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 SEA LAW AND SEA POWER
 
 SEA LAW AND 
 SEA POWER 
 
 AS THEY WOULD BE AFFECTED BY RECENT 
 
 PROPOSALS; WITH REASONS AGAINST 
 
 THOSE PROPOSALS 
 
 BY THOMAS GIBSON BOWLES, M.P. 
 
 AUTHOR OF " THE DECLAEATION OF PARIS OF 1S56 " 
 
 " Our business is to keep foreigners from fooling us." 
 
 (Adjiiral Blake, 1653.) 
 
 " The English people are many times in Treaties over- 
 matched by them whom they over-match in Arms.'' 
 
 (Selden.) 
 
 1 1 J 1 jjjj. 
 
 > a -. J > J J > ' •" J J 3 ' 
 
 
 LONDON 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 
 
 1910
 
 j^ t/l^v 
 
 .-V 
 
 • « • « 
 
 • • • • 
 
 • • • • 
 
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 ••• . * ." * '
 
 6 ^ ^i 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 r From all time the sea has been calling to the land, 
 ^' and the land has not heeded. 
 
 § From Phoenicia to England, from Tyre of the 
 e Bahrein Islands to London, Liverpool, and Glasgow 
 of the British Islands ; from Salamis and Actium 
 to the Invincible Armada and Trafalgar, the sea 
 has shown itself the superior of the land — if only 
 the landsman could be made to understand how 
 to use the seaman. The lesson of all history is 
 that, whether in peace for trading or in war for 
 fighting, the sea has always dominated the land ; 
 that in war most especially, navies are more potent 
 ujthan armies, the Trident a mightier weapon than 
 the Sword. 
 
 Yet the land has not understood. The facts 
 were there, but the land was unable to compre- 
 hend them. An articulate seaman might have 
 explained ; but among seamen there has never 
 been either a prophet a poet or even so much 
 as a journalist. Wherefore the land has never been 
 g either awed or moved or paragraphed into assent- 
 ging to what it did not understand. Even now, 
 ^ in these latter days, the seaman remains dumb ; 
 
 o 
 
 38165y
 
 vi rUEFACE 
 
 and there professes to speak for him only the 
 naval expert, who explains every Salamis and 
 Trafalgar yet to come, by adding up and carrying 
 over totals of tons, gmis, and pounds sterling, and 
 foretells the fate of nations with absolute certainty 
 by comparing aggregate totals. Plus wins, minus 
 loses, says he ; that is the beginning and the end, 
 and there is no more in it. At which the land 
 goes on wondering, doubting, trembling and spend- 
 ing, and miderstanding less than ever. 
 
 For there is more in this problem of the sea 
 than Trafalgar alone can tell. There is more than 
 the shock of navies. 
 
 There is — for those who are so happy as to 
 have in the sea their sole frontier — the barrier to 
 invasion afforded by the mere existence of the 
 sea itself, by the difficulties of crossing it and 
 landing from it, and the still greater difficulties of 
 keeping open communications, and securing retreat 
 across it. These difficulties are so great that, 
 although every great commander of armies since 
 William the Norman has longed and hoped and 
 repeatedly essayed and planned to overcome them, 
 Britain has never for eight centimes endured a 
 hostile invasion. 
 
 There is also Trade — trade, which brings 
 prosperity and plenty or the lack of it starvation 
 and ruin to the nations — trade, which can only 
 be effectually conducted on the sea, and never 
 effectually by land — trade, which if ever stopped 
 on the sea, can only be carried on over such
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 land as serves, at twenty times the cost for 
 carriage- — trade, which is the breath of modern 
 nostrils, and of none so much as oui'S — trade, 
 whereof the stoppage means the corresponding 
 stoppage to nations of their only effectual means of 
 communication with the outer world, and, to 
 that extent, the stoppage of national life. Of 
 this, the naval expert thinks nothing. But 
 of this the dumb seaman could tell something. 
 He could tell, perhaps, if it ever occurred to him, 
 that, by the stoppage of trade, the English once 
 made the French pay six shillings a pound for 
 their sugar, while the English themselves were 
 paying no more than sixpence. Whence, had it 
 been understood, the land might have learnt that 
 to stop or to hinder trade is at once the most 
 effectual and the most merciful of all the methods 
 of war; that now as then — nay, now infinitely 
 more than then, because of the infinitely greater 
 trade — the sea can always be used to coerce the 
 land, and navies to defeat armies. There is much 
 in that six shillings ; but much or little, it all 
 escapes the notice of the historian occupied with 
 the pride and pomp of victory and defeat, as 
 well as of the naval expert adding up his tons 
 and guns. 
 
 y^ For Great Britain the sea is the only road. 
 For her it is the strongest rampart of defence. 
 For her it is the only battlefield of offence. The 
 trident is her sole weapon. Preserved and 
 used, it is mightier than the sword. Broken or
 
 viii PREFACE 
 
 blunted, it leaves her but a rich and defenceless 
 prey. 
 
 When Encjland wrested from the Dutch their 
 monopoly of sea fisheries and sea-borne trade, and 
 first asserted herself as a great sea power, she did 
 but take what nature had marked as hers. Yet 
 so soon as her predominance became evident, there 
 began among the military powers of the Continent 
 a common effort to check the growth of forces 
 which even then seemed capable of becoming 
 formidable to military domination. The effort 
 resolved itself into attempts, not to destroy navies, 
 but to prevent their effectual use by introducing 
 into the recognised laws of war at sea, changes 
 destructive of those maritime rights whereby sea 
 power is asserted and established. 
 
 These attempts, begun in the seventeenth 
 century, were for two hundred years defeated by 
 the courage and constancy of many successive 
 British ministers. When the French revolutionary 
 wars broke out, British maritime rights were 
 intact ; and such was the effect of their exercise 
 that when Napoleon had beaten down all the 
 military nations of the Continent, Britain alone 
 remained upright and resisting. The very powers 
 of which these very nations had sought to deprive 
 her were now seen in their overmastering effects. 
 Those very powers it was that in the end rescued 
 these very nations and saved Britain and Europe 
 together. Once again the trident had proved 
 mightier than the sword.
 
 PREFACE ix 
 
 In 1856, however, a ministry was for the first 
 time fomid either without the understanding or 
 without the courage to maintain the proud and 
 prudent refusal to surrender the maritime rights of 
 their country. By the Declaration of Paris they 
 abandoned the right to captm'e enemy merchandise 
 in neutral ships, receiving, as a compensating 
 condition, the abolition of privateering — which 
 nevertheless was not then and is not now abolished 
 except in name only. 
 
 And now other proposals are made for yet 
 another, and greater, and indeed final, surrender of 
 all that remains of such British maritime rights as 
 would be most effectual in war. 
 
 These proposals, formulated at the Hague in 
 1907, and embodied in conventions then signed 
 by British representatives, have since been 
 carried farther towards adoption by the Naval 
 Conference of London, and the resulting Declaration 
 of London of 1909. 
 
 It is as noteworthy as ominous that the two 
 powers which, through their representatives, played 
 a principal part in procuring the surrender at the 
 Conference of London and in the Declaration of 
 London, of British maritime rights, were France 
 and Russia, which have since 1903 been presented 
 and have presented themselves, to the world, as 
 joined with Great Britain in an Entente Cordiale. 
 What that "cordial understanding" amounts to, 
 whether it has ever been formulated or even 
 protocolised, we do not know. All that is definitely
 
 X rU EFACK 
 
 known of it is, that whatever it was or is was 
 lightly blown away by a few peremptory German 
 words uttered at St Petersburg, when in 1909 the 
 Entente showed some timid desire to regularise the 
 merely forcible annexation by Austria of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina. At the Conference of London, 
 and throughout the drafting of the Declaration of 
 London, France stood and acted with Germany and 
 Russia against belligerent maritime rights. They 
 three were the minority that claimed (and still 
 claim) unrestricted power of transforming merchant 
 ships into warships and back again at will ; and it 
 was their joint insistence on this that prevented 
 any agreement being reached on the point. France 
 it was which furnished, in the persons of M. 
 Kenault and M. Fromageot, those who elaborated 
 the cuisine of the Declaration and were its 
 ingenious apologists. France, in short, blind to the 
 fact that she too is a naval state, joined herself 
 throughout with the military states, as though 
 still moved bv that hatred of Great Britain and of 
 her maritime strength which led Napoleon to 
 denounce her as the tyrant of the seas. The eager- 
 ness of France to destroy the naval power of Great 
 Britain, and therewith her own, is perhaps explained 
 by the fact that she regards herself in these days as 
 an exclusively military state, and as such, one 
 whose interest it is to exalt the military at the 
 expense of the naval powers. Her attitude towards 
 naval power is to be sadly remembered. 
 
 It is, however, also to be remembered that her
 
 PREFACE xi 
 
 action was suggested by the British minister who 
 invited the changes made, and who, when they 
 were embodied in the Declaration of London, not 
 only signed it, but now declares that its ratifi- 
 cation needs no sanction from Parliament. 
 
 The negotiations for this surrender have during 
 three years been conducted, the articles of surrender 
 have been settled, the surrender itself has been 
 made, without, so far as is known or suggested, 
 any previous knowledge or any previous sanction 
 by the King, and certainly without any previous 
 consultation of Parliament. 
 
 But Parliament at least cannot be entirely passed 
 by. For the surrender involves supersession of 
 those ancient and famous British Courts, the 
 Admiralty Prize Courts and the Judicial Com- 
 mittee of Privy Council, the abolition of their final 
 jurisdiction in matters of naval prize, and the 
 submission of them and their decisions to a new 
 foreign court sitting at the Hague. And it seems 
 that Avhile a minister claims authority to agree to 
 any alterations in the law of nations, without either 
 the previous assent or the subsequent sanction 
 of Parliament, yet he is not able without that 
 sanction to destroy the jurisdiction of British 
 courts of law. 
 
 The Naval Prize Bill has therefore been intro- 
 duced in order to effect the desired destruction. 
 It is set down for a second reading on the re- 
 assembly of Parliament in November, and is of 
 such a character that, if once it becomes an Act of
 
 xii PREFACE 
 
 Parliament, the whole final surrender of Britisli 
 maritime riirhts, courts, and jm-isdiction together 
 will have been made. 
 
 On the second reading of that Bill, Parliament 
 will have to decide whether it is prepared to 
 part with the remaining maritime rights of the 
 country ; to leave it only with a navy, more 
 powerful it may be than any yet known, yet 
 forbidden by new laws from using its powers in 
 the only effectual manner ; to submit every act 
 of that navy to the fmal judgments of a foreign 
 court; to enforce these judgments itself; and to 
 strangle its own fleet with its own hands. 
 
 Before so grave, so momentous, so fatal a 
 decision is taken, those who are responsible for it 
 to their countrymen must consider fully all that is 
 involved. 
 
 In the following pages an attempt is made to 
 bring together the more important of those things 
 that demand consideration ; to set forth so much of 
 the law of nations and its history as relates to the 
 proposals made ; to explain the effect of the 
 proposals themselves ; and to appeal for due con- 
 sideration of all that is involved, before that is done 
 which cannot be recalled. 
 
 T. G. B. 
 
 WiLBUKY, 
 
 Ibtk October 1910.
 
 NOTE 
 
 The accounts— extending over 939 pages — of the 
 proceedings at the Hague Conference of 1907 and 
 of the International Naval Conference held in 
 London, presented to Parliament, being through- 
 out printed in French only, without any English 
 translation, I have found it necessary myself to 
 translate the extracts I have given from those im- 
 portant documents, in order that some of the 
 more material passages may be accessible to 
 English readers. 
 
 It is to be further observed that the Declaration 
 of London, 1909, was signed in French alone, and 
 that the French text thereof alone is binding. In 
 the Parhamentary paper is indeed given an English 
 translation of the Declaration ; but this translation 
 seems in several instances to be inadequate, defec- 
 tive, or faulty. Thus, sont de plein droit consideres 
 (Art. 22) is translated ''may without notice be 
 treated " ; ohjets et materiaux (Art. 24) is translated 
 "articles"; and commer^ant (Art. 34) is translated 
 "contractor." 
 
 The following documents are cited or referred 
 
 to 
 
 *'The Growth and Direction of our Foreign Trade in Coal during 
 the Last Half Century." By D. A. Thomas, M.A., M.P. 
 {Royal Statistical Society's Journal, September 1903.)
 
 xiv NOTE 
 
 •S/fl/f Papas, Vo\. Ixvi., 1855-50, p. 136. French Text of the 
 Declaration of Paris, 1856. For English Translation 
 thereof, see Appendix B. 
 
 Proces y'erbanx des seances plenures de la Conference et des Commis- 
 sions of the Second Peace Gjnference at the Hague, from 
 15th June 1907 to 18th October 1907. 497 pages. 
 
 Parliamentary Papers. 
 
 Miscellaneous, No. 1 (1908), (Cd. 8857). Correspondence 
 respecting the Second I'eace Conference held at the 
 Hague in 1907 (with reference to Miscellaneous, No. 1) 
 (1899). 180 pages. Price Is. 6d. 
 
 Miscellaneous, No. 4 (190S), (Cd. 4081) of 1908. Protocols of 
 the eleven plenary meetings of the Second Peace Con- 
 ference held at the Hague in 1907, with the Annexes to 
 the Protocols (in French only). 546 pages. Price 4s. 5d. 
 
 Miscellaneous, No. 5 (1908), (Cd. 4174) of 1908. Further 
 corresi)ondence respecting the Second Peace Convention 
 held at the Hague in 1907, in continuance of Miscellaneous, 
 No. 1 (1908), (Cd. 4081.) 2 pages. Price ^d. 
 
 Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1908), (Cd. 4175). Final Act of the 
 Second Peace Conference held at the Hague in 1907, and 
 Conventions and Declaration annexed thereto. 149 pages. 
 Price Is. 3d. For extracts therefrom, see Appendix C. 
 
 Miscellaneous, No. 4 (1909), (Cd. 4554). Correspondence and 
 Documents respecting the International Naval Conference 
 held in London, December 1908, February 1909. With 
 the Declaration of London, 1909. 106 pages. Price lid. 
 
 Miscellaneous, No. 5 (1909), (Cd. 4555). Proceedings of the 
 International Naval Conference held in London, December 
 1908, February 1909 (in French only). 393 pages. Price 
 3s. 3d. 
 
 This contains the French and Flnglish Text of the Declaration 
 of London of 1909 for the (Foreign Office) translation 
 whereof into English, see Appendix D. 
 
 Naval Prize Bill. A Bill to consolidate with amendments, the 
 enactments relating to Naval Prize of War, presented by 
 Secretary Sir Edward Grey, supported by Mr M'Kenna, 
 Mr Attorney-dcneral, Mr Solicitor-General, and Mr 
 M'Kinnon Wood. Ordered by the House of Commons to 
 be printed 23rd June 1910. Bill 201. 31 pages. Price 
 Z\d- See Aj)pendix E.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I. The Law of the Sea .... 
 II. War and Trade ..... 
 
 III. War Risks at Sea .... 
 
 IV. The Hague Conference of 1907 and its Conventions 
 V. The Naval Conference of London 
 
 VI. The Declaration of London 
 
 VII. The New Proposals— The Naval Prize Bill 
 
 Appendices — 
 
 A. — Cost of Carriage by Sea and Land 
 
 £. — Declaration of Paris, 1856 . 
 
 C. — Final Act of the Second Peace Conference 
 
 HELD AT THE HaGUE IN 1907, AND CONVENTIONS 
 
 AND Declarations annexed thereto 
 D. — Final Protocol of the London Naval Con 
 
 FERENCE AND DECLARATION OF LONDON, 1909 
 
 E. — The Naval Prize Bill and International Prize 
 Court Convention .... 
 
 PAGE 
 1 
 
 21 
 
 57 
 103 
 141 
 174 
 206 
 
 227 
 228 
 
 230 
 253 
 
 268 
 
 Index 
 
 291 
 
 XV
 
 ERRATUM 
 
 Page 23, line 21— F<r>- "1861" read "1851."'
 
 SEA LAW AND SEA POWER 
 
 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 To gain and keep the command of the sea when 
 at war was always for England the condition of 
 success ; to lose that command, even for a time, 
 was always the forerunner of failure. This truth, 
 always known to the seaman, has now been perceived 
 by the landsman, and has become an article of 
 national faith. It is not necessary to insist on 
 what all can see, that as the Empire increases so 
 does the need increase for command of the sea. 
 
 The command of the sea does not mean that 
 every enemy vessel is excluded from the sea. It 
 means that, either through the enemy's fleet being 
 blocked up by a British force in his own ports, or, 
 what is more effectual and indeed final, through 
 that fleet having been met and destroyed, the sea 
 is practically debarred throughout to the enemy, 
 while it is left practically open throughout to Great 
 Britain. It means a state of things such that 
 neither the fleet of the enemy nor his merchant 
 ships can traverse the seas without the greatest
 
 2 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 risk of destruction or capture, while both our fleets 
 and our merchant ships can do so, either with no 
 risk, or with very little risk, of either. It means 
 cutting the enemy's communications at sea, and 
 keeping om* own open. 
 
 But the final end of war is so to distress the 
 enemy as to reduce him to submission. Command 
 of the sea is but a means to this end, and the most 
 effectual use of that means is to stop the enemy's 
 trade, and thus to impair the prosperity of his 
 people and their power of paying those taxes 
 without which war cannot be carried on. Trade 
 now plays a larger part in the prosperity of any 
 country likely to fight at sea than ever it did 
 before ; hence the effect of stopping that trade, or 
 of adding difficulty and cost to its conduct is 
 greater than ever it was before. This the landsman 
 has not yet clearly seen. 
 
 That the stoppage of the enemy's sea trade, or 
 the driving of that trade to overland carriage, must 
 greatly distress an enemy is manifest. For land 
 carriage, even in Great Britain, where it has been 
 so successfully developed and cheapened, still costs, 
 as near as may be, twenty times as nmch as sea 
 carriage per ton per mile, so that even if but a few 
 hundred miles of land carriage has to be substituted 
 for sea carriage, the additional charge added to the 
 thing carried by the additional cost of freight, must 
 be enormous — nor can it fall elsewhere than upon 
 the taxpayer. How much may in certain cases be 
 thus added to cost and to price, was shown at the
 
 OVERLAND CARRIAGE 3 
 
 end of our war with Napoleon in 1813 when, at 
 and round about Bayonne, brown sugar cost the 
 French subject six shiUings a pound (the price in 
 England being then only sixpence), while tea was 
 "only to be had by ounces at a time as medicine." 
 How was this ? During the latter, though not 
 indeed the latest part of the war, the land roads of 
 France had been open in every direction. Tl)ey 
 were on the whole quite as good as the English 
 land roads of that day — for heavy traffic they were 
 indeed better. If land carriage could have sufficed 
 the land frontiers of France were much nearer to 
 China than any part of English land, and the 
 journey for tea therefore shorter. Yet "tea was 
 only to be had by ounces." If land carriage could 
 have sufficed, it was open and was used for Colonial 
 produce. Sugar, coffee, and tobacco were in fact 
 despatched to Salonica, and forwarded thence by 
 land carriage to France. Yet " coffee and sugar in 
 bond which would not fetch sixpence the pound in 
 this country (England) were worth from five to six 
 shillings the pound in France, and all the Trans- 
 atlantic produce was high in proportion." For 
 land carriage could not suffice. And since all the 
 sea roads were stopped by the English command 
 of the sea, there was practically no tea to be had 
 in France, and sugar and coffee cost there twelve 
 times as much as in England. All else told the 
 same tale. " Commercial cities half deserted . . . 
 edifices falling to ruin . . . number of mendicants 
 almost incredible . . . fields principally cultivated
 
 4 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 by women . . . paupers a third, in some places 
 two-thirds, of the whole population." Such was 
 the picture drawn of France in 1810 by impartial 
 observers. Such was the distress caused by 
 stopping the sea roads and leaving only the land 
 roads open. 
 
 What now was the way in which the sea roads 
 were stopped ? It was by the old way which the 
 law of nations and the laws of the sea had 
 sanctioned ever since these had been promulgated 
 during the eleventh century in the Sea Code of the 
 Cojisolato del Mare. It was by capturing and 
 confiscating the property of the enemy wherever 
 found upon the high seas, and whether found in 
 the ship of the enemy or of a neutral. 
 
 That was the law of the sea from all time — a 
 law acted upon by all and questioned by none until 
 the seventeenth century. The attempt to change it 
 first came from the Dutch, who, after long carrying 
 practically all the trade of the world and conducting 
 all the fisheries of the North Sea, had recently seen 
 their monopoly challenged by the English. In 
 1654, De Witt conceived and suggested the then 
 entirely new doctrine of ** Vry schip Vry goed " — 
 that is to say, that in time of war the neutral ship, 
 then and ever allowed to go free from capture, 
 should invest with her own freedom any enemy 
 goods she carried. The doctrine of "free ship 
 free goods " was as much opposed to all known and 
 existing laws of the sea as it was contrary to all 
 known notions of war. For a declaration of war,
 
 "FREE SHIP FREE GOODS" 5 
 
 then as now, meant a declaration of the confiscation 
 of all enemy property found at sea ; and to allow 
 it to go unconfiscated only because a professed 
 neutral was doing to the enemy the unneutral 
 service of carrying it, seemed to all jurists of those 
 days absurd. Yet the Dutch, with characteristic 
 tenacity, pressed their new doctrine on the 
 express, and so far as is shown on the sole ground, 
 that unless it were adopted " the United Provinces 
 would lose the advantages they obtain from loading 
 [their vessels at the ports of, and] with all nations." 
 Boreel presented it to France and Nieuport to 
 England. Both pressed it in both countries on 
 that express ground, and both thereby avowed that 
 the whole purpose of it was to enable the Dutch to 
 profit by the wars of their neighbours, by carrying 
 for them such trade as either of these could no 
 longer safely carry for itself. 
 
 But France was not then prepared to accept 
 the new jingle, and would not entertain it ; though 
 later she did accept it on strict condition that it was 
 coupled with the other jingle — equally false in 
 principle — of "enemy ship enemy goods" {robe 
 dennemi conjlsque Men d^ami). As for England, 
 she was then under the rule of Cromwell, who was 
 not easily to be fooled. Moreover, England had, 
 in the war ended that year, captured hundreds of 
 Dutch prizes, had destroyed the Dutch fisheries, 
 and had almost ruined all Holland ; besides which 
 she had but just passed a new Navigation Act 
 directed against Dutch competition with her own
 
 6 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 growing carrying trade. Nieuport therefore found 
 his new doctrine received rather with ridicule than 
 with entertainment ; and De Witt saw that, in 
 things concerning the solemn and serious business 
 of war, the world was not yet ripe for folly. The 
 notion had not then been conceived that a nation 
 might be both at war and at peace with another 
 nation ; at war with the mihtary power of its 
 enemy, and yet at peace with that enemy's trade ; 
 still less that a professed friend to both sides should 
 be allowed to carry for one of the two the property 
 confiscated by the other. 
 
 For another century nothing was heard of the 
 free ship free goods doctrine. Then Frederick the 
 Great of Prussia found it convenient for his 
 purpose. By mingled force and fraud he had 
 acquired from Maria Theresa the rich prey of 
 Upper and Lower Silesia, and therewith the 
 Silesian silver mines mortgaged with a debt to 
 English merchants of £250,000, and charged with 
 the annual interest thereon of £75,000, which by 
 the Treaty of Breslau of 1742 he had undertaken 
 to pay to those same merchants. Now, in the war 
 between England on the one side and France and 
 Spain on the other, which was concluded by the 
 Peace of Aix la Chapelle in 1748, Prussian ships 
 had been captured and condemned in British Prize 
 Courts for infractions of neutrality. In 1752, there- 
 fore, Frederick sent a memorial to the Duke of 
 Newcastle, Secretary of State in Mr Pelham's 
 administration, denying the right to search, detain,
 
 REVIVAL OF THE DOCTRINE 7 
 
 or capture neutral ships at sea on the ground that 
 they carried enemy's property ; denying equally the 
 competency of belligerent Prize Courts to decide 
 on the legality of such captures ; and finally 
 announcing that, since Prussian ships had been 
 thus dealt with, he had attached the moneys due to 
 the British merchants, and would discontinue the 
 payment to them of the £75,000 interest on the 
 Silesian loan. Thus again the doctrine of free ship 
 free goods was advanced ; and this time not merely 
 as a request or desire, but as a claim of right, 
 backed and enforced by the arbitrary confiscation 
 of the private property of the English merchants. 
 The proceeding was as Prussian as the Dutch 
 proceeding of a century earlier had been Dutch. 
 But neither Dutch appeal nor Prussian insolence 
 could then find an open ear in England. For Mr 
 William Pitt the elder was a member of the English 
 ministry and inspired it with his spirit. The Duke 
 of Newcastle's reply to the Prussian minister was 
 declared by Montesquieu to be a reponse sans 
 replique. The Prussian minister abandoned the 
 principle of free ship free goods, and his master 
 Frederick resumed payment of the interest on the 
 Silesian loan. 
 
 Once again, then, the new doctrine slept. It was, 
 however, revived in 1780 by Catherine of Russia, 
 who in April of that year, finding England at war 
 with France, Spain, and the American Colonies, 
 put forth a memorial by Prince Galitzin enunciat- 
 ing the doctrine of the Armed Neutrality. The
 
 8 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 Kiissian Declaration was issued in 1780 and was 
 followed by a Convention, in March 1780 between 
 Russia and Denmark, of 1st August 1784 between 
 Russia and Sweden, of Srd January 1781 between 
 Russia and Holland, and of 8tli May 1781 between 
 Russia and Prussia, whereby all these States 
 bound themselves to maintain, if need were by 
 force of arms, the principles enunciated. The 
 central principle was the old doctrine of free 
 ship free goods ; but there was now grafted on 
 to it the further claim that merchant vessels 
 should be exempt from search or question when 
 under the convoy of a man-of-war of either one 
 of these neutral powers. The central doctrine 
 was the old one of the right of the neutral to 
 trade with either or both belligerents as he 
 pleased, except in contraband of war, and above 
 all the immunity from capture in neutral vessels 
 of enemy property, always still excepting contra- 
 band. It was the old doctrine of free ship free 
 goods, first advanced as a petition by the Dutch, 
 next affirmed as a right by the Prussians, and now 
 asserted as "a rule for future ages" by a great 
 array of armed powers. But England again 
 stood firm — "solitary and abandoned by the whole 
 world ; struggling with a fatal schism amongst 
 her own children ; opposed, with diminished 
 resources, to all the greatest maritime powers of 
 Europe, to the continent of America, and almost 
 to the continent of Asia, without a single ally," 
 she repudiated the doctrine and defied the force
 
 THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 9 
 
 of the Eussian Armed Neutrality as she had 
 repudiated and defeated the claim of Prussia and 
 the craft of Holland. Once again she found her 
 repudiation admitted by all the powers concerned. 
 And a second attempt at a second Armed 
 Neutrality in 1800 broke down within a year. 
 
 The doctrine of their High Mightinesses of 
 Holland, the claim of Frederick of Prussia, the 
 Armed Neutrality of Catherine of Kussia had 
 thus all broken to pieces on the rock of England's 
 stern, uncompromising resistance ; and when the 
 French Revolutionary war broke out, all the 
 powers of Europe brushed away all nonsense of 
 free ships free goods, and reverted one and all 
 to the law of the sea, and the established practice 
 of capturing enemy goods wherever and in what- 
 ever ships found on the high seas. 
 
 And so things remained until 1856. Then, 
 under no pressure, and by diplomatic arts and acts 
 still mysterious, England was induced to abandon 
 all she had hitherto asserted and fought for and 
 been preserved by, and to become a party to the 
 Declaration of Paris, the second article whereof 
 declared that "The neutral flag covers enemy's 
 merchandise with the exception of contraband of 
 war." At the end of two hundred years Holland 
 and Prussia had succeeded. They saw their 
 doctrine, so long resisted and so constantly 
 repudiated, enshrined at length in a document — not 
 indeed part of any treaty, nor sanctioned by the 
 authority either of the British Crown or the British
 
 10 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 Parliament — yet a formal, solemn document adhered 
 to by all the great powers with the exception of 
 Spain and the United States. 
 
 Of the Declaration of Paris, the late Lord Salis- 
 bm-y, who was no mean judge, wrote in 1897, forty- 
 one years after the event, that it was "a rash and 
 unwise proceeding." The change thus affected to 
 be made in the conditions of naval warfare was 
 extremely simple yet infinitely vast. In any future 
 war it prevented the beUigerent which might be 
 predominant at sea from capturing its enemy's 
 property afloat, and to that vast extent prevented 
 the predominant power from putting stress upon its 
 enemy. No doubt it left still open the capture of 
 enemy goods when in enemy ships — just as thereto- 
 fore. The new element was the covering of the 
 enemy goods with immunity when carried under 
 the neutral flag. The whole effort, intention, and 
 effect of it was manifestly to give to the weaker of 
 the two naval powers at war an immense advantage, 
 and to inflict on the stronger power a disadvantage 
 not merely as immense but infinitely more so. For 
 the stronger power, being in command of the sea, 
 would have no need of the protection of the neutral 
 flag or of the services of the neutral ship. It could 
 continue to carry its own goods in its own ships, 
 without any serious risk of having them captured 
 by an enemy unable to command the sea, and 
 therefore unable to make any but the rarest and 
 most casual appearance on its waters. But the 
 weaker power would need it sorely. Driven ex
 
 «A RASH AND UNWISE PROCEEDING" 11 
 
 hypothesi from the sea, whether for its state pennant 
 or for its merchant flag, that state would now be 
 able to find salvation for its trade under the neutral 
 bunting to which, for the first time, a protecting 
 virtue was attached. That weaker power would 
 joyfully avail itself of the neutrals to carry for it the 
 trade it could no longer carry for itself. The 
 stronger power, despite the most complete command 
 of the sea, would find itself unable to stop a bale 
 of merchandise from reaching its enemy, since all 
 would be under the neutral flag ; would be power- 
 less to cut the enemy's sea communications thus 
 kept open by neutrals ; and would, in short, find 
 itself deprived of all that power of strangling its 
 enemy's trade, and of making him pay famine 
 prices for sea-borne merchandise, whereby it was 
 formerly possible to distress and to coerce, not 
 merely a nation, but a whole continent. Quite 
 evidently, this was a blow at any power which 
 might be predominant at sea. Quite evidently, 
 it was contrived for the advantage of any enemy 
 of that power. And quite as evidently it was 
 calculated to bring great gain from any naval war 
 waged between two unequal powers, to all those 
 neutral powers called in to the new and profitable 
 calling of selling the protection of their flag and the 
 services of their ships to the weaker belligerent. 
 Most evident of all is it, that all this was to the 
 great gain of any enemy to England, and to the 
 equally great loss of England herself in any future 
 war in which she might be engaged.
 
 12 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 The effect thus certain to be produced has been 
 masked to British eyes — other than those of British 
 seamen — by the fact that since 1856 Great Britain 
 has never been at war with any power possessing 
 a navy capable of disputing or even questioning 
 her command of the sea, or with any power possess- 
 ing over- sea trade. Her wars have been with the 
 Chinese, Ashantis, Abyssinians, Afghans, Zulus, 
 and Boers. The war with a great power possessing 
 a navy and a mercantile marine is yet to come ; and 
 if ever it does come, will be the first conflict of the 
 kind Great Britain has affi'onted since the end of 
 the war with France, and for a time with all Europe 
 headed by Napoleon. Of such a war all real 
 remembrance is lost. The lessons burnt into every 
 Englishman's mind a century ago have been 
 forgotten. Nobody now remembers what was 
 then so well known, that it was by the stoppage of 
 their sea trade and the severing of their sea 
 communications, and by the terrible distress thus 
 caused, that Napoleon's allies were detached from 
 him one after the other, and he himself finally 
 reduced to submission. Men who still recall with 
 pride how England then saved herself by her 
 exertions and Europe by her example, and who 
 remember the glories of the Nile, and Trafalgar, 
 neither remember nor have ever really become aware 
 that both battles would have been fought in vain 
 had they not been accompanied and followed up by 
 that constant ceaseless sap of the enemy's trade, the 
 (^pture of his property, the raising of his prices,
 
 AN EXPECTED REIGN OF PEACE 18 
 
 and the consequent drying-up of the sources of his 
 taxation, which more effectually distressed him 
 than any lost battles. Had there been any memory 
 of this, the Declaration of Paris could never have 
 been signed on behalf of England. But all that 
 belonged to war of other than the "little war" 
 kind, which involved none of these vital questions 
 — all that belonged to serious deadly war was 
 forgotten. The new generation of Englishmen 
 believed only in great exhibitions and perpetual 
 peace — at least for England. They saw indeed 
 wars of the old sort raging, and their deadly 
 harvests shaken out over agonised states. They 
 saw the American Civil War of 1861, the begin- 
 ning in 1863 of that series of Prussian wars which 
 successively wrested Schleswig and Holstein from 
 Denmark, struck down Austria, and dismembered 
 France. But they saw all this only with a pitying 
 eye as distant spectacles, as things that passed by 
 afar-off and were never more to come near their own 
 island. And they grew to believe (as most of them 
 in their secret minds believe to this day), that 
 England would for ever remain what she has been for 
 nigh upon a hundred years, only a sad looker-on at 
 the wars of other nations, never again to be touched 
 herself by real war involving national independence 
 and possibly national existence ; that, whatever 
 may happen elsewhere, peace would henceforth, 
 for England at least, be permanent and unbroken. 
 Thence arose the consequent conviction that, 
 however often other European nations might be
 
 14 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 belligerent, England would always remain a 
 neutral; and thence again a general hazy notion 
 that the interest of England, which had once 
 no doubt been to maintain the rights of the 
 belhgerent against those of the neutral, must now 
 and would thenceforth be to change over and 
 to affirm the rights of the neutral against the 
 belligerent. The emotional and the humane who 
 hope to abolish war and therewith beUigerency 
 and neutrality together, seized the opportunity to 
 enforce their most respectable aspirations and their 
 most foohsh expectations. The shipowners who 
 thought their own private interests best served by 
 what promised them immimity from the conse- 
 quences of war and even a greater trade because of 
 any war, these joined in. And at last a great 
 unthinking chorus arose that trade was sacred, that 
 if there might conceivably be military war there 
 must at least be commercial peace, and that it was 
 barbarous, inhuman, and wicked to capture goods 
 at sea at all under any circumstances whatever. 
 Thus there came to be preached the last and 
 newest doctrine — the immunity of private property 
 from capture, which some excellent persons to this 
 day press. The evolution was completed, the 
 change of front made. England was presented to 
 the world no longer as the stern asserter and 
 guardian of belligerent rights, but as their opposer 
 and the champion of neutral privileges. War was 
 forgotten, peace alone remembered. But for that, 
 the Declaration of Paris could not have been
 
 RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENTS 15 
 
 endured, nor could the final surrender have been in 
 these our own days entertained, and even gone far 
 to be made, of those last rags of English maritime 
 rights which the Declaration of Paris had left. 
 
 For some rags the Declaration of Paris did 
 leave. 
 
 It left to the belligerent the undiminished 
 right of search of all merchant ships met on the 
 high seas, of search, that is, by visit of the ship and 
 her papers for the verification of her nationality as 
 alleged by the flag she flew, and the further 
 verification of her voyage and cargo as lawful and 
 innocent. 
 
 It left to the belligerent the right to exercise 
 this power even if the neutral, or alleged neutral, 
 merchant ship were under convoy of a neutral man- 
 of-war. Here it is to be remarked that the Armed 
 Neutrality of 1780 had claimed that the mere 
 presence of a convoy ought alone to suffice so to 
 protect from any visit or search the convoyed vessel 
 or vessels, that the word of the convoying officer as 
 to papers, cargo, destination, and character of the 
 voyage of every one of the convoyed ships, must be 
 accepted as final. This manifestly absurd and 
 fantastic claim was in 1856 abandoned, and the 
 right of search and visit was left intact. 
 
 It left to the belligerent the right to blockade 
 an enemy's port, provided (as had indeed always 
 been the true law of the sea) that the blockade 
 must be a real blockade maintained by an adequate 
 force, and not merely a "paper blockade" without
 
 16 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 efiPectual force to maintain it. And it left there- 
 with, as a necessary consequence, the right to 
 pursue and capture the blockade-breaker at any 
 time and anywhere on the high seas, until the end 
 of his blockade-breaking voyage. 
 
 It left to the belligerent the right to capture 
 and confiscate enemy property in enemy ships — 
 though no longer in neutral ships, and therefore in 
 a highly attenuated and ineffectual form. 
 
 It left to the belligerent the right to capture 
 and confiscate all contraband of war, or goods 
 destined to the enemy for use in the war, even when 
 found in neutral ships. 
 
 It left, also, corresponding obligations on the 
 belligerent. 
 
 It left the belligerent under the obligation to 
 abstain from fitting out or giving commissions to 
 private ships commissioned to act against the enemy 
 and thereby invested with a public character, which 
 had hitherto played a very effectual part in distress- 
 ing by capture an enemy's trade, and which had 
 been known as " Privateers " or " Corsaires." It 
 was indeed this prohibition of privateering which 
 was presented to, and with incredible folly accepted 
 by. Great Britain as an adequate equivalent for her 
 abandonment of the right to capture enemy property 
 in neutral ships. 
 
 It left the belligerent under the further obliga- 
 tion of submitting any captures made by him to a 
 Prize Court, having power either to declare them 
 good prize, or to order their release and the payment
 
 OBLIGATIONS ON BELLIGERENTS 17 
 
 of damages by the captor. To that end the 
 belligerent captor was left under the obligation to 
 abstain from destroying the papers of the capture, 
 from embezzling any property found therein, and 
 even from "breaking bulk" or opening up the 
 cargo. Still more was he prohibited from destroy- 
 ing the captured ship herself, and thus making 
 away with the principal, and often the only 
 conclusive, evidence either for or against her. In 
 case, indeed, the captured ship were an admitted 
 and indisputable enemy ship, he might, though 
 even then only when driven to it by necessity, 
 destroy her. But never might he destroy a neutral 
 or an alleged and possible neutral. If in that case 
 such a necessity arose as would justify him in 
 destroying an enemy ship, he was still forbidden to 
 destroy the neutral. He must, in case he could 
 not send her in to port for adjudication of the 
 disputed points, release her and leave her free to 
 prosecute her voyage or to return to her own ports 
 as she might please. The reason, justice, and 
 necessity of such an obligation are apparent. 
 
 It left the belligerent also under the obligation 
 to commission public ships of war only in its own 
 ports and not elsewhere ; to abstain from any 
 attempt to convert merchant vessels, which had 
 put to sea as such, into men-of-war by the produc- 
 tion on the high seas of a hitherto concealed 
 commission ; as well as to abstain from any 
 similar colom'abie reconversion from man-of-war to 
 merchantman. 
 
 B
 
 18 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 It left the neutral powers under the obligation 
 to submit to search, to abstain from supplying 
 either belligerent with contraband of war, and to 
 abstain from attempts to break blockade— under 
 the penalty in either case of capture and 
 confiscation. 
 
 It left forbidden the transfer of an enemy ship 
 to a neutral, either in a blockaded port or during a 
 voyage. And finally — which is most important 
 of all — it left the Prize Courts set up in the 
 belligerent country to declare and administer, 
 not the municipal law of that country, but the 
 law of nations. It left to those courts all the 
 powers and jurisdiction they had exercised from 
 all time. To them was left the right and the power 
 to decide, upon a full review of all the evidence 
 and taking into account all the circumstances, 
 every material question. Was this an effectual 
 blockade? The Prize Courts alone could decide. 
 Was there an actual or attempted breach of 
 blockade? The court decided. Were these 
 enemy goods ? The comt alone decided. Was 
 this a duly commissioned public vessel of war? 
 The court pronounced. Was this act a breach of 
 neutrality ? The court declared. Was this enemy 
 merchant ship duly transferred by a valid assign- 
 ment to a neutral? Was this or that thing 
 contraband of war? Again it was for the 
 court. The evidence was heard. The facts were 
 arrayed for and against. The facts were allowed 
 to speak ; and they spoke — all the facts, whether on
 
 THE PRIZE COURTS 19 
 
 one side or the other. And in the end the courts 
 decided finally. But they decided openly. They 
 gave their reasons. Their law was not alone 
 founded upon the reason and the rights of the 
 case ; it respected and followed and was bounded 
 by the precedents recorded for centuries, and 
 forming part of the body of law which the court had 
 authority to enforce. The Prize Courts — although 
 like all courts they were sometimes misled — were 
 trustworthy. They constantly decided against the 
 wishes of their own Governments, or the interests 
 of their own fellow-subjects; they were on the 
 whole more just and impartial than any municipal 
 courts administering municipal law. And if we 
 English think that the English Prize Courts were, 
 if anything, more just and more impartial than 
 French, Prussian, German, or Eussian, that is no 
 reflection upon any foreign judge of maritime cases 
 — it is explained by the vastly greater experience 
 in such cases of the English admiralty judges, 
 sitting in a purely maritime country, with an 
 infinite store of maritime maxims to guide them, 
 and an infinite variety of cases always before them. 
 Their judgments in fact are so admirably reasoned 
 that they are to this day authoritative and are 
 appealed to as such by every Prize Court in the 
 world. But, whatever these courts may be, and 
 whatever their character, they are the only courts 
 ever yet conceived for pronouncing, administering, 
 and enforcing the general law of nations as distin- 
 guished from special national municipal law. More
 
 20 THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 than that, they are the only conceivable courts, so 
 long as each nation is held to be independent of all 
 others and without superior in any other. To affect 
 to set up any other court in any other way involves 
 abandonment of the conception of national inde- 
 pendence and the adoption of some new conception 
 of national dependence upon an external authority 
 having power to command and to enforce.
 
 II 
 
 WAE AND TEADE 
 
 "The wars," says Bacon, "are no massacres and 
 confusions ; but they are the highest trials of right, 
 when princes and states, that acknowledge no 
 superior upon earth, shall put themselves upon the 
 justice of God for the deciding of their controversies. 
 . . . "Wars — I speak not of ambitious predatory 
 wars — are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's 
 justice, when there are no superiors on earth to 
 determine the cause." 
 
 The law of nations alone is what has prevented, 
 and still prevents, wars from being massacres and 
 confusions while they last, and peace from being 
 broken when it comes. It is not in peace but 
 in war that the need of a law of nations is most 
 felt, and the appeal most constantly made to 
 rules, founded upon principles of natural justice 
 and equity, which the wise and just men of 
 all nations have always agreed to and affirmed, and 
 to which all civilised states have always assented. 
 And when Bacon so wrote, he probably had in 
 mind the reply of his royal mistress Queen Elizabeth 
 to Dzialine, the Polish Ambassador who, when
 
 22 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 England was at war with Spain, complained of 
 Poland he'nvj' hindered in her over-sea trade with 
 that country. "For your part," said the queen, 
 *' you seem indeed to us to have read many books ; 
 but yet to have little understanding of politics. 
 For whereas you so often in your oration make 
 mention of the law of nations, you must know that, 
 in time of war, betwixt kings, it is lawful for the 
 one party to intercept the assistance and succours 
 sent to the other, and to take care that no damage 
 may grow thereby to himself." 
 
 The rule of the law of nations thus tersely yet 
 fully stated over three centuries ago, covers the whole 
 of the controversy begun then and continued since, 
 by those who claimed to send the very assistance 
 and succours in question, and thereby to make war 
 between two states into massacres and confusions, 
 joined in by all who think to profit by betraying 
 one friend to another — in the name of trade. 
 
 While the rulers and people of Great Britain 
 had actual experience of war which really touched 
 them and their lives and property and threatened 
 their existence as a nation, they consistently 
 repudiated this claim. That either their own 
 traders or neutral traders should be left free 
 to conduct a trade which gave the enemy 
 "assistance and succours," in the war, was a 
 doctrine they utterly denied and repudiated in 
 words and, if need were, in arms. From Philip of 
 Spain to Napoleon, from the Armada to Waterloo, 
 the doctrine found no place in any British mind.
 
 SANGUINE APOSTLES OF PEACE 23 
 
 The reply given by Elizabeth to the Poles was 
 successively repeated to the Dutch, to the Prussians, 
 to the Kussians, even to all Europe ; and Waterloo 
 left Britain where the Armada had found her, in full 
 possession of her maritime rights and ready to 
 defend them against all comers. 
 
 In the peace which followed, there arose a 
 school which preached against all war. They 
 dwelt on the greed, selfishness, wickedness, and 
 treachery which they truly alleged were the 
 motives for all the wars of history. They 
 dwelt on the horrors of war — on the men slain 
 or maimed, the homes destroyed, the countries 
 devastated with fire and sword, on the moral efi'ect 
 of all, even more destructive and deadly than 
 its most terrible physical manifestations. They 
 appealed to all the best emotions — they called on 
 all just and merciful men to join in devising some 
 method of rendering such things impossible. Their 
 appeal found ready listeners, and when the Great 
 Exhibition of 1861 was opened, they almost thought 
 their cause won and universal peace secured. 
 
 Those most respectable and worthy persons, 
 had they looked around, would have seen that their 
 dream could never be reaHsed. 
 
 No progress in humanity, in civilisation, in arts, 
 science or knowledge ever has availed, or can, to 
 make war cease in the earth. On the contrary, 
 every new achievement of man is instantly pressed 
 into the service of war ; and it is in the life 
 of this present, the last of the generations, that the
 
 24 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 most terrible wars originating in the worst of 
 motives have been fought in every one of the 
 earth's four quarters. 
 
 Moreover, those who wish to abolish war 
 altogether commonly forget that the laws of war 
 are only needed at all when, in spite of all their 
 wishes, war has actually broken out. "When there 
 is no more war, then indeed its law will not matter. 
 But the case, and the only case, here dealt with is 
 that the resources of peace have failed and that 
 war in fact exists. The question is not " Shall war 
 continue ? " but, " War having in fact arisen, in 
 what manner should it be conducted." The views 
 of a peace party on that question are as valuable as 
 those of an anti-boxing society on the Queensberry 
 Rules. 
 
 What remains then is to shorten wars and 
 to alleviate their horrors by the adoption of 
 common rules for them. This is precisely what 
 the law of nations does. In this it is that man 
 most shows himself, in the moments of the greatest 
 trial, superior to the beasts of the field. By this 
 it is, and by this alone, that wars are in some 
 degree held in check and prevented from becom- 
 ing blind, merciless, treacherous massacres and 
 confusions. 
 
 Many honest, humane and highly respectable 
 gentlemen, shocked at the horrors of war and 
 conceiving it possible to make wars without 
 horrors, have long advocated changes in the law 
 of nations which they think would have that effect
 
 "IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY" 25 
 
 — especially at sea. These gentlemen have 
 imagined that Great Britain should abandon her 
 traditional stern assertion of belligerent rights, in 
 order to become the champion of neutral privi- 
 leges ; that the doctrines of blockade, contraband, 
 continuous voyage, convoy, enemy property, and 
 the like, should be relaxed ; that the right of 
 capture at sea should be greatly restricted ; and 
 that, if not in all respects at least for trade, war 
 should be made to resemble peace. 
 
 The final form of all these aspirations — the 
 form wherein they are all included and implied — 
 is the doctrine of "the immunity of private 
 property from capture at sea " ; which therefore 
 deserves critical examination. 
 
 The notion that the private property of some 
 few in a nation should have an immunity not 
 extending to the public property of the whole in 
 that nation, seems at first sight amazing. For it, of 
 course, involves the strange correlative proposition 
 that some of a nation may be at war, and some 
 at peace, with the same national enemy. That view, 
 however, is now seriously advocated ; usually on 
 some such general grounds as that trade is 
 altogether righteous, and war altogether un- 
 righteous ; that to introduce righteousness into 
 unrighteousness is a merciful and beneficent 
 task ; and that if wicked war and innocent trade 
 cannot co-exist unimpaired — then it is war that 
 must be impaired, and not trade. 
 
 The doctrine of the immunity of private pro-
 
 26 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 perty from capture at sea — and only at sea, for on 
 land it is at the absolute mercy of any military com- 
 mander — is now, however, set also on the ground 
 of expediency, and as offering an issue out of the 
 situation created by the Declaration of Paris of 
 1856, which forbids the capture of enemy's 
 property in a friend's, or neutral ship. That, it is 
 very truly said, precludes Great Britain from using 
 all the pressure she formerly exercised on enemy 
 goods by capture — for they may now be carried 
 by neutrals alone and thus be protected by the 
 neutral flag. Since then, it is said, so much 
 belligerent power of capture has been given up, 
 it were best to give up the rest ; to abandon 
 all power of capturing enemy private property, 
 whether goods or ships, at sea; and thus, by 
 substituting a new common immunity from 
 capture for the old common liability to capture, 
 to restore to British merchantmen in war time 
 that equality with the neutral which they formerly 
 enjoyed. To wliich, for the moment, it may 
 suffice to reply that, on the ground of expediency 
 at least, it would be far better to regain the lost 
 equality by denouncing the Declaration of Paris 
 and thereby resuming the complete power of 
 capture, rather than to seek it by extending the 
 Declaration and so losing even the incomplete 
 capturing power still left. 
 
 Here it should be remarked that the advocates 
 of the new doctrine repudiate its full application. 
 They have never yet proposed immunity from
 
 LORD LOREBURN'S TESTIMONY 27 
 
 capture for such private property as consists of 
 the arms, ammunition, and such Uke, classed as 
 contraband of war ; nor for any private property 
 whatever destined to a blockaded port. These 
 they would leave to be captured, however private 
 they may be. In these extreme cases, they shrink 
 from the application of their own principle — there- 
 by avowing what they too feel, that the true test 
 is not whether the property is private, but whether 
 its transport is of material assistance to the enemy 
 in the war. Tried by that test, the private pro- 
 perty in general which makes up the trade of a 
 country may be of even more assistance than that 
 portion of it which is contraband or destined to 
 a blockaded port. For while the former represents 
 some of the means of offence, the latter represents 
 the very spring and source of those revenues, 
 out of which alone the whole means of offence 
 can be and are provided. Meantime, let this 
 pregnant partial surrender of the doctrine be 
 noted. 
 
 With these limitations, however, the doctrine is 
 pressed. The ablest, latest, and most complete 
 presentation of it is to be found in a letter written 
 by so eminent an authority as the present Lord 
 Chancellor to The Times of 14th October 1905, 
 which contains more than had ever before been 
 said, and probably as much as ever can be said, 
 in support of the doctrine. 
 
 In advocating the exemption of private property 
 from capture at sea, Lord Loreburn says : —
 
 28 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 " I urge it, not upon any ground of sentiment 
 or of humanity (indeed no operation of war inflicts 
 less suffering than the capture of unarmed vessels 
 at sea), but upon the ground that, on the balance 
 of argument coolly weighed, the interests of Great 
 Britain will gain much from a change long and 
 eagerly desired by the great majority of other 
 powers." 
 
 The question is thus simplified and narrowed 
 to this : will the interests of Great Britain gain 
 from the change ? Lord Loreburn holds that 
 they would gain much. Nevertheless, some close 
 examination will show that they would gain 
 neither much nor little, but would, on the con- 
 trary, lose altogether; and lose so greatly as to 
 endanger, with themselves, the very existence of 
 the country. 
 
 First let it be observed that, as Lord Loreburn 
 says, the change has been "long and eagerly 
 desired by the great majority of other powers." 
 Of course it has. Lord Lorebm-n himself tells 
 us why. Speaking of '' the continental powers," 
 and of the effect on them of the existing law, which 
 allows a belligerent to capture and confiscate all 
 enemy merchant ships and any enemy goods they 
 may contain, he says : — 
 
 ''They would profit in many ways from its 
 abolition. They would be able to trade freely in 
 their own ships in every sea, even when at war, 
 untouched by the powerful fleets of Great Britain." 
 
 Of course they would profit. But does that
 
 ADVANTAGES TO FOREIGN POWERS 29 
 
 show the change to be in British interests ? Does 
 it not ratlier show — is it not by itself alone enough 
 to show — the very reverse ? 
 
 The case contemplated is that of war at sea 
 between Great Britain and one of these very 
 continental powers. In such a case the eager 
 desire of the great majority of such powers, which 
 are mainly military and not naval, must neces- 
 sarily be to withdraw themselves as much as 
 possible from any harm a navy can do to them, 
 most especially from that which might be done 
 by so preponderating a navy as the British. Their 
 interest must be to increase military and to 
 decrease naval power. No doubt any one power 
 of them all must profit, in a war with Great 
 Britain, by anything that debarred Great Britain 
 from acting upon her sea-borne trade and so cutting 
 her communication with the outside world. 
 
 That is manifest. But what is equally mani- 
 fest is that any profit in war to Great Britain's 
 adversary must be — cannot but be — a correspond- 
 ing loss to herself. What her enemy gains can 
 but be through her loss. Enemies "able to trade 
 freely in their own ships in every sea " must be 
 more formidable in the struggle than enemies 
 unable so to trade, and must be able to continue 
 the struggle longer and with better chance of 
 success. All which would be not for, but against, 
 the interests of Great Britain in a war with such 
 enemies. The very eagerness of the great majority 
 of other powers to gain such a profit at her cost 
 
 
 ■i UEC.192C 
 
 \
 
 30 WAR AND TR.AJDE 
 
 is in itself a sufficient warning that her interest 
 lies in its denial. 
 
 Lord Loreburn, however, believes that Great 
 Britain does not gain but loses from refusing this 
 advantage to her enemy. He says : — 
 
 '* Half our food is imported ; if the sea is 
 closed, we are half starved. We are mainly a 
 manufactm-ing people, and an enormous propor- 
 tion of oiu" raw material is imported. If the sea 
 is closed we are largely reduced to idleness. We 
 are immeasurably the greatest carrying nation of 
 the world. ... If the sea is closed we can no 
 longer carry. . . . The facts I have mentioned 
 alarm us because they mean that war might restrict 
 our supply of food and raw materials, and ruin 
 our carrying trade. Which of them would alarm 
 us if we were agreed that private property at sea 
 should be free of capture ? We could then in 
 security import our supplies in time of war as in 
 time of peace. Our merchant ships could traverse 
 the ocean with no risks except those of nature. 
 But so long as the present law prevails, we are 
 not only liable to be ruined by naval defeat; we 
 are also liable to be ruined by doubtful war." 
 
 All this is true only on the assumption of 
 the sea being closed — closed to us so that we 
 can no longer carry, yet open to our enemy so 
 that he can prevent us from carrying. It all 
 turns upon that "if" in which there is so much 
 virtue. If the sea is so closed and so kept 
 closed by an enemy — but not otherwise — then 
 no doubt we might be half starved, largely reduced
 
 IF THE SEA IS CLOSED 31 
 
 to idleness, and deprived of om* carrying trade. 
 But it must be wholly closed, and kept closed. 
 If not, nothing of all this can happen — nothing 
 of it at all. Will the sea then — can it — be thus 
 closed ? 
 
