rebels the impending attack. 
 The Underwriter, which was in the advance, signalled, " ~No 
 battery on Sandy Point," and, as nothing appeared to hinder 
 the carrying out the plan of battle already agreed upon, the 
 squadron moved on. This plan was to land the troops at Ash- 
 by Harbor, on Roanoke Island, and assault the fort and batter 
 ies in the rear, while the fleet attacked the water-front and the 
 rebel gunboats. The land approach to the fort was through 
 wide marshes, through which the troops were obliged to wade 
 sometimes nearly waist-deep in mud and water on a winter 
 day, and exposed meanwhile to a sweeping fire of musketry 
 and artillery served with both shells and grape. 
 
 The rebels had about five thousand troops on the island, 
 enough not only fully to man the forts and batteries, but also 
 to supply formidable bodies for operations in the field, where 
 their knowledge of the country gave them decided advantages. 
 Soon after the announcement that there was no battery on 
 Sandy Point, the vessels of the navy, commanded as stated be 
 fore, and accompanied by the Picket, Captain Thomas P. Ives ; 
 Hussar, Captain Frederick Crocker; Pioneer, Captain Charles 
 E. Baker ; Yidette, Captain John L. Foster ; Ranger, Captain 
 Samuel Emerson ; Lancer, Captain M. B. Morley ; and Chasseur, 
 Captain John "West, of the army division, and keeping in close 
 order, had approached the enemy near enough to begin the at 
 tack. The following is an extract from the official report of the 
 battle : 
 
 By noon, our vessels having approached still nearer, the action be 
 came general on their part and that of tlie enemy. At 1.30 p. M. the 
 effect of our firing caused the barracks behind the fort at Pork Point to 
 
OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND ALBEMARLE SOUNDS. 387 
 
 burst into flames, and at 2.15 p. M. they were burning furiously, entirely 
 beyond redemption. About this time our vessels being placed by their 
 respective commanders as advantageously as circumstances would per 
 mit, the firing was the hottest. Throughout the sound lying between 
 Roanoke Island and the main-land the depth of water at best is but 
 little, and the bottom everywhere is essentially lumpy and irregular. 
 Even at the distance of a mile and more from the shore where 
 we had to approach, scarcely a general depth at low water .of more 
 than seven feet is to be found. With one or two exceptions, none 
 of our vessels drew less than seven feet, and some of them drew 
 rather more than eight. In placing them, therefore, so as to make their 
 various guns to tell effectually, their several commanders had to exercise 
 a sound discretion, and to keep in view the consideration due to the 
 use of shells with fuses fixed in value as to time. To have used, for in 
 stance, a five-second fuse in shelling uncovered works at a less distance 
 than about 1,400 yards, would not have secured the best results. Tow 
 ard 3 p. M. the troops, embarked on board of light-draught steamers 
 and boats, started to land at Ashby Harbor. The place was guarded 
 by a large body of the enemy, with a field battery, but the Delaware, 
 with Commander Rowan on board, and his division flag at her mast 
 head, having very judiciously taken up a flanking position to the south 
 ward of Pork Point, and thus, most opportunely, being near at hand, 
 immediately turned her guns toward the harbor, and with some 9-inch 
 shrapnels soon cleared the way. At 4.30 P. M. Pork Point battery, and 
 the one next to the northward of it, ceased for a while to reply to our 
 fire ; five of the enemy s steamers, apparently injured, went back behind 
 Weir s Point, and the first landing of our troops took place. At 5 p. M. 
 those batteries again opened upon our vessels, and the enemy s steamers 
 once more put forth and opened upon us. In about forty minutes, 
 however, the latter were compelled a second time to retire. One of 
 them, the Curlew, in a disabled condition, had taken refuge under the 
 battery on Redstone Point. At 6 P. M., the firing of the enemy being 
 only from Pork Point, and at long intervals, darkness coming on, and, 
 not wishing to waste ammunition, I ordered the signal "Cease firing" 
 to be made. In the course of the afternoon, our six launches, under 
 the command of Midshipman Benjamin H. Porter, landed their howit 
 zers and joined the army, for the purpose of commanding the main road 
 and its two forks during the night, and assisting in more active opera 
 tions the following morning. By midnight some 10,000 of our troops 
 had been safely landed at Ashby Harbor, the Delaware having taken 
 on board from the Cossack some 800, and put them on shore at 10 p. M. 
 
388 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 February 8. As it was arranged by General Burnside that his 
 forces should move, at a veiy early hour this morning, from where they 
 had been landed, and begin their attack upon the enemy ; and, as the 
 direction they were required to take would, in all probability, soon bring 
 them in the line of fire occupied by the Navy, it was agreed between 
 us last night that to-day the vessels should not renew operations until I 
 could receive word from him that their missiles would not be destruc 
 tive to both friends and foes. At daylight none of the enemy s vessels, 
 except the Curlew, could be discovered. 
 
 At 9 A. M. a continuous firing in the interior of the island told us 
 that our forces were hotly engaged about midway between Ashby Har 
 bor and Pork Point battery, and, as this intelligence also assured us 
 that our forces were not then in the range of our line of fire, our vessels, 
 without waiting to hear from General Burnside, at once moved up to 
 reengage the forts. At this work they continued until the firing in the 
 interior evidently slackened. Then taking it for granted that our troops 
 were carrying every thing before them, and thus fast approaching the 
 rear of the batteries, I again ordered the signal " Cease firing " to be 
 made. At the time, however, the work on Pork Point was so reduced 
 that it did not use but one gun against us. Shortly afterward, on being 
 informed by one of General Burnside s aides of the actual state of things 
 on shore, I was induced to order another demonstration on the part of 
 our vessels ; but before firing had generally commenced, Commander 
 Rowan came on board the Southfield just from General Burnside, with 
 the suggestion that it would be better to desist, and accordingly they 
 were recalled. 
 
 At 1 P. M., judging that the time had arrived for clearing a passage 
 way through the obstructions alluded to above, by the accomplishment 
 of which both the battery on Redstone Point and the Curlew might be 
 destroyed, and our advance up Albemarle Sound would be secured, the 
 Underwriter, Valley City, Seymour, Lockwood, Ceres, Shawsheen, 
 Putnam, Whitehead, and Brincker were ordered to perform the service. 
 By 4 p. M. one of them had overcome the difficulty for herself, and 
 reached the other side, and in less than an hour more a sufficient way 
 for all the rest was opened. This important duty could not have been 
 undertaken one moment earlier than it was without exposing our ves 
 sels, huddled together, to the converging and cross fire of the four bat 
 teries at Pork, Weir s, and Redstone Points, and another one situated 
 between the former two. About the same time that our vessels suc 
 ceeded in bursting through the barricades the American flag was hoisted 
 over the battery at Pork Point, and in a few minutes afterward the 
 
OPERATIONS IN PAMLICO AND ALBEMAKLE SOUNDS. 389 
 
 enemy himself fired the works at Redstone Point, and also the steamer 
 Curlew. Both blew up in the early part of the evening. These events 
 close the struggle, which had now lasted throughout two days, and 
 were essentially the last scenes enacted in securing to us complete pos 
 session of the island of Roanoke. 
 
 A statement of the casualties that occurred will accompany this 
 communication. They amount in all to six killed, seventeen wounded, 
 and two missing. Considering how frequently our vessels were struck, 
 it is remarkable that more did not take place ; and considering the 
 character of our vessels, it is also remarkable that none of them were 
 even put hors de combat, except temporarily. 
 
 It now remains for me to discharge the gratifying duty of speaking 
 of the officers and men under my command on the occasion in view. 
 This, obviously, I can only do, as it were, in a collective way ; but the 
 reports of the commanding officers herewith submitted, upon which, 
 necessarily, I have to rely, and in which I place every confidence, will be 
 found more circumstantial. I beg to commend to your consideration the 
 commanding officers themselves, who did their part entirely to my satis 
 faction, and, in fact, in a most admirable manner. The general order I 
 issued the day after the surrender, a copy of which accompanies my 
 preliminary report, was intended to convey applause and my profound 
 gratitude to all to whom it relates, and I therefore beg that it may be 
 so regarded by the Navy Department. I pray, too, that to the be 
 reaved individuals whose support and comfort depended upon those 
 who are now among the honored dead may be extended the earliest 
 fostering care that circumstances will permit. 
 
 It is really difficult for me to state in adequate terms how largely I 
 feel myself indebted to Commanders Rowan and Case for their con 
 stant and signal services throughout, from the very inception of the ex 
 pedition to the consummation of the achievement in view. They, hand 
 in hand, with their marked ability and sound sense, and in the absence 
 of all ordinary facilities, brought about, at Hampton Roads, the arming, 
 manning, and equipment of the many vessels sent to us, from necessity, 
 in an unprepared condition ; and subsequently they both labored most 
 conspicuously and faithfully, in their respective spheres of action, to 
 vanquish difficulties at the inlet and the enemy at Roanoke. In short, 
 their assistance to me has been invaluable. 
 
 I am promised a report by General Burnside with regard to Mid 
 shipman Porter s association with his forces, and as soon as it comes to 
 hand I will with pleasure forward it to the Department. 
 
 Although the Philadelphia did not participate in the action, because 
 
390 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of her unfitness for the purpose, still she was ever near at hand, in read 
 iness, if necessary, to tow the disabled, receive some of the wounded, 
 and furnish supplies. Her commander, Acting Master Silas Reynolds, 
 is every way worthy of his trust. 
 
 Mr. Fisher performed the important duties of signal-officer in the 
 most commendable manner. Not only were all the signals ordered 
 promptly made, but no mistake whatever occurred. 
 
 Lieutenants Robeson and Barstow, of the Army, were ever in place, 
 and ready, by means of Myers s system of signals, to make known to 
 those not accustomed to our own code whatever I wished. 
 
 It will afford me peculiar pleasure, sir, to communicate to you in 
 due season more particular information with regard to the cases of indi 
 viduals which appear to me to merit a distinct consideration on the 
 part of the Government. 
 
 I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH, 
 
 Flag-Officer commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Great praise was due to General Burnside and the officers 
 and men of his command for the promptness, energy, and per 
 severing courage with which they performed their part of the 
 work that led to this decisive victory, and it is pleasant to 
 think that this praise was freely given by the country. The 
 Army and the Navy labored together in harmony each was 
 necessary to the other, and to the success of the expedition. 
 Without the Navy, the Army could not have even reached the 
 forts, much less could they have captured them ; and any attack 
 of the squadron would have been useless without the coopera 
 tion of the troops and garrisons to hold the works after the 
 victory. By the capture of these forts, and the troops stationed 
 upon the island, free access to all the North Carolina sounds 
 was gained for our squadron, so that in a short time the rebel 
 power was swept from all these waters. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 CAPTURE OF NEWBERN AND FORT MACON. 
 
 THE capture of Roanoke Island, and the destruction of the 
 rebel squadron at Elizabeth City, were followed soon after by 
 a combined attack of the Army and E"avy upon Newbern, and 
 the siege and capture of Fort Macon. Newbern is situated at 
 the junction of the Neuse and Trent Rivers. The Neuse flows 
 into Pamlico Sound. The city is eighty-four miles northeast 
 of Wilmington, about the same distance south of Weldon, and 
 one hundred and twenty miles from Raleigh, the capital of 
 North Carolina. It is connected by railroad with Beaufort, 
 and also with the main interior lines of the State leading south 
 to Charleston and north through Weldon to Richmond. It is, 
 therefore, a point of considerable importance, and in size is 
 the second city of the State, its population having been at 
 the beginning of the war about six thousand. The Neuse 
 River at Newbern is about one mile and a half wide, and the 
 Trent about half a mile. The importance of this city did not 
 escape the attention of the rebel chiefs, and it was fortified with 
 an expense and skill proportioned to its strategic value. The 
 city could only be approached by an enemy from the south, 
 and the south bank of the Neuse was protected by formidable 
 earthworks, while obstructions were placed in the channel of 
 the river, formed of sunken hulks, and an iron-pointed line of 
 piles or cJievaux de frise, which offered a dangerous resistance 
 .to our vessels. Torpedoes of an ingenious and elaborate con 
 struction were also planted in the channel. These obstructions 
 were all commanded by heavy batteries. These works were: 
 first, Fort Dixie, mounting four heavy guns, and about six miles 
 
392 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 from Newbern. Next was Fort Thompson, a really formidable 
 work, constructed upon scientific principles, and mounting 
 thirteen heavy guns, two of them being rifled 32-pounders. 
 Then came Fort Ellis, three miles from Newbern, mounting 
 eight guns ; then Fort Lane, two miles from Newbern, mount 
 ing also eight guns; and Union Point battery was one mile 
 from the city, and mounted two guns. 
 
 If to this is added a description of the obstructions in the 
 river, a general idea will be obtained of the defences of New- 
 bern. These obstructions were placed a few miles only below 
 the city. To form one of these, twenty-four vessels were sunk in a 
 direct line. These varied in size from fifty to two hundred tons 
 burden, two brigs, three barks, and nineteen schooners. They 
 were locked together as perfectly as human ingenuity could do 
 it, with their spars and rigging still standing and intertwisted in 
 every conceivable direction and manner. It seemed impossible 
 that such a barricade could be sailed over or broken through. 
 This line of defence was the one nearest the city. The other, 
 lower down, and first encountered by our gunboats, was a much 
 more dangerous affair. It was constructed by first driving a 
 row of piles firmly across the channel, and these were cut off 
 beneath the surface of the water. Another row of piles was 
 added to these, but this second set were all pointed and capped 
 with iron. They were also inclined at an angle of about 45 
 degrees down the stream, so as to pierce the hull of an ascend 
 ing vessel. Near these was placed a row of thirty torpedoes, 
 containing each about two hundred pounds of powder, quite 
 sufficient to destroy any ship beneath which it should be ex 
 ploded. 
 
 These dangerous machines were fitted with metal fuses, 
 and trigger-lines attached to the pointed piles, so as to fire the 
 torpedo by the striking of the vessel upon the timber. In ad 
 dition to this a fire-raft, filled with cotton, which had been satu 
 rated with turpentine, had been prepared in the Trent Eiver to 
 send down against the fleet. 
 
 The elaborate and costly character of these various defences, 
 shows how great the importance of Newbern was in the estima 
 tion of the rebels ; and when one considers the position and the 
 strength of the six forts and batteries along the river, with their 
 
CAPTURE OF NEWBERN A^D FORT MACOX. 393 
 
 well-constructed rifle-pits to protect them from a land assault, 
 the dangerous obstructions in the river, the cotton-bale batter 
 ies on the wharf, and a movable battery on the railway track, 
 it is astonishing that so little effectual resistance was made to 
 the passage of the fleet and the approach of the Army. It was 
 one of the many events of the war tending to reverse all former 
 opinions in regard to the comparative power of ships and forts, 
 where the ships are moved by steam, and are armed with shell- 
 guns. 
 
 The expense incurred and the pains taken in fortifying, not 
 Xewbern only, but all the strategic points on these sounds and 
 rivers of the South, show very clearly that the rebels deemed 
 their security to be essential to the success of their cause, and 
 just as clearly reveal the wisdom of the Government in its de 
 termination to capture them. It was reported that the obstruc 
 tions at Roanoke cost four hundred thousand dollars, and those at 
 Kewbern were, in proportion to their extent, quite as expensive. 
 Whatever the exact sum may have been, it is quite certain that 
 a great amount of money and labor was expended upon the 
 various works by which these waters were defended ; and the 
 persistent and costly efforts made to recover them after they 
 had been captured by our forces prove how severely their loss 
 was felt. The rebels evidently thought they had made them se 
 cure. They knew that none but vessels of light draught could 
 be brought into the sounds, and they also knew that we had at 
 first no small, strongly-built gunboats suitable for operations in 
 these shallow waters, and that the light merchant steamers 
 would soon be disabled by the fire of heavy artillery. Al 
 though they were sorely disappointed at the success so quickly 
 gained by our flotilla of frail ships, they could not but expect 
 that they would be rapidly disabled by successive battles ; and 
 this expectation was so far realized as to increase the difficul 
 ties and perils of our fleet with every fight in which they were 
 engaged, having no means at command of making any perma 
 nent repairs. In each new battle, therefore, even though the 
 rebel force was no greater than had been met before, the 
 chances of success on our part were somewhat diminished, be 
 cause our vessels were less stanch and reliable than at the 
 beginning not only injured, as most of them were by shot, but 
 
394 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 strained by the discharge of their own guns. Under such dis 
 advantages, our Navy and the land forces were obliged to fight 
 the many battles of the sounds battles in which skill and 
 daring were most signally displayed, though they have been 
 overshadowed by the more important and better known engage 
 ments of the war. 
 
 The general plan for the attack upon these works was for 
 the troops to land at Slocum s Creek, about ten miles from 
 Newbern, and inarch from that point to attack the batteries in 
 the rear, if that were possible, while the fleet should precede 
 the Army and bombard the forts and batteries as they should 
 be successively reached. The manner in which this plan was 
 carried out shows what courage and skill can do, and is one of 
 many exploits of the Navy and Army on the coast of North 
 Carolina which have received too little attention, overshadowed 
 by the splendor of still more important victories. 
 
 On the morning of the 12th of March, 1862, the joint expe 
 dition left Hatteras Inlet, the naval division of the squadron as 
 usual taking the lead. At about 2 o clock in the afternoon the 
 advance division of the gunboats entered the Neuse River, hav 
 ing had delightful weather in passing up the sound. Here the 
 advance was stopped, and a steamer, the Lockwood, was sent 
 to lie off the mouth of Pamlico River, as it was said that two 
 steamers were up that river which might attempt to cut off any 
 transports that should fall in the rear of the fleet. At about 
 4 o clock, the fleet having been concentrated, it moved on cau 
 tiously, taking soundings in the unknown channel. At 5 p. M. 
 they came in sight of the first line of obstructions, and a small 
 steamer was discovered a few miles up the river. The Dela 
 ware was sent in pursuit of her, but she failed to overtake the 
 chase, though she was driven under the guns of the batteries. 
 
 Soon after, the naval squadron came to anchor in three col 
 umns off Slocum s Creek, the point selected for the landing of 
 the troops. In the morning four gunboats w T ere stationed, two 
 on each side of the mouth of the creek, to cover the landing, 
 and keep up a fire with grape and shell upon the shore until 
 the first brigade had landed. The landing was an unpleasant 
 and difficult work, but bravely done. The men seemed regardless 
 of fatigue and exposure. Such was the nature of the shore, that 
 
CAPTURE OF NEWBERN AND FORT MACON. 395 
 
 they were obliged to flounder on from the boats as they could, 
 through mud and water, sometimes waist-deep, and when all 
 were fairly on solid ground they were already partly exhausted 
 and ill prepared for the march before them. Six naval boat- 
 howitzers were landed with the troops, and the manner in 
 which the gunners suffered in the subsequent battle shows that 
 they were in the hottest of the fight. After this fatigue and 
 exposure of the landing, the troops marched twelve miles over 
 roads deep with mud, then lay down in a rain-storm on low and 
 marshy ground, to be waked for battle at daylight on the fol 
 lowing morning. The boat-howitzer battery did not reach the 
 point until 3 o clock in the morning. Such was the almost in 
 superable difficulty of dragging forward the guns. 
 
 So soon as the last brigade was embarked for landing, the 
 flag-ship went up the river to reconnoitre Fort Dixie, the near 
 est work, and mounting four heavy guns. The fort opened fire 
 upon the gunboat so soon as she came within range, which was 
 quickly returned. General Burnside having desired to com 
 municate with Commodore Rowan, the Perry took the place of 
 the Delaware, and engaged the fort with a very effective fire 
 until night, when a heavy fog set in. The plan of the assault 
 was, that the fleet should attack the forts and shell the road in 
 advance of the troops, and this was fully carried out in regard 
 to the first battery, when night put an end to the operations. 
 A part of the fleet was anchored for the night nearly abreast of 
 the head of the army column. At daylight the fleet was again 
 under way, and, upon opening fire upon Fort Dixie, it was 
 found that the works had been abandoned ; and a boat was 
 sent on shore, and the American flag planted on the ramparts. 
 The squadron then passed on and attacked Fort Ellis ; but its 
 magazine w^as soon blown up, and it, too, was abandoned. At 
 this time the troops were engaged with the rifle-pits and field 
 batteries in the rear of Fort Thompson. The squadron passed 
 on and opened fire upon that fortification, and continued the 
 fire until it was no longer returned by the fort, and then the 
 flag-ship, having displayed the signal " Follow me," dashed at 
 the first row of obstructions. It was a moment of intense anx 
 iety, as she struck the line of piles, for the explosion of a tor 
 pedo was the thing expected, and for a moment few breathed as 
 
396 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 they watched her. She glided safely through, however, and 
 the rest pressed on. Several were injured by striking the iron- 
 capped timbers, but for some reason not a torpedo was ex 
 ploded. Just as the fleet was passing the line of piles, the 
 troops rushed into Fort Thompson, having carried the works 
 in the rear. The ships next attacked Fort Lane, but there was 
 no response from her guns. The work had been deserted. The 
 Valley City raised on it the Union flag, and all passed rapidly 
 up the river. At the mouth of the Trent it was seen that two 
 batteries were planted on the wharf, but they, too, were aban 
 doned. They then steamed up the Neuse River to the city, 
 and discovering three steamboats and one schooner endeavoring 
 to escape up the river, the Delaware pursued and captured two 
 and the schooner, but the other was run on shore and burned. 
 At 12 M. the flag-ship was run alongside the wharf, and New- 
 bem was taken possession of by Commodore Rowan. 
 
 The rebel officers had fired the city in several places, and 
 the fire-raft having also been set on fire floated against the rail 
 road bridge over the Trent, and that also was burned. At 2 
 p. M. the troops appeared on the south side of the Trent, and so 
 soon as they could be transported across, they entered and held 
 the town. 
 
 The following are some of the more important official re 
 ports of this successful expedition. The defence made by the 
 water batteries of the rebels was a very slight one compared 
 with their force, and the preparations which had been made. 
 The fire from their rifle-pits and field batteries upon the troops 
 was much more destructive ; and, had not the garrisons been 
 demoralized by the shells of the fleet, there might have been a 
 different result, for the enemy had a large body of troops ; they 
 fought under cover, and were reenforced during the fight. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER PHILADELPHIA, | 
 OFF NEWBERN, NORTH CAROLINA, March 20, 1862. j 
 
 SIR: I beg leave to submit the following detailed report of the 
 attack upon Newbern and its approaches. 
 
 I left Hatteras Inlet on Wednesday, March 12, at 7.30 A. M., with 
 the following naval force under my command : Philadelphia, my flag 
 ship, Acting Master S. Reynolds commanding; Stars and Stripes, Lieu 
 tenant Commanding R. Worden ; Louisiana, Lieutenant Commanding 
 
CAPTUEE OF NEWBERN AND FORT MACON. 397 
 
 A. Murray ; Hctzel, Lieutenant Commanding H. K. Davenport ; Dela 
 ware, Lieutenant Commanding L. P. Quackenbush ; Commodore Perry, 
 Lieutenant Commanding C. W. Flusser; Valley City, Lieutenant Com 
 manding J. C. Chaplin ; Underwriter, Lieutenant Commanding A. Hop 
 kins ; Commodore Barney, Acting Lieutenant Commanding R. T. Ren- 
 sliaw ; Hunchback, Acting Lieutenant Commanding E. R. Colhoun ; 
 Soutlifield, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Commanding C. F. W. Behm; 
 Morse, Acting Master Commanding Peter Hayes; Brincker, Acting 
 Master Commanding J. E. Giddings; and Lockwood, Acting Master 
 Commanding G. W. Graves. By 8 A. M. the naval fleet, together with 
 the army transports, were steaming rapidly up the sound. 
 
 At 1 P. M. we made Brant Island, distant about twelve miles. At 
 2.10 P. M. the advance divisions of the gunboats having entered the 
 mouth of the Neuse River, and being some miles in advance of the flag 
 ship, I made signal to stop, that the fleet might be concentrated. At 
 this time General Burnside came alongside the flag-ship, and requested 
 that one of our gunboats might be sent to the mouth of Pamlico River, 
 intelligence having been received that two steamers were in that river. 
 To guard against the possibility of an attempt by the enemy to cut off 
 any of our transport vessels which might remain unprotected in the rear 
 of the fleet, I dispatched the Lockwood to lie oft* the mouth of that 
 river during the night. 
 
 At 3.40 p. M., having come up with the advance, signal was made. to 
 " Form line ahead," and the fleet again moved on, having now fairly 
 entered Neuse River. At 5 P. M., the gunboats being now far in ad 
 vance of the Army transports and in sight of the obstructions placed by 
 the enemy in the river opposite to their batteries, a small steamer was 
 discovered about six miles ahead, apparently reconnoitring. The Dela 
 ware was dispatched in pursuit. Failing to overtake the chase, but 
 having driven her under the guns of the batteries, she returned. At 
 6.10 p. M. the naval fleet came to anchor in three columns off Slocum s 
 Creek, the point decided upon for the debarkation of troops, and about 
 fifteen miles distant from Newbern. Early the following morning 
 (13th) I hoisted my pennant on board the Delaware. The Stars and 
 Stripes and Louisiana were placed on the west side of the creek, and the 
 Hetzel and Valley City on the east. At about 8 A. M. the troops started 
 from the transports, and at the same time the gunboats, stationed as 
 above, opened with grape and shell on the point selected for landing, 
 the fire ceasing as the first brigade landed. At 9 A. M. six naval boat- 
 howitzers, commanded, respectively, by Acting Master C. H. Daniels, 
 United States steamer Hetzel ; Mr. E. P. Meeker, United States steamer 
 
398 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Philadelphia ; Acting Master J. B. Hammond, United States Steamer 
 Hetzel ; Mr. E. C. Gabandan, United States steamer Delaware ; Lieu 
 tenant Tillotson, Union Coast Guard, and Lieutenant J. W. B. Hughes, 
 Union Coast Guard all under the command of Lieutenant li. S. Mc- 
 Cook, of the Stars and Stripes were landed to assist in the attack. 
 
 The Perry was moved up opposite the position of the battery in the 
 interior near the railroad, with directions to open fire and unmask it. 
 The Southfield was ordered to follow and take a position near the 
 Perry. The Underwriter was soon directed to join them and use her 
 rifle gun only. The Morse was stationed a mile below these vessels, and 
 the Commodore Perry and Hunchback below the Morse. 
 
 As soon as the last brigade was embarked for landing, I went up 
 the river with the Delaware, to make a reconnoissance of Fort Dixie. 
 As I approached, the battery opened fire, which was returned, and the 
 Perry coining up, a spirited and very effective fire was kept up by that 
 vessel until dark, I having returned, at the request of General Burnside, 
 to communicate with him. 
 
 Having dispatched the Delaware on special service, I returned to 
 the Southfield, after having communicated with the general, and pro 
 ceeded in that vessel to the Perry, which vessel was ordered to cease 
 firing, as the night had set in with a heavy fog. The Southfield and 
 Lockwood were anchored two miles below Fort Dixie, and, as near as I 
 could judge, abreast of the advanced position of our forces, the Dela 
 ware joining me during the night. 
 
 At daylight on the morning of the 14th the report of a gun, sup 
 posed to be a field-piece, was heard. The Delaware, Hunchback, and 
 Lockwood were immediately ordered to get under way. The fog being 
 too dense to signalize, the Lockwood was directed to trace the land 
 down and order up the vessels that had been stationed along the shore 
 from our position to the point of debarkation. The Delaware and 
 Southfield were ordered to move up and open fire on Fort Dixie. They 
 were soon joined by the heavy ships from below, followed by the more 
 distant vessels that had been guarding Slocum s Creek. Receiving no 
 response from Fort Dixie, a boat was sent ashore, and the American 
 flag raised on the ramparts. I then passed on up and opened fire on 
 Fort Ellis, which was returned until the fort blew up. At this time our 
 troops were pressing on the enemy s intrenchments in the rear of Fort 
 Thompson. I made signal " Advance in line abreast," closed up toward 
 the barriers, and opened fire on Fort Thompson and in direction of the 
 sound of the enemy s fire in the interior. At this juncture an officer 
 from General Burnside came down to the beach and informed me that 
 
CAPTURE OF NEWBEKN AXD FORT MACOX. 399 
 
 our shells were falling to the left and near our own troops. Changed 
 direction and continued to fire, and advanced close to the barriers. 
 
 Fort Thompson having ceased to return our fire, I made signal 
 " Follow my motions," and advanced through the first row of obstruc 
 tions in " line ahead." As we passed the obstructions our troops ap 
 peared on the ramparts of the fort, waving the American flag. We 
 threw a few shells into Fort Lane, but receiving no response, ordered 
 the Valley City to raise the American flag on the remaining forts, and 
 passed rapidly up the river in "line ahead." As we passed up, and on 
 opening Trent River, two batteries were discovered, mounting two guns 
 each, on the wharves in front of the city ; both, however, were deserted. 
 Passed up the Neuse River, and opened fire from the Delaware on some 
 steamboats that were attempting to escape up the river, one of them 
 having in tow a schooner loaded with commissary stores. One of the 
 steamers was run in shore and burned ; the other two, together with 
 the schooner, were captured. 
 
 At about 12 M. I ran the Delaware alongside the wharf, and in 
 formed the inhabitants that we intended no injury to the town. At 
 this time fires broke out in several portions of the city, it apparently 
 being the intention on the part of the enemy to destroy it. Fire was 
 also communicated to a floating raft in Trent River filled with bales of 
 cotton, saturated with turpentine, which had been prepared to send 
 down to the fleet. This drifting against the railroad bridge, set fire to 
 and burned it. 
 
 The Louisiana and Barney were sent to the Trent side of the town 
 in order to secure any public property that might be found there. Sev 
 eral hundred stand of arms and other munitions of war, and a large 
 amount of naval stores, together with a large three-masted schooner, 
 fell into our hands. At 2 p. M. our victorious troops appearing on the 
 opposite side of the Trent, the work of transportation commenced, and 
 at sundown the Army was in full occupancy of the city. 
 
 The obstructions in the river were very formidable, and had evi 
 dently been prepared with great care. The lower barrier was composed 
 of a series of piling driven securely into the bottom and cut off below 
 the water ; added to this was another row of iron-capped and pointed 
 piles, inclined at an angle of about forty-five degrees down the stream. 
 Near these was a row of thirty torpedoes, containing about two hundred 
 pounds of powder each, and fitted with metal fuses connected with 
 spring percussion locks, with trigger-lines attached to the pointed piles. 
 The second barrier was quite as formidable as the first, although not so 
 dangerous. This was about a mile above and abreast of Fort Thomp- 
 
400 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 son, and consisted of a line of sunken vessels, closely massed, and 
 chevaux defrise, leaving a very narrow passage under the battery. In 
 passing through these obstructions the Perry struck one of the iron 
 stakes and carried the head of it off, sticking in her bottom. The 
 Barney had a hole six inches long cut in her, and the Stars and Stripes 
 was also injured ; but fortunately the torpedoes failed to serve the ene 
 my s purpose. 
 
 The forts, six in number (exclusive of those on the Trent), were well- 
 constructed earthworks, varying in distance apart from one-half mile to 
 one mile and a half, and mounting, in all, thirty-two guns, ranging from 
 32-pounclers to 80-pounders, rifled, all en barbette, with the exception 
 of one casemated fort, mounting two guns. 
 
 I forward herewith the report of Lieutenant McCook, commanding 
 the naval battery in the battle of Newbern. The conduct of this officer, 
 as also of the officers in command of the guns and their crews, is worthy 
 of all praise. The list of killed and wounded in this little command, 
 amounting to less than fifty all told, will show that where the hottest 
 of the fire was there they were. It again becomes my pleasing duty to 
 bear testimony to the gallant bearing of the commanders of the different 
 vessels, their officers and crews. I must beg leave to express my grate 
 ful thanks for the able manner in which I have been supported by them. 
 I am happy to add that no casualties occurred on board the vessels 
 under my command during the engagement. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, etc., 
 
 S. C. ROWAN, 
 
 Commanding U. S. Naval Forces, Sounds of North Carolina. 
 Flag-Officer L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH, 
 
 Commanding North Atlantic Squadron, Hampton Roads, Va. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER PHILADELPHIA, ) 
 OFF NEWBERN, NORTH CAROLINA, March 19, 1862. ) 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to submit the following detailed report of 
 the operations of the battery under my command during the action near 
 this place on the 14th instant. 
 
 In obedience to your order of the 13th, I took command of the 
 naval battery of six howitzers, and on the morning of that day landed 
 with the advance of the Army at Slocum s Creek. I was placed in the 
 brigade and under the orders of General Foster, and at once moved 
 forward to join him. The roads were very heavy, and in some places 
 almost impassable, and had it not been for the assistance which was 
 cheerfully rendered me by the Army, the pieces could never have gone 
 
CAPTURE OF NEWBERN AND FORT MACON. 401 
 
 forward. We marched steadily forward till 9 o clock at night, and then 
 halted to rest. At 1 A. M. of the 14th we again moved forward, and 
 at 3 A. M. reported to General Burnside, who ordered us to halt. 
 
 At daylight we resumed our march. At about 7 A. M. General Burn- 
 side ordered me to take a position in front of the left of the enemy s 
 works. I moved the battery forward to the edge of the cleared space and 
 deployed it to the left of the county road, opening fire at once with shell 
 and shrapnel at a distance of about six hundred yards. Opposed to us 
 and behind the breastworks was a battery of eleven field -pieces (six of 
 which paid particular attention to us) and a number of riflemen, who 
 annoyed us excessively whenever the smoke would lift clear of our guns. 
 In attempting to drive these latter from the breastwork I advanced the 
 battery some distance, firing canister, but was compelled to fall back to 
 my original position, after having one gun disabled, an officer and sev 
 eral men wounded, and one killed. 
 
 For an hour and a half we maintained our position under a heavy 
 fire of shell, grape, and musketry, when a gallant charge by our troops 
 cleared the enemy from the breastwork. I at once moved forward into 
 the work with three of my pieces and all my remaining ammunition. 
 General Foster then ordered me forward with a portion of his brigade. 
 "When we had arrived within two hundred yards of the railroad a de 
 tached body of the enemy appeared in sight ; the guns were at once 
 prepared for action, and pointed toward a cleared spot on the opposite 
 side of the railroad, that the enemy seemed to be making for. As they 
 came into this open space I gave the order to fire, but, before the order 
 could be executed, Acting Master Hammond rashly dashed forward in 
 front of the guns and demanded their surrender. This demand they 
 complied with, by throwing down their arras and holding up their 
 hands in token of submission. The prisoners proved to be Colonel 
 Avery and a portion of his command, the Twenty-fifth North Carolina 
 regiment ; they had been driven from the rifle-pits by our troops, and 
 were endeavoring to make their escape. From this point I was ordered 
 down the railroad to Newbern. Obtaining two cars, I placed my guns 
 upon them, and reached the burning bridge to find our Navy in posses 
 sion of the city, and the gunboats transporting the troops across the 
 river. 
 
 The cheerfulness with which the brave men under my command 
 dragged their guns through the heavy roads, part of the time exposed 
 to a drenching rain, and the gallant manner in which they sustained 
 the heavy fire of the enemy, is worthy of all praise. I would especially 
 call your attention to the gallant conduct of Orderly Sergeant J. Men- 
 
 26 
 
402 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 denhall, company B, Union Coast Guard; Seamen James Judge, 
 George H. Mansell, John Williams, Charles Patterson, and Ordinary 
 Seaman Duncan Douglass. These men, with the exception of Menden- 
 hall, acted as captains of guns, and, from their intimate acquaintance 
 with the howitzers, were of great service. The conduct of my officers 
 was all that I could wish. Acting Masters Daniels and Hammond, of 
 the Iletzel, rendered me most valuable aid ; one gun in each of their 
 sections was in charge of E. P. Meeker, of the flag-ship, and E. C. Ga- 
 bandan, of the Delaware. To their coolness and courage all can testify. 
 The gun in charge of Lieutenant Hughes, of company B, Union Coast 
 Guard, suffered severely, and was finally disabled. During a portion of 
 the engagement he loaded the gun himself, until carried away wounded. 
 Mr. Daniels made an attempt to carry forward two of the captured 
 pieces, but, after dragging them some distance, they stuck fast in the 
 mud. Lieutenant Tillotson, of the Coast Guard, after firing away all 
 his ammunition, left his section, and, I have since learned, was picked 
 up by the retreating enemy. 
 
 On going into action I discovered that some of the men had strag 
 gled off, leaving me about fifty men to fight the guns. Among these, I 
 regret to report the following casualties : 
 
 Killed. Privates Arthur McGinnis and John Sheeny, company B, 
 Union Coast Guard. 
 
 Wounded. Second Lieutenant T. W. B. Hughes, Orderly Sergeant 
 J. Mendenhall, Sergeant James C. Freeman, Corporal Thomas Kiley, 
 and Privates J. McDougal, S. T. Fonda, and Nicholas Mertz (yet miss 
 ing), company B, Union Coast Guard ; Seaman John Williams, Ordi 
 nary Seamen Jeremiah Sullivan, George Bushee, and Thomas Simmons. 
 Total: killed, 2; wounded, 11. 
 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 R. SHELDON McCooK, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy. 
 Commander S. C. KOWAN, 
 
 Commanding If. S. Naval Forces in the Sounds of N. Carolina. 
 
 The next step of the Government, in repossessing itself of 
 the harbors and fortifications of the Southern coast, was the 
 capture of Fort Macon, a casemated work at the entrance of 
 Beaufort Harbor. This work had mounted about fifty guns, 
 some of them of long range and heavy calibre. In the reduc 
 tion of this fortification the Navy bore only a subordinate part, 
 as the strength of the fort rendered it necessary to prepare for a 
 
CAPTURE OF NEWBERN AND FORT MACON. 4:03 
 
 regular bombardment by batteries established on shore. These 
 batteries were planted about one mile from the fort, and 
 were three in number, one mounting three 30-pounder Parrott 
 rifles, one four 10-inch mortars, and a third four 8-inch mortars. 
 These works were by no means completed without serious an 
 noyance from the guns of the fort, but they were so far masked 
 as to render uncertain the rebel fire, and they were finished 
 without important loss. Fire was opened from these batteries 
 on the 25th of April. The shore attack was seconded by the 
 steamers Daylight, Commander Samuel Lockwood; the State 
 of Georgia, Commander James F. Armstrong ; the gunboat 
 Chippewa, Lieutenant Commanding A. Bryson ; and the bark 
 Gemsbok, Lieutenant Edward Covendy. 
 
 The bark w^as of course obliged to anchor, but the steamers 
 kept under way in a circle, delivering their fire in passing the 
 fort at a distance of about one mile and a quarter. The sea 
 was so rough that the vessels were compelled to cease firing 
 after having been in action only about an hour. The Gemsbok, 
 at anchor, had some of her rigging cut up, and the Daylight 
 was struck by an 8-inch solid shot, which shattered some of her 
 timbers, and wounded one man by a splinter. These were the 
 only injuries received by the fleet, and yet the rebel fire was, 
 under the circumstances, quite accurate, shot and shell falling 
 all around and near the vessels, notwithstanding all but the 
 bark were continually in motion. Toward evening a flag of 
 truce was hoisted on the ramparts of the fort, and soon after it 
 was formally surrendered and taken possession of by the troops 
 under General Burnside. The articles of capitulation were 
 signed jointly by General Burnside, and Commander Samuel 
 Lockwood, the senior officer of the naval force at that point. 
 The fall of Fort Macon nearly completed for the time the occu 
 pation of the sounds and coast of North Carolina, a work which 
 was begun with the attack upon the forts of Hatteras Inlet by 
 Commodore Stringham, and which went steadily forward with 
 no serious reverse until the capture of Fort Macon. Still, after 
 so much had been bravely done, the naval service upon these 
 waters was one of continual toil and peril which the country 
 will never properly appreciate, because not connected with 
 great and brilliant battles. The statements made in regard 
 
404: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES KAVY. 
 
 to the service upon the Potomac and adjacent rivers will 
 apply with even more force to the work of the Navy on those of 
 the coast and sounds of North Carolina. Both banks of these 
 streams were occupied by a hostile population, and in many 
 places they were so narrow that the channel was within rifle 
 shot from either shore, so that our vessels were exposed to every 
 species of attack. 
 
 At every suitable point earthworks or batteries mounting 
 heavy guns were established, field-batteries were transported 
 from point to point, torpedoes were placed in the narrow chan 
 nels, and ambuscades for riflemen were planted in the jungle 
 and tall grass along the shore. The miasma of these marshy 
 shores rendered this service far more unhealthy than that upon 
 the open sea ; and although the work of fever was far less dead 
 ly both for our soldiers and sailors in the South than the rebels 
 hoped, still it largely increased the hazards of the service and 
 the percentage of deaths beyond what these would have been 
 in more northern localities. 
 
 In the minor expeditions and daily skirmishes there was 
 very little glory to be obtained even by the officers, and none 
 by the common sailor, and there were few prizes to compensate 
 them somewhat for unusual effort, such as were won by the 
 blockading squadron, and there was only devotion to the cause 
 to keep the mind and body to the proper tone. That certainly 
 was not a very inviting service in which, while threading the 
 narrow channels and crooked rivers, men knew that at any mo 
 ment a torpedo might blow them in pieces, or send them to the 
 bottom, or a concealed battery might open upon them, or hid 
 den riflemen sweep the deck. Yet these were the daily ex 
 periences of our seamen on our rivers, both East and West. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 DESTRUCTION OF THE REBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 
 
 AFTER the battle at Roanoke Island, the rebel fleet, with the 
 exception of the Curlew, which was destroyed, fled up the sound 
 and took refuge in the Pasquotank River, whither our squadron 
 immediately prepared to pursue them. 
 
 On the 9th of February a flotilla, under the command of 
 Commander S. C. Rowan, and composed of the following ves 
 sels, entered Albemarle Sound in search of the rebel fleet : the 
 Louisiana, Lieutenant Commanding Murray; Hetzel, Lieu 
 tenant Commanding Davenport; Underwriter, Lieutenant 
 Commanding Jeffers ; Delaware (flag-ship), Lieutenant Com 
 manding Quackenbush ; Commodore Perry, Lieutenant Com 
 manding Flusser ; Valley City, Lieutenant Commanding Chap 
 lin ; Morse, Acting Master French ; Lockwood, Acting Master 
 Graves ; Ceres, Acting Master McDiarmid ; Shawsheen, Acting 
 Master Woodward; Brincker, Acting Master Giddings; and 
 Putnam, Acting Master Hotchkiss. It was 3 o clock in the after 
 noon when this fleet of rather diminutive men-of-war entered 
 the sound, and soon after the smoke of two rebel steamers was 
 descried. They were apparently heading for Pasquotank 
 River. Signal was made to chase, and an attempt made to cut 
 them off, but without success ; and as night was coming, and 
 the channel unknown, the chase was discontinued, and the ves 
 sels steamed on slowly over the bar, and then up the river, and 
 about 8 o clock in the evening it was deemed prudent to anchor 
 for the night, ten miles distant from Fort Cobb, on Cobb s Point. 
 
 Although the Union fleet outnumbered that of the rebels, 
 and although officers arid men felt certain of success, the situa- 
 
406 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 tion was by no means entirely satisfactory. It was ascertained 
 that batteries were established at certain points on the river, but 
 the exact strength of these was not known. The rebel vessels 
 would be supported of course by these, for they could select the 
 point of attack or defence, and our small, light steamers were 
 ill-fitted to withstand heavy artillery, and some of them had 
 been seriously injured already in the storms, by collisions and 
 strain in getting over the bulkhead, and in the fight at Roa- 
 noke Island. 
 
 There was, then, a prospect of a contest which might be 
 very serious in its consequences to these frail vessels, even 
 though a victory should be won. Another fact in their case 
 was still more perplexing to the officers. Their ammunition 
 was reduced to twenty rounds for each gun, and a protracted 
 conflict was therefore out of the question, for such a battle 
 would necessarily end in the capture of their fleet. 
 
 Under these circumstances, Commanding Officer Rowan 
 called on board his ship the officers in command, and having 
 informed them of the nature of the case, conferred with them 
 in regard to measures proper to be adopted. It was evident 
 that a failure would cause the loss of nearly or quite all the 
 advantages already gained, and postpone for an indefinite time 
 the control of the sounds, so necessary for the progress of the 
 cause of the Government. It was expected that the rebel fleet 
 would take position behind the battery at Cobb s Point, and 
 there await the attack of the Union squadron, with many and 
 decided advantages on the side of the rebel commander. 
 
 After due consideration of the state of affairs, it was deter 
 mined to organize the force in close order, so that the movement 
 might be either a reconnoissance in force or a serious attack, as 
 events should indicate. Each commander was enjoined most 
 positively not to fire a single shot without direct orders ; and in 
 order to prevent any unnecessary use of ammunition, each one 
 was directed to run his adversary down, if possible, and engage 
 him hand to hand. All expected that the fight might prove a 
 desperate affray, and the officers returned to their respective 
 ships feeling the difficulties and responsibilities of their position, 
 and thus prepared, as brave men ever are in such a case, to do 
 what skill and courage may to insure success. 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE REBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 407 
 
 On the 10th of February, at daylight, the little fleet weighed 
 anchor, and forming, proceeded in the prescribed order, the Un 
 derwriter, Perry, Morse, and Delaware keeping in advance as 
 pickets, the little Ceres nearer shore on the right flank ; the Lou 
 isiana and the Hetzel led up the remainder. The Yalley City 
 and the "Whitehead, however, were ordered to leave the lines as 
 soon as the battery was passed, and attack it in reverse. In this 
 manner the squadron moved slowly and together up the river. 
 
 At half-past 8, A. M., the rebel steamers were discovered 
 drawn up in battle order behind the battery, which, mounting 
 four heavy 32-pounders, was quite a formidable work for such 
 slightly-built steamers. On the opposite side of the river, the 
 schooner Black Warrior, mounting two heavy guns, was moored. 
 Beyond the battery and schooner lay the rebel gunboats, the 
 whole force being under the command of Commodore Lynch 
 in person. The enemy s line was drawn diagonally across the 
 river in front of the town, the right resting on the battery, the 
 left flank protected by the two large guns of the Black Warrior. 
 So soon as the Union fleet came wdthin long range, fire was 
 opened on them both by the battery and the schooner, and this 
 was immediately followed by the 80-pounder rifles from the 
 rebel steamers. 
 
 To this fire the Union vessels, wisely considering the state 
 of their ammunition, made no reply. Shot and shell passed 
 over the foremost vessels and fell rapidly in the midst of the 
 main columns, but they all pressed steadily but silently on, not 
 a shot being fired in return. When within short range, the 
 signal was made, u Dash at the enemy ! " and every vessel 
 was instantly put at full speed. The whole fleet then opened 
 fire and swept forward as rapidly as their engines could drive 
 them, and in a few minutes they were in the midst of the foe, 
 startled and demoralized by so bold and unexpected a move 
 ment, A panic seized the rebels. They set the Black Warrior 
 on fire, and deserted their battery as the steamers came abreast 
 of it, The steamers beyond vainly endeavored to save them 
 selves ; their flagship, the Seabird, was run down and sunk by 
 the Perry, Lieutenant Commanding Plusser, and her officers 
 and crew were made prisoners. Some of the rebel boats 
 were boarded and captured by hand-to-hand fighting on their 
 
4:08 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 decks ; some were deserted and set on fire, the crews es 
 caping as they could to the shore. Thus, in an action of not 
 more than fifteen minutes duration after our steamers opened 
 fire and were put to their speed for the " dash," the sound fleet 
 of the rebels was annihilated, and their control over the interior 
 waters of North Carolina was gone, to be regained no more. It 
 was one of the most brilliant and spirited little battles of the 
 war, when quite as much skill and " dash " were displayed as in 
 some of the bloodier conflicts that are more widely known. 
 
 It was well denominated a " dash." A whole fleet of steam 
 ers proceeding deliberately and in silence, though shot and 
 shell were plunging and hissing around them, suddenly sprang, 
 as it were, at full speed, and delivering their fire, " dashed " 
 upon the foe, shattering them with a close-range fire, crushing 
 in their sides, sinking some, and boarding and capturing such 
 as could be rescued from the flames which the rebels themselves 
 had kindled. 
 
 After the fight was over, a few of our steamers were sent up 
 to Elizabeth City, and went alongside the wharves. At their 
 approach a battery of field artillery made a hasty retreat down 
 the street. A mounted artillery ofiicer belonging to the Wise 
 Legion, who, by the orders of General Ilenningsen, was com 
 pelling the inhabitants to set fire to their house?, was arrested 
 and taken on board the flag-ship. As the evident intention was 
 to charge the burning upon the Union forces, Commodore 
 Rowan ordered all on shore to return to the ships, and suffered 
 no communication for a time between the ships and shore. No 
 houses were burned except those set on fire by the order of the 
 rebel commander. A supply of fresh beef, bread, and flour was 
 found in the commissary store-house, and these, as public prop 
 erty, were taken for the fleet. 
 