 It can be on one condition and on that 
 alone — on condition that the enemy of Great 
 Britain has not only defeated but destroyed her 
 fleet — has destroyed it finally, and all of it. Not 
 until that is done can the sea be closed against 
 her, so as to cause the dismal calamities recited. 
 Not a part only but all the fleet must have 
 been destroyed ; and besides that, if the sea is 
 to be kept closed, some effectual means must 
 be taken to stop the issue of the new British 
 warships which would then certainly be building, 
 and some of them perhaps about to hoist the 
 pennant and renew the struggle. Until all that 
 is done and kept done, the sea is not closed. 
 There must be no British fleet in being, none 
 in building. There must not be left so much as 
 a detached squadron in the China Seas, in 
 Australian waters, or in the Mediterranean. If 
 there is, the sea is not yet wholly closed nor can 
 it be kept so closed. If there is, the enemy 
 navy, which has certainly not destroyed a British 
 fleet without much loss of its own in men and 
 ships, may have to look to something else than 
 closing the sea. It may have to look to itself. 
 
 But when that final destruction of all the 
 British fleet has happened, then indeed there
 
 32 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 will be an end, not only of carrying trade, free 
 access of food and raw materials, but of all 
 
 If and when the enemy has wrested from us 
 the command of the sea by defeating and destroying 
 our fleet, and by making it impossible for us to 
 replace that fleet by another, then indeed we 
 must endure not starvation nor idleness nor loss 
 of carrying trade alone, but loss of our independ- 
 ence, loss of our existence as a nation, and, on 
 top of all, such a ransom as would reduce to 
 insignificance the two hundred millions extorted 
 by Germany from France. Then would be the 
 end not merely of Britain's manufacturing and 
 carrying trade, but of Britain herself, final and 
 complete. When this has happened, the possible 
 invasion so often planned through eight centuries 
 and as often abandoned, only because of the 
 British fleet, will become easy to effect and 
 certain to succeed. When this has happened, 
 Great Britain must submit to the conqueror. 
 There will only remain to parcel out the Empire 
 and to levy a huger ransom than the world has 
 yet dreamed of. Carrying trade and such like 
 will be but as the dust in the balance when the 
 spoils of our Empire are divided, and we are 
 peeping about to find ourselves dishonourable 
 graves. 
 
 But the only way of preventing this is mani- 
 festly to have a navy able to keep command of the 
 seas for us and to deny it to our enemy — such a 
 navy as, even if it were half destroyed in action,
 
 IF THE SEA IS PARTIALLY CLOSED 33 
 
 would yet suffice while awaiting another new 
 half to prevent the sea from being at all events 
 completely ''closed" to us. And what else 
 remains is to see that we are not beguiled into 
 agreeing to anything that would shorten the 
 arm or lessen the strength of the navy from 
 which that much is expected and must be had ; 
 and that, most especially, we are not so simple 
 as wantonly to weaken it by depriving it finally 
 and wholly of what has hitherto been found *'the 
 chief instrument of ultimate victory." Lord 
 Loreburn's argument, in short, when examined, 
 is an argument for the maintenance of a pre- 
 ponderant navy ; an argument for the maintenance 
 of all its existing powers of pressure on the 
 enemy ; an argument not for, but against, the 
 exemption from its operations of enemy private 
 property ; an argument for repudiating rather 
 than for extending the prohibition of capture of 
 such property declared by the Declaration of 
 Paris. 
 
 But, it will perhaps be asked, may there not 
 be something short of this ? Admitted, it may 
 be said, that so long as anything remains of the 
 British fleet the sea cannot be wholly closed to 
 us and kept closed; yet may it not be partially 
 closed ? Even though a battered remnant of the 
 fleet has survived, may the sea not be nevertheless 
 partially closed to us — closed as Lord Loreburn 
 supposes, as regards access to our own home 
 ports ? No. Certainly not. That particular form 
 
 c
 
 34 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 of partial closing is hardest of all to effect ; so 
 hard that it needs no friendly fleet to be near 
 in order to prevent it. The elements of that 
 problem have rarely been closely considered. 
 
 To close the sea round and adjacent to the 
 British Isles so as to prevent access to them is a 
 task impossible to perform. These Islands are so 
 set over against Europe that, strategically, they cut 
 the continent in half and enable Great Britain to 
 deny direct sea communication between all those 
 European countries east and north of Calais, and 
 all those south and west thereof — as though Nature 
 herself had both taught and enabled us to command 
 and coerce the land by the use of the sea. But, 
 in addition to that, so happy is their own configura- 
 tion, so numerous their harbours and so wide their 
 avenues of approach, that it is marvellous how 
 anybody could suppose those avenues capable of 
 being closed. And they must all be closed or 
 nothing is done. Close the hundred-mile stretch 
 from Ushant to the Scillies, and you leave open 
 access to the hundred-and-fifty-mile stretch from 
 Scilly to Cape Clear. Close that and there is still 
 open the whole of the three-hundred-mile west 
 coast of Ireland. Close that and you leave open 
 the three-hundred-and-fifty-mile avenue between 
 the north of Ireland and the Orkneys. Close that 
 and there is still left the three-hundred-mile avenue 
 between the Orkneys and the Naze of Norway. 
 Every one of these five great avenues must be 
 closed or the thing is not done ; and nothing less
 
 BRITISH SEAS CANNOT BE CLOSED 35 
 
 will close all of them than to draw, in the sea, and 
 to keep in all weathers, a line of circumvallation a 
 good twelve hundred miles long, every mile whereof 
 must be kept guarded, or sea access to Great Britain 
 is not denied, nor the sea for that purpose closed. 
 It is a task to which all the existing navies of 
 the world would be unequal. All these navies 
 together, much less the single navy of a single 
 enemy, could not effectually debar us from our 
 food and our raw materials, and thereby cause us 
 to be half starved or reduced to idleness. Of this 
 all who will look at a map of Europe may 
 assure themselves. Of this all seamen and naval 
 authorities have assured themselves. Of this 
 even Lord Loreburn is assured ; for he too writes 
 " I believe an effective blockade of the British Isles 
 is impracticable." With which away goes all fear 
 of famine, and therewith, it must be remarked, all 
 Lord Loreburn's most dismal apprehensions, and 
 all the argument based thereon. 
 
 But if, as must be — nay is — admitted, the sea 
 about the British Islands cannot be closed, can all 
 the rest of it be closed ? Can it be so closed as 
 to realise Lord Loreburn's remaining apprehension 
 that we shall find in time of war that we " can no 
 longer carry," and that we should in fact lose our 
 carrying trade ? That seems, on the face of it, 
 unlikely. For if, as already shown and admitted, 
 our enemy could not so close the sea as to deny 
 access to Great Britain, it is still more unlikely 
 that he would be able to close all the rest of the
 
 36 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 seas all over the world, in which the rest of our 
 carrying is done. If he could not compass the 
 lesser part, he could hardly achieve the greater. 
 
 Yet, while the sea-approaches to Great Britain 
 cannot be closed, it is far otherwise with those of 
 most of om' continental neighbours. Their ports 
 are few ; the sea-avenues to them are narrow 
 indeed compared with our own twelve hundred 
 miles ; and a British navy, master of the seas and 
 free to act upon those narrow avenues, could press 
 with immense and deadly, though bloodless, efifect 
 upon the main artery of its enemy's life. The sea 
 which cannot be closed to us, can be closed to 
 them. We have the weapon which they lack. 
 They indeed would, as Lord Loreburn says, "profit 
 in many ways " from its abolition. But where is 
 the profit to Great Britain ? 
 
 Here indeed comes in another consideration, 
 arising, not out of the nature of the case, but out 
 of the nature of the Declaration of Paris of 1856. 
 Lord Loreburn says that in war time : — 
 
 "Foreign nations would soon cease to load 
 their goods in British ships, because, though the 
 goods could not be confiscated, the ship might be 
 captured, and the owners of the cargo would 
 necessarily suffer delay, depreciation, and the cost 
 of trans-shipment. They would employ foreign 
 ships free from war risks. So would our own 
 merchants for a different reason, viz., that under 
 the Declaration of Paris, British merchandise 
 carried in a neutral vessel in a state of war is 
 exempt from captm'c, while British merchandise
 
 TO EXTEND THE PRINCIPLE 37 
 
 carried in a British vessel is liable to capture by 
 the enemy." 
 
 To many this seems a strong reason for 
 denouncing the Declaration of Paris; for revert- 
 ing to the ancient rule of the law of nations, 
 making enemy goods equally capturable in a 
 neutral and in an enemy ship ; for thus restoring 
 to the British carrier the equality with the neutral, 
 which under that rule he enjoyed ; and for so ending 
 the special advantage now given to neutral shipping. 
 Experience shows that equality in war time would 
 result, not in any loss of British carrying trade, but 
 in its increase. This, however, by the way. 
 
 Lord Loreburn, as will be seen, would cover 
 the British carrier, the neutral carrier, and the 
 enemy carrier together with the same immunity 
 for private property, whether ships or goods. 
 Since neutrals, he reasons, may now carry enemy 
 property exempt from capture, let the enemy carry 
 it too. Since enemy property in some bottoms 
 cannot be touched, leave it untouched in all 
 bottoms ; for otherwise you will, under the Declara- 
 tion of Paris, lose your carrying trade. This still 
 seems to him, not a reason for denouncing the 
 Declaration of Paris, but for extending it to 
 the exemption of private property from capture 
 altogether. 
 
 But should we lose our carrying trade ? That 
 we should lose it without the Declaration of Paris 
 is not suggested and cannot be expected — for 
 before that Declaration it was the contrary that
 
 38 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 happened. Should we then lose it with the 
 Declaration? In most conceivable cases, we 
 should not lose it. In some, we should even 
 increase it. 
 
 That, at the outbreak of war, our carrying 
 trade would lose some, perhaps much, foreign 
 cargo, and also some British cargo, because now 
 not so safe in war time as neutral bottoms, is 
 indeed to be expected. It would suffer un- 
 doubtedly. At first it would suffer much, for 
 trade is timid and the panic would be great. But 
 if the British fleet were predominant over that of 
 the enemy, the panic would be short. As British 
 command of the sea became established and 
 manifest, British carrying trade would suffer less 
 and less. Shippers would soon see that although 
 goods in British carriers were not by the law 
 immune from capture, they were in fact made so 
 by the British fleet. We come again to this : that on 
 the sufficiency of that fleet it all depends. If the 
 fleet so commands the sea as to banish therefrom 
 the enemy, and thus render all voyages safe for 
 British merchant ships, these will only suffer so 
 long as the command of the sea remains doubtful ; 
 once the doubt removed, they will suffer no longer. 
 Nay, they will probably gain even more trade, in 
 the shape of that which the banished enemy 
 formerly carried on for other countries. If, on 
 the other hand, tlie command of the sea is lost, 
 there ensues the loss not merely of our carrying 
 trade, but of all else, including our safety against
 
 BLUNTING A WEAPON OF OFFENCE 39 
 
 invasion. It all turns on the fleet and the power 
 of the fleet. Everything that lessens that power 
 increases our danger. 
 
 Would then the exemption of private property 
 from capture lessen that power ? There can be no 
 doubt that it would. When the British fleet 
 captm^ed enemy goods in whatever ships found, 
 the injury thus done to the enemy was the most 
 effective weapon of offence in the British armoury. 
 Lord Loreburn is well aware of this. He says : — 
 
 " In the old times the pressure of the British 
 fleet upon commerce was the chief instrument by 
 which our forefathers often achieved ultimate 
 victory." 
 
 In these later days the Declaration of Paris 
 forbids that pressure upon neutral-carried com- 
 merce ; but it leaves the pressure on enemy-carried 
 commerce and on enemy ships unaffected and intact. 
 Take away that by exempting all commerce, and 
 there is no pressure left at all, nor anything remaining 
 of the chief instrument of ultimate victory. To 
 deprive the British fleet, not merely in certain 
 cases but in all cases whatever, of such an 
 instrument could not but be to lessen its power. The 
 fact that in this respect the power has already been 
 seriously lessened by the Declaration of Paris is no 
 argument for, but rather an argument against, any 
 further lessening of it. As things stand, we cannot 
 afford to give up the very least of the powers we 
 still retain.
 
 40 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 The matter, indeed, goes further. For, with 
 private property immune from capture at sea, it 
 may well be asked in what effective way Great 
 Britain could use her fleet as a weapon of offence 
 at all. The trade of our enemy, vitalising and 
 sustaining him, would pour into his ports under 
 the very eyes of our cruisers. That is the proposal. 
 Our fleets could not touch it. But what, it is said, 
 of the enemy's fleet ? That, at least, would remain. 
 That, at least, would not be immune from capture 
 and defeat; and, though forbidden to touch an 
 enemy merchantman, our fleet would still be able 
 to search out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. 
 
 Yet even this is not so. For, with his trade 
 freed from all interference, the enemy would be 
 under no necessity to protect it. Unless and until 
 he felt himself strong enough to risk a fleet action 
 for its own sake, he need never — would never — 
 send his fleet to sea. And thus, if this new 
 doctrine were accepted, the more powerful the 
 British navy the more certain its futility as a 
 weapon of offence. With his trade unrestricted 
 and his navy in port, the enemy could safely leave 
 it to a wholly inoffensive mastery ; and the 
 "command of the sea" for pm'poses of offence 
 would have sunk to the level of an unmeaning 
 phrase. 
 
 An argument remains which was once presented 
 as conclusive, but which is now somewhat less 
 fashionable. It is this : — That inasmuch as British 
 merchant ships are far more numerous than those
 
 RELATIVE VULNERABILITY 41 
 
 of any possible enemy, our own private property at 
 sea — our ships themselves, and our goods when 
 carried in those ships — would be infinitely more 
 vulnerable to any enemy than his could be to ours ; 
 and that consequently, we must suffer far more 
 loss in private property and far more damage 
 thereby than we could inflict on any enemy 
 whatever. 
 
 Lord Loreburn duly admits this argument into 
 his array, though he puts it less in the front than 
 those who less understand either the sea or the 
 controversy itself. He says : — 
 
 " I will suppose Great Britain at war with one 
 or more great continental powers, and let it also be 
 supposed that the British fleet has established its 
 naval supremacy, and has even blockaded the 
 entire coast-line of its enemies, which latter is an 
 uncommonly strong hypothesis. . . . No supremacy 
 could be so absolutely effective that we could be 
 sure of sealing up every hostile port, and preventing 
 the fm'tive exit of swift commerce destroyers from 
 time to time. . . . Many British merchant ships 
 might be captured and sunk. Our merchant 
 marine is vulnerable in proportion to its size and 
 ubiquity." 
 
 As will be noticed, the supposition that the 
 enemy navy has beaten and destroyed the British, 
 or has established naval supremacy for itself, is here 
 put aside — for Lord Loreburn is aware that Great 
 Britain must in that event suffer all the damage 
 and the enemy none of it, and that such an event
 
 42 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 would end not only our merchant ships, but all 
 else, and the war therewith. He supposes the 
 more probable contrary — that the British fleet has 
 established its own naval supremacy, and he deals 
 with the question on that supposition. 
 
 But that supposition destroys the argument. 
 In that case the enemy merchant marine goes — all 
 of it. It is all, as he admits, captured or confined. 
 In that case our own merchant marine would be 
 untouched, save for those ships that might be 
 captured or sunk. No doubt some of them might 
 be, probably would be, captm'ed or sunk. But 
 with the British navy predominant these would be 
 but few. Those few would hardly be missed out 
 of so large a merchant marine as ours. They 
 would be easily and quickly replaced from those 
 laid up or building, whereof there are always 
 adequate reserves ready to come into line. That 
 would not be so with tlie enemy. Take — merely 
 for instance — Germany. In 1907 our 21,000 
 merchant ships of 11,400,000 tons belonging to the 
 United Kingdom (even leaving out of all count the 
 17,000 ships of 1,500,000 tons belonging to the rest 
 of the British Empire), were roughly five times 
 Germany's 4571 ships of 2,700,000 tons. The 
 capture or destruction of one, or one hundred, 
 British ships, therefore, would only do one-fifth of 
 the national harm to Great Britain that a similar 
 capture or destruction of German ships would do 
 to Germany. A similar number in our case is a 
 lesser proportion. The fact that we have five times
 
 ADVANTAGES OF MANY SHIPS 43 
 
 as many ships means that we could spare more, as 
 it also means that we could replace easier. Where- 
 fore the truth is that the greater size of our larger 
 mercantile marine makes it not more vulnerable 
 but less vulnerable. To make the more vulnerable 
 argument hold water, it must be contended that the 
 enemy will capture or destroy, not as many of om- 
 merchantmen as we capture or destroy of his, but 
 five times as many. How can that be expected ? 
 We have established our naval supremacy and 
 blockaded our enemy's coast-line wholly or partly. 
 At the very least we have blockaded his principal 
 ports. Our warships and cruisers are all freely 
 ranging over all seas ; his are so overpowered that 
 only a few furtive commerce destroyers are able to 
 escape to any seas. Is it conceivable that these 
 destroyers, few and hunted as they would be, could 
 do five times as much harm to our merchantmen as 
 our own free ranging superior forces would do to the 
 enemy's? Could they even, under such difficult 
 conditions, and during their hazardous and probably 
 short career, capture or destroy even so many in 
 number of ours as we, under our much freer condi- 
 tions, should capture or destroy of theirs ? It is 
 altogether improbable. It is scarcely conceivable. 
 
 But if all this be so, our merchant service is not 
 the more but the less vulnerable because of its size 
 and ubiquity. Even if it should receive more 
 blows, it will suffer less harm than will the enemy 
 from fewer blows. And it will far more probably, 
 not even receive so many. For we must remember
 
 44 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 that the sea is covered with its friends and 
 defenders, while its enemies are but a very few 
 furtive and hunted commerce destroyers, divided 
 between ambition to destroy and anxiety for their 
 own preservation, with the latter certainly pre- 
 dominating. 
 
 In fact the life of a British merchant ship, in 
 the condition supposed, would be one of absolute 
 peace and security in comparison with that of 
 a swift commerce destroyer represented as so 
 formidable an enemy. The former would find on 
 every line of trade, cruisers whose special business 
 it would be to ensm-e her safety. The latter, from 
 the moment of her furtive exit, would be hmited 
 for her life without truce mercy or respite, until 
 she ended, as at last she must, either at the bottom 
 of the sea, or in a British harbour with the British 
 ensign above her national colours. The harm she 
 could meantime do would resemble the harm a fox 
 could do to a henroost, with the hounds in full 
 cry after him. Is it necessary to carry the reply 
 further ? 
 
 If it is, let us suppose a fox so bold as to 
 capture a hen under such circumstances. He 
 cannot eat it or carry it home to his cubs — there is 
 no time for that. All he can do is to kill it and 
 leave it. That is precisely all the furtive enemy 
 commerce destroyer could do, in the supposed 
 conditions, with the captured British merchantman. 
 He must destroy it — taking ofip the crew for the 
 sake of humanity and perhaps the chronometers
 
 COMPARISON OF CASES 45 
 
 for the sake of a trophy — and must instantly 
 resume his flight from those accursed British 
 cruisers who have been after him ever since his 
 furtive exit. He cannot send his captured 
 merchantman into one of his own ports for con- 
 demnation and the subsequent division between 
 himself and his crew of ship and cargo — not if she 
 is worth a million. For she would inevitably be 
 recaptured on the way by one of those same British 
 cruisers. And even if she escaped them, she could 
 enter none of his own ports, for they are all 
 blockaded — that is the supposition. He could 
 only sink and fly, having done thus much harm 
 indeed to Great Britain, but no good to himself or 
 his crew. Very different would be the case of a 
 British cruiser capturing an enemy merchantman. 
 Here there would be no difficulty. The capture 
 would be sent home across the unchallenged seas to a 
 British port for condemnation, and upon that 
 ensuing, for a splendid distribution of prize money 
 among the captor's crew. In the one case then, 
 harm would be done to Great Britain, but no other 
 good to her enemy ; in the other case harm would 
 be done to her enemy and good to herself; a double 
 instead of a single result would be achieved. So 
 that the capture of an enemy merchantman by a 
 British cruiser would be worth, in hard cash on 
 the balance, twice as much to Great Britain as the 
 capture of a precisely similar merchantman of 
 similar value would be worth to her enemy. And, 
 supremacy at sea being established and the seas
 
 46 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 guarded, the double event for Great Britain must 
 much more often be brought off than the single 
 event for her enemy. What now is left of the 
 " more vulnerable because more numerous " 
 argument may be judged. 
 
 There remains yet the final argument upon 
 which, when driven from all their other grounds, 
 those retire who would exempt private property 
 from capture. It is this : that the pressure on 
 trade and on the resources of the enemy, once the 
 chief instrument of victory in the hands of the 
 British fleet, would now be no instrument at all, or 
 at least would exercise no material pressure at all. 
 And that because all, says Lord Loreburn, is now 
 changed ; because whereas, in the old times " the 
 want created by closing the sea could not then be 
 compensated by land-borne supplies," it can now 
 be so compensated ; because, whereas in the old 
 times " land transport from any great distance, even 
 from shorter distances, was impracticable on the 
 necessary scale," it is now become practicable ; 
 because, in fine, since the old times "science has 
 provided effective means of land carriage." Upon 
 which text Lord Loreburn thus enlarges : — 
 
 " The only damage we could do to our 
 imaginary enemies would be the suppression for the 
 time of their carrying trade. Part of their merchant 
 navy would be captured and the rest would be 
 confined to port. The injury would not be deadly. 
 They could live upon their own produce and upon 
 the produce of their neighbours carried by rail.
 
 CAN RAILWAYS REPLACE SHIPS ? 47 
 
 They could dispense with sea-borne merchandise, 
 or, if required, could purchase it from neighbours 
 who had imported it into their own country." 
 
 For which reason we are asked to conclude that 
 " the weapon of capture at sea has largely lost its 
 edge." Before we do conclude that, however, we 
 must believe some things with which no facts 
 agree. We must believe that in these days, land- 
 borne can replace sea-borne supplies so as to 
 prevent the distress arising from want of the 
 latter ; we must believe that for transport the rail- 
 road can now replace the ship, and the land the 
 sea. 
 
 This is the very citadel of the advocates of 
 free private property. Unless this can be main- 
 tained, all the rest falls with it; and it can only 
 be maintained if it be proved that in these days 
 the land has become, as of old it admittedly was 
 not, as good for trade as the sea. Is that then 
 indeed the case? All the facts go to contradict 
 it. The facts show, on the contrary, that, instead 
 of the land beating the sea for trade, it is the 
 sea that has beaten, and is ever more beating, 
 the land. Sea carriage has steadily become, and 
 is still becoming, vastly cheaper, safer, and more 
 certain than land carriage ; while its capacity for 
 expansion is, as that of land carriage is not, as 
 infinite as the sea itself. Sea carriage, therefore, 
 wherever there is a possible choice between the 
 two, is more and more superseding land carriage.
 
 48 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 The cost alone would decide that. And in 
 cost, the land cannot compete with the sea. It 
 has been established by so competent an authority 
 as Mr J). A. Thomas, M.P., that to carry one 
 ton one mile costs, as near as may be, twenty 
 times as much by land as by sea. That is why 
 it is cheaper to send coal by sea from Wales 
 to Alexandria, than by land from Wales to 
 Brighton. That is one reason, possibly the 
 principal though by no means the only reason, 
 why the sea must and does always, in carriage, 
 beat the land. 
 
 The results show that in fact the sea does 
 beat the land. . 
 
 Germany is a principal commercial continental 
 state. Her land frontiers are roughly twice as 
 long as her sea frontiers — and of her sea frontiers, 
 three parts out of four abut, not on the ocean, 
 but only on the Baltic. Yet the land-borne trade 
 across her land fi'ontiers was in 1896 (according 
 to Board of Trade Return C. 8881 of 1898 
 and Foreign Office Report C. 8649 of 1898) 
 not two-thirds, but scarcely more than one-third 
 of her whole trade. Her sea-borne trade was 
 65 per cent., her land-borne only 35 per cent, of 
 the whole. Moreover, between 1889 and 1898, 
 the sea-borne proportion had increased to this 
 65 per cent, in the latter year from 38 per cent, 
 in the former. Not only then was the sea beating 
 the land, but it was in those ten years beating 
 it more badly. Nor can we suppose that, with
 
 CAN RAILWAYS REPLACE SHIPS? 49 
 
 the great development of German shipping and 
 sea-borne trade since 1898, the trend of things 
 has since been otherwise than in the same 
 direction. Consequently we may reasonably con- 
 clude that, of the whole German trade, import 
 and export, which was in 1908 £750,000,000, the 
 sea-borne portion represented at least something 
 approaching £500,000,000. 
 
 This does not suggest that railways are re- 
 placing or can replace ships. Eather it suggests 
 the contrary conclusion. 
 
 Were it possible to divert this vast trade 
 wholly from sea to land, it could only be done 
 by increasing twenty-fold the cost of its carriage. 
 But in fact it is not possible so to divert the 
 whole of it. Part of it — the lesser part — might 
 be so diverted, weighted, however, with so 
 increased a cost of carriage as must vastly raise 
 prices all round. The rest — the greater part — 
 must continue to be sea-borne, and of that, such 
 part as was carried in German ships would remain 
 open to capture by an enemy. Such other part 
 as was committed to the neutral carrier for the 
 protection of the neutral flag, must find its way 
 either to a German unblockaded port or else to 
 a near neutral port, thence to be carried by rail- 
 way to its German destination, with its twenty- 
 fold carriage thence by land added to its value 
 and its cost, beyond the cost in peace of 
 the same delivered by sea at a German port. 
 Either then, it must all be left open to 
 
 D
 
 50 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 capture or else it must be weighted with a great 
 extra charge and its cost thereby increased. 
 
 None of this would happen were private 
 property made exempt from capture. The whole 
 of the £500,000,000 of exempted private goods 
 would, as before, come and go in the exempted 
 private German ships. Then indeed that vast 
 hostage for peace would disappear from the seas, 
 which is represented by the aggregate value of 
 the trade and of the ships that carry it ; then, 
 indeed, the sea would have lost the last vestige 
 of its power to coerce the land, by either inter- 
 cepting or vastly increasing the cost of all that 
 moves on the seas. 
 
 No doubt science has provided more effective 
 means of land carriage. But it has also provided 
 even yet more effective means of sea carriage. 
 If there is any alteration in the old balance between 
 the two, it is an alteration in favour rather of 
 the sea than of the land, whether in respect of 
 speed, of safety, of certainty, or of cost. And 
 it still remains true that, for trade, the sea is not 
 alone the best road, but in some respects the only 
 road ; so that if any trade is by any means diverted 
 from sea to land, not only the cost, but the 
 difficulty of handling it, is greatly increased. Such 
 a diversion and increase of cost and difficulty, sea 
 power effects at the least; at the most it stops 
 the trade altogether and destroys it. 
 
 When the Declaration of Paris was agreed to, 
 much sea power was lost. Were the exemption
 
 EAGERNESS OF THE "OTHER POAVERS" 51 
 
 of private property from capture at sea once 
 conceded, the whole of that part of it would be 
 gone which acts upon the trade, the material 
 resources and the taxes of the enemy. That the 
 continental military powers should seek this, is 
 natural. Their sea-borne trade during war is in 
 pawn to Great Britain. They naturally combine 
 together to take it out of pawn. But for Great 
 Britain herself, whose power is on the sea alone, 
 to divest herself of her power there, would be 
 madness and suicide. 
 
 "A change long and eagerly desired by the 
 great majority of other powers" is on that very 
 account to be suspected ; since these other powers 
 are military continental powers, who admittedly 
 stand to gain by the change. In proportion to 
 the length and eagerness of their desire, should 
 be the determination with which Great Britain 
 must resist a change whereby she alone stands 
 to lose. 
 
 Could then Germany ''dispense with sea-borne 
 merchandise" to the extent of £500,000,000 
 yearly ? Would she, because she *' lives on a 
 continent" be able to dispense with the food, 
 the raw material, the manufactures, the necessaries 
 and luxuries her inhabitants find it as imperative 
 as it is profitable to get by sea, and also to 
 dispense with the no less necessary and profitable 
 outlet by sea for her own products, to so enormous 
 an extent ? Would she, if the sea were closed to 
 all this vast trade, be able to dispense with it,
 
 62 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 and yet to feel none of "the want created by 
 closing the sea ? " That question needs no reply. 
 Nobody can doubt that the stoppage of Germany's 
 sea-borne trade must exercise the most powerful 
 pressure upon her. 
 
 But would she, in that event, escape the 
 pressm-e by '* living on her own produce and upon 
 the produce of her neighbom's carried by rail " ; 
 would she still be able to get all the sea-borne 
 stuff she needed — as Lord Loreburn thinks — by 
 "purchase from neighbours who had imported it 
 into their own country " ? Would the stoppage of 
 her sea communications, if effected, be compensated 
 by the diversion of her trade, in whole or in main 
 part, from the sea to the land? Certainly not. 
 For every such diversion would increase the cost 
 of carriage and therewith the cost of the goods. 
 Every such diversion would increase the cost " free 
 on board " of all her exports thus diverted, and so 
 make them harder to sell ; and it would equally 
 increase the cost of all her imports thus diverted, 
 and so make them harder to buy. Every mile of 
 diversion of the carriage from sea to land would 
 mean, for every ton carried over that mile, that the 
 carriage would cost twenty times what it cost 
 before the diversion. Every ton of the trade 
 represented by a value of £500,000,000 would be 
 weighted extra for Germany, with twenty times 
 the cost of carriage over a mileage longer or 
 shorter, according to the distance from the ports 
 of the " neighbours who had imported it into their
 
 EFFECTS AT CAPTURE 53 
 
 own country." That would happen at least ; and 
 besides that, there would happen difficulties and 
 delays commensurate with the increased demands 
 upon the neighbour ports, quays, docks, and 
 railways, to which the diversion had been effected. 
 And finally, what would perhaps be more serious, 
 there would also happen the neighbour's customs 
 duties, levied for his own use by that neighbour 
 at his own port. Instead of the process of 
 diversion being simple and easy and no more 
 costly, as Lord Lorebm-n seems to expect, it could 
 only be carried out with infinitely greater difficulty, 
 greater complications, and greater cost. That 
 greater cost must be applied to the whole of the 
 £500,000,000, since all of it is to be, and must be, 
 diverted upon the stoppage of the sea. Calculated 
 at its lowest conceivable figure, it must amount to 
 so heavy an extra burden on German trade, 
 traders, producers, consumers, and what is more 
 important, on their taxable capacity, as would 
 soon exercise a terrible pressure at once on them 
 and on their Government. Capture at sea then, 
 has not yet, in spite of the Declaration of Paris, 
 "lost its edge," as Lord Loreburn thinks. Once 
 it has diverted an enemy's trade from the enemy 
 ports to the neighbour ports, from the sea to the 
 land, even though but partially, it has achieved its 
 purpose by bringing severe distress upon that 
 enemy, and thereby bringing the enemy himself 
 nearer to submission and Europe nearer to peace. 
 That this at least could be done in time of war
 
 54 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 by the Britisli fleet in command of the sea, can 
 admit of no doubt. That none of it could be done 
 were private property exempt from capture is as 
 indubitable. For in that case no diversion from 
 sea to land would be necessary for any part of the 
 trade, except for contraband or goods destined to 
 a blockaded port. All the rest — ships and goods 
 together- — would go free by sea as though no war 
 nor British fleet existed. 
 
 But capture at sea (so long as private property 
 is not exempt therefrom) does more than this. 
 Exercised by a fleet commanding the sea, it puts 
 an end, so long as the war lasts, to the enemy's 
 carrying trade. Whatever else it does or fails to 
 do, it certainly does that. That indeed, is not 
 questioned ; though the effect of it is belittled. 
 Lord Loreburn says : — 
 
 "The only damage we could do to our 
 imaginary enemies would be the suppression for 
 the time of their carrying trade. Part of their 
 merchant nav}^ would be captm*ed, and the rest 
 would be confined to port." 
 
 As already shown, this is not the only damage 
 we could do. But even if it were, " only " is far 
 too mild and belittling a word to apply to it. To 
 clear the seas of the enemy's traders while leaving 
 them covered with our own is an immense result 
 to achieve. It is a result bringing not alone 
 damage and perhaps ruin to all the enemy's 
 shipowners, but a corresponding advantage to our
 
 THE "ONLV DAMAGE 55 
 
 own shipowners, by the removal for the time of so 
 much competition with themselves. The damage 
 done to the enemy in the case of a power with a 
 great merchant marine, of having every vessel 
 thereof captured or confined and unable to work, 
 would be stupendous. With British merchantmen 
 freely ranging the seas, subject only to a right of 
 capture which there was nobody to exercise, and 
 with a large competing merchant navy suddenly 
 put out of the trade, it is probable that the war, 
 instead of impairing our own carrying trade, 
 would improve its position. But all this is 
 conditional on enemy private property, whether 
 ships or goods, being left subject to capture. 
 Exempt that, and the command of the sea loses 
 its principal value. Exempt that, and the British 
 fleet would be unable either to do this "only" 
 damage which would be so great, or any damage 
 whatever to the enemy's trade or traders. It would 
 then have lost the last, yet still priceless, vestiges 
 of that power over an enemy's trade which was of 
 old admittedly the chief instrument of ultimate 
 victory, and which even to-day will be one of the 
 best instruments of offensive war. That it should 
 be proposed to give this up in the interests of 
 Great Britain is scarcely conceivable. 
 
 Much more than this might be said as to the 
 humanity which prefers cutting throats to captur- 
 ing ships or goods ; as to the civihsation Avhich 
 arrays one-half of the city against the other half ; 
 as to the progress from shorter, more eff'ectual, and
 
 56 WAR AND TRADE 
 
 more merciful, towards longer, less effectual, and 
 less merciful, war. Something too might be said 
 of those insinuating foreigners who mouth philan- 
 thropy to the simple British emotionalists of 
 conferences. 
 
 But we are on the ground of British interests 
 alone. And on that ground enough has been said 
 to show that to exempt private property at sea 
 from capture, would be so contrary to British 
 interests and so destructive of British naval 
 power, as would amount to a betrayal of duty 
 and the exposure to destruction of Great Britain 
 herself. 
 
 " Our business is to keep foreigners from fooling 
 us," said that stout Englishman Blake two hundred 
 years ago. Were he now living he would have 
 said the same of some of his own countrymen.
 
 Ill 
 
 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 War can no more be made at sea than on land 
 without risks. To sit down and count the cost 
 of war risks at sea is therefore imperative ; yet it 
 has rarely been counted either completely or 
 accurately, either so as to cover the whole of the 
 risks or to reckon up the whole of their cost. 
 Whenever it has been attempted, the attempt has 
 been to estimate, not the cost to the nation, but 
 the cost to a section or sections of the nation. 
 And no attempt whatever has ever been thought 
 worth making — except in the rarest, most casual, 
 and most incomplete manner — to estimate what 
 is most important of all — the cost to the war itself, 
 or in other words the effect of war risks as 
 affecting the issue of the war. Yet that is 
 infinitely the most important. For in the awful 
 and deadly struggle of war, when the stake is the 
 very existence of the nation, what matters — what 
 alone matters — is to win. In order to do that, 
 many risks must without doubt be taken — many 
 risks great and alarming in themselves, and which 
 are vet not to be shrunk from — but to be taken 
 
 •^ 57
 
 58 WAR RISKS xVT SEA 
 
 in \new of the greatness of the issue. As for 
 lesser risks, they are, at such a moment, not even 
 worth thinking of. 
 
 The shipowner, the mill owner, and the mill 
 hand have each and all an undeniable right to 
 have their special war risks considered. So has 
 every other section of the community as well as 
 they. But the overwhelming interest of the whole 
 must override all sectional interest. That must 
 be first, mainly and if need be alone, considered. 
 In war the j^rivate interests must give way 
 to the common duty to public interests. Other- 
 Avise the nation is divided against itself, with parts 
 struggling against the whole ; otherwise some of 
 its members are doing the work of the common 
 enemy. So far as they are concerned, the nation 
 has already ceased to be a nation, and the war 
 itself has only provided them with an occasion 
 for doing themselves, partially or greatly, what 
 the national enemy, at the worst, could only do 
 completely. 
 
 The greatest war risk of all is that of being 
 defeated in the war. In comparison with this, 
 no other is of any moment or consequence. 
 Whatever other risks may be taken, this must 
 not be taken. 
 
 Yet it is these lesser and less important risks 
 which have been, almost alone, treated. The 
 risks of a shortness in the supply of food and 
 raw material, and of a consequent diminution of 
 full meals every day and high wages every week,
 
 THE TRUE RISKS OF WAR 59 
 
 are dwelt upon as though they were to be set 
 against tlie loss of all meals and wages together — 
 the injury to a portion as though comparable with 
 the destruction of the whole. The risk of losing 
 by capture some of our merchant ships is regarded 
 rather than the loss of all of them and our in- 
 dependent existence therewith. High prices are 
 put forward as a great if not impossible penalty to 
 pay for the preservation of independence. And 
 the risks of war are treated as though they were 
 the risks of manufacturers, of mill hands, and 
 of shipowners ; whereas, rightly and relatively con- 
 sidered, they are the risks of failure in that war 
 on the issue whereof not manufacturers, mill 
 hands, or shipowners alone, but all their fellows 
 in the State and the very State itself depends. 
 
 In these democratic days it is claimed that 
 the people rule, and that they set all the tunes 
 whether of peace or war to which the nation is 
 to dance. And the people expresses itself and 
 its desire for particular tunes mainly through 
 members of parliament and articles in news- 
 papers. Strangely enough, members of parliament 
 and newspaper writers rarely show either know- 
 ledge of, or taste for, the great problems of war. 
 They can add up figures and compare totals, and 
 they believe, either that this is all that needs to 
 be done, or else that this is all they at least can 
 do. Perhaps it is. But whether or no, the 
 people never go beyond this or seek to trespass 
 into the arcana of war. That they leave to the
 
 60 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 Government, which is there to attend to such 
 things, and is paid for attending to them. Of 
 aUiances, ententes, guarantees, conventions, treaties, 
 declarations, and all the network whereby diplo- 
 macy enmeshes nations and their forces, the people 
 reck not. These indeed set the conditions within 
 which alone any war can be either begun or 
 continued ; they have already, before any war is 
 begun, settled in the main which other nations are 
 to be the aUies, and which the enemies of each of 
 the warring states, as well as which are to be 
 neutral in the struggle. They have marked out 
 the ring and, what is more, they have laid down 
 the rules of the ring. All this, however, escapes 
 the people. It seems to them beyond their ken 
 and above their heads. They have left that to 
 their Government, and they assume it to be all 
 rightly ordered. Or if not, they believe that, when 
 the time of stress comes, we shall free ourselves 
 from any of these musty documents which may 
 too much enmesh us ; shall reject any alliances 
 and tear up any treaties, guarantees, conventions, 
 or declarations then seen to be too clearly deadly 
 to us ; and shall rely at last upon om^ strength alone, 
 wherein they justly place much reliance. When 
 hard pushed, they believe, we shall and can simply 
 take off treaties and conventions as a man might 
 take off his coat and tm'n up his sleeves for a 
 bout of fisticuffs. Even for such a bout, as they 
 know, there are rules, as that there is to be no 
 hitting below the belt ; but those rules they will
 
 " CONSIDERING " THE QUESTION 61 
 
 not consider. They assume that somebody has 
 taken care that they are fair between the fighters. 
 If told that by some new rules, one of the two 
 men has to wear his belt round his waist and the 
 other on the top of his head, they would wonder 
 how it could be so ; and meantime would refuse 
 to believe that it was so. If the better man were 
 quickly and easily beaten under such rules, they 
 would ascribe it to anything but the rules. Their 
 members of parliament and journalists would 
 probably cite this strange beating as a reason for 
 compulsory boxing in board schools under one or 
 more Government inspectors. For the people only 
 see things that happen ; they rarely see why they 
 have happened or how they have been prepared. 
 
 This is not irrelevant. It goes some way 
 towards explaining why, when some unusually far- 
 seeing patriot proposes to "consider" the question 
 of war risks, the ambit of consideration is 
 narrowed ; so that instead of beginning to think 
 of the risks there may be of defeat in the war, 
 which is the only risk worth talking or thinking 
 about, men begin to think and talk about the 
 particular risks of particular sections — and most 
 especially of the noisiest of them. 
 
 Whence it is that, although there never yet was 
 a commission to consider of the conditions, as laid 
 down by treaties and rules, under which alone 
 Great Britain may wage war, there has yet been a 
 commission to " inquire into the conditions affecting 
 the importation of food and raw material into our
 
 62 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 
 time of war, and into the amount of reserves of 
 such supplies existing in the country at any given 
 period ; and to advise whether it is desirable to 
 adopt any measures, in addition to the maintenance 
 of a strong fleet, by which such supplies can be 
 better secm'ed and violent fluctuations avoided." 
 The word "fluctuations" means fluctuations in 
 price, and nothing else ; so that this commission 
 was really one for contriving some method of 
 making war on the cheap. Had it been one for 
 making war, cheap or dear, so as to achieve victory, 
 it might have been more to the more important 
 purpose. 
 
 The commission met in April 1903 and made 
 (an undated) report some time in 1905 to the 
 eff'ect that : — 
 
 " Not only is there no risk of a total cessation 
 of our supplies, but no reasonable probability of 
 serious interference with them, and that, even 
 during a maritime war, there will be no material 
 diminution in their volume unless . . . [after] a 
 reverse that would cost us the command of the sea 
 [and] would place om* whole maritime trade at 
 the mercy of an enemy." 
 
 Strangely enough, however, the commission, 
 having come to the conclusion that a maritime war 
 would make no material diminution in the volume 
 of our supplies, also came to the conclusion that it 
 might, even with undiminished supplies, increase 
 their cost, at all events to the extent of a " moderate
 
 THE COMMISSION OF 1903-1905 63 
 
 percentage," and thereby produce a "panic rise of 
 prices of staple articles of food." Wherefore they 
 thought that : — 
 
 "A system of national indemnity against loss 
 from capture by the enemy would operate both as 
 an additional security to the maintenance of our 
 over- sea trade and as an important steadying 
 influence upon prices," 
 
 and recommended that : — 
 
 "A small expert committee should be appointed 
 to investigate the subject and frame a scheme after 
 consultation with underwriters and others interested 
 in om- mercantile marine. . . . We believe that a 
 guarded and well-considered scheme of national 
 indemnity would act as a powerful addition to 
 our resources, because it would tend to keep down 
 the cost of transport, and therefore would go far in 
 the direction of preventing high prices in time of 
 war, while at the same time it would be a stimulus 
 to the enterprise of British shipowners." 
 
 In all this, as will be noticed, what is dealt 
 with is, in fact and at last, the sole questions of 
 the prices of food and the interests of shipowners^ — 
 to consider which the small expert committee was 
 recommended. 
 
 The small expert committee in question, con- 
 sisting of twelve members, met on 4th December 
 1906 to inquire : — 
 
 1. "Whether it is desirable that the State 
 should undertake to make good to ship-
 
 64 AVAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 owners and traders losses inciuTed through 
 the capture of shipping by the enemy in 
 time of war ; 
 
 2. "If so, whether such indemnity should be 
 
 granted gratuitously, or should be coupled 
 with the payment of premiums calculated 
 to recoup the State — either wholly or in 
 part — for the cost to be incurred ; 
 
 3. " What conditions should be attached to the 
 
 grant of the indemnity, and what arrange- 
 ments should be made for the proper work- 
 ing of the scheme." 
 
 In March 1908 this committee replied negatively 
 to the first paragraph of the reference to it, and 
 the two subsequent paragraphs consequently fell 
 through. 
 
 Upon learning of this inquiry, the Association 
 of Chambers of Commerce very naturally disclosed 
 " a strong body of opinion that, in the event of the 
 adoption of a scheme, the direct benefit of a State 
 guarantee should not be confined to shipping 
 interests only" — which showed an appreciation of 
 the fact, sometimes forgotten, that, in the inevitable 
 and general injury to all interests that war would 
 bring, shipping is not entitled to the sole regard of 
 the State. 
 
 Partial and restricted, however, as was the 
 character of the investigation, it was the occasion 
 for an examination into war risks which, though 
 applied to ships and their cargoes alone, was yet in 
 part of a general character, and in much of a general 
 bearing — and therefore of subsisting interest.
 
 CONSEQUENCES TO MERCHANT SHIITING 65 
 
 The novel suggestion that the State should make 
 good to British shipowners and shippers generally, 
 all losses incurred through capture at sea in war, 
 originated in the apprehension that the second 
 article of the Declaration of Paris of 20th March 
 1856 (viz., "The neutral flag covers the enemy's 
 merchandise with the exception of contraband of 
 war ") would drive British shipping, at the outbreak 
 of war, out of employment or into foreign neutral 
 ownership ; that through the scarcity of shipping 
 arising thus, and also from loss by capture, freights 
 and insurance would rise ; and that prices of food and 
 raw material would consequently rise to famine rates. 
 
 The situation has to be dealt with on the 
 assumption that during war the Declaration of 
 Paris will subsist, and that the mischief, if any, 
 thence arising will ensue. 
 
 The apprehension that war would lay up our 
 merchant ships and drive our carrying trade into 
 the hands of neutrals is not new. It was felt and 
 expressed as soon as the Declaration was published. 
 Mr Cobden so wrote on the 28th May 1856, Mr 
 John Bright and Mr W. S. Lindsay so declared in 
 Parhament on the 17th March 1862, Mr John 
 Stuart Mill on 5th August 1867 ; the Select Com- 
 mittee of the House of Commons on merchant 
 shipping, which sat in 1860, reported: "Our ship- 
 owners will thereby be placed at an immense 
 disadvantage in the event of a war breaking out 
 with any important Em-opean power. In fact, 
 should the Declaration of Paris remain in force 
 
 E
 
 6G AVAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 during a period of hostilities, the whole of our 
 carrying trade would be inevitably transferred to 
 American and other neutral bottoms." Sir Thomas 
 Sutherland avowed the same apprehension in a 
 letter published in October 1884. 
 
 Nor has time materially diminished the appre- 
 hension during the fifty years that have since 
 elapsed. Some shipowners indeed think that 
 British ships could and would still be kept running 
 in war time, and that there would be little disposi- 
 tion to transfer them to the neutral flag. Others, 
 however, still believe with the older school that 
 war under present conditions would put most of 
 our merchant ships out of work, and lay them up 
 useless or force their sale to neutrals. 
 
 The apprehension is usually expressed in terms 
 too general. That our merchant ships would in 
 fact be largely transferred to neutrals on the 
 outbreak of any war whatever is inconceivable. 
 That they would be so transferred in the case of a 
 war with "any important European power," say 
 with Austria alone, with Italy alone, or even with 
 Germany alone, is unlikely. That such a transfer 
 would, however, be made in the case of a war in 
 which the United States or France were among our 
 opponents is quite conceivable. 
 
 The suggestion that there would be a legal 
 difficulty in making such transfers, although it has 
 been put forward with a certain afl'ectation of 
 solemnity, cannot be seriously regarded ; for it was 
 disposed of by the Privy Council in the case of the
 
 POSSIBLE TRANSFERENCE OF VESSELS G7 
 
 "Baltica." That there would be a difficulty on the 
 part of the neutrals in finding the money to pay for 
 the transferred ships cannot either be supposed, for 
 the assumption is that the ships would be available 
 at a cheap price in order to carry on a profitable 
 trade in which, under t'heir own flag, they could no 
 longer engage. The operation, therefore, would 
 finance itself. Moreover, during the war between 
 the United States and Spain so recently as 1898, 
 such a transfer did actually occur. On that 
 occasion we are told by Mr H. W. Wilson in his 
 book. The Downfall of Spain, the outbreak of war 
 ran up the insurance rates of American vessels as 
 much as 50 per cent., for Spain, although relatively 
 weak in naval power, had the advantage of 
 numerous fine ports unblockaded and open, and 
 (not being a signatory of the Declaration of Paris) 
 was expected to commission privateers. Of the 
 American merchant ships, many were taken into 
 Government employ as auxiliary cruisers and 
 transports, but of the remainder Mr Wilson (p. 439) 
 says : " The few ships of the American lines 
 running to Europe were transferred to a foreign 
 flag — the Belgian." Very soon, indeed, the panic 
 subsided and insurance rates fell. But there 
 remains the fact that the transfers were made, as 
 sufficing to show that they can be made. 
 
 Will our merchant ships, then, be unable to 
 continue running in the event of war ? Will they 
 be either laid up or transferred to neutrals? 
 And, if so, will prices consequently greatly rise ?
 
 68 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 It was apparently on the assumption of an 
 affirmative answer to all these questions that the 
 suggestion of national indemnity was made. For 
 if in war time the owners of British merchant ships 
 can and do continue to run their vessels, it must be 
 because they continue to get cargo from shippers, 
 which again implies that the additional risk of 
 shipping in British ships is so small that shippers 
 being covered by insurance will be willing to incur 
 it. It follows from this that if the risk is small to 
 the cargo it will also be small to the ship ; and 
 thence follows that the risk will not materially 
 raise either freights or prices. In which case a 
 national indemnity or guarantee would neither be 
 necessary nor justifiable. 
 
 All seems to resolve itself at last into a 
 question of prices. If freights are not likely to be 
 "doubled" or "trebled," nor prices likely to rise to 
 the " famine " level often predicted, the gravity of 
 the question is greatly lessened. If they are not 
 likely to rise greatly or for more than a short time, 
 the question becomes of small importance compared 
 with those others that any war must raise. If they 
 are not likely to rise at all it becomes of no import- 
 ance whatever. All this again resolves itself into 
 the question whether we shall get our supplies 
 practically undiminished. For if we do, prices can 
 hardly rise. And price alone is the final point. 
 
 We must ask then whether war would stop our 
 supphes of food or raw material; whether, either 
 through captures by the enemy or by laying up
 
 WHAT SORT OF WAR? 69 
 
 our own ships or causing their transfer or other- 
 wise, it would so diminish the suppKes as to cause 
 a distressing rise in their prices? To all these 
 questions a generally negative answer must be 
 given though with important exceptions. 
 
 But the case will vary with the war. We must 
 ask therefore what war ? 
 
 For nearly a century we have not known war — 
 war, that is, which would touch ourselves or involve 
 risk to our own trade, homes, lives, liberty, and 
 fortunes. When we did know such a war we 
 waged it under the old conditions. These exposed 
 to our naval power the whole of the sea-borne 
 trade of an enemy; they made a British ship 
 carrying British merchandise as safe as a neutral 
 ship, and therefore as yet unexposed to the special 
 risk now imposed upon it ; and they in fact resulted 
 during twenty years of deadly struggle, not in any 
 loss of British shipping or trade, but in the 
 doubling of both, while those of the enemy were 
 lessened by two- thirds and for the time ruined. 
 The experience of our next war waged under the 
 new rule will, however, not be that of our last war 
 waged under the old rule. We are consequently 
 reduced mainly to conjecture in seeking to deter- 
 mine what the state of things would be under the 
 new rule, and what its effect upon our merchants 
 and shipowners. 
 
 " War " is often if not usually spoken of 
 vaguely and in a way suggesting that it might be 
 war with all the world at once ; though past
 
 70 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 experience has shown (as the relative circum- 
 stances and interests of all existing great powers 
 make the future to promise) that Great Britain 
 will never long continue at war without allies 
 being attracted or forced to take sides with her 
 against her enemy. Even when the impossible 
 contingency of Great Britain against the world is 
 dismissed, it is necessary, before any idea can be 
 arrived at of the effect of war on British shipping, 
 trade, or prices, to specify the war. For wars 
 differ almost infinitely. 
 
 No notion as to how or how far a war would 
 raise the questions here involved can therefore be 
 reached unless we imagine a specific war. 
 
 That war must be imagined with a single 
 important state. The probability of its effect in 
 gaining either to us or to our enemy allies among 
 other states must be for the moment disregarded — 
 gi'eat as that probability may be — because it would 
 too greatly complicate matters and also because, if 
 we take the important states seriatim and consider 
 the effect of a war with each, some idea of the 
 effect of possible war alliances may thence be 
 deduced. 
 
 The war must further be conceived as a 
 maritime war alone, without for the moment 
 taking count of the incidental and reflective effect 
 upon it of a simultaneous land war with the enemy 
 along our very important land frontiers — though 
 this too would be important. With these reserva- 
 tions then, some forecast may be attemjjted.
 
 WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES 71 
 
 The smaller states may be excluded. War 
 with Venezuela, with Greece, or even with Turkey, 
 would not raise the great questions involved. 
 
 Nor need we, for the moment, imagine any war 
 except one which would raise these questions in 
 their more serious form. Russia, Austria, Italy, 
 may be excluded on this ground. On this as well 
 as on other grounds we may further exclude 
 Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden ; while 
 we must necessarily exclude Portugal, the ancient 
 ally whose whole territories, European and Colonial, 
 we guarantee, and Belgium, whose neutrality we 
 guarantee. We are left then with three principal 
 powers to consider — The United States, France, 
 and Germany. 
 
 War with the United States would be the most 
 serious of all. Not alone their sea-board, their 
 ports, their enterprise and ability, but the fact that 
 they are not bound by the Declaration of Paris, 
 would give them great power against our carry- 
 ing and carried trade. They could commission 
 privateers under the old form. They could capture 
 British goods under the neutral flag, while Great 
 Britain, though not bound as towards them, being 
 still bound as towards the neutrals, could not 
 venture to do so in face of these neutrals' claim to 
 the promised immunity for their ships. Such a 
 war would probably cause many of our merchant 
 ships to be laid up. It would not, however, cause 
 their transfer to neutral flags, since these would in 
 this case give no protection — the United States
 
 72 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 not being bound by any Declaration to acknow- 
 ledge any such protection. 
 
 Not even this war indeed could stop the sea 
 approaches to Great Britain, or starve us out for 
 want of food. But it would assuredly increase 
 risks, raise insurance if not freights, and add, for 
 a time, to the cost of our supplies. This war, 
 however, is held to be so impossible that the 
 Admiralty, renouncing the secular tradition of 
 the country, has given up all the naval stations on 
 both sides of North America. 
 
 War with Spain would be waged under the same 
 conditions as with the United States, for Spain, 
 too, retains the right to commission privateers and 
 to capture enemy property under the neutral flag. 
 Spain, moreover, has a splendid sea-board, fronted 
 both on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and 
 provided with fine ports. But she has not the 
 resources of the United States, nor the capacity 
 to .use them if she had them. Important and 
 dangerous, therefore, as she would be if allied 
 with and directed by an astute enemy against us, 
 yet as a sole enemy she may be disregarded. 
 
 War with France would be the next most 
 dangerous after war with the United States. Her 
 grand sea-l)oard, double fronted like that of Spain, 
 her splendid ports on both, and her sound naval 
 traditions make her, next to ourselves, the most 
 formidable maritime power in Europe. France, 
 however, being endowed at once with universal 
 military service and universal suffrage, will hardly
 
 WAR WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY 73 
 
 fight again unless in defence of her own territory, 
 or in case of some inconceivably tempting European 
 cataclysm opening an easy way back to Alsace- 
 Lorraine. The last power she would desire to 
 fight is Great Britain. But a war with France 
 alone would aff'ect our supplies from the Black 
 Sea, though probably not even those very greatly. 
 It would raise the prices of wines, silks, fancy 
 wares, and other articles of luxury, but not of 
 food or raw materials to any considerable extent, 
 if at all. It would not stop our food supplies. It 
 would not close the sea avenues to these Islands. 
 But it would lay up some of our merchant ships by 
 the stoppage of the French trade, and by such 
 interference as it caused with the Mediterranean 
 and Black Sea trade. 
 