 Here, on a small scale compared with that at many other 
 points, was exhibited the destruction wTOught by war. The 
 steamer Forrest, which had been disabled in the fight at Roa- 
 noke Island, one gunboat, and one lighter vessel on the stocks, 
 were burned at the ship-yard. Then we are told that " compe 
 tent engineers " were sent " to destroy the machinery, boilers, 
 and railway ; " then three days were " devoted to the destruc 
 tion of the machinery of the Seabird and Fanny ; " and if to 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE REBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 409 
 
 this is added the ruin of the fort at Cobb s Point, the vessels 
 burned or otherwise destroyed in the battle, and eight cannon 
 and a vessel on the stocks of Edenton, we get a glimpse of what 
 the operations of war are. These steamers and other property 
 thus destroyed were produced only by a large expenditure of 
 labor and money ; and what hundreds of men had wearily toiled 
 to create, thus vanished in a day. It was a small exhibition of 
 the wholesale ruin which the contrivers of the rebellion brought 
 upon the people and property of the South. 
 
 Another step in cutting off the communications of the rebels 
 was to obstruct the canals loading northw r ard from the sounds 
 toward the Chesapeake. Four of the squadron were sent for 
 ward by which this work was performed and the navigation of 
 the canals was stopped. By these various operations, one of the 
 main channels of intercourse and contraband trade between the 
 rebels of the South and those along the Chesapeake and their 
 more northern friends was destroyed, and the means of con 
 tinuing the war were proportionately diminished. The first 
 pressure which the rebellion seriously felt was thus brought to 
 bear upon it by the Navy. From the moment that a secure 
 lodgment was made upon the Southern coast at Hilton Head 
 and the sounds of North Carolina, and the Navy had with its 
 river gunboats opened a way for the advance of the armies into 
 Tennessee, the rebellion was placed between two forces which 
 were certain at length to grind it to powder. From that 
 moment it was. no longer a question whether the South would 
 succeed, but merely how much longer the rebellion could be 
 kept alive. 
 
 The error so long persisted in by the North in regard to 
 the slave system protracted the struggle far beyond the natural 
 limits of its life ; but notwithstanding this, the rebel cause was a 
 hopeless one from the moment of these first important successes 
 of the Navy. Had the slaves been treated from the first accord 
 ing to the plainest rules of morality, or even of war, it would 
 have saved thousands of lives and millions of money ; but as the 
 natives refused to do justice, there was no alternative but to 
 suffer the fitting retribution. "While the nation was slowly 
 receiving the moral education which would enable it to per 
 ceive the design of God in the war, the Navy in the South, and 
 
410 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the Army and the ]STavy in the West, were preparing for the 
 final triumph. 
 
 In order better to exhibit the share which each vessel bore 
 in this gallant action, the following reports of commanding 
 officers are added to the general statement. Such official docu 
 ments serve to verify the narrative of the historian, and are 
 freely used in the preparation of the work, even at the risk of 
 some repetition, because thus only can all the facts be pre 
 sented. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER HKTZEL, CROATAN SOUND, N. C., February 14, 1862. 
 
 SIR : In accordance with your request, I beg leave to submit the fol 
 lowing report. 
 
 Leaving this anchorage on Sunday, the 9th instant, in company with 
 the rest of the light squadron, we stood up Albemarle Sound, and tow 
 ard evening saw some of the enemy s steamers, which were pursued 
 into the Pasquotank River, where we anchored about three miles inside. 
 
 At a little before 1 o clock the next morning, got under way and 
 stood up the river, presently discovering the rebel flotilla awaiting our 
 approach above a four-gun battery on Cobb s Point. 
 
 The position in the column assigned to the Hetzel was such that it 
 was not practicable, in this narrow stream, to fire at the enemy s steam 
 ers without endangering the lives of our companions ; but we managed 
 to get two shots at the battery and one at an armed schooner the mis 
 siles of our opponents falling thick and fast around us. 
 
 At 9.10 A. M. answered general signal, "Make a dash at the 
 enemy ! " In fifteen minutes from this time the affair was finished, 
 the battery deserted, and the flotilla burnt, sunk, captured, or put to 
 flight. At 9.45 A. M. received on board, for surgical assistance, Acting 
 Midshipman William C. Jackson, aged eighteen, mortally wounded while 
 making his way to the shore from the captured steamer Ellis. He died 
 at 10 p. M., and was buried on shore the next morning, with all possible 
 solemnities. At 11.30 A. M. anchored off the battery, and sent Lieu 
 tenant Franklin with armed boat s crew to assist in its destruction. 
 
 In conclusion, I would respectfully call your attention to the cool 
 ness and gallant conduct of all under my command, who vied with one 
 another in the steady and faithful performance of their duty. 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 H. K. DAVENPORT, Lieutenant commanding. 
 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, U. S. JV., comamndiny Fltoilla, etc. 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE REBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 411 
 
 U. S. STEAMER UNDERWRITER, OFF ELIZABETH CITY, February 10, 1862. 
 
 SIB : I have the honor to submit the following report. 
 
 This morning I steamed up the river toward Elizabeth City in the 
 position assigned me. On arriving within less than a mile of the rebel 
 battery and ships, when the general signal was made " Make a dash at 
 the enemy ! " I opened fire, and went ahead full speed. On nearing 
 the ships, I directed the pilot to [put] this vessel alongside the Sea- 
 bird ; but on closing within a couple of hundred yards, I observed two 
 steamers turning to escape, therefore passed on in pursuit. One of 
 them was cut off, and, endeavoring to pass across my stern, was met by 
 another vessel and captured. The other ranged ahead, keeping up a 
 lively fire of musketry, which was returned with the 12-pounder rifle, 
 but did not succeed in disabling her machinery, and she soon disap 
 peared around a turn in the river. 
 
 Arriving in front of the town, a battery of horse artillery, standing 
 at the head of Main Street, moved oft . I went alongside the wharf, and 
 remained until directed to drop down off the battery. 
 
 The occasion ottered no opportunity for the display of individual gal 
 lantry all merit my approbation. I, however, mention particularly Mr. 
 Walter B. Griffith, master s mate, and Mr. John Cahill, second assistant 
 engineer (acting chief) ; the former, as in the actions of the 7th and 8th, 
 worked his rifled gun with coolness and precision. The latter was of 
 great service in his own department, and also assisted at the after gun. 
 
 Ammunition expended: for 80-pounder rifle, nine shells; for 12- 
 pounder rifle, eighteen shells and one stand of grape ; for 8-inch gun, 
 four shells; for 12-pounder howitzer, one shrapnel, two canister. 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 WILLIAM N. JEFFERS, Lieutenant commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, U. S. N. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER DELAWARE, OFF ELIZABETH CITY, February 11, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to submit to you the following report. 
 
 On the 9th instant, at 2.30 P. M., the United States naval flotilla, 
 consisting of fourteen armed steamers, under your command, weighed 
 anchor for Elizabeth City. Late in the afternoon two rebel steamers 
 were discovered standing for Elizabeth City. The United States steamer 
 Lockwood with this vessel immediately gave chase, but darkness pre 
 vented our overtaking them. At 8 p. M. the flotilla came to anchor, 
 distant about fourteen miles from Elizabeth City. 
 
 On the morning of the 10th, at 6 A. M., signal was made from this 
 ship for the flotilla to get under way, and at 8 A. M., when standing 
 
412 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 on our course, discovered the enemy s gunboats, consisting of seven 
 steamers and one armed schooner of two guns, a fine battery on our left 
 of four guns, and one gun in the city facing us. When within range, 
 signal was made in accordance to the orders of the commanding officer 
 of the flotilla, to "make a dash at the enemy," which signal was again 
 repeated within six hundred yards of the enemy, at the same time doing 
 terrible execution with our guns, and filling the air with shot and shell. 
 
 At 9.25 A. M., precisely nineteen minutes from the time the first gun 
 was fired, the schooner struck her colors, and was found to be on fire. 
 About the same time the rebel flag on the battery at Cobb s Point was 
 taken down and waved by the garrison; whereupon the rebel gunboats, 
 with two exceptions, ran close in shore, and were instantaneously set on 
 fire and abandoned by their crews, some of whom escaped in boats, and 
 others jumping overboard, swam and waded to the shore. 
 
 I now gave the order to my acting aid, Assistant Paymaster F. E. 
 Curtis, to have the cutter manned, and bring off the rebel flag for Com 
 mander Rowan, which was flying on board the rebel steamer Fanny. 
 J. H. Raymond, acting master s mate, together with a part of his 
 division, jumped into the boat with F. R. Curtis, and boarded the 
 steamer Fanny, which was at the time on fire, hauled down the rebel 
 flag, and then proceeded on shore to the battery, being the first to land, 
 when the stars and stripes were planted by Mr. Raymond, amidst tre 
 mendous cheering from the flotilla; after which, in obedience to a 
 recall, they returned on board this vessel, which was moored to the wharf 
 at Elizabeth City at 9.45 A. M. ; thus ending one of the shortest and 
 most brilliant engagements that has occurred during this unfortunate 
 civil war. 
 
 Too much praise cannot be awarded to the officers and men 
 attached to this vessel for their gallant conduct during the action of the 
 10th instant. Great credit is due to our pilot, Nasa S. Williams, for 
 invaluable services rendered during the engagement. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. P. QUACKENBUSH, Lieutenant commanding. 
 STEPHEN C. ROWAN, commanding U. S. Flotilla, etc. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER COMMODORE PERRY, ROAXOKE ISLAND, February 28, 1862. 
 SIR: In the action of the 10th instant, at Cobb s Point battery, the 
 battery, schooner, and steamers opened fire on us about 8 A. M. About 
 8.15 we commenced to return it, firing at the battery and Seabird 
 alone. After passing the battery, we fired only at the Seabird. We 
 ran her down, and took her officers and crew prisoners. In the col- 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE KEBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 413 
 
 lision the ring-stopper of the anchor was snapped, and the anchor went 
 to the bottom, which accident, together with the delay occasioned by 
 receiving on board the prisoners, prevented us from making another 
 capture. While engaged in receiving the prisoners, ten of the enemy s 
 small steamers ran around very close to, firing at us with musketry, by 
 which two of my men were killed and an officer wounded. The vessel 
 was not struck by shot or shell. We fired fifteen shells, the greater 
 number at the battery. 
 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 C. W. FLUSSER, Lieutenant commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, commanding U. S. Naval Flotilla, etc. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER VALLEY CITY, OFF ELIZABETH CITY, N. C., February 10, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I respectfully beg to submit the following report of the pro 
 ceedings of this vessel in the action off this city on this day. 
 
 After steaming up the river until 8 o clock yesterday evening, I 
 came to anchor with the other flotilla about seventeen miles below 
 Elizabeth City. 
 
 February 10. At 6.30 A. M. got under way in obedience to sig 
 nal, and stood up the river in company with the rest of the flotilla. 
 When nearing the approaches of the city, received the fire of the rebel 
 battery on shore. I immediately manned my port battery, and kept up a 
 brisk return of the fire. A steamer and schooner, bearing the rebel flag, 
 opened fire on our starboard bow ; returned their fire with my starboard 
 battery. A shell from the enemy, passing through both my boats, ren 
 dered them entirely unfit for service. 
 
 Upon signal " Make a dash at the enemy," increased the speed, and 
 fired several brisk broadsides at the enemy s battery. A shell from the 
 shore penetrated the side and passed through the magazine, exploding out 
 side the screen on the berth-deck. Several of the powder divisions were 
 severely scorched, the protecting bulkheads were torn to pieces, and the 
 forward part of the berth-deck set on fire by the explosion. Ordered the 
 pumps to be manned, and speedily got the fire subdued. In forty min 
 utes from the commencement of the action, came to anchor within the 
 precincts of Elizabeth City. 
 
 I take pleasure in again bearing testimony to the gallant conduct of the 
 officers and crew of this vessel, and particularly I desire to bring under 
 your notice the cool intrepidity and thorough practical seamanship dis 
 played by master s mate J. A. J. Brooks, in manoeuvring this vessel while 
 under the hottest of the enemy s fire ; also to the undaunted presence 
 of mind of the gunner s mate, John Davis, who, while at his station in 
 
414: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the magazine, when the shell penetrated the side and ignited the berth- 
 deck, as above reported, did cover a barrel of powder with his own per 
 son, thereby preventing an explosion, while at the same time passing 
 powder, providing for the gun divisions on the upper deck. 
 
 I beg to enclose the surgeon s report of the casualties during the 
 day. I am, very respectfully, etc., 
 
 J. C. CHAPLIN, Lieutenant commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, commanding Naval Flotilla, etc. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER MORSE, OFF ELIZABETH CITY, N. C., February 15, 1862. 
 SIR: In obedience to your order of the llth instant, I submit the 
 following report of the operations of this vessel during the engagement 
 of the 10th instant. 
 
 At 1 A. M., in obedience to signals, we got under way. Opened fire 
 on the enemy with shells, at a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, 
 maintaining a steady fire until the termination of the engagement ; after 
 which a few fragments of a shrapnel were found on deck, which, with a 
 shot through the ensign, were the only ones received, neither killing 
 nor wounding any person on board. 
 
 The officers and men behaved throughout with the utmost bravery 
 and coolness. In all, thirteen shell and one shrapnel were expended. 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, etc., 
 
 PETER HAYS, Acting Master commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, commanding Naval Flotilla, etc. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER LOCKWOOD, ELIZABETH CITY, K C., February 12, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to forward the following report of the action 
 at Elizabeth City on the 10th instant. 
 
 At 9 A. M. engaged the enemy, directing my fire upon their armed 
 schooner until her crew deserted her, when I hauled across the river 
 toward the Fanny, firing shrapnel and volleys of musketry. The enemy 
 took to their boats (after setting fire to their vessel), and retreated 
 under a heavy fire. I boarded as soon as possible with my boats, but 
 found the fire too much spread to subdue; succeeded in capturing 
 twenty stand of arms. Received a shot through our smoke-stack, and 
 had our boat s davits unshipped by a spent shot ; no one injured. The 
 officers and men behaved nobly. Expended eight rounds of 80-pounder 
 ammunition ; four rounds of howitzer ditto ; fifty rounds of buck and 
 ball ditto. Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 G. W. GRAVES, Acting Master commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, commanding Naval Division. 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE REBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 415 
 
 TJ. S. STEAMER WHITEHEAD, OFF ELIZABETH CITY, N. C., February 10, 1862. 
 SIR : I engaged the enemy this morning at 8.20 ; discovered a rebel 
 schooner abandoned and fired, mounting two thirty-twos. Not bemo* 
 able to extinguish the fire, I scuttled her. I took from her six muskets ; 
 twelve boarding-pikes ; books and papers of the rebel paymaster. 
 
 I expended during the action six shells. My officers and men 
 behaved nobly during the fight. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 CHARLES A. FRENCH, Acting Master commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, commanding Naval Flotilla, etc. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER SHAWSHEEN, OFF ELIZABETH CITY, N. C., February 11, 1862. 
 
 SIR : In obedience to your order, I have the honor to submit the fol 
 lowing report of the part taken by this steamer, under my command, at 
 the attack on Cobb s Point battery ; also on a fleet of rebel gunboats 
 and one armed schooner, stationed near by to support said battery. 
 
 On the morning of the 10th instant, thirteen of our gunboats were 
 at anchor at the mouth of the Pasquotank River, having anchored there 
 the preceding night. At 6.30 A. M. a sail was discovered crossing the 
 mouth of the river, outside of the fleet, when some of the gunboats 
 gave chase. I also got under way and stood out in pursuit, and, seeing 
 her running for the land, I fired a shot across her bows, which brought her 
 to, when the Seymour, being in advance of the other boats, took her in 
 tow. She proved to be a schooner loaded with wood. I immediately 
 stood up the river after the fleet, which had got under way, and was pro 
 ceeding slowly up the river toward Elizabeth City. I soon overtook 
 them. At 7.30 A. M. some rebel steamers were discovered ahead, appar 
 ently on the retreat. At 8 A. M. came in sight of the battery, and saw 
 the steamers form in order across the river opposite. Our steamers 
 advanced at a medium rate, when, being within about two miles of the 
 battery, the steamers and armed schooners opened fire upon our fleet. 
 At 8.30 A. M. the battery commenced firing, their shot reaching our 
 steamers, but doing no injury, when our fleet ran up within good range. 
 Signals were made by Commander Rowan on his flag-ship, the Delaware, 
 to make a dash at the enemy, and fire at them at our discretion, when 
 all the steamers went ahead at full speed, and opened on the enemy a 
 well-directed fire, which fire was repeated in quick succession as we 
 advanced. Their shot and shell fell rapidly among us, some of which 
 took effect, but still we advanced on the enemy, which, with our fire, 
 threw them into confusion, although they endeavored to make an able 
 resistance ; but when they discovered our intention to board, their men 
 
4:16 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 left their guns, their steamers were headed toward the shore, and some 
 of them set on fire the flag on the fort s battery was hauled down and 
 deserted when our leading steamers made a most gallant manoeuvre 
 and ran them aboard, sinking two, capturing one, and the schooner was 
 set on fire and deserted. I was running for the steamer Fanny, and 
 being so near that all hands were ready to board and run, using muskets 
 and small-arms at the retreating rebels, who waved a flag in defiance at 
 us. As we were about to board her, discovered her to be on fire, and 
 was ordered to back off from her by Commander Rowan, which I did, 
 and followed other steamers in pursuit of one of the rebel steamers, 
 which was making her escape by way of the canal. After chasing her 
 some way up the canal, the chase was given up. Some of our steamers 
 went up to the wharf, including the flag-ship Delaware. One new gun 
 boat building and one old gunboat repairing were set on fire, and the 
 city fired in several places. After remaining some time up at the city, 
 I was ordered to anchor down near the battery on Cobb s Point, which 
 I did, as did all the fleet soon afterward ; having expended ten rounds 
 of ammunition, for forward rifled gun, and fifty charges small-arm am 
 munition, and receiving no injury throughout the engagement. Permit 
 me to add that all under my command, both officers and crew, worked 
 with a determined will worthy of themselves and the noble cause in 
 which they are engaged. 
 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 THOMAS J. WOODWARD, Acting Master commanding. 
 S. C. ROWAN, commanding Albemarle Flotilla. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER HENRY BRINKER, OFF ROANOKE ISLAND, March 1, 1862. 
 
 SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by the vessel under 
 my command in the engagement at Elizabeth City, on the 10th instant. 
 
 At 8 A. M. (the enemy s gunboats being in sight) was in the position 
 assigned me by my commander, in the rear of the first division. 
 
 Owing to my position, I was unable to fire with either safety to our 
 own vessels or eflect on the enemy, until nearly opposite the battery on 
 Cobb s Point, when we fired three shots at the schooner and battery on the 
 northern shore of the river. The schooner, ceasing to fire, approached 
 the battery. Had fired but four shots when the order to "make a dash 
 at the enemy " was given by the flag-ship Delaware. Closed in, but 
 had no opportunity to engage, the enemy being completely routed by 
 the vessels in advance. Came to anchor near the bar, above Cobb s 
 Point, and awaited orders. Ammunition expended, seven rounds; 
 
DESTRUCTION OF THE EEBEL FLEET AT ELIZABETH CITY. 417 
 
 casualties, none. The vessel was not struck by the enemy s shot. My 
 officers and crew behav 7 ed with their usual gallantry. 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 JOHN E. GIDDINGS, Acting Master commanding. 
 Commander S. C. ROWAN, commanding Naval Forces, Albemarle Sound. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER GENERAL PUTNAM, ) 
 OFF ELIZABETH CITY, February 11, 1862. J 
 
 SIR : As I have the honor to report to you the proceedings of yes 
 terday, I regret to say that, owing to the bad condition of our boiler, 
 and consequently the slowness of my boat, I did not arrive in time to 
 take a part in the action, but rendered assistance in getting the Ceres 
 and her prize afloat, they both being ashore; then steamed up to the 
 city, and received orders to anchor below. Sent a boat to put out the 
 fire of the armed schooner, but the fire was too far advanced to be sub 
 dued. Seeing a flag of truce on shore, I sent a boat and brought off a 
 man, who was one of the crew of the schooner which was burnt. He 
 claims to be a pilot through all the waters of North Carolina. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 WILLIAM J. HOTCHKISS, Acting Master commanding. 
 Lieutenant DAVENPORT, commanding Third Division. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER DELAWARE, 
 OFF ELIZABETH CITY, February 11, 1862. f 
 
 The commander of the flotilla in Albemarle Sound avails himself of 
 the earliest moment to make a public acknowledgment of the coolness, 
 gallantry, and skill displayed by the officers and men under his com 
 mand in the capture and destruction of the enemy s battery and squad 
 ron at Cobb s Point. The strict observance of the plan of attack, and 
 the steady but onward course of the ships, without returning a shot 
 until within three-quarters of a mile of the fort, excited the admiration 
 of our enemies. 
 
 The undersigned is particularly gratified at the evidence of the high 
 discipline of the crews in refraining from trespassing in the slightest 
 degree upon the private property of defenceless people in a defenceless 
 town. The generous offer to go on shore and extinguish the flames 
 applied by the torch of a vandal soldiery to the houses of their own de 
 fenceless women and children is a striking evidence of the justness of 
 our cause, and must have its effect in teaching our deluded countrymen 
 a lesson in humanity and civilization. S. C. ROWAN, 
 
 commanding Flotilla, Albemarle Sound. 
 27 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 EXPEDITIONS TO HAMILTON, WASHINGTON, AND FRANKLIN. 
 
 SEVERAL of the rivers that empty into the Southern sounds 
 are navigable for some distance from the mouth, and at or near 
 the head of steamboat navigation are small towns which the 
 rebels had fortified, not alone to secure their trade from in 
 terruption, but with the intention of accumulating at these 
 points military stores, and of constructing war-vessels where 
 they would be safe from attack. All such locations it was 
 necessary to examine. One of these was Hamilton, on the Roa- 
 noke, and against this a small expedition was sent on the 9th 
 of July, 1862. 
 
 It consisted of the Commodore Perry, Lieutenant C. "W. 
 Flusser ; the Ceres, Lieutenant John McDiarmid ; and the Shaw- 
 sheen, Acting Master Thomas J. Woodward. These steamers 
 had on board forty soldiers, in addition to their crews. The 
 river has in various places high banks and bluffs, where rifle 
 men could be concealed, and where batteries could be estab 
 lished, or field artillery placed in ambush, and where they 
 would be comparatively safe from the fire of the gunboats. 
 
 At 12 o clock the steamers reached a barricade, which, how 
 ever, was passed without difficulty. At 1 p. M., while passing 
 some high bluffs, they were suddenly attacked by concealed 
 riflemen ; and although this fire was promptly returned both 
 with muskets and cannon, it was impossible to do the rebels 
 much damage, sheltered as they were on the bluffs. For two 
 hours these steamers, compelled to run slowly, were held under 
 the fire of these sharpshooters that were stretched along the 
 bank in small companies, the officers pushing on toward 
 
ETC. 419 
 
 Hamilton in obedience to orders, their men struck down 
 around them by an invisible foe, upon whom an almost random 
 fire produced of course but little effect. Such battles, when 
 steamers with their crews and troops were exposed at short 
 range to ambushed riflemen, were among the most dangerous 
 and trying of the service. Brave men are expected to stand 
 without flinching against a visible foe, but it requires unusual 
 courage and the highest order of discipline to fight with cool 
 ness an unseen enemy, while conscious of being constantly ex 
 posed to him, and within range of his weapon. Of the little 
 band on these boats ten were wounded and one killed. Some 
 of the wounded died after the fight. 
 
 Below Hamilton a deserted battery was found, and in many 
 other instances the rebels deserted the less important batteries 
 after the capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet and Roanoke 
 Island. The rebel steamer Wilson was captured at Hamilton. 
 The little fleet returned, shelling the banks as it proceeded, but 
 without being fired upon again. 
 
 In the latter part of October a second expedition against 
 Hamilton was planned by the Army then under General Fos 
 ter, w r ho requested the cooperation of the Navy. On the 30th 
 of October the United States steamers Commodore Perry, 
 Hunchback, Yalley City, and the Army gunboat Yidette were 
 at anchor off Plymouth, while the Shawsheen was on picket- 
 duty about six miles up the river. It was ascertained that a 
 body of about three thousand rebels were posted some two 
 miles from the town. It was agreed between the commanders 
 of these vessels and Captain Hammill who commanded the 
 post that an attempt should be made to shell them out of their 
 position. 
 
 The next day the plan was carried out, and it afforded one 
 of the thousand examples of the efficacy of the shell-gun. The 
 town lay between the steamers and the rebel camp, and solid 
 shot would have effected little, even if they could have been 
 safely used. But the shell was a very different weapon. At 
 mid-day the five gunboats opened fire simultaneously, and the 
 shells, arching over the town harmlessly, burst two miles away 
 in the woods wiiere the rebel army was posted. Such oper 
 ations have become familiar things in modern war; so that 
 
420 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 we do not pause to think what an exhibition of skill and sci 
 ence it is for a fleet to lie abreast of a town, and with its guns 
 seemingly trained directly on its streets, shake the whole city 
 with the thunder of its broadsides, and yet send every missile 
 curving over the heads of the population, to deal out death only 
 to those who were miles away. The result of the shelling was 
 that the rebel encampment was broken up, and they were 
 driven from their position. 
 
 On the 2d of November dispatches were received from 
 General Foster requesting an interview at Williamston, and to 
 that point the little squadron repaired, and there met General 
 Foster and the troops intended for the expedition against Wash 
 ington. General Foster had met a body of rebels five miles 
 below, who endeavored in vain to oppose his advance. 
 
 It was agreed that they should begin their joint advance 
 upon Hamilton that night. At 7 P. M. the fleet was got under 
 way, the Yalley City leading, and followed by the Perry, 
 Hetzel, and Hunchback, one gunboat having been sent to Ply 
 mouth during the afternoon with sick and wounded soldiers. 
 At 1 o clock on the morning of the 4th the squadron reached 
 one of those barricades which were thrown across nearly every 
 navigable channel of the South, and which the rebels thought 
 would effectually stop the progress of our vessels. This ob 
 struction was at a point called Rainbow Bluffs, and eight 
 miles from Hamilton. Here the fleet anchored for the night, 
 with the double purpose of -avoiding the danger of passing the 
 barricades in the darkness, and of waiting for the signal from 
 the advance of the Army. At 11 A. M., not having then heard 
 any thing from the Army, the gunboats again proceeded up 
 the river. The main objects of this expedition were to destroy 
 any works that might be found on the river, and to ascertain 
 whether any iron-clads or other vessels were being constructed 
 at any points. Some earthworks were found at Rainbow 
 Bluffs, whicli the troops took possession of in their march, and 
 which the crews of the gunboats destroyed. The Army en 
 deavored to reach Tarborough, but failing in this object, turned 
 back, and the gunboats returned to Plymouth, taking with 
 them about three hundred sick and disabled soldiers. This 
 service, so often performed by the JS"avy where unarmed trans- 
 
EXPEDITIONS TO HAMILTON, WASHINGTON, ETC. 421 
 
 ports could not pass, was of immense importance to the Army, 
 facilitating its operations, and saving many lives that must have 
 been lost by the common method of army transportation. 
 
 In fact, no operation of an army was possible either in the 
 South or the West without the constant assistance of the Navy. 
 Every expedition needed not only transports but the protection 
 of armed vessels ; and then the defences of the lines of approach 
 were such that, as in the cases already mentioned, it was neces 
 sary that they should be reduced by the heavy guns of the 
 Navy. Moreover, without the presence of our fleets to hold in 
 check, capture, or destroy the steamers of the rebels, they could 
 have recaptured the forts on the sounds and rivers in the same 
 manner that our own gunboats had done. Not a single point 
 on the Southern coast could have been wrested from the rebels 
 except by the assistance of the Navy, nor, on the other hand, 
 could they have been retained without the cooperation of 
 troops. 
 
 This cooperating work of our ships at all points where the 
 Army was present, forming everywhere a firm support, was 
 really more important in the conduct of the war than the great 
 battles ; and yet this continuous, perilous, and exhausting labor 
 of the officers and sailors is precisely that of which the country 
 has heard the least. 
 
 In the latter part of September, 1862, a joint expedition of 
 the Army and Navy was prepared against Franklin, a small 
 town on the Blackwater River. The Army at this time was 
 under the command of Major-General Dix. Between him and 
 the officers commanding the gunboats it was agreed that the 
 attack should be made on the 3d of October. 
 
 At 5.45 on that day the steamers Commodore Perry, 
 Hunchback, and Whitehead, which during the night had been 
 lying at anchor three miles below Franklin, got under way, 
 and proceeded up the river. The river is so narrow and so 
 crooked in places, that even these small steamers could not 
 safely turn round the bends without the aid of hawsers ; and 
 the woods and bluffs were well adapted to conceal an ambushed 
 foe, and shelter them from shot. At 7 o clock the Perry, being 
 ahead, came to one of these short bends in the stream, and, 
 while engaged in running out a line to enable her to turn, a 
 
422 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 heavy fire was opened upon her from the bluff above by a body 
 of concealed riflemen. The guns of the steamer could not be 
 brought to bear, on account of the height of the banks, and the 
 only method of escape seemed to be to steam rapidly past. 
 This was attempted, but in turning, the gunboat ran ashore. 
 At this moment a daring color-bearer dashed out from the rebel 
 cover, trying to urge on his comrades to board the steamer, but 
 was almost instantly shot down, and the attempt was defeated. 
 In a few minutes the gunboat was once more afloat and passing 
 ahead until her guns would bear. She opened a fire with 
 grape and shell, canister and shrapnel, her decks in the mean 
 time being constantly swept by rifle-balls with deadly effect. 
 Her fire, however, served to cover the Hunchback as she 
 rounded the bend, and she in turn protected the Whitehead in 
 similar manner. 
 
 The steamers all succeeded in getting round the bend, but 
 only to find themselves still under a most destructive fire from 
 the rifles of the concealed enemy ; while a barricade, which, 
 under such circumstances, could not be removed, prevented their 
 further progress up the river. In the mean tune, another body 
 of the enemy had collected below, and were working in all 
 haste to fell trees across the river in the rear of the gunboats, 
 to prevent their return, evidently expecting to enclose them 
 between the two barricades and capture them all. The situa 
 tion was indeed a critical one, for it was very difficult to work 
 the guns under the fire of the riflemen without an unwarrant 
 able loss of life ; and should their return be cut off by the fallen 
 timber, there seemed no way of escape. Expecting, however, 
 to hear the guns of the land forces, they fought on. 
 
 The leading steamer, the Perry, threw 9-inch shells toward 
 Franklin ; with the forward 32-pounder she poured grape and 
 canister into the woods on her left ; with the after 32-pounder 
 and field-gun she fought the rebels on the right ; and with the 
 after 9-inch gun she shelled the bluff from whence the heaviest 
 fire proceeded. Thus gallantly the little gunboat met her ene 
 mies on all sides, her men exposed every moment to a deadly 
 fire from the riflemen concealed in every direction round her. 
 
 At a quarter past 10 o clock the steamers started down the 
 river, but were all swept with volleys of rifle-balls again from 
 
WASHINGTON, ETC. 423 
 
 the bluff as they passed, and for more than two hours longer 
 they were fired upon from every point from which a shot would 
 reach. The men were kept under shelter as far as possible, or 
 the loss would have been much greater, large as it actually was, 
 for the crews of three small steamers. Under a full head of 
 steam they forced their way through the fallen timber, and thus 
 passed out of fire. In this action the Perry was commanded by 
 Lieutenant C. W. Flusser. In order to show more fully its se 
 verity, and illustrate the nature of this river service, the follow 
 ing official reports are subjoined : 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER COMMODORE PEKRY, October 3, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform you that the following is a correct 
 report of the killed and wounded on board the "United States steamer 
 Commodore Perry, while engaged with the enemy on the Blackwater 
 River, near Franklin, Virginia, on the 3d day of October, 1862. 
 
 Killed. John Lynch, master s mate, rifle-ball through the heart; 
 Justin Baker, quartermaster, rifle-ball through the head. 
 
 Wounded. John W. Johnson, landsman, arm shattered by rifle- 
 ball ; George Nicholas, able seaman, rifle-ball through the head ; James 
 Brown, captain s steward, rifle-ball through the hand ; John Dowling, 
 able seaman, rifle-ball wound through the posterior ; William Cornell, 
 able seaman, rifle-ball in the neck ; James McManis, fireman, bayonet- 
 wound in the leg ; Isaac Fisher, private, Ninth New Jersey regiment, 
 rifle-ball through the body ; Peter Gilghassen, private, Ninth New Jer 
 sey, rifle-ball through the thigh ; John E. French, private Ninth New 
 Jersey regiment, rifle-ball, slight wound in the forehead ; William Buck- 
 lin, private, Fourth Rhode Island regiment, rifle-ball, slight, in the neck. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GEOEGE W. GALE, Acting Assistant Surgeon U. S Navy. 
 C. W. FLUSSER, Lieutenant commander. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER COMMODORE PERRY, October 16, 1862. 
 SIR : We expended, as near as I can determine, in the fight of the 
 3d: 9-inch shells, 102; 6-inch shells, 54; stand of grape for 9-inch 
 gun, 16 ; stand of grape for 6-inch gun, 27 ; stand of canister for 6-inch 
 gun, 26 ; rounds of ammunition for the howitzer, 94. Total amount of 
 ammunition expended, 319. Respectfully submitted, 
 
 WM. B. GUSHING, Lieutenant. 
 Lieutenant Commander C. W. FLUSSER, 
 
 commanding United States Steamer Commodore Perry. 
 
424: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER HUNCHBACK, ) 
 OFF PLYMOUTH, NORTH CAROLINA, October 6, 1862. ) 
 
 SIR: The following is an account of the part taken by this vessel on 
 the Blackwater on Friday, the 3d instant. 
 
 I got under way at 5.30 A. M. from our anchorage, about four miles 
 below Franklin, following your vessel closely the Whitehead being 
 astern of us. When the enemy opened a heavy fire of musketry on 
 you, I pushed ahead to your support. The river being very narrow at 
 that point, and the turn " short around," I found great difficulty in 
 turning the bend, being detained there nearly half an hour under a 
 heavy fire of musketry and one shot from artillery, which latter killed 
 two men a grape-shot passing through both, killing them almost in 
 stantly. From that time until 10.30 A. M., when we had fought our 
 way to a point within three-quarters of a mile of Franklin, the fighting 
 was the same here and there high banks with dense foliage, a narrow 
 and very crooked stream, with frequent heavy firing of musketry. 
 
 On our passage down we met with even a warmer reception, the 
 enemy seeming determined to capture us having, as you are aware, 
 cut down large trees to close up the river. We were not idle all that 
 time ; but whenever I could fire my 9-inch guns without exposing the 
 men, I let them have shell, shrapnel, and grape ; and when the firing of 
 the enemy was so hot that I could not expose the men, T worked my 
 two howitzers in the gangway, giving directions through the speaking- 
 tube in the pilot-house how to fire. I cannot speak too highly in praise 
 of the officers and men under my command. They did their duty 
 nobly. I have to regret the loss of one of my best men, James Ritchie, 
 boatswain s mate, who was killed when about to sight his gun. I would 
 bring to your notice the heroic conduct of Thomas C. Barton, seaman, 
 who, when a shell, with cartridge attached, fell out of the howitzer upon 
 the deck the charge, which must have been wet, being ignited got a 
 bucket of water and threw it upon it, thereby preventing its explosion. 
 
 Our loss, as will be seen by the report of Acting Assistant Surgeon 
 George R. Mann, was : killed James Ritchie, boatswain s mate, and 
 Frank Davis, contraband ; wounded Samuel B. Sharp, seaman, left 
 arm. We fired from the 9-inch guns 22 shells, 10 shrapnel, and 1 stand 
 of grape; from the 100-pounder rifle, 9 percussion shells; and from 
 the howitzers, 9 stand of grape, 27 shrapnel, 28 shell, and 26 canister- 
 making a total of 132. Very respectfully, your ob t servant, 
 
 EDMUND R. COLHOUN, 
 
 Acting Lieutenant commanding U. S. Steamer Hunchback. 
 Lieutenant Commander C. W. FLUSSER, U. S. JV., 
 
 commanding Naval Forces, Albemarle Sound, N. C. 
 
EXPEDITIONS TO HAMILTON, WASHINGTON, ETC. 425 
 
 LOSS OF THE STEAMER ELLIS. 
 
 The destruction of this small steamer presents an example 
 of the desperate character of the fighting in which our river 
 gunboats were often engaged, and the story cannot perhaps be 
 better told than in the words of the young officer who com 
 manded, the same who afterward blew up the rebel iron-clad 
 Albemarle at Plymouth. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMEB HETZEL, Nm&mber 26, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to report that I entered New River Inlet on 
 the 23d of this month, with the United States steamer Ellis under my 
 command; succeeded in passing the narrow and shallow place called the 
 Rocks, and started up the river. My object was to sweep the river, 
 capture any vessels there, capture the town of Jacksonville, or Onslow 
 Court-House, take the Wilmington mail, and destroy any salt-works 
 that I might find on the banks. I expected to surprise the enemy in 
 going up, and then to fight my way out. Five miles from the mouth I 
 came in sight of a vessel bound outward, with a load of cotton and tur 
 pentine. The enemy fired her to prevent her falling into our hands. I 
 ran alongside, made sure that they could not extinguish the flames, and 
 again steamed up the river. At 1 p. M. I reached the town of Jackson 
 ville, landed, threw out my pickets, and placed guards over the public 
 buildings. 
 
 This place is the county-seat of Onslow County, and is quite an im 
 portant town. It is situated on the right bank of the river going up, 
 and is thirty-five or forty miles from the mouth. I captured twenty- 
 five stand of public arms in the court-house and post-office, quite a 
 large mail, and two schooners. I also confiscated the negroes of the 
 Confederate postmaster. I forgot to mention that the town is situated 
 on the main dirt-road to Wilmington. Several rebel officers escaped as 
 I neared the place and carried the news to that city. At 2.30 p. M. I 
 started down the river, and at 5 p. M. came in sight of a camp on the 
 banks, which. I thoroughly shelled. At the point where the schooner 
 captured in the morning was still burning, the enemy opened fire on 
 the Ellis with rifles, but were soon silenced by our guns. I had two 
 pilots on board, both of whom informed me that it would be impossible 
 to take the steamer from the river that night. High water and day 
 light were two things absolutely essential in order to take her out. I 
 therefore came to anchor about five miles from the outer bar, took my 
 prizes alongside, and made every preparation to repel an attack. All 
 
426 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 night long the signal-fires of the enemy could be seen on the banks. 
 At daylight I got under way, and had nearly reached the worst place in 
 the channel, when the enemy opened on us with two pieces of artillery. 
 I placed my vessel in position, at once hoisted the battle-flag at the 
 fore, the crew gave it three cheers, and we went into action. In one 
 hour I had driven the enemy from his guns and from the bluff, and 
 passed within a hundred yards of their position without receiving fire. 
 Up to this time I had been in every way successful, but was here des 
 tined to meet with an accident that changed the fortunes of the day, 
 and resulted in the destruction of my vessel. About five hundred yards 
 from the bluffs, the pilots, mistaking the channel, ran the Ellis hard and 
 fast aground. All hands went to work at once to lighten her, and 
 anchors and steam used to get her afloat, but without success. The 
 headway of the steamer had forced her over a shoal, and into a position 
 where, as the centre of a circle, we had a circumference of shoal all 
 around. When the tide fell, I sent a party ashore to take possession 
 of the artillery abandoned in the morning, but when they reached the 
 field it was discovered that it had been removed while we were at work 
 on the vessel. If I had secured this, I proposed to construct a shore 
 battery to assist in the defence of my vessel by keeping the rebels from 
 placing their batteries in position. At dark I took one of my prize 
 schooners alongside, and proceeded to take every thing out of the Ellis 
 excepting the pivot-gun, some ammunition, two tons of coal, and a few 
 small-arms. Steam and anchor again failed to get my vessel afloat. I 
 felt confident that the Confederates would come on me in overwhelming 
 force, and it now became my duty to save my men. So all hands were 
 called to muster, and the crew told that they could go aboard the 
 schooner. I called for six volunteers to remain with me on board and 
 fight the remaining gun. Knowing that it was almost certain death, the 
 men came forward, and two master s mates, Valentine and Barton, were 
 amongst the number. These gentlemen subsequently behaved with 
 coolness and bravery. I ordered the schooner to drop down the chan 
 nel out of range from the bluffs, and there to wait for the termination of 
 the impending engagement, and if we were destroyed to proceed to sea. 
 Early in the morning the enemy opened on us from four points with 
 heavy rifled guns (one a Whitworth). It was a cross-fire, and very 
 destructive. I replied as best I could ; but in a short time the engine 
 was disabled, and she was much cut up in every part ; and the only 
 alternatives left were surrender or a pull of one and a half miles under 
 their fire in my small boat. The first of these was not, of course, to be 
 thought of; the second I resolved to attempt. I fired the Ellis in five 
 
WASHINGTON, ETC. 427 
 
 places, and, having seen that the battle-flag was still flying, trained the 
 gun on the enemy, so that the vessel might fight herself after we had 
 left her and started down the river, reached the schooner, and made 
 sail for sea. It was low water on the bar, and a heavy surf was 
 rolling in, but the wind forced us through after striking several times. 
 We were just in time, for about six hundred yards down the beach 
 were several companies of cavalry trying to reach the mouth of the 
 inlet in time to cut us off. We hoisted our flag and gave three cheers, 
 and were oft". In four hours I reached Beaufort. I brought away all 
 my men, my rifled howitzer and ammunition, the ship s stores and 
 clothing, the men s bags and hammocks, and a portion of the small- 
 arms. I retained aboard a few muskets, pikes, and pistols, to repel 
 boarders. 
 
 I neglected to state that when I took possession of the enemy s 
 ground, on the 24tb, a salt-work was destroyed, and ten boats rendered 
 useless that were to have been used for boarding. At 9 A. M. the 
 United States steamer Ellis was blown in pieces by the explosion of the 
 magazine. Officers and men behaved nobly, obeying orders strictly 
 under the most trying circumstances. I respectfully request that a court 
 of inquiry may be ordered to investigate the facts of the case, and to see 
 if the honor of the flag has suffered in my hands. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 WILLIAM B. GUSHING, Lieutenant. 
 Commander H. K. DAVENPORT, 
 
 Senior Officer, commanding in Sounds of North Carolina. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD, AND CAPTURE OF THE FORTS. 
 
 THE capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet was only a par 
 tial execution of the plan which the Government had formed 
 in regard to the occupation of the Southern coast. The reports 
 of the Board, mentioned in the preceding chapter, covered the 
 whole seaboard from Hampton Roads to the passes of the Mis- 
 sisippi. Acting under their suggestion, the first point aimed at 
 was Hatteras Inlet. In connection with other methods, it was 
 recommended, though not by this Board, that the inlets should 
 be obstructed by sinking old vessels, loaded with stone, in the 
 channels ; but this, upon trial, was found to be of little conse 
 quence, for the water, obstructed at one point, opened for itself 
 a new channel. The English journals, in their extreme and 
 tender solicitude for the rights and interests of the rebels, made 
 energetic protests against the attempt to seal up in this manner 
 the harbor of Charleston against their neutral smugglers, and 
 hinted that it was a good cause for the declaration of war, and 
 a cause of war which would justify them before the world ; for 
 hostilities were just then very earnestly sought for by one class 
 of English statesmen. But, as the old hulks offered no serious 
 obstruction, and were even of some positive advantage as marks 
 to steer by, and the Secretary of State having assured Great 
 Britain that two good channels were still left open, we escaped 
 a declaration of war for our audacity in sinking some vessels 
 where we chose along our own coast. 
 
 Though one portion of the design of the Government was 
 accomplished by the capture of the forts at Hatteras, it was but 
 one of a series of measures. There was no harbor at the forts 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 429 
 
 or in the adjacent waters of the sound which was suitable for a 
 naval station, as the perils which were encountered there by the 
 fleet of the Burnside expedition abundantly proved. But the 
 gates of those large interior waters were burst open by the cap 
 ture and holding of the forts, thus rendering it possible to enter, 
 as was soon after done, and destroy the formidable interior 
 works at Roanoke and along the rivers, and to capture both the 
 rebel gunboats in those waters and the smaller piratical craft, 
 which, darting out through the narrow inlets, had preyed to 
 some extent upon Northern commerce. 
 
 But far more than this was required in order to give the 
 Government a substantial control of the coast and its harbors. 
 In particular, a naval station was needed, a harbor where our 
 fleets could not only find refuge and safe anchorage, but where 
 machine-shops and docks could be constructed for the refitting 
 of our ships. The question where this spot should be was ear 
 nestly discussed. Several considerations, independent of each 
 other, show the importance of some naval station south of Hat-, 
 teras. It was needed to facilitate the furnishing of supplies for 
 the blockading squadron. This work of supplying the fleet of 
 blockaders was one of great magnitude and of vital importance. 
 This fleet occupied the whole line of coast from the Rio Grande 
 to the capes of Virginia, more than three thousand miles in 
 length. The amount and variety of stores required by this 
 fleet are almost beyond computation. There was, of course, a 
 constant waste, and it was necessary that this should be as con 
 stantly supplied. These supplies embraced powder, shot, shell, 
 materials for slight or temporary repairs, provisions, medicine, 
 clothing, and coal for all the steamers. In addition to the 
 ordinary provisions for a ship on a voyage, it was the purpose 
 of the Department to furnish the vessels with fresh meats and 
 ice, while even water at first had to be taken from Northern 
 ports, as no Southern harbor was open, and in the beginning 
 of the contest there were no suitable condensers provided. 
 
 It is easily seen, therefore, that it was a very serious ques 
 tion how this work could be performed with certainty or safety, 
 when along that whole stretch of coast there was not a single 
 port open to our ships, no place of refuge from a storm, or 
 where a vessel could be repaired. Water, ice, and fresh pro- 
 
4:30 H1STOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 visions on ice, formed of themselves a very formidable item in 
 this transportation account ; and when it is considered that it 
 was necessary to keep a line of supply-ships going out and 
 returning unbroken, from the borders of Mexico to the North 
 ern ports, the difficulty of this part of the service of the Navy 
 may be in part appreciated. 
 
 Another important reason why it was necessary for the 
 Government to repossess itself of some Southern port was, that 
 it might be used for repairing our ships. Enormous expense 
 and great waste of time were occasioned by sending a vessel to 
 the distant Northern ports ; and yet it was often necessary to 
 do this, where the work required could be performed in a few 
 hours at the proper shop. 
 
 It was the first experiment which had ever been made of 
 keeping a fleet of steamers constantly at sea, and even during 
 the winter months, as a blockading squadron. The engines of 
 these vessels being put to an unusual service, and often severely 
 taxed in the excitement of the chase, were liable to accidents 
 which would not have occurred in ordinary work, while the 
 unavoidable wear of the machinery was also very great. The 
 merchant-vessels, though the best of their kind, and performing 
 excellent blockading service, were built of much lighter frames 
 than the war-ships built in the Government yards, and the bills 
 of repairs upon them were very heavy. These expenses would, 
 of course, be greatly diminished if some spot central to the 
 blockading line could be obtained, where machine-shops could 
 be established, and where at least a portion of this work might 
 be done. 
 
 Again, such a harbor and station were needed as a base of 
 operations against other points. It would have been impossible 
 to have carried on the operations against Fort Sumter and 
 Charleston with no base nearer than New York or Philadel 
 phia ; and although it will probably be said that these were of 
 little consequence as against Charleston itself, yet it must be 
 remembered that every object was gained there which could 
 have been reached by the capture of the city, except the glory 
 of having taken the stronghold of the rebels. Subsequent 
 events have shown that it could have been captured fay a deter 
 mined attack, such as was made at New Orleans, Mobile, and 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 431 
 
 Fort Fisher, but the Government wisely determined, after the 
 first assault, that its possession would not repay the price of 
 blood it would cost ; and Admiral Dahlgren, with his Monitor 
 guards within the bar, sealed the port of Charleston as effec 
 tually as if his fleet had been anchored between Sumter and 
 the wharves. 
 
 This service could not have been performed, certainly not 
 without a much larger fleet, had not Port Royal been in our 
 possession, where our ships could be sent for all but the most 
 important repairs. For a long time the iron-clads were daily 
 under fire from the most formidable artillery which the rebels 
 and England could produce ; and, as a necessary consequence, 
 one or more of them was almost daily in need of some repairs, 
 which could only be done at the machine-shop, for the damages 
 were not such as required a carpenter, but the blacksmith and 
 the machinist. It was not a plank, but an iron plate, which was 
 started; not a shot-hole to be plugged, but steam-joints to be 
 made tight, and rivets to be fastened, and boilers to be made 
 secure. 
 
 In this state of things, the Government was exceedingly 
 anxious to obtain, at the earliest possible moment, possession of 
 some one of the Southern ports where a naval station could be 
 established. The Board, whose labors have already been men 
 tioned, took the whole subject into consideration, and, after the 
 Hatteras forts were occupied, submitted elaborate reports, em 
 bracing minute descriptions of every important position on the 
 Southern coast. At the time when so many were busy in form 
 ing and circulating complaints against the Navy Department, 
 it was not known that it was acting under the advice of the 
 men who, beyond all others, were qualified to give an opinion 
 the only men, perhaps, in the country whose counsel at that 
 moment the Government would have been justified in receiv 
 ing. Fernandina, Brunswick, Port Royal, and Bull s Bay were 
 all duly considered; and when, after anxious deliberation, a 
 decision was reached, such was the state of the country, that 
 it was necessary to keep it a profound secret. The choice lay 
 between Bull s Bay, Port Royal, Brunswick, and Fernandina, 
 as Savannah, Mobile, Charleston, and "Wilmington were so 
 closed and fortified that it seemed impossible that they could 
 
432 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 be taken by assault, and no prolonged operations could be 
 carried on against them without some secure base upon the 
 Southern coast. It was strongly urged upon the Department 
 that Fernandina offered advantages beyond all others, both 
 because its harbor is commodious and easy of access, and be 
 cause, by means of the railroad across the isthmus from Fer 
 nandina to Cedar Keys, communication could be kept open 
 with the Gulf of Mexico. The claims of Brunswick were also 
 earnestly pressed; and in addition to the arguments of the 
 Board to which the subject was committed, it was whispered 
 that prominent politicians, having received lands at certain 
 points, were busy in endeavoring to convince the Government 
 of the surpassing advantages of the places where their posses 
 sions lay. 
 
 It would seem, from a letter of Admiral Du Pont, that Port 
 Royal was not the point to which it was intended to send the 
 expedition until about the time of its sailing. What place was 
 originally selected as the point of attack does not appear, but, 
 from the tenor of the communications made to the Secretary, 
 there is reason to suppose that it was Fernandina. According 
 to Admiral Du Pont, the change was made at the suggestion 
 of the Assistant Secretary, Captain Fox, with the concurrent 
 advice of General Sherman, who had the command of the land 
 forces. The expedition had grown to such large proportions 
 that it was thought that the object first selected, whatever that 
 was, would appear small in the eyes of the country, while it 
 was believed that the capture of the forts at Hilton Head, and 
 the occupation of Port Eoyal Harbor, would be of sufficient 
 importance to justify the preparations which had been made. 
 
 The harbor of Port Royal is one of the best on the Southern 
 coast, affording safe anchorage for all the vessels which are 
 likely to enter there. It has a wide bar ; but the fact that such 
 a frigate as the "Wabash was taken safely over it, is proof of the 
 value of the harbor. It is situated between Charleston and 
 Savannah, and may be said to be adjacent to both, as it is but 
 a few hours sail from either. It affords, therefore, a very con 
 venient point from which to carry on operations against any 
 part of the Southern coast, and is also a spot from which sup 
 plies could be furnished to the blockading fleet. In addition 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 433 
 
 to this, the harbor and the connected inland waters command 
 nearly the whole of the Sea Islands, on which is raised the 
 peculiar cotton called by that name, and which is so valuable 
 in every market of the world. 
 
 As has already been stated, such was the state of the coun 
 try that it was necessary to keep the nature and purpose of the 
 expedition a profound secret. Until it was in a condition in 
 which it could not be baffled either by treachery or indiscre 
 tion, it was not confided even to the President. Not that any 
 one doubted him ; but the experience bought so dearly in the 
 defeat of the Fort Sumter expedition showed that, in the multi 
 tude of his perplexities, he might innocently be involved in the 
 designs of others, and the Secretary was not willing to run the 
 hazard of having his best ships taken from him without his 
 consent or even knowledge at the moment of their sailing. The 
 Government at that early stage of the struggle knew not whom 
 it could trust. Endangered by a thousand acts of undisputed 
 treachery, and perplexed by failures that could not reasonably 
 be ascribed either to accident or incompetency, it was quite 
 natural that loyal and true men should sometimes come under 
 unjust suspicion. 
 
 Men looked back with amazement, after the war was over, 
 at the state of public sentiment when it began. Few, indeed, 
 understood the real nature of the conflict, and consequently the 
 only possible method of success was continually overlooked. 
 It was regarded by many as a mere political contest, and poli 
 ticians were ready with all the usual nostrums for healing po 
 litical disorders, and the doctors were almost unanimous in 
 thinking that compromise could be relied upon as a specific in 
 the case. But the disease, happily for the country, was beyond 
 the reach of the quackery of compromise. Then it was be 
 lieved that, at the worst, it was only a question of military 
 strength, which could be settled in a brief period, with no per 
 manent disturbance. Men would not believe at that time that 
 it involved the profoundest principles of morals and religion ; 
 that it was closely connected with the progress of Christian 
 civilization here and elsewhere a battle in which it was pro 
 posed to tread humanity down, and therefore one in which the 
 Redeemer of humanity could by no means remain neutral. 
 28 
 
434 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 It is not to be denied that, at the first, a very large ma 
 jority of the people of this country were in sympathy with the 
 Sonth on the real question of the war. It was perfectly evi 
 dent that, had the question been restricted to the single issue 
 of the protection and perpetuity of slaveholding, that the South 
 would have had a speedy and a complete triumph without the 
 necessity of secession, or the shedding of a single drop of blood. 
 It was merely because the South was given over of God to 
 assail the Union in her madness, that the North was roused to 
 resistance, and then to a war, miscalled aggressive, in defence 
 of the integrity of the country. But the conscience of the 
 people had become so seared by long toleration of, and com 
 plicity with, a great wrong, the virus of that slave system had 
 so pervaded and corrupted the nation s mind and heart, that 
 with thousands even love for the Union was either overborne 
 or cooled into indifference by the fear that in some way the 
 success of the North would endanger the cherished institutions 
 of the South. 
 
 Hence the determination, persisted in so long, to preserve 
 both slavery and the Union hence the damaging dispatch of 
 the Secretary of State, that whatever issue the war might have, 
 the status of the slaves would remain unchanged which an 
 nouncement, to the full extent of its influence, weakened our 
 cause in England, and strengthened our enemies in their oppo 
 sition abroad, while at home it sapped the moral foundation of 
 the Government, and encouraged every lover of slavery, every 
 friend of the South, every hater of what was called radicalism, 
 to become a traitor whenever he thought that slavery was en 
 dangered, or at the most, to give only a half-hearted support to 
 the cause of the North. Thousands of so-called loyal men, 
 Union men, were for the Union, with slavery preserved intact, 
 and would by far have chosen to see the South triumphant 
 rather than the North should win an antislavery victory. 
 
 Hence, both in the Army and Navy, the Government found 
 its plans thwarted, and its most reasonable expectations blasted, 
 by some lack of energy or activity, or some failure to execute 
 an order at the critical moment, or some apparent blunder 
 which could scarcely be attributed to the lack of intelligence, 
 or the refusal or neglect to obey an order, under some cover 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 435 
 
 wlricli might shield from punishment, though not from the sus 
 picion of a disloyal heart. Never before has a government 
 triumphed under such overwhelming disadvantages. It was 
 crippled severely at first by the resignation of so many officers 
 whose services were greatly needed, and still more endangered 
 by the addition of strength which the rebels thus received ; but 
 both these were less embarrassing than the danger from the 
 disaffected remaining still in nominal connection with the Gov 
 ernment, and who were not only supposed to communicate con 
 tinually with the enemy, but who might at any moment become 
 false to a trust, when treachery might be fatal to an enterprise. 
 It required nothing more than indifference, a mere lack of 
 proper enthusiasm in the cause of the Government, to make 
 disaster certain. 
 
 "When, therefore, the important expedition which captured 
 the Port Royal forts was being fitted out, the Secretary was 
 determined to confine his secret within a very narrow circle, so 
 that there should be no opportunity for such another " acci 
 dent," as the President called it in his letter to Captain Fox, 
 by which the Sumter expedition was deprived of the ship 
 without which all knew the plan must fail. A single example 
 will show how important interests were sometimes put in peril 
 merely because an officer was not so decided and earnest in the 
 cause of the Government as to induce him to disregard the 
 dead letter of an old command, in order to obey a new one con 
 veying the real spirit and intention of the Government, although 
 not technically binding. As has been mentioned in a previous 
 chapter, General Scott, early in March, 1861, sent an order out 
 to Fort Pickens that the troops on board the Brooklyn should 
 be landed and the fort made secure. The commander of the 
 squadron refused to obey, alleging that he was bound by the 
 orders of the Secretary of the Navy of the preceding adminis 
 tration (Toucey) not to land the troops. 
 
 There are some, probably, who believe that his wish 
 not to land the troops gave vitality to the order which lie 
 obeyed, while that of General Scott was disregarded. He 
 stated that the attempt to land troops might bring on a col 
 lision and inaugurate civil war. The rebels had taken forci 
 ble possession of the United States forts and navy-yard at Pen- 
 
436 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 sacola, and trained their batteries on Fort Pickens, and war on 
 their part had already been most insolently begun; yet here 
 was an officer to whom was intrusted the honor and prop 
 erty of his country, refusing to obey an order from the head 
 of the Army, not only because it did not come from the (Secretary 
 of the Navy, but because to oppose the rebels might so offend 
 them that they would begin civil war, and he was not willing 
 to take upon himself such a responsibility ! 
 
 The consequence of this was, that Secretary Welles was com 
 pelled to send Lieutenant Worden across the country with a 
 special order. Worden was arrested and kept for six months 
 in a felon s prison, and an opportunity was given to break up 
 the expedition for the relief of Sumter, under cover of relieving 
 Pickens, which would have been made safe long before had 
 Captain Adams s enthusiasm in his country s cause been strong 
 enough to overcome a doubt about a trifling technicality. With 
 such experiences, it was well for the Secretary to be guarded 
 in his subsequent expeditions. 
 
 Newspaper correspondents and collectors of news items gen 
 erally succeed in penetrating all secrets but those of the grave ; 
 and even these are not always secure. They soon discovered 
 that something unusual was in hand, when the work of prepara 
 tion was begun in New York. That an important expedition 
 was contemplated the country soon knew ; and though scores of 
 correspondents and wise editors affected to understand the whole 
 movement, and many confident opinions were expressed, as if 
 by authority, and the attention of the public was directed, now 
 here, now there, as the point of destination, still no one outside of 
 the Secretary and his immediate advisers knew its real purpose. 
 Whether the indications that Fernandina would be attacked 
 were made in order the more effectually to conceal the real 
 intention, or whether the change mentioned in Admiral Du 
 Pont s letter to the Secretary, November 6, 1861, was a real 
 departure from the original plan, does not appear. The neces 
 sity of secrecy, and the great difficulty of concealing the plan 
 frojn spies and others, justified extreme caution. The com 
 manders of the vessels did not know their destination. The 
 vessels-of-war all sailed under sealed orders furnished by Ad 
 miral Du Pont, and the transports received similar orders from 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 437 
 
 General Sherman, who commanded the troops ; while the coal- 
 vessels which were sent forward in advance of the fleet were 
 ordered to rendezvous off Savannah, in order still to veil the 
 real point of attack. 
 
 On Tuesday, the 29th of October, 1861, the most formidable 
 squadron which had ever been fitted out in American waters, 
 was ready to leave Hampton Roads. It numbered, including 
 the army transports, fifty vessels ; while those with coal, twenty- 
 five in number, had sailed the day previous ; so that there were 
 seventy-five vessels in all engaged in this expedition. The 
 weather had been unpleasant for some time previous to the 
 sailing of the fleet, but appearances were favorable at the time 
 of its departure, and the hearts of the soldiers, sailors, and offi 
 cers swelled with high expectations when they saw on all sides 
 the preparations for getting under w r ay. All knew from the 
 number and character of the ships that a decisive blow was 
 intended for some important point, and they rejoiced in the 
 opportunity to win both victory and honor. When the signal 
 was made for getting under way, the various sounds of the wel 
 come work rang out, mingling and floating shoreward over the 
 waters of the roadstead and around the grim walls of the for 
 tress. The pipes of the boatswains sounded cheerily as the 
 anchors went up, and the measured tramp of the men at the 
 capstans seemed like the march of a little army. High plumes 
 of smoke, looking almost like black battle-flags, rose and waved 
 over the steamers. The rigging of the sail-ships was full of busy 
 sailors, and "All ready ! " and " Let fall ! " echoed from vessel 
 to vessel as the broad wings were spread, and one after another 
 they glided off, hauled up to their course, and stood out for the 
 open sea. Soon the waters were dashed into foam by the wheels 
 and " brazen fins " of the huge steamers, and they too moved 
 away ; the great Wabash, stateliest among them all, bearing the 
 flag of Du Pont, went off with " majestic motion," as if conscious 
 of her powder, and anticipating victory. 
 
 Fifty ships stretching seaward in one squadron, bearing the 
 American flag, had not been seen before, and it was a sight to 
 warm an American heart, if, alas ! there could be any thing 
 gratifying in war except as it sometimes avenges the right. 
 
 The fleet had scarcely left Hampton Koads before the fair 
 
4:38 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 promise of good weather disappeared, and the sea grew grad 
 ually rougher, till off Hatteras it encountered one of the gales 
 so common in the region of the cape. Many of the transports 
 labored hard ; some of the ships were driven into the breakers, 
 and were in great peril ; and two of them struck, but fortunately 
 got off without serious injury. 
 
 On Friday, November 1st, the gale increased in fierceness 
 till it became a hurricane. The fleet was scattered in every 
 direction, and on Saturday morning one single vessel was all 
 that could be seen from the deck of the Wabash. Some of the 
 transports, and some even of the armed vessels, were by no 
 means fitted to encounter a November cyclone on that stormy 
 coast ; and the discomforts, the sufferings of the soldiers and 
 sailors on board those ships during the storm, is one among the 
 thousand examples of heroic endurance and self-sacrifice for the 
 country s cause of which those who remained at home will 
 never form any adequate conception. The unwritten history 
 of war, and that which can never be written, the scenes which 
 lie back of the glare of battle and the splendor of victory 
 these, could they be known, would show, as no official reports 
 and no statistics of disease and death can do, what was endured 
 by those who saved our country. Let one fancy, if he can, the 
 feelings of the poor mangled fellows in the cockpit, berth-deck, 
 and sick-bay of the Cumberland, when their last attendant 
 rushed on deck, and left them there helpless and hopeless, unable 
 to move, and the water swelling up over them and strangling 
 them as they lay ; or of the old Chaplain Lenhart, loved of all 
 on board, who was seen going to his room just before the ship 
 went down, and whom the waters doubtless swallowed up while 
 on his knees before God. "While commanding officers on sea 
 and land should receive all the praise and reward which has 
 been offered for without their skill and personal qualities our 
 victories could not have been won it would be well for the 
 cause of humanity, it would give fresh power and lustre to free 
 institutions, if the heroism of the common soldier and sailor, and 
 the courage of the subordinate officers could be set in a clearer 
 light, and if the sufferings of these could be more fully known. 
 
 The world might be less eager for war sometimes, if the 
 blinding veil of glory could be drawn aside, and the fatigue of 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 439 
 
 the march, the exposure of the wet and chilly bivouac, the sick 
 ening wards of the hospital, the terrible scenes of the battle and 
 after the battle, all forms of exposure by night and day, in 
 storms at sea, the wreck, and foundering ship, if these could be 
 more distinctly seen ; and while all due honor would still be ren 
 dered to noble leadership, the people, the crews, the rank and 
 file, who endured the suffering and performed the work, would 
 also receive, as they do not now, the due reward of their hero 
 ism. Every effort to show what the people did and suffered in 
 our war strengthens the popular cause. 
 
 The scene on board of one of the transports in this storm 
 illustrates these remarks. The steamer Governor left Hampton 
 Roads with the rest of the fleet on the 29th of October, having 
 on board the Marine Battalion. She continued near the "Wa- 
 bash until the 1st of November, when she met the gale, which 
 about mid-day became so violent from the southeast as to compel 
 them to keep the steamer s head to the sea. As was soon per 
 ceived, she was in no condition to encounter an ocean storm, 
 and that the lives of all on board were likely to be in great 
 peril unless some stancher ship could be brought to their assist 
 ance. Not a sail, however, w r as in sight over all the sea, whose 
 every wave seemed ready to overwhelm or dash in pieces their 
 frail ship, which shuddered to each shock as if conscious that 
 her end was near. Laboring heavily in the great seas that 
 seemed to show ill-will in dashing against her, she bore it 
 bravely till 4 p. M., when several heavy seas smote her in quick 
 succession, with such force as to break the port hog-brace in 
 two places, thus materially weakening the vessel. Before this 
 could be properly supported, the opposite starboard brace also 
 gave way, bringing a fresh danger. Soldiers and sailors now 
 labored together with that energy which a question of life or 
 death inspires, and with great exertions succeeded in so staying 
 and bracing the shattered timbers as to ward off the immediate 
 danger. Soon after, with a sudden lurch, the brace-chains of 
 the smoke-stack parted, and it was pitched overboard. It 
 broke, however, some three feet above the deck, and thus they 
 were enabled still to keep up the fires. The discomfort, more 
 than that, the positive suffering of even well men, on a steamer 
 under such circumstances, in a November storm, crowded in 
 
440 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 every part, huddled together, with no fire except under the 
 boilers, no warm food or drink, drenched and shivering, no one 
 dry and comfortable in his home can understand. 
 
 Soon after the smoke-pipe was carried away, the steam-pipe 
 burst, and they were confronted by a new danger. The loss of 
 the chimney prevented them from making more than fourteen 
 pounds of steam ; and as soon as the engine began to work, it 
 ran down to four or five pounds, and this was all the power 
 they had for keeping the vessel s head to the sea, and to work 
 the pumps, which now were needed, as from her straining she 
 was leaking badly. The engineer was then obliged to stop the 
 engine frequently, in order to get up a head of steam. The 
 steamer now began to leak more and more ; still when the en 
 gine could be worked there was not much difficulty in keeping 
 her clear. When it was nearly dark and the prospect was 
 that they might never see the light of another morning all on 
 board were gladdened by the sight of a steamer with a ship in 
 tow. They sent up a rocket, and then another, and at length 
 they saw and answered the signal. There were, however, but 
 six rockets on board, and when these were all gone, they had 
 no resource but to fire their muskets. This was kept up for a 
 long time, but the wind was blowing a hurricane, and the sea 
 was running so high, that the steamer could render the Gov 
 ernor no assistance, although visible nearly the whole night. 
 At 3 o clock Saturday morning there came another very 
 serious disaster. The packing around the cylinder-head flew 
 out, and thus the engine was for a time perfectly useless, and 
 the steamer of course unmanageable. When the engine could 
 once more be started, it worked very slowly, and there was 
 scarcely power enough to keep her head to the sea ; the rudder- 
 chain was broken away, the water was constantly gaining upon 
 them, and the laboring boat appeared as if she would be liter 
 ally dashed in pieces by the waves. At every lurch it was 
 feared that the hog-braces would be carried entirely away, and 
 they knew that this would be their speedy destruction, for it 
 would wrench away the side of the boat, collapse the boiler, and 
 tear off the wheel-house. A large number of men held on to 
 ropes, by which the effect of the lurch of the boat was counter 
 acted, and one can imagine what hours of anxiety and toil were 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 441 
 
 thus spent watching every motion of the almost foundering 
 ship, and straining upon the ropes that held the broken tim 
 bers, so as to ward off the stroke of the waves, or the roll and 
 pitch of the boat. All this time the water was gaining rapidly, 
 so that it required a hundred men to bail and pump, in addition 
 to what the engine could do, to keep themselves afloat. Then 
 the rudder-head was also broken, the engine was of very little 
 use, and they were at the mercy of the winds and the sea (and 
 this was in a dark and stormy November night), drenched, with 
 out rest, and almost without food. Toward morning the wind 
 lulled somewhat, and the sky looked brighter. At daybreak, 
 when nearly all hope was gone, all hearts were once more glad 
 dened by the sight of two vessels on the starboard bow, one of 
 which proved to be the United States steamer Isaac P. Smith. 
 They had flying on the Governor a signal of distress, which the 
 officers of the gunboat descried, and immediately went to her 
 relief. 
 
 At 10 A. M. the Isaac P. Smith was in hailing distance, and 
 encouraged them by the promise to receive them all on board. 
 A boat was lowered from the Smith, and a hawser carried out 
 and taken on board the Governor ; but very soon, and before 
 any relief could be afforded, the hawser, by some inattention, 
 was let go. The water was gaining very rapidly, the engine 
 could be moved with great difficulty, and was nearly useless, 
 and death seemed nearer than ever to the brave but nearly ex 
 hausted men. The Smith was obliged to haul off, but soon re 
 turned, and with difficulty another hawser was got on board, 
 and they were taken in tow j but it was evident that they could 
 not float long, even when towed, and how they were to be 
 safely transferred from their sinking boat to another, in that 
 wild sea, did not appear. Another vessel, the propeller Young 
 Eover, now appeared, and proffered all possible assistance, but 
 such was the violence of the wind that nothing could at the 
 time be done. The remainder of the story of the rescue of 
 these men is given in the very words of the official report of 
 Major Reynolds, who commanded the marines on board : 
 
 The hawser from the Smith again parted, and we were once more 
 adrift. The Young Rover now stood for us again, and the captain said 
 
44:2 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAYY. 
 
 lie would stand by us to the last, for which encouragement he received 
 a heart-felt cheer from the men. He also informed us a large frigate 
 was ahead standing for us. He then stood for the frigate, made signals 
 of distress, and returned. The frigate soon came into view, and hope 
 once more cheered the hearts of all on board the transport. Between 
 2 and 3 o clock the United States frigate Sabine (Captain Ringgold) 
 was within hail, and the assurance given that all hands would be taken 
 on board. After a little delay, the Sabine came to anchor. We fol 
 lowed her example, and a hawser was passed to us. It was now late in 
 the day, and there were no signs of an abatement of the gale. It was 
 evident that whatever was to be done for our safety must be done with 
 out delay. About 8 or 9 o clock the Sabine had paid out enough 
 chain to bring her stern close to our bow. Spars were rigged out over 
 the stern of the frigate, and every arrangement made for whipping our 
 men on board, and some thirty men were rescued by this means. Three 
 or four hawsers and an iron stream cable were parted by the plunging of 
 the vessels. The Governor, at this time, had three feet water, which was 
 rapidly increasing. It .was evidently intended by the commanding offi 
 cer of the Sabine to get the Governor alongside, and let our men jump 
 from the boat to the frigate. In our condition this appeared extremely 
 hazardous. It seemed impossible for us to strike the frigate without 
 instantly going to pieces. We were, however, brought alongside, and 
 some forty men succeeded in getting on board the frigate ; one was 
 crushed to death between the frigate and the steamer in attempting to 
 gain a foothold on the frigate. 
 
 Shortly after being brought alongside the frigate, the starboard 
 quarter of the Sabine struck the port bow of the Governor and carried 
 away about twenty feet of the hurricane deck from the stem to the 
 wheel-house. The sea was running so high, and we being tossed so 
 violently, it was deemed prudent to slack up the hawser and let the 
 Governor fall astern of the frigate, with the faint hope of weathering the 
 gale till morning. All our provisions and other stores, indeed every 
 movable article, were thrown overboard, and the water-casks started to 
 lighten the vessel. From half-past three until daybreak the Governor 
 floated in comparative safety, notwithstanding the water was rapidly 
 gaining on her. At daybreak preparations were made for sending boats 
 to our relief, although the sea was running high ; and it being exceed 
 ingly dangerous for a boat to approach the guards of the steamer, in con 
 sequence, the boats lay off, and the men were obliged to jump into the 
 sea and were then hauled into the boats. All hands were thus providential 
 ly rescued from the wreck, with the exception, I am pained to say, of one 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 443 
 
 corporal and six privates, who were drowned or killed by the crush or 
 contact of the vessels. Those drowned were lost through their disobe 
 dience of orders in leaving the ranks or abandoning their posts. After 
 the troops were safely reembarked, every exertion was directed to se 
 curing the arms, accoutrements, ammunition, and other property which 
 might have been saved after lightening the wreck. I am gratified in 
 being able to say nearly all the arms were saved, and about half the ac 
 coutrements. The knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens were nearly all 
 lost. About ten thousand rounds of cartridges were fortunately saved, 
 and nine thousand lost. Since being on board of this ship every atten 
 tion has been bestowed by Captain Ringgold and his officers toward 
 recruiting the strength of our men, and restoring them to such a condi 
 tion as will enable us to take the field at the earliest possible moment. 
 Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the officers and men under 
 rny command all did nobly. The firmness with which they performed 
 their duty is beyond all praise. For forty-eight hours they stood at 
 ropes, and passed water to keep the ship afloat. Refreshments in both 
 eating and drinking were passed to them at their posts by non-commis 
 sioned officers. It is impossible for troops to have conducted them 
 selves better under such trying circumstances. The transport continued 
 to float some hours after she was abandoned, carrying with her when 
 she sunk, I am grieved to say, company books and staff returns. In 
 order to complete the personnel of the battalion, I have requested Cap 
 tain Ringgold to meet a requisition for seven privates, to which he has 
 readily assented. I considered this requisition in order, as I have been 
 informed by Captain Ringgold it is his intention, or orders were given 
 for his ship, to repair to a Northern port, in which event he can be 
 easily supplied, and my command by the accommodation rendered 
 complete, in order to meet any demand you may make for our services. 
 
 Under God we owe our preservation to Captain Ringgold and the 
 officers of the Sabine, to whom we tender our heart-felt thanks for their 
 untiring labors while we were in danger, and their unceasing kindness 
 since we have been on board the frigate. 
 
 This report is respectfully submitted. 
 
 I am, commodore, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JOHN GEORGE REYNOLDS, 
 
 Commanding Battalion Marines, Southern Division. 
 Flag-Officer SAMUEL F. Du PONT, 
 
 Com dg U. S. Naval Expedition, Southern Coast U. S.N.America. 
 
 The steamer Isaac P. Smith was obliged to throw her arma 
 ment overboard in tbe gale, and the men and crew were res- 
 
444 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 cued from the Peerless transport while she was in a sinking 
 condition. Such was the gale which Du Font s squadron en 
 countered before reaching Hilton Head. It seemed an un 
 promising commencement of an enterprise which had such a 
 triumphant termination. In this case, as in that of Burnside s 
 expedition to Roanoke, the rebels were inclined to interpret the 
 gale as indicative that God was on their side ; and the result 
 showed how often, through narrowness of view, or the influence 
 of our own feelings controlling the judgment, w^e misconstrue 
 the providences of God. 
 
 With far less damage than was reasonably expected from so 
 fierce a tempest, twenty-five vessels of the fleet, in company 
 with the Wabash, anchored off the bar at Port Royal Harbor, 
 on Monday, November the 4th, at 8 o clock in the morning, 
 while many more vessels of the squadron were heaving in sight. 
 Even then, though in comparative safety, the position of the 
 fleet was by no means a pleasant one. The bar lies ten miles 
 seaward, the coast has no feature prominent enough to guide 
 the navigator, and the lights were extinguished, and the buoys 
 and channel-marks had all been destroyed or misplaced. 
 
 But the skill and science of that accomplished officer, Ad 
 miral (then Commander) Charles H. Davis, aided by Mr. Bou- 
 telle, the able assistant of the Coast Survey, enabled them to 
 overcome all difficulties. Under the eye of these gentlemen, a 
 search for the channel was at once commenced, which, from 
 their intimate knowledge of the locality, was soon successful, 
 and by 3 p. M. it had been sounded out and buoyed. The 
 transports and gunboats were immediately ordered in, and be 
 fore dark these had all crossed the bar, and were anchored in 
 the roadstead of Port Royal, the gunboats having first chased 
 Commodore Tatnall s rebel steamers under the shelter of their 
 batteries. On Monday evening Commander Davis reported 
 that there was water enough to allow the Wabash to enter the 
 harbor. Admiral Du Pont felt the great responsibility of risk 
 ing the noble frigate in the passage of a bar two miles wide, 
 where, in places in the channel-way, there was no more than 
 from one to two feet of water to spare, but, on the other hand, 
 the expedition depended mainly upon this frigate s powerful 
 battery. The admiral decided that, however great the risk, it 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 445 
 
 must be taken, and on Tuesday morning the W abash was got 
 under way, and stood slowly into the harbor. Every possible 
 precaution was taken, for such was the rise and fall of the 
 spring-tide that, had she grounded, the chances would have 
 been in favor of her total loss. Slowly feeling their way along 
 the channel with the lead, and with faculties all awake to every 
 peril, the officers guided the great ship gently, as if leading a 
 little child, but with such delicate skill that she did not touch ; 
 and when, followed by the Yanderbilt, the Susquehanna, and 
 the Atlantic, she at length glided into deep water, and passed 
 into the midst of the fleet already anchored, cheer after cheer 
 burst from the excited thousands who almost breathlessly had 
 watched her perilous passage. The "VVabash was anchored, 
 and immediately they commenced preparations for action 
 throughout the whole fleet. But the necessary examinations 
 of the harbor could not be completed in season for an attack 
 that day, as buoys had to be planted in various places, and 
 especially on a dangerous shoal called the Fishing Rip. A 
 reconnoissance in force had been made in the morning, under 
 the command of Commander John P. Rodgers and Brigadier- 
 General Wright, with four gunboats the Ottawa, Lieutenant 
 Commanding Stevens; the Seneca, Lieutenant Commanding 
 Ammen ; the Curlew, Acting Commander "Watmougb ; and 
 the Isaac P. Smith, Lieutenant Commanding Nicholson. These 
 proceeded far enough to draw the fire of the batteries on Hilton 
 Head and Bay Point, and showed that the vast fortifications 
 were works of strength, and scientifically constructed. This 
 done, the gunboats withdrew, and all was made snug for the 
 night out of gunshot from the forts. The next day the wind 
 blew a gale from the southward and westward, and the attack 
 was necessarily deferred. The forts which the fleet was thus 
 ready to assault are situated at the entrance of Port Royal Har 
 bor the one, Fort Walker, on the south, on Hilton Head ; and 
 the other, Fort Beauregard, on the north, on Bay Point. These 
 forts are nearly two and a half miles distant from each other, 
 and consequently could not be engaged at the same time except 
 at long range too long for the most effective use of the bat 
 teries of the ships, while they might be reached with heavy 
 rifled cannon from the batteries on shore. 
 
44:6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 These fortifications were by no means insignificant works, 
 Fort Walker, on Hilton Head, mounting twenty-three guns, 
 two of which were 6-inch rifles, and one a 10-inch Columbiad. 
 Fort Beauregard and its outworks mounted twenty guns in all, 
 some of them 6-inch rifles, one 10-inch and one 8-inch Colum 
 biad. The ships could not pass between these forts without 
 being in range of the rifles and heavy guns of both, and they 
 had therefore every reason to expect a severe encounter, espe 
 cially as one fort had the means of throwing hot shot. Less 
 formidable fortifications than these had been successful in re 
 pelling fleets of heavy ships, and it showed no lack of courage 
 if some doubts were entertained of the result. The experience 
 of Stringham at the Hatteras forts was encouraging, but then 
 those works were by no means as well constructed and formi 
 dable as these. It was a fleet of powerful steamers that was to 
 attack, and calculations based upon the inefficiency of sailing 
 vessels were no proper guide. 
 
 The plan of Fort "Walker, on Hilton Head, was such that 
 its principal guns were mounted on two water-faces, which 
 were so nearly in line as to admit of an enfilading fire from a 
 certain point, while the flanks were much w r eaker. It was de 
 termined to direct the weight of the attack first upon this, the 
 strongest work, and then turn to Fort Beauregard. The plan 
 was for the fleet to pass up midway between the forts and en 
 gage both at long range ; and when the line reached a point 
 about two and a half miles north of the forts, to turn to the 
 south round by the west, and come to close action with Fort 
 Walker, attacking on the weakest flank, while at the same time 
 the shot would enfilade the two water-faces. The plan of the 
 fight comprised a main squadron to attack in line, and a flank 
 ing squadron, to be thrown off in the northern part of the har 
 bor, to engage the rebel fleet of gunboats, and prevent them 
 from attacking the rear of the line, or cutting off any disabled 
 ship. 
 
 The main squadron consisted of the Wabash and the Sus 
 queh anna frigates, the sloop Mohican, the sloop Seminole, the 
 sloop Pawnee, the gunboat IJnadilla, the gunboat Ottawa, the 
 gunboat Pembina, and the sailing sloop Yandalia towed by the 
 Isaac P. Smith. 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 
 
 The flanking squadron was composed of the gunboats Bien- 
 ville, the Seneca, the Curlew, the Penguin, and the Augusta. 
 To these should be added the Pocahontas, which, owing to the 
 effects of the gale, did not reach the scene of action until about 
 mid-day. 
 
 The captains of all the ships had been summoned on board 
 the flag- ship, and were minutely instructed in regard to the 
 plan of attack, and the place which each ship was to occupy in 
 the line, and how to meet such contingencies as might probably 
 arise in the progress of the fight. Early in the morning of the 
 7th of November every ship was prepared for action with the 
 most scrupulous care, for all felt that important consequences 
 must follow the battle, and they knew that they were to en 
 counter very formidable works, and they had good reason to 
 believe that they mounted some heavy rifled guns. Every 
 spar, not absolutely needed in its place, was sent down ; every 
 sail was taken in, as was also every superfluous piece of rigging ; 
 every thing loose was made fast, and every thing was snugly 
 stowed. Nothing remained on deck which could impede the 
 freest action ; the ports were all open, the guns all loaded and 
 cast loose ; the magazines were opened ; hammocks and splinter- 
 nettings were in their places ; the carpenters all ready with 
 tools and shot-plugs prepared. Each gun s crew at their sta 
 tions ; buckets of water were placed about the decks to extin 
 guish a fire or quench the thirst of the men ; the gratings were 
 on the hatches, and the tarpaulins were battened down ; the 
 grim arrangements of the cockpit were made ; the sand to re 
 ceive the expected blood spread on the decks ; hammocks were 
 slung over the hatches to lower the wounded, and the signal- 
 officers were watching the flag-ship. The vessels were literally 
 stripped for a fight, and the engines seemed panting with eager 
 ness to start. When all was ready, for a few minutes the ships 
 were silent. The men looked, without speaking, in each 
 other s faces, and seemed to be thinking what an hour might 
 bring. 
 
 At 8 o clock the ships were all riding to the flood, their 
 bows pointing seaward, the forts just visible in the distance, 
 the ships and the forts all silent alike. The signal was made 
 to get under way, and at 8h. 10m. the flag-ship tripped her 
 
448 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 anchor, and slowly, as if with conscious dignity, the huge frig 
 ate turned and headed in for the forts, and the whole fleet fol 
 lowed in order the movements of the leader, the Susquehanna 
 pressing close to the Wabash. The signal for close order was 
 made at 9, and for nearly half an hour longer the ships moved 
 silently on. At 9h. 26m. a jet of smoke shot out from Fort 
 Walker, and then a shell struck the water far short of its mark, 
 and then the dull roar of the gun came rolling along the line. 
 Fort Beauregard was also ready, and a flash, and the leap of 
 the curling smoke, and the splash of the shot, and then the re 
 port brought the rebel challenge and defiance to the fleet. It 
 was speedily answered. The huge pivot-guns of the Wabash 
 and Susquehanna were trained on the forts, and each received 
 from the ships an answering shot. 
 
 It was probably one of the best exhibitions of scientific 
 battle made during the war one for which the commanding 
 officer received due credit at home and abroad. The fleet 
 passed into the harbor midway between the forts, receiving the 
 fire from both, and returning it at long range. When about 
 two and a half miles above the forts the flag-ship turned to the 
 southward, and at lOh. 15m. the signal for close action was 
 made, and the Wabash passed Fort Walker at a distance when 
 abreast of eight hundred yards, the other vessels of the line fol 
 lowing. This gave each vessel an opportunity of attacking the 
 weak flank as they approached the forts from the north, and of 
 enfilading, or nearly so, the two water-faces, which fire was of 
 course a destructive one, while, as they passed the forts abreast, 
 they could sweep the men from their guns by the storm of their 
 full broadsides. ISTor was this all. They passed the forts when 
 moving southward at a distance of eight hundred yards. Of 
 course the rebel guns were sighted as near as possible for that 
 distance; but when the ships made the second circuit, they 
 passed much nearer, sighting their own guns for five hundred 
 and fifty yards ; and so the gunners of the fort had not only to 
 fire at a moving object, but the ships were some three hundred 
 yards nearer than when they passed at first. Of course their 
 aim was rendered doubly uncertain, and this probably accounts, 
 as it did at Hatteras, for the vessels receiving much less damage 
 than was anticipated. To add to the confusion of the rebels, 
 
EXPEDITION TO HILTON HEAD. 449 
 
 some of the gunboats took up a position where, on the flank, 
 they could enfilade the main works, and kept up there a very 
 accurate and destructive fire. The management of the battle 
 on the part of the commanding officer could scarcely have been 
 better. The forts were at once overmatched by skill and sci 
 ence. Each vessel, as it came down from the north, sent some 
 enfilading shot into the fort from its pivot-guns, and then 
 poured in the whole starboard broadside ; and when this was 
 repeated in quick succession by the whole fleet, it will be seen 
 that there was scarcely an intermission to the terrible hail of 
 shot and shell sweeping the parapet and traverses, plunging 
 through the embrasures, and bursting over and within the 
 area of the works. Having come down from the north and 
 delivered their fire, each ship went round, and, approaching 
 the fort from the south, and on a different line, again opened 
 with the port broadside, though the main dependence was 
 not on the port battery ; then again, as soon as the ship could 
 be brought round, the starboard broadside was ready. The fire 
 of the fort could not be kept up under such a terrible fire, and 
 it began to slacken almost from the beginning of the action. 
 After the third round of the ships, and the starboard broadsides 
 had been delivered three times, the fort was abandoned, the 
 garrison running literally to the woods for shelter, the battle 
 was over, and at twenty minutes after two, Commander John 
 Rodgers hoisted the flag of the, Union over the deserted works. 
 At sunset it was discovered that Fort Beauregard had also been 
 abandoned. The next morning our flag w r as also floating over 
 that work, and a lodgment was gained upon the Southern coast 
 of the utmost importance to the Union cause one where the 
 authority of the Government was never disputed again. The 
 victory gained us undisputed possession of one of the finest har 
 bors on the Southern coast, and a sufficient base and depot for 
 all the operations which have been mentioned in a former part 
 of this chapter. It afforded the means, as was afterward shown, 
 of sealing up the harbor of Charleston as effectually as if the 
 city was in our hands ; and the capture of Port Royal included 
 in its direct consequences all that was essential in the occupa 
 tion of that rebel stronghold. It was rendered perfectly useless 
 to the rebel cause. 
 29 
 
450 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 It gave the world another successful example of the manner 
 in which steamships with an American battery can deal with 
 forts, and changed materially on this point what were thought 
 settled opinions in regard to naval war. The Wabash carried 
 on her spar-deck as heavy guns as at the beginning of the war 
 had been mounted on a French or English ship, while the bat 
 tery of her gun-deck was composed of 9-inch guns, and her 
 pivot-guns were heavier still. The broadsides from such ships 
 are literally crushing ones. Delivered in quick succession by 
 steamers passing a fort, and then returning on a different track 
 to fire the other broadside, and at distances varying from eight 
 hundred yards to half that distance, nothing can withstand 
 them. For although an earthwork may not thus be battered 
 down, the defenders of it cannot stand to their guns ; and a fleet 
 of stanch steamers with such batteries can pass a fort without 
 a greater risk than may reasonably be taken, as was afterward 
 clearly shown. 
 
 The successful experiments made at liatteras and Port 
 Royal showed clearly that even wooden steamers could en 
 counter formidable works on land with comparative safety ; 
 and the experience of th ese victories, and their moral effect, 
 prepared the way for the more important operations against 
 forts at a later period of the war. It is, at least, doubtful 
 whether a fleet would have been risked at New Orleans, had 
 not the forts at Port Royal first been taken. This novel expe 
 dition placed also in the hands of the Government those famous 
 Sea Island cotton-lands which had so enriched their owners by 
 the unrequited labor of the slave. In that region lived the 
 men who, for years, had cherished and strengthened, as they 
 could, the spirit of rebellion, fattened on the riches of their 
 lands, and the hopeless toils of their bondmen ; and from that 
 portion of South Carolina came the corrupting spell that blind 
 ed and maddened the South, and prepared her for rebellion 
 and ruin. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 CAPTURE OF FORT CLINCH, FERNANDINA, AND ST. MART S. 
 
 AFTER the capture of Port Royal, it was determined to cap 
 ture some points farther south, among the most important of 
 which is Fernandina, on the coast of Florida, at the head of the 
 peninsula, and connected with the Gulf by the Cedar Keys Rail 
 road. The preparations for the defence of Fernandina had been 
 very carefully made ; the works were well constructed, and were 
 considered by the rebel officers quite sufficient for the protec 
 tion of the city. The batteries, to use the language of Commo 
 dore Du Pont, were as complete as art could make them. Six 
 were well concealed, protected in front by ranges of sand-hills, 
 and contained perfect shelters for the men. They covered so 
 small an extent of ground, and were so concealed by the natural 
 growth and the formation of the land, that it would have been 
 almost impossible to strike them from the water. Another bat 
 tery of six guns, though larger, and on that account offering a 
 better mark, was equally well sheltered and marked. 
 
 These batteries and the heavy guns mounted on Fort Clinch 
 commanded every part of the main ship-channel, and could rake 
 an approaching vessel. Besides these, there was another battery 
 of four guns on the south end of Cumberland Island, the fire of 
 which crossed the channel inside the bar. Moreover, the water 
 was so shoal upon the bar, and the channel so crooked, that a 
 vessel would necessarily remain a long time under fire, and at 
 great disadvantage ; and even when a fleet had passed all these 
 defences successfully, there still remained a well-constructed and 
 naturally masked battery at the town which commanded the 
 inner anchorage. The precipitate abandonment of all these 
 
452 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 formidable works, including Fort Clinch, when there were 
 troops sufficient to man them, shows the fear which had been 
 inspired by the capture of the forts at Hatteras Inlet and Roa- 
 noke Island, and more especially of those at Port Royal. 
 
 The old theory of the superiority of forts as against ships 
 had been thoroughly exploded by the use of shell-guns, and as 
 yet they had no settled opinions as to what limit might be set 
 to the power of this new method of attack by steamers with 
 such an armament. They only knew that thus far they had 
 conquered in every battle, with no serious injury to the ships ; 
 and the garrisons of these works seemed to have thought that 
 inasmuch as they w r ould be beaten in the fight, it would be 
 better to save life by leaving their defences than to make a 
 vain attempt to save them. 
 
 The expedition intended to operate against Fort Clinch and 
 the connected works around Fernandina, left Port Royal on the 
 last day of February, and on the 2d of March entered Cumber 
 land Sound by St. Andrew s Inlet. The fleet comprised the 
 following vessels : Ottawa, Mohican, Ellen, Seminole, Pawnee, 
 Pocahontas, Flag, Florida, Bienville, James Adger, Alabama, 
 Keystone State, Seneca, Huron, Pembina, Penguin, Isaac 
 Smith, Potomska, armed cutter Henrietta, and the transports 
 McClellan, Empire City, Marion, Star of the South, Belvidere, 
 Boston, and George Creek, with a brigade of troops and bat 
 talion of marines. This squadron entered Cumberland Sound 
 instead of approaching by the ocean, in order to turn the heavy 
 works on the south end of Cumberland and the north end of 
 Amelia Islands, works to which reference has already been 
 made. 
 
 Soon after entering the sound, information was received 
 through a colored man that the rebels w r ere abandoning all the 
 fortifications around Fernandina, and were retreating from Ame 
 lia Island. Commodore Du Pont at once sent forward the light- 
 draught gunboats and transports, with orders to push through 
 the sound as rapidly as possible, and prevent the destruction of 
 private and public property, or any other outrages which might 
 be committed. These vessels were placed under the command 
 of Commander P. Dray ton ; and Commodore Du Pont, with some 
 of the heavier ships, left the sound and went to Fernandina by 
 
CAPTURE OF FORT CLIXCH, FERNANDIXA, ETC. 453 
 
 sea. The detachment of the squadron which went down the sound 
 found the navigation intricate and difficult, and upon reaching 
 the flats where the tides from the north and south meet, it was 
 found that only three vessels, the Pawnee, the Ottawa, and Huron, 
 were able to cross. With these, Commander Drayton pushed 
 on, and when only three miles from Fort Clinch, two out of 
 these three grounded as the tide was falling, and the squadron 
 was thus reduced to one vessel, the Ottawa, and three launches 
 from the "Wabash. These incidents show that the expedition 
 would have had a different issue if the rebel soldiers had re 
 mained to defend their works. On approaching Fort Clinch it 
 was evident that it w^as deserted, and a boat was sent on shore 
 to raise over it the American flag ; and in this bloodless man 
 ner the first national fort was recovered from the rebels. When 
 they reached Fernandina, a small steamer was seen endeavoring 
 to escape up a creek, but she was pursued by the launches, 
 captured and brought back. She was filled principally with 
 women and children, who were hurrying away as if escaping 
 from savages. She had also on board some military stores. 
 The rebel leaders, as it would seem, had purposely alarmed and 
 exasperated the people by the most extravagant and false re 
 ports of what might be expected from the Yankees ; and when 
 the troops left, evidently in a panic, the inhabitants fled also in 
 perfect dismay. 
 
 The capture of St. Mary s and of St. Augustine followed 
 almost immediately the occupation of Fernandina, and thus 
 before the close of the year 1862 great progress had been made 
 in reoccupying the Southern coast a work by far the most im 
 portant part of which was necessarily performed by the Navy. 
 The historian of the Navy, however, has not the slightest temp 
 tation to underrate, in any particular, the gallant exploits of the 
 Army. It had a work of its own which it nobly performed, 
 and won its own proper glory. In all the operations on the 
 Southern coast there appears to have been the most cordial 
 good feeling and harmonious cooperation between the two arms 
 of the service ; yet necessarily a large part of the severe and 
 dangerous labor was performed by the Navy. The ships and 
 boats were the pioneers in every enterprise ; the great guns 
 cleared the path for the Army, and covered the landing, the 
 
4:54 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 advance, and the retreat. It transported or protected their 
 stores, received on board the sick and wounded, and silenced 
 forts and batteries, so that the troops could approach with com 
 parative safety. The explorations of the country were neces 
 sarily made by the Navy, with its boats or light-draught steam 
 ers, along the shallow waters of the bays, the rivers, and muddy 
 creeks a service always laborious, always dangerous, and often 
 attended with a loss of life in fearful proportion to the numbers 
 engaged. 
 
 Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, on the Atlantic 
 coast, and Mobile, on the Gulf, still remained in the hands of 
 the rebels; but although these were the chief cities, yet, as 
 these were closely blockaded, "Wilmington alone excepted, the 
 operations along the sounds and rivers by which the trade on 
 these inner waters was broken up, was really a greater injury 
 to the rebel cause than the capture of all the large cities would 
 have been without the occupation of the inner waters of North 
 Carolina, Georgia, and the upper portion of the Florida penin 
 sula. 
 
 So soon as this work was accomplished, and it was seen that 
 these points could not be again wrested from the possession of 
 the United States, it was evident that the fall of these cities was 
 certain to follow in due time, and the possession of Charleston 
 and Mobile was of far more importance, from the moral influ 
 ence of a victory, than from their military value. 
 
 When the coast had thus been occupied, and a lodgment 
 had also been made for the Army in Tennessee by the capture 
 of Forts Henry and Donelson, the defeat of the rebellion be 
 came only a question of time. It had already lost its expansive 
 power ; and although it might still be capable of making strong 
 efforts in particular directions, it had passed the climax of its 
 strength and successes. 
 
 As in the North Carolina sounds, after the capture of the 
 Hatteras forts and Roanoke Island, there were still many 
 points w^here the rebels had established batteries, and from 
 which they fitted out expeditions both by land and water, so 
 on the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. After 
 Port .Royal, Brunswick, and Fernandina had been occupied, 
 there were along the rivers and creeks, inlets and sounds, which 
 
455 
 
 are almost innumerable, fortified positions in all directions on 
 the small islands and headlands designed to protect the chan 
 nels which form the highways of that low and marshy region. 
 The Department believed it to be of the utmost importance to 
 search out all such places, destroy any works which might be 
 found, capture or destroy shipping and boats used in traffic, 
 and scatter any bodies of troops that might collect within reach 
 of the guns of our ships. 
 
 This perplexing task, so laborious and dangerous for the 
 seamen and inferior officers, was well performed by Commodore 
 Du Pont and his associates in arms. 
 
 These expeditions and small battles, taken singly, seem of 
 little importance, and yet it was a process in which daily pro 
 gress was made in weakening the rebellion, and in recovering 
 the territory of the United States from the foe, and in which 
 daily deeds of heroism and daring were performed, and lives 
 were sacrificed, and mourning was brought to many distant 
 homes. They formed one important, though not prominent, fea 
 ture of the war, and are worthy of a place in history, not only 
 as a record of acts of peril and bravery, but as showing how 
 extensive and complete the plan of the rebels for defending the 
 coast was, and how great the labor of destroying the whole net 
 work of forts, batteries, and obstructions, until at length all the 
 interior channels of navigation, extending from Norfolk to 
 Florida, with few interruptions, were brought under the control 
 of the Government. 
 