 War with Germany alone comes third in 
 importance. Germany has on the open sea but 
 a small sea-board ill provided with ports, while 
 her Baltic sea-board is on the other side of the 
 Sound or the Kiel Canal. Her powerful and 
 growing navy, admirably equipped, is yet still 
 deficient in the slow-growing naval and seaman- 
 like tradition. Her future is said to be on the 
 seas, and she has claimed the Trident and the 
 Admiralty of the Atlantic. Moreover, the recent 
 remarkable alterations in the preponderance of 
 distribution of the British navy indicate at least 
 that the North Sea seems to the Admiralty to 
 claim a greater relative importance than it has 
 hitherto had.
 
 74 ^VAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 Since, therefore, it is necessary to imagine some 
 specific war, we may take, purely by way of 
 example, a war with Germany — a war with 
 Germany alone, the rest of the world remaining 
 neutral — a war which might last two or three 
 years. 
 
 Were Holland, with her useful strategic 
 position as against Great Britain, her sea-board 
 and ports, her admirable naval tradition and her 
 splendid population, absorbed and assimilated by 
 the German Empire, Germany would be at least 
 doubled in maritime strength, and would then be, 
 taking all into consideration, as formidable on the 
 seas as France. But Holland will hardly be 
 absorbed easily, and she would be assimilated less 
 easily. 
 
 In case of war with Germany alone, some of the 
 mischiefs apprehended would probably not be 
 severely felt. The action of the German privateer, 
 in its modern form of "auxiliary," evading the 
 Declaration of Paris, would only be possible to 
 a very limited extent and for a short time, since 
 the German sea-board and German ports do not 
 lend themselves, as do those of France, Spain, or 
 the United States, to that form of warlike enter- 
 prise. Nor, for the same reason, would her naval 
 cruisers be able to effect much in capture of 
 British merchandise. The transfer of British 
 shipping to neutral flags would thus probably 
 not be forced, and therefore would not be general. 
 The great — the real — mischief here would be that
 
 OUR OVER-SEAS SUPPLIES 75 
 
 we should be prevented by the Declaration of Paris 
 from acting on German sea-borne resources ; that 
 her trade at least would be carried on under our 
 noses by neutrals ; that we should no longer have 
 the power of acting through the sea on the land as 
 in the French war; and that the struggle might 
 therefore l^e prolonged into a stale -mate war, in 
 which Germany would always be watching for an 
 opportunity of land invasion, and Great Britain 
 always for an opportunity of effectual naval action 
 — without either finding it. 
 
 That in any case our supplies of food or raw 
 material would be seriously interfered with by any 
 war whatever, much less by war with Germany 
 alone, is improbable. Nature protects us. The 
 five great avenues of approach to the British 
 Islands are wide indeed. From the Naze of 
 Norway to the Orkneys is 300 miles. From the 
 Orkneys to the northern end of Ireland is 350 
 miles. From the northern end of Ireland to Cape 
 Clear at its southern end is 300 miles. From Cape 
 Clear to the Scilly Islands is 150 miles, and from 
 the Scilly Isles to Ushant is 100 miles — altogether 
 over 1200 miles, which must all be closed before 
 access can be debarred to the United Kingdom. 
 Even, therefore, had we no navy to protect it, the 
 access to our ports is such as all the navies of the 
 world could not completely stop. But with a 
 British fleet of preponderating strength on the sea, 
 and with moderately capable strategists at the 
 Admiralty, even so much as any serious interrup-
 
 76 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 tion of sea-borne supplies is in the war supposed 
 almost unthinkable. The navy would undoubtedly 
 do its work — if not, it is to be hoped we should this 
 time shoot a first-lord instead of an admiral — and 
 part of that work is to know the whereabouts of 
 any German cruisers likely to capture British ships, 
 and, knowing it, to keep an eye upon them, and to 
 be ready to hunt them down, to run them out of 
 coal, to capture or destroy them. Even if this so 
 failed as that some British merchantmen were 
 captured, the German captor would still have the 
 difficulty of taking them into his ports for adjudica- 
 tion, in the course of which they would be exposed 
 to probable recapture by British cruisers. If, on 
 the other hand, German captors instead of taking 
 them in, sank them, or pretended to follow the 
 piratical proceedings of Captain Semmes by sub- 
 stituting the adjudication of naval captains at sea 
 for that of Prize Courts in port ; or if, like Captain 
 Semmes, they embezzled portable property found 
 in the ships ; if in any way, in short, they violated 
 the law of nations, the British fleet would probably 
 be able to find sharp and summary means of 
 reminding them of their obligations. 
 
 The adequacy in numbers of the British navy 
 as a protection to our shipping has during the last 
 few years been vastly increased. As to the training 
 or efficiency of men and officers, that is another 
 matter; for there is danger that by 1911 the fleet 
 may be partially, and later on wholly, oflicered by 
 ill-trained lieutenants. Up to ten years ago the
 
 A GENERAL RISE IN PRICES 77 
 
 navy had not kept pace in numbers with our 
 merchant shipping, but in that respect it is now 
 ample. It should be now fully equal to giving so 
 complete a protection against Germany as would 
 amount almost to immunity from capture. 
 
 The apprehension is, however, that, in spite of 
 all, British freights would necessarily rise, that 
 insm'ance would rise, that the prices in Great 
 Britain of all sea-borne stuff would consequently 
 rise, and that British merchantmen would largely 
 be driven from the seas, and either laid up or 
 transferred to neutrals, whose rates of insurance 
 would be lower than those on British ships, for 
 either German or British goods. 
 
 The reflection occurs that some of these 
 apprehensions scarcely consist with each other. If 
 British freights rose, that would probably induce, not 
 fewer, but more, British vessels to keep the seas. 
 On the other hand, if British insurance so rose as 
 to drive cargoes from British to neutral ships, then 
 British freights must probably fall. 
 
 But the final — the principal danger apprehended 
 in war is that of a general rise in prices (especially 
 of food) consequent on the assumed rise in freights 
 and insurance ; this rise in prices, the Commission 
 of 1903 to 1905 on Food Supply report, "seems 
 to us not only possible or probable, but, at any rate, 
 for a time, practically certain." Is it so certain ? 
 
 If freights alone rose, or even if both freights 
 and insurance rose, without resulting in a rise of 
 prices, nobody would be injured ; on the contrary,
 
 78 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 shipowners and underwriters would increase in 
 prosperity, while consumers of the nation at large 
 would be left unaffected ; it is therefore only to 
 the apprehended rise in price of food and of raw 
 material that attention need be given. 
 
 This apprehension, with some, is great. 
 Authorities in the corn trade think that on 
 declaration of war, prices might easily run up to 
 100s. or even 200s. per quarter ; and, in any case, 
 it is assumed almost universally that even if the 
 rise were not so great as this, it would be great 
 enough to cause much suffering to the poorer 
 classes, and to render it imperative that some steps 
 should be taken with "a view of keeping down 
 prices "and maintaining "a steady level of prices 
 in time of war." 
 
 The whole question is thus narrowed to that of 
 the effect of war upon prices, which, again, may be 
 narrowed to that of its effect upon prices of articles 
 of first necessity, such as food and raw material. 
 For while it is conceivable that a rise in these 
 would cause great distress, it can hardly be con- 
 tended that such distress would be caused by a rise 
 in the price of articles of luxury. Ostrich feathers 
 cannot claim the importance of corn, nor perfumery 
 that of cotton. 
 
 First, with regard to freights. A rise in 
 freights would, as already said, manifestly make it 
 easier for British merchant ships to continue 
 running. It is a fall in freights that would induce 
 them to cease running, or to transfer to the neutral
 
 THE PRICE OF CORN 79 
 
 flag. As to insui'ance, that must clearly be regarded 
 as part of, and included in, the freights, so far as 
 its effect upon prices is concerned. And, as 
 already said, it all conies at last to the final 
 question of prices. 
 
 That a rise in freights does not necessarily mean 
 dearer food is shown by so late an experience as 
 that of the South African War, when, although 
 freights rose "all round " from 50 to 100 per cent, 
 on "85 per cent, of all the shipping," the price of 
 wheat fell from 27s. 4d. in October 1899, to 
 26s. lid. for the whole year 1900. 
 
 But now as to prices generally and the effect 
 upon them of war. With great respect to the corn 
 trade authorities above quoted on this point of 
 prices, it is by no means certain that on the out- 
 break of war prices would necessarily rise at all, or 
 that even at the end of, say, five years of war, they 
 would be any higher than before the war began. 
 
 Mr Tooke's History of PiHces is universally 
 recognised as a sound authority, and Mr Tooke is 
 very clear and decided on the point. Writing in 
 1838, he says : — 
 
 " It will appear, on reference to former periods 
 of our history, that there is no observable coinci- 
 dence of a rise of prices during war, and a fall 
 during peace. On the contrary, it so happens, that 
 in the case of the agricultural produce of this 
 country, there was for upwards of one hundred 
 years previous to 1793, as low a range of prices 
 during periods of war as during the intervals of
 
 80 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 peace. This has been eminently the case with 
 respect to wheat" (Vol, I., p. 97). 
 
 Mr Tooke only excepts from this general rule 
 "articles subject to a tax, such as malt," to 
 " increased charges of importation such as colonial 
 and foreign produce," or to *' extra demand for 
 naval and military stores." But the general rule 
 he states as quoted (supporting it by statistics of 
 the wars from 1688 to 1783), and he especially 
 insists on it in the case of provisions in general. 
 "The prices of meat and other provisions," he 
 says, "were as low in the periods of war as in 
 those of peace, and in some instances lower " ; and 
 he adds, "the prices of wool would offer nearly the 
 same result. Other articles might be enumerated 
 as affording a similar conclusion." Mr Tooke 
 adds : — 
 
 "After six years of war (1793-1798) involving 
 a gradually increasing expenditure, defrayed by 
 loans, much larger towards the later than at the 
 earlier period, we see the prices of corn, after 
 having been elevated by scarcity, obviously arising 
 from the seasons, falHng, upon the return of only 
 moderate abundance, to the level whence they had 
 risen " (pp. 182-188). 
 
 To all this may be added the further fact that 
 in June 1817, two years after the battle of 
 Waterloo, when, not alone the second, but the 
 third and final phase of the war had been ended, 
 "wheat in Mark Lane sold as high as 135s." 
 (Tooke, Vol. II., p. 20).
 
 NO ANALOGY WITH THE PAST 81 
 
 From this we must conclude that it is impossible 
 to affirm with certainty that war will always raise 
 British food prices above the peace level. 
 
 But although the facts above cited suffice to 
 show that war does not always necessarily raise 
 the price of food, we must remember that the 
 French war was waged under the old rules, and 
 would therefore not be analogous to a future war 
 waged under the new rules of the Declaration of 
 Paris. During the French war we captured our 
 enemy's goods under the neutral flag, thus often 
 getting our stufif not cheap, but for nothing; and 
 since the neutral flag gave no greater protection 
 from the enemy to British goods than did the 
 British flag, the British vessel was as safe as the 
 neutral, and there was consequently no inducement 
 to replace it by the neutral. Yet it is also to be 
 remembered that the immunity of neutrals under 
 the second article of the Declaration of Paris is 
 presented, by those who would continue to adhere 
 to that Declaration, as a security for the continuance 
 in war of our supplies, if not, indeed, carried by 
 British ships as of old, yet carried at least by 
 neutral ships ; and therefore as a secm-ity against 
 a rise in prices. And whether by recurrence to 
 the old rule the stuff*, as of old, is again carried in 
 British ships freed from the disadvantages of the 
 Declaration, or whether it is obtained as freely by 
 the employment of neutrals, does not aff'ect the 
 question of price. 
 
 Reverting then to prices ; is it not conceivable
 
 82 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 that in the case of a war with Germany lasting 
 even so long as the first eight and a half years' 
 phase of the great war with France, prices may fail 
 to rise ? Is it not even conceivable that they 
 might fall ? Conceivable it surely is ; for prices, 
 whether of food or of raw material, depend not 
 alone upon war but upon seasons, harvests, and an 
 infinity of other circumstances which render almost 
 impossible a forecast of their movements during 
 future years. In September 1792, five months 
 before the war, wheat in England was 53s. 4d. per 
 quarter ; but in September 1793, when the war had 
 already lasted seven months, it had fallen to 45s. 
 (Tooke, Vol. II., p. 389), or to the extent of 15 per 
 cent. Is it not conceivable that a similar fall 
 rnicfht occur a2;ain ? 
 
 The one thing about prices, if there be any one 
 thing which may with some confidence be expected, 
 is that, owing to the increased number and increased 
 accessibility of the sources of supply, prices of food 
 will in the future gradually but constantly tend to 
 fluctuate less, and to rise and fall within narrower 
 limits. Consequently the expectation of any 
 such extreme difference as that involved in a 
 rise from present prices to 200s. a quarter may 
 with some confidence be dismissed as exaggerated. 
 
 The "Commission of 1903-1905 on the Supply 
 of Food and Kaw Material in War," after taking 
 much evidence, reports as regards loss of sea-borne 
 supplies through capture by the enemy : — 
 
 " It docs not appear to us that any efifort in
 
 NO RISK OF FAILURE OF SUPPLIES 83 
 
 this direction which it will be possible for an 
 enemy to make, would cause any material diminu- 
 tion in the over-seas supplies of these articles of 
 primary consumption which are necessary for our 
 population." 
 
 It says (p. 59) : — 
 
 "The effect of the naval and shipping evidence 
 is conclusive as to the point, that while there will 
 be some interference with trade and some captures, 
 not only is there no risk of a total cessation of our 
 supplies, but no reasonable probability of serious 
 interference with them ; and that, even during a 
 maritime war, there will be no material diminution 
 in their volume, unless such a disaster takes place 
 as ... a reverse that would cost us the command 
 of the sea." 
 
 This covers all supplies, whether of food or raw 
 material ; and with especial reference to food alone, 
 the commission quotes the Board of Admiralty to 
 the effect that '' our supplies of wheat and flour 
 would arrive in practically the same volume as 
 they come at present " ; and finally sums up 
 (p. 35) :- 
 
 " With a strong fleet we find no reason to fear 
 such an interruption of our supplies as would lead 
 to the starvation of our people, nor do we see 
 any evidence that there is likely to be any serious 
 shortage." 
 
 With no material diminution in our supphes, 
 with wheat and flour arriving in practically the 
 same volume, and with no serious shortage, nor
 
 84 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 even so much as a material diminution of supplies 
 to fear, it might be supposed that the question of 
 price would be solved ; for it is hard to believe 
 that with the same supplies prices would be 
 higher. 
 
 Nevertheless, the commission, partly basing 
 itself on prices in the Napoleonic war (from figures 
 of Mr Tooke's carelessly quoted, and their true 
 lesson therefore missed), was of opinion that "a 
 rise of prices under apprehension of a maritime 
 war, and still more on the outbreak of hostilities, 
 seems to us not only possible or probable, but at 
 any rate for a time practically certain " (p. 35). It 
 looked (p. 36) to a rise in freights and of insurance, 
 as a proximate cause of what it held to be the 
 certain rise in prices. Nevertheless, it admitted 
 that the opinions and calculations given in evidence 
 (p. 37) indicate that **the addition to be made to 
 the price of wheat in time of war under this head 
 is relatively small as compared w^ith that which 
 might be caused by panic." Upon this appre- 
 hension of higher prices, the commission therefore 
 considered proposals for the storage of grain, which 
 it did not entertain, and for a system which it 
 did entertain, of national indemnity against loss 
 from capture by the enemy. This, it thought 
 (p. 62), "would operate both as an additional 
 security to the maintenance of om* oversea trade, 
 and as an important steadying influence upon 
 prices." It added that "a guarded and well- 
 considered scheme of national indemnity would
 
 A QUESTION OF PANIC 85 
 
 act as a powerful addition to our resources, because 
 it would tend to keep down the cost of transport, 
 and therefore would go far in the direction of 
 preventing high prices in time of war, while at the 
 same time it would be a stimulus to the enterprise 
 of British shipowners." The commission, there- 
 fore, recommended a committee to "investigate 
 the subject and frame a scheme." 
 
 We come then at last to this : that as regards 
 supplies, no apprehension need be felt ; that they 
 will suffer no material diminution in quantity, and 
 can therefore hardly suffer in material appreciation 
 of their price ; that the addition to price will be 
 " relatively small " ; and that, finally, it is a question 
 not of price but only of panic, not of scarcity 
 but only of a scare. 
 
 It may here be said that the "Treasury 
 Committee of Experts " appointed to consider this 
 indemnity proposal reported in March 1908 against 
 it, and that nothing more has since been heard 
 of it. Among the reasons which were presented 
 — by myself among others — to the committee 
 against the proposal, and which presumably 
 influenced its decision, was the effect it would 
 have in Prize Comt proceedings. 
 
 At present, capture does not always result in 
 loss. The owner or underwriter fights the case, 
 and often, because of doubt or difficulties, obtains 
 restitution from the Prize Court, whereof number- 
 less instances may be seen in Robinson's Admiralty 
 Reports. But with a system of national indemnity
 
 86 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 no owner or underwriter need or would fight at 
 all. All the cases would go by default; and for 
 all the State must pay. The Prize Court itself 
 would have a new mducement to, and a new 
 justification for, condemnation, for under the 
 proposed system there would be no question of 
 ownership ; the British State, being now the 
 insurer of every British ship and cargo and bound 
 to pay its full value, would in reality be made 
 by the mere condemnation the owner of both ; 
 and ship and cargo together would, for that very 
 reason, be condemned sans phrase by the court 
 as the property of the belligerent state. 
 
 Indemnity after loss, then, would after all not 
 prevent loss, but would rather encom^age it. It 
 would be a subsidy from the taxpayer to the 
 shipowner and the merchant. That may be good 
 for shipowners or merchants, but that is not the 
 interest of the State. The interest of the State 
 is not that supplies should be lost and paid for, 
 but that they should be preserved and come ; not 
 that shipowners and merchants should get cash, 
 but that the nation should get the stuff. National 
 indemnity would not ensure this, but rather the 
 contrary. What the State requires is not payment 
 after loss but security against loss, not national 
 indemnity but a national navy adequate in 
 numbers, efficient in men, and set free once more 
 to exercise all its powers. 
 
 The point, however, of most permanent and 
 still subsisting interest that was raised was the
 
 VALUE OF THE GOODS INVOLVED 87 
 
 value in cash of the British ships and goods 
 exposed to war risks, and the amount of risk that 
 would attach to them. 
 
 Of this it seems possible to make some 
 estimate. 
 
 The value of the goods involved would be, 
 in each year, all that was landed in Great Britain 
 during that year, added to the value of all that 
 was exported — all, in fact, that is afloat during 
 the year, and therefore exposed to capture at 
 sea. 
 
 In 1905 there was landed from the sea 
 {Statistical Abstract, pp. 71, 209, 293, 211, and 
 271) :— 
 
 Imported merchandise . . . £565,019,917 
 
 Imported diamonds (from Cape of Good 
 
 Hope alone) . . . 6,661,957 
 
 Gold and silver bullion and specie . 51,559,909 
 
 Fish ..... 10,672,387 
 
 And there was exported : — 
 
 Exported merchandise . . . £407,596,527 
 
 Gold and silver bullion and specie . 30,829,842 
 
 £633,914,170 
 
 438,426,369 
 
 Total property afloat in the year, 
 
 value .... £1,072,340,539 
 
 Deduct one-third of the whole, estimated to be 
 carried in foreign ships and therefore, 
 under the Declaration of Paris, not 
 liable to capture except in case of war 
 with the United States or Spain . 357,446,846 
 
 Property afloat in the year liable to capture, 
 
 value ..... £714,893,693 
 
 This sum represents stuff which has to be 
 covered by the indemnity once in the year, and
 
 88 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 no more. For it runs the war risk once, and no 
 more. 
 
 It is different when we come to the ships. 
 Theirs is not the case of one war risk in the year, 
 but of many. Each of them makes on an average 
 some five round or ten single voyages a year. She 
 must be covered, therefore, not once only in the 
 year, but for as many voyages as she makes, or 
 ten times. 
 
 The navicjation returns show that there were 
 
 'O*^ 
 
 on the register of the United Kingdom on 
 3rd December 1905, 20,581 British ships of an 
 aggregate net register tonnage of 10,735,582 : — 
 
 Net 
 
 Registered Tons. 
 
 Wliereof there were actually employed dur- 
 ing the year .... 10,597,761 
 
 In addition to which there were vessels belong- 
 ing to British colonies and possessions 
 of 1,596,822 tons, whereof were employed, 
 say . . . . . . 1,580,000 
 
 Besides British fishing vessels . . . 176,374 
 
 Total net register tons . . 12,354,135 
 
 The difficulty of arriving at an average value 
 of ships of various sizes and ages, and especially 
 the difficulty of arriving at it on the purely 
 artificial and conventional basis of net register 
 tonnage, is great. Colonel Hozier, speaking in 
 1903, valued 7,400,000 net register tons of 
 British shipping, "from fast liners at £40 per 
 ton down to depreciated tramps," at £96,392,800, 
 or £12, 17s. per net ton all round. Competent 
 experts, however, who have long and repeatedly
 
 TRUE MEASURE OF THE WAR RISK 89 
 
 considered the question, point out that many 
 modern vessels like the Oceanic (and they, be 
 it remarked, of the largest tonnage) cost £100 
 per net ton to build, and that a new tramp steam- 
 boat, of the cheapest type in the market and of 
 2763 net tonnage, was recently sold to an 
 American firm for £45,500, or £16, 10s. per net 
 ton. They conclude, therefore, that £12, 17s. is 
 far too low, and that £20 per net ton all round 
 would not be an extreme price. 
 
 Consequently we may take a rough mean 
 between the two of about £17 per net register 
 ton all round, which will probably be a rough 
 approximation to the present value of the ships. 
 
 Total value of above vessels 12,354,135 
 
 tons, at £17 per net register ton . £209,920,295 
 
 But, since each makes an average of five 
 
 round voyages in the year, or ten 
 
 voyages out or in, each must be 
 
 covered ten times in the year, and the 
 
 whole value to be covered is . . £2,099,202,950 
 
 Add the value of the goods as shown 
 
 above ..... 714,893,693 
 
 Total value of ships and goods liable 
 
 to war risks in one year, say . £2,814,096,643 
 
 Here, then, we have a total value of goods 
 and ships of £2,814,000,000. 
 
 What now is the true measure of the war 
 risk to this vast property without reckoning 
 underwriter's profits — the naked war risk ? 
 
 Captain Inglefield, of the Naval Intelligence 
 Department, puts it at 2J per cent. ; Mr Douglas
 
 90 AVAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 OwGD, secretary of the Alliance Insurance 
 Company, at from 5 to 20 per cent., but would 
 "call it 10 per cent." Mr Leverton Harris, ship- 
 owner and underwriter, "will assume 5 per cent, 
 per voyage on a tramp steamer crossing the 
 Atlantic," though both the latter may be read as 
 not excluding but including underwriter's profits. 
 
 Here again, all depends on the particular war. 
 In some wars the naked war risk would be 
 inappreciable. In other wars it would be still 
 inappreciable for certain voyages, while for different 
 voyages it might rise to the 10 per cent, suggested, 
 or higher. 
 
 If I may presume myself to estimate the naked 
 war risk — the actual risk of loss by capture — I 
 should say : — 
 
 That in the case of war with Germany, for the 
 reasons already given, and taking the present 
 relative naval strength, sea-board, ports, and all 
 into consideration, the true measure of the war 
 risk would be even less than the lowest estimate of 
 2J per cent, suggested by the experts ; and that it 
 would not, when finally ascertained, exceed an 
 all-round rate, on all the goods and ships, of more 
 than 1 per cent, per voyage, even if it reached that. 
 
 In the case of war with France, it might reach 
 2 per cent, per voyage ; and in the case of war with 
 the United States, as much as 3 per cent. In the 
 case of war with any other power than these three, 
 it would probably not attain 1 per cent. 
 
 As we have seen, the project of indemnity was
 
 PROBABLE FINAL EFFECT 91 
 
 ill the event happily abandoned, and the shipping 
 trade was left in the position of every other trade 
 in war — to fend for itself. That it can do this 
 without vast loss and often even with great profit, 
 has been the experience of previous wars. 
 
 It is not easy in time of peace to realise or to 
 forecast the final effect of the cross-currents, 
 conflicting influences, and complex results that will 
 arise in war. Some of them seem likely to be as 
 follows : — 
 
 Taking (as for simplicity is done throughout) 
 the figures for 1902 as quoted by the "Royal 
 Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw 
 Material in Time of War," it appears that in that 
 year there were entered and cleared with cargo at 
 ports in the United Kingdom vessels, British and 
 foreign, trading to certain (the principal) foreign 
 countries, of a total tonnage in round numbers of 
 45,000,000 tons, whereof 32,000,000 were British. 
 This total, it will of course be remembered, counts 
 the same tonnage not only coming but also going, 
 and counts it both coming and going perhaps 
 many times in the year. But it all represents cargo 
 carried to or from British ports, whether in or out, 
 and whether by diff'erent vessels or the same. It 
 is thus the measure, not indeed of the number of 
 ships nor of their tonnage, but of the whole sea- 
 borne carriage involved. Of this whole, then, 
 British vesels trading to Germany represented 
 nearly 4,000,000 tons, and German vessels entering 
 and clearing in Great Britain 3,000,000 tons.
 
 92 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 Now, in war time, British ships could no longer 
 trade witli Germany, nor German ships with Great 
 Britain ; wherefore the first effect of the war would 
 be to diminish the total 45,000,000 tons of British 
 entries and clearances by the sum of these two — 
 viz., 7,000,000, and to reduce it to 38,000,000. 
 What will become of the 3,000,000 of German 
 tonnage stopped, we need not at present inquire ; 
 but with regard to the 4,000,000 of British tonnage 
 set free from the trade with Germany, it will be 
 remarked that it amounts to 12 per cent, of the 
 whole British tonnage entered and cleared with 
 cargo in the country. Here, then, is an addition 
 of 12 per cent, to British tonnage. 
 
 Taking that alone, would its effect be to raise 
 British freights, which is confidently predicted as 
 one of the certain results of a war, or would it 
 not rather be pro tanto to lower them ? 
 
 It is further to be remembered that our food 
 imports of all sorts (excluding wines, spirits, and 
 tobacco) reached in 1902 only a value of 
 £190,000,000, and our raw material imports of all 
 sorts only £147,000,000 ; or, taking both food and 
 raw material together, £337,000,000 out of a total 
 import of £528,000,000. If, then, the tonnage 
 broadly corresponds with the value, we should 
 require no more than three-fifths of the tonnage 
 entered and cleared to carry the whole undiminished 
 supply of food and raw material. In other words, 
 if we dispensed with luxuries, we could continue 
 our full sea-borne supply of food and raw material
 
 CONSEQUENCES TO GERMAN SHIPPING 93 
 
 with 27,000,000 out of the total of 45,000,000 tons 
 entered and cleared — a difference of 18,000,000 
 fewer tons required to continue uninterrupted the 
 carriage of oui- absolutely indispensable supplies of 
 first necessity. For this diminished carriage we 
 should have more ships available. We should 
 have 4,000,000 more of British tonnage to do 
 18,000,000 tons less work. We should in all 
 have a redundancy of 22,000,000 tons. Would 
 this probably raise freights ? Would it not rather 
 probably lower them ? 
 
 But that is not all the story. There is the 
 German shipping. In 1902 {Statistical Abstract 
 for Foreign Countries, p. 39) there were entered 
 and cleared in Germany, with cargoes, German 
 ships of a total of 13,000,000 tons. What will 
 become of them? Is it not highly probable that, 
 with the British navy predominant, most of these 
 ships would be unable to continue running ? If 
 so, at least a portion, probably a large portion of 
 their trade, such as that to North and South 
 America, would fall to the British shipowner. 
 This would seem likely pro tanto to raise British 
 freights, and, if the new portion were large, to 
 raise them considerably. And here would come 
 work for our redundant 22,000,000 of tonnage. 
 There will clearly be cross-currents and conflicting 
 influences in freights. 
 
 Germany, however, although deprived of the 
 use of her own ships, need not intermit her trade, 
 as she would have been forced largely or wholly
 
 \ 
 
 94 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 to do under the old rule which made German 
 property liable to capture even under a neutral 
 flag. Under the rule of the Declaration of Paris 
 it will matter nothing whether her navy is or is 
 not able to protect her 13,000,000 tons against 
 British captm-e. She can carry every ton of it 
 under the neutral flag, and run it under that flag 
 into or out of any German port not eff'ectually 
 blockaded, or into any adjacent neutral port. 
 Holland, Belgium, Norway, perhaps even Den- 
 mark, possibly even the United States, could 
 furnish tonnage for these uses; and if these did 
 not suffice, a considerable portion of Germany's 
 own tonnage — already laid up out of work and 
 profitless — could be, and probably would be, trans- 
 ferred to one of the flags named. Were this to be 
 the case, any temporary rise in British freights 
 resulting from the withdrawal of German tonnage 
 would be brought down again by the reappearance 
 of that same tonnage under the neutral flag. 
 
 Finally, there is the great demand for tonnage 
 for the service of the navy that war would create. 
 Whatever resulted from the various conflicting 
 influences hitherto mentioned, this influence would 
 certainly tend to raise freights, though to what 
 extent would partly depend upon those conflicting 
 influences themselves, and upon many others not 
 to be foreseen, much less estimated. 
 
 Prices in War Time. 
 As to war prices, it is informing to recur to the
 
 rUICES IN WAR TIME 95 
 
 effect on prices of the war with France which began 
 in February 1793, and lasted in its first phase eight 
 and a half years, till October 1801, and in its second 
 phase eleven years, from May 1803 until 1814. 
 
 Taking the first phase of eight and a half years, 
 we find that " never before was the shipping of this 
 country employed at higher freights " (Tooke's 
 History of Prices, Vol. I., p. 104). There was 
 an " increased rate of freight and insurance which 
 applied to the whole period of the war, but which, 
 in the last six years of it, amomited to an enormous 
 charge on all importations from the continent of 
 Em'ope " (Vol. I., p. 115). But we nevertheless 
 find that in the first two years of the war, " there 
 was a very general fall of prices from the close of 
 1792 to the commencement of 1794. On looking 
 over the table of prices, it will be seen that there 
 were very few commodities which were not lower 
 at the close of 1792, and at different periods in 1793 
 and 1794, than they had been at the commence- 
 ment of 1792 . . . the lowest point of depression 
 of the prices of such articles as had risen most 
 between 1790 and 1792 seems to have been reached 
 in 1794" (pp. 178-179). 
 
 Thus in the first two years of the war, although 
 freights and insurance rose, prices generally did not 
 rise, but fell. Prices were lower and freights were 
 higher — an ideal combination. With the beginning, 
 however, of the third year of war (1795), prices 
 began to rise rapidly, especially the price of corn, 
 which reached 108s. in August of that year, causing
 
 96 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 great distress to all, but especially to the poorer 
 classes. During a whole year the high price con- 
 tinued. But it did not last. At the end of 1796 
 the average price of wheat fell to 57s. 3d. - In 1797 
 it fell still further to 49s. and 50s., and in 1798 to as 
 low as 48s. Moreover, if the price of corn did not 
 rise at the outbreak of war, neither did the prices of 
 other commodities, as to which "there had been a 
 general fall of prices at the commencement of the 
 war; and they continued at a comparatively low 
 range through the greater part of 1794," i.e., during 
 the first two years of the war. 
 
 In 1795 and 1796, indeed, imported commodities 
 such as hemp, tallow, timber, sugar, and cotton 
 rose and continued to rise until the close of 1798, 
 by which time their price had generally doubled, 
 and was " much higher than during any subsequent 
 period of the war" (pp. 190 and 192). 
 
 Then, after five and a half years of war, at the 
 close of 1798 the price of food again advanced, 
 until in March 1801 wheat was 156s. a quarter 
 (p. 224). Imported commodities such as wool and 
 timber also rose ; but, on the other hand, such 
 colonial produce as sugar, indigo, and tobacco 
 fell to less than half price between 1798 and 
 1801. 
 
 Now, however, ensued another change in the 
 price of wheat. In January 1801 Great Britain had 
 already been at war eight years ; she continued to 
 be so for another nine months, when it might be 
 presumed that the stress of war upon prices, if any
 
 PRICES IN WAR TIME 97 
 
 stress there was, would be greater than ever. But 
 wheat did not rise. On the contrary, it fell from 
 156s. in March 1801, to 129s. in June 1801, and 
 again to 75s. a quarter at the end of 1801 (p. 237). 
 It should be remembered that so early as this year, 
 1801, we already depended on foreign wheat to the 
 extent of 1,500,000 quarters, or about one-fifth of 
 our whole consumption (p. 237). 
 
 A further notable fact, pregnant with instruction 
 and with suggestion, is that during the old French 
 war, under the old rule, while prices went down in 
 England they went up in France, especially for 
 colonial produce. At the close of the war in 
 1813 (as we learn from Larpent's Journal) the 
 French consumer had to pay six shiUings a pound 
 for his sugar while the British consumer got it for 
 sixpence. 
 
 If I have dealt, as I fear is the case, some- 
 what tediously with these figures, it is partly 
 because Mr Tooke's valuable work has been 
 carelessly quoted to show that the outbreak of war 
 does necessarily increase prices ; whereas, the 
 extracts given show that Mr Tooke affirmed and 
 proved the contrary. In this instance, at least, 
 neither the outbreak nor even the eight years 
 continuance of war had the effect upon prices 
 which is at present assumed to be inevitable. 
 
 There is the fm'ther fact that in 1817, two years 
 after the battle of Waterloo, when, not alone the 
 second, but the third and final phase of the war 
 had been ended, "the highest price was on the
 
 98 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 14th June, when wheat in Mark Lane sold as high 
 as 135s." (Tooke, Vol. II., p. 20). 
 
 It is impossible to continue in a belief that war 
 necessarily raises the price of food when we find 
 it above sho's^Ti that, during war, wheat was at 
 certain moments as low as 48s., and that two 
 years after the conclusion of peace it was as high 
 as 135s. 
 
 It is, however, essential to remember that this 
 condition of things was when war was waged 
 under the law of nations as accepted and enforced 
 before the Declaration of Paris, which profoundly 
 altered all. 
 
 The Declaration of Paris of 20th March 1856 
 declared as between those who adhered to it two 
 novel and noticeable things. Art. I., " Privateering 
 is and remains abolished." Art. II., "The neutral 
 flag covers the enemy's merchandise with the 
 exception of contraband of war." It has long been 
 apprehended that the latter article would be 
 disastrous to British shipping by driving it, at the 
 outbreak of war, out of employment or into foreign 
 neutral ownership. 
 
 This would be indeed only an incidental dis- 
 advantage imposed on Great Britain by the 
 Declaration of Paris. The principal and far 
 greater mischief of that declaration is that it debars 
 us, a maritime power, from effective action against 
 an enemy's sea-borne supplies, and thereby de- 
 prives us in the future of that ability to distress 
 our foes by crippling their material resources which
 
 THE NEUTRAL FLAG 99 
 
 the past has shown to be om^ most potent arm of 
 offence. 
 
 The doctrine, "the neutral flag covers the 
 cargo " (or " free ship free goods," without the usual 
 accompanying clause, "enemy ship enemy goods"), 
 originally propounded in 1752, was repudiated by 
 Great Britain, was resisted through the Armed 
 Neutralities of 1780 and 1800, and was only finally 
 submitted to in 1856. Many of our greatest 
 statesmen, sailors, and soldiers hold that its 
 acceptance was fatal to the offensive, and therefore 
 to the defensive, power of the British navy ; and 
 that by thus abandoning the power to make war 
 on the enemy's trade, and so to put material stress 
 upon him, we divested ourselves of the best weapon 
 of a maritime nation and rendered our fleet almost 
 valueless for any other purpose than for preventing 
 an invasion. 
 
 Mr William Pitt, Mr Fox, and Lord Nelson in 
 1801, Lord Derby in 1856, Mr Disraeli in 1862, 
 Mr J. Stuart Mill in 1867, Lord Salisbury in 1871, 
 and Lord Roberts in April 1894, have all expressed 
 and enforced this conviction ; and even so late as 
 December 1897 Lord Salisbury wrote: "The 
 Declaration of Paris was a rash and unwise pro- 
 ceeding." If the conviction of these great men be 
 well founded, the peril to the nation in general 
 arising from the second article of the Declaration 
 is so tremendous as to make whatever mischief 
 may ensue to the shipowner or the merchant in 
 particular comparatively trivial and unimportant.
 
 100 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 It is to be remarked that the first article of the 
 Declaration of Paris—" Privateering is and remains 
 abolished "—has practically been destroyed, or at 
 least evaded, by an invention first adopted by 
 Germany and by Russia, and since by Great 
 Britain, in the scheme for subsidising and arming 
 merchant vessels under the name of auxiliaries or 
 voUmteers. This is most particularly noteworthy, 
 because it was the first or privateer abolition 
 article of the Declaration which was put forward to, 
 and expressly accepted by, Lord Clarendon on 
 behalf of Great Britain, as the compensation for her 
 abandonment of her ancient rights by acceptance 
 of the second article withdrawing from capture 
 enemy's goods under the neutral flag. The con- 
 cession made by Great Britain in the second article 
 remains ; the pretended compensation made by the 
 first article has disappeared. "Free ship free 
 goods" is established. Privateering is not and 
 does not remain abolished. 
 
 That the Declaration of Paris was not duly 
 authorised ; that it is no part of the Treaty of Paris ; 
 and that, even if it were, it might be denounced and 
 revoked, as has been the case with every modern 
 European treaty from that of Utrecht of 1713 to 
 the Treaty of Paris itself (denounced and revoked 
 in its Black Sea clauses) and the Treaty of Berlin 
 of 1878 (denounced and revoked in its Batoum 
 clause) — all this has been established. Neverthe- 
 less, the Declaration is undoubtedly binding on 
 Great Britain unless and until it is denounced. If
 
 THE PROPOSED "NATIONAL INDEMNITY" 101 
 
 allowed to subsist through peace, it could not be 
 repudiated at the outbreak of war. The honour of 
 the country would forbid that ; consideration for 
 neutrals, among whom Great Britain would prob- 
 ably then be looking for allies, would preclude it. 
 
 Those who would enter more closely into the 
 details of the proposed " national indemnity " may 
 refer to the report of the Treasury Committee and 
 the evidence given before it, to be found in 
 Parliamentary Papers Cd. 4161 and Cd. 4162 of 
 1908. In the appendix to the evidence will be 
 found a paper prepared for the committee by 
 myself, from which the figures above arrayed are 
 taken. 
 
 Having so far endeavoured summarily to set 
 forth the general principles and considerations 
 affecting sea power, to show how this is affected 
 by sea law, to describe what that law long was, 
 what it is by most nations — always excepting the 
 United States and Spain — accepted to be since the 
 Declaration of Paris of 1856, and to give some 
 account of its history up to the present day, it now 
 remains to describe the most recent attempts at 
 further alterations in the law of the sea, begun in 
 1907, continued until 1909, and now proposed to be 
 embodied in the Hague Convention, the Declaration 
 of London of 1909, and the Naval Prize Bill of 
 1910. 
 
 What precedes is necessary to a full understand-
 
 102 WAR RISKS AT SEA 
 
 ing of that which follows. What precedes is a 
 chapter on the law of nations and the interests of 
 Great Britain in war. What follows is a chapter 
 of present politics — not at all of partisan, but of 
 national politics.
 
 IV 
 
 THE HAGUE CONFEEENCE OF 1907 
 AND ITS CONVENTIONS 
 
 The Prize Court Convention of 1907 has a strange 
 and, for those who look ever so little below the 
 surface, an enlightening history. 
 
 It began with the Peace Conference of 1907. 
 And that began with the Emperor of Russia. 
 This amiable autocrat desired "to give a new 
 development to the humanitarian principles which 
 served for basis to the work of the great Inter- 
 national Meeting of 1899." He therefore on 3rd 
 April 1906 issued a circular inviting to a second 
 conference the representatives of forty-seven states, 
 whereof it subsequently transpired that Panama 
 had declined the invitation, that Honduras sent no 
 delegate, and that Ethiopia for some unknown 
 reason had dropped out of the proceedings. 
 
 The British Government received these proposals 
 with compliance. Sir Edward Grey did indeed, on 
 25th July 1906, declare that they "desire to see 
 the question of the reduction of armaments included 
 in the deliberations of the conference " ; but they 
 frankly avowed that they knew well that the 
 Russian Government desire to guard themselves 
 
 103
 
 104 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 against the "inference that they are specifically 
 committed to such a discussion." This was 
 practically to accept beforehand the exclusion 
 from the conference debates of the very question 
 which some excellent persons in Great Britain 
 believed to be its main and most important 
 business; and in fact all the conference did with 
 regard to that was to declare it ''eminently 
 desirable that the Governments should resume 
 serious examination of this question," where- 
 with the grave closed over the desire of H.M. 
 Government. 
 
 The British instructions to Sir Edward Fry, 
 dated 12th June 1907, went far beyond the 
 reduction of armaments. They were in efifect 
 instructions to abandon at the conference all the 
 law, all the practice, and all the traditions of 
 preceding British Governments in respect to war 
 at sea. Thus, the British delegates were to 
 abandon the British Prize Courts and the Judicial 
 Committee of Privy Council, whose decisions have 
 gone so far to define the law of nations : — 
 
 "H.M. Government are anxious to secure the 
 adaptation of the machinery of the existing tribunal 
 which was created by the Convention [of 1899] 
 to the purposes of an International Tribunal of 
 Appeal from the decision of belligerent prize 
 courts aftecting neutrals." 
 
 H.M. Government went fmther. They "recog- 
 nise to the full the desirability of freeing neutral 
 commerce to the utmost extent possible from
 
 CONTRABAND OF WAR 105 
 
 interference by belligerent powers, and they are 
 ready and willing for their part, in lieu of 
 endeavouring to frame new and more satisfactory 
 rules for the prevention of contraband trade in the 
 future, to abandon the principle of contraband of 
 war altogether, thus allowing the over-sea trade in 
 neutral vessels between belligerents on the one 
 hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during 
 war without any restriction, subject only to its 
 exclusion by blockade from an enemy's port." 
 Furthermore, they " would be glad to see the right 
 of search limited in every practicable way, e.g. by 
 the adoption of a system of consular certificates 
 declaring the absence of contraband from the 
 cargo, and by the exemption of passenger and 
 mail steamers upon defined routes, etc." 
 
 Besides this : — 
 
 "If an arrangement can be made for the 
 abolition of contraband, H.M. Government would 
 be willing for their part, that it should also extend 
 to what are technically known as the 'analogues 
 of contraband,' viz., the carriage of belligerent 
 despatches and of persons in the naval and military 
 services of a belligerent in cases where the render- 
 ing of such services by the neutral was not of such 
 a kind or so great in extent as to identify the 
 neutral vessel with the belligerent forces, and bring 
 her within the definition of warship, which H.M. 
 Government are anxious to secure. 
 
 "The object which H.M. Government have in 
 view, as you are aware, is to limit, so far as may
 
 106 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 be, the restrictions that war entails upon legitimate 
 neutral trade. 
 
 "The question of the carriage of enemy 
 despatches cannot be entirely separated from that 
 of mails in general, and they would welcome and 
 wish you to do all you can to secure an arrange- 
 ment under which mail packets or bags in transit 
 on board a neutral ship, in accordance with the 
 provisions of the Postal Conventions, should be 
 inviolable, even though such mails should contain 
 despatches for a belligerent, and the neutral vessel 
 carrying such mails should not be subjected to any 
 interference for so doing except in the case of her 
 endeavouring to violate a blockade." 
 
 On the question of exempting private property 
 from capture at sea, indeed, H.M. Government 
 declared that they could not authorise their 
 delegates to agree to it, unless "the nations 
 generally were willing to diminish their armaments, 
 naval and military " ; but with that exception — 
 an important one no doubt — Sir Edward Fry and 
 his fellow -delegates were instructed to surrender 
 belligerent rights all along the line. 
 
 These instructions were manifestly prompted 
 by the beHef that Great Britain will be more often 
 neutral than belligerent, and that her interests in 
 naval war will consequently be rather those of a 
 neutral than those of a belligerent ; whereas the 
 contrary is the truth. For whatever gain Great 
 Britain might make during a long period of 
 neutrahty, would be as nothing compared with
 
 LIST OF STATES 
 
 107 
 
 the loss she would risk by giving up her fighting 
 powers during even a short period of belligerency. 
 
 Yet with such instructions as these, Great 
 Britain sent her delegates to take part in the 
 Second Peace Conference which opened at the 
 Hague on 15th June 1907, when there assembled 
 the representatives of 45 states represented by 156 
 delegates. 
 
 The list of the states who took part in these 
 proceedings and sent plenipotentiaries and other 
 delegates to the conference, as recorded in the 
 proces verbal of the opening sitting, is not without 
 significance. It is as follows : — 
 
 
 No. of 
 
 
 No. of 
 
 
 Delegates. 
 
 
 Delegates 
 
 1. Germany 
 
 . 7 
 
 25. Luxembourg 
 
 .1 
 
 2. United States 
 
 of 
 
 26, United States of 
 
 America 
 
 . 8 
 
 Mexico 
 
 . 3 
 
 3. Argentine Republic . 3 
 
 27. Montenegro. 
 
 . 3 
 
 4. Austria Hungary . 
 
 . 7 
 
 28. Nicaragua . 
 
 . 1 
 
 5, Belgium. 
 
 . 2 
 
 29. Norway 
 
 . 3 
 
 6. Bolivia . 
 
 . 2 
 
 30. Panama 
 
 . 1 
 
 7. United States of I 
 
 Jrazil 1 
 
 31. Paraguay . 
 
 . 1 
 
 8. Bulgaria. 
 
 . 3 
 
 32. Holland 
 
 . 8 
 
 9. Chili . 
 
 . 3 
 
 33. Peru . 
 
 . . 2 
 
 10. China . 
 
 . 6 
 
 34. Persia . 
 
 . 2 
 
 11. Colombia 
 
 . 3 
 
 35. Portugal 
 
 . 4 
 
 12. Cuba . 
 
 . 3 
 
 36, Roumania 
 
 . 3 
 
 13. Denmark 
 
 . 3 
 
 37. Russia . 
 
 . 8 
 
 14. Dominican Republ 
 
 ic . 2 
 
 38. Salvador 
 
 . . 2 
 
 15. Ecuador. 
 
 . 2 
 
 39, Servia . 
 
 . 3 
 
 16. Spain . 
 
 . 5 
 
 40. Siam . 
 
 . 3 
 
 17. France . 
 
 . 8 
 
 41. Sweden 
 
 . 4 
 
 18. Great Britain 
 
 . 6 
 
 42. Switzerland 
 
 . 3 
 
 19. Greece . 
 
 . 3 
 
 43. Turkey. 
 
 . 5 
 
 20. Guatemala . 
 
 . 1 
 
 44. Uruguay 
 
 . 5 
 
 21. Honduras 
 
 . 
 
 45. Venezuela 
 
 . 1 
 
 22. Hayti . 
 
 . 2 
 
 
 
 23. Italy 
 
 . 5 
 
 
 156 
 
 24. Japan . 
 
 . 5 
 

 
 108 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 So mixed an assembly of states so unequal 
 in size and importance, yet all equal in voting 
 power, has rarely been seen. Presumably there 
 was some esoteric principle of selection known 
 to the chancellories which dictated the selection 
 of these 45 ; but it is not apparent to ordinary 
 mortals why Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Domingo, 
 Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Luxembom'g, Nicar- 
 agua, and Panama, Salvador, Servia, and Switzer- 
 land should have been included, while Tibet, 
 Muscat, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Liberia, and 
 Monaco were omitted, besides the kingdoms of 
 Wurtembourg, Saxony, and Bavaria, and the 
 Duchies of Brunswick, Hesse, and Mecklembourg. 
 The reply presumably would be that it was all settled 
 by the Emperor of Russia, who issued the invitations. 
 
 Nevertheless there is a certain element of 
 humour in a list of states convened to settle the 
 affairs of the sea which includes countries having, 
 like Luxembourg and Switzerland, no sea-board 
 of their own, and therefore no naval affairs or 
 naval knowledge of their own. 
 
 The 156 very natm^ally proceeded to elect as 
 their president M. Nelidow, the Russian delegate, 
 representing the inviting autocrat of all the 
 RussiaSj who, as M. Nelidow at once reminded 
 the delegates, was the original august inventor 
 and initiator of those peace conferences by which 
 it was intended to advance humanity. He added 
 that, since the first Peace Conference of 1899 had 
 established the principle of arbitration, and by
 
 THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT 109 
 
 its " humanitarian measures " had " spread through- 
 out the civilised world a sentiment of international 
 amenity and created a pacific current," so those 
 measures should be completed by the labours of 
 that second conference of 1907. Strangely enough 
 he did not adduce the war between Russia and 
 Japan of 1904-1905, though the conference 
 could hardly so soon have forgotten that recent 
 example of international amenity and pacific 
 currents. 
 
 Yet he did pay some tribute to facts ; for he 
 reminded the delegates that "there is a whole 
 series of cases in which honour, dignity, and 
 essential interests are concerned, whether for 
 individuals or for nations, and in which neither 
 the one nor the other will ever, whatever may be 
 the consequences, recognise any other authority 
 than that of their own judgment and their personal 
 feeling." 
 
 Having thus avowed the incapacity of con- 
 ferences to deal with any nation that will not be 
 dealt with, he took one of those flights into the 
 hazy empyrean with which every student of 
 peace conferences is familiar : — " But let not that 
 discourage us from dreaming of the ideal of 
 universal peace and a fraternity of peoples which 
 are, after all, but the natural and superior aspira- 
 tions of the human soul. Is not the essential 
 condition of all progress the pursuit of an ideal 
 to which we always tend without ever being able 
 to reach it ? A tangible end once attained arrests
 
 110 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 the impulse, whereas the progress of every enter- 
 prise requires the continuous stimulant of an 
 aspiration towards something more elevated. 
 Excelsior is the motto of progress. Let us then 
 bravely set to work, having, to light our path, 
 the luminous star of peace and universal justice, 
 which we shall never reach, but which will always 
 guide us for the good of humanity."^ 
 
 This engaging description of the business the 
 conference was to do being thus gravely given 
 and as gravely listened to, and it being in truth 
 thoroughly understood that the only real business 
 was to set up a new law of nations and a new 
 International Prize Court for clipping maritime 
 rights and their exercise during war, M. Nelidow 
 proposed that the secretariat of the conference 
 should be composed (as composed it forthwith was) 
 of six Dutchmen, five Russians, three Frenchmen, 
 two Belgians, one Roumanian, one Spaniard, one 
 American, and one Briton — a choice which indi- 
 cated the relative importance attached on the one 
 hand to such naval powers as Holland and Russia, 
 represented on the secretariat by eleven out of the 
 twenty, and to such naval powers as the United 
 States of America and Great Britain, represented 
 by only two out of the twenty. 
 
 The note of subordination of the maritime 
 powers was thus struck at once. It was thus 
 
 ' All the extracts are translated from the French of the jtroch 
 verbaux of the Hague Conference, none of which have been laid 
 before Parliament in English.
 
 THE PROGRAMME PROPOSED 111 
 
 made evident at once that whatever might depend 
 for its expression on secretariat power would be 
 expressed rather in accordance with Dutch and 
 Eussian than American and British views. 
 
 The second sitting of the conference disclosed 
 the fact that the basis of the work intended was 
 the programme proposed by the Russian Govern- 
 ment under four heads; 1. Arbitration; 2. 
 Amelioration in the laws and customs of land war ; 
 3. Naval war, bombardment of ports, floating 
 mines, belligerents in neutral ports, etc. ; 4. 
 Transformation of merchant ships into men- 
 of-war, private property on the high seas, con- 
 traband of war, blockade, destruction of neutral 
 prizes, etc. 
 
 Then there occurred this : — Baron Marschall 
 von Bieberstein proposed on behalf of the German 
 Government the establishment "of an international 
 jurisdiction to discuss the legality of captures in 
 maritime war. This would be a High Court of 
 Justice sitting as a Court of Appeal, while the 
 national tribunals would deliberate in first 
 instance." Here was the intended purpose dis- 
 closed. And Sir Edward Fry — duly instructed 
 by the Foreign Office — "declares that it is with 
 great satisfaction that he has heard the proposal 
 of his German colleague. The British delegation 
 has received instructions in a similar sense, and 
 it is with pleasure that it will collaborate with 
 the other delegations to enlarge the principle of 
 arbitration."
 
 112 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 The proposal, let it be here observed, was made 
 by Germany. That is intelligible enough. What 
 is unintelligible is that it was accepted by Great 
 Britain, accepted with pleasure and with promise 
 of collaboration. For what was here accepted 
 was, in principle, the whole thing ; the withdrawal 
 from British Prize Courts and the British Judicial 
 Committee of the Privy Council of their power of 
 final decision ; their reduction to comets having 
 only power to " deliberate in first instance " ; and 
 their supersession by a new "High Court of 
 Justice sitting as a Court of Appeal." That being 
 accepted, all was accepted. That being sur- 
 rendered, all was surrendered. The position was 
 gone, and it only remained to settle where and how 
 those who had surrendered it should march out 
 and pile their arms — which naturally and duly 
 followed. 
 
 It Avill have been noticed that, of the four heads 
 of the Russian programme which the Conference 
 undertook to work out, only the two last were 
 concerned with maritime war. It is interesting 
 therefore to note how the members of the bureaux 
 of each of the four commissions were dealt out. 
 Of the first commission dealing with arbitration, 
 France received the post of president; Germany, 
 Italy, and Mexico the three posts of vice-president ; 
 and Austria, Brazil, and Great Britain the three 
 posts of honorary president. In the second com- 
 mission, dealing with war on land, M. Beernaert 
 (whose name is not to be found in the proems
 
 AN INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT 113 
 
 verbal recording, at the opening sitting, the dele- 
 gates) was made president; Denmark, Roumania, 
 and Switzerland each received a vice-president; 
 while Germany, the United States, and Portugal 
 each furnished an honorary president. In the third 
 and fourth commissions, dealing with naval war- 
 fare, Italy and Russia furnished the presidents ; 
 Sweden, the Argentine Republic, France, Great 
 Britain, Austria, and Norway, one each of the vice- 
 presidents ; and the United States, China, Turkey, 
 Spain, and Japan, one each of the honorary 
 presidents. These facts suffice to show the amount 
 of weight given to Great Britain in the bureaux of 
 the two commissions dealing with matters 
 important indeed to all, but to her vital. On the 
 bureau of one of the two commissions she was not 
 represented at all ; in the bureau of the other she 
 had one vice-president. 
 