 One of these lesser expeditions was made in November, 
 1861, up St. Helena Sound, under the command of Commander 
 Drayton. On the 25th of that month the Pawnee, the Una- 
 dilla, the Pembina, and the Yixen left Port Eoyal, and pro 
 ceeded up the sound to ascertain what works of defence might 
 be found on the connecting waters. Off the entrance of South 
 Edisto River a small steamer was discovered, but her speed 
 and light draught enabled her to escape up the river. Soon 
 after coming in sight of the point of Otter Island, a formidable 
 looking earthwork was discovered. The Pawnee and the gun 
 boats halted, and threw some shells into the battery, but there 
 being no response, they ceased firing, and sent a boat on shore 
 to reconnoitre. They found a well-constructed but deserted 
 
456 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 work, triangular in form, with two faces on the water, of two 
 hundred and fifty feet in length each, with bastions and a cur 
 tain on the land side, and the whole surrounded by a ditch. 
 The magazine had been blown up, and the whole was dis 
 mantled. The fragments of an 80-pounder rifled gun were 
 lying there, and large quantities of timber and palmetto-logs 
 had been collected. 
 
 This fort was in a very commanding position. All vessels 
 on the inland route to Charleston passed necessarily under its 
 guns, and four miles above the fort the South Edisto and 
 Ashepoo Rivers approach each other so closely that a few guns 
 on the narrow neck of land could easily control each stream, 
 while under the guns of the work on Otter Island is the best 
 anchorage that can be found in the vicinity. It is not easy to 
 see why such a position should have been abandoned, except 
 through fear of the fleet which had been inspired by the cap 
 ture of Port Royal and the forts of the Carolina sounds. 
 
 After the examination of this work, the little fleet continued 
 up the Coosaw, piloted by Captain Boutelle of the Yixen. Ten 
 miles from Otter Island, at the junction of Barn well Creek 
 with the Coosaw, another fort was discovered, directly ahead. 
 The engines were slowed at the distance of a mile, and the 
 usual complement of a few shells was paid to the supposed gar 
 rison. There was no reply, and no signs of occupation, and a 
 boat was sent on shore to take possession. It was a redoubt, 
 with a ditch on three sides, the top of the parapet being about 
 thirty feet above the water. The armament had consisted of 
 three guns, one rifled one that had been removed, and two old 
 18-pounders. From these old pieces the sailors knocked off the 
 trunnions, gathered up a quantity of intrenching-tools, and 
 some siege-gun carriages, and then the vessels returned to Otter 
 Island, and there anchored for the night. The next day they 
 ascended the Ashepoo River, and after running four miles 
 another redoubt was discovered, also abandoned. : Like the 
 others, it was very carefully and skilfully constructed with a 
 deep ditch around it. The armament had been removed, ex 
 cept an 18-pounder smooth-bore and a 20-pounder rifle, and 
 these had been burst. At Hunting Island they found that the 
 light-house had been blown up, and every thing valuable had 
 
CAPTURE OF FOET CLINCH, FERNANDINA, ETC. 457 
 
 been carried away. The whole country seemed quite deserted 
 by white men, and wherever it was practicable the negroes had 
 been removed. On the south side of the river many still re 
 mained, and all of them showed the most friendly spirit, and 
 were rejoiced at the coming of the Yankees, for whom they had 
 long been looking, they said, and to whom they turned with 
 confidence that their freedom would now be obtained. It is a 
 subject worthy of consideration that the first serious and effect 
 ual blow given to slavery was by the Navy, in the very focus 
 and proudest centre of the slaveholding aristocracy at Beaufort, 
 and in the vicinity, and that the cannon of the Union fleet at 
 Hilton Head must have shaken the grave of Calhoun. No 
 liberated slaves have been more secure in their freedom than 
 those of the Sea Islands, and although the most ignorant and 
 degraded of all the four millions, in less than two years after 
 the close of the war they had made such progress under North 
 ern teachers as to cause the islands to produce more cotton to 
 the acre than ever before. Another account of a similar expedi 
 tion is here added in the words of Commander Kodgers him 
 self: 
 
 IT. S. FLAG-SHIP WABASH, POKT ROYAL HARBOK, December 6, 1861. 
 
 SIR: On yesterday morning I left Tybee Roads before daylight, 
 with the steamers Ottawa, Seneca, and Pembina, and crossed the bar of 
 Wassaw Sound at half tide, not having less than eighteen feet of water 
 upon it. 
 
 We approached the fort on Wassaw Island witbin a mile, and see 
 ing neither guns nor men, we did not fire, but I sent Lieutenant Barnes 
 to it with a white flag. He found it an enclosed octagonal work, with 
 platforms for eight guns on the water-faces. The land-faces were pro 
 tected by abatis. The work was well constructed. The guns had 
 been removed, the platforms cut, and the magazine blown up. From 
 the freshness of the footprints, and other signs, it appeared to have 
 been abandoned very recently. Adjoining the fort are huts or sheds 
 for a large garrison. Some lumber and bricks remain ; every thing else 
 had been carried away. 
 
 We immediately pushed on to Cabbage Island, where we had been 
 led to look for another battery, but there was nothing of the kind there. 
 We went to the mouth of the creek, through the Romilly Marsh, and to 
 the mouth of Wilmington River. 
 
 From the mouth of Wilmington River we observed a battery bear- 
 
458 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 ing from us about N. W. by W. half W., and distant about three miles. 
 It is on the river, and just above a house with a red cupola, which is 
 one of the Coast Survey s points of triangulation, and is about ten miles 
 from Savannah. Between the ho use and the fort was a large encamp 
 ment, but we could not count the tents. We counted five guns, appar 
 ently of large calibre, on the face of the battery toward us. We could 
 only see one gun upon the other face, but there may have been more. 
 We were near enough to see the men on the ramparts and the glitter 
 ing of their bayonets. We saw several small vessels ; some of them in 
 Eomilly Marsh were in tow of a small steam-tug, but they were all be 
 yond our reach. 
 
 Upon Little Tybee Island we could see no earthworks, but could 
 not get nearer to it than two miles, because of the shoals. In coming 
 out of Wassaw Sound at high tide we had not less than twenty-one feet 
 of water on the bar. 
 
 Returning to Tybee Roads at 1 o clock, I landed and made a recon^ 
 noissance on foot with the marines of the Savannah, and detachments 
 of small-arm men from that ship and the Ottawa. Upon reaching the 
 mouth of the Lazaretto Creek, having no boats in which to cross, our 
 progress was stopped. We waited until low tide, but the creek was 
 unfordable. I was able, however, with the assistance of Lieutenant 
 Luce, to obtain, from the top of a tree, the position in which a battery 
 has been supposed to exist, and am satisfied that there is no battery 
 there. The spar, which was mistaken for a derrick, is simply a place 
 of look-out, and there was no appearance of any earthwork or position 
 for guns. A battery at such a place would be of no use whatever. 
 There may, however, have been a signal-gun placed there, as the dune 
 upon which the spar is raised is upon the southeastern part of Little 
 Tybee Island, and is a commanding point of observation. 
 
 I have to thank Lieutenant Commanding Stevens for the most 
 earnest, cordial, and efficient cooperation ; and also Lieutenants Com 
 manding Ammen and Bankhead, whose vessels were always in the right 
 place, and always well handled. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. R. P. RODGERS, Commander. 
 Flag-Officer S. F. Du PONT, commanding, etc. 
 
 Another and interesting expedition was made to St. Helena 
 Sound, and one to the North Edisto, by Commander Drayton, 
 and by him is thus described : 
 
CAPTURE OF FORT CLINCH, FERNANDINA, ETC. 459 
 
 TJ. S. STEAMER PAWNEE, PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C., December 9, 1861. 
 
 SIR : In obedience to your order of the 4th instant, I proceeded to 
 sea at daylight of the 5th, accompanied by the gunboat Unadilla, Lieu 
 tenant Commanding N. Collins; steamer Isaac Smith, Lieutenant 
 Commanding J. ~VV. A. Nicholson ; and Coast Survey steamer Vixen, 
 Captain Boutelle, and reached the anchorage off the fort on Otter 
 Island, St. Helena Sound, at mid-day. In the course of the afternoon, 
 some negroes coming on board, and reporting that there was a body of 
 soldiers at the entrance of Mosquito Creek, a place up the Ashepoo 
 where the inland route to Charleston commences, I proceeded as far as 
 that place, when the night coming on, obliged rne to return. 
 
 I saw, however, no signs of the presence of white people, excepting 
 that some buildings, which I discovered the next day to have been in 
 Hutchinson s Island, were burning. On the morning of the 6th, the 
 United States sloop Dale, Lieutenant Commanding W. F. Truxton, ap~ 
 pearing off the harbor, I sent the Isaac Smith to tow her in, a pilot being 
 furnished by Captain Boutelle. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, when half-way up, the Dale stuck fast, and 
 as it was then about high water, no exertion could get her afloat until 
 11 o clock of that night, when she was forced into deep water, without 
 having suffered any apparent injury, and towed the following morning, 
 by Captain Boutelle, in the Vixen, around Morgan Island, this having 
 become necessary, owing to her having forced over the shoal which 
 divides that channel from the one she was in originally. So soon as she 
 was safely at her anchorage near us, I proceeded up the Ashepoo with 
 the Unadilla, Isaac Smith, and Vixen, to examine that river farther 
 up than I had been able to do on the previous occasion. On approach 
 ing Mosquito Creek, we saw a picket of soldiers, who took to their 
 horses, however, on our approach, and escaped into the woods, hast 
 ened, perhaps, in their flight by a shot or two which were thrown after 
 them. 
 
 Continuing up the river, I landed on Hutchinson s Island, and found 
 that two days before all the negro houses, overseer s house, and out 
 buildings, together with the picked cotton, had been burned. 
 
 The attempt had at the same time been made to drive off the ne 
 groes, but many had escaped, although some of their number, they said, 
 had been shot in attempting to do so. The scene was one of complete 
 desolation; the smoking ruins, and the cowering figures which sur 
 rounded them, of those negroes, who still instinctively clung to their 
 hearthstones, although there was no longer shelter there for them, pre 
 sented a most melancholy sight, the impression of which was made 
 
460 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 even stronger by the piteous wailing of the poor creatures, a large por 
 tion of whom consisted of the old and decrepit. We were not able to 
 leave until some time after dark, and singular enough, the moment we 
 were fairly under way, a bright signal-light was burned on the very 
 plantation we had just quitted, showing that some of the blacks, for 
 there was certainly no white man there, were communicating the fact 
 of our departure. On the following morning, with the same vessels, I 
 stalled to explore the Coosaw River, but very soon after leaving, the 
 Unadilla, unfortunately, was completely disabled by the breaking . of a 
 main crosshead, and I was obliged to leave her at anchor, and continue 
 on with the other two vessels. When off Fort Hey ward, I left the Isaac 
 Smith, it not being quite safe to take so long a vessel higher up, and 
 continued in the Vixen as far as the entrance of the Beaufort Creek to 
 a place called the Brick Yards, where I had been told there was either 
 a fort or a guard of soldiers. Nothing, hewever, being seen of either, 
 I anchored off a plantation belonging to Mr. By the wood close by, 
 for the purpose of getting information, as I saw a great many negroes 
 there. 
 
 On landing, I found that a short time previously the cotton-house 
 with its contents had been burned, and all of the negroes that could be 
 caught had been taken away. Here were large numbers of those, how 
 ever, who had left Hutchinson s Island after their houses had been 
 burned, and who, with their household effects piled up about them, 
 lined the beach ; some of them begging to be permitted to go to Otter 
 Island, saying that they had neither shelter nor food, were taken back 
 with us. 
 
 Late in the afternoon I returned down the river, reaching our an 
 choring off Fort Otter at sunset, the Unadilla having been towed to 
 the same place by the Isaac Smith. As I did not see that the services 
 of the Pawnee were any longer necessary in St. Helena Sound, and 
 thinking it important to get the Unadilla as soon as possible to a place 
 where her engines could be repaired, I determined this morning to tow 
 that vessel to Port Royal Harbor, which I have done, reaching here, in 
 company with the Vixen, at half-past seven this evening. 
 
 In obedience to your instructions, before leaving, I transferred the 
 charge of the fort and adjacent waters to Lieutenant Commanding 
 Nicholson, who, with the Isaac Smith and Dale, will remain there until 
 he receives further orders from yourself. 
 
 As about one hundred and forty negroes, most of them in a very 
 destitute condition, had collected at Otter Island before my departure, 
 I directed Lieutenant Commanding Nicholson to see that they were 
 
CAPTUEE OF FOET CLINCH, FERXANDENA, ETC. 461 
 
 supplied with food until some disposition could be made of them, or 
 until he had heard from you. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 P. DRAYTON, Commander. 
 Flag- Officer S. F. Du PONT, 
 
 commanding South Atlantic Squadron, 
 
 Port Royal Harbor, South Carolina. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER PAWNEE, PORT ROTAL, S. C., December 21, 1861. 
 
 SIR: In obedience to your order of the 14th instant, I left this har 
 bor at daylight of the 16th instant, accompanied by the gunboat Sen 
 eca, Lieutenant Commanding Daniel Ammen, and Coast Survey steamer 
 Vixen, Captain C. O. Boutelle, but at the bar found that the heavy 
 northeaster which was blowing had raised such a sea as to render it out 
 of the question to attempt entering the rivers which I was directed to 
 examine. I therefore returned to my anchorage, which I left a second 
 time, however, on the following morning, and reached the North Edisto 
 at 2 o clock. Shortly after I crossed the bar with the Seneca, piloted 
 in by Captain Boutelle in the Vixen, which vessel he, however, left 
 when we were inside for the Pawnee, his vessel remaining astern of us. 
 
 At this time we could plainly see fortifications ahead on Edisto 
 Island, distant a mile and a half. As it was reported to me they were 
 filled with men, I commenced firing slowly from my bow-guns, as did 
 the Seneca, but receiving no answer soon ceased, and running by the 
 batteries anchored in the North Edisto River. On landing I found the 
 fort, which was entirely deserted, to consist of two redoubts for five 
 guns each, connected by a long curtain, and protected in the rear by a 
 double fence of thick plank, with earth between, and loop-holed. The 
 guns, as the negroes informed me, had all been removed toward Charles 
 ton some weeks back. "While I was making this examination Lieuten 
 ant Commanding Ammen had proceeded up the river for about five 
 miles, the effect of which was immediately apparent in the firing of 
 cotton-houses and out-buildings. 
 
 As during the night some negroes came on board and informed us 
 that at the small town of Rockville, which was in full sight, there was a 
 large encampment of soldiers, at least five hundred, and Captain Bou 
 telle offering to go up the creek on which it was, I determined to make 
 them a visit in the Vixen, and at daylight on the 17th went on board 
 that vessel for the purpose, taking with rne the boats and marines of the 
 Pawnee and Seneca, under charge of Acting Master Snell. Owing to 
 our running ashore we did not reach the town until near 8 o clock, a 
 
462 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 little above which was a sloop laden with cotton and provisions, which 
 I took possession of and towed alongside. 
 
 There being still no signs of life on shore, I landed with about fifty 
 men to reconnoitre, and was soon satisfied that the troops had left, as 
 the first thing seen was the negroes pillaging a building, in which was a 
 large quantity of commissariat stores, consisting of rice, sugar, bacon, 
 corn, etc. This I stopped at once, and had what remained removed to 
 the Vixen. 
 
 Being then informed that the camp, which was a mile from the 
 water, was entirely deserted, I went there, but although, so far as I 
 could learn, the troops had left at daylight, and it was then only a little 
 after eight, the negroes, whom I found as busy as bees, had removed 
 the most valuable part of what had been left, which was nearly every 
 thing, excepting their arms. The encampment was a large one, had 
 been occupied for many months, and its late tenants had evidently been 
 in the possession of every comfort. I removed to the boats forty Sibley 
 and four ordinary tents, besides a quantity of articles of no particular 
 value, which were lying about ; and found at a neighboring house, which 
 seemed to have been used as headquarters, a Confederate flag. 
 
 Having pretty well cleared the ground of what was worth removing, 
 and being desirous of examining above, I left at 2 o clock, and proceed 
 ing up the river with the Vixen, not liking to trust the Pawnee in so 
 narrow a channel, came on the Seneca, which had started at 9 o clock 
 to explore, fast on a mud-bank. We remained by her until 9 o clock, 
 but found it impossible to pull her off, owing to the night tide not 
 being as high as the morning one. While lying here, however, I sent 
 the boats and burnt a sloop which had been run ashore some distance 
 beyond, while attempting to escape from the Seneca, and which could 
 not be got afloat. 
 
 The Vixen afterward returned for the night to the neighborhood of 
 the Pawnee, but went back at daylight of the following morning with a 
 party of men and boats from this vessel to lighten the Seneca, which 
 vessel was got off at high tide. 
 
 While the Vixen was running up the river she came on a small 
 sloop laden with cotton, from which two white men were taken, whom 
 I now have on board as prisoners. As in the mean time nearly a hun 
 dred and fifty negroes, all in a great state of alarm, had collected on 
 board the different vessels, I determined to land them on the point, and 
 called in the United States steamer Penguin, which was cruising off the 
 port, and to leave Lieutenant Commanding Budd in charge of the river, 
 after my departure, until he could hear from you. Captain Boutelle 
 
FERNA^ T DINA, ETC. 463 
 
 was kind enough to go out in the Vixen and pilot the Penguin into her 
 anchorage off the fort, where she now is. 
 
 On the morning of the 10th I ran down to the South Edisto, and 
 leaving the Pawnee and Seneca at the bar, went in with the Vixen. I 
 found the fortifications which are on Edisto Island entirely deserted 
 and partially destroyed. They consisted of two redoubts, which mount 
 ed, as far as I could judge, four guns each, but the guns had been re 
 moved. The Dale being in sight across Otter Island, in the Ashepoo, I 
 made signal, and Lieutenant Commanding Truxton pulled over with 
 four boats. He reported that every thing was quiet in the neighbor 
 hood of his anchorage, and that the fort on Otter Island was rapidly 
 being placed in a state of defence. Up to the present time, although 
 they had been in sight of the South Edisto forts, where we were lying, 
 they had not yet landed there. 
 
 Having finished my examination of the South Edisto, I returned to 
 the Pawnee and stood north, with the intention of lying oft Stono for 
 the night; but, as the weather looked threatening, and the Vixen was 
 almost out of coal, I went into the North Edisto again for the night, in 
 order to have an opportunity of supplying her with some. Lieutenant 
 Commanding Budd reported every thing as when I left ; but on the 
 following morning negroes came in and stated that the troops who had 
 left the encampment at Rockville, being largely reen forced, showed a 
 disposition to reoccupy that place. 
 
 As the weather was too threatening to permit my making a careful 
 examination of the Stono, as I intended, I determined now to return at 
 once to this place and report to you the state of affairs at the North 
 Edisto. This I have done, reaching my anchorage here at 3 o clock to 
 day, although somewhat delayed by the sea raised by a very heavy 
 northeaster which is blowing outside. Lieutenant Commanding Ammen 
 I sent to Charleston, to report that the Penguin was in the North Edisto, 
 and with directions to look into the Stono River on his way, and see if 
 he could make out the fortifications, which the negroes tell me are there 
 in great strength. 
 
 I cannot conclude without expressing my indebtedness for the ready 
 assistance rendered by Lieutenant Commanding Ammen and Captain 
 Boutelle in carrying out the objects of the expedition. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 P. DRAYTON, commanding. 
 Flag-Officer S. F. Du PONT, commanding South Atlantic Squadron. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 MOVEMENTS OF THE REBELS. OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, 
 
 AND RIVERS. 
 
 IF the reader will examine a map of the coast from Charles 
 ton to St. Augustine, he will see that within the coast-line there 
 is a perfect net- work of rivers, small sounds, bays, inlets, and 
 connecting channels, covering the whole country adjacent to 
 the ocean. As indicated in the preceding chapter, almost 
 countless earthworks had been constructed to guard these water 
 highways; forming, as they did, not only an inland channel 
 between Charleston and Savannah, but the means of extended 
 communication with the surrounding country. The shock occa 
 sioned by the capture of the forts at Port Royal was so great 
 that most of these which could be reached by our gunboats 
 appeared at first deserted, and the troops and the inhabitants, 
 except the blacks, fled together. But ere long there were evi 
 dences of a reaction. Some deserted positions were reoccupied, 
 bodies of troops assembled, as if with the purpose of combining 
 for an attack, and it was evident that the rebels would attempt 
 to recover what they had lost. 
 
 In the latter part of December one of the plans of the ene 
 my was so far disclosed as to demand immediate attention. 
 This plan was to shut up and capture our troops on Port Royal 
 Island. The method proposed w r as to place obstructions in the 
 Coosaw River and the channel called the Whale Branch, and, 
 in addition to these, to construct batteries at Port Royal Ferry, 
 at Seabrook, and at Boyd s Neck. By these they hoped to iso 
 late the troopSj prevent the approach of the gunboats, while 
 they assembled some three thousand men at points from which 
 
OPEEATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, AND KIYEES. 465 
 
 they could easily make a combined attack. This scheme it 
 was thought necessary to defeat. 
 
 For this purpose a joint expedition was planned by General 
 Sherman and Commander Du Pont, and, the troops having 
 been put under the command of General Stevens, it was de 
 cided to move on E"ew- Year s day. The naval force was as fol 
 lows : the Ottawa. Lieutenant Commanding Stevens ; Pembina, 
 Lieutenant Bankhead; the four armed boats of the "Wabash, 
 commanded by Lieutenants Upshur, Luce, Irwin, and Acting 
 Master Kempff, to enter the Coosaw by Beaufort River ; while 
 the Seneca, Lieutenant Ammen, and the tug-boat Ellen were to 
 move up Beaufort River and approach the batteries at Sea- 
 brook and Port Royal Ferry by Whale Branch. The armed 
 tug C. B. Hale was afterward sent forward, and the whole was 
 placed under the command of Commodore G. R. P. Rodgers. 
 The work assigned the JSTavy was, to cover the landing of the 
 troops, to clear the woods for their advance, and silence the 
 batteries as they were reached. 
 
 This force, having been collected at Beaufort on the 31st of 
 December, remained there until after dark, that no intimation 
 might be given of the proposed attack. So soon as the night 
 had closed in, so as to conceal the vessels, they moved up to a 
 point two miles from the Coosaw, and anchored until daylight. 
 At 4 o clock in the morning they moved forward to the ap 
 pointed rendezvous, received on board General Stevens with 
 his troops, and crossing the Coosaw to Heywood s plantation, 
 where a part of the troops were landed under cover of the gun 
 boats. Two howitzers from the Wabash were sent with the 
 troops, to serve as a section of light artillery, under Lieutenant 
 Irwin. At a place called the Brick Yards is a very difficult 
 passage, through which Lieutenant Stevens with much labor 
 succeeded in bringing the Ottawa. At 10 o clock the gunboats 
 and launches were stationed at the point chosen for landing the 
 second body of the troops, so as to cover the landing and the 
 line of march. At 1.30 P. M. General Stevens was ready to 
 move. The gunboats took their positions, and, steaming slowly 
 just in advance of the skirmishers, swept the woods with their 
 shells, cleared the road for the column, and then advancing 
 poured a heavy fire into the fort at Port Royal Ferry. 
 30 
 
466 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 This new feature in war is deserving of more notice than 
 it has hitherto received. So far as is known to the writer, it 
 was an American invention, a new creation produced by the 
 peculiar character of our struggle. In fact, it was an operation 
 requiring for its successful performance what had no existence 
 before the rebellion light-draught gunboats armed with heav 
 ier guns than had been mounted before on a broadside ship. It 
 was a combination of power that no land force could in any 
 manner resist. The gunboats on the water and the troops on 
 land formed the two parts of one grand column, advancing 
 with equal movement, before which bodies of troops and field 
 artillery were as chaff before the whirlwind, and to which even 
 forts could ofter no effectual resistance. The gunboats, armed 
 with heavy Parrott rifles, and 11-inch smooth-bores, firing shells, 
 grape, or canister, as the case required, keeping just in advance 
 of the land column, could clear the front of every living thing 
 capable of opposition, so that the troops marched on secure. 
 The accuracy with which the rifles threw their shells rendered 
 it unsafe for even small bodies of cavalry to show themselves 
 within a distance of one and even two miles, and the range 
 of grape and canister from the 11-inch guns was found to be 
 greater than had been supposed. 
 
 Within two miles of the gunboats the rebels learned to feel 
 unsafe, and the idea of attacking a column advancing under 
 cover of the big guns was entirely out of the question. Within 
 reach of these they could form no safe ambush or camping- 
 ground, for the shells tore through the forest, scattering death 
 with their own fragments and the splinters and limbs of trees, 
 while the grape and canister, hurled almost by the bushel from 
 the 11-inch guns, swept every covert in the grass and under 
 brush, so that there could be no safety in concealment. Wher 
 ever the Army marched within range of navigable water, the 
 gunboats, from the celerity of their movements, might be said 
 to form a tight artillery of 11-inch guns, and 30-pounder, 50- 
 pounder, and 100-pounder rifles, more effective for destruction 
 or defence than if they could have been moved with equal 
 speed and swiftness on the land. The gunboats were a line of 
 skirmishers armed with 11-inch guns. The experience which 
 the rebels had with the gunboats at Roanoke and Newbern, 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, AND EIVERS. 467 
 
 at Shiloh, Belmont, Malvern Hill, and generally along all their 
 rivers, made them objects of terror to their armies. For bodies 
 of troops to stand within range of these broadsides was simply 
 an impossible thing, whatever their courage or daring might be. 
 
 The enemy did not wait for the attack, and the squadron 
 anchored in front of the battery at 2.40 p. M. A quantity of 
 8-inch shells and 30-pounder rifled shells were found in the 
 magazine, but the guns had been removed. In the mean time 
 the other vessels had succeeded in destroying the works at Sea- 
 brook, but were unable to get up the river because of the low 
 water. 
 
 In the course of the afternoon the enemy appeared in force 
 and in line of battle on the right of our advancing column, 
 where they had planted a battery of several pieces of field ar 
 tillery, and had opened fire. The value of these light-draught 
 gunboats and their heavy armament was soon seen. The Otta 
 wa and Pembina moved a short distance down the river and 
 opened upon the enemy a destructive fire from 11-inch and 
 Parrott guns. The shells fell in the midst of the troops, and 
 burst on all sides with such fatal and demoralizing effect as to 
 scatter them in confusion, and drive them for shelter into the 
 more distant woods, and the flank of our column was cleared. 
 
 The rebels sent a flag of truce, asking permission to carry 
 off their killed and wounded. Before General Stevens could 
 send a reply the gunboats, which had ceased firing for a time, 
 reopened without knowing that such a request had been sent. 
 Soon after, firing ceased for the night. Next morning the ene 
 my again appeared in the woods, as if contemplating a fresh 
 attack. Five of the gunboats at once took position, and hurled 
 upon them a storm of shells that scattered them once more. 
 The object of the expedition, the dismantling of the forts, and 
 clearing out obstructions, having been accomplished, the troops 
 were reembarked. The channel of the Coosaw is so narrow 
 that the gunboats could not turn in the usual manner, and they 
 were very often aground, yet none of them were injured, and 
 their adaptation to this service in the tortuous river channels 
 and shallow waters of the sounds and bays was admirably 
 shown. Thus was frustrated one of the first attempts of the 
 rebels to recover their lost ground. 
 
468 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 About the same time with the expedition just mentioned, 
 a blockade-runner was caught by the bark Gem of the Seas. 
 She was cruising off the north end of North Island, when, about 
 half-past 7 o clock in the morning, a schooner was seen 
 running down the coast, close in shore. The Gem at once 
 tacked, and stood to the northeast for the purpose of cutting 
 her off. The schooner thereupon hauled to the wind, and stood 
 in for the land. The Gem at once tacked again, hoisted her 
 colors, and gave chase. As the schooner refused to show any 
 colors, a shot was fired across her bows, to which she paid no 
 attention. A second shot was fired, which fell astern. The 
 third one struck her, passing through her bulwarks, and glancing, 
 passed through her deck. She, however, kept on her course, 
 and soon passed into the north entrance, but after running a 
 quarter of a mile grounded, and was set afire and deserted by 
 her crew. Boats were immediately dispatched in the hope of 
 saving her. She proved to be the English schooner Prince of 
 "Wales, from Nassau, one of the neutral squadron which England 
 so vigorously maintained during the war, forfeiting a friendship 
 which afterward she would have been most happy to regain, 
 when, alas for her, it could not be easily obtained. Her cabin 
 was in flames, and the wind was rapidly driving the fire for 
 ward. As the tide rose, she swung off with her head to the 
 wind, and thus taking the flames over the stern. The sailors 
 seized whatever came to hand, saucepans, kettles, coffee-pots, 
 dishes, anything that would hold water, and after an hour s 
 hard labor in throwing on water and salt, the fire was subdued. 
 They then began to tow her out of the creek with the boats, and 
 for a short time the prospect for a little prize-money was quite 
 encouraging, but suddenly a volley of rifle-balls from the shore 
 compelled them to abandon their course, and attempt to take 
 her through the breakers. Here she grounded, and finding no 
 channel which did not run within range of the rifles, they were 
 compelled to abandon her, having first set her on fire in several 
 places. When the last boat was ready to leave, and was cross 
 ing the breakers, some rebel riflemen who had crept along the 
 beach suddenly rose up and opened fire upon them, and a run 
 ning but bloodless fight was kept up until the boats were out 
 of range. The schooner was finally consumed. 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, AND RIVERS. 469 
 
 Incidents like this are recorded, not because they are in 
 themselves of great importance, but because they serve to show 
 the almost daily occupation of our seamen, and bring to light 
 that continuous work of the Navy which, although hidden by 
 the splendor of more brilliant exploits, was absolutely essential 
 to final success, and without which the great battles could not 
 have been fought. The daily work of the Xavy was the foun 
 dation on which the war in the Southwest rested. One purpose 
 of the officers in the neighborhood of Charleston, Savannah, 
 Brunswick, and Fernandina, was to gather the negroes from 
 the abandoned plantations, and locate them in colonies in 
 order to protect them, and to provide some reliable method of 
 supplying them with food, which at first, at that season of the 
 year, and in the condition of the country, was a matter of some 
 difficulty. It was an affecting sight to see these poor creatures 
 taken away from the only homes they knew, and gathered by 
 hundreds into encampments under the guns of our ships, where 
 they could not have even the slender comforts of their plantation 
 home, and where the sick and infirm old men and women, and 
 children, necessarily suffered much; and yet they hailed the 
 ships everywhere with delight, and regarded our sailors as 
 deliverers, and welcomed freedom even with these hard con. 
 ditions, and from the discomforts and sufferings of these rude 
 colonies they took their first upward step in progress and civil 
 ization. Their loyalty which no suffering could diminish, their 
 steadfast faith that the hour of their deliverance had come, 
 appeared like an inspiration. It seemed like a spell upon every 
 mind which kept them hopeful and believing under every dis 
 couragement. What seemed the hard necessity of gathering 
 them up from the plantations into encampments or colonies was 
 made by the Lord in whom they trusted the occasion of confer 
 ring upon them their first great blessing. It made it possible to 
 reach them with teachers, and the foundations were laid of that 
 system of instruction by which they soon made rapid progress 
 in a true civilization. 
 
 So soon as the rebels had recovered somewhat from their 
 panic, their first thought seemed to be to return to the deserted 
 plantations, and gather up all the negroes that could be found, 
 and drive them into the interior, or shoot them down in revenge 
 
4YO HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 for their having favored the cause of the Union, and fled to our 
 soldiers and sailors for protection. The islands and the adjacent 
 country were the scenes of daily outrage and murder. Squads 
 of rebel cavalry prowled around every accessible spot, and 
 troops gathered where they could be secure from the gunboats, 
 or they brought field batteries and planted them in ambush at 
 points where our vessels would pass, or attempted to reoccupy 
 the batteries that had been dismantled, or they scouted the 
 country to destroy cotton that they feared might fall into our 
 hands, or carried oif or destroyed corn that the negroes might 
 use. To watch against, meet, and defeat these ever-varying 
 methods of attack in such a country was a service whose per 
 plexity, labor, and peril, had no intermission by night or by day. 
 The light-draught gunboats were constantly pushing their way 
 through the only half-fluid water of the narrow and shallow 
 channels, and their boats in every direction along the creeks, 
 exposed ever to hidden riflemen. The negroes could not be 
 sent to gather corn without the guard of one or more boats and 
 a howitzer ; and when it is considered that some of the colonies 
 numbered more than a thousand, it will be seen that the task 
 of collecting food for them under such circumstances was by 
 no means a small one. But the N"avy was, in this, performing 
 a work nobler even than fighting great battles. It was helping 
 to lay the foundations of a new civilization for four millions of 
 people ; it was the beginning of the successful solution of the 
 great problem of free labor and civilization for the enslaved 
 race ; it was an experiment which settled the question in favor 
 of freedom forever. The sailors and soldiers who protected and 
 fed the freedmen of the Sea Islands, the far-seeing Christian 
 philanthropists who at once arranged to send them teachers, the 
 noble men and women who offered themselves for that service, 
 performed one of the most heroic and important works of the war. 
 The gunners, by daily practice, became so skilful in the use 
 of their immense rifles and smooth-bore shell-guns, they learned 
 to calculate distances by the eye with such wonderful accuracy, 
 so as to decide whether a five-second, or ten-second, or fifteen - 
 second fuse was needed, that it was a very perilous thing for 
 even a small company of rebels to show themselves within 
 range, and these squads often made fatal mistakes in miscalcu- 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, AND RIVERS. 471 
 
 lating the distance at which a shell could reach them. In this 
 manner the rebels were prevented from making any formidable 
 concentration of troops for the recovery of the islands, for the 
 dreaded gunboats could shell them out of any position ; and 
 thus effectual protection was given to the negroes, who ere long, 
 under the guidance of their friends, began to show the rudiments 
 of social order, and started in that progress which, though the 
 first steps were slow and painful, was not afterward seriously 
 interrupted. 
 
 Inasmuch as, early in 1862, the means were not at command 
 to attempt the reduction of Fort Pulaski, it was thought pos 
 sible that some channel might be discovered whereby the Savan 
 nah River might be entered by our gunboats above the fort, and 
 so communication would be cut off between it and Savannah ; 
 or, if it should be found impracticable to enter the river, it was 
 deemed probable that some one of the numerous channels would 
 permit the gunboats to approach near enough to command the 
 river with their guns. On the first of February an expedition 
 was fitted out under the command of Fleet-Captain C. II. Davis, 
 for the purpose of making this reconnoissance. It consisted of 
 the Ottawa, Lieutenant Stevens ; the Seneca, Captain Ammen, 
 and the armed steamers Isaac Smith, Nicholson, Potomska, and 
 Watmough; the Ellen, the Western "World, and two armed 
 launches, and the transports Cosmopolitan, Delaware, and Bos 
 ton ; on board of which were twenty-four hundred men under 
 the command of Brigadier-General H. G. Wright. The object 
 of this reconnoissance was to explore the channels connected 
 with Wassaw Sound. In this sound the fleet anchored for the 
 night. The next morning, owing to the shoalness of the 
 water and the difficulties of the channel it was half-past 8 
 o clock before they could enter the passage called Little Tybee 
 River, or Freeborn Cut, a channel which passes within long rifle 
 range of Fort Pulaski, on its southern face, which was not pre 
 pared for an enemy on that side. The fleet, therefore, was not 
 fired upon from the fort as they passed it about half-past one 
 o clock, but the garrison could be seen actively engaged in 
 making preparations to open upon them on their return. Soon 
 after passing the high land on Wilmington Island, they came to 
 a double row of heavy piles driven across the channel, which 
 
472 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 prevented the further progress of the gunboats. Presuming 
 that, as usual, batteries had been erected, by which these obstruc 
 tions were commanded, boats were sent on shore, and a thorough 
 examination made, but no traces of such works were discovered. 
 The rebels, as soon appeared, depended upon their fleet to aid 
 in guarding the channel. At 5 o clock this fleet of five steam 
 ers, under Commodore Tatnall, came down the Savannah 
 Eiver and anchored in the mouth of the creek. As our gunboats 
 could not pass the piles, the rebels had the power to choose their 
 distance, and a battle was expected. The night, however, passed 
 quietly. The next morning the rebel steamers attempted to 
 pass down the river with some scows in tow, when our gunboats 
 opened fire upon them, and after a fight of half an hour, the 
 enemy s flag-ship and one other steamer were driven back, and 
 the other three escaped without injury and went down to Fort 
 Pulask;i. One of the steamers driven back was said to have 
 sunk at the wharf after reaching the city. 
 
 At 2 o clock the three steamers returned from the fort, and 
 the fight was recommenced. It was, however, then low water, 
 and the decks of the steamers on both sides were sunk almost to 
 the level of the marsh between them, and the shot which on the 
 water would have reached by ricochet, spent their force gener 
 ally in the marsh. As a fight, it was of very small importance. 
 Pulaski was passed on the way back before daylight, and they 
 were not perceived. As a reconnoissance, it produced some 
 valuable results. Information was gained which served to shape 
 the future operations of the fleet and army. Savannah was 
 thrown into great excitement, and troops were brought from 
 other points to strengthen its defences. It was feared that our 
 fleet would soon be before the city. It was found, however, 
 that although the cut could be navigated without difficulty, yet 
 it would require that Wilmington Island should be occupied 
 with a strong force, and works which would probably require 
 more time and labor than the erection of batteries for the reduc 
 tion of Fort Pulaski. Gunboats could not lie in safety in any 
 part of the narrow passage, with the island in the hands of the 
 enemy, and, with Pulaski also in their possession, they would 
 soon find the means of planting guns so as to prevent the safe 
 passage of a fleet. 
 
NLETS, AND RIVERS. 473 
 
 Soon after the last-named expedition, an attempt was made 
 to discover an entrance into the Savannah River on the north 
 side, and above the fort. Wright Eiver is one of the approaches 
 to Savannah, and has two entrances to the Savannah River, one 
 through its mouth, and one through a branch called Mud River. 
 These are little more than cuts or natural canals through the 
 marshes. Mud River is bare at low tides, but the bottom being; 
 semi-fluid, gunboats can be pushed through in the high spring 
 tides. Wright River has only four feet of water on the bar at low 
 tide, and eleven at high tide. Considering the mud in which 
 our gunboats were compelled to operate in these Southern 
 bays and creeks, one sees why Mr. Lincoln applied to them the 
 term " web-footed." Operating as they did with land forces, 
 often forming a part of land expeditions, and floundering in mud, 
 they might be said to belong to the amphibious class of vessels. 
 At one point, Wright River approaches Fort Pulaski within one 
 mile and three-quarters, and consequently within range of its 
 guns, though the distance is too great for accurate firing. The 
 expedition examined and staked out both of these passages, 
 being a part of the time under the fire of the fort, which, how 
 ever, did them no damage. 
 
 At this time the army was engaged in erecting a battery on 
 Yenus Point, for the purpose of commanding the Savannah 
 above Pulaski, and cutting off its supplies from the city. This 
 point is within range from the mouth of Mud River, and, in order 
 to protect the working-parties, one gunboat was moored across 
 Mud River, with her broadside bearing up the Savannah River, 
 and the other was anchored parallel with the channel, with her 
 battery sweeping the right flank of the shore battery. In this 
 manner the soldiers were protected both against Tatnall s fleet 
 and an attack on land. On the 14th of February the rebel 
 fleet came down, four in number, for the purpose of driving the 
 soldiers away, but, with the aid of the guns already mounted on 
 the battery, they were repulsed and driven back. At the mouth 
 of New River the rebels had constructed a boom with great care 
 and skill. This the gunboats removed, and towed it down, and 
 moored it across the mouth of Mud River, within reach of grape 
 and canister from the gunboats. This was necessary both to 
 guard against fire-rafts, a favorite weapon of the rebels, and to 
 
4: 74 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 prevent an overwhelming attack of boarders from boats, a thing 
 to be apprehended, because the steamers moored in Mud River 
 were much of the time aground. At night, and in case of fog, 
 which prevented the boom from being clearly seen, picket-boats 
 with signals arranged, were kept on duty, so as to give timely 
 warning of the approach of an enemy. These show a part of 
 the operations of the Navy in giving at all points support and 
 protection to the army while preparing those works which eoon 
 enabled them to command the Savannah River, and to compel 
 the surrender of Fort Pulaski. 
 
 During these operations the rebels were not idle. Soon after 
 this reconnoissance, and the staking out of the channels just 
 mentioned, while the sailors were placing buoys to mark the 
 course, a torpedo was discovered at the mouth of Wright River, 
 in the very channel selected for the passage of the gunboats. It 
 consisted of five metal cases which served as air-chambers, and 
 buoys for five others which contained about thirty pounds of 
 powder. They were so fastened as to be covered by water 
 whenever vessels could pass the bar, but were exposed at low 
 water. As it was a somewhat dangerous machine to handle, a 
 rifle-ball was fired through it, when it exploded, but the ma 
 chinery was uninjured, and could be thoroughly examined. The 
 exploding charge was connected with a common friction primer, 
 and that connected by a string with a wire coiled in the top of 
 the buoy. The passing vessel was expected to strike the buoy, 
 draw out the wire, and explode the charge. Several of these 
 infernal machines had been placed at the mouth of Wright River. 
 They appeared at first sight like empty tin cans, and were 
 thought worthy of no attention. Lieutenant Sproston, however, of 
 the Seneca, having observed them more closely, suspected that 
 they might be buoys of torpedoes, and communicated his opinion 
 to others, and it was determined to examine them. It was soon 
 found that these suspicions were correct. They were left until 
 the next day, and about midnight one of them exploded just after 
 the launches of the Susquehanna, with a flat and artillery for 
 Point Yenus, had passed. The next day these boats were sent 
 out, provided with grapnels and lead-lines, so that the buoys 
 might be grappled at a safe distance. They caught the wires, 
 but could not, by pulling, produce an explosion. "With great 
 
NXETS, AND RIVERS. 475 
 
 caution they then cut such connecting wires as they could 
 reach, and the next day the remainder were sunk by firing rifle- 
 balls through the buoys. Thus far, the torpedo system of the 
 rebels was a complete failure. Neither on the Potomac Kiver, 
 nor at ISTewbern, nor in this case, had any damage been done. 
 Subsequently, however, they demonstrated at Charleston, 
 Mobile, and other places, that torpedoes may be used with 
 deadly effect in coast and harbor defences, and the attention of 
 scientific men, both here and in Europe, was seriously turned to 
 the question whether the torpedo will not hereafter become a 
 regular weapon of war, and perhaps the most formidable on the 
 list. Should this be so, and should the results now clearly indi 
 cated by experiments with the new heavy artillery be attained, 
 scarcely a trace will remain of the old methods of warfare on 
 the water, or in fortifications for coast and harbor defence. The 
 old navies of the world, and the huge old stone and brick forts, 
 may be regarded already as worthless rubbish ; granite, cased 
 with iron, is demolished by the 15-inch smooth-bore and 12-inch 
 rifled gun, and it seems difficult to conceive of any defences 
 which will resist the stroke of the 20-inch shot. 
 
 On the 14th of February a boat expedition was sent by Lieu 
 tenant Conroy, commanding the armed bark Restless, into Bull s 
 Bay, in search of any small craft that might be found in that 
 vicinity. Inside the shoals they discovered four small vessels, 
 three schooners and one sloop, that were loaded with rice, and 
 w r ere going through the inner passage to Charleston. They had 
 on board nearly eight thousand bushels of rice. The vessels 
 and their cargoes were burned. By operations of this sort, 
 which were continually carried on in all directions, the trade on 
 the inner channels was interrupted or broken up, while the 
 blockaders intercepted to a great extent that which came by 
 sea, and thus every week the resources of the rebels were dimin 
 ished. At every point the power of the Navy bore heavily 
 on the rebellion. It stretched an almost impenetrable wall 
 along the coast, the heavy vessels demolished their forts, the 
 web-footed gunboats seemed to be able to go wherever there was 
 soft mud, and the small boats searched even the little creeks so 
 thoroughly, that few movements of the rebels escaped their 
 scrutiny. Such was the activity and apparent omnipresence of 
 
476 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the gunboats, that the negroes felt, in their surprise and igno 
 rance, the utmost confidence that the " Linkum ships " would 
 protect them though they might be twenty miles away. 
 
 The nature of the warfare which the rebels waged, and the 
 perilous nature of the service on these rivers, is well illustrated 
 by the attack in which Lieutenant Budd lost his life. In 
 March this valuable and lamented officer organized a boat 
 expedition from the Penguin and the Henry Andrew to proceed 
 from Mosquito Inlet on the Florida coast, and make a recon- 
 noissance through a passage leading into Mosquito lagoon. 
 The expedition consisted of five light boats, which carried forty- 
 three men. They passed on some eighteen miles without any 
 accident, and without seeing an enemy. On their return, and 
 when within sight of their vessel, the two commanding officers, 
 quite in advance of the party, landed at some abandoned earth 
 works which were surrounded by dense thickets. Here a mur 
 derous volley was poured into them from an ambush, by which 
 Lieutenant Budd, Acting Master Mather, and three of the five 
 seamen composing the crew were instantly killed, and the re 
 maining two wounded and taken prisoners. A heavy fire was 
 also opened upon the remaining boats as they came up, and they 
 also suffered severely, without being able to offer any effectual 
 defence. This was one of the most unfortunate of the smaller 
 expeditions of the Navy. Doubtless there was a want of proper 
 precaution, or the useless sacrifice of life would have been 
 avoided, but they who committed the error expiated it with 
 their own lives. Of the forty-three composing the expedition, 
 eight were killed and seven wounded, more than one-third of 
 the whole ; and for this severe loss no compensatory advantage? 
 whatever were gained. It was a useless sacrifice to the spirit 
 of adventure. 
 
 Another and still more severe case of sudden attack, char 
 acteristic of determined men, and agreeing with the spirit 
 in which so much of the war was conducted by the rebels, 
 occurred in March, near Brunswick, Florida. On the after 
 noon of the llth of March, the assistant surgeon of the Poca- 
 hoiitas, A. C. Rhodes, landed with a boat s crew for the pur 
 pose of procuring some fresh beef for the ships. Having re 
 ceived the meat and paid for it, he started to return to his 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, AND RIVERS. 477 
 
 ship. He had scarcely gone fifty feet from the beach, when he 
 was fired upon by a company of rebels concealed in a thicket, and 
 two of the boat s crew instantly killed and seven wounded. After 
 the fire, not before, they called to them to surrender. Surprised 
 as were the boat s crew, and almost disabled by the murderous 
 fire, they bravely refused to surrender, and pulled with their re 
 maining strength for the ship, the rebels continuing their fire. 
 Fortunately, the attack was observed from the Mohican, and just 
 as a company of sixty were hastening at double-quick to join 
 those who had fired on the now defenceless boat, an 11-inch 
 shell dropped in their midst and sent them scattering in all 
 directions. This relieved the boat, and almost immediately the 
 Pocahontas and Potomska opened from some of their shell 
 guns, and these concealed foes were driven away. They ran 
 in confusion to some railway cars, the shells bursting among 
 them as they went, but of course they sent back no account of 
 their losses. Such was the promptness and activity on board 
 the ships to rescue their comrades, that before the crippled boat 
 was out of range of the rifles, Lieutenant Balch of the Pocahon 
 tas reached them with his own boat, and took them in tow. 
 The bravery of the men left in the crippled boat, the prompt 
 ness with which the Mohican trained on them her pivot-gun, 
 and the rapidity with which the boat of the Pocahontas was 
 manned and pulled to their relief, deserve to be held in remem 
 brance. 
 
 In June one of our most esteemed officers was murdered at 
 May port Mills, Florida, on the St. John s River. George Hus 
 ton, a most desperate character, was the captain of a company 
 of guerillas who committed savage outrages on all Union 
 men, and the usual barbarities on such prisoners as fell into 
 their hands. Huston boasted that he had hung the negro pilot 
 taken prisoner when Lieutenant Budd lost his life, and probably 
 the savage boast was true. Captain Ammen, of the gunboat 
 Seneca, thought it important to secure this man, and Lieutenant 
 John Sproston, the executive officer of the ship, was sent on 
 shore with seventy men to take him prisoner. He landed at 
 daylight, and proceeded to his house. Huston had been 
 apprised of his coming, and armed with two pistols, a double- 
 barrelled gun, and a knife, met him at the door, and shot Lieu- 
 
4:78 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 tenant Sproston dead. He then fired his other pistol and 
 double-barrelled gun, but no other one of the party was struck. 
 Huston was of course shot down, mortally wounded, and was 
 taken on board the vessel. Lieutenant Sproston was a highly 
 accomplished and valuable officer, and great indignation was 
 felt throughout the Navy that a noble and true man should be 
 murdered by such a wretch. 
 