 The end of it all was that the first commission, 
 after much and very natural doubt whether it was 
 not going outside the programme, elaborated the 
 detailed scheme for an " International Prize Court " 
 which figures in the Naval Prize Bill Schedule, and 
 which, having been, to use again the language of 
 the preamble, "drawn up," was enshrined with 
 much else in that "final act" of the conference, 
 dated 18th October 1907, which was alone {qui 
 seul aura llionneur) to receive the signatures of all 
 the delegates. Here it may be proper to remark 
 that the report of the first commission in presenting 
 the scheme contains some frank and enlightening 
 
 H
 
 114 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 avowals regarding its own work. Thus we are 
 told that : — 
 
 " The intervention of a jimsdiction, even that 
 of the captor, constitutes, when an enemy's ship 
 is concerned, a superiority of maritime war over 
 continental [land] war, in which the acts of the 
 military authority leave no place for judicial debate 
 and produce then- effect by themselves." 
 
 It would be hard to express more mildly the 
 plain and pregnant fact that the acts of military 
 authority directed against an enemy's property on 
 land are subject to no other law than the will and 
 the discretion of the military commander and 
 cannot be called in question in any cornet, while 
 the same acts directed against similar property at 
 sea are subject to law and can be called in question 
 before a Prize Court. Nor would it be easy more 
 frankly to avow that the law of nations is and 
 always has been less indulgent to and less tolerant 
 of inhumanity at sea than on land, and amply able 
 to punish on the sea misdeeds or misconduct 
 which on land cannot so much as be called in 
 question. 
 
 The report, moreover, frankly avows that 
 the new International Prize Comt proposed to 
 be set up — 
 
 " is called upon to make the law [these italics 
 are those of the report itself] and to take into 
 account other principles than those to which are 
 submitted the National Prize Com-t Jm-isdiction,
 
 A GO-AS-YOU-PLEASE TRIBUNAL 115 
 
 whose decision is attacked before the International 
 Court." 
 
 A frank declaration indeed ! The new court 
 is to make the law; and that law is to be a law 
 based to some undefined extent upon other 
 principles than those by which Prize Courts have 
 hitherto held themselves bound ! The new court, 
 in fact, is to go as it pleases. To put this beyond 
 all doubt, the reporter (M. Louis Renault) adds : — 
 
 "How is nationality, property, or domicile to 
 be proved ? Is it only by the ship's papers or 
 equally by other document produced 1 We intend 
 to leave to the court fall powers of appreciation.'' 
 
 And again : — 
 
 "Every liberty is left to the court as to the 
 appreciation of the various elements furnished to it 
 to determine its conclusion. TTiere is not here a 
 legal system of proofs'' 
 
 Here, then, we have fully avowed the manner 
 and methods whereby the new court is expected 
 and intended to act. " No legal system of proofs." 
 " Full powers of appreciation " of ship's papers, 
 other papers, any papers or no papers at all. 
 " Other principles " than any hitherto known. 
 Any proof, any principles, and the law made as you 
 go along, in accordance with the principles of 
 justice and equity entertained in San Domingo 
 or wherever the judge with a casting vote may 
 come from ! "Was ever such a tribunal, acting in
 
 116 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 such a way, seriously propounded by sane men to 
 sane men ? 
 
 Here again let it be recalled that it was 
 Germany that proposed the institution of this court 
 and Great Britain that accepted it. 
 
 How far Germany herself would observe in 
 war any law whatever that did not suit her, or pay 
 any respect to the decisions of any court whatever 
 not enforced by a power superior to her own, was 
 sufficiently illustrated and avowed by what took 
 place at the eighth sitting on the 9th October 1907, 
 when the conference received the report and the 
 convention (prepared by the sub-commission of the 
 third commission and reported by the Greek delegate, 
 M. George Streit) on submarine contact mines — 
 one of the various subjects with which the confer- 
 ence undertook to meddle besides the establishment 
 of an International Prize Court. This convention 
 would allow a belligerent to sow the whole seas 
 with these deadly secret perils absolutely at his 
 own will and wherever he pleased without restric- 
 tion, subject only to the derisory condition that 
 they shall not be placed " on the coasts or before 
 the ports of the adversary with the sole purpose 
 (dcms le seul but) of intercepting commercial 
 navigation." If the purpose be partly to intercept 
 commercial navigation and partly some other 
 purpose — any purpose whatever — then these 
 deadly traps may be laid at pleasm-e and without 
 restriction, and any vessel destroyed by them is 
 to be sufficiently consoled by being told that it is
 
 A SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST 117 
 
 not proved — which indeed never could be proved 
 — that the interception of her navigation, though 
 one indeed of the purposes with which the mine 
 was laid, was not the sole purpose. All which is 
 manifest mockery. 
 
 The sheep-like way in which the British dele- 
 gates dealt with this convention does little 
 honour to their country. After the ensemble du 
 projet had been unanimously adopted,. Sir Ernest 
 Satow said : — 
 
 " Having voted for the convention as to mines 
 which the conference has just accepted, the British 
 delegation deems it necessary to declare that it 
 cannot consider this arrangement as giving a 
 definitive solution to the question, but only as 
 marking a stage in international legislation on the 
 matter." 
 
 This belated bleating over a convention for 
 which he had voted places Sir Ernest Satow, 
 speaking for Great Britain, in contrast with Baron 
 Marschall von Bieberstein, speaking for Germany. 
 This is what the Baron said : — 
 
 " A belligerent who lays down mines assumes 
 a very heavy responsibility towards neutrals and 
 pacific navigation. On this point we are all 
 agreed. Nobody will have recourse to this 
 method without absolutely urgent military reasons. 
 But military acts are not ruled exclusively by the 
 stipulations of international law. There are other 
 factors : conscience, good sense, and the sentiment 
 of duties imposed by the principles of humanity
 
 118 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 will be the surest guides for the conduct of sea- 
 men, and will constitute the most efficacious 
 guarantee against abuse. The officers of the 
 German navy — I say it with a high voice — will 
 always fulfil in the strictest manner the duties 
 which flow from the unwritten law of humanity 
 and civilisation. 
 
 " I need not tell you that I entirely recognise 
 the importance of the codification of the rules to 
 be followed in war. But we must beware of 
 decreeing rules whereof the strict observance might 
 be rendered impossible by the force of things. It 
 is of primary importance that the international 
 law we seek to create shall onlv contain clauses 
 whereof the execution is militarily possible, even 
 in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise, respect 
 for the law would be diminished, and its authority 
 shaken. . . . As to the sentiments of humanity 
 and civilisation, I cannot admit that any Govern- 
 ment or country is in these superior to that which 
 I have the honom* to represent." 
 
 Nothing could be more frank than this avowal 
 that " military reasons " are, so far as Germany is 
 concerned, to override all other reasons whatever, 
 that only when these reasons allow will any law 
 whatever be observed, and that if any law is 
 adopted interfering with military reasons or 
 prescribing what is "militarily impossible," then 
 that law will get no respect from Germany, but 
 only a shaking of its authority. The pill was, as 
 usual, gilded with the stock phrase of " humanity 
 and civilisation," but there it was and is. What-
 
 THE CONVENTION ESTABLISHED 119 
 
 ever else is left doubtful, this is made clear : 
 that the International Prize Court may enforce its 
 decrees and apply its law, such as that may be, 
 to other cases and other countries as it will and 
 can ; but that, when Germany is in question, no 
 court and no law will avail against what a German 
 general or admiral, or even a German lieutenant 
 or midshipman, may deem to be adequate "military 
 reasons." 
 
 Nothing more can be needed to show the 
 danger of trusting to conventions setting up a law 
 of nations held in such an opinion by the very 
 power which proposed the creation of the court to 
 enforce it. 
 
 To return, however, to the convention estab- 
 lishing the International Prize Court. Out of 44 
 states, 6 (Dominica, Japan, Russia, Siam, Turkey, 
 and Venezuela) abstained from voting, 1 (Brazil) 
 voted against, and 37 (including Great Britain) 
 voted for the convention, while 10 (Chili, China, 
 Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, 
 Persia, Salvador, and Uruguay) made reservations 
 as to Article 15 concerning the nomination of 
 judges at 8 guineas a day each. 
 
 When this and other conventions had been 
 disposed of, the final act was signed ; and the 
 conference separated after the delegates had 
 covered themselves, their sovereigns, their con- 
 ventions, and the " progress of human solidarity " 
 with admiration and high-flown compliments. 
 
 The declared reason for the assembly of this
 
 120 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1007 
 
 conference was, as set forth in its final act, "for 
 the purpose of giving a fresh development to the 
 humanitarian principles which served as a basis for 
 the work of the first conference of 1899 " ; and its 
 final aspiration, as set forth in the opening speech 
 of M. Nelidow, was to "a fraternity of peoples," and 
 the pursuit of "the luminous star of peace and 
 universal justice for the good of humanity." 
 
 But in fact, as will be seen, the only things it 
 did concerning peace were few, vague, and illusory, 
 while those it did concerning war were many, 
 definite, and binding ; and it is impossible to rise 
 from a perusal of those lengthy proceedings without 
 the conviction that the only thing the conference 
 was concerned with was not peace but war ; that 
 the main, principal, and final purpose of the con- 
 ference was to diminish naval power at sea and to 
 increase and afiirm military power on land ; and 
 that its ultimate business was "to draw up" the 
 convention establishing an International Prize 
 Court. 
 
 The convention for setting up a permanent 
 Court of Arbitration was indeed concerned with 
 peace. But that convention never became more 
 than a project {projet), nor ever took a higher 
 place in the proceedings than that of an appendix 
 to the first wish {annexe an premier voeu) of the 
 conference ; and as it was left so it remains to this 
 day — in the air. So, too, with the convention (No. 
 1) for the pacific settlement of international disputes, 
 which was left a mere beautiful shadow embodying
 
 WORDS OF THE PSALMIST 121 
 
 an utterly hollow and wholly ineffectual agreement 
 to "have recourse, so far as cwcumstances allou\ to 
 the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly 
 powers ... in case of serious disagreement or 
 dispute before an appeal to arms," on the strict and 
 cynical condition, however, that " mediation cannot 
 in default of agreement to the contrary have the 
 effect of interrupting, delaying, or hindering 
 mobilisation or other methods of preparation for 
 war." All the other instruments of this marvellous 
 conference are concerned with war itself, and most 
 of them with war at sea ; and if at the end of the 
 conference Mr Van Tets Van Goudriaan, who 
 opened it on behalf of Holland as a conference of 
 peace, examined its proceedings, he must have said 
 to himself in the words of the Psalmist : ** I labour 
 for peace, but when I speak unto them thereof they 
 make them ready to battle." 
 
 Nothing short of a detailed examination and 
 collation of all the fifteen instruments elaborated at 
 the conference would suffice to display the spirit in 
 which the conference sought to arrive at peace and 
 universal justice by the diminution of sea power. 
 But to this would have to be added an equally 
 detailed examination of the discussions described 
 in the proces verhaux of the conference (not laid 
 before Parliament or otherwise accessible except in 
 the original French), in order to appreciate the 
 military flavour of the whole proceedings of this 
 conference. To enter into such an examination 
 would be beyond the immediate purpose of this
 
 122 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 work ; but, in order to assist the reader to 
 appreciate in some measure the work of the 
 conference, some of the more important are printed 
 in Appendix C, while No. 12 — the most important 
 of all — is printed in Appendix E as part of the Naval 
 Prize Bill. 
 
 The following is extracted from the final act of 
 the conference :■ — 
 
 **The second International Peace Conference, 
 proposed in the first instance by the President of 
 the United States of America, having been 
 convoked, on the invitation of His Majesty the 
 Emperor of all the Russias, by Her Majesty the 
 Queen of the Netherlands, assembled on the 15th 
 June 1907 at the Hague, in the Hall of the Knights, 
 for the purpose of giving a fresh development to 
 the humanitarian principles which served as a basis 
 for the work of the first conference of 1899. 
 
 "At a series of meetings, held from the 15th 
 June to the 18th October 1907, in which the above 
 delegates were throughout animated by the desire 
 to realise, in the fullest possible measure, the 
 generous views of the august initiator of the 
 conference and the intentions of their Governments, 
 the conference drew up, to be submitted to the 
 plenipotentiaries for signature, the text of the con- 
 ventions and of the declaration enumerated below 
 and annexed to the present Act : — 
 
 " 1. A Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
 
 International Disputes. 
 *' 2. A Convention respecting the Limitation of 
 
 the Employment of Force for the Recovery 
 
 of Contract Debts.
 
 LIST OF THE CONVENTIONS 123 
 
 "3. A Convention relative to the Opening of 
 
 Hostilities. 
 "4. A Convention respecting the Laws and 
 
 Customs of War on Land. 
 *'5. A Convention respecting the Rights and 
 
 Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in 
 
 case of War on Land. 
 "6. A Convention relative to the Status of 
 
 Enemy Merchant ships on the Outbreak of 
 
 Hostilities. 
 " 7. A Convention relative to the Conversion of 
 
 Merchant ships into Warships. 
 "8. A Convention relative to the Laying of 
 
 Automatic Submarine Contact Mines. 
 " 9. A Convention respecting Bombardment by 
 
 Naval Forces in Time of War. 
 " 10. A Convention for the Adaptation to 
 
 Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva 
 
 Convention. 
 "11. A Convention relative to certain Restric- 
 tions with regard to the Exercise of the 
 
 Right of Capture in Naval War. 
 " 12. A Convention relative to the Creation of 
 
 an International Prize Court. 
 " 13. A Convention concerning the Rights and 
 
 Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War. 
 "14. A Declaration prohibiting the Discharge 
 
 of Projectiles and Explosives from 
 
 Balloons." 
 
 Some cursory remarks on these conventions 
 may be permitted. 
 
 No. 1. The convention for the pacific settle- 
 ment of international disputes was signed on 
 behalf of Great Britain without reservation, but is 
 not yet ratified on her behalf.
 
 124 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 It is, as already pointed out, only an agreement 
 to have recourse to mediation so far as " circum- 
 stances allow," while continuing preparations for 
 war. Such a convention scarcely needs serious 
 consideration ; for it carries neither mediation nor 
 arbitration one step farther than either has hitherto 
 gone, and makes neither obligatory upon any state 
 whatever. This, so far as it goes, is a convention 
 of peace. 
 
 No. 2. The convention respecting the limitation 
 of the employment of force for the recovery of 
 contract debts was signed on behalf of Great 
 Britain without reservation, and was ratified on 
 her behalf on 27th November 1909. 
 
 It is an agreement "not to have recourse to 
 armed force for the recovery of contract debts 
 claimed from the Government of one country by the 
 Government of another country," subject, however, 
 to the condition that the agreement is "not 
 applicable when the debtor state refuses or 
 neglects to reply to an ofifer of arbitration," or fails 
 to comply with an arbitration award as contem- 
 plated by convention No. 1. This, too, may be said 
 to be a convention of peace. 
 
 No. 3. The convention relative to the opening 
 of hostihties was signed on behalf of Great Britain 
 without reservation, and was ratified on her behalf 
 on 27th November 1909. 
 
 It is an agreement that hostilities should not 
 (ne doivent pas) begin "without a previous and 
 explicit warning, in the form of a declaration of
 
 LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 125 
 
 war giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a con- 
 ditional declaration of war." This agreement is in 
 complete accordance with the principles of the law 
 of nations. But there is no principle which in 
 modern times has been so completely, so consis- 
 tently, and so recently disregarded ; nor is there any 
 prospect that it will in future be more respected 
 whenever it concerns the interest or, as may be 
 thought, the safety of a state to disregard it. This 
 is eminently a convention of war. 
 
 No. 4. The convention concerning the laws and 
 customs of war on land was signed on behalf of 
 Great Britain without reservation, and was ratified 
 on her behalf on 27th November 1909. 
 
 It embodies regulations for war on land which 
 illustrate throughout the determination of the 
 conference to regard as sacred all existing powers 
 of military belligerent commanders. Thus, by 
 Article 23 (g), it is forbidden " to destroy or seize 
 enemy property unless such destruction or seizure 
 be imperatively demanded by the necessities of 
 war," whereof the general in command on the spot 
 is, must be, and is left to be, the sole judge. If he 
 deems such destruction or seizure to be demanded 
 by the necessities of the war, he may destroy or 
 seize whatever he pleases. Again, by Article 27, 
 "in sieges and bombardments all necessary steps 
 must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings 
 dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charit- 
 able purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and 
 places where the sick and wounded are collected.
 
 126 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 provided they are not being used at the time for 
 military purposes." Here again, the general in 
 command is the sole judge of what is "necessary," 
 of what is "possible," and of whether the buildings 
 in question are or are not being used for military 
 pm'poses. And from him there is no appeal. 
 
 Ai'ticle 46 prescribes that " individual life and 
 private property" must be "respected," and that 
 "private property may not be confiscated." But 
 nevertheless Articles 48, 49, 51, 52, and 54 
 authorise the general commanding in an occupied 
 country to collect taxes, dues, and tolls, "as far as 
 is possible," on the legal basis in force at the time, 
 to levy "other money contributions," to make 
 "requisitions in kind and services ... for the needs 
 of the army of occupation," and in case of "absolute 
 necessity " (whereof he is the sole judge) to seize or 
 destroy "submarine cables." 
 
 Article 53 is especially noteworthy as showing 
 the distinction between sea warfare and land 
 warfare. It prescribes that on land, ''except in 
 cases governed hy naval law, ... all appliances 
 adapted for the transmission of news or for the 
 transport of persons or goods, whether on land, at 
 sea, or in the air, . . . may be seized, even if they 
 belong to private individuals.'' This, as will be 
 noticed, carries the powers of the military com- 
 mander on land over enemy property and enemy 
 appliances to their fullest extent, whether the 
 property be that of the State or of individuals. 
 Very different is the measure meted out to the
 
 DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWER 127 
 
 belligerent naval commander at sea. This is purely 
 a war convention. 
 
 No. 5. The convention respecting the rights 
 and duties of neutral powers and persons in war 
 on land was signed on behalf of Great Britain with 
 reservations as to Articles 16, 17, and 18, but is 
 not yet ratified on her behalf. 
 
 As to this convention, it is only necessary to say 
 that, by Article 18, it authorises the neutral to 
 engage in "the furnishing of supplies or the making 
 of loans to one of the belhgerents, provided that the 
 person so doing neither lives in the territory of the 
 other party nor in territory occupied by it, and that 
 the supplies do not come from such territory." To 
 agree that a neutral may furnish to a belligerent 
 supplies or money without being held to infringe its 
 neutrality was beyond the capacity even of the 
 British delegates to the conference ; and they 
 therefore made reservations with regard to Articles 
 16, 17, and 18, which thus enlarged the privileges 
 of the neutral to the extent of allowing him so to 
 assist a belligerent. Nevertheless, they signed this 
 convention. Whether it is ever to be ratified, and 
 if so, on what conditions, still remains an open 
 question. 
 
 No. 6. The convention relative to the status of 
 enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities. 
 This was signed on behalf of Great Britain without 
 reservation, and was ratified on her behalf on 
 27th November 1909. It restricts materially the 
 power of a belligerent over enemy merchant ships
 
 128 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 found in its ports at the commencement of 
 hostilities — yet only in a halting and hesitating 
 way, since Article 1 only declares it "desirable" 
 that such a ship " should be allowed to depart freely, 
 either immediately or after a reasonable number of 
 days of grace, and to proceed, after being furnished 
 with a pass, direct to its port of destination, or any 
 other port indicated to it." Article 2, however, 
 hesitates less, and declares that a merchant ship 
 accidentally rendered unable to leave the enemy 
 port within the period contemplated in Article 1 
 " may not be confiscated " ; while Article 3 extends 
 the same immunity to enemy merchant ships 
 " which left their last port of departure before the 
 commencement of the war, and are encountered on 
 the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of 
 hostilities." Article 4 goes still further, for it 
 implicitly covers with immunity from confiscation 
 "enemy cargo on board the vessels referred to in 
 Articles 1 and 2," though it leaves that cargo liable 
 to be detained until the end of the war, or to be 
 " requisitioned on payment of compensation." This 
 is manifestly a convention of war. 
 
 No. 7. The convention relative to the conver- 
 sion of merchant ships into warships. This was 
 signed on behalf of Great Britain without reserva- 
 tion, and was ratified on her behalf on 27th 
 November 1909. It lays down the rules imder 
 which the privateering declared abolished by the 
 Declaration of Paris is in effect to be restored ; 
 for it deals with "a merchant ship converted into
 
 SUBMARINE MINES 129 
 
 a warship," which is an exact description of the 
 privateer, and prescribes that it must be "under 
 the direct authority, immediate control, and 
 responsibility of the power whose flag it flies " ; 
 that it must "bear the external marks which 
 distinguish the warships " of that power, and that 
 the commander must be "in the service of the 
 State." This is manifestly a convention of war. 
 
 No. 8. The convention relative to the laying 
 of automatic submarine contact mines. This was 
 signed on behalf of Great Britain with a reserva- 
 tion, but was ratified on her behalf on the 
 27th November 1909. It prohibits the laying 
 of unanchored automatic contact mines, unless so 
 constructed as to become harmless within an hour 
 after the person who laid them has ceased to 
 control them, or anchored mines unless they become 
 harmless as soon as they have broken loose from 
 their moorings ; and it forbids the laying of any 
 such mines " off the coast and ports of the enemy 
 with the sole object of intercepting commercial 
 shipping" — thereby allowing their laying in such 
 places in case they are laid with some other object 
 than that. This is a convention of war. 
 
 No. 9. The convention respecting bombard- 
 ment by naval forces in time of war, which was 
 signed on behalf of Great Britain with reservation 
 of the second paragraph of Article 1, and was 
 ratified on her behalf on 27tli November 1909. 
 
 Article 1 of this convention prohibits "the 
 bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports,
 
 130 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings," and 
 provides that such places are not to be con- 
 sidered as defended "solely on the ground that 
 automatic submarine contact mines are anchored 
 off the harbour." But Article 3 declares that 
 after notice given such a bombardment "may be 
 commenced if the local authorities, on a formal 
 summons being made to them, decline to comply 
 with requisitions for provisions or supplies 
 necessary for the immediate use of the naval 
 force before the place in question." Article 4, 
 however, prohibits any such bombardment on 
 accomit of "failure to pay money contributions." 
 So that a town or a dw^elling may refuse cash, 
 but may not refuse provisions or supplies on 
 pain of bombardment. Moreover, " unless military 
 exigencies render it impossible, the officer in 
 command of an attacking naval force' must, before 
 commencing the bombardment, do all in his 
 power to warn the authorities." This convention, 
 it will be observed, prohibits that bombardment 
 of the defenceless which no predominant naval 
 power would undertake, but which might wxll be 
 undertaken by the weaker naval power. 
 
 This is clearly a convention of war. 
 
 No. 10. The convention for the adaptation 
 of the principles of the Geneva Convention to 
 maritime war was signed on behalf of Great Britain, 
 with reservation as to Articles 6 and 21, but is not 
 yet ratified on her behalf. This is the conven- 
 tion relative to hospital ships and the like. It is
 
 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT OF CAPTURE 131 
 
 distinguished by Article 7, which prescribes that 
 "in the case of a fight on board a warship, the 
 sick-bays shall be respected and spared as far as 
 possible" — a provision which may be dictated by 
 humanity, but which can hardly be of much effect 
 when projectiles are flying about in so limited 
 a space as that of a ship. Why, having accepted 
 so much, the British delegates should have 
 refused to accept Articles 6 and 21 of this 
 convention, is not explained, nor perhaps expKc- 
 able, unless on the supposition that these Articles 
 might have necessitated recourse to Parliament. 
 
 No. 11. The convention relative to certain 
 restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture 
 in maritime war, signed on behalf of Great Britain 
 without reservation and ratified on her behalf on 
 27th November 1909. This convention by Article 
 1 invests with inviolability " the postal correspon- 
 dence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its official 
 or private character, found on board a neutral or 
 enemy ship on the high seas " ; and by Article 2 
 exempts a neutral mail ship from search "except 
 when absolutely necessary, and then only with as 
 much consideration and expedition as possible." 
 These articles, in fact, absolutely prevent the 
 examination of official enemy correspondence or 
 despatches even found on board an enemy ship if 
 only it is labelled as "postal," and thereby deprive 
 the belligerent of all means of acquiring the 
 momentous information which before this conven- 
 tion was agreed to might be, and constantly was
 
 132 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 thus acquired. Ai'ticle 5, moreover, declares that 
 " when an enemy merchant ship is captm-ed by a 
 belUgerent, such of its crew as are subjects of a 
 neutral state are not made prisoners of war " ; while 
 Ai-ticle 6 extends the same privilege even to an 
 enemy crew, "subjects or citizens of the enemy 
 state," provided they undertake not to serve fm'ther 
 in the war. 
 
 This is a particularly mischievous convention ; 
 but the British delegates accepted it whole. It is 
 manifestly a convention of war. 
 
 No. 12. The convention relative to the establish- 
 ment of an International Prize Com-t. 
 
 This was not signed on behalf of Great Britain, 
 nor ratified on her behalf ; but it is brought under 
 the notice of Parliament in the appendix to the 
 Naval Prize Bill, 1910. The time for its ratifica- 
 tion, originally fixed as 30th June 1909, has now 
 been extended to February 1911. 
 
 This is the convention wdiich would submit the 
 judgment of British Prize Courts and of the King 
 in Council to appeal before an International Prize 
 Court which it sets up. The appointment and 
 functions of the judges are described in the 
 convention, and it perhaps only remains to be 
 added with regard to them, that by Article 20 
 each one of them is to receive, in addition to 
 travelling allowances, 100 Nctherland florins, or 
 approximately 8 guineas, a day while concerned 
 in the business of the court. Article 43 prescribes 
 that "all questions are decided by a majority of
 
 PROJECTILES FROM BALLOONS 133 
 
 the judges present." " The court considers its 
 decisions in private and the proceedings remain 
 secret." 
 
 This is the convention to which it is proposed 
 to give effect by the Naval Prize Bill, which Bill 
 implicitly authorises its ratification by His Majesty 
 as soon as the amendments made by the Bill have 
 been enacted. Of all the conventions, it is the 
 worst and the most dangerous. So far, however, 
 it has neither been signed nor ratified on behalf 
 of Great Britain. It never should be. 
 
 No. 13. The convention respecting the rights 
 and duties of neutral powers in maritime war, 
 signed on behalf of Great Britain with a reserva- 
 tion as regards Articles 19 and 23, but not yet 
 ratified on her behalf. No great exception is to 
 be taken to the articles of this convention, and it 
 is to be presumed that, in reserving their assent 
 to the Articles 19 and 23, the British delegates, 
 or those who instructed them, must have had in 
 view the need for submitting to Parliament the 
 legal points therein involved. 
 
 No. 14. Declaration prohibiting the discharge 
 of projectiles and explosives from balloons. 
 
 Signed on behalf of Great Britain without 
 reservation, and ratified on her behalf on 27th 
 November 1909. The title of this convention 
 sufficiently explains its purpose and effect. It is 
 a war convention.
 
 134 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 The whole effect of all these conventions ^ taken 
 together, and of the changes they make, can only 
 be appreciated by a skilled jurist. They amount 
 to a revolution in the law of nations. 
 
 Nevertheless, most of them, as will have been 
 seen, are already not only signed but also ratified 
 — the ratification having been made without any 
 direct sanction of Parliament, by H.M. Govern- 
 ment alone, assuming to act in exercise of His 
 Majesty's prerogative. How far that prerogative 
 suffices to authorise such acts need not here be 
 inquired. 
 
 Thus then the case was left on the 18th October 
 1907. During four months the 156 delegates of 
 the 45 states — invited by Russia to do the bidding 
 of Germany, with the acquiescence of Great Britain — 
 had played the part of great personages, juggling 
 in the sight of Europe with the duties and destinies 
 of nations. Those of them who were articulate 
 had babbled unceasingly of humane principles, 
 international amenities, pacific currents, fraternity 
 of peoples, the luminous star of universal peace 
 and justice, the advancement of civilisation and the 
 good of humanity ; they had admired each other 
 and each other's eloquence at interminable length ; 
 they had divided themselves into commissions and 
 sub-commissions. And, in the end, they had 
 
 1 The text of conventions Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 13 is set forth in 
 Appendix C. For the text of the remaining conventions, the reader 
 is referred to Parliamentary Paper No. 6 of 1908, Cd. 4175.
 
 FETTERING OUR SUPREMACY 135 
 
 proposed to set up a new Court of Prize without 
 any law to administer beyond its own will, and to 
 subject to its decrees all naval war and all nations. 
 
 It was all a renewal of the conspiracy against 
 British naval supremacy, started by the Dutch 
 in the seventeenth century, revived ^by the 
 Prussians (now called Germans) in the middle, 
 and entered into by Russia at the end, of the 
 eighteenth century ; brought to a very consider- 
 able success in the nineteenth century ; and now, 
 in the twentieth, to be at last crowned with a final 
 triumph over Great Britain. To subject her 
 maritime rights and their exercise in every respect 
 to an arbitrary tribunal unfettered by law, deciding 
 in secret by a majority permanently against her — 
 this would be a triumph, not merely in essentials, 
 as was the Declaration of Paris of 1856, but in all. 
 This would for ever destroy "the tyrant of the 
 seas," and would leave the military powers of the 
 continent thenceforth untouched and unaffected by 
 that sea power which had hitherto checked them in 
 their beneficent application of military reasons to 
 the great cause of humanity, civilisation, and 
 luminous stars. 
 
 The plan was infinitely bolder, wider, and more 
 complete than any that had preceded it. And 
 there was no longer a Cromwell, a Chatham, or a 
 Pitt to repel the conspiracy and defy the con- 
 spirators. There was but a bleating Foreign Office, 
 an amiable Foreign Secretary, and, behind these, a 
 people who had ceased to beheve in anything but
 
 136 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 peace, and many of whom were incessantly 
 denouncing all war as barbaric and sinful, and as 
 incessantly appealing with Baron von Bieberstein 
 to the sole virtues and sole claims of humanity, 
 civilisation, and luminous stars. 
 
 The conjuncture then was most favourable for 
 the final and complete success of the secular 
 conspiracy against the predominance of Great 
 Britain at sea, and for its destruction, not by 
 force — for that Avas beyond the capacity of the 
 conspirators — but by the secret, simple, silent 
 action of a judicial tribunal set up for the 
 purpose. The 156 representatives of the 45 
 nations were tame enough and silent enough. 
 The conference was harangued, managed, and 
 conducted by the few great powers who knew what 
 Avas meant and how they meant to get it. All the 
 rest voted as they were told, except only when 
 there was a question as to whether all the powers, 
 big and little, should have an equal share in the 
 appointment of the judges, with their salaries, 
 privileges, and allowances. In the division of 
 this plunder the little powers were left out, and 
 some of them made reserves " while others 
 abstained altogether from voting." But generally 
 speaking, Luxembourg and Ecuador, Hayti and 
 S. Domingo tunefully swelled the chorus of the 
 directing powers. And yet it was all muddled. 
 The thing was a trifle overdone. The Inter- 
 national Prize Court was left too palpably arbitrary 
 and unprovided. There was not a rag either of
 
 A COURT WITHOUT A LAW 137 
 
 law or of principle, much less of tradition, to cover 
 its shocking nakedness. To erect a court to be 
 composed of judges entirely unknown, to be 
 nominated by states many of them equally 
 unknown, and to leave such a court wholly un- 
 provided with rules, laws, or traditions, was going 
 beyond any luminous star yet known. The world 
 at large was startled. It was at once said that to 
 accept such a court without any law to guide it 
 was impossible. Sir Edward Fry, Sir Ernest 
 Satow, Lord Keay, Sir Henry Howard, General 
 Sir E. K. Elles, and Captain C. L. Ottley, R.N., 
 might deserve the order of the luminous star and 
 subsequent immortality for having accepted it on 
 behalf of Great Britain — but it was still impossible. 
 A court without a law was inconceivable. Even 
 though destined to advance humanity and civilisa- 
 tion, this could not be endured. There must at 
 least be a law as well as a court. 
 
 The reception in Great Britain of that one of 
 the Hague Conventions which set up the Inter- 
 national Prize Court was as unfavourable as 
 possible — excepting only amongst those emotion- 
 alists who fondly believe that war can be waged 
 with words, and that the interests of humanity 
 demand the surrender by Great Britain of her 
 maritime rights and powers. The Times of 30th 
 September 1907 thus described what had been 
 done : — 
 
 *'This project is utterly inadmissible by this 
 country. ... It is nothing less than the surrender
 
 138 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 into the hands of this naval tribunal of rights and 
 interests which the most sagacious of our race 
 have ever deemed essential to our greatness and 
 our safety. . . . All our sailors and all our states- 
 men have taught us that our power to destroy the 
 commerce of our enemies is one of our most 
 trenchant weapons in war and in diplomacy. . . . 
 The constitution of the panel is such that the 
 nominees of powers who have always repudiated 
 English doctrines of maritime law, together with 
 the nominees of states notoriously upon a low 
 plane of civilisation will form a permanent majority 
 of the full court. . . . Within the limited scope of 
 its authority it [the conference] has handed over, 
 as we have shown, some of our supreme interests 
 to the uncovenanted mercies of an alien tribunal. 
 Fortunately the mistake is not past remedy. The 
 convention need not be ratified until 30th June 
 1909. There is still time before then to thresh out 
 these and other kindred subjects thoroughly, and 
 to conclude precise and binding agreements upon 
 them if agreement be possible. Unless and until 
 this indispensable condition precedent is fulfilled, 
 the project adopted at the Hague must remain a 
 project to us. We cannot ratify it. We cannot 
 give any foreigners carte blanche to make laws for 
 our fleet, and to shorten at their discretion our 
 arm upon the seas." 
 
 From the date of the final act of the conference, 
 this has been felt by all who have given attention 
 to the subject, that it would be mad to set up an 
 International Prize Court without any law to 
 guide it beyond its own notions and desires ; and
 
 THE QUESTION BEFORE PARLIAMENT 139 
 
 that, if there was to be such a court, the agreement 
 as to the law it was to administer must precede 
 its establishment. 
 
 Yet it is the very contrary that is now proposed, 
 and proposed by the British Government. Parlia- 
 ment is to be asked forthwith to set up this lawless 
 court and to leave untouched, unregarded, and 
 undecided the law it is to administer. For that 
 is enshrined, if anywhere, in the Declaration of 
 London, with which the Naval Prize Bill has 
 nothing to do and which the Government declares 
 needs no Parliamentary sanction. 
 
 H.M. Government say, in effect, to Parlia- 
 ment : — 
 
 " Enact the Naval Prize Bill which accepts the 
 convention, which erects the court ; that is all we 
 ask you to do, all that we submit or mean to 
 submit to you. As for the law which the court is 
 to administer, we have settled that ourselves, by 
 ourselves alone. It is all in the Declaration of 
 London. That you will not be asked to sanction. 
 That will not even be submitted to you, except 
 possibly for an otiose academic discussion. That, 
 as we told you on 21st July, 'does not require 
 the sanction of Parliament,' and for that, as we 
 told you on 27th July, 'no legislation is necessary.' 
 You the Parliament accept the court; we the 
 Government make the law. With the law you have 
 no concern, no rights over it, and no claim even 
 to any discussion upon it, except such as we may 
 choose to give you."
 
 140 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE OF 1907 
 
 The situation so stands to-dav. 
 
 How that situation was arrived at ; how tlie 
 Declaration of London was prepared and 
 elaborated ; what it finally became ; and what are 
 the scope and effect of the Naval Prize Bill — all 
 this remains to be shown. ^
 
 V 
 
 BRITISH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 
 NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 That there must be a law as well as a 
 court, was reluctantly and sadly acknowledged, 
 though the acknowledgment up-ended the whole 
 work of the conference. To rescue that work 
 and to provide the law for the court was mani- 
 festly the business of Great Britain, for whose 
 destruction both were contrived and intended. 
 Sir Edward Grey, therefore, took the initiative. 
 Four months after the end of the conference — on 
 27th February 1908 — he addressed a circular to 
 H.M. representatives at Berlin, Madrid, Paris, 
 Rome, St Petersburg, Tokio, Vienna, Washing- 
 ton, and the Hague, proposing the assembly at 
 London of another conference to settle what sort 
 of thing the law should be. He made his pro- 
 posal, not to the 45 convened states which had 
 invented the court, but only to 10 of them. 
 For this neglect of 35 out of the 45 states, he 
 gave the reason that : — 
 
 " The rules by which appeals from National 
 Prize Courts would be decided affect the rights 
 
 141
 
 142 THE xNAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 of belligerents in a manner which is far more 
 serious to the principal naval powers than to 
 others." 
 
 An argument which cannot be received without 
 some respectful doubts. For if the wisdom of 
 all the 45 were not too much to provide the 
 court, it would seem that at least an equal wisdom 
 must be needed to make the law, and that the 
 wisdom of the 10 would be too little. Or, 
 perhaps, we are to suppose that the wisdom of 
 the 45 had proved unwisdom, and that more 
 wisdom was to be expected from fewer counsellors. 
 Moreover, if the court set up was — as this court was 
 — to have the power of overriding all rules with 
 its own notions of justice and equity, if it was 
 to be bound — as this was — by "no legal system 
 of proofs," then it would seem that the com't 
 was everything and the rules nothing, and that 
 whatever the 45 states had already done, nothing 
 the 10 could do would mend. Which was in 
 truth the case. 
 
 Moreover, if, as stated, the object was to 
 commit the framing of the law to the "principal 
 naval powers" alone, then the weeding out of 
 the 45 was not complete. Neither Austria- 
 Hungary, nor Spain, nor Holland can in any 
 sense be described as of "the principal naval 
 powers " ; neither can Russia be properly so 
 considered, nor Italy either, imless upon a very 
 undue enlargement of the meaning usually and 
 properly attached to the phrase. Wherefore,
 
 THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS 143 
 
 at the very least, three, and more properly 
 five, should have been weeded out of the 
 ten powers, in addition to the thirty- five already 
 excluded. There are then left but five — Great 
 Britain, the United States, Germany, France, 
 and Japan — which powers alone, having regard 
 either to naval history or to present naval 
 strength, can be considered to be principal naval 
 powers. And even then there would be no equality 
 as among themselves ; for even among the five 
 there are only three — the United States, Great 
 Britain, and Japan — to whom naval power is as 
 important as military power ; the remaining two — 
 Germany and France — rely mainly upon soldiers, 
 and only in an infinitely less degree upon sailors. 
 But when naval powers, not principal, were 
 introduced — when Austria and Italy, the allies 
 of Germany ; Holland, the present dependent and 
 future victim of Germany ; and Russia, so long 
 the close associate of Germany — when these 
 were introduced, then a great preponderance was 
 given to the military powers in the discussion 
 of naval problems with which not their existence 
 but only their ambitions were concerned. Possibly 
 Sir Edward Grey, during the confidential pour- 
 parlers which preceded his circular, sought to 
 restrict his invitations to those five which are 
 in fact " the principal naval powers " ; possibly 
 he was overruled in this. But, however that may 
 be, he ended by inviting, not alone these, but five 
 others as well. It was not indeed the cosmopohtan
 
 144 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 mob that had set up the International Prize Court ; 
 but it was a smaller mob, sufficient for what 
 remained. Great Britain had been hustled out 
 of her prize jurisdiction by the 45 of the 
 Hasrue Conference : she was now to be hustled 
 into a new law of nations by the 10 of the 
 London Conference — as was in the end duly 
 done. 
 
 In issuing this invitation, Sir Edward Grey 
 frankly avowed that what he had in his mind 
 was not so much either the new International 
 Prize Court or the invention of a law for its use, 
 as the British Parliament and the creation of 
 some semblance of a case for inducing it to 
 accept the Hague Convention and the court 
 thereby created. He wrote : — 
 
 "H.M. Government are deeply sensible of 
 the great advantage which would arise from the 
 establishment of an International Prize Court 
 [meaning thereby the court already set up by the 
 convention], but in view of the serious divergences 
 which the discussion at the Hague brought to 
 light as to many of the above topics [contraband, 
 blockade, and so forth], after an agreement had 
 been practically reached on the proposals for 
 creating such a court, it would he difficult, if not 
 impossible, for H.M. Government to carry the 
 legislation necessary to give effect to the convention, 
 unless they could assure both Houses of the British 
 Parliament that some more definite understanding 
 had been reached as to the rules by which the 
 new tribunal should be governed."
 
 THE NAVAL PRIZE BILL 145 
 
 This is a plain avowal that, unless the Govern- 
 ment could assure Parliament that there was 
 a definite law as well as the court, it would be 
 difficult, if not impossible, for them to induce 
 Parliament to accept the court. 
 
 Nevertheless, and in spite of all this, the 
 Government now proposes to ask Parliament in 
 November 1910 to agree to the Naval Prize Bill, 
 which sanctions the court alone without the 
 law ; and to leave to another time and another 
 procedure — which, according to the Government, 
 will not require to be sanctioned by Parliament — 
 the law itself. 
 
 The powers interested in pushing the conspiracy 
 against British sea power to its final triumph, 
 now so near, could not hesitate to join in any 
 plan for enabling the British Government to carry 
 the court through the British Parliament. For 
 they knew well that, while it was easy enough 
 to deal with the British Foreign Office, it might 
 be very hard to deal with the Parliament. They 
 therefore all eagerly accepted the London Con- 
 ference for law-making. 
 
 The conference was preceded by a "preliminary 
 exchange of views between the several Govern- 
 ments which had agreed to send delegates." These 
 Governments were, on 8th July 1908, provided by 
 Sir Edward Grey with a " memorandum setting out 
 the views of H.M. Government founded upon the 
 decisions in the British courts as to the rules of 
 international law on the points enumerated in the 
 
 K
 
 146 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 programme of the conference." A view founded 
 upon a decision is not very formidable, nor, it may- 
 be added, very respectful to those eminent and 
 honoured British judges whose decisions had gone 
 so far to build up the law of nations. But H.M. 
 Government professed no convictions as to this 
 law. It only held views ; and it presented these 
 views so as to suggest that, if they were not agree- 
 able to the other nine powers, they could readily be 
 changed. 
 
 That they would be changed with alacrity was 
 made evident by Sir Edward Grey's instructions of 
 1st December 1909 to Lord Desart, who was 
 named as plenipotentiary for Great Britain. His 
 lordship was to be assisted by the Captain (now 
 become Admiral Sir Charles) Ottley who had 
 figured at the Hague Conference, and by Rear- 
 Admiral Slade, as well as by Mr Eyre-Crowe and 
 Mr C. J. B. Hurst of the Foreign Office. Their 
 instructions were, in brief, to abandon at once 
 some of the most vital principles of international 
 law, as hitherto declared and enforced by British 
 Prize Courts; and in respect of these to range 
 themselves on the side of the contrary principles, 
 always hitherto denounced and repudiated by 
 those courts. As to other of these principles, they 
 were to wrangle before surrendering them ; as to 
 none were they instructed firmly and finally to stand 
 out in a refusal of surrender. 
 
 Throughout Sir Edward Grey's instructions 
 there ran a settled, avowed purpose to bring about
 
 THE CHAMPION OF THE NEUTRAL 147 
 
 the abandonment by Great Britain of almost every 
 important principle she had declared, justified, and 
 acted upon in war, up to the time when her people 
 had ceased to know by experience what war was, 
 and when her statesmen had ceased to understand 
 that, for her at least, everything depended, in war, 
 upon adhesion to those very principles and full 
 exercise of the maritime rights which they sanction. 
 In dealing with war he forgot its grim realities, 
 and looked at it as though it were peace ; as if 
 its terrible necessities were capable of being dealt 
 with by the very respectable but wholly inap- 
 plicable doctrines of charity and good-will ; and as 
 if rules which contemplate our being belligerent 
 should be considered as though they contemplated 
 our being neutral. Of this certain illustrative 
 instances may be cited. 
 
 1. Great Britain has, when engaged in serious 
 war, always been the champion of the belligerent 
 right to distress and destroy an enemy, against the 
 neutral claim to interfere with that distress and 
 destruction. Sir Edward Grey changes sides and 
 appears as the champion of the neutral against 
 the belligerent. 
 
 2. Great Britain has always denied that 
 neutrals have or could have any right to supply, 
 either to one or to both belligerents, that assistance 
 in the war which is provided by furnishing either 
 with such means of resistance or offence as are 
 called "contraband." She has always declared 
 the law of nations to be — as, in fact, it is — that
 
 148 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 for a friend of both belligerents to place in the 
 hands of one of them arms against the other is an 
 abandonment of the neutrality which forbids such 
 an assistance to either. And she has, therefore, 
 consistently captured, condemned, and confiscated 
 all neutral vessels engaged in carrying contraband 
 to her enemy — an exercise of right which even the 
 Declaration of Paris sanctioned and allowed. Sir 
 Edward Grey takes a wholly contrary view. He 
 looks upon trade in contraband, not merely with 
 toleration, but with positive affection. This is 
 what he says of it : — 
 
 *'Any proposal tending in the direction of 
 freeing neutral commerce and shipping from the 
 interference which the suppression by the belliger- 
 ents of the trade in contraband involves, should 
 receive your sympathetic consideration, and, if not 
 otherwise open to objection, your active support. 
 
 It would be interesting to know whether Sir 
 Edward would apply to individuals the same 
 principle as to nations — whether, seeing two men 
 locked in a deadly struggle, he would sympathetic- 
 ally consider and actively support a friend of both 
 who should furtively hand a knife to one of them, 
 and whether he would prohibit the captm'e of that 
 knife by the other of them as being an interference 
 with neutral commerce. Apparently he would. 
 
 3. Great Britain has always sought to deprive 
 her enemy of assistance by confiscating all contra- 
 band whatever — that is, all that the facts and
 
 LIMITING THE RIGHT TO SEIZE 149 
 
 circumstances might show to be contraband^ — ■ 
 which must vary with time, place, and conditions ; 
 which may to-day be hemp, tar, tow, or tallow ; 
 to-morrow rails, biscuits, or cheese ; and, the day 
 after, aeroplanes. Sir Edward Grey is now for a 
 strictly exclusive narrow definition of contraband, 
 and for its strait limitation independent of circum- 
 stances — all to the enlargement of neutral trade and 
 the narrowing of belligerent power. He writes : — 
 
 " H.M. Government are now desirous of limiting 
 as much as possible the right to seize for 
 contraband, if not eliminating it altogether. In 
 proportion as the lists of contraband are reduced — 
 and there is good ground for hoping that this will he 
 successfully done in a large measure — the value of 
 the right to seize for contraband diminishes." 
 
 It does indeed diminish. And exactly in the 
 same degree diminishes the power of the belligerent 
 to stop the neutral from taking part against him in 
 the war, and from giving that illicit, treacherous, 
 unlawful, contraband help to the enemy which is 
 the very negation of neutrality. 
 
 4. But while Great Britain has always insisted 
 on the neutral either remaining neutral or being 
 subjected to at least some of the risks and penalties 
 of war. Sir Edward Grey now holds that the 
 modern spirit requires us to allow the neutral to 
 take in the war at least this part of supplying 
 contraband with all the profits and none of the 
 risks. Having already very truly pointed out that
 
 150 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 the less contraband there is the less you can 
 capture, he proceeds : — 
 
 "Whilst accordingly, on the one hand, the 
 importance to a belligerent of the right to seize 
 vessels under convoy has lost much of its value, 
 the principle of exemption is, on the other hand, 
 favourable to neutral trade, and in conformity with 
 the spirit of British policy." 
 
 If this be in conformity with the British policy 
 of to-day, it is but another striking instance of the 
 abandonment of that policy vt^hich was British in 
 times of real war. There is nothing Great Britain 
 has more strongly insisted upon than the belligerent 
 right to search and, if need were, to seize and 
 capture all vessels, whether under convoy or not, 
 reasonably suspected of violating the law ; the 
 right being exercised — let it never be forgotten — 
 at the risk to the captor of being condemned, if 
 wrong, in heavy damages. This right Sir Edward 
 Grey now throws clean overboard. Complete 
 exemption of convoyed vessels from capture (as 
 well as from search or visit) is, he now holds, in 
 conformity with the spirit of British policy. 
 
 5. So again with breach of blockade. The 
 British doctrine has always been that a blockade- 
 breaking vessel may be pursued and captured at 
 any time until she has completed her homeward 
 voyage. But His Majesty's Government is ready 
 to surrender this too. The statesmen and seamen 
 of former times who knew what war was, where
 
 BREACH OF BLOCKADE 151 
 
 its stresses came, and what the importance was of 
 bringing blockade-breakers to book, held it as 
 essentially important that the blockade -breaker 
 should not be relieved of the risk of capture at 
 least till he had reached his own port ; and that if 
 he were so relieved, the enforcement of blockade 
 would be impossible. A similar rule allowing the 
 capture of a house-breaker, at least between the 
 house he had broken and his own home, would 
 be considered not too hard upon the house-breaker, 
 but rather too hard upon the constable. Yet : — 
 
 "H.M. Government are advised that the 
 acceptance of the latter views [that the blockade- 
 breaker shall be free if the pursuit is once 
 abandoned, and shall not be capturable during the 
 rest of his voyage] would not be likely to inflict 
 any material injury on the interests of Great 
 Britain. They therefore consider that it will not 
 be necessary to insist on the rigorous adoption of 
 the British principle on this point." 
 
 Here it is to be pointed out that, since the 
 prohibition by the Declaration of Paris of the 
 capture of enemy goods in the neutral ship, 
 blockade is practically the only effectual means 
 left to the naval belligerent of hampering the enemy's 
 trade ; and that both blockade and the capture 
 of blockade-breakers have therefore assumed a far 
 greater importance than ever they had before. 
 The surrender on this point is therefore more 
 serious and disastrous than ever it would have been 
 before.
 
 152 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 6. Even more remarkable is the case touching 
 the destruction by a belligerent of neutral ships 
 before and without condemnation or even judgment 
 by a Prize Court. The British doctrine, always 
 held and enforced, is that while a belligerent 
 captor may under certain circumstances destroy an 
 undoubtedly enemy merchant ship acknowledged 
 as such without sending her into port for adjudica- 
 tion by the Prize Court, yet, if the vessel captured 
 be either neutral or of doubtful nationality, or 
 doubtful guilt in her proceedings, then the bounden 
 duty of the captor is to bring or send her into 
 port for adjudication ; and if for any reason 
 this is impossible, to release her ; while in no case 
 whatever is he justified in destroying her. The 
 justice of this rule is as obvious as its necessity. 
 For, in case of doubt, a naval captor has no more 
 right, claim, or power to inflict the last penalty of 
 destruction without previous resolution of the 
 doubt by a competent com't, than a constable has 
 to hang on the nearest lamp-post a man he has 
 arrested on suspicion of murder. The rule is 
 manifestly one which is in the interests and for the 
 protection of the neutral who, however innocent, 
 must else be left exposed to destruction at the will 
 of a belligerent captor. But it is also a rule the 
 consequences whereof enure to the benefit of the 
 belligerent preponderant at sea, and therefore best 
 able to send his captures into port without risk of 
 recapture. Such a belligerent would, on account 
 of his preponderance, run but little risk of such a
 
 FURTHER SURRENDER 153 
 
 recapture ; and if he had, by destroying or blocking 
 up his enemy's fleet, secured the full command of 
 the sea and the power of traversing it without 
 challenge from a foe, he would run no such risk 
 whatever. The rule, therefore, while essentially 
 just and merciful to the neutral, is, as between the 
 belligerents, unfavourable to the weaker and favour- 
 able to the stronger power. And that stronger 
 power would in all probability be Great Britain. 
 Yet here, too, the British position was to be 
 surrendered. Sir Edward Grey declares that : — 
 
 "There is practically no prospect of this [the 
 British] contention being accepted in its entirety ; 
 and it must be admitted, that while authority can 
 be quoted in its support from text books and from 
 British cases, there is a large body of opinion 
 among writers on international law that, although 
 in principle a neutral ship should in every case 
 be brought in or released, circumstances might 
 arise in which its immediate destruction would he 
 justified''' 
 
 Wherefore, in order to arrive at "an agree- 
 ment," the true and more merciful British principle 
 was to be sacrificed to the false and less merciful 
 foreign principle long advanced yet never more 
 than timidly defended by those who, while 
 champions of the neutral so long as that was to 
 the disadvantage of Great Britain, were ready to 
 sacrifice neutrals, justice, and equity together in 
 order to deprive our country of the advantage of 
 its preponderance at sea. Weakly yielding to
 
 154 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 these, Sir Edward instructed his delegates to agree 
 to the foreign doctrine of destruction, if "justi- 
 fied by an imperative military necessity," — whereof 
 the immediate judge could only be the military 
 captor himself, carrying out on the spot the act 
 of destruction. This indeed was to be subject to 
 his subsequently persuading the International Prize 
 Court that he acted on the imperative military 
 necessity contemplated ; but meantime he was 
 authorised to sink or burn as many neutrals as 
 he might choose to destroy. And a court com- 
 posed like this of fifteen judges, whereof only one 
 British, would probably not be hard to persuade. 
 Anyhow, the instructions were, not to stand out 
 for the British rule which, with or without agree- 
 ment, has hitherto been enforced by British courts 
 even against British captors to their great cost 
 and damage. 
 
 7. Then, again, as to the carriage by a neutral 
 vessel of enemy despatches. No more important 
 service can be rendered to a belligerent against 
 his enemy than the transmission under cover of 
 neutrality of orders or information which may 
 perhaps materially eflfect the issue of the campaign, 
 or even of the war itself. Nothing in itself can 
 be a more treacherous abandonment of neutrality ; 
 and accordingly this has always justly been held 
 to render the treacherous neutral carrier liable to 
 condemnation. But, says Sir Edward Grey : — 
 
 " No great importance is likely to be attached 
 in future to the chance of seizing enemy despatches
 
 DESPATCHES 155 
 
 on board neutral vessels, since it now suffices to 
 include such despatches in the ordinary postal 
 correspondence, in order to render them immune 
 from seizure under the terms of the convention 
 relative to certain restrictions on the exercise of 
 the right of capture in maritime war recently 
 signed at the Hague." 
 
 Now, the convention here mentioned is No. 
 11 of the thirteen conventions elaborated at the 
 Hague Conference of 1907, together with the 
 convention for the establishment of the Inter- 
 national Prize Court. It related to "certain 
 restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture 
 in maritime war." It was signed on 18th October 
 1907, "without any reservations" by the British 
 delegates, and in November 1909 was, without 
 being submitted for the sanction of Parliament, 
 ratified on behalf of Great Britain. 
 
 This convention declares that the postal corres- 
 pondence of "neutrals or belligerents, whatever its 
 official or private character, found on board a 
 neutral or enemy ship is inviolable." Very dif- 
 ferent are the stipulations embodied in convention 
 No. 4, "concerning the laws and customs of war 
 on land," which was also signed " without any 
 reservations" by the British delegates. While, 
 at sea, all postal correspondence found in an 
 enemy ship is, by convention No. 11, declared 
 "inviolable," convention No. 4 declares that, 
 on land, not alone postal correspondence, but 
 "all appliances adapted for the transmission of
 
 156 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 news . . . may be " seized even if they belong to 
 private individuals" — except (and let this excep- 
 tion be remarked) "except in cases governed by 
 naval law." So that while the august general on 
 land may seize all, the despised admiral at sea 
 must not even so much as look at it. In which 
 appears an impudent avowal of the settled deter- 
 mination that to land power all shall be lawful, 
 and to sea power, nothing. And in which — seeing 
 that both conventions were signed on the same 
 day — there was a touch of humour which appears 
 to have escaped Sir Edward Fry and his colleagues, 
 who signed both "without any reservation." So 
 that having in 1907 agreed that all postal corres- 
 pondence shall be inviolable, Sir Edward founds 
 upon that surrender the further surrender of 
 enemy despatches as being of no great importance 
 — although in times past they were repeatedly 
 found to be, and in the future may as well be, of 
 the very highest importance. 
 
 8. The transfer to a neutral of an enemy 
 merchant ship during or on the eve of war is a 
 question which has become of the greatest 
 moment since the Declaration of Paris of 1856. 
 For that Declaration gives immunity from capture 
 to enemy goods in neutral ships. The obvious 
 effect of this is to drive the goods of the weaker 
 belligerent into the neutral ships, whose flag now 
 gives to them that immunity from capture which 
 before the Declaration they could nohow obtain. 
 The gain was wholly to the weaker belligerent;
 
 THE TRANSFER OF ENEMY SHIPS 157 
 
 the stronger, having necessarily at least a partial 
 command of the sea, would profit but little ; and 
 if having complete command, could neither need 
 it at all nor profit by it, nor experience anything 
 but harm from it. Thus it has been since 1856 
 as much to the interest of the weaker naval 
 powers as against the interest of the stronger 
 — and therefore most especially of all against 
 the interest of Great Britain — to render the 
 transfer of the belligerent merchant ship to the 
 neutral as easy as possible — and even when 
 the transfer is only colourable and fraudulent, 
 to secure, if possible, its recognition. Now 
 the law of nations, as declared by British Prize 
 Courts is that such a transfer, made in good faith, 
 is in itself good ; but that it must be shoAvn to 
 be good by the claimant of the ship, and will 
 be held invalid if the facts and circumstances 
 are such as to afford good ground for the con- 
 clusion that there has been no real but only a 
 pretended transfer made to avoid capture, as in 
 a blockaded port or during a voyage. Nothing 
 could be more reasonable or more equitable. Sir 
 Edward Grey's instructions, however, are these : — 
 
 "His Majesty's Government think that the 
 British delegates should maintain this view [that 
 the onus of proving the bona fides of the transfer 
 should rest on those concerned therein] at the 
 conference. They hope that it may be possible 
 to convince the representatives of the other 
 powers of its justice, and that an agreement may
 
 158 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 be arrived at on the subject. It seems, however, 
 doubtful whether any such agreement could be 
 established on the basis of a statement or an 
 interpretation of existing law^ and the solution 
 may accordingly have to be sought by way of 
 a conventional stipulation." 
 
 Here again is a complete absence of settled 
 conviction or resolution. Thinking and hoping 
 and doubting. Sir Edward at last leaves this most 
 grave question to such stipulations as the other 
 powers could be got to agree to. Yet this point 
 is imdoubtedly one which in any future wars will 
 take on an importance hitherto unknown. On 
 the retention of the existing sound principle it 
 will depend in future whether the trade of the 
 weaker belligerent, driven from the seas under 
 its own flag by the superior command of the 
 stronger, shall be enabled to take refuge under 
 a false character and a false neutral flag, and 
 to be carried on as easily, or almost as easily, as 
 in peace, by a fraudulent, unreal, pretended 
 transfer of their merchant ships to neutral owners. 
 That on such a point of such vast import H.M. 
 Government should not have stood firm is 
 astonishing. 
 
 9. The transformation by a belligerent of 
 merchant ships into warships on the high seas 
 during war is a question cognate to that of the 
 conversion of beUigerent merchant ships into 
 neutrals. In practice, the question is whether a 
 beUigerent has the right to commission a man- of-
 
 PRIVATEERING 159 
 
 war elsewhere than in its own ports under its own 
 jurisdiction ; whether it can, for example, authorise 
 the sudden transformation outside those ports by 
 a mere production of paper and bunting into a 
 ship of war, of a ship which, up to that transforma- 
 tion, had set forth as, and claimed to be only, 
 a merchant ship entitled as such to neutral 
 hospitality and unlimited sufferance, and dis- 
 entitled to search or seize any other vessels on 
 the high seas. In effect, the question is, whether 
 a ship may set forth as a merchant ship and 
 suddenly, secretly, and when out of all reach 
 declare itself to be a ship of war; and, if so, 
 whether it may as secretly and suddenly reconvert 
 itself into a merchant ship. Such a question can 
 hardly require a serious answer. To the use of 
 masks and false noses, to be donned and dofiPed at 
 will, there is a limit even in war. 
 
 This claim for conversion is a claim not merely 
 to revive, but enormously to exaggerate, privateer- 
 ing, which was affected to be for ever aboHshed by 
 the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and the abolition 
 of which was presented to and accepted by Great 
 Britain as the price of and compensation for her 
 right to capture enemy goods in neutral ships. 
 Privateering is avowedly to be revived — is indeed 
 already revived for Germany by the Prussian 
 Decree of 24th July 1870 establishing the 
 "voluntary marine," which are privateers in all but 
 name, as are the similar ships adopted by Russia. 
 But the privateer was at least commissioned in the
 
 160 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 ports of the belligerent after lodging security -money 
 and giving bail for good behavioiii\ When thus 
 commissioned, she became (to use Lord Stowell's 
 language) " manifestly a ship of war " ; and it was as 
 such that she left the belligerent's port, wearing the 
 belligerent flag, her character and purpose manifest 
 and known to all. None of the consideration 
 shown to the merchant ship was hers. Met by the 
 enemy, she was, if possible, sunk, burnt or destroyed 
 out of hand without mercy. All which, too, enured 
 to the advantage of the stronger and the injury of 
 the weaker belligerent. 
 
 Once the claim for conversion on the high seas 
 admitted, the case will be wholly changed. The 
 new privateer will slink out of her own port as a 
 merchant ship. As such, starting say from 
 Bremen, she may proceed north about round the 
 Orkneys, say to Buenos Ayres, having perhaps 
 freely received hospitality on her way at the neutral 
 ports of Christiansand, Brest, Lisbon or Cadiz, at 
 each of which she has coaled, refitted, and re- 
 provisioned, and remained as long as she pleased. 
 For she calls herself a merchant ship — perhaps even, 
 as well or instead, a vessel " employed on religious, 
 scientific, or philanthropic missions," and therefore 
 (by Article 4 of the convention No. 11, which was 
 in 1907 " signed without any reservations " on 
 behalf of Great Britain) "exempt from capture." 
 At Buenos Ayres she refits and reprovisions and 
 notes the British vessels with cargoes worth having 
 soon due to leave. She then proceeds — always as
 
 CONVERSION ON THE HIGH SEAS 161 
 
 a merchant ship — from neutral Beunos Ayres to 
 neutral Rio de Janeiro, where she again coals, refits, 
 reprovisions and takes notes, and whence she 
 proceeds on her purely mercantile, scientific, or 
 philanthropic mission accompanied by the good 
 wishes of all. Suddenly, when she has arrived at 
 that crossing-point of the trade routes which the 
 Alabama found so rich in prizes, the captain calls 
 the crew on deck, produces from his pocket a 
 commission which has been there ever since he left 
 Bremen, breaks out a pennant, gets up from 
 the hold some light artillery, declares himself a 
 naval captain and his ship a man-of-war — and 
 forthwith proceeds to play havoc with every 
 merchantman he can overhaul. Every enemy 
 merchantman he will sink out of hand ; though not 
 without regret, for if he could but put a prize crew 
 aboard and send her to Bremen, her certain con- 
 demnation would enrich himself and his crew. 
 But, because of the accursed British cruisers from 
 which he himself has barely escaped and which 
 would certainly recapture them on the way, he 
 dare not attempt this. So he sinks them all, or 
 nine out of ten of them, putting the crews aboard 
 the tenth with the provisions collected from the 
 other nine, and orders to proceed by the longest 
 way to the remotest neutral port. As to neutral 
 ships, there is a little more difficulty ; but not much. 
 To send them '' into such port as is proper for the 
 determination there of all questions concerning the 
 validity of the capture," as prescribed by Ai'ticle
 
 162 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 48, would expose them equally to the curiosity at 
 least and the probable visit of the British cruisers. 
 And it is clear that so to do would " involve danger 
 to the safety of the warship " he now commands, 
 for it would probably put the British cruisers or 
 even a British battleship on his own track, and thus 
 bring about his own capture or destruction. It is 
 still more clear that to do so would "involve 
 danger to the success of the operations in which 
 "she [his warship] is engaged at the time," for 
 those operations consist in capturing merchantmen 
 without being caught by cruisers. Wherefore, 
 under the authority of Article 49, he sinks neutrals 
 too, whenever he thinks that sinking is better for 
 his own side than release. In short, he has a high 
 time. It lasts until he is sighted by a British 
 cruiser. When that disagreeable moment arrives, 
 and he sees the White Ensign flaunted and the 
 boat lowered to visit him, then he will probably 
 have nothing left but to surrender and become a 
 prisoner of war, which is undoubtedly a loss to his 
 country, but yet a loss which may be infinitely 
 more than compensated by the far greater loss he 
 has already inflicted on his country's enemy. Yet 
 that is not certain to be his end. For when he 
 thinks he has done his fair share of mischief to the 
 enemy, he may reconvert himself into a merchant- 
 man. The pennant disappears into the signal box, 
 the commission goes back into his pocket, the 
 " external marks which distinguish the warships of 
 their nationality" (Article 2 of Convention No. 7
 
 CAPTURED AS A MERCHANT SHIP 163 
 
 of the Hague signed "without reservations" on 
 behalf of Great Britain) are doffed : he is once 
 again a merchant ship. With good fortune he may 
 again reach Bremen north about, receiving on his 
 way that entertainment which is denied to men-of- 
 war but due to merchantmen, first at Rio de 
 Janeiro again, and next at all the other ports on 
 his way home. It is true that on his way he may 
 be captured by those accursed British cruisers ; 
 but, if that happens, he is captured as a merchant 
 ship. Under Convention No. 11 of the Hague 
 Conference 1907 (signed "without any reserva- 
 tions " on behalf of Great Britain) all his " postal 
 correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever 
 its official or private character" (see Article 1) is 
 " inviolable " ; and if he is " detained," it must all be 
 forwarded (including all his own eloquent accounts 
 of his exploits, and all the useful information 
 for further similar exploits) "by the captor with 
 the least possible delay." Moreover, by Article 6 
 of this same Convention No. 11, which is now appli- 
 cable to his merchant ship, " such of its crew as are 
 subjects or citizens of a neutral state are not made 
 prisoners of war." Nor is that all. By Article 6, 
 neither he himself nor any of his crew, nationals or 
 neutrals, can be made prisoners of war, " provided 
 that they undertake on the faith of a written 
 promise not to engage while hostilities last in any 
 service connected with the operations of the war." 
 To undertake this — and to observe it too, as well 
 as such undertakings have usually been observed —
 
 164 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 may be better worth while than to accept the 
 hospitality of a British prison ; and once the 
 undertaking given, off home go all, captain and 
 crew together, leaving the British cruiser with the 
 ship alone to show. 
 
 This is not a burlesque. This is war as seriously 
 contemplated and prepared by British statesmen of 
 to-day. 
 
 Even to this, Sir Edward Grey's instructions 
 dealt out, not a plain rejection, but tolerance 
 suggesting a compromise, and adding : — 
 
 "But any other suggestions which may be 
 made in the desired direction [that is, in the 
 direction of free conversion] His Majesty's 
 Government will be ready to examine sympathetic- 
 ally." 
 
 It may be remarked, by way of parenthesis 
 and anticipation, that when the questions whether 
 a vessel might be transformed on the high seas 
 from merchantman to warship, and whether 
 she might then be retransformed, came to be 
 considered in the conference, Germany, Russia, 
 and France pronounced in favour of conversion ; 
 but, as Baron Taube, the Russian delegate, sorrow- 
 fully recorded, "the point of view of these three 
 powers represents, it appears, the opinion of a 
 minority of the conference." All the other seven 
 powers (Austria, however, with some leaning 
 towards it) pronounced against the claim for 
 unrestricted transformation and retransformation.
 
 ENEMY PROPERTY 165 
 
 Notwithstanding this, the commission reported, 
 not, as might have been expected and as propriety 
 seemed to demand, that the proposals had been 
 defeated and dismissed and ended by seven to 
 three — but that " the questions remain entire " ; 
 which meant that every nation went away with 
 the right to maintain its own view, and that while 
 Germany, Russia, and France will insist on and 
 will presumably exercise a right to transform and 
 retransform at will, the other seven will deny the 
 right and will presumably not exercise it. At any 
 rate, in this case Sir Edward Grey's proposals for 
 suggestions in the desired direction, and his 
 readiness to examine them with sympathy, came 
 to nothing. 
 
 10. Enemy property and how determined as 
 such, has always been a point of prime importance 
 in Prize Courts. For in most cases this lies at the 
 bottom of all ; and when once a decision is reached 
 that the goods or the ship is or is not enemy 
 property, all the rest usually follows of necessity. 
 The principle, therefore, upon which enemy or 
 neutral character is to be affixed to ship or goods, 
 is always of the utmost consequence. Such a 
 principle is not easy to arrive at, for property takes 
 on an almost infinite variety of forms, absolute and 
 conditional, and the interests in it, direct and 
 indirect, as infinite a variety of characters and 
 complexities. To lay down a single simple 
 unfaihng test or presumption is impossible. The 
 only way is to take into account all the facts and
 
 166 THE NAVAL COxNFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 circumstances, and to decide upon and after their 
 full and due consideration. That has been the 
 way of British Prize Courts ; and as they held, so 
 those will still hold who have considered all 
 that is involved in the notions summarised in the 
 single term property. 
 
 British Prize Courts accordingly have always 
 held that, whether for ships or goods, the property 
 in either must be decided to be that which was 
 established, not by any one fact or circumstance 
 alone, still less by any hard and fast rule or 
 presumption alone, but as a rational conclusion 
 reached by giving due relative weight to all the 
 facts, circumstances, and presumptions. This was 
 equally true for ships as for goods, with only this 
 difference, that a neutral flag worn — if worn lawfully 
 — by the ship, was admitted prima facie to raise the 
 presumption that the ship was neutral property. 
 But this presumption was not always supported ; 
 it was occasionally destroyed by the other facts. 
 At this day it would far more often be so 
 destroyed. Thus there is a vast fleet of ships 
 running at this day, every one of them owned by 
 the Mercantile Marine Company of the United 
 States, yet every one of them wearing the British 
 flag by a very flagrant, yet, as it is held, a very 
 legal, evasion of the British law, which restricts the 
 wearing of that flag to British owned vessels. Yet 
 Sir Edward Grey's instructions are these : — 
 
 "His Majesty's Government consider that it 
 would be right to assent to the principle that the
 
 ENEMY PROPERTY ON NEUTRAL SHIPS 167 
 
 test of the nationality of the ship should be the 
 flag which she is entitled to fly." 
 
 Wherewith away go all the other facts, 
 however strong, and in comes the single test, 
 however false and weak. 
 
 In the case of goods, the British courts took 
 the same way as with ships, of considering all 
 the relevant facts. They held that what mainly 
 determined the character of the owner was his 
 domicile then subsisting, the place of his habitation, 
 and the seat of his interests ; but that the property 
 (to quote Lord Stowell and Mr Justice Story), 
 "may acquire a hostile character altogether 
 independent of his (the ov^ne^'s) own peculiar 
 character," and that "there is a traffic which 
 stamps a national character on the individual 
 independent of that character which personal 
 residence may give him." But Sir Edward Grey 
 dismisses all as though it were a mere question 
 whether the single test of domicile or some other 
 single test is to be applied. He first incidentally 
 makes a remarkable avowal of the effect of the 
 Declaration of Paris : — 
 
 " Enemy property, except contraband, is by the 
 Declaration of Paris exempt from seizure when on 
 board neutral vessels ; and it is probable that in any 
 war in which one of the belligerents had a decided 
 naval preponderance, the enemy's mercantile 
 marine would be speedily driven from the seas, 
 and that consequently opportunities for capturing
 
 168 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 enemy property on hoard enemy ships would rapidly 
 disappear as the war proceeded" 
 
 The probability that all the enemy's property 
 would take refuge in neutral ships, that all of 
 it would, under the Declaration of Paris, be 
 protected by the neutral flag, and that there would 
 consequently be none of it capturable, is used 
 ingeniously : — 
 
 ** Whilst, therefore, His Majesty's Government 
 consider that the test of domicile is in every respect 
 preferable, they do not think the principle involved 
 is of such importance as to make insistence upon 
 it a vital matter." 
 
 Wherefore the delegates are — as usual : — 
 
 "Not to take a determined stand on its 
 maintenance should such an attitude stand in the 
 way of reaching any agreement." 
 
 The instructions throughout may not unfairly 
 be summarised as instructions to stand out upon 
 nothing, to reach an agreement upon every- 
 thing — any agreement whatever, but some agree- 
 ment. 
 
 Here again it may be parenthetically observed 
 that, as in the case of the transformation, the 
 blessed agreement to which all was to be sacrificed 
 was, in this respect, not reached by the conference ; 
 for ''unanimity could not be obtained": so that 
 while Ai'ticle 57 of the Declaration laid it down 
 that "the neutral or enemv character of a vessel is
 
 "THE RULES ARE NOT COMPLETE^' 169 
 
 determined by the flag she is entitled to fly," and 
 Article 58, *'that the neutral or enemy character 
 of goods found an board an enemy vessel is deter- 
 mined by the neutral or enemy character of the 
 owner," these articles left undetermined the ques- 
 tions of how the right to fly the flag is to be 
 ascertained, and how the character of the owner 
 is to be established^ — ^whether by domicile, by 
 nationality, or by all or any of the other circum- 
 stances. Such an uncertainty must leave these 
 vital questions wholly to its own notion of the 
 "general principles of justice and equity" — which 
 is to be the final law of the International Prize 
 Court — though they are thus left with a pretty 
 clear indication that no laborious examination and 
 weighing of circumstances is needed, that circum- 
 stances are of no great account, and that a slap- 
 dash hard and fast rule or presumption is to be the 
 guide. If, as has often happened, a ship is found 
 manned by an enemy crew and master, and 
 employed in enemy trade, yet held entitled to fly 
 a neutral flag, then of neutral character she will be 
 held in spite of all. And the same with goods 
 with an " owner "■ — whatever that may mean — " of 
 a neutral nationality"' — whatever that may mean, 
 or whether it means anything or nothing. Well 
 may M. Kenault, the French reporter, say "the 
 rules are not complete, some important points 
 having been forced to be left aside " ; and as well 
 may he add, " Article 58 only resolves the simplest 
 portion of the problem : it is the character, neutral
 
 170 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 or enemy, of the owner which determines the 
 character of the goods ; but what is to be rehed 
 upon to determine the character, neutral or enemy, 
 of the owner ? We do not say, because it has been 
 impossible to arrive at an understanding on this 
 point." And thus it was left, in the air, but in a 
 current blowing it away from the region of facts 
 towards the region of hard and fast rules and 
 presumptions. It transpires that there was an 
 " equal division of votes in the committee of the 
 conference," between this hard and fast rule of 
 domicile and the hard and fast rule of nationality. 
 What found no friends was the traditional and 
 only reasonable way of taking all the facts into 
 account. So that, here too, the sound British 
 method was abandoned. 
 
 11. The instructions lay down in a final 
 paragraph the guiding principles or notions to be 
 followed by the British delegates, thus : — 
 
 "You will ever bear in mind that the British 
 Empire, like every other state, has, ivhen neutral, 
 everything to gain from an impartial and effective 
 international jurisdiction in matters of prize, such 
 as it is the purpose of the forthcoming conference to 
 establish on a sure and solid foundation ; and that 
 if unhappily the Empire should be involved in 
 war, it will not suffer if those legitimate rights of a 
 belligerent state which have been proved in the 
 past to be essential to the successful assertion of 
 British sea power, and to the defence of British 
 independence, arc preserved undiminished and 
 placed beyond rightful challenge. The maintenance
 
 THE FACTS OF THE CASE 171 
 
 of these belligerent rights in their integrity, and the 
 widest possible freedom for neutrals in the unhindered 
 navigation of the seas, are the principles that 
 should remain before your eyes as the double object 
 to be pursued." 
 
 Stripped of its eloquent flesh and brought down 
 to its bare bones, what does this mean ? 
 
 1. It means that when Britain is neutral she 
 will gain from the existence of an International 
 Prize Court overriding and superseding her own 
 Courts. 
 
 2. That, when at war, she will not lose if her 
 ancient maritime rights are preserved undiminished. 
 
 3. And that, to maintain those rights and at the 
 same time to maintain the widest possible freedom 
 for neutrals, is the double object to be pursued. 
 
 As to which it is to be remarked : — 
 
 1. That Britain, whether neutral or beUigerent, 
 can only lose from the establishment of a court 
 which ousts her own, and in which there will 
 always be a majority against her. 
 
 2. That when at war she will lose, if her 
 belligerent rights are diminished, that sea power 
 which alone preserves her and her independence ; 
 that Britain alone and no other state is in this 
 case ; and that, being in this case, her sea power 
 must not be trusted to an if. 
 
 3. And that the merest attention will show, as 
 all history proves, that the maintenance of belliger- 
 ent rights undiminished, and the grant of the widest 
 possible freedom to neutrals are contradictory,
 
 172 THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON 
 
 contrary, and mutually exclusive propositions ; that 
 the maintenance of belligerent rights undiminished 
 renders impossible the widest freedom for neutrals ; 
 that the wider the freedom of the neutral the 
 greater the diminution of belligerent rights ; that as 
 one waxes the other must wane ; and that, in short, 
 belligerent rights and neutral freedom are opposed 
 to and mutually destructive each of the other, and 
 can never be a common object nor even a double 
 object. 
 
 All unawares, perhaps, the instructions recog- 
 nise what they do not express, and even seem 
 expressly to deny — that between beUigerent rights 
 and neutral freedom a choice must be made, and 
 that either the neutral must be advanced at the 
 cost of the belligerent or the belligerent at the cost 
 of the neutral. And the whole trend and tendency 
 of the instructions is to abandon the traditional 
 British policy of insisting on belligerent rights 
 against neutral freedom ; to accept and adopt 
 instead an insistence on neutral freedom against 
 belligerent rights ; and to inculcate throughout the 
 surrender of any doctrine, principle, or practice, 
 however sound, that might stand in the way of 
 agreement. 
 
 Naturally enough, the effect of such instructions 
 was to cause a surrender of almost everything that 
 came into question. And here let it be noted that 
 these instructions were not a surrender after a 
 conflict and a defeat in which the champions of 
 British rights had been worsted ; they were a volun-
 
 AN UNPROVOKED SURRENDER 173 
 
 teered, unforced, unprovoked surrender, lightly 
 adopted, and wantonly volunteered before even so 
 much as a summons had been made, much less a 
 defeat suffered. No array of force was required, 
 no persuasion was needed or waited for. It was 
 all done freely and even enthusiastically, without 
 need, pressure, or stress of any kind, and all 
 completed before the conference had even met. 
 
 " Sackvilles alone anticipate defeat, 
 And, ere they join the battle, sound retreat." 
 
 But these instructions, when there was yet no 
 sign of an enemy, instructed a flight and organised 
 a rout.
 
 VI 
 
 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 On the 4th December 1908, the conference 
 opened at the London Foreign Office. The 
 academic discussions which followed are enshrined 
 in 400 pages of minutes, reports, and appendices, 
 all reported, not in English, but in French alone. 
 They were so long and so meticulous as to extort 
 from M. Dumba, the Austrian delegate, "cries 
 of the heart " of impatience, which, at the closing 
 sitting of 26th February 1909, he sadly avowed, 
 and only hushed in order to join in the universal 
 chorus of congratulation and compliment which 
 ended this remarkable conclave. 
 
 Unlike the Hague Convention of 1907 setting 
 up the International Prize Court, the Declaration 
 of London, setting forth the new law for the court, 
 was on 26th February 1909 signed by six out of 
 the ten states convened to draw it up. Four of 
 the states, indeed (Japan, liussia, Spain, and 
 Italy), although they signed the final protocol on 
 the same day, did not then sign the Declaration. 
 They had all signed it, however, by 25th May 
 1909. 
 
 174
 
 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 175 
 
 The Declaration itself is such as Sir Edward 
 Grey's instructions suggested and foreshadowed. 
 So far as that could be done by such a document- 
 as to which, more later — it surrenders some of 
 the most important, and hitherto most highly 
 cherished of British belligerent rights. So far 
 as that can be done thus, it established in 1909 
 what in 1801 the King of England characterised 
 in his speech from the throne as "a new code 
 of maritime law inconsistent with the rights and 
 hostile to the interests of this country." 
 
 In every one of the ten principal instances 
 already cited from the instructions — as well as 
 in others — the rights of the naval belligerent 
 were either " diminished " or even destroyed ; and 
 that more especially whenever and wherever these 
 rights would enure to the greater advantage of 
 the stronger naval power. Throughout the 
 Declaration, at every turn, in every new change, 
 as though of set purpose, the rights which 
 experience has shown to be the essential buttresses 
 of British sea power are diminished, pared away, 
 or wholly destroyed. Every innovation proposed, 
 every change adopted, was to British disadvantage, 
 not one to her advantage. And the cumulative 
 effect of all — if once the Declaration be ratified 
 and the Alien Court submitted to — must be 
 for ever to impair British supremacy at sea, and 
 to leave her fleets, however powerful, so fettered 
 by these new paper rules of the ring as to be 
 little more than a splendid but impotent mockery.
 
 176 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 incapable of reducing an enemy to submission by 
 their power, and only capable of bringing Great 
 Britain into financial difficulties — perhaps even to 
 financial disaster — by their cost. 
 
 Let us see how the Declaration carried out 
 the instructions — leaving aside for the moment 
 all but the ten instances already cited. 
 
 1. The bias to the side of the neutral and 
 contrary to the side of the belligerent in time 
 of war, and the desire to enlarge neutral licence 
 and by so much to lessen belhgerent rights — 
 this recurs throughout. Manifest in all the long 
 discussions, it is made flagrant from one end to 
 the other of the Declaration. Such a bias and 
 such a desire are natural enough in the repre- 
 sentatives of powers every one of which would, 
 in war, be inferior in naval power to Great 
 Britain, every one of which would therefore in 
 all probability lose to her the command of the 
 sea; and to every one of whom it would 
 consequently be essential to have its trade carried 
 on for it and its supplies, whether commercial 
 or contraband, provided for it by the neutrals. 
 But the bias and the desire are as contrary to 
 the interests of Great Britain as they are for the 
 interests of the other powers. Yet, as the event 
 had been prepared, so it turned out. As the 
 British instructions set out for, so the British 
 delegates finally arrived at, a surrender all round. 
 But even these delegates, when they had reached 
 the goal, were themselves altogether uncertain as
 
 LEFT TO THE GO\'ERNMENT 177 
 
 to the real nature and effect of what they had 
 done. " The end," say they very truly, — 
 
 "The end which H.M. Government had in 
 view in callintj a naval conference has been 
 practically realised so far as concerns the general 
 6bh oratory character of the rules laid down," 
 
 But whether thev are rules which conform 
 to the true law of nations, to right or to fair 
 dealing, whether they have a good claim either 
 to validity or re.spect, and whether, above all, they 
 safeguard the rights and interests of Great Britain, 
 the delegates altogether doubt. They even express 
 their doubts in a passage coming as near to a 
 condemnation of their own instructions as anv 
 delegates ever penned. Here it is : — 
 
 " To what extent the rules themselves will 
 safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of 
 Great Britain, and how far their claim to general 
 validity and therefore to general respect is made 
 good by their inherent justice, and by their con- 
 formity with the true law of nations, of which, 
 according to the view always upheld by this 
 country, it is an essential feature that it should 
 flow from the recognition of the principles of 
 right and of fair dealing common to aU civilised 
 peoples, are questions ichkh we must leate to the 
 judgment of His Majesty's Government ^ 
 
 As to which it must be added that, not to 
 the judgment of His Majesty's Government, but 
 to the judgment of that sole and only sovereign 
 authority in Great Britain — :o the judgment of 
 
 M
 
 178 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 Parliament itself, should they and must they be 
 finally brought. 
 
 2. Contraband trade by neutrals with belli- 
 gerents received in the Declaration all that 
 sympathetic consideration which the instructions 
 had prescribed. 
 
 Article 40 declares that "a vessel carrying 
 contraband may be condemned if the contraband, 
 reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or 
 freight, forms more than half the cargo," — which 
 is only to say in other words that she may not 
 be condemned if it forms less than half. As to 
 this, M. Renault, the reporter, naively says "this 
 may appear severe," as though it were severe on 
 the neutral contraband -carrier ; whereas the severity 
 is on the belligerent, whose power of penalising 
 and of thereby hindering contraband trade is thus 
 limited. The only purpose of the Article is to 
 free the trafficker in contraband from the penalty 
 attached to the traffic. There is no other meaning 
 or principle in it. One ship is to be condemned 
 for carrying 100 tons of arms and ammunition 
 because she carries less than 200 tons of cargo 
 in all; another is not to be condemned for 
 carrying 1000 tons of the same only because 
 she carries more than 2000 tons in all. The 
 greater the ship, the more contraband may she 
 carry without risk of condemnation — which is as 
 though a five-foot burglar should be condemned 
 for carrying a two-foot knife, while a six-foot 
 bm'glar is accounted innocent unless his knife is
 
 LOOPHOLES FOR CONTRABAND 179 
 
 longer than three feet. " You may carry contraband 
 with impunity," says the Article, "but you really 
 must not overdo it^ — especially if you are a 
 small ship." Thus Lafontaine : — 
 
 " Faut de la vertu ; pas trop n'en faut : 
 L'exces en tout est un defaut." 
 
 And so faut de la contrebande ; pas trop Tien 
 faut. Never was reason, principle, or equity 
 more flagrantly abandoned in order to cover with 
 immunity the neutral provider of means of 
 destruction, and in order thereby to give an 
 advantage in war to that weaker of the two 
 belligerents to whom alone such providers are 
 essential. 
 
 Article 32 throws wide open and sanctions to 
 "a vessel carrying absolute contraband" the 
 further means of escape, always hitherto practised 
 wholesale in all wars, of false papers made out 
 for a false destination. For it declares that ''her 
 papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on 
 which she is engaged, miless she is found clearly 
 out of the course indicated by her papers a7id 
 unable to give adequate reasons to justify such 
 deviation " — two conditions which the captain of a 
 ship provided with false papers would be very 
 simple if he could not comply with. 
 
 Article 35 goes still further, and does for the 
 contraband cargo what Article 32 does for the 
 contraband-carrier. Here, too, it is declared that 
 " the ship's papers are conclusive proof, both as to
 
 180 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as 
 to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is 
 found clearly out of the course indicated by her 
 papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to 
 justify such deviation." 
 
 Every seaman knows that the course to an 
 innocent and the course to a guilty destination 
 are constantly identical for a great part of the 
 voyage. Thus the Doelwyck, carrying false papers 
 representing her to be bound for Bombay, but in 
 reality bound for Jibouti — and full of contraband — • 
 was captured in the Red Sea, on a course common 
 both to the pretended and to the real voyage. 
 She was condemned by the Italian Prize Court at 
 Eome. Yet in this case there was no "deviation" 
 whatever, and under the Declaration of London 
 she could not even have been called upon to give 
 reasons, adequate or otherwise, for a deviation 
 that had not occurred. Wherefore neither she 
 nor her contraband cargo would have been 
 " liable to captm-e " or to condemnation, so long as 
 she was careful only to show in her false papers 
 the "conclusive proof" of her innocent voyage 
 and cargo. 
 
 These two articles invest the falsest of papers 
 with a sacred character, and, if these papers and 
 the ship's course are but discreetly handled, will 
 leave the belligerent the helpless victim of frauds 
 which in all wars have been of everyday occurrence 
 — and which were indeed common enough even 
 in the late Kusso- Japanese War.
 
 CONDITIONAL CONTRABAND 181 
 
 Articles 33 and 34 are all in the same spirit. 
 "Conditional contraband" (or things capable of 
 either warlike or peaceful use) is declared in 
 Article 33 (in accordance with the now existing 
 law) to be "liable to capture if it is shown to 
 be destined for the use of the armed forces or 
 of a Government department of the enemy state " ; 
 though, even so, it escapes if "the circumstances 
 show that the goods cannot in fact be used for 
 the purposes of the war in progress,'' however 
 useful for wars in general or for any other war 
 than this. But Article 34 only allows the "pre- 
 sumption" of the prohibited destination to exist 
 either " if the goods are consigned to enemy 
 authorities," to "a fortified place belonging to the 
 enemy or other place serving as a base for 
 the armed forces of the enemy," or else to 
 a " trader [falsely translated ' contractor ' in the 
 English version] established in the enemy country 
 who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies 
 articles of this kind to the enemy." If the 
 goods are consigned (or rather addressed, the 
 French binding text having adresse) otherwise 
 than to one of the destinations enumerated, 
 then away goes the presumption; and then 
 the very contrary presumption is set up and 
 "the destination is presumed to be innocent." 
 Still more innocent must have been those British 
 delegates who, with all the frauds before them that 
 were exposed by Lord Stowell, could accept this. 
 The article is but a manual of instructions for the
 
 182 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 use of the trafficker in conditional contraband, 
 desirous to carry foodstuffs, forage, clothing, 
 vehicles, vessels, coal, railway material or such 
 like to the armed forces of a belligerent who is 
 prevented by the superior naval power of his 
 enemy from carrying them for himself. It informs 
 him that if he will only "address" such things, 
 neither to enemy authorities nor to a fortified 
 place, nor to a base for armed force, nor to a 
 trader who as a matter of common knowledge 
 supplies articles of this kind to the enemy — 
 that, if he will only refrain from such addresses 
 as these, and will address his goods to some other 
 place or person, then "the destination is presumed 
 to be innocent," and the goods, the venture, and 
 himself likewise innocent. The exact, sufficient 
 method of fabricating false papers and false 
 addresses, and the dangers that are to be avoided 
 in their fabrication, cannot be more precisely set 
 forth ; and he will be a foolish person indeed who 
 does not successfully practise the art. It is an 
 art which will be practised for the benefit of 
 Britain's enemy alone, in order to cover that 
 enemy's supplies with immunity from British 
 cruisers. Britain herself, if predominant at sea 
 in the struggle, will have no need for such opera- 
 tions. For her command of the sea will suf- 
 ficiently protect the passage of any such supplies 
 that she may need. And even if she be not 
 so predominant, even then — so wide and so open 
 are the avenues of access to the British Islands —
 
 "ABSOLUTE" OR "CONDITIONAL" 183 
 
 even then such supplies cannot be intercepted to 
 any appreciable extent were all the navies of the 
 world to be set to the task. 
 
 3. Contraband is, however, limited in itself by 
 the declaration which expressly excludes from the 
 contraband character, not only a whole category 
 of specially named things, but everything else not 
 named in two other categories. 
 
 Article 22 gives a list of "absolute contraband," 
 Article 24 of " conditional contraband," and 
 Articles 27, 28, and 29 of "articles which may 
 not be declared contraband either absolute or 
 conditional." Among those in the last list are 
 " raw materials of the textile industries and yarns 
 of the same," and "metallic ores"; while Article 
 30, adopting the principle of " continuous voyage " 
 for absolute contraband alone, makes this liable 
 to capture if destined to the enemy or his armed 
 forces, " whether the carriage of the goods is direct, 
 or entails trans-shipment or a subsequent carriage 
 by land." 
 
 Now, the experience of war and the numerous 
 decisions of Prize Courts show that what is 
 contraband is incapable of being thus listed. It 
 depends on the circumstances of time, place, and 
 destination. What is contraband at one time and 
 place is not so at another. The only true and 
 sufficient way is to take all the circumstances into 
 account. To make exclusive hard and fast lists, 
 and to declare that nothing outside them shall ever 
 at any time or place or under any circumstances
 
 184 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 be contraband at all, is most unduly to tie the 
 bands of the belligerent — especially of the stronger 
 belligerent, and therefore most especially of Great 
 Britain — in preventing such trade with the enemy 
 as is contraband (or " against the law ") of nations. 
 But there is more than that. 
 
 Articles 23 and 25 provide that anything " may 
 be added to the list" either of absolute or of 
 conditional contraband, "by declaration" of a 
 belligerent power, made either in war or in peace. 
 This is one of the most monstrous and abusive of 
 all the monstrous and abusive features of the 
 Declaration. For no authority to make such a 
 Declaration is required, either from a National 
 Prize Court or from the International Prize Court. 
 A belligerent power is left at its own will to 
 declare what it pleases to be contraband. M. 
 Renault frankly observes that (on a trouv^ ex- 
 cessive) " some thought excessive the power 
 accorded to a state of adding to the list [of 
 contraband] by virtue of its own simple declara- 
 tion." It was natural to think it. But M. 
 Renault holds it sufficient to reply to such thinkers 
 that if a power had the presumption to add to 
 the list of absolute contraband, "things not 
 exclusively used in war "• — then — what then ? 
 Why, then : " She might draw upon herself 
 diplomatic remonstrances {reclamations), since 
 she would ignore an accepted rule ! " Yes, indeed, 
 she might ; yet how much she might care for them 
 is not suggested. He also says " there would be
 
 CONVOY 185 
 
 an eventual appeal to the International Prize 
 Court " — a very insufficient consolation, seeing that 
 the declaration is to come into force the instant 
 it is made. As to all which, a cynic might say 
 " merci du peu ! " and all which leaves it open to 
 — nay, positively invites — any belligerent at any 
 moment to declare contraband any mortal thing 
 it may have at that moment either a desire or an 
 opportunity to capture and confiscate. Such are 
 the abuses that arise when it is sought to with- 
 draw from the National Prize Courts, deciding 
 not on hard and fast lists but by reference to 
 all the circumstances, what is and what is not 
 contraband. Great Britain always has desired and 
 must still desire rather to extend than to limit 
 the list of contraband, so far as her own Prize 
 Courts would permit. But to extend it in this 
 purely arbitrary fashion without law or warrant, 
 to apply the extension instantly without any other 
 check than the possibility of a diplomatic remon- 
 strance or a distant final appeal to such a court 
 as that of the Hague — this never entered the mind 
 of the most reckless British extender of contra- 
 band. Never until this declaration was signed. 
 
 4. Convoy, as giving immunity from search or 
 visit is treated by Articles 61 and 62. Article 
 61 declares that " neutral vessels mider [their own] 
 national convoy are exempt from search." The 
 neutral vessels may be two coasting vessels under 
 convoy of a battleship, or twenty Atlantic liners 
 under convoy of a torpedo -destroyer — the rule is
 
 186 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 the same in both cases. One or all of the con- 
 voyed vessels may be, in fact, engaged in attempt- 
 ing to break a blockade ; in carrying troops to the 
 enemy ; it may be imder the control of an enemy's 
 agent ; it may be a neutral collier chartered by the 
 enemy's fleet and full of coal for that fleet ; it 
 may even be an enemy ship falsely pretending to 
 be a neutral, and possibly destined to be later 
 " transformed " into an enemy warship ; it may be 
 actually engaged in giving hostile assistance in one 
 way or other to the enemy. And the warship 
 meeting the convoy may either have absolute 
 information to this eff'ect or may see manifest 
 signs of it. All that matters not. The captain 
 of the warship may not search, may not visit, may 
 not ask a question or look at a paper. He may 
 " communicate his suspicions " to the captain of 
 the convoying ship; but it is "for the commander 
 of the convoy alone to investigate the matter," and 
 to give a copy of his report thereon to the war- 
 ship officer. "With that, and with that alone, 
 under whatever circumstances, the captain of the 
 warship must remain satisfied. He must so 
 remain even if the report discloses that one or all 
 of the convoyed ships are admittedly full of " condi- 
 tional contraband." Whether they are or are not 
 destined to the armed forces of the enemy, is for 
 the convoying captain to decide — for him alone, 
 who is thus constituted a Prize Court in himself. 
 If the captain of the belligerent warship, or if his 
 Government, does not like it, why then, says M.
 
 BLOCKADE 187 
 
 Renault sweetly and finally — *' there can only be 
 a protest by the officer of the cruiser," and, if 
 anything else, the difficulty will be settled "by 
 diplomatic methods." The door thus opened to 
 wholesale frauds — not necessarily, though even 
 that possibly (for such things have been) on the 
 part of the convoying officer, but on the part of 
 the convoy ed^ — this is wide indeed. For it is 
 impossible that an officer can know all the cargoes, 
 all the papers, and all the intentions of his convoy, 
 or be able personally to answer for all. It matters 
 not. He cannot know and the cruiser must not 
 inquire. 
 
 Here, again, it is manifest that all the gain of 
 any fraud perpetrated will enure to the weaker 
 belligerent, who may urgently need fraudulent 
 neutral aid, and not to the stronger, who needs it 
 not, since her own ships freely traverse the seas. 
 Here again, then, all the mischief is done to the 
 belligerent who is stronger on the seas, or, in every 
 probable case, to Great Britain. 
 
 5. Blockade — what it is, what constitutes a 
 breach of it, and what powers and remedies the 
 blockader has against the blockade-breaker, have 
 always been matters of the highest moment in all 
 naval wars. In future wars they must be of 
 greater importance than ever before they were. 
 For, since the Declaration of Paris of 1856 
 deprived belligerents of the right to capture 
 enemy goods in neutral ships, and since it is the 
 weaker belligerent alone that will be forced so to
 
 188 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 get its goods carried, while the stronger, being in 
 command of the sea, need have no recourse to the 
 neutral flag — since this was agreed to, the stronger 
 belligerent can no longer effectually and over all 
 the seas act upon the trade of the weaker as 
 formerly it could. On the other hand, the 
 weaker belligerent will be tempted to keep its fleets 
 in port in order to avoid their probable destruc- 
 tion should they take the seas. Blockade, there- 
 fore, is the most effectual weapon now left to the 
 stronger power ; and its importance is increased in 
 proportion to the importance of all the other 
 weapons now withdrawn. 
 
 Blockade has in the past been grossly abused, 
 and, to our shame be it confessed, by no Govern- 
 ment more than by the British, which, in reply to 
 Napoleon's outrageous decrees of Berlin and Milan, 
 announced by Orders in Council an even more out- 
 rageous paper blockade of almost all Europe. 
 
 But infinitely more outrageous than this is the 
 pretence set up in recent years of a right in peace 
 to apply, by a stronger to a weaker — but never by a 
 weaker to a stronger — power that forcible coercion, 
 with all that belongs to it, which nothing but war 
 can render justifiable, lawful or even conceivable. 
 This is called " pacific blockade," which is as great 
 a contradiction in terms as would be "pacific war," 
 which inflicts upon the blockaded the miseries of 
 war without giving them any of its rights, and than 
 which no more monstrous, lawless, and unprincipled 
 use of force can be imagined. Yet strangely
 
 BLOCKADE 189 
 
 enough this wanton and unimaginable method for 
 the coercion of the weak by the strong has failed 
 to excite any remonstrance from the friends of 
 peace and the enemies of war^ — as though they 
 were as ready to excuse acts which war alone can 
 justify when done in peace, as they are prompt to 
 condemn similar acts when done in war. Again it 
 must be confessed to our shame that England has 
 been a great sinner in this respect. 
 
 Nevertheless, incredible as it may seem, neither 
 the Hague Conference of 1907 nor the Declaration 
 of London of 1909 — both of them speaking with 
 the voice of humanity and civilisation, justice, 
 equity, and luminous stars ; both of them dealing 
 with blockade ; the latter at least professing to set 
 forth " the generally recognised rules of international 
 law" ; and both professing high regard for "pacific 
 commerce" — neither of them gives any attention 
 whatever to this most monstrous abuse, beyond the 
 remark made by M. Renault, who reports that " it 
 was not intended to touch in anything what is 
 called pacific blockade." So that, while the 
 Declaration narrows, trammels, restricts, and ties up 
 by the most minute regulations that blockade in 
 war which is as lawful as justifiable, it leaves 
 untouched in anything that blockade in peace 
 which is as unlawful as it is unjustifiable. Which 
 gives the measure at once of the humanity and the 
 honesty of those who concurred in making the 
 Declaration. 
 
 Articles 1 to 21 of this Declaration are con-
 
 190 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 cerned with the regulations in question. All that 
 is new in them is restrictive of the blockader and 
 enlarging of the opportunities for blockade-breaking. 
 
 Article 2 declares (and declares be it observed 
 in principle, most properly, in order to leave no 
 room for fictitious or ''paper" blockades) that "a 
 blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective 
 — that is to say, it must be maintained by a force 
 sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy 
 coast hne " — which, of course, means not the whole 
 coast line but that part thereof which is blockaded. 
 
 Article 17 declares that : — 
 
 "Neutral vessels may not be captured for 
 breach of blockade, except within the area of opera- 
 tions of the warships detailed to render the 
 blockade effective." 
 
 What now is this new "area of operations" 
 without which no capture may be made? It is 
 not, as might be supposed, the area in which each 
 ship, having regard to her coal capacity, can 
 operate, still less the aggregate of the areas in 
 which all of the ships can operate. It is defined as 
 " the aggregate of the zones of watching and block- 
 ing ["surveillance''] of all the blocking ships so 
 organised as that the blockade is effective." Now 
 the blockade must remain "effective." If for any 
 other cause than stress of weather — the sole case 
 of force majeure which can be alleged (and which 
 is recognised in Article 4) — it ceases to be " effec- 
 tive," then it is "considered raised" and at an end.
 
 BLOCKADE 191 
 
 The consequence of this is, under Article 17, 
 considerable. Say that at least twenty ships, 
 possibly of various kinds, are needed to make 
 effective the blockade of a given port. If, in the 
 absence of stress of weather, the blockading force 
 is diminished by one of the ships, the blockade 
 ceases to be effective, the other nineteen being, on 
 the hypothesis, insufficient; and the blockade is 
 raised. Consequently no such ship in such circum- 
 stances may chase a blockade-breaker anywhere 
 beyond "the aggregate of the zones of surveil- 
 lance" (whatever that may be) of the blockading 
 force. For if she does she raises the blockade she 
 is engaged in maintaining. The dilemma is 
 ingenious. It is to say, " either you must leave the 
 blockade-breaker unpursued except within the 
 zone of your blockading vigilance, and must thus 
 possibly leave her to break the blockade either then 
 or later ; or else you must yom'self raise the 
 blockade by the withdrawal which makes it cease 
 to be effective." Whereby Article 17 adds a 
 wholly new, purely notional, and altogether 
 artificial restriction upon the blockading force 
 and consequently upon blockade itself. 
 
 But, it may be objected, if twenty ships are 
 needed to maintain the blockade effective, a 
 prudent blockader will always have a few more to 
 spare for the chase of the blockade-breaker. By 
 detaching one of those few he would still maintain 
 his effective blockade, even though the chase we^'e 
 continued beyond "the aggregate of the zones."
 
 192 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 That is true. But even so the mischief of Article 
 17 is not ended. For beyond this magic zone no 
 blockade breaker may be captured at all by any 
 one of his vessels. Herein, quite apart from the 
 possible dilemma, lies the new restriction on the 
 blockadcr. Once outside the zone, the blockade 
 breaker may snap her fingers at him. So may 
 twenty or a hundred blockade-breakers, all waiting 
 for a chance which sooner or later they will 
 probably get of slipping into the blockaded port. 
 Such a rule makes the captiu-e or even the frighten- 
 ing off of blockade-breakers infinitely more difficult. 
 How difficult it is even under the existing law and 
 practice of unlimited chase to any distance, those 
 know who have any knowledge of what happened 
 in the blockade of the confederate ports during the 
 American Civil War. 
 
 The law of nations, as declared consistently by 
 British Prize Courts, is that a blockade -breaker 
 may, so long as the blockade lasts, be pursued and 
 captured at any time during and up to the conclu- 
 sion of her voyage. How much more restrictive 
 is the rule of Ai'ticle 17 is obvious. And, as 
 throughout, the new restriction is, for the reasons 
 already stated, a restriction on the stronger 
 of the belligerents and therefore principally, 
 if not exclusively, on Great Britain. 
 
 6. Destruction of captured neutral merchant 
 ships, or even of ships of doubtful character, 
 without trial or judgment was always forbidden 
 by the law of nations ; and, in case such a ship
 
 DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL SHIPS 193 
 
 could not be brought or sent in for trial and judg- 
 ment, her release was always required under 
 penalty of full compensation by the captor. The 
 rule was as manifestly just as it was merciful and 
 considerate to the defenceless merchantman, and 
 therefore eminently favourable to commerce. Yet 
 this Declaration, affecting though it does through- 
 out an especial respect for commerce, an especial 
 purpose to relieve it from the incidents of war, and 
 asserting as it does in its own preamble that it is 
 intended among other purposes for the "advan- 
 tages" of "pacific commerce" — yet this Declaration, 
 by Articles 48 and 49, sweeps away all need for 
 trial and judgment, or sending in to port that 
 these may be held and given. It abrogates 
 both the prohibition to destroy and the injunction 
 to release — and leaves the captor free to destroy 
 at his will the defenceless, untried merchantman ; 
 subject indeed to the illusory and mocking con- 
 ditions that either to send his capture into 
 port or to release her would "involve danger 
 to the safety of the (his own) warship or to 
 the success of the operation in which she is 
 engaged at the time," and that he must "establish 
 that he only acted in the face of an excep- 
 tional necessity of the nature contemplated in 
 Article 49." 
 
 In any case an authorisation to destroy under 
 some conditions is wholly different from and 
 contrary to a prohibition from destroying under 
 
 any conditions. But the conditions attached to the 
 
 N
 
 194 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 authorisation are no safeguards at all. "Danger 
 to the safety" of his ship may mean, and in the 
 case of the weaker belligerent would mean, that 
 if instead of destroying he released the ship, she 
 might and probably would inform an enemy ship 
 of war of his whereabouts, and thus bring upon 
 him the danger (which, being only fit to deal with 
 unarmed traders, he desires to avoid) of a naval 
 action. " Danger to the success of the operations " 
 in which his ship is engaged is even wider. For 
 those operations might be no other than the 
 operations of sinking defenceless merchantmen 
 without trial or judgment. He alone is to judge 
 of that on the spot and at the moment ; and it 
 may be well worth while to accept the risk of 
 subsequent, far-distant, possible failure to establish 
 the exceptional necessity for the sake of the 
 immediate harm done to the enemy. 
 
 But, however this may be, it is amazing that in 
 the name of humanity, civilisation, justice, equity, 
 and luminous stars a captor should be authorised 
 to sink, burn, and destroy untried, uncondemned, 
 and perhaps wholly innocent merchantmen, when- 
 ever it is in any way risky to his ship or 
 inconvenient to his pmposes to release her. 
 
 7. Hostile assistance to the enemy by neutrals 
 (clumsily translated in the English version as 
 "unneutral service") embraces the carriage of 
 enemy despatches. This despatch-carrying is, it 
 would seem, assumed to be sufficiently dealt with 
 by the Convention No. 11, "signed without any
 
 DESPATCH-CARRYING BY NEUTRALS 195 
 
 reservations" in 1907 by the British delegates — 
 which convention, as already remarked, makes 
 postal correspondence, whether of neutrals or 
 belligerents, and whether in a neutral or an enemy 
 ship, "inviolable" by a commander at sea, while 
 leaving it violable by a commander on land. 
 Articles 45, 46, and 47 of the Declaration, conceiv- 
 ably for this reason, make no mention of postal 
 correspondence or of despatches. Article 46, 
 however, enlightens and defines this Convention 
 No. 11 by declaring that "a neutral vessel will 
 be condemned if" — and therefore, in this respect 
 only if — "she is exclusively engaged at the 
 time ... in the transmission of intelligence [the 
 word in the binding French text is nouvelles, 
 which is much narrower in signification than 
 " intelligence," for intelligence may be either new 
 or old, but nouvelles must be new if not indeed 
 "news"] in the interest of the enemy." Thus 
 enemy despatches in either a neutral or an enemy 
 ship, made up as postal correspondence, are in- 
 violable ; and as to the neutral, he may with 
 immunity carry either despatches or commissions, 
 or any other documents in the interests of the 
 enemy, provided only that he is not at that time 
 " exclusively " engaged in doing him that service — 
 as if, for instance, he is engaged in doing him 
 another service in addition thereto. 
 
 So too as to the transportation of enemy troops, 
 the neutral, under Article 45, goes free unless he 
 is " on a voyage specially undertaken with a view
 
 196 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 to the transport of individual passengers who are 
 embodied in the armed forces of the enemy." Both 
 conditions must be present. If the individuals are 
 not "embodied" he may transport them even on a 
 voyage specially undertaken v^itli that view. Or 
 even if the individuals are embodied, then he may 
 transport them if only he is not on a voyage 
 specially taken with that purpose. Nay, he may 
 go further. He may " transport a military detach- 
 ment of the enemy, or one or more persons who in 
 the course of the voyage directly assist the opera- 
 tions of the enemy," provided that this is not 
 done "to the knowledge of either the owner, the 
 charterer, or the master " ; a provision with which 
 the merest tyro in neutral frauds can comply. An 
 owner, charterer, or master, who left about any 
 proof of such knowledge to be used against him 
 by his captor, would have to "bear up for the 
 church " ; nor would any such proof in such circum- 
 stances ever be forthcoming unless by accident. 
 
 This is in the same spirit as is found throughout 
 the Declaration — the spirit which has led its foreign 
 advocates and its British victims to treat all 
 neutral interference with the war as a justifiable 
 and excusable act, and to protect it from all 
 penalty. Yet those most imbued by this spirit 
 must admit that in this instance it has carried 
 them so far as to reach the limits of absurdity. 
 
 Here once again it is to be observed that all 
 this is only for the sea, and that on the land the 
 belligerent is still the spoilt child of the most
 
 FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 197 
 
 respectable advocates of trammels for the belliger- 
 ent at sea. 
 