 No adequate idea can be given of the operations of the 
 Navy by merely selecting important engagements, and con 
 fining the narrative to these. It was the daily work of the 
 officers and seamen, the unending succession of toils and perils, 
 amid the marshes and mud channels and ambushes of this 
 Southern coast which the country should know in order to 
 estimate aright what was performed and suffered by this branch 
 of our service. The work of the Navy was entirely different 
 from what ships and seamen had been before called upon to 
 perform, except as occasional service. Never before had it 
 formed the main business of a great war. The history of the 
 naval wars in Europe is a narrative of the combats of squadrons 
 and single ships on the ocean, and in the same manner the 
 interest of our naval war of 1812 centred upon battles between 
 ships, and all else presented only the common routine of the 
 sailing of the ship. These sea-fights, therefore, formed almost 
 the sole material for the history. But in the war of the rebel 
 lion, with the exception of the fights between iron-clads, and 
 the one battle between the Kearsarge and the Alabama, the 
 combats at sea were few and comparatively unimportant. It 
 was not a conflict of one navy with another, squadron with 
 squadron, or ship with ship, but with forts and batteries, and 
 ambushed riflemen, and torpedoes, and hidden obstructions a 
 service partly on land with ships light batteries, partly on water, 
 and partly in the mud, where there was neither land to stand 
 upon nor water to float in. It was a work entirely unique, an 
 incessant labor, with scarcely enough of stirring incident to 
 keep up the spirit of the men, and yet one whose value in the 
 aggregate no history can adequately describe. The only thing 
 which can be done is to present a brief narrative of events 
 as they occurred. 
 
 This narrative is often best given in the very words of the 
 
INLETS, AND EIVERS. 479 
 
 officers who were engaged, and the following accounts will show 
 something of the daily operations of the gunboats and their 
 crews in the neighborhood of Charleston and Savannah during 
 the few weeks that preceded the fall of Fort Pulaski. 
 
 NIGHT RECONNOISSANCE AT BEARDS BLUFF, NORTH EDISTO. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER CRUSADER, NORTH EDISTO, March 3, 1862. 
 
 SIR: On the 23d instant I received information that the enemy 
 were building a battery at Bear s Bluff, opposite White Point. On the 
 night of the 24th, accompanied by Lieutenant Prentiss, I went up in 
 our dingy, with three men, and landed without being discovered by 
 the guard. Lieutenant Prentiss and I went up and found the battery in 
 an unfinished state, and looking about us, discovered the magazine ; 
 found two of the picket-guard asleep in it ; got one musket from beside 
 them without awakening them ; returned to the boat, and brought up 
 two of the men to secure them. In doing so, I regret to say, one of 
 them was shot through the head and instantly killed, the pistol in my 
 hand going off accidentally in the struggle. We carried both to the 
 boat, and escaped without discovery. 
 
 The picket-guard at the battery that night consisted of fifteen infan 
 try and two mounted men, in command of a lieutenant, so the surviving 
 prisoner states. We buried the other properly the next day near the 
 camp of the Forty-seventh regiment. His name was Joseph A. Wilson, 
 company C, Moore s battalion, stationed at Church Flats ; the other, 
 now on board this vessel, is William M. Evins, from Rabun County, 
 Georgia, of the same company. According to his account, there are 
 two regiments at Church Flats, sending pickets out regularly to Rock- 
 ville, Bear s Bluff, and other points on the east side of the river ; their 
 men ill-fed, not paid or clothed, and badly treated. Wilson was from 
 Pickens District, South Carolina. The musket we have taken from 
 them is of the Enfield pattern, has the Tower mark, date 1861. Both 
 cartridge-boxes contained Ely s London stamped cartridges. 
 
 I sent a boat, in charge of Lieutenant Prentiss, into Rockville on 
 the night of the 28th ; but they were discovered, though proceeding 
 cautiously, and a volley fired into them as they touched the shore, with 
 out hitting any one, however. Having orders to return, if discovered, 
 they withdrew. The bad weather to-day prevented my going up the 
 river, as I intended. 
 
 We have picked up several contrabands from the east side lately ; 
 one, coming from Charleston, reached here by way of John s Island in 
 
480 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 twenty-four hours. Though arrested by a picket and detained on the 
 way, he succeeded in escaping again at night. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. C. RIIIND, Lieutenant commanding. 
 S. F. Du PONT, Flag- Officer, 
 
 commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
 EXPEDITION TO BRUNSWICK. 
 
 TJ. S. STEAMER MOHICAN, OFF BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA, March 10, 1869. 
 
 SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your order of 
 March 5, I left Fernandina on the morning of the 8th, accompanied by 
 the Pocahontas, Lieutenant Commanding Balch, and the Potomska, 
 Acting Lieutenant Commanding Watmough, and crossed Fernandina 
 Bar with just water enough to comfortably float this ship, made the 
 best of my way to St. Simon s Bar, and reached it at dead low water, 
 passing it, and getting into St. Simon s Channel, through which I car 
 ried about seventeen feet to within two miles of the forts, which we 
 could plainly see, commanding St. Simon s entrance. 
 
 Here, at sundown, I anchored for the night. After dark I shifted 
 the anchorage of the ship, to alter the range of any guns that might be 
 left in the batteries. At daylight made preparations to pass the batter 
 ies, and at sunrise weighed anchor and stood in. Soon discovered that 
 the batteries were evidently abandoned, and anchored my little force 
 inside and beyond range of the guns, and made signal to land from the 
 vessels. Lieutenant Commanding Balch, of the Pocahontas, with three 
 boats, took possession of the fort on St. Simon s Island, consisting of 
 strong earthworks of considerable extent and having had eleven guns 
 mounted. Some solid 10-inch shot found in the fort would indicate the 
 calibre of some of the guns there. I enclose a detailed report of that 
 battery by Lieutenant Commanding Balch. Lieutenant Miller, of this 
 ship, at the same time occupied the fort on Jekyl Island, which was, it 
 seems, a much stronger position. It was a sand-work, with five case 
 mates finished, covered with railroad iron and very well built, and two 
 unfinished casemates, the iron rails ready to be put up. These two forts 
 commanded the channel for a long distance, and their fire crossed the 
 entrance, which is about a mile (or a little more) wide. Once the bat 
 teries were passed, they could offer but little difficulty, as in five minutes 
 the guns of the vessels would have enfiladed them, and could even fire 
 directly in the rear ; but they would have given a number of vessels 
 severe trouble in getting beyond them. I enclose the report of Lieu 
 tenant Miller of the fort on Jekyl Island. 
 
INLETS, AND EIVEES. 481 
 
 As soon as the boats returned I went on the Potomska, and pro 
 ceeded in her up the river to Brunswick. So soon as we opened the 
 town to view a heavy fire commenced at the wharf, and, at the same 
 moment, we perceived the railroad cars moving at full speed in the 
 woods. I at once determined to bring up the ships and place myself 
 off the town, in hopes of preventing by my presence the place from 
 being burned, and I at once returned in the Potomska, as I had the 
 pilot with me. Both the Mohican and Pocahontas were under way be 
 fore I reached them, and we proceeded to Brunswick, off which place I 
 anchored as the sun went down. The cars had returned, but again 
 started at our approach. The Pocahontas anchored opposite the town, 
 but outside of Buzzard Roost Island ; the Potomska still higher up, and 
 her guns commanded the railroad beyond the town. The following morn 
 ing I sent the Potomska into the branch opposite the town. Neither 
 this ship nor the Pocahontas can well get in, as at high water only 
 twelve feet was found in the bulkhead, and between the wharf and 
 Buzzard Roost Island the river is but about four hundred feet wide. 
 
 With the Potomska, Lieutenant Balch took charge of a landing 
 party, consisting of twenty-five marines from this ship and the Poca 
 hontas, and two 1 2-pound er guns, with forty riflemen from the different 
 vessels, landed, and hoisted the flag. The place was deserted, and most 
 of the furniture of the houses removed ; still there was much private 
 property about, some in scows on the wharf, ready to be removed. 
 After a careful examination of such buildings as might be supposed to 
 contain public property, and a careful survey was had, I visited the 
 town, and then directed the command to return to the ship ; having 
 posted a notice urging the inhabitants to return, and promising protec 
 tion to all property for all good citizens. I enclose Lieutenant Balch s 
 report of his landing, etc. Nothing in the place was touched by the 
 landing party, and such houses as were not open were not even entered. 
 I sincerely hope that at least some good citizens may be found willing 
 to resume their homes under my public notice, and I shall not allow 
 the place to be visited except on duty. 
 
 The fire we noticed was the work of retiring soldiers, and proved to 
 be the railroad depot and wharf. The lenses belonging to the light 
 house were not found ; the channel buoys for the river are in the river, 
 but out of place, and the light-house destroyed. The town is closely 
 surrounded by woods, is generally well built, and extends over a con 
 siderable space. Several contrabands have come on board. Soldiers 
 are said to be in the woods, not very distant, and most of the inhabi 
 tants are said to be about fourteen or sixteen miles back, encamped. I 
 31 
 
482 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 have sent the Potomska and Pocahontas up the river, as far as they 
 could go, to reconnoitre. There is a schooner of considerable size on 
 the stocks unfinished. Fires have been burning about us, but I believe 
 it is the brush being consumed ; nor have I noticed, as far as the people 
 are concerned, that they are willing to follow the advice of Messrs. 
 Tombs and Cobb, by placing the torch in the hands of the children to 
 consume their property. All that is done in that way seems to be 
 done by the order of military commanders, who, having no local inter 
 est in the neighborhood of their commands, have the heroism to con 
 sume the property in which they have no immediate interest. 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. W. GODON, Commander and Senior Officer. 
 Flag-Officer S. F. Du PONT, 
 
 commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
 RECONNOISSANCE FROM BRUNSWICK TO DARIEN. 
 
 U. S. STEAMER MOHICAN, ST. SIMON S ISLAND, March 16, 1862. 
 SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 13th instant I started 
 in the Potomska, accompanied by the Pocahontas, with the launch and 
 howitzer of this ship, in charge of Lieutenant Miller, in tow, and pro 
 ceeded through the inland passage toward the Altamaha River. 
 
 O A O 
 
 I had heard that there were one or two rebel steamers at Darien, 
 and I hoped that I might get possession of them. About five miles 
 from the anchorage at this place, and where I had left the Mohican 
 (between the batteries), we found, as I had heard from contrabands, 
 that the river was staked entirely across. We reached the spot at low 
 water and found a double row of heavy piles, with their heads just above 
 water. I at once got to work with both vessels, and in a few hours 
 hauled enough out of each row to allow a passage for both vessels, say 
 forty feet, and here for the first time I learned that about five miles be 
 yond another obstruction of the same kind had been placed. We 
 reached the second difficulty at midnight, placed our hawser, as the tide 
 was rising, but unfortunately the hawser disengaged itself from the pile, 
 and in the night, with the rising tide, we could not find them to go on 
 with the work, and my hope of passing through during the night was 
 lost. My object was to get into the river so as to make a dash up to 
 Darien by early daylight ; we, however, worked hard that day, and by 
 twelve o clock got through the last obstruction. Between the two ob 
 structions, midway, a battery had been built of mud, with the seeming 
 object of firing at the vessels employed in removing the piles, but which 
 could not be observed from those vessels. 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE SOUNDS, INLETS, AND KIVERS. 483 
 
 As we passed the second obstruction and turned the river, we saw 
 the steamers moving off from the wharf at Darien with full head of 
 steam, going up the Altamaha River. 
 
 At sundown I anchored both vessels at Doboy Island, passing to 
 reach that spot, which is on the Altamaha River, through Mud River at 
 high water, with just twelve feet. We remained that day at Doboy, 
 the wind blowing quite a gale from southwest to west. 
 
 As I had lost hope of the capture of the steamers, and observing 
 several large fires in the neighborhood of Darien, I determined to pro 
 ceed no farther at this time, more particularly as we found that the 
 brasses of the Potomska s shaft-bearing had broken, and I feared she 
 might become disabled. I had indeed accomplished my object, which 
 was to open the inland passage to Darien, and if the Potoraska had not 
 been in, what I fear, a crippled condition, I should have placed her at 
 Doboy, which commands the river outlet, or at Sapelow Island, which 
 commands the entire entrance to the Altamaha and the island passage 
 to Savannah. 
 
 Darien has been deserted, as was Brunswick. This we learned from 
 some contrabands who came off to us, a company of horsemen only re 
 maining in town, with the intention of firing the place should we ap 
 proach it. 
 
 I have now been from one end of St. Simon s Island to the other; 
 but one white man is left in it. I saw him ; he is with his aged mother 
 and little child. He had never been in the army, refused to leave his 
 home, and was in mortal dread of our coming, as the military informed 
 him that we came for the purpose of destroying even the women and chil 
 dren. We procured beef for the vessels at his plantation, for which we 
 paid the price he asked, and furnished the family with some articles, 
 such as coffee, salt, etc., which articles they had not even seen for 
 months. We stopped at one or two other plantations on our way back, 
 all deserted, but had been tenanted by the military at various times, for 
 as late as November some one thousand five hundred troops were quar 
 tered on St. Simon s. We found some of the places to contain large 
 quantities of cattle, and at King s plantation, not three miles from this 
 anchorage, we counted some fifty head near where we landed. 
 
 All the blacks have been removed from St. Simon s, and at Doboy 
 we met the only negro seen, who was old and alone on the place. He 
 had been the father of thirteen children, but he informed me that every 
 one had been sold as they reached about eighteen years of age, and, as 
 he graphically expressed it, " for pocket-money for his master." 
 
 Your orders did not embrace the reconnoissance I have just made, 
 
484: HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 and which has caused a delay of several days in communicating to you 
 my progress to Brunswick. I hope, however, you will approve my con 
 duct in the matter. 
 
 I have now cleared the passage to Darien from inside, which can be 
 performed rapidly by gunboats of ten feet draught at any time ; at low 
 tides eleven feet; the draught of the Pocahontas and Potomska is 
 rather great, as they might be caught and delayed for higher tides. 
 
 I now beg leave, sir, to express myself in warm terms of commenda 
 tion for the energy and skill of Lieutenant Commanding Balch and 
 Acting Lieutenant Commanding W atmough, and for the aid they have 
 rendered me in the active work we have been engaged in for the last 
 eight days, and I take equal pleasure in mentioning the cheerfulness in 
 this work of the officers and crews of the three vessels engaged. * * * 
 
 I cannot speak too highly of the service rendered by Mr. Godfrey, 
 the pilot. I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 S. W. GOD ON, Commander. 
 Flag- Officer S. R Du PONT, 
 
 commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 
 
 BATTERIES ABANDONED ON SKIDDAWAY AND GREEN ISLANDS. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMER SEMINOLE, ABREAST OF ) 
 SKIDDAWAY BATTERY, WILMINGTON EIVER, GA., March 25, 1862. ) 
 
 SIR : In obedience to your order dated 2d instant, we proceeded 
 from Cumberland Sound to Wassaw Sound, Georgia, to blockade as 
 directed. Having waited some days for the weather to settle and the 
 wind to lull, we this afternoon felt our way with the lead up the narrow 
 channel of the Wilmington River to the battery on Skiddaway Island, 
 accompanied by the Norwich, Lieutenant Commanding J. M. Duncan, 
 and Wyandot, Lieutenant Commanding W. D. Whiting. I sent 
 our launch, with the howitzer and crew, under charge of Master Mc- 
 Nair and Acting Master Steele, alongside the Norwich, and went on 
 board of her. She being the shortest vessel, and of lightest draught, was 
 sent ahead. After firing a. shell or two at some horsemen near the 
 house on the left, and a picket-guard at the fort, as we approached, I 
 proceeded in the gig, with Paymaster Sands, to the shore, followed by 
 the launch. We found the battery a strong bastioned work for ten 
 guns, with bomb-proof trenches, etc. The enemy had abandoned it, 
 leaving imitation guns, covered with canvas, in position. Other boats 
 from the vessels coming on shore, we destroyed the works, boats, light 
 ers, etc., of the enemy, and having hoisted the Union flag over the fort 
 and house with the red cupola, we returned on board our respective 
 vessels. I learn that the Confederate battery on Green Island is aban- 
 
NLETS, AND RIVERS. 485 
 
 doned. Several houses in sight are burning this morning, the red cu 
 pola house included. I send to Port Royal a prisoner taken in the 
 marshes by the Release. His statement accompanies this. 
 I am, sir, respectfully, etc., 
 
 JOHN P. GILLIS, Commander. 
 Flag- Officer S. F. Du PONT. 
 
 CONTRABAND S STATEMENT. 
 
 UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP SEMINOLE, j 
 WASSAW SOUND, GEOEGIA, March 26, 1S62. ) 
 
 SIR : The following statement is derived from London Middleton, a 
 contraband picked up this afternoon by the Norwich, and sent on board 
 this ship, viz. : 
 
 His master was William P. Fulton, of Savannah. He left that city 
 on the 22d instant (Saturday), coming by way of White Bluff and Green 
 Island to Raccoon Keys, from whence he expected to reach a " saw 
 mill," which it was said he had on Wassaw Island, with three thousand 
 troops. 
 
 All provisions are scarce at Savannah, and very dear, particularly 
 bacon, rum, liquors, and "such like." Fresh beef is plenty, but costs 
 twenty-five to thirty cents for what used to sell at six, eight, and ten 
 cents per pound. Eggs were selling at fifty cents per dozen ; chickens 
 $1.50 per pair. Tea scarce ; coffee selling at $1.50 to $1.75 per pound. 
 They are " very bad off" for rum and liquors, and " almost have to give 
 them up," and these, with bacon, they expected from the West, some 
 where where the Federals now hold possession. 
 
 Folks are " going and coming." Some who had left are returning, 
 and they are sending the " negroes and cotton " inland, and moving all 
 the " cash money " to Macon, and threaten to burn the city if they 
 should be unable to hold it, and are in daily expectation of our attack. 
 They had given up the idea of defending the Savannah River by torpe 
 does, because one of the principal men who was sinking them got 
 drowned while down in a diving-bell, and they now talk of piling the 
 river across. He knows of no raft near Fort Jackson, near which Tat- 
 nal is, on board the Savannah (late Everglade). When he was last near 
 Thunderbolt, some- time since, they had eight guns mounted. There is 
 a battery (number of guns unknown) at Costan s Bluff, and they said 
 they were mounting guns at " the old fort " above Fort Jackson, below 
 the "gas-house," and near the first ferry wharf; but he knows but little 
 of this part of the river, having been a fisherman around about White 
 Bluff and Green Island, but more recently waiting on the soldiers. 
 
486 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 All the approaches to the city, not only main, but also the l^-roads, 
 are "being fortified, and they told him that "they had one hundred 
 thousand men." 
 
 Green and Skiddaway Islands are abandoned except by a few cav 
 alry. The guns from Green Island were taken to fortify Benley, and 
 those from Skiddaway to Montgomery (a part of Benley, but about 
 three-quarters of a mile separate), both on the Winingberg River, which 
 runs from Raccoon Keys up, making Green Island, the first land to the 
 northeast going up, and thence running up to Benley, Montgomery, and 
 White Bluff. 
 
 They expect us to cross Skiddaway Island, and have guns and pick 
 ets at the two bridges to cut them away and fight our forces on their 
 arrival. The first bridge is reckoned to be five miles across from the 
 cupola house (last night burned by the rebels), near the Skiddaway 
 abandoned battery. Respectfully, etc., 
 
 JOHN P. GILLIS, Commander. 
 Flag- Officer S. F. Du PONT. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 FALL OF FORT PULASKI. 
 
 AFTER it was discovered, by the reconnoissances made both 
 on the north and south side of the Savannah River, that the 
 ships could not be safely carried through any of the channels 
 into the river above the fort, the attention of both the Army 
 and Navy was turned to the erection of batteries by which 
 Pulaski could be invested and bombarded. 
 
 As the Navy was still connected with these operations, and 
 as the bombardment of this work illustrates the power of the 
 new American ordnance, a subject which forms a prominent 
 feature in this history, it was thought that some account of its 
 capture would not be out of place. The construction of the 
 battery at Venus Point, to which reference has been already 
 made, is also worthy of notice, as showing the nature of the ex 
 posure and toil of the daily service performed by soldiers and 
 sailors in the pestilential marshes of the South. The object 
 of this battery was to interrupt communication between Pulaski 
 and the city. 
 
 Jones s Island is simply a marsh, mostly covered at high tide 
 with water, except the marsh grass and weeds. It lies between 
 Mud River, Wright River, and the Savannah, and the inland 
 side can be reached by gunboats through Mud and Wright 
 Rivers. From the point where steamboats could reach the 
 island in the rear, to the opposite spot on the Savannah where 
 the battery was to be placed, was one mile, and the question 
 how heavy siege guns were to be transported that distance, 
 through or over the mud and water, was one not easily to be 
 solved. Still it was necessary that the solution should be 
 
488 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 attempted ; and once decided upon, both men and officers were 
 determined that it should succeed, not only on account of its 
 intrinsic importance, but because of the influence which would 
 be excited, both upon our own men and the rebels, by the 
 performance of an almost impossible work. 
 
 On the night of the 10th of February a party of soldiers 
 struggled through the marsh, and partially laid the platforms 
 for the guns. The next night the guns, 32-pounders, were 
 embarked on flats at Daufurkie Island, and towed by small 
 steamers across to Jones s Island. Then they were landed, if 
 landing it could be called, not upon, but into the marsh. Poles 
 were first laid across the proposed path, forming a rude cordu 
 roy, and on these planks thirty feet long were laid for the gun- 
 carriages, and these planks were shifted ahead as the guns were 
 moved on. The first thing was to place the guns, weighing 
 three tons each, on a pile of sand-bags called a wharf, and then 
 start them along the extemporized wooden railway. The nature 
 of the work may be conceived, by thinking of the men in the 
 night in a heavy storm in the winter, floundering in mud and 
 water-pools, often up to their waists, pushing and dragging the 
 guns along a track sunk in the mud, the carriages constantly 
 slipping oif or running off the planks, and sinking in the mire, 
 from which position they were to be lifted and dragged back to 
 the track again. It is not surprising that during the whole of 
 the first night the guns were moved only two hundred yards. 
 The next night the soldiers were more successful, and the guns 
 were got across the marsh and placed in position on the plat 
 forms, and the next morning when Commodore Tatnall s fleet 
 appeared, they were confronted by the guns of the new bat 
 tery, and compelled to return. The men were so overpowered 
 by this exhausting labor and exposure to storm and water, that 
 they would lie down and sleep in the mud of the marsh. 
 
 As an engineering feat, and as testing the courage and 
 endurance of our men, probably this was scarcely surpassed 
 during the war, but there were many others showing similar 
 determination and daring. To aid this battery, two gunboats 
 were immediately moored in Mud River, as has been previously 
 stated. By the erection of two other small batteries, the work 
 of cutting off Pulaski from supplies was completed, and then the 
 
FALL OF FORT PULASKI. 489 
 
 army began the erection of the works by which the fort was to 
 be reduced, the Navy giving to them in all ways its full support. 
 These batteries were erected upon Tybee Island, which lies to 
 the southwest of Pulaski, and about one mile distant at the 
 points where the siege guns were placed. The surface of the 
 island is sufficient to conceal the batteries from the fort while 
 they were being erected, so that the working-parties suffered 
 little from its fire. Here also the labor of loading and trans 
 porting guns and ammunition was immense. A heavy surf 
 made the work of landing the enormous cannon some of them 
 10-inch columbiads a very dangerous one, and then they were 
 to be dragged two miles through the sand by the soldiers them 
 selves. Here was to be made a new and very important experi 
 ment in breaching the walls of a strong casemated fort. It had 
 before been considered as settled that such walls could not be 
 breached at a greater distance than eight hundred yards ; and 
 it is well to remember this, as the limit which the nations had 
 then reached in the use of artillery, and this will show the extent 
 of the revolution which has been wrought in the world s opinions 
 by the experiments of the war, and by the new American cannon. 
 The batteries planted before the fort were eleven in number, 
 and were armed with 13-inch and 10-inch mortars, 10-inch and 
 8-inch columbiads, 30-ponnder Parrott rifles, and 24, 32, and 
 42-pounder rifles, with James s projectiles. Four of the colum 
 biads and the rifles were placed about one mile from the fort, 
 others of the columbiads for shell-firing, and the mortars, were 
 planted about two miles distant. The fire of the columbiads, 
 using solid shot, and the largest rifles, was concentrated upon a 
 single point in range of the magazine, for the double purpose of 
 breaching the wall and of reaching the magazine. The firing 
 continued for thirty hours, but the walls were breached in a 
 little more than half that time. On the second day the fire 
 from the batteries was far more effective. The range of the 
 guns had been obtained, and a very large proportion of the shot 
 and the shell from the rifles reached their mark. The wall was 
 breached opposite the magazine so that an assault was practi 
 cable. The shells and shot passed through this, and tore away 
 the defences of the magazine, so that it was liable at any 
 moment to be exploded by a shell ; and the commander, deeming 
 
490 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 that lie was exposing the garrison to destruction, with no pros 
 pect of ultimate success, hauled down the traitor nag and hoisted 
 a white one. 
 
 So confident were the rebel officers in the established maxims 
 in regard to the effective range of artillery, that they felt entirely 
 secure, although they knew that works were being erected on 
 Tybee Island, believing that the walls of the fort, said to have 
 been sixteen feet thick, could not be penetrated at that distance. 
 As this was the first trial of the solid shot of the 10-inch colum- 
 biad, and of the new rifled guns against a well-constructed fort, 
 it excited the liveliest interest throughout the country and in 
 Europe. Inasmuch as the rifled gun was then a new weapon 
 for breaching purposes, it drew to itself the chief attention of 
 the country, and the effect of the heavy spherical shot was 
 overlooked. Although there is no method by which the com 
 parative effect of the rifles and smooth-bores can be measured, 
 inasmuch as the fire of both was concentrated upon the same 
 spot, yet enough is known to show that while the projectile from 
 the rifled gun had greater penetration, being much smaller, it < 
 was what eye-witnesses called the trip-hammer ~blow of the pon 
 derous 10-inch shot, that shattered the solid masonry and hurled 
 it in masses down. The small shot, moving with great velocity, 
 bored into the brick- work like a drill ; the solid mass from the 
 columbiad shook and loosened the masonry far beyond the 
 point of impact, and would necessarily in time reduce it to a 
 crumbling ruin. The smaller rifle projectile may bore the wall 
 like a honeycomb, but not shatter it extensively ; while the 
 massive shot, whether from a rifle or smooth-bore, produces an 
 entirely different effect, loosening on all sides the joints of the 
 masonry, and breaking up instead of cutting through the mate 
 rial. The greater range of the heavy rifle renders it of course 
 more effective at a great distance, as was afterward shown at 
 Charleston ; but the stroke of a heavy mass, from whatever gun 
 it may be thrown, is needed to demolish the walls of a fort 
 or the armor of an iron-clad. The fall of Pulaski showed, as 
 many then believed, that the era of stone and brick forts was 
 gone, as completely as that of wooden ships was closed by the 
 battle of the Monitor and the Merrimack. Subsequent experi 
 ments have shown the opinion to be correct. 
 
CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 THE NAVY OF THE WEST AND OUR INLAND WATERS IN ITS RELA- 
 TIONS TO OUR NAVAL POWER AND THE FUTURE POLICY OF OUR 
 COUNTRY. 
 
 As has been previously stated, there was not a gnn belong 
 ing to the United States on the Mississippi or its tributaries at 
 the beginning of the war ; and before the close there were a 
 hundred steamers fully armed upon these waters, and these, 
 with a few exceptions, were built there. This presents an en 
 tirely new feature in the history of the progress of the nation, 
 and one whose bearing upon our future demands our earnest 
 attention. It shows what unlimited, and before unthought-of, 
 resources that " Great West " contains both for the defence of 
 the country and for the increase of our national power. We 
 had before considered with pride and hope its boundless grain- 
 fields, its capacity for the support of hundreds of millions of 
 people, its vast manufacturing power, and its mineral wealth ; 
 but it had not occurred perhaps to any that its power to create 
 and maintain a navy might rival that of the States that lie on 
 the seaboard. The bearing which this will have upon our not 
 remote future cannot be measured now, but a few suggestions 
 may partially indicate its importance. 
 
 One conclusion has been already reached by the American 
 people, and that is, that no European power shall interfere with 
 the affairs of this continent, much less shall any be permitted 
 to establish and maintain a monarchy upon our borders. That 
 conclusion will be enforced, if need be, by the whole power of 
 the nation. Another thought is fast assuming a fixed and defi 
 nite character in the American mind, and that is, that our 
 Government niust and will control this North. American Conti- 
 
492 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 nent from the Isthmus to the Poles, and from ocean to ocean. 
 Toward this, as the territorial goal of our national career, all 
 controlling influences and all leading events irresistibly tend. 
 It is one of those popular impulses which no objections weaken 
 and no difficulties will check. It is useless to speculate upon 
 the morality of the measures which may be adopted for the 
 acquisition of territory, for we know not now what their char 
 acter may be. If wrong is done to any people, then we may 
 be certain that it will be avenged by a just God, the King of 
 nations, who is bound to defend the weak and break the op 
 pressor s power. But the rebellion has taught us a lesson in 
 regard to the danger of hostile neighbors that will not be, and 
 ought not to be, forgotten. 
 
 The imminent peril in which we were placed by the French 
 occupation of Mexico compels the nation to inquire how such a 
 danger can be best averted in the future ; the harboring and en 
 couraging of the conspirators in Canada, and the fitting out of 
 expeditions from thence to poison, rob, and burn, raises neces 
 sarily the question whether our national safety does not de 
 mand an effectual safeguard ; while the closing of the Missis 
 sippi by the rebels has caused our people of the Northwest to 
 consider whether the great Lakes shall be permitted to float a 
 hostile navy which might threaten and perhaps destroy all the 
 beautiful cities that adorn the American coast of our Mediter 
 ranean Seas, and put in peril or sweep away the immense com 
 merce which has been created there by American enterprise 
 and capital. Those who expect that England or France, or any 
 other power of Western Europe, will prove more friendly to us 
 in the future than they have been in the past, will perceive 
 their error the moment either one of them believes that we can 
 be safely attacked. It needed only the evidence afforded us 
 during the rebellion to convince us that this is true, and no 
 present professions of friendship will throw the American peo 
 ple off their guard, or induce them to neglect any proper means 
 of defence. 
 
 The control of the waters of this continent, of the St. Law 
 rence and the Lakes, as well as the Mississippi and the seaboard, 
 is a necessity of our national existence, and, as certainly as the 
 nation remains undivided and unchecked, no long time can 
 
THE NAVY OF THE WEST. 493 
 
 elapse before its flag will cover and protect all. This is no 
 threat against any, nor is it a boast of national power or a puff* 
 of vanity. It is a simple statement of the not remote result of 
 the natural growth of the nation, the inevitable effect of ade 
 quate causes already in operation. 
 
 It is not in the nature of things that a power which has 
 manifested toward us the spirit which England showed during 
 the rebellion, which sent her fleets of smugglers from Nassau, 
 and her raiders, her poisoners, and her incendiaries from Can 
 ada, should long be permitted to hold possession of any part of 
 these inland seas and mighty rivers. Our people will not con 
 sent that our national safety should thus be perilled. They will 
 at no remote period become the exclusive property of the 
 American Union. 
 
 In view of what was done on the Mississippi and its tribu 
 taries during the rebellion, we can easily see that, if the St. 
 Lawrence and the Lakes were exclusively ours, and the Lakes 
 and the Mississippi were suitably connected, the power of the 
 "West to create and maintain a navy would exceed that of our 
 seaboard. The whole chain of waters from the mouth of the 
 St. Lawrence to the mouth of the Mississippi might be fitted, 
 not alone with river steamers, but with ocean cruisers also that 
 no power of earth could even approach. In a very short time 
 the West, if need be, will be able to construct and hold in these 
 secure harbors a thousand ships, which she could send forth at 
 her pleasure through the great gate of the North, or that of the 
 South, or withdraw them from the seas, keep them secure in 
 her far-away inland fastnesses, while land and floating batteries, 
 obstructions, and torpedoes, could so seal up the Mississippi and 
 St. Lawrence, that they could not be entered, or if that were 
 possible for any foe, he would enter only to encounter a force 
 superior to his own. The Western waters are likely to become 
 hereafter the great naval depot of the nation, and the time may 
 not be far distant when the destruction of all the ship-yards of 
 the seaboard, were that possible, would not seriously cripple 
 the naval power of the United States. When once the Lakes 
 and the St. Lawrence are all American, and the inland seas are 
 properly connected both with the Mississippi and the North 
 Atlantic, a navy, limited only by the producing power of the 
 
494: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 country, can be created and maintained on waters inaccessible 
 to any hostile nation. This is one of the important facts which 
 the war has brought to light, and it is one to which the states 
 men of the country will be compelled to give earnest attention. 
 Should it be possible for the nations of Western Europe to com 
 bine and harass our seaboard, the Great West, if cherished 
 and developed by a wise and liberal policy, will have the 
 means both to defend and avenge the nation. 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 
 
 THE facts thus far presented exhibit in general terms the 
 nature of the preparations which were made by the Navy De 
 partment for carrying on the war upon the Atlantic coast. It 
 was called upon to provide for the recovery of the forts and 
 harbors which the rebels had seized ; to establish and maintain 
 an effective blockade along thirty-five hundred miles of coast, a 
 large portion of which coast has also an interior line requiring 
 to be guarded ; to prevent the egress of rebel cruisers, and espe 
 cially of such iron-clads as the Merrimack to provide the means 
 for the supply of the Army along all its extended lines of com 
 munication ; to keep the Potomac open, and to protect the sea 
 board cities. Nor must it be forgotten that all this was to be 
 done under the continual menace of a foreign war. This task, 
 however, great as it was, is only a part of the work which al 
 most from the first was laid upon the Secretary. 
 
 An interior department of naval operations was forced upon 
 the attention of the Department in the early stages of the re 
 bellion, and it was soon seen that it was scarcely less important 
 or less difficult to control than that of the ocean and the coast. 
 It was seen that there must be a navy of the rivers as well as 
 for the sea ; and such was the extent of navigation on these in 
 ternal waters that it required a very large and very powerful 
 squadron to make any serious impression upon the lines of the 
 enemy, or to maintain the communications of the Army as it 
 advanced into the enemy s country. The magnitude of the de 
 mand made upon the Department from this quarter may be 
 better understood by considering the position then held by the 
 
496 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 rebel armies. Their northern battle-line in the West stretched 
 along the southern bank of the Ohio to near its mouth, and 
 south of that they held the rivers and the country to the Gulf 
 by fortifications or batteries at every strategic point. Ken 
 tucky proposed to hold herself neutral and indifferent between 
 the Government which had fostered and protected her and the 
 rebels who had conspired for its overthrow ; yet on her soil, un 
 hindered and unmolested, these conspirators had seized Colum 
 bus, on the Mississippi, a short distance below the mouth of the 
 Ohio, and had converted it into a strongly fortified position. 
 Farther down, in Tennessee, at Island "No. 10, where a bend in 
 the river gave great facilities for the work, batteries were con 
 structed so powerful that no craft then on the Western waters 
 could pass them. Still below this point Fort Pillow guarded 
 the river at Memphis ; then at Yicksburg w r as the river Gib 
 raltar ; and beyond were the formidable batteries at Grand 
 Gulf; and then Port Hudson and Baton Rouge. All these 
 were to be approached from above, if at all, unless the forts 
 below New Orleans could be captured, and this was not done 
 until most of the work had been finished on the river above. In 
 addition to these strongholds, Fort Henry guarded the Tennes 
 see, and Fort Donelson the Cumberland; and these were the 
 only channels by which an army advancing into Tennessee 
 could be supplied, for the railway line that ran from the Ohio 
 to Nashville was not safe for an hour even in neutral Ken 
 tucky after our Army held the country below, while at first it 
 was in the hands of the rebels from Lexington, south, and was 
 frequently, by the neutral friends of the conspirators, between 
 Lexington and Cincinnati. Besides this, the rebels, when they 
 closed the upper Mississippi by their batteries, seized all the 
 boats that were below and strengthened and armed them ; so 
 that, in addition to their land fortifications, they had from the 
 first a really formidable fleet. 
 
 The main features of the rebel plan of war in the West were, 
 to seize and hold Missouri, and, as a consequence, Kansas and 
 Nebraska, and thus threaten or invade the free States of the 
 Northwest from that point ; to hold Kentucky and Tennessee, 
 and, if possible, cross the Ohio, and make the Northern States 
 the theatre of the war ; or, in case they should be unable to 
 
THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 497 
 
 invade the North, to maintain their battle-line unbroken along 
 the Ohio and through Missouri ; to keep the great rivers closed ; 
 and thus holding back the North, and secure within their own 
 territory, compel at length the recognition of their indepen 
 dence. They presented certainly to the North a most formi 
 dable front, a line of defences which was indeed impregnable 
 to any means of assault which the Government at first possessed. 
 No army could be moved into Tennessee by land alone, because 
 the line of communication with a Northern base could not be 
 held secure, and a defeat far from the Ohio would be the de 
 struction of an army, and open the road for an invasion of Illi 
 nois, Indiana, and Ohio, and the destruction of their cities. 
 
 It was quite evident that no impression could be made upon 
 the power of the rebellion in the "West, until a firm foothold could 
 be gained in Kentucky and Tennessee, and until the Mississippi 
 could be wrested from the conspirators control. It was clear 
 that the whole seaboard might be regained, even to Florida, and 
 yet the rebellion remain as dangerous as ever, if the rebels could 
 hold the Mississippi River and the valley up to or near the Ohio. 
 
 France was looking with eager eyes toward Texas, in the 
 hope of securing and extending her Mexican usurpation. 
 England w r as ready to give all the assistance in her power to 
 any step which would weaken the North ; and had the rebels 
 been pressed back from the seaports and the Northern Atlantic 
 slope, they would have had it in their power, if still holding the 
 Mississippi, the Southwest, including Tennessee, and the great 
 natural fortresses of the mountains, to have so connected them 
 selves with Mexico and France as to have caused the most serious 
 embarrassment. It became absolutely necessary to the success 
 of the Government that the rebels northern line of defences 
 should be broken through, and that the Mississippi should be 
 opened to its mouth. 
 
 At first, and before the nature of the work was fully under 
 stood, the whole was placed under the direction of the War De 
 partment, as it was thought the few armed transports which 
 would be needed would be a mere appendage of the Army. 
 The idea of a formidable river navy of a hundred powerful 
 steamers did not, in the beginning, enter into the minds of any. 
 
 It was soon seen, however, that an entirely new description 
 32 
 
498 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of craft was needed for this work. It was clear that the river 
 boats, which had been built for the common purposes of freight 
 and passage, were not capable of resisting the fire of heavy 
 artillery, and that the batteries of the rebels could not be cap 
 tured nor even passed by them. They could not even be safely 
 employed alone in the transport of troops, for they could be 
 sunk or crippled by the field batteries that could be moved from 
 point to point. The question of iron-clads was proposed, but 
 with only the ocean iron-clads as a guide, who should conceive 
 the proper form of an armored boat which could navigate our 
 rivers, and compete successfully with the heavy guns, rifled as 
 well as smooth-bore, of the fortifications ? It was by no means 
 easy to solve this problem, but it was absolutely necessary that 
 the attempt should be made. 
 
 The first movement of the Government had a double pur 
 pose. It was to throw a body of troops into Middle Tennessee 
 by the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, in order to gain a 
 permanent position within the rebel lines, and at the same time 
 to turn by this operation the fortifications at Columbus on the 
 Mississippi. But both the Cumberland and the Tennessee 
 were as has been stated, strongly guarded by forts, and these 
 forts could only be reduced by the aid of gunboats, and these 
 were almost literally to be created. Fortunately for the Gov 
 ernment, a gentleman was found whose genius, energy, and re 
 sources were equal to the exigency, as the following statement 
 of facts will very clearly show. 
 
 On the 17th of April, three days after the surrender of Fort 
 Sumter, Attorney-General Bates wrote to James B. Eads, of St. 
 Louis, as follows : " Be not surprised if you are called here sud 
 denly by telegram. If called, come instantly. In a certain con 
 tingency it will be necessary to have the aid of the most thor 
 ough knowledge of our Western rivers, and the use of steam on 
 them, and in that event I have advised that you should be con 
 sulted." 
 
 This fact shows how early the Government was considering 
 the question of the best method of occupying and defending our 
 Western waters. 
 
 As the gentleman above mentioned, Mr. Eads, was so inti 
 mately connected with the operations of the Government on the 
 
THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 499 
 
 Western waters, and as so much was due to his energy and fer 
 tility of resource, it is believed that the reader will be interested 
 in knowing something of his early career, for he too is one who, 
 through the cherishing influence of our free institutions, has 
 risen from the ranks of the laborers the people.* 
 
 * JAMES B. EADS was born in 1820, in Lawrenceburg, Indiana. He very early 
 evinced such a love of machinery as attracted the special notice of his friends. 
 When only eight years old, he watched with the greatest interest all the machinery 
 to which he had access. When nine years old, the family removed to Louisville. 
 The engine on board the steamboat excited in the boy so much admiration and won 
 der, that the engineer was induced to explain to him the operation of the principal 
 parts of the machine. So well did the lad profit by this one lesson in steam engineer 
 ing, that a little more than two years after, he constructed a miniature engine which 
 was worked by steam. When about eleven years old, his father fitted him a small 
 workshop, and there he constructed models of saw-mills, fire-engines, steamboats, and 
 electro typing machines. One of the pastimes of his childhood was, to take in pieces 
 and put together again the family clock, and at twelve years he was able to do this 
 with a patent lever watch with no tool but his pocket knife. At the age of thirteen, 
 misfortune having overtaken bis father, he was thrown upon the world with none 
 but God to help him. He was landed at St. Louis, barefooted, and without a coat to 
 cover him. There he had no resource but to undertake the selling of apples in the 
 streets of St. Louis, and this for a time he bravely did in order to obtain bread for 
 himself, and to aid in supporting his mother and his sisters. Having obtained soon 
 after a situation in a mercantile house, with which he remained several years, and 
 having free access during that time to the excellent library of the senior partner, he 
 used the opportunity to study mechanics, machinery, and civil engineering. He 
 next passed some time as an officer on one of the Mississippi steamboats, and there 
 obtained that knowledge of the great river which prepared him for the important 
 services which were afterward performed. 
 
 In 1842 he formed a copartnership with Case & Nelson, boat-builders, for the 
 purpose of recovering steamboats and their cargoes which had been sunk or wrecked 
 in the river. This plan succeeded so well that the operations of the company extend 
 ed ere long from the Balize to Galena, and over into the tributaries of the Mississippi. 
 In 1845, having sold out his interest in this company, he started a factory for the 
 making of glassware, and this was the first experiment of the kind west of the Mis 
 sissippi. In 1847 he returned to his old business of recovering boats and property 
 wrecked in the river. In this new company they began with about fifteen hundred 
 dollars. Ten years from that time the business had been so successful, that the 
 property of the firm was valued at nearly half a million dollars. In the winter of 
 1855- 56, Mr. Eads made a formal proposition to Congress to keep open for a term 
 of years the Western rivers, by removing all obstructions and keeping the channel 
 free. A bill was reported, and defeated by Jeff. Davis and J. P. Benjamin. On ac 
 count of ill-health, Mr. Eads retired from business in 1857, having prepared himself, 
 however, by a life of activity, energy, and success, for the more important part 
 which he was destined to take in the affairs of the country in the construction of 
 the Western iron-clads. 
 
500 HISTOBY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 The dispatch before mentioned came soon after the letter, 
 and Mr. Eads repaired to Washington. The Attorney- General 
 explained to him at length his views in regard to the occupation 
 of Cairo, and the placing of gunboats on the Mississippi. 
 Through the Attorney-General he was introduced to the mem 
 bers of the Cabinet, and the plan of operations on the Western 
 rivers was considered. Secretary Cameron seemed to think 
 that the idea of Judge Bates in regard to gunboats for the rivers 
 was useless or impracticable, and manifested no interest what 
 ever in the plan. The Secretary of the Navy, however, con 
 sidered the subject to be one of great importance, and requested 
 Mr. Eads to prepare a written statement of his own views, and 
 embodying the general plan of Judge Bates. This was accord 
 ingly done on the 29th of April. The paper contained pro 
 posals for placing gunboats on the rivers, suggestions as to the 
 kind of boats best fitted for the service, and also in regard to 
 batteries to be erected at several points. 
 
 This paper was referred to Commodore Paulding, who, after 
 hearing Mr. Eads s explanation of the plan, reported at once in 
 favor of its adoption. Upon receiving this report, the Secretary 
 of the Navy detailed an officer to accompany Mr. Eads West to 
 purchase and fit out the necessary vessels. Up to this point the 
 Secretary of the Navy was obliged to act almost alone in the 
 matter the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, to say the least, 
 appearing wholly indifferent. The officer selected for this ser 
 vice was Captain John Eodgers, but at the next Cabinet meet 
 ing the War Department claimed jurisdiction over the whole 
 movement. After some vexatious delay, arising apparently from 
 the little interest which was felt by the War Department in the 
 matter, an order was obtained from Mr. Cameron, directing 
 Captain Kodgers and Mr. Eads to proceed with the purchase of 
 the vessels. The project was submitted to General McClellan, 
 then just appointed to his Western command, and being by him 
 approved, active operations were commenced. They found at 
 Cairo one of the former snag-boat fleet, called the Benton. It 
 was believed that her strong hull was well calculated for the 
 service proposed, and that, with certain alterations suggested by 
 Mr. Eads, who formerly had owned the boat, she could be fitted 
 to bear the heavy armament which was required. 
 
THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 501 
 
 A plan of alterations, including a sloping iron-clad case 
 mate, was presented to Captain Rodgers. That officer, how 
 ever, did not approve it. Mr. Eads then proposed instead, that 
 they should purchase some of the strong and swift boats used 
 on the Missouri River, and have them altered at St. Louis, to 
 avoid the uncertain navigation of the Ohio. Captain Rodgers, 
 however, did not approve of this plan, and proceeded up the 
 Ohio to Cincinnati, and there altered the Conestoga, Tyler, 
 and Lexington, and armed them as gunboats. This was during 
 the latter part of May and in June. Sometime in July they 
 were started down the river, but were detained for six or seven 
 weeks on the bars of the Ohio, on account of the low water, 
 and did not arrive at Cairo until near the 1st of September, 
 1861. These vessels were not plated with iron. The boilers 
 and machinery were partially protected with coal-bunkers, and 
 they had oak bulwarks of sufficient thickness to prevent the 
 penetration of musket-balls. They had side-wheels, and were 
 originally used for freight and passengers on the Ohio River. 
 On their arrival at Cairo the Tyler was found to be so badly 
 injured by the sand-bars that she had to be placed on the ma 
 rine ways for repairs. 
 
 During the month of July, 1861, the Quartermaster-Gen 
 eral advertised for proposals to construct a number of iron-clad 
 gunboats for service on the Mississippi River. The bids were 
 opened on the 5th of August, and Mr. Eads was found to be 
 the best bidder for the whole number, both in regard to the 
 time of completion and price. The Department decided to 
 construct seven of these vessels, each of about six hundred tons, 
 to draw six feet, to carry thirteen heavy guns, to be plated with 
 iron two and half inches thick, and to steam nine miles per 
 hour. They were one hundred and seventy-five feet long, and 
 fifty-one and a half feet wide ; the hulls of wood ; their sides 
 placed out from the bottom of the boat to the water-line at an 
 angle of about thirty-five degrees, and from the water-line the 
 sides fell back at about the same angle to form a slanting case 
 mate, the gun-deck being but a foot above water. This slant 
 ing casemate extended across the hull, near the bow and stern, 
 forming a quadrilateral gun-deck. Three 9 or 10-inch guns 
 were placed in the bow, four similar ones on each side, and two 
 
502 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 smaller ones astern. The casemate enclosed the wheel, which 
 was placed in a recess at the stern of the vessel. The plating 
 was two and a half inches thick, thirteen inches wide, and was 
 rabbeted on the edges to make a more perfect joint. 
 
 On the 7th of August, 1861, Mr. Eads signed a contract 
 with Quartermaster-General Meigs to construct these seven 
 vessels ready for their crews and armaments in sixty-five days. 
 At this early period the people in the border States, especially 
 in the slave States, had not yet learned to accommodate them 
 selves to a state of war. The pursuits of peace were inter 
 rupted ; but the energy and enterprise which was to provide 
 the vast material required for an energetic prosecution of the 
 war had not then been aroused. None could foresee the result, 
 and a spirit of doubt and distrust pervaded financial and com 
 mercial circles. It was at this time that the contractor re 
 turned to St. Louis with an obligation to perform what, under 
 ordinary circumstances, would have been deemed by most men 
 an impossibility. Rolling-mills, machine-shops, founderies, 
 forges, and saw-mills were all idle. The demands of peace had 
 ceased for months before, and the working-men were enlisting, 
 or seeking in States more quiet their accustomed employment. 
 The engines that were to drive this our first iron-clad fleet were 
 yet to be built. The timber to form their hulls was uncut in 
 the forest, and the huge rollers and machinery that were to form 
 their iron armor were not yet constructed. The rapidity with 
 w r hich all these various parts were to be supplied forbade de 
 pending alone on any two or three establishments in the coun 
 try, no matter how great were their resources. 
 
 The signatures were scarcely dry upon this important con 
 tract before persons in different parts of the country were em 
 ployed upon the work through telegraphic orders issued from 
 Washington. Special agents were dispatched in every direc 
 tion, and saw-mills were simultaneously occupied in cutting the 
 timber required in the construction of the vessels in Ken 
 tucky, Tennessee, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, and Mis 
 souri ; and railroads, steamboats, and barges were engaged for 
 its immediate transportation. Nearly all of the largest ma 
 chine-shops and founderies in St. Louis, and many small ones, 
 were at once set at work day and night, and the telegraph lines 
 
fe 
 
 
 r < 
 
 O 5 
 
 I? 
 
THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 503 
 
 between St. Louis and Pittsburg and Cincinnati were occupied 
 frequently for hours in transmitting instructions to similar es 
 tablishments in those cities for the construction of the twenty- 
 one steam-engines and the five-and- thirty steam-boilers that 
 were to propel the fleet. The large rolling-mills of Gaylord, 
 Son & Co., at Portsmouth, Ohio ; those of Swift & Co., at 
 Newport, Kentucky ; and of Harrison, Chouteau & Valle, at 
 St. Louis, were all employed in rolling the armor-plates. Mr. 
 Thomas G. Gaylord, of Cincinnati, undertook to furnish this 
 important material, and his promptness and energy greatly con 
 tributed to the rapid progress of the work. To him justly be 
 longs the credit of rolling the first iron plating used in the 
 war. Within two weeks not less than four thousand men were 
 engaged in the various details of its construction. Neither the 
 sanctity of the Sabbath nor the darkness of night were per 
 mitted to interrupt it. The workmen on the hulls were prom 
 ised a handsome bonus in money for each one who stood stead 
 fastly at the work until it was completed, and many thousands 
 of dollars were thus gratuitously paid by Mr. Eads when it was 
 finished. On the 12th of October, 1861, the first United States 
 iron-clad, with her boilers and engines on board, was launched 
 in Carondelet, Missouri, in forty-five days from the laying of her 
 keel. She was named the St. Louis, by Bear-Admiral Foote, in 
 honor of the city. When the fleet was transferred from the 
 War Department to the Navy, this name was changed to 
 Baron de Kalb, there being at that time a vessel commissioned 
 in the Navy called the St. Louis. In ten days after the De 
 Kalb, the Carondelet was launched, and the Cincinnati, Louis 
 ville, Mound City, Cairo, and Pittsburg followed in rapid suc 
 cession. An eighth vessel, larger, more powerful and superior 
 in every respect, was also undertaken before the hulls of the 
 first seven had fairly assumed shape. 
 
 Major-General Fremont, about the 1st of September, or 
 dered the purchase of the wrecking boat Submarine No. 7 (the 
 vessel Captain Eodgers had been urged to obtain three months 
 before), and sent her to the establishment of Mr. Eads, with 
 instructions to convert her as speedily as possible into an iron 
 clad gunboat. She was immediately docked and the work 
 pushed on her with the same degree of celerity as upon the 
 
504: HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 others. The name under which she was known as a snag-boat 
 (Bentori) was restored to her by Admiral Foote. In 1862 Ad 
 mirals Foote and Davis pronounced her the best iron-clad 
 afloat, and the reports of Admiral Porter also testify to her 
 excellence. Thus one individual put in construction and pushed 
 to completion within one hundred days a powerful squadron of 
 eight steamers, aggregating five thousand tons, capable of 
 steaming at nine knots per hour, each heavily armored, fully 
 equipped, and all ready for their armament of one hundred and 
 seven large guns. The fact that such a work was done is 
 nobler praise than any that can be bestowed by words. 
 
 It is to be regretted, however, that the promptness and 
 energy of the man who thus created an iron-clad navy on the 
 Mississippi was not met on the part of the Government with an 
 equal degree of faithfulness in performing its part of the con 
 tract. On one pretext or another the stipulated payments for 
 the work were delayed by the War Department until the de 
 fault assumed such magnitude that nothing but the assistance 
 rendered by patriotic and confiding friends enabled the con 
 tractor, after exhausting his own ample means, to complete the 
 fleet. Besides the honorable reputation which flows from suc 
 cess in such a work, he has the satisfaction of reflecting that it 
 was with vessels, at the time his own property, that the brilliant 
 capture of Fort Henry was accomplished, and the conquest 
 of Donelson and Island No. 10 achieved. 
 
 The ever-memorable midnight passage of No. 10 by the 
 Pittsburg and Carondelet, which compelled the surrender of 
 that powerful stronghold, was performed by vessels furnished 
 four or five months previous by the same contractor, and at the 
 time unpaid for. 
 
 In April, 1862, designs were solicited by the Navy Depart 
 ment from Mr. Eads for the construction of light-draught ar 
 mored vessels for service on the Western waters. Plans were 
 accordingly submitted for vessels of five and a half feet draught, 
 with fixed casemates. The Department insisted on vessels with 
 rotating turrets and of lighter draught. Plans were then pro 
 duced for vessels of four and a half feet, with a turret eight 
 inches thick. Still lighter ones were demanded, when he sub 
 mitted others for vessels to draw but three and a half feet, with 
 
THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 505 
 
 a rotating turret six inches thick. The plans of these vessels 
 contemplated turrets of Mr. Eads s own invention, and differing 
 entirely from those of Ericsson and Coles. The guns were de 
 signed to be placed on a movable platform, supported upon a 
 piston moving in a central vertical cylinder. By the action 
 of steam in this cylinder the platform was elevated or lowered. 
 The guns were to be loaded in the hold of the vessel, and in 
 stantly raised by the steam to the level of the embrasures. 
 These were but little larger than the muzzles of the guns, and, 
 by a simple contrivance controlling the breech of the guns, the 
 muzzles were kept in constant range with the embrasures, so 
 that depressing the platform gave elevation to the guns, while 
 raising it lessened the elevation, and, when continued, caused 
 the aim of the guns to be depressed. By this means an eleva 
 tion of twenty-one degrees and a depression of five degrees was 
 obtained through port-holes barely larger than the muzzles of 
 the guns. The guns had each a horizontal steam cylinder 
 placed between the gun-slides v/hich ran them into battery and 
 held them there until fired, when the force of the recoil was 
 absorbed by their pistons (the rods of which were attached to the 
 gun-carriages) compressing the steam in the cylinders until the 
 guns came to rest, at which moment the steam was allowed to 
 escape. The ports were also opened by steam, and closed at the 
 instant of recoil. The walls of the turret were supported upon 
 small iron spheres rolling in a circular base on the bottom of 
 the vessel. The vertical central cylinder, the recoil cylinders, 
 and the two small engines to rotate the turret, were all within 
 the turret, below the level of the deck, and all revolved with 
 the turret. Steam was supplied and exhausted through a cen 
 tral steam-joint at the bottom of the turret. Although Mr. 
 Eads offered to guarantee the performance of this turret to the 
 complete satisfaction of the Department, he was not permitted 
 to put them on these vessels the reason given being that the 
 Ericsson turret had been tried one month before in the contest 
 with the Merrimack, and was a success. These vessels were 
 much needed, and a possibility of failure in the turret, which 
 would involve several months delay in replacing it with one of 
 Ericsson s, could not be risked at that time. The plans of the 
 light-draught vessels before mentioned were accepted, and Mr. 
 
506 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Eads was authorized to construct two of them, the Osage and 
 JS eosho. Their hulls were to be of iron. The deck-plating was 
 to be three-quarters of an inch, and the side-plating two and a 
 half inches. The paddle-wheels were protected by iron two 
 inches thick. Although Mr. Eads was not permitted to put his 
 turrets on them, he was allowed to modify the form of Mr. 
 Ericsson s, with a view to obtaining the least possible weight. 
 This he did by lessening the height of it from nine to seven 
 feet, making the turret six inches thick, and bending the turret 
 floor-beams to allow the guns to be worked at a lower level, 
 thus requiring less height of turret. When launched with their 
 weights all on board, it was found that the vessels would be 
 really lighter than the contract called for, and that they could 
 carry an extra half inch of armor all over their decks. This 
 was ordered to be put on them, and, when they were completed 
 and ready for action, they drew less than four feet. 
 
 The Osage was sunk by a torpedo in Mobile Bay, after hav 
 ing gallantly led the van of Porter s Red River expedition both 
 going and returning. She was afterward raised. In May of 
 1862 the Navy Department solicited plans for four iron-clads, 
 iron-hull propellers, to carry two turrets each of eight inches 
 thickness, four 11-inch guns, and three-quarters inch deck-ar 
 mor, and to steam nine nautical miles per hour, with capacity 
 of three days coal, and not to exceed six feet draught of water. 
 Mr. Eads s plans were accepted for these vessels, and he was 
 immediately authorized to construct the four, to wit, the Win- 
 nebago, Milwaukee, Chickasaw, and Kickapoo. So well were 
 his designs matured, that these vessels were also, like the Osage 
 and Neosho, found to be of less draught than the contract stipu 
 lation, and the Department ordered an extra coating of armor 
 three-quarters of an inch thick over the entire decks of the four 
 vessels. Three of them were also officially reported to exceed 
 the contract speed, and the other to be fully equal to its re 
 quirements. 
 
 In addition to the fourteen heavily-armored gunboats thus 
 constructed, he converted during the time seven transports into 
 what were called tin-dads or musket-proof gunboats, and four 
 heavy mortar-boats were built by him during the same period. 
 Thus was commenced the squadron on the Western waters 
 
THE MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON. 50 V 
 
 which became afterward such an important and even indis 
 pensable arm of defensive and offensive operations. Without it 
 the rebellion could not have been overcome, for the Mississippi 
 could not have been opened, and the lines of the rebels could 
 not have been broken through. Others shared nobly in the 
 subsequent work, but Mr. Eads was the efficient and successful 
 pioneer, and by him, almost unaided, the Government was en 
 abled to put the first fleet of iron-clads on the Mississippi and 
 its tributaries. Such men deserve a place in history by the side 
 of those who fought our battles. 
 
CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 BEGINNING OF ACTIVE OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS. 
 
 As it has been previously stated, Captain Rodgers, who had 
 been sent West in the latter part of the spring of 1861 to pur 
 chase and prepare gunboats for the rivers, procured and altered 
 three boats at Cincinnati the Lexington, the Conestoga, and the 
 Tyler. Owing to low water these boats did not reach the Mis 
 sissippi till about the 1st of September. One was injured, so as 
 to need repairs, in her passage down the Ohio, but the other 
 two were at once engaged in active service. 
 
 Before any important movements were made on the rivers, 
 Captain Rodgers returned East, and Commodore A. H. Foote 
 assumed the command of the Western flotilla. The appoint 
 ment of this officer to that post was considered by those who 
 knew him a sufficient guaranty of success. ~No one probably 
 in the Navy enjoyed more of the affectionate confidence of the 
 Government and of the country, so far as he was known, than 
 Commodore Foote. To all the qualities that belong to the 
 officer and gentleman, he added those of the devoted Christian, 
 and he knew how to obtain success, not alone by the arts and 
 weapons of war, but by asking it directly from Christ. 
 
 It was well for our country that we had so many, both in 
 the Navy and Army, who were accustomed to seek daily an 
 audience with the Lord. E"o one began the war more bril 
 liantly than the lamented Foote. He struck at Fort Henry, 
 the first important blow upon the rebel lines in the West, and 
 gained the first of those victories which gave to us the heart of 
 the rebellion. He did this, however, at the expense of a wound, 
 which withdrew him from active service, and was probably the 
 
OPEEATIONS ON THE WESTEEN EIVEE8. 509 
 
 cause of his death. The following order shows the date of his 
 appointment to service in the West : 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT. WASHINGTON. 30th August, 1861. 
 
 SIR : You have been selected to take command of the naval opera 
 tions upon the Western waters, now organizing under the direction of 
 the War Department. 
 
 You will, therefore, proceed to St. Louis, Missouri, with all practical 
 dispatch, and place yourself in communication with Major-General J. C. 
 Fremont, United States Army, who commands the Army of the West. 
 You will cooperate fully and freely with him as to your movements. 
 
 Requisitions must be made upon the War Department through 
 General Fremont, and whatever the Army cannot furnish, the Navy 
 will endeavor to supply, having due regard to its operations on the 
 coast. 
 
 The Western movement is of the greatest importance, and the De 
 partment assigns you this duty, having full confidence in your zeal, 
 fidelity, and judgment. 
 
 I am, respectfully, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 Captair ANDREW H. FOOTE, U. S. Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 When this officer arrived at St. Louis, and on the 6th of 
 September, 1861, assumed command of the Western flotilla, the 
 forces consisted of three wooden vessels in commission, which 
 had been purchased, equipped, and armed as gunboats by 
 Commander John Rodgers, and there were nine iron-clad gun 
 boats and thirty-eight mortar-boats in course of construction. 
 In his report for 1862 the Secretary of the Navy thus speaks 
 of this river service : " The service was anomalous in its char 
 acter, and there was with many great incredulity as to the util 
 ity and practicability of gunboats in carrying on hostilities on 
 the rivers where it was believed batteries on the banks could 
 prevent their passage. There were also embarrassments for 
 want of funds and of material for naval purposes, there being 
 no navy-yard or naval depot on the Western waters. All these 
 difficulties were met and surmounted by the energetic and effi 
 cient officer to whom the duty was intrusted, whose persever 
 ance and courage in overcoming the obstacles that impeded and 
 retarded his operations in creating a river navy were scarcely 
 
510 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 surpassed by the heroic qualities displayed in subsequent well- 
 fought actions on the decks of the gunboats he had under so 
 many discouragements prepared." 
 
 The country has fully indorsed the graceful compliment 
 here paid to Commodore Foote, and no officer of whom the war 
 deprived us was more widely and deeply lamented. The esti 
 mation in which he was held by the Government was subse 
 quently shown, when, after the failure of Du Pont, he was se 
 lected to direct the operations against Charleston. All expected 
 that the rebel stronghold would yield to his skill and energy, 
 when death put an end to his labors and the country s hopes. 
 
 The first service in which the gunboats were engaged were 
 merely reconnoitring expeditions, and were important mainly, be 
 cause they showed the capabilities of this novel war-vessel, and 
 gave the officers an opportunity of testing the power and range 
 of their guns. The rebel batteries at Columbus, only a few 
 miles below Cairo, were of a very formidable character ; they 
 had field batteries of rifled cannon and some heavy guns in bat 
 tery at different points on the Missouri side of the river, and 
 one or more gunboats were sheltered under the guns of the for 
 tifications at Columbus. From Cairo to the Balize the rebels 
 held by strong works and gunboats the entire control of the 
 Mississippi and its tributaries. Of course, our little fleet of gun 
 boats at the mouth of the Ohio could make no movement with 
 out being liable to an attack either from the shore or from the 
 flotilla of the rebels. 
 
 Early in September, General Grant, then in command of 
 the troops at and about Cairo, determined to make an expedi 
 tion against a body of rebels at Norfolk, a town in Missouri, eight 
 miles below Cairo. The flotilla was at that time under the di 
 rection of the War Department, and the two gunboats Lexington 
 and Conestoga were ordered to go down and support the troops. 
 The Conestoga went down as far as Lucas Bend, the point 
 above Columbus, without discovering any enemy. There, how 
 ever, the rebels had gathered in force. They had, it appeared, 
 sixteen pieces of field artillery, several of which were rifled, and 
 one heavy piece in battery. With these was a body of cavalry, 
 that assisted in transporting the guns from point to point along 
 the bank. The shot and shells from the rifled cannon ranged 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE WESTEEN EIVEES. 511 
 
 to and beyond the gunboat, striking all around her, but doing 
 her no damage. The difficulty of striking a moving mark at 
 long range was very apparent, as was also the superiority of the 
 gunboats to a land force operating upon the shore without the 
 shelter of fortifications. The shells from the heavy guns of the 
 boats, bursting in the midst of or near the cavalry, threw them 
 into confusion, and for the same reason their field batteries 
 would soon be silenced, and they would be compelled to move 
 to some other point, only, however, to be followed by the gun 
 boats and be scattered again. The batteries finally retreated, 
 and were apparently taken across the river to Columbus by a 
 steamboat in waiting, where our gunboats could not reach 
 them, because of the Columbus forts. In the course of the 
 afternoon the rebel gunboat Yankee came up from Columbus 
 and opened fire upon the Conestoga and Lexington at long 
 range. The first shot from the Conestoga struck the Yankee 
 on the ricochet, bounding from the water close by her side, and 
 she immediately started down-stream. Before she was entirely 
 out of range, and when at the estimated distance of two miles 
 and a half, the Lexington fired a shell from an 8-inch gun, 
 which struck the Yankee on the starboard wheel-house, and 
 there exploded, seriously crippling her, so that she could use 
 but one engine in getting under the cover of the Columbus bat 
 teries. 
 
 While our gunboats were retiring from this fight, the 
 Conestoga encountered what, through the whole war, was the 
 chief peril of these river skirmishes, a fire from an ambush 
 on shore. Only one man, however, was seriously wounded. In 
 such a fight these concealed enemies had of course an impor 
 tant advantage. Crouched like savages close to the ground in 
 the thickets, or the long grass of the banks, they were able to 
 take deliberate aim at any man exposed on the boat, while the 
 return fire was "necessarily very much at random, and the shot 
 in most cases passed over the ambushed foe. Several skir 
 mishes of this kind were had on the different rivers, with no 
 very important results, except that the crews of the gunboats 
 learned how to handle with skill and effect the vessels and 
 their armament, so that what was at first scoffed at, became 
 daily more and more a terror to the rebels. 
 
512 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 The first opportunity which the new flotilla had of winning 
 a marked success was at the battle of Belmont. The expedi 
 tion which brought on this conflict was undertaken by General 
 Grant to surprise, if possible, and capture or disperse a body of 
 men, of about seven thousand, that occupied the little village 
 of Belmont, opposite Columbus, and thus prevent General Polk 
 from sending reinforcements into Missouri. This was in No 
 vember, 1861. The Union troops, consisting of five skeleton 
 regiments of "Western men, numbering in all less than three 
 thousand, were embarked on transports at Cairo, and were 
 convoyed down the river by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington. 
 The troops were landed some two miles above Belmont ; and 
 then the gunboats, in order to cover the movement and mislead 
 the enemy, dropped down within range of the batteries at Colum 
 bus, and opened fire upon them, occupying their attention while 
 the troops were advancing. These batteries, however, after a 
 short practice, succeeded in getting the exact range of the boats 
 w r ith their heavy rifles, one of which was a 94-pounder. They 
 were obliged to haul off, as they were not prepared to make a 
 serious attack. In the mean time the Union forces had met 
 and gallantly driven back the rebels toward their camp ; but 
 there they had secured themselves by a broad line of fallen 
 trees, in which, and behind which, they were posted. 
 
 There the fight was nearly hand to hand, and stubbornly 
 contested on both sides ; gradually, however, the rebel line was 
 forced backward, pushed from tree to tree, until they finally 
 broke and fled in all directions, and the field and their camp 
 were completely won. So soon, however, as it was discovered 
 at Columbus that their camp w r as captured, the guns of 
 their batteries were trained upon it, and as they completely 
 commanded the spot, it was evident that a speedy retreat must 
 be made. Nor w r as there any reason for delay, for the object 
 of the expedition was gained : the enemy were dispersed, and 
 their camp, stores, and artillery had been captured. But the 
 men were elated with victory, and leaving their ranks to 
 secure the spoils, were scattered so much that they could 
 not at once be recalled and re-formed. In the mean time the 
 rebel commanders on the opposite shore, perceiving the state of 
 things, hastily collected six regiments of their best troops and 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS. 513 
 
 sent them over to cut off the retreat to the boats of our scat 
 tered men. In this they nearly succeeded. But although they 
 threw themselves in part between the Union soldiers and the 
 boats, our men were collected and re-formed in season to com 
 mence an orderly march, and they literally cut their way 
 through the rebels to the transports. Here the gunboats came 
 in with much-needed and most effective aid. With their heavy 
 guns they threw shot and shell into the dense masses of the 
 enemy with deadly effect, throwing them into confusion, and 
 preventing them from using with success their superior numbers. 
 When the troops reached the transports the rebels were in close 
 pursuit, and pressed up within a short distance both with mus 
 ketry and artillery. Here they first learned the real terrors of 
 this novel craft. The Lexington and Tyler dropped down, so 
 as to leave the transports outside of their line of fire, and then 
 poured a perfect storm of death into the rebel masses. Guns, 
 carriages, horses, and men were scattered and hurled into the 
 air by the explosion of their heavy shells, and whole ranks were 
 mowed down at a broadside; and it was most conclusively 
 proved that it is sheer madness for any body of men, however 
 .numerous, to attack these gunboats with musketry and field 
 artillery. It is only to rush on slaughter. These fearful shells, 
 if they explode over a body of men, send down a fiery hail of 
 bullets and broken iron ; and if one strikes a mass of soldiers, 
 it cuts its way through like a solid shot, and then exploding, 
 sweeps down all within its reach. 
 
 As a means of covering troops marching within range of 
 their guns, or of repelling an attack upon any point which their 
 shells could reach, the value of the gunboats was very clearly 
 shown, and the rebel authorities became more anxious in re 
 gard to the issue when they understood the power of this new 
 weapon of river warfare. 
 
 The terrible havoc which these boats are capable of making 
 may be learned from the fact that, in a little more than half an 
 hour, as was reported, the Lexington and Tyler threw more than 
 a hundred rounds of shot and shell into those masses of rebels. 
 They fought desperately with their new enemy, forming only 
 to be scattered, maimed, or killed, by the deadly missiles, and 
 putting their artillery in position only to see their pieces cap- 
 33 
 
514 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 sized or thrown into the air by the shells. Covered thus by the 
 gunboats, the army transports returned to Cairo. It was a 
 bloody fight on both sides, the loss of the rebels being greatest, 
 because of their exposure to the fire of the boats. An oppor 
 tunity was soon to be given to try the power of the river fleet 
 against the heavy armament of forts. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. EXPEDITION UP THE TENNESSEE. 
 
 THE three strong points in the northern rebel line of de 
 fence between the Mississippi and the Cumberland Mountains 
 were Bowling Green, to prevent an advance by the line of the 
 railways from Cincinnati to Chattanooga ; Forts Henry and 
 Donelson, on the Cumberland and Tennessee, to close these 
 rivers against the passage of an army into Tennessee by trans 
 ports ; and Columbus, strongly fortified, to command the Mis 
 sissippi. How to break through this line of defence was the 
 problem to be solved, and one for which a solution was to be 
 found before any effectual movement could be made from the 
 Ohio southward. It was quite evident that no overland expe 
 dition against Bowling Green could be made, for the line of 
 communication with the base at Cincinnati would be no more 
 safe in neutral Kentucky than in any openly hostile State. 
 The height of the river bluffs at Columbus forbade the hope of 
 any successful attack from the river, and General Grant had 
 not the troops to cope with the twenty thousand men said to be 
 stationed there under General Polk. 
 
 The only plan by which success seemed even possible, was 
 to attack the central stronghold at Forts Henry and Donelson. 
 If these could be gained, Columbus and Bowling Green would 
 both be turned and necessarily evacuated. 
 
 This latter course was determined upon, and early in Jan 
 uary, 1862, the preparations were being made. The plan em 
 braced a united attack by land and from the river. Commodore 
 Foote was to ascend the Cumberland with his flotilla, and Gen- 
 
516 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 eral Grant was to cooperate by a land force from Cairo. As 
 this was the first serious trial of the gunboats, and particularly 
 of the iron-clads constructed by Mr. Eads, it will be interesting 
 to know the character and armament of these floating batteries. 
 The flotilla consisted of four iron-clad and three wooden ves 
 sels, carrying in all seventy-five guns, as follows : Essex (iron 
 clad), 9 guns, Commander D. D. Porter ; St. Louis (iron-clad), 
 13 guns, Lieutenant Leonard Paulding ; Cincinnati (iron-clad), 
 13 guns, Commander R. !N". Stembel ; Carondelet (iron-clad), 
 13 guns, Commander Henry "Walke ; Conestoga (wooden), 9 
 guns, Lieutenant Phelps ; Tyler (wooden), 9 guns, Lieutenant 
 "W. Gwin ; Lexington (wooden), 9 guns. 
 
 This statement of the armament of these boats must be re 
 ceived only as approximating correctness, as it is not taken from 
 an official report. The guns on board our vessels were so fre 
 quently changed during the war that it is somewhat difficult to 
 determine what the precise battery was at a specified time, un 
 less the commanding officer made a special report. Some of 
 these gunboats carried 9-inch smooth-bore guns, and 100- 
 pounder rifles ; and it is easy to see, therefore, that they were 
 very formidable vessels. The Essex mounted a 10-inch colum- 
 biad, with which she often, it was said, threw shells from Lucas 
 Bend into the streets of Columbus. 
 
 When the preparations were nearly complete for this expe 
 dition, General Grant ordered a reconnoissance in force in the 
 direction of Columbus. This force is reported to have consisted 
 of some fifteen regiments of infantry, several batteries of artil 
 lery, and a few companies of cavalry. No serious attack was 
 meditated, but the movement was probably intended to mislead 
 both the commander at Columbus as well as those at Forts 
 Henry and Donelson. 
 
 At the same time with the march toward Columbus, Brigadier- 
 General C. F. Smith, with six thousand men, made a reconnois 
 sance by a march overland to Fort Henry, and, having made 
 satisfactory observations, returned to Paducah. The intention 
 of this movement does not appear, unless it was to induce the 
 rebels to believe that all idea of attacking the fort had been 
 abandoned. However this may have been, the attack when 
 made seems to have been entirely unexpected. 
 
ETC. 517 
 
 The expedition left Cairo on the 3d of February, and pro 
 ceeded on that day only as far as Paducah. Proceeding up the 
 river the next day, the troops were landed a few miles from the 
 fort, with the intention of having them occupy certain points to 
 prevent reinforcements, and, if possible, a retreat of the garri 
 son. General Grant and staff then went on board the Essex, 
 and, accompanied by the St. Louis and the Cincinnati, moved 
 up the river to reconnoitre the fort. This resulted in quite a 
 spirited skirmish, in which the Essex was struck by a rifled shot, 
 which went through the private stateroom of Captain Porter. 
 Beyond this no damage was done to the gunboats. 
 
 Before describing the battle of the next day it may be well 
 to give the reader an idea of Fort Henry. It is situated on the 
 Tennessee, on the river bottom, and is near the northern boun 
 dary of Tennessee. During high water it is surrounded, or 
 nearly so, by the river, and can thus be approached only by a 
 causeway. It is a regularly constructed work, having nine bas 
 tions, and its armament at the time of its capture was seventeen 
 guns. One was a 10-inch columbiad (120-pounder), one 24- 
 pounder rifle, twelve 32-pounders, one 24-pounder siege-gun, 
 and two 12-pounders. It had accommodations for a large num 
 ber of men, but how large the garrison was at the time of the 
 attack is not known. A large body of troops were said to have 
 been encamped outside of the main works, who, during the at 
 tack, retreated to Fort Donelson, leaving only men enough be 
 hind to work the guns. A portion of the garrison also left on 
 a steamboat. The fort stood at the end of a straight reach in 
 the river of two miles in length, and of course commanded 
 the stream for that distance. A battery of two 64-pounders 
 on a neighboring eminence commanded the works, which, 
 detached as it was, might easily have been stormed by 
 our troops and used to destroy the works it was intended to 
 defend. 
 
 Wednesday night was one of great discomfort to the troops 
 on shore. A heavy thunder-storm swept over the river and 
 roared among the hills, drenching the camps, putting out the 
 cheerful fires, and chilling all with the piercing dampness of a 
 mountain-rain. The soldiers were willing to believe that the 
 flash and roar of the tempest over Fort Henry, where the centre 
 
518 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 of the storm seemed to be, were prophetic of coming wrath for 
 the rebels and their cause. 
 
 The morning of Thursday was dark and threatening, but 
 ere the fleet was ready to move the sun came out brightly and 
 warm, and the discomforts of the night were forgotten in the 
 bustle of preparation and anticipation of the battle. About 10 
 o clock the fleet got under way, the four iron-clads leading and 
 moving abreast up the stream the Conestoga, Lexington, and 
 Tyler following about one mile in the rear and also moving 
 abreast. Immediately upon passing the lower end of Panther 
 Island the fort was in range, but few shots were fired on either 
 side for some minutes after. The boats moved on till within a 
 mile of the works, with only occasional firing. Thus they went 
 on till only a third of a mile lay between them, and the guns, the 
 gunners, and even the shells piled near were all clearly seen. 
 The fort was waiting for the attack ; but the bow guns of the 
 boats were all ready, and when at a distance of six hundred 
 yards the flag-ship delivered her fire, followed in the same in 
 stant by all the bow guns of her three consorts. Before the 
 echo of their roar had died away, ten guns from the fort replied 
 with an accuracy of aim that proved the value of the gunboats 
 iron mail. The three wooden boats in the rear then added 
 their fire, and the action was fairly and fully begun. The 
 firing on both sides, owing to the short range, was exceedingly 
 accurate. The iron-clads were repeatedly struck, but in no 
 case, as was said, was the plating penetrated. The damage 
 done was by shells and balls that entered the ports or went 
 through the unprotected parts of the boats. The fire of the 
 gunboats was so severe that a part of the guns of the fort were 
 silenced. One of the most efficient guns of the rebels, a 24- 
 pound rifle, burst at the sixth round, stunning and disabling all 
 about it. The 10-inch columbiad was so filled with mud by 
 the bursting of a shell as to be useless ; and then two of their 
 32-pounders were disabled by shot or shell, and thus their 
 power of defence was seriously impaired quite early in the ac 
 tion. The little garrison fought bravely, but the commanding 
 officer, Brigadier-General Tilghman, soon saw that prolonged 
 resistance would only cause a useless slaughter. One-third or 
 more of his small company were killed or wounded in an hour, 
 
CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY, ETC. 519 
 
 the inside of his works in ruins, and his best guns disabled, 
 while only one of the gunboats had been injured. He there 
 fore very properly struck his flag after a battle of little more 
 than an hour. The gunboats were struck in many places, and 
 their unprotected upper works much cut up ; but the only 
 serious injury was on board the Essex, and it was caused by a 
 single shot. It entered a larboard port and took off the head 
 of young Brittan, master s mate, who was standing by the side 
 of Captain Porter, who thus had one of the narrow escapes of a 
 battle. The shot then entered the boiler, and spread instant 
 death and terror through the ship. Twenty men and officers 
 were killed or scalded by this explosion. Among the wounded, 
 was Captain Porter himself. The men in the pilot-house were 
 suffocated, there being no way of egress except by the passage 
 from below, lip which the hot steam was rushing. The Essex 
 was of course rendered unmanageable by this fatal shot, and 
 "drifted down the stream till taken in tow by another boat. One 
 brave fellow, so terribly scalded that he knew he must soon die, 
 inquired how the fight was going, and being told of victory, 
 shouted " Glory to God ! " and died. Such incidents show how 
 the whole soul is absorbed in the terrible excitement of a battle, 
 excluding for a time every thought of self, so that a man step 
 ping off into eternity forgets the awfulness of death in his 
 anxiety for victory. 
 
 Thus the first serious battle of our iron-clads against land- 
 batteries, protected by regular works, ended in complete success. 
 Their light armor would have been no protection against the ar 
 tillery afterward encountered by the Monitors, but was a good 
 defence against such guns as were then mostly found in the 
 rebel works of the "West. The 10-inch solid shot, or that of 
 their heaviest rifles, would probably have broken it through had 
 it been fairly struck ; but such risks it was found could be very 
 properly taken, and from that hour it was seen that the forti 
 fications of the rivers, where they could be reached at short 
 range by the guns of our iron-clads, would not be an insuperable 
 obstacle to the progress of our armies. To Commodore Foote 
 belongs the praise of first solving this problem, and of forcing 
 open the first gateway through which our army could enter the 
 South. When Fort Donelson was soon after captured the 
 
520 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 northern line of the rebels was broken, never to be re-formed. 
 The permanent occupation of the South was begun, and this 
 occupation was rendered possible by the iron-clad navy of the 
 Western rivers. For although the gunboats could have effected 
 a prominent lodgment without the Army, neither could the 
 Army have advanced without the Navy. The work of both 
 was bravely and successfully done. 
 
 Soon after the surrender of Fort Henry, Commodore Foote 
 sent an expedition of three gunboats up the Tennessee Eiver, 
 under the command of Lieutenant S. L. Phelps. These boats 
 were the Conestoga, Lieutenant Phelps ; the Taylor, Lieutenant 
 Gwin ; and the Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk. This expedition 
 left Fort Henry on the 6th of February, and reached the bridge 
 of the Memphis and Louisville Railroad in the evening. The 
 draw was closed, and the machinery for opening it was de 
 stroyed. Above the bridge, several steamers were seen escaping 
 up the stream. A party was landed, and after an hour s labor 
 they succeeded in forcing open the draw. The Conestoga and 
 Lexington immediately started in chase of the fleeing boats, 
 some of which, it was known, were loaded with military stores. 
 After a five hours run a portion of the rebel fleet was over 
 hauled. Two of them loaded with stores were fired, and they 
 soon exploded, and with such force as to break the skylights 
 and slightly damage the woodwork of the Conestoga at the dis 
 tance of a thousand yards. 
 
 On the evening of the 7th they reached Cerro Gordo, in 
 Hardin County, Tennessee, where was a very fine steamer, the 
 Eastport, being converted into an iron-plated gunboat. She 
 was two hundred and eighty feet long, in fine condition, about 
 half finished, and large quantities of excellent lumber and iron 
 were ready for the completion of the work. These, with the 
 boat, a very valuable prize, were secured. 
 
 At Chickasaw, Mississippi, two steamers were found and 
 seized, one of which was loaded with iron for Richmond. 
 From this point the fleet proceeded to Florence, in Alabama, 
 at the foot of Muscle Shoals. Three steamers were found here, 
 which the rebels fired on the approach of the boats. A portion 
 of the cargoes of these boats was saved. They were loaded 
 with stores either for or from Fort Henry. The result of this 
 
ETC. 521 
 
 expedition was the capture of three steamers, including the 
 rebel gunboat, and the burning of six others, with the loss of 
 their valuable cargoes. 
 
 During the progress of this expedition so large an amount 
 of Union sentiment was exhibited as greatly to encourage the 
 officers in command. They were often told, " Send us a small 
 organized force, and arms, and we will put down this rebellion 
 among us ourselves." What became of this Union sentiment 
 afterward is a question of much interest. It certainly seemed 
 to have disappeared in the progress of the war. 
 
 The fall of Fort Henry, and the possible loss of Fort Donel- 
 son, seem to have determined the rebels at once upon that new 
 plan of defence, in which one culminating point was the fierce 
 battle of Pittsburg Landing. It was merely the removal of their 
 main line farther South. Columbus and Bowling Green were to 
 be evacuated, and then the line reestablished with Island No. 
 10, Fort Pillow and Memphis fortified on the Mississippi, a 
 point on the Tennessee at or near Pittsburg was to be fortified, 
 and Chattanooga made a stronghold on the east, making of it a 
 gate to close up Eastern Tennessee, and also to prevent a south 
 ern march of our army. Pittsburg was to be made a more central 
 position, not only to check Halleck and Grant, but, if possible, 
 it was to be made the starting-point for an invasion of the States 
 north of the Ohio. The first movement in this plan was to oc 
 cupy Pittsburg with a considerable force, and to commence the 
 establishment of batteries there, in anticipation of a concen 
 tration of troops at or near that point. This was begun about 
 the time of the fall of Fort Donelson. Lieutenant Gwin, com 
 manding the gunboat Taylor, having learned that the rebels 
 were thus employed, left Savannah, where he was then lying, 
 nine miles below Pittsburg, and with the Lexington, Lieutenant 
 Shirk commanding, proceeded up the river. Upon reaching 
 Pittsburg they encountered a force, which, as was afterward 
 learned, consisted of one thousand infantry, four hundred cav 
 alry, and six pieces of artillery, some 32-pounders, and some 
 rifled. This force opened fire upon the gunboats at the dis 
 tance of twelve hundred yards. TVTien within a thousand 
 yards the gunboats returned the fire, and soon silenced the bat 
 teries. They then moved up abreast of the place, and under 
 
522 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES JSTAVY. 
 
 cover of grape and canister, four armed boats landed, with a por 
 tion of two companies, sharpshooters, in addition to the crew. 
 
 The object of the landing was to destroy a house near the 
 batteries, and to learn the real strength and purpose of the 
 enemy. This small force actually drove the rebels back, and 
 held them in check until their work was done. They were of 
 course under the guns of the boats, but, except in landing and 
 in covering the retreat, these could not be used without destroy 
 ing our own men. Heavy volleys of musketry were poured 
 into the boats, and they were riddled with balls wherever they 
 could penetrate. The fight was short and severe, as will be 
 seen by the amount of ammunition expended by the two gun 
 boats : one hundred and sixty-five shells, forty-six stand of 
 grape, and sixty-seven rounds of shrapnel and grape from the 
 howitzers. The loss of the rebels in this engagement was said 
 to be twenty killed and one hundred wounded. Our own re 
 ported loss was only eleven killed and w r ounded. It was ascer 
 tained that the rebels had begun extensive works, and the opera 
 tion shows the important work which was continually done by 
 these gunboats on the Western rivers. After this they did not 
 renew the attempt to fortify at Pittsburg, but concentrated 
 their troops at Corinth, where the gunboats could not reach 
 them. In the mean time the river fleet was engaged in con 
 veying troops from point to point, protecting them against am 
 bushes and shore batteries, thus making it possible to gather 
 the army that w T on the great battle of Pittsburg Landing. 
 
 Some of the operations of the Western fleet between the bat 
 tle of Belmont and the movement upon Fort Henry, as well 
 as the difficulties experienced by Commodore Foote, are worthy 
 of note before proceeding to the more important features of the 
 war. 
 
 On the 7th of January, 1862, Commodore Foote, with the 
 Essex, Captain Porter ; the Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk ; and 
 the Taylor, Captain "Walke, made a reconnoissance down the 
 river toward Columbus. In regard to this the Commodore 
 wrote as follows : 
 
 I ran down within range of the rebel batteries, but the enemy did 
 not open fire. My object was fully attained in seeing the river down to 
 
ETC. 523 
 
 the point we reached clear of submarine batteries and other obstacles. 
 I did not consider it policy to open fire on the batteries, as we had not 
 the force to attempt to carry them, which would have induced the rebels 
 to claim a victory, if we had retired after first opening upon them. One 
 of their gunboats, which we had driven down the river, followed us upon 
 our return. I fired at her and then gave chase, compelling her to return 
 to Columbus, after an exchange of two or three shots, one of which was 
 fired from the Columbus batteries. The object of the reconnoissance 
 was satisfactorily accomplished in all respects, showing that the rumors 
 of obstacles being in the river and dangerous torpedoes, are unfounded, 
 at least, until within range of the rebel batteries. 
 
 The commanding officer found great difficulty in procuring 
 men to man his river fleet, as well as in collecting naval stores 
 so far inland, and where they had not been needed before. 
 Under date of the 12th of January, 1862, he wrote as follows 
 to the Navy Department : 
 
 As we are getting stores, etc., aboard the remaining gunboats, pre 
 paratory to putting them in commission, I necessarily spend all my time 
 in looking after these boats, which is not required in looking after our 
 interests down the river. We are now in immediate want of a thousand 
 men for the gunboats. In the mean time, I am getting the boats into 
 the middle of the river, and putting their ordnance and other equip 
 ments and stores on board, and by the 20th instant expect to have all 
 the gunboats in commission, although with but one-third of a crew to 
 each boat. 
 
 On the llth of January, the day previous to the date of the 
 above letter, a skirmish was had with the rebel gunboats which 
 came up from Columbus. An account of this little action, 
 written by Captain W. D. Porter, commanding the Essex, is 
 minute and official, and is as follows : 
 
 U. S. GUNBOAT ESSEX, FORT JEFFERSOX, January 13, 1862. 
 SIR : On the morning of the llth General McClernand sent on board 
 this vessel and informed me that the enemy were moving up the river 
 from Columbus with several vessels, towing up a battery. I immediately 
 signalled Lieutenant Commanding Paulding, of the St. Louis, to get un 
 der way and prepare for action. A very thick fog coming on, we were 
 compelled to steam slowly down the river, but about 10 o clock, or a 
 
524: HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 little after, it rose, and showed us a large steamer at tlic head of Lucas s 
 Bend. We heard her whistle the moment we were seen by them. 
 Shortly after whistling she was joined by another large and a small 
 steamer. We pursued our course steadily down the river, and when 
 within long range the large steamer fired a heavy shell-gun, which struck 
 the sand-bar between us, and ricochetted within about two hundred yards 
 of this vessel, and burst. We at this time did not return the fire, but 
 continued our course down in order to near the vessel. By this time 
 the large steamer was joined by her consorts, and they opened a brisk 
 fire upon us. I now hailed Lieutenant Commanding Paulding, and di 
 rected him to try one of his rifle-cannon. He instantly fired, and sent 
 his shot completely over the enemy. I then opened from my bow guns, 
 and the action became brisk on both sides for about twenty minutes, the 
 enemy firing by broadsides. At the end of this time the enemy hauled 
 off, and stood down the river, rounding to occasionally and giving us 
 broadsides. This running fight continued until he reached the shelter 
 of his batteries on the Iron Banks above Columbus. We continued the 
 action and drove him behind their batteries in a crippled condition, as 
 we could distinctly see our shell explode on his decks. The action 
 lasted over an hour, and terminated, as I think, in a complete defeat of 
 the enemy s boats, superior in size and number of guns to the Essex and 
 St. Louis. On the 12th General McClernand requested me to make a 
 rcconnoissance toward the Iron Banks. I did so, and offered the enemy 
 battle by firing a round shot at their battery ; but they did not respond, 
 nor did I see any thing of their boats. I have since been informed 
 through the general that the boats of the enemy were completely dis 
 abled, and the panic became so great at the Iron Banks, that the gun 
 ners deserted their guns. 
 
 The fire of the St. Louis was precise, and the shot told well. The 
 officers and men of this vessel behaved with firmness Mr. Riley, our 
 first master, carrying out all my orders strictly, while the officers of the 
 gun divisions, Messrs. Laning and Ferry, paid particular attention to the 
 pointing of their respective guns. Mr. Brittan, my aide, paid all atten 
 tion to my orders, and conveyed them correctly and with alacrity. In 
 fact, all the officers and men on board behaved like veterans. 
 I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 W. D. PORTEE, Commander. 
 Flag-Officer A. H. FOOTE. 
 
 The following letter from Commodore Foote, written from 
 Paducah, gives an account of the condition of affairs when the 
 expedition moved up the Tennessee against Fort Henry. His 
 
CAPTURE OF FORT HEKRY, ETC. 525 
 
 Christian character shines out even in his official papers. He 
 has " every confidence," he says, " under God," that he shall 
 silence the guns of Fort Henry. He recognizes a Power above 
 greater than powder and shot and shell : 
 
 U. S. GUNBOAT TAYLOR, PADUCAH, February 3, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform you that I left Cairo yesterday 
 with this vessel, having ordered the armored gunboats Essex, Caron- 
 delet, Cincinnati, and St. Louis, to precede me to Paducah, and arrived 
 here last evening. 
 
 To-day I purpose ascending the Tennessee River with the four new 
 armored boats and the old gunboats Taylor, Conestoga, and Lexington, 
 in convoy of the troops under General Grant, for the purpose of con 
 jointly attacking and occupying Fort Henry and the railroad bridge 
 connecting Bowling Green with Columbus. The transports have not 
 yet arrived, although expected last night from Cairo, which causes de 
 tention ; while in the mean time, unfortunately, the river is falling. I 
 am ready with the seven gunboats to act offensively whenever the army 
 is in condition to advance, and have every confidence, under God, that 
 we shall be able to silence the guns at Fort Henry and its surroundings, 
 notwithstanding I have been obliged, for want of men, to take from the 
 five boats remaining at Cairo all the men, except a sufficient number to 
 man one gunboat for the protection of that important post. 
 
 I have left Commander Kilty as senior officer in charge of the guns 
 and mortar-boats at Cairo, ordering him, with the assistance of Fleet- 
 Captain Pennock, to use every effort in obtaining more men and for 
 warding the early equipment of the mortar-boats. It is peculiarly un 
 fortunate that we have not been able to obtain men for the flotilla, as 
 they only are wanting to enable me to have at this moment eleven full- 
 manned, instead of seven partially-manned gunboats ready for efficient 
 operations at any point. The volunteers from the army to go in the 
 gunboats exceed the number of men required ; but the derangement of 
 companies and regiments, in permitting them to leave, is the reason as 
 signed for not more than fifty of the number having been thus far trans 
 ferred to the flotilla. 
 
 I enclose a copy of my orders to the commanders of the gunboats, in 
 anticipation of the attack on Fort Henry ; also, a copy of orders to 
 Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, who will have more especial charge of 
 the old gunboats, and operate in a less exposed condition than the ar 
 mored boats. I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
526 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 P. S. Several transports with troops have just arrived. I proceed 
 up the Tennessee early in the morning, and will there make the Cincin 
 nati my flag-ship. A. H. F. 
 
 The following special order, issued before moving up the 
 river to attack the fort, shows how carefully this experienced 
 officer had considered the probable circumstances of the fight ; 
 and that while he put his trust in God, he also recognized the 
 necessity of the careful and skilful use of all means at human 
 disposal. He neglected nothing which, in his estimation, could 
 secure success. 
 
 SPECIAL ORDER. 
 
 U. S. GUNBOAT TAYLOR, OHIO RIVER, February 2, 1862. 
 
 The captains of the gunboats, before going into action, will always 
 see that the hoods covering the gratings of the hatches at the bows, and 
 sterns, and elsewhere, are taken off; otherwise great injury will result 
 from the concussion of the guns in firing. The anchors, also, must be 
 unstocked, if they interfere with the range of the bow guns. 
 
 In attacking the fort, the first order of steaming will be observed, as, 
 by the vessels being parallel, they will be much less exposed to the ene 
 my s range than if not in a parallel line, and by moving ahead or astern, 
 which all the vessels will do by following the motions of the flag-ship, it 
 will be difficult for the enemy to get an accurate range of the gunboats. 
 
 Equal distances from one another must be observed by all the vessels 
 in action. The flag-ship will, of course, open the fire first, and then 
 others will follow when good sight of the enemy s guns in the fort can 
 be obtained. There must be no firing until correct sights can be ob 
 tained, as this would not only be throwing away ammunition, but it 
 would encourage the enemy to see us firing wildly and harmlessly at the 
 fort. The captains will enforce upon their men the absolute necessity 
 of observing this order ; and let it be also distinctly impressed on the 
 mind of every man firing a gun, that, while the first shot may be either 
 of too much elevation or too little, there is no excuse for a second wild 
 fire, as the first will indicate the inaccuracy of the aim of the gun, which 
 must be elevated, or depressed, or trained, as circumstances require. 
 Let it be reiterated that random firing is not a mere waste of ammu 
 nition, but, what is far worse, it encourages the enemy when he sees 
 shot and shell falling harmlessly about and beyond him. 
 
 The great object is to dismount the guns in the fort by the accuracy 
 of our fire, although a shell in the mean time may occasionally be 
 
CAPTUEE OF FORT HEXEY, ETC. 527 
 
 thrown in among a body of the enemy s troops. Great caution will be 
 observed lest our own troops be mistaken for the enemy. 
 
 When the flag-ship ceases firing, it will be a signal for the other ves 
 sels also to cease, as the ceasing of fire will indicate the surrender, or 
 the readiness to surrender, the fort. As the vessels will all be so near 
 one another, verbal communication will be held with the commander-in- 
 chief when it is wanted. The commander-in-chief has every confidence 
 in the spirit and valor of officers and men under his command, and his 
 only solicitude arises lest the firing should be too rapid for precision, and 
 that coolness and order, so essential to complete success, should not be 
 observed ; and hence he has, in this general order, expressed his views, 
 which must be observed by all under his command. 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, 
 Flag- Officer commanding Naval Forces on Western Waters. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 
 
 AT a point opposite Fort Henry the Cumberland approaches 
 within twelve miles of the Tennessee, and there the rebels had 
 constructed Fort Donelson, a much larger and stronger work 
 than Henry, and armed with heavier guns. It was garrisoned 
 by from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men, under the 
 command of Generals Pillow and Buckner. The fort is on the 
 left bank of the river, about one hundred miles from its 
 mouth. It was resolved to follow up the capture of Fort Henry 
 with a joint attack by land and water on this more important 
 work. In a military point of view, the possession of the Cum 
 berland was more important than that of the Tennessee. Ex 
 tensive iron-works were located upon its banks ; it is navigable 
 at times for large boats some four hundred miles, and for half 
 that distance boats have sufficient water all the year. The 
 country which it drains is capable of furnishing a large amount 
 of supplies, for which the river affords the means of transport, 
 while at Nashville very large factories were employed in pre 
 paring supplies for the rebel army. Besides, no advance could 
 be made into Tennessee with this fort and its strong garrison 
 behind. The land forces, eighteen thousand strong, were moved 
 across from Fort Henry, over almost impassable roads, on the 
 12th of February. These troops reached the enemy s lines on 
 that day, and, driving in his pickets, proceeded to invest the 
 fort. 
 