 8. Transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral 
 flag — lawful enough in itself when real and made 
 in good faith — is as manifestly unlawful when false, 
 or made for the purpose of cheating the belligerent 
 into the belief that the ship is a neutral entitled to 
 neutral treatment, though in fact she is an enemy 
 and only entitled to enemy treatment. The question 
 always is whether the alleged transfer was or was 
 not honestly made. And since, if it was dishonestly 
 made or not made at all but only pretended, all the 
 persons concerned would assuredly have taken every 
 precaution unscrupulous contrivance could suggest 
 to conceal their fraud ; and since the difficulty of 
 proving the fraud is thus greatly increased, no 
 obstacles whatever can equitably be put in the way 
 of the belligerent on whom, be it remembered, the 
 task of proof is imposed. All the circumstances 
 should be open to his investigation and comment — 
 which indeed have often overthrown what at first 
 sight appeared the most honest cases of real 
 transfer, and have shown them to be dishonest and 
 unreal. Manifestly the only possibility of doing 
 this is to be allowed unfettered investigation, and 
 unrestricted production and comment on all the 
 circumstances such an investigation has unearthed. 
 
 Instead of leaving cases of a kind so delicate, 
 so differing, and so infinitely varying, to that full 
 consideration and weighing of all the circumstances 
 which alone suffices, Articles 55 and 56 pile up
 
 198 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 foregone "presumptions," which decide the case 
 upon arbitrarily chosen facts before all the 
 circumstances can be even so much as alleged. 
 Thus, by Article 55, "where the transfer was 
 effected more than thirty days before the outbreak 
 of hostilities, there is an absolute presumption that 
 it is valid, if it is unconditional^ complete, and in con- 
 formity with the laws of the countries concerned, and 
 if its effect is such that neither the control of nor 
 the profits arising from the employment of the 
 vessel remain in the same hands as before the 
 transfer." In other words, however suspicious 
 the circumstances may be, however strong the 
 circumstantial evidence against the ship alleged to 
 have been transferred, she is absolutely presumed 
 innocent, unless the captor (on whom lies the 
 burden of proof), with his hands full of circum- 
 stantial evidence sufficient to hang a score of men, is 
 able to add thereto conclusive proof that the transfer 
 was either not unconditional, or complete, or in 
 conformity with the law of the two foreign 
 countries concerned, or of the effect described. 
 Nay, there is more. He must also (Article 55) 
 prove " that such transfer was made in order to 
 evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, 
 as such, is exposed." Otherwise, the "transfer is 
 valid " ; even if only made within, not thirty days, 
 but three hours before the outbreak of hostilities. 
 Here, however, comes in another presumption (not 
 an absolute presumption this time, but one "that 
 may be rebutted ") — that " if the bill of sale is not
 
 TRANSFORMATION OF MERCHANT SHIPS 199 
 
 on board," and if the transfer took place "less than 
 sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities " (for 
 here it is not thirty but sixty days), then there is 
 "a presumption that the transfer is void." It is 
 right to say, however, that this system of presump- 
 tions is as unfair to the captured as to the captor. 
 For Article 56 declares that "there is an absolute 
 presumption that a transfer is void" when made 
 after the outbreak of hostilities ; "if made during a 
 voyage or in a blockaded port " ; or " if a right to 
 repurchase is reserved " ; or " if the requirements of 
 the municipal law governing the right to fly the 
 flag under which the vessel is sailing have not 
 been fulfilled." And here the burden of proof is 
 put, not upon the captor, but upon the captured. 
 Such a fencing ofl" with presumptions, contrary 
 presumptions, and conditional presumptions, of 
 the facts and circumstances, which may conceiv- 
 ably be essential to establish the veritable character 
 of the case, is ingenious. But it is calculated to 
 prevent rather than to assist the discovery of the 
 truth. 
 
 9. Transformation of merchantmen into men- 
 of-war, or of men-of-war into merchantmen, 
 effected by a belligerent outside its own juris- 
 diction on the high seas, is not dealt with by the 
 Declaration of London of 1909. There is no 
 article of the Declaration dealing with it. 
 
 Yet this question imperatively demanded 
 decision. The ten powers were met together, in 
 order — as the preamble to the Declaration puts it
 
 200 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 — "to arrive at an asfreement as to what are the 
 generally recognised rules of international law," 
 to extend to neutrals and belligerents alike "all 
 the advantages which an agreement as to the said 
 rules would in the unfortunate event of a naval war 
 present " ; and " having regard to the divergence " 
 of rules and practice together, "to insure henceforth 
 a greater measm^e of uniformity " in this respect. 
 
 This question demanded decision not alone upon 
 these grounds, but also because upon its decision 
 there depended the fate of one of the two essential 
 articles of the Declaration of Paris, 18*56, which 
 many of the delegates professed to regard as a 
 sacred and inalterable portion of the law of nations. 
 For the Declaration of Paris abolished privateering, 
 in return for the abolition of the right to capture 
 enemy goods in neutral ships. Transformation, 
 while leaving that right of capture abolished, would 
 not only restore privateering, but would render it 
 infinitely more easy to practise; and would thus 
 leave Great Britain under all the disadvantages of 
 the Paris Declaration, while depriving her of the 
 consideration given for them. 
 
 The question was in fact decided by a majority 
 of seven to three of the declaring states — and 
 decided against transformation. Of the ten states, 
 only Germany, Russia, and France were for it, 
 according to Baron Taube, the liussian delegate, 
 who avows that "the point of view of these three 
 powers represents, it appears, the opinion of the 
 minority of the conference." On other points
 
 ENEMY PROPERTY 201 
 
 the minority had withdrawn or come to a com- 
 promise. But on this the minority stood fast 
 against all agreement. Wherefore M. Kenault 
 reported that, both as to transformation and 
 retransformation, the questions "remain entire," 
 wholly undecided, and to be decided presumably by 
 the diflferent Prize Courts of different states in 
 different ways ; those of Germany, Eussia, and 
 France deciding that transformation is, and those 
 of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Italy, 
 Austria, Holland, and Spain deciding that it is 
 not, lawful. The " greater measure of uniformity " 
 is here singularly absent, and the International 
 Prize Court is left to apply its own notions of 
 justice and equity. 
 
 10. Enemy property — how determined as such 
 ■ — is a question dealt with at the London Con- 
 ference by a special sub-commission of five (viz., 
 Germany, Mr Goppert; France, M. Fromageot — 
 who was the reporter ; Great Britain, Mr Hurst ; 
 Italy, Mr Ricci-Busatti ; and Russia, Baron Nolde) 
 — on which committee, it will be noticed, the 
 three states which had declared in favour of 
 transformation at will were each represented by 
 one delegate, while the seven states which had 
 declared against it were only represented by two, 
 all told, for the seven. 
 
 The natural rule as to enemy property is 
 obviously that the character of the property is the 
 character of its owner. And that is the rule of 
 the law of nations, whether for property in ships
 
 202 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 or in goods, as declared by British Prize Courts, 
 whose criterion for the character of the owner is 
 his domicile, his habitation, the scene of his 
 activities, the abiding place of his material interests 
 and business — whatever may be the much more 
 indefinite and much less easily established character 
 represented by that word "nationality," which, in 
 these days especially, has almost ceased to have 
 any strict meaning. Strong advocates indeed were 
 found for nationality as against and instead of 
 domicile; and it would have seemed as if, of 
 necessity, a choice must be made between the two. 
 For property in a ship differs in no essential 
 respect from property in goods ; and whatever 
 criterion there is for the one must be equally good 
 for the other. 
 
 But the ingenious gentlemen of the committee, 
 " after having ascertained that the opinions resulting 
 from the practice followed up to now by the powers 
 represented at the conference were equally divided," 
 finally adopted one rule for ships and another 
 for goods, by '' consecrating the rule of nationality 
 there where it appeared wise, and the rule 
 of domicile there where this rule presented 
 advantages." 
 
 Article 57 therefore declares "the neutral or 
 enemy character of the vessel is determined by the 
 flag which she is entitled to fly " ; by which, as is 
 carefully explained in the report thereon, is meant, 
 that the nationality alone of the ship is to be 
 considered, and neither the nationality nor the
 
 OWNERSHIP AND THE FLAG 203 
 
 domicile of the owner. "Wherefore," says the 
 report, "it is necessary [convient-il) to attach 
 oneself exclusively to it (the nationality), and 
 to set aside what belongs to the personality of 
 the owner," Thus for a ship the nationaHty 
 is everything : the owner nothing. But, touching 
 goods, Article 58 declares that "the neutral 
 or enemy character of goods found on board 
 an enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or 
 enemy character of the owner." In the end, the 
 criterion of domicile for determining the character 
 of the owner, which had been introduced as a 
 proviso to Article 58, was rejected altogether; the 
 very word " domicile " completely disappeared from 
 the article ; and the result of the so-called com- 
 promise whereby nationality was to be the criterion 
 for ships and domicile for goods was this : — That 
 whereas in the one article nationality was retained 
 and made the sole and exclusive criterion, yet in 
 the second, domicile disappeared altogether, and 
 was no more heard of For "unanimity could not 
 be obtained " for even the most modest mention of 
 domicile in the second article, while it apparently 
 was obtained for the absolute and exclusive setting 
 up of nationality in the first article. And so the 
 false principle was adopted, while the true principle 
 was rejected, even from so much as an allusion. 
 
 As this is left, what determines the character of 
 the ship we know exactly — it is not domicile, it is 
 "nationality." What determines the character of 
 the goods we do not know at all ; for that turns on
 
 204 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON 
 
 the character of the owner, and whether this is to 
 be determined by domicile, by nationality, or by 
 something else, we are not told. "Article 58," 
 says the reporter, " only resolves the simplest part 
 of the problem ; it is the neutral or enemy character 
 of the owner which determines the character of the 
 goods, but what is to determine the neutral or 
 enemy character of the owner ? It is not said, 
 because it was impossible to arrive at an agreement 
 on this point." In which there is a touch of 
 humour. 
 
 Thus the very central point of all, the point 
 which, left unsettled, not only leaves unsettled the 
 Declaration of London, but also unsettles the 
 Declaration of Paris wherever that allows the con- 
 fiscation of enemy, but not of neutral, property ; 
 this point is left wholly undetermined. That, when 
 it comes, if ever, to the Hague International Prize 
 Court, it will be determined against Great Britain, 
 admits of no reasonable doubt. Meantime, wher- 
 ever in the Declaration (as, for instance, in Article 
 60) the term "enemy goods" appears, it has no 
 meaning whatever attached to it, but only a false 
 meaning hinted at. 
 
 The examination under the preceding ten heads 
 of ten of the leading subjects dealt with by the 
 Declaration of London, does not cover the whole 
 ground. It may be thought too detailed ; yet even 
 so, there are many details of importance and 
 interest that have been left aside. Such as it is, it 
 may sufiice to show that the amiable invitation
 
 INJURIOUS ALTERATIONS 205 
 
 extended by the British instructions to the other 
 powers to alter the laws of war to their own 
 advantage and the disadvantage of Great Britain, 
 was taken advantage of to the full ; and that in all 
 important respects, and wherever important altera- 
 tions were made by the Declaration, they were made 
 to the injury of Great Britain, and to the lessening 
 of her naval power in war, while land power in war 
 was left unaffected or was even enlarged.
 
 VII 
 
 THE NEW PROPOSALS— THE NAVAL 
 PRIZE BILL 
 
 We are now asked to change the law of the sea 
 — to brand as partial and incompetent our most 
 respectable Prize Courts ; to deprive them of their 
 authority ; and to subject all their decisions to 
 appeal before another brand-new court invented 
 for the purpose. We are asked to abandon and 
 renounce the body of law built up on their 
 decisions, and to substitute for that another 
 brand-new law specially invented for the new 
 court in the recesses of foreign offices. And to 
 crown all, we are informed that a British Foreign 
 Secretary has, in fact, ah-eady agreed on behalf 
 of Great Britain to the erection of this new court, 
 and has agreed on her behalf to take henceforth 
 as the law of nations the new inventions contrived 
 by the astute chancelleries of Em*ope, and adopted 
 with incredible levity and incaution by the docile 
 Foreign Office of Great Britain. 
 
 The changes proposed are embodied in two 
 amazing documents — first the Hague Convention of 
 
 206
 
 THE NEW PROPOSALS 207 
 
 1907 setting up the new court ; and secondly the 
 Declaration of London of 1909, which affects to 
 declare a new law of nations. Neither of these 
 documents has yet been submitted for approval and 
 ratification to the British Parliament. Neither 
 represents, so far, more than the personal acts of a 
 minister — acts done secretly without the previous 
 knowledge of Parliament, and done, so far as 
 appears, without either the previous knowledge or 
 any concurrence of His Majesty the King. Yet 
 these are acts which would complete the smTender — 
 carried so far by the Declaration of Paris of 1856 — 
 of Britain's maritime rights, would deprive her of 
 every rag of naval power in war left by that 
 Declaration, would strike her Navy with final impot- 
 ency and paralysis, and would leave her incapable 
 of an effectually offensive naval action, and reduced 
 for the protection of her existence to a straitened 
 defensive against actual invasion. 
 
 None of all this, be it repeated, has yet received 
 the sanction of Parliament, nor, so far as is known, 
 of the Sovereign. None of it can be binding on 
 Great Britain unless it receives the sanction of 
 both. 
 
 This sanction it is proposed to obtain by a side 
 wind. There is to be a parhamentary proceeding 
 indirectly involving it, in the shape of the Naval 
 Prize Bill, introduced 23rd June 1910, and stand- 
 ing on the order book of the House of Commons for 
 second reading in the resumed sessional sittings of 
 next November.
 
 208 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 This Bill is presented by Sir Edward Grey. 
 That is perhaps natural. It is supported by Mr 
 Attorney- General and Mr Sohcitor- General. That 
 perhaps is inevitable, though it is possible, nay 
 probable, that neither one of them was ever 
 consulted, before the vast changes in the law 
 of nations were agreed to which would result 
 from its enactment. But what is most remarkable 
 and most ominous is that it is also supported and 
 endorsed by Mr M'Kenna, the present First Lord 
 of the Admiralty. For, in this, Mr M'Kenna repre- 
 sents and speaks for all his fellow-commissioners 
 for executing the office of Lord High Admiral 
 known as the Board of Admiralty. He represents 
 the four Sea Lords his colleagues, including that 
 First Sea Lord who, according to the order of 
 20th October 1904, has for his business "all large 
 questions of Naval Policy and Maritime Warfare 
 to advise," and who, "in any matter of great 
 importance is always to be consulted by the 
 other Sea Lords, the Civil Lord, and the Parlia- 
 mentary or Permanent Secretary." Whether the 
 present First Sea Lord and the other Sea Lords 
 have been consulted upon, and have agreed to, 
 this Bill, with all it imports, must remain doubtful 
 until we have their own testimony to the fact. 
 Without that testimony it can scarce be credited. 
 For while it is conceivable that civilians might 
 agree to the trammels it puts upon the action 
 of our fleet, it is not conceivable that admirals 
 and seamen should so do. If they have really so
 
 THE NAVAL PRIZE BILL 209 
 
 done, they have incurred towards their fellow- 
 seamen and their country's fleet a responsibility 
 grave indeed. 
 
 The Bill professes to set forth in a schedule the 
 Hague Convention itself. The convention, how- 
 ever, as thus set forth, displays splendid con- 
 tempt for material facts. There is no date to it. 
 There is no indication that it was ever agreed to 
 by any powers whatever. Much less is there any 
 statement showing what powers, if any, have 
 agreed to it. Nor is there anything to show who, 
 if anybody, signed it, or whether anybody ever 
 signed it at all. For aught that is to be discovered 
 from this schedule, the convention might be one 
 made in bygone ages between the kingdom of 
 Barataria and the Republic of Utopia. 
 
 But the Bill itself is even more remarkable than 
 
 its schedule. It is an old and very proper Prize 
 
 Bill, first introduced in 1900, and which, after 
 
 passing the House of Lords, only finally failed to 
 
 pass the Commons in 1902 because, while it dealt 
 
 with naval prize, it did not deal with the related 
 
 subject of land booty. This humdrum old Bill has 
 
 been, after eight years' repose, disinterred, hacked 
 
 about, and made into an instrument of revolution. 
 
 Into it there has been introduced a new " Part 
 
 III." of seven clauses, giving a right of appeal from 
 
 British Prize Courts to the proposed International 
 
 Prize Court set up by the Hague Convention, 
 
 and also giving to His Majesty the King power, 
 
 by Order in Council, to make rules either for 
 
 o
 
 210 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 transferring cases from British Prize Coiu'ts to 
 the International Prize Coiu't, or for regulating the 
 manner of the apjDeals or transfers contemplated, 
 and limiting the application of the seven clauses to 
 such cases only as shall be directed by the King in 
 Comicil. This is the new piece of cloth that has 
 been patched into the old garment. It enacts an 
 appeal from every British Prize Court, and also 
 from the Judicial Committee of the Pri\^ Council — 
 the highest court in the British Empire — to the 
 International Prize Cornet, leaving to the King in 
 Council — which it is needless to say, means in fact 
 to the ministry of the day — power to make rules 
 applying to such appeals. 
 
 The tremendous change effected by the Part 
 III. thus smuggled into an innocent Bill eight 
 years old, is attempted to be explained and justified 
 in what Bacon would certainly have called "a false, 
 flattering preamble." This preamble declares that 
 " Whereas at the second Peace Conference held at 
 the Hague in the year 1907, a convention the 
 English translation whereof is set forth in the first 
 schedule to this Act, was drawn up, but it is 
 desirable that the same should not be ratified by 
 His Majesty until such amendments have been 
 made in the law relating to naval prize of war as 
 will enable effect to be given to the convention " : 
 therefore the Bill is to be enacted, which makes 
 the enabling amendments for giving that effect to 
 that convention. It will be observed that the Bill 
 gives no direct sanction to the undated convention.
 
 "A FALSE, FLATTERING PREAMBLE" 211 
 
 The preamble does not even affirm the desh-ability 
 of giving ratification or sanction thereto. It only 
 affirms the desirability of not giving any such 
 ratification or sanction or any "effect" to the 
 convention, before amendments have been made in 
 the law. It leaves altogether aside the merits of 
 the convention, and only touches the question of 
 the order in which things should be done. It 
 affirms that the law should first be altered before 
 the convention is ratified. It does not expressly 
 authorise the ratification, but it implicitly accepts 
 any ratification that may be subsequently made. 
 Its pm^pose is to make such "amendments" as 
 will enable effect to be given to the convention ; and 
 accordingly Clause 25 of Part III. enacts an 
 express sanction of the Hague Court and its law 
 together ; while Clause 28 makes the British High 
 Court and the whole of the forces of the British 
 Empire the mere instruments of the Hague Court, 
 of its law, and of its decrees without any escape 
 whatever. Part III., in short, swallows up the 
 existing "law of nations" and existing Prize 
 Courts, as Aaron's rod when it became a serpent 
 swallowed up the rods of the magicians of Egypt. 
 There is not a rod left — not a vestige of the 
 authority of British Prize Courts. High Court and 
 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are swept 
 away together, as is also the power to enforce the 
 decisions of those courts and as is also indeed the law 
 of nations itself. All is gone. All is handed over 
 to a majority of one from Germany, Russia, Hayti,
 
 212 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 S. Domingo, or Switzerland, deciding in secret on a 
 Ukase which the British Empire and all its comts 
 is made the instrument to enforce. 
 
 All this is put before Parliament as though it 
 were a reasonable proposal. 
 
 If once this Bill with its false flattering preamble 
 be passed, the convention would be as fully and 
 effectually accepted, adopted, and sanctioned as if 
 an express sanction were given to it by the Bill. 
 In spite of the deceptive phraseology used in the 
 preamble, in spite of the mask thus put over the 
 whole, it is the fact that, when once this Bill, if ever, 
 has been enacted, the foreign court will have been 
 recognised, the convention creating it sanctioned by 
 Parliament, the Declaration of London implicitly 
 accepted, and the whole of the tremendous British 
 interests and rights involved thereby placed at the 
 mercy of the cornet created by the convention. At 
 present the convention is but a project of manacles 
 and fetters " drawn up " to be fitted to the British 
 navy. Once this Bill passed, those manacles and 
 fetters will be riveted upon it irremovably and for 
 ever. 
 
 Nay, more. Once this Bill passed into an Act 
 of Parliament, it will matter relatively little whether 
 the Declaration of London which affects to invent 
 and lay down the law to be applied by the new 
 com't — it will matter relatively little whether that 
 Declaration be ratified or not. The surrenders 
 made by the Declaration, of the law as it at present 
 exists — and probably much more — will be enforced
 
 IF THE BILL PASSES ! 213 
 
 by the International Court, whether made by the 
 Declaration or not. For this court is to "apply the 
 rules of international law " ; and "if no generally 
 recognised rule exists, the court shall give judgment 
 in accordance with the general principles of justice 
 and equity " — as understood and adopted in secret 
 sitting, by a bare majority of fifteen judges, Avhereof 
 one only will be British. Failing the Declaration 
 of London, these judges may — nay will, nay must 
 — fall back on their own notions of law, of justice, 
 and of equity, with full authority to enforce them 
 against all the world. And wherever they cannot 
 enforce them, the British Government will enforce 
 them ; for by Section 28 of the Part III. of the Bill, 
 " the High Court and every Prize Court in a British 
 possession shall enforce within its jurisdiction all 
 orders and decrees of the International Prize Courts 
 in appeals and cases transferred to the court under 
 this part of the Act." Once this Bill passed, there- 
 fore, it will matter little whether the Declaration 
 of London be sanctioned or not; for the Inter- 
 national Court can always fall back upon the 
 notions of justice and equity entertained by 
 Germany, Austria, Servia, and Hayti. The only 
 difference will be that, instead of an express 
 renunciation by Great Britain of those portions of 
 the existing law of nations which affirm and secure 
 British maritime rights — instead of that express 
 renunciation by the Declaration, the court will 
 avail itself of the equally effectual implied renuncia- 
 tion made by the Bill.
 
 214 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 This is not to say that the Declaration is of no 
 importance. It is of the most tremendous 
 importance. But — inasmuch as the International 
 Court, once set up and accepted, can, under the 
 powers given to it, act in accordance with or even 
 go beyond the Declaration — inasmuch as this is 
 so, the Bill which sets up the unbridled comt is 
 of far greater importance than the Declaration 
 providing the court with a new law, which it can 
 provide for itself without any Declaration. Or, to 
 put it in another way : it were better to have the 
 Declaration — false, mischievous, fatal as it is — 
 sanctioned without setting up the foreign court to 
 enforce it, than by acceptance of the convention, 
 to set up the court with power to enforce either the 
 Declaration or anything else that it chooses to 
 consider "just and equitable." 
 
 Moreover, the Bill accepting the convention is 
 to come before Parliament first : the Declaration 
 only second and incidentally if at all. The Bill is 
 instant and pressing. The Bill includes the 
 Declaration, or renders it obligatory. The Bill 
 therefore is what, if anything, must be resisted. 
 Without the Bill passed, the Declaration can hardly 
 be ratified ; nor could it in such a case amount to 
 more than an unauthoritative, unauthorised, and 
 unwarranted expression of Lord Desart's private 
 opinion on certain points of the law of nations ; an 
 expression capable indeed of being used against us 
 with much effect in controversy, but yet not 
 fastened about our necks for ever by om' own act.
 
 PRESENT RESPONSIBILITY OF PARLIAMENT 215 
 
 To destroy the law of nations, to renounce 
 essential British maritime rights ; to make an end 
 of the final authority of all British Prize Courts, as 
 well as of the King in Council ; to submit all to 
 the decision of a foreign tribunal ; and to bind 
 Great Britain to enforce every rule and order of 
 that tribunal, is a task no ministry ever before 
 essayed. Still less has it ever been essayed by 
 these indirect methods. 
 
 When, as in this case, it is proposed to subject 
 the whole sea power of the State to new conditions 
 and restrictions enforced by new methods, and to 
 bring the whole State thereby into peril — then, if 
 ever, that Parliament in which there resides the 
 sole sovereign power should first be called upon to 
 pronounce directly for or against the proposals 
 made. 
 
 As it is right of Parliament to require, so it is 
 the duty of ministers to offer, the submission to 
 parliamentary judgment of every one of the 
 instruments embodying the proposals. 
 
 Yet neither the Hague Convention establishing 
 the International Prize Court, nor any of the other 
 numerous conventions there signed as on behalf of 
 Great Britain, nor the Declaration of London, has 
 been so submitted. 
 
 Instead of this. Parliament is to be asked to 
 cover all by the indirect method of passing a Bill 
 giving an implied consent and sanction to instru- 
 ments never submitted to it for direct acceptance 
 or rejection.
 
 216 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 Were Parliament to accept so tortuous — and it 
 may be added so contemptuous — a procedure, it 
 would fail in its duty to the nation. 
 
 And now comes the gravest consideration of 
 all. It is that, so far as the sole executive action 
 of a single minister of the crown can bind, Great 
 Britain is already bound by all that is contained 
 in this Declaration of London. 
 
 The full importance of this must be appreciated. 
 To the Declaration containing that final, imperative, 
 binding article, the signatm^e is appended of Lord 
 Desart, authorised to sign by the British Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs. If that signature 
 suffices, Great Britain is at this moment bound to 
 insure the observance of all the rules of the 
 Declaration. She is at this moment bound to issue 
 instructions to her naval commanders to do all 
 that it ordains and to abstain from all that it 
 prohibits, and to send her fleets to sea, manacled 
 and shackled by herself, and deprived by her own 
 instructions of all the powers withdrawn from it 
 by the Declaration. She is bound, at this moment, 
 to insure the application by her own courts, 
 including that great court of the King in Council, 
 of all the rules of the Declaration which destroy 
 the final authority of those ancient and respectable 
 tribunals. She is bound at this moment to submit 
 every case of captm-e and prize, and every act of 
 her shackled navy to the foreign court at the 
 Hague. 
 
 If the signature given under these circum-
 
 DOES THE SIGNATURE SUFFICE? 217 
 
 stances suffices to bind Great Britain, she is bound, 
 if war broke out to-morrow, to go into the war 
 under conditions which would paralyse her fleets, 
 and subject her every action to the final judg- 
 ment of a court with a permanent majority against 
 her. 
 
 But does the signature suffice? Lord Desart 
 himself, as well as his fellow - delegates, Admiral 
 Ottley, Admiral Slade, Mr Crowe, and Mr Hurst, 
 all believe that it does. In their common report of 
 all done, dated 1st March 1909, when they offered 
 up the sacrifice of their country's naval power 
 wrapped in this Declaration, they leave no doubt 
 as to their belief. Having paid a tribute to "M. 
 Renault, the distinguished French plenipotentiary, 
 whose unfailing tact, unrivalled knowledge, and 
 wide experience materially contributed to the 
 smooth progress of the discussions," they proceed 
 to quote M. Renault's general report, which 
 " explains how " Article 66 ends, concludes, binds, 
 and clinches all. He explains, they say, and say 
 with manifest acquiescence, that : — 
 
 " The provisions of the Declaration are in the 
 first instance binding upon all the signatory powers 
 in virtue of their express engagement under Article 
 66, to give effect thereto in their National Prize 
 Courts and in the insti'uctions to their naval officers. 
 There is this further consequence, that the inter- 
 national court ivill have authority to apply the rules 
 generally, as being in conformity with the accepted 
 principles of international law, quite apart from
 
 218 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 the specific obligation which the signatory powers 
 undertake, to obey them in their relations with 
 each other." 
 
 Here, then, is the situation to which in the 
 behef of the British delegates we have been brought. 
 By a secret proceeding, carried on in the Foreign 
 Office without the knowledge of anybody outside 
 thereof, Great Britain, ever since the Declaration 
 was signed, has been, and at this moment is, held 
 by the foreign powers concerned, and by her own 
 delegates, to be bound hard and fast by this 
 Declaration ; bomid to submit to its enforcement 
 by the International Court ; bound herself to 
 enforce it by all means in her power. 
 
 Let the thing done, or believed to be done, be 
 fully realised. Without the knowledge either of 
 Parliament or people, without, so far as anything 
 is known, the sanction of the King, and certainly 
 without the sanction of Parliament, an agreement 
 has been made in the name of the country which 
 sets aside many of the most important principles 
 of the law of nations as declared by the ablest and 
 most learned jurists, and which sets up in their 
 place new doctrines, all or nearly all to the great 
 lessening of British powers. All this, we are 
 told, is to be enforced against herself by Great 
 Britain, which is not only to instruct her naval 
 officers to refrain in war from exercising her 
 ancient maritime rights, but is also to insure that 
 it shall also be applied by her own hitherto 
 respectable and independent Prize Courts. Nay,
 
 URGENCY OF THE CASE 219 
 
 more, in case she hesitates or delays, the Hague 
 International Prize Court, we are told (by our own 
 delegates), "will have authority to apply the 
 rules generally . . . quite apart from the specific 
 obligation " under which these delegates believe 
 they have laid their country. Whatever else 
 happens, they tell us, that will happen. Parlia- 
 ment may refuse to sanction what has been done. 
 The King may refuse to authorise the ratification 
 of the Declaration. The British Prize Courts may 
 refuse to contemn all their own previous decisions, 
 to burn all their books and to set out on a new 
 path not known to them or their predecessors in 
 the seat of judgment. It matters not. Even in 
 that case, even in any case whatever, the Interna- 
 tional Prize Court has already " authority to apply 
 the rules," and will apply them, whoever and 
 whatever may stand in the way. So vast, so 
 essential an alteration of the conditions under 
 which Great Britain is in future to fight for her 
 rights, for her interests, for her position — it may 
 be for her very existence — should only, could only, 
 be constitutionally, lawfully, or safely made after 
 counsel taken with that Parliament to which is 
 committed the sovereign authority of the realm. 
 Were Parliament, after full consideration of all 
 the changes proposed, to accept them ; were the 
 King then — for only then could it be constitutionally 
 and effectually done — to ratify them, then indeed 
 the thing so done would be valid and binding. 
 But that a single minister should pass by Parlia-
 
 220 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 ment, should pass by the King, and should, without 
 the previous assent duly and solemnly expressed 
 of either, agree to such a change as this, and to 
 the erection for its enforcement of such a court as 
 this — that such a thing should be done passes all 
 the bounds of ministerial presumption yet reached. 
 Blackstone, speaking of the law of nations 
 says : — 
 
 " In arbitrary states this law, whenever it 
 contradicts or is not provided for by the muni- 
 cipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal 
 power ; but, since in England no royal power can 
 introduce new law, or suspend the execution of 
 the old, therefore the law of nations, whenever any 
 question arises which is properly the object of 
 its jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent 
 by the common law, and held to be the law of 
 the land." 
 
 Whether the law of the land can be secretly 
 and surreptitiously changed ; whether the sole 
 ministerial power can effect both a suspension 
 of the execution of the old and the introduction 
 of a new law ; whether ministerial power can do 
 that which even the royal power cannot effect — 
 this is the question. If now, for the first time, 
 all things can be done, or if, having been done, 
 they are submitted to as done lawfully and effectu- 
 ally, then has Great Britain become an arbitrary 
 state, wherein the arbitrary power is not even 
 exercised by the Sovereign, but is usurped by the 
 Minister.
 
 A JOINT IN THE ARMOUR 221 
 
 But all is not yet over. There is a weak place 
 in the engine for the destruction of British naval 
 power, which the delegates think has been made 
 so complete and effective. One thing they seem 
 to have forgotten or overlooked. It is this : that 
 at this present, so far as Great Britain is con- 
 cerned, there is no International Prize Court 
 in existence, and there will be none unless and 
 until the Naval Prize Bill is enacted by Parlia- 
 ment. That is avowed and estabhshed by the 
 preamble of the Bill itself, which recites that, 
 although the convention of 1907 establishing the 
 court was " drawn up " at the Hague, yet that is 
 all that so far has happened to it ; that, as regards 
 Great Britain, it is "desirable" that this convention 
 " should not be ratified by His Majesty, until such 
 amendments have been made in the law relating 
 to Naval Prize of war as will enable effect to be 
 given to the convention " ; such amendments, that 
 is, as are proposed to be made by the Naval 
 Prize Bill itself. Quite clearly, therefore, until 
 that Bill is enacted, there can be no effect given, 
 either by ratification or otherwise, to the 1907 
 Convention; and, consequently, no International 
 Prize Court at all is so much as in existence, 
 much less having authority to apply the rules, 
 "apart from our specific obligations." 
 
 Here, then, we have a reply to some questions 
 already asked. Lord Desart's signature alone is 
 not sufficient. Standing alone, it binds us to 
 nothing. Without the Naval Prize Bill it amounts
 
 222 THE NEW PROrOSALS 
 
 to nothing. Should ParHameiit refuse to pass 
 that Bill, then the whole of the doings of both the 
 two conferences of the Hague and of London, 
 fall to pieces — all of them together, like a house 
 of cards. The convention agreeing to the estab- 
 lishment of the com't could not then be ratified 
 by His Majesty ; neither could the Declaration 
 of London, in that case, be so ratified. To 
 ratify a Declaration which expressly declares it- 
 self in its very first words to be made " within 
 the meaning of" the convention establishing the 
 International Prize Com^t, when the convention 
 and the court it creates have been rejected — this 
 would be inconceivable. 
 
 The Naval Prize Bill, then, is the king- pin and 
 pivot of all. If that be passed into an Act, all 
 the mischief is done. If not, then nothing is done. 
 
 The whole effort, therefore, of those who would 
 still retain the maritime rights of Great Britain, 
 and thereby ensure still to her that preponderance 
 at sea which they have always given, must be to 
 defeat the Naval Prize Bill. What matters 
 — what, as things now stand, alone matters — is 
 the Bill. 
 
 And now one last word. 
 
 Despite all fair words spoken, the deeds 
 done during the last fifty years throughout the 
 world from Denmark to ]\[anchuria, show that 
 we are no nearer to universal Peace but farther 
 from it ; that if Peace is cried more loudly. War
 
 KEEP THE SWORD SHARP ! 223 
 
 is more constantly and secretly prepared and more 
 suddenly sprung ; that Ambition stalks the earth 
 no less predatory than ever but only smoother 
 spoken ; and that Force is but more completely 
 cloaked in Fraud. 
 
 Any day we too, with little or no warning, may 
 have to fight for our own. 
 
 In that day what alone will avail us will be our 
 sea power and our maritime rights ; what alone 
 will check our enemy, their full exercise. As 
 they sufficed before, even against all Europe, so 
 they would still suffice. For nothing essential is 
 changed. 
 
 In that day it will avail us nothing that we 
 have the most powerful fleets, if by our own folly 
 we have in advance suffered them to be protoco- 
 lised and declared out of their efifectual powers, 
 and subjected to a foreign court. 
 
 Is that day so remote that we need now and 
 henceforth think only of om' neutral profits in 
 Peace, and not at all of our risks, rights, and 
 powers in War? 
 
 If so, why all these Dreadnoughts f Why this 
 present concentration in the North Sea of British 
 fleets recalled from all quarters of the globe ? 
 Why Rosyth ? Why this sudden, feverish, ruinous 
 race in armaments ? Is it all for nothing ? 
 
 Is that day so far off ? Is it not rather, quite 
 manifestly, believed by those who know most and 
 are most responsible, to be near at hand ? 
 
 If it be, then to part with any, even the least
 
 224 THE NEW PROPOSALS 
 
 portion, of that sea power whereon alone we can 
 rely for our defence, would be to prepare our own 
 ruin. 
 
 Not now. Not now. Not yet. 
 
 This is no time for ^^utting off any of our 
 harness — rather for girding it on. 
 
 This is no time to sign away our remaining 
 sea powers, no time to entertain otherwise than 
 with blunt refusal proposals to alter the law 
 of the sea so as to lessen them, no time to 
 submit their exercise to the mercies of an alien 
 tribunal. 
 
 Rather is it time, by denouncing the Declara- 
 tion of Paris, to resume those powers already 
 waived.
 
 APPENDICES
 
 APPENDIX A 
 
 COST OF CARRIAGE BY SEA AND LAND 
 
 " Speaking broadly, then, normal coal freights are now less than 
 half what they were a generation ago, and there is little doubt, if 
 we went back to 1850, we should find a far greater change. Now, 
 if we assume the normal price of coal to have been 10s. per ton, 
 free on board at both periods, the average reduction to the consumer 
 may be taken to have been, roughly, from 30s. to 20s. per ton, or a 
 a reduction of about one-third. It is perhaps worthy of note that 
 last year's average freight (5s. 4d.) from Cardiff to Port Said (3072 
 miles) was below the cost of conveying coal by rail from South Wales 
 (say the centre of the Rhondda Valley) to London (170 miles), 
 Liverpool (175 miles), or Southampton (128 miles), which, reckoning 
 wagon hii-e at 6d., was 6s. Id., 5s. lOd., and 5s. 8d., respectively, and 
 to which large quantities of coal are sent for bunkering liners. This 
 works out, for land carriage by rail over the Great Western Railway, 
 at about 0-40 per ton per mile, or 0-44 with wagon hire, as against a 
 little over 0-02d. for water carriage to Port Said. In other words, 
 the cost of conveyance per ton per mile by rail was about twenty 
 times that by water, or, to put it in another way, 50 tons of coal 
 were carried a mile by water for Id. as against 2i tons by rail, and 
 say, 2 cwt. by horse and cart along a high road. — " The Growth and 
 Direction of our Foreign Trade in Coal during the Last Half 
 Century," by D. A. Thomas, M.A., M.P. (Paper read before the 
 Royal Statistical Society 19th May 1903.) 
 
 Put in yet another and perhaps even simpler way, what it 
 amounts to is that : — 
 
 50 tons were carried one mile by sea for . . Id. 
 
 50 tons were carried one mile by rail for . . 20d. 
 
 and 50 tons were carried by road with horse 
 
 and cart for . . . . . 500d. 
 
 227
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 DECLARATION RESPECTING MARITIME LAW 
 
 Signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, 
 Pr^issia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey assembled in Congress at 
 Paris, IGth Ajrt-il 1856. 
 
 DECLARATION 
 
 The plenipotentiaries who have signed the Treaty of Paris of 
 20th March 1856, met in conference. 
 
 Considering : 
 
 That maritime law in time of war has long been the object of 
 regrettable contestation ; 
 
 That the uncertainty of the law and of duties in such a matter 
 gives rise, between neutrals and belligerents, to divergences of 
 opinion which may lead to serious difficulties and even to conflicts ; 
 
 That it is advantageous therefore to establish a uniform doctrine 
 on a point so important : 
 
 That the plenipotentiaries assembled at the Congress of Paris 
 could not better fulfil the intention by which their governments are 
 animated than by seeking to introduce into international relations 
 fixed principles in this resi)ect ; 
 
 Duly authorised, the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have 
 agi'eed to concert together on the means of attaining this end ; 
 and having come to an agreement, have decided upon the solenm 
 Declaration following : 
 
 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 
 
 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's merchandise with the exception 
 
 of contraband of war. 
 
 3. Neutral merchandise, Avith the exception of contraband of 
 
 war, is not capturable under the enemy's flag. 
 
 4. Blockades, in order to be obligatory, must be effective — that 
 
 is to say, maintained by a force sufficient to really prevent 
 access to the coast of the enemy. 
 
 228
 
 APPENDIX B 229 
 
 The governments of the plenipotentiaries undersigned engage 
 themselves to bring this Declaration to the knowledge of the states, 
 which have not been invited to participate in the Congress of Paris, 
 and to invite them to accede to it. 
 
 Convinced that the maxims which they have now proclaimed 
 can only be received with gratitude by the whole world, the under- 
 signed plenipotentiaries do not doubt that the efforts of their 
 governments to generalise their adoption will be crowned with 
 full success. 
 
 The present Declaration is not and will not be obligatory, except 
 between the powers who have or who shall have acceded to it. 
 
 Done at Paris the 16th April 1856. 
 
 [Follow the signatures.]
 
 APPENDIX C 
 
 FINAL ACT OF THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE 
 HELD AT THE HAGUE IN 1907, AND CONVEN- 
 TIONS AND DECLARATION ANNEXED THERETO 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 Pinal Act of the Second International Peace Conference. 
 
 The Second International Peace Conference, proposed in the first 
 instance by the President of the United States of America, having 
 been convoked, on the invitation of His Majesty the Emperor of All 
 the Russias, by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, assembled 
 on the 15th June, 1907, at The Hague, in the Hall of the Knights, 
 for the purpose of giving a fresh development to the humanitarian 
 principles which served as a basis for the work of the First Con- 
 ference of 1899. 
 
 The following Powers took part in the Conference, and appointed 
 the Delegates named below : — 
 
 [Here follow the Names.] 
 
 At a series of meetings, held from the 15th June to the 18th 
 October, 1907, in which the above Delegates were throughout 
 animated by the desire to realize, in the fullest possible measure, 
 the generous views of the august initiator of the Conference and the 
 intentions of their Governments, the Conference drew up, to be 
 submitted to the Plenipotentiaries for signature, the text of the 
 Conventions and of the Declaration enumerated below and annexed 
 to the present Act : — 
 
 1. A Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
 
 Disputes. 
 
 2. A Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment 
 
 of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts. 
 
 3. A Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities. 
 
 4. A Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
 
 Land. 
 
 5. A Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
 
 Powers and Persons in case of War on Land. 
 
 280
 
 APPENDIX C 231 
 
 6. A Convention relative to the Status of Enemy Merchant-ships 
 
 on the Outbreak of Hostilities. 
 
 7. A Convention relative to the Conversion of Merchant-ships 
 
 into War-ships. 
 
 8. A Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
 
 Contact Mines. 
 
 9. A Convention respecting Bombardment by Xaval Forces in 
 
 Time of War. 
 
 10. A Convention for the Adaptation to Xaval War of the 
 Principles of the Geneva Convention. 
 
 11. A Convention relative to certain Restrictions with regard 
 
 to the Exercise of the Eight of Capture in Xaval War. 
 
 12. A Convention relative to the creation of an International 
 Prize Court. 
 
 13. A Convention concerning the Eights and Duties of Neutral 
 Powers in Xaval War. 
 
 14. A Declaration prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and 
 Explosives from Balloons. 
 
 The Conference, actuated by the spirit of mutual agreement and 
 concession which inspire its deliberations, has agreed upon the 
 following Declaration, which, while reserving to each of the Powers 
 represented the benefit of the vot€s recorded, enables them to affirm 
 the principles which they regard as unanimously admitted : — 
 
 It is unanimous — 
 
 1. In recognizing the principle of obligatory arbitration. 
 
 2. In declaring that certain disputes, in particular those relating 
 
 to the interpretation and application of the provisions of 
 International Agreements, may be submitted to obligatory 
 arbitration "without any restriction. 
 
 Finally, it is unanimous in proclaiming that, although it has not 
 yet been found feasible to conclude a Convention in this sense, 
 nevertheless the divergences of opinion which have come to light 
 have not exceeded the bounds of controversy on legal questions, and 
 that the Powers of the whole world, through their united labours 
 here during the past four months, have not only learnt to understand 
 one another and to draw closer together, but have succeeded in the 
 coiirse of their long collaboration in evolving a lofty conception of 
 the common weKare of humanity. 
 
 The Conference has further unanimously adopted the following 
 Resolution : — 
 
 The Second Peace Conference confirms the Eesolution adopted by 
 the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expendi- 
 ture ; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably 
 increased in almost everj- country since that time, the Conference 
 declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should 
 resume the serious examination of this question.
 
 232 APPENDICES 
 
 It lias besides recorded the following wishes : — 
 
 1 . The Conference recommends the Signatory Powers to adopt 
 
 the annexed draft Convention for the creation of a Judicial 
 Arbitration Court, and to bring it into force as soon as an 
 agreement shall have been reached respecting the selection of 
 the Judges and the constitution of the Court. 
 
 2. The Conference records the wish that, in case of war, the 
 
 responsible authorities, civil as well as military, should make 
 it their special duty to ensure and safeguard the maintenance 
 of pacific relations, and particularly of the commercial and 
 industrial relations between the inhabitants of the belligerent 
 States and neutral countries, 
 
 3. The Conference records the wish that the Powers should 
 
 regulate, by special Treaties, the position, as regards military 
 charges, of foreigners residing within their territories. 
 
 4. The Conference records the wish that the preparation of 
 
 regulations relative to the laws and customs of naval war 
 should figure in the programme of the next Conference, and 
 that in any case the Powers should apply, as far as possible, 
 to war by sea the principles of the Convention relative to 
 the Laws and Customs of War on land. 
 
 Finally, the Conference recommends to the Powers the assembly 
 of a third Peace Conference, which might be held within a period 
 corresponding to that which has elapsed since the preceding 
 Conference, at a date to be fixed by common agreement between the 
 Powers, and it calls their attention to the necessity of preparing the 
 programme of this third Conference a sufficient time beforehand to 
 ensure its deliberations being conducted with the necessary 
 authority and expedition. 
 
 In order to attain this object the Conference considers that it 
 would be very desirable that, some two years before the probable 
 date of the meeting, a preparatory Committee should be charged by 
 the Governments with the task of collecting the various proposals 
 to be submitted to the Conference, of ascertaining what subjects are 
 ripe for international regulation, and of preparing a programme 
 upon which the Governments should decide in sufficient time to 
 allow of careful examination in each country. This Committee 
 should further be intrusted with the task of proposing a system of 
 organisation and procedure for the Conference itself. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
 Act and have affixed their seals thereto. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Nethcrland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent to all 
 the Powers represented at the Conference.
 
 APPENDIX C 233 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 No. 6. — Convention relative to the Status of Enemy 
 Merchant-ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities. 
 
 Anxious to ensure the security of international commerce against 
 the surprises of war, and wishing, in accordance with modern 
 practice, to protect as far as possible operations undertaken in good 
 faith and in process of being carried out before the outbreak of 
 hostilities, have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, 
 and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say : 
 
 [Names of Plenipotentiaries.] 
 
 Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in 
 good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions :— 
 
 Article 1, — When a merchant-ship belonging to one of the belli- 
 gerent Powers is at the commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, 
 it is desirable that it should be allowed to depart freely, either immedi- 
 ately, or after a reasonable number of days of grace, and to proceed, 
 after being furnished with a pass, direct to its port of destination 
 or any other port indicated to it. 
 
 The same principle applies in the case of a ship which has left 
 its last port of departure before the commencement of the war and 
 has entered a port belonging to the enemy while still ignorant that 
 hostilities had broken out. 
 
 Article 2. — A merchant-ship which, owing to circumstances 
 beyond its control, may have been unable to leave the enemy port 
 within the period contemplated in the preceding Article, or which 
 was not allowed to leave, may not be confiscated. 
 
 The belligerent may merely detain it, on condition of restoring 
 it after the war, without payment of compensation, or he may 
 requisition it on condition of paying compensation. 
 
 Article 3. — Enemy merchant-ships which left their last port of 
 departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered 
 on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities 
 may not be confiscated. They are merely liable to be detained on 
 condition that they are restored after the war without payment of 
 compensation ; or to be requisitioned, or even destroyed, on pay- 
 ment of compensation, but in such case provision must be made 
 for the safety of the persons on board as well as the preservation of 
 the ship's papers. 
 
 After touching at a port in their own country or at a neutral 
 port, such ships are subject to the laws and customs of naval war. 
 
 Article 4.— Enemy cargo on board the vessels referred to in 
 Articles 1 and 2 is likewise liable to be detained and restored after
 
 234 APPENDICES 
 
 the war without payment of compensation, or to be requisitioned 
 on payment of compensation, with or without the ship. 
 
 The same principle applies in the case of cargo on board the 
 vessels referred to in Article 3. 
 
 Article 5.— The present Convention does not refer to merchant- 
 ships which show by their build that they are intended for 
 conversion into war-ships. 
 
 Article 6.— The provisions of the present Convention do not 
 apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all 
 the belligerents are parties to the Convention. 
 
 Article 7.— The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein 
 and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Afi"airs. 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification, addressed to the Netherland Government 
 and accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph, as well as of the instruments of ratification, shall be 
 immediately sent by the Netherland Government, through the 
 diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to 'the Second Peace 
 Conference, as well as to the other Powers which have acceded 
 to the Convention. The said Government shall, in the cases 
 contemplated in the preceding paragraph, inform them at the same 
 time of the date on which it received the notification. 
 
 Article 8.— Non-Signatory Powers may accede to the present 
 Convention. 
 
 A Power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing 
 to the Netherland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, 
 which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government. 
 
 The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of the notification as well as of the 
 act of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the 
 notification. 
 
 Article 9.— The present Convention shall take effect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications, 
 sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, 
 in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which 
 shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or 
 of their accession has been received by the Netherland Government. 
 Article 10.— In the event of one of the Contracting Powers 
 wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall
 
 APPENDIX C 235 
 
 be notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall 
 immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification 
 to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it 
 was received. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has 
 reached the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 11. — A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications 
 effected in virtue of Article 7, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the 
 date on which the notifications of accession (Article 8, paragraph 2) 
 or of denunciation (Article 10, paragraph 1) have been received. 
 
 Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register 
 and to be supplied with dulj^ certified extracts from it. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their 
 signatures to the present Convention. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, 
 through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second 
 Peace Conference. 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 No. 7. — Convention relative to the Conversion of 
 Merchant-ships into War-ships. 
 
 Whereas it is desirable, in view of the incorporation in time of 
 war of merchant-ships in the fighting fleet, to define the conditions 
 subject to which this operation may be effected ; 
 
 Whereas, however, the Contracting Powers have been unable to 
 come to an agreement on the question whether the conversion of a 
 merchant-ship into a war-ship may take place upon the high seas, it 
 is understood that the question of the place where such conversion 
 is effected remains outside the scope of this Agreement and is in no 
 way affected by the following rules ; and 
 
 Whereas they are desirous of concluding a Convention to this 
 effect, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say : 
 
 [Names of plenipotentiaries.] 
 
 Who, after having deposited their fuU powers, found to be in 
 good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions : — 
 
 Article 1. — A merchant-ship converted into a war-ship cannot 
 have the rights and duties appertaining to vessels having that status 
 unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and 
 responsibility of the Power, the flag of which it flies.
 
 236 APPENDICES 
 
 Article 2. — Merchant-ships converted into war-ships must bear 
 the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their 
 nationality. 
 
 Article 3. — The commander must be in the service of the State 
 and duly commissioned by the proper authorities. His name must 
 figure on the list of the oiiicers of the fighting fleet. 
 
 Article 4. — The crew must be subject to military discipline. 
 
 Article 5.— Every merchant-ship converted into a war-ship is 
 bound to observe in its operations the laws and customs of war. 
 
 Article 6. — A belligerent who converts a merchant-ship into a 
 war-ship must, as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the 
 list of its war-ships. 
 
 Article 7. — The provisions of the present Convention do not 
 apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the 
 belligerents are parties to the Convention, 
 
 Article 8.— The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 
 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein 
 and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Afi"airs. 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification, addressed to the Netherland Government 
 and accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immedi- 
 ately sent by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic 
 channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as 
 well as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. 
 The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the 
 preceding paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on 
 which it received the notification. 
 
 Article 9. — Non-Signatory Powers may accede to the present 
 Convention. 
 
 A power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing 
 to the Netherland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, 
 which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government. 
 
 The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of the notification as well as of the act 
 of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the notifica- 
 tion. 
 
 Article 10.— The present Convention shall take effect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications,
 
 APPENDIX C 237 
 
 sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, 
 in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which 
 shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or 
 of their accession has been received by the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 11. — In the event of one of the Contracting Powers wishing 
 to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall be 
 notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall 
 immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to 
 all the other powers, informing them of the date on which it was 
 received. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has 
 reached the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 12. — A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications 
 effected in virtue of Article 8, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the 
 date on which the notifications of accession (Article 9, paragraph 2) 
 or of denunciation (Article 11, paragraph 1) have been received. 
 
 Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register 
 and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their 
 signatures to the present Convention. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, through 
 the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace 
 Conference. 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 No. 8. — Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic 
 Submarine Contact Mines. 
 
 Inspired by the principle of the freedom of the seas as the 
 common highway of all nations ; 
 
 Seeing that, while the existing position of affairs makes it 
 impossible to forbid the employment of automatic submarine 
 contact mines, it is nevertheless expedient to restrict and regulate 
 their employment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to 
 ensure, as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to 
 which it is entitled, despite the existence of war ; 
 
 Until such time as it may be found possible to formulate rules 
 on the subject which shall ensure to the interests involved all 
 the guarantees desirable ;
 
 238 APPENDICES 
 
 Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have 
 appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say : 
 
 [Names of plenipotentiaries.] 
 
 Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to b« in 
 good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions :— 
 Article 1. — It is forbidden : 
 
 1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they be so 
 
 constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after 
 the person who laid them has ceased to control them ; 
 
 2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not 
 
 become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from 
 their moorings ; 
 
 3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they 
 
 have missed their mark. 
 
 Article 2.— The laying of automatic contact mines oflF the coast 
 and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting com- 
 mercial shipping, is forbidden. 
 
 Article 3. — When anchored automatic contact mines are 
 employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the security 
 of peaceful shipping. 
 
 ^ The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these 
 mines harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and, should the 
 mines cease to be under observation, to notify the danger zones as 
 soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to mariners, which 
 must also be communicated to the Governments through the 
 diplomatic channel. 
 
 Article 4.— Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact mines off 
 their coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precau- 
 tions as are imposed on belligerents. 
 
 The neutral Power must give notice to mariners in advance of 
 the places where automatic contact mines have been laid. This 
 notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through 
 the diplomatic channel. 
 
 Article 5.— At the close of the war, the Contracting Powers 
 undertake to do their utmost to remove the mines which they have 
 laid, each Power removing its own mines. 
 
 As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the 
 belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified 
 to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power 
 must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in 
 its own waters. 
 
 Article 6.— The Contracting Powers which do not at present own 
 perfected mines of the description contemplated in the present 
 Convention, and which, consecjuently, could not at present carry out
 
 APPENDIX C 239 
 
 the rules laid down in Articles 1 and 3, undertake to convert the 
 materiel of their mines as soon as possible, so as to bring it into 
 conformity with the foregoing requirements. 
 
 Article 7. — The provisions of the present Convention do not 
 apply except between Contracting powers, and then only if all the 
 belligerents are parties to the Convention. 
 
 Article 8. — The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 
 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein 
 and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign AflFairs. 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification addressed to the Netherland Government 
 and accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immedi- 
 ately sent, by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic 
 channel, to the powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as 
 well as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. 
 The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the pre- 
 ceding paragi-aph, inform them at the same time of the date on 
 which it received the notification. 
 
 Article 9. — Non-Signatory Powers may accede to the present 
 Convention. 
 
 A Power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing 
 to the Netherland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, 
 which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government. 
 
 The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of their notification, as well as of the 
 act of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the 
 notification. 
 
 Article 10. — The present Convention shall take eifect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications, 
 sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, 
 in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which 
 shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or of 
 their accession has been received by the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 11. — The present Convention shall remain in force for 
 seven years, dating from the sixtieth day after the date of the first 
 deposit of ratifications. 
 
 Unless denounced, it shall continue in force after the expiry of 
 this period. 
 
 The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Netherland
 
 240 APPENDICES 
 
 Government, which shall immediately communicate a duly certified 
 copy of the notification to all the Powers, informing them of the date 
 on which it was received. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 Power, and only on the expiry of six months after the notification 
 has reached the Netherland Government. 
 