 The gunboat Carondelet (iron-clad) had been sent forward 
 ahead of the rest of the flotilla, and on the 13th was ordered to 
 attack the water batteries single-handed. In order that the 
 
CAPTUKE OF FOBT DONELSOX. 529 
 
 reader may know what work this was for such a steamer, a 
 brief statement is given of the character of the works. The 
 fort is situated on a sloping bluff which rises about one hundred 
 and fifty feet above the river. According to the report of Com 
 modore Foote, it mounted twenty guns, which were disposed as 
 follows: one battery, about twenty feet above the water, of 
 32-pounder and 64-pounder guns; the second, with a similar 
 armament, sixty feet higher up ; and the third, on the summit 
 of the hill, mounting 128-pounder guns ; while the garrison, all 
 but those who manned the guns, were over the crest of the hill, 
 and occupying outworks beyond the effectual reach of shot 
 or shell except from mortars. It is very easily seen that it 
 would be utterly vain for a single steamer, and she able to use 
 only her bow guns, to attack such a position as that with any 
 hope of doing serious injury, or of escape without damage to 
 herself. She fired one hundred and thirty-eight shots when a 
 128-pound ball entered one of her ports and injured her ma 
 chinery, compelling her to withdraw. Having repaired dam 
 ages she made another attack in the afternoon of the same day, 
 but without effect on the works. Both parties now prepared 
 for what was expected to be the decisive battle of the next day. 
 On the 14th six gunboats were ordered to attack the fort ; 
 four of these were iron-dads, and two were wooden ones. They 
 got under way at 2 o clock in the afternoon, and proceeded 
 toward the works four abreast, or as nearly so as the narrow 
 stream would permit. The rebels opened fire from the battery 
 of heavy guns on the top of the hill at 2| P. M., but the boats 
 moved steadily without reply, intending to come at once to 
 close action. The gunboats opened fire at the distance of a 
 mile, but did not diminish their speed till within four hundred 
 yards of the lower battery. At this point the firing on both 
 sides was very rapid and unusually destructive. Shot and shell 
 from the fleet plunged point-blank into the lower batteries of 
 the fort, dismounting their guns and driving the gunners away, 
 while heavy shot and shell came not singly, but in volleys 
 against the sides and upon the decks of the gunboats. Sev 
 eral entered their ports, and some of the 128-pound shot broke 
 through the iron armor. Many were killed and wounded on 
 board the steamers, but their fighting power was not sensibly 
 34 
 
530 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 diminished, and the rebel batteries evidently began to fail. 
 Several of their guns were dismounted, and they were driven 
 out of the lower battery ; and the action was evidently going 
 against them, when three of the gunboats were almost at once 
 disabled by shots that struck the steering apparatus and a 
 wheel-house. These were of course compelled to drift out of ac 
 tion, and as it was impossible for the remaining vessels to carry 
 the action to any successful result, they also withdrew. 
 
 The gunboats fought with twelve guns against twenty in bat 
 tery, and planted upon ground far above the level of their decks, 
 the highest battery mounting 128-pounders, which could send 
 upon them a plunging fire, with almost entire safety to them 
 selves. The result of the action showed that the light armor 
 of the gunboats could be pierced by the shot of the heavy guns, 
 and that the machinery and steering apparatus needed addi 
 tional protection. Still, the great importance of the iron armor 
 was fully shown, for the St. Louis was struck fifty-nine times, 
 with only one man killed and nine wounded ; and the Pitts- 
 burg was hit forty times, and only two men were wounded ; 
 and on board the whole fleet only eleven were killed and forty- 
 three wounded, a small number considering the severity of the 
 action. Nothing important seems to have been accomplished 
 by this attack ; and although it was thought that but for the dis 
 abling of the steering gear the batteries would have been silenced 
 in a few minutes, it is not very clear how this would have been 
 decisive when twenty thousand men were within the works 
 ready to man the guns again ; and when, though the river bat 
 teries had been destroyed, the works beyond still remained to 
 be carried by assault, as they actually were at the close of the 
 fight, when the fort was so gallantly won. 
 
 It may be, however, that too little consideration is thus 
 given to the moral effect of the fire of the gunboats upon the 
 garrison in diminishing their confidence in their defences, for 
 they found themselves unable to stand to their guns, and their 
 river batteries were being effectually silenced by the dismount 
 ing of the cannon ; and they had good reason to dread the 
 effect of the shells when the gunboats should take a position 
 where they could command the camp. Such seems to have 
 been the opinion of the Secretary of the Navy, who, in direct 
 
CAPTURE OF FOKT DONELSON. 531 
 
 communication with Commodore Foote, had the best possible 
 means of knowing the truth. The following passage is found 
 in the Eeport of 1862 in regard to this point : " The rebels 
 were so greatly demoralized that they could not be brought 
 into effective action on the following day, which resulted in the 
 defeat of the insurgents and the surrender of Fort Donelson to 
 the army the next morning." 
 
 Justice to Commodore Foote and to the officers and men of 
 the fleet requires that the following statement in regard to the 
 disadvantages under which the action was fought should be 
 given to the public. On the llth of February he wrote as fol 
 lows to the Secretary : 
 
 I leave again to-night with the Louisville, Pittsburg, and St. Louis, 
 for the Cumberland River, to cooperate with the army in the attack on 
 Fort Donelson. I go reluctantly, as we are very short of men, and trans 
 ferring men from vessel to vessel, as we have to do, is having a very de 
 moralizing effect upon them. Twenty-eight ran off to-day, hearing that 
 they were to be sent out of their vessels. I do hope that the six hun 
 dred men will be sent immediately. I shall do all in my power to ren 
 der the gunboats effective in the fight, although they are not properly 
 manned ; but I must go, as General Halleck wishes it. If we could 
 wait ten days, and / had the men, I would go with eight mortar-boats 
 and six armored boats. 
 
 Instead of the armament which he thought necessary for the 
 reduction of the fort, he had only the four iron-dads which 
 could be brought into close action, and they imperfectly 
 manned. These facts place the action of the gunboats with 
 Fort Donelson in a new light, and the wonder is, not that they 
 did not capture the fort, but that they were not themselves de 
 stroyed. 
 
 The capture of their central strongholds on the Cumberland 
 and Tennessee, and of the surrender and dispersing of their 
 army of twenty thousand men, fifteen thousand of whom were 
 made prisoners at Donelson, created a panic among the rebels, 
 which made Commodore Foote very anxious to proceed at once 
 to Nashville before the enemy could recover from these severe 
 blows. He pressed upon General Grant an immediate pursuit 
 with at least four thousand men. General Halleck, however, 
 
532 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 for reasons which do not appear, prohibited the gunboats from 
 proceeding above Clarksville. Inasmuch as Nashville, a most 
 important depot and centre of operations for the rebels, was 
 entirely at our mercy, it does not appear why the river fleet 
 was not permitted to ascend and occupy the place. Whatever 
 may have been the reason, the gunboats were held back, with an 
 open river before them, and on the 27th of February the army, 
 with two gunboats only with it, took possession of Nashville. 
 
 By these brilliant operations of the Army and Navy, the 
 rebel line of defence was broken at the centre, and this made 
 it a necessity for them to abandon the two wings of this line 
 Bowling Green on their right, and Columbus on the Mississippi. 
 It was one of the great hinge-points of the war, the first great 
 How which the rebellion received. A firm lodgment in the 
 heart of Tennessee involved, almost of necessity, the final over 
 throw of the rebel cause. The naval battles which had been 
 fought on the Atlantic coast were perhaps more brilliant ; but 
 none, unless it was that between the Monitor and the Merri- 
 niack, were followed by more important results. 
 
 After he had taken possession of Clarksville, Commodore 
 Foote, not having obtained the consent of General Halleck to 
 proceed to Nashville, returned to Cairo and prepared for oper 
 ations on the Mississippi. On the 23d of February he moved 
 toward Columbus for the purpose of a reconnoissance with four 
 iron-clads, two mortar-boats, and three transports, carrying one 
 thousand men. This expedition was to meet a flag of truce from 
 General Polk, to which Commodore Foote promised to reply. 
 
 On the 2d of March he once more moved down the river in 
 force to receive a flag of truce from General Polk. The rebels 
 probably availed themselves of this method of ascertaining the 
 force which our commanders had at their disposal. Commodore 
 Foote was quite willing to gratify them in this particular, and 
 with good reason ; for on seeing the number of the boats and 
 transports, they at once began the evacuation of the northern 
 most of their fortified forts on the Mississippi. 
 
 The rebels were soon seen burning their winter quarters, and 
 other large fires indicated the destruction of their stores. The 
 heavy guns on the bluffs were removed, but " lose in the water 
 batteries were left. The works at Columbia were very formi- 
 
CAPTUKE OF FORT DONELSON. 533 
 
 dable, consisting of tiers of batteries on the land side, and they 
 were surrounded by a ditch and abatis. Here also an immense 
 chain had been prepared to throw across the river, and a large 
 number of torpedoes were found. Great quantities of shot, shell, 
 and anchors were also secured. 
 
 General Sherman and Lieutenant Phelps, with six gunboats, 
 four mortar-boats, and three transports, with two regiments and 
 two battalions of infantry, went down and landed, but found that 
 the place was already occupied by some four hundred of the 
 Second Illinois cavalry, who, being out on a scouting party, had 
 dashed into the place. General Cullom, who, with General 
 Sherman, was in command of the troops that came down the 
 river, discovered on landing a train of fire leading to a maga 
 zine, which he cut in season to save the lives of the soldiers. 
 
 The nobleness of Commodore Foote s character was ever 
 seen in the very warm commendation with which he men 
 tioned in his dispatches every officer whom he thought de 
 serving. He was a warm admirer of General Cullom, of Gen 
 eral Halleck s staff, and in the dispatch announcing the fall of 
 Columbus he took especial pains to commend to the Secretary 
 Commanders Dove, Walke, and Stembel, and Lieutenants 
 Paulding, Thompson, Shirk, Phelps, and Sanford. He had 
 before bestowed very emphatic praise upon Lieutenant Phelps 
 for the manner in which he conducted the expedition to 
 Florence after the fall of Fort Henry. 
 
CHAPTEE XXXV. 
 
 OPERATIONS AGAINST AND CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 
 
 AFTER the centre of the rebel line had been broken by the 
 capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and these victories had 
 been followed by the occupation of Nashville and the evac 
 uation of Bowling Green on their right wing, and Columbus 
 on the Mississippi, it was decided to move down that river with 
 a more formidable force than had yet been organized, and at 
 tempt to remove the various obstructions, forts, and batteries 
 with which the rebels had blockaded the stream. The first of 
 these were the very formidable works at Island No. 10,, a spot 
 admirably fitted for blockading the river, and which it was by 
 no means easy to attack either by land or water. This island 
 is at the bottom of a long bend in the river some forty miles 
 from Columbus. The fortifications on the island and on the 
 opposite shores mounted seventy heavy guns, and there was 
 also a floating battery with some sixteen guns. In addition to 
 these, field-batteries were established at intervals for ten or 
 twelve miles where they could command the channel. The 
 river from this island runs for several miles northwest, and then 
 turns west and south. At the top of this bend and north of 
 the island is New Madrid, which the rebels had fortified and 
 occupied with several thousand troops to prevent the wwks on 
 the island from being approached by land from the Missouri 
 side. Below New Madrid they had also batteries on the west 
 side to prevent that shore being occupied ; and on the east side, 
 to prevent troops from crossing and attacking the island from 
 the Tennessee shore. A few miles below New Madrid large 
 swamps occupy both sides of the Mississippi, so that a force es- 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 535 
 
 caping from the island would have to land above these swamps 
 at Tiptonville in order to reach the interior. Above this, on 
 the Tennessee shore, it is swampy, and in most places over 
 flown, so as to prevent the rebels from leaving in that direction 
 by land. 
 
 While, therefore, our gunboats held the river above, if New 
 Madrid could be occupied by our land forces, and these bat 
 teries be placed along the river below, to the edge of the great 
 swamp that could command the stream, the garrison of the 
 island would be hemmed in, though it could not thus be cap 
 tured until the supplies should fail. The somewhat difficult 
 task of occupying New Madrid was committed to General Pope, 
 who had under his command some twenty thousand men. The 
 peril of this enterprise was greatly increased by the presence 
 below the island of the rebel gunboats, and by the stage of the 
 water in the river. The stream was so high as to raise the guns 
 of the boats above the banks ; and as the country around New 
 Madrid is flat, they commanded it to the extreme range of their 
 cannon, some of which were rifles. 
 
 General Pope, in meeting these difficulties, showed both 
 energy and fertility of resource. He established in the night 
 sunken batteries, on which the guns were only high enough to 
 fire over the surface of the ground, so that it was nearly impos 
 sible for the gunboats to strike them or get a shell into the 
 trenches, while, as they were within rifle shot of the point from 
 which the boats usually attacked, many of their men were shot 
 down at the guns. Owing to peculiar circumstances, it was one 
 of the few cases where the gunboats of the rivers fought at dis 
 advantage with troops on shore. Nine of these boats at some 
 times engaged the batteries, but with little eifect, because their 
 shot and shells went mostly over the trenches, while they, lying 
 high out of water, and above the banks, were conspicuous 
 marks, and therefore suffered severely. 
 
 On the 14th of March, General Pope having nearly silenced 
 the rebel batteries on shore, they retreated to their boats, and 
 our troops took possession of the place. By extending his bat 
 teries to the south, he gained command of the river below 
 the island, and at the same time shut up a part of the rebel 
 fleet above him, for these wooden boats could not, without great 
 
536 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 peril, pass his heavy siege-guns. Thus, when Commodore 
 Foote moved down from Columbus, Island ~No. 10 might be said 
 to be invested, the swamps on two sides serving instead of lines 
 of troops. To attack these batteries of the island from above 
 was a work of immense peril. The current of the river is 
 swift, and the most heavily armored boats of Commodore 
 Foote s fleet were very deficient in steam-power. Under the 
 most favorable circumstances they could barely stem the stream, 
 making but little progress, and, of course, should one of them 
 meet with any accident depriving her of even a part of her 
 motive power, she would at once drift helplessly under the ene 
 my s guns. To fight with only the forward guns, bow on and 
 down-stream, required great caution. It was for this reason 
 that the gunboats could not be brought into close action, as was 
 the case at Forts Henry and Donelson. The experience there 
 was an admonition not to be disregarded. Had they been 
 fighting down-stream then, all their disabled boats would have 
 been captured or destroyed, for they would have been carried 
 in a few minutes directly under the guns of the water batteries. 
 Commodore Foote was compelled, therefore, to fight at long 
 range, not approaching nearer than one mile and a half or two 
 miles. He expected much from his mortar-boats, but although 
 they compelled the enemy to move his encampments out of 
 range, the separate forts and batteries were a small mark for 
 shell practice at a distance of two miles. There was yet anoth 
 er weighty reason why it was very important to be careful of 
 the gunboats. The rebels had a fleet on the river below, out 
 numbering our own, and the Louisiana, soon after destroyed 
 below New Orleans, was expected daily to come up the river; 
 and should our fleet be weakened materially, there was nothing 
 to prevent the flotilla of the enemy from reaching the cities of 
 the Mississippi and Ohio, for no batteries had yet been finished 
 above, by which they could have been stopped. It was neces 
 sary, therefore, for Commodore Foote to exercise the greatest 
 vigilance and caution. During this time, also, he was suffering 
 greatly from the wound received at Donelson. 
 
 On the 14th of March, 1862, the fleet which the commodore 
 had prepared, consisting of seven iron-clads and ten mortar- 
 boats left Cairo, and having been joined at Columbus on the 
 
CAPTUEE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 537 
 
 same day by twelve hundred troops, under Colonel Buford, 
 reached Hickman the same evening. Here the Louisville was 
 found partially disabled by the leaking of her boilers, and was 
 sent back to Columbus for repairs. On the 15th, at daylight, 
 the fleet moved on, and arrived in the vicinity of Island No. 10 
 at nine o clock in the morning. The fog on the river was so 
 dense as to hide all objects at a little distance, and a heavy rain 
 was also falling. Nothing could be done that day except to get 
 two of the mortar-boats in a position where they could try the 
 range. On the morning of the 16th the mortar-boats were 
 placed in as good a position as possible, and they were soon en 
 abled to shell several regiments out of their encampments. At 
 this extreme range, they could just reach the batteries on the 
 island, the floating batteries, and those on the Tennessee shore. 
 These mortar-boats were under the charge of Captain Maynar- 
 din, United States Army, as ordnance officer, assisted by Lieu 
 tenant J. P. Sandford, of the Navy. The mortars were very 
 heavy, throwing thirteen-inch shells. On the morning of the 
 17th the first attack with the gunboats was made. The Ben- 
 ton, Cincinnati, and St. Louis were lashed together, on account 
 of the deficient steam-power of the Benton, which in other re 
 spects was the most formidable boat in the fleet. They main 
 tained, on account of the rapidity of the stream, a distance of 
 nearly two miles, and, of course, their fire could not be very 
 effective. The forts and batteries were isolated from each other, 
 and at that distance any one of them presented a small mark 
 to the gunners, and it was found very difficult to throw shells 
 from the mortars with much accuracy, although they succeeded 
 in forcing back the rebel encampments out of range. Indeed, 
 the enemy kept no more men within range than was necessary 
 to man their guns. The action was continued from mid-day 
 until the forts were hidden by the darkness, with no very im 
 portant results. The Benton was struck four times, but not se 
 riously injured. The Cincinnati had her engines injured some 
 what ; but the most serious disaster was the bursting of a rifled 
 gun on the St. Louis, by which fifteen men were killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 From the time of the first attack on the 17th to the 26th of 
 March this firing upon the batteries at long range was kept up, 
 
538 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the rebels having withdrawn their troops beyond the reach of 
 the shells, leaving only the men at the guns, so that little dam 
 age was done. Occasionally a gun was dismounted, but this 
 was of small consequence, when it could be so easily replaced. 
 
 At this time, the commodore reported his fleet as numbering 
 sixteen mortar-boats, six iron-clads, and one wooden gunboat. 
 The rebels, he stated, had at that date thirteen gunboats, inde 
 pendent of the five below New Madrid, and the Manassas at 
 Memphis. There was, as he thought, great danger that the 
 rebel fleet would attempt to ascend the river, and lay under 
 contribution, or burn, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and other river 
 towns. He was, therefore, very cautious in regard to exposing 
 his gunboats. He also wrote to the Secretary that it would 
 be useless, even if he should succeed in driving the enemy from 
 their forts, for, with no troops to hold them, they would be re- 
 occupied by the rebels so soon as the fleet had passed. He saw, 
 therefore, that the only hope of capturing this stronghold was 
 in some manner to send transports and gunboats to Gen 
 eral Pope, in order that he might cross the river with troops 
 that could attack the rebel works from below, and on the Ten 
 nessee shore. How to supply General Pope with the boats lie 
 needed, and not so \veaken his fleet that the rebel flotilla might 
 succeed in passing up the river, was a question not easily solved. 
 Two methods were discussed, both difficult and perilous. One 
 was to send two gunboats past the batteries, if that could be 
 done. In a council of war called by the commodore it was 
 found that the officers of the fleet, with but one exception, be 
 lieved that any vessel would certainly be destroyed in an at 
 tempt to run the blockade, exposed as it would be to the fire of 
 at least seventy guns. This plan was temporarily abandoned. 
 The other was to send some boats around the forts and island, 
 through the swamps and bayou on the western side of the 
 Mississippi, and so bring them out to the river again at New 
 Madrid. It was decided that this should be undertaken. This 
 plan, as is said, was first suggested by General Schuyler Hamil 
 ton. In the execution of it the Navy and Army cooperated, 
 but the success of the enterprise was mainly due to the skill 
 and energy of Colonel T. W. Bissell and his regiment of reso 
 lute and skilful engineers. Opposite the point where Commo- 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 539 
 
 dore Foote s fleet was lying, a swamp on the Missouri side ap 
 proached the river, so that in high water about five hundred 
 feet of dry ground lay between it and the river bank. In this 
 swamp, reaching out west and southwest, were several small 
 bayous or swamp-lakes, partly connected by narrow channels, 
 and at or near New Madrid a small stream came down from the 
 direction of the swamp. The swampy ground was covered 
 in places with heavy timber, so that six miles of timber in all, 
 had to be cut through, while the whole length of the proposed 
 canal was twelve miles. Through the solid ground, through 
 the narrow swamp channels, through the underbrush and heavy 
 timber, through the shallow lakes, a passage was to be opened 
 fifty feet wide and deep enough to float the boats. "Water, 
 swamp-mud, slough-holes, great trees, brush, stumps, and solid 
 earth, these were the obstacles which for twelve miles confronted 
 our men in the chilly weather of the spring. The first work 
 was the construction of the canal from the river-bank to the 
 edge of the swamp. "When this was finished it was a difficult 
 matter to pass even some of the small boats through, for the 
 water in the Mississippi was so much higher than the land be 
 low that the water rushed with great violence through the cut, 
 and the boats could only be passed down by a large company 
 of men on either side with guy-ropes to guide and hold them 
 back. 
 
 It was found impracticable to cut a channel deep enough 
 for the passage of the gunboats, and therefore the plan em 
 braced only the transports and tugs. This required the canal 
 to be fifty feet wide and four feet deep. The obstacles in the 
 swamp seemed at times almost too great for the skill and energy 
 of man. Fallen timber, some sunk entirely in the mud ; great 
 stumps, some of whose tops were below the water ; huge trees, 
 with the water now several feet around them, these often threat 
 ened to stop their progress altogether. The steam machinery 
 of the transports and the capstans were used in dragging out 
 the logs and tearing up the stumps, while with saws rigged for 
 the purpose the trees which stood in the water were sawed off 
 four feet beneath the surface, and thus an avenue, in all six 
 miles long and fifty feet wide, was cut through this grove of the 
 huge trees of the West. The small swamp channels were to be 
 
540 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 straightened and made larger, and the mud scooped out of the 
 shallow places in the bayous. 
 
 Thus a large body of troops, assisted by the sailors of the 
 fleet, worked for nineteen days, digging in the mud and water, 
 cutting down and dragging away the trees, and hauling along the 
 transports, and at the end of that time had the satisfaction of 
 reaching New Madrid with their amphibious flotilla. The troops 
 there received them with the greatest enthusiasm, and all felt 
 that the rebel stronghold would soon be in their hands. This 
 little fleet of steamboats, gliding along through the forest and 
 swamps, apparently without the aid of water, presented one of 
 the most curious scenes of the war. But the work was not yet 
 completed. These unarmed transports could not be used for 
 conveying the troops in the face of the enemy and gunboats, 
 and the question again recurred, " Is it possible for any of our 
 iron-clads to run the gantlet of the batteries ? " General Pope 
 urged this upon Commodore Foote with great earnestness, but 
 this prudent officer hesitated for reasons already given, to risk 
 his boats, unless such a measure should become absolutely ne 
 cessary. He was the more inclined to wait a little the progress 
 of events, because General Halleck had intimated that meas 
 ures had already been taken by him which would compel the 
 evacuation of the enemy s works. The opinions of Commodore 
 Foote, and also of General Halleck, will appear from the fol 
 lowing documents : 
 
 FLAG-STEAMER BENTON, OFF ISLAND No. 10, March 20, 1862. 
 SIR : Most of the iron-clad steamers, including this vessel, are still 
 lying within long range of the rebel forts, and occasionally, with the 
 mortar-boats, are throwing shells into the enemy s batteries, which have 
 induced them to withdraw all their superfluous men not required for 
 serving their guns. To-day the upper battery opened upon us, but was 
 silenced in half an hour, this ship dismounting a gun. I send, to-night, 
 a boat to sound in a narrow and shallow channel, in hopes the present 
 rise of water in the river will enable me to dispatch a small steamer 
 with light draught to General Pope, near New Madrid, who, as I have al 
 ready informed the Department, has several times requested that I would 
 send him two or three gunboats to enable him to cross over to the Ten 
 nessee side, with the view of attacking the rebels in the rear at this 
 point, while we make the attack in front or on the river-side. I am ap 
 prehensive, however, from our ill success thus far, that this project may 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 541 
 
 not prove feasible. To-day, for the first time since I Lave been in com 
 mand of the flotilla, I called a council of war, with the view of ascer 
 taining the opinions of the officers with reference to sending, or attempt 
 ing to send, aid to General Pope. The officers, with one exception, 
 were decidedly opposed to running the blockade, believing it would 
 result in the almost certain destruction of the boats which should 
 attempt to pass the six forts, with fifty guns bearing upon the vessels. 
 I have been seriously disposed to run the blockade myself with this ves 
 sel, which is better protected than the other boats, although she is slow 
 and works sluggishly ; but, upon reconsideration, as her loss would be so 
 great if we failed, and my personal services here are considered so im 
 portant with the fleet and transports, I have, for the present, abandoned 
 the idea. 
 
 This place is admirably chosen for defence by the rebels, as its rear 
 can only be approached, in this stage of water, from the river-side oppo 
 site New Madrid, it being surrounded by bayous or sloughs, while its 
 long line of six forts, commanding one another from the river front, 
 render it almost impregnable to an attacking force. General Pope has 
 no transports, and, without our reaching him by running the blockade, 
 is unable to cross over to the Tennessee side from New Madrid, where he 
 now is in force, and it is impossible for him, from the inundated state of 
 the country, to send or march his troops to this point. Were we to at 
 tempt to attack these heavy batteries with the gunboats, or attempt to run 
 the blockade and fail, as I have already stated in a former communica 
 tion, the rivers above us Mississippi, Ohio, and Cumberland would be 
 greatly exposed, not only frustrating the grand object of the expedition, 
 but exposing our towns and cities bordering those rivers ; especially so 
 should General Pope be unable to hold his position at New Madrid. 
 Under these circumstances, and our boats being so ill-adapted to fight 
 ing down the river, with two rifle-guns having burst, and our shells im 
 perfect, I am induced to act with great caution, and expose the flotilla 
 less than under more favorable circumstances it would be my duty to 
 do, for the great object for which the fleet was created. For the future, 
 in the absence of instructions from higher authority, I shall be governed 
 by circumstances as they may arise. When the object of running the 
 blockade becomes adequate to the risk, I shall not hesitate to do it. 
 The place may be occupied by us in a short time without an assault, as 
 the rebels must be cut off from their necessary supplies. Still, if this 
 does not soon take place, it may become necessary to force the block 
 ade, or adopt some other measures which have not yet suggested them 
 selves. Your obedient servant, A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
54:2 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 U. S. FLAG-SHIP BENTON, ISLAND No. 10, March 26, 1862. 
 
 SIR : Since my communication of the 20th instant, we have been 
 lying off the forts at long range, occasionally giving a rifle-shot, and 
 more frequently throwing mortar-shells upon the island and at the for 
 tifications on the Tennessee shore. The rebels still hold the forts, but 
 the encampments are moved beyond range, with a sufficient number of 
 men to serve their heavy guns, which seem to be well protected from 
 our shells by their breastworks. A communication from General Hal- 
 leek (a copy of which is enclosed) leads me to hope that we may yet 
 derive support from the Army, irrespective of General Pope s force, 
 which will cross over from New Madrid and attack the rebels in the 
 rear, while we make the attack in front, in case we succeed in getting 
 two steamers and several cutters, which are now working their way 
 toward that point, through the bayous or sloughs. Should this effort 
 be successful, I hope to hear that a land force of some ten thousand 
 men will be in the rebels rear in the course of five or six days. With 
 the exception of a ridge, or higher land, on the river-bank on the Ten 
 nessee side, from directly opposite New Madrid to nearly opposite Island 
 No. 10, the whole country is inundated, or at least so much so as to 
 prevent troops from other points reaching the rebels rear, showing how 
 admirably their position has been chosen for defence. 
 
 We now have here six iron-plated gunboats, one wooden gunboat, 
 the Conestoga, and sixteen mortar-boats ; one iron-clad gunboat being 
 at Nashville, one guarding Columbus and Hickman, and two wooden 
 boats up the Tennessee ; while the Essex, Commander Porter, is repair 
 ing at St. Louis. We have all the mortar-boats that we use to any ad 
 vantage, and still want two tow-boats for these in greater force, as we 
 have a strong current, requiring the greatest vigilance to prevent them 
 and the gunboats from being carried down-stream, from the want of 
 steam-power of the latter. Colonel Buford, commanding the troops, 
 has a force of between one thousand nine hundred and two thousand 
 men ; but who, in fact, living as they necessarily do, aboard the trans 
 ports the banks being overflowed, and they surrounded by water 
 cannot accomplish any thing of consequence. Thus we are waiting to 
 open communication with General Pope at New Madrid. 
 
 I forward herewith a copy of a letter sent to me by General Strong, 
 commanding at Cairo, from which it will be seen that the rebels have 
 thirteen gunboats, independent of the five below New Madrid, and the 
 Manassas or ram, at Memphis. I presume that these boats are not equal 
 to ours ; still, we have no means of ascertaining their character, espe 
 cially those at New Orleans. I have ordered the rifle-guns as they ar- 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 543 
 
 rive at Cairo to be sent us, as our rifles are unsafe, and must be con 
 demned as soon as others can be supplied. The rifle-shells, as well as 
 those of the 8-inch guns and 32-pounders, also burst prematurely, and 
 I have been obliged to drown all fuses at a distance exceeding one thou 
 sand yards. 
 
 I shall proceed with caution in our work here, being fully aware of 
 our disadvantages. If, however, any disaster should occur from circum 
 stances beyond my control, I have ordered the two iron-clad gunboats, 
 Cairo and Louisville, with the wooden boats Taylor and Lexington, to 
 meet at Cairo, or as far down as Columbus and even Hickman, to pre 
 vent the rebel gunboats from ascending the river beyond Cairo, which 
 place is now so nearly overflowed as to render it necessary for us to re 
 move all our ammunition. I have the honor to be, etc., 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 P. S. Were we able even to shell the forces out of their fortifica 
 tions, they would reoccupy as we passed down the river, as we have 
 less than two thousand troops to take possession. A. H. F. 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI, ) 
 ST. Louis, March 21, 1862. j" 
 
 SIR : I have just received your report (without date) of your opera 
 tions against the enemy s batteries in the vicinity of Island No. 10. 
 While I am certain that you have done every thing that could be done 
 successfully to reduce these works, I am very glad that you have not 
 unnecessarily exposed your gunboats. If they had been disabled, it 
 would have been a most serious loss to us in the future operations of 
 the campaign ; whereas the reduction of these batteries, this week or 
 next, is a matter of very little importance indeed. I think it will turn 
 out in the end that it is much better for us that they are not reduced till 
 we can fully cut off the retreat of their troops. 
 
 Every thing is now progressing well on the Tennessee River toward 
 opening your way down the Mississippi. The reduction of these works 
 is only a question of time, and we are in no hurry on that point. Nothing 
 is lost by a little delay there. I am directing all my attention now to 
 another object, and when that is accomplished the enemy must evacuate 
 or surrender. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 H. W. HALLECK, Major-General commanding. 
 Flag-Officer A. H. FOOTE, commanding Naval Forces, etc. 
 
 The following letter also indicates the movements of the 
 
544 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 rebels, who, not thinking it possible that the passage below 
 ISTew Orleans could be forced, were not only concentrating their 
 troops at or near Corinth for a northern movement, but were 
 intending at the same time to send their most formidable iron 
 clads up from New Orleans to destroy our fleet on . the Missis 
 sippi, and then meet the army of invasion on the Ohio, perhaps 
 at Cincinnati : 
 
 CAIRO, ILLINOIS, March 24, 1862. 
 
 GENERAL : I left Savannah, Tennessee, yesterday morning, and while 
 at Perrysville, some forty miles this side of Savannah, we took on board 
 a man by the name of M. A. Clark, formerly of Paducah, Kentucky, 
 late of New Orleans. He left New Orleans a week ago last Thursday. 
 I gained from him the following statement : Fort Pillow was being evac 
 uated when he was at Memphis last Wednesday ; Confederates moving 
 all their stores from Memphis to Corinth. The heavy guns of Fort Pil 
 low were left under water; Beauregard was at Jackson on Thursday 
 last ; would leave with his troops on Friday for Corinth. Eleven engines 
 and two hundred cars were taken from the Mississippi Central Eailroad 
 to the Memphis and Charleston Eailroad, to move Johnston s forces from 
 Decatur to Corinth. Confederates are building thirteen gunboats at 
 New Orleans twelve of them for river and one for sea service. One 
 Murray s boat carries thirty, guns, would be ready last week, and bal 
 ance this week ; were to come up the river as soon as finished ; Bragg 
 and Polk were at Corinth. Very respectfully, 
 
 JASPAR M. DRESSER, Captain. 
 Brigadier-General STRONG, commanding, Cairo. 
 
 These will explain why Commodore Foote hesitated to risk 
 his gunboats in running the batteries. In order to diminish, if 
 possible, the risk to the gunboats in running the batteries, should 
 it finally become necessary to make the trial, a boat expedition 
 was fitted out on the 1st of April with the intention of seizing 
 the upper fort on the island, in which was mounted one very 
 dangerous gun, a 10-inch columbiad. 
 
 The expedition comprised five boats, furnished by the gun 
 boats Benton, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, and Mound 
 City. Each of these boats carried a crew of ten men from the 
 vessels, and they also took fifty men from Company A, Forty- 
 second regiment Illinois Yolunteers, making in all one hundred 
 men, exclusive* of officers, all under the command of Colonel 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 515 
 
 George W. Roberts, of that regiment. It was the intention 
 to proceed through the overflowed woodland on the eastern side 
 of the river, but this, on trial, was found impracticable, on ac 
 count of the large amount of drift-wood among the trees. They 
 then dropped down as far as was practicable without being dis 
 covered and waited until 11 o clock at night when all the 
 boats were got under way, and proceeded one after another, 
 hugging the shore, and keeping in the shadow. When so near 
 that the outlines of the battery could be seen, three of the boats 
 formed in line, and the other two followed only a few yards be 
 hind. In this manner they approached the fort, so silently with 
 muffled oars, that they were not discovered even by the sentinels 
 at the guns until the boats were within less than thirty feet of 
 them. These guards uttered a cry of surprise, fired their mus 
 kets, and ran. All now depended upon the rapidity with which 
 they could work, for not only was the encampment roused by 
 the sentinels alarm, but the rebel steamboat Grampus had also 
 taken the alarm and got under way, standing toward the battery. 
 A detachment of twenty men was thrown out between the party 
 and the rebel camp to give the alarm, or fight if necessary, and 
 the work went on rapidly. Colonel Roberts gave personal at 
 tention to every gun to see that the spiking was effectually 
 done. Having finished their work, the men regained without 
 loss their boats, and returned to the fleet. This was among 
 the most gallant feats of a war distinguished for such, its very 
 boldness probably contributing largely to its success. 
 
 The following letters will throw some additional light upon 
 the reasons for delay on the part of Commodore Foote, and of 
 the nature of the work he was doing, in order that a gunboat 
 might successfully pass the batteries. It appears that the bat 
 tery at the head of the island, whose guns were spiked in the 
 night expedition of boats under Colonel Roberts, was the one 
 mainly relied upon by the rebels. It mounted eleven guns, and 
 a boat would have to pass within three hundred yards of this 
 strong work. In addition to this, there was a floating battery 
 moored also at the head of the island, which was also a very 
 dangerous affair for a passing boat. To remove these two de 
 fences was, therefore, of the utmost importance, and having 
 spiked the guns of the shore battery, the guns of the fleet were 
 35 
 
546 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 concentrated the next day upon the floating one. They were 
 fortunate enough either to cut the lashings with their shells, 
 or to compel the crew to do it by the severity of their fire, and 
 it floated .down the stream and lodged at some distance below, 
 on the Missouri shore : 
 
 FLAG-STEAMER BENTON, OFF ISLAND No. 10, April 6, 1862. 
 
 GENERAL : Your letter of this day s date, announcing the safe arrival 
 of the Carondelet at New Madrid, was received at 8 o clock this evening. 
 The telegram of Assistant Secretary Scott reached me a few minutes 
 later. 
 
 Colonel Bissel, who has charge of the steamers and barges now in 
 the slough, en route to New Madrid, lias requested that two tugs, even, 
 might be sent to you, which would, with arrangements he could make, 
 enable you to transport your forces to the opposite side of the river, in 
 case it was deemed inexpedient to send a gunboat for that purpose. 
 You, yourself, in a late letter, apply for a gunboat, our smallest gun 
 boat, even, for that purpose. I could, last night, had you made a point 
 of having two gunboats, sent them with comparative safety, as the night 
 was dark, while the vivid lightning enabled the pilots to keep the chan 
 nel. Again, it is now too late to obtain the hay and other necessary 
 articles for the protection of the gunboat to-night, to say nothing of the 
 clear atmosphere, rendering a boat as visible, or as good an object to 
 sight, as in the daytime. For these reasons I cannot, neither does a 
 single navy officer, and, I presume, not a pilot in the squadron, consider 
 that a gunboat could run the blockade to-night without an almost cer 
 tainty of its being sunk in the attempt, especially if the guns were 
 served with any degree of skill or ability whatever. 
 
 I am sorry to find the expression in your letter, " The success of our 
 operations hangs upon your [my] decision," especially referring to my 
 directing a gunboat to attempt running the blockade in this clear night ; 
 for, in my judgment, and that of all the other officers, the boat might 
 as well expect to run it in the daytime. I cannot consider the running 
 of your blockade, where the river is nearly a mile wide, and only ex 
 posed to a few light guns, at all comparable to running it here, where a 
 boat has not only to pass seven batteries, but has to be kept "head 
 on " to a battery of eleven heavy guns at the head of Island No. 10, 
 and to pass within three hundred yards of this strong battery. If it 
 did not sink the gunboat, we would, in the Navy, consider the gunners 
 totally unfit for employment in the service ; and, therefore, my respon- 
 sibilitv for the lives of the officers and men under mv charge induces 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND XUMBEB TEN. 547 
 
 me to decline a request which would, especially without protection to 
 the boat, were the rebels at all competent to perform their duty, result 
 in the sacrifice of the boat, her officers and men, which sacrifice I should 
 not be justified in making certainly not now, when, by your own ad 
 mission, it will be easy for the new rebel steamers, reported to be on 
 their way up the river, to pass your batteries in the night, and if they 
 meet my squadron, reduced by loss, so as to be unable to cope with 
 them, can continue up the Mississippi or Ohio to St. Louis or to Cin 
 cinnati 
 
 In view, however, of rendering you all the aid you request, and no 
 doubt require, while I regret that you had not earlier expressed the ap 
 prehension of the necessity of two gunboats, instead of the smaller gun 
 boat, I will, to-morrow, endeavor to prepare another boat ; and if the 
 night is such as will render her running tbe blockade without serious 
 disaster at all probable, I will make the attempt to send you the addi 
 tional boat requested in your letter of this day s date. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, 
 
 Flag-Officer, commanding Naval Forces, Western Waters. 
 Maj or- General JOHN POPE, commanding Army at New Madrid. 
 
 U. S. FLAG-STEAMER BEXTOK, OFT ISLAXD Xo. 10, April 5, 18ML 
 SIR : I have the honor to enclose several letters and papers referring 
 to our action here within the last three or four days. 
 
 By spiking the rebel guns in one fort, and compelling the floating 
 battery to cut adrift from her moorings on the following day from our 
 effective fire upon her, these have enabled the Carondelet, Commander 
 Walke, to run, as I hope, successfully the blockade, and join General 
 Pope at Xew Madrid, who has been urging me to send him one or two 
 gunboats to cover his troops while he lands in force to attack them in 
 front. \Vhile the Carondelet was running the blockade last night in the 
 midst of a heavy thunder-storm, the batteries opened upon her with 
 forty-seven guns. Still, as the preconcerted signal with that vessel of 
 firing minute-cruns was made as far as the heavy thunder would enable 
 us to hear, I trust that she is now safely at Xew Madrid. 
 
 I have the honor to be your obedient servant, 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer . 
 Hon. GIDEOX WELLES, Secretary of the Nary, Washington, D. C. 
 
 The risk of passing the rebel works having been thus some 
 what diminished. Commodore Foote waited only for a favorable 
 
548 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 night to make the trial. He had already issued the following 
 order to the commander of the Carondelet : 
 
 U. S. FLAG-STEAMER BENTON, OFF ISLAND No. 10, March 30, 1862. 
 
 SIR : You will avail yourself of the first fog or rainy night, and drift 
 your steamer down past the batteries on the Tennessee shore and Island 
 No. 10, until you reach New Madrid. 
 
 I assign you this service, as it is vitally important to the capture 
 of this place that a gunboat should soon be at New Madrid for the pur 
 pose of covering General Pope s army while he crosses at that point to 
 the opposite or to the Tennessee side of the river, that he may move 
 his army up to Island No. 10, and attack the rebels in rear while we 
 attack them in front. 
 
 Should you succeed in reaching General Pope, you will freely confer 
 with him, and adopt his suggestions, so far as your superior knowledge 
 of what your boat will perform and enable you to do, for the purpose 
 of protecting his force while crossing the river. 
 
 You will also, if you have coal, and the current of the river will per 
 mit, steam up the river when the army moves, for the purpose of attack 
 ing their fortifications. Still you will act cautiously here, as your own 
 will be the only boat below. 
 
 You will capture or destroy the rebel steam-gunboat Grampus, and 
 the transports, if possible, between this place and Island No. 10, at such 
 time as will not embarrass you in placing yourself in communication 
 with General Pope, at the earliest possible time after leaving this place. 
 
 On this delicate and somewhat hazardous service to which I assign 
 you, I must enjoin upon you the importance of keeping your lights 
 secreted in the hold or put out, keeping your officers and men from 
 speaking at all when passing the forts above a whisper, and then only 
 on duty, and of using every other precaution to prevent the rebels sus 
 pecting that you are dropping below their batteries. 
 
 If you successfully perform this duty assigned you, which you so 
 willingly undertake, it will reflect the highest credit upon you and all 
 belonging to your vessel, and I doubt not but that the Government will 
 fully appreciate and reward you for a service which, I trust, will enable 
 the army to cross the river and make a successful attack in rear while 
 we storm the batteries in front of this stronghold of the rebels. 
 
 Commending you and all who compose "your command to the care 
 and protection of God, who rules the world and directs all things, I am, 
 respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag- Officer. 
 
 Commander H. WALKE, commanding Carondelet. 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 549 
 
 P. S. Should you. meet with disaster, you will, as a last resort, de 
 stroy the steam machinery, and, if impossible to escape, set fire to your 
 gunboat, or sink her, and prevent her from falling into the hands of the 
 rebels. A. II. F. 
 
 On the morning of the 4th of April preparations were be 
 gun for executing the above order, should the state of the wea 
 ther permit. The deck was defended somewhat against plun 
 ging shot by planks stripped from the wreck of an old barge. 
 All surplus chains were coiled over the most vulnerable parts 
 of the boat, a device employed soon after at New Orleans on a 
 larger scale. A very large hawser (11-inch) was wound round 
 the pilot-house as high as the windows, the hammocks were 
 stowed in the nettings, and for greater security still, cord-wood 
 was piled up around the boilers on the exposed side, and every 
 other precaution that ingenuity could suggest was used to ren 
 der the boat safe during her short but perilous voyage. Each 
 changing aspect of the heavens was anxiously studied during 
 the day, for in a bright, clear night the passage would have 
 been nearly as dangerous as at mid-day, and the moon was at a 
 stage when her light would have revealed the boat as fully, for 
 every purpose of the rebel gunners, as the sun itself. 
 
 Late in the afternoon there was every prospect of a clear, 
 moonlight night, and it was determined to wait until the moon 
 was down, and then to make the attempt, whatever the pros 
 pect might be, because, after such extensive preparations had 
 been made, the moral effect of abandoning the scheme would 
 be nearly equal to a failure. At sundown, however, there were 
 signs of an approaching change in the weather. A haze began 
 to spread itself over the more distant scene, and to creep along 
 the river. The wind shifted, and, as evening drew on, dark 
 clouds, indicating a thunder-storm, began to lift themselves 
 above the northwestern horizon. The precautions adopted were 
 very minute, and the orders for observing them were positive 
 and strict. No lights were to be allowed where they could be 
 visible, the guns were all run in, and the ports were closed. The 
 sailors were all heavily armed ; pistols, cutlasses, muskets, and 
 boarding-pikes were within reach on all sides or in hand, on 
 the supposition that, if the vessel should be partially disabled, 
 there would be an attempt to capture her by boarding. Hand 
 
550 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 grenades were provided, and hose was attached to the boilers 
 for throwing scalding water over any who might attempt to 
 board. 
 
 It was decided to sink the boat rather than burn her, if it 
 should be found impossible to save her, because the loss of life 
 would probably be very great by the explosion of her maga 
 zines. At dusk twenty sharpshooters came on board from the 
 Forty-second Illinois regiment, under Captain Ilollenstein. At 8 
 o clock the gunboat went up the river about a mile for a barge 
 containing baled hay, which was to be lashed to the exposed 
 side. One course of bales was laid over the stern casemates, as 
 these would be exposed for a long distance after the batteries 
 had been passed. The barge and the piled hay reached as high 
 as the broadside port-holes, but as the batteries on shore were 
 some twenty feet above the water, the protection thus given was 
 not very important. 
 
 At 10 o clock the moon had gone down, and the sky, the 
 earth, and river were alike hidden in the black shadow of the 
 thunder-storm, which had now spread itself over all the heav 
 ens. The time seemed most opportune for starting ; the order 
 was given ; the lines cast off, and, with her barge of hay on one 
 side, and another with coal on the starboard side, the gunboat 
 rounded out heavily and slowly, and laid her course down the 
 river. In order to avoid the puffing sound of the high- pressure 
 engine, the escape-steam was led into the wheel-house, where its 
 harsh voice was muffled, a device which probably led to their 
 discovery by the fire from the chimneys. For half a mile, 
 every thing went smoothly and quietly, and all thought they 
 might succeed in passing the batteries unobserved, when sud 
 denly a bright, steady flame rose several feet high from each 
 chimney-top, and for a moment it seemed as if the steamer was 
 carrying aloft two immense torches, to light her on her way. 
 Her upper decks and all about her brightened for a moment in 
 the red glare. Strange as it may appear, what was deemed by 
 all a serious accident, which would bring upon them at once the 
 enemy s fire, created no movement in the rebel batteries. When 
 nearly opposite the upper fort the chimneys again took fire, and 
 at once the sentinels there gave the alarm to the fort below, by 
 firing their muskets. 
 
f 
 CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 551 
 
 Signal-rockets were sent up both from the mainland and the 
 island, and a cannon-shot came from Fort No. 2. It was evi 
 dent that the alarm was now thoroughly given. Not a shot, 
 however, came from the upper battery, a fact which showed 
 how thoroughly its dangerous guns had been silenced by the 
 party that had landed and spiked them. This, and the drifting 
 away of the floating battery, had very much to do with the 
 safety of the Carondelet. 
 
 But one course was now possible for the officers of the gunboat. 
 The vessel was at once put under a full head of steam, and was 
 urged down the river at her utmost speed, for the. rebels were 
 now making swift preparations at every gun that could be 
 brought to bear. The storm was then at its height, and its 
 fearful character, which would have been thought dangerous 
 at any other time, was welcomed, as increasing the chances 
 of escape. The darkness was so intense as to shut out earth 
 and heaven alike, except as lighted momentarily by the light 
 ning s glare. The gleam and roar of the guns of the batteries 
 could scarcely be distinguished from the flash and the thunder 
 of the cloud. The fires of heaven and earth were mingled, and 
 none could tell whether the deck was shaken by the explosion 
 above or the cannon below. The rain fell in the sweeping tor 
 rents of a summer shower. Shot and shell, and rifle and mus 
 ket balls sang and shrieked and roared around them so as to be 
 heard above the storm. Each flash of lightning revealed the 
 rebels loading, training, and firing their guns as the boat came 
 within range. The steamer, also, was disclosed for a moment, 
 but as she was moving swiftly with the current, it was nearly 
 impossible to get her range ; it was evident that only- what is 
 called a chance shot would strike her. Most of the baflls and 
 shell flew high above her, owing to the fact that the alternations 
 of light and darkness were so rapid as to deceive the rebel gun 
 ners as to the gunboat s position. She was much nearer to them 
 than they supposed, and they fired at a wrong elevation. The 
 boat was guided as close along the bank as she could safely run, 
 where, indeed, it would have been difficult to depress their guns 
 so as to strike her, even had she been plainly seen. At this 
 point their greatest danger was not from the rebel batteries : the 
 current was not only rapid, but shifted from side to side with 
 
552 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the sharp curve of the stream, and bars also ran out from either 
 shore. The intense darkness prevented the pilots from knowing 
 the exact position of the boat, and the pilots learned their posi 
 tion only as they caught glimpses of the shore by the flashes of 
 lightning. On the forecastle the lead was kept going, and the 
 depth of water was constantly reported. It contributed largely 
 to the steamer s safety that she had on board Captain Hoel, first 
 master of the Cincinnati, who had been engaged in navigating 
 the Mississippi for more than twenty years. This gentleman 
 stood- on the deck, exposed to the double torrent of rain and 
 bullets, and, watching for each momentary revelation which the 
 lightning made, gave directions for steering the boat. The 
 gleams of lightning, the momentary report of the soundings, 
 and his intimate knowledge of localities, enabled Captain Hoel 
 to judge correctly in the main, of the gunboat s position. Once, 
 however, during the passage she was in great danger of being 
 lost. The steamboat and her barges of course presented a very 
 large surface to the current, and this gave her occasionally a 
 heavy sheer. In the darkness, and the blinding rush of the 
 storm, these were not always on the instant noticed. Caught 
 in this manner by the swift stream, she was drifting toward a 
 dangerous bar, where she would have grounded under the guns 
 of the batteries, when a broad flash lit up the river a moment, 
 followed instantly by the sharp, repeated command, " Hard a- 
 port ! " and she obeyed her helm, and regained the current just 
 in season to save her. 
 
 Contrary to expectation, they found no battery at the foot of 
 the island, where it was reported that one of long-range guns 
 had been planted. The floating battery, which had drifted from 
 its moorings at the head of the island, was three miles below, 
 and this remained to be passed. As the gunboat was not in 
 fighting trim, she kept close on the Missouri shore, the battery 
 firing only a few harmless shots as the Carondelet passed, and 
 then the peril of the passage was over, and exulting shouts 
 burst from the crew and the soldiers, and the signal-guns were 
 fired announcing their safety to the fleet above, and soon the 
 gunboat rounded to at New Madrid, welcomed by bonfires and 
 every possible exhibition of joy. All felt that the fate of Island 
 No. 10 at length was sealed. In rounding to, a slight accident oc- 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 553 
 
 curred, through a misunderstanding of an order by the engineer, 
 and the boat was run hard aground ; but after an hour of effort, 
 by shifting some of the bow-guns to the stern, and bringing all 
 the men aft, she was safely backed off, and the perilous voyage 
 was over at I A. M. Great credit was due, and was duly given, 
 to the brave and skilful -men by whom this important service 
 was executed, proving that the strong river gates of the rebels 
 could be opened by the iron-clads. On the evening of the 6th 
 the Pittsburg followed the Carondelet through the gantlet of 
 the batteries, and these two were deemed sufficient to protect 
 the transports in conveying over the troops. 
 
 On the morning of the 7th the Carondelet and the Pitts- 
 burg went down the river, and engaged and silenced the bat 
 teries of field-guns which had been planted to prevent the land 
 ing of our forces ; and the way having thus been prepared, by 
 12 o clock that night, all the troops which were designed 
 for crossing the river had been safely landed. So soon as the 
 rebels saw that their works could no longer be held, they began 
 to evacuate them, and at 3.25 on the morning of April 7th, be 
 fore any troops had been crossed over, Island Xo. 10 was sur 
 rendered to Commodore Foote. This surrender was made be 
 fore the gunboats had attacked and silenced the land batteries 
 on the Tennessee shore. The following is Commodore Foote s 
 official report of the surrender : 
 
 FLAG-STEAMER BENTON, OFF ISLAND No. 10, April 8 1 A. M. 
 
 My telegram, three hours since, informed the Department that Island 
 No. 10 had surrendered to the gunboats. Captain Phelps has this in 
 stant returned, after having had an interview with the late commandant. 
 I have requested General Buford, commanding the troops, to proceed im 
 mediately, in company with two of the gunboats, and take possession 
 of the island. The batteries on the Tennessee shore have been hastily 
 evacuated, where we shall find, no doubt, in the morning, large quan 
 tities of munitions of war. 
 
 I communicate with General Pope, who has, under cover of the two 
 gunboats which gallantly ran the blockade in the thunder-storm, crossed 
 the river in force, and was ready, as well as the gun and mortar boats, 
 with General Buford and his troops, to make a simultaneous attack upon 
 the rebels, had they not so hastily evacuated the Tennessee shore and 
 surrendered Island No. 10. 
 
554 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAYY. 
 
 A full report will be made as soon as we can obtain possession of the 
 land batteries, and I am able to communicate with General Pope. 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer, etc. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 FLAG-SHIP BENTON, ISLAND No. 10, April 8, 1862 (via CAIRO). 
 
 I have the honor to inform the Department that since I sent the 
 telegram last night, announcing the surrender to me of Island No. 10, 
 possession has been taken of both the island and the works upon the 
 Tennessee shore by the gunboats and the troops under command of 
 General Buford. Seventeen officers and three hundred and sixty-eight 
 privates, besides one hundred of their sick and one hundred men em 
 ployed on board the transports, are in our hands, unconditional prison 
 ers of war. 
 
 I have caused a hasty examination to be made of the forts, batteries, 
 and munitions of war captured. There are eleven earthworks, with 
 seventy heavy cannon, varying in calibre from 32 to 100-pounders, 
 rifled. The magazines are well supplied with powder, and there are 
 large quantities of shot, shells, and other munitions of war, and also 
 great quantities of provisions. Four steamers afloat have fallen into our 
 hands, and two others, with the rebel gunboat Grampus, are sunk, but 
 will be easily raised. The floating battery of sixteen heavy guns, turned 
 adrift by the rebels, is said to be lying on the Missouri shore below New 
 Madrid. Two wharf-boats, loaded with provisions, are also in our pos 
 session. 
 
 The enemy upon the mainland appears to have fled with great pre 
 cipitation after dark last night, leaving, in many cases, half-prepared 
 meal* in their quarters ; and there seems to have been no concert of 
 action between the rebels upon the island and those occupying the 
 shore, but the latter fled, leaving the former to their fate. These works, 
 erected with the highest engineering skill, are of great strength, and, 
 with their natural advantages, would have been impregnable if defended 
 by men fighting in a better cause. 
 
 A combined attack of the naval and land forces would have taken 
 place this afternoon or to-morrow morning had not the rebels abandoned 
 this stronghold. To mature these plans of attack absolutely required 
 the last twenty-three days of preparation. General Pope is momentarily 
 expected to arrive w 7 ith his army at this point, he having successfully 
 crossed the river yesterday, under a heavy fire, which, no doubt, led to 
 the hasty abandonment of the works last night. I am unofficially in 
 formed that the two gunboats which so gallantly ran the fire of the rebel 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 555 
 
 batteries a few nights since, yesterday attacked and reduced a fort of 
 the enemy opposite, mounting eight heavy guns. 
 I am, sir, respectfully, etc., 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer, 
 Commanding Naval Forces, Western Waters. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 The following congratulatory letter was telegraphed to Com 
 modore Foote on the 9th of April: 
 
 Flag- Officer A. H. FOOTE, commanding Gunboats of Western Waters : 
 
 SIR : A nation s thanks are due you and the brave officers and men 
 of the flotilla on the Mississippi, whose labors and gallantry at Island 
 No. 10, which surrendered to you, have for weeks been watched with 
 intense interest. Your triumph is not the less appreciated because it 
 was protracted and finally bloodless. 
 
 To that Being who has protected you through so many perils, and 
 carried you onward through successive victories, be the praise for His 
 continued goodness to our country, and especially for this last great suc 
 cess of our arms. 
 
 Let the congratulations to yourself and your command be also ex 
 tended to the officers and soldiers who cooperated with you. 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 The following letter seems necessary, in order to present 
 officially some facts connected with the surrender of Island JS^o. 
 10, and the operations of the gunboats below New Madrid, 
 Reference is also made to the battle of Pittsburg Landing, 
 which will be considered in another place : 
 
 U. S. FLAG-STEAMER BENTOX, OFF ISLAND No. 10, April 11, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to ep close a report from Commander Walke, 
 of the gunboat Carondelet, detailing the services rendered by him, and 
 the Pittsburg, Lieutenant Commanding Thompson, in the vicinity of 
 New Madrid, from which it will be seen that the boats opened upon and 
 effectually silenced and captured several heavy batteries on the Tennes 
 see side of the river, on the 6th and 7th instant, without which destruc 
 tion it would have been impossible for General Pope to have crossed the 
 river for the purpose of attacking the rebels in the rear at Island No. 
 10, while the gun and mortar boats would make the attack in front. 
 
 There has been an effective and harmonious cooperation between the 
 
556 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 land and naval forces, whiah has, under Providence, led to the glorious 
 result of the fall of this stronghold, Island No. 10, with the garrison 
 and munitions of war; and I regret to see in the dispatches of Major- 
 General Halleck, from St. Louis, no reference is made to the capture of 
 forts, and the continuous shelling of gun and mortar boats, and the 
 Navy s receiving the surrender of Island No. 10, when, in reality, it 
 should be recorded as an historical fact, that both services equally con 
 tributed to the victory a bloodless victory more creditable to hu 
 manity than if thousands had been slain. 
 
 I also enclose reports from Lieutenants Commanding Gwin and Shirk, 
 of the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, in the Tennessee, giving a graphic 
 account of that great battle, and the assistance rendered by these boats 
 near Pittsburg ; stating that " when the left wing of our army was being 
 driven into the river, at short range, they opened fire upon them, si 
 lencing the enemy, and, as I hear from many army officers on the field, 
 totally demoralizing his forces, and driving them from their position in 
 a perfect rout, in the space of ten minutes." 
 
 These officers and men, as well as those of Commander Walke, and 
 the officers and men of the Carondelet and Pittsburg, behaved with a 
 degree of gallantry highly creditable to themselves and the Navy. 
 
 I proceed to-day, with the entire flotilla, to New Madrid, and leave 
 to-morrow for Fort Pillow, or the next point down the river which may 
 attempt to resist the raising of the blockade. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 The importance of the capture of this strongly fortified po 
 sition, the destruction of a part of the river fleet of the rebels, 
 and the preservation of our own iron-clads can only be clearly 
 seen in connection with the great battle of Pittsburg Landing, 
 which was fought near the same time, on the 6th and Yth of 
 April. By these two victories the second grand line of Western 
 defence which the rebels had established, and which reached 
 from the Mississippi to Chattanooga, was utterly broken, and 
 the proposed northern advance by the Mississippi, and by the 
 main army from Corinth, was turned into disastrous defeat. It 
 detracts nothing from the gallantry of the armies to state that 
 neither of these victories could have been won without our gun 
 boats. It does not disparage the river navy, then so small, to 
 say that it could have done little or nothing alone. They were 
 
CAPTURE OF ISLAND NUMBER TEN. 557 
 
 both necessary in the national movement, and neither could 
 have been spared without making certain the success of the 
 rebels. If any officer or soldier of the Army should feel that 
 the Army in these pages appears only in the background, let 
 such a one consider that this is not a history of the war, but of 
 the operations of the Navy ; and while it has been the wish of 
 the writer to place these in their proper light, he remembers 
 with equal gratitude and pride the sacrifices and the heroism of 
 those who fought on land, but whose deeds it is not the special 
 province of this history to relate. 
 
 With the surrender of Island No. 10, the public career of 
 Commodore Foote was brought nearly to a close. The wound 
 which he received at Donelson did not heal, and it was of a 
 very painful and irritating nature, depriving him of the sleep 
 which, amid incessant labor, he needed so much ; and this, with 
 the intense anxiety, was rapidly sapping his vitality. On the 
 22d of April, as will be seen by the following order, Captain 
 (now Admiral) Charles H. Davis was sent out to assist him : 
 
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 22, 1862. 
 
 SIR : Upon the completion of your present duties you will proceed 
 to Cairo, Illinois, without delay, and report to Flag-Officer A. II. Foote 
 for such duty as he may assign you in the naval forces under his com 
 mand. I am, respectfully, 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. 
 Captain CHARLES H. DAVIS, U. S. Navy, N. Y. 
 
 
CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING. THE WORK OF THE GUNBOATS 
 IN THAT ACTION. 
 
 THE battle of Pittsburg Landing, or perhaps more properly 
 of Shiloh, was the first great conflict of the war. The battle 
 of Bull Run, viewed as a military operation merely, was by no 
 means a very important affair, though in its first moral conse 
 quences it equalled a great defeat. But at Pittsburg there was 
 desperate fighting for two days between powerful armies, led 
 by some of the most skilful officers of the country, and who 
 knew that the struggle there must be one of the hinge-points 
 of the war ; and now, when we look back over the whole field 
 of strife, and consider the places which have been made sadly 
 illustrious by blood, this still ranks among the greatest and 
 fiercest battles of the rebellion. 
 
 After the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the 
 evacuation of Bowling Green and Columbus, the rebel leaders 
 in the "West changed somewhat their plan, and concentrated 
 their strength upon two main points, intending to unite their 
 land forces with their river flotilla for the purpose of an over 
 whelming movement upon the North. Leaving only enough to 
 hold, as they thought, securely Island "No. 10, they drew in 
 their troops from the Mississippi and from other points, and 
 massed them at Corinth, a point from which they could easily 
 move down the Tennessee to the Ohio, if the way could once 
 be opened. At the same time the Mississippi flotilla was held 
 in readiness to ascend that river and go up to t. Louis, or enter 
 the Ohio, if the opportunity should offer. }ome iron-clads,. 
 which they were building at New Orleans, were nearly ready, 
 
T3E BATTLE OF PITTSBUEG LANDING. 559 
 
 and the Louisiana in particular was expected to destroy the 
 fleet of Foote, and thus open all the upper rivers. With the 
 rebel fleet thus commanding the rivers, should their land forces 
 win a decided victory on the upper Tennessee, the Northwest, 
 at least for the time, would be at their mercy. It has been 
 shown already how these considerations influenced Commodore 
 Foote to be very cautious in regard to exposing his gunboats 
 when it was not absolutely necessary. 
 
 The rebel army has been variously estimated at from sixty 
 to one hundred thousand men ; the exact number can only be 
 ascertained from their own official papers, not now within reach. 
 The forces at any one time at the disposal of General Grant 
 probably did not exceed fifty thousand ; but as the available 
 troops varied constantly by the casualties of the fight, and the 
 arrival of reinforcements, the exact number cannot be deter 
 mined. The rebel army, as well as our own, had been rather 
 hastily assembled, and the plan of their officers was to strike 
 Grant before Buell could join him with the army that had been 
 confronting Johnston in Middle Tennessee, and as Buell was 
 near, the attack was hastily made. 
 
 It is not, of course, within the province of this work to give 
 a detailed account of this bloody fight. All that will be at 
 tempted is, so far to present some of the principal movements as 
 to show the part which was taken in the battle by the gunboats. 
 Our army was stationed just above Pittsburg Landing, in a 
 semicircular form, with both wings resting near the river, while 
 the most distant point in the convex line was perhaps five miles 
 away. Stretched around this semicircle, and parallel to it, lay 
 the forces of the rebels on Sunday morning. They had marched 
 out from Corinth on Friday and Saturday, and, under cover of 
 the woods, had prepared themselves for a surprise attack early 
 on Sunday morning. Of this army, probably the ablest officer 
 in the rebel service, General A. S. Johnston, had the chief com 
 mand. Under him were Beauregard, Bragg, Hardee, Polk, 
 Breckenridge, and Cheatham. 
 
 At about h lf-past 5 o clock in the morning of Sunday, 
 April 7th, the r tel lines were in motion, and they dashed on 
 with an enthusf" in which showed that they were entirely con 
 fident of success.%nd certainly not until near the close of that 
 
560 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 bloody and disastrous day did any thing occur by which that 
 confidence was diminished. The main attack of the rebels was 
 directed upon our centre, which they expected to pierce, and 
 then, by sweeping round to the right and left, strike both our 
 wings in the rear. Their first purpose was nearly accomplished. 
 The division of General Prentiss, who held the advance, was 
 nearly overwhelmed at the first onset, and, though partially dis 
 organized by an assault for which they were not prepared, they 
 bravely held their ground as firmly as possible, when forced 
 gradually back by numbers, till at length, attacked on both 
 flanks as well as in front, their organization was broken up and 
 they were swept away, the rebels occupying their camps, and 
 then pressing onward still. By 10 o clock nearly the whole 
 of our centre had been swept out and forced back toward the 
 river, and the two wings only were left with their organizations 
 entire. These two bodies made a gallant stand, even when the 
 last brigade of the front had given way, and many of the 
 troops of the broken divisions were rallied in the rear, and were 
 to some extent made available again. Gradually the rebel at 
 tack veered to the left, and about 3 o clock in the afternoon a 
 desperate effort was made to turn General Hurlbut s position 
 on the left, and get possession of the landing, the stores, and 
 the transports. Had this succeeded, all would have been lost. 
 Our troops had been forced back until they occupied a line not 
 more than two-thirds of a mile in length, from the river bank 
 on the right, round to the river on the left. They were greatly 
 disordered and huddled together, a victorious army surrounding 
 them, and the deep, swift river behind them, with no possibility 
 of retreat. One more successful charge would force them to 
 the river s bank, or over into the stream. For this the rebels 
 were evidently preparing, but for a little while it was uncertain 
 on what point the coming rush would be made. * 
 
 From the beginning of the fight until after 1 o clock, p. M., 
 the wooden gunboats Tyler and Lexington had been moving up 
 and down the stream, anxious to render some assistance, but re 
 ceiving no orders to do so. At that time Lieutenant Gwin, of 
 the Tyler, having as yet received no instructions from any 
 quarter, and growing impatient, as shot and shell from the 
 enemy s batteries were falling thick around them, sent an officer 
 
THE BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING. 561 
 
 to communicate with General Hurlbut, and requested permis 
 sion to open fire upon the woods, in the direction of the rebel 
 batteries. General Hurlbut expressed his thanks for this offer 
 of support, saying, that without aid he could not hold his posi 
 tion for an hour, and indicated the proper line of fire. At ten 
 minutes before 3 o clock the Tyler opened fire, and with such 
 fine effect, that in a short time the rebel batteries at that point 
 were silenced. 
 
 About 4 o clock the Tyler dropped down to Pittsburg 
 Landing, in order to communicate with General Grant. His 
 reply was, that the commander of the gunboats must use his 
 own judgment in the case. At 4 p. M. the Lexington and Ty 
 ler went up in company and took a position only three-fourths 
 of a mile above the landing ; so near had the rebel batteries al 
 ready come, that our troops were being pressed back. In thirty- 
 five minutes the batteries of the enemy s right were again 
 silenced, thus relieving for a time our left. But at half-past 
 5 P. M. our lines had been so forced in toward the river, that 
 the rebels gained position on our left, only an eighth of a mile 
 from the landing, and massed their troops for a final charge, with 
 which they expected, and not without reason, to crush what 
 remained of the organization of our army. Between our posi 
 tion and where the rebels were preparing for this last rush on 
 our contracted lines, was a ravine which they must cross in the 
 assault, and here the two gunboats took up position. At the 
 same time Colonel Webster, of the staff of General Grant, and 
 an accomplished artillery officer, hastily collected some scattered 
 guns within reach, among which were two siege-guns, 32- 
 pounders, and placed them where they would play on the 
 left flank of the rebel line when they should advance. This 
 was the decisive point in the great battle. The next half 
 hour would settle the question whether a victorious rebel army 
 should occupy and lay under contribution the States north of 
 the Ohio, and their cities be plundered or burned. There was 
 a brief lull in the firing while the rebel host was making the 
 final preparation. In a semicircular mass, the centre not half 
 a mile from the river, lay our partially disorganized troops, 
 who, with the exception of the shameless skulkers, had fought 
 with persistent bravery, and whose main apparent defence from 
 36 
 
562 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 the coming storm were the guns collected so hastily by Colonel 
 Webster. Only those, as it seemed, to check the fierce onset so 
 soon to come. The delay was for a few minutes only, and they 
 came, preceded by a storm of shot from their batteries, that 
 swept over all the space, and up to the very banks of the river. 
 As stated by General Grant, their troops went massed so as to 
 strike the main blow at the left, so that, by turning it, the 
 landing, stores, and transports, could be seized. It seems not 
 to have occurred to them that this would bring their columns 
 under the guns of the steamers at point-blank range. The two 
 gunboats had rounded to, opposite the ravine, so that their broad 
 sides could be brought to bear. The dense masses swarmed in 
 across the line of their fire, and then from those heavy broad 
 side guns such a hail of shells tore through them as probably 
 never before struck a body of men at that short range. They cut 
 down the ranks like solid shot, and then added to the slaughter 
 by explosion ; they screamed over their heads and burst in the 
 air, sending down a storm of death ; they cut the trunks and 
 heavy branches of trees, that fell upon them, and that ravine, by 
 the rapid fire from the gunboats, became a valley of death that 
 the living could not pass. At the same time the field-guns, 
 under Colonel Webster, were also making a fearful havoc on 
 the other flank, and that last charge was checked and turned 
 back, and in that brief artillery-fire the question of the great 
 Northern invasion was settled, and the victory of the rebels be 
 gan in that hour to be turned into defeat. Some of the first 
 hours of the evening were anxious ones. The rebels, it was said, 
 intended a night attack, but the gunboats searched the woods 
 and their camps with their terrible shells, forcing their lines 
 farther and farther back, until, when Nelson was ready next 
 morning to attack, he had to march some distance in search of 
 the foe. That day, as is known, sent the shattered remnant of 
 the rebel army back to its camps at Corinth. 
 
 Others have criticised severely the disposition of our troops 
 upon that bloody field, and the manner in which they were 
 handled. The writer of this history does not propose to discuss 
 these points. That the rebel army was managed with consum 
 mate skill is conceded by those who are capable of judging ; and 
 all agree that, except the few thousand cowards who left their 
 
THE BATTLE OF PITTSBUKG LANDING. 563 
 
 regiments and skulked in the rear and under the bluffs, our 
 soldiers fought with steady, enduring bravery, and brigades and 
 divisions were, on the whole, skilfully handled : and yet, at half- 
 past 5 o clock on Sunday evening, they had been forced back 
 almost to the bank of the river, and into a position where it 
 would seem nothing could save them from destruction but the 
 rapid broadsides of the gunboats, and the shelling of their lines 
 during the night, preventing any new attack, and forcing them 
 gradually back. 
 
 To authenticate this statement, the following extract from 
 the official report of Lieutenant William Gwin, commanding 
 the gunboat Tyler, is here given, and the reader can judge of 
 the rapidity of the fire, by observing the number of shells (188) 
 thrown by this one boat. 
 
 U. S. GUNBOAT TYLER, PITTSBURG, TENNESSEE, April 8, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform you that the enemy attacked our 
 lines on the left the morning of the 6th instant, at 6.30, and, by his 
 overwhelming numbers, forced our men to fall back in some confusion. 
 At 9.25, finding that the rebels were still driving our left wing back, I 
 steamed up to a point one mile above Pittsburg, taking a good position 
 to support our troops, should they be forced down to the banks of the 
 river. At 10.15 the Lexington, Lieutenant Commanding Shirk, joined 
 me, having come up from Crump s Landing. After a short time she re 
 turned, for the purpose of supporting the command of General Wallace, 
 which occupied that point. 
 
 Not having received any instructions from the commanding general 
 in regard to the service to be rendered by the gunboats, I awaited them 
 patiently, although, for an hour or more, shot and shell were falling all 
 around us. Feeling that, could some system of communication be es 
 tablished, the Tyler might be of great advantage to our left wing, at 
 1.25 P. M. I sent an officer, requesting that I might be allowed to open 
 on the woods in the direction of the batteries and advancing forces of 
 the enemy. General Hurlbut, who commanded on our left, sent me 
 word to do so, giving me directions how to fire that I might do it with 
 no danger to our troops, and expressing himself grateful for this offer of 
 support, saying that without reinforcements he would not be able to 
 maintain the position he then occupied for an hour. Therefore, at 2.50, 
 I opened fire in the line directed, with good effect, silencing their hair 
 tery on our left ; at 3.50 ceased firing, and dropped down opposite the 
 landing at Pittsburg. 
 
564 HISTOET OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 Sent Mr. Peters, gunner* on shore, to communicate with General 
 Grant for further instructions. His response was, to use my own judg 
 ment in the matter. At 4 p. M. the Lexington, Lieutenant Commanding 
 Shirk, having arrived from Crump s Landing, the Tyler, in company 
 with the Lexington, took position three-quarters of a mile above Pitts- 
 burg, and opened a heavy fire in the direction of the rebel batteries on 
 their right, the missiles from which were falling all around us. We 
 silenced them in thirty minutes. At 5.30, the rebels having succeeded 
 in gaining a position on our left, an eighth of a mile above the landing 
 at Pittsburg and half a mile from the river, both vessels opened a heavy 
 and well-directed fire on them, and in a short time, in conjunction with 
 our artillery on shore, succeeded in silencing their artillery, driving 
 them back in confusion. 
 
 At 6 P. M. the Tyler opened deliberate fire in the direction of the 
 enemy s right wing, throwing five-second and ten-second shell ; at 6.25 
 ceased firing. 
 
 At 9 p. M. the Tyler again opened fire, by direction of General Nel 
 son (who greatly distinguished himself in yesterday s engagement), 
 throwing five-second, ten-second, and fifteen-second shell, and an occa 
 sional shrapnel from the howitzer, at intervals of ten minutes, in the di 
 rection of the enemy s right wing, until 1 A. M., when the Lexington 
 relieved us, and continued the fire at intervals of fifteen minutes, till 5 
 A. M., when, our land forces having attacked the enemy, forcing them 
 gradually back, it made it dangerous for the gunboats to fire. 
 
 At 7 I received a communication from General Grant enclosed is 
 a copy which prevented the gunboats taking an active part throughout 
 the rest of the day. Lieutenant Commanding Shirk deserves the high 
 est praise for the efficient manner in which the battery of the Lexington 
 was served. At 5.35 p. M. the enemy were forced to retreat in haste, 
 having contested every inch of ground with great stubbornness during 
 the entire day. 
 
 The officers and men of this vessel displayed their usual gallantry 
 and enthusiasm during the entire day and night. Your " old wooden 
 boats," I feel confident, rendered invaluable service on the 6th instant 
 to the land forces. Gunner Herman Peters deserves great credit for the 
 prompt and courageous manner in which he traversed our lines, convey 
 ing communications from this vessel to the commanding general. 
 
 The rebels had a force of one hundred thousand men. A. S. John 
 ston (killed, body found on the field), Beauregard, Hardee, Bragg, and 
 Polk being their commanding generals. Governor Johnson, provisional 
 governor of Kentucky, is a prisoner in our hands, mortally wounded. 
 
THE BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING. 565 
 
 Loss severe on both sides ; ours probably ten thousand ; the rebels suf 
 fered a much greater one. I think this has been a crushing blow to the 
 rebellion. 
 
 I am happy to state that .no casualties occurred on either of the 
 gunboats. The Tyler expended one hundred and eighty-eight shell, 
 four solid shot, two stand of grape, and six shrapnel. Enclosed I send 
 you Lieutenant Commanding Shirk s report. 
 
 Your obedient servant, WILLIAM GWIN, 
 
 Lieutenant commanding division of Gunboats on Tennessee River. 
 Flag- Officer A. H. FOOTE, 
 
 commanding Naval Forces on Western Waters. 
 
 Thus, on the same day, the navy of the Western rivers re 
 ceived the surrender of one of the rebel fortifications on the 
 Mississippi, and aided very materially in saving from destruc 
 tion our army at Pittsburg Landing, repelling the last attack 
 of the rebels, demoralizing their army by the destructive broad 
 sides of the steamers heavy guns, and holding them back during 
 the night until Buell and Nelson were ready to attack. 
 
CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 FURTHER OPERATIONS ON THE TENNESSEE. MOVEMENTS ON THE MIS 
 SISSIPPIATTACK ON FORT PILLOW. FIGHT WITH THE GUNBOATS. 
 
 SOON after the battle of Pittsburg the value of the gunboats 
 in connection with the campaign in the "West was very clearly 
 shown. It was important to cut the rebel lines of communica 
 tion leading southward from the Tennessee, and the great trunk 
 railway running from Virginia through East Tennessee to Mem 
 phis. One of these lines was the Memphis and Charleston 
 Railway. ISTot far from Chickasaw, a point in Alabama which 
 can be reached by steamers, this railway crosses Bear Creek by 
 a bridge of two spans, and about five hundred feet of trestle- 
 work. If this could be destroyed, it would seriously interrupt 
 travel and the transportation of troops and munitions over a very 
 important road. But a small body of troops could not be 
 marched there for such a purpose, nor could unarmed trans 
 ports pass over a river held by an enemy, and on whose banks 
 batteries could be placed at every convenient point. It was, 
 therefore, determined to send a detachment of two thousand 
 troops in transports, under convoy of the Lexington and Tyler. 
 This work was successfully performed by these gunboats. The 
 troops were safely taken there, the bridge and trestle-work 
 and telegraph wires were destroyed, and the soldiers were re 
 turned to Pittsburg Landing without loss. 
 
 The great rivers of the West were the only lines of com 
 munication which were available for our armies moving South, 
 because the railways could be so easily destroyed in an enemy s 
 country ; but so long as our gunboats could control the river 
 channel, troops could be transported rapidly and cheaply, with 
 out the fatigue of a march from point to point, and at short 
 notice could be concentrated at any spot. In the same manner 
 
OPEKATIONS ON THE MISSISSIPPI AND TENNESSEE. 567 
 
 supplies of all sorts could be sent forward securely under the 
 protection of these armed steamers. Whenever a battle could 
 be fought within the range of their guns, they could, as at Pitts- 
 burg Landing, sweep the enemy away from any position which 
 their broadsides commanded; and with their heavy guns and 
 shells, their showers of grape and canister, they were found 
 an overmatch for the fortifications on the rivers of the West, and 
 the streams and the sounds of the South. Rosecrans s army 
 must have been captured when cooped up in Chattanooga, if 
 troops could not have been sent to their relief over the rivers ; 
 and it was by the rivers that the supplies reached them after our 
 forces had effected a lodgment on the banks of the Tennessee 
 under Lookout Mountain. 
 
 By the capture of Island No. 10, the river was opened to 
 Fort Pillow, a short distance above Memphis, and General Pope s 
 army could, of course, move safely on in transports under pro 
 tection of the gunboats. This army of twenty thousand men 
 reached the vicinity of Fort Pillow on the 13th of April, and 
 preparations were made for attacking the forts. But before the 
 forts were reached, five rebel gunboats appeared below. Chase 
 was immediately given and shots exchanged without effect, until 
 the rebel fleet took refuge under the guns of the forts. The 
 plan of attack was to place the mortar-boats on the Arkansas 
 shore within range of the forts, to be protected by the gunboats, 
 while General Pope and army should be landed five miles above, 
 and if possible gain the rear of the fortifications, while the gun 
 and mortar boats should make the attack in front. 
 
 In the afternoon General Pope returned with the transports, 
 having found that he could not reach the rear of the rebel works 
 from any point above. From the success of the canal at Island 
 No. 10, it was proposed to cut one on the Arkansas shore oppo 
 site Fort Pillow, and so pass some of the gunboats below the 
 fortifications. At this date (April 14th) Commodore Foote wrote 
 as follows, in a note to the Secretary : " The effects of my wound 
 have quite a dispiriting effect upon me, from the increased in 
 flammation and swelling of my foot and leg, which have in. 
 duced a febrile action, depriving me of a good deal of sleep and 
 energy. I cannot give the wound that attention and rest it ab 
 solutely requires until this place is captured." 
 
568 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 He was drawing very near the close of his brilliant career. 
 A few days after this he left the active service never to return, 
 leaving a place which it was by no means easy to fill. The last 
 official letters of this lamented officer have for the whole country 
 a melancholy interest, and they are inserted here both on that 
 account and because they set forth very clearly and better than 
 any more condensed statement could, the events as they were 
 then occurring, and the actual situation of Western affairs. 
 
 U. S. FLAG-STEAMER BENTON, OFF FORT PILLOW, April 17, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform the Department that yesterday, and 
 the day preceding, I Lad, with General Pope, made such arrangements, 
 by combining our own with the forces of the army, that our possession 
 of this stronghold seemed to be inevitable in less than six days. I liad 
 even stronger hopes of this desirable result than I entertained even , at 
 No. 10, till the actual surrender was tendered. Our object then, after 
 leaving a force to garrison the place, was to proceed to Memphis imme 
 diately, where, I have good authority for stating, we would have been 
 received without opposition. But the sudden withdrawal of the entire 
 army of General Pope this morning, under orders to proceed directly up 
 the Tennessee River to join General Halleck s command at Pittsburg, has 
 frustrated the best matured and most hopeful plans and expectations thus 
 far formed in this expedition. Two volunteer regiments, under com 
 mand of Colonel Fitch, were left here by General Pope to cooperate with 
 the flotilla. While I deeply regret the withdrawal of General Pope s 
 command, I am not at all questioning the propriety, and even the neces 
 sity, of its presence at Pittsburg, and I shall use every exertion with the 
 force remaining to accomplish good results. 
 
 It is a great object to obtain early possession of this place and Mem 
 phis, as ten of the rebel gunboats are now at Fort Pillow, and ten others 
 are reported as en route to Memphis, and daily expected at that place. 
 It is reported that Commodore Hollins left Fort Pillow on Sunday to 
 bring up the heavy gunboat Louisiana, now about completed at New 
 Orleans. With the exception of this vessel, however, we have little to 
 apprehend from the other rebel gunboats, according to the representa 
 tion of the four or six deserters lately coming to us from the gunboats 
 at Fort Pillow. At all events, the Department may rest assured of every 
 exertion being made on our part to accomplish the great work intrusted 
 
 to this expedition 
 
 I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag-Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE MISSISSIPPI AND TENNESSEE. 569 
 
 U. S. FLAG-STEAMER BENTOX, OFF FORT PILLOW, April 19, 1862. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform the Department that since my last 
 communication of the lYth instant, we have been occasionally throwing 
 shells into the rebel fortifications from the mortar-boats, which have been 
 returned from their rifled guns, without producing any effect. Ours 
 have compelled one encampment to remove its quarters, and from several 
 deserters we learn have otherwise discomforted them. 
 
 One or two examinations made by Colonel Fitch, commanding the 
 two regiments left to cooperate with the flotilla by General Pope on 
 withdrawing his army, have been unsuccessful, thus far, in finding a 
 bayou for our boats, and a position below Fort Pillow, where a battery 
 can be placed to command the river below. I shall again render him 
 assistance by sending over small boats, in hopes that at a distance farther 
 up the river we may be able to discover a bayou leading into a lake, in 
 which water sufficient may be found for our gunboats, with a view of 
 erecting a battery under their protection, which will blockade the river 
 below and enable his force, although not exceeding fifteen hundred men, 
 to come upon the rebels in rear, while, with the remaining gunboats 
 here, we attack them in front. 
 
 I am greatly exercised about our position here, on account of the with 
 drawal of the army of twenty thousand men, so important an element to 
 the capture of the place. Fort Pillow has for its defence at least forty heavy 
 guns in position and nine gunboats six of them, however, being wooden 
 boats, but armed with heavy guns with a force of six thousand troops. 
 Our force consists of seven iron-clad and one wooden gunboat, sixteen 
 mortar-boats, only available in throwing shells at a distance, and even 
 vvorse than useless for defence, and a land force of two regiments, not ex 
 ceeding fifteen hundred troops. Under these circumstances an attack on 
 our part unless we can at first establish a battery below the fort under the 
 protection of the gunboats, and to cooperate with it after its completion, 
 would be extremely hazardous, although its attempt might prove successful, 
 and even be good policy under other circumstances ; but it can hardly now 
 be so regarded, as a disaster would place all that we have gained on this 
 and other rivers at the mercy of the rebel fleet, unless the batteries de 
 signed to command the river from below are completed at No. 10, or at 
 Columbus, which I very much doubt. I therefore hesitate about a direct 
 attack upon this place now, more than I should were the river above 
 properly protected, although by it and loss of time the rebels may suc 
 ceed in getting up to Fort Pillow their entire fleet of gunboats. As 
 I stated in my last communication, had not General Pope s army been 
 withdrawn, we have every reason for believing that a plan we had adopted 
 would have insured the fall of Fort Pillow in four days, and enabled us 
 
5 TO HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 to have moved on Memphis two days afterward. It has always been 
 my expectation that a large army would cooperate with the gunboats, 
 and now the fall of Corinth and movements of our troops on to Memphis 
 seem to be essential to our holding this place and reaching Memphis 
 with the flotilla. I have the honor to be, etc., etc., 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag- Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. 
 
 U. S. FLAG-STEAMER BENTON, OFF FORT PILLOW, April 23, 1863. 
 
 SIR : I have the honor to inform the Department that since my last 
 communication, with the exception of a day or two, when the heavy 
 rains caused the mortars to recoil dangerously on the wet platform, we 
 have been shelling the rebel batteries at Fort Pillow, and most of the 
 time kept their gunboats beyond our range. Colonel Fitch, in command 
 of the twelve Hundred infantry, left here by General Pope, has been ex 
 amining bayous and creeks, with a view of getting guns to blockade the 
 river, and prevent the new gunboats from coming up from New Orleans 
 and Memphis ; but as the rebels are in great force, and no tools or con 
 veniences for cutting through the swamps were left by General Pope 
 when his army, so unfortunately for us, was withdrawn, he has made as 
 yet no satisfactory progress. 
 
 I am doing all in my power toward devising ways and means pre 
 paratory to a successful attack on the forts, and shall continue to do so ; 
 but as the capture of this place was predicated upon a large land force 
 cooperating with the flotilla, or its being turned by the army marching 
 upon Memphis, and considering the difficulties of fighting the flotilla 
 down-stream with our slow boats compared with up-stream work, the 
 Department will not be surprised at our delay and having made no further 
 progress toward the capture of this stronghold of the rebels. I shall, 
 however, do all in my power to be successful here, and exert myself, 
 even beyond my impaired health and strength, toward the accomplish 
 ment of this great object. 
 
 The rebels are strongly fortified on land, and have eleven gunboats 
 lying near, or rather below their fortifications. A resident of the place 
 informs me this morning that thirteen gunboats are now here, seven of 
 which, however, are mere river steamers with boilers and machinery 
 sunk into the hold, and otherwise protected ; but they carry from four, 
 six, to eight guns of heavy calibre, some of which are rifled. The other 
 boats are iron-plated or filled in with cotton. The large steamer of six 
 teen or twenty guns being plated, and named the Louisiana, has not 
 arrived, but is daily expected from New Orleans. I have, etc., 
 
 A. H. FOOTE, Flag- Officer. 
 Hon. GIDEON WELLES, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. G. 
 
OPERATIONS ON THE MISSISSIPPI AND TENNESSEE. 571 
 
 Soon after the date of these letters Commodore Foote left 
 the fleet, on account of his wound; and before Commodore 
 Davis had received the formal order appointing him to this im 
 portant command, he had an opportunity of testing his fitness 
 for the position, and winning the honors of a successful fight. 
 On the morning of the 10th of May the rebel fleet which was 
 lying at Fort Pillow got under way, and came round the point 
 at the bend above the fort about 7 o clock, evidently prepared 
 for an engagement, and steered directly up the river. Our gun 
 boats were then tied up, four on one side of the river and three 
 on the other, but they were ready for action. Some of the rebel 
 boats were fitted as rams, and they evidently hoped to run our 
 vessels down. The rebel steamers in advance made directly for 
 a mortar-boat, which for a time was unprotected, but the Cin 
 cinnati and the Mound City hastened to her rescue, and she 
 was saved. There were eight of the enemy s gunboats iron 
 clad, and they came on in three divisions. The Cincinnati, 
 Commander Stembel, and the Mound City, Commander Kitly, 
 encountered the eastern division, and were repeatedly struck by 
 the rams, while the fight often went on at pistol-shot distance, and 
 sometimes almost hand to hand, as the vessels struck each other 
 and ground along each other s sides. Our iron-clads seemed 
 more stoutly built than the rebel boats, and therefore succeeded 
 in disabling them and driving them back. The Benton was re 
 markably strong, having been built originally for a snag-boat ; 
 and although she had very little steam-power in proportion to 
 her size, she was able to endure both collisions and shot. She 
 met the two leading vessels of the rebel middle division, and 
 they were soon disabled by her heavy battery. The boilers of one 
 of them were exploded by the Benton s shot ; the other was 
 speedily disabled, and they, with the one which the Cincinnati 
 first encountered, went drifting down the stream. In the third 
 division of the rebel line, a gunboat engaged with the Caronde- 
 let received a 50-pound shot through her boilers, and she was 
 also disabled. Thus one-half of the enemy s fleet in less than 
 an hour were rendered helpless, and the remainder retreated 
 under the guns of Fort Pillow. The injured boats might easily 
 have been captured, had our gunboats been able to tow them 
 out of action ; but, deficient as they were in power proportioned- 
 
572 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 to weight and size, had they grappled the crippled boats in the 
 swift current, the prizes would have been very likely to drag 
 them under the guns of the forts. But though slow, loaded as 
 they were with their plating and their guns, and with only the 
 engines they had while they were unarmed and unplated, they 
 were much more than a match for the boats of the rebel flotilla. 
 Their armor-plates were thicker, and, in general, their batteries 
 were heavier. The rebels constructed some very formidable 
 iron-clads during the war, but the river boats which they pre 
 pared on the Mississippi were too light to meet on equal terms 
 our better constructed iron-clads. Still many of them carried 
 rifled guns, and they had an advantage in speed over our more 
 heavily laden boats. 
 
 Some interesting incidents have been related of this fight. 
 The rebel ram Louisiana made the first attack on the Cincin 
 nati, and attempted to run her down. Instead of receiving her 
 blow; the Cincinnati sheered so far that the ram ran along-side, 
 instead of striking. At this moment Lieutenant Stembel shot 
 the pilot of the ram, and was himself instantly struck in the 
 shoulder by a musket-shot, which caused a severe but not dan 
 gerous wound. The crews of the two vessels then had a fierce 
 hand-to-hand fight. The ram endeavored to get her head 
 round, so as to strike our gunboat, but the hot-water pipes from 
 the Cincinnati drove the crew from the deck, and the ram with 
 drew. Yery soon after the Cincinnati was attacked by three rebel 
 boats at once, but the St. Louis now came to her aid, and strik 
 ing one amidships, quite disabled her. Our fleet seems to have 
 been handled with great skill by Admiral Davis, and the battle 
 soon ended in a complete victory, except, as has been said, that 
 our gunboats could not tow up-stream their disabled enemies, 
 and they therefore drifted down. 
 
illlllilllllllli 
 
CHAPTER XXXVm. 
 
 BATTLE WITH THE REBEL FLEET AT MEMPHIS, AND CAPTURE OF 
 
 THE CITY. 
 
 SOON after the attack on Fort Pillow, and the action with 
 the rebel flotilla at that point, the fortifications there were aban 
 doned, the enemy deeming it more important to concentrate 
 troops in the neighborhood of Corinth than to hold the forts on 
 this portion of the Mississippi. 
 
 The rebel fleet retreated to Memphis, and having repaired 
 their damages, its officers held themselves in readiness for anoth 
 er engagement. Memphis is the most important city between 
 New Orleans and St. Louis. It possesses great commercial ad 
 vantages, from its being the western terminus of a very exten 
 sive system of railways. The great trunk line, which runs 
 westward from the Atlantic cities, through Virginia, East Ten 
 nessee, and skirting Northern Georgia, Alabama, and Missis 
 sippi, reaches the Mississippi at Memphis. "With this main line 
 a road from Charleston, and another from Mobile and New Or 
 leans, connect on the south, while on the north the Nashville 
 road unites it with the valley of the Cumberland and the Ohio. 
 After the completion of these roads Memphis very soon became 
 an important commercial centre, and was growing very rapidly 
 at the commencement of the rebellion. So long as the rebels 
 could control the Mississippi, and hold Memphis and the rail 
 roads centring there, the cause was safe; for from the great 
 river and its tributaries, and from Texas, and from these long 
 lines of railways, almost unlimited supplies could be drawn, 
 and these supplies and troops could be sent along these channels 
 in every direction. To crush the rebellion it was not only ne- 
 
574 HTSTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 cessary to blockade the whole Atlantic coast, but to establish 
 another internal one along the Mississippi and the trunk lines 
 of railway. Memphis was not fortified. It was, as was thought, 
 securely guarded by the strong forts above and by Yicksburg be 
 low ; and in addition to the works on land, the rebel river fleet 
 was superior in numbers to our own. Memphis, then, was not 
 at first supposed to be in danger. Another reason for not forti 
 fying it was, that an attack either by the gunboats or on the land 
 side would destroy the town. "When, therefore, Columbus, 
 Island No. 10, and Fort Pillow had fallen, Memphis was left 
 with no defence, except the rebel flotilla. In the mean time New 
 Orleans had been captured, and the whole rebel navy there, in 
 cluding some of their most formidable iron-clads, had been de 
 stroyed, and the gunboat fleet above could not be reenforced. 
 The rebels, however, concentrated their remaining strength be 
 fore Memphis, and concluded to risk all upon a final battle. 
 They held some advantages, to which they trusted for victory. 
 
 On the 5th of June, Flag-officer Davis got under way from 
 Fort Pillow, leaving the iron-clads Pittsburg and Mound City 
 still at the fort for the protection of the place, and to convoy 
 some transports not then ready to leave. On the way down the 
 rebel transport Sovereign was surprised in turning a bend in 
 the river, and was captured. On reaching Island No. 44, the 
 mortar-boats, tow-boats, ordnance, commissary, and other ves 
 sels of the fleet tied up for the night, while the gunboats an 
 chored at 8 o clock p. M. at the lower end of Island No. 45, one 
 mile and a half from the city of Memphis. 
 
 At daylight the next morning the rebel fleet, numbering 
 eight vessels, were seen lying at the levee. They dropped down 
 below Railroad Point, and immediately returning, arranged 
 themselves in front of the city. In addition to the gunboats 
 there were four rams, under the command of Colonel Ellet. 
 Colonel Ellet had very earnestly urged upon the Government to 
 try this method of attack, being enthusiastic in his belief of its 
 success. His plan was to select some of the swiftest of the 
 river boats which could be obtained, and strengthen them by 
 heavy fore and aft timbers, and other methods, so that they 
 could endure a shock, and then depend upon the blow which 
 could be given to crush in the sides of his enemy s ship when 
 
CAPTURE OF MEMPHIS. 575 
 
 going at full speed. He had prepared in this manner the Lan 
 caster, the Switzerland, the Monarch, and the Queen of the 
 West ; the work which they performed will appear in the ac 
 count of the battle. 
 
 The gunboats engaged were the flag-ship Benton, Lieutenant 
 Commanding S. L. Phelps ; the Louisville, Commander B. M. 
 Dove ; the Carondelet, Commander Henry Walke ; the Cairo, 
 Commander C. Bryant ; and the St. Louis, Commander "Wilson 
 McGunegh. These got under way at 4.20 A. M., and dropped 
 down the river. The rebel fleet opened fire while still in front 
 of the town, and it was returned by our gunboats, but in such 
 a manner that the shot might not reach the city. 
 
 Before the gunboats could be brought into close action, two 
 of Colonel Ellet s rams, the Monarch and Queen of the West, 
 ran swiftly past, and dashed boldly into the rebel line. The 
 enemy s rams endeavored to back down-stream, and then turn ; 
 the Queen struck one of them, and sank her almost immediately. 
 She was then struck by a rebel ram, and herself disabled. The 
 Monarch then struck the ram that had injured the Queen, and 
 sank her at a blow. The gunboats were now pouring in a de 
 structive fire, and at the instant when the Beauregard was hit 
 by the Monarch, a shot passed through her boilers, and she 
 blew up. The General Price was struck by one of their own 
 rams, and, running in shore on the Arkansas side, careened over 
 and sank. The Little Eebel, crippled by our shot, made for 
 the shore, followed by the ram Switzerland, which pushed her 
 on, having too little headway to crush her side. The Rebel 
 was the flag-ship, and Commodore Montgomery and his crew, 
 instead of surrendering, swam and waded ashore, and took ref 
 uge in the woods. The shells of our gunboats set the Jeff. 
 Thompson on fire, and she was run on shore by the crew and 
 abandoned; she burned to the water s edge, and blew up. 
 Three of the rebel rams seemed at one time to be locked to 
 gether, and while in that condition, affording a fine target, they 
 were riddled by shot and shell. The umter was captured, 
 though badly cut up, and the General Bragg was also kept 
 afloat, though shattered by our shot. Of the whole rebel fleet, 
 one only, the Yan Dorn, escaped, by her superior speed, and 
 went down the river. 
 
576 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. 
 
 It is not often that so many elements of destruction enter 
 into a single combat ; and when all were busy in the work of 
 death, they formed a scene whose terribleness at the moment 
 could not be fully known, because of the confusion of the bat 
 tle, and because it passed so quickly. The crisis of the fight 
 was over in half an hour ; and when it is remembered that our 
 own gunboats fired in the action over three hundred rounds of 
 shell and solid shot, and if we add to this the fire of the rebels, 
 the rattle of small-arms, the explosion of boilers pierced by 
 shot, the blowing up of magazines, and the crash of timbers in 
 collisions with the ranis, some idea may be formed of the roar 
 and tumult and havoc of the fight. 
 
 The thousands of spectators who thronged the high river 
 banks were not long kept in suspense. When the smoke lifted 
 after the brief struggle, and the roar of the guns was over, they 
 saw that the rebel fleet was annihilated, and the city was at the 
 mercy of the Yankees. This battle ended the naval power of 
 the rebels on the Western rivers, and only the forts of Yicks- 
 burg remained to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi ; for, 
 previous to this, Farragut had dashed open the gates below ISTew 
 Orleans, an account of which must be deferred until the second 
 volume. Above and below Yicksburg the great river was re 
 stored to the control of the Government, and the Cumberland, 
 the Tennessee, and the Ohio floated not a hostile boat. 
 
 END OF VOLUME I. 
 
ARY 
 
 ARY 
 
 
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