 Ar-tiele 12. — The Contracting Powers agree to reopen the question 
 of the employment of automatic contact mines six months before 
 the expiry of the period contemplated in the first paragraph of the 
 preceding Article, in the event of the question not having been 
 already taken up and settled by the Third Peace Conference. 
 
 If the Contracting Powers conclude a fresh Convention relative 
 to the employment of mines, the present Convention shall cease to 
 be applicable from the moment when it comes into force. 
 
 Article 13. — A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications 
 effected in virtue of Article 8, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the 
 date on which the notifications of accession (Article 9, paragraph 2) 
 or of denunciation (Article 11, paragraph 3) have been received. 
 
 Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this 
 register and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their 
 signatures to the present Convention. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, 
 through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the 
 Second Peace Conference. 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 No. 9. — Convention respecting Bombardments by Naval 
 Forces in Time of War. 
 
 Animated by the desire to realize the wish expressed by the 
 First Peace Conference respecting the bombardment by naval forces 
 of undefended ports, towns, and villages ; 
 
 Whereas it is expedient that bombardments by naval forces 
 should be subject to rules of general application to safeguard the 
 rights of the inhabitants and to assure the preservation of the more 
 important buildings, by applying as far as possible to this operation 
 of war the principles of the Regulations of 1899 respecting the Laws 
 and Customs of Land War ; and 
 
 Actuated, accordingly, ])y the desire to serve the interests of 
 humanity and to diminish the severity and disasters of war ;
 
 APPENDIX C 241 
 
 Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have, 
 for this purpose, appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say : 
 
 [Names of Plenipotentiaries.] 
 
 Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in 
 good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions : — 
 
 Chapter I. — Bombardment op Undefended Ports, Towns, 
 Villages, Dwellings, or Buildings. 
 
 Article 1. — The bombardment by naval forces of undefended 
 ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden. 
 
 A place may not be bombarded solely on the ground that 
 automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour. 
 
 Article 2. — Military works, military or naval establishments, 
 depots of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could 
 be utilised for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and ships of 
 war in the harbour, are not, however, included in this prohibition. 
 The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, 
 after a summons followed by a reasonable interval of time, if all 
 other means are impossible, and when the local authorities have not 
 themselves destroyed them within the time fixed. 
 
 The Commander incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable 
 damage which may be caused by a bombardment under such 
 circumstances. 
 
 If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no 
 delay can be allowed to the enemy, it is nevertheless understood 
 that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, 
 as in the case given in the first paragraph, and that the commander 
 shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as 
 little harm as possible. 
 
 Article 3. — After due notice has been given, the bombardment 
 of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings may 
 be commenced, if the local authorities, on a formal summons being 
 made to them, decline to comply with requisitions for provisions or 
 supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force before 
 the place in question. 
 
 Such requisitions shall be proportional to the resources of the 
 place. They shall only be demanded in the name of the commander 
 of the said naval force, and they shall, as far as possible, be paid 
 for in ready money ; if not, receipts shall be given. 
 
 Article 4.— The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, 
 villages, dwellings, or buildings, on account of failure to pay money 
 contributions, is forbidden.
 
 242 APPENDICES 
 
 Chapter II. — General Provisions. 
 
 Article 5.— In bombardments by naval forces all necessary steps 
 must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible buildings 
 dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, 
 historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick or 
 wounded are collected, provided that they are not used at the 
 time for military purposes. 
 
 It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments, 
 edifices, or places by visible signs, which shall consist of large stiff 
 rectangular panels divided diagonally into two painted triangular 
 portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white. 
 
 Article 6.— Unless military exigencies render it impossible, the 
 officer in command of an attacking naval force must, before com- 
 mencing the bombardment, do all in his power to warn the 
 authorities. 
 
 Article 7. — The giving over to pillage of a town or place, even 
 when taken by assault, is forbidden. 
 
 Chapter III.— Final Provisions. 
 
 Article 8. — The provisions of the present Convention do not 
 apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the 
 belligerents are parties to the Convention. 
 
 Article 9. — The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 
 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein 
 and by the Xetherland Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification addressed to the Netherland Government 
 and accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immedi- 
 ately sent by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic 
 channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as well 
 as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. The 
 said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the preceding 
 paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on which it 
 received the notification. 
 
 Article 10. — Non-Signatory Powers may accede to the present 
 Convention. 
 
 A Power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing
 
 APPENDIX C 243 
 
 to the Netlierland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, 
 which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government. 
 
 The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of the notification, as well as of the act 
 of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the noti- 
 fication. 
 
 Article 11.— The present Convention shall take effect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications, 
 sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, 
 in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which 
 shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification 
 or of their accession has been received by the Netlierland 
 Government. 
 
 Article 12. — In the event of one of the Contracting Powers 
 wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall 
 be notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall 
 immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to 
 all the other Powers informing them of the date on which it was 
 received. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has 
 reached the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 13.— A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications 
 etfected in virtue of Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the 
 date on which the notifications of accession (Article 10, paragraph 2) 
 or of denunciation (Article 12, paragraph 1) have been received. 
 
 Each Contracting power is entitled to have access to this register 
 and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it. 
 
 In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have appended their 
 signatures to the present Convention. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, 
 through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the 
 Second Peace Conference. 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 No. 11. — Convention relative to certain Restrictions on 
 the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War. 
 
 Kecognising the necessity of ensuring more efi'ectively than 
 hitherto the equitable application of law to the international 
 relations of maritime Powers in time of war ;
 
 244 APPENDICES 
 
 Considering that, for this purpose, it is expedient, in giving up 
 or, if necessary, in harmonising for the common interest certain 
 conflicting practices of long standing, to undertake to codify in 
 regulations of general application the guarantees due to peaceful 
 commerce and legitimate business, as well as the conduct of 
 hostilities by sea ; that it is expedient to lay down in written mutual 
 engagements the principles which have hitherto remained in the 
 uncertain domain of controversy or have been left to the discretion 
 of Governments ; 
 
 That a certain number of rules may be made forthwith, without 
 thereby affecting the law now in force with regard to the matters 
 which these rules do not touch ; 
 
 Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say : 
 
 [Names of plenipotentiaries.] 
 
 Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in 
 good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions :— 
 
 Chapter I.— Postal Correspondence. 
 
 Article 1. — The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, 
 whatever its official or private character, found on board a neutral 
 or enemy ship on the high seas is inviolable. If the ship is detained, 
 the correspondence is forwarded by the captor with the least 
 
 possible delay. 
 
 The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not, in case of 
 violation of blockade, apply to correspondence proceeding to or from 
 a blockaded port. 
 
 Article 2. — The inviolability of postal correspondence does not 
 exempt a neutral mail-ship from the laws and customs of naval war 
 respecting neutral merchant- ships in general. The ship, however, 
 may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, and then 
 only with as much consideration and expedition as possible. 
 
 Chapter II. — Exemption from Capture of certain Vessels. 
 
 Article 3.— Vessels employed exclusively in coast-fisheries, or 
 small boats employed in local trade, together with their appliances, 
 rigging, tackle, and cargo, are exempt from capture. 
 
 This exemption no longer applies from the moment that they 
 take any part whatever in hostilities. 
 
 The Contracting Powers bind themselves not to take advantage 
 of the harmless character of the said vessels in order to use them for 
 military purposes while preserving their peaceful appearance. 
 
 Article 4.— Vessels employed on religious, scientific, or philan- 
 thropic missions arc likewise exempt from capture.
 
 APPENDIX C 245 
 
 Chapter III.— Regulations eegaeding the Crews op Enemy 
 Merchant-ships captured by a Belligerent. 
 
 Article 5. — When an enemy merchant - ship is captured by a 
 belligerent, such of its crew as are subjects or citizens of a neutral 
 State are not made prisoners of war. 
 
 The same principle applies in the case of the captain and officers, 
 likewise subjects or citizens of a neutral State, if they give a formal 
 undertaking in writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war 
 lasts. 
 
 Article 6. — The captain, officers, and members of the crew, if 
 subjects or citizens of the enemy State, are not made prisoners of 
 war, provided that they undertake, on the faith of a written promise, 
 not to engage, while hostilities last, in any service connected with 
 the operations of the war. 
 
 Article 7. — The names of the persons retaining their liberty 
 under the conditions laid down in Article 5, in the second paragraph, 
 and in Article 6, are notified by the belligerent captor to the other 
 belligerent. The latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the said 
 persons. 
 
 Article 8. — The provisions of the three preceding Articles do not 
 apply to ships taking part in hostilities. 
 
 Chapter IV. — Final Provisions. 
 
 Article 9. — The provisions of the present Convention do not 
 apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the 
 belligerents are parties to the Convention. 
 
 Article 10. — The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 
 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein 
 and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Afiairs. 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification, addressed to the Netherland Government 
 and accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immedi- 
 ately sent by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic 
 channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as 
 well as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. 
 The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the 
 preceding paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on 
 which it received the notification.
 
 246 APPENDICES 
 
 A^rticle 11. — Xon-Signatory Powers may accede to the present 
 Convention. 
 
 A power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing 
 to the Xetherland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, 
 which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government. 
 
 The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of the notification, as well as of the 
 act of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the 
 notification. 
 
 Article 12. — The present Convention shall take effect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications, 
 sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, 
 in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which 
 shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or 
 of their accession, has been received by the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 13. — In the event of one of the Contracting Powers 
 wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall 
 be notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall 
 immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification 
 to all the other Powers informing them of the date on which it was 
 received. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has 
 reached the Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 14. — A register kept by the Xetherland Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications 
 effected in virtue of Article 10, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the 
 date on which the notifications of accession (Article 11, paragraph 2) 
 or of denunciation (Article 13, paragraph 1) have been received. 
 
 Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this 
 register and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their 
 signatures to the present Convention. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, through 
 the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace 
 Conference. i 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 No. 13. — Convention respecting the Rights and Duties 
 of Neutral Powers in Maritime War. 
 
 With a view to harmonizing the divergent views which still exist 
 as to the relations between neutral Powers and belligerent Powers,
 
 APPENDIX C 247 
 
 in the case of naval war, and with a view to providing for the 
 ditticulties to whio.li such divergence of views might give rise ; 
 
 Whereas, even if at present measures cannot be frametl applicable 
 to all circumstances which may arise in practice, there is neverthe- 
 less an undeniable advantage in framing, as far as may be possible, 
 rules of general application to meet the case of war having 
 unfortunately broken out ; 
 
 Whereas, in cases not covered by the present Convention, account 
 must be taken of the general principles of the law of nations ; 
 
 Whereas, it is desirable that the Powers should issue detailed 
 enactments specifying the consequences of the status of neutrality 
 whenever adopted by them ; 
 
 Whereas, there is a recognised obligation on neutral Powers to 
 apply to the several belligerents impartially the rules they have 
 adopted ; and 
 
 Whereas, it is in conformity with these ideas that these rules 
 should not, in principle, be altered, in the course of the war, by a 
 neutral Power, except in a case where experience has shown that 
 such change is necessary for the protection of the rights of that 
 Power ; 
 
 Have agreed to observe the following rules of general application, 
 which are not meant, however, to modify provisions of existing 
 general Treaties, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that 
 is to say : 
 
 [Names of Plenipotentiaries.] 
 
 Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in 
 good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions : — 
 
 Article 1.— Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights 
 of neutral Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral 
 waters, from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any 
 Power, constitute a violation of neutrality. 
 
 Article 2. — Any act of hostility, including therein capture and 
 the exercise of the right of search, committed by belligerent war- 
 ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, constitutes a 
 violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden. 
 
 Article 3. — When a ship has been captured in the territorial 
 waters of a neutral Power, such Power must, if the prize is still 
 within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to release 
 the prize with its oflBcers and crew, and to intern the prize crew. 
 
 If the prize is not within the jurisdiction of the neutral Power, 
 the captor Government, on the demand of the neutral Power, must 
 liberate the prize with its officers and crew. 
 
 Article 4. — A Prize Court cannot be established by a belligerent 
 or neutral territory or on a vessel in neutral waters.
 
 248 APPENDICES 
 
 Article 5. — Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and 
 waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries ; in 
 particular they may not erect wireless telegraphy stations or any 
 apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the belligerent 
 forces on land or sea. 
 
 Article 6. — The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, of 
 war-ships, supplies, or war material of any kind whatever, by a 
 neutral Power to a belligerent Power, is forbidden. 
 
 Article 7.— A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export 
 or transit, for either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in 
 general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet. 
 
 Article 8. — A neutral Government is bound to employ the means 
 at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel 
 within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to 
 cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which 
 that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same 
 vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any 
 vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which has 
 been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use 
 in war. 
 
 Article 9. — A neutral Power must apply to the two belligerents 
 impartially the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions issued by it 
 in regard to the admission into its ports, roadsteads, or territorial 
 waters, of belligerent war-ships or of their prizes. 
 
 Nevertheless, a neutral Power may forbid any particular 
 belligerent vessel which has failed to conform to the orders and 
 regulations made by it, or which has violated neutrality, to enter 
 its ports or roadsteads. 
 
 Article 10. — The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the 
 mere passage through its terrritorial waters of war-ships or prizes 
 belonging to belligerents. 
 
 Article II. — A neutral Power may allow belligerent war-ships to 
 employ its licensed pilots. 
 
 Article 12. — In default of special provisions to the contrary in 
 the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent war-ships are not 
 permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of 
 the said Power for more than twenty -four hours, except in the cases 
 covered by the present Convention. 
 
 Article 13. — If a Power which has received notice of the outbreak 
 of hostilities learns that a belligerent war-ship is in one of its ports 
 or roadsteads, or in its territorial waters, it must notify the said 
 ship to depart within twenty-four hours or within the time prescribed 
 by the local law.
 
 APPENDIX C 249 
 
 Article 14. — A belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a 
 neutral port beyond the time permitted except on account of damage 
 or stress of weather. It must depart as soon as the cause of the 
 delay is at an end. 
 
 The regulations as to the length of time which such vessels may 
 remain in neutral ports, roadsteads, or waters, do not apply to war- 
 ships devoted exclusively to '^religious, scientific, or philanthropic 
 purposes. 
 
 Article 15. — In default of special provisions to the contrary in 
 the legislation of a neutral Power, the maximum number of war- 
 ships belonging to a belligerent which may be in one of the ports 
 or roadsteads of that Power simultaneously shall be tliree. 
 
 Article 16. — When war-ships belonging to both belligerents are 
 present simultaneously in a neutral port or roadstead, a period of 
 not less than twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure 
 of the ship belonging to one belligerent and the departure of the 
 ship belonging to the other. 
 
 The order of departure is determined by the order of arrival, 
 unless the ship which arrived first is so circumstanced that an 
 extension of its stay is permissible. 
 
 A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead 
 until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant-ship 
 flying the flag of its adversary. 
 
 Article 17. — In neutral ports and roadsteads belligerent war- 
 ships may only carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to 
 render them seaworthy, and may not add in any manner whatever 
 to their fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral Power 
 shall decide what repairs are necessary, and these must be carried 
 out with the least possible delay. 
 
 Article 18. — Belligerent war-ships may not make use of neutral 
 ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters for replenishing or increas- 
 ing their supplies of war material or their armament, or for 
 completing their crews. 
 
 Article 19. — Belligerent war-ships may only revictual in neutral 
 ports or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace 
 standard. 
 
 Similarly these vessels may only ship sufficient fuel to enable 
 them to reach the nearest port in their own country. They may, 
 on the other hand, fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when in 
 neutral countries which have adopted this method of determining 
 the amount of fuel to be supplied. 
 
 If, in accordance with the law of the neutral Power, the ships 
 are not supplied with coal within twenty-fours of their arrival, the 
 duration of their permitted stay is extended by twenty-four houi's.
 
 250 APPENDICES 
 
 Article 20. — Bplligercnt war-ships whieh have shipped fuel in 
 a port belonging to a neutral Power may not within the succeeding 
 three months replenish their supply in a port of the same Power. 
 
 Article 21. — A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on 
 account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or 
 jirovisions. 
 
 It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its 
 entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral Power must order 
 it to leave at once ; should it fail to obey, the neutral Power must 
 employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and 
 crew and to intern the prize crew. 
 
 Article 22. — A neutral Power must, similarly, release a prize 
 brought into one of its ports under circumstances other than those 
 referred to in Article 21, 
 
 Article 23. — A neutral Power may allow prizes to enter its ports 
 and roadsteads, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought 
 there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a Prize Court. It 
 may have the prize taken to another of its ports. 
 
 If the prize is convoyed by a war-ship, the prize crew may go 
 on board the convoj^ng ship. 
 
 If the prize is not under convoy, the prize crew are left at 
 liberty. 
 
 Article 24, — If, notwithstanding the notification of the neutral 
 Power, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is 
 not entitled to remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take such 
 measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of 
 putting to sea so long as the war lasts, and the commanding officer 
 of the ship must facilitate the execution of such measures. 
 
 When a belligerent ship is detained by a neutral Power, the 
 officers and crew are likewise detained. 
 
 The officers and crew so detained may be left in the ship or kept 
 either on another vessel or on land, and may be subjected to such 
 restrictions as it may appear necessary to impose upon them. A 
 sufficient number of men must, however, be always left on board for 
 looking after the vessel. 
 
 The officers may be left at liberty on giving their word not to 
 (]uit the neutral territory without permission. 
 
 Article 25, — A neutral Power is bound to exercise such vigilance 
 as the means at its disposal permit to prevent any violation of the 
 provisions of the above Articles occurring in its ports or roadsteads 
 or in its waters. 
 
 Article 26. — The exercise by a neutral Power of the rights laid 
 down in the present Convention can under no circumstances be 
 considered as an unfriendly act by one or other belligerent who 
 has accepted the Articles relating thereto.
 
 APPENDIX C 251 
 
 Article 27. — The Contracting Powers shall communicate to each 
 other in due course all statutes, orders, and other enactments 
 defining in their respective countries the situation of belligerent 
 war-ships in their jiorts and waters, by means of a communication 
 addressed to the CTOvernment of the Netherlands, and forwarded 
 immediately by that Government to the other Contracting Powers. 
 
 Article 28.— The provisions of the present Convention do not 
 apply except to the Contracting Powers, and then only if all the 
 belligerents are parties to the Convention. 
 
 Article 29. — The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratification shall be deposited at The Hague. 
 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein 
 and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification addressed to the Netherland Government 
 and accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immedi- 
 ately sent by the Netherland Government, through the diplomatic 
 channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as 
 well as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. 
 The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the 
 preceding paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on 
 which it received the notification. 
 
 Article 30. — Non-Signatory Powers may accede to the present 
 Convention. 
 
 A Power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing 
 to the Netherland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, 
 which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government. 
 
 The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of the notification as well as of the act 
 of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the notification. 
 
 Article 31. — The present Convention shall take effect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of the ratifica- 
 tions, sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such 
 deposit, and, in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subse- 
 quently or which shall accede, sixty days after the notification of 
 their ratification or of their accession has been received by the 
 Netherland Government. 
 
 Article 32.— In the event of one of the Contracting Powers 
 wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall 
 be notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall
 
 252 APPENDICES 
 
 immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to 
 all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it was 
 received. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has 
 reached the Netherland Government, 
 
 Article 33.— A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for 
 Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications 
 effected in virtue of Article 29, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the 
 date on which the notifications of accession (Article 30, paragraph 2) 
 or of denunciation (Article 32, paragraph 1) have been received. 
 
 Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register 
 and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their 
 signatures to the present Convention. 
 
 Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, 
 which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland 
 Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, through 
 the diplomatic channel, to the Powers which have been invited to 
 the Second Peace Conference.
 
 APPENDIX D 
 
 FINAL PROTOCOL OF THE LONDON NAVAL 
 CONFERENCE 
 
 (Translation.) 
 Pinal Protocol. 
 
 The London Naval Conference, called together by His Britannic 
 Majesty's Government, assembled at the Foreign Office on the 4th 
 December, 1908, vi^ith the object of laying down the generally 
 recognized principles of international law in accordance with Article 
 7 of the Convention signed at The Hague on the 18th October, 1907, 
 for the establishment of an International Prize Court. 
 
 The Powers enumerated below took part in this Conference, at 
 which they appointed as their Representatives the following 
 
 Delegates : — 
 
 
 Germany. 
 
 The United States of America. 
 
 Austria-Hungary. 
 
 Spain. 
 
 France. 
 
 Great Britain, 
 Italy. 
 Japan. 
 Netherlands. 
 ■ Russia. 
 
 In a series of sittings held from the 4th December, 1908, to the 
 26th February, the Conference has concluded, to be submitted for 
 signature by the Plenipotentiaries the Declaration concerning the 
 latvs of tiaval tvar, the text of which is annexed to the present 
 Protocol. 
 
 Furthermore, the following wish has been recorded by the 
 Delegates of those Powers which have signed or expressed the 
 intention of signing the Convention of The Hague of the 18th 
 October, 1907, for the establishment of an International Prize 
 Court : — 
 
 The Delegates of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference 
 ivhich have signed or exjn'essed the intention of signing the Con- 
 vention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1901, for the establish- 
 ment of an International Prize Coiirt, having regard to the 
 difficulties of a constitutional nature tvhich, in some States, stand 
 in the way of the ratificatimi of that Convention in its vresent 
 
 263
 
 254 APPENDICES 
 
 foiin, agree to call the attention of their respective governments 
 to the advantage of concludixtg an arrangement under which such 
 States ivould have the liower^ at the time of depositiiuj their 
 ratifications, to add thereto a reservation to the effect that resort 
 to the International Prize Court in respect of decisions of their 
 National Tribunals shall take the form of a direct claim for 
 compensation, prornded alvjays that the effect of this reservation 
 shall not be such as to impair the rights secured under the said 
 Convention eitlier to individuals or to their Governments, and 
 that the terms of the rese^'vation shall form the subject of a subse- 
 quent understanding bettveen the Poivers signatory of that 
 Convention. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries and the Delegates represent- 
 ing those Plenipotentiaries who have already left London have 
 signed the present Protocol. 
 
 Done at London the twenty-sixth day of February, one thousand 
 nine hundred and nine, in a single original, which shall be deposited 
 in the archives of the British Government and of which duly certified 
 copies shall be sent through the diplomatic channel to the Powers 
 represented at the Naval Conference. 
 
 For Germany : 
 KRIEGE. 
 
 For the L^nited States of America : 
 C. H. STOCKTON. 
 GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON. 
 
 For Austria-Hungary : 
 C. DUMBA. 
 
 For Spain : 
 
 RAMO"N ESTRADA. 
 
 For France : 
 
 L. RENAULT. 
 
 For Great Britain : 
 DESART. 
 
 For Italy : 
 
 GIOVANNI LOVATELLI. 
 
 For Japan : 
 
 T. SAKAMOTO. 
 
 E. YAMAZA. 
 
 For the Netherlands : 
 J. A. ROELL. 
 L. H. RUYSSENAERS. 
 
 For Russia : 
 
 F. BEHR.
 
 APPENDIX D 255 
 
 THE DECLARATION OF LONDON OF 1909 
 
 [Translation.] 
 
 Declaration concerning the LaAvs of Naval War. 
 
 HIS Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the 
 President of the United States of America ; His Majesty the 
 Emperor of Austria, King of Boliemia, etc., and Apostolic King 
 of Hungary ; His Majesty the King of Spain ; the President of the 
 French Republic ; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of 
 Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the 
 Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; His 
 Majesty the Emperor of Japan ; Her Majesty the Queen of the 
 Netherlands ; His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. 
 
 Having regard to the terms in which the British Government 
 invited various Powers to meet in conference in order to arrive at 
 an agreement as to what are the generally recognised rules of inter- 
 national law within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of 
 18th October, 1907, relative to the establishment of an International 
 Prize Court ; 
 
 Recognizing all the advantages which an agreement as to the 
 said rules would, in the unfortunate event of a naval war, present, 
 both as regards peaceful commerce, and as regards the belligerents 
 and their diplomatic relations with neutral Governments ; 
 
 Having regard to the divergence often found in the methods by 
 which it is sought to apply in practice the general principles of 
 international law ; 
 
 Animated by the desire to ensure henceforward a greater measure 
 of uniformity in this respect ; 
 
 Hoping that a work so important to the common welfare will 
 meet with general approval ; 
 
 Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say : 
 [Here follows the Names.] 
 
 Who, after having communicated their full powers, found to 
 be in good and due form, have agreed to make the present 
 Declaration : — 
 
 Preliminary Provision. 
 
 The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the 
 following Chapters correspond in substance with the generally 
 recognised principles of international law. 
 
 Chapter I.— Blockade in Time of War. 
 
 Article 1. — A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and 
 coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy.
 
 256 APPENDICES 
 
 Article 2.^In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a 
 blockade, in order to be })inding, must be effective — that is to say, it 
 must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to 
 the enemy coastline. 
 
 Article 3. — The question whether a blockade is effective is a 
 question of fact. 
 
 Article 4. — A blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading 
 force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather. 
 
 Article 5. — A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships 
 of all nations. 
 
 Article 6. — The commander of a blockading force may give 
 permission to a warship to enter, and subsequently to leave, a 
 blockaded port. 
 
 Article 7. — In circumstances of distress, acknowledged by an 
 officer of the blockading force, a neutral vessel may enter a place 
 under blockade and subsequently leave it, provided that she has 
 neither discharged nor shipped any cargo there. 
 
 Article 8. — A blockade, in order to be binding, must be declared 
 in accordance with Article 9, and notified in accordance with 
 Articles 11 and 16. 
 
 Article 9. — A declaration of blockade is made either by the 
 blockading Power or by the naval authorities acting in its name. 
 It specifies — 
 
 (1) The date when the blockade begins ; 
 
 (2) The geographical limits of the coastline under blockade ; 
 
 (3) The period within which neutral vessels may come out. 
 
 Article 10. — If the operations of the blockading Power, or of the 
 naval authorities acting in its name, do not tally with the particu- 
 lars, which, in accordance with Article 9 (1) and (2), must be inserted 
 in the declaration of blockade, the declaration is void, and a new 
 declaration is necessary in order to make the blockade operative. 
 
 Article 11.— A declaration of blockade is notified — 
 
 (1) To neutral Powers, by the blockading Power by means of a 
 
 communication addressed to the Governments direct, or to 
 their representatives accredited to it. 
 
 (2) To the local authorities, by the officer commanding the 
 
 blockading force. The local authorities will, in turn, inform 
 the foreign consular officers at the port or on the coastline 
 under blockade as soon as possible. 
 
 Article 12. — The rules as to declaration and notification of 
 blockade apply to cases where the limits of a blockade are extended, 
 or where a blockade is re-established after having been raised.
 
 APPENDIX D 257 
 
 Article 13. — The voluntary raising of a blockade, as also any 
 restriction in the limits of a blockade, must be notified in the 
 manner prescribed by Article 11. 
 
 Article 14.— The liability of a neutral vessel to capture for 
 breach of blockade is contingent on her knowledge, actual or pre- 
 sumptive, of the blockade. 
 
 Article 15.— Failing proof to the contrary, knowledge of the 
 blockade is presumed if the vessel left a neutral port subsequently 
 to the notification of the blockade to the Power to which such port 
 belongs, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time. 
 
 Article 16. — If a vessel approaching a blockaded port has no 
 knowledge, actual or presumptive, of the blockade, the notification 
 must be made to the vessel itself by an officer of one of the ships of 
 the blockading force. This notification should be entered in the 
 vessel's logbook, and must state the day and hour, and the geo- 
 graphical position of the vessel at the time. 
 
 If through the negligence of the officer commanding the blockad- 
 ing force no declaration of blockade has been notified to the local 
 authorities, or, if in the declaration, as notified, no period has been 
 mentioned within which neutral vessels may come out, a neutral 
 vessel coming out of the blockaded port must be allowed to pass free. 
 
 Article 17.— Neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of 
 blockade except within the area of operations of the warships 
 detailed to render the blockade effective. 
 
 Article 18.— The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral 
 ports or coasts. 
 
 Article 19. — Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel 
 or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade, if, at 
 the moment, she is on her way to a non-blockaded port. 
 
 Article 20. — A vessel which has broken blockade outwards, or 
 which has attempted to break blockade inwards, is liable to capture 
 so long as she is pursued by a ship of the blockading force. If the 
 pursuit is abandoned, or if the blockade is raised, her capture can no 
 longer be effected. 
 
 Article 21. — A vessel found guilty of breach of blockade is liable 
 to condemnation. The cargo is also condemned, unless it is proved 
 that at the time of the shipment of the goods the shipper neither 
 knew nor could have known of the intention to break the blockade. 
 
 Chapter II. — Contraband of War. 
 
 Article 22. — The following articles may, without notice, be treated 
 as contraband of war, under the name of absolute contraband : — 
 (1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and 
 their distinctive component parts. 
 
 R
 
 258 APPENDICES 
 
 (2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their 
 
 distinctive component parts. 
 
 (3) Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 
 
 (4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military waggons, 
 
 field forges, and their distinctive component parts. 
 
 (5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 
 
 (6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 
 
 (7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 
 
 (8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component 
 
 parts. 
 
 (9) Armour plates. 
 
 (10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component 
 parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel 
 of war. 
 
 (11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the 
 manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or 
 repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea. 
 
 Article 23. — Articles exclusively used for war may be added to 
 the list of absolute contraband by a declaration, which must be 
 notified. 
 
 Such notification must be addressed to the Governments of other 
 Powers, or to their representatives accredited to the Power making 
 the declaration. A notification made after the outbreak of hostiUties 
 is addressed only to neutral Powers. 
 
 Article 24. — The following articles, susceptible of use in war as 
 well as for purposes of peace, may, without notice, be treated as 
 contraband of war, under the name of conditional contraband : — 
 
 (1) Foodstufi"s. 
 
 (2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals. 
 
 (3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable 
 
 for use in war. 
 
 (4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion ; paper money. 
 
 (5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their 
 
 component parts. 
 
 (6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds ; floating docks, parts of 
 
 docks and their component parts. 
 
 (7) Kailway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material 
 
 for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones. 
 
 (8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component 
 
 parts, together with accessories and articles recognizable as 
 intended for use in connection with balloons and flying 
 machines. 
 
 (9) Fuel; lubricants. 
 
 (10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. 
 
 (11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the 
 same.
 
 APPENDIX D 259 
 
 (12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 
 
 (13) Harness and saddlery. 
 
 (14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of 
 nautical instruments. 
 
 Article 25. — Articles susceptible of use in war as well as for 
 purposes of peace, other than those enumerated in Articles 22 and 
 24, may be added to the list of conditional contraband by a 
 declaration, which must be notified in the manner provided for in 
 the second paragraph of Article 23. 
 
 Article 26. — If a Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the 
 right to treat as contraband of war an article comprised in any of 
 the classes enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, such intention shall be 
 announced by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner 
 provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. 
 
 Article 27. — Articles which are not susceptible of use in war may 
 not be declared contraband of war. 
 
 Article 28. — The following may not be declared contraband of 
 war : — 
 
 (1) Kaw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw 
 
 materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same. 
 
 (2) Oil seeds and nuts ; copra. 
 
 (3) Kubber, resins, gums, and lacs ; hops. 
 
 (4) Kaw hides and horns, bones, and ivory. 
 
 (5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phos- 
 
 phates for agricultural purposes. 
 
 (6) Metallic ores. 
 
 (7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, 
 
 slates, and tiles. 
 
 (8) Chinaware and glass. 
 
 (9) Paper and paper-making materials. 
 
 (10) Soap, paint and colours, including articles exclusively used 
 in their manufacture, and varnish. 
 
 (11) Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, 
 sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper. 
 
 (12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery. 
 
 (13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, 
 and coral. 
 
 (14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers. 
 
 (15) Fashion and fancy goods. 
 
 (16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles. 
 
 (17) Articles of household furniture and decoration ; office 
 furniture and requisites. 
 
 Article 29. — Likewise the following may not be treated as contra- 
 band of war : — 
 
 (1) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded.
 
 260 APPENDICES 
 
 They can, however, in case of urgent military necessity and 
 subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned, 
 if their destination is that specified in Article 30. 
 (2) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are 
 found, as well as those intended for the use of her crew and 
 passengers during the voyage. 
 Article 30. — Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is 
 shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the 
 enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial 
 whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment 
 or a subsequent transport by land. 
 
 Article 31. — Proof of the destination specified in Article 30 is 
 complete in the following cases : — 
 
 (1) "V^Tien the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy 
 
 port, or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy. 
 
 (2) "VNTien the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she 
 
 is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of 
 the enemy before reaching the neutral port for which the 
 goods in question are documented. 
 
 Article 32. — \Vhere a vessel is carrying absolute contraband, her 
 papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is engaged, 
 unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers 
 and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation. 
 
 Article 33. — Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is 
 shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a govern- 
 ment department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the 
 circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the 
 purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not 
 apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4). 
 
 Article 34. — The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed 
 to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a con- 
 tractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common 
 knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar 
 presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place 
 belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the 
 armed forces of the enemy. JTo such presumption, however, arises 
 in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places if it 
 is sought to prove that she herself is contraband. 
 
 In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destina- 
 tion is presumed to be innocent. 
 
 The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted. 
 
 Article 35. — Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, 
 except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging 
 to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, 
 and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.
 
 APPENDIX D 261 
 
 The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on 
 which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the 
 goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by 
 her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such 
 deviation. 
 
 Article 36. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, condi- 
 tional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in 
 Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has 
 no seaboard. 
 
 Article 37. — A vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute 
 or conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas or in 
 the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole of her 
 voyage, even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching the 
 hostile destination. 
 
 Article 38. — A vessel may not be captured on the ground that 
 she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage is 
 in point of fact at an end. 
 
 Article 39. — Contraband goods are liable to condemnation. 
 
 Article 40. — A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if 
 the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, 
 forms more than half the cargo. 
 
 'o^ 
 
 A7-ticle 41. — If a vessel carrying contraband is released, she may 
 be condemned to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the captor 
 in respect of the proceedings in the national prize court and the 
 custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings. 
 
 Article 42. — Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband 
 and are on board the same vessel are liable to condemnation. 
 
 Article 43. — If a vessel is encountered at sea while unaware of 
 the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband which 
 applies to her cargo, the contraband cannot be condemned except on 
 payment of compensation ; the vessel herself and the remainder of 
 the cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and expenses 
 referred to in Article 41. The same rule applies if the master, after 
 becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the declara- 
 tion of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging the 
 contraband. 
 
 A vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war, 
 or of a declaration of contraband, if she left a neutral port subse- 
 quently to the notification to the Power to which such port belongs 
 of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband 
 respectively, provided that such notification was made in sufficient 
 time. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of the existence of a state 
 of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities.
 
 262 APPENDICES 
 
 Article 44, — A vessel winch has been stopped on the ground that 
 she is carrying contraband, and which is not liable to condemnation 
 on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may, when the 
 circumstances permit, be allowed to continue her voyage if the 
 master is willing to hand over the contraband to the belligerent 
 warship. 
 
 The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor on 
 the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master must give the 
 captor duly certified copies of all relevant papers. 
 
 The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been 
 handed over to him under these conditions. 
 
 Chapter III.— Unneutral Service. 
 Article 45. — A neutral vessel will be condemned and will, in a 
 general way, receive the same treatment as a neutral vessel liable to 
 condemnation for carriage of contraband : — 
 
 (1) If she is on a voyage specially undertaken with a view to the 
 
 transport of individual passengers who are embodied in the 
 armed forces of the enemy, or with a view to the transmis- 
 sion of intelligence in the interest of the enemy. 
 
 (2) If, to the knowledge of either the owner, the charterer, or the 
 
 master, she is transporting a military detachment of the 
 enemy, or one or more persons who, in the course of the 
 voyage, directly assist the operations of the enemy. 
 In the cases specified under the above heads, goods belonging to 
 the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation. 
 
 The provisions of the present Article do not apply if the vessel 
 is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, 
 or if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, 
 has had no opportunity of disembarking the passengers. The vessel 
 is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left 
 an enemy port subsequently to the outbreak of hostilities, or a 
 neutral port subsequently to the notification of the outbreak of 
 hostilities to the Power to which such port belongs, provided that 
 such notification was made in sufficient time. 
 
 Article 46. — A neutral vessel will be condemned and, in a general 
 way, receive the same treatment as would be applicable to her if she 
 were an enemy merchant vessel : — 
 
 (1) If she takes a direct part in the hostilities ; 
 
 (2) If she is under the orders or control of an agent placed on 
 
 board by the enemy Government ; 
 
 (3) If she is in the exclusive employment of the enemy 
 
 Government ; 
 
 (4) If she is exclusively engaged at the time either in the 
 
 transport of enemy troops or in the transmission of intelli- 
 gence in the interest of the enemy.
 
 APPENDIX D 263 
 
 In the cases covered by the present Article, goods belonging to 
 the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation. 
 
 Article 47. — Any individual embodied in the armed forces of the 
 enemy who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel, may be 
 made a prisoner of war, even though there be no ground for the 
 capture of the vessel. 
 
 Chapter IV. — Destruction op Neutral Prizes. 
 
 Article 48. — A neutral vessel which has been captured may not 
 be destroyed by the captor ; she must be taken into such port as is 
 proper for the determination there of all questions concerning the 
 validity of the capture. 
 
 Article 49. — As an exception, a neutral vessel which has been 
 captured by a belligerent warship, and which would be liable to 
 condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of Article 48 
 would involve danger to the safety of the warship or to the success 
 of the operations in which she is engaged at the time. 
 
 Article 50. — Before the vessel is destroyed all persons on board 
 must be placed in safety, and all the ship's papers and other 
 documents which the parties interested consider relevant for 
 the purpose of deciding on the validity of the capture must be 
 taken on board the warship. 
 
 Article 51. — A captor who has destroyed a neutral vessel must, 
 prior to any decision respecting the validity of the prize, establish 
 that he only acted in the face of an exceptional necessity of the 
 nature contemplated in Article 49. If he fails to do this, he must 
 compensate the parties interested and no examination shall be made 
 of the question whether the capture was valid or not. 
 
 Article 52. — If the capture of a neutral vessel is subsequently 
 held to be invalid, though the act of destruction has been held to 
 have been justifiable, the captor must pay compensation to the 
 parties interested, in place of the restitution to which they would 
 have been entitled. 
 
 Article 53. — If neutral goods not liable to condemnation have 
 been destroyed with the vessel, the owner of such goods is entitled 
 to compensation. 
 
 Article 54. — The captor has the right to demand the handing 
 over, or to proceed himself to the destruction of, any goods liable to 
 condemnation found on board a vessel not herself liable to con- 
 demnation, provided that the circumstances are such as would, under 
 Article 49, justify the destruction of a vessel herself liable to con- 
 demnation. The captor must enter the goods surrendered or 
 destroyed in the logbook of the vessel stopped, and must obtain 
 duly certified copies of all relevant papers. When the goods have
 
 264 APPENDICES 
 
 been handed over or destroyed, and the formalities duly carried out, 
 the master must be allowed to continue his voyage. 
 
 The provisions of Articles 51 and 52 respecting the obligations of 
 a captor who has destroyed a neutral vessel are applicable. 
 
 Chapter V.— Teansfek to a Neutral Flag. 
 
 Article 55. — The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, 
 effected before the outbreak of hostilities, is valid, unless it is 
 proved that such transfer was made in order to evade the conse- 
 quences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, 
 however, a presumption, if the bill of sale is not on board a vessel 
 which has lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before 
 the outbreak of hostilities, that the transfer is void. This presump- 
 tion may be rebutted. 
 
 Where the transfer was effected more than thirty days before the 
 outbreak of hostilities, there is an absolute presumption that it is 
 valid if it is unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the 
 laws of the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that neither 
 the control of, nor the profits arising from the employment of, the 
 vessel remain in the same hands as before the transfer. If, however, 
 the vessel lost her belligerent nationality less than sixty days before 
 the outbreak of hostilities and if the bill of sale is not on board, the 
 capture of the vessel gives no right to damages. 
 
 Article 56. — The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag 
 effected after the outbreak of hostilities, is void unless it is proved 
 that such transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences 
 to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. 
 
 There, however, is an absolute presumption that a transfer is 
 void — 
 
 (1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a 
 
 blockaded port. 
 
 (2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to 
 
 the vendor. 
 
 (3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right 
 
 to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing, have not 
 been fulfilled. 
 
 Chapter VI.— Enesiy Character. 
 
 Article 57. — Subject to the provisions respecting transfer to 
 another flag, the neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined 
 by the flag which she is entitled to fly. 
 
 The case where a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which is 
 closed in time of peace, remains outside the scope of, and is in no 
 wise affected by, this rule.
 
 APPENDIX D 265 
 
 Article 58 — The neutral or enemy character of goods found on 
 board an enemy vessel is determined by the neutral or enemy 
 character of the owner. 
 
 Article 59. — In the absence of proof of the neutral character of 
 goods found on board an enemy vessel, they are presumed to be 
 enemy goods. 
 
 Article 60. — Enemy goods on board an enemy vessel retain their 
 enemy character until they reach their destination, notwithstanding 
 any transfer eifected after the outbreak of hostilities while the goods 
 are being forwarded. 
 
 If, however, prior to the capture, a former neutral owner exercises, 
 on the bankruptcy of an existing enemy owner, a recognised legal 
 right to recover the goods, they regain their neutral character. 
 
 Chapter VII.— Convoy. 
 
 Article 61. — Neutral vessels under national convoy are exempt 
 from search. The commander of a convoy gives, in writing, at the 
 request of the commander of a belligerent warship, all information 
 as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes, which could be 
 obtained by search. 
 
 Article 62. — If the commander of the belligerent warship has 
 reason to suspect that the confidence of the commander of the 
 convoy has been abused, he communicates his suspicions to him. 
 In such a case it is for the commander of the convoy alone to 
 investigate the matter. He must record the result of such investiga- 
 tion in a report, of which a copy is handed to the officer of the 
 warship. If, in the 'opinion of the commander of the convoy, the 
 facts shown in the report justify the capture of one or more vessels, 
 the protection of the convoy must be withdrawn from such vessels. 
 
 Chapter VIII. — Eesistance to Search. 
 
 Article 63. — Forcible resistance to the legitimate exercise of the 
 right of stoppage, search, and capture, involves in all cases the 
 condemnation of the vessel. The cargo is liable to the same treat- 
 ment as the cargo of an enemy vessel. Goods belonging to the 
 master or owner of the vessel are treated as enemy goods. 
 
 Chapter IX.— Compensation. 
 
 Article 64. — If the capture of a vessel or of goods is not upheld 
 by the prize court, or if the prize is released without any judgment 
 being given, the parties interested have the right to compensation, 
 unless there were good reasons for capturing the vessel or goods.
 
 266 APPENDICES 
 
 Pinal Provisions. 
 
 Article 65. — The provisions of the present Declaration must be 
 treated as a whole, and cannot be separated. 
 
 Article 66. — The Signatory Powers undertake to insure the 
 mutual observance of the rules contained in the present Declaration 
 in any war in which all the belligerents are parties thereto. They 
 will therefore issue the necessary instructions to their authorities 
 and to their armed forces, and will take such measures as may be 
 required in order to insure that it will be applied by their courts, 
 and more particularly by their prize courts. 
 
 Article 67. — The present Declaration shall be ratified as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The ratifications shall be deposited in London. 
 
 The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol 
 signed by the Representatives of the Powers taking part therein, 
 and by His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Afiairs, 
 
 The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means 
 of a written notification addressed to the British Government, and 
 accompanied by the instrument of ratification. 
 
 A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit 
 of ratifications, and of the notifications mentioned in the preceding 
 paragraph as well as of the instruments of ratification which accom- 
 pany them, shall be immediately sent by the British Government, 
 through the diplomatic channel, to the Signatory Powers. The said 
 Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the preceding para- 
 graph, inform them at the same time of the date on which it received 
 the notification. 
 
 Article 68. — The present Declaration shall take effect, in the case 
 of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ratifications, 
 sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, 
 in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently, sixty days 
 after the notification of their ratification shall have been received by 
 the British Government. 
 
 Article 69. — In the event of one of the Signatory Powers wishing 
 to denounce the present Declaration, such denunciation can only be 
 made to take effect at the end of a period of twelve years, beginning 
 sixty days after the first deposit of ratifications, and, after that time, 
 at the end of successive periods of six years, of which the first will 
 begin at the end of the period of twelve years. 
 
 Such denunciation must be notified in writing, at least one year 
 in advance, to the British Government, which shall inform all the 
 other Powers. 
 
 It will only operate in respect of the denouncing Power. 
 
 Article 70. — The Powers represented at the London Naval Con- 
 ference attach particular importance to the general recognition of the
 
 APPENDIX D 267 
 
 rules wliich tliey have adopted, and therefore express the hope that 
 the Powers which were not represented there will accede to the 
 present Declaration. They request the British Government to invite 
 them to do so. 
 
 A Power which desires to accede shall notify its intention in 
 writing to the British Government, and transmit simultaneously the 
 act of accession, which will be deposited in the archives of the said 
 Government. 
 
 The said Government shall forthwith transmit to all the other 
 Powers a duly certified copy of the notification, together with the 
 act of accession, and communicate the date on which such notifica- 
 tion Avas received. The accession takes eflfect sixty days after such 
 date. 
 
 In respect of all matters concerning this Declaration, acceding 
 Powers shall be on the same footing as the Signatory Powers. 
 
 Article 71 . — The present Declaration, which bears the date of the 
 26th February, 1909, may be signed in London up till the 30th June, 
 1909, by the Plenipotentiaries of the Powers represented at the 
 Naval Conference. 
 
 In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present 
 Declaration, and have thereto affixed their seals. 
 
 Done at London, the twenty-sixth day of February, one thousand 
 nine hundred and nine, in a single original, which shall remain 
 deposited in the archives of the British Government, and of which 
 duly certified copies shall be sent through the diplomatic channel to 
 the Powers represented at the Naval Conference. 
 
 For Germany : 
 KRIEGE. 
 
 For the United States of America : 
 C. H. STOCKTON. 
 GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON. 
 
 For Austria-Hungary : 
 C. DUMBA. 
 
 For France : 
 
 L. RENAULT. 
 
 For Great Britain : 
 DESART. 
 
 For the Netherlands : 
 J. A. ROELL. 
 L. H. RUYSSENAERS. 
 
 Japan signed 10th June, 1909. 
 Russia signed 29th June, 1909. 
 Spain signed 23rd April, 1909. 
 Italy signed 25th May, 1909.
 
 APPENDIX E 
 A BILL 
 
 TO CONSOLIDATE, WITH AMENDMENTS, THE ENACTMENTS 
 RELATING TO NAVAL PRIZE OF WAR. 
 
 Presented by Secretary Sir Edward Grey, 
 supported by 
 
 Mr M'Kentia, Mr Attorney -Genera I, Mr Solicitor-General, and 
 
 Mr M'Kinnon Wood. 
 
 WHEREAS at the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in 
 the year nineteen hundred and seven a Convention, the English 
 translation whereof is set forth in the First Schedule to this Act, 
 was dra^Ti up, but it is desirable that the same should not be 
 ratified by His Majesty until such amendments have been made in 
 the law relating to naval prize of Avar as will enable effect to be 
 given to the Convention : 
 
 And whereas for the purpose aforesaid it is expedient to 
 consolidate the law relating to naval prize of war with such amend- 
 ments as aforesaid and with certain other minor amendments : 
 
 Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, 
 by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and 
 Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, 
 and by the authority of the same, as follows : — 
 
 Part I, 
 
 CoiniTs AND Officeks. 
 
 The Prize Court in England. 
 
 1.— (1) The High Court shall, without special warrant, be a 
 prize court, and shall, on the high seas, and throughout His Majesty's 
 Dominions, and in every place where His Majesty has jurisdiction, 
 have all such jurisdiction as the High Court of Admiralty possessed 
 when acting as a prize court, and generally have jurisdiction to 
 determine all questions as to the validity of the capture of a ship or 
 goods, the legality of the destruction of a captured ship or goods, 
 
 268
 
 APPENDIX E 269 
 
 and as to the payment of compensation in respect of such a capture 
 or destruction. 
 
 (2) Subject to rules of court, all causes and matters within the 
 jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court shall be assigned to 
 the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the Court. 
 
 2. The High Court as a prize court shall have power to enforce 
 any order or decree of a prize court in a British possession, and any 
 order of the Supreme Prize Court constituted under this Act in a 
 prize appeal. 
 
 Prize Courts in British Possessions. 
 
 3. His Majesty may, by commission addressed to the Admiralty, 
 empower the Admiralty to authorise, and the Admiralty may there- 
 upon by warrant authorise, either a Vice-Admiralty court or a 
 Colonial Court of Admiralty, within the meaning of the Colonial 
 Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to act as a prize court in a British 
 possession, or may in like manner establish a Vice-Admiralty court 
 for the purpose of so acting; and any court so authorized shall, 
 subject to the terms of the warrant from the Admiralty, have all 
 such jurisdiction as is by this Act conferred on the High Court as a 
 prize court. 
 
 4. — (1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from His 
 Majesty the King or the Admiralty for the purpose of commissioning 
 a prize court at any place in a British possession may, notwithstand- 
 ing the existence of peace, be issued at any time, with a direction 
 that the court shall act only upon such proclamation as herein-after 
 mentioned being made in the possession. 
 
 (2) Where any such commission, warrant, or instructions have 
 been issued, then, subject to instructions from His Majesty the 
 Vice- Admiral of such possession may, when satisfied by information 
 from a Secretary of State or otherwise that war has broken out 
 between His Majesty and any foreign State, proclaim that war has 
 so broken out, and thereupon the said commission, warrant, and 
 instructions shall take efi'ect as if the same had been issued after the 
 breaking out of such war and such foreign State were named 
 therein. 
 
 (3) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions may be 
 revoked or altered from time to time. 
 
 5. Every prize court in a British possession shall enforce within 
 its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the High Court and of any 
 other prize court in prize causes, and all orders of the Supreme 
 Prize Court constituted under this Act in prize appeals, 
 
 6. — (1) His Majesty in Council may, with the concurrence of the 
 Treasury, grant to the judge of any prize court in a British possession, 
 other than a Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the
 
 270 APPENDICES 
 
 Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, remuneration, at a rate not 
 exceeding five hundred pounds a year, payable out of money provided 
 by Parliament, subject to such regulations as seem meet. 
 
 (2) A judge to whom remuneration is so granted shall not be 
 entitled to any further emolument, arising from fees or otherwise, in 
 respect of prize business transacted in his court. 
 
 (3) An account of all such fees shall be kept by the registrar of 
 the court, and the amount thereof shall be carried to and form part 
 of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 
 
 7. The registrar of every prize court in a British possession shall, 
 on the first day of January and first day of July in every year, make 
 out a return (in such form as the Admiralty from time to time 
 direct) of all cases adjudged in the court since the last half-yearly 
 return, and shall with all convenient speed send the same to the 
 Admiralty registrar of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiraltj' Division 
 of the High Court, who shall keep the same in the Admiralty 
 registry of that Division, and who shall, as soon as conveniently may 
 be, send a copy of the returns of each half year to the Admiralty, 
 and the Admiralty shall lay the same before both Houses of Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 8. If any Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the 
 Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is authorised under this Act 
 or otherwise to act as a prize court, all fees arising in respect of prize 
 business transacted in the court shall be fixed, collected, and applied 
 in like manner as the fees arising in respect of the Admiralty busi- 
 ness of the court under the first mentioned Act. 
 
 Appeals. 
 
 9. — (1) Any appeal from the High Court when acting as a prize 
 court, or from a prize court in a British possession, shall lie only to 
 a court (to be called the Supreme Prize Court) consisting of such 
 members for the time being of the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
 Council as may be nominated by His Majesty for that purpose. 
 
 (2) The Supreme Prize Court shall be a court of record with 
 power to take evidence on oath, and the seal of the court shall be 
 such as the Lord Chancellor may from time to time direct. 
 
 (3) Every appeal to the Supreme Prize Court shall be heard 
 before not less than three members of the court sitting together. 
 
 (4) The registrar and other officers for the time being of the 
 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall be registrar and 
 officers of the Supreme Prize Court. 
 
 10. — (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Prize Court from 
 any order or decree of a prize court, as of right in case of a final 
 decree, and in other cases with the leave of the court making the 
 order or decree or of the Supreme Prize Court.
 
 APPENDIX E 271 
 
 (2) Every appeal shall be made in such manner and form and 
 subject to such conditions and regulations (including regulations 
 as to fees, costs, charges, and expenses) as may for the time being be 
 directed by Order in Council. 
 
 11. The Supreme Prize Court shall have jurisdiction to hear 
 and determine any such appeal, and may therein exercise all such 
 powers as are under this Act vested in the High Court, and all such 
 powers as were wont to be exercised by the Commissioners of 
 Appeal or by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in prize 
 causes. 
 
 Rules of Cotirt. 
 
 12. — His Majesty in Council may make rules of court for regulat- 
 ing, subject to the provisions of this Act, the procedure and practice 
 of the Supreme Prize Court and of the prize courts within the 
 meaning of this Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers 
 thereof, and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees 
 to be taken by the officers of the courts, and the costs, charges, and 
 expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein. 
 
 Officers of Prize Courts. 
 
 13. It shall not be lawful for any registrar, marshal, or other 
 officer of the Supreme Prize Court or of any other prize court, 
 directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as 
 advocate, proctor, solicitor, or agent, or otherwise, in any prize 
 appeal or cause. 
 
 14. The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, shall apply to 
 any action, prosecution, or other proceeding against any person for 
 any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this 
 Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution 
 of this Act whether commenced in the United Kingdom or elsewhere 
 within His Majesty's dominions. 
 
 Contimiance of Proceedings. 
 
 15. A court duly authorised to act as a prize court during any 
 war shall after the conclusion of the war continue so to act in 
 relation to, and finally dispose of, all matters and things which arose 
 during the war, including all penalties, liabilities, and forfeitures 
 incurred during the war. 
 
 Paet II. 
 
 Pkoceduke in Prize Causes. 
 
 16. Where a ship (not being a ship of war) is taken as prize, and 
 brought into port within the jurisdiction of a prize court, she shall 
 forthwith be delivered up to the marshal of the court, or, if there is 
 no such marshal, to the principal officer of customs at the port, and 
 shall remain in his custody, subject to the orders of the court.
 
 272 APPENDICES 
 
 17.— (1) The captors shall in all cases, with all practicable speed, 
 bring the ship papers into the registry of the court. 
 
 (2) The officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the 
 capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture 
 and saw the ship papers delivered up or found on board, shall make 
 oath that they are brought in as they were taken, without fraud, 
 addition, subduction, or alteration, or else shall account on oath to 
 the satisfaction of the court for the absence or altered condition of 
 the ship papers or any of them. 
 
 (3) "Where no ship papers are delivered up or found on board the 
 captured ship, the officer in command, or one of the chief officers of 
 the capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the 
 capture, shaU make oath to that effect. 
 
 18. The captors shall also, unless the court otherwise directs, 
 with all practicable speed after the captured ship is brought into 
 port, bring a convenient number of the principal persons belonging 
 to the captured ship before the judge of the court or some person 
 authorized in this behalf, by whom they shall be examined on oath. 
 
 19. The court may, if it thinks fit, at any time after a captured 
 ship has been appraised direct that the ship be delivered up to the 
 claimant on his giving security to the satisfaction of the court to pay 
 to the captors the appraised value thereof in case of condemnation. 
 
 20. The court may at any time, if it thinks fit, on account of the 
 condition of the captured ship, or on the application of a claimant, or 
 on or after condemnation, order that the captured ship be appraised 
 (if not already appraised), and be sold. 
 
 21. A\Tiere a ship has been taken as prize, a prize court may 
 award compensation in respect of the capture notwithstanding that 
 the ship has been released, whether before or after the institution of 
 any proceedings in the court in relation to the ship. 
 
 22. — (1) The provisions of this Part of this Act relating to ships 
 shall extend and apply, with the necessary adaptations, to goods 
 taken as prize. 
 
 (2) The provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect 
 subject to any rules of court dealing with the subject matter 
 thereof. 
 
 Paet III. 
 
 International Prize Court. 
 
 23. — (1) In the event of an International Prize Court being 
 constituted in accordance with the said Convention or with any 
 Convention amending the same (hereinafter referred to as the 
 International Prize Court), it shall be lawful for His Majesty from 
 time to time to appoint a judge and deputy judge of the court.
 
 APPENDIX E 273 
 
 (2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed by His 
 Majesty a judge or deputy judge of the court unless he has been, 
 at or before the time of his appointment, the holder, for a period of 
 not less than two years, of some one or more of the offices described 
 as high judicial offices by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as 
 amended by any subsequent enactment. 
 
 24. Any sums reqim'ed /or the ^?ay7ne7i< of any contribution 
 towards the general expenses of the International Prize Court pay- 
 able by His Majesty under the said Convention shall be charged on 
 and paid out of the Consolidated Fund and the growing proceeds 
 thereof. 
 
 25. In cases to which this Part of this Act applies an appeal 
 from the Supreme Prize Court shall lie to the International Prize 
 Court. 
 
 26. If in any case to which this Part of this Act applies final 
 judgment is not given by the prize court, or on appeal, by the 
 Supreme Prize Court, within two years from the date of the capture, 
 the case may be transferred to the International Prize Court. 
 
 27. His Majesty in Council may make rules regulating the 
 manner in which appeals and transfers under this Part of this Act 
 may be made and with respect to all such matters (including fees, 
 costs, charges, and expenses) as appear to His Majesty to be 
 necessary for the purpose of such appeals and transfers, or to be 
 incidental thereto or consequential thereon. 
 
 28. The High Court and every prize court in a British Pos- 
 session shall enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees 
 of the International Prize Court in appeals and cases transferred 
 to the court under this Part of this Act. 
 
 29. This Part of this Act shall apply only to such cases and 
 during such period as may for the time being be directed by Order 
 in Council, and His Majesty may by the same or any other Order 
 in Council apply this Part of this Act subject to such conditions, 
 exceptions and qualifications as may be deemed expedient. 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 PiiizE Salvage and Prize Bounty. 
 
 Prize Salvage. 
 
 30. Where any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's 
 subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, is or are retaken 
 from the enemy by any of His Majesty's ships of war, the same shall 
 be restored by decree of a prize court to the owner, on his paying 
 as prize salvage one eighth part of the value of the prize to be 
 decreed and ascertained by the court, or such sum not exceeding 
 
 S
 
 274 APPENDICES 
 
 one eighth part of the estimated value of the prize as may be agreed 
 on between the owner and the re-captors, and approved by order 
 of the court : 
 
 Provided that — 
 
 (a) where the re-capture is made under circumstances of special 
 difficulty or danger, the prize court may, if it thinks fit, 
 award to the re-captors as prize salvage a larger part than 
 one eighth part, but not exceeding in any case one fourth 
 part, of the value of the prize ; and 
 (6) where a ship after being so taken is set forth or used by 
 any of His Majesty's enemies as a ship of war this 
 provision for restitution shall not apply, and the ship 
 shall be adjudicated on as in other cases of prize. 
 
 31. — (1) Where a ship belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects, 
 after being taken as prize by the enemy, is retaken from the enemy 
 by any of His Majesty's ships of war, she may, with the consent of 
 the re-captors, prosecute her voyage, and it shall not be necessary 
 for the re-captors to proceed to adjudication till her return to a port 
 of His Majesty's dominions. 
 
 (2) The master or owner, or his agent, may, with the consent of 
 the re-captors, unload and dispose of the goods on board the ship 
 before adjudication. 
 
 (3) If the ship does not, within six months, return to a port of 
 His Majesty's dominions, the re-captors may nevertheless institute 
 proceedings against the ship or goods in the High Court, or in any 
 prize court in a British possession, and the court may thereupon 
 award prize salvage as aforesaid to the re-captors, and may enforce 
 payment thereof, either by warrant of arrest against the ship or 
 goods, or in the same manner as a judgment of the court in which 
 the proceedings are instituted may be enforced. 
 
 Prize Bounty. 
 
 32. If, in relation to any war, His Majesty is pleased to declare, 
 by proclamation or Order in Council, his intention to grant prize 
 bounty to the officers and crews of his ships of war, then such of the 
 officers and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of war as are 
 actually present at the taking or destroying of any armed ship of 
 any of His Majesty's enemies shall be entitled to have distributed 
 among them as prize bounty a sum calculated at such rates and in 
 such manner as may be specified in the proclamation or Order in 
 Council. 
 
 33. — (1) A prize court shall make a decree declaring the title of 
 the officers and crew of His Majesty's ship to the prize bounty, and 
 stating the amount thereof. 
 
 (2) The decree shall be subject to appeal as other decrees of the 
 court.
 
 APPENDIX E 275 
 
 Part V. 
 
 Special Cases of Jurisdiction. 
 
 34. Where, in an expedition of any of His Majesty's naval or 
 naval and military forces against a fortress or possession on land 
 goods belonging to the state of the enemy, or to a public trading 
 company of the enemy exercising powers of government, are taken 
 in the fortress or possession, or a ship is taken in waters defended by 
 or belonging to the fortress or possession, a prize court shall have 
 jurisdiction as to the goods or ships so taken, and any goods 
 taken on board the ship, as in case of prize. 
 
 35. Where any ship or goods is or are taken by any of His 
 Majesty's naval or naval and military forces while acting in con- 
 junction with any forces of any of His Majesty's allies, a prize court 
 shall have jurisdiction as to the same as in case of prize, and shall 
 have power, after condemnation, to apportion the due share of the 
 proceeds to His Majesty's ally, the proportionate amount and the 
 disposition of which share shall be such as may from time to time be 
 agreed between His Majesty and His Majesty's ally. 
 
 36. — (1) In any case where a petition of right under the Petitions 
 of Right Act, 1860, is presented and the subject-matter of the 
 petition or any material part thereof arises out of the exercise of any 
 belligerent right on behalf of the Crown, or would be cognisable in 
 a prize court within His Majesty's dominions if the same were a 
 matter in dispute between private persons, the petition may, if the 
 subject thinks fit, be intituled in the High Court as a prize court. 
 
 (2) Any petition of right under the last-mentioned Act, whether 
 intituled in the High Court or not, may be prosecuted in that Court 
 if the Lord Chancellor thinks fit so to direct. 
 
 (3) The provisions of this Act relative to appeal, and to the 
 making of orders for regulating the procedure and practice of the 
 High Court as a prize court, shall extend to the case of any such 
 petition of right intituled or directed to be prosecuted in that 
 Court ; and, subject thereto, all the provisions of the Petitions of 
 Right Act, 1860, shall apply with such adaptations as may be 
 necessary in the case of any such petition of right ; and for the pur- 
 poses of this section the terms " court " and "judge " in that Act shall 
 respectively be understood to include the High Court as a prize court 
 and the judges thereof, and other terms shall have the respective 
 meanings given to them in that Act. 
 
 Part VI. 
 
 Offences. 
 
 37. A prize court, on proof of any offence against the law of 
 nations, or against this Act, or any Act relating to naval discipline,
 
 276 APPENDICES 
 
 or against any Order in Council or royal proclamation, or of any 
 breach of His Majesty's instructions relating to prize, or of any act 
 of disobedience to the orders of the Admiralty, or to the command 
 of a superior officer, committed by the captors in relation to any ship 
 or goods taken as prize, or in relation to any person on board any 
 such ship, may, on condemnation, reserve the prize to His Majesty's 
 disposal, notwithstanding any grant that may have been made by 
 His Majesty in favour of captors. 
 
 38. If any person wilfully and corruptly swears, declares, or 
 affirms falsely in any prize cause or appeal, or in any proceeding 
 under this Act, or in respect of any matter required by this Act to 
 be verified on oath, or suborns any other person to do so, he shall be 
 deemed guilty of perjury, or of subornation of perjury (as the case 
 may be), and shall be liable to be punished accordingly. 
 
 39. If the master or other person having the command of any 
 British ship under the convoy of any of His Majesty's ships of war, 
 wilfully disobeys any lawful signal, instruction, or command of the 
 commander of the convoy, or without leave deserts the convoy, he 
 shall be liable to be proceeded against in the High Court at the suit 
 of His Majesty in His office of Admiralty, and upon conviction to be 
 fined, in the discretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding five 
 hundred pounds, and to suffer imprisonment for such time, not 
 exceeding one year, as the Court may adjudge. 
 
 pakt vn. 
 
 MiSCELLAKEOUS PkOVISIONS. 
 
 Ransom. 
 
 40. — (1) His Majesty in Council may, in relation to any war, 
 make such orders as. may seem expedient according to circumstances 
 for prohibiting or allo"wing, wholly or in certain cases or subject to 
 any conditions or regulations or otherwise as may from time to time 
 seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any contract or 
 agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods belonging to any 
 of His Majesty's subjects, and taken as prize by any of His Majesty's 
 enemies. 
 
 (2) Any contract or agreement entered into, and any bill, bond, 
 or other security given for ransom of any ship or goods, shall be 
 under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court 
 (subject to appeal to the Supreme Prize Court), and if entered 
 into or given in contravention of any such order in Council 
 shall be deemed to have been entered into or given for an illegal 
 consideration. 
 
 (3) If any person ransoms or enters into any contract or agree- 
 ment for ransoming any ship or goods, in contravention of any such
 
 APPENDIX E 277 
 
 Order in Council, he shall for every such offence be liable to be 
 proceeded against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in 
 His office of Admiralty, and on conviction to be fined, in the dis- 
 cretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds. 
 
 Customs Duties and Regulations. 
 
 41.— (1) All ships and goods taken as prize and brought into a 
 port of His Majesty's dominions shall be liable to and be charged 
 with the same rates and charges and duties of customs as under any 
 Act relating to the customs in force at the port may be chargeable 
 on other ships and goods of the like description, 
 
 (2) All goods brought in as prize which would on the voluntary 
 importation thereof be liable to forfeiture, or subject to any restric- 
 tion, under the laws relating to the customs, shall be deemed to be 
 so liable and subject, unless the Customs authority see fit to 
 authorise the sale or delivery thereof for home use or exportation, 
 unconditionally or subject to such conditions and regulations as 
 they may direct. 
 
 42. Where any ship or goods taken as prize is or are brought into 
 a port of His Majesty's dominions, the master or other person in 
 charge or command of the ship which has been taken or in which 
 the goods are brought shall, on arrival at such port, bring to at the 
 proper place of discharge, and shall, when required by any officer of 
 customs, deliver an account in writing under his hand concerning 
 such ship and goods, giving such particulars relating thereto as may 
 be in his power, and shall truly answer all questions concerning 
 such ship or goods asked by any such officer, and in default shall 
 forfeit a sum not exceeding one hundred pounds, such forfeiture to 
 be enforced as forfeitures for offences against the laws relating to 
 the customs in force at the port are enforced, and every such ship 
 shall be liable to such searches as other ships are liable to, and the 
 officers of the customs may freely go on board such ship and bring 
 to the King's or other warehouse any goods on board the same, 
 subject, nevertheless, to such regulations in respect of ships of war 
 belonging to His Majesty as shall from time to time be issued by 
 His Majesty. 
 
 43. Goods taken as prize may be sold either for home consump- 
 tion or for exportation ; and if in the former case the proceeds 
 thereof, after payment of duties of customs, are insufficient to satisfy 
 the just and reasonable claims thereon, the Customs authority may 
 remit the whole or such part of the said duties as they see fit. 
 
 Capture by Ship other than a Ship of War. 
 
 44. Any ship or goods taken as prize by any of the officers and 
 crew of a ship other than a ship of war of His Majesty shall, on 
 condemnation, belong to His Majesty in His office of Admiralty.
 
 278 APPENDICES 
 
 Supplemental. 
 
 45. Nothing in this Act shall— 
 
 (1) give to the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of 
 
 war any right or claim in or to any ship or goods taken as 
 prize or the proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this 
 Act that such officers and crews shall continue to take 
 only such interest (if any) in the proceeds of prizes as 
 may be from time to time granted to them by the Crown ; 
 or 
 
 (2) affect the operation of any existing treaty or convention 
 
 with any foreign power ; or 
 
 (3) take away or abridge the power of the Crown to enter into 
 
 any treaty or convention with any foreign power contain- 
 ing any stipulation that may seem meet concerning any 
 matter to which this Act relates ; or 
 
 (4) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as 
 
 expressly provided by this Act, any right, power, or 
 prerogative of His Majesty the King in right of His 
 Crown, or in right of His office of Admiralty, or any right 
 or power of the Admiralty ; or 
 
 (5) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as 
 
 expressly provided by this Act, the jurisdiction or 
 authority of a prize court to take cognizance of and 
 judicially proceed upon any capture, seizure, prize, or 
 reprisal of any ship or goods, and to hear and determine 
 the same, and, according to the course of Admiralty and 
 the law of nations, to adjudge and condemn any ship or 
 goods, or any other jurisdiction or authority of or 
 exercisable by a prize court. 
 46,_(1) His Majesty in Council may from time to time make 
 such Orders in Council as seem meet for the better execution of this 
 
 Act. 
 
 (2) Every Order in Council under this Act shall be notified in 
 the London Gazette, and shall be laid before both Houses 
 of Parliament within thirty days after the making thereof, 
 if Parliament is then sitting, and, if not, then Avithin 
 thirty days after the next meeting of Parliament, and 
 shall have effect as if enacted in this Act. 
 
 47. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires— 
 The expression "the High Court" means the High Court of 
 
 Justice in England : 
 The expression "any of His Majesty's ships of war" includes 
 
 any of His Majesty's vessels of war, and any hired armed 
 
 ship or vessel in His Majesty's service : 
 The expression " officers and crew " includes flag officers, com-
 
 APPENDIX E 279 
 
 manders, and otlier officers, engineers, seamen, marines, 
 
 soldiers, and others on board any of His Majesty's ships 
 
 of war : 
 The expression " ship " includes vessel and boat, with the tackle, 
 
 furniture, and apparel of the ship, vessel, or boat : 
 The expression " ship papers " includes all books, papers, and 
 
 other documents and writings delivered up or found on 
 
 board a captured ship, and. where certified copies only of 
 
 any papers are delivered to the captors, includes such 
 
 copies : 
 The expression " goods " includes all such things as are by the 
 
 course of Admiralty and law of nations the subject of 
 
 adjudication as prize (other than ships) : 
 The expression " Customs authority " means the Commissioners or 
 
 other authority having control of the administration of 
 
 the law relating to customs. 
 
 48.— (1) This Act may be cited as the Naval Prize Act 1910. 
 
 (2) The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule to 
 this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the 
 third column of that Schedule. 
 
 SCHEDULES. 
 
 FIRST SCHEDULE. 
 
 Convention relative to the Establishment of an 
 International Prize Court. 
 
 Part I.— General Provisions. 
 
 Article 1.— The validity of the capture of a merchant ship or its 
 cargo is decided before prize courts in accordance with the present 
 Convention when neutral or enemy property is involved. 
 
 Article 2.— Jurisdiction in matters of prize is exercised in the 
 first instance by the prize courts of the belligerent captor. 
 
 The judgments of these courts are pronounced in public or are 
 officially notified to parties concerned who are neutrals or enemies. 
 
 Article 3.— The judgments of national prize courts may be brought 
 before the International Prize Court — 
 
 (1) When the judgment of the national prize courts affects the 
 
 property of a neutral power or individual ; 
 
 (2) When the judgment affects enemy property and relates to— 
 
 (a) cargo on board a neutral ship ; 
 
 (6) an enemy ship captured in the territorial waters of 
 a neutral power, when that power has not made the 
 capture the subject of a diplomatic claim ;
 
 280 APPENDICES 
 
 (c) a claim based upon the allegation that the seizure 
 has been eflfected in violation, either of a conventional 
 stipulation in force between the belligerent powers, or of 
 an enactment issued by the belligerent captor. 
 
 The appeal against the judgment of the national court can be 
 based on the ground that the judgment was wrong either in fact 
 or in law. 
 
 Article 4. — An appeal may be brought — 
 
 (1) by a neutral power, if the judgment of the national tribunals 
 
 affects its property or the property of its subjects or 
 citizens (Article 3 (1)), or if the capture of an enemy 
 vessel is alleged to have taken place in the territorial 
 waters of that power (Article 3 (2) (6) ) ; 
 
 (2) by a neutral individual, if the judgment of the national court 
 
 affects his property (Article 3 (1) ), subject, however, to 
 the reservation that the power to which he belongs may 
 forbid him to bring the case before the court, or may 
 itself undertake the proceedings in his place ; 
 
 (3) by an individual subject or citizen of an enemy power, if the 
 
 judgment of the national court affects his property in the 
 cases referred to in Article 3 (2), except that mentioned 
 in paragraph (6). 
 
 Article 5. — An appeal may also be brought on the same conditions 
 as in the preceding article, by persons belonging either to neutral 
 states or to the enemy, deriving their rights from and entitled to 
 represent an individual qualified to appeal, and who have taken part 
 in the proceedings before the national court. Persons so entitled 
 may appeal separately to the extent of their interest. 
 
 The same principle applies in the case of persons belonging 
 either to neutral states or to the enemy, who derive their rights 
 from and are entitled to represent a neutral power the property of 
 which was the subject of the decision. 
 
 Article 6. — When, in accordance vaih. the above Article 3, the 
 international court has jurisdiction, the national courts cannot deal 
 with a case in more than two instances. The municipal law of the 
 belligerent captor shall decide whether the case may be brought 
 before the International Court after judgment has been given in 
 first instance or only after an appeal. 
 
 If the national courts fail to give final judgment within two 
 years from the date of capture, the case may be carried direct to 
 the International Court. 
 
 Article 7. — If a question of law to be decided is covered by a 
 treaty in force between the belligerent captor and a power which is 
 itself, or the subject or citizen of which is, a party to the proceedings, 
 the court is governed by the provisions of the said treaty.
 
 APPENDIX E 281 
 
 In the absence of such provisions, the court shall apply the rules 
 of international law. If no generally recognised rule exists, the 
 court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles 
 of justice and equity. 
 
 The above provisions apply equally to questions relating to the 
 order and mode of proof. 
 
 If, in acccordance with Article 3 (2) (c), the ground of appeal is 
 the violation of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor, the 
 court shall enforce the enactment. 
 
 The court may disregard failure to comply vnth the procedure 
 laid down in the legislation of the belligerent captor, when it is of 
 opinion that the consequences of complying therewith are unjust and 
 inequitable. 
 
 Article 8. — If the court pronounces the capture of the vessel or 
 cargo to be valid, they shall be disposed of in accordance with the 
 laws of the belligerent captor. 
 
 If it pronounces the capture to be null, the court shall order 
 restitution of the vessel or cargo, and shall fix, if there is occasion, 
 the amount of the damages. If the vessel or cargo have been sold 
 or destroyed, the court shall determine the compensation to be given 
 to the owner on this account. 
 
 If the national prize court pronounced the capture to be null, 
 the court can only be asked to decide as to the damages. 
 
 Article 9. — The contracting powers undertake to submit in good 
 faith to the decisions of the International Prize Court, and to carry 
 them out with the least possible delay. 
 
 Paet n.— Constitution op the Inteenational Prize Court. 
 
 Article 10. — The International Prize Court is composed of 
 judges and deputy judges, who will be appointed by the con- 
 tracting powers, and must all be jurists of known proficiency in 
 questions of international maritime law, and of the highest moral 
 reputation. 
 
 The appointment of these judges and deputy judges shall be 
 made within six months after the ratification of the present 
 Convention. 
 
 Article 11. — The judges and deputy judges are appointed for a 
 period of six years, reckoned from the date on which the notification 
 of their appointment is received by the administrative council 
 established by the Convention for the pacific settlement of inter- 
 national disputes of the 29th July, 1899. Their appointments can 
 be renewed. 
 
 Should one of the judges or deputy judges die or resign, the same 
 procedure is followed in filling the vacancy as was followed in
 
 282 APPENDICES 
 
 appointing him. In this case, the appointment is made for a fresh 
 period of six years. 
 
 Article 12. — The Judges of the International Prize Court are all 
 equal in rank and have precedence according to the date on which 
 the notification of their appointment Avas received (Article 11, 
 paragraph 1), and if they sit by rota (Article 15, paragraph 2), 
 according to the date on which they entered upon their duties, 
 "When the date is the same, the senior in age takes precedence. 
 
 The deputy judges when acting are in the same position as the 
 judges. They rank, however, after them. 
 
 Article 13. — The judges enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities 
 in the performance of their duties and when outside their own 
 country. 
 
 Before taking their seat, the judges must take an oath, or make 
 a solemn affirmation before the administrative council, to discharge 
 their duties impartially and conscientiously. 
 
 Article 14. — The court is composed of fifteen judges ; nine judges 
 constitute a quorum. 
 
 A judge who is absent or prevented from sitting is replaced by 
 the deputy judge. 
 
 Article 15. — The judges appointed by the following contracting 
 powers : Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, 
 France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Kussia, are always 
 summoned to sit. 
 
 The judges and deputy judges appointed by the other contracting 
 powers sit by rota as shown in the table annexed to the present 
 convention ; their duties may be performed successively by the 
 same person. The same judge may be appointed by several of the 
 said powers. 
 
 Article 16. — If a belligerent power has, according to the rota, no 
 judge sitting in the court, it may ask that the judge appointed by it 
 should take part in the settlement of all cases arising from the war. 
 Lots shall then be drawn as to which of the judges entitled to sit 
 according to the rota shall withdraw. This arrangement does not 
 affect the judge appointed by the other belligerent. 
 
 Article 17. — No judge may sit who has been a party in any way 
 whatever to the sentence pronounced by the national courts, or has 
 taken part in the case as counsel or advocate for one of the parties. 
 
 No judge or deputy judge may, during his tenure of office, appear 
 as agent or advocate before the International Prize Court, nor act 
 for one of the parties in any capacity whatever. 
 
 Article 18. — The belligerent captor is entitled to appoint a naval 
 officer of high rank to sit as assessor, but with no voice in the 
 decision. A neutral power which is a party to the proceedings, or 
 the subject or citizen of which is a party, has the same right of
 
 APPENDIX E 283 
 
 appointment; if in applying this last provision more than ono 
 power is concerned, they must agree among themselves, if necessary 
 by lot, on the officer to be appointed. 
 
 Article 19, — The court elects its president and vice-president by 
 an absolute majority of the votes cast. After two ballots, the 
 election is made by a bare majority, and, in case the votes are equal, 
 by lot. 
 
 Article 20. — The judges of the International Prize Court are 
 entitled to travelling allowances in accordance with the regulations 
 in force in their own country, and in addition receive, while the 
 court is sitting or while they are carrying out duties conferred upon 
 them by the court, a sum of 100 Netherland florins per diem. 
 
 These payments are included in the general expenses of the 
 court dealt with in Article 47, and are paid through the inter- 
 national bureau established by the Convention of the 29th July, 
 1899. 
 
 The judges may not receive from their own Government or from 
 that of any other power any remuneration in their capacity of 
 members of the court. 
 
 Article 21. — The International Prize Court sits at The Hague 
 and may not, except in circumstances beyond its control, be trans- 
 ferred elsewhere without the consent of the belligerents. 
 
 Article 22. — The Administrative Council fulfils the same 
 functions with regard to the International Prize Court as with 
 regard to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but only representa- 
 tives of contracting powers shall be members of it. 
 
 Article 23.— The International Bureau acts as a registry to the 
 International Prize Court and shall place its offices and stalf at the 
 disposal of the Court. It has the custody of the archives and 
 carries out the administrative work. 
 
 The Secretary-General of the International Bureau acts as 
 registrar. 
 
 The necessary secretaries to assist the registrar, translators and 
 shorthand writers are appointed and sworn in by the Court. 
 
 Article 24. — The Court determines which language it shall use 
 and the languages the employment of which shall be authorised 
 before it. 
 
 The official language, however, of the national courts which have 
 had cognisance of the case may always bo employed before the 
 Court. 
 
 Article 25. — Powers which are concerned in a case may appoint 
 special agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and the 
 Court. They may also engage counsel or advocates to defend their 
 rights and interests.
 
 284 APPENDICES 
 
 Article 26. — A private person concerned in a case will be repre- 
 sented before the Court by an attorney, who must be either an 
 advocate qualified to plead before a Court of Appeal or a High 
 Court of one of the contracting states, or a la^vyer practising before 
 a similar court, or lastly, a professor of law at one of the higher 
 teaching centres of those countries. 
 
 Article 27. — For the service of all notices, in particular on the 
 parties, witnesses, or experts, the Court may apply direct to the 
 Government of the state on the territory of which the service is to 
 be carried out. The same principle applies in the case of steps being 
 taken to procure evidence. 
 
 Requests for this purpose are to be executed so far as the means 
 at the disposal of the power applied to under its municipal law, 
 allow. They cannot be rejected unless the power in question con- 
 siders them calculated to impair its sovereign rights or its safety. 
 If the request is complied with, the fees charged must only comprise 
 the expenses actually incurred. 
 
 The Court is equally entitled to act through the power within the 
 territory of which it is meeting. 
 
 Notices to be given to parties in the place where the Court sits 
 may be served through the International Bureau. 
 
 Part III. — Procedure in the International Prize Court. 
 
 Article 28. — An appeal to the International Prize Court is 
 entered by means of a written declaration made in the national 
 Court which has already dealt with the case or addressed to the 
 International Bureau ; in the latter case the appeal may be entered 
 by telegram. 
 
 The period within which the appeal must be entered is fixed at 
 one hundred and twenty days, counting from the day the decision is 
 delivered or notified (Article 2, paragraph 2). 
 
 Article 29.— If the notice of appeal is entered in the national 
 Court, such Court, without considering the question whether the 
 appeal was entered in due time, will transmit within seven days the 
 record of the case to the International Bureau. 
 
 If the notice of appeal is sent to the International Bureau, the 
 Bureau will immediately inform the national Court, when possible 
 by telegraph. The latter will transmit the record as provided in the 
 preceding paragraph. 
 
 When the appeal is brought by a neutral individual the Inter- 
 national Bureau will immediately inform by telegraph the appellant's 
 Government, in order to enable it to avail itself of the rights given 
 by the second paragraph of Article 4. 
 
 Article 30. — In the case provided for in Article 6, paragraph 2, 
 the notice of appeal can be addressed to the International Bureau
 
 APPENDIX E 286 
 
 only. It must be entered within thirty days of the expiry of the 
 period of two years. 
 
 Article 31. — If the appellant does not enter his appeal within the 
 period laid down in Articles 28 or 30, it shall be rejected without 
 discussion. 
 
 Provided that if he can show that he was prevented from so 
 doing by circumstances beyond his control, and that the ajjpeal was 
 entered within sixty days after such circumstances had ceased to 
 operate, the Court may, after hearing the respondent, grant relief 
 from the effect of the above provision. 
 
 Article 32. — If the appeal has been entered in time, a certified 
 copy of the notice of appeal is forthwith officially transmitted by the 
 Court to the respondent. 
 
 Article 33. — If, in addition to the parties who are before the 
 Court, there are other parties concerned who are entitled to appeal, 
 or if, in the case referred to in Article 29, paragraph 3, the Govern- 
 ment which has received notice of an appeal has not announced its 
 decision, the Court, before dealing with the case, will await the 
 expiry of the period laid down in Articles 28 or 30. 
 
 Article 34. — The procedure before the International Court 
 comprises two distinct phases : the written pleadings and oral 
 discussions. 
 
 The written pleadings consist of the deposit and exchange of 
 cases, counter-cases, and, if necessary, of replies, of which the order 
 is fixed by the Court, as also the periods within which they must be 
 delivered. The parties annex thereto all papers and documents of 
 Avhich they intend to make use. 
 
 A certified copy of every document produced by one party must 
 be communicated to the other party through the medium of the 
 Court. 
 
 Article 35. — After the close of the pleadings, a public sitting is 
 held on a day fixed by the Court. 
 
 At this sitting the parties state their view of the case both as to 
 the law and as to the facts. 
 
 The Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, suspend the 
 speeches of counsel, either at the request of one of the parties, or on 
 their own initiative, in order that supplementary evidence may be 
 obtained. 
 
 Article 36. — The International Court may order the supplemen- 
 tary evidence to be taken either in the manner provided by Article 
 27, or before itself, or one or more of the members of the Court, pro- 
 vided that this can be done without resort to compulsion or 
 intimidation. 
 
 If steps are to be taken for the purpose of obtaining evidence by
 
 286 APPENDICES 
 
 members of the Court outside the territory where it is sitting, the 
 consent of the foreign Government must be obtained. 
 
 Article 37. — The parties receive notice to attend every stage of 
 the proceedings and receive certified copies of the minutes. 
 
 Article 3S. — The discussions are under the direction of the pre- 
 sident or vice-president, or, in case they are absent or cannot act, of 
 the senior judge present. 
 
 The judge appointed by a belligerent party may not preside. 
 
 Article 39. — The discussions take place in public, subject to the 
 right of a Government which is a party to the case to demand that 
 they be held in private. 
 
 They are recorded in minutes. These minutes are signed by the 
 president and registrar, and are the only authentic record. 
 
 Article 40. — If a party does not appear, despite the fact that he 
 has been duly cited, or if a party fails to comply with some step 
 within the period fixed by the Court, the case proceeds without that 
 party, and the Court gives judgment in accordance with the material 
 at its disposal. 
 
 Article 41. — The Court officially notifies to the parties judgments 
 or orders made in their absence. 
 
 Article 42. — The Court takes into consideration, in arriving at 
 its decision all the facts, evidence, and verbal statements. 
 
 Article 43. — The Court considers its decisions in private and the 
 proceedings remain secret. 
 
 All questions are decided by a majority of the judges present. If 
 the number of judges is even and equally divided, the vote of the 
 junior judge in the order of precedence laid down in Article 12, 
 paragraph 1, is not counted. 
 
 Article 44. — The judgment of the Court must state the reasons 
 on which it is based. It recites the names of the judges taking 
 part in it, and also of the accessors, if any; it is signed by the 
 president and registrar. 
 
 Article 45. — The judgment is delivered in open court, the parties 
 concerned being present or duly summoned to attend ; the judgment 
 is officially communicated to the parties. 
 
 When this communication has been made, the Court transmits 
 to the National Prize Court the record of the case, together with 
 copies of the various decisions arrived at and of the minutes of the 
 proceedings. 
 
 Article 46. — Each party pays its own costs. 
 
 The party against whom the Court decides bears, in addition, the 
 costs of the trial, and also pays one per cent, of the value of the
 
 APPENDIX E 287 
 
 subject-matter of the case as a contribution to the general expenses 
 of the International Court. The amount of these payments is fixed 
 in the judgment of the Court. 
 
 If the appeal is brought by an individual, he will furnish the 
 International Bureau with security to an amount fixed by the Court, 
 for the purpose of guaranteeing the eventual fulfilment of the two 
 obligations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The Court is 
 entitled to postpone the opening of the proceedings until the security 
 has been furnished. 
 
 Article 47. — The general expenses of the International Prize 
 Court are borne by the contracting powers in proportion to their 
 share in the composition of the Court as laid down in Article 15 and 
 in the annexed table. The appointment of deputy judges does not 
 involve any contribution. 
 
 The administrative council applies to the powers for the funds 
 requisite for the working of the Court. 
 
 Article 48. — When the Court is not sitting, the duties conferred 
 upon it by Article 32, Article 34, paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 35, 
 paragraph 1, and Article 46, paragraph 3, are discharged by a 
 delegation of three judges appointed by the Court. This delegation 
 decides by a majority of votes. 
 
 Article 49. — The Court itself draws up its own rules of procedure, 
 which must be communicated to the contracting powers. 
 
 It will meet to draw up these rules within a year of the ratifica- 
 cation of the present Convention. 
 
 Article 50. — The Court may propose modifications in the pro- 
 visions of the present Convention concerning procedure. These 
 proposals are communicated, through the medium of the Netherland 
 Government, to the contracting powers, which will confer together 
 as to the measures to be adopted. 
 
 Part IV.— Final Pkovisions. 
 
 Article 51. — The present Convention does not apply as of right 
 except when the belligerent powers are all parties to the Convention. 
 
 It is further understood that an appeal to the International 
 Prize Court can only be brought by a contracting power or the 
 subject or citizen of a contracting power. 
 
 An appeal is only admitted under Article 5 when both the owner 
 and the person entitled to represent him are equally contracting 
 powers or the subjects or citizens of contracting powers. 
 
 Article 52.— The present Convention shall be ratified and the 
 ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague as soon as all the
 
 288 APPENDICES 
 
 powers mentioned in Article 15 and in the table annexed are in a 
 position to do so. 
 
 The deposit of the ratifications shall take place, in any case, on 
 the thirtieth June, nineteen hundred and nine, if the powers which 
 are ready to ratify furnish nine judges and nine deputy judges to 
 the Court, duly qualified to constitute a court. If not, the deposit 
 shall be postponed until this condition is fulfilled. 
 
 A minute of the deposit of the ratifications shall be drawn 
 up, of which a certified copy shall be forwarded, through the 
 diplomatic channel, to each of the powers referred to in the first 
 paragraph. 
 
 Article 53. — The powers referred to in Article 15 and in the table 
 annexed are entitled to sign the present Convention up to the date 
 of the deposit of the ratifications contemplated in paragraph 2 of 
 the preceding Article. 
 
 After this deposit, they can at any time accede to it, purely and 
 simply. A power wishing to accede, notifies its intention in writing 
 to the Netherland Government, transmitting to it at the same time 
 the act of accession, which shall be deposited in the archives of the 
 said Government. The latter shall send, through the diplomatic 
 channel, a certified copy of the notification and of the act of acces- 
 sion to all the powers, referred to in the preceding paragraph, 
 informing them of the date on which it has received the notification. 
 
 ^o 
 
 Article 54. — The present Convention shall come into force six 
 months from the deposit of the ratifications contemplated in Article 
 52, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
 
 The accessions shall take effect sixty days after the notification 
 of such accession has been received by the Xetherland Government, 
 or as soon as possible on the expiry of the period contemplated in 
 the preceding paragraph. 
 
 The International Court shall, however, have jurisdiction to deal 
 with prize cases decided by the National Courts at any time after 
 the deposit of the ratifications or of the receipt of the notification 
 of the accessions. In such cases, the period fixed in Article 28, 
 paragraph 2, shall only be reckoned from the date when the Conven- 
 tion comes into force as regards a power which has ratified or 
 acceded. 
 
 Article 55. — The present Convention shall endure for twelve 
 years from the date at which it comes into force, as determined 
 by Article 54, paragraph 1, even for the powers acceding to it 
 subsequently. 
 
 There shall be tacit prolongation for the term of six years unless 
 this Convention is denounced. 
 
 Denunciation must be notified in writing, one year at least before 
 the expiry of each of the periods mentioned in the two preceding
 
 APPENDIX E 289 
 
 paragraphs, to the Netherland Government, which will inform all 
 the other contracting powers. 
 
 The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing 
 power. The Convention shall remain in force in the case of the other 
 contracting powers, provided that their share in the appointment of 
 judges be still sufficient to allow the work of the Court to be dis- 
 charged by nine judges and nine deputy judges. 
 
 Article 5C. — In case the present Convention is not in operation as 
 regards all the powers referred to in Article 15 and the annexed 
 table, the Administrative Council shall draw up a list on the lines of 
 that Article and table of the judges and deputy judges through 
 whom the contracting powers share in the composition of the Court. 
 The times allotted by the said table to judges who are summoned to 
 sit in rota will be redistributed between the different years of the 
 six-year period in such a way that, as far as possible, the number of 
 the judges of the Court in each year shall be the same. If the 
 number of deputy judges is greater than that of the judges, the 
 number of the latter can be completed by deputy judges chosen by 
 lot among those powers which do not nominate a judge. 
 
 The list drawn up in this way by the Administrative Council 
 shall be notified to the contracting powers. It shall be revised when 
 the number of these powers is modified as the result of accessions or 
 denunciations. 
 
 The change resulting from an accession is not made until the 
 first January after the date on which the accession takes effect, 
 unless the acceding power is a belligerent power, in which case it 
 can demand to be at once represented in the Court, the provision of 
 Article 16 being, moreover, applicable if necessary. 
 
 When the total number of judges is less than eleven, seven judges 
 form a quorum. 
 
 Article 57. — Two years before the expiry of each period referred 
 to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 55, any contracting power may 
 demand a modification of the provisions of Article 15 and of the 
 annexed table, as regards its participation in the composition of the 
 Court. The demand shall be addressed to the Administrative 
 Council, which will examine it and submit to all the powers pro- 
 posals as to the measures to be adopted. The powers shall inform 
 the Administrative Council of their decision with the least possible 
 delay. The result should be communicated at once, and one year 
 and thirty days at least before the expiry of the said period of two 
 years, to the power which made the demand. 
 
 In such circumstances, the modifications adopted by the powers 
 shall come into force from the commencement of the fresh period.
 
 290 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 AnTiex to Article 15. 
 
 Distribution of Judges and Deputy Judges by Countries for 
 each Year of the period of Six Years. 
 
 Judges. 
 
 Deputy Judges. 
 
 Judges. 
 
 Deputy Judgei. 
 
 First Yeae. 
 
 
 Fourth Year. 
 
 1. Argentina 
 
 2. Colombia 
 
 3. Spain 
 
 4. Greece - 
 
 5. Norway - 
 
 6. Netherlands - 
 
 7. Turkey - 
 
 Paraguay. 
 
 Bolivia. 
 
 Spain. 
 
 Roumania. 
 
 Sweden. 
 
 Belgium. 
 
 Persia. 
 
 1, 
 2. 
 3. 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 7. 
 
 Brazil 
 
 China 
 
 Spain 
 
 Peru 
 
 Roumania 
 
 Sweden - 
 
 Switzerland 
 
 Guatemala. 
 
 Turkey. 
 
 Portugal 
 
 Honduras. 
 
 Greece. 
 
 Denmark. 
 
 Netherlands. 
 
 Second Year. 
 
 
 Firrn Year. 
 
 1. Argentina 
 
 2. Spain 
 
 3. Greece - 
 
 4. Norway - 
 
 5. Netherlands - 
 
 6. Turkey - 
 
 7. Uruguay 
 
 Panama. 
 
 Spain. 
 
 Roumania. 
 
 Sweden. 
 
 Belgium. 
 
 Luxemburg. 
 
 Costa Rica. 
 
 1. 
 2. 
 3. 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 7. 
 
 Belgium - 
 Bulgaria - 
 Chile 
 Denmark 
 Mexico - 
 Persia 
 Portugal - 
 
 Netherlands. 
 
 Montenegro. 
 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 Norway. 
 
 Cuba. 
 
 China. 
 
 Spain. 
 
 Third Year. 
 
 
 Sixth Year. 
 
 1. Brazil - 
 
 2. China - 
 
 3. Spain 
 
 4. Netherlands - 
 
 5. Roumania 
 
 6. Sweden - 
 
 7. Venezuela 
 
 Santo Domingo. 
 
 Turkey. 
 
 Portugal. 
 
 Switzerland. 
 
 Greece. 
 
 Denmark. 
 
 Haiti. 
 
 1. 
 2. 
 3. 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 7. 
 
 Belgium - 
 
 Chile 
 
 Denmark 
 
 Mexico - 
 
 Portugal - 
 
 Servia 
 
 Slam 
 
 Netherlands. 
 
 Salvador. 
 
 Norway. 
 
 Ecuador. 
 
 Spain. 
 
 Bulgaria. 
 
 China. 
 
 SECOND SCHEDULE. 
 
 Bession and 
 Chapter. 
 
 27 & 28 Vict 
 c 25. 
 
 54 & 55 Vict, 
 c. 53. 
 
 67 & 58 Vict 
 c. 39. 
 
 Short Title. 
 
 Extent of Repeal. 
 
 The Naval Prize Act, 1864. The whole Act 
 
 The Supreme Court of 
 Judicature Act, 1891. 
 
 The Prize Courts Act, 1894. 
 
 Section four. 
 
 The whole Act except so 
 much of section four as 
 relates to courts other 
 than prize courts.
 
 INDEX 
 
 The figures in heavier type refer to the text of the Convention. 
 
 Admiralty Reports, Robinson's, 85 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 6 
 Alabama, the, 161 
 America, United States of, war 
 with Spain, 67 
 probable effect of war with Eng- 
 land, 71, 72, 90 
 Appeal against the National Court, 
 
 280 
 
 B 
 
 Bacon, Francis, on wars, 21 
 
 Balloons, declaration as to dis- 
 charge of projectiles and ex- 
 plosives from, 123, 133 
 
 Baltica, the. Privy Council case, 67 
 
 Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, 
 states the views of Germany in 
 the Hague Conference, 13, 111, 
 117 
 
 Blackstone on the law of nations, 
 220 
 
 Blockade, rights under Declaration 
 of Paris, 15, 187, 228 
 breach of, 150 
 pacific, 188, 189 
 
 under Declaration of London, 
 189 et seq., 255 
 
 Bombardments by naval forces, 
 Convention respecting, 123, 
 129, 130, 240-242 
 
 asi 
 
 Boreel, M., and "free ship free 
 
 goods," 5 
 Bright, John, on the Declaration 
 
 of Paris, 65 
 
 C 
 
 Capture at sea, rights under 
 Declaration of Paris, 15 
 immunity of private property 
 
 from, 25 et seq. 
 effect on the enemy's carrying 
 
 trade, 54 
 restrictions under Hague Con- 
 vention, 123, 131, 243 
 under Naval Prize Bill, 277, 279- 
 281 
 Carriage. See Land, and Sea 
 Clarendon, Lord, and the Declara- 
 tion of Paris, 100 
 Cobden, Mr, on the Declaration of 
 
 Paris, 65 
 Command of the sea, meaning of, 1 
 Compensation under Declaration 
 
 of TiOndon, 266 
 Contraband, Sir Edward Grey on, 
 105, 148 
 under the Declaration of Lon- 
 don, 178, 257-262 
 absolute, 183 
 
 list of articles, 257 
 conditional, 183 
 list of articles, 258
 
 292 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Consdato del Mare, 4 
 
 Contract debts, Convention as to, 
 
 122, 124 
 Conversion. See Merchant ships 
 Convoy as giving immunity from 
 
 search, 185-187, 265 
 Cromwell, Oliver, refusal of " free 
 
 ship free goods " doctrine, 5 
 Crowe, Mr, 217 
 Custom duties and regiilations, 277 
 
 D 
 
 Declaration of London, British 
 instructions for the Naval Con- 
 ference, 141 et seq. 
 history of, 174 et seq., 207 
 blockade in time of w'ar, 255 
 contraband of war, 257-262 
 unneutral service, 262 
 destruction of neutral prizes, 263 
 enemy character, 264 
 transfer to neutral flag, 264 
 convoy, 265 
 
 resistance to search, 265 
 compensation, 265 
 Declaration of Paris, Great Britain 
 agrees to, 9 
 effect of, 10 et seq., 26, 36-39, 50, 
 65, 81, 98, 99, 228 
 Denmark, Convention with Russia, 
 
 8 
 Desart, Lord, plenipotentiary for 
 Great Britain in Xaval Con- 
 ference of London, 146, 216, 221 
 Destination of ship, proof of, 179, 
 
 260 
 Doelwj/ck, the, 180 
 Dumba, M., Austrian delegate, 174 
 Dutch, the. See Holland 
 
 E 
 
 Elizabeth, Queen, and the law of 
 nations, 21, 22 
 
 Enemy character, 264 
 
 merchant ships, status of, 233-235 
 regulation as to crews of, 246 
 property and how determined, 
 165, 201 
 "Enemy ship enemy goods," 
 
 doctrine of, 5. 99 
 England. See Great Britain 
 
 F 
 
 Flag of ship, importance of nation- 
 ality of, 202, 203 
 Food during a maritime war, varia- 
 tion of prices, 3, 62, 78, et seq,, 
 95 
 report on supply of, 62, 82-84, 91 
 Fox, Mr, on the Declaration of 
 
 Paris, 99 
 France, cost of food in war time, 
 3, 81, 95 
 refuses "free ship free goods" 
 
 doctrine, 5 
 probable effect of war with Great 
 
 Britain, 72, 90 
 and the Declaration of London, 
 200, 201 
 " Free ship free goods," doctrine 
 of, 4, 7, 8 
 accepted by Great Britain, 9 
 probable effect of, 10, 98-100 
 Fry, 8ir Edward, and the Hague 
 Conference, 104, 111, 137, 156 
 
 G 
 
 Galitzin, Prince, and the doctrine 
 
 of armed neutrality, 7 
 Geneva Convention, the, 130 
 Germany, estimate of her merchant 
 shipping, 42, 93 
 her trade, 48, 49 
 
 result of stoppage of sea-borne 
 trade, 51-63
 
 INDEX 
 
 293 
 
 Germany, probable effect of war 
 with Great Britain, 73 et 
 seq., 90 
 and awakening, 100 
 and the Hague Conference, 112, 
 
 116 
 and the laying down of mines, 
 
 117, 118 
 and the Declaration of London, 
 200, 201 
 Goudriaan, Mr Van Tets Van, 
 Dutch delegate, and the Hague 
 Conference, 121 
 Great Britain, and the law of the 
 sea, 1 et seq. 
 and the " free ship free goods " 
 
 doctrine, 5-12, 125 et seq. 
 Navigation Act, 5 
 war and trade, 21 et seq. 
 difficulty of blockading, 34, 36 
 statistics of her merchant ship- 
 ping, 42, 87-89, 91-103 
 war risks at sea, 57 et seq. 
 Food Supply Commission Re- 
 port, 61-64, 77, 82, 91 
 probable effect of war with the 
 United States, 71 
 with Spain, 72 
 with France, 72 
 with Germany, 73-76, 90 
 her sea approaches, 75 
 effect of war on prices, 78 et seq. 
 and the Hague Conference, 108 
 
 et seq. 
 and the International Prize 
 
 Court, \\2 et seq. 
 the Hague Conventions, 122 et 
 
 seq., 230-252 
 her instructions for the Naval 
 Conference of London, 141 
 et seq., 258, 254 
 the Declaration of London, 174 
 
 et seq., 255-267 
 the Naval Prize Bill, 206 et 
 
 seq., 268 et seq. 
 how far bound by the Declara- 
 tions, 216-222 
 
 Grey, Sir Edward, and the Hague 
 Conference, 103 et seq. 
 his instructions for the Naval 
 Conference of London, 141 
 et seq., 175 
 and the Naval Prize Bill, 208 
 et seq. 
 
 H 
 
 Hague Conference, 103 et seq. 
 list of states taking part in, 107 
 its Conventions, 122 et seq. 
 status of enemy merchant ships 
 at outbreak of hostilities, 
 
 283 
 
 conversion of merchant ships 
 
 into warships, 235 
 laying of submarine contact 
 
 mines, 237 
 bombardments, 240 
 right of capture, 248 
 postal correspondence, 244 
 exemptions from capture, 244 
 regulations as to captured crews, 
 
 245 
 
 rights and duties of neutral 
 powers, 246 et seq. 
 Holland, and "free ship free 
 goods" doctrine, 4, 5, 9 
 Convention with Russia, 8 
 and Germany, 74 
 Hospital ships. Convention relative 
 
 to, 130 
 Hostilities, Convention relating to 
 
 opening of, 123, 124, 231 
 Hozier, Colonel, and the naviga- 
 tion returns, 88 
 Hurst, C. J. B., and the Naval 
 Conference of London, 146, 
 217 
 
 Immunity of private property. 
 See Private property
 
 294 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Indemnity against loss from cap- 
 ture, 63, 64, 84, 85 
 Inglefield, Captain, on war risk to 
 
 property, 89 
 International Prize Court, IIZ et 
 seq., 132, 144, 221, 272 
 constitution of, 281-284, 290 
 procedure in, 284-287 
 final provisions, 287-289 
 Italy and the Declaration of 
 London, 174 
 Commission of enemy property, 
 201 
 
 Merchant ships. Convention rela- 
 tive to conversion into war- 
 ships, 128, 158, 159, 286-287 
 transfer to a neutral power of, 
 
 156, 158 
 Convention relative to status of 
 enemy, 238-285 
 Mill, John Stuart, on the Declara- 
 tion of Paris, 65, 99 
 Mines, Convention on submarine 
 contact, 116, 129, 227-240 
 
 N 
 
 Japan and the Declaration of 
 
 London, 174 
 Jurisdiction, special cases of, 275 
 
 Land carriage, cost as compared to 
 
 sea, 2, 47, 227 
 Law of nations, 21 et seq., 192 
 
 of the sea, 1 et seq., 25, 27 
 Lindsay, W. S., on effect of Declara- 
 tion of Paris, 65 
 London. See Declaration of 
 Loreburn, Lord Chancellor, on ex- 
 emption of private property 
 from capture, 27-30 
 effect of, on Great Britain, 30, 
 
 36, 41, 46, 52-54 
 the committee's report, 63 
 
 M 
 
 Maritime law, declaration respect- 
 ing, 228 
 
 M'Kenna, Mr, and the Naval Prize 
 Bill, 208 
 
 Merchant ships, statistics of, 42, 
 87-89, 91-103 
 
 Naval Conference of London, 
 British instructions for, 141 
 et seq. 
 final protocol of, 258 
 Naval Prize Bill, the, 133, 139 
 courts and offices, 268-271 
 procedure, 271 
 International Prize Court, 272, 
 
 279-287 
 Prize salvage and prize bounty, 
 
 273-274 
 special cases of jurisdiction, 275 
 ofi"ences, 275 
 ransom, 276 
 customs duties and regulations, 
 
 277 
 final provisions, 287-290 
 Navigation Act, 5 
 
 returns, 88 
 Nelson, Lord, on the Declaration of 
 
 Paris, 99 
 Ndlidow, M., Russian delegate, 
 President at the Hague Con- 
 ference, 108, 120 
 Neutrality, armed, doctrine of, 
 
 7-10, 15-20 
 Neutral powers and ships, Conven- 
 tion relating to, 127, 133, 149, 
 152, 166, 192,228, 247-252 
 under convoy, 185 
 breach of blockade, 190 
 destruction of neutral prizes, 263
 
 INDEX 
 
 295 
 
 Neutral powers and ships, transfer 
 to a neutral flag, 228, 264 
 
 Newcastle, Duke of, Secretary of 
 State, 6, 7 
 
 O 
 
 Oceanic, the cost of, 89 
 
 Offences under the Naval Prize 
 
 Bill, 275 
 Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, 146, 
 
 217 
 
 Paris. See Declaration of 
 Peace Conference. See Hague 
 Pitt, William, and " free ship free 
 
 goods " doctrine, 7, 99 
 Poland, 22 
 
 Postal correspondence of neutrals 
 or belligerents. Convention re- 
 lating to, 106, 131, 154, 155, 
 194, 244 
 Prices, History of, by Tooke, 79, 
 
 94-98 
 Private property, immunity of, 
 
 25 et seq., 106 
 Privateers, and the law of the sea, 
 16 
 under Declaration of Paris, 99, 
 
 100, 159, 200, 228 
 under the Hague Convention, 
 128, 159 
 Prize bounty, 274 
 Prize court. See International, and 
 
 Naval 
 Prize salvage, 273, 274 
 Prussia, acquires Silesia, 6 
 Convention with Russia, 8 
 and the "free ship free goods" 
 
 doctrine, 9 
 her "voluntary marine," 159 
 
 R 
 
 Railways. See Land carriage 
 Renault, M., the French plenipo- 
 tentiary, and the Naval Con- 
 ference of London, 169 
 and the Declaration of London, 
 178, 184, 187, 189, 201, 217 
 Roberts, Lord, and " free ship free 
 
 goods " doctrine, 99 
 Russia, and " free ship free goods " 
 doctrine, 7 
 conventions with other countries, 
 
 8 
 armed neutrality, 9 
 and privateering, 100 
 and the Hague Conference, 103 
 
 et seq. 
 and the Declaration of London, 
 174, 200, 201 
 
 S 
 
 Salisbury, Marquess of, his opinion 
 of the Declaration of Paris, 10 
 on "free ship free goods" 
 doctrine, 99 
 Sea, law of the, 1 et seq. 
 definition of " command of," 1 
 cost of carriage compared with 
 land, 2, 47, 227 
 Search, right of, 15, 150 
 
 resistance to, 265 
 Semmes, Captain, 76 
 Ships. See Merchant 
 Silesia acquired by Prussia, 6, 7 
 Slade, Rear- Admiral, 146 
 South African War, prices of food 
 
 in, 79 
 Spain, war with United States, 67 
 probable effect of war with Great 
 
 Britain, 72 
 and the Declaration of London, 
 174 
 Spain, Dmvnfall of, by H. W. 
 Wilson, 67
 
 296 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Stowell, Lord, on privateering, 160 Transformation of merchantmei 
 
 on test of nationality, 167 
 on contraband, 181 
 Streit, George, the Greek delegate, 
 
 116 
 Submarine. See Mines 
 Sweden, Convention \vith Russia, 
 8 
 
 T 
 
 Taub, Baron, the Russian delegate, 
 
 164, 200 
 Thomas, D. A., on cost of land and 
 
 sea carriage, 48 
 Times, The, 27 
 on the Hague Convention, 137, 
 138 
 Tooke, Mr, History of Prices, 79 et 
 
 seq., 95, 97 
 Trade, the stoppage of, in war, 2 
 
 et seq., 21 et seq. 
 Transfer of ships, 197, 228. 264 
 
 into men-of-war, 199 
 
 U 
 
 United States. See America 
 Unneutral service, 194, 262 
 
 Voluntary marine of Prussia, 159 
 
 W 
 
 War and trade, '21 et seq. 
 
 risks at sea, 57 et seq. 
 
 forecast of, 71 et' seq. 
 
 prices during, 94 et seq. 
 "WTieat. See Food 
 Wilson, H. W., Doximjall of Spain, 
 67 
 
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